Agency: LBJ
Originator: CIA
To: MCCONE, JOHN
Document date: 12/6/63
Document type: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/26/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

LBJ

177-10001-10475

NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 23 NOV.-27 DEC. 63, BOX 1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

CIA

MCCONE, JOHN

Released under the John

Assassination Recorde

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 53244 Date:

06-13-2017

DATE: 12/06/1963

PAGES:

3

SUBJECTS :

NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

. DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

04/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

DOC. #14

v9.1

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#13

14

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk,

McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning

the procedures on MLE.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General

Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Rickette

and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a

group of "young Republicans" opposed the

MLE.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional

leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including

the United States Government, is committed to the MLE program.

Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the

most important objectives of the MLE was to give the Germans a sense

of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a

scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including

the United States.

McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the

MLF was a 'must"' or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an

independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons

resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLl might

force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara

stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force

will have a military (?) _utility

and will permit a reduction in

planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is

considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.

The President then suggested a briefing af Congressional

leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially

along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. I brought up

the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President

asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic

capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I

possibly could without endangering sources and methods.

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

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The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge

Bundy and McGone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included

in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet

Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I

would prepare for the President some special graphics which would

show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and

draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier

as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with

USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include

aid to satellites. His position is that since we include

ald to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,

South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their

satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined.

I do not know whether the figures are available.

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following

comments:

1. I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover

underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims

for vast improvemento in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-

tion on the LASER beam.

2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation

stating the fact that the khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located

in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were

not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were

broadcasting unfavorably against them.

3. I noted the additional indicators of possible confliet over

Malaysia.

I then explained to the President the source of our information

that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was

attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice

Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the

assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a

very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite bighly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon,

I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that

I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge.

He felt that to do this would have political repersucc

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::.Adkadad

tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the milltary junta, that it

would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the

present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove

' Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a

candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would

be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too

easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he

opposed his assignment or did not like hims, or wished to get rid of him.

The President sald he would communicate most emphatically with

Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communi-

cation. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was

absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted

to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration

and that he never failed to use the newspapere in order to expose an

individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he

was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David

Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young

and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request

that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the

job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his

office to keep lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South

Vietnam are so great that ClA should have a "four-star man' on the job and

that is what he wanted.

JAM/mem

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