CONSIDERATIONS FOR US POLICY TOWARDS CUBA AND LATIN AMERICA
Agency: ARMY
Originator: CIA
From: FITZGERALD/COOPER
To: DCI
Document date: 12/9/63
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10006-10000

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/24/201

AGENCY:

ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10006-10000

RECORD SERIES :

CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: CIA

FROM:

FITZGERALD/COOPER

TO: DCI

TITLE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR US POLICY TOWARDS CUBA AND LATIN AMERICA

DATE: 12/09/1963

PAGES:

13

SUBJECTS :

CIA COVERT ACTION PROGRAM

COURSES OF ACTION

POLICY OBJECTIVES TOWARD CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Calitano Papers, Box 4, Folder 1. Memo for DCI regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba.

NO STATE OBJECTION

BY DESISATICA IN

_DATE 01/14/16

artment of the Army EO 13526

E Exempt

в Declassin

, = Exclude

Authority T

Review Date 12A65 Bywhe

v9.1

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© December 1963

HOLANDO FOR:

Diroctor of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

Deputy Direotor (Intolligence)

SUBJECT:

Considerations for Ul folloy Toward

Cube and Iatin Anerlea

I. US POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Us policy toward Latin Amerion la to Increase the

stability of the area, to strengthen friendly democratic

goverments, and to prevent the establishment of Castroite

and anti- 03

regines.

None of these seen attainable so long

as Castro, with Boviet support, rules in Cuba. Accordingly,

the most Immediate US objoctive in Cube In the replacement

of the Castro-Communist regime by one compatible with the

goals of the United States. Current U8 polloy in pursuance

of this objective is to leolate Cuba from the Western Homi

sphere and the rest of the free World and to exert maxmun

possible pressures, short of open and direct US military

of the Castro-Communist rogine.

the CIs covert action pro

gram is designed to support other governmental measures to

proliferate and intensily the pressures on Castro; 1ts

ultimate purpose la to encourage diamident elements, particu-

larly in the military, to carry out a coup and eliminate

Castro and the Soviet

presence In cuba.

II. PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVEB

2.

The situation in Cuba Is characterized by econonie

atagnation, depresed living conditions, the 108s of

revolutionary impetus, and the dialllusloment of an in

creasingly large majority of the population.

To some extent

this 1s a result of innate econone deflolenotes in Cube,

and nore recently, hurrienne flora; but ton considerable

extent, the probio contronting the castro regina have been

magnifled by Chatro's own ineptitude and by the Ua policy of

econome and politloal isolation, and other barassment and

sabotago measures. Castro's position apponre to be eroding

gradually and recently he has been forced to sdopt Increasingly

harsh messures to maintain his control. "e bollove that a

continuation of prement US polley over the nort 18 to 84

months will produce a mubutantial further deterioration In

CROOP 1

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declassification

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the cuban economy and In Cuban morale, with consequent

seTIous Inpisestions for Castro's position. But U8 pressures

must be inteneified 11 the deteriorsting altustion v1thin

cuba 1e to result 1n

the overthrow of the Castro rogime in

the foreseeable future.

Despite whatever problen he has been having in

Cuba (or perhaps because of then), Castro has recently Intent-

11ad setiona ained at fomenting violence, subversion and

revolution throughout Latin America.

Given stable political

conditions in thin region, Cantro's limited subversive cap

bilitles would pose no immediate threat to US interests.

But sinco political conditions are highly fragile in many

Latin American countrios, the threat from Cautro le real and

disproportionate to his oms meager assets.

his urgent need

to sohleve some early triumph has impelled him to shake off

his recent caution as evidenced by the Cuban arms cache dig

covered in Venezuela, his sall for violent revolutionary

action to take place in Peru, Brasil, and Panams, 1n December,

and his threat to cut off support from his followerm in other

countries unlens they initiate carly action.

While we bolleve

that these actiona are evidence of some demperation and that

they may even baokfire, they nevertheless demon-trate Castro's

determination to pursue an all out campaign of revolution.

The key questions then, are bow wich time does Castro have

and, in this time, can

he set dangerous revolutionary fires

throughout the hemisphere. A corollary question Is whether

present US polley vial-vis Cuba and Latin America neote

present Us requirements. Our view is that the pace is slow.

and 1e allowing Castro a dangerous latitude in bin Latin

American program of subversion and revolution.

We belleve

that Cantro's recent activities in latin America now provide

us with our opportunity to pursue a nore openly aggressive

retallation approach against the Cantro rogime, both unflaterally

as well an in collaboration with the countries of the OAS for

joint action designed to remove Castro.

III. COURSES OF ACTION

A. Invasion

4. A muccensful Invasion of Cuba would provide the most

it simplet a exit me on tens co.

This course has been shunned up to now largels becaume of

concern for world renction and the ponsibility of encalation

Into global war with the Soviet Union, which in at leant

morally committed to defend the Cautro regime. However,

several new factors have beoome apparent slnce the gains and

costs of an invasion courne vere lant thoroughly manined over

GROUP T

Excluded from automatic,

demngrading and

dcolcaoltication

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a goar ngo and no ballovo that a roappenioal lo nor varrantod.

The USa! 1a having OCOndle dIIlIcultLO, thO Sine sovior

11to0 havo loononod sil of which night hove a moderating

intluonco on bovior sonations to & nove aguinat cub..

sor coutro, hia dissicultion at hono and his bobavior abroad

noy weaken

nio ability to defand his island unile at tho

same tino encourago other latin Auerlean governonto to

undortato moro surrosalve actiono.

3. Rogardiom of any of these rocent dovelopments, va

must recognize that an invasion of cube carrion great rish

of a Us sovlot controntation (probably in Berlin rathor than

Cuba). The rink of such a confrontation bould bo lous 11 an

INVASION WAS BLEATIY A TOSULT OS & UnANINOUS CAS docleton

and 11 tho invading forces vere gominoly multilateral in

composition than if the attack on Cuba vas strictly a uni

lateral us action.

In fact, anything nore than a unilateral

US aCtIOn, eVen

though subatantially lons than an Ons actlon,

would take sone of the odgo off the risks implicit in an

10vas1on.

Tho risk of confrontation would be

Substantially

lesa 1i multilateral Old setion vare coupled with unrest

Inside Cuba leading to a coup. In any case, however, the

usss would probably atep up tensions abarply in Berlin and

we should be premred for straine anong ous NATO allleg.

This will be espoctolly true if the invasion were undertaken

WIthOUt PI10S NATO consultation.

Finally, it should be noted that the President told

Mikoyan on 26 November that the US was not planning to Invade

Cuba.

A US invasion in the faco of the President's remarke

might reflect on the good lalth of the President and the

credibility of future UB discussiong with high Soviet officials.

On the other hand,

Mikoyan asserted that "Cuba was too small

to subvert anyone;" clearly demonstrable evidence that Castro

was, In fact, engaging in subversion would provide sufficient

Ju carication to warrant a reversal of any commitment, explicit

or implicit, that vas made to Mikoyan. If an invasion were

an OnS affalr, (or even undertaken by several Latin American

countries who were conspicuous targets of Castro's subversive

activities) so much the better.

B. Blockade

7. A complete and successful blockade of Cuba, Includiag

Canto to plait a to a to to brand a move.

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In the abnonce of an actual dooleration of var, vould almost

eorgainig romlt in & mbatatial renetion sentat the

blockaders (whether the ll alone or the OnS in Ita entirety)

and considerable opposition even anony our clemet alllus In

reduced if the blookade vore:

Bolective (1.*, linited to Pos and

mn1t1ons);

b. A quarantine of covert shipmente of

sras,

equipment, and personnel between Cuba

and latin America (see paragraph 11 8 (1)

below).

An operatton in which there vere very

substantial partleipation by other CAB CountrIes;

An action following a clear and convineing

case that Castro was engaged in mbversion through

out Latin Anerica.

® .

Of short duration and resulted in the

overthrow of the Castro rogine fros vithis.

8.

AS In the Come of an Invasion,

Soviet reaction will

probably be more lllely to take place in Berlin (whore thelr

strategic position in a favorable to then ne ours in Cuba

1a to ua).

It thie course vere pureed, it should be

done recognialog

that a counterblockade of Berlin and

Incidents Involving Soviete ships In Cuban ters will almost

certainly be an immediate corequenco.

C. Action Bhort of Inventon of Complete Blockade

Both an Invamion and a blockde me tigh Iink sotion

which would reprement a unjor chine not only to our cubin

polley, but in our intertioml polley un well. For this

remon, dometto politiel as noll so the brondent stratesto

wll1tary and foreten polley consideration vould be lavolved.

There are, howver, certain courme of notion which could

be directed anot Catro In Cub and Intin Aneries which

aro lan risky thin alther an luvalon or blockade, but would

Involve a mb tuatilly higher "note lovel" sad rink of con

Irontation with the loviot tirn thome premently 10 elfeet.

Somo of those have been considered 1n the pout, but have been

rajested, umnlly oither on tround of excrunive sim or Inck

of lenalbility, To bellove 1t 1n my appropriate to reconider

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COST

these and other actione designed to step up the intenalty

and paco of overt and covert nctions whose purpose la to

bring about the downfall of the Castro regime in the fore

seeable future. The status of current program and reco

mendations for future action are diacussed below.

10. CIA Activitie

A.

CIA'e Intograted Covert Action ProvTa

Toward Cuba, approved by bigher authority in mid.

June 1063, condiata of the following interdependent

courses of action and has ande progreas as indicated

beluw:

(1) Covert collection of intelligence, both

for US strategic requiremento as vell as for

operational requirembnts - covert collection

of intelligence utilies all collection techniques

botb within Cuba as well as agatnut Cuban Installa-

tions and personuel abrond.

The quantity and

quality of this intelligence continues to improve,

although still far from our goals.

Propagande actions to atimlate low risk

simple saborage and other forma of active and

passive resistance • CIA controlled radio prodrone

and other propaganda media directed at cuba en

courage low risk sinple sabotage and other forns

o1 active and psalve realatance.

These nodia

also sock to tilate and oracerbate tensiona

within the regime and between Cuba and the

Borlot Bloc, takim nivantura of Iino-Soviet

tensiom.

The prore Includes botb malling

and radio operations.

(3) Economic dental action - governaent-wide

overt official UB economic sanctions in conjunction

with covert coononto dental operation are causing a

marked adverse effect on the Cuban econony.

(4) Exploitation and attmlation of disai-

fection In the Cuban military and other power

conterm - ve are undertaking an Intensive probing

MILOTE to Identity, We out, no bia

channels of commnication with disaffected and

potentially dinuident nos Communint elements In

the pover center of the regime, pirtloularly 1n

the red forem herrahy. The objectivo 1u to

stimulate an Interent coup which mould dislodge

We currently are 11

who any be of

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(5) General sabotago and harasment .

sabotage in this program 1a both an economic

weapon and a atimulus to resistance.

Binoe the

approval of the program, four externally

mounted sabotage operation have been succesaful

(Santa Lucla - Casilda • Il Inabela - Cayo Guin).

Three additlonal were ready to go, but for

several reasons including "eather, "ere recalled

at the last minute.

While it in recognized that

no single act of aabotage will materially affect

economy, we belleve these ambotage raide have

had a significant cumulative effect and should be

continued.

We belleve the recent rise in internal

sabotage and increased disaffection and demoraltza-

tion in the armed forces are partly due to the

impact of these externally mounted sabotage raide.

(6) Support of autonomous anti- Cantro Cubau

to supplement and anaint in the executo

oi the above course of action - in order to expand

sabotage and resistance activities it has become

necessary to accept the laka Involved in utilizing

autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals who

will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance.

Substantlal progress la being made in this part of

the program and we expect the firat infiltration

and

sabotage operations to begin in mid January.

B. Suggentions for Intongification of Covert Action

Prugrams Directed Against Cuba.

• As #tated above,

primary objective of the covert action program ta to

create conditions and exploit all opportunities which

could lead to a coup againat the Castro regine. Under

the program approved in aid June 1963, "e have adequate

policy latitude and we are now making maxinum use of

CIA'e resources to pursue our operations. In our

Judgment, however, the category of ambotage and haram

ment should be intensilled, at least for the next

yoar, both as to quantity and quality, 11 the overall

program le to have a chance of producing the denired

To ban non cia rear

With rogard to quantity, the polloy decialon

to ban non CIA sponored exile raide fron US and

Bahaman territory bas given CIA a virtual monopoly in

this f1old, but 1t has alno drantloally reduced the

- 6.

de do not - 6.0

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number of raide againat Cuba. With rosard to quality,

we have long recognined the inportance of incapecitating

the critteal power plants and o11 refineries in the

Havans, latanzas, and santiago areas of cuba.

unduly basardous operational condition around theme

installatione for maritime raide and concern over the

political repercussions of the capture of comndos

sent on theme missions, have militated againat mounting

wuch raida.

Moreover,

the effectivo dange that can be

done to theme heavily defended targets by mall tears

now used covertly la problematical. A number of these

targets, however, can be effectively attacked from the

air under acceptable risk conditions. We, therefore,

propose the following:

(1) Relaxation of the present policy bannluy

a11 independent (non-CIA controlled or aponsored)

Cuban exile writine raide and air otrikes against

target in Cuba from UB and urge the British to do

Ilkowise for Bahaman territory.

(2) Authorization to couduct CIA or autononous

group controlled nir trikes againat selected major

economic targets such as the pover plante and ofl

refineries in the Havana, Matanzas, and Santiac

aress of Cuba.

11. Action by Other Govermmental Agencies, supported

Unless alI govermental

the downfall of the Cantro regime, un Interification of the

covert action program alone is not Ilkoly to achieve tbe

desired roult. Accordingly, we recomend that the following

propomal be given renewed emphanta or be initiated 11 not

alrandy in effoet:

A. Actions Againet Cuba

(1)

It 1s urged that Promident Jommon make a poldey

declaration on Cuba at the orllout opportunity to mke

cler that the us contime to regro the cutro regine

na Intolerablo. A "no rapprochement with CAstro" stato

mnt uhould be «plicitly Included so so to timlate

and encourate anti-Catro/Comnlot dimident elementa

In the urad force to carry out a coup.

Demo muscotion

for « Proside til statement to furthur this objective

aro contained in Tab A attaabed.

to an o side la

.. at att

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(2) By an interplay of diplomtic prenure and

politieal mriare to cause the Kremlin lendership to

conclude that dimengement from it overertended and

precarious position in Cuba would be in the beat

Soviet Interent. The President and his reprementatives

can put the soviets on notice via diplomatie channels

and in private confidential diacunion that US

rapprochenent with Castro in excluded from coneideration,

and that the existence of the Cautro regime 1a « serlous

Impediment to detente with the USSE. The US could offer

to assist the Soviets in finding a face saving way to

withdraw gracefully from Cuba Ithout serious luog-term

danage to 1ts prestige, a techalque alroady succesefully

applied during the miastle crisia of October 1962. CIA

could support this effort by covert political and deception

operation to exacerbate existing tenion between Castro

and the Soviets by causing Castro to belleve that the

Soviets are engaged in secuet negotiations with the US

to climinate him.

(3) There 1a still considerable opportunity for

tivitening the economic noose around Castro if the Us

1s prepared to incur the te porary displeamure of certain

allies and neutral countries.

More severe US sanctions

against countries that trade

with or ship to Cuba could

be imposed.

We are particularly concerned with te current

trade ind shipping practices of Canada, the Uk, eprin,

and dapan.

33623

US military feints could be undertaken deutened

to crete and maintain a high state of annlety within

the Castro regime regarding US intentions. Supported by

covert political and deception operations thee feinte

HOld cause frequent Cuban military alerts and constant

novement of Cuban forces throughout the ialand.

(5) Initiation of Iroquent lor level roconnaissance

flighta would provide additional uneful intelligence on

Cuban and Soviet military momento.

These flighte would

also have a positive paychologionl effect tonide Cuba 1n

denonstrating Us contempt for Cautro 1n a viaible and

drantic mover.

B. Actiona la Latis Amentea. A Cantro's domontie positos

deteriorates, he la likely,

In despiration.

to broome incremingly

ruthlems and reckles in fomenting mubvermion, violence, and

revolution in latin Amries. It this becones eupocially Import

ant to mke cortain that Cartro does not outflant us efforts by

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allowing his « mjor socon pomowbore to Intin Amrien

web as be ban sought to schlove in Venomela.

It vould be unreliatle to poet mch in the may

of militant or asreive notlon against Castro Iron the

and of most of the individul Latin Anerican countries strong

enough or no sographically located as to mate any significant

oontribution.

But the vulnerability of and countries to

Castro's subverive sotivitie provides all the more reason

for an Ons that has the mubatano as vell as the form of an

alliance. for this reason ve would place high on the liat of

Us netion a nove to revitalise the als. Although many of

the action linted bolar could be undertaken untiaterally by

the US, a coordinated OAl approach would not only lncrease

their offoctivene, but reduce their rint. In cames where

it in imposalble to

set wolonarted and unanimous prrticl

patlon by the Oll, 1t mould be our guidins principle to

bring as mny Latin Arican countries a possible along

with us, by bilatoral agromments 11 nocenury.

The following action with rempect to latin Amerton

are essentially defensive in the sense that they are dealgood

to thwart Castro's mubaraive efforto 1n thia region. "e

assune that they will be accompanled by long ter programs

to bulld up the stability and strength of frlendly latin

American regines:

(1) Perhap the mont inportant action the US

could take to taolate Cuba Iron Itin Amertea and

insulate those countries from Cuban subverton offorts

1e to quarantine covert arno, equipment, and personsel

shipmente by aft or se from Cuba to latin Amerloa.

For mat effect, the cordon, preferably netioned

by and perticipated 10 by the DAs, should bo drawa an

clome to Cuban shores « la tactically possible.

not be roomid that this qurantine would not be

fully effective, but 1t mould provide a lom1 basta

for melning und marching Cubis, and, 11 necery

non Cubas, remsolo and aircraft at 1111 to deter tal

whether they are engued la running arms, equipment,

and mon to Latin Anorten.

(I) Irly recognition of the Dontaten aml

SUre 1004 1000

no settee.

BUTC

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(3)

Appropriate Latin Anerican countries should

be encouraged to offer mupport and austetance, Ineluding

banes, to responsible Cuban exile groupe to permit then

to operite against castro.

(4) Ostwide or bilateral agreements with Latin

American governents should be negotiated for joint

negures,

to detoct and to prevent arm muggling by

land, men, or air Into latin America.

Becaune of the

urgency of the threat, Venesuela should be given firet

priority and every effort be made to build up Venezuela

no a decisive defont for communion in Latin America.

(5) We should strengthen on uite program to increase

the antisubversion capabilities in tho Latin American

countrios. At present, the Communiat and Cantrolte

groupe in most Latin Anerican countries are not large,

and for the moat part they are dinorganised and poorly

equipped.

Rowever, the capabilities of the governmente

of the area for detecting and coping with infiltration,

subversion, and armed upriaing are very low.

(6) We should attract world attention to Venezuelan

efforts to expose the Castro regime for it= plota and

acte of subversion againat Latin Anerican governments

and to help provide a legul basis for collective actioi

DISMOND FITZGIRALD

Chief, Special Affairs

BtAIL, DDP

CHESTKR L. COOPER

Amnistant Deputy Director

(Intelligence), (Policy support)

. 4*

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SUBJECT:

Suggestion for Additional Administration

Statements on Cuba to Stinulate Anti- Castro

Action on

the

• Part

of Dissident Elements i

the Cuban

Armed Forces

1.

The uitimate objective of our covert action

directed against Cuba

is to

create

the conditiona

which wl.1

stimulate non-Communist dissident elonents in the arned force?

and other power centers of the regime to carry out a couy feust

the Castro/Communist leadership and eliminate the Sino-Bovie!

presence from Cube.

With this objective in mind, CH iss

established and is seeking intensivoly to expand

contacts with

disaffected senior military officers in the Cubau arned forces.

In so doing,

we have been impressed by the unanimity

ith wbieh

these contacts insist on personal and political assu.hnoes from

the Unitod States as a prerequisite to active conspiry against

the Castro/Communist entourage.

These non-Comiculai

rissident Cubana argue that there ie no personal advantage or

entriotic incentive for then to overthiow Castro when: (1) they

run the great risk of being liquidated themselves as high o1f-

ciale in

that regme and (2) there 1o a liolthood that

clitical clock will be turned back and Cuba will again fall

under the rule of Batiata or someone akin to bin.

that: ther

must have solem assurances fron high level u.s.

spokesmen, especially the President, that the United States

will exert its decisive influence during and immediately after

the coup to prevent their personal liquidation and

political

regression.

2. Cla has attempted in a gonersi

and sexy limited mance:

Ic: orovlde these assurances

820

other Administration spokesnon to instill & senuine sende i

it renaina for the President

U.s, comnitment to our efforts.

Presidont Kennedy's speech to

the

Inter-American Press Association on 18 November alluded

ir.

this problem when he stated:

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"No Cuban need feel trapned between

dependence on the broken promises of toreigo

Communism and the hostility of the rest or •

the hemisphere. for once Cuban sovereignty

has been restored we will extend the hand ot

friendship and assistance to a Cube whose

political and economic institutions have

been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

3.

Our Station In Miami reports that exile conserva...

tives were depressod because they interpreted this passage

as U.S. willingness to accept "Fideliano without Fidel,

while leftlet oriented groups were encouraged to believe

that "anti-Communist progressive and revolutionary elements"

have the support of the U.S. Government. These Cuban

exile reactions, however, cannot be taken as reflecting

the views of people inside Cuba.

It la typical of extles

that they become oversensitive to the innuendoes of

official public statements bearing upon their problems,

Within Cuba, we belleve that President Konnedy's statement

probably contributed significantly to providing

political

assurances to the rolatively small number of potential

coupsters to whom these remarke are addressed.

But we

believe that action may be expected to follow only when

theo assurances are coupled with open recognition fron

authoritative U.S. spokesmen that many Cubans now servine

in" the ermed forces and other power centers of the Cratro

regime will have to play a major role in its overthrow.

These people need to be assured that the United Staten

sympathetic to the personal problems they will face in the

event of a succeseful coup.

To meet this and reiated

problens, we recommend that the following passages be

siven some

prominence in a Presidential prees conference,

declaration or speech at the earliest appropriate occaolor:

"There are many in the ranke of the Cubai

armed foroes, and in the Cuban Government itself,

who have viewed with sorrow and anger the

end ot

Cuban liberty,

the subjugation of the Cuban nation

to another state

and to a foreign idooloey that

125,

allen to Cuba's authentic nationalist and

democretic

sentiments.

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"To these men I say the United States is

ready to welcome to discussion without rancor

and without reprisal a non-Communist Cuban

leadership which truly represents the will of

the Cuban people to strike down the barrier

of Soviet domination, renounce Communism as a

way of life and re-enter the comunity of

American republics.

We recognize that many

non- Communist Cubans who now appear to be a

the machinery of tyranny, will ulti

mately be instruments in destroying it and

for this reason should be entitled to special

conslderation."

The President may also wish to refer to a speech

celebrating the

return of the Brigade menbers delivered by

President Kennedy at the Orange Bowl on 29 December 1902

at which tine he declared:

"Under the Allanza pare el Progreso, we

support for Cuba and for all the countries of

thia hemisphore the right of free elections

and the free exercise of basic numan freedome:

We support land reforn and the right of every

camposino to own the land he tills. We support

the effort of every froe natton to pursue

programs of economic progress. We support

the

rigbt of every free people to

freely transform

the econonic and political institutions of society

so that they may serve the welfare of all. and

I belleve there are the principles of the great

majority of Cuban people today, and I an confident

that all over the loland of Cuba, in the governent

Itself, In the arny,

and In the militia,

of freedom on their Island and who are determined

" that freedon go that the Cuban peopte

may once more govern themselves."

(Underlining ours.)

The President might note that in the intervening year the

prospects have improved for a return of Cuba to the OAS

family of nations and he looks forward to that day with

confidence.

SERRET

J0953

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