POLITICAL ACTION OPERATIONS IN CUBA - THE PROENZA CASE.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT

Political Action Operations in Cuba - The PROENZA

Case

1. Introduction

This memorandum sets forth information concerning the

conduct of a series of interlocking non-violent political action

operations against the Cuban governnent, its internal coalition

and its alliance with the Soviet Union mounted in 1963.

2. Objectives

Pursuant to instructions from the 303 Committee,

during the Kennedy Administration, the CIA established among its

objectives against Cuba the fragmenting of its governing

coalition and exacerbation of its relations with the USSR.

This decision was taken prior to the October 1962 Missile

Crisis.

As a result of the decision a number of non-violent operations

were carried out.

Those pertaining to the Teresa

Proenza

Proenza

case are set out below.

3.

The Operations

a.

On 3 April 1963 a set of spurious documents falsely

ascribed to a disaffected CIA agent in Mexico were passed

through a CIA contxolled asset) to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

The documents made it appear that the Cuban Vice Minister of

Defense,

a highly placed and extreme Moscow-line Communist (who

had been in Moscow when the missile build-up was planned in

early 1962), was actually a CIA agent who had betrayed the build-

The purpose of this disinformation was to cause a great

strain in the relations between the Cuban Communist Party (then

as the PSP) and the other partners in the coalition.

was also hoped that the operation would redound against the USSR

because the Vice Minister of Defense was a senior Moscow-line

member of the PSP.

It was calculated that the USSR would

move to defend the Vice Minister,

who was probably their chief

agent in the Cuban government, and that a collision between the

'Soviets and Cubans could result. The Cubans accepted the

spurious papers and paid

for them per our demand.

b. Through the

sunmer of 1963 several further deliveries

of spurious documents were made to the Cubans and several

thousand dollars were received in payment.

But results of the

operation from inside Cuba were not yet observed.

Therefore

on 13 November 1963, when a delivery of documents was again

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several were included revealing the presence of another

Embassy in Mexico. This target was

in Mexico, who was acting as Cuban Cultural Attache. She also

was a close contact of the Vice Minister of Defense. On

10 December 1963 Miss Proenza was informed of her sudden

transfer

back to Cuba; she actually departed on 23 January 1964. Her

recall was believed to be a result of the spurious documents and

of her known long-time friendship with the Vice Minister of Defense.

The first reaction to the operation inside Cuba

occurred in the week of 14 March 1964. At that time a junior

member of

the Communist Party (PSP) was tried and convicted

of betraying non-Communist leaders of the resistance to the tormer

government of Cuba which had been overthrown by Fidel Castro.

As the trial wore on it became apparent

• that since the young

Communist had been the protege of the Vice Minister of Defense

the trial was really a trial of the latter.

d. During 1964 deliveries of documents to the Cubans

were continued and payments received. On 18 November 1964

the Vice Minister of Defense was arrested on charges of treason

and removed from his post, as was his wife who also held cabinet

rank. They were jailed as

was Teresa Proenza.

e.

After terms in prison all three defendants were

released to house arrest.

Proenza was later permitted to work as

a librarian in Havana.

The Vice Minister died peacefully in his

bed several years later:

His widow was allowed to leave cuba

to reside in Spain.

This phase of the CIA operation wound

down in March 1966 when the Cubans ceased taking an interest in

it.

4. Concluding Remarks

The foregoing is but the barest outline of a highly

complex operational system that made use of a wide variety of

techniques and assets which have not been revealed to the public.

The story would make dramatic headlines if it became publicly

known, especially in the present environment.

The fact that

several persons were deprived of their freedom as a result of the

operation would attract further attention.

Furthermore, this

operation laid the basis for other operations of a similar

nature that were successfully mounted

against Cuban and other

hostile targets. In short, this file is a Pandora's box the

opening of which would not only expose the cryptonyms of other

operations of this type but would attract unfavorable publicity

for the Agency in certain quarters and would expose hitherto

secret techniques and assets.

This would make their employment

in the future very difficult. The fact that this series of

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operations did not hegin to register on the Cubans until after

the death of President Kennedy should remove any suspicion that

i not borin

it could in any way have caused Castro to direct an assassination

attempt against the President:

SECRET

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