CIA COMMENTS ON DRAFT COMMITTEE REPORT ON ASSASSINATIONS
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, S.D.
To: MILLER, WILLIAM G.
Document date: 06/10/1976
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10002-10398

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/09/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10398

RECORDS SERIES :

LETTER W/ATTACHMENTS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-3065

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM : BRECKINRIDGE, S.D.

10 : MILLER, WILLIAM G.

TITLE :

CIA COMMENTS ON DRAFT COMMITTEE REPORT ON

ASSASCTMATTONC

DATE : 06/10/76

PAGES : 14

SUBJECTS :

JFK ASSASSINATION

CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT

CUBA

CASTRO

CIA

AMLASH/1

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

JMWAVE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : 0

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/08/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 411

Folder 8

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Page 33.

Page 34.

Page 41.

Page 47.

Page 53.

The report also says, here, "none of this other

activity would seem to warrant Castro's associating

that activity with U.S. leaders to the extent that he

would threaten the safety of American leaders aiding

the plans.". We note without exception.

Footnote *. The Cuban Coordinating Committee was

a group for coordinating implementation of established

programs. By memorandum of 22 May 1963, McGeorge.

Bundy, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for

National Security Affairs, designated the State Depart-

ment Coordinator of Cuban Affairs as Chairman of the

Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba with the specific

responsibility for the coordination of day-to-day actions

regarding Cuba. Membership of the Committee con-

sisted of representatives from State, USIA, DoD, CIA,

Justice, Treasury and ad hoc representatives as

necessary.

Footnote ** This seems to indicate that the FBI

learned/ of CIA's operations on 10 October 1963

(a new date?) and that this led to termination of the

AMLASH operation. Of course, that happened much

later.

"Special Affairs Staff"' should read "Special Activities

Staff."

SASICI should read SAS/CI.

Testimony of Karamessines is quoted, in which he is

asked a hypothetical question about use of AMLASH,

and that he answered hypothetically, but the presentation

seems to treat it as fact.

Reference to CIAltechnical" collection capability in

Mexico City should be deleted. Simply delete the

word(itechnical.! This small point is a sources-

and-methods question.

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Page 120.

It is requested that elA support for DRE, JURE

and the 30th November Movement groups be altered

to a generic description of anti-Castro groups.

Persons identified with them in some circles could

suffer from official confirmation of the connection.

This is still considered as classified. It is noted

that CIA did not have an operational interest in

SNFE or Alpha 66.

Page 122.

The Agency effort to obtain EPCC stationery

through a penetration for use in a deception

operation is still classified since it involves

sources and methods.

Page 129. That the SAS Executive Officer views the AMLASH

operation as having been an assassination plot is

not very helpful, unless the time sequence and

evolution of the relationship with AMLASH/1 is

made a part of that view. His account in 1967

supported FitzGerald's story of what happened

in the 29 October 1963 meeting.

That SAS/CI speaks broadly may not be all that

helpful either, if the extent of his knowledge,

and when he knew what he says he knew, is

fixed in time. That he wrote a memorandum in

1965 on the security of the operation, does not

qualify him to address where things stood in

1963. In fact, he is quoted at page 139 as saying

that he could not recall the time frame.

Page 133.

The draft report states that in October 1963 the

FBI knew of the "assassination aspect of the

AMLASH" operation. As is noted earlier,

there was no such characterization that applied

to it then, so how it could have known is subject

to question.

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Page 161. The 1967 IG report did not consider the issue of when

the operational relationship with AMLASH/1 developed

to the point where AMLASH/1 could feel he had CIA

support for his plans. It simply dealt with events as

they unfolded. The report was used as a primary

source for the brief capsulized summary of the AMLASH

operation that preceded this detailed series of comments.

General. It is requested that reference to cables follow the general

practice employed in the SSC report on alleged assassination

plots. The date the cable was sent, the quoted portion, and

the country of origin should suffice. Specific reference to/

a CIA "Station" should be deleted; spechie designation of as

Retreaten to i are du can creator DiE nume desi cates.

the date and time group of a cable, provide information that

is subjectito-hostile communications analysis and should ther

be removed, This technique for treating cables permits

the basic story to be told without providing unnecessary and

harmful, from a security point of view, information.

Instances in the draft presenting the question were noted

at pages 41, 46, 49, and 57. In addition, although JMWAVE

has already been identified officially in SSC published reports,

the basic treatment of communications cited in relation to

that Station should otherwise receive similar technical

treatment; see pages 19, 19a, 56, 106 and 138.

Special.

Page Sl cites the CIA. Chief of Station reading a cable to

the President of Mexico. CIA relations with the President

of a foreign country.-- here, specifically, the President of

Mexico -- is extremely sensitive, both operationally and

politically. The revelation of this relationship could affect

adversely ongoing and -future operations in Mexico, as well

as being a particularly irritating embarrassmentito the

Mexican Government.

RECED A FROM

JUN 1N 1976

CIA

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