AFFIDAVIT:GERALD L. LIEBENAU. U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Originator: CIA
From: LIEBENAU, GERALD L.
Document date: 02/07/1981
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1704-10320-10099

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

3/1/51

MARK ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 78-1743

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT

GERALD I. LIEBENAU, being first duly sworn, deposes and

says:

....

1. I am the Information Review Officer for the

Directorate of Operations (DO) of the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA). My responsibilities include the review of Do

documents which are the object of Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) requests to and litigation against the CIA to ensure

that details

made regarding the disposition of such docu

ments, pursuant to provisions of the FOlA, are proper. The

statements

made herein are

based upon my knowledge, upon

information made available to me in my official capacity,

upon advice and guidance from the Office of General Counsel

of the CIA and upon conclusions reached in accordance

therewith.

2. Through my official duties, I have become

acquainted with this case since the ruling of the Circuit

Court of Appeals on 12 November 1980. My predecessor,

Mr. Robert

E. Owen, had been the DO reviewing official

concerning the FOlA disposition of the document at issue

In

this litigation.

Several affidavits of MI. Owen have

been

filed during the course of this litigation: one on

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9 January 1979, and the other on 11 January 1980. During

the course of this litigation

the document at issue, marked

509-803 for identification purposes, was initially withheld

in its entirety pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b) (1), (b) (2)

and (b)(3). During a review connected with Mr. Owen's

affidavit of 11 January 1980, a determination was made that

portions of the document were no longer exempt from release

as a result of disclosures that had recently been made in

connection with Congressional hearings. Effective with the

Order of the Circuit Court of Appeals on 12 November 1980,

all filing instructions previously withheld and deleted from

the released version of the document were reinserted in the

releasable version.

Additionally, all classification

markings and related information control markings which had

been deleted from the releasable version of the document, as

part of the declassification process, were reinserted in the

document and then marked to show that the classification

designations are no longer appropriate. The newly revised

version of the document was provided the plaintiff. (CIA:

Exhibit A).

3. On the basis of my review of the document at issue,

in connection with this affidavit I have

determined that one

additional modification of the document is necessary. The

word "City" has been reinserted in those portions previously

marked "g" on the second page in the first line of the text,

on page 3, in the second and fourth lines of paragraph 4,

and in the third line of paragraph 5. The CIA concern

over

public acknowledgment of the existence of CIA

stations or

other facilities in specified foreign locations is real.

In

2

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most circumstances, some damage to the official relacions

between the United States

and the named country is

predictable. In the case of

the

acknowledgment of the

existence of a CIA station in

Mexico City in 1963, it has

been alleged or referred to in a number of forums

and

publications, semi-official and official, including

accidental disclosure in CIA documents released

under the

FOIA. Consequently, withholding the same information in

this document can no longer be justified. A copy of the

document with "City" reinserted is attached as CIA Exhibit B

and is being forwarded to plaintiff.

4.. To fulfill my officiál responsibilities, I have

been delegated authority for original classification of

information as Top Secret. I have reviewed document

509-803

and have determined that the portions which remain withheld

are properly exempt from disclosure because:

a.

it is currently and properly classified

pursuant to Executive Order 12065 as information

requiring continued

protection against unauthorized

disclosure to protect against damage to national

security and thus exempt from release pursuant to FOIA

exemption (b) (1):

bo_ the information reveals facts about

intelligence sources and methods which the Director of

Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting

against unauthorized disclosure as set forth in

50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3), and which is thus exempt from

release pursuant to FOlA exemption (b) (3); and

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c. the information reveals facts about CIA

organization, functions, names, official titles or

numbers of personnel employed, all of which are exempt

from disclosure pursuant to 50 U.s.C. 403g and thus

FOIA exemption (b) (3).

5.

The letter markings used to identify the kind of

information withheld in each instance

remains basically as

set forth in the affidavit of Robert E. Owen except for the

reinsertion of material formerly deleted

and identified as

category "E" and "F"; said categories being withdrawn and

previously deleted material having been reinserted pursuant

to the Circuit Court Order of 12 November 1980. The

remaining categories are repeated below for the court's

convenience. Additionally, more specific language has

been

added and underlined. The additions

are possible because of

the classification of this affidavit:

Circumstantial information which, in

combination with other information, could lead to the

identification of an intelligence source, in this case

a foreign government's security service and its

intelligence service collaborating with the CIA under

an arrangement of confidentiality, withheld pursuant to

FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3):

b.

Circumstantial information which, in

combination with other information could

lead to the

identification of an intelligence method used to

collect intelligence information abroad, including the

use of liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence

and security services and the methods these services

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employ in intelligence collection, withheld pursuant to

FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3);

c. Information which is currently and properly

classified

in the interest of national

security,

because it discloses details of ClA's knowledge of the

identities and activities of soviet intelligence

officers and the nature of CIA's counterintelligence

efforts to collect said information, withheld pursuant

to FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3); and

a. Information identifying CIA staff employees

and organizational components, withheld pursuant to

FOIA exemptions (b) (3).

6. In doing my review of the document at issue,. I

determined that only exempt portions have been withheld.

Conversely, all segregable, non-exempt material has been

released.

7. The major concern which prompts the CIA to cóntinue

to withhold portions of document 509-803 is the damage that

would be inflicted

upon the liaison arrangements with the

National Security Service of the Government of Mexico if the

withheld portions of the document were publicly disclosed.

Most of the information would not have been available

except for the contributions

and collaboration of the>

National Security Service of the Government of

Mexico. The

information so withheld was

received under an arrangement;

of mutually assured confidentiality? To disregard that

arrangement and to disclose the existence and the product

of the arrangement would threaten its current viability.

The Government of Mexico, through its iational Security

service, has been, and is, a very useful partner of

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the security and intelligence services of the United

States. The collaboration includes

efforts to

stop the flow

of narcotics into the United States, to monitor and

negate

the activities of Central American terrorists organizations

and to monitor and negate the activities of hostile foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Soviet services,

against the United States. A number of other benefits also

accrue

to the United States as

a result of this collabora-

tion.

The loss of this liaison arrangement would

cause

damage to the United States' ability to protect its national

security. The protection the arrangement provides could not

be entirely replaced if Mexico withdrew.

8. Disclosure of the kind of collaboration with the

United

States by the Mexican National Security Service which

is apparent in the withheld portions of document 509-803,

-would cause considerable trouble to the current Government

of Mexico.

such activities would not be viewed with favor

by a significant portion of the public in Mexico.

Disclosure of the existence of

such

a relationship by the

U.S. Governinent

is likely to be used actively

and

effectively against the current Governnent of Mexico by

dissident political groups.

Moreover, the government itself

is likely to feel compelled to make public gestures to

discredit any allegations or inferences that the current

government would engage in such collaboration. Despite the

fact that the current collaboration is close, the government

would not want to acknowledge it publicly. Furthermore, the

Mexican Government may fear that its current cooperation

with the U.S. Government

also might be disclosed

cooperation

is reveale?.

if its past

Therefore, it might limit or even

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discontinue cooperation with our Government in intelligence

or law enforcenent activities and possibly also in other

areas where we now cooperate?

9. There have been a number of books and magazine

articles by private authors in which various

allegations of

CIA intelligence operations in Mexico City have appeared.

The collaboration of the Mexican Government had also been

alleged. Such private guessing and speculation does

not

have the authority of an official disclosure through

FOIA release of official records. Consequently, even though

some speculation has accurately described secret activities,

the damage has heen limited because such disclosures do not

officially challenge the Mexican Government to take official

note; furthermore, they are only approximately accurate and

could not be considered authentic. Disclosure of the

_withheld portions of document 509-803 would complete the

damage possible by making the disclosures precise and

authoritative.

10. Beyond purely internal discomfort any disclosures

would cause the Mexican Government, there are potentially

significant foreign relations consequences also. Diplomatic

arrängements with several foreign governments are likely to

suffer because-certain portions of the withheld material

demonstrate the violations of the sanctity of foreign

diplomatic territory and facilities in Mexico. Such

developments would, at a minimum, increase the likelihood

that the Mexican Government would want to diminish any

further hazard involved in intelligence collaboration with

the United States.

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11. It was not possible to identify the liaison

equities in an unclassified affidavit. To do so, in light

of what was already evident on the public record concerning

the substance of the document and the locale of the events

described, would have been tantamount to disclosing which

government had collaborated with CIA and, given the kind of

activity, the specific (services involved. An essential

element of the intelligence liaison arrangement. is an

understanding of confidentiality?

The intelligence

information /exchanged normally must be kept secret as well

as the fact of the liaison/arrangement. An effective

working liaison would not exist without the necessary mutual!

commitment to confidentiality)

12. The reality of such commitments to secrecy is

recognized in the language of Executive Order 12065.

Section 1-3 describes the kinds of information which are

classifiable. It specifically identifies in "Section 1-

301(b) foreign government information; 1-301 (c) intelligence

activities, sources or methods; and 1-301 (d) foreign

relations of the United States." Section 1-302 states that

"Even though information is determined to concern one or

more of the criteria in Section 1-301, it may not be

classified unless an original classification authority also

determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could

be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the

national security." To further emphasize considerations

which are unique to U.S. foreign intelligence activities.

Section 1-303 elaborates. that, "Unauthorized disclosure of.

foreign government information or the identity of a con-

fidential foreign source is presumed to cause at least

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identifiable damage to national

security." (Emphasis

added.) The information withheld from disclosure

in docu-

ment 509-803 resulting from a

liaison

"arrangement and/or

which could reasonably be expected

to lead to the identi-

fication of a confidential intelligence source, in this case

a foreign government's

security service),

is thus properly

classifiable and classified.

13. Section 1-501 of Executive Order 12065 states what

must be shown on the face of a document when it

,is

"originally classified." This section deals with documents

originated after Executive Order 12065

was effective on 1

December 1978. Such requirements could

not have been

imposed on classified documents already

in existence such as

document

509-803. Section 1-402 of the same Executive Order

states:

Only officials with Top Secret classifi-

cation authority and agency heads listed

in

Section 1-2 may classify information for

more

than

six years

from the date of the

original

classification.

This authority shall he used

sparingly.

In

such cases, a declassification

date or

set.

event, or a date

for review, shall be

This date or event shall be as early as

national security permits and shall be not

more

than twenty years after original

classification, except that for foreign

government

information the date of

event may

be up to thirty years after classification.

As I indicated-earlier, I am authorized to originally

classify information at the level of Top Secret.

For the

purpose set forth in this affidavit, I have reviewed document

509-803

and have determined that portions of the document

remain properly classified at the level of secret.

The

document is properly marked to show that classification.

Furthermore, the document is marked to shoi a date for a

subsequent declassification revier. an: 1 a.

identified as

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the classification review authority who determined that

classification should be extended.

14. The withheld portions of document 509-803 can be

viewed

in groups for purposes of discussing their exemption

justifications.

The deleted portions marked "B" on the

second page and the following page marked "No. 2" contain

information demonstrating that the source of the information

overheard both ends of conversations conducted over

telephones located in Soviet diplomatic facilities in Mexico

City. The ability to electronically monitor such;

¡conversations was possible only with the collaboration of the

Mexican National Security Service, Public allegations of

such

activities have been made by private individuals, but

official acknowledgment has been

avoided because of the

potential damage.

The information has been withheld because

it is foreign government informationf and it discloses

intelligence sources and methods and is thus properly

classified and withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b) (1)

and (3).

15. The deleted portions of paragraphs 5 through 9 and

12a through 12d contain infornation wnich was provided

exclusively by the Mexican

National Security Service

concerning whät the Service had learned of Silvia Duran's

knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City

in

the fall of 1963. The Mexican Service's information came

Eron the électronic surveillance of the Cuban and Soviet

/diplomatio facilities in Mexico city angferor the inter-

rogation of Silvia Duran by the Mexican Security Service.

24..

Silvia Duran was initially identifieá as a person potentially

noiledgable of Oswald's activities,

as the result of the

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@electronic surveillance. On 21 February 1964, the Mexican

Government officially made the results of their interrogation

of Silvia Duran available to the U.S. Government for the

Warren Commission. Most material on the same subject

received prior to that date by CIA has been maintained as

classified to avoid disclosing information confirming the>

state of the liaison activity and the scope of the

intelligence collaboration with the Mexican Government.

Some

documents have been released to FOIA requesters which

disclose that CIA had some ability to influence the Mexican

Service and that that Service provided certain information to

CIA. The documents were partially declassified and released

because of preemptive disclosures made duiing the

investigation conducted by the Senate Select Committee to

Study Governnent Operations set forth in its report

identified as "Book V," dated 23 April 1976.

Because the

above identified paragraphs of document 509-803

disclose

the

detailed nature of the Mexican Security Service's knowledge

of Silvia Duran's information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald

before the Mexican Governnent publically acknowledged having

such information, the nature of CIA's liaison with that

Service is disclosed and some of the Mexican Service'sy

intelligence methods are also apparent.

Official U.S.

acknowledgment of this information can reasonably be expected

to do damage to national security and is thus properly

clasified and exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA

exemption (b) (1). Since the same information would disclose

the intelligence sources and methods involved in the liaison

arrangement with the Mexican Service, it is also exempt fron

release under 50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3) and pursuant to Fol;.

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exemption (b) (3).

16. The withheld portions of paragraphs 10 and 11

contain information which was available

from a very sensitive

source which monitored conversations

between

the President of

Cuba and the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. Such an

ability is

obviously exceedingly valuable and sensitive.

The

information from this source has been made public in very

limited amounts, and it has been extensively rewritten,

abbreviated and paraphrased to protect against exposing the

source and method which produced the information. The

disclosure of the information in document 509-803 could

reascrably be expected to result in a clear disclosure

and

thus damage national security and is, therefore, properly

classified and exempt from

release

pursuant to FOlA exemption

(b) (1). In that a disclosure of the information would

also

expose

an

intelligence source and method,

it is

also

protected from disclosure by 50 us.c. 403(d) (3) and exempt

from

disclosures pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (3).

17. The withheld portions of paragraphs 16, 17, 19 and

20 contain information which discloses the extent of CIA's

counterintelligence induledge of the persounel and activities

of the soviet intelligence service.

Because of the amount of

time that has gone by, this information has diminished in its

potential value to the Soviet intelligence service, but I

believe it still possesses value as information that can be

used against U.S. counterintelligence efforts.

Since some

damage can reasonably be expected from disclosure of the

information, it is properly classified and exempt from

disclosure

pursuant

tO FOIA exemption (b) (1).

1?.

The withhell portions of paragraphs 21-24 centu::

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-

foreign government information or refer to foreign government

information received from the Mexican and Nicaraguan

intelligence and security services. The liaison arrangements)

included assurances of mutual confidentiality. Since damage

is presumed to flow from the disclosure of such information

and the disclosure would expose a foreign intelligence

source, the information is protected by classification and 50

U.S.C. 403(d) (3) and thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to

FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3).

19. Both the CIA and the plaintiff have asserted that

most of the substantive information in the document is

contained

in other documents that have been released to the

public. This affidavit attempts to show the court how the

manner in which the information is presented in document 509-

803 results in the disclosure of exempt information. I have

....— attached copies of CIA documents in which information

concerning the same substance as that being withheld has been

publicly released. The documents are grouped and labeled

with names to assist in making comparisons with docunent 509-

803.

The paragraphs cited are those in document 509-803.

Oswald - paragraph 1, starting on page two:

Duran - paragraphs 5-9 and 12a-d;

Cuban Ambassador - paragraphs 10 and 1l:

Kostikov - paragraphs. 16, 17, 19 and 20; and

Alvarado - paragraphs 21 and 23-25.

I believe the Court will find that the withheld portions of

document 509-803 do in fact disclose

infornation concerning

the

intelligence sources and methods

involved in

addition to

the

intelligence substance produced, à copy of the original.

unexpurgated version of document 509-803 is attached and

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marked "CIA Exhibit C."

sun adam

GERALD

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Y

)ss.

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX

)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

February 1981.

!!.:

day of

Totary

Public

ily

connission

expires:

...

S F.

14

P.

F.

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