Document date: 00/00/0000

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File #:

02-40-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 1131

HH

55093

DocId: 32989548

Page 1

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## Page 2

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/22/02 BY SpALAsil

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HH 55093 DocId: 32989548

Pare 2.

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## Page 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 10/2560

HEREIN IS INCLASSIFIER ALM CA

NTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

• W. RAYMOND WANNALL

INSPECTOR

DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

DIRENCER

HUNTER E.

HELGESON

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1S-1

15-2

BLACK NATIONALIST AND

WHITE HATE

TROTSKYIST. UNIT

CENTRAL UNIT

BLACK NATIONALIST AND

COMMUNIST PARTY UNIT

WHITE HATE -

EAST UNITI

BLACK NATIONALIST AND

SECURITY INFORMANT UNIT

EXTREMIST - WEST UNIT

WHITE HATE -

WEST UNITI

BLACK NATIONALIST - SOUTH

KLAN AND EXTREMIST

INFORMANT UNIT

EXTREMIST - EAST UNIT

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT

47

CIVIL DISORDER REPORT-

ING UNIT

. .

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT . NOVEMBER 6, 1975

HH 55093 DocId: 32989548 Page 3

15-3

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT

63

15-1

15-2

15-3

AUTHORIZED

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT

AGENT

CLERICAL-

SECRETARIAL

18

21.

22

22

26

41

---

## Page 4

•---

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE DO 0O BYSAME

HEREINIS UNCLASSIMED

Reorganization - 1955

The Intelligence Division (ID) was known as the

Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) in January, 1955, and was

composed of four sections: internal Security, Espionage,

Liaison, and Central Research. Principal cases supervised in

the DID in January, 1955, were Espionage, Internal Security and

Nationalistic Tendency matters.

In August, 1955, the Internal Security Section was the

volume section in the DID. It supervised investigations

conducied under legislation, such as the Internal Security Act

01. 1950, Communist Control Act of 1954 and the Smith Act of 1940.

It also handled investigations of communist front organizations

and of subjects involved in possible violations of the

Neutrality Act, and Sedition, Treason and the Federal Train

Wreck; statutes and the Labor Management Relations Act. In

addition, the Internal Security Section was responsible for the

handling of violations of Federal Injunctions, security infornants,

Alien Enemy Control and related matters, and the Security Index.

The Smith Act cases alone demanded considerable time because of

the aspect of prosecution involving subjects of these cases.

The Internal Security Section was confronted also with the

prospect that the Supreme Court might uphold the Subversive

Activities Control Board order requiring registration by the

Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). and its members with the Attorney

HH 55093 DocId: 32989548 Page 4

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nation a sure india ita

Ceneral of the United States. It was anticipated that, if the

CPUSA and its members refused to register, a heavy burden

relating to prosecution of the organization and its members

would be placed on the Bureau and, consequently, on the

Internal Security Section.

It was concluded, therefore, that by dividing the

Internal Security Section into two sections, each headed by a

Section Chief, tighter controls over the supervision of the

various classifications could be maintained and the vast amount

of work moke effectively handled. Based on this analysis, the

Internal Security Section of DID was divided into two sections

during August, 1955. They were identified as the Internal

Security Section and Subversive Control Section. The new

Internal Security Section was made responsible for all sub-

stantive violations of Federal statutes involving the internal

security and the Security Informant Program. The Subversive

Control Section was assigned the supervision and maintenance

of the Security Index, the Emergency Detention Program and

maintenance of the Attorney General's portfolio.

- 2-

NH 55093 DocId: 32989548 Page 5

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Prior to the division, the Internal Security

Section had a total of 130 employees, which included 59

Special Agent: Supervisors. A total of 57 employees remained

in the newly formed Internal Security Section, including 24

Special I gent supervisors, a Section Chief, and Number One Man.

The Subversive Control Section was assigned a total of 73

employees including 31 Special Agent Supervisors, a Section

Chie::, and Number One Man.

Subsequently, the finding by the Subversive Activities

Control Board that the CPUSA vas a communist-action organization,

and, therefore, required to register with the Attorney General,

was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court in June, 1961. As

anticipated at the time of the reorganization of the Internal

Security Section, the CPUSA and its officers and members refused

to register. Failure to register was subject to criminal

sanctions and prosecutions of the Party and its members were

instituted.

Subversive Investigative matters being handled by

the FBI in 1955 numbered 36, 975.

-3-

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DOMESTIC INTELLIGINCE DIVISION

* INTERNAL SECURITY - LIAISON BRANCH

Internal Security Section

Section Chief

Number One Man

Special Agent Supervisors - 24

Clerical Employees

Total Employees

- 31

- 57

Subversive Control Section

Section Chief

Number One Man

Special Agent Supervisors - 31

Clerical Employees

- 4

Total Employees

*Following reorganization of Internal Security Section in

August, 1955.

(See chart attached)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

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DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

*INTERNAL SECURITY - LIAISON

BRANCH

УСАТУСКИТИ

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

(ISS)

SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION

(SCS)

ISS

scis

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT

CLERICAL -

AGENT

26

SECrETARIAL

33

40

57

73

- y:

*Following Reorganization in August, 1955

It 55093 DocTafa ternal legurity Section

LIAISON SECTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED

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INTELLIGCICE DIVISION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

NICREIN IS UCLASSIFIED

1964 Reorganization

The Intelligence Division (ID) was known as the

Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) in 1964, and the Internal

Security Branch was composed of three sections: Subversive

Control Section, Internal Security Section, and the Liaison

Section. Effective June 30, 1964, 112 Special Agents were assigned

to DID. Trlor to June 30, 1964, 48 Special Agents were assigned

to the Internal Security Branch. In 1964, there were 36,918

active subversive investigative matters and 5,622 active racial

investigative matters throughout the United States.

Racial unrest and related acts of violence increased

significantly in 19G4. Investigations and arrests arising out

of incidents of racial violence in the South clearly implicated

certain elements of the Ku Klux Klan which carriedout beatings,

bombings, murders and other violent racial actions.

NH 55093 DocId: 32989548 Page 9

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. =

Reorganization of the Internal Security Branch of

DID occurred in 1964, to afford improved supervision of the

increased volume of information received and to chart new avenues

of approach to effectively discharge our responsibilities in the

potentially explosive racial field. In July, 1964, supervisory

responsibility for investigation, of racial matters, racial

informants, Ku Klus Klan and related groups together with the

development of informants concerning these matters were transferred

From the General Investigative Division (GID) to DID. Five

Special Agents and approximately 1,350 cases were involved in

this

transfer. Three Agents formed the Racial Intelligence Unit

in the Subversive Control Section and two Agents formed the

Facial Informant Unit In the Internal Security Section. In 1965,

there were 37,818 active subversive investigative matters and

10,557 active racial investigative matters throughout the United

States.

In 1963 and 1964, a number of significant and fast-

moving events occurred which directly or indirectly influenced

the reorganization of the Internal Security Branch in 1964. A

brief sunmary follows: (1) In June, 1964, three Civil Rights

workers on their way from Philadelphia to Meridian, Mississippi,

* 2=

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-e306

• disappeared without a trace. Their abandoned automobile was

later discovered, completely burned out. A massive search

Involving FBI Agents and other law enforcement personnel was

conducted, and 44 days later the three missing victins were found

beneath an earthen dam near Meridian, Mississippi. All had been

shot at close range. The ensuing investigation determined that

members of the Fu lux Klan of Mississippi, were involved in the

disappearance of the three victins, and a Klan official was sub-

sequently convicted on Clvil Rights charges. (2) One of the

most notorious and widely publicized murders involving Klansmen

occurred on July 11, 1964, when Lemuel fenn, a legro educator

from Washington, D. C., was killed by a shotgun, blast near

Athens, Georgia. Penn, an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, Was

driving back fron a training session at Fort Benning, Georgia,

with two other Negro reservists. A group of Klansmen from the

Athens, Georgia, area, were subsequently arrested and charged with

the murder.

(3) The Klan has been responsible for bombings,

dynamitings, and other terrorist acts, and Klan history has been

replete with acts of violence. At a Klan meeting In South

=3 -

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Carolina, in September, 1963, a klan official announced the

bombing of a legro Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, in

which four children were killed. All of the fifty members

present applauded what they considered to be the "good news. "

Attached Is a 1964 FBI Organizational Chart for the

Internal Security Branch of DID.

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FBI ORGANIZATIONAI CHART

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

1964

DIRECTOR

ASSOCIATE

DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/257,00 BY SPAHA

ASSISTANT TO

THE DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR

INTERNAL SECURITY

BRANCH

36 Agents

SUBVERSIVE CONTROL

SECTION

17 Agents

INTERNAL SECURITY

SECTION

19 Agents

LIAISON

SECTION

12 Agents

-Racial

Intelligence

Unit

-formed 7/64

-Racial

Informant

Unit

-formed 7/64

HH 55093 • DocId: 32989548 Paye 13

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINJS UNCLASSIFIED

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

DATE 10.24.00

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

Reorganization, September, 1967

Prior to September, 1967, the Internal Security Branch

consisted of two sections namely, the Internal Security Section

and the Subversive Control Section. A review of the work being

handled by the Internal Security Branch was made and it was

recommended and approved that the branch be reorganized and

the Subversive Control Section be renamed Racial Intelligence

Section. This reorganization was put into effect utilizing

existing personnel.

The reorganization was made, in view of racial violence

that had occurred in several cities in the summer of 1967 and

the rise to prominence of young black leaders with "black power"

and revolution as their goals. For example, the student

Nonviolent Coordinating Committee changed from a cooperative

effort by whites and blacks to an all-black organization

advocating violence. Black revolutionary organizations with

such leaders as H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael were

prevalent and associated with violent demonstrations and

rhetoric.

Under the new organization of the branch the Internal

Security Section handled all matters relating to domestic

• subversive organizations and individuals associated therewith.

This section also continued to handle security informant matters.

NH 55093 DocId: 32989548

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The Racial Intelligence Section handled all cases

involving investigations with racial connotations including

black and white hate groups, black nationalist organizations,

associated individuals and racial informants.

This reorganization enabled a concentration of

supervision specifically related to the type of activities

and individuals involved. For example, the investigation of

the murder of three civil rights workers near Philadelphia,

Mississippi; which occurred in June, 1964, culminated with the

successful prosecution in October, 1967 of seven defendants in

U.S. District Court in Meridian, Mississippi. This investigation

which was

substantively handled by the General Investigative

Division was a product of coordination between that division

and the above Racial Intelligence Section which provided

much of the klan background information assisting in the

investigation and also provided for invaluable informant

input.

This

case essentially broke the back of the klan

groups in Mississippi at that time.

• The Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration in Washington,

D. C. (WDC), in October, 1967, is illustrative of the

extensive potentially violent demonstrations that were occurring

throughout the country during that period. Original plans

for these "spring mobilization" demonstrations called for up

to 1 million demonstrators to be in WDC and information was .

developed that they would take part in civil disobedience,

turning in of draft

cards, and various acts of violence.

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Approximately 35,000 persons participated in the efforts,

most of which were directed at the Pentagon with approximately

600 persons being arrested. Statistics don't reflect the

attendant verbal and physical attacks against law enforcement

and guard officials nor do they account for problems which

arose as a result of the general immorality displayed by a

percentage of those demonstrators. The rioting following

the assassination of Martin Luther King, JI., on April 4, 1968,

received more effective and concentrated supervision under this

reorganization.

The massive anti-war demonstrations and racial violence

prompted President Lyndon B. Johnson to declare that "the

looting and arson and plunder and pillage which have occurred

are not part of a civil rights protest. It is no American

right to loot or burn or fire rifles from the rooftops."

He further stated that those in public responsibilities have

an immediate obligation to end disorder by using "every means

at our command..." and "if your response to these tragic events

is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster but

dishonor" and "violence must be stopped quickly, finally, and

permanently."

The case load in 1967 in subversive matters field wide

was 33,919 and in 1968 it was 36,154; in extremist matters in

1967, 9,457 and in 1968, 13,740.

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The propriety of this reorganization was borne out

by increased work load assignments brought about by the

passage of the Anti-riot Laws and the Gun Control Act of 1968.

(Reorganization chart attached.)

• NH 55093-DocId: -DocId:32989540:TPage 17-

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Internal Security Branch

Espionage Research Branch

Internal Security Section

Section Chief

Racial Intelligence Section

Section Chief

No. I Man

Security Informant and

Special Records

Unit

(3 Supervisors)

Communist Infiltrated

Groups Unit

(3 Supervisors)

No. 1 Man

Bla ck Nationalist Unit

(5 Supervisors)

Racial Informant Unit

(3 Supervisors)

Riot and Racial Disturbance Unit

(3 Supervisors)

Subversive Splinter Groups Unit

(2 Supervisors)

and Nationalist Unit

Communist Party, USA Unit

(3 Supervisors)

Special Cases Unit

(2 Supervisors)

Subversive Individuals - West Unit

(3 Supervisors)

Subversive Individuals - Bast Unit

(3 Supervisors)

. Total Agent Complement

(Including Section Chief

and No. 1 Man): 21

Total Clerical and

Stenographic Complement

(Including Front Office

Secretary and Clerk): 24

Total Agent Complement

(Including Section Chief

and No. 1 Man): 18

Total Clerical and

Stenographic Complement

(Including Front Office

Secretary and Clerk):

18

H# 55093

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN S UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1025100 BY SALARM eM

Reorganization, February. 1973

On 2/21/73, the Domestic Intelligerce Division was

reorganized and the name changed to Intelligence Division. Under

the new organizational structure, the Internal Security Branch,

formerly the Internal Security and Research Branch, was broken

down into three sections designated as IS-1 (Extremist Intelli

• gence); IS-?. (Internal Security); and IS-3 (Research). In the

restructuring, work formerly handled by the Revolutionary

Activities Section and the Internal Security Section was

combined into one section called the Internal Security Section.

In addition, the unit handling bombing matters under the

former Internal Security Section was transferred to the newly

reorganized Counterintelligence Branch of the Intelligence

Division. Under the new organizational set-up, the Internal

Security Branch was organized so that all domestic security

work would come under that Branch. Organizational change was

brought about because of the wind-down of the Vietnam War and

in light of public clamor concerning domestic security

investigations.

Changes were made to provide coverage in the

foreign field which had dropped to a dangerous level and to

reassure the public of the FBI's restraint in domestic

security programs.

As a result of the organizational changes,

the

proposed agent complement'for the newly formed Internal

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Security Branch was 61, a decrease of 10 agents of. the

previous figure of 71. These individuals were included

in the proposed agent complement of 63 for the newly

organized Counterintelligence Branch for a total Intelligence

Division complement

of 124 agents.

The case load in 1972 in subversive matters field

wide was 45,956, and in 1973 it was 29,089; in extremist

matters in 1972, 22,589, and in 1973, 22,122. (Reorganization

• Chart Attached.)

HH 55093 DocId: 32989548

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(7 +7

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FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

FEBRUARY, 1973

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Internal Security Branch. Counterintelligence Branch

IS-1 (Extremist Intelligence)

CI-I (Espionage)

Present Agent Complement - 21

Present Agent Complement - 22

Proposed Agent Complement - 23

Proposed Agent Complement - 20

IS-2 (Internal Security)

CI-2 (Sino-Satellite)

Present Agent Complement - 16

Present Agent Complement - New

Proposed Agent Complement - 28

Proposed Agent Complement - 16

IS-3 (Research)

CI-3 (Nationalities Intelligence)

Present Agent Complement - 11

Present Agent Complement - 21

Proposed Agent Complement - 10

Proposed Agent Complement - 17

--(Revolutionary Activities)

CI-4 (Liaison)

Present Agent Complement - 23

Present Agent Complement - 10

Proposed Agent Complement - Abolish

Proposed Agent Complement - 10

Total Present Agent Complement - 71|

Total Present Agent Complement - 53

•Total Proposed Agent Complement -61 Total Proposed Agent Complement - 63

Total Division Present Complement - 124

Total Division Proposed Complement - 124

HH 55093 DocId: 32989548 Page 21

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протести спарто оонм миротати

INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

• 66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

- 74.75

=

60, 000

55, 000

50, 000

45,000

• 40,000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15, 000

10,000

5, 000

1, 000

HH 55093 DocId: 32989548 Page 22

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INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS

55

56

57

58

59

6 0 61

62

63

64 65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72.

73

-74

75

-mine.

60,000

55,000

50, 000

45, 000

40,000

35, 000

30,000

25, 000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

1, 000

U

.

**.

HN 55093 DooId:32989548 Page 23

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55

56

57°

58

59

60

• 61

INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

SECURITY INFORMANTS AND

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

62

63

61

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

-..at.

55093

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24

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55

56

57

58

59

60

61

INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

EXTREMIST INFORMANTS AND

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

62

63 64 : 65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72°

73

7475

HH 55093 DocId: 32989548

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25

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wowed?

Intalligence blUfalon

Internal Security Branch

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

¡FREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE

1970 Reorgantzationel Plen

In 1970 there were 30,002 subveralve natters and

19,707 extremlot matters belag superviand by the Intelligence

invision, The Intertal SecuIlty-ResprIch Sranch experlenced

a substantial locrease in work load duxing this tim prisod.

The Intelligence Division was reorganizad 1n

Decesber, 1970. The increased volume of work 1a New Left and

Black NatIonal1st violence-oftented casas along with a decline

In esplonage and related cases necessitated this organizational

change.

A Ney Laft Saction vas created valle che Sortet

and Sino-Satellite Sections vete combined. The Racial Section

was noved to the Esplorego-RiCial Branch fon the Internal

SacurIty-hesentch Branch to ellou for sore balanced

adainistration within the Intelligence Divislon.

HH 55093 DocId:32989548 Page 26

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Intelligence Division

Internal Security Branch

In 1971 there vere 37,137 subversive mazters and

26,344 extremist nacters being supervised by the Intelligence

Dlvision.. The Incalligence Division's lncreased work lond

was nfficiencly administered with no nadittonal supervinory.

personrol necessery

• result of thie sergentzation,

Attached is the 1970 FBI Organication 1 Chart for

Intelligence Security-Research Branch, Domestle Intelligence

Division.

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FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1970

DIRECTOR

ASSOCIATE

DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT TO

THE DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT

¡ DIRECTOR

ESPIONAGE - RACIAL

BRANCH

ESPIONAGE SECTION

26 Agents

NATIONALITIES

INTELLIGENCE SECTION

16 Agents

RACIAL SECTION

17 Agents

SECURITY - INTELLIGENCE

BRANCH

INTERNAL SECURITY

SECTION

20 Agents

RESEARCH SECTION

16 Agents

NEW LEFT

SECTION

22 Agents

New Left Section created in

Security-Intelligence

Branch, 12/70

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.%.

11/6/75

CRAFT OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Domestic intelligence is a comprehensive product

resulting

from the collection, evaluation, collation, analysis,

and interpretation of all available information relating to

threats and potential threats to the internal security of the

United States posed by groups and/or individuals within this

country. Pursuant to Presidential Directives, instructions

of the Attorney General,

statutes and Executive Orders, the

FBI obtairs this product through investigations which are

initiated to determine if violations of Federal laws relating

to Rebellion or Insurrection, Advocating the Overthrow of the

Government, Sedition, or other applicable Federal statutes are

being committed, and to advise officials of the Executive

Branch of Government of such activities so that an informed

assessment of the threat can be made.

Intelligence collection is the gathering and possession

of knowledge.

The area to which the process is applied supplies

the charäcteristics of the process. Intelligence collection is

done by investigation.

The collection of intelligence for

internal security purposes can rightly be called internal

security investigation. The comparison of an internal security

investigation to a criminal investigation will show no great

distinguishing features. Both utilize basically the same

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

• DATE 10 24/00

HH 55093. DocId: 32989548. Page 29

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## Page 30

techniques. What distinguishes the two areas is the goal of

each. A criminal investigation seeks prosecution. An internal

security investigation

seeks to prevent the illegal overthrow

or destruction of the established system of government.

This is the primary goal. Prosecutions do occur but they are

admittedly infrequent, and are not the ultimate accomplishment

of an internal security investigation. Therefore, intelligence

investigations are primarily concerned with the potential of

illegal activity while criminal investigations are premised on

the occurrence of a specific act.

There are two basic kinds of internal domestic intel-

ligence investigations: (1) the general assessment and (2) the

assessment of a particular group, individual or incident.

General assessments of potential for violence and civil disorders

are collected to provide the Executive Branch with a knowledge

regarding the potential problems with which it must deal. This

information is gathered nationwide from sources whose reliability

or good judgment has been displayed in the past.

Contrasted to general assessments

in geographical

areas are investigations which are directed at specific

individuals and organizations. They are investigated because

their activities include possible violation of Sedition,

•=2=

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Treason and Overthrow of the Government statutes. Whether the

statute has been violated or will be violated is unknown to

begin with, for if the FBI waited for all the elements of the

violations to occur, there would be no law to enforce or govern-

ment to enforce it.

Some allegations or indications of subversion are

insignificant and require minimal information to refute or

to place them. in their proper perspective. Because an

allegation appears insignificant does not mean it can be

handled quickly. While it may eventually be determined that

a person poses no threat, an investigation is required to make

that determination. Additionally, the experienced investigator

knows that the full value of an item of information may not

be immediately realized. Often, an item of information triggers

an investigation only after it has been reviewed in context

with other facts.

Other allegations of subversion are not insignificant

and have proven to be of such stature and importance to require

special marshalling of Bureau resources to more efficiently

gather the information needed.

Toward this end, special

administrative devices are established to better catalog the

knowledge possessed to allow for better investigative correlation,

comparison and assessment.

- 3 -.

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... =

The FBI's programs designed to marshal resources

concerning specific groups or incidents will be discussed

in some detail in this briefing.

• 4 =

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## Page 33

INTERNAL SECURITY

THREATS - SUBVORSIVE

1955 - 1975

MOV # • 1975

In the domestic intelligence, or counter-subversive,

field, the FBI's primary concern in the time period of about

1955 was the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Socialist

Workers Party (SWP). Both are disciplined and structured

subversive organizations whose sole reason for existence is

to bring about the violent overthrow of our Government and

institution of a dictatorship of the proletariate. Of the

two, the CPUSA was, and continues to be, the most dominant and

resourcelul.

The CPUSA joined the Communist International (Comintern)

In 1921, accepting fully the 21 conditions for membership,

Including unquallited alleglance to the Soviet Union, Passage

•of the Voozhis Act in 1940 (subject to foreign control) caused

the CPUSA to disaffiliate from the Conintern in preierence to

registering with the Attorney General. During World Was II,

the CPUSA changed its name to Communist Political Association

(CPA) 1 line with Soviet efforts to solloit support of the

United States. In 1945, with the war threat over, the Comnunist

Party Soviet Union (CPSU) ordered the reconstitution of the CPUSA

as a ullitant, Marxist-Leninist organization.

Prosecutions against the CPUSA and its

leaders occurred.

The Snith Act trials in 1943-1949 convicted 104 persons. In

1957 the Supreme Court ruled the Government must prove "Incitenent

to sction" to sustain prosecution and the convictions were set

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/15

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aside. These prosecutions resulted in the CPUSA operating in

# largely underground level from 1951 to 1055.

The above trials, along with similar prosecutions of

James P. Cannon and other STP leaders, passage of the labor -

Managenent Relations Act of 1947, the Interual Security Act of

1950, the Conmunist Control Act of 1954, and the Labor - Nanare

ment and Disclosure Act of 1959 disclose a high level of interost

In connunist activity by the public,. Congress and the Executive

Branch. The FBI reneted to the extensive cormunist activity

and related legislation of that period by committing manpower

and resources to these investigations.

2

- 5am do are comes

toe tilde 2001, 00.

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This situation romained somewhat stable until the

mid-1900s. The Vietnan conflict was becoming increasingly un

popular and the old-line comuist groups, CrUSA and SiP,

becamo extremely active 1n organizing massive and often violent

protesi against Government policy which in effect resulted in

at least moral sunnort for the communist North Viotnanose. In

nadition, many young people, whose lives were directly affected

by the Seloctive service System, ronctod in both poacoful and

violont opposition to the var. out of this turmois a number

of campus oriented, protest-type sroups formed. Some of these

groups evolved fron protost to larist ioninist rovolutionary

organizations, those primary aim and purpose was essentially

the same as the old-lina CPUSA except theirs was an avowed

allegiance to the Third World conmunist revolutionary forces,

exemplified by Fidel Castro and his successiul revolution in Cuba.

For example, the 1968-69 school year witnessed & heavy

wave of deronstratious and violence. During that year there

vere more than 850 decoratrations on college campuses, including

more than 200 insicaces of building seizures or sit ins. More

than 4, 000 Individuals were arrested for their disruptive

bohavior. Danago to school facilitios caccodod $3 pillion and

61 instances of arsons or attempted arsons voic committed. This

vavo of destruction loit one dead and over 125 injured.

An unpacocdontod nurier of aloturiancos and incidonto

of student connected violence crupted auring the 1009-70 school jour.

3

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In alnost every category measiring unrest and violence, the

liques incrensed sharply ovor the previous acadomic year. In

1969-70 there were 1,785 dononstratious on college campuses,

including 313 building seizures by ranpaging students. Two

tundred and forty-sis arsons or attenpied arsons and 14 instances

of bonbing attacks vere committed. Nearly 7, 300 arrests were nade

in connection with those incidents, and damges exceeded $9,500, 000.

Eight deaths were reported and injuries totaled 402, nearly

two-thirds of which were sustained bi police and college oificials.

Not oniy have the colleges thonselves suffered. The

surrounding communities lave been severely affecied. for instance,

15311an Hustler, who directed the dofense of the now fanous

Chicaso seven, who vere tried for violations of Federal antiriot

statutes, spole to a rally at the Universliy of Californic at

Santa Barbara on Fobruary 25, He told his audience that if the

President would not listen to the people, then it was each

person's

duty to be counted in the streets. Following the rally,

demonstrators, including colloge students and other militnts,

gatherce in a parts in nearby Isla Vistz. They burned the lochl

branch of the Bank of inerica. it has been estinated that

danage to the banl reached $400,000 and that, in addition,

$29,000 was inflicted in damages to ther property.

rollowing the U.s. troop novenent Into Cambodia,

students at the Univorsity of Wisconsin, Medison, Wisconsin, loft

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the campus

to demonstrate in Madison. They inflicted widespread

property danage which has been estimated at $270,000. In addition,

the payment of overtime to police departments and the National

Guard to control the situation during these disruptions reportedly

cost the taxpayers in excess of $300,000.

Another gauge of violence during this period is the

use of bombing as a political terrorist act. During 1972

there were 1507 bombings, 714 by explosives and 793 by incendiaries.

Twenty-five deaths and 176 injuries were reported with a total

property damage value of $7,991,815.

In 1973 there were 1529 bombings, 742 by explosives

and 787 by incendiaries. Iwenty-two deaths and 187 injuries

were reported and a total property damage of $7,261,832 was

involved.

Not all these bombings were by political terrorists,

but the bomb has become an increasingly used weapon in the

terrorists' arsenal.

The pressures from the Executive Branch, Congress and

public for evaluation of this activity and determination of extent

of subversive presence, as opposed to legitimate dissent, was

severe and required extensive reallocation of resources of the

FBI until the end of the Vietnam War.

5

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From the cha of the Vietnan Var until the present

time the I21 has asuin been laced with a changing paitern of

dosestle subversios, Without the Vietnon Voi as a popular

public Iss'e which could be used to rench the public through

front group operationa (Communist Party, USA - Poopics Coalition

for Peace and Justice) (Socialist Workers Party - National

Peace Action Coalition) and the resulting return of public

interost to internal problens and issues, tretles o3 subversire

Eroups underwent a change. Old-line groups again focused on

racinl and labor issues consistent with their long-range efiorts

to roach the vorioro to build a revoluiion of the proletariais.

Racial minoritics have always been viowed so fertile rocruiting

grounds nud are propagandised as oppressed minorities.

Furchoranco and fonentrtiva of racial and labor strife are

essential clencnts in clear basie inalosophy of cians struesie.

Of more direct and inmodiate concern are the changes.

whach occurred in the loss strictured und circipliced croups.

'Consistently through the Victnam Var yoars their tactics of

protest voro more Yicicai, c.E., NOTC arsous and buislags,

assaults on nilitary end industrial recrulters, rascovers oi

canpus buildings, industrial and public orfice bonbings, and

the like. Property dange was in the millions of collars aud

thousads of forsons wese donied theis basic frecion to aitoad

clusoes, participate in NONC and noot and converse with percear

of thoir choico.

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Out of this atnosphere of violenco and espousal of

corolution evelrod what has heen variously described is the

counterculture or altornate life-style. The schercats to this

Innocuous sounding philosophy range fron pacifistic, non

competitive cropouta fron society and the acid-drug culture

victing to the larxist-leninist revolutionarios operating

within this alicrate 1ifc-sigle In an inderground capacity.

The latter, of course, are of serious concorn to the IBI. The

throat of the revolutionary within the alternate lic-style

community in turn tanges

fion the unatriliated individual who

enarges in bonbings, asons or assassinations in Aucticrance

of his rovolutionery objoctives, to colls or shall groups

operating locally in the some manner, to nationally organized,

sophisticatod unerground revolutionaries such as leaticiaa..

There are currently 22 Weatherman In fugitive status, Is otheis

who are missing non-fugitive Weatherman believed in underground

stetus, supuorted ly epprozimatoly 200 alove ground icatacau.

Noathernan has clained cradit for 20 lonbingo nnd are acturlly

baljeved resnonnible for a total of botweon 35 and 40 bombings.

Those tactics aro ploinly torzoristic - the use of tcrzcrion

by a spall group to force thoir vill, revolution, on the majorily.

Further conpounding our problous in this exes is the

prolific use of talse icontitios, tremently of acceased intants.

F2is 20z0cộ el To I25:l0n 15 cufsiciontly covore to caure 20im

•sintion 01 the Attoracy Gorcial's redoral Advisory Coonitica on

7

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False Identizication. Tie intent of this Connittos is to try to

measure the scope of the problon to lan enforconent, its impact

on business and derise neasures to cope with it. It should ie

noted that the basic problem arises from & local level In that

In mosi arcas births are recordod; bovover, seldon, 1l ever, aic

doathe micied acciant ino birth accord and littlo 11 say

reatraint is placed on obtaining a birti certificate. An

obitany collan in a nonapaper norano dor the dosisod joor of

birth is the normal first step in obtaining a safe birth

cortificate, which is tho basis to ostablísh a conploto falso

identity, Driver's license, Social Security caid, credit carda,

otc.; are then obtained to complote the identity.

Io ncet its responsibilities in the donostic intelli

gence field, the IDI nust copo vith both tho visible, structwed

and disciplined revolutionary groups such as the crucA, si and

othors, along with their various front groups, as voll as the nore

, violenco prono rovolutionries in the underground.

It must do borne 1n mind all of those gicups shuc a

connon bond of Marxist-Ioninist revolutionary fervo:. Their

dilsoronces are in tactics. The CPUSA would appoar as a political

alternativo to the Inloring soccos tho would vocifercously 11ut

{or their iuteresis, wile noching the total conination and coa:rol

of the doviot Union. Tho CrUsA is norcly en cxtension of üle

coriod Uion in ine ilkd staios end dorod Inoriauty dovidid antit

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Soviet policy or interests. DWe sopresents nuch the sauc

¿acade to Inbor, while energotically continuing to build party

streugth for the revolution and follow the international

rovolutionary concepts of Leon Troissy, Other snuller groups

continue in the sang vein, with their own variationg on the

• Harzist-Leninint doud of sevolutios. Hover, less rigidly

structured but nore violence-oriented subversive groups pose

a. Lax more disticult probiou because thoir violonce icquires

nore covcr, actiure, often completely underground in nature.

...

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Novempher 10, 1975

INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS-EXTREMIST 1954-1975

Modern extremism as it effects law enforcement

can be traced to the 1950s and the U.S. Supreme Court

decision in 1954 outlawing segregation in public schools.

The Ku Klux Klan, which had its origin in the post-Civil

War Reconstruction days, had long laid dormant, but forced

• integration in the South pumped life back into it. Civil

Rights (CR) workers championing the rights of Negroes,

first on the issue of school desegrogation, then equal

facilities and finally voting rights, flooded the South in

great numbers.

Strong opposition by southern whites inflamed

tempers and various Klan organizations inspired or directed

actions against Negroes and the CR workers, which resulted

in the Birmingham, Alabama, church bombing, murder of

_thras

CR workers in Mississippi, and the murders of Colonel Lemuel

Penn in Georgia, and Viola Liuzzo in Selma, Alabama.

The Klan and its symbol, the fiery cross, became.

synonymous with activities directed against Negroes, Jews,

Catholics, and persons of foreign birth. A wave of floggings,

murders, kidnappings, and assaults began in 1950 and

continued into the 1960s. Acts of intimidation became sọ

prevalent that local grand juries met constantly and

hundreds of local arrests of members of the Klan took

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINS UNSLASSIFIED

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place. As civil rights protests

increased, bombings became

more frequent in many areas of the South.

In March, 1965, then Senator Robert F. Kennedy

predicted violence in the South and North after Congress

passed voting rights legislation. Kennedy said, "I don't

• care what legislation is passed--we are going to have problems...

violence."

Violence reached such a stage that President Lyndon

Johnson, appearing on national television, warned the Klan

and instructed the FBI to intensify its investigations of the

violence being perpetrated in the South. While Klan activi-

ties abated, the 1y7Us have seen another stirring of the Klan

in antibusing activity as well as anti-Jewish and civil rights

issues in the Nation. Other white hate groups such -as the

National States' Rights Party, American Nazi Party and the

Minutemen had their origin in the late 195Us and early ly6Us,

basing their philosophy primarily upon white supremacy.

Arising almost simultaneously with Klan activity

was black extremism. A dissident group of former National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

members in Monroe, North Carolina, under the leadership of

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Robert Franklin Williams, fought back at the Klan. The

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),. backing

DI. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian

Leadership Conference's drive for Negro rights, under tie

militant leadership of Stokely Carmichael and then H. Rap

Brown struck out both at the Klan and southern police.

Following close on the heels of racial violence in the South

came urban riots throughout much of the United States. Tie 1965

• Watts

Riot, in Los Angeles and the nationwide rioting following

the murder of Martin Luther King, JI., in 1968, were examples

of major disturbances experienced in U.S. cities. Black

extremists provided the spark which inflamed many of our cities.

Huge conflagrations

consumed Harlem, Watts, Detroit, Newark,

and our Nation's Capital.

In a July, 1967, address to the Nation President

Lyndon Johnson declared that "the looting and arson and plunder

and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights

protest." "It is no American right," said the President, to

10ot or burn or "fire rifles

from the rooftops." Those in

public responsibility have "an immediate" obligation "to end

disorder," the President told the American people, by using

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"every means at our command...."

The President warned public officials that "if your

response to these tragic events is only business-as-usual,

you invite not only disaster but dishonor." President Johnson

declared that "violence must be stopped--quickly, finally

and permanently" and he pledged "we will stop it."

Racial tension in this country exploded into riots

and racial listurbances over 2UU times between 1964 and 197U.

Statistics reported across the country showed over 25u people

were killed, over IU, UUU were injured, and there was over a

quarter billion dollars in property damage. Civil disturbances

reached such proportions that a Presidential commission was

established and the Attorney General of the United States

instituted a data center so as to keep Federal officials aware

of riot conditions. •

Beginning

as early as 1963, mass demonstrations

played a major role in this country. Student unrest became

an important factor in demonstrations and with it came violence

to the nation's campuses.

Pronouncements like the following

were commonplace:

"This is a revolution. Reformists work within

• existing rules and regulations; revolutionists

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make their own rules and regulations."

"We will use any means necessary to uphold

the principle that people of the third world

have a right to determine what kind of human

beings they want to be. Violence is the best

means. It disrupts and terrorizes so that

if people of the third world are not allowed

to determine their own kind of education, then

nobody else on that campus can get any kind

of education."

Jerry Wayne Varnado,

Black Student Union Coordinator

San Francisco State College,

"Newsweek," 2/10/69

Statistics presented by The Senate Permanent Sub-

committee on Investigations of The Committee on Government

Operations in a publication entitled "Staff Study of Campus Riots

and Disorders, October, 1967 - May, 1969" indicate the extent

of the problem:

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-

Total Colleges

Involved in Disturbances

211

Total Disturbances

471

Black Student Demands Leading to

Disturbances

125

Total Estimated Persons Injured

598

(The February, 197U, issue of "Security World" stated that,

during the period January 1 to August 31, 1969, losses speci-

fically traced to campus disorders amounted to $8,946,972)

The widespread and increasingly violent nature of the

problem prompted concern to be expressed by responsible spokes-

men from all quarters. On October 2, 1969, Senator Byrd said

-

that "events in the news in the past few days concerning

activities by militant radical groups should alert us to the

new trouble that is brewing on the Nation's college campuses

and elsewhere.".

Senator Byrd said that "all of us would do

well to pay heed now, and law enforcement authorities should

plan a course of action before the situation gets completely

out of hand."

Editorial comment in the September 28, 1970, issue

of The Washington Post was also indicative of such concern:

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"The college campuses have been targets

of bombings and other violent disorders

•..Certainly the FBI can be invaluable

in helping to crack such cases...

Certainly, the academic leadership must

be firm in cracking down on violence; so

should local authorities; so should the

FBI when necessary."

Out of these troubled times came such groups as the

well armed Black Panther Party (BPP), spouting revolutionary

rhetoric and engaging in acts of violence like killing police,

or "offing the pig" as they expressed it. Basing their philosophy

upon the problems of poor and needy blacks, and ostensibly

orienting

their programs to community needs, the BPP and other

violence-prone groups gained a threshold. The BPP, based in

Oakland, California, grew from 75 members in 1966 to 1,000U

members and 4U chapters throughout the U. S. by 197U. Describing

itself as "the armed body for carrying out the political tasks

of the revolution," it proclaimed the aim of the Panthers as

"We will not dissent from the American Government. We will over-

throw it."

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From its inception the BPP leaders called for mombors

to arm themselves and learn how to use their weapons. The

police were the first target in the BPP program for "liberation"

of the black community and the violent destruction of white

America, Acts of violence traced to individuals affiliated

with the Panthers from 1967 to 1971 resulted in the deaths of at

least 12 police officers and the wounding of 71 others.

Separatist organizations such as the Republic of New

Africa and the Nation of Islam also offered the extremists the

opportunity to advocate violence and the overthrow of existing

society. Another form of black separatism emerged in the late.

60s and early 70s when large numbers of blacks turned to

Pan-Africanism, which is generally defined as total liberation

and unification of Africa undor socialism. Black extremists,

such as Stokely Carmichael, sought to achieve their goals

through this movement.

Groups such as the Congress of African

Peoples, African Liberation Support Committee, and the All

African Peoples Revolutionary Party were formed by extremists

who called for the destruction of capitalism.

"The 1970s have produced extremism of a different

nature. Militant Indians led by the American Indian Movement,

proclaiming long years of abuse by the white man, profess

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to champion the cause of American Indians. Their actions

have

resulted in numerous confrontations with authorities,

including the takeover and destruction of both Government

and private property. Iwo FBI Agents were murdered on the Pine

Ridge Reservation in June, 1975.

Bi-racial groups using the country's prison systems

as its breeding ground have recently adopted many of the

tactics of guorrilla warfare. A prominent example in this

regard is the Symbionese Liberation Army which has employed

murder and political kidnapping to spread its message.

Extremist groups such as the BPP, which from its

inception promoted the stockpiling of weapons, have advocated

urban guerrilla warfare. While basing political philosophy

upon the teachings of MAO Ise-tung and other revolutionary

theorists, activities have been based upon the urban guerrilla

tactics used by Arab and South American revolutionaries.

Robert Franklin Williams, as early as 1956, wrote that the

salvation of oppressed American blacks was "a common household

match and a bottle of kerosine," Stokely Cermichael, speaking

over Radio Havana the day after the murder of Martin Luther

King, JI., statad "more people are now beginning to plan

seriously a major urban guerrilla warfare where wa can move

seriously to bring this country to its kneps."

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Urban guerrilla warfare, as advocated by the Black

Liberation Army, an off-shoot of the BPP, has been directed

toward the overthrow of our present form of government.

While extremists espouse causes directed against the evils

of society, the first line

• of socioty's defense, the police,

bear the brunt of such violence. In addition to the 12 police

killed and 71 wounded between 1947 and 1971 by individuals

affiliated with the BPP, extremists have been responsible

for the deaths of 44 policemen and 35 civilians, with 158 police

and 129 civilians wounded between January 1, 1971, and June

30, 1975.

Extremists and terrorists have since 1971 been responsi-

ble for 127 firebombings, 17 arsons, 44 snipings, and numerous

other extremist acts.

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SUMMARY OF

DONESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

November 17. 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINS ENCLASSIFIED

I: Scope and Purpose of Bricfing

DATE 1Q/VO GO BYSALALMUG

This bricfing will serve as an introduction for the Committee

to those activities of the IBI's Intelligence Division during the

past 20 years which will be covered in public hearings.

The hearings

will pertain to programs (COINTELPROS) and'allegations of abuso (the

investigation of Di: Martin Luther King) undertaken by the Internal

Security Branch of the FBI's Intelligence Division. Therefore this

briefing will be a short history of the Internal Security Branch and

the issues raised by its activities. The activities of the Internal

Security Branch pertain to the FBI's efforts to counter internal

security treats, that is, individuals and organizations perceived

by the Bureau as

"extremist" or "suiversive" and not necessaril;

having any relationship to a foreign power.

It does not cover the

FBi's counter-espionage mission - its effort to counter the acti-

vities of hostile foreign intelligence services -- which will be

covered in an earlier briefing and which will not be the subject of

public hearings.

II. Internal Security Threats and the FBI Internal Security Program

A. Internal Security Threats -- 1955 to the Present

Bureau officials will describe those threats as being

at various times

the •Communist Party of the United States

(CPÚSA)., the Socialist workers Party (SWP) and other "old

line" structured liarxist-Leninist groups, the ku lux alan,

"Black Nationalists"

(black militants and some civil rights

organizations, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference

ana Congress

of Racial Equality)

and the

"Ner' Left."

Tho

Bureau officials will provide a statistical analysis reflec-

ting changes in the threats as perceived by the Bureau for

the period 1955-1975.

B.

The Craft of Internal Security Intelligence

Burcau officials will provide a general introduction to

the techniques of Internal Security intelligonce as practiced

by the FBI. First, the distinction will be drawn between

intelliyonce collection and tracitional criminal investigation:

Second, the Bureau will explain the difforenco botween Interral

Security intelligonce gathering not necessarily directed at any

particular group or individual

and designed to assess a threat,

e.g., general intelligence on civil disorders; and more aggIes-

sive intelligence prograris directed at particular-groups and

their leadership and involving COINTELPROS and criminal prosecu-

tion. (See F. infra)

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- 2.

c. FBI Internal security Policy

A description of the basic

security intelligence, mustigatinlicy materials on Internal

I. "'Subversive matters" (FBI Manual, Section a7)' --

pertaining to groups advocating violent overthrow

of the government, e.g., CPUSA; SVP and the "New

Left."

inuestigating

2.

*"Extremist matters" (FBI Manual, Section 122)

pertaining to groups the FBI perceives as racially

motivated or terrorist, e.g., Ku Klux Klan, "black

hate groups" and modern "urban guerillas."

3.

Major changes in investigative policy -- narrowing

the scope of investigations in 1973..

D.

Organization of the Internal Security Branch

E.

1.. Present Organization of the Internal Security Branch.

2.

Five Major Reorganizations in the Internal Sccurity

Branch as a Result of Changes in the Nature oi the

Threat 1955, 1964, 1967, and 1973..

Basic Intelligence Gathering Tools

Overt Collection - Interviews and Public Source

Information.

• :

2. Covert Collection Through Informants and Confi-

dential Sources.

3. Covert Collection Through Elcctronic Surveillance.

4.

5.

Covert Collection Through Sensitive Techniques

Terminated in 1906 -- Surreptitious Entry, Mail

Opening, and Trash Covers.

Covert Collection

Through Mail Cover, Photographic

and Physical Surveillance.

Internal Security Investigative and Noutralization Programs

1. Programs Involved -

a. The Establishment of Special Indices for

Intensifying Investigation on Icadership

of 'Extremist" and "subversive" Croups.

b. COINTELPPO Programs.

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3

Major Programs

. 2 .

Prograins

Relating to More Than

One Fype

of Organization - Custodial Detention

Program, Security Index, Reserve Index.

and the Administrative Index.

Programs Relating to the CPUSA and the SuP

i. "Key Figures/Top Functionaries"

ii.. COMINFIL

iii. COINTELPRO-CPUSA and COINTELPRO-SWP

C.

Programs Relating to the u Klux Klan -

i.

Action Groups, Rabble Rouser/Agitator

Index, Key Extremist Prograr

ii. COINTELERO-White lIate:

d.

Programs Relating to "Black lationalists"

•?.

Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index and

Key Black Extremist Program

ii. COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist

• e.

Programs Relating to the "New Left" -

i. Key Activist Program'

ii: COINTELPRO-New ieft

3. Other Consequences of Investigations Aside FroM

COINTELPRO -

a. Prosecution.

b: Disseninating information to other Federal

agencies when FbI file subjects apply for

Fedcral

jobs or security clearances.

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DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

November 17, 1975

Scope. and Purpose of Briefing

ALLINFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEO

DATE 10/20/00 BYSMALMM

!

This briefing will serve as an introduction for the Con-

mittee •to those activities of thi FBI's Intelligence Division

during the past twenty years which will be covered in public

hearings.

The hearings will pertain to programs. (COINTILPROs)

and allegations of abuse

(the investigation of Di. Martin

Luther King) undertaken by the Internal Security Branch of the

PET's Intellynno Division is brieling will be a short

history of the Internal Security Branch and the issues raised

by its activities.

The activitics of the Internal Sccurity

Branch pertain to the FBi's efforts to counter internal securit!

threats; that is, individuals and organizations perceived by

the Bureau as "extremist" or "subversive" and not necessarily

having any relationship to a foreign power.

It does not cover

the FBI's counter-espionage mission -- its effort to counter

the activities of hostile foreign intelligence services -

which will be covered in an carlier briefing and which will not

be the subject

of public hearings.

The briefing will be divided into two parts,

the first

effarts

to corinter what

concerned with the TBI'sperception of the major threats to

the internal security for the period 1955 to the present and

how the jurcau has attempted to counter that threat.

This

history of thc FBI's internal security function will be con-

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•ducted primarily by the leadership. of the Internal sccurity

Branch.

The second part will be a presentation of sone of

the seneral leyal and policy issues raised by IBI intolligence

activities and likely to be raised

by public hearings. This

briefing will be conducted by Mari: Gitenstein and other mall-

bers of the Cormittee starf.

II.

Internal Security Threats and the FBI Internal Security

Program

A.

Tea Sey Treat 155 to Pissent 19h1s

Fis at unions

Bureau officials will describe those threats as at

various tines the Cornunist Party of the United States (CPUSA) ;

the Socialist Workers Party (SP), and other "old line" struc-

tured Marxist-jeninist groups: the ku klux alan: "Plack Hation-

That Cuit riot,

riverst

alists blad Militanes and some eivil riants organizations,

e.g., southern Christian Leadership Conference and Congress of

Racial Iquality; and the "New Left." The Dureau officials will

provide a statistical analysis reflecting changes in the threats

as perceived by the Bureau for the period 1955-1975.

B .

The Craft of Internal Security Intelligence (This

section will be written by IBi officials.

• Bureau officials will provide a gencral introduction

to the techniques of. Internal Security intelligence as prac-

ticed by the FBI. First, the distinction vill be dravn betwcen

intelligence colloction and traditional crininal investigation:

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3

Second, the Bureau will explain the difference between

Internal security intelligence gathering not necessarily

directed at any particular group or indiviqual and designed

to assess a threat, e.g., general intelligence on civil dis

ordcis; and more aggressive intelligence programs directed

at particular groups and their leadership and involving COIn-

TEUPROS

and criminal prosecution. (See,t. infra.)

c. Per Internal security polley

The articulated, policy of the FBI with respect to

internal security threats is set out in the FBI Manual of

Instructions. section 87 applies, to "Investigations of Sub-

versive Organizations and Individuals,":

and Section 122 applies

to "Ixtremist Matters and Civil Unrest." (See Tab i for the •

present version, of these sections.)

Section 87 defines "subversive activities" as "activi-

ties aimed, at overthrowing; destroying, or undermining the

Government of the United. States or any of its political sub.

divisions" by illegal means (Sec. 87.a.4.). Section 122 defines

"extremist activities" in the same way, but also includes

"denying the rights of individuals under the Constitution"

(Scc. 122. a. 1. e.). Thus the Section 122 definition of.

•extremist activities appears to include subversive activitics.

In practice, however,

"extremist' matters".has meant matters

concerning violence prone groups composed of menbers of one or.

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another race. Section 122 is intended to cover what the

•Bureau calls "white hate" groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan,

and. "black hate" groups, such as the Black Panther Party and.

the Nation of Islam.. It also applies to incrican Ind an

groups such as the American Indian Movement, as well as. a

variety of terrorist organizations engaged in "urban guerrilla

warfare."

Section 37 has been applied to the activities of the

in the penses. r

"marxist revolutionary groups.".

Under this section the bureau has investigated groups ranging

from Communist Party USA and the Socialist Viorkers Party

to the National Organization. For Women, During the Vietnam

War period, Section 87

provided authority for

wel manginvestigations

of anti-war groups.

Manual Sections 87 and 122 and the general policy of the

Bureau with respect to internal security have changed over the

years as the fBI's perception of internal security threats has

changed. In the middle 1950's the only internal security

concern of the Intelligence Division was the section 87 "sub-

versive matters" area. Most

groups investigated under that

section vere perceived by the purcau as threats to the internal

security of the nation because of some formal or informal

relationship to the CPUSA or another "basic revolutionary

group." Section 87 was not designed to cover the iu klux

Klan

HH

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÷ 5

as it reemerged during the late 1950'5, nor groups which

as part of. the, civil rights or black yower novencnts.

the reprisititt

Until 1961 these matters wore eoverery the General Inves-

primarily

tigative Division of the F3I as criminal investigations.

The Intelligence Division gained jurisdiction over gruups

with race orientations in the early 1960's, when it was chaired

with administration of the predecessor of the "extremist

matters policy area (section 122): (At the time Section 122

• was captioned "Racial Matters") In effuct these groups becane,

for the Bureau, threats to the internal security:

Furthermore, with the evolution of the "new Left" and

as a result of the anti-Vietnam. war movement, the Bureau

revised Section 37 to place less emphasis on the old-line,

highly disciplined Marxist organizations that had been known

as "basic revolutionary groups."

In. 1973, the end of the vietnam far ana a decrease

(and concen within the Buseon tre its lenal antits to conduct intowed steerit

civil rights activities Iea tic ill to dc-emphasize and actu-

ally, attempt to limit intermin!

inet intoligenee activities.

• The FBI Manual reccived what Bureau officials

perceive as its

most significant revision. Since 1973 the Manual has required

each internal security case opened by the field to he related

to some actual or potential violation of a fedoralastatute.

"The statutory predication for an investigation must be desig-

nated in the first report on the case made to Bureau head-

quarters. The 1973 revision also provides, horever, that

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"preliminary investigation" may be carried on for 90 days

for the purpose of establishing a statutory predication

without notifying headquarters. The practical effect of

sanctioning these preliminary investigations will be dis-

cussed in Section III. D. infra.

D. Organization of the Internal Security Branch

The organization of the FBI in the conduct of its internal

security function has; like the various Manual sections,

changed as the FBI's perception of the threat and the result-

ant workload has changed. From 1955 to the present, the FBI

has been organized to provide maximum control by FBI head-

quarters of the activities of the field agents who do the vast

majority of the Bureau's investigative work.

At present, internal security intelligence matters are

supervised by the Internal Security Branch of the Domestic

Intelligence Division. (See Tab B for a chart of the overall

organization of the FBi.) The

Special Agents of the

Internal Security Branch are divided into three sections.

IS-1 Section has jurisdiction over Manual Section 122 investi-

gations! "Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.". IS-2. Section .

covers Manual Section 87, "Investigations of Subversive Organi-

zations and Individuals." IS-3 is the research arm of the

Internal Security Branch. Thus, like the Manual, the Branch

is organized around what the Bureau perceives to be the two

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7-

basic thrcats to internal security: extremist. matters

fe.g., Kkk and Black Panther Party) and

"subversive matters"

le.s..,.

"New Left" groups, CPUSA and Socialist Workers Party).

• There have been five major resiganizations of the Intel-

ligence Division since 1955, each resulting from significint

changes in the role of "extremist" and

"subversive" elements

in American society, the FBI's perception of their threat to

the government, and. the change in the Division's workload

in the internal security sphere.

1.955

In 1955 the Division undertook a major rcorganization as

a result of the burgeoning workload of the predecessor of the

• Interna?

Security Branch. At that time internal security

matters were handled by the Internal Security Section, which

concerned primarily with the CPUSA and its infiltration of

domestic oxganizations: By 1bg6 the allegations of such in-

filtration were so numerous

that the section had to be divided

and its manpower increased significantly. The total number

of internal security matters handled by the Division had in-

creased from

to

in the period

to 1955.

The

FbI increased headquarters manpower from

to

to cover

these investigations.

the effect of the rcorganization

was to create a.nev

section, the Subversives Control Section, which concentrated

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~ 3

on allogations that individuals were either members of the

CPUSA or front organizations: The Internal Security Section

retained responsivility for' actermining which organizations

were subject to Communist infiltration. Thus the Subversive

Control Soction conducted investiations of individuals, and

the Internal Security Section conducted invostigations of

§caulia also. Contrared to Investigate

organizations, as wiellas, those individuals who were known

• subversives and considered to be key figures

ian, organiza-

tions's-strature.

•1964

Hintdur.dw.

In I961, racial matters were transferred to

the Intelli-

gence Division.. A special unit was created within the Division

and additional manpower was provided to meet the new workload.

1967

In 1907 another major reorganization was undertaken to

respond to the increase in workload resulting fron the Bureau

interest in black militancy ana the so-called "New Left"

movement. All investigations of extremist matters (black and

white hate groups) were consolidated into one section, the

Racial Matters Section, and all investigations of subversive.

matters finew Icêt

and "

old left) were retained in the remaining

sections.

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1970

•In 1970 the Division vas again reorganizco to place

grater emphasis on internal security as opposed to counter-

intelligence matters. This rcorganization was due primarily

to the incicased workload in the "New Loft" area created by

the campus rebellion. The reorganization had no significant

impact on how the Division handled internal.

security matters

other than to provide additional manpower.

1373

In 1973, the Division received its present structure.

with the end of the Vietnam Mar and the decrease in black

militancy, the Division was reorganized to de-emphasize in-

Stress

•ternal security matters

and, reversiaste, counterintelligence.

Manual changes of that

year Icquiring a statutory predicate

for each internal security investigation also reflected this

change.

E.

Basic Intelligence Gathering Tools

The basic intelligence gathoring tools used by the FBI

have depended upon the seriousness of the threats and the

willingness of the courts and Congress to permit their use.

• The most overt intelliyence gathering tool is an inter-

view of the subject. There are no restrictions, other than

- internal FbI policy, on

the use of this technique. Agents

are limited, however, by the willingness of the subject to

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. -10..

tal!:, since lin:

til has no card l jeant

Anong tie dureau's most valuable intellicace sources

are officiai cocords and puntis sources. Nor if mullie

sources, of course, is unrestricted.: In recent yearsy how-

uver, court decisions and federal and stale triclation have

placed sore limile on access to stricial cuerite. Pas iink

Secracy ace, the federal Privey not, the tackled facadicat

•to the lacher Education Act of 197i (?) and i variety of

stato and fedoind coininal justice lociolation ine restric-

ted for access to a rich store ot information. There are

isstrection.

still records as to wich there ire no min flurist.

nowever; an important esample in tax return

while tis tat.

finis lecisiation liniting accoon to officin reschis too.

restrictive, civil libertarians argue that tin protection;

keysteros

such offoro in inadequatc.

The most usoftl covert intallicence mathering tool user

by thr Gureou is live informals and confidentiat courses.

Voe of chare ronourges is unrestricted it lagiatation or

#recont. study. conducted by the creat decontin

"extremind" canes opened againa dividiate are breed ch

informant tips. (oce lab i)

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- 11 -

An informant

Is an individual who is paid by the FBI

for information on a continuing basis. He is usually a

member of a target group, and may have joined the group on

• Burcau instructions., His activities as a member. of the

group are directed and controlled by the FBI.

A confidential source

is an individual thu has provided

information to the FBI on a confidential basis but who is

not necessarily paid for the information. According to FBI

officials the key distinction between an informant and a

confidential source

ist

that A confidential source provides

infornation that he has access to because of his joh or his

position in the community: He does not obtain such access

at the direction of the bureau; the information is already

available to him when

"Is contacted by the FBI. Among im-

portant confidential sources are school addinistrators, news~

paper reporters, bank presidents, telephone company officials,

and law enforcement officers. In many cases the information

which these sources provide to the Bureau has been obtained

in relent yeaus

from official records: Lan, lubrissi

As the Conmittee will see in'its public hearings on tha

COINTELPRO program and on the informant program, both infor-

miants and confidential sources have boon used from time to

time fox purposes other than information gathering. Confiden-

tial sources and informants played an important role in dis:

crediting and neutralizing r'BI targets as part of the COINTEL- i

desinted

abore

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PRO Prograns

-.1L

At present there are approximately

informants being

paid. for information by the riI.

There

arc preschtly

approxi-

nately

FbI confidential snurces. Lach year the FBI

expends approximately

on its informant program.

The FlI has very detailed policies pertaining to the

selection and supervision uf informants

and confidential

sources and the treatment of

the information they supply.

These policies will be covered in the Comnittee's public

hearings on FBI informant program. on December

These

will ve the first comprehensive public hearings on this, subject.

Until 197?, electronic surveillance was another very im-

portant covert intelligence gathering technique used by the

- Internal Security

Branch and its predecessors. In 1972,

however, the Supreme Court held that, unlens the rBI had reason

to believe that its targets are agents of foreign governments,

the burcau cannot engage in wiretapping or microphone sur-

• veillance of American citizens without a court warrant. The

FBI's use of this. technique,.

the supreme Court's decision,

and a. rait of Congressional proposals on the subject have been

explored on several occasions by three subcommitiees of the

Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Conmittec.

Electronic surveillance per se will not be the subject of :

public hearings by this Comnittee:

Hearings will touch on

specific cases of alleged abuse of this technique, including

do is driller hey onl

at the

Pirain.

"was Fring

.=....

a allegian apolone, cnaii...

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= 13-

the "Kissinger 17" wiretap,

for use in the Conmittec's final

report.

FBi policy on the use of electronic surveillance for

internal security purposes was never articulated in its

Manual of Instructions..

- the use of electronic surveillances, gen-rally, vill be covered

in a separate briefing immediately preceding the presentation

of the public icarings on the FBI's investigations of DI. King

and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Until 1966, the FBI used a number of other sensitive

covert techniques against internal sccurity targets. These

included surreptitious entry or "black bag jobs", mail sur-

veillance, and trash covers. Director Hoover ordered use of

surreptitious entry terminated. in 19G6. (Sèe Tal

for a

recent FBI memorandum suggesting that not only were

such

operations engaged in agáinst donestic targets prior to 1966,

but

have been conducted since then.)

Physical and photographic surveillance are covert techniques

that continue to be used by the FBI. The king case is a good

•example of the use of such techniques. In the six years

DI. King was under invostigation, he was subject to either

physical or photographic. surveillance on at least occasions.

There are no comprehensive Bureau policies on the use of

these techniques against internal security targets; neither

are there federal statutes or court decisions which place any

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14 -

meaningful restrictions on the use of physical. or photo-

JIaphic survcillances

satarial

See. div 4 Haiti.

'Prepare?

The Internal security Branch or its predecessors have

from tine to time created both a) special investigative.

programs and b) until April 1971, specialized extralegal

programs of "neutralization and harassment" callod COINTEL-

PROS.

The special investigative programs vore designed

to give headquarters administrative control over field inves-

tigations of the "extremist" and "subversivc" arouns and

were most

frequently characterized by the development. of

specialized indices. These indices gave headguarters a

mechanism by which to intensify investigation on the most

serious of the threats - usually the leadershiv of a move-

ment. _Is we will see

retreats of

some of ting indisas viere us to target individuals fox

COINTELPPO aCtion and other$ were used as a master list

for detention in times of national energency.

COINTELPRO greW out of the FBI's frustration over the

legal tools which it had available for use against what it

perceived as the most serious. internal security threats.

geginning in 1955 with the crusA, the Bureau decided that

because of interpretation by the courts, such laws as the

Smith Act could not control the threat of comnunisin in Ameri-

can.

society. It therefore began a set prograi! - CPUSt,

COINTELPRO - to apoly against the CPUSA and its members the

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- 15

the techniques of counter-espionage, including "misinfor-

mation" and "double cross:" These techniques were first

used by the british against the Germans during swill but vere

perfected by CIA and FBI against the Soviets during the

Cold war. In CPUSA-COINTELPRO the Burcau sought.by covert

neans to disrupt the party by exploiting factionalism and

to discredit the party in the eyes of the American public..

As other threats arose, the Bureau applied similar techniques

grovps.of;

against other,u.s. citizens which it labeled as "subversiva"

ox "extremist" - the klan what in the civil rights

trement

movenent, black*

matanis and the anti-mar movement. as

manifested in

the "New ieft."

The major investigative programs included general programs

directed at all internal security threats. Among these were

a series oê indices initiated in 1939 as part of a program

of identifying individuals who the IBI perceived as probable

•threats to the internal security in case of national emergency.

At various time, lists of persons who posen such threats were

known as the Custodial. Detention List, the Security Index,

and the Naministrative Index. It was anticipated that indivia-

uals on these indices would be detained or considered for

detention or for

more intensive surveillance if such an

emeryoncy were to duvelop. The detention plan preceded its

statutory authority (Title II of the Internal Security Act of

19501 and survived an explicit order by an Attorney General to

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- 16 .

terminate the program in 1913. Even since the repeal of the

Title. II detention provisions in 1971, the Bureau continues

to mehtain a list of about

15,000 persons io were included

on the Security Index for detention purposes. A list of about

1,200 persons, known as the Administrative Index, is based on

names selected from the Security Index. Persons on that list

are described by the Bureau as current threats to •

inter-

nal security.

While statutory authority for the detention program existed,

the r'BI maintained a special indes, the Reserve Index,. on

• indiviauals who might be candidates for the Security Index

and ultimately for detention. Thile the Justico Department

supervised the Security Index, no one outside the FBI knew

about the Reserve Index..

Other programs were directed primarily at the CPUSh and

other communist

organizations. and their fronts. Leaders of

the Party received special investigative attention. "Top

Functionaries," the highest level Icadership of the Party, and

"Key Figures," the second echelon leadership, were included

in the Security Index and tabbed for priority detention.

While investigative reports on most

Security Index subjects

were required only annually; quarterly reports vere required

for Top Functionaries, and semi-annual reports were required

for Key figures.

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Organizations which the Bureau nad reason to helieve

were being infiltrated by CPUSA were investigated inder the

COMINFIL. program.

The purpose of this investigation was to

deternine whether the organization was under the "domination

and control" of

CPuSA. If so, it was labeled a front by the

Bureau and referred

to

the Attorney General and the subver-

sive Activities Control Board. The investigation of Dr. King

was purportedly a COMINFIL investigation of. the. Southern

Christian Leadership Conference.

• COINTELPRO programs were established against CPUSA in

1956, añd against the Socialist workers Party in 1960: These

two programs combined accounted for the overhelming majority

Of COINTELPRO actions directed against internal security.

targets,

out of

The CRUSA-COINTLIPRO was broad in

scope, directed at individuals and organizutions not desig-

nated by the Bureau as party members or fronts of the party.

•For example, some of the actions directed at Dr. King and the.

SCIC were part of this program

We know of no specialized ku Klux klan indices or investi-

gativa

prograns. "Action groups" was a term applied to

violence prone elements within the klan: As

these elements

were identifica they were investigated on an individual basis.

As far as we have been able to actermine, hovever, no list

representing a systematic effort to concentrate investigative

resources on cach of these groups was maintained by the Burcau.*

aut

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= 18 -

Some klan and other white hate group leaders vere included.

in the Rabble Rouser or Agitator Index (described below),

but this was primarily a list keyca to black leaders.

A COINTELPRO program was created against the Klan and

other white hate groups in 1904. This program vas one of

the most precisely targeted of all COINTELIROs. It was direc-

ted only at the highest echelon leaders,. and only.

operations

were conducted.

Programs directed at blacks per'se originally were part

of the CPUSA or CoMINIl program. The king/Southern Christian

Leadership Conference investigation came under this latter

heading. In April, 1965, however, the "extremist matters"

Manuai section (122) was revised to emphasize "black hate"

as well as "white hate" groups, and the Bureau began to con-

centrate on what it labeled "Black' Nationalists." As a

result of the urban ghetto riots,. a special inder was created

to cover the leadership of the Black Nationalist movement.

This index, first called the Rabble Rouser Index and later

renamed the Agitator. Index, also includeã some leaders of white

hate groups. The Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index and a special

list called Key. Black Extremists vorc'established to coordinate

the investigation of black militancy, and "cuveisive

the advil rights novement.

In 2967 a Black Nationalist COINTELPRO

was established.

The cxtent to which the Agitator/Rabble Rouser Index might have •

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• 19 -

been used for COINPELPRO targeting is not!

clear, althougi

the list of Koy Black Extremists was definitely used for

that purpose.

Investigation of the New Left movement grew out of Section

37 investigations of oid-line Marxist groups.

'It intensified

in 1968: in the period leading up to the Democratic Convention

In Chieco. In January 1968, a special investigative program,

the key Activist program, was established to intensify in-

vestigation on the leadership of the New Left.

In May, 1968, a COINTELPRO. directed at the New Left was

initiated. Some individuals labeled "Key Nctivists" were

i seicated for COINTlIpRo action, but like any in-

the person,

aLVIduaL Onpa burcau

List or indesthey activists vere rit

likely to be subject to COINTELPRO action becausc they reccived

closer investigative scrutiny.

other

There were some consequences for the subjects of FBI

Internal security investigations other than COINCELPROS.

Prosecution for violation of federal treason or sedition

statutes did occur, but has always been rare. COTUPEEPRO

actions were tation with miels more frequency than irasscutian

According to the GAO report, less than

3 percent of intelligence

cases arc refcried for criminal prosecution and most of these au.

for crines unrclated to trrason or sedition.

There

have been other possible consequences. An individual

on in FBI inter, or athorvice invostigated as an "extremist

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of "subversive" could be, provented from receiviny a federal

jol or a security alcarance. The l'Bi acts as tha, central.

cleariny house for name checks-py federal drencions the

Bureau provides information on in individual's "subyersive

or "extronist" activitios each ine the civil service Con

mission or Department of Defense soonests d chech on an

applicant for a fedcral position or security clearance,

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