Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCSGO
To: COLBY, WILLIAM
Document date: 06/20/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

Date: 08/04/95

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10019

RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 05-H-03

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO

FROM

COLBY, WILLIAM

TITLE

DATE : 06/20/75

PAGES

82

SUBJECTS : COLBY, WILLIAM

VIETNAM

DIEM, NGO DINH

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John

Assassination Records

collection Aet of 199

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DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

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ORIGIRAT

Volks Or

t0:01

Thr Muitra Statra Srnate

ION

R360

Report of Proceedings

IAVINTORIIO

oN_

8/22/17

5.2

Hearing held before

senato Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Motivitles

Friday, June 20, 1975

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste

turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 844-6000

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317.064

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WARD A PAUL

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CONTENTS

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TESTIMONY OF

William E. Colbyi

÷ Director of Central Intelligence;

--accompanied by"s

Assistant to the Director and

George Li.: Cary, way

Legislative Counsel

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COMMITTEE: MEETING

Fridayn Tune 2001975

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United States Senate,

Select. Committee to Study Governmental

Operationg with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m.,

in Room S.407, The Capitol, Senator John Tower (Vice-Chairman)

presiding.

Present:

Senators Tower (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Schwelker and Mathias.

Also present;

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief

counsel; Charles Richou and patelek shea, profossional stars

Members.

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C..2000}

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Ares 202)

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Senator Towers, We will comer to order

Mr. Colby, thank you for appearing this morning. You

understand that the bath that you previously had taken

before this committeels still binding on, you and you are

still regarded as being under oath?

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM ESCOLBY, DIRECTOR

SMART

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED: BY:

ENNO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR,

weeneate

AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

MI. Colby.

I do.

Senator Tower. You understand that?

MI. Colby.

Right.

Senator Tower:?, Today' we will proceed on the matter of

the assassination of Diem in 1963 and i think that the

Director would like

to proceed in narrative form.

so we will

MASA

allow him to proceed as he wishes,

then submit the questions

from counsel and members of the committee.

Mr: Colby::: I might just precede the questioning by

a general statement which I can make off the top of my

head because I was very closely involved in those days with

Vietnam.

I served in Vietnam as the Deputy first and then the

Chief of Station from February 1959 to June 1962. When I

returned from Vietnam I became Chief of the Far Eastern.

Division of CIA, the division which dealt with the operations

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in vietnam, and remained in that position. until 1968.

I think it can be bald thatS problend ith gopoet.

to President Diem began to grow in the United States

10.77

the growth of the Communist infiltration and insurgency

22248

in. Vietnam and the consequently degree of attention that it

got from our press.

This focussed particularly on the weak-

nesses of the diem regime and some of the misdeeds Involved

in it.

There was a high degree of criticism and our yovernment

was faced with the problem of supporting a regime against

Communist insurgency that had defects and this gave our

government a problem as to its position with respect to such

a government and such defects.

There was concern in the executive branch and in the

Congress and in the public about this whäch dominated the

discussion of our policy toward Vietnam.

My role in this was to provide Intelligence from Vietnan

when I was there and to continue to assure that intelligence

was provided from here.

A good deal of: the intelligence critical of the regime

stemmed from our reporting from

clandestine. sources.within

the government and the business socicty of South Vietnam,

but I confess that my assessment as distinct from the indi-

vidual reports sent in was that the Diem regime was about

as good a regime as you are going to likely get in the circum-

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stances of, the time and in the situation it faced

In my position at chico tation shad a arcad

deal to do with President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who

was acting as his special adviser and with particular concern

for political matters and general advice on the development

of the war. And in my extensive conversations with Mr:

Nhu over the years we together discussed the counter-insurgency

problem and how it should be organized ai

and what kind of

strategy. should be applied and we very

much agreed that the key

to it was to build strength at the local village and hamlet

level to engage the population in the battle so that the

Communists did not take the battle at that level and pull

the rug of: support out from under the government and under

the military.

station and our Agency launched'a number of programs

of thisnature in Vietnam of supporting the growth of the

local village defense in the early sixties. We developed,

as. I remember, something on the order of some tens of thou

sands of armed villagers up in the high lands, down in the

Delta, and various other places, and these became experimental

models for the development of Mr. Nhu's concept of this

strategic hamlet...

He then documented the strategic hamlet

as a concept and imposed it upon the Administration of

Vietnam with his brother, the President's, full support,

began the program of the strategic hamlet There was a

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considerable degree of fakery involved in the reporting which

was known to the government. They knew it wasn't all it was

cracked up to be, that the administration itself was

Inclined

to. look for paper results and visible appearances rather than

the reality of involving the population in the fight but

nonetheless, as a big program and as.a long-term which must

be the nature of such a program, it was a beginning and it

my Her 9r

02640326802

began to have an effect. It was formally begun in the fall

of 1961, and about a year or year and a half later it began

to show some results and begun to pick up some momentum.

•At this time the government had troubles with the

Buddhists which broke out in a riot up in northern Vietnam,

In Hue, a riot in which a grenade was dropped and there were

various allegations asito who dropped: the grenade.

The Buddhists went into essential opposition to the

government during this period.:: You will recall 'it was

particularly marked by the self-immolation of one of the

Banzis in a fire that he poured gasoline on himself.. This,

of course, was a dramatic presentation. of the fact that there

were a lot of people opposed to President Diem "In Vietnam:

and this raised this particular political problem for our

government as to the degree to which it should support

President Diem.

The issue grew during the summer of 1963 in the United

States Government, essentially dividing the government into

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two positions.

Certain people chand I willidentity

which departments and agencies later i but certain believed

that the Diem regime was both reprehensible and would arouse

such opposition from, its own people that it would be impossible

for it to

rally the necessary support to win the conflict against

the Communists.

They held this position in good faith.

The other people belfeved that there was enough going on

In the countryside where the roar world was being rought,

that these political issues were essentially educated city-

urban problems and that the basic. conflict in the countryside

was gradually being: built through the strategic hamlet

program and other programs to other counter-insurgency pro-

grams and that the key to the problem was our interest in

supporting Vietnam against a Communist insurgency and a

Communist takeover,

and that that part

of the war seemed to

be moving along with problems but; nonetheless, seemed to be

moving along, and that we were not apt to get a better govern-

ment if we went into any change of government or opposed the

government.

There was very little doubt following the general con-

sensus of policy at that time that it was in the United

States' interests to help preserve a free South Vietnam

as

against a Communist takeover in South Vietnam.

But this

debate waged in the United States government. all during the

summer of 1963.

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Essentially the Defenser Department, and CIA, particularly

John McCone, with myself, operating as chis principal assistant

for this question,took the position that the main war was

In the countrysided that taid, not. seem to be going too

badly, they had serious political problems in the center, but

that it was in the United, States! interest' to continue to,

Ma.091

19202

support the war against communist takeover in the countryside.

the opposition to that position was primarily indicated

885-20

In the state Department and to some extent in the National Secur

Ity Council staff, which belleved that it would be impossible

to carry on the war under the

degree of political upset and

dissidence that the government in Vietnam faced, and conse-

• залі

quently, we should look into alternatives.

InAugust of 1963, CIA was asked by our government to 100k

into whether. the generals would run a coup and we went out

RYA.

and we made contact with several of the generals.

senator Tower. Would you field at that point?

MI. Colby. Yes, s1r:

senator Tower.:

You were head of the station there up

through 1962, 19: that right?

Mr. Colby.: Yes, sir; through June of '62. -- May of '62.

Senator Tower. You were back in the Agency?

I was back in Washington from there on.

MI. Colby:

Senator Tower. What wasyour position?

Mr. Colby. Chief of the Far, East Division, which was the

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operational division dealing with the Far East, and Including

vietnam; of course:

The August search to find out whether the generals

would run a revolt against Ngo Dinh Diem and replace him

turned out, after ve;consulted varlous of them, ve were told

it was not feasible, they were not going to do it, and this.

4 203

probe then was closed off at, the end of August, more of

less, or early September:

We are pretty sure that some of our probes came to the

attention of Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu and he knew we were looking

around in this and this intensifled the attention which existed

between the government and the United States.

You will recall also at that time when we were

changing our Ambassador from Ambassador Nolting to Ambassador

Lodge that the government took the intervening week or

two, the one was gone and the other had not arrived, to raid

the Buddhist pagotas and essentially! suppress

the Buddhist

dissidents.:. This followed the example applied by President

Diem to a similar suppression of religious sects which were in

opposition to him in 1955.

He went out and suppressed this

kind of activé dissidence justifying it in his mind 'and publicly

as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime

situation which the country was faced with.

There was a question of whether he was effectivein

suppressing it or whether it'had so adversely affected his

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image

Where: In the United States and had 6o, Intensified the

feeling of dissent within the educated class in saigon and

in the cities that he had weakened himself rather than

300-406104

strengthened himself;

but that was the political/evaluation

of that Issue that you would have to make during that pertod

As I said;late.in::August.a.telegram was.sent.out. by the

state Department, one Saturday afternoon, which was taken by

Songs 202326x24061

the mission in Saigon as' a directive to go ahead and plan

for the overthrow of President Diem.' This has been covered

in various publications, memoirs and so forth, during that

period.

I was not aware of this telegram before it went out. I

was somewhat shocked to find out that it had gone out with what

appeared to be very little consultation around Washington,

but at that point it was policy because it was stated that

that had been approved by Hyannis Port, was the reference point,

that the policy, the general policy. But as I said, our

problems at that time came.out

to nothing and there was

continuing debate as to what should be done or what could

be done about this.

In the meantime, the generals that we had talked

to

and we had contact with, and through one of them: the principal

figure was a Mr. Conein, I think you are going to receive.

testimony.from -- was a CIA officer who had served in Indochina

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some years' before and had met. various of these generals when

they were young öfficers and had a very good personal

relationship with them.

iwe maintained him there as a way of

maintaining liaison with the significant peoplesin. the

L Scare

Vietnamese picture. "He was told that they would come back

to him if the generals decided to move and the policy how-

1 Ben

ever, of the United States was under continuous debate, düring

September and October.

There were debates and messages exchanged back and forth

to Saigon. Many of the more sensitive messages were sent

through CIA channels but were actually composed and written

or policy stated, whatever, through a joint governmental

approach toward it involving the highest officials.of.the

State, Defense Department and. the White House in this continu-

ing debate and discussion as to what to do

There are some very clear: indications of our policy

in these cables but also in the

open

a lot of things were

done. These were done with the rationale of putting

pressure on President Diem and the government to particularly

remove Ngo Dinh Nhu from the country to bring about certain

changes of policy in the Vietnamese government that we thought

were necessary to improve its performance in order to make it

more acceptable. to us and also with the line that this would

make it more effective in fighting the war that they were :

facing.

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Among these were the suspension of pLe 480. ald, the

suspension of the Commodiley Import program, certain of these

things. There was criticism given in the press conferences

39t FV

about the government's performance, and so forth, and all

these vote enore a aRE roving dine sociation des

the United States.from the.support. of President Diem.

MAARON AS

n the Various contacto the generals did request whether

we would stand

aside. ilithey ran their own coup and they were

given the response in general terms that,. yes, we would stand

aside and, yes, we would continue the ald program if a

S20 dress

suecessor government took over, and looked reasonably able to

5 C08 A44

carry on the war.:

This could only be read as a green light

to the generals.

This message was passed through a CIA officer but his

credentials were checked by the generals recelving this kind

022302:

of a message with the Ambassador and with the Chief of the

milItary aid group there In saigon so that there was no

question about what U.S: policy was nor that the CIA officer

was speaking for the imbassador and with his knowledge and

consent.

•The CIA officer received a call on October 30 to come

over

and join the general staff and come to the meeting and

essentially sat with them as they continued the operation from

their own.

They did move to, the decision to run. the coup and he

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sat In the headquarters during mostyof, the time

* He went

home'at one point, and so forth.

Senator Tower:.

He was physically present?

Mr,. Colby. He was physically present with the generals

in a great part and in communiction with our station and with

the

embassy by phone informing the embassy what was going on.

With respect to the death of President Diem and his brother

• 5'

Whu, there had been a suggestion some wecks before, which was

received from an officer of the Vietnamese, that there were

various things that could be done about the government problem

there, and one of the alternatives was the assassination of the

brother Nhu and the other brother, who essentially ran

central Vietnam, brother Kahn, Ngo Dinh Kahn. Our acting

Chief of Station, our former Chief of Station had been re-

moved because Ambassador. Lodge felt he was too closely identi-

fied with Ngo Dinh Nhu

and our acting Chief of Station passed

this

suggestion with two or three others which did not

involve this kind of

action to the Ambassador with the comment

that we not set ourselves. totally against this course of action.!

Mr. Kirbow. I believe this particular matter has been

testified to before, Mr: Chairman, and it would be

appropriate at this time to put the exact language in the

record and the reply then to Mr. McCone sent.

The record before the committee indicates that Smich-

reported that he had recommended to Ambassador Lodge that

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"We do not set ourselves. irrevocably, against, the assassination

plot since the other two alternatives mean elther

a bloodbath

in saigon or a protracted struggle which could rip the

army and the country asunder."

Mr. McCone directed by cable to saigon of, 6. October

"McCone directs that you: withdraw recommendation! to Ambassador

Ayahea

concerning assassination plan under MeCone Instructions as we

cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action

and thereby engaging our responsibility

therefor."

Senator Hluddleston.:

Who was the"author of the first

statement?

Mr. Kirbow. The first statement was the acting Chief of

Station, Mr. [smith.

Senator lluddleston." Out in --

Mr. Kirbow.. In Saigon.". And MI. McCone sent the reply:.

back.

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13

Mr. Colby. Mr. McCone directed me, I sent the message,

and we sent that message before we answered the other aspects

of that cable. As soon as we got the message we sent the

response on this subject right back.

sentor Tower.. That will be made part of the record.

Mr. Kirbow: . It happens to be on page. 28 and continues

on the top of 29 of the exhibit.

Senator Schweiker: Would you explain what that means?

Mr. Colby. What that means?

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'It means we don't want to have anything to do with an

assassination plan.

Senator. Huddleston. You are eliminating that "as an

alternative?

Mr.. Colby

That is part of our concept of what to do.

Senator Schweiker:

Sdidn't"that*contradict-what.you were

saying a few minutes ago? Didn't you say we were in essence --

MI. Colby. We were looking to the overthrow of the

government.

Senator Schweiker.

I see what you are saying.

Mr. Colby.

But not the assassination in this case of the

brothers Nhu and Kahn.

Senator Schweiker. The other went forward?

Mr. Colby. The other program continued, yes.

Senator Morgan. May I ask a question?

Mr. Colby, I have heard the words used.around.

Is

that what you call a CYA -- a letter?

MI. Colby. Well, I will say that the motive in sending

it was to make sure we did not get involved in it. You can

read anything in that sense, of course, but I think the

motive was very clear that we don't want to have anything to

do with any assassinations.

Senator. Morgan.

The thing that kind of worries me,

Mr. Chairman, is that it seems that almost each time just before

something happens there always goes out a letter, and I don't

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know whether Mr. Schwarz acquainted me with the letter CYA or

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not.

-..

Mr. Colby: I am familiar withst

Senator Morgan: It is a common term used?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir:

Senator Morgan. You understand CYA?

Senator Tower. Yes.

Senator Schweiker.

Not directly related to the

CIA?

Mr. Kirbow.

In this regard --

Mr. Colby. Not restricted to CIA:

Mr. Kirbow. In this regard I think in fairness to

both Mr. Colby and the committee record of their own investi-

gation, the cable traffic both preceding this and after

indicates it was clearly intended as a position taken by

Mi. MeCone as Director of the Agency to and action that his

station Chief had taken with the Ambassador and did not neces-

sarily represent the whole policy of the government at that

point.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Colby.

I am almost certain that we did not consult

anyone in sending that message. I think probably Mr. McCone

and I sent the message.

Senator Tower. In that message you direct the acting

Station Chief to, withdraw the recommendation?

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Mr. Colby That we not set ourselves against this.

Senator Huddleston. Do you havelthe dates of those

two cables," Charley?

Mr. Kirbow.

the message from here was 6 October

#The cable from. Saigon was 5 October and

Now, Senator, we have to always remember that we have

got the date line probably here on dates.. From the traffic

and the way it is marked these were immediate action at both

ends, and I might also add if we look one step forward to

the cable from Saigon of 7 October, which would have been

really the 6th here, they replied immediately to Mr.. Macone

and says action taken as directed, and they went

a little.

further to say since the deputy Chief of Station, Mr. Truhart,

who is now a consultant to this committee, was also present

when the original recommendation was made, that he had been

made aware of Mr. MeCone's directive also.

Sentor Tower.

Mr. Colby, could you make available to

the committee the full. text of the cable traffic on this

matter?

Mr. Colby. Certainly, Mi. Chairman.

Senator Tower: Thank you.

Senator Schweiker. I might have missed this. Action

taken as directed.

- What does that mean?

Mr. Colby.:

The action was to go to the Ambassador and

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withdraw. the recommendation.that.we.not.set.ourselves

Irrevocably against this.course.of

action

Senator Tower. Wehave got some double negatives here.

Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

Senator Tower. M

The Station Chlof or acting chief

recommended that we not set ourselves against the assassina-

tion or that we hold thatriopen as an option? r

9843

Mr. Colby.: Yes, sir:

Senator Tower. What your cable in effect did was remove

it as an option?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz.

• Was the message passed on to Concin who

was action officer on the scene?

Mr. Colby. I can't say for sure. I would say,. I would

guess that it would be, but you had better

ask him for that.

I just don't know the answer to that."

Senator Tower. Any further questions?

All right, proceed.

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Conein went over to

the headquarters and participated in the command center during

the running of the coup, he kept the station continually

advised.

There were discussions as to the state of the war and

how it was going. There were meetings. here in Washington where

the information was provided to the government, as a whole,

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to the senior Levels of the White Houso*State and Defense

departments, and the Attorney General.

Ther e were a series of meetings and a series of

+$ *

directives given and the news that President Diem and his

brother Nhu had been assassinated, were dead, first came to

us in a message which started with Mr. Conein, who was told

by one of the generals; General Minh, thät they had committed

suicide, and this was publicly announced by the government

at that time. It was on its race Incredible to Mr: conein when

he heard it from the General because both were very strong

Catholics and he just doubted that they would have done

such a thing.

There was a withdrawal in essence in the conversation

from that story.

He was offered a chance to look at the

bodies but turned it down.

What was actually done, apparently, and we have tried

to reconstruct this, is that there was a telephone conversa-

tion between President Diem and the generals.. There were

several of them. And President Diem was very strongly

rejecting them, calling them to discipline, and so forth,

in the earlier stages.

At a later stage, in the early morning of November lst,

he called and indicated that he would surrender if he would

be properly handled.. The generals then sent somebody down to

receive that surrender and found that President Diem was not

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there fle.had. actually-gotten.out off the back door of, the

palace and had gone down to another section of the city.

He was reported

as having been inxthat other section of the

city later"

The generals in the interim had been very

upset and annoyear ith himy and apparentiy thra vas not done:

2, 3024

with Me. Conein In attendance the had gone home at one point

and apparently/was not. there..to.our knowledge.

Apparently, the decision was taken by several of the

generals, the ones that were present, that he would be executed

when they got him.

They sent an officer, a small armored

unit out to pick him up after they found out where he was

down in the other part of town.

He and his brother were putin an armored personnel

carrier with an officer, a young Vietnamese officer who was

an aide to General Minh, head of the coup group, and they

went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier

arrived back at headquarters

the two were dead and had been

shot several times:

That officer incidentally in a rather bizarre aspect

of this was himself apparently executed when this junta of

generals was. overthrown about two months later. Somebody

took that occasion to shoot him.:

I think I can say, Mr. Chairman, thạt CIA had nothing

to do with the assassination of President Diem and Mr. Nhu,

that the actual assassination was a shock and a surprise to

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"everyone In the United States Government when It was announced

and was a matter off great concern

Ster Ar

In retrospect.one.must-realize.that, thore was..how-

ever; a considerable debate about encouraging and supporting

the generals in an overthrow ofithe Diem regime and that

20224

the.record.is. very. clear that the United States.through its

overall policy was in support of that overthrow and, of

course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent

?...

overthrow of a regime involved such as this, people are going

to get hurt, and in this case the leaders were killed in the

process:

Now, there is one postectipt to this I would like to

cover. Mr. Chairman, because it is worth mentioning.

When Mr. Conein went to the headquarters on the 30th of

october, I think it was, the night before the coup, he

carried with him five million plasters. That five million

piasters had been put in his safe at his home, a day or so

before by our Chief of station.

That is about $65,000,

as I remember the figure in the way it adds up. He was

specifically asked by the officer who called him telling

him to come to bring some money with him. He did. And when

he got there he

gave some of the money, three million of it,

to the officers and it was apparently used to support, to

give to certain troop units that joined the coup. The

leaders of certain units that came with the coup..: I can't

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name which ones but the generals, in other words, used it

to help attract the support of certain additional units:

The remainder he gave another sum, a couple of days

later, which was given under his belief, and the reguest

was that he give that to compensate the families of

Individuals killed during the coup, the soldiers and so

Iorth. This 1s a frequent custom in'the Vietnamese, some

kind of an award is given to the families astde from the

particular activity.

Now, that money stemmed from a station decision to put

the money available there.

The action of giving the money

over was taken at the station level. It certainly was con-.

sistent in the station's view with an exchange of several

cables over the past several weeks which had indicated

that the Ambassador said that it may prove necessary to

give some money in the course of this activity.

There was one message from Washington which referred

to whether money would, be necessary às a part of this

overall effort, and a key quotation which I do not find in

this summary but I think is very important, which is a

message which was sent, I think, a day before, part of

which is quoted in this document -- but the additional

part of which is quoted, a message from Mr. Bundy to

Ambssador Lodge. The number of the message is 79407. And

it discussed that our policy with respect to abstaining

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instructions, for the u.s. posture in the event of a coup

we will reject appeals for airect intervention from

either side and U.S. controlled aircraft and other resources

will not be committed between the battle lines or in support

of either side without authorization. from Washington.

This rather plainly refers

to u.s. forces becoming

directly involved... In the event of an indecisive contest

the U.s. will strenuously avoid the appearance of pressure on

either side. In the event of failure of the coup we might

provide

but once a coup under responsible

leadership has begun and within these restrictions it is in

the interest of the United States Government that it should

succeed.

That is very clear.

Senator Tower. What you are saying is the passage of

monies consistent

Mr. Colby. Totally consistent with the policy at

that time. There is a question as to the degree Ambassador

Lodge was aware of all of this. He was aware of "Mi. Conein's

dealings over

the months in great detail and he has stated

that many times.

There is absolutely no reservation. He was not aware

apparently of this money, of the fact of the money being

taken at the time. He had, of course, himself in his own

message back to Washington referred to the need for such

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" money.

so, the action by the station was consistent With

what he had obviously indicated was part of the thing that

had to be done, but frankly in dealing with Ambassador Lodge

out there on the details of some of these things it became

40209

a habit of the station and they felt his

reeling of the

degree of detail' in depth he wanted to get Into things

and some things they brought to his attention and some

things he really just delegated off, and this one was not

brought to his attention.

Senator Tower. Mr. Colby, I think I understand the

Oriental mentality better than most Americans.and I am

certain you understand it far better

than I, so you would

expect really in a military coup that the targets of the

coup would be assassinated; wouldn't you, that is their

sort of way of doing business over there?

MI. Colby. Not necessarily.

Senator Tower.

They are not so naive to think they

would have bought them a nice villa in Paris?

Mr. Colby. Not necessarily.

Actually Mr. Conein during that night while the

thing was being launched was discussing with them before

they made the decision to assassinate, bringing an American

aircraft in and bringing it in and putting the brothers on

the aircraft and then taking them out of the country and

taking them to exile, and they specifically asked him if he

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could arrange: that aircraftor

He asked the station.

i The

station went into

Senator Tower. Who asked them to arrange the air-

craft?

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Mr. Colby. The generals asked Mr. Conein. Mr. Conein

asked our Chief of station if we could arrange, and aircraft.

We then got into a very complicated problem, that apparently

It was decided that we didn't want the aircraft to come from

either Taipel or the Philippines and it would have to be

brought from Guam, which would take

24 hours to arrange, which

sounds a little unreal, but that was the answer given.

Senator Huddleston: In retrospect.. do you think that

if the President had been at the appointed place at the

appointed time, rather than slipping.out to the other section

of town, that he might not have been assassinated?

MI. Colby. I think he might not have been. I don't

know for sure.

I think that they were excited and they were tense and

I think they got excited and considered this trickery and --

Senator Huddleston.

He might be trying to develop an

opposition? .

MI. Colby. No; I think it was more a feeling that they

had been tricked and they were infuriated by it. I think

that really is the motive at the bottom of it.

Senator. Huddleston.

That caused his assassination?

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Mr. Colby er think that is the proximate cause.

There are lots of other causes.

senator Schweiker.As I understand, then, you are say-

ing that, according to your bestrinformation, it was a

spontaneous decision to.k111?

Mr. Colby We certainly had no indication of considera-

tion of that before. In fact, the first time we heard of

the decision was after they, were dead.

Mad said

Senator Schwelker.

And at that point where did the

reins of power lie with the overthrowing people who would

have been responsible?:

Mr. Colby. The key people were General Minh, General

Don, General Khiem and General Xuan.

They were really the

four key generals in that and the key to the coup was that

No tie:

the last named had joined the

coup at the last moment. He

had been supporting the government.

Senator Tower. Who?;

Senator Schweiker.

Who was he?

Mr. Colby....

Khiem.

Senator Schweiker. The decision to kill him, would that

have been made, I am not sure of the circumstance, by all

four or by the top one or what?

Mr. Colby. « There was an element led by General

Khiem, I think that is, who advocated he be shot immediately.

It was the consensus of the generals, however, that he not be

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"26

killed at ten past six in the morning, when he was. to

surrender.

In other words Conein was there at that time and it

was the consensus there that he not be killed.

Senator Huddlestong That was, before he, disappeared?

2220

Mr. Colby Right.

MI. Kirbow.'?

The records will reveal they were sitting

around on the balcony and Mr. Conein was actually present in

and 2rae Then

the group when the decision was made, it was first-hand

knowledge on his part.

_ Mr. Colby. There were a couple of them that did ad-

vocate he be shot.

Senator Schweiker. We have interrupted your answer

there:

Mr. Colby. well, then, you will get this from Mr.

Conein. I am just reading from an account he gave us,:

frankly, because I wanted to be prepared.

At about six o'clock they discussed this and an ele-

ment advocated he be killed.

The consensus. of the

generals was that he not be killed. Then the suurender

arrangements by phone and obvious': preparations to receive

him and receive a surrender, and that point was the point

at which Mr. Conein was asked whether if we could get an

aircraft to take them away.

So, I think the intention clearly at thatpoint was to

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Prone (Ares 202).344

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take them away, and we told him it took 24 hours

Then they latern about eightro Clock, they discovered

that he was not atithe palace that he had escaped in some-

fashion, then they were lookIng around for him and they

captured varlous of them, and then at&that point Mr. Conein

left, went home, and was immediately, summoned to report to

the embassy. He had received a cable from Mr. McCone to

the effect that the highest ter

authority in Washington wanted

to know where Diem was.:

Conein then returned to the headquarters and by that

time they had all of the ministers of the government there,

the prior government, who were under arrest, or most of

them. He then went to General Minh. to find out. what happened

to Diem and General Minh told him that he had committed suicido

and that he asked where he.was and he said he was

at a Catholic

church in Cholan, a part of the city, and Conein indicated

disbelief of it and General Minh replied the bodies were

back in the armored car behind the headquarters, do you

want to see them, and Concin said no, he did not.

Conein reported this back to Mr. McCone by cryptic

message.

Also I Might add that another officer that we had

worked with was apparently executed about that time, General

Tuan. I have forgotten what his first names were.

lle had

been head of the special forces and had worked very closely

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*281

with the President, with Mro Whup and, with our station, and

he had been just executed by the generals that morning.

Senator Morgan. What was the exact date of the execu-:

tion?

Mr.. Colby. First of November.

17Y

Senator Morgan.

' 60?

MI. Colby. '63.

Senator Morgan:

How many: troops did we have in. Vietnam

at that time?

MI. Colby. On the order of 10,000. I don't now know

how many precisely, Senator, but I would say something of that

nature.

Senator Morgan.

We actually were not involved in the war

itself at that time,. were we?

Mr. Colby. We were in an advisory position and I think

we also by that time were, flying some helicopters for them

and doing technical

things like that, but we didn't have any

combat forces there.

Senator Tower.

That was largely MAC/V and special

forces, wasn't it?

Mr. Colby..

Yes, sir.: The

special forces: first

arrived in Vietnam working for CIA in this country program

of developing the villages.for.their. own defense.: When

there got to be as I remember 750 of them the question

arose as to whether they should be. transferred out of CIA

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Into military control andithis was dong during, 1963 i the

24440280

military took over responsibility for that program and

I will have some words

to say, about that at another time

Senator Morgan.:

I'am having a great deal" of conflict

in my own mind about this incident more' than any other incident

we have had.

The truth is we set the forces in motion, aid we not, that

caused the execution of President uniem?

Mr. Colby. As a national decision, yes.

Senator Morgan. Would you say that the action that set

these forces in motion was the cablegram that upset you so,

the decision that was made, I understand, without consulting

you, really?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

But I wasn't in. a high enough position to take

umbrage not being personily consulted.

Senator Morgan.

I understand that.

Mr. Colby. Essentially, yes.

Senator Morgan."

I'am trying to peg it down in my own

mind.

Is it fair to say that that was when the decision was

made to set the forces

in motion to bring about the coup?

MI. Colby. Yes; although I believe that the debate

and we might even call it vacillation as to what we should.

do in Vietnam continued all the way up to the end.

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Senator Morgan. All the way until the -

Mr. Colby: Until the overthrow.

Senator Morgan. To the execution?

Mr. Colby. To the overthrow.

Senator MOrgan.

It has been along time, since I

practiced civil law." It seems to me that once you set

forces in motion you can't back away from the consequences of

1t.

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Do you follow a different philosophy in the CIA?

Mr. Colby. I think I agree with you, Senator. I think

when you support a coup through violent overthrow you have to

understand that: you are taking responsibility for people

getting killed. Soldiers got killed and the head of the other

side got killed..

soldiers got killed on both sides.

Presidential guard soldiers and soldiers in the coup group.

Senator Morgan.

I apologize for imposing on your

time. This bothers me more than anything. I have heard.

We really were not at war, we were just there as

advisers, and yet we set the forces in motion that brought

about the execution of these two men.

That is a fair statement of the facts, isn't

it, and concise?

Mr. Colby. Well, I think when you are dealing with

foreign forces, Senator, there is a point at which you are no

longer responsible for the detailed actions they take because.

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they begin to take a responsibility, themselves for that

You are undoubtedly in the civil. law category of a co-conspira-

tor:. But I think when" you are dealing with a sovereign

foreign group or power that at some point. the decision as

to what is actually to be done withinga general policy

frame is taken by someone else rather than yourself.

, And

I am trying to draw a distinction here which a lawyer would

not admit because of the conspiracy.

Senator Morgan. . :

I want: to say, Mr. Chairman, no one

on this committee recognizes any more than I do the need.for

a strong Central Intelligence Agency, and the one question,

the central question that I have been trying to follow ever

since we have been in these hearings is is the CIA an

arm of government that acts somewhat irresponsibly on its own,

or has it been a responsible and controlled agency of

government that was carrying out policy of higher authority?

I am not interested in placing blame, because as far as

I am concerned the recommendations that this committee ought

to make are going to hinge to

a large degree on where the

action originated from.

Now, the thing I think in this situation, your

conspiracy situation, we might have tried to back away

but we didn't complete the back away. Mr. Conein, is that

his name, was even on the balcony with the generals.. It is

sort of like, I really don't --

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132

Mro Colby In the overthrown the coup no, question

about. it."

and he was thre with the full knowledge and

NORE C:2

approval of the imbssados andfull knowledge and approval of

people in Washington.

'Senator Morgan yZ am reluctantito: say this, though we.

haven't had a

leak, to myanowledge f he was there with

the full knowledge off the Ambassador, the full knowledge of

Washington, on the balconyon; the morning the coup took

place, we can't really shirk the responsibility.

In othe words, we were part of the execution, weren't

we?

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Mr. Colby. "We are certainly part of the overthrow. There

Does easter

Is absolutely no question of that. And If you talk about

overthrows I think you have to accept the responsibility for

the fact that president Diem was killed in the overthrow.

Senator Morgan. It is almost like as if I had driven

to the bank and were sitting in the getaway

car for you to

rob the bank and in the course of robbing you executed,

you shot a man.

I am held just as much responsible.

Mr. Colby, Yes, sir. That is my point about the

accomplice situation in law, which I think is somewhat different

in international relations because of the concept of .

sovereignty gets into there.

Senator Morgan. It troubles me..

I am trying to see

that distinction.

It troubles me.

Once you let this telegram

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back away, the telegram or cable we talked about earlier, that

Conein then, it seems to me what makes me think it was a

CYA proposition, he delivers a message but he goes out on

the balcony.:

This frankly concerns me more than anything

we have heard.

MI. Colby. Remember, this was a couple weeks before,

that the thought of assassination was not aimed at President

Diem, It was aimed at the two brothers who were considered

the evil influence in the government, and the thought

process was that of those advocating it,. the foreigners who

were advocating.

If you eliminate these two evil fluences then President

Diem can remain as President and we. can patch together a

good operation.

Now, the idea of removing Nhu from Vietnam was one

that was discussed in a great detail' and a great deal of

pressure was put on President Diem to send his brother out.

of the country:

At one point I made a suggestion that perhaps I

could convince him of the desirability of leaving the country

for the benefit of his own, of the country itself.

That I

could go over and argue him into it.

That I think is a

separatable thing from the actual decision to shoot Diem.

I think the decision to shoot Diem was a conscious decision

taken by the generals which came as a very new development

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during the coup, but let's face it lt is something that you

have to anticipate may take place in the event of an over-

throw of a government.

Senator Huddleston. Farlier in.your testimony you

3S 2920

mentioned receiving a telegram from the State Department re-

lating to at least investigating the possibilities of a coup.

Is it common for a station director: to receive direct instruc-

tions from the State Department or from the Forty Committee

or from the white House or from just where?

Mr. Colby. That telegram was a telegram from the State

Department to the Ambassador.

Senator. Huddleston. Is it the usual chain of command?

Mr. Colby. That is the usual:

Senator Huddleston. For the CIA to receive its in-

structions?

Mr. Colby. Well, the CIA got 'a copy of the telegram.

Senator Tower:

CIA?:

Mr. Colby. And CIA was. in receipt of a telephone call

before it was sent..

Senator Huddleston. What I really want to know, you

as station agent in Saigon, what is the one source that is your

ultimate instruction to do something.

Mr. Colby. Obviously a station chief has several chiefs.

Senator Huddleston..

•fle does?

Mr. Colby. He is under instruction and in this case he

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was. under very specific.instructlon to keep very closely,

under the authority of the Ambassador, and not to operate

independently in any fashion whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston:

I recognize the independent aspect

of it.

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Mr. Colby. He was under instruction to follow the

Ambassador's directives.,

Senator Huddleston. Is that the usual chain of commana,

that once the National Security Council or whoever makes the

determination as to what we are going to do, do they then

have the State Department convey that message to the CIA through

the Ambassador to that particular country, or is that set up

seprately everywhere?

Mr. Colby. I think policy is normally transferred from

the National Security Council to the Ambassador.

The

Ambassador is the President's representative and has overall

authority of all agencies. in that country and, therefore, an

important question like this would be passed to the Ambassa-

dor to handle.

Now; the other agencies in town would be informed of

the policy directive that we might have additional communica-

tion as the details as to how to implement them, which in

this case were done through directive to our station chief

to make sure that he operated very directly and immediately

under the

control of the Ambassador.

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Senator A Huddleston.

from?

Mr. Colby, Fromina to to our sation chior that no

would act very closely.

Senator Huddleston. Where does the director of the

CIA fit into this thing?

The state Department wouldn't lasue

an order directly: to a station without going through the Director

of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Well, in this situation we were having

almost daily meetings with senior officials. in the CIA,

State Department, Defense Department and so forth, in:

the basement of the white llouse, and there is no question

that this was national policy and hammered

out.

Mr. Kirbow. In fact, with the President on most of those

occasions?

Mr. Colby. Frequently. At these meetings, these were

the meetings in which Mr. McCone and I argued very strongly

that we should not move against the . Diem government, we

should continue to work with it.

senator Huddleston. Now, in the first survey, in the

first check, you found no interest among the generals in

conducting the coup?

Later, apparently, they were willing

to?

What kind of persuasion was used to change their position

on this?

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37

Mr. Colby®

The clear. development of u.s.policy

against the regime. The most eritical ching. think, to

the Vietnamese, and I don't think it was perceived as this

important to the Americans, was the suspension of our commercial

import program, because this said to the Vietnamese that

American assistance is being suspended from the Diem regime.

Senator Huddleston..

Who in our government: was: 50

unhappy with Diem?

Mr. Colby. Most of the people in the State Department

and National Security Council staff. " This became an indi-

vidual matter, quite frankly.

There is an article here in the washington Post in

September which sort of, I think, pretty clearly states it.

U.S. Policy toward South Vietname has come to a standstill

while the Pentagon and CIA on one side of the pot arguo it out,

with the State Department on the other.

Senator Huddleston. Is this '62?

MI. Colby. '63.

You can have it.

Senator Tower... Let me just say one thing. I think

this underscores the difficulty we are going to be confronted

with several times on the committee, that is, making a dis-

tinction between the CIA acting on its own and acting as an

instrument of national policy made. by somebody else. We are

going to be in the position, I suppose, by hindsight question-

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$3 8

Ing national pollcy today

senator Huddleston

Tam trying to get the chain of

command and order in which instructions come.

Ar.

colby. In this situation. clearly_CIA management was

opposed to the course of action taxen by the united

States goveinment, but once the decision had been made as

policy action CIA accepted United States policy and implemented

it.

PAUL

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senator Huddleston. One finaly question there.

Is there any doubt in your mind had it not been for the

United States insistence that the generals would not have

ever initiated the coup?

Mr. Colby. There is no doubt in my mind. I believe that,

frankly, I belleve that the five years which intervened be-

tween 1963 and '68 were years of chaos leading to the commitment

if the war was not to be lost, five hundred thousand

American soldiers, and we ended up in '68 with a President of

South Vietnam who was about like President Diem.

Senator Muddleston. I take it you still think your

original decision was correct?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. : Was correct or incorrect?

MI. Colby: My position was correct:

decision I have publicly called a disaster.

The original

Senator Tower. I want to recognize Senator Morgan.

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39%

would you yield for a moment for counsel to enter, some-

thing in the record?.

Mr. Kirbow. I think in connection with Senator

Huddleston's questions. that it would be appropriate to show

again that the document that ta in eviaence before the committed

shows on pages 4, 5'and a little later -

= 3w111 give you

the other page -- dated 24 August-- that there was a telephone

call from Mr. Marriman to the Deputy Directör,of.

pians in

the agency, which was the only contact shough

In the records

where Mr. Harriman called Mr. Helms just before 8:00 p.m.

and outlined to him the substance of what eventually turned out

to be the Department telegram, 213, to Saigon.

To Helms: Query:

Mr. Harriman confirmed that the

thrust of the telegram contained and impliëlt pull out of

Amelcan forces and support if the Nhus were not ousted. Harri-

man said that the message had been cleared with Hyannis Port,

the President,. Secretary of State and with : Mr. Gilpatrick.

There is a latter entry showing that the President was

at Hyannis Port, that the Secretary of State, and the

Secretary

of Defense were all out of the city:

MI. Colby. And MI: McCone was out of the city.

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

This being from the Inspector General's report which

has been made a part of the record previously.

The State telegram then follows. And while the telegram

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is a part of the record I think this important toyshow that

In addition to the official telegram on 25 August

excuse me -- part of the telegram from the State Department

on 24 August reads the Ambassador and country team should

urgently examine all possible alternatives/leadership. and

make detailed plans as to now we night bring about Diem's

replacement if this should become necessary. "you will under-

stand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instruc-

tiong as to how this operation should proceed, but you will

also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to

achieve our objectives.

On 25 August, following that, a cable from Mi. Hillsman,

who was : Assistant Secretary of State for Far East, to

Ambassador Lodge, personally sent through CIA channels, the State

cable sent separately represents agonizing at the highest

levels. The course outlines is dangerous but all agree that

delaying a clear-cut u.s. stand is even more dangerous. It

won't be easy for you but be assured that we will back you

all the way.

This was followed by a cable on 25 August from the CIA

headquarters to its Saigon station which reads --

Mr. Colby. Which I wrote.

Mr. Kirbow.

Which Mr. Colby did write and it says on

page 7, for your information,. CIN not consulted regarding

cable being sent separately, which, however, cleared. at the

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highest levels. In circumstances bellevo the CIA must fuily

accept directives of policymakers and seek ways to accomplish

the objectives they seek. while have not seen the exact

21W2-4ns2

text, understand le invites Lodge a final Judgment a Danger:

1 112

in present course of action appears to be throwing away

bird in hand before we adequately identify, birds in bush or the

songs they will sing. Thus suggest a real search for courses

of action we might retain. I think this is the important

part.. The CIA is saying to their people, thus we suggest a

real search for courses of action which might retain options

in our hands at the same time as taking positive stand rather

than waiting for situation to clarify, at which

point we probably

will be unable to effectuate.

This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least

an interim period.

So.

I think that is simply to show, senator, that while

the message went from State to the Ambassador and then they werd

having their local meetings there, that the CIA position

still is against theoverthrow was transmitted directly to

their station chief.

I think also that this same document, which is a matter

of record, reveals probably in detail the same things that

the witness has testified to here about the urgency of the

problem at the Washington area because on practically every

page of this record during August, and September, and October,

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there Is a mocting ofel ther the National Security Councti

with the President. or with all of, the Cabinet members who

have been Involved in this at least once, and in one case

three times a day the President met when the situation was

still several weeks' away from the assassination:

senator Morgan, Mat aro you reading front

MI. Kirbow. From the Inspector General's report of 1967.

Senator. Tower.

Senator Morgan?

Senator Morgan:

"". The first thing, Mr. Colby, the last

message I think certainly commends you and your actions.. But

when

was rumumba killed?

Mr. Colby. " Lumumba was killed February '61.

Mr. Schwarz.. Or possibly January?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Morgan, When was Trujillo?

MI. COlby: Trujillo was killed May 30, '61, as In

remember. Lumumba, you know, was not killed by anything the

CIA was involved. in. We did, as I have testified, look.

into the possibllities but we did not have anything to do

with his death.

Senator Morgan. I remember that we were thinking

about it.

MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Morgan:

Now, of course, during this period of

time we were also talking about Mr. Castro.

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Mr. Colby.

Yes and taking steps against him.

Senator Morgan::

Now, there was a general in Chile.

When was he killed?

MI. Colby, He was killed in October of 1970.

Senator Morgan:

1: 1970?

Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

Senator Morgan. Were there any others that we talked

about of that you have testified to?

Defaulle, did you not'testify that never to your

knowledge was there any discussion at all about deGaulle's

assassination?

Mr. Colby. What happened on that, Senator, is that about.

two weeks ago, I think it was, we got a memorandum from one of

our employees who said that he was

approached in 1968-67 by a

Frenchman, that this Fremchman called for a meeting and he met

him and this required some travel.

Senator Tower. This was in a foreign country?

Mr. Colby. .

In Rome:

Senator Huddleston.

He was an employee of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Our present employee.

The other one was.an

agent.

Senator Huddleston. The Frenchman?

MI. Colby, He was an agent.

Senator Huddleston.

Of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Schwarz. It/is in your book.

Senator Morgan."

Even in the remotest sense-could"we

be linked with that?

Mr. Colby. No. The proposal was made and we turned it

flat down.

Mr. Schwarz.

sent out a cable saying itis a silly idea.

Senator Morgan. This business coming out in the press about

deGaulle is absolutely false?

Senator Tower. The Chairman issues a statement on that

the other day.

The fact of the matter was the CIA was

approached by

the station chief who rajected it offhand right

there on the spot when he was approached with the idea.

Senator Schweiker. And relayed back to washington and

Washington --

Senator Morgan. To pursue my final question -

Mr. Colby. There is another allegation about Duvaller.

I knew there was nother one.

Senator Morgan. As I understand it, the CIA had no

plans or participated?

MI.. Colby: We did support a couple of groups to try to.

make a landing and raise a revolt, a Bay of Pigs kind of

thing in there, and they didn't work.

Senator Huddleston. In Haiti?

Mr Colby. Yes, sir.

And Mr. Duvalier died of natural

causes in '71, or something like that.

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Senator Morgan. From your knowledge of intelligence

and history, was there ever any other. period in the history of

our nation when national policy ever fomented assassinations

of coups, except the decade of the sixties.

Mr. colby. I have never studied that from that point

No bananas

of view. I couldn't say a word about the early nineteen hundreds

or eighteen hundreds.

Senator Morgan. As far as intelligence is concerned,

intelligence agencies, have you ever known of any such?

MI. Colby. No.. As I say, it is hard to talk about in-

telligence and not say that.. Assassinations have occurred in

intelligence from the days of the rennaissance on.

St. Thomas Aquinas gave us a very careful explanation of

how it is morally justified to slay a tyrant to avoid a

more serious difficulty.' I still don't agree with it.

Senator Tower. I might note in that in 1776 we dis-

patched a force under General Schuyler to try to foment

a coup in Canada.

Senator Morgan.

I wasn't being facetious.

Mr. Colby.

I know it. I just wouldn't want to

give you a flat statement on that, I couldn't say.

Senator Huddleston. Inthe coup in Saigon, how extensive

was the combat? I don't recall.

Mr. Colby. It was quite intense around the palace. The

question really. about the coup stemmed on whether a particu-

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lar armored unit outsido of Salgon would join it or not

or remain loyal.

If that armored unit remained loyal, they would be in a

very ticklish situation.

That armored unit dia join the

coup group and fighting only involved the Presidential guard

around the palace

Tt." hey

Senator Huddleston.

is that where some of the money

went? Could that be considered as a bribe?

Mr: Colby, I don'tknow but I wouldn't be surprised.

Senator Huddleston. Would that be considered as a

bribe to bring them in?

Mr. Colby. I don't know where the money went in

specific terms, to what units, but it went to somebody like

that.

Mr. Schwarz.

To persuade them

to join?

Mr. Colby. Yes,

sir.

Mr. Kirbow. Or to prevent them from taking action against

them while the coup was under way.

Senator Huddleston. Were any American soldiers or CIn

employees actively engaged in the combat?

Mr. Colby.No.

Senator Huddleston.. Or fire any shots?

MI. Colby. No.

Mr. Kirbow. .

Both our records and later history written

by these Vietnamese governments indicates that there was

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no involvement

Senator Tower. Proceed:

senator Huddleston.

I.am through.

MI. Kirbow.. I think the question has been raised,

and rightly.so, as to whether or not the CIA by its continuing

contacts may have kept the pot boiling on this thing. It

should be read into the record from the Inspector. General's

report certain cables, traffic and other memoranda from pages

32, 33 and 35 of these articles.

On 9 October the President of the United States

at a news conference in connection with the transfer of the

station chief of Saigon, Mr. John Richardson, was asked

question concerning the CIA being under control or out of con-

trol because there had been some articles in the press that the

CIA was running an assassination operation and stated the

following.

I know the transfer of Mr.. John Richardson, who is a

very dedicated public servant had led to some question, but

I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out any

independent activities but is operated under close control

of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under and

with the cooperation of the National Security Council and

under my instructions:

There is following that a cablegram from the

headguarter's to Saigon for the Ambassador's eyes only originated

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by Mr. Colby, which states in part, whilo we do not wish"to

stimulate a coup, we also do not wish to leave the impression

that the U:S: exchange of government or denied ecomomic or ni

military assistance to Nhu regime if it appeared capable of

increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular

support to win the war and improving work relations with the

U.S.

The cable urges the contact with Minh press for detailed

information clearly indicating that Minh plans over a high

prospect of success.

Inaddition to these thoughts, it indicates that the

cable had been discussed

with the President of the United

States.

Later, on 10 October, DCI briefed the Foreign Relations

committee and gave the position of the CIA in its operations

in Saigon which was a matter of record.

I believe that the next comment is very appropriate

and should be read into the record.

Apparently there was some concern in Washington onthe

part of Mr. MeGeorge Bundy that Mr. Lodge and General

Harkins and the CIA should pull back temporarily from the

generals and the following was in a cable to Saigon of 24

October.

Eyes only for Lodge and Harkins from Bundy.

There

may be danger Nhu is attempting to entrap through Don's

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approaches to coneins Feel quite strongly, that Lodger

and?

Harking should stand back from any non-ossential Involvement.

370294

It seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between

Don and Conein.

The Immediate response on the same day, a CIA cable to

saigon, Bundy from Lodge indicates In part, I have, personally

approved each meeting between General Don and Conein who has

carried out my orders in each Instance explicitly.

On the 25th of October there was a Presidential meeting

immediately thereafter at which all details of this matter

were again discussed and are a matter of record before the

committce.

Mr. Schwarz.. I have understood from other sources some-

thing that is not in the report, which may have some 'bearing

on the attitude at the very moment of the coup, and that is

there was a telephone call from Diem to Lodge in which

Ambassador Lodge offered to help Diem get out of the country?

Mr. Colby. There is a state telegram, yes, which I

don't have, but which Diem called lodge and said that he was

having trouble with -- that an attack, an effort was being

made against him by his generals, and that he believed it

essential to put this down. He offered to, he urged that

the United States consult General Lansdale and me by name

because we understood something about this tiatuion there.

This was in the afternoon of the coup.

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150

And in the responso I believe Ambassador Lodge dia

mention something about asslatance in leaving the country

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in that connection you spoke about

the time Conein was on the balcony or somewhere else meet-

ing with the leaders and there was some discussion about

euplying an airorate, but enen one prower come back that it

would take 24 hours, in part because the plane could not come

from Taiwan of the Philippines.

Why is that such a complicated matter to get an airplane

out to saigon?

Mr. Colhy. I don't know. As I said, it sounds absolutely

incredible at this venture but apparently that was the

response received at a request for an air force plane which

would not come from either Taiwan, because of the political

aspects of it, or I

think it was the Philippines, and I

don't know the rationale of that at all.?

MI. Schwarz.

From that I suppose one could draw.

the conclusion that that represents kind of a bureaucratic

Mr. Colby. I don't know of

any other explanation. I

frankly don't know of any other explanation.

Senator lluddleston. It wouldn't have been an excuse,

would it?

Mr Colby, I don't believe so. I think

it was the answer

given by the Air force when the request was made with that

limitation onit that -

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Senator Morgan.:

we had planes in Taiwan and Taiwan,

To Petir

never politically objected to our actions flying in and

out of Vietnam, did 1t?

Mr. Colby. I don't think so. I think probably it didn't

want to associate Vietnam.': At that period there was a con-

siderable concern that our presence in South Vietnam would

somehow be translated into an act antagonistic to Mainland

China and get us into more trouble up there 1f we got too

closely involved with Taiwan.

Mr. Schwarz.. Did we have planes: in Vietnam at that time.

•Mr. Colby. I am sure we had air attache planes there.

Senator Tower.

Wasn't Air America opcrating there then?

Mr. Colby.

Idon't think yet. I am not sure.

MI. Kirbow. The largest aircraft availableat the time

would have been a C-46 or C-47 type?.

Mr. Colby Probably China Airlines under contract to us

then. China Airplanes, not CAT. CAT was Air America.

Senator Tower. Yes, I know.

Mr. Colby. I guess you are right, we did have air-

craft there for some

reason of another, and I don't know the

answer as to why we didn't use that.

Senator Huddleston. You are saying though that that

answer or that decision was

outside of the cIA?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. The Ambassador himself?

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Mr: Colby. I don't know.

Conein calied our station

Mr.

Smilen looked Into it somewhere and

chief, Mr. (Smith.

came back with the answer that it would take 24 hours.

Mr. Schwarz. It doesn't seem to me, based upon" your

testimony, that the question of whether the directive from

McCone to the station chief,: that is put in the double negative

but in effect says don't associate yourself with the assassina-

tion, the question whether that was passed on to Mr. Conein put

against the ..testimony doesn't seem to make any difference but

Mr. Colby.

•I would suspect he was aware of it knowing

how close Mr.

inch) and Concin were, and they were very close

personally and officially.

MI. Schwarz.

I think in the testimony, based upon Mr.

Kirbow's interview, is going to be he was not aware.

MI. Colby. Maybe

not.

MI. Schwarz.:

Assuming that to be the fact, does it

tell the committee anything and what lessons could be

drawn from it, what kind of reasons are there for the

lack of communication on such matters between persons in the

agencies or persons in the agencies and outside of the.

agencies.

MI.. Colby. Well, the proposal had been made by a.

Vietnamese, it had been passed to the Ambassador. The proposal

had been passed to the Ambassador reporting what proposal had

been made. The station had commented on the proposal in

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*53:

speaking

•to the Ambssador.

- The station had been instructed

to withdraw Its comment to the Ambassador. It ala. At that

point there is no further action taken on the proposal.

Mr. Schwarz.

Except --

Mr. Colby.: The proposal didn't got approved, it didn't

get rejected either, apparently.

Mr. Schwarz.

But following.--

Mr. Colby. It wasn't followed, up.

Mr: Schwarz.. And I understand that is the thrust. But

following up on Senator Morgan's questions, if Mr. Conein

was the most important action person in connection with the

generals, and the telegram was expressing an attitude of the

United States about assassinations --

MI. Colby. Of Mr. McCone.

MI.. Schwarz. Of Mr. McCone:

He was. the

superior of Mr. Conein?

Mr. Colby. Sure.

Mr. Schwarz. Wouldn't it follow that it ought to be

communicated

to Mr. Conein and indeed perhaps more communi-

cated to him than anybody else, more important to communicate

it to him than anybody else?

03

Mr. Dirbow. Mr. Smith was the source of the proposal.

Mr. Colby. To the Ambassador. I just want to make

sure where the proposal came to him from.

Mr. Kirbow..

The record does not reveal that here and

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he does not recall.

Mr. Colby. Conein doesn't remember the incident.

Because it might have come in through someone else. That

is What strikes me.

• Mr. Kirbow. He does not.

Mr. Colhy.. The proposal was made to a different officer.

Mr. Kirbow. At this time he does not appear to be aware

of either: the submitted recommendation to the Ambassador

or the telegram that came out and indicates he would not

necessarily have. known from the cable traffic unless he heard

it at a meeting which was being

run practically everyday among

the senior CIA station personnel.

MI. Colby:I have a feeling in my mind, which I would

have to examine and clarify in the record, (a) that this pro-

posal came to us from somebody other than, through someone other

than Conein. Wehad another officer in touch with other

generals and so forth at that period and Idon't know whether

the advice was passed

back through that channel or not.

Mr. Schwarz: As a matter of general practice, the

attitude expressed by the McCone telegram was presumably

important and Mr. Conein was at least a significant actor,

whether or not he was the source of the telegram which Mr.

McCone responded to:

Assuming he wasn't notified, what I am searching for,

under your experience, if you can give an explanation in the

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practice having to do with compartmentation or need to know

or whatever, why he

would not be

Mr. Colby..

Well, I, think that in terms of my experience

I would say that this is not a subject that you want to

talk about very much. You certainly don't want to participate,

stimulate, encourage or assistin

V9/:

On the other hand, if a total independent force has its

own independent reasons for proceeding, we hear of these, we

get reports of proposed assassinations and so forth... in our

regular reporting, and sometimes we warn people and sometimes

we don't. It depends on the overall situation. It doesn't

have any involvement with us. I mean hut it is an intelligence

report in a sense and then the action as to what to do about

it.

I think that, consequently, so long as it is clear that

we aren't involved in it, and that is what was wrong with

that particular message, is that it indicated support of the

idea, and that was immediately responded to.

If the message had merely been reported by the station

to the Ambassador that this proposal had been made by a

Vietnamese, I doubt that there would have been a cable from

Washington.

Mr. Schwarz. But once you knew the problem existed,

and Mr. Concin was the most important action officer with

the generals -

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Mr. Colby. Oh, yes:

• Mr. Schwarz: It was not. important to inform him of the

attitude of the Director concerning assansinations because

that attitude only extended to making sure that the United

States had no apparent. involvement.

Is that what you were saying?

MI. Colby. No involvement.

MI. Schwarz.

No Involvement.

If it was, McCone's attitude was the U.S. should have

no. involvement and Conein was the person most closely asso-

clated with the generals and the subject had come up. I

can't understand why he would not as a matter of ordinary

course be notified of the McCone telegram.

Mr: Colby. Because no proposal of the American involve-

ment was made through him. If this is another individual, as

I suspect it was.

Excuse me. It was Conein. I beg your

pardon.

In a meeting with Conein General Minh requetted a state-

ment of the u.s. position, said it did not expect U.s. support

of a coup effort but did need U.s. government assurances that

the U.s. would not try to thwart his plans. le outlined the.

three possible plans.

One, assassination of the two brothers,

keeping Diem in office, encircling of saigon by various

military elements, and thirdly, direct confrontation between

military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units

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57

in Saigon. This was early October. This was the first effort

to generate an overthrow and this was replied to, this overall

proposal.

The first step was the immediate response with respect

to the assassination.

Mr. Schwarz.

"It is doubly important to understand (a)

whether Mr. Conein was notified and (b) if not, why not. And

I only have it from Mr. Kirbow's description of his interview

that he does not recall being notified.

Mr: Kirbow.. That is my recollection, MI. Chairman. I

guessMr.. Conein would be the best evidence. He will appear this

afternoon before the committee.

Mr. Colby. It the next meeting with General Don

Conein, under instructions, and I believe that means under

instructions from the Ambassador, passed the word that, passed

the word consitent with the response really to Minh's sugges-

tion of how they would, do it, why we do not wish to stimulate

a coup, we do not wish to leave the impression the u.s. would

thwart a change of government or deny military assistance

to a new regime if it appeared, et cetera, et cetera, to

win the war and improve the working relationship with the u.s..

The cable urges that Conein press for detailed information,

clearly indicating that Minh's plans offered a high prospect

of success.

The message that came back from the policy levels of the

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government in response to the proposal by Minh, which included

those three courses of action, was that the United States would

not stimulate but it wouldn't thwart, and that it would con-

tinue assistance without commenting.on any one of thöse three

courses of action.

Mr. Schwarz

Then let's see'if we can understand what

that record says.

A proposal was made by Minh to Cönein that there

were three ways to accomplish a coup,' one of which was by

assassination.

McCone sent back a telegram

to someone other than Conein?

Mr. Colby.: Immediately.

Mr. Schwarz. which said the U.S. should not actively

condone assassination. As fat as the written record shows,

the next contact is between, the next relevant contact is

between Conein and Minh and there is no statement in this con-

tact one

way or the other about assassinations.

Mr. Colby. That is right; nor in the message from

washington which dealt with the whole, the three proposals.

Mr.. Schwarz. So the message from McCone to Vietnam, as

far

as the written record shows, and we have to explore this

further, obviously, suggests that the statement the U.s.

shall not condone assassinations just never got past Don to

the

generals.

Mr. Colby. That is right. The u.s, would not involve

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#itself That was clear within the U.S., we would not

0a252200

Involve ourselves in.the coup.

But the question of U.s.

support of a specific assassination was not passed.: There was

not specific comment. on any. one of the three courses of

9A50n

action:

because that option as to how they conduct their

coup was left to the, generals.

MI. Kirbow.

Normally the message from the Director of

CIA to its station chief instructing him as to an action

c 9p/22. 2001

that he took with the Ambassador would never be passed to the

General?

MI. Colby. No, I was told, he was told to go to the

Ambassador and withdraw his somewhat favorable comment about

the assassination possibility.

Mr. Kirbow.. These are not directly related to the

subsequent meetings that Conein had with General Minh at

all?

MI. Colby. The general made the proposal,

described how

he would go at it, the three alternate positions, and the re-

ply which came from Washington to that was that the U.s.

would not stimulate a coup but it wouldn't thwart it: and.

it would continue the assistance thereafter. "

The option as to which course of action was left to the

generals..

Mr. Kirbow. Chronologically the report kind of puts

that CIA message in the middle of what was going on at that

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60

time when In fact it was kInd off in-house traffic, was not

intended to be passed on to the generals at all.

Senator Tower. Senator Mart?

senator flare of coloradal ve pursued fairly exhaustivelyi

I think, and constructively, the communications fron

45 5A

Washington to Saigon:

What Iwould like to explore a little more is from Saigon

to Washington which prompted whatever decisions were made in

Washington and were acted upon.

You have made fairlyclear your position and I take it

the position of CIA Saigon was that I think the bird-in-the-

hand phrase is an accurate summary of your position?

Mr. Colby.. Well, I think that was certainly true of

MI. Richardson as Chief of Station, and that really was a

little bit the problem that got between him and Ambassador

Lodge which led to his transfer.

03-

Mr. Smitaliss position was one of being a loyal subordin-

ate to Ambassador Lodge. That was clear.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

We had three basic American

presence it seems to me in Viegnam at this time. One is

military, one is intelligence and one is diplomatic, CIA,

Defense Department, and State.

CIA's position it seems to me was pretty clear against

a coup, against certainly the ramifications of a coup.

MI. Colby. I wouldn't say every member of CIl belleved

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TO PI SECRET.

that,

not by allong shots there vere Individual CIA people

who thought

Senator Hart of Colorado.

I am not talking about

P0646382359

individual people's beliefs, I am talking about official posi-

tion given to washington:

Mr. Colby. Given to the National security Council.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What I want to know is who

was recomriending -- I think we are now talking about Defense

Department. and/or :State. Who was recommending to the National

Security Council that the coup be persuaded or that we encour-

: age it?

Mr. Colby." I would say that the embassy's position,

the political section and the Ambassador, was much more sympa-

thetic to the proposition that the war could not success-

fully be conducted with President Diem still in power without

a major charge in his style of operation. However, there is

an additional factor in this which was the public pressure

on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and

in the United States, and I think this public pressure was felt

particularly by the people in the National Security Council

and

by the people in the State Department.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That public pressure --

Mr. Colby. WAs one of distaste for President Diem.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

And it meshed with what the

Ambassador and his political section were

saying from there?

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Mr. Colby.

Xes,

sir there is Justification for'it.

Senator. Hart of Colorado. What was the Defense Department's

position on all' of this?

MI. Colby.! The Defense Department was almost totally

on the position that the war is in the countryside, that the

:?T'

countryside seems to be going along rcasonably well, that this

•is an urban problem, urban political problem which should not

Interfere with the main things going on.

This was true of the Secretary and General Harking out

there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth.

Senator lart of Colorado.

When you say this thing should

not interfere -

MI. Colby. The political problems of niem with the dissi-

dents, political dissidents in the urban centers.

Senator lart of Colorado: Therefore, their conclusion

was it was no great matter,we should get rid of him?

Mr. Colby.

The most dramatic way in which this was

posed, this has been descrihed publicly a number of times, was

that at one time, particularly the frustrating period the

president faced with

these two strong positions, he

sent two officers, one a general Crewlack, who was an assistant

to Secretary. McNamara and

a Mr. Mendelhay, who had formerly

been the political counsellor in saigon, to saigon for about

five days to make an assessment on the spot and they came

back to the Cabinet Room and one sat on

one end of the room

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63}

and one sat on the other and General Crewlack first said he

had been to 20 privinces and talked to 20 province chiefs and

30 military chiefs and all that sort of thing and the war

business going on basically all right and there were some

problems but the thing :was they seemed to have a strategy

and they seemed to be moving along on it, and Mendelhay said

he want to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants

and political people and all the rest of it and there was

a general feeling that the cause was hopeless because there

was so much distaste for President Diem and so much opposi-

tion and the general feeling that the war could not be won.

And the President, of course, looked at them and said

did you two fellows go to the same country?

And the answer

is they did. They looked at two different parts of the elephant.

Senator

Hart of Colorado.

so to recapitulate the infor-

mation before the National Security Council when this coup

decision was made, was CIA officially against the Defense

Department, officially against or neutral.

Mr. Colby. Against.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Officially against.

Mr. Colby. And State.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And State for the --

Mr. Colby. Basically for, although I think you would

have to say the final policy was that the United States would

not sponsor, I guess is the right word, or stimulate a coup,

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would not thwart it it Lt happened, would continue our

assistance to that country

Senator Hart "of" Colorado:

"And would keep a bag of

money available in case it did and let them know we had the bag

of money there.

Mr. Colby.' "The bag of money was not really, the CIA

Five million plasters, the bag of money was the ald program.

That is the real thing. we suspended with an indication it would

be resumed and that is a much bigger bag of money than CIA ever

handles.

Senator Hart of. Colorado. Would the coup have gone

forward without the CIA's bag of money?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator llart of Colorado. So that was inconsequential?

Mr. Colby. That is right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Conein showing five million pi-

asters?

MI. Colby. That was incidental.. He had been called

over because they had made the decision that they were

going to go for the coup and he was invited to go because

they had made a commitment that they would give him an

advance tip on it and when he came they had already made the

decision. There is no question about that.

Senator Mart of Colorado.

One final question to

amend my recapitulation.

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Mr. Colby, They had ankassurance, of American assistance

• ?.

if they wanted it.

That they had "clearly." If they won

902800031

the coup they would have American assistance.

Senator Hart of Colorado.;

Even beyond that, if they

li..

started the coup we wouldn't let it fail?

Mr. Colby. I don't think they necessarily had that

assurance:

Senator Hart of Colorado. They didn't know that?

Mr. Colby. Our embassy had that and our station had no --

Senator Mart of Colorado. Conein or no one else?

Mr. Colby. I can't say we ever told them that. I just

don't know. There is no indication that we told them that.

The clear position was that it was their coup and then we

picked up the pieces

and go on with the war after the coup.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Just to amend my recapitula-

tion. CIA officially and Defense Department officially

against, State Department for, and public opinion in the United

States for --

Mr. Colby. Basically, yes.

Senator llart of Colorado. And, in your juagment, what in-

fluenced the National Security Council decision the most,

State Department, Saigon reports, or what?

Mr. Colby. I think the general press coverage and general

awareness of just the State cables by a long shot.

You had

a very heavy treatment and frankly Mrs. Nhu didn't do any good

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either:

Senator Tower.! She was bouncing around down in my

state making press statements.

Senator Huddleston. Was there ever any serious attempt

by.-=

Mr. Colby. Excuse me, if I may.

I think the answer to your question, Senator, is

one that I have used with many foreigners, that you cannot

expect the American government to carry out a course of

action

which does not have the support of its people, that it just

won't work, and that if there is no public support of a

course of action the American government will move to a differ-

ent course of action, and that is

the way we run our country.

Senator lluddleston.. It sometimes takes a long time to

filter through, though?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. I was going to inquire whether or

not there was ever any serious attempt on the part of our

government to persuade the President that he should leave

office voluntarily.

Did we express to him our unhappiness with the situation?

Mr. Colby.. We certainly discussed Mr. Nhu's leaving

Vietnam at various times.

I don't remember any.

There was

almost no contact, direct contact between our Ambassador Lodg

and President Diem very, very little contact.

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67

ambassador lodge felt that there was really very little

776393

that he could communicate back and forth to President Diem.

196240,

President Diem was a very special character in communicating

with.

You had to spend about four hours listening to his dis-

cussion of the whole situation in order to get a few points in.

Senator Huddleston. But the ilth hour telephone call .:

from Diem to imbassador Lodge would indicate that he at least

thought -

MI. Colby. He went to him as the official representative

of the American government.

Senator Huddleston. He thought we might still sympathize

with him and be on his side?

MI. Colby. He said that he was going to require his

officers to fulfill their oaths of loyalty to the Constitution,

to the Vietnamese Constitution and his office as president.

He was very stiff about his position as president. I don't

remember the text of the message but that comes through

very clear.

Senator Huddleston. Wasn't there a telephone call or

conversation or a call in which the Ambassador indicated that

he would help him get out of the country?

MI. Colby.. I believe so.

Mr. Schwarz. It is not in your report?

Mr. Colby. No, it doesn't really have much to do with our

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68

action.*

Senator Huddleston. Wouldn't that also have been

perhaps the reason he left the palace and went to another

location?

MI. Colby.. He left the palace because it was going to

be overrun.

Senator Huddleston.

He wasn't going to another loca-

thon where he might be picked up by the Americans and taken out

of the country, as he was led to belleve we would help him?

• Mr. Colby.

We had no contact with him after the coup

started after. the phone calls.

Mr. Kirbow. The record reveals the generals informed

him if he did not surrender they were going to totally

destroy the palace, and apparently from the record he was not

there while he was

making these phone calls, he was over in the

Cholan district, having left the day before from the palace

and having taken his children with

him.

Senator Hart of Michigan.. I think some of us were

struck by your statement that there was rclatively little

communication over this period with President Diem. You menn

of any sort or simply with respect to the suggestion he

leave?

MI. Colby, By the Ambassador himself. There was a lot

of contact. Aamiral felt, who was the CINCPAC, visited with

president Diem on the morning of the coup, and the generals

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.69

held up the coup long enough to escort Admiral felt to the:

airport and put him on the plane "to say goodbye. They then

repaired to the general staff headquarters and launched the

coup.. There was plenty of American contact in this sense.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

I am backing up perhaps

a matter of months trying to understand.

We took certain actions, P.L. 480, for example, in-.

tending

that it persuade President Diem to fly right?

Did not the Ambassador go in and explain to him that that

was the purpose for this suspension, or was it just to be

understood by osmosis?

Mr. Colby. There

wan't very much direct contact of that

sort; I don't think. It was clear. from the public position be-

cause President Kennedy in a press conference, incidentally,

referred to the departure of certain personalities, which was

clearly a reference to Ngo Dinh Nhu. I have forgotten the exact

phrasing of it. But that was clear reference to the fact

we felt it necessary and that is really what the issue all hung

up on because we had identified Ngu as such a nepharious in-

fluence that if we could just get him out of the country,

and I mean out of the country, no assassination or

anything like that, out of the country, that then we could

manage the operation, and that was the official position..

I thought it was wrong but at one point I said fine,

why don't we go over and try to get him to leave in order

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to get over this hump and get back to the war.

Senator Huddleston: Was that ever made, did you ask

him to leave?

Mr. Colby.

No, I didn't.

Senator Tower. Any further questions?

senator Mathias?

Senator. Mathias. Thank you, MI. Chairman. I would like

to go back to a statement that Mr. Colby made sometime ago in

which he referred to many meetings in the basement of the white

House.

As I recall! MeGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow had two

small offices down on the ground floor level and is that the

area that you are referring to?

Mr. Colby. Well, not their actual office but there is

a little conference room there called the situation room

where this kind of meeting takes place and still does.

Senator Mathias. Right. And who would typically be

involved in those conferences?

MI. Colby. Oh, at that time Mr. Bundy, Mr. Ball,

certainly Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Hillsman, Mr. MeCone, myself!

Mr. McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor, others perhaps or not

depending on the situation at that time.

In other words, the senior levels of the different

departments involved, and generally,I think, generally not

the Attorney Gencial. If we met with the President we met in

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71'*

the Cabinet room, thenfusually, the Attorney General would be

there.

Senator Mathias.?

The President did not attend these

meetings?

Mr: Colby. Not downstairs. we would go upstairs.

1, i2

There would be quite a few of those where the President would

be up there and that would be upstairs in the Cabinet Room, but

not every day except sometimes it was every day, when it got

particularly hot and heavy.

Senator Mathias.

Now, when you say every day, does

that mean a downstairs meeting or upstairs meeting?

MI. Colby. Downstairs meetings every day.

Senator Mathias. It was every day?

MI. Colby. Almost, more or less.

And upstairs meetings. Sometimes every day and some-

times not.

Senator Mathias. And the Attorney General was

generally present at the upstairs meetings?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Mathias. But not at the downstairs?

Mr. Colby. Not at the downstairs, as I remember. I am

dealing with an impression here.

Senator Mathias. I understand. And I think what we

are trying: to get at is a flavor of the direction.

MI. Colby. The Chairman of the downstairs one would be

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Mr. Bundy. Chairman off the upstairs one obviously would be the

President.

Senator Mathias.

Did you mention Mr. Rostow as

present?

Mr. Colby. I think of him as Mr. Bundy's replacement,

really, and I am not sure whether he was there at that time or

not. Mr. Harriman would come sometimes, as I recall.

Senator Mathias. How about Vice President Johnson, dia

he ever attend any of those?

Mr. Colby.

He would

attend the upstairs ones.

Senator Mathias. He did attend the upstairs ones.

MI. Colby. A number of them.

Senator Mathias.

Did he take an active part?

Mr. Colby. No, he did not particularly. Certainly

he did not take what amounted to at that time in that

community a public position. What advice he may have given

the President alone I don't know. I don't recall his being

heavily involved:

Senator Mathias. Ambassador Nolting has said on various

occasions that Vice President Johnson was the principal spokcs

man in that circle for decreasing rather than increasing

our activities in Vietnam.

Did you ever get that feeling in any way at these meet-

ings?

MI. Colby. I know that later President JOhnson felt

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that the whole move against Diem was a mistake. I don't

recall anything particularly on the degree of our involve-

See sta

ment, his feelings about, the degree of our involvement at

that time.

Senator Mathias,

How did you get the feeling that Lyn-

don Johnson was against; the Diem movement?

Mr. Colby®

Upwell, he Indicated very strongly after the

event and I think such

as he did say at the time indicated some

his vete

reserve, but interpreted, as a Vice: President doesn't take any

kind of a public argument position with the president, it

really is not very appropriate in that kind of

situation and

whatever private position he may have had he would have handled

outside of the gaze of, the lower level bureaucrats such

as

myself.

Senator Mathias.: Ambassador Holting was very much

opposed to any action:

Mr Colby.

Ambassador Nolting, of course, was replaced

in August. He was in Greece when the raid on the pagotas

took place. .

He was out of contact and was not aware of

that. When he did return to washington a week or two later he

took a very

active role opposing actions against President.

Diem to the extent he was invited to participate. And his

advice was not accepted.

Senator Mathias.. His pleas. fell on deaf ears as

far as

this was concerned?

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MI. Colby: Yes, sir:

senator Tower.

Any other members?

Senator Morgan. I have one. other question.: Reading

from this report, Mr. Colby, dated August 28, the CIA cable

from Saigon, it says Richardson reports that "The situation

here has reached the point of no return unless the generals

are neutralized before able to launch their operation. we

believe they will like and have a good chance of winning.

We all understand that the efforts must

succeed and that

whatever needs to be done on our part must be done."

Apparently at that point whatever action we had set

in motion Richardson felt was irrevocable.

Mr. Colby.

You will recall that followed the August

24 telegram which essentially told us to go out and see

what you can get down. Richardson's feeling there was that

we had launched something and that it was going to take place.

The generals then came back thereafter

and said no, we are

not going to do it. That is the sequence that occurred.

Senator MOrgan. One other question. Who is Marguarite

Higgins, the gal who --

Mr. Colby:. She is a reporter.

Senator Morgan. She apparently had all of the facts,

didn't she?

Mr. Colby. Yes. And a lot of this has been published in

all the books that have been written.

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don tiknow I have really heard any-

4.7260/44)

thing that hasn't been published.

Mr. Colby: That is right.

Senator Morgan.. These comments here are almost verbatim.

MI. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Morgan. Did you ever ascortain where she got them?

Mr. Colby. There have been lots of books written by

Mr. HIllsman, Chester Cooper..

Various other participants

In It have all written books about this period.

Senator Morgan. She surely harl her

facts.

Mr. Colby. And Mr. Halberstam and Marguerite Higgins

and Mal Brown. A variety of people have written this.

Senator MOrgan. Thank you.

Senator Tower. Wehave got a vote at 12:30 and if we

could I would like to wind this up by that time.

Do any of the Senators have questions? If not, I will.

turn it over to counsel.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one question following up on.

your first exchange with Senator Morgan earlier in the morning

In focussing on the Trujillo matter and on

this matter, both

were

instances whatever was done was done by dissident

nationalists. In the Trujillo case there was some effort.

after the Bay of Pigs to slow down or pull back. In this case

there was some effort to disassociate, although I think not an

effort to slow down or pull back.

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Is it a fair generalization to make that where the

United States seeks.to accomplish objectives through foreign

nationalists, It is difficult for the United States to

control: the actions of those foreign nationalists?:

MI. Colby. Certainly the foreigner makes his own

decisions at various times the degree to which he is going to

do one thing or the other.

The U.S. cannot control it.

The U.s. can assist him, the U.s: can

counsel him and

advise him, perhaps influence him, but the control, that is where

I got, Senator Morgon, when you are dealing with essentially

another sovereign, why there are limits to your degree of

authority over them.

Mr. Schwarz.

So when you start them down or we

start them down the path of overthrowing a government, it

follows from the comments you have just made and indeed from

the record as we have seen it, that even if we change our

mind as to whether that is a desirable result, we may not

be able to stop it from happening, we may not be able to stop

the consequences of the events we have set in motion?

Mr. Colby. Yes, except for the point of starting them

down. I don't think you can say that the United States has

the total decision there,

either. Because the decision to move

in a certain direction is a decision that they basically

make on their own. We may be able in a supporting, we may be

suggesting, simulating, indicating support for, but we do not

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TO PISEGRET

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have the capability of going up and giving them the order to

start.. That has to be something that devolops as a

consensus that it is the right thing to do because of the

situation.

Mr. Schwarz.

. Both in the Diem case and Irujillo

case motivations inltially.coming:from.the:foreign.nationalists

8o. I. think from the testimony that at some point it was

essential in their minds that this be given a word or action.

in support by the u.s.

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

MI. Schwarz. Once.

MI. Colby.

It is one of their total factors.

MI. Schwarz..

Once that is down, it follows, doesn't

it, from what we have gone through, that even if the govern-

ment changes its mind about the result, it is no longer able

to be sure it can control the result?

Mr. Colby. • Not entirely. It depends on the

situation. I can envisage a situation where we do reach

consensus that we ought to do a certain course of action.

We then have reservations about it. We consult with them and

we then indicate that we will no longer support it and they

then at that point they have the decision to decide whether

they have themselves enough force to go ahead with it, or

they are so limited that they can no longer go ahead with it.

This does occur in various ways of influencing people.

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It occurs particularly in an agency relationship. If you

develop an agency relationship, not just to be an agent

to report intelligence to you, and. we aro having this a little

bit with some of our agents now, that we indicated that we would

work together, that they would give us information, we would

support them, give them some funds and so forth. If part

of the arrangement on our side becomes non-existent any more

and our current problem is they are concerned whether we can

keep their identity secret, there is an inclination on their

part to cool down the activity, and this is happening in this

sense today. It also can happen by decision on our

part to no longer do that particular activity, and we have a

number of relationships with forcign intelligence services,

for example, by saying, well, here is a certain program but

then we cut it off.

One example in this context was the program of

American support of the special forces in Vietnam. The

Agency was giving support to the special forces.

We helped

to get it started and formed it up, the Vietnamese

special

forces. As part of the pressure on the government in the

August period and in response to the fact that the special

forces with Victnamese military and with Vietnamese police

had conducted the raid on pagotas, CIA was directed to suspeni

its assistance to the special forces.

We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to

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the military who were Involved'in that, but CIA 1s an easy

thing to turn on and off. The other

programs are much more

difficult to turn on and off.

In a simple way I think that

has had a certain influence in what they did. I know it re-

sulted in the transfer of several units outside of Saigon

where we said we would continue to support them.

Senator. Tower. Mr. Colby, I think that concludes our

questioning on this matter. Let me ask you a question that I

think is pertinent in the light of the event that occurred

last evening, that I will no doubt be quizzed about.

Does the CIA maintain any current and continuing contact

with any members of the underworld?

Mr. Colby. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have penetrations for

intelligence purposes of various criminal elements abroad.

Senator Tower.

I mean domestic underworld.

MI. Colby. The

answer, domestically in the United States,

not to my knowledge, and I believe we do not.

Senator Tower. You have no contacts that would provide

you with any information on the demise of Mr. Giancana?

Mr. Colby. I know nothing of that demise. I have no

connection with it and I can

say with, I believe, full

assurance, that CIA had no connection with it whatsoever.

Senator Tower. It would be inconsistent with your

charter to get involved after

the fact:

MI. Colby. It would not be only inconsistent, it would

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be madness.

Senator Tower. All right.

Mr. Colby. As I believe Tallyrand once said, it is not

only wrong, it is stupid.

Senator Tower. Tallyrand lived to be 105.

All Iight.

Senator Huddleston. Might we inquire whether or not

Mr. Colby had made any inquiry within the Agency?

Mr. Colby. I just heard about it on the way in this

morning. I certainly will inquire whether we know anything at

all about this and -

Sonator Schweiker.

It seems

the fBI would be the one

to

find out.

Senator Tower. Thank you.

(Whercupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to

reconvene at 2:00 p.m., the same day.)

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