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176-10036-10077

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10077

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Belief of Senior Vietnamese Officials for Need

DATE: 10/17/1961

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION:

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 10/16/61-10/19/61.

Box 1

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IKE I AWN

TELEGRAM

INFORMATION REPORT

TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

160

ma Bussy

:. This. material

contains Information affecting

the National: Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Esplonage Laws,

Title ,18,

U.S.C. Secs

793 and 794; the traasmission or revelation of which in any

manner to. an unauthorized person is prohibited by low.

daylor

CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Auston

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

COUNTRY. . SOUTH VIETNAM

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

Belk

. R. Johnsor

• REPORT NO.

SUBJECT.

BELIEF OF SENIOR VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ::

FOR NEED OF STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

AND: GOVERNMENT REFORMS

DATE DISTR.

1DCS -3/49022300e

Schlesinge

18 OCTOBER

- Zusinge

PRIORITY

Getterin

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF

17 OCTOBER. 1961.

REFERENCES

IN 47680

• INFO.

PLACE &

DATE ACQ.

VIETNAM, SAIGON. (17 OCTOBER: 1961)

APPRAISAL

2 (THAT VIEWS. WERE. AS STATED)

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-6566

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE .

AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENTIAL

SECURITY SERVICE•

•1. A GROUP OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS

CONFERRED ON 17 OCTOBER 1961 CONCERNING THE GRAVE COMMUNIST THREAT

TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THEY AGREED THÄT NO AMOUNT OF US MILITARY

OR ECONOMIC AID COULD SAVE THE COUNTRY UNLESS PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM

INMEDIATELY DECLARED A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, APPOINTED A SPECIAL EMERGENCY

COUNCIL TO CUT BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS AND EXECUTE POLICY, AND

. REFORMED

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE GUN FROM THE TOP DOWN•

THE GROUP BELIEVED THAT UNLESS THESE MEASURES WERE TAKEN TO FURNISH

TIMELY, EFFICIENT AND INSPIRED LEADERSHIP, DEFEATISM WOULD SPREAD IN

THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY (VNA) AND AMONG GOVERNMENT WORKERS AND

PEOPLE IN ALL WALKS OF LIFE, AND VIETNAM WILL BE UNABLE TO RALLY

STATE •

CONFIDENTIAL

'ARMY /ACS!"

NAVYAR

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NOT ORN CONNUES CONTROL

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SECDEF

NSA

• NIC

USIA. OCl

'ONE

OCR.

ORR

op

EXO | ICA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT

TELEGRAM

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AGAINST THE INCREASING COMMUNIST PRESSURES. THE GROUP WAS NOT HOPEFUL

THAT DIEM WOULD WILLINGLY. CHANGE FROM HIS DISORGANIZED STYLE OF

GOVERNING OR TAKE ACTION TO TOTALLY MOBILIZE THE PEOPLE AND WIN THEM

TO HIS LEADERSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY FELT THAT ANY ILL ADVISED

ACTION TÖ FORCE DIEM OUT WOULD BE DISASTEROUS. THE OFFICIALS THEREFORE

BELIEVED THE SITUATION HAD REACHED A DESPERATE IMPASSE, UNLESS

PRESIDENT KENNEDY COULD BY A DIRECT FIRM AND FRIENDLY APPROACH, INSIST

THAT DIEM TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES.

•2. THE OFFICIALS INCLUDED SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE PRESIDENCY,

NGUYEN DINH THUAN; TRAN KIM TUYEN, DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENTIAL

SECURITY SERVICE, NGUYEN LUONG, MINISTER OF FINANCE; CAO XUAN VY,

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF REPUBLICAN YOUTH; NGO TRONG HIEU, MINISTER OF

CIVIC ACTION. THESE OFFICIALS HOPED THAT CENTRALIZATION OF THE

GOVERNMENT COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH A SPECIAL COUNCIL FOR

NATIONAL EMERGENCY AS WAS DONE IN MALAYA, WHICH WOULD HAVE FULL

AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES AND ENSURE THEIR RAPID

IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT DUPLICATION, CONFUSION OR INEFFICIENCY

BY EXISTING GVN AGENCIES. THEY BELIEVED. THAT IF THE PRESENT BUREAUCRATS

- me

•AND OFFICIALS, EVEN THOSE AT CABINET LEVEL, COULD NOT RESPOND-TO- THE

CHALLENGE, THEY SHOULD BE PROMPTLY REPLACED, SO THAT THEIR SUBORDINATES.

WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE DEMORALIZED AND VITAL PROGRAMS TO RALLY THE LI

PEOPLE WOULD NOT BE. FURTHER DELAYED. UNLESS THE GN CREATED THE ..

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PROPERLY FUNCTIONING MACHINERY CAPABLE OF ABSORBING CURRENT AND

PROJECTED AMERICAN AID, THAT AID WOULD BE WASTED, AMERICANS WOULD LOSE

FAITH IN VIETNAMESE ANTI-COMMUNIST EFFORTS AND VIETNAM WOULD FALL.

3. THESE OFFICIALS HAVE REALIZED FOR SOME TIME THAT MUCH OF THE

PROBLEM LAY WITH THE PERSONALITY AND BACKGROUND OF DIEM HIMSELF•

THEY THEREFORE HAVE ACCOMMODATED THEMSELVES TO THE SITUATION, TRIED

TO WORK OUT ADMINISTRATIVE SHORTCUTS IN THEIR VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS,

AND DO ALL POSSIBLE TO RALLY POPULAR SUPPORT EVEN FROM NATIONALIST

OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. THEY NOW BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SITUATION

WAS SO SERIOUS AND MORALE DETERIORATING SO FAST THAT THE SITUATION COULD

NOT LONG CONTINUE.

40 THEIR CHIEF CRITICISMS OF GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES WERE :

AO LAZY, INCOMPETENT OFFICIALS WERE TOO OFTEN RETAINED FOR MONTHS,

EVEN AFTER THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF ADMITTED THEY SHOULD BE REPLACED,

EITHER BECAUSE DIEM FOR SENTIMENTAL REASONS HATED TO FIRE THEM, OR

BECAUSE THEY WERE ABLE TO CLEVERLY FOOL THE PRESIDENT THROUGH FLATTERY

AND FALSE OPTIMISM.

B. VITAL DECISIONS WERE HELD UP WAITING FOR A PRESIDENTIAL

DECISION, WHICH ANY COMPETENT EXECUTIVE GROUP COULD MAKE.

C. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WERE SET UP WITH CONFLICTING JURISDICTIONS,

OR REORGANIZATIONS, EFFECTED, SUCH AS THE ARMY OFERATIONAL FIELD

COMMAND, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COORDINATING

"SUPER" MINISTRIES WHICH REMAINED FACADES WITH LITTLE OR NO AUTHORITY

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OR RESPONSIBILITY.

DO WORST OF ALL WAS THE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS WHO DIRECTLY

CONTACTED THE PRESIDENT, OVER THE HEADS OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS, OR THE

PRESIDENTS OWN HABIT OF TAKING UNILATERAL ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTATION

WITH HIS MINISTERS. THIS FREQUENTLY NULLIFIED WEEKS OF CAREFUL

PREPARATORY WORK BY THUAN, TUYEN AND OTHERS.

E. ALTHOUGH THE RUMORS OF CORRUPTION AND FAMILY RULE ARE. GROUND-

LESS, MANY BUREAUCRATS HAVE ACHIEVED FAVOR THROUGH SYCOPHANTIC ATTENTION

TO MONSE IGNOR NGO DINH THUC'S RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES, OR VENERATION

OF THE PRESIDENTS MOTHER, WHILE DIEM HAS NOT ENCOURAGED THIS,

IT HAS APPEALED TO HIS SENTIMENTAL NATURE. HOWEVER, THIS HAS ANGERED

MANY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING SINCERE CATHOLICS, AND HAS BADLY IMPRESSED

THE PEOPLE. MADAME NHU'S HIGH HANDED BEHAVIOR AND THE MANDARIN-

ROBED FORMALITIES OF NGO FAMILY GATHERINGS AT HUE, HAVE SMACKED OF

IMPERIAL DYNASTY PRACTICES AND HAVE PROVIDED PROPAGANDA THEMES

FOR THE COMMUNISTS AND OPPOSITIONISTS.

5• DR TUYEN HAS DISCUSSED MANY OF THESE FAULTS WITH NGO DINH

NHU, BROTHER AND ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. TUYEN BELIEVED THAT NHU

WAS PHILOSOPHICALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GROUP, BUT HESITATED

TO TAKE ANY ACTION. NONE OF THE GROUP DARED APPROACH DIEM, EXCEPT

WITH THE PLEA TO DECLARE A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, BUT IF DIEM REFUSED.

TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY OR TO STREAMLINE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES, SUCH

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A DECLARATION WOULD BE WORTHLESS. TUYEN BELIEVED THAT ONLY DIRECT

PRESSURE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE US WOULD CONVINCE DIEM. TUYEN THOUGHT

A WORKABLE PLAN MIGHT BE TO INVITE NHU TO WASHINGTON AS A SPECIAL

EMISSARY OF THE PRESIDENT. THERE THE CARDS WOULD BE LAID ON THE TABLE.

TUYEN ADMITTED DEFICIENCIES IN THE PLAN, ESPEGIALLY ITS VULNERABILITY

TO CHARGES OF NEPOTISM, BUT FELT THAT NHU WAS THE ONLY PERSON WHO

COULD FULLY REPRESENT DIEM AND RETURN TO CONVINCE HIM OF NECESSiTY

OF CHANGES. NHU ALSO WAS THE ONLY PERSON THAT DIEM WOULD TRUST AS

EX OFFICIO CHAIRMAN OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE, TO GET IT STARTED

FUNCTIONING. TUYEN ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT NHU AND THE MEMBERS OF

GHUAN'S AND HIS OWN GROUP HAD THE CONTACTS TO AND THE CAPABILITY TO

RALLY GROUPS NOW OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO

HELP AGAINST THE VC BUT WHOSE HELP DIEM SPURNED. HE EXPLAINED THAT

THERE SHOULD BE NO YIELDING TO PRESSURES FOR LIBERALIZATION.

DEMOCRACY WAS NOT WHAT WAS NEEDED IN VIETNAM'S EXTREMITY, BUT LEADERSHIP.

6. (FIELD COMMENT. CERTAINLY MANY OF THESE GRITICISMS ARE NOT

NEW, BUT TUYEN HAS NEVER BEFORE ATTACKED FAULTS IN. THE REGIME SO

FREELY. HE HAS PRIVATELY EXPRESSED HOPE OF GOVERNMENTAL REFORM,

MORE INTELLIGENT HANDLING OF GN RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PEOPLE

AND ESPECIALLY CULTIVATION AND USE OF TRACTABLE OPPOSITIONISTS. HE

HAS ALSO CRITICISED DIEM'S ISOLATION FROM THE PEOPLE, BUT IN CONSTRUCT-

IVE TERMS. WHILE HE DISCLAIMED THE USE OF ANY FORCE AGAINST DIEM, IT

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APPEARED HE WAS SEEKING AMERICAN REACTION TO WHAT AMOUNTED TO A

SUGGESTED PALACE REVOLUTION TO EFFECT REFORMS, RATHER THAN JUST

OUTLINING A DILEMMA, HIS COMMENTS: ÖR NHÜ WERE CONFUSED AND AMEIVALENT,

ALTHOUCH HE CLEARLY (IF INCORRECTLY) STILL BELIEVES IN NHU'S

ABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY. HE EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SPOKE

ON BEHALF OF THE PERSONS NAMED.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT

ARPAC PACAF

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