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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

-n--

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD • NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10010

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

ORIGINATOR

PFIAB

FROM

TO

:

TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD MEETING

OF THE BOARD NOVEMBER 9, 1962

DATE: 11/09/62

PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS

AGENDA FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING

SUMMARY OF NÖVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET

1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

+0/06/90-08/01/2024

2025 Release under the President John F?

Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10010

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF THE BOARD

NOVEMBER 9, 1962

OC= 1000l - 10010

10d0l25

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INDEZLIGHICE ADVISORY BOARD

TrEn

5.0

6

i.

?

8.

10.

20X3

0:00 - 9130

9:30 - 10:15

10:15 - 10:30

10:30 • 11:00

11:00---12100

1: 39= 3:

12100- 12:30

The Chalmanlo Mine " Rocutle 305310n

Peciminary Reviey by Board Suelf of Recant

Cuber Developmenta

Ia. Pacricle Coysic

Recent Macuaalone Di Culan Developments with

the Defense Intellagenoc Acency and the

Nat10n21. Heconna1en2nee C021e9

1io Gordon Cray

Resent Phonzeraphas intelligoned 6ci0161610n6

Arthue Lindant, NIC

Defonor Intelligence igency nativitles

IncluS 126. 21410 ROla. 22.020. 62201 917224100

It, den, Joseph Carroll, USAl, Direator, DTA

State Department Vilers on Recent Intelligence

515-5,55

Me. Thonce huges, dotine Diroctor, Intelligence

cod Reseech, Depromont of State

÷ 05

12130 - 1:30

"Inch - Room No. 21, Dresntivo Office Luilding

1:30 - 1:445

Statue Revork on CIve Covert O20r8t1ons

' 7845-8-2015

Rovicy or tha recent senten of sovlet

Nucleer Tests

Albert meadon

orpice of strontidio Intelliconue, CIn

NO.T

TAKEN

VP-

2:15 - 2130

D.C1:1:00

017 = 1130

Ecocutive Sess1on

Banis

this meeting

1O0 SCORED

600

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2-

11.

12•

13.

14.

?15.

TIME

SUBJECT

-2:30 - 4:00

Discuasions with the Director of Central

11/00-12:55 Intolligence Including Review or U.

S.

mtelligenes Motivities Relating to the

cuban and Per112 Situattong

Tha John decons

4200-44:25

4:30-5:15

Discusgiong With the Precidant's Specl.al

Assantont for Netionel Scarity deraire

4:15 - 1:30

!i:30 - 5100

core farter ol' U.S. Mialligense dotivities

1n Italie dear and the 111ted kradon

Nii, GOsin

Status Roport on unplementation of

Bozod Becoumendo11019

5100 - END

Discussion of Board Penal Assigthents and

Board Personncl ily

Due to absonce 1r'oir

tho

country, Board mombere longer

and

Pace will be unable to

attona this meeting.

-JOB SECRET:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

The Board convened In meeting at 9:00 a.m.,

on November 3,

Board members Gray, Doolittle, Murphy and Clifford vere present as

were Mr. Coyne and

the writer.

(Messrs, Pace and Langer were out

of the country at the time of this meeting. Illness prevented Dr.

Land's

attendance.)

Dr. Baker inforned the Board that Messrs. Coyne and Ash had

a unique assembly of material for the Board's use in considering

the intelligence aspects of the sovlet missiles tailaup In cuba.

Dr. Baker expressed the view that the materials which had been

far too complicated for the Board to consider in the

course of only one day, and therefore the Board would look to

Mr. Coyne and Mr. Gray

for selective reporting to the Board con-

cerning the highlights of the coverage which had been

accomplished

thus far in the Board's review of the cuba situation.

Dr. Baker observed thai the contlict involving Cuba 1s an

Intelligence conflict.

positions of ant1-aircraft artillery units which are protecting

the SA-2 sites in Cuba. Furthermore,

such elementary things as the support facilitles which serve the

SA-2 Installations:

tained, it appears that except for Moscow and Leningrad the island

of Cuba

Is now equipped with the best air defense system in the

world.

It is possible that cuba is now on the verge of insuring

against invasion by reason of its possession of an assembly of the

nost dangerous armaments which have heretofore been collected In

In the UN the United States Is discussing

Inspection and surveillance proposals and positions which in Dr.

Dr. Baker said that he

does not know how much the president is aware of these things, but

there is a serious proposal being discussed which would contemplate

one of two Inspections a month, whereas we well know that within

72. hours there can be made operational a most dangerous offensive

capability.

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Mr. Murphy wondered what spectfically had caused the d cision

to be made to transfer from CIA to SAC the responsibility for re-

connaissance of Giba.

Mr. Miphy thought that an undirstanding of

responsibillty is: important because

the Board 1tself seemed to have been oblivious to developments

which were of such a nature as to warrant the stepped-up coverage

Mr. Gray's comment on this was to the effect that he had

noted an uncertainty In the past with regard to whether the problem

of Criba had been removed from the Board's area of responsibility.

Vr. Gray recalled remarks by. the Chalrnan at a Board meeting last

Indicating that the Cuba situation was being looked at else-

Therefore, Mr. Gray thought that If In fact

be made clear

for the benefit of the Buard.

In Mr. Gray's opinion If the Board

In fact had such a responsibillty, then the Board should have been

addressing Itself to the implications of public statements

such as

those being made by Senator Keating and others, and particularly

statement by.

Senator Keating on October 10: 1962, that ballistic

missile installations

were being constructed in Cuba.

Acting Chairman Baker Informed

the Board that he had confirmed

wi.th

the Chairman that the Chairman's remarks at the last summer's

Board meeting were intended. to convey that It was only in the

NSC. 5412/2 area that Cuba matters where being handled outside the

purview of the Board.

Continuing,

Mr. Gray said that it was a matter of personal

regret to him that

the, public statements by Senators Keating,

Humphry and others had not served to flag the situation.

Mr. Coyne said that following that line of reasoning he him-

self could be said to have been at fault.

Mr. Coyne went on to

poirt out in this connection that senator Keating and others were

speaking from:the benefit of Executive Branch briefings which they

hid received,

Including General Carter's briefing of the Republican

Policy Committee.

In any case,

the Senators had only Information

which was in

the possession of the Executive Brarch.

Insofar as

this information was based on foreign Intelligence acquisitions,

Mr. Coyne pointed out that all of the U.S, foreign Intelligence

agencies are under instruction and have an obligation to furnish

the Board witl: all significant information derived from the

foreign Intelligence effort, and If such instructions and under-

standings were not in effect the Board would be in the position

of having to dig out: the Intelligence Information which the

agencies are obligated

to provide to the Board on a systematic

In the case of the developing Cuban situation, however,

Coyne pointed out that a top level decision was made to give

limited distribution of intelligence information on Cuba and

Board was excluded from those elements of the government which

were designated to receive 1t.

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à periodic regional intelligence bulletin on Southeast As1a,

and that consideration 13 being given

to 1ssuing similar:

regional intelligence bulletins.for consumers in other

He described this particular recommendation as being a "ross.

suggestion.

this point Mr. Cllfford, reverting to the discussion

on the Hanson Baldwin matter,

asked whether a separate Investi-

gative unit 1s being established as recommended by

in lleu of the referral

of leaks for Investization by the FBI.

Mix. McCone responded that this natter 1s still under considera-

tion; that in his own office he 1s prepared to set up such a

unit; that he and the President feel this action must be taken;

there 1s growing concern in some quarters that the

creation of such a unit might ultimately lead to the establish-

ment of some kind of internal Gestapo.

Mr. McCone next turned to the subject of Cuba.

late July there was first witnessed an increased tempo

of soviet bloc shipments to Cuba, and by August the rate of

shipments had more than doubled.

On August 10, 1962 there was

held a meeting of Principals (the President not participating)

to discuss Cuban operations which had taken place during the

preceding months of 1962.

Up to that time there had been an.

exploratory intelligence

effort primarily aimed at providing

a basis for deciding what covert actions could be taken

against the Castro regime.

The results of this Intelligence

effort had been reflected in reports appearing in the Central

Intelligence Bulletin and in Items which were set forth in the

Presidential Check List.

At that time, Mr. McCone said, he

analyzed: the develooments in Cuba as Indicating .1 the establlsh-

ment of a sophisticated SIGINT operation to be directed against

our space activities at Camp Canaveral, (2, the establishment

of a comprehensive air defense system, or (3) the introduction

of a MRBM capability,

or possibly alt

However, no one

shared Mr. Mclone's feeling that the soviet activities in cuba

were directed toward the establishment of a ballistic missile

capability:

On the contrary, the Department of State and the

Office of National Estimates

within the CIA considered that such

action by the Russians would be a departure from establlshed

soviet policy.

Mr. McCone

said that throughout August a careful watch

was maintained with respect to developments in cuba, and in

late Aurist the construction of SAM sites was detected.

By August 23, when er. Necone left the country (on his

moor.) , there

obtained photographic evidence of the

construction of seven SAM sites together with evidence of

extreme security measures being taken with respect to the

unloading of ships at Cuban ports.

These developments, Mr.

MoCone, related, gave ris to considerable worry on his part,

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and prior to his departure from the country, on Auzust 23,

he took the occasion on August, 21, 22, and 23 to express

worry to

the president and to the

Secretary of Defense.

Mr. McCone acknowledged

that he had no positive evidence to

support his concern, but he reasoned that the extensive air

defense buildup which was underway in Cuba had as-its Immediate

purpose the denial of the surveillance by the United States of

the Sovlet missile buildup in Cuba.:

The U-? photography which

was being obtained reflected that

26 SA-2 s1 tes would be

Installed. In Cuba.

Mr. McCone observed that while the photo-

•graphy obtained at the time did not provide evidence of misslie

sites, a current review of that photography indicates the

presence of tents and some construction equipment.

Mr. Mc-

Cone said that when he left the country on August

23, he

instructed that a dally CIA bulletin be initlated at once with

respect to Cuban developments,

and he Initlated. Issuance of

this reporting after consultation with the USIB.

When in September

an Incident was created by the U-? which

"wandered" over soviet

territory, and also when the U-? was shot down over Communist

China on September &, these incidents caused Mr. MeCone to be

Nevertheless, overflights were ordered. It developed,

however, that from September 17 to September 20, weather con-

At about that time the Speclal NSC 5412/2 Group, as well

as the ClA, became convincea

that some risk was Involved In

she conduct of U-2 operationg over-Cuba:

for that reason,

Mr. McCone

said, the flights which were scheduled were of

peripheral nature. Four flights were authorized and flowm

1n late September and in early October, but because of their

perichera, or semi-peripheral character they did not cover the i

area of Cuba.

Mr. McCone recalled that in early

October there had been seen refugee reports concerning mysterious

shipments being transported over Cuban roads, and there were

other things of this nature reported by refugees.

As reflected in the SNIE dated September 19, 1962, Mr.

McCone said that the USIB dismissed the possiblilty that MRBMs

were being Introduced Into Cuba, and this view was based on

the bellef that such introduction would confront the USSR with

so many difficulties that the action would not be undertaken.

Mr. McCone sald that he was in France when he received a sum-

mary of the SNIE,

and he disagreed with 1ts conclusicas because

he could not see why the Soviets were establishing such 'a

comprehensive air defense system In Cuba unless this was being

done to shield the 1sland agalrist U.S. surveillance and to

protect the conduct of some clandestine operation.

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became greater.

Blit

even if this flight had been conducted,

I.n. Mr.

McCone's opinion there would not at that time have

been

obtained Information of a more convincing nature than

was later obtained as a result of the October 14 mission.

Mr.

McCone said that on September 7 he made a recommendation

that more frequent flights be conducted, and it continues to

be. Mi.

McCone's view that there should have been more in-

tense U-2 coverage during September.

Mr. Clifford

asked why and from where was there concern

a possible U-2 Incident Involving Cuba.

Mr. McCone said

that this vlew was held within the NSC 5412 Group and In CIA

Mecone said that he held a different view but

at the time. He cited as a current example of

concern attaching

to the possibillty of U-2 Incidents the fact

that today the Speclal Group considered a U-2 flight over

China-India border, and great concern was expressed in the

Group because the mission would have to include an overflight

of Burma,

and the prospect of the Burma overflight creating

U-2 Incident was a matter of considerable sensitivity

within the Group.

clifford

observed that while this concern might well

about reaction to a U-2 Incident which might arise with respect

Mr. McCone said that such concern with respect to

Cuba does not exist today and, as

a matter of fact, on that

very day there were being conducted ten low-level and 3 U-2.

missions against cuba.

Mr. Cilfford made the comment that he feared that, the

Board might pussibly be subjected to criticism in the light

of the fact that there was no photographic reconnaissance over

Cuba between September 5 and October 14, despite the DCI's

own suspicions. and. the content of refugee reports with respect

to a soviet missile buildup in cuba.

Mr. Murphy: Inquired of Mi. McCone as to whether clandestine

are being successfully operated In Cuba.

answered by saying that there have been three rather Ineffective

teams operating in Cuba with the principal objective of organizing

dissidence against the Castro regime rather than obtaining

Intelligence. He said that there are approximately 40 third-

country agents plarted in various foreign embassies In Cuba, but

we obtained no hard intelligence from them regarding the military

bulldup.

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could be reintroduced into Cuba as below-deck cargoes... Mr.

calfford thought that it would

oe. a good Idea to continue our

surveillance in order to ascertain the destination of these

ships and

the disposition made of the missiles, and Mr. Mc.-

Cone said: that we can probably

track, the ships Into the

Black Sea and the Ealtic, but that we would not be able to:

the unloading and transshipment of missiles 1nto Sovlet

ports.

Mr. Murphy wondered what had been the inspiration for

the commitment not to Invade Cuba.

Mr. McCone supposed that

this resulted from a Russian offer to do certain things In

return for things which they asked for.

Mr. Clifford asked whether 1t 1s possible for the United

States to develop Intelligence sources In Cuba which would

relleve our dependence upon photographic intelligence.

McCone sald that this 1s difficult to do primarily because

Castro had Instituted a police state in Cuba and, as an example

of this, Mr. McCone cited the practice of the Castro regime

In following a procedure whereby In effect the ration cards

of the cuban people serve as Identification cards.

Mr. McCone

said that previously eight or nine teams of trained arents:

had been Introduced Into Cuba since April. Three

reinain In Cubaji the rest have been either

killed ör

came back from their mission.

Mr. Mccone said that we have

not been able to obtain much intelligence from these three

teams because their principal activity has been to maintain

their survival.

Clifford sald that he found it hard to understand

United. States has not been able to develop intelligence

sources within Cuba, a country situated only 9o miles away

from the United States, and one with which we

have enjoyed

the friendliest relations for 60 years.

Mr. McCone said that

approximately 2000 Cubans are coming out of cuba every week

and at that rate practically all of the responsible Cubans

Invasion an Intelligence.

set in for a time.

in December 1961, the President and the Attorney

and Mr. Metone had aiscussions leading to the instigation

of some operations in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he was

aghast to learn at that time, there were no refugee interroga-

tIons being conducted, and so the Interrogation center was

established

at Opalaka, He said that within CIA a 500-man

task force was set

up. to work on the cuba problem and dis-

appointing results have been obtained. Mr. MoCone said that

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he 1s now concerned.

and he has hau under review the question

as to whether

too much dependence 1s being placed on refugees

of Information,

and consideration 1s being given as

necessary to send U.S. c1tizeng

Cuba as intelligence agents.

He said that we are not getting

intelligence on Cuba through conventional means.

Murphy

that this is a sallent point of interest to the

Mir. McCone repeated hig

concern which he had

expressed that even with the sovlet missiles removed, the

Castro regime will continue to be a center of Insurgency

for Latin America,

as indicated by

the fact that during the

recent days of the Cuban crisis orders were Issued from

"ithin Cuba for the Initiation me Insurgency action 1n sther

Latin American countries:

At this point Mr. McCone's visit with the Board terminated

and the Board recessed for lunch.

At 1:45 p.M., General Carroll, Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, joined the Board meeting.

General Carroll

said that In an attempt to anticipate the specific matters

which the Board might be interested, he had prepared some

materlals regarding the cuban situation

over the period from

last summer up to October 14 and thereafter.

He sald that

the extreme pressures which had prevalled,

the requirement

for da!ly presentations to top level officials. concerning the.

progress of the cuban situation, had made 1t impossible for

him to complete a detailed survey up to this time, out that

a survey was in process within the dIA.

General Carroll began by describing briefly the role of

the DIA's CIIC which was responsible for the coordination

Intelligence regarding the Cuban situation, In July 1962, the

CIIC leported on the Increased Soviet shipping Into Cuba.

reports were.disseninated with regard to Increasing

Introduction of Soviet materials.

On September 8,

the CIIC

reported that the scope of

the Soviet bloc assistance to Cuba

suggested motives going beyond the lending of support and

encouragement to the Castro regime. On August 15,

In an effort?

to supply guidance and requirements for photographic recon-

naissance, the DIA asked that the NPIC conduct a study and

review of photographic intelligence which had previously been

obtained with respect to three areas in Cuba.

On August 17,

photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was

located In two of the three areas,

aithough there was no

evidence of deploymentas yet The next photographic missior

flown on August 29 disclosed the presence of two SA-2 sites

and the presence of a thirdisite at Banes

Moreover, a

study of

the photographic, evidence. concerning the SA-2 sites,

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