## Page 1

1704-10332-10002

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

D0/023-1586

work copt

25 June 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Chief, Historical Review Group

Chief, Information Management Service

Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

John Berg

Special Assistant to the Associate Deputy

Director for Operations

Release of JFK Assassination Records

A .

Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June, 1993:

Subject: Release of JFK Assassination

Records -- Differences;

B. Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993:

Subject:

JFK Assassination Records-- Proposal

for discussion

--

I. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos,

it appears that

further interpretation is required.

--On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale

approval for their release, but if the crypts have been

previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be

cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate

to existing or

another project and does not contain a valid

digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts

which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would,

when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which

refer to other operations or projects cannot be released.-

--On the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been

previously blown, there is no objection to its release.

Note

that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with

assets/operations and this "guilt by association" could lead to

futher, undesireable, exposures.

Care must also be taken so

that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so

as to enable a

researcher to accummulate through an inspection

of numerous documents the approximate size of a

given station.

(The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of

pseudonyms would be considered for release.)

SECRET

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## Page 2

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT:

Release of JFK Assassination Records

=On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers, -there

is no objection to the release of this information as it

pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players

in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released

as can

dispatch numbers to Mexico City.

The release of cable/dispatch

numbers from other Stations can only be done if there has been

prior public identification of a Station in that location.

The

release of file numbers pe se, however, would reveal the

methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information..

which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it

on a blanket basis.

Blanket release of 201 numbers reveals

similar information as well as targeting/acquistion

methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.

2. I realize that the above guidelines

continue to mean

that much information will be "blacked out."

As bad as it may

appear, none of this information is substantive and its

omission does not detract from the "story."

'Its release,

however, could permit detailed analyses of our comno,

methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.

New Subject: Release of William Pawley's name

3. It is agreed that an attempt will be made to locate

Pawley's

next of kin to request their permission to release

information pertaining to his relationship with CIA.

If the

next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can

be revisited. (Note:

the information in the Congressional

record or in the book "Deadly Secrets" notes that there was

contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does

not identify the full exten't of that relationship.)

suppo ex bet

a tent of chat

SECRET

---

## Page 3

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1 November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

Linda Flor

C/MRS/LA/MRS

: Joanne Harris

: JFK Project - Review of Cuban Files

I reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which

were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets,

pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation.

Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection

from public disclosure.

(AMIRE/1 - 201-274049

A Career Agent, (AMIRE/1) died of natural causes in October

or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.

b. WILDCAT - 201-294213

FBI Double Agent.

PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico.

He was still active as of March 1982.

c. WKSCARLET/3 - 201-300985

Formally terminated in 1974. (Caracas Station)had contact

with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of :

involve in quests ance aeraved is Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still

d. AMICE-14 - 201-307337

Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.

e. AMMUG/1 - 201-749651

Cuban defector. He was terminated in 1967, but was used

through 1971.

SFORET

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## Page 4

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7. June 1995

Memo for File

Subject: ARRB request re "slug line" deletions

The policy of deleting ALL crypts & designators in the slug

line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting

with CIA.

The DO representatives present (Sander) & McNair)

deferred to the Office of Communications.

Per 6 June 1995 discussion with Don Hatch,

DA/IRO, "the slug

line is strictly an internal distribution line"

, and the

release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is

not a communications issue; slug crypts are not "commo

generated". The DA has no objection to the release of

otherwise releasable crypts in the slug line of CIA cables.

The DA response was provide to-J. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill

McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.

Bari

Harrelson

CC:

HRG reviewers

DO reviewers

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## Page 5

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Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

June 6, 1995

Mr. John Pereira

Director

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous

meetings with ARRB staff members, ClA's current practice ot redacting the sluglines

from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination

Records Review Board. As a result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting,

the Board in fact asked those present from CLA to provide it with any additional

information available in support of this practice.

If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable

cryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this

afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.

With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

---

## Page 6

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27 September 1995

Note to: HRG and DO reviewers

Subject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, re

AM crypts

Bill left the following message on my voice mail:

"I have just talked with(Peg Sanders, DC/LA Division,

and unless we see a specific incident where giving up an AM

crypt will betray an asset, then let it go. I don't

believe there is any place

we will see that.

She is will to

give upcall AM crypts

simply because there are so many

iterations going back...and things have been changed.

Barry

HRG Senior Reviewer

---

## Page 7

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SECRET

) F/:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM:

Fredrick C. Wickham, JI.

DO, Focal Point

. for ARRB

SUBJECT:

Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True

Names

.

During the period since the ARRB last met, the Do has

considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been

addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JEK

collection and by stating our position up front we hope to

facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will

be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to"

operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami,

the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and

withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms

in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals

and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK

investigation and render an easier reading of the written

material.

Country File Designators - We will delete the first

element of operational activity and operational interest

files in those instances when the credibility of the

narrative is not affected. The first element of the file

number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the

country name which is easily discernible, whereas the

subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or

interest and specific subject.

Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will

release the entire action indicator line of a document.

Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

CL BY 0695930

DECL OADR

DRV HUM 4-82

SECRET

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## Page 8

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SECRET

SUBJECT:

Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action

Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a

specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we

will release names of employees who have retired in an overt

status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a

document. We will continue to protect the true names of

employees cited as serving in a field position. References

to field personnel in true

name are uncommon, however, since

pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between

Headquarters and the field.

. Wickham, JI.

2

SECRET

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## Page 9

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SECRET

ениние cor"

Ide net file

8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jeremy Gunn,

ARRB Staff

FROM:

Barry Harrelson,

CIS/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT:

Issues re Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators and

Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the

ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country

designators, action indicators and employee true names., The

memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your

co you and your

staff and complements information provided in previous

discussions.

Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss

these issues with your staff. (U)

Attachment

Unclassified When Separated

From Attachment.

ISCRET

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## Page 10

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CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Historical Review Program

JFK Project Officer

FROM:

Frieda Gasola

Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT:

ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June

1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration

(DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the

release of ISOLATION,

ISOMETRIC of ISOTROPIC;

2. On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms

together with the term MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T

determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must be withheld in

their entirety and the DA determined that ISOLATION and

Please be advised that

the association to this Agency of the locations referred to

by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that

the locations, themselves, are under military cover.

Accordingly, any crypts,

slugs, or other words associated

with the locations and linking

them with the CIA must not be

released.

3. We hope the information provided above will assist

you.

Attachment:

As Stated

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 393504

CL REASON:

1.5 (c)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: LOC 1-82

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## Page 11

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SECRET

16 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Historical Review Program

ATTN :

JFK Provech

FROM:

Frieda Smasta (

Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT:

ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MICOSMOS

This is in response to your request that we review

the attached material and provide you with a determination

as to whether ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC' Or ISOTROPIC can be

released. We also reviewed the material with respect to

MKCOSMOS as well.

2.

The Directorate of Administration (DA) has

completed its review and we have determined that ISOLATION

and ISOMETRIC must continued to be withheld. We forwarded

your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology

(DS&T) and DS&T has determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS

must continue to be withheld as well. I have identified

below the documents in which these terms are used.

Document NO.

104-10177-10248

104-10177-10228

104-10177-10231

104-10177-10230

Crypts

ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC

ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC

ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC

ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS

3.

Copies of the documents' referred to above are

returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for

deletion.

Also returned are three documents that did not

contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This

concludes DA action on this request.

If you have any

questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL

OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachments:

As Stated

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## Page 12

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SECRET

OIM-98-0084

06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM

FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

(U)

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

(U)

Lee S. Strickland

Chief, Information Review Group

Central Intelligence Agency

(S) Protection of (IUDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) This memorandum responds to the Assassination

Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current

deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited

information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym

of a CIA source (IJDECANTER). It is our considered judgment that

the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the

given document TSX-59777 of

• 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed

with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 199% would

provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian

counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US •

intelligence interests.

2.

(S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose

and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a

fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym

(IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and

would otherwise be releasable.

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask

the Board and

staff to note the classified nature of this

memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly

cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the

conclusion of your deliberations.

4.

(S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has

been released almost in its entirety. The released version

reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

CL BY: 0619849, C/IRG/OIM

CL Reason: 1.5(c)

Decl On: X1

Drv From: HUM 4-82

SECRET

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## Page 13

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SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER

Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It

continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a

credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA

assessment is supported by reporting from another source

_identity.redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER) .It concludes by

stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides

fully established (by CIA]." It is this final fact which is

critical to our request. By having released this substantive

information - "bona fides.. established" -- and by otherwise

having: IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we

must protect the cryptony here so that the key intelligence

judgment of CIA is not compromised.

5.

(C)

The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and

hence the issue of damage to national security

= proceeds from

four basic questions:

• what information was compromised?

• what foreign intelligence sérvice (s)

received the

information?

• what understanding of the

service(s) have?

information did the

.

what information did the intelligence service(s)

believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the

detriment of the United States?

6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can

be acquired through/a combination of confession's, polygraph

interviews, and/of

assumptions based on access.

Questions three

and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important

for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target

intelligence service.

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a

foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the

import) they will be able to exploit the information fully and

the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value.

A perfect

example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information

compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a

2

SECRET

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## Page 14

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SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating

to American intelligence.

The Soviets, based on other

information they had acquired through signals intelligence,

concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-

operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their

territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-

operational, they had taken no countermeasures (1.e.,

concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of

intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they

took

extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was

directly and immediately lost.

With further respect to question four, we have the

quintessential factor for exploitation.

If the foreign service

believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment

of the United States; if they do not, the United States may

escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical

question that a foreign. country must answer and it is the

critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in

our fold.

9. (S)

In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by

what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own

knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially

released document and the Los Angeles Times article.

The

Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to

the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they

know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he

said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus

incorporated his information into our operational practices and

activities.

And it would be critically damaging today to confirm

to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow

them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been

a

US intelligence success.

10.

(C)

Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,.

we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the

Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did

not know was whether we had accepted his story or not.

Indeed,

the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and

this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the

Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period

of time.

3

SECRET

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## Page 15

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SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym

11.

(S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.

The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information

relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.

But we must

protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we

are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal

Security Service when they assess this new information in light

of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage

is the most critical

and legally compelling issue, there are

three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

First, is foreign relations.

Inour judgment, the

Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich

Ames, the

United States is considering avenues of reprisal.

This

specific release might well be viewed as a public move

to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate

tensions.

Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to

the Russian service. This specific release could

arguably provide them with insights into our capability

to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian

service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not

know this for certain.

in our custody and under our control; the CIA has

pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that

it is publicly known at least to some degree.

However,

because his wife, child and father remain in Russia

today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and

consider postponement also for this reason. Quite

candidly, I can not predict with

any certainty whether

the Russian government today would take action against

the family from this proposed release.

But I would

•urge caution here since the information at issue is

minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and

arguably harmful to living persons.

4

SECRET

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## Page 16

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SECRET

SUBJECT:

(S)

Protection of [IJDECANTER Cryptonym

13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in

person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that

this important information can be postponed from public release.

Lee S.

Strickland

5

SECRET

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym

OIM/IRG/LSS: b10/31287 (6 August 1998)

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1

- EXDIR

1

- ER

1

- D/OCA

1

- D/OPA

1

- Principal Deputy General Counsel

1

- D/OIM

1

- DA/IRO

1

- DCI/IRO

1

- DO/IRO

- DI/IRO

1

- DST/IRO

- LSS signer file

1

- OIM/IRG Chrono

1

-Subject File: ARRB

g:/irg_fr'1\general\lss\arrb_ijd.doc

SECRET

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Office or

OIM

"formation Managermon

SECRET

CIA TALKING POINTS

re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym

Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

26 AUGUST 1998

.

The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board

on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of

Operations and the CIA.

• We request the postponement of certain very limited

information in one document.

_ specifically, the actual

cryptonym of a CIA source (IUDECANTER) •

• It is our considered judgment that the release of

this

cryptonym, in the particular context of the given

document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991) / and juxtaposedl

with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997.r

would: "

.

provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-

intelligence effort,

• result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence

interests, and,

• have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and

prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which

could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

• Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and

objectives, we propose however:

• a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,

"TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or

any other document where it appears and would otherwise

be releasable, and/or,

CL BY 0619849 C/IRG/01M

CL Reason: 1.5(c)

Decl On: X1

Drv From: HUM 4-82

SECRET

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## Page 19

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SECRET

• if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the

nature of a factual description of the source (e:g., "a

valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but

not general rank, official in the intelligence service

Second Chiet Directorate which was.

internal counter-intelligence efforts."

• As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released

almost in its entirety.

• The released version reports that a Soviet official

(Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect

that OSWALD was a KGB source.

• It continues by stating that CIA did not believe

ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.

• It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is

supported by reporting from another source (identity

(redacted but, in fact, vIJDECANTER) •

It-concludes-by stating that this-source (IJDECANTER)has

hàd his "...

bona fides ….. fully established (by-CIAl."

It is this final fact which is critical.

By having released this› substantive information -- "bona

fides ... established" AND by otherwise having

IJDECANIIR known to the public in true hame and crypt,

THEN WE-MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key

intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised

• I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some

degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from

this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this

particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

2

SECRET

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## Page 20

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SECRET

• The practice of counterintelligence (CI) = and hence the

issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four

basic questions:

• what information was

compromised?

• what foreign intelligence service(s) received the

information?

• what understanding of the information did the receiving

intelligence service(s) have?

• what information did the receiving intelligence

service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and

to the detriment of the other party?

• The first two questions are largely factual and can be

acquired through a

combination of confessions, polygraph

interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

• Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and

the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service

and the target intelligence service.

• Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not

really an issue here since

the Us fully understood the

information presented.

• Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for

exploitation.

• If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset

(e.g., a defector, they act on the information to the

detriment of the other service.

3

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## Page 21

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SECRET

• If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully

or to some degree.

• This is the critical question that a foreign country must

answer and it is the critical information that we must

protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

• In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the

Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and

what they have acquired from the substantially released

document and the Los Angeles Times article.

• The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER)

defected to the United States;

• they know or suspect what he told the US;

• they know or suspect that we fully understood the import

of what he said;

• they do not know, however, whether we believed him and

thus incorporated his information into our operational

practices and activities.

• And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to

the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and

allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what

heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

• In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.

• The CIA to date has released all of the substantive

information relating to IJDECANTER in this

particular

document.

• But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this

particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial

CI benefit to the Russian Federal

security Service when

they assess this new information in light of their

previous knowledge and acquired information, including..-

4

SECRET

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## Page 22

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SECRET

of course, information on the publicrecord via the

media.

• There is additional damage that will accrue from not

officially protecting the identity of (IJDECANTER

..

Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a

devastating,

compounding consequence for an intelligence

organization.

• It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets

-- current and past - who will logically fear that CIA

will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at

some future point in time.

Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take

self-protective measures

le.g., disengagement by current

assets or public statements by inactive ones) •

• Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most

assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future

assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.

Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our

ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly

against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).

• There are other

damages that I will touch only briefly upon in

the interests of the Board's time. They are not

insignificant, however.

ONE, is foreign relations.

In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that,-after

Aldrich Ames,

the United

States is considering avenues of

reprisal.

This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to

embarrass them

and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

5

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• TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the

Russian service.

• This specific release could arguably provide them with insights

our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.

The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does

not know this for certain.

THIRD, is an equitable issue.

• The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a

defector in our custody and under our control;

• The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;

• While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to

some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain

in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial

action the current government might take.

Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether

the Russian government today would take action against the

family from this proposed release.

.

But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is

minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably

harmful to living persons.

6

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CL BY: 031682-1998-DO

CL REASON: Section 1.5 C

DECL ON: X1

DRV FAM: COL 1-82

25 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Bob Skwirot

FROM:

Charles A. Briggs-Y-

OFFICE:

DCI/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT:

Mexico City Station History

REFERENCE:

The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the most part

concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period (1947 to June 1969. In

every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief

parenthetical phrase to Several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought

relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum

amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a

minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOlA requestors concerning CIA

activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.

The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the

digraph - the location indicator. What l've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole

history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the

digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is

familiar with the decision to release almost all Ll-crypts in full - while protecting identifying

information. The major relevant LI projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the

full cryptonym and most of the details released.

Station and-Operation-Directorate division histories are among the most sensitive documents

in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within the area divisions - they are not available to

cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations

Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through

the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story,is very great.

CC:

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