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176-10036-10179

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Status Report on Southeast Asia

DATE : 7/11/1962

PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1

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SEE SANERZED VERDU NUÍ-E1-235

SECRET

• "..

STATU

S

REPORT

.

ON

SOUTHEAST

ASIA

JULY 11,1962

PREPARED BY:

TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SECRET

VIET-NAM

Current Overall Evaluation

The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing

to improve its military, and to a limited extent,

its political and ecens.

nie position.

Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive

action is rare. There were no major breakthroughs or important victories.

and nore appear Ilkely in the Immediate future.

The Viet Cong show no

weakening in strength or deterination despite reportedly heavy losses.

On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hal Yen continued

Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities down (there is

an unsonfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however,

in which the vc defeated a regular army battalion.

This may be due to

raorganization and weather rather than OVN successes.

The GIN took several

good but ninor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and

several rural tocial and econonic programs moved ahead significantly. On

the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts

to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations.

Economic conditions

snoroved soreseat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consu

mer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliverles continued good.

Fearing that the prospective lam settlement will facilitate Viot Cong

activities and that it may presage a U. S. nove to neutralize Viet-Nam it-

self, the CVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and

threatens to boycott the conference.

President Kennedy has sent Diem a

personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement

and our deterination to continue to help Viet-Nan defend Itself. There

is no response as yet.

Progress on Action Program

1. VC Activity

Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with arined

attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the pardod 20-21

mare and rising only slightly to 15 for the period dune 21 o July 4.

T'he

lack of VC aggressiveness is likely due to the reiny season and their

efforts to regroup In order to counter the Improved mobility and perfor-

mance of the GIN forces.

VC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV 20-

ports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate

platcons and companies are now being forned Into battalions. Infiltration

evidently continues, but good intelligence 1s scarce. MACV Jo2 estimates

222222

intiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of juce,

but this Information is unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltra

tion since.

SECRET

ESCHEES

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Is spite of reduced VC activity, VC casualties were high and included

some main force personnel. For the perled 20-27 June the VC suffered a

reported increase of casualties of almost 25 per cent over the previous

reportiag perlod. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VO

and 14l friendly forces.

Reports continue to indieste a critical VC shortage of medical supplies.

Unconfirmed reports rsise the possibility thet the VC are attaining an anti-

aircraft capability.

(Following itens are keyed to the Viet-Nan draft action program of

Jaly 3)

strengthen populsr support. The OVN took several steps to generate

nore popular support in the last two seeks. These include the July Y release

of 794 priseners in connection sith the celebration of the "double seven"

holiday (anniversary of Dien's coning to power), a steppediap drive to root

out lor-level corruption and abuse of pover by CVH officials, and a Presiden-

tially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of

cabinet inisters both by cormittees of the National assembly and by the

National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include

leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his par-

ticipation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urged the last item on Dier

is the past in an effort to increase the povers and prestige of the National

Assembly.

Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and

for the people in the current training program for strategic hanlet cadres.

Ngo dinh Mnu (President's brother in charge of the stretegic hanlet program)

1s concerned that the program win genuine popular support. He favors the

election of hanlet officials by secret ballot inatead of by custonary shou

of hanis. This is now baing done in sons hamlets.

4, Seck International Support

(s) Cambodian Relations. The GN replied mildly io the Camboditan

note concernine

the ARWN border Incursions of June l6 but did not apologize

or offer indemnities. The note insists that all precautions sere taken to

avoid crossing the poorly marked frontler, adnits that in spite of these pre-

cautions the frontier may have been violated. points out that any such inad-

vertent crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the

arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border con-

tral, comittee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border

cooperation.

Another source of GVN-RKG friction, disputed coastal islands.

was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up furthar

troable between Cambodia and Viet-Nan.

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(b) Third Country Ald.

The United States has suggested a

Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country repre-

sentatives to coordinate aid to Vist-Nam.

The intention is to stimulate

more third country ald if possible, and to make sure that current third

country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australla

and New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings,

Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend

any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with

caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification

with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong

reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of Its membership

on the ICC. The Belgians. French, Italians and the UK have not yet

responded.

Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into

our MAAG appear near completion. The GN has indicated its willingness to

receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being

worked out with Wellington and Saigon.

10. Military Civic Action

The 31st Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at

Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple.

In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by

soldiers to the local civilian population, 35, 000 copies of the sheet

were also air dropped.

12. Develop and Implement Mutually Agreed Plane

Operations Bink Minh and Hal Yen. Saigon reports both clear-

and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction.

Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hal Yen area, however, as

the military move into VC territory.

Hamlet Councils have been elected in the hai len area, but the

Embassy notes a serious problen in the fact that a hamlet Council member

receives only 300 piasters (about $4.00) per month for tnat is theoreti-

cally a full time job.

In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to

induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set

up there.

The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in

advance of the move. establishment of military control over the area so

that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 days to

accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a

very short period for the physical move).

Montagnards.

Latest information developed as a result of joint

surveys indicates the Montagnard situstion is more a long term problem

than an emergency. There hes in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Mon-

tagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably

continue, particularly if the GiN provides adequate food and security.

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Alrost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and re-

ceiving minimum food, shelter and security.

The Embassy conments that while this information sonewhat reduces

the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problen's magnitude or

importance. Difficulties steming from the absence of a well directed,

national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Viet-

namese prejudice against the Montagnard continue.

But the principal and

most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the VC

pressures and more may do so.

Strategic Hanlet Program. The second ten day training course for

490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nau in Saigon July 2.

Future Plang. According to CAS, General Dinh's plan for the pael-

fication of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Dien and will soon be

presented to the Embassy.

The First Corps Commander 18 also reportedly de-

veloping plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem

from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.

15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.

Village Radios. As of July 4, 817 of the planned 2500 village

radios were installed and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains

were started.

Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness

of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation

Hai Yen.

Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops be-

cause of the effect on Asian opinion.: Decision and action will be delayed

until the Governor's return from Geneva.

20. Integrate Economic Measures with Counterinsurgency Bffort.

Agricultural Extension. A pilot training progran for agricultural

efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon.

One hundred farmers will study farming and stock raising methods for one

month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.

rovincia, dospitalg. Construction of lour of the 25 planne

ospital surgical suites began on schedule

Anti-Rat Program. The usoM-supported rat destruction campaign was

carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction

of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.

25. Pablicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally:

Viet-Nam Photo Service.

USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet

of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GVN

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er effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicatin

• difficulty in placing the photos in leading newspspers

28. Establish Network of USIS Sub-posts.

The Gui has agreed. to the establishment of virtually any nunber

uf USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiations on locations and

physical arrangements are underay.

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THA LAND

Current Situation Evalustion

The RIG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the

insputed phra ham temple to cambodia.

That delegates attended the

Seneva Conterence on Laos, wnich reconvenes on July 2: but the Rit ha:

not yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO

Council of Representatives in mid-July.

On July? the US began the redeployment of 1, 000 Merines from the

Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thal concern over

this move vas lessened by our intorming them at the same time of a us

financed progren to improve logistic facilities in Thailand (see below).

Ons June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and

one in leripang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports

that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According

to unconfirmed reports these documents originated fron a Commnist pro-

paganda ring opersting out of Northeastern Burma.

Progress on Action Pregram

1. Improved Logistic Facilities

We have outlined to the RIG our proposed progrem to improve

logistic facilities in Thalland. The program would consist mainly of

a POL pipeline to forat in the northoast, rolling stock, airfield in

provement, storage areas; and propositioning of heery military engineer-

ingequipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although

Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the Eft provide the right-

of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.

2. Internal Security Plan

We have lustracted Embassy Bangkok to cable suinaries of those

portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in tine to reach

the Department by July 1l.

Thie will permit consideration of the basic

components of the entire plan during Secretary MeNamera's forthcoming

trip to Honolulu.

SECRET

ACHERTO

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LAOS

Current Situation Evalution

The principal renaining issues before the Geneva Conference, including

SEATO, having been resolved. It is anticipated that the new Accords may be

signed next week.

There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, wich

endangers the satisfsctory conclusion of the Conference, 1.e., the possible

refusal of the GIN to sigu. The GUN's position stens fron its belief that

so many concessions have been made to the communists that the security of

SVN is gravely threatened, We are, however, hopeful that Diem will st1ll

be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for laos

and that we stand fir on our commitments to sui.

Progress on Action Program

There has been little progress on our action program. We are con-

centrating at present on the following problems:

1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos avaite

the visit of Souvanna Phone to Washington, tentatively scheduled for

July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing

Souvanna with the material assistence he requires by enlisting contribu-

tions fron other Free World nations.

2. RIG Diplomatic Relations.

The RIG's decision to recognize 5 bloc

countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with

respect to the tvil. the, federal republic of germany and the rok. Further

action by the RIG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the in-

terim we are attempting to assist the pro-hestern countries involved in

establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.

3. ICC.

We have asked our Genava delegation to request the ice to

prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be

4. MAG Withdrawal, With the signing of the Accords, we will seek

Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 1 day period for the

tithdraval of foreige military personnel. This will give us the tarim

possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its

commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are carrying out

their undertaking.

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAI:

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BURMA

Current Situation Evaluation

The internal situation remains unstable. This fact was highlighted

by incidents on July 7 and l when student denonstrations led by pro-

Conmunist organisations bere ruthlessly repressed by the police and army.

These incidents could sell lead to increased public disaffection with the

Ne Win regine and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic

leftiet groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian

political supporters.

Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate,

though not dramatically. A special Governent amnesty offer expired June 30

without producing significant response from the insurgents.

Progress on Action Program

1. Political

It has been confirmed thet Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolationary

Ceancil will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably

in late July, although precise dates have not been deternired.

2. Economic (AID)

No new developments.

3. Military

a. The burnese are ready formally to accept the FY 1962 military

"sales" program.

State and DOD have agreed to accolerate deliveries of M?

carbines as requested by the Burnese, to the extent production facilities

permit, in order to contribute to planned post-nonsoon counter-insurgency

This action will also, hopefully, earn some political credit

b. Embassy Rangoon has confirned that United States training

for Burtese officers will be continued under the PY 1962 program.

prospective students have been processed for the coming year.

CONFIDENTIAI

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CAMBODIA

Current Situation Evaluation

Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nan

continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently

generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia.

That moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely, ano

it appears likely that If the announced decision to respect the World

Court's award is not implemented by September the matter may be brought

by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA.. The dispute botween Cambodia

and Viet-Nan over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come

mese naval movements near then on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam.

Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites

in Bangkok has developed.

Progress om Action Program

1. RKG-GVN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The CVN reply to the RKG's pro-

test against. the June 16 border Volations is not entirely satisfactory, but

Phnon Ponh believes it way allow progress on the border commission proposal

and has raised this possibility with the foreign Hinistry.

2o Force Increase (MIl. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval

of the request for a force increase of 3,184, for MAP support only, is one of

disappointment that military budget support was not included.

3. New Aircraft (M11. 5). Four I-28 aircraft, Mrst increment of siro

teen,

have arrived In Cambodia. Fornal turnover awaits the arrival of

Ambassador Sprouse.

would be scheduled to commence work November I, under the proposed contract.

SECRET

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