Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: SCELSO, JOHN
Document date: 5/7/76
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10014-10083

Date

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08/06/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

to as an nos son a one on o

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

: 157-10014-10083

RECORDS

SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE

NUMBER

: 11-H-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

SCELSO, JOHN

TITLE :

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

05/07/76

ASSASSINATION, JOHN KENNEDY

OSWALD,

LEE,

MEXICO

POIST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL,

TRIP TO

CENTRAL AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS :

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

:

Box 4

[R] - ITEM IS

RESTRICTED

WH 50955

DocId: 32423471

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Thr intra States Bruate 53015

Report of Proceedinga

4/ 03150:9

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Friday, May 7, 1976

Washingron, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waate turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

3017 WILSON BOULEVARD

ARLINGTON, VA 22201

(703) B41-0800

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Testimony of:

John Scelso

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LOSECRET

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Friday, May 7, 1976

U United States Senate,

select Committee to Study Governmental

-Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:28 o'clock:

a.m., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable

Pichard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Staff: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, Professional

Staff Members.

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PROCEORENGE

Senator Schwelker. Would you stand and raise your right

hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give

Is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so

help you God?

Mr. Scelso. I do.

Senator Schweiker. Be seated.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Scelso, you are here today testifying

under an alias, is that correct?

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TESTIMONY OF JOIN SCELSO?

MI. Scelso. That is correct.

Mr. Johnaton. And we executed prior to going on the recoru

a form where the Agency keeps your true identity on record

there. Our records will just reflect your alias.

Mr. Scelso. That is my understanding.

MI. Johnston. And your full allas la what?

Mr. Scelso, John Scelso, 5-c-e-1-5-0.

Mr. Johnston. And you understand that you have the right

to counsel.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I do.

Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarily

without counsel.

Mr. Scelso. I am.

MI. Johnston. You also understand that at any time if you

desire counsel, you can cease answering questions and ask to

consult with counsel.

Mr. Scelso. That I understand, yes.

MI. Johnston. And you understand that in the course oi

this investigation you have all your consticutional rights, i:

you desire to avail yourself of them.

Mr. Scelso. Very well, thank you.

Me. Waliach. Just one more thing. This transcrive iii

we are taking will be a classified document. It will be

available at Comnittee offices for your review. it will nue si

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avallable for anyone else

The the Agency'a review. should you,

before you leave, want to review it; it' should be available

within a day or two for your review here.

Senator Schweiker. . If you desire.

ME. Scelso.

I would like to review it.

Mr. Johnston. Now, you are retlied from the Agency., is that

correct?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

MI. Johnston. And you are retired under cover.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

MI. Johnston. So I will not ask your present address.

As you know, the purpose of the inquiry today is the

Committee is looking into the investigation of the assassinatio:

of President Kennedy, and in the course of that, your name

came up as being involved in the CIA's investigation.

Would you state your capacity with the CIA in November oi

19632

MI. Scelso. I was at that time the Chief of Branch 3 0:

the Western Hemisphere Division of the DDi, the Clandestine

Services, and had under me iiexico and the oner Central ¿r..

states, down to and including Panama.

Mr. Johnston. And to whom were you responsible?

sir. Scelso. I was responsible to the Chief of that

Division.

Mr. Johnston. And that was?

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MI. Scelso.

ricolonel J.

C. King•

Mi. Johnston. And Mi. King in turn answered to the DDP.

Mr. Scelso.

The DDP was Mr. Helms.

I might add that all statements I make in this matter

are based on purely my memory, because I had little or no

contact with the oswald investigation, the kennedy Investigation

after the end of 1963, and I have not reviowed any records at

all except the few documents which you showed me this mornina.

Senator Schweiker. Was this because of a transfer of

duty or assignment of what?

MI. Scelso.

It was because the investigation was turnes

over to another staff in the Agency, to the Counterintelligere:

Staff. I can explain why it was turned over in much more

detail if you'd like.

Senator Schweiker. Well, maybe briefly, if you would.

MI. Scelso. I was put in charge of the investigation in

the first place because of the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald

had been in Mexico, and the foreign entanglements seemed to

center there. Also, I was put in charge of it because I na:.

tor Mi. lielms, over the

years oi lij association with the aur:

conducted and been in charge of several very important major

investigations. Probably the most important one was the

investiyation of the disappearance of the Chief of the West

German

Security Service, Otto John in 1954. 'I think Mr.

Helms felt, and he told me personally that he gave me the jui

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because he wanted an honest Investigation in which nothing would

be concealed.

Mr. Johnston. Now, let me ask you. MI. Rocca, who followiu

you with the Kennedy case, dates his involvement as about January

23rd, 1964.

Mr. Scelso. That is possible. The turning point came

when I finished an initial report on the case and distributed

It to the people who were concerned within the Agency.

Mr. Johnston. How large was that report?.

Mr. Scelso. Oh, it might have been 20 pages long, and

summarized all of the things which we had discovered abroad.

Just at the time that this report was being finished and was

being circulated, Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach notified the igo:.

that the FBI OI Department of Justice report on the case was

finished, and invited the Agency to send representatives"to

read it in his office.

I went over -- Mr. Helms assigned me and

one other

genclenan to go read. it.

HI. Johnston, Wno was the other man?

it. icelso. ir. Burch U'Neal, of the Counterintelligene

Stair.

ide went to Mr. Katzenbach's oifice in the department of

Justice and read

this very thick report. For the first time,

I learned

a myriad of vital facts about Oswald's background

which apparently the FBI had known chroughout the initial

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LORDESRET

phase öf the investigation

and had not communicated to me.

I would like to add that in the initial phase of the

Investigation, when I was commissioned with the job, MI. Kelms

called me and Mr. Karamessines

and Mr. Angleton and a number of

others into his office and told them in the clearest terms

possible that I was to be in charge of the investigation, that

no one in the Agency was to have any conversations with anyone

outside the Agency, including the Warren Commission and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, concerning the Kennedy assassi-

nation without my being present. I was to be told and given an

opportunity to go to everything.

I did talk to members of the Warren Commission. I am

certain, although I cannot prove it, that Mr. Angleton througie

the entire period

discussed the Kennedy assassination regularli

with tBI representatives, never notified me of any of these

meetings, and never passed on

to me any of the information that

he sained in these meetings.

The Bureau did send us, duriny this initial period --

Senator SChweiker. Now, wait a minute.

What period of time is this you are sajing?

Mr. Scelso.

This is the periou oi time --

Senacor Schweiker.

when you were in charge of it?

it. Scelso.

When

I was in

charge

of the investigativi.

Senator Schweiker. What would have been his role or

reason to do that.at that time?

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Mr. Seelso. well, Mr. Angleton was the Chief of the

Counterintelligence Staff and had almost daily meetings with the

FBI representative, the liaison officer to us, Mt. Sam Papich.

These meetings were held in MI. Angleton's office.

The fBI did send us hundreds of reports of miscellaneous

people during this period, most of whon were by the very nature

of things not even involved in the case, but reading Katzenbach's

report I for the first time learned that the FBI was in

possession of diary-ilke material which Oswald had had in his

possession and was found after the assassination.

I learned for the first time that Oswald was the man wic

had taken a pot shot at General Edwin Walker, two key facts

i1:

the entire case. All the ballistic evidence was there, and

countless ocher pieces of information. one of this had evur

been passed to us.

Senator Schweiker, What timeframe was that that you saw

this report, roughly?

Mr. Scelso. I saw

the report

as soon as it was finish:.

according to lit. Katzenbach, and my recullection was that it

WaS

around Christmas of 1963.

senasor schweiker. And you haù as that point compluto:

your initial report or not?

Mr. Sceiso.

We had compluted an initial report based ni.

everything we nad learned up to that tine. It was not to ti

a final report. It was an initial report.

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Have you ever seen that report

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember if it was a two-volume

report?

MI. Scelso. No, It was about 20 pages long.

Mr. Hallach. I'm sorry.

I was asking about -

Mr. Scelso, The FBI report may have been two volumes.

can only recall one, but it may have been a volume of exhibits

or something like that.

Mr. Wallach. And your report was a 20 page report?

Senator Schweiker. Twenty page? I don't think we've

seen it.

MI. Scelso. À 20 page report.

Mr. Wallach. Copies to whon?

MI. Scelso. Copies to MI. Helms, Mr. Angleton, i think

Mr. Murphy, the Chief of the Soviet Branch, of the Soviet

Division, and possibly others, possibly to the Director.

Mr. Wallach.

Was there a title?

Mr. Scelso. It sunmarized - there was nothing

in that

report which was not in the material that you have.

senabor

sonweiker. I was going io say was there anyc?:..

significant in the report

in retrospect that sicks out now

in view of what he know now that might be helpful to us?

ir. Scelso. liothing, nothing. In

fact, much, nuch 0i

is now known than I was able to put in that report, obvious:.

senator Schweiker. Did that deal with Mexico City, os

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generally what ata it deal th?

MI. Scelso. It dealt with a summary of the Mexico City

situation -

Senator Schweiker.: Did it deal with his aotivity in the

Soviet Union?

Mr. Scelso. No. Just the fact that he had been there,

because we knew next to nothing about it. See, we had.in our

possession - I had in my possession at that time only the

fragmentary information which we had gotten at the time from

the Navy Department when it was realized that Oswald had

defected.

Senator SChweiker. Did the report deal, for example,

with the polygraph test that was given to Alvarado?

MI. Scelso. Yes, I think so, yes.

Senator Schweiker. The person who alleged that there was

a $6500 payoff?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, yes, I am sure it mentioned that. It

mentioned the Alvarado case.

Whether it mentioned the fact

that he had been polygraphed, : don't recall.

senator Schweiker.

Was he, do you Iccall, was he

polygrapned

eccording to your recollection?

ir. Scelso. He was definitely polygraphed by a polygi...

operator ly the office of security of our organization.

Senator Schweiker. The Office of Security of -

Mr. Scelso. Of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Senator: Schwelker

"The CIA:

MI. Scelso. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. In Mexico City.

Mr. Scelso. In Mexico City.

Senator Schwalker. And were the results, according to the

best of your recollection,:

conclusive or not?

Ms. Scelso.

The results were unclear.

'Senator Schwelker. Were what?

MI. Scelso. Unclear.

I might add, senator, that I was the first polygraph

operator in the Central Intelligence Agency, and that I knew

and still probably do know a great deal about the polygrap.

Our Office of Security took over the polygraph business

several years after I got into it and tookkit over exclusivel;.

See, I was an operations officer in the espionage and

counterespionage business, and was trained on the side as a

polygraph operator.

Senator SChweiker. So you were quite familiar with si

polygraph.

ir. Scelso. I was very tailiar with it, and I can ie:

you right now, one of my beefs over the decades was that in:

Office of Security never learned how to test agents, that 15.

clandestine personnel, satisfaccorily. The Office of Secur::

haá one or tho very gifted operators who were superb people..

were rapidly pronoted out of the polygraph business into ver:

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high positions in the

security structure..cOn a number of

occasions during my operational career, I had to take over

and

repolygraph important agent personnel who had been polygraphed

by office of Security men over and over again and had beaten

the polygraph, and i had to take them over and polygraph them

and get them to confetse it happened on a number of occasions

In very, very major cases, and I just felt at the time Alvarado

was polygraphed that the man that they sent down there - I don't

remember his name but I know him - juat bungled the job

completely.

Senator Schweiker. And so when you say the results of the

polygraph test was unclear, in your mind it was unclear becaus::

it was poorly administered?

Mr. Scelso.

Poorly administered, yes.

Senator Schweiker. So you really couldn't conclude whethe

he was lying or telling you the truth from that.

MI. Scelso. From the polygraph, no. The operator, i

believe, came out and saic he really couldn't:tell whether t

man was telling the truth or not.

tir. donnaton.

is it difficult to poiggraph lutin aver..

MI. Scelso, No, It is difficult lo polygraph fabrical.

assuning, as I did at that time and still do, that Alvarado

was a fabricator. A polygraph operacor has to analyse the c.

in front of him on the basis of its merits, the evidence at

hand. The polyyraph is only an interrogation aid. It is no:

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LORD CRET

a magle machine.

I was the only polygraph operator but for one

who was trained by Leonard Keeler, the inventor and developer

of the polygraph. Most of the others, I think, were trained

by a bunch of charlatans who succeeded him. Our Security peoplu

just did not know how to polygraph fabricators, and I could

explain to you why they didn't and how you should polygraph

fabricatorg.

Senator Schweiker. Well, let me ask a more layman's

question.

In view of the polygraph test being unclear, what kind of

conclusion or analysis did you put in your 20 page report is

to the authenticity or not authenticity or lack of authentici::

of Alvarado's testimony?

Mr. Scelso. I and my staff came to the conclusion that

Alvarado was a fabricator.

Senator Schweiker. Now, why did you do that in view of ti

test being unclear?

Mr. Scelso. Well, Alvarado confessed to Mexican authorit.

later that he had fabricated this.

Sonator Schweiker. Was any of on: personnel, CIA or

FbI, there when he did this?

Mr. Scelso.

No, but we talled to his later.

Senator Schweiker. ind what und he say?

Mir. Scelso.

You see, Alvarado was a Nicaraguan infor...r

as you know.

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Senator, Schweiker.

For

wasn t he?

MI. Scelso. I don't think that we knew. I am pretty sure

we didn't. We had never heard of Alvarado before he popped

up in this case, and the Nicaraguans came to us either in

Mexico City or in Nicaragua.

Senator Schweiker. Well, we saw some report and maybe

this will help refresh your memory, maybe it was an FBI report

saying that - I thought it said that CIA had used him in the

past and he was

80 percent reliable, whatever that means.

Mr. Johnston. Let me clear that up. The confusion is the

deletions in the FBI report. The true fact was that he was

an informant for Nicaraguan intelligence, and they suid he

was 80 percent reliable. Nicaraguan intelligence told CIA

that he was 80 percent reliable.

Senator Schweiker. He was not our infurmant.

Mr. Johnston. He was not oûr informant.

Senator Schweiker. I'm sorry..

Me. Scelso.

Yes.

Now, here again I am

relying exclusively on my recolle.

of cne facts.

Senator Schweiker. Well, de vill request che reports.

it will help us to get the gist of what you thought.

Mr. Scelso, ilvarado was an informant of the vicarii-:.

service in Mexico working for Nicaraguan intelligence oi:::

in Mexico City and his mission was to, I think, get to li.

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posing as a dissident Nicaraguan, and he frequented the Cuban

embassy and consulate, trying to get a visa to go to cuba. He

obviously had been in this building and in the courtyard of it

because he could describe it. That was part of his mission.

He reported regularly to his Nicaraguan case officers in

Mexico City about what he was doing. After the Kennedy

assassination became news, public news, Altarado went to his

Nicaraguan contacts and told them

that back in October of that

year he had been in the Cuban consulate, I believe, and had

there sean Lee Harvey Oswald, whose picture by that time had

been on television in Mexico, and had scon him

in conversation

with a group of people, among them a rei-headed Negro, and

nad boasted that all of

them were too covardly to carry out

some mission but that he would do it. And a sum of money was

mentioned - I don't remember the sun of money. Was it

$ 3000?

Mr. Johnston.

$6500.

MI. Scelso.

$6500, something

like that, some $3000 stuci:

In my menory.

But this puzzled us until I think ve learned from our

station in Mexico City that Mexican radio stations had broacr...:

amony the hundreds of facts and nonfacts that they were puerr

out about the Kennedy assassination,

had mentioned or had

stacement that Oswald had been discovered to have a savings

account in Texas with this amount of money in it.

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Now, the fictithat oswald' a picture, had seen on television,

the fact that this amount of money had been mentioned on the

radio, and the face that this Nicaraguan source, Alvarado»

had not reported this incident in any way, shape, or form, back

An October when he had allegedly seen this occurrence in the

Cuban consulate, but had only come up with this after the

Kennedy assassination..

Senator Schwelker. In other words, he didn't report it

to his intelligence service when it occurred.

MI. Scelso. No, he didn't.

MI. Johnston. Just let me clear one fact up for the

record. His report was that he saw Oswald on September 19th.

not in October.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And I reviewed the record, and I just want

to be clear that one of the reasons CIA had for discounting nis

story was the FBI information that Oswald was in New Orleans c..

September 19th.

Ms. Scelso. That's right, that's right. That comes baci:

to me non.

Mr:

wallach. Let's go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the recorá.)

Senator Schweiker. Excuse

me. Now, you were explainii:

to me why jou felt, in spite of the incomplete results, why

you discounted Alvarado.

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And:

discounthim, for the reasons"

mentioned, and I do recall now that the FBI established that

on the day that Alvarado alleged these events had taken place,

he, Oswald, had been in New Ozleans. That comes back to me

nove. And so on the baal of his this was one of the seat

many fabrications in my opinion which deluged us and the FBI

In the early

Senator Schweiker. Hould there have been any possibility

and this is just speculation . that Cuban intelligence would

have had an inside person in the Mexican police, and if our

personnel weren't present, played some games there with

getting him to reverse his story?

Mr. Scelso. I don't think so because I think that the

person that interrogated him was a very, very senior officia:

of the Mexican police.

Senator Schweiker. In whom you would place high

reliability?

MI. Scelso, Yes, yes.

don' remenber who. it was.

A very, very senior person. I

It was a person that we carried :

a code name

24

It was somebody very, very senior.

Senator Schweiker. So you had high credibility in tie

inside source tiere.

Mr. §celso. Yes.

Now, it is true that this person that -- they didn't

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beat Alvarado up or anything like that to make him retract his

story, but they did give him a pretty good Dutch uncle talking

to.

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Senator Schwelker. Well, I would expect that.

Mr. Scelso. Which shook him up.

To me, in my judgment, and as an interrogator of some

tens of thousands of German prisoners of Horld War II.- and

a lot of them were fabricators, and a polygraph operator who

had tested some thousands of people and uncovered guite a bit

of fabrication in the early years before we cleaned our payrol:

of such people, I felt that I was very confident that Alvarica

nad made up the story based on his knowledge of

the appearansi.

the inside appearance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico, his

knowledge of what their employees looked like and the type oi

people that went in and out of the place, and the fact that hu

was a trained intelligence agent; trained in reporting,

enabled him to fake up an interesting-sounding, semi-plausibi:

report.

Mi. Johnston, Let me go back to the meeting you said

¿oi had with ir. Helms, and jou put li. ingleton there.

can you recall the date of shul meeting?

Mr. Scelso. That reecing was a very short time after ti

assassination.

Mr. Johnston. On the afternoon of the assassination?

Mr. Scelso.

Possibly is was.

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## Page 22

THERE

no later than the

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next morning?

Mr. Scelso. I cannot be sure.

The assassination took place on a Thursday?

Mr, Johnston. on a Felday? about 1130 Mashington elme.

Mr. Scelso. It almost certainly was not that day. It

could have been the next day.

Mr. Johnston. How about the 24th. was the day Oswald was

assassinated. Had'that meeting. taken place before Oswald

was shot?

MI. Scelso. Yes.

Me. Johnston. And you put Mr. Angleton, Mr. Karamessines,

and Mr. Helms at that meeting.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Was Mr. Fitzgerald there?

Do you know Desmond Fitzgerald?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, I knew him very, very well. I don't know:

what Mr. Fitzgerald's position was at that time. I don't know

whether he was then the Chief of the Western lemisphere Divisiri

or whether Colonel 3. C. King still was.

Mr. Johnston.

Did you know any other capacity Mr. Fitziri

had at that time besides being -

MI. Scelso. MI. Fitzgerald, as I recall, was the Chie!

of what we called OPC or later called the CA Staff, the Cover:

Action Staff, that is the other side from espionage, and the::

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Dress

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LOCRET

after

we became vell, then he was chief of the

Far Eastern Division. I don't remember when he became Chief

of the Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Johnston.

Have you ever heard the words Special

Affaira Staff.

senator schwesker.

SAS.

Mr. Scelso... Yes; but I don't recall what it meant.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever associate Fitzgerald, Desmond

Fitzgerald as being in charge of the Special Affairs Staff?

Mr. Scelso, You are just asking me more than I can

answet. I am on just completely mushy ground here.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know on November 22nd, or on til

day you got this assignment, November 23rd, did you know tha:

there was a special group within CIA dealing solely with cui...

affairs?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, yes, yes, indeed I did.

But I don't remember what it was called.

Mr. Johnston. And who do you associate with that group

in that time period? Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Scelso. Well, I associate Mi. Milliam Harvey vici

but I could be wrony.

MI. Johnston, The chionology is that that would have :..

in

1962, and there was a changeover, and it. Harvey was fow..

out.

Mr. Scelso. And Mr. Fitzgerald took it over?

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Mr. Johnston

Ive belleve he did but I was just --

your recollection is who else • 1f..you:had!.needed somathing

on Cuban matters, who would you have gone to?

Mr. Scelso. I don't recall, I just don'e recall.

MI. Johnaton. Did you have knowledge of those people?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, yes. I dealt with them'all of the time,

but I just don't remember.

Mt. Johnston. Did you know Hal Swinson?

MI. Scelso.

Yes.

Mr. Johnston, Did you associate him with Cuban affairs?

Mi. Scelso. Yes and I dealt with him on a number of

Cuban problems that affected my area, my arca and Centrai

America, where a Cuban base in Miami ran agents in my country.

in Mexico and Central America, and there were constant licele

problems about this, you know, that necessitated our talking io

each other.

Mr. Johnston. Well, let's go back to the meeting, then,

on

what was

probably November 23rd.

Mr. Scelso.

Yes.

Mr. johnston. Was there anybody fron the Cuban Affai:a.

Mr. Scelso. Not that 1 recall.

Mr. Johnston. In that meeting.

Mr. Scelso. Not that I recall.

Mr. Johnston. So that although you were ordered to u.

yiven charge of the investigation -

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Mr. Sceiso.:

YOB.

Mr. Johnston.

so far as youlknow, that was not communicaiy

to

the Cuban affairs people?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, I am certain they knew it.

ME. Johnston. But do you directly know?

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall how they learned it.

Senator Schwelker. Under your investigation at that point

in time, would material, for example, Oswald had a debate

and.

a run-in with the Dre group out of New Orleang, with Bringuier

and some other people there, and CIA was working with this

grouy at the time, and I believe they did turn some materia.

of a debate over to soneone.

Would this have

come under your investigation or not?

Mr. Scelso, it would have come to my attantion.

Senator Schweiket. Do you recall the extent of any

investigation that you did with anti-Castro groups such as

DRE or Alpha 66 that had any bearing

at all on your investi?.:

Mr. Scelso. I recall that cur iliami station and the

Osfice of I tisink tie Counterintelliyence Staff and the of:::

of security passed us information on this and that steps w

taken to interrogate Cuban exiic digures with whom we were .

coniuct on what they inow about oswald's run-ins with othe:

Cuba: groups, ane that all o1 chat material

did cross my

desk.

Senator Schwelker. Did any significant material come

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• through "

hăt you ceca11 that made

a it into your

report?

Mr. Scelso. I don't recall anythign significant except the

general fact that Oswald had been agitating in New. Orleans

in a pro-Castro way, and that this had excited comment and

opposition from Cuban groups on the other side of the fence.

Senator Schweiker. Did you know . in this investigation.

was thia done under your auspices?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Nominally or actually, nominally I

was in command of it. I sent out cables all over the world

ordering steps to be taken to do this and do that

and uncover

records, make inquiries, surveil people and so on in conncotion

with this organization.

Senator Schweiker. One of the things that came to our

attention in the course of this investigation was a Customs

agent who was detailed of has been detailed to the CIA by the

name of DeEstado, out of Miami, and we understand that he,

siter the assassination, was actually interviewing Cuban

exiles for any information, or name checks or something or

other.

Does that name ring a bell, or would that be part of anal

you probably were sitting on top of at the time?

Mr. Scelso. I don't recall ever having heard of the man,

and I wouldn't have known his true name anyway.

Senator Schweiker. But that would have been part of wit

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'Mr. Scelsol: That would haveccomectocme.

Senator Schwelker. Part of what was going on at the time.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, I have a cable from the

Director - I'm sorry, from Mexico City to Director, dated

24 November 1963, and the Mexico City number 7045, and 1t

reports on name traces of certain people contacted by the soviess

in Mexico City.

First of all, do you specifically recall receiving that

or seeing that cable at the time?

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Scelso. I have no recollection of ever having seen

this cable.

Mr. Johnston. Is it possible you saw it?

Mx. Scelso. It is certainly possible.

Mr. Johnston. And according totthe distribution, would

you have?

Mr. Scelso. The Wil division got two copies, which

doesn't mean that I got a copy. It is not - it, is slugye.

the indicators at the top would not automatically have sci

to me. As a matter of fact, Soviet Operations within che

Ayency were highly compartmentalized, and I frankly -- wio i

Alferiev?

Mr. Johriston. He was a Pravda correspondent who was :..:

in contact with kostikov, and that is the reason for the

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TOR SECRET

breakout.

My question to you is this. Whether or not you actually

saw it, given the fact that you were in charge of the investiga

tion, what do you assume would have been done with this documen!

once it had arrived? What action was required on it?

Mr. Scelso. It would have been sent to me and my staff,

certainly.

Mr. Johnston. And then what would you have done with •

it?

MI. Scelso. We would have analyzed it and traced the

people concerned. I had a large staff of analysts working

for me.

Mr. Johnston. What I'm getting to is you definitely

would have traced the names in that cable?

Mr. Scelso. Well, yes, I'm pretty sure we would have. I

see a 201 number written hore on the cable. I can't tell whici

file.

Mr. Johnston, That all comes out of the Oswald 201,

which may be the Kennedy assassination file.

Mr. Scelso, Well, this is the Counterintelligence Kese..

and Analysis staff, that is Hay Rocca's staff copy.

ir. Johnston. My question to you is are you confident,

given the procedures in operation at the cime, that when ta::

arrived, either your staff or the Counterintelligence Staff

would have made name traces?

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TOMASSRE

Mr. Scelso, I"Canno

be 100 percent pure about that.

depends on how - whether there proved to be anything

It

significant.

MI. Johnston. What about the name Rolando Cubela?

Mr. Scelso. It doesn't ring a bell.

Mr. Johnston. It doesn't ring a bell?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr.. Johnston. Would you be confident that that name was

traced through CIA records because he was in contact with

Alferiev?

Mx. Scelso. I would say that it should have been donc

by routine procedures and probaby it was done.

Mr. Johnston. And to whom would the name trace - he

was a Cuban. Who would the namettrace have been directed to?

Mr. Scelso. It would probably have been traced by the

Soviet Bloc division because they are the ones who had the

action on this cable.

Mr. Johnston. And who would they had to have regueste.:

the name trace of a Cuban on?

Vir, Scelso. They would simply have done it throuy.. r

Central Registry System.

Mr. Jonnston.' Through the 201 file?

Mr. Scelso. Through the 201 fiie.

Mr. Johnston. And if that would have shown a nano -.

I'm just trying to understend how this operated - if In::

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OPSECRET

showed a name of a Cuban and you h

speclal? task force

dealing with Cuban matters, would they then have to have gone

to the Cuban task force to get the name trace?

Mr. Scelso. No, no, not at all.

MI. Johnston, What if there was an operation involving the

Cubans?

Mr. Scelso. Then they would have gotten an answer back

from the registry which would have indicated that somebody hac

an operational interest in the man, which might mean that he

was

a security suspect of closely aligned with an agent, or

even an agent.

MI. Johnston, Hould that deal with - would the Office .:

Security be the central point for that?

NI. Scelso. No. The Central Registry of the Clandestive

Services.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask now with a separate capable,

is one dated 26 November 1963, to a variety of European

statzons, and its number is Director 85133. I just call you:

attention to Paragiaph j of thai.

¿y question being, do you recall that message goiny

through to you?

(The witness reads the document.)

it. scelso, No, I don't.

I cannot see fron the indistinct printing at the botto...

whether it was coordinated with my branch. I do not recall

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TOP SECRET

Now, this is a message Paragraph 3 1s asking - would

you read that for the record?

Mi. Scelso. Paragraph 3: "Because of obvious significance

any scrap Information which bears on President's assassination,

desire addressee atations screen carefully all audio tapes

since 22 November 1963 for comments and cable any significant

Info so obtained.*

Mt. Johnston. And that is asking for what?

MI. Scelso. That is asking

for our stations which might

have had microphone or

telephone tap operations on Soviet,

Cuban or any other type of targets to look at the tapes

made on those days and see if there were any references or

allusions to the Kennedy assassination.

Mr. johnston.

Do you recall receiving any feedback from

those tapesanad the European stations?

Mr. Scelso. No, I don't recall any.

Mr. Johnston. Now, I asked you wher. we were off the

record if you had

read the Committee's report on assassinatio:

and your answer was no, is that right?

Mr. Scelso. No.

have written friends in the states and

asked ther

send ne copies of all of this stuff; aná chey say

it is.

unobtainable.

kr. Wallach. I'll say for the recore we will give jou

copy.

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Mr. Scelsol yam a very good frlend of Mrafdavid phillips,

whom you probably know, who married my second cousin, and I'll

have dinner with him tomorrow.

Senator Schweiker.

welll make sure you get a copy.

Mr. Scelso. I'll be very Interested.

MI. Johnston. Were you aware in November 1963 when you

were conducting the Kennedy assassination Investigation that the

CIA had engaged in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro?.

Mr. Scelso. I was not.

Senator Schweiker. You were not?

MI. Scelso. I was not.

I did know that in the course of our operations we were

landing armed agents on the coast of Cuba from time to time,

although I was not privy to these operations, and I do know

that either then or afterward in that time, historical span,

Fidel Castro used to allege, Cuban propaganda used to allege

that we were sending agents ashore to kill Castoo. To my

knowledge at that time and to my later knowledge wher. I was

in a higher capacity in the Agency and reviewed all of the

Agency's clardestine oporations regularly, I did knon that

were sending in paramilitary groups attempting to place ajen..

abroad to do all kinds of things, but not that they attempte:

or that we were going to kidnap Castro.

Senator Schweiker. But if you had known that, would that ha:

made a difference in the thrust of the kind of investigatio.:

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:30

would have conducted in the early stages?

MI. Scelso. It would certainly have caused me and the othurs

who were thinking about the assassination to view some possi-

bilities in a different light, and it

would have had other

drastic effects on me and my career, too, I might add, because

I feel very violently about this.

MI. Johnston. Let me ask you, just because of your

background as a polygraph operator, did you have any contact

with Victor Espinoza's interrogation?

Mr. Scelso. I have never heard the name..

Mr. Johnston. Did you have

any reason to believe at all

that the Agency might actually be engaging in assassination

plots against Castro?

Senatör Sahweiker. Other

than the paramilitary things

which you just described to us.

Mr. Johnston. No, no indeed. As a matter of fact, after

the kennedy assassination which affected all of us very

profoundly, because I, for example, had been in charge of thu

responsibility of planning the security for two Kennedy trip:

to Central America, one to Central Merica - one to Moxico

and one to Costa Rica -- I hau been up to my neck with the

secret service, and had participated in training courses fo:

the body quaras of azy

umbers of foreign dignitaries in tin

Far East and all over the world. All of our . there were :.

discussions about this between senior people in the Agency,

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the consensus; of our: happy conclusion was;

well,. thank God

we don't do anything like that.

And it would be impossible in an Agency like our own,

because you couldn't do anything like that without leims or

indeed the President's approving it. That was the tone of

everyone's conversation.

MI. Johnston. Do you, when you said the knowledge of the

fact that the Agency had engaged in plots to assassinate.:

Castro might have affected your attitudes ..

Nr. Scelso. It would have cranked other factors, you

see, into our reasoning process: I don't think, however, in

retrospect, that it would have changed our conclusions.

Kr. Johnston. And you received a verbal order from

MI. Helus to conduct -- to be in charge of the investigation?

No. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And for everyone at that meeting to

cooperate with you, is that right?

Mr. Scelso. That's right.

Vr. Johnston. Dia you know that on November 22nd, 196:.

about the time Kennedy was assassinated, a ClA case officer

was passing a

poison pen, offering a poison pen to a high

level Cuban

to use to assassinate Castro?

ir. Scelso. No, I did not.

Ms. Joinston. Would you have drawn a link

in your man:

between that and the Kennedy assassination?

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32

Ms. Scelso. I certainly think that that-would have been

become an absolutely vital factor in analyzing the events

surrounding the Kennedy assassination.

Mi. Johnston. If I add to that the fact that on October

29th, 1963 Mr. Fitzgerald met with this Cuban and

assured hir

as a personal representative of Bobby Kennedy that his scheme

for the overthrow of Castro, possibly Including Castro's

assassination, had the highest U.s. support, would that have

been a major fact?

Mr. Scelso. It certainly would.

MI. Johnston. And let me add to it, the reason I asked

you about the name traces that are on Mexico cable 7045, the

name of the Cuban that they were meeting with onnvovember 22:a

is included in this cable, and that a name trace on him, if

conducted, as you say, would have led to his file which

indicated the meeting and the assassination plot.

Senator Schweiker. And it also might have indicated

--

well, this is very debatable, but it might have indicated wier?

or not we were dealing with a double agent, which some people

•t. Scelso. It would have certainly quened up that

question.

Senator Schweixer. Are you aware that that person now

is considered

possibly a double agent?

Mr. Scelso. No, I had never heard of the person.

Senator Schweiker, Or at least

a source that Castro might

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have well have known about and have followed of surveilled in

some way.

Mr. Scelso, Yeah.

Mr. Wallach. I take it you would also not be aware of

the fact that the FBI through its informants learned about this

operation.

Mi. Scelso. I knew nothing about it.

MI. Johnston, Given - did you assume that Oswald might

be pro-Castro?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, yes.

MI. Johnston.

And did you assume or did you speculate

that the Cuban government might have been behind the assassi

nation?

MI. Scelso. We weighed this possibility, and at the

stage at which I turned over the investigation to Mr. Rocca,

on Mr. Angleton's staff, my inclingtion was still to reject

that possibility.

However, just at the time that I was turning it over. :

saw for the first time the FBI report from Mr. Katzenbach'

office and discovered something I had never known, and ti.::

is that Oswald had taken a pot shot at General Walker, an

immediately I started to wonder, did Oswald tell the Cubars

in Mexico and the Russians in Mexico that he was the mar i.

had takea a. shot at General Walker? Did he use this heroi.

deed to build himself up in their eyes. as a person who the:

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should welcome in

their country and give a visa to, which vas

what he was after? It seemed to ma, knowing the psychology

of psychopathic personalities, exactly what he would

have done.

But at that time I was turning the thing over, and I might add

that at that time I had the Panama riots of January 1964 on

my hande, and plenty of other things. I was still running my

whole branch all through this investigation.

MI. Johnston. At the time you were conducting your

Investigation, was it brought to your attention, the fact tha?

Castro had talked to an AP reportor by the name of Daniel

Harker on September 7, 1963, and threatened to eliminate or

said that U.S. leaders who were trying to eliminate. him and

that he threatened retaliation?

Mr. Scelso. I think that did come to our actention.

Or it came to my

attention personally.

MI. Wallach. Let me show you a copy of an article tha:

appeared in, among other papers, the New Orleans Times-Pica:..

and if I might, just before giving it to you

as a way of

background inform you that within - are my factaicorrec:,

Jin, within a day or two before

this article, a CIA represe:

tative case officer had met with Cubela who was involvec

assassination plot against Castro in Brazil.

Senator Schweiker. And the cryptonym for that was

ALLASH.

Mr. Wallach. And then that meeting took place in e:..

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shortly before this article. There ta reason to belleva - no

one is sure that Cubela was a double agent, and let me

show

you this statement that Castro made in Septenber - or the

article speaks for itself.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Scelso. I don't remember seeing this article.

MI. Johnston. I will call to your attention -

MI. Wallach, May I ask one

Mr. Johnaton. Hell, just to refresh your recollection, I

will call to your attention a Mexico City cable 7055,

dated 25 November '63, paragraph 2 of that cable reports

the essence of the newspaper story.

Mr. Scelso. Yeah, I must have seen this.

Mr. Johnston. You do feel, then, that although you

may not have seen the newspaper article, you knewaabout the

incident.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. I take it you did not know of any meeti:::

down in Erazil shortly before this.

Mr. Scelso. I knew hang alodi the - operations.

Cur:

operations were completely compartmented within the Agency.

ans even after 1965 when I was put on the Foreign Intellio.

Staff and had the job of annually reviewing all of the ope::

and

projects in the FI, Foreign Intelligence field, and mus:

of those in the counterintelligence field

which we knew abo

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TOPS CRITS

737

Mr. Jbhnston®

He has stated thatift did not come to his

attention either.

Mo. Scelso, Well, it did not come to mine, and I gather

from conversationg I have had with colleagues, retired colleaguts,

here in Washington and with Mr. Phillips and what I have read

in the papers, that Helms was knowledgeable of all of this, and

undoubtedly Helms, with whom I kept in very close touch

throughout this investigation - it was pretty much a one-way

street it seems now - probably was analyzing this 24 hours a

day .

Senator Schweiker. I'll buy that pretty well.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if llelms or anyone else was

conducting an investigation separate and apart from yours ci

the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Scelso. No. I would be pretty . as sure as l

could be of anything in the Agency, I could be pretty sure be

was not.

Me. Johnston. Could he have conducted one through SAS

that you would not have kacar about?

ME. scelso. Hardly. I nad so many friends in Sas, 1

would have found out about it and it would bave been beca..::

of the tremendous flow of information back and forth, the ::

that cables were misrouted

and people get to see cables tic:

are not supposed to see and

so on, it would have been ver:

unlikely that I would not have heard of it.

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38

er. Johnston.

connection with the cable that we

discussed previously to the European stations, Director 85135,

which says review the tapes, audio tapes, a return cable on

November 27th does not cite this cable but does report the

tape from Pario audio tapes. It carries a conversation relatin

to Cubala.

Could that cable have come back in without it being

routed through you?

MI. Scelso. Sure.

Mr. Johnston.

I don't have it. I don't have the Novemte:

27th cable.

NI. Scelso. I am pretty sure. I didn't know that any

such cable went out to Europe.

I didn't know at that time the:

we had any operations against Cuban targets, any audio opera-

tions

against Cuban targets in Europe, although' I later learner

about it when I was reviewing all of the operations several

years later, and I am

pretty certain that I never sai any of

the take fran any such operations.

Mr. Johnston. Let me then finally reconstruct.

You know of no investigation into the assassination oche:

than the one you condueted in that time period.

ir. Sceiso. In that time period, correct.

Senator Schweiker. Hithin the CIA.

MI. Scelso, Within the CIA, that's right.

Mr. Johnston. And your investigation did not take

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accountlot an ongoing CIA plotting with a high level Cuban

to assassinate Castro.

MI. Scalso. It did not.

Senator Schweiker. Because he did not have knowledge. of it

NI. Johnston. You did not have knowledge of it.

Mr. Scelso. That's right.

MI. Johnston. And that was not at all considered in your

investigation.

Nt. Scelso. That is Iight.

Nt. Johnston. And to the best you can put yourself baci:

to Novenber 23rd, if you had known the bare fact of a meetins

and the facts I have explained today about

the meetings with

AMLASH, would you have drawn a link between the Kennedy

assassination and the AMLASH operation?

MI. Scelso. I would definitely have brought into my

reasoning this very significant factor, and have scrutinized

the case and all of the logical possibilities from a different

viewpoint, and I might well have urged any number of operatio::

stops, investigative steps to help resolve these factors.

I would certainly, for example, have urged so set aboli

of this agent and polygraph him.

iiz. Johnston. How about the case officer?

would you have

interriewed the case officer

that net with hin on Novenwer 22.

senator Schweiker. Which agert do you mean?

sir. Scelso. Cubela. I gather that is his name. I have

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40

never heard of him before

this moment

Senator Schweiker. Right.

MI. Wallach. Well, let me ask you -

Mr. Johnston. Well, let me.

Hould you have interviewed the case officdr?

Mr. Scelso.

Who did you say the case officer was?

Mt. Johnston. I have not.

MI. Scelso. I would definitely have wanted to talk to

him.

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Mr. Johnston. And ask him what, the substance of his

meeting on the 22nd?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, find out all the details about it.

Mr. Johnston. Would you have been interested in whether

of not the agent took the poison pen that was offered him?

Mr. Scelso. Indeed.

Mr. Wallach. Would you also, having become aware of this.

asked senior CIA officials, maybe Mr. Helms in particular, abn..

other assassination attempts that we have documented such a::

the CIA's use of the Mafia against Castro? I mean, jou lou!:

have gone inco a new area?

Mi. Scelso, I would definitely have wanted to know all

about that.

I did know, by the way, about our involvement with the

Mafia concerning Cuba.

Senator Schweiker. In what respect?

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TORE CRE

Mri

22100

branch, when

had banana under

me

cather

before the Kennedy assassination, t was called over to the

Department of Justice to talk to a high official who was in

charge of the anti_ racketeering squad.: I don"t remember the

man's name but he was and still is a well-known public figure.

Mr. Wallach.. Was it Herbert Miller?

Mr. Scelso. No. It was an Irishman, I remember, a

young fellow, a young Irishman who was a crony of Bobby. Kennedy

and was trying to run down the Mafia and the Las Vegas gamblers

were what we were working on at that time, and it had been

discovered that these Las Vegas gamblers were smuggling cash,

which they skimned off the top of their daily take, to

Panama and putting it in numbered bank accounts, which

Panamanians, among their other cultural developments, have

copied this from the Swiss, although why anybody would trust

a Panamanian bank with his money I don't.know, and this man.

this Department of Justice official asked

us - and

someone

else was with me, but I don't remember whon - whether CIA

had any way of finding out all about these numbered bank

accounts, in other words, who owned the accounts.

It so happened that at that tine we were in

an excelle:::

position to do this, although it would have been a delicati:

matter, and I came back, although it was

purely

a crimina!

matter with few, if any overtones, of counterespionage interes

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wouldsha

tion,:

or given

11B

a legal,

a charter, an obligation to follow it up there was the fact

that I think Panamanian diplomats had been involved in the

smuggling of this money.. One was later arrested, So we

came

back all bristling to go ahead with this. I thought it was

a great idea. And promptly this came to Mr. Angleton's

attention, and we had to brief him on it, and he said, well,

we're not going to have anything toddo with this. This 1s the

Bureau's business. And whammo, end of conversation. We were

called off.

I went to Colonel J. Cl King, who was at that time the

Chief of the Wll Division, and told him this, and J.C. king

said, well, what do you expect? And I said, well, I don't knos:

I didn't expect that.

He said, well, you know, Angleton has

these ties to the Mafin, and he is not going to do anythiny to

jeopardize them. And then I said, I didn't know that. And he

said, yeah, it had to do with Cuba.

This bas stuck in my memory. I was quite confident at

that time -- we are, I am sure, no longer in a position to

do this -- but we could have done it then. That is how I

knew this.

Mr. Wallach. But insofar as you knew, you didn't know

any of the details of the ties.

Mr. Scelso. I didn'= know any details of it whatsoever.

I do know, I do recall that these were Mafia people who were

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engaged in running gambling castnos in cuba at one eime.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this question, sir.

Did the CIA conduct an investigation to determine whether

or not there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of

President Kennedy?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, to the extent that you could see it on

the record, we did analyze and investigate Oswald's connections

with the Cubans in New Orleans and in Mexico City.

MI. Wallach. Forgetting, for a second, Let Harvey Oswald,

you talkedibefore about if you had known of certain facts chat

we have discussed here, you would have sent out different

operational leads of requested different operations.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. I think there is a distinction between

retracing oswald and his possible contacts, and conducting ai

investigation to determine if a country. a foreiyn country was

involved in the assassination of one of our Presidents.

How, going to the latter point, was such an invostigati....

conducted that you know of by the CIA?

Ar. Scelso. Well, here we are gettiry down to fine point

of semantics. I still

insist that - of course, you can sec

the Central Intelligence Agency did issue orders to go over

audio tapes, obviously, on Cuban

and Soviet targets. That

investigation.

Senator Schweiker. I think we are talking here a matter

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TORS CRET

of degree, Paul, 1a

nat

he is responding.

Mr. Scelso. I will condede this, that had I known these

facts, our Investigation of the Kennedy assassination would have

looked much different than it did, and we would have undertaken

any number of comprehensive steps

36-38

Mr. Wallach. Such as what?

Mr. Scelso, such as querying, making sure all of our

Cuban sources were queried about what they knew on it, that

this operation, this agent that was offered the poison pen, was

thoroughly interrogated to the limit that that was

possible. I

don't know what his capacity was or where he was physicall:

located, that he would be polygraphed.

Senator Schweiker: And the case officer.

Mr. Scelso. And his case officer interrogated, obviously.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not any of the Agency

sources, agents, etc., inside Cuba were ever levied with the

reguirement of trying to find out whether or not there was

Cuban involvement?

Mr. Scelso. I don't know this for a fact.

I wouldn's is

ween the traffic, but I do know that all stations were urged

to explore everything with all sources.

Mr. Wallach. You're familiar with the JAWAVE statio..

MI. Scelso. Yes.

MI. Wallach, We've had testimony from persons there that

they did not ask their sources, either inside or outside

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Cuba, for any

that Chey duse in

essence did name checks.

Hould that have been the station that would have controlled

sources inside Cuba?

MI. Scelso. Yest they would have been the main operational

base for any such measures:

senator Schweiker. Do you recall during the investigation

• **

there was this photograph that was taken of a man entering

the Soviet embassy in Mexico City that was sent out as supposedly

being Oswald.

Mr. Scelso.

Yes.

Senator Schweiker.

And then, of course, as soon as

Oswald's picture came out, it was obvious that it was not

Oswald.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, uh-huh.

Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us as to how - wii.

happened with that picture mix-up, and was the person who wis

supposedly Oswald ever identified?

Mr. Scelso. I can answer to that to the extent that is

long as I was engayed in it, we did, as you know, have a por.

surveillance on the Soviet Embassy's main

entrance, and I

think we also had one in the Cuban consulate;

as I recall,

the sane person was seen going in both of these installati.:

and photographed.

Unknown to us in Washington, our Mexico City station

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TORS CRET

photog:

apas taken on the

key,dates that

Oswald was known to have been in Mexico and to have visited

the Soviet embassy, picked out the only possible photograph

that could have been here . that is, a Caucaslan male . and

showed it to the FBI office in Mexico Clty, and an FDI man,

all of this unknown to bendguarters here, took the photograph

and flew to Dallas with it, where the photograph was shown to

various people.

This photograph was of a - you've seen it -- I sized

this guy up as a merchant seaman or a Soviet seaman from his

build and his clothes, who was going into these places to get

visas, or he was a seaman from soneplace to get visas to get

on and off ships. That's the only thing I could think of.

Senator Schweiker.

Why wouldn't Oswald's photograph have

shown up there?

Mr. Scelso. Simply because these people operating _these

photograph centers didn't photograph everybody who went in and

out.

Senator Schweiker. They did not?

Ms. Scelso.' No. It is a problem of management.

We had a number of observation posts. We have had and

may still have these things all over the world. It is extreme.

difficult to find, motivate, crain and control people to sit

in these places day after day, looking out of the window, worti?

cameras. It is an extremely difficult and unrewarding passtin

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• Mexico city

WaSS

•419'

roving ground and

testing area for all kinds of 'esoteric techniques 11ke

chis, any

we ran those things as sort of school problems in order to

establish the best methods and management methods and techniques

and so on; but they were by no means infallible.

Senator Schweiker. Do you remember after the assassination

a Cuban policy review that the Central Intelligence Agancy

conducted?

What timeframe would that have been?

MI. Johnston. Mid-December, 1963.

Senator Schweiker. Of all its Cuban operations.

Mi. Scelso. I do not recall. I would not have been

involved in it.

Senator Schweiker. You probably wouldn't have been invi"

I just wondered if you recalled any Cuban policy review at c..

high levels of CIA.

Mr Scelso. I wouldn't have known about it anyway,

almost certainly, unless. I heard about it, you know, through

scuttlebutt.

Mr. johnston. Going back to Paul's question, whicl

basically was the nature of investigation of possible

Cuban involvement, I shoved

you carlier this morning before

we went or record a memorandum for the assistant Deputy li.

of Plans from the Acting Chief of the SI division, datec

23 November 1963. I will show that

to you to refresh your

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recollection:

In essence, that memorandum reports on Kostikov, who was

one of the men CIA, one of the Soviet men CIA belleves Oswald

talked to in Mexico City, and I show you that document to jog

your memory, to ask whether it is your sende that an elaborate

counterintelligence investigation directed at the Soviets

was conducted, at least during the time you were involved.

MI. Scelso. Well, Kostikov was put under surveillance at

once by the tremendous apparatus we had working in Mexico. I

guess you know now that our Mexico station was the most

elaborately equipped and effective in the counterintelligence

field of any se had in the world, and they went on to this

target all out, immediately, and I remember the cables vagucl;

about Kostikov's activities after the assassination which were

completely unrevealing, hundrum.

Mr. Johnston. While you were involved, was there contact

made with various KGB sources in order to find out what they

knew?

MI. Scelso, I don't know that we hac any KGB sources.

have heard since then - let's see, that was 1963. We ria: tr

had kGb sources, and I have known througlont my career about

a nunber of our KGB sources while they were still in operati:

but not about many of them because this has completely

compartmentalized.

I do know - I have heard at some jurcture later chat

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Soviet defector who

In Moscow at the time

wand 1

hauppose

you have heard this story

ME. Johnston. Nosenko.

Mr. Scelso. Yeah, Ilve heard it fourth hand, and you've

heard it third hand.

Mi. Johnston. My question was more directed at the fact

that while you were involved, did you have a feeling or a

sense that there was a major effort to determine whether the.

Soviets were somehow behind Oswald?

Me. Scelso. Yes.

dir. Johnston. Did you have an equal sense

of an effort

to determine whether the Cubans were behind Oswald?

Mr. Scelso. No, not a corresponding effort.

Mr. Johnston. Arid is that in part due to the fact that

Mr. Angleton was such a strong personality and dominant in the

Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Well, in the early stages Mi. Angleton kas

not able to influence the course of the investigation, which

was a source of great bitterness to him. He was extrenely

einbittered that I was entrusted with the investigation and i:

wasn't. I was equally embittered because

I had plenty to du

anyway, although I was proud of having the assignment. Angle:.

then sandbagged me as quickly as he could, and I had --thru..

out my career I have on

a number of occasions been forced

to

investigate major operations run by MI. Angleton. MI.

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Karanesaines Ana Men ieIms at/var lous tImes assigned me to do

these things overseas, and in the United States and I took thess

jobs very reluctantly, but once I had them, I went all out, aid

every time they ended up,. Angleton came out covered with you

know what, although I was as easy. on him as I could be:

Mr. Johnaton. One of the documents I showed you previously

this morning was a memorandum for the record which you prepared

on 23 November 1963 about the arrest of Silvia Duran.

Mr. Scelso. Yeah .

Mi. Johnston. And according to your memorandum for the

record, you received a report that the Mexican government was

going to arrest Silvia Duran. Mr. Karamessines didn't want th:

to happen, and ordered you to cable Mexico City to hold off

the arrest, and you objected and wrote this memorandum for the

record objecting to it.

Do you recall this incident?

Mr. Scelso. After seeing this memorandum, recognizing

it -- I think I even typed it myself -- the difference betwee:

recognition and

recall, I recognize it. It must have happenoi.

Mr. Johnston. But do you recall Mr. Karatessines orderia.

you to?

MI. Scelso.

No, i do not.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall why you objected andawhy i..

felt it necessary to write a memorandum for the record about

MI. Scelso. I objected to telephone calls on securis;

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grounds

absolutely convinced that these Calls

could be monitored, and everyone else in the Agency assumed

they went over land lines, and I was absolutely convinced that

they went by radio-telephone. You could see the antennas

all over the world. And i habitually objected to this.

Karamessines, I am sure would rarely resort to that. Why

I wrote the memorandum for the record, I don't know, because

I very rarely wrote memoranda for the racord. '

Mr. Johnston. I showed you previously this morning --

excuse me. The flash message to Mexico City, Director 84916 of

23 November 1963, which was authored by karamessines and

Chief of WH 3 - that's you.

MI. Scelso. That's me.

Mr. Johnston. Was the authenticating officer.

Mr. Scelso. That means

I wrote it.

ME. Johnston. You wrote it.

Mr. Scelso. He signed off on it.

Mr. Johnston. "The arrest of Silvia Duran is an extremei:

serious matter which could prejudice the U.s. freedom of

action on entire question o Cuban responsibility."

What did you mean wher you wrote that, and I will sion

you the cable.

Mr. Scelso. It is hard to say.

Me. Johnston, I don't understand,, and maybe you cun

explain to us what the great concern was with the arrest of

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Silvia Duran.

"You

may

recalli she was a Cuban employee -

I mean a Mexican employee of'

MI. Scelso. • I don't think we knew at that time that she

was a Cuban citizen. We assumed:

Mr. Johnston. I eninx she vas a Mexican citizen employed

by the -

Mr. Scelso, He didn't realize at that time she was a

Mexican citizen, and the arrest in a foreign country öf any

consular official ..

Genator Schweiker.

You thought she was'a Cuban.

Mr.. Scelso, We thought she was a Cuban citizen and a

Cuban consular official. It turns out that she was a local

employec.

Senator Schweiker. And that would have been the basis

• 0:

your concern?

Mr. Scelso. Yeah, the fact that she was -- well, we

were, one, concerned about blowing the -- revealing our telephol

taps, prematurely revealing knowledge that, revealing our

knowledge that Oswald had been in the Cuban consulate at all..

Of course, that all came but later in the papers and

so 0%,: 11

at this juncture, when was this, the 23rd, the next day, ie

were keeping the lid on everything because we didn't know

which way the thing

was going to go. Also, the arrest of

consular officials is an extremely serious matter.

MI. Johnston, Has there a concern expressed to you oi

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any discuesion to ther

heartect that it would be extremely serious

if Cuban involvement were uncovered?

Mr. Scelso, Well, I don't think -- nobody came to me and

told me that. It. was just In the air. Everybody knew that that

would be a matter of cruchal international importance.

Senator SChweiker. Well, did anybody ever suggest to you

to either downplay or not push too hard of to not follow up

something for that reason?

ME. Scel80. No, Indeed. Absolutely not, although in a

very short time, I or we came to the conclusion that Cuba was

not involved. I now say rightly or wrongly, I still think

rightly, incidentally, -

Senator Schwelket. Probably after the Alvarado analysis?

MI. Scelso. Well, after we got the full gist of all. of

the telephone conversations which were cabled up to us and

we were getting more and more information about Oswald, althoug

as I say again, we got none of this vital information the

Burcau was getting until at least Christmas, maybe later than

that. If Rocca says that he took the investigation over ii

January, he took the investigation over right after i saw

this Katzenbach report. So no one suggested that we tone thi

thing down, although we did within a very few days, we cane :.

the conclusion - and I wrote an initial report of three or

four pages which went directly to President Johnson, maybe

two or:three pages -- giving our conclusion that this was a

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solo assassination dons by tea Harvey Oswald,

Mr. Johnston. Did fi go to President Johnson in the

form that you wrote it?

• Mr. Scelso. I belleve it was hand-carried by the then

Director, Mr. Nocone I guess, and shown to president Jornson.

Senator Schwelker.

Is that the one we saw?:

Mr. Johnston. No.

Senator Schwelker.

We saw some report.

That was within the next day.

Mr. Johnston. No, this report was one that went to the

President of Mexico.

Mo. Scelso. Well, there was a short report, and it was

going out on a limb, and it was a -- it didn't hedge too

much.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this.

3

Senator Schweiker. Well, now, wait a minute.

We sit

another report.

(Discussion off the recoid.)

is. Scelso.

The

report would not contain any infornat":

of the facts you don't know, but it would throw light on air

reasoning and our conclusions draw! a that time.

Sri kallach. May ve got back, and I want to ask a cou....

of sort of logistical questions.

In the investigation that you were heading up, were di

of the persons working under you, had they been working ande:

MI. Harvey and Mr. Fitzgerald in Cuban Affairs before? Do::

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recall?

I realize i can't pin you down specifically:

MI. Scelso. I can't recall.

Mr. Wallach.. But you don't recall having someone that you

wenttto underneath you as a cubany expert?

Mr. Scelso. NO.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know, have any explanation, can you

offer us any explanation as to thy Me- Helma did notitell you

of the CIA's assassination plots?

Sonator Schweiker. I might say that he did not tell the

Warren Conmission.

MI. Scelso, I am sure the Warren Commission never hear

about it.

Well, Mr. Helms was very closed-nouthed. He knew a lot

of very, very important things which I did not know.

MI. Wallach. But he also asked you to run the investigala:.

Mí.. Scelso. YEs.

MI. Wallach, In that context I an asking you whether jou

have any explanation

as to why he would not have told you ci

nitil Desmond Fitzgurald, who you said was your stiend, woul: :

have tolá you?

No. Scelso, Well, at that time 1 was not a close irien.

No. Fitigeralá. I never was a real intimate friend of his.

Mr. Wallach. But going back to Mr. Heins who had put :

in charge, and you said, giving you full authority

as you id".:

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described before do you haver an

would not have toid you about those plota? s

lanation

: 85;

to

why he

ME. Scelso. Well, aside from the varlous obvious ones

that he realized thas it would soflect very prarly on the Agency

and very poorly on him, and that it might indeed turn out that

the cubans had undertaken this assassination as retailation for

our operations to assassinate Castro, this would have a

disastrous effect on him and the Agency, I think those are the

obvious human explanations, plus the fact I think Mr. Helms,

knowing me, would have had some concern about my reaction to th

revelation because he knewwhat kind of person I was.

MI. Wallach. What was explained to you as your juris-

dictional basis for investigating? I mean, that is sort of a

legulistic term.

How was the investigation explained to you in terms of

what the FBI was doing, what the CIA was doing, just your

general, overall understanding?

Mr. Scelso. Well, my overall understanding, Mr. Helins

told me in the presence of these others that I was in charge

of the investigation, that everybody was to feed all informa:.

to me. I was to report directly to hin, that no one was to

hold any meeting with anjbody else outside of the agency on

Kennedy assassination without my being present, and that ci

course was violated fron

the first day on.

MI. Wallach. Well, let me ask you this and then I'1!

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go on to the point that

you made*

Te to my understanding

that

the CIA is not a law enforcement agency.

Did Mr. Helms at any time discuss with you what allowed

him to ask that anninvestigation be conducted?

Mr.. Scelso.: No, that wasn't really necessary because I

was thoroughly fanillar with the ground rules affecting our

operations internally and externally. He had in our area,

my area, countless operations targeting on Americans which

were worked out elaborately within the ground rules. Helms

was very, very flem on his insistence, which came up from

time to tine, that we do not operate

against Americans outriu.:

of the United States unless we are specifically requested to

by some other Government agency which is empowered to do so.

MI. Wallach. I think somehow my question has been mis-

stated.

We have been told by persons familiar with Cuban activili:

there, including people at the JMWAVE station, that it was

their belief, whether they were told of not, that this.

investiyation was within the ambit of tie FbI, and that they

were not investiyating the assassination of President jennce:

Mr. icelso. I think that they meart and that was

true, that the investigation of things which had occurred ins:

the Unitcu States.

fir- Hallach. They were talking generally, worldwide. in!!

was my understanding.

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Welly that

certainly an errorion their

part.

Mr. Wallach. Did you directly deal with anyone at the

FBI?

¡ Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Wallach."During your month out.

Me Scelo. Yes, I did, too. I take st backi, I definitely

did. I saw Mr. Papich, the FBI liaison officer, on a number

of occasions in the company of Mr. Burch O'Neal of the cI

Staff.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. O'Neal I believe at that time was

In Special Investigations, and Mr. Angleton's CI Staff?

Mx. Scelso. That's right.

Mr. Wallach. You mentioned before that Mr. Helms laid

down ground rules that no one was to talk to anyone outside

the Agency.

Mr. Scelso. About the Kennedy case.

M. Wallach. What were the reasons for it. Helms'

ground rules? Did he ever tell you?

Ar. Scelso, Well, he didn't specifically tell ne. "e

just wanted me to know everything that the Agency knew.abou:

the investigation.

MI. Wallach. And you said before that you had reaso

to believe that someone was talking to persons outside the

CIA.

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*: Mr

Scalso. Xes. Mr. Angleton discussed, Independentl;

discussed a case with Members of the Warren Commission, inclue.

Me. Allen Dulles.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know anything about the details of

those discussions?

Ms. Scelso. Not one thing. Me. Angleton passed on to me

no information.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. Dulles ever make any request of you?

Mi. Scelso. No. I was never in contact with Mr. Dulles.

MI. Wallach. Do you know if MI. Dulles made any requests

independently of the Agency for any information?

Mr. Scelso. I don't recall, I don't recall his ever

making any.

Nix. Wallach. Do you know whether of not Mr. Dulles knew

about the - well, you wouldn't know the answer -- about the

assassination plots.

Mr. Scelso. No. :

Nr. Wallach. Why were you taken off the investigation?

Mo. Scelso. I had finished my initial report, which was

simultaneously outdated and made redundant by the FBI's repor:

which contained this vast amount of information from Oswald's

diaries, and the information about Oswald's other activities

in the United States which was not known to me when I was

writing my initial report.

I circulated copies of this report to Mi. Angleton, to thi

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OP SECRET

Chief of the sovlet

and others

i neeting in Mr.

office,

and Mra Helms asked everybody

what they thought of the report.

Mt...Wallagh:

Was!

Desmond Fitzgerald at, that meeting?

minite

MI. Scelso.y

Not th

recall

I don't

recall him at allax

er recall afstinctly, Me.

O'Neal,

3A72 ME

Mr. Angleton, Me, Dave Murphy. of the sovict proc alvision,

Me. Karamessines.

NI. Wallach, Do you recali anyone from the Cuban arda?

Mr. Scelso.: No.

MI. Wallach. I'm sorry, go ahead, 1 interrupted you.

Mr. Scelso. And MI. Melns asked for comments. I had

also on the cover sheet of my report, which I had circulated

several days before, asked everyone to give me their comments

and point out

any errors, and I had gotten no comments.

And

Mi. Angleton then said his comnent was that my report was so

full of errors that we couldntt possibly send it over to the

FBI -- or excuse me. I had said in advance that they had y

report. I yave them my resume of what I remembered fron

Katzenbach's report, and I said my eport is obviously useles:

suggest that the Soviet angles of this case be iollowed un

by the soviet Bloc Division which is much better

able to

analyze Oswald's diaries; meantime the Soviets

had turned

ow.

to us a dossier which they had on Oswald, I had just learned

that. And I said, my report is meaningless, and I propose thi

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lon-bes

cartledron n

ANd

Mr. Angleton, Ignoring what.

sardis

gie: hagi so

errors in it' we can't possibly send it over to the fBI, whic

It was never supposed to be sent to the fBI.

do after that I dald nothing In the meeting I simply

eat there, and Mr. Reima turned tha Inventigatron over to

Mr. Angleton and Mr. Rocca:

'.'•

Mr. Wallach. And you went back to your regular assignment!

Mr. Scelso. I went back to my regular assignment.

Mr. Helms then privately thanked me very much for what

I had done, and stated he had the greatest confidence in nic.

MI. Wallach. Did you ever have any contact with the !

or any members of the Warren Commission yourself?

Mr. Scelso. Xes, I had many contacts with them during

this period.

Mr. Johnston. If I'm going to be redundant - excuse me

for just a minute - if you've answered this one when I was

talking to the Senator, please tell me so, but when Mr. Angle::

spoke up and said this should be carried on by the soviet

CI Staff.

Mr. Scelso. I said that.

MI. Johnston. You said that?

Mr. Scelso. I suggested that the Soviet aspects of !:

be gone over by the Soviet Bloc Division.

ME. Johnston. I'm

sorry. I thought you said that

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MOROIN

Angle

chatCho/case ought/to/be

soviet Blor orito

¡the Counterintelligence people:

MI. Scelso. No. he said it should be turned over to

his Counterintelligence staff, to Mr. Rocca specifically.

Ar's Johnston What was Mr. Heims reaction

12200

: Me. Scelso.

Mam reaction vitt to accedo, to

request.

You see, with the receipt of the FBI report with the

vast amount of information about Oswald's activities In the

United States, including shooting at General Walker, the

ballistics evidence, the opening up of all of his activities

in the Soviet Union, this scope of the investigation was fai

greater than I could handle from my position as chief of thi:

branch in the Western Hemisphere Division. I felt that I has

very satisfactorily investigated the Mexican aspects of it, iu:

handled all of the other worldwide aspects of it in the time

that we had had, being ignorant, as I was, of our attempts ti

knoci off Castro, arid I was quite happy to get out of it.

Une of the reasons that Melns gave ine the case in the ::

place was that Angleton was so clu! " th: FBI and there :..

also initially the possibility that the rai was

in some wi:

derelict or involved or something like that, and Angleton --

leins wanted someone

to conduct the investigation who was :.

in bod with the FBI, and i was not and

Angleton was.

MI. Wallach. What was the discussion that you talked aü

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04113

with

possibility

that

ie, FBI was:

derelictit Did you mean

by that the handling of the Oswald security case?

MI. Scelso. This was a theoretical possibility.. In othe:

words, we knew right off that the FBI had been in touch with

Oswald because we got regular -.:the FBI sent us copies of ai:

of their reports on people that might be of interest to us.

including Oswald, and masses of'stuff. These reports had not

come to my desk before the assassination, you see, or perhaps

they had because,.of course, we knew Oswald had been in Mexico.

Maybe we did get it, but I know they never came across my desi.

personally. And we knew, of course, that an FBI special aye::

was meeting Oswald at infrequent intervals to find out how

he was doing and so on.

Therefore, there was a possibility that in some way, she.

or form, the FBI might have been derelict or culpabie or

something like that, and of course, we never developed anythi:.:

like that.

MI. Wallach. Did you ever have any discussions with arif:!

about why the facts you have labeled as significant in tha:

report when taizenuach showed jou the FBI ceport, were not.

brought to your attention at

any earlier date?

Mr. Scelsó. I mentioned it to llelms, and I mentioned :

the

meeting, this climactic meeting, and no one comented

it because it was par for the course. The FBI could be

extremely clannish and protective of their own interests, ...

TOP SECRET

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## Page 66

1

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I think: th

Edgar

* Hoc

Othera"

wanted to make-very.

Sxg Ti

biri

very sure that they could not be criticized, and they wanted

all of the facts before they would let anybody know anything.

4

MI. Wallach. You mentioned before that you talked to

5

certain members of the Warren Commission,

6

Do you remember who chose were?

Mr. Scelso. I recognize their names. They were lawyers.

8

Mr. Wallach. Staff members.

Mi. Scelso, Staff members.

10

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember the type of conversations

11|

you had? I know you can't remember the specific conversation.

12

Mr. Scelso. Yes. We did not pass to them in writing at

13

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that time the information that we had telephone taps an

Mexico on the Cuban and Soviet embassied, nor that we had

photosurveillance. We passed this word to them verbally.

16

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Senator Schweiker. Was there anything else that number

you didn't pass, that you had taps, you didn't pass the fact

you had photo surveillance. Was

there anything else?

MI. Scelso. We dian't pass it

in writing:

We told the.

19

vervaly.

20

senator Schweiker. Was there anything like this that i-

21

treated in that way

that you can recall?

22

ir. Scelso. The nature of our intimate liaison with si.

23

Mexicans, we didn't put down

in writing. We told them all

24

verbally so they had the benefit of it. I was authorized li

25

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Héims to do this. We

detaina Just dich e now how light the

security of the Warren Commission was going to be and so on.

Fortunately, the interrogation of Silvia Duran came out and

corroborated everything that was in the telephone calls, I

think, right doin to the laft nail, and wa more able to pass

t!:

details of the interrogation then in writing, and of course,

we showed them the transcriptions of the telephone calls.

Mr. Wallach. Was there ever any discussion out at the

Agency about whether of not there was a Nicaraguan involvement

in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy?

Mr. Scelso. I don't recall any.

MI. Wallach. I mean especially after the Alvarado

incident, he being a Nicaraguan, obviously trying to pin

blame on the Cubans.

• Mr. Scelso. I don't think anybody dreamed that the

Simosas were within rifle shot. Actually, as I recall at tha:

time, the relationship between the vicaraguans and the u.s.

Government were prett; yood.

Me. tallach. You essentially saic before that one or :

areas ina: you did look into were Canald's contacts in so::

City.

ir. Scelso.

des.

sis, vallach, Was ras your understanding as to who wi:

runniny which agency was running the investigation in Mexic.:

City with respect to Oswald's activities?

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02039334

Mr. SceLBos

The

the majore tor

trO

tanning

:19.

down the details of Oswald'a activitlen around Mexico, his

bus trip in and his bus trip out, and they worked very intinite

with the Mexican services on this..

This was a departure from

ordanary procedures... It was worked out by our station down trude

by Winston Scott and his FBI concades.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know If Mr. Scott was reporting to

ambassador Mahan?

Mr. Sceiso. I am sure he was.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever have any conversations with

Ambassador Mahan?

Mr. Scelso. Did I have any?

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall?

Mr. Scelso. No. I wet Ambassador Mahan on trips there,

but not on this case.

Senator Schweiker. Do you recall at one point the Ambassa

dor at one point felt very strongly there was Cuban involvemen?

11x. Scelso. Oh, yes, very definitely. It comes back tu

me. He felt that very, very definitely, and we got that in

a cable trom win Scott, I believe, in which he felt the

Abassajor was certain that this was the case.

Senator Schweiker. Did

he have any basis other than thu

Alvarato

incident, other than that that you cameacross?

Hir. Scelso, I think the Alvarado incident was the main

thing that got him started.

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20219330

Se

One, thing

Chhenstrike

Bittle

Tyst

unusual"

-And To is here in this Ilet - I forget, had yo:

seen this paper, the one that wert to the President of Mexi

Mr. Scelso.. I have seen it here today.

Senator Schwelker. Give came across this elsewhere is

I raised the guestion

Did the Cuban Inbassy furnish Oswald a place to stay i.:

Mexico City, the question 1s. It Is reliably reported that

Oswald did not know his address in Mexico City, buttthat

the Cuban embasay did know his address in Mexico City. As •

recald, that is actually on the phone conversation very

clearly. We saw a transcript of it. Isn't that unusual .

itself? Didn't that

strike you?

MI. Scelso. As I recall it -- and you are triggerin.

things off in my memory which I haven't thought about for

13 or 14 years, Oswald had known his address when he was a:

the Cuban embassy, and had told them his address. By the t:

he got to the Soviet embassy he had forgotten it, and the

Soviets sot it from the Cubans who had written it down.

Senator Schweiter. There were sone allegations of

relationship, Jim, that oswald had with silvia buran.

Do you rant to parase that question?

' Mr. Johnston, I don't know is you recall during the

that the Mexicans at least seemed to have information tha:

Oswald may have had some

kind of a relationship with Silvi:

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Duran while hel

was

Mr. Scelso,: I don't recall that.

Senator Schweiket. A sexual relationship.

Mr. Johnston. And the Dorticos and Armis telephone call,

there was a question of whether the Mexican police taiked and

;..

asked Duran about having sexual relations with Oswald. In 1967

for some reason, Silvia Duran said publicly, or at least

through a source, that she had had sexual relationg with Oswald

while he was there.

Mr. Scelso, I draw a complete blank on. that. I certainly

think I would remember if it had been alleged, or we had

believed there was any substance to it.

Senator Schweiker. The other question or the list was.

Gi!

Oswald ever travel to Cuba from Mexico City?

Do you know why that question might have been put on the

list, and does that refresh your memory about any possible

trip that Oswald made to Cuba?

Mr. Scelso. We we ld have asked the Mexicans that so

that they would check their records to see if he had gone

from Mexico to Cuba. This was because of some hanky panky.

actually had

passenger lists on everybody who went through

other sources of ours, but these

sources were not run jointly

with the Mexican government. So win scott was probably

goiny through the motions of asking what appeared to be a

logical question.

The absence of that guestion might have

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009.11E

appeared suspicious.

Mr. Wallach. Did you yourself have a chance to review

the tapes of Oswald's telephone conversations?

Mr. Scelso. NO.

Mr. Wallach. Is it your belief that those tapes were

erased, or what happened to those tapea?

MI. Scelso. I don't know what happened to it.

MI. Wallach, I just really have one more question.

Did you have any contact yourself during this period with

anyone from the White louse staff such as Bundy?

MI. Scelso. No, I don't think I did. I have never neu

McGeorge Bundy.

Mr. Wallach. And did you ever have contact with McCone?

Did you ever talk to McCone about the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Scelso.

ito.

Mr. Johnston. You mean during this whole time everything

went through Helms?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Ni. Johnston. Let me show you Director Cable 86051 to

Mexico of 30 Novenber 1963 which I showed you earlier this

morning on this aircrait flight, and this cable reports int:-

mation that was obtained fron a foreign diplonat who appareni::

was on the aircraft flight, the Cubana flight on November i-.

going

from Nexico City to Havana, was delayed from 1700

to 2200 hours awaiting an important passenger who arrived at

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SO ERT

the Mexico C

vate;

twin notor aircraft at 213:

Mexican time, and that the passenger transferred to the Cubana

craft without going through Customs or Immigration, and travele

in the pilots cabin to Havana.

We have attempted to tind what follow-up went on this.

Mr. Scelso. " I have no recollection of this.

oh, I

have - I can't say whether I recall it or not.

Mt. Johnston. You did not originate this cable, right?

MI. Scelso. No.

Mr. Johnston. And are you on distribution?

Mi. Scelso. Yes, Chief, Wi-3 is on it in the middle there

at the bottom.

Senator Schweiker. Wouldn't this have had some

significance in view of what we now know?

Mx. Scelso. Yes, although I am not sure what significance

it might have had. The Mexicans were always -- the Cubans

were always shooting people in and out of the country in strange

way's. The link fron Havana to Mexico City by air was at that

tine the only air connection that Cuba had to the Western

Hemisphere. And countless people, important foreigners, nevs.

paper people, Mexican government officials, went in and out

through this way, and the Cubans often mace attempts to cone.?

who they were. We were

watchiny them

like

hawks and kept

tabs on the travel of Americans, Europeans, Asiatics, and

so on to Cuba.

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portant

people?

771.

MI.: ScolBo

They

here:

Important Officiais of curopean

governments, they were sabversives from all over Central and

South America traveling under aliases, going to Cuba for

consultations and training

Mr. Wallachy so would te be fatrto say that 1f

Bomeone

was the only pessenger on a Cubana Airlines flight --

Mr. Scelso. Well, he waan't the only passenger.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I Just wondered if there would be

some significance in that fact.

Mr. Scelso. Well, that signaled the arrival of somebody

who was important enough to hold up a plane, and he came in s:1

a private plane. Ofccourse, there is a great deal of private

plane travel around Mexico because the road network is so bad.

Mr. Johnston. Butiit seems to me just vital, and I

guess I asked who had action to follow up on this, to see if

there was a follow-up. It seems the basic question you wou!:

ask is where the twin engine aircraft came from, and that is

certainly within U.S. Government capabilities to determine

where that aircraft came from, aid I ask why that wasn't di

and who had responsibility for following that.

Mr. Scelso.

well, the Nexico City station

should hak

that.

Whether it was done - what is the date of that cu.:.

Mr. Johnston.

30 November.

Mr. Scelso.

30 November. Whether there was a

folloir-.

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don

Mr. Johnston.

s so tra has responded saying they don't have any

tollow-up.

Senator Schweiker.- That

would have meant what, the

Chief of Station there?.

Mr. Scelso. Ye3, Mr. Scott,

who Is now dead, I belleve.

Senator Schwelker.. And of course, with Ambassador Mahan

breathing down his neck.

Mr. Scelso. Well, Mahan wouldn't have been that cable.

Senator Schweiket, But breathing down his neck about

Cuban involvement, he would have been pretty sensitive to this.

MI: Scelso. I think that by that tine, we, Mexico and

Ambassador Mahan no longer placed much --

Senator Schweiker. By the 30th?

Mr. Scelso. I think so, yes.

Senator Schweiker. When the FBI guy came bach. Well, I

thought the polygraph didn't oceur until the first week of

December-

Mr. Johnston. I think that's right.

Senazor Schweiker. I think the FBI guy went down there

around the 30th and came back around the ist or second, anu

the polyraph I think was taken a few days after that, which

neans that he was still pretty

Ms. Johnston. Let me ask you a second strange movemen:

that has concerned us is that a man by the name of Gilberto

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OPTECRET

Lopez, and there 1a guite a bit of cable traffic at the time

you were involved - basically the story reported by Mexican

authorities to CIA in Mexico City is that Lopez crossed the

border from Texas into Mexico on November 23Id, 1963, the

border having been closed the afternoon of the 22nd, that he

arrived in Mexico City on November 25th, and departed as the

only passenger on a. late evening flight to Havana, and that the

Mexicans reported to CIA that he looked, "suspicious" accordi:;

to the cable.

We do know that CIA checked passport records here, foun

that he was traveling on an invalid passport, that he had 11+

cuba in 1960, had been born and raised in Cuba, although he i::

allegedly an American citizen, and had spent some time in tit:

country before going back to Cuba, a young man with no

particular background.

Do you have any knowledge of --

Senator Schweiker.

he also know a little bit abous his

travels in diami.

Mr. Johnston. That was developed latey, after he 1es:

the case, and i wondered whether you had any recolluction i

Gilberto Lopez?

Mr. Scelso. I have no cocollection.

Senator schweiker. Fill iin in on the rest.

Mr. Jonnston.

Subsequently the FBi in its investiga..

determined that he was living in Tampa, Florida, and was i

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ORS GRET

meeting of the fair Play for Cuba Committee on November i7th,

awaiting an important phone call from Cuba which was supposed

to tell him whether he could return or not, and at least until

5:00 p.m. that day, the phone call had not gotten there.

President Kennedy was in Tampa on the lßth of November. On.

the 20th of November, Lopex applied for and received an entry

visa or entry permit into Mexico, and then we next have him

crossing the border at Nuevo Laredo on November 23rd, apparentl

although there is no border crossing record, but they assume

he crossed there, and I think those later facts about him wer!

probably available to Rocca but

not to you.

A subsequent report by Mexican police authorities was

that Lopez was

somehow

involved in the assassination. •

No. Scelso, Well, they would pick up things like that.

There was a tremendous flow of people back

and forth to Cuba

during this era, you see, constantly, any number of Cuban

refugees wanting to go back to Cuba, enormous traffic across

the Mexican border.

Senator Schweiker, we also got a report that he's living

the life of Riley in Cuba, not doing very much work there,

ir. Johnston. Our last repore he was playing dominoes.

Senator Schweiker. Literally.

sir. wallach. I have one point I would like to go into.

and I realize this is, this information came to another agene.

attention way after you left this

in 1967, but I want to as:

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Is at any tind you recall hearing anything about these facts.

In essence, another Agency was told that a group of Cuban

refugees had been sent by Bobby Kennedy to Havana for the purpo:

of overthrowing Castro, and subsequently killing Castro in

1963, that all the members of that group had been captured,

they were tortured, and confessed, "ete., and Castro, in

retaliation, sent a team of assassina over here to this

country and that the other agency was informed, and this was

never verified that indeed two of these assassins, or indeed

assassins of labeled assassins were living in New Jersey.

Non, at any tine while you were involved in this, do you

recall whether or not it was checked whether Cubans, ....

unusual about any Cubans that had come

into the country?

checks run through. WAVE to

see if there was any information

that possibly an assassin would have been sent

into the U.s.?

MI. Scelso. Well, from the FBI and from our WAVE

station thore was a constant flow of reports about the

activities of Cubans in the United States. I don't recall

anything on this group that you mentioned.

ir. wallach, Do you recall bearing anything generally .:

group of Cuban refugees being capsured in the spring

' 63

and being tortured and confessiny that Bobby kennedy hi

launched

that boat in essence?

Mr. Scelso. I don't recall that.

MI. Wallach, Whether or not that's true, I'm not sayi:

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76

Mr. Scelso. I do recall that our groups of agents

Infiltrated into Cuba were being captured all of the time, and

that Castro, as I recall, alleged that they were sent in to

kill him, but that Bobby Kennedy was connected with it, that

the Cubans alleged this, I don't know.

Mr. Hallach. I don't have anything further.

Mr. Johnston. I've just gone one more major point that 1

want to ask you about, and that is, after your testimony

today and what we have discussed, to go back to your recollec

tion of whether you dealt with Hal Swinson, of who in SAS

you dealt with, SAS being the Cuban task force?

Mr. Scelso, Most of my relationships with the Cuban

desk were conducted by members of my staff, not by me

personally.

MI. Johnston, Would you name the people on your staff

to the best of your recollection?

Mr. Scelso. AT that time?

Mr. Jonnston: Yes.

Now, this is on Wil-3. In other

words, you jus: took WH-3 and used that?

Mi. Scolso, Yes. i used the entrio branci as a tast

force, or working on

the kennedy, assassination, and

we ran

our country work on the side.

one of the licy people working for mu was Charlotte

Bustos-Vidella.

Mr. Walluch. Is she still with the Agency?

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TOR SECRET

Me. Scelso, I don't know.

She was transferred

to Mexico.

and I think

she was

mentioned in Agee's book, along with a

lot of other people. She was an extremely gifted woman who

handled all of our name tracing. It was. to her work that the

Agency thank's the fact that when Oswald did appear back in

September or October in our cables, thie information was

promply disseminated in a routine fashion to other government

agencies. She is

the one who handled all of the name traces

and brought things to my attention.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall being informed that some of

Oswald's letter had been intercepted, or letters to and fron

Oswald and his wife Marina by the mail opening operation in::

we now know the CIA was conducting in New York City?

Mr. Scelso. I recall being informed that letters has

been intercepted, anù I learned from Mr. burch O'Neal -- it

may have been in connection with this investigation or some "

investigation - that mail

to and fron the soviet Union, cr

to ind from one United States was beiny intercepted, and

have

seen intercepts, but I never inen that this intercept

place in the territorial Usa, in dow York or anyplace else,

1 assumed that it took piace in Eurojoon copitals like id::

bandon.

Mr. Wallach, dy yuesiren was whether of not you kne:

Enat any of Oswaid's mail --

Mr. Sceiso.

I seem to recall that some of these thii:

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TOP SECRET

were avallable and that i saw them.

Mr. Johnston, And for me I just want to clarify the

significance of that point, and that is that you had or you wit

privy to something that was at that time as sensitive as the

mail operation.

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I was specifically • you had to be

specially briefed on it.

Mt. Johnaton, But you were not privy to the assassination

plots.

Mr. Scelso. No.

Senator Schweiker. Well, we want to thank you very much.

You have certainly been very straightforward and very cooper

tive.

Mr. Scelso. I would like to add something if I may.

Senator.

Senator Schweiker. Sure.

Mr. Scelso. I would like to give you á typical exampie ..

you may have heard this story before. Please stop me is 1o:

do -- 0f how Agency officers like myself and others --

Senator Schreiker.

Do you want this on the record?

ir. sueiso. iny way you want it.

Senator Schweiker. It is up to you.

MI, scelso, - react to orders to issassinate peupie.

In 1905 at the time of the Dominican crisis - you

have heard this from Mr. Phillips because he was a witness iu

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TOP SECRET

79

1t - when.the:Dominican:crisis. broke, I at that time, my

branch, because of my outstanding work, had expanded until i

had the entire Caribbean, except for Cuba, thrown into my

branch. It was the largest geographical branch in the Agency.

Because of the landing of the American troops and so on, we

set up a wai room adjacent to our communications center, anc

we had our own teletypes and we had charts on the wall, and

were sitting around there. And you may remember that at that

the Central Intelligence Agency had uncovered some 50 or 60

Communist trained saboteurs and agents who had been infiltras:

back int o the Dominican Republic by the Culians under aliases

in order to kick off a revolution. Somebody waved the flag.

By chance, some military nuts started a revolution

prematurely because of petty grievances,

and these Communists

came out of the woodwork and took over the revolution. They

just came out of their hiding places and took everything over

and had everything organized, and it was a very danyerous

situation..

U.si troops set up a periphery around the city of Santo

ioringo, and nobody could go in di out of the city without

being checked. Just at this time dier Director of Central

Intelligence took over, and 1 rojres having to mention his naur

it has Admiral Raborn, a man wich no previous intelligence

exjerience, and an outstanding loval oificer - and during che

first hours of his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence,

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came into our war room where I, Mr. Phillips and four or five

other people who had been on our feet for days and days and

days, were reeling around in a groggy state, and we showed him

our maps of Santo Domingo and described where the Communist

headquarters were and what they were doing, and he said to us

there was no shooting going on at that time, everything had

quieted down. There was some aniping occasionally. And

Raborn said, obviously. not realizing what he was saying, all

right, I want you to send teams in by sea and knock those

guys off.

And for the second time that day, Helms stepped between

me and kaborn with his back to me so

I would: 't be able to

say what I was about to say, and kaborn was a very positive

fellow, so he left.

Present at this scene was a member of our paramilitary

staff at the Agency and they set up a war room and they blew

up photographs of Santo Domingo almost as big as: that wall,

they had eierything on it, and after

# licek they said we

are busy plunning sending those teams in to knock off the

Connies. I said, fine, just keep on planning. it me kau.

when you are

finished.

Then every week they would call me up and say, well. ..

are still planning this. ¡obody had any intentior of car:.:..

out

Raborn's orders, but we weren't going to go tell himi..

we weren't going to do it because he would have fired us....

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TOP SECRET

81

put other people in there.

This was the normal reaction of

average officers of the Central Intelligence Agency to an order

to commit assassinations.

And that would have been my reaction if I had been mixes

up in this Castro business.

Senator Schweiker.

Well, we certainly appreciate knowing

this, and it is very helpful to us to get a balanced perspective

of the situation.

But you really have been most helpful to us I think in

terns of what you had available to you at the time. You ha:

shed

as much light as anybody on exactly what did happer an:

now it happened, and what happened, and we certainly appreciou:

it very much.

And thank you for coming in.

HI. Wallach. We have a couple of more questions.

(Discussion off the record.)

(Senator Schweiker left the heariny room.)

Mr. Johnston, We have just a couple of more questions.

and incidentally, you have a tsult not to continue your

restinony in the absence of a senator.

Mr. Scelso. I will waive chat.

i'". Johnston.

I am going lu give you off the record tha

name of the case ofticer who et with AMiSh on lovender 221.,

and

ask - lel's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

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OR CRET

Mr. Johnaton.

Back on the record;

Was that case officer involved in your investigation?

Mr. Scelso. I cannot answer the question because this

name, while it means

something to me, does not give me a

picture of anybody, and have you ever seen, the man?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

Mx. Scelso. And as I recall -

(Discussion off the recora.)

Mr. Scelso. I can say that I know absolutely nothing.

may have been involved in the field in some way.

Mr. Johnston. At least you did not talk to him in

connection with your investigatio..

Mx .

Scelso.

No.

MI. Joinston. And his name never came up

as a CIA

officer who might have knowledge.

Mr. Scelso.

Not to my recollection. I would be protiy

ile

ir. Johnston. Oray.

Me. wallach. Did you know during

the course of your

investigation netner of bot cic ayency had nich level

sources within the Cuban sovernment of within Cubun inteli.'

Mr. licelso, l nave ation du ai i numer oi jarocuras

my career, because these people entered my area and were

met there. I knew a lot about it later when idas inspecei:

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and going over all the operations in the Agency, and when

Cuban operations were opened up to unilater on.

Sy impression was at the time of the Kennedy assassinatici

was that we did not have any very lay dived sodies i th

Cuban intelligence service, and that we had only a couple in

the entire Cuban government who were high level.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you whether or not at any time

after you left that assignment, handling the investigation for

the CIA, you had any contact at all with the investigation.

again?

Mr. Bcelso. Yes.

From time to time Mr. Rocca would

call me and I would go down and tall so him, and we would

kick around a couple of things, especially when this State's

Attorney down in New Orleans

Mc. Johnston. Jim Garrison?

Mr. Scelso. Jim Garrison started his convulsions. we

talked about things.

Rocca seemed to be convinced that in the early days :

the

investigation when I was running it, a great deal of

information nust have come in bearing o: the people in h

Orleans that were mixed up in in mrison accusations, i..

i tola Rocci

not to my recolidetin, that nobouy that was

thare mixed up, inciddlig

the cella player and Clay Shor

tic bald-headed pilot who died ysteriously, and so on, i...

ever come up in the investigation as long as i was handl:...

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10-59R

MI. Wallach. Here you ever present at a meeting attended

by President Johnson and Me. Helms?

Mr. Scelso.

Never. I've never been in Mr. Johnson's

prasence.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever hear of an occasion on which

Mr. Johnson or President Johnson chewed out MI. Helms?

Mr. Scelso, No. I know MI. Helms had some very tense

meetings in the White House. I have heard him talk about then:

on the telephone in my presence, but I have never heard anythin

specific.

Mr. Wallach. More specifically, did you ever hear an;

discussion as to whethur the President was annoyed at Mr.

Helms for not telling him about assassination plots?

kir. Scelso. No, I never heard anything about that.

Mi. Wallach. Did you have any contact on a continuin

basis in your regular capacity with anyone at your level a:

the FBI, ur was that

all handled through liaison?

r. scelso. Almost all hanuled entiroly by the liais:...

I had telephone contacts with the fBl from time to time.

Ar. Wallach. Have

yuu ever deard the name Thomas i..

thut is a professor out in Colurado who mysteriously disui:

in 1967?

ar. icelso.

10.

sir. Valiaon, I nave no further questions.

Nu juu?

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Mr. Scelso.

No.

Mr. Johnston. I don't have any more questions.

I want to thank you very much for coming back for this.

Mr. scelso, Hell, you know, I don't do anything anyway,

and I"m very glad to come back.

I am very, very dismayed and shocked in the Agency's

involvement in some of these activities, it is so reprehensible

and unforgivable.

(Whereupon, at 12:42 o'clock p.m., the interview in the

above-entitled

natter was concluded.)

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