INFORMATION REPORT SUBJECT REPORT ON CUBAN DOCUMENTATION AND PRODEDURES OF THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 07/22/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1-00000

104-10185-10135

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Givi

CENTRAL INTELLILENCE AGENCY

S-S-C-R-F.-T

Ni) FORFIGY DISSEY

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT

MACIT NO.

jeport on Cuban DocuintatIon and DATE CISTR

Proceuures of the lunura: Directorate

of Intolligence (Direcitos General NO PAGES

IC Intoligencia - DGl)

REFÈRENCES

C5-311/00866-64

22 July 1964

6

CS-311, 90115-64

CS-311/00345-64

CS-311, 2716-54

DATE OF

To March 1961

INFO.

PLACE &

DATE ACQ. May 1961

RED REPORT NO.

THIS IS. UNEVALUATED

SOURCE ORIDINOS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRISAL OR CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

A former Cuban IS. officer who served with the Cuban Intelli-

genco Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Conment.

The following Information, as reported

by source during a debriufing, reveals the misuse of official

documentation and proceduros by the General Directorate of

Intolligence: (Direccion General de Intellgoncia - DGI) .

Use of Altered and Fraudulent Documents by Cuban Intelligence

1.

Cubans and other Latin- American nationals operating for the General

Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion Genoral de Inteligencia

DGI) of the Cuban Ministry of Interior are issued Cuban passports

1n allas by the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

These passports are

considered legal in all respocts by Cuban authorities.

agents also use valid

passports of a numbor of Latin American

countries in which false entries are provided by Cuban intelligence

authorities;

The documents used by non-Cubans operating under

IS auspices are intended to hide all traces of their travel into

and out of Cuba.

Cuban Diplomatic Passports

2.

Cuban diplomatic passports are issued in allas to IS staff per-

Bonnol, consisting exclusively of Cuban nationals. mere are

issued to aliens operating as agents of IS.

according to Sourco, all of whom are

Itttlo over 100 staff employees

are estimated by Source to have

been dooumented in this way.

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEN

STATE

I DIA

REPCINCLANT

ARMY

CINCSO *

Mater Flold diatributton indkated by "#")

MANY

I&NS

TAiR

INFOBMATION REPORT.

NSA

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

| OCR

LEBI

5

4 :

3

2

INFORMATION REPORT

LX-1572

INP (AMNUG-1)

CS-311/00866-64

Er Distributer See Attachad Page

ACSI. ONEL SKI

TOTAL IE 3,

RID/AN I,

MY 3) AT I5 15 3(102.

TSD 1,

AH/SA 46

5961418

FE 12(822 15111 (19)

TSD/AB/T*

By phone

ORWT

¡es

---

## Page 2

14-00000

Hagrs Dissen

N11/COPS

#H/PO/A

NH/PO/B

WH/ RO

WH/1

WH/2

NH/3

NH/4

RH/5

N1l/6

NIU/R

WHI/SA/BOB

#H/SA/MOB

WH/SA/R

WH/SA/ Int

WH/SA/CI

WH/SA/SO/NS

CI Staff

CI Liaison

CI:/RiCA

RID/AN

AF/1

AF/2

AF/3

AF/4

AF/R

AF/CI

EE/K

EE/SA

EE/BR • .

EE/YA.

EE/H

EE/P

EE/C

EE/IIS

FE/PMI/I

FE/JKO/JO

FE/JKO/K

FE/VNC/VN

FE/R

FE/CI

ISD

5

5

30

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

S-E-L'-R-E-T

NO FUREiGN DISSEN

- la -

1

1

NE/AA :LES

NE/AA. AP

NE/AA, 'S

NE/S/P

NE/6/0$1

1

NE/CT

WE/1

NE!?

WEI 3

NE/1

WE, 5

WE/BC

HE/R

1

1

1

1

Field Dissen

WH/SEXI

1

NEL/UNTY

NH/MRID

WH/SDOM

WH/SNDR

WH/ SJAN

WH/PIBO

AH/POSN

WH/KNGS

WH/PRIN

NH/GORG

W'H/PACY

WIMANA

AH/SJOS

KH/ SALV

AH/TEGU

WH/GUAT

#HI/LAPA

NH/BOGO

WH/QUIT

WH/GAYA

WH/LIMA

RH/CARA

NH/BUEN

WH/ COBA

NH1/MONT

WH/ ASUN

WH/SAGO

1

BH RIOD

• CURI

AH BRIL

WH. SHOP

1

1

SH LGRE

WH: RECI

1

WH-BLEN

WH/SA/WAVE 5

AF/ALGI

AF. ORNA

AF/RABA

AF./CASB

AF/ACCR

AF/CNRY

AF/BAXO

AF/DAI'S

EE/VIEN

EE/SBUR

EE/CYRU

EE/ATHE

EE/KAVA

EE/SLON

EE/BERN

EE 'GNVA

EB/ZURI

1

FE DJAK

FE/WEDN

FE, SURA

FE/TOKY (3-31

FE/OKIE

FE/SSOU

FE/SAIG

FE/KOBE

NE/COLO

NБ/БОМ8 2-261

NE/CALC 12-251

NE/MORS

1

NE/ KUNA

NE/ KAHI

CS-311/001566-67

d. "DACC

NI: LAHO

NE/dIAL

NS/ BAGH

NE/BSI&

NE/ALEP

NE/JIDD

NE/DATA

NE/TATZ

NE/CAIR

NE/ALET

WE/BHUS

(NE/COrE) 15-61

CRE/HELS4511

WE/OTTA

WE/RONE

WE/NILA

WE/HAGU

1

(WE/OSLO) 15-4!

WE/LISB

WE/MADR

WE/BARC

CHE/STOC] 15-31

WE/LOND

WE/PARI

Llaison Dissem

IE/Canada 11

(RCMP) -

IE/British l

1

L/WASH/RRI (

S_I-C-R-I-T

NO FOREIGY DISSAN

---

## Page 3

-2.

CS-311/00856-64

Issuance of diplomatic passports In allas is an automatic

process whonevor an

IS

staff employee travels on assignment

abroad.

The employee involved provides the following items,

which he selects personally, to one "Frlix Rafael," in the

DGI, who forwards the material to the Foreign Ministry:

a.

b.

Alla%,

Diplomatic title;

One/photograph.

4. The diplomatic title chosen by the staff employee is double-!

checkgd by the Foreign Ministry to avoid conflicts or dis-

For instance, Source chose

tha.fitle.of "Consular Inspector" (Inspector Consular) for bis

diplomatic passport and the Foreign Ministry determined that

Inspector was scheduled to travel trough

the same area about that time. .Tho Foreign Ministry official

with: Issuing alias

diplomatic passports for IS persgu-

deli is one Otero: Chef of the Diplomatic Passport Section.

ptero does the work on short order,

even completing a job on

the same date the request is received, if necessary.

Freguently. IS personnel ustig diplomatic passports travel it

stall groups:

For instance,

Source traveled to Mexico in

early 1964 with a group öf six or seven staff employees, all

using diplomatic passports.

There ago no distinguishing features, either in the passport

serial numbor, the diplomatic title, or any other entry in a

diplomatic passport issued in alias to distinguish it from a

bona-fide document.

Cuban Ordinary Passports

7.

Cuban ordinary passports are issued in allas to IS agents, 1n-

Cy ding Cubans and nationals of other Latin American countries,

Cuban Foreign Ministry in much the same way as in the

case of diplomatic passports.

In addition to the bearer's

photograph, an agent provides cover information on himselt

for use in the passport which conforms as closely as possible

to his real life.

As an example, Source cited his own case,

sayidg. that he furnished a cover story containing his true

dato of birth, but listing him as single, even though he is

Typical occupations

shown on ordinary passports

used by IS agents are

"student" (estudlante) and "laborer"

(obirero.

8.

The only distinguishing

feature for differentiating between

a Cuban ordinary passport issued in alias to an IS: agent and.

a bona-fide document is a special code for the serial number.

Source thinks that alias passports for IS agents bear five.

digit serial numbers while bona-flide passports bear

digit

serial numbers.

was based

on the fact

that his ordinary passport issued in alias bore a five-digit

bona-fide passport issued

to his wife bore

a six-digit number.

This premise

is in direct contradiction

With a study of the numbering system found to bè in use on

Cuban ordinary

A pattern in numhering is found,

with occasional discrepancies, in which a new

set of acces-

sion numbers

bö lower on

is used each yeart the beginning

serial numbers will

tlian on those issued later in the sane year. The serial

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FORFIGN DISSEM

---

## Page 4

NO FOREIGN MISSEN

CS-311/00866-64

numbers are generally in a fire-drgit pattern. although it

was nosed that fron june

to Deceaber 1962 they ascended to

six-digit numbers.

9.

Source's ordinary

passport issued in alias was allegedly ob-

tained

in January

196t, but was given

an issuance date of 28

August 1963 and bears a

serial nitber consistent with the

accession pattern for the latter issuance date.

five other Cubar ordinary passports issued in 1963 in alias

for use by agents under Source's supervision bear serial

numbers adhering to the accession pattern corresponding to:

their particular dates of issue.

10.

Gronets recently ceased to be used on photographs in Cuban

ordinary passports.

Bona-fide Visas. Vaccinatior Certificates, and Passages

11.

Diplonatic visas for use in Cubaa diplomatic passports in alias

are applied for directly by the Cuban Foreign Ministry to the

foreign sission concerned in Havana.

In Source's case appii-

cation ras first made in larch 1961 for a Chilean visa and

later for a, Mexican visa, even though no travel to Chile was

contemplated.

The reason for this was awareness by Cuban

authorities of lexican suspicion of Cuban diplomatic personnel.

The Cuban authorities believed the lexican Embassy in Havana

be less suspicious of a passport containing a visa from

another Latin

American country.

12.

13.

Passage bookings and international vaccination certificates

for use by

• staff empioyees

and agents using Cuban alias pass-

ports are also obtained, through the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

Vaccination

certificates are obtained from the Instituto

Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP).

IS personnel's

passages are

always booked on Cubana Airlines because such

payable. in Cuban pesos.

No passages are booked on

Soviet or Czech airlines because

these require payment in

U.s. dollars, which are scarce for the Cuban Government.

After a Cuban diplonatic passport has been lised for one round

trip,

as

an exit permit from the Cuban Foreign Ministry, known

"Visto Bueno," is required for each subsequent departure

from Cuba.

The

Foreign Ministry issues these to personnel

using alias passports in the same say as they would.for bona-

fide docunents.

14.

Foreign risas

in ordinary passports issued in alias to IS

applied for directly by the agents to the foreign

missions concerned in Havana.

Types of Foreign Passports Used by IS Agents

15.

The Cuban IS makes use of valid passports from a number of

countries, including lexico,

all Central American countries,

Argentina, British Guiana, Colombia, Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay,

ing its agents.

ports fron Spain and the United Stares.

are the are see to our no species-

that the IS does not use Uruguayan passports because the

Cuban Government does not wish to endanger its good relations

with that country. Valid filled-in and blank passports from

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGY DISSEN

---

## Page 5

14-00000

.. .

- 4

CS-311/00806-61.

the various countries are obtained by tie IS through the local

Corrunist Parties

in the countries roicerned.

Forgery and Falsification Capabilities

16.

The IS has no capabilitirs for making false passports or iu-

ternal incuments from any country because of the difficulty

of matching the paper and the

sechnical problems involved in

the engraving and printing process.

It also lacis capability

for erauicating entries in passports because of the problem

involved in attempting to delete entries without defacing the

documents.

17.. Filsification and forgery is limited to filling in valid blank

foreign passports, making photograph and page substitutions in

sona-fide foreign passports, and placing false travel entries

in foreign passports.

Travel entries from western Europe and

Latin America can be forged.

Source did not know whether the

IS itself made the photograph and page substitutions and for-

All documents requiring forgeries and substitutions

were turned over to one "Alfonso," in the IS, who took them to

a site unknown to Source. Source theorized that the forgeries

substitutions may have been done by the Departamento de

del Estado

(Department of State Security - DSE), the

counterintelligence arm of the Cuban Government, which he

personnel than the DGI.

Travel Pattern of IS Agents

18.

Prospective agents recruited by the IS in other Latin American

countries and brought to Cuba for training in methods of sabo-

and other subversive activitics are provided with detached

visas and spurious passports to conceal the fact that they ever

entered Cuba.

19.

order that no Cuban visa will appear in an agent trainee's

bona-fide

passport on his way to Cuba, the Cuban mission in a

Latin American country issues the Cuban visa on a separate

In 1963 most agent trainees were being brought

into Cuba through Mexico, where the Cuban Embassy issued the

Early in 1963 Mexican immigration officers

rubber stamp bearing the notice "Salio para

(Departed for Cuba), with the date on it,

which they

stamped in all passports of travelers proceeding

To counter this move the IS began replacing, wherever

possible, the pages of the passports bearing this entry with

blank pages from valid passports from the same country as that

Source also believes that in 1964 the travel

fen prospective agents proceeding to Cuba nay have

been modified, thus decreasing slightly the number entering

through Mexico.

20.

To conceal the agent's travel when leaving Cuba, he is provided

of the journey with a Cuban ordinary passport

The route of travel is from Havana to Prague. Czech

authorities collect these passports upon landing in Prague.

not know what disposition is made of the Cuban

passports

by the Czechs, but he asserts that they are never

returned to the agent.

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

---

## Page 6

14-00000

S-E-C-H-E-T

NO FOREIGS DISSEN

- 5 .

CS-311/00866-64

21.

For the second leg of the jourrey, carrying the agent from

Prague via

western Erruge back to his native land, he is pro-

vided in Havana, before departure,

with a passport from another

Latin American

countrs. The non-Cuban paesport may be the

agent's bona-fide docinent which has been returned to him or

it may be another valic Latin American passport pressed into

service for the purpose.

If the agent's own passport bears

no evidence of travel into Cuba it will be used for this pur-

pose, being

"brought i? to date" with forged western European

entries to explain the jap between the time when he left for

Cuba and when he arrired in Prague, but showing his mode of

travel to be such that he never passed through either Cuba or

Czechoslovakia.

Should the agent's bona-fide passport bear

the Mexican cachet storing that he proceeded to Cuba, the IS

replaces the page bearing such entry with a blank page from a

...valid passport of the same country if feasible.

If page subr

stitution is not possible, either because no other passport

from the same country is available or because substitution

proves too difficult, the IS will provide the agent with

another passport,. from his own country if availabie, or from

The substitute passport may

tion will be made,

of the original bearer.

and the agent will travel under the identity

22.

In other cases,

where ralid blank passports are used, the agent

nay even travel under his true identity after

"surfacing"

the second leg of the journey, in westers curope,

provided the

passport used is fron bis own

country.

In such a case informa-

tion from his bona-fica passport will

be copied directly in

the blank passport.

If the passport is fron a country differing

fron that of the agent, his identity will be changed.

the case of travel

under the agent's bona-fide passport, in

the case of spurious ren-Cuban passports, false travel entries

are made to account for the agent's

speat in Cuba, placing

hin in western

Europe, but not in Cuba nor Czechoslovakia,

during that period.

Quality and Availability of Sparious Documentation

23.

.

Providing documentatios for agent trainees is the responsibility

of the IS country desk officer handling trainees

from the par-

ticular country.

The country desk officers receive and main-

tain custody of passports coming from the Conmunist Parties in

their areas of jurisdiction. Although the agent's training in

Cuba may take several weeks, or even a few nonths, it often

takes a year or more for the country desk officer

to be able

to provide his trainees with the proper docurentation.

commented that invariaoly a country desk officer will be short

one spurious passport in his "collection" of passports for a

group of about six trainees.

there possible the officer will

"borrow" a passport fren his colleague fron another country

24.

On at least one occasios forged travel entries made in an

agent's passport were lound to have a chronological error

shortly before the ager's departure from Cuba.

The error

consisted of a false exit cachet for a given port of encry

cachet for the precede teen tarnis eon al moss batty

cachet for the

in true life.

Despite the discovery of this error the IS

S-E..C-R-E-T

VC FOREIGN DISSEM

---

## Page 7

4-00000

-E-C-R- F. -

• FORGO MISSE!

-6 -

CS-311/0086G-64

nspectors abroad woul

1.

Minister.

NO

S-E-C-R-E-T

FOREIGY

DISSEM

---