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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AMTRUNK Operation - Interim Working Draft,

Dated 14 February 1977,

with Attachments

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14-00000

SENNET, INSINE

AMTRUNK Operation

INTERIM WORKING DRAFT

14 February 1977

1. It is possible that the AMTRUNK Operation might

have been a political action operation run against the

U.S.G./CIA. (See the separate memorandum on "Operations to

Split the Castro Regime.")

2. In late 1962 or early 1963, pressure was exerted on

CIA by Higher Authority (State Department and the White House)

to consider a proposal for an on-island operation to split

the CASTRO regime. The proposal was presented to Mr. HURWITCH,

the State Department Cuban Coordinator, by Tad SZULC (AMCAPE-1)

of the New York Times. On 6 February 1963, Albert C. DAVIES,

(Lt. Col. on military detail to WH/4 - Cuba) met with SZULC

at SZULC's residence, to discuss the plan. SZULC referred to

it as the "Leonardo Plan." While at first hesitant, SZULC

finally revealed that Dr. Nestor MORENO (AMICE-27) was one of

its prime originators. SZULC said that he first thought of

bringing the plan to the attention of President KENNEDY, as he

had had a standing invitation, since November 1961, for direct

contact with President KENNEDY, Attorney General KENNEDY, Or

Mr. McGeorge BUNDY, on matters concerning Cuba. He decided

against that approach, however, and instead determined to use

the Cuban Coordinating Group. SZULC later said that George

VOLSKY (AMTRUNK-1) masterminded the plan, assisted by MORENO.

It was agreed that CIA representatives would meet with SZULC

and the two Leonardo planners, MORENO and VOLSKY, in Washington.

SIGNAT STAShING

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ZENSTINE

The follow-up meeting ön 9 February (in a safehouse) was

attended by HURWITCH, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, DI. Nestor

MORENO, and David MORALES, Col. A. DAVIES and Alfonso RODRIGUEZ

of the CIA.

3. A 11 February 1963 memorandum from RODRIGUEZ to the

Chief, SAS, expressed definite interest in the operation with

certain recommendations which included having JMWAVE Station

put its operational mechanism into gear to have the Cuban

personnel of the operation (now called AMTRUNK) ready for

infiltration by mid-March 1963. Following a review of the

AMTRUNK Project, JMWAVE forwarded a lengthy dispatch to Head-

quarters, dated 8 April 1963, which recommended that the

operation be terminated soonest. Since it was a Headquarters

originated operation, JMWAVE also requested Headquarters decision

as to continuance or termination. A Headquarters cable to

JMWAVE on 10 April 1963 concurred that the AMTRUNK operation

should be terminated for a number of reasons, including the

fact that CIA could not at that time be certain that hostile

elements were unaware of the plan. A 17 April 1963 cable from

Headquarters

to JMWAVE Station advised that SZULC had informed

HURWITCH that JMWAVE had given VOLSKY responsibility to decide

whether or not the operation was to continue. It seems that

Headquarters had intended to use VOLSKY, with his concurrence,

only as a funding channel for the AMTRUNK operation if the

AMTRUNK principals were willing to proceed with the operation

independently. In any case, for some reason, CIA continued to

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4C09

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support the operation. The two principals, MORENO (AMICE-27)

and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contact

with high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltration

missions to Cuba and were terminated in March 1964.

4. Early phases of the operation resulted in the on-island

recruitment of Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz (AMTRUNK-10), Modesto

Orlando OROZCO Basulto (AMTRUNK-9), and Carlos PEDRAZA Aguilar

(AMTRUNK-11). GUIN was arrested in February 1966. (CUBELA

was arrested at the same time, separately.) OROZCO, after

reportedly running scared, was exfiltrated and terminated in

March 1964. He returned to Cuba in December 1964 on an indepen-

dent exfiltration mission and apparently remained in Cuba.

There is some speculation that he might have been G-2. His

knowledge of the identity of internal AMTRUNK agents, caused

a planned infiltration mission to be scrapped. PEDRAZA was

arrested in December 1965, tried for alleged CIA activities

and given a 30 year

prison sentence. JMWAVE Station advised

in March 1966 that four former AMTRUNK internal assets were

arrested for counterrevolutionary activities during early 1966,

in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals

of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been

rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14)

as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN.

COMMENT: It appears that the opposition might have

succeeded in obtaining CIA financial and material support for

an operation which was controlled by the planners. They

succeeded, it seems, in identifying, neutralizing, and exposing

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is11V

on-island anti-Castro forces, and tying up CIA time, money,

and manpower for an operation of their own creation. Following

are some reasons which might have contributed to its failure:

a. The controversial nature of the principal

initiators, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY and MORENO. The

AMTRUNK operatives made it known that they were anti-U.S.G.

and anti-CIA and accepted assistance only to accomplish

their own purposes. They were not under CIA control.

b. SZULC, although reportedly not directly involved

in the operation, was kept fully informed of its activities

by MORENO and perhaps others.

c.

SZULC's direct contact with the White House, if

true, placed him in a position to pass U.S. policy infor-

mation on Cuba to the opposition. (There is a note by

Richard Helms on a 23 September 1963 cover sheet requesting

Alfonso RODRIGUEZ to maintain periodic contact with SZULC

on Cuban matters at Presidential request going back many

months.)

6

d. RABEL (AMLEO-3), who "defected" to the U.S. in

1962, was knowledgeable of on-island AMTRUNK targets.

RABEL, following termination, returned to Cuba allegedly

to bring out his family, and never returned. There is

a possibility that he was a CASTRO agent.

e. CUBELA was knowledgeable of at least some of the

AMTRUNK agents. GUIN (AMTRUNK-10) was a codefendant in

the CUBELA trial. (Believe GUIN may have been given

a stiffer sentence than CUBELA and may still be in prison.)

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SHORET SENSINVE

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is

1.

SHONET, SENSITIVE

CUBELA was given a relatively light sentence, considering

the magnitude of the crime. Immediately following

sentencing he functioned as a prison physician, and

reportedly was driving a jeep unescorted, which is unusual

treatment unless one is trusted by the regime. He report-

edly is now practicing medicine as a private physician

in Havana.

f. The questionable activities and current where-

abouts of AMTRUNK-9. We have learned of the other AMTRUNK

agents who were wrapped up but we have been unable to

determine precisely where AMTRUNK-9 is. There is some

indication that he might have been G-2.

g. There was overlap with other operations: the

AMLILAC's, placing CUBELA cache, etc:

NOTE:

Cables cited in this paper, and other selected papers

from the AMTRUNK Project, are readily available in the

LAD/JFK Task Force office for review if needed..

LAD/JFK Task Force/Chris Hopkins: rp

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STUNET, SENSITIVE

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC (AMCAPE-1) (201-50539)

1.

SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland.

He arrived in Brazil from Lisbon on 3 August 1940, and came

to the U.S. in October 1947 under sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador

John C. WILEY, the husband of his mother's sister. He became

a correspondent for the New York Times (NYT) in 1953, and

became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special

Congressional bill.

2.

SZULC has been under suspicion as a hostile foreign

agent since 1948 when the FBI reported (apparently from a

Brettisfo source) that he was a Communist. He brought himself

to the attention of CIA in August 1959 in Santiago, Chile by

claiming (falsely) to be "cleared" and requesting contact with

an Agency representative. This was the first of many such

incidents

in Latin America, and resulted in a warning to all

Latin American Stations to beware of SZULC and his efforts to

interview Agency personnel. It also resulted in continuing

watch of his movements and activities because they represented

a threat to the cover of Agency

personnel. By 1960 his reputa-

tion was

so widespread that several different CIA officers

called for an investigation that would clear up "once and for

all" his suspected connections with a hostile intelligence

service. He was in frequent contact with Communist Party

leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America, constantly

sought out and elicited information from U.S. Embassy officers,

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frequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with

whom he was acquainted.

3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC's

anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and

blatant in the 1970's, it has

not been possible to clear up

any of the suspicions about his motives or his possible

connections with a foreign intelligence service. There have

been numerous reviews of his files and the interest in his

activities has extended from the case officer level to the DCI.

In fact, it is not possible to come to any clear conclusion

about this man, and the notes below are simply illustrative

of the kinds of things that keep the suspicions alive. It

is important to note that SZULC's activities can be explained

by the combination of his personality, ambition, and the

demands on an

investigative reporter for the NYT. He is an

aggressive, insensitive, and persistent journalist with the

family connections (Ambassador Wiley) and ability to develop

the kinds of contacts appropriate to a successful correspondent

for a paper like the NYT.

4. Nevertheless, there are elements throughout his

entire

career

that are almost

designed to arouse suspicion.

For example, a British source in Rio de Janeiro (see Attachment A)

reported that SZULC was "directed" by the Polish regime in

Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This

report runs like a thread throughout his file and

is repeated

and garbled in several versions

over the years.

The report

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SURPET

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61251

has never been adequately explained and was apparently never

reported in full to tondon by the British representative in

Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his

career Chis contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in

the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, however, just the earliest

elements that aroused suspicion.

5. Because he became so well-known to so many Agency

officers, his name and reputation have become subject of

discussion on many occasions. One senior operations officer

stated in 1975 that a Soviet agent could not be more beneficial

to the Soviets and the Communist cause than SZULC has been.

Although he presented a generally anti-Communist view prior

to quitting the NYT in 1972, it is noteworthy that he arranged

extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated

Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most

important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was

involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants.

More indicative of his true beliefs, however, are the articles

he has written since Watergate. They have become increasingly

critical of the CIA and of the USG generally and have damaged

U.S. image and prestige.

6. The notes below are somewhat random examples of

elements in SZULC's file that bring him under suspicion. As

mentioned above, they in no way point to a firm conclusion.

For further information on SZULC during the period 1963 - 1964,

see the CI review prepared at Miami Station on Jorge VOLSKY

in 1964.

hel

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a .

The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in

supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information

from

his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C.

Wiley has been repeated in various versions throughout

SZULC's file. The FBI has found similar allegations

made by other

sources who knew SZULC at that time. In

addition, several sources have mentioned SZULC's relations

with his cousin, Ignacy SACHS, who was the Press Attache

in the Polish Embassy in 1947 and 1948, although there

is no indication that SACHS had intelligence connections.

b.

SZULC's marriage to the daughter of the American

manager of the English language newspaper in Rio de Janeiro,

the Herald, lasted only until SZULC had permanent residence

in the U.S. and appears to have been carried through for

that purpose.

с. By 1949 (SZULC was only 23) he had come to the

attention of the Rio Station because of his dealings

with the Polish Legation and because investigation revealed

his father

had some (apparently innocent) business dealings

with Russians visiting Brazil from Mexico.

d. In 1954, about a year after he was hired by the

NYT, SZULC obtained a sensational story, by telephone,

from a Communist leader in Guatemala. This launched his

career with the NYT.

e.

In 1956 SZULC was investigating Brazilian nuclear

policy for the NYT. Although a legitimate topic, it was

somewhat unusual for him and the timing seems unusual

for NYT interest.

NEGRET

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SECRET

f. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC

claimed to be "cleared" and requested an interview

with an Agency representative. This was the first of

numerous such requests.

In addition, it was in about

1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency

personnel the names of other Agency officers he had

identified.

g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in

December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively

favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but

in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO

and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison

that

with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles / SZULC's

piece/can

be considered balanced.

h. By September 1960, SZULC was in the forefront of

those advocating action against CASTRO. (It was he who

finally brought the Leonardo Plan to Washington in 1963.

See AMTRUNK Operational paper).

i. In April 1961, shortly after John F. KENNEDY was

innaugurated, SZULC was transferred to Washington by the

NYT.

Although a

reasonable transfer, it is noteworthy

that in a very short time SZULC claimed that he had a

standing invitation to go directly to the President, the

Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY

and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban

matters.

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SEGRET

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SECRET

j. SZULC persistently sought a continuing contact

with an Agency representative in Washington shortly after

he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The

first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on

military detail to CIA - Cuba), and was arranged at the

behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director,

on SZULC's request.

k. In early 1963, at President KENNEDY's urging,

?

..... --.

contact with SZULC was made into a formal relationship and

was continued until October 1964. The meetings were used

by SZULC to cross check his information from other sources,

including various Cuban exiles and the Department of

State.

He became, by virtue of his contacts with the

exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most

knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti-

CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI

study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.)

1. The Agency officer, Alfonso RODRIGUEZ, who main-

tained official contact with SZULC in 1963 and 1964 said

in July 1964:

"The special friendship and mutual admiration

society that has existed between Tad SZULC, Jorge

VOLSKY, and Manuel RAY and the JURE is not something

that is transparent or easily explained. This

alliance may be something unholy and Machiavellian;

I just do not know, but I can find no evidence to

prove it."

SEShET

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SECRET

.

m.

Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965:

"After reading and re-reading this man's various

files, I began to feel that this man in his position

would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was

noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually

in advance of the crisis and writes articles which

are more concerned with the Communist successes."

n.

In

about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid

as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He

stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in

Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in

December he was expelled, apparently for being too

inquisitive. However, the

West

German Service has remained

suspicious of

the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and

the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting

that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH

line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who

was

in the Czech Intelligence service.)

0. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone

horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect

KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's

file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.

p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively

and demonstrated an extreme bias against the CIA. By

July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State

and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Govern-

ment

tone.

His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups

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SECRET

was less sure than in earlier days and was frequently

sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially,

article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters

in Zurich and other wild statements.)

9. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly

critical of the Agency and he has used the background

information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency

and to criticize its operations.

I. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling

the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many

irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to dis-

credit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts

was a series in Esquire magazine, in which, among other

things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community

had a hidden budget of $25 billion dollars and a

network

of 200,000 spies.

In, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, Philip AGEE

credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained

vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C.".

There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the

extreme views Tad SZULC has

manifested in the past two

years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."

SUMMATION

The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak.

However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with

the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can

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SECRET

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end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of

the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible

damage. The

current paralysis of all anti-Communist action byl!

the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the

Soviets, et al.

NOTE: (See attachment/ from a highly sensitive source.

Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI

approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working

with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for

her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that

her father quit the NYT because

of the restrictive

editorial

policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Nery Miller: rp

2 Attachments,

a/s

Copy filed:

201-50539

SECRET

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