OCI WEEKLY SUMMARY
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 11/29/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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SECRET

29 November 1963

OCI No. 0308/63

Copy No.

WEEKLY SUMMARY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

GROUP | Excluded from automatic

downgroding and declassification

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CONTENTS

(Information as of 1200 EST, 27 November 1963)

CUBA

CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE

Fear that President Kennedy's assassination will

bring a more "aggressive" US policy was reflected

in speeches by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

THE COMMUNIST WORLD

SOXIET STANDDOWN ON BERLIN AUTOBAHN HARASSMENT

- The-USSR's failure-since the 4-5 November incident-

to stop Allied convoys of nondismountable size and

Its statements of 16 and 21 November suggest that

Moscow has decided to settle for a standoff in the

autobahn dispute at least for the present.

SOXIET THOUGHT ON ARMORED VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

Information compiled from classified Soviet docu

ments has provided a good picture of the thinking

among Soviet military leaders on development of

tanks and other armored vehicles.

They appear to

be aiming toward two distinct tank types-a recon-

naissance and a main battle tank--to replace the

traditional light, medium, and heavy types.

(Pub-

lished separately as Special Report OCI No. 0308/63A)

EASTERN EUROPE PREPARES FOR HARD WINTER

The regimes there hope to prevent a recurrence of

the widespread discontent and the economic disloca

tions which resulted from last year's severe winter.

PELPING'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WITH NON-COMMUNIST ASIA

Their gradually increasing trade in non Communist

Asia provides foreign exchange the Chinese need to

buy grain.

Their aid activities in the area will

probably remain at a moderate level as long as the

grain imports continue.

ASIA-AFRICA

JAPANESE ELECTION OUTCOME

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party's victory did

not significantly shift the balance between right

and left, although the moderate socialist party

scored sienificant gains at the expense of its

more extreme rival.

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29 Nov 63

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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)

HIGH LEVEL OF VIET CONG ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

"Communist military action has become more effective

and widespread in recent weeks, thereby increasing

pressure on South Vietnam's new rulers to produce

some dramatic achievement.:

AREA NOTE

On Laos

THE TURKISH POLITICAL SITUATION.

"Turkey's military leaders--who have retained ulti-

mate authority since their takeover in 1960--must

soon decide whether to turn over power to a civil

lan party they do not trust or try to maintain in

power the present group which not only lacks popu-

lar support but shows no signs of being able to

generate it. Hitherto submerged currents of left-

ist opinion

may be coming to the surface.

(Published

separately as Special Report OCI No. 0308/63B)

SYRIAN AND IRAQI REGIMES TRYING TO STABILIZE

Relatively moderate elements in both the Baghdad

and the Damascus regimes seem anxious to reach an

accommodation with their various internal factions

as well as between the two governments, but extrem

ist pressures are still strong.

CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET DIPLOMATS

Soviet representatives in Leopoldville had been

assisting a radical exile group plotting against

Premier Adoula from neighboring Brazzaville.

ALAISE IN MALI

-The government of president Modibo Keita is faced

with

mounting criticism from powerful local polit

ical figures, dissidence among nomads, and a des-

perate foreign exchange shortage..

EUROPE

THA

DE GAULLE - ERHARD TALKS

The 21-22 November talks seem to have established

a good working relationship between the two lead-

ers and clarified certain aspects of French and

West German policies but produced few decisions

WESTERN EUROPE'S STEEL, PROBLEM

A meeting next week of the Coal-Steel Community's

Council promises to have far-reaching implications

for the CSC's future as well as for the outcome of

international tariff negotiations in the spring.

29 Nov 63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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EUROPE (continued)

ITALY'S ALDO MORO

In nearly five years as party secretary, Moro has

won the confidence of Italv's perennially divided

Christian Democrats but has only limited experience

in cabinet posts.

Personally retiring, he seems to

be undertaking the premiership with reluctance.

lished separately as Special Report OCI No. 0308/63C)

AREA NOTE

On Italy

Page

13

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

AREA NOTES

On Brazil and Venezuela

13,14

29

Nov

63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Cuba

CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE

Cuban leaders are appre-

hensive that President Kennedy's

assassination will result in a.

more "aggressive" US policy to-

ward Cuba.

who could benefit from the Presi

dent's death.

In this

connec

tion he warned that a "sinister

maneuver" was under way, and

declared "we must be cautious

and vigilant and alert."

Fidel Castro's two-hour

speech on 23 November, which

he

termed an "objective analysis"

of the implications of the

assassination, warned Cubans

that the President's death was

"serious and

bad news."

It

could, he said, turn "a bad

situation" into a worse one.

He also asserted that President

Kennedy's alleged promise not

to invade Cuba had been strongly

attacked by those "ultrareac-

tionaries" in the United States

who now are trying to create a

climate of "anti-Soviet and

anti Cuban hysteria" designed

to pressure the new US Presi-

dent toward a Cuban policy

"highly prejudicial

to the in-

terests of peace and of man-

kind.".

Che Guevara echoed these

warnings in a

speech of 24

November,

declaring that "the

years coming are going to be

as tough as, if not tougher

than; the years just past...we

must be

attack. „Prepared to repel any

He expressed confi-

dence in ultimate victory, not

only for Cuba but also for

"the peoples of Latin America."

Castro stated that he had

never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald

and insinuated that the Castro-

Communist affiliations of the

accused assassin were fabricated

by Us "reactionaries" who;

he

claimed, were the only people

Guevara stressed that the

revolutionary ferment in Latin

America is reaching a climax

and that the people there "are

going to conquer power in what-

ever manner necessary, destroy-

ing whatever force that opposes

He pointed

Cuba!s continuing "anti-imperi-

alist struggle" is closely

linked with

tion in the rest of Latin Amer-

"The fight of all peoples

is also our responsibility,"

he maintained, "and it is part

of our daily preoccupation."

(CONFIDENTIAL)

29 Nov

63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The Communist World

SOVIET STANDDOWN ON BERLIN AUTOBAHN HARASSMENT

Moscow apparently has de-

cided to refrain from harass-

ing Allied convoys on the Berlin

autobahn, at least for the time

being.

On 21 November the USSR

replied to the Western notes of

6 November which protested te

detention of the Us convoy on

45 November.

The main purpose

of the reply was

to restate for

the public record the Soviet

claim that the June 1945 agree

ment between the Soviet and

Western commanders in Germany

gave the USSR the right to ex-

ercise "protection, maintenance

supervision,

and control"

on

highways used by the Western

garrisons in Berlin.

The Soviet note sought to

strengthen this claim by stating

that the "harmonized procedures"

conveyed by the Western powers

on 29 October "are in no degree

valid for Soviet military au-

thorities."

Moscow denied

that American authorities have

any right to establish the ob

ligations and "manner of opera

tion" of Soviet checkpoint of-

ficials.

The note reflected Moscow's

sensitivity to the point made

in the Western notes contrast-

ing the detention of the US

convoy with the normal process-

ing accorded closely similar

British and French convoys on

5 November which also refused

to dismount.

Moscow took ref-

uge

in the pretense that

these latter convoys were not

challenged because they observed

existing procedures

and

"presented neir personnel for

checking," whereas the US con-

voy was detained until it agreed

to "go through the same check."

The passage since the 4-5

November incident of five con

voys of a size which are non

dismountable under Allied pro-

cedures, the 16 November Soviet

statement on access procedures,

and Moscow's 21 November note

all suggest that Moscow has

decided to accept a standoff

in the autobahn dispute for the

present.

The Soviet procedures

marked a clear retreat from

earlier extreme demands that all

personnel in convoys of more

than five vehicles are obliged

to dismount.

Although the Soviet

procedures are not identical to

the Western

"harmonized proce

dures," the differences are not

great

enough

in themselves

to

give rise to curther incidents.

The Soviet rules seem to pro-

vide Moscow with

a practical

working arrangement not incon-

sistent with normal Western

convoy practices.

In light of the failure

to divide the Allies on the

access issue and the reper-

cussions of the Barghoorn case,

the

Soviet leaders probably de-

cided

ations.

Their efforts to es-

tablish an exclusive right to

control autobahn traffic, how

revive this issue whenever

theyfeel the situation is ripe

for another attempt to bring

the West into a new round of

Berlin negotiations.

(SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

29 Nov 63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The Communist World

EASTERN EUROPE PREPARES FOR HARD WINTER

Eastern Europe is making plans

to prevent a recurrence of the

widespread discontent and the se-

rious dislocations in some sectors

of the economy which resulted from

last year's severe

winter.

The

fuel, power, and construction in

dustries and the railroads were

the hardest hit, and although a

repetition of last year's weather

conditions would be unusual, it

is primarily in these sectors that

preparations are being made.

there are signs that the other

Communist regimes are making sim

the most detailed in=

tormation is available on East

Germany's preparations.

The East German regime has

already warned that electric pro-

duction capacity again this winter

will be inadequate to meet demands

of all consumers.

The shortfall

results from growing industrial

use of electricity, delays in com-

pletion of new generating capacity,

and the low water level available

for power generation.

The regime

on 30 September published an ur-

gent appeal to save electricity.

It was followed a month later by

announcement of a

"competition"

for "power thrift."

Throughout

industry power consumption norms

are being established.

Production

during night shifts is being in-

creased to make more efficient use

of the hours when power consumption

is normally at a minimum:

In the coal industry, the East

Germans have made an exceptional

effort to increase production and

have succeeded in raising coal re-

serves in industry by 5 percent

since last autumn. Measures also

have been taken to prevent freezing

of coal loaded in open rail cars

and of rail switches at the mines,

which posed major problems last

winter.

East Germany is easing the

burdens on its railroads by con-

tinued transferal of short-distance

hauling from the railroads to

trucks.

New schedules for contin

uous loading and unloading of

trains and trucks were instituted

on 1 October.

Production in high-fuel-con-

sumption industries such as steel

and ceramics reportedly will be

curtailed or halted as required.

About 60,000 workers would be af-

fected by such drastic measures.

Czechoslovakia also has warned

that electric power output will be

insufficient to meet all needs this

winter, largely for the same rea

sons as in last Germany.

the Czechs

began instituting measures to save

power as early as mid-August, and

preparations at power plants

were

to be completed by the end of

October.

Both Poland and Hungary appar-

ently are concerned with ensuring

adequate coal supplies for the do-

mestic market. The chief of Po-

land's coal exporting agency has

said that the country this year

will export to nonbloc countries

one million tons less than last

year. This move, along with greater

coal production,

will increase sup-

plies for the domestic market.

Hungary has announced that

coal production will exceed the

planned level by one million tons

as a result of overtime work, and

that imports of coal will be 1.2

million tons above plan.

(SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

29 Nov 63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The Communist World

PEIPING'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST ASIA

Communist China's economic

activities in the countries of

non-Communist Asia now are re-

covering from the setback they

suffered in 1960 following the

failure of the "leap forward."

Peiping's 1963 trade with

most of these countries appears

to be above last year's, so the

Chinese probably will earn more

from their Asian trade this

year than they have in the re-

cent past.

These earnings will

again be used chiefly to finance

imports of Western grain--which

presumably will continue at

about last year's level.

China's net export earnings

from

trade

with Hong Kong,

its

largest source of free world

currency, are up about 25 per-

cent over 1962 and are running

at an annual rate of about $250

million.

China's favorable

trade balance with Malaysia may

reach about $80 million this

year

about 10 percent over the

level

achieved last year with

the members of the new federa

tion.

Sino-Japanese trade is

currently at an annual rate of

slightly over $100 million--up

from $84 million last year.

China's economic aid proj-

ects in the non-Communist

Far

East have been implemented

slowly in the last few years.

Such

activities are expected

to

remain at a moderate level as

long as China's attention is

riveted on earning foreign ex-

change to buy grain.

The Chinese may, however,

be willing to provide additional

economic assistance to Cambodia,

which so far has utilized about

60 percent of a total of $50

million in Chinese grants.

Peiping responded favorably al-

though cautiously to overtures

from Prince Sihanouk after his

announcement of Cambodia's de-

cision to end the US aid program.

Earlier good-will gestures in-

cluded Liu Shao-chi's visit to

Cambodia last May, followed by

a trip to China by a Cambodian

bank delegation.

Recently

Chinese technicians arrived in

Cambodia to survey prospects for

construction of a glass factory

to be financed under a 1960 grant.

A Chinese delegation this

month

arrived in Djakarta to

discuss implementation of a $30-

million credit extended in 1961

for a textile plant.

Peiping

recently agreed to provide Cey-

lon with textile plants and

equipment under their $16-mil-

lion aid pact signed in 1957.

Peiping's largest single

economic aid pact-an $84-mil-

lion credit extended to Burma

in 1961--has been drawn down

by only about $2 million.

Burma, however, has recently

accepted a Chinese offer to

build two bridges in northern

Burma, and there are indications

that formal approval of other

Chinese aid projects will be

forthcoming in the near future.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

29 Nov 63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Asia-Africa

JAPANESE ELECTION OUTCOME

The Japanese

general elec-

tion on 21 November was charac

terized by a paucity of real

issues and a low voter turnout.

It brought no significant shift

in the balance between the ruling

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

and the leftist opposition.

The LDP won 283 seats and

is expected to pick up most of

the 12 conservative "independ-

ents."

Adherence by all of these

nevertheless would leave the LDP

still seven seats short of the

position it held after the 1960

elections.

of assuring Ikeda a third term

as party president or of strength

ening his position within the

party.

Intensification of

internal rivalries for position

within the party is certain

until precedences among the fac-

tion leaders can be hammered

out. Actual damage to the

party and to Ikeda's position

nevertheless will probably be

offset by the fact that the lost

seats for the most part went

to the DSP, while the JSP, the

real enemy, was defeated.

On the left, the important

feature was the

failure of the

Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to

gain, while the more moderate

Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

obtained six more seats than it

won in 1960.

The Japan Comnu-

nist Party (JCP) now holds five

seats, a gain of two over its

1960 performance.

The voter's support of the

LDP suggests that the electorate

is generally satisfied with con

ditions and progress under the

Ikeda government.

The LDP's

victory falls short, however,

A period of critical self-

examination and possible changes

of leadership clearly are in

store for the JSP.

Its net

loss of one seat in the face

of gains by its DSP and JCP

rivals may have seriously

damaged its carefully self-con-

trived image as the

leftist

"wave of the future," destined

to control the government by

1970.

Loss of extreme left

wing

support to the JCP may be

attributed to the confrontation

of the JSP and JCP over the nu

clear test ban treaty and to

the JCP's pro-Chinese stand.

The JSP's failure to reform

internally may have influenced

some voters to shift to the DSP.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

29 NOv 63

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Asia Africa

AREA NOTE

A widening breach

appears to be developing be-

tween the Souvanna government

in Laos and the Communist

Pathet 1a0.

Further talks on

the Plaine des Jarres between

Kong Le, chief of Souvanna's

military forces, and Pathet Lao

commander singkapo have been

jeopardized by an exchange of

allegations of bad faith. The

particular attitudes and

inten

tions of Premier Souvanna and

of the pathet Lao strategists

remain obscure.

Le and rightist General Phoumi,

along with Meo guerrilla elements

has met with considerable success

The government forces have se-

cured Vang Vieng long held by

the Pathet Lao. Although an

earlier push by a similar combi

nation of government forces in

the Plaine des Jarres area did

not attain comparable successes,

the Pathet Lao position at

Xieng Khouang town remains under

In the military field, the

initiative rests for the moment

with the government. A well-

coordinated clearing action

launched north of Vientiane. on

21 November by forces under Kong

Communist reaction to these

developments thus far has been

limited to propaganda warnings.

However, there are unconfirmed

reports of North Vietnamese

troop reinforcements in the

Plaine des Jarres.

(SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SYRIAN AND IRAQI REGIMES TRYING TO STABILIZE

The stability of the re

gimes in Irag and Syria is still

uncertain in the wake of the

army coup in Iraq.

This in turn

leaves unsettled

the status of

future relationships between

these two countries as well as

between them and Egypt.

In Irad, a number of non-

Baathist army officers are

unhappy over the retention of

several Baathists in the cabi

net, and President Arif may

have some difficulty in holding

together the disparate army ele-

ments who carried out the coup.

Statements. by. Iraqi regime

spokesmen, however,

have con-

tinued to be conciliatory to

the Baath.

They have reiterated

that the coup was not directed

toward any party, and Premier

Tahir Yahja has

said that the

new government will continue the

previous regime's policies.

29 Nov 63

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET DIPLOMATS

Congolese Premier Adoula

last week declared all Soviet Em

bassy personnel in Leopoldville

persona non grata.

Adoula's move

followed the arrest on 19 Novem

ber of two Soviet diplomats found

carrying documents showing the so

viets to be giving financial as-

sistance and encouragement to a

group of radical anti-Adoula

exiles across the Congo River in

Brazzaville.

All of the Soviet

staff reportedly had departed by

23 November.

Asia-Africa

The premier charged that the

captured documents proved "unques-

tionably" the collusion of the So-

viet Embassy with the leftist "con-

mittee of national liberation" in

Brazzaville. He did not however,

break diplomatic relations with

the Soviet Union and has stated

The 2121 one wiver,

that he will consider the appoint

ment or a new ambassador. Although

Moscow has bitterly protested the

expulsion of its officials, it has

indicated

an intention to replace

them rather than retaliate against

the Congo.

No action has been taken

against the Leopoldville missions

of three other Soviet bloc coun

tries- Czechoslovakia, Poland, and

Bulgaria. Adoula earlier planned

to expel both the Soviet and Czech

missions,

and for at least a month

the Congolese have been debating

some action to curb antigovernment

activities by all the Soviet bloc

missions•

Soviet bloc representa-

tives have long been in contact

with dissident Congolese groups,

and their activity appears to re-

flect routine clandestine contacts

and financial aid rather than So

viet backing of any imminent coup

attempt.

The Congolese exiles in Braz

zaville consist of perhaps 50 anti-

Adoula politicians and soldiers,.

SECRET

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

adherents of the imprisoned Antoine

Gizenga and the late Premier Patrice

Lumumba. They fled to Brazzaville

following Adoula's closing of parlia-

ment in late September. iLed by for-

mer Lumumbist Vice Premier Chris-

tophe Gbenye, they have been able to

operate fairly freely in the Brazza-

ville Congo's present confused at

mosphere under the shaky' provisional

regime of Massamba-Debat.

declared themselves a "committee of

national liberation" for the Leopold-

ville Congo and are trying to convey

the impression that they constitute

a "government-in-exile."

The captured documents reveal

considerable infighting and confusion

on tactics within the group.

exiles nevertheless have been press-

ing for foreign support, arms, and

runds, are trying to establish an or

ganization inside the Leopoldville

Congo, and hope to subvert its army.

They reportedly plan also to try to

assassinate leaders of its govern-

Their successes and

capabili-

ties presently seem limited, but

their activities may well lead to

further friction between the Leo

poldville and Brazzaville regimes.

Katanga's ex-President Tshombé,

still in exile in Barcelona, has

again appealed to Adoula to permit

him to return soon to the Congo. The

Leopoldville

government apparently

still opposes Tshombé's return, and

his bid for a high government

has been rejected.

Tshombé's recent promise to col-

laborate with the Leopoldville gov

ernment in the 1964 parliamentary

elections appears to be having some

appeal, however.

Tshombe says he

has decided to return soon, but has

indicated he will await assurances

for his personal safety from the

central government.

(SECRET NO

FOREIGN DISSEM

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Asia-Africa

MALAISE IN MALI

Mali's leftist government

is facing increasingly urgent

economic and political problems

at a time when President Modibo

Keita's efforts to mediate the

Moroccan-Algerian dispute have

raised his standing to a new high

elsewbere in Africa.

In the

face of mounting criticism from

politicians with strong local

power bases and from young gov

ernment functionaries,

Keita

is devoting major attention to

defending his party's hegemony.

He must also contend with dissi

dence among nomadic tribesmen

and with a desperate foreign ex-

change shortage.

The key problem probably

is that of foreign exchange.

The government brought most of

its troubles on itself a year

and a half ago when, in a fit

of excessive Marxist-flavored

anticolonialism, it in effect

cut itself off from automatic

access to the French foreign

exchange reserves and set up a.

Malian currency.

Since then a

steady

adverse trade balance

has cut into the country's own

meager reserves, and by mid-

November they had fallen to an

estimated $1 million.

The gov-

ernment's budget deficit is

running about $14 million an-

ually.

France reluctantly

bailed the Malians out once be-

fore with a stopgap dole, but

it may be unwilling to do so

again.

The bloc has consistent

ly refused to extend budgetary

assistance, although it has pro-

vidid development credits

amounting to $67.5 million.

Doctrinaire rigidity bas

helped to make ineffective the

government's efforts to alleviate

this situation. Whereas Guinea's

Sekou Tour has recently retreated

from "African socialism" when

faced with an even worse situa

tion, Keita and his associates

have

been reluctant

to curtail

the activities of such consistent

money-losers as the state trading

company and the state airline.

This evidence of ineffective

ness has brought to the surface

dissatisfaction among local pol-

iticians whom Keita has never

succeeded in bringing under

close control of his Soudanese

Union Party. These local figures,

who generally occupy the conserv-

ative

end of the spectrum, seem

to control the National Assembly.

They also have at least some in-

fluential spokesmen both in the

party's political bureau and in

the executive branch of the gov-

ernment,

especially among elements

desiring a pragmatic approach to

Mali's problems.

At the same time, Keita

is faced with

active défiance

of the regime's authority on the

part of Tuareg nomads in the

country's northern deserts.

Half of the army reportedly

now is deployed in an effort,

so far unsuccessful, to halt

raids by these tribesmen. Keita

himself has spent most of this

month in outlying areas, trying

to re-establish party control

over potential and actual

centers of dissidence. (CON

FIDENTIAL)

29 Nov 63

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Europe

THE DE GAULLE - ERHARD TALKS

The 21-22 November talks

between Charles de Gaulle and

Ludwig Erhard seem to have estab

lished a good working relation-

ship and clarified aspects of

France's and West Germany's

national policies, but produced

few decisions.

De Gaulle reportedly en-

couraged Erhard to take some

initiative toward a politically

united europe, and Erhard re-

sponded that he would give the

matter sympathetic consideration.

In his public statements, how

ever, Erhard again made it plain

that he favored a Europe rooted

in an Atlantic community rather

than the French-led third force

which De Gaulle envisages.

On defense questions,

the

new German chancellor and

the

veteran French chief

of state

"agreed to disagree."

De Gaulle

reportedly lectured

Erhard on the

Gaullist view that France cannot

depend on the US but rather needs

its own nuclear force, while

Erhard publicly reaffirmed

Germany's trust in the protec

tive shield of US military power.

Neither leader disparaged the

other's position,

however, and

De Gaulle is said to have assured

Erhard that France has no inten

tion of forcing Bonn to choose

between Paris and Washington.

On the divisive and po-

litically treacherous issue of

agricultural integration in the

Common Market, some slight

progress was made.

Neither

leader appeared prepared as yet

to accept the Mansholt plan

whereby a single community

grain price would be set between

the high German level and the

lower French level, but, accord-

ing to a German observer, they

agreed that the proposal offered

a good working basis..

Implicit

in the relaxed atmosphere was

the suggestion that De Gaulle

now is willing to discuss the

grain issue beyond the year-

end deadline he had previously

set for final agreement

on

BEC agricultural policy.

It was agreed, moreover,

that EEC arrangements for beef,

dairy products, and rice be

completed by the end of December.

In addition, the communiqué

issued at the close of the

talks looked forward to the

successful conclusion of the

negotiations envisaged by the

US Trade Expansion Act.

Erhard and De Gaulle

throughout the talks apparently

maintained an air of cordiality,

but Erhard demonstrated that he

was neither so innately sympa-

thetic to De Gaulle's views as

was Konrad Adenauer nor so

willing to play a secondary

role.

Thus Erhard may have

served notice that a somewhat

sterner era for Franco-German

relationships has arrived.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

29 Nov 63

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 11

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## Page 14

13-00000

SECRET

WESTERN EUROPE'S STEEL PROBLEM

The Council of the European

Coal-Steel Community (CSC) is

meeting on 2 December to deal

with the problems that afflict

the continental steel industry.

The session promises to have

far-reaching implications for

the CSC's future as well as for

the eventual outcome of inter

national tariff negotiations

that are set for next spring.

The steel industry in the

Six now is running about 20

percent below capacity.

More-

over, steel manufacturers have,

In recent months, suitered ITOI

reductions in price that have

taken place both inside and out

side the community.

past year, CSC officials have

advanced several possible solu

tions to the problem including

the promotion of both official

or private agreements with for-

eign producers to limit their

exports-but none of these has

proved effective.

More recently, the CSC has

been increasingly attracted to

the idea of raising tariffs,

but so far has not received

solid backing from the member

states for such a move.

Council has also been

notice by the US that a tariff

an item so important

as steel would have grave polit-

ical and psychological conse-

quences on the forthcoming

tariff negotiations.

However, pressure for a

steel tariff

hike or some oth

er restrictive action again

seems to be building up.

The

latest word from Paris,

for

example.

indicates that the

French Government may have re

Europe

29 Nov 63

versed its position and now

will support a tariff rise

that was proposed by Bonn three

months ago.

If Paris and Bonn

see eye to eye on this, it is

probable that their tariffs will

go up to 9 percent-the pres-

ent level in Italy.

A restric-

tion on trade would primarily

affect Japan, Austria, and the

UK,

since the CSC already has

strict quotas on imports from

the bloc.

The political importance

of the steel tariff question

to the CSC has been generally

recognized in the community.

President Del Bo has intimated

to US officials that unless

the CSC can produce a Community

wide solution to the challenge,

the CSC's very existence will

be threatened.

The CSC's failure to pro-

duce a solution to date, how-

ever, is indicative of its de-

clining power and prestige.

Authority,

has, in

power than its

the Common Market. But this

authority has sharply deteri-

orated because of its failure

to exercise its powers and the

anpointment of mediocre per-

sonnel to its staff.

This

deterioration began in 1958

when,

under very smiliar cir-

cumstances, the High Authority

was unable

to produce a solution

to the then serious glut in

coal.

Should the member states

resort to urilateral solution

to the present problems in

steel, there would be little

left of the CSC--the first and

most supranational of the three

European communities.

(CONFIDEN

TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLICEICE WEEKLY SULLIARY

Page 12

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## Page 15

13-00000

SECRET

AREA NOTES

Italy:

beaders of Italy's

tour coalition parties reached

agreement over the week end on

the proposed program for a cen-

ter-left government

and submitted

it to their parties' national

executive committees for approval

Ratification by Pietro Nenni's

Italian Socialist Party is com-

plicated by an intransigent group

of 10 of the 32 left-wingers

among the party's 87 parliamen-

tary deputies. A party spokesman

told US Embassy officials that

Nenni was willing to risk a split

Europe

in the party to go along with

the accord.

Negotiations over appoint-

ments to the cabinet have pro-

ceeded with some degree of ur

gency.

There was general agree

ment that the Christian Democrats

would retain the defense portfolio,

as well as the Ministry of In

terior, which controls the police.

The question of ex-Premier Amintore

Fanfani's participation has been

one stumbling block.

(CONFIDEN-

TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Brazil:

Recently published

statements by president Goulart

have added to the widespread un-

rest in Brazil and increased

speculation that he is planning

to establish an authoritarian

regime.

In an interview with

the Brazilian weekly Manchete,

published on 20 November, Gou-

lart declared that he had no

doubt Brazil's rampant infla

tion will push'the country "in-

evitably to bankruptcy" and a

"social disaster of catastrophic

proportions." He emphasized his

lack of presidential powers to

solve the present crisis.

sharp criticism from responsible

political leaders and influential

Western Hemisphere

newspapers. The US Army attaché

reports a growing concern among

army officers that Goulart may

attempt some extreme action during

the next few weeks.

The additional unrest

provoked by the President's

comments has encouraged re

newed plotting by rightist

elements, such as the Marshal

Odylio Denys grOUD.

It has

also increased the chances of

an illegal action by the op-

position which Goulart could

use as a pretext to assume

greater powers.

In any event,

it is likely that political

tension will remain high for

the foreseeable future.

(SE-

CRET)

29 Nov 63

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 13

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## Page 16

13-00000

SECRET

Western Hemisphere

AREA NOTE

VenezueLa:

Communist ter-

rorists cantberexpected to con

tinue right up to election day

their campaign to sabotage the

voting in Venezuela on 1 Decem

ber for a new president and

congress. There is no reason,

moreover,

to believe they will

turn from violence afterward.

that the voters will turn out

in large numbers despite Com

munist efforts to intimidate

them.

The proficiency of the gov-

ernment security forces has

been steadily improving, how-

ever, and more terrorists are

being arrested each day.

The

Venezuelan armed forces

con

tinue to investigate reports

of clandestine landings of weap

ons for terrorist forces.

With the security situation

reasonably well in hand, there

is no question that the elections

will be held on schedule.

addition, the prospects are

In any event, electioneer-

ing has continued

apace, and

most observers still consider

Raul Leoni, heading

the Demo

cratic Action party's ticket,

to be the likely winner by a

small plurality.

The victor's biggest prob-

lem will be to pull together

an effective coalition govern-

ment.

Leoni lacks the personal

magnetism and political acumen

of incumbent President Betan

court.

Failure on Leoni's part

to convince the military of his

ability to handle the terrorist

problem could encourage plotting

for a coup d'etat. (SECRET)

29

Nov

63

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page

14

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## Page 17

13-00000

SECRET

90

90

98

OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES

Received during the week of 21-26 November 1963

RESEARCH REPORTS AND REFERENCE AIDS

China (Communist)

Directory of Chinese Communist officials,

vol.I.

C.I.A. O.C.R.

BA 63-7.

186p. 0'63. (OỤO)

Economic effects of the late summer floods

in north China.

bibliog il maps

O.R.R.

CB 63-92.

Foreign Dissem)

Germany, East

East German economic plans [for '64] show

ncreased caution and realism as resul

of shift in policyl

bibliog ta

C.I.A.

O.R.R. CB 63-94. 7p.

N 22'63. (S)

East Germany two years after the wall: eco-

• 27p. N'63.

National income and

expenditures of East

Germany, 1951-60: [private, public, invest-

and foreign accounts

bibliog graph

C.I.A. O.R.R. ER 63-34. 48p.

Germany, West

Erhard government in West Germany: [foreign

and domestic policy, and future prospects]

. N. 22'63.

(S. No Foreign Dissem)

Guatemala

Guatemalan Council of State appointed Oct 1

BB 63-03 21p. N 1463(5) LA. O.C.R.

21p. N.14'63. (S)

Italy

Italian economic outlook [clouded by inflation

and apprehensions over Socialist coalition]

graphs

C.I.A. O.C.I. Spec.Rpt.030%/63A

Ip.

N. 22'63.

(S No Foreign Dissem)

Turkey

Chemical warfare capabilities of Turkey, 1963

through 1968.

map tab [U.S.I.B.] SIC-S-

14-63. 12p. 04'63. (SNo" Foreign' Dissem)

US.S.R.

Indexes to classified documentary Soviet Min-

istry of Defense reports in the Ironbark

and Chickadee series.

tab C.I.A. CR-51.

1 vol.

J1'63. (S No Foreign Dissem No

48

Dissem Abroad)

Production of S-100 tractors at the Chelyabinsk

Tractor Plant, Chelyabinsk, USSR

1960-63.

tab

C.I.A.

O.R.R.

MCB 63-61. 3p.

0 31'63. (S)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Algeria: [political stability, foreign policy,

the economy, and future prospects U.S.I.B

NIE 62-63.

N 20'63. (S Controlled Dissem

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

Atlantic Basin. II, Northern sector of North

Atlantic: Marine climate and oceanography.

4,

Selected straits: Denmark Strait

and

Strait of Belle Isle. bibliog charts graphs

maps tab NIS 104, part II, section 4.

Ja'63. (C No Foreign Dissem)

19p.

98

North Korea: Intelligence and security.

tab

NIS 41A,

-section

56, rev.

15p-

J1'63.

(S No Foreign Dissem Controlled Dissem)

Portugal: Intelligence and security. tab NIS 8,

section 56,

rEV.

J1'63. (S No Foreign

Dissem Controlled Dissem)

Spain: Trade and finance:

bibliog graphs tab

NIS 9, section 65, rev. 55p. Je'63. (C No

Foreign Dissem)

Turkey: Naval forces:

il tab NIS 27, section

82, Tev.

19p.

Ap'63.

(S No Foreign

Dissem)

Requests for publications cited above should

be made through normal requesting channels

to the CIA Library/Circulation Branch.

SECRET

13/15

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