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Date: 06/25/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSC

RECORD NUMBER

:145-10001-10166

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 150

Released -der -the-Jehr

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

i44 USC 2107 Note).

Case#:WH 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC

FROM : THOMAS A. PARROTT

TO :

TITLE : MEMORANDUM

DATE: 09/06/62

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/25/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENOE OF

DATE:

MAR

2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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approved by Mr. Bandy 9113/62

DRAPI MONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62

TAP /mm

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin;

Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and

General Harris; General Carter; Mr. MurIOW

1.

Sabotage Operation

General Carter reported that information should be available by

Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr.

Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the

information

is obtained.

2.

General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st.

He noted that some of the operational representatives had questioned

whether this was responsive to the changed situation engendored by the

issuance of NSAM 181, but said that this plan had been prepared within

the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16).

Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to NSAM 181 has

been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified

the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that the approach

taken in the August 3lst paper was satisfactory.

3. The following specific couments were then made on Activities

listed in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not

given to the paper at this meeting.)

a. Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that

he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal

150

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is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that

details should be presented to the Group, to

include

ne tendiets which would be dropped, and specifies as

Dlace of launchings

the techorsal debat lord enter redesas

b.

Mr. Martin felt that number 25 alacovery or onches 05/

must involves

important aspect of ciming be said, and

the ecgue

sneed, shatany such action should be coordinated with U.S.

anjectives

than contusing it wich activistes

a third country Mes Bundy, emphasized

chat any such undertaking

done with the idea of providing a pretext for furthes eecto

C.

In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported

by State, said chat Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even

though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of

the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr.

Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount

against U,S, radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would

not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group

asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such

intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared.

d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directe

Bloc persongel

In Cuba) was ascigned co USTA and CLA.

e.: On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose

was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce.

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6()(c)

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all

Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed

to selected.

8. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to

be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected

overnight.

h. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22

Supn3s2u5 2003003954

, General Lansdale should be given more latitude

in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the

other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-

measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look

at other possibilities in some detail.

1.

General Carter felt that a determination should be made as

to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions.

He emphasized that

sabotage operations such as those under number 27

will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban

economy+

PERTINENT bACKgRaM

The Group Chen suedee

discusaion of number 32 (agriculcu

sabotass)

General Carter emphasized the extrete sensitivity of any

euch operation and the disastrous results that would flow frou son

ning going wrong, particularly if there vere obvious attribution to

he U.S. He went on to say, hovever, that te would be possible to

ccomplish this purpose by methods more, subtle than those indicated in

He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop

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Fluzes by the introduction of biological agents which would appos

to be of natural origia. Mo. Bundy said that he had no vorries abou

ny such sabotage shich could clearly De nade to appear as the result

local Cuban disaffection or of a natural digaster, bus that ve must

vard esternat activities such as release as chenicals, eter

tey could be coupletely coveres up

6

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which

could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can

be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination

to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

Sorted personge

Kwas suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of

chincuba should be considered

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was

suggested that the possibilities of counterfe

Into further.

be looked

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how

much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,

within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be

a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great

degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum

of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE prograu.

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He mentioned as examples what the U.S. response should be in the event

of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted.

The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military contingency

plans already prepared, must be pursued.

Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the

Sie the?

MONGOOSE framework, MI. Bundy fest that General Lansdale's group,

particularly the State representative, coutd do the initial exploration

of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the

Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General

Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates

were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible

decisionsof this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time

available for MONGOOSE operations. This matter was left open for further

consideration at a meeting next week.

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