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198-10004-10076

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT SOME SYNERY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19924

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10004-10076

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ARMY

FROM:

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

TO :

TITLE:

DATE:

00/00/1963

PAGES:

123

SUBJECTS :

EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

JFK Assossination Records

epartment of the Army EO 1352

Declassify E Exclude L Exemp

v9.1

NW 50955

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NO

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

SUBJECT

DATE

CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924

(SECRET -NOFORN)

17 Jan 63

Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C)

w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3 (S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(5)

22 Jan 63

Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy

Towards Cuba (TOP SECRET) (in dupe)

23 Jan 63

Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63

Memo for NSC Exec (Comm, subj as above, from

DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET -SENSITIVE)

23 Jan 63

DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards

Cuba; Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1

Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm,

Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba (TOP SECRET)

23 Jan 63

Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for

NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63. (TOP SECRET)

24 Jan 63

National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and

Closed) (TOP SECRET)

, Undtd

Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- 4 Feb 63

tion of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency

Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)

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war than

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SITIVE

February

2g: 1963

30

1 ARA Me.

Cobtrell

mON : $/p - John F. Ford

Subjeet:

Breminacion of Ecincipal Sources of Foltey

and enticency Mariat

on tuna

In accordance with your inatzuecions, over the week-and

I have revieved the main scurces of polley on Cuba.

The probien

ao 1 define ic as follove:

The Froblem:

Prior to the escablishaent od the intercepartmental Cooreinet-

tag

Committes of Cuban Aftaixs, such work bed beas done on Cube,

boch In

the polloy and contingency flelds,

Yao parpose of t20

cuzzent

exorcise is to review end identify ths main soureco of

such poltey and contingoney planning in en stiort to determine

if any of the work previously done will be et value to the

officare of your commietco as we go fervase mich implomontation

of the nevly atated

Cubsn policy and objective.

Sources of Folley and Continence Planning:

The petaeipal poureeo

of polley and contingency plaming

which may or may not be of value to the vort of your comittes are

28 folloss:

Tho Hacional Socurity Actiod Honorende enneting

Cron the Waste truse,

2. The Actions of the Mattonal Security Councal.

3. The Dosto Mational Jecurity Folley of the 0.5.

(now awaiting (inal atagos of lorant elecrance

before prosentation to flational Sacurity Council) -

4. Thà Becords

SUNSETAVE

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CRET - DENSITIVE

The Zacords of Action of the Brecutive Coamittee

of the Macional Socurisy Council as they pastela

to Cros*

The Reporto o& the Sub- Camuletees of EXCOd -

duzing the Cucas Criate.

6.

The Resolutione of tha Organtastion of American

Stetos and the Putta del Bete Conference.

8.

Publie Statononta of Govermat Officials, ta

Farticuler

• Prece Conference of Prostient Kennedy

of Septenber

: 13, 1962a

ineting os Secretary Rash with foretsn Ministoze

ot Latin

Americe Gazing Cuben Grisis,

9.

Rocently Approved Blew Polley Statement and

Objactives as Disa Up by the Intezdepartuental

Committac

of Cuban Altairo.

19-

Cuben Guidelines Paper-

(a guidaltnos paper as such doos not extet on

Cube os le tha case in a mojority ot other

countries.

Thore are well over eight volunas of natestel conserned with

Cuba,

7h1s

pertleslorly

thac

sonerated turing the rocent detober exisis.

review is nearing

completion, and I en segregating partioules

reporte wiics nay

bel

ot velue to

the

60 W2 89

formers

th

menbere of your comirece

implenatstion of the net polley and

obj octaves.

In

steached deementetion, I have sagzogated

Chose Mottonal

Security

• Council deciatons and Mationel Security

Action Memorende

mach

ace carried en ponding or closed in the

files of the Departmant of Bbeto.

Whare action on a particular

NSC deciaton or

MASAM hao boen trsasferred to BNOOA, aceion

cesponsibility

dectasons would appear not to be within

Cho

purvies ot

your Coordinating

Conetsted.

Uron my review

to date,

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dasey

le eppoond that all of thase

Societone call for scuions

which have alroody

comaldered by your Connittes. You o1t2

note that in sons Anatonces eotion rooponalbility on so BEC

Gectsion or lAsad has been

cannafertod to the Spoetal Group

Ote: Ateria

Jolmeon) -

Let of Fending and Closed

NSO and MASAN desisione

concazaing Cuba:

SECRETL

BELETVE

30903

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iner

70903

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RATICHAL SECURITE ACRIONS

(PENDING AND

CLOSEO)

OU COBA

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noe. herron Lo.

483 MSG 2422a

5/5/62

483 NSC 2422d

5/5/61

403 NSC 2422e

5/5/52

483 MSC 2422g

5/5/61

453 NSC 24221

5/5/61

483 NSC 2422k

5/5/62

SHONES

Sabotance

Agreed shat Us polley toward

Cuba should ass at the dontall

of Castro regine.

Scacus

(Pending)

According to

files, out of

this NSC direot-

ive exew a polley

paper, to be

hendled ul Eferent

ly from regular

suldelines papers

on each country-

As of 9/4/62, Whice House

was infomad that action on this

NSC direccive would be zeported

fa coupllance with NSAM 181

which transterred certada MSC &

RASAN actione to special group

(Alexie Johason) •

Importance Preaident

attoches to obtaining

adoquate latelligence

on Cuban nilitary

capabilietes.

(Pending)

Accion to be

reported in

compllance wich

NASAN 181.

(Johnson channel)

Impoztence President

atcaches to publiestion

la fres world press of

terzorist actions of

Caetro regime;

ete. and

to possible political action

to end curzent terror.

(Pending)

Action Crans-

ferred to EXCON

Relations with Cuban

Revolutionary Council

should be aproved.

(Penins)

Action trans*

ferred to EXCOX

Cuban refugees

to be gives

zefugee atatus; refugeco in

Miant to be relocated;

zefugees to be eligible to

apply for travel privileges:

Inclation of negociations

to enlarge sillingness of

other Ancalean states to

join in notion agalost CAstro.

(Pending)

action trang

ferred to EXCOM

(Pending)

Action trang-

ferred to EXCON

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.:*

NSe Action No.

403 NSO 2622m

5/5/61

403

• ASC 2422а

5/5/61

483 NSC 24220

5/S/61

Subatance

OStA e1l1 expand 1.io

program, but not initiate

electronic mrtire againet

Coetres moáns of propaganda

should be mademailable

to non-US groupe.

Us military officers ander

goneral guidance to bo

prepared by Dept of Statey

would discuse Castro threat

to all hA. wich lich. officers.

Dopt of State chould prepare

a report 02 a possible new

Juridical basio for effective

anti-communtet accion.

Status

(Pendins)

Actlon Cranse

fezzed to

Johnson channel

For NASAN

M1G1.

(Closed)

completed netion

as of 11/20/61.

403 кЗС 2422р

5/5/61

(Closed)

S/P paper

new

Boslo for Aati-

Comuniot Action**

7/24/61

Closed.

483 NSC 24226

5/5/61

483 NSC 2422c

5/5/61

463 NSC 24228

5/5/61

Robert Hoodsard'e assumption

of responsibllity of Task: Force

on Cuba on announcoment of

appointment.

No Us mitscary interrention

how 200

Do nothing which would

foreclose poansbility adiltaxy

intervention in futuze.

No neval blockade or alman

agasaac Cuba.

Escalled atudy

CS

• be made

by CIA with other Departoonts

of possible woaknendes and

vulnembilities la elements

andab control Cuba.

Closed.

closed.

Closed,

Bissole meno to

Acharles

11/21/61 te:

*Situation and

Prospecta 1n

Cuba by Shernan

. Rent 11/3/0J.

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ISC Action

483 ASC 2422k

3/5/63

4S3 NSC

5/5/61

24223

493 NSC 24221

5/5/61

HASAN 194

10/2/62

Substagee

No deparate Cuban allitary

forced ahould be orgonized

Le U.8, Cuben nacinole sould

be encoureged enlise in US

Annod Foxees.

Status

Closed.

DS: Tooermended

Do Pres, drafc

program bo

texninstod

6/30/02 due co

No Lamediato crade embargo

on Cubs.

Closed,

with Prooldene's

ection of 2/3/62

decleriog total eubargo on crade

with Caba with esception

medieine and food on humnitarlan

gz0unde •

Allience fox

: Ezogress

strengthened.

be

Closed.

Weckly report

not from AID

to Unite House.

Fending-

Action trans

Ferred

• to

NASAN 100

10/3/62

Folley Towind non-bloc

ships In Caban Exade (Action

BS Coverment

proposes to

take with sogard to

shipping to Cubs.)

Contingency Penning

for

Cabs:

CURA MASAN 031

3/11/62

US Government must have ready

CUBA NASAL 0161

8/24/62

Fending

Accion tran

terzed to

Johnson chzanel:

Closed»

Paper prepared

and eranslaced:

#Tha Castro

Begine La Cuba**

9/63

Closed.

offozte

Byes only • Liniced Distrib

ution. Reporting to be through

another chanaël and handled

personally by Deputy USecy

Johnson

(understand thie suchoriaed response

go Seen Readfog NSe Actions, 2 NASANa Ehru

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NSC Astion Ne.

CUBA MASAM 196

10/22/52

CUBA NASAM 208

12/6/62

KES ONLY

CUDA NASAN: 213

1/6/63

2 BECRET.

Substance

Establishment of NSC Executive

Comnittee

Cuba overfights: (This

Fresidentlal directive

approved an attached

Culdelines fox the Planning

of Cuban Overtlights, and

requested CIA to come up wich

en estinate of the adequacy os

ouch e aystes of intelligence

collection to meet the criteria

net torch, on assumptión it 1a

supplomated by enezgecte collection

of infomation by all other evailable

meane -)

Interdepartmental Organization

of Cuban Affsixs - wich

responsibilty vested fa a

Coozdinator of Cuban

affairs

in Deportaent of State*

Closed,

Report Submitted.

Closed.

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TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

DEPARIMENT OF STATE

34

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject:

Papers for NSC Executive Committee

Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary. of

Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States

Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to

members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-

tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,

January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Also attached is a new page 8

for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward

the Cuban Brigade."

The other two papers transmitted

on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be con-

sidered at the Friday meeting. They are: United States:

Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States"

and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

William H.

Attachments:

As stated.

Copy No._

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

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..

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM

:

SUBJECT:

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-

lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the

following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are

removed from Cuba

and kept out of the hemisphere in

the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,

and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive

communist purposes, there will be peace in the

Caribbean.

And, as I said in September, 'we shall

neither initiate nor permit aggression in this

hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course,

abandon the political,

economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt

subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that

the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But

these policies are very different from any intent to

launch a military invasion of the island.".

UP SECRET

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P SECRET

-2-

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States

policy with respect to Cuba are:

1.

Protecting the security of the United States

and the other states of the Organization of

American States (OAS) by assuring that

offensive weapons are not reintroduced into

Cuba;

2.

Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive

military action against other Caribbean states;

4.

Redúcing the capabilities of the Castro regime

to direct and support subversion and insurrection

within the other Hemisphere states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments

within

Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing

the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-

Soviet Communist purposes;

6.

Encouraging and supporting any developments

within Cuba that offer the possibility of

replacing the Cuban Government with a regime

that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,

it being understood that our ultimate

objective is replacement of the regime by

one fully compatible with the goals of the

United States;

SECRET

: 2201

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SECRET

-3-

7.

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of

supporting the Castro regime;

8.

Maximizing the political isolation of the

Castro regime from other free world states,

and especially from states of the OAs.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba

should be multilateral, preferably based upon

the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)

or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization

of American States. The newly-won hemispheric

solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be

jeopardized by seeking DAs actions of marginal

and which might split the hemisphere;

9.

Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or

logistical support, the wide variety of

military contingencies that may arise from

pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related

to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the

U. S. Government will be prepared to increase

the political economic, psychological and

military pressures, as appropriate opportunities

present themselves

or can be created.

The

actions listed below are those requiring immediate

approval and would be initiated in the sequence

set forth below. Recommendations for further

— SECRET

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SECRET

- 4-

actions based upon the re-examination of

existing programs and upon the development

of new programs related to the foregoing

objectives will be forthcoming.

1.

In addition to current covert program, such

as intelligence collection, recruitment of

Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,

support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)

and other exile group activities and infil-

tration of propaganda materials:

a. Intensify covert collection

of intelligence within Cuba, especially

within the regime;

b.

Support the efforts of certain Cuban

exiles, who are associated with

the original aims of the 26 of July

Movement and who believe that the

Castro regime can be overthrown from

within in order that they may:

1) cause a split in the leadership

of the regime at the national or

provincial levels; and 2) create a

political base of popular opposition

to the regime; and, 3) secure

intelligence;

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a

capability to launch balloons carrying

leaflets and other propaganda materials

from international waters into Cuba.

Launch propaganda balloons after an

operational capability has been

established.

I SECRET

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SECRET

With respect to the actions listed below,

the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent

negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing

the 20-odd American prisoners should first

be ase the

be ascertained. If these actions were taken

before the conclusion of the negotiations

they could jeopardize the release of the

Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the

prisoners are recovered, proceed on the

following timetable:

4.

Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance

of the proclamation of the four point

shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for

the orders to go into effect in five days).

These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all

vessels of a country whose vessels

engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship

which has carried goods in the Bloc-

Cuba trade within 120 days of the time

it seeks to enter a United States port;

c.

Prohibit all United States flag ships

and all ships owned by United States

nationals or residents from entering

any ports of Cuba and from carrying

any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SECRET

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5.

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SECRET

-6-

d.

Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any

department of the United States from

being shipped on vessels owned or

controlled by persons who own or

control vessels engaged in the trade

between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of

Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at

a later date dependent on the Donovan

mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or

another

representative of the President

will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico

and Brazil to convey to them the importance

President Kennedy attaches to maintaining

hemispheric solidarity by their supporting

the following resolutions:

a.

An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for

its actions which continue to endanger

the peace, deploring refusal to allow

inspection, condemning the presence of

Soviet troops, recommending continued

surveillance and continued vigilance

against subversive activities, and

terminating the invocation of the Rio

Treaty on the missile crisis, together

with

b.

An OAS resolution which would

recommend 1) extension of arms embargo

to all items of trade except food and

medicine (fall back position: extension

of arms embargo to all strategic items);

_ SECRET

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SECRET

2-7-

6.

7.

7

7.

8.

9.

2) prohibition of ships of OAS

member states from transportating

embargoed items and deny use of

ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and

transit rights for flights to Cuba;

and 4) a call on other states to

??.

take similar action.:

After obtaining the maximum possible

support of the key countries of Mexico,

Chile and Brazil, the other OAS

members will be approached in washington

and in their respective capitals,

simultaneously. It should be possible

for this consultation and OAS action on

the resolutions to be completed within

ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval

of the resolutions, we will inform our

NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

Hade ta8

At the first NATO meeting after formal

OAS action on the resolutions, we will

request that NATO include Cuba on the

list of countries to which shipment

of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

After NATO decision on our COCOM request,

we will seek to get agreement from Free

World industrial nations to prevent

shipping of critical spare parts and

equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list:

In addition to the four point shipping

resolutions, and action under Section

107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue

to press Free World nations to keep their

shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

SECRET

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SECRET

- 8==

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our

objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc

action in other parts of the world; as a result

of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)

by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a

result of uprisings or internal conflict within

Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be

undertaken immediately, should include preparations

for increased multilateral and/or bilateral

political and economic measures, large scale use of

Cubans who are now inside Cuba;

more extensive

air activity including both high and low level

flights primarily directed toward surveillance

and collection of intelligence, and which may also

have the effect of embarrassing the Castro

government and keeping the Castro forces on ,

continual alert; retaliatory measures, as

appropriate, including the imposition of a

POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in

other countries;

severance of communications

to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping

destined for Cuba and on key installations to

Cuba; intensive naval pacrols; and, ultimately,

the use of U. S. military force.

To the extent

feasible, U. S. military forces employed against

Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-

trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of

those Latin American nations desirous of

participating in the U. S. effort.

3 SECRET

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SECRET

- 8 ∞

Our programs should be designed to encourage

the Brigade members to melt back into the exile

community and engage in constructive pursuits

pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer

them some special assistance but not to the extent

that they become a perpetual privileged class

within the community: Presidential action on their

behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday: January 25, 1253, 10 a.m.)

FROM:

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT:

Summary of Coordinator's. Recommendations

1.

U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with

respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States

and the other states of the Organization of

American States by assuring that offensive

weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive

military action against other Caribbean states;

d.

Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime

to direct and support subversion and insurrection

within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments

within Cuba that offer the possibility of

divorcing the Cuban Government from its

support of Sino-soviet Communist purposes,

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments

within Cuba that offer the possibility of

replacing the Cuban Government with a regime

that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

SECRET

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SECRET

-2-

being understood that cur ultimate objective

is replacement of the regime by one fully

compatible with the goals of the United States;

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of

supporting the Castro regime;

h.

Maximizing the political isolation of the

Castro regime from other Free World states,

and especially from states of the OAS. When-

ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should

be multilateral, preferably based upon the

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of on

resolutions adopted by the Crganization of

American States.

The newly-won hemispheric

solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be

jeopardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal

value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment

of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or

logistical support,

the wide variety of

military contingencies that may arise from

pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related

to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their

time sequence are set forth in the attached paper

entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the

four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NA1O

SECRET

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in *

SECRET

= 3-

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches

to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and

shipment of critical

items from their Cuban trade.

Existing programs will be reviewed and further

recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the

variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken

at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as

intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,

support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and

other exile activities, infilcration of propaganda

materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are

recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence

within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b.

support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to

return the 26 of July Movement to its

original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the

foregoing actions may impair our ability

•to accomplish objective b. (Removal of

remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because

taking these actions could provide the

U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining

its

forces in Cuba.

Nevertheless, approval

of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3.

Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a

specially tailored civilian and military program for

Brigade

members.

SECRET

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The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit

and individual members urged to accept civilian training

or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program

for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.

Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade

members and creation of a privileged class in the exile

community would be avoided.

SECRET

HIT

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TOP SECRET

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF. DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC

Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now

been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m. - The revision

consists essentially of what is now denominated as

"ALTERNATIVE I'' in the proposed staternent of policy

and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supple-

mented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at

the top of page 3 and on page Y of the revision. This

supplemental material is derived from portions of the text

of "ALTERNATIVE II" in the original paper.

At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed him

the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my

reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to

include the supplemental material referred to above. He,

turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will

thereafter be in touch with you. If possible, will you let me

know by noon tororrow where you and he stand with regard

to the revised paper.

Enclosure

SIGNE

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

cc: Mr. McNamara

General Taylor

Mr. Yarmolinsky

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

Societ Control No. 552

SECRET Copy 2

OF

6

COPTES.

DASA003)

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D

OD

LOS SECRET

DRAFT/23 Jan 63

PSS."10.?1 A DIM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

PROM

Coordinator of cuban Affairo

SUBJECT: United Statoo Policy Toward Cuba

Unitad States Policy

In November 20, the Prevident sot forth the broad guidelines of

Unitad Stateu policy with raupact to Cuba in the following wordo:

"Ao for our part, is all offensive weapons oystems are

removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemiophere in

the future, under adequate verilication and safeguards.

and it Cuba is not uned for the expost of aggressive

communior purposes, there will be peace ir she Caribbean.

And, as I said in Saptember, "we shall reikes initiate

nor permit aggresion in thie hemisphere'.

"We will not, of cousse, abandon the political, ecosinic

and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion

from Cuba, nor our purpose and toge that the Cubar people

shall some day ba ¿sul; free. Bu: "kuse policien are very

different from any intent to launch i military invasion of

the island. "

Objectives

Accosdingly, the objectiveo of U.S. policy with sespect to Cuba

are:

Protecting the security of the United States and the

other states of the Organization of American States

(OAS) by soouring that offendive weapons are not

reintroduced into Cuba;

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3. Romoval of remaining soviet forcoo from Cuba;

Proventing Cuba from sabing any aggrenoive military

Betion againot ochor Caribbon otsto0:

1. Reducing the capabilitioo os the Cantro sogime to direct

and support oubvorcion and inuurroction within the

Diner DAS statoo:

5. Encouraging and supporting any devalopmento within

'Cuba shat offer the poodibility of livuicing the Cuban

Governmant from its cuppose of Siro-Soric: Communior

purposed os replacing tha Government with a regimo

which would accomplios this purposo:

6. Maximizing the cost so the soviet Union of upporting

sho castro sogimo:

Masimizing tha political soolation of the Castro segime

from other fsee world diaies, and especially from

orates or the DAs. Whenever possible, U.S. actions

against Cuba chould ba multilateral, preferably based

upon the Treaty ol Reciprocal Assiutance (Rio Pact)

or on resolutiono adopted by the Organization of

American states. The newly won hemiopheric

solidarity on the cuban innue should not be jeopardized

by seeling DAS actions of marginal value and which

might split the hemiaphero.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment os

appropriate U.S. cosabar olomento and/ or logiotical

cupport, the wido varioty of military contingencien

that may arine from purouit of the foregoing objectives:

and;

3 SECRET

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suppete

SECRET

3

9. Producing comprchensive intolligence selated to she above

objectives.

Our ultimate objective with kanpact to Cuba remaino dae overtbrow

of the Cartro/ Communior segime und lt0 replacement by one compatiblo

with the objectives of the U.S. und, whore goosiblo, sharing the aimo

of the free World. To achiove thin objectivo, the U.S. Government

will be prepared to apply increasing dogroes of political, economic,

prychologieal and military presquroo, un appropriate opportunitios probost

themselvos or can ba creatod, until the Cautrol Communist regime 1o

overbrows.

Isolating, undermining and discroditing tha Castro/ Communist

regime tarough the asercino os all soanible diplomatic, economic,

psychological and covert retions may achiove the immadiate objoctives

and could create propitious conditiona in Cuba for further novance soward

our ultimate objactive.

Supporting

Actions

The following actiono should be initiated in te sequence set fosta

below:

Await ronulto of Mi. Donovan's imminent nogotiation wit

Fidel Cartro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners.

Prior aggrannival. S. action could jeopardize their release.

So. Is thoro negotiations fall, or when the priconor are recovered,

procedd on the following timotable:

3.

INOrIn NATO and DAS delve tours in advance of the proclamation

of the sour polat chipping ordero. (The proclamation callo for

Eno ordoro to go into esteci in live dayal. There osders:

so close United States porto do all vessolo of a

countsy whore vessels engago in carrying armo

to Cuba:

Do clone United States ports so any ohio which bas

carriod goods in she bloc-Cuba trado within 120 dayo

of dão simo it seeko to antor a Unitod States po:t;

6o probibit all Unirod Statoo Hag shipo and all abips

owned by United

1 Statoo nationalo or residento from

entering any porto of Cuba and from carrying any

good bound to or from Cuba; und

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olio

prohibit any casgo sponsored by asy

department os agency of the United

States fron boing shipped on vessels

owned or controlled by persons who

own or control vessels engaged in the

trade betwen Cuba and the Sovier bloc.

NO, At EBO LeMintiOn Of the U.S. ChiefS of MisSiOn

Conferenco in El Salvador on January 28-30

Assistant Secsotary Martin Will visit the Presidents

of chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the

Importance presidont kennady attaches to mintaining

hamispheric solldarity by supporting the following

sosolutions:

Do AM DAS resolution condemning Cuba for lEs

setions inlch contime to endanger the peaco,

deploring refusal te allow inspection,

condemning the presence of soviet troops,

reconnending cortinued surveillanse and

continued vigilance against subvessive

activities, and terminating tho invocation

of the Ris treaty on the missile er1a18,

together with

An OAS sesolution which would recommend

extension of arus embargo to all items

of trade except load and medicine (fall back

position:

extension of ass embargo to all

strategiC Items); ?) prohibicion oL Al

ships from transporting embargued itcus and

deny use of ports to shipo in Bloc-Cuba

trade; 3)

denial of sovlot over-flighes and

e) a call on othes aratco to tao similar

action.

artes obtaining the msimm possible support of

the loy countrleo o Maxico, Chilo und Brazil, the

other Ins araboro will bo appronchod in Washington

SE

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IOP SECRES

6.

8.

and in their respective capitals, simulcaneously.

It should be possible for this consultation and OAS

action on the resolutions to be completed within

ten days.

Prior to formal COAS approval of the

resolutions, we will inform our NATo allies of the

impending DAS actiona

At the fixst NATO meeting after formal lAS action

on the resolutions, we will request that NATO

Include Cuba on the list of countries to which

shipment of COCON liSt (strategic) items is

prohibited.

After NATO decision on our CCCOM request, we will

seek to get agreement from Free World industrial

nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts

and equipment to cuba, not on the COCOM list.

In addition to four point shipping resolutions,

and action under Secti.: 10, ci the Foreign Assistance

Act, continue to press Free World rations to keep

their shipping sun of Elsc-Cuba

trade.

In addicion to current covert programs such as

intelligence coilection, radio broadcasts,

recruitment =E Cuban cfficials as agents, support

of the Cubar Re:clucionary Council (CRC)

activities,

and infileration of propagard: materials, the

following are recommended for approval and Immediate

initiation:

a. Intensify to maximum degree possible

intelligence and counterintelligence coverage

of Cubai

Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,

who are associated with the

original aims of

the 26 July Movement and who believe that

che Castro regime can be overthrown from

within in order that they may: l) cause

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ado

a split in the leadershiy of che regine

at che national or rovincial levels; and,

2) create a political base of popular

opposition to the regime; and, 3 secure

intelligence;

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a

capability to launch balloons carrying

leaflets and other propaganda materials from

international

waters into Cuba.

Launch

propaganda balloons after an operational

capability has been

established.

- .

- SECRET

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In iddition to these immediate actions, we should müke

proparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more

positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of

the Castro/ Communist rogime. These opportunities may arise

either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a

result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/

Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal

conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal

with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large -

scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including.

both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance

and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of

embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on

continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the

imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other

countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of

sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in

Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.

military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support

(to include such items as materic, advisors, training, and Special

Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military

forces), to a request for ascictanco from any anti-Castro/ Communist

group or groups in Cuba which deconstrate an ability to survive,

which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible

with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against

Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans

and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of

participating in the U.S. effort.

SECRET

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it is he can a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

23 TAN 63.

; FROM

SUBJECT:

Department of Defense Representative on the Inter-

departmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remaing the

overthrow of the Castro/ Communist regime and its replacement

by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where

possible, sharing the aims of the Free World.. To achieve this

objective, the U.. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of

political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as

appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created,

until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate

objectives are to isolate the Castro/ Communist regime from the Free

World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal

dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its sub-

versive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase

the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal

of Russian troops from Cuba.

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SECRET

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-TOP

SEGRET

CENC

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist

regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,

psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives

and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance

toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military sup

port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and

Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of

military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/

Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability

to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are

compatible with those of the U.S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished

from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should

not be undertaken in thé absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist

and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace of security of the

hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation

for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soyiet forces.

2

TAr

OFALANTOI

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CONSECRET!

CATOR

:To

the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed

against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained

free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations

desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence

gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective

of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U.S, actions against Cuba should be

multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization

of American States.

The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the

Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of

marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of

this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a

phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological

3

SECRET

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FOr SECRET

• and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping;

propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime;

psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of

Cubans in the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive

air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed

toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also

have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping

the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appro-

priate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of

Cuban officials.in other countries; severance of communications to

Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on

key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately,

the use of U.S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a hroad gamut

of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions,

such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified

surveillance.of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive

activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restric-

tions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed

to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and

participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

TOn

TER SECRET,

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This course of action has the advantage of attaining the

objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than

the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the

only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective.

It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure

of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S.

will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the

uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of

the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for

"intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the

missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations

%

throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations,

will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For

example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active

policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become

impossible to conceal, If properly handled, the overt aspects of

this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions

from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America,

increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

10

5

SECRET

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WUP SECRET

90 M

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that

the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in

the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the

more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from

the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures

on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment.to

overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply

involved. The further we progress along this route, the more

significant will be the loss of U.S. prestige if we alter or abandon

it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful

timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed

plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the over -

throw of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning

purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate

changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be neces

sary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions

already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages

of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and

dangers of such activity.

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Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the

possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime

from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator.

The objectives stated in the Coordinator's paper do not sufficiently

commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime.

¡The Coordinator's paper depends too much upon events outside the

control of the U. S. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate

the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castrol

Communist regime. The specific actions recommended in the

Coordinator's paper are consistent with the policy recommended in

this paper and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that

would be taken in executing that policy.

Recommendation

I recommend that the policy stated above be adopted as the

United States policy toward Cuba.

7

Liơi

SECRET

CEMATRE

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DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Alfairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of

United States policy with

respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As fos our part, ll all olfensive weapons systems are

removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in

the future, under adoquate vorification and safeguards.

and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive

communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbear.

And, as I said in September, we shall mither initiate

nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic

and other offorts of this hemisphere to halt subversion

from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people

shall some day be truly fred. But these policies are very

difforent from any intent to launch & military invasion of

the island. "

Objectives

Accordingly, the objoctives

of

U.S. policy with respect to Cuba

are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the

other

statos of the Organization i American States

(Ons) by nosuring that offensive weapons are not

reintroduced into Cuba:

.I:

L

SECRET

COrY

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UP SECRET

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military

action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct

and support subversion and insurrection within the

other OAS states:

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban

Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist

purposes or replacing the Government with a regime

which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximiring the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting

the Castro regime:

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime

from other free world states, and especially from

states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions

against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based

upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)

or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of

American States. The newly-won hemispheric

solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized

by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and whick

might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate V.S, combat alsmenta and/or logiatical

support, the wide variety of military contingencies

that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objoctives:

and;

- SECRET

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LOF SECRET

3

9 Producing comprehensive intelligence selatod to tho above

objectives.

Our ultimate objective with reupect to Cuba remains the overtarow

of the Cantro/ Communint regime and ita replacemant by one compadolo

with the objectiven of the U.S. and, where pounible, aharing the almo

of the Exed World. To achiove this objective, the U.S. Government

will he prepared to apply incroaning degroes of political, aconomie.

psychological and military prossured, an appropriate opportunition pranost

themselves or can be created, until to Castrol Commist segime 10

overthrowis

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/ Communior

regime through the exercine of all leanible diplomatic, economic,

prychological and covert netions may achieve the immediate objectiver

aad could cronin propitions conditions in Cube for Jumber advance toward

our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actiona

below:

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forte

Await results of Ms. Donovan' imminent negotiation with

Fidel Castro for freeing the 20 odd Amarican prisoners.

PriOr aggresSive l.S. action Could jeOpardize theis r01e80e.

?. Is these negotiations tall, or when the prisoners are recovered..

proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and DAs walve hours in advance of the proclamation

of the tour coint shipping orders. (The proclamation calls 108

the orders to go into ellect in five daya.

These orders:

• close United States ports to all vespals os a

country whose rossais ingage in carrying armac

Do close United Staton posts to any ship which has

carried goods in the bioc. Cuba trade within 120 days

of the time it seeks to ontor & United States port:

¡Co

prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships

owned by United States nationals or residents from

entering any ports o Cuba and from Carrying any

goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SECRET

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do

prohibit any cargo sponsored by any

department or agency of the United

States from being shipped on vessels

orned or controlled by persons tuno

on or control vessels engaged in the

srade between tuba

and the Soviet bloc.

Confercase in El Salvador on January 28-30

Assistant Secretary Martin Mill visit the Presidents

of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the

Importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining

henspheric solidarity by supporting the tolling

D.

An DAS resolution condemning Quba for 1E8

actions which continue to endanger the peAce,

deploring refusal to allow inspection.

condemning the presence ot sover troops,

reconnding contimed surveillane and

contined vigilance against subversiva

activities, and terminating the invocation

o che Rio

Tresty on the missile crisis,

together with

An AS resolution which would recomend

1)

extension of arms embargo to all items

of trade except food and medieine (fall back

estension ot ancs amarge 10 da

chips from tramporting embargood items and

deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba

trade; 3)

denial of Sovlet ovar-flights and

transfe rights for flights

& CALL

On

other 9rate8

G80s;

and

take similar

action.

5. After obtaining the maximi possible support of

the BEY COLE ON AN

Chile and Brazil, the

other ons members will be approached in lashington

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SECRET

=50

and in their sespective capitals, simltaneously

It should be possible for this consultation and lAS

actlon on the resolutions to be completed within

TEN dAYS. PrIOS tO FOrMAL COAS apPrOval of tha

resOlutions, We WilL infOM our NITE allies dE the

mending DAS setion

At thO firSt NATO meting after foimal. UnS action

on the resolutions, we will request that NATU

include Cuba on the list of countries to unich

probibitoe.

After NATO decidion on our COCoN request, te Mll

soak to get agreement from Free World Industriol

mcions to prevent shipping of exitical spare parts

an equipment to dia, not on the cool list.

In addition to lows point shipping resolutione

and setion under Section 107 of the foreign nesistance

Act, contime to press Free borle netions to keep

their shipping mt of Bloc-Cuba trade.

In addition to current covert programs such ad

Intelligence collection, radio broadcasts,

recruitment of Cuban officials as agents,

support

of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (6RC)

activities,

and InfLicIation ds propaganda naterials, the

Following are renunded for approval and inuedlate

initiation:

Intensify to marimn degres possible

intelligencs and counterintelligence coverage

of Cube:

Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,

who are associated with the original aims of

the 26 July Hovement and the believe that

Cantre sogim can be overthrows tron

nichin in

order that they way:

c8usg

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SECRET

a split in the leadership of the regime

at the national or provincial levels; and,

2) create a political base of popular

opposition to the regime; and, 3)

secure

intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a

capability to launch balloons carrying

leaflets and other propaganda materials from

International waters Into Cuba. Launch

propaganda balloons after an operational

capability has been established.

SECRET

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7

In addition to these immediate actione, we should make

preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more

positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of

the Castro/ Communist regime. These opportunities may arise

either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a

result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castrol

Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal

conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal

with these situationg

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-

scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including

both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance

and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of

embarrausing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on

continual alert; retaliatory meacures, as appropriate, including the

imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other

countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of

sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in

Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.

military forces.

We should be in a position to'respond with open military support

(to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special

Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military

forces), to a reguest for assistance from any anti-Castro/ Communist

group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,

which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible

with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.s. military forces employed against

Cuba should be accompanied byU.S. militarily-trained free Cubans

and by the armed forces of those latin American nations desirous of

participating in the U.S. effost.

SECRET

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ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is

the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and 'its

replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the

U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free

World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government

will apply increasing degrees of political, economic,

psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities present themselves or can be created,

until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Our fumediate objectives are to isolate the

Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from

the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal

dissension, exode its domestic political support;

frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence

in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of

sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of

Russian

troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the

Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all

feasible diplomatic, economie, psychological and

covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives

and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for

further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respondwith open

military support (to Include such items as materiel,

advisors, training, and Special Forces support and,

if necessary, up to the full range of military forces),

to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist

group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to

survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose

aims are compatible with those of the u.s.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as

distinguished from military support upon request of

Indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the

absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

Soviet

SECRET

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Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the

hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S.

retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/

Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces

employed against Cuba should be

accompanied by U.S.

militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces

of those Latin American nations desirous of participating

In the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence

gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary

objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba

should be multilateral, preferably based upon thelTreaty

of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions

adopted by the Organization of American States. The

newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue

should not be jeopardized by seeking AS actions of

marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in m

support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective in-

volves a phased and controlled series of political,

economic, psychological and military actions. Such

actions might inclyde leaflet dropping; propaganda urging

sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psycho-

logical operations urging defections; large scale training

of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of

such Cubans inside

Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low

level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and

collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

CAL SECRET

...

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effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the

Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures,

appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade;

harrassment

of Cuben officials in other countries;

severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of

sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key

installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and,

ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a

broad ganut of carefully timed political, economic, psy-

chological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions,

Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance

of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive

activitles in latin America, application of four Foint

shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and

a series of

actions designed to obtain, to the greatest

extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation

In the campaign

to unseat the Castro/Coumnist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining

the objective more rapidly and under more controlled

conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.

Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will

accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater

risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of

money

and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international polities, the

U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for

aggression from the uncommitted nations.

It is difficult

to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments.

They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they nay react

favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a

large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the

world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will

depend upon how adroitly theee actions are hendled.

For

example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our

active policy and the courses of action under it nay

SECRET

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SECSET.

-10°

eventually becone impossible to conceal. If properly

handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not

only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other

countries, but also to gein, particularly in Latin

America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castrol

Commnist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear

that the U. S, will not permit the maintenence of a

conmunist

base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of

military posture,

the more active approach may be

subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc

elsewhere.

As we Increase the pressures on Castro/Communist

Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,

U. S, prestige becomesmore deeply involved.

The further

we progress

along this route, the more significant will be

the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require

careful timing and coordination of our actions and the

development of detailed plans. While such plans would be

designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime

within a given time frame for planning purposes, they

would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate

changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will

be necessary for the highest levels of our Goverment to

review the actions already taken and those contemplated and

to assess the advantages of continued and escalated

activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such

activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude

the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the

Castro regime from the Bloc.

SECRET

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-11-

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the

Coordinator, Alternative I does not make the overthrow

of the Castro/Conmunist regime an objective of the U. S.

In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently

contemplate

the creation of opportunities to effect the

downfall of that regime. The specific actions

recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the

policy recommended in Alternative II and, in nany cases,

would be among the initial steps that would be taken

in executing that policy. I reconmend adoption of

Alternative II.

SECRET

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23 JANG 3

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECI:

United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative

statements of policy and related courses of action with respect

to Cuba.. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State.

Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense,

The

Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved,

and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the

end of

this paper.

ALTERNATIVE I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-

lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the

following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems

are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere

in the future, under adequate verification and safe

guards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of

aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in

the Caribbean..; And,:

as I said in September,

"we

shall

neither initiate nor permit aggression in this

hemisphere'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political,

economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to

halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and

DIO SECRET

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SECRET

and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be

truly fxee. But these policies are very different

from any intent to launch a military, invasion of the

Island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S, policy with

respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States

and

the other states of the Organization of American

States. (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons

are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military

action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to

direct and support subversion and insurrection within

the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cuba that offer. the possibility of divorcing the

Cuban Goverrment from its support of Sino-Soviet

Communist purposes or replacing the Government with

a regime which would accomplish this purpose.

6.

Maxinizing the cost to the Soviet Union of

supporting the Castro regime;

7.

Maximizing the political isolation of the

Castro regime from other free world states, and

especially from states of the QAS;

8..

Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U. S, combat elements and/or logistical

support, the wide variety of/'contingencies that

may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;

and;

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- 34

Producing comprehensive intelligence related

to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the

sequence set forth below:

Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation

with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American

prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could

jeopardize their release.

2.: If these negotiatione fail, or when the prisoners

are recovered, proceed on the following times-

table:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of

the proclamation of the four point shipping orders.

(The proclamation calls for the orders.

to go into

effect in five days). These orders:

a. " close United States ports to all vessels

of a country whose vessels engage in

carrying arms to Cuba;

b.

close United States ports to any ship

which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba

trade within 120 days of the time it seeks

to enter a United States port;

C.

prohibit all United States flag ships and

all ships owned by United States nationals

or residents from entering any ports of

Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to

or from Cuba; and

SECRET

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SECRET

do

prohibit any cargo sponsored by any

department or agency of the United

States from being shipped on vessels

owned or controlled by persons who wo

own of control vessels engaged in the

trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4.. At the termination of the U.'S. Chiefs of Mission

Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30

Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents

of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the

importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining

hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following

resolutions:

An OAS resolution condemning Cuba

for its

actions which continue to endanger the peace,

deploring refusa: to allow inspection,

condemning the presence of Soviet troops,

recommending continued surveillance and

continued vigilance against subversive

activities, and terminating the invocation

of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis,

together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend i

1) extension of arms embargo to all items

of trade except fooû and medicine (fall back

position:

extension of arms embargo to all

strategic items); 2)

prohibition of AR

ships fron transporting embargued items and

deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba

trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and

transit rights for flights to Cuba; and

4) a call on other states to take similar

action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of

the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the

other OAS members will be approached in Washington

HH 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 61:

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=5=

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously.

It should be possible for this consultation and OAS

action on the resolutions to be completed within

ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the

resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the

impending OAS action.

At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action

on the resolutions, we will request that NATO

include Cuba on the list of countries to which

Shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is

prohibited.

7."" After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will

seck to get agreement fron Free World Industrial

nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts

and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8:

15 - In addition to

four point shipping resolutions,

and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance

Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep

their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

In addition to current covert programs such as

intelligence collection, radio broadcasts,

recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support

of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities;

and infiltration of propaganda materials,

the

following are recormended for approval and immediate

initiation:

b.

Intensify to maximum degree possible

intelligence and counterintelligence coverage

of Cuba;

Su

Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,

who are associated with the original aims of

the 26. July Movement and who believe that

the Castro regime can be overthrown from

within in order that they may: 1) cause

SECRET

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- 5o

a split in the leadership of the regime

at the national or provincial levels; and,

create a political base of popular

opposition to the regime; and, 3): secure

intelligence;

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a

capability to launch balloons carrying

leaflets and other propaganda matorials fcom

international waters into Cuba. Launch

propaganda balloons after an operational

capability has been established.

I cecommend approval of Alcerhative

CRET

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• 7...

212 CRN. 2

•United Stater Policy

wurcinate. objecolve...obb

pada 12.

the overdow of the Castro/Communist 192 ine Waid

LES

coplacement by ops lible with the objectivs" f

U7122

esthe aims of thr

Worla, 1 adilove iiis objoscure, the U.S. Governident

will apply incredalas

degrees of political, econonic,

psychological end military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities pescent themesaved or con be created,

until the Castro/Conmunist useize in overthrown.

2. Our immediate objeceives are ce. Solute the

Castro/Communist regime Fron. the Free

World And from

the Bloc; weaken it economically, promote luceral

dissension, erode lts domeste policical conecr

frustrate its subversive accivities

in the hemisphere; increase the cost fu co, Blee

suscaining the regime; and obtain the viats-anax

Russian

troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, underminiaz tod disoredecess as

Castro/Communist rezime thro

feasible diplomatic, economic,

covert actions may achieve the inmediate objectives

and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for

further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to responditia open

military support (to include such items as material,

advisors, training, and pec al Forces support 2y

necessary, up to the fal ange of military fontes)

to a request for assis.soce

com any anti-Castro/Comminisc

group or groups in Cul: whic: demonstrate an ability to

survive, wnirh threater: the present regime, and whose

ains are ecupatible with those of the u.s,

5.

ion of Cuba FU.S. mili.

"ices, as

dininguiched from militory support upon ." jest of

inaigenous

forces, should not be undertakes ir the

absence of aggression o: other Castro/Comnl.:: 90/0r

Sovadt

• HH 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 64

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B....

Soviet actions that tressten the peace or security of tho

heniaphere.

This does noc preclude appropriate 0.8.

recertacion for isolatel hostile acts by the Caster"

Communist or Soviet i.

•To as date Resisso, U.S. military fordes

employed against Cube unculd be accompanied by U.S.

militarily-trained

* free Crbars and by the armed Enrges

of those Lacin American nations desirous of partic

Matry

in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing fucellagsort

gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a petrosy

objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever foesible, iS. actions against Cuba

should be miltllateral, preferably based upon thelTreaty

of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Pact) or on resolutions

adopted by the Organization of American States:

The

newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban abac

should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions i

marginal value and which might split the honiapisse

Overt and covert annexes of specifie tott

support of this policy will be prepared;

Discussion

The active

economic, psychological. ind military actions

actions might inclyde leaflet dropping; propassiod rais

sabotäge, strikes, and epposicion to the regine: beyche

logical operations urging defections; large #cole kraldng

of cubans in the U.S, and the use of such Cubang

insids

Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and io

level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and

collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

SECES

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.....Єt

Santonet

i Cytong one chose rue love inter the

Suscro focus to

2864

as

expropriste, inclatte tus inosition of & ROb blockadey

magga wack of

sebotage on shippiug destined for Orbe and on key

Installatioos in Cuba; inteasáve naval patrols; and.

ultimataly, the use of U. &, milibary fereea;

In, addition, this course of action would involve &

broad ganut of carefully time, politient: econonic, psy

chological and covert ections, Such se Cl aerstions,

Caribbean security arrangemnts, intercafied nerveillance

of and publicity concerning Cantre/Commist:

rubversive

activities in Latin America, applicoctor of Your Point

shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and

a series of actions lesigned to obtain, to the greatest

extent possible, mutilateral approval of an particiortion

in the camaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regina

This course of action has the advantage of attaining

the cbjective more rapidly and under more controlled

conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.

Indeed,

this nay be the only course

of action that will

accomplich the ulcimate objective. It Invo ves greater

risks; and, in the short run, & greater expenditure of

money and material and far grenter numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint o: irvacational politics, the

1. S. will probably be sunjected to criticism for

uggression from the uncomutted nations.

It is difficult

so predict the reaction of the lot. American governments.

They may attack the U. S. in "ictervening" or they nay react

favorably (as they did duzing the missile crisis).

29 a

large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the

wild, aircrautocky "e Latin American nations, v. I

depend upos bow zar fy Moce accions are handled. Yes

example, Chuce um cred be advantages to the fact the pur

active furdy duds courses of action uncer it ray

SECRET

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6. 29122221

hib?

runawal. If properly

be died,

sue overt aspects or this policy may serve not

octy to micigate any uniavorable reactions from other

icinctles, due also co sain, particularly in Latin

Accrica, increasing appreciacion ol the threat of Castrod

Conraunist Cuba.

The active pursult of our objective will make it cleai

that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a

communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of

military posture, the nore active approach may be

subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc

elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Conmunist

Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,

U. S. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further

we progress along this route, the more significant will be

the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successiul execution of this policy will require

careful timing and coordination of out actions and the

development of detailed plans.

While ziy plans would be

designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime

within a given time frame for planning purposes, they

would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate

changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will

be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to

review the actions already taken and those contemplated and

to assess the advantages of continued and escalated

activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such

privity.

Commitment to this corse of action does ist exclude

the possibility of ectively. suing the isolacim of the

Catso regime mom the blow

•NH

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-11-,

CHARINATOR'5 RECONLENDATION

'I recormend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT UF DOD RLPEESENCADINE

I do not concur. In the policy recommended by the

Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow

of the Castro/Cormunist regime an objective of the U. S.

In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently

contemplate

the creation di opportunities to effect the

downfall of that regime. The specific actions

recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the

policy recommended in Altentative il and, in many cases,

would be among the initial steps that would it. taken

in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of

Alternative II.

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2 SECRET

Draft23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 P.m.):

FROM

: Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.'

SUBJECT: United States Policy Towärd Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines

of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following

words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are

removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in

the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,

and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive

communist

purposes, there will be peace, in the Caribbean.

And, as I said in September, 'we shäll neither initiate

nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic

and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion

from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people

shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very

different from any intent to launch a military invasion of

the island.

Obiectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to

Cuba are:

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SECRET

2 -

I. Protecting the security of the United States and the

other states of the Organization of American States

(OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not

reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military

action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct

and support subversion and insurrection within the

Hemisphere

other DAs states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban

Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist

purposes,

6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban

Government with a regime that would break with the

Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our

ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by

one fully compatible with the goals of the United

States;

7. Maximizing

the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting

the Castro

regime;

HW

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8.

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DE SECRET

- 3 =

•8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro

regime from other free world states, and especially

from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S.

actions against Cuba should be multilateral,

preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by.

the Organization of American States, The newly-won

hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not

be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal

value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical

support, the wide variety of military contingencies

that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;

and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the

above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-

geg

ment will be prepared to increase the political, (economic,

psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities

SECRET

NH 60955 Do0Id:32276061 Page 72

---

## Page 73

SECRET

tatt

reggie

- 4 .

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions

listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would

be initiated in the sequence set forth below.

Recommendations=:

for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing

programs and upon the development of new programs related to

the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as

intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban

officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of

the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other

exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda

:

materials:

a) continue to intensify covert collection of

intelligence within Cuba, especially within

the regime;

b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,

who are associated with the original aims of

the 26 of July Movement and who believe that

the Castro regime can be overthrown from

within in order

that, they may: 1) cause a

split in the leadership of the regime at the

national or provincial levels; and 2) create

NN 50955 DooId:32276061 Page 73

---

## Page 74

SECRET

- 5 =

a political base of popular opposition to

the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

C.

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability

to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other

propaganda materials from international waters

into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an

operational capability has been established.

WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIONS LISTED BELOID,

THE

2. ¡Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations

with Fitoulato for freeing the 20-odd American

AGE ASUERTAINED.

prisoners/ Any of the actions listed below, If there

active whe taken before the conclusion of the, negotiation, fuza

jeopardize their release.

f the Опівилам,

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are

recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the

proclamation of the four point shipping orders.

(The proclamation calls for the orders to go into

effect in five days). These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of

a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms

to Cuba;

b. cor

SECRET

NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 74

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## Page 75

SECRET

bo close United States ports to any ship which has

carried goods in the bloc Cuba trade within 120

days of the time it seeks to enter a United

States port;

c.. prohibit all United States flag ships and all

ships owned by United States nationals or residents

from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying

any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

HH 50955

DooId: 32276061

Page

75

---

## Page 76

P SECRET

-7-

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department

or agency of the United States from being shipped

on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own

or control vessels engaged in the trade between

Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference

January 20-30, or at a later dated dependent on the Donovan

mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representa-

tive of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile,

Mexico and Brazil. to convey to them the importance

President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric

solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. : An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions

which continue to endanger the peace, deploring

refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presencé

of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance

and continued vigilance against subversive

activities, and terminating the invocation of the

Rio Ireaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension

of arms embargo to all items of trade except food

SECRET

NH 50955 • 0001d:32276061 Page 76

---

## Page 77

SECRET

- 8-

and medicine (fall back position: extension of

arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibit-

ion of All ships from transporting embargoed items

and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit

rights for flights to Cuba; and

4) a call on other states to take similar

action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key

countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS

members will be approached in Washington and in their

respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be

possible for this consultation and OAS action on the

resolutions to be completed within ten days.. Prior to

formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform

our NATO allies of the impending AS action..

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the

resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the

list of countries to which shipment

of COCOM list (strategic

items is prohibited.

8. After NATO

decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

NH 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page

77

---

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SECRET

- 9-

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations

to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment

9.

to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

the

In addition to

four point shipping resolutions, and

action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,

continue to press Free World nations to keep their

shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise

either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a

result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the

Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or

internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,.

should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or

bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of

Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity

including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward

surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also

have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping

the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as

177

appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

50955 • DocId: 32276061 Page 78

SECRET

---

## Page 79

SECRET

-10-

ment of Cuban officials in other countries;

severance of

communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping

destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive

naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use

of U. S. military

force..

To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed

against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained

free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations

desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

SECRET

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SECRET

Dxaf123 Jan 63

MEKORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S

EXECOTIVE COMMITTEE

Rupees for the meet

sten, Grang 25, 1963,4.p.n).

Coordinator

Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Untted States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Polley

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines

of United States polley with respect to Cuba in the following

words:

"As for oux part, lf all offensive weapons systems are

removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in

the future, under adequate verification and safeguardo,

and 1f Cuba 18 not

used for the export of aggressive

comnist purposes, there will be peace in che Caribbean.

And, as I said In September, 'we shall neither initlate.

nor peruit aggression in thie hemisphere."

"We will not, of course, abandon che political, economie

and other efforts of thie hemisphere to halt subversion

ETom Giba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people

shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very

alfferent from any Intent to launch a military Invasion of

the 1sland."

Oblectives

- Accordingly, the objectives of U.s. polley with respect to

Cuba are:

---

## Page 81

ASUREL

- 2"

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the

other states of the Organization of American States

(OAS) by assuring, that offensive weapons are not

reintroduced Into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soylet forcee from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military

action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilitles of the Castro regime to direct

and

support subversion and insurrection within the

Hemisphere

other out atates;

5., Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cuba that offer the possibillty of divorcing the Cuban

Government fron its support of Sino-Soviet Coumunist

purposes:

6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cube that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban

Goverment with a segime that would break with the

Sino-Soviet Bloc it being understood that our

ultimate objective le seplacement of the regime by

one fully compatible with the goals of the United

States:

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting

the Castro regime;

8.

---

## Page 82

SECRET

- 3 -

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro

regime from other free world states, and especially

from states

of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.s.

actions against Cuba should be multilateral,

preserably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by

the Organization of American States; The newly-won

hemisphere solidarity an the Cuban issue should not

be jeopardized by seeking AS actions of marginal

value and which might split the hemisphere.

9, Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical

support, the wide variety of military contingencies

that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;

and;

• 10. Producing comprehensive Intelligence related to che

above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. Io achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-

ment will be prepared to Increase the political....economic,

psychological and military pressures, as

appropriate

opportunities

SECRET

---

## Page 83

opportunities present themselves of can be created.. The actions

ilsted below are those requiring immediate approval and would

be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations:

for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing

progrens and upon the development of new programs related to

the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such ag

Intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban

officials as agente, radio broadcaots, support of

the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other

exile group activitles and infiltration of propagande

materials:

a) continue to intensify covert collection of

Intelligense within Cube, especially within

the regime;

b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban extles,

who are assoclated with the original alms of

the 26 of July Movement and who belleve that

the Castro regime can be overthrown fron

within in order that they may: 1) cause &

spile in the leadership of the regime at the

national or provincial levels; and. 2) createc

---

## Page 84

a political base of popular opposition to

the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

C. Assiot Cuban exiles in developing a capability

to launch balloons carzying leaflets and other

propaganda materiale from International waters

Into Cube. Launch propaganda balloons alter an

operational capability han been established.

2. Avalt results of Mr. Donoven'e iminent negotiations

with Eidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American

prisoners. Any of the setions llated below, 1f

taken before the conclusion of tie negotiations could

jeopardize their release.

3. If these negotiations fall, or whin the prisoners are

recovered, proceed on the followint timetable:

l. Inform NATO and DAs twelve hours in advance of the

proclamation of the four point shipping orders.

(The proclamation calla for the ordera to go into

effect in five days). These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all vessels of

3 country whose veltele engage in carrying are

to Cuba,

SECRET

---

## Page 85

- 60

Do close United States porte to any ship which has

carried goode in the bloe-Cuba crade within 120

days of the time it seeks to enter a United

States port,..

c. prohible all United States flat ships and all

ships owned by United States nationals or residents

fron entering any ports of Cube and fron carrying

any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

---

## Page 86

2 SECEN

or agency of the daired Sinter dion eins shipped

oi vessels owed or coticollat person. who of:

or control vessel: engined i do trde bored

Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

3. Arm irrination ol the U. S. Criors or M.1o: Conforce

suiry 20-30, of at a later date, depredator the Donovan

mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or moder representa"

Live of the President will visat the Fraride i of Child,

Mexico ind brazil to convey to them the toportiece

President Ronnedy diriche: to maintainir, trinkeric

solidarity by their supporting the follow re isolutions:

a. An Ons resolution condearing Cait tortis actions

which continue to endinger the perine aploring

tofusal co

sidow inspection, corte dug the presence

o1 Soviet troops, recommendin contara curvelliace

and continued vigilance against

subversive

activities, and cominating the invocation of che

Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, contitor with

b: An 0A5 resolutior wich would cemete tidion

of arme embargo co til itema di live axcepe rood

SECRET

---

## Page 87

SECRET

1=8=

and medicine (fall Back position: extension of

arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibit-

lon of AR ships from transporting embargoed items

and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit

rights for flights to Cuba; and

4) a call on other states to take similar

action.

6, After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key

countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS

members will be approached in Washington and in their

respective capitals, simultaneously, It should be

possible for this consultation and OAS action on the

resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to

formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will infor

our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal AS action on the

resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the

list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic)

1tems is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

L SECRET

---

## Page 88

SECRET

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations

to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment

to Cuba, not on the COCoM list.

9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and

action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,

continue to press Free

World nations to keep their

shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise

either

as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a

result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the

Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or

Internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,

should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or

bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of

W.

Cubans who are not Inside Cuba; more extensive air activity

including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward

surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may

alco

have the effect of embarrassing the Castro goverment and keeping

the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as

appropriate, including the Imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

SECRET

---

## Page 89

SECRET

- 10.

ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of

communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping

destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; Intensive

naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military

force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed

against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained

free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations

desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

SECRET

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## Page 90

50955

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## Page 91

(WITH REVISIONS)

38

CONE IDENTIAL

(WITH

1 TOP SPRET ENCLOSURES)

January 22, 1963

NDU. FOR:

Ti

401

The Honoral e Mece: ge Muory

All Members of he NSC Executive Committee

CUBA - Back-up rapers and a Summary of

Recommendations of the Coordinator

of Cuban iffairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator

of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.

2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.

3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization

of American States.

4. United States Policy Toward the Cutan Brigave.

5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be

considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on

Thursday, January 24.

x111am Brubeck

Enclosures:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL

(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES,

HH7 50955

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## Page 92

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1253, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with

respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States

and the other states of the Organization of

American States by assuring that offensive

weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c.

Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive

military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime

to direct and support subversion and insurrection

within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments

within Cuba that offer the possibility of

divorcing the Cuban Government from its

support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments

within Cuba that offer the possibility of

replacing the Cuban Government with a regime

that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

SECRET

NH 50955

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## Page 93

SECRET

- 2-:

2.

being understood that cur ultimate objective

is replacement of the regime by one fully

compatible with the goals of the United States;

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of

supporting the Castro regime;

h.

Maximizing the political isolation of the

Castro regime from other Free World states,

and especially from states of the OAS.

When

ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should

be multilateral, preferably based upon the

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on

resolutions adopted by the Crganization of

American States. The newly-won hemispheric

solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be

jeopardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal

value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment

of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or

logistical support, the wide variety of

military contingencies that may arise from

pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related

to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their

time sequence are set torth in the accached paper

entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.

They include the

four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

SECRET

NN 50955

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## Page 94

SECRET

-3-

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches

to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and

shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.

Existing programs will be reviewed and further

recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the

variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken

at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as

intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,

support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and

other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda

materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are

recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence

within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b.

support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to

return the 26 of July Movement to its

original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the

foregoing actions may impair our ability

to accomplish objective b. (Removal of

remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because

taking these actions could provide the

U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining

its

forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval.

of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a

specially tailored civilian and military program for

Brigade members. .

SECRET

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SECRET

=lf=

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit

and individual members urged to accept civilian training

or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program

for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter:

Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade

members and creation of a privileged class in the exile

community would be avoided.

SECRET

HIT

50955

DocId: 32276061

Page

95

---

## Page 96

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4

p.n.)

FROM

:

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-

lines of United States policy with

respect to Cuba in the

following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are

removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in

the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,

and if Cuba

is not used for the export of aggressive

communist purposes, there will be peace in the

Caribbean.

And, as I said in September, 'we shall

neither initiate nor permit aggression

• in this

hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course,

abandon the political,

economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt

subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that

SECRET

NN 50955

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---

## Page 97

...

D SECRET

-2-

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States

policy with respect to Cuba are:

1.

Protecting the security of the United States

and the other states of the Organization of

American States (OAS) by assuring that

offensive weapons are not reintroduced into

Cuba;

2.

3.

Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive

military action against other Caribbean states;

4.

6.

Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime

to direct and support subversion and insurrection

within the other Hemisphere states;

Encouraging and supporting any developments within

Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing

the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-

Soviet Communist purposes;

Encouraging and supporting any developments

within Cuba that offer the possibility of

replacing the Cuban Government with a regime

that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,

it being understood that our ultimate

objective is replacement of the regime by

one fully compatible with the goals of the

United States;

SECRET

HH 50955

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---

## Page 98

SECRET

- 3-

7.

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of

supporting the Castro regime;

8.

Maximizing the political isolation of the

Castro regime from other free world states,

and especially from states of the CAS.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba

should be multilateral, preferably based upon

the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)

or on resolutions

adopted by the Crganization

of American States.

The newly-won hemispheric

solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be

jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal

value

and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or

logistical support, the wide variety of

military contingencies that may arise from

pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10.

Producing comprehensive intelligence related

to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the

U. S. Government will be prepared to increase

the political economic, psychological and

military pressures, as appropriate opportunities

present themselves or can be created.

The

actions listed below are those requiring immediate

approval and would be initiated in the sequence

set forth below.

Recommendations for further

SECRET

NW 50955

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## Page 99

SECRET

in 44-

actions bäsed upon the re-examination of

existing programs and upon the development

of new programs related to the foregoing

objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such

as intelligence collection, recruitment of

Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,

support of the Cuban

Revolutionary Council(CRC)

and other exile group activities and infil-

tration of propaganda materials:

a. Intensify covert collection

of intelligence within Cuba, especially

within the regime;

b.

Support the efforts of certain Cuban

exiles, who are associated with

the original aims of the 26 of July

Movement and who believe that the

Castro regime can be overthrown from

within in order that they may:

1) cause a split in the leadership

of the regime at the national or

provincial levels; and 2) create a

political base of popular opposition

to the regime; and, 3) secure

intelligence;

C :

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a

capability to läunch balloons carrying

leaflets and other propaganda materials

from international waters into Cuba.

Launch propaganda balloons after an

operational capability has been

established.

SECRET

HH7 50955

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Page 99

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## Page 100

SECRET

- 5-

2.

With respect to the actions listed below,

the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent

negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing

the 20-odd American prisoners should first

be ascertained. If these actions were taken

before the conclusion of the negotiations

they could jeopardize the release of the

Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the

prisoners are recovered, proceed on the

following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance

of the proclamation of the four point

shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for

the orders to go into effect in five days).

These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all

vessels of a country whose vessels

engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship

which has carried goods in the Bloc-

Cuba trade within 120 days of the time

it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. Prohibit all United, States flag ships

and all ships owned by United States

nationals or residents from entering

any ports of Cuba and from carrying

any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SECRET

HH 50955

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## Page 101

5.

HIT

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Page

101

SECRET

-6-

Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any

department of the United States from

being shipped on vessels owned or

controlled by persons who own or

control vessels engaged in the trade

between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of

Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at

a later date dependent on the Donovan

mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or

another

representative of the President

will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico

and Brazil to convey to them the importance

President Kennedy attaches to maintaining

hemispheric solidarity by their supporting

the following resolutions:

a.

An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for

its actions which continue to endanger

the peace, deploring refusal to allow

inspection, condemning the presence of

Soviet troops, recommending continued

surveillance and continued vigilance

against subversive activities, and

terminating the invocation of the Rio

Treaty on the missile crisis, together

with

b.

An OAS resolution which would

recommend 1) extension of arms embargo

to all items of trade except food and

medicine (fall back position: extension

of arms embargo to all strategic items);

SECRET

---

## Page 102

SECRET

-7-

6.

Titte

2) prohibition of ships of OAS

member states from transportating

embargoed items and deny use of

ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and

transit rights for flights to Cuba;

and 4)

a call

on other states to

take similar action.

AG:!

After obtaining the maximum possible

support of

the key countries of Mexico,

Chile and Brazil, the other OAS

members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals

simultaneously.

It should be possible

tor this consultation and lAs action on

the resolutions to be completed within

ten days.

Prior to formal COAS approval

of the resolutions, we will inform our

NATO allies of the

impending OAS action.

7.

At the first NATO meeting

after formal

OAS action on the resolutions, we will

request that NATO include Cuba on the

list of countries to which shipment

of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8.

After NATO decision on our COCOM request,

we will seek to get agreement from Free

World industrial nations to prevent

shipping of critical spare parts and

equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9.

In addition to the four point shipping

resolutions, and action under Section

107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue

to press Free World nations to keep their

shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

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B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our

objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc

action in other parts of the world; as a result

of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)

by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a

result of uprisings or internal conflict within

Cubạ.

Our contingency planning, which will be

undertaken immediately, should include preparations

for increased multilateral and/or bilateral

political and economic measures, large scale use of

Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive

air activity including both high and low level

flights primarily directed toward surveillance

and collection of intelligence, and which may also

have the effect of embarrassing the Castro

government and keeping the Castro forces on

continual alert;

retaliatory measures, as

appropriate, including the imposition of a

POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in

other countries; severance of communications

to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping

destined for Cuba and on key installations to

i on hippine

Cuba; intensive naval pacrols; and, ultimately,

the use jof U. S. military force.

entens. S.

To the extent

feasible, U. S. military forces employed against

Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-

trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of

those Latin American nations desirous of

participating in the U. S. effort.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.J.)

FROM

.: Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of

American States.

SADELEM

as determine bee

nature Course of

is the OAS win espect soi Cuba.

2502!

52.Or

The Meeting of Foreign misters as unca dei Este An vat

' pus dan orcolen of Cuba

eTonly in lae-hemispheric contex..

that rootin the Foreigr

nasters excluded cuba from partici

meon

recte:

ide triderican system, declared en aras embargo,

and

¿outre arins Cubas subversive activinies in the

did Spl

Th:

5. invoked ne Rio Treaty on October 22,

, 19622 Pür Suant

thereto.

the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provision-

ally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimcue

sassed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of ali offensivo

¡capons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such act

"ricluding the use of armed force, as might be necessary to preve

continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prever.

the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere.

Ir accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. insti

tuted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican

Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered

their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the

Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context.

with the Organ of Con-

sultation still in being and

committees of the Council continuing

to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of

economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for

some lead from the U.S.

as to what further steps could be taken,

COURSES

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COURSES OF ACTION

(1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but

take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being

for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis.

If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either

be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed

circumstances.

(2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which

condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace,

deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of

Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued

vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would

represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step following the

conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is

believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling

for armed insur-

rection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently

vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put

the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemis-

phere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience

the Soviet Union:

to

(3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This

would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions

II and VIII of Punta del Este (Which provided for a Special Consul-

tative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the

further suspension of trade.)

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was

called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

Taken

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Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts

concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are

continuing our surveillance.

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would

appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence

of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification

surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive

weapons

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to

obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the

resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed

resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3)•

Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accom

panied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic

sanctions.

(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was

invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a

resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

Considerations:

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able.

to obtain a substantial majority.

Such action would give a better basis for urging such addi-

tional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless

we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement

action.

(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio

Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force,

to bring about the withdrawal of soviet troops in Cuba if the

OAS call is not heeded.

Considerations:

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Considerations:

This action should be seriously considered only if we are

determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet

troops.

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and

preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political

and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet

troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority

for authorization of the use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS OCto sever all diplomatic

and consular relations with fuba (probably possible only in con-

junction with (5) or

(11)•

Considerations:

This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase

the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies

encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for

such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would

be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile,

Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.

for this.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained

(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic

and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba

(probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11)

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would

go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides

for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the

U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.

Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would

probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel

with the Cuban people.

A number of telecommunications between Latin America and

Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services

would interrupt conmunications vital to many of our Latin American

friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be main-

tained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national

interest and those for humanitarian reasons.

These

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These considerations would make it extremely difficult to

obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta

del Este which would recommend:

(a)

extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except

food and medicine (Fall back position:

extension of

arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

(c)

prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed

items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet air-

craft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also

be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could

be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity

should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual

effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned

is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries

ship little except food to Cuba.

But it would show forward movement

and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an

appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps.

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S.

unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the

Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet

flights to Cuba.

(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended

controls over subversive activities. Seek. COAS resolution warning

Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action

under Rio Treaty.

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being

presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and

should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unani-

mous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because

of the reference to the Rio Treaty.

Pansalta

three Peded case

(11)

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(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued

subversive activities.

Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs.

the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be neces-

sary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the

COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under

Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveil-

lance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in

the hemisphere.

Should the level of Castro-directed subversive

activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become

a more feasible and desirable course.. This becomes an increasing

possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection

in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production

of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in

subversive activities in the hemisphere.

There is, however, in-

sufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS

action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under

way .)

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory

Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

This could be done:

(a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to

the IADB;

(b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or

(c)

having the OAS member governments designate their

representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred

to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set,. Moreover,

amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and

requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.

As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the

COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be diffi-

cult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the

Council of the desirability of such action.

As

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As to (c), member governments could take this course on an

individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that

"exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this

action under the OAS Charter.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with

respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international

so, the

complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.

Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance

us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would

involve minimum adverse

international effects.

We could probably

obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except

(10) and (12) •

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us

considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11)

particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would

involve adverse international effects, including a probable acute

confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best

interests at this time.

I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio

Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to

endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns

the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveil

lance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and

(b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still

leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIlI

of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative

nate response res

Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further sus-

pension of trade.

Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution

VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except

food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of

arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

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(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items

and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c)

denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet air-

craft on Bloc-Cuba runs.

(d)

a call upon other Free World nations to take similar

actions.

Rationale

The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our

objective, carrying the OAs with us, without committing us to any

further action.

After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess

the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with

any. of the remaining courses of

action, or any new courses which

may be opened to us by events.

I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradu-

ally, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation

under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate

additional measures.

I do not believe we should take a track now which will break

hemispheric unity.

We may need unity later in an emergency.

Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable

acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay:

for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT:

Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the Cuban

Brigade (participants in the Bay of

Pigs invasion recently released from

Cuban prisons), and other Cubans wiro

participated in or trained for the

invasion. To determine the future of

existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay

of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great

majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over

1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and

other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically

proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts

toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively

marginal military value because of its quantitative

limitations and restricted military capability, but its

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→ 2-

politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban

resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate

for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be

weighed.

COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear

feasible with respect to the

Brigade's future.

(1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military

unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and

their families would be eligible for the benefits now

accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area

(approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent

to those received by American citizens in Dade County,

Florida who are in need. The principal ones include:

financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family

and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization

and out-patient facilities at county

and private hospitals

for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities;

employnent counseling; resettlement, including transportation

and a transition grant; foster care

for unaccompanied

children; special English and refresher courses for doctors

and lawyers at University of Miami;

a student loan program

for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides

up to $1,000 a year;

supplemental assistance to Dade

County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of

cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary

and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part

of special language courses and vocational training; and

physical examinations and inoculations at time of

entry into the U.S.

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DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the

U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18

and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program

for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides

20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they

are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status.

They are not required to know English. A two week period

for resettlement is also provided at the termination of

the training•

Another DOD program enables former officers of the

Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly

selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces.

Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is

necessary.. The officers are in civilian status. They

receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and

a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer

available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and

most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide

equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent

to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for

service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill

and country knowledge could be distributed through various

U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that

it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade

as a result of Administration statements and actions; it

would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique"

the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying

Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would

probably engender some adverse political reaction

domestically as well as from the Brigade and its

sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect

on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the

Free World concerning the determination of the United States

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to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to

arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence

with the Castro regime.

(2) . Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a

unit.

Maintain and support them as a military reserve

component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whater "mystique" the

Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps

be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used

to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile

community.

It would constitute an immediate political and

psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans

within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin

Atericans, the U. S. determination to establish a

striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the

present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed

by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit

among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with

the statements and actions of the Administration in

connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for

Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and

morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to

maintain over the long term without early employment to

retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and

military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups

in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a

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risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members,

as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of

serious embarrassment to the U.S.

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military progran

Ior Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue

as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flving Tigers".

Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current

military training program for Cubans to establish a

Brigade military reserve component which other U.S.

militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the

following additional benefits for Brigade members in

need, over and above those now offered: special employ-

ment counseling and placement service; extended student

loans to provide for all institutional costs such as

tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per

year (living costs to be provided by another agency);

expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased

financial assistance to needy persons while in training;

increased distribution of surplus food (with approval

of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be under-

taken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such

action would contribute to the defense and security

of the United States or advance its foreign policy

interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for

vocational training anywhere in the United States; an

expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of

Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost

of these

additional programs, assuming an expenditure

of $2,500 per person per year would be about $2.5 million.

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Establishment of additional programs, after a

Presidential determination, would increase costs even

more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary"

privileges for Brigade members.

COORDINATORS 'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored

program for Brigade members.

2. I recommend against a Presidential determination

providing broader privileges for Brigade members.

3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military

training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve

unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should

be permitted to join.

4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than

forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange

consultation with them immediately if this course of

action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we

should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may, in the

future desire the presence in the U.. S. Armed Forces of

militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade:

members to enlist in the existing military training

program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit

thereafter.

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Our programs should be designed to encourage

the Brigade members to melt back into the exile

community and engage in constructive pursuits

pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer

them some special assistance but not to the extent

that they become a perpetual privileged class

within the community: Presidential action on their

behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m)

FROM

SUBJECT:

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.

2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.

3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus

Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to a

U. S. citizen.

" Cuban subversive activities in the Western

Hemisphere.

5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan, -Pagald Mf

6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a

political weapon against the Castro regime.

7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban

Revolutionary Council and exile groups.

8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic X

paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.

9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in

intensified intelligence collection; Policy on

illegal infiltration and exfiltration.

10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia

flights to Cuba.

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70903

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11402%

This document consists or

23

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIE 10

--pages

-Copies, Stries -

231s material contalsa Intonnation atcoilar uba National Delonse of the Unitod Bustos vithin tho meaning of the Popionage Lawa, Tyre

U.S.O. Ecca. 793 and 708, the ernachalaston or rovolation of walet in any manner to an unautborzed

person la probiblied by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY .

Cuba

REPORT NO.

CS DB-3/652,924

SUBJECT

Analysis of the Cuban

Situation by the Italian

Embassy in Habana

DATE DISTR.

17 January 1963

NO. PAGES

4

REFERENCES

DATE OF

INFO.

PLACE &

DATE ACQ.

6 December 1962

RD-W-2088

RD-W-2107

610,

THIS IS

Italy, Rome

(21

December 1962)

P'alload

FIELD REPORT NO.

UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.

SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

A qualified,

astute observer (B) who has contacts in the

Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of

Content: 2, that the document is genuine.

The following is a translation of a report dated

6 December

1962 sent by

the

Italian Embassy

in

Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aflairs.

In my dispatch of 9 Novenber I reported on some of the

considerations regarding the consequences which the recent

crisis could have on the international position of Cuba.

I

will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been

reported by some members of our representations.

The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of

the political and economic ties with the USSR

to be nil at this time.

The fact that the talks with Mikoyan

were long and difficult and that Castro expressed in private.

his opinion on Khrushchev

(wishing

that Stalin were still

alive) does not mean

that he can and will renvunce that

Soviet assistance which is vital

to him. This assistance

cannot be replaced by the Chinese.

Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have

done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and

fact the latter held firm on the question of inspection).

Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is

intense.

Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR

in economic

assistance.

It does not

seen probable to me

that _China/ can

furnish more than it has

furnished

to date,

consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather shoddy

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wool. and

silk material,

and many trifles of which the stores

in Habana

are full.

As for machinery and spare

parts, /China7

a pusition to compete with that merchandise supplied

the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined

as pro-Khrushchev, is

tied to the USSR in such

cannot for any reason release himself.

I recall in this

regard that on 2 Yovember, after the visit of U Thant during

the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations,

he declared,

"We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends

of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations.

Given this,

I feel that the

statements of the vice director

of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a good

esume of the situation, i.e., a) soviet leaders have for

some time felt perplexed with

regard to Castro's character

and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by

b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic

support to Cuba because otherwise its

prestige would suffer a

grave blow particularly in Latin America.

2)

Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that

the rovolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into a

"Titost" regime.

It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador

Zoppi reported, some

"non-aligned" countries and

'Latin American countries desire such a change and are doing

everyching possible to provoke

It is also possible that

some

Cubins share these sentiments.

in my opinion, it

is impossible that such a change can take place while Castro

is in power.

so I pointed out in my previous report,

not in Castro's temperament to become

"non-aligned"

imitate anyone, and even less to take Tito as a model.

Cherefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this

possibility seems very remote.

3)

As I noted in my 9 November report it

is difficult for

Castro to remain

Therefore

the revolutionary

will contirue with all neans at its disposition to disseminate

subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated

by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including

Mexico, are taking strong measures against the dissemination

of this propaganda.

But it is doubtful that today Castro can

do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the

security of other countries, if only because he lacks the

necessary funds.

I tend to share the opinion of the

Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to

concentrate all their subversive efforts in

that:

one country, and

they

have selected Venezuela for various reasons,

includ-

ing the

old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt.

I note

in passing that, according to what was told me by the

afore-

mentioned Ambassador,

"during the recent meeting of the OAS the

• Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the

recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish

proof, he was unable to do so.

It would certainly be highly desirable if a

pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely

Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in

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Buenos Aires.

But it is an extremely remote possibility.

countries which could do it do not have the necessary material

A partial solution would worsen the situation and a

definitive solution could be directed

only by Washington.

think therefore that only

pressure which is accompanied by

material strength can obtain results in Cuba.

In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation

necessary first

in mind the personality and

temperament

of Fidel

Castro,

the influence which he has on a part of

population,

finally his deep-rooted hate of the United

States.• It

is useless

to say that the Cuban revolutionary

regime,

purged of some

fanaticism, could be a

for other

Latin

American countries.

This would not take into

account the mentality of the Cuban

leaders and

particularly

their: chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to

imitate no one.

Furthermore it is too late to select another

path.

As Guevara said the other day in an interview for the

Daily Worker,

"this is a battle to the death with the United

States in which the most possible danage must

be done to the

adversary."

Undoubtedly,

after the events of October and November,

Fidel Castro is

in a descending parabola.

But how long this

descent will last no one can say today.

The only certain

thing is that the economic situation is getting worse every

and therefore the

revolutionary regime needs the

assistance of the whole Communist world.

Only last night

a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who

heads the most important institution of the country - the

Institute for Agrarian Reforn - left..

The mission will go

first to Moscow and then to Peiping.

new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits;

to permit the Cubans to last through 1963, which will cer-

tainly be the most difficult year.

But economic assistance can pernit this country to

survive, not resolve

its problems.

For a definitive solu-

would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans

to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the

which they have.

Agricultural

production, princi-

pally sugar cane,

as has been recognized

fanatics of industrialization, constitutes the basis of

the Cuban economy.

But how can they hope for a good

harvest if,

for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary

which should last ten years are unusable after two years?

It is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime

solely on the basis of economic

factors.

The people suffer

an insufficiency. of food and clothing. But for another

year they will find a way to get by.

the decisive and at the same

time prudent

policy followed by the United States in the recent months

is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the danger

of strategic weapons has. been eliminated, the wisest measure

is to let the situation mature.

Certainly Fidel Castro will

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present

some

mole

"headaches" to the United States; but the

atmosphere is changed and

-even without counting

01!

the

hypothetical coup d'etat of Castro whieh would

solution of the

{crce the

probien

1- one can hope

for a perhaps not too

distant day when all will get tired of him.

So long as the

Cubans.

insist on

the known five points

and the United States

refuses

any guarantees;

so long

as the USSR is obliged to

feed Castro to permit his

survival,

the less uncomfortable

position

appears to

me to be that of the Government in

Washington.

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