MEMO: AMWORLD OPERATION
Originator: CIA
To: THE RECORD
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1104-10308-10080

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

Job

File #

Volumes:

66-449 (Box 18)

19-124-27

6 booklets reviewed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMWORLD Operation

1. Description:

In addition to the booklets, the box contained tapes

and photos.

The memos dealt mainly with AMWORLD planning, status

reports and personnel and logistical needs.

This was Agency

support to the Revolutionary Recovery Movement headed by Dr.

Manuel ARTIME, a paramilitary organization dedicated to bringing

about the overthrow of the CASTRO Government.

Operations against

Cuba were tentatively scheduled for December 1963, but most of

the strikes took place in November 1963.

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ARTIME in Oct/Nov 63 felt that (Costa Rican support and

President ORLICH's role in AMWORLD were reportedly blown to CASTRO

with AGUILUZ.

2. Findings:

a. Man. DCh Recons by thAt Hecksher, 10 July 63:

ARTIME related events anteceding the Bay of Pigs

invasion. MANUEL RAY had just arrived in the U.S. from Cuba.

He enjoyed strong Department of State support. It was his intent

to get the U.S. to withdraw support from the FRD and to obtain

control over the training camps himself. VARONA's and CARILLO's

intention was to see the FRD go down.

Hecksher said he masterminded

RAY's defeat and RAY knew it.

b. Memo by Henry D. Hecksher, on AMWORLD Meeting in

7 to 10 Nov 1963. Subject; Dr. La Saga

LaSaga was the MRR delegate in the U.S. while ARTIME

zINV

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was imprisoned in Cuba (following the Bay of Pigs invasion). ARtIME

demoted La Saga. La Saga described by Hecksher as one of most

intelligent men he had ever met. It was La Saga's firm position that

while President Kennedy was in power it would be impossible to defeat

Dignitaries Abroad

AMJAVA-4 (

) mentioned that some

consideration was being given to plans involving the abduction

of Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Cuban Delegate to the U.N. , as an act of

Such plan, he understood was

of Picado / Gen. SOMOZA's pilot. in Cuban prison:/. We told AMJAVA-4

that we could not approve any

act of violence directed against a Cuban

diplomat connected with the U.N.

d. Memo by Carl E. Jenkins re AMNORLD Meeting in Baltimore,

9 February 1964, Estimage of Op Readiness Status

This deals with AMWORLD operations in 1964 . Page 4,

para 3, as Jenkins saw it, AMWORLD

could continue with what appeared to be generally

sound approach to developing the personnel and physical assets they

will require for effective ops. They can do this and still mount

small, simple, quick in and out ops, such as low risk sabotage,

abduction or assassination, release and exfil of prisoners, etc.,

e.

Memo By Carl E. Jenkins re AMWORLD Meeting in New York

15-16 February 1964 - ARTIME Op Philosophy and Concepts

ARTIME predicated his planning on the assumption that

the overthrow of CASTRO's regime would be preceded by a long and

hard war. ARTIME planned to accomplish his objectives thru

commando teams; infil teams, and guerrillas. Commandos thru

raids, abductions, assassinations, targetted against G-2 informants,

agents, officers,

foreign Communists, to lift the morale of people

inside Cuba.

•

Memo by Richard B. Beal re AMWORLD Meeting in Miami

28-29 June 1964, Delivery of Sensitive Material to

AMWORLD

AMJAVA-4 mentioned as reasonably attributable sources

to cover CIA support (air drop by CIA aircraft to AMWORLD bases) ,

several including Mafia. Rumors of Mafia support of AMWORLD had

long pervaded the AMWORLD organization. ARTIME claimed to have

been contacted in the past by the Mafia for the sale of arms.

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They discused an air drop attributable to an AMWORLD training

exercise.

ARTIME would tell Gen. SOMOZA that he intended to

make certain practice airdrops.

The drop would be at night and

made from a two-engine CIA aircraft. "For variety, certain air

deliveries could be made attributable to Venezuela, the Dominican

Memo by Carl E. Jenkins re AMWORLD Meeting in New

York, 4/5 Dec 1964: Report on AMJAVA-4 Visit to Europe

AMJAVA-4 said that Rolando CUBELA Secada was the rep.

of the internal group with whom ARTIME was expected to meet.

The dissident group consists of a number of officers, one group from

the DR headed by CUBELA, another group from the 26th of July Movement

headed by Cdte. Efigenio AMEIJEIRAS, Vice Minister of Armed Forces.

Maj. Guillermo GARCIA, commander of the Cuban Western Army, was

recognized as the leader of a regular ammy group who would not participate

in the plotting but would come in with his group after the

elimination of Fidel CASTRO. AMJAVA-4 and Nilo Messer, AMNORLD rep.

in Spain were convinced that CUBELA was not entirely moved by

ideological motivation. CUBELA was due to arrive in Madrid between

the 10th and 15th of December.

h. Memo by Nestor D. Sanchez re AMWORLD Meeting in

West Palm Beach, Fla. 3 Jan 65

ARTIME was to provide i CUBELA with a silencer for the

a rifle that was possible, ARTIME was to cache in a designated location

with a scope and silencer plus several bombs concealed

either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which

he would be able to carry and place next to Fidel CASTRO.

ARTIME

was to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no

one, including CUBELA, would know ARTIME's location.

ARTIME planned

to return to Paris the end of January before CUBELA's return to

Havana.

At that time they were to formalize their previous

agreements and ARTIME would give CUBELA what he had requested.

i. Memo by Nestor Sanchez AMWORLD Meeting West Palm

Beach,

Fla. 3 Jan 65 re Second Mtg Between ARTIME

and CUBELA in Madrid on 30 Dec 64

otherwise

CUBELA said that Sergio del VALLE would join a group

to oppose the Communist Party,

on the condition: of the death of

CUBELA gave ARTIME the details and exact locations where Fidel

spent every Saturday and Sunday and specifically every Sunday at

mene details end art location a cinda coup

Varadero.

CUBELA said that the Americans wanted him to take a radio

into Cuba which he would not do. The Americans also wanted him to

organize a coup, or organize a group of officers, battalions and

regiments in order to carry out a coup against Fidel. CUBELA said

the only thing he was capable of doing was trying to get rid of

Fidel CASTRO. He was able either to shoot him with a silencer or

place a bomb in some place where Fidel would be. CUBELA wanted to

know the exact location of the cache before he returned to cuba sc

he could memorize the info.

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