## Page 1

1704-10336-10034

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

fil

17 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Ms. Laura Denk

Executive Director, ARRB

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number

104-10151-1-206

1. The following is in response to subject request.

2. Searches were made for information responsive to

subject request and materials were provided for examination

by the ARRB staff.

From that examination, staff members

selected a number of documents. Those documents have now

been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be

processed and released to NARA.

3.

This concludes the Agency's action on this request.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Han

J. Barry

Harrelson

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13-00000.

MEMORANDUM

September 12, 1998

CIA HAS R

DECLASS.

FOE!

To:

Laura Denk

Executive Director

cc:

From:

Bob Skwirot

CIA Team Leader

Michelle Combs Michelle Combs

Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject:

CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206

In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the

Review Board requested additional information on a source identified in RIF number

104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina

Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA

searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this

source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA

provided the source's 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No

assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of

briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the

source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source

was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald's 201 file. All of these

materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK

Collection at the National Archives.

Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review

Board agreed to protect the source's true name and cryptonym. Documents from this

source are identified as the product of "a yalued American intelligence source who was

a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former

USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for

internal counter-intelligence efforts."

e: \combs \cia-ir35.wpd

File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4

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SECRET

OIM-98-0084

06 August

1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

(U)

FROM:

SUBJECT:

(U)

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

Lee S. Strickland

Chief, Information Review Group

Central Intelligence Agency

(S) Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I

respond to the Assassination Records Review Board ("'ARRB" or

"Board")

regarding their current deliberations as to postponement

of certain very limited

information in one document --

specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER) .

It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym,

in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of

15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times

article of

29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable

benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant

damage to US intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose

and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a

fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym

IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and

would otherwise be releasable.

3.

(U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask

the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this

memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly

cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at

the

conclusion of your deliberations.

4.

(S)

As the Board is aware, the relevant document has

been released almost in its entirety. The released version

reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM

• CL Reason: 1.5(c)

Decl On: X1

Drv From: HUM 4-82

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It

continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a

credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA

assessment is supported by reporting from another source

[identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).

It concludes by

stating that this source (IJDECANTERY has had his "

... bona fides

fully established (by CIAT." It is this final fact which is

critical to our request. By having released this substantive

information -- "bona fides ... established" -- and by otherwise

having IUDECANTER/ known to the public in true name and crypt, we

must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence

judgment of CIA is not compromised.

5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) =- and

hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from

four basic questions:

• what information was compromised?

• what foreign intelligence service(s) received the

information?

• what understanding of the information did the

service(s) have?

• what information did the intelligence service (s)

believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the

detriment of the United States?

6.

(C) The first two questions are largely factual and can

be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph

interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

Questions three

and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important

for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target

intelligence service.

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a

foreign government fully understands the substance li.e., the

import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and

the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect

example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case.

The information

compromised was

a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a

2

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## Page 5

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IUDECANTER Cryptonym

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating

to American intelligence.

The Soviets, based on other

information they had acquired through signals intelligence,

concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-

operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their

territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-

operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,

concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of

intelligence.

Immediately upon learning the true status, they

took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was

directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the

quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service

believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment

of the United States; if they do not, the United States may

escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical

question that a foreign country must answer and it is the

critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in

our fold.

9.

(S)

In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by

what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own

knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially

released document and the Los Angeles Times article.

The

Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to

the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they

know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he

said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus

incorporated his information into our operational practices and

activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm

to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow

them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a

Us intelligence success.

10. (C)

Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,

we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the

Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did

not know was whether we had accepted his story or not.

Indeed,

the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and

this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the

Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period

of time.

3

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IUDECANTER/ Cryptonym

MARRATH

11.

(S)

In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.

The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information

relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.

But we must

protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we

are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian

Federal

Security Service when they assess this new information in light

of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

of course,

information on the public record via the media.

12.

(S)

While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage

is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are

three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

First, is foreign relations. : In our judgment, the

Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich

• Ames, the

United States is considering avenues of reprisal.

This

specific release might well be viewed as a public move

to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate

tensions.

Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to

the Russian service. i

This specific release could

arguably provide them with insights into our capability

to assess the bona fides of defectors.

The Russian

/service knows if IJDECANTER was real;

the CIA does not

know this for certain.

• And third, there is an equitable issue...

never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN wás a defector

in our custody and under our control; thé CIA has

pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that

it is publicly known at least to some degree.

However,

because his wife, child and father remain in Russia

today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and

consider postponement also for this reason.

Quite

candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether

the Russian government.today would take action against

the

_family.

from this proposed release.; But I would

urge caution here since the information at issue is

minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and

arguably harmful to living persons.

4

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SUBJECT: (S)

Protection of (IUDECANTER Cryptonym

(U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in

to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that

this important information can be postponed from public release.

cash

Lee S

"Strickland

5

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Office of

OIM

"ormation Managerie

CIA TALKING POINTS

re Protection of |"IJDECANIER" Cryptonym

Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

26 AUGUST 1998

The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board

on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of

Operations and the CIA.

• We request the postponement of certain very limited

information in

one document = specifically, the actual

cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER) .

• It is our considered judgment that the release of this

cryptonym, in the particular context of the given

document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed

with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997,

would:

• provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-

intelligence effort,

• result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence

interests, and,

• have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and

prospective

intelligence sources given this disclosure which

could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

• Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and

objectives, we propose however:

• a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,

"TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER in this or

any other document where it appears

and would otherwise

be releasable, and/or,

CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM

CL Reason: 1.5(c)

Decl On: X1

Drv From: HUM 4-82

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## Page 9

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RETURNTO CA

Do Not Roproduce

• if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the

nature of a

I factual description of the source (e.g., "a

not general rank, official in the intelligence service

(KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the

Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for

internal counter-intelligence efforts."

• As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released

almost in its entirety.

• The released version reports that a Soviet official

(Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect

that OSWALD was a KGB source.

• It continues by stating that CIA did not believe

ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.

• It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is

supported by reporting from

another source (dentity

redacted but,

in fact, IJDECANTER).

• It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has

had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA)."

• It is this final fact which is critical.

• By having released this substantive information -- "bona

fides... established" - AND by otherwise having

IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt,

THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key

intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.

I would appreciate

a few moments to explain, with I hope some

degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from

this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this

particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

2

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The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the

issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four

basic questions:

• what information was compromised?

• what foreign intelligence service(s) received the

information?

• what understanding of the information did the receiving

intelligence service(s) have?

• what information did the receiving intelligence

service (s) believe

and thus act on to its benefit and

to the detriment of the other party?

• The first two questions are largely factual and can be

acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph

interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

• Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and

the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service

and the target intelligence service.

• Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not

really an issue here since the US fully understood the

information presented.

Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for

exploitation.

• If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset

(e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the

detriment of the other

service.

Men 2y

3

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• If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully

or to some degree.

• This is the critical question that a foreign country must

answer and it is the critical information that we must

protect vis-à-vis defectors

in our fold.

• In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the

Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and

what they have acquired from the substantially released

document and the Los Angeles Times article.

• The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER)

defected to the United States;

• they

know or suspect what he told the US;

• they know of suspect that we fully understood the import

of what he said;

• they do not know, however, whether we believed him and

thus incorporated his information into our operational

practices and activities.

• And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to

the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and

allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what

heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

• In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.

• The CIA to date has released all of the substantive

information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular

document.

• But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this

particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial

document, is

CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when

they assess this new

information in light of their

previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

4

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## Page 12

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of course, information on the public record via the

media.

• There is additional damage that will accrue from not

officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER!

• Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a

devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence

organization.

It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets

- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA

will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at

some future point in time.

Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take

self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current

assets or public statements by inactive ones).

Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most

assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future

assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.

Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our

ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly

against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism.

• There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in

the interests of the Board's time. They are not

insignificant, however.

• ONE,..is foreign relations.

In our judgment, the Russians are fully

expect

that, after

Aldrich Ames,

the United States is considering

avenues of

reprisal.

This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to

embarrass them and it would

serve only to exacerbate tensions.

5

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TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the

Russian service.

.::

This specific release could arguably provide them with insights

into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.

The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does

not know this for certain.

146241

THIRD, is an equitable issue.

The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a

defector in our custody and under our control;

• The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;

While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to

some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain

in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial

action the current government night take hea

.

Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether

the Russian government today would take action against the

family from this proposed release.

But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is

minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably

harmful

to living persons.

6

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1998)

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