CUBA, THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - FIRST DRAFT
Originator: JCS
From: V.H. KRULAK
To: SERVICE, OSD, JOINT STAFF
Document date: 03/13/1963
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10001

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

6/24/201

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10001

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: JCS

FROM:

V.H. KRULAK

TO :

SERVICE, OSD, JOINT STAFF

TITLE:

CUBA, THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES - FIRST DRAFT

DATE: 03/13/1963

PAGES:

14

SUBJECTS :

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - INTELLIGENCE

SHARING

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS:

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. First draft of paper on the exchange of intelligence concerning

communist subversive activities.

NO JONT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

MAR 2016

DATE:

JFKRew.ON

Department of the Army EO 13528

i Declassify # Exclude

D Exempt

• Refer To _

Review Date 12/U615 Bywell CelluC

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBA SUBVERSION

Draft as changed

at 1330 Mut.

063

13 March 1963

TO SERVICE, OSD, AND JOINT STAFF CONTACI POINTS:

This is the first draft on the exchange of intelligence.

Section II on the Nature and Scope of the Problem possibly

should be shortened.

Your comments are requested by 0900, 14 March 1963.

V. H. KRULAK

Major

General, USMC

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FIRST DRAFT

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting the many forms of Castro-Communist

subversion now pursued throughout Latin America frem the

Communist base of operations in Cuba, there is a funda-

mental requirement for intelligence - a requirement which

involves not only the timely acquisition and processing of

Information, but also its rapid dissemination, on a select-

Ive basis, to those who need to know. Efforts are now

being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to

Improve Latin American intelligence systems. Success thus

far has been limited. This effort must be vigorously con-

tinued. It is not with this problem, however, that this

paper is primarily concerned, but rather with that of

exchanging essential Information among those who need to

know 1t. A greater degree of Inter-American cooperation

1s required in this regard than has hitherto been achieved.

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II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

There are many legitimate inhibitions which tend

to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an

international basis, even among allies. National

privacy with regard to the inner workings of an

Intelligence system must be preserved. Further com-

pounding the problem insofar as Latin America 1s

concerned is the divisive influence of the long

history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and dis-

putes which have characterized relations among the

many nations concerned. The wounds of past con-

flicts among pairs and groupings of nations are

by no means completely healed. For example, there

is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador

deriving from their boundary war in which Ecuador

Lost a vast area of its territory: Chie and

suca acces

Bolivia continue at odds over them sattal dis-

pute, and, even now, Nicaraguan Insurgents are

harbored within the borders of Costa Rica.

/It

could hardly be expected that these countries

lager

would be peone to exchange Intelligence.c

to the

sea

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Latin America is not a homogeneous entity in

ethnic,

social, political, and economic background,

and there is a great variety of attitudes toward

the Castro-Communist subversive menace. A com-

pletely unified approach toward exchange or intell-

igence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot

be regarded as practicable.

The realities outlined above indicate that

multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached

on a strictly limited basis. It should not be

concluded, however, that nothing of value can be

done multilaterally. With proper definition limit-

ing the problem of exchange to matters directly

related to communist subversive activities, such

as the movement to and from Cuba of subversives,

the production and movement of propaganda materials,

and the movement of arms, it should be possible

to encourage a greater degree of cooperation, It

1s important, in this regard, to draw a sharp dis-

tinction between intelligence gained by covert means

and information obtained openly.

The former involves

the requirement to protect national secrets as to

sources and methods employed: The latter, which can

be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of

compromise.

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An additional impediment to intelligence exchange

is the low level of competence of most Latin American

intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure

means of communication, and the complete absence of

adequate security systems.

Security consciousness

18 not a Latin American characteristic

The lack of

security safeguards must necessarily limit the ex-

change of intelligence obtained covertly by any of

the nations involved, and particularly the United

States, which has the most sophisticated system and

hence the greatest need for protection.

The governments of some countries, of which

Guatemala is a good example, have little desire to

develop a competent career security service. There

is a fear that the existence of an efficient service

would constitute a threat to further activities of

members of the existing governments at such time as

they might find themselves out of power. Moreover,

many Latin American intelligence services display

a tendency to yield to the temptation to label as

"subversives" those of their own nationals resident

in other countries who are opposed to the existing

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government. These considerations limit the possi-

bilities of large-scale multilateral cooperation

in the Intelligence field.

2. Current Exchange Arrangements

At present there is little or no organized ex-

change of intelligence among the Latin American na-

tions. There is a limited amount of informal ex-

change, often on a basis of personal relationships

of government officials having a community of in-

terest with respect to a particular matter.

The Central Intelligence Agency has established

working liaison arrangements in some Latin American

countries where such relations have been considered to

be in the best interest of the United States. Most

of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin

America available to the CIA

1 is derived from covert

operations or through contacts with another intelli-

gence or security service. This inhibits the pass-

age of such information to agencies of a third coun-

try. There 1s, however, a substantial amount of

Intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive

sources which can be provided to other countries.

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In 1962, for example, CIA received information re-

ports from 26 services with which liaison is main-

tained in Latin America and released reports to 35

recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included

collated studies, weekly intelligence

reviews,

name

traces and travel reports.

The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral ex-

changes of Intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and

Venezuela: In-

formation provided by the Army has been concerned

with subversive personalities, communist infiltra-

tion, weapons movements and related matters. Re-

ciprocal intelligence received has been of minimal

value.

The Army also provides selected informa-

tion on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile,

Guatemala and Mexico, although there is no recip-

rocal arrangement. The attaches of other U.S.

Services practice limited exchange on a selective

basis.

Some information has been released from time to

time to Latin American countries by the Commander-in-

Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the

Military Groups.

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As yet, however, the program for the provision by

United States agencies of information on subversion

to Latin American governments has not been developed

to an adequate degree

bosses the delt, quot on sape 21t385:

as well as the only secure and reliable means of

rapid communication throughout Latin America (current-

ly in process of improvement), the development of an

integrated United States system for bilateral ex-

change offers the greatest possibility of achieving

the results desired. United States experience in

the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America

and in other areas of the world has led to the

conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more

fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as

those established within the framework of NATO,

CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience

has shown also that multilateral arrangements can

be of some use, particularly in creating an aware-

ness of the need for intelligence exchange.

The concept of an exchange of information among

members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities

has been put forward on numerous occacions at ofs

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Statas

contribution

Inter-Anerican neotings, but has not been implemented,

largely for the

roasons set forth in section II-1*

Under the Punta del Mate docisioas the OAS menboys were

waged to cooperato in strengthening thoir capacity to

counteract throats or acts of sasrossion, subversion

other dengers to pence and socurity. The Council o8

tho CAS 1s chargod with maintainine vigilanco ever

Castro-communist sabversion

310d

= "Special Consultativa

Committee on Security (MCCS)* is established to give

technical advice to soveramente and the Council en

requeas on sotters rolating

to subversion,

All Agerican

govarasents have beon askad to furnish intornation on

Castro-Connnist sctivities

to serve as the

basle for

studios and toconcendations by the Council of

the DAS

how to counteract them:

since the Punta del Bsto

• nooting

i steady, progasss in

Tu This Clold which tho Latin American countride continue

to rogard as primarily one of donencle jurisdiction.

This brked sunnery serves

to illustrate that thors

is such room for expannion of bilateral intolligence

exchange erzangonents anong

the Latin

Амся

rule

Amonican

Cal awhius

+CIA

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and other Inter-American meetings, commencing with

the Inter-American Conference

at Bogota in 1948.

At Punta del Este In 1962, OAS members were urged

to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to

counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion

or other dangers to peace and security. More

recently, the Council of the AS established the

"Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)"

to consider the specific resolutions on security

problems adopted at Punta del Este. The SCCS has

requested all American governments to furnish in-

formation on Castro- Communist activities to serve

as the basis for studies and recommendations by the

OAs on the nature of the threat and means of dealing

with 1t.

These actions by the OAS have yielded little

or nothing in terms of concrete results. The in-

dividual Latin American countries have shown little

Inclination to proceed with implementing actions

pursuant to the resolutions adopted.

This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral in-

telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

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American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best, as well as a need to create an expanded

program for bilateral intelligence exchange be-

tween the United States and individual countries,

and finally, a requirement to delaht the possibila-

ties of a multilateral approach within the recog

nized limitations involvea.

III. Actions Reconmended

1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in-

telligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US Agencies

where it 1s found possible to establish appropriate

arrangements for the exchange of selected information

consistent with security requirements.

2. Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Com-

mand and Caribbean Sea Frontier headquarters for fur-

ther dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in

conjunction with the Military Alerting System, for

apid processing and dissemination

mere intelligence or

subversive activity directly to the countries concerned

through the American embassies therein.

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3. Increase and expedite the existing flow e? in-

telligence on subversion from CIA and the other ele-

ments of the American Embassies in Latin America to

Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquariers

for

further dissemination as appropriate.

4. Increase the dissemination to Latin American

governments, by all US agencies concerned, of unclassi-

fied studies, reports and other non-sensitive informa-

tion concerning Communist subversion.

5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in

Cast.nt

bilateral exchange of Intelligence on Communist sub-

versive activities.

6. Continue the development at high priority of U.S.

communications in Latin America.

7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. in-

telligence advisors to Latin American countries.

8. Intensify and Increase existing AID, CIA, and

Military programs for the training and equipping of

Latin American internal security and intelligence ser-

vices. Establish such programs in additional countries

where it is found to be in the best interests of the

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United States and acceptable to the country concerned..

wend discourse sher pose

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DEGRAL

Undortake action in tho 0A5 to stimulate

gorcensents to

koop the Council and the SCes fully

Infozned on a continuing basis of the nature and incidenco

subversive activities la thoir respective countries.

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9. Undertake action in the

OAS to establish a

standing committee of representatives of intelligence

and security services for the purpose of receiring,

processing, and disseminating information on Cban-

Communist subversive activities. (It is visualized

that this committee would perform, dn a continuing

basis, functions

similar to those undertaken by the

Special Consultative Comnittee on Security (SCOS),

but would not serve as an intelligence center for the

immediate processing and dissemination of intelligence).

Introduce -

to termal security problem

Balbit other titt action

ite gear

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