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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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Wastingon a C2OS0S

15 April 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

CIA Employees

We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA

once the Review Board has completed its deliberationg on the

issues discusged below.)

1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memo is to relate

CIA'& concerng to the Review. Board regarding the release of

the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK

Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem

might be addressed.

I. Factual Backaround

(U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA

employees have been identified in the JFR Collection. Some

of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA

will continue to work with the review board to release as

many of these names as possible.

Many names, however,

appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection anơ

appear to add nothing to the historical record.

3.

(0

Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board

on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are

presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence

to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to

the employee would likely result from such release.

Since

these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly

clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cages,

their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this

approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to

CL BY:

CL REASON:

DECL ON:

DRV FROM:

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protect national security information and the Review Board's,

duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a

timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and

informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over

the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some

employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a

"suspicious" letter purporting to be fron CIA which they had

received.

It would not be surpriging, therefore, if many

former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons,

even though they might have legitimate needs to protect

their identities.

(U) Contacting every named employee and collecting

information on each of them to present to the Review Board

will Clearly take more time and effort than any of us had

anticipated. This will have obvlous ramifications for how

and when the Review Board releases information to the

public. More importantly, the decision to publicly

acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30

years under cover is a critical one that should be made not

cover to a er

by default, but rather by careful planning and

consideration.

5.

(U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that

the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy

for releasing true names of sources of intelligence

information.

It was

agreed at that time that there would be

a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where

a source was particularly important to the JFK story and

there was no overriding national security interest,

the name

would be released.

Although the CIA recognizes that there

are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not

apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and

operational similarities, which are described herein, that

justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As 1s

further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes

that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting

employee names that appear in the Collection,. with

exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are

important to the JFK story.

II, Legal Considerationa

6.

(U)

As both covert CIA employees and clandestine

reporting assets are types of "human sources" of

intelligence, many of the same laws apply.

Although Section

11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when

the Act requires

release of information, it takes precedence over all other

laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong

governmental national security interests in protecting the

true names of CIA employees.

CIA believes that it 1a

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important for the Review Board to reconsider the lawg which

protect classified information, because they clearly reflect

a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA

employees from disclosure.

7. (U) By Executive order and statute, the President

and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence

responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In hig

Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central

Intelligence Group, President truman made the del

responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment

of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility.

The

National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d) (3), codified

at 50 USC 8403(3) (c) (5), requires the DCI to protect

intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure.

In

addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to ensure that

risks to the United States and those involved in the

collection of intelligence through human sources are

minimized.

8.

(U) Protecting the identity of individuals working

for cia, not only covertly but overtly as well, had been of

particular concern to Us lawmakers aince the establishment

of the Agency:

For example, with Section 6 of the Central

Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress

specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law

requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,

functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel...

employed by the Agency.

9..

(0) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified

Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,

trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving

or potentially Involving classified information.

working

with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA hag

successfully protected the names of CIA employees from

public release even in criminal trials where there are

heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring

disclosure to the defendant of all government information

relevant to the defense.

CIPA allows for in camera ex parte

hearings in which the judge can rule on questiong of

admisgibility and relevancy of classified information,

including the identity of CIA employees who may have

information pertaining to the defense, before it 18

introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in

open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has

ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,

but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary.

In

other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information

and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the

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In still other.

mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified

and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,

under CIPA,. the Attorney General has the authority to drop a

prosecution in those cases where the risk to national

security is too great.

10. (U) In 1982, Congresg again acted to protect CIA

employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection

Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of ".

a covert employee or the identity of a source.

This act

subjects anyone who reveals information that Identifies a

"covert agent" to prosecution and provides up. to 10 years in

prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment.

specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an

officer or employee of an intelligence agency...."

11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed

Executive Order 12958 on classified national security

Information that became effective in October 1995. Although

it requires generally that agencies make greater

declassification efforts than under the prior executive

order,

Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of

intelligence information, which would include employees,

extra protection from the declassification provisions.

Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and

having historical

value must be declassified within five

vears..

However, information revealing the identity of a

suman

source may continue to be protected.

12.

(U) The above federal laws show a long-standing

practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from

disclosure to the public.

chio pot 105

In carrying out its statutory

obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight

to

this policy and aftora the protection of clA employees a

nigh priority.

IIde PRaIational Consideratione

13.

(0)

For current CIA employees whose names may

appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations

for protecting their identity are similar to those for

sources. Many of these employees have worked "under cover"

for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installationg

and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to

enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively

in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and

authorised clandestine activitles from attention by hostile

elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to

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certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent

embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit

plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in Loreign

countries.

14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is

crucial to gathering intelligence.

In either a "hostile" or

"Irlendly" country, should the local service become aware of

who the CIA employees are,

1t would increase surveillance

and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible.

In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA

presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local

population 18 not aware of the circumstances.

Once it

becomes known among the locals that certain US Government

officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the

government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and

diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert

employees and their families would face increased risk to

their personal safety.

Even in "friendly" countries, our

employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to

ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among

an otherwise benign local population.

In any of these

cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly

compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the

field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in

an operationally and physically secure location.

Thus.

maintaining cover is important to a case officer's

effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.

15.

(S)

Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is

also important to cover providers.

The Review Board will

recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA

employees,

both in the united states and overseas, can work

one a sche

under "official" (ag., State Department), cover

or "non-

official" (e.g. Aprivate company, cover.

• Disclosure of a

covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of

the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also

negatively affect the governmental or business mission of

the cover provider, especially those who provide non-

official

cover.

icknowledgment of an employee who had beer

under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in

other countries could have a negative impact on the

provider's business interests and activities. It would also

cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and

their families.

Further, exposure of cover providers could

affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by

the Agency and Intelligence Community.

16.

(s) Although the majority of names that appear in

the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational

considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are

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not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees

still do not want their past affiliation with ClA revealed.

Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not

aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact

could negatively affect personal and professional

relationships.

Some former employees still live overseas

where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their

personal safety.

Other former employees travel overseas on

business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can

threaten

their business Interests and pergonal safety.

One example of an employee in this category isírobert

Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the

Collection. Fulton retired under (Department of State cover;

he currently has a consultant business and frequently

Release of his name would jeopardize not

only his business but perhaps even his safety.

A_ aimilar

example 1s Walter McCabe, who also retired under State

cover.

He is now working in (Russia and several Easts

European countries for a private firm.

He does not want his

name published, because it could be damaging to his current

employer and his professional status.

17.

(S)

Even if a former employee agrees to the

revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not

be posgible for other reagona.

In some cases, officially

acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing

operations on which that employee worked.

Foreign nationals

recruited by the employee and still providing Information to

the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public

acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA statione

where the employee worked throughout his career, including

some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who

had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and

may have believed they were legitimately providing

information to a Us corporate representative would be upset

to learn they were, in fact, alding the us Government.

ваати слоу мете,

18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers

by their own gervice would have a chilling effect on

prospective assets.

Prospective assets would be unlikely to

enter into a clandestine relationship with American

intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect ever

its own staff

employees from public disclosure.

19.

(U)

In light of the foregoing, CIA belleveg it 1s

important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA

employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions

made for those individuals who are important to the story of

The Agency proposes that in most cases a

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substitution. for the true name be used. If the Review Board

is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout

the records, a particular identifying substitution can be

used for a particular employee.

20.

(S) CIA believes that this approach will not

undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act.

A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84

•of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.

In such cases, it 1s difficult to see how the individuals'

identity can add anything of significance to the historical.

record; yet there may be some security concerns still

associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur f

Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in

When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in

the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he

told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and

believed such a release could pose personal and security

problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name

even appeared in the Collection, since he had no

recollection of being involved in anything related to the

assassination.

21.

(S)

With regard to the approximately 500 names

that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast

majority of these individuals played almost no role in the

JEK story. One example of this is former Do officer

Alexander Bräsko, His name appears approximately. 20-30

times. in the Collection simply because he signed off on name

trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and

retired under cover.

The public release of his name would

provide the public with no additional significant

information about JFK. (Tom-Flores is another example of a

covert CIA employee whose name appears in the corlection but

hag little or no connection to the JFK story. (Flores

CIA 1s also attached for your convenience.

22. (8) The Agency, of courge, recognizes that some

names may be particulariy important to the JFK story

regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in

the Collection.

One such example is former COS Mexico

Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.

In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review

Board for an appropriate resolution.

The CIA proposes that

the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals

whom it belleves are important to the JFK story and whose

names should be released to the public. These names would

carry a presumption of

release unless

specific evidence is

provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result

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from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate

searches to determine whether release would pose national

security concerns for the US Government or personal safety

concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the review

Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are

significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review

of the sequestered collection.

23. (U)

It is our hope that the CIA and the Review

Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy

regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not

undermine the important principle of protecting those who

work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are

ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

ther

Michaer

O Heil

Acting General Counsel

Attachment

A.

Ton" Flores' letter

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DCI/OGC/LD/ECelpriani

0GC-97-50971

76124

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 = GC

1 - Lit File - LDG00021

1 - ICC Signer

1 - RDC - FYI

1 - OGC Registry

(10 Apr 97)

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17 Maroh 1997

Ms. Beth Mills

Dear Ms. Mills,

Your lettor of 4 Maroh was delivered to me on 10 March, and this reply will

be sent via the same channel.

I wish to go on rocord as demanding that my name not be reloased in ANY

document disclosed concerning the Kennedy assassination.

„First, I shall doscribe my present ciroumstances; and thereafter I will address

the legal points in the legislation,

I retired in 1974 in a clandestine status, using a State Department oover,

which has worked reasonably weil since then. I reside in Caracas, Venezuela. This

city (and tho entire couatry) is still populated with Communists and ex-Communists

who formed part of the Marxist conspiray to overthrow the democratically elected

Govemments in the 1960s and 70s. Many of these persons are now members of

Congress and a few are in the President's Cabinet. During my service in Venezuela,

as COS, I maintained liaison with civilian and military offcers, during which time I

worked with these to overcome the guemilla offensive, and to combat the

Communist Party after it acoepted "pacification" I left in 1972 and wont to

Vietnam, from which I returned to Venezuela as a private oitizen. Becauso of my

wife's long employment and friendships, we are as olosely connected. with the

Jewish Community as two Christians can be.

Given my somewhat exposed position as COS, my true affiliation was known

to a number of important Venezuelan Goverumont officials: In any event, soon after

my return, I was informed by the Venezuelan Govemment that an important

Communist leader had loarned of my rotum, and that "I was living in Urbanizacion

Miranda (a small and somewhat isolated Caracas suburb) and that I was training

right wing paramilitary personnel." They were right about where I lived, but

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sonfused Boy Scouts with "right wing paramilitary personnel." I worked as a

volunteer leader for the Boy Scouts of America and the Venezuelan Scout

Association from 1974 to about 1991,

In any event, the Vonezuelan Government was sufficiently concerned about

the matter, that it offered me a group of bodyguards. I turned down the offer, and

asked them to provide me with an automatic pistol for my protection. I still have

that pistol.

The country has changed somewhat since that time. There are still a number

of underground radical groups who resisted pacification, and try to foment violence

wherever possible. Along the Colombian border they appear to be linked up with

the Colombian ELN and FARC. In addition to these, the country has been

infiltrated by radical Moslem movements. A Cuban Embassy, with its usual

collection of intelligenoe officers, is looated in Caracas. Further Iran, Iraq and

Lebanon also maintain diplomatic posts here, and probably support the Muslim

extremists.

Under present circumstances, my cover has prevented mo from coming to the

attention of these people. However, I feel vory strongly that if my name is released,

I will again become a potential target for these and other persons who wish to

ombarrass the United States and/or adversely affect U.S./Venezuelan relationships.

I was recently decorated by the Venezuelan President for my contributions to good

Venezuelan American rólations.

I have no intention of leaving Venezuela under any ciroumstanoos.

Any connection I may over have had with tho investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination, was highly peripheral. Any doouments which may be

released, could include my job title (rather than my name) without reduoing the

value of said doouments.

Since I will be quite dead in 25 years, I cannot object to my name being

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released at that time.

Although not mentioned as an option in your letter, I would like to be

permitted to review the documents containing my name which you are being obliged

to release. When I retired, I gave up all links with former sources. One of these

popped up in the New. York Times last week. Some others may still be alive, and in

need of protection, although as I recall, none had any useful data concerning the

asgassination. If the sources are to be exposed, I feel very strongly that they are

entitled to all the protection we can afford them. I will be in the Washington D.C.

area in November 1997, and would be willing to review these documents.

In terms of the provisions you cite for exceptions in your letter, (A) I consider

myself a person (Agent?) whose identity ourrently requires protection.

The cover I am using, provided by the State Department, is (B) an

intelligence method whioh is currently utilized.

The public disolosure of my name as part of the assassination reoord (C.3)

could reasonably be expooted to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy, and that invasion is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest, I

cannot resist defining tho public interest in this matter as "public morbid curiosity."

The publio disclosure of my name as part of the assassination record (C.4)

would probably compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality

currently requiring protoction between a government agent and a cooperating

individual or foreign goverment, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it

outweighs the public interest.

I was COS in Bolivia when the assassination

occurred. I was in close touch with the Bolivian Goverment security chief at that

time, and with the Minister of Interior, and we probably interohanged data on the

murder, although they could provide nothing useful. Also, the Station was probably

tasked to query all of our sources on the matter, again with negative results. The

revelation of my name and the identities of liaison contacts and unilateral sources

would not only imperil me, but would also embarrass the Bolivian Government, and

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could endanger current activities of the Agency in that country. I do not recall

whether in my subsequent assignment as Chief of the Cuban Task Force, any

mention of the assassination came up. However, if it did, revelation of my name

could not only imporil those agents of the time who survive, compromise our

operational methods, but also, make me a prime target for the Cuban intelligonoe

service.

None of the above should be construed as a waiver of my rights, or those of

my heirs, to take legal action to prevent the release of my name and/or to collect

damages, both civil and punitive, resulting from the release of my name. There

exists an implicit contract between ine and the Agency dating from when I accepted

the inconveniences of a clandestine retirement. Tho Agency undertook to provide a

LASTING cover for me. It should be noted that this implicit contraot predatos

Public Law 102-526 by some 18 years. Naturally, I am going to inform my legal

advisor of this entire matter. I suggest that you pull together a set of all documents

pertaining to my retirement, so that these can be mado available for his review.

I refrain from comment about a U.S. Congress that would pass such a bill,

and

a President who would fail to veto it. (You of course, are not te-blame.) The

New York Times and the Washington Post, will, of course, be drooling to got their

hands on your papers. I don't envy you because this is an extremely complicated

matter. Unfortunately, the release ou a lot of non-pertinent information will go a

long way to reveal the soope and role of the Agenoy in Latin America to any analyst

who wants to review the material and piece it together. I believe that this role is not

significantly different today than it was when President Kennedy was murdered.

Only the targets and the gadgets have changed.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas J. Flores

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