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176-10038-10035)

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10035

RECORD SERIES : The Personal Papers of Gordon Chase

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Meeting With the President-December 19, 1963

DATE : 12/27/1963

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Gordon Chase, Box 1: Chronological file 8/63-12/63, Box 1. Box 8.

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December 27, 1963

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M.

SUBJECT! Cuba

Others Present: Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson Deputy

Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Martin;

John Crimmine: Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary

Vance; General Wheeler; Secrotary Dillon Acting

Director General Caster; Richard Helms; Desmond

Fitzgerald; Deputy Director Wilson: McGeorge Bundy:

William Moyera: George Reedy; Gordon Chase.

The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about

some of the haste Cuban Janues. Essentially, the diecuasson described where

we have been alace January, 1963, where we are now, and where wo can go.

(An outline which was prepared for the discussdon de attached. )

1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. Fliagerald

and a general discusalon on CA's present covert program and on the U.S..

Goverament's econemia denial program. Essentially, this part of the dis-

cussion covered 6 areas.

(8) Me. Fllagerald described covert intelligence aettvittes directed

against Castro' regime, including the numbers, charactertatice, and geo-

graphic apread of CIA Rogers within Cuba.

(b) Mr. Fitagerald deseribed ClA-controlled radio programd and other

propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low

sios, simpla sabotage and other forme of active and passive resetance, and

to stimulate tonaton within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

He noted the recent increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba.

(c) Mr. Fitzgerald sald that CLA has worked with State and other agencies

to deny to Cuba commodittea from the Free World which are critical to the

economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able

to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know thas

equipment vitally needed in Cube, some of U.S. origto, reaches the teland via

Canada and Great Britain.

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The group agreed that this in not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our

allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have

always had a different view of Free World/Bloe trade than we have had.

Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that

there are still things we can do. First,. Mr. Crimmins noted that we could

consider ways in which the new amendment to the Fortign Assistance Author-

ization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry

commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program.

Second, Mi. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive iterns

would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on

December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World gov

ernments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a

detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities in-

volved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his

forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Horne and Pearson.

(d) Mr. Fitzgerald spoke about ClA's program to identify, seek out, and

establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the

power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which

would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular up-

rising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling

such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's

power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the

one hand, we have been able to make an importent penetration in the Cuban

army.. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not

yet willing to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because

Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups.

The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba.

Mr. Fitzgerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on

which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to sal-

fer beavy losses at Castro's hands.

(e) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally

mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating readstance and

hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack

on a major-target - the Matanzas pover plant. Mr. Fitagerald noted that thia

would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as econom

ically; the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Admin-

istration is not giving up the fight for Cuba.

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But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the

chances of total success (e. g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than

50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are

only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will

undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point

was weak we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third,

such an attaeis will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this

regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Caatro,

presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able

to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might

slow up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba.

Fifth, Ambassador Thompson

where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot

of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big

Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more

• Soviet aid.

General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want

to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air: it should be noted that there

have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out

that an air atike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flighte.

In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an

attach on Matanzas.

It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzae power

plant at this time, primarily because of ita high probability of failure and be-

cause of the Soviet dimension. However. it was agreed, in principle, that low-

risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to

develop an air airike capability.

(1) Mr. Fitzgerald described CIA's program in aiding two automous

Cuban exile groups, whick will be operating from outside the U.S. One group.

which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and

Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is some

what to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both

of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send

teams inside Caba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dis

sidents. Mr. Fitzgerald added that there are some disadvantages in these oper.

attons -- the groupa aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CIA control..

But there are advantages too - they operate from outside Untted States territory

and we will have relatively little troubll denying U,S. association with these groups.

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Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. Fitzgerald agreed, that these groups operate a

long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from

their raids.

2. Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspecte of the current

Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief. )

(a) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength an the island, Mr.

Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no

reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so

far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added

that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about

mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the

Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals

are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly.

(b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing. our anti-subversion efforts. The key to

the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American

countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel

between Latin America and Cuba are also Important.

(c) Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal

contacts we have established with Castro himself. The inftiative te on Castro'a

part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are

prepared to listen to what Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S. /

Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations®

3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we e

cas take in the future to make life difficult for Castro.

(a) Air attacke, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory

as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acte

which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they at lend to

raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with

more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they

could precipitate the shooting down of a U-2.

(b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures

- e.g. close porte and deny U.S. -financed commodities to lines engaged in

Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through

past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free

World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves.

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•5.

We should recognise that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's

shipping noeds even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba.

(c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in

the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past. He noted

that in his November 18 apeech, President Kennedy made two pointe about Cuba

-- the first was designed to encourage anti- Castro elements within Cuba to

revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in

the Hemisphere.

(d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures againet

Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be & high priority target.

NOTE: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discueston

about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmine eald that resettlement remains our

basic polley. It is true that the esdles feel that the pressure for their resetile.

ment le intense. In fact, it le no more intense now than it haa been for some time.

5. On the President'e return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduead the aubject of

the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arme cache.

(a) Mi. Helme gave a graphio presentation of the link between the arma

cache and a plot to upset the electione in Caracas.

(b) Mr. Martin explained the statue of the OAS investigation of the arme

cache.

The evidence la convincing in showing that the arma were from Cuba.

The OAS investigating team le still working on its report. Hopefully, It will be

able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report

should be ready by about January 10.

(c) Mr. Bandy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS

as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the

surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices. we may want

to pust for a system whichlinvolves search and selaure of Cuban vessela on the

high seas; this implies the possible use of force.. Or we can puah for a ayatem

Involving the search and seisure of Cuban vessels in territorial watere: thie

evades the fasue of force. Mr. Bundy anted that it le atill too early to low

how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force agalart Castro. We

have put out feelera.

6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictione on Americans

who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of stadents want to

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- 6=

go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department

recommende that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably

be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be

embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department je tentatively opposed

to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin

American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose

restrictions on travel to Cuba; i1 we lift out own restrictions, pur position will

be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the

Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.

Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel

restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution.

Gordon Chase

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