DRAFT LETTER: THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR THE VIEWS OF THE CIA ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 282
Originator: CIA
From: MOSKOWITZ. D/CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
To: BERNARD H. MARTIN. OMB
Document date: 04/13/1992
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1104-10331-1021

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Central intelligence Agency

DRAFT

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

Washington D.C. 20505

13 April 1992

Mr.

Bernard H. Martin

Assistant Director for

Legislative Reference

Office of Management and Budget

Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is in

response to your request for the views of the

Central

Intelligence Agency on Senate Joint Resolution 282, the

"Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992", and the

corresponding House Joint Resolution 454 ("the resolutions").

The Central Intelligence Agency fully supports the

fundamental premise underlying this legislation--that efforts

should be made to declassify and make available to the public

as expeditiously as possible government documents relating to

the assassination of President Kennedy. In fact,

the Director

of Central Intelligence (DCI) has recently established and

staffed a new unit within CIA responsible for review and

declassification of documents of historical interest, including

the JFK-related files, as part of the Agency's program of

increased openness.

However, several provisions of the

resolutions raise serious concerns, as outlined below, and CIA

cannot support them as currently drafted. Our comments will

focus upon specific CIA concerns; many general issues raised by

the resolutions are better addressed by the white House or the

Department of Justice.

Initially, the resolutions are focussed on "records" rather

than the information contained in them.

We are concerned that

the Agency would not have the opportunity to object to release

of CIA information contained in documents originated by

Congress or the Warren Commission.

Under the resolutions,

documents originated by these

entities can be released by the

Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

Board

without any review by the President or other Executive Branch

agencies.

Similarly, there is no mechanism that would allow

---

## Page 2

13-00000

Letter to Mr. Bernard H. Martin

the Agency to object to release of its information contained in

documents originated by other agencies or

departments.

resolutions should provide that the agencies which originate

information have the opportunity to review that information

prior to its release.

Otherwise, an anomalous situation could

be created in which documents originated by the Executive

Branch would be withheld while documents originated by Congress

containing the

same Executive branch information would be

released.

The resolutions' broad definition of "assassination

material" is also troublesome.

The resolutions define

"assassination material"

record that relates "in any

manner or degree to the assassination."

This unbounded

definition could cover a range of material beyond that which

has been traditionally associated with the JFK assassination.

This broad definition, coupled with the Review Board's powers

to request additional

information from Executive agencies, and

the fact that the Board makes the determination of what is

assassination material, could lead to a new investigation of

the assassination, rather than review of existing files for

declassification

purposes. Such

an inquiry could well stray

into sensitive areas

that are unrelated to the assassination.

The question of proper scope of the Review Board's Charter

is a difficult

one, and we do not mean to suggest that

reasonable requests for materials shouldndenied simply because

they were not made by a previous Presidential Commission or

Congressional Committee.

However, there should be a provision

whereby Board requests for additional materials that an agency

believes are unrelated to the assassination could be

appealed--perhaps to the President.

The resolutions contain no provision requiring security

clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination

Materials Review

elements. Absent security procedures and facilities that met

Executive branch standards, agencies would be unable to provide

classified assassination materials to the new body or its staff.

The resolutions provide a 30 day period for appealing

decisions by the Executive Director to release information.

This may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review

of

what could prove to be large volumes of

material at one

time--particularly where some documents may require

coordination with other agencies.

We suggest that the

2

---

## Page 3

13-00000

Letter to Mr. Bernard H. Martin

resolutions be amended to provide that agencies may file for an

automatic 30 day extension to consider whether an

appeal is

necessary before material is publicly disclosed.

We believe that the Executive Director of the Review Board

should have substantive expertise with respect to protection of

intelligence or law enforcement information readily available

so that the initial decisions on whether to release documents

Under the resolutions, neither

Board members nor the Executive Director may be government

employees or have any background in the assassination

investigations.

Because of this restriction, these individuals

are unlikely to have any familiarity with the documents at

issue and may well have no expertise in intelligence or law

enforcement equities.

While the Executive Director may request

detailees from Executive agencies and may consult with

originating agencies, there is no requirement that he do so.

An Executive branch agency with knowledge of the information at

stake and potential harms (or lack thereof) likely to result

from release of the information may have no involvement in the

process until after an initial determination has been made to

disclose the information.

Requiring that the staff informally

consult with agencies originating the information or mandating

detailees from the affected agencies (within reasonable

limits--particularly if details are to be nonreimbursable)

would ensure that relevant expertise is brought to bear as part

of the initial decision-making process.

The Board's broad powers to subpoena witnesses and

documents and hold hearings under the resolutions

conflict with the DCI's statutory duty to protect sensitive

intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

We believe the Board should be reguired to consult with the DCI

on issues like whether a hearing should be closed, or whether a

subpoena could be narrowed, if intelligence equities are

involved. Disagreements could be appealed to the President.

Section 6 of the resolutions, which outlines the grounds

for postponement of public release of a document; may not be

adequate to protect Agency interests in certain

respects. For

example there is no provision

for postponing release of

Executive privilege/deliberative process, attorney-client, or

attorney work-product information.

Such privileges could

always be waived in the public interest, but as the resolutions

currently drafted, they would be wholly unavailable.

3

---

## Page 4

13-00000

Letter to Mr. Bernard H. Martin

While such privileges are not likely to arise with respect to

factual information directly related to the JFK assassination,

they could well arise with respect to other

documents swept up

in the resolutions' broad definition of

assassination

materials.

We also believe that "intelligence agent" under

section 6(1)(A) of the resolutions should be defined with

reference to the Intelligence Identities Protection Act so

as

to protect the identity of covert employees of the Agency.

The Congressional oversight mechanism established for Board

activities also may conflict

with

the existing rules for

oversight of intelligence activities.

The resolutions provide

for congressional oversight of the Review Board and its

activities by the "appropriate" House committee and the SSCI,

although we have reason to believe that the resolutions

may be

amended to remove the SSCI from oversight responsibilities.

Under the resolutions, the committees would obtain copies of

all material that were not released. Thus, the resolutions are

likely to involve non-intelligence oversight committees in the

review of sensitive CIA information that would not be released

to the public.

Congress enacted the Intelligence Oversight Act

of 1980 in part to reduce the number of congressional

committees with access to sensitive CIA information.

Expanding

the number of committees with access to our information would

be of concern, especially if the Review Board seeks new

documents minimally-related to the assassination.

Finally, each resolution specifically provides that it does

not

affect FOIA actions.

We would suggest that the resolution

explicitly stay responses to FOIA requests related to

assassination materials while the Review Board is conducting

its business.

The resolutions clearly have a more liberal

standards for public disclosure of information than does the

FOIA, and the public is likely to get assassination materials

more expeditiously if agencies are permitted to focus their

resources on supporting the work of the Review Board.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the

assassination materials resolutions.

Please contact

Vicki Pepper of my staff at (703) 482-6126 with any

questions or comments concerning the Agency's position

on these resolutions.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Director of Congressional Affairs

4

---