## Page 1

104-10102-10224

26808 *

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

RETURNTO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

#913

---

## Page 2

7 SECRET

SENSITIVE

O TRATTONAL PRAN • CYA

DIALTINN

In More, 1932

Io S794196

A. Thi propose of alla plea daico oneliao the accor in ta

Bo: N07 Esa pespora al tale plea tha Sallontag aenenyt1ovn

A50 sadas

Nond des

s. Seolate Cartro/Commalen fras other Haatern

Endopbero satione.

Do l'aLtrade cho Castrol Communiat regina Gut Gut:

e 1n che Montepherse

tre se

ponde sad political pecari=s

che Castro/Conada seglia to ratard devatio.

"DonE al tha cabe econoy dad salatala e strain

от 8108 rоronsв08.

do. Malatalo ansia coverago al Cuber Inta!!!g?

THIS DOCUMONT IS

A SCUF.CI RETORENCE

IN CS TITSTORICAL. e.

PAPIR NO..

so properad to capitalleo an eny elgalliene

-DỌ NOI DESTROY-

upolatar, opllo da Cab

37909110, or spll:

SECRET

SENSITIVE

---

## Page 3

N7 SERET

-SMISIIVE

∞200

0s Cabea-B100 50Laz1098418".

I80i

i vrieed

1997058

Slệ n

El conerely roppore che dbo

obfeastros ulch groppes ta Geba

1O21384

V: 8.. 03810001

ndtaa lakalligenco conerago of tebr

eeta perelanles empbande on tha collomtng1

lsle nd inceacloce of the casero

avitles of Cabes C-2.

nes 9s1v1elas 13 Caba.

ns ds seleae fadladias the toms and

mpor of tha popolaztos..

1111815y and dilela ordor of bazzio.

ar, ye?

u of pores and/os strane and atrada metir

the Pones centet la cha fubes jovero-m:.

8o sóvdas/Cuben end Oissano/Cuhen rolatloaz»lpr.

h.: Iconosto

- PolfElceli

ta Meodat end ropporé Stito la nay foinblo aotlou to

dovotop 2611T9 0A8 S0d Latts AssX1can somtiy sipp771

los tho eoace

SIRET

*оху 01 CaRtro.

GROUP Y

Exsludad (ram astamatic

SENSITIVE

deingrading and

Iac/essitlcalion

---

## Page 4

WIN SECHET

SENTITNE

lealer Brate da che

meed to soch schas

ceriag tho

Partieipato la intar-egenay essoulo action mlarining

assential material anl supplies four remhlas

sabe

Usass

Free Horld Trade

with Gubne

realst Centro/Cosmalta

₴

Premedt to Camo Mano la Sebo, la the Inspiere

and alsenbera.

3. Develop and explode tendons basires Cobe sud Sort»?

bles neabora.

Be

SENSITIVE

arad te coveray pronida slaled personea!

towagradiaz and

tastassificatias

---

## Page 5

SEASITIE

so preparad to a

egalant Cabe.

into approv

nould be ro

it tintelligence

ens belleup as intolligenes sonate sunt ba

and охреай

1a Can

Katabllet

eater

eisurtio

ve of rebleblo, nea

mors oxlelcal so poll

la Code.

radaios of lozal cravalors

1a ihe 02o pollas, and rallela pace. (1311

*SENSITIVE

CAnip 1

Exclutsi fr: 1 automatic

dix iTar ng and

Ci8 38 191ln0

---

## Page 6

SNES

тач! ПарАсТТОУ отА.

Inp1AntAt100 0l

meat of s'alsales

JE,4a07

ing;

Malin

13S COL

LISTES

34

alatala satise

---

## Page 7

Vi.

SENSITIVE

1a Malaçalo calllalent covers neveco to mar pagalai

nato londed os crl in apperrad D, Si M1116087

bara (98A5Pa) 808859 189

435 7.44

y be bald externally.

TANTO CITE TE AI

вд,

SESTINE

SECRET

Es line fe topa e)

---

## Page 8

COD SECRET - SENSITIVE

27 November 1962

Note:

UNSCUSSEd AT Neve:the:

1082 by DD/S MItU

1'6. 1

#NO ADDIOTEN CURETIN:

In priociple.ug

IC1.

PUllY CONCUIIMI

by DD/B.

MTHORANDUN YOR: DITOCtOI Of Central IntellIgeRCo

THROUGO:

SUBJECT:

Doputy Director (PlADS)

Operatinual Ples for Continuing

Orarstions Agrinst Cube

I. Action: This senorandus 18 for your information

ADd JUXANADE tO YOUT XOQUEST. ROCOMMANDAtIONS TOF NOTION 1 19

contained 10 Peragraph l bolow. The purpose "l this nenturory:

18 to dollneato an operational plan for the action vaict ir

believe should be taken by CIA against Cubs sur the predictanle

futuro, In sunnary the plan provides for cratiaulas, eveu

Intenallylan, the intelligenco elfort asainst Cuba and sir:

the reorientation of the current effort into i loug term

dented area type of operation of the highest irlority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The Unlted Staten Goverment will ¿lie public

assurances tuat, proulded do nuclasr or offenalve weapore ::r

present or sa-latroduced iato Cuba, and provided Cudri deer

not tako setdon to threaten the porco ond sceurity of tre

Hestern lesisphere, the United States does not intend

THIS DOC!!

Lavade Cuba so support an 1nva810n o1 Cuba:

A SCUE ON

0D SECRST - SENSITIVE

PAPER 10. -

-DO NOT PLALEROX

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## Page 9

B.

These assurances will preclude any neaningful CIA

notion'on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cubr, sinue

unless there are major changes in operational and Internal con-

ditlons in Cuba, such a revolt 11 provoked would be totally

destroyed by Cuban counteractios 1ns matter of hours or, at

mont oN dare antone supported by a major Walted States

Military comnitment.. In addition, the son-iavasion assurances

as a practical natter uill. preclude invading Cuba on the pretext

of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanano.

C. CIA operations lavolving a high noise level and a

diatinct.olenent.of attributability, particularly paranilitary,

guerrilläi and commando type operations vill be unacceptable

as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remals in power for

, the indefinite future. with lts security and control apparatus

rolatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing

unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational

conditiong in Cuba

Increasingly d1ff1cult. While it 18

possible that recent and future developments including the

Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may

serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no barr

indication that the control of the Castro-communist reglne over

Cuba bas been substantially weakenod.

I.. The Ualted States assurances of no Invasion and no

support olian Invasion will, 1n effect, constitute giving tr

Castro and his regime a certain degree of sonctuary. This will.

-2-

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## Page 10

severely dange the sorala and notivation of anti-rogine Cabare

both inalde and outside of Cube, which t1ll nate it Incressingi

difficult for us to recrult agents, maintain arents already

recrulted, and continue or Intensily our intelligence und other

effOrtE against cuba and tho Castro-communist regino.

?: Despite the shove lectons, llehgr Authority probably

M1l) contlavo heavy promise on the CIA sos a meximi 0110rt

agalast Cuba and say eyes continue to contend that the ultimato.

objective 1a the overthrow of the Castro-comuniat regine.

Tals 10 an unrealIstic objective, bonever, except. on a very

long-tora baslo as the Valted Statos Goveranent,, me bolleve,

wild so unailling ln the Immediato suture to comit troops

to support such an ovorthron. The Unltod Statos Government

is 1ts overt dealinga nith the Cubes exiles probably will not

esprais the above factors to then in the context of with the

bluntrons stated here.

G. In VIan of these factors, the so-called iTrack Trai

• courso 01 actIon, 1.0., unzlalted support 01 Cuban exiles

and exile groups tith no real control os objective purposes

In the hope that these groups will be ablo to shake the

Cantro regine will, although unrealistic, bacore Increasingly

attractive at varlous levels in the lalted States Goverment.

H. As a matter of polley, polltical pressures and

•conomLe pregsures short of blockado, Iaide, and arETessive

sabotago igalast Cuba will be continued.

=3 m

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I. In vlen of the abova assumptions peramilitary, commands

and sabotago operations, except in rare selective lustances

→111 serve littlo purpose; alao they will be counter-procuettin

sInce, 1l undertakes, they will nate the collection of Latalit.

gence more diffleult and should only be undertrien in those vers

sou lastancos nhore an unusually dish roturs can bo demonutrited.

logardians os uhat other pressures are placed on CIA 105

action against Cuba, It would ippear clear that Higher Autlurity

w11]. Insist on s contisued, even intensifled, lutelligence

coverago of Cuba:

I. "In vlen of the policy factors, an lncreased use of

fac111t1on, real estate and basins outside the lalted States,

particularly la'latin Averica, will be both necessary and

desirable.

I. Adequate serial reconnainance of Cuba Mill continuo.

iI: OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectiven

appear to be proper for continuing CIA operatious agalnst

A. Jase all feasiblo clandestine action to isolate

and assist in isolating the Castro-conmunist reflue in Cula

fron the rest of the lestern Hemlaphere and the rest of the

Free world.

B. To thó saximum estont possible, discredit the Castro-

communist regine is Cuba and in the festern Herisphere and the

rost of the world.

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## Page 12

C. Malntain through clandestine neans, short of commando

and guerrilla typo operations, the nextaun acononia rad

polltIcal pressures on the cuban regime and economy not only

Sor the purpose of hampering the Cuban regine, but for the

additional purpose of insurine the sarimus possible drain on

Bloc saBOuTces used to support Cubs.

Mnintain naximus possible iatelligence and counter-

Intolligence coverage of Cuba, Including particular emphasis

ОД:

1o. Capabilitles and Intentions of the government.

2. Actirities of the Cuban G-2 and Its Other

security 0rg2r9.

•3. Soviet and Bloc activities: 1a Cuba.

ta State of poteitial resistance, Including the

morale und temper of the populace.

5. M111512 and ailitaty order Of battle and equip-

mont.

5. The loci of power and of possible stresses

and strains in the power centers in the Cuban goverunout.

• 7. Bolationships botrees Cuba, USSR, Red China,

the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free forld

•and uncomitted nations.

8.

The level of and the weaknesses

in the Cuban

-5-

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## Page 13

B. Teko mazlaun action to induce a split in the cuurn

regine hod maintala the capability of capitalizing tunediately

through clandestine neans to the extent possible of any

s1ga1f1csnt uprisias, rovolt, reslatanco, split in the rentao,

or strains and stressos anong Cuban leadership or 1a Cubral

Bloc relationships.

ILL• OPERATIONAL PLAXE

A. Espionage and Intelligence Colloction - All feralble

effort ahould be undertaken to continue and Intenally intell

gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of. our Intelli...

sance colloction and related operational activity at the

presont time and its develophest during the past ait sonths

•is delinested lu detall 1n Attachnent A, which was propired tri

serve as the basis for. the il's report on this particular

, mattor tö the president's Board of Consultants on Foreign

IntollIGenCe, You will note that this lengthy document

breaks down under numerous sub-beadings the intelligence

coverage which has bean developed. by the Clandestine Servire.

Set out below aro specifios of operational action it 1s

proposod to take to continue and, as possible, increase lu.

telligence coverage of auba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of solugees: As fry

know, with tho quarantino and the cessntion of sir

travel the beavy' flow of Cuban refugees has duladled

¡almost to nothing. In vlow of this and in connection

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## Page 14

with the contingoncy planning for surrorting any ronsibl?

milltary actios 11 Cuba, the Opa-Locke Interrogation

Canter as such was disaratled, although the personnel

of the Center have boan retained intact. In order to

re-establiah. the flou of Intalligence fron refugees,

It la proposed that pen American Airways and lal be

Induced to rolnstitute their regular flights IFON

Havani to Haml. This should be done so 800k s8

possible sitor the settlonent of the current sogotirt lons

and UN dlacusslonh.. Colneldent with this, the Ope-locka

refugee interrogation conter vill be re-established

Mith the sana personnol.

•2.: Resident Agents in Cuba: Byery effort will be

ando to continue to exploit. to the fullest, preserve the

V1ab111ty 01 and, there necesasty, re-establish coaminica-

tlons: u1th the 131 recrulted agents now resideat in Cube.

To ais extent, the speed and effectiveness of this efinit

W1l1 of course depend upon the stringency of future

Cuban security and control action, walch It 1s imposslble

a5 yet to accuratoly forecast.

3. Joltd Countsy Operations: The priority on te-

crutting agents in third countries for elapaton to Cuha

will be solterated sod strengthened and every effort

:U1l1 be nade to factense this coverage, both through

the development of additional resideat agents in Cubs

=7-

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## Page 15

and through the development of additioanl logal

24:

1.

traYallers.

"alson/Operatlong: He will continue to

the Elalson soryicos]uho are ansisting ua in the eisort

agatest Cuba for additional coverage, Includiag the

rocrultidy of agents withla thely Out areas for joint

oporating at this polet in this connection are the

[stian, Dutch, Fronde, spaniah, Itallan; Crook,

N0r995120, Daniab, Nost German, Mexican, Argentinian,

Uruguayas, Canadian, Chilers, 2nd IBr2ell) Direct

approschen to several of these gesticeslalther by you

parSOnALlY OF In YOUr DANe, AB yOU DIOfer, AXe

boing separataly reconnended. Personal representation

Dy you to tho services underlined above would be unerus.

Ja additios, no w1ll re-survey all other (ilalson services)

With which to are ln contact and reiterate to those

appearing to have say sssets usablo agalnet Cuba ouI

extrane interest 1n naximus coverage of this probleu.

in connection with the [lalson] problem generally, ve will

endeavor to induce all of the llaison servicealto malia

greater une of their [nationallassets, both inside and

outsido of Cuba. Particular attention w1ll bo given to

possible utilization of the Vatican!

•-3. Heritano Operationas In addition to Inereasing

effortd to get at gonnan agents and other maritime

188ets through flaison services, to will continue our

unilateral third country efforto to recrult seamen ali

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## Page 16

praticulnrly Cuban seaned, to increme the treaty

officers and crew sembers aboard six Cubra vessels ne iro

now running as controlled agents.

6. Pegotiation of Cuban Installations Abroad: At

thes present tine ve are running 12 Cuben diplomats

stationed outside Cube as controlled agenta and have viable

operations almad at as additional 20 Cubra diplonate.

No propose to continue nad latensily the current program

uf attempting to recruit of defact every Cuben official

representative abroad to whom we can gain access nud

COnCerniNg ThOS Ne haVe spy rOSBOR to bellero a

susceptibility to approach extuts. These additional

penetrations will be attempted both throuch uallater. 1]

operatons and whore appropriate in conjunction with

(plainon servicos.)

7.. Audio Penetrations of Cube& Installations

Abroad: At the present the ve hare sudlo and/or

telephone tap coverago of Cuban official lustallations

1a Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England,

Uruguay, Groeco, Spala, France, and Conaria, Ho

ns jOr expRnBiOn Of thIS COVerage 18 presently

contesplated, but we will continue tu survey additi:unl

targets of opportunity and wherever possible lastall

coverago la those cagos there the additional Intelli-

seace fron this type of source over and above wist se

are now recalving mould appear to make such lastallit irin

" worthwhile.

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?.

Communtertions Intelligence:

To will contin

ouf present CIA Close Support coverage fras the KOlA

statton in(liani)at the sano lovel and will continue

to pross ISA for saditional coverage of Cuban comaunler..-

tlong. As the current situation "normalizes" lt should

be pOSSIbIO IOS NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even

1ieToRse their Beaborn latercept COrRIAgO Of Cuball

9. Communist Party Operatione: A couplete survey

las boen sade world-wide of all Communist Party

penetration operations and wherever any such penetration

can be directed against Cuba olther by dispatchiag the

sgent to. Cubs or by pointing the agent agalnst Cubrn

targets, this will be done, except in those cases where

such action rould result in unacceptableprejudice te

the operations 1s the ares where the agent 1s now based.

It la bolleved that the nost lucrativa fleld for the

rodirection o1 such operations to the Cuban targot Fi.!I

Do LAtiO AROTICA WherO there ITE 65 paretrations ol

vasIous conmunist parties. Of this 61, the survey

we have conducted indicates that 23 have some dirert

pertinent acceas to Cubna targeto. All oì these 29 mi!!

Do directed agalnst these targets unlosa in uny case

!:tharo 250 OrestIdinE TORsOrs, to the contrasy. the

"Jenniatos caros 1a the total O1 85 ara baia ladiridurlly

exanined to see is they cas he divertod to Cuban torgets.

•-10-

Too des

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## Page 18

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agonts; The tro

succensful black infiltrated teams (COBRA MAd AUTORRID)

which have produced subatantlal intolligence will be

continuer, resupplled, and roinforced but pointed

ritsarily at continued lntelligence colloction and at

the recrultuent for latelligence collection pusposes ot

other Cubras tho airendy are logally renident la Cuba

In the areas where the terns sto operatine (PlanT Mel

llo and Oriento). In nadition, on the nost carefully

selected baals, where it appears feasible, auditional

igents and teams will be 10f1ltratod black Iato Cuba

11 an effort to duplicato the performance of the COBRA

and ANTORRID torns and particularly to recrult and, se

possiblo, trals additional igents logally resident in

Cuba.

11. Ex313tratloz: AB Seasible, agents and potentlrl

recruIta now 1n Cuba 1ll be exfiltrated for

tra1n1ng, Indoctinatlos, supplying with communications,

and notivation. They will then be re-infiltrated intr

Cube, prinarily on intolligence sissions, there porsible,

this w1ll be done through legal travel channels, but

where this 1s not possible, it w1ll be done wherever

feasiblo through our black infiltration-exfiltration

Incilittes, DIlarily ous maritino assots.

•11-

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B.

Much

of the above affort aa noted vill bo primarily

dIrected tonarin developing all posalble evidences of stress

or stIln althin the regine and between the refine and other

antions, particularly the Bloc. An latensive program will

bi continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity

to ireaken, subvert, os split the regina la apy possiblo.

Sanhion., This in baalcally l long teri offort. A great deal

of torts sirendy bas gone into this and the current

status if this progras and the proposed further expidtation

of the sunerous leads we have developed 1s being nade, 1n

the Interests of brouity in this senorandun, the subject it

a soparato compilation. The offoctiveness of assots alued et

actually splittins the seglue, 1.0., a palrce revolt, will o

course depond, to an extent, on the willingness of the Unlted

Btates Government to suppost then and it is entlialy possible

that any: such offort night fa1l unless supportod with nilitary

Jorces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I

above sould appear ualikely.

C. Sabotage: On the bania of the assumptions set cut

abovo, comando type sabotage, sinor sabotago, and other

acts of sabotage 1nside Cuba vould appear in servo 11tt.le

purpose and should not be undertaken excopt In the rare

instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptabl.

rink to do najor danajo to the Cuban econory. It 15 proposad

to contisue searching fos such llulted opportunities, but.

so sotivo or nica seale progran la contemplrted..

-120

9999573

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## Page 20

Paran1l1tazy, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operation:

Gives the assuaptions 1n ParagIaph I abovo, no uide scale

program nf such actlvity should be undertaken. However, we

pIOpOSe tO MaintaIn is belng our present facilities and

the cipabllity of undertaking such operatine lu order to

"fully exploit any subatantial chango in internal Cubaa con-

ditlons or any substantial rovalt or uprising which night secur.

B...

Econonle Nasfare: It la proposed to continue end

Intensily the progran already undertaken to deny through

•clandestino and covert means critical natarials to the Cubrn

SCORONY.. ThIs COnsistE prinarily of denlal operations, possibly

sone proclusive buying and inducing Iriendly U,S. and alllou

Siras and governients to prevent the allpuenta of atrategle

•natorials. to Cuba.

I, Counterintelligence: The current counterintelllgence

asd CountereSpIOnagO progIan agalast the Cuban G-2 and

related services vlll bo continued and as possible intenallies.

This program bas developod substantially and 1t sbould be

possiblo vithin the coming munths to lncrenge its effoctivrican

considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc Intelll.

gence operations sounted agalast Unlted States Interests

ston cuba.

G. Political ActIoB, Propaganda, PayChologIcal Warfare:

.. In this flald tho followlag tasks vill be continued and where

approptIate Intensifiod:

1.. Assist and support State 1B any Irasible set lin.

-13-

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## Page 21

to dovelop end explolt current DAS and lutin Anoricin

attItudes farorablo to the contalmunt rad/or overthen»

of the Crotre-conmunlet regime.

3, Assist State in the developuent of post-Caster.

• concepts, loadors, and polltical groups.

3, Stlalto, support and guide covertly the

propaganda and polltical action activities of the CRC

and. other Cuban politicai groupe and Individuals, ra

appropriate, who offer a potential for impact laside

DeTOlOD, naintain and exploit the will of the

Cubari people to resist Castro-consualsu, 22k176 naxmun

use of the downgrading of Castro and his regiue durius

the stasile crlsis.

5. Discradit and IIdiculo Castro and dis rogine

10 Cuba, In the Healsphere and elsewhere, with emphnsis

on the thene tho uisgilo crisis demonstrated con-

clualvely that Castro la nothing but a yero pame of

soviet Imperiallan.

.6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-

sponsored Cubas exile radio broadcasts is appropriate.

T. Launch propaganda balloons after sa operational

capability has been established and policy authority is

granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8,, 'Contimo the infiltration of propagaada materinl

Into Cuba vis open sa1ls, legal travellors and courlers,

'with special emphasis on seloctive black rporations.

-11-

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## Page 22

1, Exploitation of Exilo Gruups: He will continue

the clabdestine exploitation.od exilo groups for intelligence

collection, psychological varlare and other approved missless.

•As lenslhlo, we will aot to mount as mich of this effort ro

possible from areas outalde the continental Unlted States, rni

partIcularly fron latis Anerica. II Higher Authority docide

on a "'ack Tro" concept or on any, similar concept maich

.contemplatas heavy. uncontrolled and only generally dirocted

setion operatioos of Cuban groups against Cubs, It 18 bellever

that offorts should be nado to transier as much as possiblo

of the responsibility for this nod-clandestine, non-latell genes

typo operation tato the polltical flold, which is the provinca

/Of the Department of stato..

In this connection, it 1a bollered

1t would bo sarisable to press for the creation within the

¡Dopartment of Stato of an OffICo of Cuban Jollo AlfalIs te

handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile

• IV. ORGANIZATIONAL, AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Haximun Isplomentation of the above plan which provides

Io5 the moat intensive fossible collection ul intelligenc»,

the implonentational relatod prograns as outilied, and tle

nulntenance of capabilities to esploit targets of opportunit

as vell as take advantago of any luture substantial changes

1n Internal Cubes conditions w111, 1t 18 belloved, perait

and make adviaable the following:

-1J

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## Page 23

A. A gradual but substantial reduction In the espendltures

and personnel of Task Foxce W.

B. ConsideratIOn of the re-positIOning of Task fOrCe M

wIthin the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component

01. the iN LivIaton under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational longooso néchanisa.

D. thai renoval of the past tranetort which required

dotalled consideration by the spealal Group (hugented) ol

even minor operational details and decision by committee un

points which 1t is bolleyed are completely within the purvlar

of the DCI and those officers to whon he delegates decision.

• To. RECONMENDED ACTION:

A.. Tour concurrence in the above general operational plan

15 rocosmended.

B. •It 18 Incommended that you discuss this plan with

the Spocial. Group (lugnezted) sud secure its concurrence.

C. It 1a recomonded that you secure tron the Speeinl.

Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce ran

AnorIChs AlIways and full to resume their fligita between #lail

and davisa at the appropriate time.

It is reconnended that 11 any "Trnck Two" concert

Is proposed, you endeavor to tranater to the Department «!

State all possible overt ispects of this type of uncontrolled

- 16=

--

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## Page 24

subaldy and support of Cuban oxile ssoups.

It to reconnended that the Hongoose operationel

mactinnisa be abollshed.

1: Il you concur in this concept, specifio recomendation:

vill bo sido to you conceralig the so-positioning of Tosi Fordo

HILLIAM K.

HARVEY

ChLOI, TREk SOrCO W

19...

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