Document date: 04/17/2018
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10209

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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FROM :

TO :

DATE :

PAGES: 310

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

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EXEMPTED N4: 01-383-3-1:4

10/06

SECRET

TAB C

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SOVIET VIEWS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC

The recent discussions with Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet response

to Peiping charges following the test ban agreement provide insights into

the balance that Soviet polley must strike between private views of Soviet

national interests and public views which tend to emphasize Soviet leadership

of the international Commnist movement.

Walle there is a clear difference in emphasis, the public and private

dialogue are not inconsistent. They are quite comparable to the position

which the Administration has had to take in connection with the Soviet Union

on the one hand and with the United States Senate on the other.

Private Views

In private, Premier Khrushchev has made Soviet views clear on the

following issues:

(1) Khrushchev is not interested in destroying rockets or strategie

aircrait.

"Harriman referred to further steps that could be taken.

Said some people were thinking of what was called in technical

terms separable first stage.

Such stage could include cut-

off of production of fissionable materials for weapons uses

and perhaps dismantling certain percentage nuclear weapons

on each side and making fissionable materials thus derived

available for peaceful uses. Wondered whether Khrushchev

had any interest in this and commented such steps might

interest whatsoever; moreover, he could say Sovs would never

agree to this. U.s. position on this matter was well known

and had been stated over many years. Sovs had also stated

their position, and still held that position.

No results could

be derived from such an approach. After all, why should

Sovs destroy their bombs in which they put so mich money; why

should Sovs destroy some bombs and build others.

could

be destroyed only under a disarmament arrangement. Sovs coula

not squander their money, particularly as their money was

people's money. Sovs were no capitalists, and to capitalists

such an arrangement would of course mean no loss. U.S. should

not waste its

time developing such proposals; they were totally

unrealistic." (Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from Moscow,

No. 365.)

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(2) Khrushchev is not interested in a separate agreement to stor

production of fissionable material.

"Harriman noted Khrushchev had neglected his reference to cut-off.

Khrushchev said such arrangement would be of no use. Other

Kara acher ren

people would say cut-off could yield no result in a situation

where U.S. and USSR had accumulated enough bombs to blow up

whole world. Others would say they did not possess such

material and therefore must produce it. Thus, this too was waste

of time. As for USSR, It had stopped expanding its production

fissionable materials and now producing such materials at

same rate as before. Although he did not know when precisely

this would happen, it very possible Soys would stop production

fissionable materials in near future; however, that would be

without any agreement and Sovs would not tell anybody about

It. Sovs had enough such materials and U.S. was probably in

same position.

What Sovs were now engaged in was refabrication

all bombs on basis results latest tests." (Reference - Harriman's

July 27 cable from Moscow, No. 365.)

(3) Khrushchev is interested in stopping the diffusion of nuclear

weapons •

"Harriman said we believed world would be safer 1f no more nuclear

powers develop, and certainly if China did not develop nuclear

capability. Hoped Sovs could get Chinese adhere to treaty before

they became nuclear power. Also, hoped by time China acquired the

ability develop nuclear powers, more comprehensive control oi

armaments could be had. Khrushchev agreed and said Sovs making

effort prevent increase in number nuclear powers. However, these

efforts would of necessity be weak until agreement on disarmament

had been reached."

(Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from

Moscow, No. 365.)

•(4) Khrushchev is interested in saving money.

"Khrushchev wished to suggest that military budgets be frozen at

levels of, say 1903. He believed this would be reasonable and would

give to peoples hope that governments were at last showing common

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Public Views

In contrast to the private discussions with Premier Khrushchev, Soviet

response to Chinese charges distributed by TASS on August 20 indicate the

position Soviet leadership is taking within the world Communist movement.

The Balance of Power

"Yes, the position of the Soviet Union on the question of ending

nuclear weapons tests did not become fossilized; it adapted itself

to the changes in the balance of power in the international arena, to the

successes in the strengthening of the defense potential of the USSR and of

all the countries of the socialist community, and took into account

everything that is generally known as the realities of the nuclear age in

their entirety.

"In the first years when nuclear weapons appeared in the arsenal of

the United States, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly--and, in

view of that, the security of the socialist countries was endangered-

the Soviet Government proceeded from the assumption that the main task was

to deprive the United States of that advantage. This aim could be achieved

either by completely banning nuclear weapons, which would have been

tantamount to taking away these weapons from the only nuclear power of that

time, the United States, or through developing our own nuclear weapons, which

would help to insure the security of all the socialist countries.

"The Soviet Government demanded the banning and destruction of nuclear

weapons; and, when this demand was rejected by the Western powers, it started

to develop its own nuclear weapons, which were called upon to become a good

additional guarantor of the independence and security of all the countries

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of the socialist community, to make the imperialists lose the taste for

aggression against the socialist states. Naturally, in those years,

the banning of tests of nuclear weapons without simultaneous destruction

of those weapons possessed by the United States would not have been in

the interests of the socialist states. It would have brought to a halt

the development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and perpetuated

the American nuclear monopoly.

"But the situation did not remain unchanged. As a result of intense

efforts of the Soviet people, of Soviet scientists, in developing their

own nuclear weapons, the American nuclear monopoly was smashed, the

world socialist system received its own nuclear shield, the imperialist

powers lost the material basis for conducting a policy of nuclear

blackmail, a policy "from a position of strength" vis-a-vis the

socialist countries. This also put into new prospective the question

of the nuclear weapons test ban. Now the continuation of nuclear

testing could only lead higher and higher the spiral of the nuclear arms

race in which the socialist countries, and.all peace-loving states, to

be sure, are not interested. At the same time, with the new balance of

power the nuclear test ban would perpetuate not the American nuclear

monopoly but the fact of its liquidation, not the unilateral advantage

of the imperialist. camp but the new balance of power in

the area of

nuclear weapons.

"The Soviet Government has already called attention of the CPR

Government to the simple truth that life does not stand

still, that

science and technology are developing rapidly, and that something which

was unacceptable yesterday may turn out to be useful and even very useful

today. Underlying this are definite material factors of great

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significance, connected with important and major steps of the Soviet

Government to strengthen

the defense capacity of the USSR, the security

of all the socialist nations.. These steps, which included also the

tests of the latest types of nuclear arms, including the most powerful

ones existing in

the world, have reliably insured the security of the

socialist commonwealth. We now possess all the necessary requisities for

further maintaining our defense potential at the proper level which is or

may be required by the situation. And when we speak about that, we do

so knowing the facts of the matter.....

"Of course now we cannot divulge such things, for instance, as the

concrete results of the tests of nuclear weapons we carried out in

1961-62, the data on the calibers of the nuclear warheads in our arsenal,

the purpose of specific nuclear combat devices of which the Soviet Union

has plenty, where these means are deployed, and so forth. That would be

against the security interests of the Soviet Union and of all the

socialist states, including the security interests of the CPR.

"And if the Chinese leaders, by saying that in recent years the

situation did not change but that the USSR policy on a test ban allegedly

did, and in a way are thus goading the Soviet Union to demonstrate

objectively the recent changes in the balance of nuclear strength and for

the sake of that divulge the defense secrets of the USSR. ....

"But if for some reason, the Chinese leaders really doubt that the

Soviet Union does possess powerful nuclear weapons necessary

for the

defense of

all socialist states and are not satisfied with our explanations,

they could at least study the statements highly placed U.s. military leaders

made only several days ago in the American congress, as well as the statement

of. the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff."

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Diffusion ard the Chinese Atomic Program

"It follows from the 15 August statement of the CPR Government that

the Chinese leaders are greatly displeased with the Soviet Union

for not

giving China samples of atomic weapons. It looks as if annoyance with

this policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states of not

spreading nuclear weapons explains the attacks of the CPR leaders on

the USSR's foreign policy measures aimed at lessening international

tensions and consolidating peace, and especially their attacks on the

nuclear test-ban. treaty.

"More than once the Soviet Government took measures to convince

the CPR Government that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons

meets the interests of peace, the interests of all socialist countries,

among them the interests of the CPR. As history would have it, the

Soviet Union is the only socialist country that produces nuclear weapons.

"By its foreign policy

the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its

nuclear might reliably stands guard over the interests of the world

socialist commonwealth, over the interests of the peoples fighting for

social and national liberation. Whether one or more socialist countries

would be added to the number of nuclear states, that would make no material

change in the defense potential of the socialist camp--provided, of course,

the socialist camp is regarded as a single whole. But with each

new

capitalist state getting hold of nuclear weapons, the danger of a

nuclear war will increase. The possibility that the number of socialist

owners would increase whereas the number of nuclear states in the imperialist

camp would remain unchanged is precluded, and to build one's calculations on

that

means to build them on sand.

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'It would be naive, to say the least, to assume that it is possible to

conduct one policy in the West and another in the East, to fight with one

hand against the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons, against the

spreading of nuclear weapons in the world, and to supply. these weapons to

China with the other hand.....

"The position

of the CPR Government, set forth in the statement of

15 August, can be understood only in the sense that the Chinese leaders

do not care how the nuclear weapons spread among the capitalist countries

as long

as the CPR leaders get a chance to lay their hands on a nuclear

bomb and see what it is like.....

"And the CPR can now rely on the means of defense which have been

developed through the efforts of the Soviet people and which reliably

serve the purposes of defending the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

"This is why the most reasonable policy for the CPR in the present

conditions--if, of course, its desires and potential are to be commensurate.

would be to devote its efforts to the development of the national economy,

science, technology, and agriculture, devoting them to raising the

welfare of the Chinese people, to meeting their vital needs. The Chinese

people are experiencing many privations, and this is why such a course

in the policy of the Chinese leaders would be more beneficial to the

Chinese people, would be more appreciated by them

and correctly understood

throughout the world. ....

"It cannot be effaced from the memory of the peoples that at the

critical moments, when

the aggressive quarters put the world on the

brink of war, the Soviet Union without hesitation threw in all its international

weight, all its military might, to stay the hand of the aggressor

raised

over a small or big country geographically distant or close to us.

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This was the case in the period of the Suez crisis. This was the case

during the events around Syria and Iraq

in 1958. This was the case.

in

the period when tension flared up in Taiwan Strait--and the Chinese

leaders, the Chinese people, certainly remember it. This was also

the case during the crisis in the Caribbean area when the Soviet Union,

by its rocket-nuclear might, shielded revolutionary Cuba.

Perhaps the

Chinese leaders consider that all these were moments of "tranquility."

But we can say bluntly that

nobody but they are in accord with this.

These steps of the Soviet Government were also an expression of genuine

proletarian internationalism, not the one on which Peking likes to

expound and which

is backed by nothing but noisy slogans and paper

resolutions.

....

"It has everything to administer a devastating rebuff to anyone

who would infringe on the security of the Soviet Union or its friends

and

allies. But no incantations from Peking will draw the Soviet Union

to the road of madness to the road of irresponsible playing with the

lives of

hundreds of millions of

people."...

Race

"'The outcry against the nuclear test-ban treaty is widely used

in Peking for the propaganda of. a Peking-invented version about a

"special" community of interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and

Latin America. ....

"As if foreseeing the present attempts of the Chinese leaders to

erect walls within the international communist and national liberation

movement, separating it by the token of the color of skin as if

foreseeing their striving to separate the liberation struggle of the

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people from the revolutionary novement of the International proletariat,

V. I. Lenin wrote: "He who takes the standpoint of nationalism,

naturally goes as far as to want to surround with a Chinese wall his

nationality, his national working class novement, unabashed by the

fact that it will be necessary to build separate walls in each city,

place, and village, unabashed by the fact that by his tactics of

division and fragmentation he reduces to naught the great call for.

cohesion and unity of proletarians of all nations, races, and languages."

Conclusion

"The Soviet Government does not abandon hope that the CPR leaders

will weigh once more all the consequences of their present policy

contradicting the interests of cobesion of the socialist countries and

the interests of peace, and would bend efforts for the CIR again to

take its place in the rank of states engaged in tireless struggle to

prevent thermonuclear war, for peaceful coexistence and for the freedom

and independence of the peoples."

» • • •

The keystone of the Soviet position is the view that the Chinese

should not develop nuclear weapons but rely upon the Soviet "shield"

which defends the Socialist camp. While this theme has underlain

Soviet statements for some time, this is probably the most unambiguous

statement the Soviet's have issued. In defending their position, the

Soviet Union not only takes the view that the Chinese are ideologically

wrong but that they are ignorant of the facts, particularly the facts

regarding nuclear weapons. The Soviet language describing the negotiation

is not phrased in terms of Communist camp and the Capitalist camp or

Eastern powers and Western powers for they state "for the first time an

international agreement (has been) worked out by three nuclear powers.

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Although discussed in a low key, this statement is significant

in the open Soviet rebuttal of Chinese racist claims "about a 'special'

community of interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America."

Finally, probably most important are the Soviet statements implying

that the present balance of stragegic power is in the Soviet favor.

If the Soviet Union is to gain the freedom to seriously negotiate

with the United States, she must, in public, maintain her position both

as leader of the international Communist Party and as a nuclear power.

Soviet statement of August 20, 1963, indicates that she is clearly trying

to do so.

Her acceptance of this

proposal should make it possible for

her to accelerate this trend.

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