PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING REPORT ON ACTIVITIES IN CUBA.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 11/26/1960
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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3. 2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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I ORANTULI FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Preliminary Debriefing Report on 1242I0-7

Activities in Cuba

1.

The substance of this preliminary report covers debriefing sessions

held With AMPANIC-T from 7 through 15 wovenöer 1960. Both Mr. Peisich and the

undersigned participated in these debriefing periods. The pertinent aspecto

of these debrieting sessions are summarized into lour specific categories:

ALPANIC-7's operational activities in Cuba fron his inicial

arrivai in Cuba 5 August until his departure 5 lovenber 1960.

b. Internal assets developed in Cia for future operational

use.

c. Probiens encountered by A-7 vaile opereting in Cuba.

d. Projected future assignment in Cuba.

2. In. James Pelich, who was diPAlne-?'s case

officer during his initial

training in lashington, was contacted by pione aron Miani by subject on

7 Lovencer.

Subject reported that he had arrived in the U. S. by boat 5 for.

and vas plarning to leave that afternoon by plane for lashington.

A room was

booked at the lashington Hotel in anticipation of 1-7'5 arrival that evening.

At aporonimately 1300 hours, A-7 called Mr. Pelich on the agent phone peon the

Washington airport to announce his arrival and as directed to go to the hotel,

inore subject was subsequently contacted by lic. Pelach end the undersigned.

3. Upol! contacting 1-7 at the hotel, it was clearly evident that he vas

in a highly emotional state wich partly stens ron his secent escare 2ron

idea of considering ninsel es being expendable; that he was not sure the re

sent hin to Cube in the alast place if ve had no intentions to suppost me

accivities inside the country. In short,

A-i feit tre had iet zin doin doin-

o ply chu that da ma fortunate la escapina vithout losing sla lies.

Mier 1x. Pelick succeeled in quieting dom A-? folloring this intejal

oubburst,

À-7 Tres first asked to describe how he managed to get out of Cuba

vishout utilioing our channels to enfect this afiltracion.

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their dee 13 Cotober he had sant

to his Mora contact (Uanf-y) informing him

that his situation is

that he mus'i get out of Cuba as soon as possible.

cording to 1-7 his Agency contact was unable to provide any definita

assurence that his depenture fron duse could be expedited.

artenpted to lay on unilateral arrangements to this end vith first

his operational contact, Benito PERHANDEZ, and later his rother-in-

Law introduced A-T to a Dr. Jose VAIS, la psychiatrist in Havane,

offered to assist him in getting out of Cuba.. In the course of the

next ten days,

A-7's plans to get out of Cuba began to take shape,

aiter (Dr. Vales introduced him to Dr. Francisco PRADO, Carplastie

(surgeon who operates his own clinic in Favana.

On 1 Hovember a negro

by the name of (Lazero RODRICUEZ. Arozárena, drove to A-7's safenouse

and took him to his on house located on(64th Street 23-25) in liarianzo.

On the norning of 2 lovember at 1100 hours, (Dr. PRADO/arrived at the

Negro's house and told A-7 that he pianned to leave for Key Test

Florida 5 lovember and vould arrange to smuggle A-T out of Cuba by

niding nim in the notor room of his yacht.

Arzangements vere mace

between the principals for 1-7 to visit the yacht 4 lovember to in-

spect his proposed hiding place on the yacht.

In the interin period,

A-T stated that he began to suspect that he may have fallen into a

tran and told the legro that he was returning to the U.S. to bring

Tony VAROlIA back with him to Cuba. A-7 felt this was a good girmici

to use in the event (Di PRADO planned to turn him over to tha G-2.

After inspecting his hiding place on the yacht, A-T tOldiDI. PRADO he

didn't like the idea of hiding in the motor room and suggested that

he swim out to the boat, there he could be picised uy at sea.

night (4 jovenber) A-T stayed at the hone of (Guido BRITO, tho had a

house close to the beach at Santa Maria del lior located alout

25 Kilometers from Havana.

On 5 November at 0530 hours,

A-T began

his long srim in rough,

choppy waters and was finally sighted by

Dig Pradors' yacht, where he vas taken on board the vessel.

states that he ras completely exhausted when he was nicked up by the

DIx. Prado's Jackt CSOnAl, piloted by Eduerdo OLEN reacher

Key vest, Florida 5 Tovanber at 1145 hours.

A-T managed to siip atey

uring the refueling of the yacht before the custom officiais sriva

ad imediateir took off dor jioni

boon reaching liand, 1-? vent

directly to his rise's home for a reunion vith his lamily.

In query-

ing 4-7 further on hour. Prado uanaged to isave Cube recout any

serious oustacles placed in his path by the E0B, A-? suoted thei

for. Prado told him that he receired officiai approvel for this trig..

to return a stolen vessel from nis racht club, (lesino gogsasi, in

Tarane, ihich mes being heid for him by merican authoricies ia

Key West. lorcorer, for. Prado told 4-7 that be nionned to leave tie

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$25,000) in New Nasty

mich de hopad to put

sale at some future dete.

(It would tapers

that ali such vessels as his tould subsequently be nationalized by the destro

regine.)

Prior to his return to Cuba, br. Prado planned to stay at the rest

fDrive Fazbor Island, Miami - Tel: (Ps 1-5310.

Efforts to debrief A-7 on his operational activities in Cuba vere

sonewhat futile in this initial meeting in view of his unsettled emotional

His primary concern apreared to be

his wite and his rather strained

relacionship with his in-laws, who were now residing in Miami.

nection, it should be pointed out that this emotional state appeared to stem,

in part, from his inherent suspicions that his wile (21 years of age and rel-

atively attractive) was being unfaithful to hin. All Indications are, however,

that A-7 has no real basis for these suspicions; other than those conjured up

in his own mind.

In any case, he requested if it might not be possible to wire-

tap his wife's house in Miami, so that he could have daily reports on her activi-

Tinile no promises were mede, A-T was

assured we would attempt to look

into this possibility, once ve had more definite information that there were

some grounds for his suspicions.

Subsequent, discussions with Security

Office revealed that a wire-tap of A-T's house was a major project in itsel

and inpossible to accouplish at this time without tieing up considerable

persounel.) A-T was later told this after ve assured him that his suspicions

vere groundless where his wife was concerned.

Following this initial meeting with a-7,

it was apparent to both

r. Pekich and the undersigned that time would be needed to restore agent's

confidence in our capability to support his efforts in any future projected

assignment in the field.

Moreover, A-7's emotional state, which appears to

sten from his problems with his in-laws and his concern about leaving his rile

alone, must be fully resolved before attempting to dispatch him again.

6. In later debriefing session held from 3 to 15 Hovember with A-7,

considerable more light was thrown on the nature and scope of his operational

activities in Cuba.

As previously indicated in paragraph 1 of this report,

A-7's activities are summarized as follows:

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ALPANIC-7 Operational Activities in Cuba:

In line wath his projected mission to parenize resistance arouns

in devana and Pinar del R10 for nounting sabotase operations against

key target installations and assasination of prominent Cuban Conminist

members in the Castro entoureze, A-T appears to have made some process

in this direction from the time he arrived in Cuba in early August 1900

to his subsequent estiltration 5. Novenber.

Upon arrival in farena,

A-7 degen a series of meetings with leaders of the CA, Trigle-A aid DO

with a view to establishing some degree of rapport in the furtherance

of his own personal objectives.

¿ period of soprocimately 5 weelss, 1-7 made contact, with over 42 indi-

viduals, who represented vorious anti-castro groups operating in

the

Havana and Pinar del Rio ereas.

4-7 Prenkly zanitted that he hea spread

hinself out too thin in this respect and that in many cases he sabula

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have amployed cut-outs inste f or attenoting to contret certain

individuals hinself.

Individual meetings were 1150 bele by

APANIC-5, De. Lino Fernanderyand MRUG-1 Mion a view to establishing

some degree of rapport and coordination of activities in the areu.

In this connection, A-7 claims he turned over a munber of his assets

over to AlPANIC-5,

prior to his movement to

the ESCMDPAX, there ha

as subsequently victed in by c-?.

b. Internal Assets Developed in Cuba Eor Future Grerational Use:

In attempting to sift out specific assets developed by 4-7 during

his activities in Havana, three of the more proninent individuals with

whom A-7 wes in direct contact should be listed.

(1) (Benito PUNANDEZ:

orner of the lAuto-Marts and (Auto-Centro

Garages) in Havana.

A-T used FIRMANDEZ for planning the

selection of suitable Id's and DZ's in both Piner del Rio

and friente provinces, location of safehouses in Fevana and

use of his garages for storage of ams and military equipment

which A-7 anticipated would be dispatched to him.

(2) Dranelio

153302012

a leyer by profession, who has unlimite

contacts in Pinar del Rio and who was working closely tith à-7

to for a guerrilla group in the Sierra de los Organos.

WARDO! was

selected to henale the propaganda for the "Cuba Libre" group

being organized by A-7 inside Cuba.

francisco ROBAYÑAS Dontaguez:

a Cuban national no had

in the U.J. Army and who also fought in the locanbrays ageinst Patis

ROBANA Claimed ne had a force of 150 men et his disposal

and was planning to use them in a guerrilla action against Castro

forces in the Pinar del Rio aree.

loreover, once proper materiel

support in the form of arms and other nilitary equipment mes nade

available to him by A-7, he felt he could marshal over a thousand

men in this area.

(1) In audition to the above assets, A-? indicated beat (bana-1

(known to him as (Intlio Rodriguez) (George DePilot (fian Herdez)

rendered him considerable assistance in moving securely about Egrana

in the course of his operational contacts.

In the cas= of fAMIRE-1,1

A-7 highly praised his abilities as a highly capable Case Officer;

and he feared for his personal sefety.

He suggested thet litre-1

should be brought back to the U.S. for a rest period,

picied ain un.

(5) Finally, APUG-1 iho vas trained in sabotage techniques

U.S. and tras

later assigned to 1-7, was listed by 4-7 as un asset,

maveriel tas forthcoming.

coated into ore secree operations sa arc-zabla

fere at considerable odds on certada aspects of conducting operates:

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in Tuvana, but felt he could resolve these differences upon

his oim return.

c. Problens Encountared by d-7 mile operating in Cuba:

Some of the nore significant problems encountered by A-7

during the course of his operations in Havena are as follows:

Security:

In this connection, A-7 stated that despite

the disguise given him, he had to be constantly on the alert

from the danger of being picked up by G-2 or Castro police

during the course of his numerous operational contacts. Fe

sited several examples where he believed he was under sur-

veillance by the opposition and subsequently succeeded in alluä-

ing this surveillance.

He complained that his disguise, (hair-

piece and mustache) rapidly deteriorated in the Havana climate

and as a consequence he was lorced to abandon this disguise towar

the latter part of his stay in Havana. Similarlj; he was forced

to change his quarters continually, by noving from one safehouse

to another as a security precaution, since he felt that it as

generally known in Cuban circles that he was operating in the

Havana area, and that he was probably already under the sur-

Hateriel Support:

In the course of these debriefing

sessions, one of A-T's chief complaints was thet despite ais

urgent messages sent through his cut-out (AIRD 1) to the Station

that arms and other military equipment were sorely needed by!

his groups in Havana and Piner del Rio, no action tras taken to

implement his requests.

As a result, A-7 felt he was losing face

with his followers and

this was one of the primary factors for

retuming to the States to discuss this aspect with Headquarters.

(3)

leed for Direct Communication:

a-7 stated thet rithout the

services of a iT operator tho could be in direct communication

with us, he is fully convinced that any subsequent return to cis:

in an operational capacity vould be ineffectual.

Herce,

this

would be one of the conditions laid on us-that wen he returned,

& W/I operator vould be assigned to him personally.

Projected ruture Assignment of A-7 in Cuba: Predicated on the assum-

tion that A-7 will be sent back to Cuba in the relatively neer futurs,

acti

Issrs. Pekich and Retary feel that his sost significant contribution car be

made in the Pinar del Rio area, where he appears to have known assers in the

This, however, does not preclude A-7 from also operating.

in Terena

developing sabatoge

operations with A PUG-1, Thon we assume will cooperate

ith A-7 despite their

differences in how these operations should be conducey

Moreover, shoula the liu complex decide to nove into other proviaces of

*Cuba where military action is to teke place, A-7 vould appeer to be the logic

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choice in taking over toe operations in this area against Castro targets.

In any case, a decision has been reached that A-7 should not be diapatched

without a trained i/I operator who can be relied on to ront closely on

operations with A-? inside the country.

8.

Case Officer Corments:

Despite A-7's tendencies to operate on

a grandiose scale,

his disappointment in the lack of support received on his

initial mission to Cuba; and his display of emotional instability at times,

it is believed that his

efforts can be properly chenneled to work effectively

for us in Cuba.

His motivation appears to stem from his personal ambitions

to make his mark on this counter-revolution against Castro, where he can

assure himself of a priminent position in the future government to be formed

in Cuba after the overthrow of the Castro regime. A-7 has imagination and

the till to succeed. His weakness is his inability to hide his personal

embitions fron others tho may work with him and who may have altogether dif-

ferent motivations and sense of values.

Hence, it is beliaved that 4-7

will encounter problems in handling peole recruited or assigned to him in

the course of his activities inside the country.

APUG-1 can be sited as

a good example, there a clash of personalities has apparently already taken

place.

In view of this, A-? will have to be dealt with firmly and must ce

convinced that the success or failure of his projected mission will depend

on his ability to develop confidence and loyalty among his followers once he

is inside the corntry agaia.

Similarly, A-? must resolve his personal problan

dealing with his wife and in-laws, which has had an adverse effect on him

personally since his return, and may affect his operations inside Cuba.

The

next several reeks will, therefore, need be devoted to re-establish A-T's

confidence in our ability to support his efforts in Cuba, once he is sent

back, and working out his family problems to obviate any adverse psyccolo-

gical effect which may be detrimental to his operations im Cuba.

JOHN

NT/4/PM/O2S

3000ET

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