Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10037-10496|

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10496

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : OSD

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Report: Cuban Internal Situation

DATE : 5/18/1961

PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS:

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Cuba, Subjexts, Paramilitary Study Group, Part III

Annex 20, Box 61A. Box 8.

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18.May. 1961

CUBAN:. INTERNAL

SITUATION

70

Background 'for Dissidence

By the beginning of 2962, the Castro Government, wes trong enough

Harose

to move toward extending its control in a variety of ways whichift

knew would increase populen disaffection ane resentment

Theregime

having already confiscated most major firms, large

and. organized

a' peoples militia to counter-balance the army was now on mes

Ione

extent sta power over the denome see ene

he

individual Cuban.

Securitr Controls In January 4961, there?

SPEAKI

eatron ofucommittees

for the Defense of the Revolution, a block warden type on informante

system, placed practically every Cuban eitizen under the

watchful eye

os a state informer is was aded to an alreday dect ve ten

whereby, agents of the 2: (the secret police) worked un the national

mobile rural police units, cooperating with the de? and the mn ti

covered the countryside. The Cuban security apparatus, under the

direction of local Communists and with the sundance de soviet Pips i

intelligence officers gave evidencero developing anto

a sophi per caved a

intelligence organization

The creation of on additionang

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self-contained G-2 control under the direction of a Bloc, intelligence

officer, represented a further development of a police state apparatus.

Labor, Organized labor, which under Batista had achieved a

position of wide political and economic influence, was by mid-1960

under Conminist control, and the workers were becoming increasingly restive f

under the new restrictions and obligations. Employees now worked longer,

hours for less pay. For example, the sugar workers, who began the harvest

In January, 1962, vere ordered to work 16 hours a day at sos reduction m

salary. They also served in the militia without pay. They "voluntarily!

contributed their leisure time and part or their salary for governmental

projects: They were controlled by limitations on job transfers: and

travel restrictions from-city to city!

Youth. The opening in February, 1961, rot ensla nurserses kost agest

one toi six and the fortiation in Aprizeder of a militane Association ory

Pioneers (for ages seven to thirteen), which added to the youth organizatione

already in existence, placed virtually every youth in the one-to-twenty-five

age category in the hands of a goverment controlled youth organization,

i where they could be indoctrinated with revolutionary zeal, for the regimes

and weaned away from parental and' religious incluence:

Education. The much-publicized educational program for the year 1961

in which illiterates are to be taught to read and write from Communist.

oriented primers, by teachers, many of whom are teen agers who have spent!

three to six months in the Sierra Maestra undergoing Communist indoctrina

tion, was pradented by the eino get a mathi scent eep coward, and 296

was officially proclaimed the "year of Educations the training of such

STORED

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teachers began in late 1960 in order to despatch them in April, 1961;

to all corners of the island seeking out, the illiterates Many realistic.

Cubans viewed the movement as a means of subjecting the illiterate peasant,

the only remaining uncontrolled and the most individualistic element of

the population, to, indoctrination and to the informer system. Thet older

professional teachers became increasingly apprehensive, that their positions

under the Communist-dominated education system would soon be taken over

by these, young, pro-regime teachers

Economic. The creation in March, 1960, of an economic czar

Che Guevara, merely served to emphasize the centralized control of them

economy

the Urban Reform lan of october, 1960, in practace lert, ther

State the real owner of all rental property and, in the rural sector, the

collectives and peoples' farms were approaching the Soviet pattero;

Other Factors. The intensification of indoctrination through tall

possible media during work and Jeisure hours lert the average Cuoan with

133H

virtually no escape from governmental propaganda. The regime sandragard

for objective justice and the mule of haw, the drum-head execution of

young coupter-revolutionaries, and the increased virulent attacks on the

Catholic church and clergy were further causes of discontent. The economic

deterioration which resulted in shortages of suchnessentials' as soaps;

fats, salt; eggs, rice, land beans were adding to the general picture of

unhappiness.

Position of Communist Party In. Cuba

A further source of opposition to the regime was the increasing.

awareness that the Communist party had in effect taken over castrols

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revolution and the regime had identified itself with the Sino Soviet

Boc: Diplomatic relations had been established with every Bloc country

except East Germany, economic and trade agreements with, the Bloc countries

left Cuba economically dependent on the Bloc, and the shipment of Bloc

military equipment (estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 tons in the fall

of 1960) created further ties. The number of Bloc technical and military

advisers and instructors In Cuba was reported to number at least a thousand

Cuba had signed protocols covering cultural scientific cooperation with

almost all the Bloc members, and the traffic between Cuba and the Bloc

had reached considerable proportions with several groups arriving and

departing each week. Some hundred of Cuban students had left for Iron

Curtain countries, and arrangements were being announced for Bloc professors

to replace dismissed or resigned Cuban university professors. Cuban

"front" groups (labor, student, youth, women) had established, relations

with their Bloc counterparts and previous ties of organizations representing

these population sectors with Free World movements were dissolved.

Locale of Discontent

By rabruary, 1961, everal sources had estimated that the percentates

of the population now disenchanted with the Castro regime had reached

as high as 60%. The midale, class, largely urban centered, offered the

most nearly solid resistance to the government. It was this class that

had brought Castro to pover and accordingly was first avare. of the dangers

of the regime's political course, It was furthermore the most affected

by the deteriorating economic conditione

Certain elements of them dile

class-- students, labor, professional, rand the Catholte hierarchy-vere the

most active opposition.

SEGRET

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SABICT

By early 1961, the only mass support for the regame. came from the

lower class, both urban and cural, principally led by those who had already!

received or hoped to receive some benefits from the government. However,

decreased wages and income even in the, lower class added to the feeling

of dissidence. While the lower class were not tô play an active opposition

role comparable to that of the middle class, their anti-regime contribution

was substantial. For example, the Escambray guerrillas could not havente

survived as long as they did without the help of an estimated 110,000

peasant sympathizers.

Active: Resistance:,

Guerrilla Activity

While there were many. evidences of dissidence?

within cuba during the early months of l%61, the not drantic ves tho

continuing guerrilla warfare waged against the regime by several hundred

men in the Escambray Mountains.

Led by such mentas, Evilip Duque and

Osvaldo Ramirez, former Castro army ofricers, the guerritias withstood 2n

from early December, 1960, the assault of some 40,000 Castro militiamen:

Although there were few pitched battles, the siege tactics of the militian

which cut the guerrillas supply links with civilian, sympathizers resulted.

in such attrition that organized resistance in that area was virtually

ended by mid-March, 1961. The four principal guerrila leaders were?

forced to gave up the struggled Twö of them, Duque and Rancez, ventianto

hiding in Habana and two others, Edal Montiel and Joaquan Bembabre,

managed to reach the U.'S

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10721

Other guerrilla activity during this period was reported from all

areas: of Cuba, with the exception of the isle or Pines. In most, unstances,

the guerrilla bands consisted of small groups, led by former Army officers

who had deserted from garrisons and taken to the hills. & The, size, of the

groups varied from fifteen to tventy men up to a reported 600, (thent

2924A

Alfonso Guevara band in Oriente Province) let

Regardless of numbers, they vere considered to be stiniticant

manifestations of discontent;

since only desperate men would rebel in the

face of overwhelming numerical strength of the Castro militia and in view

of the fact that those who rebel on an island, have no friendly border

to cross when the going becomes difficult. In February, 2961 thes

following anti-Castro forces were reported from the various provinces

Las Villas

3-400 in Escambray under various leaders:

100 near Corralilio near Benito Campos VA

180 near, Yaguajay under Armando, de Ortego

Camaguey"

Mát anzas:

groups a unknown size near Los Negrost

agroups at, Cascajal, Pedro Mayabory and:

San Jose de: 10s. Ramos

group of 80 near Jaguey Grande under

Pena. and Ramon Gonzalez!

Pinar del Rio.

150 In Sierra del Rosario

Oriente:

800 under: Arone cue at a

•Habana:

discussed below

These figures, it should be noted, represent the most, conservative

strength estimates and fall far short of the numbers, frequently reported

Activity in Habana the chief center of, anti-regime dissidence vas

in the city of Habana, where, the leaders of the several resistance.

organizations maintained their headquarters those organizations operated

3/6

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separately and except for their common hatred for Castro and nis henchmen

had no agreed program amongst themselves this did not prevent practical

cooperation, however and the politaca dipterences union atvided, ther

exile groups in the V.S lost their sharpness inside Cuba, The moser

effective internal organizations

as judged by theid ability. and inninge

ness to carry out. operations were the Movimento Recuperacion as Revolueton

ario (Mer), the Mov mento Democratico Revolucionario oratiano (melan

andries

the Directorio Revolucionario Estudi ants (DRE) The DRa vas acutaily a

branch of the Min, and the win and the no In Habana tended to

pecome,

indistinguishable, from each other

Another resistance element of signaticance consisted of the membe

several unton no, rofiney workers

The refinery wonkers busworkers andelectrican

workers in particular, whose leadershp had been oystematice ly purged

by the regime to make way for men morencedicated to the Commun

V The 700 to 1,000 active rodistance righter in Habana engagedpre-

marily in acts of sabotage and in the gissemination of propaganda mater

The sabotage, whtle at times spectacular/assin.the burning down.of

Jansest, departmont store i the dity and the extensi% damage, toa

major

television station, was largely

sange

effect on; the regime's key instablations

tsi counte

side was the burning of suger cane, felds While this was,

ensive

Losses were minimal, Since burnt

cane

effect was mostly psychologica

-Be

frays, there was a good deal of nuisar

to be considered a nightly occurrence,

by:

sabotage

ombing

múc

April

orthe pea

andom. sh

activities

(fa

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SECRET

Several attempts were

made on the major power stations and the water

distribution system of aband was considerably danaged, but these had tree

effect. of only temporary Inconvenience to the regime mile none of theser

sabotage actions vere sighicant in themselves, they vere evidences or

considerable. dissidence. with apotential for more meaningfullaction once

supplies of military equipment were made available and more trained

agents incitrated re might also be panted out that although many lon

the top leaders of the internal resistance rejuanto the hands or castrous,

G-2' at the time of the invasion, the organizations were well enough

Filly

established to provide replacements for thoser leadors andito carry one

amosition organizations seat number of resistance, or ans zat ones

"claimed to have a rollowing, in Cuba, comptiation dated Octobed 0960

revealed the exastence of approxamately 200 resust ance groups venereat many

or unach, vere believed, to be lattle more than part or ant aton one

those which were not, the most significant non-Batista organizations vere

combined in the Prente devolugionaria' Democratica (PRD) Unich wash thes

chiéf political coalition until the formation on the Revolutiona Counc

Led by pe vero Cardone the orean zation unsch nade, exton vel fores

the Unidad

Revolue oraria (Un) appeara

me

based it sucla

on

aherence to stion the chief guo italicsdera

the Escambray

Since

those leaders were also claimed by many othen organizations the yarnet

or me. Un claim cannot be determined, noisecong organization muel

in the recent news, was Manolo Ray s. Movimiento Revolucionar 1o del Pueblo

MRP frequently referred to as the group with the best-and most widespread,

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clandestine underground in Cuba.

Whatever the truth may be on that score,

the MRP failed to conduct any significant resistance activity, claimed as

Its own work known to have been persormed by others, and passed up lie

opportunities for concerted action Manolo Ray reportedly once said he

would prefer to save whatever assets he had for the struggle for power

after Castro:

Estimated Resistance Strength

It was estimated in March, 1961, that there were from 2,500 to 3,000

persons in Cuba engaged in active resistence against the Castro regime

It was further estimated that a well ornanized, veli armed forced successful!

In securing a lodrement on Cuben son ronia receive the active supert

of 25% of the Cuban populace and would beloosed, at the maximun be no

more than 20% of the people. or theremeiring 65%, the majority wourd:

adopt an attitude of routrality until such tameras there vasta strong

Indication or which side had the better anence or viatony ne traor

2,500 to 3,000 or active Penters i me erseved, would expand a ende

ten times that size.once the lodgement. as successru?.to.which they..come

rally? The word lodgement was

Used

the miletary sensevas, meaning

CUS

"the occupation and holding or a position in

hostile: territory:*:

Impact of Invasion: Failure

The tature of the invasion was accompanted by mass arresto, thie

setting-up of checkpoints, curfewer and other controls Which had therer fecte

of stirling the resistance a mostlenuirely committoes for the Doronse Vi

off the Revolution proliferated the plana At least 50,000 per engand

some reports indicate over 200,000 vere herged into prisons and concen

tration camps. The effect.of these measures plus the psychological ampact

72 т.

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STORET S

of the failure of the invaston forces (which uncluded the cream of the

anti-Castro youth) have so demoralized the resistance that it'is impossible

to estimate its present strength or the tene at wilt take to build up antes

effective internal force the blatantly Communist nature of the regime as e

revealed in,its recent announcements, and repressive actions have undoubt f

edly aroused resentment among Cubans who heretofore were either pro-castro

or neutral. The foreton embassies and legations in Habana are bulgine

with persons who have sount political asylume a key propien for the

réstetance in the ruture veil be that of ending reliable enta Castro

Wleaders willing to remain in Cuba:

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