Originator: SSCSGO
From: ANGLETON, JAMES
Document date: 09/17/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

1157-10014-10007

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date : 07/28/95

Page : 1

AGENCY : SSCSGO

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10007

RECORDS SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 01-H-07

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORNIATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

CAB/ben. 413/98

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

SSCSGO

ANGLETON, JAMES

TO

TITLE

DATE

: 09/17/75

PAGES

: 124

SUBJECTS

: ANGLETON, JAMES

CIA

HTLINGUAL

LAW ENFORCEMENT, MAIL INTERCEPTIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

DATE

OF LAST REVIEW

: 06/25/97

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

Box 1

redacted

version

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

My 50955

DocId: 32423395

Page 1

---

## Page 2

TOP SECRET

ORIGINAL

Vol A1,0103

PRATIONAL SECUATER INPORMATION

Led Died

osures

to Celainal Sanctione

subject

Thr Mutten Blaten Bruate R 1 2/8

Report of Proceedings

INVRATORI

DN 2/15/27

• вс

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental,

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

...

0, 0

Wednesday September171975

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD. & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

IOP SECRET

---

## Page 3

ANT

prono (Arma 202) 544-6000

to .

NARD

$10 First Streel, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF

James Angleton

PAGE

4

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

No. 1

NO •

2

No. 3

NO.

4

NO •

5

No.

6

No. 7

No. 8

No. 9

No. 10a

No. 10b

No. 10c

No. 11

No.

12

FOR IDENTIFICATION

8

30

40

51

60

62

63

70

74

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 4

Angleton

Phone (Ared 202) 544-6000

8

410 First Streer, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

213

24

25

TOP SECRET

STAFF INTERVIEW

Wednesday, September 17, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Governmental Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock

p.M., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Paul Wallach and

James Dick, Professional Staff

Members.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 5

TOP SECRET

PhOne (Are 202) 5465300

p.":

boogie lot

MARO & PAUL

910 Frest Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 2000)

1

2

3

4

5

?

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

₴3

24

25

•Mr. Wallach. Mr. Angleton, on behalf of the Committee,

let me express our appreciation on the record for your coming

back again. As you recall, I was present for a portion of the

testimony that you gave to Mi. Johnson on the Houston Plan, and

I still think for this session that the oath that was applied

at that time would still pertain.

Do you understand that you are still under oath?

MI. Angleton. I don't know. You know the regulations.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, you at that time were also

given then, you were advised of your rights to counsel, etc.

I take it, once again, by the fact that you have come without

counsel, that you have taken to waive that right.

Is that right?

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. The subject matter that we'll be discussing

here today primarily focuses upon the New York mail intercept

program that was run by the CIA for approximately 20 years.

I realize you've already given some testimony on this,

both. for the record, for the Commission, and briefly touched upon

it as a sidelight to lis. Johnston's examination, and I will try as

best I can not to be repetitive. I, of course, have access

to the Rockefeller material and have read it, and we will try

again not to cover the

same ground except insofar as I would like

to hit upon certain specifics that I don't believe we've gone

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 6

phone (Area 202) 548-6000

День.

410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

1

2

3

4

5

into.

I also have some documents here I would like to show you

in varying degrees that will have to be read, and I think we can

take them one at a time, and you will be given an adequate chance

to read them, and should we reach a determination it is necessary

to do so, the minute there are any questions on them, we can

do that for each document.

Mr. Angleton, do you recall when you became aware that. there

was:a mail.intercept project in New York City?

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 7

TOP SECRET

POnA (Ares 2021.

WARD

PALE

910 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON - Resumed

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the date, but I assume that I

learned of it through llerman llorton, who was my Deputy in 1954.

Mr. Wallach. At that time it was being run by the Office

of Security, is that correct?

MI. Angleton. That's right.

MI. Wallach. Did there come a point in time when the

operation was taken over, at least the substantive parts of the

operations as compared to the procedural and mechanical aspects

of gathering together and intercepting the mail, that this was

taken over by the CIA staff?

MI. Angleton.

That's right.

Mr. Wallach. When was that, sir?

MI. Angleton. Well, there is a chrono on this entire

thing.. I think the best chrono is this report, if I can find

it in the Rockefeller Commission. '55, I believe, at the time.

Mr. Wallach. Is the document you are looking at now the

attachment, prepared for the Rockefeller Commission and

submitted

the day you testified there?

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

The time was 1955.

Mr. Wallach. Given that approximate time, Mr. Angleton,

ci.

do you recall how the decision was reached that CIA staff would

take over the project?

MI. Angleton. Well, I think there was a question, I think

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 8

PROna (Aras 202) 564-6000

1

4

5

6

MARD A PAUL

A1D Forst Street, S.C., Washington, D.C. 2000}

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

"TOP SECRET

there were a number of mattera involved here. I think one of

them was that security was undergoing some kind of freeze.

Second, I belleve the Division wanted out. I think there were

a combination of factors which led to the feeling on the part

of many that the program would be discontinued for lack of

funding and personnel. The other point is that Mr. Horton

had very close relationships with the Office of Security and

I assume they went to him on it because even though there is a

memorandum by DiSilva to the effect that the project was not

to be used for counterintelligence purposes, that is very

unrealistic, because Mr. Timm, who put up the project, was

himself a counterintelligence officer. He had been formerly

FBI, and then he was OSS counterintelligence during the war,

in fact his whole career was in a professional sense in counter-

intelligence.

And I don!t feel that the thrust of it was

entirely positive intelligence in his mind.

I knew him extremely well.

Further, there was, which i have not seen reflected in

the papers I have read, the security was very much involved

operationally in terms of penetration of the Agency in

security cases, and this goes back to the post-oss period,

at least after the war when I was abroad, and there were a

of hearings on penetration of OSS, and this was supported by

sone very highly sensitive documentation, Soviet in nature, to

the extent of penetration and security were charged with this

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 9

r..

Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000

MARO a

110 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

6

TOP SECRET

problem of trying to clean out the combination of Communist

Paity members, probably

Soviet intelligence, and also known

homosexuals which also were in the counter-intelligence side.

So, I think that what the record does not reflect is that

there were very strong

counter-intelligence stressed by the

very people who, in a sense, played a part in the originating

of the entire program.

And I find that conflict with,as I say, DiSilva or Doran,

Dan Doran, or he stated or made some comment that it should

not be a - it was not for counter-intelligence purposes, that

it was entirely misleading.

And in the penetration part of it, of the problems con-

fronting security, Mi. Horton had much to do with that as well

as Mr. O'Neal. In other words, there was a very firm

relationship going back into all of the other kinds of cases.

Mr. Wallach. I'm not entirely sure I understand, when

you

talk about the Office of Security at that time probably

continually being occupied with penetration, how that would

affect their handling the project. Are you talking strictly

about manpower, because it is my understanding that project

still took up a heck of a lot of time for the Office of

Security in terms of

manpower.

Are you talking about manpower down

at leadyuarters?

MI. Angleton. No.

I only saw and noticed the effect

that

in one of llerman's memos which he drafted, he talked about the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 10

•TOP SECRET

PROne (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD &

PAUL

110 Firsi Street. S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2:3

24

25

freeze in Security, the fact that Security were hamstrung

for

personnel, etc, and starting out in '55, the staff having been

pulled together in '54, we did have a lot of slots and we had

a lot of latitude,, that it would be very natural in terms of

the associations for someone to put up to the staff for taking

away the project.

Mr. Wallach. This might be kind of:a hypothetical that I'm

going to pose, but if you really don't feel that you can give an

answer on it, just let me know.

for example, if security had continued with the project,

would they have had the expertise to really do anything with it

besides Ically straight, positive intelligence? I think you may

have suggested that, that there was sort of a natural gravitation

to CI staff once it developed.

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I think there was a natural gravitation.

I think the Security's interest,, they would have been able to

handle, but it would have been

a very small slice of the project!

In other words, theirs would have only been personnel, and then,

in correspondence within Agency peuple, and soviet units and

so on.

Mr. Wallach. I would like at this time, Mr. Angleton, to

show you a document that I will just ask the Reporter to subse-

quently mark as Angleton Exhibit 1 for identification of

this date. It is I am not actually sure whether it is

one memorandum -- I'm sorry, there is an attachment that shouldn't

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 11

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD A FAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

2

3

4

5

6

be -- it is one memorandum in a couple of different sections,

some I6 pages, dated November 7, 1955, on HTLINGUAL. I think

that is'e sufficient identification, and I'll ask you just to

take a quick look at that.

9

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 1

for identification:)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 1 will

be found in the files of the

Committee.)

11

13

19

20

21

2.2

23

24•

25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 12

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. I have seen this. It is a fairly involved

memo.

os..

WARE

C.

r..

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Wallach. The reason I said not to look at it thoroughly

is there are a lot of facts and figures that we'll be going into,

but do take a look at it.

MI. Angleton. Well, if you want to call my attention to

any specifics in it:

Mr. Wallach. Well, just take a quick look through and I'11

call your attention to a couple of specifics.

My first question was going to be whether or not you

recall this before. In fact, there is some handwriting on I

guess the third page and fourth page, and I wonder if that is

yours.

Mr. Angleton. No. No, I don't recognize it. It might have

Bircha

been Bert O'iveal's. I'm not sure.

Mr. Wallach. But in any event, you believe you at least

saw this document at some point in time.

Mr. Angleton. I have seen it, certainly after, you know,

recently, but this is apparently a draft, is it not? It is a

draft document?

Mr. Wallach. Does it say that on it? Why do you say

apparently?

MI. Angleton. Well, it wouldn't be a document with all

of these currections on it.

MI. Wallach, We are unable to determine if we got it from

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 13

Phone (Area 202) 394-6000

он..

WARD & PAUL

110 First Streel, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10T

TOP SECRET

*10

an individual's file or not, or if someone just may have made

comments on it or crossed things out after they received it.

Mr. Angleton. No, no. This thing looks as though it had

gone from one party to another.

Mr. Wallach. I agree. For example, on page 6 there are

portions crossed out and additions made.

MI. Angleton. It looks very much like a paper that was

run through a staffing process.

MI. Wallach. In any event, we haven't found a final

version, if there is one.

So this is all we have to work from

at this time.

I don't think I'll have any questions on the portions that

are crossed

out or handwritten in.

MI. Angleton. The language is very much like O'Neal's.'

Every "i" is dotted and every "t" is crossed.

Mr. Wallach. When the project was taken over by CI staff,

was it then a mail opening project or was it just a mail inter-

cept, mail cover project?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I really don't know. It could have been

both. It could have been in the process of changing, but I hau

a feeling that openings had been

taking place before.

But the

paragraph 5 which I am looking at now --

(Pause)

Although on page 3 there is the line to the effect that

under the conditions

existing now, our personnel are getting

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 14

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion. D.C. 20003

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

C.

Phone (Area 202) 5846000

access,

ete.,

for exterior examination. It is possible,

discretely to gain exclusive access to the contents of a limited

number of selected communications, and I think that ser'as to

be at variance with some other: paper I have also seen.

I thought an earlier part, that openings were taking place.

MI. Wallach. Are the documents you're looking at now

copies of documents that went into the Rockefeller Commission?

MI. Angleton. No.. I got it from a fellow. I haven't

examined it.

Mr. Wallach. From whom?

Mr. Angleton. From the project - no, not the project

but one of the men who's still back on the staff.

MI. Wallach: MI. Tsikerdanos?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Wallach. While Mr. Angleton is looking through the

documents I would like to explain, going a bit into the

Rockefeller Commission,

that there is some question as to

whether or not there was ever explicit authorization in terms

of switching from a mail intercept, mail cover to a mail

opening project.

Mr. Angleton. I understand the question.

MI. Wallach. But I think a couple of later documents

suggest that -- well, I will let Mr. Angleton finish looking

through

the documents that he has.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 15

C..

Bm: 12

PRODA (ArR 202) 584-6000

PAUL

#10 First Streel, S.E., Washenaton, D.C. 30003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

- 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1&

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

ME. Angleton.

well, I just want to see if I can see this

to

find anything --

(Pause)

Mr. Wallach. In one of the documents there is reference

to the fact that openings have been going on for some time. I

think that is a year after this document, I think it is a '56"

document that that is in.

MI. Angleton. Well, this is so repetitious that -

-

(Pause)

In '53, December, they are discussing this, saying we

M. And

now wish to carry out the second step of this arrangement, and

that is to photograph the fronts and backs of first class mail.

Mr. Wallach.

I think the first step there just might have

been

a survey to see how much mail came in and out.

Are those documents entirely sclated to the New York

project, Mr. Angleton?

Mr. Angleton. Either that or collateral.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any objection to letting us take

look at them?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I would rather leave that to the

Agency. I was supposed to see the General Counsel and I have not

been able to got a hold of him.

MI. Wallach. I don't understand what seeing the General

Counsel -

MI. Angleton. Well, I mean, I was supposed to get the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 16

1

2

3

guidelines for appearing here.

MI. Wallach. You mean even before your appearance last

week?

5

что.

HARD A FAUL

$10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

13

TOP SECRET

13

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

Mr. Angleton. Yes. And they were all tied up.

Mr. Wallach. I just think for the purposes of examination

I would like to go on your memory. You have been over the

subject before.

MI. Angleton. I mean, I don't recall the first time they

were actually opened, whether it was with us. I was under the

impression that there had been something going on in the opening,

but there wasn't very much because there wasn't much personnel

and they didn't have the people to process. In other

words,

that is my impression, that there had been opening. In November

of '55 there is a statement that the only added function that

would be formed by security in the new project is that more

letters will be opened, the implication being that letters were

being opened.

They are presently able to open only a very limited number.

Under the new setup, with full time employees, security will

be able to obtain the addressor, addressees

and total correspon-

dence against approximately 75 percent at the present time.

So, I mean, if that sentence is correct, then it means

that the letters were being opened, and that the only thing,

one of the changes would be that

more letters would be

opened.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 17

1

2

3

4

1..

@a".

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 2000}

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

12

20

21

22

23

24

25

- TOP SECRET

14

Mr. Wallach. I think you'll find the documentsido not

pin down a specific date for the authorization of the actual

beginning of the project. I think it may, in fact, have

happened - the intercaptors, may have begun to do it themselves

and then the Agency rasponding, it says, well, it looks like

we can do it. But I was wondering what your actual recollection

was. I realize it's twanty-odd years ago.

Mr. Angalton. Well, it isn't quito that. I mean, I take

full responsibility for everything, but I really didn't spand

that much time in this business, and what I am really trying

to say is Mr. Horton, who was my Deputy, was the one who

detailed, go through all of this negotiating, and so on.

Mr. Wallach. I'd just like to make it clear that I'm

not really here to assess respongibility or anything Ilke that.

All I'm trying to do is get your memory as to --

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean my point being that almost

averything I know about the origins of the mail have bean from

December of last year on in terms of going back through all

these little papers.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, aside from your raview of

the documents of Dacember on, you really have no indepandent

recullection of that time pariod?

Mr. Angleton. No. My impression is that the documents

were baing opened, but on a very small seals, due to personnel

and due to the procedural set up. They didn't have the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 18

MOnA (ArEA 202) 366-600

WARD

110 First Street, 5.E. Washington. D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

15

interpreters, they didn't have the substantive people who could

spot. In other words, it was a very poor program in terms of

exploitation.

Mr. Wallach. You mean they didn't have the interpreters

or the substantive people?

Mr. Angleton. Well, they didn't have them in the sense

that wa later had people devoted entirely to this project.

MI. Wallach. Well, without getting into that, you're

talking about people back at Headguartars or people at the

intercapt point?

Mr. Angleton. No, at the Headquarters. I mean there were

not files built up, as I recall.

Mr. Wallach. Now I think in your other dates you are

correct.

MI. Angleton. And it took a lot of trial and error to

finally get through from handwritten files to punchcard to

machine tapes.

MI. Wallach. I think the figures which I'm sure you've

seen which were compiled in January of this year show some

12,000 documents or letters being opened in 1954 which surprised

me when I saw these figures, because I hadn't thought it was

anywhere near that. I thought the 832 from 1956 was correct,

and I think that 12,000 may be in the wrong column.

But in any event, do you see the 12,000 I'm referring

to?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 19

WARD A PAUL

110 First Street. S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

son.

quit

Prone (Ar0+ 202) 388-6000

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'

18

19

20

21

22

22

21

25

TOP SECRET

^16

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I do.

Unlass that was supposed to take up all the mall that had

aver been opened prior to that, I don't know. Because it's

not responsive to the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 up above.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't think there's any explanation

as to what that figure means.

MI. Angleton. I can find out, because I talked to Mrs.

Matzen last night, and she has her fingertips on practically

avarything on the project.

Mr. Wallach. That is Elana Metzen?

Mr. Angleton:

Yes.

Mi. Wallach. Well, why don't we go back through this

document. at hand, and for the time being, forego this question?

MI. Angleton. All right.

(Pause)

I think I can finally answer to that, I would think,

without any trouble from her.

Has she been asked the question?

Mr. Wallach. No, I don't believe she has.

Mr. Angleton. And the other person who would know would

be Scotty Miler.

Mr. Wallach. What was Scotty Miler's position at this

time, as of 1955, do you recall?

Mr. Angleton. If I recall correctly, he was working with

Bertram O'Neal on Special Investigations, which was a unit

closely tied in with the Office of Sscurity.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 20

mona (Area 202: 544-600

z. -

HARDA PAUL

910 Forst Street, S.F... Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12-11

13

14

1.5

16

1:

12

19

2U

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

17

The primary task was the penetration of the Agancy and

the government and historical penetration cases are recruitment

of U.S. officials in positions, code clerka. It had a very

tight filing system of

its. own, and it was the only component

in the counterintelligence that had access to the security

files and the personnel maintained by the office of security.

And he was aither the deputy or one of the principal officers

with O'Neal.

MI. Wallach. I realize that in your testimony before the

Rockefeller Commission and in your paper that you prepared for

the meeting, it was extensively discussed, I guess the

conditiors

that existed at the time, the Cold War conditions, suspected

penetration of the Agency, and other things, and I think that

will come out clear. I think it's quite important in focusing

on the beginnings of the oparation, as you explaired, and I

don't want to lose sight of that in turning to this memorandum,

but for example -- and again, I'm only asking 1f there were

discussions that you remamber -- this memorandum, for example,

on the first page in Section 3, under "Situations," says:

"There's no overt authorized legal censorshin or monitoring of

first-class mails which enter, depart or transit the Uniteri

States at the present time."

Mr. Angleton. Which memorandum? Is this one I looked

at?

MI. Wallach. This is one you looked at.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 21

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

!.".

C

WARD & PAUL

410 Forsi Street, S.F., Washingion, D.C. 2000]

1

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

1.4

•15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

18

MI. Angleton. All Eightin try

MI. Wallach. And all I'm trying to get from you is if

you recall any discussions at that time as to whether - about

the subject and about the fact that there is no legal monitoring

By that, I take it they mean opening of showing, whatever they

mean by monitoring the mails.

Do you recall discussions

about the legality. ": even

entering into this?

MI. Angleton.

Well, I read a lot about this since, but

I don't think I ever participated in any of the meetings dealing

with that problem.

MI. Wallach, You say you read ahout discussions?

Mr. Angleton. I read about it

since. I mean, I read all

of these papers which go into the whole legal business.

Mr. Wallach. But I, from reading the documents that we

have, and the. Agency, has told ma for all intents and purposes

that is what they have. I do not see any papers which reflect

discussiong in the 'sp's on the legality or illegality.

MI. Angleton. Wall, doesn't that --

Mr. Wallach.. This one does, but it doesn't get forth any

discussion. It is just a fact that. seems to be stated. It does

not permit it at this time.

I was wondering if you recall any discussions about that

at all.

Mr. Anglaton. Well I mean there were discussiong leading

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 22

Phone (Ares 202) 344-6000

C..

WAGO

210 First Street, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

1]

12

13

14

15

16

1'%

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

"TOP SECRET

19

up to Helms and the Director going to the Postmaster General

and all of that.

Mr. Wallach. That was in 1971.

Mr. Angleton. Well, they: 'went. : much earlier than that.

I mean, back in the '50'g.

MI. Wallach. Wall, MI. Dulles did go to Mr. Helmo, I

think back in '54 to meet with the then-Postmaster General,

but I don't think the record shows that the Postmaster General

was briefed on the fact that there was going to be any mail

openings.

Mr. Angleton. I mean, to me, I think there was a lot of

dispute on whether he was briefed about it.

MI. Wallach. You think there was dispute about whether

Mr. Summerfield was briafed in the 1950°g, or Mr. Day in '61.

MI. Angleton. Both.

Mr. Wallach. In any event -- was Mr. Dulles aware, to the

best of your knowledge, that mail was being opened in New

York?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think I ever saw

any detailed piece of paper on any of these visits.. Well, they-

were all kind of short.

Mr. Wallach. I think I'll have a memorandum later that

may cast some doubt as to whether Mr. Dulles was aware the

mail was being opened.

Do you remember discussing it with him?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 23

Г..

6..

phone (Ares 202) 344-8000

410 First Street. S.F... Washington, D.€ 20003

1

2

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2:

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

:20

Mr. Angleton. I don't remember discussing it with any

Director outside of Helms.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you would not know then if

MI. McCone was aware, for example?

MI. Anglaton. I don't know. I mean - let me put it this

way. I don't think anyone tried to withhold anything from

MI. McCone. Just being sort of an impression that he himself

was disturbed that people didn't tell him, and I think it is

not raalistic in terms of the way he ran the business.

MI. McCone was an individual who had a lot of experience

in

government and he had a personal style of his own. He lived

by the record. His interest in the business was almost

exclusively devoted to items which were subject matters

for

the Cahinet. In other words, it didn't matter how mundane a

program would be, as long

as it was Cabinet-level, he went into

it in the most exhaustive fashion.

He did not deal with the

case officers down the line.

In One case which I was handling with him, he read not

only my analysis and

so one

He read

all of the attachments

down into the interrogations, and whatnot. In other words,

the actual data.

Onca he had discharged that

as a Cabinet mattar, it then

reverted back way down into the bowels of the organization,

and six months later thare might be a glimmer of this come

back again and he would update himself in the intervening

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 24

pROne (Are: 202) 384-6000

.

MARO A

110 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1':

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

period. And that is the way he ran the Agency. He was not

Interested in a lot of gratuitous matters dealing, say, with

mail intercepts or so on. If there hid been mail intercept

which involved the penetration high in the government, I can

assure you it would have gone to him.

MI. Wallach. Did Mr. Helms run the Agency in a different

fashion?

Mr. Angleton. Wall, I mean, I am just talking about MI.

McCone. He was a very unusual man in the sense of how he ran

the Agency. He depended very directly on basically two men.

one was Ray Cline and the other was Dick Helms, plus his Exec

Officer, and you know, some of the people around his immediate

office.

But I am just saying to put it in proper perspective,

there was no one withholding from Mr. McCone anything, and

I think there were many of them who would give a great deal to

go up and talk about mundane problems.

Mr. Wallach.

Well, just going back again to Mr. Dulles,

the record does reflect that in '54 he did go over with Mr.

Helms and meet with MI. Summerfield, and I think the record

also shows that at that time in '51, at least, it was a mail

intercept project in the sensa that the mail was just being

photograph or transliterated, the covers of the mail. It was

not baing opened.

The only point I was

really trying to get at was Mr.

Dulles was -- It's not really clear whether or not and I'm not

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 25

(Area

!".

WARD & PAUL

110 First Street, S.E.. Washongton, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2:

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

saying anybody was hiding anything from him, that he ever found

out that the operation changed.

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't know.

Let's put it this way. I don't thihk the project ever had

any caveat of not informing the Director of any piece of

intercept which had broad implications and should be brought to

his attention. I mean that's almost automatic, and it goes

for all kinds of collection.

MI. Wallach. Do you recall instances of bringing the

product to the attention of various Directors?

Mr. Angleton. Well, basically, Mr. Helms, because of a lot!

of things dealing with civil unrest in that period, about a

fugitive from justice, the making of bombs, things of this

sort.

MI. Wallach. Was this when he was DDP?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was Director.

Mr. Wallach. Director.

There's one other part I'd like to talk to you about and

really get your opinion on in a second. In the next page af

this memorandum, it states that "It must be assumed that foreigr.

espionage agents have relied on this policy of the United

States government" - by that, it is referring to the policy

of, there's no legal opening or monitoring of mails - "and

this has resulted in yxtensive use of the mail for intelligence

purposas to our detriment. "

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 26

Phone (Ares 202) 546-600€

!"

C.

310 First Street, S.E., Washinaton, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

TOP SECRET

23

What I would like to get at is if 1t 1s your belleve that

this is really true, or was true then, and did it subsequently

change, or do you. think it is still true that there is that

rellance on the protection, you know, the privacy of the

mails?

Mr. Angleton. I think there was up to the time that it

bacame exposed.

MI. Wallach. What you're

saying then is you do not

believe the Soviets knew

we were conducting this program?

Personally I don't think they did, but I

Mr. Angleton.

mean, that is purely a personal view on it. Of course, they

would have known if thare had been any penetration, but I mean,

aside from that, I don't think they necessarily knew of it,

because after all, you had a number of exchange students using

the mails and in their system, no one travelling outside can

get either a passport or a valida as foreign exchange who

isn't processed by the intelligence organs as to his possible

usage, and particularly those scientific schools, and so on.

And also a lot of it is preparation for them for future jobs

on the American or the British desk.

In fact, I would assume that they probably spent several

hundred thousand manhours going back through all the cases

and files and doing analysis to see what came through the

mails.

24.

25

Mr. Wallach. Was it your understanding, then, at least at

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 27

Phone (Area 202) 546-6000

WARD & PAUL

210 First Street, S.E.. Washongton, D.C. 20003

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

14

15

-16

17

19

20

21

22

2:.

24

25

TOP SECRET

24

this time that the project would only pick up mail where either

the addrassee or the sendar was a Soviet?

Mr. Angleton. No, I think it was all communications that

came out of the Soviet Union and went into 1t. A lot of the

mail was actually sent by third nationals here.

In other words, you will find somebody's brother, maybe from

Africa or someplace, and his brother is at the Lumumba Universit?

or a cousin or a ralative and you've got a lot of Latin American

mail, people who are relatives, frlends or associates in some

group that they're studying here in the United States communica-

ting to

their friend in Moscow.

So the linkage is important.

MI. Wallach. Turning

again to what you said and was

thoroughly described in your attachment to the Rockefeller

Report is the tanor of the times that existed then. I think

in reading that and then looking at paragraph 6 of this

memorandum which deals with security and subparagraph (e) which

is on page 7, which reads:

"In the event of compromise of the

aspect of the project involving internal monitoring of mails,

serious public reaction in the United States would probably

occur. Corceivably, pressures would be placed on Congress to

inquire into such allegations, but it is believed that any

problems arising could be satisfactorily handled."

What I'm trying to get at is, given that tenor of the times,

it would surprise me that you would still believe there would

be

serious public reaction to finding out about this program.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 28

Phone (Ared 202) 566-6006

ora.

WARD a PAUL

r...

210 Forst Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

14

15

16

19

20

21

• 2:

24

25

TOP SECRET

:25

Mr. Angleton. Whoever drafted that had great presclence.

I mean, I do not know who drafted it, but they turned out to

be right. .

Mr. Wallach. Nell, I think it turned out to be right in

1975, but I am very truthfully too young to appreciate what

was going on back at that time, and I, from talking to many

people at the Agency, have kind of got a different opinion,

sort of all explainedito me.very:thoroughly the tenor of the

times that axisted then and that different outlooks, certain

pressures from President Eisenhower on penetration of the

intelligence community, and then a lot of othar concerns that -

Senator McCarthy and other things.

I was surprised to see that in 1955 someone tairly high

up in the then young CI

staff would have felt that there would

be serious public reaction to some disclosure of this, you

know, it was for intelligence purposes, and you know, that

surprised

me.

And I was just wondering if you could possibly

recall if you would have thought that back than.

Mr. Anglaton. Now don't -- I car't really say one way or

the other, and I have not gotten in touch with lierman Horton.

I believo I had an afternoon with him, and a lot of things

became much clearer, I mean, all the meetings and the people

that he saw.

MI. Wallach. He's retired now, isn't he?

MI. Anglaton: He's retired.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 29

phone (Ares 202) 384$000

co..

C.

$10 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

1

2

4

5

?6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Mr. Dick.. For what perdod of time was Mi. Horton your

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Deputy?

Mr. Angleton. I have it somewhere here.

He started with me when I took over the Counterintelligence

Staff. He had'been in the FBI and then he had been with the

Agency-- I mean, the OSS.

He had also been a lawyer. When he started, he was well

up on Federal statutes.

I cannot put my hands on it right now, but I have all the

dates.

MI. Wallach. Weld, I think maybe then we can just check

it with the Agency if you don't have it right here.

Mr. Angleton. No.

MI. Wallach. One other general aspect I'd like to talk

to you on which is reflocted in the memorandum, and there is

no reason now to go over it, is the oft repeated statement here

that the security factors require no disclosure whatever .be

made to any persons or organizations outside the CIA. And I !

was wondering, at that time -- and I realize there were certain

problems that existed later on between the CIA and the FBI,

and we will go into them in the '58 events by which the CIA

or the FBI became informed of the project, but I was wondering

why, for example, this would not have been thought of as a

project that would have been very useful to the FBI at that

time, and the FBI also at least brought into the project, or

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 30

Phone (Ares 202) 344-600€

WARDIA DANI

910 First Streel, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

2'2

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

27

some sort of joint project. Was that just something that

didn't happen and then you just realized later on that it

didn't happen?

MI. Angleton. Well, I think that the relations with the

FBI were very spotty, leading up to '54...:When Daloach: was: the

Liaison Officer there were a number of problems and there was

also a very strong feeling by Mi. Hoover about CIA men who had

been former FBI people. There wasn't something generated out of

the CI Staff. It was one that probably went back since Eric Timm

was FBI, Bill Harvey was FBI. We stole a number of FBI people

and it wasn't the best of relations.

MI. Wallach. Have you been, or are you aware today, of

the various projects, mail intercepts and mail opening projects

that were conducted by the Bureau since World War II in the

United States?

MI. Angleton. No. I am aware of the fact that there

ware, from time to time.

I mean there, operationally, were

matters that would come up, whether we would get a certain mail

coverage.

Mr. Wallach. Are you aware, for example, of continual

projects from 1946 through 1966 of varlous foreign establishments

in the U.s. run by the Bureau, and this is not something that

popped up from time to time? Going to the specifica of it.

it was existing in '55, but there are no Bureau records that would

reflect that anybody at the CIA was made aware of it until

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 31

Pone (Area 202) 584-600€

C.:

r.:

r..

110 Firl Strees, S.F., Washington. D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

28

approximately '61.

Mr. Angleton. No, I think anything we've done regarding

FBI coverage came out of the counterintelligence reports of

the case that was broken and the surveillance and whatnot,

and after all, you'd learn how to read those reports and know

more or less where the sources are from.

Mr. Wallach, I think we've gotten the sane' type of tastimony!

from other people.

MI. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Wallach. In other words, after reading it, and from

your experience, you can tell this was gotten from mail

intercept?

Mr. Anglaton. That's right, and they had more sophisticater!

means. Ours was shotgun treatment, theirs was mainly rifle

treatment.

Mr. Wallach. What do you mean by that?

MI. Angleton. He ware covering a vast amount of mail;

the Bureau's interest was more or less pinpointed on matters

that came as a result of a breakthrough or identification of

some active case. That is at least my understanding of how

they operate.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Bureau, at any time, stop sending

the CIA intelligence reports on cases and things, the ones

you .

described?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think probably the most painful case

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 32

phone (Ares 202)

544

fla amt

C.

410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

29

may I go off the record on this?

Mr. Wallach. We'll go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Wallach. I think we can go back on the record. I

think the record can reflect that when we went off the record,

Mr. Angleton went into one or two specific cases and just a

further explanation of his reasons why there was not the best

of cooperative worlds between the Agency and the Bureau in the

early '50s.

I would like now to show you a document which I would

like marked as Angleton Exhibit 2 for our identification, and

it's a two page document, it's a memorandum for Acting

Deputy Director of Plans. It's from Mr. Angleton, and there's

a date on it that's not entirely legible, but it is a '56

document.

Mr. Angleton. Does it show the drafter of the document?

Mr. Wallach. Well, let me show it to you, Mr. Angleton.

(Pause)

MI. Angleton. No, it's not signed by me; it's signed by

my

Deputy for me, if you look at that.,

Mr. Wallach. Right. You are correct in that.

I'm not going to have any specific questions on it

but what l'd like to do is focuse

your attention on the second

paragraph for a minute which goes to the question about

Mr. Dulles' knowledge of the mail opening aspect of it. Once

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 33

Phone (Area 202) 5446000

0a .

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

• 12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

2)

22

23

24

25

30%1

TOP SECRET

again I'm not saying anything was held back from him. There

it says the Director approved the undertaking

in principle in

its initial stages in May 1954, and took steps which have,

through a developmental stage, resulted in a formulation of

the program and its approval by you:..

Now, looking at that language, back in 1954, the CI staff

was not involved, and the records seem to reflect that, at least:

in '54, that there may have just been isolated instances of

mail opening, but it was really a mail screening, mail cover

project. From this it looked like Mr. Helms himself approved

the HTLINGUAL aspects of it, and the CI staff, when they came,

there was probably mail opening before, but it was more formalizer.

Now, I guess it would be more appropriate to ask Mr.

Helms, really, did you tell Mr. Dulles about it, but I'm just

showing you this second paragraph to -- maybe that would refresi.

you .

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. i

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 2 will be

found in the files of the

Committee.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 34

ERona (Ares 202) 548-6001

C.

C..

110 First Street, S.E., Washington. D.C. 20003

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. It does not illuminate for me at all.

Mr. Wallach. Okay.

What I'm really, as you're aware, trying to get at is the

procedural part of it, not at the question of responsibility or

anything like that, as to a project that Mr. Dulles, you know,

may have first briefed Mr. Summerfiold on as a mall opening

project sort of turned into that. He may or may not have been

informed, possibly because he never asked, not because anybody

withheld

anything.

Mr. Angleton.

Well, he would have been told the details

because he wouldn't have gone there unless he had interrogated

who brought up the proposal.

HI. Wallach.

But

my statement is he went up there in early'

'54 and at that time we don't really have a mail opening project

as such.

MI. Angleton, well, I mean, that's what I have not been able to

find here, whether this is - let me just see if this throws

any light on it.

(Pause)

Now, going back here, and this is just an aside, but this

reflects that Dana Doran, who was head of the Soviet Division,

had queried the FBI back in '52,

153, as

to whether they had

any records of correspondence betreen soviet and U.s. citizens,

and the Bureau did reply that they did not maintain such recur

except that uncovered in the general security or espionage

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 35

TOP SECRET

PROne (Ares 202) 344-6000

PAUL

C..

110 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

14

19

2:

2:

22

24

25

cases.

Mr. Wallach. What you're looking at is the master list

of documents that was in the summaries, that was put together

by the Agency?

MI. Angleton. Yes, it's one of the summaries.

Mr. Wallach, well, I really don't think that we should

dwell on that point.

Ms. Angleton. Well, I am trying to boil this down to a

little more perspective, to see whether there is any indication

when the mail was opened.

Mr. Wallach. I think we can get a cloarer indication of that

by going back to the vault, I think we may have done this; I don't

think we have:the papers here,' and: iloaking at the first papers in the vault.

Mx.. Angleton. On what dates were there?

Mr. Walilach.. Truthfully I don't remember, but I think we

can

trace it back that way.

(Pause.)

Mr. Angleton.

No, it doesn't say anything unless

it does

down here.

(l'ause)

MI. Angleton. No, it skips over the question of when the

first openings occurred.

Mr. Wallach. All right. I think we might be able to

go back the Agency, and

we'll get documentation as to that

specific point.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 36

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

-pa...

MARO A PAUL

910 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

]

2

5

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

14

15

16

17

1c

19

2'5

21

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

Can you tell me in the early days, I'm talking '55, '56,

'57, the fifties, how really the project was set up at llead-

quarters in terms, was there any project staff as existed in the

later years?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, there was a group of about six people.

I don't think it went above

six. They handled Russian, Yiddish,

Spanish, German, French, and these different skills were dividedi

among the six people who were known as the CI Project, and

their purpose was simply to analyze the correspondence that

was opened, write a digest, and then there would be cleared

people within certain branches, geographic branches in the

division who were recipients, and

their job was

to fuse or

meld

it with their own activities and to hopefully refine the

watch list. In other words, they would levy requirements or

indicate that such and

such was of no interest.

MI. Wallach. You said levy requirements. They would ask

for à particular person to be placed on

the watch list, and

¡l any mail came either to or from that person -

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

1r. Wallach. It would be intercepted.

. Mr. Angleton. And then when they

finish with the Xero%,

a copy of the digest would be sent back to this group where it

was

destroyed, periodical destruction.

ME. Wallach. Of the copies.

Mr. Angleton. Of the copies.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 37

Phone (Aras 202) 544-6000

MART

810 First Strees, 5.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

1 €

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

6

TOP SECRET

34

But they maintained a copy which was first carded

manually, and then it went to punch card, and then eventually

it went to a tape, the control of which we maintain a computer

tape.

Mr. Wallach. What instructions were actually given to the

Office of Security intercept officers who actually picked up

the mail and opened it and

then sent it down to lleadquarters?

Mr. Angleton.

well, they were given, they were told what

was

of interest and what was not, and I think they had a watch

list, and there was one individual who was fairly sophisticated

and had a great deal of experience in this field and he,

together with the watch list, could make a fairly accurate

coverage of the mail.

Mr. Wallach. Is that Mr.Issaeff you're referring to?

Mr. Angleton.

yes, that's right.

MI. Wallach. What I'm really trying to get at is aside

from the watch list, which you viewed as Mr. Issaeff's

capabilities, he did not have any training in counterintelligence

ability, did he?

MI. Angleton.

Well, I never have seen his PHiS.

' Mr. Wallach. Have you ever met Mr. Issaeff?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Wallach, Well, then, what I'm really trying to find

out is aside from the watch list, this is something I am ashing

most of the people that I've talked to who have been working

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 38

TOP SECRET

phone (Area 202) 344-6000

r.

C.

C.

MARO &PAUL

110 Firs? Street, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

on the project;: there does not seem to have been any real

2

guidance that went out to the people in the field, the Office of

3

Security people whenever they were trained

in counterintelligenco

4

or the actual people who were picking up the mail.

5

6

Mr. Angleton. I think there was definitely guidance

explained to them on what was

of interest and what was not of

7

interest.

8

MI. Wallach. You mean separate from the watch list?

Mr. Angleton. No, I mean the watch list, the embodyment

10

of it.

11

Mr. Wallach.

But I think that at least the figures that

12

have been provided to us show that there were varying figures

13

for varying years,

some years as high as 65 percent of the

14

mail was picked up, was randomly picked up, that was not on the

15

watch list.

16

Mr. Angleton. I agree there because there were a lot of

17

P.O. boxes which were catchalls in Moscow, so you'd follow. a

18

"P.D. box number; a general delivery, and you began to find that :

19

certain organizations in the United States were writing to that

20

P.O. box. Some of the correspondence of Philby, as I recall,

21

to people in this country, the return was

a Post Office box

22

number. So we put,: right across the board, all mail

23

addressed to that Post Office box was picked up.

24

Mr. Wallach. That Post Office box itself was on the watch

25

list.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 39

Phone (Area 202) 346-6000

:

r.

domo..

PAUL

C.

310 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. I'm talking about items now that were not

on the watch list.

MI. Angleton. Well, I mean, there:was a lot of random

collection.

MI. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is how did Mr.

Issaeff and various other people who helped him at one time or

another

MI. Angleton. Well, he had a good idea what was wanted.

He was not completely isolated from what the purpose of the

entire project was. In other words, he had many helpful views

and ideas on, I mean, what was important.

Mr. Wallach. How do you know that, Mr. Angleton?

!

MI. Angleton. Well, I know it because I was told it.

MI. Wallach. By whom?

Mr. Angleton. By people on the project.

Mr. Wallach. Would it surprise you then if Mr. Issaeff

told us that he did not have any guidance and often really didn':

know exactly what it was that was wanted?

Mr. Angleton. It would

surprise me very much.

!I. Wallach. It would? ,

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean, it surprised me a great

deal because the people in the project, I've heard them say

that it couldn't have been done without him.

MI. Wallach. Is that because of his facility in Russian?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 40

_PROna (Area 202) 546-500

too.

C..

$10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1.8

19

20

21

22.

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

MI. Angleton..

Well, and his general perceptions. I mean,

how he could himself interpret the envelopes and the addressees

and

so on•

MI. Wallach. Well, a good percentage of the mail that

went back two and from the Soviet Union was, at least from the

Soviet Union, was propaganda.

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. And I believe that --

Mr. Angleton. Well, there was a big interest in government

at one time on suppressing propaganda mail. I don't know what

happened, but it goes way back. My recollection is, I don't

even know whether the mail was in fact suppressed, I mean, the

propaganda

mail.

Mr. Wallach. Did you yourself at any time have occasion

to make a cursory review of the types of mail that was coming

in?

Mr. Angleton. No. Items would be sent to me but they were

items relating to cases we were on.

Mr. Wallach. What

I'm trying to get at is the basis,

and you said that people had told you this, saying that it

couldn't have been done without Mr. Issacef. It scems that it

1 million pieces came through, discounting propaganda, if the

time is -- there's only a certain amount of mail that Mr.

Issneff can get to, and I don't really know how it can be

deternined if he missed

some or didn't miss some.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 41

PROnA (Area 202) 504

- ...

WARD a FAUL

$10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

How could anybody back at Headguarters make that judgment

2

as to whether he was getting all that was good, or just 10

3

percent of what was good, which looked like a lot, if nobody

4

really know. That's what I'm

5

Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't think that is correct.

6

Scotty Miler and Virgil Mayovand another lady who was there

were very much

on top of this mail business, and also on the

requirements. In other words, they had a vesy strong voice in

9

what was sent to the various branches and divisions, and had

10

a lot to do with the screening of requests for coverage and

11

fit it into their activity.

12

Mr. Wallach.

Maybe I'm just not making myself clear.

13

Maybe I just don't understand your answer, but it seems that

14

we're talking about two different things, one at headguarters,

and I'm not even inquiring into the

process at headquarters.

15

16

I have no doubt but that there were qualified people there.

17

I am talking about the communications between headquarters and

18

the guys in the field who were essentially -- I realize the

19

only background of them seems to be that they were Office

20

of Security people who were educated, well educated, and who

21.

went out there and intercepted mail. It doesn't seem to

22

reflect in here whether there

was any real guidance from

23

headquarters except for the watch list.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I'll have to talk to Miler for that.

24

25

He can explain that..

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 42

Phone (Area 202) 348-8001

Pan 4

0....

r..

C.:

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2?

24

25

11

TOP SECRET

39

Mr. Wallach. What you're saying is you're not really aware!

of that aspect, are you.

Mr. Angleton. I'm not aware of that aspect of it, but

I, don't have any doubts but that there were guidances given

to New York, I mean, they're not out of Personnel. At the

same time I'm confident that the guidance was given.

Mr. Wallach. In your view of the documents, have you seen

one, document that talks about guidance for the people in New

York besides the watch list?

MI. Angleton. I haven't seen all the documents.

Mr. Wallach. You have not seen all the documents, and

those documents that you've seen --

Mr. Angleton. I've not seen it.

Mr. Wallach. You've not seen it.

Mr. Angleton.

No.

MI. Wallach.. Do you know of the particular documents that

you haven't seen?

Mr. Angleton. Well, there are two filing cabinets, I

understand, of documents.

Mr. allach. Relating to this project?

MI. Angleton. I assume relating to the project, yes.

Mr. Wallach, Let's just:say that from the documents you have

there, it looks like we both have the

same amount, so I'm

basing my statement on what I've

seen.

MI. Angleton. Well, we've been trying to get ahold of

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 43

pRone (Ares 202) 544-6000

r..

can.

end "ib

begit.

110 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 2000]

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2:1

24

25

40

TOP SECRET

MI: Taikerdanos.for three or four days now, but he's gone up

in the House.

Mr. Wallach. I'm sorry, in where?

Mr. Angleton. In the House, in the House committee.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know what he's been doing with the

House Committee?

Mr. Angleton. No. He's simply not been available. I

tried to call him last night well past the close of business,

and he was in meetings. He's been working with the Department

of Justice. And the purpose of it was simply to try to get from

him the answers to a lot of questions which I have on my mind,

"which are not too far distant from the ones you're asking me

now.

Mr. Wallach. You mean by that the one or two areas that

liwe really covered

so far?

Mr. Angleton. I've been trying to find out more about the

questions and specifics on events that occurred which are not

reflected in the papers I've seen.

Mr. Wallach. I'd like

to show you another document which

is an

internal FBI memorandur dated January 22, 1958, and it's

from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Bordman, and ask you to take a quick

look at that, sir.

(The document referred to

was marked

as Angleton Exhibit

No. 3 for identification.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 44

phone (Area 202) 544-6000

C.:

WARD & PAUL

7 ;

310 First Street, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

-70

8

9

10

1

1

12

13

14

15

1

8

1

9

20

21

22

23

24

25

40-Л

TOP SECRET

(Angleton Exhibit No 3 will be

found in the files of the

Committee.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 45

phone (Area 202) 348-500€

r.

C.

WARD

PAUL

110 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2}

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. I see the source there is to protect the

British.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, we do have an agreement that

the Bureau that any documents that they give us, that we protect

sources and methods, and we do. If it's required we can go

ahead and get them, but we usually don't.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I see where they crossed it out, but

they left it on the end.

MI. Wallach. If you're saying there's sloppy editing, yes,

in very many cases.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that this may reflect the

events of the period, but it is my understanding and my

memory that this thing on the Bureau's inguiry was going back ane

forth for some time.

MI. Wallach. You mean they had reason to believe that the

CIA was engaging in a mail intercept in New York?

Mr. Angleton. Nell, my own view is that they were not

entiraly ignorant of

all this, and this is again the kind of

question which I cannot get a response to. I have a feeling

that we were handling much of this as we would communications

intelligence; that is, disseminating some of the material in

disguised form with false attribution

source.

Mr. Wallach. Even at that time in '57?

Mr. Angleton. well, that I'd have to find out, but we as

other operations much more sensitive than this, and the materia!

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 46

Phone (Aras 202) 564-6001

-...

WARO &

PAUL

410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

42

had to get out into an action element of government in which the

material was camouflaged, rewritten, and given a false source

description. So that would be the normal procedure, even

in

the case of this material, assuming that there was something of

great importance that was turned up.

Mr. Wallach. Once again what you're stating, it was

kind of assumption or kind of speculation.

MI.. Angleton. It's an assumption, but it's one of those

questions which I have been trying to find the answer to.

MI. Wallach. Just looking at this memorandum for a second,

do you renember going over and speaking to Mr. Belmont about this

project on your initiative?

Mr. Angleton. No. I talked to Papich.

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember going over and talking to

Papich?

Mr. Angleton.. No.

Ile used to come to our place every

day.

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember, did he broach the subject

with you?

The reason I'm asking is, it appears the Bureau mäde

inquiries in New York to the Postal Service for the same type

of

project, not the same type of project, but for a project

to mail from the Soviet Union, and that the Postal Service kind

of called CIA leadquarters and said the burcau is inquiring,

what do you want us to do. And that sort of set the time

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 47

Phone (Area 202) 588-6000

210 First Street, S.E. Washingion, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET:

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1€

17

18!

19

2:

21

22

2?

24

25

frame, you might have gone over there. And then there's a

meeting a couple of days later with the CIA.

MI. Angleton.

Well, this is a question where dates are

important, but I do know the files

reflect in some part, as I

recall, two different stories, one that the Bureau contacted

the Postal authorities and were told to see CIA, and another

one in which the Postal authorities contacted the CIA to say

the Bureau wants to get into the same field. And anyway, the

decision was made the Bureau had to be cut in.

Mr. Wallach. In Me. Belmont's memorandum - and I under-

stand he wrote the memorandum and not you - he quotes you as

saying that the sole purpose of the New York operation was for

the coverage the sole purpose of the New York operation's

coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who

might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in

their countries as contacts

and sources for CIA.

Is that your understanding of the sole purpose of the

operation?

1r. Angleton. No.

Ir. Wallach, Well, I think that this may

sidetrack us

For a second, but if you would really on the record explain,

it's been, it's kind of documented in various parts here

aS

to

what really you feel are the purposes

and benefits of this

operation.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think the basics are simply that

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 48

phone (Arta 202) 544-600x

WARD A PAUL

C.

110 Forst Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

16

TOP SECRET

44

It - well, starting off first was this security, hopefully

from the soviets, that this activity was going on, in other

words, that the one would hope that they did not have any

knowledge of it. Otherwise, it could have become a channel

also for deception on their part in a major way.

Beatin's

Now, my feeling on that is particularly

reviewing Boudien's

letters and Philby's, is that they were unaware of the censorship.

Now, I said before and I'll say it again, that the obstacles

for counterintelligence in'a democratic society working against

totalitarian type of intelligence service is very inadequate,

and the obstacles of simply trying to accomplish even the most

minimal investigations or coverage and of course, this varies

to a large extent in the west. I mean, there are many western

services that do have rather complete counterintelligence

coverage, and it is afforded by the entire government.

Here, I mean in terms of the perspective of our assets,

the mail program loomed as an extremely important object, I mean

in terms of exsight and insight into soviets who were traveling

here, Soviet students, and

we hal

an active program of

recruitment, attempted recruitments of soviet students, our

knowledge that practically every soviet student is at the

sufferance of Kib, where it is worked in necessarily into the

mechanisn.

It is also the grounds for

preparing young people

in Anerican

realities who come back

and go into the service

and more active roles.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 49

5

Phone (Arsa 202) 564-6000

.:

WARD

C...

210 First Street, S.E.., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

144

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

So that I think that by way of counterintelligence weapons

outside of communications intelligence, and there's practically

little or none of that for the time being, that it was probably

most important overview that Counterintelligence had. It was

also an overview, and we were very active in propaganda in all

different forms, the Cord Meyer operations and so on. And

it had the specific cases, going back into the period of

civil strife and whatnot, it was the only source of information

in those cases.

And I think you've seen the requirements which the Bureau

levied, and again, it was the only source of information which

the FBI ever had in those subjects.

Mr. Wallach. That is assuming that the Bureau did not have

its own project.

Mr. Angleton. I mean, in spite of all of that, this.

was documentation, you know, where it differs, I mean, it

goes up to the top of the

class

in the sense of grading the

bona fides of the sources and information next to Communications

INtelligence; if the opposition does not linow it, then the

mail becomes

an extremely important source of very high level

information. I mean, it's factual.

MI. Wallach. May I take you one step further on that?

would there be

any benefit to an operation like this

if we had, for example, back in '51 Congress had passed a

specific statute and said in certain circumstances the CIA can

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 50

18

phone (Ares 202) 544-6000

WARD

210 Firsl Streel, S.E.. Washingion, O.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

'8

9

10

11

12

1'3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2:,

24

25

TOP SECRET

46

open

mail, and the Soviets would have known that the CIA could

possibly have done that, and let's say today we passed that

legislation. I think you can understand what I'm getting at.

Now, would that have any benefit in just reviewing, I

think probably less benefit, if there was any benefit, but of

having that kind of statute in narrowly prescribed circumstances;

it could be entirely held secret, you know, possibly given

the approval of the President or whatever, if there was different

types of legislation, because I don't believe it now exists --

that it would be of any benefit.

I mean,

I. think this is one of the questions that academia ..

Mr. Angleton. Well, personally, I am too close to these

inquiries to be very objective on what if because my own personal

view is that, you know, counterintelligence and the work on

the Bloc in large measure has been destroyed by these hearings.

That's my personal view.

Í cannot see a Soviet defector coming over to the United

States, so to speak, in a sense committing suicide. I don't

think that agents who are high level agents are going to have

anything to do with the Agency for

a great deal of time with

all of these exposures. I think the Soviets have had very

high level discussions and conferences regarding how they can

exploit this

period

to achieve the maximun benefits for

themselves.

I think they will probably run a damage report on what

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 51

TOP SECRET

they have uncovered through these public hearings in terms of

how it affected their operations.

I would also say they provauly

put a tremendous number of agents on ice in order to avoid any

type of a reaction.

For example, I mean, they've done it in the past when they've

been in a period of crisis, where there's been a crisis in the

west, they have put agents on ice in order to avoid any kind of

political scandal.

Mr. Wallach. You're seeing some sort of a backlash in the

u.s.?

C...

WARD & PAUL

$10 First Streel, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Angleton. That type of thing, but after the Gozenko

cases up in Canada for ten years there was a type of prohibition

on operations in Canada because of the impact in Canada politi-

cally that that had in many areas

of the world, and these were

conscious decisions that they arrived at.

Now, I think any of them saying, what has happened to the

U.S. intelligence community, that the only people they would make

use of would be agents of influence, and find another way of

putting water on the wheel without themselves becoming directly

inplicated. I think this would he the normal direction of any !

adversary service, when it sees

that somebody else is doing

the job for them.

So going back to this basic question that you have asked,

I think there may have been in the '50s an opportunity to

have influenced the Congress to have some kind of bills passed

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 52

phone (Ares 202) 546-6000

WARD A PAUL

$10: First Streer, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

1

that would have aided the investigative agencies on the problem

2

of espionage. Other countries do have it.

But our General Counsel -- and I am not speaking authori-

tatively here -- it is my impression is that one of our weak

5

nesses is that

we did not have the General Counsel work into

6

7

the planning phases of operations.

Usually we went to the

General Counsel when something was going wrong, but not in the

8

inception of operations.

If there had been much more of that,

9

that type of consultation of things being originated, then a

10

General Counsel might have been able to cure a number of these

11

programs by proposing types of legislation.

12

13

Now, this was

not done. Now I think it is too late. I

don't think the mood of the country would support that type of

14

#legislation.

15

MI. Wallach. Are you saying it's too late because of the

16

mood of the country or too late for practical reasons?

17

Mr. ingleton. No, I think it is the mood of the country

18

principally, and then, as I say, I suspend judgment, my own

19

personal view is that it would not have the same benefits.

20

In tine it might again, if the pendulum swings again, but I

21

don't foresee that happening.

22

But I think that the other -- to put this in further

2:

perspective, I don't know if people really appreciate how diffi-

24

cult it is to work against the Soviets. When we

have a major

25

leakage in the Government, and I will refer to one case which

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 53

phone (Area 202) 984-6006

soon

«ы .

WARD A PAUL

210 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1.'

18

19

2C

21

22

2:

24

25

21

TOP SECRET

49

involved some government documents which have fallen into the

hands of the opposition, for a number of years they would take

those documents and then falsify either a cover letter of an

American official to another official, and float that document

in the third world. And the

attachments would be bona fide.

They were actually military documents on weaponry, whereas

the thrust of the entire operation was disinformation, total

fabrication.

We could

identify in our holdings the American documents

which were authentic, the attachments. When we tried to work

on the case, and even coming to the original recipients, it ran

into over 300 names or more, without going down to all of the

xeroxes that were made of those documents, or all of the people

who were not listed

as recipients in different offices.

On the Soviet

side, if there is a leakage, they can pinpoint

very rapidly that there were only

two of three people who knew

the secret, and that one of them was in the west. So the problen

that they have in terms of filling in the noles are relatively

simple under their system, because they have every bigot list

in terms of the need to know. So if there is a

leakage, as

there was in one of our biggest cases, the Popov case, which vas

the speech of chukov in Germany, and immediately

it centered of

focused attention on our agent, and

that document went through

the hands of George Blake in Berlin.

so all he did

was tell

his case officer, Soviet, that he

saW

the speech, a copy of thu

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 54

PROno (APas 202) 544-6001

210 First Street, S.F.., Washingion, D.C. 30003

1

2

3

4

/ 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

15

16

17

19

20

21

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

speech that Zhukov gave to the General Staff in Germany, all they

had to do was look as to which of their officers had access, was

in the west, and that had to be our agent.

Mr. Wallach. Now, I think, although I am personally quite

interested in what you're talking about, it would be a better

matter to raise

Mr. Angleton. Well, you asked me the original question to

try to define the intercept program. Unless you understand

what the state of the art is, I mean, it would be difficult for

you to put as high

an evaluation on it as we do, or as the

SB Division gave it in the times when they were first set up .

as a geographic unit.

Mr. Wallach. Well, let me at this time continue, so that

without marking for the time being, and without

asking you to

read the whole thing, because it is twelve pages, and there's

only one or two sections of it I would like you to look at, is

Annex 2 of the Inspector General's survey of the Office of

Security, which is dated in 1960, and I'll just give this to

you. And the bottom of the first page is not that clear, but

we're not going to go to that.

Mr. Angleton. This was 1960?

MI. Wallach, les,

sir.

As a matter of fact, why don't I mark this as Exhibit ,

the above-described docunent, which is an annex to and is 12

pages.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 55

Phone (Ares 202) 344-6300

0т..

C.,

a. .

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 4

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 4 will

be found in the files of the

Committee.)

6

7

8

9

10

12

14

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 56

Priona (Aras 202) 587-6000

WARD

810 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

21

22

22,

24

25

24

TOP SECRET

52

MI. Wallach. And since that is stamped Top Secret, we

will classify the entire transcript as Top Secret.

Mr. Angleton. I am just scanning this. I have not seen it

before.

MI. Wallach. Right.

As I said before, I have a couple of specific questions and

¡you can read those paragraphs:

MI. Angleton. I am unaware of the first Recommendation A.

I am

aware of the Recommendation B. I have not seen this

document before.

Mr. Wallach. I realize you've only had quick opportunity

to just

skim it at

this time.

Did you in your capacity as Chief of Counterintelligence

have occastion to get any input from the Inspector General's

office from surveys?

Mr. Angleton. On occasion.

Mr. Wallach. I, for example, was told by someone else

that this was held by the Office of Security, and you'll see

there's a later one here, an IG survey of the CI staff that

at least one of two people I have spoken to who were involved

at that time had no occasion to get any feedback from this, and

I was wondering if you at your level had, after a review was

made, be it through the Office of security, about a project

that was

essentially CI's, did have feedback from this?

Mr. Angleton. I think the only feedback was on the question

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 57

phone (Area 202) 564-6000

un...

PAUL

8...

910 First Streel, S.E., Washington.

D.C. 20003

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

53

TOP SECRET

of the cover story.

Mr. Wallach. And I have a couple of documents here that I

think you've probably seen recently that I'll show you again.

But, for example, and there are a couple of specific questions I

have.

In the second paragraph of this, the IG report annex

states, "the activity cannot be called a 'project' in the usual

sense because it was never processed through the approval

system and has no separate funds." And ther it goes on to

explain that the various components involved have been carrying !

out the responsibility as

part of their normal staff functions:

And really, all I want to get is an understanding of what

they

mean, if you know, by approval system.

Mr. Angleton. Well, the approval system would have meant

that this would have had to go to a great number of components

who would have to sign off on it, and it would receive tremendous

dissemination in the Agency.

MI. Wallach, That, at least to me, seems the opposite

of a highly sensitive operation.

Mr. Angleton. That is the reason I think it was excepted

fron it, and that way it short circuited the normal project

approval process.

Mr. Wallach. In other lords, from approval, they're not

talking about going straight up to the Director. They are talking

about laterally going out?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 58

54

TOP SECRET

Phone (Arda 202) 588-6000

AUL

«...

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Angleton. Yes, more or less. When a project is

concoived, it might cut across many jurisdictions to begin with,

I mean different geographic divisions and so on, so there would

have to be a signoff by the varlous components, and then it would

go before a project review board, which again the members would

be drawn from many parts of the clandestine services, and I

mean, you would have this tremendous opening up of the activity

to a great number of people.

Mr. Mallach. But it would just seem to me -- obviously

my knowledge of the Agency is limited - that this would entirely

be, you know, again kind of totally against the grain of any

sort of need to know concept.

Are you saying

it is not because the components usually

involved would have some need to know?

Mx. Angleton. No. Because of the

fact that it involved

Security, it involved ourselves, in the

SA Division, and since

the Director and everybody concerned were so faniliar with it,

it was very easy to exempt it from the project system.

Mr. Wallach. Who would make a determination as to that

could be exempted

and what could not be exempted?

Mr. Angleton. Oh, the Deputy Director probably could. I

mean, it would depend on what the operation is. I mean there

could be operations where he himself would not give the exemption,

he'd want the Director to sign off on it.

Mr. Wallach. I call your attention to the paragraph

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 59

Socompthe

Phone (Area 202) 584-5000

WARD

PAU1

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

155

TOP SECRET

numbered six on page 3. It states, "The principal guidance

furnished to the interception team is the watch list of names

compiled by the CI Staff. The names may be submitted by the

SR Division, the FBI, CI Staff, and the Office of Security.

The list is revised quarterly to remove names no longer of

interest, and it ranges between 300 or 400 nameg." And then

it just goes on and states, "Headquarters has prepared the

actual watch list intercepts with the photographs of all

exteriors. There has not yet been a case of a watch list item

having been missed by intercéptors. Of total items opened,

about one third are on the watch list and the others are

selected at random. Over the years, however, the interceptors

have developed

a sixth

sense or intuition, and many of the names

on the watch list were placed there

as a result of

interest

created by the random openings.

"A limited amount of guidance is given in the specific

area of topical requirements, but this is not very

satisfactory.

The interception team has to rely largely on its own judgment

in the selection of two

thirds of the openings, and it should

have more first hand knowledge of the objectives and plans of

operational components which levy the roguirements. Information

is now filtered through several echelons, and is more or less

sterile by the time it is received in New York."

Anc I don't really want to take argument with this of not.

My real question is whether or not this was really conveyed

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 60

TOP SECRET

OnE LAPBE 2021

am..

HARD A PAUL

310 Frrs1 Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to you, because at least from the people I have interviewed and

talked to, including numerous of the intercept people, they

really felt left out in the cold in certain circumstances, and

there was no feedback at all on the operation.

And here I think we have a kind of a recommendation, although

it may not be formalized and per se a recommendation, where they

are saying let's give them more guidance. I just really want to

know if this was brought to your attention, for example:

Mr. Angleton.

Well I was never aware that anyone in the

operation felt that he was not getting guidance, and as I say,

I have not, to my knowledge, I've never seen this report. The

only thing I've ever seen on it is a memorandum that starts off

something about the IG report, and it got into the whole question

of

the cover story.

MI. Wallach. One last reference on this, Mr. Angleton,

on page 11, the paragraph numbered 13, it begins, "Operational

evaluation should include an assessment of overall potential.

It is improbable that anyone inside Russia would wittingly

send or receive mail containing anything of obvious intelligenco

or political significance."

Then it continues on, including comments to the effect

that cortain innocent

statements can have

intelligence

significance, such as prices, crop conditions, etc., that goes

by

censorship.

But that really doesn't secn to vitiate the

first sentence, at least, which was it's improbably that anyone

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 61

PROne (Area 202) 544-6000

- ..

PAUL

C.

s.?.

N.

€ 10 First Street, S.F., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1a l

20

21

22

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

inside Russia would wittingly send or receive mail containing

anything of obvious intelligence or political significance.

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that is accurate, though.

Mr. Wallach. That's what I was going to ask you.

Mr. Angleton.. I don't think that's accurate. I think

that the case, one that we could cite is the case of one of

Hammer'g illegitimate sons came: over here. He had previously

been identified to us as KGB. And I don't know if you are

familiar with that whole period of the New Rconomic Policies in

the '20s, but in any event, many industrialists put their all,

so to speak, in Russia, had second families and illegitimate

children. The project. of the net: was run by Derjinski under

Lenin's order. Derjinski was head of the OGPU, and the purpose

of it was the improvement of capitalists on a broad basis, and

it was one of the foundations of the entire field of Lenin's

strategy, which to our way of thinking has been resuscitated

as a result of de-stalinization.

But anyway, he went to lew York. He was acknowledged

by the family and he wrote a great number of letters back, all

of which we

intercepted. Now, we know he is a staff officer

in KGB and his ostensible

assignment here

was to write on the

Kennedy assassination, which

is a recurring theme among KGB

people, i.c., a right wing conspiracy, etc.

Now, all of this went

to the Bureau. I an

not saying

inow

much coverage was given to him. And I would say that

a great

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 62

TOP SECRET

1

2

mono (Ares 202)

MARO A PAUL

D.C. 20003

end 2 26

begin

410 First Street, S.E.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

deal of this information has been acquired here, has not been

put into operational or investigative - it has not been.

exploited. But that has a lot to do with the cadres and the

amount of personnel that is involved.

The same goes for one of the biggest cases that's engaged

practically all western intelligence, is Victor Luis, and that

whole history and background.

Mr. Wallach. I think I understand you're taking argument.

MI. Angleton. Yes, I take argument because these people,

or whoever made those comments simply was not aware of the

cases that were of interest.

Mr. Wallach. Well, that really goes to the heart of my

question. Here we have a group that's really theoretically

revicwing projects and making recommendations, and in one respect

they're supposed to be the internal reviewing arm of the Agency,

and possibly the General Counsel's office, that whole side of

the Agency, and really from what you said, it doesn't seem

really tuned in, so to speak, as to the value of the

project,

and I think that it continues in the '69.

I'm not disputing with you at this point that the project

did or did not have value. All I'm saying is that --

Mí. Angleton. Well, I mean, I don't like to nave to

defend it in that sense because to begin with, I never had any

meetinys with these people, and I

see here as a result of the

Inspector General's survey, December '60 --

, TOP SECRET

---

## Page 63

г...

PONA (ArBA 2021 584600

410 First Street, S.E. Washingion, D.C. 20003

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. I think the memorandum you're referring to

is the next memorandum I had that I was going to show you.

Mr. Angleton. It is a Security memorandum.

Mr. Wallach. But I think there's a subsequent memorandum

following that up from the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff dated

1 February '62, but in any event, all I said, the only point I'm

trying to get at is very truthfully that you seem to have an

internal review that really didinot have some sort of under-

standing of the project, and whether or not there was any

really internal review of it at all.

Mr. Angleton.

Well, the point where I have to be very

careful is, I don't know whether they interviewed my own people,

Bir.ch.

you see.

I mean, they interviewed Bert O'Neal, Scotty Miler.

If they did, I am unaware of it. If they did, I am unaware of

it, but again, the only notification I see, the only thing I

see in Counterintelligence is this memorandum from Security

dealing only with the cover programs, nothing here on the

question of guidance.

Mr. Wallach. What is your understanding of the reasons

behind

the Inspector General's survey of the various

projects?

Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way. I would

imagine there would always be a reluctance on the part of

everyone to have an office, a Security Office, an IG report

ever go to any other component. That would be very unusual.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 64

phone (Ares 202) 588

C..

WARD & PAUL

410 Forse Street, S.E.. Washungion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

It was generally accepted in the Agency, and I think quite

rightly, that the Office of Security has to be completely sealed

off from all other elements in the Agency, I mean in terms of their

internal workings.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, a review might have been

made --

Mr. Angleton. No. They should have extracted, from our

way of thinking, they should have extracted that memorandum,

that part of it, and sent it to us.

Mr. Wallach. Well, that's all I was trying to --

Mr. Angleton. But they may have done so, but I have never

seen it, and I cannot believe that it would have gone to my

people whose really - who are really making quite a fuss about

it, as they did on the cover program.

Now, it may have been an oversight, I don't know.. I

can't reconstruct -- what

was the date on this again?

MI. Wallach. It's in 1960, sir.

The exact date is back

at the office, but it's a 1960 survey.

Did

you know Mr. Thomas Abernathy?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

sI. Wallach, Let me give you a two page memorandun and

mark it as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No.

5 for identification.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 65

PROnA (Area 202) 544-€

ann.

...-

WARD & PAUL

7 6

410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

60-A

(Angleton Exhibit No., 5 will be

found in the files of the

comnittee.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 66

C.

WARD

910 First Streel, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

33

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. Apparently Mr. Abernathy prepared, subseguent

this Inspector General's report in the Office of Security,

and I ast you to take a quick look at this. I'm going to have

a couple of questions on

Paragraph 3.

Mr. Angleton. What was his title then, do you know?

Mr. Wallach. Very frankly, no, I do not.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think It's the same Abernathy

who is now very senior in administration.

He must have been on the inspection staff from the way it

reads.

Mr. Wallach. Exactly. It refers to recommendations. I

am sure he was on the inspection staff. I just don't know his

title.

Mr. Angleton. Where did he ever get a figure that the cI

Staff had about 30 people working on it full time?

Mr. Wallach. I don't know.'

I think we probably should

ask him that. It would seem at least from some of the figures

he

has here that he would have at least have attempted to tall

to sonebody in CI about a project that was run by CI Staff.

MI. Angleton. I don't know, I don't understand it. I

didn't know there was ever any issue of that sort.

MI. Wallach. In other words, neither Mr. Abernathy nor

Mir. Belnon ever came in to talk to you about it?

Mr. Angleton. No.

MI. Wallach. And said we think there's a problem; let's

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 67

C.

C.

FROne (Area 202) 544-600

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

62

TOP SECRET

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

- 1.4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

talk about it?

Birch

MI. Angleton. No.. They may have talked to

Bert O'Neal,

who would be the logical person to come to first.

MI. Wallach. Is MI. O'Neal still with the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. No, he,'s retired some time ago. I think he's

in the area.

But I think again the person who would be most

knowledgeable would be Mr. Miler.

Me. Wallach. I mark now as Exhibit 6 a January 2, 1962

memorandum

for Chief, CI Staff, Attention, and the name

1s

deleted. The subject is Project HTLINGUAL, and it's from the

Deputy Chief, Office of Security. I think that was Mi. White

at that time.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 6

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 6 will be

found in the files of the

Committec.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 68

Phone (Area 202) 544

WARD & PAUL

7%

410 Fust Street, S.E... Washington, D.C. 20003

2

4

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. And we'1l mark as Exhibit y'for identification

as 1 February '62 memorandum for the Director, Office of

Security, Subject: Project HILINGUAL. This is from the

Deputy Chief, Cd Staif.

6

00

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 7

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 7 with .

be found in the files of the .

Committee.)

14

15

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 69

36

honE (Arga 202)

346-6001

same.

a10 First Strees, S.

E., Washington. O.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

io

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. And I belleve that these are two memoranda

regarding the cover story for the project that Mr. Angleton had

referred to before.

MI. Angleton. Let me just see if I have a memo here which

says where it originated at.

MI. Wallach. I think your memorandum might not have the

name blocked out like ours. It is fairly easy to trace. in

certain circumstances, and in others it is more difficult.

(Pause)

Mr. Angleton.

This originally went to Mr. John Mertz, who

was my Executive Officer.

Mr. Wallach.

He was at one time the project chief, was

he not?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I think so. Yes, he was the project

chief.

Mr. Wallach. You're talking about the January 1lth

memorandum went to John Mertz?

Do you recall ever discussing

it with him on or about

January 11, '62?

!r. Angleton. I did not discuss it with hin. He prepared

on 1 February '62 the answer.

The project, actually, the head

of

the project at that time was a man called Chalmers.

Mr. Wallach. You say Mr. Mertz prepared the 1 February

'62 memorandum?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 70

C.

PROng (Area 202) 544

410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

:65

ME. Wallach. le prepared it under the signature of the

Deputy Chief, CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. Who would that have been at that time?

MI. Angleton. llis name was James R. Hunt.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever discussing this cover

story in the early 'Gos, '62, or the noed for a cover story?

MI. Angleton. I can't recall that. We had

a major defector

in December '61,

and I think from then on for a year or so that

151.1 lar

was

about my own preoccupation, but I do not recall this --I

mean, I have read it since.

Mr. Wallach. Do you think that in today's time there would

be consideration given

to a cover story such as this as was

considered in the early '60s?

Mr. Angleton.

Well, you see, your report says a memorandum

for CI staff. The actual thing

is

for Chief, CI Staff, Attention:

Mr . Mertz.

Mr. Wallach. Yes. I think this says attention CI, also

and his name is blocked out.

Hir. Angleton. I didn't see that.

#r. Wallach.

I am saying it did or did not get to you.

You say it didn't, and that is a matter of record. But the

memorandun which air. lertz sent in reply under Mr. Hunt's

signature really in Paragraph 5 states, "It is most important

that all Federal law enforcement and U.S. intelligence agencies

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 71

C.

...

C.

S. E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

310 First

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

266

TOP SECRET

vigorously deny any association, direct or indirect, with any

such activity as charged." And his stated reason is that since

no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the

violation, and

existing Federal statuteg

preclude the concoction

of any legal excuse for such violation, it must be recognized

that no cover story is available to any government agency.

And then it goes on to say, "In the event of a compromise,

this position should be made known immediately to the Postmaster

General. He is fully knowledgeable of the project."

And I would like to stop there

and

ask you if you have

any knowledge that the then Postmaster General, I think it was

Mr. Day, was fully knowledgeable of the project.

Mr. Angleton. Well, do you have

a paper that déals with

any meetings with Day before this?

MI. Wallach. Well, I have a paper that Mr. Helms wrote

that I think you have.

MI. Angleton. That was before this?

Mr. Wallach. A 1961 paper, sir, in which it says, "withheld

no relevant details."

Very truthfully, Mo. Helms does not recall whether or not

he told Mr. Day what - well, in essence he doesn't recall

what was held -- what no relevant detail meant. He doesn't

recall what he told him, and there is a later CCI project

note in '74, or '73, I am sorry, which again says Mr. ilelms

really leaves some doubt as to what he meant.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 72

3

4

5

6

:

HARD A

PALE

910 Fires Street. 5.E. Mashonason, D.C. 20003

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2'3

24

25

TOP SECRET

I am just wondering if you had any knowledge.

Obviously Mr. Mertz did, but I was wondering if you did,

whether the Postmaster General was fully knowledgeable of the

project.

MI. Angleton. No, that would be spculation, but I would

have thought that Mr. Helms would have told him everything, for

the simple reason that he knew him quite well outside government.

Mr. Wallach. MI. Day?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean, I met him at Helms' house. le

seemed to be a friend of the family.

MI. Wallach. Was there a reason why certain Postmasters

General would have been told and certain would not have been

told? I think there were three or four between Mr. Day and

Mr. Blount?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the reasoning one way of

another, but I think that behind all of it was that 'the

Postinaster General in those days was also at the very top in

terms of the party in power.

Mr. Wallach. You mean a Cabinet official?

ir. Angleton. Yeah. It was the standard sinecure for

the campaign head of the party.

Mr. Wallach. So was Me. O'Brien after that, Mr. Gronouski?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying in Day's case that I would hav:

thought that everything

was told to him about the project.

can't see any

rcason going over and seeing him unless he was

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 73

68

prone (Area 202) 344-5000

m.тo

WARD & PAUL

910 First Street, S.E.., Washengion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

given very full disclosure, but that again is my own speculation,

plus, fortified by the line in Dick's memorandum -- would you

mind Incalling it to me?

Mr. Wallach. "Withheld no relevant details."

MI. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. Just getting into the fact of a cover story

here, in essence it seems that Mr. Mertz's replying to the

memorandum that was

sent to him saying, the hell, we can't

have a cover story here, we've just got to deny, you know, any

participation in it!

Mr. Angleton. I agree with his conclusions.

Mr. Wallach. All right. I guess I don't see any more point

to go into that.

Mr. Angleton. It is possible that lunt might have discussed

it with me, and this

is one month

after that defection, and that

was a full time, seven day a weel: business.

I also note here in passing that the memorandum of.

20 December '62 from

Sheffield Edwards to Deputy Director,

Support, subject: Inspection of Office of

Security by

Inspector General -- it goes on and refers

to

Recommendation

11A of Inspector General's report

and

subsequent evaluation, ind

to the subsequent evaluation of lITLINGUAL. "In connection with

the

above-mentioned evaluation, this is to advise you that the

project has been thoroughly reviewed by all interested Agency

components. This review has resulted in the conclusion that thu

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 74

69

Phone (Area 202) 546-6000

r..

MAPO

....

$10 Forst Sireer. S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1₴

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

project is of value to the Agency's overall mission in the

collection of intelligence, and as such, it should be continued."

Mr. Wallach. But that really doesn't go - still doesn't

go to what I was going to jefore, that you were informed after

intervicwing certain people that there were certain problems.

I realize you may have been preoccupied with certain other

things.

Mr. Angleton. I mean I am simply stating that there must

have been some meetings

that were held which I don't see any

record of between the Office of Security and our project

people.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I take it that after the first couple

of months, that this project really held no value per se for the:

Office of Security. It was primarily of value to the CI Staff.

Mr. Angleton. Quite the contrary, I think that it was

of value to the office of security. I think that they built

their own

files and records on the whole thing. They had

.. -

a very first rate

research

and analysis group that had a lot

to do with their responsibilities on employment and distribution

of employces. So there was a great deal turned up in the

project that related to organizations and things of this sort.

MI. Wallach. Along those lines, are you aware that any

timo of one

of the categories of mail that was requested to

be intercepted and opened

vias

mailed to or fron elected or

appointod U.s. officials?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 75

pRona (Ares 202) 544-5000

dinose

WARD & PAUL

110 First Stepet, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. ?0003

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

• 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

MI. Angleton. Well, I know there is a memorandum, and it

may be well after the event that forbids it.

Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about the December 1971

memorandum?

MI. Angleton. I don't know which one.

MI. Wallach. Well, let me get that out, MI. Angleton,

because I think a clear reading of that will make it obvious

that it is not forbidden.

The oly thing that happens as a

result of that memorandum is that separate procedures are set

up, and I think I have a copy here for you. If:it is not the

one we are referring to, we can look at the other one, and I

would like

to mark the 22nd

December 1971 memorandum as

Exhibit 8, and the subject

is Handling of Items to or from

Elected or Appointed U.S. Officials.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 8

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 8 will

be found in the files of the

Committce.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 76

C.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

110 Forst Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. I would ask you if this is the item you were

referring to.

(Pause)

MI. Angleton. Well, first, I don't know what prompted this,

I mean, what prompted their --

Mr. Wallach, Well, let me see if I can refresh your

recollection, but first let me ask if this is a document that

you were referring to before?

MI. Angleton. It is the same document.

Mr. Wallach. Would you agree with me that it does not

preclude the intercepting or opening of mail to or from elected-

or appointed U. S. officials?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. In Paragraph 1(b)

MI. Wallach. Do you recall ever discussing this matter?

Mr. Angleton. It is possible, but it doesn't stick out.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anything ever called special

category items or special file that's referred to in Paragraph

F, that would be set up?

Mr. Angleton. Not necessarily, but I mean, it wouldn't

surprise me.

Mr. Wallach. One doesn't exist.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, normally in all projects,

as

they developed they would always be

sonething that is pushed

aside that is very sensitive.

ME. Wallach. Mr. Rocca was at this time your deputy, wis

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 77

phone lArea 2021 34

to + .

210 Fiest Street, 5.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2:

22

23

24

25

he not?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Wallach. Do you recall at any time Mr. Rocca calling

to your attention that a large number of communications to

Senators Church and Kennedy had been picked up and that this

might not be a great idea to disseminate it throughout the

Agency of to the Bureau, and that there may be a need for a

|| different procedure once the material reached headquarters?

Does that ring a bell at all?

Mr. Angleton.

Who were the two?

Mr. Wallach.

Senators Kennedy and Church, and also a

congressman, I can't remember his name now. The last name

begins with a "G" I believe.

And apparently Mr. Lichenheim,

who was the Chief of the project at this time, passed these on

to Mix. Rocca because he thought they were interesting,.or for

vinatever reason, and Mr. Rocca

Mr. Angleton. Was that something he wrote on a pink

cover sheet and holographed, to your knowledge?

MI. Wallach. I don't know, sir, very truthfully, sir.

It outlines the

same question you raised, what precipitate.

this memorandul, it tooi a month and

a half of investigating to

find out that there was a special files category that did exist '

and that there were previous memoranda that for one reason or

another the Ayency had not given to us, although they were

requested, and we made a priority request again yesterday

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 78

none (Area 202) 344-6000

WARD A

310 First Sirert, 8.E., Woshington, 0.6. 20003

TOP SECRET

1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2:

24

25

morning.

Mr. Angleton. Well, the special category doesn't surprise

me because certain letters

such as that llammer business, and

Philby and a few other things, would go into . I mean, would

be segregated, because there would be a lot of colinteral

probably attached to it.

MI. Wallach. I'm not disagreoing with you, but 1t is my

understanding that all of the special category items included

was mail to or from appointed or elected U.S. officials, or at

least a special category or file, so there may have been other

special files, and I think we've had testimony that insofar

as this project was concerned, except for the occasional hot

item that might be sent directly to someone higher, that this

was the only special procedure set up, and

it was precipitated

as a result of correspondence.coming in that was described

before.

I think if you remember, that was back at the time of

Vietnam, and we mentioned Congress was acting on that, and I

believe Senator Church was

just taking a tour and was receiviny

correspondence.

I don't want to say that I know exactly what's in that

file, because I don't.

MI. Angleton. No, well, I nean, I am unaware that althougi:

I want io ser here - well, I don't know.

Mr. Wallach. I have been

told that there was an August ii,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 79

none (Arr+ 202) 544-6001

..;

котлета

Г.

NARO

& PAUL

...

910 Forst Street, S.E., ViasMington, D.C. 70003

1

2

3

4

5

TOP SECRET

'71 memorandum which precipitated this, and just for your

information you might want to ask to see that.

Mr. Angleton. August?

Mr. Wallach. August 30, 1971 memorandum. We do not have

a copy of it, otherwise I would show it to you.

As Exhibit 9 for identification I would like to ask a one

page letter dated January 13, 1971 -- I'm sorry, it is a two

page letter, but really, before I do that, I would like to ask

Mr. Angleton to focus his attention on a time that has become

more clear in more recent months, when Mr. Cotter became Chief

of the Inspection service.

7

8

9

10

11

1.2

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

(The document referred to was

marlied Angleton Exhibit No. 9

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 9 will

be found in the files of the

Committee.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 80

prone (Ares 202) 544-8001

409% a

HARO

PAUL

310 first Street, S.f. Weshington. D.C. 20003

1

4

5

6

+7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach, Really what I'm going to be getting into

"now

is, although it took four years, the termination of the project

and the events that happened during that time, and 1f we could

focus our attention on that.

What is the first time that you recall, Mr. Angleton, that

you recall there was any consideration being given to really

terminating the project?

Mx. Angleton. It came up more than once, and it usually

came up as a result of somebody who was a contact of Security

going to

Security and telling them that they had better have

new principals or they had a change of some sort, they wanted

reassurance.

Mr. Wallach. What do you mean by new principals?

#ir. Angleton. A new Postmaster General, basically that.

I

mean there would be a change of people at the top.

Mr. Wallach. Well, you say it happened more than once.

You mean it happened more than once in the life of the project?

You're talking about the period - we're talking

about

Mr. Angleton. I'm talking about through the life of tho

project, I mean, if there were any changes in the Post Offic

or something, there would be concern expressed that those

people should be briefed.

Mr. Wallach. Was there concern, if you know, that the

Postmaster should be briefed that the CIA had a mail cover,

TOP SECRET

BO

---

## Page 81

phone (Area 202) 564-6000

6:

C.

$10 First Street, 5. E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

48•

1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

mail opening going on so the Postmaster didn't stumble upon it

and make an inquiry or just to tell him that there was a mall

opening going on? I think there is a difference, in my mind,

and I don't think we have any hard evidence that any Postmaster

General up to Mr. Blount was ever told, and I can see reasons

for both types of concerns, but the first one would almost make

more sense to me, because the Postal Inspectors in New

York knew

that

mail was being provided. Some of the clerks knew the

mail was being provided. In fact, one worked in the operation.

But there is doubt that any of them knew that mail was

actually being opened; such is their testimony. It would alnost

seem to make more sense to brief the Postmaster General, yes;

ie have this intercept, and it's not in accordance with

the

usual procedures, but we are just covering the mail and, you inois,

we just wanted to let you know about that.

And I really, when I ask if you know either way of whether

that was the conern, or the conern was to tell them that we

were opening mail.

Mi. Angleton. Vell, I mean, I cannot remember specificall:.

never attended any mecting with the Postmasters, and the

memorandum, though, well it'came back, were fairly yeneral.

There wasn't any detailed memorandum of the conversation, as

recall it, but there's no question, though, through the life

of the project, the question of continuing it or not came up

from time to time.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 82

phone (Aros 202) 544-6000

tam

WARD & PAUL

r..

₫10

First Sireel, S.F.., Washingion, D.C. 90003

1

2

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

49

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. Aside from the guestion of continuing it,

was

there any difference of degree in that question after, Mr.

Cotter came on board as the Chief Postal Inspector, say from

'69 on?

Mr. Angleton. When did he come on board?

MI. Wallach. April, 1969.

• Mr. Angleton.

I don't know, really. I mean, he obviously

was

much more sophisticated,.he'd been in Security, and I think in

many ways he was probably more conscious of the flap.

Mr. Wallach. On the other hand, because he was in Security,

and

because he had been assigned in the mid-'50s to the

Manhattan field office, he did know that mail was being

opened.

I don't know if you are aware of that or not.

it. Angleton. Well, I knew that he at some stage knew

it.

ir. Wallach. In

any event, he did know that mail was

veing opened. I don't know if he knew the dimentions of the

project because

it had grown since '55 or whatever, approxinatuli

"Si, when he was there, but in any event, he did know, he was

back at leadquarters for a time, and then before he went over,

word bubled up again, the project was continuing. so, I

think you really don't know anything about what his concern

was, or you never really discussed that?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think -- my understanding is his

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 83

C.

phona (Araa 202) 544-6000

$10 Firsi Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 2000]

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21.

22

2.,

24

25

17,8

TOP SECRET

concern was the extent to which he would be compromised, I mean,

his job would be compromised in the Post Office, and he always

wanted some kind of laying on of hands, that is, the Director

secing the Postmaster General and making sure that there was

some kind of touching of base there. That is my general

impression of Cotter's

concern.

MI. Wallach. Is that essentially - I'm not trying to

put words in your mouth - that he was trying to protect himself,

to

make sure that his boss

knew?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I think so. I mean, that is my

impression. I mean, I read the papers about his appearances

and so on, and I don't bear him

any ill will for his statements.

I mean, I think all throughout he was torn about this project.

He was vory ill at ease with it, and I think he -- that his

position was very difficult.

MI. Wallach. I would like to get from you, as best you

can, if you remember the sequence until the termination, and

we have a couple of documents here.

I'm

sure that these are

documents that you have seen and you do have, but in any event,

I will show them to you, but I would 1lke to get at your

menory now as

to

what happened in goneral terms.

ME. Angleton. On the termination?

MI. Wallach. • The events leading to the tormination.

Mr. Angleton. Well, what I recall simply is again a

meetiny had occurred, I think, while Helms was still Director,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 84

phone (Area 202)

5$

201

-.

WARDA PAUL

eng 2b

410 first Street, S.C., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

regarding the question of Cotter, and it was decided to still

go ahead with the project. I can't remember whether there were

any recommendations about seeing anybody at this moment.

Subseguently, when Dr. Schlesinger came aboard, Cotter

did raise a very. strong issue with the Office of Security, and

he coupled it with sort of an ultimatum that if certain steps

were not taken, that he would abandon the operation, and I was

not present, and the ultimatum was presented to DI. Schlesinger,

and I assume it was osborn who signed, or somebody. So the

issue was drawn.

There was to have been a meeting on this in which there would

be arguments presented to DI. Schlesinger. Then something

happened there. It was the same day, I think, that Colby was

made the Deputy Director for Operations, to succeed Karamessines.

So the meeting did not take place. which had been scheduled,

and Colby wrote an opinion about doing away with the operation.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 85

#tape 3.."

amt

2

3

4

5

6

MAGA

310 Fust Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 30003

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

80

In my argument, I induced him to go to a meeting that I

had scheduled on another subject with the Diroctor and so I

pre-empted some of the time in Colby's presence to put up

another argument to the Director to the effect that in my

opinion the President had a vested interest in this.

Mr. Wallach. You say the President?

MI. Angleton. Yas. And I say the decision - I mean, I

questioned that the Director of Central Intelligence could do

away with the project, without:

it being a decision of the

Executive.

Mr. Wallach. Was the President aware of the project?

'Mr. Angleton. Well, can I come back to your question?

I'm just trying to recount what I recall here.

MI. Wallach. Go ahead.

MI. Angleton. Because I felt that there was really grounds.

for vary deep axamination of the value of 1t, its value to the

Bureau and ourselves, and he, in effect told me and he told

Colby also that he would be very pleased, or words to that

effect, to consult the Prosident, and he overruled his

previous ruling with.colby about closing it down and instructed

Colby to get word through to cotter that if he would hold off

on his ultimatum that he would consult with higher authority.

and this word was passad through Colby to sacurity who, in tur,

talked to Cotter and he rufused to do it and it was closed down

that evening.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 86

Phone (Ares 202) 388-6000

..:

WARU A PAUL

A10 Forst 51+pe6, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

2:5

24

25

TOP SECRET

2

81

MI. Wallach. I take it one of the things and what do you

say, was it Mr. Colby who was in favor of closing it down?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Wallach. Is that because of his general non-predisposi

tion to counterintolligence, or were there other reasons,

specifically, with this project?

MI. Anglator. Wall, I think that -I mean, I don't want

to try to put thoughts into how his mind was, but I think that

the whole Watergate business, the way it was handled, by taking

all of the documents and simply throwing them

all over the

White llouse and everything, out of the Agency, which has gone

on ever since, that this was part and parcel of his own, I mean,

what he had decided he was going to do. In other words, there

would be a hurried-up

meeting which Dick.Ober and myself would be

called over there.and without-any. explanation. be.reguested.tofurnish

all kirds of documents. There is to my knowledge, I don't think|

mine or Ober's were even logged in or logged out. It was one of

these crash things where

somebody was standing in the same room

waiting until all those

xeroxes were made and then rushing them

over to the White

House.

So that was the general atmosphere of

the period.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I'd like to focus mora particularly on

the question of have you had any discussions with Mi. Colby and

did he have any specific reason why he wanted to close the

project down? Did he over discuss it that he thought it wasn'

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 87

legal?

C.

one (Ares 202) 544-600

MARE

910 First Street. S.E. Washinaton Or 9000a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

1,4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

B2

Mr. Angleton. Oh, yes, very definitely.

Mr. Wallach. Therefore he was worried about sort of the

flap potential, so to speak?

MI. Angleton. Oh, Yes.

Mr. Wallach, And I take it that his astimate of the value

of the project was quite different than yours?

Mr. Angleton. He never mentioned that to me. I saw a

commert to tha effect where it stated that Dr. Schlesinger dia

not feel that the product was worth the risk. Ha never made

that statement to me, in fact, he was quite prepared to take it

up to the president, it Cotter had held off.

Mr. Wallach. What was Mr. Schlesingar's inltial, then,

reason

for sanding out the memorandum cutting off the project

or instructing MI. Colby to do so?

Mr. Angleton.

I don't know if I've seen that

memorandum.

Was there a memorandum of that sort? I didn't think so.

MI. Wallach. It's a good time to mark this and we can take

a l00k at 1t, as Exhibit. 10. It's a one-page document dated

28 February '73 which is actually an official routing siip.

1O1, a one-page memorandum dated February 15, 1973, signed by

Mr. Colby.

10B, a one-page document dated February 14, 1973.

Mr. Angleton. What was the date on Mr. Colby's?

Mr. Wallach. February 15th, and this is February 14th. I'A1

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 88

Phone (Ares 202) 546-6006

коттом.

WARD & PAUL

610 First Strees,

S. E., Washingion, D.C. 2000}

TOP SECRET

2

3

4

give you these in just a moment.

It's entitled "Talking Paper, subject, Mail Intercept

Program".

And as Exhibit 10C, a thirteen-page excerpt from documents

entitled "The Project." It is referred to in the memorandum

of February 13, 1973.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

21

24

25

(The documents referred

to were marked Angleton

Exhibits 10, 10A, 10B

and 10C Iespectively for

identification.)

(The documents will be

found in the files of

the Committee.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 89

Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000

to :

WAAD & PAUL

810 First Street.

S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

77

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

TOP SECRET

84

Mr. Anglaton. This buck sheet from Colby is dated 20

February, and I assume that is what 1s attached to all of this.

Mr. Wallach. To ba very honest with you, Mr. Angleton,

am not positive that it was attached. This is the way we

got it, and I'm not sure that it totally makes sense in this

fashion.

Do you have copies of these memoranda in your files?

MI. Angleton. I have.

The facts are that the Bureau

informally was canvassed by

ma.. From the informal reaction, it was quite obvious that

all of these proposals

for passing the project over to the FBI

were not realistic.

Mr. Wallach. Who did you talk to there?

MI. Angleton.

To one of the senior officers.

MI. Wallach. You won't mention his name?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think it is necessary, because he

didn't take it up to higher authority, but he was

senior enough

to know the Bureau's feelings about matters of this sort.

MI. Wallach. What did he tell you the Bureau's feelings

ware?

24

25

MI. Anglaton. He simply stated, forget it. They didn't

have the personnel to handle this type of thing, and so on.

But I understood this from so many other things of the Bureau

over the years, I mean, Mi. Hoover was opposed to bringing

aboard as Bureau officars people who nare not active. He didn't

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 90

WARD

PAUL

110 First Street, S.E.., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

8

9

r..!

phona (Ares 202) 544-6006

1:

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

85

want a lot of translators and so on and 80 on.

Mr. Wallach. This was after MI. Hoover, was it not?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. This was after, but I think the

judgments he had on these things were -- I mean, everyone agreed

to them and there was no problem for me to understand the

Bureau's position.

Mr. Wallach. But going back - and this may be a difficult

question to ask you, because you say you do not have any

specific knowledge - but I can tell you that the Bureau did

rub numerous mail intarcapt opening projects at different

points in time.

Mr. Anglaton. But they ware connected directly to some-

thing operational. I mean, they had a specific reason for

sach thing that they did.

MI. Wallach. What was your understanding of those

projects?

Mr. Angleton. What projects?

Mr. Wallach.

Of the Bureau's?

Mr. Angleton. My understanding only is that it was based

specifically on a piece

of information redarding some operational

matter of the opposition.

In other words, it wasn't a project of this sort.

Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about something to the

effect of an indicator?

Mr. Anglaton. Pardon?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 91

Phone (Area 202) 584-8000

WARD APAUL

C..

410 First Sireet, 5.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. Something like an indicator?

Mr. Angleton. What I mean

MI.. Wallach. Are you saying you just went after one

person?

Mr. Angleton. Well, more or less. Elther that or

looking for a category of communication.

Mr. Wallach. What you're saying is although it may

have had this same format, it was much narrower in the items

that they picked up.

it. Anglaton. And I assumed that it was very temporary

for the life

of that particular internal security matter.

Mr. Wallach. You're saying then that you would have no

knowledge of a project that lasted 18 years?

Mr. Angleton.

NO.

Mr. Wallach. You're saying of a project, the matter

would run in our particular case for x-number of months?

Mr. Angleton. That's right, where they identified the

same agent.

Mr. Hallach, But you don't know of any projects that

thay used just to try to identify agents?

Mr. Angleton.. Well, I know of that type of thing but

I thought that that was Of relatively short duration. Those

were in the questions of legals. I mean where they were trying

to get patterns of communication.

Mr. Wallach. Well, when you say short duration, are

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 92

Phone (Aida 202)

410 First Street. S. E. Washington. D.C. 20001

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

18:7

TOP SECRET

you talking about months of years?

AA200 2AT14

Mr. Angleton." Well, when you telllme. 18/years,:I

never dreamed the Bureau would have that kind of operation.

Mr. Wallach. Have you ever- heard of the term z coverage?

Mr. Angleton. What?

Mr. Wallach, I coverage.

MI. Ingleton. I've heard of it, but I didn't know it

was specifically mail.

MI. Wallach. It may have been other things, too.

In other words it was not a realistic possibility to

assume the Bureau would take this over?

You mean they you went through the formalities.of

asking?

Mr. Angleton. No, I mean when I called up and asked

this fellow a curbstone opinion as to whether the FBI would

be prepared to take on the Hunter and he just told me to

forget it. Simply they wouldn't be able to man it or to

handle it.

Mr.. Wallach.

Was there any discussion?

Mr. Angleton. Of course there would be another policy'

reason for that. I don't think the Buroau would get into

an operation of this sort where they would be passing to us

sT

the ra: materials. I mean that is again Bureau policy.

In other words, we had a different customer's list thar.

he would have

should they take this project on.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 93

Phone (Area 202) 584

ARD

PAUL

410 First Streel, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who was the Deputy Chief

of CI staff on January 27th, 1961 or 1961 who that would have

been?

Mr. Angleton. That would have been Jim Hunt.

Mr. Wallach. In the memorandum for the Chief of Operations

EDP that date Mr. Ilunt says:. "On January 5, 1961, Don

Moore, .

Deputy to A1 Bellmont, very condifidentlally

advised that they" -- by that "they" he means the Bureau --

"had set up a similar but more limited coverage to examine

mail to certain cities in Europe. Their examination is solely

to look for suspicious letters that might be mailed by

illegal Soviet agents. This coverage has positively located ore

GRU illegal channel."

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Angleton. I just wanted to grasp here, I just saw

in one of the memorandums that you referrad to -

Mr. Wallach. Is that the 27th January, '61 memorandum?

Mr. Angleton. No, this is again going back to the

batch of memos --

Mr. Wallach. Exhibit 10.

ir. Angleton. Colby and Schlesinger.

Mr. Wallach.

Yas, sir.

Mr. Anglaton. There is our presentation for the

projoct.

Mr. Wallach. Is that essentially that paper that you

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 94

Phone (Arsa 202) 544-5001

A10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

gave to the Director?

Mr. Anglaton. Well, I don't know exactly what stimulated

It, axcept that it was a paper, I think, prepared to show the

concern of the meeting that we were going to have to take

place. There was supposed to be a meeting with Mr. Austin,

myself, and probably my deputy and Karamessines and so on.

And that was cancelled.

But in any event, what I was referring to was in going.

through the chronology here on page 3, there is a statement

made on page 3, paragraph C:

"Occasional oxploratory openings conducted at

secure CIA installation nearby proved so rewarding that continu-

ation on a highly selective basis

in the national security

interest."

was deemed necessary

Now that sequentially in terms of what they're discussing

would have been prior to our taking on the project.

Mr. Wallach. But again, this was a document that was

prepared in carly '73 or late '72, but probably would have

1ooked back at other documents to be prepared?

Mr. Angleton. It would have been a synthesis of the

holdings on

the project probably prepared by Scotty. Miler in

February, 173.

And since it is a chronology, it is a chronology which

talks about the exploratory openings before it camo to counter-:

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 95

FRONA (Area 202)

C :

C.

WARD & PAUL

$10 First Street, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

Intelligence. This is a feeling I've always had. but

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember Mr. Schlesinger discussing

with you the cost of the operation in terms of actual funds?

Mr. Anglaton. No. We only talked to the question of

content and the relation to the Bureau. And this was a very

brief discussion.

Mr. Wallach. Well, who was getting that performance to

Angleton and

reading that January. 27, 1961 memorandum, which

*alks about Don Moore offering to put CIA names on an FBI

watch list? I was wondering, this sort of cuts against what

you said about the Bureau not conducting any operations like

this.

Mr. Angleton. I know that operation you are discussing.

That again was one where it was designed for a very specific

purpose and one purpose alone, and that was to get the patterr.

of conmunications to certain neutral country places before

it went on to Moscow with illegals.

Mr. Mallach. Do you know when those projects that you

are talking about ended?

Did they end?

I1r. Angleton. Well, I say none of this do I know

officially.

Mr. Wallach. Hell, 'I realize it's hearsay and it

percolated up, but you, for example, said you can read

intelligence reports and through your experience, as other

people have said, tell us something

was received from a

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 96

110 First Street. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

PHONE LAGRA 2091 844600

mall intercept.

Mr. Angleton. Well, when I say "mall intercept." I

mean -

Mr. Wallach. An opening of a letter?

Mr. Angleton. An opening of a letter. But it could

also have been a bag job of some sort.

But in any event, the precision of what followed was

something that must have come off of a document.

Mr. Wallach.

Well, did you, for example, note that

this ended when Mr. Hoover died, for examplo, that the FBI

stopped at least instances of mail openinys at that time, or

did you notice any stoppage at all?

Mr. Angleton. Nope.

Nr. Wallach.

You're saying that insofar as you know,

the same mail -- in other words, it continued in the

same

pattern that it had always been.

MI. Angleton. Well, you see, I am not cognizant of

any long-term mail opening by the Bureau. But let's take a

simple case. If they were surveilling a man and he put a

letter in a mailbox down at the Post Office, they might have

sonchody down behind the counter

who "picked up the letter."

Mr. Wallach. What I am asking is, really, these types

of incidents you are describing, did you know this, and I

realize this is only fron what you gleaned, sir, that it stoppet.

for example; when Mr. Hoover died?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 97

92

Phone (Area 202)

C.

C..

•C

WARD

$10 Fust Strees, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you noticed no termination

of this type of thing?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean I do not remember so many

specific things after that anyway. By that timo, I mean -

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember Mr. Brannigan, for example,

in 1971, sending you some of Jane Fonda's correspondence?

Mr. Angleton. That would normally go to the liaison

office, but I don't remember it as

such. I know the flap

over Jane Fonda.

I mean we were getting stuff from the Bureau

reguarly. It came every day.

Mr. Wallach. Is there a

which is kept as to which

documents the Bureau supplied?

Mr. Angleton. It used to be.

iss. Wallach.

When was

that

stopped?

fir. Angleton. I don't know

if it was stopped, but in

173 I lost the liaison office.

But prior to that we had a detailed log with everything

from the Bureau plus the gist of all meetings and discussions

with people in branches and

so on.

Me. Wallach, Hould that have bsen in the liaison office?!

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. The log actually physically kopt there?

hir. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. Il, for example, the Bureau had, assume,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 98

93

TOP SECRET

tester.

C.

C.:

Prone (Area 202) 548-8000

WARD&

A1J First Street,

S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

picked up a pioce of Joe X's mall, let's say in 168, and for

any reason on that. it wanted to pass this information on

to the CIA, they would not have sent a copy of the letter.

They would have put it into

MI. Angleton. A report.

Me. Wallach. Into a raport.

"it. Ingleton. It would be a subject of file with the

information.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if there was a special

Ilaison set up between MI. Ober and the Bureau?

Mr. Angleton. I think so.

Mr. Wallach. Has there one particular person who was

in contact?

tir. Angleton. I imagine Ober himself.

MI. Wallach. At the Bureau, I'm sorry.

Mr. Angleton. No, I mean - oh, he may have had, in

addition to the regular liaison man that came every day, he

probably had liaison with somebody who was a specialist who

was in the field. He was a specialist and that probably

in

one stage meant George Moore.

ir. Wallach. If we could for a second turn to Exhibit

10, which is his handvritten official rating slip. I beliovr

that is your handwriting, is it not?

ir. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Wallach. I have a problem reading it and I wonder

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 99

g5h

TOP SECRET

Phone (ares 202) 344-8006

.:

UL

210 Fust Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.,

2.4

25

if you could read it into the record for us.

Mr. Anglaton: I said, i as Colby knows, andlit's not

reflected herein, and I went with himito the DCI and pointed

out the inadequacy of the FBIj,etcetera,,etcetera;,Il handling,

would be known to my people, and DCI modified position to last.

clause of para two.:: Ourisman, said..he was

undér. Instruction: From: Colby to the effecti.:

that no pressure should be put on Cotter. Also pointed out

to DCI that personnel or CIA and doubted if they would wish

to be detailed.

Mr. Wallach.

Was there a discussion of detailing

Interceptors?

lir. Angleton. When Colby and myself -- I mean you have

to keep in mind a little odd coincidence.

Colby came down to my office to deliver me the final

closing down of the project. I had a meeting

scheduled for

3:00 to see the Director on an entirely different matter.

Colby actually came down at that time to see Mr. Karamessines

and Cord Meyer to the effect that he had been appointed

Deputy Director of Plans.

So I told him that I had a meeting at 3:00, that I was

going to contest his memorandum closing down

the operation

with ir. schlesinger, and I asked him if he would come alony

with me at that time because there was a real time factor

involved, which he did.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 100

opinicine

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD A PAUL

110 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

5

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

And so I went up and'explained to the Director that

I wanted to protest the decision. And that is when I put

up the proposal and I went through the question of the FbI

and whatnot, and then the suggestion was put up by Mr. Colby

that we could detail all of our personnel over

there to the

FBI, which was totally in my view unrealistic because. the

people's careers are in our business. And second, I mean the

FBI would never accept such

a proposal. It was totally

unrealistic. And that was

when I put up the proposition that

prior to the final death of the project, that in my view it

should be raised at the highest executive level as to whether

it should be terminated or not, since, if it was terminated,

It would not be re-opened again, At least give the President

that option.

So DI. Schlosinger turned to MI. Colby, and stated that

he would like him - that he had reconsidared, that he

would like him to go back to Cotter with the statement of

suspending that for a few days in order that he could take

it up "at the highest level."

But he had told both of us

that he was prepared to discuss it with the president and

that's the end of it.

Mr. Wallach. I think you've given me a very good

accounting of that. I would just like to nave a couple more

questions on two meetings -- I'm sure you've seen these

two menoranda

and I would like to mark them as Exhibit 11,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 101

my sa gah

TOP SECRET

Phone (Ares 202) 544

1

2

which is a 19 May. '71 memorandum on the DCI meeting concerning

HTLINGUAL.

4

5

You can take a look at that to make sure you've seen it.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 11

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 11 may be

found in the files of the

Committee.)

11

WARD & PAUL

C:

13

14

15

16

110 First Stiret, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

18

19

20

21

22

2:3

24

25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 102

Phone (Ares 202) 584-5001

WARD & PAUL

C.

410 First Street, S. E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

2

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach, And' Exhibit 12 18' a 3 June 1978 memorandum

for the record, Subject: Meeting In DCI!g office concerning:

HTLINGUAL •

6

7

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. 12

for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 12 will

be found in the files of the

Committoe.)

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

,25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 103

Phone (Ares 202) 384-6000

: 7

UL

$10 Fist Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. *0003

1

2

3

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2:

24

25

TOP SECRET

98

(Pause)

Mr. Angleton. I have seen this one.

All right, I read that.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention, Mr. Angleton, to the

May 19, 1971 memorandum, I just have a couple of questions.

You were present at that meeting, wero you not?

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. And calling your attention to Paragraph 5,

which discusses the theft of FBI documents from Media,

Pennsylvania, do you have any recollection of discussing that

at all, except what is written down here?

It doesn't even say that you discussed it, but do you

recall that coning up?

Mr. Angleton. No, I really don't recall it. It would not

have surprised me,

but I don't think that Karamessines got it

very straight there. I mean, I think he misunderstood something!

Mr. Wallach. Why do you say Karamessines?

Mr. Angleton. He was the DDP.

MI. Wallach. All right.

le states he had been informed.

r. Angleton. That's it.

HI. Wallach. In the event he may have been informed of

something that is incorrect?

:r. Angleton. There was never to my knowledge the damage

report submitted to the Agency by the FBI as

to what materials

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 104

PROne (Ares 202) 384-8000

2

:

cheatind

MARO

110 fust Strrer, S.F.., Washongion, D.C. 20003

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

99

of ours were compromised in that Media, Pennsylvania breakin.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to paragraph 9, sir,

the paragraph numbered 9 on the third pago, it states, on the

question of continuance, the DDP stated that he is gravely

concerned for any flap

would cause CIA the worst possible

publicity and embarrassment. He opined that the operation should

be done by the FBI because they could better withstand such

publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance.

The DS stated that he thought the operation served mainly

an FBI requirement. The CCI countered that the Bureau would

not take over the operation now and could not serve essential

CIA requirements as we have served theirs; that, moreover, CI

staff sees the operation as foreign surveillance.

There are a couple of things

I would like to discuss

really, you know, first. In there we have the Director of

Security stating that the operation serves mainly an FBI

requirement, and I think

throughout my discussions in depositions

of security people, they almost uniformly stated that all tiley

did was provide

tie documents, and it really didn't serve an:

of their purposes, you know, including past Directors of

Security.

I'n just wondering if their feeling seems to differ as

to what you've expressed before as to the benefits that resulted

fron: this. They feel they were minimal at best.

ir. Angleton. I would have to -- maybe as of the time

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 105

Phone (Area 202)

• 19

WARD A PAUL

end 3ag

210 First Street.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1.5

16

17

18

19

20

2:

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

100

spelled out here, that that was their feeling.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any discussiong with Mr. Osborn

about this, with Mr. King abou: this?

Mr. Angleton. Well, they were present at the meeting. I

mean, Me. Osborn was.

Mr. Wallach. It seems that Mr. Karamessines was also

saying here that this was domestic surveillance, and one of

your responses was that this was foreign surveillance.

Could you kind of elaborate on that?. Is there really a

distinction?

Mr. Angleton.

I am not sure, I think that we're both

saying the same things in a way. The -- i think that the basic

thrust of Mir. Karamessines feeling was the question, to what

extent it had been compromised

and whether there would be a

flap, and his thought of passing it over to the fBI, in my

view, it just simply would not fly at all. In other words,

they would not accept it.

The Agency was much more qualified in terms of

the

product and the handling of it than anybody else, to our way

of thinking, and it was, no question that it served both domestic

and foreign interests, about things, Soviets who came here and

Soviets who returned there:

Mr. Wallach. Was there

any discussion of it making any

diffurence as to whether the mail was opened outside the u.s.

as opposed to inside the u.s.?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 106

1101

TOP SECRET

prone (Area 202) 386-6000

910 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 2000)

1

2

3

4

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

18

19

20

21

2.2.

24

25

MI. Angleton. Well; those discussions had taken place

at various stages over a long period of time because we obviously

had mail opening benefits. Well, maybe we didn't do it but

we had people who opened

mail abroad, and where we got the

product.

Mr. Wallach. Was the German operation at Frankfurt, the

German authorities in the army of major benefit to the Agency,

or are you gualified to answer that really?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that is my general under-

standing.

MI. Wallach. What other specific mail intercept and

opening operations are you aware of that took place within

the United States?

Mir. Angleton. Nell, I have heard since all of this happened

about

the one in New Orleans, the one in San Francisco, and the

one in Honolulu.

MI. Wallach. But during your time at the Agency up until

this

became public, you really did not know of anyone besides

the New York Operation.

ir. Angleton. Hope. It's possible that one of my men

may have known it.

Mr. Wallach. I take it, ther, that TSD or IS in the

san Francisco operation never came to you and said would you

like some of the take from this, take a look at some of the

Chinese stuff.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 107

phone (Ares 202) 564-4000

opera

WARD

110 Forst Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'

18:

19

20

21

22

24

25

• ..

TOP SECRET

MI. Angieton. I mean, I don't recall that, although

I'say I'm not excluding that they may have gone to Scotty

Miler or somebody and stated that we have this or that. But I

don't think so.

Mr.. Wallach. In other words, nobody's ever told you that.

You're just saying it could have happened:

Mr. Angleton. I mean I don't recall it. I mean when I

saw the intercept or anything broke open

is when I learned, I

know specifically, to my own knowledge, about the San Francisco,

and

then

I was told

at that time there were three

others.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know about any

individual instances

of mail intercepts in the United States that you can recall?

have one memorandum here, and I think we have some others back

there that I did not have time to get, which I will show you:

the 22 November '67 memorandum, which I again might not have

gotten to you.. It's to the attention of somebody else whose

nand is whited out, wiich refers to Syrian items.

Mr. angloton. Mos, I never saw this.

"r, ilallach, You're not aware, I take it, of any coverage

of diadle Castorn maid in the middle or late sixties, when

mail was actually intorcopted and aponed.

Mr. Angleton. ido.

Mr. Willaoh. Have you ever

Heard of a project called

SRINDIAN?

Me. ingleton. No.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 108

On LAIR: 202) 544-6000

:

C

WARD A PAUI

410 First Street, S.E. Washinaton, 0.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

2:

24

25

1030

TOP SECRET

Mr. Wallach. Are you aware of an operation by which the

mail of certain embassies was opened in the United States,

diplomatic pouches?

sir. Ang. ston. Well, I know it's going on.

Mr. Wallach. But the CIA wasn't primarily involved in that?

MI. Angleton. I think they were not done by the Agency:

Mr. Wallach. Well, it's hard for me to really tecount this

area. . It's my understanding

that it was.

MI. Angleton. Well, I mean, I'm not aware of it. I mean,

it doesn't surprise me, mind you, it doesn't surprise me, but

I'm

not aware of it.

lis. Wallach. Did you know about it prior to 1974?

MI. Angleton. Well, we've had, going back to Oss days,

we've had operations that were domestic, in the war, all the

way through.

iir. Wallach. Well, I'm really asking from '50 on.

MI. Angleton. I was not aware of the Agency being involved,

but it would not surprise me if some of our people nelped the

Bureau or something of this sort.

MI. Wallach, ire you aware of Customs being involved in

that?

HI. Angleton. Well, I mean if they're going to do it,

they'd probably have a lot of people involved.

so. Wallach. Well, what is your understanding of the

project?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 109

phone (Ares 202) 544-6000

:

WARD & PAUL

810 Firer Streel, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

24

25

9

TOP SECRET

•104

MI. Angleton. I don't know the project. But I mean, I

do know that we had some of the best experts in the community

as far as locks and picks are concerned.

Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard of a wax and seals course?

Mr. Angleton. A what?

MI. Wallach. A wax and seals course.

Mr. Angleton. I know the course.

Mr. Wallach. That's flaps and seals. I'm asking you

if you know wax and seals.

MI. Angleton.

well, it's the same. People don't use

wax anymore anyway.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I think I have one other questio

in the line of questions.

Are you aware of any mail intercept projects where the

Bureau cooperated with the Agency or any other agency actually

provided mail to the CIA?

M. Angleton. No.

ir. Wallach. How about where they provided intelligence

reports that actually contained mail on a continual

basis?

Air. ingleton. Lixe the what?

Mr. Wallach. Instead of providing a copy of the mail, they

provided intelligence reports that you were aware contained

mail from a study project, like the thing we mentioned before.

it. Angleton. No.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you're not aware as to whether

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 110

MOne tArBE 2029 964

$

MARI

110 Forse Street, S.E. Washengton. D.C. 20003

10

05

2

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1';

TOP SECRET

the CIA receives coples of diplomatic mail?

Mr. Anyleton.

Well, I mean I know about some mail abroad,

I mean, I don't know specifically but I know there has been.

Mr. Wallach. I am talking right now about mail coming to

the United States that's actually opened in the United States.

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the meeting of June 1, 1971,

which was reflected in the June 3rd, '71 memorandum? I mean,

without reference to that memorandum, really.

Mr. Angleton. This is the one about Mitchell and so on?

NI. Wallach. Do you have: an independent recollection of

that meeting, Mr. Angleton?

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to remember.

See, I knew all

about the --I know everything about the Attorney General on that

point.

Mr. Wallach. Well, let me ask you a couple of specific

questions.

18 l

Do you recall Me. Helms telling you at that meeting, telling

Lo l you tinat ie told ta Matchela that ido cEn was daning nold in

20

How lork City?

21

ir. Angloton. I can't recall it, but my feuling was

that

22

I

told that to Mr. Mitchell.

2:,

Mr. Hallach. When do you think you told that to Mr.

24

Kitchell?

25

Mr. Angleton. I mean, I didn't tell him, I nean, I shovie:

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 111

^106

TOP SECRET:

...

Priona (Area 202) 544-600€

HARD A PAUL

110 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 90003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

him exemplars on some cases.

Mr. Wallach. When was that?

Mr. Angleton. I cannot give you a date.

Mi. Wallach, Was it in connection with the Special Report

involved on the so-called llouston Plan?

MI. Angleton. It might well have been.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, you do have a definite

recollection of showing Mr. Mitchell selections?

Mr. Angleton. Of course, I took a couple up with me.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall specifically who they were on?

Bardenn

iiI. Angleton. Boudien and one on the murder, I believe,

in Maryland, but I think Dick may have seen him subsequently.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recald what Mr. Mitchell said when

you.

discussed this with him, if anything?

Mr. Angleton. No.

I mean, he was very interested.

Mr. Wallach. Did

ie ask about the details of the project

and how long it had been going on and questions like that?

Mr. Angleton. I don't thin: so. I think that the main

thing was that the only information

the government had was

here was

a young girl in New York who was a fugitive fron

justice who had written twelve letters from Moscow

to people

throughout the United States, and they

were the only leads,

and it raised the big question of what was she doing

in Moscow

Mr. Wallach. Did ic ast you if you passed this informatin

on to the Bureau?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 112

107

TOP SECRET

Phona (Area 202) 544-600€

WARO A PAUL

110 Farst Street, S.E.. Washinoton, O.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

MI. Angleton. I think I told him. I mean I am certain I

told him. I mean, after all, it was the Department of Justice.

Mr. Wallach. Did he ask you if the Bureau had some of

the

progIans?

I take it you told him this mail had been gotten from the

New York intercept operation.

Mr. Angleton. I think so. I mean, there was no reason

to hold anything back from him. You know, he was there and the

problems we were discussing got down into this whole question

of - I mean, let me put it to you another way.

Going back into the difficulties we had in the liaison

was

interrupted. We then had eventually Mr. Gray come aboard,

and so it raised questions of whether we would be able to resolve

with Mr. Gray during his tenure a number of these outstanding

matters which had sort of hung fire over a long period of time

after Mr. Hoover's death, and before. So just as we thought we

were getting along all right and setting the stage for a number

of meetings with Mr. Gray, then he disappeared, and along came

Mr. Ruckelshaus, and he didn't stay

very long. In other words,

there was a whole series of very urgent business in the pendin:

box that never got out of the pending bo:, given the changes i:

the FBi.

Ar. wallach.

Did it strike you as funny then, on June

3rd, when Mr. Helms said ne had

briefed Mr. Mitchell about the

project, that Mr. leims didn't say why, I know you did, too?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 113

108

PRone (Ar8a 202) 544-5006

WARD & PAUL

110 Firsi Street, S.E., Wastungion, D.C. 2000)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. No. This could be an antirely separate

meeting that he had.

Mr. Wallach. But I'm saying if you had briefed Mr. Mitchell

before --

ME. Angleton. I know, but I briefed - the mail intercept

was only a small part of our discussions. I mean, the contents

of the letters which he saw relating to mail intercepts.

MI. Wallach. But in any event, this developing series

of documents that we have would suggest that Mr. Cotter had

asked that either the Attorney General or the Postmaster General

Le briefed by Mr. llelms, and he wanted that to protect his

back, so to

speak, and Mr. Helms had concurred because for

whatever reasons, he went ahead and did it, and it seems funny

that Mr. Mitchell wouldn't have said I knew, and he would have

come back to the meeting and said, Jim,. I'm glad you briefed

him, that type of thing.

15. Angleton. Well, I don't think it was in that context.

think in my discussions with the Attorney General was simply

on substantive cases, but also of discussing the whole problem

of coverage.

As I read this, lelms' discussion was prompted by Cotter's

problem.

Hr. Wallach, Exactly, but all I'm saying is that Mr.

Helms' purpose, from what I can

see fro.

these documents and

from talking to him, is going over there and letting Mr. Mitchell

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 114

cherbana

FOnO (Ard8 202) 544-600

110 First Sireel, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 2000}

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1]

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

109

TOP SECRET

know that there is a project going on in Now York.

Mr. Angleton. That's true.

Mr. Wallach. And even if it wasn't your stated purpose in

going to see him before that, at least he was made aware of that,

from your testimony, now, and just didn't it strike you as

curious?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but I cannot remember the exact date

when we had the meeting with Mitchell.

Mr. Wallach. It might have been

after this?

Mr. Angleton. That is what is bothering me.

"Ir. Wallach. In other words, you might have known that

Helms talked to him and that it was okay for you -

Mr. Angleton. No.

I had

every

intention to brief him.

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember Helms at this meeting coming

in and saying I showed Blount

sample of the product and

described the operation to him?

isr. Angleton. Vaguely.

MI. Wallach. Does this Paragraph 3 accord with your

recollection, basically, or does it accord with your recollection?

Mr. Angleton. I tell you very frankly I can't seem to

focus on this.

lir. Wallach. Well, in any event, I want to ask you to read.

through it now, but you said you did

have a vague recollection

of that.

Just a couple more questions, Mr. Angleton.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 115

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARO

PALI

810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1&

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Angleton. I do remember the latter part of all of

this.

MI. Wallach. You mean the idea of stopping first and investi-

gating later?

MI. Angleton. No, the whole - yes, that part in the

Paragraph 6, and 7 in particular.

Mr. Wallach. Okay.

Okay, turning your attention for one second to your

NA cover of MI. Johnson, I won't belabor it, especially the repott

of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, which was

eventually signed by MI. Hoover, Mr. Helms, MI. Bennett and

Mr. Gaylor, Mr. Helms has told us that you primarily worked on

this from the CIA standpoint, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. I was the Agency's representative in the

working group.

Mr. Wallach. In Part 2, sir, which is restraints on

intelligence collection, it states, "The Committee noted

that the President had made it clear that he desired füll"

consideration be given to any regulations, policies or procedures

which tend to limit the effectiveness

of domestic intelligence

collection. Ine Committee

further noted that the President

wanted the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth

so that the President will be able to decide whether or not

the change in current policies,

practices, of procedures

should

be made."

TOP SECRET

115

---

## Page 116

asine

NARD

380 First Street, S. E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1'7

1÷

19

25

21

22

2:

24

25

TOP SECRET

And then going down and talking about specific operational

restraints, Subsection (c) is mail coverage, there is a

discussion and the document will speak

for itself on page 29,

30, etc., and I don't want to readilt again into the record,

between legal and illegal mail coverage under the present state

of the law, and illegal mail coverage is defined as opening

maid.

In here it states that covert coverage has been discontinue

while routine coverage

has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth

of publicity arising

from

disclosure of routine mail coverage

during legal proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in

Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental

invasion of privacy.

Did you actually participat in the drafting of this

report?

Mr. Angleton.

well, I don't

think that, as I recall, we

didn't do any drafting.

I. Hallach. Was it Me. Sullivan?

ir. Angleton. Everybody

submitted, my recollection is

that everybody submitted their own input. The Bureau went off

and came back with drafts, which were then discussed, and then

they went off and the procedure was that. I had Ober present

as my leg man, getting papers and all that, and it's possible

that he may have had something to do with dealing with the

Bureau people who were handling the drafting.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 117

112

TOP SECRET

MI. Wallach. Let me ask you this.

Did you read the report before it was signed by Mr. Helms?

Mr. Angleton. I read the report.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know why there's a statement in there

to the President that covert coverage, which is defined

as the

opening of mail, has been discontinued?

Mr. Angleton. I think that was mainly a Bureau contribu-

tion.

C..

110 First Street. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

WARD AFAUL

Phone lAres 202) 546-600

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

20

2:

22

24

25

Mr. Wallach. If it was mainly a Bureau contribution, the

Bureau states in a note here the FBI is opposed to implementing

any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal, and it

is likely that if done infonnation will leak out of the Post

Office to the press, and serious damage will be done to the

intelligence community.

Mr. Angleton. That is the comment made after the report

was

submitted.

Mr. Wallach. There was comment made after the report was

submitted?

MI. Angleton. It was not a comment made, to my knowledge,

to the working group, was it?

is. Wallach. I don't know, but it appears to be part of

the regular type - report that was signed as a footnote, to

go in.

Mr. Angleton. I don't inow, but if I recall, the report

was pullad together and finalized, and li. Hoover put his

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 118

TOP SECRET

Phone (Ares 202) 544-$000

WARD & FAUL

210 Forst Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2:3

24

25

objections.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Angleton, without quibbling about footnotes,

it seems that in any event the Bureau was not pushing for the

implementation of covert mail coverage.

But in any event

Mr. Angleton. That was after, that was the position of

Mr. Hoover's which did not Jive with MI. Sullivan, who was the

Chairman of the working group.

Mr. allach. So, what you're saying is the fact that it's

written here, covert coverage has been discontinued, referred

only to the FBI?

Mr. Angleton.

No. I'm referring only to the footnote.

Mr. Wallach. I know, but I'd like to - I understand the

explanation. I believe you're correct, in fact, I know you

are correct, but what I'm asking is that the President here is

asking what

cannot we do and what haven't we been able to do

because of the laws as they exist, and here you are saying we

cannot do covert coverage because it is illegal, but yet, on

the other hand, covert coverage was going on, at least in

San Francisco and at least in New York.

Mr. Angleton. But not known to the other parties in the

working group.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Sullivan knew, didn't he?

ir. Angleton. Yes, but he was the only one.

MI. Wallach. But then would not this be a misrepresentation

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 119

Prone (Area 202) 3606000

MARO A PANI

110 First Street, 5.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

to the President unless he knew?

Mr. Angleton.

well, it was a question that was asked me.

Mr. Wallach. Asked you by whom?

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Johnson.

MI. Wallach. Well, I'm sorry -

MI. Angleton. Nell, I'm going to - may I look at that a

moment, because there's something that escaped my attention.

Mr. Wallach.

Surely.

I think any light you can shed on this would be useful.

It's just, I don't think anybody --

Mr. Angleton. You see, the basic -- the Bureau presided

over all of these

proceedings.

The other representatives outsid!

of ourselves were unaware of our mail coverage, and therefore

it is my understanding - let me see - that

as far as I know,

we did not spell out to anyone present about what we were

doing. So it stood to reason, except when you come down to

page 30, and this is where I've got to get together with Mr.

Ober, it comes down to covert coverage. It states, high

level postal authorities have in the past provided complete

cooperation and maintained full security of this program.

Now, this is -- what I can't understand is whether this

is referring to LINGUAL, because only high postal authorities

knew of its existence, and persons involved are highly trained.

eto.

ir. Wallach. Diu Mi. Mitchell ever tell you that he told

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 120

1.".

C.

410 First Street: S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

•PAUL

Phone (Ap88 202)

625

2

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21.

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

3622

dir

the President about the mail operation in New York and the

Boudlin

results, locating Boudien?

Mr. Angleton. No. But when I saw him, and Helms said

that he picked and chose, as he saw fit,.to brief the President.

Mr. Wallach. But at least you agree that:this document

appears, on reading, to bo - I'm not saying anyone was trying

to mislead the President; but it's just not clear, in any. event.

If you read that documention mail coverage, it appears that ..

mail was discontinued, covert: mail coverage, i.e., opening of

mail. And you're asking for Presidential permission to do it

again.

r. Angleton. The only point being, if you're going into

this, it gots back into, know of its existence. It is in the

present tense. Only high echelon Postal Authorities know of

its existence.

Mr. Wallach. Of the existence of the technique of covert

mail coverage. I don't think there's any suggestion there that

that is a progran

that is ongoing, if you look at the precedents:

MI. Angleton, Nell, I mean, I got that.

Mr. Wallach. It says

"High level Postal authorities have

in the past provided complete cooperation," and it goes on to

say that the technique involvos negligible risk.

Mr. Angleton. lell, this must be entirely Bureau input

dealing with what they had in the past.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't want to --

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 121

7116

TOP SECRET

P90n0 (Area 202)

WARD

410 First Streel.: E., Washington, D.C. 2000)

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

21

25

Mr. Angleton: All' I can say is that it must be their

input into the exercise because it is going into diplomatic

establishments.

Mr. Wallach. And it's not this example, I realize the

bottom part of this is not clear.

Mr. Angleton. That would be a Bureau case.

MI. Wallach. That was a Burcau case?

(Pause).

Mr. Angleton. I have a feeling it is a Bureau case.

I don't know. I mean, that's where I have to get clarifi-

cation from Ober because

I can't really --

MI. Wallach. In any event, just upon my reading --

Mr. Angleton. My reading of the recommendation being put

I in the way it was put in. It was simply one of saving or with-

holding from the other

participants the actualities. We had

the Army participant, made very clear to us on more than one

occasion that he couldn't even

safeguard the documents, that he

couldn't even trust the typists, etc. le didn't even know how

it was going to go through channels, to present it at high

enough levels in the Department of Defense to have it approved.

So, if you're running into that type of thing throughout

these mectings, this was a bald statement made of the security

situation in DIA.

Mr. Wallach. Who was the Army representative that actually

was there?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 122

117

TOP SECRET

1.**

C.

r..

Рого (АлА 202) 188-6000

WARD A PAUL

MI. Angleton. A Colonel whose name I know - well, I've

forgotten it for the moment, but Johnson has it.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't want to press this point --

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean I want to try to find nut

5

more but I don't know where I'm going to go to find it out, but

I think that was a Bureau input.

7

MI. Wallach. Hell, was there any discussion about saying,

8

well, we'll deceive these agencies but we've got to let the

9

President know the reason we're doing

thi:?

10

Mr. Angleton. Well, there were discussions between

1:

Sullivan and myself and so on, and there's no memo of records

12

on it. I mean, they were just things about before he went in,

1" ¡or he called ne after a meeting or something of that sort.

Mr. Hallach. Do you recall discussions specifically along

15

those lines, as you said before, we cannot let these other

.16

guys know about it, but we're going to put this in here,

17; shouldn't we let the President know?

Mr. ingleton.

It would have stood to reason that we would

have made some commont of that sort when on the Agenda, of

20

course, of mail intercopts.

2:

But you see, there

was

i great deal about these meetings,

22

and

I'd like to go off the record on this.

2'

(Discussion off the recorc.)

2;

iro wallach. If we can go back on the record, going back

26

to what we discussed

before we at off the record, Mr.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 123

C.

pone (Ares 202) 548-4004

MAHE

$10 First Street, S.L., Washingion, D.C. 1000)

TOP SECRET

1

Angleton, would it have been your position that you would rather

2

not have informed the President about this rather than prejudice

3

the program

in terms of its value?

ME. Angleton. Not at all.

5

Mr. Wallach. I just wanted to get it clear that what you

6

7

were saying was that when the point in time came when

it was

laid on the table, that you would have told him in this regard

8

that the report was incorrect.

9

MI. Angleton. Absolutely.

1C

:Ir. Wallach. One last very quick area, and I don't know

12

is Mr. Joinson had discussed it with you. If he did, just lot

me know.

17

This involves a case, one of the cases, the Didi Freeman

case.

I don't linow if you recall it.

15

iI. Angleton. The which one?

16

MI. Wallach.

Didi Freenan, the waitress, and the penetratin:

I: i of the Bureau?

?...

Ar. ingleton, I've heard of it.

19

"I. wallach. Have you had any discussions vith anyone

*:

about the case?

2:

is. ingleton. I never moard about it until relatively

22

il

recently. I rean I didn't know about it in the past.

•r. wallach. Who did you discuns it with?

tr. ingleton. I mean, I have known -- am I supposed to hi.

25

discussed this case with the Burcau?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 124

o..

C.

PROmo (Ares 202) 966

PAUL

Strap:, 5.8., Washindian, D.C20001

1

3

5

6

8

9

10

"TOP SECRET

\ Mr. Wallach, I'm sOIry, discussed it with the Bureau?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

I mean, I misunderstood you.

MI. Wallach. No. I asked you if you discussed it with

anyone from the Bureau.

"y question before I think was

Mr. Angleton. When was the case? When did the case come

out in print or become known?

Mr. Wallach. I am not sure exactly when it came out.

Mr. Angleton. It was Iccently.

llasn't it come out in

print someplace?

MI. Wallach. I think it only cane out about six months

12.

ago.

14

15

1€

17

-..

2:

2%.

24

25

Mr. Angleton. I don't think I ever know the case before-

hand. I never knew that case.

I mean I have known of cases a:

rumors of cases.

ir. Wallach. You know of no instance in respect to that

case, whether the fBI asked the CIA for help to cover it up?

Mr. Angleton.

I never heard of that case.

ir, dallach. Diay.

l'e liie to say once again thant you very

much for comir;

down. de've spent

Eour hours here and you have been most

coojurative.

sir, Angloton. Well, I haven't been able to joll you,

I'm afraid. That's the trouble.

Mr. Hallach. Well, there are a couple of arcas where the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 125

FRIORS (Aras 202) 944

-..

3=a8.rn1d1rr9

washington. be

25

TOP SECRET

120

1

documents don't speak so loudly.

2

MI. Angleton. Let me leave it this way, that I will try

3

to get into this stuff, and particularly if 1 have a chance to

soe Tsikerdanos, and then I'll give you a ring if I've learned

5

anything that is more pertinent on the questions you asked.

6

MI. Wallach. If you could really holp us, maybe we should

7

call him in and have you sit in on the meeting with him.

8

ir. Angleton. Well, I think ho's having a difficult me

9

with it because he was not involved.

10

1r. Wallach. I understand that.

11

•Ir. Angleton. ind therofore he's going bacl into strange

12

" territory on

this. But the only way this

can properly be done

15j in my view is to first deal with the various projuct officers.

14

and then principally with ir. Miler who had the day to day

15 li work, and he could

probably unswer off the toy of his head

1€

evory question and every detail. He's a vory good man on decaii.

tir. Wallach, He's still with the Ayency?

"is, angloton. io.

#r. Wallach. He's not?

*1.

i8. Angleron. He loft with me.

le lives in Alexandrid,

2: Due 1 think ac's nore of loss out of town, but do knows face

="-ually all os the ins and outs of die viole thing fron the

::: beginning.

24

tro wallach. Oned again, thank you.

25

(hercupon, it 6:02 o'cloch pom. the intervier vas co.cl....:.

TOP SECRET

125

---