Agency: LBJ
Originator: CIA
To: MCCONE, JOHN
Document date: 11/29/1963
Document type: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/26/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

LBJ

177-10001-10472

NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 23 NOV.-27 DEC. 63, BOX 1

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

CIA

MCCONE, JOHN

Document Information

Released under the John

2= ReMination Records

Collection act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel .

Case#:NW 53244 Date:

06-13-2017

DATE: 11/29/1963

PAGES :

SUBJECTS :

NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

• COMMENTS: DOC. #7

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29 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson

10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.

for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following

comments:

a. Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan

authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations

and our activities.

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The

President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal

and any recommendations that I might have for modification

of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate

of what is the outlook. The President continues to be

concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction

against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is

obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to

conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as

to who would be a good man and who could run the American

team.

He noted Item b, in the Check list and I pointed out

the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the

New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the

head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted

reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated

that I would do this.

We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of

communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an

unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR,

India military aid and Burma.

c. The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told

him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to

power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our

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withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal

to do with his loss of offlee.

d. I pointed out to the President that we could expect some

trouble in Brazil.

e. The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu

of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall

and that he would lose office soon after his retura.

&. I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President

Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by

Mr. Colby.

g. Also 1 raised the question of the importance of our taking

iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring

Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.

2. The

President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our

policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the

economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro.

He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that

the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to

evolve more aggressive policies.

He looks to us for firm recommendations.

In this connection we should prepare a briefing and aiso we should study

carefully various courses of action.

3. The President then raised the question of the deal between the

Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement

of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I

replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with

the satellites would tend to break down the closeness of ties between

the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy

effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discoataged the Rumanian

steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration

of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he

agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away.. He then brought

up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best

Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a

personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by

stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could

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TUP

serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the

President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect

to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request

for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and

the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good

representative in South Vietnam.

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill.

I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual

harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if

Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and

Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members

of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to

rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would

speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

5. I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the

President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing

of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and

CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara

was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy

felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. 'I said

that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had

some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of

President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and

suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for

a discussion of this problem.

No arrangements were made as

to the time of Friday morning's

briefing.

JAM/mib (tape)

- 3 -

ZER SECRET

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