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157-10014-10117

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

7/7/2015

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER:

157-10014-10117

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-23

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

SSCIA

TITLE:

RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER

DATE: 00/00/1975

PAGES:

103

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

CCBOX 453

v0 1

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Date : 08/07/95

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10117

RECORDS SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE

NUMBER

: 07-M-23

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

TO

. =

TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER

DATE : 00/00/75

PAGES

: 103

SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

: POSTPONED

IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CCBOX 453

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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RICHARD GOODEN BINDER

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A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

4/26/61

5/2/61

5/4/61

5/5/61

5/24/61

6/10/61

7/8/61

9/1/61

11/1/61

GOODIVIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

Summary!

on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova.

Memo

to

Bundy re "Cuba Problem" from Goodwin.

Memo to Goodwin re "Possible Covert Activities against

Cuba,"' from Bissell.

Draft of NSC Action No. 2413.

Draft Record of Actions, 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61)..•

Memorandum of Conversation with Dick Bissell, Tracy

Barnes, by Goodwin.

Memorandum for the President re "CIA Reorganization,"

from Schlesinger.

Memorandum for Mr. Richard Goodwin re "Cuban Covert

Plan," from Schlesinger.

Memorandum to the President re Cuban Task Force

Meeting,

8/31, from Goodwin.

J.

11/2/61

L.

11/4/61

11/22/61

M.

N.

8/10/62

8/13/62

0.

P..

8/14/62

5/27/75

Cuba, from Goodwin.

Memorandum, Eyes Only for the President and the

Attorney General," re "operation should be organized

with five staff components," from Goodwin.

Memo, 'Eyes Only," re recommendations that "the Cuban

Operation be organized in five components."

Memorandum to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, Director

of CIA, AG, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Lansdale,

Richard Goodwin

...summary of the major decisions which have been

made in regard to the Cuba Operations" from Goodwin.

Memorandum for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special

Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August, 1962.

Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, Robert Hurwitch,

State, Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense, Don Wilson, USIA

re "Alternate Course B," from Lansdale.

Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "Operation

MONGOOSE," from Harvey.

Sunmary of Goodwin Interview w. Aaron re "Intelligence

Activities in Latin America."

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Q.

R.

S.

T.

6/10/75

7/17/75

5/13/61

5/29/61

(date of cable)

10933

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Table of Contents - 2.

Szulc Testimony before SSC, excerpt.

Summary of documents produced by Goodwin on 7/16/75,

by Dennin.

Memorandum to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in

the Dominican Republic."

Draits and original of cable from State Dept. to

Dearborn.

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July 17, 1975

TO :

F.A.0. Schwarz/Curtis Smothers

From: Joseph E. DiGenova

Re:

Richard Goodwin Materials and Summary

summary

A. Goodwin Interview of July 16; 1975

Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time

on July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba

Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had pre-

viously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force

that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project.

In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be

very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present

during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad

Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro.

(See Szulc's testimony infra.) ¡ He spoke with the President

after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about

assassination:

"We can't get into that -- we'll all be

targets."

He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything

to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts. With regard

to the August 10, 1962, meeting, which he attended, Goodwin

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noted that McCone never made any oration upon the immorality

of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meet-

ing and said that "assassination was not shot down"

When

pressed for details at this point, and after being shown

the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he

said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made

any more statements about who said and did what. He noted,

however, that in

1966 while in Peru with Robert Kennedy that

Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions

about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said

"Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life."

At the conclusion of the interview he turned over

to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he

had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to

this summary.

B. Goodwin Interview of May 27. 1975

During the course of

this earlier interview,

Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the

Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as

follows:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much

specific talk of assassination, although

it would not have surprised him if it had

gone on.

He mentioned one specific in-

stance in which he had heard talk of

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assassinating Castro. After the Bay of

Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established,

first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by

Goodwin in his capacity as White House

Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task

Force, held at the State Department,

McNamara suggested

"getting rid of Castro",

someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell,

then asked if McNamara meant "Executive

Action".

McNamara responded that he did

and stressed his interest in the idea.

However, Goodwin did not bring the topic

up later in the meeting after McNamara

left. (See interview infra.)

C. The Goodwin Documents

The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished

the Committee are of no startling significance. One docu-

ment, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin,

is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli

connection or the efforts to assassinate Castro. Bissell

notes, "I have not attempted to

provide you with much

detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with

Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell

to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An

Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the

President discusses the need for revamping of the "intelli-

gence set-up" of the United States.. In a footnote in that

memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not able to

control its operatives once they are in the field and of

the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo.)

neit li

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The other documents indicate the thinking that went on up

to the point where the Lansdale group was established

as

the coordinated effort against Cuba.

Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin

- What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August

10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended?

-- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to

in his initial interview where McNamara broached the sub-

ject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused

them and are they one and the same?

-- How does he explain McCone's recollection of having given

an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when

it was brought up at the August 10 meeting?

- Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at

that meeting?

- What discussion, if any, followed?

MaN.

patrist:

tartantho

parate

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SECRET

Draft

4/26/61

MEMORANDUM

To:

From:

McCeorge Bundy

Dick Goodwin

Here aro a low scattered thoughts on the "Caus" paoblem.

Cuba in a threat to the cocurity of tho United States in to basic wayo:

1. As a direct military muscco in the Crib. un, a menace which will

Do intensicad ao communist errao chipmonto conti.ioe Hoverci, oven this

incrcased danger will bo minimal. Cui tacaty obligationo i. mmit us to ta

defonse of any American ratioa which do citackod directy. Any military

rIct

moves by Castro could bu inmediatoly by our foices. Similaaly we ecuid

Interveno in case of Castro military aid to guontla operasions in tie Americas.

2o As an exportez of revolution:

These in no cout: that Cuba is being

used as a base for esport of the commurist-lidolicta rcvolution. This is

done through the actual supply of fundo and technical assistance to insurgent

clemente, through widespread and reasonably eliective propaganda epparatue

including a news survice and radio netoni aid chuouga the use of Cuba 25 an

examplo of the allicace betwech fidciiomo und nocessary ¿scial icform

identification with i: weifare of the peoplo.

This thicat is significant --

conccially in the Carribcan arca. However,

oven hero, in tho last six montho thero has been a significant declino in Cuban

cslectivencss.

This has come because

of the growing isolation of communist -

fiodlicto clements from tho Democratic loit as Castro's pro-Sovist bont has

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becoma more apparent; and as Corio tao Locome lasicarngly Croctic in

His personal bohavios. Thoso are signa, in foot, thotg the commurist are

100king for arother, more stablo,

45eo a pouhaps Cardosas of leaico.

3. While this moono a dociting infuunco of aculistao over popular

movemonds; it does not necessasily

• leseen tho impostenco of Casna-Soviet

Chineso material md tocical add to corolationary movorcondso It 15143-

postant to remembar that evon it Caciro waro Wized Cut toonorzow ta World

not have solvod tho pro ziona cá coma

sinist inauonee in tha darnado Infect,

most of the giculout Cangos spots (2.G. Northeast Drauil, Columbia baeli

county, cormunist dorzinated studust movamendo, oteo) do not cue elecor

their endotence on strcagth to Cacio, but to local and independent leadessilo.

Thie danger has been Stestly growings 311.22161 Coutato Es 1021 L cue Sel:

aati-commendat nese 90E9 10 Lusch Cut Gested. These movementa vill

Erost frosa material assistance,

over if they do not icon to Cuba for Icadershiv.

boil Cauree of Actios

Aired At Cabo Discale

1o Icíuro coticg dacotly egainst Castro, in any Innhion, we need a

completo cacccosmont of to vulseastity of his regimo -- the dogsee o!

popular suppost, tie probably declining position of the Cuban economy 23d

its impact on the Cugen people,

tho eificiency of his police stuto, the possi

bilitios of undosground orgarization, etc. Without such au zosessaca: it i3

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imposcible to realitically determine wint altoinative cou.sos of action iro

open to us.

Z. To mect tho military threat we con worl out defense agrecments

with Contral Amorican notions clong tho lieso suggested with Profossor Dorle.

3. No should approsch the goverament of Chie to cail on Inier-Amorican.

aIms limitation conference. This conicienco ohould doal vith mosioss o

stopping etcinal armo shipmonto in the contont of the ovcr-ail limitations

which aro desparatoly recdod in Latin

America. Ma chould decido, befozo

thia meeting, whothes lie risks in an DAS blockoie of armo chipmonts to Cuba

aro outweighed by the dangers Involved in halting and searching international

shipping.

1. Immediataly consulé with heads of isajor nationa in Leili Anozica

to sec how far thoy are willing to go in toamo of colloctive action. this chouid

be done via a porsonal emissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear

¿dos of what we wani to do, this should ba = gonuino consultation among allies.

All the myriad proposala for Old action, dice, depend oi the caction of other

Latin nations - a roaction as you uncctermines.

5. Undoslying all these proposals is tho fecling that ve shoula not move

quickly in direct action against Cuba.

1 do not believe that there is any course

of direct sction which we can wisely talie on the basis of current Inowledge and

conditions.

SICRET

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2220ES E2 0602

do Wo could provido Cariocan nasons with to technica hola

(e.lo saras to spot incoming planes) and navy patrol asticiance to mcci the

dangers of 27n5 chipments 1om Caba to ansurgeit ecments 13 ti0so 20t1029.

2. These aro tvo or tarce roul danger spois (S.je Dantalcon Ropublic

anil liaiti) mere va should sow do coveloping comocratic externatires to tho

present regio a organiciog ropincomes govezamenic. if we do no: do 143

then the incvitablo changed in government may be followad by Castro-Gype

regimes. When Democratic alteruires auc orgcuised wa should consider

recans of procipilating tho fall of Trajillo end Durator and possibly Somo==,

In thie way we can ensui marinamn contacl over the type of roplacomont govcra-

ment - the timing and initiative should be curse

3. liolp provide couater-p5oz:

saida sonintance to Lolla goraramonia

- CEo Iatio tsanarnistero.

¡to can work tarcugh Domocratic

liberal luncco in Latin America, rathos tien through bout ciose, de moro

effoctive will be our propaganda.

Conocal countes-comradelat poacation 3

Car 200g-5ang0 strategy in to Amoricas shouid have two basic c'emento:

Eires, tic osganisation of a strong poiltical counter-feace. We have

= robby inotrument in to newly orgerited League of Damocratic parties.

SECAST

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•5..

We abould encict tose partios -- ananciaily and tochaicaliy - to develos

progressivo pollacil movemento (la somo coses serolutioray saovemento,

copecirlly in the losa progressiva countrion) brough holpity them ia teci

riguca of organiaction cova to the village lovel, ideological varlare, cic..

U. Si goveramoré holp aboula ba covert.

Sacond, te Alianso para di progreso. This program with isa emphacio

on social and econonio advance id tro soal hope of proveashg a communist

talsovor, The Plicana la procoediag bãcut es reptily ao posciblo given present

organiaation dE ellore, sad lo mogaitado di arailablo fundo, Dota of tlece

clomonis se unallsicetosy.

io Furdo: Presone plans provido Íos Qua al1ocuioa di 250-350 railion

collars worta of ecosondo ascistance.

to Lucha Acresica la flocal 1932. Tro

15 out of a toil al toño billiono (Mis suma does not Busindé tao social develop-

mont fundi. Ose hundred mûlioz cá this malgusato Deani to ges thom over

thete curront Enancia criola, & son no: clona daat euy cobstandal allocasion

costa de made Diven tiza crosmoua neodo in Asia focpecialy An Indla cad

Palistan) en although i boliove there cos us some increpece However, ticas

fundo año probably not Sudaciont to zaice a seul and effective ctort in economic

D. Orgasisatica: I contuniot inhoover corses in Laida Amorisa it

probadly vil soi come through querilla variare, but tarough tha conturo ce

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indigcnoso revclutoney movemento.

No carnot moss such a fueat

clicctvoly a woll-organined as it is

10 Lilace and uncoordinated as tay

polidical barcare of Otate, the Goi

sducalloral cachange, Clacctivities

all go, to 80o groni an cotent, thair or may under separato houdo and oitos

12 pracuis ce separate 5o=15. I bollera that recalung clinicior of cifort,

results in gross waco of rcconces and inteligence. We must crgarize our

non-military ovezgead operatioa to

reflece our boule objectivo in Latin

intorico n the strengthening us detaocratio Vostozz-ocionted nations ca1

govermonto ao thai licy kavo tie

capacity to sociot communist attacle in cil

its formo, Those woo zee changed with to rasponsiblisy ior achloving this

objective must kora coutrol over dio instrucerts vich ons govesnraent

providodo Just no we lave seen

the need for sono contralination of contand

in fighting hot meso -jin noedolos crectively vogiag scold var. This

doos not nocenorily racau a "Chiod ca Homiaphere Operatlono"; but ce se

vory leact it onss fist. with

in ouch kay country there mucat he & coniel o5-

eratoral capacity mad authority dith direct lives to the luvolo ci accos in

Washngton,

SECRET

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to a pour can

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUN FOR: Ni. Richard N. Goodwin

Assistant Special Counsel to the

President

SUBJECT:

Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations

against Cuba.

In view of your familiarity with this subject

and our conversations over the past few days, 1 have not

attempted to provide you with much detail.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Deputy Director

(Plans)

Attachment: Paper as stated above

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2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin

Assistant Special Counsel to the

President

SUBJECT:

Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations

against Cuba.

In view of your familiarity with this subject

and our conversatione over the past few days, I have not

attempted to provide you with much detail.

Richard M. Biggell, Jr.

:: Deputy Director

(Dlans)

Attachment: Paper as stated above

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SCOCA

=33

2 Iviay 1961

1"17

As indicated by the combined INR/ONE estimate, anti-Castro

activity within Cuba will probably be muted at least for the next

several months.

Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way

suspect have been arrested. A recent report from the Swiss

Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100, 000.

All internal services will continue to work on a theory of repression

plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be

very difficult to carry on any clandestine operations and it is doubtful

that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening

the Castro

regime.

In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition

to the regime among individuals still at large and that such opposition

is prepared to undertake action despite

the risks involved. Moreover,

there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces

and communications can

still be had either directly or indirectly with

these individuals. At the very least these agents can and will continue

to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In addition,

certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be

infiltrated, could attempt to carry out some sabotage. Individual

acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small

amounts of material. Successive

acts

of sabotage i extensive

SOC

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sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in

terms of loss of men.

Nevertheless,

it would be possible,

starting

the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining

its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased

program

might be developed.

A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including

infiltration and exfiltration of individuals,

landing and caching of arms,

under-water

sabotage of shipping and sinall

raider operations.

Under

present circumstances it would seem

wroNg

to attenpt these except on

a very limited scale and, in all likelihood,

raider operations

should not

be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been

obtained.

Ihe Agency also has a

small air arm including

some transport

aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack

bomber aircraft (B-26).

Although it is

not absolutely certain, there

is

reason to suppose that

Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the moment,

air operations

should be substantially eliminated with the

possible

exception of supply flights to support opposition elements unable to

survive without such support. Even with respect to such operations,

however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful

night drops is extremely limited

so that the urgency should be great

to justify the risk. B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against

chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if

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(""

successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotage.

In view

of the risks involved, however, and the poor deniability of U.S.

support where aircralt are involved,

it is recommended that such

operations be avoided at least for the present.

Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an independent ViRP

capability to conduct infiltration, intélligence collection,

sabotage

and defection operations into Cuba.

He recognizes a need for U.S.

support but is very firm in his desire

to operate as independently

as possible of any official U.S. connection.

His initial request

is for five boats, some materiel

and

some money. He admits,

however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real

estate, some help with training and

communications will be required.

He offers to share his information

with the U.S. Government, seek

U.S. advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to operate

with the Revolutionary Council. The

Council's views are being

canvassed and Ray has been asked to

prepare a prospectus giving

in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future

and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts

prove successful.

The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support

within rcasonable linits if the relationships proposed both with the

Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory.

SEGRET

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SPORT

In addition to the activities described above, propaganda

activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines

and newspapers can be continued independently by the Agency or

in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council. Moreover, limited

political action operations are possible. As to both propaganda

and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type

of activity undertaken will depend to

a large extent on the decisions

with respect to

the operations described above.. Consequently,

these will be noted here

as

mere possibilities.

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DRAFT

TOP SECRET

3.

DO So POLICY TOWAND CUSS

(USC Action No, 2413-g; lano for MSC, sane subject, dated May 4, 1961)

2. Agread that the political objective of l. B. polloy to

ward Caba lu to bring about the domfall of the Centro

b. Agresc that the United States ahould not undertake mile

Itary Intervention in Cuba nor, but should do nothiag

that would foreclose the possibility of milftary Inter.

vention in the future....."

So Agread that the Cuban aituation should be kept under

constan: review, ln the light of the possibility that

actions by Castro would prompt a reconsideration of

the decialon not to latervene..

do Agroad that the United States should not Impose a naval

or ale blockade againat Cuba at this time.

Noted the lepertence the freaident attaches to obtains

Ing tinely and adaguate latelligence an to Cuban m111-

tary capsbilitled, especially the anbancement of such

capabilitlos by Sino-Soviet Bles milftary assistance,

takiag Into aocount the posalbility of U. 8. Inter-

vention as a fature laid date.

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DRAPE

TOP SECRET

L. Noted the Importance che Preslient attaches to publica-

tion in the frte World press of, the cerroristle acciona

of the Castro ragine.

They apes - 19. 112011

¿o Hoted tha Fresident's direction that tha Jask Forca on

Cuba maso a detalled study of possible vealmeases and

vulnerabilitles in the elenonts which exert control la

Cuba coday.

Hated that a Speçtal Conaltres, under the direction os

the pirector ad Contral Intal isence, world prepara a

plas of spacial covert operations with respect to Cuba,

for tho

conesceration or

the Freeddent.

Lo Agreod thes no separate Cuban nilitasy force should be

organized to the Valted States, but that Cubes nationals

would be encouraged to enliat in the U. S. armed forces

and trained In spell unles cantreIng 0s- Sparich-

apcakine zactonato, under a plan to ba presented by

the Secratary of Defense In conveccion wich his review

of U. §. comventional forces..

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DRATI

TOP SECRET

1o Agreed chat Cuban nacionale sou la the Valted States

u111 be given refugee statue and assisted, under a

progian to be davaloped and directed by the Secretary

All note ces demined

of loalth, flucation & helfare, la carrying on tholr

debates, ter

former occupations. Refugees now in Went will be

my atone gible ur

encouragad to locate in other areas. Cuban nationale

entering the United States will ba given refugee statue.

l Agiced sor to impose a complate trade embargo on Cuba

for the present, but 11 later nctione by Castro resultad

In a desiaton to do so, all trade with Cuba would be.

atoppedo Tia Secretary of State agzeed to send to the

Frosident C4 an malyois of how a U.S. embargo on

trade with Cuba would alfoct our trade colations with

other countrios under che Bactio Ast.

Noted that the Fresident would discues wich Canade the

position of Canadian subaidiaries of U.S. corporationa

in the event of U.S. Impositions In trade embargoes

on Cubelo

22669

Io Agraad thar the United States ahould at once initiate

nagotiation to enlarge the ulllingness of ochor Aneri

can states to Join In bilatoral, muleilatoral and GiS

arrangemazo to quarantine Castro, nuah na (1) breaking

diplomats relations with Cubas (2) controlling

if -

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aubvereivs cotivistes of Cuban agents, (3) preventing

arms shipmente to Castro; (4) limiting economie rela

Cions vich Caba, (5) croating a Caribboan security

forco; (6) Intilating a naval patrol to prevent Culan

Invanton of other statos in the Caribbean, and (7) de-

nunslation of Castro as an agent of International com

malen by lakh all nationa of this honisphore.

Do Agreed that sha Alliance for Progrese should be

strongthanad by such measuron as (1) rapid Implemente-

tion of selected cocial developmont projecte; (2) ae-

coleration of the toplesentation of other latin Anor-

1can ald; and (3) provision of aidisional resources

for latin Anerican econoule and social divalogant,

Including consideration of a supplemental appropila-.

tion for devalopuent loans.

2. Agreed chat the U. S. Inforuntien Agency would fripu

expand fts existing program in Intla Anerica rather

chan inielata electronic varfare against tha Castro

regime.

Die dire el in mi lie

lo Agreed that U. S. milltary officers, undor genedal

guidance to ba prepared by the Department of State,

would discuen the Castro threat to all Latin America

with Latin Asarican officero.

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Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a

report on a possible new juridical banis for effoe-

tive anti-commiet action.

4.

YeS, POLICE TOWARD TUE DOMICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agrcod that the Tank Force on Cuba would prepare promptly

both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communior

Intervention in the ovent of crises la Halit or che

Dominican Ropublie. Noted the President's view that

che Uniced States should not initiate the overthrow of.

Trujillo bafore wa knew what govarment would succeed

hin, and that asy action against Trujille ahould be.

multilateral.

Ball Grinders

1-6-

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50

DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS

483rd NSC Meeting

(5/5/61)

1.

U. S, POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate

a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on

May 19.

2. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Agreed that & Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for

Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate

a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on

May 19.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2413-C; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

3. Agreed that U. S, polley toward Cuba should aim at the downfall

of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not

likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at

Intervals with a view to further action.

b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military in

tervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would fore

close the possibility of military intervention 1a the future.

•1

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POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

S. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade

or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither

course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely

and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, es-

pecially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet bloc

military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible in-

tervention may be maintained at an adequate level.

e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the

Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regive:

and to possible political action to end the current terror.

£. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence

Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of

possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which

exert control in Cuba today.

& Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be

improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized

as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar

as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

k. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized

in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged

to enlist in the U.S. armed forces under plans to be developed

by the Secretary of Defense.

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3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

L. Agreed that Cuban nationals

now holding U.S. visitors' visas

will be given refugee status

and assisted, under a program to

be developed and directed

by the Secretary of Health, 'Education

and Welfare, in carrying on

their former occupations. Refugees

now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban

nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status.

All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and

it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizen-

1. Agreed not to impose an Immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The

Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis

of the effects of a U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation

to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is im-

posed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain excep-

tions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.

k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation

to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in

bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro,

such as. (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) control-

ling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms

shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba;

(5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) Initiating a naval

patrol to prevent Cuban Invasion of other states in the Carib

bean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international

communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

• 3

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3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

1. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by

such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social de-

velopment projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of

other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional re-

sources for Latin American economic and social development, in-

cluding consideration of a supplemental appropriation for devel-

opment loans of the order of $200-$400 million.

m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its exist-

ing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare

against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made

available to non-U. S. groups.

D. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to

be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro

threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

O. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a

possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.

2. Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of

State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should

be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assis-

tant to the Special Counsel

"to' the President.

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4.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HALTI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emer-

gency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the

event of crises in Haits or the Dominican Republic. Noted the

President's view that the United States should not initiate the

overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed

him, and that any action against Trujillo should be mulcilateral.

5. Us So POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GULANA

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done

In cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take -over

In that country.

6. U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEASI ASIA

a. Noted that efforte

should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem

that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.

b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are

considering inclusion of U.'S. troops in SEATO forces to be sta-

tioned in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments

during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.

≤. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending

recommendations to the President promptly on the number of U. S.

training troops to be stationed in Thailand.

5

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May 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH:

Dick Bissell

Tracy Barnes

Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities

in Cuba should be made before the President returns from his European

trip. However there are a few things he thought should be done Immediately:

1. That he revise the internal ClA organization in preparation for possible

covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miami.

2. That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban pilots be continued as pilots under

commercial cover in Central America and perhaps one or two American

companies. No commitment should be made to them that they would be

used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not

as any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skilla

alive and to keep them available.

3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan situation. We have left a lot of

Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation.

He would

like to pull this equipment out of there, turning somo of the B 26's over

to Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilots to remain there to train

Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request

and would only be done if he insisted upon it as a re-payment for services

rendered. I stressed that no Americans should be involved in the train-

Ing of Nicaraguan pilots.

1. He would like to train a few Cubans as radio operators. They would be

trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others

were being trained. Thia amounts to training some individual agents for

possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men

trained. It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeke.

5. In addition, the Agency would like to survey the various potential inaur-

recitonary groups which now exist. There are several of these groupe,

three or four of which claim to have an undorground in Cuba. We should

speak to them. We should tell them we could make absolutely no commit-

ment as to any future activities. However, he would like from them an

assorment of what they thought they could do in the future and - If they

were to be active what help they would require from the United States.

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• 2

This would enable us to make & judgment at to whether we should en-

gage in covert activity based partly upon this information - informa-

tion which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required

and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been

done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groupe contacted would include

thetCouncil, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR.

6. In addition, he was informed that Swan radio could not be uned by the

Ust They are unable to assimilate it into their system. & suggested

- that we might try to find a good Latin American group, 0. 8., The League

of Democratic Partios or the Institute of Political Iducation run by Jose

Figures, to use it. I said that for the Council to operate the station did

not seem to me to be desirable.

%. I discussed the general eituation in Miami and the various newspaper

reports. I pointed out that the MlA agents now in Mlami were known to

everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were

idontified with pre-invasion activities. Their presence I felt only in-

tenstiled the rivalry among Cuban groups and sorved as a socal point of

discontent. I requested that this group be broken up and that to the ex-

tent agente were necessary new peopld people not identified with the

pre-invasion activitles - should be sent to Miami.

8. It was agreed that no future covert activitien should be conducted in

the Miamt ares and that the groupe with whom we dealt should be scattered

In other cities throughout the Sourteastern part of the country. I said that

working la Miant was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city

room of a newspapes.

9. We also agreed that Di. Miro could be intormed that we were making

a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be told nothing more

specific than that.

10. I also reforned to the newspaper stories which reported that Batiatiano:

were being used supported by U.S. -CIA funds. They sadd this was not

accurate. They sald that this would be very carefully looked into and that

the most specific Instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos

should be supported directly or indirectly by the U,S. government.

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11. I am strongly of the opinion that we must clear up the Miami area

a8 soon as possible. Therefore, I will

get Ribicof! to expedite the

Rouges program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds

in order to got these people into jobs, schools, etc. In other parts of

the country. Unless we do this we me going to have continually in-

creasing problema in the Miami aisa.

Richard N. Goodwin

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I sas 30, 1702

41100001 Рен

THR

FTA3DENT

mo prchainy bees sary goo.

MENE BETATA.

NOGISO" LO MORIOLO. MEd 575468N S0SE0C 1S

Che GHER MA IO 7I04

ie rangta dos fusure arant lo pracrically

Lea moro gli dabacie mil dista 1aih conclascery

rsarpandendo la vill fan la lue Algorisa dontanaed do ricale azes jox

iba arçanans di thie escarasdue la that ClA'e Simablo con ti isared

ascolas e alandrodns coorations f colantenate 20001211. 10

ascarican inchineen 10

publicy.

The criminh mai inna unamera tore diriga:

12. 123 11.

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concepilod ul the selzzionnhi

bainsan speradlend and inalligeses.

The memorantam dies cuassars waye la which sona el 1haa0 piot

lens cha perhapa be alloviazed.

• LA AULOREMI

ClA condocta threo main forms co socies work, clamantico irralll-

resce collectioni covert political operations; nod paramilitary

acciulear. Is carrion on luote functlons tith ralativo autonorry.

The roadone for the nutonon y are nistorical.

When ClA bogan, the stale lopertinens still chining too much is

corms st ite traditiooni misalano lo lorolga miinire, looked on this

new ventura prita stopicios apd respunced the spportuniy to selse

It did sal, fer enample, try to

establlah any aloctivo systoi cá clearanco los ClA activitios, and

in thair countrles.

Miter 1259 the lect list the secretery of festo And

the Direcror os Central baniligenco were brokera further condlamed

CA'e indapondanes fresa arpervision by Mato Dapartmen desko.

In the meantime, ClA gren la siss sad power.

Luring Sao disties 1s

bagan la some arcas to casatalo the Linto Deperimen la tha quelity ol

partly becauss ClA pald higher ellastes and even

more portapa because Allen Dullen gave his parre comragoeue pro

coctica against do Castays attacks, ClA mus ablo to airaer nad bold

s lasgo verber al asto and ladopondont ladod men, The scors 18

cood brillias resivioro to la cad, me mesa momean liu operatione

doveleped, and abo groates role de played la the iridacion sa policy.

Iy tho time thas drase had boguto lo fully arore dl los problemia

crested by as active and autobumous CIA, le had leag since mlaged

the chanes in octablish lie or widare duchessy.

tanos a nombos mpervisica over covere pollisced epsrasiona, this so.

to como dogres ofinst by ChA'o londonsy to precral a proposed epezation

almo as s in anocall stars neres ind titin to coresal overt

clandestine intelligene erilections and ll bei los grenad in 09ch

#rOSA as 009t8 pullical copciting and eras la due zoedanance el

crete diplomatic contacin

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SPIRIT

Long already lagn unctiona cs the berte department, dod s

the berease Deparinet as/vell. Today ll bao lls 0as political

decks and millary malisi is has in cliest lts osa fereiga corvice;

¡l has (or haa had) lif cua combss forces:

18 even, had ite own air

force.

No annual budgot lo stout.

slaron that oá the Stato Depare

77221280

The concommenry ClA possessos many of the characteristico

no atate 116h17 224083.

Il.

Doctrina

louga ll's amonomy sevelopod for hintoriced readons, le lie ice:

ablo to endure pecausa there ia do soctrino fuserias our condue i

ciardeauno sperationa, Tro problom dó doctrica loT CLA do the arent

do shich le carious clastestina minaions nie compatible wish a fros

and open cociety.

I 10 ialo so arguo that boozuse the Communera can do suck-and-aco,

wo are froe to do 16120. Communiora lo a cread surtared la con.

epirseys end the viole polnt of Communius eoclal and polisleal organi.

sallen lo lo make cosepiracy elfectivo. Il 'lighting Are wits fire' meane

contracing the sacsome erodisionally enjoyed by Americana in ordar

to give more freado to ClA, no one perionely eloiso to do thai.

"i est

¡ do nos deal thas we here ested rigarously do think through the liradia

mich the rainsannace of an opon society placos en necret setivity.

Unaul chla is dons, ClA'o solo will not ha cloarly defined and under.

010rd.

The problero maich must bo laçod la: whae cort of secre:

aRivily la cORsItoRt with the praserustion dl a fros soclad order -

Vie muet begin, i baldeve, by accepting sha fact tree the Unitad Biasas

sill continuo to be e nation in which pollucians vull des questions and

roake speechos, esporiese cull dig out sterior, newspapora will pula

lan editoriala, irdinuals, driver by promptingo di conocioner, will

hours out lings norman to the stare, and 1u ou

We do not wish to

chengo those things and come one do do minus violaing she essenes

El our aDEloty.

Thest things roake up tha framework da which Che

Inued operate.

in short, they condilture the problem sou, aa

Conoral Marshall usad to ray, "Thore'a no poice la fighting the

problens. "

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22Inesalos and eracticoa of cur sociaty: and they they esasa to ta

251211293.

inch horm os acert activley presente ita osm problero. Clondostlric

intelligenes collectien hes heen a tradicional functica af the sational

eletr.

o ralas and unagon ara falaig voli astablinhed in tho

main, applonigo, li cocáucted min diocroston, abould gangort no

15nat problema.

Honewer, tion condicice with an open clochbost

and a broad nandoce, even enpionage con bagia to prob agatsos lha

limite of racio achetty in an opon sociary.

1 canaldor Laser dei

mananala, lor cuandon d the Consicilsd Amoricon Scraco (CAS) ar

thetnor the prestalag d CAs 13 not bogianing so baria oshos activitioa

+8 s20 soberanent

Covers political opormiona prosant a triciles pratam Oceaeiena

ariss then li la secoznary to cubaialue somoprporo politicaros eid

osgastrations in athas counislod..

Dos corrugados do the polltical lilo

de anathor notioa do sol a responsibilisy do ba ligialy reccmad 1

mandos 11aek9r ClA baa sot doro teo muca nI chia lor tho joy es li.

Pararailitary actluition arcate da euen more culilsull preblor, 11

enly becauas the problema el concorinas aro so mosa moro diálculi.

In annersh, l mold congues ibal say socrat aparatlos maesa auscasa 18

topsadons on the engoraraton de 2ons, an lying is Crogrosensis and

jourEBidosa snd os lhe Cacaron Os lan alceierzin chould ha unsoreaser

saly when la orlalo la ao concidasablo chas the arias sentay seaos to

cubwaigà the destrantages. Thlo cu8ys0 1138 850 1112 180 3

posad endratian may te el crucias impertance. Saill erasasione can

lo dono sith a mánimum e acoanangion corruptles tho sorsicr

cansating tha Impalees and danying the vilone di da opoa seciety.

tho sioklor li boceros, aud the more ungare it 1a that an crerwkelniing

In short, uhen contrastes with a proposed egeration, o muse rol coly

ank whocher the oprention le tschriedily densilin in les con tario: na

mint ank maothor ita outedad

To4el+4y 958 70030001898 453910dny

postavo way talao to isa ana podelalon.

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CEONET

M. Screena 92d 30257

Clariorano uctivilice miabld bo aonesoed de caly la the contest

no canis relaticanty is as cuca secluty lat lee in tho corcase of soola

roladenedip to United Stares Cordiga polley.

Cle sperationa hava nes cuer bold eliocctvely extordtoase to 1. 8.

Clonecaius Arcallance collection in, Ey charger, 1880 18422

62488

Unpartrena control.

Thin tact raposes American doreigs policy

in a multinão of embarrauanets when CLA la sleeverad secruiting

counto si developing sources in e friendly country. The recent

singaporn coat, mon ClA, ultiout sollea to the Coacul Genoral,

Leled to nature a mambos o1 abs Bgachal Eranch es the Singapore

Police provideo do lestuctla eumple. Mesar carolisationo of

SulcIone conso 100100ng 15 attempt to abjees the css

= le-onedor tore, ll toned mus thas she rocrit ird long sinto

1são a trep mich, when spesas producad consuleratio embasrass.

tase to relations busmon the Ug and te fingerse Eareraarea!.

There hers hoo 1502b1ae ol a corparable sort is Pakietra gad in

Japan (rhero a grows as Chinodo Nationale vero ermgaled Lato 3aso3a

ClA has and tai, 1n such mass, nellicer sho tirchoony nor the Dageri

ment la Wanhingron is nazically laformed d this typs 61 aparalias.

In ShOTS nO dna knows how Bany posential proliame for US foreigo

polley • and low mach schanded friction win Erleny stries a RIe

balag creatod ai this amara by ClA clandoninO lusallacuce eparesis

Gurchy there 19 09 argumont los permissing sion 85 declas weshes th

arrantage lu do poted by to suaratica la gro the inforcation dosiva

from on agaro wilble the spocial Drench el Elo Siagarora Podies) 12-

wighn the theb 1. 5, enreperating the local corramon and chardg

ite conflaance bula la out parpress nud la con sopsal Clerdereine

isollignnen cogrations nhas mainy be clangod tol sits cho Duper.

murt al santa 2nd leave for encentlocal inclances and la agrosmori o

tha BesseLaTy có StAre) will 24a local UoS, Auntaesador,

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E. Coreia policions costariaos sochalenly regatro state

deparemont closrate

ana to teira the saltairo in mays nici reduco diaso'o roda aincost

to Shal C1 8 533395 51228

The has bosa partly to canosquatra d the supostar daiva nod

acsivia al ClA personnel, spacialy do comparei tie the dilidence

n Blais Doparintss porconcel.

Tor dIAmple, WhiS mEn COMO tO CLA

vits dis andigament of duveloning covort pollico campaigsa or

naturally fall to work with ingenuily and bosl; they probably leed dias.

thoy aro noi carnas thoir pay enlose, ouy, they orgariso do naday

Colpa co poauthla! Tao concora contiageney plesalag has

lin1tha11a0d tho coreiate propration ed morarions soll preoumaily

lo a hyposhetical alago, peoplo dia nes as fires notlee shas 'eoreingaucy

parning, 'chon casciod ta era clago of recrudemeus and trataing os

personael, cradido a voncod trarose unleb cisen tranciorma contin

Thas, l e grocg da ansombles

and rorred up on a contingancy banis, theo the lalluro to carry tia

projoct throagh (de lo argard) mill iriso to divarminimans ent

clienioa dí the ESanD, dO SO prOOSTO ICICAces dO Lallow Rarougl

os that had pintod tas pere pseculatios.

ul conrar, 1a lo Cubar sariuica - ta laci dias distariaos de tse

Cuban forco la Guatemala juas asamed le crento 800 many probioras and

urobarretamanto.

Maring escorod luid relalone with perescalites i

SOrTigalODÃO, CLA LeO sOmelNo sormOR lO 10rl that o Dius: thora-.

aer do pratty mach shar sy run er eins thay Mll blow security

o7 cren do mor to the communido. Thie eppresta bas muta ua u

orcaalon the privansas dá cor ou ageats. *

PHo LOcomo prisoDorO Il to ageus n anetcer senso 158.

100 Cas

Chule sho ClA perple is Warslagion ara men

di ereantionalis biga quality leo mos aitracted do fiola jobe ara some

Elas tough end even vielace pecalo motivaisd by talves os thelI in

el the eparatton, Badi acionO as Locing up thA Revolasienasy Causa,

cuch enterprises LI Operacion 10 1n Mian thera ClA eguice aspertadly

taárea Cobano la methodo el tomuro, euch entradas da the datentica ao

16 chor danocrosie Criare into Fedrassy -91l taca seegent doot tinga

Do on ander ClA apangosella vila caich ClA de ladidagton la Oly atroly

acqualnied

Sasso boctd: 32423565

galgerai

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1 has meant too chos the centa Dopertment sites eparlos el sa

059702S0N 011Y 10119 LOINE 10S0N. 10 VICE GIOR% FIODIES CO

endorso the sporadion Ba siready mountd becaues de she alleged.

evil consoguances do pracielag = voic.

I mall resember Tem

¡ann's someal she day the decialon ino asa 19 do abort ou Cisto:

"I would nevor bave favored lariastag this operation bol, alaco it

kos gone as far as it bao, 1 do not this no can rick cailing 1a 0df."

Moreover, pi a disas vera there lo luccandlad premium on activion.

Sists, than le quantirns CLA paralione of lniciselves, caste Bool la

a pissy, sinay, sugalira sole. The adrocto el elsadosire sallrities

scams "rough' and scallates she eppesost haa la tmote tanh ttangledos

sa sie zeputation el lin Untied 21a100, marli pulllo opinion, "ghet

do ma nay ln 14e Unitar Mationui", ole, ard desmo bepalesaly

Tho rogul of ClA'e Inliatino la covere pallical coeration Ais bs02

In c5ast0 eltunsions which have forcod palley esthe Sires Departeront.

The moo so: the original to babird cla.. do Allen Dulles mice

1a be 191T memorandum to tha Bonnia Arise Sarraos Carmilioe.

"The Control Extollgonon Aginey should hava unthing to do with pallcy."

Ynê, in tha yoaro elsce, ChA has, lo elfoce, 'asdo' pellay la ranay

parto vi the world. A nuraber of garacerto Mill la power kuow

a ninto of tina celculatod es etimulets friendly soniage towned tise

Wasted Sented.

lodorsulso de coarea, lad prime call

Thin experience sugecats ties tas preasat ayes by which Cle notifies

Intergate,

Thare must be some maina by vales bista cos be intoro

cí such operationa as as carly enough etaga to alfree the conception

and prellalazy planaina de the spores CCharuise ClA Til coT

tono to confrost stato ales propositiona hasing petesaial limpset en

Able COnSICi

9. Tho COStrOllad AMOSICAN SOUTES (CAS) COPSEeSASA a parIcUINE

Bopoc O ClA's encrazehmost on poltey-making lanasless.

CIA Polay

DAD Dearly as mary partie under silois 00758 70880I0 SIT

3900 $ 9700, ALRE 1590 dE tURDe arO nadoU ECO Departmas cOvos

NH • 5179

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lena other 2200 are premabi; inder military or oshos cennareto

pillciai cosert cripinally the uno ef shato lepartmart ceror for

ClA partonna uno supporri so de strlelly llalled and cemporary..

TEo Lailes-CorTes-JResean 8930z8 ersied la 1343, "Tha ClA should

Sal 190 tale Deperiment curat de a duplo ananas to ala die prohlavia,

bar shaild precord ta caroley le eno outaido suver and evernally in

thie may and tirough locreanad dificiancy sê lla erarcesa personarl,

Ind o ray tu tempor ila densando upon the Stado lorarteans," Dona

tabledo ClA haa menilly increzond lto romulaitino los cilicied cover.

There dro doveral recoous viy cla bas alaadorad la original intenito

e develocina ayptare d colvato cover.

i lu daclos do arrango cit?

tricura Slaloi il is dese spenatre, le io audciagra it secilitates al.

easurity il opecationa sa wall da ai corinuntcations; lt insuree a

pensanter ille los the ClA mogie. bus the allect 18 to fnrcher ito

ClA ancroschmane en the traditional funesione da Stato.

In torne mlesloas, luodoriiand, CAS pero:nol culaumbors tosulai

5732o Leparimoni pazzomel la the Amaricas Erubassy la Vienna,

out af 20 jordong lule in Bha Ucrobas 1860 Earoign Servico L198 88

being da sto polllel Section, ló uro GAS postonali el lbo 31 ellicere

lated en engnalo ln roportine activilies, oves hall are Cas, a the

13 officare liston in dio Political Guction in Cas Ambasoy Is Chile,

11 ara CAS. La sho day al Procidari Konody'o Iosaguration 1l pescant

el the polllicad rulcare corving la Unicad sitos Fintaesios mare Citt

Samatimoa the ChA indosion sbies has bsen do the counsy longer, iao

enote aresoy at hio ulrpostl, violdo mose influnace (emi la ableid thar

tho Arbaoador. Viton ho bas diract eccese lo lao local Palmo

Somatimise (es during e eritical period da leon) ho puraiaa

a astiereas palley aroma ahas si tha Arbassados Aleo ho la gararzily

mall known lecally do tua ClA repreGoritive®

In she farle Arabaasy dong, tore dão 123 CLA poesie. CLA da Pasle

hao long since bogun le mora isto arens la pollinead asporting narically

accapied by state.

ocenumber these in the Emkasoy'a palifical secsla by 10-3. Cia tas

men seralt to monopolius cortac, wit cotaia Iresch polluleal parsenalt

tes, among them san Iranidont di so Madaual Areeratly. ChA occurles

sta 80p daoz di the parla lanhadoy, a Inel tall inora localiyi deá co

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%

the night al the Coadrala' ronald la Algosis, pasteod-by soled

with ausenans lant tha sop dos mas 14ane Th ene 1

Informed that Abrazador Carta sas oblo ta estara estraace tare

nagas s0 the ala dificos poly mian ciensusy. )

Formenos salstion for iso probiona. l l0 presoing a bara CLA

META ATA IOTA CE LO FIALUTIS DUENTIS PIESONUEL SNA METO CAS

2pen Importans (a) SO saDSTA ovary ambRerados the 1ium periFol

sia? the jornl CAS asello naminally promired la tha NEo uisectiro

•í Jancosy 19, 1961, and (4) t0 review tho curreas CAs abastion vies

aa aya lo a send, rodnction ll cas persarnal.

Familiary ArRe, I fator, la seRradel in soma quartero

ss a purely rechnical mator, daully dorachalla from pallay sed shere-

fOrO a pERDSI SUACtian dl 213 Doparimoni cl Dolares,

Tos Chara la

almoss no ClA lunction meta pocullarly depontiano ca tao saliaica.

contExt then paramiliary parlaro.

These aro aroral calzona for this fer ea saig, & paramillary

no suggented abora, clases mis tos prosappariciona al eur epar

moral und polician terce of clros paremisttery fallaro 13 seuto 10r

Conmunen, chan toy cundal paramalary aceray, des

tota that the world exoners fuca Shemi vien va 2o 18 19 spga25

Es berray eus cun proseesas princiles una charetaso canocs atlara to

aaragound delingusney by defart

BICIROVES, RO ESO IONINE AISCTIEN

The Corrnantain, da tho oror ha, hire bo Earle 1221

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10.

men ordirasly realios, la ea siriogledi contors Tho gaeralda

May dulteale Indece to best him men the couergalia do utta bian.

ALvErilas In Endonela "ro arE sarding 50, 090 mon out taere

and will clear the attuation up in the chier mnartae."

Meroball.

vira bar had angertesco dansios quorrilles in tho palipplass,

Jepliad, "Il son't to Da 6247.

You sill fled thee thay will bieed

canina guer llla recisiance tarough shear molghe el milltary force.

Sorous guerrilla movamenta lava boan dolasted coly fareo times cinca

the ena os sho Second Morte sar: In Grasco, borsuas Xles'a dolestien

closed the northern bordari la suo Philipplnon nod ta Malayã l.

The etrurale

in Malaya, de Field Ngcha Templer uerratoo (ed said), vas for

ebe miodo and hearta el tho poeplos 1i sharciora lralved nos daiy

paramilitary operatiano sui a rast duncalienal pegram, espazinacion

a brade natona, pollica rolori son en ollos el niziozal indegandenco.

Il sho guerrillah pousa lles la sia revolutlocory program. t0s Enerar

Mes in pare in mening mo nuare chich anado tie guerrilla to rone

"¿sanous a policical goal, "sacca Pano Tes-tag.

"guerrilla vertare ries: lall, en le mase ll lia poliecad ebfoctivos do

Ios colacido silla tho capiraicas el tos amenio anl li their aympaday.

cooporetion and andiamnes condo do galas" lo sádel, "Do ma

raa$00d, aroMes Brem to scitity; cencern oureeites trila thais weal

5709."

For thoes seesons paremiliary rarlere canpot le semilared de

Il do primarie a palliere panpra end

sase therafore bo dubjeciod la siore and entell pollica, coulE.

l probably pho:d bo resaisod in a rcasoulcand ClA rattor Chra

ili

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i ho

3. Hows? Estation Felicy Cantrol? Here I memdas wbether she

Bridol empartones mighe int ba of valeo, tha candle lottaro et tho

Beiiah intelligangs ayosez is the decosmination to keep elandratino

SCRivlty Undar 01r1s1 Foreign Lilles control, Ibla Control lo achiover

le a sumber of mage!.

tha dreetion of the Joins Itelligsaco Commitos, wiich tas a

Toreign Olice chairma (all rocontly Sis fuerlos Dens, wba

Bro Sorrico lasalligence diractora end representatiros di tho

Colonial Cisco nod to Commonunalla Rolostora Olilse as vall

Do the Chief of 825.

b) baole pollical wartaro directivos are eriglasiod, not

hy Si, best by the Interacalion Research Departmons la le

Foreign Miles, Oiien in coassilacion wila sa lates depertmental

Working Croup on binaton Communist trents, sad Endar

tho altimato centio! od the Supertatending Undar Hecrotary es

tho Formanon Under scrolesy's Dapartment ta the Forciga

Caller.

Mazo la macho arcas, soch en, los examed, Sino borist sola-

Moan on to warid Tones rantival.

Chlel, and ferdig China cliciala DArn E9n18 el dosy la 313

nectiona

All pheno devices migot ta tiposa 101 usa by to Sate Dompinace.

Orgendantonolli, 80ss train bas1a 10s9 tho Leagence Bouty said

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12.

caforcad by directres, by Susa Departmans chaisaanahio el

TUrka groana, and by to miltration si Shito Dearimont

parsonadd laes the Intertagance agaazy.

FICO ISPATETOCAL LADL WAZO PIOTSIA lO OVErCOME lS LIed

Babia st duinison, numelirion dod delay and to tato a drm sad

papassin; grip on the struction.

IV. Moratana ane laellissaca

The reistlenship buteon sparrelone and intelligeace saless particu

larly pesploniag mentami.

'Insoligaca' includeo duo sagarabla

activisco, clancussin cullaction; and renarch, naalyois and

maration ins are decle ma that anad portion el tom dare

force procurod by 070r0s moana (Mi. Dallpo estimeted is 1947 thet

"a posper snalyalo el so tacolliganon obesinablo by. overl

sEimaL and abovobed nano morld myry l tRa our 80 percent.

I should stimato, a ta toi1 100rd In the Be 01

mimal palicy") the socoa involvor tbe crilomen and insispretation

• all formE ol LIsaligency, hosener abinined aud sha predaction of

Dotatoe.

The teoronar, enslyela and estimating

function de latesed 1s the foralga Cilles Research Departuent

Under 13o Amorican Gynam, ClA has reoponstallisy los bost

clandectios collockou nst ressarch and acalpain.

The stata Depart

ment'e Durosa of Inialliganen end Rematch dico has rescare end

consol eror the macidarry for prascing nationas antimetos la such

los accoptauce or rajiatici.

teo Foreiga Quico playa to excinating rode in the latelligense sold.

in the Ualied Season dust solo hoo boon baraud by Cleo

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The argument agalras incorporating the resentch and esisaate

function la Stara mos madle by Dullas In 19471 "FOs Co 38000%

Judging al tha sitalian da day foreign country it lo laportant this

Information should bo procoscod by in agency miano duty le lo to

malga facts, and to danu conclusins from tase sacco, mibout

having elshor tha facta si she conclusions rasped By 2b0 losvilablo

and even propor projidicos of the man miss duty li de to dotarmine

palley and she, having cuse desarenined a policy, are too llacly to

Do blind to say facto which migut tead to provo tha pollay to bo

faulty. "

Preciaoly tha came argumen con be used wild equal elect agalast

tha incorporation of tho research and estimise faaction la CIA .

do co, 1í latelligensa la too closely connectod ties operations, Mea

thone committed to a particular aparation will tond to soldcs out the

intelligence which validases too operation.

Obviouly both argumenta concludo la a case for the entablinement ca

a fairly Independon rescarch and antimate gros. Bu. 11 the Ail

arosy do 100 indipendors, on runs inio she espostle dangar: thes lo,

that sailher policy nor corsidona till do suojected to taegusto.

Intelligance chocks.

The LIcuble with the Cuban agoratE, for BIAsIO, WaS DUt 8eS

intelligence and coratione wore cumbinas, bas proclanly thas the

Caban operasion eradad ayrismose intelligence judgmait. The i-

ROllAzenCE branCh (DDI El ClA us never intermed el ilo entererco

el the Cuban oparacion, The Cilice of Natientl Ittimateo tas 20v6r

asked to commens on the norapilon, los ersmple, test disconsani

bad rosebod the potos in Cuba marre a encceras assing openction

DOUld pEGORe springs babiEd the linos and Celestians fEsen tha

Multa la December end Febrosey, the Offica de Nasoon Intimateo

producer genesal sppualesle el the curan rituallus, dus tbese pers

molly indopenden of tho Carna eperssion, I gubor tel 11 180

opinion had been invitos, DDI would baro glen galto a ditleroas

ectionato el lhe usare of spinton la Cuba from tist En Wild the opera

don ma bacod.

Isra exited. in shart, the ridiculous sitation

Fabricurat

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14.

thns knowlodge of the Cusen corsion, haunted la Mileral bare

by say numbar do low leval agenta la she eperations brancù et CaA,

mas daniod to evon sha lap ficiale el the latalligance beauch Tin

Duran ol intelligencs and Researca al the Dopartment si Stalo

From oven loas about she Cuban apszatica..

Tha problam, then, la to have an Ras groug custiclesty indepoodont

wo both podley and sperattons to ronist lin pressuro to mato tha cana

for veerod luess and sustesto a jet salliclenly close to ba able to

subjact projectad operation on policios to the mout intense and

searching acring.

Whore could shis group ba located? ll sha CLA mero lo become.

subosdinato co stato, as Mind lo to la Forelen Oliice, toen Rhe Kid

funcilon mugha bo vestad in a crardinaia nubagency, somembet indo.

pondaal eí toth stara and CLA, yes closaly cannector tith beta in day.

tondoy operasione. The Rat outagenty wald racelve intelligence

Ison CLA and from State, as moll no frora tra servicos and, de course,

and State/ Imelligance and Research l might also take over certaia

al the nervice functiona now confided to Cil • potographle Inierpre

casion, biographical unto, foreiga broadene moritoring, svest collee

ties, mapo, etc.

Thoro mighi be in audicion a Jolns incalligenco Board.

with representatives from all a intelligence agenciea and with o

Stare Department or Tihila Housa chalraar.

V. Concinnies.

The asgument of phia morerandus inplies a fairiy dsastic soarrange

mant al on prazens intelligance aet-up.

Il ales inailos tae capacity

el the Ilalo Departmant to susune command ds the situation and lo do

Do ln an estaclive and perpascíul way.

proson soiled la not espabia ol ascumiag dlicelve commend, this le

nor, In may judgrent, an argument againat a rusional roorgasiation al

intelligence, I la 2a sIghinor dor a dinetic ororhant of the state

Deportment®

Pionin

HW

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15.

The structure intel purla unar to colta. " dessed la this

mercarendam would to 1e 201l601

1) The midse beyartmen mond to Eraserd genaral

closvanca anthoslay over all caudactian as61518%.

This

mighe do tertuasad on in Britias model by tie appetstment

al a Lapuy UIdorsacrot dá Stato for Icolliganco, ubo

Would act for tha cocreory in lance martera bru mbo rodels

contatives fron all olomonte in the inadalyance community

and des tsara aise vitica ficuse.

3) Tho sporaling bIbichas of the proger CLA onld be

1don Servical.

This nom agemy rould ho charged wilh secpoaal-

Bility los clandestine collection, for coross pollaical operations

and for pararailltary.acumicies.

it wont suant profess to tha

Daputy UnderBrUtary dl StO fOr Ixelligrace LoT cloaranco.

lo gonoral, the agercy would boor somanite to sams rolations

chip to Sisto as los Diarramans Adminisration and ICA

presently de

1) A second comt-indapendons agency mould bo set up, agala

bartog a diana cas the the toraigo indeerch Agrasy), coersi

nato win the operationa agency. This agancy mould he chariad

wish respanelbilisy for collation and inorpretation & voi

Include CLA/DIl, the buresu of Intelligeace and Reessach ta

Stats, and the vardous poruice functione now carried en by Cl

(photographie Inezpralallan, biographien files, forolga broadensi

monitoring, eciorticis italigence, maps orea collection, is.1.

I migas well be located ln the CiA bullding In MoLean.

Rathar Schleningos, js.

The Atrarney Ceneral

Mi. Bundy

Mr. Dungan

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD GOODWIN

SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan

Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island-wide

resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal

assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and

guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a

potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations

bases" in the US.

In short, what is intended is a ClA underground

formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban

underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient

to overthrow Castro.

Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CLA

specifications is obviously to favor

those groups most willing to accept

CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups

most eager to control their own operations.

I.e., the plan discrimi-

nates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates

against men of independence and principle.

Thus

these criteria elimi-

nate the Manuel Ray group; yet I can find nowhere in the documents

any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.

Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical

effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating

broad support within Cuba.

The Agency fails to confront the key prob-

lem: i.e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against

the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled

and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable

types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes.

My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and

demand that it be recast to make political sense.

The key is the

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2.

statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only as the

covert contribution to any national program designed to bring

about the eventual replacement of the Castro government. "

This

is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity

should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba

most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for

example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity

should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban

Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper.

It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out

in a political vacuum.

A.S.1.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

SECRET

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September 1, 196%

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31.

Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secrotary Woodward, two

members of the ARA Durcau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.

"i:*

The following decisione were made:

I. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Carribean govern

ments the poasibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force. Thie could

be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework

of existing treaty arrangements, aa a series of new bilatera, treates, or a

formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization

would depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries aa to how they

could accompligh the objective of establiching the force without running

serioua internal political riska. The United States, for ita part, would pre

fer the formal multi-latoral arrangement.

Such a Carribean Security Force

would have at least four major aspecte:

(1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories

threatened by Castro rovolutione and, perhaps the designation

of specific units for participation in necessary multi-lateral

actions.

(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information con-

cerning subversive activitles with provision for exchange of

such loformation.

(3) The establishment of a Carribean air and sea patrol to watch.

for suspected infiltration of Castro arma of agente.

(3) A training program in combatting subvereive tactica, police

organization and procedure, etc.

It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if

necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seck a more.

formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the baale of internal political

considerations in the United States.

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2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as

posaible -- trying to ignore Castro and hia island.

"3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of

targets important to the economy, C. Be, refineries, plants using U.S. equip-

ment,. etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert opera-

tions - which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to

be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for

establlahing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within

that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targeta whose des

truction will have the maximum economic impact.

4. We will intensity our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and

especially U. S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal

mathode to attempt amlivert this trade - depriving Cuba of markete and

sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in

this effort.

5. We will establish next week -- in the State Department -- a psychological

warfare group. This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged

with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietiza-

tion of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc.

- much of which has been hitherto classified - putting this information into

readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through

Latin America. Such dissemination would bo primarily through USIA channels

but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helping to

prepare scripts for Latin American broadcaste, perhaps a direct mailing list

of intellectuals and government officiala to be handled by a front group, etc.

The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communica-

tion, instead of treating it as official U. S. Propaganda. We have selected

someone to head this effort -- Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was

a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday Evening Post)

for many years and who Ball highly recommends.

6. The CIA was asked to come up within the week . with a precise, covert

procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government.

The object of thia dialogue to explore the possibility of a split within the

governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split - was fully de-

tailed in my last memorandum to you. This is an effort to find an operational.

technique.

Richard N. Goodwin

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EXES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, asdiiscussed

with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-

out attack on the Cuban problem.

Since 1 underatand you are favorably dia-

posed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and

uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot

lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at lease we will

emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far cleares

Idea of the dimensions of the problems which affeci us.

The quention then in who should head this operation. I know of no one current

ly in Cuban affaira ai the State Departmen: who can do it. Nor is it a very

good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activi

ties. I do not think it should be centered in the CLA. Even if the CIA can find

someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major probiems will be to

revamp ClA operations and thinking . and this will be very hard to do from

the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of

such an operation. Zither 1 or nomeone else should be assigned to him au

Deputy for this activity, since he obvioualy will not be able to davote full time

to it. The one danger here in that he might become too closely identified with

what might not be a successful operation. Indeed. chances of succese are very

speculative. Thare are & lew answers to this:

(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs - in and out of govern-

ment - in aware that the United States le already helping the underground.

The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common

knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we

have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads il.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

COP SECRET

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EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

-2-

(2) Ilis role should be told to only a few people at the very top

with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his

deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct

of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed

except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came

through those charnels. There are probably three or four people who coulld

fulfill this criterion.

This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as

the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased

effectiveness of an operation under his command.

Richard N. Goodwin

EYES ONLY FER THE PRESIDENT

TOP SECRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM

I believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components:

1. Intelligence collection and evaluation

2. Guerilla and underground

3. Propaganda

4. Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba)

5. Diplomatic relations

Each of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to

you.

In addition you would have a deputy who would do the actual contact work

between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He

would be the one identified as the source of orders and directives when direct

contact with the agencies was needed. How hanna takagakysin-

mict

He should be from CIA for reasons discussed below. I

would act as Staff Assistant to you. My primary job would be to see that

current questions for decision were presented to you at your morning staff

meetings with the alternatives fully discussed. I would have no direct opera-

tional duties; thus keeping in the back ground.

I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply a topflight guerilla

and underground man, as well as whatever additional personnel we need. I

think this is the best way to handle it.

However, it will be necessary to use

the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable to assign

a CIA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and she-them net

a deeply involved at the command level.

In this way we can probably

avoid an internal struggle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense

command.

Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from

State. I have some ideas on this and - if you give the signal -- will discuss

it with George Ball.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence

collection and evaluation.

As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szule to take a leave of absence

from the Times and work on this one

-- although we should check with Ed

Murrow and Dick Bissell.

These people should have a headquarters. It should probably be at the Pentagon

because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work

with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc;

(c) It is a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could re-

arrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning --

perhaps for a breakfast or post- breakfast meeting.

This operation should not be discussed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only

George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McCone and Bissell should

know of your participation

When

they are named, the five section heads

will have to know -- the the initial organizing work and contact work should

be done through your Deputy and myself. If this subject is discussed tomorrow

then already too many people will know about it.

The first steps are (a) name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current

operations in their field, establish their authority over operations, get nec

essary

staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to

work; (c) establish the physical headquarters; (d) arrange for financing --

presumably coming largely from CIA.

If this meets with your approval I will begin work on the above items with all

final decisions on personnel and other matters subject, of course, to your

approval.

Richard N. Goodwin

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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coge

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Noveraber 4, 1968

The followiug aro somo tentalive secoramendationa meant to scrve as a

basio of discussion:

I would recommend that the Cuben operation be organized in

five componente:

# Intelligonco colloction and evalualion

b. Underground and questila

c. Propaganda

d. Economie warfare (other than covert activities

felthin Cuba)

• Diplomatic relationa

Although thens sections will make use of available agency capabilition tse

operational authority for each of these ampecta of the operation will be is

the hands of the cection leader who la responsible to the chairman of the

group. All of those activities will be compartmestalized sa much aa posalble,

lo do, only the chairman will bo kept completely liformed on ald aspects of

the operation

Tho operation abould have its phynical headguarters in the Department of

Defease, both los manimum security and to detach it es much as possible

Arora Identificallos as a CLA activity

The firet stope are:

1. Designation of coction chiefs:

Za A complote curvey by each section chief of current

operations in bia field;

3. The establishment of control over oporations by the

section chief;

* The expansion aá operations whore feasiblo.

Bob Amory should be anted to designato ono al his beat men lo contralise

the intelligonce collection and evalastion.

The Defense Departmeat should dosignate the section chief for underground

and guerilla activities.

EYES ONLY

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We should discuss empanatos of propaganda operationa with Ed Murrow

and appropriate CIA officers - not relating it to stepped up operationa

in other lields. With these people we should select a single person to be

the propaganda chief, coordinating CIA and USIA operations. I have

suggested that Tad Ssulc - 11 he can be persuaded to take a leave of ab-

sence - would be a useíu! peroon to advise on this aspect of the operation.

Both economic warfare and diplomasic relations should be handied by a

designee of the Stato Department. It is Important to keep the diplomatic

relations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we

con't Involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations in the OAS,

to go voting to send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations

are at a height and fidel las evidence to present of U.S. participation.

The Deputy should be from CIA.

The Prealdent abould not talk to the press. It may be that come contacte

with a few ey newsmen should be made . in the most general way. But lf

the President approaches them personaily and the operation does not succeed

it in Inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban fallure. There

are two typos of newsmen involved here. There in a rather large group which

will hear rumore and atories of various kind. There la nothing to be cone

about them

¡ There are a few newamen whore contacts in the Cuban community

are so exteraito that they might be able to put together a cohorent story, Il

any approsches are to be made it should be reatricted to these; although they

should never be told we are going to wage an all-out operation. In addition.

as much contact and operational work as possible should be done outside the

Miami arca.

Our next step should be to desig te section chieis, establish their autkority

and have them make a complete survey of peesent operations. This would in-

clude a turvey of current covertioperatione and capacities here and in Miami

(and anywhere else they are going on), as the firet task of the Defense Depart-

ment designoe with CLA assistance. The physical headquartera should be

establlahed

Although the Attorney General should majatain a general operational super-

visdon, it is probably unwise for bim to be the formal chairman of the group

becauns the risk of identification is fairly high.

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=3=

Il such identification is made, and the operation is not successful. an

other Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard

this as fairly remote in this type of operation bat the danger can be de-

creased ll the operation lo formally hoaded by someone who is not so

clearly acting at the direct bebeat of the President. The Attorney General

can give assistance and maintain general ripervision on beball of the President.

working with the Chairman alone -o rather than extending his contacta to da-

clade all the operation chiefe.

TOP SECRET

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Novembes Z6. 4968

Bob «

Is you approve this (it la based on a briel memo from

General Lnnsdale) I will send it on ita way. In additton

you should have a moeting - as, soon a0 possible ...

with Lansdalo and the senios topresentatives of State.

Defense and CIA. Il you want to call me on this after

you have read the memo I will suggeet a procedure for

getting them fogether.

Richard N. Goodwin

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Navember 32, 1968

MENORANDUM TO

The Secretary of Scale

Tha Secretary of Deluste

Tha Director of CLA

Tha Alterrey Cereral

Goneral Taylor

General I enadale

nichard Goodwin

The followlug lo a rammary of the major decisions which have been maro du

regard to the Cobe Operation.

lo lie will go ahond wits the dinconod projoce to belo cube overthrow the colo

mundel fogine and establial a fros Cuba, lill antlablo areate will be directed

to taío and so a matter of argent antional pelarity

3o The program wil be reviewed in tus veoke in crier to desertloe whether.

Conoral Lanadalo will continuo as chief of oporations.

to The NEC 5112 guouy will bo lopt intormed of activities.

3. The Secretarios ol State and Delenne and the Director of the Gentral Intelli

gonce Agensy will appoint sonor offoers of their departmant no personal repro.

emiatives to asnior the chiel of operalions so romaised. These solor o fleers

uhoald be ablo to earciao = cither tamsnivo or throsah the Sestetaries nod

Director • elective operational control ever mit aspecte al their Departaent'o

operations dealing with Cabi

6. Knomledgo of the eniateuce of tals oporation should ho restrteted to the rectilente

al this memorandum, membero of tho Sill proop, and the reprosentatives appotated

Dy Rise secretarion and the Director. Any lurther discomination of this browledge

mill be oniy with the mihority al lo Secretarios ol State or Dellence, Me Altorney

Ceneral, er te Chief • Operationa

TOP SECRET ITES ONLY

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HARVEY

7-3-75

$4.18

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of Mecting of Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT:

State: Mr. Ruski, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,

Mr. Hurwitch

White House:

Gcneral Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mi. McNamara,,

Mir. Gilpatric, General

Lemnitzer, General Lansdale,

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murzow, Mr. Wilson

1.

Mir. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of

National Estimates was that the Soviots will not let the Castro

regime fail because of its own inherent veaknesses. This thought

had not been contained us such in the Nlt. Later in the neuting,

Mr. McCone said that he bolieves we must face the fact that Cuba

will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his per-

sonal opinion that the sovicts might consider establishing on Müh

in Cuba.

He noted that these two points are nut necessarily

concurred in by the loard of rational Estimatis or by the USIB.

At Secretary Rusk's ruquest, General Lansdale gave a brief.

explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent

papers. he then summarized progress to date by saying that during

Phase 1, now completed, an incensive intolligence look has been

caken at Cuba, that we have learned a greaï deal, but that we do not

yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3..

Mir. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a:

Loci de la chat are real to and st souse shippers,

Cuba, perhaps

lio suggested that the berlin and Cuba contingency plans should

be closely meshed.

Me. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying

that ne did not bolievo liniced rctaliation of this kind would con-

stitute an acoquare response to a berlin blockade, whereas vorld vide

• harrassment of soviet facilities would be a different matior.

PliO•CRTY OF

THE WILT: HOUSE D

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4.

Mr. Kusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to

create a split between Castro and old-line Conmunists.

He pointed

out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.s.

interests no matter which way the balance of power swung.

In this

general connection, it was hard for hin to visualize a valid pretext

for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances

currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance

¡evelop to the extent lor example that some provinces might oppose

he Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support

to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at

the moment the previously-cited frictions betveen Castro and the

•old-line Cormunists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no

issue currently exists. There has

additionally becn at lcast a

temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. le indicated that

this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some

success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S.,

and that there have been some defections.

5.

The discussion then turned to the objectives of the

MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether ve cannot séparate

the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions thai would

hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This lou to the sug-

gestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the

over-all objective from one of

overthrowing the Castro regime to one

of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate

plan (called hercafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B

described by General Lansdale, which he taid had been prepared as a

result of the conclusion that stepped-up l would not in fact result

in the overthrow of Castro.

He emphasized that the stopped-up plan

should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accopt

attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual

use of U.S. military force. Tir. McCone said that a süepped-up i will

risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a llungary-type blood

bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there

would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation

would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in

Mr. McCond's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not

invite an uprising.. Again lie repeated his view that the U.S. night,

however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE DEFICE

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6.

The principal members of the Spocial Group felt, after

some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further

for consideration al next. Thursday's meeting of the Special Group.

Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize

mcasures to soment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was

emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed

3 S

to avoid major attribucion to the u.s.

7.

General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not

wish Guantanamo used as a base for opcrational activities, is

suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given

an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the

Navj, as he himsolf docs. The view is that this base is too important

to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance

of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with

this view.

lic. Bundy suggested that. a hard look be taken at the

possibility

of support to selected Cuban cxiles on a strictiy

"disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert

financial and material support, with tlie idea of secing what they

could generate on their own.

9.

Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be

placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA to preparo a new version of its variant plan, in

accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be

ready by Wesnesday, August 15ch.

Thomas A.. Parrott

cc:

General Lansdal

latin ++ 419163-17113

Attachment

Agenda for Mecting

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TeD

TOP SECRET-MOFURN

SPECIAL HANDLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTCN 25, D.C.

MONGOOS:

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA

ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE

GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE

LON WILSON, USIA

From:

Brig. Cen. Lansdale Eel

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and

guidance expressed in the

10 August policy meeting on Operation alongoose, we will produce

an outline of an alternate Course i for submission. The ClA paper

"Operational Plan (Reduced Iffort)" will be used as the starting

basis.

Since this is to be a barc outline, to permit further policy

guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only

a statement of objectivea and a lisi of implementing activities.

The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence,

Political, Economic, Psychological, Faramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational cpresentatives work session in

my office, at 1160 hours, Tuesday, i1 dugust, to complete the

outline paper for submiasion. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of

completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of

us to work from a full set of crafts.

Fapers required irom each oi you for the luesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,

"1, Economic (sabotage, limited

Also, any suggestions for inclusion

deception), and Paramilitary.

in other sectione of the pager.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Folitical, and

Economic. Also, anj suggestions for inclusion in other sections

of the paper.

ExCLUDED FROl OBS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

RET-NOFORN?

RUING

This document contains

CoDY

to.

03075

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[TOP SECRET-NOFÖRNT

SPECIAL HANDLING

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary

(limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggeations for

Inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any

suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

2

Irop cacie

SPECIAL ARNOLDIG

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SS021

SHES THe

6113/75-

11 August 1262

MEMORANDUM EOR: Depuly Divertor (Plans)

SUBJECT

: Operation MONGOOSF

1. Action.

None. This memorandum is for your inforination.

:

Za Referonce is made to our conversation on 13 August 1862,

concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale.

Altached is a copy of this inemorandum, excised fiom which are

four woids in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on

page l. these four words were "including liquidation. of.leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of fidel Castro,

was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the mecting of the

Special Group (Augmented) in Seeretary Rusk's orfice on 10 August.

It was the

obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a

comment by Mr. Dd Murrow, that this is not a subject which

has been made a matter of official record. Itook careful notes on

the comments at this mecting on this point, and the Special Group

(Angmented) is notexpecting any wiillen cominents of study on

this point.

4. Upon Icccipt of the allached memorandum, I called

Tansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to trank lInnd

the inadmissibility; and stupidity of putting this type of comment in

writing in such a document. Ladvised Frank Hand that, as far

as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to

this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it.

I strongly niged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise

the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandom, in-

cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USTA. Shortly

thercafter, Iansdale called back and left the inessage that

he agrecd and that he had done so.

SEENET

SENSTINE

EVES WAY/

:::1

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1/03 g

5. For your infoimation also, in your absence and since

the attached memorandun alicady had been distributed and in

view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's

altention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

it-s

WILLIAMK. HARVEY

Chief, Task Force W

Attachrent

Momo fi Con Lansdale did 13 Aug 62.

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INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

Date: May 27, 1975

INIERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

SENSITIVE

Time:

10:00 a.m.

page 1 of. 6

FILE:

Place:

Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants:

Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Ireverton

Subject:

Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign

policy work for John Kennedy,

specializing in Latin America. After the

election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During

that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter

the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of

1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin.

After

working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White

House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama

crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America,

instead writing speeches for Johnson.

He left the Administration late

in 1965.

1.

Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as-

sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone

He mentioned one specific instance

in which he had heard talk of

assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was

established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his

capacity as White House Staff Officer.

At a meeting of the Task Force,

held at the State Department,

McNamara

suggested "getting rid of Castro,

someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

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"Executive Action."

McNamara

responded that he did and stressed his

interest in the idea. However,! Goodwin did not bring the topic up later

in the meeting after McNamara left.

Io Goodwin, the idea was not reasont

able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that

Cuba was

politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced

with

Raul or with Che Guevara,

both worse than Castro. Somewhat later,

Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the

President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an

article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba

Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States

let Castro

alone; anything the United States did to him could only but-

tress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every

week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division

of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro.

Nor

did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin

worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in-

volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life.

During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed

diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican

Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as-

sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern-

ment was

surprised when it occurred. HenryDearborn, the American Consul

in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-

Trujillo forces. Prior to the

assassination, he had transferred some

weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said

that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have

come as

no

surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even

would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that

sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact,

he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea

because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field

might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in

supporting one political faction over another.

And of course someone

might have gotten carried

away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that

the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g.

by bringing Batista followers

into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In

general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in

all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2. CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United

States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the

period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart

factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the

Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections

for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres-

sional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome

to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further

Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

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3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic

forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist

influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was

applied to Chile, and the U.S.

switched its support from the conserva-

tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat

in on meetings of the Special Group only

rarely, only if Latin America

were the subject of the meeting. As he

remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were general

statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or

conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic

political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the

Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know

how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem

inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, 'however, the assertion that

the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing-

ton since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the

White House it did not seem so.

4. Changes during the Johnson! Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy-

Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less

about covert

actions in the region.

Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American

policy, although the President.

did become active in the two crises-

Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change

in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and

conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support

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for left democratic reform ended.

Goodwin professed himself puzzled

by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated"

in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was

Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from

the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he

became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during

the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis

was counterinsurgency, not covert action.

There was certainly no

reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American

objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was some-

thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police through

AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American

militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity.

At that point,

the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to

power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations

were

considered by the Special Group

(counterinsurgency).

Latin

American matters were considered there, and in some ways

Latin

America was considered

a kind of training ground

for Southeast Asia.

Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little

difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could

not

in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America

without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla.

movements that began had little indigenous support.

NW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 74

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## Page 75

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Page 6 of

6

FILE:

In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that

these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good-

win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on

occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like.

Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin

America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of

intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-

day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee,

on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active

staff. Once the President is

permitted both to decide what is a major

operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to

tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional

checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned

that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-

director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto

Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a

question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay

of Pigs through Cushman.

He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of

that.

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IOP SECRET

aint

Phone (Area 202)

540-6000

1

WARD

& PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

4

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the United States. Several months later, I presume because

of that trip and several other contacts I maintain with

representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations

and the Organization of American States, because of my personal

friendship with

number of people at the White llouse and

Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan'and others, in a conversation with

Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney

General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justice

Department. We discussed in considerable length the situation

in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some

different possible actions by the United States government in

that context

At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General

asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his

brother: the President. Iisaid I would of course be pleased

to do so.

The following day I received a call from the White House

indicating that the President would like for me to come in at

11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I

did. And I was received by the President in the company of

Mr. Goodwin in the Oval Office for a conversation which lasted,

if memory serves, in excess of an hour and a half, in which the

President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake

of the Bay of Pigs, asked

me a number of questions concerning

my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

ant

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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WARD

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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situation in Cuba, you know, what the United States should do,

could do, might do in terms of either in a hostile way or in

establishing

some kind of a dialogue, most relevant of which

I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly

turned to me and said what would you say, what would you think,

if I decided to authorize the assssination of Premier Castro?

Let me add for the record that the precise wording

appears

in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time.

now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather -

I am

Mr. Aaron. Let me read this into the record. "We Chatted

for a while about Cuba,. and then Kennedy leaned forward in

his

rocking chair and hurled

question at me: 'What would you

think

if I ordered Castro to be

assassinated?'"

Mr.: Szulc.

I was taken aback and so indicated to the Preside

[Othe best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a

practical matter I thought this would not make all that much

difference even if he were because I thought that by then the

Cuban structure had been established to a sufficient degree

where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro would not

necessarily mean the collapse of the governing system, if this

were the purpose of the United States government.

In the secord place, it was more important to me, I said

to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United

Statas government should not be party to murders and political

assassinations at which point the President leaned back and

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OP

SECRET

amt

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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WARD

PAUL

S.E.. Wastington, D.C. 20003

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smiled and said, well I was testing you. I agree with you

completely.

And then he

went on for a few minutes to make the point

how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United States

for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having

recourse to assassination

in foreign policy. Again, the

precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article

and again I'm paraphrasing

from memory now.

And the President added in this context that the reason I

have raised it with you, or words to this effect, is because

I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from certain

people, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation

resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think

we talked about this for

few more minutes, and I think I

repeated the points I made

originally and the President said

he felt very strongly that

same way and the fact he was testing

me or trying.

to see what

my

response as a

reporter or as a

citizen would be.

I might add that several days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had

the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective

recollections of

it, and MI. Goodwin's recollection

is exactly

the same as mine.

We discussed this at some length, this

being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current

flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if

President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination

TOP SECRET

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TOP

amt

Phone (Ared 202) 544-6000

&PAUL

810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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of Castro, he would not likely be discussing it with you in

the full knowledge of a reporter and if Castro were killed

or an attempt to

kill him

would surface you would have the

professional duty to rush

to your typewriter and report on this

conversation, even though

it was on a personal basis. And

Mr. Goodwin's judgment, and in which I concur, was that

presumably the President would not have floated this issue

with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to

Ie-evaluate after the passage of time the President's sincerity

in disclaiming any desire to do so:

My impression at the time and today fourteen years later

is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his

revulsion to such an idea of assassination.

Mr. Aaron. Let me ask you, when was your conversation

with Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Szulc.

The most

recent ona?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, the

one you just mentioned.

Mr. Szulc.

Last Friday which would have been the oth of

June of this year.

MI.

Aaron. May I read into the record the following

paragraph from your article. "Kennedy leaned back in his chair,

smiled, and

said that he

had been testing me because he was

under great pressure from

advisers in the Intelligence

community (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed, but

that he himself violently opposed it on the grounds that for

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## Page 80

GOODWIN: (TRUJILLO)

The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75

contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain

documents were selected from this material and are pro-

duced herein under Tabs S and T.

All of the attached

Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the

Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concern-

ing

them.

They are attached again herein for possible

use in connection with questions concerning handwritten

notations appearing on the documents.

TAB S.

May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin

re CIA Covert Activities in the

Dominican Republic

Page 2 of this document contains, on the

original ribbon copy,

a pencilled-in circle.

Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that this cirele

was placed on the

original copy of the

memorandum by him and indicates that the

encircled material (a report of the passage

of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin

as both significant and new to him.

Further,

the word "neutralize" is underscored in

pencil. on

the original

copy of the memorandum.

Goodwin might be questioned concerning the

significance of this underscore.

TAB T.

various drafts, together with the

original of the 5/29/61 cable from

the State

Department to Dearborn are attached herein.

Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting

on pages numbered 237, 238, 239, and 240 is

his handwriting.

The handwriting on pages

233, 234, and 235, a subsequent draft of the

same proposed cable is not Goodwin's.

Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that

of President Kennedy.

NH. 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 80.

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## Page 81

EYES ONLY

13 May 1961

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic

Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed

against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of

the White House.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

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EYES OMMY

PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I. BACKGROUND

A. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan of covert

action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which

involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo,

and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this

authority included authorization for CIA to make available to selected

exile groups communications and equipment support necessary for them to

develop a capability to undertake the infiltration of personnel and

equipment into the Dominican Republic. Since none of the exiled groups

had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the

Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually

used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with

whom the Agency and the Consulate are currently in contact.

B. On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make

available to Dominican dissidents a limited supply of small arms and

other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop

the capability to receive these materials and that the materials be in-

troduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves.

II. CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS

A. In late January 1961, CIA advised selected internal opposition

leaders that we were prepared to make available to them limited supplies

of arms, communications, equipment, and sabotage materials which they

had repeatedly requested provided they developed a capability to receive

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SEUM

EVER

ONLY

2

it via air drops' or sea infiltration.

To date the internal opposition has

not been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to

nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs.

This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of

Trujillo's security services, the

he understandable fear that prevails

throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-trujillo..

activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently

consists of only a few individuals with no real underground

structure.

CIA/has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Irujillo a

very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent

requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense

weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO,

three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying

ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The

recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.

CIA has established working relationships with selected exile

groups. These relationships have taken into account that-President

Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican

President Jose Figures as his emissary and representative to work with

Dominican exile groups. Through Figures and with the knowledge of

President Betancourt, CIA is providing financial support and technical

guidance to the following activities:

(1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose,

Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,

EIES ONLY

SECRET

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SECRET

LYES ONLY

-,3 -

a representative designated by Betancourt, and chaired by Figures:

The

council had its first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961.

Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the

concurrence of President Betancourt, CIA has indicated to Betancourt

and Figures that it is prepared to support, the council's program in

the amount of $15,000 a month. It is Figueres! Initial concept that the

council will undertake propaganda activities directed against Trujillo,

and train selected Dominicans in democratic process, administrative skills,

and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of res-

ponsibility in any successor government. Figures has also proposed

that an exile paramilitary

force be trained, but CIA has discouraged this

activity to date since neither Betancourt nor Figures have indicated a

clear plan for its eventual use. It is CIA's judgment that the exile

groups represented on Figures' council have little if any popular sup-

port among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages

that can and is being gained by support

of the council is the number of

credits that this gives to the United States Government in its dealings

with Betancourt and Figueres in utilizing them in other operations.

Betancourt

has been adamant that no action be taken against Castro until

Trujillo is disposed of. This support has served to neutralize his

attitude on that point since 1t amounts to a guarantee to Betancourt of

the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves

to solidify the attitudes of dissident exiled Dominicans so that they are

not anti-U.S. and will make them more approachable and amenable to

U.S. Government objectives once Trujillo is overthrown. (2) The conduct

EVES ONLY

SECRET

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

- 4:

of radio propaganda from Ponce, Puerto Rico, which 1s under the direction

of Horacio ORNES, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Domini-

cana (VRD). This radio program 1s heard in the Dominican Republic as

the voice of the ORNES organization.

•(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to ORNES so as

to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or personnel

into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-milltary boat capability.

has not been utilized to date. It is contemplated that both the ORNES

propaganda program and this limited boat capability will be absorbed by

the exile council now being formed by Figures.

.C. With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his govern-

ment as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial

support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing a para-military

capability in Venezuela.

D. CIA has recently re-located Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from

Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico: Jimenez, a physician and university

professor, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence

of the internal opposition. He isicurrently working with the Puerto

Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of

the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program 1s to pro-

vide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes

and selected administrative skills. Through Jimenez and a small group

of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition,

CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the in-

ternal opposition which will supplement those currently In being through

EVES ON!

SECRET

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

-5-

our Station in Ciudad TrujillO.

E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets through-

out the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.

III. COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED

A. Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio

operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf" at

our Station In Cludad Trujillo. However, this program has not been ini-

tiated due to the internal opposition's failure to provide individuals

who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican

Republic and willing to run the risk of having the radio equipment in.

their possession.:

B. Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and under-

ground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition

has

provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive

explosive materials through clandestine channels.

IV. POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION

A. CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a

small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of

our Station in Cludad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons

to the internal opposition for their use in personal defense attendant

to their projected efforts' to remove Trujillo can be developed by the

Station.

B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic,

in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets

exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.

EYES ONLY

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SECRET

EYESICOLY

C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no capability

to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA

could initiate operations to cache such supplies off the coast of the

Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop

such a capability.

D. Initiate the training of para-military cadres. CIA has been

reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current

information indicates that any invasion of the Republic unless massively

supported by overt action would be impractical.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

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## Page 88

THE WHITE

JUGE OFFICE

SECRET

FOR DEAREORN FROM DEPARTNINT

#: 4451605052006 inn

bos amarage onsent.

This docunent consists of

2 pages

copy lio. —of a copies;

series

(n8: 15/24/612

i. President has now approved contingency plans sonewhat revised subsiquen:

your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve

uncertainties reflected Icf

but your comments and requests for any necessary

clarification will be welconed.

2. Depastment appreciates valuable vori perforned by Amo. Farland and you:-

self and CAS in developing pro-l'S attitude mong dissident clements.

would hove

this could be retained and strengthened but only if ai a cosi acceptable fron

standpoint l's

national intorest. If price tasy for friendship of dissidents,

whose action capabilities and Icalistic prospects inus fai remain uninown quent:

places

100 sicat strain upon moral position and principles for which US stares ...

involves risis which in our considered

juigmeni siculd not be accepied, rich sur

you will agree ie should stand firm.

3. While fully conscizant sunique circuristances vithin stominican

licpubi:

winicil precluded normal CiS operation, Department

is noneticless decoly concern:

by degrec

to winich covert activitics this case have ueen foreca io devisie áron

normal cover

and cut-out safeguaris with seaudio result Isg too opiniy identifi.

with what should be clandesiine activities.

Running through eniire ni dilcuna has been conflict beticon to objia

(1) To be so associaled with renoval Irujillo regine as to ccrive cre

among Di dissidonis and lincral elements throughout Latin anerica;

(2) To disassociate US from any surious intervention in Dominicar.

Ropublic and. cven more so from any political assassination which migi:

OCCUE.

SICKLIT

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SECRET

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

In Department's considered opinion;

former objective cannot, repeat not, casily

override latter.

For this rcason you should not, repeat not, inform

trusted

opposition leaders at thisx time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver

copy to them.

5. In May 19 meeting here with. Yaguate and Cibio Departrent scoliesman sough.

disabuse them expectation USG acting cither through Department or CIA could be

party to any political assassination. At sane time assured them this government

continuing sympathy for legitinate

aspirations Doninican people achieve represen:

tize government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.

6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be

aware Departnent's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made conte:

upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectivcly to disassociate l'SG.

I. In light foregoing suggest you withhold further action and to sar cutoni

feasible substantave conversations

with dissidents ponding Icceip: documents now

to be pouched.

END OF MISS CE

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SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 26, 1961

MIHORANDUM FOR: Mr. HicGeorge Bundy

The thite House

yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a

Consul General in Ciudad Irujillo, supplementing the guicance he

will be receiving on the recently approved contingency planse

The text of this draft telegram has been shown to the Agency and

agreed to by them.

I am also foriarding copies of the exchange

with Dearborn leading up to the present, draft telegram to him.

I know it will be difficult for the President to find time

before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situ-

ation in the Dominican Republic, I feel that he should approve it

personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views

as stated in he HSC Record of Actions for May 5.

Chester Bowles

Attachments:

Tab

A - Proposed outgoing

telegram

Tab B - Previous exchange

of telegrams

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## Page 91

SECRET

PROPOSED TELEGRAM

to US Consul General in

Ciudad Trujillo

FOR DEARBORN FRON DEPAKTVENT

1.

President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subse

quent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest.

Hope this will

resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and

requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable woris performed by Amb. Farland and your-

self and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope

this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from

standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of dissidents,

whose action capabilities

and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown

quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which

US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted,

feel sure you will agree we should stand firm.

3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic

which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned

by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from

normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with

what should be clandestine activities.

4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives:

• (1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo Icgime as to derive

credit among Dk dissidents and liberal clements throughout Latin America;

(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican

Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.

SLiCKET

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0 2 50

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, casily

override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted op-

position leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver

copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras

Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition

leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after

overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and

request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments.

If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request

should take.

5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought

disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be

party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government's

continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represen-

tative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.

6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be

aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made con-

tingent upon deepening of cover arrangements

so as effectively to disassociate USG.

7. In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substan-

tive conversations

with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to

be pouched.

END OF MESSAGE

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## Page 93

TOP SEC

fi.

THE WHIE HOUSE OFFICE

FOR DEARBORN FROM SIATE

1. President has now approved contingency plans dis-

cussed during your stay here with one major exception: You are not.

to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident

gIoups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to

strengthen pro-U.S. sentinent among dissident groups.

Your

work along this line has been irvaluable. However, re musi

S

not run risk of u.s. association with politicalassasinarioram

This last principle is överriding and must prevail in doubtsui

situation:

however, there is much you can do to protect l.c.

interests within this framewort of policy; irciucino most i-

the rcasures in inich you are now engaged. Specific instic-

tions follow.

3. Continue to inform dissident clenents of U.s. sumit

for this position: In case of finic end overtinion of

Trujillo-wether or not initiated by pro-u.s. group--the

pro-u.s. group should promptly male every elfort to conscities

Itself as reasonable

and plausibie provisional doverrinen.

It should inmediately declare itself such and request aspittance

from U.S., Venezuela, colomuia and O15. If advance discussiors. .

TOP SECRET

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ICRET

PROPERTY UF

THE WHILE HOUSE OFFICE

•show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss

the specific content of such a request and procedures for

handling it. All possible preparations should be made short

oi actual formulation in writing of alaigtaiequest in advance

of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy tiat,

under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist

type takeover in the Dominican Republic even if we must intervena

without a request. This last possibility should not be discussed

with the dissidents.

4. Reference

to multilateral action in record of actions

means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral;

and that in the case of direct intervention it would be pre-

ferable for forces

to be multilateral. No broader interprecation

is justified. All other U.S. actions--whether propaganda or

covert activities--will be cortinued on a bilateral basis.

5. Covert activities are, as you linow, very snall. due to

inability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies

which will effectively disassociate U.S., and failure to provide

candidates for training as radio operators or sabotcurs. Our

offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity

and effective cover--renains open. However, you must sequest

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TOL SECRET

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MOrEMiY OF

THE WINTE HOUSE OFFICE

and receive further specific instructions for any specific

covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer

arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our

suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual

fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little

purpose and expose the United States to great danger of lultinase

fameation with

disclosure of participation in/ assassination attempt. Ine basic

policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help, while

carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested.

This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert helly is

very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of

information.

6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propaganda campaian

and other external pressures.

7. FyI, in event overthrow of Trujillo military forces will

be dispatched innediately to graciesion) positions.

On Icecipt

of request from provisional government, and your concurrence,

will he rese to is in indictite

It no request is received and there appears to

be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made

in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it

imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FEe

I'OP SEGRAL

35

ingente

1H. 50916 DocId:32123505 Page-95-

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TO: SOCKEd

THE WHITE HOUSE UFFICE

8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents in-

forming them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate

request. If they are favorable to this procedure take all

possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal

of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written

document for advance transfer to you.

TOP SECRET

236

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## Page 97

:1.'

TRE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

+00 5221Y

1. President has noe approved contingency plans discussed during y-ur

stay here with one ear inajor excortion: You are not to request a pre-signed re-

quest for help fron Dominicar dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that joi continue to work to surgthen pro-ü.s.

sentiment among dissident grouns. Iour nork along this line had veen inurinde.

However, we 220s must not diade germit sir danger of disclosina i.s. associntion

with political assaination di intoriention in the iominicen-Rerublic. This last

princile is overriding and must prevail in countful situation, rowever, there is

much you can do to protect vas. interasts within this framework uf policy: including

most of the measures in which you are now engacedo Spacisio instructions scili

3. Turi Carnitune to inform dissident elements ci lou. support for their

position. In case of assassination or overthrow i trusillo-hether or not

initiated by pro-j.S. Eroup--the group should a tacantião mare an i mediate

request for assistance fron l.S., Venozuela, Colorbia and the pod su.cáis reolest

sslves the provisional foverrment a request help whether or not they actually

are able to assue pover. If tira are favorablo to this procedure sodicula

237

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## Page 98

TOPSECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Fir Distom prim State

1. President has new

approved contingency plans discussed during.

stay here with

one score najor excention: You are not to request a pre-siara.

quest for help fion Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that jo contimue to nork to suratic:

sentiment among dissident grouns. Iour work along this line had been inni

Hoever, we are must not dimir it ane danger of disclose . ..

with political assaination on intervention In the dominicer-renutlic. Fils

princible 1s overriding and must prevail 1n dountful situation, towever,

much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this franework uf mat..

most of the measures in which you are no.

.3.50

ase of assinationor overthrow of Trujillo=whether or not

iated by pro U.s. group--the pro U.s. group should promptly

ke every effort to constitute itself as reasonable and plausible

rovisional government. It should immediately à declare itself

uch and request assistance from U.S.,, Venezuela, Colombia and GAS.

•--ururabie to this procedura radarzi.

...:

..-.--...

238

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

discuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for hardling 1t.

Paree i

411 possible procarations should be made

short of actual patesation in writing of

a signod requost in advance of the event. Underlying this procecure 1s the

polley that, under no circustances, can we take the chance of a communist

type takeover in the Diminican Republic exis if we mist gorin mithout a request.

This last possiblity should not be discussed with the dissidents.

4o Hittitesrat Feference to multilateral action in record of actions rieans

open

only that further sanctions will be multilateral, and that in the case of direct

- Intervention 1t would be preferable for sos fordes to be multilateral. "o

barade orcader interpretation 1s justifiod, ill other fos. actions--whether

propganda or covert activities---1l1 be continued on a bilateral casis.

5. Corat activities are, as you krow, very small due to inability oi

dissidents to develop a rethod of receirring surplies itich will efiectively

dissacoitate U.S,) ani failura to provide cardida us for trainino as radio

operatod on saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--prov.ied they

develop capacity and effective cover--renairs pren, rouever, i you must ra

me, specific Listructions for any spocific coiert activibi. it ide the presert

tIne he are unable to transfer me arms to dissidents, Tell then that this is

because of our suspicion that method of transfer nay se icinisinicion, In

actual cact se feel that the transfer of arms icula serve very little purpose

237

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108

SECRET

• THE WHITE HOUSE UFFICE

and expose the United States to great danger of tie ultimate disclosuro of assassIna.!

attempt. Eusquirquera The basic policy is to auratas contirue te hold ouen offer

of covert help, whule carefully exinining and clearing the specific help requested.

This 13 feasible becisise, in actual fact, the covert help is very slight except

exchint ir

for verhal ancouragerent and Astormations.

6. 'Ne intend to reep up arti-frujillo proacarda campaign and other exterral

prcetires.

→ In event orerthroi sujillo milite forces will de discatered immediatel-

to freema on positions. On recept di requast iron/selatule provisional governors

Pery did ip to berther !

and your concurrence, ve all,st in, If no request is received and thest arrears to

be is any danger of communist takeover then decision will be mce in

Washingten shether io a interven regardleas. Inis makes it imocrativo trat a

request ce obtained if at all possiole, . ...:: !..

8. Legin conversations imradiately with dissidents inforing ther of l.s.

position and tha osabir necencity for an innediati equest. insulus radiz

maures If trey aïo favorablo to this procedure tare all parsible meacuria o

prepare for the irmeditate transmitual of such a raûnfat short of tre actual

proparation of a iritten document En the livaiiendsifor advance trensfer to go:.

Goodwin

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ROUTING

TOP SECRET

si°

ATE: 29 MAY 1961

1580

3

TOM:

CIUDAL IRUJILLO (OP RATIONE LEDIATE)

DIRECTOR

2908)31. 21

27 z

ONt.

C/WH 1-5

¡FO A DOl 6, D/DCI 7, DOP 8, COP INADDP/A 10,0/CA 11, 5/C 11-12

DEFERREO

ROUTINE

OPERATIO: L DUEDIATE

TOP GEC-ET OUT 6C5

TRUJ (OPLI) TOP SECRET • INFO

REF: TRUJ 0609 (IN' 13990) =

CITE DIR

42443

42443

Officer

FOR CIA/ FROS STATE

1. PRESIDET HAS NO AITOVED COILINGELCY PILS ELECUSSED DURING YOUR

STAY HERS WITH ONE AJOR COPTION: YOUR ALL ACT TU LIQUEST A FRE-SIGIDD

ROQUEST FOR HELP TO: LO LIONS DISSIDENT SCUFS.

2. TO COUSIDAL IT ESITIAL TRAL YOU CONS TO LOUS TO STRUGIEH

PRO-U.S. SOUTE: SUT IONG I SADIST GROUPS. YOUT AGG. ALONG THIS LIFE HAS EBON

INVALIA-LE. MUTTO LET HUS TIN KUSK CEU.S. LSSCCINION ITH POLITICAL.

ASSASSINATION, SINCE VOL A- MATIRE DR GE PAL POLICI CANNOT COLONE ASCASSILATION.

JUIS LACE PRINCIPLE IS OVARIUING AD MUST POVAIL LI ECULATOL SEITATION. "OVEVi,

THERE IS MUCH YOU CA": LO TO PLOTECI UOS. INTERESTS LINI! QUIS FRALEHONK OF

POLICE, INCLUDING LUI GE SUE CASULES DO INICH YOU ARE JUN ENGAGUD. SPECIFIC

...

IS TRICTIONS FOLLO.

3. CONTITUE TO INFOR: DISSIDE T CLONG IS OF 1. • SUPPURT FOR THEIR

POSITION. IN CASS DE OUBLEDO! OF TEJILLO-GIE OR HOT TITLATED EI PRO-

U.S. GROUP-TE PRO-!OE. CECHP DICULO TRUTTLE ANY TO STONE TO CONTINUE

DECLARE ITSFLE SUCH AND ROBUT PIO POO LOGO, HE dab, GOLGEL AD ids.

COOPDINATINO OFFICERS

(COILIN-D)

ELEASING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICEN

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

226202663032332233

Far?

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

LATE

ROUTING

5

2

3

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO 8

PAGE TWO

io

TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT: 60674

42443

IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW TIAT DISSIDDITS AFE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE,

• DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CONTSIT OF SUCH A REQUEST AD PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT.

ALL POSSIBLE PREPAPATIONS SHOULD BE NADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING

OF A REQUEST III ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. UNDERLYING THIS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICE

THAI, UNDER NO CIRCUNSTANCES, CAN WE TAXE THE CHALICE OF A COMUNIST TYPE IANTOVER

IN IHE DOTINICAN REPELIC VEN IF WE MUST INTERVEE MITHOUT A REGUEST. THIS

LAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT EE DISCUSSED WITH THE LISSIDETS.

L. REFERENCE TO MULTILATORAL ACIION IN RICOPU OF ACIIONS MEANS ONLY THAT

FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND T: AT IN THE CASE OF DIFECT

• INTERVEITION IT WOULD BE PREFERAPLE FOR FORCES TO ES MULTILATERAL. NO BROADER.

INTRAPRETATION IS JUSTIFISD. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONE-WHETHER PROPAGANDA OK

COVERT ACTIVITIES- ILL BE CONTINULD ON A BILATERAL EASIS.

5º COVERI ACIIVITLES ANÜ, AS YOU MION, VERY S ALL DUE TO INABILITY OF

DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOY A HEIHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES MUCH WILL' EFFECTIVELY DIS-

ASSOCIATE U.S., AD FALLURE TO PROVIDE CADIDATES FOIL TRAINING AS RALIO OPERATORS

OR SABOTEURS• OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES-HOVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITI

AND EFTECI COVET--PELAINS OPEN. HOEVER, YOU MUST HUSSI AND CECRIVE FUTHER"

SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR AÏY SPECIFIC COVERI ACILVITY. AT THE PHESEIT TIME VE

ARE UNABLE TO TRANSFER AI. TO DISSIDUNTS.

TALL TE. THAT THIS iS NECAUSE CE

COOEDINATING OFFICERS

PAULASING OFTICEE

TOr SICKET

(LOUTHENEP)ATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

HN 50955 DooId: 32423505 Page 102

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dw.

2

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGS ТЫЗВ

TRUJ (OPE:) TOP SECHET INFO

CITE DIR: 42443

OUR. SUSPICION TAT MOTIOL ON IASFE HAY BE UNSAFE. IN ACIUAL FACT WE FEEL THAT

THE TRANSFOR DE ARM MCULE SEAVE VARY LITTLE PURPOSE AND EXPOIS THE UNITED SIATES

TO GREAT DANCS OF ASCCLATION LTH ASSASSINATION ATTRIPI. THE FASIC POLICY

IS TO COUTLINE IO HOLD D'N CHES OF COVENT HIP, MULE CALFULLY ENARIG

AND CLEARING ME SPECIFIC MULD RELUDOTED. THIS IS FEMIELE ESCAUSE, IN ACTUAL

FACT, THE COVETT FOL: IS VICY :LICHT EXCUIT FON VIREAL LICCURAGZENT ADD EXCHANGE

OF INFOR'ATION.

6. 'WE INTEND TO KOS! UP ANTI-RIVILIO PROPAGAIN GAITAIGH AUD OTHEP

EXTE AL PRESSITES.

TO FYI, IN EVENT OVELIC OF TELUILLO: LLIZAUY PRO'S WILL ES DISPAICHED

OMEDLATELY TO LIAIT-LY POILTIONS. ON RECUPT OF FILLOUT FROM PROVASIONAL

COVEREENI, AID YOUR CONCLUCI, LEÜLL BE PROFATU TU DU L SNIDIATELY. IF

NO REQUEST IS HECEIVED ME THE APPEALS TO LE MAY DATOES Or COMMMIST LAKECVER

THEN DOCISION LLE SU ADE LA MASELNGTUG MITHIN TO LUTEVES REGARDLESS. THIS

LAKES iT L' 'EMATIVE TUAT A RIUST EE OETAINED LE AL ALL POSSLELL END FYI.

8. BEGI: CONVERSATIC LiLDAILY WITH DiLETS LIFOILIG THE: OF U.S.

POSITION AUD THE NECHOSITY PEN ALAUGH PUGG. 1E THEL LUE FAVORACLE TO

CHIS PLOCEDURE INKE ALL FO SELE HAGUS TO WRARE DO THE CLIDIATE THAIS ITIAL

DE SUCH A REGESI SOLE DE THE ACTAL FITRATIO: CHE TITTER DECETONG AUG ALVANCE

COOPOINATINO OFFICERS

SINO OFFICER

TOP SICITT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

NY 50955 DocTa: 32423505

Page 103

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RECTOR

PAGE FOUR

CITE DIR.

ITUJ (OPL:) TOP SECRET

INFO

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OuT 60694

42443

TO YOU.

iH/Cormiert:

DID OF ME SAGE

officer

ief wus nessa,c fror CIA/

to state in which he asked what

guidance and c-couragerent ne could live dissidents, 11 he couc

provide dissidents with draft document rocuest t.:.U.S assistance

In event Trishllo overthrown, and asked clarirication oi

Presidont's state ent thist any action against TilJilLo should be

multilateral.

'S COMMENT:*DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT.

•ORGANIZATION.

C/UHD*

"BLEASING OBICER

COOIDINATINO OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

-'so

C//3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICIA

Copy No.

M 30936 pocra:32423505- Page 104

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