MEETING WITH MR. ROBERT BLAKEY, HSCA STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL; FOR BLAKEY REVIEW OF AN UNSANITIZED COPY ON TASK FORCE COMMENTS ON BOOK V OF THE SSC FINAL REPORT.
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., OLC
To: MEMO FOR THE RECORD
Document date: 12/07/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10096-10044

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

APTENVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CH HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

7 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Mr. Robert Blakey, HSCA Staft

Director and Chief Counsel

1. Mr. Cummins brought Mr. Blakey to my office at 1400 today

and.Mr. Leader and I met with them for about an hour and 20 minutes.

The purpose of the meeting was to deliver to Mr.. Cummins, for review

by Mr. Blakey, an unsanitized copy of the Task Force comments on

Book V of the SSC Final Report, as well as two sanitized copies of

the same report for review by HSCA Staff members.

2. I described to Mr. Blakey the genesis of the study and in

very general terms, how it had been conducted, emphasizing that it

is not a report of the Inspector General in the usual sense, because

it was based on work by a Task Force.

I stated that the report was,

however, assembled and written in its final form by Mr. Leader and

me, and

we would assume responsibility for any imprecisions.

3. I stated that there may still be materials in Agency files

that relate to issues that may be raised, but that on their face

did not appear to be relevant.

It would take a specific reference

to make such pieces of information meaningful.

I stated that we were

pretty confident that we had covered most of the ground.

Reference

was made to a couple of items that had turned up since the report was

written. These will be turned over to Mr. Blakey at some point.

I noted that the Terms of Reference that he would see in

the report amounted to a point of departure, and that as we pro-

gressed some of the questions seemed unimportant and new ones emerged.

5. I discussed the effect that protection of sources and methods

had on the sanitized version.

The names of Agency personnel below a

certain level were removed; he would see them in the unsanitized ver-

A press story that was significant because of its reference to

a man to have been used in the assassination of Castro posed problems

for us. Although the press reference was unclassified, its significance

was based on operational information, and we had attempted to develop

the story while protecting the man.

We had deleted the name of a Cuban

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SECRET

exile leader who was used by the Mafia.

We also had deleted infor-

mation that would permit the identification of four cubans, one of

whom had served ten years in jail but was now out of jail in Cuba

(AMLASH), and three others who are still in jail. In treatment of

the AMLASH operation, we had deleted references to places, dates

and events that otherwise would have permitted his identification.

6.

I said that in one case we had turned up an operation

(AMTRUNK) which had been sold to the White House and the Department

of State by a prominent journalist who is suspected of being a

Communist agent.

This suspicion raised security considerations

about the operation.

I described the role of counterintelligence

analysis and stated that CI analysis, in the Agency, is to alert

us to exercise care should the Agency have occasion to deal with

the man. While there are people in the Agency who believe the man

to be a Communist agent, there is no confirmation of it and it

would be unfair. if the conclusions reached in the CI analysis were

untrue and his name had been published.

I noted that Mr. Blakey

would read this in the unsanitized version and would be able to

compare it with the sanitized version.

7. I told him that all of Tab F had been deleted because of

the extensive operational detail. The sanitization of this report

was affected by the Mexican government denial of the CIA presence in

Mexico, the involvement of a former Mexican President, a series of

joint operations with the Mexican intelligence service] and the ability

to identify persons who had assisted the Agency.

8.

I observed that where we express opinions, even if he has

reservations about them, we feel that they have merit. We had

done our best to understand what we had found and had expressed

some attitudes about the various issues raised by our research.

said that after he had read the report he may have questions, and

we could discuss them.

9. Mr. Blakey asked if we had reached any conclusions about

the Kennedy assassination. I said simply that we had found nothing

that bore on the matter.

In a general discussion I pointed out that

we were addressing the issues raised in Book. V of the SSC Final Report

and that if it had turned up evidence on the Kennedy assassination we

would have reported it, but primarily we were addressing the question

This covered the subject of assassination,

but we found nothing we thought bore on it directly.

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10. Mr. Blakey asked what I thought about whether anyone had

participated with Lee Harvey Oswald. I said that I had no factual

information to that effect, but as a personal observation it was

hard for me to believe that he would not have told someone what he

planned to do.

I would have expected him to tell Marina, although

from reviews of the recent book, this does not appear to be the

case.

He offered the view that had the Russians been involved we

would have picked up some reporting by now in one way or other. I

said that although it might be possible, were such the case, I

thought it highly unlikely, given Soviet practice on security.

I

applied the same reasoning to the Cubans. He asked which Cubans,

indicating his interest in the right-wing Cubans.

I told him I

was speaking of the Castro Cubans, but that if right-wing Cubans

had been involved the FBI would be more likely to happen on such

information than would CIA.

I noted that the present ADDO, Mr.

Shackley, had been COS, Miami, during the period in question and

could repeat the testimony he had given the Church Committee on

the matter; he is quoted in Book V of the SSC Report.

In any

event, any conspirators would be few in numbers and would have

reasons to keep it to themselves.

11. Mr. Blakey speculated about possible connections between

Jack Ruby and others.

I noted that our study had a few comments

on a possible connection between Ruby and Trafficante in 1959, but

that we could not take it beyond that. I said again, that the FBI

would be more likely to have information on this than would CIA.

I said that we had not carried our speculations in the report be-

yond a possibility of a connection, as we had no factual basis for

He speculated generally about the various alternatives

-and l Solted in effect that i was not inclined to speculate very

much without some factual basis and that, in any event, I was not

an assassination buff.

After Mr. Blakey has read the unsanitized report, and

compared it with the sanitized version which is for review by

his staff, I expect to hear from him further.

S. D. Breckinridge

cc: OLC, Mr. Cummins

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