MFR-MEETING WITH ING MANUEL RAY.
Originator: CIA
From: JAMES A. NOEL
To: MFR
Document date: 1961-05-12 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

65997 Date: 10.28-2021

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

::.Do Not Reproduce

12 Mar 1901

NEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

: Moeting with ing. Nanuel May

PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Manuel Ray

Ernesto Betancourt

¡ogello Ciangros

James A. Nool DS

1. Ray did nor retura to Hashiagton until carly morning on Friday,

12 May 1961. He called me at 0700 from the airport. He was unable

to fix a definita hour for us lo got together due to the fact that he was

expecting an appointment with a person he did not name some timo

during the morning. He later called a number oi times from the Horal

Ambassador lo advise me that he still had had no word on his appoint-

mont. At 1145, Mir. Botancourt callod to say that ho was with Ray

and "Fugenlo" (Rogolio Cisneros) and could we get togothor. I sug-

gasted thoy drive out to se Clarendon Hotel Court on Wileon Boulevard

where I had taken a room for holding our moeting. They arrived in

Mr. Botancourt's car at approximatoly 1230 noon timo and to first

wont to the nearby Hogato Rastaurant on Wilson Boulevard for lusch

boforo me gor down to the business of the prospectus.

2. During lunch me did not diucuas the plan bus 1 did take the op-

portunity to atsons in a mont sorlous way the noed for absoluto secrocy

concerning our discussions today and any future diacusalone or devol-

opments which might take place in the futuro with respect to our solation-

abip.

All agread on sha nood for light security.

ii.:

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to the proper peoplo at the earliens pordiblo timo a carefully thoughe-

out plan of action which would dat forib cloarly the objoctivos - -what

he projoct sopod to achlove; a stalement of the problem; the strengtai

l the Castro rogime following the 1ll-falad invasion; the staruo of thi

underground and ito morale and capabilities; the extent of internal

support for and discontent with the regimo, orc., osc.

1. I also spoko of the need for describing the kind of activities

which the Ray organization planned to engage in and the ardeto and

capabilitios which they have or can acquire to do the job.

The need fox

explaining, the relationahip and coordination of the plan with the Revolu-

donaty Council was discuared at some length.

5. I suggosted that ho include in tha plan an iromication of the kindo

of support which he would expoct us to supply immediately as wall as the

kind and quantity of support which would be required of us sa the projact

doveloped.

6. I also suggestod that lho plan include their vows on how U. S.

linloon and coordination could best be workod out; how funde would bo

funneled into the projact; what commo and other training rould be to-

quired; whothar U.'S. "roal estate" would be neoded, etc.

7. Ray outlined some of his thoughts regarding his proposed plan

of action. According to him it contomplates actlos in tbree broad flelds:

(a) Underground sotivity a principally nabotago -i in tha

) Gradusl bulldup • largaly through clandeatino Inílltra

one of amall bodies ol men • ol guarrula lorcas in mountaix

ous and defensiblo areas.

(6) A paychological maríaro campaiga witain Cuba and abroad

Almod at discrediting Castro and al the damo lino providing the

people of Cube something so light for.

8. Il la Ray's intantion to depend almons entirely on rastilimo upora.

siona for tho lafiliration of personnel and malarial into Cuba. He aloo

rules out of hia plan the creasion ol another invalian army but does con-

complato the tralning of groupe of porhaps up to 150 men la other friendly

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countrios as South America (ho mentionod Venesuela as a possibility)

and said he mould oxploro the ponsibllity of basing maritime operationa

in sañ-U.S, porta.

9. Ray salf some means, other than Swan loland, must be found

lor reaching the Cuban population by radio broaderets. Ho spoke o!

he possibility of short rave broadcasta from Venexuela and ullliza-

lion of a commercial station in Miami which he underatando can bo

clearly board in Cuba.

10. Ray apato of the dosircability of stimulating the organisation

al "'Pro-Irus Cuban Revolutionary" student groups in many countries

ol Latin America (ho said a succreslul organizalion has been formed

do PuATIO Rico) and of sending quallliod reprosentatives to those Latla

Amorican countrios where there la Soviot diplomatic representation to

contaci student and labor groups and loaders in in effort to prosent to

them lho true picture of the sorty stato el students, vorkors, and

incollectuals la Castro'o Cuba.

1l. Ray da also intoreatod in the poosibility of pulting out a "Newe

Lottos" under MRP sponsorehip which would discuss varioua aspocto of

Lho Cubas picture and set forth plana for Cuba after the fall of Castro.

Ho thought such a nowa letter could go a long way tuwards correcting

mistaken impresciona among American univarsity professore and in

othes circlos as to the true nature of the Castro regimo. He pointad

to the recent letter from 53 Marvard profassors which was recently

published in the N. Y. Timos so a "horrible examplo" so to how mia-

datormad area university profe

sors are on presont day Cuba.

12. When the discussions got around to the seed for conducting

operationa as least "under the umbrolla" of tha Revolutionary Council,

and the need for obtaining DI. Miro's concurrence before the U. S.

mould be able to support any aporatios, It was obvious thar naitber

Lag. Ray nor Mr. Botancourt holda s high impreasion of the Couscil.

Both fool lbas there is a strong posnibility that the close public

¡dossilicasion al the Council with the recent invasion may voll have

discrodirad la Couneil to such an extent thai li commands no aupport

or raspace milala Cuba.

Tos to asto of argument thay maro willing lo concado thar tha

polltical advantagee of maintalaing the Cuunch) for the purpose-of forcing"

EXES C*X7

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unity of the varlous oxile group: may well outweigh its other obvious

shortcomings, Homever, both íoo), and Mr. Betancourt was quito

emphatic on thie point, that the Council as a body la not capable of

directing clandestino actions againat Castro and as a mattos of faci

¡o opposed to any further efforts at overtarowing Castro by sabotago

and othor subveraive actions since they aro completely "sold" on

the theals that Caotro can only bo removed by direct U. S. military

action and therefore a continuation of Cuban undorground activities

can only result in needless and futile lose of life. In the lack of this

attituda, Pay said he doos not expect to receive much encouragement

fos bis plan from the Council, although ho le faiily confident thai

DI. Miro's approval can eventually bo obtained.

Mo. Betancourt thought that a workable solution might be found

to their problem li the Council would agree to concern itooll exclusively

with (a) the current tank of undying the opposition, and (b) planning fox

¡to future asnumption of power aa the provisional goverument. Under

this arrangement, oporations aimed at the douníall of Castro could be

entrustad to those leaders and groupe (such as the MRP, MRR, and

posalbly the MDC) which have both the sesots and the will to do the

Job. MI. Ray thought that it might be foasible to creato an operationa

planning board or command among the groups with demonstrated assets

and thus avoid unnecossary duplication and confusion and make possiblo

overall planning. It was obvioua, homevor, that he would prefer to act

autonomoualy in the execution of his program.

Mo. Ray was vary critical of Artimo and claimod he was in possession

of sufficiont "Yacts" to convinco him that Artimo, in collusion with ele-

monto of the camps, wore planning to aliminato tho MRP and lis leadore

from tha pieturo, when the invasion succoedad. He said he "Knowa"

that Artime was being financially supported by wealthy ex-Batistianos

of tha Miami aros.

Ray hinted at varlous times that the MRP may at some point

lind itrall faced with the necesslty of withdrawing from the Council and

golng de alone. He says that the Council in composed of "goud man" but

thay havo no suress or significant followinge and "have nothing to alfor

the poople of Cuba" and although the proclamation of the Council, so

finally draftad, was a good one the "progronaiva" aspecto of the proclam-

allon mero forced on the Council by tha Americans and do not reprogont

tha truo fealings of the majority of the Council mamboro: Ho sald tho.

ZY

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Cuban peoplo are not likoly to want to risk their lives on the basia of.

aroraleos mana bi the present montership of tho council. He joels

that acceptance of the Council would be improved by adding do ita

membership two or three more people whose names would be sigal-

ficant and meaningful to the Cuban people. He did not name any

spocific candidates.

14. Mr. Ray let me read & 13 or 14 page raport which ho had

Juat received from the MRP coordinator in Cuba (Reinol Gonzales) 0 6

which painted a dreary picture uf conditions in Cuba since the fallure

of the invasion; was crítical of the inclusion of Batistianos and "nino

banitos" in the Invasion force; conveyed the strong feeling that the

Cubans had boon betrayed by the Americans; and indicatod that while

the MRP organization was still pretty much intact physically, morale

was almost completely shatterad. Mr. Ray said ho trould provide me

a sanitised copy (thare were some oparationa) and personal details)

of the report for our information.

15.

In vlow of thie roport from within Cuba, MI. Ray said that

ho will wiah to defer submitting his plan for our consideration until

ho is able to recolvo word from Cuba concerning the capabilities,

willingness and foasibility of carrying out some of the activition he

has in mind.

He sald it la useleas to submit a programa of sction if

the bunan elements to carry it out are lacking or completaly demoral-

1zed. He thought he might bo able to presant his prospocius within

approsiniately ton days. tie sald naturally ho will not giva the people

lasido any Indication that he has boen discussing a plan of action with

U8.

16. I urged Ray to consider submitting at loast a preliminary and

admittedly tentative proppectus at this time based on the assumption

thas his nosess are still intact and will be willing to cooperato la order.

that it nasy recoive early consideration. Howover, he sluck to bla

Bolle enal ate would not be grate be and refer eted to need for

17. Ray askod concerning the detaineos at McAlles, Toxas, and

wondered if they havo boon released. He was told that as far 8s I

know they are still under deiention.. Ho sald Mr. Goodwin had taken

their names and promined to look into the master. Ms. Botancourt

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Bald he would chock alrectly with Mr. Goodwin re thair status.

18. Liavited Mir. Ray and/or Mr. Betancuurt to call me oner

the woekend in case either should want to discuas the matter further.

I had the feeling that Mr. Botancourt was personally in favor of aub-

rittlag now a plan covering "short torm" noeds of their organization

and it may be thai such a paper wiil be submittod afier ho hao an

opportunity to talk with Mr. Ray in private.

03

JAMES A, NOEL

JAN/dIa

Diatsibution:

Original & 2 - A/DDP/A

1 - C/WHD

1 - AC/WH/4 & circulato

VT= Manual Ray 201

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