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AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10012

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

PFIAB

DOCUMENT TYPE

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RESTRICTIONS

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OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

FOR MEETING OF MARCH 8-9, 1963 (THE BOARD MET WITH THE

PRESIDENT ON MARCH 9, 1963)

DATE

: 03/08/63

PAGES

28

SUBJECTS

AGENDA FOR MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

: -08/11/98

08/01/2024

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President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

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206-10001-10012

PRESIDENT'S FOREION INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963 (The Board

met with the President on March 9, 1963)

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

06-10001 - 100 12

85

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963

ITti

TIME

SUBJECT

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

8.

9.

10.

March 8th

10:00 - 10:30

10:30 - 11:00

The Chairman's Time

Status Report on Implementation

of Prior Board Recommendations

Mr. Russell Ash

11:00 - 12:00

Discussions with the Director

of Central Intelligence

Mr. John Mccone

12:00 - 12:30

Intelligence Briefing on the

Current Situation In Cuba

M2. Desmond Fitzgerald, DDP Staîf, CIA

12:30 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30. - 2:30

Review of DCI'g Comments on Board's

Interim Report to the President

dated December 23, 1962

2:30 - End of Day Preparation of Report to the President

March 2th

9:00 - 9:55

10:00 - 10:30

Approx.

Resume Consideration of Item No. 7.

Meeting with the President

10:30 - END

DIscussion of Future Board Business

CONFIDEN

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

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March 11, 1903

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

March 8 and 9, 1963 Meeting of the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Board meeting of March 8 convened at 10:00 a.m.,

with

the following in attendance: Mesors. Killian, Baker, ClatTora,

Doolittle, Gray, Land, Langer, Ash ana coyne•

Mr. Pace was

unable to attend the two-day meeting because of absence from.

the country; Mr. Murphy was unable to join the meeting until

later in the day.)

As the first order of business, in executive session, the

Chairman reported on a number of Items Including the following,

The Chairman advised that on the previous day Mr. Murphy

had Informed Mr. Coyne that, he had received a telephone call at:

his offices in New York fron the Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. McCone Indicated to Mr. Murphy that the President had talked

with him about the Board's final report on the Cuba situation

dated February 4; that the President had shown Mr. McCone a copy

of the report, indicating that no other distribution was being.

made of the report at this time.

Mr. Murphy advised that Mr. McCone

was quite emotional in discussing the Board's report, stating that

1f the Board 1s going to insist on submitting the report, the top

five people in CIA, including Mr. McCone, would have to resign

from the Agency. Mr. Murphy pointed out

to Mr. McCone that the

report had already been formally submitted to the President by the

Board.

ir. McCone then expressed to Mr. Murphy his concern and :

disagreement with the references in the report. to the fallure of

Intelligence. Mr. Murphy advised Mr. McCone that in his judgment,

and indeed he thought in the judgment of all of the Board members,

there was In fact a fallure of Intelligence and It was the duty of

the Board to so state in its report to the President.

Mr. Murphy

expressed the view that the report was really mild.

Mr. McCone

Indicated that even in retrospect there were only about seven of

the thirty-five indicators listed in the report of offensive mis-

siles in Cuba which might be considered valid. Mr. Murphy reiter-

ated that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the above

matter, saying 1f the report stood 1t could lead to resignations

from DIA as well as CLAd

At this point e mentioned to Mr. McCone

that he was in New York

at a neeting with others and didn't like

discussing this aspect on the telephone and suggested they discuss

the matter further when they next met.

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the DCI said that he was concerned

about the prospects of a future nuclean explosion in Communist China,

and to a lesser degree he was concerneu about the prospects of such

a development in Israel. He thought that the prospects of these

developments brings up a most serious problem from the standpoint

of psychological effect upon other nations should these develop-

ments take place, although there does not seem to be anything we

Insofar as U-2 overflights of Communist China by Chinese

Nationalis pilots are concerned, these missions are being flown

"Category 3" weather (instead of Category 2 weather conditions

involving a maximum of 25% cloud cover) because there is a need for

frequent missions

The DCI sald that although these missions have

not produced evidence of a reactor in operation in Communist China,

there are some indications,

e.ga, a test area in Tibet, and the

President has been alerted to this possibility.

The DCI said that somewhat of a problem is presented in Israel.

Although we are close to the Israeli government, it appears to be

withholding information on the extent of its nuclear activities.

in the past France is assisting Israel and the French government 1s

helping the Israell government build a nuclear reactor at the pre-

sens time.

In a building next to the reactor there is an installa-

tion which could be a chemical separation facility, but the Israelis

deny that this 1s the case. Moreover, the DCI pointed out, the

Israelis refuse to submit to international safeguards prescribed by

the international atomic energy agency.

Mr. McCone stated that he

belleves that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by

Israel would have most serious effects on countries of the Middle

East and, therefore, Mr. McCone Is ready to repeat recommendations

which he previously made to President Eisenhover that unless Israel

Joins in the international safeguards we should take certain econ-

omic reprisals against Israel.

Mr. McCone observed that our govern

ment permits tax deductions on Israeli bonds, and we have given Israel

billions of dollars in ald. Despite this the Israelis could well be

proceeding without full knowledge on our part, on an atomic energy

program which could trigger grave trouble in the Middle East.

Finally, Mr. McCone reported that CIA has concluded that our

policy on intelligence collection within the United States is wrong

and particularly as it applies to Soviet Bloc Embassies and to tele-

phone intercept coverage as well as exploitation of official Soviet

Bloc personnel in the United States. Mr. McCone stated that he was

going to propose that the CIA intensify its activities on these

matters or that the FBI be directed to intensify their activities

in these areas.

He noted that basically this is an FBI responsibility

but that it is his own view that this responsibility could more

properly be carried out by the CIA. Mr. Cliflord inquired as to

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whether the DCI would not encounter difficulty In trying to get

this function transferred from FBI to CIA; and Mr. McCone responded

that he does not care who carries out the responsibillty as long as

It Is appropriately done and he added that he belleves the CIA 1s::

qualified

to do 1t.

Dr. Land observed that this activity does. not

belong with the FBI; that coverage of an espionage agent is one thing

but that exploiting Soviet Bloc coverage for Intelligence collection

purposes 13 quite another.

Mr. McCone advised that there 1s another dimension to this

problem which Involves Increasing the number of CIA Intelligence

representatives in Moscow. He noted that CIA has only. three em-

ployees in the moscow embassy.

He pointed out that in Washington,

0. C. and New York city out of a total of 392 Soviet official rep-

resentatives ciA has identified 176 as Intelligence officers of the

KGB and GRU, a proportion of 45%. He added that 2360f the Soviet

official representatives in London are intelligence officers and

In France the figure 1s 36%.

Before departing the meeting Mr. McCone displayed to the Fuard

a photograph demonstrating the success of the latest Infrared photog-

raphy taken of terrain from an altitude of 3500 feet.

Dr. Killian asked the DCI 1f the Board could have a copy of the

new draft NRO agreement, and in response to this the DCI made a

copy of the draft avallable later on in the day.

Before Mr. McCone

left the meeting he suggested that if the Board had any questions

regarding the terms of the draft NRO agreement It would be appropri-

ate to raise them with the Secretary of Defense or Mr. Ailpatric or

Mr. McCone himself, rather than raising such questions at working

levels at the Defense Department or the CIA.

The DCI sald that he

did not want to inhibit in any way the discussions that the Board

might want to have at any level at any time, and he noted that

Dr. Land was to confer with Secretary Gilpatric the following day.

Dr. Land assured the Del that the scheduled meeting was to be con-

fined strictly to a technical discussion.)

This concluded the DCI's meeting with the Board and he and

Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

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Mr. Arthur Lundahl of the NPIC, and Mr. W1111am

Tidvell Joined the Board meeting. (Before beginning their presen-

tations, Mr. Lundahl answered a question from a Board member by

stating that the NPIC moved into its new quarters at the Naval Gun

Factory on January 1, 1963, and it occuples the entire facility

except for the occupancy of a part of one floor by the U. s. Geo

logical Survey.) Mr.

Tidwell proceeded to give the Board a briefing

on the Internal situation in Cuba. In essence Mr. Tidwell said that

Cuba 1s a good example of Latin American Communism In action. The

Castro regime has established very good security, but the internal

political situation 1s considerably messed up in a controversy

between the Castroites and the old-line members of the Communist

Party of Cuba.

The sugar crop in Cuba is off one-third this year.

country will have a hard time economically next year and: the

soviets will have to provide further substantial ald. Although

the rationing program is difficult to enforce in cuba, the people

have by no means reached a starvation level.

Bloc shipping carries

most of the imports into the island, and non-Bloc shipping 1s neg-:

11gable.

Because of the

efficlency of the Castro Internal security

program, any significant organized revolt efforts have been pre-

vented,

Fifty per cent of the refugees who were Interrogated

during January thought that as of last summer there was a good:

chance of a successful revolution against Castro.

After the.ooo it

Soviets reached a peak of introducing personnel and armamentsee

In July, only five per cent thought that a revolt could succeed.

When the Russians subsequently withdrew strategic missiles from

Cuba firteen per cent of the refugees thought that a revolt might

succeed.

Some 1500 students from other Latin American countries have

been given guerilla warfare training in Cuba, Castro's radio prop-

aganda is urging other Latin American countries to follow the Cuban

example

In answer to a question by Dr. Killian, Mr. Tidwell

sald

that the Cubans are Jaming

u.S. radio broadcasts beamed at Latir

America, but Mr. Tidwell had no information to indicate, that our

Government was jamming the Cuban broadcast activity.

Mr. TIdwell

then summariaid information on the Cuban and Sovie

orders of sir

battle, along the lines of information contained in Current Intel-

ligence Bulletins.

Dr. Baker raised a rhetorical question as to whether

the sov-

lets were not in fact establishing in Cuba a command-and-control post

for use in the event of a military offensive against the western Hem-

Isphere, and Dr. Baker asked if. 1t were not true that never before

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LIMITED DISIRIBUTION

This dormoni cinnisis ol in

i=5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Subject.: Board Meeting with the President, Marun 9, 1963

At 10:00 A.M., on March 9, 1963;

the Board met with the

Cabinet Room of the

white House for the

purpose of presenting the Board's report and recommendations

growing out of Its completed review of the foreign intel

ligence aspects of the Soviet military bu1ld-up In Cuba.

Those present were Messrs. Killian, Doolittle, Land, Langer,:

Gray, Clifford, Baker, Murphy, and Messr3. Coyne and Ash.

Mr.. MeGeorge Bundy was also present.

Killian informed the President that the Board had

recommendations to present based on the cuba episode.

recalled to the President that the Board had submitted. two

previous reports, one - an interim report dated December 28,

1962, containing

recommendations of such urgency that the

Board forwarded them prior to completing 1ts revier of Cuba;

and a more comprehensive report dated February 4, 1903, In

wnich the Board set forth its complete findings based on a

detailed investigation of the Cuba situation from the stand-

point of foreign intelligence coverage. Dr. Killian said

that the recommendations which the Board was now presenting

should be considered in the light of the two previous reports,

particularly the report dated February 4, 1963.

Dr. Killian then presented the Board's recommendations,

reading from the written report which was forwarded to the

President under date of March 8, 1963. In reading this report

to the President, Dr. Killian directed attention to the fact

that most of the recommendations which were being presented

were an outgrowth of the Board's study of Cuba, but that two

the recommendations dealt with major problems affecting

the over-all foreign intelligence effort.

Dr. Killian stated Fecommendations 1 thr. an 4 of the

March 8, 1963 report.

Following Dr. Killian'a statement of Recommendation 4

regarding low-level aerial surveillance, flights over Cuba,

the president observed that such flights had not been suspended

but were being reserved for coverage of particularly critical

Intelligence targets should the situation warrant, as, for

example, the February 9, 1963 low-level mission.

Mr. Bundy

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commented that two or three important targets in Cuba have

been identifled since the February 9 low-level mission, but

the approval of low level coverage of these new targets is

being held in abeyance pending the completion of efforts by

Attorney Donovan to obtain the release of some twenty Amert-

cans held prisoner In Cuba, Including thres Individuals whom

the UnIted States Is particularly destro. of returning to

this country..:.

The President asked for elaboration on the

recommendation for the development of long focal

length cameras to be used in U-2 aircraft.

Dr. Land explained

that some time ago an effort was made to develop such a camera

but the earlier version was not a success,

and the development

efforts were suspended because there was not an Immediate.

need for a camera having this particular capability, although

at the prèsent time such a camera would be most useful in

covering such Cuban targets as caves and other installations

suspected of being used for concealment of materials and

Dr. Land thought that the cost of developing

comparison to the cost of such projects as DISCOVERER.

Killian then presented

Recommendations 5 through 7

of the March 8 report.

When Dr. Killian stated Recommendation 8 concerning pro-

posals for and the monitoring of unique intelligence operations,

Mr. Bundy made the comment that the Special Group fully agrees

with this recommendation and has Instituted procedures designed

to assure that the Special Group 13 Informea regarding opera-

tional delays encountered in the course of carrying out survell-

lance missions previously approved by the Special Group.

Dr. Killian then stated Recommendation l1 of the Board's

report dated March 8.

In connection with Dr. Killian's statement of Recommenda-

tion 12 on the need for Improving national intelligence aya.

estimates, Mr. Bundy reiterated the point which the Board had

made to the effect that the present system for producing

national intelligence estimates 1s being run by the originators

of the system, and the present mechanism for producing such

estimates is a

"founders body." Dr. Langer said 1t 19 true

thai the estimative group has a highly trained staff which has

been in existence for many years, but the Board has not yet

conducted a specific study of its operations.

Dr. KIllian

summarized the tenor of this recommendation of the Board by

saying that a monolithic point of view is not necessarily the

best estimate.

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resources and the errective organization and management of

the National Reconnaissance Office.

Following Dr. Killian's presentation, the President

expressed his appreciation for the Board's efforts and said

that he would follow through on the recommendations which

had been made.

Referring to the thirty-five intelligence reports.con-

taining indicator-type data which were dealt with In the

Board's February 4 report, the

indloations were "pretty thin "President observed that these

The President observed that

first there was the Berlin Wall Incident and then the Cuba

development, and in retrospect the President found It extra-

ordinary that our Government had not obtained more advance

information with respect to those situations.

The President said that we should have accomplished

penetration of the Castro regime at a relatively high level

1n the Cuban Government.

Dr. Land stated that he and Dr. Langer had been engaged

In récent discussions of Dr. Land's concern about the manner

in which our national intelligence estimates are produced.

Dr. Land thought that, under the present system, it seemed

that no meaning could be derived from particular facts or

near ond than

information unless the information could be fitted into patterns

which the estimators already had in mind.

The Board Is there-

lore suggesting, vr.

Land said, that the chA see if there 1s

not a neer fur trained professionals who are not only open-

minded, but whose careers are devoted to fitting Intelligence

information into all possisle patterns. In the Cuba situation,

Dr. Land pointed out, there was a fixed pattern in the minds

of estimators to the effect that refugee reports concerning

offensive missiles were in reality reports concerning surface-

to-air missiles and installations. Dr. Land said that the

Board was not proposing a policy under which the President

would review raw intelligence reports, hut the Board felt

that the estimators should form the various alternative

patterns which can be relably derived from an analys1s. of

intelligence, in order that policy makers may have the benefit

of such niternatives. Dr Langer said that on the other hand

the estimators have to action rationality and cannot assume

that the enemy 1s acting on an irrational basis.

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The President said that looking back on the Cuba situa-

tion 1t 1g now apparent that the SAM sites were related to

the deployment of offensive missiles.

The President observed

that there has not been made, to his knowledge, an analysis

the assumption under which the Soviety operated In Cuba,

and it would be of some academic interest, it least, to know

why the soviets did not use their SA-2's

against our over-

flight operations. Dr. Land observed that it the soviet

camouflage teams in Cuoa had been up to schedule along with

the Soviet schedule for deployment of offensive missiles,

we would not have round the missiles, and it was by the grace

of God that we did fina them.

Mr. Clifford, referring to earlier references to the

need for clandestine agent penetration of Cuba,

said that the

Board had concluded that the absence of clandestine coverage

1s attributable to a lack of Imagination on the part uf our

intelligence elements over a long period of years during which

we enjoyed close relations with the Cuban Government.

fore, Mr. Clifford said, the Board 18 concerned about the

adequacy

of such coverage at the present time in places 11ke

Brazil and Argentina.

Mr. Murphy observed that originally the

cIA set out to use U. S, dipiomatic establishments as a cover

for CIA intelligence operations only for an initial period,

but these cover arrangements became permanent.

Mr. Murphy

noted that in discussion with the Board the Director of Central

Intelligence has said that 1t 1s difficult to achleve deep

cover for clandestine agent operations, and while Mr. Murphy

agrees that this task 1s of course difficult, he nas seen no

evidence that concerted efforts have been made, for example,

to penetrate the Castro regime.

Mr. Clifford recalled that

on the preceding day Mr. McCone had directed the Board's

attention to the fact that whereasome ClA has three operatives

In Moscow, the Soviet Unton has 153 intelligence officei's in

the United States.

Dr. Killian Informed the President that

the Board lays great stress on the need for a real effort to

Increase our clandestine agent operations.

Referring again to the reports and findings of the Board,

the President said that one problem in reflected ir. the instance

where the Secretary of State had recommended that a particular

U-2 surveillance mission over Cuba be broken up into four over-

flight missions.

The President said he was not suggesting that

this was not a prudent suggestion by the Secretary of State,

but that this made him conscious of the fact that there 1s

perhaps a lack of expertise on the part of policy makers with

respect to certain inteligence operations.

The President

commented that one flight was flown over an area where the

aircraft could well have been shot down.

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The President then referred to the fact that Dr. Killan

retiring as Chairman of the Board In May.

The President

expressed deep appreciation for the work which Dr. Killian

has done and the valuable contribution which Dr.

K1llian has

made to the country.

The President recalled that the Board

has conducted three post-mortems on intelligence situations.

and that these efforts of the Board have been most useful,

particularly in the case of Cuba.

The President added tha

he wished to express his appreciation for the effective manner

in which the Board has carried out its dutles in the past.

Me stated that the Board's contribution has been most valuable.

In addition to 1ts being valuable to the President,

the Roard

nas also contributed In an Important way through the awareness

which 1t has created in the intelligence community of 1ts

continuing operations and continuing review of intelligence

activities.

The President said that he was very much indebted

to all of

the Board members and is hopeful that the Board will

continue

present operations for he considered them to be

Invaluable.

Dr. Killian expressed his gratitude lui the Presidentls

comments, and then said that, as a'fostnote to the Board!s.

present report, the members wished to say to the President

that he has a right to expect high quality performance on they

part of the intelligence community, and the Board suggests

that the President see fit to emphasize to the intelligenceston

community the necessity for producing adequate information.

The President then referred to current criticisma and

Inquiries which have been received from various quarters ema

concerning the role of the Government In the Bay of Pigs

Invasion, and the President wondered whether the Board felt

that the

Administration should be more responsive to such ru

criticisms and inquiries. Mr. Murphy commented that we

would be well advised to follow the practice of Prime Minister

Macmillan who responds to such criticism and inquirtee with

a statement to the effect that we do not discuss our intel-

ilgence activities in public.

Di. Killian assured the President that memoers of the

Board feel that to the greatest extent possible the Admints-

tration should refrain from making intelligence disclosures

with respect to the Bay of Pigs incident.

ME. ClIfford thought

that the situation had been summed up humorously and accurately

in a recent statement by Congressman Mahon who questioned

whether the real problem was a lack of intelligence information

on the other hand, a lack of Intelligence on the part of

oF if-appointed critics.

The President stated that he too was

impressed with Congressman Mahon's statement and, in fact,

after the statement appeared in the press, he called Congressman

Mahon and commended bim on its content.

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The one-hour meeting with the President terminated with

the President repeating his expressions of appreciation for

A. R. Ash

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January 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Diroctor of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Interin Report to the Prenident by thin

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board, dated December 28, 1962

We have set down tho several paragraphs of the subject report followed

by our comments:

The recommendation of the Board. Groat uncertainties about

present soviet efforts in Cuba indicate the necessity of a continuing aggressive

intelligence effort to eguip our policy makers with timely and adequate infor-

mation to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontation in Cuba. We

must resist any tendency : warda a let down in our intelligence eifor! against

Cuba in the wake of intelligench successes resulting from our military re-

connaissance misnions over the island. In making this observation we are

mindful that in a quite differeat atmoophere the Central Inielligence Agency

did not mount effective clandestine intelligence collection operations in Cuba

for an eight-month period following the Bay of Pigs invanion.

Comment.

We agree with the principle stated in the first sentence

of the recommendation and the need to continue an aggreosive intelligence

effort against Cuba. This view was adyanced by the Direcios of Contral

Intelligence at the meeting of the Freaident's Boaid on December 7, 1962 and

again at the meeting of the Board on December 28. The DCI Informed the

Board at thess meetings that it was Important that there be extensive intelli

gence opexations to find out the trend of uevelopmente in Cuba and that efforts

to get agents into Cuba were boing intensified. It should be noted, however.

that in clandestine intelligence operations the allocation of additional manpower

and funds to a task, although heipful, does not neccusarily, assure a corre-

sponding improvement in production or accomplishment.

Since early 1962 the ClA has increased its elfort to collect intelli-

gence information on Cuba. The operations for this purpose hay been

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conducted vigoronaly as a matter of urgency. Following the misfortune at

the Bay of Pigs, there was a decroaso in the clandestine effort againut Cuba.

Even 90, from April 15, 1961 through December 1961 the Clandestine

Services of CIA dissominated 608 information reports on Cuba,

of which 406 reporto camo from sourceo inalde Cuba. The Contact Livision/00

of ClA dissominated 1764 reports on Ciba during the period April 8 t) December

1961. During the porlod from April 1961 through December 1961, seventeen

resident agenta pare recruited in Cuba and aro atill active.

In addition, fivo

resident assete, two with sub-assete, recruited prior to April 1961, wero

maintained during this oame cight-month period and are still active:

Thero

were other recruitments and sumorous attempte that failed.

The period of sixty days following the Say of Pigs invadion wao a

difficutt one for the Agency.

The Taylor Committee, composed of General

Taylor, the Attorney Goneral, Nir. Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke, began

its survey of the Bay of Pigs operation on April 22 and continued thrcughout

May and June. This Committee took much of the tine and ciort of precisaly

those people responsible for Cuban operations, both in Miami and in Washington.

There ware demands for written papera and documents, as well as perional

interviews of key people. Changed in the top echolor of the Agency, anticipated

during the summer and implemented in the fall of 1961, bad their effect on

juban operations. While it was generally agreed and understood thai cur

effori to collect information must continue, specific policy guidance vas not

given so Cll and funds necessary to carry out expanded programs were not

approved by higher authority until August 4, 1961.

The newly appoiniod DCI, following his revier of the situation in

mid-Doceiber 1961, directed that tha effort against Cura be intencified.

This led to the establishment, on March 8, 1902, of Task Force Way a

separate entity within the Agency for the purpose of mounting a maxlinum

effort, particularly in the colleciion of information, against Caba. As of

March 8, 1962 the Task Force had a peruonnel strength in the field and at

Huadquarters of 335. As of January 1, 1963, the total number of personnel

dovoting full time to the efforts of the Task Force wao 591. Oftbis 594, 14?

wore frorn other agencies and other components of the Agency outeid the

Clandestine Services.

Total financial obligationn during Ascal year 1962

wore $17, 291,000. Estimated obligations for fiscal year 1963 totaled

$28, 200, 000, but now have been scaled to $24, 000, 000 with the final figure

dependent upon future policy:

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The.

L'commerdation of the Board. We recommend intensified, hurd-

hitting eifort io increase our capability los obtaining significart intelligence

tirougn clandestine collection oporations (espionago). Despite noichorthy

intelligence results obtal nahle through scientific and technical means, we still

have as great a noed as ever for carefully selected, hurnan-resouice espiorage

operationa profensionally executed on the basis of the soundesi planting judgments

und the most competent target selection processes which the intelligence com-

munity can achieve.

The Cuban experience is a case in point, for wa nou have

faw meaningful espionage acts on the loland and without such asets e have

little hope of developing the kind and dogree of hard intelligence which is roquired

on such criticai marters an: a) the plans and intentions of ibe Soret Governnent

and the Castro regime for fuiure operations within Cuba or for future operations

launched from Cuba against other Latin American countrica; b) the alleged con-

calment of offensive weapons in caves or other locations which arc incapable of

being probed by technical intelligence mcano; and o) the actual numbers of Soviet

troops in Cuba, their precise deploymento, equipments, activities and objectives.

in numorous countries our serious lack of clandestine ageni resources

is compounded by beavy relianco on the use of official cover as a clair for our

Intelligence-gathering activities abroad. Again, Cuba proides animportant

lennon. When the ripture of diplomatic relationg in January 1961 forced the

recall of U.S. intelligence persomel who had been operating under diplomatic

tover provided by tha American Embassy in Havana, we did not have remaining

on the island. and we still do not have - adequate. decy cover. clandeatine

agent setworks on which to rely. Priority U.S. intelligense requirements in

Latin America and elewhore cail for intensive efforts by the appropriate

intelligence agencies of the Government to lay the groundwork for dum-cover,

clandestine intelligerce operations which are not depentioni upon official cover

and which will not be affected by a breaco in diplomatic relation. *

Events of the past lew yeara nuggeat that dramatic advances in

advanced intelligence methode such as high altitude and satellite photography

have obscured the role of human beings as collection and transinission media,

trained and equipped with the most soppisticated lechnical aids, and supported

by essential logistics and communications. We are gravely concerned about

the progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence

operations and in our view there in a need for the preparation of new plans for

the recruiting, training and equipping of agents for comprehensivo clancostine

intelligence collection, particularly, in latin Anerica.

* The need for clandestine Intolligence coverage bas been emphasized previoudy

in reports of advisory bodies constituted by the President to review our fordign

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intelligence activitica.

These advisory groups, which incidentally included

some of the membors of your present Board, have made specific rerommen-

dations on the subject. In 1954 the Doolittls Committee emphasized the need

for: a) developing nonofficial cover facilities; b) the placement of "dcop-cover

sleeper: agents" with à corresponding decrcase in dependenco upon official

i over; c) the crostion of a long-range, decp-cover planning system; and d) the

promulgation di cover doctrino and procedure. In 1955 the Technological

that "we should today bo laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations

in every country available to our agents", recommended that "a heary long-

torma investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual

sources of high-level intelligence." More recently, in ita report of July 2,

1961, your Board recommended that the new Director of Central Intelligence

consider the denirability und means of achleving a deeper cover for all

clandestine and coveri activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that

the disproportionaie number of ClA peroonnel operating under diplomatic

cover be reduced on an orderly basis, having in mind their replacenient by

agents under deep cover.

Comment. We agree with the principle of intonatijing hard-hitting

efforts to Increase the production of significant intelligonce information through

esplonage. This we will continue to do on a worldwide basis within the limits

of our resources. We strongly support the principle expressed in the second

sentence above. We agree that it is imporiant for those responsible for the

collection of intelligence information to bear in mind that there is much sorely

needed information that cannot be collected by scientific and technical means.

Such information is often in the human mind or the written word, Frequently

information collected by scientific and technical means mit be supplemented

by information derived from buman sources to interpret it or to give it true

significance. As Mi. Helme inforinod the Board on December 7, 1962, there

is an impressive illustration of this interplay of information from technical

and human sources in the identification of missilos and their sites in Cuba.

Material derived fron classic eapionage played a vital role in the community's

analysis of Soviet migaile activitien in Cuba last October. Specifically, Soviet

TOP SECRET documents acquired by a CIA agent concorning the preparation

cf R-12 MRaM's for launching, and the layout of nites for such missiles,

provided the primary basis for evaluating the degree of complation and the

state of readiness of the MRBM's in Cuba. These reporto ales complemented

photo intelligence by providing organizational facto on R-12 units, ana

identifying spocific ground support equipment which appeared in photographs.

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Material from agent sporationa also holped intorpret COMINT rolating to

sovlol activity in Cuba.

Letter-number designations for compononts.of Soviot

miasileo and theis giound nupport equipment which appear in matorial suppliod

by a ClA agent have enabled NSA to identify itema being abipped from the

USSR t0 Cuba.

In considering the statement that we now have few meaningfui

oopionago asgets on the island"' it should be remoribered that meaningful

intelligonce in obtained not only on the island but elsewhere as well. Wo do

Livo assets which report on Cuba, such as Cuban diplomats, liaison services,

Cuban seamon, and audio operations against Cuban installationg abroad, all

of which are not on the island but do provide meaningíul information about

ovents inaide Cuba. Among these assets are some thai do provide us trith

insights into the Castro regime'o plaus and intentione.. We have on the island

¡taelf over 130 resident singleton agento who have boen and are providing ue

with a variety of intelligance information on Cuba. Among these are those

agents who furnished the intelligence community with significant reporta on

anpocto of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba last suromor, particularly on:

SAM'a, cruise missiles, MIG-21'8, IL-28's, and atraiegic misciles.

agent roports, combined with refugee reporte, initially resulted in the

targeting for the U -2 flights which identified the SAM's and other weapons

-and lator contributed to the targeting for the U -2 flight of October 14 which

Ascovered the MRBM site at San Cristobal. Today, there are amony the

moro than 130 rusident agonis in Cuba approximataly twenty agent. aourses

with a capability of providing significant information on military developments

and approximately ton with access to significant political imormation We

do not have sources with complete acceon to the "plane and intentions" of the

Castro regime, It must be remembered, however, that agents inside Cuba

are operating within a classic denied area with ever-increasing police

controla and where Cubana aro largely excluded from Soviet military

installations

We will never be satiofied that we have a sufficient nuraber of

agent renources on the island of Cuba; however, the quantity of agents is not

the most difficult problem. Reaching the targets within a country organized

as Cuba is now organized is the greatcot difficulty.

The second paragraph of this recommendation appears to confuse

Arnerican operatives under nonofficial cover with sourcér under deep cover

who can survire and report after the severanco of diplomatic relatione.

There is an inclination by some critics of the current clandestine

effort to consider an increase in nonofficial cover with a corresponding

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decreaso in official cover an tha solution to mary of the problems of clas-

destine activity in foreiga areas.

Nonofficial covor as used in this sonso

means an arragement which provides a plausible reason for the American

reprosontutive being in the foreign area in a capacity otber than as a repre-

sontativo of the Government of the United States. The repetitive advocacy of

more nonofficial covor and less official cover is usually for roasons other

than the suporiority of nonofficial cover in the clandestine collection of

intelligence information.

We realise that there aro other important consider-

ations which make it undesirable to have a disproportionate number of intall -

gence operatives under diplomatic and consular cover.

We contend, however,

that only under propor and special conditions is nonofficial cover superior to

official cover in the clandestine gathering of information. By and large

official cover in more productive. The question of establishing and maintaining

under viable doep cover, sourcos of information who can survive and report

through clandestino channels is quite another matter and really has littio to

do with whether our American intelligenco officers are under official or non-

official cover. These deep cover sources muat be of foreign nationality, at

loast appoar to ba so, to operato effectively in a country hostilo to the United

States and ospocially in a polico stato after diplomatic relations bavn been

broken. But the recruitment of such sources and their organization can

sually be done more effectively by American representatives under official

cover than by Americans under nonofficial cover. Had all the ClA ropro-

sentatives in Cuba at the time diplomatic relations were gevored in i 961 been

there under nonoificial cover they would probably have been able to remain

only a shoit time longer than our ropresentatives under official cover and

those who did remain could not have operated effectively under the sarveillance

that would have undoubtedly been placed on them. We do agree, of course,

that seloctively we should make an effort to lay the groundwork for deep cover,

clandestine operation that can survive a break in diplomatic relationa and

other cilses.

It in in order to consider briefly the nature, advantaged and limi-

tations of nonofficial cover. It is to be noted first and foremost that the CLA

as a matter of avowed policy, in committed to the uno of sonofficial cover in

all inutances, whore it is availablo and ite use in justified. In many areas of

the world, however, nonofficial cover does not exist or, if it does, it exista

under such circumstances as to bave little use for the conduct of espionage.

This is true of the denied areas, moro particularly tho Bloc countring; the

quasi-donied areas such as Iraq and Egypt; and the undur-developed countries,

where thoro are no facilitica of science, commerce and education from which

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cover might devolve within tho society. In those areas where nonofficial

cover may provide legality for an agent'o residence in the area and con-

cealmont of his ultimate objectivos, it atill may not givo him accoas to

dosignated targete. Unlens it doos, nonofficial cover la unproductive. Tho

Identification of a target and acceas to it through a viable cover instrumont

Is an ossential combination in the employment of nonoticial covor.

The more tactical operations (particularly in those countries whero

CA presonce is welcome or at least tolerated) are better done by individuals

under official cover. For example, liaison and joint operations are moro

effectively and more cheaply carried on from an official installation than from

a nonofficial one, for the simplo reason that secure files, work space and

communications are readily at band. It la poor economy of manpover and

overscas dollars to conduct this collaborative effort through the usage of the

much more expansive nonofficial cover uniess some clear advantage is gained

thereby,

No sweeping or general conclusion can be applied to a rolationhip

of official cover to nonofficial cover, except in those few places whore thiero

is relatively a free choice betweon the two. But since there are not very many

of those, each country must be considered as a problem in itself. Tbe augmen-

tation of sonofficial cover assets lies in closer examination of the operationl

pooalbilities of nonofficial cover in oach individual station to insure that it ie

employed in instances where it is available and will enable the represontative

to do his job or accomplish his task. We must start with a consideration of

our objoctive in a given area and determine if we can reasonably expect to

reach it through nonoificial cover.

To this end, some months ago the CIA Initiated a worldw.do

planning program, Each station and baso chief was asked to evaluate bis

operations, present and projected, to determino the most efficiont balance

between staff under official cover and staff under nonofficial cover, to bo

achieved, as a target date, five years hence.

Practically all of these plans

nave now beon received in Washington and are in process of Headquarters

ovaluation.

It was clear even befors the planning was undertaken, fbat

certain stations needed soasoned officers under nonofficial cover and that

there was a big void in the category of the officer who, an a young man,

might locate inder nonofficial cover in a given community and spend the

better part of his carear serving both the purposes of his cover and CLA.

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During the past year there has been a gratifying improvement on both counts.

Those programs will continue to have high priority and be the subject of

Intonaiva efforto.

As evidenco of our concentration on this important subject we bave

recently establiabed in tho Clandestine Services of ClA a now component, the

Domostic Operations Division and Station (DODS), which will bo reaponsible

for the management of relations between the Agency and private enterpriso

in the United States. In this component has been placed responsibility for the

mardmum utilization of the facilities offored by business, education, foundations,

ete, in furthering and supporting the activition of the Agency. We expect that

the offort of this component will lead to improved nonofficial cover und more

extonsive assistauce by the nonofficial resources of the U. S. In many aspecta

of the Agency's activity.

The bost possibility of attaining intelligence assets after i broak in

diplomatic relations or a hostilo takeovor lies in the creation and maintenanco

of a dormant skelotal network prior thereto, with activation on signal from

witbout at some future date. This plan has actually buen followed in cooper-

stion with local Services in certain European areas and it has proved to be

burdensome and very costly in terms of both manpower and money. CIA does

ant have the capability in addition to its current operationa to create and

radintain this type of staybehine on a vory large scale. This does nut mean

that nothing should be done in those canes where a hostile takoover or a break

in relations appear probable. Efforts to penetrate the communist apparat

and communist cadres should be beavily augmented. Other minority groups

should also be penetrated. Individuals who have not been active in either

espionage or national politica and who might survive tho takeover should be

identifiod, clearod and even approached at a given point in the developing

estuatioo.

All in all, more snould and can be done in those cales.. The

answer to the problem of the survival of networks aftor takoover, homever,

does not lie in the deployment of mora Americans undor nonofficial cover.

In each of the last two years, the Department of State and CLA havo

jointly made a sarching examination of the officer manpower at all poats

(stations and baseo) of which there are 165. Officer ceilings for CLA 28.0f

August 1, 1962, were fixed at 470 positions, or an average of 2. 8 positions

per poвt..

Giving effect to raductions and adjustmente resulting frorn that

examination, thoro are at present ? posts where there are 10 or more FSR

positiona, and in addition only 20 posts wherg the ESR positions are 5 or

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moro, but less than 10.

An informod current estimato is that the Soviet Union employi

worldwido under official cover mora than 1300 operations officers (known oF

suspect KGB, 652; known or auspect GRU, 328; knowa or suspect RIS (Service

unidentifled),

312). There are about 370 Soviet permanent officials serving

In Now York City and Waahington, D.C. Of these 370 permanent Soviet

"officials", there aro 140 positively identifled intelliganco officers and 33

who aro suspects. In addition, there ars hundreds of Soviets who visit the

United Staton with the U.S. General Assembly or with other Soviet delogatione

and groups. Almost without exception, these groups contain Soviet intelligence

officers under official cover. While the Soviet ofúcial representation in the

U.S, has included 140 individuals known to be engaged in intelligence activities

the ClA has never had more than four on duty in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Overseas, the provent total of American operatives under non-

official cover is 1,000, plus or minus, including a hard core of 300 staff agents

and carecr agents. The figure of about 1000 compares with a figure of 550 in

1955, the first year the consolidated figures are available. Perhaps more

significant is the fact that the 'hard core" totals havo risen to 300 from a

total of 200 in 1959. When it comes to the employment of foreign nitionals,

figures aro mucà loss reliablo becauno the reco.ds of socondary agents often

exist only in oporational reports. Howevor, in terman of primary agenta of

foreign nationality on a worldwide basis, tho number i8 on the order of

10, 000.

There has not been a progressive loss of our capability in the field

of clandestine intelligence operations. On the contrary our capability has

increasod. As an example during the last half of 1960, 2514 sources produced

23, 034 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services

of CLA. During the last half of 1962, 2850 sources produced 22, 256 positive

information reports disseminatod by the Clandestine Services of the CIA.

The smaller number of raports during the second poriod resulted from a

concorted effor: to reduce marginal reporting and encourage sewer but botter

roports.

On the situation in Latin America, the South America Asacosment

Team in its report of January 10, 1962 stated that in general CLA had es-

tabliebed a healthy foundation for the collection of intelligenco information;

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that this buso should bo rotained; that what was needed from then on wae

expansion, strengthening and rofinement of capabilities in varlous folds

of activity. During the past year CLA has made progress in expandiag,

strongthenig and refining its capabllity in the clandestine collection of

Intelligence information in Latin Amorica. CIA has openod new stations in

Kingston, Jamaice; Goorgetown, British Guiana and the Paramaribo, Dutch

Gulass and bas opened basea in Cordoba, Argentina; Merida, Medco and in

Boion, Belo Horizauto, Curitiba and Salvador, Brazil. During tho past yoar,

CIA porsonnel in the fleld in Latin America has beon increased by 51, in-

cluding 24 officors undor nonofficial cover. This makos a total of 355 officera

in Latin Arnetica. A subotantial additional number of officers under non-

official cover will be assigned to the field during the coming year. Increased

emphasis on the collection of intelligence information in Latin Amorica during

the past year has resulted in the activation of 263 additional clandestine

sources of liformation. CIA now has 1949 agents approved for use in Latin

America - a increade of 242 in the past year. Penetrations of Communiat

Parties and Front Organisations in Latio America now number 142.

3.

The recommendation of the Board. We recommend, whils it is

still possible, continued bigh-levol and low-level (as required) aeriul re-

connaissance vi Cuba as one means of acquiring photographic and sizuals

latelligence concorning the military installations, the military forces, the

nodera military weaponry and the highly sophisticated communications

facilitirs which the Soviots retain in Cuba. This surveillzace effort must be

sccompanied by priority planning for the development of acceptablo substitutes

(such as drones, improved satellito reconnaissance, etc. ) in liou of present

serial reconnaiasance coverage, when and if such coverage in denied us by

air defense systema now being installed by the Soviets in Cuba on a scale

natched only by Soviet air defonse installations in the areas of Moscow and

Loningrad. We also recommend the launching at the carliest possible dato

of a vigorous clandestina agent program to provide surreptitioua collection

of on-tbe-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential

supplement to aerial surveillance of the island.

Commeat. We agroe la general with this recommendation. High-

lovel aerial recosuaissanco of Cuba acquiring both photographic and signals

intelligerce concorning the military installation, the military forces, the

modery military weaponry, and highly sopbisticated communications facilities

In Cuba is continuing. At present low-level reconnaissance is not included

In the Cuban reconnalssanco program. Authority will be sought for ita une

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should a sufficiently suspicioue objective of potentially offensive character

be reported which cannot be covered by bigh altitude photography of otber

The United States Intelligence Board has approved SIGINI requis-

ments for the use of a drone againat Cuba when the circumstances roquiro.

A photographic drone capability existe and separate roguirementa for its use

can be gonerated when necessary. This capability is now on a staniby basis

and could be activated within 10 days. Present satollite reconnaissiace

rapabilities cannst provids the detailed information nocessary fo. meeting

our requiremente in Cuba. Even though a decision were made to program &

satellite for the southorn latitudes, acrificing the presently achlevable

losolution over priority targets in the USSR, it is felt that the resulia would

not be satisfactory. The best resolution that might bo obtained falle far short

cil the present requirement. The asset cannot be used on an "on-call" basis

either in terma of launching or in terms of insuring that a pass will cover

Cuba, and if it doas that such pass could occur in satisfactory weather

conditions:

Whereas improved satellite performance is in the offing, theas

factors would still apply for the foresseable futuro.

With regard te on-the ground photograply of targeta in Cuba, as

pointed out above we are vigorously attempting to infiltrate or recruit agonta

In Cuba. Seloctod agenta will be provided photographic equipment. It should

bo realizod, however, that the photographing of primo intelligence targets in

n denied area, even with cleverly concealed camerao, is difficuli.

4. Tho recommendation of the Board. We urge that without furtber

delay a major clandestine agent effort be directed to the obtaining of vitally-

ricoded signals intelligence available from the array of extraordinarily

nophisticated communications equipment which is being installed and operated

in Cuba by the USSR. Some of the systems already identified appear to be

under command control running from the Ministry of Defense in Moscow to

key Soviet ground, naval and air force commanda in Cuba, and their perma-

nent installation on the island marks the first time that they have been

deployed at such distances from the protected confines of the Sovlet domain.

"tho proximity to the United States of this communication equipment presents

our intelligence collectors with unique opportunities to acek the means 105

"reading" not only the current traffic carried on highly secure cominunicationa

nyatema of the USSR, but also back traffic which has boen so securrly

protected au to defy our most sophisticatod efforts to break it, We recognizo

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that continued priority must be devotad to attacking this problom through

our prosent and planned use ol intercept and direction finding íacíliílos

omployed at vantage points on land, in the nir and at sea. La additivn to

such coverage wa strongly recommend that: a) clandestine agont programo

be devised and set in motion at once in Cuba, with a view to acquiring

through surreptitious means, including the use of portable recording eguip-

ment capable of concealment on an agent'a person, the emanations Irona

Sovlet encoding machines which aro capturcable at reasonable distaace from

the communications centers at which they are omployed, and b) that steps be

taken to ensure the readiness of commando-type or covert action plane and

taok forces as may be required for the pre-emption of Soviet communication

sites and encryption machines in the ovent that oppostunities for such action

should be provided under circumstances of auccessful internal revolt or

invasion.

Comment. The collection of Signals Intelligenco from wi hia Cuba

han been under way for some time. The most sophisticated of Soviet equip

ments were not identified an being in Cuba until October 28, 1962, ind it has

not yet been possible to identify their precino location, through either electronic

nt agort means. Arrangements are now underway wbich may enable NSA to

provide the Clandestine Sorvices with considerably more accurate a applementary

P/F' results. An airborne D/F "homing" technique will be utilized to attempt

to pinpoint the locationo of tranomitters in otaer than beavily populaled areas.

The first target mission in now scheduled for approdmsely February 1, 1963.

Tinder most favorable conditions, however, it is not anticipated that this effort

would yield position accuracy of better than & kilometer. Further refinement

of such reBulte would be dependent upon a clandestine close-in effort to

determine the exact locations where the devices are being used. There is no

information availablo to ladicate that these installations are 'permanent",

although there is no doubt, as of this date, that they are under complete Soviet

control. Without question, Cubans are not permitted access to the areas in

which the machines are located nor are Cubans being trained in the use of tho

machinos. The identification of the more sopbisticated equipments comes

from Signale Intelligence, and the variety of ageni sources availablo to us in

Cuba has not reported on any aspect of this equipment, indicating that the

Cuban officials themselves with whom cur agonts are in touch are not aware

of the nature of the equipment the Soviets have put into Cuba.

Inasmuch as the only information on these devices has been derived

by puroly cryptanalysic attack, no data are availableconcerning thei: technical

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or possible radiation charactoristica. Since it in virtually certain that the

Soviets aro awaro of the existenco i possibly compromising radiations from

cipher equipmento a well as from eloctromochanical printing dovices which

are at timos associated with them, it is not considered likely that a radiation

attact can be accomplished using simple detection devices. Additional

support la lent to thia opinion by the complote absence of Soviet uno of any

enciphoring equipment in any embassy or mission outside the iron curtain.

The only exception in the past has been the use of one or two ciphor equip-

ments by very special VIP parties on Soviet naval vesselo. In the ovent that

the machines do not bavo elecurical circuits, there would be in such case no

radiation or emanations which would be captureable at any distance from the

cantors in which the machines are located. Considorable research is currently

being conducted to overcome the technical difficulties la portability and sensi-

tivity which are inherent in an effort to intercept by means of clandestine

agents emanatione from Soviet equipments.

In view of the lack of information noted above, the clandestino

etfort against Soviet COMINT in Cuba must consiot of (a) firsi atteinpting to

locato the machines themselves, and (b) devising possible means of access

to tho machines. CIA la currently reviewing all possible locationo in Cuba

whore the machines may possibly be located in an effort to develop target

data on each location, including terrain, security factors, order of battle

of Soviat unite, and personalities on each possible installation. In the absence

at adequate D/Fing and with the lack of information on the location of the

machines, we cannot be too sanguine about locating the target instiulation

with sufficient accuracy to devise ways and means of creating a fensiblo

operational situation within any scheduled phasing. Every effort in being

mado, however, to develop more precios targeting data. These efforts to

Locate the targets and to identify the facilities and agente who may evortually

be used, have been given the bighost priority.

Tbe Board's recommendation that there be available cornmando-

type or corart action plane and task forces to tako advantage of an internal

rovolt or an invasion has been the subject of past and present planning and

proparation by CLA, and iscussious have been held with NSA concerning the

bent meaus of acbieving this ond. These discussions will continue with NSA

and with DOD with the objective of creating the needed stand-by farility and

incorporating it into the appropriate military plans with specific assignment

of responsibilitien. In addition, CLA has in being extornally bold assets

which can be utilised for a commando-raid operation, in the event of a

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significant intornal uprising. Without the procise location of the macbines,

howover, evon at such a time it will bo difficult to targot tho commando rald

with any assurancos of succoss. It must be borse in mind, homevor,

any such direct action, short of open U. S. military invasion, is likely to

load jo Soviet reprisals in one form or another againet sophiaticated U. S.

communications equipments. The Soviets will probably, in such evart, not

bo hampered by as many consideratione as would the U.S., ahould this load

to a chola reaction on the part of the Sovieta. At the same lime, the intelli-

gonce value of the equipments obtained must be constantly roviewed if tho

information is to be ubtained by other than surreptitious means.

In sum, therefore, this le a problem with which the intolligonce

community has long been troubled. There are no panaceas, and even though

the location of the equipment, for the first time so close to U.S. shores,

seems, therefore, to make it appear eanier to obtain the required latelligenco,

tho facts of the matter are to the contrary in that the Sovieta ars still main.

talning full and complete control over the eguipment just as they ha're done in

the past in more contiguous areas to the Soviet Union.

Tho recommendation of the Board. In instances where ecceptional

intolligence collection techniques involvlag unusual risks aro proponed to meet

priority Intelligence objectives and their use is opposed on ground that elements

o1 risk are present, the matter should be referred to the Prosidential levol for

final docioion. Wo recommend this procedure because our Governnent may

well bo faced with the recessity of assuming increasing risks if we are to

acquiro a firm intelligence basis for estimating present and future Soviet

capabilities and intentions in Cuba and in other potential trouble apots.

comment.

We concur in thia recommendation. We assume that

torm "Presidential levol! means the President.

6. :

The recommendation of the Board. In vow of evidenco from Giba

that the Soviets are resoiting to use of camoufage of misalle installationa,

we recommond that tho Diroctor of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

assign a high priority to experiments, under controlied conditions, to dotermine

tho effectiveness of short and long rango photography agaiuet varlous types of

camoulage and concoalment of photographic targoto.

We boliove that new

sensing and illumigation mothods may now be available which would be of

assistance in reaching a solution of this critical problem.

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Commont. We agree. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaio-

sanco already has recommended the use of camouflago dotection film in

roconnaissanco of Cuba.,

This has never been tried do the COMOR has

roquostod that testo be made of tho availablo camouflage detection film and

that the reaults bo reportod to COMOR in ordor that it may be aware of tho

full nature of the capability sbould requiromento indicate a nied for its use.

In addition, tho Committes has requested a briefing by tho Joint Reconnaio-

sanco Conter on the full rango of FLASH LIGHT photography both low- and

bigh-altitude so that it may be fully aware of tho aosets available to meet

regalremonto.

Marrball S. Carter

Ideutenant General, USA.

Deputy Director

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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27 Fobruary 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Interim Report to the President by the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated

December 28,

1962

At its last meeting the Special Group considered Recommendations 3

and 5 of your Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962,

along with comments on these recommerdations from the DCI, CIA,

State and Defense.

The Group agreed with the objectives of Recommendation 3, and it has

under continual review the question of adequate aerial reconnaissánce of

Cuba. With respect to satellite coverage, it appears that within the

reasonably near future the technical characteristics of these vehicles

will make it impossible to cover the intelligence requirements adequately..

Drones are available on a standby basis and could be employed i necessary.

The Group agrees further that on-the-growid photography in Cuba is highly

desirable,

and some clandestine agents wiil be provided with appropriate

equipment. It was recognized, however, that is is a highly risky

endeavor with limited chances of success under existing circumstances:

Recommendation 5 was noted by the Special Group.

The members agreed

completely with the view that unusually risky intelligenc, operations be

referred to the Presidential level for decision whenever there is a serious

need to balance opportunity against risk.

On natters of this kind the Group

frequently refers the decision to the President, and in such cases considers

itself simply as advisory to him. This procedure will continue to be followed.

2:28-638 -

cc: Special Group Members

McGeorge Bundy

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