Meeting of Vietnam Task Force July 7 1961
From: Johnson
To: Rostow
Document date: 07/14/1961
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

176-10036-10074

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10074

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM : Johnson

TO : Rostow

TITLE : Meeting of Vietnam Task Force July 7, 1961

DATE: 7/14/1961

PAGES : 4

• SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 •

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 7/14/1961-

7/21/1961. Box 1

---

## Page 2

"Sanitigid SECRETE

N4K-75-26.

July 14. 196l: *RAC 1/2

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meetings of the Viet Nam Task Force on Monday, July. 7, 1961.

-and Thursday, July 13, 1961

Meeting on Monday, July 7

The principal item was a preliminary oral report by My. Paul Geren

the State member of the Special Financial Group.

government. It was headed by the dean of the law school. The membere of

the Viemamese group wes not. in the same gort of communication with. tho

super lors that the Americans, were with theiro

They were not,

example

familiar with the texts of the letters that have been exchanged between the

President. and Diem.

To increase the tax take through more elleclive collection of ar

Kro attempt to seft government bonde. The Viemamese were

the is a the temple la do note and bat aloney

PAT

it to fell bonds to the people, they would be solano the centrat

Bank

To collect at lead 750 million additional pianters a year

Thie would be accomplished by leaving the official er chango tate delt tel

the effective rate

There was some discussion of the exchange rate question.

No the courtels

of this discussion it was po

in fact on

a 6 plaster increase over the exiting rate on ald importe

vasardo notedes

les of the

recahange

rate:

githem andiwill thup otter increased opportunities

53-09.

SECRET.

---

## Page 3

SECRET

for graft

Mr. Geren pointed out, as an example of Diem's impact on the

negotiations, the fact that an initial one billion piaster estimate by the

Vietnamese had been reduced to 750 million after a talk between Diem and

the head of the GVN delegation. Mr. Geren belleved that the lengthy die-

cussione with the Vietnamese on thie subject helped to convince them that.

what the U. S. can contribute id a transter of goode and serviced and that

the piaster problem is their problem

Diem is convinced that exchange reform in Laos was responsible

for its downfall. He argues that establishment of a unitary rate eliminated

the possibility of export to Thailand of goods supplied under the aid program

for Laos. This in turn made it impossible for the Lao Government to pay

its soldiers, which in turn led to the Kong Le revolt. (This io a most curioue

argument and aleo a most curioue une of U.S, aid supplies in Laos Ap you

may have noted from incoming telegrame, some effort. in being made to den

velop the counter argument.)

The Vietnamese have temporarily embargoed the export of fice on

the grounds that they don't want a speculative movement in rice prices which

might result from the capability of the Viet Cong to reduce rice supplies to

Saigon

When the SiG suggested that di thie was a, problem on which we.

might be able to givercome help through our surplus.agriculatfal.commodie

program,

the Vietnamese.

indicated that they could not, for reasons of face,

accept U.

S: agricultural producte

The Vietnamese indicated that they wish next year a 5190 million. com-

This. they Justiry almost-wholly. on

balance of paymento groundo The Special Financial Group did not, of course,

agree to such a program.

(Our commercial import program last year was

something lese than 5100 mili on;)

The Vietnamese tepresented ther ebort, as summarized briefly above,

as the most thatthey would be able to do and they look to un to pick up the.

b the course of discussion of other matters, the JCS representative

ndicated that furthes investigation had revealed that there is existine

authority to permit the U.

well as consultation. on the planning of operations will take place MY neceorary

mplementation of this directive is not as complete as the U. S. Would like,

Chief MAAG is attempting to remedy the situation.

- 2.

SECRET

---

## Page 4

SECRET

Meeting on Thursday, July 13.

In the intelligence briefing additional information was given on the

recent three-service military sweep in the south, It involved 4, 000 men on

the Vietnamese side and resulted in 20 Viet Cong killed, 7 wounded, and 37

captured.

This does not seem a very large result for such a military opera-

tion. Over-all (CVN-supplied) casualty figures for May and June were as

followe

Viet Cong

GVN.

May June

May June

Killed

Wounded

Captured

Total

824

757

240

187

--

274

67.

470

158

163

891 1227

439* 634

Reference wes made to the fact that the Soylet Ambunsador in said to

have Virtually demanded that the

Thais accept Soviet aid.

according

to a Routers atpatch, has ladicated that Thalland would accept Soviet and

provided there

were no stringe attached

The State briefer summarized a TDCS (attached) containing much in-

teresting information on alleged North Vietnamese activities

bearing on

South Miet N

Jon.

itera included war

allegation that

Norto Viet Nam intends to inflitate no lees than 30 000 Vigs Consinto

South. Viet Nam during the month of July.

The State briefer was doubtfulrof

the validity of thip report and pointed out that, of course, if such an infiltra-

lion occurred avoula be readily detectable and an obylous cane or DRV

We have indicatione that the Cao. Dal han taken the tatiative to offer

its support to the GVN.

While no conditions were mentioned, it is assumed

that, aff in the past.

the Cao Dal would impose conditions on Ma cooperation

In the form of a request to recover some of ite former atatus.:

Nam because of the ingurgency.. It was INRis

however, that while the prostam

had slowed down, there continued to be-some.

progress.

(This is a matter

that, it he did not already haved

that't have flagsed to Cotrell and suggested

clear information on te, he migat check into it.).

* Includes 4I deserter not included in breakdowe

SECRET:

---

## Page 5

SECRET E

Most of the meeting was given over to discussion of Viet Nam with a

press officers group which included Roger Tubby and Pierre Sälinger

Cottrell did almost all of the talling and soon got on the subject of the etfect

of the situation in Laos on the aituation in Viet Nam and what we might do

about it. In this connection there was parded out a contingency plan for an

nformation program to support a possible change in U. S. policy in Laos.

Viet Nam.

A copy is attached. As you will note, the emphasic in this plan

in on procedure father than upon substance. No opportunity was given to

comment on the plan at the meeting. I today suggested to Coltreil that the

substantive aspecte be somewhat beefed up and also that the plan emphanize

the control of the operation in South Viet Nam by the DRY. The plan (Par

5)

now talke about DRy intervention solely in terme of exporting aggreapore

across international frontiers.

Aithough I had no opportunity to make the point while the press

5447

people were present, subsequently suggested to the Tark force harone of

the most difficult public relations problems ve have to deal with is the common

succeed in to tight ana net the Viet Conso

arguments suggested that pe haps the writer did not adequately distinguis

between democracy in saigor

me a that one to the country do a med to m than thi

refore were

Touggested that it might be deniable to get thie point ad ous to novemen

ert. H. Johnnon:

SECRET

---