## Page 1

(157-10005-10297)

: V

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

NEGL

NE94

1970

N614

1965

8/3185

Date: 10/05/93

/age: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMA::ON

AGENCY

:SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10297

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE :

SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16, 1975)

DATE : 09/01/75

PAGES : 678

SUBJECTS :

SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-J

"AB A: PROLOGUE

TAB B: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

TAB C: COVERT ACTION

TAB D: CUBA

TAB E: CONGO

TAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

TAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TAB H: CHILE

TAB I: SOUTH VIETNAM

TAB J: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

TAB K: RECOMMENDATIONS

TAB L: EPILOGUE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

COMMITTEE'S DRAFT REPORT

(UPDATED OCTOBER 16, 1975)

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

• HH 50955

DocId:32202487 Page

---

## Page 2

Date: 10/05/93

Page: 2

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HIH

50955

DocId: 32202487

Page

2

---

## Page 3

(vidate)

October 16, 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

A :

TAB B:

TAB C:

TAB

D:

TAB E:

TAB F:

TAB G:

TAB H:

TAB I:

TAB J:

TAB K:

TAB L:

Prologue

Introduction and Summary

Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation

Cuba

1. Introduction

2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or

Known About Within the CIA

3. The Question of Authorization Outside the Central

Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration

4. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy

Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs

5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy

Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs

6. The Quastin of Cantorizatin for Me 1963 Assan Plot

7. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administratio:

Congo

Executive Action Capability

Dominican Republic

Chile

South Vietnam

Findings and Conclusions

Recoumendations

Epilogue

(1) (A)

(1(5)

(1)(C)

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 3

---

## Page 4

-

TOP

29

taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a

contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this

operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as

Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or

Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely

that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed

his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized

the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside

with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura

foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule

bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states

that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro & different

diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified

that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

(e) AMLASH

(1) Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico

City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine

if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G.,

p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been

*Donovan was not aware of the plan.

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 4

---

## Page 5

.s.,.

39

100 Scene

TA cabledated terry 2

/ 1965, stated

that B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMIASH-1 had

highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965

the Modrig|Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one

pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-1's

secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that

"B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical

people and delivered to AMLASH-1 Lin Madria" (I.G., p. 103

In June 1965, CIA terninated all contact with

AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities

were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).

"4. B-l is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination

of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know

B-1's location.

"5. B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin

American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and

a junta is formed. This junta will be established even

though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive

and may still be in control of the part of the country.

This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able

to establish some control over one of the provinces so

that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,

B-l will increase the number of commando attacks to a

maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the

people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio

messages, in all propaganda put out by B-l he must relate

that the raid was possible thanks to the information

received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from

the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "p".

This will be AM/LASH-l's war name."

50955

DocId:32202487 Page

---

## Page 6

its bite a

Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommitte.

Editing and (2) Insertion of

Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

D. CONGO . .

.....

1. Introduction

...

2. Dulles Cable Leopoldville That "Removal"

of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High

Quarters"

....

*..

3.

CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"

Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave

Danger". Even

After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective

Custody . . ....

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

(a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"

of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to

Congo With

a Highly Sensitive

Assignment .

(b)

(Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to

Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi-

nation of Lumumba:

September 1960

(c)

ledgman Testified That Gottlieb| Iold

Him That President Eisenhower Had

Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

(d)

Headquarters Makes the Assassination

Plot

"Highest Priority" and Authorizes

Steps in Furtherance of It

(e)

The Chief of)Station Moves Forward

With Assassination Plot

...

(i)

The 'Chief of Station Testified

That He Requested and Received

Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan from Headquarters

(ii)

The Chief of Station Took "Explora-

tory Steps" In Furtherance of the

Assassination Plot and Testified

That He Destroyed Cable Traffic

Related to the Plot

Page

1

1

3

8

14

15

18

22

24

31

31

34

HH 50955

DocId:32202487 Page 6

---

## Page 7

5.

-

-ii-

(f)

lestimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the

Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the

Assassination Plot .................

(i)

Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation

To Poison Lumumba . . . . . .

........

(ii)

Iweedy Testified That He Discussed With

Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating

Lumumba and lle Cabled Hedgman About Gaining

Access to Lunumba for the Purpose of

Assassination . . . .....0.000.

(iii) Bissell Testified That Ile Did Not Recall

Thether the Assassination Operation Had

doved from Planning to Implementation

but It was Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to the Congo . . . .

....

The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination

Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives

in the Congo . . .

...

...

(a) (O'Domell's) operations in the congo

(1)

Iweedy and the Chief of)Station Agreed That

a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to

the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-

nation Operation

, . . .......

(ii)

Bissell Discussed Assassination of

Lumumba With (O'Donnell)and Sent Him

to Congo: October-November 1960 . .

(iii)

Bissell Testified That He Asked(0'Donnell)

to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination

Operation

.....

..

(iv) (0'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and

Learned

That a Virus Was in the

Station

Safe

.......

(v) (0'Donnel1) Planned to "Neutralize"

Lumumba by Turning Him Over to

Congolese Authorities and Requested

the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to

Leopoldville as His Alter Ego

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-

December 1960

......

•

Page

41

41

44

43

52

53

53

54

59

60

65

67

HH 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page 7

---

## Page 8

DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975

Frederick D. Baron

TOP SECRET

For

Internal Committee

Use Only

D. CONGO

1. Introduction

The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA

plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to

the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically

intended for use in an assassination were placed in

the hands

of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency .

scientist.

Although these instruments of assassination were never

used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case

which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's

assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives

in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?

Second, how high in the United States government was the

source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally,

was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led

to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these

broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-

ceived by the Committee.

-

.-.a---.=

(.

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 8

---

## Page 9

- 3 -

Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of

the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody

of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its

own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese

authorities announced Lumumba's death.

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing

of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci-

dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*

2.

Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba

is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence

From Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new chief of

Station to the Congo. The Chief of station said that the briefings

he received at CIA headquarters

in preparation for his departure

contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice

Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head-

quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late

July, the Chief of station again heard no discussion of assassi-

nating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political

strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers

of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured

* Report of the Cornission of Investigation, 11/61, Ull

Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October,

November, and December.

* See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing

anti-Lunumba attitude In the United States government as shown by

minutes of the National Security Council

and Special Group and the

testimony of high Administration officials.

N# 50955

DocId:32202487 Page 9

---

## Page 10

-i=

by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters

by the new Chief of station:

EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING

CLASSIC COMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT.

MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST

PARTY, ETC.

ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR

INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE

FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER

OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING

COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-

WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND

THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION

TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA....

Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)

SCRA Cable (IN 39706),

This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE

(OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60) .

Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-

destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State

Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR

BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59742),

Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,

Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up

cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"

(CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

several days later, the Chief off station reported that a plan

to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by.

Congolese leaders:

ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU

WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUEU

REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT

VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT

STATURE REPLACE LIMUMBA. EGIA CabLe IN 42764.

Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)

HH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 10

---

## Page 11

- 6-

The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cablet to

the sofaidville chiet of staton unica etiessed the urgency of

"removing" Lumumba:

IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-

CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-

TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE

RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST

PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE

CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE

PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF

THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY.

CONSEQUENTLY

WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN

URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING

CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH, PRIORITY OF

Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER'

AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized opera-

tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING

EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable,

8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT

THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) .

* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are

a relative rarity in ClA communitations and call attention to the

and sensitivity of the matter discussed.

** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified

that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to

refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).

-

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 11

---

## Page 12

- 7=

Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO

CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-

TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the

Chief of station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT

COMPETENT LEVEL"' in the State

Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point

of assuring the

Chief of station that he was authorized to act

unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the

Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE

10 BE CONSULTED,

YOU SHOULD SEEK. HIS CON-

CURRENCE... IE IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE

DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT

ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT

PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) .

This mandate raises

a question as to whether the DCI was contem-

plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the

Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"

United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he

was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable

shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that

the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the

President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 33,

64-65) . *

* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell

on the question of authorization for the assassination effort

against Lumumba.

NH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 12

---

## Page 13

-9-

to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might

assassinate Lumumba:

TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS

ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE

CUNGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOI

AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE

LUMUMBA.

to Director, 9/7/60.)

(CIA Cable, (IN 49679,) Leopoldville

The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered

to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"'

and assured him that the United States would supply technicians

(CIA Cable, 9/7/60) .

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of

the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.

apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the

Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official

position:

LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-

RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION

EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS

EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST

WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE

CLA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville,

9/13/60).

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported

that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-

nate" Lumunba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have

been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded

a safe base of operations:

HH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 13

---

## Page 14

0/105-233%

-10-

-

HW 50955

STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS

SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS

ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER.

STATION ADVISED

TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK

•[KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI

LUMUMBA.

FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE

LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.

ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.

CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director,

9/15/60.)

On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met

with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator

requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some

Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning

the meeting reported:

CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE

SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP

RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP [OLDVILLE] AREA

[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE

ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT

ACTION: [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES

LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY.

DISTRUSTS

LANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER]

BUT WILLING MAKE

PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION

LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228,) Leopoldville.

to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE

POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters

that they should

HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT

NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]

DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-

SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).*

* This

recommendation proved to be in line with large scale

planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support

to anti-Lumumba elements.

On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and

Bronson Iweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of'

Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repré-

sentatives or operational contacts:

(Both continued en next page)

---

## Page 15

.... ..

-11-

Several days later, while warning a key Congolese

leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,

the Chief of Station

URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL

OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,

IN 15643) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were

leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

[IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP-

MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING

FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS.

THIS

PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION

IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN -

DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED

OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS,

SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-

LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.

‹CIA Cable(OUT 04697,) Director to leopoldville.

10/6/60 .)

-

NH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 15

---

## Page 16

• AS

- 14-

(

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters

delivered to the Chief of)station in Leapoldville lethal bio-

logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.

The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving

confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the

scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps"

in furtherance of the assassination plot. The ichtef of station

testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA

scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Elsenhower

had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lunumba.

Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and fallowed by

general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA

headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Only" channel --

including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of

Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in

the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly

before the poisons were delivered to the /chief of Station, there

is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-

nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence

of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events

which actually. led to Lumumba's death. *

HH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 16

---

## Page 17

-15-

(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba,

and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly

Sensitive Assignment

On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-

self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping

force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed

a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting

between the Chief of) Station and "fidney) Braur," who was traveling

to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:

('SID"I SHOULD ARRIVE, APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL

ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS '(SID. FROM PARIS"

• IT

URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ['SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE

AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY

HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.

(CIA Cable, OUT 71464)

/ Bissell/ Iweedy to Chief

of Station, 9/19/60.)

The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator --

"PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the

Chief of the Africa Division.*

In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review

Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to

denote sensitive personnel matters"

(Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick

A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this

sensitivity indicator, while created

for other purposes,

was utilized

by Bissell, Tweedy,

and the Chief of Station to restric distribution

of their communications about an assassination operation.

The cable

traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel

did not touch upon personnel matters except in

terms of recruiting

additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

HIH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 17

---

## Page 18

1...

- 16-

The Bissell/Iweedy cable inforued the Chief of)Station that

he was to continue to use this indicator for

ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU

IMSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELE.

(CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)

The (Chief of) station -- referred to herein as "iledgman"* =-

testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such

a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a

"most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11,

43). The cable advised, in his words, that:

someone who I would have recognized would

arrive with instructions for me....

believe the message was also marked for my

eyes only ... and contained instructions

that I was not to discuss the message with

anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)

Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-

tions he was to receive,

and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any

way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).

Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was

to meet "Sid"' in Leopoldville, Bronson Iweedy uses the same sensi-

tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"

basis (GIA Cable, (OUT 74837,)

Iweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers,

the Chief

of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi-

fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,

p. 4) .

WW 50955 Docld:32202187 Page 18

---

## Page 19

-17-

(

Iweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be

required as an agent in the PROP operation:

IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES

BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH

THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]

ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,

9/22/60.)

Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station

was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A

THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT

FILL BILL''* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Iweedy's concern about

the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of)

station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as

"Sid")

who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP

operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude

in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ

OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS

OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE

CONCEALMENT AMERICAN ROLE, UNLESS OUI-

STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES

CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET.

READY

ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE

BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL

JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

-

* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later

dispatched to the Congo.

His mission is discussed in Sections -

_, and

_, infra.

HIH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 19

---

## Page 20

- 18-*

On September 24,

Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to

Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to

"eliminate"

Lumumba:

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN

ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY

RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE

FAILS IN LEOP (OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF

-IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

OUT 73573), Dulles

(CIA Cable,

to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

-

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the

presence of the President at an NSC meeting

stating:)

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in

the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not

yet disposed of and remained a grave danger

as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC

Minutes, 9/21/60)

(b)

Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the (Chief of)

Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba

The Chief of) Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson

Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville

with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable

(IN 18989), Leopoldville to Iweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same

week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba

and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that

existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of"

Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID"')

-- the messenger

referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:

l: 'Who was the messenger who arrived?

Hedgman: ME. (sidney forelied)

NY 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 20

---

## Page 21

- 19 -

S: And at that time, you knew who he was?

Hedgman, I recognized him as an officer of the

Agency

I believe he referred to the

fact that I had received a message and that he

was

the person concerned. (hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 15-16)

The message carried by Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to

DDP Richard Bissell,) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or

my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.

l: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?

Hedgman: Yes.

I would say that was

• my under-

standing of the primary means

I don't think it was

probably limited to that, if there was some other way

of doing it.

Q:. Of doing what?

Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political

threat.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)

Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb) also may have discussed non-

lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but

he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 28).

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,

however:

And what did Mr. (Gottlieb

indicate with regard to

the possibility of physically eliminating him?

Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was

probably expected of me.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)

And again:

Q: I take it that once you started discussing these

lethal agents,

there was

no doubt in your mind

that

the kind of elimination he was there particularly to

discuss was killing Lumumba?

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 21

---

## Page 22

- 20-

NW 50955

Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that

this was one of the way(sl, and probably what

they thought was the only

way that would work

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).

dedgman explained (focaleb)provided him with poisons as a means

of assassination:

I And what did he tell you with regard to

ow that might be accomplished?

... He brought some biological agents.

But in

passed to

me....

§i These were lethal biological substances?

Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding

as. a non-expert. (ledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)

Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a

syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him.

in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 20-21). Hedguan indicated that

this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

§: (When he (Gottliebl) came to the Congo

to give you lethal biological agents for

a that time that on means do adi leering

those biological agents was to inject them

into a substance that was to be ingested by

Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or

toothpaste or any other substance that was

to be ingested?

That's my recollection, yes,

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 82; accord. p. 24.)

Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted

to use of the poisons provided by (Gottlieb):

This was not a sine qua non that I employ this.

If there were another method, another way, It

would have been acceptable.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

DocId: 32202487 Page 22

---

## Page 23

-21-

• For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested"

shooting Lumumba

(to Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 27-29).

There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi

nation should not be traceable to the United States:

The biological

substance, or specimens, what

have you, I think it was

up to my judgment,

and if there was a better way

-- certainly.

(The point I now recall was in no way, if I

implemented these instructions, no way could

it be traced back to the United States.

had to be a way which could not be traced

back

... either to an American or the United

States government. (ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said (Gottlieb) assured hira that the poisons vere pro-

duced to meet this requirement:

I believe I raised the point that poisons left

traces in the human body, which could be found

on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured

that these

... lethal agents would (leave]

normal traces

found in people that die of

certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great sur-

prise" when it first became clear that (Gottlieb)was there to discuss

an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of)

Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not

carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 46). Instead, he

told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46)

and left him with the following impression:

I think it would be a fair impression that he would

take away the thought that I was going to look into

it

and try and figure if there was a way ... I beljeve I

NH 50955

DocId:32202467 Page 23

---

## Page 24

- 22-

stressed the difficulty of trying

to carry

such

p. 47.)

an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his

initial contact with (Gottlieb)

was clearly an affirmative response

to the assignment. The Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb)

were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to

Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's government

was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation

with Lumumba, and said:

HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT

WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

(c)

Hedgman Testified That (Gottlieb) Told Him That

President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination

of Lumumba

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in

Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhower

had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori-

zation of such

instructions to you?

Hedgman: Yes, I did.

recollection, that I did.

That's my quite strong

Q:. What do you recall in essence was what you

said to him?

-

Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed

out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,

and I may have probably said that I never heard of

it being done, which I had not, never in my training

or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any

references to such, in my recollection at least, such

methods.

And it is my recollection I asked on whose

authority these instructions were issued.

S: And what did Mr. (Cottlieb), reply?

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 24

---

## Page 25

-24-

Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot

6.

-

8/21/75, p. 34:771.

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":

You have a very firm recollection that he

(Gottlieb]) represented to you that the President

of the United States directed the assassination of

Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?

Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d)

Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest

Priority" and Authorizes Steps

in Furtherance of It

On the basis

Of his talke with "Sa, ») teaman Listed a

number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At

the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent

be used in the following manner:

HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.

WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP

DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-

calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in-

formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED

ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60) •

On September 30, the Chief of) Station urged that head-

quarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so

HH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 25

---

## Page 26

(

- 26-

The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgnan received

authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority

plan:

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALIS

WITH SCHOTRONME TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE

TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.

Peopold 16 2 130760 07 350,440186) co

In this cable, (Glenn Fields,) Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,

expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE"' (GIA Cable (OUT 75900,)

Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

According to the report of the (Chief Ol) Station, (Gottlien)

left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of

the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS"' (CIA Cable IN 24171,) Leopold-

ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration"' of Gottlieb's)

"materials' probably refers to the date beyond which the substances

would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of

the "expiration date" to (Gottlieb"s) departure is unclear from the

cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances

had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of) Station indi-

cated that Gottlieb) left some biological substances that were still

lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination

operation:

[SIDI LEFT, CERTAIN ITEMS OF.

CONTINUING USE-

FULNESS, (CHIEF OF STATION)) PLANS CONTINUE

TRY IMPLEMENT OF.

(CIA Cable IN 24171,)

Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

55

DooId: 32202487 Page 26

---

## Page 27

-27 -

By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con-

versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining

access to Lunumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 60). ledgman testified

that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a

means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (liedgman,

8/21/75, p. 60):

I believe that I queried the agent who had

access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in

detall about just what that access, what

access he actually had, as opposed

to speak-

ing to people.

In other words, did he have

access to the bathroom, did he have access

to the kitchen, things of that sort.

I have a recollection of having queried him

on that without specifying why I wanted to

know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 48.)

on October 7, the Chief of |Station reported to headquarters

on this meeting:

CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH

(AGENT)

... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSISILITIES

[AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY

HQS.

ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE

HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN

LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with

doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:

(Clertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild

scheme professionally.

I did not think that

it :.. was practical professionally.

Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....

I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really

expected to

carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

HW 50955 DocId:32202187 Page 27

---

## Page 28

-28-

-

However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con-

tinue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do

it successfully.

He urged headquarters to send him an alternate

operative for the assassination mission in the event that they

found his first choice unacceptable:

IF HOS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]

BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-

SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD

COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable(IN 241/1,

Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.1

Iweedy cabled the (chief of Station the same day that he "HAD

GOOD DISCUSSION. YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to

a de-briefing of (Gottlieb/upon his zeturn to the United States.

(CIA Cable OUT 78336), Iweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Iweedy

indicated that he was

CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY

NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,

SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER

PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY

ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS

StaA Cable OUT 78336, Iweedy to Chief of)

Station, 10/7/60.)

This expression of support for the operation was followed by

an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15,

1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's

Africa Division and released under Bronson Iweedy's signature, as

Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA

channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 28

---

## Page 29

- 29 -

appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States

embassy. This cable….. generally discussed the possibility of

covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and

military ald (CIA Cable OUT 81476) Dizector to Leopoldville,

10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against

Lumumba that would be authorized:

ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND

IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING

(LUMUMBA, DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE

ACtION MIGht BE.

ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD

(OUT 81476) Director Co Looped Cable

10/15/60 .)

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second

cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally

by Bronson Iweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for

Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable (UT 81396) Jueedy to (Chief 0f)

Station, 10/15/60) •

YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL

CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA [GRAPH]

ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-

CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC

[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL

STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-

POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-

SIDERATICN.

RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY

APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR

SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU

DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND

ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY.

(CIA Cable OUT

81396), Iweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-

cating that communications about the assassination mission were

NW 50955 DocId: 32202187 Page 29

---

## Page 30

- 30-=

restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination

mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's

reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to

the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... IO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY

THIS ASPECT" (CLA Cable (QUE 81396) Iweedy to (niel os) station,

10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell who

testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to

undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional

officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason

that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly

under the (Chief of)Station:

SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY

GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP.

(CIA

Cable (OUT 81396), Iweedy to (Chief of) Station,

10/15/50.)

Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba

activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels,

Iweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:

POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR

ABDUCTION [LUMUMBAJ, EITHER VIA ASSAULT

ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE

PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER

BREAKOUT

INTO TOWN

(CIA Cable OUT 81396) • REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

station, 10/15/60.)/

weedy to Chief of)

* For a full

account of the meeting between Bissell and

(O'Donnell and O'Donnell's) subsequent activities in the congo, see

Section 5(a), infra.

HH 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page 30

---

## Page 31

- 31-

This series of cables sent

during, and after

(Cottlieb)'s visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CLA

headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassi-

nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-

strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in

CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the

Congo, including those who were

aware of and involved in other

covert activities.

(e)

The (Chief of)Station Moves Forward With Assassination

Plot

The testimony of the Chief of) Station, taken fifteen

years after the events in question and without benefit of review

of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture

derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted

assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from

the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he

claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an

affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.

(1) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested

and Received Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan From Headquarters

Hedgman testified that, after receiving (CotElleb's

instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that

he was to carry out Gottlieb)'s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

P. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb) by

name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President

in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43) .

MH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 31

---

## Page 32

- 32-

Iledgman described the extraordinary security precautions he

took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in-

structions:

There was some special channel ... because

it was handled differently than any other

normal message.

For example, it was not put

on a regular cable form, which, you know,

you have several copies

for your various

files.

And it was my recollection that I personally

carried the message to the communicator to

encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk

way that even the communicator would not

necessarily know what it was about."

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for

all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-

firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment,

he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

I believe I received a reply which I interpreted

to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his.

instructions were ... duly authorized.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)

Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-

vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)

Lotties jor by cable, that he was to await fusther authorization

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from

before using the poisons (ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex-

pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free

hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving

"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).

H# 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 32

---

## Page 33

- 33-

Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his

second appearance:

I Drobably had authority to act on my own

but

... it was possible that I had to go

back and get clearance for my action.

(Hedgman, 8/25/75, P. ll; see also 8/21/75,

p. 39.)

Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been

made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of

eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52) .

I thought the policy decision had been made

not in the Agency, and

Although Hedgman assumed that the

President had not personally

selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under

the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so

and to proceed to take action:

Hedgman:

... I doubt that I thought the

President had said, you use this system.

But my understanding is the President had

made a decision that an act should take

place, but then put that into the hands of

the Agency to carry out his decision.

: Whatever that act was to be, it was

clearly to be assassination or the death

of the foreign political leader?

Hedgman: Yes.

Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?

Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if De. Gottlieb's

lethal agents were employed, that would have been

the result, yes.

(liedgman,

8/21/75, p. 104.)

NW 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 33

---

## Page 34

- 34-

Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out:

these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106).

Whether or not

he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without

seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked

with headquarters before

taking action:

I think probably that I would have gone back

and advised that I intended to carry out and

sought final approval before carrying it out

had I been going to do it, had there been a

way to do it.

I did not see it as ...a

matter which could be accomplished

practically,

certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 51-52.)

He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval

would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the

specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 53) .

( ii)

(Chief of) Station Took "Exploratory Steps. in

Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Iestified

That He Destroyed Cable Trattic Related to the Plot

Hedgman testified that after (Gottlieb's) visit, he locked

the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably"

sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was

the only other person with access to the safe and that she would

not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 3/21/7;,

p. 49) .

Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre-

served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any

WH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 34

---

## Page 35

-36 -

The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For

two months after (Gottlied's)

arrival in the Congo, a regular stream

of messages flowed between the Leopoldville (Chief of Station and

headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early

October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority

plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have

sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison

Iumumba.* In mid-October, Iweedy notified the Chief of) Station

that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and

he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-

tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy

to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60) . *is

These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Iweedy on

October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission

Chief of Station to Tweedy,

Full treatment of these cables

** See Section

cable.

See Section

__, supra, for

supra, for more complete text of this

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 35

---

## Page 36

- 37-

HIAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.

THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS

INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable

(IN 28936,) Chief of) Station to Iweedy,

10/17/60.)

Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime

in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access

to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 61). The Chief of) Station continued to communicate with head-

quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina-

tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.

Hedgman confirmed Iweedy's view that although the assassination

operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with

responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate

on the progress of the assassination mission:

ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS

VEEN MULTIPLE OPS CONTENTS OUTA CabLe.

(IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the Chief of)Station responded enthusiastically

to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER

HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA

OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF STATIONI WOULD

DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING

AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable

28936, 10/17/60.)

HH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 36

---

## Page 37

= 33 -

The (Chief of)Station concluded this cable with the following

cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he

may have "suggested"' shooting Lumunba to (Gottlieb) as an alternative

to poisoning (liedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 27-29) :

IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS

POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE

RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.

HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT

HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,

WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING

OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable (Ill 28936.)

10/17/60 .)

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers

to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The

rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the

possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" --

in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside

the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This

interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by

the Chief of)Station through the PROP channel for Iweedy's "EYES

ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from

mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on

November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but

inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese: .

TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL

WEEKS: HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY

CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP ....

CONGOLESE

TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S

ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.

UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF

PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS

OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISIMENT OF OBSER-

VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

N# 50955 DooId:32202487 Page 37

-

---

## Page 38

- 39 -

COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF

HOUSE BY CONGOLESE..

TARGET HAS DISMISSED

MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS, MEANS SEEMS

REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478) (Chief of)

Station to Iweedy.)

Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the

assassination question would have been sent with the same

extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-

ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned (Gottlieb's) visit

and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

I would have sent in a special channel

anything dealing with Lumumba, at Least

that would touch upon his removal in one

way of another: (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)

The (Chief of )Station also testified that sometime before

leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to

the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 89). Hedgman's

best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy

those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never

before in his tenure as Chief of)Station in the Congo destroyed

cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 91).

But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were

destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature:*

He said

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such

sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 38

-

=

---

## Page 39

-40-

that eventually

I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because

the Congo was a highly sensitive area in

which -- at one period I recall we had all

of our files in the burn barrels. I mean,

when you wanted a file, you went over and

dug it out of the

burn

barrell. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination

plot, the (hief of) station was asked to give a general characteri-

zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times

in which it took place. His response indicated that although he

was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized

order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating

Lumumba:

I looked upon the Agency as an executive

arm of the Presidency....

Therefore, I

suppose I thought that it was an order

issued in

due form from an authorized

authority.

On the other hand, I looked at. it as a

kind of operation that I could do without,

that I thought that probably the Agency

and the U.s.

government could get alone

without.

I didn't regard Lumumba as the

kind of

person who

was going to bring on

World War III or something.

I might have had a somewhat different

attitude if I thought that one man could

bring on World War III and result in the

deaths of millions of

people or something,

but I didn't see him in that light.

I saw

him as a danger to the political position

of the United States in Africa, but

nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 110-111.)

HM 50955 DooId:32202487 Page 39

---

## Page 40

- 41-

Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree

of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination

PTOE

There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard

Bissell and Bronson

Iweedy and the picture of the assassination

plot presented by the Chief of) Station and the cable traffic from

the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that

the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA head-

quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct

recollection of Gottlieb's) mission to the Congo and Iweedy can

recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an

assassination attempt.

(i)

Iweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation

To Poison Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal

liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief ofjstation in Leopoldville

for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the

effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the

special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations.

cabled to headquarters by the Chief of) Station on the assassination

operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed

the Chief of) Station that ("SID") would arrive in Leopoldville, with

an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464), Bissell/ weedy to (Chiet 0d)

NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 40

---

## Page 41

- 42-

Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he

had debriefed Gottlieb) upon his return from the Congo (GIA Cable

(OUT 78336), Iweedy to (Chief of) Station, 1017/60). Iweedy was also

the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on (Gottlieb's)

arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989), (Chief of)Station to

Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan

which emerged tron the discussions between (fottlieb) and Hedgman

as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-

tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA

Cable (IN 20857) Chief of) Station to Iweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,

(Chief of) Station to Iweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, (Chief Of) Station

to Tweedy, 10/17/60).

Iweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these

cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:

from ClA headquarters having to go to the Congo

to provide the (Chief of) Station in the Congo

with instructions to carry out the assassination

of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him

with the tools to carry out such an assassination,

namely, poisons

and medical

equipment for admin-

istering them?

Mr.

Iweedy: No, I do not.

(Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

-

*

See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent

in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of) Station in

Leopoldville.

HH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page

41

---

## Page 42

-43--

When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received

by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by

......

Gottlieb), who carried instructions that they were to be used in

the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:

There is nothing in my experience with the

Agency which would really bear on that

point whatsoever.. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)

Iweedy added that if Gottlieb)went to the Congo as a courier,

"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 35).

Iweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio-

logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't

recall it" (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 30).

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable

from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to

the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be

"very surprised if I didn't (know], but I certainly have no recoll-

ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of

the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through

a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions

were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Iweedy, 9/9, pp.

32-33) .

Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the

testimony of the Chief of) Station,* the discrepancies in their

(chief of station.

Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the

Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt

Hedgman"

and I certainly trust his integrity."

s veracity or integrity, adding (Iweedy, 919, p. 36)

"I would trust his memory

N# 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 42

---

## Page 43

- 44-

( :

testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:

I'really am having trouble with this.

I had to

be reminded of so

many things... The things

that I recall the most vividly about all my

African experiences were.

the things I was

basically concerned with

all the time, which was

putting this division together and the

rest of

When it comes to operational detail I start

fuzzy and you would have thought with something

ike thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms

that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking

about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the

case. (Iweedy, 919, p. 34)

Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that

"Cottlieb) would

have left instructions with the Chief of) Station which would have

empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any

further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, PP: 32,

36). Tweedy said:

In such a matter of this kind; headquarters would

have wanted to have a

last word up to the last

minute. (Iweedy, 919, p. 36)

(ii)

Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell

the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He

Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba

For the Purpose of Assassination

Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to

poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-

• ination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassina: in

Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960

(Tweedy, 919; pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know

NH 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page 43

---

## Page 44

and at distrarene la vent

-45-

whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about

exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy,

9/9, p.

28).

Generally, Iweedy said, when he received an instruc-

tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump-

tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

I would proceed with it on the basis that he

was authorized to give me instructions and it

was up to him to bloody well know what he was

empowered to tell me to do. (Iweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-

inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Iweedy, 919/75, p. 28) :

Tweedy.

•I think it came up in the sense that

Dick would have said we probably better be

thinking about whether it might ever be necessary

or desirable to get rid of Lunumba, in which case

we presumably should be in position to assess

whether we could do it or not successfully.

Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him

in any other

sense but a planning exercise,

never were we instructed to do anything of

kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a

thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of)

Station be thinking

along those lines as well.

(Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-

versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers

sending to the Chief of) Station asking him

to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever

have had

to Lumumba.

[in] the eventuality that

we might wish to get rid

of Mr. Lumumba personally.

(Iweedy, 9/9, pP. 19-21)

N# 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 44

---

## Page 45

- 46-

-

Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for

the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24);

rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were

being

explored:

0.

Would this be access

to shoot him or would this

be access

to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

I suppose all those types of things might

have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)

Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the

feasibility of an assassination operation, did

poisons come up as one means that was being con-

sidered

and which the Chief of) Station should explore?

I am sure it must have.

After all, there

are not many ways of doing it.

Shoot a man, poison

him, of course you could,

I suppose, stab him or

something like that.

But basically you are talking

about a contingency plan which I assume has the best

possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S.

Government

and if you want to do it in a manner which

would be as distant, if that is the right word, as

possible, I think poison would then stand high on

the list

of possibilities.

Iweedy did not "recall specifically" the response fron the Chief

of)Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious

answer... a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters"

(Iweedy, 9/9, pP. 23,27) .

Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a

special channel concerning the 'messenger" to the Congo or confirm-

ation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring

access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been

WH 50955 DoCId:32202487 Page 45

---

## Page 46

- 47-

sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the

normal CIA cable traffic (Iweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Iweedy

said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the

discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether

Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 22).

Iweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conver-

sation with (sidney Gottlieb) about "anything in his inventory that

could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances

(Iweedy, 9/9, PP. 68-69). Iweedy "suspected" that "the first

conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held

between Dick Bissell and (sidney Gottlieb)," which Tweedy then would

have "followed-up" (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 69).

Iweedy maintained

that the period in which he explored the

means of access

for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning

interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-

minent that somebody would say 'go'" (Iweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):

Iweedy. It was always my assumption that at the

time anything like this should occur there would

have been some kind of real focus on the problem

at probably a very considerable policy level with-

in the Agency.

and it never occurred to me that

I would

get a

cali or Bissell would ask me to come

down to his office

and sya go to it.

Nor were we

ever in a position where he said that I would

merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got

that far.

Q. You didn't have any action plans for the

assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or

were aware of?

NH

50955

DooId: 32202487

Page 16

---

## Page 47

-48 -

-

Tweedy.

No.

Planning, yes, but nothing that

ever got anywhere. (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Iweedy's

testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-

ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization

for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's

entourage is in accord with Iweedy's description of his inquiries

about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the

(chief of) station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable (IN

24171/ (Chief of)

Station to Iweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile

with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never

imminent, especially in light of Iweedy's PROP cable the next week.

which told the (Chief of) Station that Lumumba's

DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE

CONSIDERATION

• THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR

SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE

AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable

(OUT 81396), Iweedy to (Chiet Of)Station, 10/15/60)

(I11) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall

Whether The Assassination Operation Had

More tag Not Again An Pot co

Send Poisons to The Congo

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing

the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it

seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place

(Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).

H# 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 47

---

## Page 48

- 49-

Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about

steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did

not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10, p.4). Bissell said that

exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information

from the (chief of) Station about access for poisoning -- would have

been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but

he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this

subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was

aware that the (Chief of) Station had an agent thought to have direct

access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80) .

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables

that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about

gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,

9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:

I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author -

ization from me, would have had the authority to

send such a cable without my signing off on it.

(Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)

Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known Of (CottILeb's trip

to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of

knowledge of the specific operation' (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).

Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to

(Justin O'Donnellwith Iweedy was the reason for his speculation that:

Bissell's assignment to (O'Donnell) is discussed in sections 5(a)

(i) and 5(a) (ii), infra.

HH 50955

DocId:32202487 Page 48

---

## Page 49

- 50 -

Tweedy misht have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottliebys

visit (Bissell, 9/10, pP. 20-22).

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a

messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were

to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. .

• I

would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would

have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed

the assassination of Lumumba with (sidney Gottlied, who was then

(ais Science Advisor| (Bissel1, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a

number of occasions he discussed with (Gottlieb) "the availability

of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10,

p. 60) .

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed

that, if Gottlieb) went to the Congo, he had approved the mission,

(which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of

Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, PP. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of

specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is

nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the

testimony of the Chief of) Station that (Gotelieb) carried poisons to

the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy

in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

NW 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page 49

---

## Page 50

- 31-

He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo... as still

in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged,

however, that

the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which

to administer them was an extraordinary event:

It would indeed have been rather unusual to send

such materials -- a specific kit.

.. of this

sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless

planning for their use were quite far along.

(Bissell, 9/10, p. 37) .

Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he

had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to

move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,

pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of

these

events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.

Gottlieb)

took specific instructions 'to implement,! "Gottlier)

would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by

Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed

into

an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given"

(Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49) .

HH 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page

50

---

## Page 51

-52-

5.

The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination

Plot and other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives

In the Congo

(Justin O'Donnel), a senior CIA offlcer in the clandestine

operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he

had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry

out the assassination of Lumumba

('Bonne11), 619/75, PP.11-12).

(O'Donnell) said that he zefused to participate in an assassination

operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba

away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in

the hands of Congolese authorities (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).

shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in she Congo he was

joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the

following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by

assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of

the Chief of)Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of

O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (GIA

Cable (IN 18739), Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).

Despite the fact that ('Donnell) was initially approached

to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-

likely that O'Donnell) was actually involved in the implementation

of that plot by the Chief of) Station. Whether

there is any connec-

tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives

QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

...

-

HH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 51

---

## Page 52

- 53-

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i)

Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a

Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo

to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation

In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the

specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior

case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of) Station with the

assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Iweedy informed

Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH IDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR

CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national

operative (CIA Gable (OUI 78336), Tweedy to Chief of/ Station, 1017/60).

On October 15, Iweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the sugges-

tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to

concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable QUT 81396),

Iveedy to Chief of) Station, 10/15/608. Two days later, the éniel

•=) Station replied affirmatively:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER

HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable

(IN 28936), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy).

The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE

OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the

assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.

NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 52

---

## Page 53

-54-

(

(

(11)

Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With

"Donnell)and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960

Probably shortly after the chief of Station's cable of

October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to

concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached

the subject with CIA officer (Justin O'Donnell).

At that time, (@'Donnell) was the Deputy Chief of a com-

ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm

(O'DonnaLi, 619175. p.82.

(Justin O'Donnell) testified that in October of 1960, he

was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-

nating Patrice Lunumba (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pP. 11-12; 9/11/75,

pp. 19, 43) :

O'Donnell):

ile called me in and he told me

he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo,

the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate

Lumumba . . .

0:

What did you understand him to mean by

eliminate?

0 'Donnell): To kill him and thereby eliminate

(Fis influence.

2: What was the basis for your interpreting his

remarks, whatever his precise language, as

meaning that he was talking about assassination

rather

than merely neutralizing him through

some other means?

(O'Donnell): It was not neutralization.

CTearly

the context of our talk was to kili

him. (P'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12 .);

('Donnell) reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:

I told him that I would absolutely not

have any part of killing Lumumba.

He said

I want you to

and talk to (Sidney

Gottlieb).

(0, Bannel), 6/9/75, p. 12.>

N 50955 DooId: 32202487

Page

53

---

## Page 54

-55-

=

Gottlieb) was a CIA scientist who was at that time the/Science

Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).

(0 'Donnel1) said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct

such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"

(0 Donne11, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorization

was never raised by Bissell:

I assumed that he had authority from MI. Dulles

in such an important issue, but it was not dis-

(0 Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)

O'Donnell promptly net with (Cottlieb) and testified that he was.

"sure that Mr. Bissell had called (Gottlieb) and told him I was coming

over" (l' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13: 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell) said

that Gottlieb) told him "that there were four or five ... lethal

means of dispasing of Lumumba" (Ó'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 13). (O'Donnell

recalled that "one of the

methods was a virus

and the others in-

cluded poison"' (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 12: 9/11/75, p.7). (O'Donnell)

said that (Gottled) "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the

Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"

('Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 7-4).

After speaking with Gottlieb), (O'Donnell) said:

I then left his office, and I went back to

Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no

way would I have any part in the assassina-

tion of Lumumba

... and reasserted in

absolute terms that I would not be involved

in a murder attempt.

(0 'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 43.)

susan wen.

HIH

50955

DocId: 32202487 Fage

54

---

## Page 55

•..:

- 56--

(o Donnel1)

said that in one of his two conversations with

Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy

to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be

in violation of federal law" (6 'Donnell), 6/9175, p. 14). He said

that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (o'Donnell,

6/9/75,

p. 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (@'Donnell)

agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"

Lunumba "as a political factor"' (o'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):

I said I would go down and I would have no

compunction about operating to draw Lumumba

out [of UN custody], to run an operation to

neutralize his operations which were against

Western interests, against, I thought,

-

(O'Donnell) added that his objective was to

neutralize Lumumba's influence... and his

activities against

(a Congolese leader),

whom at that time you might say was our close

instrument, he was the man we had put our

chips on. (Q'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that; after their discussions about assassi-

nation, (O'Donnell) went to the Congo "with the assignment ... Of

looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 53).

Although (O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he

reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:

HH 50955

DocId:32202487 Page 55

---

## Page 56

-57-

Mr.

(0'Donne11): I told Mr. Bissell that I

would be willing to go down to neutralize

his activities and operations and try to bring

him out (of UN custody] and turn him over to

the Congolese authorities, that is correct.

senator Mondale:

Was it discussed then that

his life might be taken by the Congolese

authorities?

, but then

it would have been a Congolese being judged

by Congolese for Congolese

think it was discussed.

go Done *e7917s,

p. 38.)

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumunba would re-

ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,

according to (O'Donnell (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 24). But (O'Donnell)

"had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him

tried by a jury of his peers" (@'Donnell), 619/75, g. 14):

Although /O'Donnell) had expressed his aversion to assassination

to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"

Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still

interested in the assassination of Lumumba:

discussion

of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other

even knough you have said this, don't

there is no question about

it, he said

wouldn't rule this other out,

meaning the

(0 Donnell)

elimination or the assassination

• 9/11/75, p. 45).

(O'Donnell) had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-

cussion of Lunumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order

NH 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page 56

---

## Page 57

- 58-

to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of

record (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, PP. 44-45) :

Lin the Agency, since you don't have

ocuments, you have to

be awfully canny

and you have to get things on record, and

I went into Mr.

• Helms'

office, and I

said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell

proposed to me, and I told him that I

would under

no

conditions do it,

and Helms

said you're absolutely right.

6/9/75, pp. 15-16) .

(6 Donne11),

Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a

conversation with (o'Donnell) and he assumed that O'Donnell's version

of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, PP. 22-23).*

William Harvey testified that O'Donnell) had informed him

about the conversations with Bissell:

Me. O'Donnell) came to me and said that he

had been approached by Richard Bissell ...

o undertake an operation in the Congo, one

of the objectives of which was the elimina-

tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me

that he had declined to undertake this

assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)

Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told

him that he had asked(O'Donnell) to undertake such

an operation

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).

(O'Donnell) said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-

cussion with Bissell, he departed

pp. 45-46).

1. for the Congo CO Donne11,29/11/75;

* Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa-

cion in any way.

He did not recall why

congo or what his mission was

(O' Donnell) had

gone to the

(leims, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).

NH 50955

DooId:32202467 Page 57

---

## Page 58

- 59=-

(iii)

Bissell Testified That he Asked O'Donnell) to Plan

and Prepare for an Assassination Operation

Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and p'Donnell)

discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell,

9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, @'Donnell) said that he

thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that

the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"

(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had

asked

"'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlied (BIssel1, 9/10/75, p. 44).

Bissell differs with @'Donnell's account on only one

important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-

ment to O'Donnell) contemplated the mounting of an operation as

opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell) flatly testified that

Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first

testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked @'Donnell)

"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,

6/12/75, P. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance,

however, hissell stated that p'Donnell) "had been asked to plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 24) .

Bissell said that after his convezsations with (o'Donnell), he

felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination

operation because, "given (o'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 58

---

## Page 59

- 60-

+=3-

that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell,

9/10/75, p. 25).

Despite his impression that he might have de-

activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time,

Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/

Gobblies) poison plot continued to move foward:

(Ilhis had been in my mind a very sensitive

issignment to him,

limited -- with the

cnowledre of it limited very narrowly ever

within the Agency:

And it is difficult to

separate recollection from inference on

occasion.

But I seem to recollect that

after this conversation with him, I wanted

this put very much on the back burner and

inactivated for quite some time. Now that

doesn't rule out the possibility that some

action through completely different channels

might have gone forward.

But the best of

my recollection is, I viewed this not only

as terminating the assignment for him, but

also as reason for at least postponing any-

thing further along that line. (Bissell,

9/10/75, PP. 25-26) .

-

In Iweedy's mind, (O'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo was

linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba

rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody

(Iweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).

(iv)

O'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and Learned That

a Virus Was in the Station Safe

On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed through on.

the PROP channel that (Justin O'Donnell) was soon to arrive in leo-

polaville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable QUT 86798, Fields)

to (Chief of) Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, (O'Donnell) arrived

NW 50955

DocId:32202487 Page

59

---

## Page 60

-

-61-

in LeopoLúvilLe (CIA Cable (IN 38052), Leopoldville to Director,

11/4/60). (Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been

made aware by cable that (O'Donnell)was coming to the Congo

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 40). Hedgnan said it was "very possible"

that as a new Chief of) Station he took the dispatch to the Congo

of a

senior officer like O'Donnell)as a signal that CIA headquarters

was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb)'s instructions

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).

ledgman had a general picture of (O'Donnell)'s mission:

I understood it to be that - similar to

mine, that is, the removal or neutrali

zation of Lumumba

... I have no clear .

recollection of his discussing the assassi-

nation.

(fledgman, 8/21/75, P. 54.)

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell) indicating

one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as

a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55).

Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that

he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-

erally, however, Hedgman perceived @'Donnell

as being unenthusiastic

about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89) .

When O'Donnell)

arrived in the Congo, he met with the (Chief of)

Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"

(0' Donne11), 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). (O'Donnell said he

assumed it was a "lethal agent" (@'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 37), although

Hedgman was not explicit:

I knew it wasn't for

somebody to get his polio

shot up to date.

(0 Donnell),

• 6/9/75, p. 16.)

NH 50955

DooId: 32202487

Page

60

---

## Page 61

338

- 62-

He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,

"it would have been in the custody of the State Department"

personnel, not the CIA station

(0'Donne11), Donne11), p. p. 36).

(@'Donnell) said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned

the source of the virus (Ó'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 8).* But (O'Donnell)

assuned that it had come from(Sidney Gottlieb's office:

It would have had to have come from Washington,

in my estimation,

and I would think, since it

had been discussed with Gottlieb that it

probably would have emanated from his office.

(0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)

liedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo

with (@'Donnell), but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 60-61).

O'Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he

did

(0 Donnel1), 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that

such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because

he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the

Congo

(6 Donne11), 6/9/75, p. 17).

(O'Donnell)stated that he knew of no other instance where a .

lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station

(Ó'Donne11), 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was

assassination:

the visit of (Gottlieb) to

When (o 'Donnell)was informed about liedgman's testimony on

he said

"I believe

the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,

absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell),

9/11/75, P: 53): (O'Donnell) found nothing in the facts as he

them, nor in Hedgman'.

mạn" ((0'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 19) --

"a totally truthful man"

(0 ' Donnell)

HH 50955

Doc0n32202481' Page

61 P. 30) .

---

## Page 62

- 63-

My Feeling definitely is that it was for a

¡pectic purpose, and was just not an all-

purpose capability there begin held for tar-

gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 43.)

At several points, (o'Donnell) stated that he did not think that

Lunumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (o'Donnell),

6/9/75, P. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very

possibly Lumumba, but very, possibly in connec-

tion with other people.

(0 ' Donnell), 619/75.

p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific

purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba

(0 ' Donne11),

9/11/75, p. 50) .

(0 'Donnel)

said that the Chief of) Station never indicated that

(@'Donnell)was to employ the virus (Ó'Donnell, 9/11/75; p.52). In

fact, (O'Donnell)

I testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-

nation effort, 'he never even indicated that this was one."

(0 Donnel1),

9/11/75, p. 54.)

While ledgman has no direct recollection of discussing his

assassination operation with-O'Donnell, he "assumed" that he had

at least discussed with (O'Donnell) the problem of gaining access to

Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 55, 60). (@'Donnell) testified, however, that because he was

"morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have

(.

NH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 62

---

## Page 63

-;:.

- 64-

explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would

he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-

ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone

else

‹o'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26).

(o'Donnell) was "sure" that he "related everything" to lledgman

about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination

of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no

recollection of learning this iron (o'Donneil) fliedgman, 8/22/75.

p. 56).

Beyond this, (@'Donnell) said that his discussions of assassi.

nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with

"the morality of assassinations"

(0'Donnel1), 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):

From my point of view I told him I had

moral objections to it

not just qualms,

but objections.

I didn't

think it, was

the right thing

to do.

(6 'Donnely,

9/11/75, p. 9).

When asked to characterize Medgman's attitude toward assassination

based on those discussions, (p'Donnell) said:

I will answer your question just as fairly

and as scrupulously as i can.

T have a

great deal of respect for Hedgman.

And if

he said something, I would believe him to

be speaking the truth as he knew it without

shading it

The best I could say, 1.

think, would be this.

that he would not have

been opposed in principle to assassination in

the interests of national security....

that he is a man of great moral per-

ception and decency and honor, and so forth.

And that it would disturb him to be engaged in

something like that. But I think I would

have to say that in our conversations, my

memory of those, at no

time would he rule it

out as

being a

9/11/75, p. 18. possibility.

(0 ' Donnell)

NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 63

---

## Page 64

- 65-

(V)

0 ' Donnell

Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumta by Turning

Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the

Assignment of Agent OJWIiT to Leopoldville as His

Alter Ego

After (Justin O'Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he formu-

lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from

the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

(O'Donnell): (What I wanted to do was to

get him out, to trick him out, if I could,

and then turn him over ... to the legal

authorities and let him stand trial.

cause he had atrocity attributed to him for

which he could very well stand trial.

2:

And for which he could very well have

received capital punishment?

/o'Donnell: Yes.

And I am not opposed to

capital punishment.

pp. 20-21.)*

(0 ' Donnell, 9/11/75,

To implement his plan, @'Donnell made azrangements to rent "aa ob-

servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced.

* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it

was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General

of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was

"JUST

I TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leo|

(Chief

of) Station to Director, 10/11/60) •

to recommend Lumumba's

arrest in the same cable:

STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS

ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE

THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM

SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).

-

NW 50955

Doold: 32202487 Page 64

---

## Page 65

- 66-

(

(0' Donne11), 6/9/75, B. 20).* ('Donnell)also "spotted" a member

of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an

attempt to lure lumumba outside til protective custody (@'Donnell),

6/9175, p. 20: 9/11/75, p. 21) .

(O'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to

CIA headquarters (O'Donnell), 8/11/75, p. 26). lle also said that

he informed the (Chief of Station about his plan (Ó'Donnell), 9/11/75,

p. 56).

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus-

tody, (O'Donnell)arranzed for a CIA agent, whose code name was

QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him

(0 Donne11), 9/11/75,

p. 19):

What I wanted to use him for was

counter-espionagel.]...

I had to

screen

the U.s. participation in this

..: by

using a foreign national whom we knew,

trusted, and had worked with ... the

idea was for me to use him as

an alter

ego.

(0 ' Donnell) Ir., pp. 19-20.)

In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head-

quarters to send QWIN as Soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41267),

Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:

LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE

IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO

LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556),

Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

* A cable from the (chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November

reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese

troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan:

"CONCENTRIC

RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"

(CIA Cable (IN 42478), (Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60) •

NH 50955

Doold:32202487 Page 65

---

## Page 66

-67-

The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about

the "operational circumstances."

(b)

Agent QJIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December

I960

QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background,

recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:

Payments to QWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer (mol

Stiven In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell), 6/9/75,

p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by (silver

to under-

take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."

(CIA Cable (IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip

to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to

his mission:

In view of the

extreme sensitivity of the ob-

jective for which we want him to perform his

task, he was not told precisely what we want

him to do....

Instead, he was told ….. that

we would like to have him spot, assess, and

recommend some dependable, quick-witted

persons for our use.... It was thought best

to withhold our true,

specific requirements

pending the final decision to use

[him].

(CIA Dispatch,

(NON 147, 11/2/60.)

22

* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to

send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-

fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained

in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-

tions that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com-

pleted this mission.

(0 'Donnell) said he had no knowledge of any

mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country

10" Donnell,

9/11/75, PP. 32-33).

Sipa

00955 DocId: 32202487 Page

66

---

## Page 67

- 63-

-

This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained

at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic

necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA

22

Dispatch, (MUPl2-147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable

(I 49436, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe In late December 1960

(CIA Cable (OUT 54710), Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).

The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN

had been recruited earlier by (Agnola Suver?

for use in a special operation in the Congo

(the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be

run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)

However, both (O'Donnell) and Bissell testified that (O'Donnell) re-

fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead,

(o'Donnell) said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba

from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in

the hands of the Congolese army.

('Donne1), 6/9/75, BP. 13-14.

37 .)

According to (O'Donnell), QJWIN was a man who was capable of

undertaking an assassination mission:

(0' Donne11)

I would say that he would not

be a man of many scruples.

Q: So he was

a man capable of doing anything?

(O'Donnell: I would think so, yes.

I: And that would include assassination?

(O'Donnell): I would think so.

(0' Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)

* See Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above.

0955

DocId: 32202487 Page 67

---

## Page 68

- 69-

But (O'Donnell) had no knowledge that QJWIll was ever used for an

assassination mission (p'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).

(O'Donnell) said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA

officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QUIN did

not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 28).

When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent

of that he was performing for @'Donnell), he said:

res, that is possible -- or

it could have been that somebody contacted

nim arter he got down there, that they

wanted him to do something along the lines

of assassination. I don't know.

9/11/75, p. 29.)

But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it

would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent

in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising

officer (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 29).

Despite

''Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line

of responsibility to the (hief of) Station, a cable of Novenuer 29

shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.'

In that cable, the (Chief of) Station reported through the PROP

channel to Iweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to

"PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lunumba's residence

and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUI OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable (IN 49486) (Chief

of) Station to Iweedy, 11/29/60). (O'Donnell) said that he had directed

QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force

whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

(

HIH

50955

DocId: 32202187 Page 68

---

## Page 69

-70-

(@'Donne11) 9/11/75. p.22).

But Lumumba had left UN custody at

this point to

travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This

did not deter QJWIN:

VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN

ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED

DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT

USING AIVY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60) .

It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina-

tion as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters

came through the PROP channel the next day which was also suscep-

tible of interpretation as an assassination order:

SONCUR QUWIN GO STANLEYVILLE

WE ARE

REPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY OJWIL

BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY

FACTORS, HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED

STATES) TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314),

Chief of Africa Division to (Chief of) Station,

11/30/60.)

(O'Donnell) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-

extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I

did."' (Ó'Donne11), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (O'Donnell) said he left the

Congo around the time of Limumba's death in Katanga at the hands

of Consolese authorities. (O'Donnell p. 20.) QUWIN left in

December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities

in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom O'Donnell) had worked

before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the

success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a

HH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 69

---

## Page 70

-71-

specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been

completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey,

1/11/61). (O'Donnell) explained Harvey's reference to the fact that

QJWIN's nission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba

was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for

the mounting of the project

... had become noot" ('Donnell),

9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for

Lumunba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, (O'Donnell'

said: "Absolutely not" (Ó'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not

recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that/O'Donnelly's

return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QUWIN's

mission (ilarvey, affidavit, p. ).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that

QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission

and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November,

there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any

assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved

in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave

no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.

The (Chief of)Station had a "vague recollection" that QuWIN

was in the Congo working for (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of

Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson

Iweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo

NH 50955

DocId:32202487 Page 70

---

## Page 71

-72-

(Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 54-57; Tweedy, 919/75, pp. 54, 61).

William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for

his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities

in the Congo:

I was

kept informed of the arrangements for

QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,

of his presence in the Congo.

I do not know

specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo.

I

do not think that I ever had such knowledge....

If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination

mission, it would have been cleared with me.

I was never informed that he was to be used

for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. >

05

He stated that (snald Sliver

probably wrote the memoranda con-

cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (larvey

affidavit, p. ).

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by

CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE,

a project which included research into a capability to assassinate

foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"

figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents

by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation

of Project ZRRIFLE:

-

* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE,

see Section

infra; on the 'Executive Action Capability."

N#-50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 71

---

## Page 72

-73-

Achold Silver had not previously used

QJWIN as an

assassination capability or

even viewed him as

such.

(Harvey affi-

davit, p.

)

Although Ilarvey also had discussions with(sidney Gottlieb) in connec-

tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that (Gottlieb) never mentioned

to him either QJIN's activities in the Congo or (Gottlieb's own

trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p.

). Harvey had con- i

sulted with Crnold silv

Pabout the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

The (Chief of)

Station in Leopoldville testified that he had

never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project

to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was

"quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities

or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.)

Redgman testified that Arnold Silver)came to the Congo on a counter-

intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss

the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA

and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs

hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold silver

in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial

in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:

IF

... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASIL

CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR

OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)

DocId: 32202487 Page 72

---

## Page 73

- 74-

(d)

Agent, QUi Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE

to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960

The one incident where there is an explicit reference to

assassination in connection with QJWIll involved his contact with

WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.

WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless"

(European/ who was

"a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French

Foreign Legion) (Inspector General Memorancium, 3/34/75.) lie was

sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee

by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling

through the Congo: (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was

assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT

ANY ASSIGIMENI WITHQUI REGARD FOR DANCER" (CIA Cable (QUI 36554),

Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).

The Chief of) Station described WIROGE as "a man with a

rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least."

(Hedgman, 3/21/75, P. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility

agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-

ing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, р. 96.)

Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly. and did not put WIROGUE in

touch with (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector

General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he

received:

-

WH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 73

---

## Page 74

-/5 -

On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa

Division met with him to discuss

tional assignment in Africa Division opera-

connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1

was to be trained in demolitions, smart

arms,

and medical immunization.

In October 1960

a cable to Leopoldville stated that

Headquarters (hadl :.. intent to use him as

utility agent in order to "(a) organize and

conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept

packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute

other assignments requiring positive action.

his utilization is not to be restricted

Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on

December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739), 12/17/60). He was given two

instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;"

and (2) to "spot persons for (a) surveillance team"' of intelligence

assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA

Cable IN 18739), 12/17/60. >

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached

QWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is

described by Leopoldville (Chief of Station Hedgman in a cable to

CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):

NW 50955

QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED

LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH :

AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE QJWIN

SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS.

STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS

PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER

"EXECUTION SQUAD."

WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED,

WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS.

UNDER QWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-

INF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.

•. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED

QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.

THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE

HAD MADE APPROACI LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS.

(CHIEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT

REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION (CIA).

(CIA Cable,

DocId: 32202hepp@hevnhle to Director, 12/17, 60.)

---

## Page 75

=76-

The cable also

expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's

actions:

LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING

AND LACK SECURITY.

STATION MAS ENOUGH HEAD-

ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING

KEEP HIM ST PROBATION, BUT IF CONTENT LAVE

WILLING

DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE

WIROGUE RECALL BEST

SOLUTION.

(CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,

12/17/60.)

WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is

explained by lledgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as

an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

the thief of) Station testified that he had not instructed

WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

I would like to stress that I don't know what

WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution

squad,"

and I am sure he was never tasked to

g0 out

and execute anyone.

(ledgman, 8/21/75,

p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an

execution squad:

His idea of what an intelligence operative

I think, had been gathered by

sort.

(ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

(Justin o'Donnell) had do knowledge of an attempt by anyone

connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 75

---

## Page 76

-77-0-

tion Of VEROGUE (O'Donre11), 9/11/75, pp: 39-42). (O'Donnell men-

tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm

squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than

assassinations:

surveillance teams where you have to go

into crime areas

... where you need a

fellow that if he gets in a box can fight

his way out of it.

p. 36) .

(0' Donnell),

• 9/11/75,

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to

QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Iweedy did recall that

WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo

(Iweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would

"absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against

Lumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt

with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people

in the Africa Division - Iweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn

Fields

¡who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba

was being considered (Iweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The Chief of)station said that if the WIROGUE incident was.

connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted

a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which

this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was

sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much

wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received

concerning the (Gattlieb) assassination assignment, (ledgman, 8/21/75,

102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

HH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 76

---

## Page 77

-78-

WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you

speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 101)

The Chief of

Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition

to QUWIN to join

an

"execution squad" could be attributed to

WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:

-

kind of man that could get you in trouble be-

fore you knew you were

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 96-97).

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:

(I]f you give a man an order and he carries it

In sun, the (chief of Station testified that despite the fact

that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during

this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad"

was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi-

nation plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical

immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility

that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lunumba by means

of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 77

---

## Page 78

- 79--

by the Inspector General'

s office leaves this question open. The

report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of

his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved

in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But,

when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office,

the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one

of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in

assassination attempts:

"ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-

carded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum,

3/14/75)

6.

The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing

About Lunumba's Death in Katanga

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-

ing about Lunumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely

connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that

they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.

(a)

Lumumba's Escape from Un Custody, Capture, by

cove bes 21-December isonment at PhysvitTe:

The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved

in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure

from UN

custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from

the Chiel of) Station to Iweedy on November 14 (ULA Cable Ill 42478.

(Chief of) Station to Iweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, ledgman re-

ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's

POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT

HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINENENT AND PROCEED TO

THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

NH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 78

---

## Page 79

(

- 80-

The Chief of) Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge

of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that

eventuality:

DECISION OIT BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE

SHORTLY.

STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY

AGENT OF DECISION WHEN MADE

STATION

LAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO ÜSE IN EVENI

OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLAITS OF

ACTION.

(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.>

There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually

gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville.

In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's

escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-

stances of Lunumba's departure (CLA Cable (til 48484) Leopolaville

to Director, 11/28/60) .

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether

the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese

troops:

-

[STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]

TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED

[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,

11/28/60.)

A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates

against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese

forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable (IN 10643),

Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).

The (Chief of) Station testified that he was "quite certain that

there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure

NH 50955

DocId: 32202187 Page 79

---

## Page 80

- 81-

from lit custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's

plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64) .

He stated that he consulted

with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might

take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-

ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).

Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) had planned to draw Lumumba

out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he

insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked

by the CIA (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, p. 22) .

Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:

January 17, 1960

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was

kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of

1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba

a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of

CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the

NH 50955

DocId: 32202467

Page

80

---

## Page 81

- 83-

Group

agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily

rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-

tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

(Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)

The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special

Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of Station in Leopold

ville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE

... A HIGI PRIORITY DE OUR COVERT ACTION"' (CTA Cable QUI 62966)

Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU .CAN ACT ON

YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. "

Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-

tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the as-

sassination effort against Lumumba took place - testified that, in

his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group

meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-

sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pP. 33-

34, 61-62; see Section. 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the

primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,

testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,

including assassination, was

to be overlooked in the attempt to re-

move Lumumba from a position of influence (Iweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).

On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Iweedy cabled the Chief of) :

Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters.

Two days later,

in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 81

---

## Page 82

- 84-

Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave

danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th

NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-

tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (Chief of) Station

with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate

Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this

operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that

it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-

tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-

sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified

that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an

assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National

Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit

Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary

of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-

tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism

for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 18-19).

NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos-

sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order

would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-

mism.

Several high Government officials involved in policy-making

NH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 82

---

## Page 83

......i

-94-

7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these

early meetings was vehement:

Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a

person who was a Castro or worse

on to describe Mr. Lumumba so background which les went

"harrowing"

• It is safe to go on the

assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-

ists; this also, however,

fits with his own orienta-

tion.

(NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)

The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-

ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-

mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the

' President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, P. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the

Congo during this period makes it

most likely that Johnson's. testi-

mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series

of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-

ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-

ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.

The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-

ail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:

The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group

consider

"any particular kind of activity which might contribute to

zetting rid of Lumumba' (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this

meeting, DCI Allen Dulles

commented that "he had taken the comments

orously as the situation permits"

see Section 7(a) (iii), infra);

Only" cable under his

HIH 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 83

---

## Page 84

=95=

The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before

the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu

-- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard

the President's statement.

The only other meeting at which Johnson

could have heard the statement by the President was held on

Septem-

ber 7, two days after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,

indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon introduced

* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-

TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE

AND THAT

THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"

(CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to (Chief of) Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-

les cable added:

WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY

.. INCLUDING EVEN MORE

AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT •

ACT ON YOUR SEE AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-

FERRAL HERE.

(CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, supra,

for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters

to the Congo on

extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable

OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of)Station, 9/19/60; see Section

4(a) , supra.

On September 21, in the presence of the

President at

an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave

biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and

formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an

. The (Chief of)

sassination effort (see Sections 4(a) -4(c), supe CIA headquarters

Station stated that he received confirmation

that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section

4 (e) (i), supra).

In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two

position in the State Department

the name of which subsequently

changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently

(Continued)

NH 50955

DocId:32202487 Page 84

---

## Page 85

-107-

on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles

stressed the danger of

Soviet influence in the Congo.

Despite

the fact that Lumumba

had been deposed from his position

as Premier and was

in UN

custody, Dulles continued to regard him

a threat, especially

in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between

Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the

Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet

disposed of and remained a grave danger as long

as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes,

9/21/60.)

Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a

personal cable to the Chief of Station) in Leopoidville which

included the following message:

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING

LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL

POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP (OLDVILLE], SETTING

•HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

(CIA Cable,

OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

On September 26, (Sidney Gottlied, under assignment from

CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 18989),

Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the (Chief of)

Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba,

and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for

this mission (see Sections 4(b) -4(c), supra).

Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote

the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not

interpret Dulles'

remark as referring to assassination:.

NN 50955

DocId:32202487

Page 85

---

## Page 86

- 114-

(.

Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active

in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of

Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political

Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense

James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion

about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, PP. 1-2;

Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75, P. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/3/73).

ic)

Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of

a Specific Recollection,

He "Strongly Inferred"

That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was

Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles

Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level

authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-

lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection

of receiving such'authorization and that all of his testimony

on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,

9/10/75, P. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject

by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed

(Justin o'Donnell) to plan the assassination of Lumumiba (Blasel.

6/11/75, PP. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based

on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating

to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an

assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels

of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,

65) .

NH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 86

---

## Page 87

-115-

As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes

of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the

NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-

templated

at the Presidential level as one acceptable means

of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a) (ii) and S(a) (iji),

supra).

There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the

cable from Allen Dulles to Ene Chief of )station in leopoldville

on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized

Hedgman to take

action without consulting headquarters, was a

direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had

attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell

was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles

cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 12).

Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of

the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated

within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):

It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted

by Allen

Dulles that he regarded the action of

the Special Group as authorizing implementation

(of an assassination] if favorable circumstances

presented themselves

, if it could be done covertly:

(Bissell,

9/10/75, PP. 64-65.)

Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-

dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate

Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62) :

NW 50955

DooId: 32202487

Page 87

---

## Page 88

-116-

S: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower

wanted

Lumumba killed?

Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.

I: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously

through

this

kind of cable?

Mr. Bissell:

Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.

(Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 33.)

As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-

rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell

stated:

. =

I think it

is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles

would have

said either the President or President

Eisenhower

even to me. I think he would have said,

this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I

would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 48.)

When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the

consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-

tion of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had (such)

authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).

When informed about the Chief of station's testimony

about the instructions he rucedved iron (Gocted), Bissell sudd

that despite his absence of a specific recollection:

I would strongly infer in this case that such an

authorization did pass through me, as it were,

if (Sid Gottlieb) gave that firm instruction to the

Station(Chief.) (Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 40.)

Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this

authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).

NH 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 88

---

## Page 89

-117-

Bissell did not recall being informed by (bottlies)

• that

Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there

was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

(Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he

had instructed (gottlieb)to carry poison to the Congo, "there

was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc-

tion without authorization Erom Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 47). Tikewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell (cattlieb)

that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion

that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of)station about

(Gottlieb)'s actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were

fully authorized:

§: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency

and the

..:

that the President had instructed the DCI to

carry out this mission would not have been beyond

the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that

point?

Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,

P. 65).

Bissell further stated:

Knowing Mr. (Gottlieb).

it is literally inconceivable

to me that he would have acted beyond his instruc-

tions.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 41.)

With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell) to "plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

• HW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 89

---

## Page 90

- 1.18 -

(O'Doane22) this assignment" (84s5e12, 9/10175, p. 50). But he

said that this specific assignment was made in the context

that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-

rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see

also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).

HH 50955

DocId: 32202487

Page

90

---

## Page 91

- 1=

that, while he could have created the capability on his own,. any

urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later

appearance, however,

Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of

the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and

not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and

gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he

never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"

that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials/Sidney

Gottlieb

the

new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and

Arnold

SLived)

a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility

of creating a capability within the Agençy for "executive action"

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 52). After reviewing his notes of those

meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial

*As to the date or these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-

"25/1 Sid G' and

"26/1 Sizindicate that he spoke to Sidney

Cottlieb land Agnold Silves in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testi-

fied as follows:

Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and

is about the subject of Executive Action?

Harvey: Yes, it is.

Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that

you have recounted?

Harvey:

this, well, this has

Well, when I first looked at this, I thought

got to be '62, but I am almost certain

now that it is not.

It this is true, this might plice

the

irst discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in carlv

January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were

'61 to the fall

0955

DocId: 32202487 Page 91

---

## Page 92

-

-5-

discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,

might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.

52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he

agreed with Harvey

about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,

p. 10) .

had -- or that bissell had discussed the question of assassi

nation with aruold Silves. and this discussion, at the very

least, had to take place after i

know Bissell

already had

discussed the matter with Silver

allarvey, 6/25/75, p. 52) .

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-

structions to establish an executive action capability:

the first thing I did.

• was discuss in theoretical

terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly

the whole subject of assassination,

our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-

back as you t

our possible assets,

mental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon

of an American intelligence service, and B,

even if you

assune that it 1s, is it within our

capability within

the framework of this government to do

it effectively

and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75,

pP. 37-A, 38).

The Inspector Ceneral's Report connected Blivet) and outlieb to the

early stages of the executive action project as follows:

Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain

aspectsuot the problem with droold Silver and with Sidney

Gottlich

Since Silverwas already cut in, larvey used

him in developing the executive Açtion Capability.

llarvey's mention of him. (Gottliebl in this connection

may explain a notation by Dr.! Gunn that flarvey instructed

Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlich without associa-

ting the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G.

Report, PP. 37-38).

It is evident from the testimony of larvey and Bissell that the turn-

over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed

as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra): Thus, their initiai

discussion of executive action can,

November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to

refer to January 1961.

955

DocId:32202487 Page 92

---

## Page 93

R$:

-18-

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,

6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the

White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November

meeting wich Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, PP. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given

administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three

months later, he did

not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated

as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, P. 55).

Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were

related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Telms testified: "In my

mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However,

Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the

syndicate which had Castro as its target. . . folded into the

ZR/RIFLE project . . . and

they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action

"capability... for assassination" was "used against Castro",

Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey or November 15;

1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas-

ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii)

Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-

ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive

programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

NH 50955

DocId: 32202487 Page 93

---

## Page 94

- 19 -

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent

of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.

potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was

assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent

QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold S1lver)

his

supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey,

as the

03

Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver) worked,

had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch (Auot+147,

11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission

afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,

1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail

in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section _ supra.]

There are two factors which may raise a question as

to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop

an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.

First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,

QJ/WIN,

(Silve

and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumimba matter

and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of

ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of

an assassination capability had already been discussed with

Silver

and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey,

6/25775

p. 52; I.G. Report, PP. 37-38).

Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm

evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate

Lumumba.

HH" 50555

DocId: 32202487 Page 94

---

## Page 95

-4-

- --

5

Documents indicate that consideration was given within

the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.

At a June 21, 1960, meeting with (ra ora

of the CIA

Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly

suggested possible sites for the drops.

(CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held

around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary

of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and

Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.

Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view

regarding "To what extent will the U.s. government participate

in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were

raised by King, among them:

"c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles

or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people

from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to

that question was "yes" (CIA MeMo Of 6/28/50; King affidaviti

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting

Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's

signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,

Rudy Gomez

(1. G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that

a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked

Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate

Irujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does

either recall any proposal for supplying

sniper rifles.

(Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)

DocId: 32202487 Page 95

18501

---

## Page 96

55

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved

Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and

the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom

that the dissidents were

19

... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary

activity

in the foreseeable future except the

assassination of their principal enemy."

(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided

by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary

level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,

his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Deving,

were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,

aware of Dearborn's "current projects."

(pevine) to Dearbarn

letter, 8/15/601*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom

as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank

Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While

serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, (Devine)

reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State

activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that

03

Devine maintained almost daily communication with

and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division

ed Holnany

(Devine, p.7)

*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960

raised concern with the Department and he as advised that certain

specific information should more appropriately come through

other channel" (presumably, CIA conmunications) .

Dearborn was

advised that his cables to

State were distributed to at least 19

different recipient offices. (Id.)

111

DocId: 32202487 Page

96

...i•*

---

## Page 97

have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly

more, and we are not prepared to make them

available.

Last week we were asked to furnish

three or four pineapples for a party in the

ear suture, but I could remember nothina in my in-

structions that would have allowed me to contri-

oute this ingredient.

Don't think I wasn't

tempted.

I have rather specific guidelines

to the effect that salad ingredients will be

delivered outside the picnic grounds and will

be brought to the area by another club.

(Dearkorn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests

in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-

cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the

"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation

grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients

outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, neant to

refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group

order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.

(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

In a March 15, 1961 cable, [chief of station (one) reported

that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue

to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret

no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against

shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-

dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61). The

Station /Chief

then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary

authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had

received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

90955 DocId: 32202487 Page

97

1,;

---

## Page 98

icag

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hgs cable,

3/21/61)

Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols

and

ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station

Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn.

(Hgs. to Station

cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction

Not to Tell Dearborn

owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-

born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that

the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not

something to be unnecessarily discussed.

pp. 78,791

Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew

wen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,

1/29, p. 33)

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol

for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-

sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been

approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area

was concerned for the safety of his family in the event

of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with

a review of these events, concludes that:

"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files

that the pistols were actually pouched.

The request

for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-

sequent request for submachine guns."

(I.G. Report, p. 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March

24, 1961, Headquarters

to Station cable,

which provides:

"c.

Pouching: revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462

(in 20040) on

28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)

DocId: F22024Hat@sdabsbeing pouched. Explanation follows."

---

## Page 99

18

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a

pistol.*

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these

pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA

memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source,

states that two of the three pistols were passed by lowen to

Loreno

• "Timpy" Berr

a United States citizen who was in direct

contact with the action element of the dissident group. It

should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-

ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether

one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols

eventually came into the hands of the assassins

and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the

assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and

Owen

testified that they regarded the pistols

as weadons for self-defense purposes and they never

considered them in any way connected with the then-current

assassination plans. (Dearborn 1/29, p.70: 10900)

Pp. 38,73)

liowever, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the

purpose for which the handguns were sought and

owen

s cable

stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.

(Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that ne asked lowen to

request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 1/29, PP. 30,31) Owe 03

on the other hand, testified that if his cables

requested three

pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three

pistols 03(@wer) p.72)

DocId: 32202487 Page 99

---

## Page 100

cable advising that the pistols were being pouchea is the

very cable which was sent in response to a request by the

dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination

effort which had been previously described to Headquarters.

As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,

if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these

weapons to would-be assassins.

3.

Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by lower and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, lOwen asked

for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber MI

carbines.

The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by

Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations

in Aujust 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred

in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents.

(Dearborn 7/29, PP. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters

cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to

Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

he carbines were passed to the action group contact duez Boar on April 7.

1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found

their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio

de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report

pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and lovemptestified that the

carbines were at'allitimes viewed as

strictly a token show

5

DocId: 32202487 Page 100

---

## Page 101

of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts

03

to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Пoмeр,

p. 39)

c.

Failure to Disclose to State Department

Officials in flashington

There is no indication that the request or the passage

of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in

Washington until

several weeks after the passage. In fact, on

April 5, lieadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn

not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines

and ammunition were being passed

to the dissidents. This cable

031

sent while

@wer was in washington, and it indicated that

upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain

the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-

mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence

witi State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station

to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the

time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De-

partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the

passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

DocId: 32202487 Page 101

---

## Page 102

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a .

Over Requests Machine Guns (for Use

in Assassination

The Station Chief) suggested

that Headquarters consider

pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961

pp. 63,64;

Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again

in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961,

/cabled

a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns

specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic

pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that

delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their

resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly

Identified, in

CANSLI

s cable, as being sought for use in connec

tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to

kill Irujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according

to

Owen "

cable:

"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-

guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in

event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic

job." (Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an

03

assassination was wrong.

owen

was told that precipitious or

uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,

Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create

more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position

that:

...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action

by the internal dissidents until opposition group

and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*,

effect a change in the regime,

and

cope with the after-

math."

(HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

55

DocId: 32202487 Page 102

---

## Page 103

- 22-=

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared

to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when

they developed a capability to received them, but that security

considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*

soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1962, while rewas in Washington

for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in

the Dominican Republic and

"especially on the insistence of the EMOT!l (dissident)

leaders that they be provided with a limited number

of small arms for their own protection (specifi-

cally, five M3 caliber

•45 SMG's)." (CIA memo

for the record, 4/11/61)

b.

Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved

by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver

Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to

pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a

priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used

for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request,

submitted on. behalf of the Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division, further provided:

"B.

A determination has been made that the issuance

of this equipment to the action group is desirable

if for no other reason than to assure

this important

group's continued cooperation with and confidence in

this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier

commitments to the group.

These conmitments took

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised

that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.

05

DooId:32202487 Page

3lS 1

---

## Page 104

te dise ei

in cables from Dearborn and

(Station to HUS cables

85

4/25/61)

On April 25, 1961, Owen

advised Headquarters that

wimpy

had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was

yoing

to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.

Over also reported that this attempt would use the three

carbines

passed from the American Consulate, together with

whatever else

was available. (Ia.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated

that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the

03

dissidents and requested

owen

to advise the dissidents that the

United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with

the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,

Station to HUS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27,

1961,

replied that, based upon further discussions with

the

dissidents, "We doubt statement U.s. government not now

prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from

attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that

an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and

testified that

efforts to carry out the instructions were

unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that

this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit

the convenience of the U.j. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p. 52)

r.--

DooId:32202487 Page 104

---

## Page 105

- 33-

additional

support, coupled with fact ref.

C items [the carbines] already made available

to them

for personal defense; station authori-

zed pass ref. A items (the machine guns) to

opposition member

for their additional pro-

tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQS

to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable

was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-

zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns

as :

• having made already a considerable

investment in this dissident group and its

plans that we might as well make the addi-

tional investment."

(Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

the following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy chief

of the western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted

as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning

covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolpn

Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force

on Latin America.

A serle memorandum of the meeting states that flerbert]

informed Berle that a local yroup in the Dominican Pepublic

wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.

The memorandum continued:

"On cross examination it developed that the

real plan

was to assassinate Trujillo and they

wanted guns for that purpose. Llerbert wanted

to know what the policy should be.

"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo

and that this was the general sentiment. But

we did not wish to have any thing to do with any

assassination plots anywhere, any time. (Herbert

said he felt the same way."

(Berle, Meno of

Conversation, 5/3/61)

HH

50955

DooId:32202487

Page 105

---

## Page 106

-

34

Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;

the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

soth Herbert and Deving, who had been in almost daily

contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised

of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,

luerbext,

alony with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed

cable of May 2, releasing the nachine guns for passage.

c. Special Group Meetings of lay 1 and itay lỏ: 1961

un tire day following the berle fiterbert meating, the

Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new

anti-Trujillo plot.

He said we never know if

one

of these is going to work or not, and asked

what is the status of contingency planning should

the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point

is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed

at a high level in the very near futurè." (Special

Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes

makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed

speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail

Allen Dulles referred to

"recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo

plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was

Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination

attempt potentially utilizing U.s.-supplied weapons.

on May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the

situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

NW 50955

Doeld: 32202487

Page 106

---

## Page 107

- 36.

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary

instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in

advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State mas

approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

Ray terbert)referred to Dearborn's lay 16 request in a

memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be

advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of

the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was

last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the

weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA frOm CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to Herbert 3) memorandun on the same day,

advising herbert that the Department's policy continued to be

negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.

Herbert's)

attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group

limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the

Dominican Republic. A copy of

Devine's) memorandum to literbert)

was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,

to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.

(bevine to herbert) memo, 5/16/61)

Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --

Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,

the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was

considered and it was:

"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would

prepare promptly both emergency and long-

range plans for anti-communist intervention

in the event of crises in liaiti or the

HH 50955

By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that

roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the

fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State

1620432202487/ 6üage 107

---

## Page 108

,..

=: 45.-

NH 50955 DooId: 32202487

fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would

serve very little purpose and expose the United

States to great danger

of association with

assassination attempt."

The cable, as

revised by Goodwin and approved by President

Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept.

to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII.

May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed

and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The

assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the

action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic

and passed on to officials in Hashington at both the CIA and

the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The

assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to

whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy

information as is

available indicates that one or more of the

carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when

Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicat:

however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by

handguns and shotguis.

(I.G. Report, p.61)

B. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul

General Dearborn and Station Chief!

over sent replies, decording

to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable

as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations.

(Dearborn 7/29/75; p. 74).

' :

Page

f;"

108

---

## Page 109

- 46

He interpreted

the May 29 cable as saying:

11

...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate

Trujillo, that is all right.

But we don't want

anything

to pin this on us,

because we aren't

doing it, 1t is

the Dominicans who are doing

it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had

always been his personal belief; thae the U.S. should not be

involved in an assassination and that if an assassination

occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn

7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, owen

did regard the

cable as manifesting a change in

U.S. policy, particularly on

p. 120) He believed the

the questionof supplying arms.

May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter

and consequently felt that the government had retreated from

its prior position, of offering material support to the dissi-

dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunnort.

Owensuresponsive cable to Headquarters stated:

"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already

associated with assassination.

If we are to at least

cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in

assassination preparation must be withdrawn."

(Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

6955

DocId:32202487

Page

109

---

## Page 110

(

SCHNEIDER REPORT

I.

Summary

II. The President's Initial General Instruction

and Background

A. September 15 White House Meeting

B. Background: Tracks I and II

C. CIA Vlews of Difficulty of Project

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

2. Military Solution

B. The Chile Task Force

C. The wise of the Aroy Arcache and Interagency

Relations

D. The False Flag )Base

E. Chief of Station

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

C. October 15 Decision

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

E. The Killing of General Schneider

E. Post October 22 Events

V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II

A. September

B. October

C. December

D. Did Track II End?

Page

1

6

6

8

15

17

17

18

19

20

26

27

29

29

30

.34

36

39

41

43

45

:46

54

54

:!

ake 2017

-

PET

---

## Page 111

-17-

III.

CIA's Implementation of Track IL

A.

Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent

Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S.

Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction

to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup

d'etat in Chile. Although there

was

talk of a coup in Chilean military

circles,

there was little indication that it would actually take place

; without active U.S. encouragement and support.

There was much talk among Chilean officers about

the possibility of some kind of coup...but this

not the kind of talk that was being backed by,

you know, serious organizational planning.

(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1. The

"Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende

victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its

activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.

On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-

tion of power.

Paramilitary legerdemain has been

discarded. Military solution is objective.

(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting

a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency

decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a

successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)

Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the

congress, and proclaim a new election. (A private U.S. citizen who had

been

a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him

-

Atti

---

## Page 112

(with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23))

Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a

another aspect of a quiet and hopefully

non-violent military coup.... This was abandoned

when the military were reluctant to push Frei

publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant

on his own in the absence of pressure

military.... There was left as the only

chance of success a straight military coup.

(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor

Schneider will

act. For that reason any scenario

in which either has to play an active role now

appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower

echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course

be made. This involves promoting Army split.

(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party

convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended

all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18

memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October,

it was

clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be

found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-

ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, consti-

tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,

September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly

unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented

by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence

of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested

in a coup.

A threefold program was set lata mation: Ma pre

--.

---

## Page 113

(

Attrin

•-20-

David A. Phillips,

Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned

back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the

Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head

of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the

task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-

sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to

Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.

(November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the

significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and

Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force des

cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines

has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the

heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-

ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Kara-

messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the

Western Henisphere Divigion! James Flannery, testified that pressure was

"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme."

(Elannery tests-

mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone

through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just

constant, constant....Just continual pressure.... It was coming from the

White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. The Use of the/Army /Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the

Chilean military to carky out its task. However, the U.S. Army, At-

tache in Santiago,

Colonel Paul Wimert,

knew the Chilean military

T:::

stet

-

stet :

-=.

INSTE

---

## Page 114

very well due tò his five years of service there andjhis broad personal

contacts among

the Chilean.officers. Following a proposal by the Chief

of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert

jin collecting in-

telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a

channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support

for a coup.

Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,

the senior military which we had not maintained and did not

have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-

tative in Chile had.... And we got the approval of the DIA to

enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert) in our effort to pro-

cure intelligence.

(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

Io obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a sußfested mes-

sage for the Director of DIA to send to the

Army Attache in Santiago

through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General

Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy

Director Lt. General Jamule M. Philpott to his office on September 28,

1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of

the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized

transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,

his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili-

tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which

might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-

tache of this message, or give them any indication of its

portent.

In the course of your routine activities, act in

accordance with the Ambassador's instructions.

Simultaneously,

I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion

with the CAS chief.

General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of october

10, 1970. General Philpott

Acting DIrector in Bennett's absence.

77747795

---

## Page 115

-22-

This message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis-

cussed with

any person other than those CAS officers who will

be knowledgeable.

CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380

to Santiago)

Ear this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army attache,

the secret CIA communications channel

was used.

Both

General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-

tially the (Army

Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in-

telligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines,

P. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army jActache, however, did

in fact trigger his deep

involvement in the coup attempt. According to

the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the

Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages

ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to

take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army)

Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II

and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did

he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army)Attache.

General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything

connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman

on September 28. (Philpott, P. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roch, who in September and October 1970

was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about

this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing

an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of

Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and

instructions in paragraphs two and three.

-

---

## Page 116

- 23

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on

"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be

helpful in

preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."

(Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,

the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message

of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities

connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting

on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean

generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military

coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.

The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to

Ir. Broe to be sent dy CIA channels,* A message was sent to/col, winert!

that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has

been rescinded.

This action does not repeat not imply

change in our estimate of situation.

On the contrary,

it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can

formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-

tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-

tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters

934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he

followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on

Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that

Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this

message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-

sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert!.

(Roth,

Vol. II, p. )

TOP

WASHR

pir.

!

---

## Page 117

(

-23a -

"any further

action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility

of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions."

(Roth,

p. 8)*

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described

by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is

that I was informed that there

was concern at the highest

U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende,

that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with

the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-

ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of

the instructions or the channels through which they came.

Q. It was your

sense at the time that you were working on a

project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had

the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

*

Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe

be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert)

and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-

cate with Cushman if the need arose.

(Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-

fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would

be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)

FAD OOOR

2 41

for "assi

;:,

---

## Page 118

.a..!

Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department

that the highest level of government usually indicated the

President of

the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

The CIA produced copies of several

messages which identify

Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient.

these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's

purported signature.

(Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General

Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that

it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. Philpott,

) CIA also produced messages of. October 14 (Headquarters 762)

and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General

Bennett to the

Army. Attache.

General Bennett testified he did not

authorize these messages:

It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military

assistance area.

It goes beyond the responsibility which I

had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the

approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert

action of this magnitude. This message would. not have been

signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to

issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi-

mony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-

ing on the issue of Wimert

's Track 1l instructions or responses. A

DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the

present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents

for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth

testified that detailed

memoranda for the record which he prepared on

nis activities are missing fron the files. (Roch, Voll II. P. ›

---

## Page 119

-

142-

CIA officials maintain that they

acted faithfully in transmitting

messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a

message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly

forceful in this regard:

...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central

Intelligence Agency in which

a message was received for an

individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-

ever department, which

was not faithfully, directly, promptly

and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his

duly authorized representative.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the

water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or

among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

We could not remain in business for

a day...if this had been

the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at

all before we would have been found out, a single instance

of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken

place would have put

us out of business.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

De. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's

role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the farmy Attache.

(Kissinger

testimony, p. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the

statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are

four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals

Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their

general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be

contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware

of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to

the lAay lattache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony

but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to

keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and,

after receiving initial authorfty. from General Philpott, co-opted and ordured

---

## Page 120

::-26-

i!

the jaray detache withou further informing any member of the Deparesent

of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to

the sworn testimony of(David Phillips, Willian Broe, Thomas Karamessines,

and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized

the CIA to convey orders to the Army) Attache on the basis of high of

highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff

directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-

formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.

Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The (False Flag Base )

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident

Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a

"False Flag Base,")i.e., to send four state officers to Chile posing as

nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's)contacts

with Chilean military officers!* Given the limitations of the Station's

resources and Colonel Winert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of

"False Flag Officers")

was necessary because "We don't want to miss a

chance."/One of these officers posed as a (bratian intelligence officer

so that "any flap would be a Braztiitandone." (Headquarters 363,

September 27, 1970)

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,

"an unusual practice,

services. (Phillips testineny, PP• 4-49 Egreign intelligence

-

-

---

## Page 121

-27-

The False Flaggers

were compartmented

from each other and reported

separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer|in Santiago

who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the

Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and

not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August L, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of

Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and

the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers..

The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues

and superiors that I did not consider any kind of

intervention in those constitutional processes

desirable.... And one of the reasons certainly for my

last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot

act-which

was done in a very pleasant, but very

intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told

at

be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)

testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Irack II did not go unnoticed.

The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report

should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on

action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters

wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

!:

---

## Page 122

'...

-its

CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key

individuals. One of these was

retired General Roberto Viaux, the General

who had led

the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.

Following the

"Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the

support of many non-commissioned

and junior officers as well as being

the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA

Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July

15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo

Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was

06.00

in league with several other active duty) officers, including Edmiral

(aso tirado, Nawy Commander in Chiel

(oncel Vicento 4, sca, Director,

General, of the carabineso (police) Corps) General" Canales, Direccos of

the Military Academys

and donoral, Joaquin Carcas

O&cond In command,

Air Force

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18,

1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception/of

were in contact with Viaux as well.

**

NH

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-

tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as

an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers

is incomplete.

The record does show, however, that Viaux met with GeneratioG

finertay around October 7: (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12

Viaux

met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One

cable from

Santiago indicates that (Admiral Tirado may have been a member

of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators O6 (Station 545, 16 October 1970)

At the very least, (Pirado)was in contact with Viaux.

06

Although

a distinction can be made between the Vlaux and Valenzuela.

groups,

as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the

principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty

military officers.

The two groups were in contact with each other. The

record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three

Schneider kidnap attenpts.

122122

FER

---

## Page 123

- 30-

There was considerable communication among the various plotting

elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:

•I might add here that it seemed that a good

dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers

were privy to

what was going on in addition to

President Frei and) they were all talking to one

another exchanging views and trying to see how

best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted

to see take place.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B.

Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within

the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-

Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),

but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the

Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,

Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the

Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-

ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,

constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General

Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the

idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the

second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the u.s.

Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.*

(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in

earnest on October S when Colonel Wimert) informed both an Army General

("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup

*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be

prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-

cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-

tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

-

-

---

## Page 124

-31-

U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*

06,.08

Three days later the Chief of Station told

(Ceneral, Huerth, )Cormander,

of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu

tion and

is willing to support it in any manner short of outright

military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October)

General there

informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean

Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 1, (Colonel Wimert

approached members of the War Academy

in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was

(colonel Winert's first contact with the Army (le colonel to whom he

would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.

At this

meeting, the

Colongil) told (Colonel wimert that he and his colleagues

were

trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate

Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send

him out of the country. They had even stud-

ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the

main barrier to all plans for the military

to take over the government to prevent an

Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5

and October 20, the CIA Station and the (Army) Attache--for the most part

the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

In his testimony, (Colonel Wimert) indicated that the

affiliated with General Canales> (Wimert testimony.

Leo

Colonel

IPwas

sent to Headquarters on

' in which the LE. Colonely S'request

for three submachine guns was made,

the Station indicated that (Wimert)

believed the Army officer,

and his companion, a Navy (Captain were in

league with Admiral (ilradà06 (Station 562, October 18)

At another point

Captain end me Army Get Soone) and the As Valenzuela here ved the Na

"There was Valenzuela here and the Navy

(Wimert testimony, p. 107) «The Committee has been unable to determine

the exact affiliation of the Army (Lt. Colonel)o However, as previously

stated, both General (Canalet and Admiral Trado) were affiliated with

General Valenzuela and Admiral Miradoywas in contact wich General Viaux.

06

-

---

## Page 125

- 32-

The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response

to the Wimert-Lt

Colionel

meeting,

Headquarters took note of Schneider's

resistance to coup plans and stated:

...This would make it more important than

ever to remove him and to bring this new

state of events... anything we or Station

can do to effect removal of Schneider? We

know this rhetorical question, but wish

inspire thought on both ends

on this matter.

(Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success

looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

President Frei and the highest levels of the

armed forces unable to pull themselves together

to block Allende.

The Chilean mMlitary's tradi-

tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to

tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's

firm constitutional

stand, and most importantly,

the lack of leadership within the government and

military are working against a military takeover.

(Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning

chances for success."

(Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not

dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux

solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three

days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention

on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing

to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak

Indeed. His own colleagues, Generals (Huerce) and

Valenzuela described him

as "a General without ari army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the

first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for.

carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

Bs33255432

:

---

## Page 126

- 33-

Although Colonel Wimert)

was instructed not to involve himself with

Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he

served initially as a contact to Viaux through an esentine)

military

Attache. The

reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several

hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago

476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that

a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux

should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in

suitable manner

to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if

it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the raise l'lag tase lvas to contace Vlaux,

and it very rapidly relieved wimert and the Asgenting) Attache) of that

task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the

"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand

for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency

was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and

refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."

(Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-

quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000

in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of

U.S. support. (Headquarters, 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider

by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making

statement in early

hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join

Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that

same day was

"Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within

the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup."

(Santiago 527,

-

---

## Page 127

-34-

i'43 Octöber) " This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-

tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela."

(Station 529, 13 October)

At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its

other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was

to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing

coup activity from other military quarters,

specifically an Army General (name deleted),

Idmiralia.

Be the forces in Concepcion and

Valdivis/and perhaps even Frei and(dasa. o6

(Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-

tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with

the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-

erals (imertayand Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander

Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According

to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run-

down on Viaux, the

Samales

meeting with

raGo

and, in some detail,

the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."

(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October

1970) A decision was

made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,

at least temporarily:"

* The reason for Viaux postponing his

coup plans was the subject of a cable

from Santiago to Headquarters:

We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-

tempt because of false Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re-

porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this

weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental

in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met

with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-

tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

-

-

---

## Page 128

-35-

It was decided by those present that the Agency

must get a message to Viaux warning him against

any precipitate action.

In essence the message

should state:

"We have reviewed your plans and

based on your information and ours, we come. to

the conclusion that your plans for a coup at

this time cannot succeed.

Failing, they may re-

duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve

your assets.

The time

will come when you with all your other friends

can

do something

You will continue to have

our support."

(15 October Memorandum of Conver-

sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.

Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure

on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,

after § November, and into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White

House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to

generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-

ing every appropriate resource.

3. After the most careful consideration it was

determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out

by him alone with the forces now at his disposal

would fail.

Thus it would be counterproductive

to our Track Two objectives.

It was decided that

CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against

precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo-

ber)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him

(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other

coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message

concluded:

"There is great and continuing interest in the activities

of

G males

Valenzuela et al and we wish then optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

*

Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not

in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)

that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-

ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

-

-

---

## Page 129

- 36-

D.

Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's

father-In-law

Son October 17. Them lawyresponded that it did not

matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.

(Santiago

533,

17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False

Flagger"

and Viaux's

father-in-la

on October 18, the Agency was in-

formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-

tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."

(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication

with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,

18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter

for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.

As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

Coup possibilities afforded by the active

duty military'group led by General Valenzuela

and Admiral/(Finado) had always seemed more

promising than the capabilities of the Viaux

group.

These military officers had the abil-

ity and resources to act providing they de-

cided to move and organized themselves ac-

cordingly.

(CLA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from

the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in

this direction.

On the evening of October 17, (Colonel Wimert)met with the Army (icea

colonal and the Navy

They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,

*Iwo coup plotters, Generals danalce

and d

06

rat-ln

made one last attempt to

persuade General Schneider to change his

anti-coup position on October 15.

The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco.

Schneider refused to listen to General (males) eloquent presentation of

Communist action in Chile...and adament

In maintaining

his non-involvement

stance."

(Santiago 548, 16 October)

-

-

---

## Page 130

-37-

three '45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy

Copter

said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified

by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to

use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) (Colonel Wimert and the Chief

of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns

for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were

intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.

The fact that the weapons were provided the tie. Colonell)and the Navy

Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing

suggests

that the guns were not involved.

The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-

matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was

puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them

but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captald leading his troops

with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will

try send them whether you can provide explanation or. not." (Headquarters

854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army

Splonel and the Navy Captatil late in the evening of October 18 and con-

sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*

-

-

* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in

Chile focussed on the active duty military officers-Valenzuela, et. al.-

rather than Viaux An example of this shift in focus was the decision to

provide the Army Le. lolonel) and the Army (Capentr the tear gas grenades

originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose

of

this action:

Station plans give six tear gas grenades to

(Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces

officers (deletion) instead of having False

Flag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group:

Our reasoning is that Wimert)dealing with

active duty officers. Also False Flagger)

leaving evening 18 October, and will not be

replaced but (Wimert)will stay here.

Hence

important that Wimert) credibility with Armed

Forces officers be strengthened.

(Santiago 562, 18 October)

Hith

---

## Page 131

-38-0

That sane day, General Valenzuela informed /Colonel Wimert) that he,

General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General

were prepared

to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18

November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General

Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military

dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown

to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado fould

head the military junta, and dissolve Congress.

With respect to the

kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation

but not directly involved. He has been sent to

Vina to stay with prominent physician.

Will be

seen in public places during 19 and 20 October

to demonstrate fact that above operation not his

doing. Will be allowed

to return to Santiago at

end of week.

Military will not admit involve-

ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be

blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 Octobery*

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider

left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard

2)

failed to be withdrawn, but the Army

SocalloneL

assured Colonel Wimert Ichat an~

other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)

Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price

agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

* The "False Flag Officer") who was in contact with Viaux at the time

the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood

that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:

Q. Were you told any of the details of how

the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?

Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be

at some sort of a banquet which the General

(Schneider) would be attending.

(Sarno testimony, p. 37)

17593

405.

---

## Page 132

-39-

but/wimert/insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the

топеу. (Task Force Log, 20 October)

At the same time General Valenzuela

assured Colonel wimert) that the ailitary was now prepared to move.

(Task

Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also

failed and the Task Force concluded

Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having

considerable difficulty executing even the first

step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup

succeeding or even occurring before 24 October

now appears remote.

(Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), (Colonel wimert)

delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army li

Colonel

Lin an isolated section of Santiago.*

Although (Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not

clearly establish the identity of the group to which the be. Colonel

affiliated (see page 31)

Ewo ClA statements on Track II tie the

weapons, and therefore the

LiSo

Colonely

to the Valenzuela group:

...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela

through Schneider's abduction was several sub-

and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus

$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon

demand.

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,

18 November 1970, p. 22)

...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas

guy the send sace, he

masks, were passed to the Valen

zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason

why they still wanted the weapons was because

there were two days remaining before the Congress

decided the Presidential election and the Valen-

zuela group maintained some hope they could still

carry out their plans.

(res Beretong Paper "Special Mandate from the

p. 7, July 15, 1975)

123623007792457224

#:.

F.

-

---

## Page 133

-4U-

At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General

Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the

findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider

killing, neither the Army

ita Collonelynor the Navy Captain

were there.

Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his

way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew

his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand

gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found

that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said

"Military Mission sources claim General Schaeider machine gunned on

way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease

guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously

been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station

was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered

several hours earlier to the Army

Colonel)

Santiago then informed

Headquarters "Station has instructed/Col. Wimert) to hand over $50,000

if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating

that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-

zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

0955

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the

shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led

conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated

in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot

culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year

prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re-

sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-

spiring to cause a military coup.

Also convicted on the latter charge

(were) Generals Valenzuela (and tradig

They received sentences of three

years in exile.

DocId: 32202487

Page

133

-

-

-

-

---

## Page 134

.."

-41-

Station unaware if assassination was pre-

meditated or whether it constituted bungled

abduction attempt.

In any case, it important

to bear in mind that move against Schneider

was conceived by and

executed at behest of

senior Armed Forces officers. We know that

aptain)witting and involved.

We have reason

for believeing that General

Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,

but cannot prove or disprove that execution

or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to

elements linked with Viaux.

Important factor

to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not

retired officers or extreme rightests, set

chneider up for execution or abduction...

I1 we can say is that attempt against Schneide

is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity

to prevent Allende's election if they are willing

(Santiago 598,

F. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-

tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider

as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief

of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile •

Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional

runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile.... The attack

on General Schneider has produced developments which

closely follow Valenzuela's plan.... Consequently the

plotters' positions

have been enhanced.

(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed

and discussed Track II:

It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,

and that now only the Chileans

themselves can

manage a

successful coup.

The Chileans have been guided to a

point where a military solution is at least open to

them.

(Task Force Log,-24 October):

-

---

## Page 135

A. September

September 18

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As

Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a

plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18ch, according to CIA

records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the

conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in

the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con-

cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was

viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit.".

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation

that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar

confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-

man, also attended, although the Conmittee has not been able to review

his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting-and the meetings

of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the

meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet

privately and discuss Track II if chey desired. In all these instances

save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no

evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting

actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa-

tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none

for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no

other such private meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind

aft

ormitte

meeting called to discuss Track I. The two get

E cussed frack II

actions,

especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei.

According to

bir.

-

---

## Page 136

Kissinger told Karamessines that "our

handling of the problem during

the earlier neeting had been perfect

and he added

we were doing fine and keep it up.". (Memorandum for

the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. Ostober

October S

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a

report on how the Station planned

to contact the three Chilean Generals

-rats) valenzueza and part named in a cable of september 30.

(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was

needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,

5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place,

although he had no specific menory of it. (Karamessines testimony,

pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40

Cormittee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger

chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe

evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October.

1970)

In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one

"with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri-

ous action.". The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered

action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan,

supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of

an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)

makes no mention of any previous plots.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 24)

-

-

-

-

---

## Page 137

- 47a -

It seems to me, although the records don't re-

flect it, that there was a meeting in September,

a very brief one, in which I must have been

told that there was a specific program going

underway.

That probably would have been by

Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines

there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General

Haig.

He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number

of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly

very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."

(Memorandum/BUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.

His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

I do know, and I know that from looking at the

record this morning, that Karamessines made a

telephone call to me in which he gave a progress

report.

I recall that.

It was in effect a nega-

tive progress report, that they were just not con-

ing up with it.

(Haig testimony, P. 12)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 138

(

-49--

: Haig

indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along the

substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his

role

at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:

I am

quite confident that, given my own concep-

tion of my sole at that time, that I would have

conveyed that information to

Henry,..

(Haig

testimony, p. 13)

***

Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.

Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of

latitude did you have concerning what you would

pass on to Dr. Kissinger?

General Haig. At that time I would consider I

had no degree of latitude, other than to convey

to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)

October 14

A cable to santiago for (COlonel Vimert

ostensibly from General

Bennett, authorized wimert to select twa Chilean general officers and

convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington

has authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-

tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to

prevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters to

Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in

this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,

for no one else could have given (Wimert) such broad authorization.

Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at

least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)

However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th

cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on

the l0th that little was happening, he would have expected in the

-

;. '

-

---

## Page 139

- 49a -

.iriwaldei.

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-

cuss Track II. According

to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines

gave

a run-down on Viaux, call and (undo and "the general situation in

Chile from

the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux

did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a

successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions

from an unsuccessful coup.

The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5. It was decided by those present that the

Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him

against any precipitate action. In essence our

message was to state:

"We have reviewed your

plans, and based on your information and ours,

we come to the conclusion that your plans for a

coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,

they may reduce your capabilities for the future.

Preserve your assets.

The time will come when you with all your other

riends can do something. You will continue tr

have our support."

6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup

plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-

ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in

Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main

tain the capability for Agency operations against

Allende in the future.

8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note

that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-

sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now,

after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and

into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that

the Agency would comply.

(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.

Karamessines, Gen. Haig.at the White House, 15

October 1970)

TOP

---

## Page 140

-=;-

41%5

meeting on the Sch (sèe below) to have discussed the results of the

" october

14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any

such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14

The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-

:

cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines

gave a run-down on Viaux,:

(ganales) and (lando) and "the general situation in

Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux

did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less--to launch a

successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions

from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5.

It was decided by those present that the

Agency must get a message

to Viaux warning him

against any

precipitate

action. In essence our

message was to state:

"We have reviewed your

plans, and based on your information and ours,

we come to the conclusion that your plans for a

coup at this

time cannot succeed. Failing,

they may reduce your capabilities for the future.

Preserve your assets.

We will stay in touch.

The time will come when you with all your other

friends can do something. You will continue to

have our support."

6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup

plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-

ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in

Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-

tain the capability for Agency operations against

Allende in the future.

8.

The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note

that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-

sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now,

after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and

into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given.

Mr. Karamessines stated that

the Agency would comply.

(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.

Karamessines, Gen.

Haig at the White House, 15

October 1970)

50955

DocId: 32202487

Page

140

-

---

## Page 141

.. 4

-50-

Kissinger, In his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA

memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat

more detailed than he would have remembered.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 52)

He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your

assets, "

Kissinger believed

that the gist of the October 15th meeting as

recorded in

the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA

issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the

October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the

meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive

to preserve the maxi-

mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order

indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous

day, and stated:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

be overthrown by a coup.

It would be much prefer-

able to have this transpire prior to 24 October

but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously

beyond this date....

4. There is greate

and Continuing interest in the

activities of (Giradol Gpoles) Valenzuela et al

and we wish them optimum good fortune.

(Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15ch conversation as "turning off

the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do chem." (Kissinger

testimony, p. 56)

Halg agreed in his testimony.

The conclusions of that meeting were that we had

better not do anything rather than something that

was not going to succeed....My general feeling

was, I left that meeting

with the impression that

there was nothing authorized."

(Haig testimony, p. 13)

-

.i.

Loage

rurther warned that "the US must not appear publicly in

the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends

(Cable, Lodge to larriman, 8/26/63).

NN-54455 DocId:32202467

Page 141

---

## Page 142

- 5 -

In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief ofistation John Richardson)

reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-

heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They

accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and

would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions"

• (I. G..

c, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his

brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America

in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids.

and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation

that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South

Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, P. 212).* Later on that

same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers

Conein and /Spera

were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,

respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,

but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial

action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action,

Win DE losE' (SAIG 0304), 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized

Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United

States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,

but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-

rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,

8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge

on the same day stated:

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge conplained that the VOA broadcast

" had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating

"the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise."

Lodye further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in

the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends"

(Cable, Lodge to liarriman, 8/26/63) .

HH 50955 DooId:32202487 Page 142

---

## Page 143

-8-

against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be

identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly

approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, PP.215-]16)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a

coup was

being planned, and requested assurances of American

support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of

action, one of which was the assassination of dien's brothers,

Whu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

The (Actiny Chief of the CIA)

(Station, Davia

cabled on

October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set

ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the

other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a

protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

"(we certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,

approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other

hand, we are in no way responsible

for stopping every

such

threat of which we might receive even partial linow-

ledge.

We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.

We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this

matter opens door too easily for probes of our position

interes tod En

re others, re support of regime, et cetera.

Consequently

believe best approach is hands off. However, *He naturally

interested in intelligence on any such plan."

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon

by various military units and direct confrontation between military

units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted

this cable

for McCone.

Colby testified:

"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director

personally opposed any involvement by the

CIA in an assas-

sination?

"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

DooId:32202487 Page 143

---

## Page 144

- 9 -

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and

the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was

to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was

going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but

to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the

United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,

p. 62). McCone testified:

"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-

pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning

Diem and his

conduct.

I urged him to try to bring all

the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to

encourage more support throughout the country. My precise

words to the President, and I remember them very clearly,

was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball

team, I had

one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether

he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that,

if Diem was removed we would

have not one coup but we

would have a succession of coups and political disorder

in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed

it did."

(McCone,, pp. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with

the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go

or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing .

that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation

(McCone, pp. 62-63). Mecone cabled (scion october 6:

"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to

ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone

instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con-

doning such course of action and thereby engaging our

responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DC!

Trueheart was also present when original reconmendation

was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's

Instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart.

Ambassador

Lodje conmented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon

to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/1/631

55

DocId:32202487 Page 144

---

## Page 145

3050 Done cat:

-14-

None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or

indirect involvement of the United States.$

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge

notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders

for

evacuation, and

suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation

(Saigon Station Cable No. 2036), 10/30/63) :

Conein was charged

with obraining the airplane..

Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting

Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not

are te rest hon

pe possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,

since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified

that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country

that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in

any other country.

There were no aircraft immediately avail-

able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country

of asylum (Conein, p. 54) .

05

DocId: 32202487

Page

145

---

## Page 146

- 17 г:

1433

isf

United States

"as (al matter of general policy cannot condone

assassination"

although he did state that if the coup succeeded;

the United States would support the plotters.

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and

testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference

that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.

It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"

Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC

and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo,

Bissell's representation to [Göttlieb about "highest authority"

and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support

an inference

that the President and the Special Group urged

the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President

to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,

as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization

which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record

of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of

others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's

national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief off

Station and Gottlieb|were under the impression that there was

Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 146

---

## Page 147

1-оДі

-17A-

this impression was derived solely from/Gottlieb'sumeetings

with Bissell and Iweedy. Neither (Gottlieb nor the Chief of]

Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements

about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed

that such

authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,

but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when

this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and

DCI Dulles knew

about and authorized the plot to assassinate

Lumumba.

However, we are unable to make a finding that

President Eisenhower

intentionally authorized an assassination

effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty

in the evidence.

NH

50955

DocId: 32202487

Page

147

---

## Page 148

Modes

- 19-

First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a

matter which is not certain.

Second, it assumes that Dulles

went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action

which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than

Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of

plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third,

it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand

from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was

being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the

Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not

able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent

with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit"

approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary

to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men

closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order

to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against

Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the

Presidents in the Castro case.

First,

the Lumumba case would

imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such

matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously.

Second, the Lumumba

example indicates that the President would discuss

openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be

approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's

Prappropriate for

testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had

old Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have

told anyone else of that fact.

Yet Gottlieb'S testimony in the

Lumumba case states that he had been told öf Presidential

autho-

rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he

was told by Dulles.

HH 50955 DooId:32202487 Page 148

---