## Page 1

MAnAA

1104-10332-10008

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

k1:6

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

Copy provided to

ClA by FBI

August 23, 1995

HAND DELIVERED

John A. Hartingh

Inspector-in-Charge

JFK Task Force

Federal Bureau of Investigation

10th Street and Pennsyivania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20535

RE: Foreign Government Liaison

Dear John:

This morning, Jack Tunheim, Phil Golrick, and I met with Kenneth Duncan and several

State Department representatives regarding how best to implement the JFK Act as to

information obtained from foreign governments through liaison channels. We had a

very constructive discussion of the affirmative role the State Department could play in

encouraging foreign governments, through appropriate diplomatic channels, to agree to

the release of such information pursuant to the JFK Act. The Review Board believes

that Section 10(b)(2) of the JFK Act contemplates that the State Department play

precisely such a role.

As for now, we will hold in abeyance requests for evidence on foreign liaison

postponements to which the FBI has not yet responded. This will give us the

opportunity in the near future to work with the State Department and the FBI to

establish orderly procedures to persuade the foreign governments in question that it is

in our countries' mutual interests to release liaison information in assassination records.

Until such procedures are in place, we request that the FBI not make further contact

with foreign law-enforcement or other government officials regarding the release of

liaison information in assassination records.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff - Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce «Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

---

## Page 2

13-00000

Mr. John A. Hartingh

August 23, 1995

Page 2

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question.

Sincerely yours

T. Jeremy Gunn

Associate Director for Research and Analysis

and Acting General Counsel

cc: Kenneth A. Duncan

Department of State

---

## Page 3

13-00000

Secret

13 February 1996

Note to:

Bob Skwirot,

ARRB Staff

Subject:

Liaison related documents.

Reference:

Phone call between Ellie and Jeremy,

12 February 1996

Attached are a list and documents (13) which show

liaison relationships between the CIA and host services.

They illustrate the problem of protecting liaison while

releasing stations.

These Documents were acted on by the.

Board at the January 5 meeting.

Bou

Attachments as stated

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

Secret

---

## Page 4

13-00900

SECRET

ATTACHMENT*

104-10017-10040: Although the Board continues to protect the

liaison cryptonym in both paragraphs, the text shows Station

cooperation with the Swedish service.

104-10017-10058: Although the liaison cryptonym remains

protected, Paragraph 4 indicates liaison with the Swedish

service.

104-10018-10089: Board has made a determination to release

"your liaison" in Paragraph 1 in addition to identifying

Stockholm Station.

104-10018-10091: With release of Stations (Stockholm,

Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Oslo), text reveals liaison with

the respective local services.

104-10017-10036: Although the liaison cryptonym is

protected, the context of the cable clearly shows

Station

(if released) has a liaison relationship with the Swedish

service..

104-10015-10425: The text of this cable from Rome,

responding to a multi-station message, states that liaison

traces will follow. Once the identification of the Station

is released, the existence of a liaison relationship with

the Italian service in November 1963 is revealed.

104-10015-10420: Cable from Oslo in clear text indicates "no

liaison" traces; therefore, if the identification of the

Station is released, it will acknowledge the liaison

relationship between

the Station and the Norwegian service.

104-10015-10159: Paragraph 4 contains information that will

show that Oslo Station had a technical operation directed

against the Cuban target in Norway in November 1963. Also

context of the cable reflects that the following Stations

have a relationship

with their local liaisons: Paris, Rome!

Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, the

Netherlands, London, and Ottawa.

CL BY 05639561

REASON 1.5(d)

DECL XS; XS

DRV LIA 3-87

SECRET

---

## Page 5

13-00000

SECRET

104-10015-10225: Paragraph 2 of the cable reflects that Rome

Station had a technical operation in conjunction with the

Italian liaison. Please note: The Board continues to protect

the cryptonyms.

104-10015-10230: Cable reflects that Station had the access

to photograph US passports at the Amsterdam Schipol Airport.

It can be implied that that capability is due to a liaison.

relationship with the Dutch service.

104-10015-10255: Cable reflects The Hague Station had a

photo operation in the Netherlands. When reviewed with 104-

10015-10230, it will be clear that the operation refers to

the Schipol Airport operation.

104-10018-10088: Cable clearly shows that both Oslo aid :

Stockholm.

Stations have a liaison relationship, in their i:

respective countries if the Stations are released.

104-10018-10080: At the bottom of Page 2 of the cable is the

phrase "assume Stockholm still planned ask its liaison to

interrogate." Release of Station and this phrase clearly

reflects a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.

CL BY 0563956 3

REASON 1.5(d)

DECL XS; XS

DRV LIA 3-87

SECRET

---

## Page 6

13-00000

SECRET

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

J. Barry Harrelson

(Linda C. Cipriani

04/29/96 04:26:36 PM

Memo re Mexican Liaison (S)

CL BY 2224130

CA REASON 305(d)

DECL ON XI

: DRV FM LIA 3-82

The following is a draft memo for Jeff. Bob Caudle is looking at it now so there may be more changes. Please let me know if there is

anything incorrect here. I have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him, he may want

to deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this. I will let you know.

1. Action: That you advise as per paragraph 7.

2.

Background: You will recall that you spoke with

Chairman Tunheim of the JFK Board about the attached cable and

the importance of protecting the phrase "with Mexicans" because

it gives away liaison involvement in altel-tap operation.

its 16 April

meeting, at which I was present, the Board

At

reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase

could be released.

3.

It had just come to HRG's attention that this same

cable was released in full by the Board, with no objection by

CIA, in September 1995.

CIA probably did not contest this

release because an excerpt from this cable, containing the phrase

at issue,

had been inadvertently released

It

soard tor the protection of this phrase in the current cable ol

=o appeal this release to the White House. I to the Natronal Archives in Tug 93

4.

CIA is now

in somewhat of an embarrassing position

because it has

strenuously argued that the release of this phrase

would cause "clear and convincing damage" to the national

security only to find that this phrase

has. been released with CIA

acquiescence for at least

seven months, with no ostensible-damage.

Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification

of their second-guessing our damage assessments, and could give

us a much more difficult time in the future.

SECRET

---

## Page 7

13-00000

SECRET

5.

On the other hand, CIA could use this situation as a

way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review

process - that documents are being reviewed and released to the

National Archives in such quantity and speed that it is difficult

for CIA to. focus on any one document and, more importantly, how

seemingly innocuous information in one document can actually be

quite significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases.

Since September, when this cable was originally released, the

issue of protecting Mexican liaison has become increasingly

important because of other releases on this subject and because

of your appearance before the Board in February.

6.

Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our

ability to continue to protect the fact of Mexican involvement) in

this tel-tap operation.

Although we have argued to the BoardalmIther

the 318 does ne trach Mexic directy to do relatact, tary

the dable

In fact, the reason

-releas

was the beatentiate he chate did not decent state that the

Mexican sewere involved in the tel-tap

We should be able to use

their arguments to continue to protect the liaison relationship.

7.

Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that

CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this

cable has already been released in full.

we should, however,

naintain our position that we believe this information is

damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives

since-September; and that we never would have acquiesced to the

release in September if we knew then what would be released on

Although this message does

not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim and could

be handled by John Pereira and David Marwell, given your past

dealings with the Board on this issue, you may prefer to do this.

8.

In order to avoid problems like this in the future, HRG

is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task bf

reviewing

boxes of documents and determining what our release:

have been on eris fabjects.

HRG will also be double checking ceuti

locuments going to the Board to makersuse that no duplicates of

prior releases are being gent. You should be aware, however,

that there is only a rudimentary CIA computer index listing Outfoul prof

releases and that it is impossible to do aecurate computer

searches about our releases on specific subjects. Although HRG

personnel.

are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released,

with over 220,000 CIA documents currently in the collection, it

is suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more

often, anduo

absolute assmances it can't happen again.

CC:

SECRET

---

## Page 8

13-00000

SECRET

...

15 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Assassination Records Review

Board

John F. Pereira

Chief,

Historical Review Group

Foreign Government Information

Australia

(We request that this nemorandum be returned to CIA once the

Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed

below.)

1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position

on the review and declassification of foreign government

information that appears in the JFK collection.

This issue has

come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK

Board of Australian liaison documents.

The Agency believes it is

important to address

this issue at this time because this is the

first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has

been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such

information will appear again in CIA's collection.

This memo

will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States

Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination

and declassification of foreign government information but will

also address

(104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, 104-10009-10224).

2. (S) Conclusion:

CIA does not object to the release of the

information in these six documents, but is only concerned about

protecting foreign government information.

Therefore, the Agency

does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the

redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two

Australian letters, the Agency has no authority to unilaterally

agree to their release in any form.

Pursuant to its legal

obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign

government prior to declassifying

their information.

However,

for reasons described herein, it is not possible to even seek the

consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely

that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the

Australians against its better judgment of requesting the

CL BY: 2224130

CL REASON: 1.5 (d)

DECL ON: X5

DRV FM: LIA 3-82

SECRET

---

## Page 9

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

Australia

president to agree to the unilateral declassification of foreign

government information, CIA proposes that the release of the

{Australian documents be either postponed for a short time or that

substitution be made

3. (U) Legal Authorities:

The procedures governing the

declassification and dissemination of foreign government

information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as

Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive

Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including

(1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element

thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the

information and/or the source of the information, are to be held

in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States

pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign

government, or any element thereof, requiring that the

information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in

confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)

4: (U)

Foreign government information is subject to a

classification determination under E.O. 12958, section 1.5(c).

When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to

protect that information from unauthorized disclosure.

The E.O.

requires that foreign government information shall either retain

its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification

that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to

that reguired by the entity that furnished the information. Id.,

at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard

foreign government information under standards that provide a

degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the

originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).

into hored de that o

s. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the

intelligence community to protect all classified information from

unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has

Issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for

che declassification and dissemination of foreign government

information.

Intelligence obtained from another government or

from a combined effort with another government, may not be

released or authorized for release without its

consent.

DCID 5/6

attachment SC.3.

Furthermore, the release of intelligence that

would be contrary to agreements between the U.s. and foreign

countries is expressly prohibited. Id.. at § C.5.

6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation.

between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and

government components is classified SECRET unless a different

classification is mutually agreed upon.

DCID 1/10-1. Such

information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.

DCID 1/10-1.

2

SECRET

---

## Page 10

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

(Australia

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.

DCID 1/10-1.

7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of

such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release

of their information cannot be overemphasized.

Should CIA, or

for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where

required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned

E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has

developed with foreign services over the years.

If such lack of

coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to

share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed

it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to

the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.s. could

not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government

information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to

pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.

8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,

CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign

government information.

Its obligation to do so is similar to

its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with

another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's

documents.

For example, CIA could not declassify and release to

the public FBI information located in CIA files without

coordinating with that agency.

Similarly, CIA has no authority

to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or

information in its files.

9. (S) Coordination with Australia:- As-two of the documents

at issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009-

10224, 104-10012-10080), CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and

agreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the

Australians prior to their release, even in redacted form.

The

issue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely

one.

In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to

the

foreign government and seeking their consent for declas-

sification.

However, several events that have occurred in the

en everal events

last few months depict just how serjously Australia considers any

indication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their

classified information.

Based on the incidents described

below, it is CIA's position that even asking the Australians for

consent to release would threaten the current relationship.

• Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian

government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-

sification legislation expressly spell out that no information

provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified

without its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided

for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting

that this demarche is not between intelligence services but

3

SECRET

---

## Page 11

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

(Australia

rather between governments- it was literally delivered by

the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and

to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia.

The manner in which the

Australians treated the demarche demonstrates that the

protection of classified information is receiving top priority

in the Australian government and is not just a concern of

their intelligence community.

• On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service

passed to CIA information indicating that there would be

two non-u.s. citizens.

CIA

requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but

the Australians refused.

They argued that the information was

not specific enough and would endanger a source. The

Australians stated that if they believed the information was

useful, they would pass it themselves.

The Australians were

concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information,

and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to

share their information with third parties.

Finally, they

stated that the easiest way to protect their information was

simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.

• Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service

approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency

employee allegedly may have disclosed their classified

information.

The Australians believe that this disclosure

may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources

in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI

promised the head of the Australian service to launch

an

investigation into the matter.

• The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA

about a book published by an American USG official which

alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian

service.

Even though this book was not an official CIA

acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians,

this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect

that relationship.

10. (S) Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to

the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the

above events which have all occurred in the last year.

The

Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would

certainly deny their consent.

Should the Australians deny their

consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of

the information and would be obligated to do all it could to

prevent disclosure. It is crucial not only to CIA's mission but

4

SECRET

---

## Page 12

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

(Australia

also to the conduct of US foreign relations that the USG is seen

as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as well as its

own laws on the release of information.

11. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good

relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized.

result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison

counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished

intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources, much of this

information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it

not provided by the Australians.

Additionally, we work together

with the Australians around the world on joint collection

activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence

priorities.

Finally, there are several critical collection

efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to

collect intelligence independently.

In these cases, we rely

entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services

to

provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S.

policymakers' needs.

12. (S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the

following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First,

the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a

short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can

reassess its relationship with the Australians.

It is possible

that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that

it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full.

consent of the Australians ata

future date and the Australians object to the release of the

documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any

negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and

abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to

coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of

summary of the Australian documents for immediate release. This

summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the

Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the

letter was.

This would avoid the problem of having to go the

Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even

to do even

in the case of redactions.

13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is

willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually

agreeable solution.

We strongly believe, however, that any

approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its

obligations and commitments to foreign governments would

seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well

as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.

14. (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104-

10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222,

these are CIA documents-and-with-the redactions-proposed-by the

5

SECRET

.....?

---

## Page 13

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

Australia

government.

As such, CIA consents to the release of these

documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.

15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to

files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to

would be appropriate to do so.

Although recent events with

Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this

time, this may not be so with other services.

In cases were CIA

believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it

would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA

proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or

that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.

John A barina

John

F. Pereira

Attachment

6

SECRET

---

## Page 14

13-00000

Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification.

This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins, by Philip

Flood, then Director of the Office of National Astessments (ONA) in September 1995.

This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by

Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.

---

## Page 15

13-00000

AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 -

CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

• The Australlan government wishes to register its concern over the 17 April Exccutive

Order on Classifled National-Security Information and the apparent omission of any

explicit provision to protect foreign-sourced information or documentation from

automatic declassificaton onco it is over 25 years old.

• The Australian government understands and supports the democratic principles and

commitment to open government which underpin the Exeoutre Order. We too are

improving access to governinent informadon, but are maintaining provisions 10

protect foreign-sourced information - inciuding U.s. information.

• We do not agrce that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the

information or documentation of-another govemment without prior consultation and

'clearance. Australlan-sourced information was and continues to be passed to the U.s.

government on the understanding that it will be protecied. We adopt precisely the

same approach to information that tho U.S. shares with un.

• Omission of such consultation would, in the tyes of the. Australian government, not

be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australla General Security of Information

agreement or the many other bilateral and inuitiateral intelligence co- operation und

Information sharing agresments.

• The failure to protect sensitive Australian-sourced informaton about, for example,

our intelligence optrations, could have ramifications for our relations with reglonal

countries and compromise Intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S.

depends in part).

• Australian concerns could be addressed if provision for clearance with originalors of

foreign-sourced materlal was embodied in the Information Securly Oversight Office

• Implementation dirtculve to U.S. agencles.

- such an approach should not impede or delay the declassification prouss —

Australia is not seeking this. For example, catoguries of sensidvity for Australla

could be identified. A reasonable time limit could be put on Austrulian response

time after which the U.S. could be free lo declassify (we have & similar

urangement with the U.K.).

---

## Page 16

13-00000

like ::

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 January 1997

Mr. David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Assassination Records

Review Board

600 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Dear David:

This is to acknowledge your letter of 3 January 1997 to the

Director of Central Intelligence concerning the Assassination

Records Review Board's recent formal determinations with respect

to CIA Records.

with some information postponed.

While the Agency does not plan

to appeal to the President for additional postponements at this

time, we ask that the Board reconsider its decisions with respect

to six documents.

These documents contain information relating to

foreign government provided data, foreign liaison relationships,

and intelligence sources--information that we believe merits

protection under current standards set by the Board. Alist. of

these six documents,

together with Agency comments concerning

them, is enclosed.

We plan no further action on these documents pending

discussion with your staff and review by the Board.

Periesa

John

F. Pereira

Chief,

Historical Review Group

Enclosure.

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN

SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE

---

## Page 17

13-00000

SECRET

..:

ENCLOSURE

(We request that this enclosure be returned to CIA once the

Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues

discussed below.)

(U)

The Central Intelligence Agency requests that the

Assassination Records Review Board reconsider its determination

on the six documents listed below:

(U) 1. 104-10012-10080 and 104-10009-10224

(substitute--language for a foreign country document) .

(S) The foreign government in question has expressed

strong concern about USG and CIA's inability to keep secrets,

and current relationships are very tense. If we are required to

release the date and/or narrow the geographic choices too

closely, the foreign government will be able to identify the

document as theirs. Because this document is scheduled for

another review in July 1997, we request that the ARRB reconsider

the inclusion of the date of the document and designation of the

country of origin as "Pacific Rim Country", and accept our

originally submitted wording.

(U). 2. 104-10051-10106 (release of location)

(S)

paragraph eight.

n sat this ca baso

reconsideration of the release of the

location identified in the last three words in the eleventh line,

This CIA base currently is undeclared to the

host government.

(U) 3.

104-10055-10072 and 104-10051-10007 (foreign

government activity/liaison).

(S)

Regarding the release of the reference to the passport

camera. on page 3, it is not the USG's position to confirm that a

foreign government undertakes such activity. In addition this is

an on-going operation.

Further, releasing the words in question

would establish a

strong inference that

the two Agency officers

were permitted by foreign officials to inspect the camera, thus

CL BY: 40185904

DECL ON:

X1

CL REASON:

1.5 (c)

DV FM: #HB 70-9 MULTIPLE

---

## Page 18

13-00000

SECRET

tending to confirm the liaison relationship.

We request that the

last seven words of line four, paragraph "h", be replaced with

substitute wording such as "the public security facilities".

(U) 4. 104-10004-10213

(source)

(S)

We request that the ARRB reconsider releasing the word

"agent" in this context (page 32);

suggested substitute.

"contact." Nielson was not a paid agent of the REDSKIN project

and does not appear to have worked for the Agency in any other

capacity.

To describe him as a CIA agent could cause danger

either to him or his family, especially if they are still in

Russia.

---

## Page 19

13-00000

RECO

sovo

I EW

BOA

September 5, 1997

SECRET

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

BY COURIER

Mr. John Pereira

Director

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, DC 20505

Re:

Request to CIA to contact liaison channels regarding LIENVOY intercepts of

Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City

Some time ago the Review Board requested informally that CIA contact its liaison

channels in Mexico City for information related to Lee Harvey Oswald. During your

recent visit here we discussed with you the feasibility of your making such contacts. I

am writing in response to your request that we memorialize our request and provide

some background information.

The Review Board believes that all reasonable steps should be taken to account for all

telephonic intercepts of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City in September-October

1963. There is evidence that CIA intercepted some telephone calls through an operation

named LIENVOY conducted jointly with components.of the Mexican government. We

believe that it would be appropriate for CIA to contact directly Mexico City liaison

channels to inquire as tó whether the Mexican authorities retained copies of LIENVOY

The Review Board previously has sought information from the Mexican Government

through appropriate diplomatic channels. For reasons that are obvious to those

familiar with Mexico City issues, the Review Board could not raise with Mexican

officials nor with the U.S. State Department the possible existence of additional tape

recordings that might be in the hands of certain officials. Thus, at the behest of the

Review Board, the Department of State requested that the Mexican federal government

and local government agencies conduct general searches of their files for records

related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Mexican government responded

SECRET

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

---

## Page 20

13-00000

SECRET

Mr. John Pereira

September 5, 1997

Page 2

by sending copies of the same documentation and correspondence that the GOM had

made available to the Warren Commission in 1964.

The basis for our interest in your contacting appropriate Mexican officials is found in

CIA document 104-10004-10199, which was reviewed by the Board on September 19,

1995. On page 5 of this document (not including the cover sheet) information that the

Board agreed to protect, due to the sensitivity of sources and methods involved,

¿suggests that the Mexican security forces may have had their own copy of the October 1

intercept on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is unclear whether this statement refers to the

transcript or to an actual tape containing the phone call. Nevertheless, it provides

enough evidence to warrant additional inquiries on this matter.

For your reference we are enclosing copies of the reference documents as well as copies

of the correspondence between the DOS and the Mexican government.

We would appreciate your contacting appropriate officials to determine what

reasonably can be known about this and related matters, and ask that you provide a

response to this request by November 14, 1997. We are fully aware of the sensitivity of

this type of request and do not wish to take any action that would compromise existing:

intelligence operations. If necessary, we would be pleased to discuss with you ways in

which we might further elaborate on this request, including person-to-person

discussions with appropriate officials either herelor in Mexico.)

Thank you for your continued assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely, yours,

quitter

T. Jeremy Gunn

General Counsel and Associate Director

for Research and Analysis

cc: J. Barry Harrelson, HRG.

Enclosures

SECRET

---

## Page 21

13-00000

..

SECRET

CL BY(611637

CL REASON: Section 1,5 C

DECL ON: X1

DRY FRM: COV 2-87

15 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John Pereira @ DCI

Fred Wickham @ DO

Lee Strickland @ DA

FROM:

OFFICE:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

CSI/HRG

ARRB 22 January Meeting -. Agenda

1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:

A. Reconsideration of the (State Cover.) The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA andior State official are

not required. However, the Agency and Statejare welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the

"evidence memorandum". The evidence memorandum must be at ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested

we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee Strickland and me to be available at 600 E. St.

NW. to answer any questions.

(AIUO) Be Office of Personnel Flles in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recominend to the Board that

personnel files be.declared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy

of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story,

and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HRP is preparing five OP files for review by Board

members. The ARRB staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the

Agency prior to release.

(AIOU) C. Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files

and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by CIA during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR

and released in 2017. If the recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the

records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

D. Other possible items:

(AIUO) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1 ... The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be

declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.

SECRET

---

## Page 22

13-00000

SECRET

(S)

ii. Crypt LINLUCK - ARRB staff did not find our evidence memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to

recommend that the Board reaffirm its decision to release.

i. 1967 IG report on "Castro Assassination Plots" - ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by

the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the

agenda. HRP and

DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.

(U)

2. It you have any questions about any of these items please call me.

CC:

(Eileen Wukitch@ DO

Becky Rant @ DA

(Linda Cipriani @ DCI

Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 P.M

SECRET

---