ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Originator: OASD
From: E.R. ZUMWALT
To: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
Document date: 03/15/1963
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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198-10007-10015

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

OASD

E.R. ZUMWALT

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES

DATE: 03/15/1963

PAGES:

13

SUBJECTS :

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

EXCHANGE OF. INTELLIGENCE, LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Memo for Califano from Zumwalt re: second working draft of

"Cuba: The Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist Subversive Activities."

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13528

X Declassify → Exclude E Exempt

Authority-

E Refer To_

Review Dao 8/121/2015 8y KES

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UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENTS

ARE DETACHED

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SBCRETARY OF DEFENSE

15 March 1963

MEMO NO. 42 MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

Special Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT:

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee

of Cuban Affairs: Exchange of

Intelligence Concerning Communist

Subversive Activities

With reference to your Memo No. 19, comments

are submitted herewith in the form of hand written

changes to one copy of subject paper.

USN

Attachment

As stated above

UNCLASSITIED WHEN ATTACHMENTS

ARE DETACHED

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OSO/ISA MR SCORNE

er..-

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

15 March 1963

TO SERVICE, OSD AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS:

This

1s

our final effort on the paper for

exchange of intelligence. Please give me your views

on the manuscript by 1500 today.

V. H. KRULAK

Major General, USMO

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GROUP-1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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SECOND WORKING DRAFT

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I.

Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through-

out Latin America, there 1s a fundamental requirement for

intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely

acquisition and processing of information as well as its

rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries

concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID,

and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American

intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited,

and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad

problem, however, that this paper 1s primarily concerned,

but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a

stronger program of exchanging essential information re-

garding Communist subversion in Latin America among those

who need to know it.

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II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage

the exchange of intelligence on an international basis,

even among allies. National privacy with regard to the

inner workings of an intelligence system must be pre-

served.

Compounding the problem further, where Latin

America 1s concerned, is the divisive influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and dis-

putes which have characterized

relations among the

nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among

pairs and groupings of nations are not completely

healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and

Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and

Bolivia continue at odds over the question of Bolivian '

access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents

are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica

and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these

countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on

a full and frank basis.

Beyond this, Latin America 1s not a homogeneous en-

tity in social, political, or economic terms, and

attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace

vary widely. A completely unified approach toward

exchange or intelligence concerning this menace, there-

fore, cannot be regarded

as attainable.

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An additional impediment to intelligence exchange

is the low level of competence of most Latin American

intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure

meahs of communication, and the absence of adequate

security systems and the lack of security conscious-

ness.

Deficiencies in

security safeguards must

necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence ob-

tained covertly by any of the nations involved, and

particularly the United States, which has the most

sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for

protection.

This defect promises to persist, since the

governments of some countries have little desire

to develop a competent career security service.

There is a fear that the existence of an efficient

service would constitute a threat to further activi-

ties of members of the existing governments at such

time as they might find themselves out of power.

Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services

tend to label as "subversives" those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are opposed

to the existing government.

These realities all underscore the fact that

multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached

on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be

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concluded, however, that nothing of value can be

accomplished multilaterally. With proper defini-

tion, limiting the problem of exchange to matters

directly related to communist subversive activities,

such as the movement to and from Cuba of trainees,

the production and movement of propaganda materials

which threaten internal stability, and the movement

of arms, it should be practicable to marshal a useful

measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort,

1t will be important to draw a sharp distinction

between secret intelligence gained by covert means

and information obtained openly. The former in-

volves the requirement to protect national secrete

both as to sources and acquisition methods employed.

The latter, which can be of great value, can be

exchanged without fear of compromise.

2. Current Exchange Arrangements

At present there is little organized exchange of

intelligence among the Latin American nations.

There is a limited amount of informal exchange,

often on a basis of personal relationships between

government officials having a community of interest

with respect to a particular matter.

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The Central Intelligence Agency has established

working liaison arrangements in some Latin American

countries where such relations have been considered

to be in the best interest of the United States.

Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in

Latin America available to the CIA is derived from

covert operations or through contacts with another

intelligence or security service. This inhibits the

passage of such information to agencies of a third

country. There is, however, a substantial amount

of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive

sources which can be provided to other countries.

In 1962, for example, CIA received information re-

ports from 26 services with which liaison is main-

tained in Latin America and released reports to 35

recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included

collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name

traces and travel reports.

The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral

exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.

Information provided by the Army has been concerned

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with

subversive personalities, communist infiltra-

tion, weapons movements and related matters.

Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small

value.

The Army also provides selected information

on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala

and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has

established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange

of intelligence among nine South American navies, the

Mexican Navy and the U.S. Navy.

Some information has been released from time to

time to Latin American countries by the Commander-

in-Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the

Military Groups, and exchanges of information are

also

effected from time to time through channels

of the Department of State.

As yet, however, the program for the provision

by United States agencies of information on subver-

sion to Latin American governments has not been

developed to an adequate degree. Since the United

States possesses the most extensive acquisition

capabilities, as well as the only secure and re-

liable means of rapid communication throughout Latin

America (currently in process of improvement), the

development of an integrated United States system

for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi

bility of achieving the results desired.

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United States experience in the matter of intel-

ligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas

of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral

arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral

arrangements such as those established within the

framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless,

this experience has shown also that multilateral

arrangements can be of some use, particularly in

creating an awareness of the need for intelligence

exchange.

The concept of an exchange of information among

members of the OAS with regard to subversive activi-

ties has been put forward at numerous Inter-American

meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for

the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the

Punta del Esta decisions, the OAS members were

urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity

to counteract threats or acts of aggression, sub-

version or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a

"Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)"

is established to give technical advice on request

to governments and the Council on matters

relating

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to subversion. All American governments have been

asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and

recommendations by the Council of the AS on how

to counteract them. Since the Punta del Esta meet-

ing, the OAs has been making slow progress in the

countersubversion field, but there has as yet been

no significant exchange of intelligence through ite

machinery.

This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral in-

telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best, as well as a need to create an expanded

program for bilateral intelligence exchange be-

tween the United States and individual countries,

and finally, a requirement to develop the possibili-

ties of a multilateral approach within the recog-

nized limitations involved.

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III. Actions Recommended

1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in-

telligence

conducted by CIA, DOD, and other U.s. agencies,

Where

it is found possible to establish appropriate

arrangements for the exchange of selected information con-

sistent with security requirements.

2. Establish military intelligence centers at the

headquarters of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean

Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination

of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our

Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissem-

Ination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive

activity directly to the countries concerned through the

American Embassies therein.

3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of in-

telligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements

of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean

Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further

dissemination as appropriate.

4. Increase the dissemination to Latin. American

governments, by all U.s, agencies concerned, of unclassi-

fied studies, reports and other non-sensitive Information

concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

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5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in

bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist

subversive activities.

6. Continue the development at high priority of

U.S. communications in Latin America.

7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. in-

telligence advisors to Latin American countries. Dis-

courage their employment of intelligence advisors from

nations other than the ü.s.

8. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and

Military programs for the training and equipping of

Latin American internal security and intelligence services.

Establish such programs in additional countries where it

Is found to be in the best interests of the United States

and acceptable to the country concerned.

9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate govern-

ments to keep the Council and the SCCs fully informed on

a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of sub-

versive activities in their respective countries.

10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve

the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence Information and estimates

concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities. This cam te

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11. Take action to cause the IADB to be designated

Ante American

In orde not.

as thelagency to provide advice and assistance to the

the I estap. (or

cours os the ols 1o regar to the exchane or into eases

advise and

gence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

lisaidan un

done and are or rest no retre or senor a i a

American countries and the United states for the purpose

of fostering the exchange of intelligence concerning

Castro-Communist subversive activities and developing the

necessary mechanisms and procedures therefor.

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