MCNAMARA TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE
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MCNAMARA TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE

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SUBJECTS :

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION - LATIN AMERICA

CUBA

VIETNAM

USSR

NAVAL POWER

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/12/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 10. Taylor and McNamara testimony before the Senate; Edwin M.

Martin's "Statement on Subversion in Latin America."

JFK Review

Boparment of the Army EO 13526

$ Declassify = Exclude → Exempt

NO STATE OBJECTION

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the pooplaintil thay understand the situation. When they once

understand it they take a difforont viow. But in my opinion, wo

havo got to take a strong stand with the Communists, and I am

afraid your thinking is more along the State Department's lines

than I once thought it was.

From what I have learned about the policies over there now

and some of the things you aro advocating, I um afraid you

aro going along moro with the line of the state Department which,

of course, you havo a right to do but with which I heartily dis

agree.

It is a pleasure to have you here

and thank you for

your testimony.

Secretary McNamara.

Thank you, Senator Thurmond

I do want to emphasize my strong belief that we not only

have a policy to win the cold war but I personally believe we

are making progross in that direction.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smich?

sonator smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mc. Socretary, I have a very brief statement on my

over-all impressions and one or two questions. I think you may

have answered that in part but I would approciate it if you would

give me a briaf answox for this part of the hearing.

secrotory McNamara. Surely.

senator Smith. President Kennody and General Taylor

have said there would be no winner in a nuclear war. You and

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the presidont have stressed

the

growing power of Russia's nuclear

forces. Under Secretary Gilpatric has publicly stated that he

doesn't know how a war can be limited, and I quote, "Once you

ptart using any kind of a nucloar bang."

It is roasonable to conclude that the over-all impression

created by these statements is that the United States is afraid

to use nuclear weapons for foar doing so would immediately

and automatically escalate to a holocaust war, that is the

inpression I get and i think it is probably that it is che im

pression that khrushchev gets.

Yet the world knows that the Comnunists have a vast super-

jority in combat forces for conventional warfare including first

rate armoured units and the largent tactical air force in the

world.

coupled with this they have interior lines of supply and

communication, and an aggressive attitude to conquer the world

and some protty weak opponents on their borders like Iran,

Burma, India and Thailand.

If, in viow of these facts, Ihrushchev decides to challenge

the United States and allied conventional forces on a broad

salo, what do you intend to do about it?

Secretary McNamara.

First, let me say that we have stated

many, many times, I have stated on veral. different occasions,

I stated it in Germany, I hava stated it on three occasiong I

can recall in this country, that we will use whatever weapons

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are

nocessary to protect our interests, including nuclear

703

weapons. Pravda has printed my statements because we have had

them roturned to us.

There has been private conversation arrong

the soviets regarding such statements as i have made, and as

the President has mado about oux willingness to use nuclear

weapons in defanso of our interest.

Finally; it is porfoctly clcar that khrushchev believed

wo would utilize nuclear weapons or any other weapons necessary

to destroy the missiles which he deployed in Cuba. It is clear

that he believed that by the action he took but it is also

clear that he believed that based upon his comments in private

conversation with fordign diplomats who have reported the

conversations bach to us, and it is clear that he was right in

his bolief bacause we would have used whatever weapons were

nocessary to doctroy those missilos moved into Cuba.

so, I think that tho premica on which the statement 18

made is incorrect:

No are neither afraid to utilize nuclear weapons to protect

ou: interests nor ja it corroct to believe that the soviets

believe we are afraid, because there is ample evidence to the

contrary.

senator Smith. Would you say then that your long term ob-

joctive to create large enough conventional forces in the Free

world is to cope with major Communist aggressions without re-

sort to nuclear weapons:

would

It be fair to say we are really

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much bolder

about nuclear weapons than

our public statements

would indicate:

Secretary McNamara.

I think it is unlikely that either to

day or at some time in the future our conventional forces would

bo so large as to allow us to oppose offectively a major

Communist aggression, of the kinds you have suggested:

I think that the buildup in the conventional forces

1s, allows us to

doter lesser forms of soviet political and

military aggression, actions that they would otherwise take

were we not to build up our conventional forces because they

might boliove wo would not cospond to such losser forms of aggres-

sion with the immediate une of nucloar weapons and they might

balieve they could, therefore, accomplish their objectives with

vary little cost to themselves.

Sonator Smith. Are wa programming sufficient tactical

nuclear. capabilities to win such a conflict without carrying it

to the point of the ICEM archange?

Socrotary McNamara. Well, I don't want to say that a

mansive sovlot offonsivo accion could be turned back without the

use of IChMs; but we are cortainly building up substantially

inventories of tactical nucloar weapons that could be used

under those circumstances, inventories that we believe are

far largor than the Soviet inventories of comparable weapons.

Senator Smith.

Mr. Chairman, we have read a great deal,

and this has been referred to earlier in the Committee, about

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the managed news policy in the operation of the Department of

Dafense.

Mr. Socretary, would you please explain that policy, the

reasons for it and how le works?

socretary McNamara.

well, I don't bellovo we have a managed

news policy, but it we do it isn't managed very well. I think

your comments would lead you to that conclusion and they cer-

tainly lead me to that conclusion. We spoke a moment ago about

this B-47 withdrawals as an illustration., Whatever management

of news we are doing is a very ineffective approach to the prob-

Tom.

I think tho term in an unfortunato one. It 1o applied, I

think, without any real ovidence that we are acting in that way.

What we are trying to do is to actually increase the ex

posure

of the public to defense policies, and defense programs.

There was a period in the week of October 15 when we did not

respond fully to questions rolating to the knowledge we had

about Soviet weapons in Cuba, This because we were then formu

lating a course of action designed to insure the removal of the

missilo systoms that have been introduced and to have disclosed

publicly the extent of our knowledge of those systems would have

compromisad the action plans that vere in the procoss of formu-

lation, and for a period, therefore, of, perhaps it was, three

days or so in that week to the point of the Presidentle apeech

which, as. I remambor it, was October 22, we did not respond

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fully. I don't call that a managed news policy. But I think it

is an action which all of you would support and agree with under

the circumstances. It was very, very much in our national

interests to withhold from Khrushchev any indication of how wa

were going to respond. He obviously thought we weren't going

to respond at all or he wouldn't have taken the action. He was

in error. We didn't wish to disclose the extent of his error

to him until we wore ready to respond with some force sufficient

to force him to change his course of action.

Thio we disclosed to the nation on the zind of October, and

In the days immediatoly prior to thot we did not discuss publicly

aithor our plans or the foundation for those plans.

I think this was vory much in the national interest.

Sonator

smith.

Mr. Sacrocary, I am not referring to that

lacause you may have heard that. I have commended the President

very highly for

the

handling of that situation.

I had groat admiration for all of you who had to do with it

and I thought it was most necessary and I hope it may be done

whonover the occasion arises, or similar occasion.

Secratary McNamara. Thank you.

Senator Smith. That is not what I am talking about.

What I am asking is is it not a fact that there is à

policy, regulation, a firm practice in the Department of Defense

that news information particularly notices to the members of

Congress, has to be cleared through the Department of Defense by

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ever come to this stage, a matter of thiu type and character,

since I have been in the Senate or in the Pentagon.

Mr. Secretary, the lact question I would ask you 1s based

on what I saw on the ticker about Malinovsky.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. I do not know what the background of

that 19, but I think it 1o significant that the statement was

made by Malinovsky and not by Khrushchev.

Secretary McNamara, I think so too, Mr. Chairman. I

think that khrushchev is trying to ride both sides of the

street with this kind of a statement.

Chairman Russell.

senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. Mr'. Chairman, I was going to ask the

Secretary about that, but I think what he has said expresses

my views on that too. I think he has made a sound explanation.

The Communists, in my judgment, are not going to starc

any world War III until they are ready to start it. When they

are ready, they will find some incident anyway.

Chairman Russell. If they are sure they will win, they

won't care if they have an incident:

Senator Thurmond. If they are not, ready to start It, they

are not colne to let an invasion of Cuba or anything else

force them to scart it.

I agree with the Chairman, the fact

that the statement was made by Malinovsky Instead of Khrushchev

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carries some weight.

Although made by Khrushchev himself, I still don!t think

that it would start World War III 1f Cuba was Invaded, unless

they are ready to start ic anyway. I am glad to see the

Secretary express that view, and I am in thorough accord.

Scoretary McNamara.

I share that view.

Chairman Russell. We certainly wili be a second rate

power is we ever frame our foreign policy with respect to Cuba

upon any threate that emanate from Moscow. I would be almost

ashamed of my country: if we framed our foreign policy on such

a basis an that.

Mr. Secretary, nome of the members of the committee wanted

to hear from you about Cuba.

I don't know exactly what chey

wanted. I suppose our policy is still one of watchful waiting

and insiscing that Premier Khrushchev live up to the commitments

in hia letter of November.

Senator Engle.

Mr'. Chairman, before the Secretary goes

forward with that, may I say something. I am sorry that I

could not be here yesterday. This morning I went down to

the VIl to participate in a ceremony. I did not know you

viere going to meet this morning.

I hope a little later perhaps that I will get a chance

to go through this record. I suppose the Secretary will be

gone after that, but if I have any questions, I will get in

touch with him personally. I want to say to him though that I

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had some

probiens that I couldn't manage otherwise.

Chairman Russell. All right, Senator Engle:

of course

I din't know, you have a very resourceful mina, and I am quite

sure you will be able to figure up a few questions that have

not been asked the Secretary, but I expect you will find it

was there by Implication if not by direction in one of the

barrage.

Secretary McNamara:

My. Chairman, the President has

stated our policy with respect to Cuba. I think it has two

elements, two objectlves.

One in the eventual change in government.

The President

has expressed it in various ways at various times, but I think

It 13 quite clear that we continue to work for the overthrow

of the Castro government and the elimination of the Communist

control of Cuba.

secondly, it lo our objective to insure that Cuba is not

used as a base for the export of acgression by force eisewhere

in the hemisphere.

We are taking steps to try to accomplish

both of those objectives.

Charman Russell. Just what steps are you taking? I can

see the ones you would take to accomplish the first.

Some of

them have been manifeut in the shipping and things of that

kind, but what steps have you taken to provent this export of

communism from Cuba?

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Isn't it true that they have hundreds of young men from

most of the latin Anerican countries In Cuba, and they are

Indoctrinating them in communism and teaching them rebellion

and revolution?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I belleve that is true that a

substantial number of Latin Americans have been sent to Cuba

for training of various kinds in Communist doctrine and

potentlally subversive activities.

We are workine with the ocher Latin American nationg to

both restrict the travel of their nationals to Cuba, to follow

their return to their own nation, and in particular to check

the export if any of arms from Cuba to other countries in the

hemisphere.

so far as the controls over the shipmenc of arms from

Cuba to other nations in the hemisphere, it appears to be

working very effectively. There is no substantial volume of

such shipments that we know of, If there are any at all.

I think that as time goes by, we can develop even more

effective controls againat the use of Cuba as a training

bage for subversion in the hemisphere. It Is certainly being

used for that purpose today. But even in that sense, it

does not

appear to be the primary base for subversion in

this hemisphere.

The

Soviets are dealing directly with a large number of

Latin Americans.

You may have noticed very recently they

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entered Into negotiations with Brazii for a trade contract

under which they would supply oil to Brazil. in return for

Brazillan coffee, and in the course of the transaction would

sent into Brazil a substantial number of techniciang.

This is but one of the whole series of Illustrationg of

the extent of soviet efforts to try to subvert the duly

established governments in Latin America by means other

than operating through Cuba.

In any case, we are working with the other latin Americans

to restrict the export of ageression by force from Cuba into

those other nacions.

Chairman Russell. What degree of cooperation are we

receiving from other members of the ois?

Secretary. McNamara.

Far more now than we were a year

agO.

Chairman Russell.: How about Mexico? A short while ago

thore was free pasuage and no reotriction ao to vloa and

chingo of that kind on airplanes between Mexico City and Havanna.

Ian't that still In effet?

Secretary MeNamara. I belleve that we have received far

more cooperation from Mexico in recent months than we did

a year ago.

I should say on this question of subversion as contranted

to the export of armo, that I chink that ochor nembore of the

government, particularly representativon of the State Departmont.

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who are responsible for this, could speak with more authority

than I.

But 1t 10 my strong impression that in the case of Mexico,

thoy are cooperating nuch more fully today in Imposing travel

reotrictions of various types than was the case a year ago.

Chairman Runsell. Of course so far as the firat part of it

1s concerned, you would have to enforce that.

The State

Department would have no means of watching the export of arms.

Secretary MoNamara, That is true. We maintain a careful

surveillance of a movement of vessels, and any other traffic.

In any case, where we have even the slightest suspicion,

we work with the country to which the traffic la directed to

Insure that proper inspection of it ls made before it moves

into the interior of that nation.

Chairman Russell. Is there any communication by air now,

airplanes from Russia to Cuba?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, there 1s, but 1t 18 very sporadio

indeed.

If I recall correctly, they were establishing a once a

week service direct from the Soviet Union to Cuba in each

airection, buc the last time I saw a report on that, which was

just a few days ago, it had eperated very sporadically. There

had been a number of breakdowns encoute, and they had missed

their schedules In a high' percentage of the cases

Chairman Russell, Do they undertake to make that a one-

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way flight or do they stop, any of them?

secretary Mclamara. "I was trying to think,

Up until last

fall they were flying them with stope In Africa.

I think that

recently they have been flying non-stop.

Chairman Russell. That is a pretty gocd hop.

Secretary McNamara. When they could fly it non-stop,

and it 1n:a very long non-stop flight. This is one of the

roasons why mechanical aifficultles and other difficulties

have so interrupted the schedule. As I remember at, 1t 18

something on the order of I belleve 5,000 mlles.

Chalrman Russell. I was in Mexico about two years ago,

and I talked to the representatives of the CIA there, and they

were very concerned because they had been reporting the

existence of paper corporations there to buy parts to supply

to cuban industry in this country and crans-shipping 1t to

Cuba.

of course we know that our good friends from Canada were

not willing to lot un even store atomic weapons there for

us to use in defending them, that they carrica on a very

extensive trade in parte with Cuba for some timé.. Have we

made any progress in diminishing that?

Secretary McÑamara. I believe that in both instances we

have. You mentioned this to me about a year ago, and I looked

Into 1i at the time, although it does not full within the

responsibilitles of the Defense Department.

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based on what you had said. You were speaking I think particular-

Ly of Mexico at that time.

Chairman Russell. Yes, I was speaking about Mexico. I

did not know anyühing abouc Canada at that time.

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Secretaly McNamara. I think there was evidence that

fictitious corporations were being used as facades behind which

the parts that were of value to cuba were being shipped into

Cuba.

That traftic has been reduced materially since that time,

and an

far as the Canadian shipments of spares are concerned. I

think the same thing applies. I think we have made quite a bit

of progress toward isolating Cuba from the free world insofar as

trade is concerned.

For example, the free world shipping to Cuba has dropped

precipitously in the last 10 or 12 monthe, most of it in the

last several months.

I think it is oft in torns of tonnage

and in terms of numbers of ships moving to cuba by about 80 to

90 per cont. This is a major step forwara.

I did not mean to imply that cuba lo now receiving a major

portion of those goods through substitute channels, because of

course it is. Instead of receiving them from the free world and

in free world bottons, it is now receiving them from the Communist

bloc and in Communist bloc bottoms to a considerable degree, not

to the same degree as previously.

But this is an added cost to the Soviet Union, and this

again is one of our objectives..

to increase the cost to the soviet

Union in sustaining Cuba.

Chairman Russolli.: Thougk Cuba has essentlally an agricultural

economy, I had understood that they did not produce near enough

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Is that

food to provide for thei

correct?

ion in cuba itself.

secrotary McNamara. I think that is right, but I really

can't speak with authority on that as to the volume of their

food imports.

Chairman Russell. Do we know where they are coming from,

such as there are?

Secretary NcNamara. I think from the bloc countries, because

the present time the number of free world ships coming into

cuba has dropped to the point where I beliove in the month of

January there were only 12, if I recall correctly, compared to

many times that number a year ago.

Chairman Russell.,

Is there still any active movement in

Cuba to overthrow Castro? Are there any guerrillas still in

being there or do we know?

Secretary McNamara.

Oh, there is evidence of discontert,.

and there is evidence that some of this discontent takes the form

of guerrilla operations, but I think they are very. very small and

relatively ineffective.

the government has a very tight control

over the people.

Again, "I think you could get a more complete story on this

subject from Mr. McCone, the Dicector of Central Intelligence,

but I believe I am right in saying that the government has about

100,000 agents out of a population of 6 million, including the

very young and the very old, and that these 100,000 agente have

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the right to deny food ration books to those chey believe are

operating in a dialoyal way.

So when you think of the possibility that there is one govern-

ment agent with such an authority for every 60 people, infant and

aged as well, you can see the kind of control that is exercised

by the government over the population. Undex those circumstances

It would be extremely difticult for any guerrilla movement to

obtain any aire.

Chairman Russell. Do we have any information as to whether

the Soviet forces that are about to be moved from Cuba represent

technicians or are they organized unite such as a tank battalion?

Secretary McNamara. The implication was that there would be

organized unite as well as what you might call technicians or

advisors.

But I think it in far too early to say whether the organized

units of which the four so-called combat units, each containing

roughly 1200 men, and of a size equivalent to a reinforced

battalion, will be unite which nove out.

Those are the major Soviot combat unito in Cuba, and it 1a

those thai we are paying particular attention to during this

possible movement period.

senator Ingle. May I ask why do you think they are in there?

What are they doing there?

Secretary Mcwamara. It would be sheer speculation for me

to respond to the question.

I have some opinions of my own,

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Senator Engie, but I have no definite indication of the soviet

Intentions.

My own opinion is that they were there to protect the nuclear

equipment. that was moved inco cuba by the soviet Union.

We had many indications, for example, that the Soviets placed

nuch a tight

security, control, around the areas in which this

nucloar equipment was deployed, they would not even allow the

governor of the province in which the area existed to penetrate

that area.

I cito thin aimply to show the lind of control they maintained,

and I think these combat forces were there primarily for that

purpose. But this is sheer speculation on my part, and I do not

advance it with any real auchority.

Senator Engle.

If we take all of the alternatives that are

available, that is what they could do with those forces, and you

go right through them and finally you get down to that, don't you?

Secretary McNamara:

I believe so.

Senator Engle. That is what I would think.

Chairman Russell. Either that or a bodyguard for Castro.

Senator Engle. Yes.

Chairman Russell, Dowe have any information or theory as

to whether the warhead in the missile that shot down the U-? was

conventional or whether it had any nuclear matter in it?

Secretary McNamara.

We do not have any direct evidence that

the U-? was even shot down by a warhead. Everything points in that

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direction, but we lack any real evidence of exactly how it was

shot down.

We have no evidence whatsoever that a nuclear weapon was used.

We think it quite unlikoly that that was the case.

Chairman Russell. Didn't we recover the body of the pilot?

Was it noc sent back to the states?

Secretary McNamara

Yes, and there was no evidence from

inspection of the body that nucleax weapons were used. The U-?

is very sensitive to deconation of explosive devices near the

aixplane; and such devices need not even hit the airplane.

A conventional non-nuclear: device need not hit the airplane

in order to cause destruction of the airplane, loss of control

and subsequent destruction.

This is what we think happened in

this particular case, but we really had no clear evidence of the

exact circumstances.

Chairman Russell. You would think that an explosion of any

kind that was great, onough to knock the plane down would have left

some marks on the body of the pilot.

secretary Mclariara.

Not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.

we have

seen evidenco before that the I-? is so sensitive to changes in

the environment in which it is functioning that the pllot can

10se control of it, and it can get into a condition such that it

is ultimately destroyod.

This is caused by a near miss, for

example, of a conventional warhead.

Chairman Russell.

Is there anything about the body of the

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pilot to indicate whether he came down

the wreckage of the

plane or by parachute?

You would think if he came down from that height, there

certainly would ba some mark or some indication on the man's body

as to how

far he fell:

Secretary Mclamara. I had better not answer.

I don't know

for sure.: I don't recall. I did go over the report at the time,

but I have forgotten the answer to that question. I will put it

In the record.

Chairman Russell. All right.

Senator Symington, do you have

any questions?

Senator Symington.

I have junt been very interested in

this, Mr. Chairnan

The Chair suggested that it might be a

bodyguard for Castro. It also might be a dagger pointed at him,

might it not?

In othex words, ha might be misbehaving a lictle bit as fara

as what Mr. Makoyan and Mr. Khrushchev thought, and keeping those

troops there might be there to keep him in line a bit, might they

not?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I think they could have fulfilled

a number of different purposes. I suspect the primary purpose

was the one I ouclined, They could have both fulfilled that

primary purpose and also accomplished other objectives as well.

Senator symingion.

It occurred to me that if they were there

to protect what in effect most of what in effect they had taken

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out, that they might have also taken them out when they took it

out, and the lact that they did not was that they wanted to be

cure that Castro did some things that they wanted him to do.

Secretary Mclamara.

Senator symington.

That night possibly have been the case.

Thank you, Mc. Chairman.

Senator Engle.

Will the senator yield there?

Chairman Russell. That could be, but even with a Russian

who is ten feet tall, I don't think that would have been enough

Russians to whip all of Castro's forces.

Senator Symington. The reason it appealed to me was I heard

there were a lot of people in Cuba who, if they could get a little

support, might go after Castro.

Chairman Russell. We were disillusioned about that,, I don't

know if you remember that or not, at the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Symington.

The Bay of Pigs?: No, I don't think I

ever heard of that.

Senator Engle. Will the senator yield so I can ask a

question on that very sane point?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Engle. This is a matter it seems to me of very

great interest, because the American people are extremely upset

about these 17,000 Russians in Cuba. And yet their presence there

is an equivocal matter.

If you divide them into technicians and there combat troops.

you can say that the technicians are there to train people. But

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when you take a look at the combat situation, they have tanke

there, and the kind of equipment that would normally operate in

a land operation.

They have no tranaporse to take those troops out anyway.

they certainly wouldn't invade us. And if they were going any

place else, thoy would have to have transport, and we would detect

it immedlately.

so it is a matter of great puzzlement to me as to why they

are there. for instance, let mo ask this question.

We are flyiny air reconnaissance over Cuba now at very low

lovels:

It is my belier, and I may be wrong about this, and 1E

I am you may correct me, that chose planes could be shot down.

I think they could get at a few of them anyway. But

they haven't

done it.

Now this in a strange sicuation, that we in effect violate

the air over Cuba, and we are doing it and we know we are doing

it and the television program that you put on proved that we are

doing it, in my opinion proved it to a point beyond what I wouln

like to have seen revealed to everyhody in the toria.

But 1f

they want to shoot those planes down, they could shoot them down.

Now isn't it possible that those troops are being maintained

there to be sure that those anti-aircraft batteries do not got in

the hands of these ircesponsible Cubans who would shoot us down,

and it they shoot one or two of our planes down, we are going to

go in there. The American people will not stand for it, lan't

ISECRET

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that right?

Secretary Molamara. I think this to a very reasonable

hypothesis. I think that it is almost certainly the explanation

of why we are able to fly frequent, literally daily, when weather

1s suitable, surveillance flighte over cuba, without being des

troyed by the anti-aircraft bactories that we know are there and

that have the capability to destroy us.

Now what this implies

fox the futuce, I can't say.

senatox Engle. Do they have SAM Ill's in there to you knowl-

edge?

Secretary MeNanara. Not what we call SAM Ill's, low altitude

defense systoma of the type similar to the SAM II's. The only

high effective air defonse aystem they have are the SAM II's,

and those are highly effective at high altitudes.

Senator Engle. I understand that, but they could get some

of those, if they knew about where they were coming and waited

for them.

Secretary McNamara. There is no question but what the SAM

II's in Cuba today could destroy everyone of our U?' flights,

of which we have several, as I

say, on each day when the weather.

is good, and yet they are not destroyed. Frankly, the only ex-

planation that I have for this situation is exactly the one you

have outlined.

Senator Ingle. Of course, here is the thing that creates

the dilemna for us in public office. We hear this clamor to get

PET

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RET

troops out, and the Amorican people aro very sensitive about it,

as you inow. It croatea a difticult political problem for ua

at home.

They just raise cane about it.

Yet it seems to me that what krushchev is doing is keeping

his own people in control of thoas batterion, so they do not

stir up an incident that will bring instant American retallation.

Now how in the worla do you handle chat kind of problem?

I asked my very wise Chairman, who had been in this business a

long time, how do you get around that.

I just have the suspicion, and that is why I asked the

Secretary, 1c it 1e true that those paople are being maintained

there to maintain control of weapons which would otherwise be

in irresponsible hands, and khrushchev says,. "You sit on them".,

then what do we do?

It gets pretty sticky, doesn't it?

Secretary Malamara.

sir, I think there is an answer to it.

In the firac place, I beliove he can take out the combat

troops without turning control of the surface-to-air missile

ayotems over to the Cubans.: He certainly ought to insist on that.

senator Engle. Provided the Cuban military would not exer-

cise that power to throw them out and take them over.

Secretary McNamara. Secondly, I believe he can avoid that

situation and also probably remove the soviet personnel we believe

that are now manning the surface-to air missiles, by saying to

Castro in effect,

"You either give us a guarantee that you will

not use these surface-to-air missile systems againati the U-2

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aircraft of wa will say to you that ve will take out the systems.

furthermore, if you give us a guarantee, we leave the systems

in and you use them againat the aircraft, we want to make it

perfectly clear we are not going to come to your assistance in

the event of further attack by the United States."

This

is the way I answer the dileman you pose, the dilemma

being how can we as a nation and the United states both pressure

the soviets to withdraw all their troops and technicians and at

the same time be assured that after they do so, ve will be able

to carry on surveillance.

I think we can accomplish both those objectives by the

approach I have outlined.' I think this is in effect the President'

approach.

senator Engle. In other words, to summarize it, you would

say, "Listen, you take then out; but if they use them, we will

go in and get them,"' is that it?

Secretary McNamara, That is exactly what I would say, and I

think this is in effect what we have said many, many times to

the soviet Union.

We absolutely insist upon continued surveillance

of the Island of Cuba.

senator Ingle. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. That is really in substitution for the

on-site inspection that khrushchev couldn't deliver.

Secretary McNamara. Yes, gir, it is in substitution for it.

Chairman Russell.

or didn't deliver it.

I don't know whether

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he could have delivered it it he tried hard enough.

secrotary MeNomara.

It Lo

in subotitucion for it, but I

must say that I personally - and this to simply a personal

opinion - would rather rely upon you as controlled surveillance

from the air than upon some internationally controlled on-site

inspection.

Chairman Russell. I think we could have stood a little

of both

Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of

more questions. Mr. Secretary, ogain hindsight is always better

than foresighic, but in this country you have a good many military

men who have had military experience, and they talk with their

neighbors and their friends, and I think one thing that they have

gotten mixed up about, and I agree with the Senator from California

that there is a lot of tension about this problem in the country,

and that is this question of what is offensive or defensive

weapone.

As you know, in the battle of the bulge we used every

strategic bomber we had as a tactical airplane, and a fighter

taking off from Iwo Jima out where you were working in the war

that destroyed a japanese plant was a strategic bomber.

It 1a very hard for the people to see, based on their accual

exporionco; many of them.

For example,

I wonld rather soe Il-28'g

personally atay in Cuba, than I would MiG 21'g.

That would be

especially true if I lived in Atlanta or Miami.

And so'I think

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that you have that problem.

Now it is going to continue. for example, there is going to

be a buildup problen perhaps of this harbor, whatever it is going

to be, and what are you going to do?

They say you have got Guantanano.

"We will build a harbor

for submarines, maybe for destroyers, maybe for anything that we

want."

That part worries me, the clear cut effort to make a demar-

cation between an offensive and a defensive weapon. I would hope

that we can avoid that in some way in the future.

for example, what would we do today if Russian submarines

openly docked and berthed them in Havana or new harbor of any

other harbor

except Guantanano? What could we do?

Secretary McNamara

I thank we have indicated that we would

not tolerate the use of cuba as a soviet submarine base.

Senator Symington. The we would tolerate it as a Soviet

fighter base.

Secretary McNamara. I think the difference is that the

submarines have potential for substantial attack on this country,

whereas the fighter aircraft there at the pesent time do not.

Senator Symington. Thank you, sir. Now one final point.

You had tried to figure what you would do. Of all the stories

I have heard, the one that would appeal to me the most, if I

wanted to destroy this country I think, would be to put a

freighter under different flags in the various harbors around,

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say 20 or 30 of our leading cicies, and drop a bomb all timed

to go off togethere with a megaton weapon coming out of a false

bottom, et cetara:

Do we analyze that from the standpoint of possibility, and

What we would do in case it happened?

secretary MoNamaxa.

year

sir, we do.

We have a specific

exercise of that kind as a matter of fact.

Even though that would cause serious damage, if it were

undetected, we have a force that would respond in such a way as

to destroy the Soviet Union, and this should deter such actions

But we don't rest on the fact that our superior force should deter

it. We aloo maintain a careful watch to detect such an operation,

if it occurs.

senator Symington. Could we somtime on this Committee;

Mr. Chairman, If it met with your approval, I would hope we

might have a briefing as to what plans we would have against

that type in character of an actack.

Chairman Russell. Vexy well. We will see as to that.

senator Symington. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith.

Senator Smith:

I am sorry I was called out of the Cormittee

when you started talking about Cuba.

I have only one question,

Mr.: Secretary-

That 16, what is the Unitod States policy with respect to

Cuba. If you gave a positive stacement on that and it ls

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satisfactory to the Commi

111 not ask you to repeat it.

If it was not asked, then I would like you to.

Secretary McNamara. The

question was

asked, Senator smith.

I hope iny answer was satisfactory.

I will be happy to repeat

it if the Commitcee wishes ma to do so.

end Cantor

Elrsh fls

I can bay simply very quickly the policy has two objectives.

One I9 to overthrow Castro and eliminate formunit control, of

the Island of cuba, and the other in to prevent the export of

aggression by force from Cuba into other parts of the hemisphere.

GRET

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Firshein

cantor

Senator Smith.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. Senator Ervin.

Senator Exvin.

Well, I would just like to say I haven't

had a chance to road my mail for a week but my staff telle me

got more letters about Cuba; poople are more concerned about

cuba, than any other subject to come into my office, and I

want to associate mysolf with what Senator Symington said a

while ago, I think that the Cuba in the presont situation ful-

fills one of the dosires of Russia.

It gives them a base where

they have got plenty of weapons which I think are immaterial

what you call them, that can be exported to other countries in

South America and have got a base for subversion.

Of course, I am probably a little rockless but if I was

running it all by myself I think I would just put a blockade

thore and stop everything cominy into Cuba myself because I

keliove you have to take a chance. Those are observationa:

Chairman Russoll.

Senator thurmond.

Senator Thurmond: Mr. Chairman, I don't think I have any

questions:

for the record I just want to make this point clear,

coming from me, that in my judgment we have got to set up a policy

on this matter and it has got to be a policy to eliminate

Communism from the Western Hemisphere. Once that decision is

made I think evorything else will fall in place.

There are

various ways this can be brought about.

We can"establish a naval

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and economic blockado of Cuba.

If that doesn't work we can cancel diplomatic, commercial

and all relations with Russia and with her satellites, and if

that don't work wo; may have to use the military, but I think we

have got first to docide wo are going to eliminate Conmunism:

fom the westorn Hominophore. I don't hink it makes any differ-

ence whother Castro

is removed or not. If Communists are running

Cuba, Castro is a mere figurehead, and if he is removed, as

long as the Communists are running Cuba, somebody else will be

just there in his place, and in fact, might be tougher than

Castro is, with what little pover he has.

The Communists are tunning Cuba and we have got to remove

Communist from Cuba. Those are my thoughts, Mr. Secretary

for what they are worth.

Chairman Russoll. Castro says he is a Communist, so we have

got to remove him, too.

Senator Thurmond.

How is that?

Chairman Russell. Castro says he is a Communist.

Senator Thurmond. Of course, he ought to be removed.

I mean the point is the Communists are running Cuba.

Chairman Russell. You think he is being directed outside

from the Kremlin rather than the government in the capital in

Havana?

Senator Thurmond. He is just a figurehead.

Chairman Russell. Any further questions?

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Sonator Symington. Just one more, about this offensive and

defensive weapons.

Senator Ervin was saying they have got all

those miastlos into cuba without our knowing it until we took

ELctures.

Now, suppose they took tanks in quantity and put them into

Venozuela, as we know tanke without proper resistance ejuipment

ae dovastatingly affoctive today, and then they moved those tanke

undor the hatches of freightors, you say that the free Worla

shipying is down but Communist shipping is up, and that they put

those in Venazuela and with those tanks the Communists in

Venezuela started moving

in and capturing the capital, what would

we consider that to bo?

Secrotary Mclamara, Export of aggresssion by' force which

is contrary to the stated policy of this government and which

would be mot by some forceful action by this government.

senator symington.

Secretary McNamara.

Would it be met in Venezuela or Cuba?

We would have to face the circun-

stances.

I frankly think it would be met in both areas. But

I would like to say, first, that it is extremely unlikely that

the Cubans of the Soviets could accomplish that task given tha

type of surveillance that we have over cuba at the present time,

over the international waters between Cuba and the other nations

in Latin America, and at the ports in the other Latin American

nations.

But in any event, if they did accomplish it i think it is

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'of this Government

quite clearly contrary to the stated

and would roguire action by this Government.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary.

Senator Engle.

Mi. Chairman, -

Chairman Russell,

senator Engle.

Senator Engle.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the

unanimous consent that given the opportunity to look over the

record I missad here during those hearings, that I be permitted

to aubmit questions in writing to the secretary which I assure

you will not be repotitious, in caso I discover any --

Chairmon Russell. You will have that opportunity, Senator.

Senator Engle.

I will do that over the weekend.

Chairman Russell.

All right, sir.

Sonator. Engle.

I would like to say this, Mr. Secretary®

I looked over this document which was submitted, which showed

tho difference botween the classifiod information and the unclas-

sified information.

Now, it was extensive, and we have difficult problems in

differentiating sometimes when we are speaking in the public

or on telovision or anything olse, and it makes it very, very

difficult for us because they get confused and they got fuzzed

over and eventually you can't be sure whether you are talking

in a classified area or not and it seems to me that it would

be wise to devine some way to manage that situation a little.

I would rather have it all classified or at least a state-

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ment made to the public which we got, Mrs. Smith read it as I

did, the whole business

that you sent around, or that we got

scom the Committod, and yet after you listen to the classified

part of it, oventually, when somebody asks you a question on

a tolovinion program or radio program or something like

that we are all gotcing shot at evory five minutes, it is very,

vory difficult for us to be sure we are

not on classified grounds

and I would hope there would be some way to manage that.

I don't know how you are going to do it. It may be necessary

to release somowhat less than you do and keep the rest all

classifiod so at least we know where we are, and i mentioned

this business of corridors the other day.

I can't remember where

I heard that of saw it, but I wouldn't mention it in public.

except to me it was so obvious from what you said that there

couldn't be any other thing you were talking about. you see.

I would hope that come consideration would be given to that.

In my opinion, we just give away too much. Sometimes I think

that it would be better, Mr. Chairman, if we just gave it all

away and then nobody would believe us rather than hedge the

casan

But what I am suggesting is that perhaps in future brief-

ings we have a clear delineation in the beginning in the state-

mont itself as to what is classified, what has been taken out,

and that has been left in in order that we are not put in this

position -- I took the document, Mr. Chairman, that came in here

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the other day and I looked it over very carefully, and there

are extensive pages of it where changes have been made, and

where classifiad information has been indicated.

Now, I don't want to give away classified information and

nobody else on this Committee does.

On the other hand, I

am sure the Chairman faces more prob

lems than I do bacause I am only a junior member of this Committee,

but so help me, you get on a television program and somebody

asks you something and you may divulge it and not know it.

so, it soems to me it would be holpful to us if che

delineation was clear and more precise so that we could be sure

and be on clear notice when we are stepping into the area of

classified information.

We had a little diacussion here the other day, you may

rocall, Senator Thurmond brought it up, about this business

of what we know about thoir anti-missile missiles, and we know

a good deal, and I could detect immediately the secrotary's

apprehension on this point, and that is that where you have a

narrow area in which information can come from, then if you re-

veal it you know it, it is perfectly obvious that they are

going to put a complete surveillance on it and eventually they

will find out what it is.

What I am saying is that this briofing has been magnificant,

but it would soom to no it would bo helpful if when we get one

we know precisely what is in the classified area and what is

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776

not, because

when a book comes in hore like this one, and we

have had a book already dolivered to us, and I take it home and

spend half the night reading it, and I think I know what is in 1t

that is unclassified and yet whan I take the next book that

comes along and lines have been changed, lines have been added,

and matters have been stricken out, it gets a little tight for

US.

Chairman Russell. Senator Engle, of course, they could

kring dc in here and have that which they released printed in

black and that which is classified printed in red, but unless you

are a great deal smarter chan i am that won't help you much on

the television programs because you will get confused about what

is printed in red and what is in black, and you can't bring it

in'a television program and find it when you are asked. the

question.

That is one of the worst problems, I have never been able

to solve. I solve it by if I have any doubt I don't say, that is

the only rule of chumb I can think of.

Senator Engle. That is the way I do it, too.

"But it seems

to me if we had a clear delineation, at least we would have

some guidelines.

There are a couple of questions I would like to ask.

The

First is with roforonce to thuse soviet people down there in Cuba.

Can't we got harder intolligence on what they are there for?

This seoma to mo to bo a macter of great importance.

The

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777

poople of the country aro aggravated beyond belief that, as

Senator Ervin has indicated, we get, I get a thousand letters

a day and I suspect a third of them areon this one subject.

If we could know what they were really up to, it would

help us a lot, it seema to me, in making an intelligent decision

about what we wanted to do, and it puts us in between a rock

and the hard place when people say we have to get them out, and

it may not be in our interest to get them all out. That is

what I am saying. I just don't know.

Senator Thurmond.

You won't be able to tell the people

that.

Senator Engle:

Of course not, you can't, unless you know

exactly what you are talking about and we might not be able to

reveal it.

Sometimes we have to stand up and just take it.

But is there any way to improve our intelligence on that

SCOLe?

socretary McNamara.

Senator Engle, I doubt very much that

in the near future we are going to learn much more than we now

know about what the Soviet military personnel are there for.

Senator ingle.

Can't we tell by looking at who they are?

Secretary McNamara.

We have looked at them in terms of

the kind of equipment they have, the kinds of units they are

formed in, whether they are in temporary or permanent housing,

which gives some indication of their intention, and we, based

on all this, have arrived at certain tentative conclusions as to

CRET

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why they are there. But I think the strong opinion that is held

by most of us is that whatever they are there for makes very little

difforonce we ought to got thon out and this is the President's

position I believe, and we think that it is to our advantage

to got them out and, therefore, the fact that we don't know

precisely why they are there isn't affecting our

actions at the

present time.

I personally baliove that you are correct in saying that

you bellove at the present time the soviets are manning the

anti-aircraft system in Cuba. I think that is true.

I also believe that the reason they are manning it is to

insure that irresponsible Cubans don't actack our surveillance

aircraft and thereby bring on some incident that presumably the

Soviets wish to avoid.

But I also believe that we can continue to maintain our

surveillance of that island without the Soviets there and that

this is the position we ought to take with the soviets.

So it

doesn't make any difference what their intention is they ought to

get out from our point of view and we ought to continue to put

pressure on the Soviet government to force them out.

.. I am

certain this is the way the President looks at the problem.

Senator Engle.

All right. I will take that.

Now, the last question and this reoccurs to what the Chair-

man brought up on the first day of this session, and it involves

the question of the force structure of the Defense establishment

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of this

nation

The bast constitutional

lawyer in the Senate 1s

sitting right here today, senator Ervin;

Il my reading of the

Constitution is correct, and I would ask to be corrected by

senator Ervin if I am wrong.

Senator Ervin. Might I interrupt? I appreciate the

compliment. I believe the Supreme Court has reversed about

everything I know about Constitutional law.

(Laughter)

Sanator Engle.

"I still think you are the best constitution-

al lawyer in the Sehate, and the Constitution says that the

Congress has the pover to raise armies and to implement the

national defense. That is not the precise language. But let's

a ssuine that we disagroe with the Exocutive Department with ref-

ence to the kind of force structure we ought to have in the

Dafonse Dapartment. That is, we say to you that we believe

that manned bombors or manned aircraft are being faced out too

mpidly, that we are placing too much reliance on missiles, and

that we indicate a different policy for this nation with refer-

ence to the force structures that we expect to have in the

military establishment of this country.

Who is going to prevail, that is what I want to know. Are

you going to hit thore and say to us, "we are not going to

spend the money," even if we give it to you? Is that the way

it is going to ba?

Secretary McNamara.

Well, sir, I am not a constitutional

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*.

lawyer myself and I reallybelieve we have to rely in matters

such as this on other than perhaps the law because I think that

it is the tradition and the precedents of our Government which

perhaps have the character of law in situations of this kind,

but even more important than that, I think we must rely upon

continued probing of each others views to try to understand them

better and in hope they can a reconciled in that case.

I don't thin that the Congress objoctives are any

difforont from those of the Executive Branch. We are both trying

to devalop the strongost possible foundation for our national

security, and, therefore, I think that it is in exploration of the

viows of the other party, continued reexamination of one's own

views, villingness to adjust the force structure as circum-

a tances change that guarantees our safety and assurance that

the force curucture i adequate:

Sonator Engle.

You know that Congreasman Vinson last year

put in the bill the words "the Defenso Department is mandated and

requirad" to do cortain things.

Now, he took it out finally, and I think advisedly, but

the basic question still troubles me.

I think maybe an accommo-

dation can be arrived at, and this may be a problem that has

to be docided by the prosident himole.

But do you have any viaws with reference to whether or not

the ultimate power lies in the Congress to establish the force

structure of the Armed services or does it lie down in the

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Executive Department,

781

* the pentagon or in the white

Secretary NcNamera. I think the powers are symmetrical

in the sense that the Congress con refuse to accept proposals ag

they have in many cases of the Executive Branch relating to the

force structure and, in turn the Executive Branch can be given

within the limits of the authority, authorization of congress,

build a forco structuro that it believes suits the national ob-

joctive or fits the national objective, and in that sense the

powers of the two branches are symmetrical. But I really

think that reliance on a legalistic approach to the probiem

is not the proper way to strengthen and maximize our national

scurity.

I think the propor way to do it is in effect as you have

done it here. You have spent four days with me, the House Appro-

priations Committee spent sia days with me, and the House

Armed Sorvices: Committee spont five days with me.

Each of the

three Conmittees will spend a long period of time with others

in the Department, and through thia extensive exchange of views,

I hope

we can come out with a near unanimous view as to what

otion is roquired. I think that on 99 per cent of the foxce

structure that would be the case, and the remaining one percent,

while it remains porhaps in controversy, is not by itself so

serious a matter in eithor direction as to substantially affect

our national security.

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782

I personally bellove that this is the proper way for

the Executive Branch and the legislative Branch of our Government

to oporata

one with the other

senator Engle.

Well, I suppose that is the most practical

answer you can give and probably the one that we ought to try

to work with.

Thank you, Mx. Chairman,

Chairman Russell.

That has bean a question which has

troubled us for a long time, just where the power lies. The

constifution is very clear in one point but in many administrations

dealing with many different problems the Executive Branch has

not soon fit to spond the money that the Congress has appropriated.

I. don't think you can mandate the Executive Branch in

an authorization bill. I don't know just what good it would do

to put in their "Mandated and roquired" rather than juet rogulax

language in an authorization bill.

I think if we could get a two-thirds vote from the

Appropriations bills, suspend the rules, put language in there

to tie up the Department they would almost be compelled to do it.

but that is not a pleasant prospect and it certainly would be,

I would only engage in it as a last resort.

Anything further?

Senator Ervin. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to express

again my appreciation of the effort the secretary has made to

inform us of these matters that are of such vital concern to the

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nation.

Secretary McNanara.

Thank you, senator.

Senator Ervin. And to bay that I think one

of the moat

refreshing, inspiring things that has been said in the United

States lately was the Preoldent's statement that, in connection

with the Cuban crisis that, it a missile was fired from Cuba

on any American state that the United States would regard that

as a missile fired Erom Moscow and retaliate accordingly.

I think that is such a contrast with the situation we had

in koroa where wa tried to pretend all the tine we were really

not at war with Red China.

Secretary Mclamara.

Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman Russell. I think it was a very fine presentation,

Mr. Secretary, but I said that before and I don't want to be

redundant.

I would advise the members of the Committee that Genoral

Taylor will be here Monday morning at 10:00 o'clock to brief the

Comnittee and he will ba followed by dr. Brown

Mr. Socretary, we thank you very much for this fine

presentation and we will now stand in recess until ten o'clock

Monday.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Committee stood in recess

to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Monday, February 25, 1963:)

O-iQi0

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Have 2i Feli

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SEER

group headed by Dr. Alexander riax, who was assisted by

Dr. Eye of M.I.T.; Mr. Sucro of Purdue, and Mr. Blola of

tho Aerospaco Coxporation.

The Chairman, Than's you very much, Generai,

Mr. Bates. What to this?

The Chairman, Mx. Hobert's questions.

Mr. Arends. Skybolt.

The Chairman, Now, Mr. Secrotary, I just have a few

questions. I want

to compliment you on your statement

It lo a good statement. It to vory constructive and will be

of great help, to polnt out the highlights, on matters that

the Comnittee no doubt are deeply concerned about

And before the hearing is over, we will have some perti-

nont questions in reference to it.

Now this is not in your statemont,

At lunch I was Informed by a newapaper reporter

that some MIG-Cuban alxplane had fired on some ship, or

Ishorman, in the Florida Straits.

Of course, I made no commont, because i did not know

anything about it.

Even if I had known about it, I may not

have made any comment.

But I would like for you, 1? you are in position

to do so, inform the committee what information you have.

Secretary Zuckert. General, you are familiar with

1t:

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I know of the incident but i think the General Is

more familiar with it than I am.

The Chairman. All right.

General, proceed.

General LeMay. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. General, taik just a little bit louder.

I am a little hard of bearing, as age creeps along.

Mr. Bates. Creeps?

Mr. Arends. Creeps; yes.

General Lelay.

About

5:36 pim. yesterday 20 February,

two Juba-based MIG lighter aircraft executed rocket attacks

against a United States privatelyowned and operated

shrimp boat in the Florida Stratts.

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The Incident occurred in international wáters

2073

at 24 degrees on 5 minutes north latitude, 80 degrees

20 ninutes west longitude, which was 60 nautical miles

north of the Cuban mainland, and 78 nautical miles

east southeast of Key West

The shrimp boat was not hit and the crow of to

sustained no injuries.

About 5:24 p.m., the radar station at toy west

observed an unidentified target on their screen,

proceeding at

sixty degreos, at an altitude of 10,000 feet

at 500 knots.

When the targets crossed the 24th parallel two air-

borne fighters were dispatched to investigate the un-

Identified targets fron Key Vest and to make an intercept.

This is the normal reaction by the Air Defense

System In the Southern Florida area.

Shortly after the dispatch of the Air Defense

fighters, the Key West radar operator observed the targets

to be turning southward.

The interceptor fighters reported visual contact with

four Migs on a southwest matortal heading and reported two

Migs firing rockots at a surface vessel.

At this time four additional riBs were dispatched to the

seone of the incident. There was no engagement between the

Migs and the U. 8. Interceptors:

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As a

result of reports from the interceptors

toiling of the rockot attack, the commander, Key Hest

force, ordered a rescue effort. Three aircraft were

dispatched to the area to maintain surveillance.

A radar pioket ship on station approximately 20

miles away was ordered to the scenc. And a descroyer

oscort was dispatched from Key Hest to return any survivors

picked up by the picket ship.

By 8:45 p.m. Lastern Standard Time two men had been

taken off the shrimp boat, which was identified as the

AlA -- iron Fort Myers, Florida, and the two crew men

of the MLA, a Paris Jackaoh and Benjamin Washington,

are employed by the Jetfood Packing Company of Fort Myers.

Both Jackson and Washington state that they had been

drifting about three days because of engine failure when

attacked.

The ALA with a partial hatch of six shrimp had been away

from Fort Myers since February 10 and had sustained its

engine failure the afternoon of the 17ch.

When rescured, both men expressed a request for help

in saving their shrinp catch.: The Coast Guard has pumped

the water from the ALA's bilge and have her anchored

just to the north of where she was attacked.

Two Coast

Guardsmen are aboard as guards.

Initially in reporting the event at sea it was stated

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RiverS.

Mr. Rivers.

Other than your 104.

General Lolay. We have the 106 and the 102 that will take

care of most of the airplanes that could get in against us.

Now it is true we have a special situation down in the

southeast. United States now.

Mr. Rivers.

You certainly do:

Goneral Lelay. Where there are some 60 MIGS across in

Cuba that have a Mach 2 performance too:

Mr: Rivers. That is what I am coming to.

General Lelay. But the 104'e will take care of those:

Mr. Rivers.

It will not take care of them at aititude

General LeMay.

Yes, I think so.

Mr. Rivers. I don't think so, when they got them at Mach

2.

Now here is my point:

Don't you think this is a critcal

area in our interceptor system?

Goneral LoMay.

We must have a new follow on manned inter-

ceptor, yes, BlT.

Mr. Rivers:

Is thore any program on foot looking into

this problem?

General Lelay.

We have proposed one, which was not

accepted.

We are studying others now to presont to the Secretary of

Defense:

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(further remarks diroctod.off the record.)

Mr. Stratton. General, could I switch to just one othet

subject briefly?

The Air Force selected obviously a good deal of the

intelligence that has been used in the DIA's presentation with

regard to the situation in Cuba.

I asked this question of the Navy, and I vould like to ask

It of you as well:

Is the Air Forco inteliigence branch in agreement with the

presentation that the Secrotary of Defense gave to this conmittee

and to the nation over television a little bit later with regard

to the situation in Cuba?

General Lelay. Generally, yes:

The Air Porco has had an input into that presentation and

the facts that were brought out there, And ve agreed with them;

The only thing that I would say on that le that none of us

are happy with the amount of intelligence that ve are getcing.

We always want more.

And we would like to have more

intelligence:

tir.

scratton. I mean you, you are not the Alr Force

doenn't hold, for oxample, that there are X number of missiles

In vartous spots that the secretary is covering por hasn't

discovored or anything of that lind:

Goneral LoMay. Il there are any missiles there, we don't

know about them.

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The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Stratton --

Mr. Stratton. I remember we have had differences in the

estimates in the past.

I just wondered whether there was any difference with

regard to Cuba.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Stratton, I wint to com-

pliment you. You developed fine questions.

Secretary Zuckert. There is no difference in substance

that I have been able to discover between the conclusions of our

intelligence people and what the Secretary of Defense has said

Mr. Stratton.

Thank you very much

The Chairman.

Mr. Pirnie.

Mr. Pirnie.

Yes; Nr. Chairman.

Just pursuing that

question, General and Mr. Secretary.

The intelligence that was available didn't disclose the

arrival of those missiles, and

it could be very well possible

that the number is inaccurate..

Socretary Zuckert.

That is true.

Wo countod 42 missiles, I believe, in Cuba, or something

less than thet - counted 42 leaving.

It to entirely possible that there are a few missiles left

around some place in there. But we haven't been able to find

them.

And I think it 1s gonerally agreed by all of the intelligone

people

that there probably are none there;

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But we can't say definitely.

Only an on-site, very

careful on-site inspection in Ouba would prove that.

Mr. Plinie, That was the point that I was leading up to.

Because it is an obvious trick that has been enployed in all

military operations to let the enemy soe what you want it to

Be0.

And therefore while nobody would quarrel with the deductions

that might be made

from the type of surveillance that was repres-

ented by these oxcollent photographs, it must be admitted that

that only gives limited disclosure, isn't that correct?

Secretary Zuckert:

That is correct.

And that is the reason I said we would all like to have

more intelligenco, because we can't definitely prove that there

are no more missiles thore.

I think the odds are very greatly in favor of their not

be any there, but we can't definitely say there aren't.

All we can say de that we haven't been able tofind any.

Mr. Pirnie. That is right.

And it would be true also in regard to mobile launchers,

that tt would be possible for capabilities to be concealed

there; too?

Secrotary Zuckert. It is possible, yos, sir.

Mr: Pirnto, Goneral, I was very much interestod in the line

of questioning that has juat been developed because I have boon

puzzled as we have been studying our veapons system, to determine

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secretary

Mcivamara.

SASC

2/ Fabi

383

I agsee. But the fightor aircraft

woulü no: iativer the weapons wich such accusacy as to preclude

th: probability that sone would land off the air bases.

senator colavater. Why do you fcel that? Teir accuracy

io rather good.

secrotary Mclamara. No,. I think the hiscory of all fighter

Jordar attacks has been that many esplosives havo been landed

othes than on the taiget.

Sonator Colawates. I aged with you in the past, but that

was thon we, during vorid was it, we didn't even have a

unifica sighting dovice for rockets. But we do today. and for

instance, in tie Cuban buildup, I was, I happened to be, on duty

at that cine and I was vory impressed with the degreo of

acuracy that these men folt choy had in the event they had to

atcuch theis cargots, and i think it was reflecced in the rather

limitod nunbar of sorties that were planned on rather difficult

targots.. I don't buy the icca.

Secretasy Mclamara, in the case of Cuba we wese planning a

substantial numbes of sortios, and I chink the Air forco ivould

agao that it is extremely unlikoly that, very unlikely that.

100 per cont of the weapons would be landed on the target,

in this case the air fields. I think we nust recognize the high

probability that a substantial percentago of those weapons would

not bo landed on the taiget.. In any event, even it they were

landed on the target, the damage would be so largo and the

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431

approach, while economizing on manpower, still requires that

airlift be available to move the men to where the materiel is

prepositioned, but men are much easier to move by air than large

units of equipment.

We believe an aypropriate blend of all four methods would

produce the best results, and that is what we have actemptee to

achiove in the proposed program. We already have large general

purpose forces deployed abroad, particularly in Europe and Korea.

We have prepositioned substantial amounts of equipment and

supplies in Europe and in the Far East. We have initiated a

limiced program of forward floating bages. Finally, we are main-

raining a large central reserve of General Purpose Forces in the

continental United States, and are building the airlift required

to move these forces promptly to wherever they might be needed.

A. ATRLIFT

Last year I outlined to the Committee the manner in which we

compuied our airlift requirements and the forces programmed co

fulfill then. Problems encountered during the Cuban crisis,

however, have led us to the conclusion that some increase in these

forces is necessary. Our standby plans for the invasion of Cuba.

for example, called for the simultaneous air drop of the assault

elements of 2 airborne divisior,, totaling in all about 10,000

mon and their equipment. When the airlift force requirements were

computed, however, we found that we did not have enough suitable

aircraft in the active forces to carry out that operation,

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432

together with the other missions requiring airlift aircraft.

Therefore, we had to activate 24 squadrons of Ait Force Reserve

C-119's, and C-123's, cocaling 439 aircraft and about 14,000 men.

I might say, by the way, the Air force did an absolucely

magnificent job in an activation. Weissued the order at 10:00

o'clock one Saturday night, and within 30 hours those men and

planes veze available for combat operations ready to take-off if

necessary on an airlifc move.

The old C-119, hile specifically designed for airborne

operacions, is small and slow and has but a fraction of the range

of the new C-130. While it is useful to have in reserve, we

cannoc rely upon this aircraft for airlifc to areas more distant

than Cuba. We therefore propose to acquiro an additional 6

squadrons of C-130E's which are not only good transport aircraft

but are also efficient troop carriers. We plan to acquire the

addicional aircraft by increasing the production race from 12

to 15 per month, thus raising the C-130 force to 34 squadrons by

early 1965, instead of the 28 squadrons which we had previously

programmed. This force will be continued at least chrough 1968,

as shown on Table 13.

You might wish to turn here to page 197 and see the aizliit

forces outlined in Table 13. In Table 13 there is shown for each

of the years of the five-year program period, '6a to '68, the

planned force structure.

We have also shown the actual force

structure for 61, 92 and "3.

These cover both the active forces

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599

pa 3

of fine wale ochers go down do land iroops.

We are vuilizing

he dir roice alrplanes to give air cover and, in oher words,

have developed all the cactios and

techniques we know of in

order to improve the safeur of our helicopters and our personnel

enguged in other kinds of teste.

Sonat on

stennis. You don't lack modern equipment now.

You have pleniy oi modern equipmeni to do che very chings you

have descrined, to that right?

General Taylor. I don't know of any kind of equipment

that anyone has asked for or suggested as being useful thai

in noü avallablo in South Vict Nam.

Senator Bennis. And you give them as good au you have?

General Taylor. Yos, sir.

Secretary Moramara. I think, Senator, li is fair do

say thai we have said to our connanders in souch Viet Nan that

we are spending $52 billion a year, and they have firse cain

on the whole 452 billion, neaning all of our resources.

Senator Stennia. That la very good. Those assurances

sound Good. I wonte labor that any further, but I belleve it

necus o ve publicized some more.

Now one question here about the Navy, and this lo my

last quescion. I was very much impressed really in goịng

down co Guantanamo Bay afcer the crisis was over.

Mrs. Smith

and I went down there, and I was very much pleased to see what

had happened with reference o bringing this force, this

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clemencone force, bogother ao quickly at to Presidonig

commana righe alber october 22ù.

and inid dot she ides that the mary: carticularly the

conventional saab of the divy, that is what you sed, was

streiched out conozuerably just for that nearby mission only

a few milor away.

The thought occurred to me suppose you had ind anechting

alue happen somewhere cise in the world far removed at about

the same tille. You said yesterday as I undersiond, maybe it.

was today, that you figured that foi lintier ver requiremants

the luvy was capabie in sire and eomposition and so forch.

I vould like for you to respond, io enlarge on that

statement and respond to the impression I got about the Navy

being pretty much absorbed.

secretary Mchamara. Well, sir, I don't believe that it

540•

/ Sa

was.

Schator Siennis. I dun't mean the carriers vere all

taken up, bui more conventional ships.

Secretary Moiamara. We did not redeploy any sustantiai

nunver uf ravai crafi, either suface or air for that operation.

We utlilzea tre naval crait assigned to this parcicular drea

we did not deplete the naval forces elsewhere in ine

world therefore äuring that period.

I think that many or the

crews were

on an extended duty. We did as a matier of fact

as I renember extend the tours of enilatment of certain navai

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personnel to assist us during that period. But I don't believe

chat it demonouraied shortages of naval forces.

Senaüor Stennis. What about your landing icans and units

of chai kind? Did you have them to apare, in addicion to

what you called in?

Scorciar y Mcitamara. I think we had ample forces, aid

that the readiness measures of the last two years demonstrated

their cifect by the rapidity with which -

Senator Stennis. I know you had plenty there, Fir.

Secretary, as I said in my original statement, but how much

old you have should you had been callea on far away?

Seciciary Mclamara. We did not redeploy foices

from

other cheaters into this cheater. Perhaps General Taylor

would Ilke to conment though on the adequacy of the forces

as he appraised them during that period.

Gencral Taylor. This was a very valuable exeicise for

all the Services engaged, because we checked out many factors

that we had only computed more or less in theory.

I would say the naval forces were thoroughly adequace,.

although certainly in some seciors they became thin.

For example, in amphibious craft we comnitica just about

all we could lay ow hands on in the Atlantic.

IsTs were

short, au a matier of face we are going io bring out about

11 additional IsT's Into the regular navy, in order to have

them available.

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So we developed shoduages in narrow segments, but n the

whole I would say the naval forces are thoroughly adequaic.

Senator Stennis. Well those you named though are very

vital and very necessary. You did not have enough to have

waken care of that operation should it develop?

General Taylor. It would have been hard to duplicate

an aiphibious landing at the same vime. That I would concede.

But we did this without reaucing the strength in the Pacific

or our general war readiness. I thought it was quive a good

demonstration of adequacy.

Senator Stennis. You did not have any casualties or

replacenents to deal with on anyching like that either,

corcunately.

Secreiary McNamara. In all of our Services, Senator, as

you know well, if we go for prolonged perioda of time we will

have io have some kind of mobilization aù hone.

Serator Stennis. You feel satisfied, then, Mr. Secretary,

about the situaiion.

Sccretary Mcitanara. I feli very pleased wich the degree.

of readiness that was exhiblica in October of lasi year compared

to che degree of

readiness that we saw a year before.

I think there was a tremendous improvement and one that

was amply demonstrated. I think there were some serious

shortages that were exhibited as well.

These we knew about, particularly the airlift, because in

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order in ha

up fron the Rescives befoo entering into combat 400 aircraft

and 14,000 men.

Now forbunately the din Reserves hau been so organized

and maintained au such a high state of readiness that we were

able to do chio, bui it vas also fortunate thai the requirchen

was con a short tranport, becuse the aircrart that those

Reserves were equipped with did noi have a capabllity to move

any cubstantial distance.

Senator stennis.

So if it had been 3,000 miles, you would

have been out of business?

Secicuary McNamara. We would have been in very serious

difficulty in airlift, and I think that was our most important

shortage. I think it is probably the nose important shortage

coday, the one we

are secking to correct by the alrlifo

procurcient program put before you.

Senatoi Suchnis. Is there any other you want to mention

there before we leave thai subject?

Secretary Mcilamara.

No, sir, I don't belleve so. I

mentioned ocher shortages.

Schator Stennis. Yes.

All right.

Secretary McNamara. That we are aware of that were not

particularly demonstraved.

Senator Stennis. We will pass on.

Others are waiving:

Mrs. Smith, you are next.

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IN TERNS OF WORLD TONNAGE.

THE SOVIET PROGHAM OF OCEANOGHAPHIC

RESEARCH IS SECOND TO NONE, AND HAS, IN FACT, PRUVIDED AN IMPETUS TO

OUR OWN RECENTLY EXPANDED EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD.

THE SOVIETS HAVE FURNISHED SUISTANTIAL NAVAL FORCES TO

INDONESIA AND TO THE UNITED ALIAS REPUBLIC. THE COMMUNISIS ANE ALERT

TO THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF VITAL SHIPPING PASSAGES HETRES THES

OCEANS. CUBA FLANKS THE ATLANTIC APPROICHES TO THE PANAMA CANAL:

HOWEVER, AT PRESENT, THE COMMUNISTS DO NUT CONTROL THE IMPORTANT

NARROW HATERS OF THE HORLD SUCH AS THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR,:

SINGAPORE, SUEZ AND OTHERS. WE MUST NOT LET. THEM DU SO.

WITH OUT POTENTIAL ENEMIES MOVING FORWARD TO EXPAND THEIR SYSTEM

ON THE WORLD MARITIME FRONI, THE MEANS TO USE AND CONTHOL THE SEAS

ARE GOING TO EE MORE IMPORTANT TO AMERICANS IN THE 19705 THAN 'EVER

BEFORE. CUBA FURNISHED A PREVIEW OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD THIS

COUNTRY NOT HAD THE GRADUATED, FULLY RESPONSIVE NAVAL STRENGTH TO

APPLY TO THIS SITUATION.

THE KEY TO SEAPOWER IN THE NUCLEAN AGE LIES IN THE ABILITY OF

MIE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TO EXERT MILITARY FORCE ON A GRADUATED, CONS

TROLLED SELSCTIVE SCALE WHEREVER AND WHENEVER IT MAY BE REQUIRED. VE

IN THE NAVY

ARE FOND OF USING THE WORDS MOBILITY, FLEXIHILITY AND

VERSATILITY TO DESCRIBE OUR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. ATTRIBUTES, AUT IF

WE AKE GUILTY OF OVER-USING THESE WORDS, IT IS BECAUSE NO OTHEMS HAVE.

YET BEEN FOUND ADEQUATSLY TO CHARACTERIZE THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION MICH

NAVY. AND MARINE CORPS FONCES MANE TO. THE NATIONAL LEFENSE. WITH SKIPS,

AIRGRAFT, AND NARINE UNITS AS BASIC "BUILDING BLOCHS". WE CAN PUT

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OF HUNDREDS OF MILES FROM THEIR MOVING AND UNFREDICTABLE LAUNCH POINTS.

IT MAY BE SAID WITH ASSURANCE THAT BECAUSE OF THIS NOBILITY CHARACTERISTIC,

NAVAL FORCES AT SEA ARE NOST LIVELY TO PROVIDE THE MAJOR RESIDUAL. SPRIXE

CAPABILITY WHICH MILL BOTH HELP TO DETER AN ENEMY ATTACK AND INSURE AN

EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-ON STRIKE CAPACITY SURVIVING THE IMPACT OF AN INITIAL

NUCLEAR EXCHANGE •

TO PROTECT OUR SEA LINES OF COMIUNICATIONS AND TO INSURE CONTROL OF

VITAL SEA AREAS, THE NAVY MUST BE ÁBLE TO CONTAIN AND DEFEAT THE SUB-

MARINE THREAT. THIS CALLS FOR VIGOROUS EFFORTS ACROSS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM

OF NAVAL ACTIVITY, CONTRARY TO MOFULAR CONCEFTION, ANTI-SUBARINE BAR-

FARE CANNOT BE BROKEN OUT OR ISOLATED. SO THAT IT CAN BE IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY

FROR OTHER NAVAL OPERATIONS, IT IS AN ORGANIG, INTEGRAL PART OF VIR-

TUALLY ALL OPERATIONS. IT IS AN ELEMENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE THAT GOES ON

AT SEA. THE ANTI-SUBMARINE BATTLE WILL GE WON BY UNREMITTING EFFORT IN

ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF NAVAL OPERATIONS - FORCES, WEAPONS,. THAINING,

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. WE

ARE GIVING THIS. PROULEM TOP PRIORITY IN

OUR PROGRAMS.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ARE AND ALWAYS HAVE BEEN

PRE-EMINENT IN THE WORLD IN THE FIELD OF MNSPHIBYQUS VARFARE. THE NAVYOS

ABILITY TO TRANSPORT, LAND AND SUTPORT MIRINE ASSAULT TROOPS ON ENEMM HELD

COASTS HAS PROVED ITS VALUE TO OUR NATION TIME AND AGAIN..

THE UNITED STATES

NEEDS THE ASSURANCE THAT FAST, COMBAT-PEADY ANPHIBIOUS FORCES ARE AT HAND

TO COPE WITH ANY FORESEEABLE SITUATION, FROM A LEBANOH TO A CUBA.

THE FUTURE HOLDS LITTLE PROSPECT OF ANY REDUCTION IN OUR WURLD-VIDE

NAVAL CONMITMENTS. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELLEVE

THAT THESE COMAITNENTS MILL INCREASE AS THE SONTET BLOG TURNS ETS

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The Navy has tasen positiva etapo to implemant thin restriction in our

shipwork progran, He nou fully expect to comply with this requirement, and

ham firm plaus to allocate 35% or the funds made avallable in TY 1963 for

rejelt, alteration, anl ccavoraion of naval ubipo to privato shipyards.

trecution of this provision has by no mans been easy. It hns been responsible

for & reduction of epprosinately 3, 800 11 saval shipyard employnent during

FI 1903, and the transfer of soveral destroyer conversions fron the Heat to

the last Coast, to mintain balanced naval ahipyard work forces. ' Naval

operations during the Cuban crisis resulted in numerous changes to planed

shipwork schodules. It is quite probable that had the Cuban crisis contimed

sos a longor parlod, luvocation of the paralasive proviudone of the law 1n

exception to the 35% requirement would have been required.

In adastion to these problous and the extra administrative burden of

segregating and controlling the private yard portion of shiprork, the effect

ef this work ausigment has been felt by the fleet. The lary bas cossistently

held that militnry requiremants shoud be the prime determinent in ellocating

thie work. While our experience in FY 1963 resulting Iron the assignment of

a larger number of Activo Fleet anton to private yards has not degraded Fleet

rendinous to a medsurable degree, we must he very carenu that cur future

antions lusure that wo contique to mintala the best possible posture of

Plast readinoss. It should be noted that te have only hed a Ilttle over six

montus experience tita this requirenant us 1t In still too early to evaluate

1ta full effect.

Allocation of Highly Techntinl and Comlleated Work

In date It lns been the practice to assign auxiliary and smalier type

shipu to pilvate untpyando for conversion, alteration and repair. From an

1uductrial point of vier alono, this bus been tensible and the private salo

yardo have genorally portoned up tiREde. However, there is ho

nssurancs thet the private shipyards can satisinetortly accomplich overhaul.

5

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The Chairman.

SEGRET

Yes.

Mr. Rivors. Now they have gone so faris. to not

support our buildup of two more attack submarines?

The Chairman. We are not talking about that

Secrotary Korth.

No, sir. We have definitely

put ourselves on record with the committee I think and with

the Charman also.

The Chairnan. Keep your questions on the Polaris.

Now the nest one

Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairnan, may I ask a question

In connection with that?

My recollection was that Admiral Burke said only

that

he recommended 15 submarines in order that thirty

might be on station at all cimes. And it vas his estimate that

46 total wore nooded in order to get thirty operational.

Could you givo us an idea, Admiral, what your ostimate

would be te you have di boats how many are going to be

available on station at all times?

Admiral Anderson. We can count on approximately

two-thirds of these boats being on station at all cines.

We also have the option of incroasing the

number of

boats on station,

if, for example, we feel that there

is a particular period of cension, such as ve did during the

Cuban operation:

I would say - off the record

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There are 32 ballistic missiles nose

NASC R0FN

2194

than what we

have.

The theory of this var - or battle -- 1f lt comes,

would be the

idea of mass destruction on the enemy.

This subnarine would not give that mass destruction

on the enomy. I mean, it soons to me I detect a

change, deep change, to a political, let's say, instead of

military philosophy.

Admiral Anderson. I do not feel it does constitute

a chango.. I think that the addition of 32 addittonal

Polaris masilos, for example, ox more, would not make

a quantum differonco in the knowledge of the Russians that

Il they start a thermonuclear war their destruction is inevi-

table.

It is.

However, I think that ve are moving into an era

where it 1s far more likoly than over before - and we could

have soen a case arising right out of the Cuban situation,

where we might indood havo boen ongagod in varfare with

the russians diroct vithout a thermonuclear exchange.

HI. Bray. IS

that why ve are cutting down and going

out of the long distance bomber business?

Admiral Anderson. No, sir.

I don't bollove that that is rolated to this

particular matter.

Mr. Bray.

It seene to me ic is. I will not

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The paper that I file goes in minute detail to all the

conversion and the construction.

It gives the yard, every Navy yard that is participating

in this building program on the program and construction,

Put all that in the record.

Admiral Grifftn. Yes, sir.

The Chairman, Thenext one is the tank landing ship:

You requested one and the department approved 1t. The

cost of it 1s 29 million.

Give the comnittee the information about that

ship.

Admiral Griffin. This is the first of a new class of

ISTs designed for a sustained speed of 20 knots. It will be

ablo to 111t 400 troops, with a lull load capacity of

2100 tons and & normal beaching load of 500 tons.

The

22 previonsly.authorized post world war II LSTs vary in

speed from 14.5 to 17 knots.

Mr. Rivers. Aren't you deficiont in this area?

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir, ve are.

Mr. Rivers. Didn't the Cuban crisis point up this

deficiency?

Adniral Griffin. Yes, sir. As a consequence of

tho Cuban crista we were forced to, as Admiral Anderson

I think testifled vestorday, forced to bring some -- to

hire some ships - that were in commercial use -- and

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have them stand by for the purpose of transporting heavy e

equipment to Cuba in case we had to go in, sir.

Nr. Rivers. What priority would you attach to this

doficiency, Adniral Andorson?

You attached a priority to the two submarines?

Adniral Anderson. We are very anxious, Mr. Rivers,.

to build up both our antisubnarine warfare capability

and our amphibious capabilliy.

Wenecessarily have to place our antisubmarine

warfare capability at the higher priority.

But we feel that the amphikious force, the

modernization

of the amphibious force, is nost important,

not just for the Navy and the Marine Corps buc also for the

Army as well.

id 1

IM fols

* 2 101s

A.M.

EGRET

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12

no draft. I don't understand it. You know what I mean..

Secretary Korth, No propellor.. It is merely an ejection.

Admiral James. This is a standard gas turbine.

It 1s a

developmental application for Marine use with propellers and it

1a a displacement type craft.

Mr. Bray. This is not what you are vorking on --

Admiral James: This le not the hydrofoil typo of craft.

Mr. Bray. That is what I was thinking of.

Admiral Jamos. I thought you were.

The hydrofoll in in our program in previous years and the

first of these will fly for the Navy - hopefully - on the l6th

of March and wiil come into service this year.

Mr. Bray.

It uses the jet principle and has slight draft.

Admiral James. It has zero draft. It flys above the

surface of the water with only the foil submerged where instead

of jets we are

using goar drive mechanism.

Secretary Korth. Looks like it is standing on stilts, in

other words.

The Chairnan. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson.

I know this has conventional armament.

How

does this compare with the Russian Comar gun boats such as the

Russians have put into Cuba.

Mr. Rivers. For defensive purposes only.

Admiral Griffin. It is better than the Comar for de

onsive purposes only SECRET

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SEE

ELL

Of course, Comar has two surface - relatively short

range . surface-to-surface missiles.

Mr. Wilson. We don't see any really offensive capability

for this type of boat, then?

Admiral Griffin. We have a three inch gun on this.

Mr. Wilson.

We have a three inch gun and the Russians have

misstles:

Can't we upgrade the armament on our gun boat to be at least

superior to the russians, or do we have to keep building three

inch pop guns?

Admiral Griffin.. We don't feel we need that particular

application at this time. We have other means.

Secretary Korth.

It Isn't designed to carry the Comar.

Mr. Wilson.

I know:

Admiral Griffin. We have other means of doing this:

Mr. Wilson. The Comar is designed for the same purpose.

am wondering.

Admiral Griffin. Not the same purpose, no, sir.

They don't have control of

the seas, for example, over here,

which was a very significant characteristic in connection with

the Russian endeavor.

Mr: Wilson. Do you think the Comar is a defensive gun boat

or offensive gun boat?

Admiral Griffin. I think it is offensive.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you.

SEGRE

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The Chairman.

Mr. Chamberlan.

Mr. Chamberlain. What is the range that I read on that

chart?

Admiral Griffin, 1700 miles:

Mr. Chamberlain.

What to the range

Admiral Griffin. That is at 16 knots.

Mr. Chamberlaln, Capability of 1700 miles

Admiral Griffin. At 16 knots.

Mr. Chanberlain. What is the range of the Comar that we

have been told of?

Admiral Jamos. I would speculate it is under. 500 miles;

without having full knowledge.

Mr. Chainberlain.

Is thore anyone here that knows?

Admiral

Anderson.

655 at 20 knots.

Let me put the Comar in proper contest.

I think that the Russians put the Comar boats into Cuba,

and the Russians have put Comar boats into Indonesia, and will

probably put them in other areas, to be able to use them against

any of our ships, particularly our amphiblous ships, which might

come into the aroa.:

So in that respect, I would say their idea of putting them

1n is defensive.

But actually we know that they would be used against our

ships, and they could be used, recognizing the range to lob

missiles against shore installations or anything else.

SEGRET

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188

unclassified advance copy of the Secretary's advance statement

on Latin America, B-I, Latin American and I shall ask two

of the 11

guestions, Mr. Secretary.

There

are those who contend that the lesson of Cuba was

that we won that showdown because of our superior conventional

forces.

Yet there are those who contend the lesson of Cuba was

that we won that showdown because it turned on being a nuclear

confrontation, and we had the nuclear superiority, and sensing

that, Khrushchev

backed down.

Was there a nuclear confrontation? Did the crisis turi on

our nuclear superiority or on our conventional superiority?

...

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STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ROBERT S. MC NAMARA,

189

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GENERZI

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF - resumed

Secretary McNamara. Senator Smith, Khruschev diù back

down but he backed down in my opinion because we had both,

because we had both a nuclear superiority and a conventional

superiority in that, particular instunce.

Senator Smith. Had Khrushchev had superior conventional

forces in Cuba what would have been the outcome of an eyeball

to eyeball showdown?

secretasy Melamara. It is difficult for me to speculate on

an iffy situation such as that, but I believe that our position

would have been cubstantially weaker had we been limited to

nuclear superiority and faced Soviet superiority in Cuba.

of course, it is very difficult to conceive of how they

could have had conventional superiority in that situationbut

assuming for the

minute they did, I am confident that our total

power position would have been much, much weaker.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I will have here the balance

of my questions on that subdivision for the Secretary to

take and I will go on to my second group of questions on the

introduction, B-7, NATO, and I will ask from that group two of

the 13 questions.

If there is an assault by the Soviet bloc against western

WH 54214 Doc1HY.PPP409hdplge Our conventional forces fail under that assault,

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194

Senator Young: Then you do not believe an all-out war is

inevitable, and, of course, you are not at all in favor of

pre-emptive war by us.

secretary McNamara. I do not favor pre-emptive war. I be-

lieve we

can reduce the risks of all-out war by, one, maintain-

ing and strengthening our national military forces, and two,

by appropriate actions over the period of time to protect against

the further proliferation and indiscriminate use of nuclear

weapons.

Serator Young. Than you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chaiinan Russell.

Mc. Secretary, as a practical matter you

and General Taylor are talking about the use of atomic weapons;

I was of the opinion that there is some pcovision of the law that

no one could use any of those without direct order from the

President of the

United States, is that corsect?

Secrecary McNamara. That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman.

I assume our answers -

Chaizman Russell. That is what you would advise the

President?

Secretary McNamara. Exactly so, Mi. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Just one ocher thing in connec-

tion with that, you were discussing Cuba. I have been called a

warmonger and all because I advocate a nuch firmer policy than

we actually employed. You didn't mention the question of

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195

Mr. Khrushchev's agsecREt

co remove the missiles, the fact that

they were so far avay from him and the Russians traditionally

and historically have not liked to fight wars that were far away

from where they had their land masses:

Secretary McNamara.

Ic was geography, Mi. Chairman,

which gave us such a clear favorable margin of conventional power,

and this played a major role in his decision, I am certain.

Chairman Russell. I would certainly have taken a different

position on missiles that had been stationed 50 miles from

Berlin than I would have from those that were being erected in

Cuba itself.

Sonacor Saltonstall, Senatos Scennis agreed to yield.

Senator Saltonstall.

I thank Senator Stennis.

Mr.. secretary, this is just one quescion that I would like

to ask. I will ask it at this time. This is really a question

that you - I talked over with you when you were good enough to

come to my office, but I would like to get it on the record be-

cause I think it is awfully difficult, an awfully difficult

problem.

Several times over the years there have been deep differ-

ences of opinion on procurement problems. I have in mind since

I have been on this Committee the B-36, the number of Marines,

and I think one other question.

Now, I have felt that where it is difficult for a senator

like myself; not an oxpert, to know which is right, that it is

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208

Senator Stennis.

I Know we don't have the percentage.

But now I don't want to take up too much time. You have a fine

knowledge of all this Cuban complex and everything, the complex

questions about it. My argument about it is mainly one of

priority and preference and emphasis, but you havon't testified

mainly on that, have you?

Secretary McNamara., No, sis, I have noc.

Senator Stennis. I should think we ought to pass questions

on that then until you have given your statemen'c abouc, ic.

Chairman Russell.. Permit me to say that the Secretary

offered to go into that first and that I first thought that would

be the better procodure. Later I decided it would be better

to conclude the hearing and then proceed to that.

senator. Stennis. I think you are right.

That is correct.

There is one thing on this Skybolt now. I just had this

idea of my own when newspaper reporters told me in the lobby of

a hotel in Memphis that the Skybolt program had been changed

and more or leus abandoned, I just couldn't believe it at first,

and then my nest thought was well, it must be a diplomacic rea-

son or something in view of all the proof that we had about it

in the years before.

May I ask you that question, if it is proper. To what extent:

was this

a diplomatic decision?

Secretary McNamara.

Absolutely not at all, Senator

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210

about the British.

senator stennis... No.

Chairman Russell.

I yesterday expressed to you my con-

cern about the relationship between the Cuban withdrawals and the

test ban negotiations, and everything that happons increases

my suspicion that there is some connection between them.

Yesterday we got the notice that Khrushchev was going to

take these soldiers out of Cuba. This morning I hear on the

radio that our negotiators are approaching the two or three on-

side inspections for the test

ban agreement.

Now, I don'? know whether Congress will have anything to

say on that or not, but speaking as one member of the Senate

if we come in here with some test ban that represents a long

series of complete surrenders and submissions.to the demands of

the Russians on this tesc ban business I for one am going to

oppose it as vigorously as we can. It seems to me we are walking

right in that direction now.

I raised that question yesterday. In view of that i's

intervening in between I thought I ought to make that statement

here today. I may be the only one, but to me it has been one

Step

nas followed the other, Cuba here, we retreat on test ban

there. It may be just a series of coincidences, but I would be

opposed to this present test ban that we are about to accept,

is thero wasn't any Cuba, because I don't think we afford ade-

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211

faith, please

understand, fit. Secrecasy, when you said there was

no conneccion between them, but it has happened on three or four

ccasions that when the Russians have gruagingly lived up to their

promises of last November then we have given something on the

rest ban.

Secretary Mclamara.

Mr. Chairman, may I speak to that?

Chairman Russell. Yas, I wish you would.

Secretary McNamara. This is a subjeci that undoubtedly

Secretary Rusk can speak to more authositativoly than I. But

I have been a party to, I beliove, all of the discussions on the

question of the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba as well as

the test ban negotiations.

I have seen the documents, the cables and lecters that.

have passed between our two governmonts. I participated in the

discussiong that led to the final decisions iclating to our

Government's position, and at no time has there been any

link whatsoever ketween our actions with respect to Cuba or the

Soviet's vichdrawal of missiles and now personnel from Cuba and

any other action by tirat governmont of this Government, and

specifically no link batween those actions and the test ban

negotiations:

As a matier of fact, to be quite frank about it, our

Government's position on the test ban was determined bufore we

roceived the soviet informacion the day before yesterday, and

without any rogard to it, and it has not yet been communicated

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>816

I want to read one of the letters and one of the telegrams

that is typical, and get your comment on it, please.

This letter is from Shreveport, Louisiana. The man

gives his address and street number:

"I have just

heard that che United States Engineers

in Georgia had leased some 2,500 square miles of souch

Georgia land to train United Nations troops on, I also

heard that: 3,500 United Nations

troops would arrive there

on March 4 to train through March 27, and that in June some

17,000 Congolese troops of the Uniced Nations would be coning

in for an indefinite stay and training.

"I want to know if this is true, since my nother lives

in south Georgia. I would also like to know where such

land was rented and if we are actually going to let the

Congolese troops train there and what you intend to do abouc

1ü. Please let me have your answer by return mail as I am

very much concerned about this piece of news that has evident-

ly been kept well guarded.

"P.S.. If such news is true, what can we do abouc It?"

Here is a télegram from a gentleman in Houston, Texas:

"Understand U Thani of United Nations is establishing

a conmand post in Georgia bringing United Nations Congolese

troops from. Africa to provect the United States from Cuban

attack. Movement known as Operation Water Moccasin. Is this

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212

to the soviets.

Moreover, the informacion that was received the day before

yesterday, was

in accordance with Khrushchev's statement to the

President made last November.

Chairman Russell. I understand that. But he still hasn't

done what he said he would last November and ho didn': do it

yesterday:

Secretasy McNamara.

Ro, sir. I didn't mean to imply

that all the troops will be pulled out or he said that all the

troops will be pulled out in his statement of yestorday, but I

do wish to state insofar as I have knowlodge of the situation,

and I beliove I have complete knowledge of ic, there has been

no linkago between test ban negotiations and Cuba negociations.

Chaiman Russell. I accept that, but evidently our negotia-

tors have gotten tired and frustrated because we have concaded

and conceded. I

am a simple-minded person myself. To me if

Russia is in good faith

about suspending atomic tests there is

no reason why they shouldn't allow teams to come into Russia.

Russia is just overcun with tourists and there is noching new.

it wouldn't generate any particular ideas in the mind of Russians

to see strange people walking around because courists are on

every corner in Russia, and if they are in good faith on this

test ban, I can't escape, to me, the conclusion that they would

be willing to pormit some inspeccion other than this black box

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314

the whole world, and I am sure they must laugh at us, saying

"Well, all we have to do is sii there", the sovlecs, they just

sit there, and if they walt long enough we will keep giving

in, giving in, giving in.

This is not my idea of a good Yankee trader who is in

there to drive a hard bargain. I think we hurt our position

and seriously impair it, not only as it affects nuclear test

bans but it affeçts our whole diplomatic arm, whether we are

talking about being tough in Cuba or about doing something

elsewhere.

They get the impression that they can push us around,

and that if they just wait long enough, they will get what

they want.. I must say that we are naive.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr, Chairman, if the Senator will

yield for one question.

"Mr. secretary, you disturbed me very much just now in

answer to a question by Senator Jackson.

We were discussing

looking forward ten years.

Secretary McNamara.

Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. And as I visualize the attitude of

the chinese as we know it, is it not very dangerous for us

to agree with any tests with the Soviets now and what they way

do after we agree with them as to what they may give to the

Chinese and let them go forward?

Secretary McNamara. Right.

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as far as you know now

that there is no submarine bases at all

in Cuba, nor under construction?

Now let's get a positive answer

Admiral Anderson. I can advise the committee

that to the

best of my knowledge there have been no Russian subnarines in

Cuba.

I could also say that there are harbors, there are

facilities in Cuba, which could be used for servicing submarines.

The Chairman. That is what you said yesterday.

Now the question is: Are there any bases being established

there now?:

Admiral Anderson. We have seen nothing which can be identi-

Ited specifically as a submarine base in Cuba.

The Chairman. Is there any evidence that anything unusual

1s taking place in any of these bases where it vould be possible

to establish a submarine base?

Any unusual activity which might cause you

to be concerned

that it 1s going boyond the mere normal harbor development?

Admiral Anderson. Nothing to the point where at this

stage of the game, Mr. Chairman, we could say that this is being

developed as a submarine base, no, sir.

The Chairman.

Well, is there any unusual development taking

place?

Is there any unusual activity taking place, out of the

ordinary upkeep of

a harbor?

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2284

Admiral Anderson. Thore te nothing which would lead me

to

bellove that spoclitchlly thore is a submarine base development.

The Chaliman. Woll, then, I am warranted in stating to the

Floor, if anyone asks me the question, that Admiral Anderson

sald that as for as the information he has and the Navy Depart-

ment has,

that there are no activities in any of these available

harbors that is being utilized for the purpose of building sub-

marine bases.

Admiral Anderson. To the best of ourknowledge at this

time.

- M4

The Chairman. All right:

Mr.

Rivers. Could I ask this?

Are you doing any reconnaissance yourself, or is: the

prosant reconnaissance

being conducted by another agency of the

Government?

are you yourself doing.

any?

Aduiral Anderson. Off the record --

Mr. Smart.

Off the record.

Admiral Andercon. Off the record.

(Furthor statoment off the record.)

(Further discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Now menbers of the committee, this includes

the posture briefing by the secretary, the Admiral and the

General.

I want to thank you on behalf of the committee.

SECRET

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Admiral Anderson.

SECRET

Eight.

2197

Mr. Bates. They just cut you two.

Adniral Anderson. That is right.

Secretary Korth. What?

mr. Bates. They just cut you two?

Secretary Korth. That is right.

Admiral Anderson. I would also like

to see if the funds

vore avilable for a nuclear propelled frigate with perhaps

a terrier missile.

I would like to see sone of our ISt's, fast Lsts.

We have need for improvod amphibious lift.

During the course of the Cuban operation we

saw that we had need for lift, not only for the Marines

but also for the Army.

I would like also to continue in the field of modern

izing our fleot replenishment ships, AOR. I would include

¿wo of those ships. Because this means the difference of a

ship that has to be re-gupplted. It comes to one ship to

got iis resupply rather than to two or chreo.

I would increase by maybe a couple of more destroyer

escorts.

Then I would accolarate sons of the ships which are

in next year's program or the program in the lolloving

year tox auxiliary purposes.

Mr.

Bates.

How what would that total up?

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our people meet and we

endeavor to reconcile then..

Hx. Straiton.

Now, may I ask another question that

would oxtend iron that, Admiral.

How is the defense intelligence agency functioning

In your Judgment?

My, impression is that this agency which started

oui to coordinate the evaluation and dissomination of

intelligence collected by tho soparate services is now grad-

vally noving into the collection

As woll as the

ovaluation

of intelligence.

I would like a frank estimate as to whether the Navy

and the Navy's intelligence services felt that the coordinate

job that DIA is doing is an effective one?

Secretary Korth. Well, I cau say without any

hesitation that I believe that the Defense intolligence

Agency under General Carroll has done an exceptionally

fIne job.

They have put themselves together quickly.. During

the recent Cuban crisis they relied heavily upon the

Navy for cercain elements of intelligence, which ve made as

an input to the total effort.

We thought that that worked very wall.

Now,

I would ke ixank to say, however, that as we

transfer moro activities to the Defense Intelligence

Agency fron the services, we foel at times somewhat

T

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Mr. Stration. One further question, Adniral.

I noticed Admiral Read in the room today,

and I recall our naval reserve group going down with him

a couple of years ago and having a brief part of this unitas

operation that he was conducting down there so ably.

I am just wondering whether as a result of the

political upheavals that have been taking placo since

1960 in Latin America, the capability of the Latin

American Navies to operate with our own and provide anti-

submarine defonse and so on has improved or has declined.

Admiral Anderson. It has improved.

And I think that the operation of UNITAS last

fall in connection with the outbreak of the Cuban trouble.

was a good example of the effectiveness of our UNITAs

operation.

The task force was in Peru aù the time, and

when they

cano on up to operate in the Caribbean the fact that they

had beenoperating with tho Latin American Navles I think.

contributed greatly to the responso that the Latin Anerican

countries made first to the resolution in the organization.

of American Statos politically, and second, from.

the

offers

that. wre

made of naval forces and air forces to

to assist us in the quarantine.

Ar. Gavin.

Mx. Chairman -

Mr. Stratton.

Nay I ask one further question in that

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Mr. Gavin. And bring in the tankers, from the pipeline.

Mr. Rivers. Anything.

Now I vant to ask you sonothing that I am

sure must concern General shoug.

Is your soalifi: now I have had it brought to

me that we have the airlift on the track.

And in tha Cuban crisis I think you bad to

chartor some soalift commitments.

Did it cause you any concern about our sealift,

28

to

tho present capabilitios, or did the uhan situation

bring out

any deilcioncies in this

area.

Bocretary Korth. I think Aamiral Anderson porhaps

can answor that - unleas you experioncod difficulty

yoursell.

Mr. Rivers. I would like for someching to tell me

something about it.

Admiral Anderson. I would like to say this.

We had several problens.

The first thing was getting enough amphibious.

I1lt for all of the amphibious forces

inthe right

spot

at

the right time.

To do this, we used amphibious forces from the

Pacific to come around to join up with the Amphibious

forces fromthe Atlanic. This was in our plan.

This was carriod out.

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The second problen was getting enough lift for the

follow-up forces. We had a plan that was developed which

Involved first the utilization of MSTS ships, and second

the chartering of ships.

This was an increasing problem because as we planned,

we found that we needed more forces, Army forces, and

follow up Marine forces, so ve had to arrange for more lift.

This is commarcial typo lift, or administrative lilt.

The third problem we had was getting anough over the

beach lift to provide for the Army canks to go in, and heavy

vehicles.

As you know, the airborne forces, while they have

& capabilliy of going in, they want to have their heavy

equipment set in as quickly as they can thereafter.

They can't lift that in airplanes.

They have to get it

in in amphibious type shipping.

we are taking out of moth balls some of our

Old LST's, in anticipacion of a future requirement for this

typo of lift. And I think - I hope thai we will be

able to moot the Army's requirement.

Mr. Rivers. Xes.

Admiral Anderson. Now the problem that ve ran into was

not one of being able to line up ships, but rather the

cost of recaining ships for an indefinile perioa.

So we watched this very carefully.

We kept it

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under control. And I am satisfied that we would have net

the commitmonta we had to meet.

Mr. Rivers. Well, now, why don't you have in being

or in your future program. whila thoso aro not combattani

ships or craft; ve should have in being as a part of the

¡loet avallablo cratt of this character.

Now whother it is the rosponsibility of the MSTS

or Admiral Dennison or whomover it may bo, there is a

deficiency there.

And you ought to bo mindful of it.

It to not only the "arines, but you keve the

responsibility for the Army.

Admiral. Anderson. That is what I am thinking of.

Mr. Rivers.

The Cuban situation has given you a

breathing spall now.

And you oughi to take this into consideration.

Admiral Anderson. We are bringing

ons -

Mr. Rivers. I heard all kinds of scories abat it.

Admiral Anderson. We are bringing out of moch balls

eleven ISts, and we will have them in a condition where

they can be used for this purpose if they are required.

We will have minimun crews.

Mr. Rivers.

Are these noth ball ships adequate for

nodern day striking?

Admiral. Anderson.

for

Lic of the Army tanks, they

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Now mombors of the committoo

Mr. Hebert. May I ask one question?

The Chairman. Mr. Hebert.

Mr. Hobert. Admiral Anderson, I just want to ask one

question in connection with the announcement wade on the news

this morning on a television show.

It was announced that four Russian technicians had arrived

in Cuba to assist in the building of the so. called fishing

harbor.

Now is there any possibility that these Russians could

install a submarine base there without our knowledge, in view

of our reconnaissance?

Admiral Anderson. I did not see

that particular announce-

ment this morning.

But I would say that with the reconnaissance that we have,

wa are keeping very close track of all developments in Cuba.

And if there was any construction of a base there, it would

come to our attention very quickly.

Mr. Hebert. That is the roason I asked that.

Because I don't want to wake up one morning and lind out

they installed missile bases again like they did overnight.

We would know now what they are doing?

Admiral Anderson. I have every confidence that we would,

sir.

The Chairman.

Are you in position to advise the committee

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authority.

Senator Symingion. i understand.

Secrecary McNamara. I did not wish to dwell on this page

other than to indicate thai it is here, and particularly to call

your attention to. footnoie b.

Perhaps I should read it without

discussing it at the moment, buc I know this Conmittee is particu-

larly interested in the subject:

"In addition to this budgeced expendicure" - meaning in

addition to the expenditure of $52 4 billion - "the government's

'unfunded' cost of milicary setirement for 'current' service.

1.e. Service performed in ry '64, is approximately $600 million

on the basis of exiscing pay rates and $830 million on the basis

of proposed pay rates. The

cocal unfunded past

Service cost'

of the militasy retirement program would amount to approximately

$49.9 billion at July 1, 1963 on the basis of exiscing pay rates

and $55.2 billion on the basis of the proposed xates."

I mention this at this cime only because the Commitcee has

inquired in the past relacing to this subject.

Chairman Russell. It is not directly pertinent to this

hearing, Mr. Secretary, but were any additional expenses incurred

in the mobilization when the Cuban crisis was on or was that

absorbed in your currect budget?

Secretary McNamara.

Incremental costs approsinating $200

million, Mr. Chairman, were incusred, we believe, during the Cuban

ww 51214 boclari2tan.W@.gee,endeavoring to absor that in our approved budget.

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35

Whether we will be able to do so or not i cannot say at the

moment.

Chairman Russell. If you do not, you will have to ask for

a supplemental?

Secretary McNamara.

That is cosrect, sir.

If I may go back to -

Senator Thurmond. What was the amount?

Secretary Melamara. About $200 million.

If I may go back to page four, gentlemen, and refer to the

second paragraph on page four, admitcedly, the President's budget

does not include every program desired by the various elemenis

of the Defense establishment. Many of the items deleted during

the budget review, although important perhaps from the viewpoint

of one Department, were redundant in terms of the Defense program

as a whole. This type of overlapping of proposed programs is in-

herent in the way the defense is organized, and it is not neces-

sarily undesirable. It does assist in presenting to the top

management of the Department of Defense a wider range of alterna-

tives from which to choose, but it also requires some hard-headed

decisions in the program and budget reviews in order to prevent

uneconomical duplication of eftort.

Then, there are a large number of desirable, though marginal

or postponable, programs and activities which are always left to

be screened out by the secretary. Although this, too, increases

the workload in my office, I believe we can adequately cope with

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19.

opponents have gr

extended the range of confl

to cover virtually

every aspect of human activity. And we, together with our allies, must

carefully allocate our defense elfort to ensure that we can meet the

challenge on every front and at every level. An assessment of the present

and prospective International situation and the military programs of our

principal opponents is therefore highly pertinent to any discussion of.

the Defense program and budget.

B. ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS IT BEARS ON MILITARY

POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Last year, when our attention was focused particularly on the Berlin

crisis, I pointed out that the Defense program we were recommending was

geared to our global requirements over the long-term, and not simply to

the immediate situstion as 1t then obtained.

Since that time, the Nation

and, indeed, the whole world has gone through another crisis, precipitated

again by the Soviet Union, this time 1n Cuba. I belleve 1t 18 clear ITom

the actions taken by the President last October that the United States

Government viewed with the greatest concern the sudden intrusion of Soviet

offensive weapons in Cuba, only 90 miles from our own shores. However, as

acute as this crisis was, and the after-effects have yet to be fully

Iiquidated, It did not then and should not now distract our attention from!

the more fundamental and far-reaching challenge which Communism poses to

the Free World. Without in any way minimizing the grave threat to our

national security which would have been posed by Soviet nuclear armed

ballistic missiles In Cuba, or, for that matter, the Soviet military

presence in that country, those missiles represented but a small part

of the total Communist threat to Freedom.

Even while the Soviet Union was attempting to extend its offensive

military power directly into Cuba, the undeclared war against the Government

of South Vietnam continued and a new overt military aggression was launched

against India by the Chinese Communists. In Europe, Soviet pressure on

the Allied position in Berlin continued unabated. In the Near East, the

Communists were seeking to make inroads in the Arabian peninsula. In

Africa, their efforts to exploit dissension and unrest in the Congo had

been temporarily thwarted by the actions of the United Nations.: All of'

these crises or probing actions are simply the more obvious manifestations

of the Communist drive toward their basic objective of world domination.

This objective is held by both the Soviet Union and Communist

China, but very distinct differences in tactics have become apparent.

And, indeed, there is increasing evidence that the apparent monolithic

structure of world Communism has been fractured, perhaps Irreparably.

There is emerging a bi-polarization of power in the Communist camp, the

Chinese Communists trying to capture control of the Communist revolution

and the Soviet Communists seeking to retain their present leadership.

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Although we

• draw some comfort from this

ling out between

the Communist giants, the world situation remains perilous, nevertheless.

The destruction of freedom and free nations is still the ultimate objective

of both countries, but each is seeking to attain the objective in 1ts own

way, and to capture the spoils for Itself.

Oddly enough, in this

struggle for power in the Communist camp, the

weaker of the two rivals is by far the more belligerent and the more

reckless, and therefore, very dangerous to the peace of the world. The

reason for this difference is not hard to find. The Soviet Union, after

45 years of unrelenting sacrifice and deprivation, is finally emerging

from its status as a "have not" nation. Mainland China, however, after

13 years of Camunist rule, has barely, if at all, made a start toward

self-sufficiency. Her economic condition is desperate.

The Soviet Union

today has a great deal to lose in a nuclear war -- material wealth as

well as human life. The economically Impoverished Chinese Communists,

to whom human life has little value, belleve they have much less to lose.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Red Chinese are much more ready

than the Soviet leadership to risk even nuclear war. And, indeed, the

Chinese Communists have been quick to take the road of active belligerency

In Korea, in Tibet and now in India.

But while war and the threat of war have rightly occupied most of

our attention, we must not neglect the fact that the struggle with

Communism is continuing through other means. As long as serious political

and economic instability exists in any part of the world, the Communists

will have an opportunity to enlarge the area of the struggle. Even now

to existing authority.

In this regard, there has been no change in the policy of the

Soviet Union to encourage what Mr. Khrushchev calls "wars of national

Ilberation" or "popular revolts", and which we know as covert armed

aggression, guerrilla warfare and subversion. And the Soviet Union

has not diminished its efforts through the more subtle means of economic

and military aid, political intrigue and propaganda to win over the

neutral and emerging nations of the world to the cause of Communism. From

Aprica to the Near Fast, From Southeast Asia to Iatin America, the pattern

1s the same.

We may expect that the struggle in this ares will intensify

and we must be prepared to meet the challenge.

1. Latin America

Although the Cuban crisis has greatly solidified the unity and

cohesion of the American states, the threat of Communism has by no means

abated, and & Communist goverment still rules in Cuba.

Our forceful?

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response to the t

at of armed aggression from C

no doubt has aimin-

ished for the present the military aspect of the threat. But this simply

means that Communist efforts will be shifted to other areas, and the

Castroist Communist sabotage last fall in Venezuela 1s but one of the

more violent examples of this danger. More Important from the longer

term point of vlew is the fundamental instability engendered by the

widespread lack of adequate economic progress. So long as hunger and

economic instability persist in Latin America, the danger of Communis

will be ever present.. Indeed, 1t 1s not an overt-armed Communist attack

that 1s the real danger in this part of the world, or even Communist

sabotage and subversion - the real danger lies in the discouragement,

disillusionment and despair of the people as a result of the relatively

slow rate of economic and social progress.

Prior to fiscal year 1962, U.S. military assistance to Latin America

was geared to a concept of hemispheric defense which envisaged the direct

participation by Latin American forces in any large-scale conflict. A

thorough review of the program convinced us that, except for specific

cases where properly equipped naval and air forces could make a signif1-

cant contribution to the solution of the anti-submarine warfare problem,

this concept of hemispheric defense was becoming increasingly unrealistic.

The main threat in Istin America today is that of Communist subversion

and indirect attack, and not overt military aggression from outside the

hemisphere. Accordingly, about one-half of the approximately $75 mlllion

per year of military assistance which the United States 1s presently

providing for Latin America 1s devoted to equipment and training for internal

security purposes, with special emphasis on counterinsurgency training.

The major portion of the balance is directed to the support of selected AsW

forces. Although we fully recognize that the problem 18 essentially

political and economic, the maintenance of law and order

'1s an essential

¡ prerequisite to social and economic progress.

In addition to internal security, our program is also designed to

contribute to economic and social development through what we call "civic

action" projects.

These projects, In such fields as agriculture, trans-

portation, communications, health and sanitation, are beneficial to the

people generally. Outstandingly successful programs of this sort have

been conducted in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Honduras. More

recently we have instituted a similar program in Equador and we are

currently developing projects for other Latin American countries, including

El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. Civic action projects are jointly funded

by the Military Assistance Program and AID, with MAP providing the milltary

equipment and related training.

But the Military Assistance Program will not In Itself solve the

problem of political instability which arises from the continued economic

diffIculties in much of Latin America, and herein lies the real danger of

future Communist penetration.

It was to meet this more fundamental problem

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76

submarines on station within reachos most of our bomber bases.

In addition, ly that time the Soviets could have operational

ICBM's with ranges long enough to attack the United states fcom

the souch, where we presently have no warning system, or wich

power enough tocarty very high yield warheads.. Such warheads,

if deconated at high alcicudes above the bomber bases, could catch

the B-52 bombers before they have time io clear the destructive

area of the burst. I will discuss in the nest section of my

statement the measures we are taking to improve our defenses

against such attacks.

The increasing missile threat underscoses both the import-

ance of maintaining our on-the-sholf airborne alert capability

and

the value of the special provisions contained in the section

512b of che Fiscal Year 1963 Dafense Appropriation Act. This is

the section which authorizes the Secretary of Defense, upon

decermination by the President thai such action is necessary, to

provide for the cost of an airbone alert as an excepted expense.

This provision, we believe, should be retained in the law.

Alchough we are planning io concinue the present limited

airborne alert program of 12 craining sorties per day (plus

maintaining an on-the-shelf capability to fly one-eighch of the

force for one year), we must always be ready to incroase prompcly

the scale of this operation. Indeed, during the early phases oi

the Cuban crisis last year, ve did just that.

We may be able to

finance

the additional cost of that action from our current

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headquarters for SAC, that it won't be long before we will have

to have one for the rest of the Deparcment of Delense.

Secretary MeNanara. I think that is a bare assumption,

Mr. Chairman.

I doubt very much that we would be justified

in expending these funds for a hardened comnunications and

command center for SAC unless ve had a hardened communications

and command center in Washington at the other end of the

line.

We have this in mind. As General Taylor said, we are

carrying on a series of borings at the present time to determine

the soil condicions in this area.: It was our experience during

the Cuban crisis, and I think that we anticipate that future

crises would take the sane form, that it was impossible for

the key decision makers to move out of the Washington area.

Chairman Russell. That was I believe in consideration of

some mass of stone mouncains, Ilke the Black Hills, where It

seems to me

if you built under some miles of sock, ly would

save a good deal.

Secretary McNamara. I think lt is an undersirable :

accommodation for the Washingion personnel, but 1t is not

prohibitlve from consideration for SAC.. As a matter of fact,

one of the alternative sites being considered for this SAC.

underground at the present time is a deep mine in Colorado.

It has two great advantages.

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year's appropriacions, in which case we may noc have to resort

to section 512b this year; provided, of course, that no new

crisis again forces us to expand our aizborne aleri operations:

Senator Symingion. May I ask what the amount of money in-

volved in that Seccion 5120 is, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McÑamara. It is an unlimited authorization to

carzy out a one-eighch airborne aleri.

Senator Symingion. There is no limication on the money?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir; I do noc believe there is.

Senaior Stennis. That was put in the appropriation bill,

was it not?

Secretary Menamara. That is corcect.

Senacor Stennis. That was a compromise on the way the

argument was met there about the unforeseen possibilicies and

need for an alert.

Secretary McNanara. Although we did put a one-eighth alert

in effect in the Cuban crisis, as I mentioned earlier, we hoped

to be able to cover the cost of all the incremenial costs associ-

ated with the Cuban crisis in our regular budget without a

deficiency appropriation.

Senator Symingion. I understood that, and I remember when

it came up bofore the Appropriations Subcomittee. Buc it said

"incurred deficiencies, and I was wondering if there was any

limitation on the deficiencies you are allowed to handle unless

there was some formal recognition of trouble.

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examination of chis.

senacos Goldwater. I have a vesy open mind on this.

It has not been completely filled with two or thrce questions.

I will not belabor the poini here. You can supply us with a

proper briefing on it. I süill have questions thai I have

raised and have had communications, and I think we ought to

put into the recosd the proper information.

Secretary McNamara. We will be quite happy to discuss

it.

Chairman Russell. Since apparently we will not got

through here, I have a question or two on this sosus while

we are at ii. We have these stations at the present cime

scatiered ihroughout the Atlantic all around Cuba. Just wat

part do these stations play in locating Russian submarines

and shipping in to Cuba? Just thai part, how were they

utilized to keep up wich the Russian ships and the Russian

submarines?

Secretary McNamara. Perhaps General Taylor would like

to reply, MI. Chairman.

General Taylor. I did not hear the question.

Secretary McNamara. Whai part did the SOSUS scations

play in locating the Russian submarines during the Cuban

crisis?

General Taylor. I really do not have the details on that,

Senator. I think Admiral Anderson should answer it. I think

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it was as usual a combination of the many detection systems

which we apply in trailing the submarines.

Chairman Russell. The men who operate them clained

at those stations they can dacece a ship and tell whether it

is a submarina or a tanker os something even by its size.

General Taylor. My impression is -

Chairman Russell. That has been challenged a number of

timas. It has been extreme. Buc they say they can, and they

have all of these people wacching these things like caxdiograms.:

continually making notes on a little pioce of paper, and some

chap is reading them, and he will say, "Here is a ship at this

point," and he will wire into Norfolk where all the information

is channeled for analysis.

We know that the Russians were sending a great many

surface ships down there of various sizes, we know that.

we claim we saw, located, a number of submarines, Russian

suomarines during the Cuban crisis. Juse whai pari did all

this sosus outfit have in that. Did they help in locacing

tho submarines?: Dia we locaio them from devices on:

other submarines or from helicopters of descroyers? We have

got all kinds of electronic devices.

General Taylor. I think mosi of them were located

oucside of the range of sosus. We knew about them before they

came in range of sosus.. I have no doubt that sosus gave

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were non-nuclear submarines, they had to come up on surface.

We saw then.

Secretary McNamara. SOSUS was not the primary source of

detection of the Cuban crisis submarines.

Chairman Russell. I was rather sold on the SoSs last

year. I talked to you, and you indicated then you chought ic

was very erratic, a very erratic system, and left very much

to be desired.

secretary McÑanara. I baliove that today, Mr. Chairman,

and I do not wish in any way to deemphasize the importance of

the problem, but simply to indicate that we have not solved

it by any means nor have the soviets.

chairman Russell. These people who operate them think

they do pretty well. They say there are certain places in the

ocean, for essample, one is down at the Bahamas, maybe ic is

Barbadoes, and they say that this place on Capa Race, which

must be two or three chousand miles off fron there, where they

can pick up anything, buc there are a number of arras inbetween

where they draw blanks and cannot locate these ships.

Ic seems that the shelves and mountains there that relect

sound almost like an echo in soma places that are very far

removed from the location of the devices, and in other cases

they cannor tell at all.

Secretasy McNanara. And the water temperatures, I think

they will agree, play a very important part in affecting the

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ORDINETION & RECORI*

OFFICE

WASHINGTON

FEB 21 2 08 PM *63

OFFICE

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

February 19,. 1963

Dear Secretary Vance:

At the request of McGeorge Bundy, I

am sending you a copy of my statement on sub-

version in

Latin America, which I gave yesterday

to the House Committee.

• Sincerely,

Slimati

Edwin M. Martin

Assistant

Secretary

Enclosure:

Statement on Subversion

in Latin America.

The Honorable

•Cyrus R. Vance,

Secretary

of the Army.

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STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDWIN M. MARTIN

BEFORE THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMUNIST

SUBVERSION IN THE HEMISPHERE

February 18, 1963

INTRODUCTION

I welcome this opportunity to appear before this Subcom-

mittee to testify on the important problem of communist sub-

version in the hemisphere. In recent months public attention

has focused to such a degree on the Soviets' arms buildup in

•Cuba that it has tended to overshadow communist subversive

activities throughout Latin America, aided in many ways by

Cuba and other bloc countries.

The problem of extra-continental totalitarian powers

trying to subvert established governments in this hemisphere

is not new. During World War II the American Republics faced

the challenge of fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis

powers. Through individual and

collective action they success-

fully dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath

of the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the

inter-American community has been dealing with the problem of

communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet

bloc, now supported by Cuba.

I mention this at the outset to point out that the

American Governments were confronting this issue long before

there was a communist Cuba, and I expect they will be doing

so after Cuba is free again.

DEVELOPMENT

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DEVELOPVENT OF COMMUNISM PRIOR TO CASTRO

The establishment of the communist parties in Latin

America has taken place in at least five waves or phases.

During the first of these, from 1918 to 1922, parties were

formed in the

five countries where the industrial revolution

had made the most headway and where the labor movement had

begun to acquire national prominence. While the five original.

communist parties were building on socialist or anarchist

foundations during the 1920's, entirely new communist and

communist-oriented groups were emerging in a majority of the

other Latin American republics. In each case, the communist

organizations in the second wave had to contend with

more

serious obstacles than their predecessors had initially faced.

These handicaps included the almost complete absence of labor

organizations, little or no tradition of radical political move-

ments, and suppression of opposition groups

by regimes

, that were

either highly authoritarian or outright dictatorships.

At the sixth congress in 1928, the Comintern adopted the

line that Soviet historians have

since identified with the so-

called "third period" of the Communist International. This line

called for communists everywhere to declare themselves as

such,

to cease cooperation with "bourgeois" and "leftists reformist"

elements, and to establish purely conmunist organizations which

should strive to foment and seize the leadership of proletarian

revolutions.

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revolutions. Repercussions were felt in every phase of communist

activities in Latin America. With respect to their political

apparatus, the Comintern directives made It clear that in

countries

where

communists operated within other parties every

effort should be made to convert these parties to full-fledged

communist organizations. During 1929-1931, three new parties

were also organized, bringing the number of countries with

communist parties to seventeen.

The fourth wave of communist organizational activity in

Latin America, from the mid-1930's to the mid-1940's, can be

subdivided into three periods, each corresponding to a distinct

episode in the annals of the international communist movement.

These were the periods of the Popular Front, which had begun in

Latin America by 1935, the Hitler-Stalin pact, from August 1939

to June 1941, and the remaining years of the Second World War.

During these same years, half a dozen parties abandoned the

communist label without changing their political orientation,

while communist parties were also established in the remaining

three Latin American countries which did not already have them.

The fifth and current phase deserves a fuller treatment,

Including a discussion of Soviet bloc activities, of some

real importance for the first time.

Soviet

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Soviet Bloc Offensive in Latin America in the 1950's

During this post-war and pre-castro period, Soviet relations

with Latin America, which seemed to be entering a period of ex-

pansion in the aftermath of World War II, were cut back sharply

from 1947-52 as one country after another suspended relations

with the soviets at the same time that they were taking strong

measures against the local communist parties. Soviet operations

In the area entered on the present period of expansion beginning

in 1953 with overtures to the Perón Government for increased

trade. The post-1953 Soviet offensive in the area was part of

a worldwide operation keyed to the underdeveloped countries,

and spearheaded by trade and ald programs. As of December 31,

1958, the European conmunist bloc countries had 20-odd trade,

and payments agreements with five Latin American countries

(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and Mexico). One or more

of the bloc governments at this time had resident diplomatic

missions in these same Latin American countries and also in

Bolivia. Soviet bloc trade with Latin America rose from $70

million in 1953, only 0.6% of Latin America's trade with the

world, to $275 million in 1958, or 1.7% of Latin American trade.

The peak was reached in 1955, reflecting trade with Argentina

under the Perón regime - $340 million or 2.5% of Latin American

trade. During

the period 1955-57, fourteen Latin American

countries were visited by bloc trade missions, and seven of

these

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these countries sent missions to the bloc. In addition, during

the 1950's. travel between Latin America and the bloc reached a

fairly high level, and bloc radio broadcasts allotted more and

more time to Latin American audiences.

But the Soviets failed to gain any secure foothold through

their diplomatic and economic offensive in these years. What

apparent trade successes they achieved were based on the need of

various Latin American countries to sell surplus raw materials

and their willingness to take Soviet goods in exchange. In

Argentina and Uruguay, the main theaters of Soviet operation

during this period, the Soviets made no lasting political gains.

In general, this first phase of Soviet operations in the area

was primarily one

of probing for opportunities.

Latin American Communist Parties in the 1950's

The/Outstanding success of the post-war period before the

Castro takeover was in Guatemala in the period 1950-54, where

the communists came to dominate the Arbenz Government and estab-

lish effective control over the country's labor and peasant organ-

Izations. As the Soviets! power and status reached new high levels

in the late 1950's, the communist leadership in Latin America

gained new confidence, but the area was still isolated from the

centers of international communism and the local parties were

unable to translate this growth of Soviet power into greater

capabilities for influence and penetration in the national

societies

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societies of Latin America. The membership strength of the

communist parties and their ability to influence the political

system was largely confined to their continued hold in labor

organizations and among intellectual and student groups.

Seldom

were they able to make common cause with non-

communist parties commanding a mass following. They, therefore,

generally remained on the defensive.

As of the end of 1958 just before Castro seized power in

Cuba, 1t: appeared that the climate for communist activities in

Latin America was improving. The swollen, 11l-paid urban popula-

tions seemed to offer an especially promising field for radical

agitation of all kinds. Reacting to periods of dictatorial rule

in various countries, leftists party leaders, students, journal-

1sts, and other intellectuals were voicing an insistent, but

uncritical, demand for the extension of liberties that promised

to remove from the communist parties the legal impediments placed

in their way by more conservative governments of the past. The

communists, by their energetic denunciations of economic and

social injustice, were in the eyes of many of the superficially

educated

intellectuals and leaders of the left proving themselves

the true champions of democracy.

In terms of communist party membership, the Argentine,

Brazilian, Chilean, Cuban and Venezuelan parties represented

in 1958 all but a small part of the total, or about 215,000 of

an estimated 250,000 party members in

the area. These parties

had sizeable non-party followings and substantial influence among

other political groups in their countries.

COMMUNI ST

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COMMUNIST EFFORTS SINCE THE ADVENT OF CASTRO

Since 1959 the general pattern of communist subversion

In the hemisphere shows a continuation, though on a much

stepped-up scale, of the tactics of infiltration, popular front

action and insurgency, but with a marked shift toward more

Violence. Local groups have greatly benefitted from the receipt

of far more outside help, especially from cuba, than heretofore.

This has coincided with the advent of Castro and the sharpening

of differences between Moscow and Peking on the tactics to be

followed in pressing forward the communist campaign of world

domination. The Soviets undoubtedly regard Latin America as an

area offering unusual possibilities, but they themselves have

been cautious in their

tactics, except where special opportunities

have developed, as in the case of cuba. On the other hand, there

Is no evidence that they have in any way restrained Cuba or local

communist parties from violence of many forms.

The Strategy and Tactics of the Castro Regime

The strategy of the Castro regime from the beginning, despite

all the disclaimers, has remained one of exporting its revolution--

of converting the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the Americas,

as Castro stated in 1959. In its tactics the Castro regime has

been changeable. During the first six month of 1959 in the flush

of victory it sponsored armed expeditions against

several Caribbean

countries. None of these was successful. They served only to

arouse

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arouse suspicions and generate action by the OAS. Castro

then shifted tactics, following a more subtle, Indirect approach.

The Cuban efforts have been

channelled in four main directions:

I.: the formation of front organizations in the United

States and the Latin American countries in the form of friend-

ship societies or committees for the defense of the Cuban

Revolution.

2. an intensive propaganda campaign using: printed materials,

news services provided by Prensa Latina, and newly constructed,

powerful radio facilities.

3. covert material

support, largely financial, to sub-

versive groups.

4. indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin

Americans in Cuba, Including training in sabotage, terrorism

and guerrilla tactics.

I belleve some specific examples of activities in these

four categories would be of interest to members of the sub-

committee.

on the formation of front organizations, we do not have

to go far afield. All of you are familiar with the Fair Play

for Cuba Committee and 1ts pro-Castro activities in this country.

I would like to read the following excerpt from the annual

report for the fiscal year 1961 of the FBI:

"The Fair

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"The Fair Play for Cuba Committee 1s one of

the main outlets in this country for pro-Castro

Many of its members are United States

propagands nhis Bureau during the 1961 fIscal year

nationals.

determined that certain funds

used by the Committee

to pay for a newspaper advertisement had come from a

Cuban official assigned to the United Nations, a

fact later admitted by a Committee member in testi-

mony before a congressional committee.

FBI investi-

gations also have shown that the Fair

Play for Cuba

Committee has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist

Party and the Socialist Workers Party, and that these

Parties have actually organized some

chapters of the

Committee."

Similar groups have been established In practically

every other country of the hemisphere, such as the "Legion

of Volunteers for the Defense of Cuba"' In Peru, the "Move-

ment for Solidarity with and Defense of the Cuban Revolution"

In Chile, the "Society of Friends of Cuba" In Brazil, and

the "Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution" in Costa Rica,

to name only a few. Their function has been to propagandize

and whip up enthusiasm for the Castro regime and repetitions

of Its revolution through rallies, demonstrations, propaganda

and all the paraphernalia of communist front groups.

•As part of its propaganda campaign, the Cuban Government

uses its news service Agencia Prensa Latina to spread 1ts

distortion of news events throughout the world. There are

four Prensa Latina offices In Latin America.

These offices

the

serve not only as news gathering centers for Cuban propaganda

network, but as a means of contact with subversive groups

throughout the hemisphere.

The Cuban

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The Cuban Government places great emphasis on radio:

propaganda to further its subversive ends. It beams to the

United States two English language programs, Radio Free Dixie

and The Friendly Voice of Cuba, Intended particularly to arouse

racial antagonisms in Negro audiences.

Radio Habana 1s the chief propaganda vehicle of the Cuban

Government for other countries. In May of 1961, Radio Habana

produced a modest 42 hours a week for Europe and the Americas.

Now it puts out some 188 hours a week, with almost 60 per cent

of that

time devoted to Spanish language broadcasts to the Americas.

In good part, these broadcasts contain the usual virulent attacks

against specific democratic governments and their leading person-

ages, such as that of President Betancourt, and call on listeners

to follow the Cuban example of revolution. Radio Habana also

makes Its facilities available to such Cuba-based

groups

as

the Dominican Liberation Movement, the Peruvian Anti-Imperialist

Struggle Movement and the Guatemalan Information Committee, to

broadcast systematic and hostile propaganda designed to bring

about the downfall of the governments in those countries.

To estimate the amount of Cuban printed material that is

smuggled into the other countries of the hemisphere 1s im-

possible. But we can point to a few glaring examples where they

have been caught red-handed. Last October in Chile, a large

crate weighing 1800 pounds, and sent by the Cuban Government

to its

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to 1ts Embassy at Santiago, was documented as "samples of

Cuban products-and cultural and commercial material"

• Upon

being opened by Chilean authorities, the packages found inside

the box contained Cuban propaganda addressed to various Chileans

who a few

months before had visited Cuba. The Chilean Govern-

ment addressed a stern protest to the Cuban Embassy

In the face

of this outrageous effort to introduce Castro propaganda into

Chile surreptitiously. Similarly, in Mexico In; February 1962,

Mexican customs authorities seized a large quantity of Castro-

communist propaganda that the Cuban Minister of Education, Armando

HARI Dávalos, brought with him. to Mexico and tried to introduce

into the country during an official visit.

Another form of support of subversive activities - and

one which is difficult to trace - is the furnishing of funds

to subversive groups. Castro reportedly donated recently

$15,000 to a violent, extremist group in Colombia called

the United Front for Revolutionary Action. The Cuban Govern-

ment has also given financial aid to the leftist subversive

activities of the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean

Youth (URJE), which has been involved in guerrilla activities

in Ecuador. The Quito radio on January 29 broadcast a letter

sent to them by Pablo PAEZ, a young member of URJE who had

recently been expelled from the group, in which he publicly

acknowledged that two other individuals of the group, whom

he named,

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he named, made several trips to Cuba and returned with money

for the support of the Ecuadorean guerrilla movement. One

of these same Individuals, he said, also received funds directly

from the Cuban Embassy at Quito.

It is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 persons from

other Latin American countries travelled to Cuba in 1962 for

ideological Indoctrination or guerrilla

warfare; training. Most

of these trainees are young, mostly in their teens of twenties.

Ostensibly in Cuba to pursue normal studies of agricultural,

Industrial, or other techniques, students also receive heavy

doses of indoctrination in Castro-communist ideology and guerrilla

warfare. Returning young men from Cuba have stated that they go

through simulated offensive and defensive guerrilla exercises,

are taught how to survive in the jungles, are given map and

weapons Instruction, as well as other training every good guerrilla

should have. They are also told how to penetrate student, labor

and other groups in their own countries. Venezuelans seems to

be the most numerous national group among these trainees, and

we do not consider it sheer coincidence that Venezuela's demo-

cratic government and the Venezuelan people are being subjected

most heavily to the terrorist and guerrilla activities of the

Castro-communists in that country.

In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, the Castro regime

has shifted the emphasis of its campaign in Latin America to

one of open encouragement of terror as a principal weapon,

a move

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a move dictated by the loss of popular support as a result

of the crisis and the futility of continuing popular front,

mass movement tactics.. Violence has been the only refuge of

the very small minority throughout history.

On November 21, 1962, in a speech closing the so-called

"Week of Solidarity with the Venezuelan People", Cuban Minister

of Education, Armando Hart, said that it had become evident

that "In Latin America the conquest of revolutionary power has

to be achieved necessarily - at least in a great number of

the countries - through class struggle carried to the level of

armed insurrection by the proletariat

and peasant classes"

A week later, in an interview with the Habana correspondent

of the London Daily Worker, Cuban Minister of Industries

Ernesto Guevara Is quoted as saying: "The Cuban revolution

has shown that in conditions of imperialist domination such

as exist in Latin America, there is no solution but armed

struggle".. Castro himself on January 16 of this year stated

that "what is needed in Latin America are experts on changing

the situation, experts on leading peoples in revolutions"'

Criticizing those who shrink from violence, he said let the

imperialist theoreticians preach conformism, but let the

revolutionary theoreticians preach revolution without fear.

Significantly,

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Significantly, the "old" communists have recently also

picked up this theme. Veteran Communist Party leader Carlos

Rafael Rodriguez, now President of the Cuban Agrarian Reform

Institute, In a speech on January 23 said: "Following the

example of david, they are realizing in time, that revolution

is the road--revolution which represents the definite change

from the decayed structures which Imperialism maintains in

our America: revolution, which means the expulsion of imperial

ist and monopolistic wealth, supported by the traitor latifundists

and by the cowardly, timid representatives of a bourgeoisie which

feels the blows of imperialism without trying to divert them to

realize that this revolution is possible, that this revolution

I's achievable, that this revolution may have different roads

for achievement but that there is only one road on which it can

advance with confidence: the determination to struggle, to !

resist, to fight." Another veteran communist, Blas Roca, on

January 24 praised the Venezuelan terrorists, saboteurs and

guerrillas for their activities during the missile crisis, call-

ing this

"proletarian internationalism" and promising "we

shall

continue to give our support, each day in greater proportions,

to the Venezuelan people." Earlier Fidel Castro himself in a

speech marking the fourth anniversary of the Cuban revolution

had this to say about the tactics of violence in Venezuela during

the missile crisis:

11

• the

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...the Venezuelan people struggled and gave extra-

ordinary evidence of revolutionary spirit, led by

the glorious Communist Party of Venezuela and by

the valiant militants of the Leftist Revolutionary

Movement. The imperialists were given evidence of

what revolutionary solidarity 1s, and active sol1-

darity of revolutionaries who do not sit in their

doorways to wait for the corpse of their enemy to

pass by, of revolutionaries who understand that

the duty of all revolutionaries is to create the

revolution."

These statements are a clear indication of the

continuing interventionist purposes of the Castro regime

and point to the direction in which we can expect it to

channel its

subversive activity in the hemisphere in the

months to come.

ovie

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Soviet Bloc Efforts in Latin America since 1959

" Over the past three years, efforts by the Soviet

bloc countries, ther than through Cuba, to establish

further their presence in Latin America and promote

the fortunes of local communist parties have not

generally met with any outstanding successes. Only the

establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR

and Brazil and the promise of increased trade between

them may be said to represent a clear plus

for the bloc.

Otherwise, diplomatic relations continue to be maintained

with the same few countries in Latin America as before

(Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico) and no significant

expansion of trade has taken place. One may cite as a

clear setback the case of Argentina, where little use

has been made of the $100 million credit extended by

the USSR in 1957 (because of the unavailability or

inadequacy of merchandise) and where the Soviet and

other bloc embassies have been forced to reduce the size

of their staffs at Argentine demand.

They have succeeded in attracting more students

and other persons for training and indoctrination of

all kinds. Attempts on the part of the bloc to introduce

propaganda into the various Latin American countries

continue to have varying degrees of success. Some

governments (e.g. Mexico, Uruguay) seem lately to have

tightened

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tightened control over the importation of such materials,

but the amounts distributed in certain countries remains

a most disturbing fact.

Implications of the Sino-Soviet Quarrel in Latin America

To date the Latin American communist parties seem

to have been reluctant either to admit the existence.

basic differences between the USSR and Communist China

or to take sides even when the differences are admitted.

Castro has clearly played both sides while appealing

for a reconciliation. One might suggest that his heart

is in Peking but his stomach is in Moscow.

Castro's

tactics in winning power in Cuba have:

nevertheless

provoked among those parties sharp discussion

very similar in its subject matter to the discourse between

the Soviets and

the Chinese Communists. Principally

involved is the question of the right strategy to the

successful conquest of political power. In virtually

all Latin American communist movements there is a deep

division of opinion as to whether to take the violent

path to power--similar to that allegedly followed by the

Chinese and the Cubans-or the slower, "united front"

path of alliance with leftist forces which is called

the "via pacifica." In general, the Soviets appear to

favor the latter course of action as one surer of success

in the long run and less

liable to result in debilitating

defeat

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defeat for communist forces. However, the Soviet

attitude toward the violent path, which involves in

most cases the use of a guerrilla movement, is shrouded

in ambivalence.

The Chinese communists on the other hand are urging

this path on the Latin American communist movement through

all the avenues open to them. There is a coincidence

of strategic views between much Latin American dissident

communist thinking and that of the Chinese communists.

Our evidence suggests that the older communist leaders

in the area tend to favor the Moscow viewpoint, while the

younger, hotter-headed elements in the communist movement

find themselves leaning toward the Cuban-Chinese communist

strategy. As time brings less and less prospects of

success via the "peaceful path" there seems good reason

to think that more and more Latin American communists

will incline toward violent overthrow as their only

possible means to gain power. This does not necessarily

mean capture of the Latin American parties by the Chinese;

they do not appear to have the capability to provide

the necessary material support.

It would appear that on balance the Soviet and Cuban

images and effectiveness, as distinguished from those

of local parties,

have suffered a setback, largely as a

fromber the

result of the crisis of October 1962, but also/increasingly

effects of

disorienting / the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Conditions in

certain

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certain areas of Latin America, however, continue to be

conducive to the growth of communist influence and

consequently to pere tration by Soviet bloc states and

parties. The lack of spectacular successes in recent

years should not be taken as a sign that either external

or internal communist forces in Latin America have given

up their attempts to overturn the existing order or

are unable to do so.

Balance Sheet on Communism in Latin American since 1959

So far I have

been talking primarily about activities

or influences brought to bear by the Soviet bloc and

Cuba on Latin America. But the Communist parties there

have a life and force of their own and are not wholly.

dependent on outside nourishment or guidance by any means.

Their strength and activities are matters

of major interest

and must now be analyzed in some detail.

The communist apparatus in Latin American made

significant progress during 1959, 1960 and 1961 and

came to have greater self-confidence and optimism than

at

any time since the end of the war. Rather than in

terms of membership or electoral success, this progress

appeared in better linkage with the international

communist movement, partly through Cuba, and in the

improved atmosphere for operations in many countries.

Especially during 1959 and early 1960, this was closely

related to the appeal of the Cuban revolution. Even

after disillusionment with Castro began

to set in among

nany

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many Latin American leftists, Cuba provided an important

regional headquarters which continued to provide valuable

support and services to the Latin American communists.

During this three-year period the communists made

headway in finding indigenous leftist and nationalist

groups disposed to make common cause with them. Up

until 1962 they made significant gains among students

and intellectuals and to a lesser degree in urban trade

unions.

With heavy bloc support, propaganda activities

were sustained at a higher level than ever before.

Although 1962 was one of the most active and eventful

years in the history of the Latin American communist

movement, it closed with little if any net overall

further gain for the communist parties in terms. of

numbers or influence. In fact in some countries there

were some at least temporary losses. The highlights

of a year-end balance sheet look something like this:

In the climate of change and crisis that prevailed

during 1962, the noncommunist forces of the revolutionary

left rather than the communist parties themselves

appeared

to be the main gainers. The communists had little to

show in terms of gains in party membership or vote

following, and internal factionalism increased sharply,

in part because many old line leaders responded only

feebly to their opportunities. Nevertheless in an overall

situation

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situation not unfavorable to revolutionary appeals,

the communists in 1962 were pursuing vigorously with

ACTICA

some success all three of their standard

mies lines

adapted to the local situations in which each seemed

to offer most promise of success: infiltration, popular

fronts and terror.

Infiltration succeeded best in Brazil. Communist-

backed candidates. in the October 1962 elections, while

they did not fare exceptionally well in the country as

a whole, won important victories in certain key states.

On the other hand the outstanding division in a communist

party in Latin America during 1962 took place in Brazil

where the Communist Party (PCB), was confronted by an

organized rival party. Luiz Carlos Prestes has for the

last eight

years led the PCB on a "soft" line and

concentrated upon the quest for legality. During 1961

leftist dissidents, led by three ex-members of the PCB

presidium and five

other former central committee members,

accused Prestes and his associates of revisionism and

rightist deviation. Expelled as divisionists, the

dissidents organized early in 1962, taking the name

Communist Party of Brazil and claiming to be the

legitimate PCB. Dedicated

revolutionaries who are

convinced that they will come to lead the communist

movement in Brazil, the dissidents, who so far are

relatively

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relatively small in number, have actively sought

recognition from other communist parties and the Castro

regime. Unlike the Prestes PCB, they are actively

preparing for guerrilla warfare.

The peaceful, popular front road to power has

been followed by the communist movement in Chile more

faithfully than by any other party. The well-established

Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) had good reason for this

policy because its prospects for coming to power through

success at the polls by popular front groups to which

it belongs remain considerably brighter than those of

any other Latin American Communist Party. Allied for

years with the Socialist Party and other leftist elements

in the Popular Action Front (FRAP), which narrowly missed

electing its Socialist candidate president in 1958, the

PCCh obtained

nearly 12 per cent of the vote in the March

1961 congressional elections. With their eyes fixed

upon the 1964 presidential elections, again with a

socialist candidate, the Chilean communists give top

priority to maintaining the FRAP and avoiding any

actions which might jeopardize the legal status which

the PCCh regained in 1958.

Even so, during the past year ideological and

tactical differences

between the communists and the

socialists

became more evident than in the past, and

strains

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strains within the FRAP became acute. At the same time

voices within the PCCh advocated developing guerrilla

capabilities against the eventuality that' force might

be used to keep the communists from enjoying the fruits

of electoral victory. Thus the POCh, like most other

Latin American communist parties, is confronting the

choice between the peaceful road and violent revolution

or guerrilla warfare, and tries to make its choice in

the light of relative prospects for success. The

ambivalence in many parties stems from disagreement

among party leaders over just this point.

The choice of violent action showed most dramatically

in Venezuela, but also in Peru and to some extent in

Brazil. I will discuss this increasingly important trend

more

fully later on.

In Bolivia the orthodox Communist Party (PCB) sO

far sees its road to power through continued successfül

infiltration of the Left Sector of the National Revolutionary

Movement (MNR). The Guatemalan Labor (communist) Party

(PGT) has officially adopted a policy of preparing for

any form of struggle. In El Salvador the party undertook

some guerrilla training on a minor scale during 1962.

In Ecuador there has been a shift in tactics following

the diplomatic break with Cuba in April. It became

apparent

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apparent that further gains through peaceful political

means were unlikely, and at

the 7th Ecuadorean Communist

Party (PCE) Congress strong sentiment in favor of early

violent revolution became part of the official PCE line.

In Mexico the communist movement was already

fragmented. Dissensionover activism was only one of the

divisive factors which worked during 1962 to split the

communist movement in Mexico into half a dozen feuding

factions, none of major consequence.

On the labor front in Latin America there were few

major changes in the political orientation of the

leadership in 1962. Those which took place were mixed

in character with gains for democratic trade unionism

somewhat outweighing losses. On the positive side,

we note the failure of the communist unions to form

a "neutralist" Latin American Confederation of Workers

in Chile in September 1962. We may also cite the elimina-

tion of communist influence from important unions in

Venezuela and Mexico, defections. from communist-controlled

union organizations in Bolivia, the launching of a

democratic national confederation of labor in Ecuador

and the emergence of a strong anti-communist federation

as the dominant factor in Dominican labor.

The appeal of communism for Latin American university

students as a shortcut to the solution of all problems

seems

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seems on balance to have declined during the year. In

several important universities a reactionamears to have

set in, reflecting disillusionment with communist excesses

at home and abroad by extreme leftists formerly disposed

to accept communist views and actions uncritically; and

greater activity and unity by the noncommunists, everywhere

the great majority numerically. For example, in Mexico

a liberal-moderate slate was elected in the November

student elections at the huge National University,

which has been a prime communist target ever since the

Communist Party found it could not capture the labor

movement. For the first time in recent history, the

communist candidate was defeated in student elections

at Mexico City's important National Polytechnic Institute.

The Communist Party was reported to be "extremely unhappy"

over these developments. At the University of Buenos

Aires almost half of the communist dominated "Reformist"

student organization defected to form the "Independent

Reformists", depriving communists of their claim to be

sole champions of reform. As a result of this split,

the moderate "Humanists" won three of the five student

seats on the University Council. In the University of

Cordoba, Argentina, the moderate student organization

tripled in size in six years to more than 6000, while

the leftist Reformists split almost exactly in half,

as

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as in Buenos Aires, and maintained a static combined

membership of about 4000 over the same period.

In

Colombia, progressive Catholic groups have won strong

followings in provincial university centers, especally

in Barranquilla, Medellin and Santander.

In Chile all

the major student federations are now controlled by the

Christian Democrats•

On the other hand most of the

Peruvian student groups are dominated by communist-supported

groups. Among both student and faculty groups some real

gains have been made in Venezuela.

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Increased Trend Toward Violence

As I noted earlier, there is a marked trend toward

violence in certain areas in Latin America, reflecting Cuban

urging as well as the necessities of local movements which

find themselves more and more isolated.

Nowhere is it more

evident than in Venezuela where, since January of last year,

the communists have made a determined, but unsuccessful

effort to overthrow the Betancourt Government. During 1962,

under communist leadership, the terrorist

and guerrilla

units were reorganized into the "Armed Forces of National

Liberation" (FALN). In the interior they have attempted to

establish guerrilla bands with not much success, largely

because of the vigilance of the Venezuelan armed forces and

the cooperation of the rural population in whose welfare

President Betancourt has taken so much interest. In the

cities - especially Caracas - they are waging a campaign of

sabotage and terrorism. Homemade pipe bombs are placed

about the city; hit and run raids have been perpetrated in

which houses and sometimes policemen are shot with submachine

guns from speeding cars. Attempts have been made, some

successfully, to burn warehouses of foreign enterprises.

In

these activities, police and law enforcement officials have

been killed or wounded and bystanders have been frequently

wounded

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wounded in crossfire or by bomb fragments.

Foreign-owned

oil installations in the interior have been constant targets.

The extremists carried out their most spectacular act of

sabotage in October 1962 when they blew up four strategic

transformer stations belonging to the Standard Oil of New

Jersey Lake Maracaibo complex. Testimony taken by the

Venezuelan Government from two of the saboteurs who were

captured clearly demonstrates that it was done on orders of

the Communist Party in Maracaibo. And this week we had the

spectacular boat highjacking by several communists, a

publicity stunt, pure and simple.

Throughout this campaign the democratic government of

President Betancourt has demonstrated determination and an

ability to deal with the situation. Press accounts have

perhaps given outsiders an exaggerated impression of the

Caracas scene, where life goes on pretty calmly. I am

reminded of the popular impression of Chicago in the early

'30's, an impression greatly exaggerated for I lived there

and like millions of others never came close to a shooting.

In Peru we have another dramatic example of the increas-

ing tempo of communist-inspired subversion and violence. For

the past several months, in an agricultural area of the

Andean Department of Cuzco, communist agitators, many of whom

were trained in Cuba, have been able to foment an armed

peasant

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peasant dissident movement that has been responsible for the

forceful seizure of lands,.

armed attacks, and considerable

bloodshed. Last December, Castro-communist agitators sub-

verted a strike at the smelter of the American-owned Cerro

Corporation at La Oroya in the central Andes, seized control

of the installation, and caused about $4 million worth of

damage. Early in January, following a strike that had been

settled between the management and the legitimate trade union

leaders, communist agitators persuaded workers on two Peru-

vian-owned

sugar plantations near Chiclayo on the north

coast, to damage installations and fire cane fields - about a

million dollars of damage in all. These were the most

CASES

dramatic cases, but there were many other ineidoks of Castro-

communist-fomented incidents by workers, peasants, and

students.

In the face of this growing pattern of communist-inspired

violence and subversion, the Peruvian Government on January 5

cracked down on the communists and Castroists, arresting about

a thousand of them. The Government announced at the same

time the discovery of a Castro-communist plot, master-minded

from abroad, of which these incidents were only the first

steps in what was to be an increasing rhythm of disorder,

terrorism,

and revolutionary activity. After screening those

arrested

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arrested, the authorities have announced that they plan to

bring to trial 212 persons.

In Brazil there have been periodic instances of vio-

lence in the Northeast

during the past year or so, several

of which have been directly or indirectly linked to the

Peasant Leagues led by Francisco Juliao. Communist involve-

ment in this activity has been indicated. Among other

things local police officials discovered a large number of

pamphlet translations of Che Guevara's booklet on guerrilla

warfare.

Persistent reports of smuggling and stocking of arms

have also been received. In one recent instance, a cache

of arms was reportedly seized at Dianopolis in a remote

region of the State of Goias and some 26 persons arrested

for alleged subversive activity. In another instance, Rio

de Janeiro police arrested one Clodomir Santos do Morais, a

lawyer for the Peasant Leagues, while he was transporting

clandestine shipment of arms from Rio to the interior.

Morais was also in possession of the calling card of a

Soviet diplomat assigned to Brazil - which card reportedly

bore an inscription from the diplomat to Juliao. Finally,

there is the well-publicized instance of the documents found

in the crashed Varig airliner outside Lima - documents

which are said to contain detailed reports of activities in

Brazil

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Brazil to give guerrilla training in connection with peasant

violence. The documents reportedly reveal that these

activities, although relatively small scale and inefficiently

executed, received the help and guidance of Cuba.

In Colombia we witness a continuation of the violence

which has plagued that country for a decade. I mention this

only to point out that this violence is not primarily

communist inspired or directed, although there is reason to

believe they are attempting to take advantage of the situa-

tion. Violence in Colombia is banditry rather than insur-

gency.

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STEPS. WE ARE TAKING TO COMBAT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

In the face of the communist subversive offensive in

the hemisphere, there arises the question of what the U.s.

and the other American Republics are doing to meet

it.

Success in combatting this offensive will, of course,

depend greatly on the will and ability of the American

governments to act and to coordinate their efforts

with

each other. It is important to keep in mind that what

we are concerned with are problems and situations which

exist in nineteen independent, sovereig nations, as properly

jealous of their independence as we are. Although we are

inter-dependent and allied by geography, common origins and

the regional security system of the OAS, we are all also

firmly committed in inter-American treaties to the principle

of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs. Indeed,

the violation of this principle by the Soviet and Castro-

directed communists creates the problem we are talking about.

From this it is evident that, so far as the US is concerned,

neither the problem nor the remedies are entirely within our

control. It means that the steps the US take must be in

full agreement, free cooperation and partnership with our

Latin American allies. While promoting increasing cooperation,

the US, in all its efforts, continues torespect the principle

of sovereign independence. We cannot and will not ourselves,

in combating violation of this principle by others, destroy

the very principle we are trying to preserve.

We

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We are channelling our direct attack on the problem

of communist subversion in two directions. One is to

isolate. Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image

of the Cuban revolution in the hemisphere. The other is to

improve the internal security capabilities of the countries

concerned.

Even more important over the long term, will be the

achievement of our goals under the Alliance for Progress,

a partnership of twenty countries of the inter-American

system.

Inter-Agency Program Coordination

A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in implementing

programs designed to assist the governments of Latin America

to deal with this insidious threat. Their individual activi-

ties are carried on as a part of an integrated US effort to

strengthen country internal security capabilities and to

promote sound political, economic and social structures

through democratic processes. Each of the representatives

of the other agencies at this hearing will be able to

furnish

you in more detail information about their efforts and the

achievement of these objectives.

Coordination of all of these activities takes place in

the weekly meetings of the Latin American Policy Committee.

In these meetings, senior policy officials of all the con-

cerned agencies meet with me to discuss their programs on

the basis of prepared staff papers. We examine in some

detail the activities of each of the agencies in the area

at

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at each weekly meeting and agree on a programsfor periods

in the future ranging from six months to a number of years,

depending on our ability to foresee what is needed.

If the conclusions of the Latin American Policy Committee.

are such as to require higher level decisions, they are

promptly submitted to higher authority for review and

approval, including, where appropriate, the President.

These policy and program decisions are then carried out

as an integrated effort by the country team in the field and

by day-to-day dialogue between the country desk officers

of the various agencies here in

Washington.

Between meetings there is, of course, continuing and

frequent informal contact at all levels between the concerned

agencies.

Activities to Weaken and Discredit the Cuban Regime

While subversion has been, as we have seen, a long-term

effort, its strength is unquestionably affected by the posi-

tion, prestige and stability of Castro and his regime in

Cuba. We have had a considerable measure of success. from

our efforts to isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro Govern-

ment.. In this regard, the missile crisis proved to be of

inestimable value in unmasking the Castro regime, previously

regarded, &s

MANY

a model for a new Latin American-type revolution,

as just one more tool of Moscow. The Ineptitudeof Cuban

leaders, coupled with the success of our efforts to deprive

Cuba

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Cuba of access to the industrialized markets of the free

world, has brought about serious economic deterioration

in the island.

In the political field a major reduction in the

influence of Lidelisme in the hemisphere has been achieved.

The Castro Government has been suspended from participation

in the OAS. Fifteen American- Republics no longer have

diplomatic relations with Cuba. Last October during the

missile crisis the American Republics achieved complete

hemispheric solidarity on OAS action to protect the peace

and

security of the continent. As a result of economic

deterioration, Soviet domination and political ostracism,

the Cuban example has become increasingly less attractive

to Latin American peoples.

The facts about what Castro has done to Cuba and its

people need only to be known in order to convince. Our

copy. is readymade for us, but it must be gotten to the

millions in every Latin American country, nearly half of

them illiterate. USIA is waging a battle for men's minds

in telling this story of the betrayal of the Cuban revolution

and what conditions in Cuba and other communist countries

are like today. Through radio, press, books, television

and films, this message is being carried daily to the Latin

American public. To cite a few examples: (a) 4,500 hours

Of USIA-

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of USIA-furnished radio programs are being broadcast over

some 1,500 Latin American stations per week; (b) some

10, 000 words of news and commentary are being sent daily

via teletype to all Latin American posts to be made avail-

able to the local press; and (e) a weekly fifteen-minute

video taped show is being televised regularly in forty-two

cities of eighteen Latin American countries, with an

estimated 10 million viewers.

In addition to this mass approach, USIA has greatly

expanded its efforts. to make contact with special groups

such as labor, student bodies, and intellectual and

cultural elite who are the priority targets of the communist

efforts. The Department of Defense is also making anti-Castro

and anti-communist material available to the armed forces

in these countries for use in troop information and education

programs•

A gauge of the success of our efforts to discredit and

isolate the Cuban regime is to be found

in the inability of

the extreme left to organize anti-American public demonstra-

tions of any significant proportions during the critical

days of the missile crisis. One is reminded of the oft-

repeated boast of the regime of how the hemisphere would

rise in defense of Cuba if measures were taken against it.

The record showsotherwise. Only in Bolivia and Uruguay were

popular demonstrations of any size mounted and only in

Venezuela

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Venezuela were there any effective sabotage efforts. Minor

protest meetings, student marches, and bombings were

reported from other countries, but were regarded even by

the communists themselves as failures in terms of generating

popular opposition to the action of the United States.

In Colombia it appeared that the immediate reaction of

the communist party and other extremists was defensive, and,

rather than attempting to organize demonstrations, they

avoided hostile action. In Chile there were only small,

limited demonstrations, despite much propaganda and planning

action by the extreme left during the preceding months

calling for demonstrations and strikes if the United States

were to act against Cuba.

Pro-Cuban elements in Ecudaor made a major, though

somewhat uncoordinated, effort to protest United States and

OAS actions. These efforts were almost totally unsuccessful.

Despite vitriolic attacks by extreme

leftist publications

and the exhortations of party leaders, there were only

minor demonstrations in Guayaquil and Quito. In Peru, front

States

organizations organized anti-United/rallies. Other than one

at the University of Ica, which degenerated into a bloody

brawl, these rallies were notable for the small attendance.

In Montevideo, Uruguay, a

communist-organized demonstra-

tion was attended by some 7,000 students and workers. The

demonstration was peaceful and broke up after a few anti-

United States speeches. The organizers considered the

demonstration disappointing. The Central

of Uruguayan

Norkers

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Workers twice failed in efforts to stage demonstra-

tions.

In Bolivia, the pro-Castro demonstrators were met

by an equal number of pro-United States demonstrators who

did not hesitate to clash with

the extreme left mobs.

In Mexico and the Dominican Republic there were

only minor demonstrations. In Brazil, Haiti, Costa Rica,

El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras and

Paraguay there were no demonstrations.

This was not a record of which Havana or Moscow, let

alone Peking, could be very proud. But we would be unwise

to count on this as a permanent decline in influence and

relax our vigilance.

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United States Internal Security Programs

United States internal security programs, it should be

made clear at the outset, are only undertaken at the request

of the Latin American

governments and can only be a modest

addition to their own efforts. They and their peoples must

decide what to do and do 1t, must sometimes kill and be killed,

for this, 1s a battle to the death.

Whereas the problem for the United States in strengthen-

ing Latin American cooperation towards hemispheric security

had, until the advent of the Castro movement, been largely one

of developing the capability of the Latin American countries

to make

contribution to collective defense,

the primary problem has now become the maintenance of

internal law and order against communist-inspired violence.

It became apparent in 1960 with the avowed intention of

the Castro regime to promote

the overthrow of Latin American

governments by indirect aggression and subversion, that the

security of nearly every government in the hemisphere would be

jeopardized, in varying degrees.

In anticipation that many countries would be confronted

with communist-inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage, and

possibly guerrilla operations, a careful and intensive assess-

ment was made by the United States, In cooperation with the

countries, of the potential security threat to each country

with the

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• =40-

with the view

to

he immediate development and

implementation

of the United States military assistance and training programs

reoriented to this new danger. Where critical deficiencies

in the capability of local security forces were found, we thus

were able to respond rapidly to requests to provide appropriate

materiel, training, and services under our military assistance

and public safety programs to make up such deficiencies.

This assistance is being provided for the control of

communist-inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and

control of movements of subverside and arms inside those countries

and

across their borders, and for the maintenance of observation

and

patrol of rural areas for detection and dispersion of

guerrilla movements.

During the past two years increased emphasis has been

placed on training selected Latin American military personnel

in riot control, counter-guerrilla operations and tactics,

Intelligence and counter-intelligence, public information,

psychological warfare, counter-insurgency and other

subjects

which will contribute to the maintenanœ of public order and

the support of constitutional governments. These courses are

given at United States military schools at Fort Gulick, Canal

Zone and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In assessing the internal security situation in Latin

America, we found that the civil police forces in many of

the countries wanted assistance in police administration,

training

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training and operational techniques and particularly required

greater mobility and more adequate systems of communications,

largely related to riot control and other threats to public

order. Consequently, the public safety program which is an

Integral part of the AID. Program, 1s designed to meet these

requests.

In this connection, a regional Inter-American Police

Academy was established last year in the Canal Zone to which we

invite selected members

of Latin American civil police forces

for training in organization, administration, riot control,

records, and investigations.

Closely allied to and an integral part of our internal

security programs are civic action programs which are designed

to contribute to economic and social development and to establish

a better rapport between the forces of order and the civilian

population. If the Latin American military and public safety

forces are to win popular support for the measures that may be

necessary to curb such violence, they must

establish themselves

In the public mind as a constructive, economically responsible

element in the national life.

In essence, our programs are designed to assist the Latin

American countries to develop the capability to insure the

stability and internal security which are necessary for carry-

ing the Alliance for Progress forward.

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STEPS BEING TAKEN IN THE OAS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

As I noted at the outset, the struggle against

extra-continental subversion is not a new experience for

the inter-American system. The problem arose during

World War II with the activities of Axis agents. To

help the governments deal

with it, the Third Meeting of

Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, 1942) established the

"Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense."

This Committee functioned until the end of the war,

rendering a most useful service to the inter-American

community by assisting the member governments to identify

centers of Axis propaganda, espionage and subversive

activities and to develop suitable control measures.

The danger of international communism has been a

topic of discussion and action in major inter-American

forums from the outset of the Cold War. Beginning with

the Ninth Inter-American Conference in 1948 to the

present, the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing

preoccupation over this threat and readiness to assist

the governments to deal with it.

I shall not attempt in this presentation to trace

the history of OAS action against the subversive activ-

ities of international communism.

A good resumé is

contained in the Initial General Report of the Special

Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), a copy of

which was given to your staff last week.

At

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At Punta del Este last year the Foreign Ministers

verified, to use the wording of Resolution I, "that

the subversive offensive of communist governments,

their agents and the organizations which they control

has increased in intensity."

Concerning this offensive they said:

"The purpose of this offensive is the destruct-

ion of democratic institutions and the estab-

lishment of totalitarian dictatorships at

the service of extracontinental powers.

The

outstanding facts in this intensified

offensive

are the declarations set forth in official

documents of the directing bodies of the

international communist movement, that one

of its principal objectives is

the establish-

ment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped

countries and in Latin America; and the existence

of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which

is publicly aligned with the doctrine and

foreign policy of the communist powers."

I want to note

that this assessment was unanimously

approved, with the sole exception of the Cuban delegation.

Based on this finding the Foreign Ministers

established AS procedures for assisting the governments

to meet the challenge. They directed the Council of

the OAS:

"...to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the

purpose of warning against any acts of aggres-

sion, subversion, or other dangers

to peace

and security, or the preparation of such acts,

resulting from the continued intervention of

Sino-Soviet powers

in this hemisphere, and to

make recommendations to the governments of the

member states with regard thereto."

At the same time they made provision for the establish-

ment of the SCCS, composed of experts on security matters,

to

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to advise the Council and the member governments, upon

request, on technical problems in this field.

The SCCS was organized last spring and has

formally met in three series of sessions since that

time: to prepare an initial general report on communist

subversive activities, to advise the Dominican Government

on how to deal with communist subversion, and to assist

in the preparation of studies on subversion for the

Council. The Council meanwhile has established a special

committee of its own, composed of governmental repre-

sentatives, to carry out its vigilance responsibilities.

Both groups in recent weeks have been working together

on special studies requested by the Foreign Ministers

at their informal meeting in Washington last October 2-3.

At this informal meeting of Foreign Ministers,

considerable time was devoted to the problem of sub-

version, as is reflected in the communique issued at

the end of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers found

that at the present juncture the most urgent of the

problems confronting the hemisphere was "the Sino-Soviet

intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the

island into an armed base for communist penetration of

the Americas and subversion of democratic institutions."

They expressed the desire that in the ideological struggle

against communism "the resources and methods inherent in

the

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the democratic system should be mobilized to bring the

peoples to realize fully the differences between

totalitarianism and democracy". They also agreed "that

it is necessary for the countries, in accordance with

their laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify

measures to prevent agents and groups of international

communism from carrying on their activities of a

subversive nature." In this connection they asked that

studies be made in the three areas where Cuba appeared

to be concentrating its effort: the transfer of funds

to other American Republics for subversive purposes,

the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization

of Cuba as a base fo training in subversive activities.

I have earlier described in some detail the

scope of

Cuban activities in these fields. The SCCS has just

completed its preliminary study of these three topics,

setting forth its conclusions and making specific

recommendations for individual and cooperative action

by governments.

The Council's Special Committee received the

report in Spanish last Monday. After it has been

translated and circulated among all the members of the

Council, the United States hopes it will be made public....

The Special Committee is scheduled to meet this afternoon

to consider this point.

I

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1. I should add that the SCCS report is a technical

study prepared by experts acting in their individual

capacity.: It is to be used by the Special Committee

composed of governmental representatives in the preparation

of a report to the Council setting forth recommendations

for measures which governments may wish to adopt to

strengthen their capacity to counter subversive activities

in these three fields.

I also want to mention the fact that the Inter-

American Defense Board has established an Inter-American

Defense College which began its first course for senior

officers from the armed forces of the various American

Republics in October 1962. The College is located at

Fort McNair. The purpose of the College is to conduct

courses of study on the inter-American system and the

military, economic, political and

social factors that

are essential components to the defense of our free.

societies..

Problems of control of subversive action

Before leaving this aspect of the problem I would

like to say something about the difficulties in curbing

subversive activities. The very nature of clandestine

action makes it difficult to deal with. In free

societies where subversive elements take advantage of

the

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the safeguards of democratic processes and where govern-

ments feel themselves inhibited by respect for constitu-

tional norms, the problem is even more complicated. Add

tọ this the lack of adequate administrative machinery

and internal security capabilities which exists in many

Latin American countries, and you can see the dimensions

of the problem. For example, coastlines are extensive

and thinly populated and frontiers for the most part run

through rugged terrain difficult to patrol. Effective

control of clandestine shipments of arms and men becomes

a most difficult task under these conditions. Besides,

there are plenty of arms available in most countries for

a price and no need for special efforts to ship them in.

The ease with which money can be transmitted poses a.

serious problem even for governments with the most

elaborate security machinery. Propaganda which comes

over the radio can be jammed but only atgreat expense

and effort and even then without complete success.. The

control of the entry and departure of travellers and

surveillance while they are in the country is another

task requiring large

numbers of trained personnel and

substantial funds. I mention this solely to give you

some idea of what we and our sister republics are up

against in trying to develop our capacity to deal with

the problem of subversion through individual and

collective effort.

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=48-

At the same time I don't want to leave the

impression we have given up. The training in Cuba of

party members is a particularly important contribution

about which it should be possible to do something•

A number of suggestions are made on this matter in the

recent SCCS report. While the actions must be taken

by our Latin. American associates, we will certainly wish

to be helpful in any way we can.

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-49

ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN THE HEMISPHERE'S

SECURITY EFFORT

¡So far I have talked about US and OAS programs to deal

directly with the subversive effort. It would be a mistake

to close without a few words on the Alliance for Progress.

i In the critical last week of October, when we confronted

the Soviet Union bluntly and directly over the missiles in

Cuba, the Finance Ministers of the 20 member countries of

the Alliance for Progress met in Mexico City. President

Kennedy sent a message to that conference which established

the clear and direct relationship of their work to our and

the hemisphere's security. He said to the Alliance conferees:

"Your meeting is a vital reminder that the central task of

this generation of Americans is not merely the avoidance of

conflict. It is the construction of a new community of

American nations in which all our citizens can live not

only free from fear but full of hope...Just as the unyielding

determination of today is essential if we are to realize the

future promise of the Alliance for Progress, the future success

of the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication of

the resolute course we are taking today. "

The Alliance was not undertaken as a response to

Castro. But I do not think there is any doubt that

the threat of Castroism gave us a sense of urgency

about the economic and social underdevelopment of Latin

America and the resultant political tensions and dangers

that

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50

that we did not have before.

We have engaged in this

program because it is right ahd because it is in our

national interest to live in a world of independent

and secure countries. By doing so, however, we also

seek to provide for batin America a democratic alternative

to Castro-communism, reflecting another statement by

President Kennedy -- "If peaceful evolution proves

impossible, violent revolutions will be inevitable."

Theoretically, we could put vast amounts of arms

and riot equipment into Latin American hands today to stamp

our rebellion and to shoot down the Communist leaders and

followers. But in whose hands would we put these arms? How

can we be sure that the riot quellers of today will not be

the rioters tomorrow? What good are arms and security con-

trols in a permanently unstable society?

In practice, we are providing aid to our sister republics

in public safety and anti-subversion efforts, conscious of

the fact that these efforts are meaningful only in the frame-

work of a longer-term program. That program is the Alliance.

We are helping our sister republics to maintain order and

strengthen democratic institutions so the fruits of the

Alliance may have a chance to ripen.. Some of them ripen

fast - schools, health centers, pure water systems, low

income homes, school feeding, farm-to-market roads. Others

take time to produce results: new industries, road and rail

networks, modernized agricultural economies. We: do the first

kind,

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kind,

again, to make possible the second kind. What we aim at

1s, over the next ten years, to develop skills, attitudes

and material foundations on the basis of which Latin America

can go forward to self-sustaining growth. what we aim at,

simultaneously, is the production of sufficient evidence

for a large

enough number of people that our way works so

as to deter them from following the false but alluring

promises of the Castroites and Communists.

Are we succeeding?. We cannot/answer this question

with certainty. What we do know is that we are getting

under the Castroites' and the Communists' skin. The

Alliance for Progress is a constant object of their

scorn and their attacks. If that be a measure of the

threat it poses to their goals, then we have reason

to be hopeful about its appeal to the peoples of Latin

America and its chances of success. Let me quote just

a few examples.

Peking Radio on August 25th last year quoted the

Mexican Communist organization which calls itself the

National Liberation Movement as follows: "The Alliance

for Progress is nothing but a hoax which could not deceive

the people".

It goes on to say:

"Nobody can arrest the

advance of history, whether by violence or threat,

propaganda

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propaganda or the 20 billion dollars, a United States

promise connected with the Alliance for Progess program."

Cuban Communist leader Blas Roca in an article in

Cuba Socialista in May of last year mentioned the Alliance

no less than six times in two pages. He says the

Alliance "gives no adequate or effective answer

to the

cry of the peoples of Latin America.". The reason for

this, says the Cuban Communist chief, is that it will

not - and I quote again "liberate Latin America from

Yankee rule, but.. strengthen it." The burden of his

article, translated into plain language, is that the

Alliance would create a satisfactory and healthy;

relationship between the United States and Latin

America and thus must be fought like poison by the

Communists.

Castro's hope for the defeat of the Alliance was

expressed in an interview with some Western reporters

on June first, when he said that the American economy

cannot afford the Alliance: He said, hopefully no

doubt, and I quote from a Reuters dispatch in the

New York Iimes: "They (the Americans) have neither

the gold reserves nor the organization nor the men to

make it work."

We do not need to concern ourselves too much

with challenges thrown out by fidel Castro.

The

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The challenge we face is self-imposed, not only by us

in the United States but by all 20 Alliance members.

It is to end hunger, disease and illiteracy in Latin

America, to make these republics a better place to live

for their people and thus to make the hemisphere a

better place to live for the United States. And it

is a point to remember that Castro, Khrushchev and

Mao Tse-Tung would rejoice if we gave up on the

premise of the Alliance for Progress. They are right,

of course, in

being concerned about the Alliance, not

only for the long-term future, but more immediately.:

For one factor in the unanimous agreement in the Hemisphere

on what to do about the missiles and in the failure of the

Communist program of protests was the new hope of peaceful

change brought by the Alliance and the new view of the

us resulting from our leadership in this effort.

We see

the Alliance as much more than a program

of economic and social progress.

We see it as a

political and ideological program as well, depending

on its success

as much on the development of Latin

America's human resources, the reshaping of public and

leadership attitudes and institutions as on the

building of roads, factories and hospitals.

The Charter of Punta del Este calls for more than

a collection of separate projects paid for by American

public funds. It envisages the modernization of society

throughout

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throughout Latin America.

This includes the harnessing

of the intensive craving for a national renaissance

to the constructive goals set forth in the Charter. It

means the development of wise and responsible political

leadership; the broadening of opportunities for the

increasingly frustrated and impatient young generation,

particularly in the universities, and the channeling

of vast intellectual and physical energies into the

pursuit of national strength and independence in each

member country of the Alliance.

The building of a stronger and broader

economic

base must go hand in hand with the development of an

open and vigorous society in which there is room at

the top and near the top for all those whose talents

and dedication entitles them to play a more meaningful

and self-fulfilling role

in the conduct of their

nation's affairs. If Latin American succeeds in this

quest, if its youth finds the opportunity to plot

solutions instead of revolutions, to demonstrate

results instead of just demonstrating, the death knell

will have sounded for the pessimism and the nihilism

that are Castro's most valuable assets.

The pursuit of these objectives also entails a

new dimension for our own Latin American policy and the

resetting of sights on the part of all Americans,

official.

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official and private, active in the region and in

hemisphere affairs. This reorientation of our own

attitudes is not an intellectual exercise...It is a

requirement for the successful conduct of our new

Latin American policy.

Our own destiny is inextricably

bound up with the development of a hemisphere-wide

renewal which is long overdue. The alternative is a

series of convulsions whose consequences cannot be

foreseen but which are more likely to serve the

objectives of our adversaries than the interests of

Latin America and the United States.

In this sense, the Alliance for Progress is a

policy of both national and hemispheric security

which, regardless of the frustrations and disappointments

we may experience, must be pursued steadfastly until

the common goal is achieved.

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CONCLUSIONS

In concluding this presentation I want to draw a few

tentative conclusions, tentative because

we are dealing with

unusually unpredictable forces:

1. The peoples and governments of the Americas face a

serious problem in communist subversion.

Assessments of the

degree of danger to particular countries will vary, though

no country now seems likely to succumb in the foreseeable

future. No one can deny, however, that it is a real and

continuing problem as far as the peace and security of the

hemisphere as a whole is concerned. Further, we cannot dis-

regard the fact that terror and violence create conditions

which

make it far more difficult for public or private

enterprise to achieve the economic and social progress

essential to the ultimate defeat of subversion by the success

of the Alliance for Progress.

2. During the months ahead we may well witness a step-

up of the tactics of violence as the communists, impatient

to score successes to recoup their prestige in Cuba and in

the hemisphere, resort to terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla

activities in an attempt to get publicity, unseat governments

and seize power.

3. The nature of subversive action places the primary

responsibility on each country to adopt necessary legisla-

tion

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tion, establish required administrative machinery, and

develop sufficient internal security forces to meet any

situation which may arise. But such formal steps are not

enough. Will and skill and courage are also required. And

ultimately governments can only succeed if by their policies

for promoting political, economic and social development they

are able to command the active support of the great majority

of their peoples.

4. It is no less true, however, that the effectiveness

of the measures taken individually can be

measurably Increased

or decreased by the degree to which the governments, including

the United States, cooperate with one another, bilaterally or

in larger groups like the OAS, sharing resources, experience

and intelligence.

5. Without being complacent, we in the United States

can derive certain satisfaction that as a result of actions

of the

United States and other American governments, working

individually and collectively, some headway is being made to

reduce the

influence and capabilities of Cuba and the bloc

and in controlling local subversive activities of all kinds

in each country.: Current United States actions may be

summarized as reducing the appeal and capabilities of the

Cuban regime, spreading knowledge of what a Castro-communist

regime does for a people's freedom and well-being, providing

equipment

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equipment and training to Latin American military and police

forces to deal with riots and guerrilla actions, working

through the OAS to stimulate individual and collective

action on the problem, and through the Alliance for Progress

helping our partners attack the basic discontent on which

subversion feeds.

6. The activities of all U.S. agencies must continue

to be vigorous and be closely integrated into a single

program which, in turn, is appropriately related to the

particular problems and programs of each country on the one

hand, and the OAS on the other.

7. Further deterioration of the prestige and influ-

ence of the present regime in Cuba, and its eventual replace-

ment by a government freely chosen by the Cuban people, will

contribute materially to reducing the threat but will not

eliminate it. To do this,

we must all work continuously on

many fronts, positive and negative, individually and

together, until the strength of our free democratic system

to meet the highest needs and aspirations of the peoples is

unmistakably proven to all and the Alliance for Progress has

achieved its goals.

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