TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 1975-05-23 00:00:00
Document type: TESTIMONY

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

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Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

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178-10004-10213

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : COLBY TESTIMONY BEFORE SSC, 5/23/75

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

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SSCIA

TITLE:

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975

DATE: 05/23/1975

PAGES:

118

SUBJECTS :

19.1

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DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM

DULLES, ALLEN

EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

FBI

GIANCANA, SAM

HARVEY, WILLIAM

HUNT, E. HOWARD

KENNEDY, ROBERT

LANSDALE, EDWARD

LAS VEGAS

LAW ENFORCEMENT, WIRETAPPING

MAHEU, ROBERT

OPERATION MONGOOSE

ORGANIZED CRIME

PROUTY, FLETCHER

ROSELLI, JOHN

STURGIS, FRANK

TRAFFICANTE, SAM

WARREN COMMISSION, INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM

ZRRIFLE

CUBAN EXILES

CONSPIRACY THEORIES, THREE TRAMPS

COLBY, WILLIAM E.

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

CIA

CHURCH COMMITTEE

BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT

BISSELL, RICHARD

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

25

Best available copy

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## Page 2

JFK Assassination System

identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

MCFARLANE

178-10004-10213

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : COLBY TESTIMONY BEFORE SSC, 5/23/75

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975

DATE:

05/23/1975

PAGES:

118

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

AMLASH

CUBELA, ROLANDO

DOCUMENT TYPE : TESTIMONY

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

08/10/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Attached to 1781000410212. Page 1 of 118-page document copied only. For complete document see

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TESTIMONY OF:

William E. Colby,

Director, CIA,

-- accompanied by --

Scott S. Brechinriage, JI.,

Deputy Inspector Gencial.,

Enno inoche,

Assistant to the Director,

George I. Cary,

Legislative Counsel

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NUNBER

Colby Ehibit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, cardboard-backed

photographs, deered

marked in

an off the record

discussion early in the transcript.

Colb: No. 4

Colby No. 5

Colby No. 6

1-010

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i'.'

TESTIMOIY OF MILLINI E. COLBY,

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Friday, May 23, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Raspact to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Conmittee met, pursuant to notice at 9:15 o'clock

a.M., I11 Room 107, The Capitol Building, Senator Fran:

Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present:

Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Norgan, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and

Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, F.A.O.

Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel: Willian Badar, Professional Staff Mamber.

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• Loademand cinell, dha nearing will come to order.

Mr. Scott Breckinridge is accompanying the Director this

morning and may be called upon from time to time to testify.

For that purpose, Mr. Breckinridge, will you please stand

and be sworn?

Do you swear that all the tastimony you may givz in this

proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

the truth, so help you God?

Mr.. Breckinridge. I do.

Chairman Church. Mr. schwarz will commence the questionin

this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mi. Colby, did you have some things you

wanted to supply to the Committee?

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ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR., DEPUTY

INSECTOR GENERAL, ENTO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR, AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISINTIVE COUNSEL

Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the questions

that vere raised at the meeting the other day

and there are a

couple of clarifications I would like to make.

One, with' respect to the security investigations in the

United States. The question was asked whether we ever used

private investigators, and I said we nornally used our own

investigators. We have some relationships with private

investigatory firms which provide cover for our investigators

and, secondly, we have a few firns which we own which are

proprietary if you will, whereby our investigators appear to

be private.

I said that in the past it is clear that on occasion wa

did ask for private investigator firms to help us to some

degree.

It was usually the one that was giving us cover, and

for

reasons of overload we asked them to have their own people

to do a few of the investigations.

My General Counsel says that this is illegal. I have a

strong question about its propriety, if not legality, and I

am undertakirg to roview this matter to see whether we can not

just elininata that practice entirely, continuing the proprie-

tary and continuing the ass of private investigators as cours

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But I did want to clarily that. I think 'I mentioned it

last time that there have been occasions on which this was

done.

FAUL

Stroel, 5.6., Wasningion, u.l.

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Chairman Church. Mx. Colby, would you in connection with

your review of this matter supply the Committee with the spe-

cifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged

private investigators to do Agency work?

Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. I

confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I

certainly will do my best.

• Chairman Church. Will you provide the Committee with the

opinion of your counsel with respect to the legality of such?

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairman Church. Such use of private investigators?

MI. Colby. Yes.

Chairman Church. And then I would ask the staff also

furnish the Committee with a brief on that question so that we

are-fully advised with respect to the law.

Mr. Colby. Right.

The second subject, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mondale asked

for our command and control regulations for the approval of

covert action projects. These were supplied to the staff on

the first of May and are available to the staff.

Thirdly, i was asked.if ir. Willian Harvey was removed

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from the Agency because of his involvement in the assassination

plans 'against Prime Minister Castro.

The facts are-that in June 1963 he was assigned

25001

Chief

Chief of Stationin Rome and in February of '67 he was ..

reassigned to CIA Headquarters. He retired voluntarily undor

our retirement system on 31 of December 1967.

It I may, there is a reason why he was taken out and if I

could go off the record and mention that to the Committee. It

is a matter of his privacy.

Chairman Church. Very well, off the record.

(off the record discussion)

Mr. Colby.: Bach on the record.

Senator Schweiker asked me whether Howard Hunt or James

Mccord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of

President Kennedy's assassination on 22nd of November '63.

Howard Hunt fron. "July 62 to August '64 was assigned as a

Section Chief in the Division of Plans Directorate, which is

now the Operations Directorate at CIA Headquarters, which had

no

responsibility whatsoever for Mexican operations.

Senator Schweiker. What were those dates again?

Mr. Colby. July '62 to August '61.

Senator Schweiker. Wasn't he at some point in Mexico

City and in charge of that office?

Mr. Knoche. Way back in the '50's he served ir Maxico

17.÷993

City. Way back. He was not in charge.

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MI. LOIDY.

Me was a case oilicet then.

senator schweiker. So that is the pariod you are saying

he had no jurisdiction in any way with Latin Anerica ot Mexicor

Affairs.

MI. Colby. No, he was in what we call, and we have since

changed the name, to Domestic Operations Division at that time,

our operations here in this country, and that is a whole

differcht subject I would have to explain some day.

Mr. McCord from June '62 to June '64 was assigned as

CIA Security Officer in therer

stat lon atransfort Germany

and he had no responsibilitics for Mexican operations at that

point.

Senator Morgan last tine asked what information was given

to the Warren Commission concerning Agency assassination plans

concerning Castro, and I have been advised our records do not

indicate that the Marren Connission was provided with informa-

tion on this subject.

Allen Dulles, of course, I would note, who was the CIA

Diractor until the fall of

'61, was a member of the warren

Cornission, but beyond thet fact I have nothing I could offer.

And then who made the decision not to provide it, if none

was given? Our records do not indicate that there was a CIA

decision on this matter not to tall the Warren Commission.

I could add that I beliave the ralationship ith the

Warren Commission was handled by one of our staffer tich

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I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation

systom was such.

Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who

was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and

the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. To my knowledge it is Hi. Raymond Rocca.

Chairman Church. Where is it now?

Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year.

He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is

retired. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in

the Washington area.

Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

Mr. Colby. Still vorking with us to help on the transi-

tion of the whole counter intelligence program.

Chairman Church. Why did he rctire?

Mr. Colby.. That was the Angleton case, Mo. Chairman, ans

the facts of that case were that I had had sone professional

aiffejences in the organization with Mr. Angloton as to the

way the counterintelligerce business was run and the way the

Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a

higher degrce of coordination of the other elements of the

Directorate. and of the agency. We had debated this on various

occasions in thr past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 aro

too! a number of functions cray from it. The 11219tò

with it?

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endeavored to open un the Isracli account to a better relation-

ship with our ctior Moar Eastern

activitics. He dabated this

over many months and on several occasions. We could never

really ayrea to it because he insisted on the importance of

retaining it where it was.

• MI. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that

liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeili who

were involved in it.

I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab

areas.

• Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compart-

mentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with

our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I

set as my time limit for this discussion. the end of December.

because there were some very substantial retirement berefits

that people would loose if they stayed after that point.

Ther

unfortunately

the Seynour Hirsh article of December 22nd came

to our attention before it was actually published, and so I

brought it. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two

basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account fron

his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership

into the Head of the Countsrintelligence Staff. I said I vould

offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence

doctrina, he could stay working with us.

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REEDEN.

as to vashly to sctare the opportunity was thore. ne

chose-to retire. I insisted that I talk to him before the

seymour lirs- article appeared.. I knew it was coming. I

didn't inow what it was going to say. I wanted to make cloar

between him and me that the decision was based upon our long-

standing discussion of how to run that particular activity.

The question then came up who would be his successor and

Mr. Rocca was his Deputy. There ware two other officers who

were possibilities. One of the officers, Mr. Hood, had said

in early December that he planned to retire at the end of

December.

The other two, Mr. Rocca and Mir. Miler, vere infornad

that they would not be the successor Chief of that staff. Ties

ware offered a chance to stay on in their then current jobs.

They chosa to retire. All four of them agreed to stay with

us on a consultant basis over

the next several months to help

us on the transition of new leadership into that job, and they

have done so.

Chairman Church. Well, without getting off the track, I.

just have one further question here in connection with Mr.

Anglaton himself.

Is it true that he is still being paid as a consultant?

Mx. Colby. I believe it has dropped off, ir. Chainian.

He did help us for three or four months but I believe that it

is terminated. It is about time to terminate it, I know, ard

whether it is on this particular date has been taminated.

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(MIs-Numbered iN TRANSCRiBiNGS

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he set ourselves about six month period where we would have

to -

Chairman Church. There is no, plan to retain hin inc.fi-

nitely?

Mr. Colby. Absolutely not. It was to help us get over

this transition and phase him out.

Chairman Church. Very well.

Senator Mondale: I asked for vouchers on payments with

respect to assassinations?

Mr. Colby. I am looking for that. I don't have an answer

for you yet, Senator.

The request was also made whether we had any information

concerning plots to assassinate Chou En Lai. Re have irports

of two such examples, incidents, both conducted by the Chiness

Nationalists without our prici knowledge and without our

participation.

One in Aptril 1955, an Air India aircraft crashed at

sea off Indochina after departing from Hong Kong. Several

Chinese communist delegates for the Bandung Conferenca were

on board and it had been rumored that Chou En Lai would he on

the aircraft.

On the 11th of January 1956, the British Colonial Office

in London issued an official statonent reporting they had

evidence that the Chinese Nationalists had bribed a Hong kong

airport: employce to place a tima bomb on the airplane.

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and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employes

had flcd to. Taivan. We had nothing to do with that incident

and frankly heard about it after it occurred.

In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist Official

informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National plannad to

assassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia in

Novenber '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of

the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to. Phnom Penh to supervise

the attempt. He learned of this after it had happened and le

had

nothing to do with

it.

He had a relationshi? with the Chinese Nationalists

intelligence servica over the years and, they clearly have dona

things without our knowledge or involvenent, and in a number

of areas, but we have also worked together on some areas.

These are two that were separate.

Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Hunt

and Sturgis that appeared in wawsweel some years ago. We

obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock

We had not had it before.

We had a copy of the Newsweek

edition..

These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1919, 1950 and

1961. This is the only photograph we have of ir. Sturgis.

It is talien out of the downweck.

We have had no consection with Mr. Sturgis ard so we hara

FORÒ

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1w.. 1.

sunught, du tids subject to the problems of it.

He had our photographic experts and analysts and so forth:

200k at these two individuals here who vere piched up. He

examined them in considerable detail, and talking about the

'61 Hunt photograph, comparing it with this, and this is the

photograph, Hewsweei photograph. You will see that there is a

lot of sort of fundamental differences in the kinds of :

appearances they have, different characteristics of the

individuals.

With respect to Sturgis, of course, we are not as confi-

dent because we don't have as good a base to work from in our

comparison but at the same time we see differences there also.

Now, we further looked, had one of our disguise people --

we obviously have people who can disguise you the red wig

eipisoda. It wasn't red, thay insist, it wasn't ill fitting:

That is the thing that shey got upsetaout. But they say thai

it would not be feasible to have them actually in a disguise,

have these individuals-actually in this disguise, that it is

toobig a jump, it differs.

Senator luddleston. How about the size of the indiviaual,

are they pretty close?

Mx. Colby. These two are. la looks liko a shorter man

from the surroundings.

And Hunt is about medium height, rather

than this short.

Mr. Knoche, Hunt is sive feet tan and a half thales.

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-.....

- me any send us arulyses and they really

were able

to do a pretty good job on lunt and, what they do is

identify certain key points, make measurements and put adjust-

ments, the same thing we do for the satellite photography in

terns of these measurements, and things like that, and compara

it in that sense, and their conclusion: is that clearly this is

not Hunt. They are absolutely confident that this photograph

is not. Hunt. They are less confident that it is not sturgis

because of the base on which they are operating, but they think

it is not.

I point out that this analysis vas done overnight, about

3 o'clock in the morning.. This is sturgis.

Mr.

Schwarz. And to the right?

Mr. Colby. This is a rewspaper photograph of Hunt; a

recent one. These are sort of Agency photographs of him wien

he was an employee.

Senator Hart Of Colorado. Were those men ever identified

by the Dallas Police?

" MI. Colby. They must have booked them or something if

they carried them in. I really don't know. If they took them

in I would assume they would have had to book them.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What are these pictures on the

lower right and left?

Mi. Colby.

These

the blowaps of the particular

photographs.

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Senator liart of Colorado. Not the one you had carlier?

Mr. Colby. They are different.

Senator Hart

Of colorado. They are different angles?

Mr. Colby. This is reversed.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

They are different photographs?

Mr. Colby. It is reversed.

Senator Hart Of 'Colorado. No. They are not A and B ever

reversed.

Mr. Colby.. They car do that kird of a turn through the -

Senator Hart of Colorado. They can twist the photographs

aound?

Mr. Colby.. They can make it appear at a different angle.

Senatox Hart of Colorado.. B at least is a totally dif-

feront poss. They turred his mouth down. His ayes are closed.

They have really done a job if they changed B to that lower

right.

Mr. Colby. They can change then, honest.

Let me gat my brief on that and I will answer that

question.

They magnified them to the same scale using the eyes and

mouth.

The contrast and texture differences were minimized,

continuous tone photographs amployed and angular compensations

were made to offset errors incident to the different heads.

They can mix them arourd in that kind of fashion.

Schatcr Schueilar. Were these men dotained?

If they tie

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detained maybe there are photographs from their detention.

Were these men arrasted?

Mr. Colby. At the time we have had to work on this we hal?

just looked at the photographs.

Senator Schweiker. I assume that is where they are going

to be detained.

Mr. Schwarz. Wasn't the same analysis done for the

Rockefeller Commission about two months ago? In other words,

there has been an analysis at least once before last night,

hasn't there?

Mr. Knoche. Not by us.

Mr. Colby, Perhaps by somzone else.

Chairman Church. Mt. Director, that is a different

photograph.

Mr. Colby. It does look like it.

I will answer that question next time I come up.

Chairman Church. All right. How can we follow up on tha

identity of these two people

in connection with the Dallas

Police?

would that be done through the FBI?

Mr. Colby. FBI. I could ask or you could ask, it might

be better if you ask.

Chairman Church.

well, I think ve should. I think these

should be markad as Cormittee Exhibits and staff should ba

instructed to follow through: with the FBI to get what fuxther

information there may be about the photographs and those tho

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Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photogra,,

supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

Mr. colby, I don't have that with me. It is in the

Harren Conmission published report. It is in there.

Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in ordar to

conceal where it was taken but it was --

Senator Schweiker. It is in the Marren Commission?

MI. Colby. Yes, it is in the warren Commission.

Just one additional matter.

• Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to

you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference

to the Israeli account and the special way that it had been

handled under ir. Angleton. Before we finish our review with

you of covert operations we would like to have a more detailed

statement of that matter.

Mr. Colby. Right.

• Chairman Church. And I thin' you should preparato

discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask:

you in connection with it.

I just wanted to give you notice.

Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a

covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover

it.

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caleman church. ded light. At some point ther in our

investigation?

Mr. Colby. Sure, no problem.

The only other one thirg I would like to suggest for the

record, Mr. Chairman, with respact to the discussion of the

attampts made against tir. Castro, in no way justifying them.

My position on this is guite clear. I do think it important

to put that exercise in the context of the times, which was

the times of the Bay of Pigs, which was a decision made by

the Government. The Cuban missile crisis, and following that,

a program approved by our nornal covert action approval mecha-

nism to try to gencrate an overthrow of Mr. Castro from within

Cuba by assisting various groups to go in with sabatage and

by putting economic pressure on the country, and so forth.

That went on for a number of years after the 1961-62 episodes

and I think it does put a covsr of policy attitude toward Cuba

and toward MI. Castro that is an important factor in evaluat-

ing the thing, without in any way justifying the particular

attempts to assassinate him.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But was there any evaluation

done at or about the time of that Cuban missile crisis?

Mr. Colby. There was an evaluation done after the Bay

of pigs, a rather intensive Investigation Internal Security

Branch Review of the activity and then the Cuban missile

crisis came along shortly thersafter before anything very much

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got going. Thorsafter, however, a number or prograns ver

conducted, which I am sure the Committee might want a general

summary of. I am just giving you one sort of a paragraph

summary of it, which were aimed at putting economic pressure

on Cuba in the hopes that this would put pressure against him

and lead to its disorder and problems there and, secondly, to

encourage revolutions, sabotage and so forth, from within

Cuba through a variety of programs of propaganda, support of

exile movements, landing of teams on the coast, things of this

nature.

Chairman Church. The difficult with this is, as I see it

although what you say is true, once an agency begins to engage

in assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own

testimony shows it spread

at least as far as the Dominican

Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on

other matters such as Lmumba and Chile.

so that I don't think this issue can be confined really :

to the emergency that did in fact exist between the US and

Cuba and the seriousness of that emergency at the time.

Mr. Colby. I agree with you, ilr. Chairman. I am against

'it and have been against it for a long time, but nonetheless

I think in fairness to the paople involved at that period I

think it is important to give total context.

Chairman Church.

YES.

FORD

tir. Schwarz.

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to determine, assuming intornally tho an might have contomplate

additional efforts to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs,

after the missile crisis, it would not have acted unless direct:

by the very highest authority, would it?

Mr. Colby. That is not that clear, Senats- Part. I think

the evidence we have is that the then Director was not a rasc

of some of these activities and, therefore, one would have a

very difficult time saying that it was pursuant to a specific

authorization. It was consistent with an overall policy which

was the point I was saying, but nonetheless I think the spa-

cific action we cannot say was approved even within the Agarcy

•

at the Director

level.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Is there any indication that

the Director, who did knoir of at least an earlier attempt --

is there any indication that following the Bay of Pigs, or

föllowing the missile crisis, he explicityly brought the sub-

ject up for review?

• ~ Mr. Colby. There is one documentary evidence that MI.

McCone dictated in 1967, I believe it was, in which he recourtad

being informed of a meeting, of an inter-Agency meeting at

which the subject of assassination was raised, and he made a

particular point of indicating after the meeting - he was

not at the meeting; I believe, but he heard of the meeting and!

he made a particular poirt of saying he disapproved of this

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and did not agica with it, to the other members.

Senator Hart: of Michigan.: Who was at that meeting Mccone

heard about?

MI. Colby.

That was the meeting we were talking about at

the last session.

Mr. Schwarz. You brought up a new document which was ir.

McCone's dictation of recollection of '67.

•Mr. Colby. Yes; I think you have that.

Mr. Schwarz. That I have not seen. I know we do not

have that.

MI. Colby. I am sorry, I thought you did.

Mr. schwarz. Could that be supplied?

• Mr. Colby. No problems, yes. This is our document and

Chairman Church. Will you supply the Committee with the

document?

No. Colby. Yes.

Excuse me, 'I beg your pardon. He states in '67, at one

of these meetings, about this time, I recall a suggestion made

being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime,.

including Castro. I took immadiate excaption to this suggestich

stating that the subject was completely out if bounds as far as

the US Government and CIA were concerned. The idea should not

be discussed nor should not be discussed nor should it ap

радІ

ТОРО

in any papers.

=

Ssnator Mordale. Mr. Colly, the other day when you

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tostified there was a nomorandum that you gave us from I think

Mr. Osborn, which objected to a memorandum by General Landsdalo

which referred to assassinations of political loaders, in a

nemorandum regarding Operation Mongoose, which was Cuba. And

it referred, to an attached nemorardum which I think you said

was the property of the FBI..

Mr. Colby. Of the National Security Council.

Senator Mondale. NSC.

I gather you have a copy of that, but you don't feel

authorized to let us see it?

Mr. Colby. I do have

copy of it. The understanding

we have had with the other

agencies is that each of us gives

our own material but wa refer to the other agency for any

documents belonging to the other agency.

Chairman Church. Well, it is very difficult for the

Conmittae to operate that way. I thirk that since the Committad

is entitled to this information, that when it is pertinent

and as we proceed in our haarings from one subject to another,

we ought' to be able to secure the information without having

to go back through executive chanrels.

Mr. Colby. May I undertake to get the permission to give

it to you? I will undertake to do this today.

Chairman Church. Any obsarvations that the Committes

wishes to make on this kird of a problem?

It is the first cine it ias come up.

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Senator llart of Colorado. Is this the understanding ve

have had or not?

Mr. Schwarz. It has been a total frustration to the staff

and I am very happy it has cone up here because wa get chasta

around the corner by one agency to another. It is called the

"third agency rule." It was intended to have nothing to do

with congressional hearings. Obviously, it had to do with

declassification to the public, and it has happened to completel

delay our ability to gat infornation because we go at one agency

and then they determine that it really isn't their documant

or it mentioned some other agency, and then we have to go to

the other agency..

This is an example of how frustrating it is.

Senator Mondale. Have we tried to gat this document from

the NSA?

Mr. Colby, No; this particular document had just come up

on Wednesday --

Senator Schweiker.

Does the counsel have any suggestions

as to what he feels the Committee position should be in this

area to enable him and staff to do an effective job?

Mr. Schwarz. I think the Committee's position ought to be

that portinent information should be produced by any agency

that possesses it, and if thay wish to inform another agency

that they are doing it, they that is their business.

But I

think thuy should have to arcauca it if they possess

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it.

SORD

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Senator Bordali. Apparentiy this mero from

"chore rofors

back to the meating about which osborre mamorandum

ared

the

Lansdale --

Mr. Colby. The series of two or three meetings at that

time, yes.

Senator Mondale. I think this is very important becaus:

apparently this was a metting at which Mohamara and Rusk were

present, and apparently McCone was present, so we had all of

the top principals.

Nx. Colby. At least one

of them.

Serator Mondale.

And they discussed assassinations at

that meeting. Ard then Osborne came back with a mano which is

now part of the recora.

Mr. Colby. I think it is Edwards in that case.

Harvey,

excuse me.

Senator Mondale.

Harvey.

He came back with a memo which

the Director supplied, objecting not to the assassination buc

to putting it in writing.

Chairnan Church. Of course what wa don't know is whether

the assassination or subject of assassination that came up at

this meeting was conjecture or whether it had to do with a

revelation of actual attempts that had involved the CIA oI

that it had to do with an ongoing assassination effort by the

CI.).

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Senator Mondale. Yes.

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Chairman Church. All we know is the subject of assassina-

tions apparently came up in the course of the mecting.

Mr. COlbY. Mr. Chairman, as ons of the agencies involved,

if I could offer ona explaration for the Third Agency Rule

even in this circumstance. And I am particularly interested in

this because somatimes our documents have material whose

sensitivity is not apparent on the face and we assume that this

will be handled in certain compartmented channels, and if it

gets out of the compartment it might give problems that the

individual at the other end wasn't aware of. That is the

basis for the rule. The thought being go back and ask the

originator, and he has a feeling for that and could make the

particular casa if somathing particularly sensitive is involved.

Chairman Church. I would suggest, Mr. Colby, without

binding the Committee to a precedent, with respect to dealing

with the Third Party Rule, that in this case you undertake

to

sacure from the NSA -

Mr.

Colby. I will.

Chairmar. Church. -- its permission to turn this particular

document over to the Committee so it may be made a part of these

hearirgs.

Mr. Colby. I will endeavor to do that today, Mr. Chairman

Senator Morgan. I am going to irquire from Senator

Mondale "nat memorandun were you reading about "clone and the

group being prese::t?

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Senator Mondala. Ne

havs a manorandun, it is righi

fron Mr. Harvey. Do I have the wrong one?

Yes, it is dated, I wili show it to you, in which he

objucts to -

Chairman Church. What is the date of it?

Senator Mondale. 14 August 1962.

Senator Morgan. Do wa have

that?

Mr. Schwarz.

It was shown to us on ladnesday, marked

or deemed marked as part of the racord, and raturned to the CIA

who returned i: to us today.

Mr. Colby. I have another copy of it.

Senator Mondale. It refers to a meeting in Mr. Rusk's

office at which presumably. chamara and Rusk, I gather from tha

later meno, and HicCone ware present, and it says this.

"I called Lansdale's office and ir his absence pointsa s

to Frank Head the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this

typs of comment in vriting in a document. The words he objected

to wars including liquidation of leaders. I advised him as

far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining

to this and would participate in no open maating to discuss

it."

I read that to mean we will go ahead and do it but we don't

want anything in writing ard don't want to be in a meeting where

it is going to lud. That mares a lot of sensa. No livirg

politician wants to bo associated with an assassination, sver.

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if he wants someona

assassinated. I thirk that is conmon sense.

That is why I think these documents are so crucial.

chairman church; Of course they are crucial and we must

have them.

The ambiguity, however, that we have yet to clear up is

in the third paragraph, Sonator liondale, where the menorandum

reads the question of assassination, particularly of Fide?

Castro, was brought up by Sacretary McNamara at a meeting of

the special group augmanted in Secretary Rusk's office in

August. It was the obvious consersus at that meeting, in

answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject

which has been made a matter-of official record, the subject

being the question of assassiration.

Now, that leaves us still without any documentary proof

that it was revealed at this meating that the CIA was in fact

engaged in an effort to assassinata.

Senator Mondale. Was Lansdale working for the CIA at

this tina?

Mr. Colby. Pardon?

Senator Mondale. Was General Lansdale working for the

CIA at this time?

Mr. Colby.

General Lansdale was Assistant to the Secretary

of Defense, not CIA, at that time.

FORD

Senator Mondale. Had Lansdale been with the CIA?

Ir. Colby.

He was with cin in about 1952 to about

1555,

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more or less.

- Senator Mondale. Duxing the Philippines.-

MI. COlbY. During the Philippinas and in Vistnem at that

time. Then he left CIA. lle was a

ragular Air Force officer

all this tinie but he was assigned to CIA for the time he was

in the Philippines and the time he was in Vietnan. He then

reverted to the Air Force and was an Assistant to the Secretaiy

of Defense until about 1964 or 1965. Then he went out to

Vietnam where he was an Assistant to the Ambassador, not

working for CIA. We were associated with him but he was not

a CIA officer at that time.

Senator Mondale. Do we know what his job at the Pentagor.

was?

24

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Mr. Colby. It was Assistant to the Secretary 01 Defense.

I can't tell you exactly what the job was entitled but

he was active in the Secratary of Defense's participation in

a variety, you might call it a 40 Committee type of operation.

I think ha probably vas most cognizant of the various 40

Connittee --

Senator Mondale.

If he were involved with that, ha

would have close liaison with all members of the 10 Commitice,

FORD

including the CIA?

HI. Colby. Yes, sir..

Chairnan Church. I vould iike to call jou attention also

to this sentence.

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I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting Oi

this point and the special group augmented in not expecting

any written comnents of study on this poirt.

Thare, agair., the ambiguity.

It is within the range of the possible that one of the

ongoing efforts of the CIA was in fact raised and discusssa.

It is also possible that the question of assassirating

Fidel Castro --

Senator liondale. Do we have those notes?

Chairman Church. I was going to ask that.

And that it was agreed that no study or review of this

should be'submitted as an abstract matter, should ba submitted

in written form.

So we arg left without an

ansver to this question.

However, with respact to the notes that are referred to

hers, can you tell us whether thosa notes exist?

Mr. Colby. I dor:'t know of any, li. Chairman.

Chairman Church. He said he took careful notas.

Mr. Colby. I don't know of ary but I certainly will look.

Mr. Brackinridge. When we reviewed this problem in 1267

we found no such notes.

Senator Huddleston. Let me inject a thought or two along.

this line.

It sears to me lile on: of the things ine are going to has

so determine as ve go iluil is as to what extent there vis oi

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• 2.5

there is a standard operating procedure of your Agency an

effort not to makä notes,

an effort for certain individuals

not to have cartain, kaoiledge by design.

For irstance, I was reading your menorardun here dated

1 June 1073 in which you are reporting on a meating that occurred

You make a point to say that you briefad somaone orally. Tha

word "orally" is in there -- assuming that for the purpose

someone should know that you did not put anything ir vriting

or you did not give him a writter report.

You also say that I personally managed to avoid gaining

any kroiledge of what precise actions vera taken.

I think a reasonable inference there is that there is a

deliberate on your part here -- and maybe this is standard

oparating procedure -- for you not to get spacific information

so that you always will be in the position of not knowing sona-

thing.

: Mr. Colby. I don't recogniza the raference. Cartainly,

I think in past years there ware situations we did rot want

FOR

to commit to writing.

There is a great deal of effort made by us to what wer

call compartment information so that it is known only to certain

paople and not known to others. The compartment is still to

be open at the top, however.

There are things that I purposoly try not to kno:. I do!'t

want to know the name of an agent in the soviet Union. I have

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absolutely no desire to learn his name because I don't need

to know that information.

Senator Huddleston. Here we are referring to action in

this case and not individuals.

MI. Colby. I don't recognize that. I could perhaps put

it in context if I could see the memorandum.

Mr. Schwarz. Perhaps wa ought to mark that memorandum.

Senator Huddleston.

Memorandum for it. William E. Colby:

I thought it was by li. Colby.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry.

Senator Huddleston.

someona within the Agancy apparently

is informing you about something and the subject is special

activities. I don't see a name on it.

It has information in it about both the President and

Attorney General being involvad in briefings.

Mr. Schwärz. I think for convenience of reference ve

ought to mark it as an exhibit.

Lat's numbar as today's number, and wa have put in the

threa charts so far, and wa will call this, which is the m

June 1973 memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby, subject special

activities, from stampad pages 09.157, 00158, and 00159, of

the so-called 694 pages.

The docunint abova referica to was

maried Colby Exhibit :1o. 1.)

No. Colly. I recognize what that is, Senator muddlestion.

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The reason it was addressed to william E. Colby is we

were going through that period in the middle of 1973 where I

was tachnicallyi I guess, Director of Operations but had bes

nominated to bacome Director. This was the kind of thing that

normally would be addressed to the Director but we had an

Acting Director, General Halters, but it was pretty clear I

was responsible for making the machinery run and we had a lot

of things around the Agency addressed to me and signed by me.

I balieve this follows

a conversation I had with a Mr.

Walter Elder, who was an Assistant to Mr. John McCone -- he

was Executive Assistant when he was Director -- I think Mr.

Elder told ma

that there were certain things that he knew of

in the background that related to this effort of identifying

various quastionable activities of the Agency, and I asked

him to go write them down so we could get them into the

Inspector General's report.

Senator liuddleston. The only question I raisa, I don't

want to get off into tha

contents of a particular memorandum,

but the context with the area you were pursuing, just whether

or not standard operating procedure would raquire at timas

there be a deliberate avoidance by certain peopla in the

Agency of facts and whather of not there is a great body of

decisions that are made and implemented without anythirg writter

dor, so that trare woull never be any documentary evidence

танО

of it?

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Mr. Colby. Well, I think that you certainly can say that

there is an avoidance by a lot of paople of learning things

that they are not authorizad to kno. I mean the more loyal

in a sense of our employees, say that they have authority to

know what it going on in, say, Cuba, they don't have a right

to know what is going on in, say, China, and they rather

carefully keep themsalves from learning what is going on in

China. I think that is a pravalence.

I think the question you are asking, however, is whether

we are trying to keep activities off of paper and it is pretty

clear that the assassination story was essentially kept off

the paper.

And I would think that is about the only one. No, the

drug thing. I assune some of that was kapt off of paper?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. The lasson that I have frequently given to

my colleagues in the bureaucracy is that however hard you try

to keep it off of paper, you will not succeed ir a bureaucracy,

somebody will write it down and, therefore, it is a totally

feckless exercise to pretand that you can keep it sacret by

not writing it down. But the fact is there ware situations

in which a conscious effort was made in the past to keep things

off the racord.

Senator Huddleston.

sum up, you, as Director, with the

excuption of individual rames

for which thare would be nort.

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particular value to you and no advantage to you knowing, üicsp.

for that you make no deliberate effort not to krow about

operations?

MI. Colby. No. As a matter of fact, I take the opposit:

position, Senator. I say that to my subordinates and have

reiterated a number of times, I cannot ba subjected to surprise.

You have got to let me know the things I ought to know. And

I have undertaken the same obligations to my oversight comnittees

for example, that I an responsible getting to them before

they hear about it some place else.

Senator Huddleston. The other is in this inquiry. Can

the Committee expect that every effort will be made to supply

to us information about various things, evan though they may

not be written down?

Mr. Colby. You hava my commitment to that effect.

Senator Huddleston. Going furthar and looking through

the files for notes and documents?

isI. Colby. It is my hope, Serator, that I can help you

on this investigation rather than defending myself against you.

Senator Huddleston. That is all.

Mr. Colby. That is what I would like to have the relation-

ship, that I am trying to help you do this investigation.

Chairman Church. He want such a relationship and we

are tryirg to work it out.

1I. Colly. I lnon you do. You hass said it a number o!

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tines and I agres with you.

Chairman Church.

Now, Serator Mondals.

senator Mondale.

The nenorardum from John Mccone that

ve received this morning, dated 11 April, 1357, is addresser

to the director.

Was McCore an employee or related with the CIA at that

time?

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Mr. Colby. No, he left in 1965.

Senator Mondale. So this was a memorandum from a person

no longer with the CIA, as former Director to the current

Dirsctor, which bajins

"no

memorandum can be located covering

the August, '62 meeting."

That is the one that earlier says the question of

assassination was discussed. However, it is highly probable

that one exists.

Now, I would like all documentation, records, and notes

that bear on the quastion of what McCone was referring to,

bacause I gat the inpression that the then Director, Mr. Helms

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Mondale. -- was reviewing the question of documarta-

tions and records affacting that meeting, or the question of

assassiration, and I think ve need to know what transpirea,

what was happening then, what kind of responses he received.

Mr. Colby. He will curtainly give you that.

I can give

you a basic explanation.

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This exercise stenned from the ravelasion in Jack

Anderson's colurns, I believe, of our relationship with the

Mafia figures at that time. This then generated the reruesti

to lr. Breckinridge to do an Inspector General's repoit of

this whole subjact, which he did, and which wa will cartairly

make available to this Comnittee.

In tha course of it, and with the publicity, ir. McCora,

who does maintain an occasional contact with the Agency, he

is a friend of it ard an ex-Director -- I see him every now

and again and try to sort of keep him up with what is going

on in general terms without gatting into political or sensitiva

matters or anything -- but he doas maintain this contact and

I am sure that somebody made contact with him or he made contaci

with the Agency about the Jack Anderson column, and that then

generated this particular memorandum.

Sanator Mondala. And there was an Inspector General's

study done at that time?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir; and you will get access to that.

...--

Senator Mondale. Can we have documentation as to how

it was originated and the response to what was done?

Chairnan Church. Yes, we should have that information.

And I might say that you are aware, no doubt, that charges have

been made that documents have baen destroyed in the Cil which

may have been connacted with the genoral subject of CIA.

involvament in

assassination efforts.

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Can you tell this Comnittee whether, to your knowledge,

documents have been destroyad?

Ir. Breckinridge. I think we can talk in turms of what

we know is there.

On the Castro assassinatior, the involvement with the

Mafia, there were a few menorarda in the Offica of Sacurity,

and I think you have copias of those.

On the second phase of that, there are practically no

records at all and our investigation at that time was made

entirely on intarviers.

Based entirely on interviers, an attempt to reconstruct

that activity.

The final action which involved a Cuban by the name of

Cubella --

Mr. Colby. This was the Cuban major we discussed last

time.

• Mr. Breckinridge.

Started in the minds of the people

who gere involved, was an attempt to generate an internal

political action, revolt, and the records

are very full because

there was ro attention on the part of the people who were

involved at that time that that would be an assassination in

the sense that the origiral work. with the Mafia was engaged in

and there is a full record. and that exists today.

In the case of the Donirican Sepublic, this developed

lat:

÷04G

Let ma finish.

•TO»

SACOST

maleste.

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I will go back to the Cubella case.

In the instance of the Dominican Republic, the record

was vury full then and it is still very full today. I am

certain that racord is completa.

Again, in the minds of the people who vere involved, they

drew a line between the support they gave to the coup group

and conscious association with assassination as such. Those

records

are complete and those records were developed at the

time and they were retained.. It was in the pariod of the

Mafia was involved where people knew the purpose was assassina-

tion.

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The records are practically non-existent and I balieve

they never existed.

Harvey, who conducted the second phase of that, aù the

time of our investigation had a handful of cryptic notes that

only he could interpret. We couldn't interpret them. And

it is my understanding that those notes no longer exist. They

ware retained by him and he brought them in at the tima that

we were questioning him. He was then on sick leave prior to

retiranant.

Those notes were

totally unrevealing.

I think that those records are in the same state today

that they ware then.

There were none in the Castro affair except the results

of our inventigation irvelving the rafia.

The Cululla cass is iuil.. That caco did progress 10 th:

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point that on the very day of Presidant kennedy's assassination

a man was masting with Cubella in Paris, and in response to

Cubella's request offered him an assassination davice that at

the tine of the invastigation we understood he accepted but

I have sinca been told he did not accept. It was a ballpoirt

pen converted into a syringe for injecting poison.

Subsequently, arms were harded to Cubella by a Cuban

refugee in Madrid, in the very early part of 1965, and two.

catches were put down by boats off Cuba for Cuballa. I think

he may have recovered one of those but not the other. Tha

racords on that are pretty complete.

So, generally speaking, on those things where the Agency

was involved, with the exception of the association with the

Mafia, where from the beginning the intent was assassination,

the records are complete, and I think that if paople look at

those they will find this is so.

Mr. Schvarz. Is the understanding that all racords dealing

with this subject, whether they are in Inspector General,

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reports or underlying documents, would be produced for our

inspection?

ir.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

If I may ask only the Committee's consideration of the

norinal treatient of compartmentation ard some discussion of

possibly some individial rames in it that wa would hope that

ve might be able to handle very privataly, or necessary, or even

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leave out.

But the normal procedures.

chairman Church. Very wall.

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Now, Mr. Schwarz.

¡ir. Schwarz. Just to tidy up ons matter.

Lat me marl as Committes Exhibit 5 the John A. licCo.

to the Director menorandum of April 11, 1967..

(The abovy mentioned docunent was

marked as Colby Exhihit No.

for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Might I come down with you on this document

ard us will look at it togather?

HI. Colby. •I have a copy.

Me. Schwarz. As of April, 1957, Mr. McCone was no longer

at the Agency, was he?

Mr. Colby. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Was he then in his position with ITt, or

did: he have some other position?

fir. ,colby.

I really don't krow.

Mr. Schwarz.: In any event he wasn't at the Agency?

Mr. COlby: That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. The thing that is curious about this meno-

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randun, with respect to the state of the record, is paragraph

one, which reads as follows:

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"Wo mimorandun can be lucated coverine the rugust 10, 13621

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hovever, it is hignly arobabl: that one sxists."

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iow, Mr. locone, was not in the Agency, is vriting a

manprandun to tha Director, mo was ir the agency, referrina

a search by or or bshalf of ir. Mccone.

Now, did Mir. Mccone have documents outside the Agercy,

or ho: do you explain?

Mr. Colby. I don't balieve he has any documents. I have

naver asked hin. But I don't beliave ha has ary documents

outside of the agency.

His. Knoche.

fir. Mccone wrote ne that manorandum while or

Agency premises. It was. durirg a visit to the Agency and he

had tha benefit of his ex-staff assistant, il. Walter Elder,

helping him in doing a little research in this conraction.

Mr. Colby. All that says is that thay hadn't located it

by then.

I think we have located some since that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on a question of Senator llars

of Michigan, he asked you whether there had been evaluations

in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, and then you

testified about valuations post-Bay of Pigs and rather cortinui

evaluations of the subject of Cuba. But I take it thosa vera

not valuations or re-evaluations of the subject of assassinatior

Mr. Colby. All I can say is I think that question is,

a little obscure.

I know that aftar the bay of Pigs failure there was

i:vestigatina made of th, cile apisode, and in the course ci

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that a discassion of us in very then to do aid a progren tas

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phone (Arod 202) 564-6000

WARD & FAUL

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developed. And I an spearing

at secon hand hara. cut a progri

vas developed of keeping som= acoronic pressure on Cuba, and

that was a national policy, not just a CIA -- keaping an

economic pressure of Cuba and continuing to support the

various elsments which might -ventually lead to a change ir

the Cuban govarment through soma ovarthrow of otherwise.

I think some propoganda programs were kept up, some exile

activities were kept up, some training of teans to be infil-

trated into Cuba vare kapt up, soma sabotage operations were

continued. Mid those continued over the following saveral

morths. .

Right after the 1962 missile crisis -- I cannot identify

right offhard here any particular review of that - but I

know that that was a subject of 10 Committee considaration at

various times.

Whether that included assassination or not I cannot say.

My guess, as I say, is that if John lccone didn't know

about it, it was not covered in those discussions because it

would be very hard to cover them iithout his being involved.

Chairman Church. Ars you taliing us that the nuch publi-

cized irvestigation of the CIA, which took place folloving the

Bay of Pigs fiasco, and as I remamber this review was ordered

By the President in order to datarmine what had gone wrong ard

vay, and it was a matter of great nigercy and importano= io

Elic

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government at that time -- are you talling us that in the

course of that review the Agency's involvenent in the assissira

tion efforts against Castro never came to light?

Mr. Colby. I just don't know, !ir. Chairnan. That is

the ansver I have to give you. I do not know.

I balieve the Inspector Genaral report after the bay of

Pigs does not mention it, does it?

Mr. Brackinriage. No.

Hit. Colby. The report of the Comittee that looked into

it, General Taylor,

and the Attorney General and soinebody els=

thara ware three menbsrs of it -- maybe ir. Dulles. I don'e

believe that report mentionad it.

Chairman Church. Do ive have a copy of the Taylor Ribort?

Mr. Colby. I think it has bean made available. Or is

thät a

third agency proble?

Mr. Schwarz.

That is another frustration. That one has

been denied to us on the theory that it is part of the Kennedy

Library and, tharefore, we have to so through arother channel

to get that.

Does the CIA have a copy of the Taylor Report?

Mr. Colby. I don't believe we do.. I know we looked for

it a coupla of years ago and at that time I vas told we didn't

have it.

I hate to say here mder doth ta do not have one, but I

knor I tried to get ahold of it aul was tols

a couple of years

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ago that we couldn't have one.

But there are lots of drawers

in those sates in that building.

I ain not trying to evade the quastion.

say I don't think we have ory. It could be.

I an trying to

He have a copy of our own Inspector Genaral's report

at that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Does

that contain any mention of the

assassination subject?

Mr. Colby. No, it does not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you find it puzzling. that the CIA doesr't

have

a copy, of tha report designed to review its activities

in the Bay of Pigs, a report that led to substantial Presidentidl

changes in the instructions with

respact to your jurisdiction?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mr: Schwarz. I mean,

it

is an important document -

ir. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mx. Schwarz.

-- relating to the CIA.

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. I wonder if ir. ¡cCone has a copy?

i:. Colby. I would doubt it.

Senator Schweiker. That is why he cama in, becaus of that?

Mi. Colby. Roughly, yes.

Chairnar. Church. In the course of the investigation that.

took place, this investication that led to the Taylor Rapeit,

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thai toch place lo the aüterrath of the Bay of pigs..

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Here records lipt, that is to say --

Mr'. Colby, Of contributions?

Chairman Church. lio. Did the investigation involve

written records? Did it involve testimony taken under oath

and transcribed? Is there raw matarial relating to that

investigation to which this Committee could gair access?

Mr. Colby. I don't know the ansver to the question, Mr.

Chairman. Maybe Mr. Brackinridge can help us.

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not familiar with that study.

I am familiar with the approach that was taken at the time

within our organization when the Inspector Ganeral.-- I vas

not involved in that study but I have heard it discussed

how they approached it.

Their understanding of the 3ay of Pigs problem vas the

overall invasion plan and organization for that and concentrated

on that.

By way of explanation for the omission of reference to

the assassinations, so faw people knew about it, and I thinl

it came to no ona's attention -- simply did not discover it

at that time. And it may not have been by way of explanation,

not a justification. It may not have been associated in the

minds of the people who did know about is with the inquiry

into the military operation.

ir. Schwarz. it. Bissel knew abont it and he was certaini:

the main architect of the Bay of Pigs: right?

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Mr. Breckinridge. Right.

Pir. Schvarz. And Mir. Dulles, at least the records we

put in on Wednesday, anew about in and he was substantially

involved in the Bay of Pigs. Those gentlemen surely would have

been questioned by General Taylor and Attornay General Kennedy

Is that fair?

Mr. Breckinridge. I mould assume so.

Mr. Colby. Certainly, yes. But again, if the focus was

on the military operation, it might have been that that other

operation was not involved in it.

• Mr. Schwarz. The record further shows that on May 7, 1962,

a nesting was held with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in

which the contemporaneous document dascribing that meeting

indicates that he was not told that there was a continuirg

and ongoing operation, but rather was told of something which

was not called an assassination but was called a projec:

was told of something which was referred to ir the past tensei

is that right?

Mr. Colby. It was ir the past tense. thether there. was

any other discussion in that meeting on this subject va just

don't krov.

MI. Brechinridge.

I thini I can interpret what happened.

The people who briefed Attorney General Kennedy are the

ones who knew about wat we call the first phase of the op-ritic

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Colonel Edwards, who was Director of Sacurity, under whoss

suparvision. the first portion of that activity was carried on,

had withdrawn from:it.

The operation, when it was reactivated later, vas lactivate

on a compartmented basis, and Colonel Edwards did no: kro:

about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Even though it contirued to involve the

Mafia until early. 1963?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct. Colonel Edwards i0

longer knew what was going on. So when he briafed the Attorney

General he did not know that this second operation, this

raactivation of the operation that had fornerly run undar his

responsibility -- he did not know that it was orgoing.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was responsible for the salaction of

Colonel Edvards arâ Ganeral Counsel Houston as being the

persons who would go to brief Attorney Genaral Kanxedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure I know that.

_Nt. Schwarz. It would have been soreone of higher

authority within the CIA; is that corract?

Mr. Breckinridge.

We have tried to determire.

Mr. Houston, if I understand it, feels that he would not

have done this unless he thought the Director knew.

Ir. Schvarz.

iner what?

Me. Breckinridge.

Knal that he was goint to do this. But

ho did not talk to the Director about it.

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I gather that it is not all that clear in Colonel Laveris'

either at this point in time.

Mr. Schiarz. So someone selected these persons io go

and brief Attorney Genaral Kainedy, number one.

Number tivo, they did not know the plot for assassiration

ongoing, although in fact it was?

Mr. Breckirridge. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz.

Number three: therefore, Attornay General

Kennedy was giver the impression that

whatever was going on

was over; is that correct?

Air. Brackinridge.

I think that is correct as I reconstiuc:

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it.

Mr. Schwarz. Can we determine then who was responsible

for selecting those persons to brief Attorney General Kenneây,

instead of including in the group other parsons who knew that

the Mafia part of the

assassination attempt was ongoing?

Mr. Brechirridge.

I don't think that we can now.

-As I say, there is no written racora.

Me. Schwarz: Who could it have been? Who was in a

higher position of authority, in a position to maka a decision

as to who should brief Attorney General Kennedy?

• Mt. Breckinridge.

I would assume that ir. Bissal coule..

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HI. Scivere. Was hi still in the agacy a May of 106??

Mr. Biciridge. I don's know. I thirk he may hava

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loft by thai.

_ May I reconstruct because nuch of my understanding is busi

on my analysis of what happened and not on clear facts.

The FBI approached Colonäl Edwards when their investigatio:

and incident in Las Vegas eventually produced his name, and

his conversations, I think, ware with the General Counsal at

that time.. I cannot reconstruct beyond that so I raally can't

give you ar answer to the specific questior. But the iritiatir

came from the FBI. Colonel Edwards and MI. Houston discusss:

it. It. Houston, I have been told, believes that the Directo=

must nave known.

Hir. Schwarz: Which Director ale we talking about?

Mr. Breckinridge. Whoaver the Director was at thai time?

Mr. Colby. By that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Of what agency?

Mr. Colby. CIA. That would have been Mccone.

Mr. Breckinridge. He operated on the assumption that ir.

McCons knew.

Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

Mr. Breckinridge.

Knew

that they were going to brief the

Attornsy General.

Hr. Schwarz. About?

Ir. Breckinridge. The record ou this is vary unsatisfactory

and I can't clarify it for you bacause we have been trying to

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as it was.

When people discussed this with ore another, what thay

conveyed to ons another accurately as to what it was they were

discussing, the record is simply nos clear and I don't think

that we can jeconstruct that satisfactorily today.

MI. Schwarz. Is Mr. Eduards still aliva?.

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Houston is still alive and is in Washirg-

ton, D.C.?

Mr. Breckinridge.

Yes, sir.

Nic. Schwarz.

MI. Mccone is stiil aliva and is in --

Kr. Colby. California.

Mr. Schwarz.

Has Mr. Helms the successor to I. Bissel?

No. Colby. Yes, sir.

ax. Schwarz.

Well, let's leava a place in tha record

whera wa will insart it was either lit. McCone or Mr. Bissel

Who had the job of Dyputy diractor 'for Plans in lay, 1952.

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MI. Colby. It certainly wasn't lic. Mccone.

Mr. Schwarz.

Mc. Halms or Mr. Bissal?

No. Colby.

Yes.

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Chairman Church. You see, the state of the record dict

now

suggests a cover-up, another covar-up. It suggests that

those who were selected by the higher authority in CIA to

bries the Attornay General had knowledge limited to an atteno:

on the life of Castro that had been concluded.

It further suggests that they had no knowledga of contiruina

efforts then undervay, even though presumably their superiors

did hava such knowledge. This leaves the Attorney Genaral ir

a position of baing told about the past program and not baing

told about the present progran, and we know that he later said

to certair assistants of his that he had put a stop to

assassination attempts on Fidal Castro and he may have been

left with the impression, as a result of this meeting, that

there were no further attempts. He may have said he wanted no

further attempts. We don't krow. But clearly he was rot told

that there were further attempts then underway.

• Senator Morgan. Ware we told yasterday or the day bafora

Yesterday, that he knew of the Cuban majors' operation?

Mr. Schwarz. We were not told that.

Mr. Breckinridge. I cannos clarify the question complately

but I can introduce a little bis more.

When the discussion occurred Mir. Houston did go and, talira

with General Carter, who was them the Daputy Director

No. Schwarz. Which discussion are we talkird about now?.

Mo. Brichinriiga. The discussion about going to the Attor:

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General.

To, go back, hor the question arose, and it goes far afield,

John Roselli,

who was the Chicago member of the Mafia vio

arranged the introduction of Giancanato the Cuban syrdicate

head, through.whom they initially tried to run this operation

Giarcana had a personal love affair with a well know entertainer

who was then in Las Vegas, and she was suspected by him of then

having an affair with another well known entertainer.

Giancana went. to Robart Maheu, through whom these introduc-

tions were first made --

Mr. Schwarz. Introduced to the Mafia persornel?

11r. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. Between CIA and the Mafia.

Mr. Breckinridge. Ard asked Maheu toarange to have the

room of the male entertainer in Las Vegas bugged. They hired

a private detoctive who ther did this. The roommate stumbled

on the equipment, the private detective was arrested, and the

FBI investigativa trail led from the private datective to Maheu

to Giâncana and eventually to CIA. Giancana had insisted that

Maheu help him because he had helped Mahau with the introduction

to the read of the Cubar. syndicate, and Maheu had then agreed

to get a private detective to do it.

So this arose in the contart of a domesticviolation of

wirstapping laws and the FBI was investigating it on that hasis.

Because the tiail led to iancana andieselli, who valian.

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third nember of the syndicate

involved in this, both

he whom

were high on the FBI list, as they progressed towards developing

a prosecution, they came to Colonel Ediards, the FBI did, and

said what is your position on this. The position of the Agency

as stated by Colonel Edwards was we did not want them prosecuted

because it would expose what he understood to be this operation,

and I guess the time sequence gets a little fuzzy in my mind.

Mr.. Schwarz. Did he tell the Director of the FBI the

nature of

the operation, or simply he told him it would concern

some sensitive matter?

Mr. Breckinridge. He told him it was an intelligence

operation in country, and the Mafia was being used for that

purpose.

so in the discussions as it progressed, it dealt with

the wiretap prosecution. Colonel Edvards in discussing it

with us in 1967, according to our notes, said that they briefed

the Attorney General all the way, but at that time Colonel

Edwards, I think by the time they did it, Colonel Edwards thought.

it was over. So the Attorney General and the FBI were not told

the complete story.

Mr. Schwarz.

They weren't told the most important part

of the story, and that was that it was continuing.

Mr. Breckinridge. They didn't know that, that is correct.

Chairman Church. So you have here two violations of law.

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Apart from what was told to the Attorney General, you have two

violations of lair. One, the wiretap, it was an illegal operation

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We may have thrce. sccond, it is cortainly an activity that

the basic law prohibited CIA from engaging in, domestic activity

Mr. Colby.

CIA was not involved in the wiretap.

Chairman Church. As I understand it, the CIA was involved

because it engaged a private --

MI. Breckinridge. I am sorry.

Chairnan Church. Maybe I misunderstood.

Mr. Breckinridge. He didn't learn about this until after

the FBI found out about the Nafia involvement in that wiretap.

This was done by a private detective hired by a private businessma:

at the request of Giancana.

MI. Schwarz. CIA agents had committed the crime, in this

case, but not on behalf of the CIA.

Mr.. Breckinridge. No, no.

Mr. Schwarz.

Isn't that accurate?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. I wouldn't call Giancana an agent, setting

back to our definitional problems.

Mr. Schwarz. CIA associates.

Mr. Colby. CIA instrument. We had a contact with Giancana,

obviously, and with Maheu. They decided on their own to do

this wiretapping, or bugging, or whatever it was, without our

prior knowledgo.

They got caught. Then they said if this is

fully investigated and brought out, it will bring out the CIn

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collaboration on the other subject, and then decision is mad.

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to go and brief the Attorney General to the degree briefed.

Chairman Church. After which the Justice Department dropred

the case?

MI. Colby.

It was dropped.

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Serator llart of Colorado. Was the CIA not concerned that

Giancana inay hava told somethinn about this Cuban operation to

the female entertainer who also may have told the mala

entertainer?

Mr. Breckinridge. No. If I understand what happened,

and I art now describing what Mr. Maheu said, and I get this

from having read some files at the Dapartment of Justice

recently -- when Mr. Maheu tried to explain to the FBI his

position and tried to provida a rationale for doing this, ha

said I thought there was a leak in Chicago and I wanted to have

the room of

this entertainer bugged so I could find out i£

Giancana had leaked.

The FBI gave this the kind of cradit I think it was entitlad

to. They didn't pay much attention to it. This was somethira

he tried to develop to justify his involvement.

There is no indication that there were any leaks Exon

Chicago that we know of, something that he would know of, and

there was no instruction on our part for him to do such a thiry,

and it was for another reason Giancana asked him to do it.

Serator Hart of Colorado. As far as you can tell from tha

record, the CIA was not concarned that Giancana and his fenale

friend, or her male friend, may have blovn the Cuban operation?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It

•lias purely who was sleepira

with whon?

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MI. Brechlariage. I thinh thät is still the cass.

- I would like to add one further thin.. That prior to soirn!

over to brick the Attorney General, the general couns:l did

go Sp=ar. to General Carter. Genoral Carter said that he

understood --

Mr. Colby. General Carter was Deputy Director of the

Agency at that tine.

Mr. Breckinridge.

- he understood the situation and

in due tina night brief the Director. We don't know that ha

did brief the Director, who was then Mr. NcCore. Our notes

written in 1967 say there is no indication that General Carter

was briefed on the full datails of the assassination plot.

So while he did approve their going and briefing the Attorrey

General about this association iith the lafia, there is no

indication that he was told the full story then either.

Mr. Schwarz. Then in August of 1963, the document that

you provided for us last time, ir. lielms dia know about the

ongoing operation; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. I thin! by then he knaw that the?

operation was going.

1r. Schwarz. Ha sent to Director McCone the menorandun

which had been prepared concerning the mecting with Attorney

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Gekeral kennedy, which irdicated that the operation was compliter.

so the inferancs from that pager record is that lit. lalms vas

conceiling affirmatively from the Director of Central Intellice

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in the same way as somebody had cocoaled fren thy Attoricy

Ginaral the fact that the plot was ongoing.

Is that a fair, characterization?

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hit. Colly. I don't know.

Mr. Breckinridge. Could I sea the memo?

Chairman Church. The mano uses verbs in the past tease.

Mr. Schwarz.

The cover memo from Helms to Mccore trans-

mittirg a copy of the memorandum concarning the May, 1962

meating with Attorney General Kennedy.

Mr. Brackinridge. May I say first I don't know. I

just call your attention to the third paragraph.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the memorandum fron Director kelns?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. He was then D.D.

1r. Colby. The basic memorandum, of course, merely

referred to a sansitive CIA operation and then in ir. Helms

in the paragraph says I assume you are avare of the nature

of the operation discussed in the attachment.

Again, this was an attampt not to refar on paper to what

It was.

it, schwärz. But the attachment refers to it in the

past tensa.

hir. Colby. I agise.

Senator Morgan. Who is this memorandum from?

art

discussing now of i

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cujust 1953 sai to the Direcues fron Me. Helms, It attachei

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a copy of the briefing of the Attorney General in liay, 19G2.

Strator Horgar.

iir. Breckinridge, the transcript or rever:

that you are reading froin a few moments ago, who prepared

that?

Mr. Breckinridge.

This was prepared by another inspsctor

and me in 1957.

Senator morgan. When you say there is no indication that

he knew, that is just an assumption on your part, that you

don't have any positive evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Serator. Morgan. The truth is you sort of suspect they

all knew what was going on. Don't you think that is true?

ir. Brackinridge. No, not necessarily.

When we conducted our investigation we interviewed the

people directly involved in the operation, those that vere

available, ard trisd to reconstruct what happened with them.

• We interviswed different people. I did not interview

ir. Bissel. I did interview lir. Harvay.

We submitted this rsport to then-Director llelms, one COpy

only. We did not interview him.

Where his name appeared in the course of our inquiry ve

put it in our report so that he would see how the racord appecre

to people who approach.d it as we did.

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The extent of the kno late of thase different paople is

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aut sasy to reconstruct auf

Eric. to assumi.

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- Saintor Mortar.

In other voids, is you die.'e have

avidance that they did know, you just assumed that -- you

didn't assure that they didn't know, you just said there is

no evidence?

Hr. Breckinridge.

That is correct.

Senator Schweicker. Let no ask the question another way.

The documentation you collscted and what you do have

positivaly,.

who was the highest ranking official, according

to your records, who knaw?

Chairman Church. According to the positive documents

that you have of knowledge.

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me say we did rot have

documentatior. It was based mostly on interviers, this

period involving the Mafia.

The highest person that we understood that knew during

the first phas= with it. Bissel. That we claarly did now

about it: There was discussion at one point in which ir.

Biss=1, Colonel Edirards, the two of them, met with fit. Dulles

and had a conversation in which I can bast say there was

doubletalk as to what they were discussing.

It is open to questior. now clearly this was stated

ir. Dulles and whether or not tr. Dulles understood.

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At the time that ve tor; malind the inquiry it was our

opinion that lit. Dullis probily knew, but I cau't put it baro?

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that.

Senator Schweickar. He left the Agency in 1961, as I

recall.

When was your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge. Our investigation was ir 1967.

And our discussion with Colonel Edwards, who described

this meeting when it occurred in 1960, left us with the inpressio:

while they had met with il. Dulles, that the corversation as

not in preciss terms. As Colonel Savards said to us, wa

didn't use any bad words, which meant they didn't use the

word "assassination," but they discussed an operation against

Castro in such terms that he felt that they had conveyed the

message to Mr. Dulles. But there is room for doubt.

Senator Schweicksr. Once 1I. Dulles left the Agency, tho

then

became the highest rankird person to know, according

to your investigation?

• Mr. Breckinridge. If ir. Dulles did in fact urderstand,

he would be the highast person as this point.

Senator Schweicker. At this point. But he left the

Agency in 1061. Five years of assassination attents went,onio

after that.

You conducted an irvestigation in 1967. What did that

period show as to who was the highest ranking parson who knet?

Mr. Breckinridge. It. ¡clone did rot know until much 1at.=

until after it was all over.

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MI. Colby. He knew ir 1963.

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- Mr. Breckinridge.. About a past avent.

Mr. Colby. There was still activities going on:

itt. Breckinridge. That is right.

Chairman Church. Can wa get the answer first?

MI. Breckinridge. Excuse me. I can't give you a more

precise answer bacause somstimes the record that wa were able

to reconstruct is not precisa and in some instances not at all

clear. We were left with some uncertainty.

Senator Schweicker. Mouldn't that ba the key issue of

your viola investigation, and you mean to say you can't tall

me?

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Hi. Breckiaridge. To, sir.

Senator Schweicker. I am flabbergasted.

ir. Breckinridge. Let mo describe the investigation.

He were doing the irvestigation for ar. Helns as the Director.

Mr. Helns' involvement was sonething known to hin and we

submitted our description of mat happened to him. He did not

intorview him in the course of our investigation. "e did not

interview it. liccone. Ma did interview the other parties who

wars available to us.

But when ni gave it to Mr. Halns the

assumption was that he coild complete the gaos.

In this sense, ordirasili, then ia conduct an investigation,

a goneral investigation, ve toula conclude with racommendatione,

and in this instance we dil do la rscoastructed as all as

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we could what happened. And the report want one copy orly to

Mr. Helms who h=ld it. He had only one discussion. The

Inspector General then may have had others. We had only one

discussion with him, which was when wa gave him the first

portion of the report, because we investigated thres different

assassination plans, as wa dascribed them then, ard our discussio

with him had to do with the approach we had taken, and ve

said that we simply undertook to reconstruct what had happered

as best we could reconstruct it.

So we

• Were reporting to Mr. Helms what we had raconstruct:

vithout havirg intarvieved him as such. It was in one co?!

only, and quite frankly in 1967 wa expected that it would

have no purpose other than to tell him what the situation was

for decisions as he felt appropriase.

Senator Mondale.

"o, vou say it is so= clear whether

Dulles krei, but yet there is a memorandun fron Oshorn an

the Executive Director dated 2/15/72, which states, I quote:

""Individuals who were awara of this project" --

That is the lafia projact --

"ware tessrs. Dulles, Bissel, Colonel Kira, Colonel

Sh=ffield, Edwards, William

Harvey, James P. O'Connall, and

attorneys for Robert Male. "

Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. Osborn is vriting that on the basis

of his understanding of what Colonel Edwaras had to say.

Our discussions viti Colonel Edwards left us with this meertai

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Colonel Edwards balieves that ir. Dulles understood the

conversation. He also said that he engaged in doubletali so

that there was room for misunderstandirg.

Mr. Schwarz. I show you a document stamped 0012, headed

John Rosalli and ask you what it is.

MI. Breckinridge: This is a meno prepared in the Office

of Sscurity describiny john Rosalli, who is the first of the

menbers of the syndicate who was used to arrange the introductic!:

to the head of the syrdicate in Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. And writter when?

Mr, Breckinridge. I am not sure. I suspect it was writte

in 1973 but I would have to check.

ix. Schwasz.

Does it refar to a Castro assassiration

att=not involvirg the Mafia?

hir. Breckinridge.

does the word "assassination" appear?

I think it refers to the Masia.

Mir. Schwarz. Do you have any doubt, in fact, this is

referring to the assassination affort involving laheu, Roselli,

i:

Trafficanta, in connection with Castro?

ii. Breckinridge.

That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And does this document prepared by the

Office of Security state "the DOI was briefed ard gave his

approval"?

ir. Breckinridge.

It does.

ir. Schwar?. And sho was the Def in dusust, 19603

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Mr. Breckinridge. That was iir. Dullas.

• Mr. Schwarz. Now, therefore, either Mr. Dulles did approv

which the document says, or somebody wrote a document in

connection with the investigation which irresporsibly says

Mr. Dulles

approved.

Which is the case?

Mr. Breckigridge. I don't think that either is necessaril:

the case.

The understanding of the Office of Security is that ir.

Dulles does krow or did know. The question that vas raised

in the course of our inquiry was that the rature of the meeting

described to us raised a question of doubt. That wa did

not rasolve.

Chairman Church. I think if we accept your testinory

that there was at last an element of doubt as to whether or

not ir. Dulles knew of the conruction batween the CIA and the

riafia, and its purpose, to assassinate "ir. Castro, lat's get

back to Senator Schweicker's questior. After Hir. Dulles left

several more plots ware formed involving the CIA and having i

to do with subsequant attempts on the life of Castro.

Now, what does your investigation show and what can you

tell us with respect to the highest officials in the CIA,

following the departure of Mr. Dulles, who may have had knowledg

of these ongoing operations? .

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ir. Breckinridge. Wher the operation was runevad I thin:

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it is clear that th= Diructor at that time did not know.

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Senator Schreicker. And

ho was the Director at that

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time?

Chairman Church. Wher. was the oparation renewed?

ir. Breckinriage. The operation was actually reactivated

in April of 1962. It was plarned to be reactivated prior to

that but the employee who had responsibility for it did not

get free until April of '62 when he actually reactivated it.

Thore is no indication that anyons above the level of Mr.

sissel in 1961, at the time that this was discussed, there

is no indication that aiyone above his laval knew that it

was to be reactivated. This officer, Mr. Harvey, then took

it over and attempted to run it again through the balance

1962, after April.

ir. Schwarz. He dia that at the irstruction of ir. "'elms,

did he not?

ir. Breckinridge. Mr. Helms becama aware of this at a

latei point.

"The confusion, as parhaps ie discusssd the other day, iic.

ilelms signed off on a project that was originally initiated

by it. Bissel called 2P Rifle, and 79 Rifle vas a projede ihat

fir. Sissel was quoted as saying as at the urgency of the:

White House.

It was made no more specific than that.

Wa

don't krow where in the lhite house.

¿R Rifle was described as an executive action capability,

a capability to pormit assassinations if concone called for

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Mr. Harvey was given the rssporsibility of this by Mr.

Bissel ard originally it contirued as a separate action from

the castro opsration, but iir. Harvay was also given that

responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became

wedded.

Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle

as a projact. ZR. Rifle had a dual purpose that has sot been

clarified by our inquiry. It aoparently was in fact used for

the stated purposes, as far as organizational activities went

along, which was to steallcodes, and ise. lalms, when he

approved the project, authorized accounting on certification,

which meant that rather than the usual vouchers supporting

expenditures, that the officer involved would simply certify

that

the

money had been spent and this would he accected.

It had a project, amount of some dollars, $7500 - 510,000 --

some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to includ:

operating expenses.

So Mr. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR rifle

does not necessarily equata with the date when he bacama

familiar with the Castro operation.

Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle

means both, rifle files and used rifles?

Mr. Breckinridge. It may mean either or boti.

Me. Colby. Ii is supposed to disassociate but sometimes

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there is that kird of associatior.

• Mr. Breckinridge. I told you that I would 100k for wher

ir. Helms' name first clearly appeared and I haven't don: that.

I was out of

town yastarday.

Mr. Schwarz.

Do you hava the mamo of February 1962

when ir. Melms, according to Mr. Greer, Inspector General,

"authorized Willian Harvey by mano to handle the project or

a special basis"?:

1Ir. Breckinridge. Do I have a copy of that memorandun?

Ar. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr, Brechinridge. It is in the files and wa can ratrieva

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Chairman Church. Mr. Bissel was the Deputy Director of

Plass.

The record would indicate that he knew of the re-

activation of the operation to assassinate Castro in saril ca

1962, and ilt. Marvey, I take it, was assigned that dusy?

Mr. Breckinridge. If I may go back, it was in the fall

of 1561.

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MI. Schwarz. November 1961?

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- Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It

was

in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment

by Mr. Bissel. I think it. Bissc: left in 1962. I am no: surc

of the dates,

So Mr. Bissel would have known at that time.

But I am not sure after that.

Chairman Church. Helms succeeded it. Bissel as chief

of operations?

No. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.

Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.

Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle

operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executi

capability -- whatever that ineans. Presumably that means a

capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized

by proper authority?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.

Chairnan Church. Is that-your understanding?

dr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that

based upon what has been revealed through your interrogation?

Mr. Breckinridge. First, "let me go back and clarify, then

I will ansver this question, it I may.

Mi. Helms approved 2? Rifle, which the record showshas the

responsibility of stealing codes, essentially.

My understanding, fron my intervicws, is that zR rifle had

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also the responsibility for executive action capability. That

ts a difficult phrase.

The record does not show that Mr. Helms knew when he approved

the projest that it had this dual role. So from that poin: of

view, I have a record that shows what the project was supposed

to have been as far as its open description, though classified,

and the result of our interviews with Mr. Harvey which tell the

other story about executive action capability. So it does not,

the record does not show that Mr.Helms at that time knew what

that was.

Chairman Church. If Harvey knew that it had this other

aspect, who would have told him to develop such a capability, i

it were not his superior?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a logical conclusion, bus

I was distinguishing what the record showed and what our intervie:s

developed.

Chairman Church. Didn't you ask. Harvey in interviering

him whether or not Helms had told him to develop this capabille;!

as a part of the ZR Rifle?

Didn't, you ask him who told. him to develop this capability,

or did he do it on his own?

Mi. Breckinridga. Your question is a very proper one, and

my difficulty is with the record which goes back to what Bissel

instructed Harvey to do.

Mr. Schwarz. Before licims took the job, Bissel told Harvey

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to take, charge of the Castro assassination project?

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- Mr. Breckinridge. Bissel told Harvey to create the executi

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action capability.

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Mr. Schwarz. But he also told him to take charge of the

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Castro assassination project using the Mafia; isn't that

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correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. No:, there is no record except the

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record that came from our interviews on this score. All I

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am trying to do is draw the distinction between what the record

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shoirs and what our interviews: developed, and there are gaps

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in that.

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Chairman Church. Your interviews show that Mr. Bissel, who

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preceded Helms, told Mr. Harvey to develop an executiva action

capability, which was a capability to assassinate if and wher

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ordered; right?

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Ms. Breckinridge. That is correct.

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Chairman Church. And your records show that Mr. Bissel

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also Instructed Harvey to take over the Castro assassination

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attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship

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between the CIA and the Mafia?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a correct assumption, -

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yes.

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Chairman Church. Now, when do your records show that llelins

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becaine avare: of Harvey's whole assignment as given him by

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Bissel?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I don't have the accurate date. le have

the 16 August 1963 memorandum. i promised Mi. Schwarz that i

would try and find the date, and I was out of town yesterday

and simply didn't do it. But I have to go through the ricora

to find the earliest date that we have, and I simply have to go

into the record to dig this out.

Senator Schweiker.. Do your records show the date of when

the actual latest assassination attempt was finished?

Mr. Schwarz. For Castro?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

When was that timeframe, roughly?

Kr. Breckinridge. You

are talking about the Mafia connecti!

Senator Schweiker.

No; I am talking about when did we

finally cease and desist in attempting to assassinate Castro,

from your records?

Mr. Breckinridge. Let me, if I may, and I don't mean to

confuse the issue -- the Mafia connection from beginning to end

was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called

off finally in the spring, perhaps February, of 1963.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What year?

MI. Breckinridga. 1963.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Nafia part?

MI. Breckinridge. Yes, sir. The Cuballa Association has a

different origin.

Chairman Church.

First, who called off the Mafia operatio:

NI. Breckinridge. As near as I could tell, Harvey.

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Chairman Church. Harvey?

Mr: Breckinridge. Harvey. Harvey decided that it couldh't

succeed. Harvey was leaving the country for a foreign assigntan

and in conversation with roselli - Roselli was the man who was

in the Mafia through whom the Agency had continued to work --

and Roselll agreed that nothing was happening, nothing coula

happen, and it should be called off. He don't have a record

that harvey went anywhere for approval. This doesn't mean that

he may not have discussed it, but I don't have the record of it.

So Harvey in his conversation with Roselli, terninated the

operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The memo which we saw at the

last session, which I don't know ve officially have, "ir. Colby

made it available to us -- was a wrap-up of the whole thing, or a

meno to the files, and I can't recall now who did it.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the one referring to the meeting

with Robert Kennedy that we spent some time lcoking at.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That was the Sheffield-edwards

memo which say with the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion

operation, no further attempt was made with the Mafia. It ticd

it directly to the Bay of pigs.

Mr. Colby.. That was the first phase. There was a second

phase that followed with the

Mafia.

Chairnan Church. lie now knoir from what you have said that

Harvey called off the ilafia connection, and we don't krow whether

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that was done with the knowledge or authority of anyone more h:

placed in the CIN.

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Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know.

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Chairman Church. All right, after Harvey left the country

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wino was then assigned

to undertake the subsequent efforts again

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the life of Castro?

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MI. Breckinriage.

This brings us to Senator Schweiker's

question. A man by the name of Orlando Cubella, who had been

met in Mexico City by the Agency in 1961, who had been one of

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the leaders of the anti-Batista soups and held the rank of rajor

in the Cuban

army, that is the highest rank they have, Cubelia

was an M.D. and had been a youth leader and attended youth

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conferences around the world, and was met first in Mexico City,

and later he was met in Scandinavia on several occasions.

And

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the conversations during these various meetings had to do with

Cubella's desire to have a change in Cuba, and the attempt on

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the Agency people who met with hin to explore his ability to

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substitute a. government as well as be able to overthrow the

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existing government.

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These conversations

were

very general, exploratory,

and

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non-productive.

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In one of the early metings with Cubelle, he taiked about

climinating Castro, and the Agancy employee used the word

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assassination, which was

reported back as being an offensive

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word to Cubella, and instructions were issued that Cubella was

a... 11ca

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not to be given a mission of elimination of Castro or anyone

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else.

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He was met in October of 1963, at which time he made the

proposai that he wished to have rapons with which to commit

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an assassination, and this proposal was rejected.

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He continued to speak in these terms, and finally, I cannot

give you the level of approval -- that might be at the level

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of Mr. Fitzgerald -- and I don't recall which job Mr. Fitzgerald

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had then, whether he headed the Cuban Task Force or nether he

had become --

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Mr. linoche. He replaced Harvey.

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Mr. Schwarz. He did meet with this man and gave him a

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weapon or poison pen with which to kill Castro?

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MI. Breckinridge. Fitzgerald did not give him the pen.

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Mr. Schwarz. But discussed the subject?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I was considering the question of

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level of authorization, and I don't recall. I would assume

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Mr. Fitzgerald vas the highest level of authorization that i i

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know of.

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Chairman Church. And Fitzgerald's position at that

• time?.

Nr. Breckinridge. I was questioning whether he had

-- he

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had three jobs in fairly quick succession. tether he rcplaced

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Harvey as head of the Cuban Tast. Foice, then he became Chief of

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Will, the western Hemisphere Division, and then he became for

a short time Deputy Dircotor of Plans. But he died of a heart

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attack.: I don't know whether he had at that time - it wouid

be in October of 1963.

Mr. Colby.. I think at that time he was cither lead of tic

Cuban furse or Chief of the Hesten Hemisphere Division.

Chairman Church. Will you get that for the record?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Breckinridge. The decision was taken to try and give

Cubella some instrument. A ball point pen was designed that

could be used as a syringe. Because Cubella was a doctor, the

pen was given to him in Paris on the 22nd of Movember, 1963,

with the suggestion that he use it.

• Chaizman Church. By whon was the pen given?

Mr. Breckinridge. It was given by a case officer of the

Agency. In fact, Cubella refused to take it. then we wrote our

report, ve thought he accepted it, but I've since learnad he

refused it. He said it was not practical.

Because he was a doctor it was suggested that he could

acquixe the material to put in the pon, but he refused to accept

it.

Conversations continued, and finally the Agency arranged

to put down two caches at sea off the coast of Cuba, one of

which had weapons in it, one of which had just general eguiprent.

Senator Schweiker. Could cither of those involve the story

that appeared in the press under Colonel Prouty's' statement?

Mr. Breckinridge.

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Senator Schweiker. Did that come later, Colonel Prouty?

„Mr. Breckinridge. Me still don't know what colonel Prouty'

statement refers to..

Mr. linoche.

Prouty's allegaiions go back to 1959.

Senator Schweiker. What?

Mr. Knoche.

1959, late 1959 and early 1960.

Mr. Breckinridge. Ne arranged to have a Cuban refugee

leader meet Cubella in Spain, at which time he gave nim an

additional weapon. That would have been in February of 1964,

I think.

Chairman Church.

what kind of weapon was given to him?

Mr. Breckinridge. It is my recollection it was a rifle.

I am not sure of that.

Cubella continued to have conversations and meetings from

time to time as he came out of Cuba, and finally in the middie

of 1965 the decision was taken to cut off contact with him

because there were serious questions about the security of his

organization.

He was arrested, I think. I think I have gotten my dates

right. It is subject to correction. He was arrested in the

early part of 1966

,and tried, made a confession, had a public

trial, which was reported in the press.

I wonder if I might check those dates?

Chairman Church. Surely.

While you check those dates, perhaps Nr. .Colby coula

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explain how it was during this period that Cubella

was able

to retuin to Cuba and travel to Europe.

I assume he vas able to return to Cuba?

Mr. Colby, He was a Cuban officer at that time, and

apparently loyal to Castro. He would go out on various trips

and things like that, and we would meet him there.

Mr. Schwarz. He was the man who met with Mr. Hunt in

Madrid?

Mr. Colby. He met with a friend of Mr. Hunt. A Cuban exi:

met Cubella in Madrid. That is when the weapons were nanded

over.

Mr. Schwarz. • Was Mr. Hunt in Madrid at that time?

ME. Colby. Yes.

Mr. Breckinridge. No, because this man by the name of

Artino, met Cubella in Madrid in December of 1961, and in

February 1965 he made the delivery of the weapons.

Hunt was

not assigned there until the middle of 1965, after this was

over.

He,don't know where thet story came from.

Mr. Colby. Hunt and Artimo are

very close, and he is tho

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godfather of one of their children, and

things like that. He

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may have told him about it.

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Chairman Church. During this period you have described,

wien these various contacts were made vith Cuballa, who was

the highest officer within the CIA wo had knowledge of these

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contacts and who authorized them to be made, as far as your

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investigation shows?

Mi: Breckinridge. I don't know the level at which the

contacts were known:

I would assume that the continuing contac

were known at a high level, but I have to assume that, and this

goes to a point when Senator Schweiker was asking the question

at the last time. This is the last instance that we know of

in

which

assassination was involved.

Senator Schweiker. That is, both your records and your

interviews indicate that this was the last known activity,

according to your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge.

That was specifically related to

Castro:

Senator Schweiker.

And that date was when?

Mr. Breckinridge.

viell, our contact with the Cubella groug

was broken off in June of 1965.

Senator Schweiker.

June of when?

Mr: Breckinridge.

1965.

I don't want to confuse you, but I would like to introduce

consideration that relates to this.

Chairman Church. Before you do that, I have asked what

your investigation shows is the highest officer ino knew and

under whose authority these continuing contacts were made, and

you said you assumed it nust have been known to higher authority.

2x- Breckinridge. I said that about the contacts. Noout

the contacts, I assumed this was known fairly high in the Agency

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Chairman Church. The contacts and their purpose?

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_Mx. Breckinridge. This is a distinction I want to make.

The people who were involved, and this is difficult --

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but their statenent of state of mind, and your interpietation,

may be different things. But the people who were involved

considered that the purpose of the association with Cubella was

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he was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a

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man who represented a dissatisfied element, he had people ho

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agreed with him, and the hope was that this could be developed

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into a group in Cuba that in some way could replace the govern-

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ment..

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The conversations with Cubella were really not productive,

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and Cubella wanted demonstration of support, tangible support,

and the conversations progressed to the point that he wanted

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equipment with which he could commit and assassination.

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In the minds of the people who dealt with hin, the question

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of assassination was not uppermost, so much as it was to give

him a material denonstration of support.

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I don't mean to be trite, but the United States or the

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Agency has in the past provided weapons of one kind or another

to people, paramilitary. In the minds of these people, however

credible to you this distinction is drawn, so assassination

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becare a consideration, but assassination had not been the

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objective:

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I am sorry, one more point.

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The point at which they begar. to providc licapons to him

should have required higher level approval. I don't know what

the level of approval was.

Mr. Schwarz. It should have under the normal procedures?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. At one point a meeting took place and an

agent of the CIA gave him a ballpoint pen that had been speciali

designed to camouflage a syringe, and gave it to him with the

recommendation that it would be filled with poison and used to

kill Castro.

Are you saying that the agent may have done this without

the knowledge of the Director or the Deputy Director for Plans,

soreone high in the Agency?

Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am saying there should have been

authorization. I don't know the level of that authorization.

merely tried to draw a distinction because it is a question raise

in my mind, it was raised by Senator Schweiker's question -- wher

was the last attempt of assassination?

This developed to the point where assassination was

involved, and this was the last such interest that we know of.

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying after the incident that

Senator Church just asked you about, at that point the emphasis

shifted from assassinating him to replacing him?

Is that what you are. trying to toll us, or did I misconstru.

that, too?

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MI. Breckinriage.

No; I am confusing the issue by trying

to describe the state of mind of the people who were involved

i

the operation.

Chairman Church.

tell us that.

We don't even know who were involved.

Y,

Mr. Breckinridge. As far as I know, Mr. Fitzgerald would

be the highest level that I know was aware of this.

Chairman Church. What was his position? He are back to

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that:

MI. Colby. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

• *

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Senator Morgan. Is he dead?

=+

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_ Mr. colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Breckinridge. The problem that you are having, which

is ons that we have, is raconstructing certain aspects of this,

quite frankly, and we hava attemoted to reconstruct it by tha

record, where the record supports it by interviews, where

the

interviews can fill gaps, and it was of some interest to

try to get from the peopls involved their rationale.

The

rationale is difficult, conples, and I have tried to corvsy

that because it was brought to my mird by Senator Schweicker's

gu=stion.

Mr. ColbY: 'It I could belo interpret this from a cultaral

pattern.

I think the poirt is that wa located this major, he

looked like a very promisino contact withir Cuba who coula

possibly replace castro or bring about his disposition, ard so

forth, just r-nove him without ary specifies:

_In the course of the conversations, the 1963 meeting wie

the ballpoint pea took place. He don't have any clear recora

as to who authorized that particular aspect of the rslationshin

concerniry the ballpoint pan. The fact that we then went on

with him until '64 and '65 with the offers of weapons fits

into the genaral support of that sffort ard doesn't necessarily

coircide with the daliberate attemoss to assassinate him,

although it could, and our I cords don't clearly indicate one

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way of the other on that.

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- Chairman Church. A cache of weapons delivered on the

coast of Cuba hardly constitutes an arsenal by which it reasona

could be assumed that the government can be overthrown. It

does, howaver, fit into a scheme of providiny the major ard

his conorts with a capability of assassirating the Cuban leader

Mr. Colby. It also coincides with the possibility of

the first step toward additional arms.

I am not denying it, ir. Chairna.. I am saying that she

records do='t clearly indicate it, ard this gets back to Mr.

schwarz's original question to ma -- can you defire "assassica-

tior."?

I would raspactfully rsquest that I don't get into that

because there is a question as to when you are supporting armed

action and when you are commitzin, an assassination.

Chairman Church. All right. During this whole perica

we understand that the Director of the CIA, Who vas ile. liccore,

hag said he had no knowledge of these orgoing activities.

sir. Colby. I would inagine that his testimony that he

dia not know of an assassiration would be consistant with my

comment as to the weapons being given in support of armed actio:

but not the spacific assassination plans. I don't krow that

but I an saying that is a possible explaration of the differenc:

between those stories.

Chairmar Church. He will hava to question Mr. MeCone mich

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more closely on that poirt.

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But you are unable now to tell us in connection with thess

later activities

whether or not there was specific knowledge

of their connaction with tha assassiration purpose, above the

level of ir. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Brackirridge. At this moment I canrot.

Senator Morgan.

May I pursue a line of questions for just

a fow minutes?

First of all, hit.

schwarz, this document, Exhibit A, who

prepared it?

This is the origiral yough drait that was prepared only

by the typists?

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Ken Greer document.

ar. Colby. Preparad by one of Mr. Brackinridge's

associates, ir. Kenneth Greer.

Senator Morgan.

What was the purpose of the preparation

of this document?

"Mr. COlby. It followed the 9th of lay, 1973 directive

by it. Schlesinger for a repori on all questionable activiti=s.

These were gathared together by tir. Greer and the other members

of the Inspector General's offica ard a summary of them was

provided to me to usa to brief the Chairman of the two committe:

Senator Morgan.. This was the best information that the

Agency vas able to obtain at the time?

r. Colby,, That was the infornation available to the

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Inspector Ganeral at the tine. I think I would say it was abl.

I don't think we instituted an aggressive, positive investiga..

He rather collacted what ira had available..

Senator Morgan. Well, there have been assassinatior

attempts or efforts on the part of the government. There's no

question in my mind. The question I want to pursue is that

in the document marked here Exhibit i, project 79 Rifle, it

stated that early in the kennedy Administration, "the White

House urged Richard Bissel to create an executive actior.

capability."

That is a ganeral standby capability to carry out

assassinations.".

Now, that was the primary purpose of 29 Riflei is that

your understandina?

Mr. Colby. It was one of the purposes of the ZR Rifla

project.

Senator Morgan.

thetinite ious="?

And it was donc at the instigation of

Mr. Colby.

we have one record which states that lI

Bissal nade this statement without further precisior.

Senator Morgan.

And where is Mr. Bissel?

Mr. Colby, iir. Bissel, I think, lives in Connecticut now.

Senator Morgan.

Now latar on we find that this project

continued on under a man by the rame of Bill llarvay, did it

not?

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MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

- Senator Morgan.

And then on June 27, 1973, he vrota

a mamorandun to the Chief FI staff:

What does FI staff mean?

Mr. Colby. A foreign intelligenca staff.

Senator morgan. Stating that the original justification

for employing l.J. Hinn no longer existed ard raised the

question of his tarmination?

Mr. Colby. '63 was it?

Senator Morgan. Jure of 1953.

He was terminated in

April of 1964?

ir. Colby. Yes.

Senator Morgan.

10: there is no doubt in your mira but

what this project was known by the Director of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Approved by the Director. I don't think we

can say for sure.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, isn't it a reasonable assumptic:

that"if à projact of this magnitude was to carry out the

Fas

assassination, it would rot ba created without the approval

of the Director of the CIA?

it. Colby. It better not ba created without my approval

row, I will guarantee you.

Senator ilorgan.

It certainly is not reasonable to assine

that even in 1961 it would have boen so created?

Mr. Colly.

I would thin's that the genaral idea. mether

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the specific project or not but the general idea is so

significant, ard that is tha irdication that Mr. Dulles dis

know of this act-at the time. Whether it was spacifically

brought to the attention of his successor I could not acidall

testify one way or the other.

Senator orgar. MI. Colby, car you make any more sensitiv:

a project at tha CIA than one of assassination?

Mr. Colby. When lit. Schlesinger came ir. I nade sure he

was aware of anything I knev.

Senator Morgar. And this being true,

aren't you satisfied

in your own mind that all your directors were aware of this

project 2R Rifle until such time as it was terminated?

Mr. Colly. That is a conclusion, Senator.

give testimony on that.

I can't

Senator Morgan. It is à conclusion, bat you are an

expert.

ir. Colby. Right.

-Senator organ. You are the Diractor of the CIa and you

have had the experience and lcolleage of the history of the

CIA.

-

Let me ask you, based upon your history, the history and

the knowledge of the CIA that you know of, have as Director,

and you have gained as Dirsctor, aren't you satisfiad tha

¿V=ry director knew of this project?

Mr. Colby. In the face of the statenent by ir. eCono

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ha did not know of it, I find that statement difficult to

challenge.

I agras with you, he should have krows about it, but I

could not say for sure that statement is not accurate.

Senator Morgan. One final question. Mr. McCone left

the Agency when?

Mx. Colby. In 1965.

Sanator Morgan. I won't ask any other questions escape

for the racord I mould like to say this so I car. remember why

I was pursuing this later or.

asked these quastions ros to try to show the assassinasi

plan, because I think that has already bean established, ana

if that is all we ars after we can move on to something else.

But the thing that does concern me is that if this prrj

continued on until and past the time that President jerredy

was

assassinatid, then it raises a question in my nird as to

whether or not Castro hins:li may not well have know: about it

and whither or not the President's assassination may not have

bear. à part of a recrinisation plan and it may just oper the

door to whether or not later on we should decide to look irto

that.

That is the reasor. I have followed that line of questions.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection vith

zR Rifle, I think you testified of your associate said this was

a multi-purpose operation, including stealing codes, and the

development of the capability of what euphemistically is called

executive action.

In your professional judgment, and with your history of

your backyround in the Agency, does it make any sense to you that

a major operation; a major intelligence gathering operation of

the sort of stealing codes, which I assume means from other

governments, would be mounted under the direction of a man

about whom all I know is that Mr. Harvey has a background of

something like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the lovel,

I should say, of $7500 to $10,000?

• :

Does it not suggest to you that stealing codes was in

fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassination

operation with unlimited, non-voucher financial capability?

Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.

In the first place, Mt. Harvey had a very successful tour

in Berlin where he ran the Berlin tunnel operation, which was

one of our major successful intelligence operations.

Mr. Harvey was a very coloriul figure who had his lifestyle,

which is different than some others, but he had been very

clicctive at that, and very

adventuresore in that category of

signals intelligence and a very centuresome idca of that nature.

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lite was in the assignment of Chief of the fI Division staff.

"That staff's major function is to conduct the sigrals intelligenc

workshich rust be done in the clandestine service.

It hindles our efforts today to penetrate into foreig.

code rooms abroad, and things of that nature, and it involves

the breaking into of safes and things, all that complicated

material.

Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability"

executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of

this material, that kind of a project. In other words, a

code-breaking, a stealing operation, obviously that is to be

kept very, very secret. If you get caught in it, it has all

:.

¡sorts of very bad diplomatic implications, and so forth.

Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of

the work of that particular group.

You also are dealing with some very venturesome people

whö are willing to cravi into somebody else's code room and

take the chance of getting caught.

So, given you nave a man who had some good technical

experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a

program which is not too far off the requirements of high

compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and

therefore, for Mr. Bissel to have selected llarvey to carry out

this project seems to me that it is compatible that he coulu

be running code-breaking projects, or code staling projects,

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Jas well as this other activity.

Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second!

one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been

discussing. It was not to be put on the record although to be

done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me,

but to say that thewcode stealing was only a cover I think is

probably an unwarranted conclusion.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding

of $7,500 to $10,000?

MI. Colby. That is not very much money for that kind of

an operation.

•

Senator Hart of Colorado. Precisely. I thirk it is too

little.

Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is

largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own

staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't

think you can draw much conclusion from the actual nurber on

the figure, one way or the other.

This might not have been the only such project. You know,

an assassination project would cost you more money than that,

too.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Absolutely.

Mr. Colby. I find it hard to say, that that is the only

amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation

where additional money would be put into either of those kinds

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of activities. I wouldn't get hung up on the bureaucritic

aspect of the number of dollars.

Senator Mart of Colorado. So Mr. Harvey, if the decision

were made to try to liquidate a Screign leader, and Mr. Ha:vey

found the instrumentality, the individual to do that, and that

reguired $100, 000, all he had to do was come back in and say?

Mr. Colby. He could get it.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we should have the record reflect

two things. The two gentlemen talking are not eyewitnesses to

what ive have, been talking about.

Second, and related to that, for us to pursue this matter,

ve must have, and must have right away, the better evidence

which is in the possession of the CIA, which is at least the

Inspector General report of 1967; and more importantly than that?

the interview notes reflecting whatever interviews you had

with whomever you intervieved at that time or later.

Mx. Colby. These we will make available to you to the

extent we have them.

11r. Breckinridge. He Ictained no notes. He kept only the

one report that we submitted to Mt. Helms at that time, the one

copy.

When he left the Agoncy he returned it to us.

Nov, the files on the cubella affair and the trujitcaffair

exist, und they are available.

Ir. Schwarz. Can we have it understood that, Mr.

Breckinridge, you will as you did with the initial material...

x1 8RA03Y

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come down sometime early neit week and we can go over it and

so forth?

Mr. Colby. Sure.

If we can just have the same sort of

normal gruund rules about the papers.

Chairman Church. Sure. They always apply unless

--

MI. Colby. I know.

Chairman Church. -- unless we say differently.

Mx. Schwarz.

No, just following up one more. thing on

Senator Hart's question of some time ago.

Would you determine with respect to five different periods

of time whether, first, there was any internal evaluation

within the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether of

not

the assassination attempts should continue and, second, whether

there was any discussions with persons outside of the Central

Intelligence Agency as to whether of not the piot should continus

and the period of time would be the initial authorization, which

was larch 1960, after the Bay of Pigs, during the missile

crisis. ind, parenthetically there, will you state whether it

was possible Castro might have been assassinated pursuant to

an ongoing plan during

a period of tine when the United States

and Russia were close to a nuclear confrontation. The next

case is John F.Kennedy's assassination.

Finally, at the tire of the break-off in June of 1965..

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which I believe ivas Mr. Breckinridge's testimony, was anybody in

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higher authority told that the operation had been broken off?

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Because that will bear upon whether anybody in higher authority

had authorized or requested the operation.

MI. Colby. Yes.,

fine.

Mr. ichwarz. Can I pick up then on another subject rich

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we

just barely touched on last time, Mr. Colby?

This is related to the question I asked you about the use

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of criminal elements.

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Senator Mathias. Before we leave this, I have onc question.

Chairman Church. Senator Mathias.

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Senator Mathias. In light of the fact this poison pen vas

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actually proffered on the 22nd of November, 1963, is there a

12 scintilla of evidence - and vas proffered to a Major in the

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Cuban Army on active duty -- is there a scintilla of evidence

14l that anyone in the Cuban Government had any knowledge or suspicio

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prior to that date that this was a project that was planned?

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Mr. Colby. There is certainly no evidence that anyone

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had that information with respect to the Cubella operation.

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Mr. Brechinridge.

NO.

Mit. Colby. The second phase of the Mafia operation nad been

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wrapped up by then, I think.

21

Mo. Brockinriage.

Yes.

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Mr. Colby. The individual in Cuba involved in it had

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take asylum, I think.

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NI. Brockinridge,

No, the sequence is a little different.

2.5

MI. Colby. A little later:

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MI. Breckinridge. Yes. There vere people who reporteilly

were xnt into Cuba, a team of three people -- and I said reporte

because we were working then through a Cuban exile leader.

They had the assignment of recruiting additional people to

carry out such plans as might be developed. We never knew what

happened to those people -- whether they came back -- only that

they were sent in.

But if you are looking for a possibility of knolcage of

an assassination plot, conceivably those three people could be

the source of it, but not that the United States Government was

behind it. •

Senator Mathias. But it is conceivable that Castro and

his government could have come upon some evidence that some

plot was afoot?

MI. Colby.

He certainly could have cross allegations, ans

you really must assume that various of the other kind, even

independent activities, or the first phase of the Mafia progza-

could have produced allegations of attempts against him with

the corment that CIA or the United States was behind it. The

possibility of that kind of allegation is just almost infinite.

Senator Mathias. Particularly considering the nature of

the instruments that ivere being deployed?

Mx. Colby. Yes, sir..

No. Breckinridge. There is another consideration."

Chairman Church. You really haven't told us on the recor

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until just now, in response to Senator Mathias, just what the

second phase of the Mafia connection for assassination Castro

was. We really haven't had the detail except as you gave it

to Senajo: Mathias.

I wonder if you could complete the record on this second

phase. Give us all the information that you know about that.

MI. Breckinridge., Before I do, one additional consideratio

The Cuban exile community in Miami was engaged in a great

deal of plotting of its own and a great deal of hyperbole, and

it is safe to assume that Castro also had reports of assassinati,

schenes or threats from that group. So there is one more source

to that sort of thing.

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Senator ilorgan. Where is Cubella nov? Is he still in

prison?

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Mr. Brackinridge.

In jail on the Isle of Pines.

Sanator Morga:. Are we sure of that?

Mr. Breckinridge. I asked somebody the other day and they

said that is where they thir ha is.

Senator- Morgan. I just wondered whosa agent he really

was.

ilx. Colby.

He has been in jail for a long time if he

was Castro!'s.

Senator ilorgan.

You testified is was able to go in and

out of Cuba fairly fraquently.

'ix. Colby. He was an associate of Castro's, there is

no quastion abous that, bus he had an irdependent relation

with us that finally got picked up. I think thas is imporcent,

Mir, chairman, that wa try to keep his rame out of any published

documants for that Isason.

There is no use gesting hin in

mor= trouble.

Senator Schwaicker. That is for sure.

Chairman Church. There is no argument on that score.

Hould you please furrish us with all of the details as to

the second phasa of the Mafia conraction?

Kr. Breckinridge. Me, will give you nore accurate datail

when we give you the report, but I will ricise noir the bast

that I can r=call.

1000

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Chairnan Church. Bafore you do, would you just explain

exactly ihat the r=lationship between CIA and Giancana and

Mahau was becausa that is not clear in my mird.

Would you develop for the committee that whole relationshim

Mr. Breckinridge. Robart Maheu used to work for tbe

FBI and he resigned from the FBI and opened a private invastiga-

tive firn here in Washington ard CIA used him from time to

time for certai: kinds of support activities.

Chairman Church. What kind of support activities?.

Mr. Breckinridge. On one

occasion he obtained a female

companion for ar important

foreign leader.

Chairmar Church, What other kird of support?

Mr. Breckinridge. In the early days - and this becomes

an enbarrassment.

As nearly as I can reconstruct, th= 9=0019

wac knew him decided to put him on a I-tainer in the Office

of. Sacurity, which they did for awhile, until he as so

successful he said he no longer nesded the retaines, which is

didn't do much to ears. He later got involver rapissenting

one of the Greek shipping intsrests ard we were given the

results of some of the information that he obtained from that

where there was a fight between liarchos and Drassis. lie

think he may have had some involvsment in arother foreign

leader's companionship when he was in this country. I do=':

have the details. I think we can probably reconstruce it foi

you .

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Chairman. Church. Can we have the file on him?

- ir. Breckinridg=. I think we will provide ore on that.

We have one, Yes.

Chairman, Church. Very well.

Mr. Breckinridge. When Maheu left Washington and moved

out west, I think first to Los Angeles, later to Las Vegas,

where he became associated with the Hughes orgarization, and

when the quastion arose about getting an irtroduction to sie

liafia, because thay did have gambling interests in Cuba at

that tine, the Office of Security, Coloral Edwards was asked

if he could establish a contact, and he went to Mantu, or

had sontone go to Miaheu, to see if laheu could make such ar

introduction.

Maneu knew a man by the name of Johnay Roselli, tho

lival in Los Angeles, who had the concassion for the icamakina

machines on the strip in Las

Vegas, and he arranged, Roselli

arrarged an introductio: to -- the CIA actually arranged,

our man didn't naet Giarcana, I don't balisve, arranged an

introduction, bu Giancana who in turn arranged an introductio.

to à mar by the rama of Santos trafficante.

Trafficante was the head of the Cuban gambling interests

and Castro had alloved them. First he had closed them, then

he reoperad them hoping to attract tourists. And Trafficante

travelled to and fron Cuba.

Giancana servad only as the introduction to crafficanta.

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This as all done through Roselli.

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• Oux people never - they all dealt with Rosalli, who ir

turn deal with the others.

mar.:

Roselli

was in sssence a cut-out or served as the middle

Rosalli was naver paid for his servicas.

Giancana clearly knew eventually the government association.

Roselli came to know of it, though initially he was introduced

to tha CIA person.as a man who worked for Mahau on an assigment

by a private client.

So initially the cover story was Maheu's private client

who had an interest irsid= Cuba. Giancana never really vas

irvolved subsequently.

He dia arrange -- it was Trafficante from than on -- and

Trafficante had a source inside Cuba who had an office, bad

a position in the Offica of the Prime Minister. He as belisi

to have access to Castro and a poison pill was ieveloped that

he was to insart into Castro's food. The pills were sent in

to this man.

What we did not krow at the time was the mar.

had lost his job and lost his access and the pills were returned

Hir. Colby. That is the first phase.

Senator Schweicker.

would you dats that?

ir. Breckinridge.

That would go into the early part of

1951, March-April, 1351.

rir. Schwarz.

The pills wire given as part of the first

phase to à secold person in Cuba; is that correct?

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Mr.. Breckinridge. Just before the first phasa andad,

Roselli, through Trafficante, was introduced to another Cuban

exile leader in Miami by tha

name of Anthony Varona. Again,

his name is a sensitive matter.

Varona was the leader of one of the groups that was being

supported by the CIA as part of the preparation for the Bay

of Pigs.

Varona was uchappy with his association, with the associatio

with the CIA. H= f=lt he had not been given encugh morsy.

Varona häd pisvious contact with the criniral element in Cuba

ard he was approached by Rosalli with Trafficanta's introductio:

to tale on this mission.

Roselli's story was that he represented some private client

who had interest in Chha.

Th. Rosalli identity was apparea:,

as was Trafficante's.

Varora said. he knew sonsore who was in a restaurant that

Castro frequented and then the pills were transportei again.

"ir. Scavarz. Could you seat= for the record who made tha

pills?

ir. Breckirridge.

The pills were made in what was then

the Technical Services Division of the CIA.

ir. Schwarz.

ilad they ever made such pills befora?

Ho. Breckinridgs.

Hot that I know of.

ir, Schwarz. had they ever used soculinun as a poisor in

any way before?

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Mr. •Breckinridge. On one previous occasion Botulinun

had-been considared for use or cigars that soneone had hoped

to get to Castro, and eventually that never got off the ground.

This was a schens that was never approved and never went corvard

I know of that one instance in which it was considered.

Botulinun was made into pills and these pills era taker.

again to Cuba. Castro stooyed going to the restaurant are

this man was.

The Bay of Pigs occurred and the oparation

was called off.

When Harvey took over and then Inactivated the second phas:

in April of 1962, they want back to Varona, and on= of th=

strange things is that Varona started off with the reprizion

of the original Is'aurant approach, which I think caused

some question as to the gan brewsen what ve ware told and

what was happinirg.

Varoza aft=r this didn't materializa. Varona then stated

that he had sent thras men into cuba vhose job was to recrui

acidicionäl people for such plan as may davalog. lie lat=r

planned to sand in three nore people. Ma don't believe they

eVer went.

The missile crisis intervaned. There were a number

of delays and we don't think they ever did go in.

The first three men, if in fact they did go in -- we

don't krow who they were, ive don't know what they did, we

don't know whether they cams out or not.

As a matter of interest, the man who was to go back -

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Chairnan Church. It is possible they went in and could

have been captured by Castro?

Mr. Breckirridge. It is possible.

Tie question that Senator Krgan asked earlier, this they

could have kroun -- these men we don't beliave could hav= krow.

the actual backars of the oparatior, becaus- Varora was dealing

with a manber of the syndicate with whom he had previous

connections.

The people who dealt with Varona felt that Roselli

was discreet and careful.

But those men could have been captured. Thay .could have

supplied the interpretation

that they might not havs kron.

Mothing cama of tie operation, it was called off, bus

essentially that is the first and secord phase.

Chairmar Church. These three men were to be seat from --

Mr. Breckinridge. They were cuban exiles.

Chairman Church. To be sent in fron the United States?

•Hr. Colby. Fron sis United States.

_Chairman Church. And why is it you don't know whether or

not they were sent?

Mr. Breckinridge. The question exists in my mird. I

am not sure it exists in other people's minds.

As I reviewed the record, when we gos the record back, in

preparation for these inquiries, I was struck by the fact that

Varora had told us at the very end of the first phase that

he vas usiny this rastaurant, and when a year later the place

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410 1 1rit drool, d.l., Massingion, u.e. duuva

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was reactivated, the same story was used and already had been

proven not to ba so.

Later he talked in ganeral terms about the three men ard

I began in develop some resarvation in my mind as to hatner

or not Varona had in fact told us the truth.

That is purely spsculation or my part.

Mr. Colby: This is a problan we live with in the irtellige

business. Inen you are not able to be in direct contact, for

good reasons you are subject to fabrication, particularly it

there is some money involveà.

Chairnan Church. Did the CIA, in cornection with pinase

one of phase two, pay any of these agents for their services?

Mr. Breckinridge. In ghase one I think we paid expans:

mon=y. In phase two we gave monay io varona.

ix. Schwarz.

and to Roselli?

lir. Breckirriage. Me paid experse money for Roselli.

Mr. Schwarz. You paid him moray to buy guns?

"Mr. Breckinridge. I was going to bell the gun scory.

Varora wanted noney aul gurs and some of the squipment thas

he specified could be obtained only from the United States

military. And the equionant that was acquired at that time

did not include that kind of cquipment. It included aquiument

that could be obtalued from other sources and excluded u.s.

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nilitary equinment. It vas provided through the assistance

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of the diani station. A U-llaul tract was picked up and daliv

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I know.

- HI. Breckinridge. The first man who had tha job in the

Office of the Prime Minister, this man did get kickbacks fron

the crininals. I think that must be the one you remember.

lie

took refuge in the Venezuelan embassy ard stayed there until

1961. He finally was giver safe conduct to pass out. The

Mexican anbassy took over from Venazuela. Cuba broke diplonatic

ralations. Ha continued to be à political refugee in that

embassy until th= fall of 1964.

Chairman Church.

in the plot?

Ir. Breckinridge.

What was Varona's motive for participatint

Varona was ore of the axils leaders

who warted to overthrow Castro.

He wanted more firancing sha.

he had. He would cooperate with anyone.

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MI. Schivarz. I would like to pick up on the discussion

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re had.

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Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz has five minutes more, and

we will conclude, and I rould lixi. to ask the Committee cu stay

on for ten more minutes for an exécutive session.

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MI. Schwarz. In the discussion we had on the use of

crininal elerents, ve have dealt with the Castro operation.

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In the middle of the book supplied to us by Mr. Breckinridge

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earlier this week, there is a discussion about the Lunumi

operation, and the Agent l. J. Win.

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Noir, is it a fact that Q. J. Win was the agent, or asset,

however you would refer to hin, who apparently was considered

for the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which never took place;

is that right?

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Mir. Colby: Yes, sir.

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• Nr. Schwarz. Now, is it accurate that l. J. Win operated

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in Europe trying to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency

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"could use "in safecracking operations?

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Mr. Colby. This is what is reported, and it is quite

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possible.

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Hr. Breckinridge. The record indicates that.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it further so that one of the CIA

officers who first met l. J: Win in Luxembourg, was on a.

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trip overseas to find safecrackers and document suppliers?

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it. Colby. Yes, that is what it says.

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Mr. Schwarz. Now, just as a matter of historical record,

is the OSS the predecessor of the CIA in some sense?

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Mr. Colby, Xes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz.

Is it correct that "Lucky" Luciano was used

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to help the OSs in connection with operations in Italy during

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¡the Second World liar?

Mr. Colby. I don't know, but I have heard that story

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as well. It is an extensive story but I don't know the facts.

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Mr. Schwarz. For the record, Mr. Luciano was a Mafia

Figure who had been deported from the United States, or was in

jail in the United States?

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Mr. Colby. Mas in jail, I guess, and was later deported

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after the Nar.

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Mr. Schwarz.

Now, in connection with the instructions which

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you issued in 1973 concerning activities outside of the Charter

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of the CIA, you received, as we went through the other day, a

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report from the Inspector General leading up to tiat in kay of

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1973?

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Mr. Colby. That is right.

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Mr. Schwarz. And was part of the report that the CIA

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had itself conducted for local police departments in lashington,

Arlington, Fairfa: and Alexandria, during the perica 1968 and

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1969, a series of classes in items which included basics in

surveillance, photography, basic audio and countersabotage; anci

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in addition, this is what I particularly call your attention to,

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I locks and picks and surreptitious entry?

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_ MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Schwarz. I am now reading from pages 225 and 226 of

the 694 lages, which I will mar': is Exhibit No. 6.

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(the above-mentioned document was

marked as Colby Exhibit lio. 6

for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz.

Is it the fact that, for example, between

October 7 and October 18, 1968, the CIA conducted a course for

the Washington Police Department in the subject of surreptitious

entry?

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Mr. Colby. It was included in that, yes.

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Mr. Schwarz. What was the purpose of conducting such a

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course?

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Mr. Colby: He had a relationship with various policc

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departments around the country. They from time to time sould

17 / like to learn our knowledge of certain subjects that are quite

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unique to the CIA. There

are a number of things that we have

19 to do in CIA which are quite frankly outside the norm of nost

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other agencies of the Government.

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Chairman Church. Doesn't surreptitious entry refer to

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illegal entry?

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Mr. Colby. Going in secretly, that is what it means.

Entering secretly in some fashion of othei, yes.

Chaiman Church. That is an illegal activity for local

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police, is it not?

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_Mr. Colby. Presumably, yes.

Chairman Church.

Why is CIA conducting courses teaching

local police illegal activity, tc, to conduct illegal oçcations?

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Mr. Colby. I think at that time, ir. Chairman, that was

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at the request of the police department of that area, that they

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were interested in this thing, and there is a defensive element

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of it. In order to know now to protect against sorething, it

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is well to know how it is actually conducted.

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Chairman Church. Do you construe this activity to be

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12 activities?

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Mr. Colby. I don't think it is a violation of the law,

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far. Chairman.

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I did give sore directive on that in 1973, that we not

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engage in this anymore, in compliance with the spirit of the

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amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Adninistration

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"Act, sinich says that CIA will not provide support to the LEA

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in its assistance to local police departments. Ind as far as

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I was concerned, that is a policy that they don't want CIA in

touch with local police departronts.

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The fact of sharing our knowledge of techniques with a

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local police department does not in my mind get us into actually

conducting domestic police activity. There is a difference

there.

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Chairman Church. Yes. But apart from the technical

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question of your jurisdiction, when you engage in teaching locai

police departments how to conduct break-ins, surreptitious

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break-ing, you are teaching them how to bicak the law.

Mr. Colby. You are teaching them how the law is broken.

Chairman Church. That is right.

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Mr. Colby. Which can be useful to them in their knowledge

of how the law is broken, the techniques that are feasible.

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Chairman Church. Or can be useful to them in knowing how

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to break the law?

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Mr. Colby. It could. It is an item of information that

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they can use in ahy way they wish, either properly or improperly:

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Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any situations where govern-

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engaged in break-ins within the United States?

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MI. Colby. I know of certain situations ralated to foreign:

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intelligence operations where access to appropriate targets has

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workman or something of that nature, and I think in that history!

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there are some cases of actual break-ins.

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Now, I assure you, Mt. Chairman, we have been conducting

break-ins abroad. There is no question about that. That is,

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we train our people to be able to do that.

Chairman Church. That is not the question I am raising

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with you.

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other words, these courses, it is my inpression, were

generalized discussions of techniques. They were not particular

handholding on conducting a specific operation.

I think I am accurate in that

statenent.

•Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, just a couple of quick questions

First, with regard to the files, memoranda or diaries you

might have of former directors, are those still on Agenci

premises? Do you have those matters still there that were

left by former Directors?

Mr. Colby, Certain ones se do. I don't know of any that

we don't have.

As far as I am concerned, they are Agency property, and when

I leave I am going to walk out without any paper.

Mr. Snothers. With respect then to the inquiries you have

made with regard to information in the files on assassinations,

have these inquiries extended to an examination of these files

of former- Directors?

MI. Breckinridge. In one or two instances on specific

points ve have made inquiries. We have not gone through the

files in general for that purpose.

Mr. Colby. We have

gone through that collection I know of

Mr. Helms' files. I don't know of any specific set of files

called Mr. McCone's files.

There is an exccutive registry where my correspondence is

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- Mx. Smothers. What I an searching for is the situation

where the generic classification of materials night soncho:

have no been complete enough for us to gat particular knuwledge!

and I was wondering prior to our next meeting if a search

oriented with respect to the issue of knowledge might be a

fruitful exercise?

Mr. Colby. Knowledge by previous directors of specifies

on this topic?

Mr. Smothers. Yes.

Mr. Colby. I think it is easy for Mr. Helms. I think

we have gone through his files. I don't inow of any separate

set of files on Mr. Dulles or Mr. MCCone. We will look.

Senator Mondale. There is a reference. to John McCone's

files in one of the memos that I looked at this morning.

Mr. Colby. I will check that, senator.

Chairman Church. That is a good point, and I an glad you

have raised it.

I think we will conclude the hearing at this point with

the understanding, Mr. Colby, we will be back in touch with you.

Mr. Colby. Surely. Many tines, I think, Mr. Chairnan.;

Chairman Church. Yes.

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I think that next weck we will not have any formal meetings

of the comittce, owing to the recess, but ve will then, I

think, we arc going to have to ço into tri-weckly meetings,

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beginning. after the recess, so we can stop up the pace fur che

investigation.

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Senator Mondale. If they could get the Lansdale memo.

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Mr. Colby. I will do that tris afternoon.

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I would like to add two things that have come to my attentio:

on the subject of assassinations, both of which are allegations,

both of which have been knocked down.

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There was an allegation,

some man has alleged that he was

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working or conducting an assassination in Colonbia, and ve have

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looked into the specifics of it, and there is absolutely rothing

to it. I thought I would mention it. I have the facts here

and will include them at some time.

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There is another allegation that one of our officers

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had some knowledge of an attempt against Chou In-Lai, and ie has

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written me a note that points out that it is impossible for that

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to have happened because he wasn't in the place at the time.

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Chairman Church. Since they are allegations into which

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"you have inquired, I think you should male the papers available

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Mr. COlDY. I "1l1 nake sure the staff gets those. ~

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Chairman Church. Thank you very nuch.

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Mr. Knoche. Could I point out, I think we have the answer

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to the photographs.

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There were seven of these photographs taken at different

angles at the sane time, but absolutely different tine intervals

duriny the time that the police had these men in custoly.

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Mc. Knochc. I am not sure. I am not certain for that

particular board that you were looking at.

with the blowup, they took this one of the seven photograpas

which gives the best opportunity to look at the face.

Mr. Colby.

So they were separate photographs.

Chairman Church.

yes.

--.

MI. Knoche. I will be glad to leave that with you if you

would like to have it for your file.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock pim., the Committee

recessed subject to the

call of the Chair.)

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