Originator: HSCA
Document date: 11/02/1977
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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180-10 107-10127

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDEN ASSAS OF SYNERY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT: OF 1997/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER:

180-10107-10127

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 003012

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

11/02/1977

4

CIA

SMITH, JOSEPH BURKHOLDER

JMWAVE

HUNT, E. HOWARD

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS:

1B

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

12/17/1996

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

CIA tabbed Box CIA 71-1. Box 71.

v9.1

NH 50955

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2 November 1977

003012

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

TO :

Gary Cornwell

From: Dan Hardway

Re: Supplement to form V of interview with Joseph B. Smith.

GAETON FONZI and I interviewed Mr. JOSEPH BURKHOLDER

SMITH at his home in Jacksonville, Florida, on 19 October,

1977.

SMITH is an ex-CIA agent who has published a book,

Portrait of a Cold Warrior.

Mr. SMITH first explained how his book got by the CIA:

censors. He was living in Mexico when he contacted his editor,

NED CHASE, whö is also E: HOWARD HUNT's editor. CHASE checked

SMITH out with HUNT and SMITH was contacted in this regard by

HUNT.

When SMITH returned to Mexico he was contacted by a

Mexico City Station officer who asked if he was writing a book.

He said that he was and that he would be glad to give the book

to Langly, if they wanted it, before it publication. He did not

hear from

and bound.

The CIA contacted him and told him to retain a

lawyer which he did.

The CIA reluctantly allowed publication.

We next asked

SMITH about what motivated CIA personnel.

He said that it differed

with people but that it was usually :

1) professional anti-communism; 2) super patriotism; 3)

ideological/personal (exiles); 4) pay and excitement; or 5) a

combination of any and/or all of the above.

SMITH said that the CIA was a coherent entity. (This was

in response to a question about the tightness or looseness

of

the organization.)

SMITH started talking about the agency

response to crisis

in general, and to investigations in

particular.

He said that the

Agency response is predictable.

They will set up a task force to "handle and contain" the

crisis and/or investigation. The CIA will feel that they

are successful. if they appear frank and reveal nothing.

SMITH used the Rockefeller Commission as an example of this.

He does not have any direct knowledge of this response except

in cases regarding PHILLIP AGEE's "defection" and the

student infiltration revelations and investigation.

Both ofr

these were considered successful

, as were the Chuch

Committee

and the Rockefeller Commission.

SMITH said that CIA personnel are seldom bothered by the

distasteful tasks they undertake (such

as cover-ups)

because of the "clandestine mentality" which is drummed into

the officers until it becomes. "instinctual". SMITH said:

"When you are doing

everything is okay. "something essential for the country ther

It was clear that he meant the national

interest as determined by the individual officer.

SMITH said he had never really believed that OSWALD had

acted alone.

said that from his vantage point in Argentina

that the story

"just didn't ring true".

At the time he suspectec

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the Texas right wing but he now wonders about the Cubans. He

has no information about the CIA reaction to the assassination

because he was in Argentina at the time.

He doubted that the

CIA waS

involved because KENNEDY was "backing and depending on

the CIA. "

When asked if KENNEDY had support throughout the

Agency, he said that the people involved in the Bay of Pigs

were very angry with KENNEDY and "People like HUNT are strange

people."

He also thouth that it was possible that KENNeDy's

handling of the missile crisis was considered treasonous.

Still

speaking about the Agency's response to the assassination

SMITH said that the Mexico City Station was very proud of

finding the picture of OSWALD.

He started to talk about a

woman who worked for WIN SCOTT but he started to mumble and

very quickly changed the subject to MARITA LORENZ..

He said

that he didn't believe her story but "didn't we subsidize

them for so long, maybe she had to come up with the story to get

money: ".

SMITH said that the JMWAVE operation was considered very

important,

so important, in fact, that DES FITZGERALD, brought

in the CIA's best black operators, SHACKLEY and BILL HARVEY,

from Europe to run it.

He said that there was a certain amount

of fanaticism among the officers at JMWAVE and the CASTRO was

generally percieved as a "monster". The JMWAVE leaders wanted

to do a crack job. They

ran a lot of projects: "There was an

awful lot of wheel spinnin' goin' on". In 1962 they were

running nightly raids on Cuba.

The problem was that, in spite

of the wheel spinning and good intentions, they were inëffective.

In response to further questioning about the structure of

the CIA Cuban operation, SMITH told us that DES FITZGERALD was

brought in from the Far

operatior East Division

East Division to head up Task Force W

in early 1962. (It was called WH 4 before the Bay of Pigs.)

DES brought in ED LANSDALE and made WILLIAM HARVEY the head

of JMWAVE station. HARVEY was later replaced by SHACKLEY.

Next we asked if the structure would have permitted

running operations without the knowledge of high level officials.

SMITH said that FITZGERALD and LANSDALE were "outside of

channel's whenever they wanted to be." SMITH said that it

was possible that someJWAVE operations originated with

J. C. KING's Western Hemisphere Division..

He said that KING

would have ran it as a "hip-pocket" operation through an old

friend/contact.

FONZI then directed the conversation to E. HOWARD HUNT.

He said HUNT was "a real strange guy--conservative, bitter, ..:

and anti-KENNEDY".

He said that the source of his

story

connecting HUNT and STURGIS before the Bay of Pigs was HUNT'S

book, Give Us This Day.

FONZI then told him that HUNT had

very carefully avoided

that in his book. SMITH was very aware

of the Rockefeller Commission. He seemed surprised by what FONZI

said and said that he "was careful: not to say anything that

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hadn't already been published" about this. He said he was

sure it was published and said it was in a magazine article by

TAYLOR BRANCH which he had handy. FONZI said it wasn't in there

either and a check of the article bore him out. In response

to a question, SMITH said that DAVE PHILLIPS may have told him

the story but he doubted it. At this point SMITH started to

mumble and appeared nervous. He then said " I know I got that

from something I read" and that as soon as he found it he

would contact FONZI.

We then asked him generally about JAMES ANGELTON and how

he operated, He said that ANGELTON and most of-the Counter-

Intelligence Staff (CIS) were rabid anti-communists: "they

couldn't see the woods for the trees".

This colored every

thing they did. As to what they did: "God knows what he

was doing but he had the complete confidence of ALLEN DULLES".

He said that ANGELTON also often worked outside of channels.

ANGELTON started out in the OSS's Italian operation and

soon

hooked up with Israeli intelligence.

ANGELTON was the head : : "

of the CIA CIS from its inception in 1948.

As an example of

ANGELTON's power, SMITH said that the Middle East Division

did not have an Israéli desk until ANGELTON retired because

he personally handled all Israeli matters.

FONZI mentioned HARVEY's duplicity in briefing his

superiors on MONGOOSE operations but not on ZRRIFLE. SMITH

said that this is an example of the rule not the exception.

FONZI then mentioned HELMS.

SMITH volunteered that

everyone from the CIA who has testified is guilty of perjury.

This is because, in their view, their secrecy oath supersedes

the witness oath.

It is in the best interest of the country

to commit perjury because these things should never be brought

up, let alone

FONZI next asked him if he had any information on

POSADA, CARSWELL, WERBELL, UNDERWOOD, HECTOR OF EL INDIO.

The response to the first four was immediately negative.

started ruminating about HECTOR and

• EL INDIO but he was

soon

mumbling and showing other signs of nervousness.

He finally

said

that no, he didn't guess he had any information on them.

We then

asked him about the way the CIA manipulated the

name files:

He said that to get all the information on an

individual you would have

to ask for all the information

on him and all of his psuedonyms. There is a card "key"

in the personnel (office?) files. SMITH then explained the

difference between a vouchered and a unvouchered funded

agent.

He said that the usual procedure (above) would not

apply

• to unvouchered, or deep cover, agents.

He said that

the Agency handled these

agents' tax problems through a

contact with IRS. He said that there was a special CIA/IRS

hankling procedure and an office.

This would be the only

place where records pertaining to the particular agent would

be kept under his real name.

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h

We then asked him wheter a 201 file is significant.

He said it could mean anything from the fact that someone had

an interest in the subject to being a file on an employee.

He said that PHILLIP AGEE'S description of the dual 201

files on employees was correct. SMITH said that a cross

reference

to the two parts does exist but only a couple

of people

would have access to it.

He is not sure how

the cross referencing works. But in any case he said that

he doubted if we would ever see the second half of a 201

file simply because the Agency would not give them to us and

would deny their existence.

In response to the question:

"You mean they would lie to Congress?" SMITH answered:

"You represent the United States Congress but what the Hell

is that to the CIA?"

He said that we probably would not

even get complete copies of the first half of a 201 file;

or any of it, if it was on a particulary! sensitive person.

He said

that if we lucked out and learned

a psuedonym

and asked for the information filed under it, "it would be

met with high suspicion" and any connection or file would

be denied.

Mr: SMITH volunteered that an old friend, TOM FARMER,

was heading up the President's CIA oversight committee and

could probably help us if we contacted him. He also said

that he would be glad to work for us if we needed any more

investigators.

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