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176-10033-10151

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10151

RECORD SERIES : Church Committee

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM : Bissell

TO : Bundy, McGeorge

TITLE : Briefing Paper/Dominican Republic

DATE : 2/17/1961

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE : Paper, Textual

CLASSIFICATION : Declassified

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 3/28/2001

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

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MEMORANDUM FORE

MR:

UND Y

Per your request

RICHARD M BISSELL

17 Februar

(DATE)

TO. 10: 10I JAN 1952

SANITIZED MK: 98.84%04

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BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I. Situation

Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960

U.S. Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-t. S. sentiment

of the GODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets

outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to

extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets

Sat the in protest

bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling

for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy.

The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower

as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining

a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see"

attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding

the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.

On 26 January the GODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul

James A. McNamara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks

about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in

retaliation and anger over

the belief that the U. S. had provided information

to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President

Batencourt.

It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the

sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in

March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations.

Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if

they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are

circulating in Cludad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall

the GODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S.

consular relations.

II Operational Summary

A. General It will be recalled that on 2l January 1961 the

Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican

groups with limited arms and equipment provided their delivery to elements

within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans.

Immediately

following this decision we indicated to witting leaders of the VRD

(BETANCOURT - FIGUERES - ORNES Group) and the FCP (Internal Dissident

Group withwhom DEARBORN is in touch) that we were prepared to provide them

a limited supply of arms and equipment provided they developed the

capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.

On 27 January Station Caracas was authorized to inform

President BETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and

technical guidance to VRD activities directed by Horacio ORNES,

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=2-

za

specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locating

sites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the political

organization of the VID and propaganda. On 30 January Station Caracas

was authorized to inform BETANCOURT that Headquarters was prepared

to consider providing arms and equipment to any bona fide resistance element

with whom adequate contact can be established. BETANCOURT was to be

encouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered useful

to further objectives of the project.

Station Caracas reported that President

EETANCOURT was gratified to receive the above infornation.

In Headquarters contact with FCR exiled leaders, they disclosed

their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were

provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation

devices.

They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability.

On the other hand the VRD, while claiming no internal organization, claimed

a sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments of President

BETANCOURT and Jose FIGURES.

E. Frente Civica Revolucionatia (FCR)

(1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders of

the FCR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadre

in Puerto Rico.

It is contemplated that they will develop maritime

capability, be in touch with their internal counterparts through

/I facilities; and develop plans for implementing the internal group's

plan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with the

ORNES Group (VRD) and in the interests of security we plan to keep

them compartmented for the time being.

(2) Through our Station in Ciudad Trijillo we are attempting

to ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay-

behind communication capability.

C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)

(1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the ORNES group) in

epairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an arms deliver:

capability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to complet

this work.

Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.

(2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda and

organizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope that

the VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information within

the Dominican Republic.

D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability

(1) During the summer of 1960 WH Division made use of Fernando

MUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head of the

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Syndicate of Free Dominican Labor in Exile (SLTDE), to organize picketing

activities in San Juan against Ships carrying cargo to or from the

Dominican Republic. The picketing had some success and showed promise of

becoming a threat to the Dominican economy, but was finally broken up by

eat renan: A rocket.

the International Longshoremens Association (ILA), at least one officer

of which was reportedly in the pay of Trujillo.

(2) Inasmuch as the ILA has recently abrogated its contract

with the Dominican unions under pressure fron George Meany it is felt that

now would be a good time to consider resmiption of picketing activities. in

San Juan, in the hope that such action might spark similar activities in

other ports. Trujillo has demonstrated an awareness of the importance of

smooth labor relations in foreign ports and it is felt that a blow

at this time from international labor would do much to bring the

dictator to his knees.

(3) It should be noted that the Department of State last sunner

disapproved any approach to U. S. unions on this subject.

that perhaps this announced policy should now be reviewed in the light of

more recent developments and an attempt be made, through covert channels

1l necessary, to build up an international shipping boycott against the

GODR.

III Conclusions

(1) In many respects initial talks with FCR and VRD leaders

reveal that they over-estimate their own capabilities. Neither has an

immediate capability to introduce arms into the area or a firm plan of action.

(2) That we have indicated to both organizations our willingness

to help has been a boost to their morale and has also precipitated a

noticeable withdrawal from earlier claims of "all we need is arms and :

little help and we can do the job".

(3) Recent reports on internal conditions in the Dominican

Republic clearly point out that the country is rapidly approaching a

stage of complete economic paralysis, a situation that has created

feelings of tension and desperation, not only among the oppositior

elements but within the ranks of the Trujillo clique itself.

within the middle class express fears of eventual liquidation of that

class by the dictator and his son Ramfis, it 1s not likely that Trujillo

will move until he lears of the outcome in late March 1961 of congressional

action on the windfall sugar quota.

If such action is favorable to

Trujillo, it is probable that he will continue to rule uneasily for an

indafinite period unless material outside pressure is brought to bear

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against him. If, however, his windfall is taken from him, it is the

firm opinion of this Division that a violent reaction on his part will

shortly thereafter be felt which will end either with the liquidation of

Irujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll-up of the internal opposition.

While the organization of delivery capabilities described elsewhere in this

memorandum is proceeding according to schedule, it is now feared that

these capabilities will not be ready for use until the appropriate time,.

i.e., prior to 1 April, has passed and until there may no longer exist

internal assets with which to deal. WH Division, therefore, recommends

that consideration: be given to the immediate use of sea capabilities

now employed by WH/4 to cache the requested arms and other material

on land areas contiguous to the Dominican coast from whence, as informed

FCR elements claim they can do, infiltration of the arms can be carried

cuit by members of the internal FCh by the use of fishing vessels:

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