## Page 1

202-10002-10124

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date:

Page : 1

09/14/98

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD

NUMBER

: 202-10002-10124

RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD

FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE

TO MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS

TITLE: CUBAN AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DATE : 06/26/65

PAGES : 27

SUBJECTS : ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA

SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15.

Memo Erom Vance to

SecArm, SecNav,

SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban

Affairs in the Dept. of Defense.

ICCCA report on

Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government.

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526

SEC 3.3(b) 54X5/8

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR

2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31DEC 2038

OKAL TE PELERSE AS REDACTED W/CIA CONCURRENCE

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

H7 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page

1

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## Page 2

31 December 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG

OFFICE OF THE GENERAI COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee

(Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in

Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963.

The

agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced.

Present from

State were Chairman Bowdler, SyLvester, and Montenegro;

Irom CLA, alton and Holloway, from USIA, Murphy; and the

undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)

meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964.

Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America,

described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage

of left-wing labor Leaders, socialists, and communists who

will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes

that there will be a concerted effort by the communists

to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from

Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were

discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to

ascertain the degree to which local (not national)

governmental elements will support disruptive and

harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts

with the suggestion that local influences be brought

to bear in order to discourage country delegates

from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin

America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban

East German, and Chinese, Communist labor conditions

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations

2016

In Brazil]which suggest postponement of the meeting.

MAR

OSA, ASS Control No.3.00%

DOVNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS,

DOD DIR 5200.10

329

HH 50955 DocId:32425002 Page 2

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## Page 3

DUNHUENUAL

Partially

EXAMPTED

BY JOINT STAL

EXEMPTION 6(1) (C)

DATE:

MAY 151999-

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Department of State

SUBJECT:

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban

Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro

Government (U)

Roferénce:

Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the

status of existing contingency plans fo= those priority situations agreed

upon at our meeting of Septeraber 12, 1963. The nurbering of the para-

graphs below coresponda to the format utilized in the attachment to

reference momorandum and includes those actions for which Department

of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exet.

' "A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

*4. Harassment of Guantanamo

2016

MAR

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT:

A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water le

maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made

for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require

a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order

of CINCLANTELT.

In addition, evacuation of non-essential pessonnel

in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers

who commute!!

Cost, Ace Control No T/S 0228.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED

COPY CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

06t/203=-Coptes

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT: 12 YEAR INTERVALS

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

* DOD DIR 5200.10

OCOFSA 7 2 1/684

HH 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 3

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CONEIDENTIAD

6LK0

purpose of subatantially roducing the time requized for the U. S.

Sghter aircraft to reach the scenc. Such overflights may be author-

ized only by specifically designated commandera.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the

Gasibbean""

COMMENT:

With regard to Castro attacke on areas in Latin America,

plana exist fost the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance

by Latin Amezican governments subject to U. S. Goveramental approval.

There lo also an azrangement for the interchange of information between

the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval fozcus with regard to possible

staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas,

VE, Actions Against Targets in the Us

*1, Sabotage or terroristic bombiage"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within

she context of the paper la not considered to exceed the capabilities of

law enforcement agencies to control, There aze militamy contingency

plano to protect ageinet tila type of activity at a much higher level of

intensity.

"2, Jamming of US radio stationg"

COVENT: Thore are standing operating procodures to overcome

latezterence and jamming methods employed agalast railitary communi-

cationa.

The summaries of actions set forth above aze essentially defensive

reactions to Cuban Initiatives. There are, of course, exeting and zelated

military plans, rctallatory in nature, which zange up to and include a full

scale military invadion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 mecting of

the Committee that the most likely actlons of the Cuban government are

thone which would not provoke United States retallation sesiously and

Immediatoly endangering the Castzo regime. It appeare more likely

that Castro might intensify his support of aubversive forces in Latin

NH 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 4

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## Page 5

BONFECON

MAR

6(UCC)

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY

ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

I. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds

to the numbering of those actions

related military contingency plans exist.

A brief summary

of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

2016

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT LA minimum of approximately 20 days supply of

water is maintained in reserve storage at the

naval base.

Provision is made for the emergency

resupply of water by tanker, which would require

a maximum of eighteen days and which would

be implemented on order of CINCLANTFIT. Evacuation

of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if

directed and consistent with national policy®

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who

commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a

tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit

containing necessary skills,

the requisite labor

force,

and the possible stationing of a repair

at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel

with appropriate skills. Critical personnel

would be transported by air

to arrive within

48 hours, when ordered by CINCIANTFIT.

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gatés"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the

degree, kind,

and exact location of the disturb

ranging from no.action through such measures

as the use of fire hoses and lachrymating agents

may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base,

Guantanamo.

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury

or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

DONFICENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure

NN 50955

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## Page 6

TOR GO

C(D(C)

2016

MAR

601)

circumstance and situation ranging from no action,

through action taken in self defense by a wounded

sentry or those assisting him, through increased

defense conditions, placing personnel in positions

protected from fire, and return of fire if appro-

priate and required

as determined by the Commander

Naval Base, Guantanamo.

The precise nature of

the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance.

A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in

injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued

sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another

'"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities".

CUMNENT Extensive security measures are taken to

prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S.

taken would depend upon the nature of the

The nature of the action

sabotage and be designed to assure the continued

functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,

Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

which have been

provide that ships

aircraft ordered to the

area may take immediate protective measures_

Including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air

space or territorial waters.

Commanders are

not authorized to organize deliberately a

pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized

to attack unless either they or the ship they

are defending is endangered by Cuban attack.

In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action

to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making

their presence known by flying close aboard the

Cuban plane.

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US

registry.

12. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding

planes over

the high seas or another country's territory.

2

Enclosure

NW

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MAR

6CN(C)

CONAIDENTIAL

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the

high seas or

another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the

high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national

policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from

oso territory, however, at the time a ship o1

aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack

It may be difficult to identify

it as a "pirate"

"raider"!

"mother

ship" or "exile raider"t

though this,

in fact, may be the case.

Aỉl the

situations,

set lorth above, are covered, at

least in part, by the rules

have been approved by the highest national

However, the action summarized below

is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and

aircraft and those not clearly identified as

being of foreign registry.

Commanders are not

authorized to organize deLiberately a pursuin

however ships or aircratt ordered to the

area of the attack may take immediate protective.

measures including pursuit to, but not into,

Cuban air space or territorial

waters.

pilots are not authorized to attack unless either

they or the ship or aircraft they are defending

is endangered by Cuban attack.

In the event Cuban

aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.s.

pilots are limited to making their

presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban

Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft

2016

is authorized only in those instances where it

has been established that Cuban attack is being

made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only

for the purpose of substantially reducing the

time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft

reach the scene. Such overflights may be

authorized only by specifically designated

commanders.

Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in

the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin

America, plans exist for the U.S. military to

respond to requests for assistance.by Latin

American governments subject to US governmental

approval.

There is also an arrangement for the

3

Enclosure

CONFIBENTEAL

NW 50955

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## Page 8

TIAL

interchange of information between the U.S.

Coast Guard and British naval forces witi

regard to possible staging areas which my

be

-sed by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"I. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT

The level of intensity of such actions contemplated

within the context of the paper is not considered

to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement

agencies to control. There are military contingency

plans to protect against this type

of activity

at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to

overcome interference and jamming methods

employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing

or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other

likely actions which might be taken by

the Castro govern

ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also

requested.

The furnished list of possible retaliatory

actions by the Castro government were of "the level of

intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most

likely category." It is inferred that what the committee

had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity"

was that level which would not provoke the United States

into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously

endanger the Castro regime.

The summaries of actions

set forth above, which might be taken under existing

military contingency plans are essentially defensive

reactions to Cuban initiatives.

There are, however,

existing

and related military plans, retallatory in nature which

range up to and include a full scale military invasion of

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the

Cuban government are those which would not provoke United

States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering

the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might

intensify his support of

subversive forces in Latin America

CORFIDENTIAL

Enclosure

HH 50955

DocId: 32425002 Page B

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## Page 9

31 December 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee

(Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in

Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963.

The

agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced.

Present from

State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro;

from CIA, Tilton and

from USIA, Murphy; and the

undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)

meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964.

Mr. Montenegro,

State labor advisor for Latin America,

described the

anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage

of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who

will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes

that there will be a concerted effort by the communists

to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from

Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were

discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to

ascertain the degree to which local (not national)

governmental elements will support disruptive and

harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts

with the suggestion that local influences be brought

to bear in order to discourage country delegates

from attending the meeting-

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin

America in order to expLolt exposes ot cuban.

bast German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations

1r

which suggest postponement of the meeting.

600CA

6(I(C)

6CICC

OSA, AS& Costro! No. 3.00%

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

029

HW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 9

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## Page 10

CUNHUENITAL

Partially

EXEMPTED A

BY JOINT STAR

DATE:

6(1 (c)

MAY 151998-

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Dopastment of Stato

SUBJECT:

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban

Altairs: Possible Retaliatory Actiona by the Castzo

Government (U)

Roference:

Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the

atatus of existing contingency plans for those priority situatione agreed

upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the para-

graphs below corresponda to the format utilized in the attachment to

reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department

of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

""A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

** Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT:

In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel

In 21 hours Of leas can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers

who commute"

OSA,

Control NoT/S 0228.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED

BY JCS ON

CODY CLASSIFICATION TO GE 80-CoT

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

• DOD DIR 5200.10

OCOESA 721/684

NW 50955

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i15

1/23/3100 (8JAN63) N/S0S 2304/704-1

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## Page 11

'CONFIDENTIAL

COMNISN'T:

Provision is made for the introduction o

"(c) Staging demonstration and siote at the gates'

COMMENT:

Execution of measures appropriate to the degrce, kiad

and exact location of the disturbance, sanag from no action

60x0):

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in Injury or

death"

COMMENT:

Measures may be taken appropalate to the circumstances

and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in soll defense

by a wounded sentry or those cosisting him,

"(e) Sabotäging of base facilition"

COMMENT:

Extensive security measures are taken to prevent euch

'sabotage by the Commander U. 3. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature

of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be

designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B, Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping

"I, Harassment of U, S.. Shipping using Ucatan Channel;

Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT:

The rules of engagement, which have been approved by

the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to

2

COR MEERETAL

HH 50955 DocId:32425002 Page 11

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## Page 12

CORFDENTIAL

the area may take immediate

activé monoured

"C. Actiong Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US regiatry.

"2 Hot pursult of or attack on raiding planea over the high

seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas

or another country's tozzitorial waters.

"4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas

or in another country's territorial wateze."

COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit

raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time

a Ship or aircraft la discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be dita-

cult to identify it as a "pirate," iraider," "mother ship" or "edle raider,"

even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth

above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which

have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the actloa

rummarized below is authozined only in the case of U. S, ships and air-

craft and those not cleasly identified as belay of foreign registsy.

3

SORRIER FAL

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 12

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## Page 13

CONFIDENTIAL

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the

Garibbean"

COMMENT:

6CICC

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terzoristic bombinge"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within

the context of the poper la nos considezed to exceed the capabilities of

law enforcement agencies to control. Thore aze milltazy contingency

Plano to protect againat this type of activity at a much higher level of

Intonsity.

"2. Jaraming of US radio stationg"

COMMENT: There are standing opcrating procedures to overcome

intertorence and jamming mothode employed againct railitazy communi-

cations

The summaries of actions set forth above aze essentially defensive

rcactions to Cuban Initiatives. There are, of course, exteting and eclated

military plans, rotallatory in nature, which raogo up to and Include a full

ocale military invadion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of

the Committce that the roat lllely actions of the Cuban government are

those which would not provoke United States rotallation seriously and

Immediately endangozing the Caatzo regime. It appeazs more likely

that Castro might intensify his support of aubversive forces in Latin

COOFISENTHAL

NW 50955 DocId:32425002 Page 13

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## Page 14

CONRRENHAL

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY

ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

I. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds

to the numbering of those actions for which specific or

related military contingency plans exist.

A brief summary

of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

14. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT

uvacuation

as non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if

directed

and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who

commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction

6(UCC)

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gatés!!

COMMENT

Execution of measures appropriate to the

degree, kind,

and exact location of the disturb-

ance, canine from no action

DONFE

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury

or death"

COMMENT

FIAL

Measures may be taken appropriate to the

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure

NH 50955

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IOOMEIDENTIAL

circumstance and situation ranging from no action,

through action taken in self defense by a wounded

sentry or those assisting him,

'"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities!.

CUMNENT Extensive security measures are taken to

prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S.

Naval Base

Guantanamo

The nature of the

taken would depend upon the nature of the

sabotage

and be designed to assure the continued

functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,

Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement

which have been

approved by the highest national authority

provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the

area may take immediate protective measures

601)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

registry.

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding

the high seas or another country's territory.

planes over

COMPEDENTIAL

2

Enclosure

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## Page 16

CONFIDENTIAL

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the

high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the

high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national

policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from

at the time

a ship or

U.S. territory, howeverto be under cuban attach

aircraft is discovered

it may be difficult to identify it as

"pirate",

"ralder"!

"mother ship" or "exile raider

though this, in fact, may be the caser

Al1 the

situations, set forth above, are covered,

least in part, by the rules

of engagement which

have been approved by the highest national

authority.

however, the action summarized below

is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships anc

aircraft and those not clearly identified as

being of foreign registry.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in

the Caribbean

COMMENT

3

Enclosure

CONFIBERTEAL

50955

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CONFERE

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated

within the context of the paper is not considered

to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement

agencies to control. There are military contingency

plans to protect against this type of

activity

at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to

overcome interference and jamming methods

employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing

or related plans" and "recommendations,

likely actions which might be taken by

the castron

ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also

requested.

The furnished list of possible retaliatory

actions by the Castro government were of "the level of

intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most

likely category."

It is inferred that what the committee

had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity"

was that level which would not provoke the United States

into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously

endanger the Castro

The summaries of

actions,

set forth above, which might be taken under existing

military contingency plans are essentially defensive

reactions to Cuban initiatives.

There are, however,

existing

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the

Cuban government are those which would not provoke United

States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering

the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might

intensify his support of

subversive forces in Latin America

cohif

4

Enclosure

HH

50955

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## Page 18

than risk direct confrontation with the United States.

the long run,

such action is more dangerous

and difficult

to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke

immediate and effective United States retaliation.

actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declara-

tions that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration

for the

"inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an

inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a

few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the

training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas

than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably

would not.

Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees

to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla

training bases,

recruitment of additional personnel, and

engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately

provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo

Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who

commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange.

While such items a libe harassment of US aircraft operating in

"the harassment of air traffic into and out

of Guantanamo, " or

the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list,

it is considered that specific provocative actions are less

likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support

to subversive forces in Latin America.

Such action not only

is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support

"national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may

be done by means which

avoid an invitation to overt US military

countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime.

they are considered as of that level of intensity which places

them in the most likely category as well as being in the

category of

most dangerous to the long range interests of the

United States.

COPFIDENTIAL

5

Enclosure

NH 50955

DocId:32425002

Page 18

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