Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10064

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10064

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Cuban Subversions in Latin America

DATE : 2/18/1963

PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion,

2/18/1963. Box 1

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0W97.91°

4

DRAFT BRIÉFING NOTES

18 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

Introductory Statement

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the

daily record of events in Latin America, and reports

from our intelligence sources within Communist and

other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-

phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that

Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting the efforts

of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the

governments

In Latin America.

A. :

Analysis indicates that the immediate threat

stens less from the subversive efforts of tra-

ditional Connunist novenents than from Cuban

support of any and all active revolutionary and

terrorist movements.

B.

These

distinctions are not precise. In some

countries, Castro's original success has spurred

the established Communist

i movement to action,

and he supports it. In others, the old-time

Communists may even oppose radical action at this

time, and Castro works with more active and more

militant revolutionists.

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C. In any event, we know of only two coun-

tries- Mexico and Uruguay-where Castro

appears inclined for the time being to

forego inciting violence, and this only

because he wants a favorable climate for

his operations into other countries.

II. Even before the October missile crisis--and

with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders

have been exhorting revolutionary movements to

violence and terrorism,

and supporting their

activities.

A.

Cuban support takes many different forms.

We have occasional evidence of direct

participation by Cuban nationals, as in

the La

Oroya disorders in Peru in December.

We know that some funds move, generally in

cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolu-

tionaries in other countries. While

we have

not been

able to come up with the kind of

airtight proof a court would require that

weapons move directly from Cuba to these

same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes

money to buy weapons, and that some guer-

rilla forces in Peru, for instance, are

equipped with Czech weapons which most

logically would come from Cuba.

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B. But by and large, our evidence shows that

Cuba is not now attempting a large program

of physical support for Latin American rev-

olutionaries:

It 1s; rather, concentrating

on supplying the inspiration, the guidance,

the training, and the communications and

technical assistance they require

C. In essence, Castro tells would-be revolu-

tionaries fron other latin American coun

tries:

"Come to Cuba; we will pay your

way, we will traip you in underground or-

ganization techniques, In guerrilla warfare,

in sabotage and in terrorism.

We will see

to 1t that you get back to your homeland.

Once you are there, we will keep in touch

with you, give you propaganda support, send

you propaganda materials for your novement,

training alds to expand your guerrilla forces,

secret communications methods, and perhaps

funds and specialized demolition equipment."

Castro 1s not, as far as we know, promising

these other Latin Anericans any Cuban weapons:

or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad-

visers, or cadres. But he probably does

tell them: "If you succeed in establishing

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something effective by way of a revolu

tionary movement in your homeland, if. your

guerrillas come down out of the hills

and confront regular armed forces, then we

may consider more concrete forms of assist-

r.0

ance..

D.

So far, it should be noted, none of the

movements in South America has reached this

final stage--and in fact even Castro's

Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight

a pitched battle with regular military

formations which might have required more

advanced weapons than small arms, grenades,

mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba

under Castro is the Latin version of the old

Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-

ing revolution wherever it will flourish

Before golng into more detailed evidence of Cuban

subversion in Latin America, I should note that

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's

priority list for revolution.

A. "Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting

of Communist front organizations for Latin

American women.

1.

Che Guevara and Blas

Roca both empha-

1"0:

sized the outlook for revolution.in

Venezuela in speeches in January.

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experts, and is being done with advanced

types of explosives. The shooting has

reached the point in Caracas where it is

not safe to go out after ten at night in

some sections of the capital. But it 15

the opinion of both our people and the em-

bassy. that this is not a threat to govern-

ment control. It is one thing for a group

of young men to race down a dark street

firing a machinegun from a speeding car.

It is quite a different matter

to stand

up to the armed forces, or seize and hold

government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla

training to more nationals from Venezuela

than from any other country. I shall ex-

plain in more detail later how we arrive

at our figures on guerrilla trainees. Our

best estimate.now is that more than 200

Venezuelans received such training in 1962.

Many of these are engaged in terror-

ism in the cities, and

l others were

rounded up and given long prison

sentences when they committed themselves

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b.

prematurely: last spring in a country-

side where the rural population strongly.

supports the Betancourt administration.

One of our best penetrations öf the Com-

munist Party in Venezuela tells us that

at present the unified command has less

than 150 guerrillas in the field, in

widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men

each.

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