MEMO: STATEMENT CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT BOLIVIA IN 1967 AND ROLE IN THE CAPTURE OF ERNESTO 'CHE' GUEVARA DE LA SERNA.
Originator: CIA
From: LA/EICO
To: DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL
Document date: 06/03/1975
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEGRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL

75-2016

3 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Deputy Inspector General

Statement by Benton H. Mizones concerning.

his assignment Bolivia in 1967 and his role

in the capture of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA.

de la Serna

REFERENCE:

Memo dated 29 May 1975

1:

The undersigned met with Benton H. Mizones, contract

employee,.

on 2 and 3 June to obtain his story about his

assignment to Bolivia in 1967. This query is based upon ref

interview,

during which Mizores mentioned that he had re-

transmitted an order from Colonel Joaquin Zenteno Anaya,

Commander of the 8th Division of the Bolivian Army, to a

Bolivian sergeant, which resulted in the execution of Ernesto

"Che" GUEVARA de la Serna, Cuban leader of the guerrillas then

operating in Bolivia.

2.

Mizones said that his assignment came about after an

interview held in Miami in June or July

of 1901; at which tIme

he was a case officer working for the Miami office. He had

been selected for the job interview because of his para-

military training

and experience. He was asked if he would

agree to serve with (Gustavo Villolbo, a fellow Cuban. He

accepted. He was told that he was to go to Bolivia with

(Villolbo where they would be engaged in training intelligence

teams for the Ind Ranger Battalion of the Eighth Division of

the Bolivian Army. He was also told that he and Villolbo

would be assigned to the 2nd Ranger Battalion as advisors

and would be based in the town of Esperanza.

While in Miami,

he and Villolbo were given briefings about the political and

guerrilla situation in Bolivia, and he was given a refresher

course in communications. Mizones and Villolbo) were told

that there were strong indications that Guevara was leading

the guerrillas.

Among the instructions given them was a clear

one that in

the event that the Bolivian Army captured Guevara,

they should do everything possible "to keep him alive."

3.

They were introduced to their future case officer

in Washington, who was to be in liaison with the Bolivian

forces in Santa Cruz.

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4.

Prior to their departure, both Mizones and Villolbo

were issued false U.S. re-entry permits in the names of

Felix Ramos and leduardo Gonzalez, respectively. . These were

received in New York City just prior to their departure on

30 July for La Paz on a Braniff Airline flight.

Their case

officer had preceded them and met them on 31 July at 7 a.m.

at the La Paz airport.

Mizones believes that Bolivian visas

were stamped in their re-entry permits.

5.

The case officer and another American took them to

meet President Barrientos, to whom they were introduced as

experts on guerrilla warfare. He issued each a personal card

in which were handwritten his instructions to all civilian

and military officials that they be given full support. At

ten that morning, they met General Ovando, Commander-In-Chief

of the Bolivian Armed Forces.

(It wasn't until about a month

later that Mizones met (the COS) in Santa Cruz.) While in

La Paz, no new instructions were issued to them about their

mission. After about a week there, they were flown to Santa

•Cruz de la Sierra for a few days and introduced to Colonel

Joaquin Zenteno Anaya, Commander of the Eighth Division.

Zenteno arranged for Captain "Poppie" Shelton; the American

officer in charge of the military mission training the 2nd

Ranger Battalion,

to come to Santa Cruz to meet Mizones and:

Viliolbo. They were also introduced to Major Arnaldo Saucedo,

G-2 of the Eighth Division.. After 3 or 4 days in Santa Cruz,

Mizones and Villolbo) went to La Esperanza, where they were

quartered at the Bolivian officers' compound. In La Esperanza

they met Major Ayiroa, the Commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion,

and Captain Gari Prado.

6. Prior to their departure from La Paz, Mizones anc

Villolbo) were issued Bolivian uniforms and credentials a:

captains in the Bolivian Army. Nevertheless, they did not

receive Bolivian Army insignia. Later, Mizones was given by

Major Saucedo a Bolivian tri-color cap-insignia which he wore

(escarapela). Mizones and Villolbo were issued Smith and Wesson

1 double-action automatic pistols. During their activities as in-

structors and advisors they assumed the role of Bolivian

officers,

although they were known as foreign advisors to a

number of Bolivian officers.. (Mizones said that he learned later

that the American Ambassador had prohibited anyone other than

he and Villolbo from becoming involved in the anti-guerrilla

activities in the field.)

7. Despite their apparent status as Bolivian officers,

Mizones said that they never were given orders by higher-

ranking Bolivian officers (One exception to this rule was the

order which Colonel Zenteno issued to Mizones on the day of

Guevara's execution, if Mizones story is to be believed.)

00.. a

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8.

Mizones was assigned to Santa Cruz and Villolbo was

assigned to La Esperanza, where the latter conducted most of

the intelligence training.. As time went by, Mizones' own

duties gravitated to becoming basically those of an advisor.

He said

that his case officer was aware of and approved of this

development. Among the things which Mizones and Villolbo

attempted to accomplish was the preservation of the lives of.

captured guerrillas, for the collection of intelligence about

the guerrilla's locations, as well as for humanitarian reasons.

Mizones said that he: saved the life of Jose Castillo Chavez,

traveling for that purpose to Vallegrande from Santa Cruz,

where he spoke briefly to Castillo at the Nuestra Senora de

Malta Hospital. At this time Mizones learned of the intent

of Colonel Selich of the Rangers, to have the prisoner executed.

•Mizones prevailed on Major Saucedo and General La Fuente to

take his side.

The prisoner was flown to Vallegrande where

Mizones covered all medical costs and carried out a two-week

interrogation.

The resulting twenty-page interrogation report

provided the Bolivians with a complete concept of the

guerrilla's strategy, which turned out to be the key to

Guevara's capture, according to Mizones.

This report was

attributed by the Bolivians to be from their own people.

9.

This important development was followed by an

encounter in late September between a unit led by a Lt. Galindo

and the remnants of the guerrillas. During this action, a

Cuban

lieutenant named Miguel; the Bolivian Coco Peredo; and a

Bolivian physician named Jose Gutierrez Ardaya were killed.

Mizones travelled by jeep to Pucara, where the bodies

wEre

located, and through the information he had learned from

Castillo, he was able to establish that the men were from

Guevara's forward element.

Upon his return to santa cruz,

Mizones advised Colonel Zenteno that the 2nd Ranger Battallion

should be immediately deployed, with the remaining

of their training cancelled.

Zenteno accepted thistwo weeks

advice

continued in-his advisory role, suggesting areas for troop

deployment as well as the deployment of the intelligence.

teams:

On the 8th of October, contact was established with

Guevara's remaining forces.

(At this time Mizones was in

Vallegrande and Villolbo in Esperanza.) On the 8th, Major

Saucedo reported over the radio that "the chief" had been

captured.

Mizones then flew over the area in a PT-6 carrying

with him

a PRC-10 radio with which he was able to communicate

With the Bolivian forces. He then confirmed that Guevara was

"the chief" who had been captured. He returned to Vallegrande

where he told Col. Zenteno that Guevara had been wounded and

captured.

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10.

That day Major Selich was sent to Higueras to

interrogate the guerrilla prisoners and assembled the

captured documents: Since Colonel Zenteno was planning to fly

by helicopter to Higueras on the 9th, Mizonas asked him on

the evening of the sth if he could accompany him to interrogate

Guevara.

Zenteno consulted his staff and agreed. (The

helicopter had room only for a pilot and two passengers.)

Mizones prepared a 100-word message to

the La Paz Station)

in code reporting Guevara's capture and asking that an Embassy

representative be sent to the area to prevail upon the

Bolivians to spare Guevara's life, since he did not believe

that he could succeed in doing so. This message was prepared

for the scheduled 10 a.m. transmission of 9 October, and

was not transmitted to the relay point in Asuncion, Paraguay,

until about 10:30 a.m., after Mizones arrived in Higueras

and

set up his radio transmitter an

RS-48•

Zenteno, Mizones and the pilot, Nino de Guzman, set

out by helicopter

from Vallegrande at 7:15 a.m. on the 9th,

and arrived in Higueras at about 7:40 a.m. Mizones accompanied

Zenteno and Major Ayiroa when they visited Guevara in the

school room which was his improvised jail. Guevara would

not answer Lenteno when spoken to. He was bound, hand and foot,

and had a leg wound.

Mizones and Major Selich then reviewed the captured

documents and Mizones obtained permission from Selich to

photograph all the papers, including Guevara's diary, and also

Selich's permission to retain the original accommodation

addresses found.

13.

While Zenteno and all the other Bolivian officers

(with the exception of a Lieutenant Perez) were outside of

the village attending to other military affairs, Mizones :

remained in Higueras as the highest ranking "Bolivian officer".

In this capacity he answered a call received on the military

field telephone and answered as Captain (Ramos.

He was given

the code numbers 500 and 600 as orders which were to be

implemented by command of "higher authorities".

He said that

the connection was not clear and he could not recognize the

voice but it could have been

that of Major Saucedo.

case, Mizones said that since it was a line only available

to the military he was confident that it was order re-

transmitted through military channels. He said that he knew

that 500 referred to Guevara, 600 to the word execute and

700 to the preservation of Guevarra's life.

These simple

codes had been identified to him previously.

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14. Upon Zenteno's return, Mizones told him of the

message and Zenteno took it as

an authentic order and made

no effort to have it confirmed.

Mizones asked if Guevara's

life could be preserved since he had these instructions.

Zenteno replied that his own position would be placed in

jeopardy if he did not comply. Mizones asked him to make.

the attempt anyway.

(Mizones

believes that Zenteno had

already resigned himself to the inevitability of Guevara's

execution.). Zenteno: said that he was in sympathy with Mizones!

wish but that it was not in his power to reverse the order.

He told Mizones that he was well aware of the treatment which

Fidel had meted out to Cubans and told him to execute Guevara

in any manner which he night choose.

Zenteno said that he

had to leave for Vallegrande at 10:00 a.m. and would send

a helicopter back to pick up Guevara's'body" at 7 p.m., and

"as a friend", asked that the body be ready. Mizones

reiterated his request that the order be appealed and Zenteno

agreed to make the attempt, and said he would advise if he

were successful.

15. Failing a counter-manding of the order and as the

senior "Bolivian officer" left in Higueras, Mizones said he

was left with the implementation of the execution. After

Zenteno left, Mizones was able to talk to Guevara, who

identified Mizones either as a Puerto Rican or a Cuban

working for U.S. intelligence.

He said he made this judgment

on the basis of the questions asked and on Mizones' accent.

While Mizones was with Guevara, Shots were fired in adjoining

rooms and Mizones later determined that these involved the

execution of two other prisoners.

Recognizing these shots

for what they were, nevertheless, Guevara blanched when

Mizones confirmed that he too would be executed; although

later composing himself.

16. After leaving Guevara, Mizones told a sergeant of

the order to execute Guevara and entrusted the mission to him.

He was told to fire below the head. The order was given to

the sergeant at 1:00 p.m. and Mizones heard the shots fired

at Guevara at 1:20 p.m.

At 2:00 p.M., the helicopter returned

to Higueras. A Father Shiller performed the last rites and

Guevara's remains were strapped to one of the helicopter's

skids and Mizones accompanied them to Vallegrande, where

they landed at 2:30 p.m.

Mizones said that he lost himself

quickly in the crowd gathered at

the airport, but that

(Villolbo took charge of the remains and vas photographed.

Mizones said that the title of the photograph, which appeared

in the press, gave an incorrect identification of (Villolbo,

the name Mizones used, (Ramos.

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17.

Mizones said he reported the executions to Major

Saucedo

and the Chief of Operations, a Major Gutierrez,

and then was taken back to identify the bodies of the three

executed

guerrillas.

They then drove to Santa Cruz with the

documents, films and equipment and then flew to La Paz,

where Mizones contacted his case officer.

He was taken to

a home where the DCOS? and other Americans were briefed by

him. Everything which he had been able to retain was turned

to Washington.

Mizones then flew back to Santa. Cruz where a C-130 ordered

by General Porter, CINCSOUTH, was to pick him and Villolbo›

up for a flight to the Canal

This plane arrived with

eat see to santa could he and villane

The U.S. Mission aircraft,

were flown back to La Paz.

After overnighting there, another

C-130 carried them to Panama where Mizones was asked to

relate his story to General Porter.

After 2 weeks in Panama,

Mizones and Villolbo were documented as GS-l6s so that they

could board a over-booked military flight to Charlotte,

South Carolina. After their arrival there, they journeyed

to Miami, where Mizones briefed General Cushman.

(Mizones

believes

that in both high-level briefings he mentioned his

own personal role in the execution of Guevara.)

bals ickens

Charles B.

Dickens

LA/EICO

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