ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES
Originator: ARMY
From: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
To: ICCCA
Document date: 03/25/1963
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

198-10004-10053

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

Agency Information

6/24/201

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER:

198-10004-10053

RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ARMY

FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

ТО: ICCCA

TITLE: ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

ACTIVITIES

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

03/25/1963

27

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE - OAS MEMBER STATES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

Secret

RESTRICTIONS:

1B

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/1997

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Califano, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo from Califano to Wheeler, Zumwalt, Abrams, Wendt, Carpenter,

and Elwood concerning a proposal for shared intelligence among OAS member states.

JFKReviaw

Department of the Army EO 13528

l Declassify

#7. Exclude

D Exempt

Authority-

• Refer To.

V9.1

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-605F/wm

26 March 1963

BET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban

Affairs:

The Exchange of Intelligence Concerning

Communist Subversive Activities

1. Reference is made to your Memorandum number 22, subject

as above, dated 25 March 1963.

2.

The paper is

satisfactory to the Navy subject to the

following change:

Page 4, paragraph 3e, last line, change to read as follows:

"navies,-the-lexien-Nery and the US Navy."

REASON:

Mexico has advised that the Navy-to-Navy program

cannot be ratified in view of conflict with domestic law. It

appears unlikely, therefore, that Mexico will contribute to

the program on the level indicated.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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OSA

350.09

3/26/63

3/15/63

W F A WENDT

Director, Strategic Plans Division

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

ICSM-205-63 .

2 8 MAR 1963/

OSA: 350€09-CUBA

MEMCRANDUM FOR INE ESCROTART OF THE ARMY

Subject:

Exchange of hotelligence Concerniag

Communict Sabveratve Activitica (C)

3/28/63

1, This memoradur respondo to CSAM 135-03, dated 23 March

1900, subject as above-

4. Tho paper attached to CEAM 135-63 concerntag the exclange

of intelligence in commuotat endveratos nativittcs bae beon reviewed

by the Joint Chicle of Stal.

le to considored to be a saltafactory response

* the specte problem of eschenging intelligence on communist suh,

votive activities among nations et the Organisation of Amenteen States,

=20j0a8 to the followlag modulication:

13ST3253C; Add the following to the end

of the peasgraph:

*The 0S hid Force, through ite attache ayatens

In katta America, liberice hao an exchango program.

Tals is accomplichod on so laformal bacie end la bllateral

ls natuzé.*

FW

3/15/63

For the Joint Chiots at Stall:

SIGNED

A. H. MANHART

Major General, USA

Deputy Director, Joint Staff

SEGRET

Copy

of

6 or 2

pages series

Copies each

"A"

OSA, A9G O6:ol 13 78 6 8

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OSA

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don Gonna

CATAL, F LOVEALT 18 USA (061)

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Signed

TRA

-. Joseph A. Califaro, Jre

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FW

3/15/63

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As Fisted

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Briy

cc: Mr. Califano

Ist. Col. Patchell

ASG

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

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CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I.

Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through-

out Latin America,

there is a fundamental requirement

intelligence - a requirement which involves the

timely acquisition and processing of information as

well as its rapid dissemination,

on a selective basis,

to countries concerned.

While efforts are now being

made by CIA, AlD, and

the US Military Services to

Improve Latin American intelligence systems, success

thus far has been limited, and much remains

to be done.

It is not with this broad

problem, however, that this

paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the

narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of

exchanging essential information regarding Communist

subversion in Latin America among those who need to

know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions

which tend to

discourage the exchange of intelligence on an

international basis,

even among allies. National

privacy with regard

to the inner workings of an

intelligence system must be preserved.

Com-

pounding the problem further, where Latin America

is concerned, is the divisive

influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and

disputes which have characterized relations among

the nations concerned.

The wounds of past conflicts

among pairs and groupings of nations are not com-

pletely healed.

There is lingering hostility

between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their

boundary war.

Chile and Bolivia continue at

odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of

Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now,

Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within

the

borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras.

It

could hardly be expected that these countries

would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full

and frank basis.

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b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homo-

geneous entity in

social, political, or economic

terms, and

attitudes toward the Castro-Communist

subversive menace vary widely.

A completely

unified

approach toward exchange of intelligence

concerning this menace,

therefore, cannot be

regarded as attainable.

c. Additional impediments to intelligence ex-

change are the generally low level of competence

of most Latin American intelligence services, their

lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the

absence of adequate security systems,

the lack

of security consciousness.

Deficiencies in

security safeguards must necessarily limit the

exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any

of the nations involved, and particularly the

United States, which has the most sophisticated

system and hence

the greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist,

since the

governments of some countries have little desire to

develop a competent career security service.

fear that the existence of an efficient service

would constitute a threat to further activities of

members of the existing governments at such time

as they might find themselves out of power.

over, many Latin

American intelligence services

to label as

"subversives"

those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are

opposed to the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact that

multilateral intelligence exchange must be

approached on a most circumscribed basis.

should not be concluded, however that nothing

of value can be accomplished multilaterally.

With proper definition, limiting the problem

of exchange to matters directly related to communist

subversive activities, such as the movement to and

from Cuba of subversives, the production and

movement of propaganda materials which threaten

internal stability,

and the

movement of funds,

marshal a useful measure of cooperation.

pursuing this effort, it will be important to

a sharp distinction between secret intelligence

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gained by covert means and information obtained

openly.

The former involves the requirement to

protect national secrets both as to sources and

acquisition metnods employed. The latter, which

can be of great value, can be exchanged without

fear of compromise.

2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

The following describe generally the categories

of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material

under each:

a. Travel information - Unevaluated informatior

devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement

of individuals between Latin America and Cuba ör

Soviet Bloc countries.

Such reports can be

reduced to a

few elements such as identification

of the individual, point of departure, date and

time of

departure

or arrival, destination, and

carrier.

When presented in an abbreviated form

such information offers minimum security problems

with respect to exchange with one or more countries.

b. Intelligence information reports - Un-

evaluated information derived from clandestine

collection operations or confidential sources

reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or

communist connected subversive individuals or

groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds;

on shipping and air movements and on results of

surveillance efforts.

Because continued

receipt

of such information by the United States. is dependent

on careful protection of sources and methods of

collection, the exchange of this information with

other countries must be carefully controlled by

c. Intelligence reports and studies - Evaluated

intelligence in all of the above areas, preparea

by an appropriate element of the US government in

a form which is releaseable to other Latin American

countries.

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news

stories drawn from press, periodical and other

overt publishers.

Selected for maximum impact on

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other countries particularly where such infor

mation is not freely available to

security services,

as in the case of foreign broadcast reports.

3. Current Exchange Arrangements

a. At present there is little organized ex-

change of intelligence among the Latin American

nations. There is

a limited amount of informal

exchange, often on a basis of personal relation-

ships between government officials having a

community of interest with respect to a particular

matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has estab-

lished working liaison arrangements in those

Latin American countries where such relations have

been considered

to be in the best interest of the

United States.

Most of

the intelligence concerning

subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is

derived

from covert operations or through contacts

with another intelligence or security service.

This inhibits the passing of

such information to

agencies of a third country.

There is, however, a

substantial amount of intelligence available from

overt or non-sensitive sources which can be pro-

vided to, other countries

In 1962, CIA received

information reports from 26 services with which

liaison

is maintained in Latin America and released

reports to 35 recipients.

Intelligence items

exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelli-

gence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

c. The US Army, through its attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral

exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay,

Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.

Information provided by the Army has been concerned

with subversive personalities: communist infiltration,

weapons movements and related

Reciprocal

intelligence received has been of small value.

' Army also provides selected information on sub-

versive activities

to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala

and Mexico, without reciprocation.

The Navy has

established a Navy-to-Navy program for the ex-

change of intelligence among nine South American

navies, the Mexican Navy and the US Navy.

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d.: Exchanges of information are also effected

from

time to time through channels of the Depart-

ment of State.

e. As yet, however, the program for the pro-

vision by United States agencies of information on

subversion to Latin American governments has not

been developed to an adequate degree.

Since

United States possesses

the most extensive

acquisition capabilities, as well as the only

secure and reliable means of rapid communication

throughout Latin America (currently in process

of improvement), the development of an integrated

United States system for bilateral exchange offers

the greatest possibility of achieving the results

desired.

f. United States experience in the matter of

intelligence exchange in Latin America, and In

other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion

that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than

multilateral arrangements such as those established

within the framework of NATO, CENTO ana SEATO.

Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that

multilateral

arrangements can be of some use,

particularly in creating an awareness of the

need

for intelligence exchange.

S. The concept of an exchange of information

among members of the oAs with regard to subversive

activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-

American meetings, but has not been implemented,

largely for the reasons set forth in Section II. 1.

Inder the Punta del Este decisions, the OAs members

vere urged to cooperate in strenethening

their

capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,

subversion or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and

Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCOS)"

is established to give technical advice on

request

to governments and the Council on matters relating

to subversion.

All American governments have been

asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and

recommendations by the council of the oAs on how to

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counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting,

•the oAs has been making slow progress in the

countersubversion field, but there has

as yet been

no significant exchange of intelligence

through

its machinery:

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has

also demonstrated an awareness of the need for

exchanging intelligence regarding communist sub-

version.

Annex 4 of the General Military Plan

prepared by the IADB requests the American States to

report information to the Board and to establish

agreements among themselves for exchanging infor-

mation of collective interest.

The United States

has approved the General Military Plan, but similar

action has not been taken by all member countries.

1. This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is

much room for expansion of bilateral

intelligence

exchange arrangements among the Latin

American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best,

to create an expanded

program for bilateral intelligence exchange between

the United States and individual countries, and

finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities

of a multilateral approach within the recognized

limitations involved.

III. Existing Programs

Enumerated below are the principal programs now in

progress. They are subject to continuing improvement.

1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being

conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US agencies with their

Latin American counterparte in instances where it has

been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements

for exchange of selected information consistent with

security requirements.

2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the

feasibility and desirability of

establishing military

intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the

Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Commana, Ior Iurther

lissemination of intelligence as appropriate in con-

junction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid

processing and dissemination when appropriate, of

intelligence on subversive activities directly to the

countries concerned through the Us Ambassador.

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3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean

Command by CIA and other elements of the US Embassies

in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for

further dissemination as appropriate.

4. Various agencies of the US Government are now

disseminating to Latin American governments unclassi-

fied studies and reports and other non-sensitive

information concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

5. US Government communications systems through-

out Latin America are being

expanded and improved upon

on a high priority basis.

6. Programs now exist under AlD, CIA, and DOD IOT

the training and equipping of Latin American internal

security and intelligence services.

Additional programs

could be established in other countries where it is

found to be in the best interests of the United States

and

acceptable to the country concerned.

7. All Information received by CIA concerning

travel

to and from Cuba is put into a computer system

capable of producing lists by name, by country, by point

travel, or sorted on various other bases.

IV: New Actions Recommended

1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral

exchange of intelligence,

as described in Section III. 1.

by recommending that the

US Ambassadors utilize the

existing Country Team mechanisms as an intelligence

advisory committee to coordinate procedures for ensuring

timeliness, completeness and freedom from duplication

or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with

the host governments.

2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage.

in bilateral exchange of Intelligence

on Castro-

Communist subversive activities.

3. Arrange for the electrical dissemination to

appropriate batin American governments or daily

summaries of radio broadcast material as

monitored by

the FBID of

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4. Make available to as

many countries as security

permits, sanitized results of the extensive travel

coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency,

already processed by machine. (See paragraph III. 7.)

5. Increase, where feasible, emphasis on the

provision of US intelligence advisors to Latin American

countries.

Discourage the employment of intelligence

advisors from nations other than

• the United

States

except in instances where the United States can arrange

to provide for the training

and control of any

third

country intelligence advisor.

6. Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies

of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which

can be disseminated to selected Latin American govern-

ments.

7. Undertake action in the oAs to stimulate govern-

ments

to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed

on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of

subversive activities

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve

the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence information and

estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive

activities:

9. Undertake action in the OAs to establish a

Security Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of

senior representatives of the appropriate services of

each government to deal with all major aspects of sub-

versive activities in their respective countries, consider

new coordinated plans of action to counter and neutralize

subversion, and implement necessary actions to insure

the most effective and timely exchange

of information

between

the governments

on subversive activities.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

=E18

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

THE JOINT STAFF

25 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Intelligence Paper on Cuba

1. Attached is a copy of the final paper prepared by

my committee on the exchange of intelligence. It reflects

the changes proposed by CIA In our earlier agreed paper,

as well as amendments to the CIA proposals arising from

the meeting of my committee last Saturday.

2. The only change of significance proposed by CIA 1s

found on page

Intelligence ,, paragraph 2,

"Categories of

Exchangeable

This paragraphs as submitted by CIA, would

have seriously limited the kinds of intelligence which we

would exchange with our Latin friends, so much so as to

make the paper relatively insignificant.

At my meeting last Saturday we made the additions

which are underlined in red on page. 3.

Those additions

are designed to vitiate the adverse

restrictions involved

In the CIA proposal. As you will see, the additions

characterize the categories of exchangeable intelligence

only as examples, and add, specifically, all of the intel-

ligence areas In which we

are interested.

3. The remaining changes proposed by CIA were relatively

insignificant - removal from the action category of certain

on-going programs and the addition of CIA's IBM computer

capability among the actions.

4. This paper,

as you see it, was fully concurred in

by my committee,

Including the cla man who, to my surprise,

agreed In the changes which broadened greatly the CIA

contribution. I have forwarded the paper to Cottrell.

Respects,

V. H. KRULAK

Major General, UsMo

Chairman

OSA 350.09 (3/25/63)

Cube

3/15/63

Attachment

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15 MAR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

SUBJECT: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion Report of the Exchange

of Intelligence (U)

OSA:

350. 09-CUBA

Reference is made to the Second Working Draft, Cuba, The

Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist Subversive Activities.

2. The Army Staff has reviewed referenced paper and although it

1s felt that Section II is too long, it concurs in general with the

recommended actions. However, the following changes should be made:

a. Page 2, change last sentence to read:

"A completely... cannot be expected."

b. Page 3, omit second paragraph as superfluous.

c. Page 6, second paragraph:

This entire paragraph should be deleted or the state-

ment proved since Aruy knows of no approved exchange of Information

program between CINCARIBCOM and Latin American countries.

d. Page 7, first sentence second paragraph, change to read:

"The concept

• meetings, but has not been fully

implemented although this subject has been

Included in Intelligence brief

ings presented at the regular meetings of the IADB Council of Delegates."

FW

3/15/63

CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, JR.

Major General, GS

Assistant Deputy Chief of

Staff for Military Operations

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MAn 1.5 1983

MEMORANDON NO. 19 FOR GENIAL MAALS C. VIESITA (100)

CAPSAL 6 CONVAL, 35000(0)

SAIGADER CENTRAL IS ELWOOS, JEMC

Interdogazim estat Coordinating Committee of Cuban Attnire:

Unchange of lot liganes

Attachad is the final drad et

In ligence coocoring commut cubveroive solveins r

prod by the Fobcommitten cs Faiverason of the sabiset committes.

Ao Sodicated is Memmandan No. 15, l la seqnested

that your commate de into papor be rubmited to mo nos letur

thon 1690 houze on March 15, 1963-

This till Do the loot eppostanisy

to comment as tals papor boiore 1e is procested to Tho Pronideal.

Signed

Joseph A. Callison, Jr.

Spaciol Asalutant to thr

Seerctory of the Any

OSA 350.09

CUBA

3-15-63

as stated

Colonel Patchell

Colonel Freda

Mr. Califano

ASG

OSA, ASG Control Mo.le

1IN03S

IN SEC I ME DOC

NIOVIDES DILTAOINY WOTE CANTONE

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

15 March 1963

TO SERVICE, OSD AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS:

This is

our final effort on the paper for

exchange of intelligence. Please give me your views

on the manuscript by 1500 today.

V. H. KRULAK

Major General, USMC

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SECOND WORKING DRAFT

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I.

Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through-

out Latin America, there 1s a fundamental requirement for

Intelligence - a requirement which involves the timely

acquisition and processing of information as well as its

rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries

concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID,

and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American

Intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited,

and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad

problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned,

but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a

stronger program of exchanging essential Information re-

garding Communist subversion in Latin America among those

who need to know it.

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II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage

the exchange of intelligence on an international basis,

even among allies. National privacy with regard to the

inner workings of an intelligence system must be pre-

served. Compounding the problem further, where Latin

America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and dis-

putes which have characterized relations among the

nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among

pairs and groupings of nations are not completely

healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and

Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and

Bolivia continue at odds over the question of Bolivian

access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents

are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica

and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these

countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on

a full and frank basis.

Beyond this, Latin America 1s not a homogeneous en-

tity in social, political, or economic terms, and

attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace

vary widely. A completely unified approach toward

exchange or intelligence concerning this menace, there-

fore, cannot be regarded as attainable.

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An additional impediment to intelligence exchange

is the low level of competence of most Latin American

intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure

means of communication, and the absence of adequate

security systems.and the lack of security conscious-

ness.

Deficiencies in security safeguards must

necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence ob-

tained covertly by any of the nations involved, and

particularly the United States, which has the most

sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for

protection.

This defect promises to persist, since the

governments of some countries have little desire

to develop a competent career security service.

There is a fear that the existence of an efficient

service would constitute a threat to further activi-

ties of members of the existing governments at such

time as they might find themselves out of power.

Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services

tend to label as "subversives" those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are opposed

to the existing government.

These realities all underscore the fact that

multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached

on a

most circumscribed basis. It should not be

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concluded, however, that nothing of value can be

accomplished multilaterally. With proper defini-

tion, limiting the problem of exchange to matters

directly related to communist subversive activities,

such as the movement to and from Cuba of trainees,

the production and movement of propaganda materials

which threaten internal stability, and the movement

of arms, it should be practicable to marshal a useful

measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort,

It will be important to draw a sharp distinction

between secret intelligence gained by covert means

and information obtained openly. The former in-

volves the requirement to protect national secrets

both as

to sources and acquisition methods employed.

The latter, which can be of great value, can be

exchanged without fear of compromise.

2. Current Exchange Arrangements

At present there is Ilttle organized exchange of

intelligence among the Latin American nations.

There is a limited amount of informal exchange,

often on a basis of personal relationships between

government officials having a community of interest

with respect to a particular matter.

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The Central Intelligence Agency has established

working liaison arrangements in some Latin American

countries where such relations have been considered

to be in the best interest of the United States.

Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in

Latin America available to the CIA is derived from

covert operations or through contacts with another

intelligence or security service. This inhibits the

passage of such information to agencies of a third

country. There is, however, a substantial amount

of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive

sources which can be provided to other countries.

In 1962, for example, CIA received information re-

ports from 26 services with which liaison is main-

tained in Latin America and released reports to 35

recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included

collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name

traces and travel reports.

The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral

exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.

Information provided by the Army has been concerned

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with

subversive personalities, communist infiltra-

tion, weapons movements and related matters.

Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small

value.

The Army also provides selected information

on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala

and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has

established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange

of intelligence among nine South American navies, the

Mexican Navy and the U.S. Navy.

Some information has been released from time to

time to Latin American countries by the Commander-

in-Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the

Military Groups, and exchanges of information are

also effected from time to time through channels

of the Department of State.

As yet, however, the program for the provision

by United States agencies of information on subver-

sion to Latin American governments has not been

developed to an adequate degree. Since the United

States possesses the most extensive acquisition

capabilities, as well as the only secure and re-.

liable means of rapid communication throughout Latin

America (currently in process of improvement), the

development of an integrated United States system

for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi-

bility of achieving the results desired.

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United States experience in the matter of intel-

ligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas

of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral

arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral

arrangements such as those established within the

framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless,

this experience has shown also that multilateral

arrangements can be of some use, particularly in

creating an awareness of the need for intelligence

exchange.

The concept of an exchange of information among

members of the OAS with regard to subversive activi-•

ties has been put forward at numerous Inter-American

meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for

the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the

Punta del Esta decisions, the OAS members were

urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity

to counteract threats or acts of aggression, sub-

version or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a

"Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCOS)"

1s established to give technical advice on request

to governments and the Council on matters relating

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to subversion. All American governments have been

asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and

recommendations by the Council of the OAs on how

to counteract them. Since the Punta del Esta meet-

ing, the OAS has been making slow progress in the

countersubversion field, but there has as yet been

no significant exchange of intelligence through its

machinery.

This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral in-

telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best, as well as a need to create an expanded

progran for bilateral intelligence exchange be-

tween the United States and individual countries,

and finally, a requirement to develop the possibili-

ties of a multilateral approach within the

recog

nized limitations involved.

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III. Actions Recommended

I. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in-

telligence

conducted ky CIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies,'

where it is found possible to establish appropriate

arrangements for the exchange of selected information con-

sistent with security requirements.

2. Establish military intelligence centers at the

headquarters of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean

Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination

of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our

Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissem-

ination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive

activity directly to the countries concerned through the

American Embassies therein.

3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of in-

telligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements

of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean

Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further

dissemination as appropriate.

4. Increase the dissemination to Latin American

governments, by all U.S. agencies concerned, of unclassi-

fied studies, reports and other non-sensitive information

concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

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5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in

bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist

subversive activities.

6. Continue the development at high priority of

U.S. communications in Latin America.

7. Increase

emphasis on the provision of U.S. In-

telligence advisors to Latin American countries. Dis-

courage their employment of intelligence advisors from

nations other than the ü.s.

8. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and

Military programs for the training and equipping of

Latin American internal security and intelligence services.

Establish such programs in additional countries where 1t

is found to be in the best interests of the United States

and acceptable to the country concerned.

9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate govern-

ments to keep the Council and the sccs fully informed on

a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of sub-

versive activities in their respective countries.

10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve

the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates

concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

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11. Take action to cause the IADB to be designated

as the agency to provide advice and assistance to the

Council of the OAS in regard to the exchange of intelli

gence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

12. Arrange for regional meetings of senior intell1-

gence and security service representatives of Latin

American countries and the United States for the purpose

of fostering the exchange of intelligence concerning

Castro-Communist subversive activities and developing the

necessary mechanisms and procedures therefor.

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