Originator: DOS
Document date: 01/13/1961
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

DAVIS

178-10004-10196

RECORD SERIES :

GENERAL SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: SSC-TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION, CUBA, CHILE

Document Information

Released under the John F

Kennedy Assassination Records

Follection Act of 1992 144 USC

Case#:NW 56629

ate: 04-13-2018

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

DOS

CURTIS, E.G.

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

01/13/1961

7

CUBAN EXILES

DOS

BAY OF PIGS

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS : Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/10/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Detailed memo of meeting: Ambassador Whiting Willauer, John Irwin, General Gray, et al. Attached

to 1781000410190

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Jaruary 13, 1961

178-10004-10196

The meeting ocened at 10:05 a.m. with Ambassador Willauer in the

chair.

There were some introductory remarks emphasizing the special

security restrictions on any metters discussed--Secretary Irwin noted

that in the Defense Departnent only Secretary Ersicine, Secretary Douglas,

Secretary Gates and Secretary-designate liciamara will be infomed. There

was some prelininary discussion as to the nature of the joo to be done

which is brought out more fully in the remarks noted later on. Ambassador

Willaver indicated that the reason for the existence of the working group

was to provide a thira prong to the two-pronged approach.

The two pronged

approach is the overt progran for Cuba on the one hand, and the accompanying

covert program contained in he document dated December 6 and December 20.

Ambassador Hillauer then proceeded to read through the document,

stopping at various points to coment or to respond to questions. This

record will not attempt to reproduce the content of the document, but

merely to identify the place where the reading ceased and discussion took

place.

Ambassador Millauer read Part I. Basic Assunptions through the

sentence on econonic dislocations (lire 5, first paragraph). At this point

he noted that he felt, and ne quoted Jose figueres as concurring in this

viewpoint, that there was a high probability that the Soviet Union would

pump in enough econoric assistance to make a silo case of Cuba. He noted

thai assatisfaction arising from economic factors is not overlooked.

he

incacated that for all practical purposes, he fAst, wet the notion had been

abandoned that there was any nope o overthrowing

the Castro regime irith

econoric varfare measures alone, even in they include an effective blockade.

He then read through the rest of the Basic Assumptions section.

He then read Part II. Surrested Solution through the first

paragraph.

Comment:

Anbassador tillauer indicated that evenus hai overtaken the provi-

sions of this paragranh.

He said that at this time no one foresees any

Foreign inisters leeting by february 1, nor do they foresee any effective

collective sanctions decision. Arbassador Millauer then went on to note

that an soscure item wrich appears in the lew fork Times of January 12

indicated an inclination on the part of President Betancourt of Venezuela

to call an Ois Foreign iristers neeting for the purpose of acting against

dictators ooth of the right and of the left. ir. boorr noted that the type

of reaction wich had occurred yesterday in Uruguay against the Conunist

and Castro activitios could build un to an ais neeting Arbassarior dillauer

commented that we nad not given up all hope, but we cannot count on sucin a

meting saline place. Anbassador illauer then read the second paragraph.

PLEASE RETURN BY WAND

that Peru

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that Peru had broken relations unilaterally and perhaps Uruguay is about

to do so.

The other Latin American countries; however, are reviewing

their political sitiation and appear to be receding fron their somewnat

stronger attitude tward breaking relations which existed prior to the

United States action. He specifically cited the Chilean elections and the

Argentine evidence of softening of its position.

Aroassador Willauer then read the third paragraph of this section. He

noted that this type of action is all overi, nevertheless, assistance

a government in exile, particularly in terms of personnel training and

military materiel support, brings in the Defense Department immediately.

Secretary Intrin directed attention to the provision of assistance "after"

recognition and raised the question particularly with reference to

training, as to whether it shouldn't be done ahea of time and be ready

for use at the time of recognition. Anbassador Willauer quoted General Gray

as having said that the force of 750 men could perhaps nold a perimeter of

controlled by the government is not important and even expressed the

possibility that one could be recognized without

any real estate at all. In

response to General Gray's question, iic. Scott noted that although the

phrase used in the sarer is government-in-exile, what is really meant is a

provisional government. Ambassador Willauer

then noted the fact that the

Agency is smissling into Cuba two Cuban leaders. These persons might

constitute a rallyins point for the formation of a goverment within Cuba.

Iir. Barnes asked whether it is realistic to speak of recognizing a

government in exile while the Castro Covernment is still in existence and

asked whether this was really possible.

iro Coerr replied,

"yes" with the

proviso that it would, of course, not be done if the situation were so ili-s!

as to be ludicrous.

In response to lir. Barnes' question nether real estate

is essential or not, ir. scott replied that the present legal opinion is inat

real estate is essential.

Secretary Irvin indicated he had the same concem

as Mir. Barnes. As he described it, nis problem is tat

to establish control over a piece of territory but in adrition there must se

an ability to maintain that control. His question is whether 750 men really

till be able to do that. Ambassado. Willauer mace the point that perilaps

there is alreaty suificient real estate of one sort or another availadle in

the Escambray in dissident hands to warrant recognition of a government wien

controlled that territory.

Secretary Irvin comented that the real question as not one of racomiti..

but rather whether or not we are prepared to do enough with suficient saed

to enable the provisional government to estaolish its control over all of vuice

He noted that he is currently very concerned with such a proolen in Laos, wita..

volunteers were encouraged but no decision had been taken yet as to nor far ac

would go.

Mr. Scott observed that this was one of the reasons for this current nect:

How do we make recognition effoctive? Mor much do jou need to provide for tr?

purpose?

In this picture the abilities and limitations of the Defense Depart-

ment constitute the third prong in the program.

Ambassador illi.

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Anoassador Willauer raised the question of training volunteers such

as Argentines or Cubans.

Tracy Darnes estimated that there are now 70,000

Cubans in and around ine miami area, of whom pernaps 10,000 could be of

military age.

Anvassador Willauer then continued with "Suppose we figured

on the basis of 10,000 Cucans and pernaps 5,000 other Latin American

volunteers for training, then questions might be: Where could they be

trained? What would be required for the purpose? and, now long would it take?

Tracy Barnes noted that there may be a question of what types of people

would be acceptable.

For example, he said that a military kalgraind

of some

sort may be necessary. Amnassacor Wi lauer suggested that this was a

Department of Defense juigment.

fir. Coerr observed that the size of the force

may be, dependent upon the lind of victory which is considered to be necessari

J. In amplification he said one sized force might be sufficient to hrock Castro.

off, but to eliminate nis government quickly and thoroughly might require

more people.

Captain Spore asked whether the first step isn't really to

surface a new leader before recognition of the governent. Ambassador Millauer

commented that it would never be possible to puil all the Cubans together.

Captain Spore inquired about the need for some massive progran within Cuba.

At this point Secretary Irwin left the meeting.

General Gray, responding to Captain Spore's last question, indicated that

the document will answer that question. Ambassador millauer then noted thai it

will be necessary to make several assumptions. One is that whatever governnent

is recognized must be assumed to be satisfactory for our purposes.

i second

capabilities. One of our questionis, in the light of these assumptions,

what is required from the outside to assure success of the provisional govern-

ment?

At this point ir. Devine made three corments. He noted that rith

reference to our recruitment of volunteers, Castro is also busy recruiting

Latin Anarican volunteers for his own pumoses. Secondiy, he noted that

othe principle, point i plicit in the elenent of establishing a sale haven

perimeter within Cuba was the erectation that this would encourage and in

fact produce larze-scale acherence iron defectors within Cuba.

wished to be sure thai tie fact that two luban anti-Castino leaders are beins

infiltrated into Cuna at this time does not represent a cecision already

taken that these are the chosen instruments. Mr. Devine was reassured on

this latter point.

There was ünen an exchange between Ambassador Willauer and General Gray.

eneral Gray indicated that his directive from General Bonesteel was that

subordinate to this general plan vas to be a jamily of plans ior cetailed

operations in support.

ircassador dillauer indicated this is correct.

The reading

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The reading of the document continued tran the third section "Measures

to implement Froposed Solutions."

There was no further comment or discussion

down through paragraph d oî the section "Recognition of a Cuban Goverment-in-

exile," however, Ambassador willauer did note in passing that unilateral action

by the United States has already been taken and that the collective action

section has been overtaken by events.

He also noted that the language calling

for recognition of soremment-in-exile imediately upon breaking relations has

been overtaken by events.

Secretary Irwin returned to the meeting at this point.

Mr. Barnes then noted that there is a group of 400 to 1,000 Cubans who

expect to make some calls on resident Eisenhower and elsewhere during the

course of today and tomorrow. Ambassador Willauer then continued the reading

Ambassador Willauer read Part II - Covert Action, Section I - Objectives.

He cormented that the hgency is doing a tremendous amount of work--Iracy Barnes.

indicated that there are 180 different groups of Cubans. Mr. Barnes also said

that two representatives of opposition groups are about to so inside Cuba.

the is a mender of the FRD, the second is not. He continued by saying that

perhaps Arelland Sanchez irango might also go in.

Sanches Arango claims to

have a lot of surport, but so far has not identified any of it.

Arbassador

Willauer then read Section2 - Fresent Status, and noted that the support

spring boards are located in Guatemala, Nicaragua anci tre Canal Zone.

The Ambassador then continued reading secticn 3 and 4 ann then invited

comment by lir. farnes on the geographic score, the main thrust and the

broadcast activity in the political

action and propaganda fields. Mr. Barnes

reported in considerable detail rat activities of Swan Island, the three

newspapers, and the magazine, as well as trins through Latin America by the

jurists, lanor groups, representatives of Cuban wonen, and students orgeni.za-

He noted the political stand talen last May by leny Varona in Mexico

City and Caracas, tre

developent and announcement of a poliiical platfomm,

which he characterized as being sorewhat negative.

re indicated in sone

cetall the reasons wny it was relt that a more positive arproach to the platfom

provisions was not cesiraule at the

a was do i that on pos

stage reached when the platform was

released.

Fe then indicated that Radio Swan is comencing to discuss vericus

auproaches to such important questions as land reform, elections and other

elements of a plation.

General Gray asted who ras the leading candicate.

Mr. Barnes indicated that he has lists fron many sources with detziled

information about the incividuals.

He saic trat he is reacy to sit down and

consider the candidates and reach a decision as to who are most appropriate.

He noted that at this stage vie should not go so far as to select one incividual

wno night be shot, and that the selection of i single candidate should follow

sone demonstration that he can survive in Cuba and does in fact have a sub-.

stantial political followine.

Ambassador

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Ambassador Willauer noted that there is one military contingency plan which

will have to be ready for use if Castro should start slaughtering americans.

This would be a purely military plan and would include military occupation.

General Gray noted that such a plan already exists and is being revived.

Ariassacior Millauer noted that the hardest political problem was that the Cubans

would not work togetier.

Mr. Barnes then noted that the tabs to the paper

give full details about the individuals, names, background, etc.

Secretary Irwin at this point left the meeting.

Ambassacor Willauer then read the paramilitary section, number 5.

Mr. Barnes conmented on the communication teams in Cuba. He first noted,

however, that so far the activities have not developed any cracks and crevices

in the Castro structure. There is still hope that these night become visible

during the rext sixty days with increased propaganda, support, and other

activities.

He indicated that at one time there were ten cormunications teams

active.

For various reasons these have notbeen reduced to six. There is

no indication yet of Cuban DF capability.

In contrast the Agency with Mavy

help feels that it knows every movement of any Cuban ship and has good

information about the ground forces and secret police, and does not have

mich infomation about air activity.

Ambassador Villauer'

then continued reading in the paranilitary section

through the sentence ending "and carry out sabotage." At this point li. Noel

was asked to corment, since he just recently came from Havana. Mr. Ncel

indicated thai, the various elements o the opposition are cooperating with

each other in sabotage activities.

recently, tiere has been a decrease of

such

activity decause of the riel-inspired invasion scare, the militia

activity, and the introduction of death penalties. Some of the sabotage teans

have been picked up out some are still in exastence, miling and able to acts

however, nore material is necessary.

Ambassador Willauer noted the need

for

labor to cut the cane.

Mr. Noel continued b noter that the sabotage units

can be coorcinared with any lancing. Sone details of the supply drops vere .

reported.

Fire

Barnes indicated

that of te sis missions flom vithin the

past ten cays, lout of a totel"ol

I ten supply cropst-five were supply missions.

Of these, two vere fuily successiul, one was partially successiul, one wes

mechanically successiul cut the material was lost subsecuent to its receint

by tre people to wion it was destined, and the fifth was not good. li. Barnes

incicated that better results will ie possible in the future, notthat there are

on-site communications units in action. imcassador villauer noted in passing

that with a collapse of the Castro regine after successiul efforis, it may be

teces patient certain sal ass sue selecte tee of coes

successful as is hoped.

Thus it night be wise to earmarl: early sone ilaval

ship with this thought in mince

The final paragraph of tre pararilitary section was reau. Ambassador

Willauer noted the Faul kennedy article in the liew York Times, which he

indicated as giving preity accurate infomation about the training and asted

whether aryone requirea auditional incornation. Ambassador ilillauer incicated

that it süill may be possiole to nave Jos. strice bases; that tris matier ras

not yet been finally decided. He also mentioned the question of contract

pilots.

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pilots. He said that the idea of air strikes begining three days before

D-day has been killed, and that a strike beginning the day before D-day has

now been accepted.

fie noted that it is possible that Cuba may have a jet

air force based on the pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia.

is no evidence that there are any jet airolanes in Cuba. However, Ambassador

Willauer raised the problem Di, if Castro has a jet air force, how would it

be possible to explain the use by the FRD. of a jet capability. He suggested

the possibility of a volunteer group, to acquire and provice the jet pilots

and planes. Ambassador Willauer indicated that he hoped the Defense Lepartment

would include in its estimates some incication of what might be remired

to counteract a Cuban jei air force, and some estimate as to how soon Cuba

could have effective jet capability after delivery of such planes in

Following Mr. Barkes corment that there is no magic to any specific number

of days before D-day for a pre strike, and that sufficient facts are not now

on hand to reach a decision, imbassacor Willauer commented that with the

present Cuban air force one day before D-day is sufficient. Mr. Devine

noted that one of the problems of activity prior to D-day is what will be

happening during that period in the U.N. and the O.A.S.

Ambassador lillauer then finished the reading of the paper with the

miscellaneous section.

of turped

Captain Spore then cormented at length on the sea lift problem. He gave

a rund down of what vessels the igency new has incicating that it would not

be sufficient for the number rinvolved.

He said that the Navy is quite

concerned about the problem of selecting a beach. He also said that heretofore

calculations had been based on an unopposed landing. If an opposed landing is

a possibility, there will be a recuirement for naval support and the vessels

in hand have no armament.

landing and transportation without Castro's prior knowlecge fron cort of

erbarkation. Anoassador willauer noted the possiblity of a pre-darn strike.

Thirs

Ambassador Willauer then explained acout the timing problen, indicating

that the nest meeting of the Group is early turocay noming, and that this

been instructed to cotain the third prong document fron

General Gray and Ambassacior willauer then discussed the nature of the job

to be done by Defense and what is required.

General Gray

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General Gray then attempted to sum up what he understood was needed.

He said (1) the Group seems to want an estinate of the time to organize and

train a Cuban indigenous army, including an estimate of its chances; (2) What

U.S, support would be required for the 750 men in terms of air and naval

power; (3) What U.S. ground forces will be required to support the action.

A separate paper,

he said, would deal with U.S. unilateral intervention

to protect U.S. lives and property, involving ground, air and naval forces.

He would contemplate this situation arising so quickly that there would be

no possibility to inter mix it with the plan. And (4) the use of U.S. and

indigenous forces on a planned basis.

There was considerable discussion by Captain Spore, Ambassador Willauer,

General Gray, and!r. Sarnes on the need to work on the assumption that the

estimated, on the basis of observation of visa applicants, that in the group

duties. Ambassador willauer suggested thit General Gray note, as a problem

in connection with training Cubans, the question of who pays the trainees, who

pays their dependents, and who would pay indennity in case of their death.

Ir. Barnes noted that the study would not be complete without consideration

of the timing factor.

Nor without consideration of two further points, namely,

coordination with action vs. Trujillo, and an estimate of why an embargo,

including activity nich amounts to acts of war, will not work. Ambassador

Willauer noted that there is pernaps insuîficient time to do all this in the

final report, however, he suggested that the desirability of also dealing with

Trujillo should be noted, and that the Agency might include an evaluation of

the effects of a complete economic embargo. It was also considered that at

some point the igency will have to prepare and put up for the reaction of the

Special Group, its assessment of the possibility of success by the 750 unaided.

There would also ve required an assessment of the political feeling in the

country which it is hoped might be developed between now and the end of

February•

The next meeting is or the calendar for londay at 1600 hrs.

M: ECCurtis/ck

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