HSCA HEARINGS
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1976-08-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32401070

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Date: 02/22/05

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD

NUMBER

: 104-10145-10229

RECORD SERIES

: JEK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

TO :

TITLE : HSCA HEARINGS

DATE

08/01/1976

PAGES

: 7

SUBJECTS : HSCA HEARINGS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER.

CLASSIFICATION : SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 08/07/93

COMMENTS

: F11 F11: 1993.08.07.12:06:37:530032

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

55924 Date: 10-26-2021

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10145-10229

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SECRE

hearings or in opposing their conduct because:

of absence of adequate means for protecting.

sensitive subject matter:

sic

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SEORET

are provided partial insights into areas

of interest, if not the details. The

significance of the tactic, however, grows

as public hearings approach, involving as

they do subject matter that we view

as

having considerable sensitivity and importance

to CIA.

III. We obviously do not know all the lines of inquiry pursued

by HSCA investigators. They have undertaken to reconstruct

as much

as possible about Oswald and the assassination of

President Kennedy. They also are attempting to develop

an evaluation of the performance of the intelligence

agencies in the investigation. Two areas of special

interest

have become evident, both of which involve

sensitive operational considerations:

Mexico City

o. Mexico City is considered one of the most important

bases for Soviet clandestine operations against

the United States. As a result Soviet and Cuban

diplomatic installations have long been the subject

of CIA surveillance operations, conducted both

unilatérally by CIA as well as jointly with the

Mexican authorities.

o. Telephone and photographic coverage of the Soviet

installations

is carried on, as well as physical

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ST!

surveillance. The Mexican authorities

share the telephone operations with us;

it is against Mexican law for them to be

engaged in this activity. They are aware

of the fact of photographic surveillance.

•. Because of the telephonic coverage CIA was

able to provide the initial firm evidence

on*Oswald's contacts with Cuban and Soviet

officials, in his attempt to obtain visas

to Cuba and the USSR. CIA, limited in not

being able to conduct a traditional police-

type investigation, was able to suggest to

the Mexican authorities that they interview

at least one person known to have dealt with

Oswald during his visit. However, gaps remain

infwhat is known about his visit. This has

attracted HSCA attention.

€..

•. The reported questioning of some HSCA investigators

has on occasion appeared to be developing a basis

for criticizing CIA's performance in its part

of the investigation in Mexico City, under its

charter to evaluate the performance of the

intelligence agencies. At one time,

and

possibly

still, they appeared to be attempting to develop

a case to the effect that (1) there was photography,

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SHONET

and (2) CIA must have suppressed it.

• Practically all the above CIA reporting

on Mexico City involves classically sources:

and-methods material.

Nosenko

•. Yuri Nosenko was a KGB officer who defected

in early 1964. Among the items of information

that he asserted he brought with him was knowledge

about Lee Harvey Oswald, from his file in the

KGB.

•. The bona fides of Nosenko's defection was the

subject of doubts and he was subjected to

extensive interrogation. He was in the custody

of CIA for some five years, under laws concerning

such persons, some three years of which was in

solitary confinement under what the Rockefeller

Commission termed "extremely spartan living

conditions."

o. Eventually Nosenko was judged to be a bona fide

defector. He has proven to be the source of a

wide range of information on many hundreds of

KGB officers, and KGB operations abroad, as well

as about the KGB. Over the years his information

has been responsible for a number of successful

counterintelligence initiatives by either the

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HSCA Hearings

1.

The HSCA has scheduled public hearings for August,

September, and November.

o. The King hearings are 14-18 August, and 9,

10, 13-17, 20, 21, 22, 25-29 November. 1t

appears that CIA is unlikely to feature in

in these hearings, although this is only an

impression.

o. The Kennedy hearings are to be on week days,

6-29 September. CIA doubtless will share the

stage with

the Fil.

II. We have requested the HSCA Staff for information on the

plans for the hearings, with special attention to the

security considerations, (orally on 29 June and 13 July,

and in writing from the DDCI on 26 July and 4 August):

To date what we know about plans was acquired from The

Congressional Monitor.

•. It has been the practice of the HSCA Staff to

avoid dialogues, the effect of which is to conceal

much of what they are doing of thinking. The

resulting frustrations of trying to cooperate with

the investigation are not important; inevitably we

22276

2 Poor co ex l2110

SEGRET

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U.S. or its allies.

o. The recent book about Oswald, Legend, by

Epstein, has dramatized Nosenko's defection,

repeating the early doubts about him and

leaving the strong implication that he is

still to be doubted. Recently the HSCA

investigators seem to have shifted the

emphasis of their inquiry from this issue

to how Nosenko was handled; this judgment

may be in error and the issue of his bona

fides may return during the hearings.

•. CIA did mistreat Nosenko. He was kept in

solitary confinement, he was given a

minimum diet, he was allowed few comforts,

and

he was subjected to intensive interrogation

for extended periods of time. He believes

that he was subjected to drugs, but there' is

no record that such was the case; those who

were involved say he was never subjected to

drugs, although it was considered once and

rejected.

o. The question of the bona fides of Nosenko's

defection could involve matters

that häve

sensitive connotations; however, -a decision

to emphasize only his mistreatment would be

only embarrassing to the Agency.

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IV. In the absence of agreement with the HSCA on how

sensitive matters are to be handled in its public

hearings, the Agency may face the dilemma of how to

protect intelligence sources and methods.

• Current employees could find themselves

faced with the dilemma of abiding by their

secrecy oath and requesting to be excused

from testifying, but having to choose

between a contempt citation and violation

of the secrecy oath.

• Against the possibility that HSCA does not

undertake to work with us on this problem,

we may have to give notice to the employees

of the problem. A draft letter has been

prepared (copy attached) for forwarding to

present

and current employees who have been

interviewed by the HSCA. Its limitations are

apparent, in that it serves primarily to

apprise the employee of his or her dilemma.

• OGC will request further advice from the

Attorney General.

V. Should the most pessimistic development come to pass,

the situation will be more political than legal. The

miss

fact is that time

is of the essence, and any stretch-out

will reduce the time in which the Agency can react with

considered judgments, either in cooperating in the public

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