DRAFT HSCA REPORT.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: SULLIVAN, JACK, OS, CIA
To: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., OLC
Document date: 03/14/1979
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 12/15/04

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER: 104-10067-10224

RECORD

SERIES

JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

:

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM :

: SULLIVAN, JACK, OS,

TITLE : DRAFT HSCA REPORT.

DATE

03/14/1979

PAGES

7

SUBJECTS: COMMENTS

HSCA REPORT

JFK ASSASSINATION

Released under the John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection det of 1992 144 USC

107 Note).

Case#:NIT 53199

Date: 06-07-2017

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

: CONFIDENTIAL

: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 05/25/04

CÓMMENTS : JFK12 : F4

20031216-1025966

..........- - , =__-^=^

[R]

ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10067-10224

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• ..

MAt

OIC 79-0113/21

14 March 1979

MIEYORANDUM FOR: Jack Sullivan, OS

Dick Rininger, OG

William Sturbitts, LA/DI

Russ Holmes

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridge

principal Coordinator, HSCA

SUBJECT

: Draft HSCA Report

1. It is requested that you review the attached comments on

the HSCA draft about "The Evolution and Inplications of the CIA-

Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies" and be prepared to discuss

them at a meeting in my conference room at 10:00 a.m. Eriday.

2. Practically all of the information in this draft has

appeared in one form or another in the Church Comnittee's

interin assassination report and

in Book V of its final

report.

3. You will note that I did not itemize every appearance

of the names of O'Connell, Orta, Varona, or Cubala. I hope

this will not be necessary in our comunication with the

Conmittee as it would take pages just to list them.

1. 1. Kickerage in

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment

# 6100

pullin

1064120

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Coitments

I have read the draft report on the "CIA-Sponsored Assassination

Conspiracies."

This is my preliminary reaction.

Page 3. Insert the word "late" before the date 1960, sixth line

from the bottom.

Page 3. Last sentence should read: "CIA records indicate that

the operation was

inactive from April 1961 until April 1962."

Page 4. Delete "James 'Big Jim' O'Connell" and replace with

the word "Chief" and where O'Connell's name appears throughout the

draft from thereon it should be replaced by "the Official Support

Chief."

Page 4. The next to the last paragraph. The word "recruited"

should be replaced by the word "contacted".

Page 4. Last paragraph, third line from bottom. The word

"contends" should be replaced by the word "reporting".

Page 5. Delete the name of Juan Oxta where it appears at the

top of the page.

wherever his name appears thereafter in the

report it should be referred to as "the senior Cuban official".

Page 5. Varona should be described here and wherever it appears

as "the Cuban exile leader". Where it appears frequently this can

be detracted to a reference as "the exile leader":

Page 6. Change last sentence to commence as follows: "The

1967 IGR noted that...."

I am inclined to not take issue with the

use of the word "admitted" in the second line of the last paragraph;

it is an argument word and we volunteered. it on our own as an

assertion not an admission.

Page 7. End of the first complete paragraph. Substitute word

"operation" for the word "plots".

Page 8. Paragraph ending at top of the page, next to last line.

Just who did what for whom is uncertain but I am not inclined to take

issue with the word "probably".

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Page 11. Fifth line fron botton. Insert wor "unsuccessfully"

after "Farvey subsequently attempted..

Page 12. Twelfth line from bottom, Insert year "1967" before

the name of Ed Morgan.

Page 14. Second sentence should be rephrased as follows:

"This

report detailed the accounts of various CIA plans and operations

against Castro..."

Page 15. OGC please check what we did about INS deportation

proceedings.

Page 16. Delete that portion of the last sentence of the first

paragraph that reads as follows:

...on-going plots against the

revolutionary government in Cuba and its....

The main thrust of

the SSC report had to do with plotting against Castro and this tends

to shift the emphasis to a broader range than the SSC report really

supports.

Page 17. Second sentence, first complete paragraph. While it is

correct to summarize the SSC report as stated, the SSC report is

incorrect, and we should so note.

Page 17. Last paragraph. There was no "ripple effect". Nobody

paid any attention to the SSC report after the first few days.

It was quite some time afterwards, on a tine-available basis that

the CIA Task Force took up the problen. In any event, it was not

intended to "answer" the SSC report in the usual sense of the word

so ruch as it was intended to research the general problem. We did

not know what we would find.

Page 18. The subparagraph (1), second line. The word "assassination"

should be put in quotation marks.

Page 18. Fifth to the last line. TER for IGR.

Page 19. Fifth line. "Operative" for "operation".

Page 21. Next to last line. TFR for IGR.

Page 23.

Top paragraph. the reason there was no contact with

AMLASH for a year preceding from 1962 to 1963 was that he was in

Cuba.

Page 23. Next to last line right in middle parayraph. CIA did not

say that any dispute was in the eyes of the SSC only.

Second paragraph, first line. Substitute "cabled"

Page 24.

for "called"

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Page 24. Second paragraph, ninth line. Substitute TER fOI CIA.

The HSCA draft is imprecise in this treatment. The task force

report gave a rather detailed recitation of what AMLASH was told

as to the basis for its view, and why Book V of the SSC report with

AMLASH'sfaction was uncertain the Task force report made it clear that

his reaction as to what he was told was exactly the same as the CIA recora

of what he was told. We should maise this point.

Page 26. Fourth line in the quotation at the top of the page.

Substitute the word "reinforce" for the word "re-infor".

Page 32. While the names of O'Connell and Orta appear in other pages

in the draft, they appear here and should be deleted.

Page 34. Remove the "s" from the CIA Inspector General Reports. •

the AMLASH operation was. The authors may not wish to choose

followed by the statement below:

As you have been advised, Langosch was not involved in or

responsible for the AMLASH operation, being peripherally

aware of its existence. His views of AMIASH/1's security is a

very different question than the substance of the operation.

I must note that his testinony before HSCA seems to have

undergone material evolution since he testified before the

Church Conmittee (SSC) in 1975. One must wonder to what

extent the SSC report has influenced his present views. In

any event, when he testified before SSC he was most uncertain

about the time-frame of the AMLASH operation (critical to any

evaluation of it in terms relevant to your charter), as well

as to specific facts including how to characterize it (see

page 75 Book V, SSC Final Report). His most recent testimony

may serve the purpose of raising questions for consideration

in your report, but one would think that soire consideration

would be given his reliability as a witness (the fact that he

was not inforned at the time, that what he now says is contrary

to the well documented status of the operation, and the fact

that he now speaks differently than he did earlier).

Page 36. Instead of describing Pollack as "from the CLA" he

should be referred to as "a former CIA employee"

Page 37. First line. The word "object" should be "objective."

: ¡ 3.

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but

Page 37.

Second line. The word "Cuba" should be "AMLASH/1".

Page 41.! If they don't know how to spell "Bundy" I an not inclined

to help them.

Page 46.

¡the draft's assertion that O'Connell and Maneu are

lying about identification of the syndicate peole with whom they were

dealing; this is unsupported by the evidence.

The record is somewhat longer than the association of the HSCA

investigators with it, and the only thing they add to it is this

unfounded subjective judgment. I was one of the to CIA officers who

debriefed O'Connell on his part in the operation, when another inspector

and I did the original 1967 IG report on assassinations. At that tine

O'Connell was forthright and did not dissemble, although he experienced

difficulty in recalling sore details.

At the time of the 1967 interviews, O'Connell related the discovery

of the actual identity of the persons with whom they were dealing

primarily as an interesting development in the unfolding events of

the operation. He related his role in a factual manner; he had been

given an assignment and carried it out. He related it without explanation

or apology.

If he was presssed by HSCA investigators he may have been

asked questions that posed the various considerations in terns of

rationale, etc., that that was not his presentation when he was

speaking inside

the Agency in 1967 - then under strict terms of

security - when he originally recorded himself on the matter. He

is not a philosopher,. and I doubt that he. would have volunteered

much on this score.

Quite frankly, my impression from 1967 (and I

intervieved him again in 1975) was that he was impressed by the

high-level attention the syndicate gave the matter, rather than being

embarassed by it.

It is nore accurate to see him viewing it as a sign

of the serious attention given by the syndicate, possibly reinforcing

the chances of achieving the objective." O'Connell knew from the

beginning that he was dealing with the syndicate, and that there had

to be high-level approval was

a foregone conclusion.

No real thought

had been given as to what sort of person would be assigned to the job,

and whomever it was there was little that could be done about it if

the operation was to proceed. The interpretation of O'Connell's

thought processes are far fetched.

Page 48. O'Connell's name appears several times in the preceding

pages but it appears hare with Ed.

we might suggest that the word

"they" be substituted. All the other places it can be "operational

support chief".

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Page 68-71.

I recall the introduction to the liSCA draft report

that it would not impugn the reputation of innocent by-standers.

The identities of Dan Rowan and Phyllis licGuire fall into this

category.

The simple and correct story is that Giancana

felt that he was being cuckolded by Rorian and took advantage,

in his jealousy, of his new and novel relationship wich CIA.

O'Connell should not have gone along with him, but he did,

unfortunately.

with the advantage of 20-20 hindsight it may

look easy today to have. termed it aside then.

Remeiber, when

turner

O'Connell first told the Story in sore detail (with sore error

in dates), inside the Agency for the recora (1967), he told it in just

those terns. He had no reason then to conceal his concern, and ifamy,

little speculation really doesn't alter the basic facts of that

simple story.

There really was no concern at that time about

Giancana meeting.

lecking

Suggest we move all references that identify Rowan and

McGuire and clean up the presentation to fit the facts.

Page 74. Second line TER for CIA.

Page 76. A little confusion in the sequence of events between

phase I and phase II. When the first access to Castro failed, and

a viable new one did not develop, Roselli went to the Cuban exile

leader.

That contact and the apparent uncertainties that it

offered is what was terminated at the end of phase I. That is where

it started when it was reactivated in April 1962 for phase II.

There are many operations in the Clandestine world in which the

instruments of action. are not knom in detail to the case officer.

In. the phase II operation, Roselli served as cut-out between CIA

and the Cuban exile leader, in a sense, ran his own net and did not

reveal the identities of his people or any specific plans. In the

absence of direct access to the target his operatives have to

had

go in and develop a way in which to carry out their mission.

Had it succeeded, the possibility which have been such to meet

and reconstruct after the fact; the absence of ultimate action

it may seem uncertain to sone individuals unfamiliar with

the tenduous nature of some plans of action. The real question,

in my mind, is whether the Cuban exile leader really dispatched

"teans" with the mission they were supposed to have.

Page 77. It may seem extraordinary to the investigators that

CIA operated as they did. First, as mentioned above, there are a

number of uncertainties in the world of clandestine operations.

In this particular case, dealing with representatives of the under-

world, CIA therefore, labors under certain practical inhibitions about

hoi far it could press individuals using their resources to carry

out a mutual objective. There doubtless are many instances in which

individuals throughout the chain are unknown to CIA.

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Page 84. We do not take exception with the statement that

the Committee believes "that Roselli fabricated the retaliation

theory." If we note it at all it ay disappear from the draft, and it

reinforces our contentions that CIA did not report the Castro plots

because no one perceived the retaliation theory. If Foselli fabricated

the concept it was some time in late 1966 or the first half of 1967.

Page 92. Suggest that we reguest that FISCA relate the designation of

"A" fox Victor Spinosa Hernandez, rather than using his full name.

Page 93. Top paragraph. We cannot contribute positively to the

question of a real link between the syndicate and "A". However, the SSC

final report, Book V, at pages 78, 79, and 105 seems to make it clear

that what "A" knew about AMLASH post-dated the 1963 period.

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