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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date : 08/06/95

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1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

:157-10014-10005

RECORDS SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 01-H-05

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCSGO

FROM

ANGLETON, JAMES

TO

TITLE :

DATE: 06/19/75

PAGES

: 113

SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES

USSR

CIA

FBI

NOSENKO, YURI

CIA, RELATIONSHIP WITH WC

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : BOx 1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955 DocId: 32423393

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DET

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to criminaLs

The Knitro Statra Sruate

SLON

subject

R328

Report of Proceedings

VENTO ME

3/15/22

#Y.

Hearing held belore

Senato Select Coumittee to Study Governmantal

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

.. Thursday.-June. 1a 1977

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and

Wagte turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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WAND A PAUL

A10 Firal S1raa1, S.E. Wastington, O.C.30003

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CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF

James Angleton

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, D.C. 20003

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2.÷

Thursday, June 19, 1975

United States Senate.

Select Committee to Study Government.

Operationg with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m..

in Room S. 123,

The Capitol, Senator John G. Tower, presiding.

Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, JI., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow and David

Aaron, Professional Staff Members.

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Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I understand that you came

on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating

the Committee.

You will have to be sworn.

Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about

to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth

and

nothing but. the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to first get your name and

address on

the record.

Mr. Angleton.

James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.

Mr. Schwarz.

Just some procedural matters. You have a

right to counsel, you understand that?

MI. Angleton. Yes, I understand it.

Mr. Schwarz.

And if at any time you want to stop to ob-

tain counsel you have a right to do that.

And if you wish

to

claim

any of your Constitutional rights you have a right

to do that, you understand those things also, do you?

MI. Angleton. Yes,

I understand them.

Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what

period of time?

Mr. Angleton.

From the beginning until December, the

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110 Frss Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 2000)

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end of December.

Me. Schwarz. 19747

MI. Angleton. 1974.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligenco

at the CIA for that period?

Mr. Angleton. I was.

Mr. Schwarz.

For that entire perlod of time?

Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.

were youraiso-rasponalbls

with Israell Intelligence agencies?

MI. Angleton. That is correct.

Schwarz. Can you briefly state the

co

nection, if

between

Your counter intelligence work and

ther

Israell work,

or put even more generally, how did you happen

to have both

those jobs?

Mr. Angleto

vell, if I could ask you some clarifica-

tion, are we addressi

Lng

ourselves here in terms of

this meeting to the szuld

business, or are we trying to take

up

everything?

Mr. Schwarze

Who, we are

not going to try to take up

everything. He/may try to take

few things beyond the

Szule business. What we are trying

Ángleton.

I can direct my

answ

to

you better

Know

more where we are going.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the szule busin

but it

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it would be helpful to have a few background first

Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that

Angleton

not be taken by surprise, there are one

two things that

I WO

like to discuss. The nature of that material would be

similar

to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller,

having

tO

do

with the oswald situation and other things.

Mr. Angleton.

Well, to begin with, I went into oss in

1943,

the Infantry And then Iwas assigned to an

In 1943 from

embryonic counter

Intelligenc

e unit under General

was James R. Murphy, who had been

Donovan. My immediate

a protegee and obtainedshus.

law degree in General Donovan's

office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington.

And he was Chief of

X-2, which was the counter intelligence.

And during that time a number of

us were put together who

had never had

any experience in the subject. And that included

people such as donnie Oaks, who was

the head

of the editorial

page of the

New

York Times, and Ben Wellso

and

a tremendous

cross-section of American life.

And therewas a training intensive in

this

country, and

I

waS

se

to London. And the purpose

of thatwas to ab-

sorb

the

British experience, and more important

Athe breaking

of German codes.

The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to

our

activity, was

really done

in England. And by way

ligression, the Germans were using a receiver machine cal

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higma, the blue prints of which were originally obtained

by

a Frenchman.

And I might add that the Frenchman

er

re-

ceived credit for it. And yet that perhaps was

the most

single impor

ant breakthrough of the entire war And he had

obtained it aboutyeitht to nine or ten years.

prior to the out-

break of war, when;

It was non-operative.

and he had the

prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing,

that it would be operative.

In a time of war.

I give this digression,

simply to point out that the

fruits of that breakthrough

woulek

first go to the military

and the military operations.

And the counter intelligence

use of it would be the bottom

of the

List of priorities, in

one sense.

But it would mean/that a compromise of.

the material

in any fashion to

the Germans would destroy thermilitary

uses. And duringathe war or when the Germans went into the

war, they

brought

it up from 10 percent recovery to

about

100 percent

And

believe it was in the neighhorhood of some

22,000

operational

messages from the German high command. I know

the

Battle

of Tobruk was

fought on six intercepts.

So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence

for

the purpose of playing back German agents to their high

command. And this was an

elaborate deception. And when the

war ended I would say that 19 percent of all reporting agents

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that the Germang had were under our control. And in fac

when

many of the ferman hierarchy tried to escape to the

west

upder allases, their only point of contact fot

most

documenta

don and money was to our agent under control.

And de was

called the safe laven program.

So Londonwas ina sense a staging

rea

with full access

to

British, or the fruits of British activity, going back

through their entire history. And itowas

the advance head-

quarters for General Donovan, and

Mr. Murphy.

I was then sent to

Italy

1

1943. And I took over the

counter intelligence for Ital

the OSS, AFIO, Allied Forces

Ileadquarters.

Subsequently I became

the chief of OSS Italy. And

want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of

espionage and all thelother branches of

OSS. And I re-estab-

lished the counter/

intelbigence services.

And I brought the

French back into

existence, particularly the man who

originally

acquired

the code, and who worked

It for many

years.

And

this time it was shifted to the

Sảudi

bloc.

I

1c

Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back,

and was

discharged

and went into the Agency immediately.

And

during

the

pegiod

I was in the Agency, of course, I had hoth

gent

operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,

and

some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.

And probably the first overnight operation that there

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which was known as Plan llope, which is simply putting the

Itallang

in an airplane and having them fly over to

Roumanian border and make very primitive photographa

of the

whole region.

d I was sent back to the Air Force.

then

I had

code operations, embassy penetrations, anda

j80 on.

So, in

absense the resuscitation

of the Italian service,

Army and Navy, Afroforce, and the Minister of the Interior,

was American rehabilitation. And

am not going to go into

the details of the political sitúation. There was the

civil war in Greece, and the sevival of the international

Brigade and in fact the Soviets

had built up, when they were

not fighting the war,

in

the post-wat

period, assassinations,

and

instability.

And throughou this we had very closed

supervision from

Mr. Murphy, and

General Donovan. And we had special interest

in the Vatican,

and what was happening in Berlinabehind

the

Curtain.

And the then acting Secretary of State

for the

Vatican,

Montini

who is the present Pope. And so there was

much

to

do/through our channels, and General Donovan, with

Montini,

the

Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems

thể

cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to us

and

we worked with the fermans, and as we broke down the

Copposition, we began

to find that we were not getting the

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Germans, we were getting the sovlets.

But the penetrations and the operationg which

wo-ran

during the military phase began to take on a character of

their own in the civilian phase in the very long term Soviet

objectives against the U.S. In particular, and against the

allieso

41521

And then I got into all fields ofylabor, subversion,

Illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I wag in Greece.

And our penetrations at that perfod were fairly high level and

sophisticated, bedayse of the reaction to stalin.

And as the Sowtet troops occupled new territories, it

was faced with these

ambiguitles, the defectors coming

over to us at very high

Levels.

And in the course of this, of course, was the Israell

Immigration. Technically we were

still a part of AFHQ, which

was a combined

and Allied Headguarters. And the British desires

were that our activitles be directed

In supporting their

responsibilities in the Middle East,

and, therefore, to pre-

vent the Ammigration.

And

I think the only policy cable

that was ever re-

ceived during that period was one we sent

to

MT

Murphy, and

through General Donovan to the President. Thall

was

where we exercised our influences on the Italians to

prevent Immigration. And they addressed themselves

this

issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leaned

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toward the general proposition that we should not

scourage the British nor hurt the British directly

but

Should not interfere with the Italians to support

the

British position.

ind so my dealings were with samiral, Maugeria, who

had been Chlef of the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was

then the Commanding Admiral of the Turanian Fleet generally

south, where all

these

1lleqal Immigrants collected and were

sent down.

And then they blew

к up

thé

Ixgum, and hlew up the British

embassy in Rome, who were my opposite numbers. And the man

with whom we had set up'

as

the italian intelligence through

the rest of the Israelis - we ha

the members of the

group, and then we had the dilemma again. as to whether we

turned them over

the British authorities, and so on.

And we

ere in a position to make decisions one way or

the other.

And eventually we came down on

the

side of re-

leasing/them.

And there is so much more of it. I am tryng

sto

keep

the thread of it.

Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a rel

a t

lon-

ship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connedeed

with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of

Israeli back in the

1940's?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

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MI. Schwarz. And was there any other signifiean

reason

why you kept the Israell account, if that is the right

ex-

ession?

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't one after I left

there,

nor

waB

there one here in Washington.

had

But lene.

other side of the Isracli problem

was that you

thousands

Côming from the Soviet Union,

And you had the

Soviets making use of the immigration for the purpose of

sending illegal agents into the West, and breaking down all

the travel control, identificationg and so on.

And so there was bothe

security problem and a political

problem. And one of my men martled, I might say, the head of

the zionist movement in

Italy, the underground. So I had

a connection to this man

He was very important.

so, coming back to Washington, I was Special Assistant

to Colonal Donald/ I

Galloway, who was head of the

clandestine side jand

covered the world, on

allisides of

clandestine

agtivity.

And

(subsequently I was Chief of Operations

for

ES-

pionage.

And in 1954 I had a special operational unit;

and

was

made

head of the counter intelligence.

• to

until 1971, when you left the Agency, did you have any

Mr. Schwart. In the persod beginning da 1951 and Ide

relationship -- 1s

the Israell account the wrong way to say

it?

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Mr. Angleton.

It is all right. It is as good de

ny

Osher.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did you have any relationship

ith the

Israeli

account?

Mr

Angleton. No. That began in 1951.

There was no

relationship between the Agency and the Isracil intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean at all, or

prior to 1951.

Mr. Angletone

There wasn't any

from 1947 -- 1946 on.

MI. Schwarz.

Then it began ing1951. And all

I am trying to establish,

and notespend a lot of time with it.

1s, do you have any relationsh

with Israel, Israell intelli-

gence, or the Israeli account

on

behalf of the Agency between

1951 and 1974.

Mr. Angleton. It

jas resonst

tuted in 1951. And I was the

Trill,

negotiator of the arrangement. The

Mayor of Jerusalem, Pete

kollek, was at thefother end of the negotlation. He was

stationed in Washington. But during the Jewlsh Agency period

he

was head of

withe intelligence in Turkey,

during the war and

prior.

Mr.

MIller. How was that agreement negotiated

M

Angleton. It was negotiated by finding waat

dis

wehave in common. It was reviewed by Admiral Hillen

soetter,

whor

was then

Director. And he was to be succeeded by Genet

PIter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the

war

that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles

return

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WARD A PAUL

to this activity, that we would go ahead and re-establigh

relationship. And after a lot of bureaucratic problems, they

gave

me the account.

Mr. Miller. What ws the nature of the agrangement that

was agreed upon between the two services?

Angleton. In most simplistic terms, they were in-

formed that we would not work with them against the Arabs,

that we would work with them on

Soviet intelligence and

soviet bloc intelligence and eommunism, where it existed.

Mr. Schwarz

Did that agreement -- which I take it was

more flexible

that

but did it remain in effect throughout

the period of your

Mr. Angleton.

MI. M11ler.

service with the Agency?

More or less.

Was this agreement in the form of a

paper?

Mr. jAngleton. Paper and operations, discussion.

Miller. And under whose

authority was the agree-

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ment

made?

Mr. Angleton. Under the authority of the Director of

Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister

israel

on

the other side.

Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of

resources

of both countries?

Mr. Angleton. The term "resources" is not quite

correct. Everything except their own people. It was giving

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3,50

up papers and signals, communications intelligence,

and

81 1

the other products of intelligence action.

Mr. Miller. So the Director of Central Intel

Figence was

aware

of the agreement.

Wag the President?

Angleton. The President was aware

it. And the

Secretary on

State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of the

CIA, and eventually was very much involved.

ME. Miller there 1s a record of this agreement kept,

as an instrument of the

u.s.?

MI. Angleton.

ing

internal

papers would be in the Agency.

The letters, copies of the letters

from Ben Gurion to the

President or to the Secretasy

#of State I agsume are still in

the Agency. I dealt with

othere

departments in connection

with Africa, and so on,

underdeveloped areas.

If you are speaking as to whether

there was a representa

tive treaty which

was cleared - and people

wanted these

things cleared

I don't think there were

clearances

obtained from/the Hill.

ME.

Midler. Was it regarded as an obligation

commitment/ from the U.S. to Israel on certain matters?

MI,

Angleton. When you use the word U.s. while

may

use

it as contracting officers and all that, there wa:

very

little reduced to writing. And it is a custom of

Intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And

there have been very few directors to my knowledge that would

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put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some undet

standing. It Is based on a fiduciary relationship and

common

understanding:

So, these were all understandings that were

genesated by events. We had the arrest of the nine doctors,

and the pogrom in Russia. And obviously you didn't go through

a lot of bureaucracy, it was there for everyone to see.

And it had a direct impact on the question of immigration of

agents, and everything else that goes along with it. And

I think that characterizes any good operation.

Mr. Miller. How

was

possible for succeeding directors

of the intelligence agency?

Eo understand what the

agreements were between,

this case the israell intelligence

service and the u.s.

Intelligence Service?

MI. Angleton!

Very simple. They, saw the production to

begin with. And

they met with directors

Of the head of

Israell intelligence. And they met with Ambassadors and prime

ministers.

And

they were very much involved.

Schwarz. Just one more background

question and

then

we will turn to the principle subject.

Following through on

the subject of Israel

up

to your

departure in 1974, 1s there any connection between

Your

parture and handling of Israel?

And If there is, wha

the connection?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I have said It all to

th

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commis810! -= I don'thow how wisely. You can always

que

different information from different people. But Colo

Cold them, so I would like to give him the benefit of the

doubt

on it. But over a perlod of time Colby

who is not my

cup of tea professionally of in any other way, and in my

view is on the negative side of life

DI. Schlesinger,

before he wen'

Defense, said that Colby was the only other

So you havergot certain persong who

person on Watergate

were prominent. And there was

the negative aspect of

self-inspection, and inferiorg reporting on superiors, until

they came through the snake it.

And in the course

all of this there

was time when

he assumed the authority, and in

total contrast to Schlesinger,

he began to regard the Israeli accoun

as some

thing where we had to open the windows

ang,

let the air in.

And he used phrases

such as, we must help out llenry and a few

other things.

Any/position was that it was a political

relationship,

to using

and

we were not bound, of should not be bound,

the Agency on tactical ventures when we had relationships

which had strategic implications.

But one must rembmer that there are still three

million Jews in the soviet Union. And the relationship is the

only place

where you do it with high level agencies who

work

for ideology and do not work for money. So it la unigue.

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42.5

And my second point was that everything should

be trun

on the grounds of need-to-know, and should not go into the Arab

ivision until there was peace in the area. There was no

Identity of Interest or fundamental Interest between Israelis

and an example is 500 Polish intelligence officers who were

Jewish who immigrated to Israel. They knew more about Polish

Intelligencesthan the Poles. And the Sovlets had worked with

the Poles in the west, and trained

them in Moscow, where you

had the cohesion of: 27 bloc services working together through

their own congress party apparatus into a collective with

MoscoW.

And most important,

our job was to preserve the inte

grity of the immigrationfrom

th

bloc, because the problem

of escape to Israel

1e a religious

problem, it is not &

political problem.

There could

not

bel a prime minister who

would survive the day if he did not goralong with the idea of

the return.

And, therefore, there is a certain

of parallelism,

you might say, between handling the communications intelligence

during the war and where a low priority makes use of it and

endangers the whole with the question of immigratio

wher

the fruits of that immigration come to this government.

(Recess.)

Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the question

ing?

TOP SECRET

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Mr. Schwarz. You were in the middle of an answer.

elleve.

MI. Angleton. What I am trying to say 19 tha

Immi-

gration

a source of very high level informal

on, and 1t

is very com

Parable with 1ts problems as communications intelligeno

during the warwhen the lives of men were involved in troop

movements.

And, thereforen

the idea of opening up the doors and

things, and so on, to me seemed cabsolutely contrary to the

spirit, and what had beenaoing on for 22 years.

And during that time

we

had obtained, for example, by

way of production, Khrushcher'stsecret speech which prac-

tically created revolutions in Hungary and Poland.

I was just simply

reiterating the problem of the immi-

gration. This Idea

Of opening the doors

ang

letting the light

in, and breaking/down compartmentation, and

breaking down

the need to

know, would inevitably put in jeopardy,

the immi

gration; if

the Soviets should learn the extent of the ac-

tivities

secret

Row, the production Ian

from everything, such

a St

othe

speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran

into

first hard information on nuclear explosives, and it

the

ran

Into practically the whole

gamut. And I think in a cer

tain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports deal-

Ing with the soviet bloc which were unique. And much

of this

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18

came from, say, an engineer that had a factory, or what

in other words, it had a very direct bearing on our

ReD and our own defense budget.

attri

Now, our own way of handling it was to give

false

Ition, reports, so that if the report was

Ever compro

mised,

would not compromise the operations

or the immi

gration. Ande

therefore, that was one of the issues.

On the

other issue was that to politicize the Agency,

as I stated, on the

tactical problems, which are going to

be with us for a long

-time.

And to break down the fidugiary relationship- which is

after all a personal business.

- all the men

I have had, were

men who stayed in it and

ame back to headquarters and went back

to tel Aviv, they went,

the National Security Council, and

went back to Tal Aviv

et cetera, ausmall group of men. It

was probably the

most economical operation that has ever been

devised in the

iS. Government. I don t think there was more

than 10 people that were hired in the same process.

I started from the south side with two dewish men who

worked

th

me during the war. He sent them over as ordinary

peoplesunder cover to establish the working hours of things,

and I brought over six others and put them through

Some

months

of training, outside of the structure.

And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the

Servic

But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.

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19

For example, we had certain political overtones

we

were used in an affirmative way under President

Eisenhower.

Henwanted to make a real attempt to see if there

could ever

be

peace in the Middle East. And with Alan

Dulles, his

brothers

and myself, and Kermit Roosevelt,

we

put up a plan

to

bringing,

In Robert B. Anderson, who had/been Assistant

Secretary of the Defense.

And he was accredited as special

emissary from the

President. And I handled his base to

Israel, which was secret,

black, as we call them

to

see Ben Gurion - and Shaffetz was

the Foreign Minister --

and

Kollek, who was in the Prime Minis-

ter's office, and later Mayo

And we took him

back to

Rome. And Kermit Roosevelt

would take him over

to

see Nasser And this went on back

and forth on many trips, until the

conclusions were reached

that there could

not be any peace.

But

thoseytypes

of initiatives

could,

be done without.

publicizing

ox without destroying it.

MI.

Chwarz. In any event, some dispute

connection

with

these

Israell matters underlay your dispute swith Mr.

Colby

which underlay your leaving the Agency?

Büt

MI. Angleton.

Yes. He offered me jobs or what

not.

these are matters of principle, as far as I am concerned.

MI. Miller. MI. Angleton, you described the fiducia

relationship. Were there

points

along the way where

the U.S

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interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?

Mr. Angleton. We never got into that. Of coursel

you

only had to read the paper every day to see that.

MI. MIller. But how did they come up ?

say they

t come up at all?

Mr. Angleton. Of course, they came

4p.

There

wasn't

anything secret about it.

Mr.

MIler. But what examples can you give?

Mr Angleton..

The recent/visit of Rabun is a classic

case. The so-called reassessment of the Middle East. The

Times has better açcounts

it than the Agency has.

Mr. Miller.

mean

your level.

MI. Angleton.

don't quite get the thrust of your

question.

MI. Miller. What I

am

gaying is that you had an unusually

close relationship -

Mr. Angleton.

It was not

unusual. I have had it

with many elicis of services in 80

different countries, so

It is not any more unusual than a lot offothers. The French-

man

who

got the code is closer to me than

the

Israelis are.

Mr. Miller.

Similar to the relationship

go one

Mr. Angleton. I don't like the word unusual

because

to

me

it is usual.

Mr. Miller. Delete that. If your working relationship

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with the Israells, where you had conflict of u.s. Interogts -

Mr. Angleton.

Give me an example of what you regard

as a conflict.

Mr. Miller. Can you thing of any?

Mr. Angleton. You are the one who le posing it. I think

a lot of these things are illusions. But

whi

at

would you regard

as a confijat? I don't think there is

conflict regarding

the Soviet Union,

or the balance of power.

I don't think there

1s any question in my view --

Senator Mathi

May I au

ggest Suez as a conflict that

might have posed

MI. Angleton. Whi

are we talking about?

Senator Mathias.

Th

sraeli-British-French attack on Suez.

Mr. Angleton. Thei

r.s.

vernment position was that we

had no commitments

with Israel

and we had no binding treaties.

We had two allies.

that had just fought

a war with us, and

both of whom betrayed us. And Eden's

went with it. And that

is very clear and well documented.

The

Israelis were not

blamed because we didn't have any agreementsswith them, they

had violated no agreements. The British had

agreements.

The

Br

Ltish tried to give us a deception plan,

should they

havernaval vessels in the Mediterranean, and they

were

there

a different purpose.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me see

if I can make a point on

jus

common sense level.

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Senator Mathias. Let me follow this suez queitlor

little more closely.

That is a point at which the U.s. policy

differed from

thespolicy which was adopted by British and

F.

Fance and Israel?

I. Angleton. Correct.

Senator Mathias. And would a situatión

of that sort con

front you with difficulties in your operations because --

Mr. Angletor. There have always

been crises with them.

Senator

wathlas. And how

do you resolve a crisis of

that kind?

Mr. Angleton

You

don"t

see the fellow for a few

days.

25

Mr. Miller. I

see.

So your method was

Mr. Anseton! s tosal negerallty of interest.

to deal with them on those matters --

Mr. schwarz. Could we turn

the subject of atomic

technology?

MI .

make

1

Kirbow. Excuse me. I think for the record we should

Clear, I think Mr. Angleton has

Kãa,

an interview

with

the staff, and he has been made aware

thât

a witness

testified here under oath

as to certain matters,

and that that

the approach that we

are going to take now.

Is that clear?

Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask the question generall

first and then come to the other testimony.

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OP SECRET

Mr. Angleton, has the Central Intelligence Agency directly

or indirectly transferred any atomic technology or know how

to

Srae1?

Mr. Angleton.

From my knowledge,

the answer

aNg/

an abso-

lute

o. That would be one of those grounds that Mr. Miller

was referring to, where the Agency, in the person

Mr. John

Mccone, had some of the sharpest

rds probably in the

history of

the

relationship.

Mr. Schwa

You mentioned those

at

lunch, and you might

just put that on

the record.

Mr. Angleton.

want to sta

that to my knowledge the

Israelis themselves never raised the question of their atomic

capability or their atomic

interests, with one or

was where there had been somebody

two small exceptions, whie

who had been iced from

the

•, were he ever to get his visa

to come back and attend

some meeting, something on that

level.

Mr. Schwarz.

I want to make

sure

that I have asked

the

question/ broadly enough.

Did the Agency take any steps to make evailable

to

the Israelis any personnel who had knowledge about atomic

matters.

Mr. Angleton.

None whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. And specifically with respect

tO

man

let's go off the record for a minute.

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(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

Do you know a scientist called Dr. Wilfred

Mann?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

ME. Schwarz. Does he have any knowledgedof atomic matters?

Angleton. Yes. He was one of they

originators.

MEs

Schwarz. To your knowledge

was

he ever put in con -

tact with

Mr.

any Israeli person directk

or indirectly?

Angleton. Not to my

knowledge, never.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know

Journalist called Tad Sgule?

Mr. Angleton

I

do.

Mr. Schwarz.

id

you meet with him sometime this year?

Mr. Angleton. In March.

MI. Schwarz.

Wheres

did you meet him?

Mr. AngletongAt the houser

of Ben Wells.

Mr. Schwarz. And did the

three of you then go for dinner

some place?

MI.

Angleton. That is correct.

Schwarz. At that meeting did you

Mr. Angleton. We went as Sculz's gues

discuss

somewhere to

dinner.

Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did he raise

with

subject of the transfer of atomic technology from the

to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

you the

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MI. Schwarz. What did he say to you?

MI. Angleton. They prefaced his remarks by

ting that

was not a professional scientist, but he was a dew,

and

80

was his good friend Hersh. And they had some atrange ESP

working win.

which one said to the other, have,

You

heard what I

have heard

and the other one said, I thinke

may have heard

what you have

heard. And then this thing went back and forth,

and then it finall

devolved, one sa1

#did it have

anything

to do with Angleton,

wand the other one said yes, and it went

on to where they discover

ed

that,,each had had separate sources

that I had been instrumental

En-

acguiring plutonium for the

Israelis, and as a follow-upy

to help the Israelis on their

know-how by sending Di.

Mann to Israel clandestinely. And they

both had their stories,

and they hadva

gentleman's agreement.

And the matter/

was published without notifying the

other.

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Mr. Schwarz.

And what did you say in

esponse?

Mr. Angleton. My response to him was,

was wrong. But

he had not identified the

scientist. So, I

askedthim --

aScharz. When you say it was wrong -

Angleton. His statement was wrong.

Mr. Schwarz.

So you denied the story that atomic

technology had been

transferred to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.

MI. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is.

It

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26

does constitute a denial.

Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.

Senator Baker. Let me ask you, Mi. Angleton,

undeisstand by that that you mean every material

the story, was wrong and Incorrect?

a3

pect of

Mr.

Angleton. I didn't mean quite that

I was more in

terested in

the

fact that, one, he knew

Nad

Szule -= I am sory.

that I knew Hersh.

• and that Hersh

told him that his source

was the man who gave

him the December 22 article, and whether

he "had been set up"

Senator Baker. What December 22?

MI. Angleton. That lisathe time they kicked off the

entire furor on the pas

espionage thing.

Senator Baker;

Against American citizens?

Mr. Angleton

Yes.

Senator

Baker. Did they do that once?

Mr.

Angleton. No, because neither

isclosed

their inde-

pendent

sources to the other.

Senator

Baker. The point I am trying to

clarify for my

own

purposes is that the conversation you just related

you said

war

wrong.

Do I understand you to mean that every material aspect

of that statement was wrong?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. But I didn't know my motives on

lot of questions that I had with him.

Because this was the

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first live human being I saw that had actually allegedly

heard from Hersh. And he thought they had been set up

and that was the biggest agony in the Agency.

Senator Baker. And the person who set him

Angleton. Hersh told him, according.

to Szule, that

he was scared of the story, because this

was his source on the

December 22

article. And therefore he wondered aloud whether

he had been

set up,.

Senator Baken

Did he. say who.

had been the source of the

December 22 informatia

ME. Angleton.

Absolutely/ho.

MI. Kirbow.

Off the

record.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. I just want tormake sure, in your conversa-

tion with Mr. Szulc as opposed to your testimony here today

on the merits, aladyou deny to Me. stule

that you or

the Agency had

macilitated the transfer

fatomic technology

to

Israel?

Mr.

Angleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted

rapidly,

because Szule was . talking about a very great agent

that

he

Had

in

the Agency. And he was bragging about the fact

thathe had more

sources than llersh had. And then he said,

do

yousknow Australia?

And I said, yes, I know Australia.

Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?

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STOP SECRET

28

Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.

Do you know sho is bicycling in India?

And Isaid, I

am afraid I am

not with you.

And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one

of our most

sens let

ve employees who retired, and is bicycling in India.

And.

give this as an illustration of

the

cat and mouse

business

of

this whole evening.

And he

Bald he got that from his

gource.

Now, that

man's name is Sidney Gottlieb. And he was the

head of our technical, services depaftment, which means that

there 1s a cross planglin our business. And the man who

was bugging and performing.

all

the hundreds of technical

services, has access, unfortunately, to many of our operations.

There is one juncture point

In the business where there

is a breakdown of compartmentation And for him to indicate

that he knew Gottlieb, and the sources

that had been raised in

my mind, since

atomic energy

and

was talking about a scientist, plutonium.

all these matters, that fis source might

be in our

Technical Services Division, which,

ne

was, he

would know

everything, or could get into everythi

Dú c

I didn't tell him that.

In

fact, I expressed little or no interest in

hels

source

other

than

asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, andsthis

that and so on.

Senator Baker. Could I ast. you s question at this point

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Mr. Angleton. Surely.

Senator Baker. What

you are relating to me seems to imply

hat

formation?

Szule'g information was very, very good on

sensitive in-

Angleton. No. That information, sir.

would have

been

unclassified.

Senator

Baker. I am speaking more

ofache sidney x Gottlleb

relationship.

Mr. Angleton.

But he only

said

that he was bicycling

in India. But the way he went

about /f't, do

you know Australia,

do you know Sidney,

do you

thinkethis, and so on --

was that sort of thing.

Senator Baker.

Do youthink he had a source in India?

Mr. Angleton.

It

Started to worry me, because he was

talking plutonium, which was schentific. Gottlieb,

before he went to that whole department of his, was transferred

to Carl Duckett. And that is the reason

Gottlieb left.

Senator Baker. You mean he didn't

want to work for

Duckett?

MIa!

Angleton. That is part of it.

And there are also questions of principle. you take

it

from one director - it is lifeblocd -- and get it

to

another

director.

Senator Baker. Is this the same rottlieb who

was

charge of processing the photographs that were taken in

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Fielding's office?

Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.

senator Baker.

Do you know of that situation?

Mr. Angleton. No, except --

Senator Baker. let me ask you this

I will turn it

back to coünsel.

was there any conversation in whigh Szule of Hersh talked

to colby about chesematters? Did you sever

get any impression

that they were implying that Colby

was their source?

MI. Angleton.

The only,

thing that came up is that when

I

saw Colby yesterday

which

is the first time since

December - he told me

thàt.

he had bought a theory of mine on

Szulc, but he did not

any misgivings on lersh.

Ile

said that one year

before

he

had seen Hersh about the submarine

article, and that had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets

would not have permitted the operation

Sto take place.

And I

tố

a him that he was erroneous,

that to use that

guide was

samply not to understand what the game is all about.

And when Philby was stationed in Washington he helped

the

FBL

11 n

working on some communications intelligence which

led

the

identification of Klaus Fuchs. But inespite of

Phillby

being a Soviet agent, the Soviets were prepared.

to let

Paus Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt philby.

Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

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He was a more valuable agent. If he had not been un,

covered he would have been today Chief of British Intelligence.

In the case of George Blake, who was in the Best

€19h

ègret service, he gave to the Soviets one

year

invadvance the

entire

plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love,

that 1s, the

tunnel

We built in Berlin - very elaborate

to tap all of

the Sovie

military lines.

NoW,

M one year in advance, they

took no preventive

action in order

Sito

save George Blake.

Now, what has happened since. Décember 22 to the U.s.

intelligence community

in the

position that Hersh enjoys, with

the prestige and the impact anothe U.s. public, it stands to

reason that you can't get them to give any baby talk as to what

the Soviets would or would!

not

do, when you see something that

is the objective from

the

end

diathe last was to the present,

and destroy the agent

Senator Baker?

Do you think hersh is a Soviet Agent?.

Mr. Anglaton. I an not saying thathe is a soviet

agent. To begin with, when I went back to

See wells, who

was in counter intelligence with me in London during the war,

I

told him I could not buy szule's article regarding

alleged meetings and that they had certain sources,

Hersh, the

and the

introduction of Dr. Mann's name and so on simply didn't

hold

water,

and something was wrong.

But DI. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of

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Burgess, and a friend of Philby. And the home backgroun

which is a factual thing, is only known to very

few.

services.

And for him to introduce it

ito

this

scenario

gave it a taint that lifted it out ol

Just simply

gossip.

llow

would he ever know the name Mann?

Senator Baker. That is what I wasdriving at, 1o it

fair to infer from that conversation

that there was an

indication that Szulc had a very good source within the Agency?

Mr Angleton.

Eitther

that

or the way I look at it, I

am prepared to admit,

becauser'of an article he wrote, in the

cryptonym Easy Chair in

Oval Office of the White House.

Senator Baker.

Talking

"about the bugging situation?

That crytonym, Easy Chair was the most s

Mr. Angleton.

sanctified word in

Agency. And

what it dealt with was --

it was called Easy«Chair for the simple

reason that if the

Soviets were blocked, people abroad were moving into this

house or this

office.

Senator Baker. Off the record.

(off the record.)

Angleton.

But let me put it this way.

said, I called Ben Wells to see you, because

wanted

place in which to raise all this stuff.

Mr. Schwarz. This is Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. This is Szulc.

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And in fact, I think they had been talking mometime before

I

arrived.

And with Wells' background, the New York Times abroad, nd

S 201y

j's time abroad, apparently -

Senator Tower. Excuse me. Will you go back

just a bit

here?

Youdraised a question of how did Szulca

Know the name of

Mann

and know about his association with

Mr. Angleton.

Yes.

Senator Towel.

hillby and Burgess.

You raised thenquestion but did not ans

wEr

it.

How do you thinkphe could have known 11?

Mr. Angleton.

Th

what bothers me, that he is

either unwitting, or has

source who

has knowledge and is

working for an opposition, orshe has a source who is mis-

chievously exploiting him by, who may be retired, and does

know some facts,

therefore it

is 10 percent true and 90

percent false.

I would assume his financial situation is such that he

is very hungry.

I mean that is my general

Observation, and

that

he is/having a rough time of saving a very

lucrative

contra

it with Penthouse for supplying X number

articles.

I

that is my general feeling.

Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You say

that he

could

have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess-Philb

relationship through an

external source?

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Mr Angleton. Yes, either witting or unwitting.

Senator Tower. The KBG knows this, and, therefore, it

ould have come directly or indirectly from that source?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Senator Tower. That is a possibility?

MI.

Angleton. That is' a possibility,

And he has some

brains about

the fact that he does havel

Contacts -- he knows

the Roumanian

Ambassador better than anybody in Washington,

and he knows the

poles, and he knows.

this. And it goes on

and on.

So, he is dealing with

bloc

people who will be reporting

back to their headquarters:

detailed -- assuming he is

totally innocent, and given

his

position in Washington,

Szulc would be a normal,

witting or unwitting, channel for

them in disinformation and for any

other motive.

So, as to whether he is himself knowing what he is

doing, whether he

is a dupe, is an outstanding question.

But for a man wil

goes and

socializes with the black --

Mr. Schwarz. Did

Mr. Szulc ever work

for the Central

Intelligence Agency?

MI:

Angleton. I don't know. le may have

for

some of

our

peo

ple in the field.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?

ME. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz.

Have

you heard that?

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Mr. Angleton. I have heard that, but I haven'tlooked

at

the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention

basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay

Pigs.

Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Szui

-Wells-

Angle

con

meeting?

Angleton. This basically -- the

thung

that began to

really disturb me was, number one, his

comment, as I said before

tha Hersh told him that the thing that

really bothered him

about this story

das that it came fronthe same source who

gave him the 22nd of December,

without identifying him, and the

fact that when he was

going through this business that he had

the best sources in the

and that was Sidney Gottlieb,

and here was a scientific

egation, plutonium and the

scientist and all the rest

of

them:.

And again, if heldid have a live,

source in that

area, that means he would have a live

source across the board.

When he asked me about my successor,

told him that

was not prepated to respond to that, that every new man was

entitled to one free shave.

And&

he says, I know your successor. And I don

t think ho

actually

mentioned the name. But in this article which has just

comet.

out he mentions him with his biographical sketch

Senator Baker. Who was your successor?

MI. Angleton.

George Kalaris.

I had never known him before.

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94 de

36

So obvlously he was talking to me as somebody dis

affected from the Agency, et cetera.I mean that is my

view

of why he was doing all this. Whereas my concerns

Were quite

ferent than his.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible:

because. of

those

different concerns, that your effort

deny the story

did not

get.

acIoss to Mr. Szulc?

In other words, you are saying

you

had

some concerns that

dealt with the

scientist being

Involved,

that dealt with. the

newspaper source,

that dealt withdrasy Chalt, that dealt with

the statement that maybe the

December 1974 article was inaccur-

ate. And he pursued all

thes

matters with some vigor and in-

terest.

Do you think it

ossible that because of that that

whatever denial you ma

of the

transfer of atomic parts of

thestory didn't get across to Mr.

SEule?

got

across to him.

denied

the

ME. Angleton.

No, I think it

Mr. Schwarz. Can you recall your

atomic transfer?

words to him that

Mr. Angleton. My chief words to him wast

realize what a thing like this implies, and what

said, do you

t would

do,

depending on how the media picks it up, in destroying

all

the

efforts in the Middle East?

Mr. Schwarz.

But words like that are as consistent

with beingtrue as being false?

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Mr. Angleton. They were consistent, but they weren't

stated in that fashion. They were stated in the fashion that

Mann is a person who fits within the Philby,

cetera,

complex in a false story of this sort, which comes to the

British

go back

who pull out a file on Mann, and they

read down and

Into the fact of Mann's association with

me, Mann's

asociation with Philby, all this stuff

Israelis and

my

actions with the

that, regardless

of

tells the Britishtor the French,

what the U.s. Government

othe Canadians, or the

Australians, or the

New zealandeys, all of whom have fundament-

ally the basic information

based on very high level

would be a confirmation to them,

sec

set information, that the story was

true.

Senator Tower.

Let megpursue just about three ques-

tiong here.

Did Szulc

specifically ask you whether or not, during the

early sixties,

Eissionable material,

along with nuclear

technology and

Israelis?

technological assistance,

pagsed to the

he ask youto confirm or deny that?

Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely

that

typ

of

precision. The story that he gave was a venyalucid,

raightforward story without any if's, and's and but

Senator Twoer.

Did you deny only in part the validity

of

the question

that he asked?

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In other words, if he askedyou about the passage

both fissionable material and technology, did you deny

wholly

of in part that there had been a passage of fissionable

material?

Angleton. No, I denied his story

would like to

kecp

that

his story, something he came

an

presented. And

then when he

got down into the other things,

which had to

do with technology

all I can say

ig

at anyone who follows

closely the Nasser,

nd then later

Sadat accusations against

CIA, it is voluminous

terms

0,

their spelling out the sophis

ticated gadgetry which they

discovered, which came from

Central Intelligence.

This is a thing

th

has

ways concerned us, because

in the last war we lost

-- and we

don't know the extent of this -- we

still do this today, we

lost some of the installations

which me had ple

there.

Mr. Schwarz.

When you say "we", you

mean the CIA?

MI.

Angleton. The CIA -- the Israell lost entirely --

4,11

chwarz.

When he say we put in

there.

you mean

the

CIA

put in there?

Senator Baker. What installations?

Mr. Angleton. The line of sight, electronics --

Senator Baker. You are not talking about --

MI. Angleton. I

am talking about the signal intelli

ence.

And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in

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39

there. And I want to complete this - because of the fac

that most of the information which we gained from the

SAM'S,

which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in Vietham,

we

gained through Israel. We could read a whole

lot of the compu-

teriz

ng and so on of those SAM's. And therefore we were pre-

pared

tongive highly sophisticated eguipment to Israel to

work againschthat Russian business in,

order to transfer the

knowledge to Vietnam.

So I told

chem, I said, yegggie have worked on questions

we have always helped them

out technologically. And I think

I made the comment that

that they turned it to

any

lece of gear we ever gave them.

greater sophisticated use

than we had, which was

n many instances.

And they would cannibalize, and we would get the product.

But there was

no

- so thackthis is clearcut, there was

no attempt to lead him on regarding

the nuclear one, because

the nuclear

oney

was very clearly statedito him, that the injec-

elon of Mann into the story had a certain

i significance of Its

own.

I think Wells will hear me out very

clearly on this,

che

injection of that could not be magic,

itchad to come

from somebody who is in the intelligence service.

Immean that

element -- and if this story without the introduction of Mann

had beertold, it would be just another of the many rumorse

And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want

to

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get back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets sent

a barrage of propaganda in Arabic fto the Middle East

from

idio Moscow that the CIA - and then mentioned

Harvey,

whơi

was

working for us, and whom I had put in touch with the

Israeli

during the Cuban business - had

meton a ship with

Morris,

e

Chief of the British Intelligence, who had a back-

ground in

the, war with the Israells,

had met there and pre-

pared and carried out all the strategic part of the Six-Day

War. And this 1sv

all PFIS. And there was a tremendous pike

of Soviet materials

they never got much into our media, be-

cause it is directed

to

the

Middle East In Arabic, and which

obviously they knew.

They used Harveys,

Instead of my name, because pro-

fessionally we were

very close

Mand more important,

I had introduced Harvey as

the on

officer to the Israeli op-

erational people on the Cuban busine

And, therefore,

it showed they had knowledge of Harvey

and

so on.

The quety then raised was whether

the

penetration was

here

or

was

it in Israel.

MI

Kirbow. Did you express any concern

to Mr.

Szulc

about the use

of Dr. Mann's name in

this

article?

Mr. Angleton.

Not Dr. Mann's name. My expression was

that 1f you -- I said that article, false as it is,

With

the

many things injected in it -- I will be very frank withyou,

I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story

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these two journalists was so implausable, and I looked

Ben a few times . and I know him well - and he

had

absolutely a stoney expression, no expression on

h.rs

face.

And this

was something veryi.very queer, and the whole thing

was initiat

ed by nim. And that was why I asked Mr. Szule,

did he come

to you or did you come to him.

Senator Baker. Did he come to you?f

Mr. Schwarz.

"ple came to us.

Senator Tower.

Let me ask you one specific question,

yes or no.

Did you confirm to

szuld that during the late fifties

subsequent to the Suez War

the CIA made available to the

Israeli Government technical assustance and the avallability

of one or more distinguished nuclear

scientists or phylcists

for the purpose of

developing atomic

weapons?

Mr. Angleton

That is completely false.

Mr. Aaron,

MI. Angleton, did you confluen

or deny that

to Mr. Szulc?

MI.

Angleton. I am stating that I never made

any

such

statement

And I stayed off of the nuclear business.

Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn

is

that

correct?

MI. Angleton.

It is very difficult for me to respond

to

that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussion.

covering an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in the

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back of my mind was the fact that we had problems with

the Israelis in the nuclear field.

MI. Aaron. What problems were those?

r. Angleton. They were very sensitive/problems. And

I don't

think that they really shed any light

on things that

you

are

talking about here.

Mr. Aaro

Do you recall a conversation with me and

Mr. Schwarz in which, in discussing

said you felt under ho

obligation

lis same matter, you

to esther confirm or deny

this story with Mr. Szul

C.?

MI. Angleton, 'Yes,

Ow I used that phrase. There

was a denial. And I think

that there was a denial

F But when

that, wells would second the fact

I got down to a lot of the

other questioning, mys

thinking was

ato try to lead him around

back into the meeting with Hersh, and lead him back to this

source that had

to do with Sidney Gottisieb, and so on.

Senator

Tower. Are you saying in

effect, then, that

any questions he raised with you about the

transfer of

visual mat

lal or deeper technology, or manpower, for that

matter

the Israeli Government, was couched

in

circumlocutry

termsgöf some kind?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.

Senator Tower. That you got no direct questions

that

sort?

Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, senator.

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I left there . and I think this is a very important

pol

first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he

invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent onalt. And we

wen

there. And here in the restaurant therentire discussion

was a

secapitulation by him, in a restaurant

'that was fairly

full of people. Hersh was a person who,

requested a secret

meeting in

Wells'house, and then proceeded in a restaurant to

regurgitate thie entire matter.

Senator Tower.

Which

restaurant was it?

Mr. Angleton.

It

was

the Sea Catch.

Senator Baker.

ever have any impression that

it might be recorded,

is

at what you are driving at?

MI. Angleton.

mind. I looked at him,

don't

The thought crossed my

and he sort

of - he could hide a lot

of things.

And

so we

got back to wells' house.

And it was very

late.

And

I told him

he tried to get me to come backa

to his place. And

Just wouldn't do It. And that to how the thing

broke

Mr. Kirbow. MI. Angleton, in your long relattonship and

osition with the Agency, did you ever express your

concern to

anyone out there that you thought this might have been

setup by a foreign source, or from internally?

Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?

Mr. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story

and

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everything else.

Mr. Angleton.

I never discussed this wi

anybody

the Agency until we had this lunch.

Senator Baker. Do you suspect that now

MEna

Angleton. I do not -- I don't know what to suspect.

because I

on't have access to files and I think one has

to review a

lot

of material. I think

one has to review

Sauld's files.

Mr. Miller.

You

spoke

of that earlier, you described

it as a dossier.

Mr. Angleton. Well

think there is a file on it, a

security file. I think,

ne

was one of the journalists, the

first one, who made

Pigs, and so on.

a/reputation for blowing the whole Bay of

I think the

fact that he is foreign-

born, and the allegations and so

a similar file?

And many of these

And so the Bureau has

"fIles are created -- and

they get to,

accredited to the Pentagon

and therefore a

routine

security check is made.

Schwarz. Are you aware of any

surveillance of

Mr.

Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. No.

MI. Schwarz. Past

surveillance?

MI. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of it

As I say, I don't think I have ever

seen his file for five

"or

ten years.

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MI. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the

CIA

you never

had

any occasion to cross MI. Szulc's trail or consider him

ag.a

person -

F. Angleton. I separated him once

fight with a

friend of mine.

Mr. Kisbow. But nothing in an of

clal capacity?

Mr. Angleton. No.

MI. Miller.

et me ask another

question on this

file matter.

Yousaid that to yo

Wledge there were files on Mr.

Szulc.

Were there files of

other newspapermen?

Mr. Angleton.

Yes

there are files on other newspaper-

men.

Mr. Miller. And

other Americans?

Mr. Angletong

A lot of them.

senator baffer. Hersh wrote a storke

rabout - what did

he say -- 7,000 files. Was that right or wrong?

Mr.

Angleton. I think it would be many more.

I have

never

counted them.

Senator Baker. How many? A hundred thousands

a milliont

Mr. Angleton. Well, when you consider all visa checks --

and

we do 500,000 visa checks on foreigners -- and

ther

question

Of

American sponsors and

so on -- this thing on all of

is a question of the gradual deterioration of our efficien

because our staff was cut in half, and we had the problems

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of the Watergate, and we had all of these things. 'And

2

great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't

being

pro-

Fessionally worked upon.

4

5

Senator Baker. You have mentioned

the

Wa

tergate twice,

Mr. Angleton.

6

Can you shed any light on that period

in the Agency's

life, the impact that the watergate investigation had or any

Involvement offathe Agency in any

of the

so-called

Watergate affairs?

10

Mr. Angleton.

Of the Agency itself?

11

12

Senator Baker.

anybody

connected with it.

Mr. Angleton. I

am

sorIy, sir, that is a debatable

13

question there, and I want

get it accurate.

14

What was that

key

gain?

15

Senator Baker

I don't wan

to narrow it. I want to make

16

it broad.

17

18

Mr. Angleton. I want to make sur

I

understand you.

Senator

Baker. There are two partstof the question.

19

20

One,

do

you

know of any Agency involvement of those who were

working.

in the - working with the AGency in

the

Watergate,

21

22

in your break-in or the preparation for the

covet up or the

attempted cover-up?

23

MI. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not.

And

24/yby that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things

and

the

newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well.

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Senator Baker. Are you aware of the letters

McCord wrote to the DCI after the Watergate suggest

how

you could avoid having this blamed on the Agency

Angleto. I am aware of what was

inathe press.

And Paul

Nabami recently died who wrote thoge letters, and

It made great sense to me, and I had personal. relationships

beyond an officied relationship.

Senator Baker

He wrote two

a Gaynor and three to

Helms.

Mr. Angleton. I didn't know

Senator Baker. I belleve

so.

Mr. Angleton.

In any, évent, I can say that Gaynor's

connection, because he hadygreat trust in haynor - and he

was a very stubborn manjand he left the AGency on conviction,

I assune, or troubles in the Office of Security.

Senator Baker

In connection with

Watergate?

ME. Angleton. He left much earlier.

MI. MIller. He being MeCord?

Mr.

Angleton. Yes.

Mr.

Iller. Why did he leave?

that

Angleton. I don't know. And I was really

didn't come by and say goodbye.

surprised

Senator Baker. Was he a prominent official at the

Agency?

MI. Angleton.

He was not.

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Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent respondlbility?

MI. Angleton. He was a man that had a very @ifficult

case abroad, which meant that it had to be burled

no leakages.

And

Kused him twice, and one was a pretty

And he followed instructiong to the lettet

ngthy

use of him.

He strayed on the

one. And lids not important. It is

Just

he did somethings

that wasn't very

wise

something that

Senator Bake

Doyou know

'he went into the Watergate

Complex?

Mr. Angleton.

Can ' t

understand it, because I would

say it was ideological wit

him.

There wasn't any difficulty

in understanding his views

a given subject.

Senator Baker.

The equipment that was used, I am told,

was a fairly primitive sort for that sort of operation.

Does that agree

th your appraisal

him?

Mr. Angleton.

That is what I rea

And that surprised

me

also, because as a rule - let me put

le this way, what

I am

saying

is, it was the Soviets who made

an

allegation

that

certain country very close to us

they were

using

las

beam on a window of the Minister of Defense,

and

acqui ring

everything.

So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine

iside,

I

took McCord and the group and sent them to that country

for

six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great

knowledge of the - he knows the counter electronics.

And

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to

Know

that you have got to know the other.

ator Baker. He wag familiar with the most exotic

source of

I nit.

ligence gathering?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

And that is why I can

understand - I mean, if the

papers are correctale what they have atated, although many

whe.souxceszwese-peopleswhomalso.sellrelectronte.egulpnentg

Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away from

the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing what

1£ any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.

For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it havo

file on Lee llarvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more

than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they

have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission

through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.

And then there is a lot of undigested material that was

brought out after the Warren Commission.

Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you

have

any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know

the

time factor, I will try to shorten this.

But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should

not be - that there should be a statement to the effect that

the Commission, in the life of the Commission - that these are

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the conclusions on the avallable evidence. But given the fact

that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which 18 under

the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of

Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future

generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the

door, that it would really mean the investigation would be

pursued.

Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was

queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of

certain people, including Oswald.

Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.

Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that

time to McCone or other

wise that the bona fides of that

Soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate-

gorical terms?

MI. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission

we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko

going under the record, on a question of bona fides.

Senator Baker. Why?

MI. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.

Senator Baker. What did you regard him

as?

MI. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch

agent who

was sent to mutilated the leads. of very high grade Soviets

whom

we had acquired prior to that.

Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy

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assassination?

Mr Angleton. Relating to asgassination, KGB agents,

VASSALL

Vassily, the British agents, and many agents in France, a

alleged penetration in the U.s., et cetera.

Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?

Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that

a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this

schorr

interview recently with

Shor, I called his executive officer

Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever

alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides?

And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too

well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.

And he said, well, I will give it to you.

And I never heard from him since. But MeCone was a man

whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.

Senator Baker. I am sure he does.

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was

infact a Soviet agent?

Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.

I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too

many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in-

formation that has been developed later.

For example, in 1966, in a soviet book on Cuba there

is

photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograph

jar.t5:1=d

of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the first

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Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was

the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When

the Mexican

police

arrested Castro as a student, they found in his note-

books the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.

Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for

Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible, 75 percent KGB staff.

Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.

Now, we had a double agent after the assassination,

who made a number of allegations that he acquired from

the

Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of leontov.

Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on a state

visit. And he pulled an American journilist aside, and

totally

out of context, expressed the view that there was a con

spiracy, and it involved the Right wing of the U.s.

The thingwas totally out of context. And he planted

this bug in this fellow's ear.

We had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of

their personnel

for

six months on working on the assassina"

tion, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business

under Johnson was to succeed

in power.

And I am

not talking

about petty informants. I am

talking about

men whowere ascer

tained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet

elite.

And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have

never been followed up. One is because

of lack

of manpower.

Two, the general problem in Washington and the government

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that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the

Intelligence community. of a counter-intelligence nature.

I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to

somebody

high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman

somebody, to

whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets

and

FB,I

pull the bureau and ourselves

and

everybody together.

Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memor-

andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might

be constituded?

Mr. Angleton. It would not be a pleasant one. I have

submitted = and I don't think it is breaking any confidence --

such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted

a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea

was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and

beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as

Vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these

matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's death,

and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the …

counter-intelligence

forces.

And this added thing of llersh has about dealt the final

blow.

Bakes thate to interrupt. your andit

also hate

ask you this question, but can you make an evaluation of

the effectiveness of the gency in particularly its counter-

intelligence activities atithis timc?

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Mr. Angleton.

Very, very poor.

I have put in there, and I think it is very

conservative,

that it has put us back 20 years. But I think in

the eyes of

every

intelligence service in the western Wor

where we

have had the leadership and we pulled everything together, and

where they have looked to us for guidance and for traces and

for unders anding, that we have lost all of our prestige.

Senator Baker. Two more quie

questions, and I will

yield my turn.

Do you know offor have, any substantial information about

the U.s. such as the infiltration

Russian KGB. activities

of Congressional offices?

Mr. Angleton.

There

15

a whole history of information

that relates to the past and to modus operandi and to targets,

and so on. And that is Inclusive of all the American life.

and in particularly visits to the soviet

Union, and so on.

Thereare Communications intelligence more sensitive which was

broken

during and after the war, KGB communications, New York

to Moscow, and Washington to Moscow, et ceterag

NAnd there were

crypthyms given. And it runs into hundreds of thousands. of

messages, of which a small percentage have been broken.

And they relate to lliss and many things. And most of

those cases will not be subject to prosecution, because they

would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems

there. We have worked on it, and we brought the British,

the

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Canadians, and New Zealanders and Australians, because wethave

this common denominator of the military and other agreements

Where they do share common information.

And there are many unresolved cases.

enator Baker. Do you know of any cases

though, deal.

ang as the gnetzation of a Congressional Of eas

Mr. Magleton.

No. But my statemen

doesn't mean anything.

because I can

assure you that it is thes

last thingi have

been concerned with

in some months.

Büt I have seen these

allegations in the paper, I wouldnet be

surprised. And this is

the second time in my

lite,

or

the

third time, I have ever

been here. To come here

See how this whole set up is is

quite a shock.

Senator Baker. Whatgabout communications intercept,

Congressional conversations, are you aware of any methodical

effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a-vis Congressional tele-

phone conversations?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- 1

15A

ame

assuming.now

that the people

in NSR are correct, they usually

ase.

that the

telephone,

the

formal telephone company traffic appasently,

without

the

knowledge of the caller, is quickly shiftedato

microwa

calls

That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone

Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the

penetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it

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1s a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an

awful

long time before you finally get into a code room

and

place where you can do something securely.

What I am trying to say is that if you getkenough

depth on any target or any installation you

egin to know much

more

about, that installation than anybody who occupies It.

Senator Baker. If I were trying to confirm the rumor

that the KGB had the capability

and

did

in fact record as many

a 8

30 or 40 thousand, simultaneous

Tephone conversations,

mostly related to governmental

ficials, and transmitted them

to the Soviet Union, andy kept

Individual

files on them, would

you confirm that for me?

Mr. Angleton. I wol

itate that that is absolutely in

my view correct. And I

would

saye

that the man who technically

could respond to that

would be Dia Lou Tordello, a retired

Chief of NSA who

now, I think, still a consultant there.

And he is probably

amore sophisticated person to relate the pro-

ducts of NSA/to

the realities of the question you asked.

And

think the other point I would

make

is simply that

what theiry KGB has, which we never will have,

is manpower.

In

other words, we have to narrow the size of ther

target some

day

the

way the British did, and expel that

105,

Our State Department says that what happened in

England has no relevancy here, because we have had a different

setup, because among those expelled men who served in washiniton

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and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on the

Anglo-American Desk, which meant that there was an

American whom they had handled in Washington who

had been

transferred to London where the case officer

follows the agent.

And that statement, official statement,

was put out with-

out any

consultation with the Bureau of ourselves.

So, we

are living

a dream world here in terms of Soviets, and time

fallacious

18 all the

fallation kind of

is short, it

la detente, and it

discussions and

arguments one hears on the subject. We have

come to detente for

nformation through operations and our

understanding of it,

nọ

wishful thinking.

And our views are

Shared by professionals all through

the western World. And

they laugh at the U.S. in terms of what

detente has done.

ut what it has done to the intelligence

services, or to the

FBI, the FBIlls only a shadow of what it

once was.

Andso there isn't any

internal security protec

tion.

125

officer

the bureau's problems - and i had

the

case of a KGB

threatening one of the people we are

dealing with

in

KGB

the Mid-west, he was from the United Nations

a young

fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a

?

And they said, we put him to bed.

They didn't put him to bed, he was where he wasn

supposed to be. And I tried to get the department to go

in

him. And I am still up there.

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on two or three points. And I sald, I am exercising my ry

Laint s

under the CIA, and so on.

But he said, I have got to run, and it was about

five

past five. And I asked him if he understood in effect what

he was doing, the implications.

And he said

that is the responsibilit

I would assume.

And I said, what

about Mr. Meyer,

and

building up to be

our successors?

And we were about the same age

And he introduced

Meyer over the years into moresensitive operations, and

all

the

foreigns with whom we worked

agents and what not. And

the reaction to him universally

was,

She was to be the successor:

And he said, that if something

will have to negotiate.

And I said, what

do you mean negotiate

And

he said, we will talk about it next

week

SO, I

gotgup and shook hands with him and walked out.

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Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone having electronic

surveillance conversational recording in the oval office other

than the Presidential (7) capability?

MI. Angleton

Never.

Senator Baker.

DO

you know of anyone who ever penetrated

the Presidential apparatus?

Mr. Angleton. Never,

Sena

tor

What has come out

about the Joint Chiefs and all that

gtuff in the paper

Senator"

Baker. I am speaking of anyone who might have

penetrated the taping capability in the Oval Office?

Miz

Nois

Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that

Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?

What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of

Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's

pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?

Mr. Angleton. There

is an allegation.

Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between

that

picture and

that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico

was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the soviets.

Mr. Schwarz.

And was Leontov then in Mexico, or -

MI. Ingleton. I don't know, because the double agent

whom we believe was

actually controlled by the soviets.

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Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as

private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any

implication with Oswald.

Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources

the information that the KGB had spent some six months -

Mr. Angleton. We only acquired the hard stuff of six

months and what they did from one man who was very high in the !

KGB .

Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was,

when did you acquire the information?

MI. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.

Mr. Schwarz.

So it was after the Warren Commission had

reached its conclusiong?

MI. Angleton. Did

you have any such

information during

the life of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko --

Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?

MI. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived

at a very brief

time after the

asgassination

as

a KGB defector.

Senator Baker.

And he is the one that you think now as

a planted

agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. They

thought he was

gent on a

mission.

Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?

MI. Angleton. Suppressed

from

the Warren Commission.

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MI. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasong

you suspected Nosenko was a double agent, or a planted agent,

rather, was because he was saying things that were contra-

dictory to some other high quality person ho theretofore had

been giving you information before Nosenko came-to this

country?

MI. Angleton. That

is right.

MI. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information

relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality

person had given

you?

MI. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little

more sense.

In

December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected

to us.

His name

is Golitzen. He has never been in service,

except Jack Anderson came out with

an erroneous

account of it,

alleging that he had stated there was a plot to

assassinate

Nixon.

He did not make such a statement.

MI. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on

the record?

Mr. Angleton.. I don't mind it being on the record after

the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.

Now, his is probably without any question the most major

defection since World War II as far

as Soviet intentions,

Soviet

organization,

and Soviet operations are concerned.

And the reason, among others, that it was

SO

important wag

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he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961,

if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those

many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB

in order to acquire the kind of information which would be most

valuable to the US, and to our allies.

Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried

to always remain

in headquarters and get himself appointed to

investigative commissions and other things

of this sort which

would get Into everybody elses's business. Among other things,

he spent many years

in the training schools for people who

came back

for six weeks

from different parts of the world to

brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this

information.

And

among other things, he stated that he gave the

crytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations

throughout the West.

And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their

people after his defection.

And as is normal in a case of

this kind, the big problem

is to wiite a damage report, which

means

the whole service would come to a standstill. And the

objective would he to

review all paper files ad everything that

showed his initials.

And

you usually would

have

three

categories of information: you would

have

information

which

he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did

not have knowledge of, and

information which you are not

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ceratin about.

Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant

Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and

committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approxi

mately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to,

although he may not have had. And it is interesting to note

that after hig assassination, in a search of the quarters.

the Buread, of whoever did the search, found six of my letters

to NSA relating to information from Golltzen.

Senator Baker. Did

you speak of the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. What did

you

say?

MI. Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop?

Mr. Angleton. After his suicide. I am sorry.

Mr. Miller. You used the term assassination.

MI. Angleton. I meant

suicide.

MI. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is

charged, as you know, that he was assassinated.

MI. Angleton. Maybe I was thinking out loud or something.

In any

event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in

a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic. And there was

question of whether he passed them before or after.

MI. Schwarz. Now, what we were on was, I was asking you,

you testified earlier --

ME. Angleton. I just wanted to say solitzen was so

enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved on

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those cases which were perishable, the French, the British,

and ourselveg, et cetera. And we had never had a second Chief

Director, which means the FBI type of soviet, defector in our

lives, and all 'of this out of the blue, and no contact as in

Geneva six months after the defection of colitzen.

Mr. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the

Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton.

1÷01141

Well, this was a contact, this was not a

defection. He came to

us once for information prior to the

assassination.

And then in Moscow the Soviets - and I am not going

into a lot of names, a

member of the Second Chief Directorate,

gave an American tourist a stack of documents

from the Second

Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating. to how they

got

• and others of our agents, which

ghowed

they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got

it through a

on our

side.

So the leads rant

into the thousands from Golitzón,

and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interro-

gation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in

turn would refresh his memory on other courses.

And out of

that came

the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess, and

all that, the Vassily case

in the British Admiralty, and

some

other cases, and

many cases

in France

and

so on.

MI. Kirbow.

Did Oswald show up at that time?

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Mr. Angleton. No, not from Golitzer.

But when the assassination took place --

Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy

asgassination?

Mr. Angleton. When the Kennedy assassination took place,

Golitzon called me immediately and stated that the modus

operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet

Union required that he go through processing by the 13th

Department of the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is their assassination department?

MI. Angleton. Which is their assassination department.

which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.

And there are two reasons for it.

Number one was, to

find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have

had that would be of use to them.. And number two, whether it

was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army

for future activity.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the nature of assassinations?

Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or

intelligence, or whatever.

AND THIS WAS THE SOP

on the dealing with military

defectors.

Now. when

the soviet Government turned over to

the US

all the documents that led to the interest

regarding Oswald

stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating

processing by Department 13. Then after the

assassination

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Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow.

And in my view he would have never come back on the scene

CHEREPANOV

because they brought this Cheraponov thing in to have the locus

shifted from

where we would have controls, in Geneva, to

Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would

be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct

means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the

importance of Golitzen's defection.

But the tourist gave the documents to the American

Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted

on

giving them back to the Soviets

on grounds that it would be

appropriate.

Mr. Schwarz. These are not the official documents deal-

ing with Oswald but the documents that the man tried to pass

in Switzerland?

Mr. Angleton.

The Second Chief Directorate, he took all

of the documents out of the FBI Soviet gection

and gave them

to the

tourist and we read how we got caught on things.

So there is the

assassination. Cheraponov allegedly

was chased to the Turkish border and shot. And in my view

this is a myth, because in 1918 Cheraponov was

stationed in

Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us. and

at another time

tried to establish

liaison

and contact with the Birtish MI-6,

at a time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning

- that the approach would have been under Philby

in 1948, and

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then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the

Second Chief Directorate.

That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only

from the soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.

And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have

seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and

tells us he wants to defect.

Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was

inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.

So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his

career

so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing

he tells us is that while he was in the Second Chief

Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went

over hig desk. And his first story., as I recall it, was that

it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down

to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.

Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald

was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot,

and

therefore couldn't get

a hunting license, and a lot of

stuff

of this sort.

And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetra-

tions, of the french, the Americans, the British codes, bugging

of the Embassy, all of these different

sorts -- Nosenko had

something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads.

And

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gyre

In the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in

contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination

of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one

where logically you would bring them

in and have two bodies,

one from the First Chief Directorate, that Is, Golltzen, the

CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the

system, and therefore you would have

a very

strong balance

against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were

certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And

as far as I was concerned, if he was bona

fide he would

have

answered one way, and he did

not answer

that way. And they had

to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the

2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of

1959, presided over by Shelepin

and attended by many members

of the Central Committee

on the reorientation of

the Soviet

Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence

operations has a political objective. And this is

a part of

the process of de-Stalinization.. And so when we took him

unwittingly chronologically through his career, he : omits

all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test

things, where their damage report would not show that colitzón

had access, because

it was

part of his way of getting

in and

breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no

evidence that he had

sufficient knowledge.

MI. Schwarz. And

so Nosenko looked funny

to you, he

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looked wrong to you?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?

MI. Angleton. Precisely.

Mr. Schwarz. And

among

the information that he provided

to you was that Oswald was a mental case and wag a bad shot?

Mr. Angdeton. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenko --

ME. Angleton. Golitian -i Exon colltzen -- information

that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13,

which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassina-

tions, to interview miltitary defectors. And we had observed

that when the Russians

transferred documents concerning

Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such

debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of

it is

a man who was handling George Blake from

that there was

London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he

returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin.

But he was there under

alias as a civilian. He was the

Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man.

Then

he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.

MI. Schwarz. And what was

his connection with Oswald?

MI. Angleton. I am saying that he was head

of Department

13, and was head of Department 13 at a time -- I mean, he had

long history in that, in other words, the prominence of

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Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that

the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination

department. The Soviets have always had an assassination

department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the

organization. People from the outside kno. very little about

what goes on in that.

People career-wise stay in there. And

they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who 'in

turn report to the politboro.

And therefore

it is an entirely

sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action,

whether it be sabotage -- an illegal sabotage or what, an

illegal directorate which is independent of the rest of the

KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and

infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of

course assassination, the

assassination of Ukrainian leaders

in West Germany •

Mr. Schwarz.

Do you recount that simply because it makes

more significant the

absence of any reference to Oswald because

you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, or

did you recount it because there is a

more direct connection

with Oswald?

MI. Angleton.

This

ig related to what I told Mr. Dulles,

I thought it was absolutely

wrong

to close

the door on the

life of the Commission, and instead there should be a statement

that we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to

us during the given period, these arè our conclusions. And

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then to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization

- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden

of proof, but you never know when a worm goes

Into somebody's

head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on

the entire story.

MI. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of

Department 13. You have recounted

the significance in your

mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in

the

documentation on

Oswald turned over by the soviets to the us.

And you have recounted the strange nature of

the information.

provided by Nosenko.

MI. Angleton. Correct.

MI. SchwaIt.

Let me

ask you another line of questions

about each one of these items. As

to the Nosenko information.

you stated that that information wag suppressed

from the

Warren Commission?

MI. Angleton.

The word suppression is probably not the

right word because, I will be very honest with you, I was told

the other day that the information was given classified, and

it was given to llelms or somebody, or MI. McCone, who passed

it

as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I

haven't seen it.

MI. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment

ago that it was

suppressed?

MI. Angleton. Because I never knew where

it went. When

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I was sitting in the position as to where that information

would go, I was opposed

to it. And my pfficial position was

that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never

went.

PAUL

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And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of

stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the

Agency's dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that

Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying.

Now, his

role was not one of the executive nature. Actually

it was

simply because he was

a great scholar and a great many other

things, and therefore

he had the most catholic background to

handle something as eomplex

as the Warren Commission, not

in

exercising executive power, but working on behalf of

the

Director and all

the Directorates and everything pertaining

to the Warren Commission. He

is a

tidy individual.

And in

fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the

commission's business,

and he is the one that had

done all the

digging for the commission, and so on, on a whole series of

matters that I am not familiar with.

But my point to you -- and this is very difficult to

explain -- is that the question of Nosenko created a very

great division in the life of all counterintelligence as to

bona fides, as in all questions of when you

are dealing with

double Identification agents, there is always dispute.

But let me

just

line up the order of battle here. Our

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Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man

was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted

the fact that the man was

a provocation.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing

false information?

MI. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.

I said he was false. My man said he was

false. And it

isn't

a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and

analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitzen.

who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in

Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in

advance that

because of the enormity of his defection they would send a

provocateur into the west to destroy and

mutilate his leads.

so it was a question

of

awaiting, you might say, who

knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.

NOW,

since then the Chief of the soviet Division who is

no longer

there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector

General went into all this - he is today the NIO dealing in

Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer

on Soviet

Affairs.

And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named

Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the

two Admirals Bagley,

and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and

is now

in Belgium

in private life. And I can go all the way through

these other people who have been dispersed.. But the record

will clearly reflect that the preponderance

of

all individuals

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was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.

MI. Schwarz. And provided false information?

Now, is it your current understanding that what was

provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration

brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided

with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you

have recounted that he was

providing false information?

MI. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was

ever faced with the issue of the internal Issues of Golltzt

or Nosenko.

MI. Schwarz. You first said that the information was

suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no,

it is your understanding now --

MI. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right

word, I said. One went to

argue the matter and it was agreed

by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --

Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to

the usefulness of the material?

MI. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the

Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which eas to give it

prominence and have it come out as an official part of the

record

and documents

and

articles, and so on.

Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the

information was provided?

Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in

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public.

MI. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the

commission?

MI. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.

Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time

that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it

was

false information?

MI. Angleton. I think, as I understand

it now, that in

spite of our feelings, either leims or McCone made a

presentation of it.

MI. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings,

certain experts thought that it was false?

MI. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.

MI. Schwarz.

What about the information derived

from

Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the

documents

provided by the

Soviet Union were, I think you put

it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not

include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that

information provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all

I

can say there is this, to be realistic.

No one would expect

the

Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents.

secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their

agent.

And I say, I can go all the way back through history,

the way

they

falsified the official record, they had it with

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the Italians in 1923, Constatinople, and cases on diplomatic

Issues, the complete thing was fabiicated, and

30

one

And 1.

there is no way of testing them, the security is such that

they can't be tested.

So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to

state that he went through the 13 Department, which

asked him

the following questions.

Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goeg

there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission

was fooled?

MI. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I

didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he

was running over there

all the time, and so

on.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no

reason why anyone on the warren Commission would have known

that as

a matter of

everyday business that they did in fact

run every defector through Department 13?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you

see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to -- I used to

see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an

advisor officially

to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for

him. And I regarded him. as a very personal friend. And I am

Executor of his papers, among

other things.

But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him

guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the

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FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and so on, so that he would

be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director.

that were no longer germain to his position on the matter.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and

Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the full FBI story. I know

there was a tremendous flap in

the Bureau. And one of the best

men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt

Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt

Turner was one of the

finest

men on Soviet KGB activities in

the US, one of the analyzts.

And he was in the Washington

Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is

basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources - that Burt

Turner was handling the Oswald ore related matters at the time

the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was

some confusion that the Bureau had

not turned over, or had

not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the informa-

tion on Oswald to the local police." I had been told that

there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he

confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit,

or have

it be known to his children, that his negligence was

responsible for the death of the President. And he was

pretty

forceful about his position. And as a result, this was

expunged of something to that effect. And that is the reason

he went to the washington Field Office instead of staying in

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Headquarters.

And then he retired. And I think his retirement had

something to do with this fact.

But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands

of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service

seizing on facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then

going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send

it to Texag.

What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their

system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly

ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And

we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the

controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned

automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there

would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an

operational directive to put him on tap, check

his mail, to

do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him.

There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that.

-.....

There would be total encapsulation of that individual until

it wag ceratin beyond a

shadow of a doubt that he was not sent

back as an agent.

MI. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up,

as

I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the

views of a number of people.

And

you said that one person

had changed his mind

or recanted subsequently. And you made

a reference

in that connection to an Inspector General's

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WARD A PAUL

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report. What was that report?

MI. Angleton. At one stage in all of this - and it was

much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the

Inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of

our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word

inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko

matter and

see if there is anything there that he

should know,

because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole

question of bona fides, and it bothered him, because I had

brought him in touch with Golltzen, and he was fully

aware of

all my activitles, and

travels

and so on.

And so this person who was chosen began to interview

everybody and reopen

the whole thing. I mean, there were 21

safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen

and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as

I pointed

out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has

happened, of

27 years of experience of myself and my two

colleagues, that these are

the facts, that there are 20

cases

MI. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean

Rockefeller?

Mr. Angleton.

Excuse me,

Rockefeller.

There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence

officer in our buslenss should know before he even begins to

get his feet wet.

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Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing

all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergistid

and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which

we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought

I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians

in to take all the

safes

and figure out the Ilnear footage of

every safe drawer, all the way

on through, and to computerize

how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to

this elemental stage of being able to be launched.

That was sort of a preparatory business. And they

figured it out and they

said

it would take 22 man years, we

meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11

man years.

And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and

colby, who had

never been

in counterintelligence, of what all

this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring

people back and forth and ald the restiff it. And Inver chose

anybody in that job as a rule who had either been in the FBI

or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence.

And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business

-- I had men who stayed with me for 11 years, Rocca was with

me for 31 years, even

though they went into operational

situa-

tions abroad and returned, and

on .

And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and

Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany

where we used to have two of

300 new people --

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Mr. Schwarz. Was this MI. Ermine?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon

Stewart - and he is retired - a very able man, and a fine

executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the

really top-notch men.

But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce

In terms -- so he would talk to people and get their views

and so on.

When

I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division,

who was then stationed in Paris -- and this is only hearsay,

I never read the report - the

former Chief of the soviet

Division stated, when

I look back it, perhaps I have given

too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yea

or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past

that this man was an agent provocateur.

MI. Schwaiz.

Did the review concern in any way the

handling of the matter with the warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton.

No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this

may be

something.

I don't think I have evern

seen

the review

-- in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever pue in

the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the

idea that jr was quat the cia

staff that had this view. This

was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had

dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of

all is coldtien himself, who was In the KGB, and who knew

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Phone ¡Ares 202)

410

Fust Street.

S. E., Massinaron, D.C. 20003

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everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 years of his life.

MI. Schwarz. Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr.

Harvey in touch with the Israell's during the Cuban business.

And we have had

a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, so we

are moderately well aware of his activities.

MI. Angleton. I am sorry.

Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy ig and we have had a

fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done.

What was the connection between him and

the Israell's during

the Cuban business?

MI. Angleton. I will put it very briefly --

Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?

Mr. Schwarz. The witness used the expression Cuban

business.

I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the

What

Cuban business, and second, was is the connection between Mr.

Harvey and the Israelifs on this matter?

MI. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the

importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to

Cuba?

MI. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking

over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the

Clandestine Services activity into Cuba..

Now, what struck me,

not having had any part of

the Bay of Pigs, because

of

differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both

the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being

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MARO A PAUL

410 forst Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20001

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planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and

It was foredoomed.

Mr. Schwarz.

Through the exile community in Miami?

Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything,

and so on, there was no cover or second investigation or

anything.

So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I

decided that since we were very close friends that I would

try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown

to everybody. And I went to the Israell's. And I had them

assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well.

He was born in Bulgaris. He can speak Russian and the Balkan

countries' languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet

intelligence. He was a young officer in the days I am speak-

ing of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he

was - and the communications were from him in a one time

pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to

me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence

or his identify, except Marvey and myself, and of course,

Dick Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. McCone?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone

would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested.

What I am trying to say is, he knew.

MI. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was DDP --

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Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into

this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and

so on.

And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio

going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a

radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point 1s,

I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and

to Havana and then put it

someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and such a place

, and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call

some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust

the whole setup.

So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly.

This individual established his cover. They only had two or

three people in the Embassy there.

He would go to a

Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go.

And he would spot one of the waiters of a headwater who was

Jewish

and it wouldn't be long before he would

say, you are

from the Israeli Embagsy, and pretty soon one thing led to

another, and his production was without question the greatest

production there was.

Well, it got

so complex in names and geography, and

SO

on,

that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey

together secretly with this individual, the only person I put

in touch was an Israeli in this context. So later on the

Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on

the

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with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what

the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Mlami base with

all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the

rest, a little thing involving one man was not a thing that

you went up and made a fuss to MI. McCone about.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was

he someone you knew?

MI. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called

him the other day, his mother died.

MI. Schwarz.

I heard that.

Did you know anything about his use of underworld

figures in connection with --

MI. Angleton. I know the allegations.

Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that?

MI. Angleton. I only know one incident.

Mr. Schwarz.

Okay.

MI. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a

surveillance.

And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer

of the FBI, Who is

now lead of the Criminal Commission in

/ Mexico, was at my house around

10 o'clock at night. And the

Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich

at my house. They were

absolutely boiling, because they had

surveiled the Mafia all the way

from California to National

Airport, and he had got off the plane and

was met by a man who

was the physical description of Bill to a teel. And they

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thought it was Bill. And they were checking with Papich.

what to do.

Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was.

Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill

Harvey?

MI. Angleton. Bill Harvey:

So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And

I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone

and

not to let them

discuss 1t. And I gaid, tell them not to

do anything until they hear from you.

And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on

this ind I will be back in

touch.

And then Bill told me the whole

story in detail of how

he had gone over from California and followed him in this

thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.

Mr. Schwarz. That was

in 1973 shortly before MI. Harvey

went to Rome?

Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, It was, I think

quite

a long

time before.

so then I told sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on

this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection

with the Mafia and all that, but I did know him well enough

to know that he was not a frivolous man,

and

that this thing

, happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public

opinion, were not very

much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left

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the FBI.

So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill

around?

And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.

And I said, look, we have

some very serious trouble.

would you please tell me where

I can locate him:

And she said, he is at Duke Zelbert's. And I called

Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him.

And I turned the

phone over

to Papich, because

I did not want

to be on the

record showing that this was

Angleton, et

cetera.

And Papich talked to Bill, and

actually I didn't hear

the discussion. It was something about, I will see you

tomorrow.

And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people

to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.

And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what

Anderson and everybody

else has

stated.

ME. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge

did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had

in

Mavana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down

there, or try to get

any help out of him in that regard?

MI. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.

MI. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire

contact with the Israeli's?

MI. Angleton. Yes sir.

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CE. Wastenuint

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Senator Tower. He will take a recess for about tho

minutes while we go up and vote.

(A short recess was taken)

Senator tover.

Mr. Schwarz.

Schwarz. I don't have anything more.

Senator Tower. You have read this, and Szule

says

1n

this galley

- this is a galley of the Saule arti

clé

i n

Penthouse:

"Although:

he details of the Israel

nuclear enterprise

are still top

secret,

it is known

that

Inithe wake of the

1956 Suez war, the Eisenhower Adminiscration resolved to

provide Israel with allapossible help in developing an atomic

weapon. The Israells had the

heoretical knowledge, but they

needed technological supportat

their Dimona nuclear research

center in the Negev Dese

"According to thestop intelligence sources, the CIA was

charged with the responsibility

of providing this support to

the Istaelis."

Do you have.

knowledge that the

C TA

was charged with such

responsibilitles?

Mr.

Angleton. Absolutely to the contrar

se

nator Tower.

"_-Angleton directed the effort?"

Angleton. False.

Senator Tower. That it totally false?

MI: Angleton. That is totally false.

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91

"Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to

srael

to work with Dimona scientists."

MI. Angleton. False. I will interject her

that the

French

gent 400

as a matter of the original

with the

Israeli

to Dimona.

Senator

Tower. The reference here

s to nuclear weaponry

And

this means, sent by the CIA, as

interpret it.

ME. Angleton

It is false.

Senator Tower

"The

most

important of them, according

to intelligence source

wa

British-born physicist, now an

American citizen working

or the US Government In Washington,

with special

and

esoter

thes to the CIA."

MI. Angleton.

No.

The allegation is false.

Senator Tower

The answer

¿your previous question would

cover that one, too, I assume.

"Persons

close to Angleton have confirmed this account in

recent interviews. Reflecting Angleton snown position, however.

they havendenied

asgertions from other sources that the CIA

team

made

fissinoable material - plutonimum

available to

the

IStaelies

from United States

stocks."

#/MI. Schwarz. As far as your are concerned

that!

metatement right of wrong?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying, when he says deny

it

deny

it.

Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that

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Full Steeri, Sia, Warningion, D.C

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second paragraph, is where all the questions are

raised.

Really, the CIA would be hard put to transferany

fissionable materials without the knowledge of

he Atomic

Energy Commission, would it not?

don'

MI. Angleton. Sir, I can assure your

that the CIA - I

really know what the word fissionable means anymore.

There

is

sou much use of the atomic energy. We have atomic

battery --

Senator, Tower.

By fissionable materials, I think the

reference here is that could be converted to weapons.

Mr. Angleton. I

ise don't categorically -- in my whole

history in the CIA, no

ching

ever involved fissionable material

except intelligence.

about it

or.

speculations regarding leakages

and so forth.

senator fower. In other wordsi

the CIA doesn't have

control overbany stocks of fissionable!

materials independently

MI

ingleton. No.

senator

Tower..

And therefore the CIA could not acquire

SUC

materials except through the knowledge de the Atomic

nérgy Commission?

MI. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nit pick, bus

I want to simply state that there was a problem in

ther

-Agency

once where you have, say, somebody simply approach you

and

state, I have access

to fissionable materials, and therefor

if it is a covert thing, and it raises

a big policy question,

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Sireet, SE Wishinaton, D.C. 20001

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:93

how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where someone

allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to

you

the stuff? The purpose then was to penetrate,

try to

penetrate. And I wonder if there wasn't a questionat one

stage

to what we do about it, and what the

angers would

be if we

use

the diplomatic pouch, and there

are

thousands of

questions.

nd

it did happen in the Far

st.

And it was a

false case, confidential case. But it

Ird happen. There was

an offer to sell

diss atomic fissionable material or something.

But my point is, there

has

never

been initiative to my

knowledge, or an interes

of

CIA

in any shape or forn

wanting any fissionable

mat

Senator Tower. Da

MI. Aaron. Two small

point

Mr. Szulc said that "In

effect Mr. Angleton

said

at one point that should I surface

Mr. Mann's name,

Dis

Mann's name, he may go as far as to

commit suicide

Did you

ever say that to Mr. Szulc?

MI.

gleton. I don't think I said itac

o him.

But in

the

back

of my mind -- after I left you -- wastwhat I think

I

told

you -- and maybe I didn't tell you, mayb

told Colby,

that

Is what bothers me -- the Royal Canadian Moun

ed

Police

11 have an open

espionage case in which a report

oif

theirs

Ileges that either Dr. Mann being present or something.

ithat

someone tried to cut his throat

in Philby's house in

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94

Washington, when Philby was stationed there. Now, whethe

we had the report of not I don't know. So I am a littl

confused

as to that statement. Because I don't think

the

question of using Mann's name came up other than

the

contextrof the allegation that Mann was sent by

ne, and would

this meant

if it came out in terms of the Head

who had called, for phrases, British, French,

of services,

et cetera, and

they would have

this confirmation, one

do they know anything

about my Igraeli

activities now, and

then the most damaging

would be the entire

Information

Mann and Philby, et cetera.

MI. Aaron. Let me bust

one other segment of his

testimony: "Angleton sal

ter recounting the story of the

transfer of atomic techno

Mr. Szulc went on and said,

Angleton said that he.

as ratheretaken back by this information.

said that in effect

one, the timeframe

could confirm

it with corrections:

was wrong, that it

as not the early '60's,

but indeed the

that as

CIA, ОГ

late '50's after the Suez war, and number two,

taras he was concerned there was

hot delivered by the

yone to his knowledge any fissionable

material such

&9.

plut

nium

or other material."

st. Angleton. I don't follow that at all.

MI. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections??

Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are

ing.

MI. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?

MI. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying

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Senator Tower. He is reading - actually what he

a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to br

out

that you did not agree with his story, that you

confirm the validity of 1t.

not

Ms. Angleton.

That part is correct.

1

am not follow

ing

th

Alast part you are reading.

MI.

Aaron. Let me show it to your

and you read it.

Mr. Schwa

rz. Would you identi

the page and the line?

Mr. Aaron.

The page 1s page A0, beginning at line 19 and

running to the end

of the page

Mr. Angleton.

at sa;

In effect he could confirm it.

that ig the "it" business

Mr. Aaron. Start

ba

further and get the general

story.

Mr. Angleton

This is false

on page 40, from line 8,

"Mr. Angleton

told me that essential

Is this information was

correct,"

is absolutely false.

And

hever made any such statementothat I could confirm

it

--

lunes 19 and 20, "Angleton said he

was really

taken back

and

effect he could confirm the two correctlions."

That is

fa

MI. Aaron. I think that covers

it.

Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or

more

distinguished

pure scientists or physicists whose servi

were available to the US Government", that is totally

falt

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STOP SECRET

96

MI. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.

MI. Angleton. When I say technical assistance,

at

1g a

quite different matter.

Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assigtance in the

nuclear

fleld whatever?

Mra Angleton. He knew what I was stat

ing was this stuff

that

hag

come

out in volumes of sadat's

resume of CIA's help

to che israe

is, which was accurate

Senator Tower. By technical

ssistance here, as I

understand it, he means

technical

assistance and nuclear

weapons development.

Mr. Angleton. That

right. And that is deliberately

on his part a misstatemen

the fact. And that is what I

am trying to say.

Senator Tower

He did

admit

to technical

assistance

in

terms of intelligence?

MI. Angleton.

No, it wasn't a question of my admitting.

I told him

that

it was well-known that inathe whole field

of

ELINT and

many things, that we have worked

closely with the

Israel

énator Tower. But not specifically, technie

a

stance and nuclear weapon development?

MI. Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.

MI. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, i19

it possible that one

rce

of this story could be alleged

operations by the Israelis

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intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts

acquire nuclear technology or material?

MI. Angleton. No.

Let me just state my own feeling about some

this.

After

talked to me about having all those great sources

which were better than Hirsch's, he said,

Ica'lso

have talked

to Israell intelligence. Well, I knew

ht away

that that

was a lle.. I said, after 22 years.

work

with some people,

they would have been

naving me out of

bed

at 3 in the morning.

In other words, in 22 years

I have never known them to withhold

anything germain to our

"comno n

activity. So that for American

jounalists to go and try

to

pump things out of me regarding

the subject, he wouldn'tahaven

got home before -- that is the

first thing. That is the fact. And he said this Israeli

fellow said something

about,

someening I don't discuss, or

words to that effect, I can't remember

that part of it.

So there,

isn't much more to say about that.

the

US

MI. Aazon. Were there Israeli intelligence efforts in

1,0

the 1960's or at any time aimed

alt

acquiring either

nuclear

technology or information that would have a bearing

on

story?

MI. Angleton. There have been many efforts

many

countries to acquire technical knowledge in this country,

and

that doesn't exclude the Israelis.

MI. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of

instances

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you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton?

bellever chat might be a fair question.

Senator tower. In your capacity as Head

of Counter-

intelligence,

did

it ever come to your

ention -- did you

ever have any certain knowledge that

Israell agents were

actually trying to acquire

ear

secrets in the US, atomic

secrets?

Mr. Angleton

I have to resp

to

that?

MI. Kirboi

Would you like to go off

record a

moment

Chairman.

•Senator Tower. We can go off the record.

(Oss the, record discussio

Senator Mathias. MI. Chairman, I would suggest

that

perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we

will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.

Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the fBI matter in

the meantime.

I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate

it if Mr. Angleton would

give us his evaluations as an expert

on .

And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy

assassination.

As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassi-

nation Golitién on his own initiative communicated with you

and advised you that it was normal practice

for a defector who

had a military background to be processed

in Department 13?

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MI. Angleton. Interrogated, or processed:

Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of

this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through

this process, and that therefore at least that he might have

been acting within the context of the soviet plan, is that

right?

Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying

to say. His English is such that it is very difficult.

Senator Mathias. I understand. But then

gome years

later -- my recollection is that you sald it was in 1967 or

1969 - you learned that the KGB had spent six month of

employment of their top operators in the investigation

of the

Kennedy

assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind

negate the implication of the original Golitzen call or that

they were involved?

MI. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that

man

is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko.

Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?

MI. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are

treading on, Golitzen gave us

informatian regarding the

penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an

identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking

about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work.

And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and

the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we

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advise that you send it to the Army.

And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was

the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent

FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X"

was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept

that.

And in 1967 a Soviet - on whom we had a dossier on this

thing, because

he was once stationed in India, and therefore

we knew who he was, and all the rest of it -- with an unknown

coming to us as Nosenko was, he was

a real man, we had years

of surveillance on him, and

so on. And he came, and he

Til

alleged -- and he was a. TDC, temporary duty in Washington

here -- and he established contact with the first Mrs. Helms.

eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated

that among his missiong to the US was to effect

the redefection

... .. --

or the return to the soviet Union of a man, and that man was

the man whom we had identified as a Sovlet agent. And he went

into the whole background, that this man was one of the

highest grade illegals that they had ever had, and he was in

our Agency.

So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because

he was one

of the two interrogating officers. And I can't

talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his

competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.

So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know

about George Blake?

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Sio Blah

And then his response was, he says, we think he is dead.

Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special

Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose

mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore

from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was

the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of

Nosenko's father.

And Golitzen had told us that men chosen

for very dangerous

missions of penetration and duplicity came

from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fathers

and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.

So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is

dead.

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Two to three weeks later 1s when

• Blake escaped from

Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to

the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of

Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in

the west as an illegal from the end of world war II, and

gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the

exfiltartion plans

of George Blake, which would have been

-?

simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TDC.

So we handled him for six or seven weeks.

And

some of the most telling parts of the interrogation

was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have

access to archives.

And what was on our mind, and what

cryptonym that

we wanted him to work up -- and this would

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TOR SECRET

102

relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitzen

what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew? what

agents in the West could be under our control as a result of

Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?

And you can see the tremendous quallty this man had of

almost getting from our man those four or five crytonyms,

which would have told them what they wanted to know, because

there are cases they are not sure whether he knows of doesn't

know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.

So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was

sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken

feed - but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he

said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity,

because of my mother and so on, to become lead of the American

Department of the KGB.

And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the

Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he stated

there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to

acquire all the information possible on the whereabouts of

b011tzen and Nosenko.

And I was actually in wisconsin. And

I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there

is any

proposal put up by that individual that would expose -- and

use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- don't.

A week later is when he got to Moscow and he

sent a cable

to tell us that he can give them word on everything on

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Golitzen.

Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and

with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a

part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the

build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of

the fact that for six months the place was immobilized

for this

Investigation, of all

the high level all over the works, is

the way he put it.

Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russians

treat a returned defector, and the way we treat

them. And

in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every

interrogated when he teturned from Russia?

MI. Angleton. I don't know - I probably would know, but

I don't know whether the military -- normally that would

fall

within the jurisdiciton of

the military, since he was a

military man who defected. So I don't know' the answer to that,

Senator Mathias.

What about from Cuba?

MI. Angleton. I can't answer that.

Senator Mathias. Or at any time?

MI. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.

Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?

MI. Angleton. I am

certain we never did, no.

Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did?

MI. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did.

Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.

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This is the very last question. You referred to files

that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the

Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to .

pursue that in a personal way.

About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he

came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of

Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of

record?

WARD A FAUL

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the

Soviet Embassy, then my answer would be yes.

nator Mathias. My recollection is, he came

one

person

chim, whose name i don't remember.

Mr. Angl

If the Bureau had him under surveillance,

and he came here

now, I am getting

ground I don't

know - the newspape

said

MI. Hoov

gave an order that the

Hill was off-base, and

the

let came here he was never

surveilled, and whom he

saw

unknown. That is what the

newspaper sald. My own observation would be in any technical

coverage of an installation, the doorbof an individual, would

result in dossiersion all people who hadycontacts, if the

man

was suspect, or there is a reason.

Senator Tower. Excuse me. You are talking

about a

Soviet

person visiting members here on the Hill?

Senator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to

• getsat

isythe circumstances under which a file or dossier might

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105

opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself at.

guinea pig that Arbatov lunch as a starting point.

At this point my question is on purely hypothetical

pola

I plan to go next week with the Senate group which is

making

parliamentary visit to Russia. And

In MoscoW

I would assume it would be likely

BEE Arbatov

Would that

become a

continuing entry in such a dossieg

as far as you know?

Mr. Angleton.

We don't have any

coverage in Moscow.

Senator Math

Is that the kind

of thing that --

Mr. Angleton.

are not living

In a very ideal world

in the Agency. We can'tta

even process the hard material.

Senator Mathias.

sin

is a hypothetical question,

let me make it even more

thetical. Let's say our mission,

instead of visiting Mosco

ts Rome or Paris or someplace,

where

it is very easy

for you

tooperate. And there were

meetings with Russians who were known to have visitied me in

Washington. Woul

that be the kind of

thing which would get

to a Congressional file?

MI. Angleton. No. I imagine the

Bitish MI-5, though,

because

the

Russians in London, would

pass

through liaison

to

us

there was something suspicious,

WO

pass

through

report

on the meeting.

And we have

examples

wh

ere

Czech

defector told us about a member of Parliament,

soviet agent,

what the cryptonum was, and how he was recruited.

And you

have got other cryptonyms on British members of Parliamen

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that you have not then identified. We know what they passed

or some of the stuff which was passed.

Senator Mathiag. : Assuming a file was.

get ur

on that

lunchestwo years ago

Mr

ngleton. The file wouldn't be

setup there on the

fact - with

your name on it, it would

bef the Soviets, and

you would be bugled in the file, which would probably be that

thick, of that Soviet activity in

the

US. And there would be

the fact that he was

ere, and

at he went to New York, and

he did this or that.

Senator Mathias. So

wouldn't show up in Mathlas"

file, that would show up

Arbatov file?

Mr. Angleton.

That

is right

That is the way it is

supposed to be. And

the only time

where I can see a file

would be opened on

an American Congressman or Senator would

be where there

was

a substantial basis forgopening up that

file. But

that

wouldn't be at the initiativesof the cIA, it

would

be a matter that would go to the FBI and

Che Attorney

General

and

then there would be somebody in the

Senate

Or

the

Co

And

gress who would be contacted and notified,

and

SO

think Me. Hoover's practice was that he would

learn

on .

through his own sources that a person who is not good

was

bing to have lunch with a Congressman or was cultivating

him,

and he would pick up the money -- or this is what they say

And I think this is the way he handled it -- he would simply

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:107

call him on the phone and say, I think you should know

following, and there would be a notification that Me

Hoover

notified, et cetera. He called me once when ther

wasn't

nough time factor for him to send a letter

me.

He said,

you

ace doing something at such and such an hour, you should

know that.

this man is a homosexual, or

BO.

on

and so on. And

It may haverbeen useful to change the

gourse in a hurry. But

it is formalized in the Bureau.

When Mr. Hoover intervened

on those thingst

question of emphas

it was either a

question of time or a

But the

formal part goes on regardless,

if a person, regardless

of

who he is, is involved, or is

passed a document, or

comes. up in a telephone tap, or any

number of things, thei

record on it.

Senator Mathias.

In ott

er words, you are saying what a

political friend

mine once

that you don't get news

unless you make news?

Mr. Angleton.

That is one way

Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr.

looking at it.

Chairman.

Angleton. I want to commend

you

again on that

question,

because that fixes several things.

Because if there

iscone thing I regret about leaving the Agency,

is

the

Unresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest,

because

we

know so much about that person when he was in India.

And

he

was the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intelligence

person.

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Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton,

to

to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintelli-

gence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating,

what things in particular would you do?

Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that the Agency has to go

through

the purgatory that - these fires,

that no man would

put out

and therefore let it be shocking or whatever.

And

let all the political repercussions

take place, and if you go

to purgatory, my

vilew is, the bigger

So my view is, let ithall come

out.

the fires, the better.

And let people take the

consequences. I am notra

two fathers. And I don't

bellever that an agency can have

elleve in inferiors reporting on

their superiors by directiv

Agency below the Director has

And I don't believe that the

be responsive to two

authorities.

Senator Bake

What two authorities?

Mr. Angleton.

I mean the Congread and the Executive.

In other wogds, if Colby is asked, what do, you know about

Chile,

View is that on Chile would yoy

please ask the White

House

gAnd that is what I am trying to get

a'tr

at least

SO

then

they can come back with Colby after the Executive part has

colby what it might be. But to throw the burden

on the

rector to respond to a question on Chile, gives him

he

is

always in that dual position. And something doesn't

Seem

to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, even.

to

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Phone (APes 202) 564-400

my level, to be resonsive to more than one autholty is chaos.

And I am not making any puns.

Senator Baker. To be responsible to the Congress

and

to

2

5

4

the

N

R

LE:

WARD A PAUL

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Mir Angleton. The word response la what

disturbs me

somewhat,

because the secrets that we have

dust been discussing

here are so

germain to everything in this

country relating to

the world balances

of power and what

the

Soviets will strike

at, and what the role of detente is

That is what I am trying

to get at. The Executive

--in

other words, the intelligence

community has never real

ha

a day of peace in a way. When

Hoover passed away, and

Gr.

oame aboard, everyone in the

intelligence community

elieved, now we can normalize this

situation. It has

er been nogmal before. Mr. Hoover never

attended an Agencys

reeting. MI. Ho

over never permitted

one

of his representátives to go beyond

this jurisdiciton question.

And

you cannot run

a government that wayne

and

you cannot run

counterint

figence that way. So when Mr. Gray came to see

Mr. Hel

and Helms called me in before him

and said, what

position should I take, and I said, he wants

to come and

nogmalize relations, and he wants to reestablish

liaison.

And

said, I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the

lones

who

Sook it off. Therefore tell him that when he has read your

correspor.dence with Mr. Hoover, and revlewed all of that eit

he feels that he is capable of handling it, that you will

be

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prepared to sit down and discuss the question of liaison,

because liaison is a tiny part of the question of penetration

and double agents and all the rest of it.

And in fact that happened, and everybody thought, we had

got

captain that didn't make admiral aboard

who

will settle

this.

then we will have his demise.

And then, you had MI. Ruckelshaus come

as as acting

Director. And

then the Watergate and all

of that. So there

has

never been a

Stabilizing factor in this Government

as it

relates to, not counterintelligence alone,

but the intelli

gence community. And

OW.

I amstrongly opposed to professionals

being Directors.

I would say that a pro

essional Director of the Agency

doesn't work, he doesn't

Have

basis on the outside, or the

perspective. And I th

the Rockefeller Commission's

observations were

fi

rate in terms of the idea of two

Deputy Directors

who

have to be confirmed and whatnot. And

I think that no directorate should be expected to follow the

nuts and boltsiänd at the same time handle

ali

the duties of

meeting

and

ill the rest of it and try to keepsan eye inside

the busi

SS.

enator

Baker. What do you think of the Rockefeller

Сотл

ssion reports?

Mr. Angleton. I don't

see anything wrong with it

Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?

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MI. Angleton. I really don't know this area.

SO I

not competent to speak or go around seeing what will

happen

in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile

and

the

leakages and the damage that is done to US posture

abroad, how

much

rof it does this take?

senator Baker. It wouldn't take many

mentative thing.

That is an argu-

MI. Angleton. All the cases we

are discussing, in the

hands of the

wrong people, and ours/files in the hands of the

wrong people, would have very

decisive political impact upon

our elections. That is wha

mean, to be very frank about it

Senator Baker.

How would that happen?

Mx. Angleton.

ere are all kinds of information which,

if it falls into

the wrong

hands or should they want to use

it for their ow

ulterior

otives, would be absolutely

damaging.

senator

Tower. In other words, this information could

be

used

politicians as a political

football?

Angleton. Precisely. But

man who would do it

dama

es

Senator Mathias. Would you give an

example?

(Off the record discussion)

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee was

adjourned,

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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