Agency: JCS
Originator: OSD
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date

Page

08/28/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10001-10182

RECORDS

SERIES

: FOIA SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: DOC 183

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

issassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USc 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

09-13-2017

--

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

: OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE: 00/00/00

PAGES

: 16

SUBJECTS

: MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

:TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA, State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBUECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

NEGUNES CONCUHRENCE O

DATE:

MAR

2016

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 54214

DocId: 32424913

Page 1

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## Page 2

LOR SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING TOFORN

or not the President's decision should be sought to

implement this plan.

(2), The initial stages of

a spontaneous revolt will

be supported by the United

States through propaganda,

covert operations and other actions

as necessary, (but

maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should

the revolt fall.

In the event that the revolt spreads

as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the

United States should be capable of

rapid military action

to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in

the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

(a) wIth no elor warning and with eighteen (18)

lays of preparation a coosdinated airborne-amphibious

assault could be executed which, It is anticipated,

would gatn control of key milltary installations and

the principal centers of population of Cuba within

ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban

casualties.

(b). A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-

assault period would necessitaté incremental commit-

ment of us forces as they could be assembled and em-

ployed. Under this circumstance the time required to

gain essential US militayy control of Cuba could be

appreciably extended. However, reduction of US nil1-

tary reaction time may be of overriding importance.

In such case, air and naval forces could attack in

support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from

the time s decision is made.

in air assault

could ba luttinted within elsht (8) hours. a

Fall off

Release

irborne assault coild de initiated vithin flys

15) day and a "ariarine intoses force

could be cormitted three (3) days later Dry

7

inn pronrt

IN 54214 DOLPA: 3950RF TPage CDECIAT

118

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## Page 3

DUE SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

Department of Defense Operations.

(1) when directed by higher authority, or as the

situation demands, the Department of Defense will

initiate preparatory actions for US military inter-

vention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-

positioning forces and equipment by execution of

current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff will directy execution of military

Intervention plans for Cubar

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence

with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordi-

nated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy

air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as

possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and

anti-air capability.

(a) In western Cuba airborne and amphibious

assaults will be conducted by a Joint Task Force

with the Initial objective of selzing the alty

of Havana and obtaining control over the seat of

government. Army airporne units will secure the

major airfields in the area as well as major port

areas required for folfow-on forces and logistic

resupply.

Navy/Marine

amphibious forces will

secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Havana and

designated Army units will follow the Marines over

the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be

prepared to re-embark for further operations

23

directed.

(D) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo WIil be re-

Inforced by air- and sea-lifted Marines for

aorense]

9

WW 54214 INPa: 3SECRFTPage GDECIA MANNIINA

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## Page 4

LUP SECRET

SPECTAT HANDLING NOFORN

Los the base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious

forces will be employed in operations against Cuban

forces in the Santiago de Cuba complex or in other

operations in eastern Cuba as directed.

(4) Subsequent to the seizure of Havana and San-

tiago and the

successful defense of Guantanamo,

operations will be conducted

to defeat remaining

pockets of

resistance. Additional amphibious and

airborne operations may be required. The most likely

areas for such operations are:

Matanzas, Nuevitas,

Nicaro, Trinidad, Bahia de Cochinos, and the Isle of

Pines

• (5) At such time as

essential

US military control

1s gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and mil1-•

tary government will be given priority and undertaken

In accordance with polley established by the Department

of State.

This includes provision for a provisional

military government prepared to assume full legislative,

executive, and judicial control until such functions

can be turned over to other authority on direction In

an expeditious and orderly, manner. Remaining resistance

elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces

or other groups will be isohated, contained and destroyed

or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat

units will be scheduled for early return to the nited

States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of state will seek to

place the United States in as broad a multilateral

context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out latin American

Governments to determine whether the United States

can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing

the use of military forces under Article 6 of

the Rio Treaty.

10

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## Page 5

TOP SECRET - SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

or not the fresident's decision should be sought to

implement this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will

be supported by the United States through propaganda,

covert operations and other actions as necessary, (but

maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should

the revolt fall.

In the event that the revolt spreads

as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the

United States should be capable of rapid military action

to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in

the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

As Military Reaction.

(a) With no erlor warning and with eighteen (18)

ays of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious

assault could be executed which, It 1s anticipated,

would gain control of key military installations and

the principal centers of population of Cuba within

ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban

casualties.

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-

assault period would necessitaté

incremental commit-

ment of us forces as they could be assembled and em-

ployed. Under this circumstance the time requirei to

gain essential US military control of Cuba could be

appreciably extended. Howaver, reduction of US mili-

tary reaction time may be of overriding importance.

In such

case, air and naval forces could attack in

support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from

the time s decisioniis made

coula ba taitinted vat!

Fall off

irborne assault co.id

ii tiated witi

Release

and a lavytliarine ampnibic

could be

coirmittee

HH 54214

DoctO:D2429510 nPage 5 Onraid1

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## Page 6

TUP SECRET SPECTAL HANDLING WOFORN

Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the

situation demands, the Department of Defense will

initiate preparatory actions for US military inter-

vention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-

positioning forces and equipment by execution of

current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff will direct) execution of military

adviervention plans for Cuba,

(3)

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WW 54214 DodIlB24 GARFIse 6 SDERIAl HANNIINC

MAENDU

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## Page 7

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM

suc the croes ares 1

( At such time as essentfal US military control

1s gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and mil1-

tary government will be given priority and undertaken

In accordance with policy established by the Department

of State. This Includes provision for a provisional

mIlItary government prepared to assume full legislatives

executive, and judicial control until such functions

can be turned over to other authority on direction in

an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance

elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces

or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed

or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat

units will be scheduled for early return to the inited

States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of state will seek to

place the United States in as broad a multilateral

context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out latin American

Governments to determine whether the United States

can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing

the use of nilitary forces under Article 6 of

the Rio Treaty.

10

MACADA

---