Originator: SSCSGO
From: KARAMESSINES, THOMAS
Document date: 04/14/1976
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

157-10014-10002

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY:

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10002

RECORD SERIES: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 01-H-10

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCSGO

KARAMESSINES, THOMAS

DATE: 04/14/1976

PAGES:

69

SUBJECTS :

ANGLETON, JAMES

CIA

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

MEXICO

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

KARAMESSINES, THOMAS

DURAN, SYLVIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1A

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/13/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Box 1

v9.1

NW 50955

DocId: 32423390

Page 1

---

## Page 2

Date :

07/31/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY : -SSESGO SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER : 157-10014-10002

RECORDS

SERIES: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 01-H-10

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO

FROM

TO

KARAMESSINES,

THOMAS

TITLE

DATE : 04/14/76

PAGES

: 69

SUBJECIS : KARAMESSINES, THOMAS

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

CIA

ANGLETON, JAMES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

MEXICO

DURAN, SYLVIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/26/97

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : Box 1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 50955

DocId: 32423390

Page 2

---

## Page 3

TOP SECREL

VO FOR 3

Ohr Mlnitra Statra Briate

13970

Report of Proceedings

- 5/4/22

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Wednesday, April 14, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 4

733

C...

760 7

PRONE (Area

WARD & PAUL

#10 First Streel, 5.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003.

OP SECRE

CONTENE

Testimon'. of1

Thomas Karamessines

Page

2

+7

8

9

10

15

16

8

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 5

Phona (Ares 202) 594

WARD

$10 First Streer, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Wednesday, April 14, 1976

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Government

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activitles,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 o'clock

p.m., In Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Richard S.

Schweiker, presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker. (presiding).

Also Present: James Johnston, Paul Wallach and

Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 6

C..

-

MARD A PAUL

$ 10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

]

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

• 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

TESTIMONY :OF. THOMAS RARAMESSINES

, Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record you full

name and address?

MI. Karamessines. Thomas Karamessines, 6726xKennedy

Lane, Falls Church, Virginia.

Mr. Johnston. And you have previously testified before

the Committee, and have been furnished a copy of the rules,

and are aware of your right to counsel with regard to the

Committee, is that correct?

Mr. Raramessines. Yes.

MI. Johnston. Let the record show that Senator

Schweiker will be here presently.

But it is my understanding, Mr. Karamessines, that it

Is agreeable to go ahead without the Senator present?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Would you state for the record your post-

tion with the Agency in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Karamessines. I was Assistant Deputy Director for

Plans.

Mr. Johnson. And the Director for Plang was Mr. Helms,

is that correct?

Mr. Karamessines. Correct.

Mr. Johnston. And would you describe briefly -

Mr. Karamessines. I should correct that. The Deputy

Director for plans, that is the title, Deputy Director for

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 7

TOP SECRET

Plans.

Mr. Johnston.: That is correct.

Would you state briefly

your rile as Assistant to MI. Helms?

MI. Karamessines.. It was generally to keep abreast of

our operational projects, to review the dally cable and other

traffic for referral to MI. Helms, and matters of particular

Interest to him, to assist him by looking after managerial

problems relating to the general administration of the

Directorate of plans, and to act in his place when he was

away.

Mr. Johnston. Were there any other Assistant Directors

C.

C.

810 First Strees, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

for Plans?

MI. Karamessines. In the Deputy Directorate for Plans?

Mr. Johnston. That is correct.

MI. Karamessines. No.

Mr. Johnston. And did Mr. Helms have an Executive

Officer?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes, he had one or two. But I don't

recall who they were at that time.

Mr. Johnston. And would you distinguish your function

from theirs?

Mr. Karqmessines. Yes.

The Executive Officer would

have had no command or line responsibility, whereas I did.

MI. Johnston. Let me go to the period before the

assassination of President Kennedy•

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 8

.

r..

WARD A FAUL

410 First Street. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

And to-refresh your menory, Lee Harry Oswald visited

Mexico City in September and early October of 1963, and CIA

surveillance there picked up the fact of his visit to the

Soviet Embassy.

And I want to show you Director Mesage Number 74830

of 10 October 1963. Principally I am Interested in the fact

that on the third page of that you are the authenticating

Officer. And I will give you a chance to perruse the message.

Mr. Karamessines. Actually I am the releasing officer.

Mr. Johnston. You are the releasing officer?

Mr. Karamessine. That is right. I don't know who some

of the other people here are, because their names are not

listed. The only name that has been left on here is my name

as releasing officer, right?

Mr. Johnston.

Right. Then the originating unit is

what on that message?

Mr. Karamessine. WH-3, Mexico.

MI. Johnston. What you your capacity be as reviewing

officer of that message?

Mr. Karamessines. To make sure that it wasn't violating

any particular policies of ours, particularly since it was

dealing with a man who at least had been American, and might

still be an American. And we were taking an

interest in this

fellow even though he wasn't an American. And normally we

wouldn't do that, unless there was good

reason - as there

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 9

TOP SECRET

obviously was in this case, because he had been a Marine, and

had defected, officially defected to the Soviet Union, accord-

ing to this message in 1959.

Mr. Johnston. We are operating with a zerax copy of the

message. But is that a copy of your signature on the third

page?

PAUL

410 First Streel. S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003.

2

8

9

10

12

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And with that is it fair to establish

that you at least read the message and knew of the activity

on the date you read the message?

Mr. Karamessines. I read the message. And it concerns

a Marine defector to the Soviet Union who apparently, accord

ing to the incoming message to which this was a response,

was trying to get in touch with

some

Soviets or Cubans in

Mexico. That would be the extent of my interest in it at the

time. And I would have ascertained that this certainly was

a legitimate interest of the CIA in an American, as an

exception to the general rule.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any operational interest

that the CIA had in Oswald?

Mr. Karamessines.

No, never at any time to my knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. Were

you aware that in the fall of 1963

the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

Mr. Karamessines.

I didn't know that.

MI. Johnston. Were you later aware of it?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 10

810 First Stroet, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17.

18

19

20

• 21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Г.

Phana (Area

Mr. KaranessinesT have seen allegations of that.

don't know whether that is true or not.

MI. Johnston. But you had no involvement in any

contemplated action or operation?

Mr. Karamessines.

No, absolutely not.

MI. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of the CIA progarm

operations directed against Cuba?

MI. Karamessines. Generally, in very general termg, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And those were run by whom at the time

In the fall of 1963?

Mr. Karamessines. They had had the Bay of Pigs the

previous year, right?

MI. Johnston. No, 1961, April and May of 1961.

MI. Karamessines. That is right, 1961. I don't know

whether the Cuban activity has been -- my recollection doesn't

permit me to say with assurance that the Cuban activity had

been transferred back, had been transferred to the wi Division,;

or if it continued to function as a special staff of some

kind, I don't recall. But it was one or the other.

Mr. Johnston. Was Mr. Fitzgerald the Head of the Cuban

Division?

Ms. Karamessines. He was at one time, yes, before he

became DP at one time, he was in charge, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And did he have a unit called the Special

Affairs Staff charged with Cuban operations?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 11

410 Forst Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 |

21

22

23

24

2.5

TOP SECRET

Mr. Raramessines. Yes, he did at one point.

Mr. Johnston. Who had in the fall of 1963 counterintellit

gence responsibility for Cuban matters?

ME. Karamessines. General Cuban matters?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

Mr. Karamessines. Counterintelligence semponsibility,

In a case like that, would have been an Integral part of the

special Staff, with the assistance and the contribution and

the general staff supervision of our Counterintelligence Staff,

the senior Counterintelligence Staff.

Mr. Johnston. And that would have been --

Mr. Karamessines. Mr. Angleton's Office.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Angleton's Office. Was the Special

Affairs Counterintelligence separate from the general

Counterintelligence Staff?

Mr. Karamessines. I would have been. How much of it

they had, I don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Who coordinated the Special Affairs Staff

counterintelligence withe Counterintelligence Division?

Mr. Karamessines. They just coordinated directly, I

would imagine. I don't think we had an additional officer

appointed to the former coordination function. They would have

been required - normally that would be the sop - to

coordinate their actiong with the senior Counterintelligence

Staff.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 12

Ai.

HW

Phone (Ara

WARD &

PAUL

410 First Sirèes, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Johnston.". Was it SOP for SAS to inform the

Counterintelligence Stafs of all -

Mr. Karamessines. I don't know that. I was not very

close to the whole Cuban activity. It was an activity that had

been given birth while I was abroad. And it had its disaster

in late 1961. And I was brought back in 1962 as a DDP in

March. And my guess would be that it was a conscious decision

not to involve me too closely in the remnants of the other,

activity.

Mr. Johnston. Moving to the assassination of President

Kenney and the day of the assassination, how was the matter

and the problem and the investigation if any, of the assassina-

tion handled immediately upon receiving word? Was there any

task force created to handle the matter?

Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall the creation of any

task force. But I do remember that because the counterintelli-

gence Staff was responsible in any case for conducting our

liaison with the other American intelligence security agencies,

especially the FBI, the Secret Service, that the Counterin

telligence Staff was designated, to my best recollection now,

as the focal point for the receipt of requests for information

from

these other agencies, and

for responding

to those

requests for information. And as a result of that, as far as

I can now recall, all communications going out to Secret

Service or FBI in response to requests for information were

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 13

WARD A PAUL

410 First Streci, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

HW

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

prepared by the Counterintelligence Staff, and were either sent

directly by that Staff, or if the content warranted, they were

brought up the line for review and signature by Mr. Helms or

myself in his absence.

MI. Johnston. And again, just so that we are clear, when

you refer to Counterintelligence Staff you are referring to

MI. Angleton's operation?

Ms. Karamessines. Yes, I am.

MI. Johnston. What about the Cuban Counterintelligence

Staff, how were they staffed in the Investigation?

Mr. Karamessines. You mean SAS?

MI. Johnston.

Yes.

Mr. Karamessine. Which we mentioned earlier?

Mr. Johnston.

Yes.

Mr. Karamessines. I don't know if they were still in

being at that time. But if they were -- I don't know the

answer to yque

question, but my assumption would be that

anything they had to contribute would have been funneled into

the Counterintelligence Staff.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever specifically - do you

recall asking them to make a contribution yourself?

Mr. Karamessines.

I?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

MI. Karamessines. No, I do not.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall any correspondence or any

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 14

Phone fArma

WARD A PAUL

410 First Sireet. S.E.,

Washingion, D.C. 20003

HW

1

2

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

10

information?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I do not. There may have been,

there may have been instructions from Mi. Helmg, for example,

to Mr. Fitzgerald. But I don't recall seeing any such

instructions.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever participate in meetings or

see correspondence in which Mr. Helms directed Mr. Angleton

to perform those functions for the Counterintelligence Staff?

MI. Karamessines. No. But MI. Angleton certainly was

performing them, and he wouldn't have stepped in to take over

the activity if MI. Helms hadn't made it plain that that was

the way he wanted it handled.

Mr. Johnston.

Who was Mr. J. C. King in this era?

Mr. Karamessines.

He was at this time, I belleve, the

Chief of the Western Hen sphere Division.

Mr. Johnston. For the Deputy Directorate for Plans?

Mr. Karamessines. Right.

Mr. Johnston. And to the best of your recollection, who

was Jack Whitney?

Mr. Karamessines. Well, I know Jack Whitten as an Officer

of the DDP. But what capacity he was serving in at that

particular point, I don't remember.

Mr. Johnston. Was he at that time involved with SAS?

Mr. Karamessines. I don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Was MI. King?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 15

... -..

PhOne (Ares 202) 94

PAUL

410 Frost Stewet, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

' 6

7

8

• 9

10

11

I2

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

25

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Karamessines:

Was

Mr. KIng? Mell, he would have

been generally aware of SAS's activities, since they were taking

place within his geographical area, as a Special Staff.

Me. Johnston. Did he have operational control of SAS?

Mr. Karamessines. I don't belleve so.

Mr. Johnston. And operational control of SAS was -

Mr. Karamessines. It would have been in the nads of the

Director of SAS, MI. Fltzgerald, who would have been

responsible to Mr. Helms.

Mr. Johnston. Directly to Mr. Helms?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald respond through you to

Mr. Helms?

Mr. Karamessines. Not to these matters.

Mr. Johnston. We have touched before

MI. Wallach. Is there a reason why he didn't respond

on those matters?

Mr. Karamessines. I had explained before you came in,

I think, that I came back here in March of 1962, after the

collapse of the Cuban thing, and the changes that had taken

place, and the place was in a bit of a turmoil. And my

instructions were to look after the day to day business.

MI. Johnston. Off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Johnston. Back on the record.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 16

410 First Street, S.E., Mashington, D.C. 20003

NW

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

• Mr. Karamessines.

My charge from Mr. Helma was that in

view of the turmoil that had been taking place in the Agency,

and specifically In the DDP, that we needed more than ever to

get back to normil operating, in othur words, to bring people

down off the chandliers.. We had a change of guard, Mr. Bissell

had been removed, and Mi. Dulles had been removed, and Me.

Helms had been brought in as Deputy Director for Plans. And

the idea there was that we were going to get back to basic,

classic Intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and

we were going to be done with some of these high flown ventures

• that just get us into trouble, some of these

ridiculous things

that had beer happening prior to that time.

When I came: back. my charge from Helms was, look, you

see the general running of the DDP, the day to day, normal

functioning. We have got Fitzgerald . I think it was

Fitzgerald - and he will be worrying about Cuban things.

He was a senior officer, don't forget. When Mr. Helms

went up to the Deputy Director of the Agency, Mr. Fitzgerald

was selected to be the DDP, not I, even though I had been the

Deputy to Me. Helms.

Senator Schweiker. (Now presiding)

When was that that that happened?

Mr. Karamessines. 1965•

So that my job was to get matters back to the kind of

procedures, controls and phase by phase, and step by step

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 17

000 me

50

WARD

& PAUL

#10 First Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

1]

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

administration that I vas familiar with, and which had fir

functioned, I thought, very well all through the fiftles, when

I was serving for the most part back in Headquarters most

the time at all.

In 1959 when MI. Bissell took over he changed a lot of

things. And controls became very loosey goosey. And I think

the Agency and the Clandestine Service suffered quite a bit

from that short but for me devastating interval in the history

of it.

But what Helms tried to do was get this thing back on

track. And I was supposed to help him do this. That is why

he brought me back, when my tour of duty was nearly up.

Senator Schwelker. You were excluded from the chain of

command?

MI. Karamessines. It was simply made clear that this

was a, Special Staff whose only job would be this, and I

didn't have to be all that concerned about it. That didn't

mean that I couldn't know what was happening there if I wanted

to know. But I had my hands absolutely full with things that

I had to deal with myself. And here was a very senior fello:

with a staff of his own dealing with just this special thing,

which was-an outgrowth and a result, or whatever you want to

call it, of the Cuban operations, which I knew nothing

about.

Senator Schweiker. And how did the White House

coordination or liaison go with that Special Affairs Section?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 18

C..

509

Phone

WARD a

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

20

21

22

23

241

25

LOP SECRET

What was. the flow there?

Mr. Karamessines. Not through me.

Senator Schweiker. I understand that.

Mr. Karamessines. It would be through Fitzgerald and

Helms.

Senator Schwelker. Who would have handled that in the

White House?

MI. Karamessines. I don't know.. I have heard Bobby

Kennedy. But I wasn't there.

Mr. Johnston. Let me continue with the Special Affa:

Staff. Did they also have responsibility for the Cuban e::

groups and the operations of Cuban exiles?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes, they did, that was all part u:

their ball of wax.

Senator Schweiker. Like Alpha 66, would that have beet

under them?

Mr. Karamessines. Anything relating to operations

directly or indirectly suppored by the CIA against the Castro

Government, landing agents, small boat infiltrations,

screening fellows down in Miami, working with the Immigrati

and Nationalization, FBI, very closely. All of this

was

SA.

with the help of the Counterintelligence Staff as required.

Mr. Wallach. On the other side of the coin, what about

the question of Cuba's operations vis-a-vis the US? Was tha:

also out of SAS?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 19

2

4

6

#10 First Street, S.E..

Washingion, D.C. 20003

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

• 22

23

24

25

NW 509

TOP SECRET

Mr o Karamess-nes

Yest

in part It wasn Butsthe

Counterintelligence Staff had a good part of that,

too.

Mr. Wallach. Who In the Counterintelligence Staff?

Mr. Karamessines.

I don't know, I can't put my finger

on it. But sAs had a good part of that, because SAS, don't

forget, had to protect itself against the activity of the GI,

the Cuban Inteliigence Service. And we knew that the DGI

was very active, particularly In Canada, in sending fellows

down into the States as agents through Canada. And ever so

often SAS, through its activities in Miami would pick up

reflections: of DGI activities and report these of course intr

Counterintelligence and the FBI.

MI. Johnston, Let's go back to the investigation of che

assassination. Do you recall the incident with Sylvia Dura,

who was the Mexican employed by the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico

city?

MI. Karamessines. From the Cuban Cougulate?

Me. Johnston. The Cuban Consolate, that is correct.

Do you recall that you received information that Sylvi

Dura was going to be arrested by Mexican authorities?

Me. Karamessines.. Yes, I have a recollection of that.

I don't recall the circumstances, but that rings a bell, i!

that is what you mean. And she was going to be arrested and

questioned, is that right?

Mr. Johnston. That is correct.

TOP SECRET

SachScara

---

## Page 20

—em..

Phone (Area 202)

410 Furst Street, S.E.. Washinaton, D.C. 20003

2

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

ME. Karamessines. For our account, If I recall coc:

correctly, is that right?

Mr. Johnston.

That is less clear, as to your account.

Mr. Karamessines.

I see.

Mr. Johnston. My question is, first of all, were you

ever told or do you know whether Sylvia Dura was a contact for

the Agency?

MI. Karamessines.

No, and I don't believe she was ever

- I have no knowledge and

do not believe she was ever a con-

tact for the Agency, for the CIA.

Senator Schweiker. Let's ask the same question of

Alvarado.

Mr. Karamessines.

He was that nut that you mentioned

earlier that came in, and gave them a tall story which turned

out to be false.

Senator Schweiker.

Was he ever an informer or source of

information?

Mr. Karamessines.

The answer is no as far as anything

I ovor hoard from anybody.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall ordering Mr. Whitten to call

off the arrest of Sylvia Dura, proposed arrest of Sylvia

Dura?

call it off?

MI. Karamessines. Do I recall ordering Mr. Whitney to

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 21

TOP SECRET

д.0.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD A PAUL

410 Forst Street, S.E., Vastongion, D.C. 20003

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

12

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Raramessines. No, I don't recall that. Are you

sure I ordered him to call off the arrest?

Maybe somebody

else did. I don't recall any such thing. I don't recall

anybody ordering it.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, then, a cable which

apparently was sent out after - by way of background, prior

to this cable going out, Mexico City had cabled

and said,

Mexican police have already arrested Dura, 80 we can't call

off her arrest.

Mr. Karamessines.

I see.

Mr. Johnston.

And then this cable followed, Director

84916 of 20 November

1963.

Mr. Karamessines.

yes.

Me. Johnston.

Whn originated that cable?

Mr. Karamessines.

The

origin of this cable -- it 1ooks

like it came from

the Mexican Branch of the WH Division. I

notice that the CI Staff is on distribution.

Senator Schweiker. Who was lead of the Mexican Branch?

ME. Karamessines. I don't recall at this point.

Senator Schweiker. Wasn't David Phillips working down

there at the time?

' Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall. You can get that,"

I am sure, very easily from the Agency. I certainly can't

recall who was in charge of the Mexican Branch at that time.

Senator Schweiker. On the structure of operations the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 22

.

*.

hone (Area 202) 584-6000

NARO

3104010

Don'. dE., Westinates, D.C. 2000.

4

5

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

1.5

16

1'7

19

20

21

22

25

TOP SECRET

way that you were structured then, would the Head of the

Mexico City Branch have reported to whom under your procedures?

Mr. Karamessines. To the Director of the Western

Hemisphere Division, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere

Division, who as J. C. King.

Mr. Johnston. And he would have reported to whom?

Mr. Karamessines. And he would have reported to Mr.

Helms, or in his absence, to me:

Mr. Johnston. In other words, it would go to Mr. Helms

unless you were acting in this capacity?

Mr. Karamessines. That is right, he was the DDP at that

time.

Mr. Johnston. • Now, if operations were going

on out of

Mexico City against Castro, would they have

fallen under the

Special Affairs Section, or would they have gone up the chain

of command we have just described, or would it depend?

Mr. Karamessines. It could have happened either way.

In other words, they could have been handled by the Special

Affairs Section in close coordination with

the Wi Division,

because it happened to be not in the

States here but over in

the Wil Division.

Mr. Johnston. In Director 84916 which you just looke

at, it is a flash message which is of the highes priority.

is that correct?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes, in terms of the emergency of the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 23

r:-

C..

C.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD A

PAUL

110 First Street, S.E., Mashinolan, D.C. 20003

P SECRET

19

2

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

18

13

14

15

16

17

18

2:

messages

getting there, correct.

Mr. Johnston. And it says, arrest of Sylvia Dura is an

extremely serious matter which could

prejudice - using the

code word which I think means United States?

Mr. Karamessines. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. - freedom of action on entire question

of - another code word which means Cuban --

Mr. Karamessines. Right.

Mr. Johnston. -- responsibility. Why was the arrest

of

Sylvia Dura such an extremely serious matter that it could

prejudice the US freedom of action on the question of Cuban

responsibility?

MI. Karamessines. The only thing I can surmise here --

and this is now out of context, and 15 years

later, or whenever

it is-- that while she was

still there, and we had the lines

on the phone, and

she was in here job -- and maybe we had

informants, I don't know, I don't recall -- the idea was there,

maybe we would learn some more about Cuban responsibility,

possible Cuban responsibility, since this guy had been talking

to the Consulate.

Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss this matter with Mr.

llelms?

2:

Mr. Karamessines.

I haven't the faintest

recollection.

Ei: I couldn't possibly

answer a question like that.

MI.. Johnston. Did you discuss it with Mr. Whitten or

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 24

phone (Area 202) 544-6000

MARO A PAUL

310 Firsi Street, S.E., Washington. D.C. 2000.3

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1.5

16

18

2:.

211

22

2:.

24

25

TOP SECRET

20

MI. King?

Mr. Karamessines. I couldn't possibly answer a question

like that. That would have been one of hundreds of cables I

would have seen that one day, any given day.

Mr. Johnston. Let me just put to you, though, my review

has

not necessarily been comprehensive, but this appears to be

the only flash message sent out in the course of these events

Mr. Karamessines. I would be surprised if you didn't

find others, number one. And number two, even though it is

a flash message, and I read it, I couldn't possibly recall with

whom I might have discussed

it at the time, who brought it to

re for signature, and whether it was sent, just sent in, or

handed to me by my secretary, I don't recall the circumstances.

But it is

a very natural and very proper

and quite under-

standable operational message, given the great interest that

we had in what this woman might be able to tip us off to if

we could continue listening secretly to here conversations

with others. She might call Aunt Tillie living in. Guadalajara

and

say, Aunt Tillie, I am going to take it on

the lam here,

because I think we have been cought trying to skp the bill,

or whacever.

Now, here are the Mexicans going to arrest her. And this

kind of cut the ground out from

under our feet at that point.

And

what the message is saying in effect is, let's try to keep

TOP SECRET

1411

32323990

rade

---

## Page 25

i..

10/950

Phung (Area 202) 544-6001

PAUL

•=11, 1S. 0316.

TOP

SECRET

1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

this as quiet as possible and see what we can salvage from it.

We are also hopeful that we could get to talk to her or

interrogate her or

question her ourselves, or arrange for the

FBI or Secret: Service to do it.

Mr. Johnston. And they also put to you that this

message indicates the existence of a question at CIA of Cuban

responsibility?

Mr. Karamessines.

There was a question at that point

after the President was killed

of anybody's responsibilities,

starting with the Russians, because Oswald had been a defector

to the Russians, and then going right away to

because_ they

were palsy walsy

the cuban,

and even in touch with the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico.

These were natural suspicions at the time and we would

have been derelict not to have had them. What we didn't have

was the kind of evidence that would have proved one or the

other.

1÷

14

15

16

17

15,

1.:

2':

?.:

2%

164

2:

-MI. Johnston.

And

to explore the question of Cuban

responsibility, who should have been directed

to

investigato

that?

• Mr. Karamessines. It was under investigation constanci:.

That is what was being done. This message;is an indication

of that. Wil was doing it, and CI Staff was interested in

pursuing it.

MI. Johnston. But didn't it occur to you that sas

TOP SECRET

Paye

---

## Page 26

TOP SECRET

LIT:

7.

C..

WARDE PAUL

410 Fust Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2.

3

5-

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

should have also been Involved?

Mr. Karamessines.

I think anything SAs might have had

to contribute on this thing at the time it contributed.

Mr. Johnston.: Do you know that?

Mr. Karamessines. No, Ilassune that, I don't know it,

from the way we worked.

MI. Johnston.. You do know that the CI Staff was, involved?

Mr. Karamessines..: Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And you do know the Western Hemisphere

Division was involved?

Mr. Karamessines. Right.

MI. Johnston. But you only assume htat SAS was involved?

Mr. Karamessines.

That is right. SAS's business was

an offensive role, responsibility, to send agents - their

counterintelligence intelligence was a very limited thing

designed to protect their own activities

against penetration,

whereas this had much wider scope. This was talking: about

some fellow who had been a Marine, and had deserted and gone

to the Soviet Union, all of these things. And then when he

shows up in Mexico he is not within SAS's perameter, he is

within WH's perameter.

MI. Johnston. Did you ever ask Mr. Helms whether SAS

had gotten involved in the investigation?

Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall asking such a question.

Mr. Johnston. Off the record a second.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 27

TOP SECRET

(off the record discussion)

Senator Schweiker. Back on: the record.

• ME. Johnston. Let me show you two more messages.

One

1s Director: 84855,23 November 1963.: And the other one is

Director 84837, 23 November. And you are the releasing officer

for the Chief of the western Hemisphere Division on both of

them.

aon..

WARD &

2

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Karamessines. He probably wasn't available at the

time and they brought

It Into me. Yes.

MI. Johnston. And is It a fair statement: that those two

messages together ask Mexico City Station for all information

on Alferiev or Kostikov --

Mr. Karamessines. One is Alferiev, as I read it here,

and the other one asks information on one Kostikov, both of

whom apparently were either identified or suspected Russian

intelligence officers.

Mr. Johnston. Now, when you sent these two messages out,

when you signed on as releasing officer, would you have expected

to receive back everything Mexico City Station had on those

two?

Mr. Karamessines. Not I, the Division would that sent

the message.

Mr. Johnston. But that was what was being called for

by the two mesages?

Mr. Karamessines. Well, whatever the messages ask for,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 28

C..

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

whatever Information, do you have on his movements on a certain

date, and so forth.":

Mr. Johnstond The message on Kostikov

says: "Urgently

reguire the following information about Kostikov, the names

and background, his contacts not already reported to

Headguarters."

And the message on Alferiev. said: ¿"Request reported in

coverage Alferiev as with Kostikov." • Now, is it correct that

Mexico City should have Interpreted this to give you everything

they had not already reported

on these two individuals?

Mr. Karamessines.

Not

already reported, yes.

Mr. Johnston. As an experienced Intelligence Officer and

as Assistant DDP, what would you have expected the Counter-

intelligence Staff to do with those contacts, with the reports

coming back from Mexico City?

Mr. Karamessines. With the information?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

Mr. Karamessines. It depends on what the information

said.

MI. Johnston. The message reporting back on this gave

all contacts, known contacts that these individuals had in

Mexico City. And what is the next step in your process?

Mr. Karamessines. You check these names out to see

whether your files give any evidence of suspicios activity.

And

lif they don't, if they simply don't indicate any suspicious

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 29

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area

WARD & PAUL

Street, S.E., Washington,

D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

activity, that would be the end of it. If it does indicate

suspicious activity, then you would follow from there,' and you

would pass this information on to other interested parties

within the Agency or within' the Government, and you would

carry on from there and investigate: further?

Mr. Johnston. :That is the point I am getting to. If

1t: reports: back that: Alferlev. has contacts with a named

Individual,.is. it routine.standard.operating procedure to

check the CI file on that: named. individual?

Mr. Karamessines.. Yes, unless the desk officer that

receives it happens

to know who that fellow is and doesn't have

to check. And that happens quite frequently.

MI. Johnston. And do you know anything about th

responses on these tho messages?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall the messages going

out, and I certainly don't recall any responses.

Mr. Johnston.

Your response earlier on why we might have,

warned about the arrest of Sylvia Dura in terms of damaging

our tap, the telephone surveillance --

Mr. Karamessines. I didn't suggest, sir, that we might

be damaging our tap. What I was suggesting was that by

arresting her they were taking her out of her office, her.

living quarters, and putting her under arrest. And this would

reduce and eliminate indeed our chances of hearing her

further.

Mr. Johnston. I understand that. What I don't reconcile

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 30

TOP SECRET

540"

C..

WARD A FAUL

410 Forst Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

4

6

7

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that with is the way the first sentence, is worded! "The

arrest of sylvia Dura is an extremely serious matter which

could prejudice all freedom of action on. the entire question

of Cuban responsibility." It doesn't say specifically the

thing that. I would sharte with you as the logical thing to be

concerned about, it seems more concerned about whether we have

to come to. some conclusion. we may not want to come to relating

to Cuban responsibility. And I am puzzled by that for two

reasons.

Number. one, it doesn't express the things.that.you

would logically say, which is what you mid, and number two,

why are we more worried about our freedom of action as opposed

to finding out what happened?

MI. Karamessines. I can answer that very quickly, I

believe. I see what you are driving at now. I can easily see

a situation in which we wouldn't want the Mixican Government

or any other

government to know

what Sylvia Dura may have to

say about Oswald or the President's assassination, assuming

she had anything to

do, we wouldn't want anybody else to know

until we had had a chance to

focus on it ourselves and decide

what our Government, what position our Government was going

to take about it.

Let me put the case this way, if I may. Let us assume

that Sylvia Dura is hauled in by the Mexicans, and she says,

fellows, it is very

simple. I know, because she was hired --

because this Mexican, ex-Marine, was actually hired by the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 31

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

274

Soviet Government with the assistance of the Cuban Intelligence

Service to kill President Kennedy. And you

getra real hot

Ittle Mexican counterintelligence police guy, and

he says,

I have got the scoop of the century. And he calls his newspaper

guys in, and he says, this is the information, fellows, this

1g what the witness has said. And the next morning the world

is reading: Soviets and Cubans planned assassination of

President Kennedy.

Now, you are sitting downtown in the white House: or in

the State Department, and you are wondering, where do we go

next, declar war on the Soviets and the Cubans? Where do we

go? You would prefer to be in a situation where, if this

woman had had a . and I use. the term had had, because to my

recollection she didn't have much light to throw on it, or any

light really -- if she had that kind of dynamite information

we would have been in a much

better position, our Government,

or President, and the State Department would have been in a

much better position had we had a chance to focus on whatever

information she had to give us. Now, here she would be giving

it first to somebody else, assuming she had it, which she did

not.

Mr. Johnston.. Did conversations like that actually take

place. at CIA on November 22nd and 23rd?

Mr. Karamessines. There were all kinds of conversations

about this thing taking place, certainly.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 32

TOP SECRET

Mr. Johnston. And did this, take place with regard to

Area

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1'3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Dura?

*%,

Mr. Karamessines. All I can tell you is that they must

have, but if you were to ask me to recall apspecific. one, I

can't do that.

Mr. Johnston. I am not asking you to recall a specific

one, but whether you participated in conversations at CIA with

other officials of the Agency to the effect that you have just

talked about, that if the word gets out that there is Cuban

or Soviet involvement in this; we need to know that first

indpendently, we want to know it first independently, it would

give our Government that much head start in deciding

what the

heck it wanted to do about it.

Were there any conversations - and again in a general

sense - that looked at US courses of action in the event

Cuban responsibility was established?

Ms. Karamessines. I recall no such conversations.

Mr. Johnston. In the event that Soviet responsibility

Mr. Karamessines. I recall no such conversations, and

I was not a party to them, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Johnston. But there was great concern that your

investigation might turn up foreign involvement?

Mr. Karamessines. There was no great concern that it

might turn up. We weren't afraid of it. If it came. it would

come. What we were hoping to do, though, as a service to the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 33

WARD A PAUL

Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOR SECRET

29

Government;

was to try f possible to have that information

before anybody else - before any foreigners had it, to get

it exclusively, so that our Government could focus on what

If any action it felt it would wish to take in the situation.

As it turned out; we never had that kind of Information.

So

it was a moot question.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you two specific areas.": And

my question will be whether. they came to your attention. Were

you aware that the CIA received information that on the

afternoon of the assassination an unidentified passenger landed

at the airport in Mexico City on a two engine aircraft, boarded

a Cuban aircraft bound for Havana, bypassed customs and rode in

the cockpit of the Cuban aircraft that afternoon?

Mr. Karamessines. Was I aware of that?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

Mr. Karamessines. No, at least I have no recollection

of it. Somebody might have mentioned it at the time in

passing. What was the significance of it?

Mr. Johnston. I just wondered whether you would

attribute any significance to it.

Mr. Karamessines. No, none at all. The DGI had quite

a lot of freedom of movement, freedom of action in Mexico in

those days.

Senator Schweiker. When was this, the day of the

assassination?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 34

TOP SECRET

730

MraoJohnston:

Khat a right

Senator Schweiker.

That wouldn't be significant to it,

the day: of the assassination?

Mr: Karamessines: No, not particularly.

Senator Schweiker...You don't think that there some

special orders that went out to DGI as to where they were and

what they were doing on the day of the President's assassina-

tion?

WARD & PAUL

410

First Street, 5.

.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

_ 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Karamessines. First of all, I never heard of this

report. Let's start to that. And secondly, I aidn't under-

stand you to say that it was a DGI officer that got on the

airplane, you said somebody got on the airplane and sat next

to the Cuban pilot and took off, without going through

customs.

Mr. Johnston. I am sorry, I did not tell you that they

held up the Cuban aircraft.

Mr. Karamessines. You see the difference now? You know

the story. He gives me a couple of tidbits and then you get

excited because I am not excited, see?

Senator. Schweiker. The Cuban aircraft was held up for

1700 hours to 2200 hours awaiting this passenger. That was

the information the CIA received. And the passenger arrived

on a twir. engine aircraft, bypassed customes, and went into

• the

Cuban airlines craft and rode in the cockpit. So he was

basically unidentified arriving under those circumstances.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 35

410 First Streel, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

ano.

A am

Mr. Karaness/nes. had never heard of that report.

I wasn't famillar with 1t

Mr. Johnston Were you familiar with the travel of a

man named Gilberto Lopez who crossed the border into Mexico

sometime on November 23ra2

Mr. Karamessines. No, that name doesn't ring a bell.

Mr. Johnston. And went to Mexico City, and on November

27th went to Havana as the only passenger on a Cuban airline

flight to Havana.

Mr. Karamessines, No, that name doesn't ring a bell

with me.

Mr. Johnston. And that never came to your attention?

Mr. Karamessines.

I don't recall that. That doesn't

mean it never came to my attention. But what I am talling

you is that I don't remember having been apprized of that

particular bit of information. It may well have been brought

to my attention. And we might have done a lot about it at the

time, and we might have reached

conclusions on it. iI just

don't remember.

Mr. Johnston. If that was handled by SAs would you have

been involved in it, the Lopez matter especially?

Mr. Karamessines. Well, I might have been, if Mr. Helms

didn't happen to be there and they needed to report it to

somebody, yes, Irmight have been. But I don't recall being

involved in it.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 36

6.00

WARD A FAUL

410 Firsi Streer, S.E., Wastungton, D.C. 20003

5

: 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr Johnston:

As of November, 1963 what knowledge did

you have about CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders?

Mr. Karamessines.

None.

Mr. Johnston. And as Mr. Helms' Assistant you had not

bee Informed?

Mr. Karamessines.

: No:

MI. Johnston. Have you read the Senate Select Committee

report on Assassinations?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I have not.

Mr. Johnston. According to the information the Senate

received, in August of 1963 MI. Helms told MI. McCone about

certain CIN' plots against Castro. Were you at that meeting?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

MI. Johnston. Do you know of that briefing or that

report to Mr. McCone?

Mr. Karaméssines. No sir, I did not.

MI. Johnston. When did you first learn that the CIn

had plots to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Karamessines. You will find this surprising, but

It is true. At about the time that a fellow named Bill liarvey

retired and went out to work as a lawyer in the Midwest, or

shortly thereafter, he gave an interview which was published

in one of the columng. And he then mentioned the names of

Roselli and some other guy.

Senator Schweiker. Giancana?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 37

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr

Karamessinespeed Glancanad

mAnaK how they were

involved in an effortito do away with Castrom and her harvey,

had been the CIA man in charge of the activity, or some such

story.

Now, when I read that I asked a couple of questions about

It, what are you talking about.

And a couple of fellows

around there who were knowledgeable and had lived through this

period - and I was then not in the States, I was overseas -

told me that they had tried to do something - at the White

House request, incidentally - they had tried to do something,

but it hadn't worked, and that was it.

Senator Schweiker.

Had you heard any talk about what

role Bobby Kennedy did or didn't have in that situation?

MI. Karamessines.. Yes. What I was told - and this

was absolutely hearsay - was that Bobby Kennedy wag the one

that was pushing for this, and that he was reflecting his

brother's desires.

Senator Schweiker. Did he use a desk over at CIA

Headquarters during this period?

Mr. Karamessines. Not to my knowledge - I think I wouid

have known if he had, but not to my knowledge. Remember, I

was not in the building, I was overseas from 1959 to March

1962. So what was happening in that period I just don't know.

He might have had a desk.

But I never heard that. And I

didn't know of it.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 38

C.i

MARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

5

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Johnston. Were, you, aware that Harvey and Roselli

met in June 01:1963?

: Mr. Karamessines: No, I was not:

Mr. Johnston. Do you know the crypt AMLASH?

MI. Karamessines. Yes, I have seen it. I don't know

whether I have seen it. in Congressional reports or in the

newspapers or in the office.

MI. Johnston. In the fall of 1963 when you were serving

as Mr. Helms' Assistant did you ever see any documents with the

crypt AMLASH on them, any reports involving AMLASH?

Mr. Karamessines. I am sorry, but I simply cannot

answer that question. I don't know. I may have, or I may not

have. But there were

thousands of crypts, and I couldn't

possibly remember. And what AMLASH! means right now I haven't

the vaguest notion.

Senator Schweiker. The answer you gave a moment ago was

as to the time frame when you learned about the

assassination

attempts relating to a column by Bill Harvey, the Army:

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. What year was that?

Mr. Karamessines. That must have been around -- my best

recollection would have been about 1964, somewhere in there,

late 1963, 1964, or maybe even 1965.

Senator Schweiker.. It wouldn't have been the Jack

Anderson 1967 story, would it?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 39

TOP SECRET

Senator Schweikerpy I don't remember. whether Harvey' a

name was. in that or not

ME. KaramessinessIt might have been, but it was a

story in which Harvey was specifically mentioned by name.

*Senator, Schweiker. So, prior to that time you had.

absolutely, no knowledge about the assassination attempt?

Mi. Karamessines. That is right. This is one of the

things I am very grateful about.

Senator Schweiker. ' In retrospect it was best not to have

known?

WARD & PAUL

810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Karamessines... I asked a fellow that used to work

for me named Sam Halpern. And he chuckled and he said, look,

you weren't around when it was all happening, you were

overseas. But I was there when Bissell came back from talking

with Bobby Kennedy. And he said it was a messy business.

And

he said, when you came back and you were made aDP everybody

agreed that we wouldn't tell you about these things, because,

he said, you are the kind of fellow that would have either

left or raised holy hell about it.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware, then, of the meetings

that were taking place in the fall of 1963 between CIA case

o-ficers and the high level Cuban whose code name was AMLAS",

whereby he was proposing the overthrow of Castro, and solicit-

ing US support for him?

Senator Schweiker. I would like to qualify that a littie

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 40

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

bit, In view of your other answer in terms of overthrowing

Castro as opposed to assassination, because apparently both

elements were involved.

Mr. Karamessines.

Yes, I understand:

Senator Schweiker: Would one have come to your attention?

Mr. Karamessines. One might have come to my attention

as a DE, Ye8. Dut AMLASH, what was he, a cuban? I don' a

remember.

Mr. Johnston. Let me mention his name off the record.

Senator Schweiker. Let's go off the record a moment.

"Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Johnston. Back on the record.

Mr. Karamessines. I had heard about him, but I wasn't

running him.

He was being run by the Cuban Task Force.

• Senator Schweiker. That would have been. Special Affairs

Section that you were talking about?

Mr. Karamessines.

Right.

MI. Johnston.

Here you aware that meetings were taking

place in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Karamessines. I would have assumed at the time that

we ere in touch with somebody like that, yes.

Senator Schweiker. In other words, they were going along;

regularly as a matter of policy?

Mr. Karamessines.

Yes. And I knew that we were trying

to put agents into Cuba, drop men by alr, put them in by boat,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 41

C.

410 First Street, S.E.., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

andiltry to recruit people, within the Cuban Governmentor And

this was for intelligence Infornation; and to see whether

there was any possible hope for restirring and reagitating and

getting another indigenous revoting

MI.: Johnston. Did you know that Mi. Fitzgerald had

flown to meet with AMLASH and to assure him that his proposed

overthrow of Castro which he, AMLASHi, included in the

assassination of Castro, had full US support, were you aware

that Fitzgerald had done that?

Mr. Karamessines.

Not at all.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that on November 22nd the

case officer offered AMIASH a poison pen or some kind of

poison device?

Mr. Karamessines. No. I have heard of that in connec

tion with publications in the papers subsequent to the ..:

inquiries of the Senate. But I did not know of anything like

that, I was not kept posted on anything like that.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a Cuban policy review

within CIA in early December 1963?

Mr. Karamessies.

We had Cuban policy reviews from time

to time in the Agency.

The one that I am most aware of is

the one in which I urged that we get the Forty Committee to

allow-us to wrap up this Cuban program, because the budget

couldn't take it, and we weren't accomplishing a thing but a

waste of time and effort. And. I ordered written and sanctioned

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 42

C..

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

27,

24

25

the papers that

tvere witten and presented the papers down at

the Forty Committee.

And, the best we could get out offit was

that we could get rid of some of the ships and reduce some

of the expenses, but. we were instructed to maintain a standby

capability anyway. And all of this must have taken place

about the middle of 1960s, 1963, 1966,/1t was before I became

DDP in 1967.

But I don't have any specific recollection.of a

policy review in December 1963.

Mr. Johnston. And you don't associate - you had no

knowledge of a Cuban policy review that you would associate

with the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Karamessines. No, no recollection -- I don't want

to say no knowledge, because you could produce something that

shows that I knew about such a thing. I just don't recall any

such.

MI. Johnston. You were:aware of the JM Wave Station that

existed?

MI. Karamessines. In Florida, absolutely. I visited it

once on a brief trip.

to Miami.

MI. Johnston. And did you know of Oswald's possible

connections with the Cuban groups, that he was a member of the

Fair Play for Cuba?

MI. Karamessines. No, I didn't know about that until

after the assassination had taken pisce and the newspapers

printed up a lot of stuff about Oswald and the Fair Play

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 43

C

410 First Street, S.E.. Washengion, D.C. 20003

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

139

Committee, and I saw some off the material that the, Bureau had

that we had on Oswald, I learned about it then, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever recall; any orders being

given to the Wave Station, in Florida, to use their sources. to

assist the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

MI. Karamessines.Afterithe assassination had taken

place?

Me. Johnston. : Yes.

Mr. Karamessines:

assist in the investigation of it?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.

Mr. Karamessines. It wouldn't surprise me that such

orders were given. But I don't recall it. It would have been

appropriate to have asked them some questions about it if they

could be responsive. There may have been questions about the

local Cuban community with which Oswald might have been in

touch, in view of this fair business.

Senator Schweiker. If they did in fact do that which

flow of command would that have come from probably?

Mr. Karamessines. That would come up on the Special

Affairs Staff:

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a relationship between

the CIA and US customs agents in Florida in 1963?

Mr. Karmessines.

I knew that the CIA had working

relationships with Immigration and Nationalization customs,

the FBI, and I don't know who all else, in Florida, in

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 44

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

connection with the Cuban refugee wituation I knew that.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of it going farther than

that with regard to customs, to the extent that the customs

agents were detailed to CIA operational use?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall it:

Senator Schweiker.. Or that they were using customs

cover fox the CIA agents?

MI. Karamessines. That would not surprise me. I didn't

know it at the time, but if somebody told me that. we were

using customs covers for some of our agents with customs

permission, that would not have surprised

me. But I don't

recall knowing it at the time. We were using various covers.

Senator Schweiker. I asked you about David Phillips.

Did he work under your operations in any form when you were --

Mr. Karamessines. When I was DDP David Phillips was

in charge of our Chile operation. And he was in charge of

the Child Task Force in the DDP.

Senator Schweiker.

Were there any other operations

besides Chile that he worked for under you?

Mr. Karamessines. Well, he served in Latin America in a

variety of poses, and he served in the Latin American Division

here in legdquarters, the Western Hemisphere Division. But we

never worked together closely.

Senator Schweiker. Were tbere any Cuban responsibilities

that he had that you are aware of?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 45

WARO & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

: 6

8

9

.10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr. Karame

ines.

don t-recall anyo

Mr. Johnaton.:

Did you discuss with Mr. Helns or anyone

else the decision to make the CI Staff the point of, contact

of the liaison with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Karamessines:

*I don't recall such a discussion. It

may have taken place, butal have no recollection of It. But

making the CI Staff a point of contact for the warren

Commission would have been a perfectly natural thing to do.

Mr. Johnston.. And you have talked about it previously.

But why was it?

MI. Karamessines. The reason that it would have been

the natural thing to do was because this matter, the

assassination of the President, concerned primarily the FBI,

the Secret Service and other agencies having a plain undisputed

unambiguous domestic security responsibility, and the Secret

Service of course, having the explicit responsibility for the

protection of the President. And we were organized in the

DDP so as to concentrate or focus our liaison activities with

the agencies I have just mentioned in the CI Staff. So that

seems a very natural place in which to vest this reponsibility.

Mr. Johnston. But that left a hole from the CIA stand-

point because of the SAS counterintelligence being separate

from the CI Staff?

Mr. Karamessines. Not necessarily. Because the CI

Staff, as a sendor staff, had responsibilities which transcended

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 46

Ai

2021

WARD a PAUL

410 Firsi Sireel, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

any of the divisions or the sAs

Senator Schweiker. But wouldn't SAS have been the' more

logical connecting ppint, because of the dealings with both

the pro and anti Castrol groups, in view of Oswald's

connection first with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee 2 and

second; with allegedly/some of the anti Castrol Cubang?:

Mr. Karamessines: Not really, because SAS's expertise

on any of this would have stopped dead after the first name

or two: It was the CI Staff

that had the counterintelligence

files which would support the extensive investigation which

was conducted. SAS could never have done it because it didn't

have the files with which to do it. It wasn't its responsi-

bility.

Senator Schweiker. But Jim Angleton comes in and tells

us just about the same story that you are telling us, which

was the compartmentation they had, and the Cuban activities

per se really weren't under his province, they were over at

SAS?

Mr. Karamessines. Cuban activities, that is correct.

In other words, the Cuban activities means the conduct of

operations again Cuba largely, that is what it means. And

these operations were being conducted out of SAS largely, to

a smaller extent the Wl Division, but largely SAS. Angleton

was right.

Senator Schweiker. But it almost looks as if whoever

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 47

TOP SECRET

Bet" up

that structure really didn't want to have any communica-

tion with Cuban activities and the Warren Commission:

Mr. Karamessines No; I think that is absolutely wrong,

and I don't agree with that. I think you are wrong to believe

that.

WARD & PAUL

410 First

Stroet, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Senator Schweiker. But they would have had the most

Intimate knowledge of the very thing here that we flash as a

-$.

top secret message: "Arrest of Sylvia Dura 1s extremely

serious matter which could prejudice freedom of action on

entire question of Cuban responsibility." Who would know that

but sAs, and why not plug SAs into it?

Mr. Karamessines. But that didn't come from the CI

Staff, it came from the Western Hemispher Division.

Senator Schweiker. I understand. But here is the top.

priority at that point in that particular connection. My

only point was that since it was top priority message that

the best way to give the Warren Commission the knowledge it

needed

to pursue in whatever way it might lead would have been

to have a pipeline to SAS. But from what we can find out no

such pipeline existed to the Warren Commission from SAS, in

fact if anything, there was a closed door between the SAS

and the Warren Commission. And Angleton keeps coming

up with

-- and I believe him - the same kind of answers you are

giving, well, I didn't know, and we didn't communicate, and

you will have to talk to them. So that the one logical and

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 48

Phone:

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NH

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

most urgent top priority, information was denied to the Warren

Commission.

Mr. Karamessines. The SAS, if that is what you are

focusing on, sAS's charter, if that is what you mean, I don't

know when they were put into business as SAS: For a long time

It was known as the Cuban Task Force W, that i8 it. And later

they were called SAS. I don't. know when they were created,

or when they became one or the other. But I do know this,

that their responsibility was the conduct of what you might

call offensive operations against Cuba, intelligence and action

operations against Cuba. And that was their charter.

The President was assassinated by a fellow who has some

contact with the Fair Play Committee in Miami, and he is in

touch with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico, and he is a former

Marine. I don't see how that would tie in with SAS at

all,

in the absence of some indication that there was a tieup. But

I don't see the connection at all. And therefore I don't see

why one would get concerned about SAS not having been paraded

up to appear before the Warren Commission.

And I will tell you this. My clear recollection is that

there wasn't anything that we could provide the Warren

commission as far as we were concerned that we didn't provide,

anything we were asked for, everything we could put in.

Senator Schweiker. Knowledge of the assassination

attempts against Castro?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 49

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E.,

Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

• 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

STOP SECRET

Mr. Karame

Ines.wraidn't knowlaboutsthat..And.I.am

not sure that that would have, changed matters any, really.

Senator Schweiker. Well, hypothetically it was certainly

one of the most logical motivation factors to have purgued as

an investigative unit.

Mr. Karamessines.

I suppose.. But

In any case, any

information the Warren Commission asked for, or any of the other

agencies asked for they got, and I think the record will show

that they got in spades. I took the Warren Commission down to

the Registry of our building and explained to the Chief Justice

and to several members of the Commission how it was that we

were able to report as promptly as we reported on Oswald being

in touch with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico whenever it was,

September or October.

And he couldn't understand how we could

have gotten that report out so quickly. And I showed him how

it is done automatically with the machines, and so forth.

Senator Schweiker. One of the Senators asked Director

IleIms when he was before the committee why he didn't provide

the Warren Commission with information about the assassination

attempts against Castro. And he said he wasn't asked. I don'ti

quite reconcile that with what you are just telling me, although

I know you can only speak for yourself, obviously. But it

just strikes me as peculiar that a key question like that was

a matter of being asked. So that is why I think there is a

gap with the SAS Section here. If they are the ones that are

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 50

TOP SECRET

counter:

ttacks agalist. Cuba they are dealing with both the

pro-Castro Cubans and the anti-Castrol Cubana., Here is a guy

that allegedly had some tie with the pro-Castro Cubans:: What

better source of information than SAS? In fact they are the

only

source.

And. Angleton said he had virtually no source,

and the FBI had very little." So the only people with a

knowledge was SAS and they never plugged into the warren

commission..

That is the problem that is a pecular thing.

Mr. Johnston. You were not aware of that problem at the

time?

C.:

810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Me. Karamessines. I still don't consider it as a

problem. But I was not aware of it at the time as a problem

or otherwise. Any information that SAS might have had was

not locked off somewhere in another building with no allowed

access or anything like this. It was there, Angleton, I, the

Director, anybody, you know, could check names - and names

were checked against their files continually. And this guy's

name, the information on Fair Play for Cuba and all that

business that we had, I will bet you money came from SAS's

files very likely. You see what I mean? This was accessible.

The only question you are raising is, why didn't somebody go to

the Warren Commission -- and that somebody should

have been

SAS -- and tell the Warren Commission, you know, we tried to

kill Castrol a couple of years ago or last year, or whatever

it was. Isn't that what you are asking? I can't answer that

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 51

WARC

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24.

25

TOP SECRET

Guestion.

senator Schvelkered Thother words, that is really, the

question. And the reasons you can't answer, it 1g that the

Warren Commission didn't know enought to ask the question.

You have Commissioner Dülles in there who instigated some of

these plots in 1959% and then Director Helms coming before

and not volunteering information:

Mr. Karamessines.. I can't answer that question. But

I can assure you that SAS was not being kept locked up in the

back room somewhere, their files were not being sequestered

from the Warren Commission or anything like that, if you think

you are making a point.

Senator Schweiker. I see your point..

Mr. Johnston. How do you! know their files weren't being

sequestered?

Mr. Karamessines. Well, I know whetnever we needed to

get a run on any Cuban name or whatever, it would have been

run through: their files, our Central Registrar, in Division,

a check -- in other words, there would be a three or four way

check. And I remember one of the complaints at the time from

several of the people was, well, you have got to check this trop

three or four different points to make sure you have covered

all the bases.

Mr. Johnston. Are you

aware that at least one of their

files had a notation on it, do not remove from that office?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 52

WARD &

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.

20003

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21-

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr of Ka

Ines:

#rots of files have notatlons like that.

Mr. Johnston Dated December 1963?

Mr. Karamessines. That doesn't mean anything to me.

I wasn't aware of that. "It doesnitamean anything to me

because there are lots of files that have a stamp on them which

says, please don't take out of this office, you pay consult

them. That 1s not significant to me at ail..

Senator Schweiker. That is a routine procedure, you say?

Mr. Karamessines. It is not a routine decision.: But

tome it doesn't have any special significance.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the 1967 IG report on

assassinations at the time it was being prepared?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

Mr. Johnston. Were you talked to by the Inspector

General?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not, to my recollection.

MI. Johnston. Were you informed about MI. Helms meeting

with the President on the report?

MI. Karamessines. No. I was not.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know that there was such a meeting?

MI. Karamessines. No, I did not. You are talking about

a meeting between Mr. Helms and the President in 1967 dealing

with assassinations?

Mr. Johnston. Yes.,

Mr. Karamessines.

The answer is no.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 53

TOP SECRET

co

7.56

WARD & PAUL

410 First

Street, S.E.., Washington, D.C. 20003

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Johnston were you aware andhagaln In 1967 you

were Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, In the spring of

1967 000-

Mr. Karamessines

I wag ADDp; right.

Mr., Fitzgerald

was the DDP.

Mr. Johnston. And in August of 1167

AS

Mr. Karamessines. I became the DDP::

Senator Schweiker. Who was the top

Assistant to

Fitzgerald, who would have been right under fitzgerald?

Mr. Karamessines. When he was DDP?

Senator Schweiker. No, when he was in charge of the

special action.

MI. Karamessines. The Cuban thing?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Mr. Karamessines. I can't remember. YOu can get it

easily enough, but I just can't remember.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware in March and April of

1967 that the Inspector General's Office was conducting an

investigation of assassinations?

Mr. Karamessines. No; I was not.

Mr. Johnston. And that they were talking to Mr.

Fitzgerald, who was your boss?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of any information the

FBI was receiving in 1967 regarding CIA assassination plots?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 54

410 First Strael, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mr • Karame

No, was not:

MI. Johnston. You were out of that strema of communica-

tions altogether?

Mr. Karamessines. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. When you did; become DDP did you then see

the IG report?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I have not:

Senator Schweiker. They really compartmentalized that

operation.

Mr. Johnston. Let me just once again recap: Were you

knowledgeable of the course of the CIA investigation of the

Kennedy assassination? You have indicated throughout your

testimony today that 'you were kept abreast of those.

Mr. Karamessines.

I was kept abreast of the activities

that were taking place to support the investigation being

conducted by the FBI and the Secret Servic, of the Kennedy

Assassination.

We were not conducting a separate, special

investigation of the Kennedy assassination.

But we were trying

to get as much information as possible from our overseas posts

that might throw any light whatever on who Oswald was and why

he killed the President, and who put him up to it if somebody

put it up to it. And I was fully familiar with the fact that

we were knocking ourselves out trying to get to the bottom of

those questions.

Senator Schweiker. In your recollection again, who

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 55

7.6

WARD & PAUL

110 Fiest Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

2

3

5

6

headed that up. with whon? yIn other words, who headed it/up

within CIA?

MI. Karamessines. The Counterintelligence Staff, I

belleve. Everything was -- I don't want to use the word

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23,

24

25

Senator Schweiker. You are saying that SAS would have

plugged into them to the extent --

Mr. Karamessines.. If they had anything at all to

contribute, number one. And number two, the CI Staff was

the senior staff and could have at any time have gone to SAS

and said, we want this and that

and that, check your files and

give us this or that. They were the senior staff.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware in 1963 --

Mr. Karamessines, Let me say one other thing. Mr.

Angleton very properly would say, SAS had its own thing, and

I didn't have much dealing with SAS. He didn't.

He is sitting

up here somewhere. But Mr. Angleton doesn't always know what

the eight or one guys under him or doing, SAS and all these

others. But then thing float up to him. And he gets a report

let's say, on Oswald, or somebody. It doesn't say, we have

got this from SAS's files. He just sees a report, it came from

the files.

So I can't fault Angleton for feeling as he does.

Senator Schweiker. I am not faulting him.

Mr. Karamessines. But. I do think that it is wrong to

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 56

TOP SECRET

270

N8:

WARD & PAUL

14/6

3

4

6

8

9

: 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

suggest

that somehow SAS was something that we completely

sequestered in connection with this whole Kennedy assassination

business.

Because it is not true.

Mr. Johnston. When we get to any questions warhave

asked you today about SAS a role you have Indicated that you

dori't know what they did You do know what the CI Staff did.

And you do know what the western Hemisphere Division did. But

you have testified that you don't know what sas did.

Mr. Karamessines.. I did not say that I didr.'t know what

they did. What I did say was that I was certain that SAS

would have contributed from their files, or from agent contact

in Miami, to the effort that was being made. And this would be

true of any other of the operating divisions. We might have

had a reflection of some activity in Timbuktu, or in some

South American or African division.

Mr. Johnston. You have previously testifed that you

did not know about the meeting between Me. Fitzgerald and

AMLASH.

Mr. Karamessines. I did not.

Mr. Johnston. And you said you did not know that on :

November 22nd a CIA case officer met again with AMLASH and

showed him a poison weapon to use?

MI. Karamessines. I did

not, no knowledge whatsoever.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether there was any

investigation made connected with any relationship between

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 57

17

630

¡Ares 203)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

the:AMLASH operation and. tho assassination of President Kennedy?

Mri: Karamessines.

No, I do not.

Mr. Johnston.:: Do you know of any, talk as to whether

AMLASH may have been a provocation agent?

Mr. Karamessines. No, Iido, not•:

I have notrecollection

of anything likerthat.

Mr. Johnston..

would it be a relevant inquiry?

ME. Karamesaines: Well, I don't know. I didn't know

all that much about AMLASil.. I would have to know a lot more

about AMLASH and the details of that operation to be able

to respond to that question.

Senator Schweiker. Going back to the structure of

understanding your functional definition of flow of lines of

authority, JMWAVE, would that have been under you, or sAs,

or how would JMWAVE have tied. into this functional breakdown?

MI. Karamessines. JMWAVE was the Miami extension.of

activity against Cuba headguartered in our Headguarters, which

took place - in the Cuban

invasion, you know, they had a

station down there, I don't know whether they called It INVAVE

at that time or gave it some other name. But there was a

group down in Miami, in that area, two of three groups,

probably, when they

mounted the Cuban invasion In the Bay of

Pigs in 1961: And there continued to be an installation, one

or more installations like that, in that area down there. And

at one point it was called INWAVE, and at another point it may

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 58

Tr.

Prona

610 First

Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOR SECRET

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

1.2

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

"have been called something elses

«But chlo feas the forward base,

the forward operational base offa headquarters group in

Washington which at one point was called Task Force Wi and

at another point was called Special Affairs Staff.

Senator Schweiker. So this was really an extension of

that you are saying?

Mr. Karamessines.: That is right:

Senator Schweiker.:

Ixer: 1h 1963 Aime frame, October

* would

that have been exactly the picture pretty well then? Was

that the Special Affairs Staff, was that in' operation?."

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. So that would have been true.

So the

overwhelming bulk would have come through SAS except for

coordination and some things that might have been

done Jointly

with a concurrent knowledge kind of thing?

Mr. Karamessines. You moan from IMWAVE you are talking

about?

Senator Schwelker. Right.

The man in the picture at Mexico City, can you shed any

light on who that man in the picture was?

MI. Karamessines. That was really a problem at the time.

I don't think we ever determined, did we?

Senator Schweiker. Nobody seems to know.

Mr. Karamessines. And then there was a lot of fuss

about a picture being provided by the Bureau - that was a big

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 59

17,1

308

7-6

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

55

goof-up I don t recallsthe detalls off that one » but rido

remember an awful lot of back and forth.

Senator Schweiker.,, That is where it was photographed.

There is no problem on that.

Mr. Karamessines: That 1s; right

Senator Schweiker.MIt/just struck.me/as unusual, that we

couldn't have ascertained who this guy was.

MI. Karamessines, It isn't all that unusual, really.

Senator, Schweiker. But you have a listening device

inside you certainly could have figured out..

Ms. Karamessines. I know, but that didn't hear everything

that went on everywhere.

Senator Schweiker. But you could have pretty well

figured somehow what there was that day just in business

transactions?

Mr. Karamessines. Not necessarily... Let's say it was

a local agency of some kind, and he had instructions, and his

instructions were, you go in and the receptionist will

recognize you, you just walk right by her or him and walk down

the hall and go in Room 407. We don't happen to have a

listening device in 407, and he comes and goes and all we do

Is get a picture of him. We don't know who he is. Sometimes

we can find out who he is by working with the locals. They

will help us. Other times if he makes repeated visits, then

you have got a chance to surveil him as he leaves and see where!

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 60

7.819

410 First Street, S.E.., Washington, D.C. 20003

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

he goes anuit ind out no he too in thia case we never aid

determine who that person wass

Mr. Johnston..

A couple of final questions.

And forgive

me if I repeat, I am not sure whether wa havelgot these on

the record or off. Where there any written orders to conduct

any kind of investigations into the Kennedy as

ation, that

you are aware of?

Mr. Karamessines.

If I say I don't recall any, I do

not wish my answer to suggest that there weren't any. It

simply means that I do not recall any. It is likely. that there

were, but I don't remember them.

MI. Johnston. Any time did you receive an order from

Mr. Helms or anyone

else above you not to investigate a certain

area or a certain question?

MI. Karamessines. Never.

Mr. Johnston. That is all.

Senator Schweiker. That is all I have.

Mr. Johnston. He has never taken an oath:

Senator Schweiker. We will do the first thing last.

We appreciate

your cooperation. And just for formálity's

sake we would like to swear you in.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given

is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so

help you God?

Mr. Karamessines. I do.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 61

0917

WARD A PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

2

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

225

TOP SECRET

Mr Madigan

I-havera few questions I wonder 1fiwercould

put on the record, 1? Mr. Karamessines does not objece to your

leaving.

Senator Schweiker. I think I will run along.

would you mind a few more minutes?y

Mr. Karamessines Nomit is allsright.

Mr. Madigan:

It is kind of an adjunct to this AMLASH

thing.

Mr. Karamessines:

Okay.

Mr. Madigan. I want to ask you a few questions, Mr.

Karamessines, about a couple of areas that are involved

tangentially with the AMIASH situation, in that they take

place in the same time perlod, the first of which is with

regard to Howard Hunt. And as you may know, the Agency had

been trying to determine for sometime what Hunt's assignment

was In Spain in 1965, And that is the first area that I want

to ask you about. And my first question would be, do you

yourself know what Hunt was doing when he was assigned to

Spain?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

MI. Madigan. As background I might recall for you that

he was as you know a staff employee up until June of 1965,

when he was assigned on a contract basis over to Spain, until

November of 1966, a 14 month period. And you were Assistant

DDP, I think at the time.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 62

3

4

5

6

8

7.60

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

58

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Karamessines.

Mr Fitzgerald had wanted us. to have

36678

an operational capablilty in Spain, divorced from, totally

divorced from, the official statión in the Embassy. He

anticipated quite properly that one of these days Spain would

kind of begin coming apart at the seams with the death of

Franco, and that it would be necessary. to have someone who knew

794 230008

the language and who could get along with people, and who could

reasonably pass himself off as a retired former Service officer,

79100-2

and one who could write,.

for example, as Hunt could write and

did write.. And

Hunt fitted the biil. And It colncided with

a period in time when Hunt's services weren't being, let's say,

eagerly sought in other parts of the Directorate. And this

seemed good solution. And he was sent to Spain for just that

purpose.

Mr. Madigan.

And what was the purpose, to do what?

MI. Karamessines. The purpose was to establish himself,

to fit into the community, and hold himself available for

operational tasks as they might be given him to do at some

point in time.

Mr. Madigan. Who did he report to?

Mr. Karamessines. He would report back to the offices

of DDP.

Mr. Madigan. Did he report to someone in particular?

MI. Karamessines. Yes, he reported to the DDP and to me.

Mr. Madigan. The DDP, then, would be Mr. Helms?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 63

TOP SECRET

2

3

6

Вкачано

C".

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2,5

Mr. Karamessines.,

No, Me Flezgerald.

Mr. Madigan®

Me. Helms was then

Mr. Karamessines. In 1965 to 1969. Mr. Helms was Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Madigan. Now;

Paid Hunt during that period have

any

association with ARTIMe to your knowledge?

Mr. Karamegsines.

puring that period of time? I don't

know. I just don't recall. I know others of our people aid.

But whether he did or not I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Were you aware that they were close frlends

at the time?

Mr. Karamessines. I didn't know the Cubang all that"

well. I do know that Hunt was very active in the invasion

of the Bay of Pigs thing in 1961. And I gather ARTIME was

active in that also. So he would have known ARTIMF very well,

and he would have known a group of several others very well.

Mr. Madigan. What is your information or knowledge about

Hunt's being in effec: blocked for a position over there at

that time by Woodward, who was then the Ambassador, because of

prior problems in Montevideo?! Does

that ring a bell with you,

of had you not heard of that?

MI. Karamessines. I recall something like that, but I

don't remember the circumstances and details of it. I can't

throw any light on it.

Mr. Madigan. Did he file any written reports with your

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 64

C

3

5

6

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

60

office?

Mr. Kara

Ines:

Hunt?

Mr. Madigan.n

Yes.

Mr. Karamessines

Yes, he did:

He sent ina paper to

me from time to times

Me. Madigan. What do you know about his writing spy

novels while he was over there?

MI. Karamessines:

He wrote' a couple of them, which were

checked by us at Headquarters before they were sent to the

publishers.

Mr. Madigan. Was that part of the reason he was

sent

over there?

Mx. Karamessines. Yes, that was part of the reason he

was over there. As I indicated earlier, he had a job of

setting up out in the boondocks - he would act as a retired

Government Service fellow. who was supplementing his income by

conducting an active: business which we could prove to the

Spanish authorities if called upon to do so with a publishing

firm, that he was writing novels, books. And he did. indeed

do that. And he wrote several books. I don't know how many

he wrote while he was in Spain. He may have written one or

two.

Mr. Madigan. I think three.

Is that a normal practice with regard to: the Agency?

Mr. Karamessines. No, it is not, because we don't have

TOP SECRET

WARD A PAUL

---

## Page 65

2

3

. 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOR SECRET

61

that many publishablo novelists onboardo But leila a good

cover: and you can usent, I mean you can use it palpably

and plausibly:

Mr. Madigan.:

The documents at the CIA indicate that

normally the cover relationship such as that would Involve

the man receiving. certain salarye and Just as 4f you had

84 220P

a cover entity, the profits or whatever from his enterprise

::%.

would go back to the Agency, whereas in this case Hunt received

all the royalties himself. Is there some particular reason

for that?

MI. Karamessines. No, I don't recall what the arrange-

ments were. But I think the understandingwas that if there

were any royalties of any significance we would talk about

how they should be split up.

Mr. Madigan.

The documents also indicate that he had

done some writing for Allen Dulles, and

that this was sort

of a promise that had been made that he would be allowed to

go abroad and write books.

Mr. Karamessines. I am not familiar with that.

Mr. Madigan. You never heard of that?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I am not familiar with that.

MI. Madigan. Was his assignment over there in the

general course - did everyone of the key people know about it.

or was it some special assignment that only yourself and a

few people knew?

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

---

## Page 66

TOP SECRET

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr Karamessines. We kept it as quiet as we could keep

it; for obvious reasons

Mr. Madigan. Did he do any work with the Franco people?

Mr: Karamessines. No.. We tried to keep him away. from

the Franco people:

Xou are talking about officials of the intelligence

service of Spain, is that what you mean?.

112.

Mr. Madigan. What about the opposition, the underground?

Mr. Karamessines. No, he was not instructed to go out

and seek contacts, he was instructed to hole himself ready

to serve as a servicing depot, a safe house, an intermediary,

If we wanted him to be an intermediary, or if a station

spotted certain situationg in which it could not act but had

to have somebody outside who could act, so that it wouldn't

rub off on the station, he would be available. for that kind

of task.

Mr. Madigan. The Chief of Station over there at the

time indicates that Hunt never did any operational assignements

for him.

Mr. Karamessines. That is correct.

- Mr. Madigan. So these theoretical items that you listed,

such as providing safe house, and so on, he never did any of

those?

Mr. Karanessines. No sir. The occasion didn't arise

where he was called upon to do it. But he was put in place

TOP SECRET

WARD A PAUL

---

## Page 67

3

4

5

6.

77

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

". •16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

so that he would bo avallable to do them if the situation arose.

And Mr. Fitzgerald felt very strongly that the Spanish

situation was going to develop faster actually than it developed

in the event.

Mr.. Madigan.:

There are quitela few Agency documents

that contain the opinion that, as you may know, the Agency

looked into this matter and found that there was no operational

purpose for him being over there, and that he was

simply over

there to write spy novels to increase the image of the Agency.

it. Karamessines.

Well, that would come from individuals

who hadn't directly heard from Fitzgerald. I did. At the

time of Fitzgerald's encumbacy he had studies made, and they

were available at the Agency, and this was very far sighted

of him. Several of us felt that we ought to do this and

studied matters on the suggestion of situations and what we

would be confronted with as a Government and as an intelligence

service in Spain, Portugal, Ethiopia, Liberia, about eight or

10 or 12, areas. And

Spain was practically at the top of the

list. lle felt pretty strongly about it, and he felt this

would be one move where we would begin positioning ourselves

for the eventuality.

Mr. Madigan. What was the reason, then, that he was moved

out of there after a year?

Mr.- Karamessines. I think he wanted to come home, he

got tired of it and wanted to come home, if I recall :

TOP SECRET

WARD A

---

## Page 68

contane

C

178

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

… 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

correctly I don tremember, now

Mr. Madigan. Let me ask you some questions on another

matter. And that is about a fellow by the name of Jack:

Valenti. And you may have covered some of: these in your

questioning. Did you have any knowledge while you were at the

Agency of any dealings that the Agency had with Jack Valenti?

MI. Karamessines.

None whatever. You mean Jack Valenti

in the White House?

Mr. Madigan.

In the Motion Pictures?

Mr. Karamessines. None whatever.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know of any involvement between

the Agency and Valenti concerning the assassination of

President Kennedy?

MI. Karamessines.

None whatever, no information, no

knowledge -

. Mr. Madigan. No meetings?

Mr. Kazamessines.

No. What are they? I am curious.

Mr. Madigan. These are just a bunch of random questions

I have. I am trying to complete our record here.

In 1971 and 1972 periods do you have any dealings with

Cuban exile activities in Costa Rica in the DDP?

Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall any. But we may have

had. You don't mean personally, do you, you mean the DDP?

Me. Madigan. Do you have any knowledge of any generally?

Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall any myself.

TOP SECRET

WARD A PAUL

---

## Page 69

04:0

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

- 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

Mro, Madigan®

Do you ever, recall, being advised of or

learning of an effort in Florida' to recruit peopleifor costa

Rican exercises under the guise of the Agency, some people down

there who were claiming to be representatives.of the CIA when

7.02;

In fact they weren't, having to do with the Cuban exile

i movement in Costa Rica?

Y022

M1222 2217

Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall.

Jumping back to the '65-'66 Spain period,

Mr. Madigan.

did you have any involvement yourself, or to your knowledge

13d2kt

did anyone in the DDP have any involvement with this fello

that I mentioned earlier, Manuel Artime?

Mr. Karamessines. I never knew the man, never met him,

so I didn't have any involvement with him. And I can't tell

you now who in the DDP actually worked with him or handled

him or saw him or dealt with him. You mentioned earlier that

Hunt did, and I am quite sure that he did. I wouldn't be

surprised if Fitzgerald didn't know

him pretty well, because

Fitzgerald had been

intimate with Cuban activities.

And there would be a number of other DDP officers dating back

from the time of the Bay of Pigs situation and before who

would have been ware of Artime or might have worked with him

or handled him. But I never

did.

MI. Madigan. Did you ever know -

Mr. Karamessines. I wasn't in the States during that

period, remember that, I was overseas.

TOP SECRET

WARD A PAUL

---

## Page 70

дода 1 24

2

3

4

5

6

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

166

Mr. Madigan Y

165rand 667

Mr. Raramessines. No, I am talking now about the: Bay

of pigs period, when Artime and all the rest of these guys

came out of the woodwork, and that is how they came on the

blitzkrieg. I wasn't one of the fellows available to be in

touch with Artime.

Mr. Madigan. But you were in the DDP in the '65-66 a0.:

period?

Mr. Karamessines.

Yes, I was in legdquarters then, yes.

MI. Madigan. Have you any knowledge whatsoever about

an effort to try to

promote the Agency's image by having some

of these novels Hunt wrote made into motion pictures and

television shows?

Mr. Karamessines. There was a lot of thought going to

trying to push some of these CIA novels of Hunt's. But

nothing ever came of it as far as I know. I belleve Mr.

Helms of somebody up the line decided against it.

Mr. Madigan. And you didn't have

any personal dealings

with him?

MI. Karamessines. No sir, I did not.

You mean did I deal with the motion picture people?

MI. Madigan. Or the IV people?

MI. Karamessines. No sir, I did not.

Mr. Madigan. What time frame do you place it in your

recollection hearing about this?

TOP SECRET

WARD a FAUL

---

## Page 71

TOP SECRET

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Meo Karam

nes

I guess It would have been 165-66,

'In there somewhere

Mr.. Madigan. How about '72; that late?

ME. Karamessines.

I don't recall anything in 172 on

that, no sir. If something happened, don't remember it.

I certainly never went around and tried to get anything like

96 22 2y

that put into moving pictures.

There would be speculation

once in awhile that the Director of something would say, the

Bureau

does it, the Defense Department does it, and maybe we

ought to crank up a program or something like that. And llunt

used to think that this would be a good idea. And whether

he was in touch with some people or not I just don't remember

now. He may well have been,

Mr. Madigan. How do you know that Hunt thought it was

a good idea? Did he talk to you about it?

Mr. Karamessines. Sure, absolutely.

Mr. Madigan. That is all.

Mr. Johnston. That is all. thank you.

(hereupon, the interview was concluded at 4:25 p.m.)

TOP SECRET

WARD A PAUL

---