Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER :

180-10145-10148

RECORD SERIES: CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 50-61-01

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

DATE :

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

00/00/0000

27

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

SSCI

CIA, METHODOLOGY

CIA, FILES

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS :

1A

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

08/25/1995

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 27

KH 53080

DocId: 32272935

Page 1

Date:

4/18/201

Released under the John"

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 53080 Date:

06-05-2017

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## Page 2

Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two

general conclusions.

First,

the SSC Final Report contains numerous

factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera-

tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents.

Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren

Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-

Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for

tis: concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its

traitrent as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to

enaracterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the

prosien of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused

Be inceiligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has

reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it

nas is badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

9

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fittest

future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited

its inquiry to

normal avenues of investigation, i

it would have served

to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader

view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific

terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet

or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of

the time.

It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous

criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader

initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as.

they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had

no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place

of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has

undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings

are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA

cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have

been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of

Ere Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions

already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of

President Kennedy.

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CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the

Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in

detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that

it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for

specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren

commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times;

it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However,

to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of

evidence that must still control how the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission

inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy

Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final

Report refers briefly to some of

the more dramatic events, such as

the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962

(see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American

policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro

regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-

vocative.

Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been

viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,

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SECTET

economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re-

ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of

covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963

President Kennedy - four days before his death -- delivered a major

policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban

revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what

"White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban

people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who

conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.

Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other

elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from

private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles

spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban

intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America

and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to

CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration,

whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took

what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions

between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in

the public domain. -That consideration was given the possibility of

2

HH

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Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly

reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request

was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel-

ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being

faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it

could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its

staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the

murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary

a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of

public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the

intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention

in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that

there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President

Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro-

voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life.

However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it

had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern-

ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.s.

operations against Cuba. "

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BACKGROUND

In April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study

Government Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

(SSC) published their Final Report (Book V)

which in essence

faulted the CIA for its errors of ommission in not informing

the Warren Commission of the Agency's on-going plots against

the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the

the premier, Fidel Castro.

The Committee's rationale

is detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings, but one paragraph

succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CIA officials also

should have realized that

their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investi-

gate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections.

should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, par-

ticularly operations involving the assassination of Castro,

needed to be considered in the investigation.

Yet, they

directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation with

out telling them of these vital facts. Those officials, whom

the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the

Warren Commission that the CIA had no evidence of a foreign

conspiracy."

(p. 7, BOOk V)

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect"

that Book V occasioned in the

media, the CIA prepared

a com-

prehensive report in 1977 designed to answer, at least within

the Agency, the critical questions posited in the SSC Final

However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes

the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow

response to the Warren

Commission's quest for all possible relevant information.

"buyword" upon which both

the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance

of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work. On page

10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges

that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Com-

mission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of in-

vestigation, it would have served to re-inforce the

it would haven

credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view

of the matter.

CIA, too, could have considered in

specific terms what most

saw in general terms -- the

possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the

assassination (JFK) because of tensions of

The agency should have taken bronder initiatives,

then, as well."

(p. 10, 1977 Report)

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Page Two

It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail

the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard

to the significance to the work of the warren Commission

of the CIA's Castro assassination 'attampts' and to resolve

the parties controversy as to the operations' importance.

Instead, this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review

of all the facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of

organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in

the CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-1963. Certain

influences and conclusions will then be drawn upon the nature,

scope, and motivation of the syndicate participants in the

operations.

INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CIA PLOTS

TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO

The genesis of the utilization of the United States

criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro

is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring

during

a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans,

Richard Bissell, and the Pirector of the office of Security,

Colonel Sheffield Edwards.

(1967 IG Report, P. ; Interim

Report, p. 74) Edwards assigned the specific tasks of

locating

the right party to

"eliminate or assassinate" Castro

to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the opera-

tional support Division of the office of security.

Both men

agreed

that Robert A. Maheu,

who had been previously

utilized by the Agency in several

sensitive covert operations,

would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ-as to who initially

brought up John Roselli's name for consideration, there was a

meeting between Maheu and Roselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant

in Los Angeles

in early September 1960. (Interim Report, p.

75)

Comment: Maheu seems the logical person to have

thought of and contacted

Roselli for several reasons.

In the

**

Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell

are detailed on pp. 74-75, Interim Report.

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## Page 9

Page Three

Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there

is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews

the Mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that: "Mr. Maheu

advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions

while visiting Las Vegas.

He only knew him casually through

other clients, but was given to understand that he was a

high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the

ice making machines on the Strip!

Maheu reasoned that, if

Roselli was, in fact, a member of the clan, he undoubtedly

had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.")

(Comment:

Confirmation of the earliest Maheu-Roselli

contact

is gound in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an

alleged telephone call in 1959 from Maheu to Roselli.) (See

Roselli Write-up)

(Comment: Maheu and Roselli had mutual contacts in

Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of

the Las Vegas Sun.)

Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed

to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to

discuss further details. (Interim Report, p. 76; Office of

Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 November 1970) Al-

though the Inspector General's Report placed the meeting at

the Plaza Hilton on 14 September 1960, Roselli recalled that

the discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United

(Comment: Tony de Varona admits going to New York City

at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was

in contact with Roselli at this time or (éstimony of de

Varona) that his visit had an assassination motivation.

AC-

cording to a 19 November 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this

September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to

introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the

Cuban crowd. ")

(Comment: The timing of the introduction of both

Giancana ('Goid') and Trafficante ('Joe') is important to the

analysis of the "true"

role of the mob in the Castro assassina-

tion plots.

According to the 1967 IG Report, the entrance of

Giancana took place "during the week of 25 September 1960"

...

(1967 IG Report, p. 18))

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p. 76, does not

fix a date certain for Giancana's initial appearance but (al-

though it was "certainly prior to October 18." (p. 76)) be-

cause of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IG September

date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the initiation in

November 1960.

As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned

that Giancana had been introduced to Maheu "prior to October

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## Page 10

Page Four

18" because

(1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October

30, 1960; and (2) DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo, dated

18 October 1960, which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana

as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot

against Castro". (FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 from Hoover

to Bissell, Interim Report, P. 79)

(Comment: Each of the dual reasons listed in the

Interim Report on p. 77 are subject to critical analysis

which will be dealt with separately below.)

(Comment: Although the 1967 IG Report. stated that

"Maheu pointed out 'Gold' to O'Connell from a distance but

O'Connell never met either 'Gold!' or 'Joe'"; the Interim Report

disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's

Senate testimony and stating that "the Support Chief, who

was using the name 'Jim Olds',"

said he had met 'Sam' and

'Joe', once, and then only briefly. (0.C. 5(30) 75, pp. 26-

29; Interim

Report, p. 77))

(Comment: Conflicts appear also on several relatively

minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in New

York City and Miami. For instance:

1. Did Roselli know from the beginning that the

operation was CIA?

a. O'Connell stated that Maheu told Roselli that

they were representing international business interests

whereas Roselli testified that Maheu told him that

O'Connell was CIA

(Interim Report, p. 76).

Also, foot-

note 1 on page 76 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell

"about three weeks after the New York meeting", which

is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that "I

am not kidding.

I know who you work for."

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CIA

initiation is that it is doubtful if Giancana and

Trafficante could have been enlisted unless they could

be sure of government protection.

This theme will be

developed more fully below.

2. Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an

"agent of some business interests of Wall Street that had...

nickel interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli; 6/24/

75, pp. 9, 17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of January 19, 1971, which

stated that "Could the plot against Castro have backfired

against President Kennedy?.... None of the

assassination teams,

however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement.

The CIA

instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge

agsinst Castro for his seizure

of oil holdings."

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• Page Five

In Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli

and

William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of

Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which

exist between the CIA, Senate,

and Anderson versions which

all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3. The alleged "surprise discovery" by Maheu and

O'Connell

as to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe"

is really suspect. First, although it is possible that the

Senate Committee staff overlooked the specific Miami news-

paper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included

pictures of Giancana and Trafficante, thus graphically showing

Maheu and O'Connell the nature of the people with whom they

were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research

Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It

would appear that O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ex

post facto reason for continuing the operation after the

introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States.

O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up

to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the

operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were de-

livered to Roselli, et. al, until approximately March 1961.

Whatever, the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not

find

the Parade

article.

(Interim Report, p. 77, En. 1)

The principals in Phase I of the operation also dis-

agree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold"

and "Joe" in the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a 'key'

role, (Maheu, 7.2.975, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to

someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the

assassination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of

a "back-up" man.

(Roselli, 6/24/75, p. 15)

(Whether Roselli

received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before

Roselli's Senate appearance is open to question.) Roselli's

Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast

to his alleged recountment of Giancana's due to his "knowledge

of the Cuban crowd" which the 19 November 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more

jumbled by the available evidence.

The 1967 IG Report and

Senate Interim Report state that "'Gold' identified 'Joe' to

Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make

arrangments there".

(IG Report, P. 19; Interim Report, p. 77)

To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the

Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 IG Report in stating

that,

"At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating

in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami

and Havana on syndicate business"

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Page Six

(Comment: This factually unsupported assertion runs

contrary to the evidence available through official govern-

ment records of other agencies.

As an example, State Depart-

ment files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport

in Cuba on October

, 1959, and received that document in

Havana on February

, 1960.

(See Trafficante file, State

Department) No records available to the Committee from INS,

State Department, or FBI record any later 1960 travels even

though the Bureau maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante

during this period.

In his Committee testimony, Trafficante

recalled that he made two trips to Cuba after his release

from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within

two or three months after his release from prison.

(Testimony,

pp. 4-53, Oct.

His testimony has some logical

credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either

closed of operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforce-

cy mid-1900.

ment reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami

area consistently

during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however,

Trafficante's role had diminished to a point even below Gian-

cana's.

He had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "trans-

lator"

and was needed only to facilitate conversation between

Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual

assassination.

Interestingly, Trafficante and Roselli's 1975

and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain

in contradiction to the facts as they were being reported in

1963 by the principals.

contradictres for sting ha.

(Comment:

The Senate testimony of Trafficante and

Roselli needs

to be outlined with a view to contrasting the

"courier vs. interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate

did not vigorously cross-examine either man on this discrepancy

nor did the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.)

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching

of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method to be

employed to accomplish the foal.

The Agency took the simplistic,

straight-forward approach of shooting Castro, but this plan

was rejected by Giancana.

In a comment to its 1967 Report,

the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to

the use of

firearms.

He said that no one could be recruited

to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would

be negligible.

Giancana stated a preference for a lethal

pill that would be put into Castro's food and drink...Irafficante

(Joe, the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban

official with access to Castro and presumably of

a.sort that

would enable him to surrepticiously poison Castro.

The gang-

sters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office

Chief and Director General of

the Office of the Prime Minister,

Castro.

The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a

position to received kickbacks from the gambling interests

but had since lost that source of income and needed the money.

(I.G. Report, p. 25)

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Page Seven

(p. 21)

witt

(Comment:

The observations quoted above of the 1967

I.G. Report are extremely significant in several respects.

First, the poison pill modus operandi originated with Gian-

cana,

not the Agency, a point which is crucial to the final

conclusions presented below.

Secondly, Trafficante is

identified as 'having access

to and providing/for the putative

assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent which his self-serving

role description of "interpreter".

His ability to recruit

Orta apparently was directly tied to his former gambling

empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all

his alleged conduct both during and after his Cuban days.)

(See Trafficante prófile.)

(Comment:

during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address

a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank

Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News.

Sturgis was quoted as saying, "the third (assassination) schene

involved planting a bomb in Castro's office.

I had access

to

the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidel's'

private secretary, Juan Orta.

I recruited him to work with

the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana).

What was disturbing to the writers of the 1977 Report

was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with

a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia

connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The Report

references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and

with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's,

Norman Rothman.

(See Rothman profile)

Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob rela-

tionships is the allegation that Sturgis had a role in inspecting

the gambling casinos in Cuba or behalf of the Castro government

and could have developed an interest with Orta in receiving

gambling kickbacks.u

A second aspect of Meskill's news series concerned a

claim of Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis

n 1960 in attempting to poison Castro, which dovetailed with

-he 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically

surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin

had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a

'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's".. (Memo, Hoover to

DCI A.H., DD 10/18/60)

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report

are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be

developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not

know the full extent of syndicate activities....

Additional considerations:

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Page Eight

19t vite and aye beate may

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent

prior to CIA

involvement in late

1960. Also, could have been on-going, when CIA reactivated

plan in 1962, April.

Syndicate operators could have had activities

such as these in New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts

with,

but not a member of the syndicate. Could well have been used

by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He pro-

bably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta

assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation with Orta, it was

not CIA; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate

operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Orta

returned there.

Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC. Interim Report

can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency processed

So date on ric

the poison pills which o'Connell delivered to Roselli. (In-

terim Report, p. 80) The chain of custody, according to the

1967 I.G. Report was for the lethal pills to be delivered

from Roselli to Trafficante.

Although the next intervening

steps remain a mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell that

the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February-

early March 1961. (Interim Report, p. 27; Interim Report,

p. 80)

(Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported the version

of Joe Shimon whose memory was that the money and pills for the

operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleau

Hotel on March 12, 1961

attended by

"Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante

and the Cuban."

(Interim Report, p.81) Shimon's story is

filled with vivid details, which are documented on p. 82 of

the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question

as his account is not shared by anyone else connected with

the plan nor is his relationship with Roselli, Giancana, or

Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a

source for Jack.

Anderson's

column of January 19, 1971, which fixed the date

of the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Roselli

as March 13, 1961, and

contained the report that Castro became

ill a few weeks later.

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.. Page Nine

The real problem with Shimon's story is that the

pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta

could or would not attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently

unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Anderson and his

Senate testimony. Ms

lado

i 2001941; 100193)

(Comment: One additional fact concerning Orta's in-

ability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis

of this report.

Orta "lost his position in Castro's office

on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was

still going on in Miami and Washington"... It would seem though

that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his

access to Castro. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27)

With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results,

the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo

Trafficante assumed command.

Roselli told O'Connell that

"Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban

exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination.

(1967 I.G. Report, P. 29; Interim Report, p. 80)

(Comment: The exile leader was, of course, Tony de

Varona, who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum

of 18 January 1961 associating him with receiving financial

aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which

pre-dated the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction into the CIA-mob plots,

de Varona was already being funded by the Agency through the

Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning

for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent.

Interest in de Varona was also being expressed in

1960-61 by Mike McLaney whose advertising agency was engaged

in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McLaney's

friend "Chirri" or "Chilli" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in

Trafficante's FBI files as a close Cuban associate.))

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the

promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini, McLaney and

Lansky business associates, who

were reportedly working

through a Washington, D. C. public relations firm, Edward K.

Moss and Associates.

Moss had previous CIA associations and

was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the

Cellini benefactors with the understanding that this group

would have "privileged treatment 'in the Cuba of the future.'

Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful." (1967

I.G. Report, p. 30)

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Page Ten

The

Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers

as a

"front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's

admission that Jorge Pujol

approximately

arranged a mutiny in Miami in

1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially

"back" Varona's efforts to "educate the American people about

Castro, which may be a euphenism for anti-Castro plots.

(See Varona transcript.)

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the

Agency organized crime, and other persons interested in

removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varona, pro-

bably independently, as an individual who had the potential

of uniting the multitude of exile groups who were in a continual

internecine turmoil. De Varona was understandably pleased

to permit both the U.S. Government and criminal syndicate to

offer him support and asked no questions as to the

source of

the funds or the motives of his benefactors. (See Varona

testimony).

Although de Varona has no specific memory of meeting

Trafficante,

the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an

"interpreter" in several meetings attended by de Varona,

Roselli, Giancana and other exiles.

These meetings were ar-

ranged

by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner

from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during

the 1960's.

Trafficante claimed that Roselli had previously

recruited Gener, but this appears unlikely in view of Traf-

ficante's long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba, and

Roselli's admission to O'Connell that Trafficante would pro

vide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta, who had

escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

(Comment:

Paralleling the situation at the Senate

hearings during 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's

role changed from his "courier" characterization in 1960-61

as reported by the Agency to Trafficante's "interpreter" state-

ment,

is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with

Trafficante's Committee testimony that he was

an intermediary

with de Varona only for Roselli.

The net result in both

instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure.

(Cf. Fonzi

interview with Gener, May , 1978 and Trafficante testimony,

October 7, 1977.))

If ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the intro-

duction of de Varona into Phase One of the Castro assassination

plots, more confusion surrounds de Varona's actual participa-

tion prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The I.G. Report indi-

cates that de Varona attempted

a second poisoning

before

the Cuban

n invasion but Roselli

• was positive that only one at-

tempti(Orta's) was made. He was also positive that he delivered

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Page Eleven

both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which

roborated by oconell during 2961 me callict la resolved

by the Senate in speculating

"that only one pre-Bay of pigs

attempt was made, and that... (de Varona) was the contact in

the United States who arranged for... (Orta)...to administer

the poison.

(Comment: There appears to be no factual way to resolve

de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts, es-

pecially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills

from Rossselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's

life at any time. (See Varona transcript).)

(Comment: The Agency was aware of the possible dangers

inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots

while continuing his post on the Revolutionary Council.

ever, "steps were taken to end his participation in the

How-

syndicate plan but (they) were apparently ineffective." (1967

I.G. Report, p. 32))

PHASE TWO

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of

Pigs effort curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate

Castro, and it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey

assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made

to re-establish contact with Rosselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during

the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro

does not mean that the mob shared their shyness.

Indeed, both

Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going

operation." (I.G. Report, p. 33)

The exact details of what

that operation might have been has not been uncovered, but

Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces in response to

Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate.

Once again the

ubiquitous de Varona was to provide the individuals who would

carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant differences be-

tween Phase One

and Phase Two of the operation which bear

upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and serious

ness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960

with the Agency.

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•* Page Twelve

First: In Phase One, Rosselli, et. al., demonstrated

their ability to execute the

contract on Castro by naming

their source, who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro

to succeed.

In contrastlthe details of the modus operandi

and the ability of the putative assassins was deliberately

vague.

After Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in

April

infanty m

1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the

lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's

food (which involved) an asset of Varona's who had

access to

someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." (1967 I.G. Report,

p. 47) By June, 1962, after Varona had received money and

munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the

pills into Cuba, "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that

Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what

they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that

they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro.

They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme.

If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or

the persons they recruited were to make the attempt - perhaps

using the pills.

Harvey never learned their names or anything

about them."

(1967 I.G. Report, p. 51)

(Comment: As the 1967 I.G. authors correctly observed,

Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity

was familiar in that Edwards had'

described precisely the same

plan:

"""The fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi

to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa

1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

1. Harvey was correct in

assuming that he was taking.

over an on-going operation in April 1962; or

2.

The mob had been using de Varona before, during and

after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical

support and future protection against the Justice Department; or

3. De Varona was simply making up a story for the

Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to

directions from organized crime.)

7

Second: The cast of underworld characters changed.

Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from..

the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's

"interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban

who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Garcia-Gomez

and Godoy.

(Comment: "Maceo's" introduction into one of the

most sensitive CIA covert actions in history, without any

attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to as-

certain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency ap-

parently went blithely "to bed" with the top hoodlums in

the United States without doing any basic background security

investigation.

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Page Thirteen

Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes "Maceo"

as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual

was drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban

personnel previously used in the attempts and who still

possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies

in Miami

and Cuba.

The termination of the CIA-Mafia plots was slow and

undramatic.

Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harvey that

the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in

Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three-

man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan.

(Interim Report, p. 84)

During September 1962, Rosselli related to Harvey that

de Varona was readying a second three-man team who were

"supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate

Castro's body guard.

During this period, the 'medicine' was

reported as still in place and the three men of the first

team safe." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51) However, the second

team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed

during December and January, 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona

supposedly collected $2,700 for the maintenance of these in-

dividuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from

Harvey. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52)

In mid-January, 1963 both Harvey and Rosselli agreed

that "nothing was happening and that there was not much

chance that anything would happen in the future." (1967 I.G.

Report, p. 52) Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of

touch with Varona which he presumably did. The last meeting

between Harvey and Rosselli occurred in Washington, D. C. in

June 1963, when he was Harvey's overnight guest.

However,

their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any

assassination plots.

Ca man est

Hereg and frolle corses these pote hop i see? -1

CONCLUSION

The available evidence suggests the thesis which, in

part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal

Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is

possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing

additional resources for independent operations that the

syndicate already had under way...In a sense, CIA might

have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to

its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of

official sanction."

(1977 I.G. Report, p. 20)

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• Page Fourteen

The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 October 1960 re: Giancana ELSUR:

... Glancana

reportedly assured those present

that Castro's assassination would occur in November.

Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had al-

ready met with the assassin-to-be on three oc-

casions... Giancana claimed that everything has

been perfected for the killing of Castro, and

that the assassin had arranged with a girl,

not further described, to drop a 'pill' in

some

drink or food of Castro.

(1977 I.G. Report, p. 19)

Comment: Although the dates of initial meetings between

Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana are subject to diffenent interpre-

tation, it is clear that no plans were finalized between the

parties until sometime after October 18, 1960, the date of

the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana.

the poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's

request, were not ready for delivery until late February-

early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's

November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA

operation.

Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison

the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer

its support.

private plot actually worked, and Castro died, then the

syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CIA

which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if

their intrigue back-fired, then their position would be that

they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their

government.

Additional Comment: The actions of Giancana's "hired

hand", Richard Cain, raise some interesting possibilities.

Given Cain's admission

to the FBI that he had joined the

Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Gian-

cana's payroll

Cain's approach to the CIA Chicago Office in

che fall of 1960 to volunteer information on the Cuban com-

munity appears a little more than coincidental. Then when

FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life

i that no as

Magazine (one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in

Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story), the

coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain

was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt

on Fidel Castro.

Cain could be the "assassin-to-be" whom Gian-

cana referred to in the FBI memo of October 18, 1960 or he

could be the contact man for the operation.

(Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is

strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing

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Page Fifteen

second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of October 30, 1960.

Maheu needs to be questioned on this point.)

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and

assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963.

In August, 1963,

he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago

to that office of the Agency.

Interestingly, Cubela was the

former head of the Director's in Cuba when he was a major power

in deposing Batista.

In September, 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago

office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large

picture", a directive which is subject to several interpre-

tations,

including the fact that the CIA was a willing

participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the Chief

Investigator for Cook County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency

some. information that Oswald was in Chicago in April 1963

with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the

assassination rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of the Potential Assassin (s)

In describing

the putative poisoner, Glancana spoke

in October 1960 of a

"girl" who was

close to Castro while the

individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a

secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Giancana

can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the

best position to recruit one of Castro's Cuban mistresses

due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and

prostitution circles.

It was common for American gamblers to have Cuban

mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman and Tourine were typical

examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro

was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by

Mike McLaney) unescorter on a regular basis to visit one of

his paramours.

Thus, it would have been relatively easy for

Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service

Castro and to attempt to poison him.

(Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness, to say the least,

and her potential as a assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has

been previously discussed.

However, she was also Charles

Tourine's mistress and, thus, could

have been solicited to

activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally

uncooperative and Lorenz

was not asked about her relationship

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Page Sixteen

with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment:

Juan Orta, the man identified to the

Agency as the gangsters' contact in Castro's inner circle,

was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former

receipt of gambling "kickbacks".

One fact is extremely bothersome, however, in attampt-

ing to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta

to execute the assassination plan.

ACcordIna to the 196/ 1.G.

Report (p. 28), Orta

"lost his position in the Prime Minister's

Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation

was still going on in Miami and in Washington."

According

to

the official version Orta receipted for the pills in late

February-early March 1961 and "kept the pills for a couple of

weeks before returning them". (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27)

If

the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in

and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his

position of accessibility.

The other possibility

exists,

i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus

available to give to de Varona when he was brought into

the plot.

The question arises, then, as to whether the mob was

pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or,

what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the

ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase Two of the operation which began in

April 1962, the same possibilities exist.

If Harvey and

O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into

an "on-going operation", then it can be assumed that the mob's

relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated CIA participation

1g opera do varone

according to FBI memos of 21 December 1960 and 18 January 1961

had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs. With

the

resumption of the CIA's participation, funding and material

support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although

de Varona would continue to deal through his mob contacts,

Rosselli and "Maceo"

Due to the loose structure of Phase Two in terms of

the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the

lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete

reliance of Harvey upon Rosselli's word that activities were

actually being carried out,

the Agency's lack of interest or

ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the speculation

arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate

Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of

Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen,

Trafficante, Lansky and other Cuba casino owners must have

realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last

egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere.

Certainly,

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Page Seventeen

the evidence shows growning Lansky influence in the Bahamas,

Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic,

and

a new opportunity for collid

operations in Florida with

the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles.

It was also abundantly

clear that the new Justice Department program on organized

crime would never permit the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-

Kennedy era even if Castro and all his Communist associates

could be eliminated.

Despite the relatively useless business sense in

continuing the assassination

attempts against Castro in a sub

stantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the

Agency along"

• First, there was no expense to the syndicate

because the Agency was providing full logistical support for

Varona.

Secondly, there was the mounting pressure from the

FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible.

No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than

to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look

at the record shows the employment of this strategy at moments

of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1.

Robert Maheu

- Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966.

(Interim Report, p. 79, note 3; Interview

Edward P. Morgan)

- Solidification of position with CIA and with

Hughes Organization. (Hughes was definitely

told of the project by Maheu in November 1960

and was himself

in an alliance with

the CIA which, in fact, occurred later when

Maheu was Hughes' principal agent.) (Interim

Report, P. 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony ?)

- Dispute with Hughes.

See memo 20 May 1971 in

Office of Security file on Edward P. Morgan.

2. John Rosselli

- Avoiding criminal prosecution. (Interim REport,

p. 85, note 4)

-- Use in legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to

reduce sentence.

- Attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS

which included Jack Anderson's personal inter-

vention with IRS.

(See Anderson Interview;

CIA Rosselli file; CIA Office of Security file

re: Edward P. Morgan)

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Page Eighteen

3.

Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where

Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for

him by claiming the tap was

a result of the

CIA plots.

Early 1962, intervention with FNU Farrell of

INS re: possible deportation.

(See Tab C

Rosselli CIA file, stating that only Edwards,

Osborn,

Angleton, Rocca and Houston know.)

Patre: Chest

Attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963.

(1967 I.G. Report, P. 129)

Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967,

Sam commented that Giancana and Rosselli have

CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation".

He said that he doubted that the FBI would

be able to do anything about either Rosselli

or Giancana because of "their previous activities

with your people."

(196] I.G. Report, P. 131).

NOTES RE: JACK ANDERSON

"CASTRO RETALIATION" THEORY

March

3, 1967)

March

7, 1967)

Drew Pearson article

Source:

1.

1967 I.G. Report:

- It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source,

Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson

the recipients.

(p. 126)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not

patched together from nits and pieces picked up

here and there. His ultimate source, Rosselli,

knows more about certain details than we do,

and he evidently has talked...

(p. 126)

Impact

The Rosselli-

contact in Las Vegas in March

is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports

that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination

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Page Nineteen

in retaliation for U. S. attempts on Castro's life.

We do

not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do

(CIA emphasis) know that there were

such plots against Castro.

Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this.

(p. 127)

Maheu

Does have good reason for not wanting the story

aired further.

Unfavorable publicity might cause him to

lose his lurcative client, Hughes.

There might be some

value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he

approach Morgan and perhaps Rosselli and urge discretion.

- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much

distress, includes one detail that is only found in

Two: the

Phase

three-man team.

Comment:

Not necessarily since Varona was involved

in Phase One also, he may have begun the three-man team

initially and only briefed Rosselli on the concept in Phase

Two or Rosselli just didn't mention the three-man team to

Maheu or O'Connell during Phase One.

Comment: In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a

leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

- If protection was what

the source

was seeking,

he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach

to CIA for help. (p. 125)

Since AGency cannot figure an ulterior motive, they

decide that Rosselli is drinking too much and talking to

Morgan, who is also drinking and talking to Greenspun (and

Pearson.

Comment: Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know,

used two of his

best goodies: the story of

the pills and

the

fact of the State Department meeting.

(p.. 127)

Comment: See p. 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to

have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the

Department of State at which plans for the assassination were

discussed."

I.G. speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10

August 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which

was attended by Harvey. (p. 112)

(REK was not present.)

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Page Twenty

2.

Other Sources

3.

4.

5.

a.

Memo re: 15 February 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose

plots.

He "decided to ignore his threats and

take a calculated risk as to the consequences that

may occur with the disclosure of his story.

This

was

subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in

his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of

the

incident."

(Momo in Office of Security file

re: Morgan)

Memo: 20 MaY 1971

Subject:

Intertel

Mr. Al Pease (former CIA) , now with Intertel,

said Maheu and Anderson together on some oil mix

deals... Recent exposure of Anderson re: Maheu's

role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate ex-

posure instigated by Robert Maheu

using his son

Peter, as an intermediary. Pease's theory is that

Maheu probably would "scare them off" (i.e.,

Intertel would not want CIA stuff to embarrass

Hughes) .

Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials

that they had better take it easy on Maheu because

of his past involvement with CIA (Memo in Security

file

Ie: Morgan).

Memo - 19 November 1970

- Harvey had contacts with Rosselli in November-"

December 1967 and January 1968 following Rosselli

Conviction.

17 November 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who

represented Rosselli that Rosselli faced deporta-

tion and would blow story. DCI decided to

ignore threat and Maheu agreed.

"Maheu further advised that he was not concerned

about any publicity aa it affected him personally."

19 December 1967

Series of conversations instigated by Harvey

on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention

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Page Twenty-One

6.

directly or at least discover how good

Government case against Rosselli was.

Calls from Rosselli began in October to

Rosselli knew what Agency had done

for Maheu with Senator Long because Ed Morgan

told Rosselli.

Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a

news

clipping re: Agency use of Giancana (pre-

sumably the August 1963 Chicago story by Sandy

Smith) .

Rosselli said that the leak came from Senator

Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still

Attorney General.

Memo 28 April 1967

O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source

of Pearson story.

--

Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase

One operation due to Agency delaying on Long

Committee subpoena.

-

Maheu /isibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson

and asked 1t he Maheu had been identifie

as

the

"client" by Morgan because he was afraid

of the publicity affecting his relationship

with Hughes.

--

Maheu denied discussing with Rosselli latter

phase of thai?

and said he had no knowledge"

of operation after April 1962.

Rosselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in

the 1950's.

- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met

with Garrison in Las Vegas during March 1967.

Under the impression that Rosselli seeking legal

advice from Morgan but did not know the circum-

stances.

--

Rosselli under pressure from FBI, drinking

heavily and had a 19-year-old girl.

- Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson

and did know that Anderson had more than a

passing acquaintance with Morgan.

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Page Twenty-Two

Morgan also

tight with Pat Cayne of NSC.

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