(EST PUB DATE) REPORT AND LISTS.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/1971
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10095-10229

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Stulth.

8/56-6,59 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS

7/56 - 7/59 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)

10/58 - 12/62 Warren Dean (retired)

6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired)

10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watcon (retired in Nexico)

COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954

Howard Hunt (retired)

12/54-7/58

Williard Fill (resigned)

12/56 - 9/61

Stannard Short (retired)

Chief

9/61

- 3/64

Davia Phillips C/(retired) ~

8/62-9/64

Gunnar Beckman Asst -

2/64 - 6/65

James Flannery C/ (retired) -

9/64 - 11/66

Harold Dalghren Asst

10/65 - 1967

66 - 68

son to th

Stanley Watson C/(retired)

68 - 71

Joseph SmithC(retired in Vexico)

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief

2/60 - 4/62 Jack Stewart (retired Costa Rica)

4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief -

9/63 - 7/65 Ray Swider =

10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay (netuad) -

8/63 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (matiss) -

9/65 - 19/68 Joseph Piecolo

10/65 - 12/67 Peggy Maggard

SOVIET TARGET

6/57 - 10/59 Louise LOn (retired?

9/59- 8/65 Herbert Manell Chief-

9/59 - 8/65

Barbara Manell -

5/64 - 7/66 Willian Bright

4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Fausmann

6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger

7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

SOVIET TRANSCRIPERS

6/56 - 8/58

Morsis Gordon (resigned)

6/58-6/63

George Misko -

6/63 - 70

Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico) -

6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)

(retired ?)

Outside CO

LERGRET.

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SUPPORT ASSETS

Unilateral phono taps

1949 - 1961 Charles Anderson III Chief

4/55 - 4/60 Peggy laggard Asst

4/56 - 1/62 Frank Estancona Chief

2/60 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan

9/64 - 12/67 lichael Farmer

49-71 ÷ Outside CO

David

WILSTED (ps)

retired in Mexico*

:

Unilateral photo Cubans

4/39 = 6/62

6/59 - 4/64 Robert Zambernardi (resigned Mexico)

7/59 - 6/62 Richard Spathar TSD (retired)

Unilateral photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59 Harry T. Mahoney

(retired Chicago)

56 - 68 Outside Agent

Remon Alvarez (resigned in Mexico)

5/57 - 8/64 A. Goodpasture (alternate CO -

and internal routing)

6/58 - 6/63 Louis D. Puckett (retired)

6/63 - 10/57 Thongs Keonan Robent Held mann

65 - 66

Willian Bright

813>63-

cubana. opt reparting.

Transcen -

Liaison phone taps

1957 - 1969 Winston Scott (deceased)

1959 - 1960 Alfonso Spera (retired)

1959 - 1960 Turner Smith (outside, now retired)

1959 - 1960 John

(Iraining rept resigned)

1760- 1961 John Brady (retired)

1962 - 1908 A. Goodpasture -

1961 - 1971 Charles Flick (outside TSD Stali Agent - retired) -

5888

Ljaison - surveillance

Prior 1954 Robert Melberg (retired)

3/54 - 4/59 Harry Mahoney (retired)

4/59 - 1961 Thomas Hazlitt

12/62 - 9/67 Robert Felanann

TSD Outside unit

4/55 - 12/63 Glen Widden (rotired) -

6/59-4/84

Joseph::. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and elosed down

PERCET

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SECRA

-8-

About nid 1962 (check date) Livoy outside Mexi rept asked

for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban, and Satellite Embassies.

With this forewarning, LIFEAT (unilateral coverage) was

disconnected. However,

as I recall, the Mexicans connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech,

2 Polish, and I Yugoslav line. The basehouse listening post had a live

monitor who made short summaries of interesting conversations for a daily

resume which was received each day around 8 a.m. (passed by Flick to Goodcasture

to get to Scott before 9 a.II.) Later (when the reel was completely recorded)

full transcripts were typed and passed to the station in the same way, howevar,

there was usually a time lag of a day or so. Those transcripts which had

Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening

post the day after the transcript (of otter conversations on the reel)was

t, ped.

These reels were taken to another location where they were translated

and typed. In the case of the Russian translations, Boris Tarasoff usually ran

about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the voiume of

....Russian conversations

among the members of the Soviet Embassy. During this

period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station

carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may

have been carried to him by Flick but I think I brought the reel in and gave

it to Herbert Manell to take to Boris. Herbert Manell and his wife Barbara

handled

all of the processi.g of Soviet transcripts. My job involved screening

the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling hinself Oswald was

probably an Anerican.

However, here again there was a backlag because the

photos were picked up three times a week but the ones picked up were usually

for dates a few days previously because the doctor processed the film on a

night time basis. Photographs were made usually until one roll vas used but

later we got it changed to one day coverage on

each roll - in other words the

ter

operators

cleared the camera each day whether there was anythinxaxes a full

roll of film exposed.

Instructions liere to cover office hours, chotograph each

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SECHE

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new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates. Human

error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious.

The Cuban

embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment (a pulse camera) but it

frequently developed rechanical difficulties. Bob Zambarnardi and Spathar

(I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna Mackay screened

the film inside the station.

I am certain that the Oswald call came to our attention from the

Soviet line.

It was

picked ui and taken to Boris for a translation because

the caller was trying to speak Pussian. Any delay was caused by waiting to

compare the photographs with the typed transcript. There were no copies of

transcripts every made in languages other than Spanish or English because Win

Scott could read only those two languages and he personally screened the

transcripts

for operational leads he wanted pursued.

_3101ST.

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SERRET/ SENSITINE

Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April 1947 until

the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, the Station had

developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline

phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a

mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of the local

telephone company who was handled by a Station case officer. The number

of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post

nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish,

Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Maxican or Mexican-

American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer

assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station

on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These

operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC

and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the soviet Em-

bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en-

trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

E2, IMPDET

rI RV 004645

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Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned

street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram).

LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental

basis. in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Sta-

tion received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was

being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photo-

graphic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building

on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet

Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a

row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound.

This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The

purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of

Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a re-

cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother

and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the

LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then de-

veloped and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was

originally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the resig-

nation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was

processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers.

These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents

which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team

could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of

interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for

identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept operation,

LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. A recruited

Mexican agent, who had a semiofficial status, obtained selected letters

from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system.

2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by

• the nature of the Mexican

services at that time. The Mexican Direction

of Federal Security (DFS), with which we conducted liaison, was a hip-

pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry

was

principally occupied with political investigations and control of

foreigners.

Their agents were visite Traut, and corrupt. A Station

officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control. In

1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap

operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as

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LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines

connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican

Army officers.

In 1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican prin-

cipals, the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A

Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening

post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also

an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the

joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening

post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em-

bassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station immediately

disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so

that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their

taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five

Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav

line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of

conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume

for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded,

full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however,

there

was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian

4

SEGRET/SENSITIME

SADDET

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ir a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location

for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian transla-

•tions but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations

usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying him-

self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the

Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there

was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week

but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the

technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis.

Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of

film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera

at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to

photograph all. Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with

foreign

license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents

were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated

equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif-

ficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators

from a tap of the Soviet line.. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris.

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SECRET SENSITIE

Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian.

There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the

photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in

either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only

these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

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