TESTIMONY OF THE AMLASH CASE OFFICIER
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 07/29/1975
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10011-10125

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Date: 10/07/93

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TITLE :

TRANSCRIPT; AMLASH CASE OFFICER

DATE : 07/29/75

PAGES : 147

SUBJECTS :

AMLASH CASE OFFICER (WITNESS TESTIFIED UNDER AN ALIAS)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

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affairs?

AMLASH Case Officer. Correct.

Mr. Baron. Were you an employee of the CIA during that

time on another assignment?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I was.

Mr. Baron. I would like to ask you some questions about

a series of events that occurred in 1961, simply to find out

whether you have any recollection of any of the names of

people involved or the activities involved that you may have

garnered either from personal contact with these people or

from subsequent review of the files involved.

First of all, in 1961, we have a record from the IG Report

of a meeting between Jack Stuart, who was a CIA officer at that

time and a Cuban who we have agreed to refer to as AMLASH for

the purposes of this session today.

Our understanding is that a meeting was arranged by

Carlos repediso, Who was known as AMWHIP, who served as an

Intermediary between AMLASH and Stwurt and that the meeting

took place in Mexico City to discuss the possibility that

AMLASH might cooperate either with CIA - strike that -- to

discuss AMLASH's views on the Cuban situation generally.

Do you have any recollection from any source of initial

contacts between jack Stuart and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only the general recollection that

he was contacted about the time that you said he was, but no

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details on that.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source

about the source of the initiative for these first contacts

between AMLASH and the CIA?

AMLASH Case Officer.

No, I don't.

Mr. Baron. You are not aware of the CIA having taken the

initiative in this instance as opposed to AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, no. I don't know who

took the initiative.

MI. Baron. Did you ever discuss these meetings with Jack

Start personally?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever met Jack Stuart?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I have.

Mr. Baron. Did you meet Jack Stairt during the period

between 1963 and 1965 when you were involved with Cuban affairs?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I can recollect.

MI. Baron. Do you recall in what connection you dealt

with Jact Stuest? t

AMLASH Case Officer. As a colleague in the Agency, but

not specifically on this operation.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever met Carlos repediso, who was

known as agent AMWHIP?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I have.

Mr. Baron. And did you work with Mi. Pepedino Specifically

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on the AMLASH Project during the time of your involvement in

the AMLASH Project?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, because he was

used before to serve as the contact and the interpreter, and I

didn't need an interpreter to work with AMLASH, so although I

knew him and I knew of him, he was not involved directly with

me in my contacts with AMLASH.

Mr. Baron. Did you meet directly with Carlos repedimo?

AMLASH Case Officer. I know him, yes, or I knew him.

Mr. Baron. Although he wasn't serving as an interpreter

during the course of this operation, was he serving as an

intermediary between yourself and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was in contact with AMLASH. He

was a very close friend of AMLASH. He had served as an

intermediary, but during the time I was in contact, he did not

serve as the intermediary. In other words, I contacted him

directly. I contacted AMLASH directly.

Mr. Baron. And what role did Carios repedin® play during

the period of your involvement with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. As a friend of AMLASH. He knew what

AMLASH was proposing.

Mr. Baron. And would sometimes discuss AMLASH's proposals

with you in AMLASH's absence?

AMIASH Case Officer. I cannot recall any specific term

or any specific subject that we would have discussed, but I

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MI. Rhea. Did William Harvey ever speak to you of the

use of gambling syndicate contacts in Cuba for any operation

whatsoever?

AMLASH Case Officer.

No, he didn't.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear, during the period of

'60 to '66 of any mention of the use of poison pills against

Fidel Castro?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear about the development of

poison pills at the CIA?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

MI. Baron. Have you ever heard of the cryptonym MHAPRON?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Baron. What did that cryptonym signify?

AMLASH Case Officer. That was the recruitment of sources

as I recall it. It was a project for the recruitment of

intelligence sources inside Cuba, primary military sources, as

I recall the cryptonym.

Mr. Baron. Was that the cryptonym from the asset

spotting project that you were working on with William Harvey?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't remember if it was at the

time that William Harvey was there of afterwards, I don't

recall the time period, but it was the overall operation for

the recruitment of sources inside Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Did you continue working on this asset spotting

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and recruitment project even after you began working on

AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Yes, I did.

Mr. Baron. And at some point that project came to be

known as MAPRON

AMLASH Case Officer.

Yes, but I don't remember exactly

when that cryptonym was given to the project.

Mr. Baron. Was removal of key military leaders around

Castro ever a part of iMHAPRON E

AMIASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, no.

Mr. Baron. Who was the man in charge of Project MHAPRON?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was, at a time.

MI. Baron. You would have been called Project Director

or case officer?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer, yes.

Mr. Baron. Were any of the assets fot the MAPRON Project

also assets for Project AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. They were not conceived that way,

but one or two of them crossed.

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Mr. Baron. To your knowledge, were any of the assets in

MIAPRON who were not assets for Project AMLASH ever involved

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is in any kind of program of direct personal action against

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Castro?

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AMLASH Case Officer. No, they were not.

Mr. Baron. When you reported on Project MAPRON, to whom

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did you report?

AMLASH Case Officer.

To FitzGerald.

MI. Baron. After FitzGerald took over from William Harvey?

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of FitzGerald's reporting to

anyone above him on MHAPRoN?..

AMLASH Case Officer.

I assume that he did, but I did not

accompany him to any of the meetings.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that he reported to Richard

Bissell on -- I'm sorry. Would you assume that he reported to

Richard Helms on Project MHAPRON?

AMLASH Case Officer. That would be the chain of command,

the chain of reporting, but I am not aware of what he reported

to Helms or anybody.

Mr. Baron. And do you have any direct knowledge of any

reporting FitzGerald may have done on MIAPRON to the Special

Group?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

Mr. Baron. Okay.

Do you have any recollection of a trip that Agent AMLASH

took to Helsinki in June of 19623

AMLASH Case Officer. No details. I knew he had made

that trip.

MI. Baron. But you were never involved during that period

of time with Project AMLASH?

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AMLASH Case Officer. No, I was not.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection as to the results

of that trip?

AMLASH Case Officer.

No specific, no.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection of contact

between the CIA and the FBI with respect to Project AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

MI. Baron. Were you ever made aware of a report that

the FBI forwarded to the CIA about a meeting held between

Carlos repedino and the FBI?

AMIASH Case Officer. No, I wasn't.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection at all of

dissatisfaction expressed by carlos repedino about the lack of

vigor with which the CIA was approaching the defection of

AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. This was part of the record, of the

AMLASH record, but I had nothing to do with that, and I was

not involved in the operation at that time.

Mr. Baron. When you took over Project AMLASH, was it a

concern of yours to demonstrate to Agent AMLASH that the CIA

would be vigorous in supporting his actions?

AMLASH Case Officer. The primary objective, when I took

over the contact with AMLASH was to keep him in place and

convince him to return to Cuba and not to permit him to defect

and stay away from the island.

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or the state of affairs in the barracks? Can you be specific

there?

AMLASH Case Officer®

Well, we were looking for the

information at the highest levels.

Mr. Kelley. Your source of information from the highest

levels. You mean you wanted to know what the sentiment was in

the highest levels?

AMLASH Case Officer. That is right, and to develop

information on them. we had to develop sources in those

circles.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection of a contact

report that William Wainwright wrote about a meeting on

August Ist of 1962 that he held with AMLASH in Helsinki?

AMLASH Case Officer. I know that such a contact report

was in the file, but I was not associated with the operation

in '62.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you this, it is a copy of an

excerpt from that report, as it appears in the IG Report of

1967, and ask you if that refreshes your recollection in any

way?

And for the record, let us mark this AMLASH Exhibit 1.

(The document referred to

was marked AMLASH Exhibit

No. I for identification.

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Mr. Baron. Have you had a chance to read it through?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Having looked at this document, do you have

any further recollection of ever seeing this document, or

discussing the meeting directly with waiswright??

AMIASH Case Officer. I probably discussed the meeting

with waissight.

I don't recall discussing these specific

items. I do recall that there was a contact report in the

files. Whether this was the specific one that I recall seeing

in the files, I could not attest to, but certainly it was a

practice to write contact reports.

MI. Baron. Who was Willian wairweight?"

AMLASH Case Officer. He was the case officer who, with

Tepedino

met with AMLASH before I took over the contact with

AMLASH.

MI. Baron. So he had the same position that you did in

connection with Project AMIASH and was your predecessor?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was my predecessor, as far as

the contact was concerned, yes.

Mr. Baron. Was there anyone else who was a predecessor

to you in any other sense?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall.

Mr. Rhea. Before you took over Project AMLASH, what

office did wainwright work out of? Was he under the DDP?

AMLASH Case Officer.

No, he was under SAS.

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MI. Rhea. He was under SAS.

Mr. Baron. Which, was?

AMIASH Case Officer. Under FitzGerald.

Mr. Baron. Which was under FitzGerald who in turn was

under the DDP Helms, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

MI. Baron. After you took over from

walaw ightnidid he

continue to be involved in Project AMLASH in any way?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not after the first meeting.

Mr. Baron. He moved on to a different assignment then?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Directing your attention back to this contact.

of this excerpt from a contact report, I realize that you don't

have a direct recollection of seeing this contact report

except for glancing at it in the files, but do you recall ever

discussing with Wainweight the excerpt in the fourth paragraph

here where it says "He" -- referring to AMLASH -- "also wanted

to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriquez (a topranking Castro

subordinate) and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate

Fidel, by execution if necessary."

And then it continues, in the next paragraph, "While we

were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to AMLASH

that schemes like he envisioned certainly took place, but that

a lot of coordination, plans, information collection, et

cetera were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and

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success of such plans."

Did you ever discuss this kind of desire to eliminate

Fidel Castro and others on the part of AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, no. Not in

conjunction with this report, this contact report that is

shown.

Mr. Baron. Did you have general briefing sessions with

wailswight when you took over from him as case officer on the

project?

AMIASH Case Officer.

Yes.

Mr. Baron. Was it in the course of his briefing sessions

that you generally discussed the subject that is referred to

here, the subject of AMLASH's desire to eliminate Castro by

execution if necessary?

AMLASH Case Officer. If this was mentioned, it was a very

small portion of the discussion about AMLASH. My primary

interest at that time in my discussions with walsweight is to

find out who specifically --

(Whereupon, Senator Morgan entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Baron. Let's go off the record a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Morgan. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony

you have given today will be the truth, the whole truth, and

nothing but the truth, so help you God?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

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Mr. Baron. You understand -- is it true that, now that

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you are under oath, that you are willing to state that the

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testimony you have given here this afternoon was the truth as

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far as you know it?

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AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

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MI. Baron. And you understand that your rights are still

intact that we discussed before? You have the right to counsel.

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if you wish, the right to stop at any point and ask for

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counsel, and the right to remain silent as we have already

discussed, and these rights are still intact?

(Discussion off the record.)

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Mr. Baron. Now we were just discussing general briefing

sessions that you may have had with willian wilewight when

you took over for him as case officer for the AMLASH operation

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and you say that you do not have a specific recollection of

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wainwrighs telling you that AMLASH was intent on eliminating

Castro by execution if necessary, is that correct?

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AMLASH Case Officer. That is correct.

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Mr. Baron. Is it possible that you generally discussed

AMLASH's desira to get rid of Castro with Waimright during

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your briafing sessions?

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AMLASH Case Officer. In general this was mentioned, because

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this was seen by AMLASH at that time as one of the means of

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reversing the government in Cuba.

MI. Baron. Presumably, if Wainwright was aware, as he

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indicates in this report of the strength of AMLASH's desire

to get rid of Castro by execution if necessary, he would have

conveyed that to you in some way, isn't that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but you also must recognize

that AMLASH was a rather temperamental man whose temperament

was of a mercurical nature and

whereas he may have said something

like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk

about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath.

Mr. Baron. At the time that you took over Project AMLASH,

did wainwright tell you that a specifio means of

overthrowing

Castro had been chosen?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

MI. Baron. Then in this document when he says that "we

were making no commitments or plans" and then it goes on to

say that he wanted to make sure that AMLASH understood that

"coordination, planning, information, collection, et cetera,

were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and success

of such plans" what plans would he have been referring to there?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. It was true that

there was certainly no plans that I know of which would refer

to the elimination of Rodriquez, Fidel or the Soviet Ambassador,

general plans for the coup, for a military coup, maybe this was

what he was talking about. I wouldn't know, I don't know

what he was -- I wasn't there at the time and I don't know

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specifically what he was talking about.

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Mr. Baron. Let's move on, then, to a few days later in

August of 1962; between, the loth and the llth of August of

1962, waiswright, Carlos Tepeding and AMIASH apparently met

in Copenhagen for further meetings. Do you have any recollection

of being informed by walsweight of those meetings?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, just on the general subject

that they had met, but not on any specifics.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection of learning from

any source that during the meetings in Copenhagen, assassination

was discussed between walwight and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. As a plan?

Mr. Baron. Discussed in any sense.

AMIASH Case Officer. I don't know. I mean, it may have

been, but I don't know if it was specificially discussed by

him. But I do not recollect that walswight or anybody told

me that in Copenhagen assassination was discussed.

Mr. Kelley. Did Wainweight ever say to you that you should

not use the word assassinate with AMLASH. for any reason in

particular because AMLASH objected to the use of that word?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I recall Wainwright stating

that AMIASH did not like to talk specifically about assassina-

tion.

MI. Baron. Did you recall any time in your association

with AMLASH when he became upset when that word might arise

in conversation?

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AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that he specifically

used that word. He would use such words as "neutralization,"

but not specifically "assassination."

MI. Baron. And when he would use a word like neutraliza-

tion, he would be referring to assassination, is that a fair

assumption?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, yes and no.

We were talking

about the removal from power of Castro, which could mean

assassination, but could also mean just physically remove him

without killing him.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you for a moment an excerpt from

a contact report written by waiswight about his meetings on

August 10th and 1lth, 1962. He refers in this excerpt for the

record to the fact that they were "discussing various aspects

of AMLASH's future role in Cuba." And he says, "we used the

term assassinate, which was most objectionable to AMLASH and

he became visibly upset."

And then he goes on to say, "It was not the act he

objected to but merely the choice of the word used to describe

it. Eliminate was acceptable."

Does that fit with your understanding of the way AMLASH

related to the concept of assassination and the use of the

word assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. Generally speaking yes, because we

never - I certainly never raised the subject of assassination

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Mr. Baron. Does this description by walewightrof the

fact that AMLASH would not object to the act of assassination

but rather to the word, fit with your understanding of

AMLASH's character? That he would have no particular objection

to contemplating assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. That is difficult for me to say

because as I say, we never discussed this subject in that

detail.

Mr. Baron. Did he ever use the term eliminate Castro

to you to the best of your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. I recall the word neutralize more

than eliminate.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that they would have meant

the same thing?

AMIASH Case Officer. Yes, vaguely, I guess. It would

probably mean the same thing.

Mr. Baron. And that they could be fairly interpreted

in this context as a euphemism that AMLASH might use, because

he was uncomfortable with the word assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. It could be. I mean, I could not

state specifically whether he was using it because he ws

uncomfortable with the word assassination, or be ause he was

uncomfortable with the act itself. This is diffieult for

me to clarify for you.

Mr. Baron. All right.

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Did you ever learn of a meeting later in August between

AMLASH, Prepedino, walewright and fari willianson"

DO YOU

have any recollection of being told about such a meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only in general terms.

Mr. Baron. Did you know Carl willianson?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not at that time.

MI. Baron. Did you come to know Barl williansor during

the course of your association with Project AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the fact that AMLASH was

given any kind of special training in France during 1962?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only a vague recollection from the

file.

Mr. Baron. And what is your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if it was training

or if it was a demonstration in explosives, but no more than

that.

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Mr. Baron. Why would he be given this kind of training?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know.

MI. Baron. Wouldn't this kind of training be for the

purpose of operations that he might perform inside Cuba?

AMIASH Case Officer. I do not specifically know if there

were any plans for such operations. If such --

Mr. Baron. I'm not asking right now if there were plans

or not, but simply what the purpose of the training would have

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been?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know.

Mt. Baron. To create the capability to perform such

operations. Is that a fair way to put it?

AMLASH Case Officer. It would appear that that's what it

would be, but I don't know that those were the plans.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any S/W training that

was given to AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only from having heard that he was

given S/W training.

Mr. Baron. And is that secret writing training?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Secret writing.

In order for him to be able to communicate off-island, if

he returned.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of a cable that

Last williamson sent to CIA Headquarters on August 17 which

indicated that AMLASH might try to carry out an assassination

attempt on his own initiative?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do not have any recollection at that

time. Reading the file afterwards, I know a cable was sent.

Specifically what it said,. I do not recall.

MI. Baron. But you do remember that a cable was sent to

the effect that AMLASH might

try a physical elimination mission

against Castro on his own?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I do not specifically remember

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Mr. Baron. What do you recollect about the cable?

AMLASH Case Officer. The one of the fact that he had been

given the explosives training, or the demonstration in explosives,

but specifically that it mentioned assassination, I do not

recall.

Mr. Baron. Let me draw your attention now to a document

we will mark AMLASH 3, which is a one sentence excerpt from a

cable from farl williamson,

, who was a case officer of the CIA,

to CIA Headquarters, cabled on August 17, 1962.

The document referred

to was marked AMLASH

Exhibit No. 3 for

identification.)

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Mr. Baron. After reading this cable, do you ever remember

seeing that before?

AMLASH Case Officer.

NO •

Mr. Baron. Were you aver briefed by wainweight or anyone

else on the fact that the CIA was aware that AMLASH could or

might try to carry out on his own initiative a physical

elimination mission against Castro?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was mentioned to me, but only in

the most general terms, not in any specific plan that he had to

do it.

Mr. Baron. And what kind of genaral terms would it have

been that he would do it?

AMIASH Case Officer. Primarily, as I recall, in the terms

of his -- the fact that he did not like to use the term assass-

ination.

Again, getting back to what I mentioned before in the

terms of elimination or neutralization of the leadership, but

not specifically of an assassination, a specific assassination

attempt against Castro. It was in those general terms that I

recall it, not in specific terms.

Mr. Baron. In looking at this cable, however, would you

agred that the physical elimination mission that is referred

to there where it says "Have no intention give AMLASH physical

elimination mission" is probably an assassination attempt

against Castro? In other words, Willlanson is saying I have no

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yourself and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer.

wainwright went down there to

introduce me to AMLASH.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember if Carlos repediao was also

present?

AMIASH Case Officer. epeatho also went on that trip, yes.

Mr. Baron. And what was the purpose of that trip?

AMLASH Case Officer. To introduce AMLASH to me as a

Spanish-speaking case officer.

MI. Baron. Do you recall any specific discussions you

had with AMLASH about the role he might play inside Cuba?

AMLASH Case Officer. During the first meeting, as I

recall, we primarily discussed the situation in Cuba, the

internal situation vis-a-vis Castro personalities who were

unhappy for one reason of another with the Castro regime.

MI. Baron. In general, what was AMLASH's assessment at

that time of the strength of the Castro regime?

AMLASH Case Officer. As I recall, it was strong. There

were many people around Castro, and this was the high military

officers who were unhappy with the Communist orientation of

the regime, but many of these officers were still, as he

reported at that time, were either still loyal to Castro or

were afraid of the consequences if their disloyalty was found

out.

Mr. Baron. And AMLASH himself was willing to participate

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tape {2a

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everything that as being done, as far as I understood it,

was to foment a military coup. That was the objective.

Mr. Kelley. And where did you understand this from? who

gave direction and shape to the program in which you were

wokring?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I worked for FitzGerald. I

worked for Desmond FitzGerald.

MI. Baron. Who was at that time Chief of Task Force W?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was the Chief of the Task Force.

Mr. Baron. Or Chief of SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer. Or SAS.

MI. Baron. Do you recall telling AMLASH to assist a man

who was known as AMTRUNK in his intelligence assignments within

Cuba?

AMLASH Case Officer. I didn't specifically ask him to

assist AMTRUNK NO, because he was one of the ones of the

assets we had unilaterally recruited inside Cuba. In my

discussions with AMLASH, I found out for the first time that

he was also a friend and in contact with AMTRUNK-),0.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall the mission that AMTRUNK-lO

had at that time?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was very early in the operation.

It was a matter of establishing communications with him at that

time. Again, he was going to be used to develop the intelli-

gence that we were trying to develop.

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Mr. Baron. Was AMTRUNKESO a military officer, high

military officer in the Cuban Army?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he was:

Mr. Baron. And he was in some sort of regular contact

with you as case officer for this project?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only through a courier who had been

infiltrated to the island at that time.

Mr. Baron. In early September of 1963, do you recall

AMLASH expressing any kind of dissatisfaction with the willing-

ness of the CIA to help him out? Do you recall any thought

that he might not want to see you again shortly after that

meeting in Brazil?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only in a letter or message that I

recall that was received by Tepedino, and he had expressed his

feeling at that time that the way it was interpreted that he

decided to defect. In other words, he wasn't interested in

carrying on any further conversations about the possibilty of

returning to Cuba:

Mr. Baron. Did you meet with him, or did he defect

thereafter?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't.

Mr. Baron. And did you meet with him shortly thereafter

in the beginning of October in Paris?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

Mr. Baron. Had he changed his mind about defecting at that

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point?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, but he was willing

to, again, discuss the possibility of returning.

Mr. Baron. Had anything specific happened to antagonize

him in Brazil so that he would not want to see you again?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Baron. Was he asking for any particular kind of

support at that point, other than help in defecting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically make

any requests of me, except if he did return to Cuba that he

would expect our support and assurances of our support.

Mr. Baron. And did he make this clear to you in Paris

in early October?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did.

Mr. Baron. Did you known John Red Stent?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was in Paris at that time.

MI. Baron. And he was working for the CIA in Paris at

the time?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall that Richard Long was also

working for the CIA at that time in Paris?

AMLASH Case Officer. In Paris, yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that they participated in the

meetings with AMLASH in early October in Paris?

AMLASH Case Officer. They did not participate in my

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meetings with AMLASH. They met AMLASH to pass him a message

2

telling him that I was coming and that I would be there to

talk to him.

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Mr. Baron. Do you recall learning in very early Octobar

that the French were keeping, AMLASH under susveil lance?!

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AMLASH Case Officer. Vaguely. I vaguely recall being

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told by the people in Paris that this was the case. I did not

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MI. Baron.

And did you make any contics with the french

11

governent of wrench intelligence service, to inforn them that

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the CIA bad an ofticial relationship with

13

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

14

MI. Baron. were you, aware, that rene CTA made such a

15 '

contact?

16

AMLASH Case Officer. Later on I was aware of it. At that

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time, I wasn't.

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Mr. Baron. later on in October, around the llth of

October in '63, do you recall any particular kind of request

20•

that AMLASH was asking you to make to people back in Headquarters

21

at the CIA?

22

AMLASH CAse Officer. Yes.

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Again, he had not decided himself as to whether he would

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defect or return to Cuba. If he decided to return to Cuba, he

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wanted several things. First of all, he wanted the assurances

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MH 50955 DocId:32203893 Paye 27

AMLASH Case Officer.

No, I didn't.

Mr. Bayly. Did you think there was any subterfuge or

funny business going on?

AMLASH Case Officer.

No.

Mr. Baron.

Do you remember then a meeting that took place

subsequently in Paris with AMLASH and FitzGerald and yourself

present?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Yes.

Mr. Baron. And to the best of your recollection, would

October 29, 1963 be the date of that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was late October, yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you serve as the interpreter at that

meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Baron. And did FitzGerald use an alias?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Baron. Do you remember his alias?

AMIASH Case Officer. James Clark, I believe it was.

Mr. Baron. And was Red Stent present at that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer.

NO.

Mr. Baron. What do you remember about the discussion at

that meeting?

AMLASH CAse Officer. It was a discussion in which

FitzGerald assured AMLASH, gave him the assurances that he was

1ooking for, that the United States' government was prepared

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71

Senator Morgan. As I recall, most of them were shot.

AMIASH Case Officer. No, the whole group was reduced. In

fact, two of them were let go. He and AMTRUNKOl® were given

twenty-five years, I may be wrong.

Senator Morgan. Well, they were, but I'm talking about

other than this group of people who were involved with AMLASH.

What I am really asking is, do you think there is any

possibility that Castro knew what was going on all of the time?

AMLASH Case Officer. That is a very good question, but

I have nothing that I could say definitively that he did. It

was something that we were always checking, that we were very

sensitive to, that we had a double agent, shall we say, on our

hands, and we did not have any indication at the time I was

involved with the operation that he had been run into us by

Castro.

Senator Morgan. Does it strike you as somewhat unusual

that during all of this time while you were talking about a

military coup, you were providing guns and hidden hypodermic

needles and et cetera that nothing ever came of it? This is

the thing that disturbs me, or makes me wonder, is, you know,

I don't think there is any question but what if they had really

been concerned they could have brought about the execution of -

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, Senator, the thing is, your

reference to the hypodermic thing, it was shown to him, it

wasn't given to him, he never took that in with him.

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86

AMLASH Case Officer.

He did not specifically state this,

but this could be one type, yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me ask you first whether you remember a

contact report written by wainwright after Waiswight met with

yepedino in New York in mid-November, 1963, in which wairweight

explains what AMLASH's

reaction was to this whole meeting.

Do you remember such a contact report?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't remember the contact report.

I remember there was some kind of word back that AMLASH was

generally, again, pleased with the meeting that he had had,

but I don't remember the details as to what else.

The policy assurance had been given to him and he was

satisfied with that. He now wanted to discuss the specific

support that he thought he needed, both to initiate a coup and

to protect himself. So these were the issues that were still

being discussed at that time.

MI. Baron. All right.

Let's move then to whatever thinking you and FitzGerald

and anyone else at CIA did about the kind of support to be

provided, what kind of discussions did you have following this

meeting with FitzGerald or anyone else in the Cuban Task Force

about the kind of support to be provided at this point?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested the high-powered

rifles with the scopes and these were the center of the

discussion, because -- well, as to whether these would be, a

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93

ask you, I would just like

for you to take a look at a document

that will be called Exhibit No. 8. This is excerpted in the

IG Report, and it is a

contact report written by Walnutsight

that reports a meeting he had with repedina in New York City

in which

Cepedino explained AMLASH's reaction to the meeting

with FitzGerald.

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(The document referred

to was marked AMLASH

Exhibit No. 8 for

identification.)

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94

Mr. Rhea. I wanted particularly to draw your attention

to the sentence halfway through the paragraph which says that

he, meaning AMLASH, could not understand why he was denied

certain small pieces of

equipment which promised a final

solution to the problem, parenthetically, that refers to the

Cuban problem and Castro's control of the island, while, on

the other hand, the U.S. government gave much equipment and

money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against

Cuban coastal targets.

The first question I have about that particular document

is do recall which small pieces of might be referred to in

this contact report, which is admittedly secondhand, this

report from

repedied. to

Walawight do you have any idea what

small pieces of equipment might be referred to?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not specifically, except to

believe that this would be the small piece of esoteric type of

equipment that he would need to defend himself because this is

what had been denied him, so I am only saying this from what

I know at that time.. He would be unhappy with the technical

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support, because on 14 November, he had not been told that he

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would get a cache or that he would be given any kind or shown

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any kind of small equipment, esoteric equipment, that he thought

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he needed.

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Mr. Rhea. All right.

25

This leads us into the main event I would like to talk with

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• 95

you about, and that is the decision by people within the CIA

to manufacture a pen that would be rigged with a hypodermic

needle which could eject a poison into someone.

We have had various testimony on what this event means,

and I would like to get your impression of it.

To work into it in an orderly fashion, first, when do you

first recall any discussions about producing a poison pen or

any discussions of that type, to give to AMLASH?

AMIASH Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall when

this matter was raised. It certainly just have taken place

after the 29 October meeting.

Mr. Rhea. Would you date it before the November 14th

meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, because in fact he didn't know

that -- nobody knew that this was even -- I didn't know that

this was a possibility until two or three days before the

22 November meeting.

MI. Baron. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. For the record, there was no meeting on the

I4th of November, that was simply the date on which walmight

reportedly met with Tepedin® in New York City to discuss

AMLASH's reaction to the Paris meeting on October the 29th.

Mr. Rhea. Were you involved in the decision to produce

this poison pen?

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part referring to you?

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AMLASH Case Officer.

No, just the part referring to me.

Mr. Schwarz. With respect to the part that refers to

you, I take it you have got no knowledge about Mr. McCone's

awareness of any of that material?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

AMLASH Case Officer. And to the best of my recollection,

there's nothing in my part of the IG Report.

Mr. Schwarz. No, there is not. You are correct.

Mr. Rhea. I would like to ask you about some cables and

references in the IG Report, even though you've testified you

were not personally aware of any of these weapons drops, I

would like for you to help us clear up some terms.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Rhea. Are you familiar with the term AMTRUNK?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was -- I recall the term AMTRUNK

which was one of the cryptonyms used for the group of, a

certain group of military officers or agents inside Cuba. I

can specifically recall the one of them that we talked about

before was AMTRUNK-10

What it meant, I don't know.

Mr. Rhea. Would the AMTRUNK operation be comparable to

the AMLASH Operation but simply involve different characters?

Would that be a fair way to characterize it.

AMLASH Case officer. Yes, that would be a fair way to

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125

AMLASH Case Officer. As I stated before, I don't speci-

fically remember that he requested FAL's. What I vaguely

remember is at some time he made mention that he owned an FAL,

that he had an FAL in his home in Cuba.

Mr. Rhea. Would you have any reason to doubt, aside from

faulty memory would you have any reason to doubt that he did

request FAL's be included in the drop?

AMLASH Case Officer. He could have.

Mr. Rhea. You have no recollection at all?

AMLASH Case Officer:

Mr. Rhea.

No.

Are you familiar with the name carlos forges.

1 Robreno?

AMLASH Case Officer. I vaguely recall that he was one of

the people that was involved with AMLASH.

Mr. Rhea. Do you recall his role?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, because when I was in the

operation he was not active in any way except that AMLASH had

mentioned him as one of the people he could use.

MI. Rhea. Are you familiar with a request by AMLASH for

silencers for FAL rifles?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically that he

made this request of me.

Mr. Rhea. Do you recall discussing silencers with him'

for any purpose?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I can recollect.

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you have anything there?

Mr. Rhea. I do.: I want to show you a few things in

there.

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Again, I want to get your opinion on some summaries in the

IG Report.

I will hand you Exhibit No. 9, which appears on page 100

of the Inspector General's Report which is an excerpt of a

memorandum allegedly prepared by you and left with Robert owen,

Paris: Station on December 10, 1964.

The document referred

to was marked AMLASH

Exhibit No. 9 for

identification.)

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that in his opinion at that time was necessary to carry off a

coup.

Mr. Rhea.: But knowing what he planhed on doing,

you felt it was quite proper to put him in touch with people

who could enable him to do that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Wall, I don't think it was felt, it

wasn't a matter of it being proper or improper. The objective

for a military coup inside Cuba still existed.

There was a group on the outside -- it was bigger than

just that part of the operation, in other words, to put him in

touch with just the people who would provide him with the arms

to eliminate the leadership, because we never got down with

him to talking about that specific operation..

In other words, Artime, had a group on the outside that

could give him general support, any kind of support, which we

would have to conclude included providing any weapons that he

had requested.

Mr. Rhea. Let me read you ore further statement in the

Inspector Generals Report which I will then ask you about. It

is a parenthetical statement that is captioned as a comment,

and it refers to your testimony before the Inspector General,

that is at page 100 of the report -- it states that you "Ex-

plained to us that what had happened was that SAS contrived to

put Astime and AMIASH together in such a way that neither knew

the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was Artime

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