THE CUBA PROJECT
Originator: OSD
Document date: 01/18/1962
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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202-10001-10172

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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ORIGINATOR : OSD

FROM

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TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT

DATE : 01/18/62

PAGES : 24

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff.

by CIA, State, OSD.

Reviewed

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TO DECLASSIFICATION

PERMIRES CONCURRENOE OF

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Date

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08/04/98

1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY :

JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10001-10172

RECORDS SERIES

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: DOC 173

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT

DATE : 01/18/62

PAGES

: 24

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B,. 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Bracketed portions

withheld by Joint Staff.

by CIA, State,

OSD.

Reviewed

[R] -

ITEM

IS

RESTRICTED

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Program Review by

Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale,

Chief o! Operations

SENSITIVE

18 January 196.

0112

THE CUBA PROJECT

1. OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist

regime from wichin Cuba and institute a new government with which the

United States can live in peace.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban

people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute

a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement

established within Cubz, to generate the revolt, to give i: direction to -

wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. ' The

political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure

of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological

operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime,

and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm 10r

sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

30,

Reviewed on _

The failure.of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 60 shook

• the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-

ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against

the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American

countries.

Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny

imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the

Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actipes to

defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreig, invasion. Such an

anger will be generated, in part, by appeale from the popular movement

within Cuba to other Latin Americans especialiy.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization

in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal

communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own

action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must bave

the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this

lact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans

are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towa ids what

appears to be a hopeless iuture or the futility of their starus.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of

the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a

fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major

goal of the Projert must be to bring this abou..) The popular movement

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

ASE 23 JUNE48 mkh

OSD:

NO OBVECTION

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Le do as de la did in la

SENSITIVE

mill capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt.

Areas will be taken and held. I necessary, the popular movement will

appeal for help lo the free nations of the Western Hemisphere: The--

United States, if possible in concert with other Western Hemisphere

nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoples' revolt. Such

support will include military force, as necessary.

ID. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

. Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation

se Cuba.

The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61) of 28 November

1961 contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition

to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the

planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April.

The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based

on the hárd intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence

community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba),

due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February.

It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to

start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on

which to base firm estimates and operations.

IV. INITIAL PHASE

(30 Nov 61 - 18 Jan 62)

A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project.

Status: The President's directive of 30 November 1961 was imple-

mented by creating a U.S. operations team, with Brig. Cen. Lansdale

as Chief of Operations, and with tasks promptly assigned. His immedi

ate staff are Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secre-

taries and Agency Directors are:

State

- Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch)

CIA - Helma

Defense - Brig. Gen. Craig

USIA - Wilson

. B. Intelligence Support

Status: CIA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate

Cuban refugees in the USA (1, 700 - 2,000 arriving per month) and on

- 16 January approved a program increasing the stall at the Opa Locka

Interrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 people to 34, CLA will

build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very

limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). Special intelli-

gence assets will be exploited more fuily. The Cuba project needs far

more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CIA will

require further assistance from Delense and other U.S. organizationg

in this intelligence effort, and is submitting specific qualifications for

perconnel on 19 January:

2

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CIA

1.3(474)

1.=1.1,84)

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SENSITIVE

C. Political platform for peoples' movement inside Cuba.

Status: State has sketched in a broad outline. CLA is to produce

the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will

operate inside Cuba are willing to risk weir lives, and upon which

¿popular support can be generated.

D. Nucleus for popular movement

Status: To date, CIA has been unable to produce the secessary

political action agents for this purpose. Upon re-evaluation of its

capabilities, CLA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight

to ten Cuban political action agents by IS February, from among

Cubans available in the United States. The minimus need for the

Project to be effective is 30 such political action Cubans and CLA is

tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S.

and Caribbean area.

E. Deployment of nucleus

Status: CLA is tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba wore

political action groups can be establisbed. " Initial selection and plans

for establishing these action groups are now due l February. Havana,

and localities in the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive

priority consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on

this must be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acqured.

F. Diplomatic actions

Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign

Ministers, which opens 22 January, boping to get wide Western Hemis-

phere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it

from the rest of the Hemisphere. A compasion resolution, to offer

OAS relief directly to the suffering Cuban people (similar to U.S.

relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being considered, as a means to reach

the Cuban people sympatbeticady w

thout going through their Com-

munist government. The OAS mel

if 1s to be supported by publis

demonstrations in Latin Americal

Agrated by CIA, and a psycho-

logical campaign assisted by USLA

1,2,45

The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin

American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Pro-

ject, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist

regime. This in yet to be initiated by State and musi be vigorously pressed.

G. Economic warlare

Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the

planning slage under State leadership. State is basing future economic

actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on the outcome

of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic

action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions.

unable to undertake action to sabutage lie sugar harvest, which commences

about 15 January, and upon which Cuba's one-crop sugar economy depends

(Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking and cane fields was explored.)

3

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13/9

CIA

1.3 (0)(4)(5)

CIA

13(974)

H.

TV

asion

Status

quipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts

has been

fated on a small vessel under CLi control. Cla plans to

attempt intrusion on ti

muary during Castro's forthcoring speech and

parade demonstrations

I.

Special sabotage support

Status

State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility

of pre-em

action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship-

ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms) ChA has antiated

action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results

(stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CLA

is introducing "Lubzol," a corrosive additive, to Cuban ipcomotive.

diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Bolgiumo It will be 4

months before the first locomotives break down.

CIA expects to be able

to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attem

introduc

tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan

for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help

when their revolt starts making headway.

• This contingency plan will

permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions,

and is looked upon as a positave political-psychological factor in a

people's revolt, eves more than as a possible military action. Defense

also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitrents

of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities

(with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations

inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly

operations through the Church to reach the women and families, and

through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include

enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration

is to be given to doing this through latin American operational contacts.

This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when ClA can

pyt it into place.

1. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group lasi week, there has been a

period of a realistic second look at CLA capabilities to mouni the required

. _ clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "fooling up."

After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be

to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support

for it, to improve CLA operational capability, and to help create a climate

which will permit provocative actions in support of a shilt to overt action:

This outlook, although arrived at thoughtlully within CLA, is far short of

¿be Cuba project's goals. CLA must take yet another hard look al ita

potential capabilitics, in the light of the following rasking, to determine

il it cannot make the greater effort required.

CENCITTVE.

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V. TARGET SCHEDULE

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made

in effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CLA

with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

XIA

13(4/14)

{117

131084)

source points. 15 February target date.

ruary

SOUIC

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets.

mrity on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-

Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country

i particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cub

B. Political

Task 5: CLA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban

government officials, to fracture the regime from within.

This effort"

must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to

be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our

political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA

project.

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by l February for Cover and Decep-

tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense.

State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, ClA to submit operations schedule for

initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities

selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltra-

bion, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must

deal with the "underground, " assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S.

Embassie: in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local

sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the

Communist regime in Cuba.

State to submit report on results of this

assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational

assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governmente

or groups to mount operations on their own, to belp achieve the Project's

Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CLA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the

Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The

objective of working on dynamic clements of the Cuban population (such

as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

14,5

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CIN

1.3/21(4)

C. Econornic

Task ll: State to prepare recommendations to the President on

U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (Il the minimum

result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accom-

plice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that

Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere,

State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade

between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.)

Task 12: State to plan, with Coramerce and other U.S. agencies,

on how to halt the diversion of vital items in the Cuban trade. Due

date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly

Canada and Mexico, is to be explored by State.

Task 13: State, with Commerce and others involved, to plan on

how to make "positive list"' items to Latin America be subject to the

same licensing procedures as applied to such shipments to other

parts-of the free world. Due 15 February.

Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend

present export controls of technical data (petrochemical, communi-

cations equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-

Soviet Bloc.

Due 15 February.

Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendationg on

issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense

Production Act of 1950 forbidding U.S. -owned vessels to engage in.

trade with Cuba.

Task 16: State plan due by 15 February on feasible extension of

U.S, port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter

vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on thie).

Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harass-

ing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (statedly for

Becurity rea soBs

if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports.

Task 18 CIA to report on possibility of cooperation of AFI-CIO

with the Interittan

• Transport Federation to refuse to handle cargo

for or from Cuba.

que by 15 February.

Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for

obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade

Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call

at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.)

Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain

= the discreul cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the

National Association of Manufacturers to infuence U.S. firms having

subsidaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions.

(Commerce to assist on thie.)

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Task 21: ClA to submit plan by 15 February for inducing failures

available; timing is the problem.

Task 22: State to report by 15 February on status of plans to

gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum,

as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps

to isolate Cuba from the West.

Task 23: State to report by 15 February on status of actions under-

taken with Japan, which has comparatively significant trade with Cuba,

along lines similar to those with NATO nations.

Task 24: CIA to submit plan by 15 February on disruption of the

1136/916)

supply became available to the Soviets.)

D. Psychological

Task 25: USIA to submit plan by 15 February for the most

effective psychological exploitation of actions undertaken in the

Project, towards the end result of awakening world sympathy for

the Cuban people (as a David) battling against the Communist regime

(as a Goliath) and towards stimulating Cubans inside Cuba to join "the

cause. "

CIA

Task 26: CIA to submit by 15 February ita operational schedule

for a psychological campaign to provoke a relaxing of police state

control within Cuba. This is to include effective means of publicly

indicting "people's criminals" for justice after liberation of Cuba

ot only individual top officials, but members of the Vigilancia, etc.)

Task 27: CIA and USIA will report on progress as of 15 February

in developing identification of the popular movement inside Cuba, as

with songs, symbols, propaganda themes.

1314114)

Task 28: By 15 February CIA will report on plans and actions

for propaganda support of the popular movement inside Cuba, Included

what be exactly what is planned for use by the movement inside cuba,

and feasibility of using smuggled food packets (such as the "I Shall

"Return" cigarette packets to Philippine guerrillas in World War II)

as morale boosters in generating the popular movement.)

E. Military Action

Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S.

-military force to support the Cuban popular movement, including a

.. statement of conditions under which Defense believes such action would

be required to win the Project's goal and believes such action would not :

..necessarily lead to general war. Due 28 February.

Task 30: ClA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule

for sabolage actions inside Cuba, Including liming proposed for the

actions and how they effect the generarion and support of a popular

movemeni, lo achieve the Projeci goals.

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CIA

13(47(4)

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Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required

support by Defense as early as possible after its plans firm up. Requests

for all major needs are expected by 23 February.

Task 32: Defense will submit plan for "special operations" use of

Cubans enlisted in the U.S. armed forces.

Due 28 February.

VI. FUTURE PLANS

By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for

individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to

permit a firma time-table to be constructed. Since the President directed

that the Chief of Operations conduct the Project through the appropriate

organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S.

organizations are mainly in the initial inventory and development of

capabilities phase concerning assigned tasks, a precise operations time -

table as óf today would be too speculative to be useful.

Ahas alerted Defense that it will require considerable military

rcluding two submarines, PT boats, Coast Guard type cutters,

Special

resides trainers, C-54 aircraft, F-86 aircraft, amphibian air-

'craft, helio-couriers, Army leafet battalion, and Guantanamo as a base

for submarine operations

. Also, ClA apparently believes that its role

should be to create and aspand a popular moverent, illusory and actual,

which will create a political climate which can provide a framework of

plausible excuse for armed intervention. This is not in conformity with

the Presidential directive now governing Projecttasking- Actually, the

role of creating the polítical climate and plausible excuse for armed

intervention would be more prop

ly that of State and Defense, if such

an objective becomes desirable.

273

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Distribution:

Copy No.

•

...

2.

5.

6.

8.

%.

10.

11.

12-1.4 -

The President

The Attorney General

The Military Assistant to the President, General Taylor

The Secretary of State (and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson)

The Secretary of Defense (and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)

The Director, Central Intelligence

The Director, USIA

The Department of State Project Officer, Assistant" Secretary

Woodward and Mr. Hurwitch

Ibe Department of Defense Project Officer, Brig. Gen. Craig,

(who will inform the Chairman, JCS)

The CIA Project Officer, Mr. Helms

The USIA Project Officer, Deputy Director Wilson

Brig. Gen. Lansdale

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