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Date

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07/14/98

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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSC

RECORD NUMBER: 145-10001-10262

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 58

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

ussassination Records

collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#: N

54214 Date:

10-04-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC

FROM : MCGEORGE BUNDY

TO : THE PRESIDENT

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 12/15/63

PAGES : 22

SUBJECTS : MEETING ON CUBA 12/19/63

CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND REVIEW OF MEASURES TAKEN

AGAINST CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED

WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/17/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Paga

21 Missing from

reunt cop1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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12/15/63

•

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 15a Meeting on Cuba -- December 19, 1963

At 11:00 A.M. on Thursday, you will be mecting primarily with

sand

State, Defense,

„CIA, to discuss further possible measures we can take

against Castro, which stop short of invasion and blockade. The following

is an attempt to describe the Cuban problem as a whole -- where we have

been since January, 1963; where we are now; and where we seem to be headed.

The paper ends with a brief description of a number of further possible

measures we can take against Cuba. State, Defense, and CIA, which, by

and large, have reserved their positions on these measures, will be prepared

to discuss them with you in detail at the meeting.

I. Current U.S. Policy

The bare minimum objective of our policy is a Cuba which poses no

threat to its neighbors and which is not a Soviet satellite. In moving towards

this objective we have rejected the options of unprovoked U.S. military inter-

vention in Cuba and of ayeffective, total blockade around Cuba -- primarily

because they would risk another US/USSR confrontation. Instead, we are enga:

in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures, both defensive

and offensive, which stop short of these drastic measures.

I. Review of U.S. Measures Against Cuba Since January, 1963

On January 8, 1963, the White House set up an interdepartmental task

force, headed by State, to coordinate all matters pertaining to Cuba.

TABU

150,

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With the establishment of the Cuban Coordinating Commitice, our post-

missile crisis measures against Cuba began. These mensures have been

essentially either defensive or offensive in nature.

A. Defensive Measures

Our defensive measures have primarily aimed at three targets:

(1) Cuba, the Military Threat -- We have been intent on ensuring that

Cuba does not become again an "offensive weapons" (e. g. missiles) threat to the

U.S. or Latin America. To this end we have conducted intensive air and sea

surveillance around and over Cuba and have collected intelligence from within

Cuba. So far as we know, we have been entirely successful in this effort and

Cuba is not now an "offensive weapons" threat to either the U.S. of to Latin

America.

But even without "offensive weapons" Cuba remains a powerful military

establishment in Latin America.

To discourage possible Cuban military attacks

against its neighbors, we have put ourselves clearly on record that trailere.

any such Cuban moves and will have tirely dire consequences for Cuba.

(2) Soviet Troops -- We have been intent, for domestic political, as we!

as national security reasons on effecting the removal of all Soviet military perso:

nel from Cuba. To this end we have made it eminently clear to the Soviets on

numerous occasions that we canno

strong'? ilate the permanent assignment of Soviet

military personnel to Cuba. As a result of Soviet self-interest and our pressure.

there are now 4, 000 to 7, 000 Soviet military personnel (mostly advisers and

technicians) remaining in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65% to 75% from 11..

pest reachert in the rutamn of 1962; a net outflow appears to be continuing. How-

ever sisi

remains a delicale one. At any moment the Russians could

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arbitrarily decide to send more troops into Cuba. Also, the fact that volatile:

Cubans will probably control the surface-to-air missile sites by mid-1964 is

disturbing.

CReV

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(3) Subversion -- We have been intent on impeding and if possible

stopping Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere. -To

•this end we have made a special effort, bilaterally and in mullilateral

forums, to direct Latin American altention to, and to assist (materially

where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problem of controlling

internal insurgency and in controlling the subversive movement of people,

funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin Are rica and Cuba. On the one

hand we have had some success -- there is now an increased awareness in

Latin America of the extent and nature of the threat along with an increased

capability and will in Latin America to do something about the problem.

"One measure of our success is Venezuelan readiness, in contrast to

previous reluctance, to make an international issue out of the crime srebe

of t Cutes arms cache.

discovery, Another small measure of this success is that primarily through

the use of travel control by Latin American governments, there has been a

50% drop over the past year in the number of Latin Americans traveling to

Cuba.

-

On the other hand, with Castro still exceedingly intent on producing

"another Cuba" in the Hemisphere, and with many Latin American govern-

ments still unwilling or unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts,

much remains to be done. In this regard proper exploitation of the recent

discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela might take us a long way

towards getting wholehearted Latin American cooperation in the fight against

subversion. Such cooperation is a vital key lo success in this field.

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B. Offensive Measures

Offensively, our ultimate minimum target is to remove the Soviet

salellite from the Hemisphere. We hope to achieve this by concentrating

mainly on three intermediate targets -- intensifying Cuba's already-serious

economic difficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets

of maintaining Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance

to the regime. Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are

two

-- isolation measures and covert measures (which also have an impact

on our defensive targets, particularly Cuban subversion).

(1) Isolation Measures -- The most outstanding characteristic of our

isolation measures is that they have been exceedingly difficult to implement

-- primarily because implementation depends on the cooperation of others

and not merety on U.S. will alone. Nevertheless, while one could have

reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the world moved

away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not happened.

Instead, while far from performing aglially over the past year,

our isolation policy generally has held the ground already made in some

fields, while making further progress in others. About a year ago, only 5

OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba; the number not

only remains the same now, but anticipated OAS reaction to the discovery

• of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives some reason to hope for further

ruptures. The low level of Free World trade with Cuba reached in 1962 has

generally been maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been fairly

sizeD Taramatic dempnstration of this is the fact that many Lalin

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Americans have had to travel to and from Cuba via Prague., Free World

snipping to Cuba in 1963 is running at roughly 40% of 1962 levels. Prospects

for further reduction are good since we now seen to be making good

progress with the three principal shipping countries -- Greece, Lebanon,

and the UK. In this regard, the Grecks have recently issued stiffer laws

to prevent their ships from going to of from Cuba, while the Lebanese

bave drafted (but have not yet enacted) legislation to the same end; and some

...

that they should play ball with us.

But there is plenty of room for improvement. There are still roughly

30 Free World ships per month in the Cuban trade. Free World countries

at than frand a dogs,

still send many commodities to Cuba which Cuba needs desperately, And

there are still air routes between Cuba and Spain and Mexico.

The effectiveness of our isolation policy in hitting the target is

impossible to gauge accurately. While Hurricane Flora, in a few days,

probably hit the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a

year, it is generally agreed that the economic chaos which now in fact exists

in Cuba and the enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to

our efforts. Castro's repeated and loud public protestations about our

isolation policy and his serious and energetic efforts to break at of Free

World isolation substantiate the view that the isolation measures probably

hurt him, cconomically and politically.

COBy

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(2) Covert Measures -- Our covert program over the past year

has covered essentially six areas. First, through a variety of lechniques,

we have collected intelligence for both U.S. strategic requirements and for

operational requirements; the quantity and quality is good but there is always

room for improvement. Second, CIA-controlled radio programs and other

propaganda media, directed at Cuba, have been used to encourage low risk,

simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to

stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

Third, CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba com-

modities which it urgently needs. Fourth, we have been trying to identify,

seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist

elements in the power centers of the regime, with a view to stimulating an

internal coup which would dislodge Castro; we currently are in direct contact

with several people in Cuba who may be of significance. Fifth, we have

directed four small-scale externally-mounted sabotage operations for the

Austing Cabe econ-calle

purpose of stimulating resistance and as an economic weapon. Sixth, ir

order to expand sabotage and resistance activities we have been involved in

aiding autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals, who will probably be

ready to begin infiltration and sabotage in mid-January, and who will not

necessarily be responsive to our guidance. (A financial breakdown of CIA's

covert Cuban operations since 1960 is attached at Tab L

The most outstanding characteristic of our covert action program so

freiailat ils palcatial far bringing about a basic change in Cuba is still

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largely unknown. The program, which makes use of Cuban exiles and which

is not yet fully underway has alrcady achived a degree of success

in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing

Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities,

in inflicting small, but cumulatively significant economic damage, and

perhaps in stimulating to some degree the insurgency which is evident in

Cuba. As yet our covert program has not been directed in such a way as to

inflict serious economic damage on Cuba. There are those who believe that

much can be done in this regard, as well as in stimulating further resistance.

a least ive lin tita

But our covert program presently operates under severat handinesen

present policy prevents air attacks on Cuban targets and prevents free-lance

exile raids on Cuba from U.S. territory.

III. Where are We Going?

In theory, at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously

pursued and, to a degree, complemented by our defensive measures, could

lead finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which con-

stitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

A. Overthrow of the Castro Regime

Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as the most

likely of the three eventualities. Hopefully, by exerting maximum pressure

by all the means available to the U.S. Government, short of military force.

we will be able lo bring about a dugree of disorganization, uncertainty, and

mrcontent in Ears which will predispose elements in the power centers of the

MABy

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regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/ Communist group and

the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt,

it is likely that direct, or indirect U.S. support will be needed to ensure

its success.

Theoretically, the Cuban people, tired of economic hardship,

lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethern, will

embrace the revolt. •

B. Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms

Under this eventuality, Castro would agree to break his tie-line

with the USSR, stop his subversion efforts, and perhaps renounce the Com-

munist ideology. While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that such

factors as (l) U.S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further Cuban

economic deterioration, in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of the Soviet

intentions will lead Castro to believe he has no choice but accommodation.

Indeed, there is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these

lines. In the past few months be has made a number of accommodation noise=

and since he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms,

these noises could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way

towards meeting them. Che Guevera's reported nervousness at Castro's

that

accommodation tendencies substantiates the view / Castro's desire to

negotiate is genuine and not a ploy to reduce U.S. heat on Cuba.

But there are obvious major problems with this alternative. Not the

least of these is whether the American people would tolerale accommodation

TADY

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with even a reformed Castro and whether of not we could prove lo the

American people that we've gotten from Castro what we say we've gotlen.

Nevertheless, there is rebuttal for such arguments and accommodation

remains a distinct possibility, if not for now then for later.

C. A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba

This may be the most unlikely of the three eventualities, yet such a

Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors

as (1) the lackof real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "showpiece", (2)

the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet "dead end" in the

Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of

Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic

problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how

he Russians would view li eviction from Cuba, either by the overthrow of

Castro's regime or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U.S. on

U.S. terms. Relief would conceivably mix generously with Russian grief,

especially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf.

IV Current Estimate of Possible Success

The $64 question -- Will our present offensive measures, even if

implemented vigorously and flawlessly, ever lead, by one way of another,

to the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere? -- is impossible

to answer. Castro's position within Cuba appears to be erroding gradually,

while the situation in Cuba is characterized by economic stagnation, depress.

"itions, the lose of revolutionary impetus, and the desir sonnes

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of an increasing large majority of the populition; moreover, Castro's

stature in Latin America is generally vory low. Nevertheless, the general

consensus secms to be that Castro still retains control; without stepping up

our pressures considerably, the chances are practically nil that we will

get to Castro in the ncar future and only fairly good that we will get to him

eventually.

Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be

moving in the right general direction; and this, of course, is important. A

vigorous, tough, and nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for

bringing about any of the three eventualities which are noted above and

which constitute the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

From a domestic political viewpoint, this is probably fortuitous; a tough but

no invasion policy is one policy which the American people appear prepared

to support at this time.

V. Further Possible Measures Against Cuba

The general consensus in the Government is that we should try to

find ways of stepping up our pressures against the Castro regime. One of

the most important reasons for this is that the Castro regime continues to

constitute a threat to Latin America. While Castro's efforts in Latin

America may not be substantial in absolute terms, he is operating in an

arca which is politically especially fragile.

It is also generally agreed that we are now in a good time-frame to

secpupour pressures. The recent discovery of the Cuban arms caché in

MARTT

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Venezuela should permit us to raise the general noise level in and around

Cuba. Actions which we may have been reluctant to take several months

ago, may now be feasible.

The following is a list of further actions, short of invasion and

blockade, which we may want to take in the near future. They can con-

veniently be divided into unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures:

The brief description following each measure is meant to give you a flavor

for some of the more important implications. At the Nee meeting, State,

Defense, and CLA will be prepared to discuss each of the measures with

you in depth and in detail.

A. Unilateral Measures

(1) Air Attacks -- We can authorize CIA to conduct or to equip

autonomous exile groups to conduct air attacks against selected major

economic targets such as power plants and oil refineries. As a starter, we ..

arisaad

have #targets in mind. These motid be considerably more difficult to attaci

from the ground but planning for a ground attack on one of these targets

is already underway. Planning for an attack on the Santiago oil refinery will

be completed inter The 1$64.

While the concrete and psychological advantages of selected air strike.

have always been recognized, and while unauthorized air strikes have in fac:

already taken place over Cuba, up to now it has been our policy to steer cles:

of U.S. involvement in this sort of activity. Primarily it has been consider.:

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a relatively high risk, high noise-lovel type of operation which would not

have a major impact on Castro, which would be hard lo control fe. g.

innocents might be killed), and which could conceivably lead to a sharp

Soviet reaction in Cuba (e. g. shoot down a U-2) or elsewhere.

(2) Unleashing of Exiles -- We can relax our present policy of not

permitting independent Cuban exile groups to base sea and air attacks on

Cuba from U.S, territory/(ge can urge the British to do the same for 17

Bahamian territory.

While such attacks might inflict only small concrete

damage on Cuban targets, they have some distinct advantages. For

example, they would tend to high-light the regime's weakness, cause

Castro to divert more resources to defense, lift the morale of the exiles

and of the anti-Castro elements within Cuba, and provide cover for CIA-

controlled raids.

This also is not a new subject, and, in the past, the disadvantages

were believed to be over-riding. Such autonomous raids, which would in-

volve the U.S. directly and which would raise the noise-level in the Caribbean,

would be hard to control; it is possible that raiders would attack Soviet

vessels and installations and precipitate strong Russian reaction, including.

possibly the transfer of more Soviet troops to Cuba. Moreover, encourage-

ment of autonomous raids on Cuba from U.S. territory would be in sharp

variance with our publicly and privately stated position. Since March 30,

1963 we have taker' the public position that we will not tolerate the violation

"i penly laws, even by anti-Castro raidors. Privately, we have

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said the same thing to the Soviets while maintaining the position that we

have no control over raiding activities which originale outside of U.S.

territory.

? It beat of all saild are blo,

Operatal we would preier that these completely autonomous,

amateur exile raiders operate from non-U.S. territory. However, we

may not have this option. Generally speaking, such amateurs have their

homes in Florida and don't want to move. Moreover, the fact that U.S.

territory is physically very close to Cuba makes a difference to the rela-

tively poorly-equipped amateurs who would be involved in this sort of raid.

(3) Military Feints -- We can move U.S. air and surface units over

. and in international waters near Cuba in a manner designed to keep Cuban

military forces in a state of alert and uncertainty.

This is a measure which has not been explored to the extent of the

first two. On the positive side, it would harass Castro, cost him resources,

and, if desired, offer opportunities for escalation. On the negative side,

there is the ever-present problem of possible escalation which we may not

want as well as the investment of U.S. forces, over time, in an essentially

psychological exercise. Implicit in this measure is the assumption that we

would be able to conduct military feints on a level at which the Cubans Wald

get jumpy but the Russians would not.

(1) Low-Level Flights -- We can reintroduce low-level reconnaissant

flights over Cuba in such a way as to minimize the chance of Cuban counter-

um? Elicly, we can fationalize the resumption of theflights on the

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grounds that they will give us more intelligence on Castro's capabilities

to ship arms to Latin America. In fact, the primary advantages 1o low-

level flights are psychological; they would indicate a tougher U.S. line

and would be extremely irritating to Castro - a blatant disregard for

Cuban sovereignty.

Much discussed, the reintroduction of low-level flights has been

turned down in the past primarily because of the noise-level problem, and

because it might lead to Soviet reaction against our U-? flights and in other

areas. Also there is a real possibility that low-level flights might lead to

escalation we would not want; the Cubans are on record that they might try

to shoot one down.

(5) Free World Shipping to Cuba -- We can take further unilateral

measures to reduce Free World shipping to Cuba. For example, we can

close U.S. ports and deny U.S. Government sponsored shipments to lines

of some or all countries which have ships in the Cuban trade.

This is a subject which has probably received as much attention as

any in the whole realm of Cuban affairs. Briefly put, we have thus far re-

jected further unilateral measures mainly because the nature of the Cuban

trade is such (small shipping lines with a greater involvement in Cuban

trade than in U.S. trade) that our unilateral measures would simply not

provide the leverage needed to produce a substantial reduction in Free World

shipping to Cuba; the slight reduction we would get would not be enough to

RADY

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compensate for a number of foreign policy losses we would suffer.

Generally speaking, we have instead concontraled on applying in-

tense bilateral pressures on the governments of Free World countries to

control their shipping to Cuba; and have had considerable, but not total,

success (see also Section V B (2) below). At the same time, we have not

entirely ruled out further unilateral sanctions. Some shipping experts

seem to feel that if we apply certain unilateral sanctions in March, 1964,

the Soviets and Cubans will have to scramble seriously in order to adjust

charters and shipping schedules in time to be prepared for the heavy

Cuban shipping season which begins in May.

(6) Public Presidential Statement -- You can issue an early policy

declaration on Cuba, making clear that the U.S. regards the current situa-

tion in Cuba as intolerable. Such a statement would be designed to stimulate

anti-Castro/ Communist dissident elements is the erad-forces to carry

out a coup. It would also have a salutory effect on those Latin American

leaders who have indicated a willingness to follow a positive U.S. lead in

• taking more forceful action against Cuba.

Your statement might also include the point that the U.S. is wil

not going-te permit the establishment of "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere.

This point would be designed to make it clear to the Soviets and Castro that

they have reached a "dead end" in the Hemisphere.

REbyovember 18 in Miami, President Kennedy included both of the

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above points in his speech to the Inter-American Press Association

(excerpts are attached at Tab 2). Whether or not you would want to take

a more vigorous line in your own statement would have to dupend on many .

factors - c-g. upon U.S. willingness to pursue a more active anti-Cuba .

policy over the next months, upon possible adverse Latin American re-

action to a statement which hints of U.S. interventionism and upon domestic

political considerations.

(7) Talks with the Soviets and Cubans -- We can, through normal

diplomatic and private channels attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviets

and the Cubans and possibly, to encourage some Russian thinking in favor

of withdrawal and some Castro thinking in favor of accommodation with the U.:

U.S. terms. To the Soviets, we can emphasize (a) that we are never going

to let things stand as they are in Cuba, (b) that the Soviets, despite con-

siderable expense, are making and can expect to make, no further real

progress in Cuba so elsewhere in the Hemisphere, (c) that the existence of

the Soviet tie-line in Cuba is a serious impediment to a U.S. /USSR detente,

and (d) that the U.S. is prepared to assist the USSR in finding a fig-leaf to

cover Soviet withdrawal from Cuba.

To Castro, very well aware that the Russians pulled the rug out

from him in October, 1962 and aware that he is making no progress despite

massive Soviet aid, the following type of message might have some appeal,

It could be confident in tone to initigale the possibility of relieving Castro

POBH

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of any anxicties he may have which work in our favor.

"Fidel, we are content lo let events continue on their present course.

We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressures

against you until you fall; we are aretty certain that we will be successful..

Moreover, you can forget about getting 'another Cuba' in the Hemisphere.

We have learned our lesson and 'another Cuba' is simply not going to

happen. However, we are seasonable men. We are not intent on having

your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people.

You know our central concerns -- the Soviet connection and the subversion.

Il you feel you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably

work out a way to live amicable together and to build a prosperous Cuba.

If you don't feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole

thingi we are quite content to continue on our present basis."

B. Bilateral Measures

Further efforts in this field essentially would represent a

continuation, sharpening, and intensification of programs already in

effect. A basic limiting factor is the degree to which we are willing to

theis

expend credit with our allies to obtain diss cooperation in making life diffi-

cult for Cuba.

(1) Free World Trade with Cuba -- We can, through overt and cover:,

legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private means, make a greater effort

10 deny Cuba access to Frce World, markets and sources of supply; extra-

PRItition can be directed lo those Free World commodities which

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are critical or important lo the Cuban economy.

There

are

some real obstacles to further progress in this field --

a world-wide shortage of sugar which increases Cuba's leverage over Free

World sugar consumers, and a reluctance among many Free World

countries to interfere in non-strategic trade. Nevertheless, there appears

to be general agreement that more can be done in this area. Among other

things, we can interpret more restrictively various legislative provisions

which bear on Free World trade with Cuba; we would have to be prepared,

however, to accept political losses in the offending countries as well as

the domeStic political losses inherent in tacitly admitting that our former

interpretatiors vere wrong.

(2) Free World Shipping to Cuba -- We can increase our bilateral

pressures to eliminate the slowly dwindling number of Free World ships

which remain in the Cuba trade. We can try to ensure that the Greeks en-

force their new shipping legislation against ships in the Cuba trade. We

can press the Lebanese to enact the necessary shipping legislation which

has already passed through a number of constitutional processes; a letter

from you to the Lebanese Prime Minister might help. Although we appear

to have recently found a way to reduce British shipping to Cuba without HMG

help (through direct dealings with the shippers), we can continue to press

for IIMG cooperation, which, if obtained, would be most helpful.

Since our prospicts seem to be good with respect to the three major

spanaptries, it is axiomatic that we should keep pressure on other

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Free World countries to ensure that they don't pick up the slack which the

Grecks, Lebanese, and selective British shippers will soon be leaving.

In this regard, the selective refusal to exercise the Presidential waiver of

the Cuban transportation provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization

Act (cessation of aid to any country which has not taken steps to prevent

the transport of commodities, by plane or ship, to or from Cuba), could

increase our diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, assuming of

course, we are ready to incur the foreign policy costs involved in this step.

(3) Air Service to and from Cuba -- We can increase pressure to

reduce, restrict and harass Free World and Communist air services to and

from Cuba. Strict application of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act

could help in this regard if we are prepared to accept the costs involved

in offending certain countries (e. g. Spain). On the other hand, the con-

clusion of a U.S. /USSR civil air agreement could erode our strong position

against Free World air service to Cuba.

(1) Anti-Subversion Program -- We can continue to press in the

direction of strengthening both the will and the capability in Latin America

to take the political and technical measures which have been recommended

both bilaterally and multilaterally. The basic lines of the anti-subversion

program have been laid out and they are being followed, with varying

degrees of success, in the different countries. Constant follow-up, lechnic?!

advice and assistance, and training are essential to the improvement and

21 5377 the program.:

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We can also make a tough approach to the Russians with evidence

of the Venezuelan armis cache. Gromyko in the past, has expressed doubi

that we could show evidence of Cuban subversion. We can show it to him

now.

C. Multilateral Measures

(1) Rio Treaty Action Against Cuba -- At present, we are in the

process of deciding what Rio Treaty action we can get the OAS to taleagainst

Cuba as a result of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela.

What we push for will depend, in large part on the hardness of the evidence

presented in an OAS investigating team's report and on the attitude of other

OAS countries towards energetic anti-Cuban action. Best estimates are that

we will push for and get 4 or 5 of the following 7 measures:

(a) Stop and search, on the high seas, of selected Cuban # OAS-

registery vessels. This measure implies a willingness to use force and

involves the concommitant risk of unwanted escalation. The ostensible

purpose of this measure is to stop arms shipments, but because the quarantino

could be easily by-passed and because the chances are good that arms

shipments to Latin America from Cuba are minimal, no arms are likely to

be found. The real purpose of this measure is to infuriate, humiliate, and

provoke Castro.

(b) Siop and search, in territorial waters, of all suspect vessels. Ti:

is a variatios of the above, which is probably almost as effective in controllin.

arms shipments and which does not involve the possible use of force. At the

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however, such action will be fairly meaningless.

(2) Other Surveillance Measures -- Outside the context of Rio

Treaty Action we can try to conclude OAS-wide or bilaleral agreements with

Latin American governments to take joint measures to detect and prevent

arms smuggling by land, sea, or air into Latin America. Because of the

could

urgency of the threat, Venezuela and Colombia strivid be given first priority.

Mc EB

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