Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

v09-16-96ccr

JEK RECORDS

CroSS Reference:

None

Status in System:

AGENCY

: ASCA

RECORD NUMBER

:180-10142-10001

RECORD

SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

22-09-02

Other Agency Equity: None

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

HSCA

FROM :

CIA

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

DOCUMENT TYPE

SUBJECT (S)

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

DATE

CURRENT STATUS

OF LAST REVIEW

COMMENTS

Date

in: 01/26/96

I T

FFFF

FF

F

00/00/00

8

REPORT

CUBANA AIRLINES;

CIA, FILES;

UNCLASSIFIED

: 3

: POSTPONED IN PART

08/04/95

Released under the John

F. kennedu

assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 53080 Date:

06-01-2017

74 53080

DocId: 32271305

Page

---

## Page 2

E. Cubana Airlines

In Book V (the performance of the intelligence

agencies in the investigation of the John F. Kennedy

Assassination) of the Senate Select Comnittee to Study

Governmental Operations, the CIA is criticized for its

apparent failure to fully pursue leads surrounding the

assassination of President Kennedy and then to fully

report to the Warren Commission the results of the in-

HH 53080 DocId: 32271305

Page 2

---

## Page 3

=. 59 -

vestigation they did undertake.

One such lead discussed was a reported five-

hour delay (6:00 p.m. EST to 11:00 p.m. EST) of a Cu-

bana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of

President Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963.

(The Investigation of the Assassination of President

John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agen-

cies, Book V, Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30, Senate Report No. 94-755.)

The most intriguing aspect of the SSC account involved

the alleged delay of a Cubana flight to await the arri-

val at 10:30 p.m. EST of aprivate twin-engined aircraft.

(Ibid. p. 60. ) The aircraft deposited an unidentified

passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without cus-

toms clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's

cabin. (Ibia., p. ô1.) The source of that lead was an

Italian diplomate, Mario Mauri, who allegedly was on the

same flight. (

Analysis

In the 1977 Inspector General Report, the CIA at-

tempted to relute several "inaccuracies" in the Senate

Select Committee report regarding the "alleged" Cubana

Airlines flight that is apparently the only follow-up by

the Agency on the lead after the Senate report appeared:

NW 53080 DooId: 32271305 Page 3

---

## Page 4

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlied documents.)

-60-759

The Inspector General's report corrected the state-

ment in the Senate report that the "Central Intelligence

Agency had not information indicating that a

following

investigation was conducted to determine that a follow

ing investigation was conducted to determine the iden-

tity of the passenger and had no further information

on the passenger, and no explanation for why a following

investigation was not conducted." (The Investigation of

the Assassination of President John E. Kennedy. Perfor-

mance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Select Com-

mittee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30,

Senate Report No. 94-755.) The Inspector General Report

stated that the Central Intelligence Agency conducted

regular surveillance of Cubana flights,

filing cable

reports to Headquarters (Ibid., p. 11. ) There was one

unilateral CIA surveillance team (LIFIRE) that observed

arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, reporting

any unusual recurrences and providing copies of flight

mainfests (Ibid., p. 1l)

The Mexican government had its

own surveillance team (LITEMPO) at the airport which pro-

vided the CIA with photographs of passports and copies

of passenger lists of individuals travelling to Cuba.

Classification:

2000412

Classified by derivation:

53080 DocId: 32271305

Page

---

## Page 5

Clossification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

- 61 -

(Ibid., p. 11) In addition, telephone tap operations

(LIENVOY) against the Cuban Embassy provided transcripts

of conversations between the Cubana Airlines Office and

the Mexican Airport Control Office. (Ibid., p. 1l.)

The LIENVOY transcripts recorded a series of dis-

cussions concerning the status of the November 22, 1963

delayed Cubana flight--when it arrived and when it de-

parted. The transcripts showed that the flight arrived

at the airport at 1620 hours (All times used

will be

Mexico City time to avoid confusion) Mexico City time.

(HSCA Staff Review of November

22, 1963 LIENVOY trans-

cripts) Prior to the arrival of the aircraft, one per-

son stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours and

"it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround tha:

would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as

serving of

aircraft to a relatively short period. (Ibid.)

However, the only key report on the departure of the air-

craft was a statement at 2040 hours that the aircraft

had departed for Cuba five minutes earlier, i.e.,

2035

hours. (Ibid.)

Based on the above (LIENVOY was the only record

that existed in the CIA files on the arrival and departure

Classification:

20/007

Classified by derivation:

HH

53080 DooId: 32271305

Page 5

---

## Page 6

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

- 62 -

times of the Cubana flight) (Neither LIFIRE nor the

•Mexican surveillance team reported the arrival or depar-

ture flights of the November 22, 1963 Cubana Airlines

flight to Cuba) then I.G. concluded that there were major

differences between what the Senate Select Committee re-

ported about the alleged delayed Cubana flight and the

known facts. (Ibid., p. 12) The Cuban flight was on

the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and

about ten minutes. (Ibid. p. 12) It was not delayed five

hours as reported in Book V. (The Investigation of the

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Performance of

the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Senate Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30, Senate

Intelligence Report No. 94-755) The Cubana flight de-

parted at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of

the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a

secret passenger. (Ibid., p. 30) The 2035 departure dif-

fered with the Senate Intelligence Committee Report that

the Cubana flight departed at 2200 hours. (Ibid. P. 31)

In addition, the I.G.

staff concluded that in view of

the surveillance coverage of the Mexican Airport by

both the CIA and Mexican government, it was doubtful that

Classification:

20002/3

Classified by derivation:

NW 53080 DocId: 32271305

Page 6

---

## Page 7

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA--controlled documents.)

- 63-

the alleged activity involving the private

twin-engined

aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or

unreported had it occurred. (1977 CIA I.G. Report,

TAB B, p. 12.)

Presumably, the discrepancies pointed out by the

Inspector General are meant to explain the fact that

the CIA did not take more aggressive investigative

steps to ascertain whether there might have been some

connection between the delayed flight and the assassina-

tion of John F. Kennedy. In that regard, the 1977 In-

spector General report explains that the Agency had car-

ried the lead as far as it was able by reviewing the

surveillance file of the LIFRE and LIENVOY operations and

asking the Mexican surveillance team (LITEMEO) about

any strange occurrences at the airport on November 22,

1963: (CIA 1977 IG Report, P. 12, Tab B.)

However,

the CiA's lack of access to further information about the

allegedly delayed Cubana flight and unidentified passen-

ger

does not explain either the failure of the CIA to

take more seriously the suspicions of the source, and

most importantly, to report whatever information it had

to the Warren Commission.

The Inspector General's attempts

2006)7

Classification:

Classified by derivation:

53080 DocId: 32271305

Page 7

---

## Page 8

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

- 64-

to denigrate the value of the information provided on

the unidentified alleged Cubana Airlines and unidenti-

fied passenger do not diminish the apparent negligence

of the agency in seriously pursuing the information as

it was received. The CIA is not to be faulted for the

strength of its intelligence gathering, but rather

for the judgement which kept that intelligence from the

Warren Commission. (The Warren Commission was mandated

to pass on the strength of exactly that kind of informa-

tion.)

Depsite what is now know about the alleged delay

of the Cubana Airlines flight and the unidentified pas-

senger, the Warren Commission may have wanted to abrigate

suspicions which would remain, and satisfy itself that

these circumstances did not indicate foreign involvement

in the assassination. The CIA contributed to those

suspicions by not airing the matter and explaining the

circumstances which could shed light on otherwise sini-

(ster appearing events.

The Committee has documented instances where the

CIA decided to forego passing information to: the warren

Classification:

20.0461

Classified by derivation:

NW 53080 DooId: 32271305

Page 8

---

## Page 9

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlied documents.)

- 65 -

Commission out of a desire to not lay bare extremely

sensitive sources and methods of intelligence. The

LIENVOY and LIFIRE operations fall within that category.

Classification:

201041

Classified by derivation:

53080 DooId:32271305 Page 9

---