## Page 1

NRO46 WA CODE

8:48PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COU NTERINIELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT YOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGEI AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES

OF AN AGENIS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARIICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY

CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED

TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

105-5575-1

Make

dond

---

## Page 2

NRG46 WA CODE

8: 48PM NITEL 3-24-75 DE3

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTER TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI• AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COU UTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS •

ACCORDINGLYS WITHIN FOUR BIGNT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTINO SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS& SUPSRVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIONED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS• PERCENTACES

OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIESS

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY

CATEGORICO• THIS INFORMATION SHOULD SE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTORMAL SEGURITY AND COUNTERINTELLICENCE.

YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED TO ACENT PERSONNEL ONLY®

END

105-

2575-1

---

## Page 3

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI.

Date: 3/25/75

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

TO

DIRECTOR V TIT

FROM

SAN ANTONIO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

REBUTEL, MARCH TWENTYFOUR, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION

OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN

SAN ANTONIO OFFICE.

CASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE

MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON

SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT

OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY

MATTERS AND ATH AGENT DEDICATES APPROX/SO PEN CENT OF HIS

TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,

THIS BRING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL, / 05-5575-2

I-SA

CDA: pam

Approved:

LarO

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

45%

- M

Per Rud

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 4

NROD5 SA CODE

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

TO

DIRECTOR

LPP

FROM

SAN ANTONIO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATIN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNIING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION

OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN

ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF

THESE MAITERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON

SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME

ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO

THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS

BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

END.......

105-55755

---

## Page 5

Routire Slip

0-3. 1Ker--7-11-75)

it:

3A0

Cal Albary

i Abneucroue

Alexandria

000

Anchorage

Allarta

• Baltimore

| Birmingham

JUD

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotle

Chicago

Cincinnati

1 Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

1Dl Puso

(Copies to Of = Chected)

1 Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

Now York City

Norfolk

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philndelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt. Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfield

Tamp a

Washington Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

3 Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

¡ Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

7 Rome

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE:

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE

Date December 4+ 1975

105-55595

Relention

For appropriale

I For information [J optional CJ action

CJ Surep, by -

• The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, J conceal all

sources, L paraplirase contents.

E Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

For your assistance in responding to

Local press inquiries, attached is a copy of

unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the

Director--Deputy Associate Director James B.

Adams while testifying before the Senate Select

Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI

allegations made by Gary Rowe, former FBI

informant.

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

He 105-587517

3B -

---

## Page 6

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE,

FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

DECEMBER 2, 1975

---

## Page 7

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to

spread dissention among certain groups that they are

informing on, do you not?

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were

discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one

of the best examples of a situation where the law was

ineffective at the time.

We heard the term, State's Rights

used much more than we hear today.

We saw with the

Little Rock situation the President of the United States

sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use

local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement

use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a

situation like this where you do try to preserve the

respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical

problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where

the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless

to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some

areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents

mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the

lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action

was taken with that information as he pointed out during

his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the infor-

mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We

also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead

---

## Page 8

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.

And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no

authority in the absence of an instruction from the

Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241

and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence

of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation

where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have

authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as

frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information

from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable

information--and it was passed on to those who had the

responsibility to do something about it, it was not always

acted upon as he indicated.

In none of these cases, then, there was adequate

evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

The Departmental rules at that time, and still do,

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.

You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you

have no violation.

Congress

recognized this and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil

Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

- 2 -

---

## Page 9

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This

was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--

the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we

were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking

place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that

we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were

able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing

the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

....A local town meeting on a controversial social

issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers

rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this

mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups

organizing or participating in such meetings because

they may result in violent government disruption?

No sir, and we don't....

Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every

aspect of the peace movement?

No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor

demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have

an investigative interest in, a valid investigative

interest in, or where members of one of these groups are

participating where there is a potential that they might

change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing

on the Ist Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

_ 3 -

---

## Page 10

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers

in the past than we do at the present time.

We have had

periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe

and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,

and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect

to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged

to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut

case.

QUESTION:

MR. WANNALL:

MR. ADAMS:

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and

we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one

that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor

the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-

ments fall.

In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just

heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when

violence was known about. I know we have asked this several

times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the

rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe

situation when violence was known.

Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to

that and if you have no objections, I'1l ask that he be

the one to answer the question.

The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem

today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have

police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do.

The Marshals

- 4-

---

## Page 11

since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had

authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has.

We

are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,

and during these times the Department of Justice had us

maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities.

We furnished the

information to the local police who had an obligation to

act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those

areas where the local police did not act. It resulted

finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals

down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to

march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there

was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the

country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement

agencies in the south at the time either, because many of

them did act upon the information that was furnished to

them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the

spot because we would not have had evidence that was a

conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in

that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for

instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army

should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals

should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed

the violations.

We have over the years as you know at the

- 5 .

---

## Page 12

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the

FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well,

we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan

as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we

exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

What would be wrong, just following up on your point

there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is

obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to

have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on

some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

We do.

We have them in Boston in connection with

the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in

Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same

time and this is the approach that the Federal Government

finally recognized.

On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that

kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting

till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from

the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need

a better remedy than we have.

Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have

subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or

50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on

potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

- б-

---

## Page 13

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with

state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice

and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to

protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a

lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government

had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during

the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it

a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that

we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another

infiltrating

the

Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member-

ship.

That's right.

I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would

mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point

was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the

figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members

in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an

awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such

as that?

I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants

in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it

just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For

example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,

both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here

we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters

and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

-7-

---

## Page 14

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan

informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I

think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that

right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan

had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in

the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the

hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was

going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and

considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the

violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as

many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind

that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,

was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights

workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

I acknowledge that.

Our only approach was through informants. Through the

use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were

solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved.

They're extremely difficult, but, these informants

as we told

the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved

informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the

bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he

could see that this could continue forever unless we could

-8 -

---

## Page 15

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

create enough disruption that these members will realize that

if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the

Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if

that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I

will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence

stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say

20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately

were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of

violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy

any longer.

I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in

1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto

situation?

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year

where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was

the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington,

areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the

situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They

weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an

organization. They were listening posts in the community that

would help tell us that we have

another group here that is

getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

... Without going into that subject further of course we

have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt

was made to prevent crime when you had information that it

was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where

you have.

- 9-

---

## Page 16

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

the crime.

Not necessarily knew.

Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

The informant is on one level. We have other informants

and we have other information.

You were aware that he had worked with certain members of

the Birmingham Police in order...

That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

so you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that

incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the

time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department

agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.s.

Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

... This brings up the point as to what kind of control

you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this

kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in

an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer

using him as an informant in spite of the information he had

furnished in the past.

We have cases, Senator where we have had

But you also told him to participate in violent activities

---

## Page 17

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

That's what he said.

I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits

are all about is that there are two sides to issues

and our

Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your

staff members, that at no time did they advise him

to engage

in violence.

Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

I do not think they made any such statement to him

along that line either and we have informants who have gotten

involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately

converted their status from an informant to the subject and

have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around

20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws

once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy

of disseminating information on violence in this case during

the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they

found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a

day and he was a little late in disseminating the information

to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed

up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in

properly notifying local authorities. So we not only

have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards

in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all

informant files.

Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with

an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

-11-

---

## Page 18

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they

decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are

words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't

take the lead but the implication is that he would have

to go along or would have to be involved if he was going

to maintain his liability as a ---

There is no question that an informant at times will

have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights

that take place but I believe his statement was to the

effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do

not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with

chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with

a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is

one thing being present, it is another thing taking an

active part in a criminal action.

It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut

apparently.

How does the collection of information about an

individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming

involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for

law enforcement or crime prevention.

Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that

they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge

concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any

value whatsoever.

-12-

---

## Page 19

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

You don't know of any such case where these instructions

were given to an Agent or an informant?

To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

-13-

---

## Page 20

105-5575

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105-5575-1

---

## Page 21

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---

## Page 22

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---

## Page 23

NEOSO WA PLAIN

11:32PS MITCL 12/10/75 GHS

10 ALL SACO

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE DEFORE SENATE SELACT COMMITIEE

ON INTOLLIGENOS ACIIVITIES, DOGGISEN LO, 1975

A COPY OF IME STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SONATE

SELECT COMMIIIAR ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITILS TODAY MAS BEEN

SLAT ALL OFFICES. PON YOUN INFONNATIONY THENE FOLLONS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS ON THE CONMITTEE*S

QUESTIONS TO MC, TOGGINER WIIM MY RESPONSES:

(1) NEGARDING FBI INFORMANIS, QUESILONS WERE ASKEO

WhETHEN COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORGANIS IN INVESTIGAIIONS OF ONGANILATIOAS CUY RESPONSE

WAS TAAC TRE COVIROLS WHICH EXIST TODAX OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARE SATISFACTONY>; MOW CAN FOI KEEP LUFORMANTS OPERAJING

WIINIA PROPER LINIS SO TREY DO NOT INVADL MISKIS OF OINER

PEASONS CHY RESPONSE WAS IHAT RELIANCE MUST B& PLACES ON INE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMARIS AND INOSE SUPERVISING

INE AUSNIS' WORK, THAT INFORMAMIS USO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN 8E

105-5575-1

OrC d019/5

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## Page 24

FAGE 1WO

PROSECUICD *- AS CAN ANY AGEAT UNO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT ID

COMALE VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANI GARY ROWE

TASIIFY ACCURATELY WHEN NE TOLL THE COMMITTES ON DECENS&R &

THAT NE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNCO ACIS OF VIOLENCE SUI FBI

DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATES.

(2) IN KESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUOT SY FBI EMPLOYSES, I STATED THAI ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW DY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESIIGATED BY THE FSI OR

OTHER APPROPRIAIS AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCICO INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLIGATIONS OF MISCONDUCIE

INAI AN OFFICE OF PROFASSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MAS JUST.

SEL ESTABLISHAD IN INE JUSTICE DEPARTAGNI, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARIMENIAL PENSONNELS

INCLUDING FBI EUPLOYSES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR SIANDARDS OF CONDUCE; THAT I WOULU RESEAVE COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

IO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY AMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY•

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## Page 25

PAGH THREE

43) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING MARASSMENI OF

MARTIN LUINER KING, NA*S I SIATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

INd OROCKE WHICH NESULILD IN SUCH NAKASSAENI SHOULD FACE THE

RASPONSASILITY FUN ITS ASTHSA THAN THOSE UNDCA THEN WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH DROLKS IN GOOD FAIINS THAT THE FOL STILL HAS SECORUINGS

RESULILNO FROM ELACINOUIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING, THAT WE RETAIN

MECORDINGO FOR TEN YEARS QUI WE ALSO MAVE AGNEED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESIACY LAFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONCRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCICO; THAT I MAVE NOT

REVIEWSO INE KING IAPES; THAT IF INE CONMIITES RAQUESTED IQ

RAVILY TNE KING TAPES, INE REQUEST WOULD BE REFENIED TO INE

ATTONARY GENERAL®

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESIIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

SA AOVANIAGEOUS TO SEPARAIE INE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

NESPOASIBILITIES AND QUA INTELLIQEICE FUNCIIONS, I STAIED

THAT WA MAVE FOUND IME IWO AREAS TO 3E COMPAJIBLE, AND I

FEEL ING FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOIN AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE IO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF COMINOLE ON REQUESIS FROM THE WHIIS HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVANNENZ AGENCIES FOX FOI INVESTICATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

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## Page 26

FACE YOUK

FROM DUK FILESS I SIAICO INAT WHEN SUCH REQUESIS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THRY SHOULN DE CONFINNED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

KELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINOS THE CONGREOS FEELS WOULD

FROICE THE FOI FON TRE POSSIDILITY OF FARTISAN MISUSE,

A PULL TRANSCKIPI OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISTRO IO BACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SSPARATALY

END

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