PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO
Originator: CIA
Document date: 2000-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32345891

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Date:

12/01/04

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

----------1111=

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10061-10080

RECORD SERIES : JEK

AGENCY FILE

NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

CIA

AGENCY ORIGINATOR

FROM :

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

01/01/1900

19

SUBJECTS

: PLOTS

CASTRO, FIDEL

IG REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

PAPER

: SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: 1A 1B

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/12/93

COMMENTS : JFK9 : F40 : 1993.07.12.08:32:18:030530

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

65.924 Date: 10.21-2021

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10061-10080

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Gambling Syndicate

The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had

Its inception In August 1960. It involved the use of wembers of

the criminal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. The operation

had two phases: the fIrst ran from August 1960 unttl late April

or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Bay of Pigs;

the second ran from April 1962 until February 1963 and was merely

a revival of the first phase which had been inactive since about

May 1961.

Gambling Syndicate - Fhase 1

August 1960

- Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield

Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact

with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The

objective clearly. was the assassination of Castro although Edwards

claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his

conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated

with J. C. King, then Chief of WH Division, although King now

recalls having had only limited knowledge of such a plan and at a

• much later date--about mid-1962.

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Edwards consulted Robert A. Maheu, a private investigator who

had done sensitive work for the Agency, to see if Maheu had any

underworld contacts. Maheu was once a special agent of the FBI.

He opened a private office in Washington in 1956. The late Robert.

Cunningham, of the Office of Security (and also a former Special

Agent; with the FBI), knew Maheu and knew that his business was having

a shaky start financially. Cunningham arranged to subsidize Maheu

to the extent of $500 per month. Within six months Maheu was doing

so well financielly that he suggested that the retainer be discontinued.

Over the years he has been intimately involved in providing support

for some of the Agency's more sensitive operations. He has since

moved his personal headquarters to Los Angeles but retains a

Washington office. A more detailed account of Maheu's background

appears in a separate section of this report.

(Cament: Although we see nothing sinister in it, we are

struck by the fact that so many of the persons whose names appear

in this account once worked for the FBI. We have already named

Cunningham and Maheu. Later to appear are William Harvey, James

O'Connell, and Edward Morgan.)

Maheu acknowledged that he had a contact who might furnish

access to the criminal underworld, but Maheu was most reluctant to

allow himself to be involved. in such

an assignment. He agreed to

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participate only after being pressed by Edwaras to do so. Maneu

identified his contact as one Johnny Roselli, who Lived in Los

Angeles: and had the concession for the ice-making machines

on "the

strip" in Iss Vegas and whom Maheu understood to be & member of the

syndicate. Maheu was known to Roselli as a man who had a number of

large business organizations as clients. Edwards and Maheu agreed

that Maheu would approach Baselli as the representative of business-

nen with interests In Cuba who saw the elimination of Castro as the

essential. first step to the recovery of their investments. Maheu

was authorized to tell Roselli that his "clients" were willing to

pay $150,000 for Castro's removal.

September 1960

Shef Edwards named as his case officer for the operation

James P. O'Commell (a former Special Agent, of the FBI), then Chief,

Operational Support Division, Office of Security. O'Connell and

Maheu net Roselli in New York City on 14 September 1960 where Maheu

made the pitch. Roselli initially was also reluctant to become

Involved, but finally agreed to introduce Maheu to "Sam Gold" who

either had or could arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba

who might. handle the job. Roselli said he had no interest in being

paid for his participation and believed that "Cold" would feel the

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same way. A memorandum for the record prepared by Sheffield Edwards

on 14 May 1962 states:

"No monies were ever paid to Roselli and

Giancana. Maheu

was paid part of his expense money during the periods

that he was in Miami."

(Giancana is "Gold.")

O'Connell was introduced (in true name) to Roselli as an employee

of Maheu, the explanation being that O'Connell would handle the

case for Maheu, because Maneu was too busy to work on it full time

himself. No one else in the Office of Security was made witting of

the operation at this time. Edwards himself did not meet Roselli

until the summer of 1962.

At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edwards

told Bissell that he had a friend, a private investigator, who had

a contact who in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate

elements in Cuba could be reached. These syndicate elements in

Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter

part of September 1960, Edwards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only

ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.s.

gangster elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was not informed

of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that time.

With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Allen Dulles)

and the DDCI (General Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving

members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards

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deliberately avoided the use of any "bad words." The descriptive term

used was "an Intelligence operation." Edwards is quite sure that the

DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he

was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being "from A to

B to C.". As he then envisioned it, "A" was Naheu, "g" was Roselli,

and """ was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles.

merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly,

there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no

fornal approval as suck, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval

to use his own judgment. Bissell comitted $150, 000 for the support

of the operation.

(Conment: In the ligat of this description of the briefing;

It is appropriate to conjecture as to just what the Director did

approve. It Is sale to conclude, given the men participating

and the general subject of the meeting, that there was Ittle

likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were

deliberately blurred and the specitic intended result was never

stated in umistakable language. It is also reasonable to

conclude that the pointed avoidance of "had words" emphasized

to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.'

During the week of 25 September 1960, O'Connell and Maheu went to

Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gola" at a meeting

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in the Fontainbleau Hotel.

"Gold"

said he had a man, whon he

identified only as "Joe," who would serve as courier. to Cuba and

make arrangements there. Maheu pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell

from a distance, but O'Connell never net either "Gold" or "Joe."

He did, however, learn their true identities. An Office of Security

• memorandum to the DDCI of 24 June 1966 places the time as "several.

weeks later." O'Connell is now uncertain as to whether it was on this

first visit to Miami or on a subsequent one that he and Maheu learned

the true identities of the two men. Maheu and O'Connell were staying

at separate hotels. Maheu phoned O'Connell one Sunday morning and

called his attention to the Parade supplement in one of that morning's

Miami newspapers. It carried an article on the Cosa Nostra, with

pictures of prominent members. The man Msheu and O'Connell knew as

"Sam Gold" appeared as Mom Salvatore (Sam) Giancana, a Chicago-based

gangster. "Joe, the courier" (who was never identified to either

Maheu or O'Connell in any other way) turned out to be Santos Trafficante,

the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba.

At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba,.

and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on

syndicate business. (The casinos were closed and gambling was banned

effective 7 January 1959. On 13 January. 1959, Castro announced that

the casinos would be permitted to reopen for tourists and foreigners

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but that Cubans would be barred. The cabinet on 17 February 1959

authorized reopening the casinos for the tourist trade. Time magazine

for 2 March 1959 announced that the casinos had been reopened the

previous week.

• The New York Imes issue of 30 September 1961.

announced that the last of the casinos still unring had been closed.)

Traificante was to make the arrangements with one of his contacts

inside Cuba on one of his trips: to Havana-

Fall and Early Winter 1960

Very early in the operation, well before the first contact with

Roselli, the machinery for readying the means of assassination was

set in motion. The sequence of events is not clear, but it is

apparent that a number of methods were considered. Preparation of

some materials went ahead without express approval.

(Conment: It should be noted that ISD maintains & stock

of equipment and materials for operational use. When queries are

made of TSD technicians about materials of devices that are not

stock items, it is not unusual for the technicians to go

ahead with the preparation of the materials or devices against

the event that there is a formal request for them. Because of

this, undue significance should not be attached to advance

preparations for this operation. It should also be noted that

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tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee,

or boutllon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well

suited.

January - February 1961

Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most

destrable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in

the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.. Treichler

remembers meeting with Edwards and. O'Cornell in Edwards office to

discuss the requirement.. The specifications were that the poison be

stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not immediately acting,

and with a flimly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to

meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either

liquid or solid form. Treichler states that the pill form was

chosen because of ease and safety of handling.

(Comment:. The gangsters may have had some influence on the

choice of a means of assassination. O'Connell says that in his

very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely,

Maheu's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible

ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first

thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which

Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the

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use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do

the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be

negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill

that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Irafficante

("Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban.

official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that

would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters

named their man inside as Juan Orta who was then Office Chief

and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister (Castro).

The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to

receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost

that source of income, and needed the money.)

When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of

water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even

. disintegrate, let alone dissolve. Treichler took them back and made

up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards

• at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He

called on Dr. Gunn to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave

Gunn money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Gunn has a record of a

conversation with Treichler on 6 February 1961. It may have related to

the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that

Gurn tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.

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In any event, O'Connell did. receive the pills, and he believes

there were six of them. He recalls giving three to Roselli. Presumably

the other three were used in testing for solubility and effectiveness.

The dates on which O'Connell received the pills and subsequently

passed them to Roselli cannot be established. It would have been

sometime after Gunn's notation of 10 February 1961.

Gunn also has a record of being approached about the undertaking

by Willian K. Harvey (former special agent of the FBI) in February

in connection with a sensitive project Harvey was working on for

• Bissell. According to Gunn's notes, he briefed Harvey on the operation,

and Harvey instructed him to discuss techniques, but not targets,

a with Gottlieb.

Gunn's notation on this point is not in accord with

the recollection of any of the others involved. We are

unable to

clarify it; the note may have been in another context. O'Connell

states that J. C. King was also briefed at this time, although King

denies learning of the operation until much later.

Late February - March 1961

Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante. Roselli reported to

O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba. Orta

Is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before

returning them. According to the gangsters, Orta got cold feet.

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(Corment: Orta lost his position in the Prime Minister's

Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was

still going on in Miami and in Washington. He took refuge In

the Venezuelan Embassy, on 1l April 1961 and became the responsi-

bility of the Mexican. Embassy when. Venezuela broke relations

with Cuba in. November 1961. Castro refused to give him a sale

conduct pass until October 1964 when he was allowed. to leave for

Mexico City. He arrived in Miani In early February 1965.

(It appears that Edwards and O'Connell did not know at the

time of Orta's fall from favor. They have made no reference

to it--ascribing Orta's tallure to cold feet. It would seem,

though, that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his

access to Castro. They described him as a man who had once had

a position that allowed him a rake-off on gambling profits, a

position that he had since lost.

The only job with which we can

associate Orts that night have allowed him & rake-off was the

one he held in the Prime Minister's OffIce, which he lost on

26 January 1961. It seems likely that, while the Agency thought

the gangsters had a man in Cuba with easy access to Castro, what

they actually had was a man disgruatled at having lost access.)

The previously-mentioned 24 June 1966 sumary of the operation

prepared by the Office of Security states that when Orta asked out

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of the assignment he suggested another candidate weo made several

attempts without

success. Neither Edwards nor O'Connell know the

identity of Orta's replacement nor any additional details of the

reported further attempts.

Marca - April 1961

Following the collapse of the Orta channel, Roselli tola

O'Comell that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the. Cuban exile

movement who might do the job. He identified him as Tony Varona

(DI. Manuel Antonio de VARONA y Loredo). Varona was the head of the

Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported by the Agency as

part of the larger Cuban operation. O'Connell understood that Varona

was dissatisfied with the nature and the extent of this support and

that JMWAVE suspected that Varona was not keeping his bargain with the

Agency.

(Comment: Reports from the FBI suggest how Trafficante may

"??;

have known of Varona. On 21 December 1960 the Bureau forwarded

to the Agency a memorandum reporting that efforts were being

made by U.S. racketeers to finance anti-Castro activities in

hopes of securing the gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies

in Cuba in the event Castro was overthrown. A later report of

18 January 1961 associates Varona with those schemes. Varona

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approval became invalid if Moss were not used within six

months of the date of the approval.)

Trafficante approached Varona and told him that he had clients

who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money

for the job. Varona is reported to have been very receptive, since

it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms, and

communications equipment.

(Comment: By this time Roselli had become certain that.

O'Connell was an Agency employee, not a subordinate of Maheu..

He told O'Connell that he was sure that O'Connell was "a

government man - CIA" but that O'Connell should not confirm

this to him. Roselli said that as a loyal American he would

do whatever he could and would never divulge the operation.)

Roselli was to deliver money to Varona for expenses.

O'Connel]

now recalls the amount as $50,000. Edwards, who was away at the time,

recalls it as $25,000. Since Edwards was absent, O'Connell had to

get approval from Edwards' deputy, Robert Bannerman, who until then

had

been unwitting of the operation. O'Connell told Bannerman that

the operation was known

to and approved by Edwards. Bannerman authorized

passing the money and now recalls the amount as being on the order of

$20,00ü to $25,000. An Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI,

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of just how it was planned to get the poison into Castro's food

by employing someone with access to a restaurant frequented by

Castro. The mechanics were identical with those described by

Edwards and as reported in our earlier account of phase one of

the operation.

c. O'Connell's account of his own role in the operation

in the early weeks following Harvey's' supposed takeover makes it

evident that there was not a clean break between the Office of

Security's responsibility and that of Harvey. Further, O'Connell

now believes that there must have been "something going on"

between April 1961 (after the Bay of Pigs) and April 1962, but

he claims to be unable to remember any of the particulars.

There are other disagreements among the three on facts. They are

reviewed here, not because they alter the essential fact of the

turnover or of Harvey's sole responsibility.for the operation after

a certain point in time, but because they suggest that persons who

were supposedly unwitting of events after the turnover were in fact

witting, because they were not effectively cut off at the instant of

Harvey's notes show that he and O'Connell went to New York City

to meet Roselli on the 8th and 9th of April 1962. O'Connell recalls

it as being early in April and that the introduction was made on a

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in the original cast of hoodlum players. Harvey specified that

Glancana was not to be brought in on the reactivation of the operation,

and he believes that Roselli honored the request. Roselli once

reported to Harvey that Giancana had asked if anything was going

оД,

and when Roselli said that nothing was happening, Giancana said,

"Too bad." Additionally, Santos Irafficante ("Joe, the courier" from

the earlier phase) was no longer Involved. With the closing of the

last casino in Havana in September 1961, Trafficante presumably no

longer had access. Roselli now had a man known to Harvey as Maceo,

who also used the names Garcia-Gonez and Godoy.

(Comment: Harvey is unable further to identify Maceo; he

describes him as "a Cuban who spoke Italian." One of Varona's

associates in the Cuban exile community was named Antonio MACEO

Mackle, but it seems unlikely that he was the Maceo of this

operation. He was prominent enough in the exile commnity to

have been known to Harvey. Further, it seems clear that Maceo

was "Roselli's man." This second phase appears to lack the

overwhelming, high-level gangster flavor that characterized the

first phase. Roselli remained as a prominent figure in the

operation, but working directly with the Cuban exile community

and directly on behalf of. CIA. Roselli was essential to the

second phase as a contact with Varons, who presumably still

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11 February 1965

Madria Station cabled: "From Cubela on 10 February: On 10 or :

11 February Cubela is to receive one pistol with silencer and one

Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from Artime's secretary. Both weapons

cone from. U.S. and now in Madrid." (This is in conflict with the

earlier report that Artime would cache a rifle and silencer if that

were all he could find. We are unable to resolve the conflict.)

I2 February 1965

The Panama City Station cabled: "Artime reported on final meeting

• with Cubela: Artime had three packages of special items made up by ..

bis technical people and delivered to Cubela in Madrid. Cubela

seened satisfied."

4 Marched 1965

Carlos lepedino reported receiving a telephone call from a

• friend in Havana who had seen Cubela back in Havana the previous day.

15 March 1965

The Madria Station cabled that one Rafael GARCIA-BANGO Dirube

had arrived in Madrid fron Cuba on 15 March and had been introduced

to a station officer.

Garcia-Bango claimed to be in contact with a

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group of Cuban military leaders who were planning. to eliminate Castro

and take over the government. It quickly became clear that he was

referring to Cubela. Garcia-Bango said that he had always been

publicly identified as a close friend of. Cubels, whom he last saw

in Havana on 9 March. Garcia-Bango said that he had been the lawyer

for the Capri Hotel in Havana. He was jailed for 75 days in July

1962 for defending Santos Trafficante, a U.S. citizen and ex-manager .

of the Capri gambling casino who was kicked out of Cuba.

(Comment: This is another name-link between Cubela and

the gambling syndicate plots reported upon earlier in this

report. Trafficante was one of the principals in Shel Edwards'.

Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in .

Phase Iwo under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all,.

Trafficante was the man who brought Varona into the operation late

in Phase One, and Varona was one of the main players during Phase

by

Two. The three-man team that was sent in Varona was reported

on 21 June 1962 to be in place in Cuba.)

June 1965

Headquarters decided to terminate all contacts with key members

of the Cubela group. It had become increasingly apparent that the

circle of Cubans who knew of Cubela's plans and of CIA's association

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!

underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on

18 January 1961, suggests that

was one of those receiving

that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of

interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster

elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who

would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre-

sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits

of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an

explanation of why

was so readily available when approached

by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the

1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called

off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was

reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something

already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been

terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found

itself

involved in providing additional resources for independent operations

that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate

had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have

sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri-

butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

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1.....

ESCEST.

have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro

could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of

information. However, because the statement by Sturgis

indicated a familiarity with

additional attention was given the statement

in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are

known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach

to the reliability of newspaper stories.

"Press stories

refer to possible relation-

Ships between Sturgis and Trafficante.

17

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