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Date

Page

: 06/25/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10200

Released under the John

C. Kennedy

issassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NT 54214

Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS

THE

SPECIAL GROUP

TITLE :

DATE : 08/13/63

PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS: SUPPORT OF AUTONOMOUS ANTI-CASTRO GROUPS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/24/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

PREOCC CONCURRENCE OF

DATE: MAR

2016

aura

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 54214

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EYES ONLY

SECRET

FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS

TO THE SPECIAL GROUP

•13 fuu 1963

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

and Integrated Program of Action towards

Cuba.

1. Submitted herewith for consideration and approval

is a covert program for the

e support of an autonomous Cuban

exile group. This program is an Implementing measure of

the previously approved course of action P in reference

memorandum, which calls for support of autonomous anti-Castro

groups as part of the integrated program of action towards

Cuba.

2. It is proposed that non-attributable support in the

form of funds, materiel and guidance be furnished to the

action element of a Cuban exile group known as Comandos L

which is an offshoot of the exile action group originally

known as Alpha 66. This support would only be furnished if a

mutually acceptable modus vivendi can be agreed upon which

does not conflict with current U.S.G. policy. Comandos L

have been conducting fund drives and the money collected

EYES ONLY

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic

SEBRET

downgrading and

des lasciticatier

1930

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ES ONLY

LURS

2

appears

to have been properly handled and applied to anti-

Castro propaganda and action operations. The group's present

primary action program calls for maritime operations, e.8.,

attacking shipping in Cuban waters and making commando- type

attacks on targets in Cuba. To date they have conducted at

least one such operation in Cuban waters; in this operation

which took place in March 1963 the group fired on an unidentified

ship (which turned out to be a Russian freighter) in the Cuba

harbor of Calbarien. The group has been relatively inactive

since the recent restrictions were placed on the movement of

certain Cuban activists and their boats but recent reports

Indicate that Comandos I is attempting to establish a staging

base

Ion Andaos siana in the Bahamas and may already have sent

several boats and some personnel to the base. There are also

reports that several factions of the action element of Comandos

I have had discussions with Luis Somoza of Nicaragua and are

considering operation out of Nicaragua if Somoza will support

them.

3. The general lines of the proposed program would be as

follows:

11.

A. OPS CONCEPT:

The conduct by Comandos L of a series of anti-Castro

EYES ONLY

SECRET

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maritime operations along the north coast of Cuba;

particularly during the light of the moon period when

unilateral CIA maritime operations are not being con-

ducted. These operations would provide valuable

support to the CIA operations by wearing down Cuban coastal

defenses and by preventing the establishment of any dis-

cernible operational pattern. The successful execution

of these operations would also make a significant con-

tribution to the objectives of reference program in that

such operations will stimulate internal resistance and

weaken Castro/Communist efforts to consolidate the

position of the regine.

B. SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE:

No more than two operations per month would be con-

ducted with the targets being Cuban patrol vessels and/

or Cuban owned shipping la Cuban harbors or waters and

coastal installations such as docks, warehouses and other

such facilities. The selection of targets for proposed

operations will be reviewed by the Cuban front (and thence

covertly by CLA) for conformance with whatever policy

framework may obtain at the time. Any deviations from

approved proposals will be dealt with on an ex post facto

basis la line with paragraph 3r below. EVES ONLY

PARRET

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EXES ONLY

STOREI

C. MODUS OPERANDI :

A wealthy American who has been deeply involved in

Cuban and Latin American affairs for many years and who

has cooperated closely with CIA in the past, would be asked

by CIA to present the program to an eminent and respected

Cuban exile who in turn would be asked to act as a funding

and cover front for the support to be furnished to

Comandos L. The Cuban front would then approach the

leadership of the Comandos I action element and indicate

funds come from conservative elements of the Cuban exile

community and from contributors located in Central America

and in the United States. CIA or U.S. Government involve-

ment would not be revealed to any members of Comandos L.

The Cuban front would spell out the use of a Caribbean

Operations Base and why he wants to concentrate on the

North Coast, 1.8., accessibility. Additional ground

rules would also be established regarding target selection

and tactics. The essential point would be made that final

authority for all actions rests with the Cuban front or

his representative. If Comandos L accepts this proposition,

the Cuban front would then go about acquiring a Caribbean

Operations Base under guidance from the American cutout.

EYES ONLY

STUREL

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SOMET

5

Once a Base is obtained, members of the Comandos I would

depart legally from the United States to a Caribbean

country where they would board fishing vessels, provided

by the Cuban front, which would then take them to the

Caribbean Operations Base. From the Operations Base,

strike boats would be towed to close proximity off the

North Coast where they would then be released to carry

out their mission. After completing a mission, the

strike boats would rendezvous with the fishing boats and

then return to the operational base. Upon completion of

an operation, appropriate relatively low-key publicity

releases will be made outside the U.S. in consonance with

guidance furnished covertly by the CIA.

D. OPERATIONAL BASE:

A British Island, in the Bahamas or one of the Cayman

Islands would serve as Caribbean Base for Comandos L. The

Island would be leased by contacts of the Cuban front or

the American cutout under a suitable cover story. We

would not plan to inform the British of the activities

of the group or of U.S. involvement.

E. CLA SUPPORT:

We estimate the initial capital investment of approxi-

mately one hundred thousand dollars would have to be made

YES UNLY

116

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EXES UNAT

SECRET

to provide, through appropriate cover, for the establish-

ment of the Base camp, procurement of fishing and strike

boats, and other required materiel and services. It is

estimated that operating costs would be about §15,000

monthly based on approximately 20 men with suo fishing

and two strike boats. To the fullest extent possible,

Comandos I personnel or the Cuban front will accomplish

all their own procurement and other required activities.

Any specialized equipment or guidance which must be pro-

vided by the CIA will be non-attributable and accomplished

by appropriate covert mechanisms.

P. U.S. INFLUENCE:

It is felt that an acceptable degree of U.S. Government

influence can be exercised

I over the Comendos I ection

operations by having the Cuban front making it clear that

any actions not in accordance with the agreements (which CIA

wIll stipulate through the Americen cutout), will not only

result in all support being irmediately terminated but in

addition such actions would undoubtedly result in U.S. Land/

or. British

authorities makiag a mariam effort to restrict

future Comandos L activities. In addition, we believe that

Comandos I leadership realizes that unless 1ts operations

are conducted within the geners

7 framesork of U.S. Polley

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SEPSET

7

in terms of foreign bases, appropriate targets and

acceptable publicity releases, they will not be able to

operate effectively against Cuba.

5. It is requested that approval be granted for the

CIA to proceed with the implementation of the program as

outlined above.

SYES ONLY

SECRET

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