SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) ACTIVITIES
Agency: MATHENY
Originator: WH
From: HYLAND, BILL
To: MATHENY, JOHN
Document date: 5/11/76
Document type: MEMORANDUM

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Dale:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

RECORD SERIES :

MATHENY

178-10004-10233

SSC SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: COMMITTEE REPORTS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

WH

FROM: MATHENY, JOHN

TO:

HYLAND, BILL

TITLE:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) ACTIVITIES

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

05/11/1976

5

ASSASSINATION, JOHN KENNEDY

AMLASH

CHURCH COMMITTEE

WARREN COMMISSION

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; IC

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/11/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Contains handwritten annotations.

Released under the John F. Kennedy

issassination Records Collection

uct of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note) •

'ased:NW 53244 Date: 06-12-2017

v9.l

HW 53244

DocId: 32105785

Page 1

22

---

## Page 2

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ENTIAL

May 11, 1976

INFORMATION

178-10003-10233

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BILL HYLAND

FROM:

JOHN MATTEN A L

uck

SUBJECT:

Senate Select Committee

(SSC) Activities

and upot

do thom.

Given that the Senate Select Committee intends to go out of

business as of 31 May, there is still a full plate before them to

accomplish:

- The last of the domestic abuse papers will be released

on Wednesday, followed by a consolidation of these

(Martin Luther King, Black Panthers, etc.) into a

third volume of findings to be released next week. At

that time there will be three reports still outstanding

to be issued, an addendum to the Assassination Report,

a History of CIA, and the SSC Investigation into the

Warren Commission Findings. All three are in various

stages of drafting and CIA has viewed preliminary ver-

sions of each.

-- There will be a section of the SSC's final report that

will remain classified, and made available only to

Senators upon request. Included in this section is

the SSC report on Espionage (59 pp); CIA Relations

with U.S. Academic and Voluntary Organizations, the

U.S. Media, U.S. Religious personnel, and U.S. Labor

(82 pp); Cover (15 pp); Oversight of the CIA budget (16 pp);

and classified portions of the previously released report

on to stonent portion one the nee

the cover portion of the report

Findings and Recommendations on intelligence liaison

with foreign governments (1 pp).

THOTO COPY

FROM

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

HH 53244

DocId: 32105785 Page 2

---

## Page 3

CON

NTIAL

-2-

--

The Espionage Report details practices of agent

recruitment and the gathering of information from

voluntary sources, both domestically and overseas.

The SSC alleges that agent recruitment overseas

has serious foreign policy ramifications should such

recruitment become known, therefore, an NSC

sub-committee should review these activities on a

regular basis. In addition, the Committee takes

the same line as that found in the published report

on the State Department, i.e., the Ambassador

should be in control of such activities overseas.

The SSC also objects to CIA's Domestic Collection

Division (DCD) referring candidates for possible

operational recruitment to the Foreign Resources

Divisions (FRD) when previous association with the

Agency has been open and voluntary, and with no

inherent potential for co-option of these candidates

(American citizens) by their involvement in a

clandestine relationship. In this regard the Com-

mittee also feels that attempts at recruitment by

CIA of resident aliens who have applied for citizen-

ship is also not kosher because of the implied threat

of unfavorable consideration by the U.S. Immigra-

tion Service should the applicant refuse to cooperate.

-- The two parts of the Covert Action paper which

remain classified techniques involved in conducting

such activities and the working relationships that

have developed over time between the Executive

Office, the CIA, and Congress in carrying out these

operations within the context of over all U.S. foreign

policy. The Committee comes down on the use of

para-military techniques without Congressional

approval as contrary to the intent of the WAR Powers

Resolution and also asserts that notification practices

under the Hughes-Ryan amendment are insufficient to

involve Congress in the decision-making process.

--

The Cover Paper discusses past and present cover

techniques from a purist standpoint (as if to exculpate

the Committee from the Welch assassination in every

PHOTO COPY

FROAD

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

NH 53244 DocId:32105785 Page 3

---

## Page 4

CONFI

NTIAL

-3-

--

way). There are, however, extensive quotes

from Isenstadt on the relative merits of cover

vis-a-vis operational flexibility. The conclusion

is that the subject should be address by both

branches as a matter of priority because the old

methods are no longer adequate (there is no mention,

of course, of whether these investigations have con-

tributed to this inadequacy).

--

The paper on CIA relations with U.S. media, labor

academic and religious institutions is also naive in

its approach. Although the Committee endorses

voluntary cooperation in all counts except religious

the game is not worth the bad PR if found out, t

ay nothing of the ethical straitjacket imposed o

the clergy), they use the argument once again of

potential co-option in recommending more stringent

Executive Branch restrictions on: now these reia-

tionships are promulgated.

--

The Budget oversight Report details CIA budgetary

practices and contains a liberal amount of figures

depicting expenditures, resource allocation, etc.

The agreement is made that only by consolidating

the intelligence community budget can efficient allo-

cation of resources take place (or oversight be

effective).

The CIA history paper (an expanded version by Ann Karalekas

of what is contained in Book I already) runs about 200 pages.

I read it last week, and aside from two aspects judged it tr

be one of the more balanced papers by the Committee anc

relatively free of sensationalism or extremely one-sided

exposition. The Agency disagrees somewhat with this

assessment based on 1.) the SSC's reversal of a promise

to keep the longer version classified, and 2.) their view

of the paper's objectivity (or lack thereof). While I support

the Agency's contention that a previous understanding (which

among other things allowed them access to the McCone files)

has been breached, I am in no position personally to confirm

or deny the objectivity argument. I have told the Agency

that we will support their contention of a breach of faith

PHOTO COPY

FROM

GERAID R. FORD LIERARY

HH 53244

DocId: 32105785

Page 4

---

## Page 5

CONPIDENTIAI

-4-

but that we defer to them on both sources and methods

(they don't have a problem here) and the paper's balance.

The two aspects I pointed out to Karalekas involved: 1.)

quoting closed session testimony of George Kennan re

State's Policy Planning Staff interface with the NSC on

European covert action in the late 40's (I called State

and advised Jennings and Hitchcock), and 2) the descrip-

tion of HAK as Nixon's chief intelligence advisor (vice

the DCI) by virtue of his use of the NSC Staff as an inter-

agency clearinghouse for intelligence aspects of policy

(SALT, etc.) and his morning "briefings" of the President.

I attempted to clarify the latter conception of a "briefer"'

(and replacement for the DCI) and commented on the

former as being a relative judgment in the sense that no

intelligence reporting for the DCI was ever withheld

from the President (he got the PDB, etc.), and agency

views were always included in policy options papers

generated by the NSC Staff through Kissinger. She

agreed to check with State on Kennan (as well as Kennan

himself) and to try to re-phrase the Kissinger portion.

I, will, of course, ask for another look at this one.

I have not reviewed the Committee's work on the Warren

Commission Report (CIA tells me its virtually the AMLASH

theory, as depicted in the Sunday 2 May Washington Post

article -- Castro probably did it when he found out we were

trying to do him in), or the Assassination Report addendum.

As to the latter, I'm told by both CIA and Rick Inderfurth

of the SSC Staff that the pitch is that the CIA Set about to attempt to

topple Allende through a coup in contradiction to instructions

by President Nixon, Kissinger and Haig that the Agency

drop this line of pursuit. I intend to review what they have

in these two areas during this week and will keep you posted

on what I learn.

As a final note, the Senate debate is now in progress re:

S. Res. 400 (attached), and the word is that a compromise

has been reached (with Senator Baker's active participation)

whereby a new oversight committee will be given exclusive

authorization and oversight jurisdiction over CIA (in direct

contravention of present law, whereby CIA his given a

punterpor

':.

1N 53244

DocId: 32105785

Page 5

---

## Page 6

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5-

standing authorization approval), and shared authorization

and jurs diction over the intelligence activities of State,

Defense, Justice, Treasury and the IRS. I am plugged

in to Bill Kendall and to George Cary (CIA) and have

stressed to Bill that, if passage of the compromise

urrent adjustment in the Hughes-Ryan Amendmen

o remove Armed Services and Foreign Relations fror

the "fully and currently informed" notification process.

I personally think we haven't done enough on this. Duval

wish, however, for me to take a more active role on

S. Res. 400, just say so, and I will work with Bill

Kendall to feed the friendlies as best I can.

Dentit STO

carr.

panto ran

HW 53244

DocId: 32105785

Page

---