INFORMATION REPORT: SELECTION AND TRAINING OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS ABROAD
Originator: CIA
Document date: 10/12/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FORMATION REROI

INFORMATIONAR

REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY C'ubd

SUBJECT

Selection and Trashing of Cuban

Intelligrace Agents Abroad

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REPORT NO.

CS-311/04298-64

DATE DISTR: 12 October 1964

NO. PAGES

18

REFERENCES

CS-311/00115-64

RETURN TO CIA

Beckground Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF

1963-1964

INFO.

PLACE &

DATE ACQ. JUne 1961

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INPORMATION. SOURCE ORADINOS ARE DEPINITIVE APPRAISAL OP CONTENT IS TENTATIVE

SOURCE:

Interference Service Lead April 1964h0 served with the Cuban

Intelligence

Introduction

1.

The Cuban

foreigr Intelligence service, the General Directorate of

Intelligerce (Direccion General de Inteligencia - DGI), in dis-

charging 1ls functior of protecting Cuban interests and security

and promosing see pollgass of the Cuban Government, employs agents

of many nationalities.

Although its activities extend to Europe

and Africa, its principal agent strength is in Latin America.

Agents have ir general tuo types of assignments:

collection of

local government and the local situation, and

promorion of revolutiorary activity, including guerrilla warfare.

Ali bit agents abroid ars therefore divided into two basic cate-

gories according to suriction:

intelligence agents charged

collection of erformation

and penetration of local governments and

organirat1ons, who are truly clandestine, 1.e.,

are not known in

ecuntries as Cuban agents; and

guerrilla warfare and

charged with directing and supporting revolution-

aty activities,

who are often known as Cuban agents to the local

Communist and leftist groups with which they work.

The tho types

of agents

separately and are controlled by different

departments

DGl readquarters in Havana, intelligence agents

by the Illegal Departmont (Departamento Ilegal, called Llegal)

guerrIlla agents ly the LY or National Liberation Department.

(Departamento Liberacion Vacional).

Agent Selection

2.

as opposed to

The Dul emploja some agents of Cuban nationality intelligence agents,

staff members

working soroad.

They function as

1.c., ciandestine agents under the Illegal Department, and are

3

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3.

recruired by thai department.

Of three known agents in this cate-

gOry, one sas a sember of

the Cuban internal security service, the

Departnent of State Security (Papartamento de Seguridad del

Estado - DSE), Julio Damaso Vasquez.

He was a trained parachutist

at the time of his recruitment.

ruu other known agents, Rafael

Guzman and

"Chino" (name unknoon), were recruited because they

friends of one of the Illegal Department officers,

Gonzalez.

One criterion for recruitment is that the agent shall

not have a wide circle of acquaintance.

Agents of other nationalities are usually recruited by agreement

between a bal officer and the local Comnunist or leftist organiza-

tion to which the person belongs, but there are other possibie

c.

d.

Foreigners visiting Cuba.

dost foreign visitors to Cuba ire

handled by the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples

(Institute Cubano del Amistad con los Pueblos - ICAP), which

arranges for their travel to cuba;

their itineraries, lodging,

and entertainment while there; and their return travel to

their homes or other destinations.

The DGI has an arrangement

with ICAP under which members of the DGI MO Department

(Departnent

of Illegal Centers

- Departamento Centros Ilegales)

meet and interview foreign visitors

the purpose of extract-

.ing any information of val'e to Cuba and of assessing them as

Contacts are so well camoufinged

courtesies that few

of the visitors realize

1n touch with au intelligence agency.

The DGI does not deal

with foreigr diplomats, who are the

responsibility of the DSE,

but it has access

to any other foreigners.

ment considers any visitor a potential agent, especially if he

shows a tarsist or extreme leftist attitude, it reports his

name and whatever it has learned about him to either the

Illegal Department of the DGI, which handles intelligence

agents not in contact with local Comnunist or leftist groups,

or the IN Department, which works with guerrilla agents in

contact with such groups.

Referral is made on the basis of

membership in or attachment to an organized group.

In no case

does the NO Department recruit the agent; that privilege is

rescived for the operational departments.

Foreigners resicent in Cuba.

The BC Section (Colonial Bureau -

the SI Department (Department of Information

Services - Departamento Servicios de Informacion) of the DGI

is responsible for screoning

foreigners residing in Cuba

(except diplomats) for potential agents.

Like the NO Depart-

ment, the Be Section makes no actual recruitments, but reports

potential agents to the Illegal or LN Department, according to

whether they are or are not affiliated with an organized grouy.

Persons volunteering inforsation from abroad.

The 40 Dapart-

ment is also responsible for screening letters fror persons

abroad who volunteer information or support to the Cuban

Government.

Its principal aim is to extract any useial in-

formation

fron such letters,

but it also notes any persons who

appear to have agent potential

and refers them to the proper

operational department for consideration.

Members of Conmunist Parties and organized leftist groups in

Lat in America.

The group

reconnends to a DGI contact--an

officor on a trip to the area, a local representative or agent,

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•a bradle manficer li Cuba if a group offielal is

115a11ld !!in -aary of 185 members as cardidates for gurrrilla

trainine or cuba or so chear oun courtry.

The Del and the

or which el lie caldidates are mos! suitable.

A

DGI pen! un ki"s with th? group may also recommand mentors

for prairare, a rür31ly as sucrrilla fighters but possably

alfo as riara.ears i:talilgence agents: in the first an-tance,

ne recorr.n len is known to tne group, but in ire sacon:

e.

f.

Recrully a51n95 59n tó cuba for guerrilla darfare training.

DGI elti::8: 06051880

guerrilla warfare ard sabotage agents

th:1r eraining in Cuba and select those of sperlal

potirtin: for rocruitment as unilateral intelligenes agents.

Agents

id cerer Irlelligence services.

The Dol irritimas re-

crules a drite agents exployses of hostile in:ciligence

sorvic:, un:! aton al comis into contail.

such agorts may

also ti•said cant to the DGI by the DSE 11 1! has recegnized

andr.crud.=dr.i.m.

4.

When an agort at lidare is proposed, the Illegal or in Department

reviews the availati: intormation about him.

If t: 1= in Cuba,

it may ripur: tra DiE te conduct an investigation; the DGI

Inspection a parro. :Dorarramento Inspeccior, utich deals

primarily ul.l Dei tail Fersonnel, has

forrs for submission to

the USE tequills an enuasligat10n.

Since the Dal dres not re-

veal th: 1lt tus el it irtalligence (illegae! agents to the

DSE, not dil la!' is lidatis at thus invistigates.

tional d'yunli stitc. crofr agents on the basis of ail the

avaiiable interratiar do a personal recommendation trom i DGI

stalf member or trust-d agent.

The candidate is thai recruited.

Cuban ap-no: a:: duis: ot tre covernment agency for which they

are workira, lus ager!#

•i other rationalities ar: not gurrrilla

agents at:

rital-d or work for their own

and religim: agents ars usually aware oniy that thiry are

•iriden Griernment.

They may beiler that sor!

under the juri:lictics of

Cuban army because mistars pirs01-

believe thry it: didir tha

pss, which is widely know:. as

telligence crgan.

Preliminary TranoirE Arracerents

5.

when a Cubai ag'nt is recruited, a schedule for his training is

arranged a. sir. a was that, hi car ccntinus

his arinal miary of

Illi re imployed in

an office or lacrois,"

in his riguia: on and the tralning is

set we center med

If he 15 in acid, ro goes co liring just as ho bas befer

the training is whodeird

for hours when his absince frenches

usual haunts an ief citiceable.

6.

Agents fior furign crintries ar? usually broughe li Cuba for

training ir hor therlilgerce er guerrilla-saturdge artevitres.

The DGl 1S areatled of the

agent's solaction througt channols

from the firld, aid the central Processing STrinirsa: Fretzen of

the LN Drainin! handics arrangemones for this 1:1.d 1 and

from Cuba.

Momally the agent candidate uses his oun traval docu-

ments, but ion. rimes the group to which he belong; provides a

passport birder to a follow citizon who has already born to

He must chain his Cuban visa through the neur: se cuban

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consulate.?

Since there are no official Cuban missions in Central

America,

the agent nogmally makes his way to Mexico and obtains

his Cuban visa there.

In order to keep secret from the author-

teles in his own country that he 15 going to Cuba, the agent

candidate gives another destination,

and the Cuban congular

offices help by issuing his Cuban visa on a separate sheat of

paper instead of stamping it in his passport.

The agont candi-

date may pay his own passage, but usually he

is supplied funds or

an airline ticket through a

local DGI agent of the leftist group

to which he belongs; the funds are issued by the Central Process-

1ng Section.:

Whether he is issued a ticket or given money to buy

his own, the funds originate with the DGl and are forwarded to

the candidate's area through the DGI representation in the Cuban

Embassy in Mexico. .

DGI officers attached to Cuban consulates are alerted to assist

agent candidates"In their travel.

The agent 1s given a password,

which varles from place to place; agents from El Salvador,

example,

are told to mention

"Maurtcio."

When a DGI officor at a

consulate interviews visa applicants, he expedites the visa for

anyone using the proper password; if the password is not used,

he

stalls the applicant for several days walle he cables havana for

authority to issue a visa.

ment nirline, and is told when he is to leave.

subsistence are provided if the trainee has to wait for passage.

Agent candidates from British Gulana sometimes travel to Cuba by

small boats, not regular shipping service.

Agent trainees going to Cuba use a variety of cover stories.

the local authorities, their travel is to sone other destination,

often as tourists, students, or laborers.

For their own group,

no cover story is required;

for their familles and friends, tour-

student travel is the usual explanation.

For persons out-

side the group,

if Cuba 1s known as the destination, the cover

story is a scholarship for study at a Cuban school or university.

Groups of trainees from the same leftist organization often travel

together fror their own country to Mexico and thence to Cuba, but

intelligence agent trainees always travel alone.

Upon arrival at the Havana airport, trainees are met by DoI

officers appearing as

The DGI has an arrangement

the Cuban immigration authorities under which persons of DGI

interest are cleared through entrance formalities without compli-

The trainces are placed

in hotels while final training

arrangements are made, then are transferred to the schools where

their training will be given, or to private houses or apartments

if they are intelligence trainees. The case officer.from the DGI

department which will thenceforth control their activities is re-

sponsible for them during their stay in Cuba.

Using the funds

allotted by the department, he provides them

sonal expenses, medical

the training perlod; se bot warehouse."

clothing, and personal items are

drawn for them

As far as possible, DGI trainees live the normal life of students

and use the cover story that they are studying on Cuban Government

scholarships.

Their movements in Havana are

not restricted,

except that arrangements are made to keep them

away from fellow-

or living in Cuba.

Since most of their train-

ing is given in Havana, and the course is intensive, they do not

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usually travel to other pares ed cuba during the instruction

period, unless they are taken by ite seteel to firticipate in

national campaigns for which all students are dralerd, such as

cans-cutting and coffor-picking.

diter the trodning course is

complored, if there 1s any delay in returning student? to their

own country, they may travel outside tarand; traps are arranged

and financed by the DGl liaison offacre in ICAP.

During delay

prriods, however, they are at the disposal ol tre school, which

may use

them in

"voluntary" campaigns or other ways.

Guerrilla

agents of the same nationality are left togather 1l they belong

to the same organization, but trainces from different organiza-

tions of the same country

are siparated.

Traing of tho nation-

alities are never put together, and forsigners are never groupee

with Cubans.

In both livirg quarters and tralning,

the illegal.

intelligence agent Is separated froz guerriila agunts.

A11

trainees are encouraged to hair as little cortact as possiblo

with persons outside the school.

Upon arrival in Cuba, each agent is assigned a pseudonym, which

he uses throughout his trainery.

Actually, within the guerrilla

either large co suall groups use

their real

since their identitis

ar: ussaily krown to their fellows

carlier association or traveling cogetter.

primarily a means of protecting the studine fron 1d'ntification

outside the school.

For a tImE,

thr. D'l ustid the

pseudonym only during the trining parrod and disland another

scudonym when the agent returned hon', our the rentusion of keep-

Ing srparate files was so grat that the trainine pseudonym nas

adopted as permenant.

Sometimes, brazeel, po-udonyns ars still

changed, for security reasons, when the student liairs Cuba or

a1l:: he has returned to the frold.

Training of Guerrilla Astnts

12.

The LN Department, and spocifically too case officer in charge of

á group of agents

to be trained as gatelilas, arranges for their

instruction in the Ef. Department (Derr mint jo Spreial Schools -

Departamento Escuelds Especiales! ri mr Dil.

The case officer

himself docs

conduct the trans, which

is entircly an EE

Department responsibility.

The stud-at group is assigned to one

of the EE Department schools in Haraid, by rationality; training

groups are as large as 25 and

as small as threr ar four persons.

Courses last three to six months, degrading on the type of train-

ing and the ultimate mission

but in special cases

last as long

as a year (tWo Guateralars were trained that

ail military, diawn from tin Cuban

there is one for each military sp-cialty, and a political

13.

Training covers all aspicts of guerrila warfar:

weapons hand-

explosives,

sabotage,

demolition, military

tactics, combat

engineering,

countering anti-guerrilla

activities.

Weapons are of both American and Communist-Bloc

provenance.

specialized trainirg is given; for example,

is a school

for frogmen at the south of the Jaimanitas

in Barlovento, west of Havana, and too Guatemalans and a Dominican

as frogmen during 1963.

normally, however,

receive any conmunications training (sceret

radio, etc.?: when they retura home, thrir channel of

communication

for sending information and receiving instruction

and support is through the organized g:oup to which they belong.

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14.

practice in guerrilla warfare and weapons and explosives handling

is given

the school premises

in lavana.

In addition,

both dur-

ing the course and near its conclusion, groups of students aro

taken to the Escambray Mountallis In. Las Villas Province to put

their training into practice and to learn to live off the country.

They are integrated

into regular Cuban army units for short

periods and take part in any military activitles then in progress.

During 19G3, for example, a group of Guatemalans and a group of

Saliadorians were taken

separately to the Escambraj and partici

pated in the opcrations

then being conducted by the Cuban army

against anti-Castro guerrillas in the area.

15.

Guerrilla students are required to meet a standard of completo

famillarity with all the information and material forming part of

their instruction..

Esaminationg aro given regularly: students

cho fail them are

required to repeat the instruction.

A student

may have to repeat the entire course if he cannot pass the neces-

sary examinations.

There are many failures.

An agent candidale

who proves completely incapable of mastering the course 1s

removed from

the school, and an effort is made to find him a

special jou olsowhere.

During the course,

the instructors issue

reports to the school administration, both on the course

as a whole and on the performanco of each

student. A copy 18 sent

to the case officer.

Reporting on students covers porsonal

attitude, discipline, capability in study, political level, etc.

16.

whilo guerrilla training is in progress, two special preparations

for the future are made.

the arrangement of the

agent's travel to his target area, either his own country or

Passports and other documents are prepared for his use

on the return trip: lunds are allocated for his futuro activity;

and provisions are made for his carrying money or possibly speclal

equipment back with him if that is required.

The second thing Is

the assessmont of the traince for other possibilitics.. Through-

out the course he is observed and cvaluated; if ho shows more than

usual aptitude and ability, he comes under consideration as a

vorential intelligence agent for collection of information or

penetration of his home government.

If a traince is assessed as

sustable for intelligence-agent work,

he is removed from the

guerrilla course and receives special instruction for more

clandestine and more complicated tasks:

Training of Intelligence dgents

27.

Intelligence (illegal) agents,

whatever source they are drawn

(foreigners visiting or resident in Cuba,

contacts of DGI agents

or organizations abroad, or guerrilla

trainees selected for

superlor abilities), come under the DGI Illegal Departnent, which

is responsible for their recruitment, training, and subsequent

Since they are truly clandestine agents, their rela-

tionship with the DGI

tion.

requires special security from its incep-

They travel

to Cuba alone rather than in a group,

and in

are kept apart

from other persons of their own lation-

ality and

from one another.

Agents of Cuban nationality are also

kept apart

other nationalities and during training lead

normal lives as

Both Cubans

and foreigners

are

kept from contact with the Cuban Government

or official circles

suspicion of any government connection.

As with guer-

trainees, agents are assigned pséudonyns

in Cuba and for use in field operations later.

gents are not allowed any knowledge of any bal installations

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18.

19.

20.

excep: the ones to which thoy are specarically assigned for train-

1ng,

and never. enter ans Dot official establishment or the caso

officer's home.

A foreign agent candidate arriving in Cuba is first debriefed by

the case officer on his background and qualifications,

to that time the OGI has only advance notice of his selection and

know's little about him.

The interview is recorded, but without

the trainee's knowledge.

On une occasion in early 1964 a case

officer arranged to meet a now trainee in a Mavana restaurant for

the preliminary intervies.

The case officer provided himself with.

a pocket tape recorder, which he tested in adance and found was

in good order. When he started to record the interview, however,

he discovered that he had cither forgotten to adjust the mechan-

1sm after he had tested it, or he pushed the playback instead of

the record button: the restaurent was suddenly electrified by a

voice saying:

"Testing, one, two, three: testing, one, two,

was hastily concluded and

the next day in the safchouse where the agent, a Guatemalan, was

lodged; in this case, of course,

the agent sas aware that it was

being recorded.

the interview are entered in

biographical questionnaire covering all aspects of the agent's

family situation,

political vliws, background and education,

employment experience, connections, and intelligence potentinl;

the document forms the basis of the agont's DGl porsonal file.

In addition, the agent is required to write i complete report on

the operational situation in his country: ircluding types and

styles of dress, eating habits, working hours and holldays,

location of public buildings and places of cntertainment, the

press aid its type and circulation,

urban and rural transporta-

ducational facrilties,

iirlines, personal documents for

ide:tification, and local linguistic idioms.

In cases where an intelligence agont is selected from among

guerrilla traindes, he may romail ulider the

jurisdiction of the

IN Department, Which retains ham as a guerrilla agent but arranges

for his training as an illegal abint also.

Training for intel-

ligence work,

however, is almays sapadle for guerrilla training

and is not revealed so the Communist Party or leftist group

sponsoring the agent, who becomes, in effect, a semi-overt Cuban

agent in guerrilla activities and

a clandestine agent in Intel-

ligence reporting or other junctions.

One such agent, trained in

Cuba in 1963, was returned to the Dominican Republic about mid-

works as an illegal

agent (under the LN Depariment), without the knowledge of his MED

collcagues, as a penetration of the MPD.

The case officer from the Illegal Department arranges for the. com-

plete support of the agent during training, providing him lodging

In a private house or apartment Dol warehouse as is done for

his food and clothing

and personal equipment from the

guerrilla agents, and keeping him in pocket coney.

The case officer does not give any instruction, but

arranges with the MI Department (Department o! Technical Opera-

tional Support) of the Dil for training the ageat in the skills

he will require for his furure mission.

The VI Department has no

schools or regular training sites but

uses private houses or

apartments, which are procured and maintained by the DGI General

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21.

22.

23.

Administration Department.

The same safchouse is used for suc-

cessive agents, but only one 15

trained there at a time.

1ng the agent's operational plan as lald down by the case officer,

the MI Department provides instruction in the necessary skills

through its own

sectlong and varlous departments of the DGI out-

side the operational departments.

All. Illegal agents are trained in normal tradecraft elements such

as clandestine meetings, election and use of dead drops, recrult-

ment of agents,

establishment and operation of agent nets (only

for agents specifically intended for network direction), use of

Informants and collaborators, photography, and some form of com-

Practice in operational techniques such as survell-

lance and

counter-surveillance and gervicing dead drops is glven

sections of Havana.

Each agent in addition 1s 1n-

structod on matters relating to his particular miss10"commundca-

given whatever communications training he will need.

tions receives speclal emphasis because all arrangements must be

made during the training period.

Techniques include secret writ-

ing, codes and ciphers, radio transmission and reception, micro-

dots, and microfilm.

Only a few agents are trained in the lattor

two techniques,. and not all are tra ned in radio, but almost all

recolve instruction on secret writing, which is the most widely

used means of communication between. agents in the field and their

case officers.

The typo of communications training the agent w11l

receive is usually discussed with the case officer by the hi

Department,

but sometimes the MI Department decides without con-

it consults the SI Department for opera-

tlonal background on the country where the agent will work.

Section (Technical Section - Seccion Tecnica) of the MI

Departmont has the main responsibillty for agent communications

iraining and itself conducts the training in secret writing.

first requests the

I& Section

(Chemical Laboratory - Laboratorio

Quimico) of the MI Department to devise and prepare a secret

writing system for the agent's usc.

Most systems depend on

sympathetic inks made with salt, blood, urine, and other materials;

the type assigned the agent is determined by his mission and

operational situation.

Each agent receives a different system,

although two agents

working in the same operation use the

An agent normally

learns two systems, one for incoming

correspondence,

one for outgoing corres-

pondence, preparation only.

if he is to direct an

network of his own which

requires internal clandestine com-

munication, he is taught a third system, both preparation and

development, for use in the network.

The case officer not only

does not participate in the training but knows very little about

the secret writing systems,

since the processing of messages fron

agents in the field is handled by the ST Section and he receives

only the developed text, and the ST Section,

for reasons of

security and compartmentation,

anything specific about communications.

refuses to tell the case officer

The ST Section trains the agent thoroughly on the materials and

methods he is to use and gives him practice in processing messages

under direction,

then in preparing test messages and in developing

and interpreting test messages prepared by the instructor.

training period varies according to the complexit; of the system

and the requirement for competence from the agent.

the instruction

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agent 1s expected to attain a high scandard of performance. An

ages: Who fa1ls the course may have to reppal lt, if the opera-

sonal plan requires

it and his schedule permits.

normally continues until the agent has achieved the desired pro-

fictency; an craluation of his ability is included in his personal

Actually, however, secret writing training has not been

uniformly successful in DGI experienco; in some cases,

communica-

tions from the arent In the field could not be read at headquarters

because the secret writing was impropurly prepared,

have also had difficulty in luciphering messages. sent to them.

21.

Agents never write directly to OGl headquarters; all their mali

in another country.

Instruction in

modation addresses

1s givon by the uS Department (Department of

Legal Centers - Departamneo Contros Legales), which handles DGI

f10ld stations

their correspondence,

breduse accommodation

addresses are usually

In countring where, Cuba has official repre-

sentation and the fiold sialson survices the letter drops.

going communications to agents go by diplomatic pouch to the field

station and are malled from thrit to the agent.

Agent letters to

neadquarters go to an, accommoda! ion address,

where they are picked

up by the field station and forwarded by diplomatic pouch.

country used for incoming communications 1s usually different from

that for outgoing; an agant

in El Salvador, for example, may send

h1s reports to Havana via Mexico and receive headquarsors direc-

tions and replies via Paris.

The MIS Diparament controls the

assignment of accommodation addrisses.

Since. the DGI believes

that there is less darger of posing the agent if his cover

letters containing secret writing are

as realistic and natural as

possible, the agent is briefed rot only on th accommodation

addross to which he is to wrire,

bue alss on the persons

actually dive ther-gry,

r-1d110nshlps, etc.--so

that he can refer to birerdays

or family

agent Is also

caught salecrion 01 plausible but not

addresses for his outgoing communications.

25.

Agents who are to learn codes and ciphers and radio transmission

reception are trainid by tr. SI Scrion, which has its

radio transmitter for irstruction purposes.

own

Tist radios

the

agents use in training are precured in

their own countries and

•are adapted for cland-stint use by thi ST Section; most

such

equipment is Western-made,

ard much of it is American.

The agent

transmission and riception

and also is taught how to adjust

a commercial radio to his individual liquir-ments

and how to make

minor repairs on it. He may learn the standard Morse code but

usually is taught a numerical cod arranged in groups.

secret writing, tho case cificer knows little about the actual

mechanics of the radio communications arrang-ments because radio

messages are processed cutsid.

reach him only in the form of clar text, and because compart-

mentation keeps him from acquirirg lochnical knowledge.

Similarly, he knows little about the proficiency required of the

agent and sees only the finai evaluation report prepared by the

ST Section for the agent's personal file.

26. If the agent is also to receive training in microfilm and micro-

dot techniques, the ST Section arranges with the LF Section

(Photographic Laboratory - Laboratorio Fotografico) of the MI

Department for the use of equipment

the assignment of a

system and then itself gives the training. The Lf Section has

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all the necessary equipment.

Only a few selected agents aro

given such

instruction.

One clandestine agent in the Dominican

vell trained,

who spent a considerable mar in Cuba and was extremely

was provided microfilm

microdot equipment for

preparing and developing messages, but his case is exceptional.

also taught how to make

devices for transmitting microfilm

and microdot material securely.

The preparation of concealment

devices and instruction in their use are handled by another

section of the MI- Department, the EMB Section (Concealment Devices

Section - Seccion Embutidos), which niso prepares for the agent

any devices he will need for carrying materials or codes back to

his own country when he returns.

Final Bricfings

27.

28.

When guerrilla agents have completed their training,

Department case officer-brief's the group on its mission in its

home area, which is usually support of local revolutionary

The briefing includes assignment of tasks, explana-

tion of what support the group may expect and how it is to be

supplied, directions for reporting to the sponsoring group,

advice on security and self-protection, and the travel route to

be followed.

In addition, the group

leader receives a special

briefing on means of communication with DGI headquarters, special

arrangements for supplying the group or i's sponsoring organiza-

tion, and perhaps the transportation

to its home area of propa-

ganda "i Sabotage materials from Cuba.

Although agents are

allowed to take notes during their training, they are not permitted

to carry any compromising material on their return home.

final instructions are given orally and are memorized by the

agent.

Actually, however, guerrilla agents do not always observe

security precautions

about materials.

One Salvadorian guerrilla

agent succeeded in hiding in his luggage a copy of the Manual of

Guerrilla Warfare he had used in his training course, even though

the case officer inspected the luggage while it was being packed.

Tho case officer commented that unless another inspection was

made at the time the agent left his quarters to depart the

country or at the airport just before boarding the plane,

it was

impossible to prevent agents from carrying off such classified

matter.

Illegal agents receive a more intensive final briefing. The case

officer reviews with the agent the general mission and

tasks ho is to undertake,

all of which have been covered during

training, such as collection of information on his home govern-

ment or specific organizations, penetration of official organs in

the country or perhaps the local Communist Party or a leftist:

group, assistance in communications and forwarding of material,

The briefing includes advice on security and self-protection,

refresher instruction on accommodation addresses for secret

writing correspondence,

an rxplanation of the travel route for the

return journey and the documents to be used, and specific instruc-

tions for reporting to a group or commencing his assignment after

arrival, with a schedule

for initiating communications, depending

on his mission and his return itinerary.

Illegal agents receive

their final instruction on communications two or three days be-

Instructions about frequencies, which are

assigned by the MI Department, and codes for radio

communication,

procurement and preparation of secret writing materials, etc., are

photographed and prepared for the agent to carry with him in a

concealment device. One agent returning to Salvador received his

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29.

data on film, which was rolled and put into a

fals+ heel

on one shoe, prepared by the EMB

Agents who

are to use radios do not take sets with then: the Ill prefers to

hare then purchase their communications equipmeat in their own

country and

provides muney for the purpose: the radios are thus

not attributable to Cuba.

The agent usually car.ies with him the

funds needed for procurement of small equipment and may occasion-

ally act as a courier carising special messages or fundo.

large sums for the purchase of large equipent or arms

for guerrilla operations are sent by diplonatic ruch or are.

carried by clandestine

In Septenber lois, for example,

the IGI sent. U.S. $25,000 concealed in the lining of a suitcase

carried to lexico by a diplomatic courier; there it was turned

over to an agent for the purchase of arms to support revolutionary

activity in Vicaragua:

If agonis are not able to leave Cuba at once then they have com-

pleted their training, they remain under the orders of the school

if they are guerrillas, or of their case officer if they are

illegal agents.

They are permitted to travel in Cuba or are

assigned to public "voluntary" campaigns; the case officers try

to keep them busy, partly, at least, as a security precaution.

Delays in departure may be due to lack of suitable documentation,

difficulties in arranging air schedules, special situations In

the nome country,

or physical disability of the agent--one agent

broke his leg while in Cuba and had to wait until he was able to

30.

The principal cause of delay in returning home is lack of suit-

able docusents.

The DGI case offierr is responsible for procur-

ing passports

for his agents' travel,

passports of the proper nationality, because procurement

longer tim. than the usual traning peried.

example, of i group of abcut 25 guerrilla agents

Republic who completed six months of training near the

end of 1963, about ten were still in Cuba in April 1964 because

been unable either o provid, passports for their

travel or to arrange for their return home allegally.

time the case officer has tijing to have additional passports

collected and sent to Cuba via the DGI Station In

rexico so that

tue stranded Dominicans could travel..

Return Travel

31.

is noted abore, while his training is in progress, arrangements

are nade to return the agent to his operational area.

guerrilla agents,

this is their own country and sponsoring group;

for illegal agents normally it is their own country, but occasion-

ally, although rarely,

one is assigned to another area.

Guerrilla

agents who have been trained togother may travel baco as a group;

illegal agents always travel alone.

All agents start their

journey by air to Prague, on Cubana Airlines,

using false Cuban

passports,

their arrival

which they tugn over to Czechoslovak autorities on

of their own or some related on terry, terra ton as ports

ports, containing entries carelully made to accouat for their

period of absence from theis country without shomey any connec-

rion with Cuba.

Both passports are provided the agest by the case

officer at the time of the final briefing, when the trivel route.

is also explained.

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32.

33.

34.

35.

The second stage of the Journey,

from prague to the agent's obn

country, is arranged by the DEl Central Processing Section.

departure from Cuba and the first leg of the trip,

Prague, are arranged by ICAP, where the DGI has a llaison

officer, pseudony'm

, to handle such matters.

guerrilla

agents are preparing to depart,

the case officer

notifies "Ricardo"

• personally, by telephone,

or by official docu-

ment, and allocates the funds they will need during the rest of

their stay in Cuba and for. their travel.

The case officer in-

structs the agents to go to ICAP and establish contact with

"Ricardo", who thereafter is responsible for them as long as they

remain in the country.

If they are delajed, he arranges for

travel in Cuba, and in any case he provides

them subsistence and

pocket money. He also, through ICAP, procures their required

immunizations; an ICAP request for vaccination for a traveler is

an indication

that the person is of interest to the Cuban intel-

ligence services, since the ordinary departing visitor or resident

secures his immunization through normal civilian channels.

"Ricardo" also obtains airline tickets and flight reservations;

the DGI reimburses ICAP for any funds expended by "Ricardo"

agent iravel and handling.

The processing of illegal

agents is somewhat different from that

ICAP or come into "Ricardo's"

hands; the case officer, working through the DGI Central Process-

takes care of procuring their immunizations, plane

tickets, and reservations.

They are thus not exposed to any

Cuban agency outside of the DGI.

The agent travels via Prague to

Western Europe and thence to his own country.

At the final stage

of his journey, he may enter his own country illegally. As soon

is back and established, he is ready to initiate

tions with IGI headquarters in accordance with the instructions

he has reccived and

using the schedule he carried with him

concealment device, which is opened only when he reaches home.

A Cuban sent abroad as a DGI agent

is considered an illegal agent

and does not go through

ICAP processing for travel.

He may leave

Cuba illegally: if he

departs legally,

he uses the

normal route

via Prague but travels on a passport of another nationality than

Of three known Cuban agents prepared for assignment

scheduled to go to Mexico during 1961;

the assign-

of the other two were

the same sort of communications channels as an agent of

another nationality, according to the training he has received in

reimbursed through the usual channels--funds sent

through a Dol field station,

which for latin America is always

Mexico; and in addition his family is supported by the DGI during

his entire period of oversos service.

In agent of foreign

nationality,

once trained, is not expected to return to Cuba and

is considered an independent operator with no communication with

Cubans except through his clandestine channels,

although in an

emergency he is permitted to appeal-to a DGI officer in an

official establishment if one

is available.

The policy regarding

agents of Cuban nationality had not been decided in early 196k,

since no such illegal agents were then operating abroad.

not certain,

for example, how long the Cuban was expected to

remain

in place abroad nor whether he would de allowed access to

DGI officers in the field.

From 1959 to 1962 the Cuban foreign-intelligence service made

considerable use of shipping for sending its agents out of Cuba,

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especially Into the Central Am:ican arra and to the north coast

of Suuth

America.

Since

however,

the practice of sending

agents home as crewmen has

materially declined and in 1964 was

used only occasionally.

Effectiveness of Training

36.

The capabilities of both guerrilla and tilegal agents trained by

the DGI vary greatly because of differences in background,

native

capacity, and adjustaent to discipline.

The DGI has successfully

trained a few highly efficient agents,

but some of its trainees

have not come up to expectations.

One agent with an excellent

training record, of whom the case officer had high hopes, was

arrested for participation in illegal activities after only a

short period

of operation following his return home.

Several

agents

who were considered promising proved disappointing when

released from

training supervision; one who was given funds to

purchase a radio spent the morey on himself and was in trouble

with the group with which ho was affillated because of his lack

of discipline; another was accused of having misused funds en-

trusted to him for arms procur ment and was also distrusted by

his group as cowardly and spiritless.

As noted above, instruc-.

tion in secret writing has not always been productive of readable

reports.

The main difficully appears to lie not with the quality

of the training but with thy lack of discipline and loyalty of

the trained agent.

Headquarters Comments

1. For a discussion of the organization of the DGI and the

runetions of its departments, from the same source, see

CS-311/00115-6-.

Cuba has diplomatic relations; and hence consulates, in

Latin America only in Mexico

and Jamaica (relations were

3.

obtained only in those countries; most are issued in

Mexico, because that country has the only direct air

connection with Cuba.

Cuban handling of visas and documentation is discussed

at length by the same

source in CS-311/00866-64.

4. During 1963, many travelors from Latin America were

taken to Cuba on chartered flights by Cuban aircraft

arranged

to bring delegations to and from Cuba for Cuban

celebrations

and for the cinvention of the International

Later occasion, to Solara a ip NADEZIDA KRUPSKAYA

called at Santos, Brazil, to embark passengers for,

Havana.

Among the traveling delegations were Cuban

agents.

5.

Source Comment. Ali DGI offieers are also assigned

pseudonyms,

which they normally use in all their pro-

fessional work; even close colleagues do not always

know their real names.

Headquarters Comment.

The Cubans have also used special

and charter Tights from Cuba to return agents to their

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those arranged for the

September 1983.

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