INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE:POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF SOVIET SUBMARINE TO CUBA DURING 1964
Originator: CIA
Document date: 02/13/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGINCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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COUNTRY CUBA/USSR

DATE OF JANUARY TO EARLY FEBRUARY 1964

INFO.

TOCS -3/573,022

DISTR 13 FEBRUARY 1964

1.

2.

SUBJECT

POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF SOVIET SUBMARINES TO

CUBA DURING 1964

CUBAN CONTROL OF LAND-TO-SEA ROCKET SITES

PLACE &

DATE ACQ. (9 FEBRUARY 1964)

SOURCE

AND

REFD-ACQ-03298N

TDC SDB-3/659,020

FIELD REPORT NO.

APPRAISALI A CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE OFFICER WHO IS AN HONEST REPORTER AND WHO

HAS SUPPLIED GENERALLY ACCURATE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.

CEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM A CUBAY NAVAL OFFICER WHO IS ASSIGNED

TO THE KOMAR-CLASS GUIDED-MISSILE BOATS.

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1. IT IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD BY OFFICERS OF THE CUBAN NAVY

THAT THE CUBAY MILITARY WILL RECEIVE TWO OR THREE SUBYARINES FROM

THE SOVIET UNION DURING 1964. DURING 1963, MANY MEN HERE SENT TO

THE SOVIET UNION FOR ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE TRAINING. IT IS

UNDERSTOOD THAT THOSE SENT FOR NAVAL TRAINING WERE MOSTLY YOUNG

MEN TO BE TRAINED IN SUBMARINE HANDLING AND MAINTENANCE AND THAT

UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR SCHOOLING THEY WILL RETURN TO CUBA IN

THE SUBMARINES.

2. THE RUSSIANS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING OVER COMMAND

OF THE LAND-TO-SEA ROCKET SITES TO CUBAN SOLDIERS. ONLY A FEW

"13'

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STATE/INR

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DIA ARMY/ACSI MAVT AIR SC: SECDEF NSA NiC XINX USIA OCI ONE OCE

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TREASUR REPCISCLANT DDI USCG

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TECHNICIANS ARE REMAINING AT THE SITES TO INSTRUCT AND ADVISE

THE CUBAN FORCES.

3. IN JANUARY 1964, RUSSIAN OIL-DRILLING CREWS STRUCK OIL

ON CAYO FRANCES; THE STRIKE IS PRODUCING 300 BARRELS A DAY. TO

GUARD THE INSTALLATION, SEVEN OR EIGHT YACHTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO

PATROL THE AREA OF THE KEY AND BETWEEN 200 AND 300 MEN ARMED WITH

BAZOOKAS, MORTARS, AND RIFLES HAVE BEEN MOVED THERE. MANY OF THE

RIFLES ARE EQUIPPED ILTH SNIPER SCOPES.

4. AS OF EARLY FEBRUARY, THERE WERE RUMORS TO THE EFFECT

THAT A CONSPIRACY WITHIN THE MILITARY WAS BEING ORGANIZED. ALLEGEDLY

THE TALK OF SUCH A CONSPIRACY IS THUS FAR CLOSELY GUARDED BY MILITARY

OFFICERS. THE GROUP BEING ORGANIZED IS SAID TO BE COMPOSED OF ARMY,

NAVY, AND POLICE OFFICERS OF HIGH RANK AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT

SOME SHALL ARMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED SECRETLY.

5. AFTER THE ATTACK ON THE TWO PT BOATS NEAR ISLA DE PINOS,

CASTRO ORDERED THAT WORK ON THEIR REPAIR MUST TAKE TOP PRIORITY OVER

ALL OTHER MILITARY WORK. HOWEVER, REPAIR CREWS ARE EXPERIENCING

DIFFICULTIES MAKING THE NECESSARY REPAIRS, SINCE THEY EITHER CANNOT

REPLACE THE DAMAGED PORTIONS OF MACHINERY BECAUSE THEY LACK THE

NECESSARY RUSSIAN SPARE PARTS OR CANNOT MAKE THE REPAIRS BECAUSE

OF LACK OF KNOW-HOW. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE

"я..

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PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THE EFFECT OF COMMANDO RAIDS ON CUBA IN TDCSD-

3/659,020, DATED 15 JANUARY 1964.)

6. IN THE RECENT ATTACK AT SIGUANEA, ISLA DE PINOS, THE CUBAN

GUARDS DID NOT FIRE ON THE ATTACKERS BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID THEIR

SHOTS MIGHT SET OFF EXPLOSIVE CHARGES UNDER THE ROCKETS. THE PORT

OF CABAÑAS, ALTHOUGH REINFORCED SINCE RECENT ATTACKS, WOULD BE AN

EASIER TARGET FOR A RAID THAN THE ISLA DE PINOS AREA. THE PORT

IS PROTECTED BY ONLY A FEW GUARDS ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS, AND IT

IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE BETWEEN THE HOURS OF MIDNIGHT AND 3 A.M.

T. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

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