## Page 1

1704-10438-10237

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Page Count off

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## Page 2

13-00000

UNCLASSiFIED

INTERNAL

SE ONLY

CONE' DENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Norbert A. Shepanek

0/ SA/ DO/0

2D0109

1542

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

DATE

building)

OFFICER'

NITIALS

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

DATE 8 April 1977

COMMENS A line actoo coum to show common.)

1. Philip F. Fendig

SA/ DO/0

2.

StiR

3. Mr. William Wells

DDO

7E26 Hqs.

8A8R1871418 A FIn

4.

5.

SA/DO/D

(ShepAnek)

6.

7.

MARCHETTI

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORN

3-6:

610 USE PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

_ USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 3

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DD/027. 3/94

8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions and Certain Staffs

FROM

Philip F. Fendig

SA/ DO/0

SUBJECT

1.

Subject book was published in 1974 with 168

deleted items demanded by CIA and involved court

trial and decision.

The lawyer for the authors has,

in effect, requested that a review be made of the

168 deleted items to determine which can now be

declassified and removed from the court's injunction,

particularly in view of the official disclosures

since the publication of the book.

The Department of

Justice has advised that such a review is in order.

2.

Since the courts

decided the 168 deleted

items were properly classifiable and classified in

accordance with the appropriate Executive Order in

effect at the time of the

initial classification,

including Executive Order 11652, the review at this

time must include two points:

(a)

Is the item still classified under

Executive Order 11652,

Has the item been placed in the public

domain by official disclosure by the United

Branch' such as by an official in the Executive

authorized to declassify the item, or by

a report of a Congressional committee, or by.

the courts.

Each addressee is requested to appoint a

focal point officer to review each component's

respective items which are held by this office.

This office also has the DDO documentation submitted

in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can

be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary.

---

## Page 4

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A review will also be needed of those items which

may have been cleared or released by CIA when

reviewing manuscripts

submitted by other authors

since the publication

of the Marchetti book.

few items will need to be referred by some of the

components to other departments and agencies of

government

for their review.

4.

Please advise this office of the name of

your focal point officer by COB 11 April 1977.

R.

Philly F. Fendig

0/ SA/ DO/0: SHalpern: (NAShepanekx1542)

Distribution

Orig &

1 - DDO

1 - C/EA

1

- C/EUR

C/LA

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

- C/ FR.

- C/NE

C/AF

C/SE

- C/ DCD

- C/SIA info only

C/PCS

-

C/C1

- SA/DO/0

---

## Page 5

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n 1973 -Jrau

Dick Etlist te

Cammo t PAW's

1973-Tday-

Radio

---

## Page 6

13-00000

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---

## Page 7

13-000,00

»...

SUBJECT: Review of Deletions from Marchetti Book for Declassification -

Request for Documents.

1. In order to review the deletions from the Marchetti book, The

Cult of Intelligence, Mr. Halpern must determine if any official of the

U.S. Government placed any of the classified material in the public

domain in open testimony before a Congressional Committee. The following

material or information is required:

a. Is there any index to public statements by senior government

officials on the subject of intelligence? Is there any index

to the Pike Committee or Church Committee testimony ?

b. Mr. Halpern would like to have copies of the open testimony

before a Congressional committee by senior officials of the

CIA,.

NSA,

State Dept,

Dept of Defense,

FBI,

which deals with intelligence.

c. Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior

U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the

Cyprus disturbances.

d. Any testimony (open) concerning American POWs (MIA) in Vietnam

and CIA's method of communication with them.

..w.

---

## Page 8

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Hussein on

Following the disclosure that Jordan's

King Mussein had for years taken secret

payments from the CIA. NEWSWEEK'S

Arnaud de Borchgrade Here to Amman

last weck form exclusior intervien with

the King. The result was what Hussein

called"

"my first and very last words"

01)

The Washington Post's rebelation of the

payments and their possible impact on

chances for peace in the Middle East.

Some excerpts:

DE BORCHGRAVE: How much truth is

there in the story that appeared in The Wash-

ington Post?

HUSSEIN: The whole thing is ridicu-

lous and insulting. But I am prepared to

answer questions about it.

Q. Your government spokesman said the

story was a combination of "fabrication and

distortion." What has been fabricated and

what has been distorted?

A. What was fabricated in the story was

everything about funds handled over per-

sonally for private benefit. When friend-

ly Arab countries extend aid, it has been

tractitional for the checks to be made but

to the Head of State; which then are

deposited'in the state budget account.

This is not an uncommon practice, All

assistance received by us is handled in

the same way. What is true is that for a

number of years, we have been offered

security ind

intelligence

which the goverument of Jordan accept-

ed gratefulls:

As tor the story that the ClA Daid for

the protection of my children at sohool

in America, my request was made to the

• State Department which kindly agreed

to ensure their security. Remember that

there have been many extremist plöts

against me and my family and this was a

perfectly normal request. If Amy Carter

decided to come to school in Jordan,

we would, needless to say, be responsi-

ble for her security and would not be

sending a bill to the U.S. Govemment

for an elementary courtesy and security

Q. How do you feel about President Carter

ordering the arrangement-code-named "No

Beef"-stopped?

A. We had, I promise you, never heard

anything about all this before. I the

reference is to the assistance we have

been receiving for security and intelli-

gence, then I have not been advised

about its suspension, either officially or

unofficiall.

Q. The Intelligence Oversight Board set up

in February 1976 reported to President Ford a

few months later that they regarded the pay-

ments as improper and he did nothing about

it. What do you feel was improper about those

payments?

A. What is a proper was to support a

friend and ally is strictly your business;

Newswerk, March 7, 1977

His CIA Money

The subjoet never came up before and 1

was totally unaware that this assistance

to Jordan had come into question last

year. What is proper in some minds is

apparcntly improper in others. As far.

as I am concomed, anything I can get

for Jordan and my people is proper.

And five of your Presidents [Eisenhow-

er,

Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford!

thought so, too.

Q. Since you say the assistance was proper

and just another form of U.S. aid, why; then,

the secrecy and method of payment?

A. If you mean the report that pay-

ments were made directly to the King.

and for his (personall benefit and with

political conditions and obligations, this

"led against us. It was bardly coinciden-

tal that these attacks sore made as the

peace offensive was poking up

steam

and on the

very

diti

that Secretary

Vance arrived in Amman. It is obvious

to me that those who wish to sabotage

the peace process-and help Israel stay

put in

the occupied territories-are

even willing to engage in

character

assassination of persons whose dearest

wish is for a just and durable peace.

Q. Who benefits?

i A. Two quarters: One, in your own

country, that has been trying to under-

mine one of your key institutions. en

gaged in a worldwide, struggle to try to

neutralize the actions of the KGB in its

efforts to promote Communism. The oth-

er is a powerful group that is not interest-

ed in a settlement and which also feels it

has a score to settle with Jordan. Don't

The s

nian

Wils

begini

can b

thing

ferv

tion o

Q.1.

ready.

coexis

Gaza:

A.

But it

the I

the P

Ther

ity-

Pales

recog

Q.1

PLO F

tween

Bank

A.

leade

struc

ly P

But I

misi

confe

if it

then

letslo

back

fore

Alexandra de Boreherave Gamma-Lalson

Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range

is à complete fabrication. The assistance

was designed only to enhance our in-

telligence

security

capabilitic:

To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S.

Goverment., We have sought to acquir

know-how, equipment and new capabili-

ties to defend ourselves in the face of

workdwide battle be it hotorcold, alicl

is still with us. And wherever there is an

identity of interests between our div

continue to advocat

fruitfil and mutual cooperation.

Q. What do you feel was the principal

motivation of those [sources] who contribul-

ed to the Washington Post story?

A. To undermine the credibility in

integrity of those who are able and

willing do contribute to the forces di

Mace: My people know me and i know

hem and these attacks are lutile i

terms of the fordanian scene. We are

stronger than anything that can be lor

Newsweck; March 7, 1977

forget il was the Israeli lobby that

lainched the campaign to block the

Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys-

tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby

failed.

Q. How much of a setback do you feel the

story has been to the peace-with-Israel

campaign?

A. I fervently hope. of course, that it

will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may

have a deleterious effect on our peace

eltorts, but i plan to persevere regard-

loss of altempts to sabotage a just anal

durable peace.

Q. What, for example, do you feel the story

will do to your differences with the PLO and

attempts to form a joint delegation for the

. Geneva talks? Is a joint delegation still a

realistic possibility?

A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this

weck and the whole question of a joint

delegation is still very much in question.

affeci

ed St

A.

been

of th

frien

your

our

resp

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relat

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in. th

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ther

not

---

## Page 9

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n

His CIA Money

The subject never came up before and 1

was totally unaware that this assistance

to Jordan had come into question

lius!

year. What is proper in some minds is

apparently improper in others. As far

as I am concerned, anything I can get

for Jordan and my people is proper.

And five: of your Presidents (Eisenhow-

er,

Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon,

Fordi

thought.so, too.

Q. Since you say the assistance was proper

and just another form of U.S. aid; why, then,

the secrecy and method of payment?

A. If you mean the report

that pay-

ments were made directly to the

King

and for his [personall benefit and

with

political conditions and obligations, this

"ledagainst us. It was trolly coinciden-

tal that those attacks ore made is the

peace offinsive was pooking up stram

and

on the

very dis that Secretary

Vince arrived in Ammm. It is obvious

to me that those who wish to sabotage

the peace process-and help Isract stay

put

in the decupied territores are

even willing to engage in character

assassination of persons whose dearest

wish is for a just and durable peace.

Q. Who benefits?

i A. Two quarters. One, in your own

country, that has been trying to moder-

mine oue of your key institutions.en-

gaged in a worldwide struggle to try to

neutralize the actions of the KGB in its

efforts to promote Communism. The oth-

er is a powerful group that is not interest

ed in a sottlement and which also feels it

has a score to settle with Jordan. Don't

Alexandra de Borcherave Gamma-llalson

Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range

is à complete fabrication. The assistance

was designed. only to enhance our in-

and security capabilities

To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S

Goverment. We have sought to acquit

ties y-alex, equipmentand new capabili

ourselves in the face of

worldwide battle. be it hot or cold, whicl

is still with us. And wherever there is an

identity of interests between our tivo

countries, I will continue to advocate

fruitful and mutual cooperation.

Q. What do you feel was the principal

motivation of those [sources] who contribut-

ed to the Washington Post story?

A. To undermine the credibility an

integrity of those who are

able

willing to contribute to the

forces-i

peacé: My people know me and I knox

them and these attacks are

lutile in

terms of the Jordanian scene.

We are

stronger than anything that can be lev-

Newsweck; March 7, 1977

forget it was the Ismeli lobby that

launched the campaign to block the

Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys-

tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby

Q. How much of a setback do you feel the

been to the peace-with-Israel

A. I fervently hope, of course, that it

will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may

have a deleterious effect on our poace

efforts, but 1 plan to persevere regardl-

less of attempts to sabotage a just and

Q. What, for example, do you feel the story

will do to your differences with the PLO and

attempts to form a joint delegation for the

, Geneva talks? Is a joint delegation still a

realistic possibility?

A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this

week

and the whole question of joint

delegation is still very much in question.

The dialogue linteryd by the forda-

mian civil warin 197d.

when tae PLO

was driven out of Ammant has barely

begun. To what degree political action

can be coordinated mong us a some-

thing we will be expio. ing over the nest

few months. And does hole Arab posi

tion on this problem a vet to on stallize.

Q. Is it your impression that the PLO is now

ready to amend its basic charter and agree to

coexist peacefully with Israel in a West Bank-

Gaza state?

A. This is the docision they must face.

But it is equally important to know what

the Israeli position will be. Why should

the PLO take such a step milaterally?

There must be a degie of simultane-

ity-Tsrael recognizos a West Bank-Gara

Palestinian state and the Palestinians

recognize Israel.

Q. Is it your intention to negotiate with the

PLO prior to Geneva a new organic link be-

tween a possible Palestinian state on the West

Bank and Jordan proper?

A. This has been suggested by many

leaders in the area as a possible con-

structive development and we certain-

ly plan to explore the possibilities.

But I must caution you against overopti.

mism. The resumption of the Geneva

conference by itself means nothing and

if it doesn't produce quick results

then there will be the danger of

letdown, of the pendulum

back and the extremists coming to the

Q. How do you think the latest ClA story will

affect relations between Jordan and the Unit-

ed States?

A. Throughout all these years I have

been very proud of the growing strength

of the relationship with our American

friends. We identified with principles

your forefathers hold dear.

We built

our relations

on the basis of mutual

respect, confidence and faith, and be-

yond that anything I did to cement

relations with the U.S. was based on a

deep conviction about our common ob-

jectives-stability, peace and progress

in the Midelle East.

My duty is to develop my country, its

human resources, armed forces and secu-

rity and intelligence services, to face the

tremendous threats that lie abead. The

road is strewn with mines to sabotage the

peace process. One has just exploded in

Washington.

There will be others. But

bear in mind that Jordan is not unique in

receiving sach help. Isract falls into the

samo category and is a far greater cxam-

ple of all kinds of assistance. As far as 1

, am concerned, these will be my first and

very last words on that matter. My per-

sonal pride is a very touchy subjet. And

my main concern is to preserve Jordan in

freedom.

Finally, regarding your media attacks

against a branch of your coverment, if

you choose to denude i vital arm that is

there to protect you, that is your affair,

not Jordan's.

---

## Page 10

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SECRET

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM

M. L. Latta

Deputy Chief,

Plans and Review Group

Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT

: Fairways Corporation

1.

Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys

for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168

items previously deleted by court order from the book,

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-

tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in

this connection.

2.

Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items

all four items is that they are still classified, since they

describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an

operational support facility located in the U.S.,

and

are

therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5 (B) (2)

of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive

Order 11652.

3.

According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby

was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-

ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency

proprietaries.

Ces files are unclear on the point, but there

are indications that Director Colby may have responded to

the question in a manner which could have been construed as

admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.

In any case, CCS

files contain other evidence that the matter was considered

to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when

Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-

ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public

disclosure.

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 026089

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

---

## Page 11

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SECRET

4.

Per our conversation, CCS has

stated in its

response to the SA/DO/0 that DDA would comment further

on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may

have been placed in the public domain since the court

order (i.e., since February 1975) .

5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O..

For

your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line

x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject

for the SA/DO/0.

SECRET

---

## Page 12

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on ted de in enten

I Shep said Pick new f the 2 pite

usealed only one hit and that wasa

I ankarske

A pil27

---

## Page 13

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TO

]

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

Tem Teck, FICA

SECRET

INITIALS

3

5

ACTION

APPROYAL

COMMENT

CONCUARENCE

DIRECY REPLE

DISPATCH

FILF.

INFOAMATION

FREPARE REPLY

XECOMMENDATICN

RETURN

SiGNATURE

• FIDA release

This is mi come teen

withe crash declasseferation

(ant lage 5 Male, 9585,

amy fists lets.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADUREST AND PHONE NO

N.A. SHEPANEK

UNCLASSIFIEI

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE

2/apt 77

SECRET

FONG NO. 237

Use previous ed lions

#USGPO: 1976-- 202-953

(40)

1-67

---

## Page 14

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RTY

2. SHAH (IRAN)

3. HUSSEIN

4. INDIIT

5 INDIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

6. NANDA DEVI

> DALAILAMA

8 CHIANG CHENG-KNI

I TAIWAN

10 CHIANi. KAI-SiTEK

11 SORBONNE

, 1. TIBET

13. TIBETANI

14 CAMP HALE, COCORADO

15

16

CAMBODIA

AMB

17

STItANÖUK

INTELLICENCE SERUICE

18 VIETNAMBSE

VIETNAMESE CONEDERATIN DE LABOR

19.

TRAN NEOL BUU

20

THIEV

21

PENKOVSKY PAPERS

22

CLEE PENKOVSKY

23 GENREY PORRIVSKY

24. DAVID MIRPIY

25 NTS (NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SOLIDARISTS)

---

## Page 15

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12=

'16 ISRAEL INTELLICENEE SERVICE

17 ISRAEL

28 AFRICAN FORUM

29 AFRICA REPORT

30

KENYATTA

31 MOBUTU

32 RITiDESIA

33 RItUDESZAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

34 SOUT AFRICA

35 SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

36 WILLY BRANDT

37 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, GERMANY

" 38 SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, GERMANT

n.....

39 SOCiALISTS, GERMANY

40

LA FRANCE E

* OUVRIERE

41 CITRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, ITALY

42 MAKARIES

43 CYPRUS

44 GREELE

45

GRECK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

47

NORIEGIAN PNTELLICENCE

SERiICE

48

FRANCE

49 = FRÊNCH INTELLICENCE SERVICE

50 WEST GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLI

---

## Page 16

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-3=

51 WEST GERMAN INTELLICENCE SERVICE

52 JAPAN

53 JAPANESE INTBLLIGENCE SERVICE

S4 ITALY

55. ITALIAN ILTELLICENCE SERVICE

56

GREAT BRITAIN

57 BRITISH ENTELLIGENCE

#SERVICE

58 CANADA

59 CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE.

SeRtICE

40 AUSTRALIA

6I AUSTRALIAN

INTEVLEGENCE SERVICE

62 NEU ZEALAND

63 NEN ZEALAND INTELLILENCE SERVICE

- 64 FRANKFURT

45

ATHENS

66 MUNICH

L7 BERLIN

68

HAMBURE

69 LONDON

7O PARIS

71 BELIVIA

72 BOLIVIAN INTELLICENCE SERVICE

73 BRAZIE

74 BRAZILIAN INTELLICENCE

SERVICE

---

## Page 17

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do

=y-

75 KENYA

76

KENYAN

INTELLIGENCE

SERVICE

77

78

79

80

JURDAN

JORDANIAN IN TALLICENCE SERVICE

P.AN AMA

PANAMANIAN: INTELLICENCE

SERVICE

81 FÜRBES BURNHAM

82

MEXICO

83 MEXICAN

INTELLIGENCE

S'ERVICE

---

## Page 18

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UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

Acting Chief, Latin America

Division

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

RECEIVED

1.

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

21 April 1977

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

to whom.

Drow a line across column after each comment.)

FORWARDED

SA/DO/0

2.

4.

7.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USEDPFONOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 19

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SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM

: George V. Lauder

Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT

: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE

: SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the

review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.

Item 1, page 11, Chile

Classified. Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a,

page 11, Chile

Declassified.

Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

_tem sb, page 11, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile

Declassified.

Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item S, page 12, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee

hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile

Declassified.

Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 012180

SECRET

---

## Page 20

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SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana

Classified.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46?

page 70, lines 20--24, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select

Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Declassified. Footnote Page 7, Senate Select

Item 89,

page 106, Cuba

Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil

Classified.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama

Classified.

Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile

Declassified.

Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 468, Cuba

Declassified.

foot Cuba, sali

177, Senate Select

Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 317,

page 468, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select

Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile

Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2).

There

is no record that the intelligence report on which this

item was based has been declassified.

Items 322

, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico

classified.

Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)

There has never been official acknowledgement by either

the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

2

SECRET

(?)

---

## Page 21

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SECRET

Item 338, page 508, Chile

Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile

1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil

Problem

area.

CIA presence

been officially acknowledged and is classified information.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's

book, The Night Watch,

Page

20b Night Washt Watchter Cerns titled Braivl, Venezuela.

George

Lau

anan

V. Lauder

SE

3

C

RET

---

## Page 22

13-00000

SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

George V. Lauder

Acting Chief, Latin America Division

The clA and the cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

: SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The

following are the LA Division comments on the

review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subjoct book.

Item 1,

page ll, Chile

Classified.

Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a, page 11, Chile

Declassitied.

Page 168, Senate Select Conmittee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 3b, page 11, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 105, 190 of Senate Seleet Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Iten 4, page 12, Chile

Declassified.

Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Declass Pied. Pages ios, 190 of Senate Select Committee

Declassified.

Hearings, Volume 1, Covert Action

Item 11,

Declassified.

Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Comnittee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate

Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 012180

SECRET

---

## Page 23

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SECRET

Item

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select

Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 89, page 106, Cuba

Lee ssi pade 106 cute l 39li77, Senate Select

Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil

Classified.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

Item

261,

page 338, Panama

Classified.

Director of Intelligence Operations, AGSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile

Declassified.

Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 438, Cuba

Declasstfied: Footnote 1391:77, Senate Select

Committee Interim Report on Afleged Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Dec1 387, pa%

page 468, Chile

Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select

Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile

Classified.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2).

There

is no record that the intelligence report on which this

item was based has been declassified.

Items 322,

323, pages 473, 474, Mexico

Classified.

• Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)

There has never been official acknowledgement by either

the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

2

SECRET

---

## Page 24

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SECRET

Item 338, page 508, Chile

Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile

1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee

Hearings,.

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil

Problem area.

CIA presence

in Brazil and Bolivia has not

been officially acknowledged and is classified information.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's

bose 20h on the Nasht water encorns cia in Braidia Venozuela.

/s/ George V. Lauder

George V. Lauder

SE

3

C R

E

---

## Page 25

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

C/CCS

Gii-56

Has.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

DATE

building)

EXTENSION

9164

5407

ORITERS

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

NO.

DATE

21 APR 1977.

COMES a i acto as column to er oct comments

C/AF

3 Bal Has.

Attn: Ed Foy

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

C/EUR

4 B 4405 Has:

Attn: Wm. Phelps

C/LA

3 C. 2019 Hqs.

Attn: Wm. Sturbitts

C/NE

6 D 3107 Hqs.

Attn: George

Walsh

C/ CA

3 D 0004 Hqs.

Attn: Susan

Watkins

2222

HAND CARRY

CALL

ten to

10.

11.

12.

SA/DO/0

2 D 0109 Hqs.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-02

610 USEOPFENOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLI

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 26

13-00000

SECRETI

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: Erich W. Isenstead

Chief, Central Cover Staff

: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

By Victor Marchetti and John D.

Marks

: Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,

fr SA/DO/0, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1.

Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its

files

and effected coordination with interested components

on classification of the 26 items

Results

are described below.

on son to des for poor:

2.

It has been determined that the following items

continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt

from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated

by paragraph

citations in brackets:

page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-

ations based in Jordan. Section 5 (B) (2), (B) (3.)J

48, page 71a -- BERLINER VEREIN.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

[Section 5(B) (2)1 NOTE: EUR Division con-

the need for continued classification and will

comment separately. No CCS record.

Item

48, page 71a -- AFRICAN FORUM.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

[Section 5 (B) (2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms

the need for continued classification and will

comment separately. No CCS record.

48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT.

tions.

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND NETHODS INVOLVED

[Section 5 (B) (2)]

AF Division advises that

cA staff

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 026089

SECRETI

---

## Page 27

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SECRETI

the African American

Institute, which published Africa

Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries

in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,

Pg. 263.

However, the Report gave as its source for

the list the book

The Invisible Government, by Wise and

Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should

not be con-

sidered official Government disclosure of Agency, sponsor-

ship of the Institute.

NOTE:

CA Staff confirms

the need

for continued classification and will comment separately.

describes in 4 one Sources and those red see ;

several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:

CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification

and will comment separately.

f. Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified

SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as

related to several magazine publications.

[Section

5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con-

tinued classification and will comment separately.

Item 48, page 71a -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;

lescribes intelligence sources and methods as related

to several magazine publications.

[Section 5 (B)(2)]

NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-

cation and will comment separately.

Item

50, page 72. -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified

SECREl; describes intelligence sources and methods of

operations based in Germany.

[Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE:

EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-

tion and will comment separately.

Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods of operations based in Europe.

[Section 5(B)

(2)]

Item 55,

Item 56,

describes intelligence sources

page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

and methods of opera-

tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]

- 2 -

SECRET.

550069400001..

---

## Page 28

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SECRET

1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,

133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.

Classified SECRET;

describe intelligence sources

and

methods by identifying an operational support facility

located in the U.S..

[Section 5(B)(2)] According to

CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC

reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation

in connection with a planned IV documentary on Agency

proprietaries.

CCS files are unclear on the point, but

there are indications that the DCI may have responded

to the question in a manner which could have been con-

strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.

However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA

sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified

as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air

а5 весоньст 1976.

Advisor confirms the need for continued classification

and will comment

separately.

m.

Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES

(NIGERIA) LTD:

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence

sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria.

[Section 5 (B) (2)]

Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section

5 (B) (2) ]

methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-

mercial

company. [Section 5 (B) (2)]

Classifled SECREI; describes intelligence sources and

methods exposing

an operation which provided cover.

[Section 5(B) (2)]

describes emailine sources do methods a ene

an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]

- 3-

SECRET,

---

## Page 29

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SECRETI

3.

The following items were heretofore classified SECRET

because they described sources and methods in identifying a

support base located in the United States doma are now con-

sidered to have been placed in the public

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 --

INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC.

Intermountain Aviation,

Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of

the

Senate Select Committee Final Report, PP: 208-9,

and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States, Pg. 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area

as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by

authorized Government officials:

Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.

Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence

and methods as related to several newspaper.

publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip

from the September and October 1974 edition of the

Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.

the clA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,

Tan anin Shute, them of cravath, seen at hous

Wall Street law

and Moore,

acknowledge that the fourth partner

[in the

purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the

[Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical'

of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'."

questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who

information.

b.

Item 54, page 80

and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM

WORLD FEATURES.

Classified SECRET because they describe

intelligence sources and methods and identification of

operations based in England. Forum World Features was

referred to -- but not by name-- in Book I of the Senate

Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:

"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout'

involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-

tained in Eat U.s. newspapers.

the larger of the two was subscribed

to by over

In an effort to reduce the

problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the

major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two

- 4-

SECRET

isina....

---

## Page 30

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SECRETI

press services." It may be argued that although Forum

World Features

closure to newspaper editors

if it in fact took place

and depending on how it was handled, placed the

subject

in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff

confirm the need for

continued classification and will

comment separately.

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

CC :

C/AF

C/ EUR

C/ LA

C/NE

C/CA

CONCUR:

Awas For

for Millian U. Peps

EUR Division

220p,,172

Daté

22 Apr. 77

Date

for thiet, NE Division

Date

Aßril 22,1977

Date

- 5-

SECRET

---

## Page 31

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SECRETI

.-.-

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM

: Brich W. Isenstead

Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJBCT

The Ta on the cut 10118 arks

REFERENCE

: Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,

fT SA/DO/0, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its

files

and effected coordination with interested component.

on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for reviow.

Rosults are desctibed below.

2.

It has been determined that the following irems

continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt

from the E.O.

General Declassification Schedule, as indicated

by paragraph citations in brackets:

Item 24, page 47 -- RTV.

Classified SECRET;

sources and methods of oper

ations based in Jordan. (Section s (B) (2), (B)(3)4

b.

Item 48, page 71a -- BBRLINER VEREIN.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

[Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE: BUR Division con-

firms

the need for continued classification and will

comment separately. No CCS record.

Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICAN FORUM.

Classified SECRET; describes Intelligence sources

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

ode 40 no sated to

[Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE: CA Stait contirms

the need for continued classification and will

comment separately. No CCS record.

d.

Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORI.

CLaSSified SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and nethods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

[Section 5(B) AF Division advises that

cAstaff

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 026089

SECRETI

---

## Page 32

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SECRET

The African American Institute, which published Africa

is included in a list of Agency proprietaries

neluded

in ovie the Senate Select Committee Final Report,

pg. 263.

However, the Report gave as its source for

the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and

Ross, PP. 24/n-248n.

This citation should not be con-

sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor-

ship of the Institute.

NOTE: CA start confirms the need

for continued classification and will comment separately.

Item 48, page

• 71a -- PREUVES.

Classified SBCRET;

describes intelligence sources and methous as related to

seteral magazine pullications. [Section

5(B) (2)]

NOTE:

Ca Staff confirms the need for continued classification

and will comment separately.

Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified

SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as

related to several magazine publications.

[Section

5(B) (B) - NOTE:

CA Staff confirms the need for con-

tinued classification and will comment separately.

Item 48, page 71a - FORUM: Classified SECRET;

describes intelligenca sources and

tosseveral magazine publications. (section 5(8) (2)]

NOTE:

CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-

cation and will comment separately.

h.

Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified

SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of

operations based in Germany.

(Soction s(B) (2)] NOTE:

BUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-

tion and will comment separately.

i.

Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.

classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources an

nethods of operations based in Buropo.

[Section 5(B)

(2)]

page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes entelligence sources and methods of opera-

tions directed against Egypt. (Section 5 (B) (2)]

Iten 56.

describes intelligence sources

- 2-

SECRETI

---

## Page 33

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SECRET

1.

Items 107, 128, 129,

and 279 on pages 123, 132,

133,

and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.

Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and

methods by identifying an operational

support facility

located in the U.S.

[Section 5(B) (2)] According to

CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC

reporter

about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation

in connection with a planned IV documentary on Agency

propriotaries.

cos files are unclear on the point, but

there are indications that the del may have responded

to the question in a manner which could have been con-

strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.

However, COS files contain other evidence that CIA

sponsorship of Fairways was considored still cassified

as recently as December 1976. NOTE:

The DDA/AlT

Advisor confirms the need for continued classifieation

and will comment separately.

Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES

(NIGERIA) LTD.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence

sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria.

[Section 5 (B) (2)]

methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section

5 (B) (3)]

Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES.

Classified SBCRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-

mercial company. [Section 5 (B) (2)]

is to cat in oration'

as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency

diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match boods)".

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods exposing an operation which provided cover.

[Section 5 (B) (2)]

Item 480

an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]

SECRETI

---

## Page 34

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SECRET

3.

The following items were heretofore classified SECRET

because they described sources and methods in identifying a

support base located in the United States, but are now con-

sidered to have beenpplaced in the public domain.

Items 144, 126, and 127 on pages 129, and 130 --

INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,

Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I

of

the Senate Select Committee Final Report,

pp. 208-9,

and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States, Pg- 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area

as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by

authorized Government officials:

Item 49, page 71a .- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.

Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence

Sources

and methods as related to several newspaper

publications.

However, Cos Illes contain a newscil!

from the September and

October 1574 edition of the

•Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.

the ClA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,

Wall Street law

firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,

acknowledge

that the fourth

partner (in the

purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the

CIA.

[Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical'

of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'."

It is

questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who

information.

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM

WORLD FEATURES.

Classified SECRET because they describe

intelligence sources and methods and identification of

operations based in England.

Forum World Features was

referred to -- but not by name = In Book T of the Senate

Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as tollows:

"Anothor example of the damages of (propaganda) "fallout'

involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-

tained in Europe

.... the larger of the two was subscribed

o by over 30 U.S. nowspapers.

In an effort to reduce the

problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the

major dallies

aware that the CIA controlled these two

- 4=

SECRET

---

## Page 35

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SECRETI

press services." It may be argued that although Forum

World Features

continues to be protected to a degree

by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-

in the publia domain. NOTE:

confirm the need for

continued classification and will

comment separately.

LAL ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

BRICH W. ISENSTEAD

CC:

C/AF

C/EUR

C/LA

C/NE

C/CA

CONCUR:

Chief, AF Division

Date

Chief, BUR Division

Date

Chief, LA Division

Date

Chief, NE Division

Date

Chief, CA Staft

Date

-5

SECRETI

---

## Page 36

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SECRET

2 2 APR 19/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: George V. Lauder

Acting Chief, Latin America Division

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

: SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated & April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the

review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.

Item 1, page 11, Chile

Classified.

Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a,

page 11, Chile

Declassified.

Page 168,

Senate

Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item sb, page 11, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 105, i90 of Senate Select Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile

Declassified.

Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 5, page 12, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate

Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 012180

SECRET

---

## Page 37

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• SECRET

Item 22, page 49, Guyana

Classified.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select

Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 89, page 106, Cuba

Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select

Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil

Classified.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama

Classified.

Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

• Item 292, page.

420, Chile

Declassified.

Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,

Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 468, Cuba

Declassified.

Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select

Committee Interim Report on Alleged

Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 317, page 468, Chile

Declassified.

Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select

Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile

Classified.

Executive Order

exemption 5 (B) (2). There

is no record that the intelligence report on which this

item was based has been declassified.

Items

542

lassified

323, pages 473, 474, Mexico

Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)

There has never been official acknowledgement by either

the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

2

SECRET

---

## Page 38

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SECRET

Item 338,

page 508, Chile

Declassified.

Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile

1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia,

Brazil

Problem area.

CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not

been officially acknowledged

and is classified information.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's

book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.

Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA in Bolivia.

cinde

:...

likeLina.

George

V. Lauder

SE

3

C

R

E T

---

## Page 39

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SECRETI

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

:

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

SA/DO/0

Erich W. Isenstead

Chief, Central Cover Staff

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

Memo for All Div and Certain Stafts,

fr SA/DO/O, td 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its

files and effected coordination with interested components

on classification of the 26 items

given to CCS for review.

Results are described below.

2.

It has been determined that the following items

continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt

from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated

by paragraph citations in brackets:

aerone base a pea

Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-

ations based in Jordan. [Section 5 (B) (2), (B) (3)1

b.

Item 48, page 71a -- BERLINER VEREIN.

'Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

[Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-

firms

the need for continued classification and will

comment separately. No CCS record.

Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICAN FORUM.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

[Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms

the need for continued classification and will

comment separately. No CCS record.

Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence

and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions.

[Section 5(B) (2)] AF Division advises that

WARRING NOTICE

SENSITIVE MIGNLGGENCE SOURCES

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 026089

SECRETI

---

## Page 40

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SECRETI

the African American Institute, which published Africa

Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries

In Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,

pg. 263.

However, the Report gave as its source tor

the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and

Ross, pp. 247n-248n.

This citation should not be con-

sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor-

ship of the Institute.:

NOTE:

CA Staff confirms the need

for continued classification and will comment separately.

e.

Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods as related to

several magazine publications. [Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE:

CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification

and will comment separately.

f.

Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified

SECRET; describes intelligence sources

and methods as

related to several magazine publications.

[Section

5 (B) (2)] NOTE:

CA Staff confirms the need for con-

tinued classification and will comment separately.

Item 48, page 71a -- FORUM. Classified SECRel:

describes intelligence sources and methods as relatec

to several magazine publications. [Section 5 (B) (2)]

NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-

cation and will

comment separately.

h.

Item 50, page 72. -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified

SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of

operations based in Germany.

[Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:

EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-

, tion and will comment separately.

Item 51, page 72. - FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.

so die e operation Case in solen section ste)

(2)]

Item 55,

page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

lescribes intelligence sources and methods of opera

-ions directed against Egypt. Section 5(B)(2)

- 2 -

SPORET

---

## Page 41

13-00000

SECRETI

1.

Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,

133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.

classified SECRET;

describe intelligence sources and

methods by identifying an operational support facility

located in the U.S.

CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC

i 195 the bat vas

[Section 5(B)(2)] According to

reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation

in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency

there are indications that the DCI may have responded

to the question in a manner which could have been con-

strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.

setter ontain

However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA

sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified

as recently as December 1976. NOTE:

The DDA/Air

Advisor confirms the need for continued classification

and will comment separately.

Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES

(NIGERIA) LTD.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence

sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria.

[Section 5 (B) (2)]

n.

Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LID:

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods of operations based in East Africa. Section

5 (B) (2)]

0.

Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES.

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-

mercial company. [Section 5 (B) (2)]

Item 278

as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency

diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".

Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and

methods exposing

an operation which provided cover.

[Section 5 (B) (2)]

[tem 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

lescribes intelligence sources and methods which expose

an operation

targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]

-3-

SECZST

---

## Page 42

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SECRETI

3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET

because they described sources and methods in identifying a

support base located in the United States, but are now con-

sidered to have been placed in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129,

and 130--

INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION;

INC.

Intermountain Aviation,

Inc. is named

as an Agency proprietary in Book I of

the Senate Select Committee Final Report,

pp: 208-9,

and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States, Pg. 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area

as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by

authorized Government officials:

a.

• Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.

Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence

sources and methods as related to several newspaper

publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip

from the September and

October 1974 edition of the

Columbia Journalism Review which states,

"Landon K.

Thorne

Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious

Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,

now acknowledge that the fourth partner lin the

purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the

CIA.

[Bross] recently called the arrangement

'atypical'

of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'."

It is

questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who

retired from the Agency in'1971, and Mr. Shute, who

left the

Agency long before that,

can be considered

• as constituting official Agency disclosure of this

information.

Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM

WORLD

FEATURES.

Classified SECRET because they describe

intelligence sources and methods and identification of

operations based in England. Forum World Features was

referred to

-- but not by name -- in Book I of the Senate

Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:

"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout'

involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-

tained in Europe

.... the larger of the two

was subscribed

to by over 30

U.S. newspapers.

In an effort to reduce the

problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the

major dailies

aware that the CIA controlled these two

- 4-

SEGRET:

'a..

---

## Page 43

13-00000

SECRETI

press services.". It may be argued that although Forum

World Features

continues to be protected to a degree

oy deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-

i do gette door tie: be i on and Biat

confirm the need for continued classification and will

comment separately.

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

CC:

C/AF

C/EUR

C/ LA

C/ NE

C/CA

CONCUR:

Chief, AF Division

Date

Chief, BUR Division

Date

Chief, LA Division

Date

Chief, NE Division

Date

Chief, CA Staff

Date

- 5-

SECRETA

---

## Page 44

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

FROM:

EXTENSION

Alyson Ward

SIA/I

ain

building icer designation, room number, and

6343

1602

DATE

22 April 1977

NICERS

T.

C/SIA/I

2.

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

22 apr

3.

4.

5.

C/SIA

22 APR 1977

SA/ DDO/0

2D0109 Hqs.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORA

3-6:

610 USEDPRONOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

] UNE NALY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 45

13-00000

SECRET

22 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Special Assistant to DDO for

External

Oversight

Chief, Staff for International Activities

: Robert D. Wiecha

Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch

I CArd the Cit Tote Totel1i Maces

Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from

Mr. Fendig, same subject

1.. This office has reviewed the five items concerning

Israel which were deleted

from subject book, and has

determined that all items are still not releasable for the

following reasons:

a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon

Weimar, the

CIA's

liaison contact in the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classifled

"SECRET"' under Executive Order (E.0.) 11652, Section

5(B) (2) (intelligence sources and methods) .

Item 197

classified "SECRETage 218: This item is still

under E.O. 11652,

Section

(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2).

Item 198, page 219: This item is still

classified "TOP SECRET" under E.0. 11652,

Section 5

(B) (2) •

Item 224, page 252: This item is still

classified "TOP SECRET" under E.0. 11652, Section 5

(B) (2) •

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 059748

SECRET

---

## Page 46

13-00000

classified "SECRET"

ed 25R page 32 11652

This item is still

• Section t

(B) (1) and (2).

2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be

directed to Alyson

Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.

сигест

D. Wiecha

- 2 -

---

## Page 47

13-00000

SECRET

22 Aрт11 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Special Assistant to DDO for

External Oversight

Chief, Staff for International Activities

: Robert D.. Wiocha

Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

: Memorandum dated & April 1977 from

MT. Fendig, same subject

1.

This office has reviewed the five items concerning

Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has

determined that all items are still not releasable for the

following reasons:

Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon

weimar, the ClA's liaison contact in the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, this item 1s still classified

"SECRET" under Bxecutive Order (E.0.) 11652, Section

5(B) (2) (intelligence sources and methods).

(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2).

This item 1s still

classified TOP SECRET Eder E.0. Ilos2, Section 5

(B) (2) •

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 059748

SECRET

---

## Page 48

13-00000

SECRET

. Item 256, page 329: This item is st1ll

classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5

(B) (1) and (2).

Any questions regarding this memorandum should be

directed to Alyson ward, S1A/1,

extension 1602.

Robert D. Wiecha

SECRET

---

## Page 49

13-00000

=

'UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Addendum to LA Division Memorandum dtd 22 April 1977

FROM:

George V. Lauder

EXTENSION

NO.

Acting Chief

Latin America Division

1039

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

RECEIVED FORWARDED

FFICER'

INITIAL

COME SoN a line act so column of show trommen.

SA/DO/0

3.

5.

6.

7.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

5084

610 USE PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 50

13-00000

-

-*

".

SECRET

2 6 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM

George V. Lauder

Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT

: Addendum to LA Division Memorandum

Dated 22 April 1977

item 337 page 509 are still classified.

2. Item 9 page 14, Chile

According to Mr. David Carpenter, state/ INK/011

lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" anc

line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry through line 29 continue

to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee"

through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been

declassified.

the substance can be tound on pages 100-110,

190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7

Covert Action.

3. Item 10 page 15 Chile

Line I through "his nominal superior" and line 2

beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified

according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through

11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of

Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.

Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour

Young,

PCS/LSN.

Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.

1.

usur

Lauder

lE DINPOET CL RY. 12180

SECRET

---

## Page 51

13-00000

SECRET

26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM

:

George V. Lauder

Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT

:

Addendum to LA Division Memorandum

Dated 22 April 1977

1.

It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,

INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and

item 337 page 509 are still classified.

2. Item 19 page 14, Chile

According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL

lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and

line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry" through line 29 continue

to be classified.

Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee"

through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been

declassified.

on pages 166-170,

190

and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Y

Covert Action.

3. Item 10 page 15 Chile

Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2

beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified

according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through

1l are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of

Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.

Kelly. Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour

Young, PCS/LSN.

Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.

Is/ George V. Lauder,

George V. Lauder

SECRET

---

## Page 52

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Marchetti-Marks Manuscript

C/CAS

buildingficer dosignation, room number, and

1.

2.

SA/DO/O

Gann

DATE

RECEIVED FORWARDED

EXTENSION

FICER

NITIA

NO.

DATE

25 April 1977

COME SIN in acto num or how i comment

3.

7.

8.

9.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USE PINOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

• CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 53

13-00000

SECRET

85 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SA/DO/O

FROM:

Donald J. Purcell

Chief,

Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs,

from

SA/DO/O, 8 April 1977, same subject

Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items

24, 48, 54, 55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the

passages containing classified information that were de-

before publication of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript:

a)

Items 24 (p. 47), 55 (р. 80), 56 (р. 81),

and 280 (p. 404) are

classified secret, and are

exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of

EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and

methods of operation.

Specifically, these items

name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary

that was used for clandestine operations in a variety

of countries.

In addition, items 55 and 56 are

especially sensitive because they describe an opera-

tion in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to

United States

relations in the Middle East ( Section

5 b 3).

b) Items 54 and 236 (on p. 80 and p. 262) are

classilled secret, and are exempt Irom publication

under

Section (5)

(b) (2) of E0 11652, Which protects

intelligence sources and methods of operation.

These

items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA

proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda

operations, specify that the clandestine operations

were

directed especially at the Third World, and further

specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced

CIA operator.

It may be worth noting that the Senate

Select Committee declined to publish the name of this

clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the

Committee that publication would damage the former

director of Forum World Features, who had entered into

a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in

good faith.

SECRET

---

## Page 54

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SECRET

c) Item 48 (p. 71a) is classified secret, and

is exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2)

of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and

methods of operation.

This item

names African Forum,

Africa Report, Preuves, Encounter,

Forum as

magazines that received CIA subsidies. In the case

of Preuves, Encounter, and Forum, these magazines were

published by the former Congress

for Cultural Freedom.

The Government has not acknowledged covertdy subsidizing

CCF or its magazines, although Encounter magazine's

ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation.

Preuves magazine has been the subject of little or no

press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our

understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign

subsidies to French publications, which makes it

especially important to protect the former CIA tie to

that magazine.

would be damaging to a number of prominent people and

organizations in this country and in Africa that have

worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for

good relations between this country and Africa, which

would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa.

(Section

5 b 3)

tess Muse

to can.

SECRET

---

## Page 55

13-00000

J. UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Richard S. Sampson

Chief, European Division

buildingficer designation, room number, and

DATE

RECEIVED

2.

SA/DO/0

p5-7

COx•(e)

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

EXTENSION NO.

FORWARDED

DATE

25 APR 1977

COMMENS A bir co one to the de com whoe

mary

5.

7.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

610 USE PRONOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAI

USE ONL

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 56

13-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:.

SUBJECT:

Special Assistant to DDO for

External Oversight

Richard S. Sampson

Chief, European

Division

Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:

Review of Deletions

1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed

the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the

original manuscript because of the Agency position they were

We can find only one instance in

which an authorized official of the U.s. Government has

placed any

of these references in the public domain since

first publication of the book.

The specific references are

listed below, together with the grounds for classification

and the components who have been consulted.

References which European Division believes are

still classified and should remain

so are:

Name /Cite #/Page

Alex Springer (#50, P 72)

Rome Daily American (#49,

p 71a)

Magazines: Preuves, Forum

(#48, p 71a)

Encounter (#48, p 71a)

Forum World Features

(#54, #256, p 80, p 262)

E.0. 11652

Exemption Category

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 2

See note

5 (b) 2

Coordination

EUR/G

CCS, EUR/Italy

CA

CA, EUR/BC

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 003283

SECRET

---

## Page 57

13-00000

SECRET

Name/Cite #/Page

LCPIPIT

(#334, 335, 336,

p 483-4)

Bases in Germany (#234,

p 262)

Release of Satellite

photos to British (#62,

p 86)

E.0. 11652

Exemption Category

Coordination

1 ....

5 (b) 3

5 (b) 3

CA

EUR/G, CCS

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 2

EUR/BC

EUR/BC

AF

LIaison, others (#190, 225,

333:,

p 217, 253, 483)

MAKARIOS,

Base rental

deal (#296, 298, 300

p 425, 426)

Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,

Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380)

Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52,

p 42-45, 48, 77)

5 (b) 1

5 (b) 3

5 (b) 2

EUR/CGT

EUR/Italy

EUR/G

CAstel

NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds

paya ND.

malians

were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural

Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.

Richard S.

- 2-

SECRET

---

## Page 58

13-00000

25 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Special Assistant to NDO for

External Oversight

Richard S. Sampson

Chief, European Division

Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:

Review of Deletions

As requested, the European Division has reviewed

the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the

original manuscript because of the Agency position they were

bee ise be whe

classified information.

We can find only one instance in

an authorized official of

the U.S. Government has

placed any of these references in the public domain since

first publication of the book. The specific references are

listed below, together with the grounds for classification

and the components who have been consulted.

2.

References which European Division believes are

still

classified and should remain so are:

Name /Cite #/Page

Alex Springer (#50, p 72)

Rome Daily American (#49,

p 71a)

Magazines: Preuves, Forum

(#48, p 71a)

Encounter (#48, p 71a)

Forum World Features

(#54, #256, p 80, p 262)

E.0. 11652

Exemption Category Coordination

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 2-

5 (b) 2

See note

5 (b) 2

EUR/G

CCS, EUR/Italy

CA

CA, EUR/BC

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 003283

SECRET

---

## Page 59

13-00000

Yame/ Cite #/Page

E.O. 11652

Excuption Category

Coordination

LCPIPIT (#334,

335,

336,

p 483-4)

Bases in

Germany (#234,

p 262)

Release of Satellite

photos

to British

(#62,

p 86)

5 (b)

5 (b) 3

5 (b) 2

Liaison relations

CANUKUS (#194,

5,

7,

p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437).

Liaison, others (#196, 225,

333, p 217, 253, 483)

MAKART 06, 298, 300

p 425, 426)

Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,

Italy (#z1, 215, p 45, 580)

Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52,

p 42-45, 48, 77)

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 2

5 (b) 1

5 (b)

5 (b) 2

CA

EUR/G, CCS

EUR/BC

EUR/BC

AF

EUR/CGT

EUR/ Italy

EUR/G

CASON NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds

moms

were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural

poMp No. Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.

-

Richard S.

(25 April 77) (x1872)

DDO/EUR/FP/FC: William Phelps: kdh

Distribution:

Orig & 1

1

1

- Addressee

C/EUR

- E/FP/FC

- 2-

SECRET

---

## Page 60

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

SE/OSG

5B4806

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

1.

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

EXTENSION

1705

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

mart

SA/ DO/0

2D0109

Mr. Helpern

NO.

•26 April 1977

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

to whom.

Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Sami

This takes care

1SE. Only

Wet go

Step

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

610 USE

PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

• USE ONLY

• UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 61

13-00000

SECRET

86 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM

George T. Kalaris

Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum,

Same Subject,

dated 8 April 1977

1.

We have reviewed the seven items relating

SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974

from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult

determined chat, againt official disclosures and have

with one exception, the items are still

properly classified under Executive Order 11652:

A.

Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains

classified SECRET.

It describes intelligence

sources and methods of operations directed

against the Soviet Union.

It is exempt from

the General Declassification Schedule of

Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to

the Penkovskly Papers remains classified SECRET.

They describe intelligence sources and methods

of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.

They are exempt from the General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption

category SB(3).

operation based in Tokyo directed against the

Soviets

and also identify Agency personnel under

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 014652

---

## Page 62

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SECRET

2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57.

This item

relates to the Penkovskiy Papers.

Marchetti and Marks wrote

in their manuscript: "One of the CIA's most famous venture

appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal

of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky."

The Penkovskiy

Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence

Activities,

Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:

published her he book shape to ski papers, was

operational reasons'

, but actually became commer-

cially viable.

The book was prepared and written

by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case

materials.

Publication rights to the manuscript

were sold to a publisher through a trust fund

which was established for the purpose.

was unaware of any U.S. Goverment interest publisher

3. In view of this published statement by the Senate

Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public

domain by official disclosure by the United States.

It can

no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.

' George T. Kalaris

SECRET

---

## Page 63

13-00000

SECRET

2. 8 APR 1077

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO. for External Oversight

FROM

George T. Kalaris

Chief, Soviet/East. European Division

SUBJECT

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE.

Your Memorandum, Same Subject,

dated 8 April 1977

1.

We have reviewed the seven items relating to

SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974

from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult

of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have

determined that

with one exception, the items are still

properly classified under Executive Order 11652:

A.

Item No. 53

relating to NTS remains

classified SECRET.

It describes intelligence

sources and methods of operations directed

against the Soviet Union.

It is exempt.from

the General Declassification Schedule of

Executive Order 11652, exemption category SB(3).

Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to

They describe

of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.

They are exempt from the General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption

category 5B(3).

C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the

AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET.

They

describe intelligence sources and methods of an

peration based in lokyo directed against the

Soviets and also identify Agency personnel unde

cover.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

SECRET

EZ IMPDET

CI. RY 014652

---

## Page 64

13-00000

SECRET

The one item

excepted is Item No. 57.

relates to the Penkovskiy Papers.

. Marchetti and Marks wrote

in their manuscript:

"One of the CIA's most famous venture

(sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic).

This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin

appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal

of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Penkovskiy

Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Comnittee

to Study Governmental Operations with Respect. to Intelligence

Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 20 April 1976, as follows:

"Another CIA book,

the Penkovskiy Papers, was

/published in the United States in 1965 Tfor

operational reasons', but actually became commer-

cially viable.

The book was prepared and written

by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case

materials.

Publication rights to the manuscript

were sold

to a publisher through a trust fund

which was

"established for the purpose.

The publisher

was unaware of any U.S. Government interest."

In view of this published statement by the Senate

Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public

¡domain by official disclosure by the United States.

no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.

Hidalans

• George T. Kalaris

DDO/SE: JDKenney (x1705 26 April 1977)clh

Distribution:

Orig &

1 - Addressee :

1

- SE/RAO

1

- SE/CI

2 - SE/OSG

SECRET

---

## Page 65

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Memorandum

FROM:

EXTENSION

-1188

NE/COPS - Samuel H. Rickard

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

NO.

DATE

27

April 1977

to whom.

COMES a a line act so column of er ow from mont.)

2.

SA/ D0/0

Attn: Mr.

P. Fendig

Room:

2D 0:

. 09

Tube: DX-6

4.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-02

610 USEDIRONOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 66

13-00000

SECRET

27. APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

ATTENTION

: Mr. Philip F. Fendig

FROM

: Samuel H. Rickard

Chief of Operations, NE Division

SUBJECT

: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

1. The following deleted items in subject book have been

placed in the public domain as cited below:

order

-there

Item 72, page 97: This item, which was placed in

boo be the public domain in Harry Rositzke's book, The CIA's Secret

no laUperations, on pages 173 and 174, 1s a problem area.

The author

of this book is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the

) Agency to review his manuscript prior to publication.

However,

discours

/CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication and, there-

fore, in our view Item 72 remains classified under Executive

Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2) .

b.

Item 152, page 165 and Item 28, page 48: These

two items also fall in a problem area.

The following references

to CIA's special relationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but

p, 552 M

do not specifically state, that such a relationship exists.

a represet

• Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

with Respect to Intelligence Activities, page 552, and Ray S.

Cline's book entitled, Secrets,

Spies and Scholars; Blueprint

of the Essential CIA, pages 131 and 132. Additionally, though

a former senior ClA officer, allowed the Agency to

The following items remain classified under Executive

Order 11652:

Item

55

24

56

280

152

Manuscript Page

80

47

81

404

165

SENSIT

SCUNCES

Exemption

5B (2)

5 B

(2)

5B (2)

5B

(2)

5B (2)

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 056382

STORET

---

## Page 67

13-00000

i.".

Item

Manuscript Page

46

46

97

189

98

482

482

182

252

181

182

183

184

Exemption

5B (2)

5B (2)

(3)

5B (2)

5B (2)

5B (2)

5B (2)

(3)

5B (2)

(3)

5B (2)

5B (2)

5B (2)

5B

(3)

5B

(2)

5B

(2)

(2)

seleged

......

2 SZONET

---

## Page 68

13-00000

22 Apil 27 -

Tacked I Foy reAt men;

a) conectem f para 3: stem 4 page 65 not pay

Comete "Alleged Assassination Plot.

c) para4: I check with States NSC again on

Monday to get no byection. comment at

east, if possible get fill unidentin

27//puil77

a) Received Af comment on Congo item 339 +

enerynated into depo repent

b) Ed Foy has use cordinaten in parry a

well get plates m tende per stato frei

returm from TD%.

---

## Page 69

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optionall

Marchetti/Marks Book

FROM:

EXTENSION

1326

NO.

DATE

Chief, Africa/Plans

TO: (Officer designation, room number, aind

building)

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

27 APR 1977

OMMENTS (Number each comment to show troi

whom. Draw a line across column after each commen

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

SA/DO/0

Attn:

Mr. Shepanek

2.

N

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

610 USEDIREVOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 70

13-00000

SECRET

27 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/ DO/0

ATTENTION

: Mr. Norbert Shepanek

FROM

Edward J. Foy, JI.

Chief, Africa/Plans

SUBJECT

:

Marchetti/Marks Book

1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request

that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground

that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an

official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the

reference to the Congo.

coreporteathe existence of a CLAI

The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo

is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select

committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 19/J.

nay be argued therefore that to agree to declassification

of the reference to the congo would have the effect of

singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged

target of CIA operations.

This would have an adverse

effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.

We believe the item should remain classified and that

exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.

i see at of the congo.

WARNING NOTICE

¡SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 009904

SECRET

---

## Page 71

13-00000

SECRET

27 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

ATTENTION

: Mx. Norbert Shepanek

FROM

SUBJECT

: Edward J. Foy, Jr.

Chief,

Africa/Plans

: Marchetti/Marks Book

1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request

that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground

that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an.

official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the

reference to the Congo.

2.

The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo

is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.

It

may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification

of the reference to the Congo would hake the effect of

singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged

target of CIA operations.

This would have an adverse

effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.

We believe the item should remain classified and that

exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.

1S/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

WARNING NOTICE

iSENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND MATROUS IRVOLVED

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 009904

SECRET

---

## Page 72

13-00000

UNCLASSIF!ER

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

C/AF/PLS

building ficor designation, room number, and

NO.

DATE

1326

21 April 1977

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

SA/ DDO/0

2.

3.

Attn: Mr. Shepanek

4.

5.

6

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USEFENOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 73

13-00000

SECRETI

2, 1 APR 1977

MEMORAN DUM FOR:

ATTENTION

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Special Assistant to DDO for

External Oversight

Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek

: Edward J. Foy, Jr.

Chief, Africa

• Plans

: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

: SA/D0/0 Memo dated

8 April 1977, Same Subject

1. The information which pertains to Africa and which

was deleted by court order from subject book remains

classifiable and classified.

The information is national

security information, bears

directly on the conduct of our

foreign affairs and

requires protection from unauthorized

disclosure.

None of the items of information ordered

deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified

by any United States Government official authorized to

declassify national security information.

The exemptions which apply to the deleted items

are as follows:

Item 29, Page 49

Item 79, Page 100

Items 283 and 284,

Page 413

Items 286 and 287,

Page 414

Item, 287a, Page 415

Item 288, Page 416

Items 290 and 291,

Page 417

Exemptions 5 (B) (2) (3)

Exemptions 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (3)

Exemptions 5 (B) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

---

## Page 74

13-00000

SECRETI

3. The following items, all of which relate to matters

of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:

Item 41, Page 6f5

Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)

Item 42, Page 65a

Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)

Item 47, Page 71

Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)

Item 48, Page 71a

Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)

Item 55, Page 80

Exemption 5(B) (2)

Item 130, Page 133

Exemption 5(B) (2)

Item 170, Page 189

Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)

Item 197, Page 218

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 198, Page 219

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 301; Page 427•

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 339, Page 509

Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291

pertain to National Security Council proceedings.

Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

or African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National security

Council staff, have

been informed by telephone this date

that CIA will

refuse the request of the attorney of

Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.

Ques 2a2.

SECRET.

---

## Page 75

13-00000

SECRETI

2 1 APR 1977

MEMORAN DUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for

External Oversight

ATTENTION

: Mr. Norbert A..

Shepanek

FROM

: Edward J. Foy, Jr.

Chief, Africa

Plans

SUBJECT

: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject

1. The information which pertains to Africa and which

was deleted by court order from subject book remains

classifiable and classified.

The information is national

security information, bears directly on the conduct of our

foreign affairs and

requires protection from unauthorized

disclosure.

None of the items of information ordered

deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified

by any United States Government official authorized to

declassify national security information.

2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items

are as follows:

Item 29, Page 49

•Item 79, Page 100

Items 283 and 284,

Page 413

Items 286 and 287,

Page 414

Item, 287a,

Page 415

Item 288, Page 416

Items 290 and 291,

Page 417.

Exemptions 5 (B) (2) (3)

Exemptions 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Exemption 5(B) (3)

Exemptions 5 (B) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

E2' IMPDET

CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE

SEMSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

---

## Page 76

13-00000

adr.

SECRETI

3.

The following items, all of which relate to matters

of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:

Item 41, Page 6$5

Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)

Item 42, Page 65a

Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)

Item 47, Page 71

Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)

Item 48, Page 71a

Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)

* Item 55, Page 80

Exemption 5 (B) (2)

Item 130, Page 133

Exemption 5(B) (2)

Item 170, Page 189

Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)

Item 197, Page 218

Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 198, Page 219

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 301, Page 427

Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 339, Page 509

Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)

4.

Items 283,

284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290

and 291

pertain to National Security Council proceedings.

Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary

of State

for African Affairs,

and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security

Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date

that CIA will

refuse the request of the attorney

of

Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.

1S/ EDWARD J. FOY, JRA

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

SEGRET

---

## Page 77

13-00000

artentis

i to the Cambidion item on Glid

Boldin

---

## Page 78

13-00000

THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975

Part IV— Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of

Ambassador John Gunther Dean

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 5, 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

75-994

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1976

---

## Page 79

13-00000

672

made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real

requirements,

personnel trained in

their use and to insure that material provided under MAP had

reasonab

expectaney of maintenance support, items such as forer structure, military oren-

nization, technical assistance and logistics became watters that came under ti

purrier of the MEDTC, 'lo have closed our eyes tu there aspects in my view.

would have ignored congressional concerns regarding eficient management.

functions a violation of the congressional iuiont

in

banning advisors and these functions continued during mr tenure. In ung talise

the ban would have been riolated had personnel been assigned to military units

or activities on an around-the-cick basis and involved themselves in most of the

matters affecting their units or activits. In prescribing the limits of our assis!-

auce, the views of the GAD report were useful in guiding mr judgment.

Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S. Militars Attacke

-What regulations did the U.S. Embassy hare to gorern the actirities of

involving Major Inwrence Ondecker in March 1071?

Ansiver. No U.S. military served with Khwer military units in the feld. (..

porsonnel from both the Defeuse Attache Offce and the Othie of the Chiri

Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely risited and rejorter

the military status of Cambodian military units as part of thoir duties: howerer.

U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which tS. adrisors di:

in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arriral rerari--

ing the Congressioal restrictions arainst adrisore in the Cabndian military.

The Kampot incident occurred prior to my arrival in c'ambodia. Sboralr after

int arrival in l'hnom Penh. I received the instructions in effect and determined

that ther were adequato. I did. howerer. personally impress upon my militars

staff, on several nrasions. the noid to abide seroppinasir hg those instructions

and to avoid situations which might he interpreted as infringements rf their

prescriber dutios.

Quration 11. In dotember 1074. the Mashington Poet reported and the Da

fense Department acknowledged that data on potential hombine targets in

Cambodia nas gathered by American ronnaissance fights from Thailand and

passed on to Cambodian military authorities.

-147en d'al this practice begin?

-Did sou know about it, and did you have a role in it?

Do rou consider it a violation of the Congressional han on American

adrisors with Khmer Revublic forces?

Answer. It rould be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in

Cambodia that military information which we had mould he deliberately nithheld

or denied to a country to which me were providing enormous military and

connomic assistance.

The information se had concerning premy actirities in

Camindia ras a br-product of nur own intelligence collerting effort on com-

munist forces throughont Indochina.

This information was provided to Cam-

bodian military authorities but the decision on what artion, if ang, rould be

taken was one which the Chmodians made for themseltes. The prorisions of

information preceded my arrival and I am not aware exartir when the practice

may hare begun. I was aware of the practice although I did not plar a pirotal

port in the process and did not consider this proceunre as violating congressional

restrictions on American advisors.

Ac•tion 12. Did CIA personnel in Cambodia pror art as adrisers to Mobmer

Repuhlir forces in a fasbion similar to their actirities in Lios (eren if on a

smaller scale)?

-Could you tell us what role China Airlines plared in Cambodia and it it

was in any way associated with CIA activities?

—What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer "Sliddle

Range Reconnaissance I'atrols" (MERPS)!

Answer.

Hariug served both in Lans and Camiodia, and knowing the CIA

operations in both ccuntries, I can honestly say that the CIA did nir act a-

advisers to

the Khmer Republic fores in a fashion simsiar to their activitie:

in Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America, transported supplirs. tri

including weapons and ammunition, for L.S. agencies in Cambodia.

The Middle

Range Reconnaissance latrols received lis, military enignuni au bart of the

Khmer Armed

Forces and also received some intolligence collection training.

---

## Page 80

13-00000

• •UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

The ClA and the Cult of Intelligence,

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

FROM: Robert L. Skidmore

EXTENSION NO.

CEA/CA

DATE

5D3102, Has

1383

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

15 April 1977

SECRET

RECEIVED

ACEA/ OPS

DATE

FORWARDED

15/4

2.

DCEA

4.

5.

CEA

6.

7.

SA/ DO/0

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USE PREMOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 81

13-00000

SECRET

16 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM

:

William J. Graver

Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT

:

Th victor dathe cut of jote 1. eaces

REFERENCE

SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,

Same Subject

East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted

subject book items

are:

per Reference request and conclude they

still classified under Executive Order

11652,

2) still not in the public domain through

official disclosure;

and

3) still not. contained in material cleared

by the Publications Review Board.

ians Traver

Nilliam J.

Attachment - Detail Listing

• .

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SEC

RET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 022438

---

## Page 82

13-00000

SECRET

Attachment

E. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in

The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence

Item

26

27

• 28

31

38

41

42

43

46

47

67

152

197

319

320

321

Manuscript Page No.

p. 47

p. 48

p. 48

p. 54

p. 63

p. 65

p. 65 a •

p. 65 a

p. 70

p. 71

p. 92

p. 165

p. 218

p. 470

p. 471

p. 471

Exemption

5 B (1) (2)

5 B (1) (2)

5 B (1)

5 B (2)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B

•(2) (3)

5

B

(2) (3)

5 B

(2)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B (3)

5 B (1)

5 B (1)

5 B (2)

5 B (2)

5 B (2)

SECRET

---

## Page 83

13-00000

16 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM

:

William J. Graver

Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT

:

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE

:

SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,

Same Subject

East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted

aubject book items per Reference request and conclude they

1) still classified under Executive Order

11652,

2) still not in the public domain through

official disclosure; and

3) still not contained in material cleared

by the Publications Review Board.

Villiam J. Grave:

Attachment - Detail Listing

WARMING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 022438

---

## Page 84

13-00000

Attachment

E. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in :

The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence

Item

26

27

28

31

38

41

42

43

46

47

67

152

197

319

320

321

Manuscript Page No.

p. 47

p. 48

P: 48

p. 54

p. 63

p. 65

p. 65 a

p. 65 a

p. 70

p. 71

p. 92

p. 165

p. 218

p. 470

p. 471

p. 471

Exemption

5 B (1) (2)

5

(1) (2)

5 B

(1)

5

B

(2)

5

(2) (3)

5 B

(2) (3)

5 B. (2) (3)

5 B

(2) (3)

5 B

(2)

5

(2) (3)

5 B

(3)

•5 B (1)

5 B

(1)

5 B

(2)

5 B (2)

5 B

(2)

SECRET

---

## Page 85

13-00000

DD/0?7: 38.50

28 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney

Office of General Counsel

FROM

SUBJECT

: William W. Wells

Deputy Director for Operations

:: Review of the 168 Deleted Items in

"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

In

reply to your oral request, attached is

the report of the review of the deleted items which

are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate

components of the DDO reviewed their respective

items for classification and their findings are

contained

in the attached report.

Specific classi-

fication and

which

is

exemption authority

for each item

in

still classified is available, it needed,

each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.

William W. WeLls

William W. Wells

Distribution:

Orig

1

2

2

OGC

DDO

-

SA/DO/0

EZ IMPDET

CL BY 018630

SECAST

---

## Page 86

13-00000

88C 21

DD/077-3850!'

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA

FROM

SUBJECT

Deputy Director for Operations

Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh

Special Assistant to the DDO

for External Oversight

Samuel Halpern

Review of 168 Deleted Items in

"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

(U) 1. This is the report of the review done by

the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items

which are the basic responsibility of the ddo.

The

remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-

bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those

Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.

Responsible components did the necessary inter- and

intraagency coordinations.

(U)

2.

Several points need to be highlighted

concerning the completeness of the review,

especially

as regards those items declassified by "official

public disclosure" as defined by the courts.

While I

am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done

by the DDO components, a

thorough and absolutely

complete search is impossible for the following reasons:

(u) a.

There is no index of any kind,

let alone having the material in machine form

such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published

hearings and reports of the Senate

Select

Committee to Study Governmental Operations With

Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church

Committee), the six published hearings and

proceedings of the House Select Committee on

Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume

Report to the President by the Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States

(Rockefeller Commission);

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 018630

Flawll

---

## Page 87

13-00000

S82. 71

(U)

b. There is no comprehensive readily

available record of precisely what information

has been declassified and released in accordance

with the Freedom of Information Act and the

Privacy Act; there are separate collections

with a limited capability to retrieve some such

information;

(U)

C.

There is no available record of

the information that officials of the Executive

Branch of government, with authority to

declassify information, have said or written

in public either before Congressional

committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,

college symposiums,

the general' lecture

circuit, other public forums, etc.

In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee

that those items which are still classified by the

DDO components have not been deliberately or

inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as

"official public disclosure."

(U) 3.

Bearing in mind the above, attachment A

lists those items

of

the DDO deleted items which have

been declassified by "official public disclosure."

These thirteen complete and parts of four other

items

can therefore be released from the court injunction.

(S).

4.

Attachment B (seven parts) contains

eleven

deleted items (seven subjects) which are still

classified but about which there may be some possible

question.

These are highlighted here so that

cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with

due regard for all legal and policy aspects.

(U)

5.

Attachment C lists all DDO remaining

items

which

the DDO components advise are still

classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and

cannot be released from the court injunction.

Samos sa taipe

Samuel

SECRET

---

## Page 88

13-00000

Item No.

•3

4

5

9 (line 17 thru ninth

word on line 24)

10 (last four words of

line 1 and first 11

words of line 2;

and lines 5-11)

11

46 (line 20 thru first

three

24)

words of line

57

89

124

126

127

i... .

MSS

p. no.

11

12

12

14

15

15

70

84

106

129

130

130

ATTACHMENT A

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee

Vo1. 7, Pp. 168, 190-

• Church Committee

Vo1. 7, p. 168

Church Committee

Vo1. 7, p. 190

Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190

Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190

Church Committee

Vol..

7, pp. 160,

170, 172

Church Committee

Vol. 7, PP. 148, 165, 166, 171

Church Committee

Book I, p. 194

Church Committee,

Alleged Assassination Plots

pp. 139 ff.

Rockefeller Commission Report

P. 218

Church Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report

p. 218

Church Committee

Book I, pP. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report

p. 218

Church Committee

Book 1, pP.

208-209

---

## Page 89

13-00000

Item No.

292

307

317

338

339 (line 1, third,

fourth, eighth,

ninth words; and

line 2, first

three words)

i..:

ATTACHMENT A

cont'd

MSS

P. no.

420

435

468

508

509

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee

Vol: 7, p. 205

Church Committee,

Alleged Assassination Plots

pp. 139 ff.

Church Committee

Vol. 7, PP. 168, 189,

205

Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 144-209.

CIA presence has been

officially disclosed in

the following only:

a. Congo - Church Committee

report on Alleged Assassina-

tion Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders, pp. 13-70.

b. Cambodia - Amb. John

Gunther Dean testimony before

the Special Subcommittee on

Investigations of the

Committee on International

Relations, House of Representa-

tives, May 5, 1976, P. 672

c.

Laos - Director Colby,

13 September 1974, in an

address to the Fund for Peace

Conference on CIA and Covert

Actions and in Church

Committee Book I, pp. 120 and

155; Book IV, P. 68:

d. Vietnam - Church Committee

report on Alleged Assassination

pp. 217-224; Book I, Pp. 23

and 120.

e.

Philippines - Church

Committee, Book I, P. 23.

SENDET

---

## Page 90

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (1)

Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172 MSS PP. no. 46, 48, 165, 189

(U) NE Division has highlighted these items:

(S)

Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such

'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup

d'etat restored the Shah to power

in 1953.

The Shah was

understandably grateful..."

. Item 28 lists the Shah among

other

"world leaders with whom CIA has developed special

relationships" as does Item 152 and

a similar statement is

made in Item 179.

(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and

Scholars,' pp. 131-132, states:

a covert operation so successful that it

became widely known all over the world was carried

out in Iran.

then very young, had been

driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier,

Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the

local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet

Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful

clandestine services officer who flew to Iran,

hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate

those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian

military men

loyal to the Shah how to take over

the local radio station, and paved the way for the

Shah's triumphal return."

(U)

The Church Committee, Book 1, p. 111, brietly

mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh

in Iran"

as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert

operations."

prodie shan

(S) There is a vast difference between the classified

deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"

with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a

statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh.

The

former is

still properly classifiable and classified.

SECRET

---

## Page 91

13-00000

''..

CROCLA

ATTACHMENT B (2)

Item No. 49

MSS p. no. 71a.

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily

American is still classified SECRET because it describes

intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper

publications.

CCS files contain a newsclip from the

September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia

vournalism Review which states; "Landon K.

Thorne,

Jr.,

the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute,

then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law tirn

of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the

fourth partner lin

the purchase of the Rome Daily American

in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-

ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, "a bad

example'.

is questionable whether the remarks made by

Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. shute,

who left the Agency long before that, can

be

considered

as constituting official Agency disclosure of this

information.

SECZET

---

## Page 92

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (3)

Item No. 54, 236

MSS p. no.

80, 262

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World

Features is still classified SECRET because both items

describe intelligence. sources and methods and identifies

operations based in England. Forum World Features was

referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church

Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:

"Another

example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two

proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in

turope...

over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the

The ne spaper?

The larger of the two was subscribed to by

problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the

major U.S. dailies

aware that the CiA controlled these

two press

services." While Forum World Features was not

named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be

protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper

editors may be considered

as "official public disclosure."

SECRET

---

## Page 93

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (4)

Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25)

MSS p. no. 92

(S) Under injunction as classified information is

"For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties,

the

Agency constructed

extensive support facilities in

Underlining line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word,

indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS

brought, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly

to the United States for special paramilitary

training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."'

pested to delete a the einsisted bo.

appears in

boldface type on page 115

SECRET

---

## Page 94

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (5)

Item No. 72

MSS p. 97

(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.

(S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact

with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.

Financed

and advised by Agency covert operators, he was..."

(U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret

Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was

winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents

into Tibet to assess the

situation and see what could be

done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the

offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched

by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving

him a channel of communication with the West.

"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to

forces in 1959, he was

accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator

who was able to keep Washington posted on his often

hazardous progress."

(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA

"close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being

"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different

from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators

being with the Dalai Lama.

These are two different

comments with

the first being properly classifiable and

classified.

SECRET

---

## Page 95

13-00000

"?!

ATTACHMENT B (6)

Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279

MSS pp. 123, 132, 133, 403

(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to

Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company

are

still classified since they describe intelligence

sources and methods by identifying an operational support

facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from

declassification under Section. 5 (B) (2) of the General

Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director

Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship

ot Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned IV

documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear

on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby

may have responded to the question in a manner which

could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of

Fairways.

In any case, CCS files contain other evidence

that the matter was considered to be still classified as

recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to

the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration

regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the.

subject be withheld from public disclosure.

SECRET

---

## Page 96

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (7)

Item No. 339

MSS p. no. 509

(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been

officially acknowledged and is still classified because

it involves sources and methods.

David Phillips in his book The Night Watch,

chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-

1972" describes his presence as Chief of

Station of CIA

in Brazil and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.

(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence

in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, Mos p. no. 509),

Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence

in the Congo is reported

in an interim report of the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.

It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification

of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of

singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged

target of CIA operations.

This would have an adverse

effect on our relations with

the government of Zaire. We

believe the item should

remain classified and that

exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."

It is not a question of whether to agree or not

to declassification of reference to the Congo.

The Church

Committee

report as cited in Attachment A has already made

"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the

subject moot.

In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A

shows, four other countries of the Third World are also

nentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone.

What

adverse effect could be expected now. by another public.

reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original

1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is

difficult to comprehend.

Since the government of Zaire has

not changed since the 1975 release of the information by

the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse

effects there might be have already occurred.

SECHET

---

## Page 97

13-00000

ATTACHMENT C

ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

Item No.

1

9

(lines 14-16;

line 24, last

two words

thru line 29)

10 (line 1,

first 7 words;

line 2, last 2

words thru

line 4)

MSS P. no.

11

14

15

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

26

27

28

29

31

34

38

41

42

43

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

58

59

62

(line 24,

fourth word

thru line 31)

Item No.

63

•67

72

73

74

79

107

128

129

130

148

149

152

159

160

161

162

182

194

195

196

197

198

201

224

225

226

234

236

256

261

273

278

•279

280

283

284

286

287

287a

288

290

291

296

298

MSS P. no.

86

92

97

97

98

100

123

132

133

133

155

156

165

181

182

183

184

196

215

216

217.

218

219

222

252

253

257

262

262

329

334

380

400

403

404

413

413

414

414

415

416

417

417

425

426

SECRET

---

## Page 98

13-00000

SEC. 31

Item No.

300

308

318

319

320

321

322

323

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

339

MSS P. no.

426

437

469

470

471

471

473

474

482

482

483.

484

507

509

(line 1, first

two words and

fifth, sixth

and seventh words)

SECRET

2

---

## Page 99

13-00000

28 Aguil 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

Mr. John Greaney

Office of General Counsel

:

William W. Wells

Deputy Director for Operations

: Review of the 168 Deleted Items in

"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

In reply to your oral request, attached is

the report of the review of the deleted items which

the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate

components of the DDO reviewed their respective

items for classification and their findings are

contained in the attached report.

Specific classi-

fication and

exemption authority for each item

which is still classified is available, if needed,

in each component's response filed with SA/DO/0.

William W. Wells

Distribution:

Orig &

.1

2

- : OGC

DDO

SA/ DO/0

E2 IMPDET

CL BY. 018630

SECRET

---

## Page 100

13-00000

S0S37

27 April 1977.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA

: Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh

Special Assistant to the DDO

for External Oversight

FROM

SUBJECT

Samuel Halpern

Review of 168 Deleted Items in

"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

(U) 1. This is the report of the review done by

the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items

which are the basic responsibility of the DDo.

The

remaining deleted

items which are the basic responsi-

bility of the

DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those

Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.

Responsible components did the necessary inter- and

intraagency coordinations.

(U)

2.

Several points need to be highlighted

concerning the completeness of the review,

especially

as regards those items declassified by "official

public disclosure" as defined by the courts.

While 1

am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done

y the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely

complete search is impossible for the following reasons:

(U) a. There is no index of any kind,

let alone having the material in machine form

such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published

hearings and reports of the Senate Select

Committee to Study Governmental Operations With

Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church

Committee), the six published hearings and

proceedings of the House Select Committee on

Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume

Report to the President by the Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States

(Rockefeller Commission);

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 018630

---

## Page 101

13-00000

(U)

•b. There is no comprehensive readily

available record of precisely what information

has been declassified and released in accordance

with the Freedom of Information Act and the

Privacy Act; there are separate collections

with a limited capability to retrieve some such

information;

(U)

c. There is no available record of

the information that officials of the Executive

Branch of government, with authority to

declassify information, have said or written

in public either before Congressional

committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,

college symposiums, the general lecture

circuit, other public forums, etc.

In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee

that those items which are still classified by the

DDO components have not been deliberately or

inadvertently. declassified in whole or in part as

"official public disclosure."

(U)

3.

Bearing in mind the above, attachment A

lists those items of

the DDO deleted items which have

been declassified by "official public disclosure."

These thirteen complete and parts of four other

items

can therefore be released from the court injunction.

(S)

4..

Attachment B (seven parts) contains

eleven

deleted items (seven

subjects) which are still

classified but about which there may be some possible

question.

These are highlighted here so that

cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with

due regard for all legal and policy aspects.

(U)

5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining

items which the DDO components advise are still

classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and

cannot be released from the court injunction.

fennes

SECRET

---

## Page 102

13-00000

Item No.

3

4

5

9

(line 17 thru ninth

word on line 24)

10 (last four words of

line 1 and

first 11

words of line 2;

and lines 5-11)

11

46 (line 20 thru first

three

words of line

24)

57

89

124

126

127

MSS

p. no.

11

12

12

14

15

15

70

84

106

129

130

130

ATTACHMENT A

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee

Vo1. 7, PP. 168, 190

• Church Committee

Vo1. 7, p. 168

Church Committee

Vo1. 1, p. 190

Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190

Church Committee

Vol. 7, PP. 166-170, 190

Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 160, 170, 172

Church Committee

Vol. 7, PP. 148, 165, 166, 171

Church Committee

Book

I, p. 194

Church Committee,

Alleged Assassination Plots

pp. 139 ff.

Rockefeller Commission Report

p. 218

Church Committee

Book I, PP. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report

p. 218

Church Committee

Book I, PP. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report

p. 218

Church Committee

Book I, pP.

208-209

---

## Page 103

13-00000

Item No.

292

307

317

338

339

(line 1, third,

fourth,

eighth,

ninth

words; and

line 2, sfirst

three

words)

......i

ATTACHMENT A cont'd

MSS

P. no.

420

435

4.68

508

509

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee

Vol. 7, p. 205

Church Committee,

Alleged Assassination Plots

pp. 139 ff.

Church Committee

Vo1: 7, pp. 168, 189, 205

Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 144-209

CIA presence has been

officially disclosed in

the following only:

a .

Congo - Church Committee

report on Alleged Assassina-

tion Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders, pP. 13-70.

b. Cambodia - Amb. John

Gunther Dean testimony before

the Special Subcommittee on

Investigations of the

Committee on International

Relations, House of Representa-

tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672

c.

Laos - Director Colby,

13 September 1974, in an

address to the Fund for Peace

Conference on CIA and Covert

Actions and in Church

Committee Book I, pp. 120 and

155; Book IV, P. 68.

d. Vietnam - Church Committee

report on Alleged Assassination

pp: 217-224; Book I, PP. 23

and 120.

e.

Philippines - Church

Committee, Book I, p. 23.

SEGIST

---

## Page 104

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (1)

Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172

MSS PP. no. 46; 48, 165, 189

(U) NE Division has highlighted these items.

(S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such

a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup

d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was

understandably grateful..."

Item 28 lists the Shah among

other "world leaders with

whom CIA has developed special

relationships" as

does Item 152 and a similar statement is

made in Item 179.

scholars, "ay Siss-ine, sats book "Secrets, Spies and

..: a covert operation so successful that it

became widely known all over the world was carried

out in Iran.

The Shah, then very young, had been

driven out of Iran by his left-leaning

Premier,

Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the

local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet

Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful

clandestine. services. officer who flew to Iran,

hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate

chose working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian

nilitary men loyal to the shah how to take over

the local

radio station,

and paved the way for the

Shah's triumphal return."

(U)

The Church Committee, Book 1, p. 111, briefly

nentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"

as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert

operations."

(S) There is a vast difference between the classified

deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"

with the Shah following the

overthrow of Mossadegh and

statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh.

The

former is still properly classifiable and classified.

---

## Page 105

13-00000

S3061

ATTACHMENT B (2)

Item No. 49

MSS p. no. 7la

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily

American is still classified SECRET because it describes

intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper

publications.

CCS files contain a newsclip from the

September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia

Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,

then a partner in the prestigious wall street law tir

•he CIA's BrOSS,

and a lawyer

of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the

fourth partner [in

the purchase of the Rome Daily American

in 1956] was the CIA.

(Bross] recently called the arrange-

ment 'atypical' of what

example'."

it is west one Ae nhy her doe remat s made by

Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr.

Shute,

the Agency long before that, can be considered

as constituting official Agency disclosure of this

information.

SECRET

---

## Page 106

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (3)

Item No. 54, 236

MSS p. no. 80, 262

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World

Features is still classified SECRET because both items

describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies

operations based in England. Forum World Features was

referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church

Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:

"Another

example of the damages of 'fallout' involved

two

proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in

turope.

The larger of the two was subscribed to by

over thirty U.S. newspapers.

In an effort to reduce the

problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the

major U.S. dailies

aware that the CIA controlled these

two press services."

While Forum World Features was not

named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be

protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper

editors may be considered

as "official public disclosure."

SECRET

---

## Page 107

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (4)

Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25). MSS p. no. 92

(S) Under injunction as classified information is

"For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the

Agency constructed.

extensive support facilities

in

Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas

to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."

Inderlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word,

indicates the questionable part. of the item since MSS

page 97, lines 24-26 states

"Some Tibetans were quietly

brought

to the United States for special paramilitary

training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."

This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and

appears in boldface type on

page 115 in the published book.

SECRET

---

## Page 108

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (5)

Item No. 72

MSS p. 97

(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.

(S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact

with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.

Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was..."

(Ụ) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret

Operations" pp. 173-174;

states "As the Korean war was

winding down,

the CIA began sending intelligence agents

into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be.

done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the

offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched

by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving

him a channel of communication with the West.

"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to

avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was

accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator

naz was progress. Washington posted on his often

(S)

The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA

"close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being

"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different

from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators

being with the Dalai Lama.

These are two different

comments with the first being properly classifiable and

classified.

Willa:

---

## Page 109

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ATTACHMENT B (6)

Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279

MSS. pp. 123, 132, 133,. 403

(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to

Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company

are still classified since they describe intelligence

sources and methods by identifying an operational support

facility located in the U.S. and

are therefore exempt from

declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General

Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director

Colby. was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship

of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV

documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear

on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby

may have responded to the question in a manner which

could have been construed

as admission of sponsorship of

Fairways.

In any case, CCS files contain other evidence

that the matter was considered to be still classified as

recently as December 19/6, when Director Bush wrote to

the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration

regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and

asked that the

subject be withheld from public disclosure.

1541

---

## Page 110

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39G731

ATTACHMENT B (7)

Item No.

339

MSS p. no. 509

(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been

officially acknowledged and is still classified because

it involves sources and methods.

David Phillips in his book The Night Watch,

chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-

1972" describes his presence as Chief of

Station of CIA

in Brazil and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.

(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence

in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MsS p. no. 509),

Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence

in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.

It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification

of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of

singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged

target of CIA operations.

This would have an adverse

effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.

We

believe the item should remain classified and that

exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."

It is not a question of whether to agree or not

to declassification of reference to the Congo.

The Church

committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made

"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the

subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A

shows, four other countries of the Third World are also

mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone.

What

adverse effect could be expected now by another public

reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original

1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is

difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has

not changed since the 1975 release of the information by

the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse

effects

there might be have already occurred.

SECRET

---

## Page 111

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ATTACHMENT C

ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

Item No.

MSS P. no.

11

14

9

(lines 14-16;

line 24, last

two words

thru line 29)

10

(line 1,

first 7 words;

line L, last

words thru

line 4)

15

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

26

27

28

29

31

34

38

41

42

43

46

(line 24,

fourth word

thru line 31)

70

47

4

8

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

58

59

62

Item No.

63

• 67

72

73

74

79

107

128

129

130

148

149

152

159

160

161

162

182

194

195

196

197

198

201

224

225

226

234

236

256

261

273

278

279

280

283

284

286

287

287a

288

290

291

296

298

MSS p. no.

86

92

97

97

98

100

123

132

133

133

155

156

165

181

182

183

184

196

215

216

217

218

219

222

252

253

257

262

262

329

334

380

400

403

404

413

413

414

414

415

416

417

417

425

426

SECRET

---

## Page 112

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Item No.

300

308

318

319

320

321

322

323

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

339

MSS p. no.

426

437

469

470

471

471

473

474

482

482

483

483

483

484

509

(line 1, first

two words and

fifth, sixth

and seventh words)

SECRET

---

## Page 113

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Mr. John K. Greaney

Associate General Counsel

Deputy Director for Operations

DDO Coordination on DDSGT's Review of

Deletions from The CIA and the Cult

of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

DDS&T-5193-76/1 dated 27 May 1977

1.

Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed

the

following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent

for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS&T

that they are all properly classified in accordance with

E. 0. 11652 and

should so

remain:

Item

Manuscript Page

25

159

160

161

162

163

164

205

208

209

295

297

299

301

47

181

182

183

184

184

185

234

235

'236

424

425

426

427

2.

In Tab D of referent, the DDS&T deferred to DDO

or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manu-

script page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make

intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered

in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow.

The

appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain

Classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is

exempt. from the General Declassification Schedule of

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

SENST

:".8B3

SECRET

---

## Page 114

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S

ECRET

E.0. 11652, exemption

category SB(2).

Specific classification

and exemption authority for

each item, if needed, is available from SA/DO/O.

William

W. Wells

0/SA/ DO/0: NAShepanek: kaw

(1542)

Distribution

Original & 1 - Addressee

2

1

2

DDO

ADDO

Ex Reg

DDS&T

SA/ DO/0

S

R

E T

---

## Page 115

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•DDS&T-5193-76/1

¿ * MAr 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

ATTENTION

: John Greaney

SUBJECT

Review of Deletions from The CIA and the

Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

1.

The responsible and knowledgeable components of this

directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject

book per your request.

The review was made to determine whether

U.S. Government.

2.

Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed

by this directorate.

Tab B is a list of those items of primary

interest of this directorate.

All of these items remain classi-

fied; however, portions

is a list of

those items wice de determined be releasedassified

under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be

released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be

coordinated with other indicated elements.. Tab D is a list of

items

we determined are not of concern to this directorate and

should be referred to other indicated

Tab E is a list

of the four itens mentioned above which we believe portions

can

now. be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified

and

should

not be released.

Since many of the deleted items involved the National

Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-

tions through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any

coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General

Counsel.

As a result, no further coordination with other ele-

ments was attempted.

This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the

court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.

ERNEST J. ZELLMER

Associate Deputy Director

for

Science and Technology

Attachments:

As. Stated

-2acear se Br.005166

SECRET

---

## Page 116

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Item

25

86

87

88

91

92

"135

136

155

157

158

159

160

161

163

164

165

166

167

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

187

188

189

TAB A

DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T

Page

47

104

104

105

106

1.07

134

135

177

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

185

185

185

189

189

189

190

191

191

19.2

193

194

200

201

202

Item

190

191

192

204

205

208

209

245

248

254

258

259

260

267

268

269

275

295

297

299

301

302

304

306

312

313

324

325

3,27

328

329

Page

214

214

215

233

234

235

236

268

269

327

331

3.31

331

337

337

337

394

424

425

426

427

427

430

431

442

450

474

474

475

476

480

---

## Page 117

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Tab B

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T

AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED

Item

91

92

*135

136

155

158

163

165

166

167

188

Manuscript Page

106

107

134

135

177

180

184

185

185

185

201

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, SB(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B (3)

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, SB(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B (3)

CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)

CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)

TOP SECRET, 5B (2)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

---

## Page 118

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LaD U

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN

CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

Item

* 25

* 87

88

157

159

160

161

162

163

164

172

187

189

204

205

208

209

245

248

254

258

Manuscript Page

47

104

105

179

181

182

183

184

• 184

185

189

200

202

233

234

235

236

268

269

327

331

DDO

DOD (DIA)

DOD (DIA)

OS

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO

DDO

NSA

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

NSA and DDO

DDO

DDO

DDO

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff

DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

---

## Page 119

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Tab C

Continued

Item-

259

260

267

268

269

*275

295

297

299

301

302

304

306

312

313

329

Manuscript Page

331

331

337

337

337

394

424

425

426

42,7

427

430

431

442

450

480

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy).

OL

DDO

DDO

DDO, NSA

DDO, OC, NSA

NSA

NSA

DOD (Navy)

NSA

NSA

NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

- 2-.

---

## Page 120

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Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item

8.6

170

171

173

174

175

176

177

178

190

191

192

324

325

327

328

Manuscript Page

104

189

189

190

191

191

192

193

194

214

214

215

474

474

475

476

0/DC1

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

DDO or os

State Department

State Department

DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff

• DOD

DDI and DOD

DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

---

## Page 121

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Tab E

ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE

Item 135, Manuscript page 134

"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in 1967}

in the Bostonjarea.nset rid of a technical research laboratory

Item 25, Manuscript page 47

"Over the years,

the CIA closely collaborated with the

trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of

the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda

and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol-

ution:!'

Item 87, Manuscript page 107

"The Agency also had a project to determine where American.

prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam

and to

communicate with them Scale models of the prisons were

constructed from aertal länd satellite photographil and from

other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which

prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.

Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their

infrequent letters to

their families as a means of sending

coded messages relating where they were

being held.

Thus,

the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the

families to send answers back Meanwhile,

the Technical

Services Division of the"

Item 275, Manuscript page 394

new optics for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over

the horizon'

radars,

These technical contracts were almost

always drawn

up under the cover of being between the scholar

(or the university) and some government agency other than the

CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were

the

most"

SECRET

---

## Page 122

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Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN

CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

EA- Cheris

NE. Iran

LA

LA

I tem.

* 250

* 87

88

157

- 159

160€

1610

162

163

164

172

187

189

204

205

2089

209

245

248

254

258

Manuscript Page

47

104

105

179

181

182

183

184

184

185

189

200

202

233

234

235

236

268

269

327

331

DDO

DOD (DIA)

DOD (DIA)

OS

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO

DDO

NSA

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

NSA and DDO

DDO

DDO

DDO***:

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS) , NSC Staff

DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

---

## Page 123

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Tab C

Continued

ET China

CA-Chema /EVeCypries.

EALEUR

AF

Item

2:59

260

267

268

269

*275

295

297

(3

-

299

-

301

302

304

306

312

•313

329

Manuscript Page

331

331

337

337

33.7

394

424

425

426

.427

427

430

431

442

450

480

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

DOD. (Navy)

OL

DDO

DDO

DDO, NSA

DDO, OC, NSA

NSA

NSA

DOD (Navy)

NSA

NSA

NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

- 2:

---

## Page 124

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Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

SE

Item

86

170

171

173

174

175

176

17.7

178

- 190

191

192

324

325

• 327

328

Manuscript Page

104

189

189

190

191

191

192

193

194

214

214

215

474

474

475

476

0/DCI

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

DDO or OS

State Department

State Department

DOD (JCS). and NSC Staff

DOD

DDI and DOD

DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

---

## Page 125

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Page

Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the

strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a

desire to counter its anti-American, antl-Hussein line (which was not/new),

so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA

owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical

expertise and management skills to put the station in operation.

Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special

relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link 1s

not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,

Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the

State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something

of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-

night drinking boutsuwith the younger Chiang.

Lover the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first

to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent

years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist

pilots trained in the Untted States), electronic surveillance of the mainland

and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at

China during the Cultural Revolution._/

In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally

conducting all important me sings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was

accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed.

But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for

many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President.

According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has

served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal

meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.

personally with

Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu Personna attir millions of

Maundered money,

dollars in untraceable,

"black bag" funds, in adition ta the hundrassed

4

4

6

8

1.

1.

2

7

2

---

## Page 126

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the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making

a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content. A

Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive:

large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from

actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance

which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said with agent

reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services

confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose

function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make

decisions based on that intelligence analysis.

In. the mid-1960s, the Far East Diviston of the Clandestine Services and

the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combineddffoces to

carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful)

intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level

U.S. government officials were disturbed by repprts that Communist China was on

the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.

They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBN's would play an important part

in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-

ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest

priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the

Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.

The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-

ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from

the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information

to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain

peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the

Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to

the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA

lahnratories, the flandestine Sarvices took on the responsibility for the most

159

2

---

## Page 127

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difficult plase of the operation - installing the machine on the mountain top.

The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the

Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the

CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not

only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.

Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry

the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it

into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered

Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.

Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced

CIA case officer.

That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian

climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret

ClA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn

how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi.

Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international

mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an

ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the

technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the

CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements

with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was

clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport

plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were

brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from

where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda

Devi.

5

Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the

Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking

too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the

---

## Page 128

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would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base

camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by

a small party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the

group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to

tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the

staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes.

The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in

an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now weel off

schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition

because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency

operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its

target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures

well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into

operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news

of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging. area.

But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been

sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over

the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the

device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government

was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi

that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headgaters of the sacred

Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about

religious pollution, not ecological.

The CIA reacted by planning another climbeof the mountain for the following

year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring

system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team,

led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the

top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was

set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year

161

---

## Page 129

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sage 260k

before was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device

1621

stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical

malfunction.

2

3

At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the

Cormunist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved

5

satellites for acquiring the information it was segking. The Indtans were

6

thanked and compensated for their cooperation. A The American climbers were

7

presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA

[the fertile imaginations of the saT experts during the following

years produced many more unique codirction schemes aimed at solving the

mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be

unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.

The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man

airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In

concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into

the denied area where, after perforning his espionage mission, he would

assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border.

Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with

this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards.

A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could

163

be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall

slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three

feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from

its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still

later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most

Tikely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a

foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional

similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine

ralead carinue muactinne as to the custems utilito and worth. The LazSit

---

## Page 130

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#age 281

specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however

oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile

installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear

to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear

attack. Development of the Cossly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The

technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device

in the southwestern U.S, desert usually resulted in the system burying itself

several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation

that the device failed to self-activate and function properly._

third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird,

such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which

could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well

over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble

on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once

over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras

would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either

to its lauach site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated

Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the

CIA in research on this "baby U-?" that called for numerous breakthroughs in

to be,

the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if

and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an

Agency-sponsored spying mission.

The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop system and the model?

airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully

developedaby their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite

surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement

for these questionabls and potentially provocative collection systems before

they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few

more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value - were also being

2

165

166

167

---

## Page 131

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(

restore the shah to power. Over the years, the Shah had shown his gratitude by

allowing the Agency to use Iran as a base for electronic and radar surveillance

of the Soviet Union. The CIA station chief in Iran usually maintained much

closer contact with the Shah than the American ambassador. (With the 1973

appointment of former CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in

Iran, any Agency-State conflicts then presumably disappeared.

The issue arose after

By 7558, the Agency had developed a new type of over-the-horizon radar

205

for survettend of tho sariet me

which it wished to install near the soviet border in Iran, As was normally

2

the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the

3

Irants.

However, when Ambassador Armin Meyer was informed of the details of

the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that 5

blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State

Department for instructions and advice.

7

In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications

clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas

and Washington - for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate

code roon for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a

senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative

9

10

11

1.2

part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work

under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the

messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful

career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is

well advised to show the CIA station chief eppies of all important State

messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most

secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

communications channels which sapposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.

[hea, in 1968, Ambassador Meyer, ran into troubles with the CIA station chief

secure"

channel (Roger)

-Dest, Has

in Teheran, Meyer switched his communications, with State in washington, to one of

those "secura" channels, catted "foger." He needed to be able to discuss the

2

---

## Page 132

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(

Page 370

situation in private with his superiors.

But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were

one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept

his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each

State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy

of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of

each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be

kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.

Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information,

Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield

to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at

CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor,

they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were .

unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so

aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary

of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing

completely to the CIA position.

/ Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D

worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain

South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of

allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent

by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercept

the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements

were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw

nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which

cooperated in good faith.

FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period

of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over

unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship.

However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could

Be restoved. 7

3

5

11

/

---

## Page 133

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#age 371

Sometime later, Bob suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite

that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the

international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive

3

operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other

CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and

tether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to.

4

5

6

be a matter concer. ing CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn

7

from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American

country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which

CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme aven

10

with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.

Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the

country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that

country's secret messages.

Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the

11

12

15

life

15

Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who

probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in

17

a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies

within the U.S. government - not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues 11

perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into

liaison agreements with FI/D.

21

Bob X is one of these dodinary looking people who mow their lawn, love

their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.

23

Two

Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes

similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long,

relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-

24

2:

21

middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security

officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt

was an nnerator who nlaved a leading role in the Bav of Pias and who took part

21

---

## Page 134

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Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced

1t to intervene militarily in a

second country to pratec its

operation against Cuba. The Presisent way have set the original

policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply

by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency

paramilitary activities against Guatanala.

CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on imer-

Ican foreign policy they can subject the country to blackmail

if something goes wrong. For Instance, after th cla pilot was

shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within five days

the us government approved the sale for local currency of 37.000

tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on 51 million in

small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that

moment, the jIA was actively backing an armed revolution against

the Sukarno regime

hese would have been stranga actions indeed

for the US govertment to take if it were not extremely concerned

about saving the captured pilot.

A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960

after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city

to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworty.

When the Agency technician plugged lu his polygraph nachine in

a hotel roan, he blew out all the fuses in the building.-

The

*This was not the only time that the ClA blow major i sos sex-

seas. During the mid-1960s, the Ayenuy added to 14r nurer"

Facilities on raiwan by building a life Glactrunic tech ca

2.95

---

## Page 135

13-00000

lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were

soon all under arrest. The singapore government and the British,

who ware in the process of granting Singapore its indepandences

were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then

ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US governnent offered$3.3 mil-

lion to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as

much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the tho CIA

officials vere subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary

of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the

Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech

as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA.

The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by

the CIA-State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's

charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusi's letter of a-

pology, and State was forced to retract its original staterent,

although it still maintained that no ranson had ever been offered.

As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines

around the world, the incident caused the state jepartment to

revamp its internal system for nakirg announcements about in

telligenca matters.

Blackmail was agin the theme in the nid-1960s when the

296

President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the

Linstallation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the

device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large

2970

part of the island's power. In this case, the local goverrment

reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.

---

## Page 136

13-00000

Us gove:s.: nt that he might oust certain intelligence instal

lations from his island. the CIA had a major interest in the

matter, s'': it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information ser

vice FBIs! listaning post there, and the Pentagon was also con-

cerned about the possible loss of its large electionic surveil

lance facilities. The view in the intelligence cormunity was

that Makarios had to be nollified at practically all costs.

Finally, governnent negotiators reached a secret deal with the

wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about

$10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA

put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund

for this unforseen expense.

In goneral, the presence of American intelligence facill-

ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Amer

ican policy toward that country, especially in the leird Horld.

closely aligned countries, such as England,

termany, Japan,

and sustralia, have

usually allowed the Unived states to set

up electronic spying bases as part of the general franework of

cooperation balveen allies. But to the less developed countries,

the presence of an American installation is both a threat and

an opportunity. The threat cones tron domestic opposition for

ces who look on the base as an example of "neo-coloni isn"

and use it 85 & weapon against those in power. The opportunity

arises out of the fact that the United states will pay deariy

for the right to install its eavesdroppong equipment and ti

keep it in place, as Archhishop hakarios discovered.

298

299

300

13

---

## Page 137

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(:

The only American military bases in Africa are in fact pri-

marily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia

• TH

and Kenitra in Morocco. Both host governnents have been severely

criticized by internal forces and neighboring countries for

giving the United States & foothold in their nations, but both

have been handsomely rewarded in terms of receiving American

military and economic assistance which had added up over the

years into the hundreds of millions of dollars, While compara

tively modest amounts of aid would have probably been supplied,

even if there had been no bases, the large size of the programs

represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intelligence

facilities.

Similari, Iron 1956 until theend of 1259, the US Air force

oparated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was pri-

marily an intelligence facility. For several years before frencis

Gary Powers' abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960.

CIA U-2 planes used Peshawar as a principal take-off point for

reconnaissance flights over and along the edges of the Soviet.

Untion. In addition, military intelligence set up a vast array

of electronic listening devices there to sonitor activities

within the soviet Union.

fros the early days of the Eisenhower

administration, the linited States had allied itself more closely

with Pakistan than with India in those two countries" traditional

struggle. Yet, at least some experts on the region believe

that an important factor in the luerican "tilt" toward Pakistan,

at least until the late 1960s, was the desire to hold on to the

301

302

---

## Page 138

13-00000

penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations. I

In 1964, it was learned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly z

bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the . 3

building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the

4

equipment had been installed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated, and

that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The damige report

asserted that during this entire parlod - at the height of the cold war --

Soviet intelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable betreen

7

$

Washington and the embassy.

hts assessment was based on the discovery of elec

audio devices in the code room which mouthie allowed the Soviets to hear

distinctly the sounds being maded by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment.

It was a reasonably easy technological feat -- wall within Soviet capabilities --

to transtate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning.

American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused

14

early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrusbchev made a remark to Ambassador Fay Fry

Kohler about Kabler's role in bocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of

steel for an important popeline. Taken in context, Khrushchev's remark indicated

to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started

a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found

embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim

there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation

he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchey, the timing would seen to

indicate otherwise.

In any case, the official damage report concluded that for those twelve

191

crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew

2

every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in

?

Moscow and Washington, The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet

knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least

?.

in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At

the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that if a particular.

---

## Page 139

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while

??

DDA 77-2412

28 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Halpern

FROM:

H. G. Bean

Acting Executive Officer/DDA

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Fairways Corporation

Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff

1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum

from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship

of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the

public domain.

There has been at least one newspaper article relating

to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news

item on the same subject.

However, official confirmation of the

allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations

has been carefully avoided.

2. There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that

CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive

transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here

again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was

identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation.

The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in

paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum.

Attachment

CC:

CCS

SECRET

ELETED EL 058 229

---

## Page 140

13-00000

SECRET

10277-2340

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM

SUBJECT

: M. L. Latta

Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group

Central Cover Staff

: Fairways Corporation

l. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys

for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168

items previously deleted by court order from the book,

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.

Fairways Corpora-

tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in

this connection.

2.

Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items

1107, 120, 129, 279; on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respec-

tively,) in the

original manuscript.

The position of CCS on

all four items is that they are still classified, since they

describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an

operational support facility located in the U.s.,

and are

therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)

of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive

Order 11652.

According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby

was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-

ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency

proprietaries.

proprietations that birs to Colde may have respo, ed there

the question in a manner which could have been construed as

admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.

In any case, Ces

tiles contain other evidence that the matter was considered

to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when

Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-

ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public

disclosure.

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 026089

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIV: #TELLIGENCE SOURCES

ARiO METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

---

## Page 141

13-00000

SECRET

4. Per our conversation, CCs has stated in its

response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further

on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may

have been placed in the public domain since the court

order (i.e., since February 1975).

Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O.

your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line

xysoo, 1s preparing an overall response on the subject

for the SA/ DO/0.

2

SECRET

---

## Page 142

13-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Record

attached are DO Devision

On the baces of the attached

position was

I to Mr. treas

5-75 101 485T0NS

---

## Page 143

13-00000

SECRE

14 June '1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

See Distribution

FROM

SUBJECT

Norbert A. Shepanek

0/SA/ DO/0

DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on

Certain Deletions in the Cult of

Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele-

tions in subject book for possible declassification, the

DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should

remain classified but has requested DDO coordination.

Copies

of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached

(see page 3).

2.

Please review the deletions using the

same criteria

applied during the review of deletions within the

exclusive

purview of the DDo.

If you find that any of the items have

been legally placed in

the public domain, please provide the

details.

3.

The following items should be reviewed by the

components indicated and response forwarded

to the writer by

23 June 1977:

Item

Manuscript Page

Review Responsibility

25

•159

160

161

162

163

164

205

•208

209

295

297

299

301

190

47

181

182

183

184

184

185

234

235

236

424

425

426

427

214

EA Division

EA Division and NE Div.

11.

.11

11

•"..

'!

11

-=!!

11

1

."

NE Division

LA Division

LA Division

EA Division

EA Division and EUR Div.

EA Division and EUR Div.

AF Division

SE Division (Office of

Security may be appropriate

action office for this item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

SECRET

---

## Page 144

13-00000

SECRET

Where more than

one Division is involved, a single

coordinated reply may be provided..

If there are any questions,

please contact the writer on x1542.

N. A. Shepanek

Attachments

As Noted Above

0/SA/DO/0:NAShepanek : kaw

(1542)

Distribution

- E/FP/FC

NE/COPS

C/AF/Plans

C/SE/ OSG

LA/FOIAV

- SA/ DO/0

E C

---

## Page 145

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SECRET

DDS&T -5193-76/1

2 ? MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

ATTENTION

SUBJECT

: John Greaney

: Review of Deletions from The CIA and the

Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this

directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject

book per your request.

The review was made to determine whether

each deletion was

still classified under EO 11652 or whether the

information in each deletion has been officially released by the

U.S. Government.

2.

Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed

by this directorate.

Tab B is a list of those items of primary

interest of this directorate.

All of these items remain classi-

fled; however, portions of one iten, 135, can be released.

Tab C

is a list of those items which we determined are still classified

released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be

coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of

items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and

should be referred to other indicated elements.

Tab E is a list

of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can

now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified

and should not be released.

3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National

Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-

tions through our contacts at NSA.. We were told that any

coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General

Counsel.

AS

a result, no further coordination with other ele-

ments was

attempted.

This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the

court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.

Toms f Jellera

ERNEST J. ZELLMER

Associate Deputy Director

for

Science and Technology

Attachments:

As Stated

SECRET

---

## Page 146

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Item

25

86

87

88

91

92

135

136

155

157

158

159

160

161

163

164

165

166

167

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

187

188

189

TAB A

DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T

Page

47

104

104

105

106

107

134

135

177

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

185

185

185

189

189

189

190

191

191

192

193

194

200

201

202•

Item

190

191

192

204

205

208

209

245

248

254

258

259

260

267

268

269

275

295

297

299

301

302

304

306

312

313

324

325

327

328

329

Page

214

214

215

233

234

235

236

268

269

327

331

331

331

337

337

337

394

424

425

426

427

427

430

431

442

450

474

474

475

476

480

---

## Page 147

13-00000

Tab B

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T

AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED

Item

91

92

*135

136

155

158

163

165

166

167

188

Manuscript Page

106

107

134

135

177

180

184

185

185

185

201

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B (3)

SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)

SECRET, 5B (3)

CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)

CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)

TOP SECRET, 5B (2)

*Can

be

sanitized and portions released.

---

## Page 148

13-00000

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN

CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

I tem

* 25

87

88

157

159

160

161

162

163

164

172

187

189

204

205

208

209

245

248

254

258

Manuscript Page

47

104

105

179

181

182

183

184

184

185

189

200

202

233

234

235

236

268

269

327

331

DDO

DOD (DIA)

DOD (DIA)

OS

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO; OC, ERDA

DDO

DDO

NSA

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

NSA and DDO

DDO

DDO

DDO

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD. (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS) , NSC Staff

DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

---

## Page 149

13-00000

Tab C

Continued

Item

259

260

267

268

269

*275

295

297

299

301

302

304

•306

312

313

329

Manuscript Page

331

331

337

337

337

394

424

425

426

427

427

430

431

442

450

480

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

OL

DDO

DDO

DDO, NSA

DDO, OC, NSA

NSA

NSA

DOD (Navy)

NSA

NSA

NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized

and portions released.

- 2-

---

## Page 150

13-00000

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item

86

170

171

173

174

175

176

177

178

190

191

192

324

325

327

328

Manuscript Page

104

189

189

190

191

191

192

193

194

214

214

215

474

474

475

476

0/DCI

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSẠ

NSA

NSA

DDO OI OS

State Department

State Department

DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff

DOD

DDI and DOD

DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

---

## Page 151

13-00000

SECRET

Tab E

ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE

Item 135, Manuscript page 134

"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred

when clA decided to set rid of a technical research laboratory

in the Boston area. "

Item 25, Manuscript page 47

"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the

against mainland

for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots

trained

in the United States), electronic surveillance of

the mainland and such covert action programs. as propaganda

and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol-

ution:'

Item 87, Manuscript page 107

"The Agency also had a project to determine where American

prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to

communicate with them

constructed from aerialländ satellite photography and from

nial and e

Scale models of the prisons were

age on the prisone or ment be vetting to eye one s

or might be willing to try to communicate.

own, had earlier used their

infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending

coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus,

the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the

families to send answers back

Meanwhile, the Technical

Services Division of the"

Item 275, Manuscript page 394

new optics

the horizon' radars.

always drawn up under the cover of being between the scholar

i spent the

for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over

These technical

contracts were almost

(or the university) and some government agency other than the

CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were

the most"

SECRET

---

## Page 152

13-00000

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN

CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

Item

* 25

* 87

88

157

159

160

161

162

163

164

172

187

189

204

205

208

209

245

248

254

258

Manuscript Page

47

104

105

179

181

182

183

184

184

185

189

200

202

233

234

235

236

268

269

327

331

DDO

DOD (DIA)

DOD "(DIA)

OS

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO, OC, ERDA

DDO

DDO

NSA

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

NSA and DDO

DDO

DDO

DDO**

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS) , NSC Staff

DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

---

## Page 153

13-00000

Tab C

Continued

Item

259

260

267

268

269

*275

295

297

299

301

302

304

306

312

313

329

Manuscript Page

331

331

337

337

337

394

424

425

426

427

427

430

431

442

450

480

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (SAFSS)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

DOD (Navy)

OL

DDO

DDO

DDO, NSA

DDO, OC, NSA

NSA

NSA

DOD (Navy)

NSA

NSA

NSC Staff

*Can

be sanitized

and portions

released.

- 2-

---

## Page 154

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Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item

170

171

173

174

175

176

177

178

190

191

192

324

325

327

328

Manuscript Page

104

189

189

190

191

191

192

193

19.4

214

214

215

474

474

475

476

0/DCI

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

NSA

DDO or os

State Department

State Department

DOD (JCS). and NSC Staff

DOD

DDI and DOD

DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

---

## Page 155

13-00000

UNCLA: SIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Norbert A.

Shepanek

0/SA/DO/0

2D0109

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

1.

Ralph J:

SA/ D0/0

Katrosh

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

EXTENSION

1542

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

NO.

DATE

14 June 1977

COMMENTS. (Number each comment to show from whom

•to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3. Mr. Robert Skidmore

C/EA/CA

1/6 JUN 1977

DIS

5D3102 Has.

15 JUN 1977

4.

5.

ACRA

6.

7.

SA/ DO/ D

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USEDPIENOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

The EA iTins cited

should remain classified

o They need Sorees.

thads and have at

puttie ered in de

demain by the

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 156

13-00000

...

SECRET

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

See Distribution

FROM

SUBJECT

: Norbert A. Shepanek

0/SA/ DO/0

:

DDSGT Request

. for DDO Coordination on

Certain Deletions in the Cult of

Intelligence by Marchetti

- Marks

In conjunction with the current review of the dele-

in subject book for possible declassification, the

DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should

remain classified but has requested DDO coordination.

Copies

of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached .

(see page 3).

2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria

applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive

If you find that any of the items have

legally placed in the public domain, please provide the

details.

3. The following items should be reviewed by the

components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by

23 June 1977:

Item

Manuscript Page

Review Responsibility

25

47

159

181

EA Division

160

EA Division and NE Div.

182

161

183

"

162

184

1

"

"

"

163

184

"

164

185

205

234

208

235

209

236

295

424

297

425

299

426

301

427

190

214

NE Division

LA Division

LA Division

EA Division

EA Division

and EUR Div.

EA Division and EUR Div.

AF Division

SE Division (Office of

Security may be appropriate

action office for this item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

SECRET

---

## Page 157

13-00000

SECRET

4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single

coordinated reply may be provided.

If there are any questions,

please contact the writer on x1542.

Attachments

As Noted Above

0/SA/DO/0 :NAShepanek:kaw • (1542)

Distribution

Original - C/EA/CA

1

E/ FP/FC

1

NE/ COPS

1

C/AF/Plans

1

C/SE/OSG

1

LA/FOIA

2

SA/DO/0

S

ECRET

---

## Page 158

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•Jay

47.

SECRET

Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the

strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a

desire to counter its anti-American, antf-Hussein line (which was notznew),

so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA

owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical

expertise and management skills to put the station in operation./

Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special

relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is

not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,

Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the

State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something

of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-

night drinking boutswith the younger Chiang.

[over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Natlonalists first

to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent

years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights. (flown over China by Nationalist

pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland

and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at

China during the Cultural Revolution_/

In South Vieteam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally

conducting all important meetings, with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was

of station

accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed.

But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for

many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President.

According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has

served as condutt between Thieu and the American government when a formal

meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.

rersonally with

Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personaldigith millions of

dollars in untraceable,

"black bag" funds, in addtttan to

Purist

6

8

25

z.

-

---

## Page 159

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181

the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making

a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content.

*

Some Intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receivei

large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from

actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance

(which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said with agent

reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services

confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose

function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make

decisions based on that intelligence analysis.

In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and

59

the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddfences to

carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful)

intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level

U.S. government officials were disturbed by repprts that Canmunist China was on

the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.

They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part

in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-

ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest

priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtza, the

Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.

The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-

ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from

the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information

to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain

peak called-the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the

Indian Himalayas from where It would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to

the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA

Tatoratortes, the clandestine Services took on the responsibility for the mosS CHET

---

## Page 160

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181.

SECRET

difficult pliase of the operation - installing the machine on the mountain top.

140

The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the

Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the

CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not

only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.

Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry

the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it

into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered

Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.

Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an expertenced

CIA case officer.

That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian

climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret

CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn

how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi.

Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international

mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an

ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the

technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the

CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements

with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was

clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport

plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were

brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from

where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda

Devi.

ton.

2

5

8

Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the

Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking

too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the

---

## Page 161

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183:

SECRET

would do. 'Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base

camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by

a small party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the

group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to

tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the

staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes.

The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in

an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now weel off

schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition

because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency

operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its

target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures

well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into

operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news

of the successful installation was radioed back to the staging area.

But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been

sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over

the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the

device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government

was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi

that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headgaters of the sacred

Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about

religious pollution, not ecological.

The CIA reacted by planning another climbeof the mountain for the following

year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring

system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team,

led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the

top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was

set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year

161

---

## Page 162

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Bage 260

184

SECRET

before was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device /42

stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical

malfunction.

At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the

Conmunist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved

satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were

thanked and compensated for their cooperation. A The American climbers were

presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.

The fertile imaginations of the SaT experts during the following

years produced many more unique codirction schemes aimed at solving the

mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be

unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.

The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man

airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In

concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into

the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would

assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border.

Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with

this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards.

A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could 16:

be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall

slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three

feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from

its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still

later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most

likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a

foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional

similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine

naican cartne mastinns as to the sustan's utilitu and worth. The ElSeT

---

## Page 163

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(::

tage 201

185

SECRET

specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however

oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile

installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear

to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear

attack.

Development of the fossly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The

technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device

in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself

several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation

that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.

third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird,

such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which

could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well

over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble

on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once

over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras

would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either

to its lauach site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated

Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the

CIA in research on this "baby U-?" that called for numerous breakthroughs in

to be,

the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantase was of course, that if

and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an

Agency-sponsored spying mission.

The technical difficultles involved in the air-drop]system and the model

Jatrplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully

developediby their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite

surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement

for these questionable and potentially provocative collection systems before

they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few

more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being

2

165

167

---

## Page 164

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414

SECRET

Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced

It to intervene militarily in a second country to pratec its

operation against Cuba. The Presiient way have set the original

policy, but there was no way he could have

known that simply

by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency

paramilitary activities against Gustamala.

CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-

Ican foreign policy They can subject the country to blackmail

if something goes wrong. For instance, after th CIA/pilot waa

shot down and captured by Indonesia

In 1958, within five days

the Us government approved the sale for local currency of 37.000..

tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on 1 million in

small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that

moment, thir jIA was actively backing an armed revolution against

the Sukarno regime

hese would have been stranga actions indeed

for the US govertiment to take if it were not extremely concerned

about saving the captured pilot.

À somewat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960

after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city

to make sure that a locally recrulted agent was trustworühy.

when the Agency technician plugged lu his polygraph nachine in

a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building* the

*This was not the only time that the ClA blow major 4,509 Jar-

seas. During the mid-19605, the Agenuy added to 1t5 nwron

Facilities on taiwan by building a infe electrunic on

SECRET

245

---

## Page 165

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425 SECRET

lie detector nan, a CIA case officer. and the local agent were

soon all under urrest. the Singapore government and the British,

who ware in the process of granting singapore its indepandences

were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then

ensued to secure the men's release. According to Sirgapore

Prime iinister Lee kuan lew, the Us governnent offered$3. 3 mil-

lion to get them out. Lee clained that he wanted ten tines as

much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the tro CLi

officials vere subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary

of state, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the

Singapore leader. In 1965. Lae ventioned the affair in a speech

as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA.

The State Department then Issued a routine denial furnished by

the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's

charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusic°s letter of a-

pology, and State ses forced to retract its original statement,

although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.

As well as embarcassing the US government and making headlines.

around the world, the incidont caused the state Nepartment to

revamp its intornal systen for naking announcements about in-

telligenca matters.

Blacknail was agin the theme in the nid-1y60s when the

296

President of Cyprus, Archbishop Hakarios, quietly inferned the

installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the

device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large 297

part of the island's power. In this case, the local goverrment

reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.

SECRET

---

## Page 166

13-00000

SECMET

426

Us sove:'s at that he might oust certain intelligence instal

lations front his island. The CIA had a major interest in the

matter, s' it operated a Foreiyn Broadcast Information Ser-

vice FBIS! listoning post

there, and the Pentagon was also con-

cerned abcit the possible loss of Its large electronic surveil-

lance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was

that Makarios had to be noilified at practically all costs.

Finally, sovernment negotiators reached a secret deal with the

wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about

B10 million in return for letting the bases renain. The CIA

put uo half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund

for this unforseen expanse.

In goneral, the presence of American intelligence facili-

ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Amera

ican policy tovard that country, especially in the leird world.

Closely aligned countries, such

as England,

jermany, Japan,

and Australia, have usually alloved the Unived States to set

up electronic spying bases as part of the genoral franework.of

cooperation batween allies.

But to the less daveloped countries,

the presence of an American installation is both a threat and

an opportunity. The threat cones frog donestic opposition for

ces vio 100k on the base as an example of "neo-colonialisn"

and use it as a weapon arainst those in power.

The opportunity

arises out of the fact that the United states will pay dearly

for the right to install its eavesdroppèng equipment-and tu

keep it in placo,

/Archhishop lakarios discovered.

298

294;

13

SECRET

---

## Page 167

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL:

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO:

Norbert A. Shepanek

0/ SA/ DO/0

2D0109

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

1542

9564

DATE

14 June 1977

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

RECEIVED

COMMENTS (Number each commert to show. from whom

to whom..

Draw a line ácross column. after each comment.)

1.

Ralph J. Katrosh

SẠ/ DO/O

FORWARDED

,4

qure

2.

3. Crocky Hogg

LA/ FOIA

3C34 Hqs.

sune

4:

5.

Norbert Shepanek

0/SA/DO/0

2D0109

To 5:

: 6.

To the best of our

knowledge, items 208 and

209 have

not been made

public.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USE PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 168

13-00000

SECRET

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

See Distribution

Norbert

A.

Shepanek

0/ SA/DO/0

DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on

Certain Deletions in the Cult of

Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele-

tions in subject book for possible declassification, the

DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should

remain classified but has requested DDO coordination.

Copies

of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached

(see page 3).

2.

Please review the deletions using the same criteria

applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive

purview of the DDO.

If you find that any of the items have

been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the

details.

3. The following items should be reviewed by the

components indicated

and response forwarded to the writer by

23 June 1977:

Item

Manuscript Page

Review Responsibility

25

159

160

161

162.

163

164

205

208

209

295

297

299

301

190

47

181

182

183

184

184

185

234

235

236

424

425

426

427

214

EA Division

EA Division and NE Div.

1

11

NE Division

LA

• Division

LA

Division

EA

Division

EA Division

EA. Division

and EUR Div.

and EUR Div.

AF Division

SE Division

(Office of

Security may be appropriate

action office for this

item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

SECRET

---

## Page 169

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•SECRET

4.

Where more than one Division is involved, a single

coordinated reply may be provided.. If there are any questions,

please contact the writer on x1542:

(signed) Norbert A. Shepanek

N. A. Shepanek

Attachments

As Noted Above

0/ SA/ DO/0: NAShepanek: kaw

(1542)

Distribution

Original - C/EA/CA

E/FP/FC

1

NE/COPS

- C/AF/Plans

- . C/SE/ OSG

- LA/. FOIA

- SA/ DO/0

SECR

---

## Page 170

13-00000

(

=5FU

23'5

SECRET

sittation. in private with his superiors.

But Bob and his cohorts at Fi/D were

one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept

his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each

State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy

of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of

each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be

kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.

Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information,

Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield

to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at

CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor,

they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were

unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so

aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary

of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing

completely to the CIA position.

Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D

worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain

South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of

allowing the ClA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent

by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercapt

the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements

were normall procedure to Bob. The Intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw

nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which

cooperated in good faith.

FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period

of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over

unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship.

However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could

be restored. 7

2

3

4

5

6

7

11

12.

---

## Page 171

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Page 377

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SECRET

Sometime later, Bob suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite

that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the

international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive

operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other

CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and

kether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to

be a matter concer. ing CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn

from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American

country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which

CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme aven

with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.

Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the

country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that

country's secret messages.

Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the

Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who

probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in

a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies

within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues

perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into

liaison agreements with FI/D.

Bob X is one of these bodinary looking people who mow their lawn, love

their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.

Two

Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban lashington homes

similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long,

relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-

middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security

officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt

was an nnerator who laved a leading role in the Bav of Pias and who took part

5

7

11

12

13

15

17

Zý

21

z2

73

24

2:

z.

---

## Page 172

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UNGLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

1244n-id:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

E/ FP/FC

4 B 4406

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

EXENS 23 N°0) 591

1872

DATE

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

23 June 1977

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

to whom.

Draw a line across column after euch comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

0/ SA/ DO/0

Mr. Shepanek

2.

10.

11..

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USEFENOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED.

---

## Page 173

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S-E - C-R-E-T

23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

0/SA/D0/0

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

:

William W. Phelps

EUR/ FP/FC

: Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti

Book

: SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977

European

Division concurs that the two items involving

EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain

classified.

William

WPhelps

William W. Phelps

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY 003283

S-E-C-R-E- T

---

## Page 174

13-00000

S-E-C-R-E T

/

23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

0/SA/DO/0

FROM

SUBJECT

:

William W. Phelps

EUR/FP / FC

:

Coordination

Book

of Deletions

in Marks-Marchetti

REFERENCE

: SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977

European

Division concurs that the two items involving

EUR (Item

297, page

425 and Item

299, page 426) should remain

classified.

William W. Phelps

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY 003283

S-E-C-R-E- T

---

## Page 175

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UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NE/COPS

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

0/SA/D0/0

Attn: Mr. Shepanek

TUBE: DX-6

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

EXTENSION NO.

9165

OFFICER'

INITIALS

DATE

23 June 1977

COME a i cos column of at on te comment.)

o whom.

2.

4.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610. USE PREVIOUS

EDITION

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNA

SE ON

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 176

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-

SEGRET

JuN 23 1 1a Mme 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/0

ATTENTION

: Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM

: Joyce R. Herrmann

Chief of Operations, NE Division

SUBJECT

: DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on

•Certain Deletions in the Cult of

Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

NE Division has researched the seven DDS&T items cited

in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited

have been legally placed in the public domain. Therefore,

the items

remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as

listed below:

Item

159

160

161

162

163

164

205

Manuscript

Page

181

182

183

184

184

185

234

Exemption

5B (2) (3)

• (2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

(2)

5B (2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

5B (2) (3)

Jerus Ammaur

Foyce. R. Herrmann

WAR,

CAL NORCE

SENSITIVE INTELE DENIEL SOURCES

AND 15E

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 054979

---

## Page 177

13-00000

UNCLESSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

• CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

AC/SE

5B4803

•: (Officer designation, room number, an

wilding

EXTENDAN 2AM. 10 26 AM °77

9045

DA3 June 1977

COMES A in actor dom to thou comment

RECEIVED

DATE

FORWARDED

24

0/SA/ DO/0

2D0109

2.

3.

4.

Shep

5.

7.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

610 USEDPRONOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

• UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 178

13-00000

SECRET

23 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ATTENTION

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Special Assistant to the DDO for

External Oversight

:

Norbert A. Shepanek

: Katharine C. Hart

Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division

:

Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence

by Marchetti - Marks

Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Request

for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions

in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti -

Marks, dated 14 June 1977

1.

We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division

interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.

This concerns an

item from the Marchetti and Marks book,

The Cult of Intelligence. Checking against official disclosures

we have determined the item is still properly classified under

Executive Order 11652.

Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to soviet

capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by aud10

devices discovered in

the code room of the American Embassy in

Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to

cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).

.C. Hat

Katharine C. Hart

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 014652

---

## Page 179

13-00000

SECRET

23 JUN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ATTENTION

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Special Assistant to the DDO for

External Oversight

: Norbert A. Shepanek

Katharine C. Hart

Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division

Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence

by Marchetti * Marks

: Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Request

for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions

in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti -

Marks, dated 14 June. 1977

1.

We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division

interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.

This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book,

The Cult of Intelligence. Cheating against official disclosures

we have determined the item is still properly classified under

Executive Order 11652.

2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet

capabilities to make intelligible. the sounds picked up by audio

devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in

Moscow, remains classified SECRET.

This item relates to

cryptography and is exempt Jag the General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order il652, exemption category SB(2).

Katharie C. Hart

Katharine C. Hart

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 014652

---

## Page 180

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Deletions in

the Cult of

FROM:

Chief, Africa Plans

1326

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

1.

0/SA/DO/0

Attn: Mr. Shepanek

2.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Certain

• by Marchetti-Marks

DATE

6 JUL 1977

COMES a in och so column to the from frcommen.)

to whom.

File -

4.

7.

10.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-02

610 USE PRONOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 181

13-00000

SECRET

6 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

0/ SA/DO/0

Attn:

Mr. Shepanek

: Edward J. Foy, JI.

Chief, Africa

Plans

: DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination

on Certain Deletions in the Cult of

Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks

We concur in the DDS&T's conclusion that Item 301,

page 247 remain classified.

Qual org

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

---

## Page 182

13-00000

SECRET

• JUL 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

0/SA/D0/0

Attn:

Mr. Shepanek

: Edward J. Foy, Jr.

Chief, Africa

Plans

: DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination

on Certain Deletions in the Cult of

Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks

We concur in the DDS&T's conclusion that Item 301,

page 247 remain classified.

18/ EDWARD J. FOY, JRo

Edward J: Foy, Jr.

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

SEGRET

---

## Page 183

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PAGED

LEFT

SIDE

24 FEB/977 THENLIVYORE TIM

Transcript of the President's News Con

Following is a transcrip of Presi-

dent Carter's

news conference in

Washington jesterday afternoon, as

recorded

by

The

New: York Times

through the jacilities of ABC News:

Opening Statement:

Goed afternoon everybody. I'd like

to make a very brief statement as a

progress report to the American people

of some items that are important to

tis.

We have submitted and the Congress

is now considering legislation to give

me the

authority

to

reorganize : the

executive branch of Government.

The

Senate Committee under Senator Ribic-

off has now completed their hearings

and they'll be marking up the bill

beginning tomorrow.

The House Committee on Govern-

'ment Operations under

Congressman

Jack Brooks has scheduled hearings to

begin on March 1.

So because of the interest of the

American people and the Congress and

myself in completing this very crucial

project i think the Congress is moving

with great expedition to give me that

authority.

We've also initiated with directions

to the members of the Cabinet and

other agency heads a new program to

cut down on the extremely great over-

load of paper work with a requirement

that those

who

prepare

regulations

be

Government

responsible

for

the

preparation assigned

them. I've asked

my Cabinet officers to read the regula-

tions that are forthcoming from

their

departments each week until they see

the volume and the complexity of them,

and we hope to eliminate unnecessary

regulations,

abbreviate those that are

necessary and express them in a lan-

guage so that we can all understand

them.

I've

also asked major elements of

our own society, the university profes-

sors and the state officials in this last

week to give me their suggestions on

now the regulations might be improved.

We have done the same thing with

reports required by the Federal Govern-

nient. I hope to reduce drastically the

number of reports and the frequency

of those reports and the complexity.

of them.

We will complete the proposed legis-

lation on creating a new Department

of Energy

this

week. The proposed

legislation is now on my desk. It will

be submitted to the Congress for action

the first of next week. And we've con-

sulted very closely with the key leaders

In the Congress and I believe there's

going to be a rapid creatina of this

new department and a heavy emphasis

on the importance of energy questions:

to our people.

We will also present to the American

people probably at a joint session of

the Congress a speech by me about

April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-

cy which would involve all the com-

plexities of the energy question.

It's

something that's long overdue and it's

going to be quite profound in its impact

on the American consciousness and our

society, and I hope it will be compre-

President Carter walking past reporters after news conference at the E:

I'm not going to leave of not comment-

with labor and management. Bu

ing directly on any specific C.I.A. ac-

whether I'll be successful, I don't know

tivity. But I can tell you that I have

begun a complete analysis which will

I'm just going to have to do my hest.

be completed within the next week of

all activities by the C.I.A. I've received

6. Human Rights Abroad

substantial reports already.

Q. In your letter to Mr. Sakharov

I've reviewed the more controversial

you said that the United States would

revelations that have been publicized

use its good offices to seek the release

in the last few days, some quite errone-

ous, some with some degree of accura-

of prisoners of conscience. And you

cy. These same operations have been

said that you wanted to continue te

reviewed by the Intelligence Oversight

shape a world responsible to human

aspirations.

Board, an independent board, and also

As you know there are

by my predecessory,

human rights problems in many other

President Ford.

I have not found anything illegal or

countries.

And some of them like Iran

or the

improper.

Philippines we support with

arms, or we support with American aid

If in future assessments, which will

come quite early, I discover such an

These are countries where many people

believe we have more leverage than

impropriety or an illegality I will not

we might have in the Soviet

Union.

only take immediate action to correct

What if anything do you plan to try

it but also will let the American people

to do to help victims of political repres

know about it.

siọn in these countries?

I might say this. This is a very serious

problem of how in a democracy to have

A. I think without my trying to take

credit for it there has been a substan-

adequate

intelligence

gathered,

as-

sessed and used to guarantee the se-

tial move toward concern about hi man

rights throughout the world. I think

curity of our country. It's not part of

the American nature to do things in

this has tanen place in probably a

dozen

or more different

-ies,

secret. Obviously, historically and still

at this modern time there is a necessity

There's an arou.ing interest in the posi-

tion that our own Govemment here in

to protect sources of information from

other nations.

Sometimes other Gov-

our free country does take. Obviously

ernments cooperate

with us fully;

there are deprivations of human rights

even more brutal than the ones

sometimes they don't.

on

which we've commented up to now.

But I'll try to be sure, and so will

Stan. Turner,

who will be the next

In Uganda the actions there have dis-

director of the intelligence community.

gusted the entire civilized world and,

He will try to be sure that every thing

as you know, we have no diplomatic

we do is not only proper and legal,

relationships with Uganda. But h: e is

but also compatible with the attitudes

an instance where both

Ambassador

of the American people.

Andrew Young and I have expressed

One other point I'd like to make is

great concern about what is there. The

British are now considering asking the

this. It can be extremely damaging to

United Nations to go into Uganda to

our relationship with other nations,

to

assess the horrible murders that par-

the potential security of our country

ently are taking place in that country

---

## Page 184

13-00000

рАФ:

MIDDLE

WUNEREDS aNU I NONETE

going to be a rapid creation of this

other nations. Sometimes other Göv-

new department and a heavy emphasis

ernnients

cooperate

with

us fully;

there are deprivations of human rights

on the importance of energy questions.

sometimes they don't.

even more

brutal than

the ones on

to our people.

Which we've commented up to now.

But I'll try to be sure, and so will

Stan. Turner,

who will be the next

In Uganda the actions there have dis-

people. probably at a joint session of

director of the intelligence community.

the entire civilized world and,

the Congress a speech by me about

He will try to be sure that every thing

as you know, we have no diplomatic

April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-

we do is not only proper and legal,

relationships with Uganda. But hi: a is

cy which would involve all the com-

but also compatible with the attitudes

Ambassador

plexities of the energy question. It'g

of the American people.

Andrew Young and I have expressed

something that's long overdue and it's

One other point I'd like to make is

great concern about what is there. The

going to be quite profound in its impact

this. It can be extremely damaging to

British are now considering asking the

on the American consciousness and our

our relationship with other nations,

Nations to go into Uganda to

to

society, and I hope it will be compre-

the potential security of our

assess the horrible murders that par-

hensive enough so that it can be well-

country

ently are taking place in that country-

even in peacetime, for these kinds of

balanced and fair to all.

operations

which

are legitimate and

We are

pressures quite con. ine advisers to

aroused the irt if Mr. Amin.

proper to be revealed. It makes it hard

for us 10

I've exnrnr... mu concern ah 17i.

me on economics are trying to assess

we might predicate a successful meet-

prisoned p...u

all Government programs and private

ing of a

threat to us in time of war

Korea, in Cuna, in many countri:

actions that contribute to inflationary

if we don't have some degree of secre..

several countrics,

rather,-in s ith

pressurese

America anil I'll continue to do so. I

will use every means

I'm quite concerned about the num-

have never had an inclination to single

available to me to express these con-

ber of people now

out the Soviet Union as the only place

cerns and possibly corrective actions

to this kind of information. And I've

where human rights are being abridged.

to the American people as well.

been working very closely with the

We have, I think, a responsibility and

And the last point is

hava s. camnlata: analycia

congressional leaders, yesterday and

a legal right to express our disapproval

to try to reduce the overall num-

of violations of human rights. The Hel

on

question is the deregulation of the air

Abraument,

lines. Legislation

now.

deregulation. And he a bet of epitormation acetin the These human rights surell be present

sources of information that within the

insures: that some of

We'll be submitting a message

bounds that I've described propriety

and legality and American attitudes to-

signatory of the Helsinki

to Congress very shortly on that sub-

ward secrecy-I'll. do the best I can

agreement. We are ourselves culpable

ject. We will not submit administration

legislation because the Congress has

not ever tr nake a mistake.

in somo ways for not giving people

also assuming on a continuing basis

adequate rights to move around

already moved subst ntially forward in

a direct personal reponsibility for the

country or restricting unnecessarily, in

dealing with this important. issue.

And now I'd like to answer questions.

operation of all the ingelligence agen-

my opinion, visitation to

Mr. Frank Cormier.

cies in our Government to make sure

by those who disagree with us political.

that they are meeting these standards.

Questions and Answers

1. Defense Budget

3, Correcting Errors on C.I.A.

Q. Mr. President, you told the Demo-

cratic Platform. Committee that you

Q. If there has been erroneous infor-

thought present defense expenditures

mation, wouldn't it behoove you to cor-

could be reduced by five to seven bil-

rect the record?

lion dollars. Now I think you may have

A. In some ways we are correcting

modified your pusition somewhat since

the record, but if I began to either dis-

then. Obviously in your short time in

pute or confirm every individual story

office you didn't find the opportunity

that's written whether correct or er-

to make cuts like that in your precedes-

roneous on

every matter relating- to

sor's budget.

it also likely

the C.I.A., then these matters which

that next year's budget for the defense

are necessarily secret would no longer

will exceed this year's.

be secret, so I'm not going to comment

A. Well because of inflationary pres-

on individual items that relate to intel-

sures and because of an impossibility

ligence.

of assessing the potential threat to our

country

from other nations, it's hard

4. Difference With Meany

to

predict exactly what the level of

Q. Mr. President, George Meany says

idefense spending will be. In the short

he won't go along with your idea for

time that

pre-notification on wage and price in-

on the previous Administration's budg-

et-about three weeks of hard work-

creases. And my question really is, how

we were able to reduce the suggested

hard are you going to press Mr. Meany

to go along and do you have anything

expenditures

almost $3 billion. I

else in mind that you could use in the

think about $2.75 billion.

way of Government involving itself to

So I think that we all ought to take

a position in our own country

among our friends and allies,

among

our potential adversaries, that human

rights is something on which we should

bear a major responsibility for leader

ship. And I have made it clear to the

Soviet Union and to others in the East-

ern European community that I'm not

trying to launch a unilateral criticism

of them; that I'm trying to set a stand-

ard in our own country and make my

concerns

expressed

throughout

the

world, not singled out against any par-

Q. Mr. President, the other day. gel-

ting back to this C.I.A. thing,

that story broke your Press Secretary,

when he issued what amounted lo a

"no comment" by the White House,

someone asked him if this story had

broken back during the campaign when

you were running for Presiden:, vould

you have given a similar response? And

"well I don't know." So can

I ask you, what would have beer: you.

This was done-and I think Senator

Stennis in his recent public statements

A. I announced earlier my firm com-

has confirmed that it has been done

without

mitment not to have mandatory wage

weakening our own

and price laws or authority, not to have

capability. And the substantial savings

standby. wage and price authority. I've

in defense spending that will still leave

not made any proposal to Mr. Meany

us muscle

such things as

or any other labor leader nor to any

the standardization of weapons,

representative of. industry or manufac-

range planning,

a more businesslike al-

turing. But I. will retain the option in

location of defense contracting, an as-

the future of assessing what we need

sessment of the defense contracts for

to do to control inflation.

construction or repair already out-

I've emphasized always the word

A reassessment of priorities of the

I can arrive at a common understand-

evolution of new weapons which in the

future can become enormously expen-

ing with industry and labor leaders that

a certain amount of cooperation and

sive; a longer assignment of military

information can be exchanged before

personnel to a base before they are

a major proposal is made. I think that's

transferred; some emphasis on the cor-

a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can't

rection of inequities and unfairnesses

force it. It's got to be voluntary. And

in the retirement system.

that's as far as I can go with my an-

These things obviously can't be done

in three weeks, but they will be an

ongoing effort on my part. And I think

the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad

5. Wage-Price Guidelines

O. You mean just directly about wage

7. Review of C.I.A. Activities

Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-

ject, you said earlier that you review

of C.I.A. activities had found nothing

illegal or improper and you later said

that these activities are legitimate and

proper. Isn't that a value judgment that

the American public might like to

share? But how can they if you refuss

to' give them

any idea of wrat you

have

discovered

dur ng this review

about payments, including ones made

in secret?

A. That is a value judgment. It's made

by the independent Intelligence Over-

sight Board, which was established and

appointed

by President

Ford.

This

board has made itself available to the

Inspector General and to any employce

within the C.I.A. or within the defense

intelligence agencies or any other to

receive even rumors of imotonrietv.

---

## Page 185

13-0000&sures of iniation.

The advisers to

me on economics are trying to assess

all Government programs and private

actions that contribute to inflationary

pressures. When this analysis is done

I will use every means that I have

available to me to express these con-

cerns

and possibly corrective actions.

to the American people as well.

And the last point is that we will.

tora

• complata: analysie.

on

deregulation.

inderwav

And the first

question is the deregulation of the air

lines.

Legislation is

in

the. Congress

now. We'll be submitting a message

to Congress very shortly on that sub-

ject. We will not submit administration

legislation

because

the

Congress has

already moved substantially forward in

deauing with this important issue.

And now I'd like to answer questions.

Mr. Frank Cormier.

Questions and Answers

1, Defense Budget

Q. Mr. President, you told the Demo-

Platform. Committee that you

expenditures

could be reduced by five to seven bil-

lion dollars. Now I think you may have

modified your position somewhat since

then. Obviously in your short time in

office you didn't find the opportunity

to make cuts like that in your precedes-

sor's budget.

that next year's budget for the defense

will exceed this year's.

A. Well because of inflationary pres-

sures and because of an impossibility

of assessing the potential threat to our

from other nations, it's hard

exactly what the level of

defense spending will be. In the short

available to work

on the previous Administration's budg-

et-about three weeks of hard work-

we were able to reduce the suggested

think about $2.75 billion.

This was done-and I think Senator

Stennis in his recent public statements

has confirmed that it has been done

without weakening our own defense

capability. And the substantial savings

in defense spending that will still leave

us muscle will be in such things as

the standardization of weadons.

range planning, a more businesslike al-

location of defense contracting, an as-

sessment of the defense contracts for

construction or

repair already out-

A reassessment of priorities of the

evolution of new weapons which in the

future can become enormously expen-

sive; a longer assignment of military

personnel to a base before they are

transferred; some emphasis on the cor-

rection of inequities and unfairnesses

These things obviously can't be done

weeks, but they will be an

ongoing effort on my part. And I think

the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-

ministration's first budget, will

these improvements to a substantial de-

Q. Will next year's defense budget

then than the one

that you just revised. A. I can't say

/ 5 2. C.LA. Accountability

Q. Do you think it was proper for

the C.I.A. to pay off King Hussein and

other foreign leaders? And what steps

are you taking to make yourself more

knowledgeable

and more accountable

for what the C.I.A. does?

fi: A. Well, I've adopted a policy which

we might predicate a successful meet-

ing of a threat to us in time of war

if we don't have some degree of secre-

I'm quite concerned about the num-.

ber of people now who have access

to this kind of information. And I've

been working very, closely with the

Congressional leaders, yesterday and

to try to reduce the overall num-

today people who have access to the

sources of information. that within the

bounds that I've described propriety.

and legality and American attitudes to-

ward secrerf-I'll, do the best I can

not ever tc: make a mistake.

also assuming on a continuing basis

a direct personal reponsibility for the

operation of all the ingelligence agen-

cies in our Government to make sure

that they are meeting these standards.

3, Correcting Errors on C.I.A.

Q. If there has been erroneous infor-

mation, wouldn't it behoove you to cor-

prisoned party in furs in

Korea, in Cuna, in many countris

--in

several countries, rather,-in

America anil I'll continue to do sn. I

have never had an inclination to single

out the Soviet Union as the only place

where human rights are being abridged.

We have, I think, a responsibility and

a legal right to express our disapprovat

of violations of human rights. The Hel

sinki

Agreement,

Backint..

• Three Provision,

insures; that some of

these human rights-shalf be preserved.

We are a

signatory of the Helsinki

agreement. We are ourselves culpable

in

some ways for not giving people

adequate rights to move around our

country or restricting unnecessarily, in

my opinion, visitation to this

country

by those who disagree with us political-

A. In some ways we are correcting

the record, but if I began to either dis-

pute or confirm every individual story

that's written whether correct or er-

roneous on every. matter relatingto

he C.I.A., then these matters which

are necessarily secret would no longer

be secret, so I'm not going to comment

on individual items that relate to intel-

ligence.

4. Difference With Meany

Q. Mr. President, George Meany says

he won't go along with your idea for

pre-notification on wage and price in-

creases. And my question really is, how

hard. are you going to press Mr. Meany

to go along and do you have anything

else in mind that you could use in the

way of Government involving itself to

try to control inflation?

A. I announced earlier my firm com-

mitment not to have mandatory wage

and price laws or authority, not to have

standby wage and price authority. I've

not made any proposal to Mr. Meany

or any other labor leader nor to any

representative of. industry or manufac-

But I. will retain the option in

the future of assessing what we need

to do to control inflation.

I've emphasized always the word

"voluntary."

I can arrive at a common understand-

ing with industry and labor leaders that

certain amount of cooperation and

information can

be exchanged before

a major proposal is made. I think that's

a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can't

force it. It's got to be voluntary: And

that's as far as I can go with my an-

5. Wage-Price Guidelines

Q. You mean just directly about wage

and price "guidelines" which might be

How is that for an idea?

A. Well I think rigid guidelines are

a mistake. If we said, for instance, that

no price incrcase or no wage increase

could exceed 6 percent this would be

to my own philosophy of Government

and I think that because of the diversi-

ty of our society and the fact that it

is a free enterprise system, you've got

But I'd prefer to deal with these

So I thirk that we all ought to take

a position in our own

among our friends and allies, among

our potential adversaries, that human

rights is something on which we should

bear a major responsibility for leader.

ship. And I have made it clear to the

Soviet Union and to others in the East-

ern European community that I'm not

trying to launch a unilateral criticism

of them that i'm trying to set a stand-

ard in our own country and make my

throughout

world, not singled out against any par-

ticular country.

Q. Mr. President, the other day, get-

ting back to this C.I.A. thing,

that story broke your Press Secretary:

when he issued what amounted lo a

"no comment" by the White House,

someone asked him if this story had

broken back during the campaign when

you were running for Presiden,

you have given a similar response? And

said "well I don't' know." So can

I ask you, what would have beer you

same? A. I don't know.

7. Review of C.I.A. Activities

Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-

earlier that you review

of C.I.A. activities had found nothing

illegal or improper and you later said

that these activities are legitimate and

proper. Isn't that a value judgment that

American public

might like to

share? But how can they if yo refus?

to give them any idea of wiat you

have discovered during this

about payments, including ones made

A. That is a value judgment. It's made

by the independent Intelligence Over-

sight Board,

which was established and

beard has made itself available to the

Inspector Guneral and to any employce

within the C.I.A. or within the defense

intelligence agencies or any other to

rumors of impropriety.

They have assessed these operations.

They made their inquiries in the past,

which is in accordance with an execu-

tive order issued by President Ford to

States and also to the President.

I have read that .correspond.are. It's

quite voluminous and I think that il's

accurate to say that Senator Inouye's

committee in the Senate and the appro-

also received this information in the

I have talked to Senator Inouye and

prices on an individual bases and I also

he confirms what l've just Inld you.

prefer, of course, to work harmoniously. And I think he would also contrin that

PARES

BOTTON

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## Page 186

13-00000

pAAS

ToP

CHURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1977

ference on Foreign and Domestic Matters

But I will work with Congress on

was a waste. You also promised to cit?

the deregulation of natural gas as a

the waste out of the defense budget!

part of an overall energy policy. By.

April 20 I think we'll be prepared to

production of the B-l as opposed to

present to you,

the news media, and

research and development on the B-1?

the people

and the Congress

more

A. I think I cut out about more than

specific

proposals

involving

direct

$200 million from the B-1 program-In:

legislation proposals that wil

answer

the budget just submitted to the Con-!

your question more fully.

gress. I have serious questions about

13. Energy Program Sacrifices

in the future the center of our airborne.

Q. Mr. President, we've been told that

defense capability.

the central thrust of your new energy

I have several more months before i

program

• will involve sacrifice

and

I have to make a decision on that mat..

voluntary: conservation, yet the public's

ter and the National Security Councily,

always reading stories in the paper of

which combines, as you know, Stale,:'

how the major oil companies are with-

Treasury, Defense and other elements y

holding natural gas. So I'd like to ask

of the Government, working very close.:

how are you going to expect the public

ly with me, is now making a complete :

to make

sacrifices when

there's such

reassessment of the need

widespread public suspicion about the

role of the oil companies in the energy

A. I think the comprehensive nature

of the proposal that takes in all these

very disparate and sometimes conflict-

ing elements at one time and a long-

range projection of our needs and a

tangible demonstration to the Ameri

can people, to the extent that I'm able

to put it forward, that there will be

direct ultimate benefits to them will

be the elements that will cause them

to make those sacrifices. At the same

The New York Times/Teresa Zabala

cutive Office Buiding in Washington

f the impropriety or the illegality does

not exist on any ongoing C.I.A. opera-

tion.

time, I want to increase the surety that

we have that the reserve supply data

I don't know whether we will decide:

to go on with it or not. And I donti

know whether we'll expedite produce

tion of it or not, at this time.

•1:.

Part of the factor to be assessed is.

the attitude of the Soviet Union: If wer

can have a general lessening of tension,,

a demonstrated commitment on their

part toward disarmament, it would cer.-

tainly make it less likely that we would

go ahead with the B-1.

But I can't answer that question untif

I complete my own study, and I think

that would have to be terminated by

given to us by the oil companies and

others are accurate.

We are now conducting some admit-

edly. supertical studies by Secretacy

8. Problems With Congress

Q. Mr. President, Charles Kirbo, your

friend Charles Kirbo seems to feel that

you're going to be having a continuing

problem with the Congress and that

you'll have to go over Congress's head

to the people in order to get results.

A. I think if you read the whole

statement that Mr. Kirbo made, which

• is just a private citizen's opinion, he

would say that every President has had

arguments and debates and disagree-

ments. with the Congress. And I think

that's inevitable in our system of Gov-

ernment. That's part of the checks and

balances that's very precious to us all.

I have found up to now a growing

sense of cooperation with the Congress.

I think last week when I was asked

same question that the

troubles were perhaps underestimated

Cecil Andrus in Interior and

be followed up by more detailed studies

under Dr. Schlesinger, to see whether

or not the reserve supplies are ade-

quate and whether or not the oil com-

panies are giving us accurate data. I

think it's obvious to all of us that there

are some instances where natural gas

withheld from the market.

understandable. If I was running an

oil company I would reserve the right

to release or to reserve some supplies

of natural gas.

With the emergency legislation that

the Congress did pass, I think in about

a week of assessment during the frigid

part of the winter-it's still very cold-

we were given some authority to buy

at a very high price. This

is obviously a transcient circumstance.

But 1 believe the American people

required, if they are convinced that fu-

ture reports will be accurate, that sup-

haps the troubles with the Congress

are overestimated. I have frequent

meetings with the Congressional lead-

l ers both Democratic. and Republican.

And I think that the progress of the

legislation that we consider to be cru-

cial which seemed to be moving very

slowly in the past is now speeding up

So I don't believe that we'll have

nearly the problems with the Congress

that has been the case in recent years.

And I have to say in summary that

Iam very pleased with my relationship

with the Congress now.

9. The Election Process

Q. Mr. President, in view of your

assignment to Vice President Mondale

regarding the election laws, could you

give us your view, sir, on the direct

plies will not be withheld from the mar-

ket and if we can let the oil companies

know in a predictable way what our

policy will be two months or two years

or 20 years in the future-within the

bounds of human reason—then I think

they'll be much less likely to withhold

supplies of oil and natural. gas

the market just hoping that they'll get

sonte bonanza increased price in the

future if the policies do change.

14. Rise in Gasoline Tax

@. Another question, sir, on the sacri-

fices that you say your upcoming ener-

gy program is going to demand.

• Is it

likely

that one of those sacrifices. is

going to come in the form of a largely

increased Federal gasoline tax?

A. I don't know how to answer vour

18. Campaign Financing Law..;

Q. Mr. President, I was a little unclear

about what you're going to propose:

in the campaign finance law. Are you

saying that you will propose to have

all Congressional elections publicly fi-

nanced? A. That's my preferenge, yes.

Q. Is that what you will propose to

Congress? A. The Vice President is now.

doing a study on a complete election

law package. And I'd like to reserve

my own judgment until I see what his

report is to me. But that's my own

inclination, It's a position that I took

during the campaign and so far, I have

no reason to change my mind.

19. Foreign Policy Turntable

Q. You gave us a kind of a timetable®

for your domestic program in your pre-

liminary

statement.

wonder if you

have a similar timetable of what you

hope to achieve in foreign policy be-

tween now

and the end of the year,

such as Middle East peace, Cyprus, the

treaty with Panama.

A.

Of course I can't answer that

question specifically

because I don't

know what cooperation

we will get

from other nations and I don't know.

what the inclination of those

nations

in disputed regions of the world want

to do toward one another.

Secretary Cyrus Vance has just, res

turned from what I consider to be a

very successful trip to the Middle East.

He not only probed with the heads of

those Governments and their Cabinet.

members their own positions, both pub+.

lic and private on the controversial,

issues that have so far prevented a

peace in the Middle East. He also had

a chance to

compare their positions

on issues-which ones they found to.

be in harmony, which ones there was

---

## Page 187

13-00000

And I have to say in summary that

I am very pleased with my relationship

with the Congress now.

9. The Election Process

Mr. President, in

assignment to Vice President Mondale

regarding the election laws, could you

give us your view, sir, on the direct

election of a President versus the Elec-

And also do you think

•that the public financing should be ex-

tended to Congress as will as the Presi-

three basic questions

that come up. In the first place, I do

at least an automatic vote by

Presidential electors once the general

election is completed. I think the Elec-

for instance, should be

eliminated.

ought to be changed

I'm not prepared to comment on now.

sional elections by public funds- it has

proved to

be

successful, I believe, in

the

Presidential

election.

I strongly

favor that, yes. And the other element

of the overall package would be a sim-

ple way. for American people. who are

citizens and 18 years old

to register

to vote.

committed to

proposition and the Vice President has

graciously consented to take on

overall election process responsibility.

Those three will be basic elements of

'the proposals.

10. Relations With Cuba

President, are you, prepared

to lift the trade embargo 'against Cuba

as one step toward normalizing

A, I think any substantial move in

our relationship with Cuba would have

to await further discussions with them

indirectly, and also some tangible evi-

dence on our part that they are willing

to restore basic human rights in Cuba,

involving the number of prisoners who

are being held,

their attitude toward

overseas adventures such as the one

In Angola, and other matters. So I can't

say what might come in the future.

though, to discuss these

mattess with the Cuban leaders. At this

lime we have no direct relationships

with them, political. But through inter-

changed back and forth.

comments are in public statements like

this, but we do have messages coming

back from people who visit Cuba.

11. Defense Savings Goal

Q. In answer to an

Mr. President, you said that you could-

whether next year's

budget will be lower or higher than

this year's. But as I understood your

earlier postion, you did want to achieve

a five to seven billion dollar savings

regardless of the overall level of spend-

Do you still hold with that figure?

Is that still your goal and a commit-

1 A. Yes. The analyses that I've made

if the defense budget so far-which

is you know has been limited to about

month's study just part-time-indi-

ate

that that's a goal that will be

feached.

12. Natural Gas Deregulation

Q. Mr. President,

in letters to the

of Oklahoma,

Louisiana last October, you said uncon-

litionally that you would work with

Congress to deregulate new natural

gas. And I wondered 'if you planned

lo keep that promise, and if so how

amuse de-lo-practs u0 crosser

14. Rise in Gasolipe Tax

• Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-

fices that you say your upcoming ener-

sy progran is going to demand. Is It

ikely that one of those sacrifices is

zoing to come in the form of a largely

increased Federal gasoline tax:

A. I don't know how to answer your

questions about specifics of the propos-

al. I want to make this clear. The pur

pose of the

energy policy evolution

is not to cause

sacrifice or hardship

among the American people.Unless

can demonstrate that in balance the

temporary sacrifices in a certain area

are far overcome by immediate and ul-

timate benefits then nobody's going to

buy it.

And I believe that we've now got

such a horrible conglomeratloniof con-

fusion in the energy field that nobody

kharee what's

goine to. heppen next.

So I think that the sacrifices will be

far overcome by the benefits that the

American people sill be easily able to

discern for themsel. 's.

15. U.S. Ro! on Canada

Q. You said that in spite of the fact

that the. Canadian eople would have

to determine their future for them-

selves, particularly in regard to the

separatism issue in Quebec that you

had confidence that the issue would

be straightened out relatively peaceful-

ly. Do you really think that there is

little concern in this country about the

future of a unified Canada and is there

anything really that we can do about

A. There's a great deal of concern

in this country

about the future of

Canada and I have complete confi-

dence, as I said in an interview with

the Canadian news media in the sound

judgment of the Canadian people.

I'm familiar-and even more familiar

• today than I was two days ago after

Prime Minister Trudeau's visit--with

the problems in Quebec and the inclina-

tion of some of the French Canadians

to have an independent status from the

rest of Canadian Provinces.

I don't know what's going to be the

ultimate outcome. But I believe that

we are so closely tied together with

Canada on a mutually beneficial basis,

sharing problems, sharing opportuni-

ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur-

ing companies that have joint owner-

our exchange of energy sources,

our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-

way, the Great Lakes as far as water

pollution is concerned, the bringing of

• Alaskan oil and natural gas down to

us that we have got to have a continu-

•ing relationship with Canada.

My own personal preference would

be that the commonwealth stay as it

is and that there not be a separate

Quebec province. But that's a decision

for the Canadians to make and I would

certainly make no private or public

move to try to determine the outcome

of that great debate.

16. Keeping Campaign Promises

Q. Mr. President, you've had a month

now to enjoy the view from the Oval

Office. Do you think you'll be able to

keep fully all the campaign promises

you made?

A. As you know, we have issued what

I believe is the complete book of my

campaign. promises, which is, I pre-

sume,

being made available to all of

you.

My determination is to keep all

those promises.

Obviously if circumstances should

change I would have to reserve the

May surcessiul trip to the Micuit

He hours creed with the heads: of

those Governments and their Cabinct

members their own positions, both puber

lic and private on the controversial

that have so far prevented as

peace in the Middic East. He also had

a chance to compare their positiong

on issues-which ones they found ta.

be in harmony, which, ones there was

We also invited the leaders of all.

those nations to meet with me. They

have ali accepted ad l wil be rocüng

with the heads of the nations in dispute.

in the Middle East, all of them, before

the end of May. The first visit of one

of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin. I.

March 12. And he will be fol.

lowed by the leaders from Egypt, from

Jordan and from Syria,

Arabia-and I look forward to meeting

At that doint I hope I will have. a

very clear picture: nf what

American Government ought to play

The same thing applies to the situa

tion that exists between ourselves.and

Turkey, ourselves and Greece,..our-

selves and Cyprus

We can't impose nur will on other

people. But if they honestly want to

seek a solution, we are perfectly will-

ing to offer our good offices as a coun.!

try with influence and interest to help

them resolve their own differences. But

it's got to be done primarily by those

countries involved.

We have begun again, and within

the last week, our discussions on the

extremely good negotiators and T'hope

that we will have success there: There's.

no way that I can say at this point

what degree of progress we have made.

It's just beginning.

So throughout the areas of high dis-

pute, including South Africa and others

that I don't have time to mention we're.

probing as best we can to discern some

possibility of resolution of those ten-

We are meeting today, in fact all

this week with the British, to try to

get a renewed proposal to make con-

cerning the question surrounding Rho-.

desia. And then, of course,

have left Nambia and ultimately ma•

jority rule question in South Africa.

But I've only been in office a month.

I don't claim to know all the easy an-

swers. And these questions that have

are not going to be easy to solve.: But

weite going to do the best we can oper

ly and forcefully offering our good

services, not trying to impose our will

on other people.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Carter Errs on Rabin

And U.S.-Uganda Ties

WASHINGTON, Feb, 23 (AP)-Presi-

dent Carter made two errors in. his

news

conference

today,

which the

White House staff later corrected.

Mr.' Carter used

a wrong date. for

the forthcoming visit to

the United

States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

of Israel.

The President said

that he

thought the visit would take place

March 12.

The White House later corrected that

to say "the proposed visit is tentatively

planned for March 7 and 8."

The White House also corrected the

President's statement that the United

States does not have diplomatic rela:

tions with Uganda.

"This is not strictly accurate,". the

---

## Page 188

13m@@00@.ungress as winds une racist-

incy?

A. There are three basic questions

lat come up. In the first place, I do

ivot at least an automatic vote by

residential electors once the general

ection is completed. I think the Diec-

oral Colllege,

for instance, should be

iminated. Whether

the ratio among

ates of votes ought to be changed

m not prepared to comnient on now.

ine intencing or congres-

onal elections by public funds-it has

roved to

be

successful, I believe;

in

le Presidential election.

I strongly

ivor that, yes. And the other element

• the overall package would be a sim-

le way. for American people who are

tizens and 18 years old to register

, vote. And I am committed to that

oposition and the Vice President has

raciously

consented to take on

this

verall election process responsibility.

hose three will be basic elements of

le proposals.

10. Relations With Cuba

Q. Mr. President, are you prepared

• lift the trade embargo against Cuba

i one step toward normalizing rela-

ons?

A, I think any substantial move in

or relationship with Cuba would have

• await further discussions with them

directly, and also some tangible evi-

ence on our part that they are willing

• restore basic human rights in Cuba,

volving the number of prisoners who

e being held, their attitude toward

/erseas adventures such as the one

Angola, and other matters. So I can't

y. what

might come in

the future.

I'm willing,

though, to discuss these

atters with the Cuban leaders. At this

me we have no direct relationships

ith them, political. But through inter-

ediaries

comments

are

being

ex-

langed back and forth. Most of my

imments are in public statements like

is, but we do have messages coming

ick from people who visit Criba.

11. Defense Savings Goal

Q. In answer to an earlier question,

r. President, you said that you could-

t say whether nest year's defense

idget will be lower or higher than

But as I understood your

irlier postion, you did want to achieve

seven dillion dollar savings

gardless of the overall level of spend-

g. Do you still hold with that figure?

that still your goal and a commit-

A. Yes. The analyses that I've made

the defense budget so far-which

; you know has been limited to about

month's study just part-time-indi-

ite that that's a goal that will be

ached.

12. Natural Gas Deregulation

Q. Mr. President, in letters to the

overnors of Okiahoma,

Texas and

Juisiana last October, you said uncon-

tionally

that you would

work with

ongress to deregulate new natural

as. And I wondered "if you planned

• keep that promise, and if so how

Ju will go about it?

A. I don't know how l'll go about

I do try to keep my promises.

The

osition that I have taken,

and the

osition. that the governors of Oklaho-

a and Texas took at governors con-

1o five

cars, to see how it works out, leaving

«sting contracts in effect.

is not to cause

sacrifice or hardship

among the American people.Unless

can demonstrate that in balance the

temporary sacrifices in a certain area

are far overcome by immediate and ul-

timate benefits then nobody's going to

buy it.

"And I believe that we've

now got

such a horrible conglomeratloniof.con:

fusion in the energy field that nobody

whate going to heppen bout.

So I think that the sacrifices will be

far overcome by the benefits that the

American-people.mill be eastly-able.to

discern for themsel:.'s

15. U:S. Ro! on Canada

Q. You said that in spite of the fact

that the. Canadian eople would have

to determine their future for them-

selves, particularly in regard to the

separatism issue in Quebec that you

had confidence that the issue would

be straightened out relatively peaceful-

ly. Do you really think that there is

little concern in this country about the

future of a unified Canada and is there

anything really: that we can do about

A. There's a great deal of concern

in this country

about the future

Canada and I have complete confi-

dence, as I said in an interview with

the Canadian news media in the sound

judgment of the Canadian people.

I'm familiar-and even more famillar

• today than I was two days ago after

Prime Minister Trudeau's visit--with

the problems in Quebec and the inclina-

tion of some of the French Canadians

to have an independent status from the

rest of Canadian Provinces.

I don't know what's going to be the

ultimate outcome. But I believe that

we are so closely tied together with

Canada on a mutually beneficial basis,

ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur-

ing companies that have joint owner-

ship, our exchange of energy sources,

our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-

way, the Great Lakes as far as water

pollution is concerned, the bringing of

Alaskan oil and natural gas down to

us that we have got to have a continu-

ing relationship with Canada.

My own personal preference would

be that the commonwealth stay as it

is and that there not be a separate

Quebec province. But that's a decision

for the Canadians to make and I would

certainly make no private or public

move to try to determine the outcome

of that great debate.

16. Keeping Campaign Promises

Q. Mr. President, you've had a month

now to enjoy the view from the Oval

Office. Do you think you'll be able to

keep fully all the campaign promises

you made?

A. As you know, we have issued what

I believe is the complete book of my

campaign promises, which is, I pre-

being made available to all of

you. My determination is to keep all

those promises.

Obviously if circumstances should

change I would have to reserve the

right to go back to the American people

and say "now that circumstances have

changed this a better approach to that

particular problem." But I will do my

utmost to keep all the campaign prom-

ises that I made to the American peo-

ple:

17. Production of B-1

Q. Mr. President, you said at various

times during the campaign that the B-1

have ali accepted tid I will be riceting

with the heads of the nations in dispute.

in the Middle East, all of them, before

the end of May. The first visit of one

of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin

believe, March 12. And he will be fol-

lowed by the leaders from Egypt,.from

Jordan and from

Syria,

from Saudia

'Arabia-and I look forward to meeting

At that point I hope I will have. a

American Government ought to play

The same thing applies. to the situa-

tion that exists between ourselves. and

ourselves. and Greece,.our

We can't impose our will an other

people. But if they honestly want to

seek a solution, we are perfectly will

ing to offer our good offices as a couns!

try with influence and interest to helpi

them resolve their own differences. But

it's got to be done primarily by those

We have begun

again, and within

the last week, our discussions on the

Panama Canal Treaty. We have two!

extremely good negotiators and I hope

that we will have success there. There's,

no way that I can say at this point !

what degree of progress we have made.

Fas just beginning.

So throughout the areas of high dis

pute, including South Africa and others

that I don't have time to mention we're

probing as best we can to discern some

possibility of resolution of those ten-!

today, in fact all!

this week with the British,

get a renewed proposal to make con-

cerning the question surrounding Rho-.

And then, of course, we'll still

have left Nambia and ultimately ma

jority rule question in South

But I've only been in office a month. i

I don't ciaim to know all the easy aris

swers. And these questions that have

are not going to be easy to solve. But

weite going to do the best we can oper.

services, not trying to impose our will

on other people.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Carter Errs on Rabin

And U.S.-Uganda Ties

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)- Presi-

dent Carter made two errors in his.

news

conference

today,

which, the

White House staff later corrected.

the forthcoming visit to

he roace u vat to the thied:

States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,

of Israel. The President said that he ,

thought the visit would take place!

March 12.

The White House later corrected that

to say "the proposed visit is tentatively.

planned for March 7 and 8."

The White House also corrected the

Presidents statement that the United

States does not have diplomatic rela-:

tions with Uganda.

"This is not strictly accurate,"' the

correction said, explaining:

"While

the United States has with.

drawn its mission from Uganda and..

has no direct diplomatic representation

there,

United States affairs

in

the

Republic of Uganda are carried put.:

through the West German embassy and

the Republic of Uganda has an operal-

ing embassy, and charge d'affaires in

Washington.

pAgE 3

BOTTOM

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## Page 189

13-00000

• WASHINGTON POST

CIA Admits

Working to

Raise Sub

By Timothy S. Robinson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency

has

For example, Gesell was forced to

finally

acknowledged

publicly

issue a secret opinion in the case last.

that it was "involved" in the Glomar

October that even the attorneys in-

Explorer's attempts to raise a sunken :

volved still have not been able to

read. The opinion was issued in that

Russian submarine from the Pacific

secret fashion upon direct orders of

Ocean floor:

the U.S. Court of Appeals, which in-

The terse acknowledgement came in

structed Gesell to accept secret affi-

a court document filed in the U.S.

davits from high-level government of-

Court of Appeals by the Justice De

ficials concerning the case.

Public affidavits filed at the time by

partment two weeks ago. The docu-

former President Ford's top national

ment asked that a suit against the

security adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scow-

CIA by a private group concerning

croft, said disclosures of the CIA in-

the Glomar's financing be sent back

volvement of other details about the

project might prompt other nations

to a lower court for further hearings.

offended by the project to retaliate

The filing marks an abrupt change

against the United States.

from the previous position taken by

• Scowcroft

said that

the Justice Department in the

retaliation

18-

month-old case that the mere acknowl-

might take the form of "strong meas.

edgement of the CIA's involvement in

ures" that might "endanger U.S mili--

tary

and diplomatic

the project would be harmful to na-

businessmen overseas „Personnel

and

• tional security. Although the CIA's

operation of the project has been re-

The federal government had previ-

ported in numerous publications, the

ously acknowledged only that the ship

agency has been adamant in its re-

was part of a 1969 classified .U.S. gov-

fusal to say publicly whether those re-

ernment project "to accomplish cer-

ports were true.

tain secret tasks in furtherance of na-

The case brought by the nonprofit

tional security objectives."

Military Audit Project, which moni-

tors spending by the defense and in-

telligence establishments, has in-

volved an unprecedented amount of

secret court proceedings as the CIA

attempted to prove the need for sec

recy to U.S. District Court Judge Ger-

hard A. Gesell. The suit seeks the fi-

nancial details of the Glomar project.

board

the

!

There

uma

W. File Marchetti

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