Agency: FBI
Originator: FBI
From: HQ
To: DOS
Document date: 12/27/1995
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).

DATE: 11-14-2017

JFK Assassination System

Date:

3/31/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY:

FBI

RECORD NUMBER :

124-10375-10267

RECORD SERIES: HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62C-HQ-1029205-1104

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM: HQ

TO :

DOS

TITLE :

DATE: 12/27/1995

'PAGES:

13

SUBJECTS :

JFKARCA OF 1992

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 3;4

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/29/1999

OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

v9.1

DocId: 32320609

146

Page 1

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).

DATE: 11-14-2017

372

SECRET

BY LIAISON

MAILED SO

Dep. Dir.

Chiet of

Staff

Off. of Gen.

Counsei

Asst. Dir.:

Crim. Inv.

CJIS

Finance

into. Res.

Insp.

Lab.

National Sec.

Personnel

Training

Off. of EEOA

Off. of Public

& Cong. Affs.

Director's Office

DocId: 32320609

Date:

To:

CLASSIFIED BY: 5648 SLD/KSR

December 27, 1995

REASON: 1.5 (C,)

DECLASSIFY ON: X

Mrs. Toby T. Gati

1, 6,

Assistant

Secretary

(JFK)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C.

From:'

Robert M. Bryant

Assistant Director in Charge

National Security Division

Subject: JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS

COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (THE ACT)

PUBLIC LAW (P.L.) 102-526

DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS (U)

The following information should not be disseminated

outside your organization without prior FBIHQ authority. (U)

Reference Federal Bureau of Investigation memorandum

dated July 20, 1995, and a meeting of representatives of the FBI

and the U.S. Department of State (USDS) on August 29, 1995. (U)

: At the August 29, 1995, meeting, referenced July 20,

was discussed, as were documents which had been

provided to USDS as examples of documents selected by the JFK

Board for the FBI to justify the nondisclosure of excised foreign

@counterintelligence (FCI) information.

El C # 71029205-1104

2 - R. M. Bryant

(1

J. F. Lewis)

(1 -

J. A. Swanda)

cst

-

H.

M. Shapiro

(1 - D. H. Evans)

C.

G.

Morris

(1

-

J. A.

Hartingh)

1

- S. L.

Davis)

(8)

SEE NOTE PAGES 12 AND 13

IEFORMATION CONTANEO

& AND: ASSIFIED

HERE SHOWS

Derived from:

Dedlassify

SECRET

J.HECT

T. Snit

it

5849

504-4427

FBUDOJ

MAIL ROOM I

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## Page 3

Released under the John I'. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 199 056 2107 Hotey.

DATE: 11-14-2017

SECRET

Mrs. Toby T. Gati

Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

United States Department of State

4.

To date, the FBI has processed documents with

information obtained from technical or mail coverages

I establishments or officlals from: 1) the forme

soviet Union; 2) Cuba; 3) (France;) Dominica

Venezuela 12) Mexico; 11)Panam

• Poland; 7) Hungary, (s

on whether investigations of any establishment or

official of these countries can be released. See item

5 below. (8)

5.

If the policy of not acknowledging our FCI

targets is changed for any country's establishment or

officials, all coverages on the establishment or

officials, as well as cases opened on persons who

contacted

the establishment or officials will also be

declassified for foreign relations reasons.

HOW

DOJ/DRC will handle these matters under Executive Order

12958 is uncertain since no case history has been

established yet.

It appears, at present, that the DRC

will protect the technical coverages, lookouts and mail

covers by allowing classification under the "method"

exemption.

The DRC has classified several

investigations using the foreign relations and method

exemptions.

To date, no foreign relations exemption

has been declassified, but two on the former soviet

Union are being referred to USDS. If the investigation

is declassified, any telephone calls received at the

establishment or by the officials would be

declassified; however, much of the information would

still be protected under FOIA guidelines.

That would

not protect the fact of the technical coverage nor the

target. (8) (u)

6.

If the investigation and technical, mail, banking,

of other coverage of one establishment

is declassified,

it sets the precedent of an open acknowledgment that

the United States Government condones and, in

fact,

SECRET

-6-

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## Page 4

Releaset under the John r. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 74T 05c 2107 Fotey.

DATE: 11-14-2017

SECRET

Mrs. Toby T. Gati

Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

United States Department of State

there are countries we currently have disagreements or poor

relations with since the policy of our government is to improve

such relationships in the short term or long term and such

revelations would show a disrespect for the people of that

country; and the declassification for release of some documents,

even of

significant historical interest, will be carefully

weighed by the FBI against the revelation of our investigative

partieular country. Mil the establishments or officials of a

techniques used against

• The FBI notes that since the Intelligence Community's

current policy is not to admit any technical or other coverages

or investigations of foreign officials or establishments, any

release of documents that confirms such coverages would therefore

be harmful both to United states foreign relations with that and

other countries and the FBI's FCI investigative capabilities

united Starest

including the revelation of sensitive sources and methods.

i (1)

The FBI is not aware of any country which acknowledges

the use of any technical or other coverages or investigations of

foreign officials or establishments in their own country

elsewhere. (Ru)

OF SPECIAL NOTE:

In making a decision on whether declassification would

harm

foreign relations with any country, the FBI requests careful

consideration of the effects on the FBI's FCI capabilities,

including our investigative sources and methods, or technical

coverages. The FBI contends that if USDS decides it would not

harm foreign relations with a particular country to officially

acknowledge that the FBI investigates its establishments or

officials, this will nevertheless result in the revelation of the

FBI's investigative sources and methods used, as well as have a

detremental effect on our capabilities to enter foreign

counterintelligence or law enforcement cooperative exchanges.

5(4)

The FBI also requests USDS to consider the interests of

the lational security Agencyland consult with them prior to

reaching a decision.

SECRET

-10-

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