COVERT ANNEX
Agency: OSD
Originator: JCS
Document date: 11/00/1961
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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195-10005-10022

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/16/201

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER:

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

OSD

195-10005-10022

MCNAMARA PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

JCS

FROM:

TO:

TITLE: COVERT ANNEX

DATE: 11/00/1961

PAGES:

20

SUBJECTS :

COUNTERINSURGENCY - VIETNAM

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS -

VIETNAM

COVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION - VIETNAM

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: REVIEW COMPLETE

COMMENTS:

McNamara Papers, Box 86. General Taylor's Vietnam Trip, Nov. 61. Covert annex re: situation in

Vietnam. Issues discussed include: combatting communist insurgency, covert intelligence collection,

etc.

v9.1

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The most important covert operational effort now needed is the observa-

tion and harassment of Viet Cong transiting South Laos into Vietnam. Opera-

tions

presently directed against this target, while qualitatively well con-

ceived

are quantitatively too small in numbers of personnel and striking

force

available to accomplish more than a small part of the job to be done.

• Operations against North Vietnam are also still small quantitatively, and

their expansion can only be obtained by extensive and costly efforts.

A subject eminently related to the improvement of Vietnamese intelligence

collection and covert action operations is the availability of trained and

experienced personnel.

This deficiency can be overcome in part by training of Vietnamese.

Available trained and experienced personnel can also be augmented by the use

of third country nationals.. Some of these are:

1.

Chinese Nationalists. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force and Army

Special Forces have been estensively trained in covert activities and have a

great deal of experience in this field. The Chinese Nationalists have the

best qualified clandestine human resources available in Asía. This is partic-

ularly true with respect to their ability as pilots since one of the major

missions of the Chinese Air Force is covert overflights of Mainland China..

Both for lowlevel navigation and clandestine night flying there are probably

no better qualified pilots any place in the world. Chinese Special Forces

personnel would be of particular value in programs of Rural Reconstruction,

Montagnard operations, etc., as they live, eat and operate in much the same

manner as Vietnamese, avoiding the logistic and security problems posed by

the Americans.

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107 6÷7777

bo

Io consider accelerating the creation of the Clandestine

Action Service by assigning to it ten companies of trained troops

(Rangers, Marines, or Airborne).

4o The following be

assigned to MAAG for specific utilization in the

training of the Clandestine Action Service:

a. Iwo U.S. Army Special Forces

mobile training teams.

b. Ten U.S. Army Special Forces medical corpsmen.

5. For specific support of the Clandestine Action Service, 2 H-34

helicopters and 2 C-123 or Caribou Stol aircraft, together with spare parts,

maintenance personnel and crews be made available to the GUN.

6. The use of Chinese Nationalists)

and Malayans as instructors and

pilot personnel in covert operations in Vietnam be discussed with President

Diem and his concurrence solicited.

7.. CIA be given the responsibility for the operational control, cover

and utilization of third country personnel, once committed to Vietnam.

8. Policy clearance be granted for the continuation of CIA operations

aimed at harassment of Viet Cong lines of communications in South Laos

whatever the outcome of the Geneva Conference on Laos or the current

negotiations over a Souvanna Phouma government.

9. Resettlement of the Meo in the Lao-Vietnam border area be con

sidered in the light of the progress of negotiations concerning Laos.

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(60Xe)

2. Malayans: Malaya has faced a problem of Communist insurgency for

a number of years and has effectively diminished this problem both through

overt and covert programs designed to defeat the enemy on his own grounds

and to deny him support of the local populace. Malaya thus has a pool of

trained and experienced covert operations personnel who have faced and who

have overcome problems not greatly dissimilar to those which face the Viet-

namese today. Malayans have been particularly effective in the utilization

of special counter-subversive police and it is in this area that the Viet-

namese badly need experienced guidance. The Malayan Government has expressed

considerable interest in aiding the Vietnamese Government in its fight against

the Communists. It is believed that the use of selected Malayan cadre for counter•

guerrilla and counter-subversive covert operations training could be accom-

plished through an appeal on the part of the Vietnamese Government itself.

Malayans would need interpreters but their utility on a limited basis should

still be considerably high.

3. MEO: The Meo tribesmen of Laos have proved themselves to be effective

guerrilla fighters. Their motivation has largely been the protection of their

homes and families in Xieng Khouang. Should a "neutralist" Souvanna Phouma

government come to power in Laos it is probable that considerable effort will

be made to destroy the guerrilla potential of the Meo. As an alternative to

their annihilation, the Meo might be persuaded to migrate in significant

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