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178-10004-10087

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JK Assassination System

8/2/1201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: WILDEROTTE

RECORD NUMBER:

178-10004-10087

RECORD SERIES:

ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: CIA

FROM: CARL, OFFICE OF THE DD/S&T

TO: BUCHEN, PHILIP

TITLE: [Restricted]

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

07/10/1975

17

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

• RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS : Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

08/06/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Transmittal memo and 15-page report.

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/

10 July 1975

DATE:

24

Orfice of the DD/S&T

178-10004-10087

TO: Mr. Phillip Buchen

SUBJECT: Attached Report

N

F

REMARKS:

Phil:

Attached is the interim report on the problem

you and I have discussed recently. I stress

the term interim since we have received •

new information from Defense as recently as

yesterday and have not exhausted our own

search for information within CIA.

Recognizing your concern that the investigation

be conducted with the participation of some

outside person or group -- and also the fact

that we were unable to find a satisfactory

solution - let me briefly outline the approach

I followed.

I stressed objectivity and tried to assure

that no persons who were potentially a party

to the activities in question had any

opportunity to destroy information or material

which might be related.

My Associate Deputy Director, Dr. Sayre Stevens,

was the prime investigator with technical

advice from Dr. Tom Nevison, an MD with an

outstanding research background but hired by

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CIA only a couple of years ago and could not

possibly have had any prior knowledge or

involvement.

Additionally, I used personnel

from my own staff to assure that compilation of

inventory, etc. was done in presence of people

representing me, who again could have had

no prior involvement.

As I noted earlier, we are continuing our

investigation internally as well as jointly

with DOD. We will keep you informed.

back.

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SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI

Project Discovery.

The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the

Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity

requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It

resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated

with the project in response to. the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all

past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the

attention of Agency management. As a result of the information provided by him

and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project,

it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order. The

three identified the project at Fort Detrick as having involved the development

of Bw and possibly CW agents and associated

dissemination systems that were

suitable for clandestine use against human targets. They moreover

identified letha

agents as among those involved in the project.

Concern about these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted.

in a recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD)

that approximately $90,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at Fort Detrick

"for the maintenance of a BW capability". This statement appeared so important

that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to

questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD -- now the Office of

Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a small effort had been carried on at

Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW

E2 IMP DET CL 26895

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detection and did not carry the serious implications of the IG's report. It had

in any event been terminated some years ago. The A/DDS&T was satisfied with this

response.

When new and more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort

Detrick activity emerged, however, the words of the IG Survey tended to give it

credibility. Thus, late in April 1975 a search was begun for any records or other

information available on the project. Difficulties were immediately encountered

because the project cryptonym could not be identified. The search for records

of fund transfers to Fort Detrick did ultimately produce information in that

regard, however, and checks by the Office of Security on one of the individuals

identified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the

MKNAOMI cryptonym. This enabled OTS to recall the proper files from Records

Center; two MKNAOMI files were retrieved. Some additional information was also.

produced from the Office of Logistics files. This collection of material largely

confirmed the nature of the project as reported by the informants and identified

a number of people involved in the activity. Additional cause for concern

resulted from the association of several of these people with specific assassinatic

plans as revealed in the IG's report on that activity.

A major concern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition

of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible

Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed

along with the Army's BW stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of

November 1969 and February 1970. An unsigned meno raising the question of the

disposition of Agency materials maintained by Fort Detrick posed the option

of having it stored in a commercial laboratory. It was the impression of those

in OTS who were familiar with the project that the material had in fact been

destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find

such confirmation, laboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the

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course of that search about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and

6 mg of cobra venom

-- but none of the other materials - were discovered.

Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the

Ft. Detrick project was needed, all information uncovered was passed to the DCI,

to staff members of the Rockefeller Commissin and to the White House staff

handling Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church

was informed by Rod Hills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under

investigation.

Sources of Information.

This summary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing:

(1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are

limited and contain only a small number of Agency-originated documents; (2) the

material found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and several

pieces of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency

employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired.

employees indicated by the records as having been more deeply involved at stages

of particular interest. (Included in the latter category are

Tom Karamessines, Cornelius Roosevelt, Ray Treichler, and Nathan Gordon); (4) . .

information contained in the IG's Report on assassination pianning and (5)

information developed by a DOD investigation initiated as a result of conversa-

tions with the White House about the matter; this information was only recently

received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however.

Spectal Operations Division of Fort Detrick.

The Agency association with Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations

Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division was apparently responsible for

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developing special applications for BW agents and toxins. The principal customer

of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Army Special Forces. Its concern

was both with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for

special use in paramilitary situations. These applications clearly included

one-on-one situations in which clandestine delivery was a concern. Both standard

BH agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division.

Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SOD was first

established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about

1948, though no records. going back that far have been found. The Division was

abolished in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated.

CIA Relationships with SOD.

The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952 through

a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the performance

of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of the Special

Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick: The animus

for establishing

this relationship seems to have been a belief in OTS that the

special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological

materials of all sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which

were appropriate to its function and not otherwise available.. Discussions

indicate that the perception of the requirement for such capabilities was tied to.

earlier OSS experience. Initial funding was at the $200,000 a year level which

grew to a high point in FY 1958 of $390,000 and then dwindled to $75,000 a year.

in the late 1960's. Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding

records, total Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is

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estimated to have been somewhat more than $3 million. These funds were

apparently used to generally augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD.

Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way,

but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SOD as part of its

program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied

requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use. Through

the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined.

Thus

a project approval

memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories

of project activity:

a. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal

agents in readiness for operational use;

b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated

balance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for

operational readiness;

c. Adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbioinoculator

(a dart device suitable for the clandestine and imperceptible

inoculation with BW/CW agents) to determine compatibility with

various materials and to assure that the microbioinoculator

cannot be identified structurally or easily detected upon a

detailed autopsy; and

d. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet

ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BW/CW.

In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining

a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.

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Project Management within CIA.

From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that

was extreme even by CIA standards. Only two or three Agency officers at any

given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. This work was

managed first within the Biology Branch and later in the Chemistry Branch of

TSD. Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers

as to the availability of materials and delivery systems of the type being

developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSD unless initial

approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for Plans. Even

when this

was the case, the Chief of TSD often referred the operations officer

directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never

informed as to the nature of the discussions. This method of procedure has been

confirmed both through interviews and by the IG report on assassination planning.

No written records were kept.. Though some ClA-originated documents have been

found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation

of activities took place. No records on such things as material control, receipt,

delivery, destruction, etc. can be found. No documents relating to any possible

operational use of the material have been found. The files as they exist are quite

different from those normally maintained in the course of a typical CIA R&D

project. As noted above, funding to the project was provided simply on the basis

of augmenting the level of effort established by Army funding. There appears

to have been no relation of funding to specific tasking, nor can any strict

accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency's behalf be

found. Project officers with whom discussions were held stated thai the funding

was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities

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of SOD. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition

on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material

or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed

operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through

the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely

on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions

which will be discussed below.

Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest.

Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an

overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years, available

records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of

lethal materials and delivery systems. The evidence indicates that the Agency

relied upon the use of specific BW agents and toxins being investigated as a

normal part of the Army's BW program. However, directions were given to

investigate such matters as agent stability over varying periods of time, the

suitability of specific agents for preparation in dry form, the development of

dart coatings, and the preparation of materials in a form suitable for dusting of

clothes, pillows, etc.

Primary Agency interest seemed to relate to the development of dissemination

equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of

such dissemination devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandesti

use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among

hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of

SOD: attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the air, a cigarette

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case rigged to disseminate an agent when lighted, a fountain pen dart launcher,

an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent

light starter to activate the light and then release an agent, etc. Available

records do not indicate whether or not all these were developed specifically for

the CIA, though the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as

falling into such a category. The easy association of this equipment with

specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading,

however. At a meeting in June 1952, at the very outset of the Agency's associa-

tion with SOD when CIA representatives stated they as yet had no specific re-

quirements, a list of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was

provided. This dissemination list included such things as cigarettes, chewing

gum, cigarette lighters, wrist watches, fountain pens, rings, etc. Presumably

work on these devices was already underway in response to Army Special Forces

requirements.

Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices

and levied requirements for the special preparation of some.

One development peculiarly associated with the CIA was the "microbioinoculatol

which was an extremely small dart device which could be fired through clothing to

penetrate the skin so as to inoculate him with an agent. of some sort without the

target's perception of being hit. An added fillip to this development was the

requirement that no indications of the use of such a device be discernable in

the course of autopsy. A large amount of Agency attention was given to the

problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Much of the equipment delivered to the

Agency and some of the testing undertaken by it involved a dart delivery system

carrying dog incapacitants, and an antidote used subsequently to restore the dog

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to normal activity. Though most of the dart launchers used in these develop-

ments

were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the development of a

small hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs.

Clearly a lot of work was done on human incapacitation. OTS apparently

received continuing requests for safe, effective and rapidly acting, incapacitat-

ing devices.

Much work was done in trying to use the dart system for such

purposes, but real success was never actually achieved. Since larger amounts

of appropriate agent are required to incapacitate a human than to kill him, no

scheme was developed for introducing sufficient amounts. through the use of darts.

Attempts were made to solve this problem increasing the area of the darts

available for coating and for making

a dart which would dissolve in tissue

which could thereby introduce more material into the system. Work on this pro-

ject was underway when the association with SOD. ended and Edgewood Arsenal

endeavored to complete the project using unexpended Fort Detrick funds. Success

was not achieved, however. One reason for the preoccupation of those involved in

the project with the incapacitant problem may well have been the substantially

greater difficulty of solving it when compared to developing lethal mechanisms.

Substantial work was also done for the Agency in the development of spoilants

for: agricultural products, biological materials for the contamination of petroleum

stores; and agents for use in the destruction of electronics, optical systems,

structural materials, etc. At times in the history of the project, requirements

for such materials as these were apparently very high on the Agency's list.

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Shellfish Toxin.

By the late 1960's, a stockpile of some 15 to 20 different BW agents and

toxins was maintained on a regular basis by SOD for possible Agency use. The

supply included such agents as food poisons, infectious viruses, lethal botulinum

toxin, paralytic shellfish toxin, snake (krait) venon, Microsporeum gypseum which

produces severe skin

disease, etc. Varying amounts of these materials ranging

from 100 grams to 100 milligrams were maintained.

As noted above, with the Presidential Order requiring the destruction of

Army Bl and toxin stockpiles, the question was raised as to the disposition of

Agency materials. Though specific accounting for each agent on the list is not

on hand, Dod indicates that, with the

likely exception of the shellfish toxin,

all of these materials were in fact destroyed by SOD personnel.

The shellfish. toxin -- along with 8 milligrams of cobra venom -- was found

by David Boston, currently Chief of the Chemistry Branch, in Vault B10 in the

basement of South Building which houses OTS. This vault is a lightly used

laboratory area and historically associated with the Biology and Chemistry

'Branches of OTS. It has been regularly used for the storage of dangerous materials

of various types. In past years, the combination to the vault had been available

only to the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Branch and their secretary.

More recently, the combination had been given to other members of the Chemistry

Branch as well. With the discovery of the material on 20 May, however, the

combination was changed and is now available only to the Chief of the Chemistry

Branch, his secretary, and OTS security officers. On 13 June the vault was put

under 24-hour guard.

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The freezer in which the toxin was found is located under one of the.

work benches in the laboratory: The Fort Detrick material was the anly thing

in the freezer and was in two one-gallon cans along with several smaller con-

tainers. There were no labels on the gallon cans, but on top of each was a

folded piece of paper with pertinent information about the contents. This

information provided the types and amounts of material and the date on which

it was put into storage. The shellfish toxin was, according to this information,

put into the freezer in February 1970, and the cobra venom, in February 1961.

The shellfish toxin was packaged in several different forms including two

individual doses in tablet form.

The discovery of the material was a result of repeated attempts by Boston

to determine what disposition had been made of Agency BW materials held by Fort

Detrick. In making one more check on this, he called Nate Gordon, a former Chief

of the Chemistry Branch, who retired in September 1972, and asked him if he knew

what the disposition had been. Gordon stated that he thought that perhaps some

of the shellfish toxin might not have been destroyed and was in storage in OTS.

In following up on this lead, Boston found the material in the freezer.

Though hard to understand, such material could in fact be stored for so long

without anyone being aware of it. The laboratory is no longer used for the type

of work for which it was originally built and had become a disordered storage

facility. There have been no requirements for use of the freezer in the inter-

vening years and it is indeed possible that no occasion arose to investigate the

contents of the freezer. There have been no reported functioning difficulties

with the freezer during this entire period.

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After finding the shellfish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was

taken. A large number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were

found.

These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, including

the drug project, the development of harassment materials for crowd control or

meeting disruption, crop contamination programs, etc. Small amounts of several

other lethal preparations were found. Two of these are known to have been

obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick. Nothing is known about three.

others. Also found were a number of L-pills issued to agents, and formerly to U-2

pilots, for suicide purposes in the event of capture.

Boston contended that he had no recollection of the shellfish toxin having

been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. On 30 June, dis-

cussions were held with Dr. Gordon in an interview at which Boston was also presen

Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been called back from Fort Detrick and

stored in the laboratory on the basis of his own decision which resulted from

conversations with Boston. It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of

isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have

it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of TSD, was told of this

decision or the fact that the material had been delivered by Fort Detrick. As

Gordon recalled, this took place prior to his being told by the Chief of TSD to

inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the material on the inventory list should

take place. Boston who was present during this discussion took no issue with

Gordon's account. Neither could recall precisely how the material was delivered

to OTS, but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by

someone from Fort Detrick.

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Gordon was certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same

toxin as that listed on the inventory. There is, however,

a discrepancy between

the amount in storage as calculated from the labels and the amount shown

the

inventory.

Since the material in storage is in several different forms and

complete reliance is placed upon labeling, however, no real discrepancy may

actually exist.

Discussions with Karamessines have established that he and Helms were

aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that

the Agency stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, in accordance with

Presidential Directives, the CIA should get completely out of the BH business.

The explanation given by Gordon as to how the shellfish toxin came to be

in Agency storage is fully consistent with other available information. He

stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it

was simply transferred from one freezer to another and in his view was continually

under adequate control. He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent

to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972. Boston has

given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that.

After the discovery of the material, OTS was told to investigate ways in

which they could safely dispose of it with full documentation. Edgewood Arsenal.

was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for

disposal on 11 June 1975. The disposal was to be witnessed by a representative

from the IG's office. On the day prior to the scheduled delivery, these arrange-

ments were cancelled, however, because the DD/S&T wished to consider further

ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later

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misinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Boston

was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material

for the CIA,

it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not con-

sistent with

the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposa?

of the material have taken place, and it remains under. guard in the OTS vault.

Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material.

There is no record associating the project with actual operations.

Dis-

cussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with

darts loaded with dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use in

S.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or cropspoilants may

have been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning have •

been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being

investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitating

or assassinating Castro. For example, botulinum pills were reportedly provided

in February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pills

were made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery of

some in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960 •

involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatment

of cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files. Consideration was given to the

administration of shellfish toxin with a pin device in late 1960. Both the

toxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick. The diving

suit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus

which would produce madura foot, a serious, non-specific, skin disease.

Work

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on fungal agents generally compatible with such an approach was underway at Fort

Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent was prepared at

Agency direction in a form suitable for application to clothing, pillow cases,

and so on. Tuberculosis germs with which the breathing apparatus of the suit were

to be contaminated were available at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency

stocks. Finally, the general presence of BW agents or toxins in all of these

plans suggests. the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick.

None of the interviews undertaken in the course of this investigation provide

information about specific support to operations which may have involved

assassination. Roosevelt, who was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that

discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the

details and was skeptical as to the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler,

Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received

requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible

with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during its investigation

of assassination attempts. Treichler may constitute a connection between the

MKNAOMI project and the assassination plots involving Castro. He was the officer

responsible for MKNAMI during this period. The records show his giving direction

in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those

menttoned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG's report indicates that

he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro

schemes, no suggestion can be found that any of these materials or devices was

ever considered for use for lethal purposes.

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