PROVISION OF SUITABLE RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR TEMPORARY INSTALLATION AT THE BREAKWATER ENTRANCE TO THE PORT OF COLON, PANAMA
Agency: ARMY
Originator: ARMY
From: CYRUS R. VANCE
To: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10135

RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Released under the John

Masassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

09-12-2017

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ARMY

FROM: CYRUS R. VANCE

TO :

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TITLE:

PROVISION OF SUITABLE RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR TEMPORARY INSTALLATION AT THE

BREAKWATER ENTRANCE TO THE PORT OF COLON, PANAMA

DATE: 00/00/0000

PAGES:

23

SUBJECTS :

POLICY AND PLANNING - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/24/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder I. Memo from Vance to CJCS re: Radar Installation; Report entitled

"Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of Use of

Force)."

JFK Reviews

De Delass of the due 352

< Exclude — Exemp

V9.1

HN 54214

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SHORET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Not used

monstead

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJE

Provision of Suitable Radar Equipment for Temporary

Installation at the Breakwater Entrance to the Port of

Colon,

Panama

The recent reports of possible contraband shipments to Venezuela-

Colombia originating from the Panama Free Zone were discussed at the

Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council on December 13,

1963. As a result of these reports and as part of an intensified effort to

confirm and eliminate such traffic, I request that immediate action be

Contact with the Joint Stalf confirms that CINCLANT has appropriate

ment together with necessary operating personnel be situated in such a

manner that day and night coverage is provided of shipping, entering and

leaving the Breakwater north of Poft of Colon. Present plans contem -

plate that this requirement may extend for a period of up to 120 days.

Appropriate coordination between

•CINCLANT and USCINCSO

should be accomplished by the Joint Staff.

WISCINCSO is authorized to

coordinate this matter with the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone and

CAS Panama. In view of the urgency of this matter the equipment and

operators should be in place not later than December 22, 1963. Major

General Krulak, who participated as your representative at the Decem-

ber 13, 1963 meeting of the NSC Standing Group, is familiar with this.

requirement.

Cyrus R. Vance

Secretary of the Army

SECRE

DOWNGRAD. D LUd INTERVATS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

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UNILATERAL ACTION A

CIA View

CIA will propose authority, be granted to conduct CIA or

autonomous air strikes.

Comment

Advantages outweigh disadvantages provided "plausible

denial' can be assured. CIA (US) personnel would risk this

denial factor.

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Used in book

nsC

standingeting

Group

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GROUP I

Ixoludad fron automatio

domgrading and

declassirination

This d

No.

SEC!

went cansists of 10

of -

3

pages

Copies; Series

POSSIBLE FURTHER UNILATERAL, AND BILATERAL

ACTIONS TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA

(SHORT OF USE OF FORCE

Unilateral

A.

Alr attacks against carefully selected, important

economic installations by autonomous Cuban exile

group (s) operating from bases outside the United

States.

1325.

(Capability to be provided to autonomous group(s)

by CIA on "plausible denial" basis. Authortzation

for such operations has been requested in past but

not granted.)

1. Advantages

• Possible substantial direct economic effects

• Indirect economic effects (maintenance of

military alert with consequent partial tying up

of labor force)

- Positive effects on morale of anti-Castro-ele-.

ments and waverers within Cuba

- Clear demonstration to Castro of determination

of opposition

2. Disadvantages

SECRE

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UNILATERAL ACTION B

CIA View

CIA will recommend complete relaxation of present policy

banning all independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes

against targets in Cuba from US and urge the British to do likewise

for Bahama territory.

Comment

State course of action is preferable. Only selected reliable

exile groups should be utilized for this purpose. The British would

likely recoil from CIA proposal. Exile air attacks should not be

authorized.

=.,

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-2.

20 Disadvantages

• Technical difficulties and cost of

providing capability

* Uncertainty of successful execution

• Risk of attributability

- Direct confliet with our well-known, public

opposition-to alr attacks

Marked radsing of noise level

• Possible Soviet reaction, including negative

effect on troop withdrawals

Possible reaction against air surveillance

Selective covert relaxation of U,S, controls against

Cuban exile groups in Florida wishing to undertake

sabotage and infiltration activities.

(Involves discreet neutralization of obstacles to

the operations of such groups established by United

States enforcement agencies).

1. Advantages

« Possible additéonal (but minor) direct economic

damage

• Possible indirect economic effects

• Provision of some screen for CIA's own

operations

Possible

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C

UNILATERAL ACTION C

CIA View

CIA will concur in this course of action.

Comment

This course of action should only be undertaken if a

US policy decision to do away with Castro by all means shortof

invasion is forthcoming. Otherwise it constitutes a costly and

marginally effective course of action.

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.1.= 3

•Possible dilution of Cuban defenses of benefit

to CIA operations

• Positive effects on Cuban exile morale

- Some positive effects on morale of anti-castro."

elements and waverers within Cuba

- Method of signalling to Castro change to

"harder" U/S. policy

2. Disadvantages

U.s, acquiescence quite evident

- Direct confliet with our statements and actions

cotinerning U.S.- based exile raids

"Uncertainty of control over choice of targets

(e.g., Soviet vessels)

- Ralsing of noise level

• Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal

of military personnel

MilLtary Feints

(Movement of U.S. air and surface units over and in

international waters nesr Cuba In manner designed

to keep Cuban military force in state of alert and

uncertainty. To be effective, movements

, would have

to be extended over time)

1. Advantages

-SECRI

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UNILATERAL ACTION D

CIA View

CIA will concur for both intelligence and psychological

effect.

Comment

Flights can and should be resumed particularly if

reports of stepped up Soviet Arms deliveries continue. In

addition consideration should be given to initiating night

photography missions in areas of suspected military activity.

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1. Advantages

- Indirect economic effects of maintenance of

mIlitary alert

- Psychological haraasment of Castro and other

leaders

• Opportunities for escalation, 1f desired

2.

Disadvantages

- Risk of reaction by Castro,

with

consequent

danger of escalation

•Investment of U.S. forces over time in essen-

tially psychological exercise

• Possible negative effects on morale of anti

Castro elements and waverers within Cuba when

nothingasubstantial happens

• Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal

of military personnel

Occasional, selected low-level "reconnaissance"

overflights by U,S, aircraft

(Flight paths would be designed to reduce to a

minimum the possibility of efféctive Cuban

counter-action against afrcraft)

1. Advantages

SECR

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UNILATERAL ACTION E

CIA View

CIA will support this action and seek additional US

sanctions against Canada, the UK, Spain and Japan.

Comment

NASM 220 provides that a ship that engages in the Cuban

trade on or after January 1, 1963 is proscribed from carrying

US government cargoes. This ship can be removed only if the

owner contracts to remove it and all other ships owned by his

firm from the Cuban trade. The State course of action is a

fairly significant step which should increase pressure on Cuba.

The State paper appears to underplay somewhat the effects of

this action.

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8. 5.06

E.

1. Advantages

- Most emphatic method of signalling a change

to "harder" polley

• Possible tie-in to need for Intelligence on

Cuban capabilities for delivering arms to Latin

America

- Possible beneficial Intelligence side effects.

:2.

Disadvantages

• Risk of escalation (Cubans on formal record

-concerning reaction to low-level flights)

• Possible reaction against high-level flights

Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal

of military personnel

- Possible raising of public and Congressional

apprehension that offensive weapons systems have:

been reintroduced

Free-world shipping

(Examples: extension of NSAM 220 to cover all ships

owned or controlled by a firm with ships in the Cuban

trade; dental of commercial, as well as U.S. -financed

cargoes In U.S. parts to ships In Cuban trade)

1o Advantages

SEGRET

-SENS

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C

BILATERAL ACTION A

CIA View

Comment

Unknown.

The State paragraph is merely a generalized disserta-

tion on the complexities of US relations with its allies.

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6

1. Advantages

• Some limited reduction of number of free-world

vessela In Cuban trade

- Heightened appearance of forward movement

because of Congrassional and press sensitivity

to shipping question

Z Disadvantages

- Relatively small practical returns

• Political costs wich maritime nations

- Possible legal difficultles Involved in some

unilateral measures

II. Bilateral

A.

Ceneral

Essentially, the effort In the bilateral field

i dould represent a continuation, sharpening and

Intensification of programs already in effect.

Measures of a bilateral nature, outside and within

the Hemisphere, would be strengthened and facilitated

by OAS decisions and recommendations emerging from the

Venezuelan case, Wherever possible, the DAS reso-

lutions would request the cooperation of other

countries.

SEGRET SENSITIVE

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BILATERAL ACTION B

CIA View

As noted previously CIA will favor strong US sanctions

against free world nations involved in the Cuban trade especially

Canada, the UK, Japan and Spain.

Comment

Additional US denial efforts are required.

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SLEE

The basic limiting factor in the Intensification

of our political and economic pressure on other

countries bilaterally is, of course, the balance

that must be struck between our interests with respect

to Cuba and other broad interests at play in our

bilateral relations. For example, Spain's 1n-

creasing commercial and transportation relations

with Cuba are a matter of concern in terms of our

Cuban policy, yet the political and economic

pressure we can exert on Spain 1s circumscribed

by the need to safeguard our other political and

milftary Interests in Spain.

B. " Economic Denial

This program Involves overt and covert, legal

and extra-legal, diplonatic and private, efforts to

deny Cuba access to free-world markets and sources

of supply for commodities critical or important to

the Cuban economy.

• A major inhibiting element in

this effort is the short world supply of sugar which

increases Cubba leverage on free-world sugar con-

sumers. In addition, there 1s a general (but varying)

reluctance on the part of free-world countles to

interfere with trade in Items which are not strategic

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BILATERAL ACTION B

CIA View

As noted previously CIA will favor strong US sanctions

against free world nations involved in the Cuban trade especially

Canada, the UK, Japan and Spain.

Comment

Additional US denial efforts are required.

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=8

in the Internationally accepted sense (COCOM, Battle

Act). This fact puts a premium on direct overt and

covert pressures on the companies involved, as

distinguished from governments.

Progress has been made in our economic denial

program, and effective operations have been carried

out cooperatively by State, Treasury, Commerce and

CIA. There 1s, however, considerable additional

effort required, especially because Castro 1s now

engaged in a major attempt to broaden trade with

the free-world. No new authority is required at

this time, but rather an intensification of efforts

through the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Com

mittee on Cuba.

A more restrictive legal interpretation by the

Executive Branch of the various legislative pro-

visions on trade with Cuba could have considerable

Impact, If we were prepared to accept the costs to

our other interests in the offending countries and

If we were prepared tacitly to indicate that existing

legal Interpretations had been in error.

C.

SEC

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BILATERAL ACTION C

CIA View

Unknown.

Comment

Concur

(See Tab

_ Section I)

===-=

BILATERAL ACTION D

CIA View

Unknown

Comment

The US-USSR Civil Air Agreement will seriously erode

our efforts to establish barriers against air service to Cuba.

The US should risk offending those countries which fail to

respond to current US efforts to restrict air services to Cuba.

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C. Free-World Shipping in Cuban Trade

An additional immediately available step would be

the conclusion of an agreement involving the amend-

ment of NSAM 220 with the British shipowner, Mavroleon,

to guarantee the withdrawal by early 1969 of all his

ships in return for the progressive removal from

the blackliat of his vessels as they get out of

the trade. This agreement should have beneficial

effects on other important ship owners.

A selective refusal to exercise the Presidential

waiver of tha Cuban shipping provisions of the new

Foreign Aid Authorization act could increase our

diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, 1f

we were ready to. incur. the costs to our broad

0T345

67:90

interests in the offending countries.

D. Air Service to and from Cuba

Our efforts to reduce, restrict and harass

air services (free-world and Communist) to and from

Cuba should be strengthened by the provisions-of the

new Foreign Ald Authorization act, 1f, again, we

are prepared to accept the costs to other interests

in the offending countries.. On tha other hand, a

US-USSR

VE

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BILATERAL ACTION C

CIA View

Unknown.

Comment

Concur

(See Tab

_ Section I)

BILATERAL ACTION D

CIA View

Unknown

Comment

The US-USSR Civil Air Agreement will seriously erode

our efforts to establish barriers against air service to Cuba.

The US should risk offending those countries which fail to

respond to current US efforts to restrict air services to Cuba.

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.• 10 .

US-USSR civil air agreement could have erosive

effects on the always precarious barriers we have

established against air services to Cuba.

E. Anti-Subversive Program

Essentially, the problem here is to strengthen

both the will and the capabllity in latin Anerica

to take the politically and technically difficult

measures which have been recommended. The basie

lines of the anti-subversive program have been laid

out, and they are being followed with varying degrees

of success in the different countrles. Constant:

follow-up, technical advice and assistance, and

training are essential to improvement in the execution

of the program.

SECRET SENST

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Bilateral Action E

CIA View

CIA would favor early recognition of the Dominican and

Honduran governments to

assist in holding the Latin American

line against Castro. CIA would favor bilateral arrangements

with Latin American governments for joint measures to detect

and to prevent arms smuggling and subversive activity by land,

sea, or air. Venezuela should be given first priority.

Comment

DOD should favor the CIA view above. Balanced

corrective action in the key target areas of Venezuela and

Columbia will require improved military communications and

an increased US military presence (MTTS).

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BILATERAL ACTION E

CIA View

CIA would favor early recognition of the Dominican and

Honduran governments to assist in holding the Latin American

line against Castro. CIA would favor bilateral arrangements

with Latin American governments for joint measures to detect

and to prevent arms smuggling and subversive activity by land,

sea, or air.

Venezuela should be given first priority.

Comment

DOD should favor the CIA view above. Balanced

corrective action in the key target areas of Venezuela and

Columbia will require improved military communications and

an increased US military presence (MTTS).

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