INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY, WILLIAM
Originator: SSCIA
From: BARON, FREDERICK D.
To: FILE
Document date: 09/14/1975
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10011-10124

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/07/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10124

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : UNKNOWN

FROM : BARON, FREDERICK D.

TO : FILE

TITLE :

INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY, WILLIAM

DATE: 09/14/75

PAGES : 13

!

SUBJECTS :

HARVEY, WILLIAM

ASSASSINATIONS INQUIRY: LUMUMBA & ZRRIFLE

ROSELLI OPERATION IN NOVEMBER 1961

BISSELL, RICHARD

CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION (HELMS, EDWARDS, O'CONNELL)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

set,

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 226, Folder 8

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Record #157-10011-10124

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

INVENTERIGO:

oN 313117'

wv-124

INTERVIEW WITH:

REGARDING:

Willian Harvey

Assassinations Inquiry: Lumumba & ZRRIFLE

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: -

September 14, 1975

PRESENT:

Frederick Baron

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: -

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

EXECUTIVE SESSION:

_YES

> NO

(1) 141

(0)

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226

Folder?

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

FROM:

CIA HAS NO ORJECTION TO

-DECLASS: OAT ORI AND/OR

RELEASE OF TO DOCUMENT

AS SANNIZED

10 JAN 94

DATE:

SUBJECT:

Frederick D. Baron

September 24, 1975.

Interview with William Harvey (conducted September 14,

1975)

LUMUMBA'S ACTUAL DEATH

1. I do not know of any connection between the CIA and Lumumba's

actual death.

LUMUMBA PLOTS

2. I never heard of poison being sent from the CIA to the Congo

station, nor did I ever hear of any CIA assassination mission

in the Congo. I am almost sure that i Donnel! never told me

that he had learned that there were poisons in the Congo.

JUSTINTO DONYLE/ QJWIN CONGO MISSION

3. The only mention of assassinating Lumumba that I recall is

O Donnell's conversation with me.

Justin O"Donnel,

only told me that he had agreed to go to the

Congo to discredit Lumumba and that he had refused to undertake

an assassination mission which Richard Bissell attempted to

give him.

5. I did not debrief o'Donnell when he returned from the Congo.

So I did not learn from him what the nature of his mission was.

6.

o" Donnel

Ily's activities in the Congo were not a Staff D opera-

tion. Despite the fact that the memo of January 11, 1960

mentions that "QJWIN was being used for FI/D purposes," QJWIN's

mission in the Congo was not a Staff D operation. Rather, it

was an African Division operation. I merely loaned O' Donnell

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S.SCI

Box

226

Folder 8

to the African Division. In turn, QJWIN was loaned by my

deputy, Arnold Silver to O Domell for his activities in the

Congo.

7. In fact, it is possible that Arnold stlyer might not know

exactly what QJWIN did in the Congo because

(Si

may simply

have arranged for WIN to be placed under the supervision of

Jugtin O Donnell and sent to the Congo.

8.

The use of the phrase "FI/D purposes" in the memo of January 11,

1960 was purely an administrative device to secure funding for

QJWIN and allow for accounting out of Staff D funds. I am

almost 100% sure that there was no actual FI/D assignment.

9. It is possible that ® Dormel

may have used QJWIN to aid in a

survey

Of FI/D

opportunit

les, in the Congo.

that

was: O" Donnell's

training

and most Stat

ficers would make, such ai su

when they

ereson other assignment

But this

Wa

a, t

spose: of to"Dom

11.

Palma

Lumumba.

10.. The specific nature of QWIN's assignment in the Congo was

probably worked out between Arnold Stlves and Justin O Dompell

QJWIN was first recruited by Arnold Stiver,

while Silver was

*Chi

of Station in Luxembourg and before Silver was assigned.

to me in FI/D. After Arnold Silver joined Staff D, he told meg

that he_thought QJWIN could be useful in breaking and entering

operations.

Also, we used QJWIN for spotting Corsican assets?

the primary purpose

of @"Downeil!'s trip was to undertake an operation against

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12. Shortly after

Arnold

came back

sem dous

8 and

perhaps before he was

actually assigned to

tafE D

and I discussed QJWIN and his potential utility.

13.

In Arnold Silver's early use of OwIN as auspotter of assets

for

a Droperations, QJVIi was told to "spot" people who.

could do breaking and entering to obtain

docu

He was

probably also told that he should spot people who were capable

of obtaining documents or packages from couriers.

14. QJWIN's instructions for asset spotting did not change at all

after Project ZRRIFLE was established as far as I know. Arnold ®

stever continued to be the intermediary between myself and

QJWIN. I never met OJWIN.

15. QJWIN was not permitted to make a single recruitment as far

as I know.

16. The lengthy handwritten notes which appear in the QJWIN/ZRRIFLE

file (a xeroxed version of a spiral notebook) were probably

written by

Arnold Silver in the course of debriefing OJWIN

on his asset spotting. This is a deduction on my part based

upon the handwriting and the terminology used in these notes.

17. If there

was any CIA mission to kidnap Lumumba from UN custody

and turn him over to Mobutu, I did not know of it. I do not

think anyone would be naive enough to think that if Lumumba

were turned over to Mobutu, he would live through it.

18. As far as I know, QWIN was entirely run by

MASAN

at this

point. In other words, I do not know of any independent lines

of responsibility or reporting that QJWIN had to other people

in the CIA station in the Congo los to anyone on Staff D.

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19. As far as I knew, neither O"Donnell nor QJIN ever had an assassi-

nation mission.

20. If QJWIN were to be used on an

assassination mission, it would

have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was

to be used for such a mission. Nor did I ever discuss any such

mission with him as far as I know.

21. I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to

the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I

do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do

not think that I ever had such knowledge.

22. I was shown a CIA cable to Director from rankfut IN 36814,

dated November 2, 1960 regarding QJWIN's mission to the Congo

which reads, in the first paragraph: "He accepted offer.

Proceed Leopoldville. Precise mission not conveyed to him.

He only informed that mission might involve large element of

personal risk."

ves probably wrote this cable.

This cable does not indicate any particular kind of operation,

like an assassination mission, because anyone going to the

Congo at this time would have assumed a great risk if they

were undertaking any kind of operation against Lumumba.

23. The memorandum of November 2, 1950

to the Chief of Station,

Dakary and the Chief

oF Station,

Luxembourg, from the Chief,

probably

KUTUBEZ Dwas a memorandum I read and approved at the time it

was issued. EKUTUBE/D was.

a cryptonym for FI/Staff D, of which I f

was Chief in 1960.9

24.

The memorandum indicates that Dantel MelPresland was the re-

leasing officer. Daniel M. Presland was my pseudonym.

probably released this memorandum, although I cannot be certain.

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25. This memorandum originatedt

It was probably written,

for my signature, by Arnold

, who would have been

sufficiently familiar with the operational details to be the

author.

26. I do remember the dispatch of QWIN to the Congo, the subject

to which this memorandum refers.

27. Dakar Mission! I do recall that QJWIN was to go to Dakarat

Senegal at some point as indicated in the QWIN file, but I

do not recall the nature of the mission:

Nor do I know

whether QJWIN actually went to Dakar.

I am almost certain

that this was not connected in any way to an assassination

mission. I do not.

recall whether the mission to Dakar concerned

the spotting of assets, but Dakar would be a logical place for

cassetrspotting activity because it is a cosmopolitan porte

28. After reviewing the Memorandum for the Finance Division from

"William K. Harvey, Chief, (I/DiviSion'D" dated January 11, 1960

which concerns QJWIN's trip to the Congo, it appears to me

that this memorandum was written for my signature by Asnolda

29. I do not know what was to be signified by the note in my memo

of January 11, 1960: "In order to avoid any misunderstanding,

it should be noted that QJWIN was sent on this trip for a

specific highly sensitive operational purpose which has been

completed." I do not know what "completed" would have meant,

but I assume it must have referred to the fact that o Donnell

had returned from the Congo.

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30.

This memorandum of January 11, 1960 does not reflect any first-

hand knowledge on my part of the nature of lowDormer

d's mission

in the Congo.

WIROGUE

31. Mr. Baron showed me the cable of December 17, 1960 from.

Leopoldville to CIA headquarters concerning an approach by

WIROGUE to QJWIN for the purpose of recruiting QJWIN for "an

execution squad." I do have a vague recollection that aJWIN

approached in the Congo in connection with a "direct

action" operation. But it is my impression that this was an

incident involving free-wheeling by an agent, rather than an

assassination mission.

RRIFLE/ ROSELLI OPERATION

32. Project ZRRIFLE was used for funding the Roselli operation.

Project ZRRIFLE, which began as the development of an Executive

Action capability, was later used for the accounting for the

Roselli operation. This was for the purpose of the convenience

of vouchering whatever expenses were involved and to ensure

security.

This enabled me to keep the general Task Force W

operations separate from the Roselli operation.

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33.

The question of "reactivation" of the Roselli operation in

November 1961. In November of 1961, Richard Bissell asked me

to take over the Roselli contact. Richard Bissell's testimony,

as represented to me by Mr. Baron, that Roselli was viewed as

an "inactive contact" at that time is exactly contrary to my

recollection. I recall that Bissell simply asked me to take

over the Sheffield Edwards operation. This was not a revival

of anything that had been terminated or put on ice. The

operation had never stopped. There was no indication in any

of my talks with Richard Bissell that the Roselli operation

was dormant. But in fairness

to Bissell, I don't know that he

ever said precisely that it was an ongoing operation. The

impression I received from Bissell, however, was that it was

indeed an ongoing operation. There was nothing said to the

contrary. My subsequent talks with Edwards, O'Connell, and

Roselli indicated that the operation was active. But I do not

know how close Bissell was to the operation and exactly what

he knew about it. It may have been his impression that the

operation was inactive. Whatever language Bissell used with

me, it was clear to me that the operation was ongoing and that

I was to do whatever I could with it. It was also clear from

ny first conversation with Roselli that the operation had never

been called off. Jim O'Connell also indicated to me that he

was still in contact with Roselli. Shortly after my discussion

with Bissell of my takeover of the Roselli contact, I discussed

the Roselli operation with Edwards. The only reason for the

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hiatus in activity in the Roselli operation between November

of 1961 and my meeting with Roselli in New York in April of 1962

was the intensity of my other responsibilities at the CIA.

During

this period, I had to set up Task Force W, including

recruiting its members. I also had to continue the ongoing

Cuban operations and write frequent memos to Lansdale and

Robert Kennedy on these subjects. When I was requested to take

over the Roselli operation, I assessed it and determined that

the operation should be terminated because it had little chance

of success.

But because of the tremendous repercussion potential,

I delayed the termination. I subsequently terminated the Roselli

operation as soon as feasible after the missile crisis in

October of 1962. It would have been terminated earlier except

that during the crisis I could not cut off any potential asset.

Had I been given the original assignment of removing Castro,

this is not the way I would have done it.

34. Authorization through Bissell. At no time did I or anyone else

connected with the Castro assassination operation (Helms, Edwards,

O'Connell and Roselli) ever have the slightest doubt that this

was fully authorized. But my sense of the existence of this

authorization came solely from my conversations with Richard

Bissell. I had no other direct information about the source

of authorization for the operation.

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35.

Robert Kennedy. I never discussed the Roselli operation with

Robert Kennedy nor with anyone outside the CIA except for

John Roselli.

ZRRIFLE/RICHARD BISSELL

36.

My initial discussion with Richard Bissell about establishing.

an Executive Action capability was the first time assassination

was ever raised with me in any context other than as a subject

of general philosophical discussion.

37. The memos of January 11, 1961 and of November 2, 1960 do not

make it any easier for me to date my original conversation with

Richard Bissell about Executive Action. The ZRRIFLE cryptonym

could have been assigned before of after my initial talk with

Bissell, so the date of that assignment would not be dispositive

of this question. I don't remember whether ZRRIFLE was a

Staff

Di cryptonym or not.

ZRRIFLE /ARNOLD SILVER

38.

'I do not know in what connection Richard Bissell

raised the subject of assassinations or assassination capability

with

Arnold Silver prior to my initial discussion of the subject

with Bissell. My best recollection is that in my discussion

with Bissell, Bissell said that he had a general discussion of

assassination with

lIvery in the course of which Silvery volunteered

that a

Corsican

asset of his might be useful in this connection.

But Arnold Silver had not previously used QJWIN as an assassina-

tion capability or even viewed him as such.

Arnold Silver would

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BOX

have had to clear any such use of QWIN with me, and he did

not.

When Richard Bissell spoke to

old

about de-

veloping an assassination capability, Silver

must have raised

QJWIN as a possible asset.

39. I reviewed the typewritten version of Arnol

ilves's notes.

headed "Project ZRRIFLE" which were included in the QJWIN/ZRPIFLE

file. On page 2 of those notes, the following sentence appears:

The spotting activity has now advanced far

enough to justify removing from the o0A category.

"OOA" refers to "Other Operational Activities," which is a general

fund that a CIA officer maintains to pay for development of

assets, including recruitment of assets, and general support

of agent operations.

40. The QWIN file was created first in regard to WIN's recruitment

by

Si

and then in regard to WIN's activities in the Congo.

Subsequently, it was transferred to the ZRRIFLE file. ZRRIFLE

was primarily set up as a projectito obtain code and cipher

§. I distinctly told

rnold Silver that QJVIN was

never to be told about the development of an assassination

capability. As far as I know, QJWIN never knew that the

development of an assassination capability was one of the

purposes of the asset spotting to which he was assigned.

41. I approved the asset spotting trip that QJWIN took through

Southern Europe in 1961.

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SSICI

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226

Folder &

STONEY GOTTLLEB/ZRRIFLE AND CONGO

42. I believe, as I testified earlier, that my discussion of

assassination with Sidne

TD

was a general, philosophical

conversation precipated by Gottiteb}'s equest shortly after he

became Chief

This is substantiated by the following

fragments from my notes of my conversation with Co

on

January 25, 1961, all of which refer to general SP

subjects:

"Framework of Sidys job";

NEL.

NT/RD memo (referring to they

question of TSD's responsibility. for research and developmenty

OR ELENT

"Led

1edi

(an

officer never cut in on the

subject of assassination or on

general state D

operations

to

Obtain code and cipher ma

sials) ; "translating machine."

The noteson "anesthesia"

-reters_.to

a problem that we experiment

with,& good dealinjecting hamless anesthe

tic gas into a pullman

carefor the purpose of relteving

diplomatic counters of

ciphere

material

Notes This is a highly sensitive projec

which

bas not received any_ publictty.)

43.

I talked to Sadney Gottlieb frequently in the course of my

work. However, I do not recall any other talk with Cottleby

that more specifically concerned assassination than this one.

44. I knew that ISD had a poisoning capability -- in other words,

that they possessed lethal drugs. I very probably discussed

with Gott krebl

the poisons that were available. But I do not

recall any specific conversation with Gottliebon this subject.

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SSCI, Box 226 - Folder 8.

45. As far as I know, Richard Bissell had discussed assassination

capability with Sidney Gottiteb. I would assume that this

talk with Gottlieb would have involved the manner and means of

assassinations. I have no knowledge that Sidney Gotbiieb and

Richard Bissell ever discussed any specific assassination

missions.

46. I do not think that I ever discussed SWIN's trip to the Congo

with Sidney Gottlieb. Cottlieb never mentioned to me that he

had been to the Congo.

TESTIMONY OF TED SHACKLEY CONCERNING A "THREE MAN DECISION-MAKING

GROUP"

47. Mr. Baron represented to me that Ted Shackley testified that I

had informed him in the early days of his tenure at JMWAVE

Station in Miami that there was "a three man group" making

decisions on Cuban operations. There was no such formal

decision-making group. I probably mentioned the three people

referred to by Shackley -- Lansdale, Helms, and Robert Kennedy --

as three key people in the Special Group at that time.

HANK MANTREDLY BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

48.

Man

redis

was once used to go to Rome to spot assets. He

was la

iseau

tessageng

at the time, so his participation

with the CIA was an extremely sensitive matter.

cc: Fritz Schwarz

Curt Smothers

Rhett Dawson

Burt Wides

/

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