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FOr SECHLI

Vol. 2: OF 3.

Ohe luited Statra: Gruate

NATIONAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure: Subject

to: Criminal Sanctions

12778

Report of Proceedinger.

3295

Hearing, held before

Senate: Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday: March 9, 1976

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned, over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E:

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003₴

(202) 544-6000

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FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

Tuesday,

March 9, 1976

- --

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Goverhmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met!

pursuant to recess, at 7:46 o'cloc)

p.m., in Roon S-407, the

Capitol, Senator

Walter D. Huddly

ton

presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Hart of

Colorado and Mathias.

Also present:

Williạm G. Miller, Staff Director; Charlas

Kirbow, Joseph diGenova, Elizabeth Culbreath, David Aaron,

Elliot Maxwell, Al Quanbeck, Linn Davis, Rick Inderfurth, Greg

Treverton, William Bader and Bob Kelley, Professional Staff

Members.

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EVENING SESSION

17:46

p.m.)

Senator Huddleston.

Okay, the Committee will come to order.

Did we develop any new language for No. 2 on page 49,

MI. Aaron?

Mr. Aaron.

We have

not. I think that the recommendation

concerning the police and internal security forces, the

real alternatives which

engage in systematic violation of

human rights or the cruel

or unusual punishment is just a

very difficult concept to

apply to what police do as oppo

to what courts and governments do, and as I think other p

noted here, it does raise

important questions about our own

internal standards which

are

something of sort of debated.

I think we would be

delighted to try to tie it back to

the Constitution, but maybe

it is - we are just tired, but

we cannot come up with

creative phrase that will do the job

for us.

Mrs Kirbow. May we have say tomorrow afternoon's meeting?

Senator Huddleston.

All right, we'll pass that and what,

go-to

Mr.

Bader. Go to 3.

Mr. Aaron. I take it that the concept is fine. We will work

on the language, and we will come back to that. We will also

have to review all of the various changes we have made.

We

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have made a number of changes as we have gone along. We will

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want to review them specifically at some point. But I take

it that there is instructions

from the Committee to try to

work out something that there is ayreement on the sub-

stance, we are trying to find a way to tie it in to wur own

standards of justice:

Senator Hart of Colorado. Your first proposal wasn't

bad, the

Senator Huddleston.

Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I would like to propose an

additional item on that No. 2, on publications here in

country, a prohibition against publication --

Mr. Bader. Covert publication?

That is in the next section, Senator.

Senator Hart of calorado. .

It is in the next section?

Mr. Inderfurth. Where is that, Bill?

Is that under the media recommendations?

MI. Kirbow. It was

originally in this position. It was

taken

_out and moved down.

MI. Inderfurth. I must have overlooked it.

MAaron. It would be page 64, and there isn't a

number on it, but it's on the -- I'm sorry, it's not page

64.

Mr. Maxwell. I think that got

lost. It had been agreed

upon at the staff level.

Senator Hart of Colurado. Yes, media organization.

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Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry.

Mr. Inderfurth.

So

It must have slipped out,

we would include the --

Senator Hart of Colorado. Publication or subsidy of any

books, magazines or other publications inside the United

States.

Mr. Bader.

That's right, Senator.

Mr. Maxwell. It was clandestine or unattributed. We

thought

that - the staff level the proposal had been that those

publications that CIA put out and then identified as CIA either

funded or published by CIA employees, or the CIA as an in

tion, that it would be possible and that it would add to

overt information.

Senator Hart of Colorado. How many of those do they do?

Mr. Maxwell. They do a substantial number.

Mr. Aaron. Yes, we

just got this publication by the

CIA on Soviet military spending, which is an unclassified

attributed documen-t.

Senator Hart of Coloçado. Oh, all right, I attributed --

Mr. Maxwell. The other part is that there was a question

at leastat the stafi level as to whether you would forbid them

printing material that would be distributed overseas, propa-

ganda that would be printed here but distributed overseas.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Publication.

Mr. Maxwell. Publication and distribution, or publication

may be clearer.. That meins publication and distribution, or

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printing and distribution.

Mr, Ireverton. Why don't we

say printing and distribu-

tion, because publication isn't clear.

Senator Huddleston.

well, shouldn't that best ve left to

that next section, the media section?

MI. Kirbow. Well, you wouldn't want to have an exact

recommendation, I don't think, wouldjou, Bill?

Mr. Miller. Well, here you are talking about other typeg

of covert action, and it's

just a listing.

MI. diGenova: Your

specific point, Senator, is you

na t

want the CIA publishing

covertly written by them

in

the United States books which

and people don't know about it,

right?

So it really, doesn't

fit in here because this deals with

our actions against foreign

countries.

MI. Inderfurth. But

the point of it, if it is dropped

in here as well as in the media -

Senator Hart of Colorado. This doesn't say anything about

foreign countries. This is things to be absolutely banned,

and it

a grab bay.

Mi. diGenova. Including covert actions against ourselves.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It's a covert action grab bag

of things..

MR. Aaron: The reason that it was included subsequently

was that we wanted to liave each of the recommendations rollow

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findings in a particular area.

The findings on the whole

subject of media, its fallout, and the difficulties of control-

Ling it are in the next section.

•I don't think we feel

strongly except for the order.

Mr. Kirbow. The publication of any other publications

inside the United States is the way it originally read.

That!s

on page 52.

Mr. Inderfurth. Could we add Puerto. Rico to that?

Senator Hart of Colorado. And the Virgin Islands.

Mr. Kirbow.

"And its

territories."

Mr. diGenova. What

about genocide?

Mr. Aaron. There was

a feeling that genocide was not

something we engaged in and we didn't want to give the impli-

cation that we did, and we didn't examine cases of alleged

genocide.

Mr. diGenova. Regicide we did look at.

MI. Kirbow. sanator; you do agree that we adopt

"commonwealths and possession," so we include Guam and the rest

Mr. Kelley. The Marianas?

Aaron. No. 3 begins the statements and requirements

for the kind of review we'redommend take place, and these

proposals would involve a statutory requirement for these kinds

of reviews, and Bill, you might just speak to it.

Mr. Bader. The Senators will remember, we discussed the

issue of whether the NSC committee, the appropriate NSC comittee

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-NW 50955 DocId: 32423510 Page 10

should review

every covert action proposal, and the Committee

did agree that that was appropriate for a review of every

covert action proposal. I am sure that that is understood:

The thrust of this section is that the Committee recommends

that the review would consist of a series of steps, careful

and systematic analysis of the political premises underlying

recommended actions, a formal meeting to consider and recommend

to the President all covert action projects in which the

views and positions of the participants would be fully recarded

The intent here is

I mean, the consistence of the

recommendations is the matter of accountability.

I might go on to four, since it is really part of it

Ms. Culbreath. On my draft copy, I have 4 bracketed, but

I see it is not on the retyped.

Mr. Bader. I don't

balieve it was in dispute when we

dicussed it at the staff

level, but we certainly can flag it

because I'll go through it here.

"By statute, proposals for covert operations submitted

to the NSC Committee should show formally the concurrence or

objections for the Deputy Director of Intelligence, for the

Deputy Director of the Clandestine Service, the Assistant

Secretary of State, and the Ambassadors."

NOW in w

Mr. Kirbow. I know now why it is bracketed.

Mr. Bader. Well, ict me give you some background un

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this. It is that as far as the Deputy Director of Intelligence

that is

in the DDI, lne situation thai no obtains is that the

Deputy Director for Intelligence does have an opportunity to

express his opinion, his analytical view of proposed covert

action, but that it is not formal, and from our observation of

the process, it seemed sensible that the top of the analytical

section of the Central Intelligence Agency should be formally

recorded in the process of covert action projects.

so when they did in fact go to the 40 Committee or 1t8

successor Committee which we're now talking about! the Operar:

tions Advisory Group, that that recommendation for cover

action should formally show the concurrence or indeed, th

objections, if that be the case, of the Deputy Director for

Intelligence.-

In the process, it has been added that the formal

concurrence of objections of a number of other individuals

including the Assistait Secretary of State and the Ambassador

of the country or countries affected by the project, and then

perhaps was the issue for bracketing.

This is an attempt here to really get everybody on board

formally.

Formal concurrence we see as the best way or an

important way for those who will be responsible for these to

have formal concurrence and thereby formal responsibility.

Mr. Aaron. And to ensure that they have the access

necessasy to make the judgments and so forth.

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I might say that in

the cases that we looked at - and

correct me if I am wrong, B1ll - that at least retrospectively

we have some serious question about - of the particular

projects, and this obviously is hindsight, and hindsight is

easier than foresight:

We find that in the case of Chile, in the case of

Indonesia, in the case of - I had one other one in my mind

Angola, one or more of these individuals had serious reser

vations about the wisdom of proceeding with these activities.

In some cases they were just cut out of the process. It

the only case that we have had come before us in which th

were fully cut in but overruled was the case of Angola, but the

judgment is here.

As a routine process, the most sensitive things of this

nature, including something like Angola, does generally get

this kind of concurrerce, and the purpose here is to formalize

what is at this point a general but not necessary procedure.

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, the reason that we asked is not

because of the Ambassadors, because clearly now they operate

and report directly to the President and not to the Secretary

of State is the point someone raised the other day; but I would

like to raise the point that here, unless it has changed in

the executive order and

I just. don't recall it, the DCI is

currently responsible, and hopefully the head of the Agency will

be if it is changed, ior those things which are submitted for

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his agency. You confirm him in the Senate, you go thrcugh

all these extensive processes to make

him absolutely respon

sible, but then you dip down below him and pick up all of his

contrary or firming positions of his deputies to either bolster

or shoot down his position before the National Security

Council, and I think if you are going to have the head of an

agency, just as you have a Secretary of State, it is

ultimately his responsibility and there is no way to pass

9дi

the buck, and that it be recorded someplace internally I

think has some merit, or that the Deputies in the CIA have

formal opportunity to comment for the record within the A

But I don't see that it contributes anything whatever

except

a second guessing process, which is what was going on, I think,

in part of those agencies, within the divisions of the State

Department versus the Secretary in Angola, regarding the

Deputy for Intelligerue and Operations and everything to have

a second shot if they are unable to convince their director,

who has the responsibility for the decision.

Mr. Aaron. I don't think that is the concept exactly.

Maybe there is a misunderstanding here and it is not properly

expressed The notion here to do is what - what I think

Charles has suggested is not a bad idea; in other words,

to have a system whereby they do have a shot and they do

check off, and this is not a proposal for this all to be

handed over to the Conyross every time there is a covert

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action.. This is not a proposal to have them do this after

the DCI or the head of the Agency or his deputy or whomever

ends up with the responsibillty for covert action, day to day

of programs, but rather that in the process of preparing these

recommendations for covert actions, that these bases be touched

so that when he makes a recommendation, and when the Operations

Group sits down with a recommendation, the paper shows the

formal concurrence or disagreements generated by those particular

individuals..

That is, I think, the point.

Mr. Kirbow. well, who has the responsibillty for ru

the CIA? Clearly the Director gets blamed if it goes wrung.

29.

I don't understand, unless you just want a little checkoff

bracket on the right so that it shows in there from some

responsible person that yes, the Deputy Director for Operations

Mr. Nelson, had his input, but do you indicate by this where

it should shor formally what his position was if it differs

from the Director? Is that your intention?

Mr. Aaron. The intention is to state his position, if it

is concurrence.

Mr. Kirbow.

So it goes to the NSC, whether it be concurr-

ing or different.

Senator Huddleston. Well, here is what it does, Charlie.

It gives the members of the NSC, who may not be able to

contemplate

all of the possible objections to a particular

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operation, it gives then inmediate notice that some individual

of some stature disagreed. They can chen pursue - they are

going to make the ultimate decision and they can pursue this

matter with the person involved and find out what his objections

were, and then, it seems to me, they are in a better position

of making the final decision as to whether or not they told

hearings on the specific covert operation.

Mr. Kirbow. The very point is there will never be one

go to the National Security Council if the DCI disagrees with

it. It doesn't go. He finally has to approve all of the

covert operations which are submitted to the National Sec

Council.

Senator Huddleston. I don't think so.

MI. Kirbow. Sure he does, sure he does.

They are his reconmendations.

• Senator Hart of colorado. Oh, no, no, no, no. Chile,

Angola, those weren't his recommendations.. He was throttled.

Mr. Kirbow. This won't cure a Chile or an Angola.

Senator Huddleston, Are you suggesting the National

Security. Council can only consider those matters that are

brought to it by the Director?

MI. Kirbow. No, Senator. What I am saying is covert

operations are not generated at the National Security Council:

They are only generated within the intelligence community of

by the President, apparently. What I am really trying to

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prevent is having a Deputy or dipping on down any level, you can

go down to a dissenting Deputy Director.

Senator Huddleston. Well, there was considerable talk

during our testimony about the President or whoever is making

that final decision, having access to all aspects of the

problem, whether of not he just got a consensus from that

group and they presented it as a consensus, or whether they

really pointed out to him that while the majority of us believe

that this action we ought to take, certain members think this

or that, and to give the President or whoever makes that

final decision, maybe more than --

MI. Kirbow. Senator, I don't disagree with that, All I

say is that all of the membars of this Committee should have

their opinion stated individually to the President, but I don!t

think that a worker out at the Agency falls into , the same

category as a member ci the National Security Council or the

40 Committee. He has a Director over him that is responsible.

for that decision.

Mr. Maxwell. I think, Charlie, that here that the people

identified were hopefully people who would have some substantial

knowledge about the issue being raised, and that it would be

very unlikely that the NSC would not provide substantially

greater weight to the Director than to any of these people,

but that it might in fact help to clarify the set of issues

that the NSC would consider about a covert action project.

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I wouldn't expect that each time they are going tu go

looking for the one dissent and say we have got to hear fully

from this person, but it might clarify issues.

Mr. diGenova. Also, you might have the Secretary of

State agreeing with the Director of Central Intelligence, both

of them agreeing that this is a project, and then having his

ambassador or his assistant secretary disagreeing with him the

same way that the

deputy here, the CI, would be. In Angola

that was exactly the problem, that those views never got up

to that level.

Of course, the Secretary would have done exactly wha

ne a

wanted to do anyway, but at least there would have been a

formal recommendation.

Mr. Treverton. I think the Angola case is the kind of.

example that this recommendation is intended to formalize. Accordin

• to:

Secretary Kissinger, he let the people from the African

Bureau have their argument, passed it on to the President.

Mr. diGenova.

That's what he told us. I don't happen

to believe that.

Treverton. But this recommendation, it seems to me,

would make it more likely that that would happen.

Mr. Kirbow. Then you're saying that the NSC should

pass those differing views on to the President:

Senator Huddles.on. I would say if they felt they were

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important enough. In uther words, there would be a formalized

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record that we have not had in the past. It seems

to lie a

lot of this - that we're trying to formalize a lot of it

from the standpoint of accountability, and this is consistent

with that, I believe.

Senator Hart of Colorado. How do the Chiefs of Staff

work? Do they offer dissenting views on military operations?

Mr. Kirbow. By law they are authorized to take a dissent

where they differ with the Secretary or the Secretary decides

against them. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs may individually

make his appeal to the President, but that is because the

€

got a cabinet man that faces directly to the President.

is the law.

Senator Hart of Colorado... But I mean, do they have -

when the Secretary reports their views to the President, does

it have to be a unanimous vote, or can he say two chiefs are

for it and two are against?

MI. Kirbow. I a sure that he can say that. I know of

nothing in the law concerning the Joint Chiefs that restricts

individual views from being presented, but they do not have

a right to go above him at all except through the Chairman.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I think that is essentially

the analogy here.

Mc. Kirbow. I think the individual views of the Chiefs

are taken at various levals into consideration, but before

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formal -- well, that's within their own department, and

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think that's

where it should be within a major agenay, is lf

you are going to holi the Director responsible, he has got

to have control of the people that work for him.

Senator Hart of Colorado.'' I don't think it's a question

of control.

Senator Huddlestop. I don'tithink this breaches that.

Mr. Miller. It's to assure that all bases are covered.

That is the issue.

Mr. Inderfurth. And that's --

Mr. Kirbow.

And you can assure that, Bill, without showing

dissenting or the details of dissent.

Senator Huddleston. If we go your route, there is hardly

any reason to go to NSC, juat the fact that the DCI has made

his decision.

Mr. Kirbow.

No, sir. The NSC has the input from the

Secretary of State. or the

Secretary of Defense or anyone

else. I was simply not trying to quiet that kind of dissent

among the differing.departnents/but.from duoking below the

person

-- do you think that the Assistant Secretary's of

State should be free to go directly to the President through

the National Security Council?

Senator Hart of Colorado. They're not going directly

to the President. They initial -- I mean, there are two

little boxes on the edge of the page, "agree," "disagree,"

initials in there. Nobody is going directly to the President.

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Mr. Kirbow. But Mr. Miller said this is intended to

put his dissenting views into detail on whatever he dissents:

Now, I agree with you, if he is just talking about -

didn't you just say that it was intended to express their

views?

Mr. Aaron. That is correct.

Mr. Kirbow. well, if you're talking about a checkoff on

the side, I agree with the Senator that I agree that everybody

had his shot and his chance, wherever his

chance came, be

it out at the Agency. It should be on the paper on the

to the President.

Mr. Inderfurth. This is in the Operations Advisory Group

and there is no requirement here that they have to be passed

on to the President. These are going to the OAG.

Mr. Aaron. That's correct, and just let me say one other

real -- I'd just like to speak out of my own experience as

having work on the NSC staff and having been a principal

staff member for some of these committees, and that is that the

toughest problem is to find out what is really the problem,

-

and I think that whataver one may think about the current

Secretary of State and his capacity as Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, one of the things he

tried very hard to do was to dig into the bureaucracy and be

sure that issues, problens and questions were not covered up

but were in fact presented at a higher level, so that people

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could in fact get, particularly che President and the

senior policy makers, could have an opportunity to try to

confront the issues as best they could.

Now, that system didn't always work, and it breaks down

and what have you. This did not undermine the authority of

the Director of the Arms Control Agency, the Director of the

Secretary of the Defense of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

staff, for that matter, but it did make sure that the issues

were not compromised over in what are very large bureaucracies,

any of these, so that decisions are not just taken on the merite

of the problem,

And I think that this recommendation is aimed at two

chings: one, the paper trail, which would show concurrence

and perhaps nonconcurrence, and secondly, if there are non-

concurrences, to indicate the nature of the problem so that

that can be addressed at

a higher level, much as at the

Operations Group if there is a non-concurrence, those views

are sent higher so that can be addressed to the higher level.

And it's really kind of a two-tiered kind of addressal of tha

problem.

• Senator Hart.of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I recommend

we move on this one and get going. My calculations are that

we will finish about three weeks from now.

Senator Huddleston:'! That's pretty accurate.

Is there a motion?

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Senator Hart of Colorado.. Yes. Report it as written.

Senator Huddleston. I second the motion.

Mr. Kirbow. May I respectfully reserve, Senator?

Ms. Culbreath. May I touch on two points, please?

One

is, we make reference to the director of the Clandestine Service,

and I'm wondering if that was intentional since there is not

a Directorate of Clandestine Services as such. Do we want

to use the terms that are currently being applied in the Ayency

di was there some other purpose for using these words?

Mr. Aaron. No, I think that is fair. We will put

ne

Directorate of Operations.

Ms. Culbreath. That was the one thing, and the other

thing is something that has been touched on several times

about the different kinds of ambassadors: that we have, and f

guess it is in terms of the ones that the Department really has

confidence in and takes it into account in terms of what is

really going on, ard in some instances, as I understand 1t,

Ambassadors that are more of a head instead of a really

functioning person.

I wondering in view of that if there is any concern

about this requirement that they be informed.

Mr. Aaron.

Well, the requires that they be informed,

whether they are competent, incompetent, or wherever

they

came

from, and this vourin't add to their responsibility.

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Mr. Miller. It mijut lead to better ambassadors.

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MI. Bader. Can we go to No. 5 now?

Mr. Miller. No. 5.

Mr. Bader. No. 5, this recommendatoin goes to the

question of what level of specificity should one have in the

covert action budget submissions.: It argues here, and so

recommends, simply that the annual budget submission for covert

action should be specific and detailed as to the activity

recommended.

This works against the careful look on the part of the

Committee and the staff as the present level of specifiçi

covert action in budget recommendations, which it is fair

say are near devoid of detail. This is not to say that this

most - the most intricate details of the operation. What we

are doing here is that it should be more specific and more

detailed than it is now.

This is really a signal to the

Committee.

The second point that is in that recommendation is of

goes to the issue of where funds come from for unforeseen

covert action projects. The recommendation here is that

those funds should come. from and be limited to the contingency

reserve fund, which could be replenished only after the

concurrence of the oversight and any other

appropriate

Congressional Committees.

This goes to the point that the record is very clear on

this, that the contingency reserve fund, that it can be, and that

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it has been replenished through pre-payments and transfers

from other sources, and this can be done internally in the

Agency without reference to the appropriate Congressional

Committees.

What we are saying here is that in those unusual circum-

stances when you have to come back for funds that are not

called for in your annual budget submission, that those funds

should come from one source in the contingency reserve fund,

and any replenishment of that fund should come only after the

concurrence of the oversight and the other appropriate

Congressional Committees, and that "is the thrust of it.

Senator Huddleston. Is that gonig public with the

budget request?

MI. Bader. No, Senator. It is not a matter of public.

It would be in the normal process; it would be a classified

budget. This is

not calling for public detail for covert

action. It is calling for more detail, more specific detail

for the oversight Committee, and it is calling for a means

of containing, if you will, the funding process for covert

action to one source, an

identifiable source, of which the

appropriate Congressional Committees

know where it is and how

it is being done, and have an approval chop; if you will, on

whether that fund should be replenished.

Mr. diGenova. And the

Agency doesn't have any objection

to that, they really don't. They would rather have it done

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that way.

Mr. Aaron. It, I might say, it ties in to the poposal

or recommendation made earlier concerning defining the way

in which reprogramming throughout the entire community can take

place.

Senator Huddleston. I have no problem with that one:

Mr. Maxwell. Can I make one suggestion? It's

a sentence

which I don't think changes the meaning at all, that I think may

express the view of the Committee as to the present notification

arrangements of

the contingency reserve be added sa the la

sentence would read, "The funding of unforseen covert acti

projects should be consolidated and limited to the contingency

reserve fund, the use of

which would continue to require the

present system of notifications, and which would be replinished

only after the concurrence of the oversight and any other appro-

priate Congressional Committees." You make no finding -- we

describe the notification at present to OMB and the Congressional

-Senator Huddleston. Should there be any statement that it

should be classified, anything of that nature, or is that implied?

I. Kirbow. Adopting this, the present procedure is that

they notify

the Appropriations Committee and the Office of OMB,

and it is classified, and the Director signs off on it, and they

expend the funds.

Mr. Bader.

There is no call here, Mr. Chairman, for

any exposure, any public exposure of the funds. It is simply

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an internal process of revealing more details for the

Congressional Committee, and insuring, from our point of view!

that the funding

mechanism is identifiable and controllable.

Mr. Kirbow.

You indicated earlier that there had been

considerable evidence before the Committee of funding of

covert action projects other than from the contingency fund

by some kind of transfer.

Would you give us an example of it, because this comes as

news to me unless it is something that occurred recently, an

example of them getting money from some

other source othe

than that which had originally been planned for covert

or from the contingency fund?

Mr. Bader. What I was referring to, Charles, was the

contingency fund as it is now established,and the rules under

which it operates can be replenished by the Agency by internal

transfers in its budget system without notification of the

appropriate Committees, and it also can be replenished through

prepayments from other agencies.

I was not speaking to the issue of how it is expended.

The record shows, and we do have the statistics on this,

that the contingency reserve fund has been pushed to very

high levels at particular times in the Agency's history through

these replenishments and transfers and prepayments.

Mr. Kirbow. But there is a requirement that the Committee

on Appropriations be notilied of the outstanding balance of

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the contingency fund at the time of any transfer.

MI. Bader. There is also a requirement that the appropriate

committees be notified when there is a drawdown to it. This

doesn't change any of that. This simply means that it reguires

the concurrence of these committees for these kinds of

transfers and replenishments. It is a double check, if you

will.

Senator Huddleston. NO. 6?

Mr. Aaron. No. S. I'm not terribly pleased with the

first introductory phrase, and I'm sure we can do better

Ms. Culbreath. We did better Sunday.

Senator Mathias. Where are you?

Mr. Aaron. Page 50, No. 6.

Ms. Culbreath. The way my introduction read, as I took

my notes, so the first sentence under No. 6 would read, "To

ensure that Congress las an adequate opportunity to scrutinize

covert paramilitary operations, the Committee recommends," and

struck out -that middle and put a "covert" in front of pacar

military.

Mr. Aaron. All right, the two operating requirements

relate to the two functions, general functions of paramilitary

activity. Those

activities are essentially covert or clandestine

military assistance programs

which involve supplying training

and weapons abroad, and

in much rarer cases, but

nonetheless,

cases,

the actual involverent of U.S. personnel, often militalY

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officers in mufti, who

are actually involved in combat or

combat support.

Now, we tried to distinguish between those two categories

of activity in the following way: when it comes to what is in

effect covert military

assistance programs, the concept is ka

require that those programs require the prior approval of the

oversight committee and the cognizant Congressional committees

for military assistance. In effect; the covert military

assistance program goes around the military assistance legis-

lation, which does authorize X amount of money to go to;

countries and no others, so that we feel it is important

at least bring that under some control by giving the covert

programs the same scrutiny at. least on the committee level of

the Congress. 'That is what the second of these two recommenda-

tions would do.

The first deals with the less frequent but more explosive

and politically more difficult question of the use of Americans

in actual combat on a covert, paramilitary basis, and it

would require a modification - let me back up. It would

apply the principles of the War Powers Act with appropriate

modification to this kind of paramilitary activity: specifically,

the notification required under the War Powers Act would not

go to the whole Congress but would go just to the oversight

committee.

However, within 00 jays the entire Congress would have to

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act, and this

would be an upen act, and the operation therefore

could not remain covert for more than 60 days. In effect --

I'm sorry.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Have we gone on to that now?

Is that what we are talking about?

MI. Aaron. Yes, this is No: 6, and the one that I am

talking

about now is the very first subparagraph.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What is immediate notification?

What have we been talking about here for à long time?

Mr. Kelley. In the War Powers Act, it is 48 hours,

Senator Hart of Colorado. Have we given up absolute

on

the notion of prior notice?

Mr. Aaron. No. This would not affect that particularly.

This would -- the point of this phrase here would be that the

notification under the War Powers Act would not go to the

entire Congress as it must in an open kind of way, as is

currently required by the war Powers Art, but instead it would

go to the Committee, and the point of that phrase is not to

take away from the Committee's responsibility to be notified in

a timely or prior fashion of covert action projects. It just

simply makes a point that the notification would still take

place, but it would be to the Committee instead of to the

entire Congress, but it would not change the requirement to

60 days for the authority for the President to engage in this

activities to lapse unless the Congress' took affirmative action.

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MI. Miller. The prior notification is of anticipated afion

and it may be that the action may not take place in the

case of prior notification.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But immediate notification of

an action that is being taken. That may be 48 hours old,

Senator Mathias. It is like the old rules for making

political speeches. First you tell them what you are going

to tell them, then you tell them, then you tell them what you

told them.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I think I missed somethin

there.

MI. Aaron. Well, I see your point and I think we don't

really account for the fact that the Committee is already

suppose to have received prior notice of this activity, and

there should be either a sentence or footnote to that.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I would take the "immediate"

out, and I would say that "notification should be made to the

Committee."

Mr. Kelley. Notification required by the War Powers Act.

Senator Huddleston. Restricting all paramilitary to

60

days.

Mr. Aaron. And the import of this rule would be to

restrict paramilitary activities to 60 days before they would

become open. Not all paramilitary, let me say. We could -

let's take Angola as ai example. Angola presumably couid

häve

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continued at the level at which it was going, covertly, if it

wasn't so large

and exposed. It could have continued

indefinitely as long as, of course, the oversight committee

agreed and there wasn't a great deal of discussion about it.

on the other hand, in a situation such as the Congo, where

U.S. personnel began to actually fly certain combat missions

against some of the dissident elements could not have persisted

beyond 60 days.

Mr. Kirbow:

David, the term "CIA funded Americans," or

"CIA officer combatants," this would not have gone to the

Angola operation at all that you're talking about. They

ng

combatants.

Mr. Aaron. That's correct.

Mx. Kirbow. And whether notified or not, or approved by

it, it could have gone on forever.

Mr. Aaron. That is correct.

MI. Kirbow. If you're talking about not running a covert

action like Angola, this will not do it.

Mr. Aaron. That's right:

Mr- Kirbow. If you're talking about using an American

citizen in a combatant role, that is all the exception this

makes.

Mr. Aaron. In terms of our past paramilitary involvements,

It would have the two that would have fallen under this

5

in all likelihood, certäinly Laos, and to a lesser extent,

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depending upon the duration where you began counting, Possibly

Indonesía, where you had Americans flying sorties in B-25s and

so on, and then it would

also probably have included the

Congo operation.

MI. KiIbow.

I agree with the Senator that if you want

prior notice, you should insist on prior notice in all major

covert operations.

This is certainly the most major one

we

are going to talk about, is where we are going to use

military combatants, paramilitary.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Is there a prior notice

recommendation anywhere?

Mr. Davis. Yes.

MI. Aaron. Yes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Have we already taken it up?

Mr. Aaron. It!s in the oversight and it is in the NSC

section as well.

Mr. Inderfurth. I think it might be useful to have à

footnote to outline briefly the principle of the war Powers

Act we are referring to, and I've got that.

Senator Huddleston. And where we differ from it.

Mr. Aaron. Right.

Mr. Kirbow. This will be done in the little supportive

findings rather than in recommendations, don't you think?

Mr. Inderfurth. Now does that read now?

MI. Aaron. It would say, "By statute, any covert use of

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CIA officers of othei CIA funded Americans as combatants shall be

governed by the principles in the War Powers Act. The required

notification in the War Powers Act will be made to the oversight

Committee, and the authority in the Act would lapse unless

reaffirmed by the Congress 60 days after the initiation of

such activity."

Mr. Inderfurth. But aren't we going to get a line saying

prior notice in that, or prior notification is the 48 hour

thing.

See what I'm saying?

MI. Aaron. I thought we would probably just put a f

note:

on it saying the Committee -- the oversight committee would, of

course, receive any prior notice of any covert action as well

as notification, as well as this notification.

Mr. Kirbow.

The problem is, the War Powers Act notification

doesn't go to this Committee, it goes to

the Armed Services

Committee.

- Mr. Aaron. Well, under these recommendations it would

come to this Committee.

Senator Huddleston.

well, there's another point, too, when

we talk aböut 60 days. That is the limit. Congress can move

within 48 hours.

Mr. Aaron.. Congress can move as soon as it is notified.

Senator Huddleston.

If the Committee wants to act.

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Mr. Maxwell. Are we recommending the War Powers Act be

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amended, are we simply recommending the principles according

to paramilitary?

Senator Huddleston. I'm not sure if we're not confusing

the issue a little bit by referring to the principles of the

War Powers Act rather than just writing in those provisions

that we want to apply.

Mr. Kirbow. Just as a major covert action.

Senator Huddleston. And say, "consistent with the War

Powers Act."

Mr. Aaron. Perhaps a better way to do it would be 1

those lines and then make the footnote that related to

th

War Powers, simply, and that way we could fold in the prior

notification and say they would have prior notification of

this, and then the footnote would say that would constitute

the notification that would be analogous to the notification

under the War Powers Act, something along that line.

Senator Huddleston. Consistent with or parallel to oi

something.

Mr. Kirbow. MI. Chairman, we should here, for the sake

of clarity, to keep from a dual

overlap with the other

committee, if you want this oversight committee, you mean

intelligence oversight, you should say intelligence oversight

committee. Otherwise, the War Powers Act notification does

go to Armed Services.

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Senator Mathias. ie ought to make it clear that we are

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talking about a new statute or a new --

MEi Kirbow.

It really amends the Senate Rules and doesn't

have

to amend, the War. Powers Act on prior notification.

Senator Huddleston. Well, that concludes that section.

Mr. Aaron.

Well, the next section is on the reorganizatior

of the CIA, and essentially it talks about the pros and cons

of the concept of dividing the CIA by taking in effect the

analytical part of it and attaching it directly to the DCI

and making the rest of the Agency a separate agency. There

are reasons to do it, reasons not to do it. The recommen

is not a firm one. The recommendation is that this is

Lon

concept that merits serious consideration as a result of our

own work, and that we would recommend that the oversight

body look at it.

Now, a lot of the reasons for doing that have to do wich

the production of intelligence, and we don't have that section

of the paper here yet. I guess I would recommend that we come

back to this section, and at this point proceed to the next

section which is relations with United States institutions and

private sitizens, which ties into both espionage

and

covert

action, ald for which we have a number of recommendations.

I would like to ask Bill, who has done all of the hard

work on this, to - if you might talk to the specific recommen-

dations contained in it.

Mr. Kirbow. Where?

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Mr. Aaron. I would suggest we go on to page 54, and then

when

we

have the other paper, we can come back when we haye a

fuller picture to deal with it.

Mr. Bader. We do not have any bracketed sections

in the

introductory text, but we do have some bracketed sections

meaning differences of approach and options in the recommendations

section.

So what I thought I might do is go to the recommendation

section, unless the senators would like some time to read that

section, the introductory section as it now stands.

• 2

Senator Huddleston. We had this the other day.

Mr. Bader.

We discussed this at length the other day,

Senator. This is just a summary of an outline of the problems

on both the media level and the educational institutions.

Now, what it really comes down to, the decisions before you

is in the recommendations section about what you

do in order

to ensure - at least that is the thrust of the recommendations,

that there be a prohibition on the use of members of the United

States academic community for operational purposes, and opera-

tional purposes is explained in the text, and runs

from the use

of American, academics to assess and to assist in the operational

use and recruitment of foreign students for espionage purposes

to the use of academics for cover purposes. For example, in

the 1960s, one of our major American research institutions was

used as a backstop or cover for using two CIA agents to Latin

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America, to the use of American academics as what

the Agency

calls writers, that is to say, individuals who write propaganda

or write at the Agency's direction.

You'll note,. for esample, in the text, which you should

be aware of because it is perhaps one of those parts of what

we

have done that will take on a certain amount of press.

interest, there is at least one occasion in which a book

written under CIA direction was reviewed in the New York

Times by a CIA agent, which is rather closing the circuit.

Senator Huddleston, Pretty good review, too:

MI. Bader, Yes, it was a good review.

Now, where the recommendationg and the options are on

the recommendations, when it comes to the question on the

prohibition of - on the use of members of the United States

academic community, it simply turns on the issue of whether the

Committee recommends that

the CIA amend its internal directives

to include such prohibition on the use of the United, States

academig community, or whether this should be done by statute.

The first option, the argument goes that the CIA does in.

fact have internal

directives that go to this question.

We

have seen them, we have reviewed them. We have been given

testimony. by the Agency just a few. days ago that. they felt

compelled if for any such directives, that any changes that

would be made to those jirectives would have to be brought to

the notice of any oversight committee, so the Committee then

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would have a continuing review

mechanism

to see that these

directives remain as the Committee would like them, in this

case, to approve a prohibition on the use of members of the

United States academic community.

Mr. Kelley. How do they define a member of the academic

community?

Mr. Aaron. It means administrators, faculty members and

graduate students.

Senator Huddleston. Graduate students?

Mr.' Bader. Graduate

students.

Mr. Kirbow. Administrators down to what level, offi

managers, record keepers?

Mr. Bader. They really don't give any further definition!

and there's obviously a question of how far that goes down,

but whether it goes down to, you know, a Deputy Assistant Dean,

I would assume it would, but whether it would take someone

in the registrar's office.

Mr. Kirbow. An employee of the registrar's office.

Mr. Aaron. The supervisor of the heating system.

It is

hard to say.

MI. Bader. This option which would go to encouraging, if

you will, the Agency to change its internal directives would

be buttressed, as we see the argument, on this side is that the

academic. community, through this report, would be alerted to

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the problems of the use of academics, and would be both attentive

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to it and would, we hope,

see to their own directives and rules

within the university. So it would be a self-enforcing, re-

inforcing system.

The other argument for doing this by statute is very

clear. It is very simple that by law the Agency would be

prevented from the use of academics for operational purposes:

believe the argument against that to the Senators themselves

as to the difficulties of shielding legislation, to shield

a particular group of Americans from operational exploitation

on the part. of the Agency. That is questions of definiti

a s

to what an academic would be, and emblazing that in law?

My own recommendation goes to the first option, as you can

perhaps detect, which is that the Committee should begin with

the insistence on amending the internal directives, should

alert the academic community to its problem, should maintain

a continuing oversighi. of this issue, and that if need be, in

time an oversight committee could move to the legislative

remedy if it did not see that this was working, and it would

not guarantee that this prohibition would in fact stick.

The statute is very clear as to what you would do.

You

would put"it in law, and it would be done.

Now, I would call on -- David, would you like to argue

the statute?

Ms. Culbreath. Could we ever have some comments as to

whether either of these is what we want to do?

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to speak to the point of view of either by directive or by

statute prohibiting people, simply because they happen to belong

to the academic community from doing something which they may

wish to do voluntarily and knowingly and wittingly. I think

there is a tendency to assume that everybody in academia may

have the same

attitude about operational use of academics, but

I can think of institutions in the country where the adminis-

tration and faculty and parents of students who go there, they

all feel that this is an appropriate role for a citizen 9f

a patriot to do, and I just question whether we want to

prohibit it absolutely:

I think in terms of having an informed administration or

it being aware of this, so that if the president of the trustees

think we don't want our school or our faculty people associated

that's one point of view, but to say that others who nay wish

to ve involved and who may wish to provide a forum even to

encourage these kinds of chings, I just question whether we

want to

o put that much of a prohibition in.

I think that is the other side of academic freedom.

Senator Mathias.

could someone articulate exactly what

the evil is that we are trying to eradicate. Maybe if we

can get at it that way

Mr. Aaron. Do you want to do that?

Mr. diGenova. Weil, the evil, just from reading what

Bill has written, or to get it from your view is that this is

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an institution which people look to to shelter and to aid

the education of "young minus," and that it has a basically

sacred function, which is the education of our young people!

and to involve it covertly in the clandestine collection or

operational purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency is to

basically prostitute its function when it is done unwittingty!

and that therefore it should be prohibited because

this is an

institution which requires the greatest insulation from any

sort of activity concerned with intelligence collection other

than overt, contractual relationships, correct?

Mr. Kirbow. You missed the very point which she made

You said unwittingly: She said wittingly should be allowed.

Mr. diGenova. I know that, but the question was, what

was the evil that was attempted from what is here.

Bill, is that a fair summary of what you were getting

at?

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Mr. Bader. I think that's a fair summary. I think very,

very simply stated, as

see it, within the academic community,

in the relationship uf a professor, a teacher to student is

one of trust, is one, as I see it, where it is an open

relationship that is entered into under very special circum-

stances of trust, and that trust should be preserved.

Senator Mathias. Well, let me be the Devil's advocate

here because I think we are going to have trouble with this

one later on. We might as well understand it ourselves.

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What about a non-teaching academic, say a librarian, or

a Soviet American expert, or a Chinese research expert who

really has very little contact with students but he is on the

faculty of a university?

Mr. Bader. It becones very much more difficult when you

get down the system to the grounds keeper at a great American

university, whether he would be part of the spotting and assess

ing system. That is difficult to deal with, and obviously the

further you get from the professor-student relationship, the

less intensity, it seems

to me-

Mr. Aaron. I would be happy to make a point that

Mr. Kirbow. The person that keeps the record has the

control over the information they are seeking.

Mr. Bader. But

they are all part of the university

community to which the student has introduced himself, and I

don't think the student would make this kind of distinction of

differentiation between the nature of the relationships he

would perceive between himself and those in that.

Mr. Maxwell. Couldn't he make a differentiation if he knew

that the individual faculty member was providing, on a voluntary

basis, information to the Domestic Contact Service?

Mr. Davis. That wouldn't be done covertly.

Mr. Maxwell. But it is not broadcast. It is not something

where -

Senator Mathias. Well, let's look at some of the liard

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cases. Now, what about an academic who is in good standing.

Let's say his name is Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and he has

tenure at Harvard, and he takes a year's sabbatical and hires

out to CIA for a year.

Mr. Aaron. He would be prohibited from doing that, and I

would go beyond in arguing in this case, beyond what Bill has

said, that it isn't simply the question of students. It seems

to me that we look to our academic institutiong, which are non-

profit institutions, as sources of inguiry after the truth in

some basic way.

Now, if there are open associations with corporation

with:

government and what have you, people are in a position tu

assess the extent to which those open associations are reflected

in the views and academic work and ideas and analyses that may

come out of academic institutions, but if these relationships

are secret and covert, there is always the question whether

the views and ideas and concepts that are being put out are

in fact independent, are in fact objective, really aren't

serving the policy and purposes of what is a clandestine

organization.

Now, I personally don't think that most of these people,

of even any of these people do that, although we find cases

In terms of fallout, so to speak, in terms of writing that

some of these people may have done, but I think that one really

has to ask whether instilutions, private institutions or

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public institutions devoted to trying in some sense to find the

truth, to establish themseives as objective, above-board, whether

you really want them to have a clandestine relationship to an

organization whose part of its purpose is to manipulate

opinion at least abroad.

Mr. Kirbow.

Don't you think that that is a judgment for

that directorate and the board of directors and all of those

people to make, just like any other business?

Mr. Aaron.

No, I don't. I think it is a public policy

question.

Mr. Kirbow. . Even if it is made witting?

Mr. Aaron. We are seized with the question, we can

either say this government is going to pursue policies, it is

going to use these people or it isn't.

Mr. Kirbow. I'm sorry.

MI. Aaron. We are in a position, it seems to me, of being

seized with the questions. We can either make a decision which

says

these people may be used for this purpose, or we can make

the decision to say these people should not be, and we can

argue about the form that that ought to take, but we have

the

question before us.. But it is not a question of

what these

people ought to be allowed to do, but it is a question of

what the government ought to be allowed to do.

Mr. Kirbow. And there is only a potential for abuse.

I don't think the Committee has before it an abuse situation

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here that's been discovered in the evidence.

MI. Kelley. But taking David's point one step further,

It is not only what we would restrain the government from

doing, but we would also want to prevent a larger taint on

those academics who have chosen not to be used by the CIA or

work with the CIA, and they would be suspected of that if

there were others who were traveling abroad on behalf- of the

CIA.

Mr. Inderfurth. Can I ask a question here in the light of

that?

Is there anything here to prohibit,.if the second op

is taken, the overt relationship between academics and the

CIA? Can they continue to advise, can they continue to

consult, offer overt intelligence, that they have gone overseas

come back and -

Mr. Aaron. There's nothing to prohibit that, and they

could even undertake classified and secret work, but the

fact ----

Mr. Kirbow. But not for operational purposes.

Mr. Inderfurth. But the overt relationship would exist.

Academics could say, when

I was in the Soviet Union I found

out this.

Mr. Bader. Now, the text, in fact, does speak to the

majority of these contacts being opened. What has been lost

in this text, I think, in the late night brutality that has fron

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time to time been applied, is that we have lost a paragraph

which I think should be reinstated, where we endorse this

variety of open contact, and I would think it would be

sensible to restate that paragraph just to be sure that we

have this balance between ..

Senator Mathias. I would be very much in favor of

reinstating that, but let me say that I think maybe you have

gone too far if you say that someone who is on a sabbatical,

an extended sabbatical, really has to give up tenure, sever

all connections if he is going to enter any operational:

Mr. Davis. Well, Senator, let me interrupt and say

what tenure means to a person in the academic community,

that

neans a person has been teaching for six years, and at that

point is supposed to go off and do some research, and sort of

come back and be all refreshed and be a teacher. So the whole

idea of tenure, or of the sabbatical being used for other

purposes would in a sense violate --

Senator Mathias. Well, it is a leave of absence. Isn't

that what Moynihan had from Harvard?

Mr. Davis. Well, I think that is different, but it would

still, you would go away in order to do those things in order

to continue a career.

You know, you can serve in the United

Nations or you can come to the Senate Select Committee, but

it's all

part of the purpose of going back to be a better

teacher and a better scholar.

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Senator Huddleston. Does it work that way?

Mr. Kirbow. Would you not consider that an infringement

of your rights if you were prevented by regulation to have

made this kind of contribution to one of the intelliyence

agencies?

Mr. Davis. This is a tough one, and my colleagues split

on this. I might say that some of them say they don't want

to be singled out and spoken to separately and told that they

cannot do things, whereas businessmen can, and other people

say that academic freedom doesn't extend to everything, a

that there are certain constraints : on my academic freedo

already that I cannot engage in a classified contract at a

university without telling the university I am doing that and

that

I cannot come down here more than three or four jays a

week without telling my university that I'm doing that,

although I'm not suppused to anyway, anyway, that my academic

freedom is already constrained by my being a member of that

university. And I think that is a hard one to call, and I

myself at the end, I think, would come down to the hope that

my academic colleagues would sort of

take care of themselves,

but I am not too contident that in the public interest, that

my academic colleagues would not take this and

sort of do

with it what I'd like. So I find it fairly difficult.

Mr. Kelley. Mav i saise that taint thing again in

response to Liz's objection?

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Remember, there was an Operation Camelot a

few years ago,

I think, in Latin

America, where the Army was hiring profes-

sors to go to South America and write secret classified

papers on South American countries. When that was revealed,

I forget in what manner it was revealed, a lot of other academios

who were not involved had their freedom to travel in Latin

Ameri

ca, and their

access to government people and their general

academic business compromised. Then there was a whale of

objections that came forth out of this.

Mr. Maxwell. I think at least to be realistic about

n49,

regardless of what kind of promulgation this committee ma

as to the use of academics, there are relatively few

societies

in the world that will

take at face value the notion that

visitors from another country who come to be studying there are

not in some way tied to the government. And I think the beile

that we can convince any country in Latin America that

visiting academics are not going to report to the Government

through_ this kind of promulgation, I think, is a bit naive,

and it may be dishonorable to do.

Mr-Kelley. Well, you said the domestic contacts idea

would not: be prohibited by it, that you could come back and

report.

Mr. Miller. But it minds somewhat that you counter -

Mr. Maxwell. I think if you look at the record of

American researchers in india, for example, over che last

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five years, I think you will see a real question about the

acceptability of American researchers in a sociaty.

MI. Aaron. Well, there was a good reason for it.

Mr. Treverton. It strengthens rather than weakens Bob's

point.

Senator Mathias.

Well, let me tell you, even members of

the

Senate are not exempt from this problem. I went to teach

at the Salzburg Seminar of American Studies, and immediately

upon my arrival, all chese students, Xugoslavia, Poland,

Finland and where else, he's a CIA agent. So I spent a

...

couple of weeks, whatever time I was there, playing pingp

and drinking beer and singing songs and making all kinds of

sacrifices to kill this impression that I was an evil agent

of the CIA.

I finally had just about eradicated that idea, and so the

last night I was there they asked me to say a few words after

dinner, and I said what a positive experience it had been, and

I was going to tell everybody in Washington about it, and they

said, see, we knew you were CIA.

MI-Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, would it make the academics feel

better

if this were restrained to only witting individuals at

witting institutions, so that, you know, you've got an agreement?

Throughout the south, land grant colleges and whatnot,

are probably as conservacive a single body of people in

teaching institutions as there is in the world, and a great

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deal of work along the lines of what other communities consider

to be distasteful type work is done at those institutions. They

still have ROTC units at every one of them.

MI. Davis. But those are open, Charlie, and that's the

difference. It's the covert part of it that you are addressing

here:

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Mx. Kirbow. If the individual and the institution is

witting to do this --

Senator Hudaleston. What about if the student is witting?

Mr. Kirbow. The student himself is not affected unl

it taints the person who is teaching the student his Engl

course or his mathematics course.

Senator Huddleston. Maybe the student and his parents

should know when he enters the school that he is subject to

being proselyted by a secret agent.

Mr. Kirbow. I think that's what you do when you say that

there are 300 some institutions doing this throughout the

United States.

MI: Bader. The problem with. the witting. and unwitting is

a very difficult one to deal with just for the facts of the

matter. I mean, of the 134 American universities and colleges

who have individuals aboard who do serve operational purposes

of the Agency, at 82 of those institutions there is no one.

but the individual irvolved who is aware of the CIA link.

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MI. Kirbow.

That's why I said it should be both.

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MI. Bader. And at the other 42, there is someone aware.

The Agency's definition of this is a very difficult one because

it feels that the institution is aware as an institution, if

one responsible person in that institution is aware. This is

the nature of the problem.. How do you make an institution

aware that its faculty members are serving operational purposes?

What is witting in a university?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Let me add one fact for the

lawyers to chew on. That is the possible First Amendment

freedom of association problem. I'm not sure you can past

a law that discriminates against a group, that says the

government cannot deal with you or prohibit you from dealing

with it.

Ms. Culbreath. May I raise one other point?

Senator Huddleston. Does anybody want to comment on

that, you lawyers?

MI. Aaron. I am not a lawyer, but I would like to

emphasize that while i think there is some question about

what the role and responsibility of the academic is, it seems

me that the issue is what is the government going to do,

and the government places restrictions on itself all the time

in its dealings with citizens in all kinds of programs,

domestic and foreign, military and otharwise.

Senator Hart of Coiurado. But could you cite me a law

that says that a specific department of the United Scates

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Government cannot deal with a specific class of citizers in our

society?

The law would be essentially saying that the Department of

HEW cannot have anything whatsoever to jo with farmers.

MI. Miller. NSA laws have prohibitions against access

to

citizens without clearance.

MI. Aaron. Iwould be happy to research the question, but

I would point out that your recommendation to prohibit the

government from dealing with newsmen for operational purposes

is really --

Senator Hart of Colorado. Is that mine?

MI. Aaron. I thought it was.

oh, I'm

sorry, publishing. I withdraw the allegation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That says to the Agency you

can't publish in a book..

MI. Bader. Senator, we are starting with the issue of

the prohibition. As you know, my own recommendation is that

this be done as a combination of internal directives whereby

the Agengy would prohibit itself from making operational use of

these individuals, plus the generic exposure, if you will, so

that the academic community is aware of the magnitude, if you

will, or the scope of the problem.

I tend

to agree with you about shielding legislation in

this case. Well, thire is one recommendation here which we

will come to where to du something by statute is to say that

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in governnent sponsored and government funded exchange programs,

no funds will be expended in such programs, with a prohibition

on the operational use of government grantees.

Now, that is not as

difficult, I believe, is it?

Mr. Maxwell. But you're then receiving the benefit

from the government, and as a condition of receiving that

benefit from the government, one can make the restrictions

suggested.

Mr. Bader. It should be said there is a record here the

Central Intelligence Agency has, for a number of years!:

on

its prohibited list three categories: Peace Corps, Fulbr

Grantees, which I gather the definition of what they mean by

that is those selected and approved by the Board of Foreign

Scholarships, and employees and grantees of the Ford Foundation

Rockefeller and Carnegie. Oddly enough they have chosen

these three. I gather the history of that is that Johr J.

McCloy insisted on that at one point, and it has ever

prevailed.

So there is a record of internal prohibitions that che

CIA has.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But the Constitution says

Congress shall pass no laws.

That didn't say an Agency

can't.

Mr.. Bader. Well, we're just talking at different

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levels.

We are speaking first to the question of Micher

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there should be prohibitions, and second, as to how they

should be implemented.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I understand. I just wonder

if there is a constitutional question here.

Mr. Kirbow.

I think there is a serious question that

should be resolved, and I will only make one other point, as

I have been reminded by one of the other attorneys, that the

testimony here of one of the key witnesses in this field is

that if you eliminate their ability to recruit at the campuses,

you will eliminate 50 percent of their annual recruitment

Mr. Davis. There you have to be careful.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me finish. And I do not indicate to you

that all of the recruitments would necessarily stop if they

couldn't have spotting and whatnot, but they've indicated that

eliminating use of academics even for spotting --

Senator Hart of Colorado. This doesn't do that. This

doesn't prohibit recruitment of students.

MT. RIIbow..

It prohibits your using anyone in the

•academic field there to introduce you even to the foreign

student over a cup of coffee.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I thought you meant recruiting

for the Agency.

Mr. Kirbow. Recruiting for an agent those students

from a foreign country having nothing to do with American

students.

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Senator Hart of Colorado.

Well, if they want to lecruit

a foreign student, they can just knock on their apartment door

and introduce themselves.

Mr. Kirbow. I would just like to say that testimony

says if they lose the use of the favorable atmosphere that

they have of the academic, they will lose 50 percent of their

recruitment.

Mr. Bader. Well, Charles, let me say, in all respect,

I think that is not their statement. Their statement is in

two parts. First of all, it is that if they are denied

no, the first statement is that 50 percent of their annua

recruitments come from campuses.

Mr. Aaron. Domestic. That means 25 people.

Mr. Bader. Their second statement is that they would

consider it a major loss in that recruitment process if they

were denied the use of academics, but they don't make, or they

don't say that they would be denied the 25 or 50.

Mr, Kirbow. What they said, Mr. Bader, it would prohibit

them probably half the recruitments if they could not use

that factlity to do it. I used 50 percent.

Mr. Inderfurth.

Foreign students?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, this is another issue. I mean,

what does the commitlee think about foreign students coming over

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to this country and baing approached by the CIA. I maan,

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went overseas to study as a Fulbright, and I was under this

regulation and so I couldn't have been used over therer.

think there is something about soviet, you know, coming here

and all of a sudden we start thinking, well, now, he might

go back and turn on his country.

Maybe it is a simplistic way to look at it, but do we

want to continue that?

Mr. Kirbow.

If you intend to have human collection from

the denied areas, it is 50 percent of your opportunity over

the next foreseeable two or three decades.

Senator Hart of colorado. Now, no, Charlie, wait a

minute.

Because they have found it convenient to do this in

the past does not mean it is their only recourse. They will

think of a way.

Mr. Davis. I can think of a variety of ways to recruit

foreign students at Columbia and not use

academics by that

definition at all.

Senator Huddleston. How would you do that?

Mr. Davis. Well, there are people in the foreign student

center, there are people in the International House --

Mr. Miller. In the restaurants.

Mr. Davis. In the restaurants. There are just a variety

of places you could go to meet... people, in seminars. You don't

have to be an academic..

Mr. Kelley. Well, you're just being legalistic about

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who is going to contact them. You are still at the univarsity!

which reaches Rick's point very quickly, that why draw this

paper regulation so you can't use professors but you

can use

the foreign student?

Mr. Davis. Well, that's a separate question.

Mr. KIrbow. Well, Mr. Chairman, if it were that easy

to recruit, I think we would be recruiting more than 50 people

in the United States a year.

I am not in a fosition, I think, not being a currently

experienced agent incruiter in the United States, to make

nat

kind of -- the man that runs that business says this was

hazard that it created. He even contacted one of the staft

today to say if you'r going to do this, please consider this

aspect of it. About the only other 25 people they get, they

get out of the United Nations New York involvement, through

their principal office there.

Senator Huddleston, Well, of course, what we are confronted

with is the question of the success of the operation of the

propriety of it.

Are we going to subvert propriety for success is one of

the things we might have to do, I guess.

MI. Kirbow. well, I don't think the question Senator

Mathias asked has been airwered; that there has been any real

harm shown by this pii over the years.

I don't know that

it has subverted the ins of any student.

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Mr.. Inderfurth. What about NSA? Does that do? is that

an abuse? Does that subvert the minds of the student leadars

who were witting, or did it subvert the minds of the conferences

that they went to?

Mr. Kirbow. I don't have the answer to that question.

Perhaps you do

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I have an opinion. I don't know

if you can get an answer.

MI. Aaron. Well, I think we have two separable issues

here which I think we probably ought to -- I mean, 1f

the

committee can address

them seriatum. One is, do we want

have the Government itself place some limit on its relationship

with academics, its relationship, which is clandestine and

covert, and if the answer to that question is yes, then the

answer to that question is how would one do that? would one

do a law, shielding legislation which may raise certain

kinds of questions, including constitutionaiity, or what have

you, or do we want to recommend that the Agency itself put

the people off limits, would necessarily do anything except

institute policies which any Agency shuuld have concerning

journalists or any number of people.

Mr. Miller. Well, let me raise a question, David, which

really may go to the point.

We heard from, is ve discussed earlier, a number of Views

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of the President and so on, and as I recall that evening

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was that they don't want any laws, definitely.

On the other hand, they wanted to know what the hell was

going on so that they could govern themselves, and that puts it

in a nutshell.

Won't the effect uf this report, assuming that it is

printed and it is public, provide the university community with

an awareness of what is going on?

Mx. Kirbow. You mean without a recommendation, just the

finding that it has been done.

MI. Miller. Well, I am just raising the question for

discussion. Will the report itself provide notice that t

ase

things are going on and allow the university community to

govern itseli in whatever way. In certain areas it won't

wake any difference, and in other areas it will.

Or is it necessary to take one of those alternatives which

is either internal piulibitions on the agencies, ana the

further step is a statute.

And it seems to me that if you weigh those three possi-

bilities, you may come to an answer.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think there is one problem with the

first step. It's just à problem, I'm not saying that it is

an insuperable problem, but the problem is one I think that

Charlie put his finger on earlier, and that is the question of

witting. But we do have il individuals who are being

used

for operational purposes who are academics who do not know

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it, and we have -- I think there are 82 institutions i. which

no one outside of the operative himseli, who may not know. it

we just don't know how these numbers break out - or the

institution doesn't know it.

Now, it may well be that our report is so widely read that

all institutions will have a chance to look at themselves and

ask these questions, but chere is a problem in the problem of

witting and unwitting, as Charlie points out.

Mr. Kirbow, well, I think none of the opposition to

these two recommendations at no time has said we shall maintain

these unwitting relationship, but I do feel very strongly

AE :

the university management, whatever it is, and it can't

be very difficult so find out who is running the shop, I would

think, and the individual himself are both witting, that we

should not prohibit the Pgency from this very, extrenely

valuable resource, perturming this foreign intelligence

function.

Senator Huddleston, Well, you know, really, to get

back - the major evil as I see it was the recruiting of

students, a foreign. student. who. comes. to.the States presumably

to get an education, and whether he is recruited by another

student, a member of the faculty or a CIA agent, a local

businessman or a bar tender, it seems to me that is the

major evil, I think. It is the subversion of the student who

is sent over here, unwiltingly sent over here for one purpose,

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in our institutions of higher learning, and is subjecred to

this effort.

And I am not ready to say that we ought to eliminate

that, but it seems to me

that we really are after the problem

that we are not totally addressing it by zeroing in on the

academics. All we are doing is making it harder for them to

do it, I guess.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think that is correct. If that is what

you see as the principle evil, you really have to go to the

question of recruitments.

Senator Mathias. But the response to my question to

efine

the evil, I think we wenü wider, and we talked about the taint.

Senator Huddleston.: We are not corrupting a faculty mem-

ber.

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MI. Aaron. I think my definition of the wider evil would

encompass the question of the professor representing himself

as being something other than what he represents himself to

be, both to the student and to the public at large, and i

do think I would share Bill's view, even though I am not an

academic, that they have a special responsibility in our

society, and because of that responsibility I don't believe

the government should be in a position of trying to detract

from that responsibility, which is a way I think you can argue

that this kind of clandestine effort would do.

If you want to get it the other problem, though, of

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recruiting students, you know, we are talking here about

positive foreign inteiligence, and I don't even think we have

stepped around to find whether from the standpoint of counter-

intelligence there are recruitments which take place of foreign

students; in other words, find out if another student may be

a witting KGB cooptee, Soviet. I mean, I just don't have any

idea where that situation would take us.

MI. Maxwell. Now, there would - one piece of information

on that is the documents published in conjunction with the

Huston Plan hearings this morning, I noticed that, whether

rightly or wrongly, that close to 50 percent of those soyat

exchange students who came to the United States in 1972 were

labeled as KGB cooptees.

Now, if they are to

be seen quite

as lambs being led to

the slaughter -

Mr. Aaron. The problem may be the other way around.

MI, Kirbow. Nost of the graduate students, which is what

most of the students are here, I think, we would be

concerned about, or the ones that are here under special

programsare hardly unsheltered youths, or rather, sheltered

youths.

Mr. Quanbeck. I have a question. Would this apply to

foreign students who attend like the Inter-American Defense

College or any of our in litary institutions throughout the

MH 50955 DocId:32123510 Page 62

United States? We have nundreds of them coming in.

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Mr. Kirbow. As it is witten, it would -- the ones who

sit down here in Washington where we have civilian instructors

who are academic instructors.

Mr. Aaron. It goes from the Government's use of the

academics, and unless we went to the question the Chairman

suggests, as saying that we don't recruit students --

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think that's just an extension

of the problem. I think it's reazly a difficult racommenda-

tion, and I am inclined to lean toward Bill Bader's suggestion

with the caveat of the wittingness of the institution.

Mr. Kirbow. Institution and individual?

Senator Huddleston. And individual.

And specify, for instance, that the president and, whether

it is the presidene or the board of trustees or the chairman

of the board or whatever it is, be aware of it.

Mr. Kelley, We are talking about so many different things

here, recruiting of students --

Mr. Aaron. Propayanda is another one.

Mr. Kelley. Going only to the student and asking the

student will he be an agent. That's what Senator Huddleston

is pointing out.

Mr. Kirbow.

Thay don't use them for that.

Mr. Kelley. The CIA going to a foreign student who is

here and trying to recruit him. That has been pointed out

as one evil.. Another evil or another practice is that i going

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to American faculty members

and saying, will you tell us about

any students here, and that is using that faculiy member for

an operational purpose, and then it is employing those

faculty members or other members of the academic community

during the leave of absence, when they go overseas of somewhere

else.

There are so many different things here, and some have

greater or lesser degrees of evil and desirability: that I'm

not sure that these two brief, you know, that we are taking

into account all of the subtleties..

Mr. Bader. All of these fall under the Agency's terminology

as the operational use of the individual, namely, to fina

each of these practices as being more or less acceptable, but

they are all operational.

Mr. Kelley. Maybe I'm saying that a blanket ban is too

blunt an instrument, and maybe

we don't have the time to

analyze each one of the things we are really talking about

and apply the kind of precision to them to accomplish what

we want, and therefore it nay be something for the oversight

committee to study.

Mr. Kirbow. I would suggest the third option, as the

Chairman said, that it not be prohibition but it be in allowing

practices where both witting individuals and witting institutions

with carefully structured regulations which required

the

type of notice to the governing individuals be as far as you

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go at this time, with no furcher showing of wrongdoing

MI. Bader. Well, Mr. Chairman, the problen with that is

as far as witting institutions are concerned in an economic

community, you cannot argue the case that - well, ju can

argue the case, but it cannot be a very sustained argument

that in an

academic community, by having one or more, a few

individuals somewhere in a university administration being

aware that certain faculty members are being used for recruit-

ment purposes, that you make the institutiong --

Senator Huddleston. Well, I would assure it would be

the president of the chairman of the board.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think Bill's point is that they are

not hierarchical organizations like making the cognizant

commander aware of which his troop is doing.

Senator Huddleston. Well, the president can say no, can't

he?

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Mr. Kirbow. And he can put out a notice to his fapulty

that this institution does or doesn't. I don't think there's

any institution that isn't managed by somebody, isn't there?

Ms. _Culbreath. Just this one.

Mr. Davis. A subset of that problem is how a university

would know that it's a covert problem, and the -- I mean, while

you were supposed to inform people of what you are doing, if it

is a covert contract, it's not entirely clear how the university

official would know.

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Mr. Kirbow.

The CIA would have that responsibility, not

the individual.

Mr. Davis. Well, then, if the president said no.

Senator Huddleston. Well, that really doesn't address the

evil. It doesn't solve that. It just gives the institution

a chance to say no.

Senator Mathias. Why doesn't somebody look at Gary.

Hart's first amendment question over the night. I think we

have kicked this one around about as far as we are going to

kick it.

Mr. Inderfurth. His feeling, by the way, when he lef

was because of the importance, that the various options should

be included into the report that goes to

the full Committee,

including the option of prohibition by law.

Senator Huddleston. What are we doing when we raise this

question publicly? I'in not sure the great body of the American

public or the great body of the world i

Mr. Miller. The more I listen to this, just our own recactio

and we are people that lave been working with the problem for

a year. _It seems to me that the exposire of the question

may do far more than any prohibition.

Senator Mathias. The only problem with that, Bill, is that

that may be of limited duration.

Mr. Aaron. Well, ii addition to these options, then, it

seems to me there ought to be an option which says that these

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operational uses would be permitted as long as the individual

were witting and some, maybe as you say, the chairman of the

board of trustees, or the presidents or their equivalents, were

notified of the relationship.

Mr. Kirbow. Or regulations to that effect.

Mr. Aaron. In other words, the internal regulationg of

the CIA would be to that effect, and is there a fourth.

option, that there should be a prohibition on any recruitment

of foreign students in the United States?

Is that a reasonable thing that the Committee ought to

consider as well?

Mr. Kirbow. I chirk the Senator said he wasn't willing

to go quite that far right now.

Senator Huddleston. I may be by tomorrow morning.

Mr. Maxwell. May I mention one more thing?

Most of this has focused on recruitment of students, which

I think is an extiaordinatily difficult issue because of the

value that is claimed by the Agency for that, and I think

my own, at least, ignorance about alternative means of doing

it. The issue of another evil which is an issue that Bill

has used about the possible use of academics to write propa-

ganda is I think a somewhat simpler issue, because I think

that may get more directly, at least more directly than

finding simply a list si toreign students and providing it

to the Agency, to the isue of how that affects the academic

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community, and a situation in which an academic may in act

be writing propaganda, putting out material that other people

in the academic community don't know is essentially by.

Senator Huddleston. Well, they have indicated to us that

they have discontinued that, that they have put nothing out

that is not attributed in the first place.

Mr. Kirbow. Sir, many of these people used to write

articles and whatnot for use overseas, so it has nothing to

do with the use in the United States, and they rely a great

deal on this type of contact for specialists in certain areas

to have an appeal to the people.

Now, whether or not that does them much good is a question

that is debated in the Agency a great deal, but the third

option would include what you said there, and a fourtn, if you

want to put it down here, to go before the full Conmittee,

is

a total prohibition against recruiting foreign students.

But I think if we could have until maybe tomoriow afternoon

this

constitutional question on that one issue is going to

get a little more complex.

Mr. Inderfurth. Will the Supreme Court sit before

tomorIoW?

Mr. Kirbow.

No, sir, but MI. Schwarz will be here

earlier.

Senator Huddleston:

Well, we have beat that one all we

can tonight, I beliave.

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Mr. Aaron.

Well, the

second recommendation here, I

don't know whether that is controversial with other staff

members or with the Senator or not.

Mr. Kirbow. That we are going to pilt the whole ¿cademic

question under further congideration tomorrow?

Mr. Aaron. Including this one?

Senator Huddleston. Academics for operational purposes?

Mr. Kirbow. On top of page 59, say, they're talking about

the use of cultural grantees of all U.S. government sponsored:

programs.

Mx. Aaron. The point of that being the Congress and

the

executive branch, for that matter, makes grants for education

and all sorts of cultural exchange programs that don't involve

academics, the athletes, artists and whomever for certain kinds

of specified purposes tnere, for Hands Across the Border

purposes

and what have

you, and if these are used for clandestine

purposes, in effect they would piggyback on overt programs

and there is

some question as to whether the Congress wishes

these programs to be so used, and that is really the question

the Committee has to tace up to. Do we want to permit those

programs, some of those programs, clear to the Fulbright

program - I know there's

a prohibition on it. The question is

whether that prohibition ought to apply to others.

Senator Mathias. hild you're talking about during the life

of the program.

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Mr. Aaron. Yeah.

Iget a grant for six weeks to go

to the Soviet Union to boclov Institute.. It's a Federal

Program.

Should I have a little extra money to visit someplace

else.

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Mr. Inderfurth. Yeah, but David, those are CIA prohibitions.

not by law, on the Fulbright.

Mr. Bader. Those are CIA prohibitions presently.

The recommendation here, which I think is separable from

the earlier recommendations, this is a question of whethey by

statute the CIA should be prohibited from using programs!

grantee programs that are federally funded to piggyback,

David puts it, operational purposes and operational uses

onto

it, in other words, if you are using Federal funds for another

purpose.

Senator Huddleston. I would agree with that.

Mr. Aaron. So is it your suggestion we should adjourn

until tomorrow?

Senator Huddleston. i think so.

Mr. Inderfurth. Gary Hart wanted me to raise one question

at the conclusion of this, and that is to get some feeling

for the timetable between now and Friday when this is supposed

to be all done.

Going into speed, I think he has concluded it

will be two years of something like that?

Senator Huddleston. Well, we are open to suggestions

or speeding it up.

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Mr. Inderfurth. Well, my comment to him was I thought

the discussions of the National Security and the role of the

DCI in covert

action, what

we're discussing now, should be the

most lengthy discussions, IG recommendations would go quicker.

but will these all be done by Friday?

Senator Huddleston. That is our hope, and I don't see

how we can do it unless we do meet twice a day. Hopefully we

won't have to go any more nights.

10:00 and 2:00 suits me, but tomorrow we'll commence,

some of us at least, at 9:00.

Mr. Maxwell.. I think that would do it, I think in terms

of complexity and debate. With the staff, I think the material

we have covered so far is the vast bulk of those, the hard

issue.

I hope tomorrow I will be meeting with the Domestic

Subcommittee drafters, and I think we can have an agreed version

at least on that side on the questions of the role of the

Inspector General and the role of the General Counsel and

maybe we can go through that four or five pages very quickly!

if it is agreeable to this side.

Mr. Inderfurth. Isn't this supposed to be completed by

Friday?

Senator Huddleston. Well, this is what we are shooting

for.

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Mr. Inderfurth. To go to the Full Committee over the

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weekend, and then Monday --

Senator Huddleston, Well, if we just finished Friday,

we've got to have at least a day for typing.

MI. Aaron. Well, let me just say I think, Mr. Chairman,

may I raise a point?

I think that one of the important questions here is the

extent to which you want to look back at what you've done. In

other words, we have been sent away to prepare and redraft

certain recommendations concerning the charter of the CIA:

for example concerning whether the DCI should wear both

hats and so forth.

At some point we must, I think, leave

some

time in the

schedule to look either at all of those changes

at once, or to spend a little time each day looking at the day

before's work, in assuring that in fact that is what we all

want to do.

Senator Huddleston.. I would rather get it all done and

then take a half a day where wa might, where each one of us --

are you retyping as you go along?

Mr: Aaron. We are retyping as we go along.

Senator Huddleston. I think if we get through the total!

then we can sit down, two or three members together, or the

staff or the member of the Subcommittee, and read it.

MI. Kirbow. Could I suggest a convenience procedure for

those of you who may have

30 minutes to do that, is that on

HW 50955

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the title and whatever short title we have got there, so

that

he can go right and look if he just has time to look at that

one change, he can go look at it instead of just - you know,

otherwise you have read it ten times already. It doesn't get

much easier reading it the eleventh time if you have to read

all 100 pages.

Mr. Aaron.

Just tab the amendment.

(Whereupon, at 9:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject

to the call of the Chair.)

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