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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/05/93

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10165

RECORDS SERIES :

TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-696

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO :

..

SSCIA

TITLE :

TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS

DATE : 07/31/75

PAGES : 178

SUBJECTS :

!

CIA

CUBA

CASTRO

LANSKY, MEYER

BAY OF PIGS

ASSASSINATION

TRAFFICANTE, SANTOS

RUBY, JACK

CHILE

ALLENDE

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

.P.

DATE OF LAST REVIEW.:

09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA.

COMMENTS :

Box 256

Folder 14

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

Mr. Phillips.

No, I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do youknow him under the name of Ruben-

stein?

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MI. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba

and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your

time on?

Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to

Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very

early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican

Republic

as chiet of Station.

Mr. Schwarz. And then --

Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until

the summer of 1967.

And after that I returned to Washington and became

the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

In 1970 I went to Rio de Janiero as Station Chief!

in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to

Brasilia from Rio de Janiero.

In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of station:

And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of

And

the then Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until

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or the other which would enable you to form a juagment as

to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or

the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be

necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually

assassinate some one.

Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even

get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an

option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency

talk that way?

Mr. Phillips.

Under traumatic conditions I have heard

human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that

saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were

bumped off or something.

But I have never heard two officers sit down and

seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever

said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line

and say almost anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with

the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifi-

cally a Major Marshall, reported to the CIA

that they intended

to assassinate Allende?

Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall,

Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think

of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

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Mr. Schwarz.

And you offered through Colonel wimert,

whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could

accomplish it, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.

mI. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt

on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to

help accomplish the kidnapping?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz.

And subsequently you provided to the Val-

enzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. That is ture.

Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a

kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that,

didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be

used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their

plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them spe-

cifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was --

the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people

need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over latin

America.

And they said something about, their own arms could be

identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified.

I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was

just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

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Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we

establish what I called a false flag base of people that would

go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the

chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much

less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable - is

this cable of 27 September in the Senator's. book? I know that

he asked for it after I came over.

Mr. Treverton. It is not.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which

unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is

relatively simple.

This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970,

and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to

the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the

purposes of setting up the false flag office --

Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.

Mr. Schwarz. False: flag bases:

"Each member of base

will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as

a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican".

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. Continue:

"Having at least one key Brazilian' and one key Argentinian

would be vital, and we have candidates."

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And you did that.

Mr. Phillips.

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows:

"These

officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap

potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any

Chilean."

That is right, isn't it?

MI. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall,

that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II

activities?

Mr. Phillips.

That is right.

MI. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have can-

didates who can successfully pose as (Brazilian intelligence

officers." You did that, didn't you?

and ran

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded

a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one"

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would

the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil

would

be blamed if something went wrong.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me,

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because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazitian.

service officer.

However, that was it. It was a

devious move. It was the final result - the idea being that

if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone

other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is

not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying,

why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets,

is not true.

But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents

should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that

was the idea.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were

their instructions if they were to be caught? were they to go

to their death swearing they were Braziltans or whatever?

Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic,

Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And

I briefed them, and I think what I said to them was, this

is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have

to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble.

And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help

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you.

So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the

Brazilians that you were

sending someone down to pose as a Brazilion, and his instruc-

tions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose

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as

a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached?

Mr. Phillips.

It never occurred to us in our wildest

dreams to do that.

MI. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between con-

tinuing intelligence services were things that were

very: important to preserve, and that we had very close and

delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

MI. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a

e Braziitans would be quite unhappy with us. But I

thought that was better than letting the world know that was

a U.S. Citizen down there.

Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27

to say this:

"Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by

officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate

and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexi-

bility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations secure-

ly. "

So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging

from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?

Mr. Phillips.

Yes, and by all intelligence services --

not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living

overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you

are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana

and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence

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service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the

Soviets, from us, or tron the Brazilians

So, it is not an unusual practice.

Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing

in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year

involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered

by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was

Chile.

And then you said what the other one was. What was that?

Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs

of Station course, which is a training course for people who

are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.

When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines

to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to

protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might

have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there

as the chier of station.

And I just wasn't sure that I

wanted to be associated with something like that. But I de-

cided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is

- doing, I will go - I am going to go along. So, I did go

along.

Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation

between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassin-

ations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding

it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

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Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could under-

stand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at

Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.

Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that

he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32

years beforehe was elected.

Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ar-

dent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that

we had a visit from a man who had the code name of Arely he

was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in

rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot

at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the

same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send

22,000 rather than 400.

So,I can understand why they thought this was going,

in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our

interests. But that is an assumption.

It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear

that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The differ-

ence was that Allende

refused to take Fidel Castro's advice

and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to

Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are

going to have to use violence.

I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper

where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said,

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activities?

Mr. Phillips.

No, sir. I was the Station Chief ins

Rio deyuaniero in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for

six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

Senator MOndale. Now, in that position you familiarized

yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on,

and tried to become as expert as you could in the political

forces and so on?

MI. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator,

one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived

for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

Senator Mondale. And itis your judgment as I think I

just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused

Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the

democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff

on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he

was pursuing, is that correct?

I don't recall that he said it, but

Mr. Phillips.

he indeed acted that way.

Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pur-

suing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with

the population support under constitutional system?

MI. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

Senator Mondale. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz.

I would like to read to you in connection

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assignment by the President and by the White House?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference

today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why

should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game.

The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the

word.

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And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that

we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

I call your attention in our briefing books to what is

Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21

September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author

of that cable?

Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating

officer, yes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

Mr. Phillips.

That meant that the signature on the

right of those cables is

someone that is the authenticating

officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know

the situation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess

is what I am after.

Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably

written by Mr. Poinza

o, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was

joint.

But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by

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putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was

a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is

the one that accepts the responsibility.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Page 3 of 7 which has

the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the follow

ing sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending

us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et

cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have

to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes

on the stars.

What does that mean in Agency talk?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real

seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye,

however.

Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed

a joint venture, I can promise that that was pino Polmiotg

contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand

why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking

back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four

o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just

didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go.

I

am not sure what it means even now.

SEnator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems

to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

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Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the

assassination of Schneider was something which presented the

opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have

done.

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Do you agree with me?

Mr.. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am

not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will

tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when

the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finisher

Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred,

Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as

Marshall, immediately said, this is it, that is enough. There

was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the

moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is

it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America

that would have been the signal for further action, weakness,

and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the

business.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activi

ties which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group

and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one

of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

MI. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that

one of the assignments that Colonel wimert had?

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Mr. Phillips.

•wimert

Yes, I believe it was Colonel!

mimert

that was in touch with that group.

Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem,

didn't they?

Mr. Phillips.

Are you referring to Chilean teams?

Mr. Schwarz.

wimert.

No, the false flag team and colone!!

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have

been some central direction from the office or from headquar-

ters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had

the slightest idea that Colonel Oment was working with us.

And I don't believe that Colonel wimert -- I don't know that

Colonel wimert knew about them.

so, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of

direction from the Station.

Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in

Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand

the Viaux group?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here,

counsel?

Mr. Schwarz. I

am in a chain, but it is easily interrup-

tible.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Mr. Phillips, did we

chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

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Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one

of the Valenzuela group's plan?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically.

Obviously when the guns were passed through Colonel, Wimert

and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we

thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we

read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand-

gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could

really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly

the Valenzuela group using those guns.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had

been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there

were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to

abduct General Schneider?

Mr. PHillips. I don't recall. There may very well have

been, but I am not real sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz.

I am going to go to another area, which

Is the relationship with a

oloRed WinerE. It there are an'

questions on the relationship between the two groups.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19

attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum

by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable

A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of

these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with

quas

Army attache and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be

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carried out on October 19.

the huerth, who was head of the

Carabinesos,

witting of the above plan, has promised to keep

the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the

abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is

knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly

involved."

What do you think "not directly involved" refers to?

Why not just not involved?

Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what

I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very

unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin

that works with some group type of thing.

And I believe that it must refer to that.

Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual

cable in the Senator's books?

Mr. Inderfurther. No.

Mr. Schwarz.

Let me read the full text of that para-

graph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19

October on the subject of General Viaux:

"General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not

directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with

prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19

and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is

not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of

week. "

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Now, I can't read that language any way other than

meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in

close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it

was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear - would

be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved.

And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there

was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that

Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more

than just the statement?

MI. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.

Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to -

Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was meckshes.

MI. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an ex-

hibit.

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way.

(The document referred to was

marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2

for identification.)

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As for the narrow part of your question, by all means

it is a bad way to do business.

Senator Schweiker.

Go ahead.

Mr. Schwarz.

Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line

of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the docu-

ment Tab A.

It is a memorandum for the record by MI. Broe dated 17

September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 Sep-

tember, "Subject, Genesis of Project".

Incidentally, what was the code name for this project?

Was

it (FU Belt?

Mr. Phillips.

Beltway

r ru Belt,

, one of the two.

Mr. Schwarz.

Doesy FUstnd for anything in particular?

Mr. Phillips.

Chile So it would be FU. The first two

letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would be ay

Not of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt.

means Chile. Belt means nothing.

Mr. Schwarz.

Everybody keeps saying that so many of

these things mean nothing.

Who is responsible for these

names?

Mr. Phillips.

There is somebody who is supposed to have

a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated.

And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes

out in those things.

Senator Schweiker.

That is an understatement, to call

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it pixie-like.

Mr. Phillips.

But many times the cryptonums mean ab-

solutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

Senator Schweiker..

SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

Mr. Phillips.

I am sorry, sir.

Senator Schweiker.

We have come across a few other good

ones.

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Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that

document, and it doesn't matter. But the end

of paragraph 2

indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

"The Agency is to carry out this mission without

coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

MI. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in

Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned - he was instructed

to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that

right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell

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his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the

defense attache system down there?

Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

Mr. Schwarz.

Wimert was the man from (the Army?)

and then

there was someone else lin the Air Forcedythe Nay

and there

was a boss?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And wimert was told not to tell that boss?

MI. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did. it happen that (Colonel wiment

came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?

Mr. Phillips.

I believe the explanation for that was

the fact that colonel

wames

had been around Latin America,

spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he

developed really marvelous relationships with the military of

officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just

that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the

task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take

advantage of

the one man in

Chute that they liked the most,

trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural

for him to spend his weekends with these people.

Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset.

But how was it arrangied that he would work for the CIA, and

lay that question against

the instruction from President

Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did

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you accomplish it?

Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory

refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know

that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book

that has been signed by General Philpott: which was a message

to Wimert

saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process

was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott,

I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott ?

Mr. Phillips. I never did.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large

meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any

meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior

to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr.

Broe, MI. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been

left back in the shop,

sort of, I think.

MI. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

MI. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Phil-

pott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this

entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our build-

ing. I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do

that sort of thing.

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Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the

message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?

Mr. Phillips. It is.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you

drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and

then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.

Did you make that change?

MI. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said

Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said

Bennett. I think the signature on the original document

was

from Philpott. But that is my change there.

Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page ..

the sentence reads:

"Do not allow colonel wimert! to retain copy of this

message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that

General Bennett is out of the country".

Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what

do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make

those changes?

Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one

of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed

something that is written out, and there is no secretary,

and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that.

On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask

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108

the communicators to send that, and youwill then later write

for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable.

I am not sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Ben-

nett's name and not General Philpott's name?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had

been the case that not only would the change have been made,

but there would have been some sort of note on the side of

something. So, I believe that the original must have said

Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.

Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the

first page used Bennett's name, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had

previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the

"suggested message to be sent to Army attache from General

Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that

purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that

before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used

Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennetts'.

Mr. PHillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed

message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3

that has Mr. Philpott's signature?

MI. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would

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wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving

the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct Wimest

work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence

Agency further brought into the operation which we have been

calling Track II?

MI. PHillips. My answer to that until a few minutes

ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document

since then that indicates that someone else was talked to

later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never

knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message. But

until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have

said, I think that Philpott was the man.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on

that one occasion?

Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion.

But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little

room with windows, and so there were other people doing other

things.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was

marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5

for identification.)

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112

Mr. Schwarz.

And this is a cable releasing officer willia:

Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated Octo-

ber 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA.

And it says:

"Please deliver the following message ('destroy immedi-:

ately')

to Colonel winert eyes only from Lieutenant General

Bennett. "

Now, on what basis did you authenticate

that message

which purports to betto Colonel wimett

from Lieutenant General

Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because

I presume in this case - I am sure in this case once again

there was a document that was handed to me and I was told,

send this down. : In order to make this point, I was in there,

and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I

authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on.

If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document

that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on

the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority

to authenticate, and I didn't necesarily turn to them and say,

hey --

Mr Schwarz.

Prove that --

Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with

General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.

Mr. Schwarz.

Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated docu-

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ment headed "Destroy immediately" from INs Bennett torcintanel

wine

"Eyes only".

(The document referred to was

Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6

for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from ITG Bennett

Colonel

, and has the text in it which you sent on

Colonel Wime

t.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to

who handed you that document?

Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that.

There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the

office and say, here is something to send. There were others

which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow

forwarding slip on it. There are times,I am sure, when I

would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the

way, send this.

I simply cannot recall the circumstances " in which some-

one handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying

less attention to those things, because I was in effect the

postman for people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz.

about this document?

Do you have any recollection at all

Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on

that document?

Mr. PHillips.

well, it certainly looks like the sig-

nature which was on the other document which was said to be

Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

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119

military attache. And those instructions went down. Apparently

it would appear that theremight be something here where they

are going to bring in more people, as is known to several per-

sons, it says down here.

And itmay have been because there was

an attempt there

not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk

to you about something we are doing that we have kind of

already done.

That is theonly thing I can come up with.' I

can't give you a better explanation than that.

Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling

and strange document?

Mr. Phillips.

Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be

more helpful on this. But I was treating these - these things

were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings

on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't

paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

Mr. Schwarz.

That is an explanation that deals with

some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place

you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating

officer.

And second, this is not simply taking some other message

and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive

document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station

Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling,

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120

and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when

you have further testimony on this to help me job my memory.

I can't remember the rationale for this.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that

are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.

Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will

confuse colonel miner

It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would

have confused him.

"Background for his information: both Generals Bennett

and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".

Who told you that?

Mr. PHillips.. I don't know for sure, but I presume

this must have been Bill Broe.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling

you that?

MI. Phillips.

I do not. But I don't think that I --

I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that

Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words,

that is hthe kind of cable that I wouldn't have released

just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing.

This cable I think must have originated either with a dis-

cussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word,

write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say,

do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it

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here - is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone

else that was working in my shop, Ms

Pionzi

or someone

else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing some-

thing else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said,

here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things.

So I really can't remember.

Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe

spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff

spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes

out?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable

went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at

night.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

MI. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has

a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

MI. Phillips. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. - in the customary place for the time.

Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy..

The point I am trying to make is, if MI. Broe were

leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and

he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well.

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and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use

Colonel Wimert down there, he is really important to us, and

that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed

by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the

only explanation I can

give.

MI. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new

interested parties and the several persons referred to in

the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority

than Bennett and Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just -

this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem

logical to me that they would start going outside and down,

I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I

only assume that.

Mr. Schwarz.

You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself

being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as

you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. I understand.

Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using wiments

and knew

some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which

would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

Or outside the Defense Department, but

very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an in-

terest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction

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128

of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are

embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing

the work for the CIA lehrough collonel miment

Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety

daily events, were they?

Mr. Phillips. They were not.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it

was necessarily because General Philpott would have been

embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

But this rather unusual step was made because of the

talents of the military men, to bring him into a program

that you weren't even talking with the State Department about.

And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am

really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things

that I obviously had something to do with.

But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job,

and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would

be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and

the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when

someone would come in and say, we want something to go down

to Wimert, and it has something to do with General Philpott,

I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had

been one of our operations.

Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2

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there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse

Colon

Background for his information".

Now; there are two ways in which those words "for his

information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine

background.

The other is that it is a story to be given winest for

his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way

doyou read it if you do not know what the facts are?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because

nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do

I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent

of falsehood in putting something down like that.

So, I assume that it is really for his background of

what happened.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got

the information which you provided in this cable?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful

after you talk to others. But I simply do not.

Mr. Schwarz.

The last paragraphs make the notation

"that we must advise GEneral Bennett time when Wimesty shown"

the telegram which is Exhibit 3.

Did you advise General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I

presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been

involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

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Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't

know that it was.

Mr. Schwarz.

Which is the tab at which the reply

from Wimert is located? Is it K?

MI. Treverton. K, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit

8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant

General Bennett From Colonel wiment.

(The document referred to was

marked Phillips Exhibit No.

for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we

correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA

station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come

from colonel mimere and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant

General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would

such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the

responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable

would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an

info copy and this, that and the other.

The action on this cable would have certainly have gone

at least to Mr.Broe, and possibly higher, because it says,

this is his message to the head of another government

service. And so it would have gone to that level.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have

come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to

either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a

cable will come in and there will be more than one copy.

And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and

then you get the information copy, and so forth.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable

whether there would have been more than one copy?

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Mr. Schwarz.

Does the"eyes only"have any significance

to you in the third line?

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what Colonel

withere

was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Depart-

ment, but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else

other than General Bennett.

Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I do not know.

MI. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?

Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been

highly unusual for amessage to come in from overseas saying,

give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to

be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.

Mr. Schwarz. What would he the normal form of its

delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?

Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded

into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is

really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes

through a communications channel, it means that they are going

to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If

an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive

message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying,

will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

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Mr. Schwarz.

This message states:

closure

"Please deliver the following message, ('destroy imme-

Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General

Bennett."

And the message was: "For your information suspen-

sion temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".

What are MAP and FMS.

Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or

another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.

Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?

Mr. Phillips..

That is probably it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?

Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not,

repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the

contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which

we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and

situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date

of situation".

Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?

MI. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.

Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency

responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?

MI. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

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Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to

do with that, do they?

Mr. Phillips.

I would gather from this message that

it is simply an explanation from - it says General Bennett

, to explain something. As a part d Track I, and the

whole business, all of these different options were being

looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with

military things because it looks like Allende is going to get

in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead

and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for

colonel wimer

to give him some rationale behind it when he

was down there running: away trying to foment the coup,

saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this govern-

ment?

I am speculating. But this was another one of those

messages quote unquote which went in our channels.

Mr. Schwarz.

Who gave you this message?

Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.

MI. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?

Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are

a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that

I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved,

and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me

or how it arrived.

MI. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be

another document which contains the purported message from

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MI. Fenn.

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

Talking about telephones, incidentally,

was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago

which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is

a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on

the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those

absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it

down there -a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I re-

alize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is

a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General

Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of

endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that

the approach we are making to this?

Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach.

He has denied any knowledge of this.

Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

Mr. PHillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters

saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his

knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand

why.

Because the messages went from Philpott to Colonel, wim

And

(colonel

said, I am with you 100 percent, and from

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that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't

recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy

on his part about doing what he was doing.

And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's

side, not having been involved with him.

From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that some-

one is using that business that I referred to in dispatches,

General Bennett says, when they are really talking about

what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure

he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that

is conceivable.

But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of

little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.

Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see

a motive?

Mr. Phillips. Precisely.

I can't see the motive for fooling Colonel

be

cause colonel winert had already started working when he re-

ceived the instructions from the number two man in his Agency,

which is indeed pretty high up.

So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful

is that I, too, am confused.

Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that

Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October

14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

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Senator Schweiker.

Let me ask counsel this.

Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --

Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday.

We have talked to him.He accepts at least one message. There

are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not

sure if he accepted two.

Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?

Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.

Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while,

as we said previously, things had fallen into place according

to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction

that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very,

very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being

that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the

inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.

And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few

of us, probably myself and M

Pionzio and Mr. Bröe and Mr.

Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but

I do remember thatmeeting going up there and saying, if there

ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to

say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that

meeting.

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what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside

of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool,

and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies

to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in

refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days

to die.

Miss Culbreth. You had served as Chief of Station

in

the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in

this position on the Track II party?

Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of

Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much

aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement.

U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our

arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while !

those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly

nation", relations were very bad.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General

Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by

your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips.

It certainly was not. And I do not do

that now.

Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize

his death as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that

occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that

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when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing

around his car he drew his gun.

Miss Culbreth. Thank you.

I would like to direct your attention to this cable

that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated

September27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in

talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A

false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by

10 October".

And you were questioned about this part: "These '

officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap

potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any

Chilean. An example: We have a

canad tar

who can pose as

intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and

ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a Brazilian on

In the second paragraph which was not read earlier,

I would like to read this and then put a question to you:

"Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by

officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate

and recruit under false colors, will give station great

flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations :

securely".

To me this second paragraph indicates that these false

flag officers were people that had experience in this very

kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

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Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me per-

sonally and had worked for me.

Miss Culbreth.

And had been in this kind of capacity

as a false flag officer?

Mr. Phillips.

YeS.

Miss Culbreth.

So, this was not some unigue and unusual,

devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this

instance?

Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, es-

pecially the second paragraph that you read, was - the imme-

diate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first

heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on,

that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what

are you talking about, this, that and the other.

As ai matter of fact, as I recall, Henty Hecksder thes

Chiet

was terribly upset, because he is a sort of

an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words,

to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing

came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the

station that we had been given this job to do and that we

at headguarters saw that as the safest way for them to

accomplish the job that they had been given with the least

possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that

sort of thing.

Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think

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in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even.

though this says, probably by General Viaux and

so forth.

Miss Culbreth.

Was there any question in your mind

as principal operating officer here in the states that there

was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the

Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them

as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really

regard them as separate groups?

Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two

separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America

some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else.

But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups,

and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I

thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought

that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

And then we had the other group which seemed to be

more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I

very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that

might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping opera-

tions when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up

on these.

With regard to the information that was given to you,

the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the

Chief of Station and were directed to Colonel wimere

who can

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Senator Ilart of Michigan. Anyone else?

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. llow

large was the room you were operating out of? You described

it as a small windowless room.

Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there --

no, not that big.

Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the

Task Force?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force

besides you?

Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries,

there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing.

There were two of three secretaries, myself, Mr. Bonzio

six, eight, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

MI. Johnston. Iow many action officers were in the room?

Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much Ma.

Poinzio and myself,

as the real action officers. And then there were two junior

officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given

Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And

there was someone from

the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence

ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five

officers that I recall. And I think that there was a oth that

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