Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: SWENSON, HAROLD
Document date: 5/10/76
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10014-10048

Date :

08/04/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10048

RECORDS SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

.

07-H-06

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

SWENSON, HAROLD

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

05/10/76

: AMLASH

CIA

CASTRO, FIDEL

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

MEXICO CITY

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: 1A, 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS :

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/02/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

: Box 2

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

50955

DocId: 32423436

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Vol: 1: 0P 35,

Whe Anird Statra Bruate

ATION

sa. Subject

R3022

Report of Proceedinge

EG

Hearing heid before

Senate Select Cormittes to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Monday, May 10, 1976

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

3017 WILSON BOULEVARD

ARLINGTON, VA 22201

(703) 841-0800

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Phone (Area 202)

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WARO & FAUL

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110 Firsi Strees, S.E. WashonatoM, D.C. 30003

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CONTENT'S

4

IBSTIMONY OF :

Harold Swenson

_-accompanied by-

Robert D. Peloguin

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so..

WARD & FAUL

110 8 19 591001, 5.6., Wastington, D.C. 2000.3

mOne (9123 202) 548-8

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

2

Monday, May 10, 1976

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmenta

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. ü.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 o'clock

a.m., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms Hotel the Honorable

Richard 5. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Jim Johnston, Michael Epstein and Paul

Wallach, Professional Staff Members.

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PROna (Arta 202) 51

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PROSEEDINES

Senator Schweiker. All right, Mr. Swenson, we swear in

all of our witnesses, if you would rise and raise your right

hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you're about to give

is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

so help you God?

Mr. Swenson. I do.

Senator Schweiker.

Be

seated.

Ma. Johnston. Mr.

Swenson,

would

you

state your

name in!

addross?

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Mone (Aros 202).

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IESTIMONY OF HAROLD SWENSON

ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT D. PELOQUIN

Mr. Swenson. Harold Swenson. My home address is 5005

Edgenore Lane, Bethesda, Maryland.

Mr. Johnston. And you are accompanied by counsel this

morning, is that correct?

MI. Swenson. That's correct.

MI. Johnston. I would ask counsel to identify hinself

for the record.

Mr. Peloguin. Robert D. Peloguin, 1707 H Street, N.W.

Mi. Johnston. Let me state for the record that I called

Seynour Bolten at the Agency this morning

and stated that you

were going to represent Mr. Swenson, and he stated that that

was acceptable to the Agency.

Mr. Peloquin. I am proud to hear that.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Swenson, you are appearing here

voluntarily today. Do you understand that you have all of you

constitutional rights vefore this Committee?

Mr. Sivenson.

I do.

1a. Johnston. And

your attorney may be consulied at ay

time.

Mr. Sivenson. Thank you.

Mr, Johnston, Mould you stace the dates

and

position

you occupied in the Speciai Affairs Staft

Of CIA?

Me. Swenson. I joined the Staff at the time it was know.:

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pang

WARD A PAUL

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as the task force at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba,

and I continued with the task force, which later became known

as SAS, up to 1965, within the United States as Chief of

Counterintelligence. My first job was Assistant to the

Director of the Task Force for the crisis in Cuba, the missile

crisis. I then became Chief of Counterintelligence.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall exactly when you became Chief

of Counterintelligence?

MI. Swenson. I really can't.

Mr. Johnston, Can you recall the month that you left?

MI. Swenson. Well, let me say that when I was assigned

abroad I continued to have a relationship with

that staft. M

was during a period of

assignment in Ecrope, so I really

continued in a way to have a relationship with the Staff unti!

I retired from the Agency in 1968.

Yes, 1958.

Mr. Johnston. President Kennedy was assassinated on

rovember 22nd, 1963, and I take it you were-Chief-of-countera

intelligence_for-the-Special-nEfairs-Staff-at-that-ting

L=SwensouTI-vas=3

dir. Johnston. And that was the scaff that was responsei:

for cuban matters, is thus correct?

Mr. Swenson. That

is correct.

Mr. Johaston. Mho rose you rusponsible to?

MI. Swenson. I believe at that time

Harvey had been

replaced by Des Fitzgerald, i believe. Des Fitzgerald was thu

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chief of SAS at that time..?.9s

Mr. Johnston. And you were responsible directly to him.

Mr. Swenson. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the fact that shortly

after the asgassination of President Kennedy, the CIA initiated

an investigation into the Assassination?

MI. Swenson. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall who was in charge of that

investigation?

Mr. Swenson. No, I do not.

I assume it would have been the CI Staff.

Mr. Johnston.

Speaking

of the C1 Stuff, wao was in

charge of the CI Staff?

Mr. Swenson. Jin Angleton.

Mr. Johnston. And what was your

responsibility to Mr.

Angleton?

Mr. Swenson. Well, there was a common interest in

counterintelligence matters, and if southing came up which

required consultation, I would consult with that staff.

Mr. Johnston. wore you subordinase to Mr. Angleton?

Hi, Swenson. Not really, no.

Hir. Johnston.

Whas was the relacionship between SAS

counterintelligencu and ene Counterihcelligence state at emo

Agency?

tir. Swenson, Well, the SAS Counterintelligence Staff

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was sort of a microcosm of the Agency with emphasis on Cuban

matters, Cuban intelligence service especially.

Me. Johnston. What was the size of the Counterintelligence

Staff within SAS?

Mr. Swenson. I suppose I had perhaps 30 people.

Mr. Johnston. At headguarters, is that correct?

Mr. Swenson. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Going back now to the assassination of

President Kennedy, were you aware of the fact that a special

investigation was initiated shortly after the assassination sha

was not located in Mr Angleton's bailiwick?

No. Swenson. I knew that there was a special investiga.

but I had nothing to do with it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know Mr. Jack Whitten, or

, John Whitten?

Mr. Swenson. Yes, I knew him.

Mr, Johnston. Die you know him as being in charge of tir

Investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

M2. Swenson. I don't recall shut.

di, Joinston. Did you ever contact Ma. whisten about di.

rennedy assassination?

ir. Swcnson. I did nor.

re. doinston. Here you personally dare of any intow::

about Lee Harvey Oswald before the assassination?

Mr. swenson, lo the best of my recollection, it's ratr." :

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hard for me to place before and after, his name appeared as

having paid a visit to a Cuban or Soviet embassy in Mexico

City, and that's about the only knowledge that I had.

Mr. Johnston. And you have a recollection of knowing that

before the assassination?

MI. Swenson. Now, I cannot remember that it was before.

This is what I am unsure about.

Mr. Johnston. All right.

Mr. Swenson. Normally a great deal of information went

past the desk. I delegated screening

of voluminous materials

which came in to various people who worked for me, and they

would call to my attention thinys which appeared significant

and then I would look into those. But really, as far

as the

assassination of President Kennody is concerned, I an afraid

I don't have anything to contribute. I don't know anything

which didn't appear in the press, really.

Senator Schweiker. You were

never

asked to concuct any

investigation separately or specially or apart from that --

Mr. Swenson. No, Senator. The only request which was

levied on me with reguid to the assassination, as 1 can recail.

was to find whether the FBi hud given to my staff any informa:

which was relevant, and i caused a scaren of our

records to li

made, and I believe there hau been sone nomorandum wich was

relevant, which had then been passed on is Jim Angleton's

CI Staff, and I paseed on that information, and I think tha:

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C.:

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was

the full extent of it.

Mr. Johnston. Had that information been passed on to the

CI Staff prior to the assassination?

Mr. Swenson.

Yes.

Mr. Johnston, The routing on it, which I assume we are

talking about the same thing, was the report of FBI agent

Kaak on Oswald's activities in New Orleans.

Mr. Swenson. That was probably it, yes. As I say, I have

a very vague recollection of it.

Mr. Johnston. And that routing sheet on that meno indicams

it went to the CI Staff on November 22nd.

Is it your recollection that it went there before the

assassination?

Mx. Swenson. I really can't recall. I am sorry. All i

know is that McCone wanted to know had anything come in, I

caused a search to be made. Normally Sam Papich, who was the

Bureau liaison officer who came to my office every working

day, would

see one of the people working for me, now deceased,

Austin Horn, and we would vass to the burcau any information

which appeared pertinent to the Bureau purposes, and we woul

receive from the

Bureau anything which they considered appro

priate for us.

so that che menorandum, as I recall, which came in, i ta

never seen, but it had been receivod by the office and passed

on in due course.

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Phone (Area

WARO =

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Mr. Johnston. What role did the sAs staff itsell play

in connection with the investigation of President Kennedy's

assassination?

MI. Swenson. Directly, none.

Mr. Johnston. Did you advise either Mr. Whitten or MI.

Angleton about Cuban angles to it?

Mr. Swenson. Well, we … you know, I was very conscious

of all of the activities of Cuban intelligence.

Probably

I was better informed than any other one individual about

Cuban intelligence activities, and I knew and know of nothing

which made a contribution as far as the assassination was

concerned.

MI. Johnston. Were you consulted, though, by Mr. Anglecon

or Mr. Whitten?

Mr. Swenson.

No, I can't recall that I ever was, bur

I would have discussed anything probably with Des Fitzgerald.

As I say, I can't recall any specific discussion because I

had nothing to offer.

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever pass on any informia.

co che ClA investigation relating to CIA attempts or plous

assassinate Castro?

ir. Swenson. senator, lould you mind repeating that:

sure that I follow you.

Senator Schweiker. During the course of the investi

Mr. Swenson. Of kennedy's investigation?

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MOnA LAras 202) 54

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senatos Schwelker. Right.

Did you ever pass on any information relative to plots

ayainst Fidel Castro's life by lask Force ₩ or SAS or any

other?

Mr. Swenson. No, I did not pass on any such reports.

Senator Schweiker. Why did you not?

In other words, wouldn't that have been very relevant to

the investigation?

MI. Swenson. I had nothing to do with any such plots

against Castro, Senator.

ir. Jonnston. Were you knowledgeable of them at the

tinie?

ist. swenson. I cannot recall now whether my knowledge in

there were such plots was before or

after. I would just liic

to say I heartily disapproved of it, 1 thought it was a lou

oi nonsense, and my position on that was very clear, and 1

don't think people yenerally talked to me about it because

01.

the way I felt.

Mr. Epstein.

You said balore or after. Before coun

what?

Fir. Swensor, belore or after the connedy assassinatio...

1: other words, I can'e recail that I inew that these

han ween clots

arios do caas time, di mether i knew of 1:?.

subsequent to that time. dy own stair was not involved:.

nay, and the only knorledge that came to ne about it sas :.

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staff meetinge and concerned people who mighthhave been

involved. And I thought, as I said, it's a lot of nonsenso.

Senator Schweiker. Were you either asked by Des Fitzgerald

or the Director of CIA not to discuss or pass on information

relating to plots to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not, no.

Senator Schweiker. Or anyone else?

Mr. Swenson. By no one.

Mr. Johnston. What discussions did you have with Mr.

Fitzgerald about the Kennedy assassination, and especially abort

your expertise on Cuban matters?

Mr. Swenson, To the best of my knowledge, there was

never any discussion with bes about Cuba, participation in a

plot against President Kennedy's life because it never appeared

pertinent.

MI. Johnston. Let me ask you why you don't feel

it was

pertinent, and let us just take as a basis for that question

tact that Oswald was associated with the FPCO, and

in tha:

capacity, clained to be pro-castro, and the fact that ie

visited the Cuban consulate in mexico City to attempt to

a visa to Cuba shortly before the assassination.

or. Slienson.

I don't think that the evidunce which i

suh, any hard information nich no hac, indicated that Usia.

Wis

anyaning but a nut, perhaps a dangerous

nut. ic simply

nad no information to indicate that he was

part of a Cuban

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intelligence organization or had any real connection with them.

I might add that I did talk to many people, Cubans, who

were knowledgeable about intelligence activities, Cuban intelli+

gence officers, defectors, and I got never a single bit of

information indicating that there was any association whatsoever.

Senator Schweiker.

But when he went to visit the Russian

embassy in Cuba, it was known at the time through the intelligence

agencies that he was with Kostikov, who was also known to be

a member of Department 13, which was assassination, was it nou?|

Mr. Swenson. I did not know it it the time, and this is

the first l've heard of that, Sanator.

Senator Schweiker. You did not know that?

Mr. Swenson. No, I did not.

Senator Schweiker.

Thut he visited with Kostikov or that

Rostikov nas

a member of Department 13?

ir. Swenson. I did not know either. I did have within

my own group some people wio were soviet experts, and we

kept taos on Soviets

who were in Cuba. I did a great

deal of

research about their activities, bur what you have just

nontloned, Senator, never

cane to my dicention.

Senator

Schweiker. As part of your job, which groups dis

you work with of the Cuban exiic groups specifically? In

osiel ivores, at one -

ar. Swenson. 1 did not work iith ung of thei, Senator.

Senator Schweiker. Nell, then, which ones would

you be

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PhOne (Ares 202) 58

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monitoring as Chief of cis

Certainly you would be monitoring

some of them as Chief of CI or getting Intelligence back as

Chief of CI.

Mr. Swenson. Primarily I fargeted our duties against the

Cuban Intelligence Service. I did not deal with the Cuban

groups. That fell within other jurisdictions.

Senator Schweiker. In dealing with the Cuban Intelligence

Service, weren't some of these people bound to be included in

some of these Cuban exile groups?

Mr. Swenson. Let me put it this way. I did not monitor

groups as such.

Senator Schweiker.

Right.

Mr. Swenson, I did monitor individuals so that if a

nane which had any relationship with the perations of Cuban

intelligence surfaced, I would look into that very closely.

I cannot recall a single name that surfaced which related to

the Kennedy assassination or

any information which

+ ever

gos

any time which

related to the

Kennedy assassination.

Senator Schweiker. Do you specifically recall where sc.:

o1 jour contacts were located that you vert monitoring? me::

they in, for exampie, the bRe groups of the Alpha 6ú yrote, ci

for example, where were

some of the contacts that you were

monitoring?

Mi. Swenson. I was not monitoring cuntacts within tho

groups. If a nane

surfaced, regardless of what group he no.:.

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be in, and he was within the United States, for example, and

I felt that there was some reason to be concerned from a

counterintelligence standpoint, I usually would interview him

myself. I would interview him at great length. Some of these:

were, let's say, people who were singletons. They were not

associated with any group.

The only group I can think of offhand was the AMCANOE

group which I was concerned about, the penetration --

Senator Schweiker. What was that?

Mr. Swenson. AMCANOE. It was a cryptonym. I don't kno:

it by any other name.

Senator Schweiker. Well,

it would seem to me, and mayhe

it is a matter of functional definition, that your Cuban

exiles group would be a fertile field for any intelligence

activity. This is where both the pro- and anti-Castro agents

were operating, where all of your activities would primarily

be, wouldn't they?

Mi. Swenson. Hot mine, no, Senator.

Senator Schweiker. In dealing with counterintelligence.

wouldn't you have to be dealing with peosle who would have a

or Cuba and

been working in chese exite groups, unless

I don'e understand the naturo .: your job, and maybe i don'.

wu, owenson, well, that's probably at, Senator! de ver:

highiy compartrentalized, and i saw iny sie in counterintel:..

gence as being focused prinarily on the opposite professionals.

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not as a groad

. ganged thing.

We had other staff, sir, other

components which focused primarily on othur aspects, let's

say, the non-professionals, the non-professionals.

Senator Schweiker. In other words, on Cuban intelligence

agents, per se, is that what you're talling me?

Mr. Swenson. Yes. If they were Cuban intelligence

agents, that was my jurisdiction.

Senator Schweiker. But what I'm getting at is wouldn'

a number of these be working undercover in the anti-Castro

exile groups? That would certainly be the logical cover thai

they wouid come into this country

oi.

Mi. Swenson. Senator, : las very alert to this. This

was pait of my job, so this was why I would have all of those

names and operational aliases where we knew then, searched

very carefully to see if they merited further attention, bui

I cannot recall anythiny relating to any one particular grou?

except the one which i was concerned about because it appara.

tnac that was --

senator schweiker. You are saying you did not realit i.

wiin groups per

se.

ir. Swenson, That is correc..

senator Schweiker. Hot about if you sound at agent that

yo: enought, a susgect planted in

one group. dor, he knor

¿ta vas querating certain oi these groups, Houln't you ic:.

gone to the case officer for that group to find out about ti

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person?

MI. Swenson. I would have gone to the other staffs, or

the

case officer or whoever was responsible, and yes, I would

have discussed that. If I had any doubts about it, I would

have expressed them very strongly and would probably have taken

other measures.

Senator Schweiket. During your tenure as Chief of CI, were

you ever alarmed or concerned about leaks from our side to

theirs and was part of your job to plug these leaks?

Mr. Swenson. Yes, I was concerned and took measures to

plug leaks where I suspected them.

Sonator

Schweiker. Did we have substantial leaks or normal

leaks, or how would you describe the kind of information fist:

back to Castro?

Mo. Swenson, It is very hara to say how substantial the

leaks were.

Let me yive you an example, Senator. ve nac operatio.s

targeted against Cava involving Cabans, resident in the Unir:

States, who were often very indiscrete, so that it a missio:

wore planned to land some oi nom on Cuba, ¿or example, "i

wouid sometimes pick up the telephone and they could call

friend, a relative in Cuba, and they thought thez were beat:

very discrete, I burpose, by canning about nopiny to see i.::

aunt or their grandrother or sonething like this, and red:

they weren't. Those calls were monitored by the Cuban

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intelligence service, and some of those people were arrested or

killed on landing. This was of great concern to me.

My role in this was simply the protective measure, to try

to determine who might be involved, and ingofar as people in the

United States were concerned who were suspected of being

Cuban intelligence agents, I would discuss that with Sam Papich

because I felt that the Bureau had a jurisdiction within the

continental United States.

Senator Schweiker. As part of your role, would you ever

infiltrate an American agent to act as d double agent to

find

what the leaks were? Was that part of your work, too?

Mr. Swenson.

Yes,

1 had had such an opportunity, i

would have taken it. I did not.

Senator Schweiker. You did not.

ME. Swenson.

I did not. I would have if a suitable

opportunity hd presented

itself:

Senator Schweikei. All right, go ahead.

Az. Johnston.

were

you avare of tao allegatione uf a ran

namod alvarado in Mexico city?

Does that name ring a boll?

tir. Swenson. Yeail, it is such a common hame.

Mi. Jonnston, Mith three days after the issassinatin..

no walked into the enasst, tac ü.S. enbassy in Maxico, and

was subseyuently in contace wich the Chiet of Station. Essen

tially he alleged that he saw money passed to Oswald in the

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Cuban embassy in Mexico City.

Were you aware of that fact?

Mr. Swenson. I can't recall it now. I am sorry.

Mr. Johnston, Wouldn't that fact, an analysis of that have

been in your jurisdiction?

Mr. Swenson. If that had come to my attention at the time,

we wouid have examined it very carefully, and I would say that

either it wag not taken seriously, or for some reason it didn't

get to my attention.

Mr. Johnston, Let me address the point of your taking i:

seriously.

No. Alvarado's allegations wer briefod to President

Johnson'at the time they were being made. Now, are you testi-

Eying that you were never consulted about the Alvarado

allegations?

Mr. Swenson. I do not recall them.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know about technical coverage on thi

Cuban consulate and Cuban embassy in ilexico City?

was that in your jurisdiction?

Mr. Swenson. #vowledgo of i: i did have. I= kas not

within my jurisdiction to operase, That was not my statt'

function.

2a. Johnston. What does technical coverage di an eimbn.::

or a consulate supposed tu do?

Mi. Swenson.

well, when you say technical coveraye,:

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course, that would include the use of -

Mr. Johnston. What is the purpose of it?

Mr. Swenson, Well, the purpose of it was to obtain

intelligence about hostile intentions.

Mr. Johnston. Were you ever asked whether any of Oswald's

contacts in Mexico City were DGI?

Mr. Swenson. I can't recall the specific question

directed to me on that score, but had I known of any DGI contacts

with Oswald, I would have discussed them.

Mr. Johnston. How would you have known who the contacts

were?

ilt. Swenson.

well, my role was really the Cuban intelli-

yence service, and we went to great lengths.to keep track of

Cuban intelligence officers, their contacts, and their

activities.

Mr. Johnston. How would you have known whose Oswald's

contacts were?

Miz. Swenson. I would have known only if one of those

known contacts of Cuban intelligence nud been

in touch with

anyboat, and if Oswald's name dad surfaced, i would have looi.

at that.

ir. Johnston, But you wore never given

3 nare or a grout

of

nanes of the Cubans with whom oswald nay nave buen in contac

in Mexico City.

Mr. Swenson. I do not recall that, su.

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STOP SECRE

MI. Johnston. And given your advice on whether they were

DGI.

Mr. Swenson. However, let me go a step further. I

prepared a rather elaborate system of identification of people

connected with Cuban intelligence service. This was computerized

so that people who had clearances were welcome to look at that

list for any connections. So this group, like Jack Whitten's

group, which had a specific function, could have simply looked

at that. They need not have talked to me.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you whether in November of

1963 you were aware of an operation that nad the code name

AMLASH.

Mr. Swenson. Yes.

Mr. Johnston.

And do you know who AMLASH was, his real

identity?

Mr. Swenson. I did know, yes.

Let's go off the record. I can't recall his name.

Mr. Johnston, Let's jo off the recorá.

(Discussion off the recors.)

mure Johnston, Back of tho rodord, did you kour back i

wovenber 1963 that the old was meeting tich abash?

Mr. Swenson, jes, and 1 had expressed my reservution...

such a reeting. 1 didn'e consider him to be responsibie.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask

you a prelininary questioa."

you ever been asked by this Conmittee as to your knowledge a :

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Mr. Swenson.

No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald met with

AMLASH in late October of 1963?

Mr. Swenson. I believe I did. I have a vague recollection

of that now, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And do you know about the purpose of that

meeting?

Mr. Swenson.

Yes.

Mr. Johnston. What was the purpose of that neeting?

Mr. Swenson.

I believe this was related to the

assassination, an assassinatio!: plot against Castro, and as

to this I had reference before.

I couldn't recall the exace

time frame, but I thought it was nonsense. I thought it wou

be counterproductive if it had been successful, so I opposed

it.

Mr. Johnston,

Did you know that Mr. Fiuzgerald went

ahead with it?

Mr. Scenson:

Yen.

No. Firagoraid and 1 did not always

2: # ayres.

2:

Ma. jonnston. But he buld you de iras going anead with

the operacion.

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1n, anonson, I expressod my reservations deous it. t

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went ahead, de didn't ask ny percission.

lie was my boss.

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Hi. ivanston. Diù you in fact know about the October :..

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FROnO (Aros 202) $64

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meeting in Paris?

MI. Swenson. I knew he had the meeting, yes.

Mr. Johnston, That MI. Fitzgerald personally had

gone to the meeting.

Mr. Swenson.

Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald had

assured AMLASH that he was the personal representative of

Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Swenson. No, I don't know that he did that.

sir. Johnston.

And again as a matter of background, hav

you read the Committee's report on assasginations?

Mr. Swenson. I have not.

vir. Joinston. Did you know that on lovember 22nd,

1963 the case officer was meeting with AMLAS!?

Mr. Swenson. I believe I knew that about that zine that:

was to be a meeting.

Mir. Johnston.

Did you also know that proposed for the

meeting was the fact that the case officer was going to ori.

AMLASHI a poison pen?

dis. Swenson. io, I did not.

Mr. Johnston, You had no inowledge at the time of sau

poison pen?

te. Skanson. .0.

às i sule you, I disagreed basicil:

with the whole thrust of the AMiSh operation. My disayort:.

of it was very strong. Des Fitzgerald knew it, ard Des roi...

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preferred not to discuss it anymore with me.

Senator Schweiker. What was the basis of your disapproval?

I

mean, why did you disagree?

Mr. Swenson. Well, I didn't think it was a sensible

operation, Senator. "I felt first that we were dealing with

people whose bona fides were subject to quastion, whose

professionalism was subject to question, and I felt that if thos

had succeeded in killing Castro, that he might have.been succeuded

by his brother, for example, who would be worse.

So I thought

it was a pointless operation. I thought it was a lot of

nonsense.

Mr. johnston.

Here you asiod to provide eounterintell

support for the AMidSt operation?

r. Swenson.

I provide counterinteligence suyport tor

everyching in the sense that I have

alicady described. Any

names which came up i woule chock for.

te. Sonnston.

But specifically for disas:.

te Swanson.

veil, in debrieliny peopie connected it

y Cubar intelligence, l had a doc co mains, dun i had coiledin

7==:

lo: di enformation, includine biscunties di duAsi, 51

thao information nich a cotieciod 1 chined orar to tea.

johnson. done you ever asked specifacolay what

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men cien Alach, that question Deadbe de this Booterdon doin

A2, Owenson, is a bate alacady indicated to you, 141

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them I disapproved it, I didn't trust the people, I didn't

consider it a good operation on security grounds or any grounús.

Mr. Wallach. Did you consider

it an assassination

operation?

Mr. Swenson. Did I consider it?

Mr. Wallach. Is that how it was explained to you, an

assassination plot?

Mr. Swenson. Oh, that's it, yes.

Senator Schweiker. There wasn't any doubt in your mind

about that.

Mr. Swinson. That that was the intent of it? No.

just thought it was silly.

Mr. Johrstor. Were you aware of the statement that

Fidel Castro made to the it reporter Daniel Harker on Septembe!

7th, 1963, and in that statement said the U.s. was meeting

with dissident yroups and was planning to eliminate Cuban

leaders, and that Cuba would retaliate if that continued?

Mr. Swenson. I don't have a firm recollection now. :

probably did.

Mr. johnsion, Let me go chen to 1965.

What happened with the AMbASH operation, to your recollec

ton, in 1965?

Me. Swenson. I draw a completely blank. I don't remeric:

nOw.

¡r. Johnstor. Do you remember the name Victor Espinoza?

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Mr. Swenson't Not really

Mr. Johnston, Let me refresh your recollection, that at

least according to the files, you and the FBI met with Victor

Espinoad in New York City In 1965:

Mt. Swengon. Excuse me.!

The name still doesn't ring a

bell. I met with a Cuban In New York In 1965 for the purpose

of training him and sending him back to Cuba.

Is this what you are talking about?

Mr. Johnston. No. Victor Espinoza was part of the AMLAS!!

group that had knowledge of the AMLASH operation as it had

evolved into 1965.

Mr. Swenson. Yes I remember the man now, yes, yes I do.

Mr. Johnston. Did you meet with him

and debrief him?

Mr. Swenson. Yes, yes I did. I mes him at the FBI

office in New York.

Mr. Johnston. At that time did you know of any connections

between Victor Espinoza and anything dealing with the inves::-

gation into President Kennedy'e assassination?

ir. Senson, I can't recall. Anything which I knew soou:

Espinoza I would have put into the menocandam at the time afri

I met him at the New York Office. And I couldn't even renes:

the name, as I toid you, until now.

I do know that he wens into the office, chat he wanta.

see

someone, I believe it was Sam Papich that fiist toid :..

of it, and I went in for the purpose of debriefing him, an

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remember germade

humber for allegations fall of which I

i Can 35

recorded in a memorandum at, the time."!

Mr. Johnston.:

Do you remember that he alleged that one

of the CIA officers in Spain had been compromised by Cuban

intelligence officers?

Mr. Swenson. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. Johnston. Was that true?

MI. Swenson. I dontt know whether it was true or not.

I would say that the number of operations that were being

conducted in Spain again were not secure from a counterintelli-

gence standpoint. I thought that they were rather sloppy, ani

I indicated that.

Mr. Johnston. One of your memoranda that you wrote after

the Espinoza meeting states . and all I have are my notes fron

it -- the AMLASH

circle is wide, and each new friend of whol

we learn seems to have knowledge of the plan.

I believe the

problem is a more serious and basic one. Fidel reportedly kaveri

in 1962. that the groun was plotting against him and enlisted

its support. Hence

we cannot rule out the possibility of

provocation.

Do you recall that memorandun?

Mi. Swenson. This is true, and this is what i testific.

to already. I har serious misgivings about the security o:

the whole operation.

sir. Johnston.

And what did you nean by provocation?

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M2. Swenson. I reant that the Cubans might have been trying

to turn their knowledge ofnwhat we were doing to their purposes,

if only for propaganda purposes.

I. felt.from the outset the whole thing was nonsense, as I

have said repeatedly, and in my debriefings of people, the

more I learned, the more insecure it appeared to me, so I

simply continued to oppose such ventures. I thought they were

silly.

Senator Schweiker. Knowing Fidel Castro's personality and

temperament, and on the assumption that you were right, that he

had some knowledge of these ouerations which you feared, ouvio: s

ly, from the record of what you said, wouldn't you possibly have

meant provocation more than just reciprocating with propagande,

knowing his personality?

MI. Swenson, Well, I would have considered any type of

retaliatory measure by Castro, and this was the purpose of the

dissemination of such material to other government agencies

which had jurisdiction, such as the FBl and the Secret Service.

Nr. Johnston. Let

ne ask you, isn't it obvious that i:

CIA was plotting to assassinate Castro and he becare aware o:

it, that he might retaliate, especially when he had warned as ::

retaliation?

Ma. Swenson, it is possible, os course. This is one u?

the things that concerned

me, but I never knew that as a res::!.

of all of this there was any attenpt.on the part of the Cubar

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government or of Cuban Intelligence to assassinate the President.

Mr. Johnston. Did you conduct an investigation in order to

determine whether the Cuban government had retaliated specifically

for the AMLASA operation?

Mr. Swenson. Well, your using the term investigation is

what is puzzling me here. What I did is a constant function,

was to look for any activities on the part of opposition

services which would threaten the United States or people in tha

United States, United States security. This was a continuing

function.

There was no particular investigation except

as

part of what I did all the time. The MiLASH group was

of

conceri du me because I thought they wore sloppy, but i never:

did find out from all of the many interviews I conducted, and

the research I did, and

that of everybody on my staff, that

there was ever any attempt on the part of the Cubans to

assassinate the President.

Mr. Johnston.

Are you aware of an agent who was involved

in the AMiSH operation who had the crypt Amwillp?

Mi. Svenson. This goes

back a long tine. I remenber th

AMN!!IN.

Mr. Johnston. Lei me mention his name off the record.

(Discussion off the recurd.)

Air.

Johnston.

Back on the recori.

Did you ever

sugyest that either ALASh or AlWilP be

interrogated about the kennedy assassination and its connect..

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• (Алла 707)

to the AMLASH operation?

Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall whether I suggested it or

not. I believe I did question AMWHIP myself.

Mr. Johnston. In what

year?

MI. Swenson. This I can't recall, the exact timeframe.

It is quite a long time ago.

Mr. Johnston. Was that 1965 that AMWHIP wag interrogated?

Mr. Swenson. I would say it.was probably in 1965 because

it was in 1965 that I departed for Burope, and I think it

was prior to my departure, and that's the best I can do about

fixing it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever talk to the case officer who

had been at the November 22nd

meeting about whether anything

was mentioned at the meeting

that might indicate setaliation?

Mr. Swenson. I probably did. I can't recall anything

specific, but I talked to the people, to the case officers

who were involved. They were well aware of my reservations

about people with whom they

were dealing.

Mr. Johnston. ifter the assassination of President kent:

did you have any discussion with it. Fitzgerald of Mi. lCius

about the possibility of retaliation because of the AlLAS!

overation?

Mr, Swenson. = would say that possibly at a stafe meet!.

I might have nentioned the possibility with Des Fizzyeraid,

Dut I had no concrete information to indicate that there was

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an attempt at reti

ation

MI. Johnston. And who would have been at that staff

meeting?

Mr. Swenson. Probably Sam Halpern, Seymour Bolten,

possibly Nestor Sanchez. There

are a couple of others whose

faces I recall but I don't know that I'd even remember their

names.

Senator Schweiker. Would the Director have been there?

MI. Swenson. No, he would not.

Mr. Johnston, Would MI. Helms have been there?

Mr. Swenson.. No, he would not.

Mr. Johnston. And can you place a date, an approxima::

date on the staff meeting, or at least a date in relation?

Mr. Swenson.

We had

staff meetingsjjust daily, sir.

Mr. Johnston. Was it about the time of the Kennedy

assassination or shortly after the kennedy assassination?

Mr. Swenson. I am sure that in that general timeframe

there was a staff meeting,

and

I would have

at the time exprit.

any counterintelligence views wrich I considered appropri.t..

juse warnings, or iet's say, being sareful.

Mr. Johnston, Well, let ne

refine it.

Do you have a recollection of mentioning a connectio:

or the possibility of

a connuction between AMLASH and

Kennedy's assassinacion

at a staff meeting?

Do you

have

recollection of doiny that?

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Mr: Swenson.:

don't have a firm recolleition now.

You

had

a memorandum from which you quoted.

Mr. Johnston. Apparently a 2965 memorandu?

Mr. Swenson. I can't recall anything as of the

Kennedy assassination, nothing definite.

MI. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion now?

MI. Swenson.

Not positively.

Mr. Johnston.

That you said that sometime.

Mr. Swenson. What I am getting at is that this is

one of the things I would normally have considered.

Senator Schweiker. You're saying it may have occurred.

Mr. Swenson. It may have occurred, but I don't have any

firm recollection.

Mr. Peloguin.

May we go off the record?

Senator Schweiker.

sure.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Johnston. Back on the record. My question to you

is this. Do you have a recollection of a staff meeting at

some time with the participants you described at which a

possibiiity of a connection bogwee: AMbast operation and us

Kennedy assassination was

discussed?

fir. Swenson, no specific recollection, no.

#it. Joinsion. Dis it occur to you at the tine that

there might be some suon connection?

Mr. Swenson. I am merely assuming that I would have

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explored or would have thought about it as well as all other

ramification.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you at this point -

Mr. Swanson. I don't remember:

Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking. you at this point whether you

explored it. I'm just asking you whether you drew a possibility

of a connection in your mind?

Mr. Swenson.

I probably would have. I don't have any

specific recollection of it.

Mr. Johnston. Do you now draw the possibility of a

connection?

Mr. Swenson. As a possibility, yes, but all of my

eiforts over a long period of time which were say exhaustive

and extensive, both,

failed to produce any connection.

I wouls

be mindful at all times of such possibilities in everythiny

that I did, and I interrogated many people, I interviewed many

people. I read reports from many sources.

I never found ever:

a thread of a connection.

Mr, Johnston, Well, let me ask you as

specific fact

whether you knew

that on November 22nd an aircraft flight

in Mexico City, a Cubana aircraft flight from Mexico City su

Havana was detained from about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon

uncil 10:00 o'clock in

the evening awaiting a passenger who

arrived in a twin-enyined

aircraft, who bypassed Custons an

who rode in the pilot's cabin on the flight to Havana?

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Mr. 'Swenson. I have no recollection of it.

Mx. Johnston, Do you have any recollection of checking

into that, either receiving that of checking into that?

Mr. Swenson.

Not specifically.

Senator Schweiker. Do any recollections come back to you

of unusual movement of "'iban intelligence agents immediately

prior to, during and after the Kennedy assassination?

Mi. Swenson. They do not, Senator.

Mr. Wallach. I am sorry I had

to miss the beginning of jour

testimony and I may be going over

something that was alrcady

asked. just let me know.

It is my understanding that you were aware generally

of the AMLASH operation and the purpose of the operation in 1963.

Mr. Swenson. Generally and specifically both, I would so!

Mx. Wallach. You were aware that there was

a meeting

set up with AMLASH in Brazil in September of 1963 or thereabouts?

Mr. Swenson.

I cannot recall. I would have known

probably that there was such a meeting to be held. I was

on record as considering tiat this was a dangerous

and

stupid operation.

Mr. Wallach. The meetiny in Brazii with AMLASH was --

can you give me that?

Mr. Johnston. Septenber Sth, or early Septenber.

Mr. Swenson, I cannot remomber the exact dates. It was

long time ago.

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Mr:

wallach.

with AM Astray case officer, correct, and

then subsequently appearing In a september 7th edition of

the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Fidel Castro goes down to the

Brazilian consulate in Havana and makes a speech or grants an

Interview to Dandel Harker, the AP reporter, and specifically

uses the worda "eliminate" 1

Mr. Swenson, I believe this has already been covered.

Mr. Wallach, I know Jim did raise that but what I'm

asking you is whether or not in your counterintelligence

background and your knowledge of Castro whether or not Castro's

A, the fact that he granted

an interview; and B, the fact that

he apparently went to the Brazilian consulate, which I

understand that he did not frequent very often, has any

significance?

I an asking this to you as an expert.

Mx. Swenson. Mr. Castro is a very bold, imaginative

person who is capable of doing anything. Does it have some

special significance relating to the Kennedy assassination?

I don't see any.

Mr. Epstein. The suggescion has been made that he chose

the Brazilian consulate because that was his method of gebtar:

message, if the operation had been compromised, that he hud

learned of the meeting that had happened

in Brazil in Septe..u:

of

1963.

The suygestion has been

made that that is the war

he was yetting the message to the United States.

Do you remember that ever being discussed or considereú?

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Бом,

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"ME. Swenson."

"don't recallithat, no.

Mr. Epstein. In retrospect, now, is that an issue that is

considerable by counterintelligence people, and does it

trigger any kind of thoughts in your own head when you hear

it now?

Mr. Swenson.

Well, you see there are so many things that

were going on all over Latin America with regard to Cuban

activities in the different countries, 'I would go to

Brazil, for example, or, for example, of seeing people who

had been connected with Cuban intelligence, and debriefing them

and so on, and I would not read that Castro's visit to the

Brazilian installation had

anything to do wich the Kennedy --

had anything to do with a whole host of things.

Mr. Epstein. No. The issue is whether his visit to the

Brazilian consulate would have had anything to do with --

Mr. Swenson, With getting our attention --

Mi. Epstein. Getting our attention, and indeed, the

veracity of his assertion, that he had learned of plots --

Mr. Swenson. I would not attribute that special signiti-

cance to it because there were so nany reasons he could have

done it.

Mr. Johnston. Let no jo back to the aircraft. I show

you Direccor Cable 8604 dazed 30 November '63, which is the

cable to Mexico City about this fact, and I call your attentio..

to the upper left hand corner which would indicate SAS, EOis

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PRIONE (A188

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is the drafter of that?

Mr. Swenson.

"uh-huh.

Mr. Johnston. And EOB is what office in SAS?

Mx. Swenson. I cannot recall what it meant right now,

nor can I

recognize the initials.

Let me see If I can read this first.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Swenson. I'm sorry. Normally they would have put

down my own group here, SAS/CI. This apparently did not reach

me for some reason.

Senator Schweiker. What does that SAS up there mean?

Mr. Swenson. Well, the SAS referred to the task forcu,

really, Special Affairs Staff. They changed the name of ti

task force. And then the slash was to separate

it

from some

component, and I think that the EOB - they changed names --

I think that the OB had to do with a staff which was trying

to engage in positive intelligence operations against Cuba,

things like AMCANOE and AMLASIl, but I really can't tell you

the exact destination, but you'll note that it'did not conc

to My stale.

Mr. Johnston. Let me

ask you, did you receive infosmal

avout a Cuban-American by the name of Gilberto Policarpo Lupe

Mr. Swenson. At the time the name does

not ring ar:

recollections.

(Discussion off the record.)

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Mr:

"Johnston:

berto, Lopez croased the borier fom

Texas into Mexico on the 23rd of November. The border had been

closed by Mexican authorities on the ?2nd, after the assassi-

nation. He went to Mexico City, arriving there on the 25th

of November, and on the 27th of November departed as the only

passenger on a Cubana airline flight to Havana.

Do any of those facts --

Mr. Swenson.

They really don't register with me now.

Mr. Johnston. Do you ever recall being consulted about

that trip?

M. Sivenson.

I simply have no recollection at all.

Mr. Johnston, Could you have made a contribution on thie:

Mr. Swenson. I would have, let's say, searched through

the computer runs to see if such an individual had ever been

a contact of Cuban intelligence service. Other than that, i

don't know what I could have done because

in Mexico City ther

were people who were there for that purpose.

Senator SChweiker. Here is one of the copies we are

talking about. We just wonder if it helps you to recollect.

(The Witness roads the ducumenit.)

ME. Swenson. The only thing i can say, Senator, is

when they mention. ODENVY, which is the Bureau, if it was a

cuban aifair, any discussion with thu Bureau should have bean

through me. I do not now have any recollection of this.

Senator

Schweiker. Here is one referring to somethiny

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about his activities in Los Angeles.' At that particult time

he was coming out of Miami, as I recall.

Mr. Johnston, Let me correct for the record. Initially

they have identified - they thought he was the same as

Gilberto Lopez who was in los Angeles. Subsequently they found

it was not true.

Mt. Wallach. Who did you deal with at the Bureau? Did

you deal with Papich or did you deal with someone directly?

Mr. Swenson. Usually Papich stopped in my office every

day, every working day.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have any direct contacts with

anyone at the Bureau in the Donestic Intelligence section?

Mr. Swenson. I think someone else came over

one tine.

don't remember his name, a young fellow who is far lower in

category than Sam.. The only times I dealt with other people i:.

the Bureau were on those occasions when we had to cooperate

in a joint operation such

as their transferring an agent to me

who was going to send him back to Cuba, that sort of thing.

Hir. Wallach. Prior to the assassination, or

inmediate:

after tne assassination, did you ever sit in on any of the

meetings where Bureau

persons were present and Cuban policy "

generaily discussed?

ir. Shenson.

i did not.

Senator Schweiket. We came across some documents in the ?.i

that as of about 1961, that the FBI had surveilled about 200

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## Page 42

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agents, or 200 potential agents who were with the fair Play for

Cuba Committee as possible Cuban intelligence personnel.

Does this ring a bell with you, and what do you recall about

the information supplied to you by the FBI on the Fair Play for

Cuba?

MARD A PAUL

410 First Street

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Mr. Swenson.

Well, we received a great deal of information,

Senator, from the Bureau about people like this who might be

sympathetic to Cuba. I was not interested in a positive

operation, by function, unless there was a Cuban intelligence

connection, unless there was a way that I could use that to

penetrate the Cuban intelligence service. Other staffs were

interested in it for other purposes, for debriefing them, for

positive intelligence, and anything that could be gleaned, sor:

of a vacuum cleaner approach. My approach was strictly --

Senator SChweiker. Penetration.

Ms. Swenson. Penetration of the Cuban intelligence

service, of protection of our own resources.

So I did not get involved in that.

Now, had one of those individuals had a meeting with a

known Cuban intelligence officer, then I vould have

seen

concerned

and

would have become invoived.

Senator Schwelrer. Do you recall aiter the assassinatio:

the cuban policy revier that vas initiated by the Director,

after the Kennedy assassination, a review of the whole Cuba:

kolicy of the CIA?

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Mr. Swenson. P'i have a vague recollection of it, but only

a vague recollection.

Senator Schweiker. Do you recall what form it took or

just how it was done?

Mr. Swenson, Well, my best recollection was that he wanted

to be sure that no one had been remiss, and he wanted to take

a look at the scope of the operation before, and whether it

should be maintained at the same level and things of this

nature. I was not directly involved. My own staff's function

was clearcut, and up until the time I left, continued in the

same form.

Senator Schweiker, Was this done through written report

to

the Director, or how was this done?

Mr. Swenson. I customarily -- this is a management

procedure in my own staff - kept track of how we were doiny,

what we spent, what we needed, and how effective we were,

and I don't recall any special effort at that time to give

more than I had already dore. I think they could nave taken

any

one of the reports that I submitiad, and

it would

have

presented the situation as of the ime.

Senator Schweiker. After the review was completed, diu

the

Director sond out an internal directive as to the future

Caban policy?

Mr. Swenson. Senator, I just don't remember.

I am sorry.

Senator Schweiker. Did you have any specific dealings wich

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Alpha 66, any recollectiona:of

agents?

MI. Swenson. I remember the name, and that is all, Senator.

Senator Schweiker. No specific case.

Mr. Swenson. I don't recall anything specific. If there

had been somebody who was incidentally a member of that group

who would have had a connection with Cuban intelligence, I

would have looked into it, but I don't remember now.

Mr. Epstein. What did you mean by the word remiss, that

part of the reassessment of Cuban policy involved the study of

whether you had been remiss?

Me. Swenson. I think the then Director Mecone then wante

to make

sure that nobody had dropped the ball. For exampic,

he wanted to know what information had gonecto the Bureau,

what information the Bureau had sent us, and where it was.

Mr. Epstein. You mean with respect to Oswald?

Mr. Swenson. Yes.

ir. Epstein. Were any deficiencies found as a resuit?

Mr. Swenson. Not that I know of.

Mi. Epstein. Would that be a different kind of review

chan i policy review?

dr. Swunson. Oh, yes.

"r. Epstein. well, I'm splitzing it into no categoria:.

In octor norus, did de miss something?

da. Svenson, Well, it would be different. I mean, when

the President is assussinated, every bit of effort which coui.:

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p....

ram.

WARD A PAUL

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be brought to beas was broughtito.

bear, to look for anything

which pertained to it. I drew a blank. I didn't find anything.

Mr. Epstein. What I'm asking you is were there two types

of -

MI. Swenson. There were two different things.

Mr. Epstein. Two different types of assessment made. One

would be what should this agency's policy or this government's

policy be with respect to Cuba, 1.e., what kinds of operations

should we run hereinafter, and two, did we drop the ball in the

past?

ir. Swenson. Well, I would say that this sort of reassos..

ment was probably done, and Des Fitzyerald was probably invoi:

in it at this time. I don't recall that I made any particular

contiibution.

MI. Epstein. Do you recall whether that included any

assessment of the possibility of the AMLASH operation having

been compromised?

Mr. Swenson.

io, I can't recall anything specific abou:

it.

Vr. Johnston. Let me ask - i show you a document

dated 23 Novenber 1963, which

is a memorandum for the Actiny

Deputy Director of plans from the acting Chief of the Sa

Division, which was in Mr. Angleton's staff, and thu subjoe:

the contact of Lee Oswald with a member of soviet KGB

assass!

nation department. The contents I don't think are of gicat

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bearing to you except for the fact that that document mainly

1s a two-page analysis of the possible significance of Oswald's

possible contact with Kostikov and posaible Soviet involvement.

My question is, given the fact that the Soviet experts in

counterintelligence would do an analysis like this, why was

not SAS counterintelligence doing a similar analysis?

MI. Swenson. I can hardly tell you more thanil have on

that subject: I simply had a continual function of looking

at all operations of the Cuban intelligence service. I could

not have done any more than I was doing, so I continued doing

what 1 -- I never recall seeiny this.

MI. Johnston. Did you receive any orders to first of ai:

investigate the connection between AMLASH and the Kennedy

assassination?

Mr. Swenson. No.

lix. Johnston. Did you receive any orders to conduct an

investigation into the Kennedy assassination?

No. Swenson.

No.

Mr. Johnston. Diú you receive any orders

to cooperate

either with MI. Whitten's investigutions or ir. Angioton's

investigation?

vir. Swenson. No. My cooperation nould have been givei:

had it been asked foi.

Senator Schweiker. When you interviewed Anwhip, what

deductions did you dran out of your interview with ANNHIP

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about possible lInkage between AMASH and the Kennedy assassi-

nation?

Mr. Swenson. I didn't. draw any specific conclusions that

I can recall, SenatoriT dian't think ha was a very impressive

or true to form individualit

Senator Schweiker:

pia it confirm in any way your fears

that Castro might have had knowledge of AMLASH's operation?

MI. Swenson. No, sir.

Senator Schwelker. So you drew no conclusions from your

briefing?

Mr. Swenson. Well, this is a long time later, but so

far as I can recall, my conclusions were that he was a person

prone to exaggerate his importance, and that a lot of it was

sort of gossip, and that he was not really what I would have

considered

a very effective agent.

Mt. Johnston, Were you aware of the polygraph of AMWHli?

Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall now.

NI. Johnston.

were you aware that the polygraph indica:"

deccusion on questions related to his ties to cuban intelliga....:

and AMLASii's ties to Cuban intelligence?

Mr. Swenson. I'm really drawing a blank on this now.

don't know.

MI, Johnston. Nere you interviewed in 1967 by an Inspec:

General in connection with the report of the Inspector Gener:i

office on assassination plots?

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WAKES D

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Mri Swenson.

1067237

Senator Schweiker. For the IG investigation.

MI. Swenson. No, because I would have been in Europe

at that time.

• Mr: Johnston. Did they come to Europe to talk to you?

Mr. Swenson. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you come back to talk to Mr. Earman

or anyone in the Inspector General's office about --

Mr.

Swenson. No. When I came back from Europe, which was

about the time that I had said I intended to leave the Agency,

I had a meeting with the IG at the time, with a number of

people, who tried to persuade me to stay, and I said I was

not interested in staying.

There were no specifics that were raised in those discus-

sions.

Mr. Johnston. You don't recall beiry interviewed about

assassination plots?

Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not.

Mr. Johnston, Were you knowiedgeable of the CIA dealings

with the Mafia and attempts to assassinate?

Mir. Swenson. Long after the time.

Mr. Johnston. Not at the time?

Mr. Swenson.

Lony after

the

time.

Mr. Epstein.

How long afterwards?

MI. Wallach. After the assassination?

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Mr. swensong Long after Chat?

AP: 1001

Mr. Epstein. While you were still in washington?

MI. Swenson.

Probably after I left Washington. I think

ii..

2.1*

I probably might have heara

some what you might call scuttlebutt

1726

about it, second of

third hand corments about it, but I didn't

have any real specific knowledge about it.

Mr, Epstein, How did you come to be consulted on the

AMLASH problem?

MI. Swenson. I don't think it was a matter of my being

consulted. I think it was a matter of my expressing doubts abou:

the AMLASH operation.

MI. Epstein.

How did you learn of it, do you remember

that?

Mx. Swenson.

Because his name came up - names would

be run through my shop to see if there was a bearing on

Cuban intelligence operations, and I had debriefed Cuban

intelligence officers, that is, interrogated them in depth and

had extracted as

much information as I could, and one of the

persons concerning whom I got information was he.

Mr. Epstein. And that information was that he was 19i.

reliable?

MI. Swenson. I felt there was good reason to doubt i

reliability.

MI. Epstein.

so you would be preparing a response to ti

name check reguest,

is that how you would come to learn ot

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47

ithey were Interested?)

I'm st1l1 not quite clear on how you learned they had

the assassination plot.

MI. Peloquin.

Can we go off the record for a second?

Senator Schweiker. Sure.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Swenson. Mike, trying to answer your question, wher

mattera were surfaced at ataff meetings at which I was present,

I expressed my views. and I would do my homework and I would

go back and check any things which came up. Aciditionally whe:

I was interrogating intelligence people in the course of

debriefing them as thoroughly as possible, I would disseminate

that information io other people on the staff, and I believe

that the AMLASH, the results of my debriefings on AMLASH and

the purposes for which they intended to use him, I had come

up on both these contacts that I had obtained

information

concerning him that was not all favorable, and that at a stasa

meeting his

name was mentioned.

iLE. Johnston. Are memos prepared on shose staff ccings:

it. Swenson.

no, they gererally were not.

Mr. Johnston, You don't have any record of what transpires!

Mr. Swenson. o, because gencrally staff meetings were

nelo every day, and

the cables which came in which were

considered appropriate for discussion were discussed. If there

was anything that you had to note

for your purposes, you did

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it.:

But. there was no formal

MI. Wallach.

Who decided what cables were to be discussed

or the topic of discussion?

ME. Swenson. Well, I would raise any cables which had

a counterintelligence importance, and which I considered

should be discussed with other people, you know. If we had

staff meetings all day long, we wouldn't get anything done.

Mr. Wallach, Was Helms ever present at any of these

staff meetings?

Mr. Swenson. No.

Mr. Epstein. Did there ever reach a point in time when

you received an indication from debriefing intelligence officer

or in any other way that specifically the AMLASH assassination

plot against Castro had been compromised?

Mr. Swenson. No. I can't recall any specific.

Mr. Epstein. Do you recall any discussion surrounding

the Castro speech at the Brazilian consulate relating to tho

question of whether sone CIA operation had been compromisea

and that that is

what Castro was referring to?

Mi. swenson. I con't recall and i have no specific

recollection of that, no.

Mr. Epstein. Followiny the assassination of President

Kennedy, I think you have testified that there were

stais

meetings at which you were

Present and which the issue

or

retaliation

was --

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[ArRE

0т8:

ботор...

19 MA

HARD A PAUL

410 First Street, S.E. Washington, 0,6. 20003

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**, Mr. Swenson.

Id'I had no specific recollection.

But I would assume

now that' that might have been mentioned.

Mr. Epstein. Was there any specific investigative

responsibility or counterintelligence responsibility levied

or divided or

assigned at those meetings with respect to

determining whether or not the Cuban government was involved

in the assassination?

Mr. Swenson. I can't recall any specific sequirement that

was levied on me for example, but it really wasn't necessary.

I mean, it was an obvious thing which I would look for to

see if there was anything. This was part of my ongoing

responsibility, and I never found any relationship.

Mr. Epstein.

Was

an instruction issued to the wAVE

station to determine that issue?

Mr. Swenson.

Possibly. I have no recollection. Possibiy

it was.

MI. Epstein. What I'm getting at here is the question

of whether or not that is

a logical issue

to arise

in debriesi

and a logical issue

to be handled by the counterintelligence

veopie it it comes up in the cuurse of i contact with a soured

or an asset as distinguished from specific instructions

contact all known

sources,

informants, assets, and operations

to determine any and all inforation bearim

on that issue.

Mr. Swenson, I simply cannot recall anyching specific e

the subject,

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Mr. Epstein.

You don't'recall that kind

of an instruction

being issued.

MI. Swenson.

No.

MI. Epstein. Do you recall any discussion or decision

to: involve or to run a counterintelligence operation specifically

designed to determine that fact?

Mr. Swenson.

NO.

Mr. Epstein. Was it ever considered?

MI. Swenson. I can't recall that any such was considered.

REally, good

counterintelligence operations depend

on having

something tangible which you can use. So if there was ever

an opportunity for any counterintelligence operation, I woul

examine it in the light of the approach which was

feasible

u11!

how we could exploit it to the maximum degree. I cannot

recall that there was ever an opportunity to do anything whic.

would throw light on the Kennedy assassination.

Mr. Epstein, With respect to the connection between thi

CIA and the underworia figures with respect to the assassir:

plot.

fir. Swenson. i knon nuthing about that at all, stricti

hearsay long after chia.

12. Epstoir. i vould lika your nelp in understanding

that kind of an operacion wouid

riot

nave buen asoful the

knowledge of that kind of an operation and the details oi

who was involved in it would not have been useful or relew..

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from a counterintelligene standpoint in order for you in your

general business to determine what sources the Agency had, what

assets they had, and if a person was in a position --

Mr. Swenson. I believe it might have been relevant, but

it was never discussed with me, and to the best of my knowleüge,

underworld contacts had occurred prior to the Kennedy assassi-

nation and prior to the time. that I became chief of Counter-

intelligence.

Mr. Epstein. Were you aware of who those cantacts were?

Mr. Swenson.

At the time?

Mr. Epstein.

Right.

Mr. Swenson.

No. I read about it ir the newspapers.

Mr. Epstein. Were you aware at that time that there were

contacts?

Mr. Swenson. At that time, no.

Senator Schweiker. Have you finished your point, Mike?

Mr. Epstein.

Yes.

Senator Schweiker.

Can you just very briefly recall

what eclationship dic General bansale and MONGOOSE have to

you relationship functionally, organically, or structura.!:?

Mi. Swenson. I would say there was none, Senatoi.

Senator Sciveiker. "one?

What he was doing, I have heard casterent versions ai

how it was

see up and one version was tiat

at one point i

was overail coordinator, including the CIA component. The

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other version I have is that he was really working primarily

with Defense and State and other non-CIA agencies in his

MONGOOSE wOrk.

What is your best recollection of that?

Mr. Swenson.

I had no occasion to meet with him ot

participate in any discussion with members of his group, but

Des Fitzgerald certainly knew him and met with him. There was

no, let's say, reporting function by anybody in the Agency that:

I knew of to Lansdale.

Senator Schweiker. In other words, Des Fitzgerald

Mi. Swenson. Did not report to him.

Senator Schweiker. on a regular basis or rather not

a

regular basis? In other words, it was sort of a separate

operation from what you recollect?

MI. Swenson. My best recollection -

Senator Schweiker. And just coordinated.

Mr. Swenson.

Yes.

kir. Johnscon.

Let me ask you first of all, was Ravi

ROa, JI. -

was be inac?

dr. Johnston.

bad, or was he suspected of being dui?

ir. Senson. I was very hazy on that. I was vezy

interestea in faul loa, jr., because possilly he coula

provido useful inteiligence, out 1 cannot rocall that tou.

was anything that reaiiy indicated he had an

intelligenc

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function.

Mr. Johnston. How about Carlos Lachuga, who was Raul

Roa's successor at the United Nations, was he DGI?

Mr. Swenson. I think there was suspicion that he was,

but I don't think we had positive information.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall the name of Charles Santos

Bushe, who was one of the founders of the Fair Play for

Cuba Committee?

NI. Swenson.

It doesn't ring a bell with me now.

MI. Johnston. Let me ask you finally, diá Mr. Fitzgerald

have a principal deputy on Cuban matters?

Mr. Swenson. Well, you're talking -- you see, bes

Fitzgerald for a time succeeded Bill Harvey as Chief

of the

Task Force when it became Special Affairs Staff. Subseguer:.

the Special Affairs Staff was reincorporated in the Wh

Division. At that time Des Fitzgerald became the Chief of

Wll, and John Mart became the Chief of the SAS component. So

SAS became like bigger than any branch, but still respondin:

io Chief, wH, which it had not before.

Ne. Johnsion, In devanbor 1903 did he have a princir..

deputy?

Mr. Swenson. November of '63?

I don't think so, no.

Senator Schweiker. Does a Cuban intelligence agent ::

the name of Ruiez, R-a-i-; ring any bell with you?

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Mr. Swenson: Ruiz?:

Senator, it doesn't ring a bell with

me now. At the time it might have, I don't know. It is a rathor

common: nane, Senator.

Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand if that

was a particular Cuban in the intelligence organization.

MI. Swenson. I wouldn't know.

Senator Schweikes. There's an allegation that he was in

Dealey Plaza that day. I want to make clear it is just an

allegation.

Mr. Swenson. I have no recollection.

ir. wallach. Do you have a recollection of any suspects:

Cuban agents being in the jaiias are. the day of the assassi-

nation?

Mr. Swenson. No.

Mr. Wallach. Not that they had anything to do with the

assassination.

Mr. Swenson.

I do not.

Hr. Hallach, Lee me go jaci i second to a line of

questioning that Mu, rustein was askiny before.

Do you rocall at any ot the aberingo, the seast meeta:

or otherwise, immeclacely after the assassination, ind

shortly afoor the assascinatio: o: President Kennedy, wheth.

there was any discussion as to s, wether the CIa had

jurisdiction to lock into the assassination and to invos...::

the assassination, or i, whether it was just the FBI's job

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and that the CIA Would respond to any requests from the FBI.

In all fairness -- well, I'm sorry. Just go ahead

and

answer the question.

Mr. Swenson, Well, I remember we had a number of

discussions, many of which were informal at the time.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Swenson. In answer to your question, there were

never discussions as to. who does what and so forth, but

let's say it"

was very clear in my mind as to where, what the

Agency's role was and what the Bureau's role was.

Mr. Wallach.

What was that?

Mr. swenson.

Well, the Bureau was concerned, in my view.

with Domestic Intelligence, and we were supposed to be concer

with foreign intelligence.

M-. Wallach. We have heard testimony fron other high lov

CIA officials stating that insofar as they weresconcerned,

the investigation

of:the assassination of President Kennedy

was an FBI matter.

was that ever told to you or discussed in your presencs:

Mr. swenson.

I don't think anybody had to tell me, bir

I would assume that this was discussed at the time. I was

certainly a mauter of interest to me.

I saw San Papich

daily. I feli sure inat it was prinarily the Bureau's jari...

diction to investigace within the United States, yes, anc

my rode would have been to see if there was anything that

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Piano (Ards 202) 5-6

could contribute from the standpoint of Cuban intelligence

connections,, or possible connections.

Mr. Wallach. But as your role vis-a-vis your normal

job, and any information you may have picked up, is that

correct?

Mr. Swenson: What do you mean by my normal job?

Mr. Wallach. Well, let me go back.

Did you ever receivej.or.are.you ever aware of anyone

ever receiving in the CIA opecific instructions to investigate

the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Swenson. That has been asked before, and it has been

answered.

Mr. Wallach. Well, I'm asking it insofar as you are

concerned, was

it ever issued anywhere?

Mr. Swenson.

(Nods in the negative.)

Mr. Wallach. I take it you are not aware of any

investigation conducted by the CIA.

Mr. Swenson.

And I don't spocifically recall whitten's

heading the particular group.

Senator Schweiker. ur ingleton?

Mr. Swenson.

Or Angluto?.

I do rocall making sure

that the information which had come to me or passed throug:

ne, that there was nothing which ind been left out.

1z. Wallach. Did you tell Papich about AMLASH?

Mr. Swerson. I dun't think

50.

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MI. Wallach. Do you know if Papich knew about AMLASH?

Mr. Swenson, I don't know.

Mr. Wallach. Is there a reason why you didn't tell him

about AMLASH?

MI. Swenson. I don't think that was the type of informa-

tion which I would have discussed with him.

Mr. Wallach. Who might have discussed that type of irior-

mation with him?

Mr. Swenson.

Des Fitzgerald. Sam's normal contact withi:

the Cuban task forcevor SAS was myself, but there were times

when he talked to Des or Des talked to him.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not the bureau at

any time until recently knew about the AMLASH operation?

Mr. Swenson. I don't know. I would doubt it.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you just one last question, and

I guess we've gone through pretty much your testimony about !

and your concept. Let me restate what I think you have

testified, and that is that at least in your mind, that jou

drew a connection, the possibility of i connection betweer.

the illisH operation and the assassination st rresident

fennedy.

r. Swenson. I moulin's pot it quite that way. chas

means to say was that mithout a specitic recollection, that

wouid sio the two togetitor. "y role was to consider all

possibilities, and 1 thinn I wouid have conadered thai

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among others, but I don't recall anything specific relating

or tying the two together.

Mr. Johnston.

would you quarrel with individuals who had

the same knowledge you did - and you have testified that they

did not draw such a connection?

Mr. Swenson:.. That they did not draw a connection?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

Mr. Swenson. I couldn't quarrel with them, no.

Mr. Johnston. In other words, you think knowledgeable

officials, knowledgeable of both the Kennedy assassination

investigation and of the AMLAS! operation

Mr. Swenson, I think it would have been logical for

them to consider that there could be a connection and to

have explored it on their own.

Mr. Johnston. But therefore you say it would not seen

logical for them

to testify they drew no connection.

Mr. Swenson. Well, I'm not sayiny that.

No. Peloquin. Let me just say that i think it is a

semantic difficulty there.

Hi. Swenson. Plainl: speaking, ererybody's imaginatio::

is üifferent. My job, I hac inany, many years in intelligenc

going back to pre-pearl Marbor, so perhaps i haù a devious

mind so i would consider such things. i chink that many pet.

just never considered it.

Mr. Johnston. Finally, let me ask you, knowing that Cin

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had a special group to investigate the Kennedy assassination,

I ask you how they could have conducted that investigation

thoroughly if, A, they didn't know about the AMLASH operation -

MI. Swenson. I really can't respond because I can't

remember the group or what they did, or I can't recall any.

with them about it..

Mr. Johnston. As a counterintelligence expert, could you

have conducted an investigation if you did not know about thu

AMLASH operation?

Mr. Swenson. I think I would have considered it had I

had that role. I didn't have it.

Senator schweiker.

I gave you a wong name there.

about Raul Diaz, i-a-u-1,

D-i-and, as a Cuban intellijence

agent.

MI. Swenson. I think he might haveubeen, Senator.

The

name sort of stirs a faint recollection.

Senator Schweiker. The name was incorrect before. Theid'i

an allegation that ho was at Dealey Plaza. If he were there.

pictured

somewnere, would you attach much significance so :..

or not?

ME. Swenson. I woulin't knon, Seratos, wishout knot:

more abodi his

backgroand. 'ü have to see what sort oi

relationship he had to Cuban intelligerse.

• Senator Schweikes. Dia you ever near of a dorris

Bishop or Biship who was acting in some capacity with t

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exile group?

Mr. Swenson. Morris Bishop?

Senator Schweiker. Bishop or just Bishop as a code name

or either the name of a Bishop or Morris Bishop?

MI. Swenson. I don't recall.

Senator Schweiker. It doesn't ring any bell at all?

Mx. Swenson.

(Nods in the negative.)

Mr. Epstein. What other assasination plots, if any, were

you aware of against Castro that were being planned by the

CIA other than AMLASH?

Mr. Swenson. I think that was the orly one that 1

personally knen about at the time. I think there might have

been one other. My stand was the

same on this generally.

Mr. Epstein. Did the other one have the same security

problem involved?

Mr. Swenson.

I don't recall that it did.

Really, I don'

have any keen

recollection of anything on this. If there were

somethiny significant that would have errjod, I would ell jo:

because I would have remembered it.

Mr. Epscoin. At any of the meetings or discussions tha:

followed President Kennedy's assassination, was any concern

ever expressed chat an invescigation of possible cuban

ties mighe resuit in exposing the Cia's plou to assassinate

Castro?

Hi. Swenson.

Absolutely not. I con't thin. any friend o:

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mine would have considered that at all. They wouldn't have

cared.

Mr. Epstein, They wouldn't have cared if the CIA's

plots to assassinate Castro were exposed?

Mr. Swenson. Not if that had a bearing on; the assassination

of the President. I'd say there was no attempt on the part oi

any people I knew to cover up anything which would be embarrass

ing, if that's what you're getting at.

MI. Epstein. Well, my question also relates to your own

operation in investigatiny possible connuctions.

Would

Mr. Swenson.

Had I found & connection, I would have

surfaced it immediately.

MI. Epstein. I understand, but in the decision

as to wha:

leads to set out or what breadth to give to the exploration

of that issue, of what assets to contact, would not an issue

involved in how broad to carry that be involved with

the quest:

of wether it would compromise an ongoiny CIA operation?

Mr. Swenson.

i suppose ii would be an element. ! tir tu!

consider everything if I'm doing it. But is would not have

jeterred me.

ir. Epstein, were toe Ayero, personnel attached to cac

riami office aware of the security problems involving dias::

and the

possibility that that Ayency plot might have been

compromised?

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Mr. Swenson, I can't recall specifically. Insofar as

people located at the WAVE station who had any participation

or connection with it are concerned, I would have seen to

it that they were alerted concerning any misgivings I had.

Mr. Epstein. Would that haveincluded every person connected

with WAVE station that was interrogating Cuban intelligence

assets?

Mr. Swenson. well, I wouldn't have gone to talk to

everybody there, but there was a CI staff at the WAVE station

which reported to the then Chief of Station at WAVE, and in

a dotted line function roported to me, and 1 certainly 100k0

at everything that they were

doing, and when I had misgivings

I would go there and express them.

Mr. Epsteii. Do you remember discussing the possibility

of the insecurity of AMLASH being the subject of discussion

between you and the Chief of the WAVE station?

Mr. Swenson. I have no specific recollection.

Mr. Epstein. Did you have any contast wich the varro::

commission?

Mr. Gweason. None.

Nr. Epstein. Do you recaii mu did:

sir. Swenson. I do not.

we. Postein.' was any requiremene evar levied on you

for Informacion beariny or the assassination to be supplit i

the narzen Commission?

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OR SECRET

63

MI. Swenson.

Not that I can recall.

Mr. Wallach. Were

you ever at any time learn or

pick up knowledge that Castro might possibly have sent

teans

of persons into the United States, for sabotage missions or

otherwise, in mid-'63 or late '63 in retaliation for the

sabotage attempts against -

Mr. Swenson. Not in retaliation, no.

Mr. Wallach. Well, how about just for sabotage here?

MI. Swenson. Well, I think he - the teams which he

sent in of which I am knowledgeable, were sent for the pur

of intelliyence collection or penetration of anti-castro a..

within the United states.

dr. Wallach, Were you ever aware, or are you aware thi

sonetine - I cannot recall the date, it was '61 or '62.

Mir. Epstein.

'62.

Mr. Wallach, '62. they were run out of lew York, whic

was later intercepted, caught by the FBl, that there was

an assassinatior attempt being run by bol and certain pers...i

within the United States?

Is that a fair questioni

Mi. Swenson, ! think in 1902 ve dien't know there ta:

a DUI.

ir, Wailach, Cuban inceiligence.

Mr. Sweison, Well, what

tney used to call cuban

intelligence which was, you know, our knowledge

early on w

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quite fragmentary. We learned about the Cuban intelligence

function through the defection of a rather well-placed person

whom I debriefed at great length, and I never got from him

anything which is germane

to what we are discussing here.

Mr. Johnston. What was his crypt?

Mr. Swenson. AMMUG-1.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, the FBI did through a well-

known Cuban in New York City, intercede and stop assassination

plots against certain of the anti-Castro leaders.

Was that ever called to your attention in '62?

Mr. Swenson. I can't recall

that.

Mir. Epstein.

Just one

more

general --

Mr. Swenson.

It might have been prior to the time that

I went to the Counterintelligence

group.

six. Wallach. Generally, can you describe for us fros

your knowledge, what you know, if anything, about the Matin

or Hafia-run operations

in cuba in '63?

Mr. Swanson.

No knowledge.

Mr. Wallach. No knowleäye?

i. Swanson. Absolutely none.

tr. Epstein.

was that an issue that was

ever considered

Dy jour operacion, the possibility, not for assassination

purposes nosessoriiy -

12, svenson. I had no inowledge ci in at that time,

tin:

I would not have looked on it with great favor anyway.

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Mr. Epstein." You're saying your operation --

Mr. Swenson. I didn't know about it, had no connection

with it, and I have no firsthand knowledge.

Mr. Epstein.

And it was never considered as a method of

counterintelligence activities by your -

Mr. Swenson. Not by me, no, or my staff.

Senator

Schweiker. Well, we want to thank you very

much.

I think we have pretty well exhausted ourselves. I hope

you are not. too exhausted, ir. Swenson.

We appreciate your

cooperation in coming here this morning.

Mr. swenson, Very giac to have keen here.

(Whereupon,

at 11:52 o'clock a.m., the interview in the

above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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