Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: GRAY, GORDON
Document date: 7/9/75
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10014-10045|

Date

Page

08/06/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

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RECORD

NUMBER

157-1001410045

RECORDS

SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

• 07-H-03

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORICINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

TO

: GRAY, CORDON

TITLE :

DATE : 07/09/75

PAGES

÷ 91

SUBJECTS

: GRAY, GORDON

ASSASSINATION, CASTRO, FIDEL

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCIASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: BoX 2

DAS POO SUES TIRE ON

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICCED

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92623

Voli1 oF 3

RATIONAL,

SECUR

FORMATION

hauthor ed Biters subject

to Criminal Sancelons'"

•R473

The Muitra Statre Ernate

GRAy

Report of P'roceedings

INTENTEM MOG

BN- 3/2/37

TY.

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Uperations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

C..

Wednesday, July 9, 1975

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

110 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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SURA (9100 202) 347-4000

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF

Gordon Gray

PAGE

3

EXHIBITS

WARD

I EXHIBIT

No.

NO.

No.

NO.

1c.

NO.

1:

i No.

.:.

• No.

1:.

1

2

3

5

6

7

POR IDENTIFICATION

8

10

15

19

21

22

26

• Astocourt 11e/7:

# 108008989000158.Wess.9100, 0.6.20001

i::

?!.

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COMMITTEE BUSINESS

Wednesday, July 9, 1975

-

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

6

7

Operations with Respect to

8

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

i!!! The Cormittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:25 o'clock

i: P.M., In Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frant Church (Chairman)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

::Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, liart of Colorado, Tower, Mathlas,

and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director: F.A.O.

1÷ Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

:: Counsel, Frederick Baron, Michael J. Madigan, Charles Lombard,

Charles Kirbow, and Robert Kelly, Professional Staff Members.

i:

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phone (Ares 202) 364-4000

110 First 501001, 5.1., Mostinaton, DE. 10001

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1

2

The Chalrman. Mr. Gray, would you like to take the Chair?

Before you're seated would you please take the oath.

-.=.

Do you swear that all the testimony that you give in this

5

procesding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

6

but the truth, so help you God?

7

Mr. Gray. I do.

$

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gray, I want to apologize

9

¡for the delay. You've been walting several hours and I am sorry

10 that it's taken us

so long in our interrogation of the previous

11

witness. I appreciate your being here and I understand you have

1"

some opening remarks that you would like to read into the

record.

1: l

Mr. Gray. I will, sir, and that may save a little time

for

1 4

the Committee.

The Chairman. Very well.

16

Mr. Gray. Let me say, Mr. Chairman and members of the

1' Committee, I've been

around this town a long time. You don't

!: have to apologize to me for being behind. I know how it is.'

¿: So I am happy to wait.

24

2.

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prono (Aros 202) 344600

110F041 F0e41 S1r001. 5.l.Wastiraton. 20001

1

TESTIMONY OF GORDON GRAY

2

MI: Gray. I have always considerod it a privilege to appear

bafora a Senate Committee. Ma perhaps you know, I had a session

on July 5 with four members of the Committee staff. I should

5 Ilke to say, Mr. Chairman, that I lound them courteous, intelligent,

6

ablo and well Informed. I hope that our meeting was a construc-

7

tive ono.

8

I trust that I need not assure you that I wish to be as

9 helpful as I can, but I must remind you that ve shall probably

Ju be talking about situations which existed sonething like 15 to

::1ar years ago and I lear that my recollectione

are not as sharp

:.'as I would like them to be. The staff members did give me

13 "some refreshment by showing me memoranda unich I beliave will

Is for the badle for your questions.

I might say that these were

15

memoranda which I had not seen before, and I believe that the

16

reason that they were not distributed to principals of what is

17

now called the Forty Committee was

that President Eisenhower

!

i wanted only one copy of notes of these meetings in existence

' and that was to be kept in the files of the Director of the

* Central Intelligence Agency. An exception was made in the case

:: of cuba.

=: ! My own experience with the National Security Council and

2: Intelligence matters in general was

as follows:

2:

As Secretary of the Army from 1949 to 1950, I at one time

2:

was a statutory member of the NSC. However, as you will recall

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MORA LAPBA POT 1668001

(:

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pors

!.-

washinatron.

0.6. 20003

810 54631

the 1949 amendments to the Act renoved the Service Secretarlos.

2

might parenthetically say that Senator Symington and I have

standing joke that we are the only living two people who have

ever been kicked

off the National Security Council. He was at

the time Secrotary of the Mir Force.

6

In 1951 I established and served as the firat Director of

the Psychological Strategy Board at the request, and by appoint-

ment of, President Truman. In 1953 I was a member of the

y President's Committee on International Information Activities,

Iu popularly known as the Jackson Committoo. In 1955 I became

1: Assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

In land in that capacity served

as back up for the Secretary of

13, Defense for National Security Council mattors. I attanded all

14 NSC meetings with him.

In 1956 I became Director of the Office

15 0f Defense Mobilization in which capacity I was again a statutory,

16 member of the National Security Council. In July 1958 I became.

11 Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security

Ic: Affairs and the National Security Council and its subsidiary

:: bodies were among my responsibilities. In this capacity I also

i Berved as the President's representative to what was first

known as the 5412 Committee -- I believe it was 5412-2 Committee --

and later "Special Group," I having changed the name because

:: 5412 had attained some visibility. My understanding is that

subsequently it underwent at least two more hame changes, the

2:.

last being the Forty Committee. I consider this Committee --

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SOME (AIRS 202) 5444000

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11051rs Street, S.f., Washinaton, D.C. AnON.)

¡the Porty committoe - a vital one in the interest of the

¡United States and of the President. Indeed, when following

jinstructions from Presidont Elsanhower to leave everything

: In the best posalble shape for his successor, and when I was

, ¡DIlofing MeGeorge Bundy, President Kennody's to be Special

6 l Assistant for National Security Affairs, It became apparent

?;to me that it had probably already been decided that virtually

all of the so-called machinery developed during Eisenhower's

i Administration would be disbanded. I sought, and succeeded in

1 obtaining, one cormitment from McGeorge Bundy and that was that

i: If he wanted to protect the interests of hia President the one

i: thing that should be retained would be what is now known ag

I? l the forty Committee. This commitment was kept.

Since May 1961 I have been

a member of the President's

i: Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

16

I took no documents out of Government with me and have not

i: had occasion to read

anything other than those

shown me by the

:: Committee staff. As I have already observed, I nover even saw

:: notes of the Forty Committee meetings and such memoranda in

¿ this field as I made I think entirely related to Cuba. They

i: were produced in original form only and these are all at the

i Eigenhower Library at Abilene.

That concludes my opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Gray.

We have a vote on. In the interest of time I think we

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11050d 500991, 58. Washergenn. D.F.20003

should. trip down and keep the hearing going, as long as there

?

will be one or two Senators here at all times.

*..

All right, Mr. Schwarz, will you commence?

MI. Schwarz. All Iight, Mr. Gray, thia i9 a procedural

matter. You know you have the right to counsel

and all other

6

/ Constitutional rights.

7

Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

MI. Schwarz. Now when President Elsanhower spote to you

s about the 5412 Committee did he tell you that he thought it

It' i was important that all actions that impinge upon the soveriegnty

1: Hot another country be deliberated by the 5412 Committee?

1:'. MI. Gray. lle made the statement to me that the 5412

1: Committee -- we of course had many conversationg about it but

; that was the one thing he said about the 5412 Committee.

Mr. Schwarz. And it was your understanding from the time

Ií you bacame National Security Advisor to the President that all

:: important covert operations were to be considered by the 5412

:.. Committee?

Mr. Gray. That was my understanding.

:.

Mr. Schwarz. Did the 5412 Committee ever approve an

%..

action to assassinate Fidel Castro of any other person?

:: Mr. Gray. No, not while I was the President's representative.

:.:

Mr. Schwarz.

Well, do you know that it did at any other

:. time?

Mr. Gray. I can only speak out of experience, sir.

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.?

810 8 1081 Street, 58, Viashing"oes, DE

.n00 1

]

¡No, I don't know entiraly that it never did.

2

Mr. Schwarz. Now was your relationship with MI. Elsenhover

such that you would belleve that he would discuss with you

any important matter that came to his attention that related

to the field of covart operations?

6

Mr. Gray. I believe that - yes, the short answer to that

"¡question is yes, that he would discuss with me anything that

¡came to his attention Independently of me, yos.

Mr. Schwarz. Now 1f an officer of the Central Intelligence

Agency or 1f the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

?: had told President Eisenhower that the Agency had made a

:: contract with the Mafla in order to assassinate Fidel Castro,

do you bellove that President Eisenhower would have discussed

:; that with you?

Mr. Gray. I belleve that he would but I don't know that

¿i to be the case.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he, President Eisenhower, ever have

:. such discussion with you?

Mr. Gray. About

MI. Schwarz. Assassination of Fidel Castro?

:..

MI. Gray. No.

:.:

Mr. Schwarz. About the use of the Mafia in connection with

:: Cubans?

MI. Gray: No, I have heard about this use of the Mafia

:: only in recent times when it appeared in the press. I never

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knew anything about. that situation.

Mr. Schwarz. Hould you turn, Mr. Kelly, andiput, before

the Nitness, the Speclal Group minutes of November 3rd, 1960,

"which, Senators, are Tab V of the red book?

(The document referred to

was marked Gray Exhibit

No. l for identification.)

.

WARO A PAUL

.....:.. = ==-==::

======

7!..

130 Frest 8:1089, 5E, Wastenaton, D.C. 1000 1

2:

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810100st 990009.38 Washington, D.l 20011

1

Mr.

Schwars. Mr. Gray, this 1a what purports to be the

minutes of a Special Group meeting which you attanded?

Мг. Gray. Yes, sir.

MI. Schwarz. Hould you look at the third page, please?

The document says that "Mr. Merchant asked whether any

real planning has been done for taking direct positive action

against Pidal, Raul, and Che Guovara."

8

MI. Merchant was a State Department copresentative on the

¡ Special Group?

10

Mr. Gray. lle was. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Schwarz. Now would you agree that the words "direct

I:: positive action" appear to question whether there's been any

i" planning in connection with assassinating those people?

Mr. Gray. I think the phrase "positive action" could

1:: Include assassination, but I should say it is all the intent

i;'of the user of the phrase and his meaning of it, and I'm not

?: sure what was in Mr. Merchant's mind. I agree that assassination

:: could be included in that phrase, but I think, having had my

i: recollection refreshed by seeing this paper, which I had not

i: seen before, Mr. Merchant includes, or General Cabell pointed

out that this was not a practical option and he said it would

==

have to be concluded that MI. Merchant's suggestion was bayond

2/ our capabilities.

Mr. Schwarz. General Cabell was the Deputy Director of

25

the CIA?

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Mr. GIay. He was the Deputy Director of the CIA at the

2

time.

•*.

-.

• *

r.

G.0015

Misshirarns. M.C. d0001

Mr. Schwarz. Did he dielona at that meeting or any other

time that the CIA had engaged the Mafia In order to assassinate

6 'Fidel Castro prior to this meeting?

MI. Gray. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Schwarz. Turning back to Tab B. - Senators, I

an: now going to refar to two earlier documents at which the

subject of dealing with these three persons -- Castro, Che

1: | Guevera, and Raul Castro - is aiscussed, although not decided

i: lupon, and I think the earlier meetings should be read in light

of the November meeting when the CIA reprosentative said it

i was not practical.

Tab E, if you would mark it as Exhibit 2, MI. Kelly, is

"that what it purports to be, minutes of the National Security

:: Council meeting in March of 1960?

MI. Gray. Well, it is a report of the discussion of the

Council., I wouldn't consider it as such minutes, Mr. Schwarz,

:: but it purports to be a discussion.

(The document referred to

was marked Gray Exhibit

No. 2 for identification.)

:. :

-=

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• (Ardo 202) 984-6006

PAUL

810 59081 Sirent, S.6., Mastergton, D.6. 2000 1

2

Mr. Schwarz. The Speclal Assistant to the President for

National socurity Affairs Is reported as boing present, and

"I take it that is you.

MI. Gray. That is right, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Now there's a lengthy discussion of the

6 subjact of Cuba and Mr. Castro, which runs, starts on page 2,

?and I would like to call your attention to some piaces of it

and see if it fita your recollection of attitudes in that

period of time.

10

Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Dillion -- that 'a Mr. Douglas Dillon.

Mr. Gray. That's right.

13

MI. Schwarz. He takes the position on page 7, which is

i the second page of the copy we have: "The result of Castro'g

¿ disappearance might be a Communist take-over."

16

Was that attitude expressed by people in connection with

MI. Castro?

Mr. Gray. I am sure that there was. I don't renember

:: Mr. Dillon saying this but I have no doubt that it was a

₴

concern of people at the time if Castro should not be in power

2:

that there was a vacuum which might be taken over.

Mr. Schwarz. I'm just going to put in some exerpts from

the document which set the flavor and then read up to the

¿; particular thing I want to question the Witness about.

On page 8, which is the third page, the President is said

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prem

FAUL

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110 5 0st 441001

W.rshor.,genn, 09.6.2000.5

1

to have said that "a cartain amount of pro-Castro sentiment

2

had been expressed by amall groups in the countries he had

recently vialted."

Skipping down: "Latin American Presidents had counselled

6

¡further forebaarance by the United Statea."

Skipping down further: The President i8 quoted as having

7

said he did not wish to endanger the lives of Americans living

i in Cuba.

On the top of the next page the statament is made that

"we might finally have to use force if U.S. citizeng were

exposed to mob violence." Then Admiral Burke is quoted as

saying we need a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro elements

* could rally.

:; Was that a problem, the lack of a replacement for Castro,

i who would be preferable to the United States than Castro?

Mr. Gray. Yes, it was a problem. I think

it was recognized

:: by many people who thought about it as a very serious problem

"and I remember very well, MI. Schwarz, toward the, I guess the

i end of the Eisenhower Administration that he used to press

¿ the DCI, MI. Dulles, Allen Dulles, very hard about the

:.possibility of a government in exile because he didn't want a

"vacuun left if something should happen to Castro to take hin

i. out of power.

As I recall it, and I have not looked at my notes on Cuba

since I left the government-- 'since :the Bay og Pigs, I:

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WAHD

PAUL

r.

r.

1105.0s1 Street, S6, Washino!nn, D.C. 20003

bads a chance to see them then. The Cubana couldn't agree

2

¡among themselves. The Central Intelligence Agency had not,

I think, by the time President Eisenhower went out of office,

¡ been able to set up any kind of government in exile. I'm

* not sure that one was over set up.

Mr. Schwarz. Would the assassination of Mr. Castro prior

,? to there being a preferred replacement be consistent with

* United States policy as you understood it during the time that

i you were in office? And I understand you're saying that

assassination wasn't approved, but I'm asking you a hypothetical

question.. Would the assassination of Castro prior to the

:: Identification of the preferable leader of Cuba have been

:;consistent with the United States policy?

MI. Gray. Well, I can't answer that yes or no because

::Imust repeat that to my knowledge assassination was not

i considered a sensible course of action at the highest levels

: of government.

But

I think that the other part of the question is that

i: actions should probably not have been taken to relieve Castro

¿ of power until there was some way to assure some sort of a

:: viable government ready to move in.

I'm not sure I'm responding to your question.

2:

6.:

MI. Schwarz. No, I think you did. Now I want to pick up

:; near

the bottom of page 9 and read two sentences to you.

"MI. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation

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WARD A

2000.}

In Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggestod that any

?. "Plan for the ramoval of cuban loadore should be a package dent,

'since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than

: Castro."

Now does the plan

for the removal of Cuban leaders contem-

o iplato the assassination of Cuban leaders?

7

Mr. Gray. The plan that MI. Dulles reported on that

* was being worked on on March 14 was a four-point program, and

! I am not sure, Mr. Schwarz, whether this meeting took place

before the President approved of the four-point program or

::immediately afterwards, but Mr. Dulles was certainly referring

:: to what I. call the four-point

program which was approved

by the President and which formed the

basis of various

; activities which ultimately resulted in what we know as the

:: Bay of Pigs.

I have not had a chance to see that four-point paper,

i: I guess

since I went out of office in the Eisenhower Admini-

:: stration. As I recall it, however, it included sabotage,

:: Increased or enhanced economic sanctions, propoganda activities,

and the training of Cuban exiles.

:.

Now this program was approved by the President. Subsequently,

:.:

in about March-- I don't know the date of it -- there were

:.

many meetings with the President about Cuba and this four-point

:; program and I recorded these meetings, I must say in violation

::of his instructions because he had told me, as I think I said

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рото (Ar8e 201) 526

"AUE

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earlier, that he wanted only one copy of the reporte or notes

of covert action approvals kept in the lilos. I felt It was

Important to have Prosidential memoranda propared and kept,

: as I said earller, in original form, and they are all at

5 ¡Abilene. I: have not seen them since the spring of 1961.

6

MI. Schwarz. Whatrwetruitryingitoidecidm.hero:nhat we're

7

8

trying to deal with in your testimony about these documenta

Is whether the words that we just saw, "plan for the renoval

of Cuban leaders," turning to Exhibit 2 --

11

MI. Gray. Yes.

MI. Schwarz. Exhibit 2 la taken March 14 and reflects the

National Security Council meating on March 10th. Exhibit 3,

17

which is at your

Tab F, 1s taken March I5th, 1960, and reflects

the Special Group meeting on March 15, 1960.

(The document réferred to

was marked Gray Exhibit No. 3

for identification.)

Ii:

1i0 EuM 400001. 8 €

. Washingran. 0.6. 20001

'!

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suuri accuraries.

Mr. Schwarz. Now some related language is used in

¡Paragraph 6 on page 2, which says:

"There was. a general discussion as to what would be the

i effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che

- Guevera should disappear simultaneously. Admiral Burke said

E :that the only organized group in Cuba today were the Communists

"and there was therefore the danger that they might move into

*. control. Mr. Dulles falt that this might not be disadvantageous

because it would facilitate a multilateral action by oAs.

i" "Colonel king" -- and he's with the CIA -- "said there were

¿: few leaders capable of taking over so lar identifled."

Now the November 3 memo, which we marked as Exhibit 1,

which suggested no

such authority to assassinate the three

i men was ever granted, and indeed, that the CIA said it was

not a practical solution.

But do you not agree, Mr. Gray, that the language used in

here suggests that the subject of assassination was being

discussed?

MI. Gray. At the level of the Forty Committee or the

: National Security Council?

:..

Mr. Schwarz. Yes. Thege words should disappear simul-

::taneously of any plan for removal should be a package deal,

: which is the Security Councül. "':

Mr. Gray. I do not, no, sir. I again repeat that, "should

:: disappear"is like removal or eliminate. It is the intent of tho

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*".

Aj0 First Street, S.F.,Washirainn,

0.6. 2000.1

1

usar of the expression or the phrase that 1a controlling and

2

there may well have been in the Central Intelligence Agency

plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but I an repeating

that at the level of the Porty Committee or a: higher lovel.

5

¡than that, the National Sacurity Council, there was no active

6

discussion in any way planning assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, we agreed, remember, that there had

,, been one whore it was turned down but it was discussed. That

9

,1s the November 3, 1960 meeting.

10l Me. Gray. That's true.

1:

MI. Schwarz. And there the words used wore direct

positive action."

MI. Gray. That's right.

MI. Schwarz. And we agreed that that included assassinations

i and there from the context you thought it probably meant

assassination.

MI. Gray. MI. Schwarz, I Will say I agree that assassination

i could have been on the minds of some people when they used

:: these words eliminate or get rid of.

I cannot say that Admiral Burke, for example, wasn't

:: himself thinking of assassination. I am just trying to say that

2: It was not serious considered as a program ofiaction by the

.: President or even the Forty group.

2: MI. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible that persons

2: at the level of the forty Group or the 5412 or such high

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PRIORA (ArEs 202)

authority might use worda like "get rid of" or "eliminate" to

2

mean overthrow the government, as opposed to murder the leader

and other persons, perhaps in the Central Intelligence Agency,

would interpret or misunderstand those words to mean murder

5

the leader, kill the leader?

6

Mr. Gray. I think this ia possible. However, the people

who might have given it that interpretation in the Cantral

Intelligence Agency had no authority to carry out much a plan.

Mr. Schwarz. Your testimony is that it would be beyond

their authority to act to assassinate unless they had been

:: given a specific order.

i: Mr. Gray. Or unless it had been included in a specific

program.

Mr. Schwarz. In other words, it would be beyond the

";authority of the Agency, as you understood the Agency, to

"rely upon general instructions such as we should take action

in order to overthrow the Castro government to constitute

:. authority for taking specific action to assassinate MI. Castro

:: personally?

Mr. Gray. I agree with what you say and if I may just

speak further to the point. The fact that there were many,

:: many meetings about Cuba with the President with sort of a

i shifting group of top government leaders throughout three

:: quarters, at least, of 1960, and that is into January of '61

i when the word "assassination" or that kind of activity within

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6

7

8

9

WARD A PAUL

$10 51089 Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 30003

!?/.ПМАННІ

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19

his approved progran was never mentioned, in an indication

to me that it was never in the Prasident's mind or anybody

¡who were these important people in government that assassination

was considered a wise, sensible or practical thing to undertake.

MI. Schwars. Would you matk as Exhibit 4 the April 14th,

1960, discussion of the National Security Council on April 14th,

1960, which 1s Tab H, and the part that I'm going to call your

attention to is on the fourth page, which is numbered page 5..

(The document referred

04-=-==2=2

to was marked Gray

Exhibit No. 4 for

identification.)

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1

MI. Schwart. Actually, I'm going to start at the bottom

of page d and start with the comments made on Trufillo and

then go to comments made on Castro and call your attention to

i the different language that la used.

With respect to Trujillo the following is stated:

6 :

"Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect to the

• jaltuation In the Carlbbean. Il Irujillo could be removed from

power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elaments were

prevented from seizing power in that country, oui anti-Castro'

i campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost.

!: The Vice President agreed that getting Ild of Trujillo would

1: be a favorable development for us."

Do you understand the words "getting rid of Irujillo"

14

to mean assassinating Trujillo?

1:.!

ME. Gray. I did

not understand that to mean that. I

did not understand then and understand now it to mean assassina-

1: tion.

81050011 Street, S.f., Washmains, D.C. 20003

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you look at the next

paragraph where

it demonstrates that if people wish to talk

¿ about assassination, they were quite willing to use the precise

word assassination, and what I would like to ask you after you

2r. have read that, well, I may read it into the record:

"Turning to Cuba MI. Dulles reported that a Sonor Betancourt

2; (no relation to Venezuela's Bentancourt) had recently defected

2: in Cuba and had told U.S. officials that he sees

three possible

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en.

WARI

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1

outcomes of the Cuban situation: (l) the assassination of

2

Castro, which would make him a martyr (2) Castro's sulcide,

which 1s a possibility in the event of failure and (3) a

continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in

a socialist dictatorship and a Batista-type terror in Cuba."

I guess the only question I had coming out of that is

7

was the point that the assassination of Castro would make him

-i=

a martyr one which you heard discussed on more than one occasion,

I for was that the only time you heard about it?.

Mr. Gray. I think that this is the only time I hoard it,

MI. Schwarz. Here, of course, MI. Dulles la quoting a Senor

' Betancourt, who is talking about the assassination of Castro.

Actually, I would now have to say that it's not unlikely that

:; It would have made him a martyr had he been

assassinated.

MI. Schwarz. Now has your recollection been refreshed

sufficiently for you to remember without my

showing you a

"document that during your service the special group authorized

• the passage of weapons to dissidents in the Dominican Republic?

• MI. Gray. Yes, I think they were referred to as small

arms. That was in lata December of '60 or early January of '61.

MI. Schwarz. Well, let's put in the record

as Exhibit 5

:

the January 12, 1961 minutes of the Speckal Group, Tab X.

(The document referred to

was marked Gray Exhibit

:.:

No. 5 for identification.)

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1

2.

Mr. Schwars. In which it is stated that the Special Group

approvod the project then limited supplies of small arms and

materials would be made available to dissidents inside the

Dominican Republic so long as -- that ian't there.

Nas there any condition put on that, as you recall?

Mr. Gray. I do not recall. As a matter of fact, Mr.

Schwars, I have difficulty remembering these two meetings or

8

li this moeting, which was in January and the next earlier meeting

liwas In December.

1'1

il

I was asked by a council of the Rockefeller Commission

i:

about arms for the Dominican Republic, and to be perfactly

::honest I had forgotten any discussion of arms for the dominican

Republic and it is only because your able staff has shown me

?: this memorandum that I am able to say to you that it must have

been discussed because I can't deny that it appears in these

ic minutes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now prior to that meeting, didn't Mr. Bissell

i: say on December 29th, 1960 and let us put before us Exhibit 6

:: of the minutes of that meeting which is Tab w.

(The document referred to

was marked Gray Exhibit

No. 6 for identification.)

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2

Mr. Schwars, That tha plan, current an of Dacitber al, would

not bring about the deslied result "lacking some decisive

stroke against Trujillo himsell."

Wouldn't you read that to mean the stroke against trujillo

himself la killing him?

6 / MI. Gray. I wouldn't so construo it.

7 Mr. Schwarz. How do you conatrue it?

Mr. Gray, Heli, other manoranda here I think reflect

=:

other notes, reflact that various courses of action which

16

might take place in Cuba or Trujillo resigning, and I think

there was some negotiation to that effect.

!:.

Now you haven't mentioned in some of these minutes --

i these memoranda have rofrashed my recollection that somehow

l, there was much more concern about trufillo in many quarters

C.

it than there was about Castro, and it seemed important to some,

I now recall, that something

should be done about Trujillo

End Tape fAi: and before anything was done about Castro.

Begin Tape БB

11n A mo 80099, 3 9. 1.000.009000 0 0 29901

Senator Mondale. Could

I ask you about why are we so

concerned about Trujillo? He was presumably friendly to us, anti-

: Castro, anti-Communist. What was the concern?

Mr. Gray. I believe the concern was more in Latin America

:: than in the United States of America. I think they were.

concerned about perhaps the way he governed his country, for

:: example. But I think it is reflected that the president or

2: high officials of our government were receiving

some Latin

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1

Amorican pressure to do something about trujillo.

Senator Morgan. Wasn't part of 1t, MI. Gray, at that time

the fact that he had previously arrested a large number of

prominent peoplo in his country and while doing so maybe he

had alleviatad some of this opposition but he lost general

6

support and the country was in bad financial condition and

It was thought that he was going to either fall or abandon

8

9

the country and that Castro people would take over?

That seans to be reflected as I read the minutes of the

10

Security Council.

MI. Gray. Senator, I just don't recall the situation in

?:those terms, I'm sorry.

Senator Morgan. Piltz, if I remember, is that not

?; reflected in the minutes?

it, MI. Schwarz. Yes, it is and there's also the thesis that

i: we needed to demonstrate that we wanted to move against both

17. right wing and left wing to establish credibility in Latin

:: America for the movement against Castro.

Senator Mondale. That proves that nobody is safe.

Senator Morgan. I really think it might be well sonewhere

2: for you to put that in the record because when we come to

writing the report on trujillo that we will want to know why.

:::

The Chairman. My memory of the period and the concern about

:; Trujillo was the fear that Castro, & Communist take-over would

2: "occur in the Dominican Republic by virtue of the repressive

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*Birjague

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r.

:.

action that Irujillo had taken and the shakey condition of

his government and the ballet at the time that Castro was

lagressively engagod in efforts to extend his revolution to other

: Latin American countries.

Isn't that the case, or do you recall, Mr. Gray?

6 :

MI. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I just don't recall. I said to

7 Mr. Schwarz earlier, 1f I may repeat sonething I said earlier,

that it's a strange thing to me that my recollection about the

Dominican Republic ia much dinner than

about many other things,

In "and he told me this 13 true of some of the other witnesses. I

;'.don'e know why this is so. But my recollection is vary dim

1: about the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Schwarz.

Senator Morgan, some of the exhibits we

i; put in do put forward both the reasons that have been put

forward here.

Senator Morgan. I haven't been here all the time.

MI. Schwarz. All right. Now I want to talk about

Patrice Lumumba.

1÷

Do you remember who Lumumba was?

MI. Gray. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now we didn't like Lumumba very much, did

13080009511008. 58. 10001000996000, 0.6 20001

::

= we?

4.:

Mr. Gray. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Why was that?'

Mr. Gray. It's my recollection we thought Lumumba would

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1

be

amenable to Soviet influance and control. But your

?.

associates refreshed my racollection. Most of what I romembered

about Lumumba was tha.teirtbleifokas.we.used to!.toll about.

i "you've got the:rrong"telophone Lumumba."

6 :

The situation In the Congo was fluid, it was chaotic, and

now I remember it was the subject of very much discussion in

;: this government and in the National Security Council. But I

". do romambar the name Lumumba and I of course have seen some

i,

of the papers which contain references to him.

Mr. Schwarr. All right, now were these minutes referred

::to your associates or your

associate; we

have shown you

papers that convince you that that is the name used

.ifor President Eisenhower.

MI. GIay. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Mark: ' as Exhibit 7, Tab P of the Senators'

:: books Special Group Meeting, 25 August, 1960.

(The document referred to

was marked Gray Exhibit

No. I for identification.)

210 9 101 810999, 88. Washrerene, D.C.:000 1

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a10808e499094.58. Hashores 1s1 100001

1

Ms. Schwarz. Now you're talking about Lumumba in that

second paragraph, aren't you?

MI. GIay. YaB.

Mr. Schwarz. At flat MI. Parrott and MI. Dulles described

5

I some operational linas involving the use of unions, thee

6

and the labor groups. The group agreed that

that kind of action againat Lumumba was very much in order.

Now you went on then to call on bahalf. of your associate,

and

10

that 1s President Eisenhower.

Is that right?

11

Mr. Gray. It must have been, yes,

1::

Mr. Schwarz. Saying that he had expressed extremely strong

feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action,

14

and then there is discussion about that. And it is "agreed

I that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule

out

16

17

=.

'consideration' of any particular kind of activity that might

contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."

!::

Now do you agree that you contemplated and approved, at

least, the planning of the assassination of Lumumba in that

¿ mecting?

MI. Gray. No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Didn't you agree that no activity would be

1: ruled out?

i::

MI. Gray. Well, again, I repeat, Mr. Schwarz, that when

you talk about an activity like some of these other phrases or

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1

words we have used. I would call your attention to something

we have not discussed, if I may, though, in this precise

language. -- "Of any particular activity which might contribute

•to

gotting rid of Lumumba."

I would suggest if you meant assassination, that would

6

"Do Itsolf gotting rid of Lumumba.

Do you know a Mr. Robart Johnson?

Mr. Gray. I think there was one on the NSC staff.

Mr. Schwarz. He has testified before us that he understood

I President Essenhower, at a noeting that he had attended himself,

I'to call for the killing of lumunba.

Now, first, did you ever

hoar President Eisenhower himself

say anything which called for the killing of Lumumba?

::' MI. Gray. I do not recall him ever saying anything that

contemplated killing Lumumba.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any comment one way or the

i other which can help the Committee in understanding the

:: credibility of Mr. Johnson as a witness?

MI. Gray.

yes, sir.

This is the first thing that has

: taken me by surprise, Mr. Schwarz. Your associates have been

::. very courteous, you have been very courteous.

In all of the discussions we have had Robert Johnson's

:: name has not been mentioned.

:: MI. Schwarz. That's true. That's not from any intention

:: but that is true as far as I know.

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Mr. GIaY. Are you asking mo di I can establish hig

¡credibility. I Impune his crodibility.

MI. Schwarz. Or make any comment, 11 you can. If you

"can't --

5

Mr. Gray. All right, sir.

6

Well, Robert Johnson, as I recall, was an able member of

7

¡the very small NSC state which we had in those days. It was a

& lean staff and I recall, I think, that I regarded him highly

..as an individual and as a staff man.

1:!!

The thing that puzzles me is where he ever would have

i: "heard Eisenhower make that kind of a statement bacause

I don't

"think, I can't swear to this, that he ever

attended a National

security Council meeting, and I would wager that he never saw

:: Eisenhower in any other kind of capacity.

May I ask a question? Well, 1s this a sworn tastimony?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes, it was and he describes it as being

'In the sunner at a meeting with a number of people with the

:. normal secretary away

and that he was present at the meeting

:: to take notes.

:.

MI. Gray. This is possible. I said that I would have

gathered that he attended a National Security Council meeting,

but of course the notes of the meeting would indicate that.

Mr. Schwarz. We have

not found notes of the meeting taken

:: by him.

MI. Gray. I question the credibility of this statement.

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30

P1071A fANBA 2071

r.

8108 ast 4f000s.8f seesprematern. Tae

MI. Millor. Mt. Chalsman, I think it would be propar

to 1111 In the full circumstances.

In his testimony this Mr. Johnson, he sald it was not

: his normal course to be at the full meetings of the National

" Security Council. What he did was to fill in bocause it was

6 I the sunner and people were away on vacations. He took the

7 ¡place of tho regular note-taker and he was startled by a

remark made by the president following a belefing on the situation

• in the congo with particular regard to Lumumba when the

President said something to the effect of - he was not clear in

:: his mind about the exact words but the meaning remained in

his memory, mainly get rid of Lumumba.

Then he said that the question that arose, he wrote this

1i up in notes and he referred it to, I've forgotten who the normal

:: note-taker was, what to do with the notes.

He said he could

i not recall the exact words

of the President and that it was

'''a long time ago and that what stuck in his memory was the

startling remark by the President and the stunned silence of

:: the people in the room.

Senator Tower. Why don't we have the minutes of that

:. NSC meeting?

Mr. Schwarz.

well, we have not found the minutes of the

i: meeting, unless it is this meeting, and this meeting is not

i shown as having been transcribed by Mr. Johnson but rather

:: by MI. Parrott.

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1

MI. Gray. Woll, excuse me. You see I don't know which

2

meeting we're talking about now. The anti-zumuraba campaign

that we're talking about is a Special Group meeting.

Mr. Schwarz.

And it doesn't show President Eisenhower

o lattending it.

6

MI. Gray. He never attended a Spacial Group meeting

except the meetings in his office on cuba, which weren't

¡ technically Spocial Group meetings themselves, But the President

never attendod a Spocial Group

meeting.

10

So the President couldn't have made it in this meeting

land I would feel more comfortable having challenged the

credibility of MI. Johnson for whom I stated I have a high

it iregard.

: If you can't find the minutes of the meeting that he

"said he took notes on -- now to me it seems the Committee would

be interested if you would take his testimony sariously in

1:: trying to find out:

MI. Schwarz. And

that, Mr. Gray, i8 why we are looking;

.. we have not succeeded.

MI. Gray. And my second point again, and forgive me for

i being repetitive, that he apparontly said that, he didn't

"remember the exact word, but here again, get rid of or get

:: rid of Lumumba.

Hell, it's no secret now. I've testified here that my

c: associate wanted to get rid of Lumumba.

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r.

• Masterergleen, 80 8 80901)1

trat

Lape 68,:

Mr. Schwars. In his testimony he sald that whatever the

H

words wore ho construed them as meaning killing. He, Johnson,

construed them as moaning killing and the meeting was stunned.

MI. Gray. Holl, I would like to say I disagree.

The Chairman. What did you understand the Elsanhover

6 i policy toward Lumumba to be - take such action, such covert

¡ action as might be necessary to depose Lumumba?

Mr. Gray. That's right. This meeting moved to spend,

• the last exhibit speaks of various types of covert action that

1!:.

might be taken and this minute reflects the fact that I said

: that certainly the President had very strong feelings on the

necessity for straightforward

action.

I do not consider that to include any thought in his

1: mind of assassination.

Now this was a Special Group meeting in August. I don't

!: Know when the National Security Council meeting at which Mr.

i: Johnson said he was present:

Mr. Schwarz. All we have is the summer.

MI. Gray. All you have is what?

MI. Schwarz. He said that it was in the summer.

:::

Senator Schweiker. The summer of when, Fritz?

MI. Schwarz. The summer of 1960.

I think we'll wait until the Senators come back up.

(A brief recess was taken.)

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ape

7À

20

2

до .

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d100 8 .0s0 slept, " 8.8809990990, ne inone

The Chalrman. All right, Mr. Schwarz.

MI. Schwarz. Me. Gray, we had a chat over the recass and

"you said you wanted to make some further comment. about the

questions we asked you concerning Mr. Robert Johnson.

5 .

Mr. Gray. Yes, thank you.

6: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am troubled by this. Earller

? I expressed my high regard for him as an Individual and as

9

ja membar of my statf. I find myself now challonging his

credibility. This troubles me quite deeply. I just wanted

11:

that on the record.

1:

Also, I guess it is raasonable to point out that in any

"event if he were to take notes of the meeting and if the

President did use the word "get rid of," it is the same kind

i: of language we've been talking about ever since I have been

i: sitting before the Committee.

Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Given your close connection to President

:: Eisenhower on all covert action matters, do you believe that

i. It is possible that you might not have understood exactly what

%.

President Eisenhower had in mind when such terms were used?

:. Are you confident that it was not the President's intention

and it was not the policy of his Administration to pursue any

:.:

means, including assassination for the purpose of getting rid

of Lumumba?

..:

Mr. Gray. MI. Chairman, I would say that any administration

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•:

210 Fuss 510p08.5.0..Washing9n, 0.6.2000%

should probably give consideration to any means, but in answer

to the question about my relationships with General Eisenhower,

I would be convinced, if I may use that word, that I understood

him very clearly in any conversationg we had about anything.

5 "And in further answar to your question I would think and believe

• lehat It was not hid polder tor the united states to purrue a

" i poldey of assassinations.

Mr.

Schwarz. Why not, Mr. Gray?

Mr. Gray. I don't think that this is the kind of thing

IC

he would have believed in. Proving a negative is very difficult,

::but I will repeat one illustrátion that I gave.

In many months of meetings about Cuba if there were any

::thought of assassinating in Cuba, certainly there would have

:: been some conversation about it in these meetings.

There was to my recollection no mention of assassination

::at all. This is just not the way he would go about things.

MI. Schwarz. All right. I want to ask you a broad questión

about Cuba that will start with your testimony and then ask

:: ask you to assume certain facts as true and then ask you to

explain those facts to the best you can acting as an expert.

Pirst, you have testified that the assassination of Castro

is was not, as far as you know, authorized by the Eisenhower

:.: Administration.

:.;

ME. Gray. Not so far as I know.

Mr. Schwarz. And second, you have testified that you

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ballave that President Elsanhower would have communicated to

2

"you parsonally 18 a CIA official, Mr. Dullas, had como to 80e

: "him to say that the CIA was soaking to assassinate Mr. Castro.

MI. Gray. Yes, sit.

5

I believe that the President would have communicated any

O such action or agreement of order or approval to me, although

"¡I must point out that I was not with Preaident Elsenhower

24 hours a day. It was a fow minutes every day, practically

avary day.

I find it very difficult to belleve, and i do not belleve,

:: that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with

:: such a proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it

):. from Mr. Dulles.

1÷

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now third. You have testified

i: when we have examined Exhibit 1, which is the November 3, 1960

?: Special Group minutes, the Senators' Tab V, that you did

i" recall that meeting at which the subject of assassination was

i brought up and it was rejected by the Special Group after hoaring

:: from Mr. Cabell of the CIA as being impractical. All right?

MI. Gray. All right.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, assume, if you will, that

¿: In fact prior to November 3, 1960, and at or about the end of

:: September, 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency made a

:; contract with the Malia to offer $150,000 if Mr. Castro were

:: killed.

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1

Assume that to be a fact, as the rocord indicates. It la

fact. llow, as a parson with experience in the field of

national security matters, can you explain that fact in light

of your testimony?

Mr. Gray. I find it very difficult to explain, Mr.

6 iSchwarz. May I just speak about procedures for a moment, which

> will help me answer your question, I think?

In the case of covort action, at least at that pariod of

time, although it may have been approved by the Agency itself -

I am now speaking about the Central Intelligence Agency -- the

.: normal procedure then would have boen

for it to be staffed in

:: the State Department. I have already, I think, testified that

: I complained that I was not given a chance to staff out some

:;of these matters, but that is perhapa aside from the point

at which time both the State Department and the Agency had

agreed it would have gone to the forty Committee and if the

Forty Committee approved it, it would be approved, considered

approved by the government, unless, as in some cases, the

.. President's representative to the Forty Committee had a

:. question about the action

and he wished to have a Presidential

:. decision, and that happened on a few occasions.

so now getting back to your specific question, how could

i..

this thing have happened, one way it could have happened would

have been that it was well known in the Agency that there was

a program directed against Castro and that the people in the

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1 10 8 08e 690008, 08. 1.199000.891000, 08 in001

Agency assumed that that meant anything goas against Castro.

This could have been a possibillty.

I rather guess that that is the probable answer to tho

: Iquestion. A possibility of course is that the responsible

i people in the Agency simply felt they had the power to act on

o their own, which I would have denled had it come to my attention.

" I am unablo to, really to explain it. But if 1t happened, it

1s py judgment that it shouldn't have happoned without the

appropriato procedures baing followed.

MI. Schwarz. And your testimony is that those procedures

1:

were not followod..

MI. Gray. I belleve this to be the case. If I ever

heard of this Mafia thing before it recontly appeared in the

:: press, I certainly have completely forgotten about it.

MI.. Schwarz. It is the kind of thing you would remember

.iIf you had ever heard it.

MI. Gray. I would think so. I would think so, yes.

MI. Schwarz.

So just to pin down what you said, well,

.. you are obviously not sure.. Your opinion is that the most

: Likely explanation is that the Agency personnel assumed

erroneously and mistakenly that the program with respect to

:: Cuba included the assassination of Castro, even though the

:: program in fact did not include the assassination of Castro.

MI. Gray, I have to make that kind of assumption.

As a further observation about this we were referring to

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• =

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a November 3 meeting of the Spacial Group in which 1t was

2

¡agrood whon Genoral Cabell Bald assassination la not a

• 'practical alternative. I just can't understand how -- what

: date did you say, Mr. Schwart?

Mr. Schwarz. The record indicates the contract with the

¿ Mafia was made the end of September, 1960.

Mr. Gray. Now here is General Cabell on the 3rd of

* Novembor saying that this is not a viable alternative. I

a find it difficult because he's the Deputy Director of the

1: Agency, and I don't think myself that he might have approved

:: an assassination attempt and would have come to the Special

:: Group saying that this is not the way to go about things.

General Cabell was an honorable man, I think an able

:: Deputy Director. He would not, I think, have approved such

: an action and then a few days later say this is not the kind

i: of thing that we should do.

MI. Schwarz. So from your knowledge of hig character

you would assume he, in fact, did not know of the contract with

::the Mafia.

Mr. Gray. This would be my assumption.

:..

The Chairman. Have you completed?

'Mr. Schwarz. I do have one thing, I forget. Did you

and I discuss whether of not Vice President Nixon had a major

:: role in

the Bay

of Pigs?

;.:

MI. Gray. Yes, we didn't finish our discussion.

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Mr. Schwarz. I think you have something that might add

¡to the record on that.

/ Mr. Gray. I was saying to Mr. Schwarz that I am Isasonably

: sure - this 1a not by way o? suggesting you shouldn't call

= former President Nixon for any purpose you want to talk to

• 6 him, but I am not talking aboutr.the Bay of Pigs. I am reasonably

• sure he nover attended those meetings of the Special Group.

= It wasn't really the special Group.

How can I refer to it-

9 the Ad loc Committee that sort of was set up by the Preaident.

:: 1to doal with the Cuba program.

It is my strong recollection he never attended any of

::those meetings. I think that what he would have known about

:: the Bay of Pigs would have been known to him - woll, I say

:; the Bay of Pigs. What ultimately culminated in the Bay of.

:: Pigs, the program against Castro, would have been known by

him only as it was discussed in the National Security Council,

:.and I cannot remember with what detail that program was

:: discussed

in the National

Security Council. I would have to

see the notes to refresh my recollection.

So that if he had an active role in what led to the Bay

:

.. of pigs, I have forgotten what it was.. I'm just saying that

:: I don't think he's going to be too helpful on that particular

i: point.

Now let me say, please, if I may volunteer one other thing.

::at the time that Preaident Eisenhower went out of office on

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19l. let 81. laminate 116 30001

January 21, I think it 18 fals to say that there was no plan

..

or no action committed, there was no military planning. As

ia matter of fact, I never hoard - I'm geographically ignorant

: parhaps, but I don't think I ever heard of the Bay of Pigs

until this thing came out. So certainly there was

no military

¿ planning to land at the Bay of Pigs.

In fact, General Eisenhower objected very strongly to

- the fact that there was any military planning whatsoever when

•he left office. And I expressed to Mi. Schwarz the personal

opinion this morning that this was a bad three-months period

: In Amorican history when, after President Konnedy was elected,

he apparently felt he was not in a position to trust many of

the people around him. And my own judgment is had this thing

:: come a year later, either the Bay of Pigs operation would not

have been started or it would have been a successful operation.

.: And I think it is unfortunate for him and it was unfortunate

for him and for the country that this thing sort of came to

a head so quickly in his Administration.

That is gratuitous, I know.

The Chairman. Senator Schweiker -- Senator Tower had

a question:

Senator Tower.

keferring to Tab E, page number 9, which

is Exhibit 2, toward the end of the page there. These are.

the minutes of the Security Council meeting of 10 March, 1960:

"MI. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation

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Mar,no 1A108 2021 144

spiresson lee sonad

In cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggestod that any

plan for the removal of Cuban loaders ahould be a packago deal

since many of the loaders around Castro were even worse than

:: Castro.".

Now did MI. Dulles . now the minutes are not detailed in

ó ithis instance, but can you recall whether or not MI. Dulles

I ¡went into any dotall on the plan to affoct the Cuba aituation

t. was boing worked on?

MI. GIaY. May I take a minute to answer that question,

!. 'ME- Chairman?

The Charman. Surely.

MI. Gray. I am not so sure how much I told you, MI.

::Schwarz and members of the staff and members of the Committee.

:; It's hard to remember.

I have been shown the minutes of the Special Group which

' are dated, I think, February 27 - anyway, in February of 1960,

:: which dealt with the sabotage of sugar refineries, and I remember

'" the meeting. It was in the President's office in the Oval

:: Room and I remember it very clearly because there were schematic

: drawings of sugar mills and MI. Dulles and his technical

associates were demonstrating how this kind of sabotage could

c: take

place, etcetera.

And I remember the President, and it is my Iccollection that

:; the President said, well, perhaps it's time to make a move

:: against Castro, but don't just fool around with sabotaging

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1

sugar milla. If you want to move against the Castro governmont,

¿ bring me a program which is going to be effactive. They can

• always repalr the sugar mills, etcetera.

And as a result of that direction Allon Dulles came back

! to the President in my presence and in the presence of others,

¿ I have forgotten who now, with a four-point program which

responded to the Prosident's request to come up with something

* more than just sabotaging sugar refineries.

I havo not seen that four-point program since I left

; government. It is in the library at Abilone and those

four

:: points were sabotago, enhance the economic sanctions, propoganda,

:: which resulted, among other things, in the establishment.of

that Swann's Island radio, and the training of Cuban exiles.

Now, Senator Tower, I would have to know the date of that

: four-point program which was the beginning of all of this

i to know, for example, to answer your guestion as to how deeply

• he went into detail at this meeting because he was either

preparing the four-point program or had just prepared it. It

::was my recollection it was sometime in March that he presented

: it to the President. The records would show this certainly

:. at Abilene, and I remember very well that Mr. Dulles read from

i: this word for word without any

deviation whatsoever

to make

sure he was proposing a programthat the President understood.

So that is

sort of a convoluted answer to your question.

: I don't know at this time whether the program was in preparation

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8.

41000N6:1000.88

or had just been adoptod. But he certainly, according to this

Inote, didn't go into any real'dotall about it.

Senator Tower. Well, here again, I'll road this to you.

"Admiral Burke suggested" -- now this was in response

' Ito Mr. Dulles's report that the plan to elfect the situation

* In Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke's 101101-0n comment

7

¡was "the suggestion that any plan for the removal of Cuban

: leaders should be a package deal because many of the leaders

around Castro wore even worse than Castro."

I would assume that that rafars to Raul and Che Guevera.

MI. Gray.

Yes.

Senator Tower. So it would appear to me

from that that

•Mr. Dulles, if he went into any detail or at least it was

understood by Admiral Burke that the kind of plan being worked

on to effoct the situation in Cuba had something to do with

:; the renoval of Castro, perhaps not necessarily by assassination

' but nerhaps by other meang.

Then again, over P in numbered page 2, Exhibit 3, in the

Special. Group -- this is a memorandum for the record

& Memorandun for the Record, numbered page 2, Item 6:

:..

"There

was a general discussion as to what would be the

2: effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che

:: Guevera should disappear simultaneously."

So this says to me that at least there was an awareness

=: '

and at least some contingency planning going on, I suppose

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1.01, 88, Hastensaten, 06. 20001

¡under Dulles's diraction to affact the removal of Castro by

i somo means and those around him.

Mr. Gray. Well, in the flist reference, which is the

i National Security Council mecting, he actually said that there

was a plan being developed and Admiral Burke apparently said

¿ well any plan should be a package deal. Later on Admiral

• Burke again is expressing his opinion that the removal of

* Castro by whatever

means might result in a Communist takeover.

" But let me romind

you, please, Senator, that these meetings

were either the same day or one day apart, and I have already

:: said that I don't know whether that four-point program was

in existence under preparation or had been adopted. I just

would have to see the date of it. But I don't think you'll

find it.

Excuse me, sir.

Senator Tower. Sure, go ahead.

MI. Gray. I don't think that Admiral Burke knew what

was in any four-point program at that time and I think he

was just expressing his own observation.

well, if you're

making plans these are the considerations that I have in mind.

Senator Tower. Well, a four-point plan, as i remember

you reconstructed it, included economic sanctions, propoganda

broadcasts, the training of Cuban exiles as guerrillas, I

suppose, and what was the fourth?

Mr. Gray. I think it was sabotage.

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Senator Tower, Sabotage.

MI. Gray. I think these are the four points.

Senator Tower. But none of those contemplate political

i activity of the type that would result in the actual surgical

¿ removal of Castro.

MI. Gray. I understand that.

Senator Tower. These are less precise Instruments of

i adversely impacting on the Castro regime.

MI. Gray. I simply have to repeat that I am reasonably

i certain on March the 14th Admiral Burke was not privvy to the

:: plan that Mr. Dulles was referring to and that he was simply

expressing his opinion that if you have any plan at

all, it

.. ought to take these

factors

into consideration that you might

end. up with a communist governnent if you don't watch out.

And I think, well, I know I've already said thereafter

i: there was a lot of discussion about a government in exile to

avoid this kind of situation. My guess - I have to guess that

' Arleigh burke was just expressing an opinion when he was told

there was i plan being formulated. I don't know whether that

:

responds or not.

Senator Tower. All right, thank you.

:::

Senator

schweiker?

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MI. Gray, in the Special Group records that we are

referring to here --

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MI. Gray. Yes, 8ir.

Sonator Schwalker. Mr. Merchant la whom? He represented

• ¡whom for this Spoclal Group?

NI. Gray. He was a State Department representative.

Senator Schweiker.

And Mr. Irwin represented --

Mr. GIay. He was Defense Department. He was Assistant

: Secretary of Defense and for Sacurity Affalrs.

Sonator Schweiker. Now in your structure

sot-up at

• the Administration here General Goodpasturo played a role.

: What was his role?

MI. Gray, General Goodpasture's title was Staff Secretary.

Senator Schweiker. For the National Security Council?

NI. GIay. No, for the President, for the Office of the

: President, and that is a role which he performed. Now this wasn't

a cover name.

If you wanted a secretary you had to

get Goodpasture to hire him, this sort of thing. He was

secretary to the whole White llouse staff.

He was also a

trusted confidant. of the President, a distinguished military man,

then,

and subsequently, he was an unusual sort of man

• and I think this is not irrelevant to your question, he

foI example, though it's not generally know, has a Pho. from

:: Princeton, as well as being a four star general, and that is

: not a connon thing. The President used him, if I may over-

:: simplify, for spot matters. If he wanted to get a message to

: the pentagon or to the Joint Chiefs or perhaps even to Allen

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1111.

:

¡ Dullas on some inuediate issue or some innediate problem. My

responsibility was more in the longer range planning. I had

the National Security Council and Its Islated machinary, which

was a planning board in the OCB.

Senator

Schweiker. Was there a staff to direct over?

i . Hore you a staff director?

MI. Gray. My title was Special Assistant to the President

• for National Security Affairs and by statuta there is an

• Executive Secretary, and his name was James Lay, James S. Lay.

Now tho cause of the potential difficulties in having

:. two men dealing

in sonowhat the same fiold, it was the

::practice between General Goodpasture and me to keep each other

i fully informed when any of our activities impinged on the

::activities and responsibilities of the othor.

I thought this was a good way to opcrate the White louse

.:myself, but it did require two men of goodwill and mutual

respect of it wouldn't have worked too well, as you can guess.

So if I can oversimplify - he was the spot man and I

"as the long range planning

man.

Mr. Schwarz. So you must have had a good

working

relationship.

Mr. Gray. Well, sir, I'll say publicly, because you might

:. have him in as a witness, if somehow he could get nominated

:. for President, 1 would vote

for him. I don't know whether

he'd say the same about me.

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Sanator Schweikor. Woll, I undorstand that John aisonhower.

: in the last couple of years of his father's administration,

• also worked cither with, maybe with Genoral Goodpasture in

some context.

Is that correct or not?

Mr. Gray. Over in the White House? Oh, yes.

Ho worked

for General Goodpasture in the White House.

Senator Schweiker. Would he come into areas woll, would

eithor General Goodpasture or John Eisenhower come into that

kind of Special Group situation?

MI. Gray. Thank you, because I should have explained this.

First, with respect to leneral Goodpasture, he was always

invited to sit with the National Security Council as an observer.

not as à participant, und generally

did.

So he know what was going on in my field in that way.

John Eisenhower, never.

when some, usually when

some covert action was approved

by the Forty Committee, I would inform General Goodpasture that

if it was of

sufficient importance for him to know about it.

Never John.

What General Goodpasture informed John of I don't know,

but coodpasture was not a representative of the Special Group

and neither was John.

le never attended the Special Group

meetings.

Send:or Schweiker. Goodpasture did not attend the

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BeglA

Phone (Arde

Tape 178

5

?

jahn.did.good.ataff.work.ill milavesto/ay.hostasinot at, the

¡ NSC or SpecialiGroup lovel in tarms of his activitles.: I.

am not sure, Senator, precisely what he 1a.

He says in the letter he wrote to you, senator, recently,

think, offering -

Senator Schweiker. leah, ha wrote a letter to me.

MI. Gray. Well, It was in that letter I think he said

that Goodpasture and I were both - well, I'm not sure about

that.

PAUL

110 Forse Srieet, S.E., Wastinatin, D.C, 20003

9

Senator Schweiker.

1ü

I think he did.

MI. Gray. I've got the latter up here. I have it here

1? if It's important. But he wanted Goodpasture and me to offer

our services up to this Committee and before I had a chance

1÷

to do so, which I would have, I had a call from the Chief

15 Counsel of the committee asking me if I would come.

SO I

was able to write John that I was asked. I didn't have to

i Offer.

Senator Schweiker. That's all I have. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Gray.

I was perfectly willing to come before the

Committee, eager to come if I could be helpful, and you would

need not have

issued a subpoera to get me here.

The Chairman. Senator

Morgan.

Senator Morgan.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one question.

MI. Gray, we were talking about Robert Johnson, and as I

21

was thumbing through the book I noticed that under Tab U there

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11010981 Street. S.R..l.getrosoion, D.C. 2000.1

1

is a memorandun contained in the discussion of the National

Security Council and it lists as being present a MI. Robert H.

Johnson, the Director, National Security Council, Secretary,

and he signed the minutes.

5

So I just wonder if that does indicate that maybe at times

he

did take the minutes?

'7

Mt. Gray. Well, it certainly does indicate that he was

8

there at this meeting, Senator Morgan. But again, and I may be

9

mistaken in how many meetings he attended, and I'm already

10

on record about my trouble with having challenged him, but I

11

would remind you also that this meeting was in October and not

In in the summer. And as far as I can understand from what has

1: been reported, he only referred to attending a meeting in the

14

summer of 1960.

1

Senator Morgan. I just mentioned it to indicate that

he may have from time to time.

1÷1

MI. Gray. I would have to agree with you.

1r:

Senator Morgan. When you were the Director of the Office

1' of Defense Mobilization, did you resign the position when you

?...

became Special Assistant?

MI. Gray. Yes, sir.

Senator Morgan. So that position later was filled by.

whon, do you know?

24

MI. Gray. Well, at the time I left the Office of Defense

21,

Mobilization its responsibilities and those of the Civil

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•C.

a e ordi greear, 5.8, Peasancalroes, 02.1. 100011 1

Defense Administration were moved into are angeniration, and I

2

belleve that my successor was Leo foig, a former gorersor of

& western state, and I've forgotten which state. He had been

"Director of the Civil. Defense organization. Later Civil

5

Defense was transferred to the Defense Department, I belleve,

and that office became known as ERP. I believe it's still

known as ERP. You gentlemen would know better than I would.

It's the Emergency -- well, anyway, it does emergency planning

for relocation and so forth.

So that started out by reason of being the old National

Security Resources Board which was created by the act that

: 2

"created

the Defense Department.

:?The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Schwarz. All right, the memo I told you that Senator

Morgan referred to, that is a meeting of the National security

: "Council and there's a lot of attendees listed. It doesn't

::. list the President.

Does that mean the President wasn't there or was it

:: practice not to list the President?

MI. Gray. Actually, Mr. Schwarz, I take the position, and

i..

maybe I said this to you, really I am puzzled

by this one to

2:

which my attention has just been called because my view always

:: was that there

is no National Security Council meeting without

¿; the President. It is the President and Council. And I don't

₴:

understand, it says here is the Secretary of State, of course.

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2

He would have been the ranking member of the Council presiding.

I'm sOrTy, you've got me on this one. I cannot understand

bacause I always have taken the position when I read in the

5

¡press today that the National Security Council says, or the

¡National Security Council does I take some umbrage because

7

there isn't any such thing as the National Security Council

without the President, if the National Security Council 15

&

saying something.

This is why I don't think that we have the best organization

1':

possible to run our affairs today. But that is not the

subject of this discussion.

17

The Chairman. Well, I'll tell you one thing about it,

1. Mr. Gray. It is

no longer lean.

MI. Gray. No, sir, I know. that and I know very well

about that. But this is not the subject.

ir.

-i-=

May I go off the record?

The Chairman. Certainly.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Schwarz. MI. Gray, I have a couple of things that

came up in your meeting with the staff I neglected to ask you.

::: Was there

at some point during your government experience a

¡discussion of killing Nasser, and if so did it lead to anything?

I mean obviously he didn't die from assassination.

MI. Gray. Yes, I'm glad to bring that up because I think

: I got the impression I never heard the word "asgassination"

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110 dyest Strero GE. WHo monton, D.e, 20003

1

used and that is not quite correct. I cannot remember which

year this was but probably '58 or '59, at the time when Colonel

3

Nasser was riding high. We were in the Planning Board of

; which I was Chairman, reviewing an NSC paper which would go

5

6

naturally to the President and members of his Council on the

Near and Middle East.

And as we began discussions of this paper and views about

what our relationships with and posture toward. Colonel Nasser,

what should be this posture. And the original comments ranged

In fall the way from one side, let's bump him off, to the other

:? extreme, let's get in bed with him. And I mean there was a

12: whole gamut of expressions.

Well, when we sat down to write the paper the word

?; "assassination" of "bump off" or anything of that sort never

it appeared, nor did "get in bed with him," although it's interesting

16; that the CIA position at that time was that Nasser was the

In wave of the future, that he would sweep across Africa and

1: we ought to get rid of him.

The President's decision finally was somewhere between

the extreme of getting in bed with him and of trying to limit

.. his capabilities somehow. Having left the impression perhaps

?: I never heard "assassination" mentioned, I'll guarantee it

never found its way into print in that paper and it was never

21,

offered to the President as an option in that Middle East paper.

MI. Schwarz. Well, is the point it didn't get into print,

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NAMES A

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Bag 6 100

1

is that the only point you can say about Nasser?

2

Mr. Gray. Well, nobody seriously after the first discussion,

nobody was putting forth that as an altarnative.

I am not gure that answers your question.

5

MI. Schwarz. Well, It's better, I think, than saying it

didn't got into print.

7

Mr. Gray. All right, it was not pressed.

8

Mr. Schwarz. Did you hear of any other discussions of

9

lassassinations?

16:

MI. Gray. Yes, there's one other I mentioned to the staff

1:

jand I have forgotten. Can you refresh my recollection?

1:.

MI. Schwarz.

Yes. Was it a discussion when you were

14

with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board?

Mr. Gray. Oh, yes. A former member of that Board, whom

I would just as soon not identify because I don't think it's

important to this Committee, when the DCI would appear before

the Board and we would be brief on Vietnan, on various occasions

this member of the Board would say, have you given any

consideration to trying to bump off the leadership in Hanoi?

And I was never sure whether he was being facetious or not.

2

But in any event this was his question and the DCI would

2n dust shrug.

So we'd come back to another meeting a couple of months

2:

later and he'd say, have you yet given any consideration to

25

bumping off the leadership in Hanoi? And the DCI would just shrug.

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WAND

1

2

5

6

8

9

10

1!

13.

14

16

And I think the fact of the matter was the DCI didn't

feel he had the capability. Certainly he never responded

affirmatively to this question.

And I believe those are the two times that I really have

heard somebody seriously advocate at some point assassination,

and when I say how serious it was, l'don't know be nothing,

I'm sure there was never any! planning to it.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear of the term Executive

Action?

Mr. Gray. Well, I had not heard of the term Executive

I Action that I recall until one of the counsel of the Rockefeller

Commission asked me this. No, I am sorry. I can't be more

accurate.

MI. Belin, in my pre-appearance conference, asked me

if I knew the phrase Executive Action. I told him, I said

16

I never heard of it and I asked him what it was, and he said,

17

"well, it was some sort of, not a program but a procedure or

13:

something for bumping people off. I am not even sure that

10 i that phrase was coined as early as the Eisenhower Administration.

I don't know -- do you know? Well, the answer is I don't

410 forse Spread, S.f., Washmarros, D.C. 20001

know.

21:

24

2.0

The Chairman.

Senator Schweiker?

Senator Schweiker.

Maybe this was covered because we

went back and forth

but I don't want to be too repetitive.

The National Security Council minutes of September 2lst,

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under Tab G, Mr. Gray, lists the White House Staff Secretary

2

as being present, and I gather that would be Mi. Goodpasture.

Mr. Gray. General Goodpasture.

4

Senator Schweiker. And then it says the Assistant White

5

170-.

House

Staff Secretary. Might that be General Eisenhower?

MI. Gray. It might be.

Senator Schweiker.

But going on to the minutes, on page

8

15 of that document, the last sentence of the first paragraph

9

on that page:

10

"Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo

1?

for the moment

but Lumumba was not yet disposed of

and remained

grave danger

as long as he was not disposed of."

Do you have any recollection at all of that conversation?

14

Senator Schweiker. Senator, I remember now. As I

said earlier there was a great amount of discussion in the

16.

National Security Council about the Congo. That is, we spent

17

a great deal of time discussing it.

I don't precisely remember this briefing, but certainly

18

I have testified here today and the documentation shows that

₴:

we were opposed to Lumumba and I remember the name Mobutu,

2: and I cannot remember our relationship or concerns with him.

Senator Schweiker.

I would like to ask the counsel if

8%

c: we have

a record of these minutes?

Mr. Schwarz. I was going to ask Mr. Kelly. Did this

come from Abilene?

2:

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Prone (Area 202) 544-6000

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..

god.

==.

WARD

810) Fast S81eel, 5.1,88.1sfses9tos, D.C.2000.8

Mr. Kelly. Yes, all National Security Council meeting

minutes come from Abilene.

They give us only the portions relating to

Mr. Schwarz. It is relevant.

Mr. Kelly. Well, ¡I itold them to give me the first

ipage, whether relevant of not, and now we'll get

the algnature

, page, whether relevant of not.

Senator

Schweiker. I was wondering whether General

Johnson kept the minutes of that meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. General Johnson was the one we had with

General. Taylor, and this: is Mr. Johnson.

The Chairman. It is very difficult to read that sentence,

the one that Senator Schweiker has pointed out: "Mobutu

appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment,

14

but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and

remained a grave

1:.

danger as long as he was not disposed of."

16

It is hard to read that

sentence without at least construing

17

it to mean that Lumumba was still alive and until he was no

longer alive, he was a danger.

Senator Schweiker. What was the time seguence, if I

2

might ask the counsel, of the meeting that Bissell had about

disposing of Lumumba? When did that occur?

Mr. Schwarz. The fall or the summer.

MI. Baron. October-November:

Senator Schweiter. Of that year?

20

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11060011 Steert. s.F

Washantin, 00.61. 20100.3

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59

Mr. Schwarz. Of that year. There's no doubt about that.

Senator Tower. That might be reading too much into it.

It doesn't nocesgarily mean until we dispose of him. He could

disposed of some other way.

5

Mr. Schwarz. Senator Schwelker, I am told --

6

The Chairman. Can you interpret that

sentence for us?

7

What in your judgment did that sentence mean knowing what you

8

Idid about policy at:the time?

9

MI. Gray. I would have to study it a little more,

10

"Senator.

Senator Schweiker, I think, has quoted the last sentence

22

fin

that paragraph, which says that Mobutu appeared to be the

effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was

÷4

not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as

16

he was not disposed of.

MI. Grayl. I have already testified

we were

after Lumumba,

and as I say I remembered the name Mobutu. I have also testified

that the situation was fluid and chaotic. And as it turned

out, I think, finally we didn't do anything.. The United Nations

was

put in charge of it.

2: 1

Mr. Schwarz. How do you construe the words "disposed of"?

2: Mr. Gray. I put it in the same category as "get rid of,"

¿:"eliminate." You see, it says earlier that "a recent attempt

to assassinate Mobutu had failed." That's up at the top of

.:! the page.

There's no suggestion that we had attempted

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phone (Ares 202) 566-6000

TOP SECRET

60

passe

WAHD A FAUL

"°.

1s, 18.6. 2000.1

1

an

assassination.

MI. Schwarz. No, it had never been suggested. But does

that help you interpret the language about Lumumba, disposing

of Lumumba?

5

Mr. Gray. Would you ask the question again?

Ms. Schwarz. You referred to the jeference to assassinating

Lumumbaithe: failure.of that up above and.you: commented we: had

8

/sothingito do, with 1t, and: I said there was noiallagation ve did.

9

I But I ask..; you whether those words about Mobutu help you

interpret the "disposed of" language about Lumumba, or are

::"they Irrelevant to the interpretation of "dispose of"?

MI. Gray. Well, I will simply repeat that. It was not

¿my impression that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba.

The Chairman. If there are no further questiong, Mr.

Gray, we appreciate your testimony.

MI. GIaY. May I make some concluding remarks. They are

rather brief."

The Chairman.

Yes, certainly.

MI. Gray. Pirst of all, let me say, sir, that I have

¿ been treated with the utmost courtesy by counsel, staff, and

::: by you and your committee, and for this I am grateful. I

Er have appeared before a lot of committees and this has not

always been the case. And I appreciate the opportunity to

:; appear.

And I hope you will permit me some personal, but not

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tone 1A10+ 2071 944-6000

TOP SECRET

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"...

WARO A

c..

21081001 Sta001.S.F..W.16111199119, 0.6. 90003

unimportant observations.

2

I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously

¡as possible as I feel very strongly the noed for a viable

: Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its

¿ charter. I believe that the present furor about CIA is

E impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it

•18 able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the

better our country will be served. I believe that we will

§ continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis

for our policy makers and I think there will be occasiong when

i: covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of

::our national security.

Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that

1÷ there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that

1i it is improper -- with

the activities of the Central Intelligence

¿: Agency, while at the same time people seem not to be equally

?: concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country,

especially through its very many KGB agents who are here.

I would hope that a Congressional Committee would be

:. interested enough to investigage this most serious matter.

The Chairman. Thank you very

much, "r. Gray.

MI. Gray. Thank you for the courtesy.

The Chairman. Thank you.

The hearing will recess until 10:00 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned,

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Phone (Aiza 202) 344-6000

WARU A PAUL

410 Forst Strent, S.E., Wishenaton, D.C. 2000.%

*TOP SECRET

62

1

to reconvene on Thursday, July 10, 1975 at 10:00 o'clock a.u.).

5

6

8

9

11

12

13

1

1

2

2%

2

24

25

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3 November 1960

5

Gray Ext l

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Alinuies of Spccial Group Mecting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs, Merchani, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lanscale

r.

PHOFEHTY 10:

THE WHITE retire

1. C130

IT. Grag iquired

once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro. Me. Merchant said he

would check inio the progress of inc Siate Department group whici

has boon charged wii developing recommendations on this malier.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concep: oí U.S. efforis agains: Castro.

1r. Douglas,

supporied by Mr. Gray and Mi. Merchant, exporaded too icea that

perhaps things have now progressco to a poini miere covert activides

of the typo originally envisaged io: ClA io underica, vili not bo cliestive.

Mr. Douglas icierred to the exicosive program oi tic militia, Mr. Gray

cited the matier of arms from the Soviet bloc, and dir. Merchani dwelt

on the increasing eifcetiveness oi Castro's measures to controi te

population in ways witch ine Coinmunists have developed so well. The

lauer said dia: be and others in the Stic Department had originally

though: that a popular rebellior wouid develop within Cuba and that

this could be augmenied by the comparatively small-scale clioris oi

cxiles under Cl conirol.

Nox Lie same probie are beginning io icel

more and more thal despite the aumerous celections and the ecosomic

deprivations being experienced aj the middle and upper classes, time

is actually working on Castro's side.

foresaw dai there would occur a point in time beyond which covert

intervention would noi do the job.

Mir. Gray expressed lie opinion thi: we wiil never be able io

"clean dy" the siontion mition: the use ci over: U.S, military force.

He supperied tie posability of using the ClA-bacred exiles to modat a

simulaiod snack on Guantanamo in order io citer an excuse ior overt

GREE 2 15

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C..

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the gencral conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually lo atlack Guantanamo

chia would almost certainly mean war.

Mr. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inscribed. on ihe NSC agenda for nest Monday in

order to be able lo arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.

• He thought it essential

that the policy of the U.S. should be coinpletcly

undersiood by responsible oficials.

so tiai any overt Cuban act would

be met with a previously-agrecd-on resposse.

Mr. Merchant stated thai, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought tbat some of the previous argumentation in loday's meeting

was faulty, in that we could no: have it both ways. By this he meant

that it is nor logical to conclude ihat an indigenous uprising is impossible

and yet that it is feasible ior me U.S, to go in overuly and "clean up

the mess." He pointed out that ií Castro's support were such that an

uprising was out of the quesiion ten an open invasion by the U.S. would

ue met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

likc algeria.

Turning to the immodiaic problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in tie U.S., with the

rcasons for coming :0 this conclusion. He cited specifically ihe

possivility oi U.N. investigation in Guaremala and the increased scope

of the program, ihich has bock brough: about by the incrcased sirengih

of the Castro regime.

Allancibors of the Group expressod serious

doubts as to whether

such activity could be lopi at all sccure.

Merchant said at one point, that although inis does no: represent a

final conclusion on his part, he is inclined lo think that lie proposal

embodies the worst aspect of doih worlds; thai is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or

preparing to make to best possible case lor overt interiention.

MI. Gray suggested that the accision could be put up :o his

associales a: the samo lime liber is discussod.dr. Merchant agrceci

that this is where ii should end up, but ascered that he is not prepared

1o move in that direction until a survey has beer made oá tie vossibilities

In this connection Gen. Caball moriored tie possibility of using

a rofugee organization - cither an existry one or a contrived one - 10

backstop the operitions.

2

SHOST - DES GRY

PROPERTY TH

THE Walke torre do.

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## Page 67

Mr. Douglad said that in any case he would be prepared to have

the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whother any rcal planning hag been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

"Fic said that without those three the Cuban Government would be

Icaderless and probably brainess.

He conceded that it would be

necessary to act against all three simultar.cously. Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action of this kind is uncertin of results and highly dangerous

In conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

Fie felt that, particularly because oi the necessity of simultancous

it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

is havanal nur canabilitias.

12.07

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C.

ri. Supply Dropa - Cuba

Gen. Cabell esplained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not taken place because oi the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and lie Escambray operation had been canceled because

He said that tiese missions are still planned, and assumed

-that the Group had no objections.

The nembers so signified.

N5. U-2. Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first

flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover.

He cortizucd

that we are analycing the cxac: resulis on a priority bauis and tai

come time alter the middle of next week we should be in a position to

make recommendations for the missions required to cxiend the coveragc.

Mr. Gray commented somcwhat wryly thai this ins all right with

him since he "would certainly not be avaliable to discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of nexi weck." The other incibers appezied,

to have the same reaciion.

6. Policy Consideration ile Cuban Exiles

15. Gray said that assistani Anoracy Goncral Ycagley had spoken

to him afier his inceting with Col. King and tossrs. Esterline and

Holman.

Hic nud said tha: the intormation given to him by the CL

represchtatives,

and the arrangements for future coordination if

necessary, were entircly satisiactory io him.

Hic had staied, however,

that a problem remains wit rospoct to action te Fbl should kc;

that is, the FBI riceds guidance in its handliag o Cuban exile groups

other than inose under the direction of CLi.

"The Group agrood that the best way to anack this problem would

be to have dir. Yengley aliend nose weck's Special Group meeting and

discuss tie maltor al first hand. Mr. Parrot was asked io make

arrangemenis fortlio.

Malue of Caba to the USSR as a Base Yio-i-ris

Cape Candiera!

r. Parroll gave lar. lierchanithe gist of the OSt remorardurn

120:

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this subjeci, which had been discussed with the reat of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

LaParrattes

THOMAS A. PARROTT

• !

LYL

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## Page 70

' CIA HAS DO ORIECTION TO

DEGLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS D000MENL

AS SANITIZED Dy highlegnae

3 November 1960

15/2188

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minuies o! Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchani, Mouglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lansiale

5

r.

PROPERlY "i

1. Cub3

Mr. Gra!

inquired once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro.

Alc. Merchant said he

would check inio the progress of ihe Siate Department group which

has been charged wii developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concep: oi U.S. efforis agains: Castro.

Mr. Douglas,

supporied byti. Gray and hir. Morchant, expounded ine idea that

perhaps things rare non progressed to a poini sacre covert activities

of the typo originally envisaged ior CLA io underia: Mili no: bo cilective.

Mr. Douglas reierred to the exicasive program oi thc militia, Mr. Gray

cited the matier of arms from the Soviet bloc, and tr. Merchant dweli

on the increasing cilcetiveness of Castro's measures lo control tie

population in ways witich the Coiriunists have developed so well.

latter said tat do and

others in the State Department had originally

though: that a popular robellion vouid develop within Cuba and thai

chis could be augmented by tie comparatively small-scale clioris oi

cxiles under ClA control.

Now tie samö propie are beginning 1o icel

more and more inar despite te rumerous defections and te economic

deprivations being experienced by the middle and apper classes, timo

is actually working on Castro's side.

Mr. Merchant siid that he

hai thore would occura point in time seyond which covert

intervention would noi do the jos.

Mr. Gray espressed the opinion that we will never bo able to

"clean up" the siuntion midou: tho uso di over: U.S. militar; iorie.

Ile suggesico te possibility of using the Clá-bacred exiles 1o mount a

simulaicd anaci on Cuanlanamo in order to citer an excuse ior overt

S6833 - 203 C27

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Is

A c."'.

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..m

r..

intervention.

This led to an involved discussion, the gencral conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually io atlack Guantanamo

Chis would almost certainly mean war.

Mr. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inscribed on ihe NSC agenda for next Monday in

order to be able to arrive al a topilovel decision on this very point.

• He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be coinplctcly

undersiood by responsible officials, so cia: any overt Cuban act would

be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's mecting

was faulty, in that we could no: have it boih ways. By this he meant

thet it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible

and jot that it is feasible sor the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up

the mess. " He pointed out that il Castro's support were such that an

uprising was out uf the quesiion then an open invasion by ic U.S. would

Le met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

like Algcria.

Turning to the immediaic problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in tie

U.S., with the

=casons for coming to this conclusion.

He cited spocifically the

possibility of U.N. investigation in Guaremala and the increased scope

of the program, which has boch brough: about by the increased strengih

of the Castro regime.

All membors of the Group expressed serious

doubts as to whether such activity could be lopi at all secure.

Mr.

Merchant said at one point,

that although this does noi represent a

final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to ihink that me proposal

embodies the worst aspect of boih worlds; that is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations

entirely on foreign soil or

preparing to malic the best possible case lor overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up io his

associates at the same lime Tibet is discussed.

AIr. Merchant agreed

that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared

so move in that direction until a survey has been made cá the vossibilities

of leeping opcrations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Caboll mersioned the possiblity of using

a refugee organisation - cither an existing ond or a contrived one - 10

backstop the opcritions.

2

SEONST - DES CRY

PROPERTY"

THE WalE torre dom.

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## Page 72

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have

:he Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whother any real planning hag been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

"Fic gaid that without these three the Cuban Government would be

Icaderless and probably brainless.

He conceded that it would be

necessary to act against all three simultancously. Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action of this kind is uncertain of resulis and highly dangerous

In conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultancous

action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

in haunna. nur ranabilitias.

10003

SE0297 - C23 CIV

THE WHITE ANUCE GET

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## Page 73

gi;

C.

ro. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not lakon place because of the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because

of weather.

He said that liese nissions are still planned, and assumed

• that the Group had no objections. The inembers so signified.

N5. U-2, Cuba

Gon. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first

flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover.. He conticued

that we are analyzing the exac: results on a priority basis and iha:

come time after the middle of next week we should be in i position to

make rocommendations for tie missions required to exiend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somcwhat wryly that this was all right with

him since. he "would certainly not be available io discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of next weck. " The other scirbors appezied.

to save the same reaciion.

6. Policy Consideration ic Cuban Exiles

I1r. Gray said that Assistant Atorney Gercral Ycagley had spoken

10 him alier lus inceting with Col, King and Messrs. Esterline and

Fic hod said tha: the information gives to him by ic Cli

representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if

necessary, were entirely saiisiactory io him. Fic had staied, however,

that a problem remains wit respect to action the FBl should ike;

that is, the FBI nceds guidance in its handliag o Cuban exile groups

other than inose under the direction of CL..

The Group agreed that the bost way to anach this problem would

he to have dr. Y'eagley aliend rest weck's Special Group niccling sad

discuss tie matter at first hand.

Mr. L'arro: was astied io make

arrangeincais for this.

7.

Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Pase Via-i-vis

Cape Caravera!

Mr. Parroll gave lar, Merchani ihe gis: of the OSl memorandan

06

10..

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## Page 74

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

Laparratt

THOMAS A. PARROTT

vUiU

SENT - DS CA

NH 50955

Docid:32423433 Page 74

---

## Page 75

-.

C.

HW

N6.S1-L0SS CROO

3 November 1960

5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT:

Messes. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro.

Me. Merchant said lie

would check inio the progress of the Siate Department group which

has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concepi oi U.S. efforts agains: Casiro. Mr. Dóuglas,

supporied by d!a. Gray and li.

Merchant, expounded ine icoa that

perhaps things rare now progressed to a point wacre covort activities

of the type originally envisaged ¿or ClA 10 underian, mili not be ellective.

115. Douglas rcierred to the excensive program oi the militia, Mr. Gray

cited the matter of arms fron: the Soviet bloc,

andar. Merchant dweli

on the increasing cifectiveness of Castro's measures to control the

population in ways witch the Communists have doveloped so well.

T'bc

latter said

tia: be and others in the State Department had origirally

thought that a popular rebellion wouid develop within Cuba and that

this could be augmenied by to comparatively small-scale clicris oi

exiles under Cl control.

Now Lie same people are beginning to decl

more and more that despite tie aumorous detections and to economic

duprivations being experienced sy to middle and spper classes, time

is actually worring on Castro's

sidt.

Me. Murchant snid that he

foresaw unt there would occur a point in time beyond which covert

intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed lie opinion this we will neverbe able io

"clean up" the siuntion withou: the use di over: U.S. military force.

He suggesiod the possibility of using the Cla-backed exiles to mount a

simulated snack on Civantanamo in order to offer an excuse ior overt

120505

"?!S

S0e337 - 233 C2

1: cott

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## Page 76

...

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo

Lis would almost certainly mean war.

Mr. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inseribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in

order to be able to arrive al a top-lovel decision on this very point.

• He thought it essential

that the policy of the U.S. should he coinpletely

undersiood by responsible

officials, so tiai any overt Cuban act would

be met with a previously agreed-on resporse.

Mr. Merchant stated thai, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought ibat some of the previous argumentation in today's mecting

was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways.

By this he meant

thit it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible

and yot that it is feasible for the U.S, to go in overtly and "clean up

the mess. " He pointed out that if Castro's support Were such that an.

uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would

ue met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

like Algeria.

Turning to the immediaie problem bofore the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the

rcasons for coming io this conclusion.

possibility oi U.N. investigation in Guaiemala ind the increased

of the program, which has bock brough: about by the increased strengih

of the Castio regime.

111 members oi the Group expressed scrious

doubts as to whether such activity could be Acp: at all secure.

• Merchant said at one point, thai although this does no: represent a

final conclusion on his

part, he is inclined to think that the proposal

embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations entircly on foreign soil or

preparing to malic the best possible case ior overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his

associates at the samo lime Tiber is discussed.

Ar. Merchant agreed

that this is where it should end up, but assorice that he is not prepared

10 move in that direction until a survey has been made oi the vossibilities

of liceping opcrations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gon. Caboll mentioned the possibility of using

a rofugee organication - cither an exising one or a contrived onc - 10

backstop the operitions.

2

PROPERTY C

---

## Page 77

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have

:he Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locationg that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchan: asked whother any real planning has been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

Tie said that without those three the Cuban Government would be

Icaderless and probably brainless.

He conceded that it would be

necessary to act against all three simultar.cously. Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly cangerous

in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because óf the necessity of simultancous .

action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

9 L

1010"

SX2287 - B23 C1Y

PHOPARIY 11

THE WHITE HoodE Giti

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## Page 78

C.:

rx. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gon. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not taken place because of the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because

He said that tiese inissions are still planned, and assumed

that the Group had no objections.

The members so significa.

N5. U-2, Cuba

Gon. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first

flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover.

He continued

that we are analysing the crac: results on a priority bauis and tha:

come time alter the middle of next week we saould be in a position to

make iccommendations for the missions required to cxiend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somcwhat wryly thai this was all right with

him since he "would curtainly not be available to discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of next weck." The other menbers appeared,

to have the same reaciion.

No. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Piles

11r. Gray said that Assistant Attorncy Gereral ¿cagley had spoke.

1o him afier his meeting with Col. King and tessro. Esterline anc

He had said tha: the incormation given to hirn by the Cli

representatives, and the arrangements for iuture coordination il

necessary, were entirely satisiactory to him.

He had stated, however,

that a problem remains with rspect to action the FBl should take;

that is, the FBI nceds guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups

other than those under the direction oi CLA.

The Group agrced that the best way to attack this problem would

be to have Mr. Yeagley attend nest weck's Special Group niceting and

discuss tie manor at first hand.

Mr. Parrott was asked io make

arrangemenis forthio.

1%.

Value of Cuba in the USSR as a Base Viaet-zis

Cape Canarera!

1r. Parrolt gave lar. Hierchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

.

THe Whit bet birt

923897 - 28 C

1

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## Page 79

on this subject, which had been discussed with the reat of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

LaParratt

THOMAS A. PARROTT

5

SIGNET - BUS 02V

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## Page 80

LOP SECRET

worty uf tho Drinht

Eisenhpvor Library,

Narch 14, 1900

Gray Ex tt 2

KEYORANDU:

.

C.

6..

SUBJECT:

Discussion at the 435tn Mecting

of thie National Security Council,

Thuroday, Maich 10, 1960

Prosent at the l3óth NSC Meeting

vere the President of the

United States, presiding; In. C.

Douging Dillon for

Sccrctory of Stute; ra domes i.

bouglas for the Secictary

or Dolense; and tie Acting Director, Orfice of Civil and

Deferise Mobilization (JöhnS. Patterson):: Also attending

the ncoting and farticiyating in the Council actions belou

vere the Secretary of the Treasury and the Direcior, Burcau

0: the Budget. Also attending the meeting were the Chairran,

Atomic Enercy Commission; Admiral Arleigh Burke or the Chair

aal, Joint Chiots of Staff; the Director of Contral Intclligence;

Dircctor, U.5. Intormation Agency; the Dircetor, Inter-

national Cooperation Administration; the Special sciotants to

tic President for Rational Sccity Afroiro, for Security, Ofer-

ations Coordination, and for Science and fechnoice; nobistent

Sscretary or Stato Gerard C. Smiti; Assistani Secretury of

John N. Irvin,

II; the Assistant White touc: Starf

Secretary; in. Charles inskino, ISC; the Precutive Secretary,

ISC; and the Deputy Diccutive Secretary, NSC:

There follows a summary of the discussion at the mecting

and the main points taken.

1.. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPIENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Nr. Dulles said he would cover certain situations which

rad developed during the assence o. the Fresident in South

imerica.

Growing strains had appeared in relations hetween

Iran and the USSR.

indicated that tre

Iranian Ambassador

in roscow,

seeiny no further hope or the

re-cstablishment.of nomal. rolacions betreen Iran and the

Soviet Union; vas suggesting that idrusichev end the Sian

should hold a ceting somewhere in swore. The jssi continues

to insist that irar. must ban all military basee, while the Shan

is willing to go no surther then giring accurarces that he w1ll

not pirmilt long c: sedium-range missile bases to u established

on Iranian territory.

The campaiga of Sovict pressure against

Iron is being intonsiried, with Fission radio projecond voing

aegiened to play on the nerved of ere Srah by prasizing piota

against'lie lice.

1. Dulles solt there might

ce come Grouras

¿or celieving plous against the Siar diû in jact exigt.Balchtiar

NO OBJECTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

:3-17.98

The Department ol State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassinafer feltords

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 Capil 98 vi.

NW 50955

DooId: 32423433

Page 80

24

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## Page 81

1.-

г.

Mie Muttonal Security Council:

lioted and discussed an ornl briefing by

the Dircetor of

Contral Intelligence on the subject,

with specific

reference to

Iron; Hrushcher's triy to isin; Cuinea's

relations with the Soviet Eloc;

the Italian political

altuntion; Jajonese-Korcon relations; and the Culun

situation.

U.S. POIICY TONARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2165-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Mellon No. 2177)

Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the Plunning Board dis-

cussion of U.S. Policy toward Cuba.

(A copy of It. Gruy's Briefing

liste in filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached

to this Memorandum)

It. Dillon rerarked that ony threat to the safety of U.S.

citizens in Cuhe would probably develop

overnight.

Ine Country

Tean report that there was no hope of satisfactory relations with

aba, while

nex, was mercly a confirmation of our lasic curent

policy towurd Cuba.

Our objective is to bring another govertrent

to power in Cila.

This objective is not being ronlized at the

resent time because there

is no apparent alternative to the present

soverment in the event Castro disappoure.

Indeed, thie result of

Cestro's disappearence migit be a Cormnist tre-over.

Il Castro

were successful in his erfort to provole us into intervention, the

result would help the lisse, since American intervention in Cuta

would

be considercu in many raits

of the world as a counterpert

o? Soviet intervention

in Hungary.

It was becoming

more and more:

likely

that the law we

originally

planned to recommend to Congress

on sugar would not be passed; and indeed we may not now want it

passed.

It had been planned to reconnend

an extension of the sugar

subsidy without change excupt for the provision that the President

would have authority

to meke changes at his discretion.

Congress

mili probably nod want to go further than this recommendation. Ir.

Dillon rejorted that up to the present time he lad

felt we

should

te careful not to take actions which would have a serious effect

on the Cuban people, but nor he believed

we niced nut be so careful.

about actions of this kind, since the cuban people vere responsible

¿ur the regine.

If Castro continued his present ictivities,

the

results would be caustrophic throughout the lemisphere,

wlicrecs

e sei-back to the cuban econony as a result of Castro's

actions

migit be a

desirable development, since

it rould show that Communist-

tjie activity docs not jay.

Our lognl position with respect to

the

Giantanamo. Havel Fase was

fira.

Ine only basis for attack on our

insition would ve the argument that the treaty was imposed, on Cute

nad that it as a very old treaty.

However, If the mutter were

TOP SECRET

7.

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## Page 82

perty of the

Eisenhower Library,

silehe, lis

brought to the Ull, ve would be in a difficult ponition because

on posturo is that we do not wich to kcep a militury base 1f

the indigonous country does not want our base. There vas a

certain similarity boüreen Guantanamo and bizerte, where the

Fronch case is based on icgnlities und our ponition in that

the problem

is a politicai one.

However,

we

are starding on

legal Founds with respect to Guantanano, even thoud, our

rosicion is a diffion't ore.

Admiral Furke belioved we had a legal right to stay in

Guactanamo, which was a very userul training base. Cuentanemo

differed from Mizerio

in that we had been established in Cuantanamo

for along time and there were no Cubans living Inside the bace

arca.

Cutting off

the rater

supply would be the only neans of

Cuban attuck against the Guantanano Base.

If the water supply

were cit off, we could continue to support the base by means of

lavy tankers, perhaps even by inctalling plants nich macutac-

t122°0

fresh water iron sea water.

Admiral Burke reported in-

cidentally that ve had attempted to obtain water by drilling on

the base,

but had been unsuccessful.

In fact, we had feared for

a time ve might strike oil.

The 230 marines on the lose would

be avie to bold it against a Cuban armed attack.

In kindral

Burke's view, Castro may vant to provoke our intervention in

cruer to lower U.S, prestige in Intin Anerica so that Other

Iatin American revolutions could be created.

The latin Merican

military men to vion he had called lavored a strong U.S. Grand,

relt that tie U.S, haù exerciscan creat deul of restraint so

far, and insisted that we should not allor ourselves to be puched

further.

The President said a cortain amount of pro-Castro sentiment

lad been expressed by sall croups in the

countrica he ind recently

visitea.

His host presidonts hed labelled this continent as

Comnunist-inspired.

On the trip he sur disployed sone signs

i'avoraule to Castro, but nas avare of no demonstrationg.

The

Latin American Prosidents lad counselled further, forcucerance

üf the U.s. in the hope that the members of the Organization.of

American States would firaliy sée the potentini danger in Cuoe

and taro concerted action.

Che latin Americon Presidents, Fer-

ever, bad no Idea as to ior the situation in Cuba should se

handled.

ine President iad sugausted to them that they siculd

not condone a situation wich night result in frightninzu. s.

business anay ¿rom Latin America.

To some extent cach counury

is rescraine.l

fron action againot Castro dj n vocifcrous Cortunist

eloniont.

i2. Gray astica

whether the Counoti choild keep tic situation

in Cuba under constant curveillance and whether it was the con

senous of thie Council that, for the sine being at least, oe?

present polley tovard Cuis shonld continue to be purcued.

The

President sald he did not wish to endanger the liver of inericens

living in Cuba.

Vo would be forced to take action other than dip-

somatic uction 1i U.S. Caulzons were in daüger, and he ouglit to

8:

TOP SECRET

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## Page 83

-bisonhovor Library,

silono, Kj

Fnow what action we would take

in such a continuency, He might

rinally hero to use

l'orce il U.S. citizens were repooed to mob

idlence. Admirus

Buriso thought he necded a Cuben leader

excid whom anti-Castro elemento could rally. Me. Dulles sold

sono anti-Castro senders colsted, but they are not in Cula ot

presont.

The Presidunt unid ve micht have another Black Hole

ai Calcutta in Coon; and he wondered what we do alrit such a

li, Dilion ielt it vould be neccosary to cace

that

sisuution wien it crived.

Admiral Burko noted that ve had

¿jans dor immediage evacuation oi the 10,000 Anerisons in Cuba,

as holl as military forcos to put thece plans into execution.

Seciotary Douglas nos soncwhut pessimistic about the possibility

os evacuation, saying that soreone was bound to but hurt during

much ail operation.

The Fresident remiked that we could blockade

tie isiand and say it is quarantined.

fir. Gray tried whether

Stace and Detense slould be directed to revier contingency plans

regarding Cuba.

Dillon saiu plans vere beird reviewed con-

stantly, but the disficulty vus that all the contingencies

couid not be forescen in advance. Admiral Burke

delicved Cuba

couid re blockaded within tho to three hours after the order wao

given.

Mi. Patterson asted whether economic measures as such

Had hurt Castro, ir. Dillon believed

that economic ncastes

agrinst Castro would

not have much cirect in a short tinc. lore-

over,

castro would probably te abic to counteract econonic sane-

cons dj icceiving whet no necded iron the Sovicus, Ine President

said he could not do this i re

riochaded the island. Admiral

Airs succested thai we should intersify our propacanda to per-

suade the DAs ond die Cuban people to supreit our policy.

Trie

President ugreed, adding that he could do aimost anything It ve

had the support of tie CAs.

ir: Dillon pointed out that the State

Departironi was constantly endeavoring to secure the support of the

Cr.S.

The President agreed with the suggestion of Scoretary Ander-

son that the Intor-Ancrican Bank ghould be uned as a method of

raining the support or OiS countries.

He added

thre we chould

enacavor to think or all possible

ways of influencing intin

Ararican countries to favor our

Policies in Cuba.

it. Dulles

¿Cicried

that n pian to affect the situation in cuir was being

worked on.

Admiral Burie suggested that uny plan for the removal

on cuban leaders spoila be a racisage deal,

since mary of the

londers around

Castro vere even worse than Castro.

The President

caid die Argentinions had been very bitte: cuout

Cocvare.

Secre-

tary Arderson snid tie following

story wus going

üle rounds: When

Castro vanted to take over the Culan Fari, ie had aired at a meeting

or i's supporters woother there was an ccononist present. Guevara

had ralced his hand and Castro haù appointed him liced of the Bank.

Ci the ray out ni the necting Castro lad said to Cuevara

"I didn't

Jinon jon vere nn economist", and Guevara lad replica, "Oh, I thought

you said a Corutunioi."

9.

TOP SECRET

NIH

50953

---

## Page 84

LOP SECRET

Oporty uf tho Dright

Elsenhover Library,

111end?.

KS

March 24, 1950

Gray Ex th

KEXORINDUH

C.

C

SUBJECT:

Discussion at the 435th docting

of thie National Seewily Council,

Thursday, March 10, 1960

the k3oth NSC Meeting were the president of the

United States, presiding; Mi. C.

Donging Dillon for the

Stute; 1a. Jamus ii, lougins for the Sicretary

and the Aoting Director, Office of Civil and

Defense Nobilization (John S. Patterson).

Aiso attending

the mooting and jarticipating in the Council actions below

viere the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Burcau

ot the Badget.

ilso attending the meeting were the Chairman,

Atomic Enercy Commission; Admiral Arleigh Burke for the Chair-

Joint Chivis oi Stari;

the Director of Central Intelligence;

the Director, U.S. Incorration Agercy; the Direcior, Inter-

national Cooperation Administration; the Special issictants to

tie president for lational Sceurlty Afrairo, for Security Oyer-

ations Coordination, and for Science and Pechnoicey; hesistunt

Secretary or State Gerurd C. Smith; Assistant Secretury of

John i. Irrin, II; the Assisnt white licue: Starf

Secrotary; Ir. Charles liaskins, ASC; the Precutive Secretary,

ISC; and the Deputy Riccutive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the recting

and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPIENTS AFFECTING U:S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said he would cover certain situations which

rad developed during the ausence of the President in South

Groving strains had appeared in relations letweer

Intercepted

nessages indicated that the

iranian Ambassador in foscow,

seeiny no furcher hope or the

ze-establishment of normal relations between Iran and the

Soriet Union, was suzgesting that icrushchev end the Shai

siiculd hold a recting somewhere in swore.

Ine SSeR continues

to insist that Ivar. must ban all military vases, while the Shan

is willing to so no curther than giving assurances that he will

not permit long ci medium-range missiio vases to do establiched

The campaica di Soviet pressure against

intensified, with Russian radio propacanda ocing

desicied to play on the nerves or thie Shah by empliasizing plote

against his

iire. 1. Dulles text there micht to come grouras

xor iclieving plots against the Shan diù in tact exict Bakhtlar

TOP SECRET

NH

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## Page 85

Tie liational Security Council:

lioted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of

Central

Intelligence on the subject, with specific

reference to

Iran; Maushchev's trip

to Asia; Cuineu's

relations with the

Soviet Eloc;

the

Italian politicl

situation; Jaganese-Korcan relations; and the Culun

situation.

2.

V.S. POLICY TONARD CUBA

(NSC lotion No. 2165-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Action No: 2177)

Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the Planning Board dis-

cussion of U.S. Policy tovard Cuba.

(A copy of lu. Gray's Briefing

liste in filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and anotlier, is attached

to this Memorandum)

it. Dillon verarted that any threat to the safely of U.s.

citizens in Cuhs would probably develop overnight.

Thie Country

Tean report that there has no hore of satistactory relations with

Criba, while nei, was mercly a confirmation of our insic current

policy toward Cuba. Our objective is to bring another goverument

to power in Chile.

This objective is not being renlized at

the

preount time because there

is no apparent alternative to thc present

soverument

in the event Castro disappeurs.

Indeed, the result of

Cestro's disappeerence might be a Cornnist tric-over.

It Castro

were successful

in his erfort to provolic

us into intervention, the

result would ncip the USSR,

since Anerican intervention in Cuta

would be considered in many rarts of the world as a counterpert

of Soviet intervention in lungary.

It was becoming

more and more

likely that the law we

originally

planned to recommend to Congest

on sugar would

not be passed; and

indeed ve inay not now want it

passed. It had been planned. to recommend

an extension of the sugar

subsidy without change except for the provision that the President

would have authority to nere

changes at his discretion.

Congress

will probably nor want to go further than this recommendation. It.

Dillon reported that up to the present time he had ielt we should

te careful not to inke actions which would have a scrious effect

on the Cuban people, but nor he believed we need not be.

so careful

about actions of thin kind, since the Cuban people vere resionsible

for the regime.

If Castro continued his present ictivities,

the

results would be chiastrophic throughout the hemisphere, wierees

a set-back to the Cuban

econony as a result of Castro's actions

nigit be a desirable development; since it could shor that Communist-

type activity

does not pay.

Our legal position with respect to the

Giantanamo Favel Fase was fira.

The only basis for stinck on our

position would ve the argument that the treaty was imposed on Cribe

that it was a very old treaty. However, If the mutter were.

7.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 86

operty

öf the Dwight

Eisenhower Library,

brought to the UN, ve would

be in a difficult ponition tecause

ou posture 1s that no do

not wish

to keep a militury iase 16

the indigenous country does not want our base.

There Wes a

cortain sinlimity between Guantanamo and Bizeric, where the

French case is lasca

on iconlities und

our position in that

the problem is a politicai one.

However,

we are ctarding on

legal zounds with respect to Guantanamo, even thoudi, our

position 1s a ditricro ore.

Admiral Ruke bolioved wo had a legal right to stay in

Guantanamo, which was a very userul training bace. Cuantanomo

differed from Dizerie in that we had been establiched in Cuantanamo

I'or a long time and

there were no Cubans living inside the bace

arca. Cutting off the

iater supply would be the only neans of

Cuban attuck against the Guantanano Base.

If the water supaly

vere cit off, we could continue to support the base bj means of

lavy

tankers, perhaps even by installing plants which nocufac-

tive fresh wuter fron sea vater.

Admiral burke reported in-

cidentally that ve lad attempted to obtain water by drilling on

the iose,

but had been unsuccessful.

In fact, we had feared for

a time ve micht strike oil.

Te 230 marines on the base rould

be nuie to hold it against a Cuban armed attaci..

In siniral

Burie's view, Castro may vant to provoke our intervention in

oruci to lower U.S. prestige in Intin Anerica so thur other

Iatin irerican revolutions could be created.

The latin American

military nen to vion in had called favored a strong U.s. siand,

felt that the U.S. hud excrcised a treat doul of restraint so

far, and Insisted

that we should not allor ourselves to be puched

further.

The President said a cortain amount. of pro-Castro sentiment

had been expressed by mall groups in the countrico he ind recently

visitea.

His host presidents had labelled this sentiment as

Communist-inspired.

On the

trip lie saw displayed some signs

t'avoraule to Castro, but was avare of no demonstrationg.

The

Latin American Presidents nad counselled further forcocarance

üy die U.S, in the hope that the menhers of the Orcanization of

America States woula firaliy see the potentini. danger in Chor:

and

tare concerted action.

The Iatin Americon Presidents, Fin-

ever, inú no idea as to dor the situation in Cuba

shouid te

handled.

the president ind suggusted to them tiut

not condone a situation which night result in irightningü. s.

businöss anay from Latin inerica.

To some extent cuch country

is restraine! from action ugalnot Castro by a vociferous Cornist

elemont.

in, Gray astied whetrer the Councti shonld keep thie situation

in Cuba undor constant surveiliance and whether it was tie con-

sunsus of the Council thirt, cor the tine being at least, oil

precent polley tovard Cuca should continue to be furoued.

President sald he did not wish to endanger the lives

living in Cuba. No voila so forced to take

notion other than dip-

¡omatic iction 11 U.S. citizens were in dauger, und he cuglit to

8.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 87

Woparty

il'

tho

Drille

26 Muonhovor Library,

1110n0, ' Kg

C.

know what action we would take in such a contingency. We might

rinally have to use force it U.S, citizens were repoced to mob

• violence.

Admtrui Burke thoughe he necdod a Cuban loader

caoind whom anti-Castro elements could rally.

il. Dillon cald

sono mii-Castro ienders cxisted,

but they ure not in Cuba at

present.

The President unid ve might have another Block Hole

di calcuttz in Cuon; and he wondered what we

do obut such a

siüdic.con.

tue Dalion lelt it vould be neccosary to coce that

stuation wiien it wrived.

Aaniral Burke noted

that we had

¿rens co: immediate cracuation oi the 10,000 Avericons in Cuba,

as well as military forces to put these plans into execution.

Secretary Douglas vos soneviut pessimistic about the possibility

or evacuation,

saying

that someone was bound to tut hurt during

slich an operation.

The President remarked that we could blockade

the island and

soy it is quarantined.

Fic. Gruy tried wiether

State and Datonse should be directed

to revier contingency plans

regarding Cube.

is. Dillon saiu plans vere beint reviewed con-

stantly, but the difficulty wus that all the contingencies

couid not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke volioveil Cuba

could re blockaded vithin two to three houra after

the order

given. Mi. Patterson asked whether economic measures

as such

had hurt Castro. Ir. Dillon believed tiet economic neasies

against Castro wouid not have much criect in a short time. lore-

over, castro would probably te abic to counteract econcinic sanc-

tions by receiving

the he needed iron the Sovicts. The President

said he could nou do this it ve

Licchaded the island. Adniral

Burre susuested that ne should intersify our propagande to per-

suade die CAS und the Cuban people to support our iolicy.

Trie

President ugreed, adding that

could do almost anything 1f ve

ned the support of tie CAS.

ir. Dillon pointed out that the State

Dopertinent wus constuntly endeavorind to secure the support of the

Cris.

The President ngreed with

the suggestion of Secretary Ander-

son that the Inter-American Pani

should be used as a method of

caining the support or dis countries.

He added that we chould

enucavor to think

or all possible ways of influencing intin

Amarican countries to favor our policies in Cuba.

it. Dulles

reported that a pian to affect the situation in Cuia was being

horkes.on.

Admiral Burie suggested that uny plan for the removal

cê Cusan Jeaders siioula de a paciage deal,

since mary of the

lenders around Castro liere even worse than Castro.

The President

caid the Argentinions had been very bitter about Govara.

Secre

tary inderson snid the following

story hus going the rounds: When

Castis vanted to vine over the Culan Paris, he had aired at a meeting

or his supporters wether there was an cconomist present. Guevara

had raiced his hard and Castro. had appointed him lead of the Bank.

Oü the way out ni the mooting Castro had snid to Guevara "I didn't

linon jou vere an acoromist", and Guevaru had replica, "Oh, I thought

you

said a Cormnici."

9.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 88

:5 l'RICh ISG0

7/9/75 TESTIMONY

E-Z

Craig Ex.t 3

1, Cuba eno the ciclaniro caujoos for discuealoni in. Milita raiod

te. Dilies iciticas;

ton 12. Machucn lei ruscutly beca da dos coriging the 397458812

-

C.

ininn Samor tira cad leoin 1n22i00d Contrion 1010d De 1128

2coard ruamora 10 Microo Fico.

cica có dur cocion volid on louroned 11' 10 Cooli Do caco terrad

7.6

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

4/7198

4. Distro a discuocien có railo ritão, 1ha ino 08 1766 20 6 Cira

cores mù decretares do c mudo Contien dn don Alerte bard.

GEd CH6 1002610 1700 Co010.110 10 0 0140 0160170 109% 11112-

1!0n.

concidarsion in Citad do Exaciarcota: 2701 61230.

cialy dos decrets percorre?.

5. 14. Gray corinaral concem orer the thr otimulat 1r de Cock

Isto trendi Char Cal te Tel 100 Greg G11100 101 MiRO 10°*.

te amallato carabelacted de crioue Gauden derd 25201334.

• CHE WHITE ROSSE

NO OBJECTION

-NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The Department of State has no objection to the.

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions af the JFK Assassination Recerds

Lo ll L: Collection'Aet of 1992 (PL102-526)

—.?:::

Reviewed on -

.i..)!--

---

## Page 89

6 4;

. i:

..

ile Cult

morino 1n c01t10:ad 203. A bainilica mila le on the olort for Giunseme

1:0 FuaD Si Postale

stol Mesatema forces modo execante 60,000 kai.

Due Matool mata ricot foroca could lo in do dio vilin four bona ait22-

celot ci orlers.

6. Pare 175 e condirl discuscion co lo ct bouli be la cifect ci

Che Mica coeno il 110ed coi tel Craano cai Che Carrato Moidd Listratt

caraterconty.

niche resto daco control.

loccace to realo tratlitare ardilacenal cotica lo UiG. Colonel tler sata

8. 15. Diboston amoooad the poccitality co tomomont suito trat

ci capie mica do dinto erbideo.

9. 15. Midaco cald la maded do Cicanalio Mai Colina Delet1910S i22: 1-

Dalcomminatos to brod 011o Co Euecic2cna 21226 t6 CEo2.

ceted mirasi

forzai Croch tarat dorrote de tractreon, CorriiD 162000.

Mero mitte to totidro de 16e

choc: 1i18 CoS.

t'e'

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cha carotable acceanton lie tea terese

Totalit Coatte ViCh

E. 101100 650001844

Hi tat

---

## Page 90

SECALI

DES CAM

-3-

¡cri. lo thoreio do noula ia pruicat ani vice to do do. arra vera so

ouject-ols.

1P. Ir. Cury cald la voula lik to mirit inter tilo rock to 215 25c0-

cinto dio pesca carited doncal Corar devica titan ter Cabe"

• 102I 210 00k.

-

J. Coolid

Cu1 cạ/v81

14N

50955

33

Page

411

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## Page 91

:5 laICS I560

E-Z

Gay Ext 3:

Procent:

tecos, jerciano, Good, Lari, Milles.

I, Cuba ao tho coclubiro caulece for clacroclon. 16. Mlloo raid

12.

Lou'a programa ciprialicies nora taialo checa loeis caucto.

12. C.37

ruinal deiro conclead do Doal conne de Desilicar coi Ferroeste at

3. 1ai Dubcdera onda thot 18 crato incorrention noro cocomotel, crit!-

cica co our rotion nordo on Loucened 11' 10 Codld Do nado matar

4. L

4. Dali a discuocien do tailo cites, 190. Mo 08 1200 E76 Cara

man ino barond end bot coleoted to.

Grid Ciro 1172

10o Ward Conctadmition 15 actio 100 6o decat 105r 67212-

nited dos deitarei

concluoracte: in ciron do bracteracte E7Gd 60220.

rose Locarente total Co Gerate

infame tirince cubana

EL3

26R 200RENR 15

!...

PA1:.220

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## Page 92

Cide Cut.

sorrino in cd1t10al 22'aa. A baillica bada be on the elect for dne.m

1270 real 18 readad.

Ital Mariona force woud crostrice 50,000 ton.

Die tintrol cold riot orceo could uo in do cir vinin four hang con 1-

colot ce onlers.

Go Paro 1no a reneil diccussion es to that would be to cireet ou

Cuba thing word the Commath cart thare in denitene die draper that they

nicio coro tavo concrel.

lo Die cut ati of 01i ditcanto lo Fero, Soreco cad 092)l Was Mattered

Lo arance cretant the Curra Cerebreacate

t. 12228cb 0211

sand in Cane teen Parnaaand 1,50D Cart

9.

35. Pe2aea Cita le marted do cioanulto ture Curen deterities torte c-

1n count to includece lo posited do coer decli

Is to maxed it dock 2021226 to 62700008 802e6 10608

Po.nermmied 160 to lean Ceo Co cretitione Sidne to Clot.

To Microny cad trare.

10. Mimirid, turio lad a coronatory amort ca la, Colo trapun trem t

Poison Clien

8r 41S

milo cool 11120110 tendere

Maata and the caverable coconuace he lecd terate

the Crotch tort

Twins terring tod the Bithus Conscreet

to tigers.

tea ma probig spector voo dea to tis lait to jacine

cure coa ta tales comested erroral lif the cranitics of tasy Claendict

---

## Page 93

SESTILI

MES CAY

-3=

¡cigoi. la thocht it voula le prico di vice to do uo. mura voro so

18. 1'r. Cran cold la voulé 21ko to mait Inter Mio luci to 215 25c0-

clate tie poser cucited "donceil Corett dotica dien acr Cava

ca to train de Lão core dacunica, de dales proues a persed er

• Doger cho tock.

J. Co MiE

Chlca/01

-

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## Page 94

ot tho bright

lolleno, lis

-----

"ENORANDSH

SUIJECT:

April 14, 1960

Gray Ex.fF4

Discussion at the 441gt Mecting

oi the liational Secwrity Council,

Touroday, April 14, 1900

Present ot the Walst NSC Meeting were the Vice Irchident of

tlie Unlted States, presiding; li. C.

Douglas Dillor for the

Sccretary of State; the Secretary of Defenoe; und the Direc-

toi, Ofilee of Clvil und Defenie Mobilization.

4100 prevent

at the rectine and participating. in the Council actione below

were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau

of the Budget.

Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staft; the Director of Central Intelligence;

the director, U.S. In'ormation Agency; the Speciul iceistanto

President for National Security Alfairo (Ilems 3 & 4);

for Science and Technology, and for Security Operationg Coor-

diration; Assistant Sccretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Aubis-

tant. Secretary of Defence John N. Irwin, II; Mi. Huntington.

Sheldon, CIl; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the

Biccutive Secretary, ISC; and the Deputy Executlre Secretary,.

There follows a summary of the discuscion at ine leeting

and the main points taken.

r.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

das. 417198

ia. Lay said se regretted that it. Gray would be unable

1a mutand tub tegizzig of the leeting, but might ue able to

→ i: riii scrore 1t ended.

B PREO DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

2.

POLLO! COARD CUBA

(SC ACTiON NO: 2160-b-(1); NSC 5902/2; NSC Actiona Nos. 2177,

2191, 2195, 2201, 2206 and 2213)

3.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAII REPUELIC

(MiSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Ros. 21/0 and 2212)

Ir. Dulles said that Chou en-lal's forthconing vigit to

New Delhi represented a Chinese Coumunist eilort to restore

cordiality in the relations between India und Connunist China,

& cordiality which had been shattered by the everes of

inst year, including the border dispute, and the suppression of

the revolt in Tibet.

Chou en-la1 rould be accompanica by a

nigi-povered negotiating team and lis expectatiors cy arriving

at a settlement were apparently high. By contrast, lchru was

septical about the possibilities of settlement.

u1so under parliamentary and public pressure to rare no conces-

sions in the border dispute since he had committed aimsell not

NO OBJECTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassilication of this document in full

winder the provisions of the JFK Assassination Recorder SECRET

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7apa.98 wi

50955

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::"

• =

r.

Mr. Dulles

reported that in

the Dominican Republic, Trufillo's

position continued to weaken and

was now quite prechrious.

wholerale arrests ordered by Trijillo last winter had affected

almost

every

prominent family

In the DominicarRepnblle.Although

theoe arrests had broken up

the plotting against trufillo, they

had nt the

sume time, beatened the dietntor'e position. Mr. Dulles

thought that further attempts could

be made to kill or oust

Trujillo.

Aclationg

between the government and the church were

pidly deterlorating.

Ah. Dulles pointed out incidentally that

the altitude of

the church in the Dominican Republic was quite

different fron

the ettitude of the church in Cubr. Mie economic

stuntion in the toninich Rejublic was worsening.

lusiness 16

stigmant and

International finuncial

sources are drying up. The

goverment has

resorted to verious subterfuges in an attenpt to

improve its precarious financial

position.

Secretary Gates

asked

whether it was true that Trujillo was one of the richest men in

the world, with more money than the Dominican governnent. Mr. Dilles

said this

slatement

was true; Trujillo was reforted to have milked

the Doninican remblie of 5:00 million, an estimate which was

probanly exaggerated and should be scaled down by one-half or tro-

thirds.

Secratary inderson said lic

understood that til nillion

in dold had been recently removed from lew York banis by the

Doninican Republic and had been pleced in the Fant. ot Move Scotle.

il. iulles said le ind

a. detailed report on the finuncial situ-

stion of the terinican Republic, all the detaile of which he would

not roud. lonever, it appeared that the Datinican kupblic now

neld $15 million in gold and that it had incurred a victy of

chligntions; for example, a $10.5 million loan from the Bank of

Hova Scotia

secured by the sugar crop.

The Dominican Republic'

hed also drawn $7 million out of a $1l.5 million credit with the

International lionelary Fund.

Secretary Anderson said the Inter-

national lonetery Mind's dealings with the Doninican Republic

aight present a proolen

to the U.s.

The Doninicen Republic now

had drawn so much from the Flind that it could only draw in the

future f2. million every 90 isys without consulting the Directors

of the Fund.

If the Dominicans should want to draw more than

$2 million every 90 days, the question would arise as to how the

U.S. Director should vote when the Dominican Republic undertakes

the necessury consultation with the Fund.

Mr. Dulles, continuing his riefing, reported that 'Prujillo,

epferently

not reallzing its position,

is not anticipating on

carly fall. from pover and is apparently not planning flight.

The Dominican military. forces have apprently been repelled by

the excesses in Cube and may believe they will be compelled to. act

against Trujillo before the radioal pro-Castro elenents, which

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## Page 96

LA CHO HAINE

J. Elsenhovor Library,

1b1lene, NS

are inlly increasing in strength, take over the government. In

there is a cp becreen the departure of Trujillo and the estab-

11shaent or

the new regime,

the rudical pro-Castro clements

mat have an opportunity

to belie power.

If the army does not

liold oil there redieal clements, a period of chuod night casuo

dio Milles bulloved that Trughlo's downfall night not occur

for wicke or even months

the other hand, the situation

might becone critical at any moment.

Tie Vice President wondered whether the worut outcome of

the situation in tie dominican Republic would not be a take-

over oy the pro-Castro elements.

Ile

also wondered whether we

vere doing everything possible to support other elemento.

Dulles said the difficult question was that of leaderchip of

noierate elements in the Dominican Republic. The vice president

or the Republic might be able to assume power or the principal

milliury officers right covern through a nilitary juntu..

Hominent antl-trujialo Dominicuns were in exile. Mr. Dillon

said this government was following the situation in the Doninican

Republic closely and Intended to try to prevent seizure or power

by any pro-Castro troup.

This would irvolve working closely with

the dis.

The Vice President believed

that we could not let Castro

or a pro-castro group take over the Dominican Rejublic even if

we had to intervere in cider to prevent such a takeover. Mr.

Dillon felt thut in order to intervene we would need on invitation.

Te Vice Fresident feared thut the old

story was icing repeated

in the Dominican Repuülic; that 16, thie

pro-Castro clement wus

the caly minority group with atrong leaderchip and definite ob-

jectives.

Hir. Dulles said there vas a ercup in Venezuela

which

would like to move into the Dominican Repuulic und take over the

coveriacnt.

Mr. Dilion believed the Castro elcuent in the Dominican

Republic was not strong enough to assure control of the government

without support fron Cuba.

It was, accordingly, very important

that the U.S. be prepared for rapid action.

The Vice President

agreed that it was very important that the U.S., If necessary,

take rapid action to prevent any move by Castro to seize power

in the Dominican Republic.

Dulles said the situations in laiti and Venezuela were

being artected by the situations in Cuba and the Doninican Republic.

Bitancouri, it 15 reported, has made a deal with the erry whereby

he will evandon government by coalition, will rule Verezuela with

his can juity supported by the army, aud will take action againot

tie coumist moverent.

However,

it is possible that the commniots

know di his plans and ray take action to thwart then.

ir. Dillon said tiere was one favordule aspect to the altuation

in the Caribbean. It trujillo could be removed fron gover

In the

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## Page 97

Tupurts

• d'

do bluenhovor Library, •

1b1lono, is

Dominican Republie balle pro-Castro clements were prevented

10:: Scinine pover in that country,

our anti-Custru cunpaign

Directout larin Anerica would receive a ercat boott.

'Inc

Vie: ircaldent agreed that getting rid of Trufillo would be

a invorable development ior us.

Turning to Cuba M. Dulles reported that a Senor Botencourt

100 solation to Veremicia's Betancourt) had recently defected in

Chos und had toli J.j. cificiole that he sees tire: possible

Miesten of

the Cuben situation: (1) the

assassination of Cestro,

halich would

make his

amity? (2) Caotro's suicide, which 16 s

possibilley in the event of failure and (3) a continuation of

tie present

trend, resulting ultinately in a sociallut dictator-

stip and a Batista-type

terror

1n

Cuba.

Senor Botuncourt had

said that Custro was i warped personality and he hud accordingly

sucgested that the u.s. arroint a conmittee of thrre to

deal with

cocmittee

consisting of a psychologist, a diploat and

an actor of the orson welles type.

A recent invitation by Cuba to lionduren studort: and legis-

Jutors to ationd tha Conference of Underdeveloped jutions 1nd1-

coins that Cubo is abandoning the concept of taking

this con-

ference an oïliciul Governmental one.

Cuba appears

to be pre-

jing i0 establish diploratic relationg vith Czechoslovaria.

riviiceh, a cureur dipiorat in Latin imerican affairs too as

Minister to mexico had arranged for the shipment of Czech

armg

i0 the arbone regine in Guatemala in 1954, would

procably be the

Carch: incassador

to Cuts.

The Cuban communists were increasing

their ciforts to controi the Cuban labor Federation.

Ine Presi-

dent's lotter to the Chileen students had received wide notice

in cute and elicited a cavorable reaction among rany people who

are becoming disiliusioned with Castro.

Ir. Dillon thought the President's letter to

the Chilean

students was very cirective throughout Litin Anerica, especially

in Chile.

we had rocently called the attention of irgentina,

Chile

and Colcubia co the fart that a Cuben radio station had

veer calline the presidents of

these countries

"lacroys and alaves

ci the U.S."

On tuesady we are planning to send a ship to the

nicaro cucillty in Cuba to loou nickel.

This will be : test cage

coccuse the j0 day moratoriun on application of the Cuban export

ti: to niculo, expired on ipril 1.

It will be Interouting to see

buther Cuba mili apply the tai and compel Micaro to shut down.

Billon cuid it was his imprescion that tho Cuban cendorship

wac becoming more and more errective, sc. thut it was increacingly

disciculo to cut the trach

to

the cuban people.

He asked whether

1. alien would like to comment on this poini.

5.

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Proporty da tho mirle

ad. Elsunhowor Libinry,

Ibilono, lis

r. Allen sald USIA hud been discussing menni oi precenting

Pacinal intomatlon lo

the Cuban people.

Hie abeney had been

sone presulire

tron U.s. neropapere und fiabero ni Congrcos

on this potni.

The Senute had recently pasoed

a rosolution allo-

cucino 4100,000 lo de used by USIA io buy time on Florida radio

stations for progremo nined at Cuba.

However,

4.cxnference

com-

ittive had retused the allocation

of additional money; sucgesting

tino sundo alrendy approprinted be used for the purgese. Studles

in USti had developed tuo possibilitles for dettiny the factual

interation to tire Cuban people.

One project would

vc & 500

Milente mobile otandurd-wave indio station in Florida tronomit-

cino programs benzed to Cubu.

It would take at leuct nine montba

and

possibly up to twenty months to put this projuct into oper-

ation.

A second project was the proposal to fly un aircraft over:

Hoj nost for the purpose of beaming television progions into

Cloa, probably on Channel 8.

This project could be put into

operation in noout cight wecks if the Mavy would provide USIA.

with a Super-Constellution alrcraft now being used on weather

patrol

duties.

liowever,

thio project wus traught with certain

ailticultles.

Inc Federal Comunicatlong Comniütion, although

li would of course cooperate 1f directod

to do no bg. the RiSC or

-lie Fresident,

was strongly opposed to

the opcrution because 1t

¡cared that

the result would be a radio war in the western lemis-

Fiere.

In any case, FCC would like to be heard biforc being

dircited by the iSC

to procecd.

Mr. Allen pointod

sui that 1f

linxico or Canada beanca

programs to one of

our citico from an

vircrari, we would te furious.

A similar reaction migit be ex-

¡setud from Castro.

Morcover,

if it becune known thut we vere

broadcasting on a furticular

channel, Cactro could chift hio

tolovision stutions to thie

channel and jum our prociumi.

In

¿aci, Juuming is so caby that Castro might retaliate by jomning

other U.S.

stations.

So much for the technical difficultles of

this problem.

There were

other difficulties also.

Bcaming tele-

vision programs

to Cuta fron an aircraft would give Castro a plat-

fom from which to denounce the U.S. for television auzression.

He could pose as a martst, saying he was a victim of

the power-

fui U.3., and ask other latin American countries to rally to hie

dcfense.

In

the light or all these difficulties, USin was

seerching for

elterrate means or

fetting factual Iniormation to

thie Cuvan people.

Cur short-wave broadcasts to Cute hare been

cugrenied. The difriculty with short-wuve

broadcasts is that

tiere are only about 150,000

short-wave sets in Cuba, most of

which vere importea by Castro during ils dayo us « guerrilla.

Ii migno bo possible ior USLi to due time on lucul stucion in

Florida for brondcastino Cuban prograns.

The most usciul station

for chis purpose

is

one orned by ir. Storer, who 10 most cooperative

and wrose station has broadcast

to Cuba on un experarental basis.

Hust radio stations do not wish

to rent. two or three hours of good

licioning time to the USi for Spanini: language progtamo

because

ties are feuriul or losing their regular listeners.

kr. Allen con-

cluded by saying he rould velcome guidance on the USIn problen.

6.

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'roperty al tho Duirht

). Elsonhoier Library,

Ibilene, lis

Mr. Dillon was inclined to

think

that any contrived

solution slich us broadeacting television programs from an air-

cinde would be less than productive in cur relations

with

latin macrienn countries unless the operation produced

u very

durinste divirend.

In Alion suld it had been currested that

se brosdcasi did leugue baseball games.

to Cuba since the Cubana

appeared to be baschall lans.

No'.

Dillon douuted that broad-

carline baseball games to Cuba

would advance our dolley very

#do allen said ot course we would mention olnur newo in

the pause bolicen

innings of the basebull gane.

on balance,

do alion agreed

that wittle baseball broadcasting to cuba lad

some attractions; it was not sufficiently dignlfied for a u.s.

progren.

Tic Vice President agrerd that broadcasting from an

airplane would be counter-productive; it would not produce

enough berefits to compensate for its disadvantages.

The Vice

President id no objection to taking action which would be bit-

terly protested by Custro provided

such, "ction sould really

dungo the cautro rectue but he caw no point. in taking action

which would merely irritate Castro without producing tangible

bundlito for

the u.s.

No doubt Cautro would chiru: the U.s.

with accrescion if a U.S. broädcast prevented Curann from Listen-

ing to his spécches.

Overt action of this kind should not be

undertaken by

the U.S. unless we are sure that it ill result

in Great benefits to us.

The Vice President nondered about the

possibilit; de buying time on tient stations.

Mr. klion said

most of tiese stations vers ica-powered stations alticugh there

vas a Spanich-language stacion in Miami.

The Vice trebident

thought the power of the lor-powered stations migit bi increused.

incillen felt we should exjard

our short-wave broadcaste, 1n-

vestigate the possivility of

tuying nore time on locul statione,

etc.

lie also pointed out hat the International Telecommunicatione

Conventions contained the principle that nations wishing to broad-

cast internationally should do so by short-vave and that stondurd

wave or television broadcasts should

use only enough power to

cover the territory of the broudcasting state.

Tie Conventions

ulso contain

the principle that nations should not broadcast on

standard-wave or television from the high seas.

Secretary Anderson wondered whether It would not be more

useful to expend available lunas

for the purpose of introducing

nore siiort-rave sets into Cura rather than to buy time on local

rudio stations.

Al'. Alien felt

the introduction of more slior"-

vave radio

sets would be jcasiule..

Dulles suld distribution

oi these

seis night present a pioblem but de

would look into the

matter.

Tre Vice President

said he understoc: tbe number of people

in cuba disenchanted with Castro was constantly increasing.

ile

wondered whether twenty per ecat of the poguiation vau

disillusioned

with Castro by row.

ii, Lulles sald disillusionment with Castro

?.

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'loporty it tho

bisenhover Library,

luilono, his.

lnd

occurred principally among

the cducated clourco

of the

population; there wus not mich coldence or any change in the

l'ocling ri

otlier classes for Castro.

A change in the senti-

ment of the lower classes would only occur over 1 long period

of time, probably as a result or economic dificultles.

Tir.

broideacting to Cuba

from

Boston at night.

It wun hoped that

a second rudlo station over which Cubor refugeen micit broad-

cast would be installed in five or six wecks.

Mi. lulleo then

rod timi a report of the Secretury General if this

l'opular

Socialisto (conmunist) Party in Cuba.

This report Indicated

that the Concunist Party recognizes

that Castro, uG

the leader

ol the revolution, can do more to promote communiut uime in

Cuba than anyone else.

The report indicatco thut the communieta

we keeping in the background

in order not to nute difficulties

l'or Chitro in his International relationo.

The report declares

that the rajor almo of connuniem ure being accompl.lohed in Cuba.

It doelnes that Cootro knows that he has the utrong support

of the communiots, thut he has sold that anti-comunists are

Imporialist agents, thut he has given the communicto

credit

t'or

cicaiing during the list thirty years the unti-imperialiot

sentiment which made the revolution possible and

that he has

admitted that the revolution could not have succeuded without

communism.

the report declares that Castro and the leaders of

his covernment consult the connunists regularly,

that communists

are in dej positione in the army and in the government, and

that

a conmunist-controlled Cuban government could not make as mich

progress towards the ains of communion as the present government

is making.

Ine Vice President said this report appeared to indicate

that the communists

feel they have the Castro government well

in hand.

Mr. Gates asked

to whom the report was made. Mr. Dulles

said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communisto. The

Vice President wondered whether the

report could not be publicized.

ke feit publicity would be very effective in this case.

Mr. Dulles

said he

iculd investigate to determine nor widely the report had

beon circuluted already.

He would not wart to publicize it'in

such a way as to uncover his sources of iriormation.

The Vice

President agreed but thought that if the report had been widely

discenirated, it would be

impossible for the Cubans to tell which

recipient had rassed it on.

is. alien wished to turn to the cituation in India for a

said he had just returned iron New Delhi and. it was

hic inpreccion that one co ichru's great sifficultles was his

pronice to jarliument that he would not negotiate on the border

dispuic unild the Chinese Corrunists had evacuated the territory

8.

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## Page 101

operty or tho

De: 111111

*Eisonhovor Library,

01lono, Ks

This appears to bep 9 of

43lt nueting

know what action we would take in such a continuency. He might

finally have to use force il U.S. citizons wore expocad to mob

Admtrui Burke Chought we necded « Cuban leader

cacuard whom anti-Castro elements could rally. in. Dilles cald

sone anti-Castro inders cristed, but they are not In cule at

present.

The Presidunt unid ve might have unother Block Hole

di calcutta in Cuba; and he wondered what we de abnut such a

id. Dilion elt it vould be neconsary to lace that .

stcuation witen it crived.

Adniral Burke noted that we had

Pans in: immediace cracuation oi the 10,000 Americons in Cuba,

as hell as military forces to put thece plans into execution.

Secrutary Douglas wos somewilut pessimistic about the possibility

oi cvacuntion,

saying that sorcone was bound to tet hurt during

such an operation.

Tie President remrked that we could blockade

tie isiand and sey it is quarantined.

Pir. Gray anied whether

State and Dalense should be directed to revier contingency plans

regarding Cuba, in. Dillon said plans vere being reviewed con-

stantly,

but the airficulty vus that all the contingencies

couid not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke volicrod Cuba

coüid re blockaded within two to three hours after the order wao

given.

1. Patterson asked whether economic measures as such

had hurt Castro.

tr. Dillon believed

trat economic measues

against Castro wouid not nave much cirect in a short time. lore-

over, castro would probably te avic to counteract econcuic sanc

cons by receiving wei ne noeded iron the Soviets. The President

said his could not do this it ve

bicchaded the island. Admiral

Zure sliggested that we should intersily our propaganda. to per-

sundo the

OAS ond the Cuban

people to support our policy.

The

President agreed, adding that he could do almost anything if

had the

support of die

Departinent

CAS.

He

ir. Dilion pointed out that the State

was constantly endeavoring to secure the support of the

The President agreed with

son that

the

the suggestion of Secretary Ander-

Inter-Amcrican Pank should be uned as a method of

caining the support or ais countries. He added that we should

cnicavor to think of all possible ways or influencing latin

American countries to favor our policies in Cuba.

it. Dulles

reported that a fion to aifect the situation in Cuir was being

horked on.

Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal

of Cuban leaders

sioula de a paciage deal, since many of the

senders around Castro vere even vorse than Castro.

The President

caiu the Argentinians had been vory bitter avout Cacvara.

Secre-

tar; inderson said

the following story nus going the rounds: When

Castro vanted to take over the Cuban Bari, he had acred at a meeting

or his supporters wether there was an economist present. Guevara

had raised his hard and Castro had appointed him liced of the rani.

On the way out oi. the acosing Castro had said to Guevara

"I didn't

inion jon icre nn econouist"

, and Guevera lad replica, "Oh, I thought

you

said a Continist.

9.

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## Page 102

proporty ul uno brightl

Elsonhovor Library, ti

1o1leno, lis

2P ONL

HELORANDJi

AprIl 14, 1960

Gray Ex-IF 4

SUBJECT':

Discussion at the 4416t Mecting

of the lational Security Council,

Thuroday, April 14, 1960

Present at the Waist NSC Meeting were the Vice Fresident of

thic Unlted States, presiding; Mr. C.

Douglas Dillon for the

Secretary of State; the Secrctary

of Defenue; und the Direc-

toi, Orisee or Civil and Defense Nobilization.

Also prevent

at the Necting and participating in the Council Actione

were the Secretary of

the Ircasury and the Director, Bureau

or the Budget.

also attending the liceting were the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs oi Stafr; the Director of Control Intelligence;

the Director, U.S. Intormation Agency; the Speciul icsistanto.

to the Preuident for National Security Afairo (Items 3 & 4),

for Science and Technology, and for Security Operutione Coor-

diration; Assistant Sccretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Auula-

tant Secretary oi Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Huntlagton

Sheldon, CLi; the Absictant White House Staff Secretary; the

Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Exccutlve Secretary,

There follows a summary of the discuscion at the lecting

and the main points taken.

i. Lay said ze regretted that it. Gray would be unable

Ta tunet the defiazine of the leeting but might ue able to

• it riiii sciore 1t ended.

SOLE US DUELOPENS TECTING U.S. SECURITY

TISE ACCiGT NO: 2166-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 22T7,

• 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206 and 2213)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD TIE DOMINICNI REPUELIC

(ISC 5902/2; NSC Actions Nos. 2178 and 2212)

IF. Dulles sald that Chou en-lal's forthcoming viGit to

New Delhi represented a Chinese Coumunist eifort io restore

cordiality 1n

the relations between India und Cornunist China,

& cordiality which had been shattered by the everts or the

inst year, including the border dispute, and the suppression of

the revolt in Tibe.

Chou en-lal rould be accompanied by a

hidi-povered negotiating tean and his expectutiors ci arriving

i settlement were apparently high. By contrasi, ichru was

shoptical about the possibilities or settlement. Henru

ulso under parliamentary and public pressure to rare ro

Gions in the border dispute oince he had committed himsell not

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## Page 103

Mr. Dulles reported that

In the Dominican Rejriblic, Trujillo's

position continued

to weaken and was now quite precurious.

The

wholesale arrests

ordered by Trujillo last winter had affected

almost every prominent family in the

these arrests had broken up

DomtnicanRepull1c.Although

the plotting against trujillo, they

hod nt the

sume tine workened the

dictator's position. Mr. Dulles

thought that further attenpts would be made to kill or cust

Trujillo.

Relations

between the government and the church were

rapidly deterlorating.

In. Dulles pointed out Incidentally that

Che attltude

of

the church in the Dominican Republic was quite

different fron the ettitude of the church in Cub.

Mie economic

situation in the ioninican Regublic was

worsening.

Mriness 18

stagmnt.and International finuncial sources are drying up.

Thie

government has resorted to various

subterfuges in an attenpt to

improve its precarious financial position.

Secretry Gates asked

whether it was true that Trujillo was

one of the richest men in

the world, with more money than the Dominican goverment. Mr. Dilles

said this slatement was

true; Trujillo was resorted to have milked

the Dominicon Rerublie of $100 million, an estimate which was

probanly exaggereted and should be

scaled down by one-half or two.

thirds.

Secretary Anderson said lie understood that $4 nillion

In gold had been recently removed from lew York banks by the

Dominican Republic and had been

pleced

in the Bank of Nove Scotic.

iro iulles said he had

a detailed

report on the finuncial situ-

ation of the forinican

Republic, all the detailo of which he would

not reud.

However,

it appeared that the Doninican luablic now

neld $l5 million in gold and that it had incurred a varioty of

chligations;

for example, a $16.5 million Joan fron the Bank of

¡ova Scotia

secured by

the suger crop.

The Domintcan Republic

hed also drawn 37 million out of a $1l.5 million credit with the

International Monetary Fund.

Secretary Anderson said the Inter-

notional binetery Fund's dealings with the Doninican Republic

might present a problen to the U.s.

The Doninicen Republic now

had drawn

so much from the fund that it could only draw in the

future $2 million every 90 isys without consulting the Directors

of the Fund.

If the Dominicans

should want to draw more than

52 million every 90 days,

the question would arise es to how the

U.S. Director should vote when the Dominican Republic undertakes

the necessury consultation with the fund.

Mr. Dulles, continuing his briefing, reported that Irujillo,

apparently not reallzing its position,

1s not enticipating on

carly fall from pover and is apparently not planning flight.

The tominican military forces have apparently been repelled by

In cuba and may believe they will he compelled to act

against Trujilio before the radieal pro-Cestro elements, which

3

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## Page 104

•POLY CA TO MINI

Elsenhover Library,

¡bilene, AS

r..

are dally Increasing in strength, take over the government. Il

there is a

Eup between the dejarture of Trujillo und the estab-

1lohment of

the new regime, the radical pro-Cactro clements

might have an opportunity to seize pover.

If the urmy does not

hold ori these radicel clements, a period of chaou might enoue .

ri. Dulles belloved that Trujillo!o

downfall might not occur

for hocks or even months but, on the other hund, the situation

ache become criticul at any moment.

The Vice President wondered whether the worut outcome of

the situation in the ibmindom Republic would not be a take-

over by

the pro-Castro elements.

He also wondered whether we

vere doing everything possible to support other elemento.

Dulles said the difficult question vas that of leaderchip of

moderate elements in the Dominican Republic..

The vice president

os the Republic might be able to assume foner or the principal

milltary officers night govern through a military Juntu.

kany

¿onchent anil-truftaio Dominicano vere in exile. Mr. Dillon

said

this government was following the situation in the Doninican

Republic closely and intended

to try to prevent selzure of power

by any pro-Castro group.

This would Irvolve working closely with

the üis.

The Vice

Fresident believed that we could not let Castro

or a pro-castro group take over the Dominican Rejublic even 1f

we had to intervene in cider to prevent

such a takeover. Mr.

Dillon felt thut

in order

to intervene we would need en invitation.

Tie Vice Fresident feared thut the old

story was being repeated

in the Dominicon Repuülic; that 16,

the

pro-Castro clument wus

the caly minority group with otrong leaderohip und definite ou-

Jectives.

Ir. Dulles

said there

was a Ercup

in Venezuela

which

would like to move Into the Dominican Repuvlic and take over the

govertment.

Ni. Dilion belloved the Cactro elenent in the Dominican

Republic was not strong enough to assume control of the government

without support frou Cuba.

It was, accordingly, very important

that

the U.S. be prepared for rapid action.

The Vice President

agreed that it was very important that the U.S., if necessary,

take rapid action to prevent any move by Castro to seize power

in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Dulles said

the situations in liaiti and Venezuela were

being arrected by the

situations

in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Betancourt,

It 1s reported, has made a deal with the army whereby.

he will avandon government by coslition, will rule Verezuela with

his ann party supported by the army, and will take action againot

the, couminist movement.

However,

It is mossible that the communiets

know of bis plans and nay toke action to thwart them.

ir. Dillon said thiere was one favorable aspect to the situation

in the Caribbean.

Is trujillo could be removed fron fover in the

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## Page 105

all di,tal

do Elsanhouor Library,

(bilene, lis

Duminican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented

tron seiding pover in

that country, our anti-Custro cumpaign

Circughout Latin America would receive a gicat boout.

The

Vice

resident agreed

that gotting iid of t'rujillo would be

a luvoracle

developseat for

US.

Turning to Cuba Mi. Dilles reported

that a Sonor Botancourt

(ro relation to Verozaula's Botancourt) had recently delected in

Cibe und lad toli u.s. oriciala that he sees three possible

alicones of the Cuban sicuation: (1) the

assasolnution of Cestro,

which would make him a martyr (2) Caotro's suicide, which 16 a

possibility in the event oi

failure and (3) a continuation of

the present

trend, resulting ultinately in a sociallut dictator-

Susp and a Batista-type terror in Cuba. Senor Betuncourt had

said that Castro was a narped personality and he had accordingly

sucsested that the v.ü. apoint a conmitree of three to deal with

his - i cormittec consisting of a psychologist, a diplorat and

un actor of the Orson Helles type.

A recent invitation by Cuba to Honduren studert and leg16-

lators to aliend the Conference or Underdeveloped intlors ind1-

cats that Cuba is abandonind the concept of making this con-

t'erence on orficial govermental one.

Cuba appears to be pre-

jorin to establish jirioratic relations with Crechoslovaria.

Faviicon, a cureer dipiorat in Latin imericon alfairs

cinisucr to rexico nad arranged for the shipment of Czech

io the irbene regine in Cuatenala In 1954, would protably be the

Carch arcassador to Cusa.

The Cuban communicts were increasing

their eiforts to control the Cuban Labor Federation.

dent's lotior to the Chileen

students had received wide notice

in Cuba and elicitod a cavorable reaction among many people who

are secoming distliusioned with Castro.

Mr. Dillon thougnt the President's letter to the Chilean

students was very cirective throughout Latin America, especially

in Chile.

We had recently called

the attention of irgentina,

Chite and Colombia to to fact thai a Cuben radio station had

beer calling the presidents of these countries "lackeys and elaves

o¿ the U.s."

On Tuesdgy we are planning to send a ship to the

nicaro facility in Cuba

io louù nickel.

This will be & test case

iccauce the yO doy moretoriun on application of the Cuban export

tii to licuro expired on ipril 1.

It will be Intercoting to see

ilicter Cub wili Giply the tax and compel ficuro to shut down.

". onion Guid it nos his impression that thu Cuten censorshi;

iac becomine mori

and more criective, de thut it was

dieticule to cut the

inercasingly

truth to the

Cuban

people.

He goked whether

¿ Alien would like to comment on

this point.

5.

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## Page 106

Troporty ad tho Drillit

Elsunhovor Library,

lollono, dis

L

Hir. Allen said USIA had been discussing meuns of presenting

factual

information to

the Cuban people.

His agency had been

under sone presoure from U.S. neuspopers und lembero ni Congreas

on

this point.

Tie Senate had recently passed a resolution allo-

cating $100,000 to be used by USIA to buy time on Florida radio

stations for procrens aimed ut

Cuba.

However, a conderence com-

altied had refused the allocation of additional noncy, sucgesting

that dunds already appropriated be used for the purpose. Studies

in USii had developed two possibilitles for getting the factual

internation to the Cuban people.

One project wouid be a 500

itlerte mobile standard-wave radio station in Florida tronomit-

cing programs beamed to Cuba.

It would tuke at luuut nine montha

and possibly up to twenty months to put this projuct, into oper-

ation.

A second project was

the proposal to fly un aircraft over

Rej nest for the purpose of beaming

television progrus into

Cliva, probably on Channel 8.

This project could be jut into

operation in nuout cigit weeks if the Navy would provide USIA

with a Super-Constellation aircraft now being used on weather

jatrol

dutles.

lowever, thie project was traught with certain

airficulties.

Inc Federal Connunicationg Committloa, although

it would

of courue cooperate if directed to do no by the fisc or

tie Fresident, wus strongly opposed to the operation because it

¡cared that the result would be a radio war in the western lemia-

there.

In any case, FCC would like to be heard before being

directed by the iS to proceed.

te. Allen pointed sut that if

lixico or Canada leanca prograns to one uf our cities from an

aircruit, we would te furious.

A similar reuction migit be ex-

restud from Castro.

Moreover, If it becane known thut we were

bronicanting on a ferticular channel,

Castro could shift his

television stutions to this channel and jum our progrunt. In

jamming 1s

so easy that Castro might retaliate uy jamuning

other U.S. stations. So much for the technical difficulties of

this problem.

There were other difficulties also.

Beaming tele-

vicion programs to Cuia from an aircraft would give Castro a plat-

form from which to denounce the U.S. for television atgression.

He could pose as a martyr,

saying he was a victim of the pover;

ful U.S. ,and ask other

Latin American countries to rally to his

defense.

In the light of all these

difriculties, USIA was

searching for elternate means of getting factual

information to

thie Cuvan people.

Cur short-wave broadcasts to Cuba have been

eugenied.

The difficulty with short-wave broadcasts is that

tiere die only about 150,000 short-wave sets in Cuba, most of

witch

were imported by Castro during ils days us " guerrilla.

Ii might be possiule for USLi to our time on

local sissions in

Florida for brondcasting Cubun programs.

The most usurul statlon

for this purpose is one orned by tir. Storer, who 10 most cooperative

and whose station has broadcast to Cube on an experarental basis.

Host radio stations do not wish to rent two or three hours of good

listening time to the USIA for Spanion-language programs because

thuj are feuriul of iosing

their regular listencis.

in. allen con-

cluded by saying he would welcome guidance. on the USl problen.

6.

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## Page 107

TOP SECRET

•roperty

di tho Duiplit

Eisenhoor Library,

Ibilena, hs

Air. Dillon was

inclined

to think

that any contrived

solution such as broadcasting tolcvision programs trom an air-

cinit would be less

than productive

in our relations with

latin Anoricon countries unless the operation produced a very

deiinito dividend.

Mi. Allen said

it had been cupgested that

lio broadcast big League baseball games to Cuba since the Cubans

appeared to be baseball rans.

Mr.

Dillon douuted that broad-

carline baschall games to Cuba would advunce our policy very

ta, allen said oi course we

would mention other news in

tie palise between innings or the baucbull gane.

un balance,

Mi. Allen agreed that vhile baseball broadcastine to Cuba nad

some attractions, 1t was not sufficiently dignified for o U.S.

proften.

Te Vice President agreed

that broadcagting from an

airplane would be counter-productive;

it would not produce

enough dererits to compensate

for its

disadvantages. The Vice

President ind no objection to

taking

action which would be bit-

terly protested by Custro provided such ction would really

daigo the Castro regine but he saw no point. in taking action

which would merely irritate Castro

without producing tengible

benetito

for the U.s.

No doubt Cautro would chire: the U.s.

wiin aggrescion if

a U.S. broadcost prevented Cuband from listen-

int to his speeches: Overt action

of this kind should not be

undertaken by

the U.S. unless we are sure that it will result

in treat benefits to us.

The Vice President nondered about the

possibility of buyine

time on tiaml stations.

ir. Alien said

most of these stations vers low-yovered stations although there

vas a Spunish-language station

In Miami.

•The Vice preoldent

thought the power of the lor-powered

stations might u: increused.

is. illen felt we

Should exjand our

short-wave broadcasto,

in-

vestigate the possivility of buying more time on local stationa,

etc.

lie also pointed out that the Internationel Telecommunicationa

Conventione contained the principle that nations wishing to broad-

cast internationally should

do so by

short-wave and that

standard

wuve or television broadcests should

use only enough pover to

cover the territory of the broudcasting state. The Conventions

ulso contain the principle that nations

should not broadcast on

standera-wave or television from

the high seus.

Secretary Anderson wondered

whether it would. not be more

uscful

to

the purpose of introducing

nore short-rave sets into Cuba rather than to buy time on local

radio scations.

Mr. Alien ielt the Introduction of more short-

vave radio sets would be icasible.

Mr. Dulles said distribution

oi these

sets night present a problem but he would look into the

matter.

Trie Vice

President

said he understood the nunver of people

in cuba disonchanted with Castro was constantly incrensing.

wondered whether

twenty per coat of the pujulation vac disillusioned

with Castro by now.

Mr. Lulles 6a1d digillusiorment with Castro

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## Page 108

"roporty el tho Duiiht

Lisenhover Librury,

Ibiluno, NS;

had occurred principally among

the cducated clorres

of the

population; there wus not mich

evidence of any chande

1n the

l'ecling ci otlier closses for

Castro.

A change in the senti-

ment of the lower closses

would only occur over i long perlod

ol cimo, probably as a result of economic diificultles.

Hiro

mullrs rugurlod lan sumo Cubon intercütanle nouma. Lioi be

Uroadcasting to Cuba from Boston at night.

It wan hoped that

a secori radto station over wnich Cuban refugeer nict broad-

cast would be installed in five or six wocks.

Mi, lullco then

read tinn a regont or the Secretary Goneral

ci th: Topular

Socialists (Communist) Party in Cuba.

This report Indicated

that the Comcanist Purty

recognizeo that Castro, us the leader

ol the revolution, can do more to promote communiot uims in

Cuba thun anyone else.

The report indlcatco thut the communiste

we kecping

In the background in order not to nake difficulties

lor Chotro in his International relations.

The report declares

thut thr anfor alma of connuntun ure being acconpllohed in Cuba.

It declares

that Caotro knows

that he trs the utrong support

of the commundots, that he has

said that anti-comunicto are

inpcrialist ugents, thut he hao given the conmuniuto credit

t'or ereating during the last thirty ycaru the unti-imperialiot

sentiment rhich made the revoiution possible und that he has

admitted that the revolution could not have succouded without

contunisn.

The report declares thut Castro

and the leaders of

his covernment consult the comunists regularly,

that communists

are in kcy positiong in the army and

in the government, and

that

a conmrunist-controlled Cuban government could not make as much

progress towards the ains of communiaia as the present government

is making.

The Vice President said this report appeared

to indicate

that the communists feel they have the Castro government well

in hand. Mr. Gates asked to whom the report was madc. Mr. Dulles

said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communists. The

Vice President wondered whether the report could not be publicized.

He felt publicity would be very

eflective in this case.

Nr. Dulles

said he would Investigate to determine nor widely the

report had

been circuluted already.

Hle would not want to rublicize 1t'in

such a way as to uncover his sources

of Iniormation.

The Vicc

Preoident agrecd but thought that

1f

the report had been widely

dissenirated, it would be impossible for the Cubuns to tell which

recipient had fassed

it on.

is. ilion wished to turn to the citiation in India for a

He said he had just

returned fiom New Delhl and it wos

his impreccion that one ot ichru's groat difficulties was his

to parliument that he would not negotiute on the

diopuco untli

the Chinese Corruniets had evacuated the territory

•8.

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## Page 109

12 January 1961

Gray ExIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: !finutes of Special Group Mccting, 12 January 1961

PRESENT: 1033r9. Merchant, Gray, LWiD, Dulles

3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolitionary Front

Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General

Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation irom the above-mentioned

group, reporiedly will visit Washingion on Saturday.

5.

Continenty Planaina for Cuba

Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a lask force

consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defcase and the Joint Siali

netó dras up contirgency plans covering the possible eventual use of

overt U.S. forces.

All members agreed that such planning is an essential step.

Mo. Gray askod lici a preliminary report of the task force be availablo

for the mocling of January 19th.

% Capture of Supplies in Cuba

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Ac1 ot 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on top, 48 10

In answer 10 a guestion, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban

governmcals capture oi materich from to airdrops plus one cache.

PITH GIV

1: 66 116:

oche

1..... :0.-0.2.0

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

CPI"

NO OBJECTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3-17-98

14H7

50955

DOCI

raje

---

## Page 110

19. Dominican Republic

1fr. Micrchant explained the fecling of the Departerent of state

that lilies supplies of small arms and other materiel Should be tract

amilable for disorients inside the Dominican Reputatie.

!!..

Parrot

maid that we bolieve this can be managed securely by cite dad tini

the plan would call for final transportation into the country beirg

provided by tie dissidents themselves.

The Ciroup approred lie project.

M1. U-a Flights - Vietnam

Mr. Dulles and Mir. Parroll ouilined gencraily the results of thie

three sacocssful Il-2 Mights.ovcr Vicinam, noting that Manoi bad no:

been coverod because of clouds, and tat it is planned io fly a missio

to cover that arca as soon au lie weadier permito.

The Group agrood that no such flight should tale place after

January 20th.

They diso regucated a briel memo summarizing acoulis,

10r the meeting of ihe 1901.

SEGRET - DIES GULY

THE WHITE HOUSE VENICE

50955

DocId

33

Page

110

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## Page 111

12 January 1961

Grayity IS

MEMORANDUM FOR THIE RECOND

SUBJECT: "linules of Special Group Mecting, 12 January 1961

PRESENT: lc9srs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Frout

Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General

Goodpaster in the effect that a large dclegation irom the above-mentioned

group, reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday.

* 5. Contingency Plannior for Cuba

Mr. Willaver outlined a proposal to establish a task force

consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff

Itó draw up contingency plans covcring the possible eventual use of

overt U.S. forces.

All members agreed that such planning is an essential stop.

Mr. Gray asked thai a preliminary report of the task force be available

for the mccling of January 19th.

%. Copture of Supplica in Cuba

In answer lo a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban

governincuts capture of matericl from mo airdrops plus one cache.

ITS ASKARAT 1S

1000e:10010102

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1 g.

Dominican Republic

Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Departmont of State

that limited supplies of small arma and other materiel chould be made

available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, Mr. Parrot:

maid that we beliere this can be managed securely be Cla, did that

the plan would call for final trausporation inig the country being

provided by the dissidouis themselves. The Ciroup approced die projoci.

M11. V-a Flights - Vietnam

Mr. Dulles ard Air. Parrolt oudlined generaily ihe resulis c! tic

three successiu 11-2 sights.over Vicinam, noting that Manoi had no:

been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a missica

to cover that arca as soon as tie weatier perio.

The Group agreed that no ouch flight should take place after

January 20th.

They also requested a brief memo summaring resilis,

for the meeting of the 19:h.

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29 Decembor 1960

Gay Gx#6

MWMORAGDUM FOR THE RECORD"

SUBJECT: Minutes of Spocial Group Mecting, 28 December 1960

PRESENT: Messes. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

3. Air DrOps - Cuba

Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in

the next three days.

"s. Dominican Republic

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a tvo-pronged plan for

proceeding with certain linited covert activities directed against the

Trujillo regime. lie emphasized that although support would be given

to the Figures group: there is no intention of establishing a para-

militery tored as such; since this would be impractical in view of

remirements for Cuba, lie also emphasized that the proposed actions

would no: of incinselves bring about the desired result in the near future,

liching soine decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it

should be mentioned at the Tuesday mecting. It was noted that

Pawley jecls that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic

"should be mounted simultancously with the Cuban opcration.

•Sconsensus of tie Group was that this would not be entirely consistent.

However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time

no maiter whai the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

i. Cuba

Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with

1r. Grip's ascociates this morning.. The latter had made two points:

(a) is could be desirable lo obtain the cooperation and support of

individual Lith american governmonts, (b) it would he desirable, if

CIAHAS NO OBJECTION TO

possilde, for the l.S. in brcal: relations with Cubn, in concert with

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR.

F THIS DOCUMENT

4/7/98

RELEASE OF

cher comtries, coine time before January 20th.

2

NO OBUECTIONT - PICS CANY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

wig

3.17-98

The Demagent or State has no objectiorrie ine

Feleape or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act ot 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7.Oyos 98

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## Page 114

29 Decembor 1960

Gay Ex# 6

.

..

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 29 Decciber 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

3. Air Drops - Cuba:

Ma. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in

the next three days.

'5. Dominican Republic

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a tvo-pronged plan for

procooling with certain linited covert activities direcied against the

Trujillo regime. lie emphasized that although support would be given

10 the Figures group, there is no intention of establishing a para-

military torer as such; since this would be impractical in viow of

requirements for Cubi.

He also emphasised that the proposed actions

would no: of thenselves bring about the desired result in the near future,

laching soine decisive stroke against Trujillo himsolf.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it

" should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that

Pawley jecls that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic

should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. Tlie

•"consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent.

However, it was agrced that the plan is worth beginning at this time

no matter whai the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

i. Cuba

Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with

11e. Crag's associates this morning. The latter had made two points:

li) it would be demirable to obtain the cooperation and support of

individual Late American governments, (b) it would he desirable, if

possible, for the U.S. to brcal: celations with Cuba, in concort with

other countries, come time before January 20th.

2

PROPEPTY D:

THE WHITE hOUSE C1A16

SHORET - FUEG ONIV

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## Page 115

SECHET - ENSS ONLY

The Department of State has no objection tó the

release or declassification of this document is as sunit 20d

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

25 August 1960

Reviewed on 7 ap98 u

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Mossrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

Gracy Ext 7

DECIASSIFIOA

RELEASE 05

DCSL

AS SANITIZED

@053 4/7/98

1. Congo

Air.

Parrott outlined broadly thrce for as Mr. Dulles later

descrived them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in

mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:

operations through

the pianned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of

no contidence in Lunumba; and a brand new contact with an aliegea

¡ender di certain independent labor groups. fic empinsiied that te

latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing

inc bona fides and

capabilities of the individual.

08

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much

in order.

Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation; and he wondered whether

the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and'had

every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits

or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a

position of inerpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of

necessily and capability. It was tinally agreed that, planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out "considiration" oi any particular

kind cincivity snich might contribute to getting rid uf Lumumba.

d.!..

Irwin

conmented that cortain individuals in Defensc have

uphe 1o the possibility of using high officials

Arica to promote the general objectives of we west.em

296(1)(c)

this consection,

no cited a preliminary assessment lich had been

madio o:

ahc

08 -

absussinünt

bang that the individuat in question is a man of not

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outstanding Intelligencon abllity or drivos but that he is obviously

well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might bo other

individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature

who could bo useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that

in Black

Aírica is not a vory substantial force.

Mr. Dulles concurred in this,

but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

3296(1)Lc,

29

4491

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

V1. Cuba

'The DOl summarized the progress we have mide in establishing

contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection

he also noted the apparent iulfillment of a sabotage requirement which

had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilitiey

(after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

? He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary furce of

approximaicly 500 people ready to operate by November.

In answer

10 Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined to possible ways of initiating

che tactical combat phase.

: Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the

Direcior of the Bureau of the Budget. The lutter had told M.. Gray

that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as

a resull of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had tvo roservations that

he would like Gray to look into.

"One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his

discussion wit Cl ropresentatives in connection with the laicst

withdrawal frein the keserve, he had received "no evidence" that any

effective resistance had been identified within Cuba, (Mr. Gray had

Answered that in the formal presentation last weck, Mr.. Dulles and

11r. Bissell had mentioned a numbor of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a fooling that.we might not

3

fle bepartment ollape pas ng objection to the

NO OBJECTION

!:.-. -release or declassitication of this document in full

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET - ESS

*under the provisidas of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

3-17-96

" viewed on 7 april 98 u

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## Page 118

know chough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,

particularly an to basic frcedoms, their attitude toward restoration

of seined dinerteen property, cic. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had

pointed out turt

takrente is composed of people who have broken

with Castro, i: ican; on the basic philosophies.)

In an altempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first

point, Mr. Patroll iold the Group about last Monday's mecting with

Mr. Macy, ai which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail

all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to

understand how Macy could have received the impression that ClA

is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer

10 Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -

and had devoloped at considerable length - the thesis that our vicw

was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just

why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the

stops that have been,

and are being, taken to identify such groups and

to assess their apparent loaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the

point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V

1o: ClA lo nitempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the

participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the

country.

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good

deal about the insic political sympathics of Frenic mombers, and

cited as an exampie the position that had been taken as to the inclusion

of cortain ultra-conservative groups.. He said that the Frente had

issued i statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly

as being to preserve the principles of the cvolution. He said that as

to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, elc., this

was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance

of being a tool of the Amcricans.

He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans'

point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do

50.

He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near futurc

and would take that opportunity io discuss these malters further, as

appropriate.

Mi. Par roit said that there was no disagreement that the political

idean of there

individuals must be constantly issusied and must be

clearly established before the opuration actually comes off.

mided, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these

politically serconed individuals had issucd their goneral ctatement

oí objecires,

our primary opcrational task ins been to hold the FRD

logether, and that at this particular slage it would not be practical

1

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## Page 119

to insist on a more precise pelling out of individual or group

vicws.

Mo. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a rolated

point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that

Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given

adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a

concern expressed as lo planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -

of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn

of thic present onc. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the

necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in jact

directed three wecks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

japanett

THOMAS A.

PARROTT

SECRET - EVES CALY

HH 50955

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## Page 120

25 August 1960

Gracy ExHt 7

MEMORINDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Spocial Group Mocting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

Fran

1. Conso

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later

descrived them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in

mounting an anti-Lumumbs campaign in the Congo.

operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;

the pianned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of

no conitence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with in aliegud

¡cier oi certain independent lubor groups.

rie emphasized that te

lilier had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing

ine sona fidos and

capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much

in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightorward action in this situation, and he wondered whether

the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had

every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits

or requires,

but added that he must necessarily put himself in a

pusition of inierpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of

necossily and capability. It was linally agreed that planning for the

Congo would not nocessarily rule out "consideration" o: any particular

kind e: icivicy wich might contribute to getting rid uf Lumumbo.

t!i. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have

given thought to the possibility of using high officials of te Catholic

Church in márica to promote the general objectives of the West. In

this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been

mixo o: te Nogro Cardinal recontly appointed by tie Pope - the

assessment being that the individual in question is a gian of not

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outstanding intelligencon ability or drivod buf that he is obviously

well motivated." Mr. Irwin asked whether there might bo other

individuals. of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church

hierarchy who could bo useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black

Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this,

but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriaic.

7 i

SEGRET - EVES SAY

THE WHITE MOWER C:

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## Page 122

5.

V1. Cuba

The DEl summarized the progress we have made in establishing

contuct with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection

he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which

had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its eapabilities

(after this action had been clared with the Special Group).

? He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of

approximaicly 500 people ready to opcrate by November. In answer

10 Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined to possible ways of initiating

the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the

Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

The latter had told Mi. Gray

that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as

he would ake Gray to look inio.

i result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had no robervations that

'One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his

discussion with ClA representatives in connection with the latest

withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no ovidence" tint any

effoctive rosistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had

answered dia: in the formal prosentation last week, Mr.. Dulles and

11r. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

T'he second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

3

Car 2

SEBRET - BIES COLY

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## Page 123

020i

know enough about the political attitudes of the membera of the Frente,

particularly an to basic frcedoms, their attitude toward restoration

of sciaed Americin proporty, cic. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had

pointed out thai die frene is composed of people who have broken

with Castro, it leasi on the basic philosophies.)

In an alempt to clarify the situation with respoct to the first

point, Mr. Parrot iold the Group about last Monday's mecting with

Mr. Macy, ai which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail

all aypects of the Cuban project.

He said that he was at a loss to

understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA

is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer

10 Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -

and had devoloped at considerable longth - the thesis that our view

was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just

why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the

steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and

• 10 assess their apparent loaders. Mr. Parrott said further that te

point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question v

1o: ClA 10 alump: to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the

participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the

country.

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good

deal about the unsic political sympathics of Frente members, and

cited as an example the position that had been taken is to the inclusion

of certáin ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had

issued a stlement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly

as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as

to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this

was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appcarance

of being a tool of tue Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans'

point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do

50. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future

and would take that opportunity io discuss these matters further, as

appropriate.

Mr. Parrot said that there was no disagrecment that the political

ideas of there indiriduals must be

constantly assesued and must be

clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He

idded, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these

politically-serconed individualy had issued their general statement

of objecires, our primary opcrational task ins been to hold the FRD

lugether, aud tut at this particular stage it would not be practical

1

!?:.

SCARE - EAS C7

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## Page 124

to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group

vicws.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related

point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that

Mr. Barnès had undertaken to assure Macy that it would bo given

adequate altention by the interagency planning group. This was a

concern expressed as lo planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -

of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn

of lic present onc. Mr. Merchant said that he agroed iully with the

necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact

directed three wecks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

11

japaneit

THOMAS A. PARROTT

5

it find

SENET - EVES CHEY

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