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T104-10307-10006

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

EVES SMY

SEGROT

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE. COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE "

ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP

14 APRIL THROUCH I4 OCTOBER 1962

Task Force W

Foreign

Intelligence

Branoh

3G 2S/

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III.

WILAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT

FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY?

The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is,

coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere

in the world.

Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations

abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intolligonce which has

served operational

ends, In other words, information which has pro-

vided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruit

mont of agents.

Due to the standard security measures taken in

most official installations, these technical operations have been

able to provide only a limited anount of positive intelligence.

general, agents have produced infornation essentially in accordance

with their known access at the time of rocruitment.

Responsibility

for many of the agents dealt with during the prosent reporting period

was simply assumed by TIW from past efforts against cuba.

In many

instances, these agents hau been recruited strictly on an "availa-

billty" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort

was made at the inception of Tri to winnow out those persons who

could make no contribution and to redirect those who could.

This

process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and

generally inefficient S/W channels, rosulted in the conversion of

a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent report-

ing sources:

Though, in most instances, TEW operations officers

had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded

in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents.

This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in

vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means.

In regard

to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period,

TEW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly,

the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access

to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and

extent of coverage are indicated below.

A. Military

During the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's

major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered

on Cuban military affairs.

The reporting obtained covered matters

ranging from military policy to detailed OB.

Almost every agent

contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage

of military matters was wide-spread and continuous.

Despite the

fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W much of 1t

fron totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience),

such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were

able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel'

movements, location and nature of military sites, etc.

The follOw

Ing agents

served as the major sources of military 1Aformation

during the reporting period:

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4Ips

1. Cuban (Insurance) exocutive, who had a large and diversifled

net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically

anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimatoly-

took place in Cuba.

Throughout the build-up Itself this agent

provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on missile,

maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the Initial

reporting on delivery of IL-28'g to the island.

2. .

A relative of a former Cuban president whose government

connections provided him on several occasions with information on

attitudes of varlous military factions toward Castro and the

Soviets. Agent also provided sone detailed missile OB.

3. (.s. citizen who established contact with a resistance

chief (in Pinar del Rio)during July 1962, provided, in the course

of several reports, an Inventory of Soviet installations throughout

the province.

The maintenance of communication with this agent was

extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.

4.

A Havana (surgeon who took special horseback trips to cover

the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.

5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information

on Cuban armymiine laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as

on Soviet troops and materiel movements.

6. A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet

occupled hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements 1n

the Havana area.

7. A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state

readiness of Cubana air materiel.

8. A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observa-

tional reporting on military activitles in his area.

9.

A former wife of a Cuba Alrlines pilot who has contacts

among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.

10. A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically

on activities at the port.

A construction company employee at Guantanano Naval Base

reported on Cuban OB in the environs of the base.

12. A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a

counter-revolutionary group, reported milltary information acquired

through his group contacts.

13. A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities

data obtained Irom his large circle of varied acquaintances

1n Havana area.

14. A rotired railroad official reported data on ra1l

shipments.

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15.

A lawyer in havana reportod on lancho Boyeros Airport

1n Havana where & certain airline) is one of his clients.

16.

A(pineapp1®) firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited

In July 1962 reported on military developments in his area.

17. A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July

1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained

through casual contacts.

10

18. A customs inspoctor at Jose Marti Airport in Havana

was the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to

Havana, Including military cargos.

19. A physician in lavana who reported on military movements.

20. A Cuban Airlines Official, with limited access, reported

AIr OB.

21. A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana

reported military OB.

22. A second foreign intelligence servico staff officer in

Havana

reported military OB.

23. A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc

military cargo deliveries to Cuba.

b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the agency was

able to produce intelligence on cuban political attairs at the

ministerial level and above.

This intelligence was derived

essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of

high rank or in key positions.

This type of access placed a premium

on Agent elictation skills and the ability to distinguish between

rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous

waters.

The most significant political information was provided

by the following agents:

1.

An official in the Ministry of Economics who, 1n theod

capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVArA,was able to glean informa-

tion on Cuban political affairs.

A relative of a forner Cuban president who through this

connection and his own social position 1s able to maintain contact

with high-level officials in Cuba.

3.

A Cuban doctor who gives medical treatment to Cuban

officials and who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction,

until he is able to develop direct access to important high-level

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00

4. (A cultura)

attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who

picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on

political matters.

A sub-agent of this asset has also been & source

of medium-lovel political information.

A West European Ambassador In Cuba who provides political

Information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.

A /Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe who has been reporting

with utmost dotail and frequency on high-level political matters of

which he is aware.

7. The Ambassador to Cuba of a Latin American country who reports

political intelligence obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts.

8. A former protege Of Raul CASTRO)who retains contacts with

government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting

capabilities on political matters.

i0

The Ambassador in Cuba of @ North African country who has

provided high-level political Information.

10.. A Cuban lawyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, a high-

ranking official, provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations.

2411. A staff officer of a foreign intelligence sorvice assigned

to a cover position)in a Havana Embassy who has produced some

political intelligence responsive to our requirements.

12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has

relatives in the PSP and in the government.

To date, his reporting

has covered general political developments.

This agent has been reporting political personality data and some

political information.

14.

A Cuban Ambassador 1n Western Europe who has reported political

Information to which he has access.

15.

In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in

Cuban

diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of

miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the

areas concerned.

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.

[conomic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous amount

of intelligence irom Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, oil and trang-

portation industries, much of which was in the form-of statistical

summaries.

In a number of instances, this intelligence was pro-

vided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue

of their jobs.

We also have been able to get continued reporting

on general economic conditions and foreign trade.

Among the most

significant agents reporting economic information were:

1.

A Cuban (insurance salesman, previously noted, wio

through his extensive contacts and

sub-agents has been able to

provide information on sugar production, Ensurance) altairs and

the Cuban banking system.

08

An official of the Ministry of Economy, a close associate

of Che GUEVARA, who has provided useful economic intelligence.

3. A relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted,

who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary

reports on petroleum.

4. A high-level) official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly

provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly

financial and materiol affairs.

об

5.

A resident of Mexico and (director of an Itallan-controlled

pharmaceutical firm who travels to cuba where he has good contacts

in the Ministry of Industry, who has reported economic information.

A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic

officials and who has provided useful economic information.

7. U.S. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports

covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood

of the populace, living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly

every Cuban province:

A survey of

agents reporting this type

of information has not been completed, because almost all of our

agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time.

Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target

Has

It Unable to cover and Why?

Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to

which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting

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29

period. The key military, political and economic targets were

clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TIW. The immense

pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack

on the Cuban problem is to be granted its full perspective..

Even

before TIl assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba,

it was clear that intelligence on soviet,

Satellite and Chinese

Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers would be formulated and

planned at the highest level in the respective governments.

Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for in-

sights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy

only as much success as the clandestine search for any intelligence

regarding any policies of these governments.

Time restrictions

alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key

denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every

facet of the TEW collection program was geared to the search for

top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world

and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in

terms of his access to such intelligence.

Translated Into

espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was

examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help

penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial

policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the

success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target

areas were under direct, specific assault.

b. Political.

1.

Cuban Communist Party: ° In late May a close relative

and confidant of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party was

singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent.

candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the

sunmer of 1962. Though the information was obtained indirectly

by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce..

Thus

the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate'g

direct recruitment.

The drive toward this goal continues, and

though we aro optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far 1n-

vested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level

Conmunist Party member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of

the close of the reporting period, the Party) had been penetrated

at a significant level.

29

2. GOC Ruling Circle.

(a) . In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal

traveller whose brother-in-law has been a membor of the GOCi

from its inception.

The agent was recruited under specific

Instructions to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC

policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent

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bofore dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out

his instructions.

By October he had succeeded in eliciting

significant information from the target,

and was confident his

full recrultment was simply a matter of time.

One inhibiting

feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that

the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, 1s

a resident of Havana.

Unquestion: bly the full recruitment of

the targot could help fill an important gap in our reporting

on GOC activities.

(b) In June 1962 TIVY obtained a lead to a

person very closely related to fidel CASTRO.

Throughout the

summer extensive but necessarily circumspent negotiations were

conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment,

training and briefing would be possible.

The negotiations

culminated in success. The agent was met and trained by Agency

personnel in September

and early October and dispatched to Cuba

on 15 October with the

specilic mission of reporting on the

thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and otner leading

GOC figures.

Since the target, prior to recruitment did not

possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him

systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he

had matural access, the Agency was denied any prime political

intelligence from this source during the reporting period.

(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW

received various reports, the tenor of which were that ernesto

"Che' GUEVARA would like

to defect from Cuba.

Each report proved,

upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, untll

we learned in late

September that a Mexican Industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had

asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba.

Though many

of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data,

exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by

the inability to aline a qualified agency officer with the widely.

travelling Mexican.

This lead illustratos well the frustrations

Involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time

franework, and with a limited number of avallable personnel.

It also tilustrated the need to persist, when the target is

of

sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads.

•3. MilItary

(a). In late July TIW recruited a Cuban

legal traveller expressly because oI.

his close relationship viti

1 member (of the Cuban General Staffoo Once again only a few houre

was available in which to train the agent..

Nevertheless, during

August, September and October the agent persisted in his

efforts

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Juanita

?

relcase

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to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB

at the same time.

Neither this, nor the other efforts to

penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had net

with full success by the end of the reports period.

(see paragraph 206 (b) The Cuban lawyer recruited in May 1962-

above) developed a second target in september,

& former membor (of the Cuban General stait now awaiting reassign-

ment.

The agent

was Instructed to recruit and train this

military Officer in S/W.

At the end of the reporting period

it was not possible to determine the success of this potentially

excellent operational development.

(c) Included in this discussion 1s the

partially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer who

1s stationod In Santiago.

The agent cited in (2b above) has

been in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962,

but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitnent. He

has obtained OB from the captain, but we feol the operation

will not have reached its full potential until the captain has

been trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us..

(d) Since mid-lugust the Agency has been

pursuing a load to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of this

pursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finally

centered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recrult-

ment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade.

By

cut-off date, the developmental activity had reached the point

where the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter into

the hands

of the officer.

Economic.

The Agency has striven to identify key

highost priority.

lowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him 24

in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the chief of the petroleum)

industry.

The families of the two man had been close friends.

The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out via

s/W.

still, the major ain 1s deemed worthy of the investment.

Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide Intelligence of

increasing value.

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(b) Nicklo Industry: The seat of this

important industry unfortunately is In two small towns in Oriente

province.

Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance

always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are

no exception.

Numerous well-meaning persons In the U.S. have

attempted to help us obtain access to this critical target.

not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (by.

virtue of a New Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leads

to ley personnel.

By cut-off date, however, we had not been able

to bring any load to function.

Most promising is a lead to the

technical supervison of the Nickle complex.

(c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrations

of the Sugar Industry defected to the U.S, soon after the inception

of TEW.

Throughout the summer it was not possible to identify

a suitable candidate to replace them.

1 New York source In early

Ictober succeeded in placing us in touch with the chier sugaro

technician in Cuba.

This operation should be fully productive

by Christmas 1962.

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To Illustrate the results of this operational data, we have

recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of

one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign Service in

Europe.

We have been able to develop the proposals through an

already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach

and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us

4p ploat rentions

Independently by three other agents in close contact with hin as

well as through a technical surveillance operation.

G. Llaison

The most truttful liaison relative to the Cuban target has

been conducted with European)and a few of the (Latin American lö

Specifically, the

British, Dutch), French, (Spanish),

Some of these services are working closely with the Task Force

both in Washington and Miami, cutting cornerg on procedure,

protocol and actually oxceeding their own official instructlons.

This has been particularly true after the announcement of the

President on 22 October 1962. The degree of this effort is

remarkable and runs all the way from full cooperation to an

outstanding exertion of personal commitment, resourcefulness, and

Imagination to find ways to help our effort.

provided us with one (resident diplomat who communicates: directly

with us (by M/T)24 Thel (Danish and Dutchiservices, have given us

by v7/454 mad bands, and

calling at Cuban ports), and they haye

also participated in joint bperations using(legal travellers) 24

In addition to mountinguoperations against Cuba, several European) (0

services nave provided secure aiplomatic courier services for the

transmittal of our own agents' communications)and for the inf1l - zu

tration of S/W and N/T and other materials )to our agents inside

Cuba.

Services In Belgium)and Holland have been particularts

helpufl in the development of an operation to deny Cuba access 2

to añ urgently needed solvent for petroleum products.

it appears that efforts to male this product unobtainable to

the Cubans has been successful.

24

In general, the West European)services have been cooperative

in assisting us to mount operations agalust Cuba and against

installations in their own territory. lo uatin American services,

have been most helpful in developing operations agalnst Cuban

targets in

their own countries, apparently because oi the Latin

Americans') increasing concern with the threat of Cuban subversion

on their territory.

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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITIIER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN

THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE

PERIOD.

The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to

and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability

was to ostablish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to

staff it with experienced intelligence officers.

These officers

other operating Divisions within the Agency.

Many of them spoise Spanish and all of them have had extensive

experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters

and in the flold.

This newly created Task Force was charged with

the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate

all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed

against Cuba.

At the same time, the Task Force Field Station In Miami was

strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced

staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations

against the Cuban target.

This concentration of experienced

personnel into the Cuban

. Task Force, both at Headquarters and

at

the Miami Field station, was a positive and significant effort to

increase

the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order

to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks

which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist.

takeover in Cuba.

To further improve our coxerage capability, the Agency communica-

tions office set up a special facility in lilamt to (intercept

Helectronically internal communications) within Cuba.

These (Inter-24

cepted communications are processed in Miami and then forwarded

directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station, (and to NSA for ection 24

and/or further dissemination) The NS, disseminates to the other

members of the intelligence community the information that has been

Intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication

facility.

This facility cooperates.

and coordinates its oporations

closely with [NSA and is used @y NSA) to assist in the (Intercept102) 24

of (Internal communications) in Cuba. 29

In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization

whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of Intelligence

operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions

within the Agency were directed to give top priority attention

to

the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This. has

resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite

access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.

TIW

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The response of the various Agency components, both_by Head-

quarters Desis and by the Field Stations, has

been most satis-

factory and has aided the Task Force considerably In the perform-

ance of its assigned mission.

Within the Task Force, selected

officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate

on all phases of Cuban Intelligence operations with the various

geographic division desks.

This arrangement has provided for &

continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by

insuring a regular review of current, developmental, and planned

intelligence operations of all avallable Agency intelligence

assets which could be directed against Cuba.

The above points are ones that reflect significant changes

which have taken place during this period. In addition, it

should be pointed out that there has been

an intensification

and concentration of all operational techniques applicable to

the particular type and character of the Cuban target.

There

has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training

of agent assets.

There has been an extensive increase in the

establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and

channels.

The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as methods

of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expanded..

And sinçe certain Western Nations) still maintain Embassies in

Havana? "(courier) channels for the delivery of letters and packages) 24

by the diplonatic pouch have been developed and are being ussd

extensively. "The above points are discussed elsewhere in this

paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being

closely related to significant changes in the Agency's Intelligence

capability.

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Vl.

WILAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIRED

FROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELY

AND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?

The conduct of intelligence collection operations often

has depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. govern-

ment agencies.

Several government agencies provided support to

Intelligence operations directed

against the Cuban target on both a

regular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request for

policy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly and

effectively.

For example, the Department of State has expedited the

Issuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as granting

visa walvers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency.

In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attempt

to establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets who

voluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This is often done

alone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer prior

to introducing the agency officer for further development and ex-

ploitation as the case may require. These types of support are

provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute consid

erably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.

Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluable

support to the Agency's Intelligence collection operations 1s the FBI.

The FBI has provided biographic data, Investigative reports, and

operational leads to individuals of

interest.

known or potential operational

This support has been maintained on a regular and continuing

basis.

Close llaison relations between the FBI and this agency are

maintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This close

liaison has resulted in a better understanding of the needs and

requirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments of

their separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channel

for providing support and assistance when requested.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facil

itated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interest

to the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases which

Involve unusual allen residence and/or naturalization proceedings.

Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1s

particularly close

and harmonious at the Miami Fleld installation

where the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interest

to us originates.

Reports provided on a regular basis by the National Security

Agency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed

1..

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up for the development of collection assets.

The disseminations by

the N.S.A)also serve as an effective means of checking selected

information and activity that has been provided by other sources of

Information. The NSA also collaborates in the aissemination of

ki certain information with the CIA conmunication fac1lity) 1n M1am1, an

gone at el a a a to trade intercaption qua praseasing of

Llaison with the aforementioned U.s. government agencies

1s maintained on a continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters

level in Washington, D.C. and at appropriate field Installations by

designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience

that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of

Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their par-

ticular fields oi competence, have provided timely, effective, and

professional suppoit and guidance, in support of policy approved

Intelligence colloction operations as required in the national interest.

Without such support, the task of Intelligence collection would have

been in many instances much nore diffieult and, In many cases, Impossible

5/MV

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d.

VII. AGENT SUMMARIES

The scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelli-

gence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal

ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the

agents involved.

The following sketches of the individual agents

engaged in these oporations have been compiled in recognition of

the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an apprecia-

tion of the Agency's FI operations.

It will be noted that a

majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami,

the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the

major pool of potential agents, since 1959.

Other geographical areas are represented in mathematical

sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in

residence at a given place.

This same mathematical order applies

with reference to the jobs

these agents hold.

Thus, 11 a Cuban

has a function, the performance of which is important in sustain-

ing the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency

has sought the

services of this man as lts agent. 24 for this reason,

several agents

are in the employ of the airlines and of (merchant 2l

marine shipping businesses.

so too, with diplomacy. Every foreign

diplomat now accredited to

the Regime In Havana has been examined

by the Agency as a prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplo-

mats were approached.

Of this number about one half took our bait

and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement

in "intelligence" (e.f:, using their diplomatic immunity to carry

our materials), to active participation in our operations.

Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential,

though limited, role during the past six months was the defector

(who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector 1s

the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be

persuaded to renain in place and report on his job. Owing to the

nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard

lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those

who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months,

the Agency tapped in on the defections of akout ten Cubans of

consequence, prufiting from their information in all cases and

from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit..

..:,

1 0d

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