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124-10325-10318

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

3/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

FBI

124-10325-10318

RECORD SERIES: HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-80750-4166

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM: BRENNAN

TO: SULLIVAN

TITLE:

DATE: 09/11/1963

PAGES:

12

SUBJECTS :

CIA LIAISON FILE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS:

INC MEMO, SUMMARY

v9.1

NH 52333

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¿IA HAS NO OSJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION.

IN THIS DOCUMENTAS

11/9/98

CENTRAL INTELLIIENCE AGENCY SECREEK

DIRECTOR'S NESTING WITH J. SHIC CONE WAShDC

Although Mr. McCone has

has indicated he will not be raising

any problems or issues,

the Director may find the following of

assistance:

AND INTORIADION CONTAINID

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA

HEREIN IS UNCIACSTATED REORET

VITETA SHOWN OTHERR ISAA

Io say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is

not true. Conflicts of past years have had

their influences. Fortu

nately we have been successful in establishing very effective work-

ing relations with several key figures in the agency who have been

very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the

job done.

Without this existing framework our relations with CIA.

could degenerate into a chaotic state.

With regard to differences with ClA, there were two

situations during the past year which had a signiticant bearing

on the relations bètween the two agencies. Approximately a year

ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile

who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency

that he had been trained as a Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had

this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau.

We lodged very vigorous protest (re:(Alwin Odio Tamayo) The CS

other event which led to a heated conflict arose from informatión

which we disseminated to the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic

establishments in this country•

On May 15, 1963, McCone informed

Nr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the afore.

mentioned Board should be retracted because the communication

included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the

CIA Director.

Nr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter

and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it

clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never

retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were

predicated on information which had been given to us by two top

ICIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone:

writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his

subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular

matter.

STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He

considers himself not only the head of a particular government

agency but also "the Director of Central Intelligence and in

11/13/98

CLASSWIED BY 5668=520/mide

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

JFK

62-80250-4166

ENCLOSURE

ECRET

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fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence

being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of

the agency.

Io show impressive results, McCone must fall back on

intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography

and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used

to photograph targets and to intercept communications.

Much of

this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U.S.

agencies such as the Air Force.

FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA

During the past year there have been numerous instances

of excellent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA. Set forth

are some outstanding examples:

INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO

We have furnished CIA information from our

sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled

to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet

leaders.

This information has been most valuable

to ClA in following developments particularly the

differences between Red China and Russia.

TOPHAT

Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet

Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produce

highly valuable information of use to CIA.

GI MVE

VS

This is a highly sensitive penetration of

the Czech Intelligence Service. His information L S

has Significantlyyassisted CIA in obtaining a

current picture of the Czech intelligence organiza- (5)

BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE

Our sensitive Czech source, (Gimme, is CS

scheduled to return to Czechoslovakia.

Arrange- (S]

ments have been made to make him available to

CIA.

FEDORA

Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have

furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence

operations abroad.

In addition, we have given the

agency data pertaining to the organization and functions

lof KGB.

-3 =

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SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Through our investigations in this country,

we have identified Soviet mail drops in other

areas and we have given this valuable information

to CIA.

CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE

NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under agreed to restrictions we have per-

mitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite

visitors in this country for the purpose of

assessing their potential as sources when

they return to their native countries.

CUBAN _SOURCES

We have afforded CIA the opportunity to

brief Bureau sources before such sources made

trips to Cuba.

SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Both FBI and CIA have had access to

intercepted radio communications being

utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau

has been far ahead of CIA in identifying

agents mentioned in the communications and

has furnished pertinent information to CIA.

TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA

The Bureau has been very successful in

identifying Soviet and Cuban secret writing

techniques. We have made this knowledge

CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU

TOPHAT

in Moscow in this very sensitive case.

SCA did an excellent job of servicing drops (S

ros done de considerabie risk and was protutive

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SECRET

DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU

There have been a number of instances

where CIA operated Soviet double agents

outside of the U.S. and then made these

individuals available to the Bureau for

In this connection it is

also noted that in our development of the

sources, Fedora KGB penetration)

and (Gimme (penetration of Czech Intelligence X CS_

Service) CIA furnished valuable assistance.

VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE

Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that

one of its employees had been contacted by

the Soviets.

With CIA's cooperation, we

conducted investigation which led to the

ouster of a Soviet official and very favor

able publicity for the Bureau.

COVERAGE IN MEXICO) CSJ

Through surveillances and surreptitious

entry, CIA produced valuable informationin

our investigation of Franz Froehlich, a GRUL S

Agent whom we since have doubled.

AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS

CIA has been most cooperative in making

defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.

COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY

From time to time CIA has made certain

documents and equipment available to the

Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few

weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory,

at no cost, a portable unit designed for making

radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such

characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.

ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT

Through assistance afforded by CIA, we

gained access to an individual who subsequently

became a valuable informant in the labor rackets

field (NY 3936-C):

SECREL

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(FRENCH ACTIVITIES (S]

Information provided by a sensitive CIA

source has been very usetu. in following

the

ctivities of french agents in the U. S. CS

POSSIBLE TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO

JACK EDWARD DUNLAP

This is the National Security Agency employee

worm elted intermation to the soviets one who

committed suicide in July of this year. We

recently received information from our sensitive

source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap

worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information

was furnished to McCone last week.

McCone is

particularly concerned about the possibility

that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets

information which led to the compromise of Oleg

Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

The Dunlap Case

has been raising questions

concerning the effectiveness of security within

U.S. agencies.

McCone anticipates that Congress

eventually may initiate some inquiry and he

already has been informed that the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is looking

into the matter Last week Mr.. McCone asked

Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security.

McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning

our careful screening of applicants and our

strong administrative controls including inspec-

l|tions. It was emphasized that the Bureau always

resolved security problems in favor of the FBI

rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone

SEGRET

COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

IN THE U. S.

up this matter before the Pestdent's foreoug

Mccone broughi

Intelligence Advisory Board and he subsequently

SECRE

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had a discussion with Mr. Belmont.

Essentially,

McCone is most interested in technical coverage

of individuals and installations of non- Soviet: Bloc

countries. He has left the impression that in

his opinion such coverage could be

expanded in

the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence

and more sources.

Our coverage in this field

at the present time is quite extensive. With

regard to CIA, we have the understanding that

if the agency desires particular technical

coverage, we will give each request the necessary

consideration.

FRENCH ACTIVITIES CS]

n the early part of this year, we initiated

xtensive investigation of the alleged French C

agents in this country on the basis of data fur-

nished to us by a sensitive CIA source.

source has informed CIA that De Gaulle has (S

embarked on an extensive espionage program in

he U.S. primarily designed to collect scienti

lata which will enable France to hasten its (S

development of a nuclear capability. We have

disseminated the results of our investigation

to CIA and we are continuing the handling of

numerous leads. The information developed by

is so far has failed to disclose any evidence

that the French are stealing any classified CS.

secrets in the U.S. The French appear to be CS

obtaining voluminous information available to

he French through normal contacts between LS

french officials and their counterparts in the CS

114M

TOPHAT

A CIA agent recently obtained the message

which our sensitive source lophat secreted in a

drop in Moscow.

The message included information (SJ

and Austria.

concerning Soviet activities in Franceto CIA y

We have given this data

addition,

McCone was told that Tophat identified

Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that

Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as

June, 1963.

The delay in obtaining the communica-

prevented us from getting into the Dunlap

Case well before the subject committed suicide.

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SECRET

CIA did not service the drop because our informant

did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently

did not use the signal in order to fully protect

himself.

On the other hand, CIA was unable to

service

the drop until August because State Depart-

ment adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to

conduct any activity in Moscow.. This position was

taken by State because it felt that any operational

activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. (5]

ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV

This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to

the s, under ClA control, feuded with the agency,

left for

England under British Intelligence control

and very recently returned to the U.S.

Since his

return,

he has met with the Attorney General and

with McCone.

He has been extremely critical of

the U.S. position toward Russia.

Although a prima

donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely

valuable information for all U.S. agencies including

the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to

the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact

appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past,

Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director.

The

Director has made it very clear that he will not

see Golitzyn.

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

The subject is a former high-ranking official

of the Polish Security Service who defected in

January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an

embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many

complaints. He has communicated with the President,

the Attorney General and has been in contact with

• Congressman.

Bone one rat

Iuture.

He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over-all

failure to comply with his needs.

We have had access

to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of

information.

However, we have been most careful not

to become involved in

the feud between him and CIA.

We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA

any information received from Goleniewski which

might be of assistance to the agency.

SECREL

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SECREM

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD***

For your information,

McCone has found this

Board to be a constant irritant.

This Board was

established several years ago by the Eisenhower

administration then continued by President Kennedy•

It is designed to periodically review foreign

intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

The present chairman of the committee is Clark

Clifford and the

staff director is J. Patrick Coyne.

Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as

this Board looking into his operations.

There is

some indication that his irritation arises from

/ personal differences. with Coyne.

WENNERSTROM CASE

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military

Attache who, a few weeks ago,

admitted to his govern-

ment that he had been working for the Soviets.

Wennerstrom was in the U. S. from 1952 until 1957

and was collaborating with the Russians while he

was here.

Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage

report"

should be prepared on this case and he

expressed the opinion that this should be the

responsibility of the Bureau.

With regard to damage,

he was referring to an evaluation of all information

which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U.S..

We have taken the position that we will not prepare

such a damage report and if one is needed the work

should be done by each interested agency.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"

This is a Bureau investigation predicated on

information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the

KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated

by KGB.

We have been endeavoring to identify the

unknown Soviet agent.

Barescu, who was born in Russia and who has

We do have a suspect, (John s. (S]

for CIA for several years.

McCone may not mention this

matter but he is very much concerned about the situation.

We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent

developments.

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