DCI (MCCONE) MEMO FOR THE RECORD 01 JAN - 5 APR 1964.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 -

14 January 1963

MEMORANDÚM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretaries Gilpatric and Vance at lunch this date

Earlier in the day Secretary McNamara had advised me that

Deputy Secretary Vance would assume all responsibility of DoD/CIA

relationships, Special Group activities, etc. heretofore handled

by Gilpatric.

98

Gilpatric explained in detail the background of the formation of

NRO, the problems that we have encountered, the successes and failures

of the satellite reconnaissance effort, the need for using the special

skills of CIA and the resources of the Air Force and finally the Fubini

memorandum of January 13. He said that the plan outlined by Fubini

seemed logical, that CLA's special skills rested in imaginative

development, that once a system was developed and operating it

could be handled as

ments and schedules established and approved by USIB upon recommenda-

tion of COMOR, that he felt Air Force desire to engage in development

should be respected and they should pursue the perfection of and

ultimately the improvement of the GAMBIT, and while all this was good

he had not discussed the subject with McMillan. However he stated

that the plan provided for the utilization of the special resources of both

organizations.

98

[McCone stated that he agreed, he traced for Vance's information

the background of U-2 development, CORONA development and now

OXCART, he reviewed the "philosophical" approach to reconnaissance

traditional with the Air Force which contrasted sharply with the needs

of the intelligence community, finally that he felt that a plan such as

that covered by the Fubini memorandum was O.K, if we really adhere

to it, provided

appropriate funding and gave the whole NRO effort

proper direction at the level of SecDef (or Deputy SecDef) and DCI.

McCone raised the question of Under Secretary of the Air Force

running a line organization, expressed preference for a civilian in

the position of Under Secretary of the Air Force or Assistant Secretary

of Defense with a small staff for planning, programming, budget

review, etc., with actual physical operations of a more or less routine

nature being handled by an Air Force command. McCone pointed out

that McMillan was leaving and this would present a problem.?

All agreed the approach was reasonable, that many details had

to be worked out, no decisions were sought or made, and the subject

would be further

discussed.,

JAM/ mfb

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Reviewed briefly the North Vietnam operations (with

Secretary McNamara joining us) and I recommended that the

decision as to who would be in charge should be resolved by

the Secretary and myself, and should not be put up to the Ambas-

sador and the Country Team. We briefly reviewed for Secretary

Vance the scope of the operations since he will be dealing with

the subject regularly in the Special Group meetings in the future.

Secretary McNamara agreed, in a subsequent telephone call, to

have draft instructions prepared and coordinated with State and

the White House after securing CIA's approval.

Gilpatric explained the details of the Cuban operation to

Vance who was quite familiar with them because of his work on

the Cuban Task Force. I stated that President Johnson had ordered

all special operations withheld pending a thorough review of the

Cuban policy, and that Mr. Bundy said this review should be made

the first week in February because of his and my absence from the

city during the last two weeks of January. Vance felt this was too

late, that we should review the policy and determine the future

course at once. I said this was perfectly satisfactory with me.:

General Carter, supported by Messrs. Helms and FitzGerald, knew

all about it, were thoroughly familiar with my views and were

empowered to discuss policy from CIA's point of view.

JAM:mcm

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6 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Luncheon, 6 February,

12:45 - 2:30 p.m.

1. General discussion of relations with the President. The

Secretary felt that he was preoccupied with many problems, such as

Congressional relations, press relations, election, etc. The Secretary

is taking more responsibility than he did under Kennedy. A great

many matters are being settled at Rusk's desk and not referred to the

White House. Rusk generally concerned over Administration management

technique, agreed that we are still in a shakedown period. He felt the

President was working very hard -- perhaps too hard, but effectiveness

and method of administering office is not yet fully developed.

2.

Cuba. After reviewing the situation I stated that I was not

at all satisfied with our policy with respect to Cuba. I was convinced

that Castro had turned the corner and would very probably grow stronger

as he improved his economic situation and gained popularity. I stated

that I felt he had passed the low point and barring unforeseen economic

or political problems would improve in his image and in his acceptance

in the future. Therefore, we could expect more provocation in Panama,

Venezuela, and practically all other Latin American States.

I said that

I was in disagreement with the paper which had been prepared by the

Crimmins Committee,which was being considered by Secretary Mann

today, because it outlined and overstated Castro's difficulties and

outlined a plan of action which would not overthrow Castro or for that

matter cause him unacceptable hardships. Furthermore, many of the

actions would give Castro a good propaganda platform. I stated that

Castro had passed the point of no return, as far as I was concerned,

and that he was conducting himself in a manner and carrying out

provocative acts which had been declared by President Kennedy,

President Johnson (when he was Vice President) and Secretary Rusk

himself as being totally unacceptable to the United States. I therefore

felt that all prohibitions and self-imposed restraints, such as the use

of American territory for training of personnel, launching of provocative

CIA HAS NO OSJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATIOM AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

29/20/98

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... Iì.

CALY

acts, etc., could be declared void. Threfore, I concluded we had one

of two courses to follow: either we move in on Castro in the most

aggressive possible way, accept attribution and destroy him by acts of

violence short of war or including war if necessary, or, as an alternative,

live with him in the hope that providence might take care of the situation.

I stated that I felt the latter was a big gamble and the prospects were

that Castro would grow stronger and as he did so he would cause

increasing trouble in all Latin American countries. In urging dynamic

action I stated that, in my opinion, we should advise Khrushchev in

advance, advise Castro in advance, and let the public know what we had

in mind.

The Secretary was passed a note that the water had been cut

off in Guantanamo. After a telephone conversation with McNamara it

was determined that an adequate water supply was on hand, more could

be supplied by ship and the 3, 000 Cuban employees in Guantanamo could

be replaced. I suggested that we refuse admittance to Guantanamo of

all Cuban employees.

.98

LACTION: NRO should immediately order continual

U-2 surveillance of the Guantanamo area

3. LPanama. Reviewed with the Secretary the clandestine reports

of February 4th and 5th, indicating Communist operations. Restated

the statement that the world opinion was thoroughly convinced that the

United States actually invaded Panama, killing Panamanians, etc.

Stated

that I could not understand the reluctance on the part of the President

and Rusk to admit participation of Castro Communists in the Panama

situation.

Rusk expressed surprise, stating that he had in a speech made

reference to this participation. I stated that the Crimmins paper was

today being modified on State Department's orders to eliminate such

references. Rusk said he hoped to get Chiari to the conference table

before Castro's participation was fully publicized. I asked if Chiari

really knew what was happening to him and read statements from the

February 5th clandestine reports.

ACTION: Rusk suggested that I explore the advantages

of briefing Chiari on the growing Communist threat to his

country. Rusk had no other suggestions.

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4. South Vietnam: Advised Rusk that I felt the situation was

most serious, the government was very fragile, that there was little

meaningful reporting from the Embassy, MACV, or the Station.

There was no evidence of Country Team operation and increased evidence

of Viet Cong activities and victories. The Secretary had no particular

program in mind.

98

5. Reviewed my discussions with the SDECE in Paris, as covered

in my memorandum of discussion with General Jacquier and Minister

Frey, revealing in detail the French attempted penetrations of U.S.

atomic energy and missile facilities and also the disappearance of

de Vosjoli.

ACTION: With respect to this the Secretary suggested we

might pick up two or three French operators and declare

them NPG. This should be explored and discussed.

98

6. Reviewed the Ghana situation briefly. Concurred in the

withdrawal of our Ambassador. Objected to the appointment of Edgar

Kaiser as a government emissary because of conflict of interest. I

pointed out that Kaiser would wish to "patch up things" because of his

contract in Ghana.. Advised Rusk that I felt the Congress or the American

public would not be happy with our commitments of $200 odd million

to the Ghana enterprise and have them tearing up the American flag

and discrediting our intentions. Rusk thought that we might tell Kaiser

that his projects were down the drain because of Nkrumah's attitude

and let him move in on Nkrumah in order to save his own enterprises.

This matter was left in a tentative status.

Rusk then raised the question of the ability of General Nkrah

to take over the government. I advised that the General, in our opinion,

was well respected in Ghana, but not inclined to accept responsibility.

ACTION: Rusk asked that I explore this prospect fully and

report to him.

7. Cyprus. The Secretary expressed concern over the danger

of placing U.S. troops in Cyprus in fear they will be singled out by

violent mobs and a serious situation would result. He asked our appraisal

of the consequences of U.S. troops joining the NATO forces and the

prospects of the dangerous situation developing.

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ACTION: We should prepare an opinion for Rusk or

this matter promptly:]

98

8. Rusk raised the question of DIA briefing reserve officers

in Congress.

He expressed great bitterness and said he was prepared

to issue an order that no State Department communications go to DIA

because he had learned that many very sensitive cables had been read

at DIA briefings to selected members of Congress. The Secretary felt

so strongly that if this practice was not stopped he would tender his

resignation.

I urged him to take no action until I had discussed the

matter at USIB because I had been concerned over the same problem

but I thought USIB was the proper facility to restrain this activity by

DIA.J

9. Discussed sensitive problem with Foreign Minister Bhutto

in Pakistan which I agreed to talk over with Critchfield and report to

the Secretary.

JAM:mcm

3/20

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