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157-10014-10081

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IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10081

RECORDS SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 10-H-13

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

TO

GOODWIN, RICHARD

TITLE

DATE: 07/10/75

PAGES

: 61

SUBJECTS : ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CIA

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

:UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

05/12/98

OPENING CRITERIA

:

COMMENTS : BOX

3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

50955

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to 'Cr1

Ohr Initra Batra Bruate

FORMATION

IT® Subject

R478

Gooduri

Report of P'roocedings

#r.

Hearing held before

Benato Select Committee to Study Governmental

parations With respect to Intelligance Aativitles

Thursday, July 10, 1975

Washington, D. C

Stenotype Tape and Waste turned ove

o the Committee for destruction

WARD & PAUL

110 FIRST STREET, S. F.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(808) 864-8000

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TESTIMONY OF

Richard M. Goodwin.

PAGE

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FXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

No. 1

No. 2

No.

Nº.

3-B

FOR IDENTIFICATION

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TONNA LANE HARD

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Thursday, July 10, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Oparationg with Respect to

Governmental Activitles,

washington, p. C.

The Committaa Met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clock

p.m. In Room S-120, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church

(Chairman of the Committaal presiding,

Present: Senators Church (presidiny), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and

Schwelkar.

Also presents William Millar, Staff Director, Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, JI., Chief Counsal, Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel, Charles Rirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan,

David Aaron, J00 Donnin, Elizabeth Culbroth

and Patrick Shed,

Professional Staff Members.

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• датна 797.

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it -57 in

2

PROSERRIMIS

The Chalrman. He will come back into order.

Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to ive

in this proceeding will ba the truth, the whole truth, and

nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MI. Goodwin. I do.

The Chairman. I am given to underatand that there has

been some problem in connection with your appearance here today

and that there are some notes that you have that you feal you

need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brounht

with you. In that the cage?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful.

That

havo baon in storage for sevaral years and I just had no access

to than. I have to go got them out of the storage. They were

notes - my files and averything have been in storage for

several Years. I'va had no accesg to them. And they consist

of the files that I brought from the White House with me.

The Chairman. Have you been intervlowed by membors of thel

staff and shown cartain documonts that the staff bolioves will

be pertinent to your testimony?

MI, Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with

tha Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

Tha Chairman. And do you belleve that you ara praparad

today to give us tostimony relating to Me. Trujillo or do you

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ballave that you need to or ought to review thome notes befora

you give any

tastimony?

MI. Goodwin. Mall, I'm of course fully preparad to testi!

to the boat of my racollaction to any matter, and I think

probably in the case of the Dominican Republie, the documenta

have been adequate. I think thera's a good chance that 901no

through the tiles may very woll add something to my recollectio

of Cuba and Castro.

The Chairman. Hell I will have thia suggention to make.

No will tato your testimony on the trujillo mattar today, and

then = how long will 1t take you to dot your allos and rovl.w

than and come back fully prepared to give un your testimony on:

tha other issues?

Mr. Goodwin. Hell, lt will take a day or two. It 1s

possible 1 41l1 not ba able to got access to tham until Monday

morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello

and find them in a varahousa, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.

But I am sure that 1t would not take mora than a day or two.

The Chairman. So that 18 the Committee were to give you

that opportunity, would you than get those files, revlew them.

and respond to the request by the Committed that you appear th

first of next week to tostity?

Me. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly,

The Chairman. Wa are most anxious to complete the record

and your testimony is necessary, and it would cortainly

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accorodate our, need it; you.

would cooperate.

Mr. Goodwin.' I would ba glad to.

The chairman. All right.

"ii

With that understanding then, Mr. Schwars, are you

prepared to proceed with the questioning on Truj111o?

ME. Schwars. I'm sorry Mr. Coodwin that we didn'e hava

a chance to gat togather. I thought de were going to have a

chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to

speak to you but I do know nome of the materlal, and parhaps

we can work on the material.

Refore we do so, could you atate your full name and you:

addr«sa pleasa?

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MO! COOLIN

Mr. Goodwin, Richard M. Goodwin, 1516 J2nd Streat, N.W..

Hashington, D.C.

Mr. Schwars. And au a master of courso, ve tell all of

our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their

right to counsal, and you know that, and if you want to stop

to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?

Me. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyara.

Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional

righta are?

Mr. Goodwin. Mopefully.

Mr. Schwars. Now, what connection did you have with the

Dominican Rapublie In the winter and apring of 19617

ME. Goodwin. I came into the White House an Mosistant

Spocial Counsel to the Preaident, having worked On Latin

Amorican altairs policy statamente in the procooding campadan.

I becane involved in Latin Amarica. And from that parlod until

I lolt to go to the State Departmant, I vas Involved on a

dally basis with Prasident Konnedy and his activitlas'in Latir.

Amardea which Included what was happening in the Dominican

Republio in terma that I draftad contingency plans, 1 prepared

cablos that went to Me. Daarborn loeussing on the areas that

you are Interested in,. and I was with him ovary day on somethin

connected with Latin America.

Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary

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material, would

you recount for the Committae your understandin

of what the United States govarnment polloy toward the Dominir.

Repubile was In the winter and spring of "81 and what action:

vero taken to implament that polley.

Mr. Goodwin. Moll, that polley was a continuation of thr

policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in

accordance with the vote of the DAS, voted to never - decide.l

to sever diplomatic and commerolal relations with tha Dominica:

Republia and the altdation which you know arone was preespitated

by the attampted assassination of Prasident Detancourt by the

President of the Dominican Republic.

So that from that point on when we cane in, the feeline

was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was avan more

at odda with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress tha:

had bean and beyond that; having cut off diplomatie and other

rolations, that Trujlllo's tima:dh office was probably. •

numbared. The principal support of the regime in that decare

which was often in great domestic difficulty had beer the

concept of Amarican support, it strengthened Trujillo agains:

his opposition.

At that point our policy became one of trying to antleli

at least, the fall of trujillo, Of course the Castro thin

was vory much in everybody's mind and the principal concern

the Presidant, the ond thing ho didn't want was for trufillo

to go and a Communist leadar to come in. - So I think the polle:

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was to kanp up our economie and diplomatic prassure to hope

that when Trujillo went, howaver he went, whether violently or

peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would

be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of

the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in

touch with and help out and keep communications open with

the potential successor groups, and it was vary hard to

pinpoint.

Ms. Schwars. What stapa did you take during the perlod

of time you vare involved, or prlor therato, 11 you knos

about it, in order to asslat one or more of the dissident

groupa?

M. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts - everything from

polley statements, the und of USIn, the ude of acononie

pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile

groups principally'in New York and elsewhere. A certain number

of limitad covert operations, some tranafer of arms. Dearborn

of course was one of the prineipals, his principal instruction

was to try to keap all channels of communication open, he was

zealous in thia because he dialiked Trujillo intensely himsel!

and falt that he ought to be allied with these other aroups.

And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and i

think they falrly reflace that range of operations.

None of than weru terribly effactive.

ME. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arma,

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what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorizatio:

was provided to transfer arme?

Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower

Mr. Schwarz. And that was at a meeting of the Spocial

Group?

MI. Goodwin. Hell,

don't know because they didn't let

me in that wask, but thare was an NSC action mamorandlum of

some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really

know the procedure.

Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms pansed?

Me. Goodwin. I don't know. I became aware of the transte

of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of 1s the

transfor of a couple of carbinas and .3A pistols. Mitor the

transfer had boon made,: l the megsage of communication that

came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request

for the transfer of machine guns which ware to ba used in an

effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns wore to be given as

Daarborn told me later in conversation after the assassination

because these poople folt their own lives were in danger,

especially if they embarked on anything aa rlaky as tryina to

k111 Trujillo, and they wanted some self-defange weapons, and

they were given to them for solf-dofanso and then thay made a

roquest that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, they

wantad a machine gun.

Assassinating Trufillo, of courso, a lot of people had

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arm,

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tried and most of

cham, they were all dead. It was a very

risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to

try with a -38.

And I think also, I mean nobody, I think -- aa I say, ve

had no particular anticipation that this or any other group

would be succeasful in something that nobody had been able to

do for thirty yoars, but at any rato, those vera the backstopa.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arma were passed into

the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the disaldents?

MI. Goodwin. No, I only know what Dearborn later told me

In conversation. I only have this fifteen year old mamory

on my part that he gave them to them in the consulate. I may

havo known at one time how he got them. There ware a lot of

gune in the Dominican Republic.

Me. sohuare. old you knou fear an are passed erot)

the diplomatic pouch?l

Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but I wouldn't be

surprised, weapons of that size.

Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as

far as you know?

Mr. Goodwin. Woll I don't know, I don't have the exact -

the message is in here. I think It was altor President

Kennedy took office.

My knowledge of 1t was on the basis of the massago --

The Chalrman. Is there someone that can halp Mr. Goodwin

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with the documents?

Mr. Schwara. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1.

• document consiating - dated May 13, 1951 and headed

Subject, CIA Covert Activitles, Dominican Rapublio, stating:

"Attached is the spacial briefing paper of CIA covert activitie:

diracted againat the Dominican Republie which in requested by

MI. Richard Goodwin at the White House," and attaching a

moveral page document with that hoadiny and that date.

MI. Goodwin. This in the paper that they sent me and

that'a where, I guess, I found out about it.

(The documant referred

to was marked Goodwin

Exhibit No. 1 for

Identification. s

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11

Mr. Schwarg: Now that Indicates, does it not, that the

weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell

that?

Mr. Goodwin. Yeah.

Me. Schwarz. All right.

You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which

Indicatas when the requast for the passage of the arme was

made.

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ME. Goodwin. Yos, 1t says in late January. Of course

they weren't authorized until the 12th.

M. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, alter

the kennady Administration took office.

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

Mt. Schwars. Now you told President Johnson, Vice

President Johnson, - we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2.

« memorandun which, Senators, 1e at Tab ll, the book which 1a

marked book 2 of 2 and datod June 1, 1961.

(The document referred to

was marked Goodwin

Exhibit No. 2 for

identification.

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Mr. Schwars. Hould you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin,

this 1a a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject

Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

Hould you read into the record the second paragraph?

MI. Godwin. "At one point during the meeting, the Vice

President asked about the three carbines which the Agancy had

turned ovar to the dissidents, specifically anked about the

date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the affect

that thia was done under the previous Administration, 1.0.,

prior to Tanuary 20, 1961, pursuant to a decialon of the

Special Group."

Can you toll me 1f chia his memo I'm reading? I'd like

to know.

M5. Schwarz. Hall, there are some initials at the botton

of the page, do they help you decida whose meno 1t 187

Mr. Dannin. I bollave we vare told by secretary of state

Rusk that 1t'= Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what

the U stands for.

Ms. Schware. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It 18 an

inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it

would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen.

I thought that I wouldn'e have made de. I had no purpose in

making it. And this 1a

The Chairmas. What is the inaccuracy of this?

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MI, Goodwin. The delivary'of the arma was not made prior

to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, vas pilor to

January 20th.

Senator Schwalker. Was when, again? Mas what date?

Mr. Goodwin. The anthorization was the 12th of January.

Sanator Schwalker. What year?

Mr. Goodwin. 1961.

Senator Schwolker, And delivery was when?

Mr. Schwars. Sometime subsequent to January 20th.

Mr. Goodwin. Wall, now that I look at thie, all lt says

was lato January.

The Chairman. This do June lot, Chla la datel June lat,

and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the

meeting the Vice President asked about the three carbines

which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and

spocifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin

made the statament to the affect that this was done under

the pravious Adminiatration, 1.e., prior to January 20th,

1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

Netually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.

15. Goodwin. Hell that was my firat impression on readina

that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator,

so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somabody's mind could bu

lato January, I mean, I don't coally remember.

Mr. Schwarz. Bu: Mr. Goodwin, you know, independent o

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the document which we marked as Exhibit 1, in fact the arms

ware dalivared after January 20th.

Mr. Coodwin. I may have known. All I my first

knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requester

which simply informed me that the dolivery of carbines had been

made in late Jaguary, I don't know any moro than that.

Mr. Schwars. All right.

Mr. Goodwin, Thie lu my source of knowledga. I may have

Inarnod more mubsequent to lt if Dearborn pinpointod it.

Mr. Schwarz. In addielon with dealing with Dearborn, verg

you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?

Mr. Goodwin. Wall, they were alwaye at the meetings.

Mr. Schwarz. Who do you ramambar from the CIA?

Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes - I can't be sure who all was

there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some-

body liko Dissoll, at least, would have been there. But I'm

sure you must hava a list.

Mr. Schwarz, Now I would like you to testify in answer to

a serios of questions as to what you were or were not told.

24

Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered

¿: " had boon delivered to persons who sald at times thes choy

wanter to ust than for personal delanse, but who said more

21.

2.

often that they wanted to use them for assassination purposes?

24

Mr. Goodwin. I was givon to understand

and told

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spacifically and 'it'a reflacted in the documenta, that they

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wanted - In order to carry out an assassination, they thought

they noeded transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns.

I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that a

carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an effort of that kind

againat Trujillo. Rut they, of course, vare interested in

assassinating trujillo, Involved as they were in a very life

and death atruggle, thelr families were being alaughtered

Mr. Schwart. The racord demonatrates that the Agency was

informed in April, prior to the mamorandum that went to you

which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the diasidents intended to

undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the

means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the

road and shooting Me. Trujillo as he was vialting his mistress.

And that they intended to do it whether or not they received

the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just

to halp.

Now, were you informed by the Agency or by anyone else

that the dissidents intended to accomplish the sasassination

with the small arms whether or not they got the machines?

Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other

groups intanded and wanted to assassinate Trujillo, He got

reports of assassinationa about to occur almost evary two or

three weaka in the White House. There la a long gap between

wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do 1t, and - but.

at all times, continually, up into May, there was the very

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Insistent request for additional arms that vould make the

plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy,

those arma were denied and

Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know

what you were informed about the intentione of the diasidents.

You didn't answer my question. You maid you were fraquently

informed about assassination plots all over the world, but

spacifically with respect to the Dominican Republie, were you

or ware you not informed that the Agency had been told by the

dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination

of Fidel Castro - excuse me, of Trujillo --whether or not

thoy received the machine quna?

MI. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. !

wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that

wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you

mean Daarborn, or --

Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency

in this instance?

Me. Schwarz. Thare were Agency people in the Republic.

Did you know there were Agency paople in the Resublle?

Mr. coodwin. I knew they were in and out.

Mr. Schwarz. In and out?

Mr. Goodwin, They ran sona guns in at one time, as l

ramember, and thay also were anganed in the collection of

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intelligence about dissident groups.

Mr. Schwarz. Man It your impression that Dearborn was

in charge of the Dominican Republie, or the Agency personnel

was in charge of the Dominiean Republie?

Ms. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the

inatructions given to Dearborn ware carried out, and all

Instructiong from the President went to Duarborn.

Mr. Schware. Apart from intructions from the President.

was it your impression that the Agency was in charge of the

Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the

Dominican Republie.

Mr. roodwin. My imprassion was that Dearborn was in charne

of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision

fron Hashington.

The Chairman. Dearborn was the -

Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. He had no formal

relations.

The Chairman. He was the Consul?

Mr. Goodwin. Right.

Hasn'e that true?

MI. Schwarz. The paper racord makes it look quite likely

that the Agency, at loast from their point of view, thought

that thay were in chargo.

Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We

sunt all of our messages to nearborn.

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Mr. Schware.

What was Your understanding of the

location of the machino guns that the dissidants wanted?

MI. Goodwin, I don'e remember, but it's iri hare somewhere

in the paper.

(Pause)

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cue through the question.

Did you know that the macidie guns vere sent to the

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Mr. Goodwin.

I know now.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?

Mr. Goodwin. No:. I knew, when the lasue arone in May

that wo had - we had brought in machine guns, but the precis

mathod by which thay were brought in I never asked about.

The ChalIman. I am having a little difficulty following.

We bogan with your haing told that it was the policy of

the previous Adminiatration to ancourage dissident groups ani

do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down

the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of

President Kennady, cortain wespons ara passed to these

dissidonts in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of

assasainating - of their use in the assassinating President

Trujillo.

Now when did you learn that weapons had been in fact

passed to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after

President Kennody had been Inaugurated. When did you firat.

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learn?

Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we raquested from

the White House a briefing papar on all covert activities in

tha Dominiean Repuhlie, that had been conducted in the

Dominican Republic.

Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from

whom?

да.

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Mr. Goodwin, Well, it would have been requested by me for

the President.

Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?

Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.

The Chairman: From the CIA, and that brieling paper Mas

been identified for the record?

Mr, Goodwin. That is correct.

The Chairman. M11 right.

When you found out that these weapons had been transferred

In January to certain diasident groups for the purpose of

assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?

Was it then your understanding that this was President

Kennody's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. No.

The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received

that information?

Mr. Goodwin. It I may go back for a moment, Senator,

and that is the briating paper involvad a very clear distinction

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between these waapons which vare to ba used for purposes of

personal typo side-arma, the salf-defense attendant to any

projoct and the desire for assassination weapons which would

have consisted of machine guns.

Our response to this brleting paper was immediately to

try to revlew our entira policy toward the Dominican Republic

and proparo, which we did over the next couple of weeks,

instructions to the Consul about the nature of fúture relations

with diasidents, because the President felt that chinos

might be gotting out of hand, with what was happaning in the

Dominican Republic.

So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I

said, two great concerne. He didn't want anybody trying to

push Trufillo over unless he knew what was going to happen

next, because he would much rather have Trufillo in there than

a Communist: leader. And secondly, that the United States

not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in

the telegram that was

The Chairman. All right.

Now whan the President told you that those were his

two concoins, what action was then taken to implement the

Presidant's policy?

Me, Goodwin. The action that was then caken was to taka

and set aaide the original instructions from the stato

Ospartmant and at the President's instructlong, I typed up the

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telegram which in here in my handwrlting, which was to go and

did go, slightly ravised to -

Mr. Schwars. All right. Let me mark the one in your

hand as Exhibit 3.

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(The documant referred to

was marked an Goodwin

Exhible No. JA for

1dentifloation.)

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Mr. Schwars. Hall, let'a mark than, Mr. Goodwin - you

know how to do this as wull as I do. Make them JA, J-D and

3-C.

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Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course

of rowilting

The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' hooks

whore these documents appear?

Mr. Schwarz. Whore 1a 3-1?

MI. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.

(Pause)

This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears

page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.

And then page 256 1a the final. And the same pago, 242,

page 237 and 242.

The Chairman. Is 242 the final varsion of the message

that want out?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?

Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they

aro both my drafta. I recoived a draft from the State Depart-

mast, discussed lt with the President, and at his inatruction

propaçad thia rodralt. I never would have overriddon the state

Dupartment on my own, and adding to it two major points aside

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from rewording it.

•The firat one la on a different matter, and

the second one was to say in the final version, "Howevar, we

must not run the riak of U.S. association with political

assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general

polloy cannot condone assasainatione. This last principle.

overriding and most prevail in doubtful aituations."

That was insarted at the instruction of the President.

a much stronger statament of that than occurs in the state

Department draft, and 1t finiahos again with -- 16 says,

"Cloarly, at the present time we are unable to transfor arma

to dissidents, "Na loal that the tranaler of arms would servo

vory Ilttle purposa."

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(The document referred to

was marked Goodwin

Exhibit No. J-B for

identification.)

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The Charman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it

bafora it was sent by state?

MI. Goodwin. I wrote it.

The Chairman, Dut you said that the state Department

changed the language.

Mr. roodwin. No. They had prepared an original deate.

which I changed and redrafted. Now that 1e here too, Ineludinn

a note from them saying that I wasn't atlafled with thalr

draft.

The Chalrman. So this was your own message, then; that

you ballaved accurataly reflected Preuident Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. It was propared at the specific inatruction

of the Prosident. It was shown to him before transmission.

The Chairman. It was shown to tha President?

Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

Tha Chairman. Very well.

Thon, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now

approved contingency plans discussad during your stay here

with ono major excaption. You are not to sequest a pre-

signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."

MI, Goodwin. I can axplain that, sanator.

There was a proposal made in the State Department version

that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case!

they managed to take over the governmant and there was some

kind of fighting that thay should request halp from Venezuela,

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papers (Artel

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columbia, a lew of our allies and therefore na ought to prepare

them in advanca for such a raquest. The President thought that

putting such a document in their hands would amount to a

declaration of war and wanted it struck.

The Chairman. All right.

Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that

you continue to work" - wall, bafore we go on with the necond

paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has

now approved contingency plans discussed during your atay here

with one major axcoption."

Now, what wore those contingancy plans that had been

discussed?

Mr. Goodwin. They have them hare, I ballove.. I think -

this is a very thick document, where you have a series of

contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest

of the United States la to assure that Castro-Communiat

oloments not take over." It says Trujillo la weak, and then 1t

Is an analysis of the dissidents and their Intention, the

weaknoss of the Trufillo ragime, and it goes Into the covert

activitles, which, I think probably - is that your prineipal

intorest at thia time?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all tho

covert activitias. Recommendation A of the Unitod Stater,

not initiato the overthrow of trujillo, that we inform prod.s.

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dissidents that if they succeed on their on and form an

acceptable government we.will be glad to come in and halp them

and then the rest talke about hares waya of recognizing

The Chalrman. There 1a nothing in that contingency

plan that contemplated the assasaination of Trujillo himselt?

Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that

he might ba assassinated, not that we vould assassinate him.

The Chairman. But if he were'assassinated, lt vould have

presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group

to overthrow his regime?

Mr. Goodwin, Yes.

The Chalrman. All right.

Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message - the President's

massage to Mr. Dearborn, "No consider it ensential that you

continue to work to strengthen pro-u.S. sentimant among diast-

dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable.

Howevar, we must not run the risk of U.s. association with

political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general

policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle 1s

ovarriding and must prevail in doubtful siruations."

Now that language, It has been suggested by some members

of the committos that your concern hare had to do with avoldin

any relationship that might lead to a diaclogure that the

United Status had Indoed an Inturest in or was somshow involved

in a plot to assassinato Trujillo.

Because you say, "nowaver

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wa must not run the rink of 0.8. association with politioal

assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general polloy

cannot condone assassination. This last prinaiple la over.

riding and must prevall in doubtful situations."

Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves

to

the interpratation that your primary concern was that the

United States should not get caught?

MI. roodwin, Wall, I don't helleve so, senator, because

I think, to me, the plain meaning of che vorde and as i

underatood it was that wa must not run the riak of u.s.

association with political assassination. That means not

be associated with the process of political assassination in

any form.

Sanator Baker. Mr. Chalrman?

In that same vain, 11 I could interrupt for just a second,

1e 1t true - and would Counsel prompt me - that the guns had

already been dispatched?

Mr. Schwarz. Cortain guns.

'Senator Baker. I'm not talking ahout how many, Fritz.

Guns had been dispatched.

M5. Schwarz. But this talegram refuses the passage of

four machine guns.

Senator Baker.

I'm not going to arque with you.

I am

Just saying that guns harl been dispatched.

Senator Schwelkar, What's the date of this cologram?

20

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Sanator Bakar. This was just before the assassination,

two days befora the assasadnation.

Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched.

Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over

to the diesidents.

Sanator Baker. And now, in retrospect, no're not quite

sure - or thra's no indication that the quns were actually

used in the assassination, although they may have been in the

back Beat. Is that about the way it stacke up?

The Chalrman. And the dissidente had requested machine

guns.

Sanator Bakor. And the witness, or another witness, has

sald we thought tho signale for assassination afforts for

machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead

with the material In hand.

Mr. Goodwin, I believe they had additionad guns of their

own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.

Sanator Tower, I think the type of guns is important,

because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassination

against a hoavily armed

Mr. Goodwin. Trutillo travalled with bodyguards in a

hravily armed car.

Also, if I might add, Senator =

The Chalrman. Just to undarstand what you have said,

as the author of this instruction and having conferred about

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it and having shown le to President Rennedy, are you testifying

that it was your underatanding that the meaning of that

santance -- that that sentence was intended to convey to ME.

Dearborn a prohibition againat involving the Unitad States

In an assassination attempt on tha life of ME. TIUj11lo?

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, And in my firat draft. I did it

In torma of discloaura and changed that, struck that phrase

about disclosure in ordar to make the point, and alwaya at the

President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consuls

bacauso I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and

I crossed it out, in my handwritina.

Mr. Schwarz, Could you read into the record how you

changed it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, It's not very grammatical, it's

ambarrassing. Also, on the xerox - I can't read the hand-

writing on the xerox.

"Howover we also must not" - something - "permit any

danger of discloßing any U.S. association with political

assassination or Intervention in the Dominican

Republic,"

It says or intervention. All that wag struck.

Serator Baker. That sounds 1lko exactly what the Chalrman

asked you, It sounds like 1t might be intarpretod as, plodie

don't got caught.

MI, coodwin. Absolutely, which do why I changer It.

Sanator, to road "Howaver, we must not run risks of las.

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association with political anasination mince the U.s., 88 a

matter of general policy, cannot condone assasaination."

Senator Bakor, I've got to say, and i don'e mean le ea

Do critical of this witness, but on firat roading of this

document, which was some time ago, lt sounded a lot to me like

the Mission Impossible opening when they say, 1f you got caught

the sacrotary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.

Mr. coodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this

time.

MADO

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Sonator Baker, "or was I, at that time.

I need radssurance, and I think the record does, that the

coincidance of that this cablo, this wire, going out, say two

days bofore the assassination, ' after guns in fact had been

dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under

tho circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.

This witnesa says 1ª does not. There la no evidence to

the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need

to pursue the lasue any further.

MI. Goodwin. If I may, Senator -

Sonator Bakar. And it also, as Smothera points out, that

thara was another communication saying dastroy anyching you've

got, all those communications excapt this cabla.

Mr. Maron. That is standard practica, That la the standar!

practice for covert operations,

Mr, Goodwin. My rasponse, Senator, la that the carbinor

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and platola were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent

to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's takina

office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfar. I haven't

saen any indication of the data of that transfor. I do know

that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns,

bocause ho told ma ho was not aware of de, until va finally

renumstad a ravlaw a couple of montha, a los monthe later, of

our complete covart operations in the Dominican Republie, at

Which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred.

I still don't know the date of that transfer.

And then It was the baste of that hrleling paper, which

obviously tho Dominican Republle was not the firat matter on

Presidant Kennedy's agenda when he came into offica, on the

basis of that briefing paper, he ravlewed our policy and sant.

this tolagram.

The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call

off any further involvement by the United States government in

an assassination attempt against. Mr. Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the Unitad

Status was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was

slow down that kind of ovor-zealousness. The President was

not that anxious to sae Trujillo thrown out.

Sanator Tower. That dossn't totally answer the question.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.

The Chairman, Wall, you sae, we know, from your testimony,

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that you had bear advisad in May that cartain weapone had been

transtersad to cortain dissident groups who at least had

oxpressed an Intarest in assassinating Trutillo.

MI. Goodwin. Correct.

The Chalrman. So there was a connaction, the connection

baing that the American government, through the CIA, furnished

weapons to a group that had communicated ite interest, 1l not

1ts Intention, to assassinate Trujillo.

So then you sand this message, and f'm asking you if the

massage was meant to call this off, this involvement. What

axactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arma.

Mr. roorwin. No, I wasn't. No.

The Chairman. Dut at the same time, you ware saying, don'e

transfer the machine guns, ware you not?

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what

wo ware saying is -

The Chairman. What axactly were you saying?

Mr. Goodwin: We were saving that we didn't want to do

anything that would Involve us further, the United States

further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.

Tho Chairman, I sad. I 500.

Mr. Goodwin. Becauso we wore not for assassination.

Sanator Baker. The distinction is -

Senator Tower. Woll, it saya hare in number 1, 1t says,

continue to inform dissident alements of U.S. support of their

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position. So what, again the interpratation that can be drawn

from this la that wa don'e want to be involved, but do ahead

and have the other guys on, becauss their position would be to

assassinate trujillo, so what you are in affect doing 19 sayino.

let's don't be Involvad in it but let'a indicate our support

for what they are doing.

Mr. Goodwin. He wars indleating our support for what they.

wore doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency

papar that Trujillo's days were numberer and whoever took office

wa wanted to be our man, that in corract. And so we were goinn

to support and try to retain'relatione and say we would support i

which in not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any troup

that might take offico and ba modarate and pro-united states.

That was all we wore interested in, was having a pro-imerican

government.

Senator Schweiker. Wall, there are two other references

hore, Mr, Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or

ovorthrow" - obviously you still had a reference thare, whether

initiated by a pro-u.s. group of not, was atill part of the

planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we

fool the transfor of arms would serva very little purpose and

axpose tha United Statos to great dangar of ultimate disclosuro

participation in an assassination attempt," and that 1s

scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that

thoro was = to me -- some othor plan afoot to assassinato

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since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

So what interpretation? I mean, thia 1a rift here wich

sassination propositions, and the fact that you have ultimate

disclosure," foar of ultimato disclosure of participation,

asant that cortainly there was something already afoot, thet

ultimately would be disclosed if you vant ahead with this

pans through.

Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is 1f we did,

de would be found out ultimataly, which means not right away.

but lator. In the case of asrassination or overthrow, there

are many groups, a continual llow of groups, of information.

that thore ware varlous groupa planning to assassinate

Trujillo.

Senator Schwolker. Wall, if that's what it meant, then

why dld you dolete 1t?

MI. Goodwin. Hall, I think -

Senator Schwalker. If that was your interpretation, why

In fact did you deleta those four words, "ultimate disclosure

of participation?"

Mr. roodwin. Could you tell ma what page you're roading

from?

Sanator Schwalker. Page 3.

The very words that you interpret one way were in fact

dolated, which shows to mu that you meant them another way, or

thay wouldn't have baon doleted, and you substitute two words

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{or 1t.

MI. Goodwin. Hall, & mean =-

Sanator Schwalker. So that you disguise that.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words ware deleted because they

ware words that were going to give axactly the impregaion you

are talking about. By talking about ultimata disclosure, ug

ware afraid of boing lound out and what we didn't want was any

association with the assassination attempte, no the reference

to disclosure was struck and the words association were

insertad.

Senator Schwelker. But you still call off - you still

laft the language, in actual fact we fool the transter of arms

would surve very little purpose and expose the United States

to great danger of association with assasaination attempte.

Thet still makes the point that you want to make, but you had

othor language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation

which implies to me you ware concerned about other things you

wore doing and things that had already bean programmed and ar.

operation that you ware as much concerned about those baln --

or you wouldn't have changed the lanquage to still say the game;

thing with that one distinction ahout somethina else being

aloot. I don't -

Mr. Goodwin. Hall, I changod 1t, 1 bellevo, Senator --

mean It's hard to ba hald responsible for languana that wan

sojoctail becauso it was Inaccurato. The problem was not ono

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of dieclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated

with assassination. That's why I atruck it out.

Senator Schwalker. You changed the language, but the firat

part of it ramained exactly the same. In fact, wa leel the

transfar of arms would serve very little purpose and expose

the United States. So while you changed the language, you har

the same condition there that you were not going to aupply those

arMS.

7

8

9

Mr. Goodwin, No weren't, that's correct. to wore not -

Sanator Schwalker. Nut why ware you not concerned about

10

the other language, because

11

Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other lannuan

12

I: I was that, well, wa were worried shout baing found out, when in

fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be

14

15

involved. So I struck the implication.

Mr. Smothors. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of

16

1: I our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have

bean any closer to thia plot would have been to bacome one of

1i:

19

" the dissident group. They told him everything thay did, down

"to and including when the car was coming down the road. And

2':

was knew that, didn't we?

*:

Mr, roodwin. Nell, I haven't seen any communications to

Z%.

us that said that. I would not have - I mean, one of his

Instructions was to kesp in very close contact with these

24

li dissident groups. I wouldn't ba surprised if they dropper by

20

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and if they told him everything they ware planning to do. Dut

It's a long jump betweon saying you ra going out and k111

Trujillo and pulling le off, as many people toled.

But I was not aware, as I can ramember, that he had any

kind of detailed information.

Mr. Smothers. Ils messages back to CIA, in fact, convey

those datails, don'e thay?

Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after thia, when these -

none of than that =

Mr. Schwarz. Wall, did you know or did you not know that

the dissidente intanded to usa the small arma, carbines and

pistols, and othor materials they harl themselves, but intended

to use the moopons we had auppliad to agsasrinato Trujillo in

precisely the way he was, in fact, assaasinated? Did you know

that befora you wrote the telegram, or not?

Mr. Goodwin. No, bacause what I'm rasponding to is a

roquest that says we can't do 1t unless ua have the machina

guns, and that's to be used for the assassination.

He are

saying, don'e give them machine runs.

Later on they said to nearhorn, l mean ho did tall me

that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, wa'll

do It, Whether of not we get the machine guns. I mean, that

might also just bravado, or an effort to bluft us into sayina.

well, you might as wall giva lt to them anyway aince they re

gaing to do it. I don't know why anyone would take on

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Trujillo with a.18. I wouldn't have thought that, 11 I thought

about it.

President Tannedy went to Paris a week or two later. When

the assassination actually occurred, we ware all taken by

surprise, so that Dearborn had dotalled knowledge of when it

vas going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called

an amorgoncy menting with the Vica President, a telegram was sent

to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announcel

by Piorre Salingor.

Dut this instruction, the President told me he wanter to

make it absolutely clear we're not getting Involved in

assasainationa.

Sanator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record

shows - I think

you've tostifled to this = that toward the end of the Eisenhower

Administration, they decided to supply arma to this dissident

group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trufillo. Then,

as thase documents show, at some point very near to the time

that. Mr. Trufillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was

19

sent to our consul saying, we don't want to be associated with

¿u i this.

24

2.1,

Why didn't we also say stop it, toll these poople not

proceed further, in light of the tact that they may have

thought, bacause of previous history, that their efforts to

assassinato Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, chara

is still a ploco missiny, in my opinion, that should have

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suggasted -

Senator Tower, Held, the next line says, "Continue to

Inform dinaidanta of U.S, support for their posieion."

Senator Mondale. In other words, 1! I were one of those

dissidents and I qut that from the United States pursuant to

this earlier agreament, I would feel ancourager to bellove that

I had the support of the United States in killing

Trujillo, and

that wo woren't exactly noutral in that, at least, our govern-

ment was not really neutral, that it ancouraged them.

It to true that they didn't get the machine guns, and 1t

Is trus, apparently that what you understood was that thay

wanted the machine guns for assassination and thay wanter! the

other waapons for personal defense, but thare was still, it

would soon to me, reason for them to believe that they had our

support.

Why didn't we say or communicate to tham we want you to

stop and we don't want this man assasainated, and we want you

to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

Why wasn't that final - I just want to make one more

24, 1

point -=

2?1

Thare was a similar talegram sont juat before Diem was

2P

assassinator -- now those are entirely different mattera, and

I appreciate that == but it always soons to me that if we're

24

worrlad about human life, If wa're worried about corractina d

21,

policy that may have set a possibla assasaination in motion,

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tha way to really disassociate lt 1a to say atop, and that 1s

roally what I don't understand.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, lat me say, Senator, flrat of all,

that the question of assassination now la paramount

In people's

minds. There is no doubt that wa hoped that trujillo would. he

ovarthrown. Not only was their no doubt, but thare was a

unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it

Da ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that 1t

might happen. And that occurred avar bafore wa took office and

wo wore in full agraament with it.

There are papers hare which talk about the avant of a coup

of how you're going to gat trujillo some money to get him out

of the country. Assasaination was always a posalbility, but

a coup d'otat, a revolution or a civil was of some kind, a whole

range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, bellove that

Trujillo was going to be ovarthrown one way or another and

not nacessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by aggass1-

nation because -- in fact, 1$ would soam at that time to be tha

most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and

21 i protocted, ordinarily. They knew more about it than we did.

?.:

And when that happened, which wa favored that happoned,

I because wa fult that the datablishment of a democratic rarime

2!

in tha Dominican Republic was something not only banoficial to

2:

tha United States and to our policias. I mean, whon wa're

2. 1

talking about Trujillo hy was not -I mean, about human life,

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1

the man was not only a fasciat, but he was a murderer. He ungr

to have a fraster room in the back of his house where he would

take poopla and show tham the bodies of enemies.

Dut in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real

6

concern was that this was regarded as an Inovitability and we

wanted to be associated with the new governmant.

7

Senator Mondule. I undarstand, but the arqument la made

with respoct to that last telagram that lt was a fig leat

telegram designed to cover our cracks should assassination occur!

10

and you arque, and I think persuasively, that you intended much

11

mors than that, you intanded to make lt clear that we were not

supporting the assassination, that machina quas were not golnn

17.

to he used.

1÷

If that was our intent, and I take le that lt was, why

15

wo didn't we go one step further and say please communicata to

16.

those dissidents who have avary reason to believe from paat

I? i history that we may be supporting the overthrow, including

lo i assassination, that wa oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

13

i. "

the business?

Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we wore out of

*:

Nr. roodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I

27.

suppose, claster to tham. On the other hand, I think, it's

their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as thay wantad

%. i

to.

It was not going to be us that daslt with him in. this

21.

fashion.

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•$00

Senator Mondalo, Yeah, but see, if va vera complatoly

noutral I'd agree with that. If thay wanted to assassinate

Trujillo that's their bualness. I agree with it, that's none

of our bualness.

But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like

being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day

before the job is done and not talling anybody, It suans to

me you should aay, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do lt.

The Chalrman. I'va changad my mind.

Sanator Mondala, That's why I don't understand.

Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's

bean described to ua where people ware beyond control and you

couldn't communicate with than after the forces had been sut

in motion.

H5. Goodwin. Hell, may I tell you, I don't know that there!

avet was any statement that those quas that were authorized on

January 12th, alther in the authorization or subsequent, for

the purposes of assassination or otherwise.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, thare were iscores of those;

and whother they raached you or not is a separate and important

quoition, but thare are four or five axamplos of communication

to tho Agancy, and I think passad on to tha stato Department.

and that those guns ware to be used for an assassination effort

whather or not the machino guns were obtained.

Senator Mondale. Well, you sas, that could be important.

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becausa if your understanding was as you have just deseribed

then the tolegram makes more sense. But 1! in faot vo vare

Implicated, as I underatood earlier in assassination attempta

The Chairman. Filtz, look at the way Daarhorn 1a. I

think dt's vary important to understand this matter, to 1o0k

at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He

was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having

recalved the Inatruction, the following - now this 18 at Tah

J, book 2 of 2, the second s.

It saya -- firat of all, do you have that, Mi. Goodwin?

ME. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

The Chairman, It says: "One, l belleve we can hold pro-unite

States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis

set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tall

them you're no longer connected with thair scheme and Mr.

Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

"Two, following our obsorvations for Department and CAS

considerations, Al 11 attempt is mado by United Statea' friends

to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations against us

and the best we can do la sae there la no prood."

Sonator Baker. To 8de there is no proof.

Tho Chairman. "The greatest danger point is Thomas stockarr

1'e was given a small number of arms by dissidant agents to holl

several days and has told several parsona disaldenta obtalned

those Items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I have

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Dom

tapa

b..

2000)

informed him thia cannot be true or I would know

and when he

2

requested me supply arms through him for diasidents, I told

3

him 1t was impossible. He : de greater danger because of

personal ambiterment againat CAS, a matter of which CAS head-

5

6

quarters 1a fully Informed.*

Than ho goes on to say that "since local CAS la now to

ungage mainly in Intelligance collection and reporting, I

recommand urgent transfar from the Dominican Republie of three

CIA officars, If simmering assassination plot should matar1:lle

10

they would be in danger and might be picked up for trujillo-

11

type questioning. This la enally avoidable hy quick transfer

now. These three have engaged in fully authorized actlvity

which, 1f uncovered, could put the United States in bad publie

14

position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage

1:

and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR.

16.

fostar Laftist activitiea."

1'1

1k

Now there's a vote on.

I read this because it suggests the Mr. Dearborn got a

1!

"different message than the one you say you intanded to sand.

(A briof recess was

taken.)

21

The Chairman. Lot's go back on the racord.

?:!

Mr. Goodwin. Wall, that paragraph, to mo, Senator.

21

Paragraph A == I am not sure whether his interprotation o

2:! Instructions, or at least in spocifles, seems to be clear.

ar He says that he has informed tham that ho cannot supply arms

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to the dissidents, and that la what 18 what Rennody, of course,

had said in the talagram. And the roquest had been to know

whather or not he could supply arms.

So that I ane from that point of vlow, l am not suro,

quite clear, In what way he misinterpreted the telegram.

The Chairman. Well, let's go down = I don't think he

has misinterpretad his instructions not to supply more arms.

That's clear anough. But if you go down to D . are you with

me now?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. "Since local CAS" - I quess that should

bo Chiat of station - "Sinco local Chlat of Station, than" --

and chat would bo CIA Chief of Station - "Since local Chief

of Station la now to engage mainly In Intelligence collection

and Ioporting, I recommand urgent transler from Dominican

Rapublic of three CIA officers. If sinharing assassination plot

should materialize" -- now that in itself, if I may digress a

moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might

be imminent. For he says "If simmering assassination plot

should materialize, they would ba in danger and might be picked

up for Trujillo-type questioning. This 1s easily avoidablo by

gulck transfor now." -- again the indication of his feeling

that. an assassination might ba imminent, othorwise, why transfer

thom. "These threo have engayad in fully authorized activitias

which, If uncovared, could put the liniter Status in bad public

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46

position."

Now. I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn

anticipated at loast the real possibillty of assasaination

attempts in the immediato future and that he was recommendino

that those CIA officers that had been connected with having

supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic

right away.

Mr. Goodwin. Hall, I would agree with a good part of that

Sanator, although I think that there were assassination plots

aimmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this

in fact took place.

And I think he was concerned that the

assassination would be unsuccessful, that Trujillo would pick.

up the Marleans and fled out not simply about the translos of

guns but the whole range of covert activities that they harl

been angaged in, torture them and perhaps kill then,

And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in

the alr, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing.

I think, in the telagram that was sent to him that dandes the

possibility that trujillo might be assassinated or that there

might be an attempted

assassination, which is the purport of

Duarborn's, bocausa ll the assassination was succossful, thera

was no nood to get the cIn out.

The Chairman,. But there is something more, roally. It

the possibility of assassination was a long continuing china,

always on the mind of Daarhorn, why does he respond to this

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instruction by saying, gut these men out nou?

Mr. Goodwin. Woll I think obvlously thess people had

relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt

anyway, with or without the machine quns. He thought the attempt

might ba abortive, and it so, he thoucht that all Americans or

paople that worked for him or with him would be in danger.

Tho Charman. Then you would have to aaros with ma,

wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had

eviiance that suggasted to him that an assassination attempt

was imminant.

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, ? think it was.

The Chalrman. And ha took this sufficiently serious to

recommend gatting the threa CIA agents out without further

dalay?

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely

true, because I think he belleved that there was a serious

attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he vas absolutely

19

right and he was doing his job wall.

I would like to say, 1f I might go hack, that in toims of

i

tho tolegram, is that I sat in the office with President

20

Kennady who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that ha

wanted nothing to do with political asgassinations, which I

did,

so lt's not a matter of interpretation, bacause he cannot

23

testify to that mattor, so it's not a question of reading the

taxt so much as dociding whethor of not I'm tolling the truth

25

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about that instruction.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth

Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.

Mr. Schwara. He hava to explore whether something went

wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some

information in front of you and then see if you can halp us

explain what, if anything, want wrong.

Hould you show him Exhiblt 2-1.

Now Exhiblt 2-A 1a a cable dater March 20th from the Agency.

in the Dominican Rapublie to the Agancy In Hashinaton, And

roading in Paragraph 3, lt describes the way In Which - 1t

#

describes a plot.

In Paragraph 4, it says the following: "To do, they noor

live M-j's or comparable machine gune and 1500 rounds

ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use

quiet weapons for basic Job." Now the basic job is apparently

the assassination.

Now again, were you told - now, in Exhibit 1, you ware

told in the brieting on covert action by the ciA that cho

carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal dofense

woapona and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says.

Mr. Schwarz.. Right, I understand that.

Now, what I am trying to undorstand is, in telling you

that

the waapons had boon passad for paraonal dalense purposes, do

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you think that is consistant, 1s candid, in light of the

fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons ware

3

going to be used for the basic job, that ls the ansassination.

Mr. Goodwin. Holl, there are several communications

regarding the unapon dotails of the plan and they are obulously!

6

inconsistent.

7

Mr. Schwara, They are.

Mr. Goodwin. The telegramg say it, but on the other hand,

a carbine or pistol 18 hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would

10

sonard that as saying I am going to strangle him. And it

you're going to have a fire flaht with machine guns, l mean.

11

In other words, it suams to ma that somebody is interprettin

what they say, or they might have had five or six different

plans.

14

The request that came to the White louse, Iinally, was

1÷

very apacific, and this 1s too, that additional weapons are

16

needed in ordor to carry out an assassination plot. I mean,

howover you read this, they do say they need additional weapons

1c

to carry off an assassination. And that Is what the President

19

"at that paint had in mind on May lith, around May 13th, about

the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any polley that:

?.!

¿ho had astablished of any directions that he had giver, Immediatel!'

i Bald, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not sotting

, Involvod in assassinations. They can do what they want, but

8.4

ara not going to get involvad.

21.

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Sanator Mondale. In othar worde, the President wag

2

advised by you that there was an assasaination plot in which we

ware implicated and he told you that wa don't want any part of

it and you are to send a message on his authority sayian that,

5

and that is what you thought you had done?

6

Mr. Goodwin. I would phrasa it a little bit differently,

7

Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who

8

vanted to assassinata Trujillo to whom we had given some quns

9

and hia rasponse was probably like, you mean some idiot gave

10

them guns? I said, yes.

He said - this ls a paraphrago o

11

you know, if you know Senator Kennedy, or Preaident Kennedy,

12

I mean, ha said, woll, lot's make it clear. And if you compare

1%.

my draft with the Stato Department draft, I was overridina, as

they point out, bacause thair draft says, wa're tryino to ret

this message through but wa're blocked by 115. Goodwin and have

16

to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of

course, than the President.

It is clear that the stress la changed to make it clear

14

1' that the President wants

nothina to do and cannot condone

assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at

::' assassination, 1t says cannot condone asgasaination. Anil i did

at " that becausy ho told me to do that.

The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy

2: polley as one of gettina the novernmant no Purchar Involve!

bocauas thore had been a past involvamant? lla know that an!

%!

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you know that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished

dissident groupa ho had expressed an intorest in assassinating

Trujillo. And your intention hare in sending this telegram

was to convay to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration

wanted no further Involvement in thig --

Mr. Goodwin, That's right. Wa found -- the President

found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that

procaedad his coming into office that a couple of carbinas and

platols had boon transfarred in order to mount a major assault

on a government that had lasted for thirty yoars, and lt seemori

at that point like a formidabla threat to trujillo.

llo wanted to mako it absolutoly clear when he found out

that anybody who wantad to assasoinata Trufillo in the Dominican

Republic that they ware going to do it on their own, the

United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out

no more weapons and this is why ho said wa do not want to

condone assassination or ho assoclated with it. And that's why

I wrote the telogram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

Sanator Towar, Well, may I ask you, then, what you

2..

' Interpratted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3,

• "Continue to Inform dissident elementa of U.S. support lor

2'%.

¡ thair position?"

24

1r, Coodwin, Thay wore -- thals position was that, what

ithey rogardod as that Trufillo should be overthrown and ranlacet

%!.

"by a moderats govarnmant, Ma supported that position, as did

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the othar mambors of the Organization of American States, an

we wanted to make it vory clear that we did support that

position, and we wished then well in their efforts to establish

that position and 1f they did wa would recognize their govern-

ment and sand them asslatance, which we did.

As a matter of lact, we took much groater efforts to

got rid of Ramos Trujillo in the six months that followed the

aBBassination than anything that proceeded it, Ineluding brining

the Amorican float practically into the harbor at Cuidad

Trujillo at the direction of the secratary of Dolenso, Instant

of

carbines and pistols, wa brought in dastroyers, alrcraft

li

carriors and Marine battalions so that they would know what

the consequences might bo if they didn't got out when they not

out.

14

15

If I might make one more point, senator, 1f 1 may, la that

1C

the countries of South America are full of quns sent there

17

by the American govornment to be used to kill thousands of

li people over the last several decades, and with the lone

axception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies

2

# from on top -- of course you're well-acquainted with that --

:::

, sent knowing that they would be used to kill paople in interral

2e l struggles. The only distinction in this case la that Trufillo

2!

happened to be the head of state, which is a practical

distinction, but you could hardly make a moral one.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could l dak a question in

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that raspect?

The Chairman. Hell, I am not sure I agros with that;

although that is a philosophical argument.

Sanator Baker. Are you talling us, Mr. Goodwin, that

assassination, not of hoads of stato, but assassination of

lasser figuras was a common, ordinary occurrence in South

America at the bahoat of imarica or with American support?

Mr. Gooduln. No, 1 an talking about that we supply arma

to revolutionary groupa or to armed groupe which we did in

say Bolivia, or sometimos to the government Itsall, or in Chilo

wo gave assiatance of various kinds to dianident groups with

the knowledge that our assistance would he used in internal

struggles.

I don't have to use the word assassinations.

Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then.

as opposed to assassination?

Mr. Goodwin, Wall, this is an Internal struggle in the

Dominican Republic.

The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction,

because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is

a difforonco botweon first depres murdor and manslaughter.

Thore Is supposed to connote a curtain difference in moral

connotations, and undertaking dollbarate action that is

targotted against a particular person with the intantion o!

murdering that porson is normally regarded under our crimiral

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laws as the most reprahansibla kind of homicida and therefore

dofintad as murder'in the firat degree, so there mást be some

gradation there.

Mr, Goodwin. Well, there are gradations, althourh I do

think that many of the activities agalnat, say, someone like

Allande or others are equally targetted in Latin American

countrias and not just general conflict or the killing of

particular l Mexicans, of course, traditionally go out and

shoot down leaders of new querrilla groups or insurgenta, but

not nocessarily with our guns.

The Chalrman. But in any event you're not testifying hare

to your cartain knowledge the United States government participa

tad in an assassination attempt or asalstiny in an assassina-

tlon attompt -

MI. Goodwin. No,

I don'e have any deep knowledge of that

subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acte.

In any event, I do want to return to this.

This was -- clearly Prosident Kennedy was much closer to

Yours.

Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assagsination took. place.

Presidon: Kennedy was in Parla and as one of the documants wa

1ooked at indicatas, there was a meeting at which vice Prositanti

Johnoon was Interasted in finding out what had happened and you

had a raviow of this, and discussed in that revlow that tha

weapons had buan passed, the small arms and the machino guna

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55

hadn't bean passed and the assa

asination occurred.

Now, aftar that ravlow, were any stops taken to make, as

a mattor of more general, governmental pollay, the policy which

1s expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy'

instruction?

MI. Goodwin. Not to my knowlerigo.

(A brief racess was takon.)

The Chalrman, Do you have any more questiona?

Mr, schwarz. I don't have any more questions.

Tho Chairman. Do you have any other matters chat you

can toll us about the Trujillo assassination for our onlinhten-

mant?

Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?

The Chalrman. On the assassination.

Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me road through

all of this, and when I come back the noxt time, I might have

something olse, if I can find anything else in thare --I do

think this la pretty complata.

The Chairman. He will axpect to henr you again garly rext

weak, on the cuban phase of your testimony.

Hr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.

Tho Chairman. Mr. Dennin, thay've been lo all nighe,

would lika to ask two quystions.

Mr. Dannin. Wall, when you said thera ware no more

questions, I juat ralsad the possibility and you digoussed it

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ристь (Auto 202).

mangor. D.E. 20003

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about mestings hold alter the assassination back in washington

Whan Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those maatings hald

aftor the assassination bofore he came back, at which the

wholo matter was discussod, initially with Vicy President

Johnson presiding and ultimataly, the last one, with President

Kennedy.

Mr. roodwin. That's right. la had, of course, a serlas

of amergancies, We had an amergency mesting, and cabled tho

Prasident who was in Paris, and the firat matter on our mind

was how to keep Ramios Trujillo, who was the son of trujillo,

from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first.

It took us awhile to find out that he was in Parls, which ar

least indicatad, Senator, that if they were planning de, le

wasn't done in a vary comprahanalva fashion, and we lound ha

was in Paris and we wantad to stop him from returning, to

dotain him, but 1t was too late. By the time we found out, he

had already chartered an Air France Jet and was on his way to

Cuidad Trujillo, and I bellove thore was some affort made to

bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight,

diverting it to some Amarican airport, but ho didn't do that.

and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of

our policy from that poirt on was how to get him and his uncle.

Hoctor - and I forget the other fellow's name -- out of there

so that tho kind of moderato government that we wanted could

be installerl.

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And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make

various inducementa like he could take his money out, it was

discussed that 1f he would leave peaceably, but what finally

happened was when MeNamara movad the fleet in over the horizon

and an AiI Force Canoral bombed the palaco, that was the and.

he got on his boat and loft.

Tha Chalrman, Mir Force General?

Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Alr Force Caneral.

Ile dacided that was an eagler targot than the American

floot.

The Chalrman. Has the bombing done at our Instruction?

M5. Goodwin, No, I don't ballava ao. I was tryina to

Ismambor that, but I don't balieve it was. As I remember.

it was quite a surprise to us that this fallow harl taken the

initiative. The moving of the floot was intonded as sort of

a threat that if thay didn't get out we might come in and dut

them. There was no, howsver, no, at that point, no country

attempted to do that, just

to scars then, And the flaet was

actually cheared in the Dominican Republic, a vary rare

occasion.

But chis Air Force Genaral did, and then ha trial to make

himself dictator and two of his own officors arrustad him, Thay

all had been trained in Amorican military achools.

Mr. Schwarz. To complete tha racord on the response to

the telegram wo had Dearborn'n snaction., la will read into

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the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of station in

response to the telegram Me. Goodwin drafted.

Assume -- reference 1, that's the telenram, "Final word

present policy in which KuDAre? - that's CIl - "work here

must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that raference, are for

practical purposas retreat from previous policy. Howaver.

Hoadquarters awars extent to which ODYOKE" that is, the United

States --"already associnted with Enslai

== that in the

assassination of trufillo, - "It wa are to at loast try 'cover

up tracka' XUDARK personnel directly involved in trusting

preparationa must be withdrawn now."

I don't know if that merits comment or not. It just

happons to be how it was interpretted by cin.

Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also raflecte

Dearborn's own disappointment that

Mr. Schwarz. CIA.

Mr. Goodwin. CIn's disappointment, which is understandable.

The Chairman. Any further quastions?

Senator Tower?

Mr. Smothors?

Mr. Smothers. MI. Chairman, I'd rathor walt till the return

of the witness.

The Chairman. Yos.

Lot's make cartain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to

most with the staff so that the portinent documonts that will

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up In connaction with our interrogation on Castro vill be

ravlawad. We're not intarested in any kind of entrapment. No

want you to be fully avara of whatever documentation we have

so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the

policy at the time.

Mr. Goodwin. And whatevar I bring I can give to you and

then duplicate 1t.

Mr. Schwarz. Wall, ahall we plan, for safety, on the

staff seeing you on Wednasday morning and having your testinony

Hednasday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and

gatting the things out, I think it will bo safer Wednesday,

that's not too inconvenient.

The Chairman. Wednesday?

All right. Thank you very much.

(whereupon,. at 6135 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,

to reconvene at -8130 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)

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