(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, KGB -JUNE 1955-JANUARY 1960)-OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (1958-1960) DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 2000-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32397033

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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER : 104-10429-10091

RECORD SERIES

: JEK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, KGB -JUNE 1955- JANUARY

1960) -OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (1958-1960) DEPUTY CHIEF

OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION.

: 01/01/1900

32

SUBJECTS : NOSENKO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

1B

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 12/13/98

COMMENTS

JFK-RH17 : F05: 1998.12.13.11:09:52:543107 : THE 32

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PAGE 104-10150-10136 (SAN BY ARRB, 20 JULY

98) . ALSO

INCLUDED ARE 2 DOC. RECORD FORMS.

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

65990 Date: 11-01-2021

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10429-10091

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Top Secret

(SEVENTII DIPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities (1958-1960)

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorgan-

ized. in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore

had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists

from all countries, was split into two new sections, one

concerned with tourists from the United States and the

Eritish Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe,

Latin America,

and all other. countries.

that at that time he was promoted to the position.of Deputy

Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section, "the

most important

section of the Seventh Department"

September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited

Gisella HARRIS.

It was also

in 1958, he

said, that he super

vised the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT,

although Seventh

Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach.

Beginning

in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV

and VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments--DREN, LUKIS,

WILBY, TAYLOR, and

NOSENKO stated that he also

used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two

American

guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLER-

Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow

representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL.

NOSENKO claimed that his operational success during 1959

earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman.

He has

since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his

KGR service.]

It was vecause of his position as Deputy

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO

said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

MOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among

foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal

mission, the detection of western intelligence officers and

agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the

Soviet Union.

In line with that counterintelligence mission,

on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO

Document Number

1549-497

for FOlA Review on

FEB 1978

127

CONDUCTED ON.

CERIVATIVE OL BY .

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1982

RED ON DOING TO

REVW ON

DEPIVED FROM

D938

• IS. No.

8. 197124

7

• Copy -

CONDUCTED ON

DEGIYATIVE ELBY

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DERIVED FROM

Ten Secret

EXTRATI only

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

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Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

-FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions,

twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR

in 1962 and

NOSENKO insisted that he met FRIPPEL but once

in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.

Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL

case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964.

Ile

frcely

related the details of the summer 1962 and

February 1963 meetings with FRIPPEL in the

USSR.

His account of FRIPPEL'S activities is

consistent with FRIPPEL's version, except as.

noted

above.

Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's:

alleged involvement with OS"IALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963

are described elsewhere.

(See p. 303.)

According to NOSENKO,

he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

of the Seventh Department.

In that capacity he participated

in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB

and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.

Comment:

NOSENKO's information on his involvement with

OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as

evidence confirming or refuting his claimed

service as Deputy Chief of the American Section

of the Seventh Department in 1959.

143

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

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Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief

of the entire Seventh Department.

A year later, he was made

First Deputy Chief,

and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV

and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist

operations. The Seventh Department,

which had a strength of

about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations

against tourists in the Soviet Union.

From this period NOSENKO

claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as

Deputy Chief or otherwise, of a number of KGB operations

against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and

investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey

OSWALD.

NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB posi-

tion during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent

and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy

Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re-

turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO'S Information

In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate,

Seventh Department case officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the, management

of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY (cryptonym "ANOD").

SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel

agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian-

language bookstore.

There was originally some suspicion

that

SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was

also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts

with AMTORG per-

sonnel in New York City.

NOSKOV, the case officer at the

time,

"felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and

recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for

blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union.

SVENCHAN-

SKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB

promises that

Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel

agency.

SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of

prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who

might be connected with American Intelligence.

If he suspected

such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph

on the visa application slightly,

or making a small pin-prick

or pencilled mark on the application form.

292 .

Ten

Secret

TS No. 197124

CODY ...

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Ton Secret

_ (SEVENTH

DEPARIMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The OSWALD CASE

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in

OSWALD stemmed from

his claimed Tourist Department

assignments.

He asserted that while Deputy Chief

of the American Section in 1959 he participated in

the RGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational

interest.

Chief of

In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy

the Tourist Department, he was informed of

OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to

apply to return to the USSR.. Immediately following

President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO,

Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB

records of OSWALD's stay in the soviet

Union including

the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.

For continuity of presentation, both periods of

NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case

(1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.

The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD

case is significant if it substantiates. NOSENKO's

claimed positions

in the KGB and confirms the validity

of his claim

that he knew the extent of KGB involvement

with OSWALD.

NOSENKO's Information

Residence in the USSR

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was

completely unknown to the KGB.

Moreover,

upon

receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief

Directorate determined that he was not_of sufficient

importance to justify any special interest by the

Seventil Department.

Not until about October 1959,

when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR

did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, Who was, at

that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of

the seventh Department.

All available materials

on

him were

thereupon collected and examined - the visa

application,

Inturist reports, interpreters' reports,

reports from

hotel agents, and the results of

a check

of KGB Archives.

NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV

interviewed the

interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated

his wish to stay in the USSR.

303

Top Secret

TS. No. 127124

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" Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD

might be an American

agent, the KGB did nothing to

investigate this possibility because

"this would be

done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet

Union."

Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after

his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB

in an attempt to establish his intentions.

sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information

which had been received concerning OSWALD.

cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin,

OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary

and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom

OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet

Union.

A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV

had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.

From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded

: that. OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed

that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal."

For this reason

NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the

Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to

remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on

the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a

permanent resident through normal channels at

the Soviet

Embassy in Washington.

KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders,

and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD

failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his

Inturist guide.

This prompted a search,

and

after

several

hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel

room, bleeding

heavily

from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this

incident

from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief

of the Seventil Department.

NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in

turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate.

GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision

that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and

that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was

not an interesting person

and wasn't normal."

. OSWALD was

never questioned on his past nor asked

to write an

auto-

biography.

304

Tep Sacret

TS No. 197124

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Tep Secret

(SEVENTH DEPÄRTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO did not know who eventually

granted

OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the ÜSSR

or who approved issuance of his temporary residence

permit.

The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to

live

in the Moscow area.

Either the Soviet Red Cross or the.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision

. to assign OSWALD to Minsk.

The Seventh Department updated

his file,

and it was sent; along with a cover letter pre-

pared by

KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk.

KRUPNOV'S letter

summarized the case

structed local

authorities there to take

specifically in-

no action con-

cerning OSWALD except to observe his activities

"passively"

to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent

on tenporary "sleeper" status.

NOSENKO read this letter,

and it was signed by DUbAS.

On the basis of the instructions

contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could

be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval.

It was

NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during

his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his

place of

employment, questioning of his neighbors and

associates, and

coverage of his mail.

After OSWALD'S

threatened

second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its

hands of him"

and that even though there was considered

to be

some possibility that he

was

"sleeper agent,

KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk

was

"practically nil."

Reguest

to

Return to the USSR

The KGB Second Chief Directorate

was not concerned

with OSWALD'S'

return to the United States in June 1962,

by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department.

No further word on him was received at KGB •

Headguarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City

in September 1963 and requested a visa to

return to

the Soviet Union.

The Mexico Legal Residancy

reported his visit

to KGB Headquarters by

cable, re-

questing information.

The KGB

First Chief Directorate

had no record on OSWALD.

M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of

the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Tro (Counter-

intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to

see if the. latter element had any information on OSWALD,

The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department,

V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call

and reported the in-

quiry to Seventi Depariment Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.

305

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

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Cóp Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time.

ALEKSEYEV

was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt

and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was

told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should

not: be permitted to return to the Soviet Union.

ALEKSEYEV

relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know •to whom OSWALD had spoken at the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts

between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban

Government there or elsewhere.

Comment:

Independent sources, however, réported on

visits by OSWALD to the Cuban

as well as

Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29

September and 3 October: 1963

and on his

(apparently overt) contact with

a KGB officer

under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy

there.

NOSENKO originally said he knew

nothing of any such contact. In October 1966

he revised this to say that

OStIALD did not

have contact with the KGB in Mexiço City.

NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in

the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N.

DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head-

quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in

Mexico..

The cable, which NOSENKO said he did

not personally see, reported that OSWALD had

visited the soviet

Embassy in Mexico City

requesting permission to return to the USSR

and

that the cable specified that OSWALD had

dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel

only.

306

Tep Secret

TS. No. 197124

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C Top Secret "C

-(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result

of President Kennedy's assassination.

About two hours after

President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact

in a telephone

call to his

home from KGB Headquarters.

short

while

later he was told, again by telephone, that the

President had died. Aboyt two hours later, NOSENKO was told

that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers

of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine

whether the KGB had any information concerning him.

After

establishing OSWALD'S

identity from KGB files and learning

that his file

was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB

office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders:

The Local KGB dictated

over the telephone a summary of its file on OSHALD.

This

summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk

had attempted "to influence OSALD in the right direction".

GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's

efforts because it had

been given specific instructions to

carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD

there.

He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to

OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation

of the

meaning of the statement about influencing OSTALD, be flown

immediately to Moscow by military aircraft.

NOSENKO personally

read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of

this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSTALD's file when

it

arrived by plane.

He then turned the file over to s.M.

FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB

Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary

memorandum for GRIBANOV.

This memorandum, which NOSENKO

read,

was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and

Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee

and to Khrushchev concerning it.

OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to

indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken

any action with

respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Hend-

quarters.

From the date

of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR

until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with

him and had not attempted to utilize him in' any manner.

3

307

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

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Top Secret

-(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT. - January 1962-January 1964)

OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assign-

ments.

If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had

wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure

permission from the Seventh Department, which originally

opened his case file.. In view of OSHALD's apparent mental

instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu-

larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage)

Department, would have considered using him.

KGB Head-

quarters did not maintain a control file on him following

his settlement in Minsk,

would have done had OS!/ALD

been of any operational

The only KGB record on

OSTALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his

name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a

file concerning him.

The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OS!lALD;

all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file.

was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any

interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union

or after she left for the United States.

Comment:

NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he

"only skimmed the file" and on another that he

had it in his possession about 20 minutes.

In

October 1966 he again said that he read

the

file and that while doing

so he saw

a picture

of OSWALD for the first time.

NOSENKO added

that he never met OSWALD personally:

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief

Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he

applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in

September 1963 is probably incorrect. The

consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern-

ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington

after the assassination indicated that the KGB

First Chief Directorate would have known of

OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier.

That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of

February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from

OS'IALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had

308

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

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C Ten Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

(Continued)

earlier requested permission to return to

the

Soviet Union.

In the last dated letter of the

file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised •

the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel

under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact

with an official (whom CIA identifies as a

KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City,

his contact there with the

Cuban Consulate

and his efforts to reach Havana in order to

visit the Soviet Embassy there.

mithout regard

to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD'S

request for à Soviet visa

addressed to the

Embassy in Washington in July: 1963 would require

the Washington Residency to report the matter

to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico

City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent

ignorance öf OSWALD's communications with. the

Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his

claim

to complete knowledge of all aspects of

the KGB relationship with OSWALD.

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Comment:

On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA

employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed

to an American book-buyer a package which he

requested the American to deliver to a trust=

worthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy

officials found the package to contain a.

bundle of typed or handwritten documents which

appeared to have originated in classified KGB

files.

Fearing a Soviet provocation which

could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy.

for possessing classified Soviet Government

documents,

Embassy officials had the documents

photographed and on the next day,

5 November,

returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry

of Foreign Affairs.

309

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy.

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