PHASE I
Originator: WH
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

176-10011-10051

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date:

5/5/2016

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY:

NARA

RECORD NUMBER:

176-10011-10051

RECORD SERIES: • NSF

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 5A

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: WH

FROM:

TO:

TITLE: PHASE I

DATE: 00/00/0000

PAGES:

10

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION:

Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS : NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED): 1/62-6/62: BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-47

v9.1

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

/PHASE: I (CLA)

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

* Diepatch one intelligence

agent operation to key area

selected by CLA:

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

-I March 1962:

PURPÖSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Collect and report intelligence on anti

regime attitudes, on potential resist-

ance, and on vulnerabilities and

strengths of Communist security,

system.

There is a rick that this action will dieclose this U.S.

intelligence activity within Cuba, Selected personnel

are being intensively trained.

This first team has 2

agente. An area in which resistance has been reported

has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive

make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA:

Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack

of intelligence.

First reports from Wept team are

expected by the end of March, while reporte from the

second and third teams, dispatched in March, are ex-

pected to start in April:

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained

for paramilitary skille as well as intelligence, collection,

with the thought that they will be in place incide Cuba

and ready to act whenever paramilitary operatione are

decided upon. However, CLA has noted that, once the

agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled

effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort

will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the

future for communications or agent handling. it future

developments warrant.

2.

3 third-country intelligence

staff officers in place in

Havana.

• 3.

third-country trained intel-

ligence officers, readied to

fravel in Cuba for temporary.

periods.

To collect intelligence:

To collect intelligence.

Home marked by aoteriakyere approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

['7

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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1=15 March: 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

4. * Caribbean Admission Center;

Opa-Locka, Florida, fully

activated by. 15 March 1962.

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the

operations, to identify and earmark in

telligence assets as refugees arrive,

and to provide security against Com-

munist agent operations.

5. #

Periodic intelligence esti-

mates,

as required by progress

of operations.

To up date NIE 85-62, so that current.

estimates can be considered at national

policy levels.

CONSIDERATIONS:

This operation,

in response to early recommendation

as essential by the Chief of Operations; is moving at

utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with

a new building completed and occupied, and with a

staff of 43 at work. Overatione commenced 15 February

and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center.

(ClA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice,

State,: USIA:)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased

intelligence collection and a need for as current an In-

telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.

It is likely that a more informal method of producing an

Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than

now governing the issuance of NIE's) may bave to be

followed. CLA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-

maries on Cuba and is planning a bi monthly or weekly

report summing up intelligence for this purpose: (CIA

respondibility. with support of others as'required)

OTHER OPERATIONS:

"Continue negotiating for

British help in contaminating

locomotive lubricante..

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

British assistance is required to undertake a successful

sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating

lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months

is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking

down, once the contaminant is introduced.

16 - 31 March 1962

=.:.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7: * Two teams of agente dis-

patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented). 5 March 1962

[2]

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include

personnel who have had resistance training and some past

experience.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

ACTIVITY

8. Establish 2 additional third-

country resident agents in

: Cuba:

9.: By 31 March, have 105 agents

selected and 50 agents trained.

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

To ready agent operations.

10.* Develop intelligence potential

To exploit the intelligence possi

of Cuban "colonies"

' in U.S.

bilities of former residents of

Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now

in the United States.

11, * Develop additional interroga-

tion centers in other areas by

31 March:1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin

atmosphere. at different levels than

now seem possible in the continental

U.S., to spot additional intelligence

assets and to provide security.

against Communist agent operations:

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose

of recruitment,

nature of training, and policy decisions

controlling these factors. the recruitment and train.

ing are for resistance activities, the task of recruit-

ment and training will be much less difficult than if

they are limited to intelligence collection pürposes

önly.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other

U.s. cities which are "little Cubas

Family,- Church,

and business intereste provoke unusual perconal ties

inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential

existe for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail

able. (EBI support and coordination is basic in thie

effort.)

, As-Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CLA will activate

other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible.

center is being activated in Spain. Negotiations with

local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers,

it possible, in Mexico City, Caracas; and Aruba. San

Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile, are being sur-.

veyed for possible centers. (CLA responsibility with sup-

port by others as necessary.).

OTHER OPERATIONS

• None.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

137

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1. 15 April 1962:

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

12. *

Two teams of agents dis -

patched to. Cuba.

13. 5 third country agents, tem-

porarily travelling legally, in

Cuba:

OTHER OPERATIONS

Nose:

INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS.

14. * Two teams of agents dis-

patched to Cuba:

15.

One third-country legal

resident agent in Havana.

OTHER OPERATIONS

Nöne:

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16. * Two teams of agents dis -

patched to Cuba.

17.

3 legal resident agents in

Cuba.

PURPOSE

To colet me lie

To collect selligenc

16 - 30 April 1962

To collect intelligence:

To collect intelligence.

1 - 15 May 1962

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

Iteme marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

[4]

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSiDERATIONS®

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each; depending on circum-

stances:

Possible use for communications and support.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-

stances.

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18

TOP SEGRET-SENSITIVE

1 - 15 May 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

ACTIVITY

One or possibly two trained

staff intelligence officers

(non-U..s. ) resident in

: Havana.

Ten legal travellere in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

19.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None:

To collect intelligence.

"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting.

some for extended periods.

16 - 3I May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

20. * Four teame of agents dis-

patched to Cuba.

21.

22.

To collect intelligence.

One possible singleton agent:

To collect intelligence.

operation, Isle of Pines.

Four additional resident agents

-To collect intelligence.

inside Cuba.

Teams.012 to. 5 agente each depending on circum

stances. CIA will be attempting to cover ab

ch

of Cubá ap it can,

Difficult

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba

as it can. The main factor of determining location.

of resident agents is to find a place where a trained

agent can stay viable.

23.

Five "legal travel" agents

inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

24. By. 31 May, selection of 50

To ready agent operations.

additional agents and train

35 additional agents:

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVEL

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16 - 31 Mạy 1962 (cönt) :

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPFRATIONS

25. By 31 May, develop a plan for

counterfeiting currency, which

would not be implemented until

a decision was made to debase

the economy in Cuba:

-PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

To debase the economy of Cuba.

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs

are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy

decision to be made and tò staff out a feasible distribu-

tion plan.. It is expected that no decision to implement

such a plan would be made immediately:

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26... * 10 to 15 teams of agents dis- To collect intelligence.

patched to Cuba.

27.

Reinforce and resupply agents

To reinforce and resupply, as

and teams previously placed or • possible.

activated inside Cuba.

28

By: 31 July, select 100 additional To ready agent operationg.

agents and train 70 additional

agents.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas

will be determined by developmente of the previous

actions and by conditions.:

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent

upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of

methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used,

of if this activity rust depend upon maritime delivery).

2.,9%: *

Collection of psychological

material.

To provide documentary and photo -

graphic evidence of the tyranny. of

the Communist regime.

30. * Survey airfields, military.

installations, and communica-

tion centers.

3i. * By the end of July, have

operations to penetrate the

regime.

To provide current intelligence on

key security resources of the

regime.

To provide current intelligence on the

actions and intentions of the regime.

[6]

# Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize

the influence of Castro and the Communists in the West-

ern Hemisphere.

intelligence agents.

Bove rener of animation pa to dated offata sin place.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 June = 31 July 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

None

CONSIDERATIONS

32.

Comprehensive and

definitive intelligence

repoft on attitudes and

abilities of the popula-

ition infide Cuba.

End öf July 1962

To provide the Special Group CINSC 5412

augmented) with a hard estimate of the

Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for

a Special Group recommendation on

whether or not the

US. chould undertake actione to make maximum use

of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S.

military intervention.

E.1

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

[7]

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact

on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but

are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro

and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemis-

They are noted here,

for the-sake of com-

pleteness; as actions now being carried out. by the

Department of State under other existing programs

and projects.

.3::

[8]

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE T (Defense).

ACTIVITY

Expand special intelligence and

other, sensitive intelligence cover-

age of Cuba as required.

2. Develop the means of the inter-

American Defense Board to pro-

vide substantive intelligence.on

Cuban activities:

suppose loreta indigeonnel

operations into Cuba:

4:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will con-

tinue the planning and essential

preliminary actions: to assure a

decisive U.S. military capability

for intervention.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

March = July 1962

PURPOSE

To develop increased hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S: intelligence coverage

on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the

concern of Latin American states for

security

To ensure optimum implementation of the

intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist goveriment

of Cuba

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security

rioks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties.

(Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organiza-

con clearly reptricte potential use by USA. Visi-

bility of operational interest is an acceptable risk

here:

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S.

mulitary manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted

no quickly as possible and with sufficient force

[9]

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (USIA):

ACTIVITY

"Propaganda programs to isolate

"Castro regime

and neutralize its

influence in the Western Hemis-

phere:

TOP SECRET SENSiTIVE

March - July 1962

PURPOSE:

Activities in consonance with U,S.

policy established after the April

1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact

upon Castro support and influence in the Western

Hemisphere.

There will be some new material

for use as the Phase I intelligence operations

produce but essentially the program in a continua-

tion of that already in effect.

[107

•est

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