PROGRESS REPORT: 1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: CHIEF, WH DIVISION
To: COS, MEXICO CITY
Document date: 09/29/1971
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 01/06/05

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

RECORD

SERIES

AGENCY

NUMBER

104-10091-10005

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Recorda

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NU 53199 Date:

06-12-2017

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

COS, MEXICO CITY

CHIEF, WH DIVISION

PROGRESS REPORT: 1

JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971

09/29/1971

6

SUBJECTS : WITHHELD

CUBA EMBASSY

PHOTO COVERAGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

:SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

1B 1C

CURRENE STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 08/01/9:

COMMENTS : JEK31

: F6 1993.08.07.08:51: 32:460032

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10091-10005

HH 53199

DocId: 32353680

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"TRANGE

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Py"!

TEOTDIADICTE

£735

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief, WOACRE

NO INDEXING REQUIRIO

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK

CAN JUDGE INDEXING

Chief of Station, Mexico City f7:

"31 KDAFGHAN Progress Report: 1 July - 30 September 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Paragraph 16 (WOACRE)

MICROFILA

SUMMARY: Daring the reporting period this Project continued

wiüh no change.

The KDAFGHANS continued to provide the Station with

photographic coverage of visitors to the Cuban Embassy.

A new case

oificer took over the Project at the beginning of the period and has

spent the major part of his mectings with KDAFGHAN-1 and

2 on dis-

cussing and planning ways to improve the percentage of identifications

made by them.

What follows is a description of the operation as it

now stands and the Station's plans to improve it.

PRESENT KDAFGHAN ROUTINE: Visual coverage of the entrance

to the Cuban Embassy compound is

provided

from 0900 to 1800

approximate hour at which lighting conditions

pliotography with the present equipment.)

Embassy hours are 0800-

2100, approximately:

KDAFGHAN-1 provides the najority

powei, with KDAFGHAN-2 filling in for rest breaks, lunch and while

KDAFGHAN-1 processes the previous day's take.

The general pracilce

is to observe the entrance without optical assistance until a person

or vehicle is seen to be entering or leaving the gate area.

restricted size of the aperture possible in the Op for this viewing

(a rectangular opening approximately four by

five inches) prevents

simultaneous viewing of any other area of the conpound.

baiget is seen,

the observer shifts his head a few inches to the

reflex finder of the camera and is given a 20 X magnification of

the target.

This is more than adequate

for identification of any

If the target is unknown and/or a previous photograph has

not been taken,

the observer takes

At the same time he records

the time of arrival/departure, whether the target is known or

unknown, and records any

obvious identifying data such as license

plate, apparent nationality, apparent orcupation, etc. In addition

Attachments:

--as

stated h/w

B - as stated

$ 055 REFERENCE TO

Distribution:

dOrig: & 2 - Chief, WHD (w/atts. A and B i/w & u/s/c)

1 - Chief, WOACRE (w/o/atts.)

r..1

IS COPY

CISPATCH SYMBOL AND HUMBER

DATE

HMMA = 41087

# 16133

29 September 1971

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to the above general visual surveillance,

the agents are

occasionally provided with photographs of targets

the Station

believes might visit the compound and on whom we wish a specific

alert - such as visiting agent personnel

and third country

subversives known.or believed to be in the area.

Each day,

KDAFGHAN-1 processes his notes and the photographs taken and

them to the Station in the following form (one day's

production is illustrated in Attachment A):

a. A timetable of arrivals and departures (the number

in the left margin

indicates that a photograph was

taken) •

b. The original negative.

The daily average seems

to

be about eighteen photographs.

c. A contact print of the above negatives (the inked

numbers on the photographs correspond to the

marginal numbers on the report).

d. Enlargements of selected subjects: (not included).

THE AGENT PERSONNEL: GARDALPHE spent one day, from

0645 to 1900, inside

observing the agents and

routine.

Both seem to have adapted to a very

boring routine

quite well.

Their eyesight, which has been the subject of quite

a few off-the-record comments

at both Headquarters and at the

Station (viz, that they are blind),

was checked out thoroughly,

but innocuously, by asking them who such

such a person was

at the gate or

in photos and by asking them to read

small print film-processing instructions.

While KDAFGHAN-2's

eyesight is definitely poorer than that of KDAFGHAN-1, she easily

identified

the subjects and was able to read the

test literature

with no problem.

She was observed carefully while manning

Op and she missed no one in that one and one-half hour

Previous cases of missing known targets scheduled to visit the

Embassy are more probably

the result of boredom and a resultant

lack of attention.

Their job requires them to be hermits.

have very few friends and

even fever visitors.

To break them out

of this rut, the Station will soon start altering their work

hours to provide more extended coverage of the target, and give

them more interesting work to do.

PRESENT KDAFGHAN FACILITIES

AND EQUIPMENT:

The present

located on the roof of a three-story apartment house

located about eighty yards from the compound

entrance (see

Attachment B).

Concealment is excellent.

Windows on other

floors allow visual

observation of most of the compound facing

the OP and of the entrance

to the Consulate.

However, they do

not permit photography,

except on a selected basis, because of

the concealment problem.'

The OP proper is a small

about five by six feet in what used

maid's quarters.

A captain's chair, the tripod, camera, lens and a small worktable

have been fitted

plumbing

fistures.

Adjacent to this is another room of approximately twice the size

contains a desk, cot,

the printer

and a vardrobe

photographic materials.

This room

has a large picture

window overlooking the entrance to the Consulate.

Continued......

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5.

The

photographic equipment used by

the KDAFGHANS at

present consists of

a Bausch and Lomb spotting scope with 20-x

eyepiece,

and a Pentax H-3. camera.

This equipment is not

satisfactory

(see below).

Except

for the printer, all darkroom

equipment is located in a darkroom on the first floor.

darkroom

is well equipped and adequate.

KDAFGHAN-1 makes 10

attempt to conceal the darkroom.

His

cover for the darkroom

that it is his hobby.

6. STATION PROCESSINS OF THE KRAFGHAN PRODUCTION:

Time•

tables are filed and not processed - at

present.

If the Station

is looking for confirmation of an agent report or a surveillance

sometimes consulted. About every year they are

shipped to Headquarters for retention in the Archives.

The

negatives and contact prints are handled in the same way:

7. The enlarged photographs are processed in the following

way:

2.

Certain photographs of unidentified persons are

sterilized and forwarded to the local office of

LNERGO.

The Station receives no feedback or

identification of these individuals from LNERGO.

b.

Photographs of PCS or known TDY Embassy personnel

are kept and used for identification purposes at

the Station and some are forwarded to Headquarters

for the same reason.

Photographs of other identified persons are placed

in Station personality files.

All other photographs-(the major portion) are simply

(destroyed.

8.

LNERGO was recently queried on the value of this

operation to them.

They replied, "(these photographs) are

compared with the photographs of

known leaders of extremist

groups in WOCORK as well as with photographs of persons who

are

subjects of Identification Orders prepared

on badly wanted

fugitives in WOCORK.

It is requested,

therefore,

that you

continue this service

if it does not cause problems or unusual

costs to your office."

While this project may be of some value

to LNERGO, it is of little value, as presently constituted,

to

the Station. There are other,

and cheaper,

means

of obtaining

photographs of PCS and TDY personnel.

No identification

operational use is made of the photographs of the unidentified

subjects - at least by JKLANCE - and no operational use is made

timetable.

For instance, license plate numbers ale

not

now traced as either a possible means of identification, or

leads to CI or recruitment targets.

A previous effort at

analyzing

the timetable for possible patterns of activity was

unproductive and has not been repeated.

Only in selected

instances do we try to correlate

the

information received from

KDBADGER coverage of the Embassy and that provided by the

KDAFGHANS.

But generally this has not been successful, since

most often people with previous appointments

are going

to the

Consulate (which we do not cover with KDAFGHAN),

or too many

unidentified people arrive around the same time

at the gate,

precluding a positive identification.

While the above evaluatioi

Continued

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may read more like a project termination request than a progress

report,

Station does believe

that this

project could be made

not extremely valuable to both JKLANCE and LNERGO

if faces

could be related to names and other operational leads

inherent in

the KDAFGHAN production were

abstracted

and followed

out:

Our plans to do so are outlined below.

9. PLANS:

Technical quality needs to be improved.

present enlargements are only poor to fair in quality.

to the lens now in use, which only has an effective aperture

of f-22.

The Station WOACRE officer will soon initiate corre-

spondence to obtain a better lens which

will not only result in

photos,

extended coverage

in conditions of

twilight

by increasing the light-gathering capability

of the camera.

camera with a behind the lens light

meter will

be used from now

prevent underexposures in poor light

conditions.

enlarger lens has a fungus growth which

lowers photographic quality.

This will be repaired

or replaced.

Since the move to this OP,

in the line

of sight to the target area obstructs'or

photographs.

This prevents the Station from using

graphs with agent personnel or contacts who might be able

identify the subject of the photograph.

sterilized, it provides a very easy means of identifying where

the photograph was taken, and conceivably, by using a theodilite,

the exact location of the OP.

All operation, through

liaison, to remove this obstruction has been initiated.

11. Identification of PCS personnel, out-bound TDY and in-

transit passengers can easily be raised to near one-hundred

percent.

The Station will arrange for

passport coverage to be passed on a routine basis to KDAFGHAN

and, using these,

he should be able to identify

subjects that fall in the above category.

instructed to start a photo file on all TDY and in-transit

personnel and, as he builds this base up, he should be able to

identify

nore

and more of the in-bound in-transit personnel.

Consideration is also being given to have him develop and process

these passport photos for both himself and the Station. This

would not only speed up identification of these subjects - and

the exploitation of possible

ops leads

- but relieve

the Station

Technician and Support Section of some of their work load.

12.

The exploitation of potential operational leads through

the compilation of data on license plates,

servicemen,

visitors and arrival and departure times, has previously been

tried by the Station on a sporadic basis

with no success.

is primarily due to the fact that the workload involved

Station personnel has prevented a continuing effort:

KDAFGHAN-I and 2 are underworked (and would probably welcome

some change in their incredibly boring routine),

this job will

be given to them. They will be required to submit monthly

reports on:

a. All vehicles that call at the compound (frequency

figures).

b. All service calls.

c. All visitors

and or servicemen who get inside the

compound.

Continued

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DEFATOR

11ДI81A

Actio.

d. All visitors and or servicemen

who get inside the

gate.

e.

Compiled statistics on the arrival and departure

time (and

method) of each known or suspect intelli-

gence officer.

This should considerably improve the Station's ability to exploit

any leads that might arise.

13.

and the one where we

stand to strike the most "pay-dirt" is

that of identifying the

photographs of non-Cuban personnel who visit the Embassy or the

Consulate.

true, we are unlikely to identify any DGI

agent personnel or illegals, we would be most likely to obtain

identification of subversives traveling to Cuba and on local

sympathizers or contacts who could possibly serve as access

agents.

Linking unknown faces to names can only be done by

technical means.

The target situation and our proposed means

of attack are given below.

Since the arrival of the new DGI Chief of Center and

the DSE security officer last year, security at the Cuban Embassy

and Consulate has tightened drastically.

Metal shutters have

been placed on all but

windows in the area suspected

of being the DGI center.

crack of light now shows

from these windows at night.

The entire compound

the sur-

rounding wall have been

In KDAFGHAN' S

only shadows in the place now are during the daytime":

former open grill gate to the automobile entrance has

placed by an electrically operated solid metal garage door.

Passerbys can no longer look into the compound or gatehouse and

KDAFGHAN can no longer observe the latter.

The door into the

gatehouse,

which is

in the outer wall alongside the automobile

entrance,

has been changed to a heavy metal door with a one-way

mirror for observation.

No vehicles except those belonging to

the Embassy are now allowed inside..

All delivery trucks must

their items

inside.

A completely new,

and unknown,

telephone

system has been installed:

Access control

is

now

rigorous.

When a visitor now calls at the Embassy he

must ring

the doorbell, wait for the door to be opened

slightly,

and, if he is not recognized, announce his name and business.

The door is then shut in his

the gatekeeper calls the

person he wants to see and the person is then either let in or

turned away.

If let in he no longer is allowed into the

compound - with some few rare exceptions -

- but is led into the

Former gatehouse which has just been converted into a reception

The person he came

-to see comes to the reception area

and interviews him there.

Very rarely

is the visitor let into

the compound.

If the visitor calls at the Consulate he may

freely enter that one room on the ground floor, but is allowed

no further.

Usually the secretary handles all

requests.

times a visitor to the Consulate who requires an interview with

one of the consuls is taken or sent to the Embassy entrance

interviewed in that area.

Our chances of implanting an audio

Embassy,

the Consulate,

or the gatehouse with

our current assets and under these conditions is nill.

There are seven telephone lines into the Cuban

compound. Five of these go directly

to the Ambassador's office,

the Cultural Office,

and the Consulate.

the Press Office,

the Commercial Office

As far as we know, the DGI center has no

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#10n9

direct lines.

Two lines go to a switchboard of

bat-mise possible

in the gatehouse/reception

room.

unknown capacity

These lines

receive an average

of two thousand calls

each per month.

Many times,

in reading

the take, we note that a person will call and say

that he is

coming by at a certain time - or he will be called and told to

come

at a certain time.

If KDAFGHAN could corelate these calls

with the photographs he takes he could make many identifications

which,

in turn,

could be exploited by other Station assets,

KDGLACI ER,

or LNERGO.

Even of more assistance would be the "hot

miking".. of these lines. That way we could not only identify any

caller

to the Consulate or gatehouse, but also who the gatekeeper

calls inside to announce the visitor.

expect to

In

addition, we would also

pick up quite a bit of conversation of interest, for the

gatehouse

seems to be a favorite hangout in the Embassy for DGI

personnel.

KDAFGHANS 1 and 2, being experienced LP operators,

could easily handle the take.

KDAFGHAN-1,

being fluent in English,

could also handle the English language portions of

any

take

-

which in view of

the number of English-speaking visitors would

probably be considerable.

Therefore,

we request that we be advised what technical

information is necessary for WOACRE to determine the feasibility

of a hot mike installation into the gatehouse and Consulate

(assuming no access to the instruments) serviced by an LP located

in the current KDAFGHAN OP.-

Tn the meantime, we will investigate

the possibility of tapping one of the gatehouse telephones

currently monitored by KDBADGER and running it into the KDAFGHAN

Op where it will not only be transcribed but live monitored.

normal.

17. PRODUCTION: Production figures for this period were

KDAFGHAN provided

of 600 contact prints and

enlargements per month.

No new identifications were made.

18-

ADLINISTRATIE,There were no changes in gastror

personnel during this penied.

There were no security incidents

during this

To improve security, meetings have been reduced to an

average of one every two weeks.

Use of the safehouse is now held

to a minimum and wherever possible meetings are by car pickup.

While KDAFGHAN-l's cover for his darkroom is that it is supposedly

his hobby, there is not one photograph or camera visible anywhere

in his house. He has been instructed to correct this deficiency.

Jesse R. GARDALPHE

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