Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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File #:

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Serial Scope:

ITIS THRU 114O

55008

DocId: 32989599

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Memorandum

30%

Dep. Dir.

ADD Ach._

ADD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs.

Crim.Inv.

Ident.

Info.Mgnt.

Insp.

IntelT.

Lab.

Legal Coun.

Tech.

Servs.

Training

Cong. Affs. Off.

off.

of EEO

Off. Liaison &

Int. Affs.

Off.

of Public Affs._

Telephone Rm.

Director's Office

To

:

Date

3/30/92

From

Ou songressional Affairs Office (CAO)

Subject

DOCUMENT REVIEW FOR SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

PURPOSE: To request that LCD deliver to CAO for transmittal

the Office of Senate Security certain classified and unclassified

POW/MIA documents received from the Department of State (DOS) ,

which are currently being processed by LCD, CDRU, for

dissemination to the Select Committee.

DETAILS: The above referenced FBI documents were received from

the Dos by letter dated 3/6/92, and forwarded to LCD for review

prior to any dissemination of same to the Senate Select Committee

on POW/MIA Affairs.

DOS has requested these documents be turned

over to the committee for their review/use. LCD, CDRU, has

advised CAO that some of the documents under review are

classified, and has requested clarification of the procedures

surrounding transmittal of classified FBI documents to the

Pursuant to

established procedures regarding

transmittal of classified FBI documents to the Senate for review

by a particular committee, CAO is responsible for physical

delivery of classified documents to the Senate Security Office,

where they are stored and made available to persons possessing

proper security clearances.

CAO attaches a transmittal letter

with receipt to the documents,

and they are delivered to the

Senate Security Office by courier.

62-1117

RECOMMENDATION:

That upon completion of review of the

above

documents, LCD deliver same to CAO for transmittal to the Senate

Security Office.

APPROVED:

Adm. Sens.

Director

Crim. Inv.

_Laboratory.

_Ident.

_Lagal Coun.

Dep. Dir.

_Tech. Sents.

Leone in. aren

_Into. Mignt..

ADD-Adm.

_Training

_Inspection.

ADD-Inv.

_Intell.

_Off. of EEO

1740

1

- Mr. McFarland

1

1

Mr. Dohogne

- Mr. Collingwood

3

- Mr. Hooks

1

- Mr. Brust

PFB: sI (7)

ALI, INFORMAMON CONTATED

MDR-16

HH 55008

Do01d:32989599

Page 2

SSA PETER F. BRUST

ROOM 7240

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## Page 3

185-10214

RECEIVED

rreiaiiese".

APR| 8 24 AM '92

LITICATION SECTION

sas +4y 7-138 0 o idte

HH 55008

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## Page 4

SECRET

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Community Staff

Washington, D.C. 20505

SSE

CLASSI

SER

REC

ICS 0843-90

30 March 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, Jr., USAF (Ret.

Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security

Coordination of SSCI Testimony--10 May 1990

1. Attached for information and action are copies of Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) letters of request to principals scheduled to

testify before the sscl on 10 May 1990.

The materials are provided, with the

consent of respective addressees, to facilitate interagency awareness and

coordination.

Also outlined below for your concurrence is a recommended

procedure intended to further promote optimum coherence in all intended

testimony.

2. As reflected in the attachments, it is clear that many of the specific

questions asked of individual respondents also have relevance to the missions

and interests of other agencies providing testimony. It would seem mutually

beneficial therefore to be collectively alert, in advance, to the general

• direction of intended individual positions.

As an ald to further promotion of improved Community coordination

CCISCMO proposes the following:

06-10395-1124

CISCO will facilitate distribution, amongst addressees, of the

text of intended written

testimony. Addressees from the Departments of

State and Defense as well as those from the CIA and FBI are requested to

provide input to CCISCMO by 30 April 1990 so that timely distribution can

be made prior to the date final written testimony is due to the ssel,

b. CCISCMO will host a preliminary coordination meetingaofUL 12 1990

appropriate representatives of those agencies scheduled to testify.

purpose is to provide a forum for discussion of themes and content of

proposed replies to SSCI questions. The meeting is scheduled for 1000, 11

April 1990 at the CCISCMO offices, room 1005, 1820 North Ft. Myer Drive,

Rosslyn, Virginia.

REGRADE UNCLASSIFIED WHEN

SEPARATED FROM SECRET ATTACHMENTS

5'

SECRET

NV 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 4

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## Page 5

$...

+: 784-3

RECANE "."!""

linid. Muänm 'S0

REsu/ CONS 19 10T 548

RECEIVED

APR 3 12 48 rM '9D

OFFICE DF

CONGRESSINL

. ATFAIRS

FROATHFOL

# 55008

DocId: 32989599

.Page 5

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## Page 6

SECRET

SUBJECT: Coordination of SSCI Testimony--10 May 1990

4. Request addressees provide telephonic notification to CCISCMO

indicating approval of the proposals outlined in paragraph 3 above as well as

_A response to Mr. Waldo Webb at 351-2001

(STU III) or secure 34176 by 5 April 1990 would be greatly appreciated.

Richer eyedea,

Tr.

Attachments:

a/s

2

SECRET

AHH 55008

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## Page 7

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Coordination of SSCI Testimony--10 May 1990

Distribution of ICS 0843-90 (w/atts)

1 - Mr. Rich

Haver, Dod

1 - Amb Ivan Selin,

State

1 - Mr.

William Sessions, FBI

1 - Mr. Hugh price, ClA

62-116395-1739

UNCLASSIFIED

ENGLOSURE

IN 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 7

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## Page 8

SAM NUNN, GEORGLA""

LANEST F. HOLEINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA

NEW JERSEY

ALAN GRANSTON, CALIFONHIA

DENNIS DICONCINI: ARIZONA

HOWARO M.

METZE "SAUM. OHIO

JOHN M. GLENN. JA. ONIO.

ORAIN HATCH, UTAN

FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA

ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANLA

JOHN WARNER. VIRGINLA

ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORX

JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOUT

GEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE I TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR

JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

L BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERX

United States Sen

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6478

UrrICe OF 11

CORETARY OF CEFES.

SO FEB 13 AHII: 29

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-508

The Honorable Dick Cheney

Secretary of Defense

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Cheney:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.s.

• counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, ir

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

We reguest

that you make available to testify at that hearing Mi. Rich

Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for

Intelligence.

Other witnesses invited to testify at this

hearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, MI. Ivan Selin,

Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price,

the announced

successor to Mr. Gardner

Hathaway as CIA

Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA

Counterintelligence Center.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss

with the Committee the results of the Administration's review

of counterintelligence

and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating

environment require

modifying objectives in the 1990s, and

the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,

program direction, and

possible legislation.

The hearing

will also consider issues identified in the

testimony from a

group of prominent

citizens scheduled for March 22, and we

will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Haver to address in his written

testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:

(1)

What are

the results of his review of DoD counter-

intelligence which you stated was

"an early and high

priority" in your letter of May 31, 1989?

(2) To what extent

political

change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the

requirements for CI operations and security measures against

that threat?

(3) To what extent do other traditional

threats,

such as the PRC and Cuba, reguire greater attention

in the 1990s?

(4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s

from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as

well as

narcotics traffickers and terrorists?

(5) What new

challenges do

technological advances and transfers to

criteria

countries and

terrorist groups pose in the 1990s?

(6) What are the consequences of these changing threats for

90/5/066

X52444

SECRET

102-1110395-5044

TRIOSIRE

144 55008 DooId: 32989599 Page &

---

## Page 9

SECRET

The Honorable Dick Cheney

February 7, 1990

Page two

DoD counterintelligence needs and protection of military,

diplomatic, and intelligence secrets in the 1990s? (7) How

will CI and

security programs cope with increased soviet

emigres and visitors, arms control inspectors, and US-Soviet

commercial contacts?

(8) Are US computer and

communications

security efforts adequate for the 1990s? (9) How serious is

the CI impact of counterpolygraph techniques and NSA'S loss

access to certain targets?

(10) What national policy

initiatives are reguired for the 1990s, i.e., personnel

security standards, actions to deter leaks?

(11) Is a

national countermeasures budget needed?

(12) What should be

done to improve multiagency organizations such as OFM, SEO

and JSPO?

Witnesses are asked to submit their written testimony a

week

in advance and to make informal opening remarks of about

5-10

minutes.

Agency representatives should contact

Committee staff members Mary Sturtevant or John Elliff at

224-1700 regarding this hearing.

Sincerely,

Neil 2 Brea

David L. Boren

SECRET

NH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 9

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## Page 10

DAVID L BOREN. OKLAHDHA CHAIRMAN

• WILLLAM S. COMEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN

JAI! HUNH. GEDAGIA

ORTIH MATCH, UTAH

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS. SOUTH CAROUMA

FRANK MUAKOWSKI ALASKA

BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSTIVANU

ALAM CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA

DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA

ALFONSE M. D'AMATO. NEW YORK

HOWARD # METZENBAUM, OHIO

JOHN C. DANFORTIL MISSOURI

JOHN M. GLENN. JA. OHIO

GEORGE MITCHELL, ANNE, EX OFFIOTO

MODERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

'GEORGE J. TENET, STAFT DIRECTOR

JAMES H. DYKSTRA MINORITY STAFE DIRECTOR

L BRITT SNIDER GENERAL COUNSEL

KATHLEEN P. MIGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

SECRET

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6475

Feb

8003893990

'90 FE8-20 9:22 PM

SSCI #90-505

The Honorable James A. Baker, III

Secretary of State

Department of State

Washington, D.C.

20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process,

will hold

a hearing on U.s.

counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

We request

that you make available to testify at that hearing MI. Ivan

Selin, Undersecretary of State for Management.

sestions tachava head Speche

Other

witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director

William S.

Sessions, MI. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr.

Associate Deputy Director for

Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center:

and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss

with the Committee the results of the Administration's review

of counterintelligence

and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating

environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and

the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,

program direction, and possible legislation.

The hearing

wili also consider issues identified in testimony from a

group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and. we

will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like MI. Selin to address in his written

testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:

at extent eared.

(1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union

and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the

1990s and the requirements for CI

operations and security

measures against that threat?

(2) To what extent do other

traditional threats, such

as the PRC and Cuba, require

greater attention in the 1990s?

(3) What are

the emerging

threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly"

intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and

terrorists?

(4) What new challenges do technological

advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist

-groups pose in the 1990s? • (5) What are the conseguences of

these changing threats for embassy security priorities and

rotection of diplomatic, military

and intelligence secrets?

SECRET

55008

DocId: 32989599

Pase 10

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## Page 11

SECRET

The Honorable James A. Baker

February 7, 1990

Page two

(6) How will the State Department assist CI and security

programs to cope with increased

Soviet

emigres and visitors,

arms control inspectors, and US-Soviet commercial contacts?

(7) Are US computer and

communications security efforts

adequate for the 1990s?

(8) What national policy initiatives

are required for the 1990s, i.e., personnel

security

standards, actions to deter leaks?

(9) Is a national

countermeasures budget needed?

(10) What should be done to

improve the multiagency organizations such as OFM, SEO and

JSPO in the 19905? (11) Are organizational changes in State

Department security, counterintelligence, construction, and

foreign missions programs needed for the 1990s?

Witnesses are asked to submit their written testimony a

week in advance and to make informal opening remarks of about

Agency representatives should contact

Committee staff members Mary Sturtevant or John Elliff at

224-1700 regarding this hearing.

Sincerely,

David L. BOIs

Chairman

Nil liam

cohen

Vice Chairman

SECRET

14 55008

DooId: 32989599

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11

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## Page 12

SECRET

CANG С СОМИ. ОЗОНА СНАТИИ

пишни я сонёк, меня нее снежнал

OARIN HATCH, UTAN

ER MST E HOLLINOS, SOUTH CAROLMA FRADA, MURKOVERI, ALASKA

HEW HASIY

ALAM CRANSTON

CALMORKLA

ARLEN SMCTER MHASTIVYANRA

JOHH WARHER VAGANA

DENMIS DECONCIN ARIZONA

ALPOMSE M D ALLATO. HTW MONE

HOWARO M LETZEMBAUM, ONIO

OHH 6 GIHFORTH, AUSSOUT

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

GEORGE MITCHELL ALAINE, EX OFFICIO

MOBIRT DOLE KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6478

BEORGE L TENET, STATE DARECTOR

MMES N DIASTRA MMORTY STASE OMECTOR

& BATT EMDER GEHERAL COUNSEL

KATHLLEN P MEGHEE CHIEF CLEMA

February 7, 1990

SSCI 190-507

The Honorable William Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

J. Edgar Hoover Building

Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The senate intelligence committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process, will hold à hearing on u.s.

counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart senate Office Building.

we invite you

to testify at that hearing as FBI Director and

as chairman of

the DCI's Advisory Group on Counterintelligence. Other

witnesses invited to testify are Undersecretary of State Ivan

selin, Mr. Ted Price, the announced successer to MI. Gardner ›

Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and

head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center, and Mr. Rich Haver,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared

to discuss with

the Committee the results of the Administration's review of

counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment

require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications

for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction.

and possible legislation.

The hearing will also consider

issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent

citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with

you further on those matters.

be prepared to discuss the following questions:

(1) What are

the results of the administration's review of counter-

intelligence and security programs to meet the needs of the

1990s?

(2) How will the Administration coordinate national

policy in these areas?

(3) What national policy initiatives

are required for the 19905,

i.e., personnel security standards,

actions to deter leaks?

(4) To what extent has political

change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their

intelligence threat in the 1990s and the reguirements for CI

operations and security measures against that threat?

(5) T0

what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and

Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (6) What are the

emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly"

intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers

and

02-116345-1739

SECRET

HiT 55008 DoeId: 32989599 Page 12

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## Page 13

SECRET

The Honorable William Sessions

february

7, 1990

Page two

terrorists? (7) What new challenges do technological advances

and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose

In the 1990s?

(8)

What are the consequences of these

changing

threats

for FBI surveillance needs and investigative strategy?

(8) How will the FBI cope with increased Soviet emigres and

visitors,

arms control inspectors, and US-soviet commerciad

contacts

in the 1990s? (9) Are US computer security efforts

adequate for the 1990s? (10) Are U.S. computer and

communications security efforts adeguate for the 1990s?. (11)

How serious will be the CI impact in the 1990s of

counterpolygraph technigues and NSA's loss of access certain

What should be the role of multiagency

organizations such as OFM, SEO and USPO in the 1990s? (13)

Should Congress consider

any legislation to meet FBI

counterintelligence needs in the 19905? (14) Should the FBI

have the greater flexibility to manage its counterintelligence

personnel in the 19905?

Witnesses are asked to submit their written testimony a

week in advance and to make informal opening remarks of about

5-10 minutes.

Agency representatives should contact Committee

staff members Mary Sturtevant or John Elliff at 224-1700

regarding this hearing.

Sincerely,

David L. BoreD

SECRET

IN 55008 DOLIN: 52989599 Page 13.

---

## Page 14

S, SOUTH CAROLIA

JERSEY

CALIFORNTA

ЛиШі мним

M. METZEMBAUME ONTO

КЁМ ОКСАНОША СНАЖИЛАМ

COHEN, MUNE, VIC СНАЖНА

ОТУН HATCH UTAN

FRANX MUAXONVSXL MASHA

AILIN SPECTER PENNSTIVAMA

JOHN WARATER, VASCINA

ALFONSE LL D'ALLATO. HEVY YORK

JOHN C. DAMFORTH, MISSONS

GEDAGE MITCHELL, MAJNE, EX OFFICIO

MOBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFRIO

GEORGE I. TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR

JAMES H OVASTRA, MILOATY STAFF DIRECTON

LEANTT ENIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL

KATHLEEN P. HIGHEE CHEF CLERK

SECRET

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENGE

WASHINGTON, DE 20510-8478

February 7, 1990

SSCI 490-506

postpon

--

The Honorable William H. Webster

Director of Central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

washington, D.C. 20505

:

Dear Judge Webster:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.s.

counterintelligence and security programs on may 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

We request

that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ted

price..

Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA

Other witnesses invited to testify

are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Undersecretary of State

Ivan Selin, and MI. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

we are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with

the Committee the results of the Administration's review of

counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment

reguire modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications

for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction,

possible legislation.

The hearing will also consider

issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent

citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with

you further on those matters.

We would like MI. Price to address in his written

testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:

(1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe affected

their intelligence threat in the 1990s

and the requirements for CI operations and security measures

against that threat?

(2) To what extent do other traditional

threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in

the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from

third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as

narcotics traffickers and terrorists?

(4) What new challenges

do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries

and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s?

(5) What are the

conseguences of these changing threats for operations and

security at CIA stations,

embassy security priorities, and

protection of military,

diplomatic, and intelligence secrets?

6) are us computer and communications security effort

03-10518-173

STARFT

55008 DocId:32989599 Page 14

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## Page 15

SECRET

The Honorable William H. Webster

February 7, 1990

Page two

adequate for the 1990s?

(7) How serious will be the CI impact

in the 1990s of counterpolygraph techniques and NSA's loss of

access to data? (8) What national policy initiatives are

required for the 1990s, 1.e., personnel

security standards,

actions to deter leaks?

(9) What should be done to improve

multiagency organizations such as

SEO, JSPO and OFM in the

1990s?

Witnesses are

asked to submit their written testimony a

week in advance and to make informal opening remarks of about

5-10 minutes.

Agency representatives should contact Committee

staff members Mary Sturtevant or John Elliff at 224-1700

regarding this hearing.

Sinc

-rely.

Quit 2 Bren

David L. Boren

Chairman

Chairman

REPRIT

1762 55008

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## Page 16

Memorandum

SECRET -

To

SSFrom

CLASS.

SRC'D

SER Subjec

REC

Date

8/10/89

Exec AD Adm. -

Exec AD inv.

Exec AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs..

Crim. Inv.

Ident..

Insp.

Intell.

Lab.

Legal Coun.

Off. Cong.&

Public Afts.

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Servs.

Training

Off. Liaison &

Int. Affs.

Telephone Rm.

Director's Sec'y

H. Geer

SENATE SELECT COMATTTEE SU INELLIGENCE

REPORT ON THE FBI AND CISPES

PURPOSE:

Although the Intelligence Division was not requested to

provide recommendations as to additional policy or procedural

changes

to be implemented, we do wish to comment on an errant

conclusion of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

regarding our jurisdiction in international terrorism/

counterterrorism matters. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That consideration be given to requesting the SSCI

amend its report to correct the statement that the FBI's

international terrorism jurisdiction is derived in part from the

Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act (FISA).

(U)

APPROVED:

Director

Exec AD-Adm.

Exet ADinv..

Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Grim. Inv._

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboraton

. Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong.

_ & Public Atfs.

Off of Lia

& Intl Affs

lec. Mgmt.

ech. Serv:

Training

DETAILS:

On page 131 in the last sentence of the last full

paragraph of subject report, the statement

FBI's international terrorism jurisdiction, derived in part from

116395-17

(CONTINUED - OVER)

k*g1hdf (12)

- Mr. Clarke

1

- Mr. Otto

- Mr. Revell

1 - Mr. Baker

1

- Mr. Davis

1

- Mr.

Geer

1 - Mr. McCreight

1

- Mr. Toohey

1

- Mr. Risslér

1

- Mr. Ash

1- Mr. Kleino WEl

SECRET

Classified by:

Declassify on:

05

OADR

# U.S.G.P.O.: 1988-202-042/75505

NW 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 16

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## Page 17

SECRET

Memorandum from J. H. Geer to The Director

Re:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Report on the FBI and CISPES

(U)

FISA, includes

domestic groups that are believed to be providing

personnel, training, funds,

or other means for the commission of

terrorist

acts abroad."

This statement is an inaccurate

conclusion of law which we could see in the future as

determinative as to

the intent of Congress in which activities

they choose to consider as under our counterterrorism program.

Footnote 89 acknowledges acceptance of the current definition of

terrorism as being the one favored by the FBI. The fact

this particular definition is utilized in FISA, as well as in the

Attorney General Guidelines governing the conduct of the

intelligence aspect of our counterterrorism cases, is a quantum

leap from the conclusion that our investigative jurisdiction is

derived from the FISA.

The definition utilized by FISA is

determinative only for jurisdiction of the FISC. (U)

A case in point are the requirements for subjects of

counterintelligence activity in FISA, which are more stringent

the requirements of our counterintelligence guidelines for

subjects of a full counterintelligence investigation.

In fact,

entire class of cases, those involving targets of intelligence

activity, are omitted from the FISA.

This in no way limits our

counterintelligence jurisdiction, only the ability to utilize

FISA in those particular cases.

(S)

SECRET

- 2 -

HH 55008

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## Page 18

Memorandum

To

:

CLASS.

SRC'D

SER

BEC

Subject :

Exec AD Adm.

Exec AD Inv.

Exec AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Ident. -

Insp.

Intell.

Lab.

egal Coun

The Director

Date

8/22/89

Off. Cong. ‹

subtic Affs.

Roc. Mgnt.

congressional artalra OfEifiC

Tech. Servs.

Training

Off. Liaison &

Int. Affs.

Telephone Rm.

REQUEST OF THE SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE'

(SSCI) FOR A BRIEFING ON SOVIET EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE

ILLEGALS INTO THE UNITED STATES AS POLITICAL REFUGEES

PURPOSE: To recommend the Director approve the briefing of

Senator SIMPSON (R-WY), Senator BOREN (D-OK), and Senator COHEN

(R-ME) by the Intelligence Division on the captioned matter.

DETAILS: Attached is a request from Senator ALAN K. SIMPSON,

Ranking Minority, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on

Immigration and Refugee Policy, for a briefing on September 7,

1989, at 10:00 a.m. concerning Soviet efforts to infiltrate

illegals into the

United States.

As the FBI does not ordinarily

provide such classified information to other than the

intelligence oversight committees, CAO contacted SSCI staff to

inquire of Committee interest. Both GEORGE TENNET, Staff

Director, ana JIM DYKSTRA, Minority Staff Director,

on behalf of Chairman DAVID L. BOREN and Vice Chairman

WILLIAM S. COHEN. It is anticipated that either Chairman BOREN

or Vice Chairman COHEN would attend the proposed briefing along

with Senator SIMPSON. Mr. TENNET proposed that the FBI treat the

SIMPSON reguest as an SSCI request.

If Chairman BOREN or Vice

Chairman COHEN

cannot attend the briefing, Mr. TENNET and Mr.

DYKSTRA will sit in on their behalf.

62-116395-1737

I - Mr. Geer - Enclosure

1

- Mr. DuHadway - Enclosure

- Mr. Stukey - Enclosure

- Mr. Borocco - Enclosure

- Mr. Collingwood - Enclosure

3

- Mr. Rissler - Enclosure

1 - Mr! Hooks - Enclosure

JSH-gYh (10)

ESSA JOHN S. HOOKS, JR.

ROOM 7240, TL-245

NOV

1989.

Eld into indis

0I1.02

#U.S.G.P.O.: 1988-202-042/75505

DocId: 32989599 Page 18

---

## Page 19

Memorandum to The Director from the Congressional Affairs Office

RE:

REQUEST OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(SSCI) FOR A BRIEFING ON SOVIET EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE

ILLEGALS INTO THE UNITED STATES AS POLITICAL REFUGEES

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Senator SIMPSON,

forth above.

1.

That you approve the captioned briefing for

abroatend and vice Chairman COHEN as set

NEPROVED:,

Director

xoc. AD-Adn

Exec. AD-LES

Crim. Inv...

Inspection

Intell._

_ Laboratory V

_ Legal Coun

_ Off. of Cong.

& Public Atts.

1cc

01. of Lia.

& Intl. Affs.

Rec. Mgmt..

— Tech. Servs.

— Training

2. That the Intelligence Division designate a

senior official(s) to conduct the requested briefing.

APPROVER

3 Adm. Servs.

Crim. In...

Director

Exec. AD-Acm.

= Inspection

Intell.

Exec. AD-Inv.

. Laboratory,

Exec. AD-LES

Legal Couf

8. Public Affs.

_ Off. of Lia.

_ & Intl. Affs.

_ Rec. Migrt.

. Tech. Servs.

- Training

-2.

Ww 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page

19

---

## Page 20

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWA

HAIRMAN

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA

HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH'

DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA

ALAN K. SIMPSON, WYOMING

PATRICK J: LEAHY, VERMONT

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA

HOWELL HEFLIN, ALABAMA

ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL SIMON, ILLINOIS

GORDON J. HUMPHREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE

HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN

DIANA HUFFMAN, STAFF DIRECTOR

TERRY L WOOTEN, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

R.J. DUKE SHORT, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Smate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

August 3, 1989

SSS

* ASS

isoC

Honorable William S. Sessions

Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigations

9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20535

ear Director Sessions:

Senate Select

Commettee.

on Latelligence

This is in reference to a recent conversation between

Richard W. Day, my chief counsel on the Subcommittee on

Immigration and Refugee Policy, and Steve Hooks of your agency,

concerning the growing numbers

of immigrants, parolees, and

refugees from the Soviet Union entering the United States.

I

am writing to request

a briefing from the Bureau on the

possibility of the Soviet Union infiltrating agents into the

flow of refugees and other emigres to the United States from

the Soviet Union.

It has been called to my attention by several sources that

the Soviet government might well be using our refugee program

for that purpose.

Legislation ie norently pending in the comerees to

= 116395-1736

provide a presumption of refugee status to all members of

certain groups within the Soviet Union.

The bill, if enacted,

would make a substantial number of Soviets presumptively

eligible for our refugee program, which gives rise to such

concerns about the infiltration of agents into that flow.

I would appreciate having the briefing after the AugUst

congressional recess.

If 10 a.m., September 7th, is

acceptable, that would be a good time for me.

NOV 6 1989

Mr. Day has a top secret clearance and will be available

196499277548561

during the August recess to help arrange the briefing.

I appreciate your consideration of this request.

Most sincerely,

1203o A330,

Alan K

Simpson

United States Senator

55008

AKS : IWY

DocId: 32989599

Page 20

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## Page 21

Memorandum

ExoC AD Irv. _

Exoc AD Adm. -

EXoC AD LES -

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs..

Crim. Inv.

Ident. -

Intell.

Laboratory -

Legal Coun. -

Plan. & Insp. -

Rec. Mgnt. -

Tech. Servs. -

Training

Public Affs. Off. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director's Sec'y -

CLASS

REC

To

:

E. J. O'Malley

Date

8-21-84

A From :

w. M. Baker 1/up

Subject:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) REQUEST

RATES

. REGARDING FBI INTERVIEWS OF SALVADORAN

PURPOSE:

Io request that the Intelligence DiViSION (INTD)

consider the request of the SSCI to provide the

terms of the Attorney General's authorization for captioned

investigation, and the two documents which were disseminated to

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) •

DETAILS:

By letter dated July 31, 1984 (copy attached)

seratil

Gary Chase, Chief Counsel, SSCI, requested that the

Department of Justice

(Dou) provide lurther information regard-

ing the FBI's interviewing of Salvadoran expatriots concerning

the 1984 Salvadoran Presidential elections. This was in follow-

up to the DoJ letter dated July 27, 1984,

that responded to a

question by the SSCI regarding the United States Government's

obtaining of intelligence and other information about

political violence in El Salvador.

At a meeting on August 15,

among representatives of INTD, Congressional Affairs Office,

Gary Chase, and John Elliff of the SSCI, it was requested that

the FBI supply the SSCI with the exact terms of the

authorization

by the Attorney General for the captioned

investigation, as well as copies of the results of this

investigation

provided to the CIA. It was explained that any

release of the results of the investigation which were provided

would have to be cleared by that Agency.

1735

SECRET

Classified

Declassify on:

#: 201516395-1235

10213

OADR

1 - MI. O'Malley - Enc.

Attention Mr. Egbers

1 - Mr.

Baker

3 - MI. Moschella

1 ~ Mr. Moran - Enc.

l'o

Yell

SA ROO

Room

(Continued - Over)

OCPA -

17/4/84

I7 AUR 31 1984

N 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 21

---

## Page 22

i...

Memorandum to E. J. O'Malley from W. M. Baker

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) REQUEST

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING FBI INTERVIEWS OF SALVADORAN

EX-PATRIOTS

RECOMMENDATION: That the INTD review the above request

and provide appropriate responses to the

Congressional Affairs Office, Attention: SA Robert A. Moran,

7240, extension number 4510, for further handling.

ipprovet:

Adm. Fervs.

Crim. lov.

Legal Coun.

Of. St Cong.

Eirooter.

ExSC. AD-AtT.

Blank

Fles. Mignt.

CICO. AD-LES -

- 2-

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 22

---

## Page 23

di

SECRET

BY LIAISON

Date:

To:

From:

subject:

September 15, 1989

Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, JI.

CCISCMO/ICS

Room 1005 Ames Building

Washington, D.C.

James H. Geer

Assistant Director in Charge

Intelligence Division

FBI CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF "SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON COUNTERINTELTIGENCE AND SECURITY

COUNTERMEASURES

This communication is classified "Secret" in its

entirety.

Review,

nemorandum of August 8, 1989, captioned the same, which provide

in additional section of the draft on Technology Transfer for FB:

classification review. (According to your instructions, the

Technology Transfer section of the draft has been inserted at the

end of page 59 of the July 20, 1989 draft.)

Enclosed is a copy of the entire draft report which has

been reviewed by the Intelligence DivisiOr.

It is requested that

the following changes ise made to ensure classified information is

Enclosure

1 - OLIA

- Mr. J. H. Geer

1 - Mr. D. E. Stukey, III

Exoc AD Adm. —1

- Mr.

J. C. Johnson

Exac AD Inv.

Exac AD LES.

KPG: in (11)

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sarvs. -

Crim. Inv..

Ident,

Insp.

Intoll.

Lab.

Logal Coun.

Off. Cong. &

OLIVIRED BY LIATSON

DATE

1115.6

Public Affs. -

Roc. Mgnt..

Tach. Sorvs..

Training

Talephone Rm.

Director's Sac'y -

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 23

1.

Mr. R. F. Klein

P. Watson

• Mr. C. W. Saari

1 - Mr. K. P. Giblin

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

SECRET

111515-173

(st

---

## Page 24

SECRET

Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, Jr.

not released in the final version of the report. The changes

appear below, introduced by the appropriate page, paragraph,

sentence and line numbers of the draft; the sentence or sentences

where changes have been made is then repeated, including the new

information and/or deletion of information.

Change number 11

concerns the FBI's disagreement with Recommendation 33 of the

Technology Transfer section of the draft.

1.

Page 14, paragraphs 1-4 sentences 2-14, lines 2-31:

"Upon returning in 1985, Conrad attempted to continue his

espionage operation through active duty personnel.

Conrad was arrested as a result of a long term Army CI

operation to determine the source of an apparent compromise of

U.S. Army, Europe, and NATO warplans.

The operation led to the

identification of Clyde Lee Conrad as the source of the

compromise.

Leads to possible additional

suspects are being

pursued in the U.S. and abroad.

In April 198] Army CI investigation mounted an.

undercover operation using an active duty Army source who knew

Conrad.

Under Army CI control, the source recontacted Conrad and

eventually passed him approved

"feed" material, for which Conrad

paid $15,000.

In June 1988 the West German Government was informed of

the developments in the Conrad case, accepted criminal

jurisdiction, and arrested Conrad.

They found extensive

materials providing further evidence and leads, including a

computer on which Conrad kept records of his activities.

Conrad.

is accused of selling NATO plans to Hungarian intelligence anc

will be tried by the west Germans for state treason.

If

convicted, he faces a possible maximum sentence of 15 years in

prison.

In August 1988 the Kercsik brothers, two Hungarians who

were the alleged couriers for Conrad to the Hungarian

the 'Soviets' classified documents, and signed a receipt for

SECRET

-2-

MH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 21

---

## Page 25

SECRET

Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, Jr.

repo cont fee to me an is lot to the at ane,..

4. Page 15, paragraph 3, sentence 4, lines 9-11.

"On

5. Page 18, paragraph 3, sentence 1, lines 1-5: "In

September 1986 John Allen Davies contacted the Soviet Consulate

in San Francisco; an undercover FBI agent subsequently arranged

o meet Davies, who verbally provided sensitive information to

the undercover

FBI agent about his former duties in the U.S. Air

Force."

6. Page 18, paragraphs 4 and 5, sentences 1-4, lines

1-11: "Thomas Joseph

Dolce had a Secret clearance and was a

civilian mid-level weapons analyst at the Army Material Systems

Analysis Activity Unit at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

pon confrontation by FBI agents, Dolce admitted

oroviding the South Africans with classified documents.

exchange for his agreement to cooperate during his debriefing,

Dolce was charged with only one count of espionage.

In April

1989 Dolce was

sentenced to a maximum prison term of 10 years,

and was fined $5,000. "

Page 19, paragraph 4, sentense 1, lines 1-4:

FBI learned that Craig Dee Kunkle contacted the Soviet Embassy in

Washington, D.C., on three separate occasions to inform officials

there he had information of interest to them. "

8. Page 20, paragraph 1, sentences 1-3, lines 1-10:

"The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) received

information from the FBI in May 1988 that an individual

subseguently identified as Ronald D. Parker had contacted the

on three consecutive days.

his home; believing the undercover FBI agent to be a Soviet,

Parker admitted contacting the Soviet Embassy and expressed his

willingness to work for the Soviets."

Page 20, paragraph 4, sentences 2-4, lines 2-6:

'In July 1986 Richardson had contacted the Soviet Embassy anc

another official Soviet establishment in Washington, D.C.

SECRET

-3-

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599

Page 25

---

## Page 26

SECRET

Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, JI.

Army INSCOM identified Richardson in August 1987. An undercover

FBI agent, who Richardson believed to be a Soviet, met with

esphonage." the Army Seargent was then arrested for attempted

"While serving as a

classified information, including a crypto keycara, Top Secret

Spade mailed and hand-carried these materials

to his home and, after his discharge,

that he could make a lot of money selling them.

The cooperating

witness reported this to the FBI.

Spade was indicted for

unauthorized possession of classified material, and all of the

material is believed to have been recovered.

The FBI does not

believe that Spade actually compromised any classified material.

On March 13, 1989 Spade was sentenced to three months

probation and charged

$50 for court costs.

The Federal judge

ignored sentencing guidelines as he felt that his were merely the

actions of a stupid young man. "

11: Technology Transfer section, Recommendation 33, no

page number indicated:

statutorily limited in its investigations of technology transfer.

The FBI's main priority in technology transfer investigations is

foreign counterintelligence, as the fBl has the primary

responsibility of countering hostile intelligence services

activities and collection efforts in the United States. The FBI

only becomes involved in an investigation regarding technology

transfer when a hostile intelligence service is involved or the

technology in question is classified.

There must be specific and

Laws remains with the U.s. Customs Service and the U.s.

Department of Commerce,

SECRET

-4-

HH 55008

DooId:32989599

Page 26

---

## Page 27

•..

SECRET

Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, Jr.

NOTE:

Responds to request of Community Counterintelligence and

Security Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO) for FBI Classification

review of report intended for dissemination to the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence.

Recommended changes recorded in

letter and draft provided

to CCISCMO.

Coordinated with Sections CI-1 and CI-2, CI-3 Section,

A Unit, and Special Staff,

INTD; and Security Programs Unit,

Records Management Division.

Copy of draft maintained in room 4835, INTD, CI-3

Section, B Unit.

Ky

RAID

SECRET

-5-

tH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 27

---

## Page 28

SSP,

CLASS

SRC 'D

SER

REC

Memorandum

10

To

J. H. GeekYw

Date

5/22/89

From :

Supiect:

Congressional AFFaiRS OFFiCE SER

BRIEFING OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTRE ON INTELIIGENCE

(SSCI) STAFF ON THE IMPACT OF AN INCREASE OF 25

OFFICIAL SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES

WILL HAVE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

PURPOSE:

To recommend a briefing be provided on the captioned

matter.

DETAILS:

Attached is a note concerning the proposed increase in

the ceiling of U.S. foreign service officers in the Soviet Union.

As is detailed in the note, the Department of States (DOS)

recently justified the need for an increase of foreign service

representatives in the USSR to SSCI staff.

On May 19, 1989, JOHN

Bullfr requested a briefing by the FBI on the impact a reciprocal

increase of Soviet officials in the United States will have on

counterintelligence:

on May 22, 1989, KEITH HALI, Budget

Exac AD Adm. _

Exec AD Inv. -

Exec AD LES_

Asst. Dir.:

Adm.Sorvs..

Crim. Inv. _

Ident. -

Intoll.-

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Insp..

Roc. Mgnt._

Proch, sarys.

raining .

Off. of Cong.

& Public Affs.

Talaphono Rm. -

Disoctor's Soc'y -

The DOS briefing was provided by JOHN EVANS, Deputy

Director, Soviet Desk, to 10 SSCI staff members.,

CAO recommends

an FBI representative from CI-1 provide the FBI briefing.

Although Mr. ELLIFF requested a representative from WMFO

attend

the briefing, CAO recommends against that request.

The proposed briefing will not require the FBI to

evaluate the DOS need for a ceiling increase or make any

counterproposal.

only the facts should be presented as they

relate the response to address the increase.

Potential resource

needs rising from the possible reopening of the New York City

Soviet Consulate should also be discussed.

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the Intelligence Division

116595-1733

designate a

representasive

from CI-1 to brief SSCI

on the impact

the

proposed

tling increase. APPROVED:

Adm. Serve.

Crim. Inv.

ON CAN SEC/AR

crapathan

Ident.

Off. of Lia.

Inspection

& Int. Ams.,

ExAc. AD-Adm..

Intell.

Roc. RemE.

Exec. AD-Inv.

. Laboratory

Toch. Sors.

Legal Coun

- Training

That SSA JOHN S. HOOKS, JR., CAO, coordinate

APPROVED:

Adm. Soris, -

Off, of Cong.

Crim. Inv..

& Fustic Affo.

ident.

Off. of Lia.

Director

Inspection

& Indi. Afie.u

1

EXOS, AD-Adm.

Intell.

HH

- Mr. Geer - Enc.

Mr.

1 - Mr. Collingwood - Eng AD-Iny.

Ficc. Mgmt.-

Laboratory

Tech. Seno.

DuHadway - Enc.

- Mr.

Rissler - Enc. Exeg. AD-LES

bogal Coun.

Training ess

MI•

Mr.

stukey - Enc.

1

- Mr. Hooks - Enc.

McClay - Enc.

(9)

SSA JOHN S. HOOKS, JR.

ROOM 7240, TL-245

FBI/DOS

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599

Page 28

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## Page 29

DANIEL AT CO LUNATE IT, CHARCHARMAN

JAKE GARN, UTAH

VALTER D. HUDDLEST

OHN H. CHAFEE, R.1.

OSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DE

DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII

DAVID DURENBERGER, MINN.

LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX

VILLIAM V. ROTT

VILIAM S. COHEN, N. DE

SAM NUNN, GA

HOWART AYED. I. VENEX OFFEREO

CAR SHAT. MONG SYST OF ERECTOR.

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#84-1335

April 11, 1984

FEDERAI GOVERNMENT

exes. Ab-Adra.

Exec. AD-Inv.

MEXEC. AG-LES

masst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. In.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell. _

Laboratery

Legal t. in.

1. от 6473

PublicAt

Free. Mgnt.

Tech. Servs.

Training

sclephone him.

¿ Practor's Sec'y

994445T7244Z

The Honorable William H. Webster

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

J. Edgar Hoover Building

Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Bill:

On

Tuesday, March 26, 1984, Senator Kennedy introduced Amendment

$2836 to the Urgent Supplemental for the Fiscal Year 1984 PL-480

(Program [H.J.Res. 492].

At that time, Senator Kennedy said bis

amendment was based on

the CIA." Kennedy's amendment stated the following:

"The senate and House select cometees onl fe:

Intelligence,

in coordination with the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs

Committee, shall conduct a full investigation of death

El Salvador and shall report to the Senate

the House of Representatives by May 31, 1984, on

death squad activity, responsibility

organizing, directing and carrying

out death squad

killings, and progress in prosecuting those responsible

for

such

killings."

1738%

DEG 5.1989

hersenate Select Committee on Intelligence, reu rem doe

on its own recognizme requestrother Committee

reports

549159

Members of the Senate.

So on April 3, 1984, we agreed in a colloquy

on the Floor of the Senate to hold

a series of hearings on the death

squads in response to Senator Kennedy's concern.

We further agreed

to investigate the matter of these allegations

and to make the

record of

that investigation known to the extent that it can be

published.

On the basis

of our commitments to Senator Kennedy, the

Staff Director and Minority Staff Director of the Committee have

established

Death

Squad Working Group which is being coordinated

by Larry Kettlewell and Steve Ward.

ALL ISFORMATION CONTAINED

FARHET 15 UNCLASSINICD

moR-yo

Off. od Cong

HH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 29

---

## Page 30

The Honorable William H. Webster

Page Two

April 11, 1984

The purpose of this

letter is to ask your maximum cooperation

in this undertaking.

We expect your

staff to cooperate with the

¡Coordinators and with the Professional Staff Members who are on

the Death Squad Working Group. In a week or ten days, we will be

issuing letters of invitation

to various individuals

before our Committee in closed session on this issue. We will also

be requesting certain documents from the Intelligence Community,

well as access to certain files in the possession of your Bureau.

We look forward to and expect full cooperation in this important

undertaking which we hope to complete by July 4, 1984.

let us know if you have any questions regarding this matter.

King fallente

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Vice

Chairman (new york)

HH 55008

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Page 30

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## Page 31

Memorandum

SECRET

CLASS

SRO'D

SER

BEC

Exec AD Adm. -

Exoc AD Inv. _

Exoc AD LES —

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sorvs.

Crim. Inv.-

Idant. -

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Insp.

Roc. Mgnt.

Toch. Sarv's.-

Tolophone Rm.

Director's Soc'y.-

To

Director, FBI

Date

3/21/89

Eroin

Mr. Ahlerich Al Just

Subject :

APRIL 18, 1989 FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

AUTHORIZATION HEARING BEFORE THESENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)

PURPOSE: To provide details of the captioned hearing and to

request briefing materials be prepared for the Director's

appearance.

DETAILS: Attached is the congressional hearing schedule for the

intelligence community.

Director Sessions has been asked to appear as the

FBI witness, accompanied by Assistant Director James H. Geer,

on April 18, 1989, at 2:00 p.M. before the SSCI in Room 219,

Hart Office Building. Also appearing will be Maynard Anderson,

Department of Defense, accompanied by Ray Pollari.

The theme of the

hearing will be how counterintelligence will cope with increased

responsibilities in the 1990s without additional resources. The

first part of the hearing will be a joint FBI/DOD affair.

The sea-

ond part will be compartmented to discuss funding of FBI special

projects and issues relating to the Soviet occupation of Mt. Alto.

Briefings for the Director are scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on April 11

and 2:00 p.m. on April 17.

Briefing materials should be submitted to

the Congressional Affairs Office (CÃO) by April 5, 1989 so the

Director will have the opportunity to review the materials prior to

1 - Mx. Otto - Enclosure

1 - Mr.

-Revell - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Glover - Enclosure

1 - Mr. -Ahlerich - Enclosure

- Mr.

Bayse - Enclosure

- Mr. Clarke - Enclosure

- Mr. Davis - Enlcosure

- Mr. Geer - Enclosure

- Mr. McCreight - Enclosure

- Mr. Sharp - Enclosure

Mr. Rissler - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Strait - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Brixey - Enclosure

- Mr. DuHadway - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Penrith - Enclosure

1

1

Mr.

Ricks - Enclosure

-

Mr. Ludemann - Enclosure

1

1

1

1

Mr.

Stoops - Enclosure

MS.

Pagelsen - Enclosure

Mr. Hale - Enclosure

1

1

ttt

1

Mr.

Klein - Enclosure

Davis - Enclosure

Mr. O'Brien - Enclosure

- Mr.

Dun - Enclosure

- Mr. Hooks - Enclosure

CLASSIFIED BY:

DECLASSIFY ON:

632-116-395-17375

OADR

SECRET

FBI/DOJ

HH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 31

---

## Page 32

SECRET

Memorandum to Director, FBI

the first briefing.

A large portion of the Director's briefing book

will consist of materials prepared for the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) hearing which occurred on March 9,

1989. Additional requirements are set out below:

Although zero is expected

States and increasing immigrants from the Soviet Union, Cuba, etc.

QUESTION: A. How will the FBI address the increased presence of

criteria country nationals in the United States in the 1990s?

B. There is a proposal by the Administration for $100, 000, 000 to heli

celocate Soviet emigres in the United States. Does the FBI desire a

portion of this funding to address this immigration? What resources

are needed to address this increased immigration?

C. How will the FBI get greater productivity from available resources

in the 1990s?

The Intelligence Divison (INTD) should prepare a response.

2. ISSUE: A National Academy on Public Administration report

cecently recommended the FBI be exempted from the pay classificatio

requirements of Title 5, United states Code.

It is presumed by the

SSCI that the FBI would need additional resources to implement the

flexibility this proposal would allow but that such resources may not

be available in the 1990s.

QUESTION: If the FBl had the flexibility recommended by NAPA, how

could it currently be utilized without additional resources? (The

answer should discuss the current pay

•scale that forces the FBI to

contract for engineering services as it is unable to hire engineers.)

The Adminstrative Service Division (ASD) should respond with input

from CI 3-D and the Engineering Section, Technical Services Division

(ISD) •

3. ISSUE: The FBI is requesting 55 work years for its Security

Programs

in FY 1990 although in FY 1988 131 work years were expended

and in FY 1987 in excess of 100 work years were expended.

QUESTION: A. Why is the request so much lower than the actual number

of hours TURKed?

B. Is the field burning too many hours for the Security Programs?

- 2-

SECRET

WH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Paye 32

---

## Page 33

SECRET

Memorandum to Director, FBI

c. Are the additional hours utilized for Security Programs coming

Erom man years intended for counterintelligence investigations?

D. What is the position of the FBI in moving the Security Programs

from the

Records Management Division (RMD) to the INTD?

RMD should respond.

4. ISSUE: For the past 2 years the SSCI has requested the Domestic

'errorism Program justification be submitted simultaneously with the

Vational Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget request.

QUESTION:

Would the FBI object to including the Domestic Terrorism

justification in the NFIP budget?

Criminal Investigative Division should respond.

5. ISSUE: The SSCI seems reluctant to support the FBI's current

request for access to Social Security account records and past

requests for access to taxpayer records in counterintelligence cases

and has suggested we work cases jointly with the Internal Revenue

Service to get taxpayer information.

QUESTION: A. Does the FBI conduct joint investigations with the

Internal

Revenue Service?

B. Would the FBI object to increasing its joint investigations with

the Internal Revenue Service to gain access to taxpayer information,

and if so, why?

INTD should respond.

6. ISSUE: The HPSCI and the SSCI support the expansion of the New

employees.

providing the FBI with increased resources to fund the participation

by those offices.

QUESTION:

A. How serious is the New York Office support problem in

terms of turnover, vacancies, moral, etc?

The ASD should respond with input from the New York Office.

7: ISSUE: The Director's opening statement before HPSCI pointed out

that the Interagency Group on Counterintelligence (IG-CI) was a very

important entity.

It is proposed that the National Advisory Group on

Counterintelligence (NAG-CI) will replace IG-CI.

- 3 -

SECRET

HH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 33

---

## Page 34

Memorandum to Director, FBI

QUESTION: A. What is the current status of the NAG-CI? •

B. What Agencies will be represented in the NAG-CI?

C. How important will the NAG-CI be?

The INID should prepare a response.

8. ISSUE: The SSCI has followed the FBI's POWERCURVE investigation

and is interested in the FBI's findings.

QUESTION: What is the outcome of the FBI's investigation into the

security leaks of the Moscow Embassy?

INTD should prepare a response.

9. QUESTION: A. What is the status of the Conrad case?

B. How many people have been implicated in the Conrad Case?

The INTD should prepare a response.

10. ISSUE: The Congressional Budget Justification Book (CBJB)

indicates a reduction in the number of double agent cases conducted

in 1988.

QUESTION: A. Why has there been a reduction in the number of double

agent cases?

B. Is the FBI conducting fewer double agent cases but cases of better

quality?

The INID should prepare a response.

11. ISSUE:

There is concern by the SSCI that the FBI is less capable

in conducting analysis than other intelligence agencies.

QUESTION: A. How many analysts (Special Support) are there at FBI

Headquarters? In the Field?

B. How do these numbers compare to the number of analytical positions

available 5 years ago?

c. Could the FBI use more analysts?

The INTD should prepare a response.

- 4 -

SECRET

HH 5

---

## Page 35

SECRET

Memornadum to Director, FBI

12. ISSUE: The Committee believes the fBI does not share all

information contain in its files with other members of the

intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would

ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.

QUESTION: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single

database

• for CIA, FBI, and DOD?

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INTD, ASD, CID, and RMD prepare

responses for the questions identified above and submit those

questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business

April 5, 1989 in the format currently in use classified as appro-

summary response, details,

APPROVED:

Director .

Exec. AD-Adm

Exec. AD-Inv..

Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

, Crim. Inv..E

Ident.

inspectio

Intelt. TAil

Laboratory

_ Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong.

go f& Public Affs.

Off of Lia

& Inti Amis..

sout

Tech. Servs.

Training .

That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the

preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening

statement and briefing book.

APPROVED:

Director

Exec. AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv. Fre

Ident.

- Inspecto

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong.

HE & Public Affs._

Off of Lia.

& Intl Affs.

Rec. Mamt. AtM/RE

Tech. Servs.

→ Training

- 5-

SECRET

HW 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page

35

---

## Page 36

CONFIDENTIAL

As of: 10 March 1989

DATE & TIME

Tuesday

14 March

0900-1200

H-405

Capitol

1400

Hart 219

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Congressional Hearing Schedule

COMMITTEE & SUBJECT

HPSCI P&B A Subc.

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

Special Air Force Budget

WITNESS/ATTENDEE

PM/Special Air

Force; PBO

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

GDIP Budget

HAC Defense Subc.

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91 Budget

PM/GDIP; PBO

Wednesday

*75 March

H-405

Capitol

1330-1475

1475-7500

1500-1600

Thursday

16 March

0900-1230

H-405

Capitol

1400

Hart 219

GDIP

Special Air Force

CCP; TCP; CCS

HPSCI P&B A Subc.

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

CCP Budget

Consolidated Cryptologic Program

Tactical Cryptologic Program

Computer and Communications Security

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-97

Special Air Force Budget

HPSCI P&B A Subc.

Subject:

Testimony on 1990-91

GDIP Budget

DD/ICS;

PM/GDIP;

PBO

DD/ICS;

PM/Special AF;

PBO

DIRNSA; PBO

DIRNSA; PBO

PM/Special Air

Force; P.BO

Tuesday

21 March

0900-1200

H-405

Capitol

*Indicates Change or Addition

PM/GDIP; PBO

-1-

CONFIDENTIAL

MH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 36

---

## Page 37

DATE & TIME

Wednesday

22 March

0900-1230

H-405

Capitol

Tuesday

04 April

0900-1200

H-405

Capitol

P.M.

H-405

Capitol

1400

Hart 219

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMITTEE & SUBUECT

HPSCI P&B A Subc.

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

TIARA Budget

HPSCI P&B A Subc.

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

NIESP & DMA Budget

HAC Defense Subc.

Subject: MiTstar & Airborne

Reconnaissance Programs

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

CIAP

Wednesday

05 April

0900-1200

H-405

Capitol

1400-1700

Hart 219

HPSCI P&B A Subc.

Subject:

Testimony on 1990-91

Covert Action Budget

SAC Def Subcmte

Subject: Overview of IC Program

& Budget

Thursday

06 April

1400

Hart 219

Thursday

13 April

1400

Hart 219

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

Special Navy & NIESP Budget

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

CCP Budget

*Indicates Change or Addition

CONFIDENTIAL

WW 55008 DocId: 32989599 Paye 37

WITNESS/ATTENDEE

*ASD/I; Armed

Service/Principals

DD/ICS; PBO

D/SIO; PM/NIESP

D/DMA

*PM/Milstar

PM/ARP

DD/ICS; PBO;

ExDir; DDI; DDO;

DDA; DDS&T; Compt;

D/OCA

DDO; Compt; D/OCA

DCI; ExDir; Compt;

D/OCA; PM/NSA;

PM/GDIP; PM/NRP;

D/ICS; DD/ICS;

C/LL/ICS

DD/ICS; PBO;

DASD ( I)

DIRNSA; DD/ICS;

PBO

---

## Page 38

-

-------

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE & TIME

Tuesday

18 April

1400

Hart 219

Thursday

20 April

1400

Hart 219

*Wednesday

26 April

1000-1200

1330-1500

1500-1600

H-405

Capitol

Tuesday

02 May

1400

Hart 219

Tuesday

09 May

1400

Hart 219

Thursday

11 May

1400

Hart 219

COMMITTEE & SUBJECT

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

FBI & DoD Foreign Counter-

intelligence Budget

SSCI

Subject: Covert Action Budget

WITNESS/ATTENDEE

D/FBI

PM/DoD/FCI

CIA/DDO; D/OCA

HAC Defense Subc.

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91 Budget

Special Navy

CIAP

908

ExDir; DDI

DDA: DDS&T

D/SIO; Compt/SIO

SSCI

Subject: Testimony on 1990-91

TIARA Budget

ASD/C3I; PBO

SSCI

Subject: Committee Markup

SSCI

Subject: Committee Markup

*Indicates Change or Addition

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

MH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 38*

---

## Page 39

Memorandum

SSE

CLASS

SRO' D

SER

REC

To

Subject :

ee. Devel

Make anlerich

Date

1/25/89

FBI RELATIONS WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) AND THE HOUSE PERMANENT

—SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE_ (HPSCI)

PURPOSE:

To set forth FBI policy on the conduct of business with

SSCI and HPSCI.

DETAILS: This memorandum restates the agreement of Assistant

Exoc AD Adm.-

Exec AD Inv.-

EXOCAD LES _

Asst. Dir.i

Adm. Sorvs.-

Crim. Inv..

Idont.-

Insoll. -

Laboratory -

Legal Coun._

Plan. & Insp. -

Roc. Mgnt.

Tech. Sorvs..

Training -

Off. of Cong.

& Publicati

Telophone Am. -

Director's Soc'y-

committees will be received and handled by the FBI.

Requests for briefings may be initiated by designated

senior staff members of SSCI and HPSCI.

On November 9, 1988,

KEVIN O'BRIEN anD GEORGE TENET, Staff Director,

ssc1, agreed

SSCI

staff members GEORGE TENET; JAMES H. DYKSIRA, Minority Staff

Director; SVEN E. HOLMES,

General Counsel; and I.

BRITT SNIDER,

Minority Counsel could make requests on behalf of the Committee.

on November 30, 1988, KEVIN O'BRIEN and SSA JOHN S.

HOOKS, CAO, met with THOMAS K.

LATIMER, Staff Director, HPSCI,

who agreed requests by the Committee could be made by Mr.

LATIMER; MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, Chief Counsel; and THOMAS R. SMEETON,

Associate Counsel.

62-1 116-395-1731

1 - Mr. Revell

1-

Mx. Geer

1 - Mr. Clarke

1 - Mr. Ahlerich

(10)

1 - Mr. O'Brien

3

Mr.

Rissler

1 - Mr. Hooks

SSANJOHN S. HOOKS, JR.

ROOM 7240,

TL-245

* JUN I2 1989

DES. 05A

pig- and Fub. Ate

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

FBI/DOS

WH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 39

---

## Page 40

Memorandum to O. B. Revell from Milt Ahlerich

FBI RELATIONS WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI AND THE HOUSE PERMANENT

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HPSCI)

For all other congressional committees, a written

request signed by the respective committee Chairman will be

required for briefings.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

For information only.

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

Director

Exec. AD•Inv.//A_ Laboratory

EXeC. AD-LEg

Off. of Con

& Public Afis. Attle

-2 -

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 40

---

## Page 41

Memorandum

SBeRET

SSP

GLASS

SRC 'D

SER

BEG

To

: Mr.

Gee

From : M. Ahlerich

Date 11/8/88

Exec AD Adm. -

Exec AD Inv..

Exoc AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sorvs.

Crim. Inv..

Idont..

Lab:

Logal Coun. -

Off. Cong. &

Public Affs..

Roc. Mgnt.

Tach. Sorvs.

Training

Tolophone Rm. -

Director's Soc'y -

Subject: VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INIELLIGENCE, (SSCI)

STAFF TO THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE (WMFO)

PURPOSE :

To recommend WMFO host SSCI staff on 11/18/88.

DETAILS: On 11/1/88, John I. Eliff, Professional Staff Member,

SSCI, advised that he; James H. Dykstra, Minority Staff

Director; Britt L.

Snider, Minority Counsel; Edward P. Levine,

Professional Staff; and Charles Battaglia, Professional Staff,

wish to visit WMFO

on 11/18/88. Mr. Eliff was reminded that a

letter from the Chairman would

be required for a field office

visit and advised that a letter would be produced.

The visit

to WMFO was briefly discussed during a 10/26/88 meeting at

FBI Headquarters concerning an update the SSCI is preparing of

a 1986 study entitled "Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A

Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security

Programs" and will be used to gather information for that

update.

In that regard,

Mr. Eliff requested that ar

ntelligence Division (INTD) official in a policy

position accompany the SSCI Staff during the visit. CAO agrees

that,

given the subject matter,

this is a reasonable request

and is in the interest of the FBI.

On 11/2/88, SSA Monty C. Strait, CAO, and John S.

Hooks, Jr., CAO, met

with Messrs Eliff, snider

and Dykstra

to

develop issues

for the visit at WMFO.

Those items are set out

CAO notes that SSCI requests to visit offsite

operations will likely be impossible given time constraints.

Provide an explanation of WMFO's organization for

counterintelligence and criminal investigative

matters.

An organizational chart would be helpful

to demonstrate how resources are deployed.

Appropriate WMFO officials including the sAC

ASAC

1 - SAC, WMFO

12-116

375-1730

-

Mr.

Revell

1

1

--

Mr.

Geer

1

Mr.

Ricks

-

Mr.

Gallagher

1

1

- Mr. Clarke

1

Mr.

0 'Brien

• DEC.2_1988

- Mr. Ahlerich

1

-

1

- Mr.

DuHadway

1

Mr.

Rissler

1 - Mr.

Penrith

Mr.

Strait

1

- Mr.

Hooks

J majh, (14)

DECLASSIPIND BYS

Pa ALLA VILL

GOn.

mifh

SEGRET

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1983-411-864/90791 assify

mOR-16

by:

S-5H4/90

DeclassIFY

on:

HH 55008

DocId: 32989499V page-ft

---

## Page 42

SECRET

Memorandum from M. Ahlerich to Mr. Geer

Re:

Visit of Senate Select Committee in Intelligene (SSCI)

Staff to the Washington Metropolitan Field Office (WFMO)

and the SSA's should be available to meet with SSCI

staff.

Data on the number of establishments covered

by WMFO should be available.

A map identifying their

locations would be helpful.

Provide an estimate of the approximate number of known

intelligence officiers and suspected intelligence

officiers under investigation.

Provide detail on the

number of Look-out sites currently in use.

Provide

data on the total number of offsites in use by wMFo.

Provide details of additional resources needed to

maintain the attack on the hostile foreign intelligence

presence in the WMFO territory.

SSCI Staff has

expressed an interest in visiting a Look-Out if time

permits.

Staff members visited a Look-Out in New York

City in

early 1988.

There is

a proposal for an increase of 30 U.S.

diplomatic

representatives assigned to the

United States Embassy in Moscow.

If this proposal

is approved, the USSR might ask

for reciprical

treatment.

If 30 additional Soviet officials were

posted in

the WMFo territory, how would it impact on

WMFO's counterintelligence missions?

FISA-Prepare to discuss

how decisions are made to

conduct electronic surveillance of an establishment

subject, including Bureau policy as it dillers

from the Foreign Intelligence surveillance Act, and

necessary paper work to implement coverage.

Provide an

update on Double Dagger and a tour of the monitoring

plant.

Explain any problem with utility service that

Impacts on the electronic surveillance efforts staged

by WMFO. Discuss cooperation with the National

Security Agency and National Security Agency

lacilitles.

Discuss minimumization-prepare to answer

questions that might be posed:

What happens if a

Senator calls the USSR Ambassador? Describe the

Investigative processes taken 1f a Senate Staff

member calls a known Intelligence Officer and holds

a conversation that stimulates FBI investigative

interest.

Discuss any needs for additional language

specialists.

-

SE

2

REI

IN 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 12

---

## Page 43

Memorandum from M. Ahlerich to Mr.

Re: Visit of Senate Select Committee in Intelligence (SSCI)

Staff to the Washington Metropolitan Field Office (WIMO)

Physical Surveillance-Discuss the utilization of

SSG. If time permits, Committee staff would like

to speak with SSG as they did in New York in early

19a deploy are pol cases peteritized to determine

Has the ISD Engineering Section

provided new technology assisting in Physical

Surveillance, example grid, satellite systems,

Terrorism-Counterterrorism squad supervisors,

ASAC John M. Kelso, and ASAC David W. Johnson

should be available, if possible, meet with

SSCI Staff.

They should explain

the difference

in the investigative efforts of the two

counterterrorism squads.

They should prepare to

discuss the use of the Hostage Rescue Team in

terrorist matters.

The Congressional Affairs Office has scheduled the WMFO

Meeting to begin at 10 a.m. If desired, this

• time could be moved

to 8:30

la.m.

WMFO should plan time for lunch. The cafeteria in the

building will be suitable.

Some SSCI Staff members visited the New York Office and

the San Francisco Office in early 1988. During those visits, time

was available for SSCI Staff to have an informal discussion with a

small number of office managers and with a small number of case

Agents after regular business hours.

opportunities and inquired if a similar setting could be used to

This communication makes no

recommendation in this regard other than to note that such contact

did create good will between the Committee staff and the Bureau.

SECRET

H₩ 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 43

---

## Page 44

Memorandum from M. Ablerich to Mr. Geer

Re: Visit of Senate Select Committee in Intelligence (SSCI)

Staff to the Washington Metropolitan Field Office (WMFO)

RECOMMENDATION: (1) That the INTD approve the visit of SSCI Staff

(letter to be provided) on 11/18/88 at 10 a.m. and coordinate

with WMFO to prepare an agenda for the visit.

APRROVED:

som gers.

Heat

Director

Exec. AD.Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv..

Exec. AD-LES

•Leberator

- Legal Guis

TED

Training

(2) That the Criminal Investigative Division approve

the meeting of SSCI with WMFO counterterrorism management.

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. inv.

Iecr...

_ Off. of Cong.

- Ci ci Lia.

Director

Exec. AD.7em.

Exes. AD-Inv.

Exec. AD-LES

Incpecic.?

Laborate?

Legal Cou.

_ Tso:: Saris.

_ Training

TED

(3) That INTD designate an official in a policy

position to accompany SSCI Staff during the WMFO visit.

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. inv..

. Off. of Cong

& Public Affs. MASK

- C. d! Lia.

Director

Exec. AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.-

Exec. AD-LES

1:3.1.

Leboratory (

Legal Coun

_ Tess Sorus.

_ Training

TED

(4)

That SSA John S. Hooks, Jr. coordinate this

matter.

APPROVED:

Director

Exec. AD-Adr.

Exec. AD-Inv.-

Exes. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv...

kent.

Inopertian

Iricil.

Legal C

TED

_ Cí of Lia.

a tas Niis.

- Tron Benis.

_ Training.

IN 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 44

---

## Page 45

In response reply to:

88-3766

DAVID L BOREN, OKLAHOMA CHAIRMA!

• • •WELAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMA!

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINLA

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

GEORGE I. TENET, STAFF DIRECTO

AMES H. DYKSTRA MINORITY STAFF DIRECTO

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE CHIEF CLERK

November 7, 1988

The Honorable William S. Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

J. Edgar Hoover Building

Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

As part of our current review of counterintelligence

programs, we are looking at the challenges and

opportunities

confronting the FBI.

For this purpose,

we believe it would be

valuable for our staff

to visit FBI field offices, beginning

with the Washington Metropolitan Field Office which plays an

important role in the national counterintelligence effort.

such visits have helped in the past to identify ways of

strengthening FBI capabilities.

We would appreciate your

making appropriate arrangements for an oversight visit to

Washington office by Committee staff members Jim Dykstra,

Britt Snider, Ed Levine,

Charles

Battaglia, and John Elliff on

Friday, November 18, 1988.

We are grateful for the assistance of FBI

headquarters

and field personnel in preparing for this visit.

Sincerely:

Leord S. Born

David L. Boren

Cohen

# p 8y449198-899448497 744748 4845I

TI, INTORMATION CONTALNEL

DATE a 20 a00057SPa, Fin. Unf

moR-1l

67-114-385-1730

AH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 45

---

## Page 46

SECRET

October 24, 1988

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

Honorable David I. Boren

Chairman

Select Committee on

Intelligence-

ünited Statessenate

Washington, D.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please be advised that we have received your letter to

Bye sea or by the Best a te one be the tea tent to then

A member of our Congressional Affairs Office will be in

contact with your Committee staff regarding this request.

Sincerely yours,

-

10/25

Milt Ahlerich

Assistant Director

Office of Congressional

and Public Affairs

1 - Mr. Revell - Enclosure

1

1

- Mr. Ahlerich - Enclosure

- Mr. Geer - Enclosure

HH

- Mr. DuHadway - Enclosure

Mr. O'Brien - Enclosure

2

-

Mr.

Rissler - Enclosure

1

. - Mr.

Hooks - Enclosure

Mair

6941427-1729

• DEC 8_1093

1. Da

ROON E1Y, TI-245

классно

"Hire - one

1 of song

Cr:

17:

In'

Straid:

Bad pair,

*Xt of Lia.

¿ int! Ato

Rus Mgal

Tach Servs.

Training

Exoc AD Adm..

Exoc AD Inv.'

ExaC AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

Insp.

Intoll. -

Lab.

Legal Coun. -

Off. Cong, &

Public Affs.

Roc. Mgnt.

Tech. Sorvs.

Training

Tolephone Rm.

Director's Soc'y.

MAIL ROOH

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 46

APPROVED:

rocks!

Exec. AD-LES

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY:

DECLASSIFY ON:

G-:

DADE

FBI/DOJ

---

## Page 47

DAVIO L BORER, OKLAHOMA, CHAMPALAM

WALAMS COHEN, BLUE VICE CHUPANY

1L010 BENTSEN, TEXAS

WILLAM Y.ROTH,IR, DELAWARE

EAM HUNGH, GECAGLA

ORPIN HATCH, UTAH

ERNEST F. HOLLMIGS, SOUTH CAROUNA

FRANK MURKOWSKL ALAST

AIL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

ARLEN SPECTER PENNSYLVI

ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORANA

CHIC HECHT, NEVADA

DENIAS DACONCHH, ARIZOT

JOHN WARNER VASTIANA

HICLAÑO M METZENBAUM, OHM

ROBERT C. BYRO, MEST VIAGINA, EX OFFICIO

ROSERT DOLE KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR

JAMES H. DYASTRA MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

SECRET /SENSINE

United States State

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475

#88-3613

October 17, 1988

Honorable William Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is

conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence

and

security programs and capabilities.

Included in this

review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of

sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.

Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers

have been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel.

Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee staff

technology and equipment from

the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis.

For

the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played

in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission

and Trade Center in. New York.

Sincerely,

Said Loren

David L. Boren

Chairman

71 Miam S. Coher

Tilde Chairmai

WW 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 47

SECRET SENSITIVE

45-162951779

---

## Page 48

Memorandum

Exec AD Inv.

Exoc AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs.

Crim low freeme

Idont.

Insp.

Intell.

Lab.

Logal Counce

Off. Cong. &

Public Affs..

Roc. Mgnt.

Tech. Sorvs..

Training -

l'alephono Rm. —

Director's Soc'y -

To

clarke

Date 8/22/88

From

M.

ihlerich

Subject :

BRIEFING FOR

INTELLIGENCE

STAFF ON CENTRAL

AMERICAN TERRORISM

PURPOSE:

To recommend captioned briefing be provided.

SSCI staff designee for

briefing is to be limited

to current terrorist activities,

including those of the FMIN and other groups, and is separate

from the CISPES inquiry.

It is noted by the Congressional Affairs Office that

Mr. LEVINE is one of the SSCI staff members conducting the CISPES

review for the Committee.

POCAN SOCion chief,

That Mr. LEVINE be briefed by STEVEN I.

Counterterrorism Section on 8/30/88 at

2:00 p.m.

APPROVED:

*

Adm. Servs.

Off. of Cong.

Crim. Inv. Frc./AMg& Public Afts.

Ident.

Off of Lia.

Director

Inspection

& Intl Affs.

3 Intell.

Rec. Mgmt.

Exec AD-inv.

_ Laboratory

Tech Servs.

Exec. AD-LES

_ Lega. Goun.

Training

2.

That SSA JOHN S. HOOKS, JR., CAO coordinate

this matter.

APPROVED:

Director

Exec. AD-Inv

Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Off. of Cong.

Crim. Inv. Fire/ANG & Public Affs..

dent.

_ Off of Lia.

- & Intl Affs..

Rec. Mgmt.

Laboratory -

_ Legal Coun

Tech. Servs.

Training

718065

1

1

1

- Mr. Revell

Mr.

Clarke

Mr. Ricks

• Mr.

Pomerantz

glh

(11)

1

- Mr. VanBalen

Mr. O'Brien

- Mr

DE-142

6:2116 345-1728

ROOM 7240,

TL-245

10 OCT 3 1950

* This wits clanged to 2:70 8131/88; the briefing to be

AcarducteR by Pomertz TRAD RiCks.

35009 dodya: 32989599 Page d8

---

## Page 49

INCONS

Tob C0 1989

RFP-5T

F.B.1.

U:S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JUSTICE

INYESTIGATIYE

ASSIGTAN EHEATLE 23

3 a rM 1988

SEP /

5 29 PM

CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIVE

FRONT OFFICE

SEP 1 10 15 AM 1988

RECEIVED

CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIVE

FRONT OFFICE

DIVISION

SEP I1

RESTOR

AUG 23)

nEr:

& PUBLIC AFFS! 22 PM 'BO

1S.

3AN-0V3

B8, HY SMS Z d3S

034.3038

F. 8.1

U.S. BEPT. OF JUSTICE

SEP / 11 32ĂM 1988

RECEIVED

CRIMINAL

INYESTIGATIVE

FRONT OFFICE

SNOO

1036.d10

AR. WILS Z

12 d35

03Л3038

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 49

---

## Page 50

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO

From

Subject

Mr. S. M.

Date 4/20/88

M. V.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)

REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON AND

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLIA) AND THE

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN

This communication is classified SECRET.

Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.

Exec AD Adm

Exec AD InV_

ExeC AD .LES

Asst.Dir.:

Adm.Servs._

crim. Inv._

Ident.-

Insp--

Intell.

Lab._

Legal couns._

Off.Cong &

Public Affs._

Rec. a .._

Telephone RM._

Director's Sec'y_

PURPOSE:

To set forth results of briefing of John Eliff,

Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of Congressional

Public Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr., Unit

Chief Roland 0. L'Allier, Jr., Intelligence Division, and

OLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) representation in Berlin.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED:

Director

Exec. AD.Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv..

Ident.

Inspection

inteli..

Legalow.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - S. M. McWeeney

1 -J

H. Geer

Attn:

J. E. Tomlinson

1 - J. K. O'Brien

Attn:

J. S. Hooks, Jr.

1 - S. A. Pimentel

1 -

T.

E. Crosson

1 - M. V. Hale

MVH: Chim (Z)

607-111-395-1727

3 MAY 2'8 1938

SECRET

Classified by:

Declassify on:

3642

OADR

HH

8 DEC 22 1988

35001

DocId: 32989599 Page 50

---

## Page 51

SECRET

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

Re:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and

International Affairs (OLIA) and the

Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS:

State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in

order to present the FBI's case for representation in

During these discussions, Mr. Hale was advised that

staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin

concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale, in that

context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding the FBI's

perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a

counterintelligence point of view.

Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently

visited West Berlin, he was intimately familiar with the

intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin

and supported the FBI's presence there.

•He indicated he was well

aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence

coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in

that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian

intelligence intelligence components were addressing the threat

to these individuals and this for two reasons.

The first involved the basic functions of the U.S.

antonine done he er boing te boat no one to

requirement.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

SECRET

-2-

HH 55008

DocId:32989599

Page 51

---

## Page 52

SECRET

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

Re:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI

Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison ano

International Affairs (OLIA) and the

Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

technical surveillance and mail openings. Mr. Eliff stated that,

sector of West Berlin.

It also opens certain mail of interest

from the Fast which passes through this sector.

However,

whenever there is an overhear of a U. S. national or whenever

there is mention made of a U. $. national in a piece of

correspondence,

that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to

any other U.

intelligence agency.

This lack of dissemination

is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. S.

Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the

activities of U. S. nationals.

As a consequence of this lawsuit,

very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. S.

military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to

monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for minimizing

overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.

The net results of these restrictions is that, according

to Mr. Eliff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as

well as the

like potential collection of names of U. S. persons

via mail openings has been lost.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

SECRET

-3-

IN 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 52

---

## Page 53

SECRET

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI

Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and

International Affairs (OLIA) and the

Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblum,

office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice,

had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant with

this U.

s. military monitoring issue.

Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBI

presence in West Berlin in that his study of the

counterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that the

many double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were run

for parochial reasons with no strategic view of

counterintelligence.

He stated that even though the U. s

military services were professional and did coordinate the

turnover of some of their many double agents to the FBI when

these agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believed

the fBl should have input at the outset of these double agent

cases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamental

counterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with the

principle counterintelligence service, the FBI, at their

inception in order to better globally address counterintelligence

He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin would

therefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherent

national counterintelligence strategy.

Mr. Elifi concluded by reiterating his support for the

FBI's presence in West Berlin, by indicating that he would be

willing, were we to ask, to indicate his support of this position

to the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. Jeff

Smith, Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also well

versed in counterintelligence issues and a potential stron

supporter of the FBI's cause.

Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff for

his time and indicated that the

FBI had designated a new

assistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely be

to travel weekly to west Berlin in order to prepare the FBI's

case for a permanent presence there.

SECRET

-4-

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599 Page 53

---

## Page 54

Memorandum

Exoc AD Adm. -

ExaC AD Inv._

in

Exec AD LES -

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sorvs

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

Intelle

Laboratory

Legal Coun

Plan. & Insp.

Rec. Mgnt..

Toch. Servs..

Traming -

Zpoif. of Cong.

& Public Affs.

Tolophone Rm. -

Diractor's Soc'y.-

OLASS,

SRO'D

SER

REC

To

From

Subject :

Date 12/11/87

M. Ahlerich MAgRe

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIICENCE (SCI) MEETING

TO GATHER INFORMATION ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR

FORCES TREATY (INE TREATY)

PURPOSE: To advise of captioned meeting and to request the

Intelligence Division (INTD) designate a representative to

attend.

meeting at 4:30 p.m. on December 15, 1987 in the SSCI hearing

room 211 Hart Office Building to discuss matters relating to INF

Treaty verification.

The meeting is scheduled to last

approximately one hour.

The purpose of the meeting is to give

Committee Members an opportunity to tell the Department of

Defense (DOD) what SSCI expects in the way of treaty

verification.

JACK DONNLEY,

DOD Counterintelligece, has been

requested to attend along with a General DANIELS (not further

identified) who will be in charge of INF Treaty verification.

Although it is not necessary that the FBI attend, It is belịeve

DY SSCI FBI presence would be beneficial and an invitation has

been extended.

17268

1

- Mr. Revell

1

Mr. Geer

1

Mr. Ahlerich

Mr. DuHadway

Mr. Stukey

- Mr. O'Brien

3. - Mr. Rissler

;= vi.

Hooks

PH:glh (11

12 DEC 9 1988

25453T ESSED ENTRAN

SSA JOHN

ROOM 7240,

QOKS

1-245

SECRET

SEE OCPA ADDENDUM PAGE 3

HH 55008

JUL 2 0 1980

DocId: 32989599

Page 54

FBI/DOS

---

## Page 55

Memorandum to J. H. Geer from Milt Ahlerich

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) MEETING TO

GATHER INFORMATION ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TREATY (INF TREATY)

RECOMMENDATION:

1.

That INTD designate a representative to

attend the captioned meeting and notify CAO.

APPROVED:

XeC ADAGIT. _ Intell

Exoc. AD-Inv.

ExeC. AD-LES

Tech. Servs. -

•2. That SSA JOHN S. HOOKS, JR accompany the

INTD representative to captioned meeting.

APPROVED:

Exec AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

Exec AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

- Lege

..un.

- & Intl Affs. _

Rec. Mgmt

Tech Servs. --

Training

SECRET

-2.

HHT

55008

DooId: 32989599

Page 55

---

## Page 56

Memorandum from M. Ahlerich to J. H. Geer dated 12/11/87

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Meeting

to Gather Information on Intermediate Range Nuclear

Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)

ADDENDUM:

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs (OCPA)

USH:mmc

12/16/87

on 12/15/87, Deputy Assistant Director Thomas E.

DuHadway attended an informal meeting of the SSCI in which

Te a in and estate on tell gene come o. the

I PROVED.

Director

= 05 10.;.

Adm. Servs.

..:"

-3 -

1N 35008

Doc1d: 32989599

Page 56

---

## Page 57

March 20, 1987

FEDERAL GOVERNMENE

Mr. SVen HOLmes

chief Counsel and Staff Director

Senate Select committee on

Intelligence

United States Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Holmes: achina

Pursuant to Question #12 of the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential

Nominee,

have enclosed a list of all the speeches William

has given since becoming the Director of the FBI in 1978.

This information is being provided in advance of the completed

questionnaire.

Those speeches which have not been transcribed

are asterisked.

also enclosed a copy of the speeches

antones bene as been tillation sent tis will

meet your needs.

sincerely,

62-116-395-1121

William M. Baker

Assistant Director

Office of Congressional

and Public Affairs

Enclosures (2)

1

- Mr. W. M. Baker - Enclosures (2)

1

- Research Unit - Enclosures (2)

(CIA Nomination)

Exec AD Adm. -

Exec AD Inv.

SDG: baf (5)

:Speech Unit - Enclosures (2) (detachird)

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs. -

Crim. Inv. -

Ident.

Insp.

Intelli

Lab.

Legal Coun..

Off. Cong. &

Public Affs. -

Roc. Mgnt.

Tach, Sorvs.

Training

Telophono Rm..

Director's Sec'y

HH 55008

APPROVED:

160233

DEr

Seat 3/20

506

Director.

Exec. AD-Adm._

Exec. AD-InV..

Exec. AD-LES -

ATI, INFORMATION CORTATIO

MAIL ROOM D

DocId: 32989599 Page 57

&I JUNES

1981

Adm. Servs..

Crim. Inv...

ident...o

Inspection.

intell_

Laboratory.

Legal Coun

Oft. of Cong.

& Public Alfen Us

Training

FEl/DOJ

---

## Page 58

1 - Mr. O'Malley

1

- MI.

Baker

1

- Mr. O'Brien

3

- Mr. Moschella

. - Mr. Moran

FEDERAL COVERMINE

April 17, 1985

Honorable Dave Durenberger

Chairman

-Select Committee on Intelligence

United States Senate

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter confirms our response to your letter

dated February 26, 1985, when you recested that we continue to

advise the Committee promptly whenever information is developed

that a foreign agent has contacted a member of the Committee.

Nur Congressional Affairs Office has notified Comnittee staff

that we will continue to abide by this agreement.

to ab do py thing

I aqree

that this arrangerent has worked well in the past and we will

continue to bring such matters to your attention whenever they

OCCUI.

1.:/17

Exac AD Iny. _

Exoc AD Adm. -

ExeC AD LES _

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs._

Crim. Inv. _

Ident. -

Intell.

Laboratory -

Legal Coun..

Plan. & Insp.

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Servs.

Training -

Public Alfs. Or

Telephone Rm.

Director's Sec'y-

MAIL ROOM

55008

DarIA: 3290

Sincerely yours,

APPROVED:

151

William H. Webster

Director

Adm. Servs._

Crim. Inv. -

Director L/1y

Exec. AD-Adm..

ExeC. AD-InV.

Exec. AD•LES

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong.

& Public Affs.

Rec. Mignt.

/Tech. Servs.

Training _

(- 1: 995-1125

A 1 dig 1905

NOTE:

Bernie McMahon, Staff Director, SSCI, was contäcteã.

regarding receipt of this letter on March 19, 1985.

He was

advised that we would continue to abide by the agreement referred

to in the Committees request.

RAM: tlm

(8)

SL SVORMATION CONTAITHE

BERAT IS LNCLASSETED

60000.5x0 An UnF

39 2 1270/ an

519

---

## Page 59

DAVE DURENBERGER, MINNESOTA, CHAIRMAN

PATRICK LEAHY, VERMONT, VICE CHAIRMAN

VILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARI

LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS

VILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA

ORRIN HATCH, UTAH

RANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA

THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MISSOURI

ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA

ILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSE

MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY

AVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOM

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIC

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIC

nited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 205 10

#85-0659

February 26, 1985

Sexoc. AD-Adm.

Exe. A0-104.

Exer. AD-LES

asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sais.

Crim. hav.

ident.

Jaspectan

Intell. _

Laboratory

Legal Caun.

Olt. of Coing

& Public Afts

Rec. Ligat

Tech. Sarys.

Training -

Atelephore Rm.

•Direstor's Sec'y

1981

FEDERAL GOVERIMENT

The Honorable William H. Webster

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

J. Edgar Hoover Building

Washington, D.C. 20535

Per Mr. O'Brien's office, OCPA,

an appropriate response

§ beinr

prepared by Congressiona. 'Affail.

Office for your approval.

Dear Bill:

In 1977, when Senator Daniel Inouye was Chairman

of the Select Committee, an agreement was entered into

with the Intelligence Community that the Committee would

¡be advised promptly whenever the Intelligence Community

learned that a foreign agent had contacted a Member of

At the budget authorization hearing on

counterintelligence in 1981, Senator Inouye recalled

this agreement; and both you and Director Casey affirmed

that the Committee would be so informed. We wish to

continue this arrangement, which appears to have worked

well

in the past.

sincerely

Pausunhi

etrick

Vice Chairman

4. La

1.50

537°

- 14325-1724

DE-133

10 APR 23 1985

HH

55008

DATE 2/0

HEREIN

ALL, INFORILATION CONTAITIN

AO0 DI

ECLASSEIX

MOR-)6

water

"AY"" 1985

DocId:32989599

Page 59

022. of Cotta 4

---

## Page 60

Memorandura!

To

Mr.

Date

214/83

AIWiTK:

Subject SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) STAFF

REQUEST FOR BRTEFING CONCERNING THE MARINE RESOURCES

COMPANY JOINT FISHING VENTURE

PURPOSE:

Exac AD Adm. -

Exac AD Inv. _

ExoC AD LES -

Asst. Dir.:

Adm.Sarvt.=

Crim. Inv. -

Idant..

Intoll..

Laboratory

Logal Coun..

Plan. & Insp.

Roc. Migne.-

Tach, Sorus. _

Training

Off. of Cong.

& Publie Affs.

Telophono Rm. -

Diracsor's Sac'y-

490i2.5

ORIGINAL FILED LA

to E. J. O'Malley memorandum 1/27/83, captioned as above. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

(U)

AF1.439524

Acm. Sons..

Crim. Hir.

Director

LEDOriOrY.

Legal Coun

Oft, of Cong.

& Public Alls.

Bee. Worst.

Exoa. AD-iny.

_ Ident.

haspsetien

- list

DETAILS:

The U.S.-USSR Marine Resources Company of Seattle,

Washington, is a joint venture of the Soviet Government and

One Soviet is stationed in Seattle

stationed in Nakhodka, USSR, on a

strict reciprocity basis.

(U)

62-116315-

1 - Mr. R. S. Young

1 - Mr.

E. J. O'Malley

1 - MI. R. L. Lettler

1 - Mr. A. S. Archer

I MAR I 1983,

Erican's

16-304723

RLL: dmy (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified

DecLassie

G-3

OADR

TO TEREN

MAR 1. 1983

FBI/DOJ

HH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 60

---

## Page 61

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum R. L. Leffler to Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Re:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Staft

Request for Briefing Concerning

the Marine Resources

Company Joint Fishing Venture

Mr. Butterworth requested a briefing on the counter-

intelligence implications of a proposal made to Senator Jackson

by Bellingham Cold Storage Company, Seattle, Washington, to

establish

servicing and dry dock

Bellingham,

repair facility in

Washington, For Soviet Fishing vessels.

The

vessels would dock for repair for a two to four-week period

and

would be accompanied by a maintenance crew of 25 to 50

Soviets.

These maintenance crews would live on the ships

being repaired, would be allowed free access to the port

community and would be rotated back to the Soviet Union

every six months. (U)

I advised Mr. Butterworth that this proposal was

similar to one made in 1979 by Bellingham and that the FBI

had

recommended against implementation at that time because

it represented potential for significant intelligence

exploitation by the

Soviet intelligence services.

Moreover,

it would constitute a major drain on our investigative resources

which would be required to effectively monitor Soviet activity

in and around Bellingham. Our reasoning was based on the fact

that there were major sensitive defense installations in the

area and that Soviet intelligence personnel, fully capable

of mounting HUMINI gathering operations, undoubtedly would

be assigned to the semipermanent Soviet complement. It was

also speculated that the Soviets would eventually require

some type of permanent shore facilities which would add to

the coverage problem. (C)

It was further explained to Mr. Butterworth that

insofar as repair work on the Soviet vessels by U.S. persons

was concerned, it would probably be limited to the exterior

of the ships, with any interior work being done by the Soviets

in order to protect sensitive SIGINI gathering equipment

known to be aboard at least some of these vessels.

Hence the

need for such a relatively large Soviet "maintenance crew." (C)

Mr. Butterworth was told that from the FBI's view-

point nothing has occurred since we last studied this matter

that would alter our recommendation against the implementation

of this proposal.for counterintelligence reasons.

(C)

Briefing provided by Acting Section Chief Rodney L.

Leffler and was attended by Margaret Owens, Congressional

Affairs

Section.

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

HH 55008

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## Page 62

Memorandum

To

E. J. O'Malley

Date 1/27/83

Exac AD Adm. _

Exac AD Inv. -

ExaC AD LES-

Asse. Dir.:

Adm. Sorrs.

Crim. Iny. -

Idant. -

Intall., -

Laboratory -

Legal Coun. -

Plan. & Insp. -

Roc. Mgnt..

Toch. Sarvs. -

Training -

Off. of Cong.

&-Public Affs.

Tolophone Rm. -

Diroctor's Sac'y-

Artiuli

Subie SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIIGENCE ISSCI) STAFF

REQUEST FOR BRIEFING CONCERNING THE MARINE RESOURCES

COMPANY JOINT FISHING VENTURE

PURPOSE: To advise of the above.

DETAILS: On 1/26/83, Mr. Bob Butterworth, Senator

Jackson's designee on the SSCI, telephoned Congressional

Affairs Section and requested

a briefing concerning

a proposal by Bellingham Cold Storage Company, a Seattle,

Oregon business which is part of the Marine Resources Company

Joint Fishing Venture.

The proposal relates to establishing

a vessel repair operation for Soviet fishing vessels in the

North Pacific. It is expected that these vessels will dock

at Bellingham, Washington, (or as an alternative, in Coosbay,

Oregen)

for 2 to 4 weeks for repairs. The crew of the vessels

will return to the Soviet Union but a Soviet maintenance group

of 25 to 50 individuals would remain to supervise the work.

These individuals would live on the vessels but would be free

to visit the port community.

These maintenance crews would

be rotated back to the Soviet Union every 6 months.

Senator Jackson has been advised of the economic

benefits to the community but is concerned that there may

be some counterintelligence problems with this arrangement.

Therefore he has asked Mr. Butterworth to discuss this matter

with the FBI.

Mr. Butterworth received a briefing on Soviet

shipping at headquarters and at the Seattle field office

in December 1981 and January 1982 respectively).

This request was discussed with Deputy Assistant

Director Phil Parker and SA Rodney Leffler on 1/27/83.

RECOMMENDATION:

requested briefing.

That Intelligence Division provide the 7 =1

12-11639

165-

Laboratory

Adm. Serve.

Legal Coun.

1

APPROVER! MAR

Icritoeno._

Off. a Cong

Man? Malley

1

Mr. Leffler

1

Mr. Haynes

3

- Mr. Moschella

1 - Mr. Brewer

n1 - Ms. Owens

'MRO/lec (9)

LEc

& Pubiis Affs.

Rec. Mgrit.

Director +

Exec. AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Iny.

ExBO. AD-LES

Tech. serus.

Inspectio

Intell

Training-

Pander

ALL IUTORVATION CONTATIS

HEREIN IS UNCLASSLASO

DATE 113€ 20008X S12 0um WAf

TMDK-14

8=1983

FBI/DOJ

HH 55008 DocId:32989599 Page 62

ORIGINAL FILED I

105-300723

---

## Page 63

155

5

1-10-03

SECRET

#F$HOPP NYODE HQ HO155 #NOYSEP 102244Z JAN 83

PRIORITY

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI NEW YORK PRIORITY

ATTENTION: SAC GRAY

ATTENTION: SAC MCGORTY

I вт

SECRET

ACTIVITILS

ERSENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCERSSCTE TET VISIT TO

_THE NEW YORK OFFICE JANUARY 17-189 1983.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

LUNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

REBUCALLS TO SACS GRAY AND MCGORTY, AND BUTEL JANUARY

1983, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE. fUJ

ON JANUARY ?A 19031 SSCI STAFF MEMBER JOHN ELLIFF, AND STAFF

•BUDGET OFFICER HERBERT KLINE MET WITH

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

63-1

{INTD} TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF VISIT TO THE NEW

PORK OFFICE.! CUT i

SSCI STAFFERS WISH TO HAVE GENERAL OVERVIEW BRIEFING ON

FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CECIF AND TERRORISM MATTERSEWJAMINA 1983

I FEC: Im

{9}

11-10-63

403515

4674/232

1 - Mr.

R.

S. Young

{Attn:

B. F. Brewer}

- Mr.

J. O'Malley

A. Parker fEnc:}

- Mr.

rettus ine.

- Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

-

Mr.

.

L. Tierney {Enc-}

W.

D. Gore

tEnc.}

R.

P. Hanssen {Enc-}

F. E. Carey, III

INCATIONS LENTLN

SEE NOTE PAGE SIX

120/7CK

JAN 1 1 19837

NN 55008

59 FEB 1

Doc1d:32989599

1983

Page 63

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## Page 64

i:.

PAGE TUP*O DE HQ 0155 SECRET

NEW YORK.

THE SSCI STAFFERS ALSO HAVE SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTERS

THEY WISH TO DISCUSS, WHICH ARE SET FORTH HEREIN.

NEW YORK SHOULD BE MINDFUL THAT SSCI STAFFERS MAY INDICATE A

_ DESIRE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES SET FORTH HEREIN, IN SOME DETAIL,

IN AN EFFORT TO "ASSIST" THE FBI IN MEETING ITS FCI

RESPONSIBILITIES. HOWEVER, THE NEW YORK OFFICE IS NOT THE

APPROPRIATE ARENA TO RAISE PROBLEM ISSUES AFFECTING OVERALL FCI

POLICY. NEW YORK'S COMMENTS, AND THE CONTENTS OF ANY BRIEFING

AFFORDED SSCI STAFFERS, MUST BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE, BUT

STRICTLY WITHIN GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY FBIHQ. NEW YORK MAY

COMMENT ON CURRENT RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED TO MEET

HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT IN THE NEW YORK OFFICE. PENDING

CASES AND OTHER SENSITIVE MATTERS SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AND

WHILE SSCI STAFFERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS AND BRIEFING

INCLUDE AGENT PERSONNEL, FBIHQ DESIRES THAT MEETINGS BE CONFINED

TO THE SAC/ASACST AND SELECTED SUPERVISORS. SSA ROBERT P.

i HANSSEN, BUDGET AND PLANNING UNIT, WILL REPRESENT INTD DURING

BRIEFING AND DISCUSSIONS.

¡ THE FOLLOWING:

BEYOND THE OVERVIEW BRIEFING SSCI STAFFERS WISH TO DISCUSS

FBIE 9.

NH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 64

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## Page 65

AJEK Act 6 (1) (B)

3

PAGE THREE DE HQ DI55 SECRET

13 CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY

AGENCY ENSAS AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ECIAS COMPONENTS

THE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE

GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE

FACILITY. ACCORDING TOI

SSCI STAFF MEMBER, NSA HAS POSED NO OBUECTIONS AND INTD HAS NO

_ OBJECTIONS EITHER. HOWEVER, TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED;

_BY THE SUPERVISOR, AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED. UNDER NO

CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED. AND NO DISCUSSION

SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED:

AS "EXCELLENT." SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION BE

EXTENDED TO

REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS

- REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO

CONTACT CIA,

INDEPENDENTLY.

2} UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE

_CONGRESS. SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING

_ VIEWS OF FIELD ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS; PROBLEMS, VALUE, ETC.?

' INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 65

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## Page 66

4

1!!:

PAGE FOUR DE HO 0155 SECRET

OPERATION, AND HOW IT HAS BEEN USED TO ASSESS HOSTILE TARGETS.

NEW YORK MAY ALSO WISH' TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN AN OPERATION OF THIS NATURE EE GO LEASING

SPACE, ETC}.

3} ACTIVE MEASURES• SSCI STAFFERS WISH TO DISCUSS NEW

YORK'S RESPONSE TO SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER

INTD BELIEVES SSCI MAY ATTEMPT TO CENTER DISCUSSION ON THE

CURRENT "PEACE" AND ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT. NEW YORK COMMENTS

SHOULD BE CONFINED TO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY,

U.S-A. IS UNDER INVESTIGATIONS AS WELL AS THE KGB. BUT REQUEST

THAT FURTHER AMPLIFICATION BE DISCUSSED WITH FBIHQ. NEW YORK

• MAY WISH TO REFER TO DIRECTOR'S AIRTEL TO ALL SACS, DECEMBER IP.

1982, CAPTIONED "FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDELINES -

INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS," FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON

THIS SUBJECT.

4} TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. THE AREA OF INTEREST IS FBI

¡ RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE AND CIA REGARDING

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. THEY WOULD LIKE TO COVER THE "EXODUS"

PROJECT AND THE RELATIONSHIPS OF UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS TO .

' TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

NH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 66

---

## Page 67

•..,....

5

PAE*GE FIVE DE HQ D155 S E CRE T

57

. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

63 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT EFISAJ. HOW IS

FISA SYSTEM WORKING?

C BY: 859, DCL: OADR

BT

HH 55008

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## Page 68

PAGE SIX

SECRET

NOTE:

Communication providing New York with details of

proposed visit of SSCI Staff members to New York on January

17-181 1983.

Details of request contained in memorandum

R.S. Young to Director, dated January ba 1983, captioned "Visit

by Senate Select Committee on

York office."

This communication coordinated with Mr. Parker

Mr. Pettus,

and Mr. Nolan.

Fair 83013

shantis .

Bras. AD-Adi.

Exes. AD-inV.

ENsO. AD-LES

sdont...

Inspection

Intell. C. TT/2

Legal Couns.

Off. of Cong.

& FubliC Atts.

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Serva.

Training _

- — —

HH 55008

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Page

68

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## Page 69

Memorandum

Exec AD Adm. —

Exoc AD Inv. -

(Lu)

Exec AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sorvs..

Crim. Inv.

Idant. -

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

To

: 0. B. Revell'

Date 8/31/82.

Plan. & Insp.

Roc. Mgnt..

Tech. Servs.

Training_

From

Off. of Cong.

& Publie Affs.

suer: SENATE SELECT COMTILE CO STUDY LAN ENCROUT UNDERCOVER

Talophone Rm. -

Director's Soc'y-

ACTIVITIES OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PURPOSE: To advise you of captioned Committee's oral

request

to review certain files and make appropriate.

recommendation.

DETAILS: On 8/30/82, Deputy. Chief Counsel, to captioned Committee,

Malcolm Wheeler, requested that the FBI provide the Headquarters

volume I and Washington Field Office volumes 1, 2 and 3 of Labou

and all Headquarters and Seattle volumes of BUYIN for his review.

This request is made in order for the Committee to more

appropriately prepare for Assistant Director Revell's testimony

scheduled 9/21/82.

RECOMMENDATION: That Criminal Investigative Division provide

appropriately redacted. copies of the above volumesto Office

of Congressional and Public Affairs pursuant to the Committee's

review..

APPROVED:

Director -

Exec. AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

Exec. AD-LES

1

1

- Mr. Revell'

- Mr. Young

- Mr. Haynes

- Mr. Moschella

- Mr. Andrews.

- Mr.

Martens

Torn

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Init

ident..

Inspection.

Intell._

Laboratory -

Legal Coun. -

Off. of Cong

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Servs.

Training.

42116395-4772

Efu

21 AUG 25 1989

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN

HEREIN IS WNCLASSINDED

DATE 11.30

MOR-16

FBI/DOS

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 69

---

## Page 70

1

1

-

HI.

Mullen, Jr.

- Mr.

R

Young

MI.

O'Malley

Mr .

Tierney

Mr.

E.

Carey

- Mr.

R. M.. Clancy

- MISS M. F. Devine

CANERAL GOVE

January 13, 1982

Honorable John H. Chafee

Chairman, Subcommittee on

Collection and foreign operationa

Select

solost Contes Senate atelligence

Washington, D. C.

20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

By letter dated December 17, 1981, you requested

more detailed responses from the FBI

regarding certain

countertatelligence topics discussed in our December 7,

1984, letter to you.

This is to advise that a joint FBI-Central

Intelligence Agency response is in preparation and u1ll

be forwarded

to you in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

1/n0/81

delete

Curier for

RMC: enb int

(10)

Given to

Exac AD Inv. -

Exac AD Adm. -

Exoc AD LES -

Asst. Dir.:

Adm: Servs. _

Crim. Inv. _

Ident.

Intell.

Laboratory

Logol Coun.

Plan. & Insp...

Rec. Mgnt.

Toch. Sorus.

"Training

110

fec'y.-

MAIL ROOM C

5008 L

DocId: 32989599

Page 70

William H. Webster

Director

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

62-1165451

FEB 5. 1982

ALL INPORMATIONT CONTADI

DATELA

VER 08106

---

## Page 71

Honorable John H. Chafee

United States Senate

NOTE:

This is to advise the SSCI that a joint FBI-CIA

response is in preparation.

This response will be

coordinated by the Community Counterintelligence Staff.

Rime

APPROVED:

PARADLES

Adm. Servs. Laboratory on cal

Crim. Inv.

Legal Coun, sec

Oit, of Cong,

& Pulls Affor

-**.

stie legite degreesenti

1:323.

gott

Toes 505/B1td22

-2.

AH 55008

DocId: 32989599

Page 71

---

## Page 72

Spares

DocId: 32989599

Page 72

---

## Page 73

Memorandum

To

From

•R. S. Young

Date 1/4/82

Exoc AD Adm. -

Exec AD Inv..

Exoc AD LES_

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sorvs..

Crim. Inv. -

Intelli anit

Laboratory.

Legal Coun. -

Plan. & Insp. -

Roc. Mgnt. _

Toch. Servs.-

Training

Off. of Cong.

& Public Affs.-

Telephone Rm. -

Diroctor's Soc'y-

Subject: LETTER OF

DECEMBER

COMMITTEE ON INTELLICENCE

1981, FROM THE

SENATE

SELECT

supplemental information on counterintelligence.

DETAILS: By letter from the SSCI (attached) dated 12/17/81

1981, response to

the Committee.

This letter is apparently identical to one sent

to the CIA,

a copy of which has already been provided to the

Intelligence Division (INTD) .

RE COMMENDATION:

That INTD prepare an appropriate communication

to the SSCI and forward the response through the Congressional

Affairs Unit.

Let to Heralde jole Iches,

Kirittend, 1/1e/20

APPROVED:

Director

Exec. AD-Adm._

Exec. AD-InV..

¡EXeS. AD-LES.

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Laboratory=

Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong

Ident.

Rec. Mignt.

Inspection

ech. Servs.

intell._

TA A/Training.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

Mr. O'Malley - Enclosure

Mr. Young - Enclosure

Mr. Haynes - Enclosure

Mr. Moschella - Enclosure

1

Ms. Owens - Enclosure

MRO: Imb b (7)

1iL31-

-1921

FEB 5 1952

TaSe Entend

FBI/DOJ

H# 55008

DocId:32989599

Page 73

---

## Page 74

D0÷7

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, F

FROM

SERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW

Mr. Colwell

Mr. Mullen

Mr. Otto _

Mr. Bayse

Mr. Greenleaf

Mr. Finzel.

Mr. Kelleher

Mr. McKenzie

Mr. Mintz

Mr. Monroe

Mr. O'Malley

Mr. Revel!

Mr. Stames

Mr. Young

Mr. Hotis

Mr. Andrews

Ms. Douglas

Mr. Gants

Tele. Room

Miss Devine

See Me

Note and return

Prepare reply and return for my signature .

Please Handle -

Respond over your signature

Prepare memo for the Department

For your recommendation

What are the facts?

Hold

Remarks: -

(

FBI/DOJ

45008

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## Page 75

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ,, CHAIRMAN

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y., VICE CHALIAN

JAKE GARN, UTAH

WALTER D. HUd

'ON, KY.

JOHN H. CHAFEE, R.I.

JOSEPH R. BIDEL

, DEL,

RICHARD G. LUGAR. 1ND.

DANIEL K. INOUYE, RAWAII

MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO.

HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.

DAVID DURENBERGER, MINN.

PATRICK S. LEAHY, VT.

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.

LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX.

HARRISON H, SCHMITT, N. MEX.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO

ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO

ROBERT R. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR

ABRAM N. SHULSKY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

COMMITTEE SENSITI

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 400, AITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 17, 1981

IN REPLY PLEASE

REFER TO N#9435

Exec. AD-Adm.

•Exec. AD-Inv._

¡Exec. AD-LES

Asst. Dir.:

Att. Servs.

Criar. Inv. -

Inspection

Inteil. _

i Locratory

L. "al Coun.

C,. 0: Gong.

Res. Ignt.

Tech. Servs.

Training

Telephene Pim.

•ĐE0311981

The Honorable William H. Webster

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

Dear Judge Webster:

Thank you for your letter of 7 December replying to our

questions raised at our Committee's counterintelligence brief-

ing on 28 October.

We hope you will amplify your response considerably so

that we can understand

as clearly as possible the threat tac-

ing us and the protective responses we should be developing.

Ne understand that, in some instances, appropriate corrective

action must be taken by agencies and departments outside the

intelligence community.

We on this Committee are interested

in helping to affect such changes, but to do so effectively

we need complete and actual information.

In this spirit, we hope you can provide, by 25 January

1982, fuller and more detailed responses to our

questions pro-

viding, at a minimum, more information on the following topics:

KGB active measures:

Please provide recent examples of such activities in

the U.S. with an assessment and analyses of their

success.

--

Please describe the level and type of FBI effort against

such activities.

Please provide examples of such activities in Western

anarysis of the success ute sach side.

U.s. countermeasures,

and an assessment and

Please include a copy of the joint CLA-SIAlE-ICA

briefing referred to in your

7 December response.

173

COMAN EE SENSE

SUNG

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Page 75

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## Page 76

-gur

she

COMMITTEE SENSITINE

The Honorable William H. Webster

December

17, 1981

Page two

Clandestine technology transfer:

--

Please report on the status of the improvement measures

outlined in the generally excellent October 1981 repoxt,

including the resources and effort you are currently

programming.

-

Please describe arrangements for information and support

Irom other agencies to the intelligence community to

deal with

these problems, and provide your assessment

of the effectiveness of such arrangements, together with

analyses

and suggestions regarding how they could be

improved.

Reciprocity:

- Please describe and assess the net practical impact

of the disparity in personnel numbers on U.S. security

and CI operations.

--

Please analyze disparities and/or lack of reciprocity

in respects other than numbers, such as the type and

quality of personnel, the activities they can engage

in (either officially or in practice), and the intelli-

gence/CI opportunities open to them.

- Please identify participants in the current State

Department review of reciprocity, and provide an

analysis of why, as you said,

"past reviews ... have

been without effective results from

1 a counterintelligence

perspective."

Official Presence:

- Please provide a more detailed breakdown of categories,

to include separation of U.N., military, and intelli-

gence personnel.

Travel Restrictions:

-- Please provide a complete bill of particulars detail-

ing official and de facto

• travel restrictions on

Soviet and PRC personnel in the U.S., preferably

including a map to compare with that

appended to the

recent report on travel restrictions on U.S, personnel

in the U.S.S.R.

2/00032038

SEnsI

WH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 76

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## Page 77

ALMONTINE

The Honorable William H. Webster

December 17, 1981

Page three

--

Please provide an account of any exceptions officially

granted in recent years, together with any comparable

exceptions granted to U.S, personnel in the U.S.S.R.

as quid pro guo.

Soviet deception of telemetry and SIGINT collection:

By what specific means does the intelligence commun-

ity currently guard against such deception?

--

Recent examples of Soviet attempts at technical

deception should be provided.

-- Recent examples of Soviet failures and possible

successes should be provided.

Comments on paper by Dr. Harris:

--

Please provide a copy of written comments within

CIA on that paper.

Thank you for your attention to these matters. We are

hopeful that our continued cooperation can lead to correcting

services.

Sincerely,

thu 1d. Clafee

Rhode island)

Hemin packen

Malcolm Wall

(Wyoming)

HH 55008

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## Page 78

Memorandum

Exec AD Adm.

Exec AD Inv.

Exec AD LES —

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs..

Crim. Inv.

Idens--

Intell.-

Laboratory -

Legal Cour. _

Plan, & Insp. -

Rec. Mgnt.-

Toch. Servs. _

Training-

Off. of Cong.

& Publie Afís...

Telephone Rm. -

Director's Sec"y-

To

Mr.

3. J. O'Maller f

From : C.P. MonroeN

Date

4-20-81

Subject :

DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE

'SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE, MARCH

25, 1981

PURPOSE: To transmit answers to the questions arising from

this testimony.

RECOMMENDATION: That the attached answers to their questions

be transmitted to Intelligence Division for

submission to the committee.

APPROVED:

Adm. Serv.

Crim. Inv.

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Insp..

Director.

ExeS. AD-4dm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

ExEc. AD-LES_

Fies. Mignt.

Tech. Servs.

Training -

Iniell.

Laboratory

Off. of Cong

& Public Airs.

DETAILS:

The attached questions were furnished to the FBI as

a result of the Director's testimony. They were

answered by

the Terrorism Section.

Enclosure

1 - Mr.

O'Malley

1 - Mr. Monroe

1 - Mr. Castonguay

1 - Mr. Duffy

1 - Mr. Ivey

1 - Mr.

Hope

(7)

7

JUN 29 1981

1120

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED?

ENCLOSUR

6. 13504

OIL. OI COng

0032F-272

236

1981

: 32989599

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FBU/DOJ

---

## Page 79

HH 55008

62=116395-1728

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---

## Page 80

..

SECRET

That report did not cover international terrorism

hostile covert action (including subversion) threats.

What

assessment of these threats has been aone or is underway?

The Terrorism Section, in the fall of 1980, established

at research'and analysis group This group will have the

responsibility for. assessments of the international terrorist threat

when it is fully implemented. At present the threat of each

international group is assessed on a case by case basis by the

Terrorism section at FBIne pilu)

SECRET

NW 55008

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---

## Page 81

SECRET

How does the FBI ensure the responsiveness of its programs

concerning either international

or domestic terrorism

requirements?

The FBI's terrorism

program is dual-phased, preventive and

reactive.

Through close coordination with/its field offices, FBIHQ.

ensures that the terrorist threat is met. (YU)

--

SECRET

. и 55008

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---

## Page 82

SECRET

34a.

Does this separation cause any gaps or problems?

The FBI's Intelligence Division and Criminal Investigative

"Division work closely in: the area of: international terrorism and

no significant gaps are obvious in the day to day investigative

product. The separate budget for international and domestic

terrorism results in significant administrative problems.

SECRET

HH 55008

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---

## Page 83

.,;.

...

SECRET

34b.

To what extent were the Libyan "hit" teams, which were

sent to the U.s. for assassinations, directed by Libyan intelligence

or security services?

Libyan intelligence personnel under diplomatic assignment

in the United States "were part of alleged assassination effort. . (S)

casstid

SECRET,

HH 55008

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83

---

## Page 84

:

SECRET

34c.

What are the respective roles of the two FBI Divisions

in obtaining foreign counterintelligence or counterterrorism

intelligence concerning such operations?

.....The FBI's Intelligence. Division investigates.foreign

counterintelligence regarding hostile intelligence services within

the United States.

The FBI's Criminal Investigative Division

investigates and collects counterterrorism intelligence.

When

these two areas overlap, coordination

between the two divisions

is initiated.

(S)

SECRET

MH 55008

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---

## Page 85

SECRET

How do intelligence and FBI domestic terrorism efforts

relate to the efforts of the military

services to prepare for

terrorist incidents?

FBIHQ maintains close liaison with all branches of the

'?"United States military." The TBI provides the military authorities

all pertinent information developed concerning any terrorist

activity directed against or affecting military bases, personnel

or resources.

-

SECRET

14 55008

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---

## Page 86

SECRET

Unlike the Bureau's FCI guidelines, its domestic

security guidelines for domestic terrorism investigations have

not been revised significantly since 1976.

Should they be reexamined

in light of

any specific problems that have arisen over the past

five years?

Although it is believed that the Guidelines have. enable

the FBI to cope with the domestic terrorist problem in an effective

manner, the Guidelines limit the use of one of the most effective

investigative techniques at our disposal. The Guidelines forbid

the FBI to develop and direct the activities of an informant

against an individual or group unless that individual or group is

currently the subject of a full domestic security investigation.

Thus, we cannot continue to operate an informant in a group

once that group's activities fail to meet the criteria for a

full investigation. This prevents us from obtaining valuable

information regarding the group's possible decision to return to

or instigate violent actions prior to these actions taking place.

This prohibition has also created an obvious lack of intelligence

data to assess the terrorist threat. In view of this, a re-examination

of the domestic guidelines as well as all guidelines should be

undertaken on a periodic basis.

SECRET

...i

---

## Page 87

SECRET,

(a)

What special training is provided in the terrorism field?

The FBI'S Training Division conducts training in the

following areas:

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Crisis

Management, Bomb Technician School, Hostage Negotiations, and

seminars on terrorism. All the above-mentioned training is provided

to all interested Federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies.

SECRET

HH 55008

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Page 87

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## Page 88

SECRET

(c)

What type of personnel are being recruited as analysts

in this area, and what training and career development is planned

for them?

The personnel that are being hired as analysts in the

""Terrorist "Research and Analytical Group" (IRAG) fare from the Bureau's

ranks. They have each taken a series of tests to determine their

adaptability for analytical work. They are people who have a keen

interest in the work of this group and all but one have at least a

college degree. (Alu)

They have received training in the use of the computer

.."

‹system and the basics.of analysis.

They will be receiving additional

training in the use of the computers and, by cross training with

analysts

from other FBI sections

and other government agencies,

will develop their analytical skills.. They are also being encouraged

to either complete their degree or obtain additional ones. (An

The analysts in this group will have a career path that

will permit advancement from junior analyst to senior analyst as

their level of ability increases.

--

SECRET

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SECRET

19

(d)

How do the functions of the Terrorism Section compare

with the Training Division programs in the terrorism field, and how

are they coordinated?

The Terrorism Section actively coordinates all investigations

of terrorist organizations and their members in the United States..

It also supervises investigations of criminal violations committed by

these groups.

shus

The Training Division conducts studies of known terrorist

groups, both international and domestic to develop psychological

profiles of terrorists. The Training Division also conducts training

for the FBI and local law

enforcement agencies to enable them to

respord to terrorist incidents. 59)

'The FBI's Internal Committee on Terrorism coordinates

communications between the Terrorism Section and the Training

Division.

-=

ECRE

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SECRET

80a.

Is this a significant informant shortfall?

The 69 individuals and 17 organizations represent all full,

limited, and preliminary domestic security cases currently under

investigation.Informants..anonly be targeted. against groups or

"."

organizations who are under full investigation. Currently, there

are 17 individuals and 8 organizations under full investigation.

This is not a significant shortfall because in addition to the

13 domestic security informants there are 27 terrorist informants

which

also

report

on

some of these

organizations

and individuals.

(S)

---

!

SECRET

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SECRET

80b.

If so, what is the relative impact in this area of such

factors as FOIA, lawsuits, guidelines, and the operations difficulties

of recruiting productive informants?

Factors such as FOIA, lawsuits, and guidelines have reduced

"the rumber of "domestic security informants:. The guidelines restrict

the usage of informants.

FOIA and lawsuits have caused fear of

disclosure and therefore people are not willing to cooperate in this

area.

SECRET

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SECRET

Should more effort be devoted to long-range informant or

undercover agent operations beginning at the periphery that may not

be productive immediately?

Domestic security operations of this nature are prohibited

by the 'Attorney General Guidelines

....

--

SECRET

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SECRET

81.

As of January, 1981, how many international terrorism

investigations were being conducted, how many organizations were

involved,

and how many informants were in use?

• As of January! 1981, there were approximately 325 full

..

'FCI-Terrorism investigations open on'individuals, 12 terrorist

organizations

under investigation, and 235

active FCI informants.

SECRET

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SECRET

81a.

What makes possible the larger number of informants in such

investigations, in contrast to the number per investigation in domestic

security investigations?

The rules for. opening domestic security informants come from

*the "Attorney "General'Güidëlines for domestic security investigatione.

These rules are considerably more restrictive than those for the

opening of informants under the guidelines for FCI-Terrorism.

(C)

--

SECRET

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SECRET

81b.

What differences are there in the relative value of

informants in the two fields?

Informants are an invaluable aid to the investigator.

"quality informant, whether domestic or foreign; is equally important

to the FBI's

investigative effort.

(C)

SECRET

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SECRET

Does the FBI have adequate authority to investigate

domestic-based international terrorist groups engaged in of preparing

for terrorism abroad?

The FBI does have adequate authority to investigate

..*cdomestic-based international terrorist groups. (C)

-

SECRET,

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SECRET

Under the domestic security guidelines, what are the

recent and current practices for review and approval of full

investigations by the Justice Department?

Initially, the Justice Department is notified that a

full domestic security investigation has been authorized. After

a 90 day period, the FBI field office is required to submit a 90 day

report on the progress of the investigation. This is forwarded to

, the Justice Department. At

the end of one year if the FBI desires

to continue its investigation, it must be approved by the Justice

Department.

(C.)

SECRET

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SECRET

Within a framework of Attorney General Guidelines, could

approval of full investigations and use of new informants be shifted

to the FBI Director or the head of the Criminal Investigative Division

in consultation with the FBI Legal Counsel Division if necessary?

Approval/already rests .with the.FBI.and.not with.the

Department of Justice.

(C)

SECRET

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& an -1.

It can

SECRET

Would reporting to the Justice Department, with the

opportunity for the Attorney

General or Deputy Attorney General

to terminate investigations,

provide

adequate Departmental supervision?

ident

Yes." This is the system currently.in'use-regarding domestic

security investigations and it provides

adequate Departmental

supervision.

(C)

SECRET

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SECRET

82c.

What safeguards have been adopted in domestic security

investigations to limit the collection and dissemination of.

information about lawful exercise of First Amendment rights that

, does.

not relate to possible violent criminal activity?

• In 1976, the Attorney General Guidelines for. domestic

security investigations were instituted. The Terrorism Section

Of FBIHQ closely supervises the domestic security investigations

which are conducted by its field offices to insure that they comply

with the restrictions in these guidelines that were designed to

insure the rights of American citizens.

(C)

--

SECRET

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.? . отрооола аа.

. . .

SECRET

If increased threats of domestic terrorist violence were

to require a larger number of domestic security investigations,

An increase in domestic security matters would not

"necessitate. a change in the safeguards protecting the. lawful

exercise of the First Amendment rights.

(C)

SECRET

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0-50 106 + 4079

= 1.

...

SECRET

What are the current views of the Justice Department on

these questions?

The Justice Department has established the policy as already

'mentioned: that. the Director of:the FBI:is authorized to approve

domestic security investigations.

(C)

--

SECRET

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## Page 103

Memorandum

To

:

From:

Subject :

The Director

Mr. E.

• Malley

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE

OSENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE, MARCH 25, 1981

Date 3/4/81

*,

Exec AD Adm.

Exec AD Inv.

ExoC AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Sorvs.

Crime Inv..

Idont.-

Intell.

Laboratory

Logal Coun.-

Plan. & Insp.

Rec. Mgnt..

Tach, Sorvs.

Training.

Off. of Cong.

& Publie Affsof

Tolophone Rm. le

Diroctor's Sec'y-

Enclosed is a copy of questions pertaining to FCI which will

be posed to the various agency heads appearing before the Committee.

These are not all inclusive and other questions will be forwarded as

preparations for the hearing continue.

PURPOSE:

To inform the Director of changes in format and content of

questioning expected in his appearance before the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence scheduled for March 25, 1981.

T!?.

APPROVED:

Adm. Serv._

Crim. Inv.

Legal Coun. _

Plan. & Insp...

• Director

Rec. Mignt.

Exec. AD-Adma.

Ident.

Tech. Servs..

Exec. AD-Inv.,

Intell.

€

Training -

Of. of Cong.

Exec. AD-LES

Laboraiory

& Public Affs.

t2-111-395-1789

I would like

Enclosure

1 - The Director

1 - Mr. L. Colwell

1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.

1 - Mr. H. J. Roin

1 - Mr. L. C. Groover

1 - Mr. R. J. Ivey

1 - Congressional Affairs

(Attn: I. A. Bassett, Jr.)

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

- Mr. J. L. Tierney

1 - Mr. R. P. Hanssen

RPH: aed

151981\

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599

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103

CONTINUED - OVER

I-BRIEFING

3/23/x

10 %.

2-Hollawd-up

---

## Page 104

Memorandum from Mr. E. J. O'Malley to The Director

Re: Director's Appearance Before

Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, March 25, 1981

SYNOPSIS:

On March 2, 1981, a preparatory meeting was held at Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Headquarters chaired by Admiral Showers of

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Staff and attended by representatives

of CIA, Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

and the FBI. The purpose of this meeting was to block the time necessary

for each agency head to make a statement and answer questions. The

enclosed questions were handed out and each agency present is to draft

answers and submit them to CIA for distribution to all participating agencies.

Another meeting on the same matter was held on March 3, 1981,

with Staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to

discuss the Director's March 25th appearance before that Committee.

In the past, intelligence community members responsible for

counterintelligence were afforded individual appearances. This year all

such members will appear jointly allowing cross commenting and questioning.

This is a marked change and a departure from the notion that each agency

in turn would appear and answer questions for a limited time.

The emphasis in questioning will be the Committee's perception of

a lack of strategic planning within the community from a multi-disciplinary

counterintelligence view.

Specific questions asked the Director will center on Bureau strategic

planning and the role of foreign threat assessment in this planning.

Opening remarks are expected to specifically justify resource

requests through concrete appraisals of hostile intelligence service threat.

It appears that the thrust of these changes is to force the Intelligence

Community to establish mechanisms for threat assessment and strategic

planning below the White House level where they will fall under Congressional

oversight.

CONTINUED - OVER

-2-

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Memorandum from Mr. E. J. O'Malley to The Director

Re: Director's Appearance Before

Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, March 25, 1981

RECOMMENDATION:

That Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate briefing book

for the Director.

DETAILS:

Three Staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

met with representatives of the Intelligence Division on March 3, 1981. The

purpose of this meeting was to discuss the scheduled March 25, 1981,

appearance of the Director before that Committee.

In the past, members of the Intelligence Community have been afforded

individual appearances before the Senate Select Committee. The March 25,

1981, meeting has been scheduled as a simultaneous appearance of all

Intelligence Community chiefs having counterintelligence responsibilities.

It is the intent of the Committee that this be a joint appearance. That is,

while individual statements from each Intelligence Community chief will be

expected, questions may be directed to any member appearing, allowing

cross commenting on answers of other chiefs. This is a marked departure

from previous procedure.

The emphasis in questioning before the Committee this year will be

into who has overall responsibility for counterintelligence operations fror

a multi-disciplinary view. How is the counterintelligence "puzzle" pul

together, and how can the Committee augment the budgets of each Intelligence

Community member to increase the effectiveness of the total counterintelligence

effort.

CONTINUED - OVER

-3-

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## Page 106

Memorandum from Mr. E. J. O'Malley to The Director

Re: Director's Appearance Before

Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, March 25, 1981

DETAILS (Continued):

In line with these directions, questions can be expected to center on

F'CI strategic planning, FBI strategic planning and the synthesis of the

multiple threats of foreign intelligence services into a coherent response.

Participants should additionally expect specific questions as to illegals

presence, numbers of foreign recruitments and their threat, war-time

contingencies, the utility of budgetary augmentations (what could be done with

an additional 10%), and changes in the law which might increase performance.

Participants have been requested to address, in their opening remarks,

the following three major areas pertaining to the area of inquiry being conducted

this year.

1. What is the mechanism within your organization for assessing the

overall hostile intelligence threat and how do established mechanisms in

your organization allocate resources to respond to that threat?

2. What is that threat both quantitatively and qualitatively citing

concrete examples?

3. What resources are needed by your organization to meet this

threat?

It appears that the thrust of these changes is to force the Intelligence

Community to establish mechanisms for threat assessment and strategic

planning below the National Security Council level where they will be within

the Senate's oversight responsibilities. During this meeting, one Staff

member, Mr. John Elliff, stated that these matters were currently

"unaccountable" as they were done by the White House staff, implying that

the Committee wished to extend its oversight to the strategic planning

mechanisms.

CONTINUED - OVER

-4-

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## Page 107

Memorandum from Mr. E. J. O'Malley to The Director

Re: Director's Appearance Before

Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, March 25, 1981

DETAILS (Continued):

The Staff members present in the March 3, 1981, meeting were

Angelo Codevilla, employed by Senator Wallop, Chairman of the Budget

Subcommittee; John Elliff, from the same Committee and formerly

with the Bayh Committee, experienced in budget matters and John Pingree,

a new Staff member. Bureau representatives were Dennis L. DeBrandt,

Unit Chief, CI-3 Section, D Unit and Supervisors Richard M. Alu, Robert P.

Hanssen and James D. Ohlson of that Unit. Supervisor Irving A. Bassett, Jr.

of the Congressional Affairs Office was also present.

This joint appearance also was the subject of a March 2, 1981,

meeting convened by the Special Assistant to the DCI for Counterintelligence

and attended by representatives of agencies having FCI responsibilities.

The views expressed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Staffers,

as above, were not fully conveyed in this meeting. It was agreed at the

March 2nd meeting responses would be exchanged between participants by

March 18th. As of this writing, the participants are as follows:

Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy DCI

The Director

General Tighe, DIA

Mr. John McMahon, DDO, CIA

Mr. Roland Morrow, DOD

=5-

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(27) That need do you see for creating a broad, national-

level, strategic, multidisciplinary counterintelligence program

which includes a closely-coordinated counter-SIGINI, counter-

imagery, protective

security, counter-espionage and counter-

deception progiam?

(2)

How much progress has been made toward this end?

What'is being done to hasten this process?.

(b) What steps are being

taken to increase the capa-

bility o the U.S. Government for interagency and comprehensive

national foreign counterintelligence (FCI) analysis and

production?

(c) Given the admitted increase in threat from foreign

-=:

intelligence activities, way is there no increase in resources

allocated for counterintelligence (less than 2 percent of

NEIP) ?

(28) A least sèven different agencies are involved in

comterintelligence work -- FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA and the three

nilitary services. Each agency has its own approach to counter-

intelligence, and the emphasis in recent years has been on better

opezational coordination and on preparation of an inter-agency

threat assessaent.

(a)

Who is responsible for making an assessment of

our countzy's own counterintelligence capibilities?

62-116-15-11717..

14 55008 DorLd: 32989599 Page 108

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## Page 109

- 18-

(b) Should there be more of a joint effort by senior

FBI, CIA, and Defense Department officials to assess the

overall quality of our counterintelligence efforts and to

protote: improvements and innovations for dealing with the

threat across the board?

(29) The FBI gets by far the largest share of the national

intelligence budget for counterintelligence, and Director Webster

has made counterintelligence a top FBI priority. Last year

this Comnittee recommended that the FBI move towaids the

creation of a separate entity in the Bureau for counterintelligence

so that it could play a more effective role as the lead agency

in this field. Inis is especially important for countering the

HUMINT -collection efforts of Soviet and other Comunist intelli-

...

gence services.

(a) Would a stronger FBI leadership role in this

field meet with any significant resistance. from the intelli-

gence commnity?

(30) Inese is some evidence that particular agencies, such

as CIA and liSA, nay not be adequately collecting and disseminating

counterintelligence that the FBI needs to monitor possible

foreign intelligence threats to this country. This problem may

be due to a fear of collecting and disseminating information

about U.S. citizens, so thai these agencies do not use the full

authority they have under current guidelines.

NH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 109

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## Page 110

- 19 -

(a) Does this appear to be true, and if so, what can

be done to encourage CIA and iSA to use their full authority

to support the FBI's counterintelligence requirements?

(b) Roat unrealistic restrictions on counterintelligence

activities nost need revision?

(31) The issue of technology transfer is one which affects.

many parts of the government, not just the intelligence coumunity.

•(a) That role do you see fos counterintelligence

in providing infornation concerning technology diversions,

espionage directed agains= American high technology (both

civilian and defense-related) and key financial and business

data obtained through COMINT?

(b) Do you believe a national level program is required

to

combat this threat?

(c) Should counterintelligence information obtained

by the intelligence commity be provided to the private

sector?

(32) Ierrorisa poses a sazious threat to world stability,

as well as to the physical safety of individuals.

(a) What is the intelligence community doing to give

Anezican policymakers comprenensive analyses of worldwide

terrorisa, including the links among countries and groups

and the factors that increase of reduce terrorist activity?

r..

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(b) Is the connunity preparing the kind of estimates

that will best help policymakers understand terrorism problems

and the likely consequences of U.s. policies for dealing

with those problems?

(33)

Although the NSC Special Coordination Committee for

Counterintelligence has responsibility for counterintelligence

policy, there has been a lack of long-range strategic planning

in this field.

(a) Has the NSC committee undertaken any long-range

•strategic planning for U.S. counterintelligence programs?

(b) What other steps have been of could be taken to

ifpzove long-range strategic planning for counterintelligence?

(c) In general, how effective has the NSC comittee

been, and what could be done io strengthen its effectiveness?

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## Page 112

RT 0081 355 00447

HQ

MDE BI

R' C1 0001Z DEC. 79

21 DEC 79 00

÷1:7

50 z

ExE.

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. ServSe;

Crim. Iny.

lient..

totell.

Res. 1..

"ottis is. om

1274ae Am.

Gicitor's Sec'y

FM BUTTE

TO DIRECTOR

ROUT INE

ATTENTION: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

JAN. 71980

MAK

BT

UNCLAS

HEARINGS BY U.S. SENATOR JOHN MEL CHER D. -MONTANA) RE:

INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, BILLINGS, MONTANA, DECEMBER: 21, 1979.

RE SUITE TELCALL TO LEG EASTAREN UNIF,

DELEC

RESEARCH UNIT, FBIHQ,:

Committee.

DECEMBER 29, 1979.

ON DECEMBER 2D, 1979, A TELEPHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED

FROM MR. CHARLES TIEFER, WHO

REPRESENTED HIMSELF AS BEING

FROM THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U. S. SENATE, AND A

CONSULTANT TO SEANTOR JOHN NELCHER'S COMMITTEE. MR O I IEFER

STATED HE WAS CURRENTLY IN BILLINGS, MONTANA, FOR IHE

PURPOSE OF HOLDING FIELD HEARINGS INVOLVING EXPENDITURES

02-1/6

345

1718

FOR THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE• THOSE HEARINGS ARE

TO

"BE

HELD IN BILLINGS ON DECEMBER 21, 1979.

195 DEC 2'7 1979

MR: TIEFER ADVISED

HE

REALIZED HE WAS NOTIFYING THE

66 JAN 221980

ILI, INTORMATION CONTAI

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 112

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PAGE TWO

FBI ON VERY SHORT NOTICE, BUT IT WAS THE INTENTION OF

SENATOR MELCHER 'S COMMITTEE TO PUT TOGETHER A PANEL

CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FBI, U.S.: POSTAL

SERVICE, AND BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, WHO WOULD BE

QUESTIONED IN THE AGGREGATE FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED

TEN TO FIFTEEN MINUTES. THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE

TEST IMONY WOULD BE HOW THE AFOREMENTIONED AGENCIES CONDUCTED

TRAVEL TO AND FROM THE INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN THE STATE OF

MONTANA.

MR. TIEFER WAS ASKED SPECIFICALLY AS TO THE QUESTION

WHICH WOULD BE ASKED, WHICH AS AS FOLLOWS:

1. A. HOW DOES THE FBI ARRANGE TRAVEL TO AND FROM

INDIAN RESERVATION IN THE STATE OF MONTANA?

B' HOW DOES THE FBI HANDLE THE DISTANCES AND

ROAD CONDITIONS IN THE STATE OF MONTANA?

20 HAS-THE FBI PAID FOR. FLIGHT LESSONS FOR ITS •

PERSONNEL IN THE STATE OF MONTANA?

HH 55008 DocId: 32989599. Page 113

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PAGE THREE

ASAC, BUTTE, ADVISED MR. TIEFER THAT THE ANSWERS TO

THE ABOVE QUESTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

1. A. BY GOVERNMENT VEHICLE.

B. THE FBI WORKS FROM RESIDENT AGENCIES THAT

ARE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF MONTANA,

ALLOWING FOR REASONABLY PROMPT RESPONSE TIME. THE FBI

UT IL IZES GOVERIMENT VEHICLES REGARDLESS OF THE ROAD

• 1.

CONDITIONS.

20

NO.

MR.• TIEFER ASSURED THAI NO QUESTIONS WOULD BE ASKED OF A

FBI REPRESENTATIVE WHICH WOULD CONCERN A SPECIFIC

'INVESTIGAT IVE MATTER, BUT RATHER THE QUESTIONING WOULD ONLY

CONCERN IT SELF WITH THE ABOVE TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.:

PER BUTTE TELCALL TO LEGAL RESEARCH UNIT, BUTTE URGED

APPROVAL OF ITS COOPERATION WITH AN OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF

THE U.S.;ANE VACB EITHER THE SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT OR

ALTERNATE SENIOR RESIDENI AGENT OF THE BILL INS, MONIANA,

RESIDENT AGENCY WILL FURNISH THE ABOVE ANSWERS TO IHE

QUESTIONS AS INDICATED:

BT

IN 55008 DocId: 32989599 Page 114

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## Page 115

:?

1

Mr. Steel

1

Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Fulton

1

- Mr. Groover

2 - Mr. Moschella

1 - Mr. Mazzella

FEDERAI GOVERNMENT

November 30, 1979

Honorable Birch Bayh

StATE Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

United States

--

senate

Washington, D. C.

20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of November 15, 1979,

your reference N-664, which was received by me on

November 19, 1979.

I am pleased that you are interested in increasing

your understanding of our foreign counterintelligence

activities and am directing all personnel at Headquarters and

in the field to cooperate fully with your staff during

their visits to FBI Headquarters and selected field offices.

Special Agent Christopher Mazzella of our

Legal Liaison/Congressional Affairs Unit will be responsible

for planning an appropriate agenda and any other arrange-

ments necessary to facilitate your staff's visits to our .

FacIlity.

Mx - Mazzella has already been in touch with /

•your stati regarding your request.

I hope this meets with your satisfaction.

Sincerely

yours,

#E063-11652=1717

William H. Webster

Director

BLY. DEC 6 1979

MAILED

1358

DEC - 5 137

Assoc. Dir..

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. EM : cah

Asst. Dir::

Adm. Servs. -

Crim: Inv. —

Ident. -

- Vi

Intell..

aborator

ALI, INIORMATION CONTATIO

HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIELAD

moR -16

Plan. & Insp. -

Rec. Mignt. _

Tech. Servs. -

Training

Public Affs. Off. —

Telephone Rm.

Director's Sec'y -

5 CHALROOL

HW 55008

DocTa 41595991980

age 115

APPROVED:

Exes. AD-Invi

Exec. AD-Adm

Adm. Serv.

Crim. Inv._

Intell.

Laboratory.

Legal Coun

Plan. & Insp.

Rec. Nignt.

Tech. Servs.

Training

Public Alfs. Off._

---

## Page 116

REGE NE..

RECTOR

.= =

REGEIVED

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

INTELLIGENCE DIV.

Nou 29

1/ 55 AM 179 :7

Noy 2o

≤ 23 rM 1979

LES.

Nov 50 12 35 Pi: 1979

0VSG

21GMADI X7 LACEVES LITE

TOP TOL OEGAVAION CONNEIOS

REGEINED

EXEG. A. D.

FBI

***

2 10td

DESI

Ir-55000 Doctdrz2esaçãe Dage 116.

---

## Page 117

• BARRY GOLDWATER, ARE AN

DLAI E. STEVENSON, ILI

¿HAIRMAN

JANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y

RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND

MANI LU AREA, MIN.

MONSTER PER A VAN ORIGIO

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

@nited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 100, 4TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 15, 1979

IN REPLY PLEASE

REFER TO N-6404

The Honorable William H. Webster

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Judge Webster:

As part of its continuing oversight and budget authori-

zation responsibilities, the Select Committee on Intelligence

wishes to increase

its understanding of the foreign counter-

intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In this regard, I respectfully request the Bureau's cooper-

ation in facilitating

the visit of three members of the

Select Committee staff to Bureau headquarters and to two or

three field offices.

These visits would be for the purpose

of helping the Committee become better acquainted with Bureau

operational management practices and to acquire first-hand

knowledge of FCI field operations.

and Thomas Crowley, who hold all appropriate clearances,

I have designated Messis. Daniel Childs, George Pickett

undertake these visits.

Thank you in advance for your help.

Bird bah

ALL INFORMATION CONTAMIIY

SHRAULIS INCLASSINIE

DATE 11 30 2000 BXSPS AUn VATI

i: 220

1716

CMIC

59 JANS

1988

HH 55008

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## Page 118

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

FROM

Assistant Director

Criminal Investigative Division

Legal

counselrosenstudy

PROPOSED

ETECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION

DATE: 7/19/79

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Insp.

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Servs.

Training

Public Affs. Off. _

Telephone Rm.

Director's Sec'y -

§sUByRCE:

PURPOSE:

To advise of the imminent introduction of

legislation affecting electronic surveillance proce-

dures by making emergency wiretaps available in life

endangering situations and by requiring notice to the

court of surreptitious entry, and to solicit the views

of the Criminal Investigative Division for transmittal

to the Department of Justice (DOJ) .

stearn.

DETAILS:

On 7/19/79 Ms. Molly Warlow, Criminal

Division, DOJ, made available to SA Parks H. Stearns, /

JI., Legal Counsel Division, a draft of legislation

which has been forwarded to the Office of Management

and Budget for approval.

She requested the FBI's

comments on the proposed legislation.

The primary effect of the proposal would be

to make available to the Bureau emergency wiretaps in

situations where there is "immediate danger of death

or serious physical injury," (see page 3 of

attachment,

coction otal of tha 3- REC69 / 2-110395-1715

The bill also makes statutory-the current

that notice be given

to the magistrate issuing a Title III order in situa-

tions where surreptitious entry is necessary to install

the device.

Enclosure

JUL 31 1979

steams

1 - Mr. Gow (Enclosure)

1

2

- Mr. McWeeney (Enclosure)

- Mr. Moschella (Enclosure)

1 - Mr.

Stearns (Enclosure)

PHS: A

(6)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

ALL INFORMATION CANADIE

HEREIN IS UNOLA SSIAN

suy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plai

IH5s2oSE SE Bodra197

89599

Page 118

FBI/ DOJ

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## Page 119

Memorandum to the Assistant Director

Criminal Investigative Division

PROPOSED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION

The impetus for the first change came from the

FBI, which for several years has urged the Department to

life endangering situations.

change above has come from the domestic policy staff of

the White House in response to the recent Supreme Court

case United States v. Dalia,

_ U.S:

(April 18,

The bill also requires prior notice, when

practicable, to the issuing magistrate for subsequent

entry under the same order to repair or replace the sur-

veillance device.

When prior notice is not practicable,

notification to the authorizing judge should be made

within 48 hours after the re-entry (see page 30, Section

5[91 [iiil).

Previous Congressional requests for prior

approval before the re-entry and for additional minimiza-

tion provisions have been dropped.

Bob McNamara of Senator Kennedy's staff is

anxious to introduce this legislation as a Kennedy bill

and has requested that it be submitted as soon as possible.

Accordingly, Ms. Warlow requested that Bureau views be

provided to the Department by Monday, 7/23/79.

Stearns has provided copies of this draft legislation to

Section Chiefs Douglas Gow and Shawn McWeeney of the

Criminal Investigative Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the Criminal Investigative Division

review the attached draft and advise SA Stearns, Legal

Counsel Division, regarding its impact upon Bureau

investigative operations.

APPROVED:

Direcior

Dep. AD Inv.

'Adm. Serv._

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

Inte!l.

Laboratory

Plan. & Insp.

Rec Mant.

Tech. Servs.

Training

Public Affs. Off.

-2-

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=

Memorandum to the Assistant Director

Criminal Investigative Division

Re: PROPOSED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION

That upon receipt of observations and

recommendations by Criminal Investigative Division, that

SA Stearns advise Ms. Warlow of the Department of

Justice.

AFPROVED:

Direcior

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD: do.

Dep. AD Inv. =

Adm. Serv.

Crim. Inv._

Ident.

Intall.

Laboratory

Tech. Servs._

Training

Public Affs, Off: -=:

• --.-.

:-3--

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## Page 121

A BILL

Io diend certain provisions of title 18, United States Code;

relating to the procedures for interception of wire or :

oral communications.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives

of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that

Sec. 2 That: Section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(a) in subsection (10), by striking out "and" at the end

thereof; and

(b) in subsection (11), by

striking out the period at

the end thereof and inserting

in lieu thereof a

semicolon

and "and"; and

(&) by adding at the end thereof the following new

subsection:

"(12) 'surreptitious entry' means a physical entry

Sec. 3.

upon a private place or premises to install, repair,

reposition, replace, 'or remove any electronic mechanical

or other device, and includes both covert entry and

entry effected by means of

a ruse or subterfuge."

Section 2518(1) of title 18, United

States Code, is amended --

(a) in paragraph

(e), by striking out "and" at the end

thereof; and

(b) in paragraph (f), by striking out the period at

end thereof and inserting

in lieu thereof a semicolon and

"and"; and

(&) by adding at the end thereof the following new

paragraph:

"(g) a statement whether surreptitious entry

the purposes of installing, repairing, repositioning,

replacing, or removing any electronic, mecranicat or

other device is requirea to effect the interception,

and if such surreptitious entry is reguired, a statement

why other means of effecting the interception than

tren

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ALL, INFORZAXION CONTADID

TER / 00 8738 pun A

• moR-).

+2-116-395-1715

ENGLOSURE

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•

Sec. 7.

Sec. 5.

- 2 -

surreptitious entry reasonably appear to be unlikely

to succeed, to be too dangerous if triea, or to be

impracticable."

Section 2518(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended -

@) in paragraph (a), by striking out the period at

the end thereof and inserting

in lieu thereof a semicolon

and "and"; and

(D) by adding at the end thereof

the following

new

paragraph:

"(e) where the order is to authorize or approve a

surreptitious entry, for tha purposes of installing,

repairing,repositioning,replacing, or-removingary.

electronic, mechanical, or other devies, such surreptitious

entry reasonably appears to be required to effect the

interception, and other means of effecting the

interception than surreptitious entry reasonably

appear to be unlikely to succeed, to be too dangerous

if tried, or to be impracticable."

Section 2518(4) of title 18, United States Code, is amended -

(2) in paragraph (a), by striking out the "and" at the

end thereof; and

(b) in paragraph (e), by striking our the period at

the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof

a semicolon

and "and"; and

(X) by inserting the following immediately after paragraph

(e) the following new paragraphs:

"(E) whether surreptitious entry for the purpeses-of

installing, repairing, repositioning, replacing, or-renovin

any electronic, mechanical, or other device is authorized

or approved to effect the interception; and

(g) in any order which includes authorization of

surreptitious entry --

(1) the identity of the agency authorized to

make the surreptitious entry; and

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..

- 3 -

(ii) that the attorney for the government in

charge of the investigation

shall, when practicable,

notify the duthorizing judge of the proposed time

of the entry, and when prior notice is not

practicable, notification is to be made within

48 hours after such entry; and

"(iii) that in any case in which more than one

entry is necessary to install the device, or in which

re-entry is necessary to repair, reposition, or replace

the device, the attorney for the government in

charge of the investigation shall, when practicable,

notify in writing the authorizing judge prior to such

re-entry of the reasons which

necessitate

the re-entry,

and when prior notice is not practicable,

such

notification is to be made within 48 hours after

the re-entry and is to describe the reasons which

necessitated the re-entry and why prior notification

was not practicable."

Sec. 6. Section 2518(7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(a) by deleting paragraph (a) and inserting in lieu

thereof:

"(a) an emergency_ situation exists that involves --

(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical

injury to any person; or

(ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the

national security interest; or

(iii)

conspiratorial activities characteristic

of organized crime,

that requires

a wire or oral communication to be intercepted

before an order

authorizing such interception can with due

diligence be obtained, and"; and

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(2) by inserting a comma and "and may make any

surreptitious entry required to effect such interception,"

immediately after "wire or oral communication" the second

time it appears.

sec. 7. Section 2519 of title 18, United states Code, is amended

(a) in subsection (1):

(1) by inserting immediately after paragraph (e) the

following new paragraph:

"(f) the fact that a surreptitious entry to effect the

interception was authorized or approved, the number of

such entries made, and the purpose, either to install,

repair, reposition, replace, or remove the interception

device, for each such entry;"jaand

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (f) and (g) as paragraphs

(g) and (h) respectively; and

-.-=...

(b) In paragraph (2)(a), by striking out "(g)" and inserting in

lieu thereof "(h)".

-

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185-10214

*

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