FILE: CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: SOLIE. D/C, SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF
To: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY
Document date: 10/1/68
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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MATRON, MESMENTED DO COE MANARTES IS

SO SALACE COME MO ASSASSMATIONS GANE MOS

Declassified and Approved for Relea

by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date:

2003

_ CLARENTS LA THE CASE

•NE VIRIY MANUCH NOSENKO

(cify +19)

1 10T. 11

PATES:

INIT/LOCAT 10:1:

IF AVY: -

LIFE BEARINE iN SETURITY CE CLEONES

CIA CI'S

DATI:

COPLE NAMED

Sheet 2ueey

12003

122

REVIENING OFFICIAL

Anti de

Eles San

Stion Saste

LANTS HAY BE COPIED ON ELOVED FRO THIS FISI.

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1 Octobur isus

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS

IN THE CASE OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

GENEE

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MEMORANDUN FOR: Diccluad: Gecurity

FROM

SULJECT

: MOaNio, furig aviaovich

do Ja accordance vill lic resuusi aí the Depuby Liicelos

of Central Inielligeace, inachaü 1a i sunraay Will Coaclario 15

concoralno sho bura fides o! lurij ivanovica dosinio. susa

conclusiona are conialrcó in li suiraty concerriao screenl

major arcas which were giron primazy coulderation la it Dater

of the bona flues di NCSiO.

2a Includid in taio cummary are comichis concerning

conciucions in to piovicle burmary and an annes consular is

1n the person ho ciairo to so, lau do loid bio clatraci postions an

lae KGE during 1953 - Jazuary Lit, let NOSE KO was act dis

palchca by the ioo, and list ila previouo lies and esaguerica.

aro nos scirally di material clusaicance ai laia time.

Eruce I, Solio

Attachment:

Sunmary

BLS:ko

6001002

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TALUR OE COXTEYES

I.

intacuuction

I. Summaty oi Deve'opmeris ia JOSENKO Case Sirce

30 Ocidser 1967

=1.

Araiylica: Commenty Corcerrirg lic Zoaa Fides of Yuriy

Ivarovick VOSENXO

A. IS NOSENKO idcriicai io tae Person Wiom Re Claims

to be!

D, Is ine Clsimed ¿B Carii- cá XOSENKO Piausible?

C, Mas NOSENKO Givir un iccepiabie Expiaraiion di

Mo Molivaitoa in Comiacting CLA in 1962 cnd 20=

Ris Deíeciioü in lsos?

D. Is tie iniorration Furrisied by NOSENKO io CLA

Concernina NGS Opcraioss, Personalisies, aic

Organizaior Jeasorauy Commensurate Wäth Eis

Claimed KGB Careez?

E. Can ine lriormeiico Furristed by NOSadiO be

Consicered in Tüio is Faving Resulied in Niaieriao

Damage to tae KC3 ardlor ñas the incormation

Furnisned by JOS2NKO 3een oi Signilicari Bereii:

F. Is There Eviderce oi KG3 Deception or "Give-Away"

in inioirration Furrisied by NOSENKO Which Woid

Warrant à Conclusica tai NOSENKO was Dispaicced

Dy the KGB?

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IV.

;.

Cojecire trici Como Jabilly a Dispaica Gi NOSENKO

Ly io 80o did Denarasion io Speak Free y io Cat

Concernino is Knowiedge di tie N03

and witnout

ICSD\ÃO Seing Civer à Specific Missior 6i Missions?

do is sidie any evictaco mate Conucts oi NoszikO i

1902 or in isod Wick Cia Wore Known to t: X03 2210.

i0 His Driccida di Thai NOSENKO Was Over Baiiied

by ine 103 Reiive to Mis Bazarior or KGB Cujectives

During Tres. Coniacis 0i After Bis Dejection?

Commonis Corcerning Previous Conciusiors in Regard i0 NCS2VKO

A. NOSENiO Did Noi Survi in to Navi: Rü in Any of tic

Capacines

or ai tre Prices and Times He Claimed

B. NOSENKO Did do: Erier lie KGB in the Manner or ai tru

Time Me. Claimed

c. NOSEiXO Die Noi Scive in le American Embassy Suitic.

Throughout ine 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimid

D. During lie Perica 1955 - 1960, He Mas Neither a Senior

Case Oilicer in, For Deputy Chici Oi, the Sevenua

Departmui American-Sritish Commoalcair Sectior

E. NOSENKO Was Scitae= Duguiy Chiei cí ine American Zirbassy

Section nor a Senior Cilicez or Supervisor in the Sectior

During tre Perica 190i - 1962 (sic)

F. NOSENKO'S Caims,

Thai in 1962 He was Cries of the

Americar-aritish Cummorwealta Section ard Was

Thereafter a Deguy Chici of the Severth Deparunert,

Aïe Noi Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim io Certainty That the KGB

Recruitca No American Embassy Personnel Betweez

1953 and His Dciection ir 1964

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v.

¡inex à -Simiomuns di Soric: Oriciais Aiout XCSEiXO

Anaes a - Si:.

"ua vi Cuses do: Examired in Text

Armex C - Tre Cirepaidi Pabers

C001005

3

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Erictes to

Leclasslical/an

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(ACe

INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be

all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-

zational, operational, personality and case type intormation furnished

by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To aitempt to do so wouid be repetitious

and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the

formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of

primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological

assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous

theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying

aspects oi the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily

directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not

dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively

plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in

a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO

has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that

these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

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"tina leas

it aid

LÜU1007

19-54

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S50055

but not to mislead tois Agency in any material matters of an operational

or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding oi ibe phrase "bona

fices" as considered in this summary. NOSENiO will be judged primarily

on whet..: he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB kno.riedge.

and whelder his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this

Agency were known to ibe IGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent

aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and

exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a

"uuna fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measuremen:

against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or

correlated io determine il he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For

purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas

considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may difier in regard to

whether this arbitrary siandard is a completely accurate standard, but it

is felt inat the information from NOSENKO and information from otner

sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader

to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers

appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami-

nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, " has been considered in

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she proparation of this summary. li will be commented on la part

and thie commary will Include conclusions correlated with the seven

pilmer, concluelons do isola on rage 399 of the above sunristy.

Rexaarla concerning celixi, crrore, inconsistoncles,

omándions and

unsupported conclusione i its previous summasy in regaed to spectic

cases or sub-area will be lacluded in this zummary. Howerer, this

«ammary will not Include a polal-by polat comparison of all areas ol

agreement os disagreement with laformation contalned in the pronoun

A positiro docteion in regard to NOSENKO based on all

aralinble informaion should be made la the immediate lutare. Taore

are no knOwa BOurCes CurrGElly avalable to pronado new positire

Information coscerniog NOSENKO and bis bons ildes. It la recognized

Ebat there do always a poesibillty in the future a Dew source or sourers

will be able to turnich addicional information in regard to NOSENKO.

Howener, this possibillty lo exceedial, tenuous and de la lolt there

do cafflelent isformation available on which to base a conclusios la

the NOSENKO matter.

3

6001CCS

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•SECRET

SZNCã 30 0070328 1957

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*500P 1

Einses fan atematic

er grades ant

declassificatlen

CU01010

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SUMMERY OF DEVELOPVENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to

NOSENIO but who bas been aware of the NOSENXO case since June 1962.

Intervicws have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have

been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and caree.

Of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been

covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturaily apprehensive during the firet few

interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed atitude, and

the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect

of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a

reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously

considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluciance

was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

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interviewer would not dispule co disparage his statements without adequate

reason, this reluciance on the purt oi NOSEiXO, in the opinion oá the

interviewer, totall; disappcared.

During the interviewing period, pariicularly in the cirst sir monine,

¡OSINKO materially assisted ine interviewer by preparing approximately

sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his lie, motivation ior de-

jection, individual cases, noies which he furnished to CLA in 1904, KGB

organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example

of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included

remarks concerning approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents,

35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha -

beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation oi NOSENKO has

materiaily assisted in the orgarization and evaluation of iniormation

furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripis of interviews with NOSENKO and relatec

memoranda have been disseminated to the FBi and the Cl Stali. Special

Agent Eibert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington

Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research

and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-

viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning

whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

2

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In addition, throe professtonale lenin the SE Divladoo lave

rovlowed the current information and asslated in lao retrloval of

preTtons Inforinalion from NOSENKO and collalton of current

Infermalion ultà previous laformatli-1. The latter in i tremendous

tank because of the volume of materiali te sunder ol individusl

casce i-nived, and the essensive Infosmation in regard to KGB

persosalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.

The BB Divislon elso provided tha services af an expert

tranelsior to translate the lapes al the 1965 Interrogation of HOSENK?

by Pair DERYABIN and ose of the previoualy mentionod tare pro-

fennlosla completed a new translation oi the 1962 Isterolewe with

NOSENKO. In adillion, transcriptions of certaia cter particularly

pertiosal paculous interviera of NOSENiO bare been complored by

the Difice al security.

Approsimately 7000 pagos of transcripts sod related matorial

have been complied and disemlusted atsco late October 1967. Coms-

ments concerning tha value of tse iaformation contalrod ln lao aboro

materiel are cortained la anotber sectlon of this surimary. As of the

present tune, a complote anslyals lo not possiblo since a considerable

portion al the material has not been fuily processed. In the preparation

of this summary all arcas al major signuficance bare bean examleed.

Because of the voluminous informasion, all analysicel and collation wort

bas not been complatad; but li la pot considered that, bared on all

0001013

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writ

aratlabio laformalion, the semaining work will materially alloci

tha conclusions drawn la this ruminary.

The pulygraph intervier of NOSENKO Mas initialed os

& lieguet and concludod on 6 Augum: 1968. Approstonately sisty

goratone of a pertinent esture vere included la the poligrant intar

Mer. No problemo we.r encountared duriag the polygrapa laterview

and so Edditional restliÿ oi NOSENKO le anticipalad. Attached la a

copy ol ths sell explanatory report on the results ol the podygra

interview.

Interviews with NOSENKO have contimed since the polygraph

taserver on a temporarily roduced ocale in order to parmit a review

of previous leformation sud preparation of this summary. There de

no conbi that fature intertiame wita NOSENKO will cereal informatios

of Insalligenco valuo, but irformation devaloped dius fir lll pazioli

a docialon ta the case of Yurly Ivanorich NOSENK?.

Attschmers:

12 Abg 68 Polygraph Rpt

0001014

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PRO%

: Crici, Security ilescarca Suare

: interrogation researca Divicion

12 August i9óa

DEMITIG DICA

Subject iô 4 i0 jeur oil iormer 103 Stalier wino derected io tre

2G30U:D

#r. Bruce I. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de-

iricring ard interrogating Subjeci since October 1907 in order to

cholve the issue metic subject vas a alanaicied agent o. the tua

ie has conducted a vast arount oi research and checiing vita source

in an cliort to establisa the veracity oi Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose ci the polygraph test vas to determike:

1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the iGB;

2. Whether Sinject had Interricually given Mi. Solle

any faite iticiation.

PROCEDURE

Subject has given a polygrara examination on 2 iugust 1968 6t

a safesite in tre vicinity of hashington, D.C.

conducied in tre Engiisa language.

suoject's comprehension and tre

soilliy to expreso rinsels In Ingiisa was coupietely sdequate for

purposes of poilarza testing. Subject was completeiy cocperative

in all respects.

Suoject aleplayea to evasiveness and appeared te

be completely ¿rans veerever he has questioned or gave infortio

as a topic.

The following relevant questioas were asied during the first test:

Is your true same furly Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

• Were you bord in the year 1927% Yes.

Besides the mericans, die you tell enyone else soout your

Intention to deject?

0001015

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Exclent 135

37109 did

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Did you ever teii alone in the dus about jour

Merican Inteiligerce:

io..

contact. with

ser con intel seel as y tire dus so do in contact vátia

¿cro you tola by tre Kus to defect in order to carry out ar

Inteiligeace mission?

io.

Toe folioving reicranü questions vere asica during tre secorà tect:

Did tre XG3 actually sera a comuication ior your recall to

the USSR on the day of your ¿ciuction? iu.

Here you acquainted vità CHoREPAiOV? Yes.

Did you actually travei to Goring in jovewoer 1963 to hunt for

CiTREPisOV? YCE.

ire you deliberately witholding fron us ary inioration about

the ica recruitsent of mericans? co.

Does the XG3 Lave ¿DIRA und ¡DPIU.I E0l YeS.

liore you the responsioie Cace Orficer for join Abidian 1n 1960-617

Yes.

Did jou ever dave ducercuiosis? jes.

tre foilovinz reievant questions were abicù on test three:

Dia you serve in jary inteiligence from 1951 to 19537 Yee.

Was Savani in the üssR during the perica 1957 to 19598 Xes.

To the best of your snowledge, were you in the Seventh

Department at this tabc? YeG.

Did you telephone tre GRU about Saubin at this tine? Yes.

To the best of your inowledge, was ZOPOV compromised because

of the letter Mr. Minters nailed? Yes.

0001016

is as gotiat Materia

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..: 6?1.

Pince. 3

To the ocot of jour iná cage, was minoriãr cinosca to the

1G5 secauGe 0.

the 1155

ies.

Gurciliance oa tie Drivica Ebassy?

out fron the soviet juica

so.

Diù you Intertionally excuserate your persorai association vitia

ire you hiding any curezse trioration about your baciground? lio.

tects vere niministered on is iate decause thu craminer dia not want to

¿un the riox oû fatigue settiro 1a and thus possibir ceusing adrenalin

excausiIon.

Poisorash testing was resured on ú lugust 19ó8.

relevant questions vere asicà ca test four:

Too fosioving

Dia you join the XGD in area 1953? ICo.

lere you a XGB officer inca 1953 to i9o4? Yes..

"ere you a Deputy Chicê ci the Severio Departenti

Yes.

Here you only a Captala at trus tire? Yes.

¡ere you en officer 1n tie U.S. moassy Secuon Irón varca

1953 to lay 14557 les.

In 1958 ana 1959 vere jou tre derusy Crici oi the imerican-

Britisa-Canadian Sectica in the Severth Espartzent? Ics.

Pros Jaruary 1900 to Decesser 195i vere you tre Deputy to tire.

Chier of the First Section of the First isparmeat? Yes.

Froz January to July 1962 ere you the Criez of the First Section

of the Sevento Depart-ent?

Were you an officer in tice firôt Section, First Departuent, SCD,

at the tire oî the Stajagraá operation against Bensos, jule and

Stroud? Yes. :

0001017

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s mnid

10 1 6751

Püge

CHitT

"1.

: )

roc iolioring reievant guestions were asicủ on Ica- five:

SInce 1953 dO JOS MON OI LIJ OLICT :GO rCCTUiLICÁIS In toe

Merican Eibassy besides jcitl ará N0liD?

Did the XüD inor duout tie totee you droudiù. .: ¿o.

lave you told us the compiete trutin about your ius carcer? Yes.

Dia you intentiorally chamerate your gersomal Itroivemert 1

ases 1n 1962 ani 19o4 ia orier to aidicad us? io

Did you intentionally give us any fuice opcrationai

inforcationi io.

Diû GRiBiOV offer you the porition of Deputy Cbies of the

First Departuent:

Was an orier actually prerarcù promocina you to deputy to the

Chiei of the First Departicatl

fes.

In early 1960 dù GRIaWiOY seli you tiat your prizary responcibility

was to nori Bgainet Mericas Code Cicrks? Yes.

Other than you rentloned, are you mialng any otrer reasons for

your defectioa?

Are you dellveraieiy wilrioiäing ary iniomation ca any forelgcers

recruitea oy the kü38 io.

Ine foliowing reievaat questioas vere asied on test six:

Dia you enter tée KGB througà the lmiluence of Gezerai BOGDAN

KOEULOVY

Yes.

Did you succee¿ DAKHVALOY as Deputy Chiei of the Pirst Section?

Yes.

Dia GRYAZSOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section?

Yet.

Here the CHERSPANOV papers passed to the Avericans with KGB

Anowleäge?

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crai

20: 61

nobledge was there any hidicnding inforuation in the

Cisi-sidd papers?

Did yoü ever personiy Lect GOiüli? o.

nas there a caule scio to Geneva for you to assist intrie

in the DEUITSKIY caGe? Yes.

Did you persoming taxe an approach to kilsun at the roscow

Yes.

The forioring rejevant questione were asica on test seven:

Did you actualiy revier the 1G3 ¿1le on OStuD? Yes.

DId LET FARVEY OSWALO reCEIVe AnY XGA traiLiNE Or astigmento?

No.

Here there any microphones instailed in tre dorth king of the

U.S. Patoassy 17 405c0HT

Was the review of microphone reports ore of your dutles in

2960-617 Yes.

Are you withhoiding any intoriation kno to you concerning

XG3 microphones or ejecuronic activity against the ü.s.

Biassy?

No.

Before your officiai trancier to the Seventa Departient dia

you rena the survelliance report on the visit or MiDiAi

to Pusitin street? jes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of sivisor

in 1962 1a General Yes.

Was the raris of Lieutezant Colonei on your travel docluent .

to GORiTY Oniy & mistaKe by KiSHPIROV?

ics.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

While 1n tre U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter

for BORODi for the preparation of a letter to Zavarà zilís

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201672

Ttà vEnER On 6 traiN IrC. CiGiti tO 100C0W

Yea.

re jou intentiong rivaccino dy irconinüion conceitera

sio.

Subject's

poigoraja test où dingict sirovise recieoted to '

CONCLUSIO

Basea soleiy on the overall armiycie oi Suuject's polygraph

tooto, it 10 the opinion oi tre uncicisica trat

ine suoject cas

icer Guantasining truini in incerilo une reievant questiona

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JI. ANALNTICAL CONVENES CONCERLENG THE EONA RIDES

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mia: 36 255

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ANALYTICAL COVIVENTS CONCERNING THE BOXA FIDES OF

YUR!Y IVANOV:CH NOSENKO

As indicaied in the itroduciion to this summary, incormation in

regard to Yuriy ivanovich NOSENiO will be considered against an arbi-

trary but realistic list of areas considered vertinent to the question of

whether NOSENKO voluntary defected to lins Agency without KGB

knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early i904 contacts with represer!.

atives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted thai motivation and certain other pertinent aspects

would aiso be considered bui that his admitted previous lies and exag-

geraiions wouid not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a

"bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which

are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section

containing remarks in regard to the designated areas oi A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to tre person waom he claims

to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

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C. Fias NOSENKO given an acceplable expianation oi

his motivation in contacting CiA in 1962 and for his

defection in 1964?

D. is ine information furnished by NOSENKO to CLA

concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-

zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB

career?

E. Can the irformation iurnished by NOSENKO be con-

sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage

to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by

NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-

gence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in

information furnished by NOSENKO nich would warrant

a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. is there evidence of a political or any other type objective

which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB

with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his

knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given

a specific mission or missions?

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SEGHER.

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB

prior to his deíection or that NOSENKO was ever briefca

by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives

during these contacts or alter his dejection?

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WECH LE CLANG 2032?

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SECKEL

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims lo be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnisaed detailed information in regard

to his family, his activities as a youth, ine schoois he attended, assoc-

iates of his father and rother, and his own associates. The period

under consideration in this section is int period preceding his entry

into ine First Department, Second Chiei Directorate, ViVD, in mid-

March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and

mother and his early life, together with other information such as a

comparison of phoiographs ul NOSENKO and a photograph of his father

and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 195ó with

Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich

NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-

building in the USSR prior to his death in 195ó. This is also satisiactorily

supported by personal-type information furnished oy NOSENKO concern-

ing other associates of his father and motner.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt

that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of

Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

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¡ile or no value in assessing lie bola fides or non-bona fides oi

MOSENKO. An expose of his youlniul indiscretions, of nich re sas

admitted a number, is oí no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO

was or was not dispatched bi the #GB. Obtaining any coilaterai first-

hand injormation in regard io NOSENKO uciore 1945 would be oi

negligible value, but there actually is supporting iniormation from

NikoLay ARTAVONOY, a delecior iron the Sovict Nary, concerning

the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparaiory

school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad-

uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had

attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he shouid have

graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final

examination in Marxism and iherefore was required to attend the institute

sor a longer period of time arc again take his final examinations.

Based on iriormation furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-

studenis and the Institute, there is no reason to douot inat he acruaily

attended and graduated from the Institute oi International Relatiors in

1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by

NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that

he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement

2

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by NOSENKO in 196% resulted in conilicting information since NOSENKO

on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he

"completed toe Institute of International Relationa in 1950. " NOSENKO

has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to

1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had ailed to graduate in

1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation

caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950

instead of 1951 and his aciual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The abore action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has

characterized as his "stupid blundera." The latter is a rather apt

characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not

evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence oi

a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own.

admission tended io enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically

portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which

he had knowiedge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during

March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been

seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of

3

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pratin!

time are contained in a separate section of lhis summary, but it is

considered that the recent interviews oi NOSENKO satisfactorily sub-

stantiate his claimed service in Navy Inteiligence during March 1951

•to eariy 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed

by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con-

cerning his life and KGB carcer. No effort has been made to correct

grammatical errors or speiling since to do so would be in conflict with

the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give

NOSENKO an opportunity to recuunt his life and activities to permit a re-

examination oi the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of

NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposee

in October 1907 and both have matcrially improved since that time.

interviens of and memoranda prepered by NOSENKO since

• 31 October 1967 have not indicaled any material discrepancies with the

siatemerts of NOS EINiO in the altached memorandum. One change tiat

has been niade by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the

First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh

Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather

than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO

also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"

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(personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April

1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory perfonnei

report was directly related to %... transier to the Seventh Department,

neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature.

An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between

errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by

NOSENKO.

Attachment:

31 Oct óT Memo

5

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Sitiün

Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri ivanovici

The folowing is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum

furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a requeat on

30 October 1967:

1, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city

Nicolaer, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, ivan, b. 1902, was working

at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which

he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, T'amara (nee MARKOVSKI),

b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENIO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a

otudent.

In Sepiember 1934 I began to study in the school (0 claes) but

studied a short period oi time because in October with the mother went

in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant.

"Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicoiaev I was living at the Street

Nicoleki 7 All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938:

at the Street Stachek (1934 • suinmer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov,

154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938).

From 1935 till

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1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living.

In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and acon I with ine mother

went to live in Moscow in tie end of this year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serasmovich, 2. Here

I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. Is. Polianka), In 1941

I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the soutn (Sochi)

but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I witl my mother went in the evacuation in

Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7in class in spring 1942. In

Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok Chiz, beig there I tried to run to

the front with my playfeliow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned

home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorisi and in

July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special

school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where 1 finished 8th class

in summer 1943 and after that i arrived on a leave in Moscow. Thie

• school muet be evacuated from Kuibyslev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I

did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the

Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku,

where I was studying at the second course (9th class), in thie school

I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon

2

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after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January

1944). In Moscow I studica it lne courses (Russian word), finished

9th class and was accepted again in the military-ravy preparatory

school, which was located in Leningrad. in August of 1944 I went in

Leningrad.

: All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km.

from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two"

monthe. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put

in the navy

• hospital. When I was in the hospital l decider lot to return

in the school but to finish l0th class in Leningrad about what I have

written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such

my decision. With the nelp of the fatlier's friends i quited with the ecnooi

and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January

1945 and studied there tili the end oi May. The WWil finished and i

decided to return to Voscow. The direcior of the shipbuiiding college

had given me a document that I studied in this coliege at the second

course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). in

Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Toimachev).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parente

(St. Granovaki, 3).

3

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In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter

national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In uly my father went in Germany with the group of engineers

and he too‹ me (1 received à temporary tanis of a senior lieutenant,

documenis and a unilorm).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted

with à girl - Sitiror FLAVIA, stuient of the medicine inbire. I

was in close Ii:.! ona with this girl, because of the pregnancy i married

her and she maic an abort. My parents were against the marriage and

we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 194ó I was

acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re-

ceived a flat in 1947 (Si. Mira - former Ist Uecychekad, 162/174). In

• November her father, Generai TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married

her. The marriage was not successiul. I foundout about her close

relations with the brother, and ihe child-giri was born with patnological

changes.

I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with ner

and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working

the commission, which was deal ing with future worke of the studente of

ny 5th course. I expressed a wish to works in any military organization

0001034

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and soon I was invited to visit personnel department oí MGB (Ministry

of State Security). Bu: MGB did not accept me. After that with the

help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the

intelligence of the ministry of mililary navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a

group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950

I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951

and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7in

Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going

to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 i went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately

alter returning in Moacow I had a blood cough out. Il the middle os May

I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. in July I

finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health

I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department oi

the navy inteiligence seni me to Baitic Sea (as a senior interpreter oi

the navy intelligence poirt of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk,

Kaliningrad's district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a

rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service alter finishing the

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second course in 1947. In 1951 lie ministry of navy nad given me also

the ranks of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence.

In September-October i952 I received a rank of licutonan..

In Sovietak the work was not interested and for me it was nothing

to do. Besides this the cia te was not good for my health and I decived

to change the job. With : purpose beiore new year at the end of 1952

I took a leave and went to Moscow. January l I was with my parents

at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I

did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a

former stucent and my friend. I lold him about my job and that now 1

was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me

on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing

more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the

incad of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN

about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium,

where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to

Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There

I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said

that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days

in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to

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come to KOBULOV. There l have spent about two hours in the re-

ception room of KOBULOV, but lie was too busy and his assistant

SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy oi the Chici oi the Second Directory

SHUBMIAKOV, who told me that tiere was signed an order and i was

accepted in the l department of 2:ini: reclory as a case officer.

SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy vi ine chief of l departmeni GORBATENKO

(who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chiei of ine

department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department

of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and

GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the d section of

the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the l department,

was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV

told me that I will be working against the American correspondents,

showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were

working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORVOSOV.

The last officer must give files on the correspondente and agente. i

was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorim I acquainted

with KOJEVNIKOV, Luimila, a student of the Moscowite Univereity,

and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents

at St. Gorky, 9, but alter marriage was living with the wife at

7

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St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 1 received a flat

at St. Narodnya, 13, Where was jiving with my jamily.

In 1954 1 contracied & discase (gonorrhea and on the advice

of the friend iVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya.

Doctore

asied to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an

operative passport and showed them the

passport. Doctora had given

me a treatment, after that twice they made teste and asked to come once

more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a

letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. ine

plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHÜBNIAKOV,

was speaking with me. I had written my expianation, and punisred by the

chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's

organization aleo puniehed me. I received a strict reprimand and was

• freed of the head of komsomol's organizalion of the 2 chief director.

I was a member oi komsomol's orgarization from October 1943.

In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol

organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written

characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that

I did not appropriate to the l department 2 chief directory. In June-

July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case

... 0001038

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officer of 2 section. This

section was new created (the work agains.

tourists). The chief oi 7 department - PERFiLIEV, the chief oi the

2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party,

soon received a rank oí a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a

senior care officer.

Ir :157 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

• In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a depuly chief of 2 section. In

Ith department i was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent 10

work as a deputy chief of the l section in the l department 2 chief

directory (chief of the l department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the

i acction - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist oi ine wife and two daughters: Oksara.

• born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (hronchial

asthma) from 1957 ard aimost every year till i9ó3 2-3 months was in

hospitale. In 1960 I was thinking about change (temporary) place of

living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB

in Lvov and Odessa.

But there was another question if I go from Moscow

I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of

2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia

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(counter-intelligence worx among Sovict speciaiists in Ethiopia). The

chiei of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided

but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agice.

The reasons were the case oi 1954 (in: and use of the passport for

"cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agente report

that drink and on this base have quarreis with the wife).

I was working in the l department till 1962. In january 1962

I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the l section

(vork against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 1 50t a rani oi a captain.

When i began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon 1

musi be promoted a deputy criel of the departrent, when would free

a place - the deputy cnief of department BALDIN was preparing io go

to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department

(the chiel of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working

till January 18, 1964

During my work in MVD-KGB i did not study in any school,

only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-

KGB at St. Kiselni•

.. .

.....

10

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Five times I was sent abroaci: in 1957 I was in England with a

sport delegation; in 1958 was again in Engiand with a sport delegation;

in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation oi specialists of nickel industry;.

in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim 10 heip to l department 2

directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzeriand - ine conierence of die -

armament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In

1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954

I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage.,

In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechosiovakia.

In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at

the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife

rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 i rested with the wife in

Kislovodes. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in

Nicolaev. In October 1962 1 reeted with ine wie in Sochi. In Juiy 1963

I rested with the wife and daughters in Arapa.

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BO iS FHE CLAIMEO SUZ CARZER CE NOSENKO FIAESIBLE!

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B. 15 :he claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the

past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer

in the KGB. information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern-

ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, ias been so

extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in ine claimed

Departments curing the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed

positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has

not materiai; varied in his statements in regard to the above since his

original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as

date of his eniry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given

in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature,

as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day

of transfer irom one Department to another and not considered critical

or evidence oi deception. NOSENIO has admitted previously giving false

information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

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his KGB career today is not significanily different from the fragmentary

version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB

career f NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, Firat Section,

First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December

1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh

Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chiei of

Section, First Section, First Department,

SCD

January 1962 - July 1902, Chie of First Section,

Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chieí of Seventh

Department, SCD

(NOIE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this

summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief."

The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance,

including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used

0001044

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in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example,

a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad

may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one oí whom is

given the titie oi

First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief

of Department and in generi: has supervisory functions over all the

Department sections.

The cception to the latter is when the Chie of

Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider ine

most imporiant section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only

over designated sections or organizational components. )

During current interviews and in prepared memoianda, NOSENKO

has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates

his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are

contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO

was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department,

SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until

circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief oi the First Section,

First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information

with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department

in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-

ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available

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it this time. On the other hand, it is not Icasonable that NOSENKO

would lay claim to ine litie of Deputy Chief oi the Firsi Section, First

Department, l this were noi true when he cicarly knew of the visits oi

GOLITSYN to the Firsi Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conierences

with officers ciosely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has aiso mentioned & number of officers di the SCD

or former cilicers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with wiom

he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.

A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLTSYN has

stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware

oi certain activities inciuding Viadislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.

GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. Guis, Vladimir

A. CHURANOV, Y'ergeni; GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statemont of NOSENKO that although he had heard of

GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict

with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and

ralied with NO NKO in the SCD in the late 1950'5. The description

of GOLITSY vi iris meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halis

rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any

reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such

an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this

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issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encourier took

place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection oi it, merc is

no reason to attach sign cance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinios thai NOSENKO did not noid the claimed

wition oi Deputy Chiei, First Section, First Department, Guring 1960 -

190% has had the most me.: in the controversy over his statements

reiative to his KGB carces. This particuiar aspect will be covered in

detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy

over what duties the position of Deputy Chief oi Section in ine SCD, KGB,

entails or does not entail. Il is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge

whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief oi the First Section in 1960 - 1961

on the basis of wether his knowledge of the toial activities si the First

Section was commensuraie with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief

in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Depuij Chief of Section in ide SCD,

KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties oi a Deputy

Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in

the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB

may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure

of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment

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Ei.c

as to wnether NOSENKO heid a certain claimed position on the basis

of a comparison oi his activities and responsibilities with that inherent

in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important difierences between United States

agencies or organizations, inciuding CiA, and the bureaucratic structure

of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including ine KGB, is the

salary structure. Pay oi a KGB officer is based on military rani and

on actual position heid with an additional percentage increase for longevity

and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a

monetary vievpoint in addition to the prestigc. As an example, ine

difference in montaiy

salary between a captain and a major is iserty

rubles and the dilference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and

a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rublus. An increase in miitary

rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant

Colonel who is oruy a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major

who holds the posizion of Chief oí Section.

During current interviews, an eifort has been made to obtain

Irom NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various

claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not bold

the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual

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supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a

considerabie degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO.

Admittedly this is not the most satisiactory way of resoiving the

questions, out it is the orly method possibie ai this time.

0001049

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C. FAS MOGENKOCNRXM :005221323 283-485608 03

ES VORNARION IN CONEEOEENG CERAN E502

AND FOR HIS DEZZ0E-ON IN 1SS:?

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relaetlenr astna

cingreding a:d

deriarsilicailen

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• C. Fias YOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of nis

motivation in contacting Cil in 1962 and for his deiecsion in 1904? Of

the cigat listed categories waich are being given specific consideration

in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably

the most difficuit in which to present a logical position with actual

support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and altaough

motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation

problem is not a paramoun: factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is Or

is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in

1962 and defected in 19u% without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late

dato have failed to disclose some important events oí a personal nature

which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.

Defectcis are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit

unfavorable informaiion weich they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnisned a

handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of

which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct,

is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memo -

randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

SECRET

C001051

Han tel

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## Page 53

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NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society

throughout their entire lives. The envizorment is an importani factor

of influence in

the life of an individual and irue disillusionment is at

best usually a graduai process in vich, many factors, some recognized

and some not recognized by ine individual, save played a role in varying

degrees.

NOSENXO, until 1955 ard possibi; until the death of his iather

in August 1956, could be compared io the profligate son of wealihy

parents in the United Staies who linally graduates from college and obtains

employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of

the luxuries be has enjoyed. The faiber of NOSENKO was not only wealthy

by Sovici standaris bui also held a diga government position. The

influence of his fatcer and the name di dis iater undoubtedly was an

important if not the must imporiani lacior in NOSENKO even being

permitted to enter the Naval RU and the XG3 even though NOSENXO is

particularly reluctani to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was

the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the

actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how

NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His

2

0001662

SECRET

starin in.

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## Page 54

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periormance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that

be probably would have been summarily ierminated ii he had not been

the son oi tue capable, respecied Minister oi Shipbuiiding.

Lí a certain amount of speculation is permitied, ibe

disiliusionment o1 NOSENKO, who iost many personai advantages

following the death of his father inciuding a personal automooile, may

have actually started soon after the leach of his fatner. That NOSENYO

is undisciplined is supported by his acmissions relative to his life in

the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period oi time

after his defec ion in 196%. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liguor. and

the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through

influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation

in contaciing CIA in 1962, particulazly his statement that he needed money

and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO das stated that he

wanted to make a contaci with the Americans, that de vas not emotionally

ready to defect, but thai he subconsciously believed inai if he made a

contact he wouid be making an ultimate commitment from which he could

no longer retreat.

3

0001053

-SECREF

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## Page 55

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NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerabie thought to the

beat way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not

rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some

information. NOSENKO staied that he thought if he approached the

Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted

to give information, " he would not have been believed and would have

been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding

how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally

decided to do it inrough Dawa VAnis whom the KGB considered was with

American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the

record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information, " almost

immediateiy gave more information, made no significant demands for

morey, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was

ridicuiously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current

interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive

amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO

has during current interviews staied that he could have covered his

expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the

Americans.

4

0001054

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## Page 56

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SEGRET

NOSENKO has biated that the night before ble departure from

Genera to the USSR ho gavo sortoon thought to defection but was nos

emotionally scepted to doloct at that laine. Following his return to the

Soviet Undon, NOSENKO, during a pertod el limo, made lila final

decleios to defect at she firet opportunily, realialng that it mean:

Icaring bio vifo, chidras, end osbor membero of lie fer lly ln the

Some aspects of the notivation of NOSENKO are obacure and

will probably so ramals. & rould be preferable li an exes datalled

chronology n! all the factore involved could be prepared or 11 even

cortain obvious lictors could be accurasoly delineatad. These are bori

Impossible as this time and probably at any simo la the futuro. What

¡a Impostani ai this timo ta a decinion ee lo whather the motivation al

NOSENSO N23 leed on personal rescons viia no impitcatiora of ROB

dispatch. Ii la considerod that die explanation of NOSENKO concerning

hia motivation la ecceptable and tast dia nitemont thas no sas escept

the Americava was aware of bis contacts with the Anortcase la 1962

or hia tatent to defoct in 1964 lo mupportod by ofber Information of a

collateral nature. (See Secton Ill, H.)

Attachment:

Typed epy Memo from NOSENKO

4001055

SECRET

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## Page 57

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Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a hundwritten memorandum

furnished by Subject on l November 1967, foilowing a request on

31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to

the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an

understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of

the methode of the communist regime,

the knowledge of the real foreign

and interior policies of the Soviet government and the laith in the right

nese of the iree world.

It svas not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted

in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I

think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent'e

and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers

and periodice and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in

the Far East and later being in trips in different regione and cities of

Russia I found out much better the life and conditione of the life of the

people of the Soviet Russia,

SECRET

6001056

p-1:1la. 148

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## Page 58

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When I worked 1l years in MVD-*GB i understood and found

out very many things, detaile and the rcal deal of the existing regime,

about methods

of the work of MGB-MVD-KG3 and about their doings,

about hundreds of thousande of the pcople of Russia who were (and

still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was

(and atill ic) going an active wori of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was scveral times abroad I have

seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in

reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying

at the West and not returning in Ruasia, but only one thing was keeping

me - my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the

Americans.

From my part "the sell of the information" was a real

show. I was thinking that they wouid not beiieve me otherwise. In

that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay

abroad of to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even

when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 1 decided definitely that i did not want and could

not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done

all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

00U1657

SECRET

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## Page 59

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buries

It was not cady io make this decision, it was very difficult

to leave the family ior ever.

And row in spiie of everything i do not regret.

0001058

3

SECRET

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## Page 60

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SECRET

D. IS THE INFORVATICN FUR

JOSENKO TO CLE

CONCERITYG AGE OPERATIONS, PERSOSALITIES.

AND ORGAVIZATION REASCYASLY COYVENSURATE

WITH FIS CLAINED KGS CAREER?

SECRET

texcitent

0001059

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## Page 61

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SECRET.

D. Is the iniormatior furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning

KCB operations, personalities, and organization reasorably commen-

surate with his claired KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-

mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,

and organization is more than reasonably commensurate wiin nis claimed

career in the KGB from mid-Varch 1953 to his defection in early February

1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given

to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each

department. Certain allowance has been made for lauily memory with

consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception

or whether the fauure to recali a particular item oi interest can logically

be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, oi course, no

accurate standard oi measurement which would permit a positive deter-

mination as to whether inability to recall certain deiails or events is

actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events

or could be attributed to willful deception.

SECRET

GOVICEO

.......

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## Page 62

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An efíort has been made to determine if there are any particular

patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recali

specific matters or certain details, and no pallern or specific areas

have been noted. NOSENKO, in iact, has an

unusually good memory

as evidenced b; the extensive iniormation iurnished by NOSENKO purely

from recollection, In adcition, there has been no material reiuctance

on the part of NOSENKO io discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has

known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topica di nièrest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB

officers whom he has inown at various periods in his entire KGB career.

He has been very consistert in information furnished and has frequently

added certain details which he recalied at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to

the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in-

formation is nol sciective, out is ad excellent indicator that NOSENKO

was assigned to the First Depariment and Seventh Department, SCD,

during the claimed periods of time and neld the claimed positions. Con-

sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignmente in

evaluating the information iurnished in an effort to assess whether his

indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during

COU1C61

SECRET

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## Page 63

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a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not

occupy ibe position wnich he claimed to have heid.

It is consicered thai iniormation furnished by NOSENKO supporta

his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially

confirm tarough collaieral sources that NOSENKO srived in bis claimed

positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an

applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual

holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It

is feit there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of

junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957.

As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section,

Chief oi Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO

held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal

judgment bas been necessary. This personal judgment has been nade in

as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in

regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices

he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices curing the four pri-

mary periode of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -

1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers

3

0001C62

SECRET

...=

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## Page 64

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and other personnel, ard chunges of persorrel, as well as diagrars

of the oifices of the Chiai and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 -

1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO

could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not

immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source

or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. li these diagrams

and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite

astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily

prepared the material in such detail. This ype of information is

peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another

defector and could, if not relotively correct, permit a rather positive con-

ciusion that NOSENKO was lying of fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB

operations during te 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1950 - 1962, and 1962 -

1963 periods of time. As migat be expecied, his specific inowledge is

Less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude

until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewbere, should be given

consideration. In any event, be has furnished adequate information so

that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently

substantiated even though his actual job periormance undoubtedly

deserved a low rating.

6001263

4

-SEGRET

!

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## Page 65

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The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations,

and other officies can consistenily be related to his claimed department

and position assignmeni during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The

scope of his inowiedge of his own department when considered in toto

is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of

increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of otber departments

of the SCD irom the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is aiso a

further indication that NOSENKO actually beld the claimed positions

during this period of time.

5

GUIDEA

SECRET

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## Page 66

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SECRET

E. CAN A20XV42-0% 20382229 37 X0SE33022

CONSIDERGO EN 2020 1E E6V2I0 A3SE2E=3

IN VATERZAL DANAGE TO FEE BOB ANSLOR BAS

THE INFORVATICN FURNSED BY SCSENKO DORN OE

SIGMFICANT DEXUEXE TO 729722) ENTERZOZNCE:

0001C65

SECRET

1505 1

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## Page 67

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MEDOERSO E CORREREL

22220 E8 021662B98 2022 16.2161

..-

20922212 10 12: 208 226003 022

2212222

trácomaton during curzcar and Dreriodo Metviews.

Anaceurate court

normal questions arc discussions his beca ará can corinia to je

productive.

00Ü1C66

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## Page 68

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-SP*

rosedor, de ras identid adoratimciely 250 correr 0r Clarino Jiasi

Calei Directoraio Glicera and inere is à considerabie exchange ci

có she SCO aid oirer Eternai kG3 orgarizations travel abroad wisa

delegations, tourist groves, and as visitors to varicas majos extisitions

suca as ford's Fairão iis impossibio ai ihis ime to estimaié ine

number o: 103 olicers idertfied by JOSENiO vino save been outsica

ine Soviei Bioe since nis éciectica 0r vio wiii de out sometime in sae

juiuire.

Treze has deen very lise acempica expioitation oi inionnacios

furrisred"sy YOSENÃO concerzing Dise= 103 olicers ard, tereipse,

the possibie vaiue o inis inormation io ünited Sites intelligence

Camos de estimaicá no: can tae poierial Camage to ina XG3 de est-

mited.

Disclosure o: miormation concerning ceriain XG3 oiicers would

be a necessary pari oi añy dispaici cá à AGS ageni oi dificer to ica

West eine: ior purpuses di coriaci with Western Inteligeace íor a

6001CE7

~.5.

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## Page 69

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---

sistis.

merevei,

posire di tre ilentines di approsimaci; 2, sud #CB Officero iné direza!

minared ÁG3 agents couié mui do consicurcá ol segagibie imporcice.

Osialing specilio iniornarda da cepird to NG2 Glicero di

¡GB assets is imporiani to ünicá Sinica irieiligence and a Consider-

abie arnouri di marpover and roncy is speri on this activity. Iven

acinowledging trat it is mucia more dircuit io= CiA to obiai tris type

i iriormation aboui ine 1GB, viici operaies in a ciosed sucicsy, tia-

it is íor ihe RûB to duiun die iborti, u Cal impiogues, dis bucevai

cition di 2, 000 Cli erpiojees aro sévorai hunired agoni asseto io

¡i KãB vouid de auy jess inar à very sericis compronise di vianato

incormaiion.

Prioi to tie dciection di düszano, littie was iowa di ino

organization of the SCD o cer internal XG3 organizations. The

information provided by JOSENKO concerning boin das beer desailed

ard extensive. Thai lis information is di vaiue io the United Siates

Inielligence community is cardly subject io disguie, althouga aralysis

3

SEGRET

0001668

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## Page 70

13-00000

car cilic as to ine wiga vaici sacue do givenio di value oi this

type di iniormacion.

NOSENKO has iurnistied iniormation concarning SCD, XC3,

recruments of ünited Siates citrins und ¿oreiga nationais covering

tie period of 1953 through 1903. Tris shouid not se interpreted as a

statement thai NOSENiO has furnisted iniormation in regard to all

SCD recruitmerts, evon oi Americans, during inis period. ats inío=-

rution based on personal knowledge is in gonerul limited to ihe Firsi

Department and Severth Departmeni.

He has furrished iniormatior.

concerning cases oi several other Cepartments in the SCD and sore

FCD cases, but this injormation was in generai acquired indirectiy

from social or business conversatiors with O'he= KCE oificers.

NOSENKO has furnished iniormation in regard to a number of

cases which weré previousiy laown io United Siaies intelligence. Wrile

the value of such information carnoi be considered high, the additioral

detais which NOSEYKO has proviced in i rumber d cases cainu: be

dismissed as being oi to value io Western Inteäigence, even li te

indormation cannot be regarded as damaging to ine KGB. Furthermore,

inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing di iniormation

already known, there is no basis ior suspicion of NOSENKO for his

having provided such iniormation.

0001(69

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## Page 71

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dosaur0 has urnisacà inoraion in regardi to a numbar oi

recruito ty ine KGB odor-Bivc inionals Who were known by

Wesera micigence to be piú-Communic: oi

even connectid with

Communisi organizaiions, Ine identitication as a recruited 203

agent oí an individial previous y knowa io be pro-Conimunist is oi

considerable value to Westero midiligerce and may be considered to

cäve resulted in some damage io sic 103. Abraintediy, ine Duicadal

to the KGB of ais ageni who is knows as pro-Communist is less than

that of a "politicaily ciean" individuai. However, "pro-Communist"

or even "Communis:" are noi syronymous with "recruited KOB ageni."

NOSENKO las jurnished additiona, informacion on cases in

which there was sone previous but limited informasion, In a rumber

oi these instances she additional inormation from NOSENKO nas per-

mitteà identicatos of the individuals a rierest and the ciosios dian

"Unknown Subject" case. In such instarces the information iroa

NOSENKO must be considered valuabie do Western Intelligence since

the incomplete information knowa previously wouid in many cases not

nave permitted uitimate idertilication o she individual o interest.

This category of cases must ba corsidered as having resulted in damage

to the KGB and in benefit to Wesiern In elligence.

5

-SECRE?

6001C70

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NOSENXO ias jumisicé mcemiccon in regard i0 iiuriue: dá

iacividiiis, oui Américan nné aor-äuo forcign, Who vere recruiicd

üy sie ÉCD aid Concerrng walio desiore niciligerco diu üu sigailcant

indormialico, li is recognidid imni corcain di tnese cases crcndonddüy

VOSENKO, Duriichiiiy in iic iouricb caiogosy, Woril arimndig tddes

iave estuaig naterialived às cxciuclin 10o agenis, Falo écund zü

iDo VariouS Ieasons nciüding laidi Icinsi io Coogeriio, mniià gié-

grapaical iraccessibilliy io ire i02, ci mui being eidacr ni io ilmi

d SCD rcciuitmnoni or idter in à pusáioo io luinisi dorrisiór oi

imceresi to ine kos. i ihis regaid, dusitirO das sicici tniii iiasi

until 1902 tnere vas a coliriio icrdoney in dne Seventà Decururaezaio

make a "recruiimoni" as a siarstic ior ine endrui-gear cupur cves

inough it was apaureni ine agero anino iimo iiud io poicririno idá éccá

it was highly anlirely inèie wonis do a boirmaiui in tire éucure.

NOSENÃO 1ão inanished iciormacion di or icado io a cucaoer oi

cabes, primarily thiró naionais dua sumè Aniericar, à waica ne cas

been unabie to iurnisi suilicioni cciis io pormit idensuicaiion ai tais

time. In certain instarces it is boxevcé trat an iceailication vir oo

possible aiter acditional rescarch and inveszigation. Uniá an icezti-

fication is mãde, the value oi any purticuleï lead to Wesier= irieli-

gence cannot be estimated, but that ihere may be a poierzial value

COUICTA

6

-SE9.27

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cando be ignored, as in exuipié có inis caregory, dOSElãO ins

vidadj Toi an American, mio in 1902 vas in a positio. to comove

¿e "NATO Gneinenoy Cides, " didrez dù cocos io ine doeicä

diciographing, and inta süccessing Irpacé ino ecues. Because ic

ageni is as je uridenalicó, dis curroniaccess io tormation arcerino

the securij di ine únicó Sinies Cuando dn jaujia.

an all, she incormañon irom deSIliO in ire caiegory ci cases

wiere Western Iricligence dió aui privaundoy nave signiticari ario=-

mation musi be considered on balance as inving resulica la mutoriai

camage io ide XG3 and di sigrilican: donado to Westera anidägerce.

Guaruiy aluno of Cios di nicaracion dior a iDO Gudecior is

¡ci à siancalli du trica io jlago duro dicca. The Guéstica is inciae=

ino aincini di ris inormaui is reuscaaby commensurrio mila dis

clairred postions in de K03. Tris cuestior is regarás loSENão

has been exarrinco, with alfirmacito haciago, in añolaer section ci

itis paper:

i few exampios irom ine above ciec caregories di iniormation

¿urnished by NOSENKC dre listed aciov. Trese cases aro given as

ilustraticas and are aci necessarily lisied in order di importance.

7

32072.

0001072

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## Page 74

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employce woo sponi consiceradle smé die üsSa is 1562 - 1953.

E:e First Secio, First Depurada, SCD, la 0562 and Wis Zunive

USiA was not renewed.

to deiermine sos much miornation loüil navo scea Compromiard al

LOndiD; wile in te ÜSSi, sù Cil caro Corinnacceos iü ine Calsei

Siaies Embassy. Trere is dubù riuson io sicuro liail Rotano was

recruited, it was se woo was responsore ici ine compionide dia

potentialy vailaoie Soviei wain-a win: Waon: Cas Was atesapring io

establish cortaci using 5O:A20 as incermediazy.

NOSENiSO in 1964 iurnistod iiormation in regare io à "ZHia""

lappareaty a KGS code sarco, alchougà l'OSENXO cougat is was a true

COUICTS

SEO3E7

e no..

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## Page 75

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mano), Ho Identlilod "ZHARI" (phonelle) no an American code elert

Triso defecied to the USSR la 1968. An Internal assumpion was made

Basod on the origloal lead lufarration frOM NOSENKO tAL "IHAR!"

WE VIctor NOrriE HAMILTON, ALA FCU:! ArI HINDALY, A fOrMer

NSA sToployee Who delectad so la USSR Is 1962, Bad lla IsfOrTuallon

from NOSINO was never dietemoniad or Investigated.

PrOs to shA surfectag al JObA DieCOe SAUTH by the Sortala

la the tail of 196%, EtHE lalormaton coaceralag KGB krowledgo

of American code clerka was belag lavestigaied; and Jobs Diacos

BLITH man & leading suspoch. After le suriciag of SMITH by the

BOrlOLA, de became appareD: lat SMITH, Taher thAN HAMILTON, WAS

Identical to "ZHARI." Investigation dleclosed that no defiallo Informa.

ten could be enablished in ragard lo the actual wereaboute of SMITH

alter circa mid-1960, It cannot be positively arted that approprlace

Lavarigation la 1964 al the "ZHARI" load would have lod to the lonti

ICElLOR O1 JOLI DISCOS SAITH AS "IHARI," Howevor, much loalifi

callon weald have been of considorable Interani to the Departingst ol

Sizia and CIA, dad could rosy well tara permined certala acitos olica

moald have at leno: lessened the propaganda allect al lie surprise

ansou cement by the Sortela la lhe fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, In Juse 1962, furalahed Isformatlon from wilch

Willam VASSALL could be quickly Identified. GOLITSYN, la late

1960 • early 1961, bed furnished Inforration concersing a Sortet pana-

9

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## Page 76

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Servicus had complied a lot si twenty puspecia, including VASSALL.

Even thougà It may be presuned that larestigation of the twenty euspecta

would ulamataly have rosulled in a determilantior ChaL VASSALL waE

lie agent on whom GLITSYN sad furnisbed certain Information, the

Information from NOSINKO In Jure 1902 renulted In the earlier termi

callon by te Drliah Services of a sall valuable productive KGI agent.

Although not the care of a KGB ageni, the matter of this malero-

jà200s la the Unitod Staies Embasay should also bo meniioned.

ÜOLITSYN, following hle defection in Lecember 1961, furnished

certain dalormation la regard to microphones ln the Unitod Statee

Embasay (Charcery). Since la fact the inicrophonen we & connecled

to contral cablos, locatloa of osa microphone would logically bave ded

to tho esporure of the entire sot of interophones. Howerar, appro-

prlete action was not taken on this inforniation and the KGB would have

bean aware tri no action the taken prios la June 1962 when NOSENKO

fleet contacted ClA.

I NOSENKO la a dlepatchod KGB agent, ll 1a rus cloar visy the

KGB would attract pacific aitention so a Bysiem ol microphones which

Inant havo atill had somo value an of June 1962. A presumpion may

Do sande taL LI NOSENKO was a dispatchod agent, the KGB had, a8 of

196%, an advanced system of monitoriag devices which rendered the

abore microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidenco

Ol such an adrauced system la avallable and le should be noted that le

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jáver à lead in idio a

A jes generis.

•dato daie

Ás tègurós ¿calo furnicaci up dicia.

interviews with YOSENKO ruve reginia diparosimaicly severicen

ail Americar icads waich aic bein, esamincé spie 23i dichier-

iccional divcioracri dámise cascs ap ine i 3i.

arenis.

Geogia micaiy inese icalo die dice in scope, inciccing

muticadis ol suci courtros as accaccia, dustria, truguay, de trico

¡inguom, France, Vesi Germano, jugun, Swede, jusiénta, desci,

Verico, jay, ad à suriver di dici evaniries.

inciuded in te more imporiani dá inese agori or Oiker luadis

are leads io nigà leveis di governmeni and inteiligerce io code clarks,

to access agenis í0: Arerica ingeis, to aciual oi possibie ilegal

0001076

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maDonnessio.

in doscow, ircluding icial dá cinturnoiocess inio ceriaia dciicra

Anoussies joi not the Britis, do Gmaicio Guibassica).

NOSINO Fas iiso iirionil inndo io curain =0D ioreiga

miorai agers, lis iricamanon un suviii. bug derived curing ris

"=ce moris in Ceriva in i962.

i: de inpossibil iO Sivi in caci eviinica dá mio significance

có tie lorcion icads furriarcó j $0S2060, Thittoyare da siga

suoject io disgure, this evaasicarus: di given even inoüga irc=a

are numercus doraiga leals vialca nare no: seen adeçuaie y expioied

=: inis time. •

As a final noie, ¿ne impilcó cunciasica la lae previous summary

is accepted thai the faiture di MOSENio io provide usabie positive •

00010r6/a

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Intelligonco Ialormatios la nst a sigalfleant factor la s daterminatisa

of tio boas isdos, Tho quallficaiion sbould, bomerer, bo added that

11 la not feèt tsal NOSINKO bas, ue el thie tlmo, bees fully debrielod

In srany uroRs of positlve iscolligenco lntere et.

StCRET

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SECKLI

F.

IS THERE EVIDEXOS 08 20098228-0% CA0322002

AN308K620% 303832286: 8062620 73563

WOULD WARRANT A CONCHES:ON FRAT NOSENEO

WAS DISPATCHED PY E22 20B?

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SECRET

F. Is there evidence of KGB decestion or "give away" in

incormation furnished by NOSENKO which wouid warrant a conclusion

that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KCB? The conclusion in this

summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGI. In

reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above " ion has

been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by

NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration

in arriving at a conclusior thât NOSENKO was or wäs not dispatched by

the KGB. Il NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have

surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the iGB

in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO

was dispalched, it must have been to accomplish or iurther a KGB

purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be

unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first

contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is

particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would

have surely been under direct KGB control i there are any implications

of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

solid!

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NOSENKO has staied that his original approach to "sell iwo

pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to

be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact

with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the

time, and felt that if he merely stated that le was a "KGB counter-

intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly

would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his

first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information"

and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

IL NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962

contacts, would have beer very carefully brieied and that his remarks

or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any

suspicion in regard to the bona fides cí NOSENKO. Instead, a current

review of his statements and remarks during his five contacte in 1962

indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite

likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO

and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO

that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in

Geneva.

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NOSENKO, during his five contacis in Geneva, made many

statements wnich in retrospect were impossioie, and the investigation.

of which could only have raised ceriain questions con arning NOSziKO.

The following is a list of the more obvious areas in nich NOSENiO

made gross exaggerations or mace incorrect or impossibie statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with

Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the

recruitment gitch to James STORSBERG. (This was

a lie and an interview with STORSBERG with display

of photograpi would have disciosed inat JOSENKO

did not participate. )

(0) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment

approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and

LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited LUNT (riorace

LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSENKO never met

IUNT.)

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(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund

STEVEN'S woo, according to NOSENKO, Lar been recruited

by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met

STEVENS and oniy had seen STEVENs once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY"

in Moscow as 1949-1950. At ihe same time he furnished

information that "ANDREY"' ¡vbo is considered identical to

Dayle Wallis SMITti) was in Moscow during a part of the time

that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to

Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actuaily in

Moscow 1952-1954.

(5) NOSENKO said be, GRIBANOV, and anoiser officer

met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since staied he did

not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign

typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH

operation. )

(g) NOSENIO in a number of instances spoke in the

first person, saying "We did this, " or "We did that, " in

reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admite

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in.

he was not involved but had some knowledge. (I

NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he

and the MiGB should have known that these indicated

exaggerations would eventually lead to a question

concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 19ó2-1963 a number of similarities were noted between

information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been

furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were

quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because

he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered

already compromised as a result oi the defection of COLITSYN. Certain

of the similarities ai the time could only be explained in terms of

NOSENKO being a dispaiched agent. The following are some examples of

the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to

Johan PREISFREUND.

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a

military code clerk case (James STORSBERG).

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a

trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name.

to the United Staies. (GOLITSYN was sure it was

connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

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Moscow, or a recruitnichi of ar American formerly

with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO

related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the

assumed name which KOVSHUK usca. )

(a) Both furnished information in regard to

microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to

Edmund STEVENS and Isaac Henry SHAPIRO.

The above list is not compiete nor does it indicate the actual

differences in the amount of information furnished on any partic diar

topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in leis

summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest

is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases,

or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate

question concerning the bona fides o NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and

it is considered that the fact that NOSENIO furnished some informasion

on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or

greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence

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ric.

that NOSENKO was dispaiched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during

current interviews satisiaciorily sourced his information in alir.: st

overy instance. in a few insiances he has said he dia not recali

how he learned of a particular piec. oi information but these

apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are

considered to be in no laj suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between

information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early 1962 and

information furnished by JOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have

been the most significant insoíar as the security of the United Staies

Government was or is co-cerned relaica io certair activities centering

around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conciusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an

officer of the First Section, First Depariment, SCD, during 1953-1955

and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore,

the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases

or situations in the Firs: Depariment and the fact ihat GOLITSYN

furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not

unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN

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eso and was in coniace min dios cicuro di mio Dirot Seccionand

WiE miormacon iroN MOSENKO. 2rgis :d2 - ili cáme previcis

summaiy icier io iriorniacon from COrSd wiico is craticiorizie

as "'cormaio, abou: 10B Operaiono agairsi Erinsäy Coie Cicarsi

1900 - 1401," The reicrences are to intormation iron COrristi curde

KCSJi%PO% di ine Firsi Secion, Firsi Deparunert, SCD, andar

pizieer oi the Seconó Section, Firai Debactradai, SOD.

NOSENRO las siaied inui ne was Depuj Calei di ine Firsi

Scrion, Firsi Depurineri, SCD, Guring 1960 - 1901, tnai his partirg

-espunsibility was woik againsi coce cierks ai me Undied Siaies Encassy

in Moscow, and that boü KOSOLAPO: ard CalAZNOV were engagic ir

the same work and inder his supervision. The dialement by GOLITSYS

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that NOSENKO was nol Depüly Chief of the First Section in 1900 has

been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSY, has furnished certain iniormation which he re-

ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, couid

not be immediately correiated with information from NOSENKO, it was

previously considered to be evidential i deception of lying on the part

Of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility

that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at leaet in certain

instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now beer possible to correlate irag-

mentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO,

making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be

construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples

cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible

correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this

time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he

received in April-Vay 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV

that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

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American female employee of the American Embassy

in Moscow trough a male Soviei friend, but that the

atzempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished iniormation

that the woman had left Moscow by the time he icarned of

the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return

to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to

effeci her recruitment. Fie did not recall the name of the

secretary, but did recall ibat it was a long and "German

sounding" name.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a

recruitment aïtempt againsi Collette SCHWARZENBACH,

who il is considered is identical to the "American secretary"

referred to by COLITSYN. However, SCHWARZENPACH

was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but

had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassauor

BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed

as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The

recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH, according to

NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the Firs:

Section, First Department, SCD.

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WORE:

(b) Page ló3 of the previous summary contairs infor-

nation that GOLITSY; also learned from GRYAENOV in

the spring of 1960 that GRYAZA,. V had developed an operation

against an American. Embassy military code clere in which the

Gu was "9y per ceni sure" tout the target wouid be recruited.

This is believed to undr. liedly be a reierence to the case oi

James STORSBERG Wio was actually the subject of a recruit-

ment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that

GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from

GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow

rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was

preparing ior lis assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This

theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous

summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January

1961 from Vladisiav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)

that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the

successíul recruitment of an American employee oi the

Embassy.

Johan PREISFREUND was used in the STORSBERG

operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also

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done tota

R2.

aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about

PREISFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted to use PREISFREUND

in Heisinki. NOSEYKO has stated he was not present during

the above conversation. It is very possibie that KOVSHUK

exaggeraied a littie in his conversation with GOLITSYN in tie

matter of why GOLITSYN could not use PRE'SFREUND as an

agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive irormation in regard

to the James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to

tie accuracy and recoilection of GOLITSYN, there does noi

appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of

NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report-

ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV

concerning what is considered to have been the James

STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by

NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG Case. The

exact date of the recruitment aîtempt against STORSBERG

has not been positively established, but it is consiciered to

have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the

March-April 1961 period. The statemen: by James

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STORSBERG ihat it occurred in Ociober 1961 is com-

pieiely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other

statements by STORSBERG himseif.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains

information from GOLITSYN wnich he had received from

GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American

employee of the Embassy in Voscow was either recruited

or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual

compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.

The previous summary also states shat according to

GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in

various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just

become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing

iceoiogical rather than biacimail recruitments. SHELEPIN

aid not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB

would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the

homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a

guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and

with whom "SHIMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

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agente oí NOSENKO, became acguainted. Work against

the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of

the Ninti Depariment, SCD, but various Departments

were participing under he direction of the Ninth

Department.

One of the above homosexual agente succeeded in

involving BARRETT in homosexual activities which were

photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,

although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB

was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a

general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment

of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned

visit of Presidert EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENIO also stated that the compromising material

and information on BARRETT was later given to the First

Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second

Section, First Department when he returned with another

Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in

the recruitment operation. BARRETT, following his return

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to the Unied Staics in January 1902, confessed to the

FBI that he had been recruited in 19ó1 on the basis of

compromising photographs which had been taken

during his 1959 trip to Moscou.

Although it cannot be established at this

time, it is possibie that the information furnished

by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV

actually refers to the Robert BARRETT case. It should

be noted that Robert BARRETT could not actuaily be

characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy

in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary conia ins infor-

mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he

visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned

from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZ.\OV had as an agent an Embassy

code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred io rielsinki.

GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had

already furnished the KGB with some inforration, that he was

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considered by ine XGis to be a "real" agent and that ii

the transier of the code cierk materialized, GOLITSIN

might have the code cleric as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENIO has furnished no information which ca. be

correlated in any way with the above information from

GOLITSYN, bui neither has the information from GOLiTSYN

resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation

which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is

considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily reier

to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in

Moscow during 1960 - 1961. I: is also poesiole thai the previous

remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who

might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks

in a-c could be clarified or ai least additional information

obtained if a specitic reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in

November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information

from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

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also mentioned in anoiber section pertaining to the 1960-i9ól co reer

U NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLiPOV came to Helsirisi

to accompany an Ámerican Embassy code cieris on the train to

Nioscow and that KOSOLAPOV pianned io sirike up an acquaintance

with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code cierk referred to above was

undoubtedly John GARLAND and the train manifest lists John GARLAND

and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the

same train from Heisinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the

identity of John GARLAND but claims no knowledge of the above trip

Of KOSOLAPOV to leisinki, although being well aware oí a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of tae First Section specifically

charged with work against code clerks, shovia have been aware oi ine

November 1960 trip of KOSOLA?OV to and irom Helsinki. His lacis of

knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities

such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be

interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispaiched by the KGB since, if

he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of

KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as thie was an event sce

KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

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rong dint

ricott

.*

A theury which has previously been given consideration and

Warranted fui consideration was that il NOSENKO was dispaiched,

his mission was io confuse leads furnished to American intelligence

ard/or io ¿enigraie tue vallie oi information furnished by GOLiTSYN.

In connection with this iceory, it should be noied inat NOSENKO during

current interviews has noi made any remarks which could in any way

be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does

not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,

when some topic peculiar to the ICD bas been broached with NOSENiO,

his immediate reply has been io the elleci that "I didn't work in the ECD,"

or "You shouid ask GOLiTSYN about thut."

In connection wiil any consideration of whether lae contact of

NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiatea by

the KGB as a result of tine defection of GOLITSIN, the timing oi certain

events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected os 15 December 1961.

NOSENIO deparied from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzeriana,

where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not

impossible ior KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual of

potential damage which could result from the dejection of GOLITSYN.

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selec: NOSENKO as the indiviqual wno would be dispatched to counier-

act ine possible damage, and appropriaiely brief YOSENKO prior to

his departure for Gereva in March 1962. Thertiore, i NOSENKO

was dispatched by the KG3, it would appear that pians ior this would

have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and inat any GOLiTSYN

aspeci could only be a clated aspect and not the basis for ine original

plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In audition, if NOSENKO was dispatched.

it would hardly seem necessary for ike KGB to send NOSENKO i

Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered thai NOSENKO could have

been dispatched to confuse and divert American inteiligence and taus

to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United

States Covernment, particularly CA. This is a ineory which should

and has been given full consideration, out it is noi possible to factualiy

substantiate or refute this ibeory in the absence of specific information

that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area waich should

be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from

NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it bave on the efforts

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of American counter-interigence tú deiermine the identity of and

take appropriate action aguirst KGB pereirations of the ünited

States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be

inat there wouid de jittle consoiation of assurance to American inielli-

gence even if every statement by NOSENXO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-

sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.

In this area hie statements could be construed as assurance that there

were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy

in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with he exception of "ANDREY"

(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD. The basis for this

expressed opinion of NOSENKO is consiered eleewhere in this summary

and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred

of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements

are made in good faith, it shouid be noted, however, that at this lime

there is no specific incormation which is in direct conflict with the

expressed opinion oi NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any

particular knowledge of ECD activities.

In addition, he does not claim

to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD.

As an .

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example, he has made it clear thai his knowledge of SCD activities

against members oi deiegations, ioreign businessmen, foreign studenis,

ard individuais in the ÜSSR on the invitation oí a Soviet organization or

à component of the Soviet Government is extremely limired and at best

mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed krowleúge oi

activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the Firsi Departmeni, SCD,

nor does be claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh

Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain

notes brought out b; NOSENKO which are short references to a number

o! Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code

name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an

opportunity to review a notebook beld by the Chief of the Seventa Department

and constituta the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particuiar cases.

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SEGRET

G.

S THERE ENDANCE OR A POLITICAL OR ANY

OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE MELON COULD JUSTIRY A DISPARCE

FREELY TO CLA CONCERVING FES KYOWLEDGE OF F:0203

AND WIZZIOUE VOSENTO BERTG GIVEN A SPECIFIC

VISS:ON 03 VESSIONS?

0001100

SECRET

destr sites ties

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## Page 103

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820.21

06-5 16055 65

ONCE COCH:

ISe KCE WE FoRmission

ROSENKO Doing given a spec

Daisy has beer given consiceresos ever ough de timate camisicions

are Pracsically Licalcubio.

wita the single excepaos detailed below, is els co evicence cia

poliscal or ciner sypo pojective walca could be considered of seiscies

importance by no KCB to warrant de Capare ClaCB once wee

too knowledge otOS 10 to speak iscely wild CIA Wison his bales

given a specific mission o

missions by sce XC3.

It accepted an ad Soret louder dis would te saely cant

of last toting sa 2G3 to diss

ala

sial olicer for permanent dated br

to United Scares authoriés wits so specto incaligence mission and o

13522A

4738204220433

Sons on she

wai such act would, la the estirrate of the leadezstig, ratult in a net

political gain for lue USSil. For such a possibility to ba seriously

entertained by ¿re Sovieis, however, li woüid tave to involve an issue oi

major importance to the Sovie: icacerstig and presimably would hava to

G001101

SECRET

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Oi amacios.

ivanedy: de inteiriccios sce farto; Gata in in codistrinia

assassinador, joji e archise tirin iccü toro Was ao Soviet

invoivemoni, ard jcj a djpuchesis toni ine Sorioi dadorolar wis doebiy

concerned lesû erronedas conciusicas de crava Vaica couda duad to

inviversable acons, ii is concoivadio iu dio Sovicicaudorecio miga:

have been prepared io take extremo siego io convince diluié Suis

autoritos of their no:-invoiveront in tre asoasalnarion (zue passage

io ice Gritea Stares Corerameri di ine anugedly compens Suvidi consuini

file or OSWALD was, initoes, an inprecedeniod ac=)

The NOSENKO case wairants examinatica in te above cogará ir.

Lighi of the fact thai umong the iricomaior NOSENXO poviccc was

"inside" KGB informasion on OSWALD: ircormation waisa burgorray

00011C2

2

SEGM

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## Page 105

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rovialcó ino suborndo di mu cuinni di de diG8 tles dr CSWARD.

continuing series ci probiemo.

-equizemen's promisea above ici soricas Sorici consideration dimirco

a. Tre caronoiogy, in isela, presenis virially irpossibio

probiems dor suca à incoes, via. NoszNi0's inidial appruaci io ca

in June 196e, 17 ragnias prido io ino assassinazion di Presideni derrody.

D. Valic md i-ormamin izon X0S2X70 o CStAiD is

inceresting and portacco, itis ado, tanaturo, soopo, and conicas,

sufficienty convincing ior United States autorities io reuso-abi, sa

expecicá io conclude ino: in represeroá unoçuivocal paooi dá Sovie:

maniavolvement.

c. It is impiausiale noi so assume inai da Sovieis Woria

assume tai United Siates auraorives, in ari examinato= dá ico

possibility of a Suvie: (KGD) hard in ibo assassinaiion, world presume

3

60011C3

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## Page 106

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cscéorodej adeiül Solice diir dänieckaraul in sücidid üpcänindi --i

concaanenodon Miicl Wónd oncino ciotrldagcdbllay Üy ing tncuà

cmcoà gmoà mân dong cuion uddén mod ià mmodammii di cidng ái

icico incávécaais spuctaarin, dundacac tiara écaiaoão dá cico riciacia..

Pio X0B carcos oi NOSENäO Moui mos barmc croa boridus

icmábezaidumiét 1OS28a0 coii siio logiciäaj dudá dnccé irico iii

moote VeJy lamüd Cá¿êgOäj•

Ii is accordinã'y conciadeó iáno ião jussuenaay dé a polaicnt;

raciraied áree dispaica caa in ine cass ci lOSzNãO dù saïsiarserii

cimmanaica.

Tou possibility ras aiso boca cunsicezoé tnmo dos diCa tigaa

nave ieoried inai by dispeiching in agonü, in this cise andidice=,

Visamuraeious ¡lals io run-vallcmo dù nui-cuarca: KCS ageais ca

cases, tue iaciáries oi io ünlicà Surus inbangonce comraundry Woud

ds practically routralizeá do: án Gasoadud Dortoù oá vamoo Fuis auuld

Oiy se based on an assurapion inus ico Jnlicá Siaies iielligunca

comriunity would involve a majoi sorzon oi ls pirsonnel und esicaus

¿n sue investigation and cesciution oi cases viaica tad little oi no Curuea-

or poiential value to the KG3. Tui suove pussicilty carroise

arbitrarily eliminated witaour fuil considezation.

In is io= believsd 23a=

00011C4

S20M2P

.msiécoii at, ud,

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## Page 107

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expioisazion di sis iniurraica voia do quio duragang to deo ace.

Consideratión un mi ciuto possany musiciso incisto ini

ay io 103 caused sy jsja icior mico againsiincivimiiis exposin ti

indomacion from ibo discuicaoá agoni ui oicor. The coterroni ciuci

un dicors di ia convicide aia soni-cing di pursons mio bava cucunitos

a crime o1 crimes tas long scon a pari di lie lugal moory Ci way Darseas

wao commit à crime

shoun de migrisoned or punisted.

The deicireni cicci on Ouars di ico mials and Convictions oi

Villiam VASSAia, RObert Lee JORNSOY and sumes alion Ma2k2)-

triai and convicion di cicui dico agunts 0r recauisments concerning

whom NOSENKO iad some inowledge.

5

6001105

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SECRET

IS THERE ANY EVE: 1002 72.

C T22 CONTACTS CE

KGB PRIOR TO MIS DEFECE-ON CA THAT JOSENKO

WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KO3 RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR

OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING ELSE CONTAGES OR

AFTER HIS DETROTION?

0001106

SECRET

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## Page 109

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-SEORE

HI. Is there ar; evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1902

or in 196s with CIA vere known to ine CB prior to his ¿cfection or

that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KUB relative to his behavior

or KGB objectives during these contacis or alter his aclection? The

conclusion is that there is no evidence that ice contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were inown to the KGB prior to his

defection and that NOSENKO was never brieled in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for ice above conclusion is substantially contained in

previous sections. It is being treaied bere as a separate area of interest

since it is a sulficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized thai since positive factual confirmation suci as

the KGB file on NOSENIO is not available, any conclusion concerning

whether NOSENKO was of was not dispatched by the KGB can only be

based on the full review of availabie indormation from NOSENKO,

collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the

individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of

each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacis of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962

and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

0001107

SECRET.-

gang and

riganica

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## Page 110

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necessarily based in pari on a judgment as to whether any of his

activities or information logically varrant a substantial suspicion

that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction

or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent

bchavior during his contacts with ClA in June 1902 and the conclusion

was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB

control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962

contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to

the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. it was con-

cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant

serious consideration of tie above possibility aside from the separate

conclusion that the KOB wouid be very unlikely to reward a traiter in

KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free

to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,

during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his

personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be

kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

0001108

-SECRET

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## Page 111

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, parüciquied in any way in ine assumoung of this ruir anün icioeciona

oi maierial, dono dá ido muierié ipposis io haro dica dica ceconciadio

---

ai oi to materiai to Cid und retarred to tae Sovica Grion Wiroca lis KC3

evez ai a latez date beconing awuze caso the raveziai las actuck; missing.

The laster stuvement even molicos do cavel docureri vaico autorizad

the trip of lOSENKO io Gozlay in Decensoer 1963.

00011C9

3

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## Page 112

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di Lielicicio Coione.

rato di Lielierano Gliel, siding di avis as a Digury Giravasaria

ment de was oriy à Cajin diligine las cnted io än6 especicü io

sivirg kim ine rari di niGuierari Colorü la me Eborü Cucurcilii

¿hai pracically ail Depay Caicis di Depazamori in ino SODind audcast

The above exciarada dy MOSElio maj weili considered sy

readers wiia ai leas: a degree di saspicism. Howevei, #lOSaNkO

was dispatcced by the KGB, ii would suer toti he colia nave ütea 2r0-

vided with something i live mose suostanziai i document sis ciura di

ine rank oi Lieuterani Colonino in aiaimon, it would seem iii te KG3

6001110

SEGRET

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## Page 113

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voca supone anivasi bau dideo inico postons da dia debe neua

0001111

5

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## Page 114

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SECRET

IV. COMMENES COLCERNENO PREVIOUS CONCZESIONS

IN REGARD TO JOSENÃO

0001112

SECRET

Eriaie: :

2. ": 237

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## Page 115

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JLOREF

CONVENTS COYCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIOYS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examina-

tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Deiector" which contains seven (A - G)

primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence)

and KGB Career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findinge are

independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in lais summary are

in direct conflici with the above conclusions and are basically that

NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was

• a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in Februazy 1964,

and held his claimed positions in the KGB during the Narch 1953 -

February 1961 period.

* For purposes of clarity, toe term KGB is used to refer to the

Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations

unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:

Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination

of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

0001113

-SECRET

macia, 322

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## Page 116

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PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO

AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF

"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The foliowing is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO. (T'ne specific conclusions have been fire ine designation

of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with otier sectiona vi this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S 30%1 FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in

successively senior positions of aunoriy from which he derived

extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB

operatione against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period

1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive

array of information about KGB personnei, organization and opera-

tions which, to the extent that it has been confined, is preaumptive

evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet oificials, including

intelligence officers, have generally corroboraied NOSENKO's

claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a

senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensive positions, who

0001114

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## Page 117

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enjoyed considerable autority and trust despite personal short

coming., and whose acfection, 'the gicatest loss ever suffered

by soviet Intelligence', paralyzed lie work of em kGß eas

• Legal Residency, and justified the formulation oí plans to assas-

sinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO'e

biography relerant to his claimed KGB service with known

facis and reasonable surmise. The examination reilects the

test to which his accounts were pul: whether his accounte are

internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether

he actually gained the information de has from occupying the

KGB positions he claims to have heid. In short, is he what he

says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the ioilowing findings, arrived

at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU

in any of the capacities or at the places and times he

claimed.

B. NOSENIO did not enter the KGB in the

manner or at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American

Embassy Section througaout the 1953-1955 period as

he claimed.

C001115

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•...

D. During the period 1955-1960, ie was neither

a senior case oilicer in, nor Diputy Chiti of, the Seventh

Department Amnezican-British Commonwealth Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Depuly Chief of ine

American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or

supervisor in int Section during the period 1961-1902. (sic)

F. NOSE,XO's claims, that in 1962 se was Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was

thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Sevenin Department, are

not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valia ciain io certainty

that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel

berveen 1953 and his defection in 1964.

Inese lndings difier somewhat with respect io degree of probability

or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of avaiiable evidence

in each instance. "

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence

OÍ NOSENIO's bora fices. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts

of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make nis claims

as a whole unacceptabie. While truth and fact in this case frequently

G001116

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-..

cantot se establisned with certainty, it is evicent that truth and

laci are not what NOSENKO reites. By ahnosi any test, virtually

any of NOSENXO's above claims are impugned by jaci or provability,

or coniradicted or retracied in his own stalements. NOSENKO is

nor what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bora lice deíector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide

dejector, it is necessary to attempi io determine his true motives

for contacting American inielligence and for providing the iniormation

he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely

consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal

conclusions. Neverheiess, the question cannot be ignored. The

character of ine information NOSENKO nas conveyed, ine fact that

some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,

and the necessity to maxe decisions about NOSENKO's future ali

require that at ieasi a provisional judgment be made. "

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced ior NOSENKO's

misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing

as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he

suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has

greatly exaggerated his actual rani, status and access in the KGB, for

simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB

agent. "

0001117

SFARFF

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## Page 120

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Deunit

"The first iwo possibilities are casily dismissed. That

NOSENKO is not simply & swindler woo falsely claims for personal

advaniage to have been à KG3 officer is cvident, we believe, rom

tne confirmed details of KGB organizaiion, persornel and operations

which he has provided and wiich couid only derive from within the

KGB itself. "

"Second, as noted in ine text, extensive psychiatric and

psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the

possibility that NOSENiO's actions and testimony are the product

of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible inat NOSENKO is a KGB

officer who served in at ieast some of the components for some

or all of the time periods that he ciains, bui wno greatly exag-

geraier his positions, rank and access to intormation, and

invented some matiers outright, io achieve greater status with

American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to

accommodate tre fact thai several KGB officers have asserted

that NOSENKO did in fact nold senior positions in the KGB. Also,

NOSENXO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's

patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be justa

product of his own invention, since these were the subject of

comment by other sources. "

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"Because none of ine above explanations is consistent with

the data developed in inierrogations and investigations, we are

left with lie hypothesis inat NOSENKO was dispaiched by the

KGB. Whiie this e planation does not reconcile all the anomalies,

none of inem renders it untenable. "

"In tne absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or

other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the

evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched

by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be

regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor-

mation should be abscssed accordingly. "

0001119

FEARET

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SECRET

A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NEVAL RÜ

IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT CHE PLACES ANO

IMES FE CLADED

65009

soving aad

0001120

SET

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## Page 123

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1. NOSENiO did not serve in tie davai RU in any of the capacities

or ai the places anci times he ciaired. (Previoua conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard

IC NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that tre claimed service of

NOSENKO in Navy Inielligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early

1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated

and should be accepiec.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated

by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation irom the Institute of

International Reiations irom 1950 to 1949 because he dia noi wish to

admit that he had failed io graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class.

However, previous ejoris of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962

statement that he graduaied in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted

significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period oi time.

It is considered that NOSENXO has adequately explained his

"stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal

matters and that his claimed service in Nary Intelligence from March

SECRET

Ends ten rae

Migranto as

C001121

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Jeerer.

195i to early 1953 boü in the Far East and the Baltic area is fuliy

accepiabie. I is not considered necessary to comment concerning all

oi the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval

RU service oi NOSENKO as

reilecied on pages 49-59 and remarks will,

for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole

Headquarters RÜ officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chicí,

Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic

or Far East Inteligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identily.

by his own admission, IOSENIO knew not from his Naval RÜ service,

but through social acquainiance, later, in Voscow, or through his visits

do Geneva."

Altached is a copy oi a handwritten memorandum voluntarily

prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names ci a number

of GRU personnel of whom ie had some knowledge. The attached was

not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval

RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by

NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by

NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB oilicers, 100 KGB agents,

35 GRÜ officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.

2

SECRET

6001122

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It is interesting to note that the altached list contains the names

oi approximaiely 20 GRU oificers whom NOSENKO relates to the cariy

1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews

and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelii

gence personnel whom he know in the 1951 - carly 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary an other related pages question

wnether NOSENXO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence

and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a

copy o: a handwritter memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by

NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy

Intelligence in the Far East and the Baitic area. The memorandum was

compicted by NCSENKO without any reierence material and a review of

his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic

area was at Sovetsk Primorsiiy and during current interviews recailed

that the former name of the place, an aimost deserted fishermen's

village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENSO

for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsi Primorskiy had

caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-

existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the

place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and

that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

3

6U01123

SECRET

.i.:.."

:..

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The previous summary aiso siated that despite his claimed

active commissioned service in ihe Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of

Soviet Nary iradition, doctrines, or orgarization of procedures, It

souid be noted that there is a considerable difference between being

a member oi the Naval iU and being an actual member of the Soviet

Navy.

The situation could be compared to a carcer civilian empioyee

of tre Oilice of Naval Incelligence and a line officer in the United States

¡ävy.

Attachments:

List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO

Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

60V1124

PREP

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'krence Iscuid a Till sittan lists a reputy of chief of nasy:

ints lynsel then a chinf f very allegenre,

Ender he read a deputy of wick-

if Bill (Jezer Such and brashatiny. I heard he was as many attache in the lit

i. bespilos - imagin, code chie of the very intellizeuce if 7 fiet

in Strict Marion's zeg on in 1157-1352.

3. Fogdaresig at digaig of chick of the wasy intelligenes of 7

Fleet (on agints) in 1751-1156.

4. Enlakh - an officer of Henry intelligence print of inteligaus

al KelFlict in Soretsk Kalisingzad's district in 1952

5. Pickien - in 19504 a colored rested in the department f foreign

af, ins of the sinisteg if elifene.

6. Currilskig - a caluel, in 1950 woolad inthe depestment if

reign, feins of the innisterg of defence.

7. Reschen seen fier l assy intelligene point of interience if 4 Pet

in Sovietse, isliningreds listict

8 Menisento - in 1962-1304 emiliary at ache of soviet mbaby inbeen.

V. Bollshator Juri- an officer f GAH (colonel), was in the Ust

works wnder cover of-press-agency " Nicos

10. Gulgeniu Ler li,

in 195%= worked in gRU.

". Soliger - sa pficer if YUl i 450f. (or Eyerler).

12. Kaloshi - a colore?, in 4150-1155 a chief of personnel departienit

of the nasy intelligence

cOU1125

13. Kokonyuk - in 1350 finished the instatute of international relations,

es ran taken in the hey istelligenes, and seut to work in Berlin kuries,

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11. Lapackin- a general, no list ines a diperly ef chif the militing

liplemlio nonderg. We hes tire sons: Krillin Sergey-fishid luis acring

licishal Timosheato - Diga (pinistice il instititi (fazeigitzer); Lipallinite

be - in 13402 studid as a stedcuit in ile lest, als cords in gall.

is. Kabaliner Mdisin-ainjor, i senion office if the nary intrecioure.

•PF Fleit in 1950-52.

is. Khaleirie - in 4950-52 a deputy of absuf of nary zurio detocáment

if he naug intol ligenee of 7 Féiet.

17. KlaytorS.S.-adeprity ofehifloninformation fnery inteli:-

jin if f Firet in 1980-52.

18. Kon'kor -a depaly of chiff'ney intellizeuse of 7 Flict in 1951-52

1s. Reliskig in in moffice degestucut f feriga of Bairs ef The.

miss fry f difense

so Molehanir - an officer of gru (in 4s50-)

31. Ozchitor Gousadi - in lisi-52 un aininistic fier of the waay in -

Celligence of 7 Flut.

20. Pegodin Boris a chuf of thi seiziliziate of kry intellizeuse f P Fliet.

in 1950-1952, Kinos a japanze linguage.

23. Fezantsce - a commander of leg intelligence print of the inte ligence

f4 Fleet in Sonitok, Laliningaudy distict in 112

.24. Stalin - a general, in 1s405 wes a chief of the Military diplometic as -

i dimy, later sas a chief of you.

er Shapeshuiker Dycil a goerle porks in Gall; his fitter was a mashess?

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## Page 129

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W. Mel'niker Sergoy - achif ef nery intilligonce of 7 tit i 130-32.

2f. Hlasugaladze - ayeweel, nehif (nery ütileizueenit Bluch ser 4950-52

18. Sezgigit - as inginea-fenicrlizer,

?, a senio fficon ofe the uazy.

intelliguce if 7 Flaet in Kist-si (iarlicn hi courled in Turkey).

1/ Suslotich - inlsso-se a cenminedin of nargeactio dotachnent of tle.

.:. y isitoleigeme. P 7 Fuit.

3. Ssistoluchor - cu fica f- jau, colid in the USt, hest yaes i tn -.

dis, from slere ines arcelidf.

3. Jislkin, - a zune -uluirn', i tiso 5e e lepetydif ef te enesy it ...

ili fiace of the missisty of inililury suay.

32. Dusilerskig Yore- wor's in fill, son ef a musshel, fuessi.

13. Peroulier Aellest uuolficz of thi hasg isitilligndi f 7 Fhict in 1950.

34. Tözchtser dilüchail a tico almiznl, a fosuir chief fheryintillipuei(soss)

wkgibeledtelodolzad cdte flit arreistorpoie lecengaed,

aesienchires egeslmaftgs

35. Yersturr -al affuca ef persionie of the lury inlelligens di 7 Tiat

in 1iso-5e, Kuons a chinize Cargjungs

0001127 -....

.u ud.i' .

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in Sozit herfuz, Renorshig distüct, ahire I have u.

bp a train and driven in li plier of is

- relie:

sier and from station Pirael scit to forcit Pure (stutia.

Pay faster o,

sity forief.

wishind Sakhalin,

The tellizense of 7 Feil sel Conated in fay Fasterays, here

eive also Political directory of I Flirt, schnarinis and distroyces less.

i halfasters of 7 Finit as Pretent in silkient Thilderlit

He commander in dief of 7 Fliet, uns admizal Baykor tract,.

I chick of staff - rice admiral lisitiner.

d001128

He chief of nary intelligence of 7 Feet was captain of Leach

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Bunchenko (a consmissin).

A sas working in the inferentin deputat: pics halines,

§fine ner sorking in the degetaunt. Öller fficers of the intelligene

Esshov, ce, Asins Orether, Redlisuor, Pejectio, Bespear anel 3-1 Merse.

offices. there vere also sirigento and printis.

di the cud of April, 145ä I Plour in ilosers (stigging for 1-2

alegs in Khalerers) for a lease.

I fore July 182 pessad digas aunt tie it.

juries (a chip-colonil katashan) mes isolicy a quition about.

idlist cifere a peninsula te Billigst - foruca Pictau), robese 1

ezzined in August, li(kalicingrades district famin fusssi.

Soviet is a Citie sity-vilijc, a form gerat village of fish-

ersen, it seens had a hisse Fishhansch.

öritik

Sumitsk -a stenlished Cited tirin, herclhiri

ollins military a

intelingines picnit and l-2

battalions:

detachments (Guilling

..-6001129

baltigsk,

suctigst uns a buse and headgastes of 4 Flect.

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the cliff my g intelligene pit sons implain of 2 sunk kg-gantion.

Nue bize offices tingzadoo, blath, hickouko and others site sergents

and piricates.

ied from inst germinny in Sorest. Off in Yosmemy the sock of the

suit was somested will agil's send, heir thee las abather.

taste- a preparation of agent stication pond inanic of nester

(5-4 pissous cook pusil). - an alsolictly incubey lu. ness.

In lie and of Herzukin Strik a liner rescuing it will hey illuch,

fit: hasing in mind a tiansferche in unither plese.

In rid of Warch, 4s53 ligen li wonk in 2 chief diresting fligh

(nic 102)

00U113C

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I. NOSENZO DID NOT EXTER TEE KOB IN TRE

MANVER OR AT FEE FINE HE CLADES

SECRET

Existed

declassilicatias

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B. NOSENKO did not inter the GB in the manner or at the time

claimed.

(Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard

in NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENiO catered

the then Second Chiei Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his

entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General

Bogdan Zakharovich KC3JLOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of

entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary

and will not be repcated here. His statements during current interviews

that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First

Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are

con-

sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed

was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when

he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in

1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

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Luis:

in 1964, NOSENKO had given to daies in 1952 as dis time oi entry into

the KGB in an elort not to aumit that he had failed to graduaie from the

Institute of Internacional Relations in 1948.

The previous summary gave considerable weight io the statemente

OÍ NOSENKO indicating ihai he disi not enter the KGB (VVD) under what

are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not

given for posicion of the fairer of NOSENKO, ine Minister of Shipbuilding,

and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accep. or

reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through

the influence oi General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then

the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGä procedures

should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet intelligence

organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a bigh oificial.

Gereral KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy is BERIYA,

... "..•..

the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summaiy raises

several points concerning the

eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67

that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU,

he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at

the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro-

vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO

0001133

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imperate

was not spondored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953

with General KO3ELOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy

¿O BERIYA.

The previous summary also siates that according to KGB

dcícctors familiar with the siandards in iorce at the time, no cancidate

was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.

This is a flat statement

which it is doubiíul any defector or series of defectors could fully

substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is

medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted

that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest.

piace in Kubinka. It is also accepied that he was an officer in the KGB

after mid-Varch 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly

have permitied NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously

had tuberculosis, but the flat siatement inat no candidate was accepted who

had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufriciently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks

and conclusions intended to snow that NOSENKO was not eligible for and

therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning

these wiil be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at

this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB

(MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

3

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NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection wit his

processing ior KGB entry, and that such a medical examiration was

a routine and mancaiory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.

This staierent makes no allowance for the influence o! General

KOBULOV; but, in addition, docs not consider the faci that the Navai

Rü dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed is note that ine MVD wouid

have rad independent iniormation in regard to NOSENXO since ine MVD

would have conducied any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry

of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtediy also

had a dossier un the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN

era.

The summary

also states that NOSENKO did nor compiete the

necessary jengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (iVVD) and did not

speax to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. it would

seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the

elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal

procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com-

pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not

know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly

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eniered on duiy or during his first year of KGB service. While

NOSENKO has claimed ihai the designation of bis Direciorate at the

time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March i953 was the Second

Chief Directoraie ard that it subsequently was redesignated lbe

First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN das staled ibis reversal of

designations occurred in March 1953.

;"y."

STALiN died in carly Varcia 1953 anc that same month the

MVD and the MCB were merged under the name WVD with BERIYA

as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June

195j. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less

than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the

date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places

it as the erd of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated itai

the change occurred "soon after ine aúvent of SERiYA as head oi she

MVD in April 1953. " In the light of our inability to fix the electivé cate

of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the ECD, it is

unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation

of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who

was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD.

NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is

5

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in conflici with ise sidiercis of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and

GOLITSYN, all oi vioni mainiain that BERIYA was responsiole for

the changes. As lor the issue of who was responsibie ior tre reversal

of desigrations, li would appear that NOSENKO is in error. rowever,

the faci irat he was à now jurior officer and that this was a period oi

uphcaval in the KGB (MVD) electively eliminates any significance in

this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing

the location of ine Chiel Directorate of the Militia or the nisiory of the

iSI (Committee of Iniormation). NOSENKO has stated that be had no

contacia with either oilice during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason

to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the ki ceased to

exist (195l giver, in ine summary, but other information indicaies the il

continuec to exisi in a nomirai capacity until the mid-1950'e), but care

should be used in siating whai NOSENKO should know it he beid a certain

position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own

memory concerning the location and their knowledge oi Agency facilities ai

any given period of time or when Agency components or relaied organizations

were organized or ceased to exist.

6

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The poiri cas also beer made thai any career of NOSENKO

in the KGB snowd have ended or he should have at least encouriered

difficulty when die berefacior General KOBÜLOV, together with the

hrother oi General KOBULOV, was arresied with the BERiYA group in

early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated at he

encountered no difficulties bii is aware that the KOBULOV cornection

was discussed by ar oificer from the Personnei Directory with an

official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO

would very possitly have encountered dilliculty, but, it should be noted

that the father o' NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only

met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO bas stated

that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father couid in no

way be consiciered a member of the BERIYA group.

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C.

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NOSZYKO DIS NOC E2RY2 30E33 142R:C48 213:55:

SECTION TEROUGHQÜT TEZ 1653 - 1955 PER:O3

15 FE CLEEE0

0001139

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C. NOSEYKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section

throughout she 1953 - 1955 perica as he claimed. (Previous conciusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The

conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First

Section (American Embassy Seciion), First Department, from mid-Varch

1953 to late May 1955 when he was transierred to the Sevenin Department,

SCD.

This period of time has beer. covered in detail with NOSENKO

during curreni interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an

viticer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that

both his works and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact thai he

was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is rejuctant to

admi: that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work curing

this period of time, but is not hesitant io admi: that his persoual be-

havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the

Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

SECRET

EB6:5d31 166200

0001140

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to be propared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether

he would be fired irom the KGB of transierred to some other component.

The induence of his family is quite appareni in the above sirce

" nis father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an oilicial of the

KGB and his mother inierceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chies of

SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the

Seventh Department ard not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how JOSENKO could remais

in the KGB when after 1954 be was not a member of the Komsomol and

was not eligible to become a candivate for the Communist Firty. This

is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was

the son di the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews ii:

Jollowing his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon-

sible for work againsi American correspondents in Moscow. He has nos

claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news-

paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other oificers.

NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer, "

indicating be could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced

officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period

of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his

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information concerning his own ajents is believed of suificient weight

to accept tne statement of NOSENKO that work against American coi-

respondents was his assignmen irom mid-Varca 1953 to mid-1554.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to ine Seventh Depart-

ment in late May 1955, NOSeNXO ciaims and has claimed be was an

officer of the First Section with loe responsibility of work against the

Vilitary Attaches (Army) at the United Stales Embassy in Moscow. It

is considered, based on his knowledge of she various Military Aitache

personnel and oiher coliatera; irformaiion furnished by NOSENXO, that

NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late

May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members

of the Oilice oi the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work

undoubtedly left much to ve desired.

In circa mid-1954; NOSENXO was removed as Secretary of the

Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least

certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the

First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances,

NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very 200r if not

undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during

this period of time and hia knowledge of the members of the Office of

3

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the Military Aitache supporis the claim oi NOSENKO toat he was an

oilicer of the Firs; Section wiüh the indicated assignment ab related

by him.

NOSINXO has siaied that the work against the Military

Attaches was noi primarily directed toward developmeni of recruitment

possibilities, but was direcied toward control of the Military Attaches

on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive

sires or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB

would appear to be compietely plausible and NOSENKO noted as

excepsionzi in tois regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Waiter

MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches

to Sovieis in the Uniid Siaies in that periou.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the

details corcerning the Military Attaches which i: was considered he

should have known il be kad the specific responsibility for work against

the Military Aitaches during the indicated period of time. it is submitted

thai this may be evidence o' his failure to satisiactorily fulfill his

0001143

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in:gaidinotiono, i dtaados c pantnande lai dae unbritadio porsieo

Siaus is üDCEtio Warai iciani nidii iü ie KGB Was ir jeopaiá;

mãinariié- 956.

tiioeioich piciuibiy ibacãiol aic oii áridicaies è déisiè

iachocäculeugi corcornic ns issigiei iaiguis during appioxii y

Varch - Vay 1955. Tuo, accorcing io NOSENKO, was wher an l.-

satisiaciory "characicrizaiioa" was being prepared on YOSENKO, a

úccision was being mace on nis case, ani a period oí time ir. wi.ciá

weri os i mbig drunk" which cuirninated in lis spending abru. 46 daya

adde: mungihiaà care mecause oá the possibilily of recurrence di his -civion"

minczerosis.

Jajes 81 - 37 oi ire previcus summuiy suagesi tidi NOSaio

inl ino áuiniancó sifficioni jecalis auclà dio acleged igizi idarié-isiuà

iue annbi she Military Aitaches. it is corsidered tüi dcueno:.

JunrèLé änérviews das iurioncù adegua è iccepiai."o, sii do

imes.inode ininisaed aniclio miberaiibà Coacaraing ": "IUDäl:

cad "242 2a." do: 85;.

¿Himu dopcca ilãi iere Wão 20 -iüüay

lôrriñio io Nilaidii anonintioh acacerning inese dncifiiuido, éii

éciana dãi àe wao aevor dinco e émpaliy iia

dievidi. ¿co mna ätacáerär

in tiese individlieiu.

0001144

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The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his

assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March

1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the

bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actuaily was an oificer

in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that iniormation

furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews

is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an

officer

in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

0001145

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14025

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D. DURIYG THE PERIOD 1155 - 1969, DE WAS JEICEER É

SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NO3 BEPUTY CEEF O3,

THE SEVENTH DEPARTVENT AV'SRICAY-ERITISH

COXMONVEALER SECEION

0001147

SECREF .

Ercinte inoe

fo tireatic

ntigratang and

decsogct ocrtiy

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SECHE!

D. During the périod of 1955 - 1900, NOSENKO was neither a

seidor case officer in, nor Deputy Cher o1, the Seventh Department,

American-British Commonwcaith Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The

current conclusion is that NOSENXO was an officer in the Seventh

Department, SCD, from late May i955 to December 1959 and was

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventi

Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive

information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department

during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject

of KGB interest collateraily confirm that NOSENKO was personally in-

volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.

These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI

in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the

summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS in 1958, the re-

cruitment of George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

0001148

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William Stanley WiLBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR

in the summer of 1959, the recruitment oi Gerard VERTENS in July -

August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsere FRIPPEL in 1959. The

foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO ciaims

personal invoivement, but is representalive oi cases in wnich his allegea

participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who

was the KGB target.

Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and

David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named indi-

viduals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate

the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an

officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-

wealth tourists in the USSR.

in addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about

an operation against Viartin MALIA, an American tourist who was in

the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955.

ViALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this

time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims invoivement

or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the

individual involved.

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NOSENKO has furnished inormation on the travel of certain

United States Government officiais, inciuding Congregsional represent-

atives to the ÜSSR in 1955 - 195ó; and the trip oi Supreme Court Justice

William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when consisred with the previously

mentioned specifies, adequately substantiate his nimed service in the

Seventh Department and work against American-British Commorwealth

tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh

Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent

network was not vailable for opcrations against American and British

tourists. This seems quite logical since the infiux of tourists into the

USSR was ju t in a iormalive stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he dc-

veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel

and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code

names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by

interviews with individuais who were the subject of homosexual com-

promise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150

in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Sevento Department service of

0001150

NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those filty

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pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is

considered that even ii the statemenis were accepted in toto, there

would still no: be an adequiie basis ior a conclusion thai NOSENKO

was not an oificer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department

during the period of late Vay 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it con-

ceded that, i all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various

areas of information were accepied without quaiification, there is any

evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, inere

are certain assumptions and interprctations which appeared in the

previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and waich

are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO

was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a couater-

intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign ageris

among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation

of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the

MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous

known (and presumably iriknown) successíul recruitments and recruit-

ment attempts.

This activity has noi been limited to the Seventh Depart-

ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-

speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB gaUdritien

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considered with the detaied itormation NOSENKO has provided on

Sevenin Departineni persoirel, activities, procedures, and topica of

a similar tature is not considered to have any ioundation in fact.

Page 145 oi the above surnmary lists eleven operations which

were Seventh Depariment Cases prior to 1960 and which were included

in the notes furnished to ClA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations

were those against Berrard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, Join RUFE.

Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK,

Ralph MATLAW, Varvin KAVIOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William

TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases

was that NOSENKO could not describe the irdividual operations other

than to say that he had recorded the name of the larget and such details

as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart-

• ment in 1962 foilowing his return from the Firet Department.

The notes brought out by NOSENiO aïe considered in another

section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a fuil review

of all of the notes oi NOSENKO currently availabie indicates that his

statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes

are completely piausible.

A detailed explanation of the notes furnished

by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of ine approxi-

mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.

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During curreni interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific

indormation on certain of the above eleven cases, including William

TARASKA, Bernará PECTiTER, Michaei GINSBURG and John RUFE.

I shouid aiso be noied that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR

ard William TARASKA were cases in wich the tourist was visiting

reiatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has giver a satisiactory

expianation oi how he jearned oi the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in

discussing his duties as Depuy Chief oi the American-British Common-

wealth Section, aiso explained that il a tourist indicated that he intended

to visit relatives in the USS?., the case automatically was assigned to a

group di officers in the Section who reported directiy to the Chief of

Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three oi the

individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV, "

two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO

has expiained that "SHIMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of

identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they

had contact with numerous Amcricans, and that they had homosexual

activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt

action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual

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was not considered a worihwhile target and in others the iniormation

was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual

returned to the USSR.

NOSENKO has aiso explained how he learned of the Patrick

PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVER, cases; and, the listing oi the Sofia

SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in com-

plete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information

from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews

the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in

detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material

which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement

•i NOSENKO in cerlain cases being handled by other Sections in the

Seventh Department or by ihe KGB Directorate oi Muscow was, unusual.

An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation

was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is

logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English

language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents

were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning

whether Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

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SEÜNE!

This question seems quite superfluous since HAzit was in the USSR

on a tourist visa and "scal" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventi

Depariment. Departinental rcoponsibility within the SCD for an indi

vicual traveling in the USSR is decided or the basis of how the indivicual

is traveling: i. e., whetner on à tourisi visa, as a member of a deiogation.

as the invitee of an organization in the CSSR, as a former diplomat

stationed in Voscow, as a dipiomat not previously stationed in Moscow,

as a member of ine Cuitural Exchange program, as a student attending

a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors

which affect the determination of which Department or organizational

component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These

factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign

intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman.

In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the

responsibility oi the SCD if tre individual is of specific interest to the

FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at

least some of the substance of the information furnished by George

BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents

in the USSR. This criticism compleiely ignored the fact that NOSENKO

made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

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althouga he did then and still suspects thai William VASSALL was the

source. The relerences by NOSENKO to the KGB having such inior-

mation were not developed in 1902 or later interrogationg, and it was

not until current interviews thai it was established that NOSENZO had.

actually seen excerpts of incormation passe: by George BLAKE.

According to NOSENXO, the iniormation which was covious iy only

partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could oniy have come

from an agent

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CLA

acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists

by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the

Soviet Urion (document was lurnished by GOLITSYN following his de-

fection in Decemder 1901). it was noied that ine summary contained

"references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-

intelligence identified as Amirican agents and noted that NOSENKO

claimed he was Deputy Chief oi the American-British Commonwealth

Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified

no American Intelligence agenis during this period of time. What later

is described as a claim by NOSENKO is reither an accurate reflection

of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

==:

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NOSENKO jas never claimed to krow all activities against

American traveiers in the Soviet Urion during 1958 - 1959. Many

of tnese travelers wolic lave been the reaponsibility of a section in

ine Sevenin Departrer, other than the American-British Commer-

weaith Section, or aroiner. Depariment in the SCD. NOSENKO was

quite aware that certain of the American touriste in 1958 - 1959 were

actig suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the

Seventh Department had prepared and iurnished to the FCD in an effort

to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists

had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENIO stated he was not in

the Seventh Department when the document was preparca and did not

review the documeni until after the defection of GOLITSYN and foiow -

ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the

document rad been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN

has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained

additional information not in the document which he was aware had

been prepared by the Seventh Department ior the FCD.

NOSENKO bas been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with

a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by

GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiguloSEixo

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regardio de :955 - 1959 periodio de secondy desenho dimi

¿resunce dá imerican Cilizon JOm STUDit in te USEi is a ibücist

tá in laze 1950'S. Tae preVicas sümmaay Dored Gui tict, siree

true name in the USSR and, therefore, a ranget of ine Severia Deza=i-

meat, as N'ûSENXO ciaims. Alsouza sevazal avenues di bussic!

0001158

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justliadly can de sui as me pricimme is shat even i ise scory

O NOSENZO is inaceutica, moro lo no ericcanci ceasca way sucia

as indicatio de decepion do Cropaica,

or ico that raditer

American-Brisi Commonweside Sectio de me Seventa Suicizzar

ir. 1958 - 1959; reichor would suca an inacouncoy redect on his clairici

sesvice in i9ú2 - 19ó3 in me Saved sugarimes.

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JOSENKO WAS VEITHER DEPOTY CIZE OF FEE AYERCAN

EVBASSY SECTION VOL & SENIOR CETICER OR

SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE

PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

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CSo.s

20:5355: S0C10216=:8020T 2020801003V.805 10 Kid SecheE

¿urina :: Dariod 0: 105: - 1962 'sla facevicas concision)

posicion di Depusy Caca, Fiäst Sucien (merican Dricasy Sectivai,

SCD, Érom Jañuary 1960 - Decende: 1961.

The Giaim di NOSEYKO jai do deil ma duovo posito. in iso

- 1961 has deen ine mosi dificui clatini zuscion di NO53=50 :

satisfactorily resolve and accesi. Accipiance dã conaicepianci ci

ais claim so bave held vis particuiar posiaca is à criical lacior in

a decision as to whesati ine remaindei di bis Claimic 103 caree:

is validi, i is believed ¿casonoie io presume ¿dai à dOSENKO is

Deputy Caicá di ibo Americaï-Briuss Commonwealia Seczon, Seraria

Deparimeni, prior io Decomber 1958 i iso sbsence di day irdicazion

thai de was demoieá, se saoula nave aten ailasi a Dezury Chici di

Section auring 1960 - 1901.

Position in ibe SCD, KC3, and tarougiaout te KGB is imporiani

from a moretary poini di view as wail as a prestige poia: of view. Ii

SIONET

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1552020 Was baly in de Faro Sectorno e Serior Gasi Glicör ii

sideradie condias io vicier de dos ms clarid posicion prior to tive,

as wei as Wietaer de acid na ciadracá posticas ia 1942 - 1933.

Ie às apparen inci ice icouca,è di NOSENiO concening áu

assecis oi activiy in tiü Firsi Section, Firöi Deparumeno, Guring iSto -

1901 is incorpicie wi•: iraged oy Wacture considered ine sormai

responsistinies dé a Degusy Caiei in Clà, Juring Curzer inserviews,

al eiort was made to deiermine viai de respondiolares Gi NCE2AXO

actualiy were in :900 - 19ói añd wrether ais statemonis in dis arca

vere impossidie ni coud se accepiei no aci negaring dis ciaim io cavo

•seen Deputy Criei, Elisi Sectios.

Accorcing to MOSaNiSo, indie carly 1900's inere were cay

aproximaleij ilicen Depury Caleis di Sacion in tre ensize SCD ari

in ceria departmenis rose oi ine secroas nad a Deputy Cabei df Scction.

iniciacion, transier oi a Debuty Caldi di Section Was adialvays fuilowed

by a repiacement in kiné, accordino to NOSENÃO vio staied indi de was

2oi replaced by another Deguiy Chiei Ween «e transferred io the First

Section, First Departmes:.

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beivces eariy siaienento di NOS5N20 trai de coplaced au cão liaca la

clain it se repiaced Vini DARiVAiON is Depuy Caciin ino 2irai

Sector. Along wih iris de sãù droi Cacic KOVSHOK and various

ciner dificers in the Seción Wiih previous respondientoy ior cariada

maliers which were assigreá io him uson dis arriva: dere, taer latai

stated tha: BAKUVALOV had veen risporsidio ior mese marere. Tae

previois suramary roicó trai interrogaio. ind never resored iise

• contradictions.

In the lighi of ino preser cièarez piciure di ine nature di a

Deputy Chie of Secion, ine siaTemtas d: lOSENXO OS BARiVALON

ard on ine issue oi wio ne, NOSENXO, die oi did noi replace are nos

contradiciory. There is no reason io cuestion inãi suitaVaioV, wit

Wrom NOSENXO, ircidentaly, did roi overia), was a Dezü; Chiti oi

Section in the Firsi Section before NOSDNXO, and icat ce was respos-

sible for certain areas which dater ¡el' 1o JOSENXO. On the otaer

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Io ino Ficci Secion mas do concentro diá new arco dá diagradio jeodo

clerio), pacre coid di coucue have been no socchlo pacdeceosin ica

a sudsianiery new aica.

being in condici appears do do dio resido di comusion do inis colis!

ail concerred.

Accorugio NOSSA%O, at ino limo di dio tinnsior to de alasi

Seccion, First Derimeno, in caily iSão, de racinui dica ioid aná ior

a short period merecer was tui toid viat his actui ducies word ic.

supervise ine Wuri aguinsi service Anachos at ine Crisod Sicico anicass;.

NOSaNKO ¿ci trai iie Eroposed assigamei by KOVSHud Was tinied

i0 keep MOSaNXO cecupicd wich aunprocucure Work suce KGS Foicy

for work against ine Service Ataches was primarij ore dá contrus oi

tripo and roi acsive vora iowarás possible recruiimerà.

After à shuri period oi time, NOSENXO was icormed by

GRIBANOV iraihe, ICSENHO, had been tramoierzed io supervise dae

work agaiisi code cieras (also coce machine mechanica) ai ine üstiva

Staies Emcassy, GADANOV dened inis work as being oi the gresiasi

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solde

responsiole lor saperrada di di Wuir, GAlAZiOV ii KOsOriroi

were noi new 10B Glucero, Du indicio Were exporienced Glicers

JOSENKO coes not cinim inai ne nad io train dicher Giaçer di to manuccis

scrutirize every action ca proposed actior di CRYAZNOV and kusciror.

NOSENKO dues ciair, na sas respunsibio du= supervision over tacia

work.

According tO NOSAXO, GiraNOV giasivec tri voci

against code cierks was io de di primary vori in inc Firsi Seccer

•and that il iouid take aricedence over añy oier activity. Oier inan

wori against code cieris, NOSINXO cas gereraily ¿cined sis ses-u--

sibilities as ioliows:

(a) Responsibility ior fie di (worà againoi) jobr.

ABIDit, Securty Ouicer at United Saies Baabassy.

(b) Responsibaity for arciminary review oi=e-

poris irom OTÜ (XOB ¡echnica: unity un "taixe" iroma

microphones in ise ünited Staies Embassy.

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security ile on the came juice direcosy.

Firsi Sectoi, Mier NOVSuá dos ausea..

Deputy Chiti 01 Branch 0i Sectión in Cato dhamiysi Can Ginta accepi

or rejeci ine iheor, inai inere is accessary an egunior beivecaiie

responsibilities of a deguy Cales in Cabind ine 103, burtine analysi

accepis ine ireory, so musi dier some supporting evidence in iris poisi.

Pages 151 - 261 cite previus summañy Cunaired commicas

did conclusions and sub-conciusica in regard to lai camed service

Cé NOSENiO at Depuy Crici di Firen Section, Elidi Degarment, 1950 -

1961. The previous primary conclusion ias indice was deirce= Degusy

Chieé d ine Firaï (American Dramasoy) Secion roi a superviso, in siai

sectior. The conciusion dá inis stimary is thai he was Deguj Cricá

and had supervisory responsibilities ior work agairst code cierks. The

matier d the responsibility di NOSENKO for wori against code cieris

will se considered laier. Commer's will sirst be made on the respor-

sibilities listed in (a) - (c) above.

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ABill congured lavoradiy wii vian lo Considered io du dio dio ci

• a esponsibli Cli case citeer is immaiori, What is muteria is

tac answer to chis is ita: NOSEYKO die.

ccording io NOSENXO, die work ajainsi ABidiaN vas la tae

¿irection oi determining is ABiDint Would ical ie KCI io "cides

POPOV, "and no consideraiion vas give io active ageni worn againa:

ABiDiAl for possible recruitmeni. This expiation by NOSENiO

appears reasonable and logical aad his knowiego di ARIDial and dis

description of his work agains: ABIDIil should be considered ory

within that iramework.

Admittedly NOSE\KO was unaware oi a considerable amount

of details regarding the backgraura di ABiDiAY, bui on ine oiner dare

il tre statements of NOSENKO are accepied that the only aim oi she

KGB was to see if coverage di ARIDiA) would lead io "arother POPOV,"

it follows that such personalia information on ABiDiAN wouid have had

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de lamerican mielligence, "ano bilbao Abitano assurdo das

Wio was inown by the k05 iude dan do rivisigation dj ine 505

was recessary io decermine à ABiDual was lamerican Mteingsboe"

0s noi.

Tre previois summary, jujes lis - 216, Contas some quie

spectic siatemenis scintive 10 de Danti and a Sovicimaio, à aca

operazional coriaci accorcing io dOSavio, vala are recordous.

This invadates one di ine bases ioi int previcus Cocusion soci

NOSENKO Wãs noi tre responsic-e casé únicer ioi damino.

JOSENKO nãù previous y siated indi in circa Gescber 1955 ma

oi ino piacing of vicina an the cluizira and edecto di ASiDialey is

maic who is mertioned above, Juijana IEDONOViCa, ine sicemen

is male in the summary that inis coüd noi de true beCause IEDO¿OVIC?

dia not wori part time sor ABiDiAl undil ai itasi Judg 1961. ADiaT

has recently been reinterviewed concezzing tre abové ará ine resules

invalidate the previvas concision inai FEDOROViCH couia sciive

treaied the clothing and efiecis oi ABIDiAN wita Veika prior to July 196i.

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became ine Darismo mall idi dicino segining sorcini in me ici

incoroed access i0 ais living Cureza sice sue cal a scy io permia

encry for cleaning purposes.

ABIAN did soi mail any Operaiora iciers Wiirin the Sovac:

Univa unil after ¿arca 1901 and mereiore in lion dime ibove, teeze

is no reason 1o contradict the siäierier: d NOSENKO tico tic trea

1.6.

meridal?

sroved evidence of Meria, i is mieresting io ndie inã: NOSEliO

June 1s02 warned Cir abour the KGS use Ci Meica lor sporinõ intersal

letter mailings by ündied Siates Embassy persome:.

ABIDIAN, accordIg :O NOSENIO, vas il sübjec: di a 24--0u-

surveillance with the Seventa Direcioraie assigning a specitic surveiance

brigade to cover ABIDilt. The acadi survediaace di ABIDIAN was ¿e

responsibility of the Seventa Directorate Weich suomited reports to se

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• iino

Firai Sccion, Fiisi Dipicndini, NÜSENZO, is ixe zuszursibie Casó

unticoz íoi ábidinà, vas ixgicica io céviér iredó cézoris dni sive

anjappropalaie guicince do diccczion io mno Sereria darccioraio, bui

ünde ie K0u irginiuton àe Vouid a0ü pazticizaie in iaé cazveiiincé

activálies có :n: Severi Direccoraio, NOSENKO säied dairud duia

veiiince ci..ni mricamation discioscd iny zsraciii bécircades i

AbIDinl, : ":Co louió cavé añemoicá su exgio dumo do secscci

weadresses vère disciused, accoruno :o NOSINão, and ice pavera

dí coverage to see li AbiDial' Wouid icad ira 805 iu "anoice= PO=OV"

remained incrangeá.

Pages 210 - 212 oí tie previcis summary -dies dai dOSElilO

was lmaware di countries visited by ABiDill duriro iripò Gutsidé tau

USSR and tnat no eitori was mace dy NOSIN4O irouga ino EC) io ilad

Out such idormaion According to tac previcus summaïy, NOSENKO

stated trai tse FCD vouid noi accepü suca à request íor "operacionai

action agairst an Americãa dipiomai comirg izor dioscow." Thé

sürveilänce wrich woüù nave been reguired co ie pari oi tü FCD

to achieve any sort oi reasonabie coverage oi àBiDind abroac would

certairiy have piaceù á severe bürden on sue FCD. Furirez, NOSENKO

coaterás thai the resulis which might icasozadly de expécied woüd be

of little or no praciical value io iie SCD.

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Pageo 216 - 22à di ine previcos summazy Chiti a Suraming

Di tie 1964 - 1900 imerrogaños d: NOSENKO di Lis marer indicaics

¿ne; vere baubie iû Ciaráy ino munici in diá Tica io cémuso ine isoic.

Current irierviers, as mucarcó inovt, bave djuy resuivid

confici or condusion. il is abmien in lOSaNKO was soi in dae Firs:

•secilos, First Deparimerì, for any truierial perioc ci aime aites

30 December 1901. liás also cicai innt ho einer rezê ine surveilasce

rEpOrI On iCE ViSiI di ABIDÀN' I0 ine Pustikin Street deadèros site 0=

vãs fudy bricied on ine deialis di ine visio. NOSENKO insisis traile

read ice surveillarce repoit ai me sime or shorty aie= ide everi.

•There is no renson io question sis assertion tant de read te repora

sir ce his accurale nowiedge di die Icule di ABIDils abá iis actioas

is connection with she visit suppor: dis claim. Fowever, lis consisien:

inabiliy on his oun to approxinute ihe daie di the visio dù relatis io

his change oi assigments raises a question regarding when ne actuaiy

read ihe report.

NOSENKO claims irat ine visit di ABIIAY so she Pushin Sireet

deaddrop area ledto the KGB setting up a stationary surveilance posi

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acát ihe sie Wiicá lás mummicoli irce montis and iraial las

iniormeú dã i dudly vasi di iie cruno di mis stake dui jaways

regaiive). Io iné dio darzero diezaly woüi rainà furiez probiers

since, ir aldirion io bis iraidécà iron ine Fiest Degaromerato zia

Sevenià Deparimeries di caily January 1942, NOSENiO verato

Geneva in mid-Varca 1962.

=ás conceivadie toui, es te almscá nou maincairo, dè was icga

advised of developmeris o= nordève'opmcas ionowing ine visit oi

ABILAX 10 Lie Pusain Street Dulding by Vuniamia KOZZOV, & Chici

of Departmeni in the Severin Dirécioraie vau bad been iaewa tu

NOSENKO since 1953, or Viadisän KOVSaüR or Genrally GRYAZNOV,

Chieí and Deguiy Chici respectively di de First Section, First Depici-

ment. Ever so, iowever, his iallure io call cùr airention io this minus

in June 19ó2 would seem to requira explancior, especially in view ci

the lact thai he diù wan us abou the danger oi oberalionai lette: maii-

ings by ABIDiAN -- a warning wiich would appear ciearly so have beer

derived irom KGB coverage dí ice activities oi ABIDiAl ia le sprina-

summer o: 1961.

It is to be noied that during the Jure 1902 meetings VOSENKO

was not specilically asied lor ary additionai informaton regarding

any known of suspecied intelligence activities of ABIDIA). Bayoza

12

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us because ine siane unirió long sinco seca drogaed, ii rid covedied

ne rad regáried it as insignilicani.

Tais is noi impiaisiole, lucier possidie explanacion, sowevas,

derived irom ine aiready nored ininly di NOSENIO io pia cola a daci

¿or ine visit, is inai hè learned di mit maliurary surveilaaco postl-o-

oi ine visit irsei after nis meetings with us injune 1962, a stonese ,

noted in this contexê thai with the public exposure of die PENKOUSiCY

case in she fui oi 19ú2, the Pusticia Sircei dcicirop undoudtoday sicame

tre subject oi midespread interest withia the KG2.

That JOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visi.

Di ABIDIAN' i0 iie Pustixin Street Ceacaios año ats Conseguences is cicar

•irom ine record. While it is entirely posaibie that NOSENKO is co--

sciously exageraied dis involvement with the visit and iis aisermata,

it is also possibio inat ine evident distorions of his accourts oi ine

aidair derive irom honest confusion.

Curzeni interviews and a check of the iajes of previous inte=-

views leave zo doubt trai NOSENXO was awara ai the visits of ABID-AN

to ihe upper Gorkiy Street area circa Varch 1961. These visits by

ABIDIAN were jor cover purposes ard preceded his start of operationai

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crávings Waicia suosianiio, ini visis diisibirdio à concisaion

saup, añexi-cour añi Subo, ino á ducas aust Office in ino dida Viere

inow io and considered sungiciono dj is KCB. Tie cntrance io ie

art sius, accorting io NOSANO, vas sù sicatos ao io do an ideai

Diace dor picking up ur piacang à concuros, ano a rouco susteiance

was piaced on ine ani siop ¿ur á perico di ame icicwig ine visi di

ABIDIA). Oficiai recoris contarm ii visits oi ABIDiAN ao tae time

and to the buildings described by NOSaN:O.

Pages 21ó - 220 di me arevious summay coniuin no reerence

to the specific starements dÍ JOSENKO reativa to 103 interes: in the

visits o ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Sica area. Ii is also cicai

fror a review o ceriaia transcripis dé previous iriurtogaticas trai

no diferentiation was tnale oncerning ais siatemenis relative io isca

coverage of the activues dá ABiDind in ine upper Gurny Süeci arca

circa Viarch 1961 and his staiements concerning ais irowiedge oi tie

Pusnkin Street deaddrop site aiter the visit oi ABDiA. to trai site

(30 December 1961).

It is impossibie ai tris time to siaie thai a detalied debzieting

O NOSENKO concErning ASiAN prioI io hostile interrogation would

have permitted the clarificazios of au issues including the above, büt

14

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Sicida, Fañsi Deparinci, dy di Decomber iSti and miosi Cériciij aul

tuadácracd oy culy damary igua, mi luchinci SOSaNKO tas

süsanta

to impuga dis claim to indag ocea case Glicer ioi ABIDIAN dors escly

augerly dase the visio di ABiDiAl io Fusaida Sereca, is i io Way indicinile

vi KGB dispaica. If dispatcheá, NOSENKO Dresurdy viii savi ne ine

cite right.

In regará io (b), de responsi day o NOSaNXO lü preliminary re-

view di reporte irona Ciü frecimical Üni di sODi di "'ce" iros micro-

piones in tre Únited Siaias Embassy, inc previous concision was dai tas

ciair that he personaily revicwed ic KG3 iunioring repors das not

süstaired.

it às not fel trai ie previdis conciusion mace suricicat aldolv-

ance ior the expianation di MOSEliO di via me responsority actually

estailed, inormacion iron microsiones in ine ürdied Siaies Imbassy,

äccording io NOSENKO, was handied very specialy. Telephone inter-

cepis were given io a designarea officer ior distribuzion to ine appropriaie

case officer, bui microsione reporis, io prevent wide dissemination even

0001175

withir the First Section, were broughi daily io the Deguiy Caiel or la dis

absence to the Chiei and ien were distributed to lae individual responsible

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to Tried Sidies Ridisa!

mis vas cousicored to musi importani ty me liC are Car, NOSalO

had 0 resporsiaility ico reviou di animate dissimminion dific iáoi-

malica io the Criel, SCo, in irairan, bud, or tie Ocarral Commisce

since this was ine responsion y cia bail in lie ullica cá to Chiel, SCa.

NOSENKO has ¿ico stated true ine cutout irom cozzaia di te

working microphones was "jing'' añá tri: oru in accision to having

recepiion difficures was aiso having dificulty ostamira à sullicien-

number of gualilied monitor-tranalators.

As a result, according to

NOSENKO, OTE was ad providing compice verotim trazscripts iron

most microphones,

bit actually was repo-iing owly those portions which

OTU considered pertineni.

Despise tre luci chat áull iranscripis oial

conversations in arcas covered by active microptores would have bees

oí interest to responsibie officers citie First Section, OTU, according

tO NOSENKO, did not provide iuil transcripts and when asked to provide

more gave the routine answer of, "we couid do so ii we had more

persornel." According to NOSENIO, the tapes were maintained at

OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An oiicer

0001176

16

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## Page 179

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Firsi Secica COuld indiCá iù is Miniciano inpe but de lad to go Ic OTi

NOSENIO as de rio aciive micropataés in noi ceisCrane do evia

compromised io ie KGB. Tre late: is a jaciO tO bE Constered in

any darage assessmeri; d is nor an appropriait basis dua apresumpio

¡hat JOSENKO cau io save bees awarè oi sals da taus just because sore=

one had à conversaiios in ore d tre rooms in Wiica tere was aa active

microphone and NOSENKO ras cirmed he ceviewed elise" son.

microphores in tre tried Sies Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderade iactors

to be considered such as viether the conversation comic te picked 1o

by the microprone, wreiner ie morior could recover sudicient portoas

di the conversation to undersiand the gisi oi what was being saic, are

even il he did, whether de wouid consider it di suriciani importaace 0=

interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regará io (c), the ciaim o1 NOSINKO tha: de was responsibie

for maintenance o the physical securiy ise on the United States Embassy,

17

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## Page 180

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i' is noi Considerei dai micro io in mini mie casis lo= Güéstioning

inis ciciria.

The presidis simary coriamoi i conclusio indi iné conin.

• NOSENKO ¿di ne was cusiouin oi ind Imbassy secuzioy le sti

In regaráio (à), ine cham di NOSalitO thut de acted in sace

• KOVS:TUR, ine tries di Firoi Secico, vien MOVS-ür was acicão,

it is considered inai dis ciair is accupaio providino i is =ui co=-

verted inio a presunzion trai chereiore dOSaNO kew evezywing

that KOVSiUK *res.

NOSENÃO ciaims inai le was Ili responsible dor me direc:

supervision dá approximately suo-tairis di the officers in tre First

Section, These officers -ormady resured direciy io KOVSaui and

would only repori to dOSENiO Wica iDiSaUK was ausent. As an

example d ilia, 105ENiO nas shown a icci di deianied inowlecõe c!

the work againsi diplomatic personnel in sa Urited Siaies Erbass;.

He has siated he is süre se would have itowa of anytaing "imporiaaa"

such as à recruieni or attempied recralment, bui be does noi ciaim

so have reviewed all the reports of tue various officers of the Fizsi

18

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## Page 181

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Sicies Erisosy in ilúo -¿Qui mi evennicio assigariario scurso

adeçüait.

oi mosi agonis oi operaile contació Who West aci dimo 10S -csx02k

amacio te indigerous emplogees di de samerican amonasy, dilica

recoguize intir photograjos, and dió noi sire suiciono deñilo co--

cerning treir specito aciviles lù considerá =o de inunwarramied

criscism, VOSENXO incicaces toco in guaera de inmaling di ageras

in the Firs: Section Was the responsibilay di individui casa cilicers.

It is diso appareni trai ine paidosophy in ie ñGB was io maintain

a sirgie handler-agent relacionshio as much as possibie, and shai réspor-

sibility for an agert would rüi be transierred merey bécausa ine agent

had access io a inigei vio was de responsibily di à case cálice: ciaci

tran ine hancier oi ine agéni. Tris asparent saliososày is oi particular

interest in connection with NOSENSO, vio evea touga he was thü case

dificer responsible los ABisil ard togeter wis KOSOLAPOV arc

GRYAZNOV worked active y agaiast code cierks, dic not have an agent

network which he specifically bardled. Mere use oi an agent ior cepori-

ing on

or a specific activity agains: a partichiar targei was cormally

G001179

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¿zadais tie KOB Consiuoro inni ine Corinuaica di in esidiasice

curing i9óo - 1961.

Excepi for ibe period di time traine Crimo I05506-

sibaliy 1or supervision di lord aquinto me Survice dracocs in carat

1900, de was, accorcing io NOSENiO, ¿esponside ior supervision di

¡nE wari di VadimA, NOSOLAPOV, Curmady i CAYAZIOV, Viadimi-

DINKIN ard levgeny GRoMAKOVSKy.

GRIAZNOV aù KOSO-APOY Worked dij agaiasi codo cioris

and therefore were superviseá sody by NOSENKO, wacrias DaVikal

ani GROVAKOVSKIY, who cardicó indigenous agents in American

House, came under the supervision d NOSENKO ory in trose cases

where these agents were direcied againsi cose clerks.

I is quite ciear trai the inowledge di NOSENiO Concerng isa

code cierks, code machine mechanies ana pouca clerks who, according

tO NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was muca

greater than his knowledge d any otrer category dí Americas exployees

at the United States Imbassy during this period excepi loi AbIlial.

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## Page 183

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Tãi idiowing Conmcmo ace Curecinod Win several specific

considerabie amoure di specite wore was Carrica Cuit, NOSalio,

KOSOLAROV and GRYAZNO%.

The firsi cabe, james STORSEERS, is covered on pages ids -

177 cé the previouó summango incri incisionai Cormeniis condiccrid

necessary on this case since tere luis ju uppear ic do any alécuice

reason to guestion the gerorai siory d: NOS2NKO in ragasi io lie iõe

effort agaias: STORSBIR.

It is recogrized ard menioned i siwhere trai NOSENiO in 1902

exaggeraica his personi invoiveren in ise case, paricularly is. piacia;

hirscù as preseri vit: GRBANOV vier ie recruitaren prich was inade

¿O STORSBERG, NOSENKO ras reiracice is parsicular cialri, üut

there is no reason to doud licide was cagaged do: approximicy à year

in the planning and activities waica preceded the unsuccessivi approaca

to STORSBERG.

An issue was previously made over the timing di tae approich

tO STORSBERG SiICE STORSBERE caic¿sais as Ociode= 1961, NOSENKO

has indicaied aboui Jure 1961, and iriurmacion from GOLlISY, jasec

on remarks by KOVSHUK to kim, cad beer interpreted as indicating the

21

C001181

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## Page 184

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cause oinersise au accon wurid Lave beca dien aga diSERS.

When receady reinterviuwed, STORSSERG condanod to mainiair

inat the approaca occurrea in Cesusir iloi, bii die miciri evidence in

nis coscription di conterà, everis mares do cleai tito ine inprocca vad

io nave caren piace corsiderably carliei.

Josepa MORCNs, anoine: code cierk ai tre triied Staios aricassy,

who will be the subjeci of further discussion beiow, ias unen interviewed

un she basis of staiemeris by STORSBERC tha: MORONE was prescii ia

American Huuse the right di the approach. Aralysis di tie siciêeris

Oi MORONE clearly indicaies that tae everis STORSBENG describes

could noi have taker piace later than te period Fuoricay io early day

1961.

The besi estimaie possible ai this tire is trai me asproaca io

STORSBERG occurred in Varch - April 1951, waica is quite compatibie

with the approximate ding de the appicaca by lOSaNKO. In tre ánce

of this approximation oi ine date di the approaca to STORSBERG, i is

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## Page 185

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appicaca, or was premarely clubring anticipaica success.

Pages 178 - isè di me providuo sumimary concan iiormation

in rEgará io iie añergico éciecava égeration agains: james ibiszaS.

As cé tino iime, il is consicoréi mai inere are no discrepancies berwees

recorù inormaior aid imormation irom NOSENiO waica in ary waj

refect agalasi MOSENXO, MBYSINS diá noi recognica a pactograga

O1 NOSENÃO as ite Soviei vito maco à iast aprivacio io tira ai tre ii-

pori, but this does doi provice a vail reason io dispelieve ie stiement

•Oi NOSANKO that ii was he who tricá io ili iù NEYSaRS.

Inero are ceriaia stater mts relativa to tae KDYSDAS cast is

set iorta in the previous summary waich regura specie commi=-.

ja) The siemero is mace that no dos cicer

direcily cornecied wita tae case couia regard KEYSaRS

as tae replacemen foi STORSBERG. iiaci, KEYSERS

actually was bemg trained dy STORSBERG as a substitute,

not a replacemeni, evea trouga his primary assigament

0001183

23

$50957

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## Page 186

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curreno iniervielo carici con do ccccared io impressica

Erricassy irãi NDYS225 dicior dis noi i sede ciezi c=

had ocer away irca cone vori ior a considezable berica

oi time, in any eveni, me incaression Gi NOSaNiO vas

Ine paricuãi work io iDisaia. tri coservations oi

noi bees a cose cierabui, as soced, was being trained

by STORSBERG so dai ne couiù aci as à substituie, ünder

the circumstances, it is considered quite iogicai trai ine

KGB Koüld assurre at tre time ise dEYSaaS was to be the

eventua: repiaceren di STORSSaRO.

(b) The previous summary staiecimo, "prior io sis

departure from Moscow, AGiSEnS aCirowicáged io dis

supervisors /Eoiorei URJAN/ ris homoserial tendencies

and he admitted invoivemeni in three homosexual irciderts,

ail at the American House" (Fage 179).

0001184

24

$E008T

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## Page 187

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Charary io ins indurin, i rivédis di le

ci Coonel

casad reñecio da: KaiSCS was tuiriorie by

Unant d ise "allegatono di limonosauri; suocer

White witzin the Soviet Ünior."

ic) Oi Jage 250 Di io DioVicià Simary, me

siatemeni is made inai, "in ini singie case i laico te

cured irom micropones (KEYSIRS' inture io report

receipi di ine deicciion invicaion) he was in error."

While the officia, record saows tra: KEYSERS

did indecà report receipi di tre ceiccida jer io Courel

URBAN in ide difice of CuiGiel URBAN, ii scolid be abied

thai this occurred less iner one hour beiore XEYSERS leit

ine Embassy ior the airpoi, NOSANO las staica trai in

the absence di aforinativi io ine conira-y árom miczczione

and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded iat KEYSERS

hai not reportea receipt oi the deiection lever and inere-

¡ore had decided to approacr KEYSD2S ai ise airport. In

view of ire short time betweer KEYSIRS seyort of receipt

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25

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## Page 188

13-00000

Pages lö1 - iôf di ine previous suramaiy contain iníormaiion

in ving arrived in Muscow in September ista, GaYAZiON was zie

caponbibio case cáicer or ZUruS, iccuila, io doseNko.

Tat previona simmary stuies (pago i03) inai ZÜJUS, durin; à

rovide dearieling, conlimed ai Errivassy repori irai in sac summi= oi

1902 be sad been intimaie with an Ausirias wonan, "HeliAN, "co

visiled ine imerican House wits someone iron the Unised Arin Rizubiic.

•"IlLLlA!" was interviewed by the American House manager ard sae

ciained to be fror. Vierna but traveling with nes employer, à Creci.

Further inquiry reveaied inat so dustriar passport nad been issuicio

"WillA", " and she was later added ior her passpori. "LiLLiAl"

rojiied thai she had corgoiten it, inen leit, and diá noi return.

The previous summary stated inat tie above incidert had bees

described by NOSENXO but in conrection wits aitempis to entrap josepin

VORONE iN 1960, IOt ZUIUS in 1962.

G001186

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Pijü ifs di ie Drctdid smocii iclaies intormaiior izoin

Acsalio imi Jnt6290i seario Ean Cnaim in caziy isoo to cotai

Dão Cerrin lorcà Vio cócié d6 üded agiid: lid rosicenis di Amcricar

FOise, Düring Currcri LicäViibo, iaiáèca daS DeCR igu COVIod

WiES NOSENÃO. ACEGICOGiO NOSZNNO, GNVAZNOV adruiged ior

¿aose svo woren, agerte çi tre Berlir, KCù Residostura, jo visiù Moscow

incen false Cocunichuion, Coeus á West Cordaan dii Giiti as in

Ausirian NOSaViO jrier iberiiei iie "Wesi German" agent,

"EÁNNA, " as baving ihe cover oí a jourralisi, and siied he believed

"FANiVA" ñad mei MiORúlI ài American rouse, is a recèninterview,

MORONE coriirme: ma: i carly 1901 ne hid mei a Wesi Cérmar giri

ai imericãi ricise Wao caimeủ io se a jouihalisi The siaicmentà of

VORONE Lereiore appear to substmiate the reporê di dosaNko.

Concerning te agent documerted as an Austrian, XOSENKO -e-

poried that sie was cueried about aer passpori at America. Fiouse ard

as a resuli ie 1G3 returied her io Zast Germany withoüi surther

aiempis to use aez ai Ámerican ñouse. NOSENXO piaces this incideni

in tne same lime period as ie "FAlNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. Fie

has never suggested auy connection with ZUJUS, nor is tnere reason

to assume toa: he could be reierring io the experience oi ZUJUS since

this took place in the sammer of 1962, aiter NOSENIO had leit the

American Embassy Seciioz.

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time any supervisory luncions d YOS2l5O ismiraied. durce, wao

did coi arrive in moscow uni Soponica inã:, contined i doacow

knowing anyining abom ZUauS alier 1 Jeruary 1902.

Pages ios - ¿09 di sae graviona summary contain a syropsis ei

previous imormaiion from MOSaNKO in regard to Paul JaNNa?.

Basicaüy, NOSENiO had reporeé inai vaca de ice learned todi

Paul JENNER, who was toight to be a code cleak, was coming ic

- Moscow ihrough zelsiara, i plan was made io sená Vadir. V. KOSOI-POV

¿o Heisir'i to travel on the same train as jallaR to Moscow. dinaie

ageri di GRYAZ)OV was so be piaced on this ian ai Vyborg allor ite

trai emered the ÜSSR. The icale ageat was to becare acquaiica

with JaViER as a part oi a iucure operation againsi Jan van in Moscow,

ard KOSOLAPOV was also to become acclainied wid JexiDs.

JOSENKO has staied that the operation was successiul, inai both

KOSOLAPOV and ice iemale agent made the accuainace di JENNER,

28

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Le irip izur duisinira io didacow.

Ma cige:.

Moscow, About jaree monis mier Jallai reporcd acing approucica

again by the same gial, inis sime dimé dicocou airpurs Wacre de ind

gone on courier busincaso Trera Was à souri COnversaiion éné dne give

advised JENVER roi io meation ine conversation to anyone. NOSaTiO

as statedi trat in an eifort io iciow ip iie inilai train accunirsance,

¿ce KGB har arranged for the demaie acdi io encourie: Sealaa:

ine Moscow railroad stacion co airpor waca ne weri ilone to race:

couriers.

Insoar as is inown, jIllER cas rever beca scown à paciograza

O KOSOLAPOV. AcOugA KOSOLAPON Vai approximately 3à jaaco oi

age in 1960, his phoogrash ard remaris dy NOSENiO indicate Lui in

appearance he was much younger ard inui de coula have passed as a

university studeni.

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## Page 192

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31 Varca 1960 irain isom Finianaso Mosco, and inci Gae Vanoo=

KOLOSSOY ja rame lOSaNñO is idoled as agains ined oy

¡OSOLAPOY) Was O me 2 Apri ilio imana icioacow.

The ajove obvicis discrizaroy idò Ili vier añi cannui do Cincin

sied with avanabie indo: nation. MOSOLAPOV IOLOSSOV; vão éldici

on the same irain as jaNlER oria was aci. Iraia maricsis indicaie

¡nai KOSOiAPOV wassu diverácess, me "boy and giri, probabay

üniversity sacderts" wio, according io JENdER, druci so a conve=-

sation with him on the irain wouid appear clearly io be pari di ine

operationa: eliori described by NOSENKO, particulariy in view un ise

laier approaca di this same giri io JaNNER ai ine airpori. There is

no reason io question shat luis giri was the female ageii di CRYAZNOY.

In vies oi the conilici beiweea tre train randes. ard sia:emenis dy

NOSENKO, however, it is soi ciea: who the "boy studer"' was: whees

this somerow was KOSOLAPOV. or whether i may have been some

other person entirely.

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Toère is jisinoi a suisiciory inador ior meindicaica discrepuray

¿i NOSENXO is wrong; la is eviderce sai do does «o indir sumcining

ãe, as ihe supervisui di ROSOPOV, socid rave iown accordio io

"is ola staremenis.

Pages 190 - 192 contain à summary d previous irormatica in

regará to the jour GARLAND case. GARiANO was icertiled oy

NOSENKO as i code cleri woom ine KCS was stiging, lui on whom.

no derogatory imormacion was icveloped. NOSENKO provided practicali;

no deals in rejara to GARiANo Ger ian i0 ideriãy him as a coce

clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on aa lucidani viricia it io consicered.

relates to the trip oi GARLAND irom Frisiani io Voscow on ló lovemider

19ó0. GOLIISYN reported that in November 1960 ine meisicki X03

Residency received a cable from Moscow advising ihat an Americza

coce cler' would be arriving in Heisinki en zoute to Voscow ard tzat

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## Page 194

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no respondble SOS case diRcer, MOSCLADOV, Wedd de ser to Fiadaaki

mnet amas do Sirio ap du acciniminco wii io cocé cièrio Waico mc

à jace i ine comparmino dé ine american d it irai icoro Feisiai

io Moscow.

The previous summary aloo siica GOLISE) ind abvisio trai

mier in ricisinki he inquirea di anotros SCo dificer "irom sao Emissy

Secion" (Firsi Section, SCDj abou de Case di Waica no indiciged

KOSOLAPOV. ACCOTÓGiO GOLITSYT, inE Orcer JEjuséGiO cscuss

tae case and he, GOLIISY,, conciuced irom tais reaction itai ii must

save resulied in a successiul recruitmeni.

It has beer desermined trai COriSY), in a iriervies wish ire

' EBl on 20 Marca 1962, reierred io the above "SC) cilicer irom the

Embassy Section"' as (ínu) ZINKIN of the American Department.

COLiTSYN also stated that the officer was in belsizki urder the alas

O SERGEDV (SERGIYEV), but was urasie io iurrisà à first name ará

patIonymic foI SERGIYEV. GOLITSYN reiezred to (iau) ZENKil es

being from ine American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubi that the (iru) ZENKIN

referred to by GOLITSYN is the irdividual of the same last name

32

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zussiony is tariji as in Chicor dimi Second Secion, First Demari-

meni, SOD, According so MCaRakO, de scou?

of te Seccad SectiC-

Dota bedore in aries igoù -isus dias engaged in lopezinvo garacs"

againsi american michigence and mu ZaiiIt Was a mercer oilins

regarding ine acivities di ZENKil On Lilactipo, NOSE\KO hasiur-

ris-ed some iragreatay inormacion maica re learnei in regara to

LENTIN ard wacs tie ldi tame di SERGEYEV (ZENA)) in iner wii

ais paoiograga is cotained, this iragmeniary informatica irom lOS EVXO

may prove quiic useiul..

As regards tie KOSOLAPOV-GARLIND mate: aid te opinion

expressed ay GOiiISYN based on do reusal oi ZENT i0 discuss tie

case (GARLAND) irai it must have resurred in à successiu recrumeni.

¿nere appears to be an inadequaie basis foi ins presumpili. According

i0 NCSINKO, and mere is no reason to discelieve MOSaliO on tais

point, ZE\Kul was in tae Secord Section, not the First Section, ir.

1960 - 1961. He was no Chief oi the Section, but only a Senior Case

33

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Crices.

Since KOSOmPOV vüs inciner of tio Dirst Secon ind

1áe timisa Cam Malest C C6 Doremoer 1900 40r de dama

KOSOrAROV; as passengerã, Connato, Vientresvieved in is62

¡cuowito de dead irom COLITSY), curiod naving met amy Sovic wisa

trio, and demicó ever ving appruacie ly Sovier Iricli-gence, isie=

interviews by ire FBi and a poiygrapa interview diá not indicate trai be

Kio ever mei KOSOAPOV or thai me cad ever knowingiy been cuniacied

by any loreiga

intemagence ageri.

It ás accopied ii KOSOAPOY ver iron voscon io festi

in jorember i9óo, Liai de ialred widi GOLITSYN inazo, aad that at

was oz the same trair as GARLAND irom Helsiaki io Moscow. it is

aiso accepteà thai NOS2NiO is unaware trai KOSOLAPOV made a irig

to Reisinki in November 1960.

Iravel for an SCD oificer ouside the USSR o= Bloc countries

reguires higi-level approval, accorcing to NOSENXO. II does 20i

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matter inat de incivicuas ins zoey mussy cravereá on a sinaião missica,

The red tope liai

juries supposis ie assumption du disalO ud dave own cacha

The position taken by NOSEdiO ca inia puincis trai do accepis

¿ne siasemen by ice interviewer chas KOSCuaDO% made socia inco

but he says inas de, NOSENIO, simsty dues sos cow anyonag accui

it. Fe adds ony tai had angring signucani developed in tae silly

of GARLAND, ¡e woulá have been aware oí it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the arous working against coce

clerks, should save known of any trip o KOSOLADOV to Firand i-

1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba

from 15 Noverdicer 1960 to circa 17 December içó0. The possibily

exists inat iris could cave accounted ior his ci ci momicigo dice

trip of KOSOLiPOV to Meisinù and remirn to Moscon on ló Joverder

1960. However, NOSENKO nas not aitemptea io use his Cuban trip as

a possible explazazion ior no rowing oi tae November KOSOLADOV

trip.

As with ¿e JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is noi possibie at

this time to resoive the discrepancies bestairing i ie GARLAND-

KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSE KO denied any kooffs

35

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..thas operational activig oi KOSOLAPOV is aroiner agatent inacince,

:..: as in ie iNVER case, di his Ico iowing someshing al, by his cwa

stacerners;

should have known.

...Viewed in Lae COrONE OÁ iDE tOiL MiCHELLE di NOSENKO ci

operations against coce cieris, rarever, acci lie problems in ine

JENNER case nor lose in the GARLAND case, singy or combinic,

in any way represeri conclusive eviderce jaci NOSZAKO was no. super-

..visor oá KOSOLAPOV ür thai de was aot responsible ior the code clerk

operations described by NOSENKO. This siniemeni, sowevez, was so

subsiantiated in ine previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 o the previous surmar, contain an account of

KGB activisy agains: code clerk Joseph MORONE irom various souices,

including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first marioneá the case in 19ó2.

According to NOSENKO, the respursibie case officer for work

agains: MORONE was KOSOIAPOV. Waen i was learried that VORONE

and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guara dy the ramt of BEGGS, were

...plaring à vacation irip iu Warsaw, arrangements were made wita tae

:.:.:: "UB (the Polish Security Service) jor a iemale Polish ageni to come io

niNoscow and travel from there to Warsaw or the same train as VORONE

..and BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or suo-

sequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise VORONE sextally. Sae

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succestiny accommisied ins, di due do corinin probioms in KOB-02

Liaison reaiions, is vas not possibic or te X03 to expicit this cirectay.

The previous

UB agent, tiere was persuasive evicince da neither NOSENKO .0.

XOSOAPOV aycá Le Tis in Di MORONE case deSCribE by

NOSENKO. Thai summary cited the travel o: NOSINTO to Cuba and

trip io larsaw as eviderce di she impossicary di lOSiNiO are

KOSOLAPOV being irvoived personaly in tis pari ci tae MORONa

case.

JOSENKO has stated thai KOSOLAPOV met ine Polish female

agent and made the arrangemeris io place "er on the train to Warsal.

MORONE and BEGGS departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. it is rot

krown when XOSOLADOV Lei Moscow for Feisiaki, but he was on ide

ló November 1960 ¿rai: manifest as cabarting delsinki dor Voscow.

NOSENTO deparied Moscow on 15 Novembe= 1960 ius Cuba. Ire

activities described by NOSENKO are thereore possibie within ine

known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENIO in 1902 exaggerated his personal roie

in the VORONE case, particulazly when he staied that he, NOSENXO,

placed the female ageni on the train. NOSENKO now ciearly states inat

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KosOviPÕ% nasme orig ico oice: in coniaci wii the Poisà ageni.

NOSEVÃO previcisiy siaico ima "03 ocinición Wio Was Ci ti traia

train arrivec in Warsaw.

iiior NOSENKO said do instead ci tlking

to the ¡echrición personally, re may nave read ine report of the rechniciar

ater he returned irom Cuba.

The acivities described by JOSINKO with regará io mis maices

are accordingy possice witin ine miowa dime árarne. * is not co.-

sidered that ine retractions N'OS ENKO las made irom ris original

statements on this operation are oi suilicient sigrificance to materially

discredit him.

Page 198 o1 ixe previous summazy contains ine staicment thai

MORONE, when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svitluna

•IVANOVA, à KGB agent employed at ine americar Fouse. NOSENKO

had stated inai IVANOVA wes instrucied io repor evergthing she saw

or heard concerning VORONE (page 19%). The summary, sowever,

cited a xumber oi reporis thai MORONE had been intimaie with IVANOVA

and with Ella UMANETS, also a KOB agent employed at tre American

House, and commented thai NOSENKO iterefore was apparently unaware

of the sexual involvement oi MORONE wii. "IVANOVA's friends. "

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NOSENKO, curiab currenimaviows, das indicated alareress

ci at loasi sone invoivemori d VAlOVA sitoRota, nerasti-

nasied iniormation

on à develoning operation againsi Narice giare

GARCiA (Antroay A. GARCii) insii di iie invoivemeni di CARCi

with IVANOVA, e ins aiso siaici üni the pusability was considerio

oi using IVANOVA against MOROYS io obii compromising caotogragas.

This pian was seriousy affecied wien it vas learned iron ire

militiaman/ KGB guarú at the Urited Siaies Ericassy iai iVANOVA,

her girl friend, MORGNI ard a varine guard, possib'y GARCiA, sa6

been "in the city," then returned io die "jai" di one di de Variar's

where the girls spert ine night. This apparenily piaced the reliability

O IVANOVA in question in the eyes di me First Secion.

According to the previous summary, lOSaNKO staied thai piciro

CECCHI, Italian coox ai ibe American Embassy and ageni of KOSOLAPOV,

rejorted on Americans at the Embassy, Düi NCSENKO recalied ioning

specific ihat CECCHI hud reporica about VORONE. Tre surarary also

states thut MORONE was said by oiner American Smbassy empioyees

to be a close friend of CECCHi and thai VORONE had admitted blacis

market money exchanges with CECCHi.

During curreni interviews, NOSENKO bas stated thai CECCHI

furnished "pieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENiO.

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NOstinO hão iido juicidü inù me 202 sometanes suspecied,

año da Occasil aciliny decamé alar irái larious agonis die not

fuly report everyting di interesi inic K03. Tre KOS

ci acurse

was avare thai COCCii was involved ir me back mariei. Rowevez,

wreiner de reported io ihe KG3 everyng de dic and wizh whom is

open s0 questiva, viza, de Maurice CHAlO cuse sciow.

The commeni was mace in ire previous summaty that NOSalio

was traläre tha: MORONE met sume Sovic lema'es in the spring oi

1961 at the apariment d Sarai el SarZLY, an Zayptian-rational KOS

ageni of the Sixth Deparimeni who was aiso reporting on Americans,

and was intimate with ore in this aparanent.

A review of ouicial records indicates tai VORONE did repori

having mei some Soviet giris ai the apariment o Sarwat, but there is

so indication that he admitted or thai anyore cise has reported thal :e

was intimate wich any oi them. The conciusion of the previous sumriai;

in tais regará was bascó on a misiciezpretaiio.. Accordiagly, since

there is no reason to believe that ay comprorsise incidert iook place

in tre Saiwai apariment, the siory oi NOSENXO on this matter is co=-

sidered completely acceptable.

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A jew commonis dié apropriule conceraing remarks i me

previola sunimary on pagos ils - 201. Commenis Vere mile trèze

concerring live code cleris, durice ZHálo, Join TAYLOr, Friri

DAY, ROberi DWEilY indicses: CazzaY, ard aiough di is zur

sper ficay staied, ise suggestion is apparent thai ine reportang ci

NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence ici NCSENKO was

not supervisor li an KGB Operaids nguinsi code cierla.

ing observations may assis: in biacing iese cases i their proper

perspective:

(a) Naurice ZWANU - ZWAlú was irezatied by

NOSENKO as à code cleri who was actively "ozked ca'"

daritg 1960 - 1961. Tue previous summary suggested

tat the kaondedge o NOSENKO regarding 1G3 activity

against ZWANG was iladequaie, First, reporting of

NOSENKO On ZHANG coriaineá no reference to the

relationship oi ZWAJJ with his maid, whom NOSENKO

in another case hão identified as à KGB agexi. Althouga

ZWANG denied sexual relations with his maid, he did

acimit to some intimacies with her in her aja-tmert.

During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when be

41

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arie

resporded in ine regicire io è guiscion reguiding sextai

pori da ilio rcalibiao cia do nucaioco io igroranco,

Duraiso can de Disidly ixpicinee my imity merory on

ris part oriallure on ino puri di iii micito sopori detaiis

di tais relacionship to tre iCE.

Second, NOSDiO indIci soporica di ZWANC

was invoived in tre currercy operazioas di Piciro CICCii.

(a iact thai previous summary impied de sabile iave

knowa from iGB agent CECCru.i rom the record, row-

ever, it appears trai the cealings oi ZWANG were not

directy with CICCril, but rather ¿rougi oder Erbassy

employees, maxing it piausibie shi CECCHi was eiiner

unaware of tie invoivem est oi ZWANG or, as NOSENKO

kimsel stated he suspected, CECChi did noi report all'

details o his currency operations io dis koa bandier.

(b) John TAYLOR - NOSENKO identiáed TAYLOR

as a State Depariment code clerk and targei oi KOSCiAPOV.

The KGB was aware of the involvereri of TAYLOR with

his Soviet maid, but no attempi was made to recruit TAYLOR

beicre his departure in early 1961 since to do so might

42

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encatjer tre pioto 10l: à rccrminent agproach io Jaines

STORS3ERG, Uioiul jrca miicr deveiopment ior almos:

a yeai ind vas corsidired more vamáble.

Tac impicalion d ie brovicus sunarary tact

the expianaioà givcá by NosaNiO vas suujeci io questioa

faileú io take inio accouni ine faci inai alinouga STOXSB2RE

was tot approacheà unti aicr tho departure di TAYLOR,

the mperation agairst STORS2ZNG was underway beiore

TAYLOR became involveù with his maid. Furiaer, i is

apparent that the KGB did soi abandon irterest in IAYLOR

since he was ayproäched at a later date outside te ÜSSR

on the basis oi his previoua aliair with his maid in Vioscow.

(0) ErAck DAY - NOSENXO identified Frank DAY as

a State Departmori codo cieri: who was iie larget oi ellaer

KOSOLAPOV OI GRYAZIOV. ACCOrGing to NOSENXO,

nothiag "interesting" was icarned about DAY asd no opei-

ational measures were taken againsi DAY. The previols

summary noicd thai in Juiy 1961, DAY traveicd to tse

Caucasus with his iriend and iormer overt CiA employee,

Agricultural Atiache G. Staniey BROWN. Ii was also

stated that the tvo were under surveillance by live persons

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at all times on ic ibove trip, lin indy éouad a "reptian"

in deir anici room siammy mixpecieday returned, and

that ca indires Occuson in "nicaciove and availagie Suvict

compartment.

According io NOSENXO, survelliance ard any cicer

local coverage of añy empoyee ai the Calico Staies Zacassy

who travels in the ESSR is the responsibility of tie local

KGB organization, not the SCD. Ii Woud appear iti tre

local orgarizacion was trying to do a thorouga joo ca DAY

and BROWN, an it apparently was rongroducsive, at does

not seem justifiabie to expeci thai NOSENKO scouà jave

recalled a trip which produced no resulis.

(d) RoDeri DWELLY - NOSENXO lis reated in cor.-

siderabie detail the elioris o NOSENIO, GRYAZNOV ard

KOSOLAPOV to involve Roberi DWELLY, a code ciers i.

Moscow irom April 1959 - July 1960, in a comosextiai com-

promise operation. According io NOSENKO, a homosexual

agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opizion DIZiLY was a

homosexual.

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JOSEIKO concerning 108 cinna 10 Coternice Wien

ard Where DiZilY was jurng 'laio dai ciay" foscow)

50 trai a boruserta Corpicrisi situation coid te

arränged. Inere were do specião divelopmerio irom

their eloris, accoráng io loSaNão.

DUELLY jas calejoriciy denicd being a somo-

sexual; NOSEVO has tot said ic wis, but cry thai ine

romosesual ageri oi GRYAZIOV assessed DUELLY as

à homosextai, There does Ici appeai io bê day reasta

io consider tre staiements di NOSENKO ADOLI DWELLY

as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) JOSe CAFFEY - JOSENO ras identified

Joseph GAFFEY is 2 code cieri. The previous summary

noied that NOSENKO had siated ide KGB had tried to düre

GAFFEY inio downtowa Voscow, using Svedana IVAVOVA,

an agent of DiVisil in the dierican Housc.

By way of comment, the previous summary staica

that GAFFEY arrived in Voscow in September 1961 and

thai Fred KADERA had repozted ai GAFFEY lad told kim

he had been istimate with a Russian girl at the Amerjs P2C5

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Rouse, It was futiler ice si: GarFEX Was ecajed

irom dioscow in iii simmer di igúl sucause oi crunkera

WiCH IVANOV it ine Minerican duusé and at der apart-

meri and trai sic a cinnaid

pregoatty.

As to Whether ine abuve incormaion raises à

question concerning NOSEN%O, the iciuviag jacicas

should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO sas stied ina: during the

latter pari oi Decembor içãi se was pair tirie

in the Fire Departmeni and zart time in tie

Seventh Deparimeri, ard thai he reported full

time to the Seventh Department alier New

Years Day 1962.

(2) In addicion to ice iniormation areviously

mentioned as furnished by GAFFEY during inter-

vies, GAFFIY also stated faci he was first

intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 Decerrber

1961 and was also intimate with her later on thrce

occasions at her apartment. According io GAFFEY,

IVANOVA told kim of her pregnancy about! May

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¿902, Maica no appinximuing four montias alce-

NOSENãO dis Siciod id irnsierzed to the Severia

Departner:.

The mader di review by NOSENKO d OTU sports iron: micro-

one coverage on iie rich Siies Emissy has previousiy beer.

mentioned in iis summaija Pages 22ú - 230 of ie previous Suramary

contained a ceraded accouni di iricemaica iron JOSaNNO da is manes

si microphones, couriermeasures taser uy ire Americans in 196%, ar

camage estimaies prepired by ire Americins. The pievious corclusica

was that his iriormation did not sustain lis ciaim to have been Depuy

Chief, First Section, ry his ciaim that he personally reviewed the iG3

microphore monitoring reporis. Commin's have been mace in this

summary in regard 1o is previous conciusio..

A few remarko, i is beloved, wiil assist ir a fulles understar?-

di the microsione matier. In ine material brougni out by NOSENKO .

¿9ú4, there was à singie sheei li japez containing on Ore side hard-

written noies wrich NOSENKO identilied as a list of ine acsive micro-

Drones (those which were being monitored) in me Urited States Smoassy.

This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary ard need not be

repeated herc. The acquisition of this list by JOSENiO was character-

ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated thai NOSENiO

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nas never pláusilly expiami tie circursances vaica promped dis

roscarion di ine list tnil igur, waen do produced it áor ClA i Ceneva.

During currero interviowo, te mator of tie above list ras deen

covered in considerauly arener deii wic dossiO tratal acer

done baiore. Ris expinmino, boia di ina circumsinces waica ica to

sis acguiring ine list as weü us oi his sil havirg i in mis gossessior

ai tre sirie of his delecsión, is considered pausibre, concrusy so isc

juagmeri of ine previous sumary.

NOSENIO has stateó trai la 1100 - 1961 Viadimir i. BEIROV,

Criei of the Seconà Section, Firsi jujartmeni, desired soma "Joints"

for use against targeis o his section. NOSENXO uses the serm "point"

not as mearing jusi a micropione, dü as reierring to ân. OFt sub-unii

wnich inciudes microprones as well as the necessary monitors aro

trans-aiors io cover the microphore ard translate ine "take." Tre

targeis o PETROV were primarly Americans ard, sherefore, dere

was a transcription-translation probiem.

According to NOSENXO, mosi oi the avaliable "points" vere

assigred to the First Section io cover microphones in te trited States

Embassy, The Chief of the First Department, Viadimir A. KLYPiN.

held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Criei of the Firsi Section Viadislav

KOVSHUK, Viadimir 1. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose oi wnich

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was io discuso tre pusaioli, di curapuraçi, cscontinuing coricir

Imbissy "puris" com-ohia aj ire Firsi Secion, and zerratia:

PETROV :0 use inese "buris" againdi largero of his sectica.

ACCordino iO DiOSENÃO, PETROY Grunght to ine mecting à is:

di names di ceriain icrocio iù maici no visaed io give ieciricãi core=-

age. During ine meero, KOVSHUK apparendly ¿ooi a ziece oi page:

Waich PETROV hai aná wroie di li a lisi di active miczogiores i tou

United States Imbassy and zesicences. When ine tréting enced.

NOSENKO had jais paper ard de icui i suck io ais ollice.

Coniained on ine reverse side di me paper were ire doliowi;

names in Russian: LÜBIN, SViTH, Wil BURTIN, ard Sipe BÜRIE:.

The name à. d. MIGAYLOV was lisied rexi to the rare oi LuBil,

ard the name of !. E. CHERVSTSEV was isted next io che sume si

SVITA. NOSENTO nas expiained inat Lüzil, SVITH, WiL BURTiN,

and Sige BURTI were among te iargeta di PETROV; and WIKHAY"OY

ard CHER\DTSEV were officers oi ine Seco.d Section.

NOSENKO siated ie inew roinirg more aboui ite icui no--Soric:

sames excesi thai tre; were largeis oi PETROV. NOSENDO siaed ina:

he couid noi be positive oi the date oi the meeting order tas that it

occurrea while ALYPal was Chiei of the First Deparimeri, (Accorcino

IO NOSENKO, KLYPil was succeeded by Sergey Mi. IRDOSEYEV as

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Cicá GainE Fiasi Deuinea d cica mié-iGol.) Research in regare

citizens wro weze in tie USSa Circa June iSci. SVata, intis tire,

mas sild so: been icersilied.

In vies d! ine above, dias acen possibie so deduce de dali

cí the meeting cailed by zulPal as circa jime :9ó..

According in lOSINZO, ina piece di pager described above

was piaced a; NOSENKO wita vicer soies it dept betweer de pages.

o a bound voiume waice NOSEN%O cais a "working copi." Inis.

according is NOSENIO, Was in accouniabie, regisiereá acecock

issued to all officers in waica iney were supposed to write aù their

notes, destroying any oraca rates.

ACCOrdiNg iO NOSENKO, ne, lie many ciner oilicers, did ros

compietely dodow regulations and ine derdescy was to irecuerty put

1o0se notes in ine noiebooi so inai the notebook oiten acted as a file

rather lan being usea in ise way required by regulations. NOSENSO

tas stated that wher he lei the First Section he cook various Joses

with hina to she Sevenia Deparmer; these iacluéed notes he had drafied

concerning certain First Section activities dor use in briedr. FEDOSEYEV

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¡cciates io il Severi Diacciuraio, Accorgio NOSENÃO, de did

no irreniosa; tare inè curcuno duri percurio, io microsaones;

¡i vas jusi in ine grono di acies du icui dicio loca de veri 10 tre Sivirt

Departnera

In consideratica di ine above espianation d; NO52NKO, i sicuid

be noied imi se ciso droigii wiiammi.. inus bis noies lui tre oniccano

OI FIDOSIYSV ari ceriair coies he.iu..uly mul inso propared Widie

in the First Sectioni eo go, dis duica ii.

CETC io tie Seventi

Direciorate in regazd to a "mass survinaice" ca ie American

Embassy.

By inciuding à seciion ipuges 23ó - 239; on ine iracwicage os

NOSENKO of the KGB crypiologic alack on Unirei Siaies Embassy

•communications, tre previous summary imples iiai there is some

reason to question his inicrmaio: on inis subjeci.

NOSENXO jas asseriedi thai ine KGB hai sever sücceeded in

reading esciphered communications di the Service diaches; however,

he said thâi the Dighth Directoraie ithe unii di ice kOB responsible 10=

communications intercepi ard crypiologic artigsis) was reading some

United Staies Embassy trailic. While it is open io question to whai

exteni knowledge of successes oi the Digath Directorate would be known

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to anjoe in tre Firsi jecici do mo dira- Dogantront, Within tae

scope jausibly avanaáo io NOSENO li lis claimed positior, tere

is : OIcason io Glésica io sidienci.

i me grovicus summary lages 260 - 210j me indures oi

successes di dOSENiO in identigne Can Clicers ize nored. Wir

¿he excepiOn di ABIDIAN, NOSENTO ces noi ciaim io have jeta sio

responsibie case cilices dui any di doc asted CLA Gilicers, Accorcina

¿o his clain, NOSENKO siouid have bees avare indi Willam di lONE'-

was CIA, büi he hasrever identified VOnSuias Ci. Surely novsauk

¿new MORELI WaS CIA JUi WAY NOSENKO is 10: aware VOREli vas

CIA is To: kroWs. li has already been established, cowever, laa:

NOSENKO, a Depuly Chiei, was noi aware di ali li ine activisies oi

KOVSHUK.

As regards sone oẳ the oiner listed incividuaàs, a ew romaris

are appropriate.

(a) NOSENKO has never irdicated any snowledge

Pal GARBLER WaS CIA, ard je GARBLER vas surey

¡nown to the FCD as a ClA employze before going to

Moscow.

It is

presumed that the FCD furnished tre SCD

at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was

"American Intelligence," GARBIER, however, did roi

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an....

aIrive in Moscow tadá dorciber iso:, cady a radria

DEÍGE NOSENKO ict lie Firsi Secita lor thE Seventh

Deparinera.

(5) The previous surimary suried indi according

] was a ClA olice, yes to was à Cid olicur.

it was aão stated inal 03 June to presce

oi imiensive KGB surveilance whiie in Moscow irom

Octoner 1960 to Sepiember i9ó!, Tie "intensive AGB

suzveillance" is basea on sidimens o (03 ]=

may possibiy be more a reflection di ais persorial corcean

over surveillance rather man what was acially dappening.

cil 03 Juas correcty identici by

NOSENKO as Cli. William HORBAi! was Cir and

idealica by NOSENKO as suspected di beingà Cia difice:

or coopiee.

io) Lewis BOWDEN, who was no: CIA, was, according

tO NOSENKO, suspected oi being a Cal officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Ji., has siaied inat

KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "23ĩ

officer" in the Embassy. The Cheregarov Papers indica:e

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that the KCB had rescone to conelder the activitler ot

BOWDEN with suspictor.

It lo not balloved that the linted tallures of NOSENKO to Identlly

CIA officero are of particular significance in astrblichiog last be was

o8 was not Depaty Chlet of the Firat Section. There are too many pr

known factors wilch would sed to bs considered. Desple our assump

Mone as to whas the KGB knows, lt is possiblo that (a) the KGS did 208

JOw of De CIA alillion of theso people, (b) the laformation knowa

to the KGS was not avallable al the Firat Secilos, Tirnt Departnent,

lovel, or (c) laformation avallable to the Cilal of the Tirat Beetion or

SO a specife case officer Waa of no oillelal concera to NOSENKO and

ma sot made avallable to him. The last of there possiblilites le

suggested is epile of claims by NOSINKO that be had to have snows

Whatorer was known in the Section regarding ClA Identifications; a

• proposalty os the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the aren of his own

knowledgeability has been seen elsowhere in thie case.

Pages 252 - 258 ol the previous cammasy contala a report ef

the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and bis 1961 trip to Bulgaria. Wita

regard to the Cuba trip, there la collateral evidence of his traval so

desertbed by NOSENKO, and tbere la no subatartine reatos to dosat

Ida accour of his netivitiea on this trip. The statament was made la

34

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¡e previcio summary dia tae iravel di NOSENiO io Cuba ¿a 1660

camaged las claira ina he was suguivisid oberaiions againdi airiossy

code cierica ai die ime. To accupi de vailoty di this judgmiero is to

say diat no supervisor in ine SCO wore du permicci to make a irio

abroal unrelaied io his supervisory function, a juigmeri loi viica

there is no supporting evidence.

As regards die iris di NOSENIO io Bugaria in 1901, dug waict

¿hero is no colnieral iriormaidi, ino previous summary conciucei

mat his accouni of the trip was urirue and argued that such a trip to

Bugaria, i it did take place, at a time when se claimed the operason

against STORSBERG was reaching a cilmas ard his subordinates were

"apparenty planning to expioi: KEYSERS' newly-discovered vuircrability,"

it would incicaie irai the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis-

pensable. There was, however, to evidence that NOSENiO did =or

travel to Buigaria ard oniy ligay specuative reasoning as to way ais

account of the purpose of the trip was latrue.

As to the STORS32RG case, while it canno aù preseni be proved

that the recruitment piich took place beiore NOSENXO leit for Buigaria;

it cas be siated, on the basis o reporting irom VORONE, thai it had to

have taken place before ine time NOSENKO returned iron Bulgaria.

Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning thi file e

55

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G NOSENKO in Moscon iù iie dine iis picia was made, li would appear

inãi NOSEAXO was Comumative'j iree io go to Bulgari because inis

prase oi the STORSa-lo operaios luc been compicice.

As io the KersiaS cuse, iore is no appareri prosier since

i is cleãr inai the approach to KEYSERS ¡oui pluce aier NOSaNiO

returaed irom Bulgaria, and iurthermore irai the KGB probably dic

soi become aware ina: KEYSERS was a romosexial, ard iereiore

potentially vuinerable, until just beiore ire pitch was mace.

In short, there is no reason to believe thai the accouris by

NOSENKO oi his triga so Cuba and to Bulgaria are Ici essertially true,

or that il they are true ¿hey necessarily retect on his claim io having

been supervisor of coce cieri operations.

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«SEGRET

FO NOSENHO'S CLAINS, FUNG EN 1962 RE WAS CHEES

OF THE AVERICAY-BRITISE COMVONWEALTH SECTION AND

WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIES OF THE SEVENTH

DEPARTMENT; ARE NOT CREDIBLE

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F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not crediole. (Previous

conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from

January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department tbereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position

of a Deputy Chiei of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV,

Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the

Personnel Directorate, be declined the profered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaglovich

FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO

as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promoie Vladislav KOVSHUK,

then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

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0SU.i2T

willing to promote, NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section.

However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO

considered inat under the circumstances it would be better for him to

return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to

FEDOSEY EV who wanted KOVSriüKas a Deputy,

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOS ENKO the

position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the

reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would

become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The

above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi

cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to

GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career

§ NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section,

and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-

ment. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to

June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-

tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January -

July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarke

in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period oi

March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases

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are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett

JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst

BRAUNS. Apparent conlicts between information from NOSENKO and

information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals

were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the

previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial

evidence that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed position of Chief oi the

First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That

there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and

BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all iour

individuals.

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are

warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial

discrepancies between wizat NOSENKO has said and what each individual

stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-

fication.

In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted

that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB

operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug-

gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend

encies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary

to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current zagview

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has stated that the KGB learea of the homoscrual tendencies oi JOHNSON

"by chance" soon after his arrivai. "STiVELEY" and "GRIGORIY, "two

homosexual agenis of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out oi a room

at the Metropol Hotei where jOHNSON stayed. They met ICHSON there

and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regari to the William Carrol JONES case, NOSENKO during

current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation

against JONES, including the woman iudmila BUGAY EVA who was recruiied

as an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case. The other

details furnished by NOSENXO concerning the JONES case are compatibie

with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Severth Department.

In regard to the Nataie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did ros claim

to have been the responsible case officer but was abie to provide erough

specific informaiion concerning tre case to bring about a coriession when

she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the cetails con-

cerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been

Chief of Section and not the case oificer directly invoived with the case.

In regard to the Forst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary

the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUN'S visited

the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS

met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

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the Seventh Depariment was no, concerned wit foreigners visiting

reiatives in the ESSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord-

ing to the previoss summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former

Soviet citizen and ibe summary siated loat his pian to visit relatives

was information available to the KGB trough his visa application.

In regará to the staiemen: that toe Sevenih Depäriment was not

concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in tae USSR nor with Soviet

expatriates, this is not in agreement with curren: information from

NOSENKO, * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon

sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of

another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were

involved. Howerer, if the case was not taker over or assigned by higher

authority to anoicer department or component, it was and remained the

responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that BRAUNS was a

former Soviet citizen could very well have made BRAUNS of interest to

the Second Section, First Deparimeni, or a direction in tae Service of

the SCD. However, in the aosence of an actual reassignment by higher

authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Sevents Depart

ment since BRAINS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The

previous summary also indicaied that BRAUNS listed on his visa appli-

cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS bad a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the

Seventh Department. The situation was not the same 00&1:934.

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relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by

the FBI, mertioned a number of items oi which the KGB was aware concern-

ing his background and occupation irom his visa application, there is no

specific reierence in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose

in visiting ine SSR.

Pages 282 - 28ó of the previous summary revicws remarks by

NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role

in the case was not plausible. There are several accific points made in

the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of

the case. Taere is adequate reason to believe thai NOSENKO exaggerated

his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance

¿o Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva

in 1962 and rot to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in

"what NOSENIO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and inior-

mation from the actual CiA record of the case. There are major dilier-

ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved,

an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ-

ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there

is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSINKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom

American Inielligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence

into meeting BELITSKIY inside he USSR. The previous summary stated

that NOSENKO did no: know when the BELITSki: oporation started

(Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British

involvement, did n:t know the operational details and contact arrange-

ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, ard did not know BELITSKIY's paitern

of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness

that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use

BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-

ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in Loadon and still states that the

primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in

contacts with BELITSKIY within ine USSR. The latter was considered

• completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in

Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters bad been mailed to

BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY

had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the

BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis

crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY

case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO U0l1 224

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toe other band, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO bas

furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the

KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relation-

ship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the

KGB believed the SEMITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London

and BELITSKIY did not then nor has be since admitted to the KGB

his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium.

As a possible reason way BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in

1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some

at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused

BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result

he told the KGB of certain events in Loadon in 1961, relating these

events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB

actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London

in 1961 and that BELIISKIY may have never told the KGB of the

developments in his case prior to 1961;

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which

time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also

reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information

received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

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George BLAKE. (It scems highly undikely the KGB would

ever have directed BELITSKIY to iurnish information which

may have been a lead to George BLiKE, or at least could

have caused the employees of the knit in which BLAKE was

employed from June 1959 io August 1900 to come under

suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has staied that BELTSKIY, aiter he went

to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA

rather quicily because he met a girl he had previously known

whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and

that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American

Intelligence. (l the BELITSiSIY case had been controlled by the

KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of

the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY

had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to

initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB

anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then

gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961,

BELITSKIY would not have told the XGB of the internal mail-

ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had

a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore

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vom de tal Dictiony siola, de Was sure sie Vorked

10: Ainerican Milligunco and in Wis :brough jais Noraia

American interageace becime avece 3JLITSKY vas

GeneVân. )

wiesin the USSR añ individual reprosanina Car, Howeves,

bis agreemeni war. orly bader cormia saguaiel Contio=s,

ihe most irieresting of Waico Was inù me inciridual mus:

be linwitting di the true nature of ie realionstig of

BELITSMY Wich CiA, in acidision, asy message to

BELITSKIY or any indivicual who mei BELITSY must

make no reiezence io any previous meeing oi DaliSKlY

with CIA.

The above conditions are quire explainasie il

BELITSKÏY bad not been under K03 cortol berveer 1953

anà 1961 and in 1961 gave the KG3 ariy a partial story ci

tbe 1961 events in London.

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As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient

number of unresoived questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discres

ancies between information i:om NOSENKO and the actual record in the

BELITSKIY Case cannot at present be considered as a reilection against

YOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not

know the true facts of the BELITSKlY case.

The previous summary nored on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA

was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also

noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB

that CIA had warned BELITSKIY agairst SHULGINA. " The previous

• stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB

agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY. "

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by

DOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY

against SHULGINA, " is a rcasonably accurate description of what actualy

happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva.

The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially

told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by

the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence

while previously in Paris, France.

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it was determined there was no collateral imormation which

would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis

and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaid

of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "iorcibly recruited by

American Inteiligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to

BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and

report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGiNA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with

the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV.

It was stated that ARTEVOV had been involved with a series of America.

tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly

familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV

with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this

-was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart-

ment. Although not specificaily stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV

was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO

was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO

has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,

First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi-

mately 1957.

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A closer examination of the cases described in the previous

summary. as "CiA American tourist agents," reveals there is no con-

flict in the invoivement of ARTEMOV in these cases and ine statement

by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart-

ment.

As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN.

NOSENXO has furnishica irformation concerning this case, stating it was

originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a leiter

by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the

First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only

became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with L

32

J,

and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individua, would under

no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of

the Seventh Depariment, particulariy since apparently the individual was

even traveling under a diplomatic passport, ii is, assumed the individual

was oi interest to the First Chief Directoraie and if the First Chief

Directorate required or desired support from ine SCD, it would normally

request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely ur-

likely that the FCD would request ine Seventh Department ior assistance

in a case involving an American diplomat.

13

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Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis

¡or the previous conclusion thai the claim of NOSENIO that he was a

Deputy Chiei di the Seventh Departinent from July 1962 to January

1963 was not crcdible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is

not necessity since this conclusion was apparently based on inadegudie

information. During current interviews, NOSENKO bas furnished

details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position

which substantiate his claim, to having been a Deputy Chief of the

Sevents Depariment from July 1962 to January 1964.

1n example in support of the staiement that the previous conclu

sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written

rotes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.

The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is

inadeguate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,

an effort had not been made to obiain from NOSENKO a detailed expiar-

ation of his notes or of boiv he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed iniorma-

tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports ais

claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes

collateral support to bis claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,

First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

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Primarily the notes di NOSENKO can be calegorized as

follows:

• (a) Snori case sunmaries by the Chicfs of the

First Seciion, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventa

Depärtment. NOSENKO has siaied that he was in 1962 -

1963 responsibie for supervision over these Sections and

that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Depudy Chiei, SCD, who

supervised the Seventh Depariment, requested a list of all

recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to

NOSENKO, the order irom BOBIOV was to only retain the

files (cases) of agents in tourisi firms and that the files of

other recruited agerts should be sent to the FCD or Archives.

NOSEN%O has stated that ne in turn levied on the Chieis of

the inree Sections the reguirement of BOBKOV, but also ex-

panded the request to include ail 1960 - 1962 cases, no:

excluding previous cases or cases which had already been

given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand-

written reports from the Ciniei or Acting Chief of each Section

on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to

agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been trans-

ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO aboli thejf0U1232

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inclusion support his statement that he had expanded

the original request irom BOBKOV so that he would have

some "pieces of information lo give ClA."

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases waich he learned

of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were

made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Severin

Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two

occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were

sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later

date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before

his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to oificers of the Seventh Directorate

prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and

the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1763.

(d) Drait report ior the briefing of the new Chief, First

Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre-

pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,

including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the

Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance beiore the Collegium

of the KGB which was reviewing the activitieu of the Seventh

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Drpartment. According to NOSENKO, the prepared

report was never syped as.

a formal document.

The view has beea set forth thai NOSENKO took undue risk in

carrying written notes with him out vi the Soviet Union. An examination

of this material suggesis inat NOSENKO was using extreme care in

collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the

possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought

out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-

siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with

little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB aiter his depart-

ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None

of the material was registered and all could have previously been des

troyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB

documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered

or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Coliegium

which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually

a Chief of Section had typed his notes on

cases instead of

submitting in handwriting as the others did.

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(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent.

NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the iile

kept by the Chef which he reviewed and that he kept one.

Of interest is the lact that the copy was not a registered

documeni and did not contain the usual iniormation as to

number oi copies typed.

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PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1955 105 EES DEE ECTION EN LSCH

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• •

G. NOSENiO: 25 no valici claim to certainty that the KGB

recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his

defection in 196%. (Previous conclusion)

The concision in this summary is that NOSENKO is oi the

orizion that there were no iG3 recruitmenis o linited States Embassy

personnel in Moscow beiween 1953 and December 1963 with the excoption

Of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wailis SMITH) and Herbert'FiOWARD, who actually

was a 29 employee bus did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of

NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual krowledge so that this opinion

can be accepied as absolute evilence that there were no other KGB

recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The

only logical conclusion is that tac opinion of NOSENKO cannot be

accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that

a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any

way of the recruitment. This sould in no way be interpreted as a

suggestion that NOSENXO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased

observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to

accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO bould be

examined and can be cited as follows.

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(a) During Marco 1953 -laie May 1955 NOSENKO

was a case oilicer in ine Firsi Secion, First Department,

SCD. NOSENTO does noi claim thai he would tave knowa

the detaiis concerning any recruitments (other than

"ANDREY") in this period, but staies if there nad been

he would have beard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO

was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department,

but continued to have contact with certain officers in the

First Section, First Depariment. NOSENKO is of the

opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United

States Embassy during this period he would have heard

"something" even thouga he would probably have learned

few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period

NOSENXO was Deputy Chie of the First Section, First

Department, and he has made the categorical statement

thai there were no recruitments by the KGB of United

States Embassy personnel during this period of time.

He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments

during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during

1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of 404)01239

case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

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NOSENKO since the Chief oi Section was Vladislav

KOVSHUK wno had been an ofticer of the First Depart-

meni since 1953, actually working in the First Section

excepi ior the periods of time that he was in the United

States to reactivaie "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a

period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First

Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the

Seventà Department. However, he continued to maintain

contact with certain officers of the First Section, First

Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV,

who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First

Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter

part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationsbip with

GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that

he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO

some iniormation in regard to any successful recruitments

of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed

out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD

case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until

1963 that NOSENKO heard the name.

NOSENKO actually

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FECRET

learned of tbe namo when the Firat Sectlon, Firet

Departnent, needed the services of the Seventh

Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room i z

certain hosel for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARD.

In gonoral the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion

Of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the only

Duccessful KGB recruftmente during 1953 - December 1963. It should

be noted chat there are no other Identified IGB recruitmente during

this pertod of time which would spectfically refute the opinlon of

NOSENKO. However, in vlew nê the cilod actual basto for the opinion

Of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an

honest opiaton should no: be couverted into & statement that it le

absolute proof that anosher recruitment could not have occurred.

NOSENIO may be completely correct in hie opinion, but dince

NOSENKO was only in the Firat Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961

his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitnent

In 1953 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 ¿annot be accepted as infallible.

G001240

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SEGREF

v. awa

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Eriadei D

Fieg sad

y.eg116eB459

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ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Arnex "A" ard an Aries

"3" coveriro pages 3ió - 435. Limitod commens concerning Anrex

"A, " Siatezieris di Soviei Oliciais AbOu NOSENIO, ad Annex "3."

Summaries of Cases Noi Examined in Texi, are attached. In additior,

there is an Armex "C" 1o dis summary whica is enticled, "The

Caereparov Papers. "

Aitachments:

Arres A

Annex B

Arrex C

SEGRET

Eating

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AYNEX B - SENATES DE CASES NOT

0001243

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Excites 1.

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1N2X3

SÜMARIES OF CASTE NOT 2Y

22D.316212

Pages 599 - 435 divie dividis sumury conici stia:

on the cases of il americuio Wio, iciuring to iniornindiiiun

NOSENIO, were di KGB interesi, wore approuciod by mu KO3, Oi

were actually recruited by tac $G3. I WaS siated imeso dêses

did noi clearly relaie to te suicile KCS positions seiù un durticini

times by NOSENiO si thus couid noi da isciully empioyed in exumining

bis ciaimed KGB survice. Tre sourcia: o ibese cases las deen exgiored

in detail during e Current irierviews Wi NOSENZO, and io is solv

possible io estbiisi & cermin raiacionsip be ween tese cases and

certain claimed positions di ESENTO in ie KGB.

Ii is ibe cunclusion di dis süminary tual any 8rou, oi 19 casca,

as well as all otter cases concerning viica NCSENZO ras furnisced

information, musi be fully considered, soi necessarily ior ire impostance

or unimporiarce di ine information, bui io determine sow NOSENkO

claimed to have learned of ine case and wiether bis statemerts cor-

cerning each idertified case are supported by collateral informazion.

. These iactors are important in assessing se overall validity oi inio=-

mation from NOSENKO as well as beisg supporting evfallabloitis

claimed positions in the KGB.

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## Page 247

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To comment spectacully où cach di fit 49 custo Would reguire

a very lengiay paper. Curica micrevo save diveioped Durinent

cases. Of even more signiticarco is tie face tai NO52NKO las

logicaliy sourced ras iiorration in all excozi Jerrora duur cases.

The indicaied inability oi NOSENKO to compurely scuico ai 48 0i

the cases is not considered signidicur, bartcuily sinco ais latins

knowledge ai all iie cases ia quito comicio Wiia dia clained posinars

in the KGB, in adcition, criticisin de lOSINiO los sou veing able so

source ail of his informaion wouid da unicasoaabie sinco it makes

no allowance for normal lapses of memory o initure io racali some-

thizz winch was insigninican at me mime is occurred.

Wimout cing in deiail any oi tro if cases, i ways in whica

NOSENKO icaried oi a number di the cases aie corsidored importai

since there is a direct relationshi, so his ciained posicions in tre Ä03

during 1960 - January 1904, specifically te Josizon Oi Deputy Criei,

First Section, First Department, 1960 - 196%; Cael, First Section,

Seventa Deparimeni, January - July 1902; ard as Depuiy Chief, Sevani

Department, July 1962 - Jaruary 196% Certain examples of the ajove

are as follows:

2

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(a) NOSENO locaned oi i muniaco di tie Sovente

Dipariment cases which ind acciarid i i9ó0 - igüt, is

weil un several 195o - 1159 casto dom abico premice Dÿ

¡ie Chici or Accino Chici di iie Firsi Section, Second

Secion inà Sisili Sccticü in 1905. Treseroies vere pie-

pared ai ile request oi OSatão vio as à Dipay Caici,

Sevenili Department, was responsole édi supervisica ci

these three sections; and die reçucs. was acilaly an ex-

pansio: di the original requesi irom BODKCV, Depul; Chief

uf the SCD, for informaion on recruiimeris di te Severin

Depariment.

NOSENKO Droughi vita mira in ilor die noies

preparcù by the Chici or Acting Cuiei di tie Firsi Sectioa,

Second Section and Sirt Section mad ris knowieuge di mary

oi the cases which had occurred prici io l9cz, pardcularly

1960 - 1901, was limired io informaiio contained in the

noies.

From trese noies, NOSINXO saù prepared is re-

port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were net applicable

to the request.

(bi NOSENKO learned di sevcra: 1902 - 1903 cases oi

the First Section, First Deparimeni, fror. Germadiy i.

GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deguiy Chiei,

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First Socion, Firsi Departmento Dis inébersinG Was

was furnished acciona details as a resulini acgues:

Deparimori, l0r assistance di ViCi Versã.

Certain oi ice 49 Cases listed Were Cases die Severin Depici

ment prior io 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 WaCa NOSENIO Vis in ice Severic

Departmeni. Cerain oí the Cases were cases in Wiica ie Firoi Secäu.,

First Departmeni, was invoireù prior io 19óù or ilão -ilói. Tie

knowledge of NOSENKO corcerning inese ivo groups di Cases does roi

raierially suppori his claimed positions in to Firsi Dopasmen: anci

Sevenis Departmeni, but does support dis claimeo assignment to te

Seventa Department prior to 1950 ard in 1962 - 1963, anciais claimec

assigament to the First Deparument in 19ú0 - 1961.

It is difficui: to speculicaliy comment concernino tause 4f cases

since ibey do noi iali irio one o= two specitic categorico. Instead, they

constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of

the detailed sections of the previous summary. Inclided are Firs:

Department and Seventh Depariment cases covering a pariod oi approxi-

mately five and one -half years. It should be noted, iogHUf? at the

4

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## Page 250

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expiciaion di diCSaNKO concernio ms inowieligi di mie i9 cases

is jota pausible and computoie wiczis ciaimed posicions in tao

Fitsi Deparaneri ant Sévent Depüisnent Curing 196ù - Januaiy iSós.

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SEGRET

ANYEY C- THE CERZEPAYOY PAPERS

SECRET

Exceetes

0001249

....

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920238

2H2 CHERE2ANOY PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of ine previous surmary Coriair à discripior.

oi the Cherepanor Papers, and cow Aleisaadi Misdiayevica CHERIPAlOV

passed a package oí documents io an Amaricar tourist in Moscow in early

November 1963. The conclusion, however, was thai fue assertions o

NOSENKO with respeci to the CHEREPAYOV case were not material to

the claim o1 NOSE IO thai de was Depusy Chiti, Severin Depaïsment,

in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona

fides or NOSENKO cannoi be ignored aid must be given specitc coasic-

eration, I CHEREPANOV was under KGB corroi wala he passed ite

papers to the American iourisi, or ií the papers contain "deception

inormation, " the bona fides oi NOSENKO are subjeci to very serious

question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was,

according to NOSENKO, an oificer in the First Section, First Desarment,

SECRET

0001250

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duriaz i9ú0 - mid-isói wher tè was forcei into cotiremono adão dio

KG2. During die above perica oi time, JOSENSO ciaims io sive

veen Depuiy Chicí, Firs: Sucion, imouga na Goes no- Clain to irve

nad a direct supervisoty responsionisy dir CAEREPANO escopa

ia ibe absence of ise Chici di Sicion, Vlacisiar KOVS=Uk. CsaNxo

also chams io dure parüciaica in tuo dualor CHaRaPANor Li

December 1963.

Consideration bas previously been given to ice mcory tani ido

Cherepanov Papers were passed io Americans by ii 103 irougà

CHERIPANOV tO SUSPOTI iNE DONE ÁCES O NOSENKO. TuimiO=y

seems to have itie credibility sirce de papero Contuin no irisimacios

which would even sup?ort ide claim O NOSENIO dai be was in ite

Firsi Section, Firsi Deparameni, 1960 - 1961. The papero aido contair

no incormation vaica would incicate theze was ever a Deputy Calei oi

the First Seccion during 1958, - 1960.

Statements by NOSENXO aze erapaatic tai CABREPANOV was

nos under KGB control, that ke passed the papers waick it lair ¿eveloped

be bad taken from ine Zirsi Section prior to lis retiremeni decause de

was disgruniled with ais treaiment by ice KGB, and that she accion by

CHEREPANOV caused

consternation in the KGB.

There is no colateral evidence which contradicis any of

the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPAVOV. Further, isere is

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noiino in either ine ionna 01 subsince di the pubero Waich grovides

à basis for suspición as io iheir duncerucity, in nicision, ice ivem

and substance oi ine papers are in looping win ine cescription oy

NOSENKO di tie day io-day opuramior of she Firsi Secion, First

Déparimerni.

covered in deiail wiis NOSENHO, Ine Cherepanor Pagars, Wick

were originally saown io NOSTriO in iGó aie= sis Calacios, buva

also been covezca in ¿emil on a sepuraie item-by-lion basis, discough

NOSENKO does noi ciain, i0 inve specilically sten any particuia= item

prior to 1964, his siaiemenis in regard to te various candwritags,

types of notes, and árait memoranda leave so dutc: ¿cai NOSENiO

was very famiar wite personnel in to First Secion, Firsi Desari-

ment, ard with Firsi Deparimeni procedures.

Certain aidizonal researca cos been conducied in regard in the

papers and à detailed analysis will de prepared at a laier daie. i-

shouid be noted inat a considerabie arouni li personal judgmericas

been recessary in making an assessment oi tae Chereparov Pagers

since ¡cere are no exemplars wii waich to compâre aay of the material.

However, based on informatior developed thus fai, and daere is 20

reason to believe additional work will alier the conclusion, there is

not an adequate basis for an opinio. toat CHEREPA.TOV was under KGB

conizol, thai the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive infoiUT 252"

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or iasi the papers vere dicr ihin mi colicciica ai maiccial ij é

asgruniled

empioyce waick he vozy careálly solected cruccumuave.

te removal oi which would ouj inte constituied i iraiama disi io.

CHERSPANOV.

The cairo Crcicpaior Pircis dave ucca icviowed 1o Leicamire

ii inere is any inormañon viici cola de curdoreá "deccpiro inci-

mation" eiiber by direci siatemori or implicazion. 1l0 possibio arcas

have been noied ard given duli cursicoraior.

Taese arcas inc:

(a) There is no specile inioimüon dai iere

were any recruliments by ie KGB 0i Anerican per-

sonnel in the ünited Siaes Iridassy Guring 1958 -iSo,

nor is sacro any iniornaior suggestro ie iGB i in

American source or American agent in de Emiassy

curing inai period of dire.

¡i POLiS. POPOV, à GÃÜ dicer Wio dai dee:

an extremely valuable Cii source from 1953 on, was,

according io tue papers, esposed to tse KGB in Janliary

1959 as a resui: of a leter mailing oy George Pajre

WINTERS, JI. WINTORS was a CIA employae indei

L

32

Jassigned to dae Embassy in

Moscow. The letter, which was io POPOV, was objained

by the KGB aier mailing sy WINTERS aná was a direci

result o KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

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in regard so lil, mo papers dio only a rainer minuse paro di

the sia papers partruà in the First Secion during 1958 - 1960.

The laid any irration in these papers wiica dixocily or indirecy

indicares didi ine iGo rico a rochutront où an American in the

Embass; or had ai American source in did Dinbassy Curing bao 1850 -

1960 period is oily a iráica idi considcianion, I is noi conciusive

prodi tai a recrumen was not made or taban American source

cid no exisi. Tha papers do not Gun a positive stimoni on

either maiter.

In regara io (a), die quite speculo imormation in to pagers

that Peir S. POPOV was uncovercd ly tie KGB as a rebuit oi iGB

surveillance on George Payre WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to

POPOY in January 1959, this iriormacion should be considered as

possibiy information di a reccasive rature unless an alequate explaricion

can be mace for is presence in the papers. POPOV was recalied to

Moscow' irom Eusi Germany in November 1955 ostensibiy lo: TDY.

The circumstances under whick te was recalled and coliaterai inior-

mation save given adequate grounds for a beliei tat by Noveriber

1958 POPOV was suspecied by due XGB of cooperating with Western

Intelligeace or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had

been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed tat any lead so the KCS in regara io

POPOV or the fact that taised Sidies Inteligence, more speciod 1254

5

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sante

Cia, bad a source in mi GRÜ sould lave come irom in agori o1

source of ihe FCD, ÁG3, sui iLi SCD. li caruiso da presumid iai

¿ sourco or agoni di te PCD i i posicion io finisa a leuci io a

penciation ul te GRÜ by Wesicin Iniolligenco Wolic be carcidy

projected even witi ine KGB. Trè possibuit; di coursa exivis inui

à ledi icon George BiAno, an ECD ageri, resulied in mi cosuie

O POPOV to the KG3, bui i is no- esüblished dai it did noi is iscre

any reasor to believe sae ECD cuuid roi or cià roi save anoiur üguri

or agents who furnished information tu ste XG3 pertinent to develop-

ment of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regaras the Cherepanov

Papers is wheüer, even i it is resumed we iG3 obiired inio=mation

from an FCD source or ageri Waici icá io suspicion di 2OP0V ci

¿dentication of POPOV, tais Would be incorpatibie vita inioimaiion

in the papers and could Orij leau to mie cusciusion indi ide dagers cortain

"deceptive incormation. "

The conclusion in regard io ibe abova is thai me duci the papers

attribute the exposure of POPOV to the X03 to surveillance oa WINTERS

when he mailed the leier io POPOV in Januazy 1959 is noi incomunible

with the distinct possibility toat the KGB had previously obiained infor-

mation from an FCD agen: or agenis waich actually leá io suspicion in

regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

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Il incormaio vas reccivoé irom ar important ECD agoni

DUCK dE GOIge BLAKE 0E TOU inOLOr Vinde ICD agoni viica

¿ed 1o KGB suspicion ui POPOV drur io his return io Moscow in

November 1958, it is highly unitisj suca incormation Woud reccive

wice distribution wichia te KG&, Cerie ECD 0ã La SCS. =

is aiso possibio ine limid grou, vichin ie 2103 mio nonid du awara

_¿at the KGB had receive inioirion leading io suspición di POPOV

irom a valuable ageni would de sery intoresied in actricini; mae

expostre di POPOV io the foriticis maling di sca lestei io POpol

by WINTERS. The possibility sionia be corsidured thai prior io te

retrieval by the KGB oi the lotte: io POPOV iere was orly a dev?

suspicion of POPOV but thai the icter compiutely souduled ile case

against POPOV.

Consideration has boer giron io the possibity didi CaLaSPANOV

was under KGB conirol wien de possed ino pagero in isè Americi

iourist and thai it was done by ise XG3 with tae hope oi invoiving Gua

in a KGB-control'ca operation vicia the ÜSSR. In inai event, saa

papers passed by CHEREPANOY wouid mos: likeiy be genuine since

this would have been ¿ne irisial sip in What ie KGB dosed would become

a successful operation.

The above cheory bas leer rejectd since there are a number

of factors which militate against i. These faciors include the fac: that

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aass

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SEUREF

'INDEX

ABIDIAN, Joln - IV, E, 5, 7-15, 19, 20,52

"ANDREY" (Dayle Wailis SMITIl) - Iv, G,1-4

ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - ILI, A, 2

ARTEMUV, Vladir.ir Lvovick - IV, F, 6,12, 13

BAKHYALOV, Mikhail - IV, E, 3, *

BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F, 2

BARRETT, Robert - Ll, F, 14,15

BEGGS, Frank - IV, E, 36,37

BEL TSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12

BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - IV, B, 2,3, 5-7

BIENSTOCK, Natalie - IV, F, 3,4

BIRSE, Artbur - IV, D, 1,2

ALAKE, George - IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9; V, C, 6,7

BODKOV, Filip Derisovicl - IV, F, 15,16; V.B, 3

BOHLEN, Ambassador - II, F, 10

15:E1AEE

BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53, 54

BRAUNS, HOrsI - IV, F, 3-6

BROWN, G. Stanley - IV, E, $3

C001259

SECRET

Esskees bea

ey to atie

C. 9g die

2act:

.........•M..

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BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 4

BURGI, Richara - IV, D, 1

BURTIN, Sipe - IV, E, 49,50

BURTIN, WIL - IV, E, 49,50

CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40,42

CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, ä, :, 16

CHEREPANOV, Aleksand: N. - Iú, H, 4; V, G,1-4, 6-8

CHERNEISEV, Y. E. - IV, E, 49

CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - III, B, 4

DAY, Frank - IV, F, 41, 43

DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20,45

DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV, B, 5, 6

DOUGLAS, William O. - IV,D, 3

DREW, George - IV, D, 1

DWELLY, Robert - IV, E, 41, 44, 45'

FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V,A, 1

FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV, E, 8,9

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey .M. - IV, I, 49-51; IV, F, 1

FISK, Norman - IV, D, 5

FRIPPEL, Arsene - IV, D, 2

GAFFEY, Joseph - IV, E, 41, 45,46

2

SEAT

0601259

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EEGRET

GARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 52

GARCIA, Anthony A. - IV, £, 39

GARLAND, John - II, F. 17: V, 5, 31, 33-30

GINSBURG, Michael - IV, D. 5, 6

GOLITSYN, Anatolly Mikhayiovich - III, B, 3,4; IM, E, 9-11; III, F,5-13,15-19:

'IV, B,5,6; IV,L,9,10; IV, E, 21,23,31-34;

V, A, 1

GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - III, F. 3.4; IV, 6; IV, 6; IV, E, 4,5,21; IV,F. 1,2

"GRIGORIY" - I, F, 13; IV, D,3.6; IV,F,4

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - I, B, 4; IV, E, 20

GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - 11, B, 4; III, F, 8-13,15; IV, E, 5,12,19-21, 26-28.

30,43-45; IV.G,3; V,B, 3,4

GUK, Yuriy I. - II, B, 4

HAMILTON, Victor Norris - I, E, 9

(aka: HiNDAL, Fouzi Mitri)

"HANNA" - IV, E, 27

HARRIS, Gisella - IV, D, 1, 7, 8

HORBALY, William - IV, E, 53

HOWARD, Herbert - III, E, 8; II, F, 20; IV, G, 1, 3,4

IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39, 45, 46

JENNER, Paul - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36

JOHNSON, Robert Lee - III, 2, 8; III, G, 5

JOHNSON, Wallace Everett - IV, F, 3,4

JONES, William Carroll - IV, F, 3,4

3

-SECRET

6001260

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C=00E7

KADERA, FIed - IV, E, 45

KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D, 5, 6

KARLOV, fru - IV, D, 5

KASHPEROV, Vikhail - II, Fi, 4

KEMMER, Myra - IV, E, 9

KEYSERS, James - IV, E, 22-20, 55,56

KLYPIN, Vladimir Aiekseyevich - IV, E, 5, 48-51

KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV, B, 1-4,7

KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34

(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - III, B. 4; I, F, 8, 16,17: IV, E, 5,19-21,28-32,

34-39,47-44

KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1

KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - III, B, 4; II, F, 5, 11, 12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18,21,

23,49,52,53; IV, E, 1, Z; IV, G,3: V,C,2

KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12

KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - IV, B, 5

LANE, Alien - IV, D, 1, 2

LANGELLE, Russell - II, F, 3; IV, E, 8

"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26

LUBIN, George - IV, E, 49, 50

LUNT, Horace - ILI, F, 3

MAHONEY, Eugene - IV, E, 53

6001261

MALIA, Martin - IV, D, 2

GEORET

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## Page 264

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SECRET

MARK, David - ILI, C, 4

MATLAW, Ralph - IV. D, 5

MERTENS, Gerard - IV, D, 2

MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, $9

MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - III, E, 8; II, G, 5

MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52

• MORONE, Joseph - IV, E, 22, 27,36, 37,39. 40,55

MULE, Walter (Cape) - IV, C, 4

MC GOWAN, Edwärd - IV, F, 13

PECHTER, Bernard - IV, D, 5,6

PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - IV, E, 13

PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - III, B, 4; IV, E, 48,49

POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/*-7

PREISFREUND, Johar. - II, F, 5.11, 12

PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV, D, 5, 7:

"RAKETA" - IV, G, 5

RASTVOROV, Yuriy - IV, B, 5, 6

RHODES, Roy - I, F, 4

RUFE, John - IV, D, 5, 6

SCHWARZENBACH, Collette - IU, F, 10

5

SECRET

0001262

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## Page 265

13-00000

SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), EXU - IV, E, 32,33

(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich LINKIN, but is now considered also

identical to Igor Aleksejerich SERGIYEY, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV

and very possibly Igor A. SMiRNOV.)

SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - Li, F, 6

SHATTAUER, Solia - IV, D, 5,7

SILAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40

SHELEPIN, Alektandr Nikolayevich - III, E, 13

"SHMELEY" - II, E, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

SHUBIN, John - IV, D, U

SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, F, li, 12

SMITH, Dayle Wallis - II, F, 4, 20; IV, G,1

SMITH, Edward Ellis - II, F, 4

SMITH, John Discoe - II, 5, 9: IV, E, 49,50

STALIN - IV, B, 5

STEVENS, Edmund - III, F, 4,6

STORSBERG, James - ili, F, 3, 5, I1-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55,56

PARASKA, William - IV, D, 5,6

TAYLOR, David - IV, D, 2

TAYLOR, John - IV, E, 42, 43

UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38

0001263

6

SECREI

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## Page 266

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SE0.27

URBAN, (Colonel) - IV, E, 24, 25

VASSALL, William - III, E, 9: III, G, 5; IV, D, 9

WASHENKO, Steve - IV, E, 53

WILEY, William Stanley - IV, D,2

WINTERS, George Payse, Jr. - IV, E, 53; V, G,4-?

ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34

(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevica LENKAl, but is now considered also

identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Aleiseyevich SUKHOV

and very possibly Igor A. SVIRVOV.)

ZUJUS, Matthew - IV, E, 26-28

ZWANG, Naurice - IV, E, 40-42

7

0U01264

SECREF

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