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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

1.

Attached is Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials

About NOSENKO - which is part of the summary entitled,

Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich

NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968.

The

aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review

on

13 March 1978.

2.

Certain portions of Annex A of this study are

deleted since it contains information which bears on the

security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related

thereto.

3.

We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A

when your review has been

completed.

Attachment:

As Stated Above

Declassified and Approved for Release

by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2003

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

SECRET

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1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret

study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB

Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10) .

Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for

your review.

2.

We have deleted certain portions of these pages

containing information which bears on the security of

ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3.

We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A

and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment:

Pages VI, VII, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278

281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and

357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

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Top Secret

CONTENTS

PAGE

VIII SEVENTH DEPARIMENT (January 1962-January 1964)

(Cont.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department

(July 1962-January 1964)

KGB Operations

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIYS

Investigation of SLESINGER

Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN.

GRU Agent SHUBIN

Arrest of BARGHOORN

Investigation of OSWALD

Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Contents

NOSENKO's Travel Document

Return to Geneva (January-February, 1964)

Purpose of Trip

Visits to KGB Legal Residency

Avallability for Meetings with CIA

NOSENKO's Written Notes

NOSENKO'S Defection

The Recall Telegram

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department

Operations

Operational Activities (July 1962-

January 1964)

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among

American Tourists

Information Furnished the KGB by

GeoIge BLAKE

KGB Study of American Intelligence

/ 1

Tourist Operations

NOSENKO's Information

Summary

Summary

and Conclusion

291

2.92

292

293

295

2.96

298

303

303

305

307

309

314

315

316

3.17

318

318

319

320

324

32.5

326

326

327

327

330

331

331

(v1)

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CONTENTS

IX OTHER ASPECIS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE

Relationship with General GRIBANOV

Communist Party Status

Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures

Awards

Decorations

Sourcing

Ranks

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIAIRIC ASSESSMENI

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

Annex A - Statements

of

soviet Officials About.

NOSENKO

Annex B

- Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

PAGE

335

335

338

342

345

349

350

355

357

Index of Personalities

361

399

437

(v11)

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(FOUNDATIONS

OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from soviet

officials'

statements about him since his defection coin-

cides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According

to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-

gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,

defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased ilinister, he

served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings

were overcome

through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV,

and in connection wit operations against Americans he

occupied positions of progressively greater trust and

responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief

of the

largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)

Chief

Directorate.

According to these sources, his defection

wrought

severe damage "for

years to come" to the KGB

because of his krowledge of KGB

operations against American

targets, and his treachery prompted

the expulsion and

disgrace of numerous senior KGB

personnel, the recall of

many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB

operations in the United

States, and extraordinary plans to

assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in

Annex A.

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.

second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow

Special Naval School required prior completion of the

Seventh Class NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he

and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he

completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942.

They returned

to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the

School (then in Kuybyshev) where he

completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943

NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

School (then in Baku) •

After just six months in Baku, without completing the

Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to

MOScOW.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran

away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and

that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku

and then

spent the period 1943-1945

Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of

Annapolis. Ile has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the

Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval.

Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he

resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO

received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being

month, he left the Naval school.

" Comment:

NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by

a jealous naval officer whom he then protected

by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,

and that he actually did accidently shoot him-

a sensitive source the affect that

in quoted 0e

the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoic

being

sent to the front while attending a naval

college in

1942.

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• Comment:

(Continued)

After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,

Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered

to CIA that he had known the son of the

Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in

Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-

building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he

the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to

no she denied an

the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on

his early life. However, this portion of his claimed

biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-

abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his

father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the

schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics

(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and

formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of

which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's

claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO

and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945

are accepted as true.

si...

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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute

course was of four years' duration and

that he entered

the

Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'

duration and that because he failed a state examination

he

was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'

duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it

was of five years' duration but he failed an examination

which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment:

See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB

upon graduation Irom the Institute In 1y4/.

The duration of the Institute course and the

date of NOSENKO's completion are material to

the plausibility of his claimed Naval

Ru service,

which he said followed almost immediately upon

his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953!

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at

the Institute of International Relations he entered the

Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post,

finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the

intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.

A sensitive source

is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO

served in the RU. According tou

, NOSENKO attended Whis

the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU

Information Department for about a year before securing a

transfer to the KGB through his father's influence.

NOSENKO

denies having attended

the Military-Diplomatic Academy and

has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports)

Department,

although he had on occasion claimed to have held

Reports assignments.,

SOU

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A sensitive source

two

mans has quoted /KGB officerse

respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947

or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact

that he claims it launched his

intelligence career and

served as the means through which he

secured appointment

to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more

years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a

significant period of his adult life for which he should

have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his

actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to

determining the time from which his claims about KGB service

can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU

service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his

1964 defection,

it was the topic on which he made one of

his initial retractions and his first admission that he had

earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval

RU

service was consequently prominent in interrogations in

1964, 1965 and 1966.

However, throughout these interrogations,

challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted

adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from

the

Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as

challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-

ments with respect to his RU service.

The extent of the

still-unreconciled discrepancies and

contradictions in

NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison

of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1982

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations

in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.

He did not amplify how he drew

such an assignment.l

September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,

Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East

"so

no one would think he would

take advantage of his father's

position".

assigned to a radio signals interception

unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite

Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by

monitoring the communications of American units operating in

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January

1962-January 1964)

• FRIPPEL was. a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-

NOSENKO said that although he had

recruited

him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent."

The

KGB

nevertheless hoped that

FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Mos-

cow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the

FRIPPEI, case.!

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees

with NOSENKO that they met twice

in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts

he also met NOSENKO in Oäessa

in February 1962.

which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL 1S known

to have planned to

travel to the Soviet Union

at that time, and there is no apparent reason

why he would make a false claim on this matter.

a sensitive sourcen

According tod

MaN, FRIPPEL, WhO 1S nOw

in New York City.

1S

a current target of the

→ Soviet intelligence service.

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFRSUND compromised to American

Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 19611 and

thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em.-

bassy in Moscow.

For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take

PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh De-

partment.

As the agent

spoke only Finnish and Russian, however.

he was of no use against English-speaking tourists.

met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,

but did not use him in any operations.

Conment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB

agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.1751

and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent.

return visits to Moscow, it was only because

NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and

drinking.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

who was (erroneously) considered to be a CIA officer.

SHAKHOV "mayhe" häd sone contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961.

but NOSENKO did not know the substarce of it.

A counter-

intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M.

GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV

and he

had noted "little details".

While SHAKHOV was in the united

States, earlier, he had been terminated las an agent by

KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SlAkroy

liked life in the Unites States, American products, and

In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"

not wanting to worl: as an agent'

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that

service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV

was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being

an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs,

and "the KGB could do nothing about his

trips abroad'.

•There was no proof, only suspicions, and

furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal

staff of

the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Isarapkin."

Accordin?

to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment:

a sensitive souces

SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United

States since 1942, when he was assigned to the

Soviet Consulate General in New York.

Ho at-

tended the 1945 Conference on International

Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-

tended

number of sessions of the UN General

Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned!

to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the soviet

Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV Iden-

tified him as an MVD (KGB] officer whom he 1s

certain he saw at MVD Headquarters In Moscow,

# identified him as

KGB": and KGB

defectors PETROV and DERYABIN

have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's

face

'was faniliar'.

An FBI source, however,

in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a 'pure diplomat"

and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged

in no soviet intelligence activity until that

time.

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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions

of SHAKHOV in Geneva.

He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then

watched

for an indication that he passed it on to his American

contacts.

SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance

tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,

while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had

forewained the Americans about the meetirg.

Finally NOSENKO

revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and

checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared

materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO'S

conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion.

and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-

turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still

"under suspicion", according to

a sensitive source.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO Said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-

man

Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and

as

such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the

entire delegation.

(KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.

TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left

Geneva before NOSENKO nade the foregoing statement to CIA.]

To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO

had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB

who were serving in the delegation. INOSENKO has never re-

ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates

in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants

provided him.)

NOSENKO has never been precise

about how he spent his days

and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed

of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little

to do.

He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he

pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most

of the delegation.

No one paid him any attention.

It was

known that he

was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs

officer, and ne could

absent himself from conference

meetings

at any time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu. I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing.

NOSINKO related in i96? that he and GUK were together neary

every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have

few drinks.

As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access

the residency and was able to elicit intormation about some

of GUK's operations 1a Geneva.

He described his "big. big

friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the

only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access

to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to

GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A .

because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUi was

dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and

identified nim as Chict of the Illegals Directorate of the

IGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoon with

him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationshig.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with

T'SYMBAL since 1960 or

1961, when he was looking foi some

candidates for recruitment aud came across some hose baci-

ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegale:

Directorate.

NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-

quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer

to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be

assigned to the United States.

In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had

dinner together several times

a week, sometimes accompanied

by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,

NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency

in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was

granted access

in 1961.

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NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First

Chief Directorate because of his business transactions

with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in

whom he seemed to show more than

casual interest.

The

First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that

SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with

some Soviets, to study them.

SLESINGER had visited the

Soviet Union

several times.

Learning SLESINGER planned

another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he

might make some contacts or do something interesting"

while visiting the Soviet Union.

The KGB wanted to

resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an

agent or operational contact of the FBI.

The KGB had

a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the

American Section of

the Seventh Department, Yu. M.

DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer.

An agent

of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-

graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly

with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet

Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.

SLESINGER went to Odessa to

visit relatives, and DVORKIN.

directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who

could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication

of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted

to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,

SLESINGER had travelled to the

Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment:

A sensitive source

* had reported to the

FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to

be an FBI "plant"

and that KGB officer

• "might be trying to develop

SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some

other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially

coriect.

Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,

reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his

June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.

In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a

Soviet official who exhibited "intimate

knowledge" of his business in New York

City and had asked whether SLESINGER had

"ever been bothered by the FBI."

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Comment:

(Continued)

In 1966 SLESINGER: reported to the FBI. that.

he was in touch with a Moscow photographic.

shop proprietor, and he described evidence

of KGB interest in him during his visit to

Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the

Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in

contact with a number of Soviet officials

from the United Nations.

NÖSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned

Of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate

case.

(ROTEN'

Arrest and the KGB Agent

NOSENKO was

asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was

involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the

USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO

identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for

Atton Tours In New York City (and hence an employee of

Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested

on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN

was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific

and Technicäl (S&T) Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know. the

agent's name, but from the description he provided he is

believed identical witho

4 a KGB S&T

agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report

from

a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist

Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World Wär

to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among

dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens,

particularly among Russian Jews.

[NOSENKO explained

in

another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts

with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service

has frequently inspired süch contacts. Because of these

many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and

Second

Directorates had concluded that (KOTEN might be a

"provocation

agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks. of the

Communist Party in the United States.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-

traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor

in New York City.

SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet

Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958

or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of

duty in

the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN

was the target of Seventh Department case officer

A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was

placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance

observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a llinistry of Defense

automobile, the GRU was asked about the American.

"They

very furtively said that they were interested in him,"

from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign

corn to his sov,

visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name

and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.

NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office

and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according

to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by

others).

SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for

having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's

interest

in SHUBIN.

a sensitive source

Comment: Earlier, &

miss identified af

agent apparently identical with SHUBIN

and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel

to the USSR in summer 1961 and in

September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport

between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited

the Soviet Union during that period it was

not as an American tourist under his true

name.

Consequently, he could not then have

been the tourist target of the Seventh

Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.

If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring

to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further

contradiction: NOSENKO could not have

noticed his name while reviewing tourist

lists in the Seventh Department, because

he claims he was in the American Department

at the time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-

PANOV's disappearance.

The area was covered

with

very deep

woods, "where a person could los himself for life". On the

seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in

where he was on his

way to the Iranian border.

Baku,

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying

S.M.

FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-

cers.

They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow.

interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed

to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked

why, he said he was

"angry at the KGB, very angry", and

besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some

money in return for the documents.

4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist

who was a librarian interested in Russian books.

He said he

had given the documents to the American in the entrance

hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Irade was also

housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had

eluded the KGB between the two

fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the

Second Chiet Directorate sufferea considerable criticism

for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock

surveillance.

CHEKEPANOV himself, however, told the KG!

that if he had detected his surveillants he would have

written to the government

and newspapers a letter of protest

against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then

would have cormitted suicide, leaving the KGB

without proof

of his guilt.

sensitive sources,

Comment: Other sources, including @hise

have also reported various aspects of the

CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the

CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to

his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department at the time.

313

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Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, MOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB

Legal

Residency once during the morning

before he met with

CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those

times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of

4 February he again stopped in at the

were again no such messages for him.

of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the

Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and

i coast et attending he"

Residency, but there

Later in

the morning

found that a telegram from KGB Headguarters had arrived,

instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to partici-

pate in the KGB conference on tourism.

After relating the

substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-

forth in CIA custody•

Comment:

Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's

assertion regarding the existence of the recall

telegram.

According to Special Intelligence,

there were enciphered communications from Moscow

to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and

later, but there was none from 1815 on 3

February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours

after MOSENKO was in custody of CIA. /

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Top Secret

(SEVENTII DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO'S Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations

in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram

and that

it prompted his defection.

In October 1966, however, while

veing questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had bee::

no telegram recalling him

to Mosco!! from Geneva, and he

signed the following statement:

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact

in Geneva

that a telegram from Headquarters in

Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in

Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow.

I said

at the time that this telegram said that I was

recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB

activity against tourists for the 1964 season.

I

maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent

interviews and interrogations by American authorities

in 1964 and 1965.

No such telegram ever existed.

No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that

the story was a lie.

I myself invented this tele-

gran in order to hasten my defection.

I was nervous

and afraid that my

contacts with American Intelli-

gence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964

(see p. 319) included brief

reference to thirteen other KGB

operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as

tourists during

the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited

in the description of these operations in Annex B, these

opcrations are not material to MOSENKO's claim to service

in 1962-1963

as cither Chief of the American-British

Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department.

325

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Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January. 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy

Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO

describes KGB invölvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations

Of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,

his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his aasignment

to Geneva.

Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as

he described and they were as he described (there are substan-

tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGe

elements other than the Seventh Department, they are atypical

with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-

ment

operations. They do not accurately characterize, as

NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against

tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department

service.

NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to

Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier

assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was

not a lieutenant colonel

as the temporary duty authorization

indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy

Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would

have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions

which he claimed to have held.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations

Among American Tourists

1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed

awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

326

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Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSEUKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

a

sensitive source

As indicated in Annex A, da

reported

several items of information he stated he obtained from

various KGB colleagues.

According to these reports, GRIBANOV

was expelled from

the KGB as a

i consequence of NOSENKO's

defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired

because he had been NOSINIO's friend and patron, that

GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection

of his

protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to

Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO

Ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's

father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief

and been en

dcspite his junior rant because of GRIBANOV's influence,

and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party

because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's

procuring women for parties which he and the General arrarged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to

refer to this special and personal relationship, which

touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO'S KGB

service.

Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain

this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted

or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by

other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted

GRIBANOV wrote

the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given

(Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness

reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women

provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two

occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.):

recruited

Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO

(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-

ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.):

1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador

336

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Top Secret

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in

successively senior positions of authority from which he

derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and

results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet

Union in the perica 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim,

he provides an impressive array of information about KGB

personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent.

ration which, e

that it has been

confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his

bona fides.

Various soviet officials, including intelli-

gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO g

claims.

According to some of these sources, NOSENKO waS

¿ senior KGB officer who occupied a series

of sensitive

positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust

despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection,

"the

greatest loss

ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence"

paralyzed

the work of

KGB

The examination has

compared

each element of NOSENKO's

biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known

facts and reasonable surmise.

The examination reflects

the test to which his accounts were put:

whether his

accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known

fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has

e on oat t2 one

from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.

In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own

accounts?

357

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• TOP SECRET

1.

Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study

entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB

Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).

Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier

for your review.

2.

Certain portions of Annex A of this study are

deleted since it contains information which bears

on the

security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related

thereto.

3.

We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A

when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As

Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

EZ IMPDET CL BY 011340

... TOP SECRET

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## Page 24

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Top Secret

Annex A

Statements of Sovlet Officials Abour NOSENKO

= February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

- February 1964

The Chlef of che Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified

the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that

NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as

4 February.

They speculated privately between themselves

that he might have been

"poisoned"

or injured in an auto-

mobile accident.

& February 1964

An official spokusman of the soviet Misgion

in Geneva

reported to the swiss police that NOSENko, an "expert

remporarily assigned to Geneva"

, had been missing for four

days.

2 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports

attributed

to both Soviet and

Swiss sources that NOSENKO

had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The swiss press quoted unidentified soviet sources

as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

361

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Top Secret

( Аппех А)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of state press release was issued

identifying NOSENKO

as KGB officer and

acknowledging

h18

request for political asylum in the United

States.

According to a sensitive source,

Because of hig

long tenure in

the

KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of

important information which he could impart to intelligence

agencies

of other countries.

Certainly, he would be

acquainted with many KGB empluyees

and

could identify

them.

He also would be Intimately

acquainted with a large number

of soviet agents working inside the USSR against American

and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source,

The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning

KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence

operations of the KGB In Moscow and also KGb personalities

working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly

familiar with all koB personallules in Geneva and certainly

knew some KGB poisonalities in other countles.

Comment: NOSENKü identified a number of KGB officers

in

Genevi; he asserted that

some others, known

by Cli to be connected with the KGB, were not.

362

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source

1833

NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for

approximately sixteen years, since about

1947, and was an

employee of the second

Chief Directorate in Moscow.

kig

father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the

Soviet

Union

and

also Minister of the Shipbullding Industry.

There 1s a shipyard named

after NOSENKO's father in the

Ukraine.

Comment:

NOSENKU claims to have gerved in the GRU until

1933, when he entered the liß.

According to a sensitive source,

It appeared quite certain to

officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

several kog

Comment:

NOSENKO was

at the time clalming to have been

a KGi

lieutenant colonel:

According to a sensitive source,

Sales

afrom KGB officers cordi

The

worked with

NOSENKO for geveral years

1n KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who

11kes to be fashionably dressed at all times and 1s fond

of women, by nature a friendly individual and

generally

well-liked by his

fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the

Second Chief Directorate.

363

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment:

The photograph accompanying

American

and Swiss press

accounts of NOSENKO's defection

was by error not that of NOSENKO but of

a sensitlye source Vladimir SHUSTOV,

whom ensus and NOSENKO both

identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the

Geneva

Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB

officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, COLITSYN recalled that

NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working

against American citizens.

Comment:

Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962

(before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of

Soviel delegates to the Disarmament Conference.

NOSENED'S

name, which

was on the list, did not

at that tine prompt any comment

GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department

of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to

How NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release,

and to demand an immediate Interview with him.

ask

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the

Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press

In which he strongly condemned the swiss authoritles for

permitting NOSENKU's "kidnapping"

and for hindering efforts

to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate

stepg be

taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet

custody.

364

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 Peontinued!

At simultaneou: press conterences in

been and Geneva, the

Swiss rejected these accusations of non-coogeration and

noted

the sovlei delay in adulsing the pollce of NOSENKO's disappea-

rance and soviet sallure

to cooperate with Swiss authoritles

in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earler promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered

to the State Department.

A noncommittal reply was given to

Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the

means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in

order to obtain assurance that the defection had been

voluntary.

Arrangements

were made to have NOSENKO meet with

swiss and

soviet representatives in Washington as soon

possible.

NOSENKD arriviu in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Sorlet Forelgn Minister GROMYKO read to

Ambassador KOHLER

i statement deploring the "evasive" reply

of the State Department to soviet Inquirles in Washington

and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance

365

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 leontinued)

"gross provocation by imerican Intelligence organs"

CHOMIKO repeRied

the demand for NOSENKO's immediate

release

from American

custody

The

counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at

the washington offices of the U.S. Inmigration and Naturald-

zation Service.

The suviet confrontation immediately after-

handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and

Third Secretaly V.F. ISANOV, a recent arrival in Washington.

NOSENKO told both the swiss

and the Soviets that he had

defected of his own free will after careful consideration

and that he had no desire to return to the soviet Union.

response to KORNIENkO's questions, he spacificaliy renounced

his status and rights as a soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a soviet diplomat in Buenos Alres, told

a CIA agent that he had attended the

Institute of Inter-

national Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV,

NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background,

was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious

for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

366

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(Annex

A)

Top Secret

367

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Top Secret

368

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Top Secret

According to a sensitive source,

NOSENIO had been in the Second Chief Directorate

for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the

employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure

of the KGB and knows many personnel of the Firet Chief

Directorate.

NOSENKO, as

Deputy

to the Chief

of the Seventh

Department, had in his possession a telephone

directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees

In Moscuw.

Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departmentsals officer

these phone books.

expressed the

opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and

CiA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he

knows so much about the methods of work of the first and

Second Directorates of the KGB and is famillar with so many

Individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad.a

Strata KGB office

saws sald

that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and

British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning

defense secrets

o1 the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO 1s much

more knowledgeable in Intelligence and counterintelligence

operations

of the icb."

Comment:

NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB

telephone book referred due

369

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370

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2. 17

According to a sensitive source, a

in a response to a question

whether NOSINIO actually defected or whether

the defection might be a

KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter,

he was convinced that WiSENIO's defection was not a "trick" hy the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with vardous unnamed KGB

officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel

stationed

at th: murican Enbassy in Moscow, and with his

help

agents

were developed

these Americans.

It 1s

assuned by the ill that he is tamillas vich

the number and

location of micro gro in

the Embassy.

Comment:

Alchragn doSeNko knew

that there were micro-

phone:

in three reneral locations in the

Embaisy,

his

specific information regarding

the

number and location of microphones was

linied to that contained in a critten

list

to Geneva

1: 1964, i list which he

Claimed

no one in the KGB

kntir he had.

24 February 1964

Women claining

i to the wife and mother uf NoSENKO

visited the amerian lmbassy in Moscow fo: the first time,

expressing disbelrei that

11 c

had

voluntarily betrayed his

family and

country und requesting a persoral

meeting with

him.

371

Top Secret

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....7

Sacs

(Annex

A)

24 February 196: (continued)

Comment:

NOSENKO confirmed their identities as

his wife

and

mother on

the basis of

physical descrip-

tions.

On only one previous occasion

have

members of a defector's family called on a

foreign

embassy in

Moscow.

Following

the

defection of Yurly Vasilyevich KROTKOV in

England in 1963, his wife appeared at the

British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

According to a sensitive source,

KUROCHKIN (Enu),

KGB SaT officer scheduled for assignment to Washington,

will not be sent is

he is

"well-known" to NOSENKO.

In the

course of his duties

in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often

visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a

¿esult, NOSENKO is "more

than casually acquainted with him"

Comment: NOSENKO has never Identified KUROCHKIN nOr

referred to the name.

372

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONUV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in

the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO'3

defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval

preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO 1n

1944-1946.

Comment:

ARIAMONOV's description of the school and of

the dates involved differs from those. claimad

by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a

CIA double agent in Vienna) TULAYEV said that NOSENKO,

whon he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved

h1 s

wife and children, and earned a good salary.

(TULAYEV

later said on another occasion that he had friends who

knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment:

NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name oi

phötograph.

When asked, NOSENKO denied

knowing him.

373

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February-March 1964

+

According to a sensitive source:

commission

was in the

process of studying

"the scale of loss" (caused

by NOSENKO's defection)

USSR. The commission

very large, formed from different departments of the KGB.

The study (sic) was made "because it is aupposed that

NOSENKO had access to

many rocket matters, to many nuclear

matters, to

strategical objects of the country...many

details

about life of the leaders of the country, in the

government...that he knew very much about internal relations

between the people working in the KGB, that he had many

close frlends among them and (spent)

days and nights

together with them.

The whole history of his life was

studied step by step very carefully."

374

TS No. 197124

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2 March 14tu

According to a sensitive

source,

me(from conversations with varioue

unnamed KGB

officers

SAM: NOSENKO knows many

of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and

departnents at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.

In KGB Head-

quarters thure are four

separate dining rooms

for personnel

who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs

and deputias of departments.

Because of

th 18

fact, NOSENKO

has

a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms

until the January-March 1965 interrogations,

when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally

in the "chiefs' dining room".

375

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_Top Secret

(Annex

A)

23 March 1964

The two

claiming to be the wife and mother of

NOSENKO made the

last

of five visits to the Embassy in

Moscow.

NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required

some definite statement in writing from her husband so that

she could plan for her own future and

that of the NOSENKO

children.

376

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to

a sensitive source

#(from various unnamed KGB officers

-certain

There seems to be unanimous opinion among

SS KGB

chiefs

that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a tre-

mendous amount of harm.

NOSENKO In his position as a de-

puty chief in one of the departments of the

Second Chief

Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel

directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the 1den-

tities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Head-

quarters.. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory

listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file

employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by

a KGB "chiefs" e

8 that if NOSENKO

were merely able to make these two directories available

to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged

for the present and for several years to come.

Comment:

NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc-

töries described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers (I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in (Canada

told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all Intel-

ligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating

materials in his possession as well as to

supply the Soviets

with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could

be prepared for himself and his family. (SPRECHER asked

whether

the action had

any connection with NOSENKO's recent-

ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied 1t,

asserting NOSENKO

"was just a secretary".

377

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Top Secret

(Annex. A)

31 March 1964

(continued)

Comment:

When

PETUKHOV/recontacted/ SPRECHER In February

1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENRO had

in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he

had had some connection with NOSENHO, and

NOSENKO may have known something of what the

KGB was doing in (Canada)

NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name

way unknown to him, who apparently is identical

to SPRECHER!

March 1964

According to a sensitive source who

briefed in his office in KGB Headquarterg by a Second Chief

Directorate officer of the American Department; Personnel

of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served unt1l his

defection, were so

shocked at the event that they would not

mention it at all.

1 Commens:

a sensitive

source

In this and other contexts

• has stated

of implied that NOSENKO served in the American

Department in 1963-19641

#NOSENKO asserts he

left the

American Department in January 1962

and served in the Seventh Department until his

defection.

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Iop Secret

(Annex 1)

1P111- MaY 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, cage

officer of Robert, Lee

JOHNSON In Paris, began

to meet JOHNSON on the street rather

than in various restaurants as had been their habit.

At one

of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United

States, VLASOV told JOliNSON that a Soviel Intelligence officer

had defected to the Americand in Geneva, and chat extreme

caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts

with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could. not identify

JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had

which

might

11nk

him to

Soviet espionage activities.

(See

24 for a

summary

of

the JOHNSON

cage.)

May 1964:

According to a

sensitive source

(from unidentified sources,

presumably from KGB

Two commissions have

been established by the CPSl for the purposes:

¿determine why KGB employees such

as DERYABIN, GOLIISYN,

and NOSENKD defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt.

to eliminate the

"weak" employees

and

improve the efficiency

of the KGB.

Top

380

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(Annex"A)

20

May

1964

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only

40

microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Actually,

about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the

Embassy: NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information

tö the Americans which resulted in the microphones being

found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40

microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge

of the remaining ones.

1.2 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American

Embassy in

Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom

he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a

profligate

with two wives and many debts and 18 considered 1n

MOscow'

to be someone they are well itd of.

22 June 1964

According to a sensitive source

various sonamed KGB officers

The consensus among KGB employees

1s.

that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the :

effects of NOSENKO's escape

tö American Intelligence.

NOSENKO is considered to be vastly

more important than either

GOLIISYN Or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on

several factors:, First, NOSENKO worked against personnel

stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his

agents were developed among these Americans.

Second, "It 1s

assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

381

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22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be

familiar with the number of

microphones which had been

installed in the

Embassy by the KGB'

and the locationg of

these microphones.

Third, as a Deputy Chiaf of a depart-

ment, NOSENKO would normally have had

a telephone

directory 11561ng all personnel in all directorated of the

"GB In Moscow. Another factor, which

i8 a formidable one

1n the minds if other KGB employees, 15 that NOSENKO

ravelled in a rather influential circle of friends in

Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these

comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an

"important catch"

for American Intelligence, but no one in

the kGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO

had concerning the kGB.

29 June 1964

• GULIISYN (fron personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son

of the

former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer

who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh

Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while

on his owr Flrst Chief Directorate budiness, net NOSENKO two

oI three times in the American Embassy Section In 1953,

and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.

When COLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO

replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department.

NOSENKO served in the American Embasy Section from 1953.

until 1957 oi 1958, and was specifically responsible for

KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during

1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section

until 1957

or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsi-

bilities or may

have been working against other Embasay

personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely. in the

American Department during the entre perlod. In 1957 or

1958 NOSENKO was

transferred to the Seventh Department, and

was a senior case officer there

as of 1959. NOSENKO did not

work in the American Department

of the Second Chief Directorate

American Department at

any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited

the Embassy

Section on at least three occagions from early

1960 to early

1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been

1n the Section, particularly 1f NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief.

G.J. GRYAZNOV

was

acting as

assistant of the Chief of the

Section during, this period.

382

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(Annex A)

29 June 1904 (continued)

Comment:

NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in

1955 and was assigned

to the Seventh Department

until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy

Section as Deputy

Chief.

NOSENKO did not

1 dentify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied

since defection that he has ever met or even

• Y

1202 1954

According to a sensitive source

"Just after" NOSENKO'&

defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the

CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the

Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to che Disarm-

ament Conference.

MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of

the defection

and urged greater vigilance against such acts.

Ine defection

caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA,

a KCB secretary in Geneva.

It was rumored that some sixty

soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from

their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affali.

V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent soviet

Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely

exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return

to

Moscow. Yu. I. GUk who was known

sail source

had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended

NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the

chief of

the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed,

would also lose his job:

by.a

sensitive source

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly

gtationed..in

New York City, was said by.

to be one

of those from the CPSU Central Committee uno

conducted interviews with KGB personnel going

abroad.

Another sensitive source:

So Identified MEDVEDEV, V

383

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continied)

Comment:

(Continued)

AMara Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the

United Nations, as the Communiot Party organizer

and

possibly a member of the KGB, but said that

MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he

worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

POCHANKIN, whO NOSENKO had Identified

as a

KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

22 July 1964

According

to a sensitive source,

•(from unnaned

sources, presumably KGB officers

7): An investigating commission of the

CPSU Centräl Committee checking into the circumstances

surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible

for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate

employees.

Thes::

include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled

from the CESU ind was stripped of his rank of lieutenant

general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, 11ke

an ordinary soviet ritizen.

This drastic action was taken

since the piinary responsibility for the defection was placed

on GRIBANOV.

It was realized that, in addition to being Chief

of the second Chief Directorate

at the time of the defection,

GRIDANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or :

less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps

to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB..

It wag

felt

that GRIBANOV shold have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to

defect.

Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled

from the KGB,

one of

whom was a Major General BANNIK

(BANNIKOV].

Of the l1 other Second Chlet Directorate employees

expelled, some

were found to have been personal friends of

NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO

details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV,

a KGB officer

stationed

in washington, would be leaving for

Moscow because the

Investigating commisgion had determined

that Yu. I. Cuk, a

mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told

NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been

assigned to the Washington Legal

Residency, GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

Toy

384

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

22 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO

and GOLUBEV were given different asgignments within the KGB

not associate with one another in the

couise of their daily activities.

Content:

NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claing

that CRIBANOV had been instrumental in his

advancement and assignments.

NOSENKO identi-

fied by name and photograph

GOLUBEV, whom he

had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO

said he had never worked with him at KGB Head-

quarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the

First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the

USSR on 28

August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source:

a) :

The first

information

Mataly about

NOSENKO was

from KGB Headquarters which reported

the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed

to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection.

The

letter, which was very brief, said that

"the loss was very

great and some new forms of work should be created to be

efficient in the future"

The Legal Residency had not

before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's

escape!'

385

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(Annex A)

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian

people had been tuld of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet

mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an

American

acquaintance that they had not been told officially but

they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in

Moscow.

It was in this way;, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he

learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance.

According to the "grapevine"

, the defection was very

damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the:

Chief of the American Section, and he knew the Identitles

of all Soviet agents in the United States.

386

-Top secret

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Top Secret

(Annex. 1.)

Novenber 1964 (continued)

Comment:

GAMKKELIDZE 18

suspected of having connections

with soviet Intelligence because of his

statements, actions, and unusual freedom

solitary movement while on visits to the United

States.

GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment

attempt in 1964, but added

that he "welcomed

the opportunity

to meet with an American

Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet

Intelligence officers

he had mat with their

American counterparts. During that 1964

meeting GAMKRELIDZE again ralsed the subject

NOSENKO, describing

him as "obviously a

traitor to

his country"

initial

December 1964

a

source

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's roommate in Geneva at the

time of his defection, told du

that he had been

Interrogated by the KGB 1n

connection with NOSENKO's defection,

and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which

NOSENKO was gentenced to death in absentia.

RESHETNYAK

source reported to-d

wage the dismissal of large numbers

KGB officers, Including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what

RESHETNYAK. said, M

thought the KGB might 80 80 far

source

387

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Top Secret:

(Annex

A)

December 1964 (continued)

ag to send

NOSENKO.

officer.)

soneone to

Source

the Volted States to locate and k111

later identified

RESHETNYAK as & KGB

Comment:

NOSENKO Identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the

staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29

January

• 1905

According to a

sensitive source

• (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers

#): It is common knowledge among

NGB

employees that GRIBANOV was

expelled from the KGB and

CPSU and is now on pension, partlal rather than full, as a

result of the NOSENKO defection.

When NOSENKO was being

considered int assignient to Geneva (1n 1964), a summary

statement of his activities

was

Directorate

prepared in the Second Chief

and sent

tO GRIBANOV.

considerable

This summary contained

"compromising information"

, concerning NOSENKO;

If acted upon properly, it would have removed him from

consideration

for this

trip. GRIBANOV read the summary

material, ran a line through all of it, and added the nota-

"Send him to Geneva."

The general feeling is that

GRIBANOV

W111ing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's

deficiencies because of GRIBANQV's long-tine frlendship

with NOSENKO's father.

spiel sist

Comment:

NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV

was responsible for sending him to Geneva in

1964, but

after retracting' his claim that

GRIBANOV had

played any, special role 1n hia

assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved

1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father

GRIBANOV were acquainted.

388

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(Annex A)

February 1965

According to a sensitive source from

a KGB officer

defection he was Deputy to the Chlef of a department in the

Second

Chief Diractorate.

While working in the Seventh

(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, dures on three

- the KGB officel

separate occasions

participated in conferencas between

"important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the

Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these.

Although NOSEND was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank

of captain in the KGB. E

mE Dattributed this

(the

the KGB officer

disparity between Job and rank) to the Influence which

GRIBANOV

exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO:

the KGB officer

Comment:

NOSENKO has never identified

NOSENKO

always claimed that he had been a lieutenant

colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when

he

retracted that claim and

asserted that he had

been ouly a captain.

According to a sensitive source from

a KGB officer

GRIBANOV has been dismiused from

the KGB, expelled

from the CPSU, and 19 presently living on

a small pension.

His dismissal occurred imnediately after

NOSENKO'S defection.

In addition, not less than 50 other

people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of

GRIBANOV.

Most of these were from the flist and Second

Chief Directorates, with

the majority fron the Second Chief

Directorate.

The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief

Directorate

Is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment

has not yet

been approved by the Central Commietee

of the

CPSU.

One of his deputies

is a Major General

(E. A.)

SHCHERBAK.

389

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Jop Secret

(Annex A)

8 February 1905 (coutinued)

Comment: GRIDANOV was reported in operational contact

will a senior Western diplomat until late

autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's

defection), when he turned over that contact

lo another KGB officar.

2 February 1965

According to a

sensitive source from a KGB officer

IM: The amount of damage caused

by NOSENKD's defection is "unpredictable".

NOSENKO knew

sew employees of the First Chiel Directorate working abroad,

employees serving in KGB Headquarters by

seeing theu

the dining room

which is reserved

for chiefs and deputy chiefs

of KGB departments.

Early June 1965

Iccording

to a sensitive source

mr (fron

conversations with KGB officers

8: Major General BANNIKOV is currently

temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having

replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB

because he

supported NOSENKO in his career.

GRIBANOV is working in a

small city outside Moscow as the chlef of security at an

unimportant military plant and 19 now a "nothing"

390

Ton Secret

TS No. 197124

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Iop Secret

(Annex A)

a sen-

sitive

source

15 Juli 1905

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

who attended the Moscow meeting described):

A meeting

of all First Chief Directorate personnel

at KGB Headquarters

was held

on 15 July 1965.

The meeting was devoted to the

circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second

(Br1t18h) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A.

TARABRIN, about thiee and

a half nonths earlier. I.A. BELOV

and other officers also attended the meeting. According to

official statements made at the meeting, after the defection

anger Ace adies con

of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extenalve investigation to

determine which employees knew him and the nature of their

relationship.

During this TARABRIN was questioned; he sald

he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited

contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, how-

ever, that TAKABRIN attended

several parties at which NOSENKO

was

present. Gils Invited by NOSENKO were also there.

described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN

wag

afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing

vital information.

As a result he was expelled from

the KGB

and the CPSU and

was deprived uf all pension rights.

Comment:

NOSENKO had

nost recently asserted thai he met

GRIBANOV socially only three times during his

KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was

present.

NOSENKO sald he twice provided girls

fOr GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or

November 1963 in circunstances similar to those

referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was

Chief of the British Department from 1958 to

1963,

when he became Deputy Chief of "Service

No. 2"

, the reorganized Counterintelligence

Department of the First Chief Directorate.

391

_Top Secret

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Top Secret

(Annex A)

Summer 1965

According to a sensitive source

WE: As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many

azalial from the barry, and

i:==

?r.E

!!:.

These

MCälded MGE Chairman SEROT, and Second

Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the

Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially

friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and

they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment:

SEMICHASTNYY, nOt SEROV, was KGB Chairman 1n

1965. SFKOV became

head of the GRU In 1958.

Winter 1965-1966

Source,

a

self-professed former KGB Second

Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a

colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science

sald

* Source

that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations

against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father

was a Minister or General and his mother

was Jewish

"always involved in some blackmarketeering"

NOSENKO was not

a KGB officer but a "civilian"

connected

somehow

the KGB.

When NOSENKO defected, everyone sald

he was detestable.

NOSENKO told the Americano about the

microphones

and things (s1c) in the Embassy.

392

Top.

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Source

Top Secret

(Annex A)

Winter 1905-1966 (continued)

Comment:

Source's

allegation is the single report

from any source

describing

NOSEYKO

& S

other than

a KGB officer.

March

1966

According

to a sensitive source,

(fron unidentified

who

wa's

not personally known to

NOSENKO,

Important Source

boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man,

he was

1n

the GRU Military Academy and was then

Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps

for a year.

NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined

person

while in the GRU and "not very good"

been

discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very

influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was

able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion

of persons to whom i

Here talked that NOSENKO had given

very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection

and that NOSENKO had had great access

to KGB information

which included all means of KGB coverage of people in

Moscow,

microphone systems

in

the embassies,

etc.

Based on

NOSENKO's information the American Embassy

found many of the

microphones.

393

Top Secret

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Top Secret

March 1966 (continued)

Comment:

NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer

to attend

the Military Diplomatic Academy

(which he, 11ke

don, called the GRU

-Source

Military

Academy), by choice accepting assign-

ment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in

time, the

Military Diplomatic

Academy was a four-year course; 1f NOSENKO

the school, he could not have

served as he claimed

in the GRU.

the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged

NOSENKO served in the GRU.

'Source

... !

/ 7.

394

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Top Secret

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(Annex A)

M1d-1966

Yurly Dultriyevich KOROLEV, & Soviet Journallot, violted

Parls and spoke with representatives of the French magazine

Paris Match.

KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve

as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he

begin with a story on the life of the family of a "soviet

secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and

Engl18h, the magazine

staff did not seriously pursue the

matter

at that time:

Comment: KOROLEV is belleved Identical with Yurly KOROLEV

who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for

the

United Press International Moscow corres-

pondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and

GOLITSYN have Identified as an agent of the KGB

Second Chief Directorate, KOROLEV has travelled

previously to Brussels as a correspondent for

the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan

and the United States ad & correspondent for

Novostl, the Sovlet news Agency..

The offer by

an official Soviet press

representative of

Information on a "Soviet secret agent", which

turned out to refer to NOSENKO, 18 without

precedent.

Datober 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with

an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors

provide a story on the life of the famlly of a

"Soviet secret

agent"

The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

396

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(Аппех 1)

October 1966 (continued)

life In Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background

statement KOROLEV provided

Paris Match editors

stated:

"NOSENKO, about 30-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret

Police

organization, defected

to the USA without his family about

two yeais ago and asied for political asylum

in the U.S.:

it was

granted to

him.

This was the most serions defeat of

the sovlet security organs as NOSENKO occupied Important

positions in espionage and counterespionage

aloo was Josely requadated with the country"s deadeng

and

families and homes.

NOSENKO's family consists of a wife,

35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and

a younger brother.

The fanily

is not

prosecuted

(sic) but feel very badly about

the Incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply

to the International Lawyers liganization for a divorce and

compensation.

It is possible that this case will be given

ouch publicity. His wife has not heard fron him since he

defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA."

KORDLEY displayel a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and

family going aboul their daily affairs in Moscow, and

indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family

could be obtained and that interviews with then and with

others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Parig Match

correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector

from the Soviet Union,

who is legally considered to be an enemy of the

state, is granted

automatically upon the wife's

request.

28

January 1967

According to a sensitive source

(from personal knowledge):

knowledge of KiB organization,

his explanation, he

would

call

knew these

matters better than

at KGB Headquarters longer.

Referring to his own

said if NOSENKO heard

a child, since NOSENKO

because

he had served

Source

397

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(Annex A)

February 1967

According to a sensitive source

(from unidentified GRU sources in Mogcow):

NOSENKO worked only in kl

Information Department of the GRU,

and

only for about five of six months, after which

he went

to the KGB.

May

According to a sensitive source

The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole

system of surveillance of Americans.

He worked

on 1t, knew

all about it and exposed the whole system of work.

He knew

all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all

the surveillance grouys and knew survelllants by sight.

According to a sensitive source

When

NOSENKO worked in the

GRU Information Department he worked

only th the Center (Headquarters) In Moscow.

He worked badly

there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of

which

he had

argubents. Then with his father's help he went

to the KGB.

§ June 1967

According to a sensitive source

There had been some

KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in

Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacta

which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to

investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN 18 still susp1:10us of

SHAKHOV.

Comment:

NOSENKO claimg he was sent to Geneva in 1962

to investigate SHAKHOV.

398

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SECRET

ANNEX A - STATEMENTE OF SOVIDI OFFICLALS

ABOUT NOSENKO .

SECRE

declas i tiri

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## Page 63

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ANNEX A

STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO

Pages 361 - 398 of tie previous suminary contain statements

by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO.

These remaris cover the period oi February 190:10 Juxe 1967.

by d

None of the quoted information with the exception of a statemeni

a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate age

who slated NOSENiO was not a kC3

officer but a "civilian" connected sonchow with the KGb, raiges a

question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether be was

actually a KGB dificer. it is not considered that the remark by

SOURCE

Can be given any particular weight or that it repre-

sents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.

Of the cited information iroin Soviets in regärd to NOSENKO,

the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are

sensitive Source Il, sensitive Source 13

cited elsewhere, is the information from Thi

ensitive source

Source #1,

Source #3

and probably in that order.

s0515,

annuak and

sourse i had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their

comments were based on information irom third parties or obtained

Source #1

through conversation. There are discrepancies between what tallate

Source #2

Asthanast have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has

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sitinctis

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Source 11

Source 12

said, but under the given circumstances of how dall and di

acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected.

No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted

Source 12, Source 113 and Source 11

• and durai

I have furnished no information

that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.

Soufce #1, Source #3 and Source 12

It is felt that information frontest, anitar and thin

is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case,

but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO

is not a bona fide defector snould not be considered as absolute proof

he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO

was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of

all

available information. It must be realized there is a possibility

Source H1, Source #3

NOSENKO could have beun dispatched by the KGB and sak

Source 12

and Sis

"be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that

NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona

Source #1,

Source #13 or Source 12.

fides of twin

Kor d

NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received

in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in

connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram,

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according lo NOSENKO in interviows prior to October 1966, had beer

reccived in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his

CLA contacts and stated he had defected.

In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention oi

the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous

state-

ments on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has

subsequently maintained,

that there was not a "recall telegram." He has explained that he invented

the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal

safety in remaining "in place" for à longer time. NOSENKO has stated

he thought the aliged "recall telegrara" would be accepted by Cia as

à logical reason íor his precipitate desection.

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4

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Certain of te discrepancies noted in tie previous suminary

Source #1

between imormation comesid

have been clarified and cerain discrepancies could noù be clarimod.

In some insiances the information from

Source and Source 12s

adjadged to le inaccurai. The judgmeis on cd on to bearsay maure

Source i

and Source #2

oi the reporting oy can

He measured aguins to ubsence

oi any reason lo question this part of his life as icied by Nosenko.

Examples are informudoi from

Baut NOSENKo dad been

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## Page 68

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Source 12

affiliated with the KGB since about 1147 and iormaiion romeuse

that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOSENKO

worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow. There are also

Source #2,

certain discrepancies between information furnished by farmatt,

Source #1 and Source 113 in

aste arden and in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO

prior to 1964.

In regard io discrepancies previously noted betveen information

Source #1

Source #1

¡romesias as to certain KGB officers wliom Surf understood

NOSENKO had personaily met and concerning whom NOSENKO had pic-

viously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory ixplanation has been

obtained for certain of the discropancies during current interviews with

NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explana-

tion is not available but there is jusi as adequate reason to believe

Source #1

desh had obtained ircorrect or incomplete information as there

is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his jailure to recognize

a name and/ or photograph.

As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now

been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had

Source #1

never commented on the KGB telephone book which Assaull had ie-

ported NOSENKO, &

had in his possession.

During current inicivicws, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning

6

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how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephore number of an

FCD officer, gave a dutailed report including information that there

was at least one complute SCD telephone directory in each roona

occupied by SCD officers, In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access

to a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the

Department and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs

in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.

It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the

Source #1

information furnished byellnes concerning the telephone directory

and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logical

Source #1

since his could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone

directory which he had never seen.

7

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