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157-10014-10185

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES:

SSCIA

157-10014-10185

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-90

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

SSCIA

TITLE: THE CONGO

DATE: 08/22/1975

PAGES:

5

SUBJECTS :

CIA

MOBUTU

LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS:

IB; IC

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

05/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

19.1

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Date : 08/07/95

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:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER: 157-10014-10185

RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-90

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : THE CONGO

DATE

08/22/75

PAGES

SUBJECTS

LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

-CIA

MOBUTU

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

01/19/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

50955

DocId: 32423573

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R883 Nec et! Versitine

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

INTERVIEW WITH:

REGARDING:

"Victor Hedgeman"

The Congo

DN....

ar..

4/1902

BL

DATE-TIME-LOCATION:

August 22, 1975, S20I, a.m./p.m.

Bill Bader

PRESENT:

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

SEE PAGE 5-- POSSIBLE INTERVIEWEES

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S) :

EXECUTIVE SESSION:

_YES

_NO

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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1

of

Interview and Meeting Summary - "Victor Hedgeman"

w/Bill Bader, August 22, 1975, S201

After an extended tour with the United States Army and

some education at San Diego State, Hedgeman went to Harvard

where he studied in the Department of International Relations,

working to a degree in political science. He didn't finish

his degree but went after being recruited at Harvard into

the OPC. He then became an NOC in Europe and for a number

of years worked in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. His pri-

mary responsibility in Belgium was that of surveillance of

Soviet operators in Europe. While in Brussels in 1959 he came

to meet a good percentage of the Congolese who would be

important in the Congo after independence: Ileo, Mobutu,

and Adoula. In January of 1960 he became the first Chief

of Station in the Congo; prior to that time the Agency had

had merely a liaison service. In late July of 1960 Hedgeman

returned to the United States with Ambassador Timberlake to

press for a U.S. policy of political action in the Congo.

Hedgeman's position was that the Soviets were moving large

amounts of equipment and manpower into the Congo and that

something had to be done to head it off. At the time he

first

went to the Congo he was the only man in the Station.

A year later there were five or six and eventually the Sta-

tion would reach upwards of twenty. Hedgeman mentioned that

the relationships and staff that he built in the Congo per-

sisted, and that when the Laotian operation started the

group would move

almost intact to Laos. Hedgeman believed

that the Congo was vitally important to American interests,

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Page

despite some criticism of that point from the State Depart-

ment. He felt that the economic wealth of the Congo was

important to the United States' future, and ;that it was

equally important that the Congo remain a viable unit. He

said that there was very strong resistance at the State

level for political action involvement in the Congo. For-

tunately the Congo operation became one of Allen Dulles'

projects. At the beginning, with the approval of the

Special Group, it was agreed

that the CIA would begin to

provide financial support for moderate Congolese politicians

By August of 1960, however, Hedgeman and Timberlake were push-

ing for instructions that would allow them to pursue a course

that would lead to a change in government. Hedgeman said that

those close to Lumumba at that time were Soviet agents. The

way that it was initially pursued was to the building of

personnel assets investing in labor unions to help them

with their propaganda, a lobbying campaign, direct payments

to

politicians.

The first major effort to

rid the Congo of Lumumba came

with a plan developed by Hedgeman to bribe enough members

of

the Senate in order to induce them to vote Lumumba out.. This

plan was to have taken place on the 7th of September, 1960.

Hedgeman had arranged that the radio would be denied Lumumba

after his defeat so

that he would

not be able to go on the

radio to try to change the decision of the Senate. Unfortunately

and for reasons Hedgeman does not know to this day, Mobutu

jumped the gun and threw

Lumumba out.

Lumumba in turn went

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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3. of

to the Assembly and harangued them

and got the vote and also got

FILE:

the vote in the Senate by bringing troops out and surrounding

the Senate building. Hedgeman said that up to this point he

had been thinking largely in parliamentary terms; that the

way to rid the country of Lumumba was through

the paramilitary

method. After this experience of the sth through the 7th, he

decided more drastic and direct methods had to be employed.

Hedgeman contends that the coup of Mobutu seized control was

arranged and supported, and indeed, managed, by the Central

Intelligence Agency. During the course of the interview

Hedgeman spoke glowingly. of Mobutu, who he feels is a man with

good political judgment, a sense of history, and the capacity

to be a Pan African leader.

Mobutu was only twenty-nine at

the time. Hedgeman says his most difficult time with Mobutu

came in February of 1961 when the Kennedy administration decided

that a federalized government, including all political factions

was the only hope of averting civil war.. Hedgeman was charged

with going to Mobutu and telling him that the United States

had decided to withdraw all support from him and that he

would have to resign. He said Mobutu was utterly shocked

by this and could not possibly believe the United States

could believe that the Congo was ready for parliamentary

government.

He said Mobutu was so upset that he drew his gun

and waved it in the direction of Hedgeman and said "If this

happens, I will die," and, looking at Hedgeman, "so will others."

Hedgeman said Mobutu only put his gun away when Hedgeman

told him that he did not personally agree with the decision,

that

he was just carrying out orders like a good soldier.

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Hedgeman stressed that in this period, 1960-1961, the

Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he sais that what

they were running was

a Scotch tape and baling-wire opera-

tion. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman said they be-

gan seriously in the end of 1962 with the arrival of a number

of I-6's that he and Ed Gullion had asked for. He said that these

aircraft were not intended to be used in combat, but only to

reassure the Congolese that the United States was with them and

provide them with a bit of black magic. Hedgeman professed that

the paramilitary combat missions of 1963, in support of anti-

rebel activities, were really quite minor affairs.

Some specifics. Hedgeman contended that he had no knowledge

of the approval of funding of South African mercenaries and

tribal leaders capable of resistance as approved by the 303

Committee. He also said, though, that he had important contact

with Mike Hoare mercenaries, they gave no direct or indirect

support to them. He also said there was he, repeat no, com-

plicity or support on the part of the CIA in the ouster of

Kasavubu by Mobutu in November of 1965.

Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman interspersed the

most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter's brushes with

death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, ranging

from being placed before two different firing squads during

one day and his evening as the selected victim of a hit con-

tract given by the Union Miniere.

As for CIA employees who might testify well, should the

Committee handle the Congo issue in executive session, Hedgeman

recommended Edward Korn-Patterson, Bronson Tweedy, and Glen

Fields.

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