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Vol.: 2/OF* 3:

Che United Statra Sciate

NATIONAL SECURITY SINFORMATTO

Unauthorized Disclosure Subilect

to Criminal Sanctions

R283

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate: Select Committee. to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Friday, March 12, 1976

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste, turned over

to the Connittee for destruction)

WARD &. PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. O

WASHINGTON, D. 6. 20003

(202) 544-6000:

ТАП АРАТТ

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FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

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Friday, March 12, 1976

-

-

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:25 o'clock

p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, Senator Walter D. Huddleston

(Chairman of the Sabcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Hart of

Colorado and Mathias.

Staff: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and David

Aaron, Elliot Maxwell, Ric, Inderfurth, Joseph diGenova,

Charles Kirbow, Al Quanbeck, Elizabeth Culbreath and Bob Kelley,

Professional Staff Members.

AFMAFT

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PROCEEDINGS

Senator Huddleston. The Committee will come to order.

Shall we go to 41(c), directly?

Mr. Aaron. I don't see why not. I think the rest of it

is pretty much accepted.

Senator Huddleston. Why is this in brackets? Is there

a question of whether or not this is a conclusion or whether

it will be included in here?

MI. Aaron. It's whether it ought to be included as an

example of these two things.

I guess I will state my view.

Mr. Miller. 41(c)?

Mr: Aaron.

41(c).

Mr. Kirbow. About half way down, where it starts, "The

Intelligence Committee staff" --

Mr. Aaron. My only point for including it is to try to

make vivid the problem which is described, you know, in just

plain general language in the few

sentences preceding, and

to add to that, this is the problem of a lot of raw intelli-

gence suddenly impact on analysts, as well as the other

problem, which is that there is this difficulty of trying to

predict, essentially, acts which from the standpoint of

Washingto!

D. C. and Langley, Virginia, just don't seem rational, and

it is in the hope that people will be rational and so forth.

I think there is some exception to that, because the term,

TAN CANET.

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which is not mine but which is in the quote from the post

mortem, uses the term "bias," and that may have a perjorative

quality to it. But the reason it is included is to simply point

out that it is just an awfully hard problem to, you know, use

a rational. system and to be rational men trying to deal with

a situation which, from our standpoints, are not rational.

Senator Huddleston. Both of these instances have been

listed in the press, have they not, as intelligence failures?

Mr. Miller. By Pike.

Mr. Aaron. The Pike committee has charged they were.

The

community's own post mortem staff has viewed them from that

standpoint.

I am not trying to put the Committee on record as agreeing

that they are failures, particularly, although I don't think

there is much difference of opinion in the Community as to

whether

failure to foresee the Cyprus coup as opposed to some

of the things that happened after it, was a kind of failure,

because the situation there was that they had in fact

predicted that if certain things took place, you know, Ionides

became head of the Greek junta; if Makarios moved against the

Greek officers in the National Guard, that really there was

a very good chance that there would be a coup.

Mr. Kirbow. Wasn't all of that furnished by the

analysts in the community to the highest policy levels of the

government?

TAO RIDIT

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Mr. Aaron. That's correct.

Mr. Kirbow. Several weeks in advance.

Mr. Aaron. That is correct, and then what happened,

apparently, was that - two things happened. One, the Greek

press, our intelligence officers, embassy people with the

exception of the embassy in Cyprus, all became preoccupied

with what was going on with the Aegian Sea, and there was a

struggle between the Greeks and the Turks over the oil there,

and that became a hot item. And there was also concern about

conflict, and there was a big intelligence collection on that

subject. And so Cyprus became kind of a sidelight. That's one

thing.

The second thing that happened was we got some raw

intelligence which said Ionides has decided to cool it, don't

worry, and so forth. And the Agency analysts accepted that,

and in effect said temperatures are dropping, things are cooling

off and so forth, so that even though what they predicted would

precipitate a coup began to take place, they didn't stick

with their own original estimates. So they were kind of led

astray with both this innundation of foreign information and

the fact that -- that's how the post mortem put is, onto saying

if you want to see or if you want an example of when this

general point took place, the IC staff says that's at least

one of them.

Senator Huddleston. I want

to make sure it was the

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intelligence community staff that made that judgment.

Mr. Aaron.

That is correct. In fact, that really ought

to be capitalized.

Senator Huddleston. I think it ought to be left in there

to give a little more flavor to the report.

Mr. Bader.

Senator, may I speak to the other side

before you make that decision?

And Mr. Kirbow can speak for himself.

Senator Huddleston. I hate to be thoroughly confused

by the facts though.

Mr. Bader. I think in the beginning it is bracketed

because there is

some disagreement

among the staff as to the

appropriateness and usefulness of putting this in, this

information into this particular report.. Let me separate the

two elements of this footnote or suggested addition to it.

The one goes to the question of the analytical bias. This is

a very difficult and complicated point to make, and as David

has suggested, there is the perjorative weight to the word

"bias." It is a complicated point to understand and analysts

worry about this a great deal as they approach the estimative

and other intelligence business because they are constantly

faced with the problem of how to anticipate the -- in some

cases how to anticipate the rational behavior.

The word "bias"

here is used in the sense that the

analyst is biased in the direction of thinking that individuals

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act rationally when they make decisions.

My objection to including the second half of this conclusion

is that it isn't really importantly related, or related at all

to the paragraph that it is part of. I think the first part

of it that has to do with Cyprus is an illustration of the

problems that raw intelligence in great quantity give the

analyst, who is working a crisis situation, is perfectly

appropriate, as far as the substance of it is concerned, to

the paragraph, the second part of which, of this analytical

bias I think flows from that paragraph.. As

a start, I think

you would need a great. deal more explanation in the text to

talk about this.

It seems to me it is a throwaway point that comes at the

end of it; though I accept it as an issue.

As far as the intelligence community tasks, seeing this

as one of the reasons for failing to foresee the coup in

Cyprus in 1974; it is perfectly correct. That is what the

intelligence community staff post mortem does in fact say the

hesitations that some of us had, or I had about the conclusions

of this is that we had not done Cyprus as a case study. We

haven't taken testimony on it. We have the one statement

that comes from a credible source, which is the IC staff in

its post mortem.

Senator Huddleston. Which we are quoting.

Mr. Bader. Which we are quoting. So I think the

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IC staff reference takes away most of the problems that I have.

My recommendation would really be here that we keep the

first part and drop the second part, that is, the analytical

bias.

I think the first footnote of part of the text is an

illustration, is an example of just what we're talking about,

and the rest of the part of it. I think on the second part

we are talking about analytical bias. There is not enough

text to really give the reader a sense of quite what we mean

about it.

So that would be my recommendation.

I think Mr. Kirbow has another view.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, this was, I think, four or more

times, I know specifically considered by the staff with all

of the people that appeared to have an interest in it being

present, and it had been decided as a policy type matter that

since all of the original information had been furnished both

to the policy makers at the highest level, and that they

themselves had a requirement and were levying on the intelli-

gence community, on this new Aegean Sea problem, that they too

were being furnished great amounts of raw intelligence at their

request, along with the analysts fumbling this, and even

this last bit of raw intelligence which came from a source in

Athens, and by the way, a new source, not one that

we had

relied on before of had great trust in being absolutely good,

sou

TAO CEPORT

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raw evidence, was made available. The decision had been made

that -- the final concluding words in the paragraph discussing

this sort of thing would read something like the failure to take

effective action to prevent such invasion

was a policy failure

and not an intelligence failure, and I think that basically

we don't ever hold post mortems in the intelligence community

on the failure of the Secretary of State or the President or

the Secretary of Defense to act in accordance with a policy

procedure. We always hold post mortems on, kind of down at

the level of the analyst, and what did he get and did he fail

to properly advise.

The record before this Committee, except for the post

mortem -- and we have no great weight given to the post mortem

that I can see from any evidence in the record, or anything

cited by the intelligence community, I just think it unfair

for this Committee to decide, without almost a preponderance

of evidence, to kind of indict those analysts that were working

this problem at that time, placing no blame whatever on the.

policy makers who had exactly the same information plus all

of the other information that the analyst never has as to what

the policies of the governments really are in this case.

Secondly, I agree perfectly with Mr. Bader on this analyst

bias.

Americans are the product of our background, and we

always weigh other people as best we can, if you are in the

analytical business, based upon your own experiences. and

TAN REDET

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whatnot, and I just don't think that to rub these two together

here, also, it makes a good point for the Committee, if you are

going to use them at all, it should be put in another section.

And thirdly, there really hasn't been a Cyprus study or

even a comment from the State

Department or anyone else as to

whether or not the information they had was adequate to meet

whatever decision they wanted.

And I just don't think it well serves the Committee that

we don't have a better picture, that this kind of

recommendation

is kind of a conclusion drawn, I think, from among the staff

and not totally supported by investigation.

MI. Aaron. Well, just let me say, I think you have heard

the

arguments, so I want to clarify one point, and that is the

point about intelligence failures versus policy failures is

made on the paper on page 4lb. I think we all agree on that

statement. It simply says there is a difference between the

two.

The U.S. had intelligence on the possibility of a

Turkish invasion of Cyprus in '74.' The problem of taking

effective action to prevent such an invasion was a policy

question on intelligence failure.

I think we capture that point, and on the other point,

this is simply drawing on documentary evidence available to

the staff to illustrate a point.

Senator Huddleston.

We also have something of a disclaimer

toward the effort on the reflection of the intelligence analysts,

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it seems to me.

It

seems to me we are talking about improving the analytic

operation, and it just seems appropriate to point to some

specific instances, especially when we are quoting some other

group that has a certain amount of stature.. I don't know that

we can make that any stronger there.

We could say this

possibility was indicated by the Committee or the intelligence

community staff report, or emphasize that it is the community

staff, the intelligence community staff itself indicated this

possibility.

Mr. Aaron. Just say "saw this as part of the problem."

Senator Huddleston. Yeah.

Mr. diGenova. The word itself also emphasizing the self-

analytical aspect.

Mr. Maxwell. The latter part of that quote, I'm not sure

whether it doesn't detract from the impact, saying the

intelligence community saw this as one of the reasons for

failing to foresee the coup in Cyprus, because it seems to

imply that analysts will make predictions based on what they

believe rational people will do seems a fairly straightforward

point, but it breaks up the impact of the earlier statement.

Mr. Aaron. Well, as far as the latter statement is concerned

I would agree with Bill's point here that it doesn't necessarily

flow from the thing we are talking about before, which is the

abundance of --

TAn GENET

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Senator Huddleston.: You are relating two problems, aren't

you? You say "in this connection".

Mr. Aaron. It turns out that there is another problem that

is involved in that case.

There is not really. The thing is,

and I agree that it is a very complicated problem. It just

strikes me as one which, because it is a problem, and I think

as Charlie says, it is a big thing that we all have to live

with. It is the kind of points that people need to understand

that this is a problem, you know. We don't make any recommen-

dations about how people ought to be irrational. I mean, there

is no way to do that. But it is just an effort to try to

give a different side to the problem.

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, one possibility is that we could

separate these two, the intelligence community staff and its

reflection on the Cyprus problem, which flows directly, as an

example.

from the text, that goes before it, from the general

to the specific; and then perhaps include this analytical bias

point which goes to another country and makes it a separate

point, as part of the body of the

larger paper that supports

this, the backup paper.

Mr. Aaron. See, I have the feeling is the quote read:

An old and familiar analytical problem," we'a all feel more

comfortable with the quote because it would not have the

pe:jorative little twist to it, and maybe we should -- one

of the things that we could do, we'd simply say, is to take

AM AYAMAT

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the quote off of "and" and just say "An old and familiar

analytical problem" that perhaps, I mean, we wouldn't be doing

much violation to the statement of the IC staff, and we would

not be removing the perjorative.

Senator Huddleston. Would it be any better to paraphrase

that rather than taking it in full?

Mr. Aaron. Yeah, we could do that, too.

Maybe we could do that -- why don't we take that and

do a paraphrase, and maybe you can put that paraphrase in

such a way that it would help meet the complexity of the

problem.

Senator Huddleston. You're talking about improving the

professionalism or effectiveness of analysis. It seems to me

one of the things we have to do is to find some way to overcome

the natural tendency of people to do what it says here, expect

that rationality will prevail, or expect that people won't

do obvious and very rational things.

I would like

to see the reference in there somewhere, just

to give

a little extra impetus and emphasis to this one section,

and I believe this whole question of analysis is one that is

very important.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. Inderfurth. I agree.

Senator Huddleston. All right, would you agree with an

attempt to do a little paraphrasing there instead of a quote?

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, if I had my 'druthers,

I'd leave the direct quote.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think the direct quote has

one thing going for it, and that is, it is a direct quote, and

it is taken from a group that is identified.

Mr. Aaron. I think if we just take the quote of "the

old and familiar analytical bias" section.

Senator Huddleston. The word "bias" has a connotation

I think that might make it hard to understand.

Mr. Aaron. We might have to move that little paragraph

to a little later, where

it would fall in better.

Mr. Maxwell. Just for those people, for the late reader,

perhaps in the top paragraph on 41, the carryover, 41c, the

carryover paragraph, it may make sense to try to illuminate

what is the kind of policy maker's lust for the latest fact,

because it is not on its face, I think, so clear that the

policy maker would be or would want that raw fact, and yet it

is the latest cable or the latest SIGINT or whatever.

Mr. Aaron. .

I think we need a little introduction here

about policy makers want the latest news.

Mr. Maxwell. That's the point.

Mr. Aaron. And producers of finished intelligence have

to compete.

Mr. Maxwell. That's my point.

And the bottom paragraph, is there a

need for

an

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example, or does it speak for itself, that the analysts aren't

in part sufficiently informed about national policies and

programs.. I mean, one example traditionally has been covert

action, but I wonder if there are other examples that would make

that point as well.

Mr. Aaron. Oh, yes, there are other examples. I think

a lot of the -- or one of the major ones, for example, analysts

trying to predict or foresee or suggest the trend of our

relationships with Japan, were unaware of the trip to China,

and they never knew it was going to happen, and the Nixon

shocks had a major impact on a lot of other

things we were

concerned about.

Mr. Maxwell. That may be a good example to capture the

point here, if people think it is not

as clear.

Mr. Aaron. Well, that is my example.

Mr. Kirbow. But that's also the thing we take up in

Recommendation No. 29, that policy decisions don't feed down

fully or rapidly enough to keep the analysts in the main stream

sometimes.

Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps if it is going. to be our first

recommendation, we might just add a factual example at the

bottom of 4lc to make it clear how important that is.

Mr. Kirbow. The China trip may well be an example, because

it too is recent, it's well known, and there's nothing inflamma-

toly, I mean, nothing serious happened before or after.

So. I

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think you can use that as an example.

MI. Aaron. And of course, the China trip had impacts

quite beyond Japan. That's one you could look at very carefully

because it had a big impact on the Soviet Union and a couple of

other areas.

Now, turning -- and beyond that I don't think there are

any other

-—

Senator Huddleston. Well,. let me suggest on 41c, the

first paragraph after the section we were just dealing with,

it seems to me we have made an unnecessarily long sentence

there in that one paragraph that might really have more impact

if we just eliminated that middle section of it.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think that is just an over-

sight on our part. I believe we had discussed that very thing.

Senator Huddleston.

I was wondering if (a) ought to be

(d) .

Mr. Kirbow. Intelligence is the principal purpose of all of our

intelligence activities, and the Committee finds that such

collection is unacceptable --

Mr. Maxwell. I think, Charlie, it has to be (a). Covert

action.

Mr. diGenova. There is a point I think the Committee is

de-emphasizing in one of its reports that covert action is

that important, that it is an extreme tool to be used, and it

would follow therefrom that really the principal purpose would

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be the production.

Mr. Maxwell. But the principal purpose of all intelligence

activities.

Mr. diGenova. Well, maybe.

MI. Kirbow. Unless the Chairman feels strongly..

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think we can leave it (a)..

Mr. Kirbow.. When you really think about it, that is the

whole crux of intelligence, though, is the finished part of it.

Senator Huddleston.: I think it could very well be the

thing.

Mr. Aaron. The principle is lucid.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, the principle of the system is

to provide our leaders with the guidance they need.

Mr. Kirbow. In fact, a lot of finished intelligence, both

ahead and during, you wouldn't have any successful covert

operations at all, large or small.

Senator Huddleston. The word "finished". I guess implies

useable.

Mr. Kirbow. Put it to a report form or summary type

form, Mr. Chairman, instead of the bits and pieces like a

photograph or a cable and whatnot being supplied without it

being correlated into an overall picture.

Senator Huddleston.

All right,: we are in agreement there.

That ought to finish 41c:

MI. Aaron. All right, I think we can go on to the

TAN CLAPT

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recommendations:

The first one follows on after your point that you just

made, which is that the Committee recommends a system be devised

to assure that intelligence analysts are better, more promptly

informed on U.S: policies, programs, particularly in the area

of

their responsibility, and secondly, there is a change in

the second sentence of Recommendation No. 30. This is not

a Freudian slip. Analysts should be able to advance to super-

grade positions without having to assume major managerial

responsibilities.

Senator Huddleston.

I saw that when I came through.

Mr. Maxwell. David, could I suggest a further amendment?

Major managerial responsibilities and with analytical capabilitie

being the principal criteria. Unless you do that, the last

sentence eliminates the possibility that an analysts with

managerial capabilities would be able to advance.

Ms. Culbreath. No, he says analyst advancement, so if he

starts advancing -- in the last sentence.

Ms. Davis. I'm sorry, I don't understand.

Mr. Maxwell. For analyst advancement, the person is

an

analyst until he becomes

a manager, perhaps, so what I'm saying

is, if you say analysts should be able to advance to supergrade

positions without having to assume major managerial responsi-

bilities and with analytic capability being the principal

criteria, that ties in both thougts I think.

TAN CLARET

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criteria?

Mr. Kirbow. Would the word "able" bother you there instead

of "being allowed to advance?"

Ms. Culbreath. "Should be advanced."

Mr. Kirbow. If you agree here in principle with what we

are trying to say, then we can rewrite this, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. Suppose you approach it from this

angle, that supergrade positions should be available to personnel

on the basis of their analytic capabilities, period.

Mr. Aaron. The flavor of managerial was we made it quite

clear in the text that the route up is through the management.

Okay, the third

• recommendation is that the Director of

Intelligence seek to bring in more analysts from the outside,

particularly at the middle and upper grade level for both

career and temporary positions.

The next recommendation, that greater emphasis be placed

on the stimulating and development of analytical methodologies

at all levels of management. We might just say that this can

be an effective exercise sometimes. I mean, there are a

great deal of people interested in methodology, and on the

other hand, it is one of those things that requires constant

attention, and which the Agency itself needs some encouragement

to continue doing. It has some activities under way now. It may

be

the beginning, but now that they are in a transition, I think

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the staff felt it would be important to give them some additional

encouragement.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What is that? I don't understand

what that means.

Mr. Aaron. Well, it means, for example, trying to come up

with a new technique for assessing -- well, we have an example

of a new one that they just put in, and that is a new technique

for assessing crop yields, and they use a combination of

photography and a number of other things to make assessments.

long before even the Soviets knew what they were going to be

getting, and that would be an analytical methodology in that

particular area.

Senator Huddleston. They apparently changed their method

on the Soviet Union's defense spending.

Mr. Aaron. That's great. Maybe we should encourage them

to do that every year.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Will everybody who reads this

know what it means?

Senator Huddleston. I think the people who wrote it

don't know what it means.

(General laughter.)

Mr. Maxwell. Would it be clearer if you don't have the last

five words?

Mr. diGenova.

Which five?

Mr. Maxwell:

"At all levels of management."

TAN GEFAIT

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Mr. Aaron. How about just saying, on stimulating the

development of new tools of analysis?

Senator Huddleston. Yeah, I think that probably would be

better, tools and methods.

I don't see any reason for not having them both because

they do refer to two different things.

MI. Aaron. The final paragraph in the recommendations

suggests that they encourage tours of duty outside the CIA;

both outside the Government and other agencies of the Govern-

ment, and it goes back to your recommendation about the rational

behavior, in a sense. This is not to suggest that if they go.

to the State Department they will learn what being irrational

is all about, but

Mr. diGenova. May I make a suggestion, that we say that

if they do go to academic institutions, that they do so overtly?

Mr. Aaron. I think that is a good point.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I think you have got some

problems there.

Mr. diGenova. I think that really jumps out at me, after

that whole schtick we went through. : I'm serious. I'm not

kidding at all.

Mr. Kirbow. Every agency of the government has their own

major postgraduate program.

MI. diGenova. But not the CIA.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you want nothing but dummies in the CIA?

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Mr. diGenova.: No, Charlie, I'm not

syaing they shouldn't

go. I am just wondering if that is an issue.

We can spend a lot

of time worrying about people being who they are.

Ms. Culbreath. Analysts aren't. under cover.

Mr. Quanbeck. Generally they are under DOD cover.

Mr. Miller. No, as a whole, they're generally known as

CIA people.

Mr. diGenova. No problem.

Mr. Aaron. We can just say we encourage analysts to

assume general duties on an open basis with other agencies.

Mr. Miller. Yeah, that's good.

Mr. Aaron.

Well, we are through that one.

Now we come to Section D on the reorganization of the

CIA. That is page number written 52, Section D.

Ms. Culbreath. Can I ask a managerial question here?

These handouts that we have been getting, like the one

on proprietaries and covers, is this the one with our changes

in it, following the Subcommittee consideration?

Mr. Aaron. I hope not, but I can't assure you.

Ms. Culbreath. It's dated March 12th.

Mr. Aaron. If it's dated March 12, it must be the new

version.

My instructions to the staff were not to redistribute

the things we have been through but to hold them and put them

together in a new book because we are creating a new book.

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Now, you may have gotten one anyway, but please treat it

accordingly.

Ms. Culbreath. I guess I

did.

Senator Huddleston. Where is what you just referred to?

Mr. Aaron.

Page 52.

(Pause)

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of opening a chapter

which we have already gone through, and of not taking a good

suggestion from Mr. Kirbow, not that they all aren't good, but

instead of using the China example on not being informed, we

have a record before the Committee on Chile.

Mr. Maxwell. Fine. I think that is important.

Mr. Aaron. In which the activities, the TRACK II and

TRACK I, for that matter, were not available to the Chile

analysts, so that their analysis didn't reflect what U.s.

policy was in the area.

Mr. Kirbow. I'll go along with you if you will go along

with the fact that Mr. Kissinger withheld it from the Secretary

of State and from everybody in the world that we beat the

Chile thing to death. It's no longer chili, it's all has.

Mr. Bader.

Mr. Chairman, a point here is whether the

analyst is deprived or is lacking information about national

policies and programs at the time he is doing his analytical

thing, and we do have a good record on Chile and most recently

on Cambodia, and I think that if we could fit this to that point

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on the production of finished intelligence, I think we could

stand behind it.

Mr. Kirbow. I thought we were just trying to come up with

an example to demonstrate the fact that very high policy

decisions

such

as the President's impending trip there and

Mr. Kissinger's negotiations in the Middle East had been a

constant daily thing which no one at the analytical level has

been told anywhere where they stand until it is finally published

in the New York Times, and they have no way to weigh what is

coming out of the Middle East on a day to day basis in the

light of his negotiations because as he is shuttling back and

forth, none of that stuff, to my knowledge, is fed down at that

level. In fact, I don't know that anybody but he and the

President know what is going on at all, and the President

probably kind of at the convenience of the negotiator.

Ms. Davis. That's precisely why Colby swet up the

National Intelligence Officer, and that person has on occasional

bases been privy to this so that he would get it from the

policy maker, and filtering it back to the analyst. But however

well it is working is open to question.

Mr. Kirbow. I don't have any objection to using Chile,

Mr. Chairma, but the only point I am making is if you are trying

to draw a person's attention to a real problem, it doesn't do

much good to dredge up yesterday's mashed potatoes, because

people don't pay much attention because Chile has been overdone

ТАМ АГАРНУ

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on the dealings of this Committee. If you want to draw a few

new examples, I think it might be meaningful, and if you want

to use Chile also, I don't have any objection, by the way. The

record is clear on the position this committee has taken on

Chile.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, Cambodia does add some fresh meat

to the dinner table.

Ms. Davis.

We could use Cambodia after MI. Helms response

to our cable.

Mr. Kirbow. We may have difficulty in getting it back

in

time, and also in getting the Cambodia thing cleared, but

use any tough example that you like. You might as well pick

one that you don't have any idea that you won't get cleared at

all, and then you'll pick another one if it doesn't clear at

the last minute.

Ms. Davis: Well, I have it cleared, Charlie.

Mr: Aaron.

We will do something with an example.

On the reorganization, the next thing take up more or less

in order is the issue of reorganization of the CIA, and if --

I would suggest, it is only two pages long, and I would

suggest you might want to take a look at it.

Mr. Inderfurth. I have his comments, and I might just

mention these to you now, something. I think I might gave

mentioned earlier.

In the latest draft that I have,.

you don't state where

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covert operations would be. The end of the first paragraph you

simply say another for clandestine

collection of foreign

intelligence from human and technical sources and covert

operations.

(Pause)

Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry. The question went to the question

of where is covert action?

Mr. Inderfurth. Yes, and right: at the end of the first

paragraph, if I've got an old draft you could just say "and

covert operations, one for analysis under the DCI, and another

for clandestine collection and

covert operations.

Mr. Aaron.

Yes, that is the thought, nothing more compli-

cated than that..

Mr. Inderfurth. And the other is that

senator Hart thought

that it might be appropriate to put in a little bit, just a

couple of sentences on the executive order and how that relates

to

this, just saying that there are two deputies, and the fact

that the Deputy DCI will be running a CIA, and it's

a step

sort of in this direction.

MI. Aaron. Well, this raises a little broader question while!

we might want to consider, that is, you make the recommendation

concerning

consideration of dividing up the functions of the

DCI, and we also make some recommendations here about consider-

ing the possibility of dividing up the Agency itself. They

don't have to go together, but they can. In particular, if

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you separate the functions of the DCI from the head of the Agenay

yet wish him to retain a strong analytical capability, you

could still retain line authority over the analytical portion

of this now-divided Agency; and while having a different command

arrangement for the clandestine services. We could consolidate

those two recommendations in the same place, if you wish, and

that might make for a somewhat clearer discussion of the

problem.

In other words, it would start out by saying something

along

the lines of that final paragraph. If all the recommendations

made by this committee are implemented and the proposals of

the

President are implemented, we could take a close look at

dividing them up, and in addition, we also think there are

other issues which would fit in with that. It is worth taking

a look at whether the functions of the Agency shouldn't be

further subdivided..

Charles?

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, so that you don't think that

by silence either Ms. Culbreath or myself indicate any kind of

agreement with this, Senator Tower has personally askedüthat

he would be reserved on this entire section on the reorganization.

of the CIA.

Senator Huddleston

All right.

With that

notation we will accept the proposed alteration

that Dave mentioned.

TAN CLANET

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Mr. Maxwell. May I just ask, would both of those go

here rather than earlier, and the

reason I raise the question

is that although they are closely tied, the DCI recommendation

flows directly form that analysis that has been done on the

DCI section, and the reason for placing this here in the first

instance is that it flowed from the question of collection,

covert action and production.

I am not sure whether we might not lose something for the

reader by amalgamating them.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think you clearly, you just have a

choice. You can either lose the reader because you have now

got to refer to a set of other similar and if not integral,

congruent proposals which are, you know, some 40 pages earlier;

or you are going to lose something by virtue of having that

thing here, in which case the reader is going to have to remember

sort of what transpired, and in either case --

Mr. Maxwell. And another suggestion, that is, that the

first paragraph of this, that it be left here, the first

paragraph be the Committee has "see Section X, proposed

strengthening the DCI in the following ways," and then intro-

duce it, introduce that idea here and tie it to this, rather

than trying to force them together.

Mr. Aaron. I think that's a good idea. I think you have

to recapitulate what you have said in a brief compass.

Mr. Inderfurth. May I ask, just so I know what we are

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referring to, what is the basis for the reservation? I mean, I

am not challenging it.

Mr. Kirbow. I want to make it absolutely clear for the

record that the Senator, by letter to the Chairman, asked that

he be allowed to just note his reservations, and his reservations

would not be stated by the staff but would be stated by him at

the appropriate time before the Full Committee, and the Chairman

had agreed that the Staff Member would be allowed to do that,

and

I don't think it is proper at this time for me to try to

decide what the Senator's position is on it since he has. not

explained it to me in detail.

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, the only reason I ask is that we

are recommending the

oversight committee look at this, not that

they exclude it.

Mr. Kirbow. I don't think Senator Tower can be compelled

at this point to debate with the staff, and I didn't debate it

with him.

Mr. Maxwell. May I just make two further comments? One

the first bullet on 52, is the problem seen by some people

in the intelligence community; and secondly, on 53, I think

under the proposal that there be two agencies, one for analysis

under the DCI and another for clandestine collection, that would

raise the question of the DCI's -- a strain being put on the

DCI's time as well in regard to managing another not inconsiderabl

agency of 2000 people and a fairly substantial budget, and that

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I'm not sure whether that shouldn't be noted as well.

Ms. Davis. The point is that he wouldn't lose the strain

on his time because he would take with him some part of the

agency.

Mr. Maxwell. That's right.

Mr. Aaron.

Well, would you like-to propose a fix? I

might just say that he is supposedly doing that now, so the

net effect would be a reduction, that the implication that

it would be a total reduction was not correct. So how would

you like to put that?

Mr. Maxwell. Simply that if the DCI, the present

proposal - the other proposal was to split the DCI from

any responsibility for a

particular agency because that was the

thrust of the consideration, and that here, too, there would

be a problem for those people who believe that the DCI

should be split from any managerial function, direct Agency

managerial function, that there: still would be a managerial

responsibility.

I can try to draw a sentence..

Mr. Aaron. Well, wait a minute. If you're trying to

make a case, I do not know of any recommendation that the

DCI should have no managerial authority. The point is that

he manages an operating agency operating in the sense of

collection. Nobody has challenged that there is some conflict

of interest

inherent in both managing resources and producing

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finished

intelligence, nobody. So far as I am aware of, there

hasn't been any problem adduced in that direction. The problem

is adduced in the direction of allocating resources and

running a large collection operation

and a research and

development activity. That is where the conflict would be

seen.

Mr. Maxwell. I thought it at least implied, and Mr.

Graham's comments about the DCI's, there was a question of

whether when military people produced finished intelligence,

the DCI was not as well in a possible conflict of interest

position with the finished intelligence produced by his agency.

Mr. Aaron.

Well, that is a point of view.

Mx. Maxwell. That was my understanding of at least one

thrust of Mr. Graham's testimony.

Ms. Davis. Well, they had considered him, just put

him in with just a very small staff and leaving the analysts

over there.

Mr. Maxwell. It's not an important point, but that I thought

it might be important.

I'll try to make a fix on it.

Mr. Aaron. Well, if it's not an important point, let's

not make a big -

Senator Huddleston.

Make it a small fix, will you?

All right, where are we now?

Mr. Aaron.

We are now at the Section G, Intelligence

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Liaison, which picks up with page No. 73.

All right, the next section, Intelligence Liaison, on page

73, it

•is also extremely brief, but I think important.

We have

run into the question of liaison from time to time, but we have

not made a careful examination of it. My own view is that that

was a sensible thing to do, given the sensitivity and importance

of these activities, and the fact that we were not particularly

looking into the propriety of those activities, that an

investigatory approach would not have served us well

across the

board. But it is an extremely important dimension to our

intelligence, and if one does not understand it, one does

not get involved in knowing something about it, you miss an

awful lot of what the intelligence community, particularly the

CIA, is all about.

we ran into quite a bit of it, or I ran into quite a

bit of it in my travels, particularly in Europe, where our

principal liaison arrangements take place. It is, I think,

something certainly worth preserving and protecting.

On the other hand, because of its importance, it seems to

me that we really also ought to simply point for the oversight

committee in the direction of making clear that this is an

extremely important element.

Now, the recommendations go to the suggestion that, in

the point that treaties are approved by the Senate, executive

agreements are reported, and we believe the Director of

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Central Intelligence should report to the oversight committee

on the nature and content of all liaison relationships with

other intelligence services.

Now, that phrase "nature and content of all" is in

brackets, I think out of concern for the sensitivity of these

activities. The question is where does one

draw

• the line.

My own view is that "nature and content of all" captures the

kind of authority that one would like to see the oversight

committee exercise. The discretion that they exercise would

really be up to them. The notion of simply reporting on the

relationships is a much vaguer one, perhaps it is broader, but

in any event, that is the alternative.

Mr. Quanbeck. I have one comment. This may be a little

misleading because it is my understanding, although we have

never received official information, that elements of the

DOD, including the individual services, also enter into

agreements with foreign intelligence groups, and I don't know

how well these are coordinated with the DCI or CIA. Certainly

NSA does, and I know of a couple of cases where the Navy does

too.

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Mr. Aaron. Well, it might be well to add here the

Director of Central Intelligence and any other intelligence

agencies should report.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, the brackets on that were to

highlight in this recommendation the problem that I think we

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are going to have. Our recommendations

are not necessarily at

this time planned to be exposed to the agency for clearances

or to see if they do not have, or if they are classified, rather.

I just believe that the nature and content of these liaison

relationships probably is the most serious sources and methods

information available in which they engage,.and I just point

out that to require that this should be reported goes to a

thing that I think the oversight committees and these committees

have very carefully avoided over these investigations.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I don't think it does any great

abuse to the paragraph to leave that out, if your case is

strong enough.

Mr. Kirbow. It is obvious that a good oversight committee,

or an oversight committee should be aware that you would

have a rather close working relationship of some sort with the

XYZ country and the agencies, or even more important is in

certain of these countries, even where they are not friendly

to us openly, we have very close working relationships with

their intelligence groups. It would be very -- this is very

tenuous.

MI. Miller. You want to know what obligations the United

States enters into as a result of this relationship.

Mr. Kirbow. What do we owe them type thing, and

not necessarily the day to day working relationships between

how you are going about doing your collecting and trading-offs

TAN ALANET

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and

things like that.

Senator Huddleston. You have got to know something.

You couldn't enforce No. 2 if you didn't have some

information.

Mr. Aaron. That is correct. Let me give you an example

of one which I have some extensive and very fascinating

discussion during my travels, and I think we should go off

the record here.

Senator Huddleston. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Huddleston. I think in this case we ought to

take the brackets out and --

Mr. Kirbow. And leave the words in.

Senator Mathias. Well, let me give you an example of

why that might be desirable. I made a visit to a friendly

country not too long ago, and the other day when we requested

our FBI files, one of the items that I discovered was a complete

memoranda of my conversations in this friendly country.

Senator Huddleston. That was in

the FBI file?

Senator Mathias. It was

in my FBI files at the --

Mr. Kirbow.

What that really means is that it was picked

up under our CI feedback, counterespionage or counterintelligence

feedback, through the CIA.

Senator Mathias.

I know who did the recording. I can

put a name on him and everything, but I was not aware at the

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time that the conversations were taking place.

Senator Huddleston. That Senators would be under surveil-

lance, you mean?

Mr. Kirbow. I will say something that Senator Mathias

didn't hear earlier. My earlier comments, and the reasons the

brackets were put there by Mr. Aaron initially was that

felt that when you use the words "nature and content of all

liaison relationships," that we might be speaking to sources

and methods, but you know, the oversight committee is going to

avoid sources and methods like a plague anyway, so I don't

see anything wrong with leaving the words in.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think just to echo that, and to argue

the other side of the case for just a moment, the only real

reason to be less explicit about this is that it might deter

other countries from wanting to enter into such agreements

because they would think that this is going to be open

sesame with the Congress.

Now that, I think, is the most telling reason to be purposel:

vague. The oversight Committee will do whatever it wants, you

know.

Senator Huddleston. That's true. The thought occurred

to me a moment ago, just announcing that might cause some of

them to be a little reluctant. But at any rate, I don't

see how we can carry out the responsibility.

Senator Mathias. Well, but that's in writing, and these

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friendlies are nervous as hell about this. Embassies just

twitch around town hearing mention of the subject.

Mr. Miller. You have to give in order to get.

Mr. Kirbow. In that respect, Mr. Chairman, and since

the minority member is present, too, one of the other minority

members of this Committee, specifically Senator Baker, had

asked me to make mention to you as the Chairman and any of

the other members his concern that the recommendations were

not - the findings and recommendations were not in some way.

going to be carefully considered by the Agency to prevent

just what you discussed, that mere publication of this being

made available to the oversight committee may cause some

serious effects on the relationships, and that we

could ask the

agency not to change this, necessarily, but to state a position

on what effect would this have if it were made public; or that

type of thing, that he was going to make a formal request to

the Subcommittee, and wanted to kind of have your feelings

on that.

I felt at this time it was appropriate to make his request

known here.

I think the problem arose on the Domestic Task Force

where the General Counsel had advocated against any contact

between the executive branch and the findings and recommen-

dations part of the task force.

Senator Huddleston. I thought Chairman Church had indicated

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that they would look over the whole report.

MI. Kirbow: I thought that also, and he had, and that

is why he asked me to broach it to the Subcommittee. Specifically

you recall a couple of days ago we were talking about, with a

group of witnesses from the CIA, what would be the effect of

a public announcement that the CIA had relationships with

480 something academic institutions, and so many individuals:

there, and they said it would cause serious harm to their

activities in that. That is the sort of thing that I think

he was specifically wanting the agencies to be able to go on the

record,.

so they fully understood what the committee was doing,

not necessarily that they were going to change their position.

Mr. Inderfurth. The appropriate time, I think, would be

after the full Committee has completed its review and approval

of the recommendations.

Mr. Kirbow. He did not move to an exact procedure, but

just that the desire should come out.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I can see that this kind of

recommendation here on the staff would cause some nervousness

on the part of --.

Mr. Kirbow. And you could find out, you know, well, it

bothers us and we can live with it, is one level, or it

creates harm or serious harm, or it is a disastrous escalation

or whatever the positions are.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Chairman, in that regard, and I was

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thinking about this the other day, I think -- and the Committee

has looked into an area and done a study on it, and certainly.

wants to make a recommendation. It could still decide, for

example, after consultation with the Executive Branch that this

did pose a sources and methods problem, but there is nothing to

stop the Committee from having a classified version of its

recommendations which would be transferred to the President

of the United States, which would eventually set out for the

Agency, so there would be no misunderstanding, that it was in

fact, going to look into liaison services. You wouldn't neces-

sarily have to say that in public. That's just an example of

the kind of thing that the Committee could do. The Chairman

could transmit a letter to the President of the United States

testifying to the fact that he was making an effort to protect

some valuable information, but the Committee was not giving

up any authority by not mentioning it in the public document.

I think that is something the Committee may want to

consider.

Mr. Kirbow.

Mr. Chairman, I don't want to call for any

kind of decision. Obviously I don't have the authority. But

he just wanted me at some appropriate time to make that known

to you, and I had elected to do it today because these are

to go to the Full Committee next week, and I waited until

Senator Mathias has arrived.

Senator Huddleston. Do you have any further thoughts,

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Mac, on this?

Senator Mathias. I think maybe Joe's idea of a classified

section may be the answer, either that or Senator Baker's.

Senator Huddleston. I don't think we need to be too nervous

about No. 2, the fact that we are going to require them to not

get involved in things through liaison that we're not permitted

to do otherwise.

Mr. Aaron. I think Joe's recommendation is a good one.

If you read. Recommendation 3 against 1, if you deleted the materi

in the brackets, it would tend to imply that you got much less

in 1 than you would get in 3, and liaison people could not be

too unhappy about 3 because they're really talking about non-

intelligence matters-being used, just using secure intelligence

channels to do it.

However, if that were the case, I think you really would

want the content of l as it is now.

Mr. diGenova. Absolutely.

MI. Aaron. And we might put a footnote on it to the

Committee here in that this would be supported to a classified

letter to the President, the Director, the Agency and the

oversight Committee whenever it came about, stating that

our recommendation was in fact fuller than this, and was, you

know, made mor ambiguous in the public text in order to protect

sensitive channels, or something to that effect.

Senator Huddleston.

I think that I would approve of that

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approach. I think that we can work that out.

Mr. diGenova. The Committee may wish to do it in other

instances, or they may

say no, they don't want to do this.

Mr. Aaron. I take it the second one doesn't cause any

problem.

Ms. Culbreath. Elliot had a suggestion on that one which

I'm going to try to interpret here, on the second one, on the

second sentence.

Mr. Aaron.

Well, let me say, the second line says, "encoura

with action," and the "with" is a typo that comes out.

Senator Huddleston.

"Should be prohibited from engaging,"

shouldn't it be?

Mr. Aaron.

From engaging and causing, funding or

encouraging.

Senator Huddleston.

The way it is is prohibited to

engage.

Mr. Maxwell. I wanted to try to make the second sentence

a little bit clearer, and I can read it and see if it does.

Furthermore, the fact that a particular project, action

or activity of the CIA is carried out through or by a liaison

service does not relieve the CIA of its responsibilities for

clearance within the Executive Branch or with Congress.

We may be making it a

little bit clearer.

Mr. Aaron.

Well,

let me just say one thing here, then.

We really in the first sentence have to say, liaison

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relationships with other foreign intelligence services, first of

all, and then down here, through a foreign liaison service.

Mr. Maxwell. Okay, through

or by.

Mr. Aaron. Through or by.

Okay, I think that's a good fix.

The third recommendation, let me explain that, there

occasionally, a negotiation of agreement will be struck through

an intelligence channel, in order to give it a sort of super-

secure quality, and I think that because it has been done in

liaison, that has been a way of protecting it, not only from

unintended public disclosure, but also from disclosure to

Congress which had little or no access to these kinds of

information.

Once it was labeled intelligence information, you

had a number of barriers to its dissmination, appropriate or

inappropriate. This simply requires that if this takes place,

and there are real agreements that occur as a result of it.

that these have to be brought to the attention of the

Committee.

Ms. Culbreath. How is this related to the existing require-

ments regarding treaties and agreements.with other. countries,

any other kind that you might have?

Mr. Aaron. Treaties, as you know, have to require advise

and consent. Executive agreements must be reported to the

Senate.

Ms. Culbreath. Even secret executive. agreements?

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Mr. Aaron. That is my understanding.

Mr. diGenova. They have a specific definition, however,

and I don't know if a liaison type service --

Mr. Aaron.. This doesn't fit into that. It is kind of a

further refinement.

Ms. Culbreath. This is just intended to get. at contracts

with liaison services to do things for us?

MI. Aaron. No, it is not for intelligence or intelligence-

related like covert action. It doesn't deal with that. It

deals with really other matters.. For example, I think certain

nuclear agreements are worked out in intelligence channels

because they provide a supersecure way of doing it.

Ms. Culbreath. But those would also have

to be reported

under existing requirements. to --

Mr. Aaron. They have not been, or I'm not aware of it:

Ms. Davis. Welt, that's something -- I don't know.

Ms. Culbreath. Well, that's what I don't understand. I'm

trying to figure out if this is already required somehow or

another to go to Congress.

Mr. Aaron. I don't believe so.

Mr. Miller. Well you see, Elizabeth, this is the whole

problem. There is a whole range of activities that range

from te kind of thing that David describes, which may be

simply a technical means of obtaining an agreement, to exchange

of equipment, money, people in some cases.

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2.5

Senator Huddleston. Is this within the agency of government

now?

Ms. Culbreath. I mean the Agriculture -- for instance,

if the Agriculture Department has a secret agreement with India,

would that have to come through this channel or go to our

oversight committee?

Mr. Aaron. Well, let's take a hypothetical but I think

a real kind of example.

If there were a special agreement made with Iran: concerning

breaking the oil embargo, and how money was going to be spent

and how much oil they were going to try and get out and what

have you, and this was negotiated through an intelligence

channel because that's how the Shah or the United States

wished to negotiate this, if you will, cartel type agreement,

that agreement would not ordinarily come to the Congress in

any other way. Congress would have no knowledge of it.

Ms. Davis. And it probably wouldn't, even if it came throug

intelligence channels.

Senator Huddleston. What we are asking is any time

the

intelligence community is used as a negotiating instrument for

the government, that we ought to know about it.

Mr. Aaron. That's right, and the fact that it is being

used is not an excuse or justification for not following

through with these other reports.

Ms. Culbreath. Well, that helps me to understand it.

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don't know about anybody else.

Senator Huddleston.

All right.

Let's move on.

Mr. Maxwell. The budget paper is on its way over, and

here it comes now.

(Pause)

Mr. Aaron. Turning to Section VIII, let me explain a

little bit of the history of it.

The Defense Task Force did the primary work on the

budget along with a consultant that we had, formerly associated

with the Bureau of the Budget, but I think it is safe to say

that in essence this distills the analysis and judgment of

the Defense Task Force concerning the intelligence budget

questions. It cannot, do justice to it because it is an

extremely rich and useful and interesting analysis that

• they

put together, and I think we are a long ways toward getting a

good portion of that declassified and available for the overall

report.

Now, it doesn't

appear under the Defense Department

section because in terms of findings and conclusions and

recommendations, or findings and conclusions in regard to the

budget, it doesn't go

to so-called budget issues, in other

words; are we spending

too much or too little of so forth, but

they go to the question of how does the budget fit into the

Congressional oversight problem.

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And we went over this paper a couple of times, and most

recently, even after we last

went over it, it contained both a

section on the numbers relating to the budget and its structure

as well as the arguments for Congressional oversight and the

constitutional requirements, and what we have just done --

Elliot made the point that it really made more sense to start

out with the basic charge of the Committee, which was what

about the Constitutional questions, what about the Congressional

part. So it starts out now with something of the introduction

to the Constitutional and Congressional issue, and then goes

on to the issues of the numbers.

Now, there is apparently a sentence missing.

Mr. Maxwell. Yes. On page 107, the first full paragraph

ends with the sentence, "While this represents I percent of

the Federal budget, it constitutes 10 percent of the control-

lable Federal spending." A sentence was dropped in the typing

that should go before that sentence, and the sentence is

"The Committee found that the foreign and military intelligence

community spends roughly $10 billion a year on intelligence

activities." Then the next sentence, "While this represents

1 percent of the Federal budget, it constitutes 10 percent

of controllable Federal spending."

Mr. diGenova. Elliot, the word "both" after the "U.s.'

Constitution" should be in brackets, also, because that is

a debatable question.

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MI. Maxwell. That is correct..

Mr. diGenova. The word "both."

Mr. Maxwell. In the third full paragraph.

Mr: Aaron. I just wonder if it wouldn't be useful to add

just to the very first sentence that the Committee finds that

a full understanding of the budget is required for effective

oversight. I think that is the first of our findings here.

Mr. Quanbeck. In the second sentence, I would recommend

the budget procedures, that should be-the secrecy procedures

presently employed. The

budget procedures are straightforward,

are the same used for the rest of the Department of

Defense,

but the secrecy.

Mr. diGenova.

HOW

about the secret budget procedures?

Mr. Quanbeck.

The

data is what is kept secret, the

procedures are not.

Mr. Aaron. Can you say the present secrecy surrounding

the budget makes it --

Mr. Kirbow. I don't want to necessarily dwell on that

because obviously it is

the cause and effect of everything that

goes on in this area, but procedures

adopted by the Congress

is not made more

fully aware.

I don't want to make it appear that just because of the big

secrecy surrounding this, it is totally secret, and as long as

we adopt a procedure, that we are going to recommend that it

Stay secret:

Really, it is the Congressional procedures that

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are preventing the Congress from full exposure.

Mr. diGenova. How about "employed by the Congress itself"?

Mr. Kirbow. Budget review.

Mr. Aaron. Well, it isn't entirely fair to put the

entire burden on the Congress. There is no question that the

executive has gone to great lengths to insist that this be

secret, and the Congress have complied, the appropriate

committees have complied.

Now, whether in the absence of that they would still want

to do that -

Mr. Kirbow. I think secrecy surrounding the budget

procedures -

Senator Huddleston. Is it necessary to put "public" in

there also?

MI. Aaron. I refer to you.

Mr. Maxwell.. It may not be appropriate in that sentence,

but the problem is that the thrust of the Constitutional require-

ment goes to the public rather than to Congress alone, and

because the public was to serve as a check on Congressional

procedures, the public is unable

as well.

Senator Huddleston. Iunderstand.

Mr. Kirbow. We could - it certainly doesn't exercise

oversight.

Senator Huddleston. We could use the words "full

understanding," which would seem to imply to me that the

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public ought to have all

of the details.

Ms. Maxwell. That could be dropped there because I think

it is clear later on.

Ms: Culbreath..

Well, Mr. Chairman, that gets to some of

the discussion about how much revealing of the budget is

necessary in order to meet the requirements of the Constitution,

and that is not something I'm sure we're going to fully step

up to.

Senator Huddleston. I've got a

feeling that we're not goin!

to suggest that the full Constitutional requirement be adopted,

it would be my guess, is that right?

Mr. Maxwell. I certainly would not recommend full disclo-

sure of the budget.

Senator Huddleston. But here we seem to be implying that

they have to have a full understanding, even down to the

general public.

Mr. Maxwell. Well; why don't we strike public there,

because I think the -- we do make the point clear in other

places.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we mentioned Congress. Make it

"even Congress."

Mr. Maxwell. Well, let's focus initially on Congress.

I think it goes to the public after.

Senator Huddleston. All right there, Dave?

Mr. Aaron. All right.

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Let me see if I understand it.

You want the "even Congrees"?

Senator Huddleston. Well, what about that? That seems

to me to emphasize it.

MI. Aaron. That's fine. It's "even Congress as a

whole, to make use of this valuable oversight tool."

Senator Huddleston. That makes it possible for Congress

to exercise its appropriate oversight responsibilities.

Senator Mathias. Generally that whole section looks

all right to me. The Recommendation 94 is the only question

I would have.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, since I asked that it be brackete

the discussion I had with the staff, and I suggested that the

current statutory law of the nation, and the rule that you

have adopted in the Senate, require any Committee oversight

on intelligence or otherwise, to do whatever it has to do

with the Budget Committee, and you don't want to recommend

against it. It is already a rule.

MI. Miller. We have had inquiries, for example, from the

Budget Committee to this Committee.

Mr. Kirbow. As to how you would do it, or whether or not?

Mr. Miller. Whether you would and how you would do it.

Would an oversight committee --

Mr. Aaron. Be the people to do it?

Senator Mathias. I just think that they are going to work

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those out.

Mr. Kirbow. Obviously if there were inadequate security

arrangements, two chairmen could decide that the Committee

itself is able to get more information than would be made publid

I think you can spell out more here, and it becomes

kind of a

recommendation that later becomes a law that you can make it

more rigid, then flexible.

Senator Mathias. Well, you also have a problem, if you

talk about the Budget Committee, you're also going to have to

talk about the Appropriations Committee, so

I would say strike

this.

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Senator Huddleston. Strike 94.

Senator Mathias. Otherwise I have no problems.

Mr. Aaron. Now, 93 has two brackets on it, and they are

somewhat different. There is a recommendation that it -- it

has three recommendations in it, if you will. The first is

to authorize the release, both authorize and release an

annual figure. To be more precise, it is to authorize a

national intelligence budget and release a total figure. The

second recommendation is that it release the figure for each

major agency.

Now, I think the authorization point is picked up in the

previous sentence, because if you're authorizing the budget as

a whole, you're really going

to have to authorize things, not

only the agencies, but maybe even categories within agencies.

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So the real issue here is whether these agency budgets

would be made public. That would include NSA, CIA, DIA, the

Joint Reconnaissance programs and so forth, the total for

each one of these.

Now, back in the text of the findings we make some

comments about those organizations, and some of their costs, such

as the Agency itself. If we do not want to release those sub-

findings, we may not want to include those costs, particularly

those of the CIA.

On the other hand, we had some discussion at the staff

level about the possibility of recommending that on an annual

basis there be released a global figure, if you will, for the

entire intelligence community, and not a more detailed breakdown,

but that this one time for the purposes of our investigation

and so as to give a relative -- an appreciation for the

relative allocation of effort within the intelligence community

we might give a detailed breakdown, yet recommend that this

is the last time, in effect, that we are only going to do this

once.

You can see how it works now. This is evidence of what

it is that goes on in the intelligence community, but that for

security reasons we don't think this ought to be a common prac-

tice.

The

further recommendation in that paragraph, in the

last bracketed sentence really urges the oversight committee

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to do more in the way of releasing information in this area.

It should be contrasted to a finding on the top of page 107, whi

is in brackets, which has the opposite thrust, and it says that

the Committee

opposes a more detailed public itemization than

whatever it decides to release.

So the last sentence in Recommendation 93, the Committee

really has two choices. It can either urge the oversight

committee to try to expose this problem more within the bounds

of national security, of it can try to go on record as

saying,

really, it shouldn't go any further than this.. The argument

on behalf of the last alternative, which is to go on record as

saying this is as far as we ought to go, is that I think it

will help assauge the fear that exists in the executive

branch. that once you refeal any numbers, even if the numbers

themselves are probably not going to be detrimental in any way

to the national security, this will only feed pressure for

more detailed exposure, and that if we agree with the point

that there should not be more detailed exposure, this will be

most reassuring to the executive branch and help keep from

happening a process which both they and the Committee would

find undesirable.

Mr. Quanbeck. By way of explanation, the analysis we

did would be that we can release the aggregate figure every

year, and it would be virtually impossible to pick out changes,

significant changes in programs. It's so aggregated and there

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are so many variables that you couldn't do it. But I believe

if you went on an agency by agency basis, especially the NSA

and National Reconnaissance programs, that it would be possible

to detect the addition of new programs or major cryptological

effort or something like that.

So I don't think -- our analysis would lead us to believe

that the aggregate number is what we should work toward.

Mr. Maxwell. There is some conflicting testimony about

that. I think Charlie has gone over the record, and I have.

The

past Directors of the CIA have come down at varying positions

with regard to component disclosures and their effect on

national security. They all agree that there is a substantial

danger of people nickel and diming on' figures, so that sooner

or later an enormous amount of detail gets out. But MI.

Schlesinger did not take a position that component surveys

posed =- the component figure, the aggregate figure for CIA

posed

real danger, while Mr. Colby did. Mr. Helms again

took a position that he was not generally opposed to it, and

when the former Comptroller of the Agency, Mr. Clark, was

asked precisely the point about revealing

new programs in

regard to CIA, he took the position when he was Mr. Colby's

Comptroller, Mr. Colby asked him whether in fact it would

reveal new programs, he

said he.couldn't find the evidence that

it did.

Mr. Quanbeck. But that's the CIA, but I'm addressing NSA

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and the National Reconnaissance Programs. I think it is a

different problem there.

The NRO is much more system oriented

and doesn't have that vast overhead that remains constant.

Mr. Kirbow. It is almost solely constituted in major

hardware expenditures, and if we can go off the record just

a moment.

Senator Huddleston. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Huddleston. My personal feeling all along is that

if we showed an aggregate budget, it would be trouble.

Mr. Kirbow. I would say in regard to Elliot's position,

in regard to the Constitution, that he's not calling it a

cure-all.

Is an aggregate budget enough to satisfy the Constitution

in light of the National Security matters in the eyes of the

Congress.

It seems that if we tried that the first time and got

beat, either on the floor or from the oversight committee or

wherever, that you'd have to live with it, but if you sold it

a couple of times

and no real

harm accrued to either the

American public or the Congress, you might find that as times

change you could do something different. But clearly you could

very much harm yourself. Now,

not a single witness has said

they couldn't live with the total aggregate.

Mr. Quanbeck. There are other programs going on in the

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Department of Defense not related to intelligence that are done

in complete secrecy.

MI. Kirbow.

And indeed they are and are approved by the

Armed Services Committee as classified projects, and not even

revealed in detail there.

Mr. Maxwell.. I think Charlie sums up accurately my own

feeling about the need

to protect the national security, and

the fact that total disclosure or even disclosure in significant

detail would not be appropriate at this point. I think, how-

ever, that

the point should be made that the purpose of the

Constitutional requirement should be facilitated as much

as

possible, given the limits that National Security would place

upon it.

If one took the aggregate budget, I think Congress would

be in a better position to make some judgments as

to whether

they would like this amount of money spent. At the same time,

the public would be able to see that $10 billion of roughly

$10 billion was being spent, but there, my own feeling, based

on the record that I have taken a look, at, is that to say that

the CIA, for instance, was receiving $750 million, would not

pose that threat. It is already clear from Mr. Marks and Mr.

Marchetti, for whatever fortunate reasons exist, that the budget

is pretty widely known, and I think it is pretty unlikely

that we could maintain as a serious matter that the

enemies of the country don't know whät the rough figure is.

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if, in fact, there was a new program either in NSA or CIA.

You also have to understand that Mr. Schlesinger took the

position

that that could be done, if one did it, in regard to

outlays rather than obligational authority. For instance, the

KENNAN program was funded over a period of time, so it wasn't

as if the total cost of the program showed up, and I think the

same would be true with the situation in regard to other

intelligence agencies. I mean, that is one possibility.

The second possibility is, if there was a bump, according

to. Mr. White and other people in the DOD task force, even

in regard to CIA's budget, from my discussion with them, CIA

was unable to explain bumps in their budget process, that there

were a number of explanations, internal cuts in personnel

efficiency or whatever.

The only point that I am trying to

make is that insofar as we can provide information to the

public which helps them exercise their function in deciding

whether Congress is allocating their funds properly, and inso-

far as we can facilitate Congressional oversight by saying

that funds are appropriately addressed to particular agencies,

we increase the likelihood of better oversight, and that

each

time that we have to look and see what the effect would be on

national security.

My own sense, and that's a personal judgment, that it

could be done in terms of aggregate program, of the total in

CIA, if this were in fact seen as a particularly, as a figure

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The national objectives of an intelligence community are

determined in probably 10 percent of the -- excuse me, for

10 percent of the amount; of money. that we know we are going

to continue to monitor the Soviet Union with our Spies in the

Sky, and you can pretty well estimate what that kind of budget

is going to be.

If the Congress of the executive had any way of truly

determining what the national objectives would be in the

intelligence community over a five year period, I think then

you should require the Agency to come forth and put its plans

against those, but I just don't see how in this case here,

having the oversight of the intelligence community, that you

could compel them, because that's what you're really going

to try to do, to determine what the national objectives are

out to the fifth year,

against which they are going to match

each and every one of

their requests for funds.

The

second part on the hardware system, I don't

see. any

serious objection to it.

Someone has to authorize those things

so you can get the handle on proper costs and whether you're

getting other systems out of the sky, when you are putting

up new ones, and I think it should stay in there, but I think

that as it is worded, it is an unworkable situation.

Mr. Inderfurth. The first part.

Mr. Kirbow. Principally, yes.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I might say that my understanding -- and

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believe me, this is strictly personal; this is not Committee --

my understanding is that the efforts to get the Department of

Defense in particular to provide five year force

budget

projections which they do for themselves, to get them to

provide it for Congress has not been successful.

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, I think that is wrong, because

at its initial inception of five year planning, when Mr. MCNamati

was Secretary, it has been furnished to the Senate Armed

Services Committee, at least for the six years that I was

in the Senate. I don't know if they were in the detail that

everyone thinks they should be, but they have the five year

forecasts.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, I don't see requiring anything

there the Committee would

up before the Committee

ask for. You know, when they come

they are going to ask for it, but I'd

let it go.

Mr. Kirbow. You just want to delete that, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Huddleston. Yes.

Mr. Aaron. The next recommendation deals with a point

which I think is quite important to keep in mind, and that is

that we have talked about the National Intelligence budget and

control over it and what it should do and authorizing it, but

much as we give the Director of Central Intelligence earlier

in the paper the authority to keep an eye on the tactical

budget, we sort of have to give that of recommend that the

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oversight committee also keep an eye on the tactical budget,

simply to insure, for its own sake, that the tactical budget is

really, contains just tactical things.

Mr. Kirbow. Not used to hide national programs.

Mr. Aaron. That's right, and also there are some simple

questions which are going to have to be resolved, for example..

like the Kennan, and what

is tactical, and they are going to

have to define that, and you really can't define it without

looking at what is tactical.

And so this is by way of making that point.

Ms. Culbreath. An éditorial point.

Do you want to delete the first four words and put "The

Committee"?

Mr. Aaron..

"The oversight committee should"? All right.

I don't think "carefully"

adds that much.

Our next recommendation goes to the recommendation that

the GAO be empowered to conduct full audits. We took out

something of this character from the proprietary section you

will recall, on the theory that we were going to be providing for

it here.

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, David, didn't we take it out

because we already had it in the oversight bill?

Mr. Inderfurth. No!

In fact, it was also taken out of

the oversight bill.

Mr: Kirbow. It was taken out because we have the authority

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to do so at any time.

Mr. Inderfurth. But

some of us were concerned

about that

because although GAO does have the authority --

Mr. Kirbow. No, they don't have any authority by

themselves.

Mr. Inderfurth. They have the authority by the Committee.

if asked by Congress. However, despite the fact that GAO has

been asked by Congress on occasions to look at various components

of the intelligence community, it has had a great deal of

resistance from the CIA, from NSA to do that, and so I've

got a number of comments on this one that at the appropriate

time I want to raise.

Mr. Kirbow. well, I think the latter part where it says.

"should be authorized to have access to all files and records

of the intelligence community for the purposes of conducting

full audit as requested by the Committee" is

something we

should be sure that the executive understands that that's what

we want done, that they don't cut them off at the door like

they did at the FBI. That first part of it, the business by

statute, they should be empowered to conduct. They are

empowered to conduct by statute now.

Mr.

Inderfurth. It's ESP or something. The comnents

Senator Hart wanted me to make about this, Elliot, you wrote

this and maybe you can explain why.

Mr: Maxwell. I didn't. Bill White wrote this. I am

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willing to defend Mr. White.:

Mr. Inderfurth. By statute is inappropriate, and GAO

would be opposed to that:

Mr. Maxwell. I would be opposed to it also.

Mr. Inderfurth. In the last sentence, the results of this

audit

should be made available to any oversight - well, since

the Senate is doing it --

Mr. diGenova. That's the issue that the intelligence

community is going to make, and that is that there should be

GAO type people on the intelligence community. That is going

to be their thrust against this, and the answer has to be that

Congress picks who it hires to do its jobs and makes sure that

they have security clearances, and it should be clear in here

that we are talking about the oversight committee probably

literally doing that, bringing these people into the committee

quarters and having them do this operation out of the committee

quarters, and whether or not we want to say that is another

question.

Mr. Maxwell. We might want to change this to read --

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, let me ask, do you mean that you

would think that the oversight committee would have the audit

conducted within its spaces?

Mr: diGenova. No. The people are going to be operating

probably out of committee, will be consulting the committee

during

this audit process, and they will be operating from out

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of its quarters.

They will be conducting an audit within the

confines of the agency which they are investigating.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, normally they conduct it from downtown.

They don't conduct it from the committee spaces.

Mr. diGenova. I'm just talking about the problems which

are going to come up, which is what the FBI said before.

Mr. Maxwell.. CIA, for instance, has raised objection for

having GAO do certain audits for the oversight committee, that

that material would go into the data base that would be

available for the GAO, and I have suggested that in order to

prevent that, that the Committee have staff who would be

able

to perform similar functions to those conducted by GAO. That

is the objection that Joe was trying to raise.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think the problem with this

and we tried it

out for

several years in the Armed Services

Committee, was to have two permanent people,: staff members,

secunded there from the GAO, to do only investigative. It

never worked, and we finally had to send them back because

they've got to have the same support from downtown anyway.

Two people cannot do this kind of audit, or more.

Mr. Maxwell. I think that's right, and I'll just say,

"at the request of the oversight committee, the GAo should

conduct audits both for compliance and for management of every

components of the intelligence community." Second sentence as

is: And the third, we can amend simply, "In order to conduct

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these audits, the GAO should be authorized

to have full

access to all necessary files and records of the intelligence

community.

Mr. Inderfurth. Leave off the last, about the idea of

sending the GAO auditor over to the executive.

Mr. Kirbow. Yeah, let the Committee send it if they

want. Let the GAO furnish the audit to the Committee is what

you are saying.

Mr. Inderfurth. Yes.

Mr. Kirbow. I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maxwell. Is the other way it was read to you acceptable:

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I think we've got that one pretty

well whipped then.

Mr. Aaron. Okay. I'm not too well sure I understand the

language fixes that go with all this. Can I get your fixes?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes. We are clear on this.

Mr. Aaron. All right.

Now, you may think we are done, but we arenot.

We can now turn to Chapter X, General Recommendations.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Huddleston. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Aaron.: I would recommend that we probably cannot

clean up the different

language points in here. What I would

suggest is we sort of focus on the principle involved.

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Senator Huddleston. Let's take the first paragraph.

Mr. Aaron. The first one essentially says,. or is explained

by the very first sentence, and the rest of it is a finding.

Senator Huddleston. Does anybody have any serious problem

with that?

Mr. Aaron.

I have some problems, even though I am here

to defend all of this.

Senator Huddleston. As it is done now?

Mr. Aaron. As it is done now, you have every agency

essentially conducts its own security clearances, and the FBI

does a lot of leg work, but doesn't necessarily serve as the

sole organ for establishing security clearances.. The Agency

does some of this, the State Department has its own security

office, Arms Control in my experience uses the FBI. The White

House uses a variety. Over time it has used a variety of

instruments.

Senator Huddleston. What are we suggesting here?

Mr. Aaron. That there just be one place that does the

security

clearance and consolidate it.

Now, the problem is your military services. You have

2 million men under arms in this country, and they give

clearances up to the level -- I think

there are 2 million con-

fidential clearances somebody quoted to me, and that really

isn't something you want to ask the FBI to do.

so I would just say that with the exception of the military

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services,

security clearances on access to sensitive information

should be conducted by

one. Agency, the FBI, and just let it

90.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, that would be a conflict with our

Domestic Task Force, both because I think they are recommending

that the FBI not conduct

these investigations.

Senator Huddleston

Really? Where do they want to put

them?

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Mr. Kirbow. I'm not sure.

Mr. Maxwell. I don't -- maybe that's not -- I think they

have not centralized it in one agency. They have said that

in certain instances the

CIA would be conducting its investi-

gations:

Senator Huddleston.

Essentially they are leaving it like

it is.

Mr. Maxwell. Except putting firm limits onwhat can be

done in the course of a background investigation, the kinds of

methods that can be used, the techniques that can be employed.

'Ms. Culbreath. All I'm saying -- have we really

developed any record on this? I don't know what the agencies

think, I don't know what their reasons are to hold onto their

own clearance processes.

I haven't seen any discussion of

it.

Mr. Kirbow. The Commission on Atomic Energy downtown has

had

such serious restrictions that they would not take me

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today without doing

another full field background, Mr. Chairman

if I had just been cleared by this Committee.

Senator Huddleston.

They don't accept anybody else's.

Mr. Kirbow. No, sir, they don't.

Mr. Aaron. That's kind of the problem here, and. I think

that most of the people, I would agree, I don't think we have

any testimony on it. Almost everybody has had an experience

with it, or has had the

same experience. The real question,

there

are some practical

difficulties. I think Joe might

attest to some in regard to the Glomar Explorer, when, in order

to get some security clearances for operational purposes,

to

clear people who on the one hand may be witting and maybe even

people who are unwitting

of the true purposes of

the program;

building this huge ship

for example, the Agency, if I am

correct, on this, Joe, or

incorrect -- please comment one way

or the other - the Agency used a proprietary investigative

agency in order

to do the security clearances.

aside.

Now, this kind of recommendation would presumably set that

That isn't the problem we are trying to get at, and

I think that's the kind of thing you want to get around; the

general point that security investigations for intelligence

purposes -- there are others -- ought to be consolidated in

one place, that one agency should do the investigation, that

this would eliminate a

lot of duplication.

Senator Huddleston. Well, there's a lot of others. They

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check prospective judges. That's a clearance, isn't it?

Mr. Aaron. And the whole notion of a top secret clearance

doesn't necessarily relate to intelligence information at

all.

Senator Huddleston. We want to be concerned with the

intelligence operation.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, the biggest single area is

not even the military area. It is the Defense contractors.

each employee of whom

must have this type of clearance.

Itis

done through an industrial clearance. It is a massive problem

on which we should receive --

Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps we should recommend to the oversight

committee --

Mr. Kirbow. Why do we recommend in this area? It really

doesn't fit our intelligence manual.

Senator Huddleston. Are we thinking of the necessity to

centralize or to standardize?

Mr. Aaron.

I think both problems exist. Centralization

is important in only oné. It is important, A, because it makes

it possible to

standardize, but also I think that in

connection with the notion of counterintelligence, counter-

espionage, being sure that you are not giving an intelligence

clearance to somebody who shouldn't have it, one of the

concerns is in the counterintelligence function. This is one

of

the arguments for the FBI doing it. They presumably have

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files and all that kind of business.

I would tend to support Charles' suggestion that this is

a kind of an idea to which we would like to give a little

greater push,. but we probably shouldn't try to be too specific

about

how you really solve the point.

Mr. Kirbow. Just point it to the oversight committee

without mandating.

Senator Huddleston.. If Dave and Charlie are on the same

track, I think we ought to move that one real quick.

Mr. diGenova. This is an area that is going to be of

chosiderable importance because the CIA has used its

investigative proprietaries, which are literally security

agencies, to do, as

we know before, penetrations and probes

not only of contractors, but to do sensitive background investi-

gations of employees of contractors as well.

They did it once, they went out and set up a proprietary

in St. Louis and in six months had investigated very efficiently

an incredible number of people who worked on highly sensitive

Defense contracts, and then closed up shop and left, and there

is something to be said for that, but there is also something

to be said for whether of not they ought to do it at all.

Mr. Kirbow. Let's go off the record.

Senator Huddleston. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Huddleston. Well, we point out some of the

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things that happened, and let's just suggest the whole system

should be studied to see whether or not it should be eliminated.

Mr. Aaron. The second recommendation goes to the point

that intelligence operations can have, and they are not alone

in this in the government, but they can have important impli-

cations for the rights of citizens of America and for the

obligations under the Constitution, and that in this area it

would be advisable to make an extra effort to have the

personnel involved in this fully aware of what the Constitution

says and means, and they take an oath to uphold and defend

most of them and they don't read the fine print.

So we suggest that maybe they take a look at the fine

print.

Senator Huddleston. I see nothing wrong with that.

Ms. Culbreath. Mr. Chairman, if I could just comment on

this for a minute as somebody who worked in an agency

on the General Counsel's staff, and one of the things you run

into when you get other people in the agency being concerned

about what the law is, is folks trying to make decisions about

things that need to be referred to the General Counsel's office

and one of the strong recommendations that we have made, and

I think we have all agreed to, is that any important matters

that the Agency is involved with should go to the General

Counsel's office for review for the very thing as to whether it

is a legal thing to do or whether it is being handled

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appropriately.

I certainly wouldn't object to something that

emphasized this for employees, but I think we have to be careful

in this area not to assume that because we do that that we are

not going to raise questions and we are not going to have

people deciding that they can look at it and because they have

had this course they know that this is okay.

MI. Miller. The other side of this is -- and I speak from

personaly experience, for example, in the Foreign Service in

the initial training courses for the junior officers going

in, and I believe it is the same in the Agency, that there is

tradecraft training to some extent.

There are courses in

international law as it is useful to Foreign Service

Officers.

There is a course in consular practices, which involves legal

situations and various matters, but nothing on the lws of

the United States with regard to their own activities, just

laying out where it can be found, what the nature of it is,

just a straight, simple' -- it doesn't have to be terribly

detailed, but an exposition of the ramifications of the work

that they do, how it impinges on citizens and on government!

that is all.

And at all levels,' it seems to me a very sensible •thing

to do for it tells them about their own country, how the

activities of their agencies impinge upon others.

Mr. Kirbow. But, Mr. Miller, this would apply to the

Department of Housing and Urban Development. This would --

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where they have got 10,000 people down there that can barely

read.

Mr. Miller. Well, I have got no objection to that.

Mr. Kirbow. And what you are saying is institute programs

to teach them how the Congress acts

and the practices of the

legislative, executive, and judicial? This is about a three

year course in government.

MI. Miller. Not really. '

Mr. Kirbow. You want to teach them, it should also

describe the practices of the legislative, executive and

judicial branches of the government, and the obligations

that all of the intelligence agencies have to each of the

branches of the government.

Senator Huddleston. Personally, I think we can eliminate

that part. I think we ought to have an awareness of how

their specific type of operation, which is perhaps

clandestine

activities.

Mr. Kirbow. You're saying in the intelligence agencies,

oh, those

people, I agree, but I think if we go outside of our

intelligence mandate --

Mr. Miller. Well, 'there's no intention to go outside

the intelligence agencies.

Mr. Kirbow. It says to institute in all agencies.

Mr. Miller.

All intelligence agencies.

Mr. Kirbow. It doesn't say that, Mr. Miller. I'm reading

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it.

Mr. Inderfurth. The second sentence, "all intelligence

agencies."

Senator Huddleston.

We say that in the first sentence.

We should also say it in the second sentence because that is

where our obligation is in this particular inquiry, and the

objective of our comnittee relates to intelligence agencies.

I further

would suggest that we restrict that training

program or informational program to types of activities that

intelligence agencies are involved in such as clandestine

activities, and how this can adversely affect the rights of

citizens.

I would leave out on 1l4 there, starting with the first

sentence, leave that full sentence out, as far as legislative,

executive and judicial.

Mr. Aaron.

So that entire sentence can come out.

Senator Huddleston. Right, and I think they ought to be

aware, just as a policeman is given to be sure he is aware, he

is given a little card

to read the rights of any person he

arrests. This is not totally analogous, but he ought to be

aware that the kinds. of activities that he is likely to

participate in may have

some adverse effect on his rights; and

secondly, we have already put in here, "We recommend strongly

that any person who sees something he believes to be wrong has

an obligation to report it.". So let's give him something to

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hang his hat on there.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, in view of that last sentence,

I find this an appropriate time to ask the Subcommittee to

consider whether or not in adopting many of the other things

that have been recommended by the President, be codified into

law.

as he expressed them in his executive order.

Does this Subcommittee intend to consider that provision

that he has put forth in his messages to Congress on having a

statute that would prohibit the Agee problems and those other

former employees?

Senator Huddleston. It is in here someplace..

Mr. Miller. If you read

D, Charlie.

Senator Huddleston

Which makes me wonder why this

particular sentence is

in

this particular place, the last

sentence on 114.

• Mr. Aaron. It might well go down to D.

Senator Huddleston

It seems that when we are talking

about protecting secrets, it all ought to be down here.

Mr. Kirbow. It all ought to be in that one section if

we are going to deal

with the employees' obligations to do so.

Mr. Inderfurth. ' I

have

a hunch, although Elliot can

confirm it, that Recommendation C on security functions would

be a major finding and recommendation of the Domestic Task

Force or the Domestic Subcommittee. Elliot can tell us if

that

is a fact. That goes to quite a few of the CIA domestic

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practices about infiltration and the rest.

Ms. Culbreath.

Did you mean to restrict this C to

domestic functions?

Mr. diGenova.

No,

no.

Ms. Culbreath.

Well, you don't want the FBI looking into

what CIA is doing in Rome, do you?

Mr. Miller. No, of course not.

Mr. diGenova.

It says the CIA's particular intelligence

agency's personnel,

which

means personnel overseas:

Ms. Culbreath.

And

facilities overseas.

Mr. diGenova.

Yes,

exactly:

Mr. Quanbeck.

This poses a problem for the military. You

know, they have groups

that do both law enforcement and

security.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr.

Chairman, here we talk about security of

the people and installations. A great part of the Office of

Security is involved with the security that prevents their

people from revealing secrets and other things like that.

Don't we wish them to continue that operation?

Senator Huddleston!

The Office of Security where?

Mr. diGenova. At

the CIa.

Mr. Kirbow. And

in

the NSA. That's one of their major

functions.

Mr. diGenova.

It

says:

"and security related to the

particular intelligence agency's personnel." That covers it.

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Mr. Kirbow. Well,

the security of the personnel is the

physical security. That is the way it is written.

If you are

talking about the security of the government that are in their

possession, that is where the bulk of their investigative and

security work is done.

Senator Huddleston. What is the abuse we are

shooting at

here?

Mr. diGenova. CHAOS and the Office of Security proprietarie

were used to infiltrate antiwar groups. First it grew that

there was a perceived threat to the physical facilities of the

DOD and the CIA during demonstrations. As a result of that,

they penetrated domestic

groups to gain information concerning

attempts on

the Agency,

and it grew into a counterintelligence

operation of disrupting their speeches and marches.

Mr. Quanbeck.

This

is

gone into extensively in the

Domestic group.

Mr.: Maxwell. They are going into CHAOS, domestic

security and investigations.

Senator Huddleston:

The White House used that as an

excuse.

Mr. Maxwell. I think in essence it comes out this way,

but it is in much greater detail with the fact statements

behind it on the other

side.

Mr. Kirbow. Why

don't we just verify

• that that

which you wish to have accomplished, Mr. Chairman, is taken

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care of in that other recommendation, and that is that it be

both physical and department security, so to speak, secrets

type protection, if it is in the other one. If it is not,

we will work with them.

Senator Huddleston. What do we do about this law

enforcement activity?

Mr. Kirbow. That's clearly over in their bailiwick.

Mr. Maxwell. They have made statements.

Senator Huddleston. It has been pointed out that some

of these activities are abroad where the FBI would not be.

Mr. Kirbow. That

is correct.

MI. Maxwell.

The recommendation will be that the CIA

would be barred from law enforcement activities abroad except

where they were specifically requested to, let's say, get

information by the FBI.

There is an approval mechanism set up there so that in the

normal course of events CIA would not be providing law enforce-

ment information.

Mr.

. Inderfurth. So this Committee should recommend

to the

other subcommittee that they look into their recommendation;

the ultimate part..

Mr. Kirbow.

What I am saying, if you want to prevent the

law enforcement activities of agencies overseas, you immediately

get into the drug business and the business of the terrorism

and whatnot, and I would sure hate to see us adopt that sort of

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procedure. I hope it is not intended to be included in our

part of the recommendation.

Mr. Maxwell. Even on the domestic side, the focus is

on the rights of Americans, so that insofar as the CIA might

intercept a conversation between two foreigners overseas

relating to drug trafficking, they would be able to supply that

to the FBI.. The focus

has been on how to be sure that the

rights of Americans --

Mr. Kirbow. That

the American drug trafficker can't

get caught by the CIA.

Senator Huddleston.

well, I think we understand that.

Mr. diGenova. There is going to be a fight on that one

anyway.

Senator Huddleston.

It seems to me what we are trying to

do here is avoid using the security function of the Agency as

an excuse for doing other things.

Mr. Kirbow. And we should proscribe against instead of

describing what they should do.

Senator Huddleston. That is what most of the first.

sentence here does.

Mr. Inderfurth.

Are we just going to leave this one

out?

Ms. Maxwell. Perhaps what we could say to make sure that

people understand we are concerned about that, leave the heading

and say "See Domestic Report,"' and that way they can understand

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that we want to coordinate and make sure

that is covered.

Mr. diGenova. Maybe we should bracket the whole recommen-

dation.

Mr. Miller.. No, just say see the other report.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, there is a major effort under

way by the other staff on this one now to see whether we have

either compatible or differing recommendations, and we should

reconcile those and point them out to this committee as well as

to the other subcommittee.

Mr. Aaron:

So is it suggested we just set this aside for

now?

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Mr. Miller. No. Just say "See the Domestic Report."

Senator Huddleston. See the Domestic Report and determine

what is the best way

here to refer to that report. We might

want to make some statement.

Mr. Aaron.

I'll leave in the subhead, but I'll take out

the other. I'll just take out the text and say "See Domestic

Report."

Senator Huddleston. That is where we stand right now, and

I'm not sure whether it's good or bad or whatever.

Yes,

and we ought to say whether a general sentence ought

to be there.

All right, Secrecy and Unauthorized Disclosure we get into

Mr. Miller. Yeah, this addresses Charlie's point.

Ms. Culbreath. Could we have the executive branch proposal

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to look at while we are talking about it?

Mr. diGenova. This is the one that was included in the

President's message.

Ms. Culbreath. I don't have one.

Mr. diGenova. I don't think it's here.

MI: Kirbow.

We have a copy of it in

the Committee spaces,

Mr. Chairman.

Senator Huddleston. Are we going to add a penalty for

unlawful classification?

MI: Aaron. I think I can say that Senator Mondale would

support that.

Senator Huddleston. I would agree if we can figure out

how to do it.

Mr. Kirbow.

What "unlawful classification" means.

Senator Huddleston.

I think we should make a clear, valid

definition of national secrets, including a precise definition

of sources and methods.. I hope I am not on the committee that

has to draft it.

Mr. Maxwell.

I think we may mean here that there should

be a penalty for overclassification rather than unlawful

classification.

Mr. Kirbow. Not overclassification. You don't want to

punish inadvertent classification. "Unlawful"' is the key

word, and unless you want to describe the parameters of that,

you can't pass a statute.

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Mr. Miller. Well the point is, where there have been

instances where things have been classified not because of their

value to national security, because they are protecting the

hides of those who are involved in some particular

activity.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, that's classification to cover wrong-

doing is exactly what that is, but there is classification, Mr.

Miller, which does not go to national security. It is in the

national interest, and they go with a recommendation to that

extent.

Mr. Maxwell. There is also very little lawful classi-

fication that is done pursuant to an executive order rather than

by statute.

Mr. Miller. All right, de novo classification is what you

are saying.

Senator Huddleston. You are saying "over" and Charlie

says "unlawful," and I think if we are going to write the

definition and put it into law, I think "unlawful" is the

correct word.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I just don't think I have ever

seen a time that you could draft a legally technical section

like this. The CIA and the executive branch spent over six

weeks just trying to draw up a two page recommendation on

amending the 1947 Act, and unless we look in some considerable

depth here with the lawyers as to the terms and phrases, we can

get you in over your head on a recommendation, and I suggest

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we do that with this particular --

Mr. Miller. I respectfully disagree. It seems to me. that

sources and methods is an area that requires definition, and

it jumped out of the proposal of the President. The question

of disclosure is addressed by the President's recommendation

but not the idea of allowing for proper disclosure.

Mr. diGenova. I tell you, the President is

going to have

to define it because if they try to prosecute anybody they

are going to ask for a definition of sources and methods, and

they are going to find the statute unconstitutionally vague

and not be able to prosecute anybody. They are going to have

to come up with a definition if they ever intend to prosecute

anybody.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Miller, I don't disagree with you that

there should be a balance between classification, overclassi-

fication and underclassification. What I'm saying is I've

never known the time that I could off the top of my head,

and I'm only a fair country lawyer, can draft a legal document

that will stand the ravages of court cases and tests sitting

at a table like this, viewing it for the first time.

Mr. diGenova. Nobody is suggesting that it be done here.

Mr. Miller. We're not drafting it.

Mr. Kirbow. We say there should also be a penalty for

unlawful classification. What do you mean by unlawful

classification?

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Senator Huddleston: Well, we will let somebody else

figure that out.

You won't know it, Charlie, until you write a law.

Mr. Miller. We are just saying that it is a problem,

an

issue to be faced, that's all.

Senator Huddleston. I'm wondering whether or not we can

take out the line referring to "seriously deficient."

Ms. Culbreath. We can make our recommendation because

we are not criticizing theirs.

Mr. Aaron. Well, perhaps the thought is.

Mr. Kirbow. The oversight committee does not consider

that legislation.:. That was an amendment to the 1947 Act. Unless

we do something here in a recommendation, it is going to be

considered by the Committee: on Armed Services.

Senator Huddleston. You are talking about --

Mr. Kirbow. The one the President sent up.

Mr. Miller. The oversight- committee which would have

legislative authority would draft an omnibus bill. We have

recommended that all the way through, which includes recasting

the 1947 Act.

Mr. Aaron. I might just suggest that for the --

Mr. Miller. Only the portion that deals with intelligence

agencies.

Mr. Aaron.

For the

portion that deals with seriously

deficient, perhaps the best way to put this would simply be

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to say it should be amended. Their proposal should be accom-

panied. This is, I think; the thrust of the thought here, that

if you are going to increase the penalties for the disclosure of

information, the concern is that there might well be some

penalty or provision for dealing with the retention of infor-

mation that really ought to be disclosed, and to try to come to

some way to balance that. I don't know that it is any harder

to define one than the other, probably, but -

Senator Huddleston

What does he essentially do in here

by amending Section 102?

Is he adding penalties for dis-

closure?

Mr. diGenova. It is an official secrets act, isn't it?

Mr. Aaron. For people who have clearances.

Mr. Kirbow. It doesn't go to the newsman who gets

the

leak, it doesn't punish

him.

Mr. Aaron. But it

does deal with the people that have

the information, and the

concern that has been reflected -- and

I will simply try to reflect what I know to be Senator Mondalé's

concern which he holds very strongly, and that is that a lot

of what we have come to find out about this problem in the

field of intelligence community has been because of disclosures

and one of our greatest safeguards is the ability of people

to speak out. The country has lasted 200 years without

provisions like this, and it has done reasonably well, and he

feels very strongly that we must be very careful about any

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further steps that we take.

Now, I think the real problem with this paragraph, if i

can say so, lies more, and I am speaking for myself, the real

problem lies less in the question of whether one should try

to frame some additional legislation that would try to

protect us from our secrets as well as from their disclosure,

but whether or not we want to endorse the President's proposal,

because this is kind of a backdoor endorsement of those

particular proposals.

I think the Committee may want to consider that step

extremely carefully.

Mr. Miller: And the issue of whether there should be

legislation to protect national secrets.

Mr. Aaron.

Whether there should be additional legislation

to protect, of the character the President has proposed, and

I don't know where the Committee comes out on it, but the

thrust of this, while it talks about this additional area,

is to assume that yes, that is good, now let's do something

more, and I'm not so sure --

Senator Huddleston. Well, it seems to me you come down

right here, and I don't know how this fits in, but we come

down on the fact that yes, there ought to be laws and penalties

for unlawful disclosure of classified information. Secondly,

there ought to be laws and penalties against unlawful classi-

fication.

Third, in order to accomplish either one of these,

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we have got to have definitions for valid secrets and I guess

precise definitions of sources and methods.

Mr.Aaron. Valid secrets including sources and methods.

Senator Huddleston.

We need those terms clear.

Ms. Culbreath. And also for the terms themselves,

the

terms "lawful secrecy," "lawful disclosure," and "unlawful

classification," you've got to have definition for that, too:

Mr.Miller. And that's something that has to be worked

•out.

Senator Huddleston

The legislation should include the

precise definitions for these.

Now, can we do that?

Charlie, we are not

trying on our own effort here to define.

these things.

Mr. Kirbow.

We can

take a shot at trying to draft those

definitions.

Mr. Miller. Well,

don't think, we can of want to,

Charlie.

Senator Huddleston! You'll have to get your oar in there

some other place.

Mr. Kirbow. I just hate to recommend terms and phrases

where you don't know yet what you mean.

MI. Miller. Because we use them every day, because we

right now as a committee, you know, we are going to the agency

and saying, because we are declassifying our documents according

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to some understood thing about sources and methods --

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Miller, sources and methods is no

concern about you and I. You and I are in agreement on the

subject. The only other thing, Mr. Chairman, because we

certainly don't want to go away from here thinking you want

all of this in, 'in addition, the Committee believes that

Federal employees who have some reason to suspect that unlawful

or improper acts are being conducted or are about to be conducted

under the guise of secrecy should have access to authorized

institutional groups independent of the organization that they

serve.

The new Intelligence Oversight Board is one such

group. "

Are we intending

to cover all federal employees?

Senator Huddleston•:

We argued this out the other day,

didn't we?

MI. Miller. Yeah,

we endorsed it.

Senator Huddleston.

I don't like the way this is written.

Mr. Kirbow. Now, do you intend that all Federal employees

go to that group, Mr. Miller?

You say, "In addition, the

Committee believes that all Federal employees."

MI. Aaron. There's no "all" in there.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, that includes all of them, doesn't

it?

Mr. Aaron.

It's. hard to say.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I don't think you want the people

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down in the Department of Housing and Urban Development who

felt there

was something unlawful going on to report to the

Oversight Board.

Senator Huddleston. I think we ought to attempt to confine

as much as possible our suggestions to

the Intelligence

Community, whether that ought to be

in that way, it probably

should.

Mr. Kirbow. And directed. Here

again, encouraging the

Federal

Senator Huddleston. Well, what we were trying to say the

other day was that it could come to the Select Committee or

to the oversight committee.

Mr. Kirbow. Direct.

Senator Huddleston: Now, we went through that, how to

go through the Counsel, the IG, and the Intelligence Board, and

finally I guess to us.

Mr. Kirbow. What you are really saying is the door here

is open, as the court of last resort.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, what I want to do, and what I

think is appropriate is that any Federal employee, really, al-

though we are not addressing ourselves' to the whole Federal

bureaucracy, but any person in the CIA or the FBI who feels in

his own mind that there is wrongdoing going on, whether it is

unlawful classification or whether it is some other, ought to

be able, with impunity; with impunity, ought to be able to go

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to some source and reveal that.

Now, that doesn't mean that that automatically is going to

mean that somebody is doing something wrong, but if it is a

group such as the oversight committee, then there is a method

of

checking it out.

Mr. Kirbow.

fortunately, the majority of the Federal

employees are covered, because all of the Department of Defense

civilians and all of the military employees are authorized in

the regulations of those agencies that they can contact their

Congressman directly and have been, I guess, since the very

beginning.

Senator Huddleston. But just a Congressman. If they had

a specific place like the oversight committee, I think most

of them would be inclined to go there, and I think that would

be a great plus for the Agency.

MI. Kirbow. That's what happens with the Armed Services

Committee, Mr. Chairman, not all agencies, but frequently -those

complaints.

Senator Huddleston. They might go to the press if they

don't have

someplace to go.

Mr. Miller. Which is what they have done.

Senator Huddleston. Which is what they have done.

Ms. Culbreath. Is it the sense, then, that if we revise

the first paragraph to include the revisions with regard to the

definitions and the injunctions to the follow-on committee to

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make these definitions. and get them into law, that by what we

did yesterday afternoon on establishing the procedures for people

to go directly to the oversight board of up through channels as

may be appropriate, that we really don't need the second

paragraph, but because that gets taken care of by getting

these definitions.

Senator Huddleston. It does, except this would be a

logical place to

put this when you are dealing with secrets.

It would be a logical place to lay out the fact that a person

who is charged with keeping secrets would not be deemed to

have violated that charge if he comes to the proper committee,

is not going to be indicted for unauthorized disclosure if he

comes before the Senate oversight committee and tells what he

thinks.

Mr. Maxwell. A particular fact on that is Mr. Cotter, who

was a devoted Federal employee, worked for the CIA and later

for the Post Office,

felt the burden of the Secrecy Oath that

he had taken in regard to disclosure to his superiors in the

Post Office about the CIA mail opening.

Senator Huddleston. And frankly, I think it would be

more reasonable to restrict it to this type of group.

Mr. Maxwell.

I think if it should go anywhere, it should

go to the oversight Committee.

Mr. Kirbow. You mean the military man in Paris should

go to this Committee instead of to the Armed Services

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Committee, or do you

mean just the intelligence community?

We should stick

to

, the intelligence community as an

oversight committee.

Senator Huddleston. That's my judgment, and if the court:

wants to expand it to everybody --

Mr. Kirbow. Let them do it.. I agree with that concept.

Mr. diGenova. The intelligence community employees.

Senator Huddleston. If it was the FBI, the FBI, he

could have a choice.

Mr. Kirbow. He could go anywhere he wants to, but you

could open the door is what you are trying to do.

Senator Huddleston. Do you see anything wrong with that,

David?

MI. Aaron. The only thing I would like is if the author

of the original text

would help me out in redrafting it.

Senator Huddleston. Did you write the original?

Mr. Inderfurth. The last sentence of that paragraph ought

to be made a new paragraph. The question is, should these

principles instead of provisions, perhaps, in consultation

with the Judiciary Committee, should that be a part of this

as well?

Mr. Aaron.

Should join with another committee to draft

this.

Mr. Miller. That is a question that has been raised.

Now, Judiciary has been working with this in several committees;

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it's been working in the area of secrecy legislation for

quite a number of years. There is a big body of experience

there, and it would be a sensible thing.

Ms. Culbreath.. All right, would this, this last sentence

would maybe fit better at the end of the previous paragraph?

Mr. Aaron. I'll leave to you the fix on this.

Senator Huddleston.. I think the Committee should

instigate with the proper or appropriate other committee. The

main thing is somebody has got to give the impetus to do it,

and if we are setting up a committee for that purpose, it will

have to go through the normal legislative processes anyway.

So the Judiciary Committee is -- the committee is going

to wind up there anyway.

Next is a Federal Register for Classified Executive

Orders be established by statute.

Ms. Culbreath.

This would mean you couldn't have an

executive order that could be immediately effective.

Mr. Aaron. Sure:

It means all you've got to do is

go downtown.

Senator Huddleston.

well, suppose he has to move right

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now?

Mr. Miller. Constitutional authority.

Mr. Aaron.

Yeah, but the Constitution has no suicide

pact.

Mr. Kirbow.

Bill, would you explain on the record what you

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mean by the sentence "No official of the United States could

undertake a

secret intelligence activity except under a lawful

executive order pursuant to statutory or Constitutional

authority."

MI. Miller. Statutory authority:

Mr. Kirbow. Do you mean executive order or statute or

constitutional authority?

You mean three different things.

Mr. Miller.

No, an executive order is only lawful if it

is a result of constitutional authority or statute.

Ms. Culbreath. You mean everybody has got to go out

and find out if it is lawful before they do it?

Mr. diGenova. Well, You know, Congress passes statutes

and that is no difference than anything else.

Ms. Culbreath.

Well, my question is, do you need

lawful?

Mr. Miller. Well, all that is contemplated here is a

place for depositing all of the implementing regulations,

executive orders or whatever names they are called.. They have

been called various things throughout history.

Mr. Kirbow. Why don't we stop after the word "lawful"

then. It goes very nicely and succinctly in that first two

sentences, your requirement to put it in the Classified

Federal Register under appropriate security procedures, by

whatever name called, before they are lawful, and once you have

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done that --

Mr. Miller. All right, period:

Mr. Inderfurth. All right, but let's have the sentence

that provision

should be made for regular access

to classified

executive orders by appropriate Congressional Committees.

Let's put that in.

Mr. Kirbow. I don't object to that.

Mr. Maxwell. I would be a little hesitanti about that

because it implies that they couldn't have access at any time.

Mr. Kirbow. But we have said we have access without

limit only of agencies and whatnot.

MI. Miller.: But in the executive field, all orders are

deposited in the Federal Register. There is an actual,

physical place where it exists.

Mr. Kirbow. Yeah, they're all down there.

Mr. Miller.

At

one period there were a few

classified executive orders.

Roosevelt dumped a few in there

during the war, and what has happened is, as a way of getting

around the requirements of the people, they invented

other terms and so on and so forth. This is just a place

where

you can deposit them. It is a recordkeeping center.

Mr. diGenova. What about the rest of the paragraph? Are

you saying it comes out?

Mr. Miller. It is not necessary.

Mr: diGenova. All national security, NSCIDS and all that?

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107

Mr. Aaron. Well, I would presume if you are doing this,

you had better be clear what you are talking about. We now

have executive orders. They exist, a classified executive:

order registery exists.

What is different about this provision

is that it would say that things like NSCIDs are executive

orders and must be so treated, and need to be deposited there..

Mr. Miller. They have that effect on the bureaucracy,

and NSCID is an order.

Mr. diGenova. It is an' executive order, but we have got

to say it, we've got to explain what we mean by an executive

order includes

or is or is not limited to.

Senator Huddleston. The only other question I think ought

to be cleared in this is the emergency question, to be able

to act immediately, if necessary, before you file in the

Registery.

MI. Kirbow. This is the other one, Mr. Chairman, that

just bothers me. We haven't even talked to anybody about this

thing. We haven't heard one word of what the problems are

for them or anything else.. We really are kind of recommending

off the top of our head here. I see a need for something.

Senator Huddleston. Didn't we incur a lot of difficulty

in giving any kind of files?

Mr. Miller. We had a year's experience.

Mr. Kirbow. You mean, you had access to them.

Mr. Miller.. And where they were, where they lay, third

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agencies.

You go to one agency and they say no, it is not

there. --

Mr. Aaron. And physically we have problems of even finding

some of this stuff because it was out on a rock somewhere.

Senator Huddleston. Where are you saying this is going to

be kept?

MI. Miller. Just probably at the Federal Registry. They

can just put a vault.

Senator Huddleston. Well, work on that one a little bit.

We'll find a location for it.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, I think we need to look at the whole

problem.

This is a serious problem and a whole new procedure

for the government, not just for this one agency.

Senator Huddleston. I think there is a lot of justification

and I think the Committee is going to want to insist on this.

Mr. Kirbow. I'm not insisting we do something right. I jus

think

we should do a little better staff job.

Senator Huddleston. I think we ought to clean it up a

little bit, the

concept.

Mr. Aaron. All right. I will look to the author once

again for guidance and direction.

Ms. Culbreath. So we are going to bring this one back

to the Subcommittee.

Senator Huddleston. Well, if we meet again and have time

we will bring it back.

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MI. Kirbow. Because here we are saying that the directives

of the Central Intelligence Agency are executive orders.

Senator Huddleston. Well, haven't we addressed in our

recommendations so far the requirement that the recommendations

of the Central Intelligence Agency be reduced to writing and

on file someplace?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes, but not as executive orders.

Senator Huddleston. I realize that, but is that in there

someplace?

Ms. Culbreath. Is that in there?

Mr. Aaron. I'm not clear.

Mr. diGenova, Well, this came up the other day, and

this is why I wrote that note in the column, to be sure that

these things are written down, and somebody said the issue was

discussed and it was never clearly set out that we wanted

orders of the Director never to be simply oral. We have never

made that point anywhere in these papers. We have alluded to

it vaguely but never said it directly. I think we have to

address the issue of oral orders, talk about them and say

we don't want them ever again.

Mr. Miller. Well, this is another aspect.

Mr: diGenova. Now, we talk about oral orders dealing with

actions, dealing with significant actions.

Mr. Kirbow. Now, that is going to have to be a very

carefully circumscribed thing or you inhibit the day to day

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workings of the government.

Mr. diGenova. I think we have some examples, like when

Allen Dulles: was smart enough to order, in December of 1959,

authorizing thorough consideration of the assassination of

Castro, I think that's the kind of thing where we --

Senator Huddleston.

The question is how do we do it.

Mr. Kirbow. How far down the line?

Mr: Aaron. I would recommend --

Mr. Kirbow..

Only that things pertaining to these secret

agencies be in writing and be maintained and be available to

this Committee. It is a very essential thing. You know, you

kind of see a lot of what is going on if you see that manual,

so to speak.

Mr. diGenova. Well, that's just a paper trick.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, are you ready to close the

record on this one?

Senator Huddleston:

I was ready, but Mr. Aaron comes

along.

(Whereupon, at 6:46 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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