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62-117290-1314

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ORIGINAL

Enclosure to Ryan to Bassett Memorandum

Dated: 11-16-78

Subject: House Select Committee on Assassinations

Staff Report

Investigation into the Assassination of

Dr. Martin Luther King, JX.:

An Analysis of the Performance of

The Department of Justice and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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—...

INVESTIGATION INTO THE

ASSASSINATION OF

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR.:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AND THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

**

*:

STAFF REPORT

OF THE

-SELEOT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

•U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

*SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 27, 1979.

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HOUSE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina

WALTER E. FAUNTROY,

District of Columbia

YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee

- FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana

ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania

SAMUEL I. DEVINE, Ohio

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut

CHARLES THONE, Nebraska

HAROLD S. 'SAWYER, Michigan

STArt

G' Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director

Mark Speiser; Seniör.Staff Counsel

Peter Beeson, Senior Staff Counsel

Tom Sacco, Staff Counsel

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CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: The Issues and the Approach

II. THE COURSE OF THE. INVESIIGATION.

A. The Investigators - Memphis Field Office.

B. The Investigators - FBI Headquarters..

C. Initial Response and the Identification of

James Earl Ray--...-00

D. Identification to Arrest.

Er.

"Arrest to Guilty Plea..

III. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

A. The Lawyers..

B. The Införmation Flow and the Role of the Attorneys.

C.

Personal Relations Between the Department and the

BureaU. ...

IV. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE. BUREAU AND OTHERS

•A.. Local Law Enforcement Agencies.

B. Assistance in the Tennessee Murder Prosecution

V. PROTECTING THE BUREAU'S IMAGE.

Kent Courtney.

B=, Louis Lomax.

•Ci Jim Garrison.

De, In Search of Favorable Press.

VI.. INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGY

A. Grand Jüry,"

VII.

Ba Electronic Surveillance:

JAMES EARL, RAY - THE ULTIMATE

. SOURCE

•OF, INFORMATION.

A. Post-Arrest Interview.

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B. The FBI and Ray Prior to the Guilty Plea:

Attorney/Client Privilege Problems..

79

C. Post-Guilty Plea Interview: Miranda Problems.

83

D. Official Approaches of James Earl Ray in 1970 and 1976.86

VIII. THE CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATION.

•88

A. The Findings.......

• •88

B. The Investigation..

IX. HOOVER, COINTELPRO, AND THE ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION..

.89

• .101

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I

INTRODUCTION:

THE ISSUES AND THE APPROACH

Because of the extensive effort made by the FBI in both

the security (COMINFIL) investigations and the COINTÉLPRO

operations carried out against DI. King and the SCLC during

the 1960's, the House Select Committee on Assassinations was

faced with the troubling: question

of whether that same agency

was either willing or able to conduct a thorough and far

reaching criminal investigation of the assassination itself.

Stated otherwise, could the FBI abandon the adversary posture

it had assumed toward Dr. King, and carry out an objective

and agressive investigation of the person(s) responsible for

the murder?:

Beyond this overriding issue, the Committee's review

of the federal assassination investigation involved a number

of additional important inquiries:

1) Did the Justice Department, I properly exercise its

supervisory authority over the direction

and conduct of the

investigation?

2) Were, all available investigative resources committed to

the task of identifying and locating the person(s) responsible

for DI. King's death?

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3) What was the nature of the FBI's coordination with, and use of,

the facilities and resources of local authorities, including the

Memphis Police Department and the Shelby County prosecutors?

4) Was the investigation conducted with due regard for the

constitutional rights of citizens? of investigative targets? of

the defendant, James Earl Ray?

In order to answer these and other significant issues, the

Committee

directed staff to undertake, as its first step, a

thorough review of pertinent investigative files from both the

Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Of primary importance were the FBI Headquarters MURKIN File;

(the official designation of the FBI's assassination investi-

gation was "MURKIN"); the Memphis FBI Field Office MURKIN File,

(Memphis was "office of origin" on the investigation"); and major

field Office reports from sixteen separate FBI districts, including

the key cities of Atlanta, Birmingham, New Orleans, St. Louis,

Kansas City, Chicago and Ios Angeles. In addition, the

Justice Department files on the assassination investigation, a

" separate Department file on Ray's extradition, and the 1977

Justice Department Task Force Report were also reviewed.

This file review was followed by a series of lengthy, in-person

interviews with former officials of both the Justice Department

and the FBI who played significant roles, either as supervisors or

field agents, in the assassination investigation. The interviews

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were supplemented by executive session testimony from Ramsey Clark,

former Attorney General of the United States; Cartha DeLoach, former

Assistant to the Director of the FBI; and Robert Jensen, former

Special. Agent-in-Charge of the FBI's Memphis Field Office,

With the exception of J.Edgar Hoover, FBI directer in 1968;

• Clyde Tolson, Hoover's Associate Director; and Thomas Robinson,

United States Attorney in Memphis in 1968, all of whom are deceased,

the Committee was able to interview all individuals whose testimony

was considered necessary for a thorough examination of the quality

of the performance of the FBI and the Justice Department during

the assassination investigation.

The results of the Committee's inquiry into the issues described

above and other related areas is included in the report which

£ollows.

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II

THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION

(A)

THE INVESTIGATORS - Memphis Field Office

Memphis, Tennessee, city of Dr. King's assassination, was

one of fifty eight cities in the United States in 1968 with an

FBI "field" or district" office. The Memphis field office

was manned by approximately ninety persons (agents and adminis-

trative personnel) working either out of Memphis or a resident

agent office elsewhere in the district. Because of the location

•of the murder, Memphis immediately assumed the responsibilities

of "office of origin", a designation which meant that Memphis

received a copy of most of the paper work produced by the Bureau

and its various field offices during the investigation, and

assumed, in addition to its daily investigative chores, reporting

and

administrative responsibilities. The head of the Memphis

office, carrying the title of Special Agent in Charge, (SAC),

was ROBERT JENSEN.

SAC Jensen's ."case agent" for the FBI's assassination inves-

tigation was Special Agent (SA) JOSEPH HESTER. As case agent, Hester

assumed imnediate responsibility for monitoring all aspects of

the investigation, coordinating investigative leads and preparing

monthly reports on the progress of the case.

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(B)

THE INVESTIGATORS - FBI Headquarters

Because of the significance of the investigation, and its

national and ultimately international dimensions, the direction

of the investigation was shaped in Washington, rather than out

of the Memphis field office; consequently, a number of FBI

headquarters officials were also closely involved in the investi-

gation.

From the beginning, the MURKIN investigation was classified

as a civil rights investigation. RICHARD E. LONG, an Agent

Supervisor assigned in 1968 to the Civil Rights Unit of the Civil

Rights Section of the General Investigative Division, became the

headquarters "case agent" for the MURKIN investigation; Long re-

ceived this assignment because

Memphis

fell within his area of

3

geographic responsibility.. As case agent, long received incoming

communications from field offices, worked with others in preparing

daily memoranda for his superiors within the FBI and separate reports

for the Department of Justice, drafted leads to the field, and

coordinated inter-field office communications.

Long's immediate supervisor and head of the Civil Rights

Unit was EDWARD J. MCDONOUGH. Immediately following King's

assassination, McDonough assumed Long's outstanding case load

so that the case agent could devote full time to the paperwork

of the MURKIN investigation.

McDonough also screened all com-

munications on the MURKIN investigation and assisted in preparing

the daily summary memos used to keep FBI superiors informed on

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progress in the investigation. Neither Long nor McDonough exercised

• significant independent command authority; McDonough stated in his

Committee interview that except on rare occasions. neither he nor

Long. initiated leads from headquarters without clearing them with

Clem McGowan, head of the Civil Rights Section.

WILBUR MARTINDALE, head of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Unit

within the Civil Rights Section, worked closely with McDonough

and McGowan in coordinating the MURKIN investigation. While not

5

in the strict chain-of-command, Martindale performed a large part

of the daily report writing and recalls meeting on a daily basis

with Clem McGowan, head of the Civil Rights Section, and Alex

Rosen, Assistant Director in charge of the General Investigative

Division, to assess the evidence and direct the field investigation.

Martindale also spent several weeks in London following Ray's

apprehension as headquarters liaison with Scotland Yard, and was

one of four FBI agents who accompanied Ray on his trip to Tennessee

7

following his formal extradition from England.

CLEM MCGOWAN, Chief of the Civil Rights Section of the

General Investigative Division, represented the lowest level of

significant command authority at headquarters during the MURKIN

investigation; leads to the field generally originated from his

8

office, or that of Alex Rosen or Cartha DeLoach. McGowan's

office reviewed most incoming airtels and communications initially,

and then passed

them up to Alex Rosen or down to Ed McDonough and

Richard Long depending on their importance. McGowan recalls

meeting on a daily basis with the personnel of his section, and

almost as frequently with Rosen and DeLoach, to discuss the MURKIN

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investigation.

He never personally discussed the case with Hoover.

McGowan stated that the daily memos prepared within the Civil Rights

10

Section were the primary means used to brief Hoover.

In 1968, the FBI was divided into nine operational divisions,

each headed by an Assistant Director. The General Investigative

Division, (Division 6), which contained McGowan's Civil Rights

Section as one of four separate sections, was the responsibility

of Assistant Director ALEX ROSEN. Rosen, who had held this same

12

position since 1942, identified his primary function as keeping

Director Hoover informed of the significant case developments.

In performing his functions, Rosen reported directly to Cartha

14

DeLoach.

Rosen stated that active daily and hourly coordination of

the investigation was initially the responsibility of the Memphis

office, followed closely by headquarters. ' Once evidence

was developed on the international scope of Ray's travels, however,,

Rosen recalls that the burden of coordinating the investigation'

15

shifted from Memphis to headquarters.

Rosen's "number one man"

, JAMES R. MALLEY, kept fully abreast

Of MURKIN communications relayed to Rosen's office, and had the

authority to act independently on matters he felt Rosen had no

16

need to see.

Malley did not meet with Hoover on the MURKIN inves-

17

tigation; in-person briefings of the Director were handled by

-

Alex Rosen and/or Cartha DeLoach.

CARTHA DELOACH, one of two "Assistants to the Director" in

1968, is currently the highest llving member of the MURKIN

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chain of command. In addition to his direct supervisory respon-

sibility for the Bureau's investigative and public relations

activities, DeLoach was also responsible for liaison with the

Attorney General, Ramsey Clark. During the MURKIN investigation,

as at other times, DeLoach answered directly to Clyde Tolson,

• Associate Director, and to J. Edgar Hoover, Director. In turn,

DeLoach dealt primarily with Alex Rosen, and recalls little contact

with Malley or McGowan.

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(C)

INITIAL RESE

. -9-

SE AND THE IDENTIFICATION

OF JAMES EARL RAY.

At 6:00 p.m. on April 4, 1968, DI. King was struck by a

single bullet fired from a high powered rifle while standing on

the balcony of the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Approxi-

mately one hour later, at

• 7:05 p.m., King was pronounced dead by

attending physicians at St. Joseph's Hospital, in Memphis. Cause

of death was a bullet that passed through the lower right side

of DI. King's jaw before severing the spinal cord at the root of

the neck and lodging in the upper back.

Within brief moments after the shot, members of the Memphis

Police Department had saturated the crime scene. A call was

placed to the FBI field office in Memphis and SAC Jensen was

notified of the assassination attempt. Jensen

immediately con-

tacted the night duty man in Division Five (Domestic Intelligence);

shortly thereafter he was put through to Cartha DeLoach,

Assistant to the Director of the FBI with supervisory authority

over both the Domestic Intelligence Division and the General

Investigative Division. Deloach in turn notified Hoover:

While the news of the attempt on DI. King's life moved

through the FBI's command structure, Attorney General Clark was

first contacted, he believes, by Jim Laue, a Justice Department

22

Community Relations specialist who was with King when he was shot.

•Steven Pollak, head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights

Division, (soon to be responsible for supervising the civil rights

investigation), believes he was with Attorney General Clark at

the time he first heard of the crime. A short time later, Clark

was in telephonic contact with Deloach and thereafter with Hoover.

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A decision was made-apparently almost instinctively - to involve

the FBI completely in the investigation of the assassination,

and later that evening a written memorandum was sent from Pollak

to the Director of the FBI ordering "a full investigation into a

possible violation of 18 U.S.C. $241" - the federal statute barring

conspiracies to impede or otherwise interfere with the constitu-

tional rights of an individual - in this case Dr. King's.

Back in Memphis, witnesses to the shooting indicated that

the shot had come from the rear of a lower-class rooming house

located at 422½ South Main Street, Memphis. A bundle of evidence®

containing, among other things, a 30.06 Remington Game Master

rifle, Model 760, with scope; a box of Peters cartridges; binoculars;

articles of clothing and various toilet articles, was recovered

from the entrance of Canipes Amusement Company at 418 South Main

Street. Individuals inside Canipes at the time of the

assassination recalled seeing a white male walk quickly away

from Canipes immediately after the bundle was dropped; moments

later a white Mustang parked just south of Canipes drove

25

rapidly north on Main Street and away from the crime scene.

As the evening passed, the Memphis office initiated a trace

of the weapon by serial number, interviewed witnesses, including

Bessie Brewer, the landlady at 422% South Main Street who

recalled receiving a $20.00 bill earlier that day in payment

for an $8.50/wk room from a white male using the name

John Willard. In addition, agents were attempting to locate and

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interview Charles Stevens, whom news releases identified as a

witness to the assassin. Finally, arrangements were made with

the Memphis Police Department to forward all physical evidence

to Washington for analysis in FBI labs. Agent Bob Fitzpatrick

of the Memphis office left the city on a 12:25 a.m. flight to

Washington; the evidence, including the binoculars, the rifle,

the bullet taken from King's body, and a $20 bill given to Bessie

Brewer, arrived in FBI laboratories as of 5:16 a.M., April"

5, 1968,

27

and was immediately subjected to analysis.

While the FBI's Memphis investigation got off the ground,

Attorney General Clark decided that an immediate visit to Memphis

was in order.

Accompanied by Roger Wilkins, Director of the

Community Relations Service; Clifford I. Alexander, Jr., Director

of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and Cartha DeLoach,

Assistant to the Director, FBI, Clark left Anderews Air Force

Base on a 6:45 a.m. flight to Memphis the morning of April 5, 1968.

Several reasons have been offered for this visit of high

level officials to the scene of the crime. Attorney General

Clark has indicated some concern over the explosive racial situ-

29

ation in Memphis following the assassination. He also felt a need

to remain immediately apprised of progress in the FBI's investi-

gation in Memphis, thus explaining his decision to bring Cartha

DeLoach with him. DeLoach explained his participation in the trip

as, in part, "window-dressing", prompted by a desire to have a

high level FBI official on the scene. In Memphis members of this

31

visiting group visited with Mayor Loeb and the United States

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Attorney, Thomas Robinson, and made stops at the FBI field office, ,

Director Holloman's office in the Memphis Police Department, and

the Memphis Airport to observe King's body being placed on a plane

for a return trip to Atlanta. Finally, a press conference was

held in which Attorney General Clark expressed a belief that the

assassin's capture was imminent, and that the available evidence

indicated the involvement of only one individual; Clark has explained

his remarks in terms of his desire to quell the racial unrest that

33

erupted throughout the nation immediately following King's death.

Many of the early investigative developments

resulted from the Bureau's analysis of physical evidence discovered

at the scene of the crime. Both the binoculars and the rifle were

traced to their respective places of purchase. The binoculars had

been bought locally, in the City of Memphis itself. The suspected

murder weapon, on the other hand, was traced to the Aeromarine Supply

Company, in Birmingham, Alabama. Early ballistics tests conducted on

'the 30.06 rifle and the death siug taken from Dr. King's body during

the autopsy revealed that while "the bullet could have been fired

from the rifle found near the scene:, the mutilation of the bullet

made it impossible to state "that it was actually fired from this

one rifle." (emphasis added). Interviews with clerks at Aeromarine

established that the rifle had been purchased on March 30th, 1968,

by an individual using the name of Harvey Lowmeyer, generally

described as a "white male, thirty-six years old, five feet eight

inches tall, one hundred fifty - one hundred sixty pounds, black

or dark brown hair." Laundry marks found on a pair of undershorts

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and an undershirt in the bundle of evidence were traced to a

specific machine model, and efforts started throughout the

38.

country to locate a particular laundry, and a particular machine.

One week after the assassination, the suspect's use of the Home

39

Service Laundry in Los Angeles was established. Finally, by

April 9, 1969, a pair of duckbill pliers found in the bundle

was traced to the Rompage Hardware Company in Los Angeles.

The FBI's MURKIN investigation was treated from the beginning

as a "major case" or "special" investigation. Additional adminis-

trative personnel and agents were assigned to Memphis during the

intitial stages, including an accountant to maintain nationwide

cost figures on the investigation. A twenty-four hour deadline

was imposed on all field offices to check out leads, and a tickler

system was implemented by headquarters case agent Richard E. Long

to monitor compliance during the field investigation. On April

7, 1968, an "All SAC" memo issued from headquarters with instructions

similar to those normally issued in special investigations:

"All investigation must be handled under the

personal direction of the SAC.

Leads are to be afforded

immediate, thorough investigative attention. You must

exhaust all possibilities from

such leads as any one

lead could result in the solution of this most important

investigation.

SAC will be held personally responsible

for any failure to promptly and thoroughly handle inves-

tigations in this matter..

Finally, in further recognition of the "special" nature of the

MURKIN investigation, the FBI sent an inspector from headquarters

to oversee the investigation in the crucial field offices.

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Inspector Joseph Sullivan, selected for his past experience in

civil rights investigations in the

deep South,

was sent to Memphis, and remained there for approximately one

44

week before moving to Atlanta to direct the investigation there.

While in Memphis and Atlanta, Sullivan took over the day-to-day

direction of the investigation, leaving the SAC free to attend to

other matters in the office. The Committee has been assured that

the assignment of Inspector Sullivan to Memphis and Atlanta

during the initial stages of the investigation did not indicate

a lack of confidence in the field SAC's, but simply was evidence

of the importance of the investigation in the eyes of the Bureau.

During the first two days of the investigation, the FBI

had discovered two aliases used by the suspected assassin - John

Willard (used in renting a room at Bessie Brewer's rooming house

on April 4, 1968) and Harvey Lowmeyer, (used during the Birmingham

rifle purchase).

On April 9th, a third possible alias - Eric's. Galt

was added to a growing list. During a routine motel search in

the Memphis area, agents discovered that an individual using that

name, and driving a Mustang with Alabama license plate "138993",

had registered on April 3 and checked out on April 4, 1968. Galt's

residence was listed as 2608 Highland Street, Birmingham, Alabama

(noteworthy because it was in the same area as the fake residence

listed by "Harvey Lowmeyer" during the rifle purchase on March 29 and

March 30, 19681.

An investigation of 2608 Highland Street, Birmingham, revealed

a rooming house owned by one Peter Cherpes, where Galt had resided

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during 1967. Cherpes and other tenants noted similarities between

an artist's conception of the assassin and Galt. Further investi-

gation in Birmingham disclosed that Galt had purchased the Mustang

in September of the previous year from one William Paisley for a

price of $1950. At the time of the car purchase, Galt possessed

safe-deposit box at the Birmingham Trust National Bank, and a

comparison of writing samples from safe-deposit box documents and

"Lowmeyer"'s rifle purchase receipt revealed "similarities". Galt's

name was added to the list of individuals sought for interview by

the Bureau, and a directive issued to

all continental offices to

search records at the local offices of the Selective Service, tele-

phone company, motor vehicle departments, financial institutions,

credit bureaus and other "logical sources" for information under

the new alias.

In addition, information on the Mustang was entered

into the NCIC (National Crime Information Center) system, insuring

that inquiries concerning the vehicle would be directed to the

FBI.

On April 11, 1968, the Mustang was located in Atlanta,

abandoned in the parking lot of the Capital Homes Apartment

Building at the intersection of Memorial Drive and Connally

Street. The car provided a number of leads. An inspection of

mileage figures revealed that it had been driven approximately

19,000 miles since Galt purchased it from William Paisley in

September of 1967. A Mexican tourist sticker indicated that the

car had entered Mexico, at Nuevo Laredo, on 10/7/67. The car

had been serviced twice in California, once in Hollywood, and

on 2/13/68, in Los Angeles. In the trunk, agents located clothing

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and bedding, floor mats, a hunting knife and tools, and a piece

of cardboard with two names and the address of "1535 North Serrano"

written thereon. shortly after the car's discovery, laboratory

tests proved that fibers found on a blanket in the bundle of

evidence in Memphis and on a sheet from the vehicle trunk were

identical; the FBI concluded that "Galt's automobile (was) involved

in the murder. "

Additional evidence on Eric S. Galt, the primary suspect,

continued to accumulate. By April 13, 1968, nine days after

the assassination, Galt's movements throughout the country had

become clearer. Correspondence with the Locksmithing Institute,

Little Falls, New Jersey showed Galt in Montreal, Canada on July

31, 1968. Field investigation in Birmingham disclosed Galt's

attendance of classes of the Continental Dance Studio between

September 12 and October. 3, 1967, and-a

search of post office records

in that city revealed his purchase of a significant amount of cam-

era equipment in October. of 1967; letters written to the Superior

Bulk Film Company, Chicago, carried return addresses of Hotel Rio,

Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. and 1535 North Serrano, Los Angeles.

A

second Los Angeles address for Galt - the St. Francis Hotel on

Hollywood Boulevard - was established for the period of January 21,

1968 to March 17, 1968.

Particulary important for purposes of the upcoming prosecution

case against Galt was a Los Angeles postal change of address card

executed and mailed by Galt on March 17, 1968, which gave a new

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address of "General Delivery, Atlanta, Georgia", the city of

King's home and SCIC headquarters. Galt's actual Atlanta address -

113 14th Street, N.E.; was discovered on a change of address

implemented by the Locksmithing Institute, Little Falls, New

Jersey on March 30, 1968. Agents were placed in the "hippie"

rooming house at that address in an undercover capacity, hoping to

catch Galt if he returned to his prior residence.

While agents awaited Galt's return to Atlanta, others interr

viewed two of the suspect's chief acquaintances in California:

Charles Stein, an unemployed, self-described "song-writer", and

Marie Martin, a cocktail waitress at the Sultan Room Lounge on

Hollywood Boulevard. Stein recalled meeting Galt on December 14,

1967; the following day, December 15th, Galt prevailed upon Charles

Stein, his sister Rita Stein,

and Marie Martin to sign a petition

in support of Governor George Wallace's presidential campaign.

Immediately thereafter Galt and Stein drove to New Orleans to

pick up Stein's niece and nephew. Stein recalled Galt mentioning

a meeting with individuals associated with an engineering or

56

contracting firm; he met Galt once in New Orleans on December 18,

1967, the day after their arrival. The next day they returned to

Los Angeles, again driving non-stop. While in New Orleans, Galt

stayed at the Provincial Motel; however, investigation at the motei

revealed no long distance calls, and local telephone call records

had been destroyed prior to the agent's arrival.

Using statements of Stein and Marie Martin, as well as those of

other witnesses, the FBI began to document aspects of the suspect's

personality. Martin reported that he was constantly at the

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sultan Room, took a bartending course, drank vodka and sometimes

beer, didn't smoke, and was solemn and emotionless. She also

remembered Galt recounting an incident when he drove his Mustang

through a Black neighborhood and was hit by tomatoes thrown by the

Local

residents, Charles Stein recalled neat dressing habits, a

soft-spoken manner and a penchant for country western music. 57

In addition, in California agents located a Los Angeles

bartending school attended by Galt and discovered two items of

Interest: first, the FBI Obtained its first photo of the illusive

Eric Galt, taken at the time of his graduation; Galt's eyes were

closed in the picture. Second, Thomas Lau, president of the Bar-

tending school, told agents that on March 2, 1968, Galt turned down

an offer of employment, explaining that he would be leaving town in

two weeks to visit his brother.58 Meanwhile, records were dis-

covered at the Piedmont Laundry in Atlanta indicating visits by

Galt on April 1, 1968, following "Lowmeyer's" purchase of the rifle

In Birmingham, and on April 5, 1968, the day after the assassina-

tion. 59

On April 17th, in order to secure an arrest warrant and addi-

tional publicity in the fugitive search, a federal complaint was

filed with the United States Commissioner in Birmingham, Mildred

F. Sprague, charging

• Eric S. Galt "and an individual alleged to be

his brother" with conspiracy to interfere with constitutional

Fights of Martin Iuther King, JI. 60 A "fugitive press release"

was Issued with the complaint, o1 and widespread distribution of the

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information and accompanying photo through the media was encouraged 52

While the Department of Justice and the FBI solicited the

assistance of the public through their press release, a fingerprint

project was in progress at Bureau headquarters which led, on

April 19, 1968, to the largest break in the case - the identification

of James Earl Ray as the illusive suspect. Almost immediately after

the assassination, the Bureau obtained unidentified latent prints of

value from the rifle, binoculars, bear cans and a Memphis newspaper -

the Commercial Appeal - items found in the bundle of evidence

thought to have been dropped by the assassin shortly after the

murder. As the evidence accumulated, additional latents were

obtained, including one on a map of Mexico discovered. in the

Atlanta rooming house by Galt shortly before the assassination.

Comparisons revealed that at least three prints, found on the Mexico

map, the rifle, and the binoculars, were identical, and apparently

came from the left thumb; the print was identified as "an ulner loop

with twelve ridge counts. "63

After unsuccessfully comparing this and other prints with known

prints of "approximately 400 suspects," the single fingerprint file

and "all outstanding FBI identification orders, "64

a systematic

search of fingerprint records of fugitives was initiated. Approxi-

mately 1900 fugitives were identified with "ulnar loops of 10-4

ridge counts in the left thumb. "65 Fifteen days after the assassina-

tion, a manual comparison of the smaller group with the isolated

laten produced a positive match with the prints of James Earl Ray,

fugitive from Missouri State Prison. 66

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(D)

IDENTIFICATION TO ARREST

It is clear from a review of the investigatory files that the

identification of James Earl Ray terminated a major phase of the

Bureau's investigation. Inspector Joseph Sullivan, the Headquarters

representative assigned to coordinate activities in the Memphis and

Atlanta field offices during the early stages of the investigation,

was taken off the case and sent to. Detroit, Michigan to work on the

racial informant program in that office. In recommending this move,

• Assistant Director Rosen, stated:

"In view of current developments, there does not

appear to be any need for Inspector Joe Sullivan to be in

Atlanta, Georgia, or Memphis, Tennessee. We are now

engaged in a fugitive investigation and all offices will

• have to focus their full attention to any leads which

Simultaneously, Memphis was directed to phase out the fifteen agents

and three stenographic clerks they had received on the heels of the

assassination. 68

• A new press release was issued, with directions to all field

offices to insure "repeated and widespread distribution. "69 For

only the second time in Bureau history, approval was given to make

Ray a "special addition" to the "Ten Most Wanted List"

• Finally,

short appeals for public assistance in the fugitive investigation

were drafted and approved for use on the April 21st and April

28th installments of "The FBI" on television, 1 and within a week

after the identification, various institutions and officials

had offered a total of $100,000.00 for information leading to

the apprehension and conviction of Ray, 72

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With James Earl Ray, a fugitive from Missouri State Prison,

now at the center of the investigation, the Bureau initiated

efforts directed both at the family and at inmate and criminal

associates of the suspect. Jerry Ray, the youngest of the three

brothers, was interviewed in Chicago on the day of Ray's identifi-

cation, denied knowledge of and participation in the assassination,

supplied handwriting samples, photos and major case prints and stated

that he had not seen his brother outside of prison since 1952.

Three days later, John Larry Ray, the middle brother, who had been

located in St. Louis, stated that he had seen his fugitive brother

twice in the last twenty years, and most recently three years back,

and then expressed

surprise to the interviewing agents that so

much effort was

being expended in attempting to locate James, since

all he had done was "kill a nigger".

Interviews

with Ray's inmate associates produced volumnious

and often contradictory information on a variety of topics, including

the suspect's racial attitudes, the manner of his April 23, 1978 es-

cape from Missouri State Prison, his involvement in the trafficking and

use of drugs while in prison, assassination plots relating to King,

and information on the suspect's present whereabouts. On several

occasions, and quite predictably, agents attempting these interviews

met with antagonism or outright refusals to cooperate in the inves-

tigation.

In addition to the information relating to narcotics, the

escape, and the suspect's racial attitudes, some inmates also told

of a prisoner association known as "Cooley's Organization" alleged

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to have been active in the "protection" business during the period

of Ray's incarceration at MSP. After receiving one allegation

75

that Ray was a member of the organization, and another that Ray

said in 1963 that Cooley or his organization would pay $10,000

to have King killed, a directive issued from headquarters to the

Kansas City Field Office to "press every effort possible to deter-

mine any information whatsoever concerning the Cooley organization."

Extensive field interviews were conducted. However, no substantial

evidence was developed of the group's involvement in the assassi-

78

nation or of a concrete link between Ray and the organization.

Throughout the country,radditional details on Ray's 1967-68

travels were developed.

Prostitutes, bartenders, and cigarette girls in Puertô Vallarta,

Mexico told of the suspect's interest in marijuana and of a possible

"racial incident" between Ray and some Black customers at the

Casa Susana in Puerto Vallarta. • )

Interviews with Dale Rodriguez, Lorraine Calloway and

Mariane DeGrasse established the likelihood of a second visit

80

by Ray to New Orleans in March of 1968, after leaving Los Angeles.

Meanwhile, further efforts were made to determine who Ray tele-

phoned during his first drive to New Orleans with Charles Stein

in December of 1967.

Nevertheless, while the picture of Ray's pre-assassination

life-style became clearer, important issues remained a mystery.

With the passage of time, FBI files reflect increasing emphasis

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on establishing Ray's source of funding during both the pre-

assassination travels and the post-assassination flight. "AJI-SAC"

directives were issued to contact local narcotic investigative

agencies to follow-up on evidence of Ray's interest in marijuana

in Mexico, and amphetamines in Missouri State Prison. On

April 23, 1968, all office were instructed to consider Ray a

suspect in the unsolved bank robberies, burglaries and armed

robberies.

And on April 29, 1968, an "ALL-SAC" memo issued

directing field offices to contact local law enforcement

agencies maintaining latent fingerprint records "for (the)

purpose of possibly establishing Ray's past whereabouts and

84

source of funds."

As the leads came up dry, additional approaches to the

funding issues appeared:

"Ray's prison financial accounts at

Missouri State Prison were reviewed. On May 6, 1968, Atlanta,

Birmingham and Memphis were told to check local safety deposit

box records for April 4, 1968, to determine whether Ray had

withdrawn valuables before fleeing. On May 14, 1968, following

up on the April 23, 1968 instructions, Washington directed all

offices to display Ray's photograph to "appropriate witnesses

in unsolved bank robberies and bank burglaries: and to consider

requesting the assassistance of local police in displaying the

picture to witnesses in unsolved robberies.

A week later, field

offices in Atlanta, Birmingham, Los Angeles, Memphis and New Or-

lears were told to investigate withdrawals from local banks

exceeding $10,000, during April of 1968, to investigate the

"possibility" that Ray was

a hired assassin and received a

88

timely pay-off.

Finally, the Springfield Field Office began

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a thorough re-investigation of the July 13, 1967 robbery of

the Bank of Alton in Alton, Illinois. The lead was considered

promising because Ray was in the area at the right time and

his description approximated that of the two unidentified

89

suspects. Ultimately, however, the investigation bore no fruit.

Above and beyond these questions, however, was the over-

riding problem of Ray's apprehension itself. Three days after

the positive print

identification, a directive was sent to all

offices re-emphasizing the 24-hour lead deadline, and directing

contact with all criminal, racial and security informants to

90

determine whether any possessed information on James Earl Ray.

In addition, record checks and interviews were performed.

at local banks, telephone companies credit agencies, police

departments, car rental agencies, motor vehicle departments,

dancing schools, low and middle class hotels, laundries, li-

braries, motels, utility companies, selective service bureaus,

and appropriate unions.

Beyond these general investigative efforts, specific "Ray-

oriented" leads also appeared. On April 24, 1968, acting on Ray's

use of Garner's low-class roominghouse and other similar estab-

lishments, Washington directed all offices to "conduct appro-

priate investigations of all hippie roominghouses and similar

establishments to obtain any information concerning Ray.

And

on April 25th, a check by Ford Motor Company of over 1,500,000

warranty cards on work done

since August 30, 1969 produced negative

results with respect to Ray's Mustang. 93

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Despite these impressive nationwide efforts, however,

it is clear that the FBI felt the

prospect for

breaking the fugitive investigation lay with Ray's family.

On April 20, 1968, St. Louis was directed to obtain all

telephone calls from the phones of John Larry Ray, Carol

Ann Pepper (Ray's sister) and any phone located in the Grapevine

Tavern in St. Louis

(Leased by John Larry Ray and licensed to

94

to Carol Pepper). This was followed up two days later by

instructions sent to the four field offices responsible for

areas inhabited by key members of the Ray family:

"Full coverage is to be afforded relatives of

subject residing in your respective territories.

This will include a spot surveillance of these

persons as well as a determination of their

associates and individuals making frequent con-

tact with them.

You should also obtain all

long distance telephone calls from their res-

idences for period April 23, 1967 to the present

time.

You should make this a continuing project

until otherwise advised by the Bureau... You

should insure that each relative is adequately

covered to possibly assist in the subject's

location and apprehension." 95

While the Bureau approached Ray's relatives directly in

numerous field interviews in an effort to secure information

on the whereabouts of the fugitive, additional, indirect

approaches of the family were also considered. On May 7, the

St. Louis office informed the Director of discussions with the

local United States Attorney, in which the latter had agreed

to "cooperate fully" in prosecuting Carol Pepper, Ray's sis-

ter, for false responses in an official liquor license

questionnaire, "in the event pressure of this nature needed."

And on May 13, 1968, an official request was sent to the

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office of the Attorney General seeking authorization to install

microphone and technical surveillance on the residence of John

Larry Ray. The purpose of the requested surveillance as phrased

in the May 13 memo, was to "assist in the early apprehension of

the subject."

The request was not approved, and was withdrawn

on June 11, 1968, immediately following Ray's apprehension in

London.

Efforts to secure precise information on Ray's location

from the family did not bear immediate fruit. Nevertheless, in a

May 9th interview with John Larry Ray in St. Louis, Ray's brother

reported that Ray had mentioned an intention to leave the country

if he escaped; Ray had also indicated, on one occasion, admiration

for Ian Smith, head of the Rhodesian government. On May 10, 1968,

based on this interview and other independent evidence of Ray's

100

interest in African countries

headquarters initiated a United

101

States Passport review in the Washington Field Office,

focusing initially on the 2,100,000 applications that had been.

filed since April of 1967, the month of Ray's escape from Missouri

State Prison. Thirty-six agents were assigned to the task; (they

had completed a review of 700,000 applications by the time of

Ray's apprehension in London exactly one month later.)

Simultaneous

with the initiation of the U.s. Passport

project, wanted fliers were sent to the American consulate

in

Rhodesia for distribution there, and Washington instructed the

FBI legat in Ottawa to implement a similar review project of

Canadian passports with the assistance of the Royal Canadian

102

Mounted Police. A check on flights between Montreal and Rhodesia

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103

was also ordered, and ten days later, on May 21, 1967,

arrangements had been made with the State Department to provide

information on Ray to the 290 U.S. diplomatic establishments

104

throughout the world.

In addition to these efforts on the international scene,

additional, often major domestic efforts were made in the fugitive

investigation. On May 14, membership lists of the John Birch

105

Society were checked for any ascertainable leads; (Ray had left a

John Birch Society pamphlet at Garner's in Atlanta). On May 21,

1968, all domestic offices began a review of drivers license

applications for the months of April and May, 1968, for all white

106

males between the ages of 30 to 55 years. On May 22, 1968

headquarters, willing to attempt every possible device.

considered placing

an ad for "self-hypnosis" in

publications normally read by Ray "in an effort to

107

surface subject", and sent a directive to various field offices

to identify magazines habitually read by Ray. And on May 28, •

1968, in anticipation of an extensive project, the Director •

authorized a request to the Department of Health, Education

and Welfare to check all new social security card applications

(received in 1968 at rate of 110,000/wk.) for. a lead to Ray's

whereabouts. Despite these efforts, however, the FBI's fugitive

investigation in May produced discouraging results. As the days

passed, the illusive suspect was proving an embarrassment to the

Bureau.

Then, on June 1, 1968, a break occurred in Canada when the

RCMP passport review project turned up a possible match of Ray

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in the Canadian passport of one "George Ramon Sneyd". RCMP

officials determined from the Kennedy Travel Bureau in Toronto that

"Sneyd" had purchased a Toronto-London-Toronto airlines ticket

with a scheduled departure of May 6 and return on May 21, 1968.

Meanwhile the FBI ascertained through print comparisons that Ray

109

and "Sneyd" were, in fact, the same person, and the trail

was once again hot.

A check with airline authorities revealed that Ray, instead

of using the return portion of his airlines ticket, had exchanged

it in London and continued on to Lisbon, Portugal. FBI headquarters

sent Unit Chief Wilbur Martindale to Europe to follow the latest

lead; Martindale stopped off in London to meet with the FBI

Legat from Paris; the two then continued on to Lisbon.

Unknown to the FBI, however, Ray had returned to London on

May 17, 1968; after a ten-day stay in Portugal. Approximately three

weeks after his return to England, and on the same day that

Martindale arrived in Lisbon, Ray was arrested at the London Inter-

national Airport. The time in London was 11:15 a.m., on June

8, 1968, somewhat more than two months after the assassination

of Dr. King.

(E) ARREST TO GUILTY PLEA

A quick review of basic cost information on the MURKIN inves-

tigation reveals that the FBI's nationwide field investigation

wound down dramatically during the month of June, 1968.

For

example, the overall mileage driven by FBI agents through May 31, 1968

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was placed at 448,775. The mileage figure for June was 24,430, and

for the next four months - July through October - 4,322 miles

Similarly, the overall cost of the MURKIN investigation through

May 31, 1968 was $1,117,870.00. Expenditures for June ran to

$135, 375.00, and for the next four months combined, $34, 390. do.

Arrangements began immediately to bring Ray back to the

United States. Attorney General Clark asked Fred. Vinson, Jr.,

the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, to coor-

dinate the extradition proceedings in London, and in Memphis and

Birmingham, Department of Justice attorneys completed affidavits

of key witnesses for possible use in the English proceedings. At

the same time, Vinson's counterpart in the Civil Rights Division,

Assistant Attorney General Stephen Pollak, was told by the Attorney

General to work fulltime on the king case, while at the FBI, agents

were selected to return with Ray to the United States and the London

Legat began to monitor progress in Ray's various extradition hearings.

In terms of the on-going investigation, FBI files reflect one

area of lingering concern: the funding of Ray's travels. On

June 20, 1968, the question of funding was raised in a discussion

between Attorney General Clark and Director Hoover, and in a

memo later written to summarize the meeting, Hoover wrote:

"I stated that in Ray's case, we have not found a

single angle that would indicate a conspiracy. I said the

only significant thing is the money he had and what he

spent freely in paying bills and I thought that could

have been obtained

from a bank robbery.

The Attorney

General said that if we could show he robbed the Bank

of Alton, it would be helpful. I said we are working on

that because he was paying his bills with $50 bills up

to his arrest. I said on the other hand he stayed at flop

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houses and never stayed at a first-class hotel but at the

same time spent,

I thought, $1200 or more in buying guns and

the car, which I thought was $150D, and then he took dancing

116

lessons, bartender lessons, and lessons in picking locks

In search of a solution to the funding problem, investigation

of Ray's involvement in the Alton Bank robbery continued in the

117

Springfield Office. Meanwhile, the Kansas City Field Office was

instructed to contact the warden at Missouri State Prison for new

information on the "Cooley Organization" - a lead "which may

assist in tracing subject's

source of funds". Finally, on June

24, 1968, Hoover authorized the Liaison Section to coordinate

with the State Department in an attempt to ascertain the existence

119

of a Swiss bank account in Ray's name. Despite these efforts, a

specific answer to Ray's manner of funding alluded the FBI.

Also apparent, following Ray's apprehension; was some effort

to investigate the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination.

On June 11, 1968, AAG Pollak asked Assistant Director Rosen,

"whether the FBI was running out all allegations relative to

possible conspiracy", and was assured that "so far (the FBI had)

not been able to establish that there was any conspiracy, (but

120

remained) constantly alert to this possibility." On June 13,

Ray's contact with "a fat man" in Canada was resolved as an

121

innocent occurence. On June 18, 1968, FBI headquarters, appar-

ently in response to a second directive from the Department of

Justice to continue to follow out leads pertaining to a possible

federal violation", (i.e. conspiracy), ordered a "specialized

recheck" in Birmingham and Memphis of clients at the New Rebel

Motel and the Birmingham motels during what was designated as the

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relevant conspiratorial period (3/29/68 and 4/3/68) in search of

possible Ray associates.

While a thorough analysis of the Bureau's conspiracy investi-

gation will be included in a later portion of this report, it

can be noted here that the Bureau's finding that Ray acted alone :

remained, throughout the investigation, constant and unshaken.

On July 23, 1968, the FBI sent a memo to the Justice Department

recommending dismissal of the conspiracy complaint that had been

filed three months earlier in Birmingham "in view of the fact that

123

this offense was not cited in the order of extradition." Fred

Vinson, AAG of the Criminal Division, concurred withthe FBI's

124

recommendation on July 29, 1968; however, AAG Stephen Pollak,

(whose Civil Rights Division was responsible for the conspiracy

prosecution), instructed the FBI one day later that "it would

not be appropriate to dismiss the complaint at this time. The

125

conspiracy investigation is still underway." Thus, it was not

until December 2, 1971 that the conspiracy complaint in Birmingham

126

was ultimately dismissed.

In Memphis, the Tennessee State murder case against Ray

proceeded slowly to trial. On July 19th, Ray returned from

London and was released by the FBI into the custody of local

authorities in Shelby County, Tennessee. Sometime before, but

after Ray's apprehension, Memphis FBI Case Agent Joe Hester's

"prosecutive summary report" had

been distributed to phil Canale,

District Attorney General, for his use during the prosecution.

This was the first major release of FBI investigative files to

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-

the local prosecutors since the assassination. Ten additional in-

vestigative reports from key field offices were sent to Memphis on

127

August 6, 1978.

As is indicated from the cost data cited earlier, the FBI's

investigation had by this time been dramatically reduced; however,

some additional steps were being taken. ' On August 27th,

•a request was made by the FBI to the Justice Department to consider

a search warrant or grand jury subpoena to obtain the written notes

of author William Bradford Huie. After lengthy consideration,

the Department decided on November 27, 1968 not to undertake this

approach. While the files contain no explanation for this decision,

it is noted that this memo is dated after

the publication of

Huie's second Look magazine article on Ray and the King case; it

seems likely, therefore, that the Department did not feel

the poten-

tial gain would justify risking an adverse legal ruling on the

propriety of a search warrant served to an author under contract

to a criminal defendant, to obtain

the product of his communications

with the defendant.

The November 12th trial date was postponed when Ray fired

his first attorney, Arthur Hanes, SI., and hired Percy Foreman.

Mr. Hugh Stanton, Sr., Shelby County Public Defender, was assigned

to assist Foreman shortly thereafter, and a March 10, 1969 trial

date was ultimately set.

In the end, however, the trial never occurred. Rather, Ray

pled guilty to the first degree murder of Dr. King and accepted

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a sentence of 99 years in the Tennessee State Prison. In an

interview with FBI Memphis SAC Jensen, three days later, Ray

proved generally uncooperative, and provided no evidence of the

involvement of others in the assassination, and while the FBI

"MURKIN" File remains open today, to accept incoming leads on the

case, nothing has occurred to change the official conclusion reached

during the first months of the investigation: Ray killed King and

acted alone in the process.

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III.

COORDINATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was, and

remains, only one of several component agencies within the

Department of Justice, the conduct of the MURKIN investigation

was ultimately the responsibility of the Attorney General of

the United States, as head of the Department of Justice, and

of the attorneys that the Attorney General assigned to

supervise the investigation.

A. THE LAWYERS

By April of 1968, Ramsey Clark had held the office

of Attorney General, (either "Acting" of confirmed), for

approximately eighteen months; he had spent an additional

eighteen months as Deputy Attorney General under Nicholas

Katzenbach.

During the administration of the assassination

investigation, Clark's two primary assistants were Stephen

Pollak and Fred Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General

for the Civil Rights Division and the Criminal Division

respectively. Because federal investigatory and prosecutorial

jurisdiction was premised on a possible violation of 18 U.s.c.

$ 341 (conspiracy to interfere with the constitutional rights

of another), Pollak's Civil Rights Division was formally

responsible for the conduct of the investigation, and for

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any

•federal prosecutions thatr might develop. From the

beginning, however, Clark decided to deviate somewhat

from the customary Justice Department practice of main-

taining responsibility for an investigation exclusively

within the confines of the appropriate division; instead

he chose to involve the Criminal Division equally in the

investigation, feeling that they had a better working

132

relationship with the F.B.I.

Thus, it soon developed that

both Pollak and his counterpart Fred Vinson, JI. of the

Criminal Division were reporting on the King investigation

directly to Clark; moreover, it is Vinson's recollection

that both he and Pollak were kept egually informed on this

133

case and shared the burden of responsibility for its progress.

Outside of Washington, the Department of Justice is

represented by local United States Attorneys; one for each

federal district in the country. Normally, the actual

prosecution of a federal criminal case will be the respon-

sibility of the local office, subject only to the super-

vision of the appropriate division of the Department; in

1968, however, this was not the practice in the area of

civil rights prosecutions. Because of political considera-

tions, together with the need to maintain working relations

with local law enforcement agencies, the resident United

States Attorney often found it awkward to bring cases against

the local authorities under the various federal civil

rights statutes.

Thus by 1968, federal civil rights

investigations and prosecutions had, with very few

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exceptions, become the responsibility of the Civil Rights

Division in Washington; the local United States Attorney

remained on the sidelines, uninvolved in the prosecution

except perhaps to provide information on local courtroom

practices, or to assist during the voir dire of the jury panel.

134

In the King investigation, this practice did not

change. While the FBI's investigation was carried out

by offices throughout the country, local U.S. Attorneys

in important cities such as Atlanta, Memphis, New Orleans,

Los Angeles, Chicago, and St. Louis were excluded from

the information flow and therefore from the decision-making

process.

B. THE, INFORMATION FLOW AND THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEYS

The ability of the Justice Department to provide

meaningful input into the daily course of the FBI's inves-

tigation depended primarily on their ability to remain fully

informed concerning developments in the case. Ultimately,

however, the amount and quality of investigative

information transmitted to the Justice Department depended

almost exclusively on the Bureau's willingness to provide

the data.

During his executive session testimony, Ramsey Clark

recalled that. he "caused a quite different relationship

between the Office of the Attorney General and the Bureau

in this (King) assassination...I became personally and

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directly involved in the investigation, and received

information directly about it in a way and to an extent

135

that exceeded all others during my term as Attorney General."

Prior to Ray's arrest, Clark's information came in the form

of frequent briefings, either telephonically or in person,

from Assistant to the Director Cartha DeLoach, as well as from

136

written Bureau memoranda. It is Mr. Clark's recollection

that AAG Vinson and Pollak backed him up on examining the

137

documents that came through. Despite Mr. Clark's efforts,

however, it is clear that the written information received

by the Attorney General and, in many ways more importantly,

by the rest of the Justice Department, was often both super-

ficial and untimely.

During the course of the FBI'S MURKIN

investigation,

the paperwork produced in Washington and the field was

voluminous. The various forms of reporting included airtels

and teletypes to, from, and among field offices; internal

field office and headquarters memoranda; interview reports;

and the more formal letterhead memoranda. In addition,

major field offices produced monthly reports summarzing

the previous 30

days of investigation. which were in turn

transmitted to Memphis, the "office of origin", as well as

Washington. Finally, a "prosecutive summary" report was

prepared by SA Hester, case agent in the Memphis Field Office,

shortly after Ray's arrest.

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Information transmitted to the Department of Justice

always arrived from, or at least with the approval of, FBI head-

quarters in Washington. Moreover, it was transmitted,

almost without exception, in sanitized and digested form.

During the first days of the investigation following DI. King's

assassination, FBI memoranda to the Department contained only

138

the most basic and fundamental facts; some, such as the

April 11, 1968 FBI memorandum to the Department quoted below,

contained no facts at all, but were merely assurances that an

investigation was being pursued.

"The investigation of the murder of Martin

Luther King, JI., on April 4, 1968, has assumed

gigantic proportions.

All Field Divisions of the FBI are partic-

ipating in an around-the-clock operation designed

to identify and apprehend the person or persons

responsible for the killing.

Suspects are being developed and processed

on a daily basis as additional information is

developed.

Every aspect of the investigation

is being vigorously pursued

and the complete

facilities of this Bureau will remain fully

committed until this matter has been fully

resolved. "139

The superficial nature of these initial memoranda was

acknowledged during HSCA interviews with FBI agents who worked

in Washington during the MURKIN investigation; the situation

explained in terms of the need to take security pre-

140

cautions, or to prevent leaks concerning an on-going fugitive

investigation!' Moreover, it was the clearly-stated opinion

of these FBI headquarters personnel that the Bureau had sole

responsibility for the

on-going efforts to identify and to

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I42

locate the assassin, and would have resented any efforts

by Justice Department personnel to get more deeply involved

143

in the daily investigative process.

It is important to note that early involvement by

Department of Justice attorneys in criminal investigations was not

"common throughout the Department in 1968; thus, none of the Justice

Department officials interviewed by HSCA staff expressed any

dissatisfaction with the nature of information received

from the FBI. Assistant Attorney General Vinson of the

Criminal Division expressed his confidence in the ability

of the FBI to determine what, if any, information should

be distributed to the Department45

•, and AAG Pollak character-

ized the information received as "more than normal", and

consistent with the traditional FBI practice to send "digested"

material to the Department.

In addition to the daily memoranda described above, the

Department of Justice also received, starting on May 2, 1968, •

field office summary reports submitted by the major offices:

Memphis, Birmingham, Los Angeles, and Atlantà! These reports

were also distributed to the office of the Birmingham United

States Attorney, in light of the fact that a federal complaint

against "Eric S. Galt" was filed in that city on April 17,

1968. These reports were distributed with specific instructions

that they were not to be disseminated to any other U.S. Attorney

in the country, thus insuring, from an early point, that the

local United States Attorney would play no meaningful note in

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148

the investigation. The exclusion of the United States

Attorneys was, of course, consistent with normal practice

149

on civil rights investigations. Moreover, Attorney General

Clark, when asked about the Bureau's instructions to

exclude the local U.S. Attorneys from the information flow,

expressed total agreement with the policy:

"The need for all those U.S. Attorneys

.. to have all the information is not at all

clear to me, and you might as well print it in

the newspapers...I don't know why it would

have enhanced the investigation to have U.S.

Attorneys all over the country privy to all

the information."

150

The background sole which had been assumed by the Department

of Justice during the two months following DI. King's assassina-

tion changed somewhat with Ray's arrest in London. In a meeting

in the Attorney General's office the day of the arrest, Clark

directed AAG Pollak to put aside other commitments and

con-

centrate exclusively on the King case; Cartha DeLoach

was

instructed

simultaneously to keep Pollak advised of "any

communication, airtel, or cablegram that might come in

connection with this case.? At the same meeting, Clark

decided that Vinson would coordinate the prisoner's extra-

dition and return to the United States. Vinson left for

London shortly thereafter, and Justice Department attorneys

from the Civil Rights Division were sent to Memphis and

Birmingham to prepare affidavits for use in the upcoming

British legal proceedings!53

Despite this flurry of activity, however, the files

reflect no discernable change in the depth of involvement

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of the Justice Department in the investigatory process

itself. AG Clark's request that Pollak immediately receive

all communications

concerning the case was, on Hoover's personal

154

instructions, ignored. As an interim measure, Pollak received

a more detailed daily memorandum. However, even this practice

155

stopped on June 19, after only seven memos had been sent.

Finally, as was noted earlier, both Pollak and Clark indicated a

general interest, following the assassination, in the

extent to which the FBI was exploring the possibility of

15€

conspiracy.

Beyond these general inquiries, however, the

course and direction of the investigation remained exclusively

in the hands of the FBI, with results conveyed to the Justice

Department -- after the fact -- either in the form of monthly

field office reports, or

in IuMs concerning the resolution

of specific areas of inquiry. Active and contemporaneous

participation by Justice Department attorneys, for example

through the use of a grand jury, the identification of possible

witnesses, the use of immunity grants, and the consideration of

electronic surveillance, (lawful after June 19, 1968), was

non-exixtent. While further analysis of the grand juoy and other

investigative tools available to the Justice Department will be

included in a later portion of this report, it would be appropriate

at this point to include the following excerpt of Mr. Clark's

executive session testimony:

l. Specifically referring to the people in the

Department of Justice, Mr. Vinson and Mr. Pollak,

how did you perceive their relative roles in this

investigation?

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A.

:

Well, I guess I didn't see them as having any

real role in the investigation. I saw them as

backing me up on examining the documents that

came through, on thinking about what could and

should be done. They were given some special

assignments.

Fred Vinson went over to London to

represent the U.S. when the arrest was made over

there.

But I don't recall thinking that they

were or should be involved in the

actual investiga-

tion! 57

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C. PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BUREAU

Much has been written of the independence of the FBi.

under Director Hoover, and the inability of the Department

of Justice, and specific Attorneys General, to control, or

even be familiar with, the scope and nature of the Bureau's

operations. The FBI's COINTELPRO against Dr. King is one

example. The "MURKIN" investigation, at least to the extent

that it reflects the agency's arrogance and independence, is

another.

Throughout the Committee's analysis of the FBI's assassina-

tion investigation, evidence was disclösed -- both in the files

during the extensive interviews with FBI and DOJ personnel

which followed-- instances reflecting a poor and often counter-

productive relationship between the investigators of the.

Bureau and the lawyers at the Justice Department. Examples

range from the inevitable, (and normally healthy) policy

disagreements which may be expected during any lengthy

and dynamic criminal investigation, to situations of mutual

distrust between members of the two organizations that

seriously undermined the possibility of a productive working

relationship.

Perhaps the most significant

source of friction between

the two organizations, beyond the Bureau's

apparent inbred fear of

departmental intrusion into and control of their activities,

was the poor relationship that existed between Attorney General

Clark and the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Much of the friction

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stemmed from basic philosophical differences, characterized

by Mr. Clark as "diametrically opposing views of the role of

law in a free society." For example, Clark's opposition to

the death penalty and general support of the Warren Court

158

"defendant-oriented" decisions, were strictly at odds with

Hoover's more conservative, "law and order" beliefs. In the

same vein, Clark and Hoover differed fundamentally over the

use of electronic surveillance in FBI investigations and

the AG's unwillingness to authorize requests was a constant

159

bone of contention.

Finally, and probably of equal overall

significance,

there was a

significant difference in age and experi-

ence between the two men. Deloach, Assistant to the. Director in

1968, recalls that while Hoover had great respect from Tom C.

Clark, (Ramsey Clark's father and a former Attorney General

under President Truman before becoming a Supreme Court Justice),

he was disturbed by the idea of having to deal with his son

some twenty years later.

As was so often the case, Hoover's •

views quickly became those of the FBI rank and file; in

interviews with members of the FBI headquarters chain-of-command,

it was readily apparent that the director's basic philosophical

disagreements with, and lack of respect for, Attorney General

Clark, became more or less universally-held opinions within the

161

agency.

With this situation as a background, this report now turned to

specific instances of difficulty that

•arose in the DOJ/FBI

relationship during the MURKIN investigation:

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1)

On April 17th, a federal complaint was filed in

Birmingham, Alabama charging Eric S. Galt with conspiracy

to interfere with the civil rights of Dr. King, (18 U.S.C.

$ 241). Because the assassination and a large portion of

the initial investigative activity occurred in Memphis, that

city would seem the obvious initial choice for a conspiracy

complaint relating to the crime; however, in a memo from

Rosen to DeLoach recommending Birmingham, rather than

Memphis, as the location for filing, the supporting argument

for this choice focused on security considerations and

included the statement that "we cannot rely on the U.s.

Attorney at Memphis. If we tried to file there, we would immediately

lose control of the situation and the complaint would become

162

public knowledge."

Thus the complaint was filed in Bir-

mingham, city of the rifle purchase.

While Attorney General Clark apparently authorized the

filing itself on April 16, 1968, there is no indication in FBI

files that the selction of a filing location was discussed

either with the AG or with member's of the Civil Rights

Division in Washington until after the fact. In fact, the

memorandum itself clearly envisions informing AG Clark of

the selection of Birmingham and of the "circumstances" sur-

rounding that decision, only after the filing had occurred.

FBI Headquarters personnel have assured this Committee

first that normal procedure required the Justice Department

to authorize the complaint and the location of its filing,

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and second that proper procedure was followed in this case. 164

Nevertheless, in interviews with Mr. Clark, Mr. Pollak, and

Mr. Pollak's Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Mr. D. Robert

Owen, none had any specific recollection of discussing the

Birmingham filing, and Mr. Pollak had a "dim recollection" 65

of being surprised when the decision to file in Birmingham was

announced, a reaction which would be consistent with the apparent

Bureau plans reflected in the April 17, 1968 memo--to inform

the AG of the select after the filing in Birmingham.

2) Throughout the period prior to Ray's arrest, FBI files re-

flect Hoover's irritation over Attorney General Clark's comments to

the press concerning the progress of the Bureau's investigation. In

response to, a report that Clark promised a progress report "soon" on

the FBI search for the assassin, Hoover noted: "We are not going to

make any progress reports. Our sole objective is to apprehend the

assassin not to give blow by blow accounts just to appease a selfish

press and get cheap headlines. "166 After reading a copy of a April

28, 1968 news article quoting Clark as indicating that there was

"no

significant evidence that the assassination.... 'goes beyond the

single actor'"

, Hoover penned the following notes: "I do wish the

AG would stop talking about this case until it is solved. ", 167

and on

a copy of an article written two weeks later citing Clark's

"optimism"

168

over Ray's imminent capture, Hoover noted: "Still talking!".

Hoover's overall dissatisfaction over Clark's public state-

ments is found in his reaction to a April 24, 1968 Washington Post

article, written by Robert Evans and Robert Novak and reporting

Hoover's "deep-seated unhappiness" with the AG, "aggravated by

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Clark's misleading public optimism about a quick solution to the

murder of the Rev. Martin Luther King." Hoover's terse note

169

scribbled on a copy of the article: "Well written."

3) On June 8, 1968, the day of Ray's arrest in London,

relations between the Department and the Bureau appear to

have reached their nadir, at least in terms of the MURKIN

investigation. FBI files reflect a

series of telephone calls

and meetings between

Attorney General Clark, Cartha Deloach, and

other officials from both Justice and the FBI. Based on a

review of FBI files detailing the incidents, the encounters

can fairly be characterized as hostile and riddled with mutual

distrust. Attornev General Clark's decision to send

AAG Vinson to London to coordinate extradition proceedings

was immediately resented, and Clark was advised that

"this was completely unnecessary if the representative would

be going for the purpose of attempting to look into FBI

170

171

activities;" London Legal Attache Minnich was then instructed

that "while he should confer with Assistant Attorney General

Vinson, he should not be 'bossed around' by vinson or allow

Vinson to upset any delicate relations that we have with law

172

enforcement authorities in England."

In addition to the Bureau's resentment of Vinson's role,

June 8th, 1968 marked a major breach in the relations of

Mr. Clark and Cartha Deloach, (until that time Clark's primary

liaison with the Bureau on the King investigation). FBI

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memos reflect the Attorney General's displeasure over the

Bureau's failure to keep him fully informed on the recent

developments in the case, a disagreement which ultimately

caused DeLoach to hang up on Clark during a telephone conversation.

Summoned to a meeting in Clark's office immediately after the

telephone incident, DeLoach writes that he brought Assistant

Director Rosen "as a witness"

-- a clear reflection of the erosion

of any trust which might have existed between the two men. When

Interviewed concerning the June 8th difficulties, Mr. Clark

and Mr. Deloach differ in their recollection of the overriding

1.73

cause of the confrontation. Both confirm its occurence, however,

. and Mr. Clark recalls directing Hoover to replace DeLoach immediately

with another agent for liaison purposes; the former Attorney

General recalls no further contact with DeLoach on the

174

King investigation.

4) Not surprisingly, evidence of a poor Justice Department/

FBI relationship continued to appear after the June 8th, 1968

incidents.

As was indicated previously, the Attorney

General's request of that day that his Assistant Attorney

General for Civil Rights, Stephen Pollak, receive all

communications (i.e. teletypes, airtels, cablegrams, etc.)

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relating to the case was ignored four days later on the

personal direction of Hoover. In addition, internal FBI

memos reflect criticism of the Department of Justice for

making direct contact with FBI field offices, land thereby

Failing to remain in the proper channels of communication 76

and for issuing conflicting instructions to the FBI on the

question of dismissing the Birmingham conspiracy complaint

against Galt. The latter instance is referred to in one

memorandum as a "typical example in the Department of the

left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing t

The Committee has reviewed these incidents in some

detail not because the issues raised are of inherent im-

portance, but rather because they, and other incidents not described

herein, are one indication of the nature of the overall re-

lationship which existed between the Justice Department

and the FBI in 1968. It is of more than passing significance,

for example, that relations between Mr. Clark and Mr. DeLoach.

were so strained as to require a curtailment of the latter's

liaison functions. It is perhaps equally significant that

FBI headquarters personnel often viewed the Department as both

unnecessarily intrusive and internally mismanaged. These and

other incidents are helpful in gaining an overall understanding

of the quality of the king investigation, and the respective

roles played therein by the Bureau and the Department.

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IV

COORDINATION BETWEEN THE BUREAU

AND

OTHERS

During the course of its assassination investigation, the

FBI made contact with, or was contacted by, countless individuals,

organizations, and state, federal and local authorities through-

out the United States and abroad. Often the contacts were

simply routine stops in a widespread fugitive investigation; on

other occasions, specific leads were being pursued. In addition,

random citizen inquiries were received almost daily, the White

House expected regular briefings, and the media was constantly

seeing information, either through direct requests or investigative

reporters.

The Bureau's relationship with these outside individuals and

organizations during the MURKIN investigation reflected

variety of elements." On the one hand, the

FBI took great satisfaction in their successes -past and present -

and relished their reputation as the country's leading investiga-

tive

agency. Laudatory remarks from public officials were filed

and circulated, and cooperative authors were assisted in preparing

articles expected to comment favorably on various aspects of the

179

King investigation.

On the other hand, however, FBI files reflected a constant

fear of potentially compromising situations which could tarnish

the Bureau's public image, a fear which resulted at times in a type of

"we-they", or seige mentality. The outside world was divided into

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friends and foes: reporters were either for the bureau ( and thereby

members of a "special correspondent list") or against, often becoming

themselves the targets of FBI investigative efforts. A curious

conflict arose in situations where a person possessed potentially

valuable information, but at the same time carried a "questionable",

or anti-Bureau, reputation that was perceived

as a

threat

to the

agency's public image. Through an analysis of these "outside"

contacts, (which were normally not unique to the Bureau's MURKIN

investigation), a clearer picture of the strengths and

weaknesses of the agency itself. may be gained.

(A) LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The term "one-way" street is often used to characterize the

FBI's relationship with local authorities during official inves-

tigations. the import of the phrase is that while the Bureau's

willing to receive, and often solicits information from local

authorities during an on-going investigation, it traditionally

has refused to release anything in return. Two explanations for this

conduct have been offered. First it reflects a legitimate concern

for security, expecially in fugitive investigations, which dictates

that information be released only on a "need-to-know" basis.

Second,

the practice manifests the FBI"s strong sense of professional

rivalry, resulting during important criminal investigations in

a desire not to assist local police departments, investigative

reporters' or any other interested parties.

During the assassination investigation, the FBI received

editorial criticism concerningthe "lone role" it had assumed

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181

vis a vis major metropolitan police departments.

In fact, the Bureau did not totally exclude local

authorities fromthe case.

Their assistance was solicited

on a number of matters, including comparison of Ray's description

182

of those of suspects in local offenses, use of local latent finger-

183

184

print files, display of Ray's photos to witnesses in unsolved crimes

and use of local police department investigative files and

--7=-4.-

185

photographs.

Nevertheless, the contacts

with local police departments were

made at arms length, and at no time do the files reflect consideration

of the potential for employing a "task force" approach that might

been beneficial in areas peculiarly within the expertise of local

authorities.

The situation was one in which gains were weighed

against potential losses. To the extent that the FBI chose to

conceal the nature of its investigation even from local police

departments, it insured that no leak would result that could

compromise its fugitive investigation. At the same time, however,

the "one-way streets" established by the FBI throughout the

country precluded the possibility of a closeknit? working relation-

ship with local authorities on

matters peculiarly within their ex-

pertise.

(B) ASSISTANCE IN THE TENNESSEE MURDER PROSECUTION

Perhaps the best example of the caution with which the

FBI approached local authorities is found in its relationship with

the Shelby County officials responsible for investigating and

prosecuting James Earl Ray. Federal jurisdiction to investigate

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DI. King's assassination was premised on the possible existence of

a conspiracy to violate, or interfere with, his civil rights.

(18 U.S.C. $ 241). Simultaneously, local authorities in Tennessee

were proceeding with a murder investigation carried out by the

Memphis Police Department and scheduled for prosecution by

the office of Mr. Phil Canale, District Attorney General for

Shelby County, Tennessee. Because of the limited geographical

jurisdiction of the Memphis authorities, and the relative simplicity

of their facilities, the FBI's nationwide investigatory aparatus

and sophisticated scientific laboratories were of enormous potential

value to Shelby County authorities. It is, therefore not surprising

that relations between the two offices were harmonious.

Within hours of the assassination, Inspector Zachery, Chief

of the Homicide Bureau at the Memphis Police Department, released

all available physical evidence to the FBI for analysis in

Washington.

The evidence remained in the custody of the FBI, either

in Washington or Memphis, for almost exactly one month, and

was used during much of this time for comparison purposes to

further the FBI's on-going, fugitive investigation.

However, despite the apparent harmony in relations between feder-

al and Tennessee authorities, and the initial cooperation of the

-Memphis Police Department in supplying the FBI with all physical

evidence, it is nevertheless apparent that the FBI approached its

relationship with this local police department with pronounced

caution. When the FBI's Memphis Field Office was approached by local

authorities on April 18, 1968 with a request for assistance during

Canale's upcoming grand jury proceedings to indict Eric Galt for

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murder, FBI headquarters, concerned perhaps over leaks in

the fugitive investigation, informed its field office to limit

information released to the local police department and pro-

secutors to that which had already appeared in a public press

release. Two weeks later, SAC Jensen received Bureau authorization

to testify in the local grand jury proceedings; however he also

received detailed instructions limiting the permissible areas

of testimony to various laboratory tests used to limit evidence

to the fugitive and to identify James Earl Ray.

After the May 7th grand jury proceedings, no additional in-

formation was released to the Shelby county authorities, on a formal

basis, until after Ray's arrest over a month later; then, after

the case was solved and the fugitive located, a copy of the

187,

"prosecution summary report" prepared by the Memphis Field Office

was released to the local authorities in preparing for trial.

Ultimately, prosecutors in Memphis had access to most of the

investigative files in the case. Nevertheless, the limited distri-

bution that had occurred during the on-going investigation remains

an excellent example of the extent to which the FBI guards the

substance of its on-going cases.

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=

PROTECTING THE BUREAU'S IMAGE

As was noted prevously, FBI files reflect a constant preoccu-

pation with situations

which threatened to "embarass" the Bureau,

or otherwise jeopardize the agency's public image. This tendency

is perhaps nowhere more apparent that in the FBI's reluctance,

even during an on-going and challenging criminal investigation,

to pursue leads which might associate the Bureau with "anti-FBI"

or otherwise controversial individuals. Some examples follow:

(A) KENT COURTNEY

Shortly after Ray's guilty plea in Memphis, Tennessee on

March 10, 1968, Kent Courtney, a New Orleans conservative spokesman

and editor of the Conservative Journal, was contacted by Jerry Rayi

brother of the convicted assassin. Jerry Ray asked Courtney to

meet with him in New Orleans to discuss a new attorney to handle

his brother's appeal; Jerry also told Courtney that a conspiracy

189

existed, and that James did not act alone.

Courtney immediately contacted the local office of the FBI,

seeking "advise as to whether he should meet with Ray or not!.

He was

told to refer his inquiries to Phil Canale, the State

prosecutor. Informed of these events, FBI headquarters checked

their indices, found information indicating Courtney had opposed

the nomination of Abe Fortas to the Supreme Court and was "a rabble :

rouser and hate monger"

, and concluded - consistent with the action

already taken by its field office - that "the Bureau should in

no way, either by implication or direct action, be associated with

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this individual."

New Orleans was accordingly instructed

191

"not (to) have any contact with Courtney".

Instuctions were sent to Memphis to conduct a field interview

with Jerry Ray. Nevertheless, because of Courtney's character,

as reflected in the Bureau's files, the possibility of exploring

Jerry Ray's claimed knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy

through the publisher, or with his cooperation, was foreclosed.

This was, of course, at a time when the FBI's conspiracy investiga-

192

tion was still open.

The FBI's investigation of members of Ray's family will be

explored in greater detail later in this report; however, it

should be noted here that the Bureau was unsuccessful in its attempt

to interview Jerry Ray on this new information; on the advise of

193

J. B. Stoner, his brother's attorney, Jerry Ray refused to talk.

(B) LOUIS LOMAX

A situation similar in many regards to that of Courtney

developed much earlier in the investigation in the Bureau's

relationship with investigative reporter Louis Lomax.

Lomax was an investigative reporter operating out of Los

Angeles and writing for the North American News Alliance at the

time of the assassination. Within weeks after the assassination,

Lomax developed a relationship with Charles Stein, Jr.,

Ray's

driving partner during a mysterious, trip to New Orleans in

194

December 1967, and began writing stories containing references

to. Ray's receipt of a pay-off from a New Orleans industrialist

and other intriguing conspiracy possibilities.

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Lomax and Stein also drove to Houston, Texas in an effort to

recreate the first portion of the New Orleans trip, and to locate

a telephone booth used by Ray.

FBI files reflect a substantial and time-consuming effort by

Bureau field offices to monitor Lomax's investigative activities,

and to keep abreast of the results of his efforts, through inter-

views with Charles Stein, Stein's California relatives, and confi-

dential Bureau sources in a variety of locations including a

195

Houston radio station, The Houston Chronicle, the Pacific Telephone

Company, the Sultan Room in Los Angeles, and the Rabbit's Foot

Lounge in Los Angeles. In addition, extensive memos were written

200 .

by headquarters personnel. Two such memos, authored on April 30th

201

and. May 'Ith, analyzed Lomax' news articles and defended the product

of the Bureau's official investigation against Lomax's criticism.

A third, remarkable memo written on May 2, 1968, (and including

as an attachment Lomax's rap sheet), deals with Lomax himself and

his past, anti-Bureau activites, and concludes that Lomax is "no

good, ... has repeatedly proven his antagonism toward the FBI, ...

(and is using) his articles regarding the King case as a vehicle

202. .

to get back in 'big time' television"

• These memos, written by FBI

headquarters personnel during the busiest weeks of the MURKIN

investigation, are revealing examples of the Bureau's preoccupa-

tion with its image and its enemies. In addition, thefiles reflect,

from

zobe beginning, a conscious decision to avoid contact with

Lomax, with no apparent consideration given to a field interview,

or a grand jury subpoena, to obtain information he claimed to have

developed on the King investigation.

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(C) JIM GARRISON

Underlying the Lomax memos discussed above is a clear concern

that a private investigative reporter would break the case before

the nation's largest and most famous investigative agency.

This

fear was also visible in the Bureau's relationship with Jim

Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney and critic of the Bureau's

"lone assassin" theory in the Kennedy assassination, during the

MURKIN investigation.

On April 12, 1968, headquarters received notice that "a repre-

sentative of the District attorney, New Orelans, Louisiana" had

requested an interview with Walter Bailey, owner of the Lorraine

Motel in Memphis, Tennessee. No reason for the interview request

was given, and it was noted that "based on the information

available, it is not knownwhether District Attorney Garrison is

making an attempt to tie the killing of King in with his investiga-

tion. into the assassination of President Kennedy or whether some

ulterior motive exists"

_Nevertheless, two days following the indica-

tion of interest by Garrison's office, Alex Rosen, Assistant

• Director of the General Investigative Divison, contacted. the New

Orleans FBI field office telephonically, instructing the agents

to be "most circumspect in its investigation in view of the inter-

est of DA Garrison in this case," and directing that there be "no

2:05

wholesale showing of photographs in New Orleans." Three days later,

in one example of compliance with these instructions, a decision

was made, with the approval of Clem McGowan, head of the Civil Rights

Section, not to interview one:. Orlena Miller in the MURKIN case

"as Miller was a very close friend of Jim Garrison' 3.9,6

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Another, more prolonged example of the Bureau's reluctance to

pursue leads associated in any

manner with Garrison appears in May,

=

1968 in a series of communications between Washington and Denver,

Oklahoma City, Little Rock, Arkansas and Los Angeles, concerning

the appropriate manner to pursue a lead on Ray's location involving

one Edgar Eugene Bradley. Bradley, who was then involved in

fighting extradition to New Orleans in connection with Garrison's

Kennedy assassination prosecution, was alleged to have been in

recent contact with Ray in Tulsa, Oklahoma. On May 28, 1968,

207

after several earlier memos pertaining the matter, headquarters

directed Los Angeles not to interview Bardley. Reasons given

included the mental condition of the original source of the Bradley

lead and Bradley's involvement in the "extradition matter by New

Orleans District Attorney James Garrison."' Rather, despite the

pressing

fugitive investigation, the less direct and more time-

consuming investigative approach of accounting for Bradley's

whereabouts on date he is alleged to have talked to the source was

chosen.

Two days later, Bradley learned of the Bureau's field

investigation into his past whereabouts and contacted the Los

Angeles FBI office, offering his assistance. This in turn prompted

a thorough analysis by Los Angeles of the potential embarassment

to the Bureau threatened by different investigative approaches,

and a request on June 7, 1968, for headquarters authority to

accept Bradley's offer of assistance; the request was withdrawn

three days later after Ray had been arrested in London.

In retrospect, this Committee is in possession of no information

that would indicate that curtailment of the MURKIN investigation

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to avoid association with Garrison jeopardized the ultimate

results of the investigation; however, it is also noted that

the perspective of hindsight was

unavailable to agents during the

investigation itself.

(D) IN SEARCH OF FAVORABLE PRESS

Just as the FBI avoided individuals who posed a threat to

their public image, so they courted members of the press and

authors who could be counted on to provide favorable coverage

of the Bureau's activities. Files were maintained on the

writings and editorial positions of correspondents and newspapers,

and letters of appreciation under Hoover's signature were sent

209

to acknowledge specific favorable articles. In addition, press

officials with whom the Bureau maintained particularly cordial re-

lations were placed on a "Special Correspondent List".

Also exemplified during the MURKIN investigation was the

FBI's practice of assisting friendly authors in preparing articles

or books covering the FBI investigation. One article scheduled

' for the August, 1968 edition of Reader's Digest, which described'

the FBI's successful fugitive investigation in highly flattering

terms, was submitted to the Bureau's Crime Records Division

220 - £05

"review and any changes (the

FBI) desired made" prior to publication.

The manuscript was reviewed in its entirety, and small changes,

including the insertion of two additional references to the par-

ticipation of Director Hoover and Associate Director Tolson, were

made.

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The day following Ray's guilty plea, Assistant to the Director

. Cartha DeLoach proposed a second "cooperative effort", with a

"friendly, capable author", to produce a "carefully written,

factual book" on the investigation. Deloach noted that "while

it will not dispel or put down future rumors, it would certainly

help to have a book of this nature on college and high school

217/

library shelves so that the future would be protected. "" In response

to an inquiry by Associate Director Clyde Tolson, DeLoach suggested

either the Reader's Digest or Author Gerold Frank, noting "Frank

is already working on a book on the Ray case and has asked the

Bureau's cooperation in the preparation of the book on a number

of occasions." Deloach added, "we have nothing derogatory on

212/

him in our files, and our relationship with him has been excellent.

On March 12, 1969, Hoover approved DeLoach's two-part recommen-

dation. Nevertheless, one week later, in response to a second

.. memorandum directed to Thomas Bishop, Assistant Director of the Crime

Records Division, by a member of his division, and recommending

"cooperation with The Reader's Digest and (author) Jim Bishop

on his book,. Hoover apparently reverses his position, noting

"I think we should wait and see what move Ray makes to re-open

his case. "213/

In an interview with HSCA staff, Assistant Director Bishop

stated that the Bureau ultimately did not cooperate with any

author on the King case, offering as a reason Hoover's concern that

the resulting publicity would jeopardize the government's ability

214/

to uphold Ray's conviction on appeal. In addition, no further

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evidence of active cooperation with any author was found in FBI

files. On the:other hand, it is also clear that portions of Frank's 1971

book, An American Death, bear striking similarities to the FBI

reports covering the same subject matter. It seems quite likely,

therefore, that the author had access to FBI documents through

some source prior to the preparation of his'book. Frank refused

to disclose his sources during an interview with HSCA staff 275/

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VI

INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGY

A variety of investigative techniques were available to

the Department of Justice and its investigative arm - the

Federal Bureau of Investigation -- during the assassination

investigation. Some, such as field interviews, record checks,

informant coverage, laboratory analysis of physical evidence,

and undercover surveillance -- all capable of being implemented

by the FBI and its agents

acting on their own -- were used

extensively during the investigation.

To this extent, the investigation presents an excellent

case study in traditional FBI police work. Other investigative

methods, specifically those which would have required active

coordination with, and participation of, Department of Justice

attorneys, such as search warrants, electronic surveillance,

immunity grants and the grand jury, are conspicuously absent. In

the following pages, an attempt will be made to understand this

situation, and to determine whether it reflects a deficiency in

the investigation:

(A)

GRAND JURY

In 1968, the early involvement of Department of Justice

attorneys in the FBI's criminal investigations was comparatively

care. 216

Traditional roles of the two bodies were clearly defined,

with the Bureau responsible for the "investigation" of the case

and the attorneys, once presented with a complete investigative

Nw 55126 peerage? lostal for the prosecution.

In part, this practice

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reflected FBI re

stance in any departmenta

efforts to oversee or

intrude upon the investigative process. In part, it reflected the

reluctance of attorneys to become involved in work outside of the

court room.

Perhaps the best example generally of cooperation between

attorneys and agents in the investigative process is in the use

of a grand jury.

Reluctant or adverse witnesses are summoned before

a group of lay jurors and, in a confidential proceedings, asked

to provide evidence on a specified matter. Grand jury subpoenas

can be issued for records, as well as for testimony, and witnesses

refusing to answer questions on Fifth Amendment grounds can be

compelled to testify through the employment of a grant of immunity.

The grand jury has been particularly effective historically in

official corruption, organized crime and major criminal conspiracy

cases... crimes in which the evidence, either because of the

reluctance and fear of the witnesses, or the inherent secrecy of

the criminal act, are difficult to crack through ordinary field

interviews, laboratory analysis and a search for the crucial eye

witness.

A review of the FBI and Justice Department files reflects only

one instance prior to Ray's plea in which the Bureau and the Depart-

ment considered, as an investigative alternative, empanelling a

217/

federal grand jury to secure the testimony of a witness.

In late

August, 1968, William Bradford Huie, an author who wrote both

magazine articles and a book, (He Slew the Dreamer), centered around

the assassination, interviewed Harvey and Clara Klingeman, former

employers of James Earl Ray, while doing research for his

writings. During the interview, Huie indicated that he had

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entered

into a contract with James Earl Ray and Arthur Hanes, Sr.,

Ray's attorney, to fund the defense through his writing. Huie showed

the Klingemans pieces of paper with Ray's handwriting on it, and

gave the Klingeman's details of a vague conspiracy to kill King

218/

in which Ray was only an unwitting dupe.

On August 24th, the FBI

began internal consideration of means to secure Huie's evidence,

including

"seizure" of the author's notes, (through use of a

search warrant or a grand jury subpoena), or the taking of Huie's

testimony in a grand jury. Three days later the matter was raised

with D. Robert Owen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the

219/

Civil Rights Division, and federal prosecutors initiated what turned

out to be a lengthy and ultimately inconclusive consideration of

the Bureau's alternative proposals.

Meanwhile, the Birmingham Field Office was contacted, apparently

coincidentally, by Huie himself, and received a rather extraordinary

offer from the author.

Huie stated that he was in "constant contact"

with Ray through the defendant's attorney, although he had been

denied personal access to the prisoner by the trial judge, Preston

Battle. The author offered to turn over to the FBI on a confidential

basis all information received from the defendant both' in the past

and in the future, (including "names of cities, states, places,

maps and individuals contacted by Ray, as well as activities from the

date of his escape from prison to his apprehension in England"),

if he could be given "current, non-publicized photographs of Ray

of character type" and

was afforded personal access to the prisoner.

220/

Huie then requested that the interview be kept confidential:

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FBI officials conveyed this new information to the Justice Depart-

ment on September 10, 1968, along with a request for permission to

inform Mr. Phil M. Canale, JI., State Attorney General, of Huie's

evidence, and a request that the Department "give consideration

to the urgency of making a determination as to the course of action

it desires to follow in this matter", in light of the upcoming

221/

November 12, 1968 trial date in Memphis. The Birmingham Field

Office was advised not to bargain with Huie, and to keep headquarters

informed of any further approaches by the author.

Within the Department's Civil Rights Divison, which was ulti-

mately responsible for any federal conspiracy prosecution, and

therefore most keenly interested in the evidence possibly in Huie's

possession, a lengthy memorandum of law was drawn up exploring

practical and legal problems inherent in the use of the search warrant

or the grand jury subpoena. Despite the Bureau's request that

the Department also consider taking oral testimony from Huie

before, a grand jury, the memo reflects no consideration of this

alternative. Clearly - and justifiably - concerned over possible

damage to the state and potential federal prosecutions that would

222/

result from an invalid search warrant, Pollak ultimately

recommended cautious use of a

search warrant "under tight, specifically

defined procedures" including requesting Huie's unconditioned

cooperation prior to use of the warrant. Pollak's memorandum was

223/

transmitted to the Attorney General, and the FBI was asked to

postpone any disclosure of information to the local prosecutors until

224/

a decision was reached by the Department.

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On October 4, 1968, five weeks after the matter was first sub-

mitted to the Department, the Bureau sent another memorandum to

AAG Pollak, reminding him that Canale had not yet been informed of

Huie's evidence and asking for a decision concerning the possible

employment of the search warrant or grand jury subpoena. No

response of any type was giver, however, until November 7, 1968,

when, after circulation of Huie's first Look Magazine article, the

Department asked the Bureau to investigate certain leads suggerted

by the article.

The same procedure was followed a week later, fol-

227/

lowing release of fuie's second, Look magazine article.

Then, on November 27, 1968, three months to the day after the

intital FBI request, a short memo is sent to the FBI:

This responds to an inquiry from your Bureau.

We have no present plans to obtain a search warrant or

issue a subpoena in order to obtain the notes and letters

in the possession of William Bradford Huie, allegedly

received by him from James Earl Ray through Attorney

Arthur Hanes 228/

No mention was made of the possibility of securing Mr. Huie's •

oral testimony before a grand jury, and no steps were taken by

federal prosecutors then, or at any later time, to secure that

229/ •

testimony. In February, 1969, prior to Ray's plea, Huie was

called before a local grand jury in Shelby County conducted by

District Attorney General Canale to secure testimony concerning

a variety of matters, including the possibility of co-conspirators

in the. Tennessee murder case. •

Beyond this one instance, the FBI never formally proposed the

use of a grand jury during their assassination investigation.

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Different explanations for this situation were given by various

members of the FBI's headquarters staff. during their interviews

with HSCA staff. Alex Rosen, Assistant Director of the General

Investigative Division, noted that the Bureau traditionally

resorted to the grand jury only after all other investigative

methods had failed. Since active leads existed until Ray's

arrest, the grand jury was unnecessary. In addition, Rosen

raised the possibility that an active field investigation and a

simultaneous grand jury investigation could wind up on different

tangents, and expressed

some concern over the premature publicity

of confidential information which might result from involvement

230/

of a local U.S. Attorney in a grand jury proceedings.

Additional reasons

given by FBI headquarters personnel for

the absence of a grand

jury investigation included a general feeling

that people were cooperating during field interviews, neither

231/

withholding information, nor giving false information; the

Bureau's customary practice of not bringing the prosecutor into

the

232/

case until the matter was ripe for indictment; a concern about

233/

• the tenuous jurisdiction supporting the FBI's investigation;

a skepticism about the value of this investigative approach, con-

sidering the probability that a prospective target would either

234/

perjure himself or assert the Fifth Amendment; a fear over loss

of control of the investigation that would result from the parti-

235/

cipation of Department attorneys; and a feeling that the FBI's

field investigation had solved the case, making a grand jury un-

236/

necessary.

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Department of Justice, officials interviewed

by the Committee were, in many cases, no more impressed with the

potential value of the grand jury in the assassination investigation

than were their FBI counterparts. Assistant Attorney Gernal Vinson

of the Criminal Division noted that the grand jury is, comparatively,

an inefficient and laborious means of investigation, and stated

that every effort should be made to run out the "leg investigation"

before resorting to this approach!

Steven Pollak, Assistant

Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division, stated that the grand

jury was not used in investigations where individuals were cooperat-

ing, and described the

use of grand jury in civil rights investi-

gations as "relatively rare". To the best of Mr. Pollak's re-

collection, the use of a grand jury in the assassination investi-

gation never became an issue.

Attorney General Clark similarly had no recollection of

consideration of a grand jury in the investigation; in addition.

he was emphatic in his belief that it could not have furthered the

investigation!

"A grand jury would have no conceivable utility

in the investigation of this case and one in

Birminghạm, (referring to the federal complaint

tale on conspiracy co interere an, baring eric s.

civil rights..)

It would be hard put to ada to

out ability to solve the matter. "239/

In part, Mr. Clark's skepticism concerning the productivity

of a grand jury investigation is explained by a strong philosophical

and practical opposition to the use of a grant of immunity to compel

the testimony of witnesses asserting their privilege against self-

Incrimination under the Fifth Amendment:

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"I have, you know, very strong feelings that the

Fifth Amendment relates fundamentally to the

integrity of the individual. I think that--this

would nowadays offend some people but this is what

Christ was talking about when Pilate asked him

whether he was the king of the Jews, and he said

"Thou sayest it."

am not going to bend by knee.

You can't compel me.

I am a human being; I have

my rights....I think it is coersive, it is distortive,

the abuses that you see under it far exceed the

benefits that you derive from it, but finally, in

a society devoted to freedom and dignity, it is not

the way to determine facts." 240/

Using his own words, Mr. Clark saw the grand jury generally

241/

speaking "as a shield, not a sword", in existence solely to

protect the individual

from unwarranted charges of criminal conduct,

and

not as a means of supplementing the criminal investigative

process.

Against this background, and considering the general tension

that existed between the FBI and the Department, the desire of

the Bureau to control the investigation, and the general concern

for security during Ray's fugitive period, it is perhaps not

surprising to observe the absence of consideration of

grand jury

work reflected by the files during the first crucial months of the

assassination investigation. Numerous situations arose, however,

in which it could well have been of use. These included instances

of uncooperative witnesses, such as Charles Stein in Los Angeles,

who refused to provide the Bureau with the names of several of

Ray's associates he and investigative reporter Louis Lomax claimed

• 242/

to have located during their private investigation;

several of

243/

Ray's inmate associates, all potentially capable of providing in-

formation on the mysterious "Cooley Organization" at Missouri

State Prison; or the individual considered by the FBI as

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the "most likely suspect" in a search for the person responsible

for the transmission of a false C.B. Broadcast in Memphis thirty

minutes after King's assassination, and who denied making the

244/

broadcast in his FBI interview."

Similarly, a grand jury might have been used to some advantage

in tracing the possible involvement of Ray's brothers, John and

245/

Jerry Ray; or in resolving blatant conflicts of testimony between

the source of a conspiratorial allegation, and the parties

246/

implicated by that allegation; or in the investigation of leads

pertaining to members of hate-type organizations, such as the

National States Rights Party, The White Knights of the Kü Klux Klan

or the Minutemen, individuals who could normally not be relied

upon to. be totally candid or cooperative in interviews with agents

• of the FBI.

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(B.) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

At the time of DI. King's assassination; the FBI was required

to submit all proposed "non-consensual" electronic surveillance -

either by "wiretap", (i.e. electrical connection attached to tele-

phone wires) or "bug", ( a concealed listening device used to pick

up conversations in the immediate vincinityl, to the Attorney

General for his approval prior to installation. "Consensual"

electronic surveillance, (for example through a transmitter worn

on the body of an undercover agent during a conversation with the

suspect although clearly legal under. decided case law, was

monitored by the Justice Department and approved, prior to use,

247/

by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. Because of these

authorization procedures, electronic surveillance was another

tool requiring coordination between Justice Department attorneys

and FBI investigators during the investigative process.

After assuming the position of Acting Attorney General in

1966, Ramsey Clark devoted much of his time to procedures for

monitoring and minimizing the FBI's use of electronic surveillance.

A quarterly reporting system was established requiring the FBI to

submit :to the Attorney General a "list of all taps installed, all

taps taken off, all taps pending at the begining of the period and

in place at the end of the perioa." In addition, Mr. Clark made

it clear in personal discussions with Mr. Hoover that he "did

249/

not approve of wiretapping except in the national security area,

and that their use would be limited "very severely" even in that

250/

area.

The Committee's file review reflects only very limited

consideration, and no actual use, of non-consensual electronic

surveillance, (I.e, wiretap of bug), during the FBI's assassination

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of activity resulted in large part from Mr. Clark's known opposition

to non-consensual electronic surveillance as an investigative tool

except in the area of national security. In addition, it also

undoubtedly reflected the limits placed on the use of electronic

surveillance by the Supreme Court in the decisions of Berger

V.

State of New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

Despite those obstactes, on May 9th, 1968 the FBI, clearly

concerned about their inability to locate the illusive Mr. Ray,

initiated internal consideration of "technical" surveillance (i.e.

wiretap) and "microphone" surveillance (i.e. bug) against John

Larry Ray, Carol Pepper (Ray's sister) and the Grapevine Tavern,

251/

a business jointly owned and operated by the two relatives.

Apparently trying to fit the request into Attorney General Clark's

"national security" preference, the justification used on the

May 13, 1968

authorization request transmitted to the Justice

Department reads as follows;

"These installations could assist in the early

apprehension of the subject, which could possibly

be instrumental in reducing the stresses and tension

place antin tone sensity unguent to the 52/

There are several, significant

aspects to this

électronic surveillance request. First, while DI. King's

assassination triggered immediate, nationwide rioting in April of

1968,

it is clear that these disturbances had widely subsided by

the second week in May the time period of the FBI's request for

electronic surveillance; thus, it seems fair to characterize the

"national: security" justification as insubstantial.

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In addition, however, it is clear that the requested

electronic surveillance, if installed, would almost certainly

have been judged illegal under 1968 constitutional standards.

The purpose, stated explicitely in FBI memoranda discussing the pro-

posal, was

to surveil the family in hopes of catching the fugitive,

and not to gather evidence. of the commission of a crime by Carol

Pepper or John Larry Ray. Moreover, as to Carol Pepper at least,

there was no significant evidence in FBI files to indicate

her involvement in any criminal activity - even harboring.

•Absent a clear threat to national security, or probable cause as

to the commission of a crime that might have justified an effort

to secure a judicial warrant, no basis existed for the implementation

of this surveillance. Moreover, it is clear that the FBI recognized

their difficulties, for in an internal memorandum analyzing the

legality of the proposed surveillance, the conclusion was reached

thạt the proposed installation "is unconstitutional as to the Peppers"

"and that "they have at least a theoretical cause of action for

damages against those who have installed the devices by trespass. "253/

• The willingness of the FBI to proceed with this investigative approach

in the face of their own recognition of its unconstitutional nature,

reflects an absence of concern for the rights of the surveillance

targets.

Finally, the FBI's proposal is a clear indication either of

the Bureau's failure to seriously consider the possibility of

conspiratorial involvement by members of Ray's family, or of its

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reckless disregard for the damage that this investigative approach

could have done to any later prosecution of Ray's brothers.

Assuming, as the Bureau apparently did, the illegality of the proposed

electronic surveillance, any evidence of conspiracy intercepted by

the tap would have been inadmissible against individuals with

standing to contest that illegality; in addition, the installation

of an illegal tap or bug would have raised significant "taint"

problems, and seriously jeopardized the ability to use any subsequentl

developed evidence in a later conspiracy prosecution, 354/

The problems that could have been created by the FBI'S

proposal never materialized. While Attorney General Clark

has no recollection of receiving of acting on the request,

it seems clear from the files, and from various interviews,

that the proposal, although

sent, was neither authorized nor

2.55/

implemented.

Harold F. Dobson, MURKIN case agent in the St.

Louis Field Office, (responsible for the areas of proposed

electronic surveillance), authorized no electronic sur-

veillance in the MURKIN investigation, and stated specifically

that there were no surreptitious entries into the Ray family.

256/

residences or the Grapevine; in addition, a review of the

St. Louis Field Office files, and of the Headquarters

MURKIN files, produces no evidence of the implementation of

the proposed electronic surveillance.

in a June Ilth,

257/

1968 memorandum to Attorney General Clark, Director Hoover

withdrew the May 13th request for electronic surveillance

in light of Ray's apprehension in London....

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Earlter in this section, it was noted that 1967 Supreme

Court decisions severely limited the use of electronic sur-

veillance in criminal investigations. This situation changed

on June 19, 1968 with the passage of Title III of the Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, an act that per-

mitted the

use of court-authorized electronic surveillance by

law enforcement officers in the investigation of certain

enumerated crimes,

Including murder. Despite the potential for

imaginitive Investigative efforts offered by the act, FBI files

reflect no further attempts to Implement electronic surveillance

as part of the assassination investigation.

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VII

JAMES EARL, RAY - THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF INFORMATION

The evidence against James Earl Ray at the time of his

arrest on June 8, 1968 constituted a strong, albeit circum-

stantial case. A confession would have strengthened the

government's position; however, it was certainly not essential

to the prosecution.

On the other hand, information which Ray might possess on

the separate question of conspiracy would have been, (and remains),

potentially invaluable. It is therefore important to determine

both the adequacy, and the legality, of the steps taken by the

Department of Justice and the FBI in pursuing this source of

information.

(A.) POST-ARREST INTERVIEW

At the time of his arrest, Ray was placed in the custody •

of Scotland Yard, and was unavailable for interview until aftei

his arraignment on June 10, 1968?58

A formal FBI request to

interview Ray was lodged with the "British Attorney General",

who decided as of. June 24, 1968 that the request would not be

conveyed

to the "Governer of Prisons" until after Ray's extra-

dition. 259 Wilbur Martindale, a Unit Chief in the Civil

Rights section who was in London at this point because of

his knowledge of the case and his potential value in inter-

viewing Ray, was sent back to the United States260 and the

Bureau, along with the Department of Justice, began to consider

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• -78-

-

the feasibility of interviewing Ray during his trip back from

Iondon to the United States.

On July 11, 1968, the possibility of such an interview

diminished somewhat when Arthur Hanes, Sr. wrote Attorney General

Clark requesting that his client "not be interviewed, or interro-

gated by any member of the Justice Department, unless done in

(his) presence;" in addition, Hanes asked that he be able to

accompany his client on the trip to the United States "if

extradited? 62

Concerned that the presence of an attorney during

263

transportation of a witness would provide a "bad precedent," in

addition to posing other potential problems, Attorney General

Clark and Director Hoover decided to deny Hanes! requèst to

264

accompany his client, and on the following date Assistant Attorney

General Vinson, who had been appointed by Clark to oversee the

London extradition proceedings, formally "recommended" to the

Director that "no effort be made to interrogate Ray on his re-

turn trip to the United States." The recommendation was based

on Vinson's "grave doubts" that the prosecution could demonstrate

a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights by Ray-

regardless of the actual facts - considering Hanes' earlier

request and the "added factor that, on his trip back, Ray will

: 26.5

be in restraining devices on a military aircraft," Vinson did

note, however, that "this does not mean that statements volunteer-

266,

ed by Ray may not be used under some circumstances."

Following

up

on this possibility, Wilbur Martindale was assigned as one of

foux FBI agents who would accompany Ray on the return trip.

Ray did not speak, eat or drink, during the flight home, however,

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and was even reluctant to take aspirin provided by an accompany-

ing military physician after he complained of not feel-

ing well.

Thus, no inculpatory or otherwise valuable in-

formation was received from Ray during the trip.

(B.) THE FBI AND RAY PRIOR TO THE GUILTY PLEA: ATTORNEY/CLIENT

PRIVILEGE PROBLEMS

Efforts to interview Ray ceased with his return to

Tennessee, and it was not until after the guilty plea in March

of 1969 that renewed consideration was given to a direct approach

268

of the defendant.

Nevertheless, FBI files reflect, almost from the

moment of Ray's arrival, an insatiable curiosity concerning the

prisoner's activities, vistors, thoughts and communications.

At times, the curiosity was harmless. At times, however, it

reflected a

disregard

for the prisoner's attorneyl

client relationship

and for his right to privacy during the

preparation of his defense.

Prior to his return to the United States,

Ray retained

Arthur Hanes, SI.

to represent him in the Tennessee murder trial.

Hanes was Ray's primary attorney until November 10th, 1968, when

Ray fired him and brought in Percy Foreman.

On September 18th, 1968, Hanes filed a motion before trial

Judge Preston Battle seeking to modify various aspects of his

client's conditions of confinement. During the evidentiary

hearing held on September 30th, 1968 to determine the facts

underlying the motion, testimony was taken on various subjects,

including the methods used to monitor Ray's mail; Captain Billie

J. Smith of the Shelby County Sheriff's Department stated that

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Ray's general mail was read and censored, but then assured the

Court that written material passing between Ray and his attorney

was perused for security purposes only, and was not read to

269

determine the contents. Following the hearing, Judge Battle

memorialized this procedure in the form of a judicial order,

and in a teletype sent from the FBI's Memphis Field Office to

Washington, the essence of the court's ruling was conveyed as

follows:

Judge Battle ruled that written notes

exchanged between Ray and his attorney

are privileged. However, the Shelby

County Sheriff or his designated agent

has the authority to peruse these notes

to determine if there is any attempt to

breach security of the jail. These notes

should not be perused for the purpose of

ascertaining the full contents of the

message. (Emphasis added) . 270.

Despite this

indication of clear understanding of Judge

Battle's order, however, the need of the Memphis FBI Office to

monitior Ray's activities apparently proved overpowering. With-

in the month following the order, no less then three letters from

Ray to his attorney, Arthur Hanes, were intercepted at the prison,

zeroxed, passed to the FBI's Memphis Field Office and transmitted

271•

to FBI Headquarters in Washington, In addition, on one occasion,

the covering memorandum sent to Washington directed the reader's

attention to particularly interesting parts of the letter:

"Of significance, Ray in his letter to Hanes.

requests that Mr. Hule not

.9o to any of

the addresses in Miami until after the trial.

In this connection, Ray also states that

part of the story just covers

a few days any-

how and is not too important.! 272

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Robert Jensen, SAC of the Memphis Office, conceded in

interviews and executive session testimony that his signature

or initials were on memos transmitting two of the three memos,

and speculated, (although he could not recall definitely),

274.

that the source of the letters was the Shelby County Sheriff.

Jensen felt that the letters were "volunteered" to him, rather

275

than being solicited by the Bureau; he had no recollections of

informing the state prosecutor or defense counsel of his receipt

of the letters, did not consider the possibility that receipt.

of privileged information might taint the prosecution, and

• explained the situation as follows:

"Where the U.S. Government or the FBI Or

the Justice Department has an interest in

' a matter and I am volunteered information

relative the matter, Iam afraid that I

would accept it, and I think this is what

happened in this case.

This

was not, it should be noted, the only example of mail

interception found in the FBI files, which also contained

279

correspondence between Ray and J.B. Stoner, Trial Judge Preston

28.0

281

282,

283

Battle, Jerry Ray, William Bradford Huie, and Mrs. Carol Pepper.

Moreover, it was not the only time in which the conduct of the

Memphis Office intruded upon the privacy of the defense camp.

On August 6, 1968, a Memphis FBI informant received information

from a defense investigator, Renfro Hays, concerning Hanes'

planned defense strategy. In conveying the information to

Washington, Memphis added the following caveat: "Above for

Bureau's information only and is not being disseminated to local

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authorities lest we be accused of interferring with client

284

dash attorney relationship".

And on August 26, 1968, after

receiving copies of a map drawn by Ray of his Missouri State

Prison escape and of questions sent to Ray by author William

Bradford Huie, the Memphis Field Office noted that "since

there is some question that this information may be privi-

leged, it is not being disseminated and will not be put in a

report. "285

However, in view of the inherent confidentiality of

communications between a defendant and his attorney, a

privilege which was not created, but only reinforced, by

Judge Battle's order of

September 30, 1968, the knowing

involvement of FBI's Memphis Office in the receipt and

transmission of Ray's letters to Hanes stands out as both

illegal and potentially injurious to subsequent prosecutions.

On October 31st, one month after Judge Battle's order,

FBI Headquarters, using a carefully-worded directive initialed

by Clyde Tolson, Cartha Deloach, Alex Rosen and others,

instructed the Memphis Office as

follows:

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In view of the above order of W. Preston

Battle, (referring to Sept. 30, 1968

order, you should not accept any written

communication from the Sheriff regarding

correspondence between Ray and other in-

dividuals. If it is not in violation of

the court order you may accept information

from the Sheriff if he volunteers this

information and it is on an oral basis only 286,

With the receipt of this directive the Bureau's practice

of receiving zeroxed copies of Ray's correspondence apparently

ceased.

There is no evidence in files reviewed by the Committee.

that knowledge of the operation, or of information found in the

intercepted mail, spread beyond the Memphis Field Office and FBI

Headquarters in Washington.

287,

(C.) POST - GUILTY PLEA INTERVIEW: MIRANDA PROBLEMS

Immediately following Ray's guilty plea

on March 10, 1969,

at the initiative of Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard

of the Civil Rights Division, (who had replaced Stephen Pollak

with the change in presidential administrations in January of

1969), consideration of various approaches to Ray began.

Alternatives considered included an immediate interview, an

interview at some later date, and testimony under oath before

.288.

a federal grand jury. The action was being taken in light

of President Nixon's reported plan "to take the position in a

future press conference that the Federal Government was continuing

to give intensive interest to the possibility of the existence

• 289.

of a conspiracy."

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An immediate decision was made, following a discussion

between Leonard, Rosen' and Martindale, to clear an interview

290

of Ray with the appropriate people and by March lath, the Memphis

Field Office had contacted Canale, Ray's attorney-of-record

:

Percy Foreman, and Harry Avery, Commisioner of the Tennessee

Department of Corrections. Foreman, after an informative

discussion with the Houston FBI Office concerning his relation-

ship with his client and various statements Ray had made about

the case, approved the interview of his client in his absence.

Neither Canale nor Avery interposed any objections.

The interview itself was conducted by Robert Jensen, SAC

of the Memphis Office. Authority for the FBI to conduct the

interview on their own was given by D. Robert Owen, Deputy

Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division, and in

a recent interview with Committee staff Owen recalled no con-

sideration of the possibility of having a Department attorney

present during the interview. Director Hoover gave specific

instructions that results of the interview be given first to

him prior to dissemination to the Department.

Jensen's interview with Ray lasted fifty minutes, and

covered a variety of topics - including Ray's dissatisfaction

with his attorneys, his plans to reopen his case, Charles

Stephens, Charles Stein, "the FBI" (a I.V. show), fingerprints.

on the rifle and Inspector Butler of Scotland Yard. Ray provided

no evidence supporting the possibility of a conspiracy.?95

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Ray was not accompanied by an attorney during the interview;

nor was he informed specifically of his right to have a lawyer

present; his right to terminate the interview at will; his right

to remain silent; or the government's ability to use his state-

ments against him at a later date, (i.e. Miranda rights) : In

an interview with Committee staff, SAC Jensen confirmed that he

did not advise Ray formally of his Miranda rights, explaining

that surrounding circumstances, including Ray's extensive

criminal record, indicated that he was aware of his rights with-

out formal notification.

Moreover, Jensen stated that the

interview was not a hostile one, that he had called the guard

to terminate the interview when Ray stated he wished to leave,

and that he changed the subject matter of the interview when

296

Ray refused to continue along a specific line. Accepting, for

the moment, the accuracy of Mr. Jensen's recollections, the

fact remains that this interview of Ray was the first offical

effort to gain information on the possibility of conspiracy from

the self-confessed triggerman. The ability to use any statements

Ray may have given, in a subsequent trial of the prisoner on

conspiracy charges, would depend on being able to survive a

motion to suppress the statements that would automatically be

filed by any defense counsel, certainly not a foregone conclusion

In light of the failure of this experienced FBI agent to observe

routine interview procedures through the administration of

Miranda rights prior to questioning.

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A second effort was made to Interyiew Ray the following

day and Ray refused. With the interylew approach comparatively

unproductive, consideration turned to the possiblity of com-

pelling Ray's testimony before a grand jury. Assistant Attorney

General Leonard recalls extensive consideration of this possibility

within his Division, and feels that his proposal met fairly stiff

297

internal opposition; he does not recall whether any of this

opposition emanated from the FBI, and is not certain which

specific attorneys objected to this course. Neither former

298

Attorney General John Mitchell nor D. Robert Owen, Leonard's

299

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, recalls active consideration

of the grand jury alternative immediately following Ray's plea.

(D. L OFFICIAL APPROACHES OF JAMES EARI RAY IN 1970 AND 1976

In September of 1970, Assistant Attorney General Leonard

asked Mr. K. William O'Connor, Chief of the Criminal Section of

the Civil Rights Division, to "review the file" on the

assassination case, and bring him up to date, Shortly thereafter,

a meeting was

held between O"Conner and Bernard Fenster-

wald, Ray's attorney, and Ray was offered an opportunity to appear

voluntarily before a federal grand jury to provide whatever

evidence he possessed on the conspiracy issue. Fensterwald

recalls at least the "intimation" that the Department would make

efforts to get the sentence against Ray reversed and to secure

301

a new identity for him through the witness protection program,

if his client cooperated and provided useful information. O'Connor

does not recall the specifics of the offer he conveyed, but is

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certain Fensterwald received the impression that the Department

would attempt to better Ray's situation if he provided valuable

302

information.

Ray rejected the offer, explaining to Fensterwald

that he did not believe he could say enough to satisfy the

• Department and stating that in testifying he would be signing

his death warrant.

After Ray's decision not to cooperate in 1970, no further

efforts were made either by the F.B.I. or the Department of

Justice to talk to Ray until 1976, when the Department, as

part of an internal review of the FBI's MURKIN investigation

and Security and COINTELPRO operations against King, attempted

to conduct an interview. Ray refused to meet with members of

303..

the review force.

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-

VIII

THE CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATION

(A)

THE FINDINGS

The ultimate conclusion of the federal assassination investi-

gation performed by the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation was that James Earl Ray, acting alone, killed Martin

Luther King, JI. Moreover, during the extensive interviews conducted

by the Committee on the subject of the MURKIN investigation, no

dissent from this conclusion has been voiced.

Director Hoover's views on the issue of conspiracy are clearly

stated in a memorandum which he wrote on June 20, 1968 summarizing

a discussion with Attorney General Clark. At one point during this

conversation, Hoover told the Attorney General that "in Ray's case,

we have not found a single angle that would indicate a conspiracy."

Later in the discussion, he added his personal opinion that "he (Ray)

acted entirely alone", but then assured the Attorney General that

"we are not closing our minds that other might be associated with

him and we have to run down every lead"r

In a recent interview with Committee staff, Attorney General

Clark indicated his agreement with these investigative findings,

and added that the Bureau was probably more inclined to view the

1305/

assassination in conspiratorial terms than he was. It was Mr. Clark's

instinctive feeling that DI. King's death resulted from the act of

an eccentric racist loner, and that Ray's reference to a "brother"

during the rifle exchange in Birmingham the week before the assassi-

nation - the remark which was to provide the factual basis for a

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federal conspiracy complaint filed in that city approximately two

weeks after the assassination - was merely an excuse created by the

assassin on the spur of the moment, rather than sound evidence of

conspiracy.

Additional evidence of the Department's agreement with the

results of the FBI's investigation is found in a August 20, 1968

memorandum from AAG Fred Vinson, Jr. of the Criminal Division, to

the Deputy Chief of the organized Crime and racketeering Section 306/

in which he writes that:

"while we weren't prepared to announce publicly

that we had proved a negative, I was personally

satisfied that a thorough job had been done of

running out all leads with respect to any con-

nection Ray might have with any sort of conspiracy

and that we had come up with nothing.

I told

i ca tea that.

him that, to the contrary, our information in-

dicated that Ray was a loner, a shy, reticent

person who didn't even have many acquantances,

and that we were pretty well satisfied that he

had no independent source of finances."

Moreover, the opinions of Mr: Clark, Mr. Vinson

and Mr. Hoover described above represent the consensus

of opinion of those FBI supervisory personnel and Justice Department

officials who participated in the assassination investigation and

who were interviewed on

the subject by the staff of the Committee.

(B) • THE INVESTIGATION

It would not be correct to conclude, based on the ultimate

finding of "no conspiracy"

reached by the investigators, and the

lawyers who supervised the original investigation, that a conspiracy

investigation was not conducted. In fact, FBI investigative files

reflect, almost from the moment of the assassination, a conciousness

within the Bureau of the possibility of conspiracy surrounding the

crime. During the first two weeks of the investigation, the primary

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focus was clearly directed toward ascertaining the true identity of

the individual who dropped the bundle of evidence and the 30.06 rifle

while fleeing the crime scene. However, even during this initial

period, directives from Washington were phrased in terms of identi-

fying the "person of persons responsible for the assassination of

3077

Martin Luther King, JI., " Temphasis added), and it is apparent that

investigators were, even at this early date, sensitive to circum-

stances which suggested the possibility of conspiracy.

Perhaps the best example of the FBI's general awareness of,

and willingness to consider, a conspiracy angle in the assassination

investigation is found in an "All-Sac" Teletype issued on April 26,

308/

1968, three weeks after DI. King's assassination. Two days earlier,

headquarters had completed a review of the main Bureau file on

Martin Luther King, (ironically created during the security investi-

gation of the civil rights leader), and had identified and documented

: 309%

approximately fifty prior threats on Dr. King's life.

These threats

were set out in investigative leads and transmitted to the appropriate

field office for resolution. Accompanying the leads, in the April

26th teletype noted above, were the following instructions:

"The main file on King has been reviewed at the

Bureau and leads are being sent out concerning

persons involved in prior threats against King.

These leads as well as leads concerning any other

suspects developed from any source must be given

Immediate and thorough handling on a top priority

basis. Process has been obtained against James

Earl Ray and extensive investigation is continuing

to locate Ray and to establish motive of crime.

You have been and will be furnished information

relating to other possible conspirators.

These

must all be thoroughly resolved no matter how

remote.

• (emphasis added) 3107

The truest indication of the FBI's overall sensitivity to the

conspiracy possibility, however, comes after Ray's arrest on June 8th.

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While cost data

icates a significant ovei

1 reduction in Bureau

expenditures at approximately the time of Ray's arrest, FBI files

still reflect a limited number of additional, conspiracy-oriented

investigative leads. The major, post-arrest focusjian attempt to

determine the source of Ray's funds through an intensive re-investi-

gation of the July, 1967 Alton Bank robbery, certainly stemmed

almost entirely from the Bureau's awareness that Ray's extensive

expenditures during fourteen months of freedom strongly suggested

the possibility of association with as-yet-unidentified individuals.

In addition to the funding concern, files reflect efforts over

the months following Ray's arrest to (1) identify possible criminal

associates through a recheck of the New Rebel Motel in Memphis; and

of motels, hotels and rooming houses in Birmingham" for the time

• 3I1/

period of the rifle purchase, (2) to investigate the possiblity,that a

Louisiana State Policeman was, in fact, the mysterious "Raoul"; (3). and

to interview Ray himself on the issue of conspiracy. Thus, while

officials in both the Justice Department and the FBI were rapidly

reaching a unanimous "no-conspiracy" conclusion, this did not prevent

at least a limited amount of conspiracyroriented field investigation

even following Ray's arrest.

Despite these efforts, however, the Committee's review of both

the evidence within the FBI files indicating specific conspiratorial

possibilities, and of the investigative techniques employed by the

Bureau and the Department of Justice in resolving these leads, has

not disclosed a basis for confidence in the official conclusion

that responsibility for Dr. King's death does not extend beyond the

triggerman, In fact, the Committee's review has revealed serious

defects in both the focus, and the method, of the overall conspiracy

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investigation.

First, conspiracy leads were, at times, resolved solely through

establishing a potential co-conspirator's alibi during the period of

March 29, 1968 to April 4, 1968 designated

as the "pertinent period"

For purposes of the assassination investigations!,

The inadequacy of

this method

is demonstrated by the FBI's own investigation, which

had almost immediately, produced substantial evidence that Ray's

plan to kill DI. King began to take form while he was still a resident

of California, i.e. prior to March 17, 1968. Moreover, the general

notion that a conspiracy suspect can be eliminated by establishing

his absence from the scenes of the crime and at one major eyest act

(the rifle purchase), reflects a simplistic view of the law of

conspiracy. In 1968, as now, a conspiracy prosecution required only

an agreement and one subsequent overt act by any of the parties in

furtherance of that agreement. Proximity to the scene of the crime,

while clearly a relevant and significant investigative concern, was

not, in a conspiracy investigation, the ultimate issue.

Second, FBI files reflect only limited efforts, independent of

a specific lead, to investigate the possible involvement of those

hate-type organizations, (such as the White Knight of the Ku Klux

Klan or the Minutemen). which had demonstrated both a propensity

for violence, and a clear antagonism toward Dr. King. A general

canvassing of "ali racial, criminal and security informants" occured

at various stages during the investigation reyond this general

directive, however, the Bureau's investigation of possible hate-

group involvement was

both limited and unimaginative.

For example, even after the Bureau had received evidence of a

possible link between the United Klans of America. and Ray in the

for of Ray's immediate selection of Arthur Hanes, Sr., (an attorney

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who had done extei

ive legal work for the Kl

, and in later

informant information indicating the possibility that the United

Klans of America might become involved in the funding of Ray's

315/

defense, no concerted effort was made to pursue the conspiratorial

implications of this information. Additional steps which might have

been considered include a check of Bureau hate-group indices against

Ray's known and potential associates, and the compulsion of sworn

testimony of appropriate Klan officials through the use of a grand

jury subpoena, and the judicious use of immuity grants.

Third, FBI and Department of Justice files reflect almost

total reliance on the field interview as a means of resolving issues

clearly relevant to the overall conspiracy investigation. • At-

no time

was a grand jury utilized to supplement the FBI's field

investigation of the numerous conspiracy allegations, despite

situations where it would clearly have been appropriate. The circum-

stances surrounding Ray's escape from Missouri State Prison, for example.

considered by some to be the first step in an elaborate, year-long

conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King, was

never investigated through

the grand

jury. Similarly, a possible association between Ray and

a " Missouri State Prison inmate association named the "Cooley

Organization" was left essentially unresolved after extensive field

interviews with MSP inmates and former inmate-associates of Ray

confirmed the existence of the group, but "(failed) to ascertain

information concerning its principles or membership or the extent of

its

316/

network"; the

use of a grand jury to explore this issue -a

logical step following the unsuccessful interview process - was

apparently never considered.

Additional examples of conspiratorial allegations or issues

appropriate for grand jury treatment included the false C.B. broadcast

NIN

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in Memphis ½ hour fter the assassination,

by some as an

317,

effort to divert police attention from the flight of the true assassin;

and allegations received by one John McFerren that the owners of a

Memphis produce company had been involved in directing and funding

318/

the assassination. In both situations, however, the Bureau and

the Justice Department were satisfied to resolve the issues solely

through field investigation.

Of far

greater potential significance :than any of the defects

noted to this point, however, was the almost inexplicable failure

of the FBI and the Justice Department to focus a concerted effort

on Ray's family, and specifically his brothers, during the conspiracy

investigation. Absent any extrinsic evidence, family members of

the suspected triggerman deserved at least some investigative

attention. Given the significant amount of direct and circumstantial

evidence received by the FBI during the months following the assassi-

nation that. strongly suggested a great deal more contact among the

three brothers than any was willing to admit - the failure to pur-

sue this area more

aggressively constitutes a serious defect in the

overall investigative effort.

The single most

signficant piece of evidence raising. the

possibility of participation by a brother in the assassination came

during early interviews by the FBI of clerks at the Aeromarine

Supply Company, in Birmingham. During such an interview, Donald

wood told agents that Ray, while exchanging rifles on March 30,

1968, five days before the assassination, explained that he had

decided to return the

initial rifle, and replace it with a more--

• 319/

powerful weapon, after a conversation with his brother. This state-

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ment was, of cou

, later used as the fact

basis for a federal

conspiracy complaint charging Ray, (then known as Eric Galt) and

"an individual

whom

he alleged to be his brother" with a violation

1320/1

of 18 U.S.C. $241. In addition to this incident, however, the FBI

received additional evidence which over the weeks and months to

follow created an ever stronger possibility of family knowledge of,

and involvement in, circumstances surrounding the assassination of

DI. King. Examples follow:

On August 4th, 1967, Ray told a female acquaintance in

Canada that he had been in Grey Rocks ( a resort north of Montreal)

for about one week and that he would be leaving within the next few

1321)

days to meet his brother in Montreal." Three weeks later, Ray told

the same acquaintance that he was currently working with a brother

in real estate,,

and that he had no problem with money and could

1322/1

always get some.

In December of 1967, immediately before his departure on an

abrupt and never adequately explained trip te New Orleans, Ray told Dis

Freeman, a psychologist, that his brothes lad found a job for hima

in the Merchant Marine based in that city?" "In early January of

1968, shortly after his return from this trip, Ray made a $364

payment for dance lessons and told a Los Angeles dance instructor

3241

that he had recently met his brother in Hquisianal

On March 2, 1968, fifteen days before his departure from

California and approximately one month before the assassination,

Ray stated during a discussion at graduation ceremonies at a Los

Angeles bartending school that he would be visiting his brother

in Birmingham

about two weeks.

325/-

On March 9, 1968, Ray turned down an offer of employment

from the president of the same bartending school, explaining that

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326/

he was leaving

n

within two weeks to vis=t his brother. Approxi-

mately three weeks later, of course, Ray mentioned a conversation

with his brother while exchanging his rifle at the Aeromaine Supply

Company in Birmingham.

In and of itself, the coincidence of numerous references by

Ray to a brother during the time period surrounding three important

pre-assassination transactions - the New Orleans trip; Ray's de-

parture from California to take up residence in Atlanta, Di. King's

home town; and the Birmingham rifle purchase - presented a strong

basis for directing a major investigative effort toward the family.

Moreover,

this was not the extent of the eyidence available to

the Burean and the Justice Departments

In his first interview with FBI agents, John Larry Ray,

younger brother, exhibited strong signs or racism when he belittled

the crime. with which Ray was charged, ("all he has done is kill a

1327/

nigger "Iyand stated that there would be no interest in ray if

*328/

King had been white," Moreover, the strong likelihood of John

Larry Ray's involvement in Ray's escape from Missouri State Prison

had been established by the end of April when a review of prison

records indicated a visit to the prison by the brother on April

22, 1967, the day before the escape. 79/

Similar indications of racism were manifested by Ray's

second brother, Jerry Ray, particularly in his close association

with J.B, Stoner, head of the virulently anti-Black National States

Rights Party, following Ray's London arrest. In addition, infor-

mation received by the FBI around the time of Ray's arrest reflected.

statements by Jerry that his brother was to receive. at least

$100,000 for killing Martin Luther King, and that the purchase of

the Mustang and use of the safe deposit box in Birmingham were

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linked to a cons

tracy.

Moreover,

it was clear almost from the beginning of the

Bureau's investigation of Ray that both brothers were lying to the

interviewing agents concerning contact with James Earl during the

recent past. John Ray's claim during his initial interview that

he hadn't seen his brother in three years was undermined by MSP

records indicating his visit to the prison the day before Ray's

1967 escape. And Jerry's similar denial of contact with his brother

was contradicted by information received by the Bureau shortly before Ray's

331/

arrest, as well as by admissions of James himself to author william Bradford

Huie, that he had given a red Plymouth automobile to Jerry in Chicago in lat

August of 1967, and had called. Jerry while enroute to. New. Orleans in December: of 196

In addition to undermining Jerry's official denials of

contact with James during the pre-assassination period, Ray's story

to Huie also provided a final, major piece of evidence in the

growing case against the brothers. In two. Look magazine articles

published in November of 1968, four months before the guilty plea,

large portions of Ray's story to William Bradford Huie, including

the first detailed version of his early association with "Raoul",

appeared for the public to examine. Following the plea, the entire

"Raoul" story, from the first meeting in Canada to the alleged

gun-running operation in Memphis on the day of King's assassination,

333/

was published in Huie's book, He Slew the Dreamer. A comparison

of the "brother allusions" by Ray in Canada, California and

Birmingham, with Ray's own Raoul story revealed remarkable coin-

cidences.

For example, Ray's known reference to a planned meeting with

a brother in Montreal coincided with his alleged meetings with

Raoul in that city; Ray's known references to a brother both be-

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December New Orleans tr

coincided with his

claim that he met Raoul in New Orleans to receive money and discuss

future criminal activities. And Ray's known references to his

brother immediately prior to his move to Atlanta, and during the

rifle purchase, coincided with his claimed receipt of instructions

from

Raoul to come east and to purchase a display weapon for the

gun-running negotiations.

Thus, within a relatively short period after Dr. King's

assassination the FBI had collected evidence of numerous references

-

by Ray to a brother during crucial moments in his pre-assassination

activities, of strong

signs of racism in both John and Jerry Ray,

of probable involvement by John in the Missouri State Prison escape,

of claimed knowledge by Jerry of an assassination conspiracy and a

prospective. $100,000 pay-off, and of striking coincidences between

Ray's own story of Raoul, and the independent evidence of association

with his "brother". Clearly this evidence warranted a major and

concerted effort by both the FBI and the Civil Rights Division of

the Justice Department to determine both the extent and the nature

of Ray's actual pre-assassination contact with his brothers.

In.

fact, however, no such concerted effort was made.

This is not meant to indicate that the Bureau ignored the

family, or the brothers, during their investigation. 'As has been

indicated previously, an intense effort was made to secure assist-

ance and information from the various family members during the

1334/

pre-arrest fugitive investigation, and during this period the bro-

thers were interviewed on numerous occasions concerning knowledge

of the suspect's location. In fact, at one point the Bureau's

preoccupation with the fugitive investigation became so great that

a recommendation was made for the use of patently illegal elec-

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tronic surveill

ce on John. Larry Ray and

rol Pepper in an

335/

effort to locate the subject. Had such a tactic been implemented,

any subseguent conspiracy case against family members could have

been seriously jeopardized. Nevertheless, with the exception of com

parisons of the fingerprints and palm prints of the two brothers

with unidentified latents in the case; an effort to verify Jerry

Ray's alibi for April 4, 1968; and the posing of some questions

during the above-noted field interviews arguably connected to a

conspiracy investigation; investigative files reflect no signi-

ficant efforts to determine the extent of their criminal involve-

ment with James.

No effort was made, for example, to determine whether the

1967-68 travels of either brother coincided with those of Ray's

companion, Raoul. Such an effort might have included motel and

airline canvasses under Ray brother aliases and employment verifi-

cation for appropriate periods.

Similarly, no effort was made, other than through direct

questioning of the brothers, themselves, to establish the alibis of

either Jerry or John during the time of the rifle purchase, and

John's alibi went unchecked even for the day of Dr. King's assassi-

nation. Ironically, the Bureau covered this ground routinely

with other conspiracy suspects.

Further, Jerry Ray's statements concerning a conspiracy ir

June of 1968, and again in March of 1169 during a discussion with

Kent Courtney, a "conservative spokesman" in New Orleans, were

never adequately pursued. Despite a strong indication by Jerry in

the latter situation that he would discuss the

"conspiracy" with

1338/

Courtney during a meeting on March 20, 1969,

and Courtney's

339V

apparent willingness to cooperate with the Bureau,

*no

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consideration w

given to the use of cons

sual electronic surveil-

lance to record Jerry's discussion with Courtney. Rather, a

decision was made - based on Courtney's suspect reputation and a

fear of Bureau embarrassment - to pursue a field interview with

Jerry Ray instead.

when Jerry was ultimately located, however 34I/

he refused the interview, and thereafter, Bureau efforts ceased.

Finally, the files reveal no efforts to investigate the

brothers through interviews with their associates. Given the

criminal nature of many of John's associates, this might well have

required the use of a grand jury, and immunity grants, investigative tools which

might have been useful in the additional areas of John's probable

involvement in the MSP escape, and his possible participation in

the Alton Bank robbery in July of 1967. Some of this grand jury and inmunity work

could have been accomplished, it is noted, without violating a

Justice Department policy against compelling testimony of a family

member, or facing the issue of immunity with either of the brothers.

As at all other times during the investigation, however, the grand

jury and immunity approach was never utilized.

• NW 55126 DocId: 32989758

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IX.

HOOVER, COINTELPRO AND THE ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION

Not suprisingly, the adversary relationship which had existed

for so long between the FBI and Martin Luther King, JI. did not

terminate with the assassination of the civil rights leader. To

cite only one example..,FBI files reflect Bureau plans in March

of 1969 to brief Congressmen in an effort to defeat the proposed

creation of a national holiday in recognition of Dr. King's

birthday. The cointerintelligence operation was approved by

Hoover, who noted at the same time that it must be handled "very

342/

cautiously"

Despite

this continued animosity, however, the general feel-

ing of the Justice Department and FBI officials interviewed on

the subject was

that Hoover's hatred of King, and the Bureau's

extended involvement in security investigations and COINTELPRO

activities against the man and his organization, had the ironic

effect, (although perhaps predictable, in light of the Bureau's

noted preoccupation with public image), of increasing the

intensity of the investigative effort after the assassination. The

following is an excerpt of testimony given by Ramsey Clark:

•+-.

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Mr. Clark, given the dislike which Mr. Hoover

felt toward Dr. King and communicated to you

in lurches and other occasions, and given

• the

...FBI...electronic surveillance and taps in

the early '60's, and the continued interest

in DI. King in the form of reguests to you for

additional electronic surveillance as recently

as April the 2nd, only two days prior to this

assassination, did it ever occur to you that

the FBI...would not be in a position to

objectively carry out the

responsibilities of

the investigation itself? -

A. I don't believe it did...I had the strongest,

clearest conviction that the FBI would do every-

thing in its power to investigate this case

quickly, effectively and successfully, and it

wasn't just logic. It was, I mean, my total

being told me. that the thing Mr. Hoover really

loved most, the Bureau, was on the line here,

and that if they couldn't produce here where

many would suspect their concern, that their

failure would do more damage to them in the

minds of the people than any other case they

had worked on. 343/

Similar

satiments were expressed by FBI unit Chief wilbur

$345

Martindale, AAG Vinson of the Criminal Division, and AAG Pollak

11346/

of the Civil Rights Division.

In an attempt to determine how great the potential

problem was, the Committee, early in its investigation,

identified FBI personnel who were involved in some significant

manner in either the pre-assassination COINTELPRO and security

inyestigations:

against Dr. King;or the post-assassination, MURKIN

investigation. Not surprisingly,a comparision of the two lists

revealed some overlap in personnel both at Headquarters and in

the field. Beneath Hoover and Tolson, Assistant to the Direct

Cartha Deloach had overall supervisory responsiblity for the

operations of both the Domestic Intelligence Division (Security

and COINTELPRO cases) and the General Investigative Division

(MURKIN investigation), and was therefore equally involved in

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both. In the field, the most significant overlap was in Atlanta,

where Alan Sentinella, "case

agent" for the King Security case

(5/21/65 - 6/5/68), and the SCIC Security case (4/26/66 - 3/12/712,

was also assigned initially as case agent for the MURKIN

investigation in that city.

In light of Sentinella's assignment, it is clear that no

official effort was madeeither by the Bureau, or the Department

of Justice, to formally preclude the involvement in the assassi-

nation investigation of agents with backgrounds in the King

Security or COINTELPRO operations. (The absence of such an effort

was "also confirmed in HSCA interviews). Sentinella's assignment

as Atlanta MURKIN case agent lasted only for the month

of April, however; thereafter, the responsibilities of the

position were assumed by S/A Robert Perry. Moreover, during

much of the period prior to Ray's positive identification on

April 19, 1968, the operations in Atlanta's office were directed

by an Inspector from Washingtion - Joseph Sullivan - an agent

with extensive experience in major civil rights cases.

In addition, Sentinella's temporary assignment as "case

agent" - while central because of its function in coordinating,

monitoring and reporting on the investigations; did not

carry command responsibilities.

Thus, while the evidence

shows the use of an agent with an extensive background

• in King COINTELPRO and Security work as case agent in Atlanta's

MURKIN investion there is no additional evidence that the field office.

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investigation was curtailed or restricted as a result of the

assignment.

When questioned concerning this general

situation, Attorney

General Clark recalled no concern about a widespread or

debilitating prejudice against King within the ranks of the FBI

that would have effected the day-to-day investigation:

"I guess I assumed that the agents who were

doing any work that related to DI. King

were just acting in the ordinary course of

their employment...My sense of the distortion,

if there was one or was to be one, was that it

came from the top, which was often the case be-

cause Mr.

and that •

would have been less than the prejudice of the

that the prejudi thin

Hoover had been so dominant so long,

the prejudice in individual agents

Director toward Dr. King, but that once they

saw, as I believed, him making this his first

priority investigativewise, they would?! too, 347!

At headquarters the effect that Hoover's hatred for king

had on his personal involvement in the investigation is difficult

to gauge from files alone, Nevextheless, certain patterns are clea

Hoover received information on the progress of the case primarily

through daily internal FBI memos and briefings with Rosen,

DeLoach and Tolson, His scribbled comments on various in-

vestigative memoranda indicate: closest attention to those details

of the investigation

that; reflected on the conduct of his agents

1349/

or a image of the Bureau. A deep-seated distrust of the press,

and his displeasure with agents who broke the "no comment" rule,

also appear on numerous occasions:

April 18, 1968: "I want 'no comment' strictly

adhered to. We have plenty to still do in this

case and no time to engage in chatter with the

responsible press which is already printin

alot of 'hog-wash'

in emphasis in original

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- 105 ÷

April 27, 1968: "Tell Jensen to stop talking."

(emphasis in original) 351/

April 29, 1968: " We must adhere to 'no comment'.

The avid press

will be concocting all kinds of

stories and if we start answering them we

are 'sunk'.

The press release is all we have to

say at this time."_352/

4, 1968: " I must insist that we stop giving

off the cuff comments re Ray case." (emphasis in

original) 353/

On at least one occasion, Hoover rejected an investigative

proposal, apparently because the source of the information, to

be pursued had, in 1947, called Hoover an "SOg 354/ Nevertheless, as

a general rule, the files reflect neither positive additions

355/

nor restrictions by Hoover on the scope of the investigation.

He maintained, apparently, relatively close contact with

investigative developments, (Assistant Director Alex Rosen

described his primary function in the assassination investigation

as keeping the Director informedf, and clearly developed his

personal theory on the evidence of the case, specifically

that

was a "racist and detested Negroes and Martin Luther

King", but that he was not a fanatic in the sense of Sirhan

Sirhan. Moreover, while Hoover believed that "Ray acted entirely

along," he assured Ramsey Clark on June 20, 1968 that "we are

not closing our minds that others might be associated with him

358/

and we have to run down ever lead."-

These assurances were

then passed on to his chief lieutenants

in the MURKIN investiga-'.

tions in the form of a written memorandum to Tolson, DeLoach

and Rosen, among others.

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Thus, while there were serious problems with the FBI's

assassination investigation both in its failure to pursue

significant conspiracy possibilities and in a disregard for

the constitutional rights of both citizens and the defendant,

James Earl Ray, there is no current evidence that these

specific deficiencies, or any others were directly or indirectly

caused by the Bureau's well-documented hatred for DI. Ring and

his movement.

NW 55126 DocId: 32989758

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## Page 114

FOOTNOTES

1.

FBI Functional Organizational Chart, HSCA Document Number

200.072.

3.

HSCA Interview with Robert Jensen, June 20, 1978, HSCA Document

Number 190108.

HSCA Interview with Clem McGowan, June 13, 1978, p.2, HSCA

Document Number 220469.

4. HSCA Interview with Ed McDonough, June 14, 1978, P.2, HSCA

Document Number 220368.

5.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Unit concentrated primarily on

complaints of discrimination in housing, education and

employ-

ment; the Civil Rights Unit.. on the other hand, investigated

alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. $241 (conspiracy to interfere

with constitutional rights of an individual - the statute used

as a basis for the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's assassin-

ation) as well as election law violations and involuntary

servitude and white slavery cases.

6.

HSCA Interview with Wilbur Martindale, June 15, 1978, p.2

HSCA Document Number 220471.

7. IBID. at p. 5.

8. See note

3; See e.g., HSCA Interview with James R. Malley,

June 14, 1978, p.2, HSCA Document Number 220470.

9. IBID.

10. IBID.

11. See note 1.

12.

HSCA Interview with Alex Rosen, June 28, 1978, p.1, HSCA

Document Number 210237.

13. IBID. at p. 2.

14. IBID, at p. 1.

15.

IBID. at p. ?, Mr. Rosen's current recollection is somewhat in-

consistent with the substance of FBI investigations files, which

reflect substantial

Headquarters involvement in the investigation

from the beginning.

16.

HSCA Interview with James R. Malley, June 14, 1978, p.2 , HSCA

Document Number 220470.

NW 55126

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## Page 115

-IT.

IBID at p.2

18.

HSCA Interview with Cartha DeLoach, June 26, 1978, p.I, HSCA

Document Number 230174.

19.

HSCA Executive Session Testimony Of Robert Jensen, July 12, 1978,

p. 14.

20.

IBID. at pp. 14-15.

21.

22.

See, note 18 at p. 2.

HSCA Interview with Ramsey Clark, June 21, 1978, p.2, HSCA

Document Number 220473.

23.

HSCA Interview with Stephen Pollak, June 29, 1978, p.2, HSCA

Document Number 250279.

24.

DOJ Memorandum from Pollak to Director, FBI; April 4, 1968;

FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, serial 44-38861-109.

25 a

Teletype, Director to ALISACS, April 7, 1968. FBI Headguarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-153.

26.

See, e.g., FBI Letterhead Memorandum, April 5, 1968, Captioned

"Murder Martin Luther King, JI." HSCA Document Number 220330.

27°

Memo, McGowan to Rosen, April 4, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-327.

28.

Pres, reLeas 44-08661-169. 1968, FBI leadquarters MURKIN

29 .

see note 22..

30. IBID.

31. See, note 2.

32.

See, note 18 at p. 2.

33€

See, note 22 at p.4.

34,

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 6, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-329.

35.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 5, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-177.

36г

37.

see, note 34.

Teletype, Director to All Continental Offices, April 8, 1968,

FBI Headquarters MURKIN files, Serial 44-38861-158.

38.

Teletype, Director to All Continental Offices, April 8, 1968,

FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-224.

NW 55126

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## Page 116

=.:39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53 g

54 e

55.

56 г

57.

58.

59..

60.

61.

Memo, Ros

MURKIN Fi

to DeLoach, April 12, 1960,

FBI Headquarters

Serial 44-38861-1113.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 9, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1174.

See, note 2 at p:3.

HSCA Interview with Richard E. Long, June 2, 1978, p.2,

HSCA Document Number 260327.

See, note 25.

See, note 3 at pp.3-4.

IBID. at p.3.

See, note 4.

IBID ate pali see, e.g., note 16.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 10, 1968, FBI Headquarters,

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1180.

IBID.

See, note 37.

Teletype, Director to All Continental Offices, April 10, 1968,

FBI Headquarters, MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-191; See,

e. g.

note 37 for similar record check of the "Willard" name.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 13, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1348.

See, note. 39.

See, note 52.

IBID.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 16, 1978, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1704.

IBID.

IBID.

Memo, Rosen to Deloach, April 17, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1706.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 18, 1968, FBI Headguarters.

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1367.

Memo, T.E, Bishop to DeLoach, April 17, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1705.

NW 55126 DocId: 32989758 Page 116

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## Page 117

62.

63.

64.

65.

Teletype, D.

ector to ALL SACs, April

MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-1271.

1968, FBI Headquarters

Memo, C.L. Trotter to Mohr,

September 2, 1969, FBI Headguarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5818.

IBID.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71g

72,

73 .

74.

75.

76..

77 g

78.

potential suspects identified at 1740.)

While some outside commentators have expressed concern over

the amount of time necessary to identify Ray through his

prints, the Committee's investigation has revealed no prob-

lems in the Bureau's procedures.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 19, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4046.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 19, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1727.

See, e.g.r Teletype, Director to ALISACs, April 19, 1968,

FBI Headquarters, MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1396.

KEN one a rtl-19381968, F eadquarters

Memo, Jones to Bishop, April 25, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2584.

see:

;e.9., Teletype, Director to ALLSACs, April 27, 1968,

FBI Miami Field Office, MURKIN file, Serial 44-1854-614.

Airtel, SAC Chicago to Director, April 19, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1316.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 23, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2406.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 10, 1968, FBI Headguarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3362.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 9, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3435.

Teletype, Director to SAC, Kansas City, May 13, 1968, FBI

Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3369.

Seen esg.r Memo,

Branigan to Sullivan, June 14, 1968,

FBI

Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4682; Airtel,

Director to SAC Kansas City,

June 20, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4653.

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79.

See, e.g.r

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach,

April

22, 1968, p.9, FBI

Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1812, Memo, Rosen to

DeLoach, April 24, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial

44-38861-2148.

80 .

81.

82.

Memo, Rosen. to DeLoach, April 26, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2207.

See, e.g., Teletype, Los Angeles to Director, April 25, 1968,

FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2190; Memo,

Rosen to DeLoach, April 30, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-2598.

Memo. Rosen to DeLoach, April 22, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1812.

83.

Teletype, Director to all SACs, April 23, 1968, FBI Miami

Field Office MURKIN file, Serial 44-1854-206.

84. Teletype, Director to All SACs, April 29, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2443.

85.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 3, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

• file, Serial 44-38861-3123.

86.

Airtel, Director to SACs Atlanta, Birmingham and Memphis,

May 6, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2989.

87.

Teletype, Director to All SACs, May 14, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3495.

88.

Airtel, Director to SAC's Atlanta, Birmingham, Los Angeles,

Memphis, New Orleans, May 21, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-3806.

89.

20.

91.

92.

93.

94.

Memorandum, Rosen to Deloach

May 25, 1968, FBI:

Headquarters MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-4353; See

Teletype, Director to sAc springfield, June 1, 1968, i°

Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-432

(direction

to "completely exhaust" every avenue of investigation on

Alton, Illinois Bank Robbery; Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, July

29, 1968, FBI Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5079.

Teletype, Director to All SAC's, April 22, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1658.

• see,

e.9., Teletype, Director to All SAC's, April 24, 1968,

FBI Miami MURKIN file, Serial 44-1854-273.

See, c.g.. FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2344,

summarizing investigation of Atlanta Field Office.

Teletype

Detroit to Director, April 25, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN

File, Serial #4438861-2350.

Teletype, Director to SAC St. Louis, April 30, 1968, FBI

Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-249-

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la-.

95.

96.

97.

98.

99.

100 .

101.

102.

103.

104.

Teletype,

ector to SAC's Chicago,

ssas City, St. Louis,.

Springfield, May 1, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-2622.

Teletype, SAC St. Louis to Director, May 7, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3146.

Memo,

Director, FBI to Attorney General, May 13, 1968, FBI

Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3509.

Memo, Director to Attorney General, June 11, 1968, captioned

"Electronic Surveillance", FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-non recorded serial.

FBI Interview with John Larry Ray, May 9, 1968, by SA Patrick

W. Fradley, St. Louis Field Office MURKIN file, Serial 44-775.

_e. g., Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 10, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3510.

IBID.

Correspondence, Director to Ottawa Legat, May 11, 1968, FBI

Memphis Field Office MURKIN file, Serial 44-19872-76.

IBID.

May 21, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-383

105.

Teletype, Director to SAC Boston, May 14, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters

• MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3514.

106.

Correspondence, Director to All SAC's, May 21, 1968, FBI

Miami Field Office MURKIN file, Serial 44-1854-604.

107.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 22, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4552.

108.

Teletype, Director to SAC's Birmingham, Chicago, Kansas City,.

Los Angeles, Newark, May 22, 1968, FBI Headquarters Murkin

file, Serial 44-38861-3872.

109.

Teletype, Director to Memphis,_6/5/68, FBI Headquarter's

,MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-4262.

110. Airtel, Legat, Paris to Director, June 13,

1968; FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, Serial #44-38861-4725.

111.

See.

quarters MURKIN file, Serials 44-38861-4444, 44-38861-4933,

44-38861-5471.

112.

Memo, DeLoach to Tolson, June 8, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-4447.

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## Page 120

1I3.

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

119.

120.

121.

122.

123 a

124 g

125.

126 ₽

127 g

128 .

129 :

Memo, Rosen

McGowan, June 10, 1968, BI Headquarters, MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-4379:

See, note 112.

Transportation of federal prisoners is normally a job which

falls within the responsbility of the United States Marshall

Service.

The use of FBI agents to transport Ray resulted

in bad

feelings within the USMS, and a feeling that the FBI

had infringed on another agency's jurisdiction.

see, e.g.,

memo, DeLoach to Tolson, July 26, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4970.

Memo to Tolson, DeLoach, Rosen, Bishop, Sullivan, June 20, 1968

FBI Headquarters MRUKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4660.

See, e.g., Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, July 29, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters

• MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5079.

See note 78 - Airtel, Director to SAC, Kansas City, June

20, 1968.

Memo,

Rosen to DeLoach, June 24, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial: 44-38861-4779.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, June 11, 1968, FBI MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-440

Memo, Director to Pollak, June 13, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4419.

Memo Attors wee ale Direct 44-516 -8611968, EBI

Memo, Director to Attorney General, July 23, 1968, FBI

Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5003. •

Memo, Fred M, Vinson, Jr. to Stephen Pollak, July 29, 1968,

FBI Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5003:

Memo, Stephen Pollak to Director, July 30, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5004.

Order granting defendant's motion for dismissal of complaint,

• U.S.

District Court, Northern District of Alabama, December

2. 1971:

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, October 1, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5225.

Memo, Pollak to Director, November 27, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5462.

Article, Look Magazine, November 12, 1968, entitled "I Had

Been

In

Trobule Most Of

My Live, In Jail Most Of It"; Article,

Look Magazine, November 26, 1968, "I Got Involved Gradually,

NN 55126 DooId: 32989758 Fage

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## Page 121

130.

131:

132.

133.

134.

135.

136.

137.

138.

139.

140.

141.

142.

143.

144.

145.

And I Didn

Know Anybody Was To Be Mu

dered."

Teletype, Memphis to Director, March 13, 1969, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-562

Complaint filed pursuant to Title 18 & 241 alleged a violation

of Dr: King's..

consitutional right to travel.

See, note 22; See,

e.9., HSCA Interview with Fred Vinson, JI.,

June

30, 1978, p.2,

HSCA Document Number 230173.

IBID.

See, note 23.

HSCA Executive Session Testimony of Ramsey Clark, July 19, 1978,

p. 64.

See, note 22.

See, note 135 at p. 66.

See,

e.g., Letterhead memos FBI to DOJ, April 6, 1968, April

1968,

April 9, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

14-38861-329/14-38861-982, 44-38861-224, 44-38861-1174/44-38861

139,

Letterhead Memo, FBI to Attorney General and others, April

11r 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-859;

See, e.g., LHM April 12, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file,

44-38861-538.

See, note 6 at p.4.

See,note 3, at p. 4.

See, note 16 at p.4.

see, note 4i see, e.g., note 6 at p. 4.

HSCA Interview with Fred Vinson, Jr:, June 30, 1978; .

HSCA Document Number 230173.

IBID.

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;...

146. See, note

23 at p.3.

147.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 2, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

File, Serial 44-38861-2946; Teletype, Director to SAC's

Birmingham and Memphis, May 2, 1968,

FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-2851.

148.

IBID.

149.

See, note 135 at p.76.

150. IBID. at p. 74.

151. In response to a question concerning the appropriate role of

DOJ attorneys during

the pre-arrest investigation, Mr. Clark

responded as follows:

I. In addition to keeping abreast of the steps in the

invest the act eft it,

investigation effort, did you perceive an active role

during the actual fugitive investigation following the

assassination until the time of Mr. Ray's apprehension

on the part of Department of Justice attorneys! Or was

their responsibility up until that time to receive and

digest information from the field in preparation for

possible prosecution itself developed?

A. Well, you know, there really wasn't a whole lot we

could do as lawyers...

152. See, note 112.

153.

Memo, Pollak to Director, June 10, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-4505.

154.

See, e.g., Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, June 12, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-4528.

155 •

Memo, Pollak to Director, August 16, 1968, FBI Headquarters

Serial 44-38861-5114; See, e.g., Individual memos

156 €

157

158.

159 г.

160.

161.

162.

4549г. 44-38861-4585.

See Text, P. 30.

See, note 135 at p.66.

see, note 22.

IBID.

See, note 18.

See, e.g., note

• 4i note 8; note 12; HSCA Interview with Thomas

Bìshop

June 20, 1978, p. 3, HSCA

Document Number

230012.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, April 17, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1555.

NW 55126 DocId: 32989758 Page 122

---

## Page 123

163.

164•

165.

166.

167.

168.

169 .

170.

171.

172.

173.

174.

175 .

176.

177.

178.

179 .

180 .

181.

182g

183 г.

184.

185.

IBID. at

P

see,

("Action" Section of Memo

• Step. 4)

9.. note 12 at p. 5; note 6 at p.4; note 16 at p.4.

See, note 23.

FBI Headguarters MURKIN files, Serial 44-38861-1061.

Article,

Washington Star, April 28, 1968, P. A16, FBI Head-

quarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2633.

Article, New York Times,

May 13, 1968, p.38, FBI Headguarters

MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-3556.

Article, Washington Post, April 24, 1968, p.37, FBI Head-

quarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2638.

See, note 112 at p. 3 of Addendum

A Legal Attache (Legat) is an FBI overseas representative.

Legats are attached to the U.S. Embassy and are found in a

limited number of major cities throughout the world.

See, note 112 at p.5 of Addendum.

See, note 22 at p.4; note 18 at pp. 3-4.

See, note 22 at p.4.

See, Text, P.

45-47•

Memo, DeLoach to Tolson, July 2, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN, file serial 44-38861-4761.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, August 21, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5115.

See, e.g., Memo, Director to Attorney General, June 12, 1968,

FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4355.

See, Text p. 60-62

-

Text po.56,57 re: FBI's relationship with Louis Lomax,

an investigative reporter on the Ring case.

Editorial, Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, serial 44-38861-3184.

See, e.g., Teletype Memphis to Director, April. 22, 1968, FBI

Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-1739.

See, _e.g, Teletype, Director to All SACs, April 29, 1968,

FBI Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2443.

See, e:g:^ Radiogram, Director to All SACs. May 14,1968, FBI

Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-3495.

NW 55126

DocId: 32989758

See, note 181 - Airtel, SAC Los Angeles to Director.

Page 123

---

## Page 124

186.

187.

188.

189.

190.

191.

192.

193.

194.

195.

196.

200.

Memo, Jensen

to file, May 3, 1968, FB

Memphis MURKIN file,

Serial 44-

87 - Sub -162

See, e.g., Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, June 18, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters

MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-4644.

Memo, Vinson to Director, August/68, FBI Headguarters MURKIN

File, Serial 44-38861-5059.

Airtel, SAC New Orleans to Director, March 18, 1969, FBI

Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5661.

IBID.

Airtel, Director to SAC's New Orleans and Memphis, March

26, 1969, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38862-

See, e.g., Final Report section

for HSCA Investigation

vis, Kent Courtney.

See, e.g., Teletype, Memphis to Director, May 23, 1969, FBI

•St. Louis MURKIN file, Serial

-1142.

e.g., Final Report Section

for HSCA Investi-

gation

of Ray's New Orleans Trip.

Teletype, Houston to Director, April 25, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-2013.

Teletype, Houston to Director, April 26, 1968, FBI Head-

quarters

MURKIN file, Serial

44-38861-2241.

See, Note 81 ~ Teletype, Los Angeles to Director.

IBID.

IBID.

See, note 81 - Memo Rosen to Deloach.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May

7r. 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-3145.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 2, 1968, FBI Headguarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-3196.

See, e,g., Note 197 at p.10.

MemO, Rosen

to Deloach, April 12, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial #44-38861-850.

Memo, ASAC Sylvester to SAC, New Orleans, 4/15/68; FBI New

Orleans MURKIN File, 157-10673. When asked about these

Instructions, Mr. Rosen had no

specific recollection of the

situation but stated that Garrison's total unrelaibility

may partially account for his desire that the New Orleans

office disassociate themselves from Garrison's office.

NW 55126 DocId: 32989758

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## Page 125

•206.

Memo, ASAC

Sylvester to SAC, New Orle

1s, April 17, 1968;

FBI New Orleans MURKIN File, Serial 157-10673-258.

In an

interview with HSCA staff, Jim Garrison could not recall

Orlena Miller. HSCA Interview with Jim Garrison, December

28, 1977; HSCA Document Number 150160. Efforts

• by HSCA

staff to locate one Orlena Miller in New Orleans with

knowledge of the King case were not successful.

207.

See., e.g. Teletype Denver to Director, May 23, 1968; FBI

Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial # 44-38861-3925. Teletype

Oklahoma to Director, May 24, 1968; FBI Headquarters MURKIN

File, Serial #44-38861-395

Teletype, Little Rock to

Director May 24, 1968; FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File,

Serial

#44-38861-3973.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 27, 1968; FBI

HQ MURKIN File Serial #44-38861-4306.

Teletype

Los Angeles

to Director, May 27, 1968; FBI HQ MURKIN File Serial #

44-38861-4067.

208 g

"Extensive investigation would be required to verify his

whereabouts if do not use his assistance. Note that Bradley

promptly learned of recent investigation, as mentioned re-

ferenced Los Angeles Airtel.

Since he has offered full

assistance, then should investigation proceed without prior

contact with him, he would undoubtedly feel his offer was

ignored, Since allegations of New Orleans District Attorney

Garrison are uppermost in Bradley's mind, embarrassment to

Bureau could follow if he took his own inference that.

such investigation pertains to Garrison's allegations.

Embarrassment might also arise should Garrison learn of

current investigation about Bradley, since Garrison might

infer this supports his position in

some way.

It is felt that most discreet verification of alibi could

be under taken on basis of information received directly

from Bradley, since it would allow fewest possible contacts

and minimize

possible embarrassment.. Los Angeles holding

investigation in abeyance."

Airtel, SAC, LOS

Angeles to Director, 6/7/68; FBI HQ,

MURKIN

File, Serial #44-38861-4366.

209 г

See, e.g., Letter, Director to Dick Thornburg, 6/14/68;

FBI HQ, MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-4599.

Adverse or hostile treatment of the MURKIN investigation

also received Bureau attention, although of a different

variety.

Offending editors were contacted, normally by the

SAC.of this local FBI office, and lengthy memos were sent to

Washington detailing the specifics of the ensuing conver-

sations, In one memo anticipating such a confrontation,

Washington is promised by the local SAC that "the next time

I am in personal contact with ranking officials of the Los

Angeles Times newspaper,. I intend to point out to them in

the appropriate manner their blatant disregard for the truth

in this matter as well as their exceedingly poor taste in •

publishing such an editorial." (Airtel, SAC, Los Angeles to

NTW

55126 DocId: 32989758 Page 125

---

## Page 126

210.

Director,

130/68, FBI HQ MURKIN File

Serial #44-38861-3184.)

He MURKIN File, Seetal

Airtel, SAC, Houston to Director, 4/26/68; FBI

HO MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-3182 (describing lengthy

conversation with editor of Houston Chronicle concerning

editorial entitled "FBI Loses Some of its Shine."

According

to the memo, the SAC successfully "straightened out" the

offending editor, and received repeated assurance that

"(the editor) heed the greatest respect for MI. Hoover and

realized that no other investigative

agency could have done

such a thorough job of investigating".)

The Crime Records Division of the FBI in addition to

responsibilities in the areas of crime statistics, Congress-

ional liaison, and citizen correspondence, handled all press

and media relations for the FBI.

211.

Letter, DeLoach to Tolson, 3/11/69; FBI HQ MURKIN File,

Serial 44-38861-5654.

212.

IBID.

213:

Letter Jones to Bishop, 3/20/69; FBI HQ MURKIN File, Seriai

44-38861-5655.

214.

HSCA Interview with Thomas R. Bishop, 6/20/78; p.3, HSCA

Document Number 230012.

215.

HSCA Interview with Gerold Frank, 9/1/77; HSCA Document

Number 130100.

216.

217.

See i note 144.

218.

219.

220.

Use of a grand jury to secure the testimony of James Earl

Ray, has been considered by the Department of Justice on at

least two occasions to be discussed in a separate section

of this report. See, text, pp. 83-87.

Teletype, Chicago to Director, August 23, 1968, FBI HQ.

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-

Memo, Director to Pollak, 9/10/68, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-39961-5158.

Airtel, SAC Birmingham to Director, 9/2/68, FBI HQ. MURKIN

File, Serial 44-38861-5160.

221.

222.

See, note 219.

Memo, to Attorney General re: James Earl Ray. Possible

Evidence of Conspiracy; DOJ King Assassination file,

144-72-662.

223.

224.

Memo, Pollak to Director, 9/17/68, FBI HQ. MURKIN File,

Serial. 44-38861-5174.

See, note 129 - Article, Look Magazine, November 12, 1968.

NW 55126 DocId: 32989758 Page 126

---

## Page 127

•225.

226.

227.

228.

229 .

230.

231.

232.

233.

234.

235.

236.

237.

238.

239.

240 g

241.

242.

244.

245.,

246,

Memo, Poll

to Director, November

MURKIN File,

Serial 44-38861-5382.

7,

1968, FBI Headquarters

Memo, Pollak to Director, November 16, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-5388.

See, note 129 - Article, Look Magazine, November 26, 1968.

See, note 128.

When interviewed by HSCA Staff, AAG Pollak could not recall

why the Department's decision took so long, and agreed that

the reason for the ultimate decision

not to pursue a warrant

was based on an assumption that Huie's articles contained

most of

the information.

See, note 12 at pp. 5-6.

-

See, note 16 at pp. 4-5.

IBID.

See, note 3 at p.6.

IBID.

See, note 6 at p.6.

See, noté 4 at p.3.

See, note 144.

See, note 135 at p.78.

IBID, at p.78.

IBID, at pp. 79-80.

IBID at p. 82.

FBI Interview with Charles J. Stein, April 24, 1968 by

SA's Gardner and Slicks, dictated on April 30, 1968. Los

Angeles file 44-1547.

h1imt catervie with Gene tones tanes city

1968, 302 BY SA Howe) ; Robert Burnie and James

Slidkano (Kansas City 6/14/68, 302 by SA Howe) •

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, 8/19/68, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-5097.

For further analysis of the investigation concerning Ray's

family. See, Text,. PP. 94-100 •

See, e.g., Memo from Director to Pollak, 4/20/68 and 4/25/68

FBI Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5631. (con-

cerning the Bureau's resolution of allegations made by one

NW 55126 DocId: 32989758 Page 127

---

## Page 128

John McFei

in concerning Frank C. Lill to and James W.

Latch of Memphis, Tennessee.

247.

248.

See, note 135 at p. 85.

IBID. at p. 26.

249.

IBID. at pp. 25-26.

250.

IBID at p. 85.

251.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, May 9, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file, Serial 44-38861-3764, HSCA Document Number 260130.

252.

253.

See, note 97.

Memo, Casper to Mohr, May 10, 1968, FBI Headquarters MURKIN

file,

Serial 44-38861-3763.

254,

It is unclear whether these problems were considered by A.G.

Clark or other attorneys in the Department of Justice.

is noted in the text which follows, Mr. Clark has no recollec

tion of receiving the electronic surveillance request.)

However, it is interesting to note that in approving the

proposal, Assistant to the Director DeLoach appended the

following note:

"It is doubtful that A.G. will approve.

These could be of

great assistance."

255.

Several FBI documents reflect strong dissatisfaction with

the amount of time being

taken by A.G. Clark to act on

pending electronic surveillance requests.

see, e.g., Meno,

Brennan to sullivan, June 10, 1968, caption:

Electronic

Surveillances Awaiting Approval of

Attorney General. HSCA

Document Number 260130.

256. €

HSCA Interview with Harold F. Dobson, June 28, 1978, HSCA

Document Number 230396.

257. See, note 98.

258

Telegram, Hoover to Phillip Canale, Jr., June 9, 1968, FBI

Headquarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4346.

259.

Teletype, Legat, London to Director, June 24, 1968, FBI

Memphis MURKIN File, Serial 44-1987-Sub M-11

26:0.

Memo, General Investigative Division, June 24, 1968, FBI

Memphis MURKIN File, Serial 44-1987-Sub M-11l.

261.

T'eletype, Memphis to Director, June 26, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4718.

(Recommending considera-

tion of interview of Ray prior to his delivery into custody

oi local authorites in Tennessee.)

262.

Letter, Arthur Hanes to Attorney General Clark, 7/11/68,

FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-4923.

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Page 128

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## Page 129

-263.

Memo, Hoo

to Tolson, DeLoach, Ros

Bishop, 7/16/68,

FBI Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-4853.

264.

265.

See, letter, Vinson to Hanes, 7/16/68; FBI Headquarters

MURKIN Serial #44-38861-4923.

Memo, Vinson to Director, 7/17/68; FBI Headquarters MURKIN

File,

Serial #44-38861-4923.

IBID.

266.

267.

See, note 6.

268.

269.

See, note 2.

270.

Testimony, Captain Billie J. Smith, Evidentiary Hearing on

Defense Motion to Modify Conditions of Confinement, 9/30/68,

SCA Document Number 110337.

Teletype,

Memphis to Director, 9/30/68, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-5209.

271.

See, e.g., Memo, SAC Memphis to Director, October. 11, 1968,

and attached communications, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file.

Serial 44-38861-5235; Memo, SAC, Memphis to Director, 10/14/68

and attached communications, FBI Headquarters MURKIN file,

Serial 44-38861-529

¡ Airtel, SAC, Memphis to Director,

November 24, 1968 and attached communications, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5327.

272.

See, note 271 - Airtel, SAC, Memphis to Director, 10/24/68.

2.73.

See, note 19.

274.

IBID at pp: 50-51.

2:75.

IBID at p. 51.

276.

IBID, at p. 55,

277. . IBID.

278.

IBID, at p. 54;

Cartha: DeLoach had no recollection of any activity in Memphis

which might have intruded upon Ray's attorney/client privi-

lege.

(HSCA Interview with C. DeLoach, 6/26/78; HSCA DOCU-

ment Number 230174), Alex Rosen, Assistant Director of the

General Investigative Division,

did not recall seeing either

the September 30, 1968 Memphis airtel detailing Battle's

order. Of the three letters which followed in apparent

contravention of the order.

He recognized his initials on

the 10/31/68 headquarters directive to Memphis, but had no

Independent recollection of the situation that

had triggered

: the directive. (HSCA Interview with A. Rosen, 6/28/78;

HSAC Document

Number 210237.)

Finally. neither Attorney General Clark (Executive Session

Testimony of Ramsey Clark, 7/19/78 at pp. 89-92 HSCA Document

NW 55126 DooId: 32989758 Page 129

---

## Page 130

279.

280.

number

) nor Shelby C

nty District Attorney

Canale kn

of any

activity constitusing an infringement on

Ray's attorney/client privilege.

Memo, SAC Memphis to Director, 8/14/68, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5076. Stoner was subsequently

hired by Ray to represent him in certain civil actions;

however, a formal attorney/client relationship did not

develop

until after Ray's plea.

See, note 271 - Memo, SAC, Memphis to Director, August

26, 1968,

FBI Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial

44-38861-529_

281.

IBID.

282.

Airtel, SAC, Memphis to Director, August 26, 1968 FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5162.

283.

IBID.

284.

Teletype, Memphis to Director, August 6, 1968, FBI Memphis

MURKIN file, Serial 44-1987- Sub N-44

285.

See, note 282.

286.

Airtel, Director to SAC, Memphis, October 31, 1968, FBI

Headguarters MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-531

287.

A search of Miami Field Office MURKIN files, for example,

shows no lead sent out from Washington or Memphis following

Ray's mention of Miami in his letter to Hanes.

288.

Memo,. Rosen to DeLoach, March 11, 1969, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5612.

289.

IBID.

290.

291.

IBID.

Ray was taking steps at this time to replace Foreman with

court-appointed attorneys to handle an appeal from his

guilty plea. However, none had yet been formally appointed.

292.

Airtel, SAC Houston to SAC, Memphis, March 12, 1969, FBI

Memphis MURKIN file, Serial 44-1987-Sub-M-447.

293.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, March 12, 1969, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5639.

294 .

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, March 13, 1969, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN file, Serial 44-38861-5615.

295. See, note 130.

296. HSCA Interview with Robert Jensen, August 8, 1978, HSCA

Document Number 260328.

297. HSCA Interview with Jerris Leonard June. 30, 1978; HSCA

NN 55126 DooId: 32989758 Fage 130

---

## Page 131

NW 55126

298.

Document

amber 230102. Leonard re

ils staff attorneys

arguing that an internal DOJ policy precluded taking an

uncooperative individaul before a grand jury subsequent

to his guilty plea. The Committee has found no other

evidence that such a policy existed.

HSCA Interview with John MItchell, July 5,1978, HSCA

Document Number 230175.

299 .

300 . .

301.

302 .

303.

304.

30.5.

306.

307.

308.

309.

310.

311,

312.

313g

HSCA Interview with D. Robert Owen, August 11, 1978, HSCA

Document Number 210383.

Memo, Jerris Leonard to K. William O'Connor, September 22,

1970, Caption: James Earl Ray.

HSCA Interview with Bernard Fensterwald, March 21, 1978,

HSCA Document Number 190476. See, e.g., HSCA Interview

with Bernard Fensterwald, August 7, 1978, HSCA Document

Number 240136.

HSCA Interview with William O*Connor, August 6, 1978,

HSCA Document Number 270016.

Report of the Department of Justice Task Force to review.

the FBI Martin Luther King, Jr. Security and Assassination

Investigations, January 11, 1977, at p.105.

Memorandum, Hoover to Tolson, DeLoach, Rosen, Bishop,

Sullivan, June 20, 1968; FBI Headquarters MURKIN File,

Serial Number 44-38861-4660.

HSCA Interview with Ramsey Clark, June 21, 1978, at p.3;

MLK Document Number 220473. See, note 22, at p.3.

Memorandum, Fred M. Vinson, Jr. to WilliamS. Lynch, August

20, 1968; DOJ Assassination File, #144-72-662.

Teletype, Director to All SAC's April 7, 1968; FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-153. (See,.

footnote 47.)

Teletype, Director to All SAC's, April 26, 1968; FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, Serial #44-38861-2288.

Memo, McGowan to Rosen, April 24, 1968; FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-2649.

See, footnote 308.

Memo, McGowan to Rosen, June 18, 1968; FBI. Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-4578.

See, e.g. Airtel, SAC, Memphis to SAC, New Orleans, 3/5/69;

FBI Memphis MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-1987-SUbM-423.

See, e.g. Teletype, Charlotte to Director, 4/29/68; FBI

Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-2747.

DocId: 32989758

Page 131

---

## Page 132

.:.314.

315.

316.

317.

318.

319.

320.

321.

See, e.g.

irtel, Memphis to Albany,

6/68 FBI Memphis Field

Office MU

IN File, Serial Number 44

987-Sub B-16. See also

Teletype, Director to All SACs, April 22, 1968; FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-1658.

Memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, August 26, 1968; FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, Serial

Number 44-38861-5120.

Memorandum, Branigan to Sullivan, June 14, 1968; FBI Head-

quarters MURKIN File, 44-38861-4682.

The FBI determined that, the available evidence pointed to

one individual. However, he denied his involvement during

an FBI interview,, and added that there was no way for the

FBI of the FCC to determined who sent the transmission,

unless an admission were made.

Despite his denial, no

effort was made to take his testimony under oath before

grand jury See, e.g. FBI Headquarters MURKIN Serial 44-38861-

See, e.g. Memo, Director to Attorney General April 20, 1968;

FBI Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-5631.

See also Memo, Director to Attorney General, April 25, 1968;

FBI Headquarters MURKIN File Serial Number 44-38861-5631.

FBI Interview with Donald F. Wood, April 5, 1968; FBI

Birmingham MURKIN File, 44-1740, p.23.

Memo,. Rosen to DeLoach, April 17, 1968; FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-1555.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Interview, 10/15/68; contained

in Royal Canadian Mounted Police Report on Canadian assassi-

nation investigation, p. 4506.:)

322.

323.

324.

325.

326.

327.

328.

329.

FBI Interview with DI. Mark O.

Freeman, April 19, 1968; FBI

LoS Angeles MURKIN File, 44-1574 (p.129 of S/A A'Hearn's re-

port.).

FBI Interview with Sharon Rhoads, 4/16/68; FBI Los Angeles

MURKIN File, 44-1574, (p.117 of S/A A'Hearn's report.)

FBI Interview with Richard Gonzales, 4/16/68; LOs Angeles

MURKIN

File, 44-1574.

4/15/68, LOs Angeles MURKIN

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, 4/23/68; p.731. Headquarters MURKIN

File, Serial Number 44-38861-2400.

IBID.

Missouri State Penitentiary Visitors Log for James Earl Ray.

MLK Document Number 240179.

NW 55126

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Page 132

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## Page 133

330.

331.

332.

333.

334.

335.

336.

337.

338.

339.

340.

341.

342.

343.

344.

345.

346 .'

347.

348.

349 •

350.

351:

Teletype

Newark to Director, Chcia

and Memphis, 6/9/68;

FBI Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-4390.

FBI Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-4594.

W.B. Huie, He Slew the Dreamer at pp. 50-78; Publisher

DeLa Certe Press; Copyright 1968.

IBID.

See text, pp. 25-26 - •

See text, PP. 72-76 -

Airtel, Director to SAC, Memphis, 8/14/68; FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-5073.

FBI Interview with Mrs. Marguerite Welch, April 24, 1968;

FBI Chicago MURKIN File, 44-1114, (p.48 of DuMarie's 5/10/68

report.)

Airtel, SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI, March 18, 1969;

FBI Headguarters MURKIN File, Serial Number 44-38861-5661.

IBID.

Airtel, Director to SACs, New Orleans and Memphis, 3/26/69;

FBI Headquarters MURKIN File, Serial number 44-38861-5661.

Teletype, Memphis to Director, 5-23-69; St. Louis Field

Office File, Serial Number 44-775-1142.

Memo, Jones to Bishop, March 18, 1969, FBI Headquarters

King Security file, Serial Number 100-106670-3586.

See, note 135 at p.63.

See, note 6 at p.3.

See, note 144.

See, note 23.

See, note 135 at p. 66.

see.

e.g. Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, 10/24/68, FBI Headguarters

MURKIN' File, Serial 44-38861-5295. (Reflecting displeasure

with SA Bonebrake's alleged breach of court order against

comment on case.)

See, 'note 209 - Serials 44-38861-3184, 44-38861-3182.

UPI Wire Service Report, April 18, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-1950.

UPI Wire Service Report, April 27, 1968, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-2101.

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352:

353.

354.

355.

356.

357.

358.

UPI Wire

ervice Report, April 29,

108, FBI Headguarters

MURKIN File, Serial 44-38861-2513.

UPI Wire Service Report, May 4, 1968, FBI Headguarters

MURKIN File, 44-38861-3199.

Memo, Rosen to DeLoach, January 29, 1969, FBI Headquarters

MURKIN File, Serial. 44-38861-5535.

See, note 42, In an HSCA interview with Richard Long, MURKIN

case agent at headquarters, Long expressed his recollection

that Hoover suggested the search through the fugitive prints

which resulted in a positive identification of Ray. How-

ever, Hoover is not credited with this decision in either

of the FBI memoranda written to describe the successful

print identification of Ray.

See, e.g. FBI Headguarters

MURKIN File, Serials 44-38861-2034,

44-5818.

See, note 12.

See, note 116.

IBID.

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