DRAFT ASSASSINATION REPORT
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 10/16/1975
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

157-10014-10136

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT ON ON SYNERY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19972

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DRAFT ASSASSINATION REPORT

DATE: 10/16/1975

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Box 349

October 16, 1975.

TOP SECRET

¡SINATION REPORT

TAD A

TAB

TAB

TAB

B:

C:

D:

TAB E:

TAB F:

TAB G:

TAB: H:

TAB I:

TAB J:

TAB K:

TAB L:

DRAFT ASSASINATION REPORT

ENTS

prologue

Introduction and Summary

Covert Action as Vehicle

for Foreign Policy Implementation

Cuba

1. Introduction

2. At What Level Were

the Castro Plots Authorized or

Known About Within the CIA

3.

The Question of Authorization Outside the Central

Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration

4.

The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy

Administration, Pre-Bay Of FIgS

5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy

Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs

6 .:

7. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration

Congo.

Executive Action Capability

Dominican Republic

Chile

South Vietnam

Findings

and Conclusions

Recommendations

Epilogue

349

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September I, 1975

SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT

Tab A: PROLOGUE

Tab B:. Part I: Introduction and Summary

•Tab C: Part II: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation

Tab D: Part III/Cuba

Tab E: Part III/Dominican Republic

Tab. F: Part III/Chile

Tab G: Part III/Congo

Tab H: Part III/South Vietnam™*

Tab I: Part IV: Findings and Conclusions

Tab J: Part V: Recommendations

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Agreed to by Subcommittee

October 8, 1975

PROLOGUE

The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in

the context of United States policy and actions designed to counter

the threat of spreading Communism.! Following the end of World

War II, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under

Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was

accompanied by the rapid disintegration of the Western colonial

empires. The Second World War no sooner ended than a new struggle

began... The Communist threat, emanating. from what was then called

the "Sino-Soviet bloc,"

"produced apolicy of containment intended

to prevent further encroachment by Communism into the "free world."

United States strategy for conducting the Cold war called for

the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military

bases throughout the world. Our concern over the expansion of an

aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two

major wars in Asia. In addition,

it was considered necessary to

wage a relentless cold war against Communist expansion wherever

it appeared in the

"back alleys of the world." This called for a

full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations

of Communist clandestine services

The fear of expanding Communism was particularly acute when

Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of Cuba in the late 1950's.

His takeover was seen as the first significant penetration by the

Communists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including

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most Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem the

Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on '

widespread popular support and encouragement.

Throughout this period, the US. felt impelled to respond to

threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes in a global Cold

War against Communism. Castro's Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet

outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic

appeared to offer more such opportunities for the Russians and their

allies.: The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic'

center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist pene-

tration there was viewed as a threat to American interests in emerging

Africa.: Americans are well aware of the powerful reactions set off

in the United States in

the 1960's,by the domino theory in Indochina.

And, even the election in 1970 of |ä Marxist president in Chile was

seen by some as a threat similar to that of Castro's takeover in Cuba:

The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this

Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but

not justified, by the pressure of events at the time. The Committee

- believes that it is still in the national interest of the United

States to do what it can to help nations resist Communist domination;

but it is clear that this cannot justify in the

future the kind of

abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved

*---

that steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again.

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Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee

on August 2T, 1975*

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMARY

This interim report covers allegations of United States involve-

ment in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal

significance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political

leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner

involved in activity leading up to the killing, but where it would be

incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been

to encourage assassination.

The evidence establishes that

the United States was

implicated in

several assassination plots.. The Committee believes that the use of assassi-

nation as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles,

international order,

and morality. It should be rejected.

Our inquiry also revealed serious problems with respect to United

States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments. Some of

these problens are addressed here on the basis of our investigation to date;

others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into

covert action has been completed:

We stress the interim nature of this report. In the course of

the Conmittee's continuing work, other alleged assassination plots ay

surface,.

and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to

light. However, it is the Committee's view that the cases covered herein

have been developed in sufficient detail to clarily

the issues which are

at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative and other

reforms relating to the vital matters discussed below.

* The Vice Chairman reserved as to the first sentence in the discussion

of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p.

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Aur winda

In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthened

the Committee's schedule but has greatly increased the Comnittee's avareness

of the hard issues it must face in the months ahead. The Cormittee intends,

nevertheless, to complete, by February 1975, its main job of undertaking the

first comprehensive review of the intelligence community.

Л.

The Comnittee's Nandate

Under Senate Resolution 21,

the Committee as instructed to in-

vestigate the full range of governiental intelligence activities and

the

extent, if any, to which such activities vere "illegal, inproper or un-

ethical"'. In addition to that very broad general mandate, the Committee

was required by the Senate to investigate, study and nake recommendations

concerning various specific matters, several of which relate to the assassi-

nation issue."

Although the Rockefeller Commission conducted an inquiry into

reported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, for

a variety of reasons, to complete its

inquiry. At the direction of the Presi-

dent, the Executive Eranch turned over.

to the Select Committce the work

the Commission had done, along with other documents relating to

assassina

tions.

* Tor example, S. Res. 21 requires the Cornittee to study and investi

gate the following:

the extent and necessity. of

• covert intelligence activities

• :. abroad";

"[the] nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all

United States

intelligence activities";

"the need. for improved, strengthened, or consplidated oversight

of United States intelligence activities by the Congress": and

the need for new legislation.

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D. Comnittee Decision to Make This Report Public

This report raises inportant questions of national policy. ie

- 30

-believe that the public is entitled to know what certain instrumentalities

their Government have done. Further, our recommendations can only be

judged in light of the factual record.

Therefore, this interin report

should be made public.

Because of our faith in the denocratic systen, and the paranount

importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Cormittee

believes the truth about the assassiration allegations should be told.

Denocracy depends upon a well-informed

electorate. Truth underlies both

justice and freedom.

We reject any contention that the facts disclosed herein should be

kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United

States. Despita

the possible injury to our national reputation, the Comnittee believes that

foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States more

for keeping

faith with its democratic ideal than they will condemn us for

the misconduct itself.

The fact that portions of the story have already been publicly dis-

closed only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and mis-

leading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved,

nor a responsible way to lay the groundwork for inforned public policy

judguents.

C.

"The Scope of the Comnittee's Investigation

The investigation of the assassination issue has been an unpleasant

duty, but one that the Select Committee had to meet. The Comnittee has

compiled

massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway.

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1 TOP SECKE

The hearing record includes some

pages of sworn testimony from __

witnesses during --

hearing days as

well as numerous staff interviews.

The documents which the Committee obtained included raw files from the

agencies

and departments. from the White House, and from the Presidential

libraries of the Administrations of.former Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy

Kennedy and Johnson.**

We obtained evidence of two

general types: first, evidence

which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of

the time, and descriptions of normal operating procedures including

channels of command and control; and 'second.

evidence relating to specific

events.

A Senate Committee is not a court. It looks to the past, not to

determine guilt or innocence, but in order to make recommendations for the

future. Therefore, where we found the evidence to be anbiguous--as we did

on some issues--we have set out both sides, in order

that the evidence may

speak

for itself.

Despite the number of witnesses and docunents examined by the

Committee, there were the

following shortconings in the evidence available

to us:

* The names of the witnesses

are

set forth in Appendix A.

** The Conmittee served both general and specific document requests upon

the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committee that

it did not know of any additional relevant documents, except, of course, for

the possibility that the "Nixon papers!' (which the Committee is attempting

to obtain) may contain material relevant to the allegations relating to Chile.

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Many of the events under consideration occurred as

long as fifteen years ago.

With one exception, they

occurred during the administrations of Presidents now dead.

Other high officials, whose testimony might have

additional light upon the thorny issues of authorization

and control, are also dead. Moreover, with the passage

of time,

the memories of those still alive have dirmed.

The Committee often faced the difficult task of dis-

tinguishing refreshed recollection from speculation.

In

many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from in-

dependent recollection and had to rely on documents con-

temporaneous with the events to refresh their recollections.

While informed speculation is of some assistance, it can

only be assigned linited weight in judging specific events.

Assassination is not a subject on which one would

expect many records or documents to be made or retained.

In fact, there were more relevant contemporaneous documents

then we had expected, land the CIA in 1967 made

internal

study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination allega-

tions.

That study was quite useful, particularly in

suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual

assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material

* Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms

to provide him with information to respond to questions put to him by

President Johnson. The President's questions, as to Castro, were provoked

by a Drew Pearson newspaper column of March [6], 1967, which had alleged

CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Maria.

The President asked Helms at the sane time to provide information

about Trujillo and Diem.

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relating to that investigation was destroyed upon its

completion.*

1 final deficiency in the evidence stens front the

doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed

from the

world and performed in such a way that if they

were discovered, the role of the United States could be

plausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of

¡plausible deniability' conmunications

between the Agency

and high laministration officials were often convoluted

and imprecise.**

The evidence contains sharp conflicts,. sone of which relate to

basic facts.

but the most important conflicts relate not so nuch to basic

facts as to differing perceptions and: opinions based upon relatively undis

puted facts.

With respect to both kinds

pf conflicts, the Conmittee has

attempted to set forth the evidence

extensively so that it may speak for

itself.

In the findings and

conclusions section, we suggest resolutions

of some of the conflicts. Remembering that the Connittee's nain job is

to find lessons for-the future, there are also occasions where we point

out that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important than

making certain that the system which produced the arbiguitics is corrected.

* This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard

Helms (Helms Ex. _; 6/13/75 Tr.).

In fairness to Director Helms it

should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the.

preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving them.

** For a full discussion of this doctrine see pages

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HUN SECRET

D.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

1. The Questions Presented

The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:

ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate,

attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to

assassinate foreign leaders?

INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials

assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly con-

tributed to the killing of foreign leaders?

AUTHORIZATION. Where there was involvement by U.S.

officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such

activities ordered and if so, at what levels of our Government?

COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL. Even if not authorized,

were the assassination activities perceived to be within the

scope of

agency authority, and was adequate control exercised

over

its

activities.

2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots

The Seven Allegations.

The Committee investigated alleged

U.s. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.*

They

were:.

Country

Cuba

Congo (Zaire)

Individual Involved**

Fidel Castro

Patrice Lumumba

• .

* Insert Footnote on Sukarno and Duvalier.

** Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu.

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Country

Individual Involved

Dominican Republic

Rafael Trujillo

Chile

General Rene Schneider

South Vietnam

Ngo Dinh Diem

In summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed

the following.*

Fidel Castro (Cuba). United States Government personnel plotted

to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in

these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro regine. One of the later

plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban dissident who was provided

encouragement and material support by the United States.

Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire). In the Tall of 1950, two CLA

officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were

sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining

access to Lumumba.. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by

Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United

States was

involved in the actual killing.

Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic): Trujillo was shot by.

Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. Commencing in 1960 and continuing

to the time of the assassination, the U.S. Government generally supported

these dissidents and some Government personnel were aware that they intended

to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by

American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused.

There was conflicting evidence whether the weapons vere knowingly supplied

for use in the assassination

and whether any were

present at the scene.

* See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence.

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1: 6329

Ceneral Rene Schucider (Chile)•

Un October 25, 1079, General

Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt

three days carlier.

Schneider, as Conmander in Chief of the Army anú a

constitutionalist opposed to military coups: was considered an obstacle to

effórts to prevent Salvador Allende fron assuming the office of President

of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate,

a military coup

to block Allende. U.$. officials supplied financial aid,

machine guns

and other equipment to various military figures who opposed

Allende. There was conflicting evidence on whether the United States had

previously severed relations

with the group that kidnapped and killed

Schneider

and on whether any of the equipment supplied was

actually used

in the kidnapping.

Mao Dinh Dicin (South Vietnai). Diem and his brother, thu, were

killed on lovember 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Cenerals'

coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there was

no evidence that Merican officials favored the assassination. Indeeù, it

appeared that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals'

pre-

coup planning but was

instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the

coup and with which there was no American connection.

In addition to these five cases the fonittee received evidence

that ranking sovernment officials discussed, and may have authorized, the

establishment within the CIA of à generalized capability to assassinate.

ice-Chairman

Similarities and Differences Arong the Plots. The plots all

ver reserved

ght to

involved Third World countries, nost of which were relatively snall and

range to

iclude con-

none of which possessed great political or nilitary strength.. Apart frem

ant of Com

inj sphere that sinilarity, there vere significant differences anong the plots. The

- ..

luence

i.,in

following distinctions are pertinent:

stern Hemi-

nere.

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410-

(1)

Wnether United States officials initiates the plot or

were responding to requests

of local dissidents for aid.

(2)

Whether the plot vas specifically intended to kill a

foreign leader,or whether the leader's death was a reasonably

foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the covern

dient.

The Castro case

is an example of a plot conceived by United States

officials to kill a foreign leader.

The Lununba plot falls into the same.

category.

In the case of Trujillo, although the U.S. Covernment certainly

opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States

officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose ain

clearly vas to assassinate Irujillo. By aiding them this country as in-

plicated, whether the specific weaponry actually supplied was neant to kill

Trujillo or was only intended as

symbol of U.s. support for the dissidents.

The Schneider case is different from that of both Castro and Tru-

jillo. The United States Government sought a coup and provided support to

local dissidents, knowing they believed that General Schneider was an obstacle

to their plans. However, even though the support included deadly weapons,

it appears that the intention of both

the dissidents and the United States

officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider. Similarly, in

the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Government, but

there is no evidence that the United States sought the death of Dien himself.

3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority

and: Control.

To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two.

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L0N?

points must be made clear.

First, there is no doubt that the United states

Government opposed the various leaders in question. U.s: officials

at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Irujillo regimes, believed

the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American in-

terests, and thought of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa.

Second, the evidence on

assassinations has to be viced iu the context of other,

more massive activities directed against the regines in question. For

example, the plots directed against Fidel Castro personally, cannot be under.

stood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults upon

his repire, such as the lay of Pigs invasiod in 1961 and Operation "ongoose in

1062.

However, the issue of Goverimental authorization of assassination

is of independent importance. There is a significant difference between a

coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and

other forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore,

the Comnittee

endeavored

to explore as fully as possible the question of

and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, fron

what level the authorization came.

He discovered a murky picture..: It is not clear wether this is

due to the systen of deniability and

the consequent state of the evidence

which

even after our long investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive,

or whether there were in fact serious

shortcomings in the system of

authori-

zation so that activities such as

assassinations could have been undertaken by

an agency of the United States Government vithout cagress authority.

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-1ật

TOP SE

mo :

Based upon the record of our investigation, the Committee's

single most important finding is that the system was such that assassina-

tion activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States

Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was

explicit authorization from

the highest level.

110nS

with that paramount conclusion, the Conmittec tales four other

najor findings.*

The first rclates to the lack of direct evidence of authori-

zation of the assassination plots by Fresidents of other persons above the

Governmental agency or agencies involved. The second caplains why certain

officials may have,

nonetheless, perceived that, according to their judgnent

and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third

criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to roveal tlicir

plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to do so with

sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials

for, on occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and

for not making sufficiently clear that 'assassination should be excluded from

consideration.

There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first

and third points tend to sussest a lack of authority while the second and

fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perccived

that their actions

were

proper. This tension reflects

a basic conflict in the

evidence.

While there

are sone conflicts over facts, it is more important

that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same facts.

This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and ex-

perience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinguished

* The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section

, infra.

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from those who were not.

Hords of urgency which to the former nay have

meant

killing,

to the latter may have meant nothing of the sort.

While we

are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee

is mindful of the inherent problems

in

a system which relies upon secrecy,

compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility.

This

syten creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where

clarity

and

sober judgment are most necessary. lence: before turning to an

extensive review of the evidence relating to the cases: we briefly deal with

the general subject of covert action

during the relevant period.

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TOP SECRET

Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee

pn. August 28, 1975

II.

COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Simply stated, covert action may

be defined as activity which sup-

ports the sponsoring nation's foreign

policy objectives but is concealed

under circumstances permitting that

nation

to plausibly deny its actions.

The National Security Act of 1947

did not specifically include

authority for covert operations.

However,

it granted to the National

Security Council, then created as

an

instrument of the President, the

authority to direct the CIA to "perform

such other functions and duties

related to intelligence affecting

the

national security as the National

Security Council may from time to time: direct." Thereafter, at

its

first meeting in December 1947, the National Security Council issued

a top

secret directive granting the

CIA

"the authority to conduct covert

operations. From 1955 to. 1970, the basic

authority for these operations

was National Security Council 5412/2.*

This directive framed the purposes,

of covert operations entirely

in terms of opposition to "International

Communism, "** directing the CIA

to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism" throughout the

world in a manner consistent with U.

S

foreign and military policies.

It also directed the CIA to undertake

covert operations to achieve this

end, and defined covert operations

as

any

' covert activities related to

i..

-

Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National

Security Decision Memorandum 40, which superceded NSC 5412/2 on Feb-

ruary 17, 1970.

By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970 described covert actions as those secret

activities designed to further official U. S. programs and policies

abroad. It made no reference to conmunism.

• T.

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SIEGME I

propaganda, economic warfare, political

action (including sabotage,

demolition and

assistance to resistance

movements) and all activities

compatible with the directive (emphasis; supplied). In 1962, the CIA's

General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities are

"not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth

in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62)

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

AND APPROVAL MECHANISM

The evidence dealt with in Part III is concerned with what actually

happened as far as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the ac-

tivities under review by the Committee!

With respect to what was

meant

to happen in regard to covert action generally, the CIA's General Counsel

stated in 1962:

CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. 0c-

casionally suggestions for action will come from out-

side

sources but, to depend entirely on such require-

ments would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibili-

ties.

Also, the average person

, both in government and

outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop

clandestine cold war activities properly, persons know-

ing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine

action must be studying and devising how such actions

can be undertaken effectively.

With respect to policy approval,

the General Counsel went on to say:

Both in developing ideas or plans-for action. it is in-

cumbent upon the Agency to obtain necessary policy ap-

proval, and for this purpose these matters should be

explored with proper officials in other departments.

and agencies, particularly in the Departments of State

and Defense, so the determination can be made as to

whether any one proposal should go to the Special Group

or higher for policy determination.

The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear

that the CIA

considered

itself responsible for developing proposals and plans to

NN 30933

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21

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## Page 22

implement the specific objectives of NSC

SION

5022913

the same time, how-

ever,

the memorandum stated that even in the development of ideas or plans

for action, it was incumbent upon the Agency not only to coordinate with

other executive departments

and agencies, but also to "obtain necessary

policy approval" (emphasis added). The issue which faced the Conmittee,

of course, was whether such

approval was, in fact, sought and obtained

assassination

plans, and whether

CIA officials thought it was "neces-

sary" to obtain express approval for

these activities.

Beginning

in 1955, the responsibility

for authorizing CIA covert

action operations rested in the Special Group, a sub-Cabinet level sub-

committee of the National Security Council composed of the President's

Assistant for National Security Affairs!

the Director of Central In-

telligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of

State for Political Affairs. Today

group is known as the 40 Com-

mittee, and its membership now includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staffs. In addition, during 1962 another subcommittee of the NSC was

established to oversee covert operations relating to Cuba. It was known

as the Special Group (Augmented) and

wa's

composed of the members of the

Special Group, the Attorney General andicertain other

high officials.

The overriding purpose of the Special Group and

its successors

has been to exercise control over covert operations abroad. The Special

Group was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives

of any proposed activity, whether or

it would accomplish these

"aims.

how likely it would be to succeed, and in general

whether or not it would

be "proper" and in the American interest.

The Special Group Chairman

usually was responsible for determining which projects required Presi-

dential consideration, as well as keeping him abreast of progress or changes.

- 99,8007

NW 50955

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÷ 41

WON MISCIEN

The foregoing should not be taken to imply that the procedures

always have been clear and tidy, nor that they have always been fol-

lowed. Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. In

1955 the Special Group procedures were made more formal. Neverthe-.

less, the procedures that were followed during the period of 1959-63

were characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudy

and thus can probably be described as

having been based on value judg-

ments by the DCI." (Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Co-

ordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967)

In addition to the "somewhat cloudy" nature of the formal pro-

cedures themselves, there are other

options available to any Chief Ex-

ecutive. The Committee recognizes

that

an agency charter to plan cov-

ert

action could not preempt Presidential authority to develop and

mandate foreign policy. Similarly,

is equally clear that what may

he represented as the "desire" of a

President is often communicated by

intermediary officials whose perceptions may or may not accurately

reflect the true Presidential purpose.

Obviously, formal procedures

can be disregarded from above or below.

In at least one case, for

example, a President instructed CIA officials not to consult with the

Special Group or other departments.

nat least one other case, Agency

officials decided not to bring matters to the attention of the Special

Group. It should also be noted that

ali

of the above procedures apply

to activities labeled "covert action"

whereas some of the activities

considered in this report were treated

as "counter-intelligence" actions.

Such actions are not normally subjecti to

40 Committee-type interdepart-

mental authorization and review.

NW 50955

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## Page 24

The Concept of "Plausible Deniability"

Non-attribution for U. S. Government covert operations was the

original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of plausible

denial.

Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates. that this con-

cept, designed to protect the U. S.

and,

its operatives from the conse-

quences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask

not

only Presidential decisions but

those of his senior staffers; (2)

support less than complete advice to

such persons regarding these op-

erations.

The quest for "plausible denial" has shaped the processes of the

U. S. Government for approving and

evaluating covert actions.

The 40

Committee and

its predecessors can

serve as

"circuit breakers" for a

President, placing the locus of consideration of covert action at sev-

eral removes from the Oval office.

One:

consequence of the doctrine of

plausible denial is an incomplete

documentary record.

The quest for "plausible denial"' has

also led to the use of cer-

tain techniques, including euphemism

and

circumlocution.

These tech-

niques have had as their purpose the

objective of allowing the Presi-

dent

and other senior officials to

deny

knowledge of an operation should

It be disclosed. In addition, the use of indirect reference to inform

a President could be reversed--a President could communicate his desire

to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect,

circumlocutious manner.

Whether, at times circumlocution had the affect

of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand

what was being said, was a question faced by the Committee.

side

AW 50955

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- 6.4

"Plausible deniability" raises

NOw SEEKE

al number of other issues which the

Committee has had

to confront. Differing interpretations of the practice

of plausible denial has affected the extent to which sensitive matters

were raised or considered.

The evidence discussed below revealed that

very

serious problems of assessing and

insuring acccuntability and con-

• trol- can

arise out of plausible deniability.

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U4 34840U C72 1911

TOP

Lite

3. Cuba

We have divided the facts

with respect to Cuba into three

broad sections:

The first discusses the plots against Fidel Castro's life

without attempting to confront the question of authorization.

The second deals with the

evidence concerning whether or not

the successive Directors of Central

Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John

McCone, authorized or knew about the

various plots. (Although we have

organizationally divided the evidence

relating to the DCI's from the

proof

relating to other high administration

officials, it is important

to remember that the Director of Central

Intelligence is the principal

advisor to the President on intelligence

matters,

a member of major

administrative policy-making councils

as well as head of the Central

Intelligence Agency.)

The third section covers

the

evidence concerning whether or

not other high officials--including

the

various Presidents--authorized

or knew about the plots. This section

also considers the evidence relating

to whether or not the CIA officials

who

were involved with the plots believed

them to be consistent with the general policy objectives of the various

administrations even if they had no

personal knowledge as to whether the

plots were or were not specifically

authorized by higher authority.

NH 50955

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## Page 27

TOW

ECIET

1.

The Assassination

Plots Themselves

We have found concretel

evidence of at least eight

plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960

to 1965. Although some of the

assassination plots did not

advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot

involving the use of underworld figures reportedly twice pro-

gressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and

dispatching

teams to commit the

deed. Another plot involved

furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban

dissident. The assassination

proposals ran -the gamut from

high-powered rifles to poison

pills, poison pens, deadly

bacterial powders, and other devices which would strain the

imagination.

The most ironic of these plots took place on

November 22, 1963--the very

day

that President Kennedy was

shot in Dallas-when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison

pen to a Cuban for use against

Castro while at the same time

an emissary from President Kennedy

was meeting with Castro to

explore the possibility of improved relations.

The following narrative

sets forth the facts of

assassination plots against Castro as established before the

Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question

of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is

considered in the sections that follow.

2

HH 50955 DocId:32423524

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TOP SECRET

(a) Plots: Early 1960

(1) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image

Efforts against Castro did not begin with

assassination attempts.

Fron March through August 1960, during the

last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered

plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his

speeches. According to the Inspector General's Report, an

official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled dis-

cussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a

chemical which produced effects

similar to LSD, but rejected the

scheme because the chemical was

not reliable. During this period,

TSD impregnated a box of cigars

with a chemical which produced

temporary disorientation, hoping

to induce Castro to smoke one

of the cigars before delivering

speech. The Inspector General

also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by

dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that

would cause his beard to fall out.

The chemical was to be adminis-

tered during a trip outside of Cuba, in which it was anticipated

Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room

to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals,

but apparently abandoned the

scheme because Castro cancelled his

trip." (I.G., pp. 10-13.)

(2) Proposal to

Sabotage Flight

& Cuban leader sponsored by the

The first

proposed action against the life of

CIA of which the Committee is

aware took place in July 1960.

On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airline

3

NH 50955

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## Page 29

SECRE

pilot who had volunteered to

assist the CIA in gathering intelli-

gence informed his case officer

Havana that he would probably

be chosen to fly to Prague on

July 21 to return Raul Castro to

Cuba (Memo to I.G., 1/17/75)

On July 20 the pilot confirmed that

he would definitely fly the

plane.

CIA Headquarters and field

stations along the route were

requested to inform the Havana Station

of any intelligence

needs that

the pilot might fulfill. The case

officer testified that he and

the pilot contemplated only acquiring

information about Czechoslovakia

and Raul Castro, and that assas-

sination was not considered.*

The cable from the

Havana Station was received at Head-

quarters on the night of July 20.

The duty officer, who was summoned

to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to

DDP Richard Bissell, and J.C.

King,

Chief of the Western Hemisphere

Division. **

Following their

instructions, he sent a cable to the

Havana

Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible

removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at

HQS. "

The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficiently

motivated to risk "arranging an accident during return trip" and

4

* A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs

supports this account.

**-The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King

because he would not otherwise have signed the cable "by direction,

J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely"

have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes

was the man to whom we went

i for our authority and for work

connected with the Cuban Projecti." (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) Since

King at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cuban

affairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of an

assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes"

(Duty Officer,

p. 24)

HH 50955

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## Page 30

TOP SECRET

advised that the station could

at discretion contact subject to

determine willingness.to.cooperate. and his suggestions on details".

Ten thousand dollars was authorized

as payment "after successful

completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the

possibility that the pilot was

double agent. According to the

case officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the

conventional activities we'd

been asked to handle". (Case Officer

interview, 8/4/75, p. 2)*

The case officer contacted the pilot and told him of the

proposal while accompanying

him

to the airport for the flight. The

case officer avoided the word

assassinate"

, but made it clear

that

the CIA contemplated an "accident

to neutralize this leader's

(Raul's) influence". (Case

Officer interview, p..2) After being

assured that his sons would

be

given a college education in the

event

of his death, the pilot

agreed to take a "calculated risk",

limited to

possibilities that might pass as accidental.** (Cable,

Havana to Director, 7/22/70)

Immediately after returning to the station the case

officer was toid that a cable

had just arrived stating: "Do not

5

* The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surround-

ing facts for precisely that reason: "[Ilt was an unusual type of

[cable], and I say this because I can remember it 15 years later."

(Duty. Officer, p. 14)

The case officer recalled that when he saw

the cable, he

"swallowed hard'

(Case Officer interview, p. 3)

** The cable from Havana to 'Headquarters stated that the pilot

was willing to risk: "A.

Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or

harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching approximately

three hours out from Cuba."

AN 50955 Doold: 32423524 Page

30

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## Page 31

TOP SECRET

pursue ref. Would like to drop matter." (Cable, Director to

Havana, 7/22/60; Memo to I.G.j, 1/17/75)* It was, of course, too

late to "drop the matter" since the plane had already departed.

When the Cuban pilot returned;, he told the case officer that he

had not had an opportunity to arrange an accident.

(3) Poison Cigars

A notation in the records of the Chief,

Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that on

August 16, 1960, he was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars

with instructions to treat

them with a lethal poison (I.G., p.

21). The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so

potent that a person would die

after putting one in his mouth

(I.G., p. 22). The Chief reported that the cigars were ready on

October 7, 1960; TSD notes

indicate that they were delivered to

an unidentified person on February 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). The

record does not disclose whether

an attempt was made to pass the

cigars to Castro.

(b) Use of Underworld! Figures--Phase I

" (1) The InitiallPlan

In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist

the aid of members of the criminal underworld with gambling

6

*"This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28)

The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he

had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing

the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty

Officer, pp. 29-30) The reasons for Dulles' action are discussed.

infra at

HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 31

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## Page 32

TOR SECRET

syndicate contacts to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidence

of the operation

is a conversation between Deputy Director of

Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Chief

of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked

him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro (Edwards,

pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find

someone to assassinate Castro,

and believed that Edwards. raised

the idea of contacting member's

of a gambling syndicate operating

in Cuba* (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 71-73).

to James P. O'Connell, Chief

Edwards assigned the mission

the Operational Support Division

of the CIA's Office of Security

explaining that he and Bissell

were looking for someone to

eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro

(0'Connell, pp. 6-8, 95-96).

Edwards and O'Connell decided to rely on Robert A.

Maheu to recruit someone "tough

enough" to handle the job

(0' Connell; p. 8). Maheu was

an

ex-FBI agent who had entered into

a career as a private investigator

in 1954. Robert Cunningham,

a former FBI associate of Maheu s

who was employed in the CIA's

Office of Security, had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in

7

* Although Castro. closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when

he first came to

power, they were reopened for use by foreign

tourists in late

February 1959, and remained open until late

September 1961.

NW 50955

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## Page 33

TOPISECRE

several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to

8

have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell,

p. 158).. Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA

of $500, which was terminated after his practice became more

lucrative (O'Connell, pp. 13-14; I.G., p. 15). O'Connell had

served as Maheu's case officer

since the Agency first began using

Maheu's services, and by 1960

friends (Maheu, p. 6).

they had become close personal

Sometime in late. August or early September 1960,

O'Connell approached Maheu

about

the proposed operation (Q'Connell,

p. 9; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu

recalls the conversation,

O'Connell asked him to contact John Roselli, an underworld figure

with possible gambling contacts

in Las Vegas, to determine if he

* During 1954-1955, Maheu

cooperated with the CIA in attempting

to undermine Aristotle Onassis

contract with the Saudi Arabian

government that would have given Onassis virtually complete control

over shipping of oil from Saudi Arabia. Although he was employed

by Onassis' competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the

He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be

placed on Onassis' room in New fork after first consulting with the

Agency, and that he provided the impetus for the termination of the

contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he

said he purchased with CIA funds. (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 14-25.)

O'Connell testified that, Maheu, at the CIA's request had also

previously arranged for the production of a film in Hollywood

depicting a foreign leader with a woman in the Soviet Union.

CIA planned to circulate the film, representing it to have been pro-

duced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-163). Maheu testi-

fied that he had located an actor resembling the leader and had

arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-42).

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 33

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## Page 34

TO SECRET

9

would participate in a plan to

l'dispose" of Castro* (Maheu, 7/29,

p. 8).

Maheu had known Roselli since the late 1950's (Maheu, 7/29,

pp. 58-60). Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of the

extent of Roselli's underworld connections and activities, he

recalled that

"it was certainly evident to me that he was able to

accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed

to get the same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60).

O'Connell had previously met Roselli at Maheu's home (Maheu, 7/29,

p. 8). O'Connell and Maheu each claimed that the other had raised

the idea of using Roselli, and Maheu said O'Connell was aware that

Roselli had contacts with the

gambling syndicate (Maheu, 7/29,

p. 8; 0'Connell, pp. 15-16).

Maheu was at first reluctant to become involved

in the operation because it might interfere with his relationship

with his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because he

felt that he owed the Agency

commitment (O'Connell, pp. 12-13,

103). O'Connell recalled that. Maheu was to approach Roselli

using

a cover story that he represented business firms suffering

heavy financial losses caused

Castro's actions** (O'Connell,

p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money,

* Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate

Castro was

one phase of a larger

project to invade Cuba (Maheu,

pp. 7, 13, 47).

** Roselli testified that the story was developed later and

used as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli in

dealing with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17%.

NH 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 34

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## Page 35

ON SECRET

probably $150,000, for Castro!

assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16,

111; Memorandum, Osborn. to DCI, 6/24/66).

(2) Contact With The Syndicate

In early September 1960, Maheu met Roselli

at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that "high govern-

ment officials" needed his cooperation in getting rid of Castro,

and asked him to help recurit. Cubans to do the job (Roselli, p. 8).

Maheu recalled that Roselli was lat first reluctant to participate

in the project and insisted on

meeting with a representative of

the government (Maheu, 7/29,

pp.

10-11; Roselli, P. 9): A meeting

with O'Connell was

arranged in

New York City at the Plaza Hotel

during the week of September I4, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; I.G.,

p. 16) .

O'Connell testified

that he was introduced to Roselli

as a business associate of Maheu, and that Maheu told Roselli

that he represented international business interests which were

pooling

money to pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell,

p. 26). Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that

O'Connell was with the CIA** (Roselli, pp. 11, 85).

10

* The I.G. Report places thelamount at $150,000; O'Connell

thought it might have been $100,000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli

recalled $250,000 (Roselli, P. 25) and Edwards confirmed the

$150,000 figure (Edwards, p. 9).

Maheu could recall no "price

tag" for Castro's assassination (Maheu, p. 34).

** The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized

the CIA was behind the

assassination attempt at an early stage.

HH 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 35

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TO

It was arranged that Roselli would go to

Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. 11-12).

Edwards informed Bissell that contact had been made with the

gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21; I.G., p. 17).

During the week of September 24, 1960,

O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli, met in Miami to work out the

details of the operation (O'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12;

I.G., p. 18). Roselli used the, cover name of "John Rawlston"

and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of

"some

business interests of Wall Street. that had

nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I

getting financial assistance from them" (Roselli,

pp. 9, 17).

Maheu handled the details of setting up

the operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments.

After

they had been in Miami

for a short time, and certainly

prior to October 18,* Roselli| introduced Maheu to two indivi-

1]

Maheu substantially confirmed his account (Maheu, p. 111).

O'Connell recalled that about three weeks after the New York

meeting,

Roselli told him,

"I am not kidding, I know who you

work

: for." (O'Connell, p. 26))

* Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana)

after November

, 1960, when he was staying at the Fountainbleu

Hotel (Maheu, p. 17). Other evidence indicates that the meet-

ing took place earlier.. When they first went to Miami, Maheu

were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File

R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved

in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth

because (1) the wiretap of Rowan's apartment, discussed infra,

was made on October 30; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent. a memorandum to

Bissell stating that Giancana had been telling several people that he was

involved in an assassination attempt against Castro (see infra, p.

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 36

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TOP SEGREN

duals on whom he intended to

rely:

"Sam Gold", who would

serve as a "back-up man" (Roselli, p. 15), or "Key" man

(Maheu, p. 17), and "Joe", whom

"Gold" said would serve as

a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there (I.G., p. 19) .

O'Connell, who was using the name "Jim Olds", met "Sam" and

"Joe"' only briefly (O'Connell,' pp. 26-29).

O'Connell testified that he learned the true

identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and

asked him to examine the "Parade

supplement to the Miami

Times.*

An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted

criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana,

a Chicago-based gangster,** and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante,

the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cubat (O'Connell, pp. 28-30);

I.G., p. 19). O'Connell reported his discovery to Edwards

(0' Connell, pp. 31; 33) but did not know whether Edwards

reported this fact to his superiors (0 'Connell, pp. 32, 41).

O'Connell testified that this incident occurred after "we

were in this thing up to our ears"

, a month or so after

12

* A search of supplements to all Miami papers during this

period did not reveal the article described by O'Connell.

** Sam Giancana

was murdered in his home on June 20, 1975.

+ Trafficante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba on

gambling syndicate business (I.G.

6, pp. 19-20).

NN 30903

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Giancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to

giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, 44).

Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job

to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish

the assassination (Maheu, p. 19),, and that he met almost

daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu,

p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key

role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans

eventually used in the operation, were acquired through

Giancana's contacts (Roselli,

15).

(3) Rowan Wiretap Incident

In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for

a Florida investigator, Edward DuBois, to place an electronic

"bug" in comedian Dan Rowan's

room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36).

DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and

installed a tap on Rowan's phone (Maheu, p. 38). O'Connell

characterized the ensuing events

as a "Keystone comedy act"

(0'Connell, p. 68). On October

31, 1960, Balletti, believing

that Rowan would be out for the afternoon, left the wiretap

equipment unattended.

A maid discovered the equipment and

notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought

13

* According to O'Connell and Roselli, DuBois had been

requested to place a legal electronic bug against the wall

from an adjacent apartment.

Balletti instead installed an

electronic tap.

on the phone (0' Connell, pp. 67-68; Maheu,

pp. 36-37).

NO 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page

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14

him to the jail. Balletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this

thing up to his ear" (O'Connell, pp. 71-72; File R-505, FBI memorandum).

Balletti's bail was paid by Roselli (Roselli, p. 52).

(i) Evidence Concerning CIA involvement in the Tap. The

Committee received conflicting evidence on whether the agency was consulted

prior to the installation of the tap. * O'Connell testified that he

had called Edwards and cleared the placement of an electronic "bug" in

Rowan's apartment prior to the installation of the tap (O'Connell,

pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that!

he had initially asked O'Connell if

the CIA would handle the job, and that O'Connell had told him that

"he would call Mr.. Edwards and see if they would have the

capability of accomplishing this, . . . and that subsequently

he informed me that

Mr

• Edwards had said that they would not

do it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independent

private detective to put it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37).

On the other hand, Edwards, in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for the

Attorney General (discussed at length, infra, p.

), stated that

"At the time of the incident neither. the Agency nor

the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."**

4119

*

Regardless of whether the CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparent

that the CIA paid for the tap.

DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had

paid him a retainer of $1,000 (Fale R-505, p. 14). O'Connell confirme

that CIA "indirectly" paid for the tap because "we paid Maheu a certair

amount of money, and he just paid it out of what we were giving him."

"Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the money

the CIA made available to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap?

A: Yes.

***

knew somebody was being employed

in order to accomplishi

a tap?

* *

A: That is right." (0'Connell, p. 69.)

A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover states that

the Attorney General said he had

been told by Edwards that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu

in making the installation" (Memo, Hoover, 4/10/62).

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15

The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that "the

Agency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact",

but offered no further evidence, to support that contention (I.G., p. 67).

The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerning

whether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to check

on security leaks. O'Connell testified that during the early stages of

negotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed O'Connell that a

girl friend of Giancana was having an affair with Rowan. Giancana wanted

Maheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to las

Vegas himself. Maheu was concerned

that Giancana's departure would

disrupt the negotiations, and

secured O'Connell's permission to arrange

for a bug to ensure Giancana!s

continued presence and cooperation.

(O'Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu

substantially confirmed this account

(Maheu, pp. 25-30).

There is some evidence, suggesting that the CIA itself may have

instituted the tap to determine: whether Giancana was leaking information

about his involvement in an assassination attempt against Castro.

Bissell was informed that Giancana had been talking about Giancana's

involvement in an assassination" plot*s without indicating the CIA was

When Roselli talked with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered,

Giancana "laughed. ... I remember his expression, smoking a cigar, he

almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52) .

Roselli

claims that he was "perturbed! because "It was blowing everything,

blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet"

(Roselli, p. 52) •

Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in the

operation "in order to have him keep his mouth shut" (Roselli, p. 27).

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16

involved) by an October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, which

stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported:

"(During recent conversations with several friends,

Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done

away with very shortly.

When doubt was expressed

regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured

those present that Castro's assassination would

occur in November.

Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on

three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that everything has

been perfected for the killing of Castro, and

that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further

described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or

food of Castro's."

(File R-505, memo from Hoover

to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.)

Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tap

on different occasions: first,

that Giancana was concerned about a

possible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that he

had arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl

friend about the assassination plot, and whether she was spreading the

story (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Mäheu gave the second explanation to the

FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (File

R-505, FBI Sunmary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to the

Attorney General:

"Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana's

girl friend) might know of the proposed operation and

might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend

of (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwaras to

Kennedy, 5/14/62.)

(11) Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if he

was "approached by the FBI, he; could refer them to me to be briefed

that-he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba"

(Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18,

it's

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17

1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA,

and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be. contacted (File R-505,

Memo, 4/20/61).

Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau

that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it

might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive

Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, Summary of FBI file). In a

memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney

General that the "national interest" would preclude any

prosecutions based upon the tap.

Following a briefing of

the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to

prosecute.**

* Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are

described fully infra at pp.

** Maheu subsequently drew

on his involvement with the CIA

to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee

investigating invasions of privacy in 1966.

According to the

Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the

Committee intended to call him, "he applied pressure on the

gency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might

xpose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (I.G., p. 74).

Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu

and his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long

that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pP.

58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu

to testify.

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(4) Poison Pills Are Prepared and Delivered

18

to Cuba

The Inspector General's Report described

conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and Cornelius Roosevelt,

Chief

of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning

the most effective method of poisoning Castro (I.G., pp. 23-

24) .

There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated

the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give

the "asset" a chance to escape (I.G., p. 25). O'Connell

recalled Roselli's request for

something "nice and clean, with-

out getting

into any kind of

out and out ambushing"

, preferably

a poison that

would disappear.

without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116).

The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that

the Agency had first considered a "gangland-style killing" in

which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed

the idea

because it would be difficult to recruit someone for

such a dangerous operation, and suggested instead the use of

poison. (I.G., p. 25)

Edwards rejected the first batch of pills.

prepared by ISD because they would not dissolve in water. A

second batch, containing botulinum toxin, "did the job expected

of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell,

p. 43) 0'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in

February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal,* and

* Records of the ISD still extant in 1967 indicate that the

pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell

sometime thereafter.

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53I23

then gave them to Roselli. (O'Connell, p. 43).

In late February or March 1961, Roselli

reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in

Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received

kickbacks from the gambling interests (I.G., p. 23). The

official kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them.

Roselli and O'Connell ascribed' his failure to a case of

"cold feet" (Roselli, p. 24; O'Connell, p. 44). The Inspector

General noted that he had lost his position in the Prime

Minister's office, and thus access to Castro, before he

received the pills (I.G., p. 28).

(5) A Second Delivery Is Attempted

Following this first failure, Roselli told

O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading

figure in the Cuban exile movement, might be able to accom-

plish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* Dr. Manuel Antonio

de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front,

a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector

General's Report suggests that Varona may have been receiving

funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in

securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in

19

O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once, and

that after the meeting Varona told Roselli:

"Look, I don't know (sic] like the CIA and you can't

tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man"

O'Connell

recalled, "I don't know whether I showed It or what,

but he suspected

that I wasn't what I was represented

to be."'

(0' Connell, P: 22.)

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Cuba after the overthrow of Castro (I.G., p. 29). The Report

speculated that Varona

was interested in the assassination

scheme as a means of financing the purchase of arms and

communications equipment (I.G., p. 31) .

Varona claimed to have a contact inside

a restaurant frequented by Castro (Roselli, P. 21). As a

prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth

of communications equipment (I.G., pp. 31-32; O'Connell, p. 23).

O'Connell recalls that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western

Hemisphere Division, gave him $50,000 in Bissell's office to

pay Varona if he successfully

assassinated Castro (O'Connell,

pp. 17-21). 0'Connell stated that Bissell also authorized him

to give Varona the electronics, equipment that he requested

(0' Connell, pp. 20-24) .

Bissell testified that he did not doubt that

some cash was given to O'Connell, and that he was aware that

the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the

meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell. would have

been given the money in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The

Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security

memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an

interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds,

placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., PP. 31-32). If the

Inspector General's conclusionswere correct, the funds which

Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment

inti

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21

to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varona

after. Castro's death.

The record does clearly reflect, however,

that communications equipment was delivered to Varona*

that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, provably

in the amount of $10,000 (I.G:, p. 32). The money and pills

were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante,

and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Roselli

recalled, Maheu

"opened his briefcase and

dumped

a whole lot of money

on his lap

.. and also came up with the capsules

and

he

explained

how they were going to be used.

As

far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling

soups and things like that, but they could be used in

water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever . .

It had to be done as quickly as possible.

(Roselli,

p. 21).

Varona had no better success than Orta.

According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards believed

the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restau-

rant where the.

"asset"

was employed._ Maheu suggested an

* O'Connell testified that a man from the communications

office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had

ing an automate which he had been told cont recalled deliver-

been told contained communica-

tions equipment to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52) .

** Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, and

did not recall being present at a meeting at which the pills

were passed (Maheu, pp. 40-41). Maheu did recall that O'Connell

showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pills

would be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. 40).

NN 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 46

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alternative reason.

He recalled being informed that after

the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had

to be received before in fact' they were administered" (Maheu,

p. 42).

He testified that he was informed by O'Connell some-

time after the operation that' the Cubans had an opportunity

to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra

or Raul Castro, but that the

¡so signal" never came (Maheu,

pp. 43-44, 60-61). He did not know who was responsible for

giving the signal (Maheu, p. 44-45). Varona subsequently

returned the cash and the pills

(0' Connell, pp. 19-20; CIA

Justice file R-153, Memorandum!

Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66):

The date of the Varona operation is

unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March-

April 1961, prior to the Bay off

Pigs (I.G., P. 29). Bissell

testified that the effort against Castro was called off after

the Bay. of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11, p. 52) and Maheu testified

that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of

Pigs (Maheu, p. 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it

occurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 47-48).

21n.

(c)

Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II

(1) Change in Leadership

The Inspector General's Report

divides the gambling syndicate operation into Phase I, termina- i

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22

10P SECRET

ting with the Bay of Pigs, and Phase II, beginning with

William Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinction

between

a clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be an

artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that the

operation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period

immediately following the Bay of Pigs.*

In' early 1961, Harvey** was assigned the

responsibility for establishing a general capability within

the CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassination

as a "last resort" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, Pp. 34-35).

* Harvey said that he took over a "going operation" from

Edwards (I.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized

that:

"I would like to make as clear as I can that there was

no phase 1, phase 2 in thi's. This is an ongoing matter

which I injected into . .

• (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90).

Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the case

officer for the project well into May 1962. During interviews

for the Inspector General's Report, O'Connell recalled that

there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and

Harvey's assumption of control, (I.G., p. 43). When testifying

ta go one rol, tien

before the Committee, O'Connell

¡firmly recalled several trips

to Miami in the Fall of 1961, and "right up to the time I

turned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami" (O'Connell,

pp. 89-90) .

** Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities.

He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation

(Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the division,

which was responsible for ,the surreptitious acquisition of code

information (Harvey, 6/25, pp.

8-9).

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The capability was called Executive Action and was later

included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE. It and the evidence

relating to (i) its

connection to the "White House" and (ii)

Whether

or not it involved

action as well as "capability" is

discussed

extensively infra

at

Harvey's. notes reflect that Bissell asked

him to take

over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards

and discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on

November 16, 1961 (I.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the

conversation took place and accepted the November date as

accurate (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 12-13). He also testified that the

operation

"was not reactivated, inlother words, no instructions

went out to Roselli or to others

.. to renew the

attempt, until after I had left the Agency" (Bissell,

6/11, P.

53).

Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited

to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syndicate

against Castro (Harvey, 7/11, p: 60) .

Richard Helms replaced Bissell as

DDP in February 1962. As such, he was Harvey's

superior.

Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of

the gambling

23

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HOP SECRE

277 24

syndicate operation at all stages* (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 65-66;

7/11, p. 42; I.G., p. 41).

(2) The Operation is Reactivated

In early April 1962, Harvey, who testi-

fied that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms (Harvey,

7/11, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Roselli

(CIA Justice File R-153; Edwards memorandum, 5/14/62). O'Connell

first introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey told

Roselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Maheu

or Giancana (O'Connell, P. 50; Roselli, pp. 27-30), whom he had

decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65).

O'Connell recalled that Rosellijdid not initially trust Harvey,

*When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harvey

stated that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Roselli,

and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the

Castro operation" (I.G., p. 41)!

Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did recall that

he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli in

April 1962. He remembered that he

"reluctantly"

but that he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17,

had approved the operation,

p. 23).

When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida,

Helms testified:

"I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall

necessarily approving them; but since Harvey alleges to

have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must

have, I must have

authorized them in some fashion."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 44).

-Helms confirmed that Harvey was "reporting quite regularly what

was going on.

Whether he reported everything. or not, I do not know."

It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him a

matter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms also

testified:

"You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently

informed. Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today

I don't remember it, as I have said. But I do not

recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was

really made on Castro's life" (Helms, 7/18, p. 32).

NW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 50

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although they subsequently developed a close friendship.

(0' Connell, p. 52) .

Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met for

a second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962 (I.G., p. 43). A

notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Ser-

vices Division indicates that four poison pills were fiver to O'Connell

on April 18, 1962 (I.G., pp. 46-47). The pills were passed to Harvey,

who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touch

with Varona (I.G., p. 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explaining

that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Reselli,

p. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended

to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul

Castro.

According to Roselli's testimony, Harvey approved of the

targets, stating "everything is all right, what they

want to do"

(Roselli, p. 34).

Varona

requested arms and equipment as

a quid pro quo for carrying out

the assassination operation (0'Connell,

pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help of the CIA's Miami station

(JMWAVE), procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns,

radios, and boat radar costing about $5,000 (I.G., p. 49). Harvey

and the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck under

an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were

given to Roselli, who watched

the delivery from across the street with O'Connell (O'Connell, pp. 92-93).

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The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona

or Roselli's agent, Maceo (I.G., pp. 49-50; Roselli, p. 40).

Harvey testified that the arms "could" have been for use in the

assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona

solely for that purpose (Harvey, 7/11, p. 9):

Roselli kept Harvey informed of the

operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the

pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli,

pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dis-

patched & three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report

descrihed the team's mission as "vague" and conjectured that the

team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the

poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G., p. 51).

Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7

and 1l, 1962. Varona was reported to be preparing to send in

another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey

was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were

still "safe" in Cuba (Harvey,

6/25, p. 103; I.G., p. 51).

Harvey testified that by this time he

had grave doubts about whether the operation would ever take

place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that

this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey,

6/25, p. 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming

that "conditions" in Cuba were not right (I.G., p. 51-52). During

early January 1963, Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's

expenses (I.G., p. 52).

26

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TOM SENEI

Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a

meeting with Roselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Roselli

would taper off his communications with Varona (I.G., Pp. 52-53).

Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans.

However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for

Castro's assassination had been withdrawn* (Roselli, p. 45).

The lagency personnel who dealt with

Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism** and testified

that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell,

Roselli

"paid his way, he paid his own hotel fees, he paid

his own travel....

And he never took a nickel, he

said, no, as long as it is for the government of the

United States, this is the least I can do, because

I owe it a lot."

(0'Connell, p. 27):

Edwards agreed that Roselli was

"never paid a cent" (Edwards,

p. 16), and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing at

all, not even for expenses,

and that Mr. Roselli was given a

pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu,

7/29, p.

68). It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's

27

#"Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they

understood from you to come from Wall Street was still

outstanding?

"A: I don't know if they still think so ... I didn't see

them after that to tell them that" (Roselli, p. 45)."

** Roselli claims that he was motivated by "honor and dedi-

cation" (Roselli, p. 59).

In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from

notion picture producers to insure studios against. labor strikes, *

and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was

deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas

(File R-505, Summary of FBI Documents).

It is possible that he

believed cooperating with the government in the assassination

operation might serve him well in the future.

NW 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 53

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hotel bill during his stay in Miami

with Roselli caused the Agency some

prosecutions for fraudulent gambling

under an assumed name. **

in

Ко сок H

28

October 1960.* The CIA's involvement

difficulty during Roselli's subsequent

activities and living in the country

(a) Plans

in Early 1963

Two plans

to assassinate Castro were ex-

plored by Task Force W, the section

concerned with covert Cuban

operations, in early 1963.

Desmond: Fitzgerald (now deceased),- Chief

of the Task Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic

seashell, rigged to explode, could

be deposited in an area where Castro

commonly went skin diving (Halpern,!p. 28). The idea was explored by the

Technical Division and discarded as impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; I.G., p.77)

A second plan involved having James Donovan

(who was negotiating with Castro for

the release of prisoners

* FBI reports reveal that Roselli's expenses at the Kennilworth Hotel,

where he was registered from October 11 - 30, 1960 under the name. of

J.A.

Rollins, were paid by Maheu (File R-505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's

expenses

reimbursed by the CIA!

** In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli for living in the United

States under an assumed name unless, he cooperated in an investigation of the

Mafia.

(Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and

allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.)

Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to

"keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters might kill. him

for "talking" (CIA Justice File R-153', 'Memorandum, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66).

After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars

Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency,

'to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn,

12/11/67)• Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the

prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra)! Roselli was subsequently convicted

of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA

approached the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice,

to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity

with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to

Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed

of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently being

litigated in the courts.

7N 50933 Doold: 32423524 Page 54

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29

taken during the Bay of Pigs

operation) present Castro with a

contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this

operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as

Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or

Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely

that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed

his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized

the plan as

"cockeyed" (Helms,, 6/13, p. 135).

ISD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside

with

a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura

foot), and contaminated the

breathing apparatus with a tubercule

bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states

that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different

diving

suit

on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified

that the diving suit never left

the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, P. 135).

(e) AMLASH

(1) Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico

City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine

it he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G.,

p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been

*Donovan was not aware of the plan.

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30

involved with an anti-Batista faction that only grudgingly accepted

Castro's rule (Case Officer

p. 9, 39).* The meeting was incon-

clusive, but lead to subsequent

meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed

to cooperate with the CIA.

AM/LASH-1

was viewed as an important "asset"

inside Cuba. As a high-ranking military leader who enjoyed the

confidence of Fidel Castro,

he could keep the CIA informed of the

internal workings of the regime

(Case Officer 2, pp. 23, 40). It

was also believed that he might play a part in fomenting a coup

within Cuba (Case Officer 2,

p: 43).**

From the first contact with AM/LASH-1, until

the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect

or remain in Cuba. His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for

aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., Pp. 80, 82-83). When Case

Officer 1 joined the AM/LASH-I' operation in June 1967, his assign-

* The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers

involved in the AM/LASH project.

Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1

through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid-1965

(Case Officer 2, P.

.:The Committee has agreed not to divulge

their names as they are still in active service with the Agency.

** AM/LASH-I was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation.

During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to

"penetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections

or an attempt to produce information from dissidents,, or

-perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of

replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1,

pp. 18, 22).

The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second

related program.

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31

ment was to "stay in

place

and

report.to.us" (Case Officer 1, p. 38).

At a meeting in August 1962

in a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated

that he would remain in Cuba, if he "could do something really signifi-

cant for the creation of a

new Cuba", and expressed a desire to plan

the execution of Fidel Castro! (Case Officer'1 Contact Report, August 1

meeting).

The subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed

at a meeting on August 10, 1962, between AM/LASH-1 and his case

officer.

The case

officer's contact report states that assassination

was raised in discussing AM/LASH-1's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH-1

was visibly upset.

"It was inot the aet that he objected to, but

merely the choice of the wordlused to describe it. 'Eliminate' was

acceptable."

(Case Officer ], Contact Report, August 7-10, meetings).

The case

officers who testified before the Com-

mittee said that AM/LASH-1

wa's not directly requested to assassinate

Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that the agency per-

sonnel dealin gwith AM/LASH-1 were aware of his desire to take

such

action. A cable to headquarters reporting an August 16, 1963 meet-

ing with AM/LASH-1 stated:

• "Have no intention give AMLASH-1 physical elim-

ination mission as requirement but recognize

this something he could or might try to carry

out on his own initiative."*

*

Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH-1 discussed "eliminating' Castro,

although he attributed such| remarks to AMLASH-]'s "mercurial" nature,

and stated that no specific plans for assassinations were ever discussed

(Case Officer 1, pp. 39-41, 62). The case officer who took over the

AMLASH project in September 1963 recalled being briefed by Case Officer

1 on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first

step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, p. 28).

The second AMLASH case officer described the context in which AMIASH-1

generally raised the topic of assassination:

"You also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather tempera-

mental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and

whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of

pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular

military coup in the next breath." (Case Officer 2, P.29)

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TOP SEGMETE

At a meeting on October 3, 1963, AMLASH-1

again raised the possibility

of defecting, but indicated that he

would be willing to continue

working against the Castro regime if

he received firm assurances

of American support (Case Officer 2,

pp. 48-49). According to Case Officer 2, AMLASH-1 asked for

military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his

plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney

General Robert Kennedy (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49).

Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was

then Chief, SAS * agreed to meet AMLASH-] and give him the assur-

ances he sought. The Inspector

General's Report states that Fitz-

gerald consulted with the DDP, Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald

should hold himself out as a

personal representative of Attorney

General Kennedy (I.G., p.89) •**

Helms testified that he did not recall the con-

versation, and speculated that the Attorney General might not have

been consulted because

"this was so central

been trying to do .

to the whole theme of what we had

(find someone inside Cuba who might

we had been pushing, what every-

body had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is that

context that I would have made some remark like this."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 117)|

*

SAS (Special Affairs Staff) was the name given to Task Force W in

early-1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey. as head of the covert Cuban

operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald.

e AMLiSH case

** The contact plan for the

proposed meeting stated:

cific purpose meeting AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of**

full support with a change of the present government in Cuba."

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TOP S

"..

Helms recalled that he told, Fitzgerald to

"go ahead and say that from the standpoint of political

support, the United States government will be behind you if

you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings.

This had only to do with the political action part of it".

(Helms, 6/13, p. 131.).

Fitzgerala met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963,

in a foreign capital, and promised that the United States would

support a coup against Castro* (Case Officer 2, p. 60). When

later interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Fitzgerald

recalled that AM/LASH-1 repeatedly requested an assassination

weapon, particularly a "high powered rifle with telescopic sights

that could be used to kill

Castro

from a distance" (I.G., p. 90).

Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH-1 that the United States

would have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life" (I.G., p. 90).

Case Officer 2 recalled that:

AM/LASH-1 raised the prospect of

assassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan (Case

Officer 2, pp. 62, 85). AM/LASH-1, was, however, "convinced that

Castro had to be removed from power before a coup could be under-

* Case Officer 2 did

not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name

was used (Case Officer 2, p. 60).

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34

= .

taken in Cuba" (Case Officer 2, p. 61).

AMLASH-I also requested high-powered rifles

and grenades (Case Officer ?,,P. 77). A memorandum by Case

Officer 2, dated November 18

1963, states:

"C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would

be given a cache inside Cuba.

Cache could, if. he

requested it,

include

• high powered rifles with

scopes

AMLASH-1 was told on November

22, 1963, that the cache would be

dropped in Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 92).

(2)

Thel Poison Pen Device

AMLASH-1 in a foreign capital

On November 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with

loffered him a ball-point pen rigged

with a hypodermic needle,

and

suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be

an effective poison to use in the device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110)

The needle was

designed to

be!so fine that the victim would not

notice its insertion (Case Officer 2, p. 103).

The Inspector General's Report states that

Case Officer 2, when he was interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1

had requested the Agency to

"devise some technical

means of doing the job that would

not automatically cause, him to lose his own life in the

try."

(I.G.; p. 92):

The Report concluded that:

"although none of the participants so stated, it may be

inferred that they were. seeking a means of assassination

of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been ex-

pected to have devised himself." (I.G., p. 92)

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35

3 /C

Halpern,

Fitzgerald's assistant, told the

Committee that the pen was

intended to show "bona fides" and

"The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro

and we thought this other method might work whereas a rifle

wouldn't."

(Halpern, p

26)

Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured

"to take care of a request. from him that he have some device

i even cao caoto fell 603m, murdering him,

". . . (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, p. 133)*

On November 22, 4963, Fitzgerald and the case

officer met with AMLASH-1 in

European capital and offered him

the poison pen, recommending

he use Blackleaf-40, a deadly poison

which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, F. 112) The Inspect-

or General's Report noted that

"it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was

shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris

and giving him an assassination device for use against

Castro."

(I.G., p.94)

* In his testimony before the

Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a con-

flicting story. He said that

the purpose of the pen was

"to provide AMLASH with

a device which would serve him to

protect himself in case he was confronted with and charged

with being involved in a military coup against Castro."

(Case Officer 2, P. 107)

According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an "esoteric device

which could easily be concealed and which he could use in self-defense

(Case Officer 2, po. 98-99). The device was not intended for offensive

use against any person, but was rather

....

"a kind of psychological crutch to help him think that

(Case Officer 2

ease erriter, e. 104-105).

protection, his own security"

This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some

of which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish that

AMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire and

endeavored to supply the means that he needed.

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36

ALin

The case officer later recalled that AMLASH-] did not "think much

of the device," and complained that CIA could surely "come up with

something more sophisticated than that" (I.G., p. 93a).

The case

officer recalled offering the pen

to AMIASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-1 threw it away

then or took it with him (Case Officer 2, pP. 105, 110). He did

recall that AMLASH-1 said he would not take the pen back to Cuba,

but did not know what AMLASH-1 in fact did with the pen (Case Offi-

cer 2, pp. 110-111).

An entry

in the CIA files on AMLASH dated

March 29, 1965, states:

"Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH-1

on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everything

he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he

wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and

Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President

Kennedy had been assassinated.

Because of this fact,

plans with AMLASH-1 changed and it was decided that we

could have no part in the assassination of a government

leader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 in

this attempt.. • AMLASH-1 was not informed of (this de-

cision) until he was seen by the case officer in Novem-

ber, 1964."

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TOP SECOET

(3) Providing AMLASH-1 with Arms

CIA cables indicate that one cache of arms

for AMLASH-1 was delivered in Cuba in March 1964 and another in

June. An entry in the AMLASH file for May 5, 1964, states that

the case officer requested the

Technical Services Division to pro-

duce, on a "crash basis," a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle.

The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a

confidant of AILASH states that AMIASH was subsequently informed

that it was

not feasible to make a silencer for an FAL.

Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1

became more insistent on the:

fact that the assassination of the

Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step in a successful coup.

(Case Officer 2, Pp. 129-133).

In a memorandum dated December 10,

1964, the case officer wrote:

"AMLASH-1 was told and fully understands that the United

States Government cannot become involved to any degree

in the 'first step' of his plan. If he needs support, he

realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is

where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he

would request."

Documents in the AMIASH file establish that in

early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an

anti-Castro group.

As the cäse officer explained to the Inspector

General:

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TOP SECTE

38

... what had happened was that SAS had contrived

to put B-1 and AMASH together in such a way that

neither of them knew that the contact had been engin-

eered by CIA. The thought was that B-l needed a man

inside and AMLASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA

was unwilling to furnish to him directly.

By putting

the two together, B-l might get its man inside Cuba

and AMLASH might get his silenced weapon -- from B-1."

(I.G., P. 101)

A report of a meeting between a case officer and

B-1 states that B-1, in his initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed

plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla

raids against Cuba should bẻ

stepped up one month before the

"attempt on Fidel Castro" tói

"prepare the public and raise the morale

and resistance spirit of the people." B-1 reported that AMIASH-1

believed that the only solution to the problems in Cuba would be

"to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot

him with a silencer or iplace a bomb in some place where

Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb

that he can carry andiplace, or with his group attack,

the residence where Fidel lives . . . . B-1 is going to

provide AMIASH-1 withscape routes and places where Bel

is able to pick him upd

He will memorize these points

and escape routes. .

Next, B-1 is to provide AMLASH-1 either

a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer.*

A CIA document dated January 3, 1965, states that B-1 told a

case officer that he and AM/LASH-1 had reached an agreement on the

"1. B-l is to provide AM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAl;

if this is impossible, B-l is to cache in a designated

location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several

bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some

other concealment device which he would be able to carry

and place next to Fidel Castro.

"2.

B-1 is to provide AM/IASH-] with escape routes controlled

by B-1 and not by the Americans.

The lack of confidence

built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large:

"з.

B-1 is to preparelone of the western provinces, either

Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandes-

tine underground mechanism.

This would be a fall back

position and a safe area

where men and weapons are avail-

able to the group

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39

10%

Zy 1965, stated

that B-1 had given AMLASH-]

silencer and that AMLASH-1 had

"small, highly concentrated

explosives.", On February 11, 1965

the Madrid Station cabled that

AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one

pistol with

silencer and onelFAL rifle with a silencer from B-'s

secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that

"B-I had three packages of special items made up by his technical

people and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madria" (I.G., P. 103

In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with

AMLASH-1 and his associates

because of reports that his activities

were widely known (I.G., pp 104-105).

"4.

B-1 is to be in Cuba

of Fidel, but no one

B-l's location.

one week before the elimination

including AM/LASH-1 will know

"5. B-l is to arrange

for recongition by at least five Latin

American countries

as soon as Fidel is neutralized and •

a junta is formed.

This junta will be established even

though Raul Castro ahd Che Guevara may still be alive

and may still be in control of the part of the country.

This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-I be able

to establish some control over one of the provinces so

that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6.

One month to the day, before the neutralization of Fidel,

B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a

maximum in order tolraise the spirit and morale of the

people inside Cuba. | In all communiques, in all radio

messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate

that the raid was possible thanks to the information

received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from

the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "p"

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Approved by Dratting

Subcommiteee 9/5/75

2. At What Level

Were the Castro Plots Authorized or

Known About Within the Central

Intelligence Agency?

(a) The Question

Presented. As we have seen, first

Richard Bissell and then Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director of

Plans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate

Fidel Castro.

The

evidence set forth herein relates to whether their superiors in

the Agency, in particular Allen

Dulles and John McCone, authorized

or were aware of the assassination plots.

Dulles served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

from 1953 to November 1961.

McCone served as DCI from November 1961

to 1965.* The Committee took considerable testimony on whether Dul-

les and McCone (or their Deputy DCI's, General Cabell and General

Carter, respectively) knew about or authorized the plots against

Fidel Castro's life.

In summary, the evidence

is as follows:

(i) Dulles:

Bissell and Edwards both

expressed the belief that Dulles

(and his Deputy, General Cabell)

authorized the initial phase of the assassination plot involving

underworld figures. They acknowledged, however, that 'Dulles (and

his Deputy) were not told about the plot until after the under-

world figures had been contacted. The words

said to have been

used to brief them--"an intelligence operation"--do not convey on

secause of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8).)

nems, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in

February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and

DCI in June 1966.

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- 2 -

their face that the plot involved

assassination, although- Bissell

and Edwards insist. the real meaning must have been understood.

There is some other evidence which can be said both to suggest

that Dulles and Cabell did know and to suggest that they did not

know. (See Section. (b)

belows

(ii) McCone

McCone testified that he did not

know about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both stated

that McCone was not told by them of the earlier assassination ef-

forts when McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961.

The I.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval not

to brief McCone when the actual efforts were resumed in 1962.

Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter,

Helms and Harvey did not tell

McCone about assassination activity

on several occasions. Helms did not recall any agreement not

to

brief McCone, but did not call into question the position taken by

Harvey or the I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that Mc-

Cone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that he

was not claiming that he told McCone about the plots. (These mat-

ters, as well as the various reasons put forward by Harvey and

Helms for not briefing McCone, are set forth in Section (c) below.)

(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial

Plots Against Castro?* Both Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCI),

* This testimony relates to the "airplane" incident in July 1960

and what the I.G. Report referred to as the initial phase of the

assassination effort involving the underworld. With respect to

the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I.G. Report concluded

they could "find no evidence that any of the schemes

were approved

at any level higher than division, if that"

: (I. G., p. 10.)

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3

General Cabell, are deceased.

Since we were unable to take any

testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered

around the documents available and the testimony of those still

alive who served under Dulles land Cabell.*

*The Inspector General questioned neither. Dulles nor Cabell in

preparing his Report in 1967.

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4

(i) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the Special

Group Suggesting Contingency!Plans for the Overthrow of the

Casto Government, but Rulinglout "Elimination" of Castro.

January 13, 1960,

Allen Dulles, in what was apparently

the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to over-

throw Castro, emphasized that

"a quick elimination of Castro"

was not contemplated by the

CIA (minutes of Special Group meet-

ing, 1/13/60). According to:

the minutes of the meeting, Dulles

first "noted the possibility that over the long run the U.s.

will not be able to tolerate

the Castro regime in Cuba, and sug-

gested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall

of the Castro government migh't be in order." Then, in response

to the State Department representative's comment that "timing

was very important so as to

permit a solidly based opposition

to take

over," Dulles

"emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick

elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed

to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a

foothold. "

(ii) Dulles' Alleged Recission of the July 1960

Airplane Assassination Plan Upon Learning of It.

As discussed in greater detail above (see p.

in July, 1960, Tracy Barnes,

Bissell's assistant, approved the

•sending of, in July, 1960,

cable to the Havana station stating

that "possible removal of top, three leaders (was) receiving .

serious consideration," and

instructions were given to carry out

a plan to kill Raul Castro.

That plan was, however, abandoned

shortly after it had been approved.

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The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cuba

court action project, who had sent the cables testified that

he had "heard" that Dulles had

countermanded Barnes' plan and

had indicated that "'assassination was not to be considered."

(Duty Officer, p. 29).* The officer added, however, that he

had no personal knowledge of

the reason for calling off the plan,

or even if Dulles had been the one who called it off, he further

testified that

"assassination had not been part of the Cuba

covert action project in 1960 and that Dulles'

action in this incident. conformed witi CIA

policy against the use of

assassination." (Duty

Officer, p.

) .**

"Operational Immediate,

The counternanding " was.

to the Havana station, which was

sent the morning after the cable

of the previous night.

The

onficer who sent that cable testiried:

...I saw the cable and was told that, to the

best of my knowledge; my memory is that the

Director [Dulles], not the Deputy Director

(Bissell] had countermanded the cable and

had directed that -- had indicated that

assassination was not to be considered.

(Duty Officer, p. 29).

The officer stated that he did not talk to either Dulles or

Bissell about the countermanding cable, but that he did see the

cable and in all likelinood heard of the reason for Dulles' re-

action in discussions

the same morning with his superior, the

Chief of the Cuba project. Duty Officer, pp. 30-32).

The officer testified:

11

..iwe were schooled that although other countries.

[used assassination] we, do not,

and I had always.

understood this as a basic rule."

(Duty Officer, p 14).

"Question: So was it your understanding after this

cable, and in view of your knowleage of

the Agency

general practice with respect to assassination in which

you had been schooled thät it was not done, that assass-

ination was not part of the Cuba Project, as far as

knew?"

you

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## Page 71

"Officer: That's correct.

13.19

***

"Question:

And would it be accuaate to say that

your recollections

concerning what you now view

as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were ... are based

on your general training about what had always been

said ..

[and] that after this incident, what you

were told

... fortified that previous belief (in]

that Dulles had nullified at least this particular

cable?"

"Officer: Correct."

"Question:. Do you have anything in your recollection

or as a result of your informed opinion or experience

that would indicate to the contrary; that Is, that

Mr. Dulles

did have assassination in his arsenal, so

to speak?"

"Officer:

I have no basis

(Duty Officer, pp. 31,

for any such speculation."'

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(iii) Dulles Briefing on Use of Underworld Figures

in September 1960.

1. Bissell

and

Edwards Said Dulles Was Told

About An "Intélligence Operation" With No "Bad Words" Used.

But That Dulles (and his Deputyi)

Understood That to Mean

Assassination.

Bissell recalled that "in the latter part of

September" there was "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I

briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20).

Bissell testified that "Colonel

Edwards outlined in somewhat

circumlocutious terms the plan that he had discussed with

syndicate representatives" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22). He stated

that Edwards had said:

"that contact had been made with [the underworld], that

a plan had been prepared for their use, and think he

either said in as many words or strongly interred that

the plan would be put into effect unless at that time

or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should

not be"

(Bissell, 6/9, p.

22.).*

The CIA's 1967 I.G.

Report, based upon interviews

with Edwards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were briefed

as follows:

"The discussion was circumspect.

avoided the use of

term used was

any

"bad words, Edwards deliberately

descriptive

'an intelligence operation'.

Edwards is

quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood

the nature of the operation he was discussing. He

* Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating

provided in the Inspector General's Report, but that his state-

ments concerning what was said at the meeting were of his

personal knowledge (Bissell.

619, pp.

20-22).

HW 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 72

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## Page 73

recalls describing the channel as being 'from A to B. to

C'

As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B

was

Roselli, and C was the principal in Cuba.

Edwards

recalls

that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in

understanding and approval. Certainly there was no

opposition.

Edwards states that, while there was no

formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had

tacit approval to use his own juagement."

(I.G.,

pp. 17-18.)

Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible"

(Bissell Tr: 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate"

(Edwards Tr. at 11).

In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards

described briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whether

Dulles in fact would have understood that the operation involved

assassination.

The Inspector General, in attempting to "con-

jecture as to just what the Director did approve"

, decided

"It is safe to conclude, given the men participating and

the general subject of the meeting, that there was. little

likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details

were deliberately blurred and the specific intended

result was never stated to unmistakable language.

It is

also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of

sensitivity of the operation „Participants the extreme

'bad words' emphasized to the

(I.G., p. 18).

Bissell testified

that

"I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from

that meeting--and there was, I think, subsequent

occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and

myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature

of the operation.

"Q.: What were the subsequent conversations you had

with Mr. Dulles in which you concluded that he knew

that this was

an assassination effort?

"Bissell. :

it's really

a guess on my part that

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such conversations occurred

.. I do believe they did

occur is that during the entire autumn I suppose I must

have spoken to Mr. Dulles

practically daily about some

aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually

certain that he would in one or another of those con-

versations and probably more than once have asked if

there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards'.

operation.

He also may have been in direct contact with

Edwards at that time."

(Bissell Tr. 6/9/75, pp. 24-26)

When asked by the Chairman why, in this context,

persons within the Agency talked "in riddles to one

another"

Bissell replied that:

17

• . I think there was a reluctance to spread even

on an oral record some aspects of this operation.

"Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact

that it simply grated against your conscience to have

to speak more explicitly?

"Bissell: I don't think it grated against my conscience.

I think it may have been a feeling that the Director

(Dulles1

preferred the use of the sort of language that

is described in the I.G. 'Report."

Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the

Committee, again addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards

had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an

assassination operation:

"I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and

I believe the impression incidentally that I thought

was confirmed in the [I.G:

Report]--that in discussing

this with Dulles and Cabell

•the objective of the

operation was made unmistakably clear to them.

The

cerms

'an intelligence operation'

, I think someone

said, was that not a cover designation?

But we would not

under

any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this

was an intelligence collection operation. If I said that

on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression.

(Bissell

Tr. 6/11, p. 24.

On the other hand, 'Scott Breckenridge, the only

author of the Inspector General's Report still with the CIA,

testified that in his opinion

"pointed avoidance of 'bad

1W 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 74

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words'" would have made it less likely that an "intelligence

operation" would have been understood as an assassination

attempt, and that "it was open to question how clearly this

was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles under-.

stood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/:

, p.

Sheffield Edwards was: quite infirm when examined by

the Committee and has since died. * Edwards testified before

the Committee as follows:

.: • [This possible project was approved by Allen B.

Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General Cabell, the

Deputy Director. They are both dead.

"The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that the

project had been approved by these two gentlemen?

"Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles . . . and

Cabell. "

(Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 5-6)

In his interview with

the Rockefeller Commission,

Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5):

"Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did

you have any contact with on the top echelon?

"A.: Very important.

The plan was approved by Allen W.

Dulles and General Cabell!'

* As the investigation proceeded, members of the Committee

requested that Edwards be recalled.

Edwards passed away

before this could be accomplished.

As a result of Edwards'

infirmity and subsequent death, the Committee was unable to

examine him effectively concerning his conflicting prior

statements, concerning Dulles

knowledge of the plots.

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James. O'Connell, who

was the case officer for the

operation involving underworld

figures, testified that when

he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving

evidence to the Rockefeller Commission, he was sure that

Edwards had told him Dulles had approved the plot (0'Connell

Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added that he was "reasonably sure"

or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that either Edwards or

Bissell had also told him of Duiles' knowledge when the plot

was underway in 1960-62 (0'Connel1 Tr. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36;

60) . *

A review of Dulles'

calendar for August through

December 1960 showed no meeting

involving Dulles, Cabell,

Bissell and Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have

occurred without having been recorded.

2.. Whatever Was Said to Dulles, He Was Not Briefed

Until After Contact With the Underworld Figures Had Been Made.

Bissell and the Inspector General's Report (which

* In June 1966, Howard J. Osborn,

Edwards' successor as

When questioned about this memorandum, Osborn stated that he

had no firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had

most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell.

** The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period

between Dulles,

Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and

Edwards.

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relied on Edwards) placed

the briefing of Dulles in "the latter

part of September 1960".

Bissell did not have a clear independent recollection

of the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerning

the possible use of syndicate members against Castro began "in

the Autumn of 1960"'.* He recalled initial discussions among

himself, Edwards, and Colonel Ji C. King, Chief of the Western

Hemisphere Division, which he said occurred before Dulles and

Cabell were approached about assassinating Castro. According

to Bissell,

"those conversations, the subject matter was a capability

no eliminate Castro it such action should be decided

• upon.

"It is, therefore, accurate to say that my best

King lestion thad conser thee with dares atence

or non-existence of the capability and to the possibility

of developing a capability. They were not conclusive or

decisive conversations

al. nor would they have revealed

a prior decision to implement such a plan by anybody."

(Bissell, 6/9, p. 19.)

* "Q.:. When did you first become aware of any plan or

effort to assassinate Mr. Castro?

"Bissell: Well, I became aware of planning a contingency

basis for such an operation.

My recollection is

August

..

"Q.:

August of 1960?

"Bissell:

'60, correct

but without reading (the

I.G. Reportl, I would have remembered initial conversations

early in the

autumn of 19'60."

(Bissell Ir. 6/9, pp. 17-18.)

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O'Connell contacted Röselli in early September 1960.

During the week. of September 25, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli

met with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. Bissell testified

as follows concerning the sequence of those events:

"Q.: Well, before we come. to the meeting [with Dulles1,

you had been informed, prior to that, had you not, that

contact had been made withillthe Mafia?

"Mr. Bissell.: I had..

"Q.: Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given

the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate.

Castro?

"Bissell: Not that early|lto my

best recollection.

I cannot date that at all

well.

I would suppose that it

was within the next

two or

three weeks."

(Bissell, 6/9,

pp. 20-21.)

On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had

indicated prior to the "latter part of September" 1960 that a

large sum of money would be paid

for Castro's death (Roselli,

p. 17), and Edwards' May 14, 1962

memorandum indicated the

briefing of "senior officials"!

took place after the money had

been offered.

It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed

about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, sub-

ordinate agency officials had previously decided to take steps

toward

arranging for the killing of Castro, including discussing

it with organized crime leaders

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(iv) Questions Raised

by Edwards' Communications

to the Justice Department in 1961

and 1962.

As fully described supra, pp._, the FBI discovered

in the late 1960's that Maheu had been involved in an illegal

wiretap in Las Vegas. In April

1961, Maheu told the FBI that

the tap had been placed in connection with a CIA operation, and

suggested that the FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact.

An FBI report of a May 3, 1961 interview with Edwards

(in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as

relating to "clandestine efforts

against the Castro Government"

with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given

to the Attorney General) stated:

"Col. Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of

Plans, CIA) and two others!

in CIA were aware of the

Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and

Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards'

contact

with Maheu in this connection.

He added that Mr. Bissell,

In his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney

General in connection with their inquiries into CIA

relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General

that some of the associated planning included the use of

Giancana and the

underworld against Castro."

(FBI memo-

randum entitled "Arthur Jämes Balletti et al.";May 22,

1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis added)

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Bissell said he was certain, however, that the

statement regarding Dulles' knowledge about the operation was

wrong, and testified that "it is

just flatly contrary to my

recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts,

as I have testified several times"

(Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).*

When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have

told the FBI that Dulles was unaware of Edwards' contact with

Maheu, Bissell replied:

"I can only surmise that he believed he could secure

the cooperation of the Justice Department that he

required without in any way involving his superior,

Mr. Dulles, and simply did this in a protective

fashion."

(Bissell, 7/174, P. 20).

A year later, on May

1962, Edwards and CIA's

General Counsel met with Attorney

General Robert Kennedy. (That

meeting, is discussed extensively

below at p.

→. Edwards'

memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that

after Roselli and Giancana had been offered $150,000, Edwards

had "then briefed the proper senior officials of (the]

Now, It (the FBl memorandum) is just flatly

contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles

was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified

several times.

Also, I submit it is quite im-

plausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor

and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I

have no recollection of briefing those two

gentle

men except as members of the Board of Inquiry

that I have described, of which Allen Dulles him-

self was a member--it is quite implausible that

I would have briefed them on a matter which had

been going on for some months, and some which

the Director, Mr. Dulles!

himself, had never been

informed."

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16

Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally

approved."* It further

states

Ithat "knowledge" of the project

had been "kept to a total of

SIX

persons." **

Dulles had left the Agency between the time of

Edwards'

two statements.

(v)

Remarks Made to the Special Group by General

Cabell in November 1960.

Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware

of the Castro plots (Bissell IT. 6/9, ap. 22; Edwards II. 5/30/75,.

pp. 5-6).***

* On the same day as writing that memorandum for the

Attorney General,

Edwards wrote another memorandum for his

own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact

with

Roselli in early April, he had:

"cautioned him (Harvey] that I felt that any future

projects of this nature should have the tacit approval

of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62,

Memorandum for the Record.)

This memorandum, which

contained other information which

Harvey and Edwards had

agreed

to include to "falsify" the record,

is discussed infra, p.

** The 1967 Inspector General's Report surmised that thirteen

people knew

of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's

and Edwards' account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion,

supra. at

. )

*** The Inspector General's Report stated:

"With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director

(Dulles) and the DDCI (Cabell) on the existence of a plan

involving members of the syndicate.

• Edwards is quite

sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the

nature of the operation he was discussing."

(IG Report,

p. 11.)

O'Connell testified that, prior to O'Connell's testifying

before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that

Cabell had been aware of and authorized the project.

H₩ 50955 DoOId: 32423524 Page 81

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The testimony indicates

that the meeting between Dulles,

Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime "in the autumn"

of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting of

the Special Group, the high-level governmental body for consider-

ing covert action, on November

'3, 1960, reflect the following.

remarks:

"Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning

had been done for taking direct positive action against

Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

He said that without these

three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and

probably brainless.

He conceded that it would be necessary

to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell

necessary

pointed

out that action of this kind is

uncertain of

results and highly dangerous in conception and execu-

tion, because the instruments must be Cubans.

felt

that, particularly because of the necessity of

simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded

that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities."

(11/3/60 Special Group Minutes, P. 3).

Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant to the

speaker of those listening is uncertain. Neither was able to

offer any interpretive help to

the Committee. However, other

participants at this meeting have testified that the reference

could mean or include assassination.*

*

"Q:

Do you read.

• direct, positive action. • :

as meaning

Guevara?

killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and Che

"A:

I would read it that way, yes." (Lansdale

Tr. 7/8/75, p. 103.)

"Q:

-would you agree that the words 'direct

positive action'

appear to question whether there's been any

planning in connection with assassinating (the Castros and

Guevara)?"

I think the phrase

positive action' could include

I'm not

sure what was in Mr. Merchant's

assassinations, but j/9/75, p. 9:)

mind."

(Gray Tr.

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18

-

Bissell was also asked

about the minutes of the

November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to "direct

positive action," Bissell said

find it difficult to

understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17

•p .

18). He was then asked

"Q:

Do you, in light'of the November 3

minutes) remain firm

that Cabell was knowledgeable

(of the

assassination plots)?"

"A: It casts

some doubt

on that in my mind."

When asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of

(Cabell's) character" ,Bissell

answered "yes" (Bissell, 7/17,

pp. 22-23) .

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9

(c) Did John McCone| Know of or Authorize Assassina- •

tion Plots During His Tenure as DCI

The CIA considered several assassination plots

against Castro during

McCone's

tenure as Director. Harvey

initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the

operation involving underworld figures continued into early

1963.

In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of

assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated

diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison pen device in

November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for

nis use in the following year.

(1) McCone Testified That He Did Not Authorize

or Know About the Castro Plots and That He Would Have Dis-

approved the Plots Had He Been

Asked

McCone testified that he was not aware of

the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the

years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those

plots. * (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he

was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles,

Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as

Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, PP. 6-7, 17), and

that if he had ever been

asked about the plots, he would have

disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, p: 47) McCone testified:

*McCone testified that he first

in August, 1963, long

after

p.

learned of the Roselli operation

it had. been terminated.

See discussion,

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I had no knowledge'of any authorized plan or

planning that might lead to a request for

authorization.

Of course, during those days

it was almost common dispost of caste another

to say, we ought. to

blut at no time did

anyone come to me, or

come

to other authorities

to my knowledge,

with a plan for the actual undertaking of

an

assassination.

* * *

1%

Senator Hart of Colorado:

Did you

ever discuss the subject of assassinations

with your predecessof, Mr. Dulles?

McCone: No, I did not.

(ii) Helms; Bissell,

land Other Subordinate Agency

Employees Testified That They Did Not Ask McCone to Approve

the Plots of Know If He Had Knowledge Of Them.

Richard Bissell was

DDP

under McCone for three months,

1962. Richard Helms assumed

from November 1961 until February

the duties of DDP from Bissell.

Bissell testified about

McCone's knowledge as follows:

?.: Your testimony

ils

that you never discussed

assassinations

with Mr. McCone?

A.:

That is correct.

0.:

.. [Did you tell McCone anything about

that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which

you at least told him (Harvey) to take

over the relationship with the criminal

syndicate?

A.: I don't remember

so doing.

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21

Helms testified that he did not recall ever having dis-

cussed the

assassination plots with McCone while the plots

were continuing.*

When asked

whether McCone was aware of the

assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified:

No, it isn't my impression that I told him,

at

'least I don't have any impression, unfor-

tunately.

Mr. McCone is

an honorable

man.

He has done his own testifying,

and all

- can say is that I do not know specitically

whether he was

aware or not.

(Helms, 6/13/75,

pp. 90, 101-102)

Helms further testified:

Q.: I believe Mr. MeCone testified that he

never heard of any of these attempts when he

was Director.

Would you have any reason to

disagree with his testimony?

Helms:

Sir, I have

always liked McCone and

I don't want to get, into an altercation with

him.

i am so get ind

He had access to Harvey and everybody

else just the way I had and he had regular

access to the Attorney General.

* * %

Q.: If you were a member of this Committee

wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was un-

aware of the assassination attempts while

they were underway?.

No hia cuppete kue the way everyone in uP

the way everybody else

*Helms testified that he first told McCone about the plot

using underworld figures in August 1963.

See discussion supra

at p.

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was that was in it,

"and I just don't know.

I have no reason to impugn his integrity.

On the other hand, I!don'

t understand how

it was he didn't hear about some of these

things that he claim's

that he didn't.

(Helms, 7/13/75, PP. 32-33)

* * * ;**

I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone

was not informed and

when I was told that

there was evidence that he wasn't informed.

I was trying to scratch my head as to why I

didn't tell him at the time and my surmises

are the best I can come up with.

surprised I did not discuss it with him at

the time.

My relations with him were good,

and so my surmises are just the best I am

able to do in 1975 over an episode that took

place that many years ago. (Helms, 6/13/75,

p. 90)

Several other Agency officials who were aware of the

assassination plots testified that they had not told McCone

of the plots. William Harvey

testified that he never spoke

with McCone about the operation involving underworld figures

or assassination and that, to the best of his knowledge,

McCone had not been told about

the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75,

- p. 66)

Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informed

Mecone about the plot, replied?

Edwards: No, I did not inform Mr. McCone.

"Q.: Was there a reason for why you did not

inform Mr. McCone?

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-

Edwards: Well, I did not want to drag

McCone into this thing that in my

opinion had petered out, and I did

not

want to involve him.

" (Edwards, P. 18)

James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the opera-

tion under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had

told him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that

Edwards had not briefed McCone on the operation.

As a matter of fact, lI don't think he ever

knew about it. From later conversations with

Colonel Edwards, not recently, we talked about

it, and he said that he was convinced that

Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on

his watch, so to speak, and he didn't want to

get him involved. (O'Connell, pp. 37, 39)

'George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba during

the relevant period, testified that he was not told about the

assassination activities, and gave his opinion that if McCone

had

been asked to approve an assassination, he "would have

reacted violently immediately" *

*McManus advanced two reasons for this opinion:

(1) McCone had a great love for the President of

the United States and he sort of looked at him

as an older son other president, President

a very protective

sense he had about

Kennedy, and McCone would have immediately said

Jesus, this is a no win ball game.

(2) - Secondly, as an individual, he would have found

it morally reprehensible.

(McManus, P. 33)

(Continued)

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Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified

that he had not known of the

underworld operation until August

1963, and that in his opinion

McCone did not learn of the

operation prior to

that time

(iii)

(Elder, P. 15)

Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About

the Assassination Plots

McCone assumed the position of DCI in Novem-

ber 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked

Harvey to assume operational control over the Castro plot in-

volving underworld figures.**

Richard Helms replaced Bissell

in February of

1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on

(Continued)

McManus also testified:

I always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the

Director fully informed of any activity that he

thought was sensitive.

Under most cir-

cumstances, and indeed under all circumstances

you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone,

with the exception of a situation in which

Helms had been told by higher authority not to

tell him. (McManus, pp. 32-34).

¿In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14,

1962, memorandum to the. Attorney General.

See discussion infra

at p.

With respect to the Cuban assassination matters,

where

Colby's knowledge was only second-hand, Colby said:

"Mr. McCone

did not know of it."

(Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101)

**See earlier discussion supra.

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the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey's

immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about

the Castro plot activities.

Harvey testified that in the spring of

1962, when he was preparing to, contact Roselli, he briefed

Helms

on the assassination plot..

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 65)

Harvey said:

I briefed Helms generally. on the take-

• future of

it, and to the extent it had then been possible,

the assessment of Roselli and the cutting out

of various individualls.*

Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on the assassina-

tion plot operation, they decided that it would not be appro-

priate at that point to brief John McCone.

There was a fairly detailed discussion be-

tween myself and Helm's as to whether or not

the Director should ät that time be briefed

concerning this. For

a variety of reasons

*Harvey testified that when he took over the Roselli opera-

tion, he had "cut out" both Maheu and Giancana

because

"regard-

have thought. of their trustworthiness,

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)

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which were tossed back and forth, we agreed

that it was not necessary or advisable to brief

him at that time.

I then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you

decide in the future that he should be

briefed,

I would like to know about it in advance to

which, to my best recollection, he agreed.

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P: 66)

Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and

Helms had decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at

that time:

There were several reasons for this.

One,

this operation at that stage had not been

assessed:

It was obviously questionable on

several grounds.

It obviously involved know-

ledge by too many people. We were not, even

sure

at that point it had any remote possibility

or rather any real possibility for success.

It

had arisen with full authority insofar as either

of us knew long before I knew anything about it,

and before the then-Director became Director of

the Agency.

I saw no reason at that time to charge him

with knowledge of this, at least until we reach-

ed the point where it appeared it might come to

fruitation or had had a chance to assess the

individuals involved and determine exactly the

problem we faced, including the possible problem

-- and it was a very, or-it appeared to be, and

in my opinion was, at that time, a very real

possibility of this government being blackmaile

lther by Cubans tor political purposes or by

Figures in organized crime for their own self.

protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned

out, did not happen, but at that time was a very

pregnant possibility. (Harvey, 6/25/75, PP. 67-68)

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27

I am definitely not saying that there was any

effort to hide or conceal any information

from

the Director.

There was not.

This was a dis-

cussion as to whether or not it was even neces-

sary or appropriate at this point to take details

ot this particular operation in an unassessed

form to. the then-Director at that time. (Harvey,

6/25/75, p. 69)

Harvey stated that he did not have any reason to believe

that the assassination activities would have been "disapproved

by the Director" had he been advised of the project (Harvey,

6/25/75, P. 69) and stated that he had thought the plots "were

completely authorized at every appropriate level within and

beyond the Agency". (Harvey,

7/11/75, p. 66) When asked why

McCone had not been given an opportunity to consider the plot,

Harvey replied:

One of the things that I don't know from

my own

.. knowledge... is who was briefed

in exactly what terms at the time of the so-

called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to

place

a technical surveillance

in Dan

Rowan's hotel room.

(Harvey, Ti1i/i5, p. 46)

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28

Harvey was queried on whether the reasons he had given for not

briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should (have been]

briefed forthwith"

• Harvey replied:

Well, Senator Huddleston, it will be quite

easy in looking at it now to say, well, 1 can

see

your argument.

All I can say to you in answer is at that

time I didn't feel that it was necessary or

advisable.

I did not make this decision except

in consultation, and had I been disagreed with,

that would have been it.

And I am not off-

loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to

at all.

It isn't all that easy for me to go

back this many years and sort of recast all of

the reasoning and be sure I am accurate. And

I don't also want to evade it by saying, well,

it seemed like

a good idea at the time.

But

actually it did.

In other words, this was not something

that either Helms or myself felt that at that

stage there was any point in attempting to

brief the Director on it until, at least, we

had a

somewhat better handle on it...

And I might also add, if I may,

.. . but as

far as either one of us knew at that point he

might, have been or should have been briefed,

if you want it that way, -by either Allen Dulles

or Richard Bissell, (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71).

The 1967 Report prepared by the Inspector General for

Helms states that Harvey said:

"When he briefed Helms on

Roselli, he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the

Director." (I.G., P. 41)

NH 50955 DocId: 32123524 Page 93

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29

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation,

but that he had no reason to

doubt the accuracy of Harvey's

testimony and the Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75,

PP. 32, 106)

Helms, when asked about Harvey's testimony that he and

Harvey had agreed not to brief McCone, stated "I frankly don't

recall having agreed to this!"

My recollection is that I had very grave

doubts about the wisdom of this. .

And as

I recall it, we had so few assets inside Cuba

at that time that I was willing to try almost

anything.

But the thing did not loom Large in

my mind

I was enormously busy

with a lot of other things, taking over a new

job [as DDP]. Mr. McCone was realtively new in

the Agency and I guess I must have thought to

nyselt, well this is going to look peculiar to

him and I doubt very much this 1s going to go

do bet vet 30.

anyplace, but if it does, then that is time

enough to bring him

Into

the picture. (Helms,

6/13/75, p. 33)

Helms also stated:

It was a Mafia connection and Mr. McCone was

relatively new to the organization and this was,

you know, not a very savory effort. (Helms,

•6/13/75, p. 92)

Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having been

convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life."

I am having a very difficult time justifying

before this Committee, because there is some-

"thing in here that doesn't come together,

even

for me, I am sorry to say.

Because if this was

all that clear, as:

everybody seems to think it

NW 50955

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$30 .-

that there were those pills in that restau-

want in Cuba and Castro was about to die, I cer-

tainly would have talked to Mccone about

It.

And this never was that clear, I am sorry to

say,

but it never was,

not at that time. (Helms,

7/17/75, p. 34)

On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel,

Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on

the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as

terminated.*

Harvey told the Inspector General that :

.. on 14 May hel'briefed Helms on the meet-

ing with the Attorney General, as told to him

by Edwards. Harvey,, too, advised against

briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and

states that Helms concurred in this.

(I.G.,

p. 65)

Harvey testified that what he had probably told Helms was that:

=.

Any briefing of the Director on the discussion

with the Attorney General concerning this

should come from Colonel Edwards and Larry

Houston, the General Counsel, and not from the

DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75,

p. 99)

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and

remarked:

It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney

General had been briefed on something it would

seem very logical that it would be very important

to brief the Director at that time on the same

thing. (Helms, 6/13/75, P. 107)

*The briefing is exhaustively described supra at p. —

According to the Inspector General's Report, Harvey and

Roselli had a

farewell dinner before Harvey went on an assign-

ment to Rome in June 1963.

The meeting was observed by the FBI,

and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the CIA, notified Harvey

MN 50953 Do01d: 32423524 Page 95

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## Page 96

31-

Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to Roselli

and his Cuban associates duringla trip to Miami in April, 1962.*

At a Special Group meeting on, April 26, General Taylor requested

that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent

activities" (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey

was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request

and McCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately

on your return to discuss the Task Force Activities." (Memoran-

dum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/621)

Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported

to the Special Group on the

"stätus of the active and potential

sources inside Cuba:.."

Q.: "Did you report on

the passage of the pills to Roselli?

Harvey: No, I did not

Q.: Which you had just accomplished in Miami. . .for

the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro.

Harvey:

No.

Q.: And did you report! that to Mr. McCone when he asked

you to tell him what you had done in Miami?

Harvey: No, I did not

(Harvey, 7/11, pP. 16-17.)

that Hoover would be informed." Harvey asked Papich to cäll him

if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident.

"Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the incident

and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief

McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected. (I.G.,

p. 54.)

* Harvey described the trip to Miami as

"one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of

reviewing in toto.

the actual and potential operations at the

Miami base... and this covered the whole gamut from personnel

administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and)

so on. . ."

(Harvey, 7/11, pp| 15-16).

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 96

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Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Group

about the operation at that time because:

"I did not consider either, A, that this should be in any

sense in

_this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group,

пог,

as I have attempted to explain before that it should be

briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was

in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the at-

tendant background

which at that point, and I was not personal-

ly cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximate-

ly, as I recall, two to two-and-a-half years." (Harvey, 7/11,

p. 18.)

Harvey attended 'an August 10, 1962 meeting of the

Special Group Augmented.* He testified that a person [Robert

McNamaral at that meeting suggested that the Special Group "consider

the elimination or assassination of Fidel" (Harvey, 7/11; P. 30):

Harvey then testified that on the day following this Special Group

meeting (Harvey, 6/25, p. 71):

"in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the

question again came up and I expressed

some opinion as to

the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this

form and at that forum [Special Group meetingl, at which

point Mr.

McCone stated in substance that he agreed and

also that he had felt so strongly that he had, I believe,

the preceding afternoon of evening, personally called the

gentleman

who made the proposal or suggestion and had stated

similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he Mc-

Cone] said in

addition:

•if I got myself involved in some-

thing like this, I might end up getting myself ex-communicated."

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about

the actual

assassination operation involving Roselli. He said

==

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 73):

*This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassina-

tion is discussed in depth in part

-, infra.

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H33-

"I would like to recast the time that this took place.

This

was August of

'62. This was at the start of the so-called

Missile Crisis.

"A tentative decision had been made at that point that

the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation]

was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be

done . . . I am sure that

I had discussed with Roselli, at

least on a tentative basis, by August, the probable neces-

sity of terminating this

According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was

reported to be still in Cuba at this time. (I.G., pp. 51-52)

Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 105).*

In relation to the August 10 meeting, Helms was asked whether

he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if

he had known. that one was underway. Helms stated:

Mr. Helms: "The reason I say I don't know . . . is that

elsewhere Mr. McCone states that he went to see Mr. Mc-

Namara in connection with this August 1962. affair and told

Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with

this, that I have no recollection that I don't believe he

ever

said anything to me about his not wanting to have any-

thing to do with it.

Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You

are his Deputy for Plans?

Mr. Helms: "I saw him almost daily.

Q.: "And is it your belief that if he had made any such

statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you

and told you about it at some point?

Mr. Helms: "I just don't know why he didn't but I don't re-

call any

such statement.

As I said, and I would like to

repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job, he had promoted

me, I felt close to him, |I felt loyal to him.

and I would

not have violated an instruction he gave me it I could have

possibly helped it.

int

*Harvey said:

"I may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving

an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible, . . ."

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 74).

NW 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 98

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0.: "But in any event, it is your judgment that he did not

indicate that he was opposed to assassinations?

Mr. Helms: "Not to me."

Walter Elder, who served as McCone's Executive Assistant, testified,

however, that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition

to assassination after the August 10 meeting.*

(iv) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone

An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed

that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana.**. McCone asked

Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when

Helms came to see him, he brought the following memorandum:

"1.

on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney

General in

May of 1962. Il was vaguely aware of the existence

of such

a memorandum since, I was informed that it had been

written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and

Lawrence Houston to the'Attorney General in May of last year.

"2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening,

and, in

the

absence of Mr! Bannerman on leave, I was with Colo-

nel Edwards'

assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I

*Elder told the Committee:

"I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling

that assassination could not be condoned and would not

bhag

be approved: Furthermore! I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement

that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consid-

eration of assassination because it left the impression that

the subject had received Serious consideration by governmental

policy makers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded,

'I un

derstand'.

The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the

strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assassination.

I know

that- Mr. Helms

could not have been under any misapprehension

about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation.

(Elder

Affidavit.)

**The 8/16/63 Chicago Sun Times article states that "Justice

Department sources" believed that Giancana never did any n fing

for the CIA, but pretended to go along with the Agency

hopes that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars

might be slowed - or at least äffected - by his ruse of coopera-

tion with another government agency."

HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 99

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## Page 100

- 35-

am aware,

this is the only written information available on

Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will

serve your purpose.

"3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation

discussed in the attachment.

(Memorandum to Director of

Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Helms, 8/16/63.)*

That memorandum attached the May 14, 1962, memorandum to Attorney

General Kennedy from Sheffield Edwards which described the opera-

tion as having been

terminated before McCone became DCI. (See

discussion, infra, p.

Neither McCone nor Helms

were able to remember what was said

at the meeting. Walter Elder,

who was then McCone's Executive As-

sistant, recalled:

"Mr. Helms came in with [the memorandum]. He handed it to

[McCone] who read it and

handed it back without any

particular comment other

than to say,

'Well, this did not

happen during my tenure.

Q.: "Was anything else said?

A.: "No, he had very little to say about it.

Q.: "Did Mr. Helms then leave?

A.: "Mr. Helms left.". (Elder, pp. 16-17, 57-59.)

Elder testified that he had concluded that the operation in-

volved assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given

• to McCone

(Elder, 8/13, p. 60):

Elder "further concluded that [Mc-

Cone] was perfectly aware of what Mr. Helms was trying to say to

*When asked whether this entry in the memorandum suggested that

he had previously been aware of the operation, McCone testified that

'Helms had orally informed him "on that day in August" that it in-

volved assassination (McCone, p. 9).

AW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 100

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## Page 101

him" (Elder, p. 60). Elder further testified:

Q.:

"Other than that conversation that you just described

between yourself and Mr. McCone, did he have anything else

to say about that memorandum?

Mr. Elder:

"No."

Q.: "I take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms

that we absolutely could not have this activity going on in

the future?

Mr. Elder:

"No."

The Inspector General's Report concladed that:

"This is the earliest date on which we have evidence

of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the

scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the

gambling syndicate." (I.G., P: 70) .

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9/1/75

Based on

Subcommittee

Meetings

8/29/75

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

The question of Authorization Outside the Central Intelligence Agency

In the Eisenhower Administration~

1. Summary-

2.

Richard Bissell's Testimony-

(a) Lack of Personal Knowledge-

(b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles-

3.

White House Officials Dented Knowledge of Assassination Efforts and

Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed--

(a) Gordon Gray-

(b) Andrew Goodpaster-

(c) Thomas Parrott-

(d) John Eisenhower

4. Documentary Evidence

(a) The Inspector General's Report

(b) The Contemporaneous Documents-

1

1

4

4

4

7

8

9

10

11

1I

12

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TOP SECRET

2ra475

Based on

Subcommittee

Meeting; 8/29/75

(b) The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelli-

gence Agency In The Eisenhower Administration.

1. Summary

As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether

Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the Eisenhower Administration, was

informed of the Castro assassination operation is not clear.

Even assuming that Dulles was so informed, authorization outside

the CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony,

only have come from President Eisenhower, from someone speaking for him,

or from the Special Group.* At issue, therefore, is whether President

Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had knowledge

of the Castro assassination plots. .

In addition to Bissell, we took considerable testimony from

President Eisenhower's principal staff assistants, Gordon Gray (Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs and President Eisenhower's

representative on the Special Group); General Andrew Goodpaster (Staff

Secretary to President Eisenhower with particular responsibility for

•,....

* With respect to then Vice President Nixon, Bissell testified--and he

was supported by the principal White House assistants and the documents--

that Nixon was not significantly involved in Cuban matters generally at

the critical times.

There is no evidence suggesting his knowledge of the

castro assassination effort

during the period under review, significant

parts of which occurred during the Presidential campaign.

; Gray, T/9, P. 39) Therefore, we concluded that, despite the

indications in Nixon's book My Six Crises (p.

)that he was involved

in Cuban matters generally--and Howard Hunt's characterization of him as

the [action officer for the Bay of Pigs, there was insufficient reason

to examine Mr. Nixon on Cuba looked at alone. We came to a contrary

conclusion on Chile and . . . .

TOP SECRET

NW 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 103

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OP SECRE!

national security operational matters); John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff

Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary

to the Special Group and special assistant to Allen Dulles). In summary,

the evidence was:

(i) Bissell testified that he did not inform the Special Group

or President Eisenhower of the Castro assassination operation, and he

had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles informed either President

Eisenhower or the Special Group. However, Bissell expressed the belief

that Allen Dulles would have advised President Eisenhower (but not the

Special Group) in a "circumlocutious" or "oblique" way. Bissell based

this "pure personal opinion" on his understanding of Dulles' practice

with respect to other particularly sensitive covert operations. But

Bissell testified that Dulles never told him that he had

so advised

President Eisenhower regarding the Castro assassination operation, even

though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed this "circumlocutious"

approach to the President on certain other occasions.

(ii) Gordon Gray testified that the Special Group never approved

a Castro assassination, and that President Eisenhower had charged the

Special Group with the responsibility of authorizing all important covert

operations. A review of the records of Special Group meetings shows that

a query concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro

at a Special: Group meeting caused Allen Dulles' Deputy, General Cabell,

to advise that such action was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray,

Goodpaster and John Eisenhower all affirmed (i) that they did not believe

rat

President Eisenhower would have considered such a matter in a private

2

TOP SCA

HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 104

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TOP SECRET

3

meeting with Dulles, or indeed that President Eisenhower would have approved

a Castro assassination in any event, and (ii) that he would not have dis-

cussed such a matter without telling them. They conclude, therefore, as a

matter of opinion, that President Eisenhower was never told, and testify,

as a matter of fact, that they never

heard anything about any assassination

at any time.

(iii) In addition to the I.G. Report (which found that the CIA could

not

say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was

responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence showed that

the subject of Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the National

Security Council and the Special Group in March 1960. The minutes of these

meetings indicated that the discussions were in the context of a general con-

sideration of the proposal

to train a Cuban exile force for an invasion of •

Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrow might result in a Communist

takeover. Gray and Admiral Burke testified that the discussion of Castro's

removal at these meetings did not refer to assassination, but rather to the

problem of creating an anti-Castro exile force strong enough to insure a non-

Communist successor to the Castro regime. In any event, no action was shown

to have

stemmed from those meetings. An additional Special Group document

showed that when a question regarding planning for "airect positive action".

against Cuban leaders was raised at

a meeting in the Fall of 1960 (shortly

after Phase I-of the CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated),

the Deputy Director of the CIA told the Special Group that such action was

beyond the CIA's capability.

TOP SECRET

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2. Richard Bissell's Testimony

TOY SEOKE!

(a) Lack of Persoral Knowledge. Bissell testified that he knew

nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort.

(Bissell, 6/9, p. 30). Indeed, Bissell met frequently with the Special

Group in the Fall of 1960 for the purpose of discussing Cuban operations,

but never informed the Special Group that there was a plot underway involving

use öf underworld figures to assassinate Castro, (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 25-26);

nor did Bissell inform President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon or any

other person outside the CIA (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 26-29). Bissell testified

that his reason for not

doing so was that as Deputy Director of Plans, he

reported to the Director and under Agency procedures relied upon the Director

to inform the appropriate persons outside the Agency. Thus, the question of

President Eisenhower'

s knowledge rests on whether Allen Dulles personally

informed him of the Castro plot.

(b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles. Based upon his belief that

Dulles had been briefed about the operation involving underworld figures

and understood that it involved assassination, Bissell assumed that Allen

Dulles would have sought authorization above the CIA level. As Bissell

testified:

"I went on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity,

the Director would handle higher level clearances.

By clearance

I mean authorization.'* (Bissell, 6/9, p. 26.) */

*Bissell reiterated this view on his second day of testimony: ". . . I

felt that the responsibility for obtaining necessary authorization should

remain with the Director."

(Bissell, 6/11, p. 4)

TOP SECRET

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5

TOP SECRET

Bissell further stated that although he believed that Dulles

"probably" talked with President Eisenhower:

"the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance

and there were much more important matters to talk about with

the President."

(Bissell, 7/17, p. 25.)

Bissell said he was "guessing" that Dulles informed Eisenhower.

(Bissell 7/17, DP. 38-39.) He said, however, that he based his assumption

on his knowledge of "command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual,

and of his (Dulles'] mode of operations". (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As

Bissell explained, his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower "is

not based on hard evidence" but is "pure

personal opinion". (Bissell,

6/9, p. 61.) Nevertheless, he believed it to be so, and that the Presi-

dent thereupon gave his authorization "perhaps only tacitly". (Bissell,

6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained,

"My guess is that indeed whoever informed him,.

that is Dulles

directly or Dulles through a staff member, would have had the

same desire.

.. to shield the President and to shield him in

the sense of intimating of making clear_that something of the

sort was going forward, but giving the President as little in-

formation about it as possible, and the purpose of it would have

been to give the President an opportunity, if he so elected, to

cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but

without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement

of the detailed specific plan." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61)

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OP SECRET

6

Bissell said circumlocution would have been used "to protect

the President" in accord

with the concept of "plausible deniability".*

As noted above, Bissell testified he had no personal knowledge

that Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the Castro plot. On other

specific occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told

Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President

Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 10.) But with respect to the Castro

assassination attempt, Dulles did not so inform Bissell. (Bissell, 6/11,

p. 11.) As 3issell testified:

"I still want to be quite clear, I do not have a recollection of the

Director telling me that on this specific operation he had made

such an approach and received assent, approval, tacit or otherwise."

(Bissell, 6/11, p. 11.)

As to whether Dulles knew of the plots and informed Eisenhower, we

have discussed above the fact that in January 1960 Dulles had told the Special

Group that the CIA "did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro."

(Memorandum of Special Group meeting, January 13, 1960, p._). And in July

1960 an Instruction by Bissell's deputy to attempt to kill Raul Castro, which

also stated that "possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious

consideration at headquarters" had been countermanded. The CIA officer

who drafted this instruction testified that he had heard at the time that

It was Dulles who countermanded this instruction and in doing so had "indicated

• that assassination was not to be considered." (Hinkle, p. 29).

* Bissell explained the "plausible deniability" practice as follows:

"Any covert operations, but especially covert operations . . . that

if successful, would have very visible consequences, it was of course

an objective to carry out in such a way that they could be plausibly

disclaimed by the U.S. Government." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 5.)

Bissell apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the

use of "oblique"

, "circumlocutious" language.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECKEL

(iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination

Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed.

1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to the

end of the Eisenhower Administration on January 20, 1961. (Gray, p. 4.)

In this capacity, Gray served as the President's representative on the

Special Group. (Gray, p. 4.) President Eisenhower specifically instructed

Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of another

country must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray, p. 6.) Gray

testified that during the period July 1958 to January 20, 1961, the

Special Group

never approved an action to assassinate Castro (Gray, p. 6)

and no such suggestion was made by Bissell. (Gray, p. 37.)

Gray

testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have

approached President Eisenhower without informing Gray: Gray stated:

"I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that

Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a

proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr.

Dulles." (Gray, p. 35.)*

7

* Gray pointed out "that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty-

four hours a day. It was a few minutes every day, practically every day.".

(Gray, p. 35.)

According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone

with President Eisenhower on one occasion in the Fall of 1960.

meeting lasted ten minutes on November 25, 1960. The record of the

previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates only that, in

addition to discussion of operations in another country,

"there was also

some discussion of Cuba"

• (Memorandum, November 28, 1960, by Gordon Gray,

of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960 at 10:40 A.M.). We feel

compelled to state that the fact of this brief meeting, on the evidence

available, is of little, if any, significance or relevance.

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Gray

further testified that his relationship with President

Eisenhower was such

that President Eisenhower "would discuss with me any-

thing that came to his attention independently of me." (Gray, p. 7.)

And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with him the

subject of a Castro assassination or of the use of the underworld figures

and Cubans in such an effort. (Gray, p. 7.)

2. Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster served as President Eisenhower's

Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of

the Eisenhower Administration. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) In addition to responsi-

bility for the President's schedule and the supervision of the White House

staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President "all

matters of day to day operations" in the foreign affairs and national

security field, including the activities of the CIA and the Departments

of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) Goodpaster testified that he

had a "very close personal relationship" with President Eisenhower and

saw the President "essentially every day when [President Eisenhower) was

in Washington (Goodpaster, p. 4). Along with Gordon Gray, Goodpaster

served as the channel

between the CIA and the President. Goodpaster was

the particular channel for "operations in which (President Eisenhower)

might take a personal part". (Goodpaster, p. 4.)

Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assas-

ination efforts. (Goodpaster, p. 5.) He said that President Eisenhower

never told him about any assassination effort and that it was his belief,

under White House

procedures and by virtue of his close relationship with

President Eisenhower, that

if an assassination plan or operation had ever

been raised with the President, he would have learned of it. (Goodpaster,

. p. 5.)

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063T.

Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's

assumption of a "circumlocutious" personal conversation between Dulles and

the President "completely unlikely"

"That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He

had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of

this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then

handled that way." (Goodpaster, pp. 6-7)

According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit

Conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khruschev as

a result

of the U-2 incident in the Spring of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration

reviewed its procedures for approval of CIA operations and tightened them.

General Goodpaster testified that this review was carried out

"with the aim in mind of being sure we had full and explicit under-

standing of any proposals that came to us and we knew from

[President Eisenhower] that in doing that we were responsive to

a desire on his part." (Goodpaster, p. 7.)

Secondly, according to Goodpaster, the relationship between

President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles was quite different from that

between the President and John Foster Dulles. He said John Foster Dulles

was a confidant of the President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster,

• p. 8.)

3. Thomas Parrott. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, served as

Secretary of the Special Group from 1957 through the end of the Eisenhower

Administration (and thereafter until October 1963). (Parrott, p. 4.)

Parrott stated that, by virtue of this assignment, he functioned as Allen

Dulles' assistant in connection with the Special Group, knew Dulles well,

and gained an understanding of Dulles' method of expression and his

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10

practice

for

dealing

with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-14:)*

Parrott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower

directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve,

or reject all significant covert action operations (Parrott, p. 4.)

Parrott testified it would have been "highly unlikely" for President

Eisenhower to have instructed the CIA to carry out a covert operation

without informing the Special Group. Parrott testified:

"as

evidenced in his

.. • revitalization. . . of this Committee

(the Special Group), [President Eisenhower was] highly conscious of

the necessity to be protective... in this field, and I just

a bean on loa of

cannot conceive that (President Eisenhower, would have gone off and

mounted some kind of covert operation on his own.

This certainly

would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff

method of doing business

"** (Parrott, P. 7.)

4. John Eisenhower. John Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's

son, served in Goodpaster's office as Assistant Staff Secretary from mid-

1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. (Eisenhower, pp. 5, 9)

He testified that his father had confided secret matters in him "to a very

large extent". (Eisenhower, p. 3.) For example, he said that after the

Potsdam Conference in July 1945, then Gen. Eisenhower told him that the

United States had developed the atomic bomb at a time when this was highly

* Parrott testified:

"I saw him (Allen Dulles] several times a week for hours at a time.

I had known him somewhat before . :

• but I got to know him very

well indeed during these four years." (Parrott, p. 13.)

* * Parrott further testified that Allen Dulles followed a practice of

insisting upon specific orders rather than "tacit approval"

and he also

found Bissell's assumptions regarding a circumlocutious conversation

between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles "hard to believe".

(Parrott, p. 14.)

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4: 737.

secret information. (Eisenhower, p. 3.) And he said that as early as

1956, President Eisenhower told him of the secret U-2 flights. (Eisenhower,

p. 4.)

John Eisenhower testified, as a matter of fact, that President

Eisenhower never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination

plan or attempt with respect to Castro. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) Based on

his

father's practice in other matters, it was his opinion that President

Eisenhower would have

told him if the President had known of any such

activity. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) He further testified that President Eisenhower

did not deal with important subjects in a circumlocutious manner. (Eisenhower, p. 8.)

John Eisenhower further testified that it was his father's belief that

no leader was indispensable, and thus

assassination was not an alternative

in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower, p. 14.)

(iv) The Documents

I. The Inspector General's Report

The document latest in date which bears upon the issue of

authorization for Phase I of the Castro assassination efforts is the 1967

Inspector General's Report. In the concluding section of the Report to

Director Helms, the authors advanced several possible Agency responses to

Drew Pearson's public charges regarding CIA/underworld links. * One of the

* On March 3, 1967, Drew Pearson stated in his newspaper column that

there was a U.S. "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that

"one version

claims that underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the

plot."

(Pearson, Washington Merry Go-Round, March 3, 1967)

TO Ser

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questions they asked

was whether the Agency could say it was acting pur-

suant to Government policy - or as they put the question: "Can CIA state

or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given

was:

12

"Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the

- attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an

atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration pressure to

do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier

phase."

(I.G., p. 132) .

In addition to the I.G. Report, we examined the records of the National

Security Council and the Special Group, as well as other relevant White House

files bearing on the question of authorization for the period from

Castro's rise to power to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. As we

discuss below, three documents were found which contained references arguably

related to the subject. of assassination.

2.

The Contemporaneous Documents

In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special

Group focused on Cuban policy. President Eisenhower had just returned from

a foreign trip in which

"Latin American Presidents had counseled further forbearance

by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization

of American States would finally see the potential danger in

Cuba and take concerted action."

(Gray, Ex. 2, Memorandum of

March 10, 1960 NSC Meeting, p. 8).

Castro was characterized as hostile, but his Communist ties were apparently

then unclear. Indeed, it may have been the prevailing opinion, at that time,

that Castro was not actually a Comnunist.* For it was stated in the minutes

of the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting:

"there is no apparent alternative to the present government in

the event Castro disappears.

Indeed the result of Castro's dis-

appearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray, Ex. 2, p. 7).

* Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Lenist"

on December 2, 1961. (David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304).

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13

Out

of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group came

the general covert action plan against Cuba.*

Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we con-

sidered certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National

Security Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting.

The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President

Eisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in commenting on

Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action plan was in preparation,

"suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package

deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around fastro were even worse than Castro."

(Gray Ex. 2, P. 9). And, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting

on March 14, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was a

general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel

and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously." (Gray Ex. 3,

p. 2).

Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to

1961, stated in an affidavit** that although

he did not have a specific recollec-

tion of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a

clear recollection of the discussions of Cuba policy that took place in the

spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated that the reference to

the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly refers to the

*

As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanc-

tions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion.

Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, 7/9/75,

P. 17).

**

Admiral Burke was unable to testify in person before the Committee

because he was in the hospital.

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action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to

the general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government to

identify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro

regime." (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated:

14

"In this connection, it was my view that the U.s. must support

those Cuban groups who would have a sufficient power base among

the Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to be

able to cope with and dismantle his organization

as well. It

was my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro's

organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a

Communist.

I therefore advocated that any effort to support

groups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, not

merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but on

the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's

rise to power, and was the basis for his power." (Burke affidavit,

p. 1-2). *

Burke stated further:

"The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10,

1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or discussion that I

attended or in which I participated.

It is my firm conviction

based on five years of close association with President Eisenhower

during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that President

Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion,

ore

have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he

have ever

authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassination

attempt." (Burke affidavit; p. 2).

Gray testified that the discussion at the March 10 and March 14,

1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather than

to assassinate Castro himself. He said that Admiral Burke's recorded comment

at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general discussion

of the problem of Cuba.

At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretary

of State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearance

might be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 7; Gray, p. 11). And

SECUEN

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Admiral Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the removal of Cuban

leaders was in direct response to a comment by Allen Dulles recorded in

the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked

on."

(Gray Ex. 2, p. 9; Gray pp. 13-14). Gray said he believed that

Mr. Dulles

"was certainly referring to"' the Eisenhower Administration's

plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attempt

on Castro's life.f/ (Gray pp. 14, 45): Gray testified that viewing Admiral

Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that "Admiral

A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First

Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first

meeting of the CIA task force established to plan the training of a

Cuban exile force was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March

10, 1960 NSC meeting. (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task

Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA

task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of the

Castro regime" and described that operation as one: in which a Cuban

exile force would be trained for "6-7 months.". In the discussion of

this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness

of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided

into many parts,". but it was hoped that during the long training

period the "opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed

a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached."

• one all retro a one

(Id., p. 2).

According to the memorandum of the meeting,

chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division

J. C. King, had stated,...

"unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could

be eliminated in onepackage - which is highly unlikely - this operation

can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be

overthrown by the use of force." (Id., p. 1).

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Burke

IVE DECKEI

was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan /for the

overthrow of Castro/ it ought to take these factors into consideration, that

you might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p. 45).

With respect to the March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting, Admiral

Burke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of that

meeting 'clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders,

but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a group

not powerful enough

to also

master the organization those leaders had established

• in Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated further:

"Thus,

it was consistent with my views then that I should have

recorded

in the record of the March 14 meeting as warning

in this discussion that the Communists might move into control

even if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As stated

above, I strongly believed that & strong, organized group must

be in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castro

government." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).

In any event, when a question "whether any real planning had been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara"

was subsequently asked at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, the

Deputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of that

meeting, pointed out

"that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly

dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments

must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the

necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded

that (such action) is beyond our capabilities." (Gray Ex. 1, p. 3).

* The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the

only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was

therefore

(Gray Ex. 3, p. 2)

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The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can

be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a

question suggesting exploration of assassination.* However, it is clear

that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct

positive

action" meant killing, it is significant that shortly after assassi-

nation plots were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that

such action was "beyond our capabilities."

17

* Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action"

and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.

Gray testified that the phrase "direct positive action" could be taken

to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended

to refer to assassination

or not. (Gray, 7/9, p. 9).

Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had

no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based

on the context of weekly Special Group meetings

and discussion in the Fall of

1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as

opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell

was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out

this kind" of a coup.

(Parrott, PP. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the

phrase "direct positive action"

was not a euphemism, and that he did not

employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the

President. (Parrott, PP. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail at pp.

_ and

_ other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by

Parrott.

Bissell testified that he found it "difficult to understand" that General

Cabell would have told-the Special Group that it was beyond the CIA's capa-

bilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination)

in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/

underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18).

Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of

his physician.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

.. (1) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS

a. BISSELL, WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED

PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD

BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTED -

b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION

PLOTS

c.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF

ASSASSINATION EFFORTS AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT

KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED

d.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE

DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION

OFFICIALS -

(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

(ii)

DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON 'EXECUTIVE ACTION

CAPABILITY"

e.

(iii)

TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY

(iV) MEMDRANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

CONVERSATION BEIWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND

GEORGE SMATHERS

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(DRAFTING SUBCOMMITTEE)

8/29/75

C. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were

authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two

broad sections. The first primarily relates to the assassination operation

involving. underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion

of April, 1961. The second section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period,

including the Roselli operation in the spring of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the

laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963.

(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS

The pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same

as for the Eisenhower Administration. Bissell, once again, said he assumed

and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in

a circumlocutious fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being

attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the

President about the assassination efforts of any of the other non-CIA persons with

whom he was working on covert Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration

officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots.

Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize.

an assassination plot.

There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents.

a.

BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY

THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTEN

When John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, Richard Bissell

was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official respon-

sible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the

Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only sur-

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viving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision-

making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. Bissell

testified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (although

Dulles did not so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approved

by the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the Pres-

ident would have been made aware of the plots:

"Senator Baker:

... You have no reason to think

that he (Dulles] didn't or he did [brief President

Kennedy]. But the question I put was whether or

not in the ordinary course of the operations of

the CIA as you know it under their traditions,

their rules and regulations, their policies as

you knew them what in your opinion -- [was the

President, President-elect briefed or was he in

the light of all these circumstances?

Bissell: I believe at some stage the President

and the President-elect both were advised that such

an operation had been planned and was being attempted.

Senator Baker: By whom?

Bissell: I would guess through some channel by

Allen Dulles.

The Chairman:

But you're guessing, aren't you?

Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that

I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at

the meeting with the President-elect in November or

in any meeting with President Eisenhower." (6/9/75,

pp. 38-39).

Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he stated

his belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as

"a pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion he

testified as follows:

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"Senator Morgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious

matter to attribute knowledge of this sort to

the President of the U.S., especially one who

cannot speak for himself.

Is it fair to assume

that out of an abundance of caution you are simply

telling us that you have no knowledge unless you

are absolutely certain?... I gather that you think

...it [assassination plot information] came out

but because of the seriousness of the accusation

you are just being extremely cautious...is that

a fair assumption to make?

Bissell:

That is very close to a fair assumption,

sir. It's just that 1 have no direct knowledge,

first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's]

being advised, but my belief is that he knew of it

[assassination plans]." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 56).

When asked why he had not himself informed White House officials or the

President of the assassination plots, Bissell said since Dulles was the DCI,

he "left the question of advising senior officials of the government and

obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands" (Bissell, 6/9/75, рр. 29, 33).

As with President Eisenhower, Bissell said that, based upon his testimony

that Dulles knew about the assassination plot, he "assumed" that Dulles

"had at least intimated [to President Kennedy]

that some such thing was underway." (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 33).*

meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion at which the President and Allen Dulles

ranch 25nt.

no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this

meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or

relevance.

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Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60)

that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a

"circumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using

"rather general terms."

• Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy together when he

speculated about the marner in which he felt the Presidents would have been

advised to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57;

6/11/75, pp. 5-6) :

"In the case of an operation of high sensitivity

of the sort that we are discussing, there was a

further objective that would have been pursued at

various levels, and that was specifically with

respect to the President, to protect the President.

And, therefore, the way in which I believe that

Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to

have indicated to the two successive Presidents the

general objective of the operation that was contem-

plated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the

President - either President Eisenhower or President

Kennedy -- could have ordered the termination of the

operation, but to give the President just as little

information about it as possible beyond an under-

standing of its general purpose. Such an approach

to the President would have had as its purpose to

leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the

operation if it should surface.

"My belief -- a belief based, as I have said, only to

me knowledge of command relationship of Allen Dulles

as an individual, and of his mode of operations -- is

that authorization was obtained by him in the manner

that I have indicated. I used the word on Monday

"circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that I

- referred.

"Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the

effort would have been to minimize the possibility of

mbarrassment to the President, it is, I think, under-

Standable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency

would have discussed this operation on our own initiative

with, for instance, members of the White House staff.

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The effort would have been to hold to the

absolute minimum the number of people who knew

that the President had been consulted, had been

notified and had given, perhaps only tacitly;

his authorization." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).

However, Bissell testified that Dulles never told him he had briefed

President Kennedy and he did not recall asking Dulles. (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 34: 6/11/75, p. xx; 7/17/75, p. 27). In contrast, Bissell testified that

on certain other occasions, Dulles had mentioned that a "circumlocutious"

approach had been used to brief President Eisenhower on sensitive subjects

(Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 10-14). Bissell also said that he never asked to

what degree Dulles had advised MeGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, of the assassination plot. (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 34).

b.

BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE

OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS.

When asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that an effort to

assassinate Fidel Castro was underway, Bissell stated, "not to my recollection."

He added that he was not told that any Administration official had been made

aware of such efforts. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-30).

After the change of Administration, McGeorge Bundy was the White House

official who was the liaison with Bissell concerning Cuba and in general was

the principal White House official responsible for CIA matters (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 16). Bundy was a former student of Bissell's at Yale and they were personal

friends (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 28). Bissell testified that he did not tell Bundy

about the ongoing Castro assassination plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-29; 7/22,

p. 31), and Bundy confirmed this (Bundy, p. 41).

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 125

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Cuban affairs during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs received

active high-level attention. Bissell said that, in a continuation of the kind

of intense weekly scrutiny the Eisenhower Administration had given the invasion

plans (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 13).

"...almost from the beginning of the Kennedy

Administration, the President himslef and a

number of Cabinet members and other senior

officials took a very active

interest in the

operation(s) concerning Cuba." (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 16) •

Bissell "almost invariably" was present at meetings in which the President

and other senior officials took an "active interest"' in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 17). Bissell testified that he did not inform any of them of the assassin-

ation plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39).

c.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS

AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED

Testimony was taken by the Committee from all living officials high in

the Kennedy Administration who dealt with Cuban affairs.* The theme of their

testimony -- which is set forth in detail below -- was that they had no know-

ledge of any assassination plan or attempt by the U.S. government before or

after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

As with the Eisenhower Administration officials, members of the Kennedy

Administration also said they did not believe the President's character or

style of operating would be consistent with approval of such a matter.

(McNamara, p. 4; Bundy, p. 98; Taylor, pP. 45,51).

* Most of the testimony from officials high in the Kennedy Administration

dealt with the period after the Bay of Pigs invasion, involving Operation Mon-

goose and related activities. (See Section

,infra.) It was during this period

that most of the high officials in the White House,

, State Department, Defense

Department, and the CIA were drawn into the detailed planning of Cuban Operations.

During this period, an extraordinary amount of decision making memoranda and

other documents were generated in response to the Cuban situation.

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 126

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Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified:

"I never had any reason to believe that anyone

that I ever talked to knew about had any active.

planning of assassination underway." (Rusk,

pp. 65,49).

Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no

knowledge or information about.:.plans or preparations for a possible assass-

ination attempt against Premier Castro." (McNamara, pp. 7,4). [The question

of whether McNamara once raised the issue of assassinating Castro is discussed

at Section

, infra. l

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara, said that

killing Castro was not within the mandate of the Special Group which he con-

strued to be the weakening and undermining of "the Cuban system." (Gilpatric,

p. 28).

This was supported by General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired Special Group

meetings on Operation Mongoose. Taylor stated that he had "never heard" of

the assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, pp. 72, 7-8). Taylor stated

that he never raised the question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, p.

19). Moreover, Taylor testified that he was not aware of a directive for an

assassination effort from the President or the Attorney General, nor was he

aware of a proposal-for the assassination of a foreign leader in any form by

anyone to the Special Group (Taylor, pp. 41,45,62).

McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that

"no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the

White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any

authorization, approval, or instruction of any

kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the

CIA." (Bundy, P. 54)

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Furthermore, Bundy testified that he was never told by anyone at any time that

assassination efforts were being conducted against Castro (Bundy, p. 63) .

Bundy said that Richard Bissell never informed him about CIA involvement in

assassination attempts against any foreign leader (Bundy, p. 41). Bundy

acknowledged, however, that he had once been briefed by Richard Bissell on

the development of an "executive action capability" at the CIA (see Section

, infra) . *

Walt Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy before moving

to the Department of State, testified that during his entire tenure in govern-

ment he "never heard a reference" to an intention to undertake an assassination

effort (Rostow, pp. 10, 12-13, 38) .

Asked if he had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate

Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, replied,

"No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, p. 13).**

* As indicated further below, Bundy also said (i) that the matter of a

Castro assassination was 'mentioned from time to time... as something to

talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p: 73); and (ii) he had a "vers

essentially refreshed recollection" that at some time he had hearc

going to kill a large number of people in a headquarters mess or something

various plots. (Bundy, pp. 54, 63-64) .

** As indicated below, Goodwin did on two occasions hear questions raisec

about assassination. One involved the President, who said he was opposed

(see p.

); the other involved the meeting of August 10, 1962 (see pp.

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Presidential Assistant Theodore Sorensen said that his "first-hand

knowledge" of Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period

(Sorensen, P. 4), Sorensen stated, however, that his general opinion based

upon his close contact with President Kennedy, was that

"such an act [as assassination] was totally

foreign to his character and conscience,

Foreign to his fundamental reverence for

human life and his respect for his adversaries,

foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimen-

sion in U.S. foreign policy to his pragmatic

recognition that so horrendous but inevitably

counterproductive a precedent committed by a

country whose own chief of state was inevitably

vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and in-

flame hostility.!! (Sorensen, p. 5).

Sorensen also said that President Kennedy "would not make major foreign

policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of one or more

of those senior föreign policy officials in whose judgment and discretion he

had confidence." (Sorensen, pp. 5-6).

Sorensen concluded his testimony by providing the Committee his judgment

on the following question:

"Q: Would you think it would be possible that ... the

Agency, the ClA could somehow have been under

the impression that they had a tacit authorization

for assassination due to a circumspect discussion

that might have taken place in any of these

meetings?

Sorensen: It is possible, indeed, I think the

President on more than one occasion felt that Mr.

Julles, by making rather vague and sweeping re-

ferences to particular countries was seeking tacit

approval without ever asking for it, and the Presi-

dent was rather concerned that he was not being

asked for explicit direction and was not being given

explicit internation, so it is possible. But on

something of this kind, assassination, I would

doubt it very much. Either you are for it or you

are not for it, and he was not for it. " (Sorensen,

(p. 52-55.)

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d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED

IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS. OF, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT:

After the election, in the latter part of November, 1960, Dulles

and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most important

details with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 34).' Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assass-

ination

efforts were mentioned to the President-elect, and that to the best of

his recollection they were not. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36). Bissell

surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initial

meeting were: (a) "apparently" they had not thought it was an important

matter*; and (b) they "would have thought that that was a matter of which he

should be advised upon assuming office rather than in advance." (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 35). The latter comment led to the following exchange:

"The Chairman:

Isn't it a strange distinction

that you draw that on the one hand (as) a Presi-

dential designate, as President-elect, he should

have all of the details concerning a planned in-

vasion of Cuba, but that he should not be told

about an ongoing attempt to assassinate Fidel

Castro?

Mr. Bissell: I think that in hindsight it could

be regarded as peculiar, yes.

"The Chairman:

... (I)t just seems too strange

that if you were charged with briefing the man who

* This was subsequently repeated by Bissell in response to examination of

his assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assass-

ination operation:

"...the Mafia operation was not regarded as of

enormous importance and there were much more

important matters to talk about with the

President."

(Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 25).

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was to become President of the U.S. on matters

so important as a planned invasion of a neigh

bine an autation

boring country, and that if you knew at the

time in addition to the planned invasion there

was an ongoing attempt to assassinate the leader

of that country, that you would tell Mr. Kennedy

about one matter and not the other.'"

Mr. Bissell: Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite

possible that Mr. Dulles did say something about

an attempt to or the possibility of making use

of syndicate characters for this purpose. I do

not remember his doing so at that briefing. My

belief is that had he done so, he probably would

have done so in rather general terms and that

neither of us was in a position to go into detail

on the matter. " (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35).

However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doctrine of

plausible denial, efforts were made to keep matters that might be "embarrassing"

away from Presidents (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).

(i1) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "'EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY"

As explained in the next section, sometime during the early period

of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed with Bundy the subject of a

"capability" for "executive action"' -- a term said by Bissell to include various

means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders up to and including

assassinations (Bissell, 7/22/75, P. 32).

There is some dispute concerning when this occurred and who initiated it,

and this subject is discussed at length at Section

, infra.

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that Bissell did not tell Bundy --

in the course of discussing the executive action capability or at any other

time -- of the actual assassination plots against Castro (Bissell, 7/22,

p. 31; Bundy, p. 41) .

(However, there was some testimony that the

names of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection

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with the discussion of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75,

pp. 50-51)) .

(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy

convened a "board of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of... [the] failure"

of the operation (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 42,45). The members of the board were

Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke.

The panel examined the Bay of Pigs failure for several weeks and issued its

report on June 13, 1961. The "Taylor Report"' does not mention the assassination

plots.

Bissell was questioned extensively and appeared to General Taylor to have

been the principal person involved in the operation and much more knowledgeable

than Dulles who had deliberately kept himself out of the planning and delegated

responsibility to Bissell. (Taylor, p. 73).

Bissell testified that he did not disclose to the Taylor/Kennedy Committee

that there had been an assassination effort against Castro (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 42). He put forward several reasons for not having done so. First, "the

question was never asked."

Second, he claimed Dulles already knew about the

operation. Third, Bissell said 'by that time the assassination attempt had been

called off." Fourth, he contended that the assassination effort was "not germane"

because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell,

6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39).

Bissell hastened to add that he had no reason to believe" that Allen Dulles,

himself a board member, did not discuss the plots with one or more members

(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46).

isti

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However, both General Taylor and Admiral Burke stated that neither

Bissell nor Dulles informed them of the assassination plots (Taylor, pp. 72-73;

Burke affidavit, 8/25/75, p. 3) :

When asked if Richard Bissell ever informed him that underworld figures

had been offered a large sum to assassinate Castro, General Taylor responded,

"No, I never heard that, and it amazes me" (Taylor, p. 72). Taylor said that

during his review of the Bay of Pigs operation no mention was made of an

assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, p. 72). Despite the fact that

Dulles met with Taylor on the Board of Inquiry thirty or forty times, Taylor

testified that Dulles never told him about the plot (Taylor, p. 73).

(iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Bissell's testimony that he had not disclosed assassination plots to

the Kennedy/Taylor "court of inquiry" was consistent with his statement that

"I have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was

advised of this (the plot to kill Mr. Castro)."

(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41).

The Committee tested this statement against other parts of Bissell's.

testimony. An attachment to the May 22, 1961 FBI. memorandum (regarding the

Las Vegas tap) which Director Hoover had sent to the Attorney General* had

quoted Edwards as saying that Bissell in "recent briefings" of Taylor and

Kennedy,

"told the Attorney General that some of the

associated planning included the use of

Giancana and the underworld against Castro."

(Bissell, 7/17/75, Ex. 3).

When first shown this document, Bissell said,

* A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assistant on the

face of the memorandum indicates that he had actually seen the document*.

This

memorandum is discussed in detail at Section

, infra.

NN 50955 DooId: 32423524 Page 133

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"I have no recollection of briefing those

two gentlemen except as members of the Board

of Inquiry that I have described, of which

Allen 'Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell,

6/11/75, p. 27) .

As mentioned above (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his briefings

to the Board of Inquiry did not deal with assassination efforts. (Bissell,

6/11/75, pp. 45-46) .

Discussing the document in a subsequent appearance before the Committee,

Bissell again said that he had no recollection of any such conversation (Bissell,

7/22/75, p. 56) but he was sure that it did not take place in front of the

Kennedy/Taylor board of inquiry (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64).

However, Bissell speculated, the report quoted language which "I might

very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro."

(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 21).

The examination of Bissell on whether he had had any such discussion and,

if so, why he used such obscure and indirect language, elicited the following

testimony:

"Q: Did you, sometime in May of 1961 communicate

the state of your awareness to the Attorney General

In your briefing to him?

Bissell: Well, there is a report which I was shown,

I think it was last week, I believe it also came

from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or

i bat one

indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief

tne Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to .

le errect that the Agency had been using -

on't know whether Giancana was mentioned by nam

but in effect, the Underworld against the Castro

regime.

Q: Did you tell them - them being the Attorney

General and General Taylor -- that this use included

actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?"

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"Bissell: I have no idea whether. I did [.]

I have no idea of the wording.

I think it

night quite possibly have been left in the

more general terms of using the underworl

against the Castro regime, or the leadership

of the Castro regime.

Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your

knowledge at that time, wouldn't that have been

deLiberately misleading information?

Bissell: I don't think it would have been.

Ve were indeed doing precisely that. We wer

rying to use elements of the underworl

against. Castro and the Cuban leadership.

Q. But you had information, didn't you, that

you were, in fact, trying to kill him?

Bissell: I think that is a way of using these

people against him.

Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in

briefing the Attorney General you are telling

him you are using the underworld against Castro,

and you intended that to mean, Mr. Attorney

General, we are trying to kill him?

Bissell: I thought it signalled just exactly

that to the Attorney General, I'm sure.

Q. Then it's your belief that you conmunicated

to the Attorney General that you were, in fact,

trying to kill Castro?

Bissell: I think it is best to rest on that

report we do have, which is from a source over

which I had no influence and it does use the

phrase I have quoted here.

Now you can sumise

and I can surmise as to just whattthe Attorney

General would have read into that phrase."

(Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-54).

Bissell then, testified:

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"Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously

or otherwise, to advise the Attorney General

that you were

in the process of trying to kill

Castro?

Mr. Bissell: [U]nless I remembered the con-

versation at the time, which I don't, I don't

have any recollection as to whether that was

my intent or not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56).

Bissell proceeded to speculate that a "proper" briefing might not

have included any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, 7/22/75,

p. 59). He gave two reasons for this speculation: (i) even if he had

"thoroughly briefed" the Attorney General he would have chosen "circumlocutious"

language to tell him about the activity involving Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75,

pp. 53-56); and (li) the assassination effort had been "stood down by then."

(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "ho

knowledge" that the Attorney General was "specifically advised"' of the

assassination plot against Castro (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62).*

e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERS

George Smathers, former U.S. Senator from Florida, testified that the

subject of the possible assassination of Castro arose in a conversation between

Smathers and President Kernedy on the White House lawn in 1961.* Smathers.

* If the FBI quotation of Edwards is to be accorded significant weight, then

it is important to nate that another section of it contradicts Bissell's assump-

tion that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had been circumlocutiously advised

by Dulles of the assassination plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was

completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu" in connection with Cuban opera-

tions.

Bissell's explanation for Edwards' statement was that Edwards was being "pro-

tective"' of the DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20). But this testimony must be

reconciled with Bissell's previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and

probably would have told the President about it.

#* Smathers' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of

an Oral HIstory interview, conducted on March 31, 1964, in which his testimony was

based gives an indication that the conversation transpired in 1961, before the

Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April.

It appears from the White House logs of Presidential meetings that there were

only two occasions in 1961 when Senator Smathers met with the President alone for

as much as twenty minutes. Both of those meetings took place in March. (Supra,

P.

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 136

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said he discussed the general Cuban situation with the President many times

(Smathers, p. 6). Smathers had many Cuban constituents, was familiar with

Latin American affairs, and was a long-time friend of the President (Smathers,

p. 6).

Smathers had the "impression" that the President raised the subject of

assassination with him because someone "had apparently discussed this and

other possibilities with respect to Cuba" with the President (Smathers, PP:

16, 25). Smathers had no direct knowledge of any such discussion, nor did he

know who might have been involved (Smathers, pp. 18-19, 25). The President

did not indicate directly that assassination had been proposed to him (Smathers,

p. 18).

According to Smathers:

":.. [President Kennedy] asked me what reaction

I thought there would be throughout South

America were Fidel Castro to be

assassinated...

I told the President that even as much as I dis-

liked Fidel Castro that I did not think it would

be a good idea for there to be even considered

an assassination of Fidel Castro, and the Pres-

ident of the United States completely agreed with

me, that it would be a very unwise thing to do,

the reason obviously being that no matter who did

it and no matter how it was done and no matter

what, that the United States would receive full

credit for it, and the President receive full

credit for it,

and it would work to his great

disadvantage with all of the other countries in

Central and South America...I disapproved of it,

and he completely disapproved of the idea.".

(Smathers, p. 22) .

Smathers further testified that he had said the reason it would work to "great .

disadvantage" with the nations of Central and South America was because they would

blame the United States for any assassination of Castro (Smathers, P. 6).

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Smathers said that on a later occasion he tried to raise the subject

of "Cuba and what could be done'' with President Kennedy (Smathers, p. 22) .

The President made it clear to Smathers that he should not raise the subject

with him again.*

Senator Smathers concluded his testimony by indicating that on Cuban

affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than was the

President"' (Smathers, p. 24). But Smathers said that he disapproved of even

thinking about assassinating Castro and said he was "positive" that Kennedy

also opposed it (Smathers, p. 16) .

* One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized

his point by cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba. (Smathers, P. 22) .

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-199797

TABLE OF CONTENTS

9/1/75

Based on

Subcommittee Meetin!

8/30/75

(pp. 75-80 reserved

by Senator Tower)

Page

Kennedy Administration -- The Question of Authorization Outside

* the Agency

during the Post Bay of Pigs-Mongoose Period.

A. Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of Pigs

B. The Issue of Authority

C. Events from the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose

1. The Taylor Review -

2. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961

and the CIA Intelligence Estimate

NSAM 100

Testimony of Bundy -

Taylor's Testimony -

Parrott's Testimony

The CIA's Intelligence Estimate

3.

Testimony of Szulc on President Kennedy's November 9. 196,1

Question regarding a Possible Castro Assassination

Testimony of Goodwin

4. The Rejection of Assassination in President Kennedy's

November 16, 1961 Speech

D. Operation Mongoose

1. The Creation of Operation Mongoose

a. The Special Group Augmented

b. General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of

Mongoose -

c. CIA Organization for Mongoose

2. Lansdale's Theory and Objective for Mongoose

3.

Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instructions to

Act More Vigorously, But That Assassination Was Not Included

at tre ors

]

1

2

2

3

3

5

6

8

10

11

12

•12

12

13

13

14

15

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4. The January 19, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was Quoted.

as Saying Cuba Should Have the

"Top Priority" in the United States

• Government. --.

5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning Tasks

a.

Lansdale's Rejection.of a Suggestion That a Propaganda Campaign,

Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored

6.

The Control System for Mongoose Operations

a. The Documentary Evidence

7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action

E. Testimony on the Issue of Authority Outside the Agency-

1. Helms' Testimony Concerning Authority

a. Helms! Perception of Authority

b. Helms' Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate

Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group

of the Assassination Activity --

c. Helms' Testimony That He Doubted Whether He Had Authorized

a Specific Assassination Attempt or Was Informed of the

Passage of the Pills

d. Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's Position on a Castro

Assassination

e. Helms' Testimony as to Why He Did Not Obtain a Direct Order

f. Helms' Perception of the Relevance of Special Group Controls

to Assassination Activity -

2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority --

a. Harvey's Perception of Authority --

b. Harvey

and the Special Group Augmented

3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials

Testimony. of McCone

b. Testimony of Taylor

c. Testimony of Lansdale

•d. Testimony of Bundy

e. lestimony of MacNamara

16

17

21

22

23

25

29

29

29 a

31

32

32

34

36

38

38

40

43

43

44

45

48

51

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-3-

Testimony of Gilpatric

g.

Testimony of Rusk -

h. Testimony of Sorensen -

F. The August 10, 1962 Meeting --

1. The Contemporaneous Documents

a.. Lansdale's August 13, 1962 Memorandum

b. Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum --

c. The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting

d. The August 10 Meeting --

2. The Testimony

a. Testimony as to the August 10 Meeting -

(1) Testimony of McCone

(2) Testimony of Harvey

(3) Testimony of Goodwin

(4) Testimony of MacNamara

b.

Testimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting -

(1) Testimony of

McCone

a snaps

(2) Testimony of Harvey

(3) Testimony of McNamara

(4)

Testimony of Elder -

(5) Testimony of Lansdale

C.

Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on the

August 10 Meeting

(1) The Martin News Report

ours dou a

(2)

The O'Leary Report --

Page

54

56

58

59

60

60

- 61

62

-63-

66

66°

66

67

68

69

69

69

70

71.

72

75

75

78

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-1-

Based on Subcommittee

Meeting 8/30/75

(pp. 75-80 reserved by

Senator Tower)

(iii) Kennedy Administration - The Question of Authorization Outside the

Agency During the Post Bay of Pigs, Mongoose, and 1963 Periods

~- This section discusses the question of authorization outside the Agency

for the assassination plots during 1962 and 1963 -- the period of Operation

Mongoose (the 1962 Kennedy Administration program aimed at overthrowing Castro

by an internal revolt), the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, and the subse-

quent

program in 1963 which

saw a more limited covert action program directed

against Cuba.

A. Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of Pigs

During 1962 and 1963 there were three principal assassination plots.

I. In the spring of 1962, William Harvey reactivated the contact

with John Roselli and in April provided lethal pills and guns to Roselli and

Cuban associates in Miami. In May it was reported that the pills reached Cuba.

2. In early 1963, the science fiction schemes - exploding sea shell

and poisoned diving suit -- were contrived and then abandoned.

3. In November 1963 the dissident Cuban who was code-named AMLASH

was given a poison pen device.

B. The Issue of Authority

The fundamental issue dealt with in this section is whether the above

assassination plots were authorized outside the Agency. The issue arises from

the differing perceptions of

Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand,

and

members of the Kenned Administration, including the Director of the

CIA, on the other hand.

While Helms stated that he never received a direct order to assassinate

Castro, Helms testified that he fully believed that the CIA was at all times acting

within the scope of its authority and that he believed a Castro assassination came

within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's effort to overthrow Castro and his

regime. Helms stated that he never informed Macone, or

otricials

505 FReakennedy

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Administration of the assassination plots. On the other hand, McCone and the sur~

viving members of the Kennedy Administration testified that they did not believe

a Castro assassination was permissible without a direct order, that assassination

was not within the parameters of the Administration's anti-Castro program, and

_ testified that to their knowledge no such direct order was given to Helms.

Before

setting out the testimony in detail, we discuss below the Kennedy

Administration's 1962 covert action program, Operation Mongoose (as well as the

events in 1961 leading to that program) which was designed to overthrow the Castro

regime. An understanding of that program is essential to an evaluation of the testi-

mony on the issue of authorization.

C. Events From the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose

1. The Taylor Review

On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested

General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a re-evaluation of "our practices and pro-

grams in the areas

of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla

activity which fall short of outright war." The President hoped that Taylor

would give special attention to Cuba. (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, April 22,

1961) Robert Kennedy was to be Taylor's principal colleague in this effort.

The resulting review of the U.S. policy in this area concluded:

"We have been struck with the general feeling. that there can be no

long-term living with Castro as a neighbor.

His continued presence

within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent

of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable

of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more

of weak Latin American republics.

***

"It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light

of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political,

military, economic and propaganda action against Castro." (Report to

the President, June 13, 1961, memorandum No. 4, p. 8)

laured!

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It is clear from the record, moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of Pigs

had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally

and for the CIA

institutionally.

By July the Special Group had agreed that the basic objective "is to provide

support to

a U. S. program

to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about

a regine acceptable to the U. S."

(Memo

for the Record, July 21, 1961.) Occasional

harrassment operations were mounted during the summer but there was neither over-

all strategy nor much

activity.

2. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1061, and the

CIA Intelligence Estimate

The documentary evidence and testimony indicate that in the fall of 1961

the question of the effect of Castro's removal from power and the prospects in

that event, for U. S. military

intervention vere considered by the kennedy Admini-

stration.

Two studies were prepared in this connection. Pursuant to ilational Security

Action Memorandum 100 ("NSAM 100"), the State Department was asked to assess the

potential courses of action open to the U. S. should Castro be removed from the

Cuban

scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense

for military intervention in that event.

, The CIA, prepared an "Intelligence

Estimate" on the "situation and

prospects" in Cuba. As discussed below, the

evidence indicates that the focus of these studies was on the possible

courses

of action open to the U.S. in a post-Castro Cuba, rather

than

OD

might bring about Castro'

s removal. However, it

af:

that

absassination

was not excluded

from the potential means by which Cas

tro might be removed.

NSAM 100

On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No.

100 ("NSAM 100") (Bundy, Ix 3) entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba", USA!!

100 was addressed to the Secretary of State stated in full: "In confirmation of

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oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward,

a plan is

desired for

the indicated contingency."

"Related documents indicate that the subject matter of the contingency

referred to in NSAM 100 was

the "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene".

(Bundy ix 3A, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, October 6, 1261, p. 1.)

The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on October 6, 1961, (the day after

the issuance of NSAMl 100) state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall

plan for Cuban covert operations," a contingency plan in connection with

the

pos

sible removal

of Castro from the Cuban scene".

was in preparation. (Bundy, Ex 3A, -

Memorandum for tlie Record of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1951, P. 1.)

In addition, a Memorandum for the Record by Parrout on October 5, 1961,

states that Parrott informed Assistant Secretary Woodward's Deputy that "what was

wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other

be removed

from the Cuban scene".

(Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.) Parrott's memorandum

further

stated

that in preparing the plan, "the presence and positions

of Raul

(Castro) and Che Guevara nust be taken into account", and that General Taylor had

Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned"

toto Woodward. (Bundy, Ex 3B.) Parrott's memorandum also stated that "on the

covert side, I talked to Tracy barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report»

be furnished as soon as

possible on what is going on and

what,is being planned".

(Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.)

*Woodward at that time was Assistant Secretary of State

for Latin American Affairs.

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Bundy further contended that the President was

not considering an assassina

tion, but rather "what are things going to be like after Castro." (Bundy, p. 81.)*

* Taylor's Testimony

Taylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 of the events de-

scribed in the related documents set out above. (Taylor, P. 18.)

On the basis of

his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds like purely a political

consideration of the sequence of power in Cuba ,** Taylor emphasized, moreover,

that"never at any time" did he raise the question of of assassination with Parrott,

or with anybody else. (Taylor, P. 19)

Parrott's Testimony

Parrott, the Special Group Secretary who transmitted the request for the

NSAM 100 study to the State Department, testified that the request for a plan re-

flected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum

to the "contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the

Cuban scene" (described above,

p. 18), reflected interest in a contingency study

for Castro's removal, but by means "short of being killed." (Parrott, P. 83)

*Thus, with respect to the desire not to indicate the President's interest in

the plan requested from the State Department, Bundy testified:

"...it was precisely to insulate the President from any false in-

ference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy

to confuse the question, what are things going to be like after

Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus atten-

tion on the information he obviously wanted, which is, what would

happen if we did do this sort of thing, and

not get one into the

frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it."

(Bundy, p. 81)

**Taylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents

and stated, "I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation."

(Taylor, p. 18)

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The CIA's Intelligence Estimate

The CIA study in connection with the consideration of Castro's removal

intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA's Board

of National Listimates

(which was not part of the CIA's covert action directorate), entitled "The Situation

and Prospects in Cuba's. The CIA Estimate was pessimistic regarding the chances

for success of a Cuban internal revolt,

and further found that

a Castro assassina-

tion would likely strengthen the Comnunist position in Cuba.

After a general review of the economic, military, and political situation

in Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient popular

and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat. The concluding

paragraph of the estimate was entitled "If Castre were to Die". It noted that:

"Ilis (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural

causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost.

certainly not prove fatal to the regine...(I)ts principal

surviving leaders would probably rally together in the

face of a common danger." (Estimate, p. 9.)

The CIA study further predicted that should Castro die, "some sort of power struggle

would almost certainly develop eventually," but that whatever the outcome of suche

a struggle, the Communist Party's influence would be

cantly" licreased.

(Estimate, p. 9.)

*The IG Report apparently refers to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate.

(IG, p. 4.)

The IG Report, in reporting that many CIA officers intervieved in the

IG investigation stressed the point that "elimination of the dominant figures in a

sovernment. will not necessarily cause the downfall of the governnent," stated:

"This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA

draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in respouse to General Max-

well Taylor's desire for a contingency plan.

The paper took the position

that the demise of lidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little op-

portunity fox the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control."

(IG, p. 4) The CIA was unable to locate the draft paper rcferred to in the

IG Report.

**A cover memorandum by Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy

stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose

your program" (referring to the proposed overall Mongoose operation). Lansdale's

memorandum criticized the estimate's assessment that "it is highly improbable that

an extensive popular uprising could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion

of fact quite outside the area of intelligence." (Lansdale Memorandum to Robert

Kennedy, 11/62, p.1) As discussed in detail at PP.

below. Lansdale's basic

concept for the Mongoose program was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt

NH

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3. Testimony of Szulc on President Kennedy's November 9, 1961 Question

Regarding a Possible Castro Assassination

Tad Szulc* testified that in a private meeting he had with President Kennedy

on Novebmer 9, 1961, the President asked"Szulc what would you think if I ordered

Castro to be assassinated,"

and said "I agree with you completely" when

Szulc answered that

a Castro assassination should be ruled out on both practical

and moral grounds. Szulc further testified that President Kennedy went on "to

make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral

reasons"

must not be involved in assassinations. (Szulc, p.27).

In early Novenber 1961 Szuic was asked by Richard Soodwin, the Special Assistant

to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8,

1961, to discuss the situation in Cuba. The meeting was an "off-the-record"' one"

which Szulc attended

as a friend of Goodwin's and not as a reporter. (Szulc,

p. 24.) During the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the

situation in Cuba following the (Bay of Pigs) invasion (and) the pros and cons

of some different possible actions by the U.S. in that context" (Szulc, p. 25).

The subject of assassination

was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, P.

31.)

ULEa

*In November 1961 Tad Szulc was employed as a reporter in the Washington Bureau

of the New York Times (Szulc, p. 24). Szulc had

visited Cuba in May-June 1961,

following the Bay of Pigs invasion.

(Szulc, p. 24) During the course of that

trip, Szulc had a "series of very long conversations with Castro". (Szulc, P.

24.)

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At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet

with President Kennedy the following day (Szulc, p. 25). On November 9,

1961, Szulc, accompanied only by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy

for over an hour in the Oval Office.*. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 25.) Szule

recalled that the President discussed "a number of his views on Cuba

in the wake of

the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning

my conversations with Premier Castro, and.. what the United States could

/orT might do in... either a hostile way or in establishing some kind of

a dialogue..." (Szulc, 6/10, pp. 25-26) •

Szulc testified that after this general discussion, the President

then asked "what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated.*/*/

(Szulc, 6/10, p. 26; Szulc Notes of conversation with President Kennedy,

November 9, 1961). Szulc testified that he replied that an assassination

would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban system, and that it was

Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be party to murders

and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26). Szulc testified that

*/Goodwin testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of

the press and others who were experts in their fields, but that it was

"possible"

that the meeting with Szulc may have been an occasion for the President to con-

sider Szulc for a position in the Administration (Goodwin, p. 29-30). .

On November 2, 1961 Goodwin had: addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the

President and

the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what

became the Mongoose operation.

Goodwin proposed five "staff components,"

including "intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propa-

ganda."

The memorandum stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask

Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one--

although we should check with /USIA Director/ Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell."

(Goodwin Ex. 2, p. 1, 2) .

*/*/ Szulc made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon

as he returned

to his office, based on his memory of the meeting.

President

Kennedy's question regarding a Castro assassination appears in quotation marks

in Szulc's notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh" memory.

(Szulc, 6/10, p.30) .

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thereupon the President said, "I agree with you completely."

further:

Szulc stated

"He /President Kennedy/ then went on for a few minutes

to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt

that the United States for moral reasons should never be

in a situation of having recourse to assassination.

" (Szulc, p.27) .

Szulc's notes of the meeting with the President

state:

"JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same

way -- he added 'I'm glad you feel the same way'

because indeed U.S. morally must not be part [sic/ to

assassinations.".-

Szulc's notes of the conversation further state:

"JFK said he raised question because he was under

terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intel-

ligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro

murder.

sed /sic/ he was resisting pressures."

(Szulc

note of conversation with President Kennedy, November

9, 1961).

Szulc stated, relying on his memory, that it is "possible"

and he "believed" that President Kennedy used

such words as "someone in the

intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro assassina-

tion.. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 29). The President did not identify the person or

persons. (Szulc, 6/19, p. 27) .

If anyone was in fact putting pressure on the President, there was no

other evidence on this point adduced before the Committee. This was particularly

troublesome since everyone questioned by the Committee, both within and without

-

the CIA,denied ever having discussed assassination with the President, let

alone having pressured him.

Testimony of Goodwin

Goodwin attended the November 9, 1961 meeting between President

Kennedy and Szulc.

(Goodwin, p. 3). Goodwin testified that, after asking

Szule for his reaction to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated,

President Kennedy said "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do."

(Goodwin, p. 3) .

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Goodwin testified further that several days after the meeting

with

Szulc, Goodwin referred to the mention of assassination to saule, and tresident

Keanedy said only "we can't get into

that kind of thing, or we would all be

targets".

(Goodwin, p. 4, 11.).

4.

The Rejection of Assassination in President Kennedy's November 16,

1961 Speech

A few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and some six

weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech

at

the University of Washington. In that public address, President Kennedy stated:

"We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adver-

saries in tactics of terror,

assassination, false

promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." (Public Papers

of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)

We discuss in the next section the nature of the program which was initiated

against the Castro regime at the end of November 1961 pursuant to President

Kennedy's instruction, and which continued to the Missile Crisis in the fall of

1962.

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D. Operation Mongoose

I. The Creation of Operation Mongoose. In November 1962 the

proposal for a major covert program to overthrow Castro was developed.

Richard Goodwin, a special assistant to President Kennedy, and Edward

Lansdale,

a military officer with experience in counter-insurgency

operations, played major staff roles in the creation of Mongoose. Both

Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who took an

active interest in this preparatory stage and in the later conduct of

Mongoose. On November 1, 1961, Goodwin advised the President that

Robert Kennedy "would be the most effective. commander" of the proposed

operation. (Memorandum to the President, November 1, 1961, p.

Lansdale,

in a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on November 15, 1961, out-

lining the Mongoose proposal, stated that a "picture of the situation

has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to

support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba". (Memorandum, November 15,

1961, p.)

At the end of the month, on November 30, 1962, President Kennedy

issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the Mongoose project-

to "use our available assets... to help Cuba overthrow the Communist

regime". (Lansdale Ex. IT, Memorandum to the Secretary of State,

Defense, et al., November 30, 1961).

Important organizational changes were made in establishing Operation

MONGOOSE.

a .

The Special Group Augmented.

• A new control group, the Special

Group Augmented, was put in

charge of Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA con-

sisted of the regular Special Group (i.e., Bundy, Johnson of State,

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Gilpatric of Defense, McCone of CIA, and Gen. Lemnitzer of the Joint

Chiefs) plus Robert Kennedy and General Taylor. Also, Secretaries

Rask and McNamara more frequently attended its meetings than they did

those of the Special Group itself.

b. General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE.

General Edward Lansdale was named the Chief of Operations of the MONGOOSE

activities by President Kennedy. Lansdale had developed a reputation in

the Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with revolu

tionary insurgencies in less developed countries. In addition, as a

result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrusted the CIA

and believed he required someone from outside the Agency to oversee

major covert action

programs. Rather than appoint Robert Kennedy to

head Mongoose as proposed by Goodwin, President Kennedy gave Lansdale

the

task of coordinating the CIA's Mongoose operations with those of the

Departments of State and Defense, and made General Taylor the Chairman

of the Special Group Augmented. However, Robert Kennedy did play an active

role in the Mongoose

structure, unrelated to his position as Attorney General.

c. ClA Organization

1 for Mongoose.

In late 1961 or early 1962, William

Harvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force ll, the CTA arn for. longoose

Operations.

Task Force W operated under the Special Group Augmented

and em-

ployed some 400 people at CIA headquarters ard at the Miami Station. McCone

and Harvey were thereafter the principal CIA participants in Operation Mongoose.

Helms atianied only some 7 os 40 donsoose meetine ind destitied that i fi

was fair to state that McCone and Harvey, rather' than Helms, vere principally

concerned with Mongoose.

llelms was, however, substantially involved in Mongoose

and testified that he "was as interested" in Mongoose as Harvey and licCone were.

(Helms, 7/19, p. 10)

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Lansdale's Theory and Objective for Mongoose

In the fall of 1961, Lansdale had been asked by President

Kennedy to examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommen-

• dations.

Lansdale testified that, in reporting his recommendations to

President Kennedy,.

he emphasized that "Castro ... had aroused con-

siderable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population...."

(Lansdale, p. 4), and that the U.S. "should take a very different course"

from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro

up

to that time.. (Lansdale, P. 3). These prior U.S. operations were

conceived and led by Americans, Lansdale informed the President. (Lans-

dale, p. 5). In contrast, Lansdale proposed that the U.S. work with

all exiles, particularly professionals who had opposed Batista and then

became disillusioned by Castro. (Lansdale, PP. 4, 10-11). Lansdale's

ultimate objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the

Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered

efforts from outside Cuba."

(Lansdale, p. 41).

Hence, after his appointment as Chief of Operations, Lansdale's

concept for the MONGOOSE project emphasized as a first step the develop-

ment of leadership elements, and "a very necessary political basis"

among the Cubans opposed to Castro, before any large actions began.

(Lansdale, p. 11). At the same time, Lansdale sought to develop "means

to infiltrate cuba duccessfully" and to organize "cells almo ts

inside Cuba... who could work secretly and safely

Lansdale, p. if)

Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not

to bring great reprisals on the people, and abort any eventual success."

(Lansdale, p. 11).

#/

As Lansdale described his "concept of operation" for Mongoose in a

memorandum to the President on January 18, 1962, it was to "help the

Cubans from within Cuba" to overthrow the Castro regime through a

"revolt of the Cuban people.". (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 2).

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3. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instruc-

tions to Act More Vigorously, But That Assassination Was Not Included.

Sometime in the early fall of 1961, Bissell was apparently called. to

the White House and was said to have been

"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House.

by both the President and the Attorney General for,

as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing any-

thing about getting rid of Castro. and the Castro

regime.

This description comes from the testimony of Samuel Malpern, a middle-

level CIA covert action officer, who said Bissell-told him about the

meeting; and directed him to come up with some plans. (Halpern, pp. 8,

36-37). Bissell said

he did not remember that precise meeting but that

he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass about Cuba."

(Bissell, 7/25/75, pp. 37-38).

Bissell was asked whether he considered such an instruction

to constitute authority for proceeding to assassinate Castro. He said it

would not, and that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for

assassination action (Id., 38-39).

Bissell also testified that there was in fact no assassination

activity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Roselli operation and his departure

from the Agency in February 1962.

In late 1961 Halpern became Harvey's Executive Assistant

on Task Force W, the CIA action arm of Operation Mongoose.

Ile testified

that he never heard of the Roselli assassination operation Halpern

pp. 15-16) .

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4. The January 19, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was

Quoted As Saying Cuba Should Have the "Top Priority" in the United States Government.

On January 19, 1962, a meeting attended by Lansdale, probably Helms, Helms'. Executive

• Assistant George McManus,

and other representatives of the agencies involved in

Mongoose, took place in Attorney General Kennedy's office.*

(McManus, p. 6).

Notes taken at the meeting by McManus contain the following passages:

"Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible"

"....

... "a solution to the Cuban problem today

carried top priority in U.S. Gov/ernmen/t.

No time, money, effort - or manpower is to

be spared.'"

"'Yesterday ... the President had indicated to

him' that final chapter had not been written --

its got to be done and will be done."

(McManus Ex. 1, Memorandum, January 19, 1962, p. 2). Melanus

stated that the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov/ernmen/t -- no

time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared" had been spoken.

Attorney General (McManus, PP. 8-9) .

# Others who attended the meeting were Brig. Gen. Craig, representing

the Joint Chiefs, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary

of Defense's office, and Frank lland of CIA.

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Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere" on which he

relied for his perception that

assassination was implicitly authorized. (Helms,

7/17, P. 60-61.) McManus, who wrote the memorandum, agreed that Robert Kennedy

"was "very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action" but McManus disagreed

with Helms perception, stating

that "it never occurred to me" that the words

quoted above from Robert Kennedy included permission to assassinate Castro. (McManus,

p. 9.) Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole give McManus any idea that

assassination was either contemplated or authorized. (Tr., p. 9-10.)*

5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning Tasks

On January 18, 1962, Lansdale-assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies parti-

cipating in Mongoose. (Lansdale Ex. 3, Program Review of the Cuba Project.) In a

memorandum to the working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to put

the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a

change from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a com-

bat situation--where we have been given full command." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62,

p. 1.)

The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence collec-

tion to planning for "use of U. S. military force to support the Cuban popular

*/ With respect to the question of priorities and emphasis in the Kennedy

Administration, there was a great deal of proof showing that Cuba

indeed had a high priority and the very existence of a high level

group like the Special Group Augmented further demonstrates its

importance. Macilamara, for example, stated that "we were hysterical

about Castro at the time of the Bay

of Pigs and thereafter.

(In

the same context, MacNamara stated "I don't believe we contemplated

assassination.)

(MacNamara, p. 93). Similarly, General. Lansdale in-

formed the members of his inter-agency committee that Mongoose "demands

a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing, of the fact that

You're in a combat situation where we have been given full command."

, Memorandum, January 20, 1962, from Lansdale).

On the other hand, Sorensen testified. that "there were lots of top

priorities, and it was the job of some of /us/ to continually tell

various agencies their particular subject was the top priority" and

although Cuba was "important" it was "fairly well down on the list of

the President's agenda."

(Sorensen, p. 12). For example, when told

that his first letter to Khruschev in the secret correspondence that

lasted two or three years would be "the single most important docu-

ment you will write during your Presidency," President Kenndy said,

"Yes, we get these every day over here."

(Sorensen, p. 12).

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movement'' and developing an "operational schedule for sabotage actions inside

Cuba." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 5, 7.)*

In focusing on intelligence collection; propaganda and various sabotage actions,

Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of Mongoose to build

gradually towards an internal revolt of the Cuban people. (See p. above.)

Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Robert Kennedy on January 18, 1962,

with a handwritten note stating "my review does not include the sensitive work I

have. reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately."

Lansdale testified that this did not refer to assassinations and that he "never took

up assassination with either the Attorney General or the President."** Lansdale

testified that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work"

but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cuban

leaders in Florida and to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, p. 30.)

*There was testimony regarding one Lansdale plan that a witness thought was an example

of Lansdale's "perspicacity" in planning operations.

Parrott, the Secretary to the

Special Group Augmented, testified:

"I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He

had a wonderful plan for getting rid of Castro.

This plan

consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of

Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro (who)

was anti-Christ. And you would spread this word around Cuba,

and then on whatever date it was, that there would be a mani-

festation of this thing. And at that time--this is absolutely

true--and at that time there would be an American submarine

eve the horizon of i can cuba and send

which would surface just over the horizon off of Cuba and send

And this would be the manifestation of the

Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown..."

'Well, some wag called this operation--by this time Lansdale was

something of a joke in many quarters--and somebody dubbed this

Elimination by Illumination. (Parrott, P.

**Harvey testified that he never received any instructions from Lansdale to under-

cake assassinations, although as noted below (p. ), in August 1962, Lansdale aske

Harvey to consider the feasibility of a plan for the

"liquidation" of Cuban leaders.

(Harvey, 7/ 175, p.

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Lansdale also referred, in a memorandum to the Attorney General on

January 27, 1962, to his feeling that "we might uncork the touchdown

play." "independently of the institutional program we are spurring."

(Lansdale Ex. 4, p.l). Lansdale testified that in this memorandum the

phrase "touchdown play" was a

"breezy way of referring to "a_Cuban

-revolt to overthrow the regime"

rather than to a Castro assassination.

(Lansdale, p.45) :

*/

The examples

of such "plays cited in the memorandum

*/ The testimony was as follows:

"The Chairman: What precisely did you mean by "uncork the

touchdown play independently of the institutional programs

we are spurring?"

"General Lansdale: Well, I was holding almost daily meet-

ings with my working group, and — in taskin,, and finding

how they were developing plans I was becoming, more and more

concerned that they kept going back to doing what I felt were

pro forma. Amcrican types of actions rather than activoly ex-

ploring how to get the Cubans into this, and to have them

undertake actions.

"To me, the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to over-

throw the rerime. I did not feel that we had rotten into

the real internal part of getting Cubans into the action,

and I was concerned about that."

"Senator Baker: In the same context, is it fair. lo say that

the name of the came was to get rid of Castro or his regime. d

and that touchdown play was one of several methods that f

might have been used for that purpose?"

"General Lansdale: Yes."

"at you had in mind hernt, now what was the touchdown play

"General Lansdale: Well, it was a revolt by the Cubans

themselves... a revolution that would break down the police

controls of the state and to drive the top people out of

power and to do that, there needed to be political actions

cells, psychological propaganda action cells, and eventually

when possible, querilla forces developed in the country in

n. safe place for a new government to set up and direct the

revolution that would

eventually move into Havana and take over."

(Lansdale, pp. 45-56).

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(e.g.s

"stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba," work through "ethnic

language groups," "youth elements," or families through the Church") do

not contain any indication of assassination.

(Lansdale, Ex. 4, p. 1.)

On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional

task to those assigned on January 18. This "Task 33" involved a plan to

"incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical

warfare means. (Lansdale, p. 29). Lansdale testified that the plan in-

volved the use

of non-lethal. chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and

keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects."

After

initial approval for planning purposes (with the notation that it

would require "policy determination" before final approval), the plan was

ultimately cancelled after a study showed it was not feasible and before de-

bate by

the SGA. (Lansdale, P. 29, Special Group Minutes, 1/30/62, p. 1.)

Lansdale's 33 tasks were approved for planning purposes

by the Special Group on January 30, 1962 (Minutes of Special Group meeting,

1/30/62, p. 1). Thereafter, on February 20, 1962, Lansdale detailed a

six phase schedule for Mongoose, designed to culminate in October, 1962,

with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale

Ex. 11; Program Review of the Cuba Project, 2/20/62, p. 2). As one of the

operations for the "Resistance" phase proposed for September, 1962, Lansdale

listed "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key icaders." (Id., p. 151).

Lansdale's plan stated:

OA DEA

*/ Lansdale's memorandum described the "touchdown plays as follows;

"It may be a special effort which professional labor

operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America

and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups; Spain

has

an untapped action potential.

It could be a warming-up

of the always lively youth element in Latin America and

Cuba, through some contacts specially used.

It could be with

the families through the Church, with families resisting the

disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists.

It

could be an imaginative defection project which

cracks the top

echelon of the Conmunist gang now running Cuba."

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"This should be a 'Special Target' operation

Gangster elements might provide the best recruit

ment potential for actions against police -- G2

intelligence/ officials." (Ia., p. 151). *1

Lansdale testified that early in the Mongoose opera-

tion he had suggested to the working level representatives of the Mongoose

agencies that they get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain

a intelli-

gence and "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba.. (Lans-

dale, p. 104). But Lansdale conceded that his proposal to recruit

gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders": contemplated the targeted

killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in

the course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, D. 107).

These 33 plans of Lansdale were, however, never

approved for implementation by the Special Group Augmented. As

discussed below in greater detail

(see p. ), the Special Group Augmented

tabled Lansdale's six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directed

Lansdale to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only.

(Memo, 3/2/62; Minutes of Special Group Augmented Meeting, 3/5/62).

a. Lansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion That a Propaganda

Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored

On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and the

Joint Chiefs on the Mongoose Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's con-

sideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban

Communist Hierarchy". (Lansdale Ex. 1, Memorandum, 1/30/62, from Craig

to Lansdale, p. 1). This concept, titled Operation Bounty, was described

a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature,

for killing or delivering alive known Comnunists." (Id., p. 2) Under the

concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which

*An earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared

in a CIÁ memorandum for the Special Group on January 24, 1962. Commenting

on Task 5 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called

for planning for

"defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum noted

that planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal made

the island by intermediaries" and listed "crime syndicates" along

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were proposed as ranging from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for

"government officials."

A reward of "2ç" was listed for castro nim

self. (Id., p. 3). Lansdale testified that price was designed "to deni-

"grate ..: Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, Ir. 26).

Lansdale testified that he "tabled" this concept when

he received it, on the ground that "I did not think that it was something

that should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, p. 26).

Lansdale did not bring the proposal before the Special Group Augmented.

6. The Control Sustem for Mongoose Operations.

In establishing the Mongoose Operation

on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the Special

Group should be "kept closely informed" of Mongoose activities. (memo-

randum by the President, 11/30/62; Goodwin, p.: ).

In practice, as Samuel Halpern, Harvey's Executive Assistant on

the CIA Mongoose Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission

of "specific detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task

force." (Halpern, p. 16). Halpern testified that those plans were sub-

mitted "in nauseating detail:"

"It went down to such things as the gradients on the

beach, and the composition of the sand on the beach

in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in

those plans, full details, times, events, weaponry,

how it was going to happen, who was going to do

wha

... the full details of every single thing wendi

(Halpern, p. 17).

Harvey similarly characterized the control process (Harvey, 6/25,

p. 123), as one which required the submission of "excruciating detail" and

where it was understood that the Special Group Augmented was

to be given

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an opportunity to debate and decide after weighing the strengths and

weaknesses of any given proposed action. (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 114, 124).

a. The Documentary Evidence

The documentary evidence illustrates the tight control pro-

cedures set out for Mongoose by the Special Group Augmented. For example,

as discussed above (!. ), bansdale initially submitted 32 gpecific tasks

with his "basic concept" on January 18, 1062 for consideration by

the Special Group Augmented. (Lansdale Ex. 3) After consideration

of Lansdale's concept and the 32 tasks in february, the Special Group

Augmented ordered Lansdale to cut back his plan to Limit it to an

intelligence collection program for the larch-May 1962 perind, rather.

than the five-stage plan to culminate in an Oetober "popular revolution"

as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Meno 3/2/62, by Lansdale)

In

approving the intelligence collection program, the Special Group Aus-

mented pointed out that:

• any actions which are not specifically spelled

out in the plan but seem

to be desirable as the pro-

tlie Special Group

In addition, the Guidelines for the Mongoose program

emphasized the Special Group Augmented's responsibility lor contro

prior approval of important operations:

"SECRET

"The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is res

for providing policy quidance to the Mongoose, project,

for approving, important operations and for monitoring

progress.

(Guidelines for Operation ionoose, March 14,

1962, p.2)

Further indication of the Mongoose control process in the request given

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to llelms a month prior to larvey's trip to meet Roselli in Miami. Pur-

suant to the discussion at the Special Group's mecting on March J, Helms

was asked to estimate "for each week as far into

the next twelve nonths

as possible... the members and type of agents you will establish

inside Cuba... (and) brief descriptions

•. of actions contemplated.'

(Memo to llelms from Lansdale, March 5, 1962)

Morcover, the approved plan for Operation Mongoose, as of

the time of llarvey's meeting with Roselli in Miami required that any

proposal to supply arms and equipment to particular resistance

• groups inside Cuba "be submitted to the Special Group for decision,

ad hoc." (Lansdale Memo to

• April 1, 1962, p. •).

And the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized that, after specific

tasks were approved by the Special Group Augmented and given to participating

agencies by Lansdale, normal command channels were to be observed. As the

Guidelines stated:

During this period, General Lansdale will continue

as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the

participating departments and agencies for support

and implementation of agreed tasks.

The heads of

these departments and agencies are responsible for

performance through normal command charnels to

higher authority.

(Guideline for Operation Mon-

goose, March 14: 1962, p.2)

* The initial draft of these Guidelines had referred to the President but

was later amended to read "higher authority." (Draft Guidelines, March

5, 1962, p.2)

The minutes of the consideration of these Guidelines were

also amended with respect to the manner in which the Guidelines were approved.

On March 16, 1962, a Memorandum for Record of "Discussion of Operation

Mongoose with the President" of the Special Group (Augmented) stated:

"In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented)

the President was given a progress report on Operation MOl-

GOOSE. The guidelines dated March 14, 1962 were circulated

and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a

prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and

risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Aug-

mented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance

with the guidelines.

(footnote cont'd.)

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In a Memorandum to McCone on April 10, 1962, Harvey recognized that the

Special Group Augmented control process required advance approval of "major

operations going beyond the collection of intelligence." But llarvey stated

that these

"tight controls" were unduly "stultifying:"

"To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism

for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the

right controls exercised by the Special Group

and the

present time-consuming coordination and briefing pro-

cedures should, if at all possible, be made less

restrictive and less stultifving."

(Memo, April 10, 1902,

Harvey to McCone, p.4) *

Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the pressure to

act against the Castro regime increased through a "stepped up" Mongoose

plan, the Special Group continued to insist on prior approval of sensitive

operations.

Thus, when the Special Group Augmented on September 14,

1962, approved in principle a proposed set of operations,

(Footnote cont'a)

However,

a note at the bottom of

this memorandum, dated March 22, 1962,

stated:

This minute was read to the Special Group

(Augmented) today.

The Group

was unanimous in feeling

that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was

given by higher authority. The members of the Group

asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the

Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with

the Guidelines.

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Bundy, speaking to the Group,

"... made it clear that this did not constitute

a blanket approval of every item in the paper and

•that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example,

will have to be presented in more detail on a case

by case basis."

(Memo of Special Group Augmented

meeting, September 14, 1962, p. ).

Helms and the members of

the Special Group Augmented differed on

whether or not these control requirements were consistent with Helms' per-

ception that assassination was permissible without a direct order. We

discuss that testimony below at

7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action. The documentary evidence and the

testimony reveal that the Kennedy Administration pressed the Mongoose opera-

tion with vigorous language and

although the collection of intelligence

infornation was the central objective of Mongoose up until August 1962,

sabotage and para military actions were conducted.* thus

re

major sabotage operation aimed at a large Cuban copperi

mines

rand other

sabotage operations.

As Lansdale described them in his testimony, the

cahntaoe

acts involved blowing up bridges to stop communications and

blowing up certain production plants!

(Lansdale, p. 36). And during

the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged.

*/ In early March, 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin "preliminary

actions ... involving such things as spotting, assessing and training

action-type agents" but the Group agreed that it must

"Keep its hand

tightly"

-on these actions.

The Group saw, however, that such control

might not be completely effective and recognized "that many of the

agents infiltrated would be of an all-purpose type; that is, they would

be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively

intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the

country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although

every effort will be made to attempt such control." (Minutes of

Special Group meeting, March 5, 1962).

GRE

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At the same time, however, the record shows that the Special Group Aug-

mented turned away from proposed sabotage and similar violent action throughout

1962, including the period of the Missile Crisis. (See p.

above.) Thus, Helms

noted®

in a memorandun of a meeting on October 16, 1062, that Robert Kennedy in ex-

pressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Mongoose, "pointed out

that (Mongoose) had been underway. for a year...that there had been no acts of sabo-

tage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice". (Memorandum

by Helms, October 16, 1962, p. 1.) Similiarly a memorandum to Helms by his Execu-

tive Assistant (who spent full time on Cuba matters), which reviewed the Mongoose

program

in

the aftermath.of the ilissile Crisis, stated:

"During the past year, while one of the options of the

project was to create internal dissension and resistance

leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows

that policymakers not only shied away

from the military

intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of

sabotage proposals. (McManus, Ex. 2, p. 1, McManus, p. 11).

Harvey testified that this assessment of the Special Group Aug-

mented's position was an accurate one. (Harvey, 6/25, p. ). This is

also borne out by the record of Mongoose activity. For example, after.

Lansdale's initial six phase plan to overthrow Castro by the fall of 1962,

the single phase approved for January August 1962 was described by Lans-

dale as "essentially an intelligence collection" effort. (Memorandum,

April 11, 1962, by Lansdale). Indeed, the guidelines for Operation

approved on March 5, 1962, stated that the acquisition of in

en

the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts ins

coming, months."

(Taylor Ex. 3, P. 2, Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962).

The Guidelines further stated that although other covert actions would be

undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to be on

a scale "short of those

reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in Cuba.

(Id., p. 2). And the Special Group stipulated that Mongoose action beyond

the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Memorandum, -

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With the scheduled conclusion of that intelligence collection

phase in August 1962, the Special Group Augmented considered whether to

adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was

designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memorandum for

the Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62, from Lansdale, p. 1). Initially, the

Special Group Augmented decided against this course and in favor of a "CIA

variant," at a meeting of Special Group Augmented principals on August 10,

1962. (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, August 10, 1962) . : The

"CIA variant," which was proposed by McCone on August 10, posited more

limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought not Castro's over-

throw, but a split between Castro and "old-line Comnunists." (Id., p: 2):

The onset of the Missile Crisis caused an initial reversion to the

stepped-up Course B plan, but ultimately, however, an order was issued on

October 30, 1962 to halt all sabotage operations. (Lansdale, Ex.8, Memo

by Lansdale, 10/30/62)

Thus, on August 20; Taylor told the President that the Special

Group Augmented perceived no likelihood of an overthrow of the Castro govern-

ment by internal means

without direct U.S. military intervention, and

that the Special Group Augmented favored a more agressive Mongoose program.

(Memo fron Taylor to President.) Shortly thereafter, on

August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memo Number 181 to Lansdale and Taylor

stating that, at the President's directive, "the line of activity projected

for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible

speed." One week later, on August 30, the CIA was instructed by the 'Special

Group Augmented to submit a list of possible sabotage targets they might

propose

and it was noted that this list could serve as the limit for action

on the Agency's own initiative: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could

define the limit's within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative."

Special Group Augmented Minutes of August 30, 1962.)

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Thus, at a Special Group Augmented meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert

Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose

program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage

operations"'. And Robert Kennedy urged that "massive activity" be undertaken

within the Mongoose framework. In line with this proposal, the Special Group

Augmented decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and that

"all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the pos-

sibility of getting rid of the Castro regime". (Minutes of Special Group Aug-

mented meeting, October 4, 1962, p. )*. On October 30, 1962, however, the

order to stop all sabotage operations was issued (Lansdale, Ex. 8).**

The SGA also decided on October 4, 1962, that Robert Kennedy would chair

the Group's meetings "for the time being." (Id., p. ). Subsequently,

at a meeting on October 16, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that he was

10ing to give Mongoose

"more personal attention" in view of the lack of

progress and would hold daily meetings with the working group represen-

tatives, i.e., Lansdale, Harvey, and the other Agency members. (Harvey,

Ex. 12, Memorandum of Meeting, October 16, 1962, by Helms, p. 1).

• Helms

testified that he did not recall any such daily meetings with the

Attorney General, but he had the impression there may have been several

at first, but then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/

,pp. 54-55).

**Harvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert Kennedy

at the height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that

agent teams be sent into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. mili-

tary operation that might occur.

Harvey stated that Robert Kennedy

dent and stated that, although llarvey had attempted to set guidance i

rom top otticials during the Missile Crisis, larvey "carned another

black mark as not being fully under control". (Elder, p. 34-35.)

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As Sorensen (a member of the Executive Committee established to deal with

the Missile Crisis) testified, even though Cuba was the "No. 1 priority" dur-

ing the Missile Crisis, and "all alternatives, plans, possibilities were ex-

haustively surveyed" during that time, the subject of assassination was never

raised in the high-level National Security Council Executive Committee (of which

Helms was not a member) that was formed to deal with the Missile Crisis.

(Sorensen, 7/21, p. 11.)***

* **

There are references in the Special Group Augmented records to attacks

on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The record of the SGA meeting on September 9,.

1962, states:

"It was suggested that the matter of attacking and

harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be

considered."

(SGA Minutes, 9/9/62, p. ).

Earlier, on August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included a task "to provoke

Incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions,"

in a proposed projection of actions for Phase II of Mongoose. (Memo-

•randum to SGA, 8/31/62, from Lansdale, Action No. 47). The Special Group

thereafter decided, as

a means of "emphasizing such activity" to replace

that task with one to "cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel,"

and to note that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting

physical attacks on Bloc personnel."

(Memorandum to Taylor, Rusk, and

MacNanara, 9/12/62, from Lansdale, pp. 1-2).

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E.

The

• Issue of Authority Outside the

Agency

This section discusses the evidence as to whether there was authorization

from

outside the Agency for the assassination activity that took place during

the Mongoose operation.

TR. 7/17, p.4)

As discussed below in detail, both Helms and the Kennedy Administration

officials agreed that no direct order was ever given for Castro's assassina-

tion and that

no one

outside the Agency (including McCone) was informed

about the assassination activity. Helms testified, however, that he believed

the assassination activity was permissible and that it was within the scope

of the authority given to the Agency. McGone and the other Kennedy Admini-

stration officials disagreed, testifying that assassination was not permissible

without a direct order and that a Castro assassination was not within the

authorized bounds of the Mongoose operation.

In April 1962, when the poison pills were given to Roselli in Miami,

Helms was the CIA Deputy Director in charge of covert operations and reported

to McCone, the CIA Director. Helms had succeeded Bissell in this job,

following Bissell's retirement in February, 1962, as a consequence of the

failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Helms testified that, after the Bay

of Pigs, "Those of us who were still (in the Agency) iere enormously anxious

to try and be successful at what we were being asked to do by what was then

a relatively new Administration. We wanted to earn our spurs with the

President and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration.' (Helms

1. Helms' Testimony Concerning Authority

As set forth below, llelms testified that while he doubted whether

he was initially informed that Harvey gave poison pills to Roselli and did

not recall having authorized a Castro assassination in that form, nevertheless,

Helms had authorized the 1962 assassination plot because "ve felt that we

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were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if

not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms."

(Helms, 6/13, p.61)

3.

His Perception of Authority

Helms

testified that based upon the "intense"

nressure exerted by the

Kennedy Administration to overthrow Castro it was his percention that the CIA

was at all times acting within the scope of its authority with respect

assassination activity.*

but, Helms testified that there

was

no.

direat order

assassinate Castro from anyone, including the President of the Attorney General.

(lielms, 6/14, P. 6S.) (This point is discussed in détail infra p.....)

(Helms, 6/13, p. 137; Helms,. 7/17, p. 62, 7/17=p. 1-5.) Helms testified that

this authority, as he perceived it, was implicit in the U. S. policy and attitude

towards Castro. (Helms, 6/13, p. 165.) As Helms testified:

"I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro

and if killing him was one of the things that was to be done

in this connection, that was within what was expected."

(ilelms, 6/13, p. 137.)

*The extent to which pressure in fact existed "to do something about Castro" is

discussed in detail in the section immediately above dealing with Operation Mon-

goose, its strategy of causing an internal revolt of the Cuban people against

Castro, the strict control system established by the Special Group Augmented, and

the pattern of intelligence collection and sabotage activity actually authorized

and undertaken.

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Helms testified that "I remember vividly (the pressure to overthrow

Castro) was very intense." (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helns stated that this pres-

sure intensified during the period of Operation Mongoose during late 1961 and

throughout 1962, and then continued on through much of 1963. (Helms, 6/13, p. 27.)

As these pressures rose, "obviously the extent of the means that one thought

were available, obvious increased too." (ilelms, 6/13, p. 26.) ==

Helms stated that during

the Mongoose Operations period "it was made abundantly

clear... to everybody involved in the operation that the desire was to get rid of

the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro...the point was that no limitations

were

put on this injunction." (Helms, 7/17, p. 16-17). In Helms' testimony,

the following exchange occurred:

"Senator Mathias: 'Let me draw an example from history.

When Thomas A. Beckett was proving to be an annoyance,

as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man.

He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him.

He

said

who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that.

"Mr. Helms:

'That is a warming reference to

the problem.'

"Senator Mathias: "You feel that spans the generations

and the centuries?'

"Mr. Helms: 'I think it does, sir.'

"Senator Mathias:

'And that is typical of the kind of thing

which might be said, which might be taken by the director or

by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?'

"Mr. Helms: 'That is right. But in answer to that, I re-

alize that one sort of grows up in lthel tradition of the

time and I think that any of us would have found it very

difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the

U.S. I just think we

all had the feeling that we're hired

out to keep those things out of the oval office.'

"Senator Mathias: "Yet at the same time you felt that some

spark had been transmitted, that that was within the per-

missible limits?'

"Mr. Helms: 'Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene

they would not have been unhappy.'"

(Helms Ir. 6/13, pp. 72-73)

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lelms said that although he never was told by his superiors

to kill Castro

(llems, 7/17, p. 15), there was at the same time never any injurction laid down

by the l'ennedy Administration that proscribed a Castro assassination: "No member

of the Kennedy Administration...ever told me that (assassination) was proscribed,

(or) ever referred to it in that fashion..." (Helns, 7/71, p. 182)

"Nobody ever

said that (assassination) was ruled out..."*/(Hclms 7/17,

43

assassination of Castro, "with all the other things

triat were going on at that

time...seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort." (Helms, ú/13,

p. 99.) "In the perceptions of the

tine and the things we were trying to do this

was one human life against many other human lives that were being lost."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 64.) *2/

*As Helms declared: "In my 25 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, I always

thought I was working within authorization, that I was doing what I had been

asked to do by proper authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing

what I believed to be the legitimate business of the Agency as it would have been

expected of me."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 30-31.)

*As set, at above people had less seat die at peoplayer losing these ele

...people were losing their lives

being arrested left and right and put before the wall and shot."

(Helms, 6/13,

p. 64.)

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b..

Helms' Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate

Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group

of the Assassination Activity

Ilelms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro.

ile said that his perceptions of authority did not reach the point where he could

testify that he had specific instructions to kill Castro. As he put it:

"I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere

"of the time, what I understood was desired, and I don't

want to take refuge in saying that I was instructed to

specifically murder Castro: • ." (Helms, 6/13, p.88).

On the question of whether the President was informed of any

assassination plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a

President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign

leaders

in his presence" (6/13, p. 29), and that the Special Group was "the

mechanism that was set up. ...to use as a circuit breaker so that these

things did not explode in the President's face and that he was.

responsible for them." (6/13, p. 29). However

also, test

he had "no knowledge that a Castro assass

nation was ever authorized

by the Special Group (Augmented)" (6/13, pp. 28-29) .:

In addition, Helms said he never informed the Special Group Augmented

or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli

in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms,

7/18, p.18).$/ Helms also stated he never told Robert Kennedy about any

assassination activity and my "presumption is he wasn't informed" (Helms,

6/13, p.58), and that "Harvey kept (the Roselli pill plot) pretty much

in his back pocket." (Helms, 6/13, pp. 57-58).

Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was "constantly

in touch" with him in 1962 and 1963, Robert Kennedy never instructed Helms

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to assassinate Castro:

"The Chairman." Since he was on the phone to you

repeatedly did he ever tell you to kill Castro?'

"Mr. Helms. 'No.'

"The Chairman: 'He did not?'

"Mr. Helms: 'Not in those words, no.'" (Helms,

7/17, p.13)*/

# Helms immediately reiterated after this exchange that his perception of

authority for a Castro assassination rested on the pressure exerted by the.

Administration against Castro. The exchange between the Chairman and Helms

continued as follows:

"The Chairman: "Well, did he ever tell you in other words

that clearly conveyed to you the message that he wanted

•to kill Castro?'

"Helms: 'Sir, the last time I was (before the Committee), I

did the best I could about what I believed to be the parameters

under which we were working, and that was to get rid of Castro.

And I don't, I am sorry to say... see how one would have

expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassinating

would become part of a large group of people sitting around a

table in the United States Government. I can't imagine any

Cabinet officer wanting to sign off on something like that. I

can't imagine anybody wanting something in writing saying I

have just charged Mr. Jones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith."

(Helms, 7/17, PP. 13-14)

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Helms Testimony that he Doubted Whether he had

Authorized a Specific Assassination Attempt or was Informed

of the Passage of the Pills

There is some doubt whether Helms ever authorized

a specific attempt

at Castro's assassination, or was informed of the passage of the pioson

pills to Roselli in April, 1962. Although Helms testified that Harvey

regularly reported to Helms on Harvey's Mongoose work (HeIms, 6/13, p.95),

and Helms "would have thought" that Harvey would have reported to Helms

the transfer of the pills into Cuba (Helms, 6/13, p.105), Helms does not

recall Harvey ever telling him that the pills were delivered to Roselli..

(Helms, 7/17, p. 22).

Thus, as indicated above, llelms testified he never informed the Special

Group Augmented or any member of that Group that ilarvey had given the pills

to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time."

(Helms, 7/18, p. 18.)* And with respect to the pills, Helms testified that,

altioust he anreed in the Harvey-Rosell reti

Cand believed.

implicit

call having okayed the killing of Castro myself in that form," (Helms, 7/17,

p. 9.)

d.

Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's Position on a Castro

Assassination

In testifying as to his perception of authority, Helms emphasized the

particular role played by Robert Kennedy in pressing for progress and results

*/ Helms' testimony that he may not have been informed that the pills were

delivered is corroborated by Harvey's testimony. Harvey testified that

when he returned from Miami he reported to Helms on his contacts with

Roselli. But Harvey said that he only "briefed Helms generally", on the

subjects of Harvey's lakeover of the Roselli operation, the prospects

of the operation, and the fact that Harvey liad dropped Maheu and Giancana

from the operation. (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65) •

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in the Mongoose Operatión./ In addition, Helms said that

Robert Kennedy often talked directly with Helms and other CIA officials

working on the Mongoose program, outside of the Special Group Augmented

channels. (Helms, 7/17, p. 13; 7/18, pp. 60-61). As Helms stated:

"I can say absolutely fairly we are constantly in

touch with each other in these matters. The Attorney

General was on the phone to me, he was on the phone

to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor. He

was on the phone even to people on Harvey's staff, as

I recall it." (Helms, 7/17, p.13) .

Helms said

that although he did not know whether a Castro

assassination would have been morally acceptable to Robert Kennedy,.

Helms believed that Robert Kennedy "would not (have been) unhappy if

(Castro) had disappeared off-the scene by whatever means." (Helms,

7/17. p. 17-18). And Helms stated that Robert Kennedy never told him

that a Castro assassination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17, p.21).

However, leims further testified that although Robert Kennedy was

"constantly in touch" with Helms and their exchanges were marked by de-

tailed, factual, and highly specific discussions on anti-Castro operations.

Robert Kennedy never raised the subject of a Castro assassination and never

Instructed Helms to assassinate Castro.** Helms further testified that he had

no knowledge that Robert Kennedy "was ever asked to specifically approve

an assassination plot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 57.)

# R: "So it was. your impression that he was sort of setting the tune for

the group's action or activity.

A: "Oh, yes... there wasn't any doubt about that..

He wastvery much

interested in this and spent a great deal of time

on ith Helms,

6/13, p. 22.)

**The telephone records of the Attorney Generalls office indicate frequent:

contact between the Attorney General and leing and Helms stated that his

conversations with Robert Kennedy were 'candid" and that "lie and I used to

deal in facts most of the time."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 63. )

Helms testified as

to the level of detail in his talks with Robert Kennedy:

"For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams.*/

Well, (the Attorney General would ask) have you got the

team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been

delayed a week because the weather is bad or the boats

don't run, or something of this kind. It even got down

to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17, p.40)

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And, as stated above, llelms also testified that "Harvey kept Phase 2

(the Roselli

pill opcration) pretty much in his back pocket" and

that al-

though Helms stated "I do not know this for sure," he testified it was

his "presumption" that Robert Kennedy was not informed of the Plase 2

operation.*

(Helms, 6/13, p. 57-58.)

e. Helms' Testimony as to Why He Dia Not Obtait a Direct

Helms testified that assassination "vas not part of the CIA's policy"

or a part of CIA's "armory". (Helms, 6/13, p. 57-981) And, in his own

view, lielms said that he "never liked assassination". (And, in fact, banned

its use

years after he became CIA Director.) (Helms, -

. )

Moreover, Helms testified that he had serious reservations regarding the

CIA working with underworld figures. (Helms, 7/18

propsed to contact Roselli to

see if gangste

p.31). When Harvey

developed, Helms "had very grave doubts about the

Wisdomt

underworld figures. (Helms, 6/13, p. 33; 7/18, p.31) .

Despite these reservations, Helms did not seek approval for

the assassination activity because he said

assassination was not

a subject that he felt should be aired with higher authority. (Helms, 7/18,

pp. 31-32). With respect to the question of obtaining express authority

* Helms based this presumption

on a review

time of his testimony.

(Helms, 6/13, p.58).

of relevant documents at the

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from the Special Group or Special Group Augmented, Helms stated: "...

I didn't see how one would have expected that

a thing like killing or

murdering or assassination would become a part of a large group of people

"sitting around

a table in the United States Government." (Helms, 7/17,

p. 14). And with regard to informing the President or obtaining explicit

authority from him, Helms

stated that "nobody wants to embarrass a Presi-

dent of the United

States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign

leaders in his presence." (Helms, 6/13, p. 29).

Thus, in the following exchange Helms stated that it "wouldn't have

occurred to me to ask" for clarification or express authority

for assass-

ination activity from Robert Kennedy or the Special Group:

"Senator Huddleston: "...it did not occur to you to

inquire of the Attorney General or of the Special

Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and

asking for

action...to clarify that question of

whether you should actually be trying to assassinate?"

"Mr. Helms: "I don't know whether it was in training

experience, tradition or exactly what one points to,

but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer and

am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate

Castro or to try to assassinate Castro, is a question

it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask."

***

"Senator Huddleston: "... (because assassination has such

serious consequences)

seems to fortify the thought that

I would want to be dead certain, I would want to hear

it from the horse's mouth in plain, simple English language

before I would want to undertake that kind of activity.

(Helms, 7/17, pp. 51-52) •

in the following exchange:

Mim so mised me in mann i need State.

I UL

"Senator Morgan: "In light of your previous

statement

that this is a Christian country and that this Committee

has to face up to the prime moral issue of whether or not

killing is...acceptable...don't you think it would have

taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather

than just saying it was not eliminated from the authority

or you were not restricted...?"

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"Mr. Helms: "...killing was not part of the CIA's policy.

It was not part of the CIA's armory...but in this Castro

operation...I have testified as best I could about the

atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired (and)

that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten

rid of by this means that this would have been acceptable

to certain individuals...I was just doing my best to do

what I thought I was supposed to do." (Helms, 6/13. pp. 87-88).

When asked why he did not seek clarification from the Special

Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy whether it was "in fäct, the

policy of the U.S. Government to actually kill Fidel Castro," Helms

answered "I don't know..."

...There is something about the whole chain of episodes

in connection with this Roselli business that I am

simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion.

And there was something about the ineffectuality of all

this, or the lack of conviction that anything ever

happened, that I believe in the end made this thing

simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I

was briefed on at the time. Maybe I was kept currently

informed and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember

it...But I do not recall ever having been convinced

that any attempt was really made on Castro's life.

And

since I didn't believe any attempt had been made on

Castro's life, I saw no reason to pursue the matter

further."

(Helms, 7/18, pp. 31-32).

f. llelms' Perception of the Relevance of Special Group

Controls to Assassination Activity

The evidence concerning the control system established by the

Special Group

for the Mongoose Operation is discussed

above (see p.

Helms stated, however, that the control system established by the

Special Group for Mongoose was not intended to apply to assassination

activity.

(Helms, 7/18, p.21). Thus, with respect to the Special Group

Augmented's decision on March 5, 1962 that major operations going beyond

the collection of intelligence must receive advance approval llelms.

stated that this referred to "rather specific

at the piece tie

Group had on its agenda" from the outset of Mongoose.

(Helms, 7/18,

p.21). Since

assassination was not among such items, Helms seatoi?

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that the Special Group

would not have expected assassination

activity to come under this particular policy, (Helms, 7/18,

• p.21). And with respect to the Special Group Augmented's desire

to "keep its hands tightly on preliminary actions" leading

towards sabotage and other actions beyond intelligence collection!

Helms stated that was the kind of injunction "that appears in all

kinds of governmental minutes of neetings."

(HeIms, 7/18, p.17).

Helms said he regarded these as "general injunctions: rather than

an "all inclusive injunction" to keep the Group informed of all matters.

(Helms, 7/18, -. 17) .

Helms said he recognized, however, that there were limits on

permissible activity during Mongoose.$/ (Helms, 7/18, p.9). Thus,.

Helms stated

that although there were "no limitations" on actions

to remove Castro during Mongoose,

there were restraints on sabotage

operations and he did not understand the absence of specific limitations

to authorize more drastic actions, such as committing the U.S. military

to an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18, p.9) ..

In addition, Helms testified that he saw no need to inform the

Special Group of the Harvey-Roselli operation because that operation was

characterized by

"ineffectuality" and a "lack of conviction that anything

ever happened." (Helms, 7/18, p.32). Helms stated he did not be

any attempt had been made on Castro's life by virtue

neetings

in Miami with Roselli. (Helms, 7/18, p.32) .

NN 50955

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# Helms testified, that although loss

of life

was implicit in the

Mongoose operations,

"I think

there was an effort made not to take tacks

that would recklessly kill a lot of people and not

achieve very much. I think there was an effort, if you

had a sabotage operation, not to throw a lot of hand

grenades into a city, but rather take out the power

plant which would actually damage the economy of the

country. There was an effort made to find devices that

would seem to have a useful end. (Helms, 7/17, p.63-64).

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38

2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority

a. Harvey's Perception of Authority

Harvey stressed that at all times he was acting as a line officer re-

porting to his immediate superior within the Agency, the Deputy Director for

covert actions (first Bissell, then Helms.)* (Harvey, 6/25, p. 83).

Similarly, Harvey also pointed out that his information with respect

to authorization from outside the agency came from the Deputy Director:

"(a)t no time during this entire period...did I ever personally

believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or

end-running or engaging in any activity that was not in response

to a considered, decided U. S. policy, properly approved, admittedly,

perhaps, or through channels and at levels I personally had no in-

volvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider

it at that point my province to, if you will, cross-examine either

P. Deputy Director or the Director concering it," (Harvey 6/25.

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39

Thus, Harvey relied upon his superiors within the Agency for authority.

Indeed, Harvey indicated that his perception of the authorization for the

1962 assassination activity may have come from the period when Allen Dulles

was DCI. As Harvey stated:

"But I had every right to believe organizationally,

humanly, whatever way you want to put it, that nothing

that was being told to me by Bissell had

not in fact

come to him from /Allen DullesT.

But Harvey made clear that this did not imply that McCone knew of or au-

thorized the assassination activity:

"The Chairman: "That doesn't necessarily mean that be-

cause the previous director had knowledge that Mr. McCone

had knowledge. It is not like a Covenant that runs in

the land."!

"Mr. Harvey: "No, of course not, and they don't always

brief their successors.".

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 85.)

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D. Harvey and the Special Group Augmented

Harvey testified that he never informed the Special Group Augmented,

or any of its members individually, of the ongoing assassination plots. As

we described earlier, the Special Group Augmented and its Mongoose program

began its Cuba activities in late 1961 through 1962. Harvey attended. many

of the Special Group Augmented meetings as the CIA's representative. He

testified that at no time was assassination discussed at any of the meetings,

except for the August 10, 1962 meeting.*

We took substantial testimony covering the April/May 1962 period when

the underworld contact was reactivated, the pills were passed to Roselli and

delivered to Cuba. Harvey had been appointed several months earlier as head

of the CIA's Task Force W, which operated under the Special Group Augmented as

the CIA's action arm for Mongoose activities.

In the latter part of April, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its

large (at least 200 persons) JM/WAVE Station. As Harvey testified, in addition

to his meeting with Roselli and the delivery of the poison pills, Harvey's trip

had other totally unrelated (in Harvey's view) purposes as well:

"...this was one of a number of periodic trips for the

purpose of reviewing in toto...the actual and potential

operations at the Miami base... and this covered the whole

gamut from personnel administration, operational support

in the way of small craft (and] so on.."(Harvey, 7/11,

pp. 15-16).

The Special Group Augmented expected to receive a rep

com. Harvey on

was: in Miami, Lansdale

his April trip to Miami. On April 19, 1962, While

told the Special Group Augmented that:

"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit,

more specific information on the status of agent training

and operations should be made available."

(Menorandum for

* This meeting and the testimony concerning it is treated in depth in the

section, infra, pp.

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the Special Group, April 19, 1962, from Lansdale, P.--

). On April 26,

1962, the Special Group Augmented was informed by Lansdale that Harvey

was in Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would

return to Washington on April 30. (Memorandum for the Special Group

/Augmented/, April 26, 1962, from Lansdale.) At the Special Group meeting

on the same day General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meet-

ing and report on agent activities." (Memorandum for the Record, April 26,

1962, by McConé.) The next day, April 26, 1962, Harvey was sent a memorandum

informing him of General Taylor's request as well as the fact that McCone

wanted to meet with Harvey and Lensdale "immediately on your return to dis-

cuss the Task Force activities," (Memorandum for Action, Elder to Harvey,

April 27, 1962.)

Harvey did report to the Special Group upon his return but did not

mention his meeting with Roselll of the delivery of the pills and the weapons.

Harvey testified that when he reported to the Special Group, Augmenteda

on his trip to Miami, he did not inform them or, indeed

an

individual

outside the Agency, that he had given the pills to,

Rosetti.

(Harvey, 7/11,

p. 16.)* And when McCone

asked Harvey to brief him on what Harvey had done

in Miami, Harvey did not tell McCone of the pills.As indicated above,

Harvey did not believe it was necessary to do so. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 17.)*

--.

* llarvey testified with respect to why he did not brief the Special Group Augmented,

in the following exchange:

"Q.: '...Did you believe that the White House did not

want the Special Group to know?'"

"Л.: "Well, I would have had no basis for that belief,

but I would have felt that if the White House (tasked)

this (operation to the CIA) and wanted the Special

Group to know about it, it was up to the White llouse

to brief the Special Group and not up to me to brief

them, and I would have considered that I. would have

been very far out of line and would have been subject

to severe censure.'* (Harvey Tr. 7/11, p. 77).

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The minutes of the May 3, 1962, Special Group Augmented meeting make no

mention of Harvey's above-related plot activities. The minutes of that meet-

ing show that on his return from Miami, Harvey gave a progress report to the

Special Group Augmented on "agent teams" and the "general field of intelli-

gence". (Harvey, Ex. 3, Memorandum of Special Group Augmented Meeting, May

1962, p. 1.) Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and

that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in place. (Harvey Ex. 3,

p. 1.)

Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor went to see the President to -

give him what he called a "routine briefing" (Taylor Tr. _

General Taylor's memorandum of his briefing of the President similarly makes

no reference to Harvey's contacts with Roselli or the delivery of pills and

guns.

(Memorandum for Record May 7, 1962, by General Taylor.) Taylor testified

that he had never heard of Harvey delivering pills to poison Castro, or of any

assassination attempts. (Taylor Tr.

_, p. 42.)

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3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials

In addition to examining the actual nature of the Mongoose operation (discussed

above at p._, we took considerable testimony from Kennedy Administration offi-

cials. on the question of authority for a Castro assassination in the Mongoose

period. Set out in the section below is the testimony of the Kennedy Administra-

tion officials principally involved in the MOngoose operation and the Special Group

Augmented, all of whom testified the assassination plots were not authorized. These

were McCone, the Director of CIA and a member of the Special Group Augmented;

General Taylor, Chairman of the Special Group Augmented; General Lansdale, Chief of

Operations for Mongoose; Special Group Augmented members Bundy and Gilpatric; Secre-

tary of State Rusk; and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Their testimony focused on

the principal issues raised by Helms, including: (1) whether any authority for a

Castro assassination existed; and (2) whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassi-

nation activity.*

In the succeeding section we discuss the August 10, 1962, meeting where the subject

of a Castro assassination was raised.

a. Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that at no time during his service in the Kennedy Administration

as DCI (1961-1963), did President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy or any member of

the Cabi-

net or White llouse staff discuss with him any Castro assassination plans or operations.

(McCone, p. 44.)

As discussed above in greater detail, McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence

and Helms inmediate superior, testified he did not authorize and was not informed

about, the assassination activity. (McCone, p. 3.)

*In addition, the Committee questioned the Kennedy Administration members as to the

likelihood that an assassination order might have been given to Helms by Robert

Kennedy through a "back channel", outside the normal chain of command; however,

Helms

subsequently appeared and testified that no such order was ever given by

Robert Kennedy. (See p.

above.)

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McCone pointed out that although the Cuban problem was discussed in terms

of "dispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro", these terms were meant to refer

to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba" and not a Castro assassi-

nation. (McCone; P. 44; McCone Ex. 4, memorandum April 14, 1967, to Helms:)

McCone further stated that "it is very hard for me to believe"

that Robert Kennedy would have initiated a Castro assassination activity

without consulting with the Special Group Augmented. (McCone, p. 52).

b.

Testimony of Taylor

Taylor served as Chairman of the Special Group Augmented

during the Mongoose Operation (Taylor, 7/9, P. ): In addition, Taylor

also served as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence

Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962. (Taylor, 7/9, p. ; Bundy, 7/11,

p. 25).

Taylor testified that a Castro assassination plan was

"never" submitted to the Special Group Augmented, either orally or in

writing. (Taylor, p. 41): Taylor further testified that he and the

Special Group Augmented were never told of the passage of the poison

pills to Roselli in April 1962, and that the passage of these pills

without the knowledge of the Special Group Augmented was "entirely,

completely out of /the/ context and character of the way the /Special

Group Augmented/ operated or the way it would accept" that an operation

was properly authorized. (Taylor, p. 43). And laylor testified that

although the Special Group Augmented was "certainly anxious for the

downfall of Castro"

"assassination never came up" in the meetings

and discussions of the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 62).

With respect to whether President

Kennedy or Robert

Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have bypassed the Special Group Aug-

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Castro, Taylor testified that this would have been "entirely con-

tradictory to every method of operation I ever saw on the part of

the President and his brother." (Taylor, p. 45). Taylor stated "the

President and

the Attorney General would never have gone around" the

Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 49).

Although Taylor acknowledged that Robert Kennedy

frequently pushed for more direct action during Mongoose, Taylor

stated that "there was no suggestion fof/ assassination" in these urgings.

(Taylor, p. 67). Taylor testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly

with Lansdale outside Special Group Augmented channels "only for the

purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency" but "never" would

Robert Kennedy have done so on substantive issues:

"Senator Hart of Colorado: But on substantive issues,

he wouldn't, in effect, been dealing behind your back?"

"General Taylor: Never.

Never.

That was not his way."

(Taylor, p. 53). _7/

C .

Testimony of Lansdale

Lansdale testified that he "was very certain" that

he never discussed a Castro assassination with either President Kennedy

# The evidence showed, however, that there were necasions when the

Attorner (eneral dealt with those concered with Mongoose without

consultins Goneral laylor. lor examole

attached to which was a cover nonorandum indicating that other "sensi-

tive work" not in the review was to be dealt with only between the

'resident, the Attorney General, and Lansdale.

The nature of that

work: (which Lansdale testified involved political contacts in the Cuba

exile comnunity) is discussed at p. _

above.

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or Robert Kennedy:

"The Chairman: You do not recall ever having discussed with

the Attorney General a plan or a proposal to assassinate

Fidel Castro?"

"General Lansdale: No. And I am very certain Senator, that

such

a discussion never came up.. neither with the Attorney

General or the President." (Lansdale, p. 18.)*

Lansdale further testified that the plausible deniability concept had no part

in the fact that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy

or the Attorney General. ** Lansdale testified that he "had doubts" that assassina-

tion was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in the past, and dur-

ing work in copying with revolutions and I had considerable doubts as to its utility

and I was trying to be very pragmatic." (Lansdale, p. 31.) When asked if he thought

the President was not aware of efforts to depose Castro and his government by any

means including assassination, Lansdale answered "I am certain he was aware of ef-

forts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am really not one to guess what he knew

of assassinations, because I don't know." (Id., P. 32.)

With regard to the Castro assassination attempts, Lansdale testified that

Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate Castro. (Lansdale,

p. 24.) Lansdale stated:

"I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order

or permission for such a thing and I was giver no infor-

mation at all that such a thine was roing on by people

who I have now learned were involved with it."

(Lansdale, p. 58). _

* Thus, when Lansdale was questioned about the "touchdown plays"

(discussed in detail above at p. ), there was this testimony:

"Senator Baker: Now do you completely rule out the possibility

that the touchdown play had to do with the possible assassination

efforts against Fidel Castro?"

"General Lansdale: Yes ... I never discussed, nor conceived, nor:

received orders about an assassination of Castro with my dealings

with either the Attorney General or the President."

**/ "Senator Baker:

Is that the reason you didn't, because of

the'

principle of deniability?"

"General Lansdale: No, it wasn't.

The subject never came up,

and I had no reason to

bring

it up with him.

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As discussed below in detail at Pp

after the subject

of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting of the

Special Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the

"Iiquidation" of Cuban leaders. However, no such plan was ever prepared and,

as the IG Report concluded, the August 10 meeting was "unrelated to any actual

attempts at assassination." (IG, p. 118).

With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy

might have by-passed the SGA and Lansdale to deal directly with Agency

officials

on a Castro assassination, Lansdale testified:

"I never knew of

a direct line of communication

between the President or the Attorney General and Harvey

apart from me on this...."

During the course of the Committee's investigation

these allegations of

assassination efforts by the U.S. government,

however, General Lansdale spoke with several reporters concerning the

subject of a Castro assassination plan

in 1962. Lansdale's comments lu

the reporters

are dealt with below in connection with the August iu,

1962, meeting of the Special Group.

"Senator Huddleston: You never had any reason to believe that

the Attorney General had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?"

"General Lansdale: I hadn't known about that at all, no...."

"Senator Huddleston:

...You have no reason to believe that he

might have broached (a Castro assassination) with the Attorney

General?"

"General Lansdale: I wouldn't know that -- I certainly didn't

know it."

"Senator Huddleston: You had no reason to believe, that there

was any kind of activity going on in relatión to Cuba outside

of what you were proposing or what was coming before the Special

Group?"

"General Lansdale: No, I was supposed to know it all, and I

had no indication that I did not know it all (except for one

operation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations)."

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d. Testimony of Bundy

• Bundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant

for National Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Administration.

(Bundy, p. 2). In addition, Bundy participated in the planning that

led to the creation of Operation Mongoose and was a member of the .

Special Group Aupmented. (Bundy, pp. 34, 87).

Bundy testified that the matter of a Castro assassination

was "mentioned from time to time" over the period 1961-1963 but "never to

me that I can recall by the President." (Bundy, p. 73). Bindy emphasized

that the question canc up "as sonething to tall about rather than to

consider."

(Bundy, p. 73.)

Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no

one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House ... ever gave

any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort

to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54). Bundy testified

that he knew and worked on an intimate basis with both President Kennedy

and Robert Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration, and testi

fied that it was "incredible" that they would have authorized a Castro

TOP SECRET

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assassination, either explicitly or implicitly as a result of pressure

they exerted in the anti-Castro effort:

"The Chairman: Based upon that acquaintarceship, do you

believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred

during that whole period, either one of them would have

authorized the

assassination of Fidel Castro?"

"Mr.

Bundy: I most emphatically do not ... If you have

heard testimony that there was pressure to do something

about Cuba, there was.

There was an effort, both from the

President in his style and from the Attorney General in

his style to keep the government active in looking for

ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you,

as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the

matter most closely as having essentially been inspired

by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to

them, go and kill anyone.

Let me say one other thing about these two men, and

that is that there was something that they really wanted done,

they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one

hand, I would say about their character, their purposes,

and their nature and the way they confronted international

affairs that I find it incredible that they would have

ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassi-

nation of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to every-

thing that I know about their character, they had had such a

decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in

any doubt about it."

(Tr. 98-99).

Bundy was asked "have you any way to explain to the Com-

mittee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he...had no doubts,

that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop

schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?"

Bundy replied: "I have no explanation of that." (Bundy, Pp. 99-100)

Bundy further

testified that despite the extreme sense of

urgency that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro's assassi-

nation was never discussed, and it was "totally inconsistent" with the

policies and actions taken by the President and Robert Kennedy in that

POET

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crisis for them to have authorized a Castro assassination. Bundy, p. 95,

97-93).*

Bundy further stated that he was never told by anyone that assassination

efforts were underway against Castro, that underworld figures were hired by

the CIA in this regard, or that Harvey was engaged in Castro assassination ac-

tivity. (Bundly, p. (3.)

Bundly testified that he heard about the concept of "executive action"

"Some time in the early months of" 1961". (Bundy, 7/11/75, P. 4.) But since

this was presented to him as an untargeted capability only he did not "dis-

courage or dissuade" the person who briefed him on this. (Bundy, p. 1, 7, 10.)

then asked if he had any recollection of any specific covert plans that involved

poisons in conjunction with activities against Cuba, Bundly stated

"I have no recollection of any specific plan. I do

have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection

that I heard the word poison at some point in connec-

tion with a possibility of action in Cuba.

•But that

is as far as I have been able to take it in my own.

memory. (Bundy, p. 42).

Bundy stated further that this recollection relating to poison involved a

proposal that seemed "impractical" because it was going to kill a large group

of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort."

(Bundy, p.42-43).

*/ Bundy stated:

... the most important point I want to make

..Is that

I find the notion that they separately, privately encouraged,

ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally incon--

sistent with what I knew of both of them. And, as an

example, I would cite - and one among very many - the role

played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because

it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called

surgical air strike or any other action that would bring

death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which

was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a

quarantine or a blockade."

(Bundy, p. 98).

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With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy

may

have authorized

assassination outside of Special Group Augmented

-channels; Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur people

to greater effort during Mongoose, "he never took away from the

existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility."

(Bundy, pp. 47-48). Bundy further testified that there existed be-

tween Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor (the Special Group Augmented

Chairman) "a relation of real trust and confidence." In view of this

relation, Bundy stated it was his opinion that Robert Kennedy would

not have by-passed Taylor to develop a "back-channel" relationship

with someone else to assassinate Castro. *(Bundy, p. 87).

e.

Testimony of MacNamara

MacNamara served as Secretary of Defense throughout

the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. In that capacity, he repfe.

sented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special

the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operations

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196

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McNamara stated that. he had no knowledge or infornation of any proposal

for the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President lemely or

Robert Kennedy. (INamara, 7/11/75, P. 1.) He did note that "we were hysteri-

cal about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that there

was pressure from (President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy) to do something about

Castro. But I don't believe we contemplated assassination. He did, however,

contemplate overthrow." (MCNamara, p. 93.)

There occurred during MCNamara's testimony an exchange which is appropriate

to set out in full because of the manner in which it captures the dilemma posed

by the evidence on the question of authority:

"The Chairman. We also have received evidence from

your senior associates that they never participated in

the authorization of an assassination attempt against

Castro nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such

attempts.

We have much testimony establishing the chain of

command where covert action was concerned, and all of

it has been to the effect that the Special Group or

the Special Group Augmented had full charge of covert

operations, and that in that chain of command any proposal

of this character or any other proposal having to do

with covert operations being directed against the

Castro regime, or against Castro personally, were to

be laid before the Special Group Augmented and were not

to be undertaken except with the authority of that

group and at the direction of that group.

Now, at the same time we know from the evidence

that the CIA was in fact

engaged during the period

in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro.

Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma.

Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out of

control, over which no effective direction was being

given in this matter of assassination, or there

was

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some secret channel circumventing the whole structure

of command by which the CIA and certain officials in

the CIA were authorized to proceed with assassination

plots and assassination attempts against Castro..

third and final point that I can think of is that

somehow these officials of the CIA who were so engaged

misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of authority.

Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that we

can find out which of these three points represented what

actually happened. That is the nature, that is the ar

quandary.

Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would

assist us

in finding an answer to this central question?

Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will further your

today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization,

say that the lo

Because I have stated before and I believe

fully under the control-of senior officials-of the govern-

ment, so much so that I feel as a senior official of the

government I must assume responsibility for the actions

of the two, putting assassination aside just for the

moment.

But I know of no major action taken by CIA during

the time I was in the government that was not properly

authorized by

senior officials. And when I say that I

want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight we

authorized actions that were contrary to the interest of the

Republic but I don't want it on the record that the CIA

was uncontrolled, was operating with its own authority

and we can be absolved of responsibility for what CIA

did, again with exception of assassination, again which

I say I never heard of.

The second point you say that you have, you know that

CIA was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination.

I think to use your words.

I don't know that.

I accept

the fact that you do and

that you have information I was

not aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I just

can't understand how it could have happened and I don't

accept the third point, that they operated on the basis

of minunderstanding, because it seems to me that the

McCone position that he was opposed to it, hits, clear

recollection and his written memo of 1967 that

Alawas strongly

opposed to it, his statement that Murrow opposed

fall should

eliminate any point of misunderstanding. So

rankly can't

reconcile. (TR. 38-41)

McNamara further stated that "I find it almost inconceivable

assassination attempts were carried on during the konnedy Administr

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days without the senior members know it, and I understand the contradiction that

this carries with respect to the face.' (McNamara, P. 4.) He

further emphasized

that for the President or Robert Kennedy to have approved a Castro assassination

was "totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men." (McNamara

p. 90.)

f. Testimony of Gilpatric

Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Admini:

stration. (Gilpatric, P. 5; Gilpatric Ex. 1, P. 5.) In that capacity, Gilpatric

represented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group and the

Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose operation. (Gilpatric, p. 5.)

Gilpatric testified that he understood the mandate of

the Special Group

during Mongoose was not to kill Castro, but to "so under-

mine,

so disrupt

the Cuban system under Castro that it could not be

effective. "* (Gilpatric, p. 28). Gilpatric emphasized that "it was the

system we had to deal with" and words such as "get rid of Castro" were

said "in

the context of the system, of the ....

gove gamen;

she had installed

and was presiding over, but of which /Castro/ was only

(Gil-

patric, p. 29) .

* Initially in his first appearances before the Committee Mr. Gilpatric

was unable to recall any. of the events or characters involved in Operation

Mongoose.

He failed to recall that General Lansdale was the Chief of

Operations for the project, or Lansdale's involvement in the Special

Group Augmented even though Gilpatric recommended Lansdale for pro-

motion to Brigadier General.

Gilpatric testified that the lapse of time,

approximately fifteen years, had impaired his memory on these events.

(Gilpatric, pp. 6-9.) (Insert possible proposed additional language by

Smothers.

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Gilpatric said that he knew of no express restriction

that would have barred

the killing of Castro. But Gilpatic testified that

he understood "There were limits on the use of power" and that these pre-

•cluded the use of

assassination. (Gilpatric, p. 31). Thus, while Gil-

patric said that it was "perfectly possible" that one might reasonably

have inferred assassination was authorized, nevertheless, the limits on

action

set down by the Special Group Augmented would have

required that specific efforts be made by one receiving general instructions

to clarify whether those instructions authorized assassination.$ He added

that "within our charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits

military invasion." (Id. p. 45). In this context of the ilongpose

charter, Gilpatric, when asked whether the "killing of Castro by a para-

military group (would) have been within bounds." he responded, "I know of

no restriction that would have barred it." (Id.) In response to a ques-

tion as to whether there was any concern for the limits on the activities

of personnel involved in these raids and infiltration efforts, Gilpatric

said: "No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had,

if we assume he was reflecting the President's views on it, Iwas that the

steps taken by the CIA up to that point, Land/ their plans were too petty,

were too minor, they weren't massive enough, they weren't going to be ef-

fective enough." (Id., p. 47.) However; as discussed above at p._

on March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented had agreed, with respect to

"action-type" agents, that it "must keep its hand tigh

on these agents'

activities, and although once such agents were inside Cuba, they could not

be "effectively controlled," the Group would make "every effort...tö attempt

such control."

* In Gilpatric's testimony, there was the following exchange:

"Senator Huddleston:...It's on the basis of these words that

everybody admits were used, like replace or get rid of, on

the basis of these kinds of conversation alone that /Helms/

was firmly convinced and that apparently went right down

through the whole rank of command, firmly convinced that he

had the authority to move against

the life of a head of state.

(Footnote continued on next page.)

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Gilpatric testified that "it was not unusual" for Presi-

dent Kennedy and Robert Kennedy to deal directly with people at various

levels in

the Executive Branch. (Gilpatric, p. 58). With respect to Mon-

goose, Cilpatric said that Robert Kennedy was the "moving spirit" (Gil-

patric, p. 11).

But Gilpatric stated that Robert Kennedy's role was "min-

cipally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking.". (Gilpatric, p. 47). Thus,

although Robert Kennedy frequently complained that the plans of the CIA and

Mongoose weren't "massive enough" and that "we should get in there and

do more," Gilpatric pointed out that Robert Kennedy was not making specific -

proposals in these urgings, and the result he desired was a general one

"to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness," rather than any specific measure...

(Gilpatric, p. 47) •

Testimony of Rusk

Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State throughout the

Kennedy Administration.

Rusk participated in a number of Special Group

Augmented meetings during

the Mongoose operation. (Rusk, p. →.

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

this disturbs me, and I don't know whether our councils of govern-

ment operate that way in all areas or not, but if they do then it seems

to me it would raise a very serious

question as to whether or not the

troops are getting the right orders."

"Mr dilpatric...I thought there were limits on the use of power and

that was one of them."

"Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that

some,

body make a specific effort to make sure he understood preciselyuratr

they were talking about, would that be your interpretation?"

"Mr. Gilpatric. It would." . (Gilpatric, p. 31).

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Rusk testified that he had never been informed of any

Castro assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of any

such activity. (Rusk, p. 52).

believe"

Rusk further testified that he found it "very hard to

that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy would have, in the course

of urging action against Castro, sanctioned the use of any measure against

Castro.*/

Rusk said that, while it was "possible" that a person, in good

faith, might have thought

specific courses of action were authorized from

the emphasis given to taking action against Castro, nevertheless Rusk testi-

fied that with respect to a Castro assassintion,

"It would have been an abuse of the President and the

Attorney General if somebody had thought they were

getting that without confirming that this was, in fact,

an official, firm policy decision. (Rusk, Pp. 98-99).

With respect to whether President Kennedy or

Robert

Kennedy might have communicated directly with Helms or Harvey on a Castro

assassination effort, Rusk testified that, based on his experience and the

manner in which foreign affairs matters. were handled, I don't see how it could

have happened." (Rusk, p. 99). **/

*/ "Senator Huddleston.. (Do) your contacts with Robert Kennedy or Presi

dent Kennedy, indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extent

about Cuba and Mongoose progress that in a conversation with someone

urging them to get off their rear-end

and get something done that they

might convey the message that they meant anything, go to any length to

do something about the Castro regime?

"Mr. Rusk.. I find it very hard to believe that Robert Kennedy standing

alone, or particularly Robert kennedy alleging to speak fortresident

Kennedy, would have gone down that trail...

**/"Senator Mondale...We asked General Taylor yesterday whether he) thought

something of informal, subterranean, whatever kinds of communications

from the highest level to Helms would have been possible without his

(Footnote continued on following page.)

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h.

Testimony of Sorensen

por

Sorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy during

the entire Kennedy Administration.

Sorensen was a member of the National Security

Council Executive Committee that dealt with the Missile Crisis, although he

was not involved with Mongoose.

Sorensen testified that in his daily personal meetings with the

President and at all the National Security Council meetings he

attended, there

"not at any time any mention = much less approval by. him - of any U.S.-

sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders" (Sorensen, p. 4). Based

upon his close contact with President Kennedy, Sorensen stated that it was his

opinion that:

"such an act (as assassination) was totally foreign to his

character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence

for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to

his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy

and his concern for his country's reputation abroad, and

foreign to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but

inevitably counter-productive a precedent committed by a

country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable."

(Sorensen, p. 5):

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

knowledge, and he said he felt that was incredible, he didn't think it

was possible.

Do you think that it would be likely that an informal

order around

channels, say to Helms or to Harvey--

The Chairman. Over a three-year period.

Senator Mondale. Over a three-year period would have been possible

without your being informed?

MI. Rusk. Theoretically, Senator, one would have lo say it is possible.

Senator Mondale.

But based on your experience?

Mr. Rusk.

In terms of practicality, probability and so forth, I don't

see how it could have happened:

You know those things, in these circles we were moving in could not

be limited in that way. You know the echoes would come back."

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F.

The August 10, 1962 Meeting

As indicated above (see p. _:, the question of a Castro assassination

was raised

at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on August 10, 1962.

Thereafter, on August 13, 1962, Lansdale directed Harvey to include in a

proposed plan for Phase II of Mongoose. a plan for the "liquidation of leaders"

as an option. We took considerable testimony and examined the documents

relating to the August 10 meeting, the nature of the discussion of a Castro

assassination, and Lansdale!

s subsequent request for a contingency plan.

At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony

showed that discussion of a Castro assassination at the Agust 10, 1962 meeting

had

no connection to the assassination activity undertaken by Harvey and

Roselli, or any other Castro assassination plans or efforts. As the CIA

Inspector General found:

"The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised

at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is

unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination.

It did result in

a MONGOOSE action memorandum by

Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning

liquidation of leaders. (IG, p. 118) •

The finding of the Inspector General is supported both by the chrono-

logy of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of Harvey. The

chronology shows that it was three months prior to the August 10, 1962 meet-

ing that Harvey gave

Roselli the poison pills for use against Castro, and

that shortly thereafter (and well before August 10, 1962) Harvey was informed

that the pills were inside Cuba.

(see p.

above).

Moreover, after the

August 10, 1962 meeting there was no Castro assassination activity during

the remainder of 1962. (see p. _

_ above).

In addition, Harvey.

(who attended the August 10, 1962 meeting and

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recalled that the question of a Castro assassination was raised) declared

that the discussion was

not related to his assassination activity with Ro-

selli. (Harvey, 7/11, pP. 48-50). Harvey further testified that he did not

view the August 10, 1962, discussion of a Castro assassination as authoriza-

tion

for the Roselli operation because "the authority,

as I understood it,

for this particular operation went back long before the formation" of the

Special Group Augmented. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 49).

1. The Contemporaneous Documents

a. Lansdale's August 13, 1962 Memorandum

Following the August 10, 1962 meeting, Lansdale sent a memorandum on

August 13, 1962, to Harvey and the other members of Lansdale's interagency

working group.f/ (Lansdale Ex. 15, Memorandum from Lansdale, August 13, 1962) .

The Memorandum began by stating:. "In compliance with the desires and guidance

expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will

produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission." (Lansdale

• Ex. 15, p. 1).

Lansdale further set out his concept of what was required: "I be-

lieve the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of

implementing activities. The list of

activities will be under the heading

of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and

Military." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1) •

* In addition to Harvey, copies of Lansdale's August 13, 1962, memorandum were

sent to Robert Hurwitch (State Dept), Gen. Benjantin Harris (Defense Dept) and

Don Wilson (U.S. Information Agency). (Lansdale Ex. 15.)

In his testimony, Gen Harris identified a document drafted by the Mongoose Hork-

ing Group in the

Defense Dept shortly before the August 10 meeting. The document

listed a number of steps that could be taken in the event of an intensified Mon-

gossa sinate that might his have . St mop itery intervent ox. 4

One such step was

(Harris Ex. 4.) Gen. Harris

stated that this was "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning...

it's one of the things you look at.

(Harris, p. 37.) There was no evidence that

this document was distributed outside the Defense Dept's Mongoose working group.

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Lansdale's memorandum then assigned

to Harvey papers on the following

subjects by the means of the following passage, which contained a deleted

phrase:

"Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, [words dileted/,

Economic,

(sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary."

(Lansdale,.

Ex. 15, p. 1).

According to

a memorandum by Harvey to Helms the following day, August

14, 1962, the words deleted from the above-quoted passage were "including

liquidation of leaders."

(Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum by Harvey, August 4,

1962, to Helms) •

b..

Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum

When Harvey received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote

a memorandum to Helms attaching a copy of Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, and

noting that Harvey had excised the words "including liquidation of leaders."

(Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum, August 14, 1962, from Harvey to Helms). Har-

vey's Memorandum stated:

"The question of assassination, particularly of

Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara

at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in

Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the

obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a

comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub-

ject which has been made a matter of official

record. I took careful notes on the comments at

this meeting on this point, and the Special Group

(Augmented) is not expecting any written comments

or study on this. point. (Lansdale Ex. 16).

Harvey's memorandum further stated that, on receipt of Lansdale's

memorandum, Harvey. had called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inad-

missibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such

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a document," and that the CIA "would write no document pertaining to this

and would participate in no open meeting discussing it."

(Lansdale Ex. 16,

p. 1 =

c .

The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting

The minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to the sub-

ject of a Castro

assassination. (Memorandum for Record, Special Group Aug

mented Meeting, August 10, 1962, by Parrott, hereafter referred to as

the

"August 10 Minutes"). Parrott, the author of the August 10 Minutes, testi-

fied that he did not recall a discussion of assassination at that meeting,

but the fact that the minutes do not reflect such a discussion is not an

indication that the matter did not come up. (Parrott, P. 34). Parrott

pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a verbatim transcript

of everything that was said," since the purpose of his minutes was "to

interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to use' them as

a useful action document." (Parrott, 34-35). Parrott testified:

"we had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962

meeting)...all of them well informed, all of

them highly articulate.

This meeting, as I recall, went on for several

hours...Now I'm sure that particularly in a

group like this that there were a great many

proposals made that were just shot down

immediately."

(Parrott, p. 34-35) .

Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals that were

- quickly rejected

at the August 10 meeting. (Parrott, p. 35). Parrott

stated that, although he had no recollection of a discussion of Castro's

assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from

the related

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documents (the Lansdale and Harvey Memoranda of August 13 and 14) that the

subject was raised

but "it never got off the ground....Therefore, I did not

record it." (Parrott, p. 35).

The documents and testimony of Parrott suggest several possible in-

ferences with respect to the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination

at the August 10 meeting. First, as indicated by the Lansdale and Harvey

memorandum, it is possible that a contingency plan was requested but that it

decided not to

make

this "a matter of official record." (Lansdale

Ex. 16, p. 1). However, if it had been decided to commission a written

contingency plan, as Lansdale requested Harvey prepare, it is difficult to

see how this request could have been reconciled with a decision to make to

written

record:

Second, it is possible that, as Parrott's testimony indicated, the

subject was raised but quickly rejected. This inference is apparently con-

sistent with the fact that the subject did not appear in Parrott's

minutes,

and perhaps, although less so, with Harvey's August 14 Memorandum. Harvey's

Memorandum states that the Special Group Augmented "is not expecting any

written comments or study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1).

Before turning to the testimony on these questions, we discuss the

context of the August 10 discussion of a Castro assassination as reflected

in the minutes of the August 10 Meeting.

d.. The August 10 Meeting

The August 10 Meeting was held to decide upon a further course of action

to succeed the intelligence collection phase of Mongoose which was scheduled

to conclude in August.

McCone, p. 34). As a policy meeting, there were in

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attendance a larger

number of officials

than usually participated in Special

Group Augmented meetings. The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of State

Rusk (and held in his office), and attended by a total of 15 officials,

including the principals of the agencies taking part in Mongoose, i.e.,

Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and USIA Director

MurIOW :

At the August 10 meeting, General Lansdale proposed that a "stepped-up

Course

B" be adopted for Mongoose, (August 10 Minutes, p. _). This plan

involved operations to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychologi-

cal, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Cömmunist regime, without

overt employment of U.S. military." (Memorandum for.

Special Group Augmented,

August 8, 1962, p. 1) .

However, the Special Group Augmented decided against consideration of

the "stepped-up Course B". In the discussion of Lansdale's Course B proposal,

Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between

Castro and old-line Communists". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). In addition,

McNamara questioned

whether the practice of building up agents in Cuba would

not lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion".

(August 10 Minutes, p. 2) (A remark which seems inconsistent with McNamara

at the same Meeting raising the question of assassination in any sense of

advocacy). The Minutes

state that McNamara's concern "led to the suggestion

by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective

Lof Mongoose/ from

one of overthrowing the Castro regime" to one of causing

its

failure. (August 10 Minutes, p. 2) •

Hence, in lieu of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course B", the Special Group

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Augmented chose a plan advanced by McCone that

assumed Castro's continuance

in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from

"old-line Communists":* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action"

of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 meeting was stated as follows:

"The principal members of the Special Group

felt,

after some discussion, that the CIA variant should

be developed further for consideration at next Thurs

day's meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked

to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize

measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split."

(August Memorandum, p. 2) .

* **

"Action to be taken:"

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan,

in accordance with the above-summarized discussion.

This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15."

(August 10 Memorandum, p. 3) .

It was therefore in this context that Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum

to Harvey stated that "in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed

in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an

outline of an alternate Course B. "Indeed, pursuant-to the August 10 decision

to adopt

McCone's proposal

for a more

limited plan that

assumed Castro's

continuation

in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled

"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis."

(Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1) .

The August 10 Minutes show that McCone pointed out that the stepped-up

Course B "will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary

type blood bath if unsupported".

(August 10 Minutes, P. 2). McCone

"emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the

U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions rhe

including the eventual use of military force". (August 10 Minutes).

August 10 Minutes further stated that, in McCone's view, the CIA variant

"would

avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising".

(August 10 Minutes, p. 2) .

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In view of the issues raised by these documents we took testimony

from the principal participants in that meeting. In particular, we discuss

below, the testimony as

to whether Lansdale's request for an assassination

plan reflected the desire of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decision

to proceed with a plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuance

in power.

2. The Testimony.

As set out below, Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recall the question of

a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.* We discuss

that testimony, first with respect to the August 10 meeting itself, and,

second, with regard to the action that followed that meeting.

Testimony as to the August 10 Meetine

(1) Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that the question of a "liquidation" or removal of

Castro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the context

of "exploring

the alternatives that were

available" for the next phase of

Mongoose. (McCone, p. 33). McCone testified that he did not recall who

made. this suggestion, but that he and Mr. Murrow took "strong exception"

to the suggestion. A memorandum of McCone's recollection of the August 10

Meeting, written in 1967, 21/states:

*/ Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gilpatric) did not recall

the August 10 discussion.

**/ On April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA, he dictated a memorandum

of his recollection regarding the August 10, 1962 meeting.

The memoran-

dum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack

Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination

(Continued on the following page.)

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"I took immediate exception to this suggestion,

stating that the subject was completely out of

bounds as far as the USG (U.S. Government)

and

CIA were concerned and the idea should not be

discussed nor should it appear in any papers,

•as the USG could not consider such actions on

moral or ethical

grounds."

(McCone Ex. 4).

McCone testified that there was no decision at the August 10 meeting

that assassination should not be part of any program, but that "the subject

was just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, p..

McCone's 1967

memorandum stated that

"At no time did the suggestion receive serious

consideration by the Special Group (Augmented)

nor by any individual responsible for policy."

(McCone, Ex. 4).

• (2) Testimony of Harvey

Harvey's testimony that the August 10 discussion was unrelated to any

actual Castro assassination

activity is discussed above (see p._.

With

respect to that discussion itself, Harvey testified that it was his recollection

that the question of a Castro assassination was raised by Secretary McNamara.

(Harvey, p. 30). Harvey said it was his impression that McNamara raised the

question as one of "shouldn't we consider the elimination or assassination"

of Castro. (Harvey, p. 30) •

With respect to the reaction of the Special Group Augmented to this

(Footnote continued from the previous page.)

attempts, implicating President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. After talking

with Anderson on the

telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dic-

tated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated that at one of several

Mongoose

meetings on August 8, 9 or 10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being

made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro."

(McCone, Ex. 4, P. 1) .

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suggestion, Harvey testified:

"I think

the consensus of the Group was to sweep

that particular proposal or suggestion or question

of consideration off the record and under the rug

as rapidly as possible.

There was no extensive

discussion of it, no discussion, no back and forth

as the

whys and wherefores and possibilities and

so on."

(Harvey, p. 30) .

(3) Testimony of Coodwin

Goodwin testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty"

that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10

meeting-=/

Goodwin testified that "I am unable to say with any certainty who it

was" who raised the subject of a Castro

assassination at the August 10

meeting. (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8) **/

* In a staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin

recalled

the date

of the meeting at which a Castro assassination was raised as falling in

early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. (Memorandum of Staff Interview with

Goodwin, May 27, 1975, p. 2). After reviewing the Minutes of the August

10, 1962 meeting and the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August 13 and

14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had "misplaced the date of

the meeting in my own memory."

(Goodwin, 7/18, p. 7). In placing the

incident on August 10, 1962, Goodwin stated

"Now, of course, you know, it may not be. That's the best

recollecti

recollection I now have.

It's a little better than the earlier

one, but it's not certain." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8).

**/In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted as stating that

at one of the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba it was McNamara

who "said that Castro's assassination was the only productive way of deal-

ing with Cuba." (Branch and Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers,

July, 1975, p. 61): In his testimony on July 18, 1975, Goodwin stated:

"that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained further:

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(4) Testimony of McNamara

McNamara testified that,

although he had no recollection of the question

of a Castro assassination being raised at the August 10 meeting, he did

express opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke with

McCone several days after the August 10 meeting. (McNamara, p. 7,8) .

McNamara's testimony with respect to his conversation with McCone'is dis-

cussed below with the testimony as to actions after the August 10 meeting.

b. Testimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting

(1) Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that he called McNamara after he received Lansdale's

August 13 Memorandum and,

"insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn

because no decision was made on this subject, and

since no decision was made, then Lansdale was

quite out of order in tasking the Central In-

telligence Agency to consider the matter."*/

(Footnote continued from the previous page.)

"I didn't tell (the author of the magazine article)

that it was definitely McNamara, that very possibly it

was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, and

I said it very well could have been McNamara.

(Goodwin, 7/18, p. 33).

If Goodwin's recollection was as uncertain as he swore it was in his

testimony, it is difficult to understand how he could have spoken in the terms

he testified he did to the author of the magazine article, particularly in

view of Goodwin's statement that "it's not a light matter to perhaps destroy

a man's career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence

that he might have said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your

own mind /and/ I do not have that."

(Goodwin, pp. 34-35).

*/ McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated:

"Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara

personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily

agreed. I did this. because Operation Mongoose--an interdepartmental

affair-was under the operational control of (the Defense Depart-

ment) ... (McCone Ex. 4).

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McCone also testified that McNamara agreed that the Lansdale Memorandum

should

be withdrawn for the same reason expressed by McCone, i.e. because the

topic of a Castro assassination had not been given consideration by the Special

Group Augmented. (McCone, P. 39) .

(2) Testimony of Harvey

As discussed

above (see p..

Harvey's Memorandum of August 14, 1962

states that upon

receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, Harvey demanded

that Lansdale excise the words referring to "liquidation of leaders." Har-

vey's Memorandum further stated that "the Special Group (Augmented) is not

expecting any written

comments or study on this point." This latter passage

raises the issue whether Harvey meant to state that the Special Group Aug-

mented

authorized a Castro

assassination plan or activity but that no written

record should be made. In his testimony, Harvey clarified this point by

stating that the Special Group did not express a desire to proceed with the

• suggestion

of a. Castro assassination:

"Senator Schweiker:...was it understood in an

unwritten way that (assassination) was to pro-

ceed?"

"Mr. Harvey: Not to my knowledge, no....:

there was any unwritten understanding on

the part of the members of the Special Group

concerning this, other than what was said at the

meeting, I

do not know of it..."

(Harvey, PP. 30-31).

Harvey further testified that shortly after the August 10 meeting,

McCone told Harvey that he had called McNamara to state that

assassiantion

should not be discussed and that he had told McNamara that if he was involved

in such matters, he might be excommunicated from his church.

(Harvey, p. 25).

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(3)

Testimony of McNamara

McNamara testified that he did not recall any discussion of a Castro

assassination at the August 10 meeting, but that he did express opposition

co any

assasssination attempt when McCone telephone him after Lansdale's

August 13 memorandum was brought to McCone's attention.

(McNamara, P. 7,8).

McNamara stated that

"I agreed with Mr. McCone that no such planning

should be undertaken."

(McNamara, P. 8).

McNamara stated further that

"I have no knowledge or information about any other

plans or preparations for a Castro assassination."

(McNamara, p.. 7).

(4) Testimony of Elder

Elder, a career CIA officer, served as McCone's Executive Assistant

from May 1962 until McCone's departure from the Agency in April 1965. Elder

testified that he was

present when McCone telephone McNamara after the August

10 meeting. Elder stated that McCone told McNamara

"the subject you just brought up, I think it is highly

improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It

is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is

not proper for us to discuss, and I intend to have it

expunged from the record."

(Elder, p. 23).

Elder testified that this was the essence of the conversation but that he

remembered "several exact phrases, like 'would not be condoned' and 'im-

proper'". (Elder, PP. 23, 24).*/

*/ Elder, who stated he heard both McCone and McNamara's pact of the tele-

phone conversation via

a speaker phone, said that McNamara "just more

or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without comment or rejoinder."

(Elder, p. 24) .

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When Harvey later received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, McCone

spoke to Harvey in Elder's presence, and "McCone made his views quite clear

in the same language and

tone... that he used with Mr. McNamara." (Elder,

p. 25).

Elder testified that Harvey did not tell McCone that Harvey was

engage in the Castro assassination effort at that time. (Elder, p. 25).

Elder

also described a meeting he had with Helms in Elder's'öffice

shortly after the August 10 meeting to convey to Helms McCone's views re-

garding the subject of assassinations. Elder stated:

"I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed

his feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey that

assassination could not be condoned and would not be

approved.

Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's

statement that it would be unthinkable to record

in writing any consideration of assassination

because it left the impression that the subject

had received serious consideration by governmen-

tal policymakers, which it; had not. Mr. Helms

responded,

'I understand.'

The point is that

I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr.

McCone's opposition to assasination. I know that Mr.

Helms could not have been under any misapprehension

about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation."

(Elder Affidavit, 81_175, P. →.

(5) Testimony of Lansdale

Lansdale testified that he recalled that the subject of Castro's

assassination surfaced at the August 10 meeting, but that the "consensus was

..:hell no

on this

and there was a very violent reaction." (Lansdale, p.

20).

With respect to why

he asked Harvey on August 13 for a Castro assasination

plan, Lansdale testified:

"Senator Baker: Why did you, three days later

if they all said, hell no, Lso/ ahead with it?"

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"General Lansdale:.. the meeting at which they

said that was still on a development of my original

task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a

regime.

At the same time, we were getting intelligence

accumulating very quickly of something very different

taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which was

the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the

possibilities of Soviet missiles being placed there...

At that time, I thought it would be a possibility

someplace down the road in which there would be some

possible need to take action such as Lassassination/."*/

(Lansdale, p. 21) •

Lansdale stated that he had only one brief conversation with Harvey

after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it...

see about

developing some plans" but. that was the last Lansdale ever heard

of the matter. (Lansdale, P. 124). Lansdale stated that with the develop-

ment of the Missile Crisis, Mongoose "was being rapidly shifted out of con-

sideration" and thus "I wasn't pressing

for answers...

it was

very obvious that another situation was developing that would be handled

quite differently in Cuba." (Lansdale, P. 124).

Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that a discussion of a

Castro assassination plan or proposal never came up in his discussions with

Robert Kennedy or with President Kennedy, and that he had originated the

request to Harvey for plan without discussing the matter with anyone:

HH 50955

"Q:...Why, if it is true that assassination idea

was turned down on August 10, you sent out your

memo of August 13?"

"General Lansdale:...I don't recall that thoroughly,

I don't remember the reasons why I would."

"Q: Is it your testimony. that the August 10 meeting

turned down assassinations as a subject to look into,

and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to 100k

into it?"

"General Lansdale: I guess it is, yes. The way you

put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it.

I don't know." (Lansdale, pp. 123-124.

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"Senator Baker:...did you originate this idea of

laying on the CIA a requirement to report on the

feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did

someone else suggest that?"

"General Lansdale: I did, as far as I recall."

"Senator Baker: Who did you discuss it with before

you laid on that requirement?"

"General Lansdale: I don't believe I discussed it with

anyone."

"Senator Baker: Only with Harvey?"

"General Lansdale: Only with Harvey."

"Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?"

"General Lansdale: I might have, and I don't believe

that I did. I think it was just with Harvey."

"Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Robert

Kennedy?"

"General Lansdale: No, not that I recall."

"Senator Baker: With the President?"

"General Lansdale: No."

(Lansdale, pp. 19-20).

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C.

Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on

the August 10 Meeting

During the Committee's Investigation, news reports concerning the

August 10 meeting and Lansdale's request for a Castro assassination plan

appeared in the press.

Two of these reports were based on statements made

by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and Jeremiah O'Leary

of the Washington Star-News. In view of the apparent conflict between

Lansdale's testimony to the Committee and what Lansdale was reported to have

said to Martin and O'Leary, the Committee Invited these reporters to testify

as to Lansdale's statements to them. Martin testified under a subpoena

issued by the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21. O'Leary appeared

voluntarily but stated the policy of his newspaper with regard to disclosing

news sources precluded him from any comment going beyond that contained in

a prepared

statement he read under oath. O'Leary's statement declared that

his news report "represents accurately my understanding of the relevant in-

• formation I obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, page 5).

We discuss below Martin's testimony and the news reports as they compare

to Lansdale's testimony.

(1) The Martin News Report

Martin's news report stated, in its lead paragraph:

"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale

said Friday that acting on orders from

President John F. Kennedy delivered

through an intermediary, he developed

plans for removing Cuban Premier Fidel

Castro by any means including assassination."

(Ex. 2 to Martin Affidavit)

Martin testified that this lead paragraph was accurate and that it was

a conclusion which he drew based upon the totality of his interview on

May 30, 1975 with Lansdale. (Martin, pp. 19-20) In contrast, Lansdale

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testified that, after reading Martin's report in the press, he told Martin

"your first

sentence is

not only completely untrue, but there is not a

single thing In your story that says it 1s true." (Lansdale, p. 65)

As discussed

above (see p. _), Lansdale testified that on his own initiative

he had originated. the request to Harvey without discussing the matter with

anyone and that a Castro assassination plan never came up in his discussions

with Robert Kennedy (or with President Kennedy) .

In view of Martin's testimony that the lead paragraph of his report

was a conclusion based on the totality of his interview with Lansdale, it

should be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that

Lansdale was ordered by President Kennedy Or Robert Kennedy to develop

plans for a Castro assassination. The report quotes Lansdale as stating

'"I was working for the highest authority in the land... the President"

and

goes on to state that Lansdale said he did not deal directly with

the President but worked through" an intermediary more intimate to the

President than Bundy.*/ It can be' noted that the phrases "working for"

and "working through"

are not the same as the lead paragraph's conclusion

that Lansdale was "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination plan.

In addition, subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lansdale

said the decision to include assassination in his planning was Lansdale's

own, as

he testified it was to the Committee. Thus, the lartin report states

Lansdale said that assassination was "one of the means he /Lansdale]

considered," that it was Lansdale's belief that assassination would not have

been "incompatible" with his assignment, and that Lansdale said "I just wanted

to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities."

*/

NH 50955

The Martin report

states that Lansdale refused to provide this

intermediary's name for the record. In respecting the confidentiality

of news sources, the Committee didnot seek to ask Martin what was said

off the record to him in the course of his newsrathering efforts. (Martin,

p.

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Moreover, in his

testimony as to the conversation with Lansdale on

May 30, 1975 that was the basis for his report, Martin said he did not

specifically ask Lansdale if he had acted on orders with regard to an

assassination plan, nor did Lansdale say he acted on orders.

Rather,

Martin asked Lansdale "who were you working for?"*

When Martin did

specifically ask Lansdale in a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975

if he had acted on orders, Martin testified that Lansdale stated that

he had not.

In this

subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin

said he asked Lansdale specifically, "were you ever ordered by President

Kennedy or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?"

(Martin, p. 21). Martin testified that Laasdale replied "no" and that

his orders were "very broad." (Martin, p. 21). Martin further testified

that in this June 4 conversation he

asked Lansdale whether "any assassination

planning you did was done on your own initiative," and that Lansdale replied

"yes." (Martin, p. 21). Martin stated that it was his belief that his

June 4 conversation was at variance with Lansdale's statements to him

on May 30, 1975. (Martin, p. 21). It may also be the case, based on

Martin's testimony as to the differences between the questions he posed to

Lansdale on May 30 and on June 4, 1975, that he and Lansdale may have

misunderstood each other.

* Martin testified that his conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975

involved two subjects: 1) "what were you (Lansdale) doing in August 1962"

(Martin, p. 16), and 2) "who were you working for." (Martin, p. 17).

Martin stated that in the first portion of the conversation dealing with

Lansdale's activities in August 1962, Lansdale stated, according to

Martin, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities" and

that this included "assassination" as well as other means of disposing

of Castro.

As to the second portion of the conversation, Martin stated

he asked Lansdale "who were you working for" and Lansdale replied "on that

project I was working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin, p. 18).

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(2) The O'Leary Report

O'Leary's news report read as follows

in its lead paragraphs:

"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named

Robert F. Kennedy as the administration official

who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project

to work out all

feasible plans for "getting rid

of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

"Lansdale, in an interview with the Washington

Star, never used the word "assassination"

and

said it was not used by Kennedy, then the attor-

ney general.

But he said there could be no doubt that "the

project for disposing of Castro envisioned the

whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the

Cuban

leader to assassinating him."

O'Leary's report also stated that "Lansdale said he was contacted

by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962...."

In his appearance before the

Committee, O'Leary pointed out that this reference to the mid-summer of

1962 modified the reference in the lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary,

p. 13).

In his testimony, Lansdale said he submitted a statement to the

Washington

Star

stating that this

report was "a distortion of my

remarks." (Lansdale, p.61). Lansdale testified that he

stated to

the Washington Star

that "perhaps someplace in the planning there

is something about what to do with a leader who would threaten the

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lives of millions of Americans With Soviet Missiles7...but I can

say I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from

Robert Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally."

(Lansdale, pp.61-62). Lansdale further testified that he told

O'Leary that he did take orders from Robert Kennedy, but made clear

that "it was on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, p.62).

Lansdale testified

as

follows concerning his statement to the Star

following the O'Leary report:

"After the story appeared, the... Washington Star

asked me what wide-ranging things were you talking

about?

"I said there were economic matters and military

natters and military things and they were very

wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary

was thinking of was assassination.

thinking of far wider than that." (Lansdale, pp.62-63)

O'Leary's report makes clear that Lansdale did not state that

Robert Kennedy instructed Lansdale to develop an assassination

plan. The O'Leary report states:

"Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's

instructions to him did not include the word

"assassination."

He said the attorney general,

as best he could recall, spoke in more general

terms of exploring all feasible means and

practicalities of doing something "to get rid

of" Castro.

In view of the above, it appears that although he may have been

imprecise in his conversations with O'Leary and Martin, Lansdale never-

theless did not tell them that he was ordered to develop an assassination

plan by Robert Kennedy or the President.

As discussed above (see"p.".

Lansdale testified that he never discussed a Castro assassination with

President Kennedy or with Robert Kennedy. Lansdale's reported

statements

that he was ordered to plan to "get rid of Castro by all l'easible means"

is also consistent with

Lansdale's testimony, as well as that of the other

witnesses, with respect to the objective of the Mongoose operation. As

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discussed above in section

however, it was the testimony of all

witnesses

except Helms that such

statements did not include assassination.

Lansdale's statements to O'Leary and Martin appear consistent with his

sworn testimony that it was his own idea to request an assassination plan

from Harvey and that he did not discuss this idea with anyone except Harvey.

(see p.

above). With respect to this latter point, however, it is

& fact that Lansdale's request for an assassination plan followed almost

immediately after the August 10 meeting, where the question of a Castro

assassination was raised. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that

the raising of the question of

a Castro assassination at the August 10

meeting prompted Lansdale to request an assassination plan (although it

was the finding of the IG Report as well as the testimony of Harvey that

the August 10 meeting had no relation to the question of authorization for

the 1962 assassination plot).

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Approved by Drafting Subcommittee on September 8, 1975

(Material In brackets on p. 1 and p. 14. added to incor-

porate Helms testimony on 9/12/75)

RIOSO

Il. The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assassination Plot

1.

The 1963 Assassination Plot

This section discusses the specific question of authorization above

OP SECRE

the Agency

for the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH on November 22, 1963, and reviews

certain policies of the Kennedy Administration during 1963 which are relevant to

that question.*/ (The facts relating to the poison pen plot are set out at pp. -

above) .

2. The Issue of Authority

Much of the testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members dis-

cussed in the preceding section (see pp. _ to ..) is relevant to the question

of authorization for the 1963 assassination activity. Once

again there was no

evidence that anyone above the Agency was informed about or specifically authorized

the plot.

As in

the case of the 1962 assassination plot, however, Helms testified that

he believed the 1903 assassination activity was permissible in view of his

perception of continuing pressure exerted by the Administration to overthrow Castro

Land his perception that there were no limits placed on the means that could be

used to achieve Castro's downfall. (Helms, 9/11/75, pp. 11-13) T

The testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members on the issue

of whether the pressure to overthrow Castro made assassination permissible with-

out a direct order is discussed in detail in the preceding section

and is not re-

peated here.

Before turning to Helms' specific testimony relating to AM/LASH

(Including his view that AM/LAsh was not seen as a potential assassin) we

discuss below the Kennedy Administration Cuba policy in 1963. In

*/The evidence showed that the "science-fiction" devices of an exploding sea

shell and a poison diving suit were abandoned at the laboratory stage within the

"IA and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual use.

dence, the focus in this section is on the activity involving the delivery of the

poison pen to AM/LASH.

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TOP ANORE

general, the 1963 covert action program and pressure was less

intense. than it had been in 1962.

3.

The Kennedy Administration's Policy Towards Cuba in 1963

(a)

Organization

The Mongoose Operation was disbanded following, the Cuban

Missile Crisis. An interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee"

was established within the State Department with responsibility

for developing covert action proposals. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.)

The review and approval function was taken from the Special. Group

Augmented (which passed out of existence) and was placed under

the Special Group, chaired by Bundy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, P: 148.)

U.S. policy towards Cuba in 1963 was also treated in the

National Security Council's Standing Group, the successor to

the Executive Committee which had dealt with the Missile Crisis.

Members of the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy, Mclamara,

McCone,

Bundy and Sorensen.

We discuss below four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's

1963 Cuba policy. These are: (1) the Standing Group's discus-

sion of possible developments in the event of Castro's death;

(2) the Standing Group's discussion of policy options; (3) the

covert action program approved by the Special Group; and (4) the

diplomatic effort to explore the possibility of reestablishing re-

lations

with Castro. The first three of these took place in the

Spring or early Summer of 1963; the fourth aspect -- the effort

to communicate with Castro -- took place at the same time as the

1963 assassination activity.

TOP SECKET

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(b) The Discussion of the Contingency of Castro's Death

→ In

the Spring of 1963,

the Standing. Group discussed con-

tingency planning in the event of Castro's death. The documen-

tary evidence and testimony indicated that Castro's death was

discussed as a contingency which might occur independent of

U.S. action.

The Group found that the possibilities for

favorable developments to the United States

should Castro die

vere "singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of Standing Group.

Meeting, May 28, 1963, p. 1).

The discussion stemmed from a memorandum by Bundy which

discussed "possible new directions" for U.S. Cuban policy. (Bundy

Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1903). The memoran-

dum distinguished between (i) events which might occur indenen-

dently of U.S. action and (ii) steps the U.S. might "initiate"

(Bundy memorandum, p. 2.)

When the Standing, Group discussed the Bundy memorandum,

Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would take

following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shoot-

ing down of a U-2." (Bundy Ex. 6B, Summary Record. of NSC Stand-

ing, Group Meeting, April 23, 1963, p. 2). The downing of a U-L

had been listed in the Bundy memorandum as a subject for contin-

gency planning under the category of steps for which the U.s.

must "await events" as distinguished from "initiate actions".

Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a further stand-

ing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed the subiect of a

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Castro death contingency under a category comprising subjects

not involving U:S. initiatives, e.?., "occurrence of revolt

or repression in the manner of Hungary", attributable inter-

ference by Castro in other countries", and "the reintroduction

of offensive weapons". (Bundy Ex. 6-6, 4/29/63).

After the meeting of April 23, 1963, the Standing Group

assigned to CIA's Office of National Estimates*/ the task of

estimating possible developments if Castro should die. (Bundy

Ex. G-H, Memorandum for Members of the Standing froup, May 2,

1963) .

The resulting paper analyzed the various forces which would

come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, including the

likely behavior of Castro's top aides, Raul Castro and Che

Guevara, as well as possible Soviet reaction. (Bundy Ex. 6-I,

Draft Memorandum by Office of National Estimates titled "Develop-

ments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's

Death", Pp. 2-5, hereafter called the "ONE paper"). The ONE

Paper concluded that "the odds are that upon Castro's death, his

brother Raul of some other figure in the regime would, with soviet

backing and help, take over control". **/

*/The Office of National Estimates is the research division of the

CIA responsible for analyzing foreign intelligence. The office is

not part of the CIA's covert operations organization.

**/The ONE Paper also saw little chance that a government disposed

towards the United States would be able to come to power without ex-

tensive U.S. military support: "Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would

require extensive U.S. help in order to win, and drobably U.S. military

intervention."

(Bundy Ex. 6-I, p. ii) .

--3

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In addition, the ONE Paper warned that the United States

would most likely be blamed if Castro should die by another's

hand. "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the

U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though it

is widely known that Castro has many enemies"

(Bundy Ex. 6-I,

p. 4.)

The ONE Paper also identified a number of possible u.s.

actions in the event of Castro's death, ranging along a spec-

trum that included no U.S. initiatives, action to support a

government in exile, quarantine and blockade, and outright

invasion. (Bundy Ex. 6-I, PD. 7-12.)

On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed the ONE. Paper.

The Standing Group

found that "all of the courses of action

lopen to the U.S. should Castro die] were singularly unpromising"

(Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28,

1963, p. 1) .

Bundy agreed that the Standing Group "certainly posed the

question" in the Spring of 1963 as to what would happen if Castro

died or were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130.) But he testified

that he had no recollection of a Castro assassination being on

the minds of Standing Group members when they discussed this

contingency. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 14.)÷/

*/As indicated above

p.

); Bundy did recall that over the

period 1961 and 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassination was

mentioned from time to time by different individuals"

but said that

he was not aware of "much discussion

in the Spring of 1963

_ on, that

subject"'. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 140.)

1:.

weave kade

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Bundy testified, however, that one reason for getting an

estimate of this kind was to get it on record that we should

not be "fussing" with questions of

assassination and that it

was not a sound policy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, P. 142.)

Bundy further testified that it was not unusual to assess

the implications of a foreign leader's possible death, giving

the cases of Stalin and DeGaulle as examples.. In the case of

Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt to

assess the question of a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was

such a "dominant figure". (Bundy; 7/11/75, P. 145.)

(c) The Standing Group's Discussion of U.S. Policy

Towards Cuba

The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to

assume the desirability of harassment, but recognized there

were few practical measures the U.S. could take that were

likely to achieve Castro's overthrow.

In his April 21, 1963 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives"

Bundy identified three possible new alternatives: (1) forcing

"a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means"

(2) insisting on "major but limited ends"', or (3) moving "in

the direction of a gradual development of some form of accommo-

dation with Castro"

• (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group,

April 21, 1963, p. 3.) These alternatives were discussed at

Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.

TOU

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Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testified

that the "widest possible range of alternatives" were dis-

cussed, but that "assassination was not even on the list".

(Sorensen, 7/21/75, P. 4.) He said that consideration of.

possible options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution

in Cuba by all necessary means" did not encompass assassina-

tion:

"[this could not have included or implied assassina-

tion.

Instead, it expressly referred to. 'the develop-

ment of pressures'

and 'gradual escalation of the con-

frontation in Cuba' to produce an overthrow of the

regime,

including

'a willingness to use military force

to invade Cuba'.

Such a course was obviously not

adopted by the President, and in any event expressed

an approach far different from assassination"

• (Soren-

sen affidavit, 7/25/75, p. 4).*1

The record of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy's

memorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (none

of which involved

assassination) but no conclusions were reached.

On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group met again.

McCone argued

for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented

by sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be

possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting

*/ The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures"

to describe the steps the U.S. was willing to take to "prevent" a di-

rect military threat to the U.S. or to the Western Hemisphere from Cuba.

Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of the

April 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy:

"(this phrasel could not by any stretch of semantics

or logic have included assassination or any other

initiative. It reflected

the purely defensive posture

implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles

and other offensive weapons were placed in Cuba." marr

(Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75, 5p:

4.)

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to overthrow Castro"

• (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group

Meeting, No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) McNamara said that

sabotage would not be "conclusive" and suggested

study of

"economic pressures which could upset Castro." Robert Kennedy

said "the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though

we do not believe our actions would bring him down"

• Id.,

p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the task

"to decide now what actions we would take against Castro,

acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take will

not result in his overthrow". (Id., p. 2.)

(d) The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Pro-

gram Against Cuba

During the first six months of 1963, little, if any,

sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.&/ However, on

June 19, 1963, Following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba

policy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotage

program.*i/ (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, D. 1.)

*/ At an April 3, 1963 meeting, on Cuba, Bundy stated that no

secitate operations were then underway because the Special Group "had

that such activity is not worth the effort expended on

it."

(Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1).

**/ The

sabotage program approved on June 19,

1yos was directed at

"Four major segments of the Cuban economy"

, (1) electric nower: (2)

petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and high-

way transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memoran-

dum for the special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1) Operations under this

program were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban arents from a

U.S. island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort de-

signed to "develop internal resistance elements which could carry out

sabotage." (Id., P.?.)

TOP SECRET

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In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build

toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action

program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a

spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to

significant defections and other byproducts of unrest". (Id.,

p..2.)

After the initial approval, particular intelligence and

sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for.

specific prior authorization. On October 3, 1963, the Special

Group approved nine operations in Cuba, including several

sabotage operations. And on October 24, 1963, thirteen major

sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the

period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabo-

tage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar

mill. (Memorandum, July 11, 1975; CIA Review Staff to Select

Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba.").

(e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation With

Castro

As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President

Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be

explored. (Bundy Ex: 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4,

1963, p. 3.) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the

Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "gradual de-

velopment of some form of accommodation with Castro" among

policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3) ..

TOP SECRET

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"was Kland

And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed

it would be a "useful endeavor" to explore "various possibili-

ties of establishing channels of communication to Castro".

Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June 6, 1963, p. 2).

In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor

to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with the rank

of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3.) Atwood testified

that during the period of September-November, 1963, he held a

series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations

to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between

Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.)

Atwood testified that at the outset he informed Robert

Kennedy, who told him that the effort "was worth pursuing". (Atwood, p.6) .

Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the White

House and to his superior at the United Nations, Adlai Steven-

son. (Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that

he was told

by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards

an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet

fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting

back into normal". (Atwood, p.7-3 .)

Atwood stated that he believed the only people who knew of

his contacts with the Cubans were the President, Harriman, Steven-

son, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa

Howard. (Howard had initially placed Atwood in contact with the

Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that during a

trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish

se wot be and adan

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As deals

communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard

served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with

the Cubans. (Atwood, pp. 4, 18)).

Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French

journalist, Jean Daniel, to visit the White House prior to

Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p..19.)

(According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel

met with President Kennedy on October 24, 1963. They discussed

the prospects for reestablishing U.S.-Cuba relations and

President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him after

seeing Castro.) */

Atwood's efforts reached their high point ön November 18,

1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's

staff in Cuba. (Atwood, P. 8). Pursuant to White House in-

structions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the

U.S. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than

in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired

to work out an agenda for these talks. (Atwood, DD. 8-9) .

After receiving Atwood's report on this conversation, Bundy told

Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President

Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and

2/ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy:

A Historic Report from Two Capitals,

Lew Republic, December: 14,

Daniel was with Castro when Castro

received the report of President Kennedy's assassiñation.

Daniel,

When Castro Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963) .

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39949/04018

T809)

whether to go or what we should do next'

(Id.: p. 9.)

Four

days later, on November 22, 1963, (the same day AM/LASHI was given

the poison. pen), Jean Daniel was meeting with Castro. On that

same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of

Administrations, Atwood's talks with the Cubans became less fre-

quent and eventually ended in early 1964. (Atwood, p. 10.)

4. Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the

AM/LASH Poison Pen Device

(a) Testimony of Helms

(i) The October 29 Meeting and the Use of Robert

Kennedy's Name Without Obtaining His Approval

As discussed above in detail (see pp.. ), Fitzgerald met

with AM1/LASH on October 29, 1963, in a foreign capital. Fitz-

gerald represented to AM/LASH that he was the personal represen-

tative of Robert Kennedy, and gave AM/LASH assurances of full sup-

port should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.

The IG Report states that, according to Fitzgerald, Helms and

Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH and Helms de-

cided "it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for

Fitzgerald to speak in his name". (IG, pp. 88-89). In his testimony.

Helms stated he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald, but

that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with AM/LASH

with respect to "a change in government" (as opposed to assassination)

and that this made it unnecessary to obtain Robert Kennedy's approval.*i

"I felt

so sure that if I went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have

*/The following, exchange occurred in Helms' testimony:

"Sen. Hart of Michigan: Dealing with respect to what?

A change in government, or assassination?"

Mr. Helms:

A change in government, Senator Hart: This is

what we were trying to do.

(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132)

TOP

Perimened it.

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said yes, that I didn't think there was any need to." (Helms,

6/13/75, p. 13L.)

Helms said his view was that AM/LASH was a political

action agent, not a potential assassin, and that the meet-

ing with Al/LASH and his decision not to contact Robert

Kennedy should be viewed in that light:

...given this Cuban of his standing and all

the history...of trying to find someone inside Cuba

who might head a government and have a group to re-

even ent

place Castro...this was so central to the whole theme

of everything we had been trying to do, that I find

it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy at that

point (whether) we should go ahead with this.

This

is obviously what he had been pushing, what every-

body had been pushing for us to try to do...let's

get on with doing it. " (Helms, 6/13/75, PP. 117-113),*/

(i1) The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22

Thile lielms stated that the delivery of a poison pen to

AM/LASH was not part of an assassination plot, Helms testified

*/As discussed above (see pp.

), there was conflicting testi-

mony from CIA officers as to whether they viewed AM/LASH as an

assassin and as to the purpose of giving him the poison pen. .

The docu

mentary evidence, however, indicates that AM/LASH in 1963 was intent

upon assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew of this, and,

in addition to

offering

a poison pen, told AM/LASH they would

supply him with high powered rifles with telescopic sights. (see

p. __, above).

Helms testified that because Amlash

'was the asset we were looking

for, (we didn't want him to blow himself or blow anything else by

getting involved in something like this [assassination] and have it

We wanted him to stay in place.

6/13/75, p. 131).

Helms stated that "at no time was it the idea of (the M/LASH-1] case

atticers, or those people in the chain behind, to use [AM/LASH-1] to

assassinate castro.

(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135).

Helms further

.:tr

there was an enormous amount of

temporizing with this fellow to

keep him on the team, to keep him

working away at this job, but to try

and persuade him that this was not

the way to go about it.

(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135): Helms testified

that AM/LASH-1 was given the poison pen "because he was insisting, on

something and this was a temporizing, gesture rather than giving him

some kind of a gun he had asked for..

1 2828

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- 14 -

that he believed Castro's

assassination was within the scope of the CIA's

authority. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12).I As in the case of the 1962 plots,

Helms based this on the vigor of the Administration's policy towards Cuba

land his perception that there were no limits put on the means that could

be used in the effort against Castro. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12). Thus,T

Helms testified that after the missile crisis the U.S. continued to conduct

covert actions whose purpose was "to overthrow Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75,

p. 24.). Helms was asked whether it was his opinion that the

offer of the poison

pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came within the scope of the 1963 pro-

gram against Castro.

Helms. responded:

/"I think the only way I know how to answer that is that I

do not recall when things got cranked up in 1963 any dramatic

changes or limitations being put on this operation. There

was still an effort by whatever device, and perhaps only

slightly differently oriented

at this time, to try to get rid

of Castro...But I do not recall specific things being said,

now, (we are not) going to do this, we're not going to do that,

and we're not going to do the other thing, and we will do just

these things.

(b) Testimony of Administration Officials

As with the Mongoose period, the Administration officials agreed that

they were not informed about any assassination plot and that there was no order that

Castro be assassinated. Again, they disagreed with Helms'

position that an assassi-

nation plot could be undertaken without express authority. The only added part

relating to the AM/LASH plot was certain testimony which asserted that it was in-

conceivable that the President would have approved an assassination plot at the very

same time he had authorized talks to explore the possibility of improved relations

with Castro.E/

*/Rusk testified that "I find it extraordinarily difficult to believe" and that "y

just can't conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passage of an assas-

sination device for use against Castro while Atwood was

exploring the possibility

TOP SECRET

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Since Helms did

100-

not claim any higher specific authorization for or

knowledge of the AM/LASIl assassination plot, however, the additional issue

posed by that

testimony does not really arise.

(continued)

of normalizing relations with Castro. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 85). Similarly, Bundy

"absolutely" did not believe President Kennedy would have authorized:

or permitted an assassination device to have been passed at the same time a

possible rapprochment with Castro was being pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 151).

On the other hand, when the possibility of exploring better relations with

Castro was Initially raised (but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated

that it could be explored on a

"separate track" while other proposed actions

such

as sabotage, were going on. (Agenda for Speclal Group meeting of 4/29/63.

p. 2.)

TOP SECRET

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Subcommittee Meeting

9/9/75. Approved Draft.

d. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration

1. Sunmary of the Assassination Activity. As discussed above (see pp. _

the Agency delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June 1964. In early

1965 after AM/LASH became more insistent that a Castro assassination was neces-

sary and had asked for a silenced weapon, the Agency put AM/LASH in contact with

the leader of an anti-Castro group, B-1, with the intention that AM/LASH obtain

such a weapon. Thereafter, the Agency learned that AM/LASH had received a

silencer and other special equipment from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate

Castro.

2. The Issue of Authorization. The issue of authority in the Johnson Admini-

stration is similar to that in the Kennedy Administration. During this phase of

the AM/LASH plot, Helms continued as Deputy Director for covert operations, and

the principal members of the Kennedy Administration continued in their positions

in the relevant period of the Johnson Administration (Robert Kennedy left the

Administration in the midst of this period, on

_ * Helms' testimony

that he believed a Castro assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority

in view of Administration policy towards Cuba applied to the AM/LASH operation in

both 1963 and 1964-65. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 137-138.) Again, there was no evidence

that McCone or anyone above the Agency specifically authorized or knew about the

1964-65 plot. We discuss below four other matters occurring during the Johnson

Administration:, (1) the covert action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2)

the Special Groups' action in investigating reports of Cuban exile underworld

*Rusk (Secretary of State), McNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director

of Central Intelligence); and Bundy. (Special Assistant for National Security

and Chairman of the Special group):

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SENSITIVE

plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was not in-

volved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4) Helms' briefing

of President Johnson on the 1967 IG Report on alleged CIA assassination plots.

3.

The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in 1964-1965. According to the

minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, which he chaired, President

Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controlled sabotage raids against

Cuba.*

(Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, P. _) A memoran-

dum by McCone indicated that in deciding this question, President Johnson abandoned

the objective of Castro's overthrow. **

At the April 7, Special Group meeting, Rusk had emphasized his opposition to

the use of sabotage raids, stating his belief that they were unproductive, and

had a "high noise level" that called attention to them. In addition, Rusk stated

that "he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possible

wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U. S. involvement in order to increase

that involvement." (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, page.2.)

*A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects of the covert action

program which had been in effect.

These were: (1) collection of intelligence;

(2) covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance;

(3) cooperation with other agencies in economic denial; (4) attempts to identify

-and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba; (5) indirect

economic sabotage; (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous opera-

tions.

(Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group, April 7, 1964, p. 1-2.)

**At the April 7, 1964, meeting Rusk and Bundy opposed continuation of sabotage

actions by CIA-controlled assets as "unproductive" and impractical. McCone dis-

agreed, noting that the covert action program relied on a "well-planned series

of sabotage efforts"'. (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, р. 3.)

in June 1963 "policymakers...had turned sabotage operations on and off to such

an extent that (the sabotage program) simply does not, in the nature of things,

appear feasible"'. (Id., p. 2.)

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3

OLOMING

4. The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination Plots

by Cuban Exiles. On June 10, 1964, Helms informed McCone by memorandum that

Agency officials had learned of several plots of Cuban exiles to assassinate

Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, June 10, 1964.)

Several of the plots, according to the memorandum, involved "people apparently

associated with the Mafia"'. Reportedly the exiles had offered people associated

with the Mafia $150,000 to perform the deed. In his memorandum, Helms stated that

the sources of the reports were parties to the plots and in submitting the in-

formation to Agency officers were presumably seeking legal immunity should the

plots succeed. (Id., p. 1.)

Helms' memorandum, however, made no mention of any of the CIA assassination

plots against Castro.*

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled

sabotage operations, McCone stated: "the real issue to be considered at. the

_ meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement

the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bring-

ing about the liquidation of the Castro Conmunist entourage and the elimination

of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed

nature which might accomplish this objective". Memorandum by McCone, April 8,

1964, p.

In the context of the Special Group's discussion, McCone's use of the words "liqui-

dation" and "elimination"' appears to be another example of inartrul language.

literal interpretation of these words leaves one with the impression that assassina-

tion was contemplated. But the context of the discussion does not bear out such an

interpretation.

Thus in specifying what he meant by "future events of an undisclosed

nature. McCone pointed to "extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop in

sugar prices"', and "other external factors"'.

(1d, P. 8.) Mccone testified that

such references as the "elimination'' or "liquidation" of the Castro regime did not

refer to assassination. (McCone, p. _)

**Moreover, according to Bundy, no one from the CIA or anyone else informed him at

the meetings that "in earlier years there had been a relationship with...persons

allegedly involved with the criminal syndicate--in order to accomplish the assassi-

nation of Fidel Castro". (Bundy, p. 71.)

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SEINONUIVE

Indeed, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that

the United States Government would not under any circumstances, condone the

planned actions". (Id., p. 1.)

When the Special Group considered the information in Helms memorandum on

June 18, 1964, McCone stated he was "somewhat skeptical" and proposed additional

investigation, but "others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the U. S. was being

put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the

veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention". (Memorandum of Special

Group Meeting, June 18, 1964.) In a memorandum on the June 18 meeting, McCone

indicated he had dissented from the Special Group's decision, stating his be-

lief that the Special Group was "overly exercised" and that he was inclined to

dismiss the matter as 'Miami cocktail party talk". McCone noted, however, that

the Special Group 'was more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss

the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover". (Memorandum

June 18, 1964, p. 1.)

The Special Group decided that the reports be transmitted to the Attorney

General "as a matter of law enforcement". (Id.) Robert Kennedy was informed of

this matter a few days later and stated that the Justice Department would investi-

-gate. (Memorandum of Meeting, 22 June 1964.) Thereafter the FBI conducted an

investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Special Group on

August 19, 1964, by McCone.* (Memorandum, August 19, 1964, McCone to Bundy.)

*McCone's memorandum summarized seven FBI reports on its investigation. The FBI

found that several of the persons it interviewed stated they had knowledge of

the exile's plots and had reported the information to the CIA. Others inter-

viewed denied knowledge of the plans.

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SENSITIVE

5. Helms'. Report to Rusk that CIA was not Involved with Amlash in a

Castro Assassination Plot

In March 1966, Helms reported to Rusk by memorandum on the CIA's re-

lations with Amlash.

(Rusk Ex. 7, Memorandum, March 7, 1966, Helms to Rusk).

In this report, Helms

stated that the CIA's contact with Amlash was for "the

express purpose" of intelligence collection. (Id.). Noting Cuban press

claims that Amlash and a second Cuban had been involved with the CIA in a

Castro assassination plot, Helms stated:

The Agency was

not involved with either. of

these two men in a plot to assassinate

Fidel Castro, as claimed in la Cuban news

release/ nor did it ever encourage either

of these two persons to attempt such an act.

(Rusk Ex. 7, p. 1).

The Helms memorandum to Rusk made no mention of the fact that CIA officers,

with Helms' knowledge, had offered a poison pen to Amlash on November 22, 1963,

that CIA had supplied

arms to Amlash

in 1964, or that CIA had put. Amlash in touch

with B-l to enable him to obtain a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro.

In his testimony, Helms stated that this memorandum to Rusk was "inaccurate"

and "not truthful".

(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)

The CIA's copy. of the Helms' memorandum to Rusk contains a typed notation

• in which Helms' signature was recommended by the CIA's then Deputy Director for

Plans, Thomas Karamessines. (Rusk Ex. 7, p. 2.) Helms testified that the day

before his June 13, 1975, testimony to the Committee he had asked Karamessines

why the memorandum to Rusk had been written as it was. Helms stated he and Kara-

messines concluded they. did not know the reason but Helms speculated that "it

may be until we conducted (the 1967 IG investigation) somewhat later we didn't.

have the facts straight, or maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not

"have them straight later"'. "(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)

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6

6. Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's

Report. Drew Pearson's article in the spring of 1967 alleging U. S. involve-

ment in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro prompted President Johnson to re-

quest Helms, who by then had become the DCI, to conduct an investigation. The

result was the Inspector General's Report of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 35.)

After receiving the report, Helms briefed the President "orally about the contents".

(Id. at 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten notes apparently

prepared for his briefing of the President. Those notes carried the story through

mid-1963. When asked if he told President Johnson that, according to the 1967

study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's

presidency, Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, I just don't know. I can't

recall having done so". (Id. at 38.) He did note that it would not have

occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964 AM/LASH gun deliveries

because "I don't think one would have approached the AM/LASH thing as an assassina-

tion plot against Castro''. (Id. at 39.) Helms had testified that AM/LASH was an

intelligence and political action agent. (Helms, _, P. _ .) The IG Report

however, treated the AM/LASH operation as an assassination plot. (IG, p. —_

7. Helms Testimony on Authorization in the Johnson Administration. In

his

testimony, Helms was asked if the Agnecy regarded 'whatever marching orders

they had obtained prior to the dealth of President Kennedy as still being valid

and operative" when President Johnson succeeded to the office. Helms replied:

1. 1

Fate

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7

This is not very clear to me at this stage.

A lot

of the same officers were serving President Johnson

as they served President Kennedy, and.. I can't re-

call anymore whether there was any specific issue

about whether this was taken up with President

Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had

been, I would have thought there would have been

records someplace.".

(Helms, 6/13, p. 139.)

When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized

continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms replied indirectly that "the

Special Group would have continued to consider these matters, and I would have

assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported

to the President, which was the usual practice". (Id.)

But the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of a

Castro assassination or of the AM/LASH plot during the Johnson Administration

(or earlier). And, as discussed above, there was no evidence that McCone or

anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically authorized the AM/LASH

plots.

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sidelf in

Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee

Editing and (2) Insertion of

Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

D. CONGO

1. Introduction : . .

2.

Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That. "Removal"

of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High

Quarters"

....

3.

CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"

Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even

After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective

Custody : .

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba . .

(a) Dulles Cabled Again for 'Elimination"

of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to

Congo With

a Highly Sensitive

Assignment . .

(b)

Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to

Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi.-

nation of Lumumba:

September 1960

(c)

Hedgnan Testified That Gottlieb Told

Him That President Eisenhower Had

Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

(d)

(e)

Headquarters Makes the Assassination

Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes

Steps in Furtherance of It

...

The Chief of Station Moves Forward

With Assassination Plot.

(i)

The Chief of Station Testified

That He Requested and Received

Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan from Headquarters

(ii)

The Chief of Station Took "Explora-

tory Steps" in Furtherance of the

Assassination Plot and Testified

That He Destroyed Cable Traffic

Related to the Plot

Page

1

1

3

8

14-

•15

18

22

24

31

31

34

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(f)

Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the

Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the

Assassination Plot . .

......

(i)

(ii)

Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation

To Poison Lumumba

...

...

Iweedy Testified That He Discussed With.

Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating

Lumumba and Ile Cabled Hedgman About Gaining

Access

to Lumumba for the Purpose of

Assassination •

(iii)

Bissell Testified That Ile Did Not Recall

Whether the Assassination Operation Had

Moved from Planning to Implementation

But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to the Congo

...

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination

Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives

in the Congo ... ..:.

.'..

...

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i) Iweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That

a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to

the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-

nation Operation

...

(ii)

Bissell Discussed Assassination of

Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him

to. Congo: October-November 1960

...

(iii)

Bissell Testified That He Asked O'Donnell

to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination

Operation

1...

(iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and

Learned That a Virus Was in the

Station Safe

(b)

(v). O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize"

Lumumba by Turning Him Over to

Congolese Authorities and Requested

the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to

Leopoldville as His Alter Ego

Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-

December 1960

Page

41

41

44

• 43

52

53

53.

54

59

60

65

67

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(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

"(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative

WIROGUE to Join an

"Execution Squad"

December 1960

6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in

Bringing

About Lumumba's Death in Katanga

(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture

by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at

Thysville: November 27-Decémber 3, 1960

(b)

Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He

Was Killed:

January 17, 1960

7.

The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination

Plot Was

Authorized

→...

(a)

High-Level Meetings at Which "Getting Rid

of Lumumba" is Discussed

(i)

(ii)

Dillon Testified That the Question of

Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon

Meeting: Summer 1960 :

Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard

the President Order Lumumba's Assassi-

nation at an NSC Meeting .

(iii)

The President's "Extremely Strong

Feelings" Lead the Special Group to

Consider Anything That Might Get Rid

of Lumumba and Dulles Cables for Lumumba's

Removal: August 25-26, 1960

(iv)

NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles

Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger

Until "Disposed Of"

.....

(D) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials

That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration

of Assassination

..•

(c) Richard Bissell Testified That He "Strongly

Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against

Lumumba Was Authorized By President Eisenhower

and Allen Dulles

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Page

72

74

79

79

81

82

84

84

88

101

106

110

114

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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975

Frederick D. Baron

FOP SECRET

For Internal Committee

Use Only

D.

CONGO

ino

1.

Introduction

The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA

plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.

The plot proceeded to

the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically

intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands

of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency

scientist.

Although these instruments of assassination were never

used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case

which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's

assassination inquiry. First, did CIA

1 officers and operatives

in the Congo take steps

to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?

Second, how high in the United States government was the

source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot?

Finally,

was

the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led

to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these

broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-

ceived by the Committee.

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In the summer of 1960, there was

a great deal of concern.

at the highest levels in the United States government about the

role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.* Lumumba, who served briefly

as Premier of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm

by United States foreign policymakers because of what.

they perceived

as his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet

Union.

Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new President,

Joseph Kasavubu, the Congo declared its independence from Belgium

on June 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba

threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of

Belgian armed forces. The United Nations Security Council re-

quested a Belgian withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force

to the Congo to preserve order: In late July, Lumumba visited

Washington and received pledges of economic aid from Secretary

of State Christian Herter. At the beginning of September,

Soviet

airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the

province where Lumumba's support was strongest.

By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection

1 from the UN

guard in Leopoldville after losing a struggle over the leadership

of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff

of the Congolese armed forces. In early December, Mobutu's troops

captured Lumumba while he was traveling toward his stronghold at

* Since the period in which the events under examination occurred,

the names of many geographical units

and governmental institutions

have changed.

For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic

of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city;

Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville.

For the sake of clarity in

dealing

with many of the documents involved in this section, the names

used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960's, con-

temporaneously with the events under consideration.

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= 3=

Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of

the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody

of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its

own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese

authorities

announced Lumumba's death.

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing

of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci-

dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*

2. .

Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal"" of Lumumba

is an Urgent Objective in High Quarters"

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence

from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA

i assigned a new Chief of

Station to the Congo. The Chief of Station said that the briefings

he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure

contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice

Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head-

quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit

to Washington in late

July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassi-

nating Lumumba (Hedginan, 8/21/75, p. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political

strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers

of

the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured

* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN

Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October,

November, and December.

* See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing

anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by

minutes. of the National Security Council and Special Group and the

testimony of high Administration officials.

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by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters

by the new Chief of Station:

EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING

CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT.

MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE :

SOVIETS

... COMMUNIST

PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR

INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE

FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF.

WHETHER

OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING

COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-

WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND

THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION

TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA....

(CIA Cable IN 39706,

Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.) -

This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE

(OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP. (CIA Cable, 8/18/60) :

Bronson Iweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-

destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State

Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR

BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59741,

Iweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,

Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up

cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"

(CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan

to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by

Congolese leaders:

ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU

WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE. LUMUMBA

• KASAVUBU

REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT

VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT

STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761,

Leopolaville to Director, 8/24/60.)

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- 5 -

This incident indicates. that the CIA was aware that there was

some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that

the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and

refused to consider assassination.

On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the

Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee re-

sponsible for the planning of covert operations:* In response to

the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against

Lumumba, such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese

Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs reported that the President

had expressed extremely strong feelings

on the necessity for very straightforward

action in this situation, and he wondered

whether the plans as outlined were sufficient

to accomplish this. (Special Group Minutes,. 8/25/60.)

After this discussion, the Special Group

finally agreed that planning for the Congo

would not necessarily rule out "consideration"

of any particular kind of activity which might

contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

(Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)

* This Special Group meeting and the testimony about its

significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail

in Section 5 (iii), infra.

NH 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 255

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- 6 -

The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable*

to

miss

the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of

"removing" Lumumba:

IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-

CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL (LUMUMBA] CON-

TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE

RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST

PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE

CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE

PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF

THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY.

WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN

URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING

HE TRES LEMONADE

CONSEQUENTLY

CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF

OUR COVERT ACTION.

• CIA Cable, OUT 62966,

Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)

Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER

AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the préviously authorized opera-

tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING

EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF II CAN REMAIN COVERT"' (CIA Cable,

8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY. PRESENT

THEMSELVES IO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) .

* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are

a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the

importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.

** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified

that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to

refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).

HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 256

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Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO

CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-

TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the

Chief of Station

that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT

COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point

of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act

unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the

Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE

TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CON-

CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, 1IE

DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT

ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT

PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) .

This mandate raises

a question as to whether the DCI was contem-

plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the

Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"

United States involvement. DDP Richard

Bissell testified that he

was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable

shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that

the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the

President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 33,

64-65).*

* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell

on the question of authorization for the assassination effort

against Lumumba.

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3. CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"

• Lumumba,

Who is Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even After

Being Deposed and Placed in UN Protective Custody

On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed

Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support

for Lumumba that

existed in the Congolese Parliament. After losing

the

ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, who seized

the government by a military coup on September 14; Lumumba sought

protection from the United Nations peace-keeping force. The

evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba from the government

did not alleviate the concern about him in the United States govern-

ment.

Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration

officials continued to view him as a threat, at least until

early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and im-

prisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised

and aided Congolese contacts known to have any intent to kill

Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process

after the coup -- by reopening the Parliament -- because of the

likelihood that this would return Lumumba to power.

The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two CIA

officers met with a high

level Congolese politician who had a

close

relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station re-

ported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response

* A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern

over Lumumba at the National Security Council level is set forth

in Section

infra.

HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 258

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## Page 259

to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might

assassinate. Lumumba:

TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS

ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE

CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD

AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE

LUMUMBA. (CLA Cable,

IN 49679, Leopoldville

to Director, 9/7/60.):

The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered

to assist this politician "IN_ PREPARATION NEW GOVERVMENT PROGRAM"'

and assured him that the United States would supply technicians

(CIA Cable, 9/7/60).

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of

the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.

apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the

Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official

position:

LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-

RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION

EACH TIME IT SEEMS. HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS

EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST

WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE.

(CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director to Leopoldville,

9/13/60) .

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported

that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-

nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have

been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded

a safe base of operations:

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STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS

SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS

ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER.

STATION ADVISED

(TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK

WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-

NATE LUMUMBA.

FEAR UN: PROTECTION WILL GIVE

LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER. ATTACK

ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.

(CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to Director,

9/15/60.)

On September 17, 'another CIA operative in the Congo met

with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator

requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some

Congolese Army troops.

The cable to CIA headquarters concerning

the meeting reported:

[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE

SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP

TROOPS

RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP [OLDVILLE] AREA

[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE

ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT

ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES

LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS

[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE

PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION

LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldville

to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE

POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters

that they should

HAVE ARMS) SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT

NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]

DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-

SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).3

* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale

planning at ClA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support

to anti-Lumumba elements.

Bronson Tweedy signed

Un October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and

a cable concerning plans which the Chief of

Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-

sentatives or operational contacts:

(footnote continued on next page)

H7 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 260

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-11-

Several days later, while warning a key Congolese

leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,

the Chief of Station

URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL

OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable

IN 15643, Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were

leading his

supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

(IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP-

MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING

FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS

PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION

IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-

DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED

OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS

SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-

LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.

(CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville,

10/6/60.)

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Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view

Lumumba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN

protective custody.* One concern was that if the Parliament --

which had been closed by the coup -- were re-opened and the moderates

* Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the

CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view

Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody

Bissell, 9/10/75, Pp.

; Iweedy, 9/9/75, PP.

?. Both

Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this

view: first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability

to stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did

not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and the Congolese army

surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their vigil.

(Quote/Cite from transcripts:]

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262

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failed to obtain a majority vote, the "PRESSURES FOR [LUMUMBA'S]

RETURN WILL BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499,

Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60).*. Another general concern

at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in

the Congo and bring Lumumba to power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director

to. Leopoldville, 10/17/60). Similarly, throughout this period

Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Adminis-

tration» as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet

effort to take over the Congo"' (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 10, 45).

During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to

maintain close operational relationships with, and offer aid to,

Congolese contacts who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba***

although there is

no direct evidence that aid was provided for the

specific

purpose of

assassination.

* A CIA Cable (IN 37289) from Leopoldville to the Director

on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme: the opening of the

Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed because it

"WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO POWER.

** See Section __, infra, on such analysis at high-level policy

meetings.

*** A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an .

attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA]

KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS. JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE

BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN... (CIA Cable,

IN 34867, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.)

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263

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4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters

delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-

logical substances to

be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.

The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving

confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the

scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps"

in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station

testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA

scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower

had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba.

Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by

general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA

headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Onlv" channel --

including two messages under the

personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of

Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in

the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly

before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there

is no clear evidence that the assassination operation

was termi-

nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence

of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events

which actually led to Lumumba's death.*

* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about

the circumstances that Ted to Lumumba's death in Katanga.

NW 50955

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(a)

Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba,

and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly

Sensitive Assignment

On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-.

self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping

force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Iweedy signed

a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting

between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling

to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:

("SID"'] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT..: WILL

ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS"

• IT

URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE I"SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE

AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY

HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.

(CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissell/Iweedy to Chief

of Station,

9/19/60.)

The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator --

"PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the

Chief of the Africa Division.*

* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review

Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to

denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick

A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron; 9/23/75. It appears that this

sensitivity indicator,

while created

for other purposes,

was utilized

by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution

of their communications about an assassination operation.

The cable

traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel

did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting

additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

NN 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 265

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## Page 266

-16-

The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chief of Station that

he was to continue to use this indicator for

ALL CABLE TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU

INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.

(CIA Cable, 9/19/60 .)

The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* --

testified to

a clear, independent recollection of receiving such

a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a

"most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11,

43). The cable advised, in his words, that:

someone who I would have recognized would

arrive with instructions for me....

I

believe the message was also marked for my

eyes only ... and contained instructions

that I was not to discuss the message with

anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 12-13.)

Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-

tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any

way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 12) .

Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was

to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Iweedy uses the same sensi-

tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"

basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Iweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers,

the Chief

of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi-

fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,

p. 4) .

1W 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 266

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## Page 267

-17÷

Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be

required as

an agent in the PROP operation:

IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,

BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH

THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]

ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED.

(CIA Cable,

9/22/60.)

Iweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station

was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A

THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT

FILL BILL'* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Iweedy's concern about

the

two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of

station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as

"Sid'' who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP

operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude

in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ

OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS

OPPORTUNITIES• OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE

CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN ROLE, UNLESS OUT-

STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES

CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET.

READY

ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE

BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL

JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later

dispatched to the Congo.

His mission is discussed in Sections

- and

_ infra.

HH 50955 DocId: 32423524

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On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to

Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate"

Lumumba :

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN

ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY

RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE

FAILS IN LEOP [OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF

IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

(CIA. Cable

OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the

presence of the President at an NSC meeting; stating:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in

the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not

yet disposed of and remained a grave danger

as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC

Minutes, :9/21/60)

(b).

Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substanres to the Chief of

Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba

The Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson

Iweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville

with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable

IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same

week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba

and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that.

existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of"

Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger

referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:

Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?

Hedgman:

Mr. Sidney Gottlieb

NH 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 268

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f: And at that time, you knew who he was?

Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the

Agency .

I believe he referred to the

fact that I had received a message and that he

was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 15-16)

The message carried by Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to

DDP Richard Bissell, was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

Hedgman:

It is my recollection that he advised me, or

my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba:

l: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?

Hedgman: Yes: I would say that was

• my underi

standing of the primary means.: I don't think it was

probably limited to that, if there was

some other way

of doing it.

Q: Of doing what?

Hedgman:

Of removing him from a position of political

threat.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 17-18.)

Hedgman said that he and Gottlieb also may have discussed

non-

lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat"

, but

he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that! (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 28) .

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,

however:

And what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to

the possibility of physically eliminating him?

Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was

probably expected of me.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 18.)

And again:

Q: I take it that once you started discussing these

Lethal agents,

there was no doubt in your mind that

the kind of elimination he was there particularly to

discuss was killing Lumumba?

HW 50955 DooId:32423524 Page 269

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Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that

this was one of the way[sl, and probably what

they thought was the only way that would work

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 25):

Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means

of assassination:

how that might be accomplished?

And what did he tell you with regard to

Hedgman :

... He brought some biological agents.

I assume that that's the correct word.

But in

any case, poisonous agent with him, which he

passed to me....

L: These were lethal biological substances?

Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding

as a non-expert. (ledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)

Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a

syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him

in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that

this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

When he (Gottliebl came to the Congo

to give you lethal biological agents for

the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear

at that time that the means

for administering

those biological agents was

to inject them

into a substance that was to be ingested by

Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or

toothpaste or any other substance that was

to be ingested?

Hedgman :

That's my recollection, yes.

(ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)

Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted

to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:

This was not a sine qua non that I employ this.

If there were another method, another way, it

would have been acceptable.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

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- 21-

For

example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested":

shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP: 27-29).

There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi-

nation should not be traceable to the United States:

zin

The biological substance, or specimens, what

have you, I think it was up to my judgment,

and if there was a better way -- certainly.

(T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I

implemented these instructions, no way could

it be traced back--to the United States. . It

had to be a way which could not be traced

back

... either to an American or the United

States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were pro-

duced to meet this requirement:

I believe I raised the point that poisons left

traces in the human body, which could be found

on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured

that these

... lethal agents would (leave]

normal traces found in people that die of

certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great sur-

prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss

an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 30). But the Chief of

Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not

carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he

told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p: 46)

and left him with the following impression:

I think it would be a fair impression that he would

take away the thought that I was going to look into it

and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I

NW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 271

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## Page 272

-22-

stressed the difficulty of trying to carry

out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 47.)

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his

initial contact with Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response

to the assignment. The Chief of Station said that he and Gottlieb

were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to

Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's government

was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation

with Lumumba, and said:

HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT

WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

(c)

Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That

President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination

of Lumumba

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting

in

Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed him that President Eisenhower

had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

I: Did you raise with him the question of authori-

zation of such instructions to you?

Hedgman: Yes, I did.

That's my quite strong

recollection, that I did.

Q:

What do you recall in essence was what you

sald to him?

Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed

out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,

and I may have probably said that I never heard of

it being done, which I had not, never in my training

or previous work in the Agency had. I ever heard any

references to such, in my recollection at least, such

methods.

And it is my recollection I asked on whose

authority these instructions were issued.

L: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply?

NH 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 272

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-23-.

tedgman :

It is my recollection that he identi-

Fied the President, and I cannot - the President

of the United States -- and I cannot recall

whether he said "the President,

"or whether he

identified him by name.. (Hedgman, 8/21/75;

pp. 30-31.)

Hedgman continued to explain that he was told "something to the

effect that the President had instructed the Director". (Hedgman,

8/21/75, PP. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source

of authority for the assassination mission was the President:

{: Your understanding then was that these

instructions

were instructions coming to you

from the office of the President?

Hedgman: That's correct.

S: Or that he had instructed the Agency, and

they were passed on to you?

Hedgman: That's right.

Q: You are not the least unclear whether or

not you became aware with a very clear im-

pression that the President's name had been

invoked in some fashion?

Hedgman :

Yes. I came - certainly that is my

recollection.

Q: You have no doubt about that?

Q: At the time.

Hedgman: At the time, I certainly felt that I

was under instructions

from the President, yes.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 32-33.)

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Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

Hedgman :

Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot

be 100 per cent certain, but I have

always, since

that date, had the impression in my mind that these

orders had come from the President. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, P: 34.)

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression" :

You have a very firm recollection that he

Bottliebl represented to you that the President

of the: United States directed the assassination of

Patrice Lumumba, Is that correct?

Hedgman: That's my recollection.: Yes. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d)

Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest

Priority"

and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It

On the basis of his talks with "Sid,' Hedgman listed a

number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At

the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent

be used

in the following manner:

HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.

WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP

DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-

calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in-

formed headquarters:

"PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED

ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY"' (GIA Cable, 9/27/60).

On September 30; the Chief of Station urged that head-

quarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so

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that he could proceed with the plan that was his top priority:

NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS

NOW AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING

OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING

DEGREES.

.: LIN! VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT

ALL,

URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVER-

SATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [AGENT] WILLING TAKE

ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP

(WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT

REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT

ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJEC-

TIVE OP TO HIM.

REQUEST HQS REPLY [IMMEDIATELY]. (CIA

Cable,

IN 20857, Leopoldville to Iweedy,

9/30/60.)

Hedgman's cables -- sent for Iweedy's "Eyes Only" in the PROP

channel -- indicated that the assassination operation had been

mounted.. They show that a specific operational plan had been set

in motion to the extent that ledgman thought that it would have

to be. clearly "cancelled" by headquarters before he would stop

proceeding with the plan. Hedgman's description of the means

of maintaining the security of the operation could be taken as

a reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow to

take effect or which would leave no traces:

ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS

(AGENT'S] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINI-

MIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP

ARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857,

Leopoldville to Iweedy.)

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The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received

authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority

plan:

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS *

WITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE

TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.

... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO

PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 75900, Fields to

Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,

expressed a "HOPE .... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 75900,

Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb

left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of

the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopold-

ville to Iweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration"' of Gottlieb's

"materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances

would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of

the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the

cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological

substances

had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station inci-

cated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were

still

lethal and that he

intended to proceed with the assassination

operation:

(SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USE-

FULNESS.

[CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE

TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171,

Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

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By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con-

versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining

access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 60). Hedgman testified

that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a

means

to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman,

8/21/75, P.. 60) :

I believe that I queried the agent who had

access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in

detail

about just what that access; what

access

he actually had, as opposed

to speak-

ing to people.

In other words, did he have

access

to the bathroom, did he

have access

to the kitchen, things of that sort.

I have a recollection of having queried him

on that without specifying why I wanted to

know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)

On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters

on this meeting:

CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH

(AGENT]

... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES

(AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with

doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:

(Certainly I looked on it as a pretty wild

scheme professionally. I did not think that

it .:: was practical professionally.

Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....

I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really

expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

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However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con-

tinue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do

it successfully. Ile urged headquarters to send him an alternate

operative for the assassination mission in the event that

they

found his first choice unacceptable:

IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]

BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-

SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD

COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171;

Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60 .)

Iweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD

GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to

a de-briefing of Gottlieb upon his return. to the United States.

(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Iweedy

indicated that he was

CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY

NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,

SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER

PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY

ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.

(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of

Station, 10/7/60.)

This expression of support for the operation was followed by

an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15;

1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's

Africa Division and released under Bronson Iweedy's signature, as

Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA

channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to

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appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States

embassy. This cable: generally discussed the possibility of

covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and

military aid (CIA Cable OUI 81476, Director to Leopoldville,

10/15/60).

This cable also delimited the kind of action against

Lumumba that would be

authorized:

ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW. STAND BEHIND

IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING

[LUMUMBA] , DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE

ACTION MIGHT BE.

ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD

HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE.

(CIA Cable

OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville,

10/15/60.)

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second

cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally

by Bronson. Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for

Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Iweedy to Chief of

Station, 10/15/60) •

YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL

CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH]

ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-

CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC

[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL

STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-

POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-

SIDERATION.

RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY

APPARENT DUPLICATION.

THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR

SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND

ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY.

(CIA Cable OUT

81396, Iweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-

cating that communications about the assassination mission were

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restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination

mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's

reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to

the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY

THIS ASPECT"' (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Iweedy to Chief of

Station,

10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell, who

testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to

undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional

officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason

that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly

under the Chief of Station:

SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY

GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP.

(CIA

Cable OUT 81396, Iweedy to Chief of Station,

10/15/60.)

Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba

activity outlined in the cable sent through

normal channels,

Iweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:

POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR

ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA],, EITHER VIA ASSAULT

ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE

PROBABLY, IF (LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS

ANOTHER

BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

(CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of

Station, 10/15/60.)

* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and

O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see

Section 5(a), infra.

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= 31-0.

This series of cables sent

during, and after

Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA

headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassi-

nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-

strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in

CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the.

Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other

covert activities.

(e)

The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination

PIOt

The testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen

years after the events in question and without benefit of review

of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture

derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted

assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from

the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he

claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an

affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.

(i)

The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested

and Received Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan from Headquarters

Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb's

instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that

he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by

name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President

in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43) .

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Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he

took cabling his. request for confirmation of the assassination in-

structions:

There was

some special channel

:.: because.zr

it was handled differently than any other

normal message.

For example, it was not put

on a regular cable form, which, you know,

you have several copies

for your various

files.

And it was my recollection that I personally

carried the message to the communicator to

encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk

way that even the communicator would not

necessarily know what it was about.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP: 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for

all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-

firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment,

he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

I believe I received a reply which I interpreted

to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his

instructions were

... duly authorized

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 37-38.)

Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-

vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from

Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization

before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 38). Hedgman ex-

pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free

hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving

"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 38, 47, 53).

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Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his

second appearance:

I Drobably had authority to act on my own

but

... it was possible that I had to go

back and get clearance for my action

(Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75

p. 39.)

Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been

made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of

eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52) .

I thought the policy decision had been made

in the White House,

not in the Agency, and

that the Agency had been selected as the

Executive Agent, it you will, to carry out

a political decision... (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)

Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally

selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under

the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so

and to proceed to take action:

Hedgman:

• I doubt that I thought the

President had said, you use this system.

But my understanding is the President had

made a decision that an act should take

place, but then put that into the hands of

the Agency to carry out his decision.

Whatever that act was to be, it was

clearly. to be assassination or the death

of the foreign political leader?

Hedgman: Yes:

Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?

Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's

Tethal agents were employed, that would have been

the result, yes.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)

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Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out

these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not

he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without

seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked

with headquarters before taking action:

I think probably that I would have gone back

and advised that I intended to carry out and

sought final approval before: carrying it out

had I been going to do it, had there been a

way to do it. I did not see it as ... a

matter which could be accomplished

practically,

certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 51-52.)

He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval

would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the

specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 53).

(ii)

The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in

Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified

That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot

Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked

the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably"

sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it

(Hedgman; 8/21/75, pP. 48-49). He said that his secretary was

the only other person with access to the safe and that she would

not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 49) .

Hedgman

testified that it

was "possible" that he pre-

served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any

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rate, they were not disposed of before Lumumba was "successfully

neutralized" by being captured and imprisoned by the Congolese

government (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85-86) at the beginning of

December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does not recall taking the

poisons out of his safe on any occasion other than when he disposed

of them on the banks of the Congo River:.

I think that I took them out probably in a

briefcase; or an air bag of some sort, and

I believe

that the things like the rubber

gloves and the mask were thrown away in a

bushy area or something where, you know, if

they were found, it didn't matter that much.

I believe I buried the other matters.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P: 84.)

Hedgman testified, however, that in the intervening months,

while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps"

in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 60).

He said that he sent several cables to CIA headquarters, after his

request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which

"probably reflected further steps I had taken" (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 59-60) .

Hedgman stated that his cables to headquarters on this matter

were essentially "progress reports" on his attempts to find a means

of access to Lumumba (Hedgman,

8/21/75, P. 50). He also said that

he "would bet on the fact that there was at least one or two

. more

[cables] back" to him

from CIA headquarters in response (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 50) .

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The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For

two, months after Guttlieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream

of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and

headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early

October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority

plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have

sufficient access

to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison

Lumumba.*. In mid-Octöber, Iweedy notified the Chief of Station

that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY"

• and

he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-.

tensify "'CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy

to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).**

These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Iweedy on

October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination nission

* CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Iweedy, 9/21/00;

CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief

of station to Iweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable

full treatment of these cables.

_ supra, for

** See Section

, supra, for more complete text of this

cable.

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HAS NOT BEEN ABLE. PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.

THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS

INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable

IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy,

10/17/60.)

Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime

in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access

to. Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,.

p. 61): The Chief of Station continued to communicate with head-

quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina-

tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do

so.

Hedgman confirmed Iweedy's view that although the assassination

operation was

still his highest priority, he was overburdened with o

responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate

on the progress of the assassination mission:

ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS

SP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,

VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,

IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the Chief of Station responded enthusiastically

to Iweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER

HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT. IDEA

IF CASE

OFFICER AVAILABLE (CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD

DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING

AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable

IN 28936,. 10/17/60.)

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The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the following

cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he

may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb

as an alternative

to poisoning (liedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 27-29) :

IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HOS

POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE

RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.

HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT.

HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,

WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING

OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable IN 28936,

10/17/60.)

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers

to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The

rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the

possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" --

in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside

the

residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This

interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by

the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's. "EYES

ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from

mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on

November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but

inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:

TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL

WEEKS.

HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY

CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP....

CONGOLESE

TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S

ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.

UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF

PALACE BY CONGOLESE.

CONCENTRIC RINGS

OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-

VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

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COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF

HOUSE BY CONGOLESE....

TARGET HAS DISMISSED

MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS

REMOTE.

(CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of

Station to Iweedy.)

Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the

assassination question would have been sent with the same

extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-

ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb's visit

and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

I would have sent in a special channel

anything dealing with Lumumba, at least

that would touch upon his removal in one

way or another.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P: 62.)

The Chief of Station also testified that sometime before

leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to

the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's

best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy

those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never

before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed

cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 91) .

But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were

destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a

sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

NH 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 289

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that eventually

I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because

the Congo was

a highly sensitive area in

which -- at one period I recall we had all

of our files in the burn barrels.

I mean,

when you wanted a file, you went over and

dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman,.

8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination

plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characteri-.

zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times

in which it took place. His response indicated that although he

was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized

order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating

Lunumba:

I looked upon the Agency as an executive

arm of the Presidency....

Therefore, I

suppose I thought that it was an order

issued in due form from an authorized

authority.

On the other hand, I looked at it as a

kind of operation that I could do without,

that I thought that probably the Agency

and the U.s. government could get along

without.

I didn't regard Lumumba as the

kind of person who was going to bring on

World War Ill or something.

I might have had a somewhat different

attitude if I thought that one man could

bring on World War III and result in the

deaths of millions of

people or something,

but I didn't see him in that light.

I saw

him'as a danger to the political position

of the United States in Africa, but

nothing more than that.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 110-111.)

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• (1)

Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree

of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination

Plot

There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard

Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of

the assassination

plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from

the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that

the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA head-

quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct

recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Iweedy can

recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an

assassination attempt.

(i)

Iweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation

To Poison Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Iweedy was the principal

liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville

for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the

effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the

special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations

cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination

operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed

the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with

an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of

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Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he

had debriefed Gottlieb upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable

OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Iweedy was also

the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on Gottlieb's

arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to .

Tweedy; 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan

which emerged from the discussions between Gottlieb and Hedgman

as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-

tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA

Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable;

Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station

to. Iweedy, 10/17/60).

Iweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these

cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:

?. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger

from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo

to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo

with instructions to carry out the assassination

of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him

with the tools to carry out such an assassination;

namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-

istering them?

Mr. Tweedy.

No, I do not. (Iweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent

in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in

Leopoldville.

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When asked

his opinion about the truth of the testimony received

ses

by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by

Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in

the assassination of Lumumba, Iweedy replied:

There is nothing in my experience with the

Agency which would really bear on that

point whatsoever. (Iweedy, 9/9, PP. 39-39)

Iweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo as a courier,

"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Iweedy, 9/9, p: 35) .

Iweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio-

logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't

recall it" (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 30) .

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable

from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to

the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be

"very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recoll-

ection of it whatsoever (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony. of

the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through

a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions

were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Iweedy, 9/9, pp.

32-33).

Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the

testimony of

the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their

*Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the

Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt

Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory

and I certainly trust his integrity.".

(Iweedy, 919, p.

36)

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testimony could be attributed to

his own lack of recall:

Ireally am having trouble with this.

• I had to

be reminded of so many things. . . (Ilhe things

that I recall the most vividly about all my

African experiences were.

• the things I was

basically concerned with all the time, which was

putting this division together and the rest of

it.

When it comes to operational detail I start

fuzzy and you would have thought with something

Like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms,

that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking

about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the

case: (Iweedy: 9/9, p. 34)

Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would

have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have

empowered (him]... to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any

further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32;

36). Tweedy said:

In such a matter of this kind, headquarters would

have wanted to have

last word up to the last

minute. (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

(ii)

Iweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell

the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He

Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba

For the Purpose of Assassination

Despite Iweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to.

poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-

ination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating

Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960

(Iweedy, 9/9, PP. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know

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whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about

exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy,

9/9, p. 28). Generally, Iweedy said, when he received an instruc-

tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump-

tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

I would proceed with it on the basis that he

was authorized to give me instructions and it

was up to him to bloody well know what he was

empowered to tell me to do. (Iweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Iweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-

inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):

Tweedy.

•I think it came up in the sense that

Dick would have said we probably better be

thinking about whether it might ever be necessary

or desirable to get rid of Lumumba,

in which case

we presumably should be in position

to assess

whether we could do it or not successfully.

Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him

in any other

sense. but a planning exercise,

never were we instructed

to do anything

of

this

kind.

We were instructed to ask whether such a

thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of

Station be thinking along those lines as well.

(Iweedy, 9/9, P. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-

versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers

sending to the Chief of Station asking him

to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever

have had to Lunumba. . . [in] the eventuality that

we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally:

(Iweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)

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Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba. for

the purpose of abducting him from UN custody. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.. 24);

rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were

being explored:

0.

be access

Would this be access to shoot him or would this

to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

Tweedy.

I suppose all those types of things might

have been considered. (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 23)

I.. In your discussions with Bissell, about the

feasibility of an assassination operation, did

poisons come up as one means that was being con-

sidered

and which the Chief of Station should explore?

Tweedy. I am sure it must have.

After all, there

are not many ways of doing it.

Shoot a man, poison

him, of course you could,

I suppose, stab him or

something like that. But basically you are talking

about a contingency plan which I assume has: the best

possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.s.

Government and if you want to do it in a manner which

and no crane.

would be as distant, if that is the right word, as

possible, I think poison would then stand high on

the list of possibilities.

Iweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief

of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious

answer.:: a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters"

(Tweedy,. 9/9, PP. 23,27) :

Although Iweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a

special channel concerning the 'messenger" to the Congo or confirm-

ation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring

access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been

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sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the

normal CIA cable traffic (Iweedy, 9/9, PP: 22, 32-33). Tweedy

said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the

discretion of the Chief of Station and he did not know whether

Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 919,.p. 22).

Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didr't" have a conver-

sation with Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory. that

could possibly be used, inclüding lethal biolögical substances

(Iweedy, 919; PP: 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first

conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held

between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb," which Tweedy then would

have "followed-up" (Iweedy, 919, p. 69) :

Iweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the

means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning

interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it

was im-

minent that somebody would say 'go''' (Iweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19) :

Iweedy. It was always my assumption that at the

time anything like this should occur there would

have been some kind of real focus on the problem

at probably a very considerable policy level with-:

in the Agency. .

and it never occurred to me that

I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come

down to his office and sya go to it.

Nor were we

ever in a position where he

said that I would

merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got

that far.

Q. You didn't have any action plans for the

assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or

were aware of?

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Iweedy.: No. Planning, yes, but nothing that

ever got anywhere. (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult. to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's

testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-

ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization

for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to. Lumumba's

entourage is in accord with Iweedy's description of his inquiries

about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the

Chief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN

24171, Chief of Station to Iweedy, 1017/60) is harder.

to reconcile

with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never

imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week

which told the Chief of Station that Lumumba's

DISPOSTTION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE

CONSIDERATION.

• THIS CHANNEL. REMAINS FOR

SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE

AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable

OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60)

(iii)

Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall

Whether The Assassination Operation Had

Moved From Planning To Implementatior

But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to The Congo

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing

the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Iweedy, but it

seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place

(Bissell, 9/10, PP. 3-4).

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Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about

steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did

not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that

exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information

from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have

been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but

he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this

subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was

aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct

access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80) .

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables

that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about

gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell;

9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:

I think Mr. Tweedy, on

the basis of an oral author-

ization from me, would have had the authority to

send

such a

cable without my signing off on it.

(Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)

Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's

trip

to the Congo, although it was possible that Iweedy was "cut out of

knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).

Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to

Justin O'Donnell&with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that

* Bissell'

s assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a)

(i) and 5(a) (ii), infra.

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Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's

visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22) .

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a

messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were

to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. ...I

would expect, given the background,

that the confirmation would

have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed

the assassination of Lumumba

with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then

his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said

that on a

number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability .

of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10.

p. 60) :

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed

that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission,

(which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of

Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, PP. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of

specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is

nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict. with the

testimony of the Chief of Station that Gottlieb carried poisons to

the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35) .

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy

in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35) .

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He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo.

as still

in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, P. 49). Bissell acknowledged,

however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which

to administer them was an extraordinary event:

It would indeed have been rather unusual to send

such materials

-- a specific kit.

• of this

sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless

planning for their use were quite far along:

(Bissell, 9/10, p. 37) .

Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he

had sufficient authority at that

point to direct CIA officers to

move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,

pp. 60-61).. In light of his absence of a specific recollection of

these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.

Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,! " Gottlier

would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him-by

Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed

into an implementation phase" and that "authorization

was given"

(Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).

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5.

The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination

Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives

in the Congo

Justin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine

operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he

had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry

out the assassination

of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pP. 11-12) .

•0 ' Donnell

said. that he refused to participate in an assassination

operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba

away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in

the hands of Congolese authorities (0'Donnell; 6/9/75, pP. 13-14): -

Shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in the Congo he was

joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the

following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by

assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of

the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of

O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA

Cable IN. 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached

to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-

likely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation

of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connec-

tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives

QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

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(a)

O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i).

Iweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a

Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo

to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation

In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the

specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior

case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the

assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Iweedy informed

Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH IDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR

CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national

operative (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60).

On October 15, Iweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the sugges-

tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to

concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396,

Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief

of Station replied affirmatively:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER

HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA.

(CIA Cable

IN 28936, Chief of Station to Iweedy).

The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE

OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the

assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.

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(ii)

Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With

O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960

Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of

October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case

officer to

concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached

the subject with CIA officei Justin O'Donnell.

At that time, O'Donnell was the Deputy Chief of a com-

ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm

O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8).-

Justin O'Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he

was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-

nating Patrice Lunumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pP. 11-12; 9/11/75,

pp. 19, 43) :

O'Donnell: le called me in and he told me

he wanted to go down to the Belgian Conco;

the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate

Lumumba

What did you understand him to mean by

eliminate?

O'Donnell: To kill him and thereby eliminate

his influence.

Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his

remarks, whatever his precise language, as

meaning

that he was talking about assassination

rather

than

merely neutralizing him through

some other means?

0 'Donnell: It was not neutralization

Clearly the context of

our talk was to kill

him. (D'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)

O'Donnell reacted strongly to Dissell's instruction:

I told him that I mould absolutely not

have any part of killing Lumumba.

He said,

I want you to go over and talk to Sidney

Gottlieb: (D'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)

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Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science

Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14):

O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct

such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles!

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorization

was never raised by Bissell:

I assumed that he had authority. from Mr. Dulles

in such an important issue, but it was not dis-

cussed, nor did he purport

to have higher

authority to do it. .

(0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)

O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was

"sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming

over" (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, P. 7). O'Donnell

said

that Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... lethal

means of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13). O'Donnell

recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-

cluded poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell

said that Gottlieb "didn't even hint …... that he had been in the

Congo and that he had transported

any lethal agent to the Congo"

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, P: 7-4).

After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:

I then left his office, and I went back to

Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no

way would I have any part in the assassina-

tion of Lumumba

and reasserted in

absolute terms that I would not be involved

in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p..43.)

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O'Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with

Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy

to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be

in violation of federal law"' (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). He said

that Bissell "aïrily dismissed" this prospect (D'Donnell, 6/9/75,

p: 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, O'Donnell

agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"

Lumumba "as a political factor"' (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pP: 43-44).:

I said I would go down and I would have no

compunction about operating to draw Lumumba

out lof Ui custody], to run an operation to

neutralize his operations which were against

Western interests, against, I thought,

American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.)

O'Donnell added that his objective was to

neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his

activities against [a Congolese leader],

whom at that time you might say was our close

instrument, he was the man we had put our

chips on.

(0 ' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassi-

nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of

looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 53).

Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he

reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:

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Mr. O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I

would be willing to go down to neutralize

his activities and operations and try to bring

him out lof UN custodyl and turn him over to

the Congolese authorities, that is correct.

Senator Mondale:

Was it discussed then that

his life might be taken by the Congolese

authorities?

Mr.

O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered

In the -- not to have him killed, but then

it would have been a Congolese being judged

by Congolese for Congolese crimes.

yes,

think it was discussed.

CO' Donnell, 619/75,

p. 38.)

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would re-

ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,

according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell

"had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him

tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to assassination

to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"

Lumumba's influence, it was cleas to him that Bissell was still

interested in the assassination of Lumumba:

in leaving at the conclusion of our second

discussion..: he said, well, I wouldn't

rule out that possibility -- meaning the

possibility of the elimination or the killing

of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it.

In other

words, even though you have said this, don't

rule it out....

There is no question

about

it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out,

meaning the elimination or the assassination

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 45) .

O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-

cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order

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to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of

record (0' Donnell, 9/11/75, pP. 44-45):

[I]n the Agency, since you don't have

documents, you have to be awfully canny

and you have to get things on record, and

I went into. Mr. Helms' office,

and I

said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell

proposed to me, and I told him that I

would under no conditions do it, and ilelms

said you're absolutely right.

(0' Donnell,

6/9/75, PP. 15-16) .

Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a

conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's

version

of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23)..*

William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him

about the conversations with Bissell:

Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said that he

had been approached by Richard Bissell ...

to undertake an operation in the Congo, one

of the objectives of which was the elimina-

tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me

that he had declined to

undertake this

assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)

Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told

him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9) .

O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-

cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

pp. 45-46) .

Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa-

tion in any way.

He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the

Congo or what his mission was

(Helms, 9/16/75, PP: 32-33).

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(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked O'Donnell to Plan

and Prepare for an Assassination Operation

Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell

discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,

6/9/75, P. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell,

9/11/75, P. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he

thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that

the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"

(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).-

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked

O'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).

Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one

important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-

ment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as .

opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that

Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first

testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked O'Donnell

"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,

6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance,

however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 24) .

Bissell said that

after his conversations with O'Donnell, he

felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination

operation because, "given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk

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that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell,

9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-

activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time,

Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/

Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:

[T]his had been in my,mind a very sensitive.

assignment to him, limited -- with the

knowledge of it limited very narrowly ever

within the Agency.

And it is difficult to

separate recollection from inference on

occasion.

But I seem to recollect that

after this conversation with him, I wanted

this put very much on the back burner and

inactivated for quite some time. How that

doesn't rule out the possibility that some

action through completely different channels

might have gone forward.

But the best of

my recollection is, I viewed this not only

as terminating the assignment for him, but

also as reason for at least postponing

any-

thing further along that line. (Bissell,

9/10/75, PP. 25-26) .

In Iweedy's mind, O'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo was

linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba

rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody

(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26) .

(iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That

a Virus. Was in the Station Safe

On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed through

the PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in-Leo-

poldville "IN FURTIERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields

to Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived

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in Leopoldville. (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director,

11/4/60). Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been

made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible"

that as a new Chief of Station he took the dispatch to the Congo

of a senior officer like O'Donnell as

a signal that CIA headquarters

was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 42).

Hedgman had a general picture of O'Donnell's mission:

I understood it to be that -- similar to

mine, that is, the removal or neutrali-

zation of Lumumba .... I have no clear

recollection of his discussing the assassi-

nation. (ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicating

one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as

a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55) .

Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that

he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-

erally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic

about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP: 56, 88-89) .

When O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief of

Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he

assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37); although

Hedgman was not explicit:

I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio

shot up to date.

(0' Donnell, 619775, p. 16.)

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He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,

"it-would have been in the custody of the State Department"

personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 36).

O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned

the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8).* "But O'Donnell

assumed that it had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office:

It would have had to have come from Washington,

in my estimation, and I would think; since it

had been discussed with Gottlieb that it

probably would have emanated from his office.

(0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)

Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo

with O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 3/21/75,

pp. 60-61) .

O'Donnell was

"certain" that the virus had arrived before he

did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that

such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because

he had refused an assassination mission before departing. for the

Congo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17) .

O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where a

lethal biological

substance was in the possession of a CIA station

(0 ' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50).. He assumed that its purpose was

assassination:

When O'Donnell was informed about lledgman's testimony on

the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,

he said, "I believe

absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, P. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he

knew

them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that

testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as. "an honest and a decent

man" (0'Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 19) -- "a totally truthful man"

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p.. 56).

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My feeling definitely is that it was for a

specific purpose, and was just not

an all-

purpose capability there begin held for tar-

gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49.)

At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that

Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell,

6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very

possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connec-

tion with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75,

p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17:)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific

purpose"' of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, :.

9/11/75, p. 50) .

O'Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that

O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In

fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-

nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, p. 54.)

While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his

assassination operation with O'Donnell, he "assuned" that he had

at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access to

Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman,: 8/21/75,

pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was

"morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have

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explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would

he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-

ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone

else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26).

O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman

about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination

of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no

recollection of learning this from O'Donnell (ledsman, 8/21/75,

p. 56) .

Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi

nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with

"the morality of assassinations!' (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54) :

From my point of view I told him I had

moral objections to it,

not just qualms,

but objections.

I didn't think it was

the right thing to do. (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, p. 9) .

When

asked to characterize ledgman's attitude toward assassination

based on those discussions, D'Donnell said:

I will answer your question just as fairly

and as scrupulously as I can.

I have a

great deal of respect for Hedoman.

And if

he said something, I would believe hin to

be speakins the truth as

he knew it without

shading it.

The best I could say, 1

think, would be this, that he would not have

been opposed in principle to assassination in

the interests of national security....

I

know that he is a man of "reat moral per

ception and decency and honor, and so forth.

And that it would disturb him to be engaged in

something like that. But I think I would

have to say that in our conversations, my

memory of those, at no time would he rule it

out in 1s possibility. CO'Donnell.

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(V)

O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning

Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the

Assignment of Agent OJWIN to Leopoldville as His

Alter Ego

After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu-

lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from

the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

O'Donnell: [What I wanted to do was to

get him out, to trick him out, if I could,

and then turn him over ... to the legal

authorities and let him stand trial.

cause he had

atrocity attributed to him for

which he could very well stand trial:

2:

And for which he could very well have

received capital punishment?

O'Donnell: Yes. And I

am not opposed to

capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

pp. 20-21.)*

To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an ob-

servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced'

* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it

was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General

ot the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was

"JUST

A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop

Chief

of Station to Director, 10/11/60) .

The Chief of Station proceeded

to recormend Lunumba's

the same cable:

STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED (CONGOLESE] LEADERS

ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE

THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM

SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60) .

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(0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a member

of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an

attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell,

6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).

O'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to

CIA headquarters (0'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26): He also said that

he informed the Chief of Station about his plan (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

p. 56) .

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus-

tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was

QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

p. 19) :

What I wanted to use him for was

counter-espionagel.]...

I had to screen

the U.S. participation in this

... by

using a foreign national whom we knew,

trusted, and had worked with ... the

idea was

for me to use him as an alter

ego. (0' Donnell Ir.,. pp. 19-20.)

In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head-

quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261,

Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:

LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE

IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QUWIN TRAVEL TO

LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556,

Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-Novenber

reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese

troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan:

"CONCENTRIC

RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"

(CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Iweedy, 11/14/60).

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The cables: contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about

the "operational circumstances."

(b.)

Agent QUIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December

1960

QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal

background

recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:

Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer Arnold

Silver. In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell, 6/9/75,

p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by. Silver, to under-

take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."

(CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip

to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to

his mission:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-

jective for which we want him to perform his

task, he was not told precisely what we want

him to do..

Instead, he was told ... that

we would like to have him spot, assess, ano

recommend some dependable, quick-witted

persons for our use....

It was thought best

to withhold our true, specific requirements

pending the final decision to use (hin].

(CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)

* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to

send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-

fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained

in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-

tions that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com-

pleted this mission.

O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any

mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, PP. 32-33).

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This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained

at the station: :"this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic

necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA

Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable

IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960

(CIA Cable OUT: 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60) .

The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN

had been

recruited earlier by Arnold Silver

for use in a special operation in the Congo

[the assassination of Patrice Lumumbal to be

run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)

However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell re-

fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead,

O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba

from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in

the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pP. 13-14,

37 .)

According to O'Donnell, RJWIN was a man who was capable of

undertaking an assassination mission:

0. 'Donnell:

... I would say that he would not

be a man of many scruples.

l: So he was a man capable of doing anything?

O'Donnell: I would think so, yes.

I: And that would include assassination?

O'Donnell: I would think so.

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, PD. 35-36.)

* See Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above.

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But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an

assassination mission (D'Donnell, 9/11/75, PP. 36, 42) :

O'Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA

officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QWIN did

not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28).

When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent

of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said:

O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible --or

it could have been that somebody contacted

him after he got down there, that they.

wanted him to do something along the lines

of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, p. 29.).

But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it

would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent

in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising

officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).

Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line

of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29

shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.

In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP

channel to Iweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to

"PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence

and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief.

of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed

QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force

whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

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(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at

this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This

did not deter QJWIN:

VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QUWIN

ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED

DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELE WITHOUT

USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60) .

It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina-

tion as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters

came through the PROP channel the next day which was also suscep-

tible of interpretation as an assassination order:

CONCUR QUWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.... WE ARE

PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY OJWIN

BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY

FACTORS.

HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED

STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314,

Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station,

11/30/60.)

O'Donnell said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-

extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I

did." (0'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19:) O'Donnell said he left the

Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands

of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20:) QJWIN. left in

December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities

in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom O'Donnell had worked

before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the

success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a

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specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been

completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William'k. Harvey,

1/11/61). O'Donnell explained Harvey's reference to the fact that

QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba

was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for

the mounting of the project... had become moot". (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, P: 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for

Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, O'Donnell

said: "'Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 35). Harvey did not.

recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that O'Donnell's.

return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QUWIN's

mission (Harvey, affidavit, p.. ).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that

QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission

and the suggestive language of the cables at the

end of November,

there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any

assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved

in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave

no testimony that tended to show. that QJWIll was related to that plot.

The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection"' that QWIN

was in the Congo working

for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of

Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 3/21/75, P. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson

Tweedy did not recall anything about AJWIN's mission in the Congo

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(Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, PP. 54; 61).

• William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for

his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities

in the Congo:

I was

kept informed of the arrangements for

QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,

of his presence in the Congo.

I do not know

specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I

do not think that I ever had such knowledge..

If QWIN were to be used on an assassination

mission, it would have been cleared with me.

I was never informed that he was to be used

for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, P. )

He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda con-

cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Harvey

affidavit, p. .

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

After leaving the Congo in early. 1961, QJWIN was used by

CIA officer Willian Harvey as the principal

asset in Project ZRRIFLE,

a project which included research into a capability to assassinate

foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"

figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents

by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation

of Project ZRRIFLE:

* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section

infra, on the "Executive Action Capability."

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Arnold Silver had not previously used

QJWIN as

an assassination capability or

even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-

davit, p.:

Although Harvey also had discussions with Sidney Gottlieb in connec-

tion with Froject ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned

to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Cottlieb's own

trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p.. ). Harvey had con-

sulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52) . :

The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he had

never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project.

to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders.

(Hedgman, '8/21/75, P. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was

"quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities

or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 95.)

Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-

intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss

the plan to assassinate Lumumba.. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA

and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs

hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold

SIlver

in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial

in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:

IF

.... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISHL ATTEMPT QUASIL

CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR

OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.)

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(d)

The one incident where there is an explicit reference to

assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with

WIROGUE, another

asset of the Congo station.

WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European who was

"a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French

Foreign Legion. (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was

sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee

by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling

through the Congo: (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was

assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT

ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT

REGARD FOR DANGER"' (CIA Cable OUI 36554,.

Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60) .

The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a

rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least."

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility

agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-

ing new contacts; various things." (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.)

Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in

touch with Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector

General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking-he

received:

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On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa.

Division met with him to discuss

tional assignment in Africa Division.

"an opera-

connection

with this assignment, WIROGUE/1

was to be trained in demolitions, small arms

and medical immunization....

In: October 1960

a cable to Leopoldville stated that

deadquarters (had] ... intent to use him as--

utility agent in order to "(a) organize and

conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept

packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (1) execute

other assignments requiring positive action.

His utilization is not to be restricted to

Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on

December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 13739, 12/17/60). He was given two

instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;"

and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team'' of intelligence -«

assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA

Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60.)

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached

QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is

described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a cable to

CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99) :

QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED

LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH

AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE.

SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS.

STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS

PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER

"EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED,

WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPEÇIAL JOBS.

UNDER QJVIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-

INF FOR (AMERICAN) SERVICE.

IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED

OJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.

THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE

HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS.

[CHIEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT

WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION (CIA]:

(CIA Cable,

Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60)

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The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE'S

actions:

LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING.

AND LACK SECURITY.

STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-

ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WIIO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING

FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING

KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE

DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST

SOLUTION.

(CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,

12/17/60.)

WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is

explained by lledgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as .

an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed.

WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

I would like to stress that I don't know what

WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution

squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to

go out and execute.

anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocterl the idea of an

execution squad:

His idea of what an intelligence operative

should do, & think, had been gathered by

reading a few novels or something of the

sort.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone

connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-

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tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75; pP. 39-42). O'Donnell men-

tioned that. agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm

squad," but' said that this was for purposes more general than

assassinations:

surveillance teams where you have to g0

into crime: areas... where you need a

fellow that if he gets in a box can fight

his way out of it. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

p. 36).

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to

QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that .

WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo

(Tweedy, 9/9/75, P. 63). But Iweedy testified that WIROGUE would

"absolutely not" have

been used on an assassination mission against

Lumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt

with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people

in the Africa Division - Iweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn

Fields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba

was being considered (Iweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was

connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted

a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which

this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was

sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much

wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received

concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

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WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you

speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75;

p. 101)

The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition

to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to

WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman

said:

I had difficulty controlling him in that he

was not a professional intelligence officer

as such. He seemed to act on his own without

seeking guidance or authority ....I found

he was rather an unguided missile ... the

kind of man that could get you in trouble be-

fore you knew you were

in trouble....

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 96-97) .

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:

(I]f you give a man an order and he carries it

out and causes a problem for the Station, why

then as Chief of Station, well, you accept

responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 37.)

In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact

that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during

this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad"

was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi-

nation plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that VIROGUE was to be trained in "medical

immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility

that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means

oi lethal biological substances.. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case

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by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The

report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of

his time trying

to develop contacts and was not directly involved

in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But,

when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office,

the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one

of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in

assassination attempts:

"ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-

carded out of hand as

'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum,

3/14/75)

6.

The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing

About Lumumba's Death in Katanga

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-

ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely

connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that

they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.

(a)

Toole say an us concede a physite:

November 27-December 3, 1960

the strongest hint that the CIA inay have been involved

in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure

from UN custody on

November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from

the Chief of Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,

Chief of Station to Iweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re-

ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's

POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT

HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO

THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

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The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge

of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that

eventuality:

DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE

SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY

(AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE..

STATION

HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT

OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL. PLANS OF

ACTION.. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

There is no other evidence, however, that-the CIA actually

gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville.

In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's

escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-

stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable IN 43484, Leopoldville

to Director, 11/28/60) :

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether.

the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese

troops:

(STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]

TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED

(BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,

11/28/60.)

'A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates

against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese

forces as the source of the station's information. (CIA Cable IN 10643.,

Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60) :

The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that

there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure

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from Uil custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's

plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted

with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might

take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-

ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (liedgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell had planned to draw. Lumumba

out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he

insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked

by the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22) .

(b)

Tanuate of Lupuna to Katanga Where He Was KilLed:

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was

kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January, of

1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba

a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of

CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

* Excerpts fron cable traffic of January 1961 and from the

testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms

(investigative report) should be inserted

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SECTION 7: Rewritten per

Subcommittee Instructions,

10/20/75 (FDB)

7.

The Question of the Level at which the Assassination Plot

Was Authorized

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony

is

strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assas-

sination plot was authorized by

the President. It is clear that

Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

At the least, the chronological relationship between strong

Presidential or other White House expressions of hostility. to

Lumumba and CIA steps toward the

assassination of Lumumba is close

enough to make it appear that Dulles thought he was acting in re-

sponse to pressure from above in approving assassination as one.

means of removing Lumumba from the political scene.

Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by

Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity in the

records of high-level policy meetings to raise a doubt as to whether

President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.

The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with

the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meet-

ing of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of

1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order

for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memo-

randum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indi-

cated that when the President's "extremely strong feelings on the

necessity for very straightforward action" were conveyed, the Special

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Group

agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily

rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-

tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

(Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)

The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special

Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of Station in Leopold-

ville that Lumumba's "'REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE

• . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966,

Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON

YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."

Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-

tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the as-

sassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in

his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group

meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-

sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP: 33-

34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the

primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,

testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,

including

assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-

move Lumumba from a position of influence (Iweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).

On September 19, 1960, Bissell

and Tweedy cabled the Chief of

Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters.: Two days later,

in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

HHT

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Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave

danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th

NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-

tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Chief of Station

with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate

Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this

operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that

it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-

tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-

sponsible to the

President for national security affairs testified

that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an

assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National

Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit

Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary

of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-

tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism

for extremely

sensitive

statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 18-19).

NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos-

sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order

would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-

mism.

Several high Government officials involved in policy-making

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and planning for covert operations testified that the language in

these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated

at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political

threat; other officials testified to the contrary..

(a)

High-Level Meetings at which "Getting Rid of Lumumba"

Was Discussed

(i) Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassina-

tion Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960.

In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United

States and met with Secretary of State Christian Herter and Under-

secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washing-

ton, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Govern- -e

ment of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60, p. ).

According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left

with the Government officials was that of an irrational, almost

psychotic personality:

When he was in the State Department meeting, either with

me or with the Secretary in my presence • i

• he would

never look you in the eye. He looked up at the sky.

And

a tremendous flow of words came out.,

He spoke in French,

and he spoke it very fluently.

And his words didn't ever

have

any relation to the particular things that we wanted

to discuss

You had a feeling that he was a per-

son that was gripped by this fervor that I can only char-

acterize as messianic

• He was just not a rational

being. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 24.)

Dillon said that the willingness of the United States Government to

work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings:

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(Tihe impression that was left was

.. very bad, that

this was

with.

an individual whom it was

impossible to deal

And the feelings of the Government as a result

of this sharpened very considerably at that time

We [had] hoped to see him and see what we could do to

come to better understanding with him.. (Dillon, 9/2/75,

PP. 23-24.)

Dillon testified that shortly after Lumumba's visit to Washing-

ton, in late July or August, he attended a meeting at the Pentagon

where representatives of the State Department, Defense Department,

Joint: Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, PP.

17-20, 25-26).*

According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of

an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the

meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 15; see also 17, 25). Dillon did not

recall anything about the language used in raising the question

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon assumed that when the subject of

Lumumba's assassination was raised, "it was turned off by the CIA"

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30)... Dillon said that "the CIA people, whoever

they were, were negative to any such action" (Dillon, 912/75, p. 18).

This opposition "wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an

objection on the grounds that it was "not a possible thing" (Dillon,

9/2/75, p. 18). Dillon said the CIA reaction "might have been" made

out of the feeling that the group was too large for such a sensitive

Dillon was unable to recall the precise date of this meeting (Dil-

Ion, 9/2/75, PP. 25-26).

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discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 60).

Dillon was clear about the fact that "top level" CIA people

were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the

negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75,

pp. 22, 25). He said it "would have to have been either Allen

Dulles, or possibly (Generall Cabell... most likely Cabell"

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 25). He added that it was "very likely" that

Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2475, p. 21).

Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served as

authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 31). But he believed that the expression of

concern typified a prevalent attitude toward Lumumba that might

have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate

him:

I think they could have decided they wanted to develop

the capability .

just by knowing the concern that

everyone had about Lumumba.

• *.

They wouldn't have

had to tell anyone about that. That is just developing

their own internal capability, and then they would have

to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30)

Dillon testified that he had never heard any mention of the plot to

poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that

the CIA asked permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75,

p. 50). But after being informed of the poison plot, Dillon made

the following comment about the Pentagon meeting he attended:

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I think it is .

likely that it might have been

the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that

they should develop such a capacity.. And maybe they

didn't have it then and went to work to develop it be-

ginning in August.

(Dillon, 9/2!75; p. 61)

Dillon said that it was unlikely that formal notes were taken at the

meeting or preserved because it was a small "ad hoc" group rather

than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Such interdepärtmen-

tal meetings were "not unusual," according to Dillon (Dillon, 9/21

75, p. 20) .

The only officials Dillon named as probable participants other

than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James

Douglas and Assistant

Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II (Dillon,

9/2/75, PP. 19, 21). Douglas stated that it was possible that he

attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall it

(Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Nor does he recall the question of

Lumumba's assassination ever being raised in his presence (Douglas

affidavit, 9/5/75). Likewise, Irwin stated that it was "likely"

that he attended the meeting to which Dillon referred; but he did

not remember whether he was present "at any meeting at the Pentagon

where the question of

assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised"

(Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3).

(11)

Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the Presi-

dent Order Lumumba's Assassination at an NSC

Meeting

Robert H. Johnson,.

a member of the National Security

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Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what he termed a

"clue" to

the extent of Presidential involvement in the decision to

assassinate Lumumba (Johnson, 6/18/75, PP. 4-5).* Johnson re-

counted the

following occurrence at an NSC meeting. in the Summer

of 1960 which began with

a briefing on world developments by the

Director of Central Intelligence:

* Robert Johnson introduced his testimony with the following state-

ment:

. I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out

that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has

involved tor me a profound personal, moral dilemma.

In

my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half

years, I was privy to a great deal of information that in-

volved relationships of confidentiality with high officials

of the United States government.

I have always taken very

seriously the responsibilities implied in such relation-

ships.

These responsibilities extend, in my view, far beyond

questions of security classification or other legal or

foreign policy concerns. They relate to the very basis of

human society and government - to the relationships of

trust without which no free

society can long survive and

no government can operate.

I have been forced by recent developments, however, to

weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broad-

er responsibilities as a citizen on an issue that involves

najor questions of public morality;

as well as questions

of sound policy.

Having done so, I have concluded, not

without a great deal of reluctance, to come to your commit-

tee with information bearing upon your inquiry into govern-

ment decisions relating to the assassination of foréign

leaders.

(Johnson, 6/18/75, PP. 4-5)

After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council,

Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Coun-

cil at the Department of State.

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At some time during that discussion, President Eisen-

hower said something -- I can no longer remember his words

-- that came across to me as

an order for the assassina-

tion of Lumumba who was then at the center of political

conflict and controversy in the Congo.

There was no dis-

cussion; the meeting simply moved on.

I remember my sense

of that moment quite clearly because the President's state-

ment came as a great shock to me.

I cannot, however, re-

, construct the moment more specifically.

Although I was convinced at the time -- and remained

convinced when I thought about it later -- that the Presi-

dent's statement was intended as an order for the assas-

sination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about.

the incident more recently I have had some doubts.

As is

well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President

Eisenhower

to make or announce policy decisions in NSC

meetings.

strange if he departed from

that normal pattern

a subject so sensitive as this.

Moreover, it was not long after this, I believe, that Lu-

mumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in an action

that was a quasi-coup. "I have come to wonder whether what

I really heard was only an order for some such political

action.

All I can tell you with any certainty at the

present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet

Room of the White House, (Johnson, 6/18/75, PP. 6-7)

Johnson "presumed" that the President made his statement while "look-

ing toward the Director of Central Intelligence" (Johnson, 6/18/75,

p. I1). He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the

words used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, P. 10).

When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had

heard only a general directive for the political overthrow of Lumumba,

Johnson testified that it was his clear impression at the time of the

meeting, and has remained so for the fifteen years since, that he had.

heard an assassination order:

• Would it be fair to say that although you al-

Iow for the possibility that a coup or some more general

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political action was being discussed, it is your clear

impression that you had heard an order for the assassi-

nation of Lumumba?

Johnson: It was my clear impression at the time.

S: And it remains your impression now?

Johnson:

It remains my impression now. I have reflect-

ed on this other kind of possibility, but that is the

sense .:. • that persists. (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp: 24-25)

Johnson explained that his allowance for the possibility that he had

heard an order for a coup did not disturb his recollection of hear-

ing an assassination order:

It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard

and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me that

It was possible that that is what I heard, but that

would not change my sense of the moment when I heard

the President speak, which I felt then, and I continue

to feel, was a statement designed to direct the dispos-

al, assassination, of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12)

Johnson. stated that the incident provoked a strong reaction

from him:

I was surprised

.. that I would ever hear a President

say anything like this in my presence or the presence of

a group of people. I was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75,

p. 13)

A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by Senator

Mathias in the

following exchange:

Mathias:

.. . What comes across is that you do have a

memory, if not of exact words, but of your own reaction

really to a Presidential order which you considered

be an order for an assassination.

Johnson: That is correct.

Mathias: And that although precise words have escaped

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you in the passage of fifteen years, that sense of shock

remains?

Johnson: Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8)

After the meeting, Johnson, who was responsible for writing the

memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on

the NSC staff to determine how to handle the President's statement

in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board

that followed each meeting: -

I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection --

that I omitted it from the debriefing.. I also do not re- -

call how I handled the subject in the memo of the meet-

1ng, though I suspect that some kind of reference to the

President'

s statement was made.

(Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7)

In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite like-?

ly that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have

been omitted altogether" (Johnson, 9/13/75, P. 21):*

*. In 1960, Johnson was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat --

third in command on the NSC staff. He attended NSC meetings to take

notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials

was absent.

Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the

manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one

of the two top. NSC staff officials at that time:

NSC Executive Secre-

cary James Lay of Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs (Johnson,

9/13/75, pP. 12-13)..

Johnson could not recall which of the two offi-

cials he had consulted, but he "inferred" that it must have been the

"top career NSC staff person present" at the meeting where he heard

the President's statement (Johnson,

9/13/75, p. 12).

At both of the

NSC meetings where the President and Johnson were present for a dis-

cussion of Lumumba -- August 18 and September 7 -- James Lay was ab-

sent and Marion Boggs served as Acting Executive Secretary.

Marion Bogg's statement about his method of handling the situation

described by Johnson is in accord with Johnson's testimony:

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•As Johnson stated, his testimony standing alone is. "a clue,

rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision-

making with respect. to assassinations"' (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 5). To

determine the significance of this "clue," it must be placed in the

context of the records of the NSC meetings attended by Johnson,

testimony about those

meetings, and the series of events that pre-

ceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassina-

tion.

In the Summer of 1960, there were four NSC meetings where de

velopments in the Congo were discussed at which Robert Johnson was

present. The President was not in attendance at two of those occa-

sions -- July 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes,

I have no independent recollection of being consulted by

Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of dis-

cussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba.

I am

not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do not re-

member such an incident..

If I had been consulted, I

would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit

the matter from the memorandum of discussion. (Boggs .

affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2)

James Lay, who attended other NSC meetings where. Lumumba was discuss-

ed (e.g.

September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC min-

utes would not be likely to record a statement as sensitive as a

Presidential order for an assassination, if such an order were given:

If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an

NSC meeting, it was

sometimes the practice that the

official NSC minutes would

record only. the general

subject discussed without identifying the specially

sensitive subject. as the discussion.

In highly

sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would

be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75,

p. 2)

NH 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 343

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7/21/60).

Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even

at these

early meetings was vehement:

Mr. Dulles

said that in Lumumba we were faced with a

person who was a Castro or worse

• . Mr. Dulles went

on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-

scribed. as "harrowing"

It is safe to go on the

assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-

ists; this also, however,

fits with his own orienta-

tion.

(NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)

The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-

ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-

mine with

certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the

President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the

Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testi-

mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series

of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-

ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-

ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.

*

The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-

tall in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:

The week: following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group

was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the

necessity

for very straightforward action"

consider

and the Group agreed to

"any particular kind of activity which might contribute to

getting rid of Lumumba"' (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this

neeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the cómments

referred to seriously

and had

every intention of proceeding as vig-

orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60;

see Section 7(a) (jii), infra).

The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes

Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in

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The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before

the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu

-- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not

long after" he heard

the President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson

could have heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-

ber 7, two days after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,

indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Doüglas Dillon* introduced

* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-

TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE

AND THAT

THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"

(CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-

les cable added:

WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY

INCLUDING EVEN MORE

AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT

ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-

ACETO AUTHORITY

YOU CAN

FERRAL HERE.

(CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, supra,

for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19; a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters

to the Congo on

an

extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable

OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60; see Section

4(a), supra). On September 21, in the presence of the

President at

an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave

danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see

section /(a) (1V), infra). Finally,

on September 26, the CIA scien-

tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal

biological substances,

instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in-

formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an

as-

The Chief of

sassination effort (see Sections 4(a) -4(c), SUROM CIA headquarters.

Station stated that he received confirmation

that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section

4(e) (i), supra).

* In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two

position in the State Department,

the name of which

subsequently

changed to Deputy Secretary of State.

In this position, he frequently

(Continued)

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the discussion of U.S. policy toward the Congo. In the course of

his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations

troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at

Lumumba's request:

If.

Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN

out,

he might then offer to accept help from anyone. . .

The elimination of the UN would be a disaster which,

Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we

could to prevent.

If the UN were forced out, we might

be faced by a situation where the Soviets intervened by

invitation of the Congo. (NSC. Minutes, 8/18/60)

The discussion then continued to raise the spectre of an alliance be-..

tween Lumumba and the Soviet Union:

Secretary Dillon

said that he (Lumumba] was working to

serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed

out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/

60)

In this context, the following exchange between President Eisenhower

and Secretary Dillon was recorded:

The President said that the possibility that the UN would

be. forced out was simply inconceivable.

We should keep

the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European

troops to do it.

We should do

so even if such action was

used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight.

Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but

that the Secretary General and Mr. Lodge doubted whether,

if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the

UN, the UN could stay in.

In response,

the President

stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent -- we were

talking of one man forcing us. out of the Congo; of Lumum-

ba

supported by the Soviets. There was no indication, the

served as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was

kept informed about NSC and Special Group meetings.

Dillon

later served as Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy.

(Dillon, 9/2/75, PP. 2-4.)

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President stated, that the Congolese did not want

UN

support and the maintenance of order.

Secretary

Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling

about the matter.

The

situation that would be

created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too

ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)

This is the only statement about Lumumba which the memorandum of

the meeting attributed to the President.

As reported, it clearly does not contain an order for the

assassination of Lumumba. But the statement does indicate extreme -

Presidential concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so

disturbed by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to

risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was

the "one man" who was

responsible for this situation, a man who

did not represent the sentiments of the Congolese people in the

President's estimation.

After reviewing NSC documents and being informed of Robert

Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated his "opinion that it

is most. likely that the NSC meeting. of August 18, 1960 is the

meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.)

However, Dillon testified that he did not "remember such a thing"

as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of

Lumumba (Dillon; 9/2/75, P. 32). Dillon explained how he thought

the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba:

Dillon: .

• It could have been in

view of this

feeling of everybody that Lumumba was lal very

difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and

was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world,

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that the President expressed himself, we will have

to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I

don't know that I would have taken that as a

clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And

I think perhaps others present may have interpreted

it other ways. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 32-33.)

Q: Did you ever hear the President make such a

remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's

take

action right away on this?

Dillon: I don't remember that. But certainly this

was the general feeling of Government at that time,

and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't

agreed with it: (Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 33.)

Dillon said that he would have thought that such a

state-

ment "was not a direct order to have an assassination" (Dillon,

9/2/75, p. 33). But he testified that it was "perfectly

possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated such strong

Presidential language about "getting rid of" Lumumba into

authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75,

pp. 34-35) :

I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite

responsive to what he considered implicit autho-

rization, because he felt very strongly that we

should not involve the President directly in

things of this nature.. And he was perfectly

willing to take the responsibility personally

that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have

been.

And so I think that this is a perfectly

plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles.

(Dillon,

9/2/75, p. 34.)

Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, as

Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing

the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting:

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I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no

independent recollection of any statements or dis-

cussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically,

I have no recollection of any statement, order or

reference by the President (or anyone else present

at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favor-

ing action by the United States to bring about the

assassination of Lumumba.* (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75,

pp. 1-2.)

The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of Septem-

ber 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have

heard the President's

statement--records only a brief, general

discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes,

9/7/60).

As part of Allen Dulles' introductory intelligence briefing on

world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the situation

in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba from his

position in the government (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 4). Neither

the length nor the substance of the record of this discussion

indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received the same

intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August

18.**

There is no record of any statesent by the President

* Boggs added:

'Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have

considered it highly unusual if a matter of this natur

had been referred to in a Council meeting where a number

of persons with no.

"need to know'

were present."

(Boggs

affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.)

** The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with

the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes,. 9/7/60,

pp. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an

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during this discussion (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, PP. 4-5).

Nevertheless, in the course of his briefing Dulles

expressed his

continuing concern over the amount of personnel

and equipment that was being sent to the Congo by the Soviet

Union, primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5):

Dulles concluded this part of his briefing with an observation

that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal from the government

had not lessened the extent to which he was regarded at the

NSC as a potent political threat. in any power struggle in the

Congo:

Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to

come out on top in each of these struggles.

(NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5.)

The day after this NSC meeting, Gordon Gray made a pointed

reminder of the President's concern about the Congo to Allen

Dulles at a meeting of the Special Group:

Mr. Gray

said that he hoped that Agency people in

the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be

amiss.

(Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60.)

There are three possible interpretations of the failure

of NSC records. to reveal whether the President ordered the

assassination of Lumumba at one of these meetings. First, an

extraordinarily lengthy (fifteen pages) summary of discussion

on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating

that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC

Minutes, 8/18/60, pp. 1-15) .

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assassination order could have been issued but omitted from

the records. Robert Johnson testified that it was

"very

likely" that the Presidential statement he heard would have

been handled by means of

a euphemistic reference or by.

complete omission "rather

than given as lal . . . direct quo-

tation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75,

p. 14).. Second, as illustrated by Douglas Dillon's testimony,

the President could have made a general statement about "getting

rid of" Lumumba with the intent to convey to Allen Dulles that

there was implicit authorization for an assassination effort.

Third, despite general discussions about removing Lumumba, the

President may not have intended to order the assassination of

Lumumba even though Allen Dulles may have thought an assassina-

tion effort had been authorized. The three White House staff

members responsible to the President for national security

affairs testified that there was no such order.

Gordon Gray,

Andrew Goodpaster, and

John Eisenhower were all in attendance

at the NSC meetings of August. 18 and September 7:*

(i11) .

The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Led

The Special Group to Consider Anything That Might

Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960

On August 25, 1960 five men*' attended a meeting of the

* See. Section 7(b), infra, for a general treatment of the

testimony of Gray, Coodpaster and Eisenhower.

** There were four standing members of the Special Group at

this time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon

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Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security

Council responsible for planning covert operations. Thomas

Parrott, a CIA officer who served as Secretary to the Group,

began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations

that had

been undertaken in "mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the

Congo" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). This campaign involved

covert operations through certain labor groups and "the planned

attempt: : . to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba"

in the Congolese Senate (Special GrOup Minutes, 8/25/60).

The outline of this campaign evoked the following dialogue:

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is

very much in order.

Mr. Gray commented, however,

that his associates had expressed extremely strong

feelings on the necessity for very straightforward

action in this situation, and he wondered whether the

plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.

Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments

referred to seriously and had every intention of pro-

ceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or

requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself

in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind

within the bounds of necessity and capability.

It was

finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not

necessarily rule out

'consideration' of any particular

kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid

of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, p. 1.)

Both Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that refer-

ence to Mr. Gray's "associates" was a euphemism for President

Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political

Affairs; and John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Also in regular attendance was Thomas A. Parrott,

Secretary to

the Special Group.

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Eisenhower which was employed to preserve "plausible deniabil-

ity" by the President of discussion of covert operations

memorialized in Special Group Minutes. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 27;

Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 8-9).

The four living participants at the meeting have all stated

that they do not recall any discussion of or planning for the

assassination of Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1;

Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, PP. 1-2; Gray, 7/9/75, PP. 27, 32;

Parrott, 7/10/75, pp: 25-26). Gray said that he did not con-

sider the President's desire for "very straightforward action".

to include "any thought in his mind of assassination" (Gray,

7/9/75, p. 32): Parrott testified to the same effect, maintain-

ing that he would have recorded a discussion of assassination

in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes if such a dis-

cussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 26-27).

John N. Irwin II acknowledged, however, that while he did

not have "any direct recollection of the substance of that

meet -

ing"'

', the reference in the minutes to the planning for "getting

rid of Lumumba" was

"broad enough to cover a discussion of

assassination" (IIwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2).

Irwin's interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and

Richard Bissell--two high government officials who were not.

participants at this Special Group meeting but who were involved

in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the

Congo during this period.

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As a participant in National Security Council meetings

of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special

Group minutes of August 25, 1960, to indicate that assassina-

tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might

be used to "get rid of" Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 42):

Dillon noted that the reference in the minutes to the fact

that Allen Dulles stated that he "had taken the comments

referred to seriously" probably pointed to the President's

statement

at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson

took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, PP. 39-40) .

When asked whether the CIA would have the authority to

mount an assassination effort against Lumumba on the basis of

the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said:

They would certainly have the authority to plan.

It is a close question whether this would be

ce question ve

enough to actually go ahead with it.

But cer-

tainly the way this thing worked,

as far as I

""think they would have checked back at least

they didn't do anything. just on their own.

with the senior people in the State Department

or the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75,

p. 43:)

Dillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Depart-

ment, it might have been done in such a way that it would not

appear on any rècord (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43). Dillon added that

"to protect the President as the public representative of

the

U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen

Dulles "wouldn't return to the President" to seek further

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approval if an assassination operation were mounted (Dillon,

9/2/60, PP. 42-43).

Richard Bissell

stated that in his opinion the language

of the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 indicated

that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general

strategy at the NSC and within the CIA for removing Lumumba

from the political

scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 29, 32).

Bissell added:

The Agency had put a top priority, probably, on

a range of difterent methods of getting rid of

Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him

physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating

his political influence: (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 29.)

Bissell pointed to the Special Group Minutes of August 25,

1960 as a "prime example" of the circumlocutious manner in

which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high

government officials:

Bissell: When you use the language that no particu-

lar means were

ruled out, that is obviously what It

meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room.

Meant

that if it had to be assassination, that that

was a permissible means.

You don't use language of that kind except to mean

in effect, the Director is being told, get rid of

the guy, and if you have to use extreme means up

to and including assassination, go ahead. (Bissell,

9/10/75, PP. 32-33.)

Bissell added that this message was, "in effect"

• being given

• to Dulles

by the President through his representative Gordon

Gray (Bissell; 9/10/75, p. 33).

(iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said

Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until

"Disposed Of"

In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC

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on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of

Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba

had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN

custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially

in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between

Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the

Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet.

disposed of and remained a grave danger as long

as he was not disposed of.

(NSC. Minutes,'

9/21/60:

Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a

personal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which

included the following message:

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING

LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL

POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOPOLDVILLE!, SETTING

HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,

OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from

CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989,

Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief of

Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba,

and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for

this mission (see Sections 4(b) -4(c), supra).

Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wroté

the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not

interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination:

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I have

examined the memorandum (which I prepared)

summarizing

the discussion of the Congo at the

September 21, 1960 meeting of the NSC.

I recall the

discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately

summarized in the memorandum.

of any discussion of a possible assassination of Lumumba

at this meeting.

mich

•I have no recollection

With specific reference to the state-

ment of the Director of Central

Intelligence

I

believe this is almost a literal

rendering of what Mr.

Dulles said.

My own interpretation of this statement

was that Mr. Dulles was speaking in the context of

efforts being made within the Congolese government to

force Lumumba from power.

I did not interpret it as

referring

; to assassination* (Boggs affidavit 10/10/75,

pp. 2-3.)

Boggs was not, however, in a position to analyze Dulles'

remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations

that took place during this period because Boggs was not privy

to most such discussions (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, P. 2).

C. Douglas Dillon, who attended this NSC meeting as

Acting Secretary of State, said that he did not recall the dis-

cussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 47). Dillon said that the minutes

"could mean that" assassination would have been one acceptable

means of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that "getting

him out lof the Congol or locking him up" would have been a

preferable disposition of Lumumb at that point since he was

* NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was

at the meeting of September 21, 1960, stated:

whether there was

september 20m

also present

"I cannot recall.

any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at

any NSC meetings."

(Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1.)

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already out of office (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 48).*. When reminded

of the fact that Lumumba's movement and communications were

not restricted by the UN force and that the Congolese army

continued to seek his arrest long after the NSC meeting, Dillon

acknowledged that during this period Lumumba continued to be

viewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatile

force in the Congo:

He had this tremendous ability to stir up

a crowd or a group.

And if he could have gotten

out and started to talk to a battalion of the

Congolese Army,

he probably would have had them

in the palm of his.

hand in five minutes. (Dillon,

9/20/75, p. 49.)

John N. Irwin II; who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant

Secretary of Defense, stated that although he had no recollection

of the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enough

to cover a discussion of assassination" (IIwin affidavit,;

9/22/75, p. 2).

Richard Bissell testified that, based upon his understanding

of the policy. of the NSC toward Lumumba even after Lumumba was

in UN custody, he would read the minutes of September 21 to indi-

cate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means"

* See Section 3, supra, for discussion of CIA cable traffic

indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable..

of taking over the government after he was deposed. and that

pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease until his death.

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of "disposing of". Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissell

was not present at the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60) .

Bissell's opinion stands in opposition to that of Gordon

Gray, the President's National Security Advisor, who Iikewise

testified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in which

he participated (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57). When asked to interpret

the reference to "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray said he "put it

the same category as 'get rid of', 'eliminate'" (Gray, 719/75,

p. 57): Early in his testimony, Gray stated that "assassination

could have been on the minds of some people when they used

these words "'eliminate' or 'get rid of'' (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17).

Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSC

meeting of September 21, he said: "It was not my impression

that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75,

p. 57).*

* HonE state, who attended he Neeting ages istant

White House Staff Secretary,

recollection" of the discussion

but he found the minutes of

the meeting consonant with his "recollection of the atmosphere"

at the time: "the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba"

(Eisenhower, 7118/75, P. 9). He said:

I would not conjecture that the words "disposed of"

meant an

assassination, if for no other reason than

if I had something as nasty as this to plot, I wouldn't.

do it in front of 21 people

the number present

lat] the meeting. (Bisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 10.)

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- (b)

Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That

They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of

Assassination

The two members of President Eisenhower's staff who were

responsible for national security affairs--Gordon Gray.

and

Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge

of Presidential consideration of

assassination during their

tenure.

Gordon Gray served as Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated

the National Security Council and represented the President at

Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall

President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated

killing Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 28) . * When

asked to inter-

pret phrases from the minutes of particular NSC and Special

Group meetings such as "getting rid of" or "disposing of"

Lumumba, Gray stated:

It is the intent of the user of the expression or

the phrase

that is controlling and there may well

have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans

and/or discussions of assassinations, but

the level of the Forty Committee [Special Groupl

or a higher level than that, the National Security

Council, there was no active discussion in any way

planning assassination.

• I agree that assassination could have

* At the outset of his testimony on the subject, Gordon Gray

acknowledged that

he did not have a clear, independent recollec-

tion of Lumumba'

s role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, PP. 25-26).

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been on the minds of some people when they used

these words 'eliminate' or

'get rid of'

• I

•am just trying to say that it was not seriously

considered as a program of action by the Presi-

dent or even the Forty [Speciall Group.

(Gray,

7/9/75, P. 17.)

Andrew. Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to

President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the "principal

channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC

meetings (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, P. 4): Goodpaster was responsi-.

ble for "handling with the President all matters of day-to-day

operations in the general fields of international affairs and

security affairs" (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, P. 3). He regularly

attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at

the NSC meetings of August 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960.

When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort

during the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster replied

unequivocally:

.: at no time and in no way did I ever know

of or hear about any proposal, any mention of

.. (Ilt is my belief that

nad such a thing been raised with the President

other than in my presence, I would have known

about it,

and

it would have been a matter

of such significance and sensitivity that I am

confident that

• I would have recalled it had

such

a thing happened. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75,

p. 5.)

John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Good-

paster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that

the use of assassination was

contrary to the President's philos-

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ophy that "no man is indispensable" (Eisenhower, 1/18/75, p. 14.)*

As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended dis-

cussions in

the Oval Office relating to national security affairs,.

John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his atten-

tion in his experience at the White House "can be construed in

my mind in the

remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge

of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans" (Eisenhower,

7/18/75, P. 4).

* Douglas Dillon

never arose in his

testified that the subject of assassination

He was

the general philosophical approach

that Presidents Eisenhower

and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question

of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy:

Senator Hart (Colorado): I would invite your speculation at

this point

as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisen

hower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I

think

the Committee would be interested in your view as to

the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is

to say;

the elimination, violent elimination of foreign

leaders?

Dillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on

But I think probably

both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic

way, most likely, simply weighed the process and con-

sequence rather than in

a way that was primarily of a

moral principle.. That is what would probably have been

their attitude in a few cases.

Certainly the idea that

this was going to be a policy of the U.S., generally

both of them were very much opposed to it. (Dillon,...

9/2/75, PP. 22-23.)

Dillon served as Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower

Administration and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy.

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• Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active

in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of

Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political

Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense

James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion

about

assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, PP. 1-2;

Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).

(c)

Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of

a Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred"

That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was

Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles

• Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level

authörization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-

lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection

of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony

on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,

9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject

by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed

Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,

6/11/75, pP. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based

on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating

to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an

assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels

of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,

65) .

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As discussed above; Bissell testified that the minutes

of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the

NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-

templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable

means

of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections. 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii),

supra)

There was

"no question", according to Bissell, that the

cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville

on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized :

Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was

direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had

attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell

was

"almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles

cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).

Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of

the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated

within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32) :

It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted

by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of

the Special GrOup

authorizing implementation

(of an assassination] if favorable circumstances

presented themselves,

if it could be done covertly.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, pP. 64-65.)

Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-

dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate

Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 61-62) :

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I: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower

wanted Lumumba killed?

Mr. Bissell:

I am sure he didn't.

Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously

through this kind of cable?

Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)

As for discussions with Dulles

about the source of autho-

rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell

stated:

I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles

would have said either the President or President

Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said,

this is authorized in the highest quarters, and 1

would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 48.)

When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the

consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-

tion of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had (such)

authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 61-62).

When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony

about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said

that despite his absence of a specific recollection:

I would strongly infer in this case that such an

authorization did pass through me, as it were,

if Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the

Station Chief.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 40.)

Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this

authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).

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Bissell did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that

Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there

was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he

had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there

was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc-

tion without authorization. from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb

that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion

that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about

Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were

fully authorized:

• In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency

Sottlie policy at the Agency at the time, Mr.

s representation to the Chief of Station

that the President had instructed the DCI to

carry out this mission would not have been beyond

the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that

point?

Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,

P. 65)

Bissell further stated:

Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable

to me that he would have

acted beyond his instruc-

tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75; p. 41.)

With respect 'to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

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O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 50): But he

said that this specific assignment was made in the context

that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-

rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, P.

50; see

also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-621.

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