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104-10306-10016,,

T. MAY

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE

PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet

plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the

Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had

now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered

that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all

of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague.

Meone stated the indicator were chanting and rope hand certain

own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and

continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and

became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment,

This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and

Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing

Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building

of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently

sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless

important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to

stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

JAM/ji (taped)

Inc

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SECRET.

The President then suggested a meeting be held this

afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1.

We should establish what our contacts are with the groups

so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down

the operations.

2.

A policy statement which State is undertaking.

3..

The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.

4.

Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this

originated in the Bahamas.

5.

The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cotrell,

Douglas Dillón, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon

for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and ClA, Immigratio:

ixxsliates officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1.

Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where

they are, and what can be done about them.

2.

Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami.

Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.

3.

Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some

of this.

4.

Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we

intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives;

arms, etc.

FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped

with DE-equipment to locate the stations.

6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from

Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown

in tat cola be do,

before any attempt was made to guide the groups.

7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane:

matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize

the plane.

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Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is

that they did not come from the United States. We have already

indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a

useful purpose.

It seems to me in some ways they strengthen

the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba

and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might other-

wise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported

this and these men do not have a connection with the United States

Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate

the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and

who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases

the chances of freeing Cuba.

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CONSIDERIZA? Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Solo A. To Come

Marck 28, 1963

LIMA

HE ELICUTIVE CONUTTLE:

Draft lattor to tse president

fron the secretary regardlas

the problem presented by

Cubes refugee prospe..

The President DRA CAllEd an HIS BRACUtIVe ComEtaR

Natiog far FrIday, March 29 u8 22:70 p.n. t0 8180136

the prosios posed by Cubas rapaçse eroupo.

The secretary has arcel ns to sate anailable to

you the atrarbed proposed lotsar tran aln to tbe presl-

dent which nils serpo as a banla for diacuasion at

COMOTTOM's MetInE.. Top rotter has sor got been

signed by the SeCTAtary but froMably Mill fo to tae

presidant 1a Ito present fort. I8 any subarsative

changes are made at the tius of airpatura I sball so

10боты уок.

Malles

BRBOTHED

cretary

Attachment:

As starod.

•COM

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

DRAFT LETTER

TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE METING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p..

Group I

Excluded from

automatic down-

grading and de-

classification

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles

may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our

national interest. Increased frequency of these forays

could raise a host of problems over which we would not

have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which

ceused substantial damage tr a Soviet vesse? may

complicate our relations with the USSR without net

advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could

impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its

efforts in Miami to develop hard information about

projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs

authorities charged with investigation of violation of

arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast fuard, on the basis

of this information can ston and search the vessels.

(They now do this, and picked un about 50 men and four

boats last year.)

Arms and vessels are confiscated,

and participants arraigned if a violation of law has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2 .

occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity

of the violation.

An increase of one or more vessels

to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations

in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami

could quietly inform suspects in the exile community

that the United States intends to intensify enforcement

of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illega!

radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in

connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of sur

plans to try to control these activities and express

our understanding that the British Government has

become increasingly concerned about the possibility

that British territory in the B-hamas may be used for

these raids and may be considering action to police

these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of

the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but

if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I

suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments

be called to discuss the nrob'em.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

March

28,

1963

CONFIDENTIAL

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29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations

such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66,

and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto

Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and

reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida

and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and

explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or

unlicensed

sources (of which there are many). We believe that the

operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious

courage and dedication.

Apparently the organizations are building up

and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

• 4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with

Sastro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint,

arendesirable. However, successful harrassment will create very

considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will

complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect

in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal

with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of

his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is

impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand

it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other

to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion

of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the

Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and

publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw

more public and press criticism in the United States than would result

from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government

from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

JOHN A. MCCONE

Director

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#.24

28004

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. - 29 March 1963

IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and

others

The President raised the question of what should be our

policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my

views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary

Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized

raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they

would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships,

etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves

and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized

raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of

the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities,

etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by

utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested

we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should

disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General

outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership

of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them

from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and

Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane

that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance

thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks

on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The

Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting

them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt

the military should immediately study that which should be done to

stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized

raids.

CIA WAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

29/23198

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TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded or declass

ied when filled in form is detached from controlled document

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

SOURCE

REGISTRY

CIA CONTROL NO.

DOC. NO.

DOC. DATE

COPY NO.

NUMBER OF PAGES

NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS

DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED

LOGGED BY

P

R

E

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency

transmitted outside of CIA.

to the lose l reme attached to the see to t is tea it os rongrated, deste ed, on

duties relate to the matter.

op secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this 10r

a indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Ton Secret document will sion' ar

indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO

OFFICE

RECEIVED

SIGNATURE

DATE

TIME

RELEASED

DATE

TIME

SEEN BY

SIGNATURE

OFFICE/DIV.

DATE

DOWNGRADED

BY (Signature)

"OFFICE

DATE

8.03M 26 v8e

PREYtOUs

EDITIONS.

i see this form de ached from Top Secret material i shall be completed i she appropriate spaces belou

DESTROYED

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)

BY (Signature)

WITNESSED

BY (Signature)

OFFICE

DATE

TO

BY (Signature)

OFFICE

DATE

TOP SECRET

(40)

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Nated by scs

#46

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council

Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us

In the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward

them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

• The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S.

Is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are

part of NATA, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not

a part of then. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount

importance in reaching judgments - both by the USSR and the US. Our big

problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a

very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike.

In looking back, It was rea'ly that it presented us with an innediate crises

and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in

twelve hours.

In looking back over that four or five day period, we all

changed our views sonewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and

disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do

in any other struggle with the Soviet Union - and I believe we will be

In one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the

alternatives.

You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate

In a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their

actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war.

It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should

continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

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GET

2.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba.

Cuba might be our response in some future situation - the same way the

Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more

satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready - although

this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should

be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military,

in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba

in mind in the coning months and to be ready to move with all possible

speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had

Berlin to limit our actions.

In thanatter of Europe, the us has been faced since 1958 with alaulle's

position.

• .. • nuclear veto by French ... President

Eisenhower

reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by

the NATO nations - the NATO nations would not act.

... no agreement

between the Three.

That decision this Administration also supported.

However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the

French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would

make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches

and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which

France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western

World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult

to deal with.

Do Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we

have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not.

They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore 1t 18 not a

distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France

shou'd assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance

on the U.S.

У/ж

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RET

Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been

turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad

as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically,

Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us

In this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this

would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time.

If GoBo does go 1n, 1t will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will

be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a

setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to

have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe

& and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By

strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO/and increases

-98.

their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and

gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the

past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral

concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be

difficult to work this out, but 1t is important that we do so. But

we should not be wholly distressed.

After all we have done for France in s0 many ways, deGaulle has opposed

us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other

places - but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can do

so 18 to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect

our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control.

If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will

be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the

Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

98

Уж

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I SECREN

4.

98

We will be very tough about the actions that Furope takes. We maintain

large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient

¡forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to

our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying

helf of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and

they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their

protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howle can

protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous

policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we

are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they

will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not

think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done

a lot for them.

So we

must have all our representatives looking out

very strongly for the U.S. Interests.. We must be sure our econonic house

1s in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.

Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is critieism about

98

our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis

are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If

they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis

are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or

attempt to exploit our power. Our interest 1s to make a strong sub-continent.

- We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used india

lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While

doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer

to the chinese and against the Indlans. We have not been able to persuade

Ч/рс

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JC RET

98

the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance thir policy on India.

These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot

do much about it - we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to

keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call

themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp.

We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not

like the leaders themselves.

With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we

hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United

States. This is the reason we give sid. The test 1s whether 1t will

serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not

a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -

though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we

must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out

of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a

country out of a

communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless.. The Congress

may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this 1s a great danger to the

safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do

on a per capita basis.

We will probably take a cut, but we do not want

to hurt our Defense effort. We would not Ilke four or five countries to

suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of

aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it

will best serve our own interest.

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6.

98

Turning to the domestic scene, we will have a deficit of a bout $12

of $12z billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and

we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and

Interest on the Debt we have wat increased the National Budget but 1t

has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration.

With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had

many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped.

We have only increased about l% a year in the growth rate during the past

ten years. This is serlous, particularly with the grest increase in pop

wation.

I think this Tax Bil Es very import 98. I wa get another recession

In this country it will saxbohem have a bad effect on the gold seserve.

It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when

we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to

agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy - and if we just

drift, we will look very bad to other nations.

Furthermore, the dorloit. Is a reflection of the right in the hot and 98.

cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we

go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for

the Unlted States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we

will be in much better shape. All of these matters - the tax program,

AID, defense, etc. are all related.]

The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with

certain programs.

For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a

matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a

Ilmit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more

4/та

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7.

98

This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been

appropriated for Sace and Defense — and perhaps we should spend more.

98 One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to

to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe

and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two

9 or three days — If we have sufficient force to fight and supply for

ninety days and those around us can ohly fight for two or three days,

then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad,

but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of

the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we

grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and 1f

that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle

is basing his whole position on the position of the United states. He

can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe

and he can bank on it.

98

Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban.

We might be successful here

if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the

Chicoms develop an atonic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty

in protecting Asia.

If the Test Ban Treaty is successful It will inhibit

the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every

effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only

the Russians

and the U.s. it is not worth very much.. We should support

Foster all we can until we see where it is going.

If we get a successful

treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us.

(On the Kill ?)

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously.

Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this

Administration.

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The let

23 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces - 5:30 p.m.,

22 March, 1963

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric,

Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant,

• Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others

The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador

Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported

qualified success, indicating reservations by the German,

Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent

ones being:

a. Problem of control;

b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.

A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there

was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the

extent of the control of the United States versus control by

European countries since it seemed to mean that control should

shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States

clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able

to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no

country or group of countries exclusive of the United States

should be likewise able to fire them.

There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant

on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether

Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign

Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time.

The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress

at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed

to the President's directive.

It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be

sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to

draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a

similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion

should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.

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LORES ONLY

With respect to submarine versus surface ships,

McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better

and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in

coastal waters where

several thousand ships of all types would

be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily

identified and attacked.

The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral

forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he

seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without

its failure being used against the United States or his administration

to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the

"European control" idea.

No action was required on our part. I expressed no

viewpoint at this meeting.

JOHN A. McCONE

Director

JAM/ mfb

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