YURIY I. NOSENKO-THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM DESCRIBES THE TECHNIQUES USED AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PRESENT INTERROGATION OF NOSENKO.
Originator: CIA
From: DAVID E. MURPHY, CHIEF, SOVIET BLOC
To: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Document date: 1966-10-25 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32397035

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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM.

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

: CIA

RECORD NUMBER

:

104-10429-10093

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

: CIA

DAVID E. MURPHY, CHIEF, SOVIET BLOC

: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

:

YURIY I. NOSENKO-THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM DESCRIBES THE.

TECHNIQUES USED AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE FIRST

PHASE OF. THE PRESENT INTERROGATION OF NOSENKO.

DATE :

10/25/1966

PAGES : 16

SUBJECTS : NOSENKO

JFK ASSASSINATION

DATE

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

OF LAST REVIEW

COMMENTS

PAPER

SECRET

RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

06/24/04

JEK-RH17 : F05 : 20040330-1069616

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

992(44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

55990 Date: 11-01-2021

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10429-10093

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25 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Director of Central Intelligence:

Yuriy I. NOSENKO

The attached memorandum describes the techniques

used and the results obtained in the first phase of the

present interrogation of NOSENKO.

The most significant

item to emerge from this questioning and related polygraph

testing pertained to Subject's story on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Subject's reactions to the polygraph indicate that he

never heard of OSWALD until after President Kennedy's

assassination in November 1963, that he was not an active

participant in the case as claimed and that his whole

story on OSWALD was prepared by the KGB and given to us

at their direction.

Other areas of strong reaction refer to Subject's

suspected contact with the

while in Geneva in 1962

1964 and to Abidian and the Pushkin Street drop (key factor

in the PENKOVSKIY compromise). Subject became very upset

at questioning on this subject and refused to discuss his

alleged involvement in the case.

We also touched upon

NOSENKO's parental background, periods of imprisonment

homosexuality.

His reactions

all pointed to clear-

cut contradictions in the story he has told us.

There still remain several areas of interest and

importance to be covered with the techniques used to date.

We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October.

4. This first phase has enabled us to confirm our

analyses. of key

the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive

areas and this is worrying him because he

much we know or how we learned it.

19222

More important is

is not sure how

NOSENKO's reactions

have given us hope that we may by.

this procedure have begun

to strike home.

We do not know what it is that keeps this

man sitting-month after month in his present situation.

We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the

KGB will

get him out.

Related to this may be the thought

that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that it would be

unhealthy for him to confess.

Dur current line of interro-

gation, expanded and used even more forcefully, might

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F81-0351 x')g, eury ne. "86

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- 2 -

break down

some of his obstacles to confession by showing

us in a different and stronger posture.

Therefore,

we nOW

plan to go beyond the limited aims originally set for this

phase of

the interrogation.

We plan to continue the inter-

rogation in the hope of getting a confession; written plans

will be submitted when they are more definitely formulated.

David E. Murphy

Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Attachment

Cc:

Acting DDP (w/attach)

Chief,

CI (w/attach)

Director of Security (w/attach)

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24 October 1966

1o

This 1s an interim report on progress to dato in

the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began

on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21

October. Aftar a break. it will resume on 25 October.

20:

been limited in view of the possibility of losing access

to NOSENKO, we have sought (a) to strengthen our basic report,

now in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying

points of confusion and revealing new contradictions: and

by polygraph examinations of key areas, and (b) to. lead

toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our

hypotheses about the true background of NosaNKo and this

KGB operation, to convey to NOSENKO the impression that we

know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof

of his guilt and that ha has no proapacts for aleasa.

refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interro

gation, but at this point there seems little to lose.

The first four days have shown that the method is

NOSENKO again proved a good reactor on polygraph,

he seemed disturbed by our knowledge and the special areas

of interest we revealed, and we were able to develop tm-

portant new information, contradictions and indications

concerning the background of this operation.

Method

4.

Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in

specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story

he has told to date.

renewal of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any.

questions have been pointed and detailed and neither require

data portion.

we gave him no explanation for our

Our

nor permit long-winded answers, they do not seek new infor-

mation but are clearly designed to check information he pro-

vided earlier, our questions are slanted to build up the

impression that they are based on data we have learned in-

dependently.

The subjeet matter 1s taken up in a predeter

mined order designed for maximum impact on NOSeNKO.

Inter-

rogation sessions are followed by polygraph examinations on

the matters covered in the interrogation and/or other topies.

Somewhat more time is spent.

on direct polygraph examination

than on interrogation.

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2.

Hichlights to Date

OSWALD Cases

The opening session was a polygraph

examination conducted by Nicholas Stolaken, whom NOSENKO

recognized as his earlier polygraph operator. The question-

ing was devoted entirely to Lee Harvey OSWALD and NOSENKO'3

role in the OSWALD case.

We hit this point before any other

In order (a), to permit clean polygraph testing on this key

matter without having disturbed him with other questions,

and (b), to get over to NOSENKO the gravity of our concern

on this matter of highest state interest. The operator's

conclusions were

a.

Subject was not personally or actually in

volved in the OSWALD case from 1959 while OSWALD waS

in the Soviat Union.

Subject received special instructions (from

Che KGB about the OSWALD Ca3 and t=11 Am-

erican authorities about it.

was partly for

the purpose of supporting and sub-

stantiating Subject's cover story "legend".

Subject heard of OSWALD (as a case) only after

Kennedy's assassination, however he was not an active

participant in 1963 as

he indicates, but was probably

briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

Geneva Meetinas:

We devoted several hours of inter-

rogation and polygraph testing to the Geneva periods, June

1962 and January-February

We hit this point second in

order because there are clear signs of important deception

behind it and it offers us special opportunities to suggest

Inside Information which in fact derive from observation and

deduction.

the high points were the following:

said was suspected in 1962 to be an American agent, was

covered again in detail.

The new data we obtained tend

to confirm that this 1s a serious part of NOSENKO's

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3.

message..

SHAKHOV's background in fact suggests that

he is actually a KGB officers his contact in Geneva

with David MARK, a former CIA cooptee in Moscow, 1s

at the center of NOSENKo's story.

We slanted our

questions to suggest knowledge that SHAKHOV is a KGa

officer (not a KGB investigation suspect) and that

we may know of some of his important operational

contacts.

NOSENKO was inconsistent in his story

and reacted significantly under polygraph examina-

tion.

We are currently tracing new names and data

and

are re-examining the significance of this matter.

NOSENKO reacted very

strongly and consistently to the question of whether

or not he had been sent to Geneva by the KGB. to con-

tact CIA, whether he was receiving KGB direction

there, and on ralated questions, including some re-

to his ostensible investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV.

U.S. Personnel and Installations in Geneva:

NOSENKO was: Interrogated on

his earlier story that

he had seen. in Geneva in 1964 the file on KGB activity

against American installationg in Geneva (KGB cryptonym

"SKORPION") •

His version this time conflicted with

his 1964 version but contained the same message, that

the weak and understaffed KGB in Geneva had little

interest, limited facilities and no success in opera

tions against the Americans and had practically no

identities of CIA personnel there.

addition, NOSENKO reacted to polygraph questions

related to whether the KGB had told him the name of

his CIA case officers.

On the other hand, he did not

react to the names of

the then Cos Switzerland and

COB Geneva, which suggests that he was not told them

(these names were buried in lists of names).

KGB Personnel in Genevas

NOSENKO®s answers

to questions concerning Alexandr KISLOY conflicted

with certain details earlier reported. Including KIS-

LOV's role in the AECHITCHAI case.

He

seemed disturbed

by the questioning on KISLOV and finally said he saw

no reason to answer. any more of them.

However, his

polygraph reactions did not suggest that he was as

sensitive to KISLOV as to other individuals and matters

covered in the same series of questions.

We also asked,

with the polygraph, whether he was withholding anything

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4.

concerning his alleged agent Oleg GRINEVSKIY, an

official of the Soviet delegation, his reactions

suggested that he may genuinely be ignorant of

GRINEVSKIY'S KGB activities as handler of a British

double agent in Geneva at the time.

He had earlier

said that his daily access to the KGB Residency in

Geneva in 1964 was due to his freguent contacts with

Mikhail S. ISYMBALy this time he said that he only

saw ISYMBAI, twice in Geneva in 1964 and failed to

mention a Sunday meeting with ISYMBAl which he had

reported to us at the time it occurred.

This leaves

open the whole question of how NOSENKO

can explain

his daily access to the Residency, which he himself

now says - evidently on the basis

of what he has

learned from our previous interrogations - is not

normally permitted.. This will be covered in further

questioning.

7.Matters Related to the PENKOVSKIY Compromises

a. John ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street

Deaddrop: NOSENKO reacted with special sensitivity

and intensity when asked in a polygraph test whether

he had been instructed to tell CIA about ABIDIAN'S

visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop.

In addition.:

he refused for the first time to discuss his own

participation in the incident, adamantly claiming

that he does not remember when or even whether he

visited the drop or whether he read reports on

surveillance coverage of 1t after ABIDIAN's visit.

(He had earlier said he visited the drop at least

twice, immediately after ABIDIAN's visit; he des-

cribed the location and named the KGB officers he

went with.)

In sharp contrast to his reluctance

to discuss his personal role was his unhesitating

and confident response to other aspects of the

Pushkin Street drop storys he reiterates that

ABIDIAN was under full time, double-strength sur-

veillance throughout his tour in Moscow and that

ABIDIAN was surveilled to the drop.

He now adds,

for the first time.

that the KGB concluded that

the

drop had been initially found by a U.S. tourist or

delegation member and that ABIDIAN was merely check-

ing out its suitability for some eventual use.

(In

fact, PENKOVSKIY proposed the drop and ABIDIAN went

there only in response to the agreed telephonic

signal triggered by persons unknown, not by PEnKOV-

SKIY.)

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5.

b.

ONCKO-ZAPP: NOSENKO was again queried on

Colonel DULACKI 'g bugged restaurant meeting with

an Indonesian officer,

whose name he gave as ZEPP

in 1962 and ONGKO in 1964..

He could not clarify

why he had confused the names.

since we now know

through Greville WYNNE that the Soviets were inter-

ested as late as early 1963 in clarifying PENKOV-

SKIY's allusion in a bugged conversation in 1961

to "Zepp", we believe that NOSENKO's 1962 version

was a KGB fishing expedition. However, NOSENKO

aid not react to a polygraph question concerning

the name zepp, and he may not himself know that

he was given a wrong name for the Indonesian officer.

nor. why.

Admiral VORONTSOV: It had been speculated

that when NOSENKO mentioned in June 1962 meetings

the name of his "big friend" in the naval GRU,

Admiral VORONTSOV, he may have been fishing for

comments from us concerning Marshal VARENTSOV.

PENKOVSky's protoetor.

quaried this time about

Admiral VORONTSOV, NOSINKO said that he had never

met him and had no personal or similar connection:

he seems to have completely forgotten ever having

claimed a personal relationship.

PREISEREUND and STORSBERG:

NOSEnKO was asked about

Johan PREISFREUND, whom he had earlier claimed to have handled

in 1960-61 in Moscow as an agent against the military code

clerk Jim STORSBERG.

NOSENKO again said ha first met PREIS-

FREUND in 1960. We told NOSENKO that PREISFREUND told us

that he had not met NOSENXO until 1962.

NOSENKO denied

We then added to his concern by telling him (untruth-

but with a reasonable estimate of the true situation)

that PREISFRUEND also said that the KGB had told him to say

he first met NosaNKo in 1960.

When polygraphed NOSENKO rE-

acted strongly and consistently to questions on the subject.

These reactions and our follow-up may well bear on the ques

tion of whether STORSBERG was actually recruited by the KGB,

an issue we have reviewed with the FBI. NOSENKO must be

concerned because he now says that the

STORSBERG case was

primarily GRYNAZOV's, not his own, although he, NOSENKO,

"supervised" It.

Thus disappears the sole case that NOSENKO

has claimed as his very own.

9. Identity and Personal Backaround:

One of the basic

questions underlying this operation is NOSENKO's real identity

and personal background.

There are many indications, reported

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"*'6:

earlier, that he has spent time in prison and that he 1s

not in fact a KGB officer, similarly, his stories of his

early school and military service are inconsistent and

clarify this important point.. Among the points covered

so far are the followings

152218552

Identity. NOSENKO was guestioned extensively

on the polygraph concerning his identity.

series of tests, for example, he was asked whether

Minister of Shipbuilding Ivan NOSENKO was the father

of Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO and was then asked whether

Minister NOSENKO was his father; similarly with

Tamara NOSENKO, his ostensible mother. NOSENKO did

not react to the question phrased "Yurt Ivanovich

NOSENKO", but reacted consistently when asked if

these were his own parents. He was sensitive to

questions concerning his marriage.

There is reason

to believe he is not, in fact, married.)

given a series of tests asking for the first letter

of his given name.

The whole alphabet was covered,

and the polygraph

charts show that he became increas-

ingly tense, culminating at the letter $ (or perhaps

on both runs.

While we recognize that testing of

this sort may

not give valid results, it certainly

gets over to NOSanKo the degree of our doubt and may

even help us determine who he really 15.

pursue this further, covering his patronym and family

name as well.

Homosexuality,

We tested polygraphically our

observations that NOSENKO has homosexual tendencies

and experience..... He showed himself extremely sensitive

to this line of questioning.

The test results tend

to show that he had homosexual experience in Soviet

imprisonment (see below, and with the KGB homosexual

agents whom he has told us he recruited and handled.

Imprisonment: In view of the strong indica-

tions that. NOSENKO has spent considerable time in

prison (as reported in the past), we questioned him

on this. He reacted strongly and consistently to the

question of whether he had been imprisoned in the USSR.

We then ran a series of tests to determine his relative

sensitivity to various types of imprisonment. various

crimes for which he may have been imprisoned, various

areas of the USSR where he may have been imprisoned,

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and varlous years of imprisonment.

He seemed con

sistently sensitive to correctional labor camps

as the type of prison, and to several possible

causes of imprisonment: particularly homosexuality.

desertion and felony.

Interestingly enough he was

not sensitive to questions concerning imprisonment

for self-inflicted wounds despite his story that he

had shot himself in the hand during the war. He

seemed more consistently sensitive to Siberia as

the area of imprisonment but the results were not

as clear as on other aspects of his story.

He seems

particularly sensitive to the years 1954-1956, which

Immediately preceed the period from 1956 onward,

when he began to appear in KGB operations.

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24. October 1966

SUBJECT:

Polygraph Examination of Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD on 18 'October 1966

Background:

subject of this report is a thirty-eight year old married

male who, on 4 february 1964, established contact with United

States authorities in Geneva, Switzerland and asked for political

asylum.

subject was initially polygraphed on d April 1964 at a

covert security location in washington, D.C. suburbs (see

IRD Report #67491, dated 8 Apr1l 1964).

1964 polygraph intervier was to establish whether Subject was .

a bona fide defector, or 1f he was a dispatched Soviet agent

sent by soviet Intelligence on a specific mission,!. The con-

clusion arrived at during the 1964 polygraph testing was that

Subject was attempting deception, that he was not a bona fide

defector. but a dispatched soviet agent.

During the interim,

Apr1l 1964 - October 1966, Subject

has undergone additional interrogation during which an attempt

was made to obtain the truth from subject, and to clarify the

many Inconsistencies. and discrepancies which were evident

throughout subject's version of his personal and professional

background history.

subject admitted to lying and falsifying

about some phases of his background only after long and tedius

interrogation and after confrontation with irrefutable facts

which subject could not argue agalist.

subject has admitted

to exaggerating his own personal participation, his KCB rank.

and certain areas of his personal background.

He has not,

hovever, admitted deception concerning two main elements. of

his KGB operational history, even when confronted by logical

and factual contradiction in his story.

Purpose:

The specific purpose of the 18 October 1966 polygraph

test

was to.

Attempt to establish whether subject was in

fact actually Involved in the OSWALD case whila OSwALD

was in the Soviet Union.

or 1f his association with the

OsAlid case was only part of his cover story legend.

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bo

Determine if Subject was personally active

in the OSHAND case in 1953 after President Kennedy'g

assassination.

Ascertain if Subject received special instruc-

tions from the KGB to pass on to the American Government

regarding the OSWAlD case.

Procedure:

The undersigned polygraphed Subject at a covert security

location on 18 October 1966 between the hours of 1305 and 1810.

The testing was conducted in the Russian language.

The specific

area covered during the 13. October polygraph intervier dealt

with questions concerning the Lee Harvey OSHALD case and sub

ject's knorledge and association with the OSwAlD case in the

sovist Union. The saries of questions asked of subject about

the Ostrio case das based entirely on the information subject

gave regarding OSHALD.

subject Immediately recognized the undersigned as the

polygraph officer who had administered the previous polygraph

test, and recalled the specific date of the test, 4 Aur1l 1964.

subject was told that he would again participate in another

polygraph intervier. Subject's polygraph patterns revealed a

certain amount of muscular novement during some of the phases

of testing, however, not withstanding thia evidence it 1a the

opinion.of the undersigned that there are polygraphic indica-

tions of attempted deception by the subject to some of the

specific questiong asked of him (see conclusion)

then Subject

was challenged and accused of deception. ha would repeat that

he was telling only the truth non,, and was telling the truth

auring his last polygraph test.

when he was confronted with

the fact that he had lied to specific questions during his

1964 polygraps, and that these lies vere subsequently con-

clusively proven to be lies. when he hinself later (1965-1965)

17 5 1 06)

admitted that he had fabricatad about portions of his back-

ground story, he admitted that this was so, but that the lies

were minor and regarding personal areas of his background only.

He justified his past deception on the ground that he did so

only to embelish his personal background to improve his image

in our eyes.

Discussion which took place during the colygraph testing

and subject's additions to and revisions of his previous

statements are incorporated in the 53 report.

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In analyzing subject's jolygraph charts, polygraphic

evidence or indication of decaption was considered from the

stanapoint of consistency and significance (strength) of the

Reactions found to axist on norm or unimportant lead-in

questions, especially if these reactions are inconsistent, are

not noted

as such in this report.; There is no logical explan-

ation for subject's sensitivity to this catagory of questions

other than the possibility that some of these questions may

be more meaningful to subject than we are at present aware.

or that subject is acquainted with the polygraph technique

and is attempting to create false, controlled reactions to

lead-in and harmless questions in an attempt to mislead poly

graph analysis.

However, Subject's reactions to important questions when

noted as "reaction" are, in the opinion of the undersigned,

definite indications of deception.

The following are questions agied during the polygraph

testing, subject's answers and his reactions to the questions:

Series No. 1

1. las Lee Harvey OSALD ever in the sovist Union?

Ansiver: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSwALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?

answer: Yes.: (No reaction)

Did you receive special instructions about what to

tall the Anericans about the OSAL case?

AnSwers: No. (Reaction)

4. Dia you personally mest OSALo?

Answer:. No.

(No reaction)

5.

vas OSWAD recruited by iCB as an agent?

inster: No. (do reaction)

6.

iere you glad that President Kennedy was killed?

answer:. 1o.

(Reaction)

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4.

7.

Other than what you told me.

aid you actively participate

in the OSHALD case prior to 1963:

Angwer: No. (No reaction)

8. DId you see a photograph of OSAID in 19637

AnSWEr!

Yes. (Reaction)

go

Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agant of KGB?

Answers No. (No reaction)

9a.. Before her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?

AnsWer:

No. (No reaction)

10. Did you personally neet Marina PRUSAKOVA?

Answer: Do.

(Raaction)

11.

Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Ot&el

of the 1st Chief Directorate?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

12. Did KGS prepara OSWAUD for cormitting assassinations?

Answer:. No. (No reaction)

13. Nas OSHALD prepared (trained) by KC3 to kill President

Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

24.

Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President

Kennedy's assassination?

AngNer: Yes. (Reaction)

subject's nost significant reactions on this test series were

to questions 3 and 24 - other reactions of a lesser significance

vere evident to questions 6, S, 94. and 10.

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27S 07Y

5.

Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?

Anawer: Yes.. (Mo reaction)

21.

Did you ever read the OSAlo case?

Answers Yea. (No reaction)

22.

Was this the full and official KGS case on OStALo?

Answers: Yes. (Reaction)

23. Did you give us any kind of inforation about OSWAIiD?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

24. Did you hear of OSMAid (case) prior to President

Kennedy's asgassination?

Answer:: Yes. (Reaction)

243.

Did you hear of OSMAID (case) only after President

Kennedy's death?

25.

SHer:

Instead of tha usual yes or no answer, Subjact

answered

"Before and after".

then the question

was repeated, ha again ansvered "Before ana

after".

Only when the question was asked a

third time on a subsequent test did he answer

"No"• (Reaction)

(Jubject reacted when he

answered "Before and after" and when he

anawarsd "No".

D1d KGB consider OSMAID aboormal?

Answer: Yes. (ito reaction)

As far as you kaon, did Marina OSwilD Inow about her

husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?

Anaver: Ho. (No reaction)

27.. To your knowledge did OSwAlD talk with a KGB officer

in Mexico?

Answer: No.

(No reaction)

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28.

Did OSWALD return to the United states in 19513

Answers les.

(No reaction)

subject's reaction

to this question was inconsistent then he

answered "Yes", hence tha (No reaction)

notation.

However, it 13 notevorthy that

Sublect did not attemot to correct the

date of OSNALD's departura to the U.S.

-

OSWALD returned to the U.S. in Juns 1962

and not in 1961.

Is your contact with the OswAlD case part of your

legend (cover story)?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OS:ALo case in 1959?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

Subject's nost signifieant reactions were to questions 22.

24, 24a, 29 and 30.

Series No. 3

¡laitional pertinent questions included among those already

asked in Series No. 1 and do. 23

16.

Did you personally order Ristrusta, in 1959, to collect

naterial on OSWALD?

15.

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk

about the OSWALD case 1a 1953?

17..

Answer: Yes.

(Reaction)

Nere you instructed on the OSWilD case by one of the

KCS operational officers?

angier: No. (Reaction)

Did the KGB instruct you to tell us osdilo was a bad

shot?

AnSwer: No.

(No Reaction)

TOP SERRET

NW 65990 Docld:32397035 Page 16

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## Page 17

18.

THIS ONLY

7.

Do you mon definitely that ostalo was not of

operatiosal interest to KGB?

ingwer: Yes. (Reaction)

Did KGB give the OSwAlda any kind of help in

their departure from the Sovlet Union?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

3A.

AnSwer!

No. (Reaction)

ubject's reactions to the questions so indicated vere abou

qua1 in consistency and sicallicance

conclusion:

On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained

during subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the

18 October 1966 session, it 1s the undersigned's opinion that:

Subjact was not personally or actually

involved in the OSimo case from 1959 to 1961 whila

OSHALD was in the soviet Union.

Subject heard of OSwAld only after Kennedy's

assassination, hoirever he was not an active partici

pant in 1963 as he indicatas, but was probably briefed

on the case by a KGB officar.

subject received special instructions (from

KGB) about the OSNAl case and what to tell American

authoritias about it.

Nicholas ?. Stolaken

NW 65990 Docld:32397035 Page 17

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