STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO
Originator: HSCA
Document date: 03/00/1979
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

180-10147-10192

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Informa ión

Date:

4/27/201

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER:

180-10147-10192

RECORD SERIES: CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 61-10-06

Document Infonnation

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE: STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLU: ION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED

ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO

DATE: 03/00/1979

PAGES:

149

SUBJECTS:

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

ORGANIZED CRIME

CIA, FILES

CIA, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: IA; IB

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/07/1995

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Box 34

NA 47055

DocId: 32273547

Page 1

---

## Page 2

TO:

Fret. Breckinridge,

it is 0n 12 in 79

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED MEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

INFORMATION

ACTION

CONTROL NUMBER

DOC. DATE

TRANSMITTAL AND D-CUMENT RECEIPT

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel

Central Intelligence Agency

Room 7 D 35

Washington, D.C. 20505

12 Mar. 70

RETENTION

SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)

XXX

LOAN

CLASS.

Secre

Undated

I Forwatring copy of JISCA Draft Report entitled:

STAFF REPORT ON THI: EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CLAI

-SPONSORED ASSASSIVATION CONSPERACTZS AGAINST Fidel Castro

com

Cy 15 of 5

SIGNATURE (acknowledging receipt of above docunents)

hitest 5013.

RESTRA 79

F0076 3772B

NW

47055

DocId: 32273547 Page 2

RECEIP

RETURN TO

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROOM 7 D 35

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY

2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK

3 - CAMARY, OLC HOLD BACK

---

## Page 3

1aman79

Classification:

SECRET

(This form is to be'used for material. extracted

from ClA controlled docu.ments.) .

Mr. Buckinidge

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cover Sheet

The attached package of paper is the property of the House

Select Connittee on Assassinations; and is on loan to CIA under an

agreement whereby CIA is not to reproduce or copy the draft or any

portion thereof.

Notes may be taken on materials in this package, and rough

notes may be prepared as a basis for informal and oral

exchanges

with HSCA representatives. These nctes, however, are to be held as

though controlled and are to be destroyed under agreed conditions

with HSCA. They are not to be copied or excerpted and are to be

held until further instructions are received for eventual disposal.

These papers have been numbered for accountability and receipted

accordingly.

They are to be handle on a secure basis as though

constituting sensitive papers on a reed-to-know basis.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy 11 5

of 0

Classification:

SECRET

Classified by derivation:

NH 17055 DocId:32273547 Page 3

KENANTE

---

## Page 4

Ecommitea Paint

Rioril

STAFF REPORT COM

THE EVOLUTION AND

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

CIA SPONSORED

ASSASSINATION

CONSPIRACIES AGAINST

FIDEL

CASTRO

STAFF REPORT

OF I TE

SELECT COMMITTEE • IN ASSASSINATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF. RE PRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFI. I CONGRESS

SECOND: ESSION

*ETUST 5, I978

MIne+ 1979

Page Minter for the use of the Select committee on Assassicatlons..

---

## Page 5

HOUSE SELET COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

NIKETY-FUTI COYOBIES

LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chatmen

•RICHARDSON PREYER, No. h Carolina

SAMUEL L, DEVINE, Obio

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Di: rictol Columbis

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut

YVONNE BRATHWAITE BU !BE, California

CHARLES THONE, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Co. secticut

• HAROLD S. SAWYER, Allchigas

HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee

FLOYD I. FITHLAN, Indiana

ROBERT F. EDGAR, Pennsyl inta

G. B01 ERT BLASEY, Chief Coundl and Diredor.

ГЕВ ~ WOWD, Depaly Chief Cornel, Leged Unil

PETER BESSON, Cocoal

N: ARLES RISINGER, RescureiTer

LISA BERLOS, Hereorcher

(rE)

Gon i ConnweL, Deputy Chied Cornel

-Mork FlANAGAN; Reseeder

---

## Page 6

TABLE OF COnTENTS

AT INTRODUSTION

IT BACKGROUND MATERIAL- RELEVANT SUMMARV

Onganized Crime

B. The Las Vegas Wiretep Incident

C. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

0. Boser@ Effurts of JohN.

Roselli To Avoid

Prosecutzin

E. Debut of the Retaliation Theiry

1F.:

The 1967 TOOl Insector General's Repert

G.: Anderson Aeticles

H..

Roselli Departation Attempts

I. The senate Select Camn tHee To Stily Govermmental

Sperations eith Lepect to Intelligenie

Actinities.

J.. The CIA 19TT TASK FORCE REpOrt

1. Siplicate Orations

2. " AMLASH

K: Recent cinderson Cirticles

TIl

1 ISSUE ANALYSIS

LA. Preface

Th

angel at AMLASH Operation

the AMLASH Operation

1 Characterination tet Cactio woued hase

2. The Probably

assassinated the resident of the nute states

3.

ar Sun mary.

(Over.).

---

## Page 7

ICT CIA - Organized Crime PLots.

1. Acope and

Netire of the Clots-

a) loselli Knoutedge of CIA sponsorship

b) Discovery of tuie edentities

c) Roles of prive pals.

i) Phase One

2) Phase Two.

d) Delivery of the pills

e) Location of Trafficante

f) Veionia's other contacts

g) Introduction of "Jos" and "God" aid

redded excris

h) Richard Cain

1) The "girl" in

- he 18 October 1960 FBI

memorandum

j) Articles an Frank sturgis

K) Implications insing from

• Chase Two.

Motivation Of Onjanizid Crime to be

Involved In

The Plots

3. Relalation Thee y

a) healer of

the emmittie's inveiligation

of the Retaliater Themy

c) Suimary

4. Related Organize Crime Actuities

a) Norman Rottimin

b) Name luis k tween de AmLASt anD

he CIA - Ongaria Crise Operations

1) Link One

• 2) LinK TWO

3) - Link Three

5. Deaths of Roselle and rancana

b. @CIA Actions In. Concealing

"The: Reactiration

and Cintinicatioo

of the Plats fini

Abernzy.

-(OVen: General Robert F. Kenrely.

---

## Page 8

IV

A. AMLASH Operation

B. CIA - Onganized Clime Ploto

---

## Page 9

DRAFT

STAFF fEPORF-@i THE

EVOLUTION

AND IMPLICATIONS

OF THE CIA - SPONSORED

ASSASSINARON CONSPIRACIES

ISSUE: INCU JAN-CONSPFRACT

AGAINS?

FIDEL CASTRO

Intrag tian Forwond

(1) The attempt of the United States government

to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro as well

as other foreign lealers during the turbulent decade

of the 1960s shocked and disgusted the American peopl

citizen. When sit was disclosed that the Central

Intelligence Agency pereirafter tral intentionaly

solicited and received the assistance of various

members of organized crime fa Cosa Nostral in the

comers

furtherance of such lots, aadi due cerem lea

expressed

civilized sociaty simply did not and does not condon

such acts as a legitimate instrument of foreign

policy. There is no exeuse, no rationalization.

) The effect an i influence of these actions

did not stop, howeve, with invoking the disdain of

the

the American publie indiworte. These

assassination

attempts gave birth =o the bauntiny theory that

Fidel Castroforchest rated the assassination of he

President tohn ate meds in defensive retaliation

for the plots on his life.

---

## Page 10

-2-

(3) In its Final report published in April,

1976, the Senate Selict Committee to Study Governmental

4) In this Repor:, the SSC focused on two operations

of the CIA whieh may have provoked Castro into

retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint

effort of the CIA an i Organized Crime to eliminate

Castro. Second,

the SSC examined the nature

and extent

of the CIA AMLASH op ration. The SSC concluded its

analysis with the st itement that "/E/he Committee

believes the investi jation should continue in certain

areas, and for that reason does not reach any final

conclusions. "I

this result of

(5) This sellers is an aflampt to meet

suncil, /coalitions

of-this material to ais

not every

any review te

willesrevirud.

the CIA-Mafia plots. »I of the AMLASH operationg to

no so will le sacket

the c)nflicting viewpoints of the

SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the

various operations on to to, so pect anyone to morat

tongue-lashing

Instead, this materiad first seeks

---

## Page 11

3..

to present a 1sa

• review of the CIA.

operation AMLASH and

of the involvement or potential

involvement of organ: zed crime in the CIA operations

against Castro durin 1960-1963.

From this review, it

lientions

oncerning the naturr, scope, and taliticates o

these operations.

II. BACKGROUNI MATERIAL - RELEVANT SUMMARY

A.

CIA-Mafia Plots

(6) The genesis o

the effization of the untied

States criminal synd cate by the CIA to attempt to

assassinate Castro i:: placed by the 1967 Report of the

Inspector General as

occurring

during a conversation

between the Deputy D rector of Plans, Richard Bissell,

• 3.

and the Director of ecurity, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.

These plots extended from 1960 until early 1963 and

can be divided into wo stages." The first stage.

occurred from August 1960 until April, 1961, arid

can best be termed a; Phase I or the pre-Bay

From April

April 2061, A CIA

records indicate that the meration

cakes seagou a parate tracts

inactire.b.

1962

---

## Page 12

_4-

(7) In Late 1961, he CIA decided to renew

the CIA-Mafia plots, then creating Phase II, and

7

kept them active unt. late 1962 or early

1963.

(Spuring the in tial stages of Phase I, Edwards

assigned the specifi: task of locating the proper

persons

to

assassina:e Castro to Me aa

FeNd

the

Office of securite

Operations

cancer

Kippot Branch wetnafter he support chief)

Both men

@ privati investigater and farmer FBI manj

agreed that uppera should contact Robert A. Maheu,

whom the CIA had pre/iously used in

several covert

operations, to recru.t the necessary personnel.

9

JOhN

(9) Maheu subseguintly contacted Roselli, ^ who

10 an organized cRime

figures

in turn recruited tw, persons Initiall known to the

Suppat Chief as "Sam God" and "Joe, "11: The support chil

he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities

of these persons to ›e Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante,

respectively, two rajor gures in organizia crime.

(10) After meeting

several times in Miami and deciding

upon poison pills as

the method of assassination, the

IGR

150770 sepert Suste is that Trafficante made the

arrangements for the assassination of Castro with

one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips

---

## Page 13

5

he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. 13: This contact

was ants, a Cub in official who held a position

close to Castro. 14

(Il) The 1967 IG A port then states that

Roselli

passed the pills to rafficante. 15 Roselli subsequently

thi Cuban official

do Cuba, 16 Menut he gils vere delivered to ter

Ceta apprently retained the pills for

a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable

to fulfill any plan.

→ The Cuban official

-Arta was

no longer in a

position to kill Cas ro because he had lost his Cuban

post. 18

the Cuban pfficial

(12) with out unaile to perform, thes support chief

looked elsewhere.

R selli next told the suppor

sometime during

earl' 1961, that Trafficante knew

a man prominent in tie cuban exile recent all teader)

could accomplish the job, De Manact autonio de

approval, Trafficante

this persor

approached besent abut assassinating Castro and

reported that Varna was receptive.

The -196 Fe

Support Chief

Report states that @ Cometl again distributed pills

thes

His tan 21

which eventually rea hed f

ver the Cuban exile leader.

---

## Page 14

6

(13) This activity concluded the pre-Bay of

I6R

Pigs phase of the plits. The 1967 foR does not

Actual

document anynattempt to a

administer the

pills to Castro.

(14) The IST IGR elates that after a period

of apparent dormancy.

Bissell directed william

Harveyin approximat :ly November of 1961 to

reactivate the CIA-Mifia plots.

introduced Harvey

to Roselli.

• During this phase,

the CIA decided agai ist using Giancana or Trafficante;

instead, a person referred to as "MACEO" entered the

plot as the person

wio would help provide Castro

contacts.

In addi ion, the plots still utilized

the services of Ante te

the Can perist 20.

tene wender.

(15) Even though tie plots no longer included

Trafficante and Gian ana, the CIA admitted that

Roselli most likely ept them informed.. The t

* = that: "/i/t would be naive

to assume that Rosel i did not take the precaution of

informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was

working in a territoy. considered to be the private

---

## Page 15

Cuban

exile

lidder

domain

of someone elle in the syndicate."

(6) In June of 19..2 Roselli reported to. Harvey

that›v

saNdispatch d a three-man team into Cuba

with the general ass gnment of recruiting others

to kill Castro, and, if the opportunity arose, to

28

kill him themslgves, maybe through the use of pills.

In September of 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey

in Miami that the

"m dicine" was reported in place,

that the three-man tram

i was safe, and that a Cuban ende

leader

was

prepared to dispitch

another three-man team

29

to infiltrate Castro s bodyguard.

In December,

1962, Roselli and Ha: vey agreed that not much seemed

to

be occurring and by l'ebruary, 1963, Harvey terminated

the plots.

в.

The Las Vegas Wi, etap Incident

17) The CON IGR: iso mentioned an event that

that

occurred during

Phas. I of the CIA-Mafia plots which

resulted in the firs. dissemination of the details

of

the plot to persois other than the ones involved

in the operation. On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas

police arrested Arthir J. Balletti, an employee of a

Florida investigator named Edward Dubois, for placing

---

## Page 16

31

an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas.

Subsequent investiga ion determined that Robert f.

Anate monstrogate

lahew authorize

the surveillance and possibly the

wiretap of the subjet involved and that Maheu probably

32

acted on behalf of G.ancana and the CIA.

(18) the violation of the wiretap statuteplaced

the case under feder il jurisdiction and the FBI soon

began an investigatin. In the course of this

investigation, Maheu informed the FBI that he

instituted the surve llance on behalf of CIA efforts

to obtain Cuban inte ligence through the hoodlum

33

element, including G.ancana.

In its efforts to

prevent the prosecut on of Balletti, Maheu, and an

who had alleged y asswill Balletle in thi wiretap,

inidentified individial known as J. W. Harrison the

CIA eventually told he Justice Department the details

of Phase I of the CI!-Mafia plots to kill Castro

This

most accurately

say can baat be relited through the following

---

## Page 17

memorandum from J. Elgar Hoover to Attorney

34

General Ramsey Clark (quoted in part):

Blank letterhead lemorandum

3-6-67

TO: Attorney Gen ral

FROM:

Director, FB:

TOP SECRET

/Attorney General Ribert Kennedy/ indicated

that a few days prior to /5-9-62/ he had been

advised by the CIA

hat Robert A. Maheu had

been hired by the C.A to approach Sam Giancana

with a proposition ›f paying $150,000 to hire

gunmen to go into Ciba and kill Castro.

He

further stated CIA idmitted having assisted Maheu

in making'the

"bugg.ng" installation in Las Vegas

which uncovered thi; clandestine operation and for

this reason CIA could not afford

to have any action

taken against Giancina or Maheu.

Mr. Kennedy stated

that upon learning

'IA had not cleared its

action

• in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of

Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never

again take such stes without first checking

with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this

matter it would be very difficult to initiate anv...

prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could

immediately bring out the fact the United States

Government had apprached him to arrange

assassination of Castro.

He stated the same was

true concerning any

action we might take against

Maheu

for any violasion in which he might become

involved.

(19) In summary, te Las Vegas wiretap

forced. the CIA to ac<nowledge the existence of the

CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA government officials

---

## Page 18

-10-

and provided the fir it occasion for participants

to manipulate the op ration to prevent prosecution.

C. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

(20) The next majo: event related to the CIA-

Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his

involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before

Senator Edward Long's Committee which was investigating.

invasions of privacy.

The attorney for Mahue,

Maher

Edward Pierpont Morgin, informed the House Seleet

Committee on Assassi tations (hereinafter the "Committee

that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and

said he was going to be called before the Long

Committee in conjunction with the Morganthau investiga-

3 6 35am

tion.

Maheu then informed Morgan of the plots and

suggested that any testimony might necessar ly reveal his.

previous covert actirities with the CIA. '

Morgan

then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the

General Counsel to tie CIA, to reiterate Maheu's

concerns in an apparently successful effort to block

-356-38

any testimony.

---

## Page 19

-11-

Jiho

D.

Rosetti Efforts? o Avoid Prosecution

21) The SSC relati:d that in May, 1966, the FBI

threatened to deport Rosell,"

*for living in the

United States under .in

assumed name unless he

cooperated in an

inv stigation of the Mafia 97a 39

The

SSC then states hat Roselli contacted Edwards

who subsequently spo e to the FBI in regard to

38.40

Roselli.

do The SSC repor s that Roselli again contacted

CIA sources in an ef ort to thwart prosecution when

Roselli was arrested for

fraudulent gambling activities

at the Friars Club i 1 Beverly Hills in 1967..

6739 selLi

contacted Harvey, wh, was no longer a CIA employee,

Hide 70.

unsuccess fully

to represent him.

Harvey subsequently attempted A

43-41

to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution.

The Justice Departme it, however, subsequently convicted

Roselli for a violat.on of the interstate gambling

4244

laws.

---

## Page 20

-12.

E. Debut of the Retaliation Theory

23) The genesis of this theory can be attributed

to an interview that Premier Castro held on

September 7, 1963, wish Associated Press reporter

Daniel Harker. In trat interview, Castro-warned

against the United States "ai

ding terrorist plane

to eliminate Cuban leaders.

He stated, according

to Harker, that United States leaders would be in danger

if they promoted any attempt to eliminate the leaders

46)0(24)

of Cuba.

early January,

19 Zaward Morgan approached columnist

Drew Pearson, relatel the background of the plots,

posed the possibility that the plots could have provoked

a Castro retaliation and asked Pearson

inform

44 (no No. 73)

Chief Justice Earl Warren of the operation.

Warren subsequently

informed Secret serviceo birector

James J. Bawtey who in turn notified the FBI.

Morgan

informed the Committze that Roselli initially approached

him complaining

of excessive FBI surveillance ever

49-16

since he had been involved in this patriotic venture.

Roselli also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated

for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy:

4680

Rowlen

---

## Page 21

-13-

(25, Aiter receivi.ig this information the FBI

*47

decided not to furthir investigate the allegation.

Following the publicition of the Jack Anderson

and Drew Pearson art cles of March 3 and 7, 1967,

however, where the teory of

retaliation first

gained public notority, President Johnson ordered

the FBI to investiga e the matter.

E2 48 The FBI

consequently intervi wed Edward Morgan on March 20,

1967.

Morgan info med

the FBI that he represented

clients that were re isonable individuals who entered

into a project that hey understood to have high

thes

governmental backing and which involved the assassina-

54 50

tion of Fidel Castro.

Morgan then stated that his

clients had reason t, suspect that Castro learned

of these plots and k lled President Kennedy in

.5755

retaliation.

(26) The FBI inves igation resulted in President

Johnson acquiring

a ersonal interest in the

retaliation theory, wich prompted CIA Director Richard

52.56

Helms to prepare a riport on the assassination plots.

F. 1967 IGR

---

## Page 22

Not

only

Castro

assass; -

nason plots

All Eclivity

ident fred agargl

includi

Male not 18ss5531

noton ins

's mell

N# $7055

DocId: 32273547

Page 22

---

## Page 23

-14-

(27) On March 23, 1967, Director Helms ordered

the CIA Inspector. Geleral to prepare

a report on

57 53.

the CIA assassinatio, plots.

This report detailed

the accounts of various CIAloperations against Costu

including an analysi; of the CIA-Organized Crime

plots and the AMLASH operation. The IGR also

examined the 1960 La; Vegas wiretap incident.

(28): In reference

=o the AMLASH operation, the

IGR related AMLASH's activities in Madrid, Spain

in late 1964 and early 1965, where AMLASH was meeting

with Manuel Artime.

The IGR further noted that

in Cube

Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer for Santo

Trafficante, was in

55.

ladrid, Spain in March, 1965.

Bongo claimed to be in contact with dissident Cuban

5660

military leaders, in:luding AMLASH.

G. Anderson Article:

(29) In 1971, Anderson once again published

information promoting the retaliation theory in two

articles dated January 18 and 19.: These articles

exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins

made it to a rooftop within shooting. distance. of

Castro before being apprehended. that this event

---

## Page 24

The CIA's concern

Was the protection

of intelligence

Sources and

methods.

- 15

occurred

in late Feb uary or early March, 1963,

that Robert Kennedy it least

condoned

the CIA-

Mafia

plots, and tha: Roselli delivered poison

pills

to be used in illing Castro to a contact at 6/

-60..

the Miami Beach Foun ainbleu Hotel on March 13, 1961.

#. Roselli deportat on

(30) In 19.71, the ame year that Anderson released

additional information on the plots, the CIA contacted

the Immigration and laturalization Service, Department

of Justice, in an at empt to prevent information on

CIA operations from heing disclosed in the event INS

.5762

brought deportation roceedings against Roselli

The SSC stated in it.; Interim Report, released in

November, 1975, that the deportation order was still

9R43

in the

process of being litigated.

4vIn August,

1976, authorities di: covered Roselli's butchered

body stuffed in

an o 1 drum and floating in Miami's

Biscayne Bay.

His colleague in the plots to kill

Castro, Sam Giancana

had been shot to death in

his home in June, 19'5.

---

## Page 25

The Senate Selec: Committee To Study

Governmental Ope ations with Respect to

Intelligence Act vities

(3:)

In connection with its mandate to investigate

the full range of go ernmental intelligence activities,

the SSC "examined the performance of the intelligence

agencies

in conductig their investigation of the

assassination and thir relationship to the warren

Commission."

In April, 1976, the SSC published.

its Final Report (Bos V), which in essence, faulted

the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing

the Warren Commission of the CIA's on-going plots

against t

sen the life of the premier, Fidel Castro:

31) After reviewing the details of the CIA-Mafia

plots, the SSC stated that "Castro probably would .

not have been certain that the CIA was behind the

underworld attempts" and that it would have been

unlikely that Castrc would have distinguished the

the CIA plots with the underworld from any plots

sponsored by the Cut an exile community and not

---

## Page 26

-17=

6•2

6'5

affiliated in any wa with the CIA.

(33)

The SSC ident fied the AMLASH operation,

however, as being "c early different" from the under-

66 635

world plots.

TheiSC stated that AMLASH was in

progress at the time of the assassination, that it

could clearly be traied to the CIA, and that AMLASH'S

proposal. for a coup lad been endorsed by the Cit se

the initial step beig the assassination of Castro.

The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw "no evidence

that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government

plotted President Keinedy's assassination in retaliation

15565

for U. S. operations against Cuba."

(34) As related in the Introduction to this material,

the SSC did not react any conclusion because it

believed additional nvestigation needed to occur.

J.

The CIA 1977 PIA SEE FORCE Report (TER

35)

comeera

Stung by the jenate criticism and the rippling

effeet that Book V clused in the media, the CIA

: 1977

prepared a comprehen ive report in

that disigned

oves tigato

ape at least vithin the CIA, the critica

questions postulated in the SSC Final" Report.

---

## Page 27

- 18;

(36)

The fryf

dentifies a principal theme

of Book Vas the pos ibility that Castro retaliated

against the United Sates for attempts on his life

and that the CIA ope ations may have specifically.

70 71

caused say such actions by Castro.

In responding

to this theory, the CiA decided to perform the.

following:

1)

to the assassination of President Kennedy,

2)

to review the possibility that CIA

activitie; against Cuba did, by their

nature,

cluse Castro to order the assassina-

• tion of President Kennedy. 72=7/

(37).

The details of the bo

P are thoroughly

related in this matecial because no source has

previously feubliclys eleased them

1. Syndicate Operations

(33) Before analyzing the AMIASH operations, the

CIA first related nev considerations pertaining to the

FR

syndicate operations. The man refers to a series

of articles written sy Paul Meskill and appearing

in the New York Daily News in April, 1975.

(39) In these articles Meskill described how

Frank Fiorini, 150 Known as

Sturgis, allegedly

---

## Page 28

-19-

a tomer rustress of Castro,

recruited Marie Lore iz, to spy on Castro

how Sturgis knew: Jual Orta and planned to use him

in a bombing assassination of Castro.

Meskill

asserted that Sturgi; claimed he had been a hired

operative for the cIt for at least a decade and that

sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators 194.14

in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover.

In another article oi June 13, 1976, Meskill related

the claim of Marie Lorenz that in the fall of 1960

Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two .

capsules of poison powder, which

she was to sprinkle

ER 73

in some food or drins of Castro.

(40) The writers of the 1977 leR were quite

vith there assertion ecauSe of in bael in

Phase 1 of

the piots

publicly|surfaced in connection with a Castro assassina-

tion plot before the ssc retite

Ortais r 01:

we the CIA-

organized crime lot on the resent too

poison. Castro-gave.t

this Cuban afficial

assassination plots other than the CIA operation

also attracted the attention of the CIA.

---

## Page 29

2.0-

(41) In reference o Sturgis' allegation that he

opa stire

had been a hired epa aber for the CIA for a decade

the lentor asserte.l that "he was

in contact with

some of the CIA Cuba: employees in the Miami are 1a7?7

but had no direct re ationships with the Agency."

TER

The foR recognizes tat

Sturgis, through his gambling

activities and relat onships with

various casino owners,

may quite possibly hive known Orta, and also raises

the question of wheter Sturgis may have been a source

of information to Ca tro regarding Orta's participation

07098-78

in any assassination plot.

(42) In reference a the lorenz-sturgis poison pill

plot, the linter noted the similarity of this plot

to the details in th: 18 October 1960 FBI memo

The CIA concluded thit this October date is too early

for the CIA syndicat: operations and

that therefore

880

the syndicate may hare been acting independently.

43/. The CIA also oncluded that Autor

the Cuban exile leadir active in the CIA syndicate

operations may have already been active in g 855

with the Mafia when he CIA approached him.

---

## Page 30

- 21-

(44)

The CIA cited two FB: memorandum as support.

First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to

underworld support frr some Cubans, and second, a

L8 January 10C4

18 January 1961 memo: andum relating an unconfirmed

the Cuban exi Gleader

report that Vunna

wis one of the Cubans receiving

support.

(75) The CIA /further acknowledged that although

the operation with tle Mafia was suspended after

the Bay of Pigs, it i ppeared to still be in progress

when re-activated in April, 1962.

1 83

(46) the the summarized its position concerning

non-CIA sponsored sydicate operations in the following

passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found

itself involved in providing additional

resources for independent operations that

the syndicate already had underway...I I/n*

a sense CIA miy have been piggy-backing on

the syndicate and in addition to its material

contribution vas also supplying an aura of

official sanction. 85 gu

2.

AMLASH

(47)

The WE states the ssc suggests that AMLASH

was possibly a Castir, agent assigned a provacation

---

## Page 31

that

mission which would hen justify retaliation. or,

in the alternative, hat AMLASH was a security

risk through which a tails of the plotting may have

Castro tus providing the impetus for

provocation.

TER

Addi :ionally, the zer cites the

SSC as holding that n either case, AMLASH

should

8736

have been reported t, the Warren Commission.

TFR

87 €9.

48) The i conte ids neither theory is correct.

stating that the relitionship between the CIA and

AMLASH before the de ith of President Kennedy was so

"unsubstantial and i conclusive that it provided no

basis for AMLASH/1 t, feel that he had any

tangible

€580

CIA support for ploting against Castro.

49) In support th. ta proceeds to narrate the

Agency's understandig of the operation.

On August 17,

1962, the case officir for AMLASH reported that he

"/has7 no intention of giving AMLASH/1/ physical

elimination mission

is requirement but recognize

this [as7 something le could. or might try to carry

out on his own initiation.

89,900

Headquarters replied

---

## Page 32

23°

the next day, "Stron/ly concur that no physical

elimination

mission

91g0

He given AMLASH/1. "

August 29, 1962 unti

September, 1963 the CIA states

it did not have any ontact with AMLASH.

18281

50) on september', 1963 the CIA received the

following cable:

AMLASH still eels there only two ways

accomplish chinge either inside job or

invasion he Inalistic enough to realize

latter out of question. According AMWHIP,

AMLASH still waiting

for U. S.. reveal

plan of actio..

5.92

The

FoR notes that tie SSC interpreted "inside job"

as referring to an oeration against Castro; the CIA,

however, says it refirs to a general commitment concerning

TER

how to effect change 93: The for also states that. at

this point. Book V sa's

"characterization of this phase

of the AMLASH operat on is disputed. "94. The CIA "

contends that any dispute /onlylexists/in the eyes of the

95-95

SSC:

No

(51)

The Fur next comments on an interview of

Castro by AP reporte: Daniel Harker in which Castro

said that anti-Castr, terrorists had the support of

---

## Page 33

-24-

2596

U. S. leaders.

The IGR states that the. Book V

implies that AMASH/l may have reported to Castro li

what the SSC charact:rized as assassination plots.

The CIA response is hat "Castro's remarks at that

time could not have stemmed from anything

said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA offi:ers as they proposed nothing

and undertook nothinj."

13998

(52) On October 11, 2963 the case officer ente

cabled

headquarters and sail that AMLASH/1 claimed to have

the necessary people and equipment to overthrow

100

Castro without U. S. assistance.gg

In October, is,

Outside the

Unite Statia.

1963, Desmond Fitzgerild met AMLASH/1* insenio. 100

At this meeting the :IA maintains that Fitzgerald

rejected AMLASH's rejuest for an assassination weapon®

specifically, a high powered rifle with a telescopic

-102

TER

lens./O/ The Cat coltends that at this point it

was clear that AMLAS I was informed that there would

be no U. S. assistanie until after the fact, which

is contrary to the SiC statement in Book v to the

effeet that it was u certain how AMLASH interpreted

the put-off by Fitzgarala./02

---

## Page 34

-i5

(53) On November 11, 1963, Fitzgerald approved

informing AMLASH/1 tiat he would be given a cache

inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a.

scope would be incluled upon request./03 - on

November 20, the case officer informed AMIASH that

10y 1033

he would be receivin, the meeting he requested.

This meeting occurrel on November 22.

706,05

(54) The fed sunna ized the significance of these

contacts

with AMLASH as related to the contentions

in Book V in the fol owing passage:

(55)

Whatever the elationship with AMLASH/1

following the death of President Kennedy,

there is ever, indication that during

President Kenedy's life AMLASH/1 had no

basis for believing that he had CIA support

for much of alything. Were he a provocateur

reporting to

astro, or if he was merely

careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting and6

actual CIA plot directed against Castro.j06

Finally, in r:ply to the SSC allegation that

the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's

request for all possible relevant information, the

TFla

#aR observed:

---

## Page 35

re in foRce

While one can understand today why

the

Warren Commis: ion limited its inquiry

to normal avenues of investigation, it

would have

se: ved to remisem) the credibility

of

its effort had it taken a broader view

of the matter

CIA, too,

could have considered

in specific trms what most saw in general

terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban

involvement i: the assassination (JFK) because /02

of tensions o

the time...The Agency should

have taken brader initiatives, then, as well."

K. Recent Anderson rticles

JACK

(56) In september 976 and October, 1978, 'Anderson

That

again published arti :les which propounded the retaliation

theory. to?

In addit.on, for the first time Anderson

(publicly revealed/th it John Roselli served as his source

for the retaliation heory in all of the articles

published through th: years.

(57) The september 7, 1976, article appearing in

the Washington Post contains all components of the

The centiel?

retaliation theory. This states:

Mafia mobster John Roselli may

have taken

secret of the John F:

Kennedy assassination with him to his

death.

He was brutally murdered a

few weeks ago, his hacked up body

stuffed into

an oil drum and dumped

• into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to

associates that he knew who had arranged

President Kernedy's murder.

It was the

same conspirators he suggested, whom he had

recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier

Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's

cryptic account, Castro

learned the identity of the underworld

---

## Page 36

27-

contacts

in Hivana who had been trying

that President

Kennedy was bhind the plot.

The Cuban

.eader, as the supreme

irony, decidel to turn the tables and

rowd to arrange Kennedy's

assassination according to Roselli's

scenario.

To save their skins, the

plotters linel up Lee Harvey Oswald to

pull the trigjer.

• Roselli coild never be pinned down

on names or details.

It was also difficult

to assess whe her he knew what he was talking

about or whet er he merely

thought might have happened. Certainly there

is no real evidence to support Roselli's

But tere are enough curious circumstances

to justify telling it. Here are the facinating

highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant

inderworld contacts

• authority, hovever, over the underworld elements

in Havana.:

They were inder the loose control of Florida's

Mafia chieftal, Santos Trafficante.

In fact,

Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a

Cuban jail, al indignity that didn't endear

Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his

Florida haunts, he left part of his organization

ehind in Havana., Some of his henchmen eve

managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner

These were the people Roselli wanted

to use to knock off Castro.

---

## Page 37

128.

But Roselli d.dn't have the

the Mafia

to make

the necessary

the Chicago

godfather Same (lomo) Giancana, to deal

with Trafficante

As Roselli's

issociates tell it, he

persuaded Gianca la that it would be to

their advantage

o win the good will of

the CIA.

Convin:ed, Giancana

Florida to make he preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up,

•Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot

Castro's demise.

At first, they tried to plant

poison pills, su›plied by the CIA, in Castro's

The pills would have made it appear that

he died of natur il causes.

When this failed,.

snipers were dis atched to a Havana rooftop.

They were caught.

The word reacied Roselli that some of the plotters

had been torturel and that Castro had learned about

the whole operat.on.

The CIA callel off the Roselli operation in

March,

1963, but recruited à Castro associate,

Rolando Cubela, co murder Castro.

In an impromp:u, three-hour interview with

Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro

indicated that h: knew about the attempts on his

life and warned that U. S. leaders also

---

## Page 38

2'1=

might not be sale. That was

1963.

Sept. 7,

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted

the same underworld elements whom he had

caught plotting against him.

They supposedly

were Cubans fro, the old Trafficante organiza-

Working rith Cuban intelligence, they

allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter,

Lee Harvey Oswa.d, who had been active in the

pro-Castro move lent.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald

may have shot Kinnedy or may have

decoy while oth irs

ambushed him from closer

When Osald was picked up, Roselli

suggested, the

inderworld conspirators feared

he would crack ind disclose

information that

might lead to tem.

certainly would

have brought a tassive U.S. crackdown on the

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald,

making it

appea as an act of reprisal against

the President's killer.

At least this is how

Roselli explain d the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CA officials believed that Castro

, was

behind the ennedy assassination.

It has also ben established that Jack Ruby,

indeed, had bee, in Cuba and had connections

in the Havana u derworld.

One CIA cable,

dated Nov: 28,.

963, reported that

"an American

gangster type nimed Ruby" had visited Trafficante

in his Cuban pr .son.

---

## Page 39

30°

III. ISSUE AVALYSIS

A.

Preface

58)

determine what conclisions eat be ascertained craur

concerning the natur:, scope, and renifications

of these operations. In this regard, various

issues are presented in the following sections,

subjected to analysi. and then resolved aecording

to available evidene.probablemotivations and

the mast logical inf rences.

Conmettie

59) To fulfill ths process, the then reviewed

material from numero is governmental sources that

pertained to the perions and operations relevant

to the investigation

1.

- John Roselli

2. Santo Trafficant:

3.

uban exile ied:

4. Sam Giancana

These persons included:

-principal in cIA-O.C.

operation

i-

- principal in CIA-Q.C.

operation

- principal in CIA-O.C.

operation

- principal in CIA-O.C.

operation

5.

Robert Maheu

- principal in CIA-O.C.

operation

---

## Page 40

6..

Michael McLaney

7. Samuel Benton

8. Norman Rothman

9:

John Martino

10. Edward P. Morgan

11. Edward K. Moss

12. Dino Cellini

13. Richard Cain

14.

Charles Tourine

15. Rafael "Macho" G:ner

Identity protestel

17.

identoty protectidi

Kosenig 11

18. Joseph Shimon &

19. Angelo Bruno

20.

Sam Mannarino

- Inrolved is Havana

_ Involved in HAvaNA

carno business

- Hasara Casino operator.

- Audi-contra Activist

- Washington, BC: attarisey

- Interratinal Rentie Fetateens

Represeneltie

- Haina Casino operater

_ Indiat in Harena Caseh

businees

- Asseciole of Sende TirOcente:

- Anti-castro Centon

- Anti-Castro Ceban

-Reputel Organized düne

rader 4

Parlacel phia

- Herana Cairo

operator

---

## Page 41

302

21. Kelly Mannarino

Heraldi Crio

-omares

22. Edward Browder

23. Joseph Merola

24. Arthur Balletti

25. Dominick Barton:

Actualici

-plat active in this Car'? o

activities

- Famer privale detectie tuiz

Eladre

0/ Bart

-Reputa Organice Conc

26.

Richard Helms

Chif, Office if aceret, Opirati a Support

27. James iConnell Barth

fermer Directer A CIA

28. Luis Balbuena Cilzadilla - Associate Of Evelio duque

*29. ..

AMLASH

Cuban officine in.

30. William Alexand:r Morgan -

tre Castro goverirneuit

figene active is. Anti-

Cuban officint -

Castro

actividay

31.

Guar ante

- fuerar seiretag to Fitel

(astio

32. Jack Anderson

- Columnist

33.

Frank. Sturgis

- ésteer of feretzura active

in. anti-Castro. actinites.

Fidel Castro Rub

" Preinier of Cier

35. Victor Espinosa ternandez - anti-Castro Culeand.

36. meyer Lansky

- organized CRime

figure

---

## Page 42

(65) a whorever discina desirable, the the lammitte

either intervieved o: deposed these persons or

subpoenaed them to

g: ve testimony before Committee

members.

(61)

The governmen sources where the HSe Cerrittic,

requested and reviewid

material were:

1. Central Intellignce Agency

2. Federal Bureau o: Investigation

3. Drug Enforcement Agency

4. Department of De ense

5. Department of Stite

6. Department of Al:ohol, Tobacco and Firearms

7. United States Cu:toms Service

8. Immigration and vaturalization Service

9. United States Senate Committee on Intelligence

10. United States Se:ret Service

11.

Chicago Crime Commission

12. Chicago Police Department

13. New York Police Jepartment

14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime

Bureau, Dade County, Florida

15. Cuban Government

1 ross Doctor

---

## Page 43

167)

In the majori:y of instances, review

the

of a material at tiese

sources and any statements

from individuals wer: not pertinent to any

assassination plots gainst Castro, particularly

the CIA-Organized Crime aft the AMLASH operations.

Further, Almost ail elevant information acquired

was already known though the SSC investigation

JER and TER.

and the CIA Inspecto revers. For this

evidened

reason, the following

analysis represents

conclusions

principally derived from information substantively

the same as that which the SSC and CIA previously

considered! Consequantly, the foex Investigation.

FACTUAL

resulted in additionil corroboration of this informa

tion from a diversity of sources.109

What remainsa,

to be drawn de

the sonclusions.

B.

Fogues Pertainin gito The

AMLASH Operation

Characterisation of the AMLASH

opuations

---

## Page 44

35^

the former Director of the

CIA, in his testimon before thie Committee stated

that the AMLASH oper ition was not designed to be

an assassination plo :!d0

As already indicated,

TER

the 7977 TGR concludid that AMLASH had "no factual

basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot

directed against Cas:ro" during President Kennedy's

"7082

life. 1!1

(64) Joseph Langosh, the Chief of Counterintelligence

for the CIA's Specia. Affairs Staff

in 1963, the

component responsibl: for CIA operations directed

against the Governme it of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence

Services, offered a contrasting view to the testimony

• TFR

112. 1056

of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the 1977 IGK.

Desmond Fitzgerald headed the Special Affairs Staff l13.

thos

1000

which was responsibl: for the AMLASH operation.

In an

affidavit to tie Committee, Longosch recalled:

Mum 301020c14: 122737

---

## Page 45

36"

/I/he AMLASH peration prior to the

assassination

of President Kennedy was

characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmon! Fitzgerald (sic) and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation ini iated and sponsored by the

(65)

I Langosch further rec llected that as of 1962 it was

highly possible that the Cuban

Intelligence Services

were aware of AMLASH and his association with the

CIA and that the information upon which he based his

conclusion that the IMLASH operation was insecure

was available to senior

level CIA officials, including

7195116

Desmond FitzGerald.

(66)

In response t, Langosch's sworn statements,

this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA

A former CIA empluyee.

pseudonym) I. Pollocs, from PlrectA..

Pollock "served

as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during

the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special

Affairs Staff...

and discussed with him the AMLASH

operation as it progressed. for

Pollock specifically

contested the assertions of Langosch

stating:

To the best of my knowledge,

Mr.

FitzGerald

considered

the

AMLASH

operation to se a political action

---

## Page 46

-37-

mosquete

activity with the objection of

organizing a

¡roup under eaba AmLASH/'

to overthrow

castro and the

Castro regime by means of a

coup d' etat.

I heard Mr.

FitzGerald di :cuss the AMLASH

operation fre juently, and never

heard him cha acterize it as

an

assassinat.on operation.

Mr.

FitzGerald stited within my hearing

on several occasions his awareness that

coup d'etat o ten involves loss of

life.

FORE LE

(67) O He also stated:

Desmond FitzG.rald did not characterize

the AMLASH

operation as an

'assassination

operation'; tie case officer did not; I,

as Executive )fficer did not,

never discussed

any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph

H.

Longosch;

the Deputy Chief, the other

branch chiefs and the special

assistants

could not have so characterized it since

they did not

now about the pen

(the pen

was specially

filled with a hypodermic

syringe

in

response to urgings by AMLASH

for a means to start the coup by killing

Castro.)

The case officer offered the pena

to AMLASH on

he day of President Kennedy's

death.

• AMLAS I rejected the pen with

disdain.toon

68) The linimittee also vereeweed

numerous filis. es an elfort to detemine the

tree character of the An. LASt operation. Sinc

We Commetter receired equally percussive

endence, rowever, it cannot determine

whether the AmInst Operation can be described

so as tennelot ride the c

course. of it. invitization, the Carmittee

found no evidence that the AMLASH

operation provored iremier Castro into

assascinating Priside t Kennedy.

cop-out

---

## Page 47

ot The probabili that Castio would

hare not

its aside sted

he Prisedent if 'e United Sche.

(69) in his interviey with the conmittee, Premier

Castro set forth some reasons supr

mithes agross with The reasoning in his

persuasive.

statements^ Castro said in part:

That was insane. From the ideological

point of view it was insane.

And from

the political point of view, it was a

tremendous

insanity:

I am going to

tell

you here that nobody, nobody ever had the

idea of

such things.

What would it do?

We just tried to defend our folks here,

within our territory..

Anyone who

subscribed

to that idea would have been judged insane...

absolutely sick.

Never, in twenty years of

revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor

even

speculate about a measure

of that sort,

because who could think of the idea of

he would fies not

than assassince nerdut Kunety.

FAi.

---

## Page 48

39-

(78)

the ASSASSINTIINS

of

leaders

organizing th: death of the President of

the United

Stites.

That would

have

been

the most perfict pretext for the United

States to invide our country which is what

I have tried

o prevent for all these

years, in eve y possible

sense.

Since

the

United States

is much more powerful than

we are, what

could we

gain from a war

with the Unitid States?

The United States

would lose no hing.

The destruction would

have been her:. 120

Castro also added:

I want to tel. you that the

death of the

leader does not change the system.

It has

never done thit.121

71) In this inter iew Castro

also commented on

the speech of septemer 7, 1963 wich has been cited

throughout the years as an indication that Castro may

have assassinated Pr :sident Kennedy in retaliation.

Premier Castro asser-ed:

: So, I said so nething like those

start to

set i very bad

plots

very serious

one that

precedent.

A.

that

could become

a boomerang a jainst the authors of those

actions... but

I did not mean to

threaten

by that.

I d.d not mean even

that...not

in the least...but rather,

like

warning

that we knew;

that we had news about it;

and that to sit those precedents of plotting

>of other coun ries would be a very bad

precedent...S mething very negative.

And,

if at present, the same would happen under

---

## Page 49

-46-

the same circ imstances, I would

have no

doubt in sayig the same as I said (then)

because I didi't mean a threat by that.

I didn't say -t as a threat.

I did

not mean by tiat that we were going to take

measures - si ilar measures - like a

retaliation for that.

We never meant that

because we kniw that there were plots.

For three yea's we had known there were

plots against us. So, the conversation

came about ve y casually, you know; but

I would say tat all these plots or attempts

were part of the everyday life.12?

(12) some faso in li, denommittee cautions is

speculative, may be ›f

some assistance, have.

It

does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled

fary

reference to assassi ating/American leaders in

retaliation. for plot; on his life if he was actually

of

planning or contempliting

such acts? he would

want

to call as little at :ention as

possible to himself.

Rather,

it seems Cas:ro was attempting to display

his public dismay ani knowledge of such attempts

in an effort to prevint their continuance Alonsequently,

cogether with an absince of any evidence implicating

it seems probable

Castro. in the assassination, the Connittee believes

---

## Page 50

This an sumer, is not bacedi on Caitro's

i nied was he made a lesat;

Castes woes ibully sing sch a charge

that this incident, 'hile displaying Castro's

displeasure at American activities, does not

implicate Castro in the assassination.

(71) The Gorittee baliones there are additional

reasons to discount iny involvement of Castro in

the assassination which are also compelling. spre

ComT

ttee cautions tiat these reasons, while persuasive,

are

also

gabit necessaril Sentative.

cheesecter.

(75) 5575t1 Willial Atwood, Special Advisor to the

United States Delega ion to the United Nations, was

involved in diplomat c efforts to establish a frame-

work for detente dur ng the fall of 1963.

Atwood

told the SCC that Mcieorge Berndy, an advisor to President

Kennedy, told him thit President Kennedy was in favor

of "pushing towards in opening toward Cuba" to take

Castro "out of the S viet fold and perhaps wiping "out

B4

the Bay of Pigs and naybe getting back to normal."

Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean

Daniel to meet with sennedy prior to a scheduled

trip by Daniel to see Castro.

Daniel and Kennedy

---

## Page 51

discussed the prospeits

for reestablishing

United

States-Cuba

I-lations and Kennedy asked

Daniel to see him af-er visiting Castro.

Ist seems e Kely

(76) The Game salians that such efforts

to establish a peace ul

coexistence between the.

United States and

Cusa would have hampered any

desire by Castro to issassinate Kennedy.

in Corpor

the attitude of the

'|| Second, the Cammittootalso believes tha

it can he orgued that

anonymbie leaders of the United States, President

Kennedy supported

a less hostile attitude and position

toward Cuba. Even

if Castro felt the relations between

Cuba. and the United

states were bad under the Kennedy

Presidency, there wece

legitimate reasons- to suspect

they

would have been worse under any other administration.

(18) 7 Consequently,

Fanssuming that AMASt was

not. an assassiration

plot during the life of president Kennedy and that

Castro uncovered its existence

and scope, thordenmittse

have been provoked

assassinating

in a manner sufficient to induce

President Kennedy in retaliation.

(19) Furtheun

" Assuming that AMIASH was an assassination

plot during the life of President Kennedy and that

Castro uncovered its

is still

wilexistence and scope, themesse

stridenteres/that eastro ould Bat have resorted to

assassinating the President of the United States in

retaliation.

hocios Surmary

Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic

relations in

the air ard the knowledge that Kennedy

possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than

other military or political leaders, Castro would have

NN 47055 DocId: 32273547 Page 51

---

## Page 52

every

reason to l'ope that Kennedy maintained

the Presidency. Fur her, thengenittenderat

believe that elimina :ing Kennedy would necessarily

have favorably alter.d the United States' operations

- chira not sea

and ties toward Cuba

In addition, the famitte

provable that

dees-latbelieve Cas ro would have assassinated

President Kennedy be :ause such

an act, if discovered,

would have afforded he United States the excuse to

destroy Cuba. The r sk would not have been worth

it.

C. o.

== -to. The CIA-Organized

Crime Plots

1.

Scope and Na:ure of Plots

a): Roselli K owledge of CIA Sponsorship

(80)

The Suppert Chief

: James O'Ennelt informed the Committee

that Maheu told Rose li he represented an international

209. 126

group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba.

Roselli, however, teitified to the SSC that Maheu

told him from the be inning that sappot has with j23

the CIA.12% Maheu confirmed this account to the SSc.

Maheu also stated in a deposition to the Committee that

he Suppatchie

Giancana knew at the time that @leonarl was with th

-1422

•CIA. y29 Further, Trifficante testified to the

SENATE

---

## Page 53

41=

Committee that Rosel i informed him that he,

Roselli, was operatiig as an agent of the CIA.

(81) The weight of the evidence indicates that

Roselli, and thus Gi incana and Trafficante, knew

the CIA was behind tie assassination plots at an

early stage. This r cognition of CIA initiation

is important, bliss it shows that Giancana and

Trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly

became involved with the CIA.

b) Discoery of True Identities

82) Rosel i arzanged fox the entrance of

Giancana and Trafficinte into the plots and introduced

them to arrantert as

o the Support Chis "Sam Gold" and "Joe. "It The support Chie

contends he learned

he true identities of these

persons a few months after the operation was in progress

when he and Maheu say an article in one of the Sunday

sections of the Miam. newspaper. 132 This article

supposedly pertained to organized crime in the United

States and contained pictures of top hoodlums, including

Same Giancana and

Saito Trafficante. 133 In the

---

## Page 54

45°

the SuppertCh id

Bagp IGR Oblorett s:ated that the article

came from the Parade magazine 3' in the Miami Times.

Maheu

also contends hat he did not know

the true.

identities of Sam Go.d and Joe until this

article

148 The Sup ot Chief

appeared. 155 O'Conpith also stated that this incident

occurred after the "e were up to our ears" in the

operations and conse juently the CIA decided to

progress forward. 13

The SSC condu ted a search of supplements

to all Miami

newspapurs for the requesite time

period and could not locate any such article.137

The Committee conseq iently searched Parade magazine

for the fall of 1960 all of 1961, and all of1962.

the years which spanied the entire operation. The

Committee

Learned thit on Januar:

21, 1962, Parade

THE

INTOID

STORY • Ou

published an article entitled, "guy government's

crackdown on organiza grime, " written by Jack

Anderson, which conti ind a listing of the top ten

hoodlums in the coun: ry as well as several photographs

of mobsters, includig Santo Trafficante. 13%

The

article focused on tle efforts of Attorney General

---

## Page 55

6

Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized

crime and mentiong soth Giancana and trafficante.

(84) Although this parade article appears

hi, Suppat Chief'

o correspond with -Heanuld and Maheu's description

it is over one year past the beginning months of the

operation.

Indeed, it occurs nine months after the

completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally,

neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered

any other article pirtaining to organized crime in

Parade magazine

or

he supplements of any Miami

newspaper for the a leged time period.

he- uppert this

hot tellig the treet

D) It appears of amett and Maheu are ling t

an attempt to look

or an ex post facto reason

continuing the operition after the introduction of

two of the top orga lized crime figures in the United

States. Implicit i, their contention is that while

the CIA wished to

slicit criminal sources to

assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have

recruited any figur:s. from the top-echelon of

#29

organized crime. 121

the support chief's

Additionally, alcom

---

## Page 56

47

statement. that

"we v'ere up to our

ears in it" is

even more difficult to fathom

since

according to the

2897 IGR

the operat: on was in its embryonic stage

in the

fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered

until approximately February or March of 1961.-

-without addit: onal support, the Gemmit

Chie not bedtovo tin contentions of Maheu and the Support

oderntane, Not believable,

86) 1 this CIA plot to assassinate Castro was

necessarily a highl! volatile and secret operation.

Once Roselli introdiced additional contacts into the

scene it is not log: cal that the CIA would have

neglected to verify the identities of such principals:

On the contrary, it is more believable and more

probable that the C: A ascertained the true identities

of "Sam Gold" and ", oe" at an early stage and

consciously progres: ed forward in the operation,

confident that these two persons, in the words

attributed to Colonel Sheffield Edwards, were

individuals "tough ‹ nough" to handle the job. 140

---

## Page 57

-46-

c)

Roles of 'rincipals

Phase One

(67 00100.1 Sheftseid Rawarde assignat

the Suppet Chief,

@Connell the task ›f finding someone to assassinate

Castro. 1l sawards Ine alconnetl both decided to

utilize Maheu as

soone to recruit persons to

effectuate the operition..a

2 The Suppert sib

described his role is the liaison to the CIA and

confirmed that all eports or information would

e125

proceed through him to the Agency. 145 In addition,

the Suppet Chief

Olfermett said he asted as a "babysitter" to Rosellia

babuse remainiy with him to occupy his time to

insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. 1y%

(88) There 18 a discrepancy over!

who suggested

Roselli for the operation, Is but in any event,

he was recruited because he had connections with

120

persons who could handle the assignment.

(89) conflict arises over the role of biancana.

Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a

"back-up" man. 147 It should be noted that Giancana

was murdered four days before Roselli made this

statement. Mahue, however, described Giancana

fr. 157.

Rentin my 04) Jehn Rossin Senate

Operators, onis, 018.

KLATE

---

## Page 58

4'4-

as having a key tolt and characterized his job

as "to locate someo e in Castro's entourage

could accomplish thi assassination. " 145

Shimon, a close frind of Roselli who had knowledge

of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted

Giancana to provide Cuban contacts. 47

Shimon further

characterized Gianc.na as only providing contacts,

specifically Santo 'rafficante, and not as an active

12 150

participant.

90) The nost soun! analysis is that Giancana solely

servealas a person roselli could approach who could

then make the neces iary contact

into the Cuban domain,

specifically Santo rafficante. Roselli, who FBI

• files indicate repr sented Giancana's interest in

probably

Las Vegas and was s bordinate to him, wouldinot

directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban

and Southern Florida area without first contacting

his superior, Giancana, who would

then make any

necessary arrangements.

Both Giancana and Trafficante,

being bosses of twe organized crime domains, would

have the means, power and

stature to arrange for

the

assassination.?

After contacting Trafficante,

---

## Page 59

• has!

who have the influe,ce to recruit the necess.

personnel to ageate perform the assassinai

Giancana probably wis

not an active particia

the process of pois mina pills or

actually

the assassination.

Gia) The role of latficante, the only liv

major organized cri le figure involved in the

is a major source o: conflict. The Elor IG

several references :0 Trafficante which cha.

his function. In d-scussing how poison pil:

be given to Castro, it states that "Traffica

the courier') was i, touch with a disaffecte

official with acces; to Castro and presumab?

wort that would ena ›le him to surreptitious?

-134

Castr.", 5d Later tie report states that "Re

passed the pills to Trafficanted" and that'

reported die te a chat the pan o had bes.

[the Cuban officiall

to east in Cuba. "is 3

After drea lost his ps

in the Cuban governnent and could no longer

IGR

Ithe Suppset Cl

pills, the 3SR says

"Roselli told ecommet

Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuin

movement who might do the job."154

Roselli

- -xP:

---

## Page 60

.51.

a inciting lege in the Citan crete Morenset.

1555

him- as (Antonio de cona.)

-137

The following

passage further con irms Trafficante's fole:

Lottis Carbondl

Trafficante

approached Verona and

told him that

he had clients who wanted

to do away

wih Castro and that they would

pay big money for the job.

reported to hive been very receptive, since

it would mean that he would be

able to buy

his own ships

arms and communications

equipment. 198 156

(93) Trafficante tustified in public to the committee

that Roselli asked im to solely act'as an interpretor 15 7

between the America, operations and the Cuban contacts.

Trafficante denied landling or carrying any poison pills

1:8-25523

used in the operatin, denied recru cung vile baler

142, 59

the Cubin offrei :1. 160-1721

and denied recruiti gOtta

In his Senate testimony,

Roselli confirmed I afficant's role as that of a trans-

161

(94) t sapal, holever, informed the committee that

Trafficante was the person in contact. with Cubans in

Havana. 162 Giancana partially confirmed this in the bes

IGR by identifying loe as a man "who would servena 163

a courier to Cuba aid make arrangementsilthere.

The Suip par chiet

O-fennell also confirmed that he was the only. CIA

conduit and that if the

- IGR states Trafficante

10 steel Operamentat

Operat once 6/04/15, p.20

SENATEL

---

## Page 61

contacted.or procured the

assassin then it

accurately reflects the information the

CIA received./ug

(95) It is interesting that The 1975 and 1978.

Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante

corroborate each other, but remain contrary to how

the principals repcrted the facts in 1967. The

evidence /stronglylindicates that Trafficante was not

merely

an interpreter but an active participant in

passing the poison pills and in recruiting the

potential assassins. This is important in dramatizing

the deep

involvemert of organized crime with the CIA

in these plots.

Ore can understand why Trafficante

today wishes to douplay his role; the facts, however;

evidence

simply do not suppert his assertions. The

Cannibtere

support the

the Cuban

96/ The Committee also heard testimony from Antoni

enle leader

verone. Jaroha stited that he is not aware of any

CIA assassination lots to kill Castro and

denied

involvement in their operations.

tent is obviously

not talligale truth

lying.

at feed horevery that fo

prosecution for perjury,if possible, would

set probably ng

Further it Investigation goals.

47055

DocId: 32273547

Page 61

---

## Page 62

- 5

Ithe Cuban aisle leader.

(49)

2) Phase Two

Support Chief 97) 11 ph15t To Willian Harvey' assumed

ellis role. Giancana and Trafficante were

no longer involved n the operation. !6%

IGR states that Rosilli remained as a prominent

figure and worked "lirectly with the Cuban exile

174 16.8

community and direc ly on behalf of the CIA."

(98) Although the GR does recast that Trafficante

was not involved in Phase II, lolit contains this

caution:

Trafficante wis one of the principals

in Shef Edwar is Phase One of the operation.

He presumably was not involved in Phase Two

under Harvey,

but we cannot be sure of that.

After all, Tr. fficante was the man who brought

-Verana into thie operation late in Phase One,

and Verona wa:: one of the main players during

Phase Two. 170

It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept

both Giancana and Tafficante informed of the

operation's progres:.

d)

Delivery of the Pills

(00) Neither tie bast IGR of the SSC pinpoints

the Support Chief

the date on which @ foult delivered the pills

to Roselli during Piase One of the plots. The chain

of custody, as alreidy mentioned, was for Roselli

deliver

the pill: to Trafficante.

The subsequent

---

## Page 63

steps remain a mystry but Roselli reported to the

sCout at that

the jills had been delivered to

171

Oft in Cuba in late February or early March, 1961.

(0l) Joseph shimon informed the committee that he

and Maheu travelled together to

Miami to the

Fontainbleu in Marcl, 1961, to witness the Patterson-

-149

Johansson fight. IT Once there Maheu informed him

of the plot to assa: sinate Castro. 173

Shimon also

says that during this trip he attended a meeting

where a poisonous l: quid to be used in the assassination

751(1

was passed.

(02) shimon is prol ably the source for Jack.

Anderson's

column of January l!; 1971, which fixes the date of the

passage of the poison at the Fontainbleu as March 13,

undective.

103)

In any event, it appears sertain that the CIA

did not pass any pils, poison, or assassination

weapons before February of 1961.

The

fall segment

of the plots only constituted. a planning

Stage; no

one undertook any ojerational activities.

((0t) It is interesting to nois that

Richard. Helms stated in his tentioning to the

committe that he doubled if the pills ever

lift the United Stares. On even it this project

PE WAS AN ASSASiATiOn plot. HEsid

2876

2uo4377

2878

2880

2881

•2882

2883

I also understand that there was a question of poison

pills which were supposed to

be transported to Havana.

There was never any evidence

they were transported there or

ever left the United States. There was never any evidence

that this plot ever left the florida nainland, and if it was

indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to me

because I had understood it was an effort to see

it a

connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida.and

47055

2884

the Mafia in Havana: As

i(5ic)

7.885

connectionheve was.

made

DocId: 32273547 Page

to

the best of my knowledge, the

---

## Page 64

5%

e) Location of Trafficante

(165) To suppor. the description of Trafficante

as a courier, the dAy IGR states that "/A/t that time

the gambling casino: were still operating in Cuba,

and Trafficante was making regular trips between

Miami and Havana on syndicate business."

40b)

The Committee has obtained some evidence

which indicates tha. Trafficante was not travelling

to Cuba during this period. No records available to

the Committee from

NS, State Department, or the FBI

reflect any travels after February, 1960. During this

time, the FBI maint ined physical surveillance on

Trafficante. Tra ficante testified before the

Committee that he oily made two trips to Cuba after

his release from th: Irescornia prison, in August, 1959,

and that these trip; occurred within two to three

months of this rele ise. inaditionally. considering

Trafficante's reputid top position in the La Cosa

Nostra, it seems moe reasonable that Trafficante would

send a representati re to Cuba to conduct any business

rather than risk be.ng detained by Castro again.

---

## Page 65

(101) I Irafficant. was actually travelling

between Miami and Hivana, the implications are

interesting. He wa; either willing to risk being

detained again or hid acquired assurances from the

Cuban government rearding his safety. In any

event, the presence "f Trafficante during the fall

of 1960 in Cuba rai:es the possibility of a moro

cooperative

asta relationship between himself and the Cuban

government than pre iously believed! such a

relationship during the period when Trafficante

was scheming to ass. ssinate Castro invites the theory

that Trafficante wa; possibly informing the Cuban

government of activ ties in the Miami area in

general and of the

lots in particular.: In return

bean preme

for such informatio,, Trafficante could havenaegussed

lost gambling opera ions as well as support and a

Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband

into the United Sta es.

There are

108) The committee palemmitte enormous ramifications

such a theory an cautions that it has not received

---

## Page 66

any information or vidence in this regard. In

addition, the avail ible evidence

indicates

Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and

+ is recognize

Havana

although the fommitter recognires tha

Trafficante could mike such trips and not disrupt

his normal

routine n Miami and Tampa, thus possibly

undermining the eff.ct of

any surveillance.

f) Verona's 0 :her Contacts

(109) As previously, related, the FBI forwarded

to the CIA a memora dum

en 21 December 1960 revealing

that U. S. racketers were making efforts to finance

anti-Castro activit.es

datalind subseguently forwarded

that

another memorandum m 18 January 1961 wrich associated

the Cubow enile leader

795.179

A Herona with those

s themes.

(110): other sources were also providing assistance to

Verona to conduct

a'sti-Castro operations. At the time

of his introduction into the CIA-Organized.crime

Cuban ex le leader wis active

plots, the Cit nes unding verone through the

Revolutionary Democ:atic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary

The est leader

Council 80 verone informed the Committee that the

purpose of the coun :il stemmed from

an agreement with

---

## Page 67

any

information or e' idence in this regard. In

addition, the availale evidence indicates

Trafficante

was not ravelling between Miami and

Havana although the log seizes that

Trafficante could maie such trips and not disrupt

his normal routine i, Miami and Tampa, thus possibly

undermining

the effect of any surveillance.

f) Verona's Other Contacts

(109)

As previously

related, the ral forwarded

to the CIA a memorar dum an 21 December 1960 revealing

that U. S. racketers were making efforts to finance

anti-Castro activities

diteland subsequently forwarded

that

another memorandum (# 18 January 1961 mirich associated

he Cuban escle heade

53035-179

A Wanna with those s hemes

(110) other sources were also providing assistance to -

Verona

to conduct a'sti-Castro operations. At the time

of his introduction into the CIA-Organized.crime

cuban en. le leader was

active

plots, the elame unding Verone through the

Revolutionary Democcatic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary

11-560

The an he leader

Council / 80

Were informed the Committee that the

purpose of the courcil stemmed from an agreement with

N# 47055

DocId: 32273547

Page

---

## Page 68

58:

the American governient to invade Cuba and le

establish democrati.: control of the island.

the cuban ence leade

(Ill) Adding to the support for bebows were the

promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who

reportedly were wor ing through a Washington, D.C.

public relations fi m. Edward K. Moss and Associates.

He aldo

Moss had previous C A

associations. and was supposedly

acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini

brothers with the u derstanding that this group would

receive privileged reatment in the Cuba of the

79182

future.

the Cuban escle leadsi

(12) In his

Meyer Lansky in Lan ky's home in Miami in the summer

155.

of 1960.03 Lansky aid he had business interests/in

Cuba and wanted

to elp the Cubans fight Castro,

destroy Castro,

and try and establish a democratic

0767)./84

government.

(113) the logical liference to be drawn from this

is that the CIA, Of ranized Crime, and other persons

interested in remov ng the Castro regime all

settled

---

## Page 69

the Cuben ereli lede in

upon deferena,

prob. bly independently, as a

person

who had the potenti. l of uniting the multitude of

exile groups to ove: throw Castro. Additionally, th

enll made reported cuntacts with Organized crime

raises the possibil ty that he was involved with

them in a plot to k. ll Castro before the evolution

of the CIA-organizer crime plots..

CIA operation would result in providing official U.s.

sanction

to an alrei dy existing independent operation.

The CIA recognized his in stating, "Ilt is possible

He exile: leadin

that Mesota already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first

approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961

to carry. out the Ca: tro Assassination./85

9)

Introduct: on of "Joe" ard

"Gold"

Related E'ents

(114)

The timin of the introduction of Giancana

("Gold"). and Trafficante ("Joe") is important to the

analysis of the tru role of organized crime in the

Castro

assassinatio plots.

This introduction,

---

## Page 70

-10-

together with other related events, /furthel suggestsi

the thesis that the CIA found itself. involved in

providing additiona. resources for independent

operation that the cyndicate already had commenced.

(115) According to he tia IGR, the entrance of

Giancana and Rosell occurred during the week of

September 25, 1960. 18 In contrast, the SSC did not

assign a precise dae for their entrance because of

conflicting evidenc: between the fogy IGR and Maheu's

Senate testimony wh.ch set the date after November, 1960.

The SSC did conclud:, however, that Giancana was involved

in the operation du:ing October because of the Las

Vegas wiretap incid int which occurred on October 30,

and because of the Ictober 18, 1960 FBI memorandum

Inett revealed Gian :ana had tola several people of

25108

his involvement in 1 plot to assassinate Castro.

(116) Although thes : two events

which the SCC cites

may support the invlvement of Giancana during

October, they also invite speculation of independent

organized crime operations. The October 18, 1960,

FBI memorandum is particularly applicable.

This

states:

Friendin a anana cover satton vet asteral

stated that Fidel Castro

---

## Page 71

51-

was to be don: away with shortly, said it

would occur i1 November.

Moreover,

Giancana

said he had

a.ready met with the would-be

assassin on tiree occasions, the last meeting

taking place. 'n a boat docked at the Fontainbleu

Hotel, Miami

Giancana stated everything

had been perf :cted

each for killing Castro and that

the assassin lad arranged with a girl, not

further descr bed, to drip

drink or food of Castro. t85/84

'pill' in some

Since-according to the 1907 for the poison pills,

which the CIA prepa 'ed at Giancana's request, were not

ready for delivery, intil late February, or early

March, 1961, it is transty doubtful that Giancana's

November, 1960, ass issination plot was part of the

CIA operation.

Rat ler, it appears that organized

crime already had i:s poison plan in progress, using

a mistress of Castr, to accomplish the deed, when the.

CIA(fortuitouslyJen ered the scene.. Organized

crime then occupied a perfect position. it their

private plot succee led, they then would possess

far-reaching blackmil potential against the CIA

which they could exircise at an opportune moment;

if their intrigue filed, however, they could then

assume the position that they were only executing

the directives of the government And lould possibly

stect un their involvenest as blacknail

potential.

---

## Page 72

161=

h)

scoreron

Richard Clin

(118)

Devocanatic; attent

The "assayin' that Giancana refers to in

involvid

the October 18 memo may have been Richard Scallzetti

Cain. Cain, in con ection with the top Echelon

Criminal Enforcemen: Program, informed the FBI

of his criminal act vities and close association

with Giancana. 190 Ciin admitted that he had

covertly|worked) for Giancana and been on his

payroll while he wa;

a member of the Chicago Police

Department from 195;-1960, director of

a private

detective agency

from 1960-62, and Chief Investigator

(set yellon page 102y for the Cook County

Sheriff's Office from

1962-1964.

(119)

Several of Cain's activities during the fall

of 1960; together with his past experience, support.

the proposition tha: if Giancana was involved in any

Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination

of Castro

independent of the ¿IA plot, he would have recruited

Cain to assist him.

---

## Page 73

63"

see yellow 104y

(121).

(120) First, cain mintained a record of voluntarily

providing informativnyto the CIA concerning his

foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have

promoted

in an effo: t to gain possible leverage

with the CIA. • In a CIA memorandum to the

FBI dated

4 November 1960 Cail. supplied the following informa-

tion

in his first contact with the

• CIA:

1)

that in

950-52 while in Miami,

Florida, le initiated several telephone

taps

on

v. rious Cuban revolutionary

figures

wider the supervision of William

Buenz,

a private detective who had contact

with

the vatista government.

that on Outober 2, 1960, William Buenz,

then oper. ting out of New York City,

met with lain at O'Hare Airport and

$25,000 to travel to Cuba

at the request of former President Piro

telephone taps on various

Cubans, ai.d

3)

that in 1'59, Constantine Kangles, a

26th of July

movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct

officers in the use of poly-

raphs fe:

HIt seems more than incidental that Cain's approach

to the CIA to suppl: this information occurred

simultaneously with Giancana's meeting with Roselli

and Maheu.

cain su sequently volunteered information

to the CIA during 1'61-63.

---

## Page 74

6e!

(122) second, on No ember 2, 1960, a confidential

informant told the ureau that on October 20.

1960, Serapio. Month o, the former head of the

July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard

S. Cain

in the office of Costantine Kangles, the former

attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July

Movement and former counsel in the United States 193

for the Cuban Gover ment headed by Fidel Castro.

Cain indicated to Kingles that he had clients who

wished to get news : tores and photographs out of

1944

5573

Cuba concerning rebr l activity in the Cuban foothills.

Cain/further indica ed that he wanted to cover this story

and was soon going o Miami in an attempt to enter

Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and

Bob Ajamian, of Life magazine, had knowlegge of this

venture. 195

(123) Thira, on Normber 2, 1960, the FBi interviewed

57796

Cain in Miami at th: Sands Hotel, Miami Beach.

Cain

said he was a epresentative of Accurate Detective

197 8993

Laboratories 198 iF

ife magazine, and sixty-four

other newspapers.

'. After providing information on the

military armaments

n Cuba, Cain said that the

---

## Page 75

Resistence movement had eight hundred men fighting

in the Escambray Mo intains and that he was

awaiting

the opportunity to. ›arachute, into the Escambrays

HaS 149

to take photos for ife.

Cain said that Antonio

de Verona gave him he information on the Cuban

1.27

armaments. ac

(124) when cain's p ans to visit Cuba, either to

install wiretaps fo: former President Prio or to take

photographs of rebe. activity, or both, are considered

simultaneously with Giancana's presence in Miami,

GIANCANT'S

CAstRE

reference to the assassination of fame in November .

and saint Cain's app:oach to the CIA, the true purpose

• and

possible interr:lation of these events become.

even more

suspect. The wiretap assignment and the

photographic story nay have been covers® Giancana

may have been attem ting to send Cain to Cuba to

supervise the poisoling attempt on Castro. Cain

whs cannected

belongod to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had

extensive contacts in Latin America, was well-versed

in

sabotage and investigative procedures, had

been

on Giancana's payroll for four years, and apparently

---

## Page 76

66.%

was

attempting to arrive in Cuba by approximately

November, 1960201

Fu ther, Cain's reference

the Cuban ente lecitie

in his FBI intervie, to sniolde verona, the

person

that the CIA concedes may have been active

in independent orgalized crime assassination plots

against Castro prio: to his recruitment by Trafficante

in March, 1961, raises more suspicion.

(125) shese ments

that Cain may have seen the "assassin-to-be" whom

Giancana referred t, in the 18 October 1960 FBI

oR

memorandum, on he miy have been the contact man

It stowed be noted

for the operation.

Paris

masong that this

analysis is obviously speculative.

126) Cain could alio have provided another service

to Giancana: As already indicated,

a second person,

called J.W. Harrisol, allegedly accompanied and

assisted Balletti i1 the wiretap.. Although the Justice

Department Vigorous ly) pursued this investigation

and

---

## Page 77

- ó7-

prepared to indict he principals, no one could

determine who Harri on was and no partiffins.

would admit to know ng his identity. #There is no

doubt he existed: h: signed the hotel register and

11 200

accompanied Ballett. on the flight to Las Vegas.

BotH Dubois, the pr vate investigator Maheu hired

to conduct the survillance, are Belletti maintained

that Maheu arranged for J. W. Harrison to accompany

Balletti from Miami to Las Vegas to as The support chiel

operation? 03

Maheu e miod this s

Olfenneti; the

CIA liaison man, in ormed the Committee that whoever

-189 204

Harrison was he was not a CIA employee.

(28) Clearly; someo le arranged for Harrison's presence

and knows his true

-dentity.

Since DuBois and Balletti

acted only as the: i,struments of Maheu, it seems logical

that they would hav: revealed Harrison's identity in

the face of federal prosecution if Harrison were just

an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA

or to the associates of Maheu "in the CIA operation

against Castro.

This, Balletti

and DuBois either did

---

## Page 78

not know the identi y of Harrison or felt that

their client's inte: ests prohibited them from

revealing such info mation.I The

theory. that

trarea, howerer, denica

→ participate in

speratien

205

ive Likelyertet Maneu p ovided Harrison at the request

of a source that hal a direct interest in the surveillance

seeins r905t

mansu insole the conte enhat he haverited

were nie

and to uncover any ossible leaks regarding the operation.

Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate

895.207

testimony.

Shimon further informed the Comnittee

that Giancana told

20j'm he paid $5,000 for the las

Vegas operation

130) Assuming that Maheu dia provide for Harrison,

he fast tikaty did io at the request of someone else.

Maheu did not have iny reason to independently prefer

one person over ano her; the CIA or Giancana, however,

did have such a personal interest.

Giancana"s interest

ersoral hatter

bviously stemmed tom his (celetionshipich MaQuin

and it is probably correct that Giancana requested

---

## Page 79

19-

Maheu to bug Rawarty room. This personal interest

could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to

use a person of Gia cana's choice, Cain fits that

role perfectly. He was

a skilled electronic

surveillance techni :ian and was in Miami during

which

late October and

finni was the

ea: 1Y November,

their trip to Las V:gas.

in a deposition to the Cimmitte

297209

denied any knowledg: of Cainn

shown several

photographs of Cain from the late 1950's and early

1960's, Arthur Ballitti also could not identify Cain

as Harrisone 1O These denials do not detract from

the theory that Cai, was Harrison! if no one would identify

Harrison in 1960 th:re

is no reason to expect

change in testimony.

any

tARget A (tuo persons were targets, He get Acto ter 1960 memorandum where

AreQuire because

Giancana discussed

assassination plot against

Castro. The SSC colcluded that this memo caused the

CIA to be concerned

tA determining if Giancana

was leaking informa=ion on the CIA-organized crime

plots.

This may be partially correct, but as already

---

## Page 80

-70.

indicated, the FBI ilemorandum depicts a plot

substantially in progress and involving a girl which

cum not resemale tie October status of the CIA

operation. The CIA could have been more concerned

that Giancana was i. volved in a separate assassination

plot and consequent. y could, have been concerned with .

its nature and exter t. he reasons why abstarget A

whathia bie demo bargette such surveillance

the target A's

were two-fold. Fir:t, her relationship with Giancana

the

might have entailed ber learning of certain clandestine

i tenget A

activities. Second 'was' one of the "several

friends" in the con ersation related in the 18 October

memo. all

(134), The CIA inter-st would also explain why a wiretap

was installed..

Mahou informed the.Committee that he

only ordered physicil surveillance of the targete

Resear and could no understand why anyone installed

a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on

see yelloe p. 118

Mothere spat utterica savan.

700212

(135) Physical surv illance and a room bug would,

admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any evidenre

Of the persinal matter.

If, howeve., Maheu also wished to investigate

---

## Page 81

71°

the possibility of leaks in the operation as well

as the

possibility f Giancana's involvement in an

independent plot, tien the use of a wiretap would

have been logical.

the paris at nates.

(136) Assuming that investigating an affair was not

the primary focus o: the Las Vegas operation, it can

E targettin@ target is un sam and other habitas, as opposed

be argued that dire it surveillance of liquin; would.

have been the optimim method to investigation ke

for surel

Ariy leaks and information that Giancana may have

Gironiel. This, however, would have run the risk

of incurring the writh of Giancana and his possible

departure from

the 'IA assassination plots if anone

detected the surveillance.

Through the cover of

a minion target 8

Association

surveilling an a possible Act with tages!

however, the CIA hal the opportunity to indirectly

surveil fe tenget A

to obtain information on the

assassination plots for a reason

which met the approval

of Giancana. Indeel, Giancana probably always believed

the precinal

matter

that his directive to investigate a post

was the only issue involved in the surveillance.

---

## Page 82

-72°

(131) 9K

In any event, the o›jectives of both Giancana

and the CIA could hive been achieved whether Harrison

was a Giancana choi:e, specifically Cain, or an

Agency operation. @jundine.

(38) After the las vegas operation backfired, the

CIA obviously decidid to continue the assassination

plots This indica es that de Suppet he patelt the

security of the CIA organized crime plot had not

been seriously brea hed. Additionally, it possibly

indicates that the 'IA determined that even if Giancana

was

involved in an dependent operation, that it would.

not hamper their ef orts, and that all interests could

be reconciled. The CIA continued on the same track:

blithely going "to ed" with organized crime

"girl' in the 18 October 1960 FBI

Memorandu 1

(139) in this memo, siancana spoke of a girl uto

was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro.

This format is agai / contradiction to the CIA

operation which in ially relied onthe Cubanoft ial

secretary in Castro's prime ministry, to administer

the pills:

---

## Page 83

•..€

73.

(146) the identity of this" girl"ieferred to by

Giancana has not been ascertain, but it is reasonable

• ca

• to assume that Trafficante was in the guese position

to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous

contacts in the Cub in gambling and prostitution.

circles. t

Anor can samb lers souterg mentainet Euban

ted

€ 160 :

sempt

Cop 115e

Consequently, the use

of a girl is quite logical and further supports the

involvement of orga lized crime in an independent plot

• **=*

to kill Castro.

"(141) Oh for, the CIA is protestly correct

shrien

_Fie

So 2050r

on that!

Ye le Agency "may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to

its material contribu :ion was

also

supplying an aura

of official sanction "213

---

## Page 84

2do.v.

19) I) Articles en frank sturgis

(147) As indicated in Section II Paul Meskill of

the New York Daily lews wrote

several articles in

1975 and 1976 conceining activities of Frank Sturgis.

These articles (furt! er reflect) the theory that

organized crime was involved in independent Castro

assassination plots.

(43) ape f-The Following

considerationshemanate.from

this theory; and mot thoroughly respond to the allegations

in the Meskill arti:lesi (See parao.

for this e

(144) rirsti organized crite probably initiatedlegations)

independent assassiation plots against Castro prior

to any CIA involvement in late 1960. Such plots may

have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its

plans to kill Castr, in April,. 1962.

(vS)

4S) second, organized ersme could quito possibly

have been directing activities such as those described

in the New York Daily News article.

146) third, Frank sturgis most probably established

contacts with organ zed crime through his gambling

associations and probably was used by them in some

measu

not.connected

capacities. This dies not jus

Ey that he was

a member

of organized crime.

---

## Page 85

(147) roath, Frank turgis probably knew bett

the Cities officiall

and could have been involved with him in

an assassina-

tion plot.

Since Surgis is not a reliable. source,

however, his allega ions are suspect.

(48) Fifth, according to the demininterts resea

ali available evide ice, the CIA was not involved

the Cilan officiat

in any operations w-th obta prior to late 1960.

149) sixth, sturgi; was not necessarily involved with

Lorenz or ertalin

the Cuban of. ia

¿ plot to kill Castro.

the Cuban fficed!

earned of plots in olving Arta' and possibly Lorenz

the Cut in offlicat

in Miami after Osta arrived there in 1965.

with poison pills. It is only after the publication

of the

SSC Interim Report in November, 1975, and the

Final Report in April, 1976, that Meskill describes

this plot. Thus, Surgis may have

combined accurate

the Cuber officia

information obtainel from Orbaand other Maimi sources

iSC presented and then fabricated

Lorenz story, it gether with other evidence such

as the 18 October mamo, asia can succeed Infortunately

in appearing both

logical and believable.

---

## Page 86

96°

k)

Implications Arising From Phase Two of

(151)

Significant

d. fferences are apparent between

Phase One and Phase Two which reflect upon organized

crime's motivation .ind

seriousness in fulfilling

its part of the bar ain originally initiated in 1960.

(157) First, in phaie one, Roselli and his colleagues

demonstrated their bility to execute the contract.

on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed,

in a position close to Castro.

In Phase Two, the modus

operandi and the ab lity of the assassin or assassins

the Cuban exile leade

becomes quite vague

Harvey reported that verse

had an asset in Cub. who had access to someone in a

restaurant which Caitro frequented who could administer

the poison Jiff In rune, 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey

the Cuban enile leade-

that Verona had disatched a three man team to Cuba

to recruit persons :o kill Castro, or to kill him

themselves, maybe w.th poison pills, if the opportunity

207 21l

arose. 215:

Harvey sid they had no specific plans.

(153)

Second, as al:eady indicated, the cast of the

organized figures i volved changed.

Maheu, Giancana,

and Trafficante all gedly retired from the scene, with

---

## Page 87

a

"Maceo" assuming the position of Trafficante.

the Cuban Bille later

with sued that these figures, at least. Trafficante

and Giancana, were sept informed of the progress

of

the plots.

(5) what is puzzling is the introduction of a

person simply referred to as "Maceo" into a highly

sensitive and covert CIA operation without any

apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background

or ascertain his icentity. It seems extraordinary

that the CIA would propel the plots forward without

performing any sec rity check. . Indeed, it seems

more logical that it least Roselli and Harvey did

ascertain the identity of Maceo and for whatever

reason decided to vithhold this information. Further,

although the!

/IGR characterizes Micco as Roselli's man, it is

more probable that trafficante, who had recruited

all the Cuban perso inel previously used pin the

attempts and who maintained the most complete network

of Cuban allies in liami and Cuba, provided this

individual. If thi; speeulation is aeetrate, then it

displays Trafficant again performing a direct role

during Phase II, a function every source has denied.

NH 47055

DocId: 32273547

Page 87

---

## Page 88

78

(156) A related issie is whether "phases" actually

existed or whether the operations to kill Castro

encompassed a contil uous time period.

As previously

indicated, the CIAl recautions that the plot was

dormant from the Ba! of Pigs until Harvey assumed

direction in the spling of 1962. Both Harvey and!

tSuppat stated, hewever, that Harvey "took over

a going operation." Considering. that Roselli was

Vable to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in

response to Harvey': request, and that this

nobilization involved vetena, whom

Trafficante recruited i:: Phase One, it-seems reasonable

to assume that some of • he

individuals in Phase One

were actively attemptin to kill Castro after the Bay

of Pigs and probably un il the advent of soviet

solidification. These ‹ fforts, however, may well.

have been conducted without CIA knowledge and furblur

amin support the theory of independent organized

crime plots..

---

## Page 89

(157)

During late 1'62 and early 1963 Phase Two

fundramatically and lowly terminated.

In retrospect,

the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack. of identity

of the potential

as ;assins, the

total

reliance of

Harvey on Roselli f›r any information,.

and the

seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate

any information

fro, Roselli, all converge to posit the

theory that organizid crime was

not seriously attempting

to assassinate Cast o at following the

# In Has regatio

of soviet influence in the Castro regime. "Trafficante,

Lansky, and other Ciban casino owners must have realized

by the mid-1962 tha: the "golden goose" of Havana

had laid its last eig, and that fortunes

were to be

made elsewhere. Ce:tainly, history shows growing

Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas

"yE"

Trafficante project; in the Dominican Republic, and

burgeoning bolita overations in Florida arising from

the influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized crime

may have determined that the new Justice Department

crackdown would pad sably not have permitted the

"wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if the

unsino for age ty, osle the united states

ad sicceeded in ousting the cubai

---

## Page 90

government, specifi :ally the CIA, still possessed a

viable interest in issassinating Castro, organized

parents

crime did not.

• 2.

Motivatio, of Organized Crime to b

involved

nSPlots

(165) Despite the

rasons just presented to discontinue

attempts to kill Ca;tro, organized crime still had

strong incentive

to string the CIA along. Specifically,

this incentive was o establish a relationship with the

CIA for subsequent ise

in thwarting prosecution for

unrelated offenses ind thus blunting any Justice

Department proceedi gs against organized crime.

It 24. 7

(161) 18 bee mabiaide that organized crime,

while always recogn-zing the benefits of establishing

a relationship with the CIA, finitiallylwas also

seriously intereste! in

assassinating Castro to regain

lost territory. As already indicated, sereneu

bainswer this desir rebbed with the solidification

of soviet influence

and other factors just mentioned.

After this occurranse

is organized crime may

only have put forth the "appearance" of involvement

and good faith in tie plots to further define a

---

## Page 91

relationship with tie CIA. Indeed, the CIA

prevention of prose ution in 1961 in the Las

Vegas wiretap incid int would have given Maheu,

Roselli and Giancan, confirmation of the value of

such a relationship and impetus for continuing it

in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro

may no longer have

seen a viable alternative.

(162) The actions o: Maheu, Giancana, and particularly

Roselli in the year; following these plots support

this theory.. As related in Section II, these

individuals actuall, did use their CIA affiliation.:

and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder

1895=17

law enforcement prosecutions and objectives.

(163) The success

some of their efforts verifies the

tremendous blackmail potential they possessed.

As

Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to

the CIA, commented in

May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over

a barrel" because cf "that operation" and he doubted

that the FBI would se able to do anything

about either

Giancana or Roselli

because of "their previous

activities" with

tra CIA.. /U

Bed

tronathe Faisuse.at

---

## Page 92

02-

154) In an interview with the c smittee, former Deputy Director

the esor

of blacimail,

of the CIA Richard Bissell discuised smea

tess, stating that he

had come

to feel

that the threat of blackmail by the

underworld

figures involved had constituted the single greatest danger in the

plots. 219

Bissell, as Deput, Director for Plans, had been

personally involved in the plannung and authorization of the CIA-

Mafia plots in 1960-1961.230 Bissell had not been

interviewed

by the Inspector General's Offic: during their 1967 investigation

of the plots, and thus his recol ections and views were not contained

in the Inspector General's Repor 2 /

(165)

Bissell told the Committee that he believes he and other..

Agency officials should have bee, more cognizant of the possibility

of blackmail by the organized cr.me

figures involved in the plots. 2J2

Bissell stated, "We

didn't give

it sufficient attention at that

time. It was unwise. We only thoight of the possibility of black-

mail later." DeS

The former eputy Director recalled that

the

CIA's main fear at the time had eer "some sort of unfavorable

publicity, if by chance it leakel out," rather than the potential

ramifications of entering into sich a

sensitive relationship with

---

## Page 93

-83-

powerful criminal figures. O2U

Bissell went on to state, "I

knew it was serious. I knew these were Mafia leaders., And I knew

they were in a position to make very damaging revelations about

the Agency. But we thought it was all

under control." 225

(166) While Bissell stated that le and his colleagues had not

realized the potential for blackrail when they first enlisted

Mafia leaders in the assassination plots, the CIA officer who

later

assumed control over the continuing plots has stated he

was well aware of - and

fearful ibout - such a possibility. 226

William Harvey, the clandestine ervices agent who coordinated the

reactivation and continuation of the plots in 1962 and 1963,

testified in 1975 that he and thin Deputy Director Richard Helms

had concealed the existence of tle assassination plots

from CIA

Director John McCone partly out «f concern over the potential

for such blackmail. In his Senat: Testimony, Harvey stated that he

and Richard. Helms decided not to inform McCone about the plots:

. until we reacher! the point where it appeared

it might come to fruition

or had a

chance to

assess the

individuals

involved and

d termine exactly the

problem

'"".

we faced,

including the poisible problen - and

it was a

very, or

it appeared to be

and in my

opinion was, at that

time, a very real possibil ty of this government being

blackmailed either by Cuba 1s

(exiles)

for political

purposes

of by figures in rganized crime for their

own

self-protection or aggrand zement, which,

as. it turned out,

lid not happen,

but at

tha: time was a very pregnant

possibility. /

(1651)

Upon learning partial detals of the plots, both Attorney

General Robert F. Kennedy and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had

immediately recognized the distu bing leverage the participants

in the plots had gained through their involvement with the CIA in

the murder attempts. As noted earlier, Attorney General Kennedy

was partially briefed about the re-Bay of Pigs assassination attempts,

authorized during the Eisenhower Administration em May, C

1962. 00p

Upon being informed of the plots, Kennedy had

met with FBI Director

Hoover to share the information and to voice his anger over the

CIA's actions. 224

In memc randum of their conversation

prepared

on May 10, 1962, Hoover stated that Kennedy had angrily noted that

the CIA's use of these

figures lad resulted in the possibility that

NG 17055

DocId:32273547

Page

93

---

## Page 94

-84-

"the CIA was in a position where it could not afford to have

any action taken against Giancans and Maheu." 230 Hoover further

noted that he had been greatly disturbed over the Agency's use

of these individuals,

stating, "I expressed great astonishment

at this

in view of

the bad reputation of Maheu..

• The Attorney

General shared the

same views.", 23/

(165)

In his interview with the committee, former Deputy Director

Richard Bissell stated that he hid been distressed over reports

that. CIA Director John McCone hal never been

told about the Agency-

Mafia assassination plots during the period in which they were

occurring. 232 Mccone had bee, appointed Director of the Agency

by President Kennedy in. November of 196l/ thus serving as head of

the CIA during the last 15 months in which the plots

were continuing.

233 In his Senate testimony in 1975, Richard Helms who served as

McCone's Deputy Director during the period in which the plots were

continuing): stated that he could not recall telling McCone of the

existence of the plots while they were occurring.

2.34

Helms went

on to state that he "was trying to scratch my head as to why I

didn't tell him at the time and ny surmises are the best I can :

come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him

at the time." Q35" Mecone's former Executive Assistant, walter

Elder, told the Senate that McCone had once notified Deputy Director

Helms. that "assassination. could not be condoned and would not be

approved," and that the Agency.

was never to become involved in such

activity. 236 In his senate tastimony, William Harvey stated that

Director McCone had once personally told him that the Agency and

U.S. government must

not engage in such plots against any foreign

leader, and

further, that "if I got myself involved in something

like

this, I might end up gettiry myself excommunicated." >3?

As noted

earlier, Harvey went or

to testify that he and Helms had

withheld their knowledge of (anc personal involvement in) the murder

plots from Director McCone, partly out of fear "of this government

being blackmailed

... by figures in organized crime ..

2258

NW 47055 DocId: 32273547

Page 94

---

## Page 95

-85-

(169)

Speaking of the failure of Hetms, Harvey, and other Agency

personnel to inform Director McCone of the plots, former Deputy

Director Bissell told the Committee, "The Director should have

informed. This was bad, anc shouldn't have gone on."' 239

Bissell, who. left the Agency in January 1962, stated, "The Director

should know if his subordinates - his top subordinates - are in a

position of being subject to blackmail or are in fact being blackmailed

¡by Mafia figures or anyone else. This is very bad." Q40

Bissell

commented that "in something that sensitive, involving national

security, you shouldn't have that potential of blackmail going

unknown to the Director." ati

(175) sissell told the Committee that he would not have become

involved in the early plots without then Director Allen Dulles'

personal authorization, stating, "If Dulles told me not to become

involved in such-a thing, I knon for sure I wouldn't. You can't

disobey the Director. " Of Steaking of Director McCone's

reported notification of both Richard Helms and William Harvey

that the Agency must not become involved in assassination activity,

Bissell stated, "I cannot say wiat McCone's reaction would have

been if he found out about such a violation of his wishes at the

time. I do know that Helms would have been in a most uncomfortable

position, but. I can't speculate." @43 The former Agency official

stated, "It's wrong. Obviously senior officials should follow

directions, especially on somett ing like that. " @44 Bissell

further commented, "If McCone told Helms and Harvey not to get

involved, then it raises obvious questions about their actions •

I would rather not speculate abrut this. I don't know who gave

what orders to whom after I left. " 245

(1) .

Speaking of the CIA's wittholding of all information pertaining

to the existence of the CIA-underworld

assassination plots from

the Warren Commission, Bissell: tated that the Agency probably "didn't

think it was relevant I would giess." 246 Bissell further stated,

"I can't believe the potential ‹ oncern over blackmail by the Mafia

people would have been allowed ly the Agency to serve as a reason

NY 47055

DocId: 32273547 Page 95

---

## Page 96

-86=

for shielding the existence" of the plots from the Presidential

commission. d17 However

Biss ill added, "I guess you couldn't

absolutely rule out such a possisility."

248

(7) noked if he believed that the agency would have informed

the Warren Commission of the CIA plots if there had been substantive

news reports at the time linking Santos Trafficante, Sam Giancana,

or other organized crime leaders to the assassination of President

Kennedy, Bissell stated, "I can': speculate what

it would have

done. I would hope so." 344 Bissell went on to state that he

• believes that if the Agency actully suspected such Mafia involvement

in the President's murder, it wo ild probably have informed the

Warren Commission of the CIA plo:s. Bissell stated, "They wouldn't

have liked to. But I do think they would have told Earl Warren. " 250.

Bissell stated his belief that hid the Agency found that Trafficante

or Giancana had been involved in some way with President Kennedy's

assassination, it would have inf rmed the Warren Commission of the

CIA plots against Castro, even tough such information would have

led to the disclosure of the Ageicy's own prior

involvement with

these same Mafia elements in

assissination conspiracies.

251

47055

DocId: 32273547

Page

96

---

## Page 97

attache

insert

-E--f8

3.

i Results o

retaila a thi connellics investigatio

(173) The Comnittee found no evidence that these

operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate

• President Kennedy i, retaliation.

(174) The Committee also do found no evidence that

Castro knew of CIA ,ponsorship of these activities

or. even knew of the t existence prior to the death

of President Kenned,. Bush If Castro did discover

their existence, ho ever, i le neston

Proposent

Eves of the Retallin

(16) in an axticle in the washington Post on

Thereas

September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex-CIA

agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P. Morgan,

hi newspaper

and reputed mobster John Roselli were

he sources A acters.

It seems certai..

The Conmittee has-determinee that John Roselli was the

person who informe Harvey and Morgan about the plots

and the retaliatior theory; thus; only one

source,

---

## Page 98

insor ip.82

seems invalidasia

cool the centerilion of

sse that Cast

would not have tiniecied then viren thi CIA

titt recognized that inly a few persins cictually

Knew if the ciA sponses, ip and trait the

Cubar operatives and other. engaged in peretriting

Cuts or drectly pacticipiung in the assassination

eftorts were reportedly toed that the

united states busines men and oganges

Di still Use eme more probeele

crime sponsored le ape ation. Te

hoever, bat while not being

able to be citia, Casti waned has tight

suspected the CIA: in ivy assassination plot

he uncovered, at least to the degue trat

he visuld has suspected the CIA UMs

funding. the i

prison aspersens plotting

his murder.

The reas in is that Castio

expected the ClA of castanth

attempting

through every possible method including assesse

overthroi has governmen? Castio's meeting

with denator George i.: govern where. Casted

alleged

65 Cinsequently,

assassination plots

there is no reason to issume that Castro

would. not has attributed. this plats induct's this

plot, to the CIA.

---

## Page 99

•-3-

John Roselli, actually existed. Further, John

Roselli supplied al: information concerning the

operation to the

er through either the support child

or William Harvey.

Key. lane see noted rat Fine

public disseminatio, of the details of the plots

corresponds remarka ly to the efforts of John

Roselli to prevent is deportation in 1966 and 1971,

and to prevent his prosecution for illegal gambling

activities in 1967. These coincidences plus other

evidence have 1 is lamictoo vanconstate. that

John Roselli manipulated the facts of the plots into

the retaliation theory in efforts to force the CIA

to favorably intervane into his legal affairs to prevent

the further disclos.re of the plots in general and the

retaliation theory in particular and to prevent

further waves of puslic paranoia.

The Committee notes-that

In some instances John Roselli was successful.

---

## Page 100

- git: 89-

c) Jummaxy

(174) . Even assuming that Castro did

ascertain

the existence of th: CIA-organized crime plots and

that the CIA sponso ed them and ignoring the

belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory,

it Is

still

the cannitentin don

unlikely that

Castro would have r sorted to assassinating the

President of the Un ted

States

in retaliation for the

reasons indicated i, the AMLASH portion of the Issue

Aralysis section. specifically, these reasons are:

the prospict of exposing Cuba to

/ invasion

ind destruction would not have

been wort, the risk;

2)

the act o: changing a leader does not

necessarily change the system;

3).

4)

Castro ma! have recognized that among

the leade's of the United States. Kennedymay har

maintaine? the least hostile approach

towards Ciba; and

the growing prospect of detente between

Cuba and the United. States would have

refrained Castro from assassinating an

American fficial.

4.

Related Organized Crime Activities

Additiona

1179 The Committee reviewedlevidence that

raises the possibility that various organized crime fal

figures involved in attempts to assassinate Castrowere

unrelated to the CIA ot t

---

## Page 101

see YEITo p. 149

a) Norman Rothim in

(80).

To ascertain lore information about organized

crime's knowledge

a rout Castro

assassination plots,

the Connittee inves igated Norman Rothman, who was active

in operating variou; casinos in Cuba before the Castro

takeover and who co sequently maintained associations

with organized crim: and

the Batista regime.

(181) At various tiles, Rothman served as manager of

the Sans. Souci and

'opacabana Clubs in Cuba representing

the interests of th Mannarino brothexs of Pittsburgh Pitttsburgha5f

(82) FBI files on iothman indicate that a proposal

to kill Castro washrade to Rodhman as a "quid pro quo"

In which Rothman exected to avoid imprisonment for

a 1960 gun running conviction 255

During an FBI interview,

Rothman stated that he had been in "personal contact

with White House atorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well

as Assistant Attornay General John Legenthaler, both

of Washington, D.C.' and members of the Kennedy

Administration: 251

(83)

In a deposition to the Committee taken in

Miami on April 16, 1978, Rothman expanded on theS

theme to include a series of mysterious telegrams

sommoning him to the White House for a series of two

or three meetings a rich began in Attorney General

---

## Page 102

I see yellowp.

1

1864-91-

Kennedy's office with members of his staff and

continued in a conf-rence room where Rothman's

assistance in proviling contacts inside Cuba was

explored? 5%

At the list meeting Rothman says that:

"one of them

appened to discuss /the

assassinatio, of Castro/with me, but not

a technical way.

You know, just in a

casual way.

That is about it. I cannot

for

the mome it remember it word for word

because it is too far back." 258

fee evidence suggesting such an approach by Robert

Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense

when viewed in light of the Justice Department crack-

down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely

doubtful that any meeting with Rothman on this topic

would have occurred at the White House. Consequently,

ne committoo believes it 'highly unlikely that esta

The Committee also' reviewedad the

СКЛ-Онагл

evidence which Cin

operatess.

indicates that organized crime may have been aware

the AMLASH operaticn during its existence.

(186) The las IGR identified three name Links between

the AMLASH. operatin and the organized crime operation.

The IGR did not sufficiently analyze, however, that

the common denomini tor in two of the links was Santo

Trafficante.

---

## Page 103

Link one

(127) In Narch, 196, the CIA received information

bott

thatsa high-ranking military figure in the Castro

regime and a former personal secretary of Castro

both wished to defe.t.

The military officer was.

StO AMLASH

Ratande dude Seen gaMbASily and the former

the Cabarottila

secretary was Fast

Phase. I of the CIA-,rganized crime plots. As already

indicated, the 7 IRs documents/that Trafficante re-

cruited Arta.

the Cuban official.

(188) The committee has determined we Other than

he Cubanofficial

the coincidence of loth Gabaland AMLASH seekin

infiltration at the same time there is nothing to

suggest a relations ip between the two men in attempting

Exists

among

to assassinate Cast: 0!

at common denominator ch

Trafficante, Rosell; Giancana or any other members

of the American gam ling syndicate. This link is

therefore insignifirant.

2) Link two

(189) In mid-Maron, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a spea

Cuban lawyer whose lirother occupied the prestigious

position of Ministe: of Sports in Cuba, contacted CIA

---

## Page 104

Stat

-Madrid to inform the agency

"he was in con-act with a group of military

officers who were planning to kill Castrona

It quickly became clear to. CIA

AmbAsit

employees that

Bong)'s reference was to Cabita and the

military men who were allied with him in attempt-

the TFR

ing to depose Castr).

Although the 1957- and 1ae.

nading an

Repents are silent esthet attitude toward Bongo's

information, it must be assumed that the did not

respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was

in progress at the time antactime oasias

the process

of delivering arms. raches to lubetals people within

Cuba.

1190) Interastingly, Bongo identified himself to agency

personnel ag a lawyers the Capri

Hotel and Casino

in Havanajwho had ken jailed in July, melior a

period

of 75 days, allegedly a eprisal for.

representing Santo Irafficante.. Bongo's utilization

of the short prisor term to establish his "bona fides"

is questionable. Trafficante was in jail during

three

August, 1959;

For the Cuban government to wait Sensati

years to exact retribution for. that representation mates

bull possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching

seems unlikely.

---

## Page 105

the Castro governme it in 1962 on Trafficante's

behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino.

Bones trip, a Madrid apparently involved mete

counterfeiting and iela

until his

old client,

Santo

prat tica

(191)

One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship

¡Madeid deserves fuller treatmentpalthough it is

doubtful that anyth rig more than supposition can result-

to speculate that C banstoriginally recruited/by Santo

Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and

sent back to the United

States where they were directly

involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

If this line of hypothecation is adopted, then the

trip belt

hind by Eongo could

assume sone heister

implications such as the possibility that Bongo's

---

## Page 106

195-

C: 1.4

real purpose in con acting the Madrid Station was

to act as a double

gent for Castro in ascertaining

the nature and scop: of

destity became awire of the Artime meetings with

AILASH

Gubeta in the fall if 1964 since the list of charges

AMLASH

upon which Cubeta wint to trial in 1966 began with

these #absid meetin is. If Castro had begun his

AMLASHIO

suspicions of Cubet ts

- role with the CIA during

late 1964 or early 75, it is likely that he would

have begun counter- intelligence

measures to confirm

his

fears which could hive led to Castros

sending Bongo

on the trip

te durint to contact the Agency. Given mal

See, the TrAtticante

gage

- Bango relationshilit .can be postulated that

Trafficante was aware of Bongo's true mission prior

at some later.

to his departure or 'became knowledgeable women baited

is date t

Incalciente alsa could have received news,

cubela

ies with the Agency torough his close

ssociate

sarge Not regas who was

deseribed by Gorge

Cr.

hig hashitston

Post article

(circa 8

7/76)

"having

worked with

the

GIA, was in Cubela's

sti

dent

revolutions

group

1m

Cuba

and always close

to TIa

ficante

---

## Page 107

4496-

(PI) DuE

Th givin the extent of Trafficante's

high-level contacts within the exile community and

the low-level secur ty in the CIA exile operations,

it is alerty log cal that trafficante, and other

members of the unde world knew, in some fashion,

part or all of the MIASH plot.

The question

becomes: So what?

Short of being able to blackmail

the government abou: the modus operendi of the 1960-62

events, the signifi :ance of mob knowledge of AMLASH

is not readily appa :ent.

(193). IAtrafficant: was a double agent, working for

the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro,

then another scenario emerges. It is then logical

to assume that Cast:o knew of the AMLASH and CIA-

organized crime operations from their inception...

As mentioned earlie: in this material, Trafficante

could have received a sanctuary and assistance in

smuggling contrabani for such information.

As also

discussed earliernd never the Committee believes

test, howerer,

in me promot

CAStRO

nation a i Foldent Kenney. Neverthless,

contemporaneous knowledge of the plots would

---

## Page 108

istute tre

BeIGe indicates thait as of

1965 Ucter Espinose had Kiroutedar of

Cubila's plans to assassinale

Castio, and 264

thus possibly

Knew about the AmLiSH operation,

97.

he been beneficial for enother riavor:

cAsino would in, hame laeen able

to neutralize to est

the effects it the p' iconsequently, thre

committee bations heriany contacts between

woute

hanécessarily

AMLASH and Bongo de is noth effecthe untenability

of the retaliation heory, they de hae been extensig

valuable,

Link thre:

(195)

IG-K

mast are intended to imply t

SSC sated that information contained in the

is an arti-Castro Cuben

asa harmander, raised raises

the possibility tha: a link existed between the

AMLASH operations ad the 1960-62 CIA plots to

assassinate Castro ising underworld contact 263

(196)

A review of tle fined. Sodst does not

sustain

the seach conjecture, Pull khere is no

IER, however,

available evidence sited in the Repart to suggest

that. "A" @@clot

• UbscHernin@day had knowledge of,

or involvement with, any of the syndicate. or Cuban

exiles who participated in Phase I or II of the

CIA-Mafia

assassination plots during 1960-62.

this

IGR'S

requiris de usengupon the ESTe tentative

identification of

"name links" between the 1960-62

organized operatior and

AMLASH intrique, and expand

---

## Page 109

98-

93

the amorphus nature of those

. "name links," which

conduit through whih the Syndicate became knowledgeable

of both the AMLASH /peration and the initial CIA

efforts to eliminat: Castro.

(197) The only sebil formia basis for some me,

CEl between ANTASH aid the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots

is based upon Vivia ispensaterene activities

265 € 7

in June-July 1963,

ning

detail his involvement witz anti-castro exiles and "underworla

figures" who were cerating the guerilla training

camp in New Orleans in July 1963.

(198)

The "underworld figures" reference relates to

Michael and Willian McLaney, who have been considered

organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and

media personnel. a

Again, however, no

eitherf the

brothes

evidence from any source places McLaney"into the early

CIA plots to kill (astro.or into the AMLASH operation.

A revien of the Jure-July 1963 activities of Melaney

and Tree

topinest-leady only to the inference that

---

## Page 110

their

operation was a private limited venture

with no agency or s'ndicate support and very little

chance

of

success.

over.

MCLaReY:

Espindsa

an

CI>

slot

be

on th

tha synd.

ini

nation on Agen y

operations in

1960-65

(199) since the

Senite did not attemptine interview

"A"

elther of the McLanay brothers or viebeSsp

nose 4

(Ole nor ask princials of the 1960-62 plots of their

knowledgelor relationship to Mclaney or espimoin the

sebáte hypothette it question of medi organize cin

ome knowledge

WAS

of the full range cE CIA Castro plots @

based son a little

тат.

at Dand a maximum of tree wheeling

jecture

4 what litte

there is

amlevidence" inking Espinosa to any know

crime figures consiftstil in admission to being

friends with

"Cappy" Rothman, Norman Rothman's son,

arcasual knowledge of American gamblers starine

visits to lizrana.

cannos

from his students youf visiting the te

dising his studist days. There a no

evidencs, howerer, that Rothman, on

any alice ascociates of

Knoutedgeatt: of the AMLASHt OR

CIA - Orgar zed Crime Operations.

garrized

---

## Page 111

(don)

Otha evidence..

→ pertain to.

shich.

Ilke McLaney": ties to organized crime have

been

seasoniyas toand within federal law

enforcement agencie: since the 1950's kit do solid

evidence; has linked him to Trafficante, Roselli or

pressint s

Giancana,

angel Mc aney has been most frequently beeri

with meys in

prima-pals in the

esto then19 i0-62 plots, de reguires a series

speculatin- hurdles which include:

V (a) Meye Lansky was

a plotter with

Traf icante,

(D) McLaley was Lansky's "action" man; and

ing.

the arious underworld figures acted

In cincert in promoting anti-Castro

oper itions.

9(201)

Ther Gonna

8 fastthat not

these premises

To support a possible

at a pos vie tor spinati

link.

Deaths of laselli and Giancana.

6(607) As indicated

earlier, both

San Glancana

John Roselli were murdered®

Sam Giancana was

shot

in the basement of is home in Chicago in June,

1975, just prior tc his scheduled testimony before

the

SSC regarding tie CIA organized crime plots;

---

## Page 112

-11-101-

John Roselli's butciered body was found inside

an oil drum which wis floating in Key Biscayne

Bay, Florida in Augist, 1976, whistmas shortly

after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA-

organized crime plo:s.

(203) Various theories have surfaced concerning

why they were killel and who was responsible. One

theory relevant to this investigation is that Giancana

and Roselli were killed because of their participation

in the Castro assassination plots and the SSC attempts

to elicit information on the plots. .

In this

regard, Trafficante has most often been the person

assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other

hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee

that it believes that organized crime performed the

murders and fade ens reasons vere unrelated to the CA-

organized crime plets.

(204) The Justice [spartment is still investigating

both murdere. The zoraitee has not it are eydence

relevant to solving these murders.

doachestra however, that a variety of motivations

inspired the deaths; These motivations included

internal mob conflict, especially in the case of

Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-

---

## Page 113

#0-103-

(205)

organized crime plo:s. The comm

vite possible:

ete tha Trafficante approved of and

assisted in the murrer of stege John Roselli.

Trafficante's motiv, tion would have been to maintain

a low

profile in conection with

the CIA plots and

to prevent

disclosue of other

unknown persons

involved

in the plos

as well

as other operations

and

activities which an investigation of the plots

magnis

mean there

might uncover.

The Committee does not balente

such activities wer: necessarily connected to the

For instoner,

assassination of President Kennedy.

wished to protect

Trafficante may hav : 1%

a covert relationship with

Castro IT

on may hae entailed his running

contraband

through Cuba into tie

United States. -

9(206)

All consequently

although the deaths of Roselli

and Giancana Ase simene related pa

to

the CIA-organized rime operations,

thres eurt tree

are Not

dose he pa relate to the

assassination of Pesident Kennedy.

---

## Page 114

-10÷-

6

CIA

Agency Actions

Conceali g

5ie Reactivation 2n

Continuation es the dea

from

i ssassination Plots Ban

Attorney General Robert F.

Kennedy

(201) FRom

•aw

Duringnthercoussesofrits e: amination of the CIA's use of

iRganized crem

aste in assassination cons iracies against +

Ber CastIo,

evidence

cincealed

ender enhassinastil yale agency one entro

the continuation of those plots in 1962 and 1963 from Attorney

General Robest do Kennelicated ~ Section II, Part B,

201) As vas in detailedit ensenate serest hese

Inteil gencerReportson theselAs nderworld mundekaplotsy Attorney

General Kennedy had been told o: the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the

plots during a CIA briefing on lay: 7, 1962. 2.67 Rather than

• the CIA volunteering this inforration about the existence of such.

plots, the meeting had come abor t when Attorney General Kennedy had

inadvertantly learned that the (IA had secretly utilized the services

of former. FBI Agent Robert Mahe and Chicago Mafia leader Sam Gian-

cana a year

earlier, 268 Kenyantonatel ana

Make connesbion during the cou se of a wiretap prosecution against

Maheu; a prosecution the Agency had warned might "result in most

damaging embarrassment to the US. government. " 259

11952 CIA officials Sheffiel. Edwards and Lawrence Houston in-

forned. Kennedy about the Agency s use of the underworld in a 1960-

196i plot to assassinate Castro 270

a deareen

whorhadwigstnoondinated.thema tuaamade.rajat

ho were

As the CIA's own evidence and il ternal records of the plots has

shown, as well as the Senate Colmittee's investigation of the matter,

Edwards and Houston told Attorn y General Kennedy that the assassi

nation efforts against Castro h. d begun during the Eisenhower Admini-

stration, had climaxed at the t me of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and

"had been terminated completely " 27/

NY 47055 • DocId: 32273547

Page 114

---

## Page 115

-104=

@11) yet, as the CIA and Senate evidence makes clert, and is the

Organized Crime

Committee's investigation has confirmed, the CIA Matira plots were

actually being reactivated and

intensified at the very time that

Agency officials were

telling Attorney General Kennedy that they

had been "terminated." 273 In the agency

IGR

salaspector Geresa:

Reportepreparamn early 196g, it was noted that

The Attorney

General ras not told that the gambling

syndicate (assassination)

speration had already been re-

activated, nor,

as far

as ve know, was he ever told that

CIA had a continuing involement with U.S. gangster

elements. 274

211)

While noting the accuracy ind

veracity of the preceding

conclusion from the Irresped on erasepents thes Commistres

hassbeertstbedao other star ements in the agencys report

that.

seen in attempt to justify, excuse, or even deny the agees

concealment of this important in formation about the plots from

Attorney General Kennedy have seen distusting.

212) Lawrence Houston, the CIA': former general counsel, testified

in 1975 that Attorney General Konnedy had voiced strong anger over

CIA

the agerays use of the Mafia diring his briefing by Edwards and.

Houston on May

7, 1962. 275 louston, who testified that while

Edwards was familiar with the pots, he (Houston) was not, stated

that Kennedy had specifically o: dered that he be personally notified

before the Agency ever consider d utilizing organized crime figures.

again. 276 Houston testifier:

"If you have ever seen Mr.

Kennedy's eyes get steely and hs. jaw set and his voice get low

and precise, you get a definite feeling of unhappiness." 277

Houston testified that Kennedy had

stated, "I trust that if you

ever try to do business with of anized crime again - with gangsters

you will let the Attorney Gener i1 know." 278 Former Office of

Security Director Edwards similirly testified that Kennedy had

demanded, "I want you to let me know about these things." 229

(213) In the ima nes sepost on the plat

sin 1967, it

was noted that Attorney General Kennedy believed that as a result

NY 17055 DocId: 32273547 Page 115

---

## Page 116

-105-

of the meeting, he would be tole of any such future actions

contemplated by the Agency. The Inspector General concluded,

"From reports of the briefing, :t is reasonable to assume that

Kennedy believed he had such a

commitment from Agency represent-

atives." 280

214) Disturbing however,

Ene: nspector General's Report then

went on to conclude,

have award: had "probably acted properly"

in concealing knowledge of the : eactivation and continuation of

the Mafia plots from Robert E. Jennedy. The CIA Report stated:

The gambling syndicats operation had been taken

from him, and, in retrospert, he probably acted properly

in briefing the Attorney Gneral on only that aspect of

the operation for which he had been responsible and of

which he had direct, personal knowledge. &/

(RiS)

One page later in the Repot, the Inspector General went on

to state! Elat, "the Attorney Geeral on 7 May 1962 was given a

full and frank account of the Ajency's relations with Maheu,

Roselli, and Giancana in the Caitro operation . : ."

282

The Conmitteeshasbeenadis nessedaby.thencontradiotions.ands

These inconsistencies

judgments rident in the Inspec:or General's Report,

demonstrate.a

lack of good

the goa can.

Agency document on the CIA-Mafi, assassination conspiracies/ The

commit een eganisathe aReponte statement that Edwards "probably

acted properly" in concealing. te continuation of the murder plots

15. misteaduns and inexcusable.

from torney General Kennedy westea

IGRA

lisbing Further, the I spector Gemaite description of

also

the briefing on May 7, 1962 as "full and frank" is siminathi

untruthful, in light of the reastivation and continuation of the

plotstitten under the direction of Deputy Director Richard Helms,

CIA agent William Harvey, and Mifia leader John Roselli.

Inspector Generals corclusion thateEdwands probabl iacteds properly"

This statement

when Considering

evenstersbertakennedy is all

the more disturbing imharthes

Gaat that the Inspector General's Office knew that Edwards' own

assistant was then still involied in the plots, with Edwards'

personal knowledge. 2831

neat herethe Inspector General alsc

knew that Edwards had personally prepared a fraudulent internal

N# 47055

DocId: 32273547 Page 116

---

## Page 117

memorandum fox the files, in which he falsely stated that the

assassination plot and utilization of John Roselli was being

dropped.

234

(215)

The implications of the Im pector. General sa conclusions

about, the adequacy and propriety of Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence

Houston's May 1962 briefing of Ittorney General Kennedy are serious:

The Inspector General's Office vas clearly cognizant of the fact.

that Edwards had withheld - and thereby concealed - the continuation

of the plots from Robert Kennedy, and more importantly, that this

concealment of information concerning the Mafia murder plot was in

direct disobedience to the Atto, ney General's personal direction:

The Committee views. such

chow singtand disobeyal of the Attorney

General's orders to be of utmost seriousness, particularly in light

of the gravity and nature of thi operations in question.

(2i7)

While The concealment of tie reactivation and continuation of

CIA

the Ageroy Mafia assassination flot from Attorney General Kennedy

- and hence, in all likelihood President Kennedy - was insat

Committer sase ghent

Serious. elongh; the Inspector General's

apparant endorsement and justif cation of such concealment ir

also

alarming.

the Report prepared for Directo: Helms in 1967 is even more deks

stabing troublesone:

(al) The Agency's total withholling of information pertaining to

the .CIA-Mafia

assassination att.mpts from the Warren Commission

which never asked about such mitters in 1964) becomes all the more

intentstroble

when

the withholding of the same matters

from the Attorney

considinel..

General (who did ask for such i formation in 1962) is one man

That these two seperate withhol lings

and concealments may have been

directly connected is a possibi ity the Committee believes cannot

be dismissed

(a11) while the propriety ae holesty of these Agency actions in

1962 and 1964 must be seriously questioned, the judgments

and

IGR

statements of the Latela,

eate anten

easterost must be weighed

just as seriously. As the most important embodiment of internal

checks and balances within the gency, the Inspector General's

Office is intended to

serve the function of conducting official

internal reviews and investigations of potential wrongdoing and

VY 47055 PoOTd: 32278647-Page 117

---

## Page 118

1167-

internal abuse. withinthes CAs

The find ngs and judgments of the Inspector

General have long been

integral to the continuing integrity and

by the Inspector General in 196 regarding the propriety of

sheffield Edwards' actions in tie briging or attor pay enera

General tic

Kennedy about the assassination plots in May of 196214

To, state

Inspected

in 1967 that Edwards had "probal ly acted properly" in withholding

the important information that le did,. and to characterize the

May 7th briefing as "full and fiank," represents a mistake in

judgement, and departure from tu thfuness as serious as any the

Connittee has-found_in its-inve: tigation of the compl

CiA assassination plotsy ebell ones that former Director Richard

Helms bas

described

a5)

at "not

• very savory.'

te plots thenseues, it is

HIt should be

Then Committee pot motewbat the views and conclusions

reached in the 1967 Ir spector General's Report do not ne-

cessarily reflect the judgment about such matters by present

Agency officials. Hort veranthetonish cerwouldyakson ote

that a principal

author of the 1967 Report has

served

as

the Agency's official liaison to the Committee during

the

course of it's

investication, coordinating Agency activities

and responses relating to the investigation of President

Kennedy's death.

HA 47055

Docid: 32273547

Page 118

---

## Page 119

-108-

IV.

Pousso s nucle

The earnset

A. AMLASH OPERATION

(220) 1. THE CONTINE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT. THE

AMLASH OPERZ TION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO

TO ASSASSIN/ TE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

(221) 2.

insuilicent evidence

THE COMMITE E HAS-NOT BEEN ADEE TO ASCERTAIN

WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH

OF PRESIDENI KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS

AN ASSASSINI TION PLOT.

(222) 3.

. ASSUMING THIT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION

PLOT DURING

THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND

THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND

SCOPE,

I CENTER EARCHES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY

• THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVOKED IN A

MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING

PRESIDENT KINNEDY IN RETALIATION.

(223) 4.

ASSUMING THI T

AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION

PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

AND THAT CA: TRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND

SCOPE,

UNLIKELY THI T CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO

ASSASSINATA THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN RETALIAT: ON.

(224). 5.

THE COBAR

HE BESIDENT ANY KNOWLEDGE

ON

THE PART

OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH

OPERATION O1 ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED

CRIME FIGURIS INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED

CRIME PLOTS

AND AMLASH WOULD NOT ALTER THE

CONCLUSION: HAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN

THE

ASSASSIl ATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

---

## Page 120

-109

B. CIA-ORGANIZED C : IME

PLOTS

(229)

(226)

(228)

3.

(228)

4

(224)

5.

(230)

Thace ad

THEYCONTE MESS ENDS NO EVIDENCE

THAT THESE

OPERATION: PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO

ASSASSINA' 'E PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

There is;

THE CONNI: 955484N26 NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE

THAT CAST:O KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE

PLOTS DUR NG THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY;

F CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE

WOULD HAV:

CIA.

WE ASSESD THEM

WEE THE

Attribaited

ASSUMING 'HAT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT

KENNEDY TIAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE

OF THESE 'LOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING

THEM, TID COMMONS SHEEIATIOSS. IT IS-UNLIKELY

THAT CAST O WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING

THE PRESI JENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

MISSAT SUSANNES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME

WAS

INVOL /ED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

INDEPENDE IT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS.

6.

THEREDUME ITEEIEAGEEVDGNAIT

PRINCIPAL

REASON WH/ ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE

PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS

FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD

SUBSEQUEN FLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS

OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS.

THEN COMME PrIT SITEVESIS JOHN ROSELLI USED

THE FACTS OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS TO

FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS

TO PREVENC HIS PROSECUTION IN LEGAL MATTERS.

---

## Page 121

STAfF Report ON THE

EVOLUTION ANO IMPLICATONS OF THE CIA -

sponsored

MalE Jul I

ASSASSINATION

CINSPIKALIES

ASPINIT FIDEL CASIRO"

The

Enobation on la Assessenen

sand Greenmare

4/22/76-p:2

Senati No.

The conquet details of the AreAst

and CIA - Organind cruse piot

ca:: De

But Celed la motion Peas

Anning Foregn Leaders, Baltim

Repoit, Alast Commiller to thicki

generatintal Options, 11/20/15,

scale Perset No. 94-465.

3:1967 Repoit of t'i Pencitai

Gineial, Cential futillegine

Desert 7;

filinen Repart at pit4

---

## Page 122

5

6:

See gimenllay, 1=6 Repat

Zb id: Gk p8 3, 14

Thid.

Б. i

-.p.3

Ibid Apis-eme-

Ibsirl.

a p.

Ibird.

RApeE

10 Ihid i pll e there is some

disaepiement betwen: lobert mahau

and lans O Conneit orei ido

manotul chat tzilli lecaractei;

2ach biler lue elhe did. se

any event, mateu incláco the

corlaut iick Roscilo.

-11. Ibid at p. 19

12. IDid a0o

1... 3 Tbid, p- p. l20

bid Mp 25

---

## Page 123

15 -bidi pAip. 27

/6

14

20

Ibid, dip.29

20.1

73

25

5, 4 pi32

The ClA contendi that the plob

weie dormant afte the Boys Pigle fatate:

The possibilly eucts, homer, that

the plots sure on m-gourg

operation

FiLiport 4f, 3%.

Antisem Repet 11 p. 83

Fi Minest, at p. 48

Tbil, M. p. 47,49.

---

## Page 124

27.

23

29

=bid

30!

Ibil M p: 52

31 Inerem Repoit, M p. TI.

32!

Alise Cipoit, tV p: 28-79:

3311

F32: Meniarantum

feon Wannall ,.

Sullivan

Sero

Headluma

to Cuba To ASSASiLWATe CastRo,

": 3/6/67.

34.

FBI Blank libiche minorandion

to cha Attorney- General kom"

le Periclor, FB2, 3/6/67;

z0p Secret

351

Asterum Repst, KAp 79

301

RAD Intesi contino

AASIASSINOXAANS

16/02/78

fER Document No. 002530)

---

## Page 125

37

Pid 600

33 bid, dis

39

sutrun Berse, footate 4, at pe 85.

Ibid.

IBid

It 18.

4 li

42

4-3

441

'Com

melte is

attions,

Hous

bid see also

De seition i Rotert

makeu, 8/8/78, 1

(JEK Document No. 012926)

p. 31, 1 Wine makeu

i. Cout procilip. Mahen staled

Hat Roselli's attorney called him

to cate

CASE Mai

statement 1 degradig

Postles

involinent in.

the

CI4- Organizid

Crume plots.

---

## Page 126

45.

i Bosis it

d. p. 14.

46

- 447

See 8:360, -

da fatenes of Morgan, 9/2P, p-3

48| BoOK I, el p: 80

See fo 36,.

50:

shid, p 3

_ 5/

52

BoOK II, At p. 82

it to not mine to ride on the pies cit

Pearson's "ultimat: source, Roselli, knows more

-about certain-deta ls-of the-gambling_syndicate-operation

FBI AL

evidently has talked,"I6&,gl26

SO A 3/1/67,962

FBI DOCUmeNt No.

109.000 -

I Are.

55|

55| = eide (over)

Перевари, тела

320KE, off p.p. 6, 85,86.

Contract

---

## Page 127

It showed be noted that diving ths time, maich, 1967,

Can cent nit a gone nie, a sea again,

pitlicied tral into.

death if Precedent

Kennedy.

The En

"Sted ToR stated:

"The Roselli- Garrison

contac: in Las Vegas in March is

particularly disturbing lip=?

---

## Page 128

5% Thil, 6l pp. 85-86.

59 Ibid alp. 103.

60

Ibil at p. 104.

61

The westington Post MenDay Januney

18, 1971, Section B; p 7: Tuesclay,

january 19, 1971, Section D, p. 15.

6211

Deterin Report, footnote No: 4, at p, 35.

63

6410 Book I, UPiL.

65 € 6 i; M p. 68

66 be

---

## Page 129

6921

#bid.

70 2A 1971 TASK FORCE Repoit, Central Intelligence

Agency, ps. 1,2: Etesister celed are T.P.

Reportil

Paul Meskill,

7274/ Yes Daily News, to

MALAGEN 4/20/15.

Pail meskill,

73 4 New your Daily News assad

4/21/75

2T 761

Neilok Daily len, anten

UNt: 4/51/75 and 4/10/15

Paul Meskill.

75 974 New You Daily Nes, athle

6, 13/76

---

## Page 130

7632

B00K T, Wip. 80

T2A1. TiFRPGi, O TABC. p.15.

T8 so Ib id fll Tạb C, p 17:

ebid, oe piranuit ce

30 82 Ibid

0. 13

Kex

AIRAL

8/

T. E Pepot, ill Tab C, p. 19.

83 ₴5.

= Did, As p• 20

-shded dpechis

the dand tanc.

I: b il

84816

=bil

8587 Ti E Repout, (t Tal D, pI.

8630 Ikiiel

87 20

83₴

TBicky 21301,2

Ib red

---

## Page 131

89-17 Ibid i ps

93 pr

Ib id.

93.75

94 %

9597

96 48

97 570

98 1051

99 11

100 1212

10/103

102.2901

Tbid-

Ibid

Ibid.

ibil all.p.ia

bed alli p. 11

---

## Page 132

1031052bid,00 15.

1040/2

105702.

zh id

106. 108 zhid

107 109 TIF. depart, El

John F. Kennedy's Murder

Back, Andersh and les Whitten, "Behind

The l shinen Post, 917/76; "cris withiuls

From His Grose,"

Data in JESProbe, The Waister tims Post, 919 76, Roselli Points

* 2.

¡Trafficantes Teetimony on JRiC AS ASSINATON,"

" The Washengles Post, 0123/78; 5 The story Berne

"The Wackington Past, 10/2 5478

10x Has 100007 atirnalen

109

prenay fennel an dis apart

alis not eat is cites again.

13 Executie Sesaia Testimony if Richard iselmo, 8/9/78,

leaump Before the House delu. Committee an

Arcarsuations,

1 pp. 26-27.

ref

See foolinate # 108.

Affidarit of Joseph Langoschi, 9/14/78,

House. delut. Commeltten Assaiation, p./.

---

## Page 133

113

11-5

TI5.

BooKI, pp. 3, 8, 19

Affiant preph hangasch, 9/14,28, p.4.

1165

IB id

0. 120

Ibidi, para 3, p.2.

Fia, para 4, p.2

House ditet Committe en.

Assass

E Internei a Videl Casteo Ruz, 4/3/28,

p. 38, 39,

(IFK xumet Ma 011776)

12!

Ibill; A pp 2, 3

123

Be Anterim Report, p. 173

Allor.

12.4

arus Ibil e p. 174

. D

-121

клити Ibid

126

A Ford:

, dA

127

---

## Page 134

Intrem Ripest, p. 76; fr. 1.

- 126

124/Deposion. of Rotat Meu, Houseles

(JFK Dociment No. 112976)

ta sins then it ye was the

d:103=

Imminind Testimony

Santia

Trafficent,

9|28/78

committee on. ASSASS NATIONS,

23/1

p. 7,8,

hen:

1220

-House delus

Ammell on Assassiations

133

Ibi rick.

134

21.135

I.G. Report at p 15

Repositor. of Robert Maters, 8/8/78, House Veteck Committee on Asassert,

'7

.,(JFK Document No. 012.926)

136

piteria Pipert, O

17

_ 13:7

17.

JACK, Anderson," The Cuntold Stop: Dur Gorinment's CRasion On Definial

1381 The washigton Port lense forgazini

431/62.

NH • 47055

DocId: 32273547

Page 134

---

## Page 135

139

14o

suit a distinction is innatie.

He achin of dealing with arig

criminat

so Kill is rep chessible enough

Antesson Repal, A p.74

1'4 /

14/2

- 143

cass

таму

144

1751.

House telet Cemete a Crisscration

tames O'Connill

9/25/25;

Affidant if

P. 12, IF

=b id.

1461

Bok mateu and O'Connell attritute

eacho ther ind suggesting

What john Roselli ki recruital See

Interem Report asp 75.1

Satic Report at p 25.

1477

hateum east p.17

---

## Page 136

Ibid.

118

Ished tal

13/5

tsue dileet Cirmittee in,

Assassinations

00 Intere is Peph Shinen,

3/11/20, 04 (JER DOCent No. 013889)

150

December; 1917, p.6.

See fr. 149,

_Joseph Shuman, HESCA.,,

AllO Interiresi

@p. 4; BBC

Pinterica, 08p.s

15/ Thi condention ssfeis only to the

CIA - Orgamized cine dote and not

to any indeper dead speration, tact

ramans may his ben inclind in

152

I. G. Report, al p. 25.

123

IBId

1, 19 p. 27

15%

zbill, at p.29

155!

---

## Page 137

156

do 15%

See fn: 130,

222022.

we that posses

158

=bil, El p. 37

137

Ibid, 2U p:

160

Ibid, EUp.

16/1

162

Testimony of John holli, derate delict Cometter to

Strily Governmental: Ope ations, 6/24/150, p. 20

Affidant i ames O'ernell,

9/25/20 p12,

153

I. G. Repert, 0U p. 19.

164

0 Conell 02p. 17.

105

soyn

Executive Session Tention ei

Antonio Verina,:

- 166

58.

Leaump Befir in House Select, Immelle in AssascinAtions, 3/16/78

I G. Repat, 4K p 43

16311

---

## Page 138

169

170

171

172.

bid

Ibid A p. 49 - chuck-

Ibill, dp. 02

House flict Conmetter on Assassimations,..

10. 013889

173

174

175

175

IBiD

IBiD

¡See fof. 110, Testimony of Recho d Helms, Volume i p. 155.

I.G. Report, 18

p. 19.

Filo on SANto TRIAERICANTE AT The Department.

See

can, ot celere immunized tek.

T79 tha

defn. i30, Immunized Testimony of Santo TRAfFiCANTE,

-Votine 5.

7. G. Report, @ 1:29

See fn.

12- QU

Secular

3/16/78,

---

## Page 139

Ho I G Pepont; Dp 3e:

Sce.ref: 179,

Erzoutaa

Lesriaa

Testicimy of

183

Vixera, P.36

Antome

-.- 8.4

13.5

1861

T05

-1.8.7

188

189

100

190

18.9

cbide

TeF. Iepart,.

Frean p.19

I. G. Repontati p :8

Intrum Repot, Feotnote No Two, P.16

Ebrch

FBz Memonandum, 1o/i8/60, To die

Dineiton of the CIA jiam TiE Hoauee

ubpiel "Anti-Castri Activitiai ES=CUBA,"

E,He NO: 109-584-005€-

EBI Répoit, 3/8/73, Archard CALil

Filei, 92- 12846-11,-

JEK DOCUMENI

1/0.

IDid: CRis's: zupuiois diamiroed

timtos epne in 1964 -uhea cAiil

ncint to tiil

iie s drug car

envangation. Qftir 1964 CAIAI

---

## Page 140

fonica stenditi rett.

Grassis threet the net ae

Purtiti tany fatisurag a 1969

cracconta entraci be

19631001 Fetten Back Brat

Ricina:

7 au. TOP Echele Cumusal

Enficement blog ae

newali in perie

in satotogi, poligaapis, and

clistioni:

reportiali finer u datori and

paus and tante annere

iraphout deten america fi

1913 Cain ans erin is

gangland jartion ena Canapo

estasiant: le quelli FBI

file on Richard Scaleretti CAiN, FIle

110. 92- 12846.

---

## Page 141

192;

CIA MemoRaNDuno c0 682, 11/4/60,-

TO due DIRector, B7, FRun Leputy DirecteR

105 - 93264-20,-

-193

T72I FBI Letterhead memoradin, 1l/2/60;.

OFFICE: Chicago, Jilinzis; Subject: Anti-

Fidel Crates Actvites - Interesai Security - CiBA;

File No. 105-93264; 60 canadis

Richard CAin File aul uns suppled to ASCA.

ce also FBI RepoRt 12/1/60, Checajo, Allinois,

Susject: Accuati Det chire baboratoRi, aka

CAiN ENvestigation, File NO: 139-1403-3.

194

Its id

195

FB= Blank lettihad Airtel, 11/3/60,

To di DirectoR from Ac, Muami, Subject:

1D.

105- 93264

- 1-9-7

=bid

198

des Ibid

,99

san Ibid

---

## Page 142

2.00.

2o1

- See Re$. 191

20I FBI leport, 4/1/61, Subject: Anilur

pawer.Balletti.p3.com.tunedir HSCA

Requal to 56E6 910/78/TFRT Repart

12-23 - 60 FBI

InterueL of BALLETTi ContaINed

503

with.

50t FRE Repot, 1/28/61, Arthurjame

Balletti, v. W. HARish, Eite NO.

139-1201-15, p. 4 Cinterview ot Edward

Da Bois.

EB7 Asport, 6/9/61, Subjecte Balletti,

UnKrioun Subect; File No. 139- 1201-50,

Interview of Robert Mabel on 6/0/61

contained in m

20

206

20ti

Outside Intact Report of fames O Cornel,

House deleel Conmillie i.

scinations, 9-19-28.

(JFK Document No. 012307)

Deposites ag Pubert Malies,

8/8/78

→ p. 42,, (JEK

No.

012.726

---

## Page 143

22

207

Interim Pepest at , 79.

.20S

House delict Commite on Ass, varies

usA Laterwends Joseph Shimon,

1

8/17/28

10, 013 889).

013. 829)P 5. (56K Decument.

ref.

-209

See l 44,.

Depositin of Pubert Palen,

46

200

of Azthe - Balietti

Outside Cuntact Repent, 3/14/18, p3, JEK

Oubide Curtset Repert, Perre of FBI files, 3/16.1,

(JFK Dociment io: 014932)

a12 sce fn. 44,

*Deposition if Rober Maici, pi40 9

216

I. F. Report

at: pe 20

---

## Page 144

-8.14

I.G. Report al p 4$50

25 Did Na 51

016

ide else

2171

216.

8 be demo

- War lie

CLA:

interrenal on matieus

Ichalf to present an presention

3212

(2) 2257

---

## Page 145

2.19

I. HSCA Staff Interview of Riclard Bissell, 12/15/78.

.220

"Alleged Assassination Plot; Involving

Foreign Leaders," p. 74.

301

'3

HSCA Staff Interview of

Ricard Bissell, 12/15/78.

227v. Ibid.

233 5.

Ibid.

29V

Ibid.

025

Ibid.

"Alleged Assassination Plots,"

p. 102.

237%

Ibid. at 69.. The 1967 Inspector General's Report took note

of the leverage that those

involved in the murder plots had

attained as a result of their association with the CIA. In one

section of the Report (pages 128-129) titled, "Should we try

to silence those who are talking or might later?" (emphasis

theirs) the Inspector General's Office noted that one or more

of the conspirators, most likely John Roselli, was then leaking

information about the plots to newsmen Drew Pearson and Jack

Anderson. The Report discussed the possibility that Agency

pressure could be brought to bear on Roselli

and the others to

preserve the secrecy of the past assassination plots. The Report

went on to note that,

"None of them would have compunctions

about dragging in his CIA connection when he was being pushed

by law enforcement authorities."

23070.

Ibid. at 133.

Ibid:

2301%

Ibid.

23!

Ibid.

238

HSCA Staff Interview of Richärd Bissell, 12/15/78.

233

"Alleged Assassination Plots,"

pp. 84-85, 99-103.

234

16.

Ibid. at 100.

235

Ibid. at 101.

2361

Ibid. at 106.

2.3710

Ibid. at 105.

23: 20. Ibid. at 102.

2.39 32. ASCA Staff Interview of Richard Bissell, 12/15/7B.

240

Ibid.

2%1

Ibid.

240)

Ibid.

Ibid.

24i

• 25

Ibid.

24522

Ibid.

24

0 24

Ibid

119729.

Ibid

2 48 32.

Ibid

24131

Ibid.

2.50 32.

Ibid.

25/p. Ibid.

---

## Page 146

252. BooKI, p.68

S5; Castro eport, senator ('age Migoren

JFK Document 0005931

254

255

256

257

see gesealy Fôt Files pestasue

Nouch Pathmana File No. 87-5043,

File ilo. 97-4030, votems 5, 5, and 6.

FBI Elles on Mirins Retaman, ses reclicall

SA JohN P. LenchiN and Guage E. DAUss, JR.

Deposition Of Nexman Rothsan, 4/5/781

56(GFK DocuaNt No. 001235

---

## Page 147

258 22 2i0; AN p.68

259093

I.G. Report, p. 80.

210

261 220

3 23 2 BookI, pp. I 14; I s. Report, p. 105.

264 23p:

I, G Repert, p.125

265-237 BooK I, ipp lI= 14;

-I G. Repert, p105

266 733 Outside Contrat Repuit, Edward

Sharp, Department of Justice

Special Investigations Division, 6/7/78,

(JFK Document No.

09888)

---

## Page 148

Footnotes:

Interim Report,

201-7.

"Atregediassassination Plots Involva nanoreignsteadersa"

BengEt Enthesenate selecta ommitteeronintelkigencer975g

pp. 131-132.

see para.

26% 2 Ibid.

26 3. Ibid.

270*4. Ibid.

57/5 Ibid., aep.74.

E72,6, Ibid., axf-132.

273% Ibid., 22783-84, 133.

2748. Ibid. Exg.133.

The Inspector General sets forth Robert F.

Kennedy's partial knowledge if the plots

in a similiar manner

in another section of the 1917 Report. In an

analysis.of the

newspaper column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson in 1967, in

which it was stated that,

"Re bert Kennedy may have approved (the)

plot," the Inspector General's Report disagreed with that

The Report stated:

"Not

statement.

true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndi-

cate-Phase One after it was ‹ver. He was not briefed on Phase

Two.": The Report went on to state (pages 118-119) that Pearson

and Anderson had

"Kennedy."

"a garbled i ccount of the role played by Robert

275

Jiterin

• Report,

"Alleged Assassina

P-

133.

276. 10. Ibid.

27? Ib. Ibid.

278 72. Ibid.

27973. Ibid.

280 14. I.G.R., p. 64.

28 / 75. Ibid., 270.64-65.

28236. Ibid, 7tp.66.

Inte im Report,

2831 reassassanatiots rivalvengepor

adeEss,p. 134.

284 7a. Ibid.

285 1, Ibil

1p.103.

NH 47055 DooId: 32273547

Page 148

---