ASSASSINATION PLOTS
Agency: DAVIS
Originator: WH
From: SCOWCROFT, BRENT
To: MC FARLANE, ROBERT C.
Document date: 05/27/1975
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY: DAVIS

RECORD NUMBER :

178-10004-10136

RECORD SERIES: GENERAL SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: INTEL INVESTIGATIONS--MISC. B, 3/75-6/15/75

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: WH

FROM: MC FARLANE, ROBERT C.

TO : SCOWCROFT, BRENT

TITLE: ASSASSINATION PLOTS

Released under the John F. Kennedy

assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992 144 USC 2107 Notel •

Case#:NW 53244 Date: 06-12-2017

DATE:

05/27/1975

PAGES:

7

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

ORGANIZED CRIME

MAHEU, ROBERT

KENNEDY, ROBERT

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

CUBAN EXILES

COLBY, WILLIAM

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

CHURCH COMMITTEE

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1A

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

08/09/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

v9.1

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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178-10004-10136

May 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

GENERAL SCOWCROFI

Assassination Plots

On Friday, May 23, Director Colby continued his testimony on covert

actions before the Church Committee. Prior to his appearance, the

Director had been enjoined by Mr. Buchen and Mr. Hills to refrain from

answering questions on assassination plots on the grounds that research

to date on this matter was incomplete and that in the interest of preclud-

ing the risk of damage to persons that could arise from ambiguous

references in the material, additional time would be necessary. During

his appearance, the Director was questioned on the existence in the past

of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. Notwithstanding the above guidance,

Director Colby elaborated in great detail the involvement of the CIA with

underworld figures in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro during the period

from 1960 until 1965. Following his testimony, the Director provided

copies of two documents: one of these summarized a meeting of the

Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office in August 1962

at which the subject of assassination was raised by Secretary McNamara.

The other document, which flowed from the same meeting, was a tasking

directive written by Major General Edward Lansdale, which called for

planning in several areas to include the possible "liquidation of Cuban

leaders." Since the hearing on Friday, the Committee has also requested

copies of three 1967 reports by the Inspector General of the CIA dealing

with plots to assassinate Castro, Trujillo and Diem. This memorandum

addresses the contents of those reports as a basis for reaching decisions

on the Administration's response to the Committee's request.

Plots Against Castro

The Inspector General's report treats exhaustively all written and oral

evidence available in 1967 concerning various plots to assassinate Fidel

Castro.

From the report, the following facts based upon incontrovertible

evidence,

are clear:

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-- CIA twice (first in early 1961 and again in early 1962) supplied

lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working in

behalf of CIA in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1961

plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished in

1962 were passed by the gambling syndicate representative to

a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who in turn had them sent to

Cuba in May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that

a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for

the operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team was

to make an attempt on Castro's life.-- perhaps using the pills.

-- As mentioned above, there was a meeting of the Special Group

(Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's conference room on 10 August

1.962 at which Secretary McNamara broached the subject of

liquidation of Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a

memorandum under a program designated Project Mongoose

prepared by General Edward Lansdale which also mentioned the

liquidation of Cuban leaders. No details as to further action

taken pursuant to this directive are as yet available.

-- A ClA officer passed an assassination weapon to an Agency Cuban

asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 November 1963. The weapon

was a ball-point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe. The CLA

officer suggested that the Cuban asset load the syringe with

Black Leaf 40 for use against Castro.

From the above, it is clear that the CIA did in fact develop plans to assas-

sinate Castro. The first seriously pursued plan was conceived in August

1960. It involved the use of members of the criminal underworld with

contacts inside Cuba. The operation had two phases: the first ran from

August 1960 until late April or early May 1961 when it was terminated

following the Bay of Pigs; the second ran from April 1962 until February

1963 and was a revival of the first phase which had been inactive since

May 1961.

The report provides only a sketchy basis for determining to what extent

authorities outside the Agency may have directed or influenced the CLA

to develop and carry out assassination plots. The authors of the report

do state, however:

"We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency

officers felt themselves subject to the Kennedy Administration's

severe pressures to do something about Castro and his regime."

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Separately, in describing actions taken by Richard Bissell early in the

Kennedy Administration to establish an executive action capability ("a

general standby capability to carry out assassinations when required"),

the report quotes Bissell as saying: "The White House has twice urged

me to create such a capability." The only other suggestive reference

in the IG's report is to a CIA statement in one of its contingency plans

that the elimination of the dominant figure in a government would not

necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This contingency

plan was developed in response to a request from General Taylor for a

plan apparently designed to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro

regime. It is understood that "The Taylor Report" which deals with

this espisode is now held by the CIA. A copy has been requested for

review at the White House.

The underworld-connected plot mentioned above began with a request

from Richard Bissell to the Director of Security that he investigate the

possibility of establishing contacts with underworld figures who might

have gambling connections in Cuba for the purpose of effecting the assas-

sination of Fidel Castro. This request led to Agency contacts with

Robert A. Maheu, a private investigator who had done sensitive work for

the Agency and who had been a special agent for the FBI. Maheu in turn

developed contacts with underworld figures (Johnny Roselli and Sam Gian-

cana).

The latter two, affiliated with gambling operations in Cuba, estab-

lished the link with in-country persons who were ultimately to perform

the assassination.

The details of the above episode are treated at length in the report to

include the identities of the technicians, scientists, station chiefs, and

divisions heads within the Agency that were involved in any respect.

Apart from this operation, several other aborted schemes are summarized

such as: a plan in August 1960 to pass a box of cigars contaminated with

lethal botulinum toxin to Castro; a concept plan for contaminating a radio

station where Castro was expected to speak with LSD in the expectation

that he would then make a fool of himself on Cuban television; a plan to

seed a depilatory into Castro's clothing during foreign travel which would

cause his beard to fall out; a plot to have William Donovan present Castro

with a skin diving suit which was contaminated with poison; and a scheme

to place an explosive sea shell on the floor of the ocean where Castro was

known to go skin diving.

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With regard to the only serious plan, that involving underworld figures,

the following persons were identified

as being witting: Alan Dulles, General

Cabel, DDCI; Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans; Richard Helms,

successor Deputy Director for Plans; Sheffield Edwards, Director of

Security; James O'Connell, Office of Security; J.D. Esterline, Chief,

Western Hemisphere Division; Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, Technical

Services Division (TSD);*Ray Treichler, Chemical Division, TSD;

Edward Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services Branch;

William Harvey, Chief, Foreign Intelligence (Domestic) Division;

Sydney Gottlieb, Special Assistant to Bissell; Robert Bannerman, Deputy

Director of Security; J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;

Robert Maheu, a private investigator, John Roselli; Sam Giancana; Santos

Trafficante and Antonio Varona (both inside men in Cuba). In addition,

the Agency's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston and Attorney General,

Robert Kennedy learned the full details of the operation in May 1962,

following its termination. It is further speculated that the following per -

sons have learned of the operation in the intervening years: Edward P.

Morgan, Maheu's attorney; columnist Drew Pearson and his partner,

Jack Anderson; Chief Justice Earl Warren; James Rowley, Chief of the

Secret Service, Pat Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, Attorney

General, Ramsey Clark; and various members of the FBI. Virtually all

of the information above, except for the names of the persons involved,

was disclosed during Director Colby's testimony on Friday.

Trujillo Plots

U.S. involvement with local Dominican groups plotting the assassination

of Trujillo began in November 1959 and carried through the actual assas-

sination on May 30, 1961. The IG report details the nature of this involve-

ment which included: approval of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American Affairs (Roy R. Rubottom), and the CIA Division Chief for the

Western Hemisphere for cooperation with dissident Dominican groups

whose objectives were known to both men to include assassination of

Trujillo; approval by these same parties and Deputy Director for Plans

Bissell of the provision of automatic carbine rifles to the dissident groups;

active encouragement by the U.S. Consul. to the dissident groups; and

involvement of a private U.S. citizen in the Dominican Republic as a go-

between for the Consulate with the dissident groups in providing the arms.

With regard to the awareness by higher authorities of this U.S. involvement,

a meeting was held on June 9, 1961 at the Department of State attended by

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Vice President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer,

Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alex Johnson, Director

of USIA Edward R. Murrow, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard Good-

win, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion, and Mr.

Jamison (Agency unknown). At this meeting Vice President Johnson

referred to a message from Consul General Deerborn concerning the

possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of arms to the

dissidents. The Vice President then asked for details as to the timing and

authority for the delivery of the arms. There is no record to indicate that

anyone at the meeting expressed awareness or lack of awareness of U.S.

involvement in the operation. Another memorandum for the record exists

concerning a meeting at the White House on June 7, 1961 chaired by the

President at which the Vice President was also in attendance. Similarly,

at this meeting there was no indication of Presidential or other high level

awareness of U.S. involvement in the operation.

The Diem Coup

The third Inspector General's report (May 31, 1967) details U.S. policy

toward and dialogue with Generals of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces

who successfully conducted the coup against President Diem and his brother

Nhu. on November 1, 1963. The period in question was from August through

October during which time U.S. support shifted away from Diem and to

opposition forces. The record of exchanges makes clear that the decision

to provide U.S. encouragement to opposition forces was taken by the Presi-

dent upon the advice of virtually all members of the bureaucracy with the

notable exception of the DCI and the Station Chief. At the same time, there

was never any consideration or discussion of providing overt or covert

U.S. support for an assassination. There was, however, general recogni-

tion of the fact that the coup, weretto take place, could be a violent one. On

the one occasion in which assassination was reported from the field as a

possibility, Director McCone issued a strong warning that no U.S. support

for such an assassination attempt should be considered.

Apart from making clear U.S. support for opposition forces, the IG report

also notes that cross border operations were taking place at this time.

Summary

It is difficult to establish perspective over the Administration's position to

be taken at this point in the Church Committee's investigation. Prior to the

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disclosure by the Director on Friday, May 23, of detailed U.S. Govern-

ment involvement in plots to assassinate Castro, the Administration's

position had been to seek to have this kind of extremely sensitive informa-

tion handled on a close-hold basis with the Chairman and Vice Chairman

of the Committee. The Director's testimony and the subsequent disclosure

of U.S. involvement in coup and assassination planning foreshadows

severe damage to the foreign relations of the United States in the months

ahead. An important collateral impact upon the United States intelligence

system will undoubtedly result from the legislative restrictions that may

be anticipated on future activities of the CIA and other intelligence gathering

bodies. In addition, a significant threat is posed that public disclosure of

the details of these several operations will compromise and endanger

sensitive sources and methods. Thus, at least three serious areas of

damage maybe anticipated: to the image of the United States abroad and its

foreign relations with specific countries; to the integrity of the U.S. intel-

ligence gathering system; and to sources and methods. It is doubtful that

the Committee would be responsive to an Administration request to limit

the scope of their activities in order to limit the damage that is anticipated

in these three areas. Unfortunately, it is probable that the only deterring

element that will be effective concerns the sensitivity of the Committee to

the disclosure of witting involvement in the planning and execution of these

operations by Cabinet and higher-level officials of the Government.

It is understood that the preliminary report of the Rockefeller Commission

establishes no basis for alleging significant involvement in these operations

of persons outside the CIA. Nor does the documentation thus far available

conclusively demonstrate such involvement. At the same time, it is clear

that we simply do not know exactly how the many decisions were reached

and to what extent non-intelligence persons were involved. In order to

facilitate presenting comprehensive responses to the Committee in this

regard, it is recommended that the agencies involved (DOD, CIA, State,

and the NSC) be tasked immediately to forward all documents which bear

in any way on any phase of the operations in question.

With regard to the immediate problem -- following up on Director Colby's

commitment to provide the Inspector General's reports to the Committee --

it is considered unrealistic to expect that this may be avoided. Accordingly,

it is recommended that the three reports (on Castro, Trujillo and Diem)

be delivered to the Chairman. Apart from doing so, however (and in

accordance with procedures accepted by the Chairman), it is recommended

that the names of sources and unwitting participants be excised from the

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reports. Further, it is recommended that mention of operations having

no relationship to the events being considered le. g. references in the

Castro report to Mossadeq and Lumumba) be excised on the basis that

the public disclosure of these references could seriously damage the

foreign relations of the United States.

As a final measure; it is recommended that the Agency representatives

responsible for coordinating Administration responses to the Committee's

request, be convened in a meeting at which procedures agreed upon at the

outset of the investigation be reaffirmed. That is, that all requests for

information be reported to the Office of White House Counsel and that no

response be provided verbally or in writing to the Committee unless

cleared by the Office

of White House

Counsel.

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