DRAFT DOCUMENT: COMMENTS ON BOOK V, SSC FINAL REPORT, 'PERFORMANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
Originator: CIA
From: DEPUTY IG
To: ACTING DDCI
Document date: 08/30/1977
Document type: UNKNOWN DOCUMENT TYPE

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104-10143-10048

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CONFIDEN

INSPECTOR CEMERMO

77-1408

HSCA

77-0090

3. 0 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUN FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridge

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

Deputy Inspector General

CIA RISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SUBJECT

Corments on Book V, SSC Final Report, The

Investigation of the Assassination of President

Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies

l. Forwarded herewith is the report of a review that Mr.

Knoche requested last fall. The undersigned was designated as

chairman on

coordinator of an Agency working group that was

conduct the study.

It proved a more ambitious undertaking than

had been anticipated. The extensive files of cI Staff on the

Warren Commission inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination

were reviewed in detail, as were the very large file holdings of

LA division on its Cuban operations during the period preceding

and following the death of President Kennedy.

The most pains-

taking review and analysis was required, and

the files proved

be so extensive that the research became a major task.

The files

of the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General

presented a less formidable problem.

2.

The attached report, with its annexes, is the formal

result of the effort.

It ene atcachments seem bulky, it is

noted that additional back-up materials are being heid for the

record in the event of future inquiry.

These papers represent

the rasult of a conscientions and painssaking effort, conducted

with high standards of review and testing kept foremost in mind.

We believe that thare is Tittie likelihocd of oversight or emission

in coverage; the work was so extensive and carefully done that we

feel there is small chance of surprises remaining in CIA files on

this

subject.

In brief, we found that many of the presentations of

Book Y of the Final

Report of the Senate Select Conmittee were

based on incomplete information or distorted perceptions

the record of CiA was not perfect, the performance at the time,

under the understanding of the period, ssems reasonable.

The fact

remains that evidence of a Castro conspiracy to assassinate Presiden

Kennedy still has not been discovared. The Warren Commission and

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CIA could well have perceived the usefulness of inquiring into

specific sources of possible provocation of Castro at the time of

the 1964 investigation; it is clear that the general consideration

was recognized by all concerned, and pursued, but the concept of

specific possible provocations was not. A review into such possi-

bilities has now been conducted, with essentially negative results.

4. The report is not to be considered a report of the

Inspector General, as such, being the result of a representative

working group.

However, the report should be considered as being

for internal CIA consumption only. It contains third agency reports,

liaison reports, and involves sources and methods materials, as wall

as evaluation and comment of a nature that is advisory to manage-

Any release of this report and its annexes outside the Agency,

even in classified form, would require considerable sanitization.

It is recomnended that this report be held against future inquirias,

providing a basis for appropriate responses, and that it not be

Brechinly

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment:

As Stated

D/IG/S.D. Breckinridge:js (23 Aug 1977)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/Copy Fl of Att.

1 - SA/DCI (Robert D. Williams) w/Copy #2 of Att.

1 - SA/ADDCI (Lewis D. Lapham) w/Copy #3 of Att.

1 - ADDO w/Copy #4 of Att.

1 - Asst. Public Affairs (Mr. Hetu) w/Copy #5 of Att.

Chief, LA w/Copy #6 of Att.

- Chief, CI Staff w/Copy #7 of Att.

- D/OS w/Copy #8 of Att.

- IG (John L. Leader) w/Copy #9 of Att.!

- D/IG (S.D.B. Chrono) w/Copy #10 of Att.

1 - IG subject w/Original Copy of Att. (UNNUMBERED)

- 2 -

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Table of Contents

APPROYED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA MISTORICAL REYES PROGRAM

Summary of Findings

Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review

Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries

Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba

Tab D. AMLASH Operation

Tab E.

Materials Forwarded to Warren Commission and FBI

Tab F.

Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit

Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments

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_-

SUBJECT: Comments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities

1. Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the

Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves

to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based

on a

series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled,

and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that

the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren

Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations

of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence

on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation.

The following statements appear in the Report:

"It (the SSC Report) places particular

emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera-

tions seemed to have on the investigation."

Page 2.

"They (senior CIA officials) should have

realized that CIA operations against Cuba,

particularly operations involving the

assassination of Castro, needed to be con-

sidered in the investigation. Yet, they

directed their subordinates to conduct

an investigation without telling them of

these vital facts." Page 7.

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GONFIDENHAL

The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC

Report, is highlighted as follows:

"Certainly, concern with public reputation,

problems of coordination between agencies,

possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment,

and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge

of sensitive operations may have contributed to

these shortcomings. But the possibility

exists that senior officials in both agencies

made conscious decisions not to disclose

potentially important information." Page 7.

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro

had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into

retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes

it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and

accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention

the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro

programs

to see what it might reveal.

The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the

SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the

perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con-

ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that

the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President

2

-GON

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Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding

of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the

Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban

Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to

Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs.

The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile

Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been

perceived by a foreign power as a provocation.. To note these events

serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at

the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA

operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of

provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep-

tions.

In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the

various operational activities against Cuba and Castro.

Organization for the Review

As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved

at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary

to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963

and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are

no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and

detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi-

gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for

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145: 563ao

the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following

it.

It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted

to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The

organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper.

It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations,

it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper-

ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the

Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to

plotting against Castro.

The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are

contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it,

Tabs & through G.

CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end"

of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have

started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination,

although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In

fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying

to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to

identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President

Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity

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CONFIDENTIAL

(whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the

assassination of President Xennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it.

The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make

the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's

presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.)

We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's

theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance

in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is

compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories

can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones.

Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary

possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee

Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the

possibility of Cuban or Soviet

involvement, but could not find evi-

dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it

would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a

simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in

the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif-

ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often

prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of

government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con-

spiracy to suppress evidence.

5

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Operations Against Castro

The -AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a

capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into

a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban

exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to

CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum,

with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. At a

later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew

from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in

Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity

from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are

suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having

been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the

reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that

Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range

objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an

irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum

until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely

that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to

assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C.

Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1,

who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime.

The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned

Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of

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President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation

shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA

not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/, but had rejected his

proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view

was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was

dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC

Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character

of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1

was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot.

Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro

as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against

Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the

justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either

event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and

CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association

that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the

basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail

at Tab D of this paper.

The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that

actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source

for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There

are new considerations that developed in the course of the present

review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate,

but they do not provide a basis.for taking issue with the judgment of

the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided

Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C.

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SONFIDENTIAL

Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for

treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in-

vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with

the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These al-

legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to

have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report

is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a

reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting

arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only

was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to the

alleged. five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the

alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a

Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi-

gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available

for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be

dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially

being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another

instance considerable emphasis was given lythe SSC Final Report to a

cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1963 in-

quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain

named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/1 was given in the Mexico City

reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the

purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in

8

CONFIDENTIAL-

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LUITIDENDAL

1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern-

901e09t

ing

with

ase to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1, i

7961.

AMLASH/1's name could have been omitted from the cable

altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about

persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the

meeting in

1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration,

which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject

matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to

AMLASH/l's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is

discussed further at Tab D.

Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two

general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous

factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera-

tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents.

Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren

Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-

Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for

that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its ..

treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to

characterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the

problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused.

the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has

reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it

has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

9

CONFIOSNTAL

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GUNHIDENTIAL

future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited

its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served

to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader

view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific

terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet

or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of

the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous

criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader

initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had

no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place

of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has

undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings

are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA

cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have

been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of

the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions

already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of

president Kennedy.

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SEBREL

1 AUG 1975

TERMS OF REFERENCE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED FOR REVIEW OF:

1999

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELZASE 1993

CIA HISTORIGAL REVIEN FROGRAM

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses --

(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily

CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility

of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative

and may have led to the assassination of President Kerredy. The

former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either

there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection

program to ascertain all possible information on the subject.

Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all

information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this

question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had

to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation

is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back-

ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's

Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these

general activities were provocative. More specific, however,

is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity

that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory

action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report

this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation

theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information.

Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in

support of the thesis.

=...

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3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot

be restricted to the AMLASH operation.

In itself it may be one of

the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro-

vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against

President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un-

qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the

AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and

in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the

Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as

a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's

investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to

the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was

there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard

to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in

response to Headquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this

reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to

the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was

ordered through 1964?

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(

--

(10) What were the parameters of these instructions?

(Il) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"

theory was considered during the Warren Commission

enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this

concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an

Oswald/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this

subject?

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and

where

are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency

other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in in-

vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission

tenure?

(21) What is the total CIA information on the two

fights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further

information on this matter?

(23) Can further information be acquired on this

matter now?

- 3 -

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SEAR

(24) What is the total CIA information on "D"?

(25) Is further information on "D" needed in view

of the SSC Subcommittée reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald

FPCC relations?

(27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans

training activity and was anything provided on this to

the Warren Commission?

(28) What is the total CLA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?

(30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December

1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban

assassination policies and programs up to November 22,

1963?

(32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's

7 September 1963 statements re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA

employees contain anything on the abové questions?

If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the

assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities

should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine

any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving

the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate

operation?

- 4-

sar?

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SEME

(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate

operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office

of Security officer may have knowledge that was not

surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or

Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division

career agent may have some insights that could throw

light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent

trattic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged

assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of

Pigs period to shoot Castro.

information on these?

What is the total ClA

(5) What is the significance on the subject of

provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by

Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly

detailed reconstruction from a very complete record,

there are points that should be addressed particularly,

because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report.

For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA

contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a

long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time

the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1

when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive

Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the

AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

-5 -

....

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(

SLoB

c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection

with the investigation? An effort should be made to list

these, including consultation with surviving officials to

determine not only what they considered the requirement

at the time, but what was omitted and why.

4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake

to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S.

policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's

apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which,

therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the

area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission

requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those

that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued

these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This

will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions

raised in the Schweiker report

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{)

APPROVED FOR MELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROCRAM

ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW

-.

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-

CONFID

APPRCIED FOR RELEASE 1933

Organization For andiA StOPICAL REVEN PROGRAM

1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com-

mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities

of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President

Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are

no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have

retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died.

2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to

this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities

of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A

study group was established to consider the size of the problem and

to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre-

sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also

consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of

Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in

early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the

thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full

review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify

any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba

did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONEMENTIAL

2--

president Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached.

3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question

were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations,

with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security. and

the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review

of those files is described below.

4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files

for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known

to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the

period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review,

covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy

and the following year. A research group was formed composed of

five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor.

An additional four researchers participated in different phases of

the research, which continued to mid-May 1977.

5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from

the LA Division

registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special

comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information

Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed

that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900

operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later

determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional

operational and

subject files which brought the total to well over

two

thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it,

CONFIDENTIAL

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GONFIDER TIAL

-- 3 --

both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives C

The remainder is held at Headquarters in the

files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This

material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job

numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the

LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein).

6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files

reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and

organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed

(1) Operational

1,729

(601 with findings and 1,128

with no findings)

(2) Subject Files

547

1186 with findings and 361

with no findings)

(3) Cuba Policy Files

101

(4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files

(Task Force W Chronos)

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

Total

37

100-plus

2,514

b..

Criteria Used in the Research

As a guide the research group followed the Terms of

Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of

Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest

---

## Page 27

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CONFUENTA

brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis,

and to additional questions raised in the course of the

study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was

reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved

in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel

Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of

a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975,

based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book

that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt

with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi-

nation attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the findings

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the

subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the

activity, and a copy of those documents) or findings which

contained information believed to be pertinent to the review.

Also included were job numbers, official file numbers,

inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of

volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request

of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or

other government agencies knowledge of information, to the

extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda

were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the

heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document

number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing

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## Page 28

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COMTIUENTIAL

-- 5 --

the gist of the documents) for purpose of easy and quick

reference.

These memoranda, with a copy of the documents)

attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and

subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official

LA Division research group files a

(Volumes XI through XX). Also

included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X)

containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings.

These records are restricted in LA Division.

7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more

complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new

files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation

of material further extended the time required to complete the under-

taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency

can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of

Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the

death of President Kennedy.

8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review

its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of

Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points

not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject.

9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point

of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the

CONF

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## Page 29

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AONEIDENTT

AL

--6 --

Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com-

mission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising

some 142 file folders and portfolios.

In addition, the Staff. has

accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy

of those documents released under provisions of the FOlA to the public

in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series)

released in September 1976 and March 1977.

10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono-

logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a

chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the

Agency's central repository for information and documentation that

it holds on:

a. The life of Harvey Oswald;

b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted

by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964;

c. The testimony by various Agency officers before

the several commissions and committees set up to review

the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should

be pointed out that this portion of this file is not

complete) ; and

d. The point of record for Agency action taken in

response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro-

visions of the freedom of Information Act.

CUNNDENTIAL

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GONTIDERTAL

-- 7--

11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in

the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in order to be in

a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of

Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to

place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific

subjects.

In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld

information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there

was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi-

gation or gather information," the following files were set up:

a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission;

b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren

Commission;

c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community,

particularly the FBI;

d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting

assistance and information;

e. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and

f. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the

SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do

in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry.

COMFIDENTAL

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GONEIDENTIAL

-- 8--

12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by

chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on

the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor-

mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the

investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly

the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b), its response to require-

ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and

the Warren Conmission. Certain parts of the record were summarized

to record what actually happened in those instances in which it

differs from representations in the SSC Report.

13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one

officer to identify material in its records believed to have some

possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of

this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as

containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to

the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed

included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals

connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of

files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time.

of the "Garrison Investigation."

14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector

General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against

Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It

also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONSMENTIE

-- 9--

request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable

activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to

the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research

effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in

Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector

General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as

a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding

President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards.

The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive

review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters

or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in

Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General

are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by

LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of

the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK

file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed

in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify

specific points.

********

Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the

respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-

up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the

Inspector General.

CONFUICMTIAL

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## Page 33

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- =

SEGRET

1 AUG 1975

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR REVIEW OF

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORIGAL REVIEW FROGRAM

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses --

(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily

CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility

of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative

and may have led to the assassination of President Kercedy. The

former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either

there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection

program to ascertain all possible information on the subject.

Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all

information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this

question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had

to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation

is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of generai back-

ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's

Cuba.

There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these

general activities were provocative. More specific, however,

is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity

that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory

action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report

this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation

theory, is

advanced as a failure to report relevant information.

Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in

support of the thesis.

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## Page 34

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..:

3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot.

be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of

the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro-

vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against

President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un-

qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the

AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and

in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the

Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as

a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's

investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to

the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was

there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard

to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in

response to Headquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this

reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to

the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was

ordered through 1964?

- 2-

£330007

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## Page 35

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(

(10) What were the parameters of these instructions?

(11) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"

theory was considered during the Warren Commission

enquiries,

either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this

concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an

Oswald/ Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this

subject?

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and

where are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency

other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in in-

vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission

tenure?

(21) What is the total CIA information on the two

flights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further

information on this matter?

(23)

Can further information be acquired on this

matter now?

- 3 -

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## Page 36

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(24) What is the total CIA information on "D"?

(25) Is further information on "D" needed in view

of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald

FPCC relations?

(27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans

training activity and was anything provided on this to

the Warren Commission?

(28) What is the total ClA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?

(30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December

1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban

assassination policies and programs up to November 22,

1963?

(32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's

7 September 1963 statements re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA

employees contain anything on the abové questions?

If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the

assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities

should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine

any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving

• the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate

operation?

- 4 -

---

## Page 37

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(

(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate

-

operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office

•- of Security officer may have knowledge that was not

surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or

Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division

career agent may have some insights that could throw

light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent

traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged

assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of

Pigs period to shoot Castro.

What is the total CLA

information on these?

(5) What is the significance on the subject of

provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by

Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly

detailed

, reconstruction from a very complete record,

there are points that should be addressed particularly,

because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report.

For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA

contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a

long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time

the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1

when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive

Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the

AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

•...

-5 -

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## Page 38

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c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection

with the investigation? An effort should be made to list

these, including consultation with surviving officials to

determine not only what they considered the requirement

at the time, but what was omitted and why.

4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake

to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S.

policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's

apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which,

therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the

area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission

requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those

that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued

these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This

will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions

raised in the Schweiker report

---

## Page 39

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

CIA

PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES

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## Page 40

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COMFIDENTAL

CIA's Performance on the Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Cormission inquiry, empha-

sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts

were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or

analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the

years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the

Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every

theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con-

clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is

evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the

intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the

performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying

a patternof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case:

a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as

"D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and

saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose

of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both

by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans

instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to

have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in-

conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

CONFIDI

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## Page 41

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COLRDENTIAL

b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the

AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately.

The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during

the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in

order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D

of this report.

c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico

City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60-

63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report,

is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November

flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story

removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The

second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance

arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him

thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC

Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final

Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional

criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions.

To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth

and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both

on the part of CIA and the Warren Commission--consideration was given

to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

2

COMMIDENTAY

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## Page 42

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CONFIUEIINL

questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those

questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of

inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent

to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959.

These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The

first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in

October 1959

from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from

which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA,

there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that

might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final

Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA

as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These,

four general areas of inquiry are covered below.

I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962

On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome,

madrid,

1/7

Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to

the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his

employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested:

"any scrap information which bears on President's

assassination....

3

Troves

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## Page 43

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CONFIDENTIL

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with

-two

Helsinki and London providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British

journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959

there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living

in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Setawd reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from cuba to "govern that on the

official attitude of Govt to which they accredited.

same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's

travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by

a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various

reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife

from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the

United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

4

BOTTLENTH

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## Page 44

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wing

detailed results although there were some

operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence

surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held

with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance.

No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's

assassination of President Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report,

in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the

investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will

not be detailed here.

II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get

visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive

attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to

Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern

felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit,

and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at

the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on

28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possibility

that other as yet unknown persons may have

• .

been involved or even that other powers may

have played a role.

5

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COMPOENTIAL

ag allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money

¿egm Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive

scention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter,

and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively

is have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the •

time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations

was demonstrated

to have been lying. After the allegations

dy "g" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following

statement to the Mexico City Station on l December 1963:

"Pis continue to follow all leads and tips.

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on

Ma December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as

follows:

"Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

propaganda about case.

el

restlerico

On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stated as follows:

"...Mexico City has been the only major

overseas reporter in the case. While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

6

COR

FIDENTIAL

a artrait:

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## Page 46

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COMFIDINTIAL

life, we have not overlooked the really out-

_standing performance of Mexico City's major

"assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded. Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

[Department of State] and [the FBI].

dorta

the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in

the quick clarification of the case, blanking

out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as

thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or

Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything,

events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as

counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans

and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more

simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with

speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press

in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations

inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit;

these are commented on at Tab G.

III. General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable

from Headquarters with the following statement:

.. . ...-

7

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## Page 47

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рон

MOENTAL

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all

of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence

developments. Although we have no reason to

expect anything of a particular military nature,

all hands should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new President

takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other

than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to

field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be

stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and

this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi-

cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative.

It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has

been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant

or significant information on the subject it would have been reported

either in responses to the expression of general interest, or

spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly

involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

CONaDE TA!

8

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## Page 48

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would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete

reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis

for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re-

quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to

produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect

at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued,

but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-

what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection

•

reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in

the Headquarters cable to Mexico City of I December 1963 (note above)

which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from

other stations:

"... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee

Oswald's life.

• "

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10

about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description

of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was

only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were

military infe

sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but

there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor-

mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently

was missed - or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As

stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

"Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct

an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was

limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

.9..=e

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## Page 49

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requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity

in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case

officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic

activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station

as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be

extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the

United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of

page 58.

The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different

terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI

and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of

activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every

question that has been concerned since then.

IV "Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section

that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the

intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance

on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to

Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's

murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported

to be aboard those flights.

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana

flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico

City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this

time on 22. November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on

10

PROCTOR MIAT

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CONFIDENTIAL

22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headquarters. There was ane unitaterall eRA surveillance Cabilet

that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

кЛах

e.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

11

YAB

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CoMEDENTAL

Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain,

at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record

of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori-

ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no

recorded response. The current review revealed additional information

from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

in reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion

of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final

Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City

times

are used in the following discussion.

TAB

=

Records show that the flight arrived at the platform

at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed

few minutes earlier.

cha tam

The departure of the aircraft was

2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation

in

the SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana

flight was on the ground in Mexico City

for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not

12

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## Page 52

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CONFDENHAL

delayed five hours, as alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City

time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a

private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts

further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight.

which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded

-..

substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it

allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of. the Cubana flight, it is

very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported

had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of

these sources and probabiy knew the above facts, feeling no need to

follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its

summary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con-

siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to

the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the

assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the

SSC Final Report state that:

•• • one source alleged that the Cuban-American

was 'involved' in the assassination."

LUNITOER

13

TAB

IAU

Гт

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CONFIDENMAL

-

The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI "almost

inmediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi-

gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further

down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi-

gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual

travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious

travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had

contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee --FPCC)

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi-

gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau

did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon-

sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report

contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the

results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the

FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting

about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will

be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement

at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who

saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana

on Movember 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'

..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-

up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

14

CONHDEMTAL

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## Page 54

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CONHDENTIAL

except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban

American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some

inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington

that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December

1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on

23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at

a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a

certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana

flight on night 27 November,"

This was followed by a dispatch the same

date, repeating the basic information in the cable, -

and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding

Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana

are suspicious."

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in

history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who

was on

the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as

possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report

of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI;

it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal

memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the

nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

15

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## Page 55

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CONFIBENTANL

to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way

into the more careful statements that usually characterize official

reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres-

sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic

•

activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing

the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the

context of known

i facts. On 19 March 1964, Meteeppey Base cabled

that a source

alahad information on a man; the description seems to have the

same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the

report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement

that. he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he

entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final

Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts

that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and

times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico

City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his

passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued

in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa,

Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number

of known points.

The source patently was extensively misinformed, the

hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time,

when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could

not recall it.

GENFIOEHEI

1hk115i

16

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BONES

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the

record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre-

sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out

that the Mexico City Station's response to the

Monterney report

contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When

vase

Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of

Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully

with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63."

It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of

entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained

today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to

highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how

it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information

on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access

to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became

available with such information he was queried and the results

were provided the authorities.

17

69830T 2

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## Page 57

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

---

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## Page 58

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AFPROVED FOR NEI.ERSE 1933

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW FROGRAM

CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the

Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in

detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that

it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for

specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren

Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times;

it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However,

to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of

evidence that must still control how the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission

inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy

Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final

Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as

the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962

(see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American

policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro

regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-

vocative.

Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been

viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,.

GEORET

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## Page 59

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SEGRET

¿conomic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re-

ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of

covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963

president Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major

policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban

revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what

"White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban

people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who.

conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.

Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other

elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from

private sources. With or without official U.S, support these exiles

spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban

intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America

and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to

CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration,

whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took

what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions

between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in

the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of

2

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SECRET

Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly

reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request

was not, made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel-

•ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being

faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it

could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its

staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the

murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary

a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of

public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final

Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the

intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention

in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that

there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President

Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro-

voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life.

However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it

had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern-

ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S.

operations against Cuba. "

In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the

3

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## Page 61

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organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report).

This

was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that

could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President

Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security.

Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything

that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in-

quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is. a matter of record. For

instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to

various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with

those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and

weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded

judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera-

tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of

those activities that may have related to the assassination of the

President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way.

While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see

Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what

was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what

might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary --

which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con-

spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom

knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities.

4

SEARET

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Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the

various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's

death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those

persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some

are dead. The SSC, for instance - in its attempt to capture ele-

ments of the past - seems to have led some employees into expressing

opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in

response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this

illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues,

today, on a responsible basis.

The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called

AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was

dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative

relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although

the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted

to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten-

sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in

this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President

Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/l was amorphous and

without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that

there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under-

taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this

discussion.

5

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In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report,

it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban

aperations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1967-1964.

The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not

possible to predict the form that information turned up by this

inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort.

In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in

mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review,

it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational

activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements

of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues

already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the

original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether

there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That

such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds. is apparent, but

that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly

to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The areas of operational activity noted above can be described

briefly as follows:

1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (ANTRUNK)._

2. Operations involving the criminal underworld.

3. Other reports of plans to

assassinate Castro.

6

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asid

There is one other general activity that was considered in the

course of the present research, which is discussed below. This

activity!

AMTRUNK

was to develop a capability for splitting the

leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It

never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered

possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it

never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity,

because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele-

vant to the question.

It is included simply because it might be viewed,

by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the

hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than

try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the

reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject

to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some

purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this

research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis

of the SSC Report.

In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the

direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of theme

developed an oper-

ational concept to overthrow the Castro government.

which came to be

known as the Leonardo Plan.

had been a public figure in Cuba,

who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception

of the plan.

поіс

a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in

the anti-Batista movement.

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## Page 65

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Monce

defected to the United States in April 1961, settling

in Miami-where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his

associates was

/, a Cuban citizen

After

WWIl he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own

business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was

imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As

he held a valid U.s. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961.

discussed the Leonardo Plan with

He,

in turn, discussed it with

ma reporter.

had reported on Cuban activities

prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had

developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to

Washington

n April 1961, where he claimed to have

an entree to the White House

He also claimed to have a

standing invitation for direct con-

tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and

McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of

this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that

the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval.

In early 1963

arranged an interview in Washington with

Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor.

•and

• then met

with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State,

who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA

assigned it to iss Miami station, where it became known as LATANKa

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## Page 66

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SECRET

Nik was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per-

sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of

uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled

certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be

used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station

in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain

security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen-

erously in order for it to proceed independently:

17 Anital ARRi

posation was in.

In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A

Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases

complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It

emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a

high priority objective.

Hactor Be

mammasons to me arents sources,

itat

9

SEGRET

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## Page 67

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SECRET

The AMLASH operation is

discussed at Tab D.

as patchan 1900.

пре-

stretros anne our cus

rection wid

Ve

resi

In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads

into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The

operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to

set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success-

fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac-

tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability

for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur-

ity became less certain. In 1965. its security was believed to have

been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re-

lations with it.

10

SECRET

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SECRET

The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is

just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses

from the beginning. -

she is tuered to be tinglity

thianatibers

erson to became

Fad Szute ingzulchhas beer suspect since 1948

Hen

the Blarecorded reports that he was

a communist.

Re-

portedly

was in frequent contact with communist

party

leaders and

functionaries throughout Latin America.

sus-'

picions about his

motives or possible conpections with

foreign intelligenc

services, have never been proven.

Nicole Szulc, daughter

af Tad Szuls

fis reportedly an avid

communist. Philip Agee's

Aside

the Company: A CIA Diary

credits Nicole: Szulc with

"obtained vital research

materials in New York apd Washingsoin

D.C." She is be-

lieved to be an agent of the Cuban Dot,

Doubts about Tad

Szulc are unconfirmed but remain alive.

¡Polish origin

Szulc became

us. citizen in 1954 by a spec

al

bill of

congress.

orig

Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky.

Like Szulc, he is of golish

He and szule became" acquainted In 1959-1960-14

11

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## Page 69

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GEORET

Cuba:

A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared

by

MWAVE analyste makes the fottowing statement: "Vorsky's

knowle.

ge of clandestine methods of operation, together with

his Russia

prison backgroung and his ingenuity a

a middleman

in U.S. Gover

ment/ClA activities, made him arexcellent

candidate for a

ammunist penetration agent and that the pos-

sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or

stringer for the RIS."

There has beer no confirmation of

Volsky

became

naturalized U.S. citizen

these suspicions.

on 10 April 1969.

C.

•Jose Ricardo RABEL

Aune:

Born in Cuba, he was the

son of a native born Ameyican citizen.

He was educated both

in Cuba and in the States and later

(0940) enlisted in the

U.S. Army. After

anischarge he returned

Cuba but kept

moving back and forth between the U.s. land

uba.

Viewed in

retrospect,

career presents a patter

of changing alle-

giances.

enjoined the anti-Batista forces in

arch 1952

first wi

h the Cuban exites in the United States and later

from

side Cuba. He joined the cuban Army under Batis

and yas the Cuban liaison affieer with the U.S. Army mis-

12

SEARET

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## Page 70

4-00000

period in the Cuban Army he was involved with

Gident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956

nen

he par

icipated in an attempted coup. After a short i

orison-

ment he returned to the u.s. and worked with one or

mis brothers.

In October 195

he returned to Cuba and became involved with

the 26th of July Movement and later with the

Cienfuegos Group.

Shortly after the Castro

victory, Cast

called upon RABEL to

set up a Cuban Marine Corge, a job dle held until 1960, at which

time he was appointed Chief

¡viendos Campesinas (Rural

Housing). Approached by CIA, he

refused to work in place but

was willing to defect, y

fich he did

December 1962, being

recruited by UMWAVE

cation where he was

used in AMTRUNK

activities.

He

turned to Cuba on his own

in 1965, reportedly

to attempt th

exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba

he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was

set fre

in July or August 1967. There were accusatio

s that

was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusa.

ions

RAB®

over.

In view of the later roll-up of the Awlrink operation the

tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have

been

an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access

at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of

13

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## Page 71

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S707T

individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime.

Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the

operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress

and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The

eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization

to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress o

An attempt to build support that might eventually have the

capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously

would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog-

ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant

consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have

provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul

Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because

14

SECRET.

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## Page 72

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of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories

printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis =

Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the

years, having served in different branches of the U.s. military

and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's

takeover.

Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which

time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control

of the gambling interests.. He came to the United States in 1959.

Sturgis gained notoriety when

arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water-

gate break-in.

He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been

an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation-

ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the

Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

ad-ont newspaper

PUNCHINGS,

15

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## Page 73

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SECRET,

This was prior to delivery

of the poison pills

in late February or early March 1961.

kale in this connection was over when he took refuge

di

ne.

it on

sturgis' identification of !

prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised

the question of just what sturgis had known, and whether he could

SEORETI

---

## Page 74

14-00000

have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro

could have learned

l. of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of

information.

However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975

additional attention was given the statement

in the press to see,how it might fit in with other things that are

known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach

ato the reliability of newspaper stories.

The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another

story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation-

ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning

Pat

LOCHEET

ro, tri conguneiro

Yarsk Da

nate bei

have tada,

gavernme no reration to the gambingo....

another because or chen. connections

17

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## Page 75

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The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a

Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an

attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the

1975 stories.

Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one

point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means

for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that "soon after

her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters ... to

kill Castro..." In the news story she claimed that the plan

involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face

cream; they dissolved and could not be used.

On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum

from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA

Deputy Director for Plans:

"During recent conversations with several

friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel

fastro was to be done away with very shortly.

When doubt was expressed regarding this state-

ment, Giancana reportedly assured those

present that Castro's assassination would occur

in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already met with the assassin-to-be

78

---

## Page 76

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.....

SECRET

on three occasions... Giancana claimed that

everything has been

perfected for the killing

of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged

with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill'

in some drink or food of Castro."

This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro

with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time

frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various

schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961.

It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own.

Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta,

Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter-

mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader

who might participate. This man,

, headed ti

one of the exile groups that also received

support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation.

was

dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station

suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In

fact, it is possible that

already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to

the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this.

One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal

SEGRET

19

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## Page 77

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•

SOMET

underworld for some of the Cuban exiles.

The other report, on

18 January 1961, suggests that

was one of those receiving

that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of

interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster

elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who

would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre-

sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits

of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an

explanation of why

was so readily available when approached

by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the

1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called

off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was

reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something

already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been

terminated a year earlier.. It is possible that CIA simply found itself

involved in providing additional resources for independent operations

that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate

had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have

sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri-

butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

20

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## Page 78

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SEGRET

What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious

that many. lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of

which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate

activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were

initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing

the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be

listed as follows:

1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde-

pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve-

ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con-

tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs,

being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan

in April 1962.

b. The syndicate operations could have activities such

as those that are reported in the New York Daily News

stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the

criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he

was not a member of it. He could well have been used by

the syndicate in its activities.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his

statements are treated with considerable reserve. He

probably did know

He was outside of Cuba, however, wheng

when both of them were in Cuba.

was given the

STORET

21

---

## Page 79

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.

SCORET

role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and

his. knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been

in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975

newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it

was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation

of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of

or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate,

whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any

of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits

and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami

community after

settled there

5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations,

that would tend to reinforce

the thought that the details

of its operations would have been characterized by discre-

tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960.

The authors of Book Y of the SSC Final Report felt that the

operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate

would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe-

sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated:

..

• it is unlikely that Castro could have

$;

22

---

## Page 80

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distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its

provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different

context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations

with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination

of President Kennedy.

Possible Ruby-Trafficante Contact

There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect

of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can

only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another

are not within the Agency's capabilities.

As noted earlier (see Tab B...

_page 4), a 27 November 1963

report records statements by a British journalist that during his own

imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos"

who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type

named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that

"Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in

1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person

jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.

23

---

## Page 81

4-100000

If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the

British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow

point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material

consideration, as there are reservations about both sources.

It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but

there is no further known relevant information in the Agency

on the matter.

The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in

jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit

by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit

Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963

removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as

evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if

Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide

an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi-

ficance of past assocations or contacts.

Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's

1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby

reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.

24

157722

Meet 81

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## Page 82

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SERREA

However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify

at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late

1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true.

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

There were other references to possible assassination plots

against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim

Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders. They are summarized briefly below:

In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee

stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission

to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to

enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to

Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter.

As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check

was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited

by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the

Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement.

On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966)

he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro.

He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report

of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas

post. The details of his actual role is unknown to the Agency,

although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in

Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the

course of this research effort.

25

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## Page 83

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SECREI

Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro

1. During the investigations in 1975 five

agent messages were

identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing

such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation,

the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication

that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The

existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony

before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy

Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages

and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged

with serving as an interface with the congressional committees.

Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled.

The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report

on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is

sunmarized again below.

I

2.

and seem cu

22 March t964

the messages myarved the game peop

e co the same prail. Me purst messagey datect

ine message

aproposed sabotage. or he electre

Cor

this cour be

"ordinated with attempt

aga Iris

des ted the Agency piron sma

thes

26

SSCRET

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## Page 84

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all

lad died in accordance with general plan

The

is no record that this-message was answered. Two days later,

on 2

arch 1961, possibly because off the absence of a reply, the

same agent

nent another message.

This stated that the plan was

scheduled for

3 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an

"assassination attenat at said place (will be) followed by a general

shutting off of main

ectric plants in Havana.

General anti-regime

developments to follow this

were then outlines. This message was

answered on 30 March agreeing

hat a

"major effort should be launched

Hawana on date you selected."

It

ecommended contacting other, named

persons, looking to a more general

sing. The message addressed

the general issue, making no comment on f.

3 proposal to kill Castro

third message, on 5 April

1961

1, presumably

from the same agent,

reported that the persons

had been directed

contact had arms

for only 50 men.

While stating that the sabotage a

the electric

company and "possibly

attempt on Fidel" would be carried

out 9 April,

he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a

clandestine organization in Cuba; "your military aid is decisive.

does not

come that date we are lost." There is no indication what

this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has

best.

3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the

cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for

one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The

four agents in question are commented on briefly below:

if it

27

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## Page 85

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SECRET

a.

AMBRONG/5 is the agent who sent the messages out-

lininga the proposed sabotage effoct and attempt against

Castro.

file opened 3o July 1960. A PA MaS

not iss

ed

until 18 December 196l, and ar

31 Januar

1962. A debriefing of him

November

1960, prior

to the Kennedy Administration, revealed

that he had

been in touch with people who had

plotted the aliassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed

to have tried hipself to make

similar plans. He was

infiltrated on 9

ecember 196

0, exfiltrating 15 February

1 961

.. *

(2) AMBRONC/5

1961 and exfiltrated

infiltrated again 3 March

in 19 June 1961. This

covered the period ofsh

pigs.

His sole mission wa

messages and the Bay of

to organize resistance

groups.

(3) AMBRONCy5 was infiltrated again on 19 December

1s61, exfiltrating 29 March 1962 again with the same

mission.

(4)

AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated

finally 2 May

1962, was ärrested 29 May 1962, and way executed.

30 Augus

1962. He has been reported asanever admitting

thal

herwas a CIA agent. His name is not one of those

28

MACHET

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## Page 86

4-00000

- 1 =

SEGRET

in

Ake book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing

those

daimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against

his

Fe.

b. AM-DAX/Y

was one of those AMBRONC/5 was t

id to

ontact for

general plan for April 1961.

(1)

POL

on 5 January 1961. His missión was to

organize paralei litary activities in Cuba.

He in-

filtrated in Fe

Truary 1961 and extiutrated in July

1961 following the

Bay of Pigs.

This period covered

the above messages.

(2)

Re-infiltrat

29 July 1961, with the same

organizing mission, he

Was

arrested on f7 August 1961,

and is serving a thirty year

term.

His name appears

in the book given Senator

c. AMPUG/1 was another

chovern.

those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan

in Apri

1961.

(1) Recruited/ing September 1960

, he was in-

filtrated that mantil, receiving airdraps in December

1960.

He returned to the U.S. 15. May 19

al, following

the Bay of Pigs.

(2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1967;

With the

mission to grganize resistance groups and conduçt

sabotage

gperations, he was arrested in July 196

is serving a thirty year term. His name is among

the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

and

40

ose

29

SECRET

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## Page 87

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SEGRET

d.

AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5

told to

cohtact for his general plan in April 1961.

This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 196%

a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (althoughsthere was

a MOC sHie

12 July 1960). He was to orgallize resistance

groups

in

the Havana and Pinar del Rio greas.

(2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, hedwas/arrested

23 April 1961g

and is serving a thirty year term. HiS!

name is among those in the book gaven Senator McGovern

by Castro.

(3) Records relating to

filtration into Cuba

this man mention his in-

August 1960 and exfiltration

in November 1960 (prior

his being issued a POA).

His

"mission" during

the

taperiod is mentiöned tersely

as/ being "to organized

resistance groups... for

mounting sabotage

operations

and assassination

of prominent Cubari

Communist members in the Castro

entourage

The records refer to "his own

personal objeetives" during this period and criticizes

how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August

to November

1960. The record then spech

fies how he is

to conduc

E himself-and focus is effortstan his return.

whic

vas to develop sabotage operations. We were able

to contact one of his two case officers, whoshas retired

30

SECRET

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## Page 88

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SECRET

other had died), to ascertain his recollections.

rating that at the time the focus was on developing

ordantzations for operations, he statedthat a

assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7

on hispearlier time in Cuba, not ohly was not authorized,

but would

have compromised the effort to organize.

Any

such

desasstination mission, the case officer states,

would have been at AMPANÉC/7's own initiative.

4.

It is clear tha

€ AMBRONG/5 envisioned a general uprising

in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana

and an attempt on Castro's

fe

Th

third of his messages reflected

pessimism, and the

fact is that

the operation did not come off.

While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an

operation against Castro personally,

it is clear that no specifid

objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one

recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes

no reference to the prodosal to make an attempt on Castro.

5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come

off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as anAgency asset.

Nor was his name included in the book given Senaton McGovern

by Castro.

exother men, none of whom had a misston

sofiassassi

nation from

the Agency, are now serving thirty year ter

That!

their names were included in the list given Senator McGovetg

by

may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the

FaC

31

SEGRET

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## Page 89

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SECRET

cmeves.

They were not

a constera cron chat may support ew.

6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by

the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs.

The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than

that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event

described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent

infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had

a mission from CIA to kill Castro.

моро.

AMBRONS 5

ager

II

7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a

man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy,

who claimed to work for U.s. intelligence and to be in touch with

one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans

for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A

reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and

that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar

as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name

in Cuba

at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator

of the agent message cannot be identified from present records.

32

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SECRET

III

8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 Prom a member of

the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said "will try to kill

Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent

and his companions to "lay low" for the time being, and "will

advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up

messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the

message possibly

but as noted earlier his mission did

not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not

been

identified.

33

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## Page 91

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORCAL REVIEN PROGRAM

•

AMLASH OPERATION

---

## Page 92

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I. AMLASH OPERATION

Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta-

tion in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the

treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a

unified way, reference and discussion is found

throughout the Report.*

The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation

differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report

leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with

the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79),

which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching

Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively,

the Report suggests that AMLASH/l was so insecure in the conduct of his

activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to

Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75). :

Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH

operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. He believe

that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between

CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Dswald's assassination of President Kennedy,

was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for

*See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24,

25, 26, 27, 28

29, 31, 35,

36, 59, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77,

78, 79, and

86 of the 97-page text,

and pages 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and

105

of the eight-page chronology following the text.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA NISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

---

## Page 93

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(*"

....

AMLASH/I to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting

against Castro. Whether one is inclined to. see AMLASH/l as either a

double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed

what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak.

**** * * * * * * * * t

In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as

treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two

ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH Operation is intended to

present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity.

Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed.

It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per-

spective for judging the actual substance of the operation.

**** * * * * * * * * *

As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing

directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba.

At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment

and that if he"...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill

Castro himself."

Two years later, in fein

1961, AMLASH/1 was met in expong

by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/l's

presence at

Seve

Sten SOR

America conference on at rong).

The meeting was arranged by

AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961,

giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in

2

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## Page 94

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SEGRET

described the meeting (along with others) as follows:

"...the Station made an unsuccessful 'approach'

to (AMLASH/1)... the 'approach' consisted of a

'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual

friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last

was visiting

While (AMLASH/1) did not

pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently

did not report the incident to his superiors and

the ground work may have been laid for a similar action

in the future."

Later

there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted

to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil-

tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's

intention and plans.

In

1967 AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend the

I, and that AMLASH/1

wanted to meet with a "friend" of the

case officer's. The

files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred.

In guns 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling

191921

1. AMLASH/1 was

reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from

he would pass through

where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The fB

dig association

3

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## Page 95

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MAS

In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/l, who made known his dis-

satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/T's "planned defection" in

1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and

AMWHIP/1 to travel tanish senanywhere

necessary in an attempt

to bring about AMLASH/l's defection.

The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held 091)

August 1962. The original objective of his defection

became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/l was reported as feeling

that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a

new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there."

AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a

top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro

himself.

The case officer's report stated:

"While we were making no commitments or plans,

we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes Tike

he envisioned certainly had their place, but that

a lot of coordination, planning, information-

collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to

ensure the value and success of such plans."

(Emphasis in original).

The security hazard of too frequent meetings

further meetings

aled to

AMLASH/1 was next

met

in Raris, where/AM.HIP/T and the case officer

were joined by another case officer.

baining

04-6$7

4

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## Page 96

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SEGRET

stemorson

Amon sushion

officer reported on 17 August:

"Have no intention give [AMLASH/11 physical

elimination mission as requirement but recognize

this something he could or might try to carry

out on his own initiative."

The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated:

"Strongly concur that no physical elimination

missions be given [AMLASH/1]."

In'

August

1963.

AMLASH/1 left

for Havana. This was

the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September

COMMENT:

It is noted at this point that AMLASH/l was not a

recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that

matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for

this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela-

tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress,

although he was viewed as an operational contact with

potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and

September 1963 when he was next contacted by cIA.

In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the

* critical period, for purposes

of this paper, is there-

7.2

fore between

September and

November 1963.

LambAsiz astended the f

suresenterte 1963.

5

rate take as tuan

19277.

---

## Page 97

4-00000

officen

said that be had unist

pa, and by one alasta

sane over he eat on wear Archorl

esign dung one nut beemers).

cuban sant

It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship

between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V

of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears:

... the CIA took steps to renew its contact

with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. The

SlA's previous contact with himphad been sporadic;

he had not been in contact with the CIA since

before the missile crisis of October 1962. The

exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is

not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended

at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination

operation. " .

The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was

simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September

1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose"

for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report,

it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important

potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this

point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination

operation" was indended, it is quite clear that it was not under

consideration. The problen at the time was how to deal with the man.

• At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting

6

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## Page 98

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in September 1963:

• may have been to gain intelligence and to

cultivate him as an asset for covert operations .

."

A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report,

provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1 was assessed at the time, as

well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers

of how to deal with him in the future:

"AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always

be a control problem. . (Were

M2. AMLASH also needs strong

confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain.

CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part:

"1

• . . Based on what little feel we here have for

subject however appears he is hopeless as intell

performer and is best approached as a chief con-

spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among

whom we may then find persons susceptible to long

distance and covert disciplines.

The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to

any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/T may put

together.

Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially

important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities,

requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of

action that might later ensue.

7

• 10

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## Page 99

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SERGEN

•

Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963

cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows:

"AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the

United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an

'inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting

a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added).

This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro

himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC

Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently:

"AMLÁSH still feels there only two ways accomplish

change either inside job or invasion he realistic

enough realize latter out of question. According

AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of

action."

COMMENT:

At this point, after a year out of touch with a

man with whom there had been no working understanding,

AMLASH/l's views were of interest, but were very general,

as might be expected after such a long time. The actual

reference to an "inside job" did not specify Castro,

as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards

the more general question of how to bring about change.

It was offered alternatively, in the context of con-

sidering both external and internal action, and not with

the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.

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## Page 100

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The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left

- AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S. plan of action." There was

nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things

were left very much up in the air.

Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that

"characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation

is disputed."

(Emphasis added). The footnote observes

that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination

operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this

phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on

Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From

the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963,

it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba."

(Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V,

itself describes the very general nature of the approach

by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra).

Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that

time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the

SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views

expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the

SSC Final Report.

The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents

in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held

with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed

9

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## Page 101

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1327A57

BOUNCI

against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.s. leaders.

The intended inference, as is known from discussions with

SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or

leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected

to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri-

zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary

and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter-

pretation as categorically as though it were fact.

The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH// may have

expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of

any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever

may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time

they could not have stemmed from anything said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and

undertook nothing.

AMLASH/1 flew toj Paris

The trip actually was for an

extended vacation

AMLASH

a fren the vagu

On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not

"intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to

the CIA case officer.

On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless

arrived in Paris)to meet with AMLASH/1, Station officars were already

in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed.

On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that

AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

= 7:43

10

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## Page 102

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-SECRET

•

[Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1

was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official,

preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for

any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that

the request for a meeting:

"be given highest and profound consideration as

feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that

he determined attempt op against [Castro] with or

without [U.S.] support."

A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with

AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him

if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added).

Desmond Fitzgeräld, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff,

was going to Paris

•on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/l.

The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows:

"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled

[to Paris) for specific purpose of meeting (AMLASH/1]

and giving him assurances of full U.s. support if

there is change of the present government in Cuba."

(Emphasis added).

on 29 october Fitzgerald met with AMASH/Kin PariS representing

himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person

at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.

11

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## Page 103

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Shout fo

On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high-

lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows:

"Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United

States is prepared to render all necessary

assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which

succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader-

ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the

United States to render the assistance it is

prepared to give. It was emphasized that the

above support will be forthcoming only after a

real coup has been effected and the group involved

is in a position to request U.S. (probably under

DAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis

added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not

prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated

uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished

in a matter of hours if the present government is

still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup

period, the U.S. does not desire that the political

clock be turned back but will support the necessary

economic and political reforms which will benefit

the mass of the Cuban people."

At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject

in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-

12

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## Page 104

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SEGRET

called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination

weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some

other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald

stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer,

although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and

had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer

is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum

stated that:

"Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at

the Fitzgerald meeting.. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated

that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now

desired to know what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported

on AMLASH/I's reaction to the 29 October meeting In Parts) The contact

report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as

follows:

"The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the

capacity of a representative of high levels of

the Government concerned with the Cuban problem

satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con-

cerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact

that he still was not given the technical assistance

for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1]

said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point.

13

SECRET

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## Page 105

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He could not understand why he was denied certain

small pieces of equipment which promised a final

solution to the problem, while, on the other hand,

the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money

to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets. According to

[AMWHIP/1J, [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point,

and if he does not get advice and materials from a

U.S. Government technician, he will probably become

fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we

have made to date."

COMMENT:

At this point it is important to note that Agency

documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told,

and what he was told, which matches a later report

of what he understood. In essence he was told there

would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then

only if he was successful. While that may not seem a

very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow

of a government, it is directly relevant to the question

of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is

contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18)

to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter-

preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.

14

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## Page 106

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Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/l's understanding

is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously

at pages 35, 72-and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This

report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1

was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General

Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance

of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the

date of the report is June 1964, this particular information

dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by

Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F.

Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera-

tion. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited

in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional

clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he had

been turned down at the 29 October meeting.

Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what

be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963

agerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside

The cache could, if he requested it, include ...high-power

"as w/scope..."

On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to

in to Cuba. On 20 iovember Headquarters cabled Pari requesting

*'AMLASH/1 "delay departure...(to) permit one more meeting which

Us4/1 requested." On the same day (20 November) in response to

15

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## Page 107

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a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure "if it

is something interesting." The case officer told him that "he could not

assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH

had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was

a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person

in the room.

The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief

and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he

might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and

quite significantly, the Report acknowledges that no specific support

had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of

highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of

22 November and met with AMLASH/l late that afternoon. As they left

the meeting they learned of president Kennedy's assassination. They

probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of

President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President

Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA

support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro,

or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed

against Castro.

16

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## Page 108

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II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT

Section 1, B

This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it

places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies)

Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states

that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were

relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the

AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been

examined by the Warren Commission.

The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation

warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as

follows:

"The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren

Commission's work than the early CIA assassination

plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier

plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the

time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots,

the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA;

and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed

AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him

being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat

of retaliation for such plotting."

As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was

without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly

17

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## Page 109

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unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally

accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1

prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect

to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agree-

ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned

of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact

of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any

support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat"

--as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive

nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time.

This viewpoint was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica-

tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically

there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations

involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence

of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have

provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there

were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68

as follows:

"...it is unlikely that Castro could have

distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

18

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The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final

Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con-

testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC

Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation

was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are

inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously

considered as a likelihood during the Warren Conmission inquiry--

that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed

to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the

presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks

to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion

of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest

a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given

by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S.

Government, including CIA activities.

*******'* * * * * *

At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a

meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having:

"stated the United States would support a coup."

Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald:

"also gave general assurances that the United

States would help in bringing about the coup."

The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at

the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This

presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match

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## Page 111

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the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time.

In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it

is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC

Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots:

"Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and

promised him that the United States would support

a coup against Castro,"

citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting.

An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows:

"3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting

stated: 'Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to

(foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1

and giving him assurances of full support with

a change of the present government in Cuba.'"

(Emphasis added) •

The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual

document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported

quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what

Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when

matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made

(as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1

understood (as discussed at pages 13-15).

**********

•At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible

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SECRET

for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating

to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it

would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is

likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were

responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the

operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was.

*************

At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following

statement:

"According to the 1967 Inspector General Report,

CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on

the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break

contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi-

nation and to return to Headquarters."

This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of

the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows:

"[The case officer] states that he received an

OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early

the next morning telling him that everything was

off."

The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on

the reference in the 1967 1G report. His testimony is cited,

apparently despite suggestive prompting, that:

... he recalled receiving such a cable, but

could not recall whether it made specific mention

21

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of the President's assassination as the reason for

breaking contact.

• "

It is noted that the cable was never. found; it may never have been

sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event,

the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version.

******* * * *

Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the

AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation,

AMLASH/T was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the

Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1.

here set are

ve know that other cubans were aware of his

fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these

generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what

persons.

We do know how little substance there was to his relationships

with ClA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were

he inclined to do so.

Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he

obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind.

To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey

assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we

do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things

that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the

question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than

one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA

to break relations with him.

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Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's

provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for

consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the

issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, *hand

1 251445

An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro-

vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the

mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those

included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this

earlier period.

******** * * * * *

At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November

the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names

of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC

Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to

determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to

assess their activities. The SSC Report states that:

"AMLASH's real name was included in the list

of names on the Mexico Station cable."

This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why

the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification

of the AMLASH operation.

The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest

on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was

mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of

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the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in

1960

about press conference planned daise i an exico crea in

1961. It was not a report of a contact between

AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the

name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In

any event, the

1960 date preceded the inauguration of

president Kennedy, which further removes the question from any

relevance to the subject. There was no reason to check the name.

The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead-

ing on this point.

* * * * * *

*

*****

Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con-

cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states "that the

purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of

Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the

earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages

14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under

discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly

mixes times and events.

In any event, this aspect of the report

substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is

not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

24

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SER 35E

************ *

dia. 191.

At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the chief,

SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He

is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact

time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks

of his "vague recollections." that the Fitzgerald meeting was related

to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless

gives this opiniontffull play despite the extensive quatification as to

its reliability.

*************

At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration

is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA

employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or

should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept

as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot throughout,

and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period in question.

There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship

with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is

noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties

were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on

positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important

to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as

presented in the SSC Final Report.

25

SECHEN

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## Page 117

4-00000

•

SECRET

Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH

affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating

to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What

did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum-

stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps

on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it

was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final

Report did not accord the subject that treatment.

* * * * * * * * * *

At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made

to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in

mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and

of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made

it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/l's 1963 associations with CIA.

This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred

time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it

did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half

after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no

knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When

this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature

of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an

irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this

point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator

McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his

26

TURE

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## Page 118

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•

SEGALT

assassination also contained no reference to that period, although

AMLASH/l's later activities were cited.

**************

It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows

that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented

as a potential asset.

There was early consideration of his defection,

which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his

self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was

determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his

own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were

held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically

conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period

preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his

own program before he could expect support from the U.s.

Eventually -- but not until after the death of President

Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then

the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a

man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

[Cubal to accomplish (the) overthrow ..." The nature of the

relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964

(page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1

that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step

of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro.

while

one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included

association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those

directly involved structured their thinking differently.

27

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## Page 119

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SE GRET

The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH

operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim

Report on Alteged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG

report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at

different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that

question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship

developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and

without substance during his life. During that time it was not an

assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC

Report is both imprecise and misleading.

28

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## Page 120

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA MISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

MATERIALS

FORWARDED

TO WARREN COMMISSION AND

FBI

---

## Page 121

4-00000

Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of

limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Conmission

inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report,

CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts

of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and

submitted special analyses and reports.

The following pages list reports and other papers submitted

to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation)

and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation

is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that

effort.

The lists fall into the following sections:

E.l Dissemination to the Intelligence Community

E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission

E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations

E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission

---

## Page 122

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- SECRET

AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION

Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis-

seminated •to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as

possible arter receipt.

The following list of some 100 cabled

disseminations, CSCI's, and memoranda

were forwarded to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, et al. The listing covers the period from

10 October 1963 through September 1964.

AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS)

II

*10 October 1963

DIR 74673

III

(WH/J/Mexicot

"On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source

in Mexico City reported that an American male, who

identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City ...

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Com-

mission]

*24 October 1963

DIR 77978

(WH/3/Mexico)

Request for two copies of most recent photograph of

_ee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipients: Navy. [Warren Commission'

23 November 1963

DIR 34915

Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep-

tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

- Document Date

II

- Document Number

III - Originating Office

- An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available

to the Warren Commission.

CLUNLY

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## Page 123

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SEGRET

24 November 1963

TDCS- 3/565,829

Subject:

Cuban Precautions following Assassination of

president Kennedy.

Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSl, Navy,

A1r, JeS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR,

ORR, 00, EXO.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy Lsic - Consulatel in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

(CI/SIG)

ency res in Mexico cation relating to OSHALD'S

Recipient: FBI

26 November 1963

CSCI-

(WE/BC)

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

(WH/3)

CSCI-3/778,026

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(WH/3)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

(Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD

between 27 September and 3 October 1963.

This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to

be the correct one, according to a copy of the

document in CI/SIG file No. 568.

Recipient:

2

SEGRET

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## Page 124

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-..

26 November 1963

DIR 85069

(WH/3)

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Recipient: FBI

*26 November 1963

DIR 85089

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey

OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in

a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City"

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

Commission]

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

(WH/3)

Subject:

Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD Ci

2000

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Tal anhane sarks

bateson Suhad President

strato

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

(CI/SIG)

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject:

Recipient:

HUNTER Report No. 10816.

FBI.

3

SECRET

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## Page 125

4-00000

-SEGRET

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient:

FBI.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85182

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Thanas CricAl,

lattan to?

Jenni

Recipients:

FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. Lwarren Commission

27 November 1963

DIR 85195

(C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage

of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. MCCONE,

and Mr. HOOVER.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

(C/WH/3)

an gitte besting

into generas

Ang 1 06220

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85199

(WH/3/Mexico)

27 November 1963

nformation solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte

Recipients: FBl

State, White House; Secret Servic

received

copy. (warren Commission]

DIR 85222

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Subject:

Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City,

contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

4

---

## Page 126

4-00000

27 November 1963

DIR 85246

(WH/3)

in verontaninfarmation

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. (Also relayed to S, RAPICH of the FBI

by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

(C/WH/ 3)

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for secretary

of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEL, Cubar

Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele-

phone to 5. PAPiCH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

cingpassed

"gif

one tie

FBI.

Recipient:

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to

OSWALD's presence in New Orleans

in September 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 35657

(C/WH/3)

On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John

WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American

bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster-

type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

5

SECRET

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## Page 127

4-00000

SECRET

*28 November 1963

DIR 85662

(C/WH/3)

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren

Commission]

*28 November 1963

DIR 85665

(C/WH/3)

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

Warren Commissions

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN

and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation and investigation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mission

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

(WH/3/Mexico)

Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House-

*29 November 1963

DIR 85670

(C/WH/3)

the personhe

gaunter@diers the 9440971923

recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren

‚Ommission!

6

SECRET.

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## Page 128

14-00000

SEGRET.

29 November 1963

DIR: 85676

Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers.

Recipient:

FBI.

(WH/3/Mexico)

*29 November 1963

DIR 85691

(C/WH/3)

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of

-ne Naval Attache in Canberra, Australla, by a mar

:laiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November

• 1963

DIR 85714

(C/WH/3)

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85715

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel

of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959

to May 19o<).

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

(C/WH/3)

Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85758

(WH/3/Mexico)

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

[Warren Commission]

7

OSARET

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## Page 129

14-00000

*29 November 1963

DIR 85770

(C/WH/3)

Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging

advance information on assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPIEH concerning rumor that

Oswald had made a bank deposit.

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director's

suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe

deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas..

30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778/894

it suggesting eno men overved in assassin at Washington

Recipient: FBI.

*30 November 1963

DIR 86063

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

(C/WH/3)

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

Recipient: FBI.

*4 December 1963

DIR 86702

(C/WH/3)

Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife,

June 1962.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

35012,

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## Page 130

4-00000

SECRET

5 December 1963

DIR

87189

Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi

demanding full probe into assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*6 December 1963

DIR 87520

(C/WH/3)

(C/WH/3)

Correction of DIR 87502.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

*7 December 1963

DIR 37667

(C/WH/3/)

Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission)

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

(WH/3/Mexico)

Suhan Fats

Recipient:

*9 December 1963

FBI.

DIR 87796

(WH/3)

beging assass matter

stop

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

[Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S, PAPICH regarding identity

of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy

prepared and executed jointly by the Communist

Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries.

JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902) •

Recipient:

FBI.

11 December 1963

TDCSDB 3/658,408

Subject:

Comments of Soviet official regarding

(a) Moscow views on international situation

following death of President Kennedy, and (b)

resumption of disarmament talks.

Recipients: General distribution.

9

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## Page 131

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12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

(C/WH/3)

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: HILSON-HUDSON,

John; WILSON, John Hudson.)

Recipient: FBI.

*12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi-

dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa

Rica.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

[Warren Com-

mision]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

(C/WH/3)

recheristsatsendian rescuest

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State,

White House.

*13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy

Assassination.

Recipient:

FBI.

*18 December 1963

DIR 89970

(C/WH/3)

stogin

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

[Warren Commission]

10

.559757

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## Page 132

14-00000

SORET

*18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission

19 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,225

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

FBI.

19 December 1963

CSDB-3/658,870

(WH/Reports)

Subject: a. Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and .

Rauo ROA y Garcia.

b. Probable Future Plan of Action for

Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez.

Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified.

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese) •

Recipient:

FBI.

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.

Recipient:

FBI.

#10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

11

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## Page 133

14-00000

SERRET

14 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,510

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of

information from CIA.)

Recipient: FBI.

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,814

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of John F.

Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0861

Never on the reAssessinationed of

Investigation.

President John F. Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret

Service.

subject:

Assassination of President

12

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## Page 134

14-00000

SEGRET

John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary"

Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

SETYAEVA and RAHM.)

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

(C/WH/3)

Subject:

* 128648

Recipient:

White House (attention Secret Service).

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

( SR/CI/R)

Subject: Assassination of President John f. Kennedy.

(Photograph of an individual closely resembling

OSWALD).

Recipient:

FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI -3/780,996

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Recipient: FBI.

20 April 1964

CSD8-3/660,704

Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination.

Recipient:

FBI (?)

13

SEARCY

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## Page 135

14.00000

22 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

(SR/CI /R)

Subject:

•Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)

Recipient:

FBI.

30 April 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

8 May 1964

Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November

advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office

of Security for information.

DDP 4-2351

Recipient: Copy of attachment forvarded to FBl.

11 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient:

FBI.

13 May 1964

CSCI -3/781,282

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

of photographs sent to cla by FBl..

Recipient:

FBI.

(Identification

15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, tO J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

-to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

14

"?

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## Page 136

14.00000

SECRET

13 May 1964

19 May 1964

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,351

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified

Information about the U-2.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444]

CSCI-3/781,386

Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK).

Recipient:

Navy.

CSCI-3/781,543

(CI/R&A)

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD. (esenion maemmertien

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,847

Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby.

Recipient: FBI.

(CI/R&A)

29 June 1964

CSCI -3/782,058

-Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

subject:

Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

6 July 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

DDP 4-3470

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Statements Reportedly Made by George and

Seanne de MoRENSCHILT Coneery ng lee Harvey OSHALD

and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Recipient:

Copy to FBI.

15

,.SEGRET

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## Page 137

4-00000

SECRET

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Joachim JOESTEN.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964

CSC1-316/01446-64

Spret Queep

Subject:

MADUE Interview on 9 September 1964; H1S

Comments on Seven

Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964

CSCI-316/01709-64

Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE.

Recipient:

FBI.

2 November 1964

CSCI-316/01779-64

Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in

the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Recipient:

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

• Recipient: FBI.

16

SECRET

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## Page 138

14-00000

SECRET

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

Government.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5710

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Sorret We

Subject:

IADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; Hi:

Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964

CSCI-316/01709-64

Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE.

Recipient:

FBI.

2 November 1964

CSCI-316/01779-64

Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in

the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

• Recipient: FBI.

• 16

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2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi-

gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

8 April 1965

•CSCI-316/01398-65

30 June 1965

Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City.

Recipient: FBI.

[Copy to Secret Service]

CSCI-316/02654-65.

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist

Guide in Moscow.

Recipient:

FBI.

9 May 1967

CSCI-316/02153-67

Subject: BEAUBOVEFF apparently to be used as a pawn by

Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a ClA agent and

was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON

alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or

by Senator Robert KENNEDY authorizing certain Americans

to work with Cubans for the assassination of CASTRO.

This memroandum is intended to record that such letters

never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON'S

possession.

Recipient:

FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/02669-67

Subject:

Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding

• Mario GARCIAS et al.

Recipient:

FBI

17

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24 July 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman,

chat OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cubal

imbassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS'

statement of dubious credibility; information passed to

Mexican authorities.

Recipient:

7 May 1968

CSCI-316/01678-68

Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged

Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by

Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim

GARRISON's Allegations.

Recipient: FBI.

16 September 1969

CSCI-316/03323-69

Subject: Charles William THOMAS.

Recipient: FBI.

DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF

Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD,

all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by

cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad-

ditionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison.

Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

on short-form sci's

Sfore CS Staff releasedaned the eSC SC, She co started

received copies of all CSCI's.

13 December 1963

DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION

[Commission Document No. 100]

Memorandum

Subject:

Analysis of World Reaction to President

Kennedy's Assassination.

(Supplied by A. W. DULLES.)

18

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21 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 300]

Nota men ichard Recent Soviet statements on

DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case.

21 January 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the

Government of the Soviet Union.

22 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 691]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Suggested Questions for Marina OSWALD.

25 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 321]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in

the Soviet Union.

Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet

Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife.

31 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 347]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity

of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3

October 1963.

5 February 1964

Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN.

Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet State-

ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964).

5 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 361]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to

J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appendix B,

a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.

19

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•

8 February 1964

[Commission Docjment No. 1182]

Létter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, tO J. Lee

RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned in one of

Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents.

[Information passed to FBI.]

18 February 1964

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention MarS. J. PArter. Subject: Assassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for

information which might be helpful in interpreting

available materials relating to OSWALD's activities

abroad.)

[Copy to Warren Commission. ]

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention ArS. J. RAPICH.

Subject: Assassi-

nation of John F. Kennedy. (Request for information

relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

[Copy to Warren Commission. ]

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPISH. Subject: Assassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy.

(Request for copies

of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey

OSWALD. )

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service;

signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject: Assassination

of president John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry

in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted

suicide.

[Copies

to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

20

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18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. HUGHes, The Director of

(not a 0 thy i 450 i on, Kennedy.

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.J

19 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 384]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(TS No. 787908.7

• Subject: Information Developed by

CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

19 February 1964

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and

Embassy in Mexico City.

*21 February 1964

DOP 4-0940 [Conmission Document No. 4261

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Translations of Interrogations

Reports of

Silvia DURAN.

Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 35758, 29 November 1963.

Translation of Interrogation of Silvia

DIRAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964.

Trans-

lation of Official Mexican Polic Report

on the Second Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

5 March 1964

DOP 4-1171 [Commission Document No. 448]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

*6 March 1964

DDP 4-1224

[Commission Document No. 692]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding

Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963.

21

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SECRET

18 March T964

DDP 4-1423

[Commission Document No. 528]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

24 March 1964

DDP 4-1555

[Commission Document No. 674]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Disseminated to the secret

Service but not yet made available to the President's

Commission.

*24 March 1964

DDP 4-1554

[Commission Document No. 631]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. .

Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee

Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October

1963.

OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October

1963.

25 March 1964

DDP 4-1576

Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN.

Attachment: Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey

OSWALD", dated 23 March 1964.

27 March 1964

DOP 4-1606

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to Thomas L. HUGHES,

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of

State.

Subject: Verification of Entry in "Historic

Diary"

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

*31 March 1964

DDP 4-1655

[Commission Document No. 698]

Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.

Attachments:

OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963,

22

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SEGRET

to the White House, the Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December

1963, to the White House, the Department of State,

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to

the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the •

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

*3 April 1964

DDP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December

1963, to White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

6 April 1964

DDP 4-1739

7 April 1964

[Commission Document No. 708]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Sabdent dated le dare stions onertain questions Pos

("Certain Questions Posed

= by the State Department Files")

DDP 4-1787

[Commission Document No. 726]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First

Interrogation.

23

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7 April 1964

DDP 4-1786

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

20 April 1964

DDP 4-1997

[Commission Document No. 817]

remorandum fren Bichard HELS, DOP J, Lee RANT, ta in

21 April 1964

Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN.

Attachment: CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and

French Publishing Firms

to Publish the Thomas

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President

Kennedy.)

24 April 1964

29 April 1964

DDP 4-2099

[Commission Document No. 844]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD.

DDP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

4 May 1964

DOP 4-2256

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

6 May 1964

DDP 4-2296

[Commission Document No. 902]

8 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information to

the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central

Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection.

DDP 4-2351

[Commission Document No. 911]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

24

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SECRET

13 May 1964

15 May 1964

DDP 4-2444

[Commission Document No. 931]

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD'S Access to Classified Informa-

tion about the U-2.

[CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission]

[Commission Document No. 935]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service ir

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to FBI]

19 May 1964

DDP 4-2533

[Commission Document No. 944]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. •

Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

*19 May 1964

DOP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943]

Memorandum from Righard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

Attachment:

OUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, State Department, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

*22 May 1964

DDP 4-2624

[Commission Document No. 971]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

25

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SEURETT

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2688

[Commission Document No. 985]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists OT

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December

1963, to the White House, Department of State, ano

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2692 [Commission Document No. 990]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEV and

Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

1 June 1964

DDP 4-2747 [Commission Document No. 1000]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Attachments:

OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963;

subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

3 June 1964

DOP 4-2764

[Commission Document No. 10p1]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

= the Soviet Government.

3 Juné 1964

DDP 4-2770 [Commission Document No. 1012]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject.

George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT.

26

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4 June 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

5 June 1964

DDP 4-2844

[Commission Document No. 1041]

• Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee_RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training

School in Minsk, USSR.

10 June 1964

DDP 4-2922

[Commission Document No. 1054]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

#12 June 1964

DOP 4-2988 [Conmission Document No. 1089]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the

19 June 1964

DOP 4-3169

[Commission Document No. 1131]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques.

26 June 1964

Subject:

DDP 4-3366

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Soviet Brainwashing Techniques

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

[Commission Document No. 1188]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocço.

[Copy to the FBI.]

(SEURET

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1 July 1964

DDP 4-3389

[Commission Document No. 1201]

Memörandum from Richard HELMS; DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki

on 10 October 1959.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

[Conmission Document No. 1216]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consu

avel Antonovich YATSKOV).

[Copy to the FBI.]

6 July 1964

DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Statements Reportedly Made by George and

and the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to the FBI. ]

22 July 1964

DOP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. 1273]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Apparent Inconsistencies

in Material Fur-

nished the Commission by CIA and the Department of

State.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. 1287]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum-

stances of a photograph of an unknown individual

furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November

1963.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3770

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

•Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachments:

Translation (original documents included.)

28

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31 July 1964

DDP 4-3916

[Commission Document No. 1358]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

7 August 1964

DDP 4-4037 [Commission Document No. 1356]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479 [Commission Document No. 1443]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J.

Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

31 August 1964

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and

Embassy in

Mexico City.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 2]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government.

[Copy to the FBI]

14 September 1964

DOP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Wester, Europe in 1964.

11 September 1964

DOP 4-4793

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the central Intelligence Agency.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4794 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart-

ment Files.

(Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479)

29

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11 September 1964

DDP 4-4795

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies. (Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479.)

11 September 1964

DOP 4-4796

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4801 [Commission Document No. 1493]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4823

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4838

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: State Department Files.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4893

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN..

Subject:

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4841

= Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Regarding Agency approval

for the publication of memorandum, dated 2 July 1964,

concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Not authorized.)

30

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-

18 September 1964

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State.

DDP 4-4848

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4850

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Passport and Visa Office.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4873

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow.

18 September 1964

DOP 4-4882

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee

Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4886

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR.

22 September 1964

DDP 4-4921

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Silvia Tirado Bazan de DURAN.

17 September 1964

DOP 4-4922

• Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban

Consul, Mexico City.

31

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18 September 1964

DDP 4-4952

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD.

(Information regarding

OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.)

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to 3. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

[Conmission Document No. 1532]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.

[Copies to FBI, I&NS, State]

13 October 1964

DDP 4-5275

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to j. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

16 October 1964

DDP 4-5334/1

Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren

Commission Report.

subject: CIA's Role in the Support of Presidentia

Foreign Travel.

20 October 1964

DDP 4-5341 [Commission Document No. 1545]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

29 October 1964

DOP 4-5558

• Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication:

Press Reaction to the Warren Report"

Report, dated 22 October 1964.

32

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## Page 155

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AGENCY DISSEMINATIONS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND

ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

10 October 1963

DIR 74673

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico

City, 1 October 1963.

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House.

23 November 1963

DIR 84915

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's ac-

tivities in Mexico City (from FBi interrogation

of OSWALD).

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient:

FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

arborro

Recipient:

1i05.

FBI.

33

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## Page 156

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-SERGET

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(Comment:

Subject:: Sames dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to

be the correct one, according to a copy of the docu-

ment, fA GI/SIG file 70-568)

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85069

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect

that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Communist, pro-Castro deputy

to the Costa

Rican National Assembly, will try to

gather data in Texas to use in pro-communist-pro-Castro

propaganda in connection with the assassination of

President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85089

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 [sic - 25 November 1963]

that "on 18 September

1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand

five hundred dollars in

a meeting inside the Cuban

Embassy in Mexico City."

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (CAR

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

Subject:

dent: Bas

FAU94

adman. Ang

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

34

SECRET

=

---

## Page 157

14.00000

SEGRET.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the

White House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico

City on 18 September 1963.)

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

Subject: Lee Harvey: OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

DIR 85182

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

On 23 November, Richard

Thomas GIBSON, an American living in switzerland, who

was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding

latter to a close friend in Bern.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

Ae

Seu

infamation fm

480

tigence source

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85199

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI

Recepved sopy arate Connie House; Secret Service

35

SEGRET

---

## Page 158

4-00000

SECRET

27 November 1963

DIR 85222

Subject:

Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban

Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85246

aros

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

(Also relayed to §. PAPICA of the FBI by

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of

State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Am-

bassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone

to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Rectpient:

28 November 1963

FBI.

DIR 85657

moon gave information

36

SOMET.

---

## Page 159

4-00000

SECRET

London indicating that an "American gangster type named

RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

28 November 1963

DIR 85662

28 November 1963

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

DIR 85665

nansts that on 22 Navenkar 1068,

Inant frat

the suben speasy.

thur creamed one knew one Mittee forei mino

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Conmission]

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

29 November 1963

Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

DIR 85670

37

_SECRET.

---

## Page 160

14-00000

SEGRIET®

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85691

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the

Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming

to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate

President Kennedy.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85774

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85770

Series of incidents which have produced a report

Re a a re danis one here service

29 November 1963

Unnumbered memorandum

Telephone contact with &. PAPICH concerning rumor

that OSWALD had made a bank deposit.

Recipient: FBI.

NATORET

---

## Page 161

14-00000

SECRET

30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,894

Sabject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Post suggesting the men involved in assassination.

Recipient:

30 November 1963

DIR 86063

recipients: FBl, State,

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

Recipient: FBI.

7 December 1963

DIR 87667

Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient:

FBl.

[Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

with

Recipient:

FBI.

9 December 1963

DIR 87796

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging

assassination arranged by Communist Chinese.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with & PARICH regarding identity of

a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared

and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans

# through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8638, IN 75902.)

• Recipient: FBI.

12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON,

John; WILSON, John Hudson.)

Recipient: FBI.

39

. SEORET

---

## Page 162

14-00000

SECRET

12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy sent to United states embassy in costa Rica.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

four mor

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963

Sou fCSC1-31779,135

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

18 December 1963

DIR 89970

Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

Recipients: FBl, State, white House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient:

FBI.

40

deu.

---

## Page 163

14-00000

SECRET

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S.

Embassy on 26 No-

vember.

Recipient: FBI.

10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/778,814

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Soviet Union.)

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

("In connection with our efforts

to assist the

President's Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy by providing information which

might be helpful in interpreting available ma-

terials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,

47

---

## Page 164

4-00000

•

SEGRET,

we have considered the entry with regard to attempted

suicide.

We consider this entry as being of consider-

able importance and one which might be subject to

verification.")

Recipient:

FBI.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

• • 47 photographs which were among the effects of

the photographs were taken in the USSR and depict

Soviet contacts of OSWALD or scenes in the soviet

Union.")

Recipient:

FBI.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to

OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient:

Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary"

Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (in mean

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

Subject:

Recipient:

Honor rio

White House (attention Secret Service.)

42

---

## Page 165

14-00000

SECRETT

11 March 1964

CSCI -3/780,344

Subject:

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Photograph of an individual closely resembling

OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. S5

Recipient:

FBI.

8 May 1964

DOP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

[Warren Commission]

11 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,282

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Identification of

photographs sent to CIA by FBl.)

Recipient:

FBI.

15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing

Visa Applicants; Reaction of the Service to the Assassi-

nation of President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission]

(SERRET

---

## Page 166

14-00000

SECRET.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

rom

Recipient:

FBI.

10 June 1964

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY.

Recipient: FBI.

CSCI-3/782,085

er.

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Remarks made by Soviet Consul

Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.)

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government.

Recipient: FBl. Warren Commission]

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

Government.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Sor leg!

... Subject:

VIADUGH Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

44

SECRET.

---

## Page 167

14.00000

SEGRET

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with

Investigation of Lee Harvey and Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's In-

tourist Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican

Newsman,

That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortly

After the Cuban Embassy Refused Him a Visa to

Visit Cuba.

CONTRERAS' Statement of Dubious

Credibility; Information Passed to Mexican au-

thorities.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN

COMMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RE-

LATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION

31 January 1964

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City,

28 September - 3 October 1963.

45

---

## Page 168

4-00000

SLORET

5 March 1964

ming logan

18 March 1964

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

- 31 March 1964

DDP 4-1655

Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey

OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD

Enclosures include the following

Teletype Message No.

87515, 29 November 1963 -

paragraph g - marina SNETHLAGE.

Teletype Message No. 85182, 22 November 1963 -

Remarks made by Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Teletype Message No. 85665, 28 November 1963 -

Remarks Made by Maria SNETHLAGE and Third

Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Em-

3. April 1964

Subject:

Pr

7 April 1964

DDP 4-1699

Teren

DDP 4-1784

stagen

Subject:

4 May 1964

DDP 4-2256

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

"A survey of Agency files indicates that all..

information known to the Agency on OSWALD's association

(with communists or criminals, either in United States

: or abroad) has been made available to the Commission."

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

(Compilation of traces on what appear to be Soviet

names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an ad-

dress book identified by Marina OSWALD as belonging

to her.)

46

---

## Page 169

14.00000

-SEORET

15 May 1964

19 May 1964

22 May 1964

27 May 1964

1 June 1964

3 June 1964

4 June 1964

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2534

Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

DDP 4-2624

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

• Embassy in Canberra, Australia; Relative to Planned

Assassination of President Kennedy.

DOP 4-2688

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

(Comment: Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm.)

DDP 4-2741

Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Enclosures: Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85662, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85666, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 86063,

30 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 87667,? December 1963.

Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interroga-

tion of Gilberto ALVARADO.

DDP 4-2769

: #Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

DOP

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of

Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

47

„SEU

---

## Page 170

14-00000

10 June 1964

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

12 June 1964

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of

President Kennedy sent to United States Embassy

in Costa Rica.

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD

was in Tangier, Morocco.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4808

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4839

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Subject: Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

48

---

## Page 171

400000

APPROVED FOR HELENSE 1933

CLA HISTGRICAL REVIEM PROGRAM

MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

---

## Page 172

4-00000

SECRET SENSITI

Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit

to Mexico City in 1963

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April

51947 until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in

(1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads

sus suvree, rorist, breing to

Genama1k

were manured by en

afficer acciat

rest

fixed site directly abrasite the Sau

street) which had both dush

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 004645

RECRET SENSITIVE

---

## Page 173

the

Wakkas A

sage side

the blach

Sari trades

Savint

gend idantrification nkst

photoaraabie sites wer

Ma

reopera

•gi

2

---

## Page 174

2

rized butt

axican Dir

Mini

SECRET

SENSITUT

ance was!

→ a

by

ican agen

Af Federal

it of the Mexica

adar

SEGRO?

3

SENS/THE

---

## Page 175

ser, vetame tre provece

aniciasat

the listening past

the Marican

deficen in

the ioint

TENVOY Liste

Cuban and

te.

acensasted all

ha dis

ans The Mexicans

the Me con tradi

stad five.

entetendocusnaries.at

ender Snanish ni

---

## Page 176

SECHET/ SENSITHE

griom mete takeni to anvener

ty

SCS

Hawevgna

were nick

dlass afnama

dusarssains all pbstagkanhs

les basauca

aoaibagiaaphs

S2296d9Et

mpachcaht

Sibmpemeiming.

(suean Drue

wisicnat faratana

ansaiantiious.

awattba

Idatcne

---518

XSTT'E

---

## Page 177

SECRET SENSITIVE

дем

4.1

SECRET

Calle

atly

---

## Page 178

14-00000

(4) Jor Erit gate

1- LIMITED

2. LILYRIC

3. LICALLA

3

Phate Bases

briel

Tub. F page 2

---

## Page 179

4-00000

SECRET / SENSITNE

gaton wer taken tö anotner

itine brassariats

disaster in

screaming illibetaganha

Ana feedbasti

However h

a nicked

are pores

S7

La!

assanand the

paleness,

Para becar

canastentious.

D/229T:E

---

## Page 180

4-00000

SECRET SENSITNE

# Чу

SECHE!

CRISITVE

---

## Page 181

14-00000

(4) Jar Erib gate

I-LIMITED

2. LILYRIC

3. LICALLA

Phate Based

-

Tul E page 2

---

## Page 182

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SELECTED NEWSPAPER STORIES WITH COMMENTS

---

## Page 183

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1893

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

In the course of the research effort leading to this general

report, there were newspaper stories relating to the assassination

of President Kennedy and to CIA. Some of these appear to have been

based on specially designed stories emanating from the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. At the time of their appearance they

were the subject of comments prepared in CIA. These newspaper

stories and the comments are attached.

The following newspaper stories and comments are listed below:

Tab G. 1

Jack Anderson column on 6 May 1977 alleging

CIA activity in Dallas, Texas in 1963.

Tab G.2 Jack Anderson column on 20 January 1977

alleging that CIA is tied to a false Oswald

story.

Tab G.3 Norman Kempster story on 1 January 1977

alleging that CIA withheld data on Oswald.

Tab G.4 Clare Booth Luce involvement with Cuban exiles.

Tab G.5 Ronald Kessler story on 26 November 1976

alleging CIA withheld details of Oswald tele-

phone calls, with report on handling of documents.

Tab G.6 John Goshko story on 13 November 1976 alleging

that Oswald

told the Cubans of his plan to kill

Kennedy.

Tab G.7

Tabloid Midnight story on 2 August 1976

regarding CIA and Castro.

Tab G.8 Washington Post story on 1 October 1976 concerning

CIA consideration of possibly interviewing

Lee Harvey Oswald in 1960.

---

## Page 184

4-00000

COMFICENINAL

77-044

10 May 1977

MENORANDUM FOR:

VIA

FROM

Director of Central Intelligenca

:

:

Deputy Director of Central intelligence

John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

:

Jack Anderson 6 May 1977 Column Entitled

"Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963"

REFERENCE : OLC Manorandum for Director of Central

Intelligence - OLC 77-1816 (attached)

1. Action Requested: None, for information only.

2. Background: The attached Jack Anderson colunn

mixture

of some fact and error.

At least portions of it seen:

to have been leakad by someone connected with the House Select

Committee on Assassinations.

3.

Factual information on matters covered in the article

follows:

a. Alpha 65 was

an anti-Castro Cuban Exile

Organization.

Antonio Veciana was one of its

founders. Veciana contacted the Agency on three

occasions for assistance in an assassination plot

against Castro (December. 1960; July 1962 and April

1966).

On each occasion

he was turned down.

The

Agency had no responsibility for or sponsorship of

Alpha

66.

Geran

1553€

remarried

E?, M0О:i

6! 0/16.11

---

## Page 185

4-00000

...ft,

-..

COMRIOENTAE

•d. Anderson attenots to connect one Moris

Bishop with CIA in Dallas; newspapers in Dallas

have tried to identify Bishop with our DCD repra-

sentative in dallas, in

cording to our records,

no Agency orricers ever

used the name of Morris Bishop as an alias. No

one named Morris Bishop was ever employed by the

Agency.

The FBI identified the three men who

visited Mrs. Odio. Lee Harvey Oswald was not.

one of them. The Warren Commission was satis-

fied that Oswald could not have been in Dallas

at the time of the visit.

Jolin E

John H. valley

Attachment - 1

Distribution:

Original - Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs) w/att.

1 - Office of Legislative Counsel w/att.

7

- Office of General Counsel matt.

1 - Executive Registry watt

1 - IG Subject w/att.

1 - 1G Chirono w/att.

1 - J.L. Leader Chrono W/ate.:

OIG/J.L.Leader:aal

---

## Page 186

THE WASHINGTON POST

Fs:425, 3109 5, 2075

Jack Anderson and Les Waitten

Odd CIA Activity in Dalias in 1703

The secret illes of the Huusa Assaz

ceived irom his ClA contact altar Ken-

had been a misup but never ciedrin

sinations Commitz contain reports of

nedy Has siled.

the ratter up."

strange CLA activities in Dallas on the

The CLA man, ilorris Bishop, asked

eve of the Joan F. Kennedy assassina-

Veciana to contact his caujia, Buil

vestigasors, meanwaile, iac a Car's

tion.

lamo Ruez, woo worked for tae Cuban

monitering camera happened to areas

Credible witnesses have confirmed

embassy in Medco City. Reiates a con

down on the day that Cswaid allegediy

our past reports that the accused assas

identlal report. "Veciana ivas to relay

visitint the Soviet Embassy.

But the

sia, Lae Harvey Oswald, was in touch

Bishop's oiter to pay Ruier and his

CLA Lap no the Soviet Emoassy's gaona

with ant!-Castro Cubans in Dailas, Cue

wite to say that they bai mat with Cs.

productt an alegeù telephoue cal

contidential report statey that In 19s,.

wald in ilexico City."

Iron someune who Identifiai himsall

Oswald was seen leaving the Dalias ol-. This not only sould save placed Os as "Jee reary Oswald"

fice of Alpaa Cô" This ivas a Cuban

wald out of Dallas hut would hars

The CLl vitress claimed that ibs e-

commando group trained by the ChA

thrown suspicion on ibe Castro gov-

tual voice recording of the telephone

A Cuban CLA operative, Anuaio Va

crament. The ruse was later called off.

conversation "was destroyed in Foll

ciana, also told investigators that he. Insteadi, the CLA cited secret tapes and

the destruction procedures approx

had been summoned iù Dallas in sit

photographs as evidence that Crvald

naialy one week aiter it was ra

gust. 19a3, by his ClA contacta myste

had been in touch with both the Cuban

ceived" Yet more than seven tvesks

rious man who went by the jama ol

Morris SisaoD. States a couideatial

and soviet embassies in mexico city..

laier, the aBl ciaimed in save azaid

the telephone conversation that the

summary. "When (Variany arrived,

The ClA kept tapes of all paone calls

CLA said bail been destroyst iue

віздор was ассогорамі пу анодег

guing in and out of the two embassies

man, Laz Harvey Csmaid"":

Phutograpes were diso taden ui every-

Fol's judgment was that the voice did

noi beong is Oswald.

Another witness who impresseu she:

one entering and leaving these ambas

Wrote tae late DBl director J. Lagar

investigators, Sylvia Odio, toid them

sies. On Ock. 1, 1953, the CLA notified

Fleover on Nov. 23, 1983: "The Central

toat two anti-Castro Cubans had intro

othar U.S. embassiss that "an Ameri-

duced her to an American by ta: name

can male, who identiied himsen a3

Ltelugence Agency advised aal 93

of Leon Oswald Saa was told that Os

Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Don-

Oct. 1,

1st3, an extremely seastu?s

wald was trying "to convince ant

bassy in Mexico City."

source had reporter taat an indivicual

Indentilied aimsall as Lee Osaid,

Castro Cuban groups . ED Kill Presi-

Oswald was describer in the cable as

sino contacted the Sovie Embasty in

dent Kencedy.

Atter the aicassina-

"approximateiy as years old, with an

Miesien City inquiring as to any messa

tion, she recognized this American as

sibletic build, about six iset tail. with

ges.

Lee Harvey Oswald.

2 recuding bairline" The counsalitze

"Special agents of this burean, 23o

The House investigators don't reaily

lies noia toat this "in no way piyst

have conversai with Comaid is Dailay,

beliave that the Cil bad any part in

cally rosemales the Lea Harrey Os

ler, save coserves sacroginpis et

the murder of President Kennedy.

ivaid accused

toe individuai telerrad io ibove and

More likely, they suspect the CiA may

tave listened to a recoruing of his

have tried to cover up soine einbar-

Re ClA sougat photograpes drom

voice. These special agents are of i

rassing contacts with Cavaid in Dallas.

the navy to compare with is poo

crinion that the soor reler edo 13-

3 2ay case, the ClA took pains to

tograps of Cawaid at the Soviet cia-

dividual was not lee darvey Orynid"

give the imorsision laat Cimail was in

bassy. Declares a committee recort

Tha ficusa inventigators its bayia-

Mexico City at the time loui witnesses

"These paotogragas, though obviously

ring to wonder whetaor the Cli cun-

claimed he was dealing. with the Cit-

not of the correct Lea firrey Cowaid,

crited the whole Corali adventur: i7

guided Cucans to Dallas. Veciana, for

became the Warren Commalsion's ai-

Mexico dier is aa nitempt to conazi

exaiple, told of a strange call ha re

hiost 227. The Cit admitted thai taara

his resi activide in Dallas

---

## Page 187

4-00000

Untaris

stil dial

• APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

veccane

21.10 197?

LA/E0G/021-77

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director for Operations

FROM

SUBJECTS

Chief, Latin America Division

A .

Jack Anderson

20 January 1977 Column

Titled "CIA Tied

to False Oswald Story"

B.

Identification of the Mr. X in the

Anderson Column

1. The attached column, citing the testimony of a Mr. X,

alleges that a CIA agent tried to link Oswald to Cuban intelli-

gence officers in Mexico.

There is, of course, no substance to

the column's allegations.

The column identifies the source as

Mr. X because of attempts on his life, but subsequently gives

enough information on Mr. X to establish his identity.

.. According to the Anderson column, Mi. A was first met

by his CIA contact

in Havana before relations with U.S.. Cuba were

severed. Mr. X had helped to organize bank accountants to en-

bezzle Cuban government funds

to finance

anti-Castro causes.

Mr. X was reportedly recruited by a Morris Bishop (CIA contact),

to plan an attempt on Castro's life.

The plan

was to fire

bazooka from

a nearby apartment building while Castro was deliver-

ing one of his marathon speeches.

According to the Anderson

column, the plot was discovered by Castro's

reportedly tried to assassinate

Castro in chile in 1971 in league with the Venezuelan buis Posada

Carriles, who 1s now being detained in Caracas for the o octobei

airline bombing.

The Anderson column ends with the report

that Mi.

worked for CIA until 1973 for expenses, but was

$253,000 in cash by Morris Bishop when he vas terminated.

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 025251

2: -3114:

---

## Page 188

14-00000

SECRET

3.

iron the above description of Mr. X, it is reasonably

-ear that Mr. & is Antonio Carlos VECIANA Blanch #010%

VECIANA, an assistant bank manager and past president of a public

accountants association in llavana,.

first contacted CIA in Havana

in December 1960 when

asked the cos,

to help in an assassination plot against Castro. VICIANA äsked

• for visas for ten relatives of the four men assigned to kill Castro,

and also requested four MI rifles with adapters for grenades plus

eight grenades. The COS did not encourage VECIANA and subsequently

checked

with an Embassy officer who reported that VECIANA had made

similar "wild-eyed"

proposals to him.

On 23 November 1961 the

Miami News

published

i report of an unsuccessful attempt by Antonio

VECIANA to kill Castro.

VECIANA reportedly had arranged to

assassinate Castro and. Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos on 5 October

in Havana, but the bazooka he was using failed to fire.

4.

There has been no Agency relationship with VECIANA.

POA, which was granted

for his use in para-military affairs in

January 1962, expired in November 1962.

VECIANA was born on

4 October 1935 in Havana.

He ivas a member of the People's Revo-

lutionary Movement, an anti-Castro group. in Cuba during 1960-61, and

was one of the founders of Alpha-66.

A certified public accountant

by trade, VECIANA was with A.I.D: in La Paz in 1908-72.

aleil On 23 July 190L

vectav vas interviewed, at his request, by Me tarky keal from

the DCD New York office. VECIANA asked Roat to arrange a meeting

with a senior CIA officer to discuss Alpha-66's plans to assassinate

Castro and to request CIA's assistance

(U.S. $100,000; 10,000 Cuban

pesos; 48 hand

grenades).

There is no indication that this request

ever acted upon by CIA.

C/A

"5. In April 1966 a LA Division officer,

the

1_ met VECIANA in New York City. The

meeting was arranged by a retired naval officer,

who had informed Chief, Wil Division that he had information of valuc

concerning Cuba.

when

arrived in New York City for the meeting,

he was introduced

to VECIANA.

He immediately launched

a discussion of the Cuban political situation and noted his strong

feeling that the only

solution

was the

assassination of Castro.

Alvised VECIANA that he was in no position to provide him

with

assistance or encourago him in an

assassination attempt and was only

interested. in gathering information which he thought was the purpose

of the meeting.

VECIANA subsequently said

that his roommate felix

ZABilLA, a Cuban refugoe, had

excollent contacts in Havana.

It was

clear to

however,

VECIANA was attempting to use ZABALA poten-

tially to get Agency financial support for his organization.

SECRET

2

---

## Page 189

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516:81:1

VECTANd suggested that 550, 000 would be needed to

get his

activities off the ground.

indicated to VEClAN that he

would look into the ZABALA matter and would probably arrange for

ZABALA to be contacted in Puerto Rico.

6. There is no indication in the file that any Agency officer

in contact with VECIANA ever used an alias Morris Bishop.

There is

no Morris Bishop listed in true name in the Doo rolls.

There was

never any contractual relationship with VECIANA and he was not

paid CIA funds.

7.

On 11 January 1977 a sanitized copy of VECIANA's 201 file

was

made available to staffers from

the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence.

Attachment

E

RE

3

---

## Page 190

THE WASHINGTON POST

Fedneslay, January 19,1977

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Mystery Witness in JFK Inquiry

i A mystery vitness has sworn to con-

anti-Castro forces might have re

gressiona, investigators that a Central

how Kencedy would die. Then the rab

cruited Oswaid, a bocan, pro-Castro

Inceligence Agengy agent introduced

ble rouser added knowiagiy that Ken-

activist to sill Kennedy.

nedy "knows he is a marked man'

him to Lee Barrey Oswald in Dallas

"The motive on this," states the me

three months before Cswald gunned

down president Joan F. Kaaredy.

то,

"yould oi course be the expects.

Miltzer later admitted to the FBI

tion that aitar the President was

that he had been in-Dallas in June,

1903, but denied having any baowl-

• The witzess, whom we have agreed

killed, Ostali would be caught or at

•to idently oniy as Mr. & because of at-

" least his idantity ascertained; the law

edge of the Kennedy assassination.

tempts of his life, is the founder of a.

eniorcemen: authorides and the pub...

However; the informant told the FBI.

that he asked Miltzer alter the saoot-

Caban terrarist group that worked

lie would then blame the assassinatica

ing whether he had known about it in

ciesely with the CIA.

on the Casten government, and the call

advance or had merely been guessing.

The group seid secret meetings at

for 2 forcerul overthrory would be irre.

3125 Zoilandale in Dallas betore the as

sistible."

"I don't do any guessing." replied Mil-

teer...?.: :::"

sassination. Not long after Kennedy

But Hoover abruptly blocked this

But the most explosive deveicoment

was shot, a Dallas deputy sheriff was

line of inquiry by notiying the war is Mir. &s statement that he met Os

told by an iniormant that Oswaid had

ren Commision on Sept 21, 1964, that

been associating wita some Cubans at

the FBl had Iccated and identified

waid in the company of a CLA agent

"3123 Harlendale."

Odio's callers. He named them as

Congressional investigators questiored.

ir. Is dramatic testimony: casts

Loran Hail, Lawrence Howard and.

the mystery witness closely on threa

separate occasions. They finally cor..

new light on the story Sylvia Cdio,

Wiliam Seymour, all anti-Castroites.

daughter of a wealtiny opconent of Cu-

Hoover even suggested that Odio could

cluded that "his credibility is strengts.

• ban Premier Fidel. Castro, told to thg.

bave confused the names "Loran Hall"

ened by the details the provides consist.

FBI. Two ronths before the Kearedy

and "Leon Cswald.".

ent with what he told us before. Sigmil.

icantly, he remains very strong on the

silling, she related, she was risited in

Now the congressional investigators

Oswald sighting."

cer Dallas aparment by toree men

have uncovered eridence that all three :

The encounter occurred in a down-

who identitied themselves as friends

denied visiting the. Odio apartment

town Dallas building, whare vl. Xand

• of her father.

and that the BI had obtained their.:

an appointment with his CLA contact

One was introduced to her as "Leon

deniais before Hoover wrote his letter

The agent was accompanied dy a man

Oswaid." When she saw the picture in

to the Warren Commission.

whom bir. & later recognized-as Ken.

the newspapers of the man who had

Ine investigators have alsu obtained

: nedy's siller.

saot Xenredy, she fainted from snock

the tape of a tascinating consersation,

"When he saw it was Oswald that

• It was ike same Oswaid, she was cer-

predicting two weeks in advance that

tain, wco had visited her apartment

Kennedy would be shot "troin an oif-

kalled Kennedy," the investigators re

ported in a confidential memo, "He

ice building with a bigh-powered ri-

Congressional investigators

have

nearly freaked out, but he never said

fle." The prediction was made by the

now learned that the late J. Edgar

anything."

•Hoover dalcerately misled the War-

late Joseph Miteer, a right-sving rab

The investigators tried to pin down.

bie rouser, who aiso happened to have

ren Commission about Odio's mystari-

Mr. & on hoy he could be sure that

close

connectiors with anti-Castro

ous visitory. She tas such a persuasive

man was Oswald if. & replied, ae:

leaders.

witness that the commission staft was

cording to the memo, that he had

• The conversation was taved on nov.

precaring to investigate her story

leared "bow to retain the character-,

9, 1933, in Miami by an FBI informant

thoroughly.

ics of a person; he had trained hirsel

Stall members even speculated, ac

named Wille Somersett, who turned

cordiaz to one internai memo, that the

the tape over to the FBI the next day.

to do that And il it wasa't Oswald, It•

Milteer is heard on the tape describing

was someone who was exactly like Cs

wald, his exact double.

it airais

B15

---

## Page 191

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SSORST

10 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM

SUBJECT

:

CI' Operations Group

: Article by Norman Kempster Appearing in

the Los Angeles Times of 1 January 1977

and Entitled "CIA Withheld Data on Oswald"

(copy attached)

In light of the inaccurate and misleading statements

attributed by Kempster to Sprague, the following comments are

offered in rebuttal.

a. "The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost

two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Oswald

had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his

desire to visit those countries . .

Comment: Oswald's name did not surface in Mexico City until

1 October 1963 when a hitherto unknown male soc-2l

Soviet Embassy. During this telephone caltrathe catter identi-

fied himself as "Lee Oswald." On 8 October 1963, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters the highlights of the

transcript of the conversation.

(1) On 1 October 1963, an American male who

spoke broken Russian and said his name was Lee

Oswald (phonetic), stated he was at the Soviet

Embassy on 28 September when he spoke with a consul

whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich

Kostikov. Oswald asked the Soviet guard Ivan

Obyedkov, who answered, if there was anything new

regarding a telegram to Washington.

Obyedkov upon

checking said nothing had been received yet, but

the request had been sent.

(2) Mexico Station said it had photographs of

a male who appeared to be an American entering the

1 October. Sys apparent are as 5, aaleti on

1 October.

build, about six feet, receding hairline, balding

top.

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

---

## Page 192

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.......

-- 2--

---

(3) No local dissemination was being made by

the Station. [MEXI 6453 (IN 36017), 8 October.]

(Note: Cablese has been rendered here into readable English,

without substantive changes or omissions. Cryptonyms and

pseudonyms have been omitted or put into clear text.) '

The above information was received in Headquarters on

October; the following day Headquarters incorporated thi:

Intormation in an electrical dissemination to the Federal Burear

of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of

the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive

source in Mexico reported that an American male

who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the

Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram

which had been sent to Washington. The American

was described as approximately 35 years old, with an

athletic build, about six feet tall, with a

"receding"

hairline.

(2) It is believed that Oswald may be identical

to Lee henry sic, Oswald, bom on 18 October 1939

In New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who

defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later

made arrangements through the United States Embassy

in Moscow to return to the United States with his

Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova [sic]

and their child.

(3) The intormation in paragraph (1) is being

disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject

will be fumished you.

This information is being

nade available to the Immigration and Naturalizatior

Service. (DIRECTOR 74673, 10 October 1963.]

Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.)

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated

a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy

---

## Page 193

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-- 3 --

that the Station learned that Oswald's Gall to the Soviet Embassy

on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa

to the USSR.

Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of

Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to

obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility

of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official

request from those agencies having investigative responsibility

requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station

did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October 1963 for

a photograph of Oswald.

MEXT 6534 (IN 40357), 15 October 1963.]

un 25 October 1963, Headquarters sent a request to the Department

of the Navy for a photograph of Oswald. [DIRECTOR 77978,

24 October 1963.] It was not until 26 November 1963, however,

that the Navy Department apparently responded to this request by

sending directly to the Mexico City Station a photograph of Oswald.

In response to a question from the Warren Commission, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 6 April 1963 stated that:

'The investigation of Oswald in 1963 prior to receipt

of the Central Intelligence Agency communication

dated 10 October 1963 was directed toward the primary

objective of ascertaining the nature of Oswald's

sympathies for, and connection with, the FPCC (Fair

Play for Cuba Committee) or subversive elements. The

Central Intelligence Agency commmication which

reported that a man, tentatively identified as Oswald,

had inquired at the Soviet Embassy concerning a

telegram which had been sent to Washington did not

specify the nature of the telegram. This contact

with the Soviet Embassy interjected a new aspect into

the investigation and raised the obvious questions of

why he was in Mexico and exactly what were his

relations with the soviets. However,

the information

available was not such that any additional conclusions

Intentions

ould be drawn as to Oswald's syn, one of the objectives

activitles at that time.

of the continuing investigation was to ascertain the

nature of his relations with the Soviets considering

the possibility that he could have been recruited by

the Soviet Intelligence Services.

The Central

Intelligence Agency communication, dated 10 October 1963,

stated that any further information received concerning

Oswald would be furnished and that our liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City were being advised. On

15=779

---

## Page 194

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7771

-6101

-- 4--

18 October 1963, one of our FBI liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City was furnished this infor-

mation by Central Intelligence Agency and he arranged

tollow-up with Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico

City for further information and started a check to

establish Oswald's entry into Mexico. Subsequent to

the assassination, Central Intelligence Agency also

advised us of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico City at the time of his visit there."

(Conmassion Echibit No. 853 (FBI Letter to J. Lee Rankin,

dated 6 April 1964).

b. "Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the

committee staff had learned that a CIA message des-

cribing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal

agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to elimi-

nate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet

visas.

The message was sent in October, more than a month

before the November 22,1963 assassination."

Comment: It is not CIA practice to disseminate raw information in

the form it is received from the field. Field reports are received

in Headquarters where they are first reviewed by the action desk.

The information is then written in a form suitable for dissemination

to the intelligence community, including additional information,

if available, from the Agency's central counterintelligence files

to make the report more meaningful to the recipient (s).

Upon learning that on 1 October 1963 an American identifying

himself as Lee oswald had telephoned the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 the highlights of

Oswald's conversation with the Embassy.

Because the Station at that

time did not know that Oswald was Lee Harvey Oswald and that he had

come to Mexico to apply for visas to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the

Station reported only that information obtained through telephone

tap operation against the Soviet Embassy.

On 10 October 1963, the day after it received the information

relating to Lee Oswald and his contact with the Soviet Embassy,

Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemi-

nation to the community and included a brief summary of biographic

information obtained from central counterintelligence files on the

possible identity of Lee Oswald. Since Headquarters had no indi-

cation before 22 November that Oswald had gone to Mexico to apply

for Cuban and Soviet visas, there was no question of eliminating any

---

## Page 195

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--5 --

mention of Oswald's request for such visas.

Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico Station had

omplied with the Agency regulations pertaining to reporting o

Americans abroad.

The Station had informed Headquarters which i

tum had alerted those agencies with an investigative or policy

interest in Oswald as an American in the United States. Headquarters

also instructed the field station to inform the local representatives

of those agencies.

As mentioned above, the action desk in Headquarters neglected,

include the fact that Oswald had visitec

the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963. Had this information been

included it would have indicated to recipients of the report that

Oswald had more than a fleeting reason to be in contact with the

contact and ere subjet et he are a to easing he 28, aptember

time, unknown.

'The CIA's decision to withhold information

was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed."

Comment: This statement is patently false and misleading. It is

totally incompatible with Sprague's remarks to Agency representatives

in Headquarters on 24 November 1976, i.e., "he will not prejudge the

Agency for any sins of 'omission or commission'

d. "Sprague told a press conference that it was

impossible without more information to know why the CIA

had censored its own message."

Comment: If Sprague needed more information, why did he not ask

the Agency for an explanation, instead of making it appear to the

public that the Agency has been dishonest in its dealings with the

intelligence commity?

"But he said the incident raised two interesting

guestions: what might the other agencies have done

afterently if they had been more fully informed, and

why did the CIA decide to remove information that was

considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial

draft of the message?" "

Comment: As already mentioned, the Agency did not know initially

why Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in October 1963.

---

## Page 196

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C=0.37

-- 6 --

It was only after the news of the assassination had reached the

Station that the Station initiated a review of its holdings. As

a result of this review, the Station learned that Oswald had also

visited the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald's contacts with the two

embassies were in connection with his desire to travel to the

Soviet Union by way of Cuba.

As to what "other agencies" might have done had they had more

information, attention is drawn to the FBI's comment in respons

to the Warren Commission's question. According to the FBI's

response, some Investigation had been initiated on or about

By the 25th of October, FBI headquarters had

informed its field office in New Orleans "that another Agency had

determined that Lee Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City in the early part of October 1963." The New Orleans

fleld oftice in turn informed the Dallas office which had juris-

diction over Oswald's place of residence. (For further detail, see

IV H 447 and 459.) There was, however, no request, official or

otherwise, from any of the responsible departments and agencies in

Washington for further details as to Oswald's presence in Mexico

and his reasons for contacting the Soviet Embassy.

f. "The committee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had

personal knowledge' of Oswald's visits to the Soviet

and Cuban embassies in Mexico.

As a result of that

Interview, the report said, staff members were sent to

Mexico, where they found and questioned additional

witnesses.

Comment: Sprague's characterization "a former CIA agent"' is probably

in reference to David Phillips.

The latter's "revelations" to staff

investigators (and also to Ronald Kessler) were unfortunate to say

the least

in that they were inaccurate, so far as we know.

There

is no indication in the Oswald files that Oswald wanted to make a

deal with the Soviets in retum for a free trip to the USSR.

The

"additional witnesses" in Mexico, it is belteved, each

.

" "These witnesses had never been sought out

before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the

act that they nad important intormation concernin

statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 61

days of the assassination of President Kennedy,

, the

report said."

---

## Page 197

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-- 7 --

Comment: If "these witnesses" include people entran

it would be impossible,

at this time, to make an appropriate comment.

The fact remains, however, that if Sprague had obtained additional

details, he should hold such information and not make it public

until the Agency has had a chance to review it and comment. There

are many examples in the Oswald files of statements made by people

claiming to have knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald which have been

proven to be fabrications.

One such person was Gilberto Nolasco

Alvarado Ugarte who, on 26 November 1963, came to the U.s.

Embassy in Mexico City. He

claimed he had been in the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later

recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill

an important person in the United States.

After thorough investi-

gation by Mexican authorities, the Mexico City Station, and the FBI,

it was concluded that Alvarado had completely fabricated his story

about Oswald.

Attachment

---

## Page 198

GiA Withheld

Data on Oswald

Assassimations Panel

issues.

• Report to House

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

ASHINGTON _Tre CIA. With-

held irom: the FBI for almost tro

manths in 1983 information that Lee

Flaryey Oswald. had talked with Cu-

ban and Soviet officials about his de-

sire to visit those counties, a House

cominittae reported Friday..e/rg.4g

The Select Committee on Assassin-

ations indicated in a report ta the ful

House that its investigation. of the

¿murder of President John F. Kennedy

would iccus early in 1977 on a trip

‚Oswald had made: to Mexico City in

g'* Counsel Richard A Sprague

said at the committee stait hed

learned that a ClA message describ-

Fing: Osirald's activities in Biexico 10

federal agencies such. as the FBI had

been rewritten to eliminate.any men-

-tion of his request for Cubani and So-

the CLA discavered Ostrals pres

Esence at tie embassies: through its

¿roulice su reillance.of those facilities.

Because Oswald had once defected to

the Soviet Union, the CLA and FEl

hed bean interested in his activities

ene neiore the Kennedy: assassina-

7 aRe decision to Mthaold in-

suzation was reversed shorty aiter

Meanedy was killed. The agency re-:

"ported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba

and the Soviet Union, both to the FBL

1 January 1977.

* District of Columbia's congressional dele:

and to te Warren Commission, which con- gate ans the cat no decision lad been made

cluded that Ostrald was the assassin and

mittee' said that no decision had been made

had acted alone.

on accepting Ray's olfer.

Sprague told a press conference that it

Hoyvever, Sprague indicaled that it pros:

yas impossible without more information

ably would be accepted

o know why the CLA had sensored its oisn

Any and all people iho have relevant

gessage.

suit he said the incident raised tvo inter-

information will be interrogated,.

" Sprague

sting. questions., what might the other.

• In a personal statement issued. in cu-

igencies have done differently if they had

junction with the report, Rep. Henry B.

seen more fully informed and why did the

Gonzalez (D-Tex), who is lo become com-

CIA: decide to remove: "information. that - mittee chairman in the new year; said a

was considered pertinent enough to be put

thorough investigation was needed to an

itt an initial draft of the message?"

31211

swer hundreds al pressing questions.

There were no firm conclusions in the

Gonzaler said that the commiltee hoped

report, which the 12-member committee

- to discover whether former FBI Director J.

prepared after the first three months of its

Edgar Hoover's now, well-known animosi-

inrestigation into the murders of Kennedy

ty toward King had affected the fBls 13-

and civil rights. leader Dry 3fartin Luther: restigation of the assassication.

gauhat onese Bud and However, Gonzalez said, the commitlee's

Technicaly, the committes goes out of ort could one heyod. the suings of

business Tuesday. with the end of the ses-

Kennedy and King.

sion of Congress in which it ivas.formed.

I the comanies can shed light on ine

The purpose of the year-end report was to

The the see Congress-e egalisa the Dege sonal e sata Ve should not

committee and to give it $6.5 million to pay

forget that President Ford had his on

for the first year of what coud be a yo-inanow escapes; no member of the Ecuse

jear investigation p

set should

• In the three months since its establish-

bombed..

ment, the committee has icitiated prelim

:: He said the committee's ultimate task

inary investigations into new and pre-

- was "to find out not just that happered

vicusly unou sued leads in both assassina-

bụt way.

tions," the report said.

so: he 2t

The committee said its staif investigators

had recently "questioned a: former CIA:

agent. who hed,"personal knawledge.". of.

Oswalds visie lo, the Soviet and Cuban

embassies in menco: As a result oi that in-

"tervier, the report said, staff. moabers

were sent to bledico, where they found and

restored additional witnesses, distur

These, witz eses had never been sougat

: out bejore-ay any investiga ire cody, not..

withstanding the fact, that they had impor-

tant inioration concerning statements by.

Lee Harvey: Oswald in Mexico within-60

days. of the assassination of President Kea-

nedy,

"the report said,

26 11 2

The report said also that the commiltee

staff had interviewed a person who assert.

ed that he had discussed the King murder

with James Earl Ray, who pleaded guilty

to the crime The unidentfied witness said

that Ray had told him about contacting an

asseciate in Europe, to receive. further in-

"structions. The story, which was told to re;

porters by a committee member: several

Weeks ago, has not been vertied he

In a letter to New York: Times columnist

Anthony Lewis, Ray offered tals meel lo.

1,3

tests uncer daa at a commisee bearing..

T? 9.09 997 WHaT A. 732531. 194

---

## Page 199

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77-6741

APPROVED FOR R01EA921083

CIA HISTORIGAL REVIEW ENRO GRAM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

FROM

SUBJECT

: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

: President Kennedy Assassination - Mrs. Luce Story

1. Action Required: None; for information only.

Background: In 1975, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce telephonically

informed Director William Colby of support she had rendered to certain

Cubans who were conducting their own independent operations against

the Castro Government in 1961 and 1952. Mrs. Luce stated that she and

Mr. William Pawley; an American financier long associated with the

Dominican Republic, helped finance a motorboat for three Cubans.

three Cubans, concurrently, were members of a CIA supported Cuban

exile organization.

After the 1962 missile crisis, all resistance

groups against Castro were ordered to cease operations. At this time,

Mrs. Luce and Mr. Pawley also ceased their financial support.

1963, very shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, the

captain of the motorboat, which Mrs. Luce helped to subsidize,

phoned Mrs. Luce to inform her

that "Oswald was a hired gun".

She, in

turn, informed him to tell all to the FBi.

At the behest of Director

Colby, Mrs. Luce passed the story on to Senator Richard Schweiker,

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report.

A version of the information was given to columnist Betty

Beale and was published in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975

(attached).

A staff member of the Senate Select Committee, on 10

December 1975, inquired as to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was that it had nothing

to add to the news-

paper story and that since this query involved U.S. resident Cuban

refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

---

## Page 200

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The transcripts were received by CIA's Inspector General

on 22 December 1976 from Mr. Colby's secretary. At the suggestion

of the Inspector General, the Office of Security sent copies of the

transcripts and a background note to the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation in January 1977. He do not know whather the FSI passed this

information to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

event that it should be replayed by the press as a result of releases

which may be made by the House Assassination Subcommittee. While it is

not a new story, the actual CIA transcript of Mrs. Luce's conversation

with Mr. Colby could be considered newsworthy and could be presented

in a manner detrimental to CIA.

Taciel

Waller

Attachment: a/s

CC:

Asst. for Public Affairs w/att

Mr.

H. Hetu

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att.

1 - DDCI w/att:

! - Asst. for PA/Mr. Hetu w/att.

1 - ER w/att.

-I - IG Subject (Task Force) w/att.

1 - IG Chrono w/o att.

1 - J.L. Leader Chrono w/o att.

OIG/J.L. Leader:aal

---

## Page 201

Clare Boothe Luce Weav

a Fascinating Tale

ne day in the latter part of October, Clare Luce re-

ed a call from Sen. Richard Schweiker,

R.-Pa.,

Betty Beale

irman of the subcommittee investigating the War-

Commission Report. He wanted her to persuade

e Cubaas she had known - Cubans who had known

Harvey Oswald - to testity beiore his committee.

Luce's efforts to locate the Cubans led to a some.

si bicodcurdling warning. But let her tell the story

n the begirning

"ear is 191, a jear of great

American

she began her narration to recent dinner

sis in her agua-colored Watergaie apartment

: a friend named Bill Pawley who was brought us in

ja and tito was Truman's ambassador to Peru and

zit. I got to know Bill very well in India and China

are he had built up a voluntary outit called The

ing Tigers. Bill was aiso called in by the CIA to re

it Cubans fcr the Bay of Pigs operation. Afterwards

was a very unhapoy man.

'One day he called me up and said, 'How wouid you

¿ to get in on the Cuban Flying Tiger operation?' He

1 in mind a fleet of motercoais subsidized by Ameri

is and manned by Cubans who had been in the Bay

Pigs operation — all these young kids who had been.

anded aiter the Bay of Pigs.

'I said, 'Fire.' So I helped to finance a motorboat.

a three lads who manned mina came up to see ma.

veral times. They would leave the coast of Florida

1 land in Cuba and come out with information. The

ormation they came out with was remarkabiy accu-

ie - that the Russians were building missile sites in

ba. I was told that the information was eventually

! to Sen. Ken Keating and was passed on to the

Tite House. You rererber what an impression it

de and how accurate it was.

"THEN CAME THE MISSILE showdown. Soon alter

e showdown I got a teiephore call from Allen Dulles

ying the Neutrality Act had been invoked and all

pericans must cease and desist in any luriner ettorts

wards the liberation of Cuba. Of course, we desist-

Tiro years later she and her husband Harty (Henry)

ice were sitting in their New York apariment listen-

? to the televised reports of President Kennedy's !

jessination when around midnight she received a

phone call from New Orlears. "It was the captain of

my motorboat," said Clare,

"A young men not more

• than 25, a young student lawyer. He said, airs. Luce, I

want to tell you about Oswald."

"He said that immediately after the 1951 missile

showdown, FBI men had come to Miami and told the

Cubans to break up all resisiance grougs and disperse.

He and the other too membars of his crew had moved

to New Orleans where they staried aroäner

Cuba" group. They had been there a year and a hall

when who made contact with them but Oswald!

"The Cubans all thougnt he as a look. Oswald

bragged about having been in Russia and said he was

an ex-Marine. He said he could shout anyoudy and he

would be happy to shoot Castro. He had no money, ne

was living with his wife in New Orleans and it looked

like he was presenting himself as a hired gun. They

didn't like the cut of his jib so they turned him oif. But

they followed him and found he was in a Fair Play for

Cuba Communist call to whose members he as giy-

ing the same line.

"And I remember this from the teleprone conversa-

tion — Oswald was telling the cell that he could shoot

anyone, including the secretary of the Navy. The Fres

Cubans continued to tail him and found that suddeniy

he had money, and he started going to Mexico City. He

made several trips. They continued their peneloction

of the Cuban Communist cell. He said they made tape

recordings of some of Oswald's meetings and they had

taken photographs of him distriouting handbills for the

Fair Play unit. The next thing they knew Presidert

Kennedy was shot.

"THE YOUNG CUBAN THO called me." continued

former Ambassador Luce,

"said leat there was a

Cuban Communist assassination least working some.

where — in Dallas, New.Orleans or wherever —I don't

remember, and that Oswald was their hired gun. Os-!

wald, he said, had triad to report the Commurist plans

to the FBI some time before tie assassination. But be-

cause he was out for the dough they didn't believe him.

continued

---

## Page 202

14-00000

I crapose that the FBI musi hear from a thousand

cracknois' a week.

In any event, on the telephone my young friand told

me that they had these tege recordings of Oswald and

snotograpns and what should they do? I said, 'Go to

he Fit and tell them everything you krow." Ina: ray.

ing been said I pui the whole thing out of my mind.

Comes the Warren Commission and says Oswald alone

was rasconsible and I forgot the whole matter.

"Then, in 1967, a fellow named Jim Garrison, dis-

Tici aworney in New Orleans, hit the headlines charg-

ing thai the assassination was a conspiracy. At that

moment I was reminded of the information I had re-

ceived and I bagan to wonder whether of not the

Warten Commission had goi all the facks. I couldn't

remerter the names of the Cubans but I finally locat-

ed one crewman who was living in Miami again and I

asked him what happened aiter he went to the FBI.

"He said, 'We turned over copies of everything.

were then told.to keap our traps shut and inat we

would be deported it we said anything publicly.' He

said one of the crew was deported to Guaterala, and

one was murdered - stabbed in front of a store.

"THEIR INFORMATION, HE SAID, never appeas

ed in the Warren Commission report. He said, 'I' an

marned row, I live in liams and I don't want to get

involved in it ever again' "

• Wren Sen. Schweiker made his request of Clare

Luce less than three weeks ago, she telephoned anoih-

er Cuben friend to see il he could locate and persuade

the young man to testify behind closed doors. Replied

the oider Cuban, if the testimony sas behind 13 closed

doors it would still become public.

"Americars thick they are playing games.

." he told

"They don't know they are involved in a life or

death business. No. I won't teil you where he can be

found. The people working for a free Cuoa would lose

their lives. A lot of them have already. They are not

interested in making political headlines for politicians.

You think the Bay oi Pigs,

the nuclear missiles, the

assassination oi the president was the end of the story?

I tell you it is just tie beginning. What you Americans

don't understand is, there are trained Communist ter-

rorists, assassination, kidnapping, bombing and saco-

"tage teams all over the country and the world."

- Fide #orld Paolas

Clare Boothe Luce

:".. "A year of great American trauma."

The very day aiter that conversation, observed

Clare gravely, bombs went oft at the State Depart-

ment here, at the U.S.-U.N. mission and four banks in

New York and at three places in Chicago. And close to;

the same hour she was recounting the whole lascinati

ing story to her guests,

a Cuban, anti-Communist

leader was exploded into bits in his car in Miami.

---

## Page 203

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UNLLASSIEILU

_ USE ONLY

LUATIULNIIHL

.. UTING AND RECORD St..I

L

SELALI

SUBJECT: (Oprional)

FROM:

Inspector General

2 E 24 Has.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

704O

OLC

ATTN: Lyle Miller

DATE

RECEIVED

EXTENSION

6565

R-1252

OFFICER'S

IN TIALS

FORWARDED

16

2.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12:

13.

14.

Director of Security

NO.

DATE

6 January 1977

COMMENTS (Number eoch comment lo show from whom

to whom.

Dram a line across column after each commonit.)

SUBJECT: Attached Transcripts

The OLC and the IG concur that

the attached transcripts should

be provided to the FBI. A blind

memo is also attached.

It is requested that the O/S

pass the package to the FBI.

7D Buckin

John H. Waller

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Litt.

The Office

semily sir

enter

the

bil: + 95-00

05-74110

FORM

1-62

EDITIONI

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 204

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77449.

6 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Transcripts of October 1975 Telephone Conversations

Between Director Colby, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce and

Mr. Justin McCarthy

Attached herewith are transcripts of two telephone conversations

between Director William Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, and one between

Director William Colby and Mr. Justin McCarthy. The conversations took

place in October 1975 and discuss Mrs. Luce's concern that certain infor-

mation, from a former boat captain, a Cuban refugee, regarding the Presi-

dent Kennedy assassination, reached the proper authorities.

information in these transcripts have been provided to investigating

authorities, they may be of some assistance to the House Select Committee

on Assassinations as it investigates various allegations.

2. The transcripts were received by the Agency Inspector General on

22 December 1976. The transcript of the 25 October 1975 conversation was

typed by Ms. Barbara Pindar on the same day. The other two transcripts

were typed by Ms. Pindar on 21 December 1976 from her stenographic records

Ms. Pindar

A version of the telephone conversation transcript was published

in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached). A staff member of

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 10 December 1975, inquired

as to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was

that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this

query involved U.S. resident Cuban refugees, the FBI would be the proper

agency to contact.

---

## Page 205

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4. The attached transcripts indicate that the matter was brought to

the attention of Senator Schweiker and The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(Telephone conversation between Director Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce

on 25 October 1975, pages 2 and 3).

Attachments:

a/s

2

---

## Page 206

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Review Staff:

75/3637

Date 10 December 1975

TO

:

CIA Task Force

FROM

: The Review Staff,

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED:

Date

Walter Elder

Time

Sitin

Paul Wallach, SSC staff, asks what we think of the

actached.

He is not writing a formal request and will

be satisfied with

• oral reply.

AFPROVED FOR RELEASE 1903

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Comments:

Action

Info

SC/DCI

A/DDA

A/DDI

A/DDO

A/DDS&T

OGC

OLC

IG

B. Evans

---

## Page 207

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PREGRAM

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BL?

Fle with Me CBC

talk.-

assed

The sto

(I advised l

her

to do so to Sa Sclea

Date

12/15/75

5101

USE

---

## Page 208

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Lelephone Conversation Bu. veen Mr. Colby and Mrs. Cla Boothe Luce

at 12:40 on Saturday, 25 October 1975 (from steno notes of Barbara Pindar

"ranscribed the same day)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

MIs. Luce:

I have a big problem, ClAUS IONG BEVEN PROGRAM rather

deeply involved during and after the Bay of Pigs, and up to the time of

the missile crisis, with a group called the (Directorate Revolutionario

Estudiante; Note: the spelling of that is just a guess), the DRE. Whether

you know this or not, it was me who fed the missile stuff to Keating. I

knew a number of these leaders well; they were going in and out of Cuba,

and I paid for one of the motor boats. Bill Pawley did too. We thought we

were doing another Flying Tiger. The missile crisis came, and I got a

telephone call from Allen telling me that the Secrets Act had gone into

effect and that henceforth there would be no voluntary American efforts.

That ended that, and I don't know what I was doing -- maybe I went back

to Arizona, or whatever. Then came the assassination. The night of the

assassination, right after Oswald was caught, one of my boys telephoned

me from New Orleans. Didn't I ever tell you this?

MI. Colby: . No.

MIs. Luce:

It was the captain of my boat. It seems that after the missile

crisis -- a period of about a year had gone by -- he said that all the young

Cubans involved profoundly in all of this had been told to scatter and

scram, that he and two of my other lads --

MI. Colby:

When, after the crisis?

MIs. Luce:

(Yes. ) (were told) to leave Miami.

Mr. Colby:

In 1962?

Mrs. Luce:

Yes. They were to stop their efforts to free Cuba; and if they

did not, they would be deported. It has a very interesting end involving you.

In any event, this one had been told to leave Miami after the missile crisis

was over, and he had opened a cell in New Orleans. He telephoned me to

tell me that Oswald was -- I am telling you what his view was -- was a

hired gun; Oswald had tried to penetrate their little cell; that they turned

around and did a counterpenetration job on Oswald; all of this was done

several months before the assassination. He said,-telling me on the phone,

he was terribly excited - he said you see he had no money, all of a sudden

he began to get money, so we checked him and he had a little "Communists

be Free"' or "Be Fair to Cuba"' group going in New Orleans." He said "We

---

## Page 209

4-00000

had tape recordings of what he was telling his group." It was a co unter-

penetration they went on. He said, "We have photographs of Oswald.

passing out handbills on the street, 'Be Fair to Cuba.'' He said, "We

are absolutely certain that Oswald was simply one of three assassination

teams, that they were working out of Mexico City (or funded in Mexico

City) by Castro." He said there were three assassination teams. Then

he said, 'We have these recordings, these tapes, and we have these

photos, what should we do?" These fellows always trusted me. I said,

"The first thing you do, the minute you hang up this phone, you telephone

to the FBI, give them everything you have got." Working in New York

with these Cubans is an extraordinary fellow, one of the most puzzling

characters I have every met; he is a devout Catholic -- Justin McCarthy.

Justin is the American patron -- although he has no money, nevei had

money -- of all these free Cubans in America. He never worked at CIA,

although CIA tried to pick his brains. He tried to help the FBI. I knew

Justin McCarthy, and he used to send me bulletins; he said he had been

sending them to me for the past six months, and I had never received one

of them. Out comes the Warren Report. I have many other things to do,

and I assumemy lads had reported what they knew, and maybe it had been

discounted, but I had taken the Warren Report at face value without poring

over it -- and I forgot the whole darn thing. Then, this must be nine

years ago, up turns a guy named Lloyd Garrison* -- what was he, a sheriff

or something? (* she means Jim Garrison)

MI. Colby:

District Attorney•

• MIs. Luce:

And he hit the headlines that the assassination had been a con-

spiracy. Then it all flooded back into my mind that I had never been quite

satisfied with what the Warren Report had brought out. Basically, I was

troubled by the whole thing, so I said I thought I would call Garrison.

In order to call him, I had to have the names of the Cubans, which had

gone out of my bean. So I called Justin McCarthy. He, said one of them

was now, my lad, was in Miami. I got him on the phone, my fellow, and

I said, "You remember your midnight call to me about the assassination

of the President, I want to know what happened after that." He said, "We

went at once to the FBI, they took all the tapes and photos and all our

information and told us to keep our moiths shut, and shortly after that they

informed us that if any of us talked to the press or anyone, dire things

would happen." He said one of the fellows on the boat was deported to

Guatemala or Chile, and one of them was murdered. He said, "I am a

lawyer, have two children, I am making my way in Miami, and I never

want to hear a damn word about the assassination of Kennedy because you

Americans really do not want to know the truth. " He said, "We waited,

expecting the Warren Committee would want to have us, and wenever heard

a word. " He said, "I want no part of it." Then the Garrison thing died

.-..

---

## Page 210

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- 3 -

down, and I am a busy woman, and I forgot about it. Three days ago,

a reporter was in here -- a gal*- asking about my life style and

said, in passing, "What do you think of the investigation of the

assassination of the President?" I am afraid I hit the roof.. I said,

"I think everyone must be absolutely off their rockers.

What possible

motive would the CIA have for murdering their own President? " I

said, "Even to assume such a thing is beyond belief because where

there is a murder or assassination, there is a motive, and there could

be no motive." I said, "Who had the motive was Castro; but perhaps

not even Castro, possibly just a bunch of Communist Cubans or plain

Communists."

I said, "They always had a motive for that sort of

thing. " Schweigker called me up yesterday -- when the reporter said

to me, "What is the name of the young Cuban?", I said, "Well, let's

call him Julio Fernandez." The Senator said to me "that is a fascinating

story. " (#I missed the fuct that

the girl reporter was

with knight Newspagers)

MI. Colby: You told the story to Schweiker?

Mrs. Luce: He read it in the Knight paper.

MI. Colby: You told the story to the Knight people?

Mrs. Luce: Not in the detail I told you. Schweiker asked if I could locate

any of these men involved for him, and I said I would try. That was

yesterday. I used that opportunity to say, "I do not know what you are

doing on the Hill. " I said, "You are in the (process?) for headlines and

destroying this country's security." He. said, "If you have this informa-

tion and you can get your hands on it, it would be a good thing to lay

this story to rest. " He said, "If you can find me these people, I assure

you they will be listened to in closed session." Now comes the big.

thing. Justin McCarthy runs an animal farm in Nyack: telephone

number is 914; 647-8596. I have known him to be a man of complete

integrity. He is a devout Catholic. He may or may not be a fanatic.

What makes one think he is is what he tells you is just so terribly

alarming; as be was the one, along with Bill Pawley, who involved me

with these Cubans, I tracked him down and had a two-hour conversation

on the phone with him this morning that was really staggering. When I

said to him, "Would you tell these things in the closed session in the

Senate?", he said, "I would find it more expedient and to shorten the .

process to hire loud speakers and put them on top of the Empire State

Building." He said, "You don't know, Clare, the Cubans have not lost

their desire to free their country, and there are plenty of them working

---

## Page 211

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-4

Leidi

at it, and they trust me, and I trust them, and they all trust me. "

He said, "All these fellows on the Hill give a damn about is a big

headline and political attention, and if this should involve my testi-

fying and some of my fellows got bumped off, or their apparat shut

down, I could not live with myself, no I will not testify."

I said,

"You know, Justin, if they send for you, you might have to." He

said, "They are not likely to send for me unless you tell them. " He

said, "They do not know who to ask for anyway. " (It doesn't appear

in my notes, but my memory is that he added that the reason the Hill

doesn't get to the truth is that they never know who to ask for. ) He

told me a story about working once with CIA. He said, "We did this --

DRE did one operation with CIA, as a result of which all the Cubans

involved were caught and killed, and I do not want any part with the

CIA. " He said, "It too can be a sieve." I said, "You have me really

over a barrel." I said, "Justin, I have to tell someone, is there

anyone you trust?" He said, "There is only one man in this whole

country whose word at this point I would take." I said, "Who is that?"

and he said, "Bill Colby." He said, "He is a daily communicant" --

Mr. Colby: No, no.

Mrs. Luce: I did not disillusion him. In any event, if only to put my own

mind at rest since -- he always says, which is fascinating if true,

that my lads in New Orleans, yes, they did turn over the tapes to the

FBI but they kept copies.

MI. Colby: Really?

Mrs. Luce: So he says. If so, you are possibly, if -- I think you should

get hold of Justin and give him a couple of hours because he has plenty

to say. If what he says is true -- he also told me, which I had forgotten --

that during the time of the missile crisis, and I was the one he came to,

and naturally the one I went to was Harry (note: this is first mention of

& 'Harry''' maybe I misunderstood; could she have said ''Allen!'*) because

I could trust him. In a way, Justin McCarthy supplied a lot of background

mateial on the Cubans to (note: could not hear what she said). He said

a few days ago -- Time is planning to do a (take-out) issue on the

assassination of Kennedy. He said that, going back through their files,

they came across my name as an informant, and he said "they tracked me

down too.". He said, then he told me -- I mentioned in passing that there

-

de her husbandillenny Luc.

Tim

basing her name

listen as

infirmant;

---

## Page 212

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-5 -

was a wonderful girl on Time that knows more about the Cubans

almost than anyone in CIA, Priscilla Badger. He said the Time

people are now trying to get information. He said, "I will talk to

no one because there are lives at stake" -- except you. For my

own sake, if you have a go at him, I would be very happy to know how

serious it is.

Mr. Colby: I will report back to you by all means. Let me do a little home-

work on just where this (looks). You do not remember the name of the

Cubans in Miami?

MIs. Luce: There are so many names; he talked to me so fast. He kept

saying "Chilo." I asked who "Chilo" is, and he said that was his code

Dame.

Jose Antonio La Nuza (Note: That last name may be all one word;

she said it means "the nut.")

Luis Fernandez Rocha

One of those fellows was the Director of the DRE. Then he also reminded

me of a guy who used to come to see me -- Cardona. (He had been told

by the American Government to get out of Miami) and he died, having

• become the President of a university in Puerto Rico.

These fellows

were scattered all over the place. As I mentioned that to Justin, he said,

"I know where they all are." The thing that alarmed me is that -- he

does not talk in an excited voice, but the statements are -- he said

"People think of the Bay of Pigs and the nuclear showdown and the

assassination of Kennedy as the end of the story, it is only the beginning. "

He said, "If you knew what is being laid on for the U. S.," and he talks

like that. I asked him, "What do you think happened? " He said, "Oswald

went to the FBI." He said, "I know that, he was selling them information,

and they did not believe him. " I said, "That is incredible." He said, "I

do not know how much you know about the FBI, but no day goes by without

desks being loaded with letters saying something will be blown up. "

(Note: I missed a little bit here due to something else happening in the

office.) I said, "What happened?" and he said, "The FBI got the word

from on top 'Destroy the letters. '"

Mr. Colby: From on top?

Mrs. Luce: From the President, who was Johnson. I contended that if at

that point the FBI had proven that Castro had in mind assassinating the

President, we would have been in war with Cuba. It might have been

---

## Page 213

4-00000

- 6 =

an act of State to shut up about it. If I had been the President, I

would have had (Note: missed more due to outside interference).

What is hideous about this is that the CIA is being accused or

Kennedy is being accused -- anyone except the people who probably

were involved. If putting it at rest in a secret session will work,

if such evidence does exist, you are the man to present it.

Mr. Colby: Schweker does not know about McCarthy?

Mrs. Luce: He only knows this -- I said there is one man I know who

might be able to tell you where the se Cubans are, and that is a fellow

named Justin McCarthy. He said, "Where is he?", and I said, "I do

not know, I have lost track of him." He said, "If you find him, let me

know. " After talking with Justin McCarthy, I do not want him to talk

to Schweiker. I do not know what to say if he calls again. Knowing the.

Senator, I may never hear from him. I leave it with you.

NOTE: Mrs. Luce closed the conversation by referring to a ClA paper

entitled "Restless Youth" and asked if it had been declassified. Mr. Colby

said he would check on it, and Mrs. Luce said she would like to have a copy

if it has been declassified.

---

## Page 214

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Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Justin McCarthy at 3:45

on Tuesday, 28 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 21 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

MI. McCarthy: I am glad to know you, even if it is over the phone.

MI. Colby: Mrs. Luce talked to me yesterday (sic). She gave me a capsule

version of some of her chat with you. It puts me in a bit of a jam,

obviously, because there are some things that really hold some

potential for being very important in these days (of) post-mortems

of everything. I wondered if maybe we should chat about it some-

time, or, quite frankly, one of the main things I would suggest is

that you might want to go to this Senate Committee looking into this.

MI. McCarthy: No. There are several reasons why not. I am sure we do

not need to discuss them, but there are many reasons. Over the

period of time there have been so many things.

We were theonly

ones who had the information about the missiles in Cuba for many

months, and we beat our brains out trying to get someone to do

something (or believe?) and regrettably (in) Washington there are

too many political (opportunists?), but there are too many lives at

stake. We risked our neck for all these years. We are interested

in doing the right thing.

Mr. Colby: I wondered if you could (slice?) off that New Odeans thing (and

not go any further than that?)

Mr. McCarthy: As I said to her -- (can't read the next few words). For me

to be seen in Washington, it is (can't read the next few words). We

do not trust anyone. We did so many operations for so long, and

we were entirely successful and never lost a man, and then one day

we did an operation for the Government and lost 22 men. Lives

depend on it. Someone sent a Top Secret memo, and the one he

sent it to left it on his desk and someone came in and read (it) and

the men were arrested. She asked, "Would you talk to Bill?" I

said I would. We think it would be a good idea - - for me to go down --

I do not want to blow my cover, but I would like very much to chat with

you and tell you.

Mr. Colby: My problem is then I get information, and then what are my

obligations.

Mi. McCarthy: From the point of view of (seeing?) how to do it through persons

other than me -- to get the end result.

---

## Page 215

4-100000

2

Mr. Colby: It might be that one of your fellows aware of some of the things

(would not mind telling Schweiker?) under some protection and

assurances of anonymity. That would be enough of a (can't read the

next word) to get started.

Mr. McCarthy: There is plenty to get started on.

Mr. Colby: Then (he?) could cut your people aut as a source.

Mr. McCarthy: She said it wo uld be aclosed-door hea ring. I said there (would?)

still be someone come out of the meeting and (can't read next word)

their names in the press. You see Jack Anderson's column on Monday.

It is vitally important, and it is true evidence. It is not conjecture.

I am concerned about what it ties into -- it is all the same ball of wax.

We sat on the information about the missiles. This has been going on

for a good twenty years, and we have accumulated an awful lot of

information. We are more concerned today than when we had the

missile information. It is appalling, and it is frightening, and people

do not want to believe it. Last night I enlightened people about some of

the things that are going to happen. We feel the time has come that

some of this should come to light.

It is necessary and essential to go

back and bring out some of these things that need to be brought out, but

not at the expense of (next word missing). We have done this on our

own and at our own expense. One of the reasons my people trust me is --

I am thinking of a book -- we did not want to do a book before. The

American public wants to know. It is all part of what went on then.

I think it should be clarified and straightened out what went on then.

But I am so terribly wary. I went to everyone, including the President,

about the missiles.

We had evidence -- what ships they were on,

where they (docked?), and a few days later they came back and said

there is no credibility of what you say.

Mr. Colby: The only thing that bothers me is the story about the existence of

some records (you?) still hold. The important part of that is that

indicates some (part?) of a failure, or possibly even worse -- that

is the kind of thing that does need investigation or (correction?) --

protecting your people that are in on it. The other possibility would

be to ask Schweker or one of his men to go and talk to you or one of

your people who would have factual knowledge of it.

Mr. McCarthy: When (Dorothy) told me about you over a period of time --

(Dorothy) said we have been through this so many times -- I took

this to editors of Life. That was the time when the guy sent the

Note: I am not positive about the "Dorothy"' above, but don't know what else it

... could be. I had written in long-hand, "Doroth." My only guess at this poiat is

Dorothy Farmer, Mrs. Luce's secretary.

---

## Page 216

4-00000

3

Top Secret memo and it got left on a desk in Miami and we lost a

lot of people on that. Inadvertently so many things happen. We

work so carefully. We have information now that no one else has.

because it has come to the point where so many of the people I work

with find they cannot trust people because of the opportunists. I

have never met such overbearing and obnoxious (can't read next

word). We sat on this year in and year out -- we never know when

we might get calls. I was up all night long the night before last.

Time is doing a big cover story on the thing -- the next issue --

the Today Show is bugging me. Washington is a funny place. LI --

by and large, when your life is on the line -- one of (our?) guys hung

himself after one of the escapades we went through. He committed

suicide because he felt guilty about it. Up here it is terrific because

I am an animal nut. A lot of the guys divulging some of this stuff

that they would not normally do.

MI. Colby: Let me talk with Clare again as to how we handle this. The main

thing is not so much the overall stuff about Cuba -- the main thing

is the story about records, about Oswald. That comes at a time

when that is a serious subject of study here by the Congress. If we

could in some way shake that information loose without putting the

finger on any of your friends, I think we are sort of obliged to do this

in terms of clarifying the record against the (facts?) -- this is a very

key aspect of it and a very serious problem that if it was suppressed

at the time.

MI. McCarthy: That is not all that was suppressed.

Mr. Colby: That is the thing. They are looking into it. Let me talk to Clare

again and see if I can figure out some way in which we could talk to

you (maybe?) and if you could in the meantime think of a way of

(can't read the next word) out or (can't read the next word) out this

(feature?) of it so that you give the (final result?) but not the sourcing,

and let the investigators (find their own source later on?), we would

have done our duty. My problem is that I really cannot sit on it with

my obligations. I can be reasonable about protecting other people,

and I have to be, but I also have to have the responsibility for responding

to proper investigations of things that really should be looked into.

Mr. McCarthy: Let me (can't read next word) this in. Some of our guys (can't

read next several words).

Mr. Colby: ' That is what she said.

---

## Page 217

4-100000

4

MI. McCarthy: They and I are scared to death. I was Executive Producer

of TV programs for years -- I cannot make -- I have earned the

respect and confidence of these people över the years. The other

night I talked all night long. If Itry to push my guys -- Clare said

it needs to be laid to rest, and it does. I would like to see it get

laid to rest, but my people --

MI. Colby: I can assure you I am as interested (as) you in protecting that

part of it if there were some way of having part of the cake and

eating part of it, so that you do not lose the one or the other but to

work out some vehicle -- a way in getting the substantive information

loose but protecting people involved. There may be ways to do that if

we put our minds to it. Let me talk to Clare and see what really --

I will not do anything except with her without your permission.

NOTE: MI. Colby tried to call Mrs. Luce on 29 Octaber, but could not reach

her. He contacted her on 31 October (see separate notes)

---

## Page 218

4-00000

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Clare Boothe Luce at 4:07

on Friday, 31 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 22 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. Colby: I got the Restless Youth for you. And I called Justin McCarthy.

We had a long chat.

He does not want me to do anything about it,

but I said you put me in an awful position. (Note: The "you" there

refers, I believe, to McCarthy.) I understand what you mean about

his strong manner of talking. I think both of us are (hung?) with a

rather tantalizing story.

Mrs. Luce: If I had not known the guy for 25 years, I would take him much

less seriously.

Mi. Colby: The only real point is the thing about the tapes and the photos and

the allegation about the FBI. I tried to (argue?) him into figuring out

some way in getting rid of those but keeping himself out of the act.

Mrs. Luce: He called me back and said he talked with you and that you left

him in a box, and I think he feels now that there is some kind of a

question of conscience involved. He said, "I am going to let you and

Bill Colby decide what is best to do."

Mr. Colby: I said I would be in touch with you and try to figure out something

sensible.

Mrs. Luce: Why don't we suggest that he bring you or me -- perhaps he feels

safer with me -- the tapes and photos if he has copies of them.

MI. Colby: And then you pass them over to Schweiker.

MIs. Luce: And let them decide, and I will maintain his cover -- he keeps

saying it is not worth it to him after all these years to blowthat --

the paradox, he tells me he is going to have to write a book (and

whether he is indeed going to?) so that he is not altogether a crackpot.

On the other hand, what he is doing is sufficiently crackpot. He is

taking care of broken-down animals from his entire area.

However, --

Mr. Colby: I think that is a good idea. You say that you and I have talked, and

we are all in a kind of box at this point, and we really in conscience

cannot sit on this stuff -- all these charges that there is remaining

evidence that (can't read next word) was held back and disappeared

---

## Page 219

14-00000

into the FBI,

and maybe the way to do it is for him to provide it to

you, and you to Schweiker, and then I would just as soon drop out --

it does not really have much to do with me -- and in that way you

would protect him from Schweiker, and you would say you got it from

a friend -- and the source is whatever he and you agree on.

MIs. Luce: I will do that.

Mr. Colby: I think that is the best thing to do. If he does not buy that, I do not

know what we do about Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: (I am going to ignore it if Schweiker comes to me.)

NOTE: The conversation continued, but it did not pertain to this subject.

---

## Page 220

4-00000

30 November 1976.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comments on Ronald KESSLER's Article: "CIA

Withheld Details of OSWALD Call," which Appeared

in the Washington Post of 26 November 1976

The following comments are keyed to the attached Washington

Post article, i.e., the paragraph numbers below correspond to the

paragraphs as numbered in the margin of the xerox. of the article:

1. COMMENT: While CIA knew that a man identifying him-

self as Lee OSWALD had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy by

telephone on l. October 1963, this information had no unusual

significance until 22 November 1963 when President Kennedy's

assassination occurred.

Ду ena

aiminassina nanish assa

TELESH

the

eat

T58698

assertere reported by caore to peace,

the das

2AC6

community

•обнім я

be made sasente

партни

2.

COMMENT: This statement is not substantiated by our

files.

COMMENT: The information regarding the 1 October 1963

contact with the Soviet Embassy -- received in leaquarters on

9 October -- was disseminated on 10 Oatober 1963 to the Department

---

## Page 221

14-00000

of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department

of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

A copy of the 10 October 1963 dissemination was made available

to the Warren Commission on 24 March 1964. (See Memorandum

for J. Lee RANKIN,

dated 24 March 1964, from Richard HELMS,

Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: CIA Dissemination of In-

formation on Lee Harvey OSWALD, dated 10. October 1963.) On

16. October 1963, our Chief of Station sent a memorandum to the

American ambassador on the subject of Lee OSWALD's contact with

the Soviet Embassy. The original of this memorandum was routed

to the ambassador, the minister, the counselor for political

affairs, the regional security officer.

legal attache, naval attache, and the lans.

A copy was sent to the

In April 1964, Messrs. COLEMAN, SLAWSON and WILLENS,

staff representatives of the Warren Commission, visited the U.s.

Embassy in Mexico City.

AS

pas

1863

rat-

manut october

mercubarnt sortei

vegasssar

Feransta

called HMMA 23248

JA Ancil

1964

This dosse

11ze aliastares paper vergron

under provisions of the FOIA in March 1964 as Document Number

274 and in September 1976 as Document. Number 658)

See follow-

ing:

Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31

January 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, 28 September - 3. October 1963.

b. Letter to Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans, dated 10 February 1964, from J. Lee

RANKIN, General Counsel.

Memorandum for J. Lee PANKIN, dated 19

February 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

2

---

## Page 222

4-00000

4.

COMMENT:

See conments in Paragraph 3, above.

5.

COMMENT: The Agency disseminated the information

concerning OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 Octo-

ber to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and

Naturalization Service on 10 October 1963.

Brembar

ho da Nakenher 19s2

and

the curan and

7.

COMMENT: OSWALD was in no sense "under investiga-

tion" (before 22 November 1963). None of the facts of his trip

to and stay in the USSR and return to the United States, 1959-

1962, were known to the Mexico" Station before 10 October 1963,

the bare bones of his biography were forwarded by Headquar-

ters to it in response to a Station cabled report of 8 October

1963 which forwarded, on a routine basis, what appeared to be

a contact by an American for a visa to Cuba in transit to the

USSR.

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entningdared

3

---

## Page 223

4-00000

G600A

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reaction by the inon

finat

nation to Headquarters. and th

8.

COMMENT: No comment.

9.

COMMENT: Tarac

crosit under transcripe

nd

Tanas

used.

1963

and l Dictaba

остіком

ed

aat have containad that infarmatian

10. COMMENT: No comment.

11. COMMENT: Files do

not support this statement.

12.

COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

• 13.

COMMENT: The information "given by DURAN" is sup-

ported by her interrogations.

14.

COMMENT:

"OSWALD later referred in a letter to

'meetings' he had in the Soviet Embassy."

Although KESSLER

chooses not to give details, this statement is in reference

to a letter OSWALD wrote on 9 November 1963 to. the Consular

Division of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Conmission

Exhibit No. 15, Vol. XVI of the Hearings before the President's

Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.)

15. COMMENT: No additional comment.

16. COMMENT: With regard to the press statement that

"CIA claimed it did not know of most of OSWALD's activities in

Mexico try of his det vie assassination is tre n

did not know of his activities noted that after the dissemination

on 10 October 1963 of the 1 October 1963 contact, no requests

were raceived from the dissemination customers for further in-

formation or follow-up. Without some customer interest being

expressed, particularly from the Navy, the FBI or the Department

4

---

## Page 224

4-00000

of State, who had the greatest interest in OSWALD at the time,

there would have been little motivation for the Station to in-

dependently pursue such a tenuous CE lead.

17. COMMENT: The discussion in this paragraph of the

article

rests on assumptions and allegations developed earlier

in the article, followed by comments by Messrs. BELIN and

SCHWEIKER, apparently based in turn on information provided

them by reporters.

No further comment seems relevant, beyond

those comments made earlier.

COMMENT: Is BELIN here referring to Gilberto

ALVARADO Urgate?

If so, information regarding OSWALD provided

by ALVARADO was passed to the Warren Commission as attachments

to a memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated l June 1964, from

Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.

(See also Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 4 June

from Richard HELMS; Subject: Information Developed on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

This mamorandum

became Commission Exhibit No. 3152 contained in Vol. XXVI of

Warren Commission report.

19. COMMENT: We do not know what BELIN actually said to

We believe, how-

to E. Henry KNOCHE of CIA.

BELIN at that time was Executive

Director of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United

States (Rockefeller Commission). In his letter, BELIN refers to

the photograph of an American male and the question whether or

not this male was Lee Harvey OSWALD. He continues:

"The CIA and the Warren Commission both

determined that the picture was not of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and that the picture was taken

after OSWALD left Mexico City.

"Although portions of this record have

been

released

to the public, other portions

have remained classified because of concerns

by the CIA at the time that a release of the

full picture might disclose sources and

methods which the CIA felt were not in the

national interest to disclose at that time.

In light of the false allegations about the

assassination of President Kennedy and the

5

---

## Page 225

4-00000

-.

false allegations of CIA involvement, I

feel that it would be appropriate to re-

consider whether or not the entire matter

can be fully disclosed at this time."

An interim reply was forwarded on 23 April 1975 by

E. Henry KNOCHE, Assistant to the Director; CIA.

On 2 May

1975 a review was completed of Agency holdings regarding the

photograph of the unidentified individual in Mexico City pube

lished by the Warren Commission.

and ano uncha

Attachment:

Article

---

## Page 226

CIA Withheld Details on Oswuld Cali

By Ronald Kessier

transcript lo either the FBI. or the

So, with the full cooperalion of the

Washador. Dose Prall Writer

Warren Commission.

Mexican government,

ClA kirctays

In late Septemcer,

1963-cignt

Instead, the ClA gave the Fly in

were Installed en leicphone liuci to.

waks ecicle

the

assassination

of

Oclober, 1963, only a brief report say.

ing into both embassics.

sident Kennedy-Lea Harrey Osi

5 ing Oswald had inade contact with

The ClA was espocially interested

in U.S. citizens. who made cuntact

nd talesnoned the Seriet embass'-

the Russians lt gayc

¡euno City and tried to make a.

Conunission a transcript of the laped

conversation but for unexplaincd ica-

Thus, when Oswald showed up in

City in lale September and

seas talled to include in the transcript

in exchange for unsaccified infer:

ation, he

waned a free trip to 6 Oswald's offer of information and his

scicphoned the Russian cinbass%,.his

35:0.

suggestion that the Russians would

conversation was picked un fruit the

wirclan. A transcrlpt nas made and

la conversation was intercepted:;

want to bay his way. lo

circulated in the CIA nifices in the

American embassy in Mexico Cily.

ecorded by the Coriral mie.

The Post has:also delermined that'

once Agency et the time. But it was

"The' station chiel at that time was

on canca over to the rBil

the CIA, for unexplained reasons, told

the late Winston M, Scolt; who per-

Commission that it

has responsibility for investi

sonally reviewed all transcripts chia-

Jearned of most of Osirald's activitics

ing pessible sples, and it was not 7 in Mexico Cily only afler the assas.

mating rom wiretaps on Sovict bloc

turned cvor lo the Warren Com-

sination. The fact is, however,

The Oswald transcripl, according to

Mie during its investigation oi the

the CIA monitorud and tarc-recorded

who vorked with

riestation.

his conversation with both the Rus.

Scotl, aroused a lot of intercit:

Too manswered guestion is why

•sian and Cuban embassies in alexico

"They usually picked un the lans

Cils in the fall of 1953, ocfore Kch-

cripts the nest day" hu said.. "This

The existence cá the CIA telephere

meis's death.

they wanled right away."

mercop' oi Oswaid's conversation in

It was the CIA's belief that the tio

What that transcript contained is

City and the contents of the

• ombassics vere heavily

ill 9 a matter of some dispute, and the CIA

scoret ererscript have been verig the spy business and that,

Ted by The Mashington Post.

The

says it routinely destroycal the tape

• cally, they were opcrational bases for

before the assassination. But sonie

Font has aiso versied that the CiA

intelligence activities directed at. the

Sance to ture over the complete

United States.

See OSWALD, 17, Ccl. 1

•?..

LEC HAKSEY OSWALD

•.. relephonca Sorict embass:

'"''

THE WASHINGTON

POST

26 Vovember 1975..

---

## Page 227

4-00000

10

11

i2

13

O&TVALD, From A1

i

saw the trarscript or

toard lie tape

icfere tine assassina.

don reocll that Oswald was liging to

One of them is Davld A. Phillips, a

jarmer CIA oificer, ino now heads

the assoclation of Retired Intelligence

Didicers and is & loading delender

Sca:. 27, 1963,

a "riend"

wist Party.

called lig

the Scrict

actlvitics. And lis reictyped eport

riade no mention of Oswald's offer

of information in excha: ge for a irec

trip to Russia or of his attempts to

travel to Cuba and Russia.

tober 1, 1963," the toletype message

sald, "a reliable and insitive source

in Mexico reported that an American

male, sho idertified himself as Lec

Osivald, contacted the Soviat Enicassy

in Mexico City Inquiring whetter

the embassy had received any neis

concerning a tricgram which has becn

sent to lYashington."

That was strictly a routine handling

of the matter, and similar, lo the

standard reports made to the FBI at

that time on other contacts with the

communists by American citizens in

; hase raz"a

relationship wit!:

sought to conceal. Tue Cia has in.

David V. Beiin, who sas an is.

sistant counsel to the Warren Cor..

mission end inter executive director

el lie Rockefciler commission's prose

of the Cia, sold that it the darren

Commission had krown of Oswaic's

conversations and other aew iniC..

mation, it would have beer. loss sure

that the assassination 1as rot par

oi a foreign corspiracy.

• Sen. Richard S. Scitwoike: (3.72.)

who lcá the Senate intelisoner coir.

mitico's probe of thie assassination

said that investira.ion

Even after Kennedy's assassination,

taken on ar.

the CIA failed to turn over to the

rection and perspcatire" it the cor:

Warren Commission the full trans.

mittoe had been aware cí Cara':

"Ilis main con-

cript of the telephone intercept it lad

made in Plexico City. Oswald's offer

In intersigus wih The Pos, Beir

of information lo the Russinas in ci-

who documentca do CiA 3.0.3 arains

change ior passage sas omilted irom

:Castro in. his capacit is excarsir

the transaript, aud the ClA claimed

director f the icekeiniler commi:

SILVIA DUR?"

it diù not know of most ci Oswald's

sion, revealed te CiA tire did ne

.. recalls talk mita Corald

activities in Mexico City until riier

the assassinat:on.

report licin or alicacd minoss is

The significance of the CIA actions.

mecting in Mexico Cily Ecticer C:

would take three to four months to

is difficult to assess. The FBI in the

process. Informed of this, Duran said,

vald and Cuban tricilladies arcel:

fail of 1963 was already showing ir-

Oswald "got really

• At the time, Cucan rseats 40o:g

tormittent interest in

nated their more immortal ac.?!it

He was gesticulating" Duran said she

might or might not have intersified

with archts of the XGB, Die Sovic

had to call for help iron. the Cuban

that interest if it had been told of

intelligence service.

consul who got into & snouting match

Cswald's conversations.

Bolin called on tie CiR is mas

sith Oswald and told him to get out.

• Whether the neir information would • dui! disciosure c iis anailedoe

Duran said she nover saw him again.

and his contacts with 1

Howeve", Duran's story coverca oriv 7

sion's deliberations is also an open

Cubans and Russiane.

154

day ci Oswald's divc-da;

Belin, a staunch detender c: 1:

stay in Mexico City. Oswala laler ¿e-

gated the possibility of a forcigr. son.

icired in a lotter to "maatings" he

Taron Commission's carcission ti

spiracy. and

concluded there was to

Oswald was the ione astrasin in:

had in tig Sorict Erabassy.

show Oswaid acted

Miller Koncio, said de precani:

liow. intercsted the CIA was in

ocial of a iorcion power.

the CiA's concern coold dirdesi:

Oswald's donlings win the two en.

Nevertheless, there is vet no ca.

scere: sourech and incitizened iss

plunation for the CIA's henching ci

But he said

The translator ard typist sno han-

Oswaid's conversations. The CIA to.

dom merest would Be send i

diled the transcript of in. inicicopied

¿ciuses to comment,

disclosing the truth.

conversution recalled that ine Jovel'

would not be appropriate in the light

ray to

informl 5 of interest was lign. But the Cia's

of an impeading investigation by tie

nied that tie agonsy has a room:.

own actions lead to a ditcrent con-

• House Select. Commiltce on Assas.

she: 1 clusion.:

and

agents. "The drones is care c.

visa

The agercy waltce until Oct. 10,

When asked if they could eoplain

muo such serotic airator.

1503, lo notify the FEl ci Oswald's

the agency's actions, seme CIA cí-

was debunked," the spoissa

---

## Page 228

14-00000

SECRET

2Q GOT 0.5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

:

Senate: Select Committee on Intelligence

Request to

the Deputy Director for

Operations

Diot proper tille:

This ass in resprice te telen 6C).

Attached, in response to the Senate Select Comnittee

Clace Biotique

request of 27 October 1975, are separate memoranda on the

DRE and several Cuban exiles.

Chief

Latin America Division

Attachments

De, Brishit

ly DDO,

10/25/25-

_..m

---

## Page 229

4-00000

)

SUBJECT:

Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students'

Revolutionary Directorate)

The DRE was founded by a group of students at Habana

University in 1954 as an instrument of opposition to the regime

of President Fulgencio BATISTA.

The original members of this

group were

also members of the

Habana University Student Federa-

tion (FEU) .

Several leading members of the DRE were killed by

Cuban authorities during and following the attack on the

Presidential Palace,

Habana, in March 1957. The remaining DRE

leaders, as of 1958, were in exile.

The DRE worked as

a secret

underground organization in Cuba,

generally in Habana, laying

plans and making preparations.

The theory of the DRE

was that

success of the revolution depended on quick and efficient

elimination of BATISTA which Fidel CASTRO's forces at that time

could not achieve alone.

The DRE finally turned against CASTRO

on the issue of communism.

sages a m

me nooney.

1..

---

## Page 230

4-00000

95925

Julio FERNANDEZ, Molino

(No crypt)

DPOB :

23 March

201-752511

Subject was of

operator in 1964.

AY

934, Havana

exile in May 1964. In 196, he lived at 430 SW1lth Ave., Miami.

Julio FERNANDEZ Bencomo

(No crypt)

DPOB :

10 April 1917, Havana

201-742497

Received POA 14 January 1964

which cancelled 24 February

1964, because he was not interested in employment with CIA

since salary was insufficient.

signed secrecy agreement

and was terminated without prejudice.

He took SGSWIRL 10

January 1964.

No derog, but he had told his wife and one

CarIÖs MARQUEZ that he would be working for CIA. He was

originally recruited for AMWORLD by one Pedro BLANCO, and was

to be used as PM asset on a CIA vesse

Julio FERNANDEZ Conzale

(AMOT-99)

DPOB:

10 May 1935, Havana

201-299222

He was employed

by the Intelligence

and Security Commission

•of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (AMIRON/ AMBRUSH) for

about two months m 1901.

He was brought into it by Julio

PASCUAL Abril.

te stated in a letter to Hernan HENRIQUEL

LOICa,

anti-CASTRO Cuban in Madrid who intormen the FBl (wnc

told us in memo dated 2 November 1961) that he twas about to

take

material to anti-CASIRO elements,

He received POA 10 May 1961 for

use

from it, but when last contacted was working for Dixie Lily

Products Company (a wholesale grocery outfit) as an accountant

at $50 weelly in December 1951.. POA Cancelled 24 Ju

1962.

---

## Page 231

4-00000

CEC-

Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez

(Formerly AMTORIC-2, AMHINT-5S)

DPOB:

3 May 1989, Havana

201-316766

POA granted

his job as Secretary

April 1962.

for JMHOPE, Swan Island

There is no further indication in file that he was terminated,

no quit claim, no OA or POA cancellation. However, there 1s no

information on his use since 1964.

Per document dated 7 June

1965, he was studying at University

of Miami and working as

switchboard operator for Cuban Catholic Children's program in

Miami.

According to Cuban Fanilies Yearbook of 1974, Dr. LuIS

FERNANDEZ Rocha living at 602} W. 14th Lane, Hialeah,

Florida,

33012 with wife and four childien. He became naturalized U.s.

citizen on 15 September 1yof

Julio FERNANDEZ Travej

(No crypt)

DPOB: 10 August 1934

201-297828

Havana

POA requested for use as PM trainee 21 March 1961. POA

cancelled 4 April 1962.

FBI memo dated 14 December 1961 notes

that he told FfI of CIA financial supporg to Frente

Revolucionario

Democratico (FRD) and to Antonio

VARONA, ane of its leaders, to

the tune of Six million dollars."

Subject told FBI he himself

belonged toggroup led by rolando

MASFERRER which NOT getting

CLA suppora.

Subject visited BIaNovember tel

Key in Florida had

That

oup was called "Ejercito Nacional Cuban

---

## Page 232

4-00000

SSOZZT

Jose Antonio LANUZA

Florida, in November 1963.

providing intermation (does not

say to whore on thi

"Commandos L,

"man anti-CASTRO organizatign.

Not clear

whether he is identified with the follaving LANUZA.

Jose Antonio LANUZA

(on microfiche)

201-339258

file

15

that Subject is a Cuban

f Inter-Source Registry

was living at 1705 sw 3ro. gsid Miami.

According to a document dated 1 November 1968, "SD 10658 is

no present

contact with Subject, dated 29 October 1962.

No traces Justin MacCarthy

---

## Page 233

4-00000

( CONFIDENDAL

DISPOSEOR CONERAL

710-3320

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

: Washington Post Story of 13 November

1976 "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans

of Plan to Kill JFK"

1. The Post story on Saturday states that a J. Edgar Hoover

memorandum reported that Lee Harvey Oswald told Cubans in

advance of his plaz to kill President Kennedy. The attached

package was prepared by

• CI Staff. It is for-

warded for your information.

2. A copy of the Washington Post story has been added

to the package.

John H. Waller

Attachments: a/s

SDBreckinridge:js (16 Nor (76)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/atts

1 - IG Chrono

1 - IG Subject (Task Force File)

A - SDe Chrono

w/atts in above file

1 - Seymour Bolten w./ atts

1 - John Waller w/atts

1 - Andrew Falkiewicz w/atts

intts

an.

---

## Page 234

4-00000

ICTORS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1333

- CIA NISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

13 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

FROM

SUBJECT

"Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan

to Kill JFK" by John M. Goshko, Washington

Post, 13 November 1976.

1. The memorandum".. by the late FBI Director

J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald reportedly

told Cuban officials in advance of President Kennedy's

assassination that he intended to kill the President"

is cited in Commission Exhibit No. 3152, Volume XXVI,

of the Hearings Before the President's Commission on the

Assassination of President Kennedy pp. 154-157 (See Tas A).

CE No. 3152 is cited in support of statements made by the

Warren Commission in it's Report on pages 307-308 (see

Tab B).

memorandum is based upon information which

the Agency had passed to FBI Headquarters and it's repre-

sentative in Mexico City.

2.

On 26 November 1963, the Mexico City Station

reported to Headquarters that a Nicaraguan named Gilberto

ALVARADO Ugarte (referred to as "D" in the larren report)

came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City.

He claimed ne

had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18

September 1963 when

a man he later recognized to be Lee

Harvey Oswald received $6, 500 in cash to kill an important

person in

United States. (See Tab A for complete

memorandun.)

The information obtained from ALVARADO was passed

in Mexico City to the Legal Attache,

MT: Clark D. Anderson,

by our Chief of Station on 29 November 1963 (See Tab C).

---

## Page 235

14-00000

/SECRET

A short dissemination (DIR 85744) alerting customs agencies

to ALVARADO's allegation, was made on 29 November 1963

to the White House, the Federal Bureau of InvestigatiOn,

the Department

semination (DIR 87667) was made on 7 December 1963 (see

Tab E) •

(NB: In the latter dissemination, mention was

made that a representative of the Fil participated in the

interrogation of ALVARADO.)

On 13 December 1963, the Agency forwarded under

CSCI 3/779 ,

136 a translation of the Mexican police

interrogation report on Gilbarto ALVARADO Ugarte (see

Tab F) .

5.

In summary, the Agency and the FBI knew of

ALVARADO's allegations concerning Oswald, which were sub-

sequently retracted by ALVARADO himself as being false.

In addition,

the FBI was able to prove that Oswald was

still in New Orleans at the time ALVARADO claimed he saw

Oswald in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.. The information

was forwarded to the Warren Commission by the Agency

and the

FBI as evidenced by its inclusion in the Warren Commission

Report and accompanying exhibits.

SECRET

---

## Page 236

WASHINGiON

13 NOT'TE

FEET

Oswald Reportedly Told

V Cubans of Plan to Kill JFK

Dy John M. Goshko

Cubari embassy in Mexico

17:241055001 Post Cla'd Srtier

City prior to the murder of

The Justice Department

Kennedy.

has discovered a 1994 memo

There has been persistent

• randum bỳ the late FBI Di-

surmise about a possible in-

volvement of the Castro.gov.

rector I. Edgar Hoover say-

ernment in. the murder of

ing that Lee Harvey Oswald.

Kennedy, possibly as a coun..

repertediy. told Cuban offic

ter stroke .against. CIA ef.

ials is advance of President

forts

to assassinate. the

Kennedy's assassination that

Cuban leader.

he intended to kill the Presi-

There has also been spec.

•dent.:.

ulation that the assassina.

Informed souress said yes

tion may have been the work

of Cuban-exile terrorigis

terjay that Hoover, in the

mero, attributed this infor. :

However, all of these reports

e mation to a highly reliable

have baen fourth-or filth-

•Informant wno claimed to

hand accounis originating

have been told it personally

with informants of doubtful

by. Cuban Prime Minister

reliability:

Fidel Castra. •.:.

Castro, according to the

LEE HARVEY OSWALD

•Hoover memo found

The: Hoover memo was

described by the sources as

memo,; reportedly said he

having been addressed. to the

had been advisad by officiais

Warren

Commission, ap.

of • tho

Cuban embassy in

The assertions reported in

pointed by former President

Mexico City. that they had

"the lioover memo go further

Johnson

to investigate the

met with Oswald before the

than any information cur-

assassination.

But former

Nor. 22, 1963, assassination

rently on the. record. con-

commission stalfers said yes.

of •Kennedy in Dallas and

cerning alleged statements

terday

that. they had no

that Oswaid informed them

made by Oswald in a prey.

recollection of ever having

•of his, intentions.

lously disclosed visit to the

See OSWALD, A9; Col. 1

---

## Page 237

Memo Cites Informant

On Oswuld Cubun Link

•OSWALD, From Al

. sald though that they believed "as an

'i'¿ educated

received such a memo or having been

guess" that it was Polando

told by Hoover or other FBI officiais

Cubela, a high Cuban official and Cas-

tro intimate whom the ClA recruited

of the information in'i

1 In. 1951 and who later figured in ClA

•.Officials of the Jujuice Department

"placs to kill Castro.

and the FBI refusad any comment on

In the Senate intelligence commit.

the memo's existence or its contents,

tee investigation last year it was dis

and other sources familiar with the

closed that the CIA employed a hishly

assassination investigation said they

placed Castro government. official

had no koowledge of whether it act

with the cryptonym AMLASH in ef

ually was sent to the larren Commis

*forts to assassínate the Cuban leader.

Sion.

• Cubela and ABILASH were publicly

Those sources who told The Wash,

reported to have been the same man.

ington Post about the document said

The sources also were unable to say

its existence apparently had been un-

how Hoover came: into possession of

known until recently. It was discon

information from an informant inside

ered, the sources said, as the result of

Cuba, since foreign intelligence is a

information that came to the atten.

CIA. rather than

an FBI function

tion of the Justice Department and

Some said they thought the iniorma:

"that prompted: Attorasy: General Ed-

tion had first been given to the CIA,:

ward H. Levi to order a search of FBI

which then turned it over to Hoover.

files.

However, John McCone, who

WYZS

After. the memo

#aS

found, the

CIA director at the time, said in a tel.

sources added; Levi put a tight clamp

ephone interview yesterday that the

of secrecy on the matter, and only a

information reportedly in the Hooper

small number of persons in the Jus

memo sras "unknown to me."

tice Department and FBI boor about

.. "It's the first I've ever heard of it,"

the document's existence. i".

McCone said "It's hard for me to be.

-As a result, the Sources said,' they

lieve that such a memorandum ex-

are-unabie to asser such quegtiong

isted without it being known to me

as why the mamo apparently never

and to the staff of the Warren' Com:

reached

the .Warren

Commission,:

• mission."

whether the information was accurate

The same point was made by David

and, if

so, whether Castro: vas: In

W. Belin, who served as one:of the

formed about Oswald's Intentions be

' Warren Commission's legai counsels.:

fore or after Kennedy was killed:

He said, in a telephose interview, "

Documents released recently.by the

have absolutely

recollection

CIA under the Freedom of Informa

such a memo. If such a docuraent did

tion Act establish that Oswald visited

exist, I'm sure that we never saw it'

Mexico City less taan tiwo months be:

•Other documents

that have been

fore the assassination and met taers

made public recently indicate that

wite orficiais of the Cuban embassy, it Hoover and top FBI officials. knew.

One of these CIA documents, dated

-while the bureau as investigating

May 5, 1964, states that prior to Octo

the Kennedy assassination - that the

embassy on wadd lited the Cuban cavias exploring the possibility of

three occasions

having Castro killed, However; Hover

and was in contact with three alleged never informed the Warren

Comp-

Cuban

intelligence agents. identitled

mission of the CIA plotting agalnst

a5 - Luisa

Calderon.

vianuel. Vegas

:CaSiTO.:

Perez and Rogelio oáriquez LoDiz.

He also is. krown to have

talked

with an embassy official named Stiva

Duran. She reporiedly has said that

i she dealt with Oswald only about his

:unsuccessful.attempts lo obtain a visa

to visit Cuba:

The sources were unable to identity

the iciormant described In the Hoover

•ruemo as having obtalaed the inforea-

ton from Castro. Some of the sources

---

## Page 238

14-00000

D00-222/88.

NE, ISRIEL DORTITI MAN SOLEPhOSIER

deforE tO MaKo na appoSataBas sUT LA

Intorrier,

lalaphora aumbor La 4-7250,

rooke aso Do bovad bis

10341T7

Bute T 150x 1i8

LOLD, lO 0348

Coll led to dual bordere

MUNSO DUBIRONA dO CULOATO UNdOI

etrod

" about

& но

asto Shon Tina.

1ag1vldual.

and

statod ho

ENOVO BUDLAUTSIX I&DY

LS. D0K1112

stated

RUDDIST

TheO RUDZUSTI

onLy & fal

WhatROOver of this

activing

Спіська.

ЦД1BBA0СВ

0_12122210-911905011119019

11101-11-815

1 SA PILLIAN RE BRODEDICACON $1

betrans 444900849998 atstando

CoMMuSSION ExuDr: No, 3151--Continuod

оттяя інтимаких покы

вильтоь, о.

в Juo 1968

НЕМОЛА ДОЦ ГОЛІ

SUBJECTS

Мт. J.

Les franks

Cuneral Counsel

Preoldart'a Commaleslan os the

drescolnation of Prooldent Kennady

Informadion Doraloped os the Acilvity

of Les HaTroy OSWALD La Mealso Cla

do On 26 November 1963 a young Lotta American, rulersed

do kerala as "D", came 8o the U.S. Imbassy la lexico Cler.

He

clalmed do had beon la la Cubis Cansulato As Alexico Gisy. on

18 September 1968 whes a man he later gecogalaed to be deo Harrer

OSWALO racelved $6,500 in cash to kill as imposians persoa la tha

Unliad Sealer.

8.

uD" doseríbed lhe circumalances an fallours While daadlos

by a bathroom doos abour soon da dave a sroup ol larea persons can-

passian Da a pallo & low foct away.

Ona was a lall, lila Negro with

reddlah hair, obrlourly dyed, who spoke raplaly in both Spandch and

Ingleh. He had prominent chers bonea and a noticeable scar on tra

lower right elde of dãs chin. The accend mas a maile person whoro

the aubject bad dera prevloudiy in a walling room carsylng a Canadias

давкрохво

The wille person sad l

son ayes, blandies hair, with a

pompadour balrde, and dork ags

The taled person

allegedly

was colmpletely conrinced of eldo

Irom publlahad pholas al OSVALD dollarlos the assasstralica,

OSWALU NIO MATINg a blacK aport coal, buttoneú-up mallo anni

Mila ahare collar labe, no lle, dark prey panto, and cloar ayoglando.

COMIASSION ExILErT No. 3152

---

## Page 239

4-00000

He had a gregs passport la ble packal, mor

yollow land,

and eppesrad lo bara 6 platol la

shoulder

A sall Cubao Joined to group

momilarly and passad Amorices

currency lo the Negro.

The liezro then allegedly sald to OSWALI

In Engles, "7 tsas do bIll lio man. " OSHALD replled,

"You're

cot man caouga, I can do í8," The Me;to then dald ln spaniab

"'I cans go wilh you, I have a los to do."

OSALD replied,

•The prople are wallug for me back thare."

The llegro thea

Edro OSWALD 56,500 la largo denomiralion U.so aula,

The lent muca.

Bald

that be

phoaed the U.i

ca City ssreral llmes

on 20 September bofore lhe a

In an allempt 8o. report

ala balled lhas someono Important in lha

od Staled '

was to

Anally fold by cornedar a8 lhe Embassy to s80p

adollegalo

'D' was Laoma lo this Agancy do a lormor ladormans ol

Lalla American secu

1la sellabillty was conaldera

queallosabla by los

although ha had rot bees whoily

In Mexico Cliy wording

the Coban Cominundalo los

ale acrolco.

"She corvice,

adwarer.

hee denied tbat ho was aching on lle bebell. Wille Inventigallon

Ya the Undied Slaled showed las OSWALD could not poseibly bare

bein ln Alestco Clay on 16 Seflember (be was lipora do kavo beca

dallen Oricars on boss 17 and 18 Seplezderl, Loionalva laberrogallos

¿siled to stars "D'," ssory.

d.

Ca I8 Sionerabas 1963 the Mealcas pollce lalorrlatad Mira.

11 Bras "D peralaled la bla atory bus on 30 flovember ho admiliad

alfned asalement elas lle Whola account abor OSWALD use

dio admillied do bad cor

OSWALD as all and thas

ho Lad act seon anybody i

Catan Imbeaty.

alв0

the U,S. Em

rrarlously.clalmed.

ed to

had

had lIshi conzactad tha U.J.

Inso

"D" sald that ble mediuo la tolling

coulú faruelpado in actloa agalast fldal Castro.

So nald this do Dated Castra and thoughe lber the story abous OsWAlo,

I8 bellerod, mould help causo ho Unllad Steles

-?-

(and 1k11T No. 3152-Continued

Following tha

lad lào conle

allag that il bed

his then guelle

Durlaz the

phologe

Consula

Is took place

from Laa faster

TOTY BLOUS OSKALD L

ha Hasican sulhorilla

prorapily

So sha Molean eutrorlllas

led from

aloo andes prasaure,

palyzrapt

to the see

of thia

•quip.

gointed out to bira lhas de

8 lo the golygraph, la laurelstlas

person do sam la tha Cubea

•« full Calla la she polyarapa,

ite tie susaila, dad lies be

adullica do changed bla ssory

Cuban Consulato, Anally de-

17 seplember.

I8 mes concluded

a laas that Myu had Labricated blo

D' deo alnca bars deporiad by

setlra soundry.

lichardhem

Richard Maims

Depusy Diracion for Pleze

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3152-Continued

---

## Page 240

4-00000

Ib, ALLSCITIOS Ur T-33

Luvas 39,

Moxico,

CORIUS

d subsequontly

vicle the Cubra

88808 вог 800

so Moxico,

Ha abatad BAsE

and tb!lo

Sopscaber, 18: 106 4114159

500D

COGsULERA

and

the 01!

desko

CubIa Санаці

cod

ASLY

raddles balri

LOIdIDE

‚Canadian passport

113

390 1

tho

CORSULACOS dEd SUE BUSTA MOrSON MAU LE

ECurCe statOd SAlE &

FTOVIONALS

LiCITO (LE SAXIISD)I & ALDE tO X1II tO S2D.

• 136

COLLISION ExaLBIT No. 3152-Continuod

& have

OSTALDI THA DOODLO NTO MALINE YOT MA DECX BAATO.

108

donominations,

от thin нить,

31,000 mea for mira

as datoryion, source

ntated

that tha

notos vore in & anall pack sbout one touris

Batod that 0381

and ho

holat

gure of taly

OSTALD DRO

OSYALD

complotoly

at liano so sha consulato and 8o knos

• bY CubLe Copaulaso pornonnal.

copy of the ani

thee rocordad above.

tho

ropealou

do which

anarally raceubiod

MoxIcan authoribles

aao tho desto,

8h0

she

Passo, and the conroraardos

tho

SEATBONUS

7-32 adriaod the Intervieuing conlean o111o.a1a

Shat upos soosag the photorepa

C8 OSTILD

sho scrapapors

Solinine tha suasalaation os

YOCOgNIZOS OSYILO IN BAS INTICAN do DAd sUen dE INA CuDeR

159 a

COSCUISSION ExIMBIT No. 3152-Continued

---

## Page 241

14-00000

860

08

And do Tha

8028 EZrad

xpLanailos thoroos.

1O TOPILed thAt Do had Sull Sa1ta

may Bast the

not affonge

In the

only

188

es dabricza

1u

the

could o1l

Cuban Cocoulato

012óг TA

photorranh

Não renonblud OSYALD, and that upon

Of OSTALD sa the

ASA301{Les 1to parsos Do

0810t

докорарогі

or aubcuasciously, a

дао дія

cavalng

SIDEL CASTRO.

incause of the faci

a-nonblanad

he tau

Hesican sucheritica,

rulerad at cunniderable

koxico.

tha

Docander

caninatdon до

OSTALO,

-Aco time ho нао навой

"Yes,"

DUE 18.108 1

вропаа"

thaao

cus so slo

L048

altar, sited

8h0 g0l7854p)

14e

coUrad

shows

phosographa

1hla questloi

an casinflaly

the

polyerepa indictiod

80$

GDDGLUALDS

NOS LONGE

COMMISSION ExIlET No. 3152-Continued

157

COMAHANIN EXILIES NO. 3108-611/shees

"EG

---

## Page 242

Mexico City in early Septembar to receive money and orders for the

assassination, is that he had been flown to a secret airfeld somewhere in

or near the Yucatan Peninsuln, that he might have mada contacts in

• Mexico City with a Communist from the United States shortlg

before the assassination, and that Ostrald asonssinated the Press-

dent at the direction of s particular Cuban agent who met with him in

the United States ind paid him $7,000,370 A letter was received irom

someone in Caba alleging the riter had attended a-meeting where

the assassination had been discnssed as part of a plan which would

soon include the death of other non-Communist leaders in tho Ameri.

cas,"7 The charge was made in a Cuban espatriate publication that in

a speeda ha delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under

the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said,

"The first time Oswald was in Cuba," thereby giving away the

fact that Osvald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that

country. 873

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who

allegedly were engaged in obtrining illicit firearms in the United

States, one such claim being that these groups lalled the President as

part of & bargain with some illicit organizations who would then

supply them with firearms as payments Other rumors placed

Oswald in Miami, Fla, at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban ac

-tivities thare. Tha assassination was claimed to have been carried

out by Cainese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans. 575

Oswald was also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in

- = Dlesico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's

car for a private talleve. Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after

the assasaination callad for the files relating to Ostrald's delings with

tro members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union;

the inference draw was that the "dealings" ind occurred and had

established & secret subversive relationship which continued through

Oswald's life. Without exception, the rumors and allegations of

a conspiratorial contact ers shown to be without any factual basis,

in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

Illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations

is tha casa of "D," & young Latin American secret agent who ap-

proached U.S. authorities in Afexico shortly after the assassination

and declared that he saw Lea Harvey Oswald receiving $6,500 to kill

the President. Among other detrils, "I" said that at about noon on

September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban con-

sulate, he saty a group of three persons conversing in a patio a few

feet awny. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously

-dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and nother

was a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the

group momentarily and passed some currency to the Negro.

The

Negro then allegedly said to Ostrald in English, "I tant to sill the

man." Oswald replied,

"You're not man enough, I can do it." The

Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do."

Ostraid replied, "The people are waiting for me back there."

The

307

---

## Page 243

Negro then gave Oswald $6,500 in large denomination American bills

saying, "This isn't much."

Aiter hearing this conversation, "D" said

that he telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several

times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that

someone important in the United States mas to be killed, but mas

fnally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"D." and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensire

investigation. His former employment as an agent for a Latin Amari-

can country was confirmed, although his superiors had no knowledge

of his presence in Alexico or the assignment described by "D." Four

days aftar "D" first appeared the U.S. Government was inforned by

tha Mexican authorities that "D" had admitted in writing that his

whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never

seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody paid monar

in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to tale

phone the American Embassy in September and that his first call to

the Embassy was after the assassination. "D" said that his motire in

fabricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United

States so that ho could there participate in action gainst Fidel Castro.

He said that he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up

would be beliaved and would cause the United States to "take action"

against him.

Shil later, when questioned by American authorities, "D" claimed

that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the sier

ican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement,

.. was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried on

with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of "D." When

told that the mahine indicated that he was probably lying, "D" said

words to the effect that he "must be mistaken." Investigation in the

meantime had disclosed thst the Embassy estansion number "D" said

a9 had called monid not have given him the person he said he spobe

to, and that no ons at the Emoassy-clerks, secretaries, or officers

had any recollection of his cris. In addition, Oswala spoba little, li

any, Spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversation

with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which was

supposed to have been in Sparish, was therefore doubtful. "D" not

said that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw "someone who

looked lika Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration,

he now thought it was on & Tuesday, September 17, rather than Sep-

tember 18.. On September 17, homeyer, Oswald visited the Lousiana

Stato Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashes 2

coec's from the Teras Employment Commission at the Winn-Diste

Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made

by "D" when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, and

on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it was

concluded that "D" was lying. 378

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence

that Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assas-

sination of President Iennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the

308

---

## Page 244

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CLA HISTORICAL RENEN PROGRAM

#1 JuL isro

VaLORIRO: POR: Director of Central Intelligence

• FRO

VIA

SUB-JECT

Chief, Latin America Division

: Deputy Director for Operations

: Possible Accusations Against the CIA

1.

On 50 July 1970 at 1630 nours,

Latin America Division

was adrised

¿the Office of Legislative

Counsel that he had just talked on the phone to ü staff aide

of Representative Thonas Downing, Democrat of Virginia.

The

aide told. White that Representative Downing had just

received information from

a Nr. Robert Morror, author of a

rocent book (Betrayal) on the John F. Kennedy assassination.

Morici provided inis alleged information to the los angeles

Times, New jork Times, a Richnund nerspaper (Times or Mersieader,

perhays)

and others.

According to this information, which

staff aide said is to appear in the New York Times on

Sunday, 1 august:

President Richard Nixon promised a MT. Mario

GARCIA Konly that if an invasion of Cuba were

successiul;

Nixon would arrange that all Cuban leftists outside

Cuba would be killed.

The implication was that these

killings would be carried out by the ClA.

British overflights

from

the Bahamas showed

that there vere soviet missiles in Cuba as early as

1960, and. they

were not

removed until 196%.

President

Kennedy new

of this information, but withheld it from

the public.

2.

The staff aide said that Representative Downing plaas

to call a press conference on Monday, 3 augusi, to disclose

the abore

information, but not necessarily to attest to its

a[curaC}.

• E? INPOST

---

## Page 245

14-00000

6116 J00

He jin forer Cuban business-

..: 301

Te sen

mraasaador to

Spain.

Since

136: 0e

nat aaronted to gain official U.S. Government support,

and the

schemes

to berthrow piedi caseronents,

tor various giandiose

In pursuit of this goal,

he has used numercus higa-level government contacts in an

effort to

associate hinsois with the cIa.

In April 1954

Garcia was sentenced to one year in prison for forging Cuban

currency to introduce into Cuba to depress the econony.

He

clained he did this with the knowiedge of the Clà ang

the

U.S.

Government.

CIA denied

any inchledge of Garcia.

This

Agenc} has had

no operational relationship with Gaicia.

CC:

DDCI

CONCUR:

5422127

Deputy Director

tor Operations

Date

---

## Page 246

* How CiA Plot To Kil Castro Backfired

•HAARY ALTSHULER

MIDNIGHT Start Writer

The ClA and Fidel Castro moro

'Kennedy

Don betting on the same agent

- and Castro man.

•Was

The ClA plotled to murder Cas.

iro by using a cuban agant

code-named

Am/Lash,

'AnO

Trying

agreed lo lead a coup lo overturn

the Castro gov

To Get

1u88 1111, Lish wine double neine.

imagine lindarial pad sli lindro.

Castro,

(18 +1080s c001nddspaikediis pleas

into Cirson car.

But •

In angry recaliation, Casta see up

ine insistinativa ul Prosivent Junn

F. Nonnedy.

Castro

This is tho seery → reineds tenso

bizesen in sone Bashingsom circles

Goito

→ Rehind the responeny as the sile

un sin's murder.

Him First

But lie truth may he esen mure

ClA blamed Kennedy

JOHNSON refusad lo

ilse.Runentl9..Norrooe. hasspriteet

for Bay Of Pigs failuro.

spilt any detasis.

-LBJ

¡adel see i seres ined sintiesenial tent, lee phasee working under urders. He han midesh is wood

punioned ny she Herry Nognery Cu.. C'hisases.

Te Havey the her ke do Coron

über or where ais nun intens tilled ingo the picture s

• giun indue ine Cll seit. working dorely sien

Domitid soils just the chump ser up lu lihe the blase, winde

чить.

•te reisi isilero pocared.

Positid & pure wire sether ClA empluyes. Jon Kune

suny iness the cerpo."

ine plas ind minded noo pire of is.

But Kuns Rada mésel albs son on the side, Jrig running

¡non ¿'uta. le mid bir sunerale lo blankimid.

Muing was 170 Dullins arunsciuh,

eratur whu walked up iu

ROLANDO CUBELO, almost a Casiro lookali

with the beard and cigar, wore his arm in a slir

range. KUDy 1401

clim +48105010m4

as a result of wounds he recaived in the Pres

she ires our ol lu

for the dead Pres

elink Mortow siys this

dential Palace takeover in Havana on Cas:.o

is thie truth itous Kuor:

behalf.

He was ordered in traudare Orwald, lo leep his muresh.

shut. mw threatened with a jail sentenceon adrug chargest

now dead. a New Orleans husines man who was a power

he heritured.

he ClA. Vurrow quites him as deciaring: "The arcessin

lum of a President may seems a rumserous acs, bus nue it e

riains the C8:l 3re1g

and do Canin evile triends blented!

alternalise is in mertes under cummunise rube...

Kenneds for the ilav

Lung snterward, shaw sis indiciou on i conspirac

charged not with playe pairies in the Cubin missole cris.

wirse, ind acuunted as innocent.

"Ir our President and ins irueher sie on the missie inior.

But incanwhile, is Morrow leis it, the plot went ahea

Inition. he won't live through hes firstlerm.

Orwild was picked as the fail guy, to he icu to ike zoin

irons on insider.

while the men who scrusily fireu the shots in Dallas l:.

The Clid. Curan exile purero regarded JFK ils in triador.

Hiv.

They felt he want's reade enough lo maule Cistro, snuin

This prt of the sury ies in with recent Senate Inte:

"Weir sire pun Xi"

silvo is il dendly prenio lu ihe U'.S.

bence Cummuce revelations a iso ('uba-onretied tere

tinesiollowing.hesssrssnatrun.OnerledTexasior.dler

Cuban currency lo amish ihe deunume. They were runnin;

the same dias, and i Cubs inund uriner was held back:

their counterciung speration duh L'.S, guvermont funus

he serumbled ibuard.

isno sideriess, nut naturally indy had lu jeep it dark irom the

The whor resched derico ine following das, ant i

White House.

immensely down ous to Cuba on in arliner with so uit

Their secresy duisecued leno weil — for ihe Socror sori-

passengen.

ne proñe in inu irresos them is ordinary cubniericrion..

respruing so Morrow, these were the men with Mir

Muraw nirseil wes aarueu a fij tear sentence,

licker.anex.smiar. isine une@owaldowned who tid

renusd, in connection

no Presuen: dom buter santage pointo: The expinia:.

The insiders iel: ine

¡hiro Muuse had interiorad is:a

al there sis more thin one man sining accoures iur :.

Ineer tave hope.

-i braining C.a05a

ruleling profusion di anunes.

ROBERT MORROW, 'ormer CiA man, holds

¡annlicher nila na was ordared to ouy before the

assassinalion. Three men tired at jFk ne claims.

'It we can't der Castro becauve of i he President, ve'il 201

If the taith sens drown or issrecied in Washing:or. ro

the President first, so we can yel de Caalro."" one di ibera

¡is linen se ng comery inas the iren!.

wierned sorrow.

Current palis in the dillon cigariad so idat ibe liti ones:

The dingein di ine goup. his inna says. das Car 5h3w.

reabode l oro' insistement did a terrible lear thal is.

it ere upenly recused, it mandid ice lo a cunirontation ar

nis filter.

4413.85

interie inorld dreided.

Kunia — pussibig the rucicar huiocause !.

sos they here quer - even the man in the White Hous:

.89

Linion 13..1017007.

bennetten dir Howardk. San nasnow revesies

son ident deniersion send johnson, eng ipo.

'I'll seit yue marnething annue hererto s murder has me

jinan distined.

Lauro, inue Casero got in bies firse.

"hiennedy tras prying :0 ge

one to parade odors is Sut

can inder the barst dear.

Pros aimine crossure to tara rinses the frutis — iri.

ROLANDO E' TELO.

et:: Quoan Poice Cher. Ergenro Amearag: Foe

Jasiro: ang

Havana unders ly Presiceni duan tarne.lo. in the eary cats of ira Casirg dictory.

tand to what thog intril corn.

-

2÷3

---

## Page 247

4-00000

INSPECTE- GONERAL

74-2452

8 70G 1976

₴ 515:

APPROVED FOR RELFASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

VIA

SUBJECT

:

REFERENCE

Chief, Latin Anerica DiVISIOn

Deputy Director for Operations

Citations from Robert Dietz Morrow's Beok!

"Betrayal" in "Midnight," a Weekly Tabloid,

entitled,

"How CIA Plot to Kill Castro

Backfired"

Memorandum for DCI from C/LA, Subject:

"Possible Accusations Against the CIA,"

Dated 31 July 1976

trail

1.

Attached is a copy of Subject article from the

2 August 1976 edition of the tabloid "Midnight."

2.

Also attached is a copy of a 24 March 1976 memorandum

for the Deputy Director for Administration from the Director.

of Security relative to Robert Dietz Morrow.

This memo

indicates

that Mr. Morrow was granted a Secret contract

clearance in September 1962 for use by the Office of Commu-

nications which contracted with Morrow Products, Baltimore,

Maryland, to produce an adapter which would greatly reduce

In February 196 radio receivers. The adapter was delivered

and found to be worthless and the contract

was terminated.

Subsequently, Morrow became involved with

Mario GARCIA Kohly and made the plates from which konly

produced counterfeit Cuban pesos.

Morrow and his wife,

Cecily, were

arrested along with

Kohly by the Secret Service

on 1 October 1963.

At that time Morrow told the Secret

Service that he had become associated with a "certain agent"

after building a device which he demonstrated to SIA.

VARIETE NORCE

SERGIVE ANTLLiGENCE SOURCES

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 9560

---

## Page 248

4-00000

To our knowledge the allegations in Subject article

have no basis in fact nor did we have any relationship with

Jack

Ruby, Clay Shair or Lee Harvey Oswald.

2 Attachments,

a/s

Cc: DDCI

CONCUR :

22333

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

Date

for

Deputy Director for Operations

Date

---

## Page 249

4-00000

APPROVED FOR. C. JX9Z 1993

CIA MISTORICAL NEVIEW PROGRAM

1:1903

NEVORLIDUT FOR:

Daputy Dirzetor for Adninistration.

F70%

Director of Security

SUBUACT : : Morrow, Robert Diet=

1. This menozandun is for your inionacion only.

2.

advisod tat it. Fred Blumenzhal of Parade magazine

¿alonhocicully contacted hin azu said that a Hobert

lorro: bad writton

3 book ontitied Bezrayed, wich vas due

for publication in tiay 1076.

MI. Cluneataal advised chat

ao is currently reviering this boon, and that it conceins

sona crizical couments concorning the Ageney, o.s. the

Agency was responsible for the a55a5sination of

President

Join F. Konnedy.

Mr. Bludential also

stared that lie. Mortow

clals to hava been a CiA contraCE min. Mr.

Sluzcathal

desired to vorisy Mr. Morrow's clained

associaiion irish

the agency, and die. Tauerer requested

this Difica

review it3

files to ascurtain whether tr. lorior was

in Ecce'associated with the agener, and if so, lite infor-

antion could be passed to Mr. Blumenthal.

3.

12:8

---

## Page 250

0n l Corober 1363, ho U. S. Secret

Sorries arrested

maile loader;

"anis Gasein Achtys

to terror did ale wife,

in consaction wish a

1x. Kokay was she leader of

this serene, unile dir. Morion and his wife were charged with

muning the glatos tot the coucerigic bills.

nsa Interrogates oy the l. 3. Secot sarrico, adrisad that

M. Jonly supplied hin with a countarisit 20 posos bill

which Mr. donly said ins offared for sals

to hin fran

2503is so the CIA in Miani.

Morrow also stated that

he had bacosa associsted vith a "ceziais ageze" rier

Silling a devies which ho dononstratod so this agesey.

The Sacret Service Was adrised in 1905 that the Agoasi

did nos have any interost in sit. tohly.

Thare is so infomation in tbis file verifying

He. Kohly's allogation that he had obcained the countorfeis

vili fron agents of to CiA.

5. Sit. Thuemor las been adrised that ho say tall

Ar. Blumenthal that the Agency entered

into a contract with

MOTTON Products, inc., in Sontenber 1062 whereoy Me. Morrow

was. to darelop a piece of equippint, but that the concraet

1a5 tarainated in April 1955 aftor the prototype of tho

coulprent had been tested and found to be unsatisinctory.

Distribution:

Orig. & 1

-Adise

D/Sec

1

CD Reading file

- Subjaci File

Рогур.

(1S March 1976)

(21 March 1975)

---

## Page 251

4-00000

...

iNSPECTOR GENERAL

76-3086

APPROVED FOR RELFASE 1993

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Washington Star Story, 1 October 1976

.....

1. This is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1976 the Washington Star published a news

story with an Associated Press credit line, headlined CLA.

Viewed Oswald As Information Source (copy aitached). The

lead stated:

Contrary to sworn testimony, the ClA once con-

sidered using presidential assassin Lee Harvey

Oswald as a source of intelligence information

about the Soviet Union, according to a newly

In sworn testimony before the Warren Commission,

former CIA Director Richard Helms said ihe

Agency never had "or even contemplated" any

contacts with Oswald.

The news story, in another section, made the following

statement:

The November 25, 1963, memo explained that

the Agency's interest in Oswald as a potential

intelligence source was due to his "unusual

behavior in the USSR, " to which he had defected

in 1959.

---

## Page 252

;::..:

3. There was such a memorandum, written by a case

officer then stationed in Paris, recently released under FOIA.

Writing three days after President Kennedy's assassination,

this case officer recalled that there had been interest in Oswald.

• As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled

that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed --

sometime in the summer of 1960 - - with the then

Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section

the laying on of interview (s) through KUJUMP or

other suitable channels • • •

I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the

USSR had struck me from the moment I had read

the first ODACID dispatch on him, and I told my

subordinates something amounting to "Don't push

too hard to get the information we need, because

this individual looks odd."

I do not know what action developed there-

after ..

..

4. The Helms testimony before the Warren Commission

on this subject was.as follows:

Mr. Helms.. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all

our records searched to sée if there had been

any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's

assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence

Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our

card files and our personal files and all our records.

Now this check turned out to be negative.

In addition

I got in touch with those officers who were in positions

of responsibility at the times in question to see if

anybody had any recollection of any contact having

even been suggested with this man. This also turned

• out to be negative, so there is no material in the

Central Intelligence Agency,

either in the records or

in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was

any contact had or even contemplated with him.

2

---

## Page 253

MARY DO OCE OLY

5. Mr. Helms did state exactly the words quoted in the

news story -- "or even contemplated." But the contest of

those words was what was reported to him as the result of

a search of records and memories. To this day those.

familiar with the extensive Oswald records state that there

is no reflection in those records that anyone even undertook

to propose or approve a contact with Oswald. It would have

been natural to do so, but apparently any such thoughts did

not progress to formal action. From the memorandum

quoted, it is apparent that someone at Branch level did think

about it, even if nothing ever came of it. This hardly con-

stitutes a responsible or official or serious "contemplation"

of the idea. Mr. Helms' full statement on this point seems

literally correct in the full context of his statement, although

more refined qualifications might have reiterated the basis

for his conclusions. The news story is misleading on this

point.

6. The news story statement that Oswald was considered

due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR," is exactly the

opposite of the statements of the quoted memorandum, which

reported the care that should be used if Oswald were approached,

because of his strange conduct.

?. The statement in the news story about Mr. Dulles

consulting with Agency personnel on how to answer questions

is basically true. The interpretation to be placed on this

counselling will depend on the interpreter. The inference of

the news story is that Mr. Dulles was counselling slanted

responses on the Oswald issue, thereby tending to reinforce

the interpretation of deception attributed to Mr. Helms.

his Paler

John H. Waller

Attachment:

As Stated

cc: DDCI w/atts

DIG: SOreckinriage:jo (R 1407) & Cotoner 1975

Distribution:

Orig w/its - Audresses'

7wlatts - DOCI.

1w/atts - ER

#latts - IG Chreno

- 3 -

/sts - 1600000007

---

## Page 254

ARTICLE APPALLO

ONPAGE 2

Document Contradicis Testimony

ClA Viewed Oswald

As Information Source

Contrary to-swom testimony, the

CIA once considered using presiden-

tial assassin Ice Harvey Oswald as ai

source oi intelligence. information.:

abous the Soviet Union,

according to

a newly released ClA document.-•

In sworn testimony. beiore, the?

Warren: Commission, former. CLAs

Director. Pichard Heims. said

the .

¿genc; nevar bad.""or even conter.-.

plated zuy contacts with Oswald,

The newly released document,

written by an unidentified CIA oificer

three days after President John F

Kennydy was killed in Dallas on Nor.

22, 1963, says tirat'"we showed intel-

ligence interest. in Oswald and "dis-"

crissed.

views: the laving on of inter;

1.t.1..?

The unidentified.office-added-.thet:

"I do not know whai action developed

thereaiter.

• ITTE MEMO. HAS AMONG NUN:

dreds of pagesioi documents. from:

the CIA's file on lee Maryay Oswald.

The material was;released to Thei

Associated: Press yesierday - underg

the Freedom of Information ACt::

• A. second-document-reveals. that:

former CiA: Director Aller Dulles.:

while.serving as.a_member.or.tne-

Warren Commission, privately. coun

seled CIA osticials on the best way to

answer questions-from.the.commis-

sion acout allezations, that Oswald

asa Changest 4+41000-617

Dulles

"thought language nich

made it clear. that. Lee Harvey Os-

wald was never an employe or agent

of ClA would suffice,

* an unidenti-

fied Cis oificer wrois Helms in April

1934.

"I agree wish him that a carefully

• phrased donial of the charges of in-

volvement with Oswald seemed most

appropriate," the unidentitied olficer

*When he appeared beiore the com-

mission in Mlay: 1964, Fielms, then

head of. the agency's- Clandestine

services,

testified

under" oath that

"there's no material in-the Central

Incalligence: Agency,: either in

the

records or is the mind of any of the

individuals that there.was any con-

tact had or even contemplated with"

Oswald.

THE NOV: 25, 1953, memo explains

that the agency's interest in Oswald

as a potential intelligerce source was

due. to his "unusual behavior in tha

SussR." to which he had defacted in

• 1959.:

We were particularly interested

in the (deleted) Oswald mighi pro-

vide on the Minsk factory in waich he

ihad been employed, on cerkain sec-.

tions.of the city itself, and of course

we though! the usual (deleted) that

might nelo develop (delatad) parson-

¡ality dossiers," the mamo states.

::The memo indicatcs. that Oswald

mas also or interest to the; CIA be

cause of concern thatlis Russian:

horn wire, Marina, might have been

part of a trend for Soviet women to

marry roreigners,.deave the Counir

and setile overseas where they coul

serve as spies:

THE MEMO ABOUT the agency's

interast "in; Oswald said the discus-

sions about Oswaid occurred "some-

time in summer. 1960." The author:

continued:."'I don't recall if this was!

discussed whtle Oswald and his fami-!

vas ere route to our country or iti

las alter thairarrival

20a06

---

## Page 255

4-00000

i (

S30

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1033

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

29 H0veniJe= 1753

OK.

Jean

2304

Sis. Claris Do incarson, Lassiai

inton d. Scatt

SUBJECI

Gilderto Nolasco ALYARADC

Uzarta

1.. On the morning oi la November an oilicer of this Saction,

accompanied by iir. Plarabacio

af the Security pitice, interviswed

suoject is a parted ca. on the sguts edge of ina city. Tbe lollowiag

atatemeats, valesa otharwise noted, are thade of tha Subjact:

Subject was born 31 January 1948 in Ciudad Rama,

Departamesto Zelaya, Nicaraguz.

He estered Maxico by

Dus on 23 Asgust 1963 on his wat

Cuba to study guarrilla darfara

tacticg. Ha wag to wait 13 Iver:

until false documentzon

3s a Mexican citizen could be a.

anged through the Cuban

Consulata in Maxico. Iba reapposs bahind hia travel

involved a penetration missiod fo= he Nicaraguan Sacret Sarvice.

His suparior in Mexico City is Major Roger JERSZ, Nicaraguan

iVilitary Attache, Whose office is logated at Pasaje Latino,

Interior 513, telepbona 46-33-37, ividico Cisy.

On 2 September Subject reported i

PIdlassOr Edelberto TORRES, who lived at Genara. zuazua.

Number 37, Interior 7 TORPES is a Nicaraguan ard is in

charge of Nicaraguary Comsuaiot travellagg to Cuba. He is a

wall-known Communist and has a drughiarin moscow wio

travelled thare on false Mexicia papers.

On 2 September Suojact ciscussed anti-Somoza Juerrilla

activitias in Departmento Allantico, Nicaragta, wiz IORRES

and the brothers Custro and Humberto Jere- Talavera:

Humbarto is altezcher in a Mexican female normal sca00l.

TORRIS told, Subject that he would receive 500 liarican pes03

gubaistence allowanca beading the arrangenen:

Tai if las 18433

(Er: 72. 13. 1. <9

S380 251.35

BEEN (18)

120 (4)

1881220

RECORD CO

6976

1971

816

201

---

## Page 256

14-00000

-=-

cá his travel payers.

Es 13 Jepiansber Subjeci went to ta Cauda Coasuate is

male victing

he saw a groug o! approx

Jasely 3

persons entar taa

onsulate and go into Ache's olica, but

be noticed that an unown person was sitti

A Cuban employee of taa Consulate i

own to Subject in

alias as Juis Jose, about 10 years old

nustacha, normal

build, straight hair, emerged froz: the oifica and arced

Subject to tars over dis protographa " At this point, Suajact

asiced to be shown the location of the men's room and vas

directed through à door tà a passagaway leading to a patio.

The door of the patio open.

сріЗ разазена!

While standing by tha ba

room door, Subjac: sai a

group of 3 pargoss conversiag on the patio a few feet away.

One was a tall; this Nagrawith reddisa hair wich appeared

¿o be dyed. Fie dal prozinana chaaloonea and a roticaable

acar on his lower right fida ofthis cain. Ha spois repazledly

with a Cuban accest and also spoka some Zaglist. -Abother

One was a waiis mas whon suojact nad previously seca

holding a Canadias passport in the waiting roon. Ihis person.

had grant eyes and wila haa bie was are god is of

the type with a mstror-like outer surface. The third person

was Lee Harvey OSWALD ¡Subject was completaly conviacad

10m publigned protos tbat this was aSWanD). He said thera

not a shadow of doubt in hig mis

OSWALD was wer-ing a black sport coat, buttoned up

ivize shirgwith short collar tabs, no tie,

jack gray pants ard

clear eyaglasgeg. (Subject stuck to this story that he was

wearing Eyeglassaa despite the lact that they were sot present

iz publidead photos of OSWALD.)

Se ject saw a tall Cubaa joia ine group momeatarily and

ome America currency to the Nagro.

This unidenrified

•Cuban man had apparanüy come oui di AlCUE's offica into the

#6976

---

## Page 257

4-00000

1314 sorre

-=-

2120, do is described as tali, solidly bulli, a zeuireso miss

Eusly hair, earisg a brava sui: 201501-atripad tic.

Subject estimated his age as approximataly 37. Subject

never saw tais maa sier 13 Septerber.

Jabject overheará the following convergaion basizan se

PeggO and OSTAID:

Negro: (in Engliss) I want to 'ill the mas.

OSWALD: You're not man enouga. I cas do it.

Nagro: (in Spanisa) I can't go witb you. I have a latio do.

OSWAJD: The peopla ara waising for me back iere.

Tas Negro then gave OSWALD 5, 500 Joilars inlarge

deronization U.S. bills sayiag "this isn'i much". Of tais aris,

1,500 dollaza was for extra expanses. The Megro also gave

OSWALD about 200 Mexican pegos. Later tha Subject say a

pretty girl believed ta ba a Cuban emoloyas of the Consulate

give OSWALD an "abrazo" and tell him that she was living aù

Calle Juarez $407 is casa he wighed to find her. The girl

aporeated to be about 20 yearg old and har mangar reminded

Subject of a prostitate. OSWALD, tha Negro and the Canadian.

then want upstairs.

Subject lait the Consulate building momentarily to buy a

popsicle at the corner and saw these threa persons leave by

the Embassy gate near the corner of Iacubaya where thay

entered a parised biack car, arobably a Chaviolat. Subject

reentered the Consulata waiting I0oi and latar was approachad

oy the tall unidentified Cuban was came qui di AZCus'a suice

and told Subjact to return the next day at which time his finger-

prints soulà be taken and he would complete a farm for

obtaining travel documents.

Subject returned to the Consulate on 19 September ai

about 0345 and filled out the form. He was told at this time

that he would be approached by an Embassy alicar io maje

up a siory for hig lalse Mexicas papers. Many peopla sara in

the waiting room on the moraing of 1f Septembai acd tha doos

SE

76776

---

## Page 258

4-00000

1aa linaily closer to ksee oibars from entering.

Subjece was then told to sonias: TURNEd, disre 202 ha

WeRE iO IORRES' LOSe SU TORRES' wile, & Guaterials,

toli Subjaci that he was at the Soviai amband. Subjeci weat

to the juviet Encasay about 1130 bui was zot allousá io sater

alibouga ha bad been there on sailer occasiona witi IORRES.

At this poisi, Dr. Noel JARQUIN Ioledo, Nicaraguar

Communist, who has been in Moscow, approachai and saw

Subject standing at the gate. Ha asked Subject way ha was

thare and Subj=ct said ha was looking for tORRES. JARQUIN:

irformed him that TORRES was inside. IORRES 1000 camE

out and accompanied Subject to the Cuban Consulate.

TOPRIS entered AICUE's oilice alone and later emerged

telling Subject "you bars nothing further to do here uatil I

contact you" At this poist, an unidentified girl entered tha

•Consulaie and greeted IORRES. TORRES rapiled "not now,

come back tomorraw."

On taa night of 19 Sapteinber IORRES presided over a

meeting of about 18 Nicaraguan Comwists heid at his bome

to diacuss a receni guarrilla attachua the Sagavia Region of

Nicaragua. IORRIS announcad that l guarrillas had been

killed and aaid thai the nast year would be a tough one bacausa

the J.S. policy might change and tha Communist migit find

themselves isolated. TORRES asked Subjact ii he knew the

Laguna de Parlas arsa of Nicarag'a where tha U.S. is training

Cubans. He refarrad to it as "zona gringa". Subject replied

that he was not acquainted with the area.

Oz 25 Saptaziber TORRES sai: Enrigua GUADRA Collado,

an saploy so of Carton Invases de Macico, Lago de Cavala 13,

to sell Subject that be ghould go to tha Cuban Inritulate. Subject

waai to the Consulate bui was told to wait because the Consul

was vary busy.

While waiting for tha Consul, Subject saw the Canadian:

azair. Tha Canadias was smoking a cigarette and wearing a

Rolas wristwaich which a Consulaie employee was trying io buy

from him for 1, 00D pa303.

Tco Cazadian reiudad to sell, saying

---

## Page 259

4-00000

-3-

that be hud purchased the vacca in darico and was taxing i

¡uina as i souvesir.

Ine Canadian Carried i Ca:c=1

giaquel 25r030 his chast 2d alau carriad i batca di abacaoe

I'he soú baired Neg=o mantioned salian then came in and look

the Sanadiar sustaira. As he sae izaving a wardeg coom,

the Canadia Blashed a large wad di U.S. dollarg and said "I

Juiaz. The skias are clouding up sid thay 'ra waiting fos me

at bama."

it tae end of Septarebar Subjeci phoned ta Americaz

Finbassy several timas to Ispost big belief thai sarazona

important is ta= U.S. vas so be killed. In making lage calle,

he used the name Jorge KYNAUT (paonatic) to protect his

identity. He was asked i tha call related to visa matters and

ba replied "no, it involvad a political saiter, he wishad to

spear with a persoz of confidencs." His list call wag acrsened

by two females and ha finally apoke to a mas wino took Subject's

phona number (30-19-52) and said he vould call back. Tha mas

never called. Subject tried repeatedly to contict the Imbassy

by paone but was finally told "quit wasting our time; wa are

working here and noi playing."

When Subject. saw the photograph of OSWALD in a local nawg.

paper, he contacted the Embaasy Security Cilice on 25 November.

The officers interviewed Subject on 25 Novembar and agised

that ha was a young, quita serioua person who spoke with conviction.

He showad that he knew enough English to undar sizad rudimeatary

coversation in that language.

Subject said thar be had tacon training is ina Panarca Canal

Zona whea ha vas iita the Nicaraguan Army and admitted tha:

a was atill a member of the Nicarazuan Commurist Party:

having originally bass a conviaced Marxist. Later he-became

disiliusioned and for the pagt four years has ivorked as a pena-

tration ageni for the Nicaraguan Govarament. He said he

expected to enter Cuba within 2 months.

Subjact explaited that he was outraged by the assassination

ol President Kenuedy which ha was "30 percent gurai was a

$5976

---

## Page 260

4-00000

Commanist gig:.

He said he did aot wish to bazoine invoired

in aay big pusilcity aplagi and hoped that his aaine sould da

ays sechei. Dut taat ba would de willing to do "icacares

aucagyary." li thia time, Subjeci was living a: Pio 173;

Col. Santa Liaria da la Ribera, telephon= 11-07-31-

Coutast arraagarenta wara made ao that ba could ba picked 1p ana

3. On the night a 26 Novsmoer ha was interrogatad by two officers

of this Section. His stary remains substantially the same as set forta

abovs. He recognizad paotograghs a tae idllowing Cuban Embassy.

personnel: Silvia DURAN, EraLcisco LIAGOSIORA, Crastas RUIZ,

Samuel PEREZ, ROgEliO RODRIGUEZ, RaU APARICIO, Rolando : '

ESTEVA, Heberto JORAIN, Oscar CONCEPCION, AStORiO EARCIA,.

JOSE FAIRICAI ROA, ARCIOS ARMONA, JOAQUin HOTDANDEL AFTO2S,

"Razl", Peraguin ALONSO, LUiSA CALDERON, 20d "LESCO ILRABAL.

He did not know any of thasa persona by nama, but waa aale to give:

partial descriptiona such as duties, height, skis coloring, condition as

¡eata, disposition, accent, atc. He identified tha photograpia of Oscar

CONCEPGION as the tall Guban mentionad above and a piologizoo of

Luisa CALDERON ay tha pretty girl mentioned above. He also identified

FIZaCiaCO LINGOSTERI as the mustached Cubas whom he bad inowa

wader aliza of Juan Jose. This was the same person incidentally who was

trjing to buy the watch from.lhs Canadiai. Subject quietly identifiec

the New Orleans mug soot of OSWALD waich had baen supplied by your

oflice.. He said tha: ha was positive of thase identlficatious.

4. At this interrogation, Subject said

OSWALD bad carried a greas pagaport in ais pocicat

and Subject beliaves he saw OSWALD waaring = scouider

holatar pistol. He did sot seem io ba too sure oi tis

poiat. Hs said OSHAID wors long shoar and had a vrist

watch with a yellow metal band. He illustrated OSWALD's.

mangar of slouching in a chair at the Consulato while in

the waiting room at about noon on 18 September. Ee said

thai OSTALD seemed to ba completely at hora and appeared

¿o know and ba known by Consulate parsonaal. At one point

he heard OSWALD use the Marican slang expression "Cabror",

---

## Page 261

14-011100

12dÿ 2=0:3070÷1.

cone dagcribad roove. Hiy accouat di tho convasiatici

was eusealially de same ag reported, sacapi ai this tine

he bad OSWAiD uJa la word kill is his list reply to t=

Ñegro; hesco, "'You'== aut tha zan. I cas kili bim."

Se said thai tha U.S, bank notza svere in = szall

pack abou: 1/ iich thick bound with a pager land waich the

Negro brole before cousting out 1, 500 dailars for extIz.:

expensas and 5,100 dollarg as "advance paymant."

Subject said that ha ig still a sargeast in the Nicaraguai

Civil Guard and that ba entared Mexico illegally os 29 Auguat

without travel docameris, paying a bribe at tha bordar and

baving transited Honduras, Guaterala and Il Salvajor en

route. He said thai ha bad been to Maxico in 1961 on a mission

for the Nicaragura Secrer Serrice after a contrivad escape

¡ron false aireat in Nicaragua, followed' by aperiod oi asylura

'in tee Meiican Imbassy. He sail tcat his training recaived

in the Canal Zore took place in Fort Glick in March 1956 (nota

Subject would navi only bean ló years old zi that time)-

Subject said that da had been to the Cuban Coasulats on

2 ar 3 September, 15 or 16 Saptember, 19 Septemberi

19 Septerbar, 26 Saptember and 25 November.

Ha adscita to baving visited the Soviet Imbassy approsi-

mataly 6 or ? timas; about 1 tirues wich zORRaS. He was

- somewhat fuzzy on reagona lor thaga vigits zad ya3 not

pressed for dacail at thia seagion.

5. In order to leeep Subjact available for further interrogazion, ba

was instructed to fiad other living guarters where he should register

in an alia3. On the following morning, 27 November, he reported that

ne had regisiared as Alberto SANCHEZ, Room 203, Hatel Neca.

Oa 28 November he was arrested by vieticas police ai the hotal. This

difics has so further contact with Subject.

DISSEMINATION OF TRIS INFORMATION OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE

SHOULD BE CLEARED WITH CUR HEIDCUARIERS IN WASHINGION.

-sitin.

spineianes

1- 8.2595

SE

#6970

---

## Page 262

4-00000

-..

13 DEC 1963

?Ö':

4025324

STOC.or

dtrenatai:

Penl2e2

!?°

Lapulg 51reai0s (22ar3)

SEriena IntaTo a:1on d/e12O aiASO

Atracbeù ia a sarsla-1oz a8 risa sauiras solice tekezaa

LUSIÁI.RIS IInOIiaNE IOIsij.

1 THET.8122% Z3I ÁLiAHER

re:racrad ilosa soceraioro ara atuliiad lias da sada stan ia ledio

z%i. t0 109 84127 d S0iias a:215i Ciza

Tãie 150 persoss dico Midülio ser sad io yior de 2153= 10la

13 ?10N 1In LEdEROISaLT MTICONA dE L1S ATIITT- diS ciEi

FROy LESÓ SEE ErIdEOELElS "I, Si EOT, EbaDlataly Izise- fur

DENICOSE LEU BO CICTORIIZlA 1I IEEITO DEFT-

D9 TIS EIn, AADO riaeTeN te CORecaian De 3222-

Iareroassó b5 repraseniaciios di iois i seay aid 3r Fuaaa

3u15 1202e Inieraiatlos diinuel inai le saa 2500aitr lytio

CICI 3/TT9.335

Distriburioz:

0a2 - idinisees, o/ett

2 - RI, W/26,

1 -CILIZWEN

CI/121 7/25=

CI/EIU 7/211

CU Rw ait

-11/3/186/2:t

1 - 0518/31/061

12 Decunter 1963

ZAEIE: : More

BO 220ISCT

---

## Page 263

14-00000

Te0T 09 cilero lales dirittili

Iss parsos (suidid) c01l rea: be pso fi jears 212,

ETlettENa-117: Hè 199 9 113 C4 50 1

10 lase a layer det far ala a pesce, dirta cerielenier

ISCOIG III

---

## Page 264

14-00000

code bonds, this 1150, reddlah, stay bolo, doù vents a bina

100193, 5700-3015 9d poets doi tuna 203 a Lit

AFTER 15 DENIS, ALACE CARES DAS SEEiES 5000 C

tHE 0015019 1510 HO T9 ICE, 30Ễ

antoss, because dullio led see his theng barons, fe so hea

SONS- T90N CHI: Eite 160 I05: 1041, 13 17s 130÷112 137

TO a 209 + 59 TET 27210n 35S A CIERR 350

FELT LIECE RETITY LUCISY TIDE CHI OF LE TURNER FOR ENOE

Dither so she tonsu tit they stopped a lmy seria to sit vita

UADUE TRIA YES FATIS INTES.

---

## Page 265

4-00000

an 21a9k, ora nailo doli, tido be dow inc te ton

ie ierin

1n:2-i07 1215505115, uniab rapere -0 la s steroiat

sey'ces do talephocai ies irerdean labassy, int Decouse le

d11 =0s 2000 biale 1a pensas, tay palà 10 accontion o

dy tho i2 00 Cibsa sulao, sad so far ica paesi da goszos ser

IDa death di ta ingiano di tia Unitad statos ana tai se

DECISE 0s 29 Esprese.

1den21a0à sensale and bad t'es consantialo si 1i aranta te

meni, Ben 5:15 tea sono sareing l0 sha restammisi, Jese, iscrcei

T22 BO IEN

De Di te day delato, aulici tor tise parera appainious alatis

Tale Toy Mon 20 arà 20n1 1 fex streeta 12 27 aironia- Es

ALTERADO LITES-

IOLA LÙ tO TETE LEA 39 INTES INTER 1E FINTE E t80 HOUST

BATMEDUS SOL MITALDA MENS IN & I95O CSS tO 193 10129

apertone in a ballata, Teneted da tia corres di bacri asi separa.

---

## Page 266

Are cogiati, del to 1e31 sia 1s valen tosal da dei marico

ENTE TEN GENG. TITA CHE CRESET TENE EIETTIT GHE FIN ITRE

noi racsriceias ita, tirar essini ina suura sistessaio, Alitarão

INES

15 coptoniser al tito your in tizo dubas Consistata Isosi Ii,

ATA LE 325 60S SO iat DE ICONI 11E0, LE BENEY DESTI»:

0° F1293 CANIO tita

Ecat de raggets no: tavia analared his soguesare

il chusi, a macile ta tua part di ile lalter stacos Edista-

Tat tha ialencosa correnaties glice la raratad to

ebra in his atatesent, lea tos cada on 12 leplender 23 30

Lo sua concacieù vila estensio lil in anier to salata sha

fitiranta 12neait 101110259.

---

## Page 267

ỐU20

C/HE. 3

D'INDEX

SECREI

D NO INC

5513

? DẠCHUN 103

O FILE IN LU FILE NO.

ÜI SSIEM TO

BIUI EIREAU DE LIVASTECATIGS RE. CTCALD.

BEEEZE CENERAL, IES3

LTTOHEILE ACONCY

7 DEG 63

17157:

DC1 FD/DCI, DDP, C/CI,. C/CI/S1,.VR

..: INFO

CITE DIR

DEFETE GEH

ROUTINE .*

ERICCAY

À7627

SUBJECIN

INES: HARYISY OSHAIO CASS

LES IE IISTSCCATICI U ELEETNO ARAZUO

ITICARAGIAI ICECATE TEO GLIDSNS

PO LAYS SSI LIS OSATI ZCUTE INIGTE TOASSUSSIRATA SOCTATI, EAS ESST COSCLUCED.

CUE LECCO CIY SRATTEY ATVISOS US THAI ALTARADO AIDINIRO EE SUES EAVE SEST

MISTALG IN SATTHS TEIR IL SAY OSTATU IN TE CURAT EABISST- ATSO, ES RAS.

UNCOTTADEI OR MS LATE OS FRTCZ ME LUGRE EATE SEEOI SANECES IUNE OSHATIO AUD

,dèr..

CHOLUEE IN HUST EATS ENOY OI A TUESDAY, PHICE HEULO EATS ILIS II 17 SOPMONSEE

AOACOCA T FUAS POPOE O DS PORIGITI DNSATLA IS HOS TE

AVAITASTÃ, TEB FDULINATI FITLUDIE IS TEAI AUTARADO IVIMATCEO IDUREIION

"REACTICES HEAS TALITG AECTI OSHAID.

IB IS EXOBCIRT TEAT' AUTARALO HITI, ES ISPORIEN IO SICIIGLÀ CEI 9 IECOYISA

:1903-

¡A IRPORSSTINTITO II ICUS EUSZAT PARIICIPAIMO IT IES INUERECCATIOU 0$

DSEETA EITABADO:

C/S COMMENT:

"y aLticorlty of

ECEARD EOTASS

"ELEAS

SiuE

OFEICER

END OF MESSAES

Deeumert tumbo 319-717

jOrFOIA Rariew on- RAY 1975

#DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR ICABLES

Tàl -2542017

CLASSIFIGATION REVIEN

AESTRAGT

WSEX

CONFUCTED ON 2 = M4) 1510

I'MPDET CL BY 212203

COORDIYATING

OFFICERS

pit 7 Diül3

Escluda iron auioralls

dgange.89.98200

SECZIN

BERODUCTIÓN SY OTHEO THAY THE ISSUING DEFICE 15 PROHISITEDE

AUTHERTICSTINÓ

OFFIGER

't?.

.Copy No.

---

## Page 268

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE:

ORIG

UNIT

ExT-

D.

BINDEA

SECRET

5523

1 NO INDEX

29 Mor 1953

O FILE IN OS FILE NO. : ...

PHTYS HOLSS

ALX:

IR. MESERGS BUrwY

TO

FKADIRZAT. BUFLZAN DF INYBENIGATICH

DECARININI dE STAM

ATTY: 18, U. ALSETS JCrOSOS

FRO:S:

DIRECTOR

CONF: C/VH 4

YDCI, D/DC:, DDP,

à, VRị

63 AMT

12-62

POUTING

2

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2,9 H0u 61

19/52

DereRgen

ROUTINE

ILANOTAMS

TO

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85742

JHE FTEST VEG" SRETCEY ROFORT DI TEE EICETSSS DE THE MEXTCAT ORFICTAE

TEURERCEATTON CY

ETTEEREO ANVARATO, IUCIAGIAT NEOM HAS OZATRD LE SAW LIS OSHATO

SHOES EOST ICHNMEAS SI EO TITO OIXET I ESSTECI SUZOO SIT LI SEVITÖC COSS EUTaDE

ES IS VOTTINE EOSONITARI

PHIS SALS STORI:

C CU L5 TÁ ME TA CÁ

JECOGNIZS A PEOTCERASE

DLETIA LUAAN AS AH EUPLUYES OF THE CUSAT ENLASSY, HESRGAS

AVDIREA CR •JETOSASE LIO IE NISTOISTEI LEGTOVITINII IEM EE EURESDRE OS CUL IE

FEECIAT LOIIG DIS LROUOCATON DE AUTARADO SAYS IE "DOUDIS" ALVARADO!S STORY AID

ITET FEGII VOEI TO "FEBAS" IIM. THES INFORUATION HAS ECCLYSO II LONICO CINT AY

1330 GOUAS HASHTAGION MCIS. 29 ÉOVAIAR 1953-

END DE MOSSACE

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT EPFLCOR)CABLES.

CLASSIFIGATION REVIEW

CONDUGTED GN Z 4 MAY 1978

_INPOET CL BYD13208

221-6

Document Number

for FOlA Review on

APR 1976

08 51RY

71254>

S aLtCOrITy UI

RICIARD ECIL'IS

DD?.

Di25g54t.

COORDIMATING OFFICERS

PELEASINO OFFIGER.

CHD? ;

Esclud:9 lium aufonatic

carnerasing ano

ceslasriticalien

SECREI

ATIOA TIAÜ TUE ECE!liR MERIRE IE DOMHIRITEr

AUTHENTICÁTIRG

OFFICER

Coo'r i

---

## Page 269

SIGNALCENTERUSEON

• "'ace"..

COI

OMF

0

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"HISSACEMANOUNGNOICATOR

STAFF

14

MRO

0

1/553

DATE-TINEGROUP

020046Z

19IFO: FILE De, DIDU,

CiTa

DIRECTOR

0D03 CS/RE.

c/PS/EG2

PArL

MISSAGIRTAITINCANUNBRT

922277

DISSEM BY: 45

14O37

NO 1N0IX.

RITUM-TO

PER

TO :

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN,

WNINTEL RYBAT

AP WIRE STORY IN WASHINGTON STAR ON FOLA RELEASE OF OSUALD'S

MATERIAL MAKES FOLLOWING STATEMENT WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AUARE,

45

CUTE: IN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WARREN COMMISSIONI

RICHARD HELMS, THEN A BRANCH CHIEF AND LATER CIA!S DIRECTOR,

SAID THE AGENCY NEVER HAD OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED ANY CONTACTS

WITH OSWALD.•: NEULY RELEASED DOCUMENT, SAYS UE SHOWED IN-

TELLIGENCE INTEREST IN OSWALD AND DISCUSSES... THE LAYING ON

"OF. INTERVIEWS. END QUOTE. Y

MATERIAL

2. ASOVE MISCONSTRUED FROM SANITIZED SO RELEÄSED UNDER FOIA,

...

WRITTEN BY FORMER OFFICER

WHO WAS INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE USEFUL IN-

FORMATION OSWALD MIGHT HAVE IN CONTEXT OF SOVIET REALITIES.

RESPONSE TO DCI CALL TO ALL HANDS TO RECORD WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT

MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO WARREN COMMISSION INTERESTS, OFFICER WROTE THIS

MEHO

MEHO

223-

THE CHEN DOES RECORD BRANCH LEVEL DISCUSSION BUT STATES THAT

WRITER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN. E-2, IMPDET-A

DATE: 1 OCT 76

OR!J:

UnilT:

EXT:.

CHRONO

C/ISS

7,595

DIO

w.lo. love

nel toren

COORDIMATING DARICERS"

THEODORE GA SHAGSLEY ARDO

REPRODUCTION aY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRÓHIBITED

2

117037

EX: n53a15

SECRET

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## Page 270

CONFIDENTIAL

22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.;

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports

* Headquarters. There was one [24 JCIA surveillance Capability

teamt

that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

11

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