SUBJECT: AMMUG/1 DEBRIEFING REPORT #285 - AGENT COMMUNICATIONS.
Originator: CIA
From: C/WH/C/RR/OS
To: FI/D STAFF
Document date: 03/01/1965
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10239-10023)

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEONET

1 March 1955

WH. C 4 65-91

IX-2500

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FVD Stall

WH/2/Salrador

TSD

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

General: AMMUG/1 Debriefirg Repart 1285

Specllic: Agert Coramunicatioris

WH/C Memorandums #65-86 and 485-87

(Not sent WH/2/sajrador)

1. The LN Department hes no means of direct radio

communication with its own agents. U it wishes to send a message

to an agent, it passes the message to the legal Department, and

that otfice sends the message for LN, elther to the LN agent

directly 1l ha has radio facilities for receiving li,. or to an Illegal

Department agest (with whom tare is direct radio communication)

for passage to ike LN agent.

The Li Departneat, wten in

1963, for example, it wished to send a message to YON Susa,

passed the: message to she Olegal Department, which sent li to

an agent with radio communication in Guatemala to relay to him.

2. The Dlegal Departmort has 1ts own radio atation for

communicadon with its agents.

The station 19 not in any of the

headquarters' bulldings; Its actual location is not known Even

when the lllegal Department and the LN Departmect Here com-

Dined in the mA stution and shared odices, the members is the

section hardhne legal agents were very unaluins to tair ibout

communications in any way.

3.

In the Zapote Operatior agent communication brake

down because of several factors.

As planned

the there agents

in the caration were to uge the same post ollice box is a cover

andress, but each agent was taught a separair sin systei The

Chemica Lavoratory (LQ) had a recurd of each syriem agains.

the agent's pseudonym,

under the heading of the Zapote Operaion.

as well as examples of his handwrite 6, all

SECRET

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It was planned that Roque DALTON, "MONTENEGRO,"

the principal agent in the Zapoie Operately was er do the letter

writtry, the other too axents were do pase thelr lidormation lo

The first letter received at DGI (Cuban litelligence Service)

headquarters was picked up al the accommod.ation address in

Mexace and forwarded to Havara, where through sume corfusion

It was misrouled to the Ilegal Department From there li was .

esentually forwarded tu LN. The Salvador Desk officer yent the

lester ir 18s ervelope to LA requesting processing aid identuying

the leiser as belungine to the Zapote case, Irom SARAVIA (the

second agent), and ashing notification as to whether the lefter

contained secret writing.

The LQ analysts, examining the letter,

equated Zayote and "MONTENEGRO" (although SARAVIA was

also part of the Zapote Operation) but checked with the desk

officer and with him agreed to develop the secret writing with the

SARAVA developer.

They believed that the letter contained

secret. writing because It was folded with the lival text ourside

and the d'ank side inside as if to protect i secred text. When

the letter was tested with the SARA VIA deseleper, however, no

• The rechnichame then tried to wish the

"MONTEVEGRO' developer, but by this time any secres writis

the letter contaied had been destroyed by the Ircorrect process

They identified the handwriting as thai ol SARAVlA, and the

texi indicaied that there wils any i enclosure.

Mearwhile,

"MAURICIO" had reported from Mexice that DALTON had been

arrested and deported from El Salvador.

A gecond letter from SARAVLA was also receired aid

tester wish the SARAVlA developer. Although there were in-

dications that it contained a/w, rothing could be rucovered.

There was to s." on the envelope, which had mr been opened. A

third leiter from SARAVLA, folded in the form to contain s/w,

was also dereloued and showed stgas it y! but so faint that it

could six be read. The desk officer thought that perhaps when

DALTON BAR arreStE SARAVLA lad liken over his s," laid tras

usty ll lagiead of his own The LA didiysts coermented thai

SARAIZA was using for communucator with Dol headquarters a

aystem that he had been laught for use unly 1a inernal com-

murications in El Salvador and Mal he should be trid to use thie

prider system for beaddüarters. The dest officer, disaser,

hart me meins if communicatine with toe agent since the sw

messages could not bo read, A systeal of recognition for

SUSAST

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Melan 1

personal meetings with the agents in El Salvador was Included te

the operational program for Zapole, but that meant an intermediary

or the case officer going to El Salvador for the contacl since

DALTON was out o! El Balvador and Other means al communtcacos

was lost, DALTON was ordered to Mexico and the desk alficer

arranged i trip there to get explanátions of what had happened and

roestablish mall communication

When the desk olficer went to

Mexico for the meeting in March 1994; however; DALTON and

the other Saivado ans he wanted lo ace did not show up.

The cAse

officer also wrote a sill memorandum to PINEIRO complainlag

about the quallty of the s/w systems and training. His letter

was returned with an endorsement by PINEIRO saying that the

matter was being looked into and resulis rould be expected Up

o April 1964, bowever, nothing concrete had been achiered, as

far as the deat officer knew; he heard nothing from L& and was

unable to resolve the matter directly with the agent in Mexico

because the agent never appeared for the scheduled meeting.

6. All agent zoramunications from the field to accom-

moriation addresses in Mexico or elsembera are picked up and

forwarded through the fleid station to headquarters without being

opened.

In the Sonis Operation, lor example, when the agent

manted a meeting in Mexico, she sert a letter to hor accom-

modation addresa there; the letto. yas picked up and forwarded

to headquarters; when it had been developed al headquarters,

the desk oficer informed the case allicer in Mesico of the time,

date, and place set by lha agent for the meeting.

In no case

doea the fleid atallon upon and read any agent cortespondenca.

7. Lu the Lapoto Operation, all agent personal documents

were picked up during the training perlod and were photographed for .

the agent's file. When the agent laft Cuba to return to his opera.

( lonal area, the personal documents such as the cadula de

Identidad were teturned to him.

03

(Ben Stolts)

C/WH/C/RR/08

322131

1, 4.0

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