Originator: HSCA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

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180-10147-10 182-

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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Fisher

Purpose and Scope of Study

The Central Intelligence Agency's performance

in its role of support to the Warren Commission

has been a source of controversy since the

inception of the Warren Commission. Critics

have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated

in a conspiracy designed to suppress information

relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy •

During 1976 the critic's

assertions were the subject of official inquiry

by the Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). The

SSC, In its

report regarding "The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:

Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached

the following conclusion:

The Committee emphasizes that it has

not uncovered any evidence sufficient

to justify a conclusion that there was

a conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy.

The Committee has, however, developed

evidence which impeaches the process

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arrived at their own conclusions

about the

assassination, and by

which they provided information

to the warren Commission.

This

evidence indicates that the

investigation of the assassina-

tion was deficient and that facts

which might have substantially

affected the course of the inves-

tigation were not provided the

Warren Commission or those

individuals within the FBI and

the CIA, as well as other agencies

of Government, who were charged

with investigating the assassina-

tion. (SSC, BocKI: P6)

This Comnittee has sought to examine in

greater detail the general findings of the SSC.

The Committee has particularly focused its attention

on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any

employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed,

or withheld information relevant to the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy from the Warren

Commission. In addition, the Committee has

attempted to determine whether, if the warren

Commission was misinformed or not made privy to

information relevant to its investigation,

the misinforming or withholding of

evidence from the Warren Commission

was the

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result of a conscious intent to do so by the

Agency or its employees.

The Committee has sought to examine the

issue detailed above in both an objective

and disciplined manner.

In order to accomplish

this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977

Report by the CIA's Inspector General (hereinafter

77 IGR) ::

This Report vesthm castal of

the SC findings and asserted that the SSC

Final Report conveyed an impression of limited

effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission

in its work.

The 77 IGR was in fundamental

disagreement with this characterization of the

SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and

collect information in support of the Warren

Commission.

Additionally, it conducted studies

and submitted special analyses and reports."

(77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.)

In order to demonstrate further the scope

of support provided by the CIA to the warren

Commission, the 77 IGR. contained a comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material made available

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to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission regarding the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy: In this respect,

the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein

it is stated that "This compiliation (of

CIA generated material) is appropriate to

consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of

the results of that effort." (77. IGR, Introduction

to Tab E)

In examining the Agency's comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material referenced above,

the Committee has paralled its review to the

structure given to these materialsby the 77 IGR.

In this regard the 77 IGR details four inter-

related compilations of Kennedy assassination

material. These four compilations are:

1) Agency dissemination of information

to the Intelligence Community (Formal

and Informal Disseminations)

2) Dissemination of material to the

Warren Commission

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3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al

regarding rumors and allegations

regarding President Kennedy's

assassination

4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the

Warren Commission on Rumors and

Allegations Relating to the President's

Assassination (77 IGR, Introduction

to Tab E.)

In reviewing these compilations,

the Committee

focused upon those

CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as having

made available in written form to the warren

Commission.

During the course of this study: additional

Agency files have been

reviewed. These

files have

been examined in an effort to resolve certain

issues created by the review of the Agency's

compilations discussed in this report. Where

apparent gaps existed in the written record,

files have been requested and reviewed in an effort

to resolve these gaps.

Where significant substantive

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issues

have arisen related to the kind and

quality of information provided the Warren

Commission, files have also been requested and

..reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues.

As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising

an approximate

total of ninety volumes of

material have been examined and analyzed

in preparation of this report.

The findings set forth herein are subject

to modification due to the following considera-

tions.

During the course of the past fifteen

years; the CIA has generated massive amounts of

information related to the assassination of

President Kennedy: In spite of the Agency's

VAnious

sophisticated document retrieval system certain

'ith manur/scomput.

documents requested by this Committee for study

and analysis have not been located. Whether these

documents merely have been filed incorrectly or

destroyed, gaps in the written record still do

exist.

Struce

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secondly, due to dissimilar standards of investigativ

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Eg: CIA JFKassas materials prouded the Rackefeller

ClassifiCatron staining no Luisa CalleranGuraler

Maria Te resurrena Humos

(Cubun Intelligence Service lefector),

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relevancy adopted by the CIA and this

Co

certain files requested by the Committee for

review::

:.

have been made available

mittee,

the comnittee in a santized fashion.

Therefore,

to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial

of access and/or santization of certain materials,

this

study's conclusions are based upon the

best evidence available to the Committee th[ough

this may not be all relevant evidence to which

the Agency has access:

One must, moreover, give due consideration

to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings,

and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA

representatives may have played in the supply of

assassination-related information by the CIA to

the Warren Commission.

The subject and substance

of these discussions, briefings, and meetings

may not always be reflected by the written

record made the

subject. of this.study.

Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews;

depositions and executive session hearings with

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elA files pertaining to AMiUS

Maria Terise Proenza

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i En t te restle parist

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key Warren Commission staff and members and

former or present CIA representatives in an

effort to resolve questions that are not

addressed by the written record. The results

of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this

aspect of the working relationship between the

Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject

for discussion herein.

In addition, this report will examine the

following subjects generated by the Committee's

study as outlined above, in the following general

order of discussion:

1) the organization of the CIA's investigation

of President Kennedy's assassination;

2)

the working relationship of the Warren

Commission staff and those CIA representatives

3)

concerned with the Warren Commission inguiry;

the

standards of investigative cooperation

which the Warren Commission staff believed

to govern the quality and quantity of

information supplied by the CIA to the

Warren Commission;

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4)

the CI

s concern for protection of its

sensitive sources and methods and the

consequent effects of this concern

upon the Warren Commission investigation;

and

5) the substance and quality of information

concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the

Warren Commission and the results of this

Committee's investigation of Calderon

and her significance to the events of

November 22, 1963.

II. Select Committee Stung or

Information Made Available by CIA to Warren

Commission

see clA page 2000517 intra

for beginning of this section.

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From Entroled emers:

To be insated prior to section II

I. Organization of CIA Investigation

of President Kennedy's Assassination

In his Executive Session testimony before the Select

Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for

Plans during 1963, described the CIA's role in the

investigation of President Kennedy's assassination

as

follows:

This crime was committed on United

States soil. Therefore, as far as the

Federal government was concerned, the pri-

mary investigating agency would have been

the Federal Bureau of Investigation without

any question. The role of the CIA would

have been entirely supportive in the sense

of what material we are (sic) able to

acquire outside the limits of the United

States with reference to the investigation.

For investigative purposes, the Agency

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had no investigative role inside the United

States at all. So when I used here the

word "supportive," I meant that in the

literal sense of the term. We are (sic)

trying to support the FBI and support the

Warren Commission and be responsive to

their requests, but we were not initiating

any investigations of our own or, to my

recollection, were we ever asked to.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 17-18.).

On November 23, 1963. Helms called a meeting of senior-

level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investiga-

tive responsibility vis a vis the

assassination. (sSC,

Book V, p. 25.) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso,

Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexico, Central

America, and[Panama, In charge of the Agency's initiate

investigative efforts. (HSCA Class. Deposition of John

Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 111-112, Exec. Session Testimony

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of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.)

Scelso testified before the Select Committee,

that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation

on the basis of two considerations: l)!his prior

experience in conducting major CIA security investi-

gations and 2) the observance of Oswald by CIA

surveillance in Mexico, (Scelso's operational concern)

less than two months prior to the assassination. (SSC

Book V, p. 25, HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso,

5/16/70, pp. 111-112.; Scelso also noted that

during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms

did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative

theories nor reach conclusions within a set period of

time; Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms •

719/78, pp. 9-101*

Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for

CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized Scelso's

responsibility not as a mandate to investigate but

rather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation,

telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working

with the DDP with respect to what was being done over

the whole world..."

(HSCA Classified Deposition of

R. Rocca, 7.17/78; p. 9.)

Rocca referred to this

phase of CIA activity as

the GPFLOOR phase. (Ibid.)

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Scelso described in detail to the Committee the

manner in which he conducted the Agency's investiga-

tion:

•practically my whole Branch participated

in the thing. We dropped almost everything

else and I put a lot of my officers to work

in tracing names, analyzing files.

We were flooded with cable traffic, with

reports, suggestions, allegations from all

over the world, and these things had to be

checked out. We were checking out just dozens

and dozens of people all the time. (HSCA Classified

Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, p. 131)*

*. During the course of the Agency's invetigation, Liaison

with the FBI was handled for the CIA by Birch O'Neal

(Ibid. p. 80.) At the time of the assassination MI. O'Neal,

a former FBI agent, was Chief of the Special Investigations

Group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classified

Deposition of Birch O 'Neal, 6/20/78, p. 7, 52) Mr. O'Neal

characterized his functions with respect to the Agency

as follows:

(This footnote - Footnote

on bottom of page 5)

- continues

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Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA

field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's

investigation "and the key stations were receiving

tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not

send out instructions saying everybody participate in

the investigation." (Ibid. p. 133.) It was his

recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as

coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexico

City Station

was the only CIA field station directly

Footnote

-- continued from bottom of page 4.

I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the

basic responsibility for investigating the

assassination of the President.

If there was

a crime commited in the course of this activity,

(sic) it belonged to the FBI.. I recognized that

it was our responsibility to give the fullest

cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency

with regard to any aspects of our operations,

you understand, and at the same time giving them

cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr.

San Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co-

operated,

and he always fully cooperated with he.

(Ibid. p. 52.)

O'Neal noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of

the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was

designated the central point for collection of assassination-

related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid. pp. 52-53.

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involved in investigatory activities related to President

Kennedy's assassination. (Ibia.)

ON 10113/63

During the latter half of December, Scelso

issued a summary report which described Oswald's

activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 -

october 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report

as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related

information then available to the FBI but not provided

to CIA until late Dec. 1963. (Ibid: p. 114-115.) (CIA

Document Report by John Scelso to C/CI, 24. Dec. 63.)*

Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted

responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination to the Counterintelligence

Staff: (ESCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso,

5/16/78, P. 136, cf. HSCA Classified Deposition of

Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, P. 15 wherein Rocca states that

responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on

January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift in

*

Approximately two days after President Kennedy's

assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report,

provided to President Johnson by Helms.

This report

adopted the position that Oswald probably was a lone

assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban

intelligence though such ties could not be excluded

frou cons elassification. d. p. 114.)

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yes tomas to me me me material

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ocuments

responsibility was a logical development because the

investigation had begun to take on broader tones.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,

P. 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John

Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.)

Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond

Rocca:::

who testified before the Committee that the

shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused

in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission.

(ESCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, pP. 12-13.)

Rocca added:

It was entirely appropriate in the

GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would

have that

(responsibility for the Agency

investigation. But the minute you had

a commission set up outside the line

obviously had to be the Director, and from

the Director to his Chief of Operations

overseas, because the spread involved

then all of the divisions. Here you had

Mr. (scelso) being asked to sian off on

have seemed to me utterly administratively

simply a hybrid monster.

• (HSCA Classified

Deposition of R. Rocca, 1/17/78, p. 12.)

James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the

spread (of investigative responsibility) involved...

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all of the (CIA) divisions." Angleton testifed

to this Cormittee that the Agency's efforts to

gather and coordinate information related to

the assassination underwent a metamorphic

transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the

Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and

Case Officers approached Warren Commissiong

requirements in a piecemeal fashion.

However,

Angleton testified the Agency was eventually

able

to focus its resources to avoid duplication

of effort and provide a system for the central

referencing of assassination related information

as such information was developed. (HSCA

Classified Deposition.of James Angleton,

10/5/78, pp. 76-77, see also HSCA Classified

Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78,

p. 23.)

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The record reveals that during this second phase

of CIA information collection efforts in support of

the Warren Commission investigation the concentration

of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration

of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency

in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible

association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. * seaftaff)

(Ibid., pp. 32-33,44, Executive Session of Testimony of

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 23.1 AccordinglE, Rocca conmented

that during this phase primary interest in support of the

Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet leads:

on the assumption that a person who spends

four years**in the Soviet Union, under his

circumstances, had to be of specific interest

to Soviet State security and their collateral

authorities.

(HSCA Classified Deposition of

Raymond Rocca, PP. 32-33.) (seep gefor#*)

Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended

to concentrate on concerned the Soviets:

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Rocca and Committee

Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered

by the Agency related to its investigation of possible

areas

Mr. Goldsmith:

Earlier, when I asked you which

of the case received emphasis, I believe that you

indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis

was the Soviet connection.

Mr. Rocca.

That was certainly the one that I would

say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-

Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would

you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the

possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

MI. Rocca.

Again, I say that

it would have

simply intensified it, that there was attention given

to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities

on the Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their

operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic)

within - it was an enigma at the time.

They were just

getting started. This was WH's area.

This was Win

Scott's area of

proficiency. So the

defectors had only

begun to come out

and they

came out later, the Cuban

defectors.

So, I can't. -- I really can't say that (a) the

Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The

press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtagly

given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it

was given specific attention, I was told at the time of

the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection

investigated?

Mr. Rocca.

I don't know. I don't know this.

That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent

was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by

the Warren Commission: I mean to what extent did the

Agency provide -

Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly

didn't do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca:

we certainly didn't, in R& A.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not -*.

Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all.

This was something left to the people who were concerned

specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

g-74n cuban in

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we

established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information

pertinent to the assassination was to go through your

office, correct?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent

to the assassination went through your office, I take (it)

you or Mr. Helms

would decide what information would

be relevant for the Warren Commission to see.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca.: Well --

Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?:

Mr. Rocca.

Well, everything would go, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the

position, it would seem, to know what information was

being generated in the

field that was going to the

Warren Commission.

Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis

and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (dia).

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MI.

Rocca..

Primarily, primarily. But I didn't

mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there

was a lot of material that came through and went to the

Commission that concerned the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's continue.

My recollection is that at the time

the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who

maniFestation

were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this.

This was the great concern.

Mr. Goldsmith.

That's another possibility.

There are different -

Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH:

do you

have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in

this kind of thing.

There was extraordinary diligence, I thought,

exercised to try to clarify that side.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility

of an assassination plot by Castro against the President

was adequately investigated?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind-

sight, I could say probably not.

But at the time it seems

to me that they gave due attention to it -- within the

information that I had at my disposal:

**In fact,

Ten See a case in the sore insani

October 1959 - June 1962

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because the people he was in touch with in

Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB

people. They were under consular

cover and obviously could have been

doing and were undoubtedly doing a

consular job in those earlier contacts.

(Ibid., p. 33)

However, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects

of the CIA investigation were not ignored "because

there was a lot of material that came through and

went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans."

(Ibid., p. 44)

MI. Helms also testified that the possibility

of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy's

assassination was a

source of deep concern within the

Agency.

(Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, p. 21)

Nevertheless, Mr. Helms stated that development of informa-

tion pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation

in the assassination was very difficult to-obtain.

(Ibia., p. 138)

Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis

that during the

second phase of the Agency's support

role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its

resources Elsications ible soviet influence on

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Oswald.

(Angleton, p. 86) He stated for the record

with regard to the Warren Commission's investigation

(with the CIA's support) of possible Cuban involvement

in the assassination:

I personally believe that the United

States intelligence services did not

have the capabilities to ever come to

an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect).

I don't think the capabilities were there.

(ASCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78, p. 93)

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As noted above, the CI Staff assumed responsibility

in late December 1963 - early January 1964 for the

coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren

Commission in its investigation.. At that time, Raymond

Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for CI Staff,

was designated point of contact with the Warren

Commission. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James

Angleton, 10/5/78, P. 77.) Rocca's Research and

Analysis component was concerned with:

"analytical intelligencer analytical

brainpower, which meantall source, all

overt source comprehension; a study of

cases that had ceased to occupy opera-

tional significance, that is, closed cases,

to maintain the ongoing record of overall

quality and quantity of counterintelligence

being performed by the entire DDP operational

component;.. the Deputy Director for PlanS

(HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca,

8/17/78; See also HSCA Classified Deposition

of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.)

Mr. Rocca testified that assassination-related

information generated by CIA components was directed

to his staff (as designated point of contact with the

Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day

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form is to

work (Ibid., pp. 16-17.) This information was then

reviewed by Rocca or his assistants who ineluded

Thomas Hall

Soviet Expert) , Paul Hartman (general

research and search man for the U.S. Intelligence

Community and its resources), and Arthur Dooley (who

had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of

years prior to the assassination) (Ibid. p. 17.)

During the course of the Warren Commission investi-

gation, Hall, Hartman and Dooley worked with those.

CIA divisions producing substantive information

related to the assassination. (Ibid.)

Mr. Rocca testified that even though

CI/R&A was the Agency's point of reference with regard

to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the

CI staff in general displaced the direct relations of

Mr. Helms or any other concerned Agency official with

the Warren Commission. (Ibid.; Rocca testified that-either

CI Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet

Division

(represented by David Murphy, Chief of the

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Elassification: -

→ SEGRE

(This f8rm is 18 be used for material extrated

1F8m ElA-santFelled documents:;

SR division and his assistant

Tennant Bagley)in

Its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/R&A

displace John Scelso in his contact with the Warren

Commission.) Rocca testified that in some instances

J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly

to Helms with requests, and in other instances David

Slawson, a Commission Staff counsel, conferred directly

with Tom Hall of Rocca's staff. (Ibid. p. 36.)*

The record reveals that on certain issues of

particular sensitivity Rocca was not permitted to act

as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren: Commission

He testified that "compartmentalization was öbserved

notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level

point of contact." (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond

* Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct

superior during the course of the Warren Commission

investigation, he did not participate on a regular

basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive

information to the Warren Commission nor did he deal

* did he are

on a direct basis with Warren Commission representa-

tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis;

HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78,

p. 17-18; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78, p. 78.0

However, Angleton testified to this

Committee

that he did attempt to keep apprised of

developments as the investigation progressed through

consultation with Rocca. (HSCA Classified Deposition of

James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 81)

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This form is 18 be used for material extrated

Rocca, 8/17/78, p. 18) Rocca cited by way of example

the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca

testified that he did not attend any of the Agency

discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case (Ibia.)

Rather, (as it affected the Warren Commission investi-

gation) responsibility for the Nosenko case was

NAme

assigned to David Murphy, Chief of SR Division, in

addition to Richard Helms. (Ibid)

Rocca described the CI staff mail intercept program,

ETLINGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter

about which he had no knowledge nor input vis a vis

the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission

(Ibid., pP. 19-20.) Rather, James Angleton and Birch

O'Neal handled the disposition of this particular

material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso,

5/16/78, P. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff

including O'Neal, was repository of HTLINGUAL intercepts;

but rei Seats Dates that One di 1070/78, eineer

#ThIrSuAn programo

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This form is 18 be used for material extrarted

In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally

decentralized information reporting function best

characterized the organization of this second phase

of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist

the Warren Commission.: (Ibid., p. 10; HSCA Classified

Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 75, 80.

See:

also CIA Doc. Rocca Memo for Record, 1 April 1975,

Subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1,

1978

wherein it is stated that Helms remained senior

official in charge of the overall investigation,

with CI staff acting as a coordinator and repository

of information collected.)

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from

ocument.

ocuments

- 9-

A. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representatives

Regarding Warren Commission-CIA Relationship

The Committee has contacted both representatives of

the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of

the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA-

generated information to the Warren Commission. The

general consensus of these representatives is that the

Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful

working relationship during the course of the Commission's

investigation.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78,

p. 18)

(See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms!

8/9/78, p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel

for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren

Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters

which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized

the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as

highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent.

(See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman,

8/2/78.) MI. Slawson expressed

a similar opinion

regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality

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from CPA confolled document aterial extracted

-10-

of work.

(Executive Session Testimony of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17isee also JFK

Exhibit 23.)

J: Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the

Warren Commission, testified that the Warren

Conmission and its staff were assured by the CIA

that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's

work.

(SCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/7/78, p.4; HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone,

8/17/78, p. 9)

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence

at the time of President Kennedy's assassination

and during the Warren Commission investigation,

supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard

by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis

the Warren Commission as both responsive and

comprehensive.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of John

McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5) Mr. McCone was responsible

for ensuring that all relevant matters were

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from ClA- controlled documents.)

-10a-

conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission.

(Ibia., pp. 5-6)

In this regard, Mr.

McCone

testified that:

The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren

Commission everything that we had. I

personally asked Chief Justice Warren to

come to my office and took him down to the

vault of our building where our information is

microfilmed and stored and showed him the

procedures that we were following and the

extent to which we were giving him - giving

his staff everything that we had, and I think

he was quite satisfied. (Ibid., p. 9)

Materials Be Made Promptly Available: By

CIA To Warren Commission

Mr. Raymond Rocca, • t darningir i implementer of ClA

ring me warten

the Warren Commission

investigation,

characterized the Agency's role as one of

full support to the Warren Commission. Mr.

Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and

008030

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secret

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

tithis abina controded stadrientsaterial extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

-10b-

Analysis Divison for the Counter-Intelligence

Staff of the CIA, stated under oath that

Richard Helms had given the following

directive:

(?)

All material bearing in any way that

could be of

assistance to the

Warren Commission should be seen by C

staff and R and A and marked for us.

He

issued very, very strictly worded

indications - they were verbal in so

far as

I know - that we were to leave no

stone unturned.

(ESCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca,

7/17/78, p.

24)

@ssifiration. -

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MI. RochAisaArds thater used for incharmlaidded Mr. Helms'

orders were folio cla to tole letter by all CIA employees.

(Ibia. p. 24.). Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis:

"the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information

bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance

to the warren Conmission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the

supply of CIA's information to the Warren Connission was

propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as

the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren

Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the

CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination and the

establishment of ClApolicy visa ris the Warren Commission.

(Ibid., p. 23.).

He testified to the Committee that the

CIA made every effort to be as responsive as

possible to

Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard

Helms,

8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony

regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor-

mation to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com-

mission).

We would attempt to respond to it.

But these inquiries came in individual bits and

pieces or as individual items...Each individual

item that came along we took care of as best we

could:

(Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA

provided information to the Warren Commission primarily

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on the basis thieher me sit for peterial extreests. Under

from CIA - controlled documents.)

oath he supported this proposition:

MI.

Goldsmith:

In summary, is it your position that

the Agency gave the Warren Commission

information only in response to speci-

fic requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms:

That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that

memory is fallable. There may have been

times or circumstances under which some-

thing different might have occured, but

my recollection is that we were attempting

to be-responsive and supportive to the

FBI and the Warren Commission. When

they asked for something we gave it to

• them.

As far as our volunteering information

is concerned, I have no recollection of

whether we volunteered it or not.

(Ibid., p. 34.)

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren

Commission requests on a caselbasis rather than uniformly

volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission

stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception

of the CIA's investigative responsibility. : MI. Rankin was

asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the

impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to

respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the

Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified

as

follows:

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I

would have insisted that the Commission com-

municate with the President and get a different

arrangerlassificatione might not ask the right

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gassitication:

Secret

lassitication:

his torm is to be. üsed for material extracte

oh cram contioned urecurent material extracte

from CIA -controlled documents.)

-13-

questions and then we would not have the

information and that would be absurd.

(asCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/17/78, p. 4)

Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position

testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA

were rarely specific. "The request was made initially

that they give us all information pertinent to the

assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of.

W• David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29)

CIA's failere to Discles: C14 anti

stro assurination Piss to Darren

commipain

tri unfortunate consequence of stren commissas eliame a

trecrA to provide tu

commission.cocth.alrejerany

CIA matüriel

the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro

assassination plots /(SSC Book V) see also (Alleged

Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim

Report, SS, 11/20/7517. Paradoxically, even if the

Warren Commission had requested information on such

plots, the CIA's point of contact with the Warren

Commission would not have been able to provide the

Secret

2000521

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lassitication:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

fris dram kortpolted usertentsmaterial extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

-13a-

Commission with information so requested. As

MI. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no

knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission

investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate

Fidel Castro. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond

Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 50)

ReASONAbLe

one

thought

алі

world

4

20.0522

secret

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

Had Rocca, as the CIA's working level representative

to the Warren Conmission, been requested by the

Commission to research and report on any and all

CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's

efforts would have produced no substantive informa-

tion. (Ibid., p. 49)*

The record also "-lius that the CIA desk

officer who was initially given the responsibility

by Mr. Helms to investigate

Lee Harvey

Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy

had no knowledge of such plots during his investi-

gation.

(ESCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78,

pp. 73, 111-112) Mr. Scelso testified that had he

known of such assassination plots the following

action would have been taken:

WASIN

AN

"We would have gone at that hot and heavy

We would have queried the agent ((AMLASH)

about it in great detail.

I would have

had him polygraphed by the best operative

security had to see if he had (sic) been

miL.

a double-agent, informing Castro about

querlo

our poison pen

AMLASA

would have had all our Cuban sources

queried about it." (Ibid.. p. 166)

00003

As the record reflects, these plots were known

by few within the CIA.

Mr. Helms' testimony regarding

Rocce testified heidas notin a positivito ansierquestions relutia tocita

nutira prais against castro bur that prose nave to de ansiveed er, pridis uno vere in tre inuind

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toassusine Fidei Cistro antir atré tanaren conn issian du

om.

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

these plots reveals that the Agency compromised the policy of

its Pirector

Its promise to supply all relevant information to

the Warren Commission.

(see statementot Jonn Murant, p loa herein)

The following exchange

between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates

the jextent

¡of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith

Mr. Helms, I take it from your

testimony

that your position is

that the anti-castro plots, in

fact, were relevant to the

Warren Commission's work; and,

in light of that,

the Committee

would like to be informed as to

why the Warren Commission was

not told by you of the anti-

Castro assassination plots.

Mr.

Helms:

Mr. Coldsmith:

I have never been asked to testify

before the Warren Commission about

our operations.

If the Warren Commission did not

know of the operation, it certainly

was not in a position to ask you

about it.

Is that not true?

Mr.

Helms:

Mr.

Goldsmith:

Yes, but how do you know they did

not know about it? How do you

know Mr. Dulles had not told them?

How was I to know that? And besides,.

I was not the Director of the Agency

and in the CIA, you did not go

traipsing around to the Warren Com-

mission or to Congressional Committees.

or to anyplace else without the

Director's

permission.

Did you ever discuss with the Director

whether the warren Commission

should be informed of the anti-Castro

assassination plots?

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ever

ASK

- 16 =

Classification: _

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.).

Mr. Helms:

I did not, as far as I recall.

(HSCA Exec.

Sess. Test. of Richard

adas 8/9/78, PP. 30-31.1, emphasis

Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware

of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots

involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He

stated that upon learning of these plots he directed

that the. Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA

Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13)

When

asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa-

tion from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-.

Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the

Agency or causing an international crises he gave

the following response:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA

employees knowledgeable of the

continuance of such plots) withheld

the information from me.. I cannot

answer that question..

I have never

been satisfied as to why they with-

held the information from me.

(Ibid.,

p. 16)

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the

Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels

Rankin, slawson and Spector were in agreement that

such inforpation should have been reported to the

- 17

could

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from CIA-contrpipaddocérdents.)

Warren Commission.

(Exec. Sess. Test. of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, P. 27; Exec. Sess. Test.

of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec.

Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71

where he states that possible witholding of

information by CIA about Agency attempts to

assassinate Castro did not significantly affect

Warren Connission investigation)

From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca

testified that had he known of the anti-Castro

assassination plots his efforts to explore the

•possibility of a retaliatory assassination against

President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi-

fied.:

He stated that:

" a completely different

procedural approach probably would and should have

been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca

7/17/78, p. 45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer

who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility

was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff,

offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms'

non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

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II.

40

56563

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA - controlled documents.)

Mr. Goldsmith:

Do you think Mr. Helms was

acting properly when he failed

to tell the Warren Commission

about the assassination plots?

MI. Scelso:

No, I think that was

a morally

highly reprehensible act, which

he cannot possibly justify under

his oath of office, or any

other standard of professional

public service.

(HSCA Class.

Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78)

full gone co

legitimate epotly obligared

Agency Concern for the Sanctity

of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting

CIA Resporse to Warren Commission Requests

The length of time required by the CIA to

respond to the warren Commission's requests for

information was dependent upon 1) the availability

of information;

2) the complexity of the issues

presented by the request and 3) the extent to which

the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA

sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr.

Helms testified

that when CIA had been able to

satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send

a reply back:

"and

some of these inquiries obviously

took longer than others.

For example, some might involve

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Оті

give

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

checking a file which was in Washington.

Other inquiries might involve trying to

see if we could locate somebody in some

overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to per-

form than the other.

(Exec. Sess. Test.

of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, P. 25)

At times

the CIA's concern for protecting its

sensitive sources and methods. caused the Warren

Commission to experience greater difficulty in

getting relevant information than when the protec-

tion of such sources and methods was not at issue.

J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's

effort to protect its

sensitive sources and methods, particulur

with regard to CiAsurellance operition in Mexico Lity,

affectathe quality of the information to which

the Warren Comnission and its staff were given

access.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78,

27-

22). As a result of the CIA's concern, in some instances

the Agency made the unilaterial decision to

limit access to CIA materials by the Commission.

(HSCA Class: Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158)

related

The Committee has identified two areas of

concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its

sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren

Commission's investigation.. These are:

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Knows the

MMM

photos were

Atrer Lio

tri,

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SECREL

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

1)

Witholding information from the Warren

Commission

pertaining to the photo-

surveittance and telephonic surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station

2)

As a related consideration, the Agency's

reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph

now referred to as that of the "Mexico

City Mystery Man",

surveillant dierations.

developed by the Class Mexicoloty photo -

GAs Initial Concera for Retalina

sensitive sources intmethods

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence

of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above,

was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized

at first to reveal all our technical operations."

(Ibia., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that:

We were going to give them intelligence

reports which derived from all our sources,

sources, including the

gotten from the interrogation of Silvia

Duran, for example, which corresponded

almost exactly with the information fron

the [telephone intercepts.

Mr: Scelsco's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the Warren Commission regarding

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This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA

DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J.

Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the

information provided to the Warren Commission

in this report was based upon sensitive sources

and methods, identification of which had been

deleted completely from the report.

The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission

knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu-

lated as early as December 20, 1963, at which

time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico City Station which stated:

Sovace

Our present plan in passing information

to the Warren Commission is to eliminate

mention of[telephone taps] in order to

protect your continuing ops.

Will rely

instead on statements of Silvia Duran

and on contents of soviet Consular file

which soviets gave ODACIDICIA Doc. FOIA

#420-157, 12/20/631 DII 90466)

The basic policy articulated in the December

20, 1963 cablenis also set forth: in a CIA memorandym o

of December 10, 1963(as it specifically concerned

the CIA's relations with the FBI.

(CIA Memorandum

for File, 12/20/63, Birch O'Neal, included in with Soft

file materials) In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal

of the CIA Counterintelligence/Special Investigations

Group

wrote that he had been advised by Sam

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

Papich, FBforhiCadseonttalledklecuhents.) that the FBI was

anticipating a reguest from the Warren Commission

for copies of the FBI's materials which supported

or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the

Warren Connission. Papich provided O'Neal with

this report which indicated that some United

States Agency was Capping telephones/in Mexico

and asked him whether the FBI could supply the

warren Connission with the source of the telephone

taps

O'Neal's memorandum shows that he discussed

this

matter with Scelso. After a discussion

with helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare

CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission.

O'Deal wrote:

or

ph

desir

Some other poli

al regard -

0

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Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not

the Agency's desire to make available

to the Commission at least in this

manner--via the FBI-sensitive informa-

tion which could relate tol telephone

taps, (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by

Birch O'Neal, included in Soft File materials)*

inco

Brockets

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December

20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a

formalized fashion when Helms expressed his

concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency

sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote

that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had

already:

called to the attention of the

Commission, through its attorney,

that we have information las deter-

mined from Agency sources coinciding

with the date when Oswald was in Mexico

City and which may have some bearing

on his activities while in that area.

(CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64,

CIA

# CSCI-3/779/510.

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might

be called upon to provide additional information

acquired from checks of CIA records and agency

sources.

He suggested that certain policies be

employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively

with the Commission in a manner which would

protect CIA information, sources and methods.

Among the policies articulated were two which

Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control

the flow of Agency originated information. In

this way the CIA could check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly.

The policies articulated were:

SECREI

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The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency

sensitive sources and methods is further revealed

by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29,

1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico

City Station. (CIA DOC. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64,

DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of

Agency sources and techniques was still being with-

held from the Warren Commission, and stated that on

Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present

a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the

Warren Commission which would be in a form

protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's

sources and techniques (Ibia.)

(Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.)

1) Your Bureau not disseminate information re-

ceived from this Agency without prior concur-

rence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided

information to your Bureau and you consider

that information is pertinent to the Commission's

interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise

is pertinent to information developed or

received by your bureau througi other sources

and is being provided by you to the commission,

you refer the Commission to this Agency. In

such cases it will be appreciated if you will

advise us of such referral in order that we may

anticigate the

comicstate eriorible centure interest of steps to

meeting its needs. (Ibid.)

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Telephone Taps

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the warren Commission, at least

during. the initial stage of the Commission's work,

of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance

operations in Mexico City.

The reason for the

sensitivity of these

telephone taps and surveillance was not

say tore Ban to men the to pione

the Mexican authorities and therefore,

if this had become public knowledge,

it would have caused[very bad feelings

between Mexico and the United States, J

and that was the reason..

(Exec. Sess.

Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52)

The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren

Commission in the early stages of its investigation

of the above-described surveillance operations is

a source of concern to this Committee..

It is

indicative of an Agency policy designed

skew

in its favor the form and substance of information

the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren

Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso,

5/6/78, p. 158)

This process might well have

hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in

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De use the

its investon chine dod men meteries erated

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964,

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a

memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's

Mexico City visit during September 26,

1963 -

October 3, 19637 CLA DOC. POLA H509-803 1/31/54)

That memorandum did not mention

that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban

and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been| tapped anc

subsequently transcribed.

by the Agency's Mexico City Station

Furthermore, that memo

randu did not mention that the CIA had tapped

and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy

employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the

Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of

the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos

and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA

had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Commission and likely discussed the memorandum of

January 31, 1964.

(CIA DOC. FOIA #498-204, 1/29/64

DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

Helns in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31.

(JFK DOC. No. 3872) A review of Rankin's letter

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indicates that as of his writing, the Warren

commission had no substantive knowledge of| the

telephonic surveillance operation or the production

f.e., the tapes and transcripts from that operation.]

Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter

whether Oswald's direct communication with employees

of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1

of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by

telephone or interview. Manifestly, had the Warren

Commission

been informed of the telephonic

surveillance operation and its success in tapping

Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been

made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support

this conclusion.

It was Rocca's recollection that

between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964,

Warren Commission's representatives had visited the

CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had

been shown various transcripts resulting from the

CIA's telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico

city.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78,

p. 99)

However, Mi. Rocca did not personally make

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this material available to Commission representa-

tives and was not able to state under oath

precisely the point in time at which the Warren

Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibia.)

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to

Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency

response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the

Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the

Consulate. However, the Agency

neither revealed

the source of this information in its response to

the Commission nor indicated that this source

would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral

briefing). (Ibid.)

Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA Teléphonic Surveillance

During the period of March - April 1964,

David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which

among other issues concerned Warren Commission know-

ledge of and access to the production material

derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations

in Mexico City.

A review of these memoranda tends

to support the Committee's belief that the Warren

Commission, through Mssis.

Slawson, Coleman, and

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and WillenThiafmisttoobtas deceterigo trestedelephonic

trom CiA -controlled documents.)

surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On

that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with

Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City, who provided them with various transcripts

and translations derived from CIA telephone taps

of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson

Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to

Mexico City pa2 )

prior to April 9, it appears doubtful that

ser

the Commission had been given even partial access

astitue?to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March

12, 1964, the record indicates that the warren

-

Commission had at least become aware that the CIA

did maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban

Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12,

1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives).

Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that. the Warren

Commission had learned that the CIA possessed trate

scripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador

to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. The

Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren

50

may

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from CIA - controlled documdite Marcit

Commission representatives at nuttirg with

CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned

Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the

Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of

April 22, 1964, PP. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded

to the Commission's request for access, stating

that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren

Commission's representatives to review this material.

(Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6)

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25,

1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo

Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions

he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip.

were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964

and February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March

25, 1964, P. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal

police summary of interrogation on destro, a 40.

after the assassination with

Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report)

is simply a summation of what the Mexican

police learned when they interrogated Mrs.

Silvia. Duran, an employee of the Cuban

Consulate in

Mexico City, and is there-

fore only as accurate as Mrs.

Duran's

testimony to the police. (Ibid.)

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These comments indicate that Slawson placed

qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary.

Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had

been provided the Duran telephonic intercept tran-

scripts:: In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments

concerning the Mexican police report, it would

appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25,

had been provided little substantive information

pertaining to Silvia Duran.

As Slawson reveals;

the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two

memoranda that did not make reference to the surveil-

lance operations, and a summary report issued by

the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had

for over three months Preluded

- exposing

actual antanalys 15

the surveillance operations to the review of the

concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was

stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its

Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information

to the Warren Commission is to eliminate

mention of| telephone taps,J in order to

protect your continuing operations.

will

rely instead on statements of Silvia

Duran and on contents of Soviet consular

file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA DOC. FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964,

CIA P. 2144, DIR 90466)

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The Committee's belief that Slawson had

[telephonic intercept

not been given access to the Duran transcripts is

further supported by reference to his memorandum

of March 27, 1964 (CD 692) wherein he

states his

conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban

Embassy on three occasions. : (Ibid, p. 2) This

again

conclusion, he wrote, was based upon an analysis of

Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police.

This memorandum bears no indication that he had

reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore,

had Slawson been given access to these transcripts,

certainly their substance would have been incorporated

into his analysis and accordingly noted for this

purpose.

His analysis would have reflected the fact

of his review either by its corroboration or

criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report.

Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic

surveillance production would have clarified some

ambiguities.

For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.M.

(Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intercepts ])

from soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 2) put f..at

Erichotsentence

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stated that an Ameritan dos resently at the

Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to

Cuba.

This American was later determined by CIA analysts

to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.I.

Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that

an American, subseguently identified by CIA analysts

as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy.

:11b1d. p.

corroborating oswalas visits tothe Cubanfembassu

Had this information been made available to Slawson,

his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico

City would

have been more firmly established than

refleiedir.his.nemorrrcimm

they were

as*of March 27, 1964•

The

record supports the Committee's finding

that as of

April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had

stall not been given access to thing see har ini

series of telephonic intercepts.

i + memorandum of

that date by Coleman and Slawson,

posed one

question to the CIA and made two requestsfor information

from the Agency. (Slawson - Coleman Memorandum of

April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador

Mann File)

Coleman and Slawson wrote:

1)

What is the information source referred

to in the November 28 telegram that

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Ösiwädren isntehdedect dors enteriel extresterh

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the

transcripts of the intercepts,]translated

if possible, in all cases where the

intercepts refer to the assassination

or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see the

intercept lin which the allegation that

money was passed at the Cuban Embassy

is discussed (Ibid.)

The question initially posed by (Item I) in

the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns

the CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963

at 10:37 a.m.

(Slawson Memorandum of April 21,

1964, p. 1) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary

to request. the source of the information, he had

not as yet been provided access to the original

material by the CIA.

Item Number Two of the above listing tends to

show

that the Cormission had not been giving access to the interce

concerning the assassination.

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Item number three of the above listing

reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Armas

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the

passing of monies was discussed had not as of April

2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission

had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas

transcripts at a March 12, 1964 meeting between

Commission representatives and Agency representatives.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference

with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed

their concern for receiving complete access to all

materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:

The most probable final result of the

entire investigation of Oswald's activities

in Mexico is a conclusion that he went

there for the purpose of trying to reach

Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies,

etc. took place.

... In order to make such a judgment (that

all reasonable lines of investigation that

might have uncovered other motivations or

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possible conspiracies have been followed

through with negative results), we must

become familiar with the details of what

both the American and Mexican investi-

gatory agencies there have done. This

means reading their reports, after trans-

lation, if necessary, and in some cases

talking with the investigators themselves:

(Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April

13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of

Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove

Worthwhile, p. 11.)

Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire

rampeded

for a thorough investigation had been

=.by

the CIA's concern lest its sources and methods,

however relevant to

the Commission's investigation,

be exposed.

Considering the gravity and signi-

ficance of the Warren Commission's investigation

the

Agency's witholding of material from the

Commission

staff was clearly improper.

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On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens,

and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico

to meet with the representatives of the State

Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico.

(Slawson Menorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Irip

to Mexico City, p. 1) Prior to their departure,

they met with Thomas Mann, the U.S. Ambassador to

Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.)

Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representa-

tives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively

engaged in photosurveillance operations against the

Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Ibid., P. 3)

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they

were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra

of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI,

and Winston Scott of the CIA (Ibid. PP- 9-10)

That same day, during a meeting between the

Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made

available to the group actual transcripts of the CIA's

telephonic surveillance operations accompanied with

Englisn translations of the transcripts. In addition:

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for the time period covered by Oswald's visit

that had resulted from photosurveillance of the

Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson

wrote:

...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning

of his narrative that he intended to make

a complete disclosure of all facts,

including the sources of his information,

and that he understood that all three of

us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and

that we would not disclose beyond the

confines of the Commission and its

immediate staff the information we obtain-

ed through him without first clearing it

with his superiors in Washington.

We

agreed to this."

(Ibia.)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission repre-

directly

sentatives the CIA's course of action i:

following the assassination, indicating that his

staff immediately began to compile dossiers on

Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald

(Ibid.) Scott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian

intelligence agents had quickly. been put under

surveillance following the assassination. Slawson

concluded :

"Scott's narrative plus the material we

were shown disclosed immediately how

incorrect our previous information had

been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet

and Mexican

Embassies.

Apparently the

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distortionsonialedricains to which our

information had been subjected had

entered some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we

were shown by Scott was unambiguous on

almost all the crucial points. We had

previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable

activities at the embassies to get Scott's

opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted

our information was we realized that this

would be useless..

Therefore, instead, we

decided to take as close notes as possible

from the original source materials at some

later time during our visit." (Ibid, p. 24)*

A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records

the results of the notetaking from original source

materials that he did following Scott's disclosures.

These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic

intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conver-

sations for the period

Sept. 27 - Oct. 1, 1963.

(Slawson Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj: [Intercepts ]

from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City-

It is evident from Slawson's record that the

Agency's denial of original source materials, in this

case the[telephonic surveillance intercepts, ]seriosly,

impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately

reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in

Mexico City. It meant that as of April 10, 1964,

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nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission

investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's

activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that

the Agency had provided ambiguous information to

the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the

crucial points" significantly more precise materials.

could have been made available for analysis by the

Commission. (Ibid.) Thus, the: Agency's early policy

of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant

information derived from certain sensitive sources

and methods had seriously undermined the investigation

and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation e.g.,

Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously

considered had this material been expeditiously

provided.

Mexico City Station Photosurveillance and tre

Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odum

showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man

bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren

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commission mcdote women teeb feastshad been

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's

MexICO City Station after Agency representatives

searched their files in an effort to locate

information on Oswala: (CIA DOC. DDPA-1555, 3/25/641

warren Conmission Doc. 67)F, this photograph, which was one

in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet

and Cuban Embassy/Consulates,

Prior to the assassination;

had been linked by

the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald.: (Ibid.)

Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren

Commission, stated that the photograph shown to

Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963

in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to

Oswald. : (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms

8/7/64, Vol. XI, PP. 469-470)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified

before the Warren Commission and recounted the cir-

cumstances under which she was shown the photograph.

(Warren Commission Report Vol Ip153)Mrs. Oswald testified

that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack

Ruby. (Ibid.)

000063

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from ClA-cortrolled documents.)

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP

requesting both the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph and an explanation of

the circumstances by which this photograph was

obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

(Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK DOC.

#3872)

On that same day, in a separate letter,.

Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials

that the CIA had disseminated since November 22,

1963 to the Secret Service but not to.

the Warren

Commission.

Rankin requested copies of these

materials which included

three CIA cables. The

cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown

by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual

originally identified by the Mexico City Station

as Lee Harvey Oswald. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin

Feb. 12, 1964; JFK DOC. #3872)

Among the materials disseminated by the CIA

to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination.

(CIA DOC DIR 85177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned

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SOCIAL

the borticaom Chacontrolled d&cuments.

existence of [CIA telephonic surveillance operations]

in Mexico City at the time of the assassination

and Oswald's earlier visit. As a result the CIA was

reluctant to make the material disseminated to

the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission

for in so doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its

telephonic surveillance operationsto the Commission.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the

Commission

recounting the origion of the photograph in

question.

Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the

Warren Commission all of our technical.

operations.

In other words, we did not

initially disclose to them that we had

photosurveillance because the November

photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald.

Therefore it did not mean anything, you

see?"

Mr. Goldsmith:

..So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.

Scelso:

Right, we were not authorized, at first,

to reveal all our technical operations.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso 5/16/78,

p. 150)

In sumary the records shows that

By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had

inadvertantly requested access to|telephonic surveillance

production, a cause for concern within the Agent

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asst cation:

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-44-

due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods.

Similarly, the possible disclosure of the photosurveillance

operations to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause

concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an

internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have

a problem here for your determination." Rocca

outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly

to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA

material forwarded to the Secret Service since

November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would

prefer to wait out the Commission on the

matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the

above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone

requesting access to CIA reports provided

the Secret Service after November 22, 1963,

JFK DOC. 3982). If they come back on this

point he feels that you, or someone from

here, should be prepared to go over to show

the Commission the material rather than passe

then to them in copy.

Incidentally, none

of these items are of new substantive

interest.

We have either passed the material

in substance to the Commission in response to

earlier levies or the items refer to aborted

leads, for example, the famous six photographs

which are not of Oswald..."

• (CIA DOC. FOIA

#579-250, 3/5/64; see also HSCA Classified

Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp.

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-442-

wherein he states that the only reason

for not providing the Warren Commission with

access to CIA surveillance materials

was due to the Agency's concern for

protection of its sources and methods)

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on March 12, 1964, representatives of the

Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding

the February 12 request for the materials forwarded

to the Secret Service by the Agency:

(Letter of

J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK DoC. # 3872, Slawson

Memorandum, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Cormission at

the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the

Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms

on March 16 that it was his understanding that the

CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of

each report of communication pertaining to the Secret

Service materials "with all indications of your

confidential communications techniques and confidential

sources deleted..

You will also afford members of

our staff working in this area an opportunity to

review the actual file so that they may give assurance

that the paraphrases are complete." (Letter of J. Lee

Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK DoC. No. 3872)°

Rankin further indicated that the same

procedure was to be followed regarding any material

in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,

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1963 which had not as yet been furnished because

it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid.,

par. 3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter

on March 24 (FOIA # 622-258) by two separate

communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD/631,

3/24/64, CIA Doc.; DDP4:-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter)

CD 631 provided the Commission with a copy of the

October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept.,

INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on

22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence

at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.

The response

further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

Epon the Navy

requested two copies of the most recent photograph

of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person

believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore,

the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that

it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite

Oswald on Movember 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee

Harvey Oswald. The Agency explained that it had checked the

photogri

against the press photographs of Oswald generally

available on November 23, 1963,

CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately follov

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the assassion then confled doddamper asy age, three

cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters

from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs

of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and

Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963.

Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive

sources

and methods, were attached to CD 674.

The

Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced

in these cables was not Oswald. It was further

stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and

your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens

will review at Langley the original copies

of these 3 disseminations to the Secret

Service and the cables on which they were

based,. as well as the photos of the unidenti-

fied man.": (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555 CD634,24

March 1964)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum

for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

on March 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631)

in which it: set. Forth:the dissemination of:

the information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

rey ovation 2 128

I reblizg

that this memorandum is only a partial answer

to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964

and I hope that the complete answers will give

us the additional information we requested."

(Memorandum of William Coleman, March 24, 1964)

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an

explanation of the photograph which the FBI

showed marguerite Oswala soon after

the

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assassination.

I hope that paragraph

of the memorandum of March 24, 1964

(CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA

is not the answer which the CIA intends

to give us as to this inquiry. " (Ibid.)

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission

and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the

Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley,

Virginia.

Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that

he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca.

Stern

indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials

furnished previously to the Warren Commission by

the CIA. The file also contained:

"Cable reports of November 22 and November

23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station

relating to the photograph of the unidenti-

fied individual mistakenly believed to be

Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those

cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to

the Secret Service by the CIA." (Memorandum

of Samuel Stern, March 27, 1964)

Stern noted that these messages were accurately

paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the

#Paregraph 4 of CD 631 stated that ClA soncluded the

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Warren Comfressfion contrelledcacuments.l964. He also

reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's

Mexico City Station to

CIA headquarters

reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City. In addition, Stern examined the

October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico. City Station reporting background infor-

mation on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded

that these

messages

were

paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January

31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's

Mexico City trip:

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him

for his review a computer printout of the references

to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's

electronic data storage system. He stated "there is

no item listed on the printout which the Warren Com-.

mission has not been given either in full text or

paraphrased." (Ibiđ.)

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission

representative had been apprised of the circumstances

surrounding

the

mysterious photograph.

Nomys

Abor. s

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Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President

Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee

in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone

call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish.

( CIA DOC. FOIA

MEXI 7105, 11/27/63, 173-615, attachment)

This call had been intercepted and recorded by the

CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its

LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. ](Ibid.) The Mexico

City Station,as subsequently reported to CIA

headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa-

tion as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in

the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consu-

late. (Ibid.)

During the course of the conversation, the

unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard

(of the assassination)

the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kenneay.".

(Ibid.)

Paraphrasing the telephone intercept transcript,

it states that the caller told Luisa

the person

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apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the

"President of one of the Committees of the Fair

Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she also knew

this. Luisa inquired whether the person being

held for the killing was a "gringo." The unidenti-

fied caller replied, "yes." luisa told her caller

that she had learned nothing else about the assassina-

tion and that she had learned about the assassination

only a little while ago. The unidentified caller

commented:

We think that if it had been or had

seemed..- public or had been one of

the segregationists or against

intergration who had killed Kennedy,

then there was, let's say, the

possibility that a sort of civil

war would arise in the United States;

that contradictions would be sharpened...

who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that

makes three. (She laughs.) : (Ibid, p. 2)

Raymond Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rocke-

feller Commission request for information on a

possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

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Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge

This is the

only item in the [intercept coverage of

the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina-

tion that contains the suggestion of fore-

knowlege of expectation.

(CIA Doc.,

Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for, DC/OPS,

5/23/75, P. 152 *(see p, 55a for 1)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic

comments do not merit serious attention. Her words

may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina-

tion but may equally be interpreted without such a

sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee

has determined that Luisa Calderon's case

should

have merited

serious attention in the months following

the assassination.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa

Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964

in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State

Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573, 11/27/63) •

In that cable Mann stated:

• Washington should urgently consider

feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities

to arrest for interrogation:

Eusebio Azcue,

Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal.

The two

men are Cuban national and Cuban consular

officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary

in Cuban Consulate here."

(ibid.)

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*Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments

could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible.

foreknowledge, the CIA position is as follows:

During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry,

Calderon's conversation was identified

as a possible item of information from

the [Agency's ]Cuban and Soviet/ telephone

intercepts that might suggest foreknowledge

of a plot to assassinate the American Presi-

dent. This involves a faulty translation of an

answer Calderon gave to her caller.

In answer

to the latter's question as to whether she

had heard the latest news, Calderon said:

"Si, claro, me entere casiantes que Kennedy."

The verb entere is mistranslated. Me entere

(the first person of the verb enterarsede,

past tense) should be translated as

found

out. (or I learned) labout it the assassination/

almost before Kennedy Laid/•" In other words,

Calderon was saying she heard about the shooting

of Kennedy almost at the time the event took

place..

(CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding

Luisa

Calderon conversation, p.l).

The Committee fundamentally disputes the

narrow interpretation of Calderon's comments

assigned by the Agency. It is the Committee's

position that translation of Me Entere as

either "I found out" or "I learned about"

does not foreclose interpretation of Calderor®s

comments as a suggestion on her part of possible

foreknowledge of President Kennedy's assassination.

The interpretation, inany event

shouldhavelon/eftto

Hejudgementof the arsen Commission, not treelf

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This cable does not state the basis for

arresting Calderon.* However, the CIA's copy of this

cable bears a handwritten notation.on its routing

page.

That notation states:

"Info from Amb Mann

for Sec Rusk re: ...persons involved with Oswald

in Cuban Embassy." Mann went on to state in urgent

terms:.

"They

may quickly be returned to Havana in

order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican

government could use them as witnesses.". (Ibid.)

According to CIA files, Calderon made

reservations

to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on

December I1, 1963, less than four weeks after the

assassination. (CIA Doc. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63)

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested

nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal

police.

However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate

of Calderon's and the one person believed to have

*It is the Committee's belief that Mann was prompted

to request the arrest of Calderon on the basis of

Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte's allegation that Calderon

was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald

was allegedly given a sum of money presumably to

carry out the assassination of President Kennedy.

(CIA DOC. DDP4-2741, 1 June 1964, Attachment C)

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had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in

Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the.

Mexican police on two separate occasions. (CIA

Doc. DIR 84950, 11/23/63, CIA DOC. DIR 85471,

11/27/63)

During her

second interrogation, Duran was

questioned regarding her association with Calderon.

There is no indication in the reinterrogation report

accounting for the questioning of Duran about Calderon.

(CIA Doc. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64) The information regarding

Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission

on February 21, 1964, more than two months after

Calderon had returned to Cuba. (Ibid.)

Information was reported to the CIA during

May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa

Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The

defector, AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence

Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable

information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence

operations. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch

to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) Calderon's

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ties to Cuban intelligence were reported to the warren

Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319,

6/19/64)

However, the Committee has determined from

its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's

conversation of November 22 to the Warren Commission.

Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that

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Calderon had connections to intelligence work,

as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital

link between her background and her comments

was never established for the Warren Commission

by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this

regard may have forclosed the Commission from

actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she

arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16,

1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7• Her date

of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch

HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July

15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field

office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the

Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban

operations) .. (CIA Doc. Dispatch JECA-/0095, 7/15/63)

That dispatch had attached to it a report containing

biographic data on personnel then assigned to the

Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the

attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary

of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The

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notation indicated that a report was

pending on

No such report is present

Calderon.

(Ibid., p. 3 of attachment)

The

'in Calderon's

201 File.

Agency has attempted, without success, to locate

the report.

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban

DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964.

(CIA DOC. Blind Memorandum of [Harold Swenson, FOIA

68-290 5/5/64) At that time, Joseph Langosch,

Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs

Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of

the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated

that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide

items of interest based upon the comments of

certain

Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specificaliy,

• AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban

intelligence services before November 23, 1963.

AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald

visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or

three occasions.

Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion

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General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically

with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and

Rogelio Roâriguez Lopez.".. (Ibid.)

Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's

precise relationship to the DGI was not clear.

As a comment to this statement he set forth the

CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her

arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure

for Cuba within one month after the assassination.

(Ibid.)

put no

bisbliNd

On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional

information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding

Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA Doc

FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/7/64) Paragraph 3 of

this memorandum stated in part:

"a.

b.

Luisa Calderon, since she returned

to Cuba, has been paid a regular

salary by the DGI even though she

has not performed any services.

Her home is in the Vedado section

where the rents are high.

Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon

for several years. Before going

to Mexico, she worked in the

Ministry of Exterior Commerce

in the department which was known

as the "Empress Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General

of the Communist Youth

in the

department named in the previous

sentence. (Ibid.)

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On May 8 Langosch further disclosed AMMUG'S

knowledge of the Oswald case.

(Ibid, attach. 5)

Langosch paraphrased ANMUG's knowledge of Calderon

as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned

about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to Mexico, that she had been

involved with an American in Mexico.

information to which I refer was told to

me by a DGI case officer...

I had commented

commented

to (him) that it seemed strange that luisa

Calderon was receiving a salary from the

DGI although she apparently did not do

any work for the Service. : (The case officer)

told me that hers was a peculiar case and

that he himself believed that she had been

recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence

Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head

of the DGI, did not agree.:

As I recall,

(the case officer) had investigated Luisa

Calderon. This was because, during the time

she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted

a letter to her by an American who signed

his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar.

As you know, the pronunciation

of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in

Spanish so I am not sure of how the name

mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled.

It could have been "Howard" or something

different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love

letter but indicated that there was a

clandestine professional relationship

between the

writer and Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the case officer)

that after the interception of the letter

she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.

I do not know if

this could have been Oswald... (Ibid.)

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On May 1l, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information

Swenson had elicited from AMMUG (CIA DOC. FOIA 687-295,

5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) Rocca proposed that "the

DDP in person or via a designee, perferably the

former, discuss the AMMUG-1 situation on a very

restrictéd basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest

convenience either at the Agency of at the Comnission

headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not

desirable to put anything in writing."

(Ibid. p. 2).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its

sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA DoC.

FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached

to Helms' conmunication was a paraphrased accounting

of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.): In that

attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel

Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forgh.

However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever

to Luisa Calderon.*

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission

requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,

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access.

to the questions used in Langosch's

interrogation of AMUG... (CIA DOC. FOIA: 739-316, 6/19/64,

Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of

Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis

Group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to

the Warren Conmission's office"s for Willen's review.

Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only

mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise

relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not

clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from

which she

returned to Cuba early in 1964." (Ibia.)

However, Willens

was not shown

Langosch's

memoranda of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which

1 contained

much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon,

including her possible association with Lee Harvey

Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)*

The Warren Conmission as of June 19, 1964,

had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Caldero@

lead. It had effectively been denied significant

*

It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,

7, 8, I1 and June 19 with attachments, are not

referenced in the Calderon 201 file:

(See CIA

Computer printout of Calderon 201 file)

Their

existence was determined by the Committee's

independelassification: other agency files.

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background information.

This denial may have

impeded of prevented the Commission's pursuit

of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald

and the assassination of President Kennedy. But

even if the Warren Commission had

learned

of Calderon's

background and possible contact with

Oswald it still had been denied the one significant

piece of information that might haveraised its

interest in Calderon to a more serious level.. The

Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's

conversation of November 22, 1964:

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he Calderon 201 file wrea

reference to the conversation nor does it indicate

that it was ever made known to or provided the

Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Compute

print-out of Calderon 201 file)

In an effort to

determine the manner in which the

treated the Calderon conversation this Committee

posed the following questions to the CIA:

1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever given access

to the transcript of a telephone conversa-

tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a

female employee of the Cuban Embassy/

Consulate in Mexico City, identified

as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak-

ing from outside the Cuban Embassy/Con-:

sulate? If so, please indicate when

this transcript was provided to the Warren

Commission or its staff, which CIA official

provided it, and which Warren Commission

members or staff reviewed it.

2.

Was the Warren Commission or any member

of the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever informed

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orally or in writing of the substance of the

above-referenced conversation of November 22,

1963? If so, please indicate when and

in what form this information was provided,

and which CIA official provided it. (ESCA

request letter of August 28, 1978)

The CIA responded by memorandum:

"Although the (Mexico City) Station considered

the conversation of sufficient possible

interest to send a copy to headguarters,

the latter apparently did nothing with

it, for there appears to be no record in the

Oswald file of such action as may have

been taken.

A review of those Warren

Commission documents containing information

provided by the Agency and still bearing

Secret or Top Secret classification does

not reveal whether the conversation was

given or

shown to the Commission."

(CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding Luisa

Calderon conversation, p. 1)

The available evidence thus supports the

conclusion that the Warren Commission was never

given the information nor the opportunity by

which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's

significance to the events surrounding President

Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been

expeditiously provided this evidence of her

intelligence background, association with Silvia

Duran, and her comments following the assassination,

it may well have given more serious investigative

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consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald

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and the Cub#em xeran aed Semestle involvement in

a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Two difficult issues remain which are raised

by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't

the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the

Warren Connission; secondly, why didn't the Agency

reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge

of calderon's intelligence background, her possible

knowledge of Oswald and

her possible connection to

the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

The first question can be explained in benign

terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer

oversight the conversation was filed away and not

recovered or recollected until after the Warren

Commission had completed its investigation and

#see p 65, cirder portion as footnotherein

published its

report.

(See above CIA explanation)

As for the Agency's withholding of information

concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the

record reflects that the Commission was merely

informed that Calderon may have been a member of

the DGI.

(CIA DOC. 5/5/64, Swenson Memorandum)

The memoranda which provided more extensive examina-

tion of her intelligence background were not made

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might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's

sister:

Ronis told the Committee that he had no

recollection of recruiting any person associated

with the Cuban Intelligence Service.

He did recall

that he had recruited women to perform tasks for

the Agency.

However,

he did not recall ever recruiting

any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in

Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had

no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated

with the CIA. (Ibid.)

Various present and former CIA representatives

were queried whether Luisa

Calderon had ever been

associated with the CIA.

The uniform answer was

that no one recalled such an association.

• (Cites:

Exec. Sess: Test. of Richard Heims, 8/9/78, p. 136;

ESCA Class. Depo. of Raymona Rocca, 7/17/78, P. 148;

HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78,

Piccolo, Interview of _

Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the

testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no

connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as

indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the

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most glaring omission being the absencé from

cryptic remarks

following the assassination of President Kennedy.

Buckgrourd.and

This Committee's investigation of Luisa

Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban

Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi-

ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts

with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was

assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter):*

CIA files reveal that A-l defected from the

DGI on April 21, 1964 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.)

When he defected, A-l possessed a number of DGI

documents which were subsequently turned over to

the CIA.

(CIA DOC. [OTTA JIN 68894, 4/24/64)

Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph fi. •

Langosch, vent.[to Canada to meet A-1, debrief him,

and arrange for A-l's travel into the United States.

(Ibia.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's

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arent that little of this information

Eur classiticatione bu the CiA to the Warren Commission.

was made

Therefore, the possibility exists that A-l had

provided other

rele

to

mare commission devich

Warren Commission

ted

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debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of

Station in Ottawa, Canada. ](CIA Doc. Dispatch [OCDA]

7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-1 was under.

contract with the CIA for operational purposes.

(CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64)

By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-l

would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that

AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or

that he has furnished us with accurate

and valuable information concerning

Cuban intelligence operations, staffers,

and agents.. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to

Director of Security, 6/23/64)

As an officer of the DGI, A-l from August of

1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's

Illegal

section B (CIA DOC. [OTTA IN 68894 4/24/64)

which was responsible for training agents

for

assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi-

bility pertained to handling of agent operations

in El Salvador.

(CIA Doc. Personal Record Question-

naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. (Otta fIn 68894 4/24/64)

A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli-

gence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch

described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in

Mexico as follows:

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In

Mexico City, he knows who the

intelligence people are.

One is the

Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is

called the Chief of the Centre. That

is his title but he is actually the

intelligence chief, or at least he

was until the 16th of April at which

time a replacement was sent to Mexico

to take over.. This fellow's name is

Manuel Vega.

The source says that

the Commercial attache whose name is

Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is

not sure which is an intelligence

officer) and another one is Rogelio:

( I might say that some of these names

are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing

of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64)

Thus, A-1 was able

to provide the CIA soon

after his defection with accurate information

regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in

Mexico City•

* Insert from p72

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files

concerning A-l. This examination was undertaken

to determine: 1) whether A-l had provided any

valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining

to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2)

whether, if such leads were provided, these leads

and/or other significant information were made

available to the Warren Commission.

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The Committee's initial review of the

materials provided by the CIA to the Warren

Commission did not disclose the existence of the

AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during

the course of its review examine a file containing

material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That

file made reference to A-1.

Included in this

file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by

Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-l

provided

about the Oswald case. (CIA DoC. FOIA 68-290

Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within

this file were the A-l debriefing memoranda of

May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard

to Luisa Calderon. (CIA DoC. FOIA #687-295, attach's

3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the

Committee requested access to all CIA files

or

concerning referring to A-l.

From review of these materials the Committee

has determined that the Warren Commission did learn

during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably

had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.

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the warren Commisston

Prior to learning of

Oswald's probable contact

with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the

CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal

memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter-

intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been

informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee

Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that

the Director consent to an interview before the

Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar

Hoover also appeared before the Commission on

that date prior to McCone's appearance.

Warren

Commission Report, FR17129)(CIA Doc. FOTA 689-298,

Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64): Angleton

also wrote:

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of

the recent information which you are

processing which originated with the

sensitive Western Hemisphere source.

I

informed him that in your view this would

raise a number of new factors with the

Commission, that it should not go to the

Commission prior to the Director's appear-.

ance unless we have-first had some pre-.

liminary reaction or made sure that the

Director is fully aware of the implica-

tions since it could well serve as the

basis for detailed questioning.: The DDP

stated that he would review this care-

fully and made (sic) a decision as to

the question of timing. (Ibia.)

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Undoubt Caly trella deu modse source referred

to in Angleton's memo was A-l. This conclusion is

based in part upon the date of this memo which

was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In

addition, Rocca's staff prepared

prior

to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren

a "Brief

Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission

outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a

vis its investigative efforts and

assistance to the

Commission. (CIA DOC. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64)

At Tab. E of this brief it states:

Within the past week, significant infor-

mation has been developed by the CIA Ie-

garding the relationship with Oswald of

certain Cuban intelligence personnel in

Mexico City and the reaction in Havana

within the Cuban Intelligence Service

to the news of the assassination of

President Kennedy. The Commission Staff

is in the course of being briefed on the

Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E)

On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview,

the Warren Commission received its first formal

communication regarding A-1. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294,

5/15/64)

However, the Agency did not at that time

identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did

the Agency indicate that the source of this information.

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was a defector then residing under secure conditions

in the Washington, D.C. area.

(Ibid.) The May 15

communication did

state that the Agency had

established contact "with a well-placed invidivual

who has been in close and prolonged contact with

ranking officers

of the Cuban Direccion General de

Intelligencia." (Ibid.)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a

copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of

May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro-

bable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. The

attachment made no reference to the source's status

as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment)

As set forth in the section of this report.

concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard

Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's

May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa-

tion set forth in the memo was elicited..

Neither the

questions nor the memo shown to willens made

reference to the

source's status. as a defector col-

laborating with the CIA. (CIA DOC FOIA 739-319;

6/19/ 64) -

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•Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda,

the Committee has determined that significant

information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically

of Nov. 22

details of her

her conversation and association with Cuban Intelligence

were withheld from the Warren Commission. This

information as described above, was derived from

However,

debriefings of A-l. from the Committee's review

of the A-l file provided by the CIA, the Committee

has not found any credible evidence indicating that

other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was

relevant to the work of the Warren Commission: However,

in its review the Committee has determined that a

as

specific document referenced in the A-l file is

not present in that file.

The missing itemis of considerable concern to

the Committee.

It is a debriefing report of A-1

entitled "The Oswald Case." (CIA DOC Dispatch (UFGW-?

5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch

records the transmittal of the report, along with

eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next

the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten notation "SỊ." A CIA employee

who has worked extensively with the Agency files

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system told a Committee staff member that this

notation was the symbol for the CIA component

known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA

representatives believed the notation was a

reference to the Counterintelligence component

CI/SIG. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27,

1978, the CIA has adopted the position that

debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of

the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964

concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey

(steps0 a tort,)

Oswald's possible contact with the Dí.l.*

Verertheless

officers regarding additional information that A-1 may

have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when

interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not

have contact with the Warren Commission and does

not know what information derived from A-l's de-

briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission.

(HSCA

Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also

Interviews of

Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that

he does not recall that A-l provided any other information

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missing

eveN

*The CIA memorandum states in part as follows:

When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection

and considered the possibility that he

might have some knowledge of the Oswald

case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions

to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing

AMMUG-1...WH desk records reflect that

AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding

this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing

on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive

matter, it was dictated directly to a CI

(Counterintelligence) stenographer on

5 May 1964.

/Note:

A-1 was debriefed on

several subjects on 4 May 64. The procedure

was to assign each subject discussed a

debriefing number and they were written

up in contact report form by the WH case

officer.

The instructions from CI staff

were to handle the Oswald case debriefing

very closely and not to keep any copies in

WH Division/. The "Oswald Case" was

logged in the WH

notebook log as debriefing

report number 40, but the report itself

was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly

to a CI staff stenographer. There would

be no reason to include the number 40 on

the report of this special debriefing for

CI staff, since it was

their only debriefing

report.

We are certain it is the debriefing

report (#40) because the date is the same;

it is the only debriefing report on Oswald

listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it it (sic)

the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in

oswald's 201 file.

(CIA Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding

AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald

Case, 27 September, 1978, p. 1)

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on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that

set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8

as discussed herein. (Ibid.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance

of information that A-l provided to the CIA

regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted

to locate A-1. The CIA has also attempted to

locate A-l, whose present relationship with

the Agency is ambiguous, but has been unable

(see pila for *)

to determine his present whereabouts.*

The CIA'S

inability to locate A-1 has been a source of

concern to this Committee, particularly in

light of his long association with the Agency.

remains incomplete withregard to

Thus, two, nircircorhot died information A-l

may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However, with

the exception of the Calderon episode and on the

basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1

information of investigative significance.

A separate question remains, however. The

Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the

Warren Commission that A-l was present in the

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*An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding

A-1 states in pertinent part:

Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved

in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere.

[Joseph Norrisdis the alias of a CIA

representative who periodically debriefs

(A-1) on personalities and methods of the

DGI. There is no other CIA involvement with

Rodriguez.

(CIA Doc. 0807602, CIA 202417,

Vol. 4, A-1 File 201-749651)

However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning

the Agency status of A-l states:

Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that

(A-1) lis still an active contact, not

receiving any salary, but could be paid if

and when used in an operation.

No problems

here. (SPOB will keep his contract in an

active folder. CIA Doc., Handwritten Note,

15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file

201-749651)

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washingtorromDCtA-egntrollechep.cumardet controlled

conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving

due consideration to the CIA's serious concern

for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's

status was not disclosed prevented the Warren

Commission from exercising a possible option,

i.e: to take the

sworn testimony of A-l as it

concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

On this issue, as the written record tends to

show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility

of exercising this option.

In light of the establishment of A-l's

Rona fides,

, his

proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of

Cuban intelligence activities, this option might

well have been considered

by the warren Commission.

The AMLASH operation (to be ine graded nto criticism deme

During

1967, the CIA's Inspector General

issued a report which examined CIA supported

assassination plots. Included in this report

was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an

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Agency project referred to as the AMLASH

operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967

pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved

a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA

cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting

with a CIA representative expressed the desire to

assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a

result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the

CIA'S

desire to find a viable political alternative

to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently

provided AMLASH with both moral and material

support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid.,

pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated

by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks.

(Ibia. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his

conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting

against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but

at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to

twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110).

In its examination of the AMLASH operation

the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both

direct and indirect

support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p.

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The most striking example of the CIA's direct

offer of support to AMIASH reported by the

1967 IGR states

"it is likely that at the very

moment

President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer

was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving

him an assassination device for use against CASTRO."

(Ibid.)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming

or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation

prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The

1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was

court

tried in"Havana", press reports of Cuban knowledge

Of AMLASH's association with the CIA weredated from

November 1964, approximately one year after President

Kennedy's assassination: (Ioid: p. 111).

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final

Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail.

(SSC, Book.V, pp. 2-7, 67-69)

The Church Connittge

concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the

Warren Commision work than the early CIA

assassination plots with the underworld.

Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH

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operation was in progress at the time

of the assassination; unlike the earlier

plots, the

AMLASH operation could

clearly be traced to the CIA; and

unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had

endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup,

the first step to him being Castro's

assassination, despite Castro's threat

to retaliate for such plotting. No one

directly involved in either investigation

(i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of

the AMLASH operation. No one investi-

gated a connection between the AMLASH

operation and President Kennedy's

assassination. Although Oswald had been

in contact with pro-Castro and anti-

Castro groups for many months before the

assassination, the CIA did not conduct

a thorough investigation of questions

of Cuban government or Cuban exile

involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5).

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In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector

General's Report concerning the subject of CIA

sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in

large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the

Church Committee's findings.

The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee)

assigns it (the AMLASH operation)

characteristics that it did not have

during the period preceding the assassina-

tion of JFK in order to support the SSC

view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH

operation was not an assassination plot.

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

It would have served to reinforce the

creaibility of lthe warren Commission

its efforts had it taken a broader view

of the matter kof normal avenue of

investigation.

The CIA, too, could

have considered in (specific terms

what most then saw

in general terns--

the possibility of soviet or Cuban

involvement in the assassination

because of the tensions of the time.

It is not enough to be able to point

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to erroneous criticisms made today.....

The Agency should have taken broader

Initiatives then as well. That

CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities

about which they knew had no relevance

to the Warren Commission inquiry does

not take the place of a record of

conscious review. (Ibid. P. HIT 10

Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA

employee in contact with the Warren Commission on

a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller

Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH

operation was relevant to the investigation of

President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission,

Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392)

In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this

Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed

to be an

assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-271.

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr.

Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963

was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's

Special~

Affaj

The

• Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component

Stabl

responsible for CIA operations directed against

the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence

Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,

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Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) The Special Affairs Staff

was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible

for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pP. 3, 8, 79)

Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence

for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for

safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Cuban

Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit

of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). It was

Langosch's recollection that:

... the AMLASH operation prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy was

characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation initiated

and sponsored by the

CIA. (Ibia., p. 4)

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962

it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence

Services were aware of AMLASH and his association

with the CIA and that the information upon which

he based his conclusion that the AMLASH

peration was insecure was available to senior level

astepsiator*.

officials, including Desmond FitzGerald.

(Ibid., p. 4)

However, the issue before this Committee is

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*In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this

committee has received from the CIA an affidavit

executed by Kent I. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who "served

as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the

entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs

Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it

progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock,

executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. l) Mr. Pollock specifically

contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation

was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond

FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an

assassination operation.

In pertinent part, Pollock

drew the following conclusions:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald

considered

the AMLASH operation

• to be a political

action activity with the objective of organizing

a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the

Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat.

I heard

Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation

frequently,

and never heard him characterize it as

an "assassiantion operation."

Mr. FitzGerald

stated within my hearing on several occasions

his awareness that coup d'etat often involves

loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2)

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH

operation as an "assassigntion operation"; the

case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer, never

discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with

Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other

the

branch chiefs and

the special assistants could not

have so characterized it since they did not know

about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a

hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH

for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.)

The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the

day

of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the

pen with disdain. LIbid., par. 4, p. 2/), (Ibid.,

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not simply 'Whethers the eate stor material

from ClA- controlled documents.)

operation was ar

assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's

death. The broader and more significant issue,

as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether

the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy

to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLASH operation this

determination is a most difficult matter to

resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their

characterization of the Agency's operational

objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence

it is the Committee's position that such informa-

tion, if made available to the Warren Commission,

might have stimulated the Commission's investiga-

tive

corcern for possible Cuban involvement or

complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin

commented before this Committee:

...when I read...the Church Committee's

report--it was

an ideal situation for

them to just pick out any way they

wanted to tell the story and fit it

in with the facts that had to be met

and then either blame the rest of it.

on somebody else or not tell any more

or polish it off.

I don't think that

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could have happened back in 1964.

I think there would have been a

much better chance of getting to

the heart of it.

It might have

only revealed that we are involved

in it and who approved it and all

that.

But I think that would

have at least come out.

(HSCA Class.

Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin

that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to

the Warren Commission, the Commission might have

been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture

that has surrounded the AMIASH operation during

the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH

operation remains a footnote to the turbulent

relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

FREN

Classification:

SECRET

000115

Classified by derivation:

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