MEMO PROPOSED FOR DDCI TO STOKES ON NOSENKO.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., OLC
To: RININGER, DICK, OGC, CIA
Document date: 03/20/1979
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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7104-10067-10143

20 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dick Rininger, OGC

Jack Sullivan, OS

Russ Holmes

Michael Sednaoui), DC/CI Staff

Dale Sumption, SE/DDO

not to be sent

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

SUBJECT

: Memo Proposed for DDCI to Stokes on Nosenko

Assuming Blakey wants a letter, I submit the attached

draft for preliminary review.

It will have to be coordinated

formally if the letter is desired.

"ti"

V. Bucking K.

S: D.:. Breckinridge

Attachment

#6092

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DRAFT

Honorable Louis Stokes, Chairman

Select Committee on Assassinations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is written on the understanding that you welcome a

statement on the Agency's view of the issues arising from CIA's

handling of Yuri Nosenko, which arose in connection with your

inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy.

First, it should be noted that the reservations in 1964 over Mr.

Nosenko's reliability as a witness, along with what he had to say then,

was reported personally to Chief Justice Warren by Mr. Helms. Given

the questions that existed at that time, the information Mr. Nosenko

offered was not factored into the findings of the Warren Cormission.

Had this information been accepted at the time, it would have served to

reinforce conclusions of the Cormission rather than alter them. I

trust that there is no issue on that point.

There are two critical considerations in the handling of Mr.

Nosenko, both of which bear on how he should be viewed.

These are

the errors in his interrogation and the way he was treated.

A critical aspect of Mr. Nosenko's interrogation at the beginning

was a preconception then prevalent in certain elements of the

intelligence community. There was concern that he was a dispatched

agent, sent to mislead

us not only

on the status of Lee Harvey Oswald

but on other things as well. The issue was not limited to the

Oswald issue for, as you know, CIA had been in touch with Mr. Nosenko

well before President Kennedy's death and his own later defection, and

earlier had received useful information from him. He is not the only

man whose bona fides were strongly suspected at that time.

The problem at the time was very real.. There was little

that could be done to clarity or verify the few things that Mr.

Nosenko had to say about Lee Harvey Oswald, however important

they might be. If a proper perspective was to be established for

considering the case, it would have to be settled first on the

issue of whether he was a bona fide defector. The course chosen by

those with responsibility for the case was to break him as they

were convinced that he was not a bona fide defector.

The steps

taken to do this were then and remain grossly improper.

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Important aspects of Mr. Nosenko's interrogation by those

assigned to work with him, was based in significant respects on thre

transcripts of early questioning of him. The records of those

early debriefings were put in transcript form in English, translated

from Russian. They contained a number of mistranslations, which

came to serve as the basis for testing the consistency of what he

said. As he made statements inconsistent with some of those early

transcripts, he was cross examined intensively on these apparent

inconsistencies in an effort to force his confession that he was a

false defector. It requires little imagination to understand how

intensive interrogation of a man, challenging what he was saying in

contrast with what he was incorrectly recorded earlier as saying,

could compound initial distortions and build a record that could be

righted only with sone difficulty. When the extended period of

detention, under extremely spartan living conditions,, was made a

part of recurring intensive interrogation, one must recognize the

permanent harm done not only to the record, but to the clear and

unburdened memory of the man.

We will never really know the extent to which the treatment

accorded Mr. Nosenko may have affected his memory on things known

clearly to him at the beginning.

We now know that much of the

record built against him was founded on initial errors extended

and compounded by the way in which his interrogation was handled.

We have taken steps to ensure that such an occurrence will not be

repeated.

Mr. Nosenko was removed from the responsibility of those in the Agency

who handled him initially, and was placed: with others, who addressed the

case afresh. Mr. Nosenko, as a result, ultimately was released to private

life and since then has proven himself a valuable asset of the American

Government

Now, fifteen years after

his defection, there is an

accumulated record of the value and reliability of what he has told

It is impressive indeed.

He has proven a unique source of

information on Soviet intelligence operations against ourselves ano

some of our allies; a number of intellgience coups have been based

on information from him.

It must be observed that former Agency employees contesting the

current Agency assessment of Mr. Nosenko are essentially defending the

record of their own stewardship, feeling that they have been wronged

by its having been made public.

media, made in violation of their cormitments to secrecy, that have

placed the matter in the public domain. This led to emergence of the

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issue in the context of the present investigation, with the

disclosures to which they object. Expressions of injury

by these former employees must be viewed with some reservation.

Certainly, their treatment of Mr. Nosenko remains a mar

on the Agency's record. The Agency must share the fault for that

conduct, which cannot be deflected by diversionary argument.

The fact remains that Mr. Nosenko was accorded inexcusable

treatment..

The original record of his questioning was flawed;

its continued uncorrected use served to further mar the handling

of the case. It is understood that some of these recorded errors

may have had their effect on the Committee as well. That Mr.

Nosenko has proven so useful a man subsequently is the final test

of the matter.

Any further detailed discussion of this matter would serve only

to obscure the central facts. We are satisfied as to the true nature

of past errors, and hope to avoid a recurrence. We are satisfied

with Mr. Nosenko's contributions over the years, and with his

continued value today.

Sincerely,

Frank Carlucci

.. •

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