Originator: SSCIA
From: TWEEDY, BRONSON
Document date: 10/09/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

157-10014-10068

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date :

08/06/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10014-10068

RECORDS SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 09-H-09

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TWEEDY, BRONSON

TITLE :

DATE

' : 10/09/75

PAGES

•45

SUBJECTS

.: CONGO

ASSASSINATION,

LUMUMBA

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 09/25/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955

DoeId: 32423456

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Whe Initro Statre Bruate

Breatho

to Criminel San

IATION

m, Subject

R1567

Report of Prooeedinge

TAVIATIN

017 m

1722

Hearing held before

Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thuraday, October 9, 1975

Washingeun, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Haste turned over

co the committee for destreet ..i

WARD & PAUL.

110 FIRST STREET. S. E

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 644-0000

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AsN (N03 708) S68100€

TAU1

dipeno.1is00r 9l. Masrrnaton, De 10000

HH,

TOR SECRE

1

2

3

OMENS

TESTIMONY OF

Bronson Tweedy

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2:23.

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TASCIONE unt

AMonE (ArDs 2021 347

1

1

2

COMMITTEE MEETING

.. .

Thursday, Octobar 9, 1975

- -=

5

United States Senate,

6

Salect Committee to Study Governmental

Operations Hith Respect to

8

rovernmental Activities,

9

Washington, D. C.

10

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 o'clock

11 i p.n. in Room 407, The Capitos, the Honorahle Frank Church,

Chairman of the Committed, presidina.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mondale, Huddleston.

14

¡laIt of Colorado, Baker, Goldater, Mathias and Schweiker.

15

Also present: Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Chiat Counsel:

Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel: Charles Kirbow, Frederick

I Baron and Rhutt Dawsor, Professional Staff Members.

--

2o001

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The Charman. Would you pleass take the oath?

Do you solannly swear that all the testimony that you will

give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth.

and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy, I do.

7

1

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mans (8162 202) 564

!.

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TO

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TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

2

The Chairman.. Would you please state your name?

Mr. Tweedy, Bronson Tweedy.

The Chairman. Mr. Baron, ara you going to commence the

questioning?

6

Mr. Baron. Mi. Tready, are you aware that you have the

7

right to counsal?

8

MI. Tweedy. I am.

9

Mr. Baron. You are appearing voluntarily today without

10

counsel?

Mr. Twoody, I am.

MI. Baron.

Are you also aware that vou have the right

1nj at any point to cease answerina quèstions in order to consult

with counsel?

1:.

Mr. Twoady.

I am.

16

Mo. Baron. Are you finally aware that all of your consti-

tutional rights are intact bafore the committes, Includina vour

Fifth Amendment rights?

MI. Tweedv. I am.

Mr. Haron. Mr. Twesdy, the committee has been informed that

i: We have yone over your tastimony on the Lumumba case

in sont

i idetail in two sassions, one today when you reviewed

301d 11004•

?!.ments that we obtalned since your firgt axamination. And 1

;, would like to baals by reading a quotation from your first.

:! ¡axamination hefore you hail seen thesa documents.

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mona lArde 2021 3A6

NH

1124h

TODIS CHET

At page 30 of the: transeript of your examination on

2

Septamber 9th, I would like to ank you whether today's ravlew of

documenta has changed your ansvar to this question. At that

time I asked you: "Do you have any knowledge of a messenger

5

from CIA Headquartors having lo yo to the Congo to provide the

6

Chial of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out

7

the assasaination of Lumumba if posalble, 'and also provide him

8

9

with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely

polsons and medical equipment for administering them?"

10

You said, "No, I do not."

11

Later on in your testimony of that sama session when you

"I wares asked your opinion as to the truth of testimony we had

13.

15

16

recalved from Di. sottllab - excuse me, from the Chief of

Station, who was in Leopoldvilla at that time, about a visit

that he racelved from Dr. Gottliab, where the Chief of Station

tastified that he raceived poison and instructions tromiDr.

Cottlieb, when asked your opinion about the truth about the

tastimony of the Chief of Station, you responded that "There

' is nothing in my experience with the Agency that would reall

"' Dear ou that point whatsoever." And that was at paro 39 in:

:: your trauscript:

Have your answers to those two questions changed in light

:: of your

review of the documents today?

i. i

Mr. Tweedy. I have

not hail a chance to read the transer!:"

p: of my first testimory. As you know, I started reading it this

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morning but did not gat a chance to get through it. There seeng

to be something incomplate with that answar of mine, however.

there is no question in reading the documents that I road this

morning, which I had not seen in the batter part of fifteen

years, that a man did go out from Headquartars and was provide

with material which you mentioned and had a discussion along

these lines with the Chlot of station.

lie did not, howevar, go out with instructione to the Chief

of Station without furthar rafarance to Headquartara to set

about assassinating Lumumba.

Mr. Baron. In your answors that we have just reviewed in

your first examination, you indicated that you had no knowlerus

of a mission by Dr. Gottliab to the Congo and that there was

nothins in your experience in the Agency that would really bear

on the question whather such a mission was undertaken or what

the character of it was.

Has the review of the documents torlay refreshed your

recollection to some substantial degree?

1r. Tweedy, What I was certinly trying to say the firat

2:.

time, and I repeat it, I said I had no recollection of rur!

:: rottlien goinn to the condo, but 1f the chiat of station sai.!

in " he was thore, I was perfectly prepared to believe the chief o!

Station:.

I have now reviewed thase documants, I recall the circum-

24

I stances in which thass things occurred, and there's no question:

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MonTo (Art 702) 96A-600

Hir

Name.

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that Dr. Gottliab went to the Congo.

2

I was marely tolling you, at that time, what I could

ramembar, and there was an awful lot that l Ald not. an do not.

Mr. Baron. To move to the parlod when you ware Chlet of

tho Africa Division and Richard Bissell was DDP in the summer

6

of 1960, did you have conversations with Richard Biasell where

7

the subject of the assassination of lumumba aroso?

8

MI. Twoody, Yas, I did, In lace, the first conversation,

9

as I racall it, that I ever had on the subject was one he

1.:

initiated with me, and, as I think i told you, i do not recall

-.-

oxactly what was said, but there was no question about lt but.

what Mr, Bissall was saying to me was that there was agreement.

:: ¡ policy agrooment in Washinaton, that Lumumba must be remover

from the position of control and influance in the congo or that

:: l the Corgo was going to be in serious trouble and thus Africa,

at that stage of its development; and that among the possibil

i:: ities of that elimination was indeed assassination.

In tarms of the dotail of that conversation with Mr. Hissell.

:: I really cannot go ary further chan that.

This cartainly was

: the slat of 1t..

:.:

Mr. Baros. Was Mr. Binsell any mora specific at any poi:t

i With you about the policy level whore the consideration to

.. assagsinate Lumunha had been

marle?

:.;

st. Tweedy. No, sir. The most

authoritative statement

U::

::that was a cable that want out to the field fron the Director.

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Ms. Dallas, which implind to me there was pollay agreement in

Washington. When I say polley agreement in Washington, I cannot

ba more specific because I navar knew any more specificity. '

however, 'it was perfectly clear that the Agancy felt that it

had some aort of policy consensus in Hashington about the need

for the removal of Lumumba. When I aay removal, I mean by

whataver means; this does not necessailly have to be confined

to assassination, a political way of doing it, or anythin

alas.

10

Mr. Baron. It did not exclude

assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. No, indeed it did not.

11

;:.

MI, Baron. You are referring to the cable of luaust lath

from Allan Dullas to the Chief of Station in tho Condo. llar

you seen that cable shortly after it was sent?

=-==

Mr. Tweedy.

I suspect, again I cannot be sure, I guspect

that I saw it when it went out. At this point, I could not

16

•=.

avan tell you. On instructions, I might even have drafter it,

1:

this seems odd. I might have done, or had a hand in draftina

1:

it, I do not know.

It was basically Mi. Dulles' cable expres-

1.

sing to the station the type of authority that ha had to pass

:: such a message to the field. I cartainly would have sear it

i:. On its way out.

Mr. Baror. When you spoke to Mr. hissell, either in tha

:: first talk or in any

subsequent talks

The Chairman. Where is this cable?

?: .

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Mr. Baron. Tab 2 in the Senator's packat.

2

The Chairman. Thank you.

*.;

Mr. Baron. In your talke with Mr. Dissell, where the

subjact of the assassination of Lumumba was raisod in any

5

fashion. did Mr. Biasell move

from this general laformition

6

to you that the subject had been opened at very high lavels

to asking you to procoad to axplore means to getting access to

6

Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

Mr, Tweedy. The purpose of his conversation with me was

to Initlate correspondence with the station for them to explore

:: with Headquarters the possibility

of this, that la assassina

tion, or irdead

any other means of ramoving Lumumba trom power.

:: In other words, the purpose of thei

exercise was to tall the

:: Station what Headquarters had in mind, aiving it some idea o!

::' the policy hackground

of it, and than to have the station

start roviowing possibilitias, assets, and discussing them with

i: Headquarters ir detail in the same way that we would with any

:overation, whether it was as sensitive as this, or loss so.

It was, in other words, the initiation of quite normal

: operational dialoque between loadquarters and the field, apar:

from the fact that it was

an unusual subiact.

Mr. Baron. At some noint after the serias of conversations

:. With Richard Bissell, did you have a conversation with slanes

:; Gottlieb about a mission that he was to undertake in the

:: Congo?

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Mr. Tweedy. "I was certainly reminded of that in this

correspondence, as I think I told you in the first instance.

If Gottlieb, went to the congo, there la no question that I would

havo sson him befora ha want. This traffic makos it perfectly

clear that I did. The actual content of that conversation is

no more clear to me now as is revealed in this cablo craffie:

On the other hand, I do think that is the qiat of de.

Mr. Baron. You are rafarring to the cable that appears in

Tab 1, a cable of September l9th that you signed and Richard

Bissell signed and dispatched to the Chief of station in

Leopolduillo telling him that'sid

from Parig, a man who would

announce himsoll as sid from paris, would be comina soon to

=.."

Leopoldville to explain an assiqnment to the Chief of station.

Mr. Tweedy, That is correct.

the Chairmar..t

1d, from paris baing De. sottliab?:

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir.

MI. Baron. , As we discussed earlier today, you do have

a recolloction of setting up a specially restricted channel of

conmunication by this cable which would hold all communications

i

on this operation; to the ays only of the chief of station.

i. is that correct.?

2: Mr. Tweedly,

Yas. This was done inneilataly after my

:: first discussion with Mr. Bisgell.

w: Me. Baron, Do you ramember any anstance whare 4r. Riass!!

asked you to speaklto Dr. dottliah all dive him this assiannent?

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Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. My assumption would be that

he would have had the firat conversation with DI. Gottllab and

quita routinaly have sald, now you talk to MI. Twoody, Chief of

the Diviaion, before you go out.

MI. Baron, Would you assume in this normal course of

oparatione in the DDP at that point you would have spoken to

i:

B188«11 bofore you spoke to Gottliab) about this mission?

Mr. Moody, Inevisably, I chink, i think core laplund in

alfact sent by MI. Bissell, Ho was not ment by me. Ir, Gottriad.)

I think pr. Gottlied was, at that time, an abelatant to mr.

Bissell. He was not my assistant. I would not have sant him.

101

Mr. Baron. As best you can recall, what instructions 11d

I': you give to De rottliah when you met with him?

Mr. Tweedy. This is very general, but I think it covers

injit: to assist the Chief of Station In his operational plannino.

¡ for this particular purpose.

MI. Baron. Would that plannina have included plannina for

... the assassination of Lumumba?

MI. Tweady, Specifically, I do not think Dr rottria!!

would have beon there to discuss Constitutional means of over-

i..

throw of Lumumba. He was there for one purpose only, He las

%.i:

a tochnician. Ha had this material with him. He was thus

to act, as I think, a tochnical advisor on there matters to

the Chlof of Station, I do

not think he was to be there

as d

i: Jonsral operational alvisor. That was not within his competence.

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his training, or anything else. It would not have been his

assignment.

Mr. Baron. What did you tall! Dr. Sottlied about the source

of

authority for this mission?

MI. Tweedy, I am not sure I told him anything. I assumer!

that came through Mr. Rissall.

ME. Baron. I will represent to you, as I did earlier corday,

that De. Cottliab testifled that in his conversation with you

you indicated to him that you were giving him this miesion on

the authority of Richard Bissell.

would that his consistant with the way you operated at that

:: times?

1:1

MI. Twoody, Yes. The only thing that ls wrong there is

the use of the verb

-= I was not sending him to the congo, He

21 l routinaly checked, probably on Mr. Biesell's dustructlona, with

i:' me, Chiaf of the Mirica Division. Ho had already bean given

1: his marching ordors to go to the conno by Mr. Rissell, not by

"r:

:.

Mr. Baron. You would assume that or. lottlich had a

: separate conversatio: with Richard Bissell, where Richard Biss.?!

:: told him, it is time

for you to go to the congo and deliver a

lethal material and a certain set of instructlons to the Chiet

of station.

2: Mr. Twadily. I cannot assuma what was said in such a

conversation, but that De. lottllon talked to Mr. Bissell belor:

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he want to the Congo la without quastion. I do not know what

was said. I assume the general outllnes of the purposes of

him going to the congo ware discusgad, and I would be discussing

them with him in greater detail.

5

Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 6 of the Senator's books, I'm

referring to s cable we revleved this morning lasuad on

Septembar 27th by the Chiat of Station and sent to jai, Eyes.

Only, at the CIA leadquarters where the Chiaf of Stating indi-

catas that ho contaoted rottliab on the 26th of Septenber and

they were on the sany wavelength.

::

Mr. Tweedy, Which one is this?

Mr. Bar0n. This should be marked number 6.

!:"

Mr. Tweady, Oh, yes, axcuse me.

MI: Baron, It bogins, "Iden Rof contacted 26 septamber."

In this cable, the Chief of Station indicates that he had hal

two talks withibr. Gottllab, lie and Dr. Gottlleb had been

:: considering a list of possibilities as follows.

In paragraph 3 at the bottom of the next page, the Chie!

:: of Station says, "Plan procaed on bagis priority as listed

:above unless instrurted to contrary."

i..

And paragraph A on thy first page was chief of scation'

:: top priority plan which related to rycallina a cartain agent

' fron Stanlayville and havinn him take refuge with nia Prother.

::The coble continues, "would thus act as irside man to brush 1i

:: details to

razor edne."

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2

Having reviewed this cable early thla morning, is it your

understanding, Mr. Tweady, that Big Brother refers to Lumumba?

MI. Tweedy, Yes, I do.

5

Mr. Baron. That this was a report from the Chief of

station to yoursalf informing you that the top priority plan would

6

be to recall an agent from Stanleyville and ask that agent to

infiltrate the entourage of Lumumba where he could assess the

8

possibility for poisoning Lumumba, would that be your under-

standing?

10

Mr. Tweedy. Fventually, when a nunher of other stena harl

1: " taxon place before and they would, for example, have included

1:: a discussion between the Chiaf of Station and this anont which

1: i would have made clear to the arent what this was all about.

14

At this stage, he had no idea of it, and our saries of

I:1 exploratory cables between Leopoldvilla ard leadquarters

outlining the degrue -[schotroft gis his ran --Fahotoss

1: access to the entourage, what he-found out and whether any of

1: this basically bore on the feasibility of the operation.

Ur, Baron. This was one of a saries of cables where the

Chiaf of station was Irporting on his attampt of findina means

:: of access to lumumba for the purpose of noisonina him?

Mr. Twoorly, Throuthout this whole perior, the activity o!

.: the Chief of station, in cortospondence with Headquartars was

:: exploratory.

Mr, Baron, What was baind axplored was the means of access

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to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

2

MI. Tready, That was one of the things that was being

explored. The other thing explored and constantly under review

was the whole altuation of Lumumba and were there other alter-

5

natives. That does not appear in this particular cables it

appears in othere.

7

Mr. Baron. Turning now to Tab 9 of tha Senator'a books,

8

this is the cable of Octobar I which you received in the fyes

Only channel from the Chief of Station which indicated that

¡Gottliab

had departed from Leopoldville for Amerlea on the

:: " Sth of October, and it says: "Vion expiration date his

:: " materials. However laft certain items of continuing usefulness.

1:: " Guthman" -- which-is a proudonym for the Chief of station whom

1; we have been calling ledgeman -- "Guthman plans continued

is l try implement op."

Does that indicate that you received a report trom the

...

1: Chief of Station that he would continue to try to implement

this operation against bumumba even aftar Gottlian had loft

the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. He would continue to axplore the possihilities

i.

of this oparation and continue to report to leadquarters. That

is all that. this

means,

i.:.

It dous not mean with the disappearance of cottliab hu

- sara

i would try to pull off the operation without further reference

:: to

Hoadquarters. It just means a continuation despite the

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1

diaappearance of Gottllab and his materials that the Chiar of

2

Station would continue to axamine the possibilities of carryina

this out.

Mr. Baron.

lie was to continue, in your mind, at least up

until the point where he had determined there was a leasible

6

means of assasainating Lumumba?

7

Would that be correct?

8

Mr. Tweedy, I would put it more broadly than that. I

9

would say that he was to continue to explore it to determine

10

whather or not there was a feasible means.

He perfectly well

1:

could come to the

conclusion that with the hardest work in the

i: i world that he could see no way to do it. That would have beer.

a perfectly acceptable conclusion to leadquarters, because a

decision would have to ba made professionally.

15

MI. Baron. Turnina to Tab 12 of the senator's books, there

16

is a cable that you sant in this Fyas Only channel

to the chief

1÷

of Statior. O1. October 15th, which is the wear after Dr. Gottlie";

i had left the Cougo. In this cable, you are aaying, you are

:.

I=farting first of all to anothor cable sent on the same da:

that was

not sait through the Ryas Only chanel, and then.

:: rodssuring this Chief of Station that

:: pacudonym for Lumumba, 19

it not?

ROAK, which is s

07

Mr. Tweedy.

It is.

i1r. Raron.

That

ROAK was still a stumbling block ani

:!•that it was Increasingly apparent that all

studyinn Conno

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1

situation Closely and his disposition: apontaneously becomes

number one consideration."

In the sacond paragraph, you told the Chief of station:

"Rajas above so you ara not contused by any apparent duplication."

5

Inferring to the other cable. "This channel remains for

specific purpose you discuss with colleaque also remains highest.

priority."

8

was the colleague that you ware referring to de. rottllati

Mr. Tweedly, Without doubt.

16.

Mr. Baron, What did you mean by disposition spontaneous!:?

MI. Tweady, The English of that cable, an I mentioned

this

morning, 1s absolutaly appalliny.

What I am actually saying is, wherever you talk to people

like vs did with the French, as I mentioned in the noxt sentenc=

or anyone is studyina the situation in Africa, thay all came

1€

un with the same conclusion, that there was to he no solution

!:! to the condo with iumumbastill in power, or in a position o!

overcoming it.

Mr. Baron. To summarize what we discussen this mornino,

despite the suties of

cables and the indication here that

::: Lumumba's disposition spontaneously was the number one consil:-

a: "ation and highest priority. You are

still maintaining that

:: the chief of Statio: was not annowered to no through with

agsassination without checkinn back with Headquarters?

::i.

i:

'Ir. Tweedy, That is correct.

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1

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions at this point.

2

(Wharaupon, Senator Church laft the hearing room.)

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Tweedy, how long did you serve

with the CIA?

5

Mr. Tweedy. I startod with CIG on the lat of May, 1947 and

served until March, 1973.

7

Senator Goldwater. You have had experience with intelli-

gence gathering agencies all around the world, I assume, or

most of tham?

10

Mr. Twaady. A considerable number, yes, air.

Senator Goldwater. Is it common practice in intelligence.

1:

agancias such as the CIA for a lot of people to know about

13

everything that is going on, or am I right in assuming that

1÷

there are many thiras that you do in the intelligence fleld,

1::

!

particularly the covert fiold, that the man sitting next to you

may know nothing about. Is that corract?

:

MI. Tweedy. That is correct, sir. Compartmentation was

1. very heavy in CIA. Thate were a gidat many thirs going on that

1: I nevar knew anything about

and do not know

to this day.

Senator rioldwater. Is that not in your experience the

most

succussful form of intellinance nathering? Is that the

2i. British

practice?

Mr. Twearly. The only way that you can run an intellinenr:

organization, in my view, is intornally.

Senator Goldwater. You have been with the CIA actually

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1

2.

since before its conception. I want to ask you, and of your

axpariance, what you think aa a professlonal of the men in tha

CIA, man and women?

IT. Tweedy, I came away from a carear in intelligence in

March of 'y3 with rather strong convictions. I might preface

my remarks here in answer to your question, Sanator, by saying

I was in intelligence during the War, I was in Naval Intall1-

8

gance. This was not oss, but I was in Intellinence. It alao

9

determined mo, ll the circumstances permitted, to make a

11'

career of intelligence aftar the war, and after the difficulty

of making the right contacts and so on ard so forth, aventual!:

:. it worked and I apert a career in CIA.

I have two vary strong impressions o! that exparience.

i: Ouo of them has to do with my colleagues, the personnel of the

1:, " agency, who I found to be a remarkably talented aroup.

The

16

second was, and it was something that I think all of us were

1: " basically proud of, the esprit do corps was at a very hih

!.. level and Issulting from esprit de corpg, as it usually does,

!. discipline was anually of a very high level, and it camo quir:

raturally, this was not a matter that hed to be inculcated du!

:. beata: into junior officers, it came quite naturally hecause

::' this wag quite claarly the way the organication

WaS

run, and

:: bagically, we were proud of it.

1 have never regretted for a secoud my career, and i am

: very proud of it sun my

asgociations.

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19

Senator Goldwater. Are you still close to the members of

the CIA, your old frienda?

MI. Tweedy. Obviously I have a groat many frlende who are

still serving. This la Increasingly not the case as retirements

are catching up with my collaagues, but I do keep abreast of

6

Agency affalia to the extent I can. I do not attempt to inter-

7

fars with them. At their request, I did a consultation job in.

8

the Agancy this summer. It's the first time I was aaked to io

9

it. I was Very glad to do 1t. I lound it intorestina,

103

stimulating, I was glad to be back, I do not necessarily .

1]

expectto do it again. However, if they asked me, I would if

1:'

i!

I thought I could be of any help.

Senator Goldwater.

Have you ovar known of any actions

14

activitias to be taken in a precipitous manner in the CIA?

1::

Mr. Tweady. That is a very broad question, Senator. I am

not quite sure how to answer it.

As in every organization, l have cortainly seen decisions

:: taken and actions implemented that might have bean better

!: considered. This includes

me, and thore are a number of thirs

that profassionally I would have done different 1? I had been

i: gifted with the hindsight I have now.

But on the whole, I would say the mark of the Agency was

:: not irissponsibility.

Sanator Goldwater, I asked that, hecause the attack or

the CIA la probably the atronnest I have seen ir my life in

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20

5

6

7

9

polities, and I cannot follow the idea that such a serious

undertaking :as an assassination, regardless of who the target.

might be, would be a subject that would be dreamed up in the

lockar room at some lower lovel. Those decisions and other

covert deciaions, in my opinion, have to start someplace, and

they do not start at the bottom.

Mr. Twaady, I would agree with you, sir. My experience

in this particular case - the only one of its kind that I have

over had any experience with -- Indicate axactly what you say.

I nover felt at any time that i was onerating in a policy

vacuum. I never had the impresaio: that any of my sendors

, felt that they ware alther.

1..

Senator Goldwater. That is all the questions I have.

Senator Huddleston. I just have a few questions.

What is your concept of the term higher or highest author-

Mr, Tweedy, Hinhast authority was a term that we used in

the Agency and it was gerarally recognized

as mganing the

Prosident, and I would like to make myself quits cloar on this.

is this context, the?

althouth,

a9: gald

a minuty ano I

:..

never folt: that I was in a polley vacuun or that the agency war.

:.:

I have no idas of the contaxt in whirt molicy was passed to thr

Anancy on this.

140 not kron wholler the President

paisonally player a tele, whetle he played a sole and passad

i.:

the mergare to thee intimal territy alvisors or the Secretar!

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## Page 24

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21

ONE LANES 70R1 SAI

of state or whoevar: I have no idea.

I merely felt that the conconsus at the policy levels of

government were that Lumumba must go and that discussion of the

feasibility of assassination was at least part of thig. I carrot

5

to any furthar than that.

6

Senator luddleston. Do you recall baing told specifically

7

that this operation had the approval, or was, in fact, the

8

polley of the highest authority?

9

MI. Tweedy, No, sir, I do not recall that. Highest

10

authority was normally used in cable traffic, so we did not hav

to say the President. I do not recall that the word "highest

i:: authority" in connection with this particular oneration was

i: i used.

1:

16

Senator Huddlaston, It is not an unfamiliar term? lt wer

used during your experience in the Agency?

Mr. Tweedy, Yes, certainly it wag. It was

somatimes

!:: nocassary for examole, that leadquarters would come to the tie!a

! and say, you will understand, I'm not talk in about this

operation, but just generally, vou will understand, that 11: a

Matter of this kind, it will require the abproval of hihest

i..

authority. ind normally this mount in my mind, overseas, the

40 Committoo or its sevaral equivalents, most of which decisions

:..

wore rafariod to the libridont. That Is basically what it

Meant.

ant tape

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## Page 25

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22

cap

1b

+ NOT DO

1

Senator Huddleston. What types of action come to your

2

mind when the instructions come down that a cortain individual

must be ramoved or possibly eliminated, or whatover form of

instructiong may come?

5

Mr. Tweedy. This 1s the only case that i personally was

6

ever involved with. What we were talking about was the renoval.

7

by any moans, of an individual, and, as i have tried to make

cisar 1n my previous testimony, this involved the launching of

the idea with the fiold so they in turn could make the proper

1:

oparational explorations into the feasibility of this,

!:

reporting in all detail hack to unadquarters for guidanca.

At

i :

no point was the flold aiven carte blanche if they thought the:

!:I had found a way to do the job, junt to carry it out with no

further reference.

so it nover occurred

to me or

anybody else

i: li in the position of the chief of station In leopoldville to frel

" that he had that kind of delegated authority.

:: Senator Huddleston.

Removal would include all the way up

... to assassination?

't, twoarly. Was are now talking about ir this specific

cage, jes, sir.

i .

Solde. Hilllertne Yot hai in lact of understandina?

i.:

Mr. Iwdedy, He had no lack of understandina that lead-

quarters wanted

this explored. At no wint did Headquarter

;..;

over say to the fluld, he is to be assassinated at all costs.

;.:

it said, it is important he be removed. Mona the tools of

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23

removal 1s assassination, you will explore it and report.

2

Senator Huddleston, Is it common within the Agency, that.

Instructions of this nature be handed down in oral fashion from

the Director to the Deputy Director for Plans to the Station

5

Chief?

6

Mr. Tweedy. Not the Station Chiet unless you actually ask

7

the Station Chief to come back.

Senator Huddleston. A cahle would have to be 115e1?

Mr. Tunedy, Or send a messenger personally out.

10

Normally on somathing like this, as it happened in this

case, MI. Missoll talked to Ma. Dulles

and Mr. Missall talked

i: " to me and ho did not sit dom, and wiito a memorandum to

me.

1:11 am virtually a hundred percent sure.

Senator Huddleston.

Is it your beliaf that participante

:!! in these kinds of discussions had very explieit understandinas

I' i about what each was talking about? No possibillty, virtually

1%

no possibility that there would be a misunderstandin as to

what the instructions were and what the limits were?

ir. Tweady.

Raally the only paopla that wore seriougly

involved with this were in the fiold, the Chief

of station;

:.

i..

if you are talking about operational detail, myself and my

deputy, with 1r, Bissell included, to the exten: that he needer!

:.

to got into the overational detail.

On that score, I would sar no misunderstanding whatsoever.

2:

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Rissall's communication with the

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12, 00€

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24

Director of the CIA would be such that they would have no

misundorstanding?

Mr. Twoody, I always assumed so, air. Obviously, again.

cannot comment specifically.

Sanator Huddleston. Given their experiance and their

knowladge of each othur and the knowladge of the operation --

8

Mr. Tweedy. They were very close personally, My. Bisaall

and Mr. Dullas, and Mr. Dulles had personal affection for him

and

enormous raspect for him, intellectually and profesalorally.

10

Senator Huddleston. Ever. the communication batween the

11

...

National

Security Council and thy Director or the ClA who was

1: "

a mambol of the council, it was not likely that there would br

!: a groat deal of misunderstandig thers betwoon what you really

?: are talking about, although thare is no written order?

1:.

MI. Tweody, That would have been my assumption, Senator.

16,

Senator Huddleston. Sunstor Schwalkar?

17

Sanator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1r:

Mr. Tweedy, in the August cable that. Allen Dulles

sont to

!' Chiat of station, he started out with the words "In hinh

• quarters hore." What dues that moan, to you, "in high quarters

i..

hara"?

Mi. Twaedy. The policy loval. As I say, I cannot nocessari!:

:: gay it included a spocific conversation with the l'resident.

:; cortainly, in my view, would have

involved the National Security

i: council, the advisor to the Prosident, secretary of state.

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## Page 28

2071

then

116.20001

ATOP SECRET

25

1

I mention the Secratary of State, bacauna later on in the cable,

Mr.Dulles saysto the extent that the Ambassador desires to be

consulted, you may seak his concurrence. Mr. Dulles was

parfactly content to have this discussed with the State Depart-

ment in the field, 1.o., the Embassy, if thie should prove to

6

Do necessary.

Sanator Schwelker, Mr. Biesell tastified before this

8

Committus that "in high quartare hero" meant the Preaident to

9

him, I assume that you ara not as convinced of that as Mi.

10

Bissall?

MI. Twaady, I do not think 'it a question of conviction.

was closer to the policy lovel than I was; he would have a bet:!

feel for this than I would. He never explalned to me what th

specific policy laval decision was.

He was the one Executiv

::.

Director who would talk directly with the Director. Conceiv-

ably -- I do not say he did not, and I do not say he did. 'lle

1%

may even havo talked to the senior mumbars of the government:

1:: I did not.

Senator Schweiker. la also testifiad that the further

part of the paragraph, consequently we conclude that dis renc:i,.

:.. that removal maant assassinatio...

Dous that or doos that not concur with vou?

Mr. Twoody, It does not concur; it would rafer to assas-

sination but not exclusively.

?!.

Serator Schwalker.

it.

goes on to say "in further author:'.

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1

expanditures of up to $100, 000 to carry out any programa

2.

which you do not have the opportunity to consult. Please

advisa."

Does that not mean to you, hure is $100, 000, do with 11 88

you want, you do not have to consult 1i you do not havo the

6

opportunity?

7

Mr. Tweady. Thia 1a cartainly the way it would read. I

read it, and I think I read it at the time, when you are talking

about that kind of money and crash programs, what you are talking

basically are political action type programs, not assassination

1:1

type programs.

::

sanator Schwalker. Of course..

Mi. Tweedy, Tho beginning of that paragraph says, "Herce

14

wo wish to give you wider authority," ot cotora, ot catore,

i: !!

"ircludig more aggresalve action, if It can remain covert."

--

Sanator Schweikar. What does the term maan, "more

.: aggressive action?

How aggressive can you get, oven more

:. aggressiva, "including even more accressive action, 1e it can

i: remain covert" moanina if you can get away with it.

MI. Tweediu. correct.

i..

My own belief is, bocause quite frankly I cannot rocal!

i.:

what. this had spocific reference to - my bellof is that thi

had rafarelico to goneral political actios alona the lines o

mounting

successful

political operations against bunumbe, whir

:.:

is the sort of thing that woull cost a lot of money.

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27

Sanator Schwelker. Of course, we know now that at the time, '

2.

or vary shortly about the same time va ware sendina poison dow.

thare, cortainly it was not political action. In light of what

we know now, would it not mean falrly clearly that this was an

5

authorization for an

aBBabBinution?

6

7

8

MI. Twoody, No, sir, I do not bellovo so, for the simple

reason that although we sent he! rottllah and his mater fart

down to the condo, the Chlat of Station was always axploring.

9

as many of thase cablas indicate, other moans of mattina rid o

11

Lumumba besides assassiration.

It was always, cortainly in mi

i: " mind, and I think In Mr. Bissoll's mind, a clear 19alirat101. --

"and gertedly the chief of Station's mind -- "hat wher ausry.

!:: thing had been axaminad, a succassful way of dolna assasgiaatio..

in was not locossarily to be axpected. Maybe it would, hut it

was not recessarily to be expected.

Thus, it was ircumbant upon th Chief of station to keep

' his eye on the whole spectrum

of possibilities of rattiny rin

of lumumba, politically of any other wav.

Sandtor schweiker. He know two things now in light of

i.

this. Due is he askod

an enant to kill lumumba, one arent.

:

declined. He asked

another anent to no down, and do that, an!

since he

specifically mentioned the two separa

dionts, 01e

in which the arent tostifist, sittina where you air.

:: that lie taclined to till hin, the other savina that

he woul.!

:.:

the poison, it seems to me very likely that this lanquere

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28

1

has to rafer to that kind of authority, or I cannot see how

MI: Bissell would have respected -- you say you respoot Mr.

Bissall and he operates within the CIA system. Is it not

inconcoivable to you that he could be doing this without this

5

kind of authority?

6

MI. Tready, No, it 1a not.

7

Sanator Schweiker, He would be doing it without authority?

_=---==--

MI. Twoady, No, lt is not within my hollof of MI. Blasall

that he would be doing it without authority.

Senator Schweiker. All righe.

One other point. It says, consult thu Ambassador if he

desires or you may seek his concurrence

if he desires it, and ::

!:'any particular case ho does not wish to be consulted, you can

1: act on your own authority where

time doas

not nermit referral

151 here.

i: I cannot imatine a more blank chock wording, sayino, *irs.

1: consult the Ambassador if he wante to be coisulted. It also

says in that particular case where he doss not wish to be

i consulted, you have vour om authority withour conferring heri

::

here.

I think that this is

at variance with the point vou nat=

spsculatin on earliet, that we had to have the findl

decision, when in fact it seems to me that that line sayb, .

;..

hore is authority if tine does not permit iciarral here.

:.,

'Ir. "weely. I can only

assure you, carator, that this

was always ny understandint, not aver understandina, it was mit-

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routine, that in any kind of an oparation as sensitive as was

2.

involved in the United States that there would be no blanket.

delegation of authority to the flald. Although I quite under-

4

stand your soint here, I can only assure you that that le the

5

way I felt about it then, feel about it now, and balleve this

6

opinion was shared by the Chiat of Station.

Sanator Schwalker. That you can act on your own authority

8

does not mean that to you?

9

MI. Tweedy, Not to pullina a triggar or administering

10

poison or what have you.

11

In other words, we do not want to hear anythina about it.

11

If you find a charco to do it, do it and renort later, no.

14

Sanator Schweiker, Mr. Tweady, have you ever heard of the

words Health Alteration

operation?

15

MI. Tweedy, What was that?

7.2

Sanator Schweiker, Have you avar heard the words Health

1:! Alteration Operation?

1':

MI. Tweedy. Never.

Senator Schwelker.

Have you ever heard of a Health Altai-

ation Comnittes chaired by a 'ir. Herman llorton?

;:.

'Ir. "Weedy. No.

Senator lichviker. Are you familar that an effort ever

i Was haile

to send a biologiral arent to incapacitate Irani

=: Colonal Fahil aldawi?

21.

Mr. Twoody.

No.

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30

1

Sanator Schwelker. Do you know Mr. Herman Horton, or did

2

you know him?

Mr. Twaady. Indeed, very well.

Senator Schwelker. Did you know a Mr.

5

Acting Chief of the Near Eastern, South Majan Division?

6

MI. Tweedy. Yes, I did, sir.

7

Senator Schwalker.

The Committee has a record of a meno

thare sent fron Mr. fool ecommending a Hoalth Alteration

Oparation Against the Colonel.

10

Mr. Tweedy, I have never heard of the phrase Health

1:

Alteration.

-::

Senator Schweiker. None of this is familiar to you.

Mr. Tweedy. It is the first timo I hava evar haard of it.

14

Sanator Schweikar, That is all I have.

1:

Mr. Dawson. You described this opsration anainst Lumumba

10

at various times in your testimony'as exploratory, To the

I: l bust of your knowledge, or your knowledre now having been

!: refreshed, having seen a variety of documents, was anybody s'el

i.

asked by tha CIA to assassinate Lumumba?

*.

MI. Tweedy.

No third narty, no arent.

:..

For listanco, Gual chotro e

who appears in this traffic.

i: in he was never asked

to

assassinate Lunumbs. Whan you say that

:!' I charactorized it

as exploratory, may I just axpatiate on thi

it for a moment?

Whenever, under our aystem and in our profassion, you no

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1

to the field asking that something be accomplished which clearly

2

Is not the sort of thina that you just do off the top of your

head, like having lunch with Mr. Smith tomorrow, but achieving

the difficult result, the task of the field 1a to explore the

5

feasibility of such a request by lleadquarters.

6

This might be done quite quickly. It might take an

infinite amount of time. Headquarters would expect the field

8

to raport regularly on lta prograss, giving leadquarters a chance

9

to comment, as we have done in this traffic. This particular

modus operandi was no different in this case than the cases of

1 :

infinitely lass sensitlvity or importance. That aspoct of it

" was quite routine.

There was no way in thy world that the Chir:

I:' ¿ of Station was going to come back, air, I understand what you

1: want, I will have it down in twenty-four hours. No had no

1:" inkling that this was going to occur: it took him obviously.

totally by surprise. He had to sit down and examine the

1' foasibility of it.

In the and, he could not come un with ar.

!" ai,swer.

I think the axploratory natur

is in the innate nature o:

: our business or somethin of that kind.

Mr. Dawsor. Thank you.

:::

Mr. Kirbow. Mi. Tweedy,

assumina that the chiot of

station. out there had the impression at the time that the

mossanger, or any other redson, that thin was authorized by tir

:: Prosident of the United states, this whole operation, knowin

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what you know about the business, would he have conducted

himsalt any differently than what you now see as this case?

Mr. Iwsedy. Not the slightest. He would consider hingel!

In a disciplined organization, a servant of his chain of command

5

as a membar of the organiaation and not receiving some direct

6

word from the President which, in affoct, would have made him

faal to go out and do anything he pleased,

Mr. Kirbow. Is it not the paramount situation, the non-

attribution type situation, was the only thina that he could

10

undertaks, that

it could not bu attributed to the United States?

1:

Mr. Tweedy, That was Inherent in all of the corresporderes

J:; on the subject, our intercourse in the field on this. l third

1: " this makes it amply clear in something like this, on attribu-

14

tior, obviously would

be vary important. The othor was just

plain feasible access.

1F

Mr. Kirbow. Thark you.

1::

Mr. Smothyrs. As I listel to the testimony here, we ma:

!. not bo terribly clear on what woull have hapened had our chir

i: of Station come up with what his considored to la a feasible.

i ple:..

HOW

would he have communicatod a fuasible nian bart to

" you?

"r. Tweeds, Thrount this channel.

Hi. Smothers. What would have happened i: you had rare:.!.

for example, the messane

from him that wy now have a feasi!!e

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33

plan for the removal or the killing?

Mi. Tweedy, I would immadiately have shared lt with Mr.

Bissall. Aftor that, I can only apaculate what would happen

and I know MI. Bissell would have talked to Mr. Dulles. Whare

5

it would have gone from there, I just cannot do anything more

6

than speculate. I do not think that would be very helpful.

7

My duty was quite cloar. I was chargad up the chain

of command. I would probably comment on it onerationally to

Mr. Bissell. I would say,

profesaionally this seams sound or

professionally i do not agree with it.

Mr. Smothers.

It is your assumption that it would have

:: sons up aven beyond Mr. Dulles, your assumption from your yeurs

i of work with

the Agency?

MI. Tready. I think that would be fair to say, but that

: I would depend ao much on the undarstanding between Mr. Mullen

"and the policy ltvels

of government to which I was not privy,

#I coally cannot comment substantively on that.

MI. Smothers.

I have some problem in looking back at the

!:tostimon:, your pi-vious testimony -- which I realize you have

not had a chance to revich. The mist of what you say un nare.

• 3a of the trangeript

is that this operarior against Lumunba

::was carteinly somethind, that was so axtraordinary that vou woul:

: have none to berl dudl got un thinkina about rumunha

-- I use

:; your words here

== vot at that time your recollaction was

i cartainly not as clear as it was

from a raview of the documents.

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In your exparience, are va 'talking about this activity

2

being an axtraordinary situation?

• #

Mr. Tweedy. The only one to which I was ever axposed of

i '1ts kind.

Me, Smothers. In torma - the only one of its kind, you

6 i mean the only one involvlna an a88a8a1nation?

7: Mr. Tready, Let us be quito clear, exactly. I was never

personally involved in any conversations about a specific

9

assansination at any other time in my career in the Agency, nor

1!

I was I aware of any other, so thia was the only one that I

1: personally had any experierco with.

Mr. Smothers. After looking at the documented evidence,

1:

1" your memory is now much batter concerning your own

involvemant

1i in the cable traffic.

Mr. Twoody. In the apecificities of it, Mr. Smothers,

!: yos. In torme of the dansral role I played as Chief of the

'Africa Division, there was nover any doubt about that, but

:.the spocificitias of this, really -I had forgotten, as 1

.: told is. Baros: the other day, for exampla, that there was a

period when Lumumba was actually in the hands of the u.N. I

:.

had

just foraotten.

:

I had not remanhared that ur, D'Donnell had boon aster? bu

:..

:.

Mr. Blissell to

assigt the Chiuf of Station in this oparation

until I was reninded of it. I'm afraid that's my.

frailty.

isut that is -- my conscience, howaver, is quite clear, hut:

::

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1

my memory la not quite as clear.

2

MI. Smothers. I do not want to balabor the documents we

have gone over today. As you have reviewad them and as you

recall this timeframe, and giviny un

some assistance in Inter-

prating what the documents say, is there any other matter that

6

7

bears on the question of the discussions surrounding the

Lumumba casé that we have not gone into that have come to mind

as you think about the circumstances of this case that you think

will bo holpful to this committos in understanding, lf you will,

both the question of the flow of authority and indoed the scous

of what was intended?

Mr. Twoody. From the time that this was flagt broached in

¿ï me by 1r. Bissell, I do not bolinva I discusged this matter

1: i

with anybody aise but Mr. Rissoll, cartainly Mr. Gottleb

" he wart out on this trips certainly now that t've been reninder

1i

of his tasking by Mr. Bissall, Mr. D'DOnnell; obvlously, the

i:' Chief of station; and my Dabutv.

1:-

I sover discussed it over with Mr. Helms. I suppose i

!: did discuss it with Me, Dulles. I think it was much more that

i 1 knew perfectly well that mr. Dulles was familiar with it

i rather than I sctually had any conversation with Mr. Dullys on

2: it. 1 think those were all conducted by Mr. Rissell and passe!

i: down to me. I do not think I probably had any.

Ir. Smothers. Let mo understand the reference to Mr.

a @Donnell? Are you saying you probably discussed it with him?

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MI. Tweedy. No, I think probably I did not directly, I

was perfactly aware of hia knowledge of it, but at thin point

I cannot recall having discussed it with him.

To put it diffarently, thare was no reason for me to,

because I would have had nothing to say to him that I way not

saying to Mi. Blasell, who in turn would have passed it to

MI. Dulles, as he aaw fit. And in any event, that tnleas

Invited by Mr. Dullas, I would not have jumped the chain of

command.

Mr. Smothars, I have nothing further.

Sanator Huddlaston. Mr. Schwarz?

Mr. Schwarz. This 1s the only killing ineident you know

of?

MI. Twoody. The only killing incident I know of. It 1s

the only question of assassination which (a) I knew of, or (hy

1 have avor played any role in.

Mr. Schwarz. You refer to the special channel of cable.

the FOBROP.

Did you ever use the YOprop in any other operation?

ar. Tweariy, Napion was a one-time thing for this opera

tion. He could have attomptad to assassinate 500, 100 peopir

there would

always have been

an additional channel set

up..

Mr. Baron. We were told by the MOPHOr channel, by the

review staff of the ciA that the channel was sat un for

ayus

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only uns: for the chiot of the Attion Division, primarily for

2

pereonnel mattars; that it' vas: Just taken advantage of for

thia operation because it already axisted.

MI. Tweedy, I will not gainsay them, but I think thay are

5

wrong. I think this was set up purposefully for this. this

cryptonym was only used for this particular oparation. I do

not think it had anything to do -

8

Mr. Kirbow, You were Chief of the Africa Divialon?

Mr. Tweedy, I do not think it had anythina to do whatsoever

10

with othor sansitive mattars in the Divinion, not at ali.

Mr. Schwarz. Both In the sense that this is the only

i: assassination matter that you were over connected with and the

1÷

special treatment of tho cablas, it was a matter of signifar:

!: importanca at the timo, was it not?

::' Mr. Tweedy, Yes, it was a matter of stonificant importance.

as I made clear to Mr. Baron this

morning and Mr. Dawson, The

iï sotting up of spocial channels and special indicators for

sensitive oporations was

and is a complataly common occurrence

i: in the Agency. It has nothing to do suecifically with assass-

:. nation; a very connor occurrence.

Mr. schwar?. Do you know diy other incident in which

poisong wors used in your expariance?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

15, Sowharz. What. did you first rocall - Mr. Twearly, YO:

i have appeared before us this

summer formally and in this occasis.

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formally this morning. You were axamined under oath on

Septamber 9th and you appeared before us informally on one or

two occasions,

Mr. Tweedy, No, just once, whenever that was; this must:

5

" have bean back in June or July.

6

Mr. Schwarz. When did you firat racall that poisong were

used to attempt or prepare to assassinate Patrice Lumumba?

8

MI. Tweady. By having my memory jogyed, I quass.

remembar the first time it was mantioned when

somebody said,

10

would it have been posalble that polson had heen sent to the

1:

Station? I aald, you, indeed, it would have

been possible.

:: Did I know that the chlaf of Station had

sant poison there, rha+

1' he had kopt it in his refrigerator? l said 10, 1 did no: recall

It, but that I would not gainsay it, that If somsone testiflei

1:!.

that it was thare this has all come back

as a result of my

memory baing jogged.

I was not -- certainly the poison was considered; that i

ramambar quito cloatly.

"r. Schwarz. From the beginning?

MI. Tweedy. Yes.

That was obviously one of the ways tia!

it might have boen carried out.

Mr. Schwarz.

I would

like to axplore for a moment, o! a!!

:::

:..

the mathods that you used to jog your manory, wa showed vou

documants. Did you see any documouts

at the Anancy?

i i

Mr. Tweady. No, I have seen none, for have l talked to

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anybody, because there is nobody to talk to who, you know,

participated in this axperience with mo.

MI. Schwarz. You did not talk to Mr. Biasell?

MI. Tready, I have not talked to Mr. Bissell.

5

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Fielda?

Mr. Tweedy, I have not seen Mr. Fields, I have not talked

to him by phone or any other way, nor hava I seen any files.

9

Mr. Schwarz. The totality of your effort to refresh your-

self has boes afforts in the course of working with people on

10

the staff of this committed, is that right?

1:

MI. Tweedy, Correct.

10

Mr. Schwarz. You have not talked to any current, or have

not talked to any current or former Agency employee?

Mr. Twendy. No, sir, not on the subject of this field.

The only thing I have discussed with them, as I told you, I

16.

was working on a job with the Agency this summer. I quess I

!:

told Mr. Elder I was goino to be going up to testify primarily

1::

to find out whether I could nat a car or something. No point

I'i in discussing it with him, because he would not have told me

anything about it.

:..

Mr. Schwarz. When you were told

to take stays to nove

*: "towards the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, dir you consider

:: declining to do that? If not, why not?

MI, Tweady, I will try to be as honest with you as l ca:..

I cortainly did not attumpt to decline it, and I falt, in view

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of the position of the government on the thing, that at least

2

the exploration of this, or possibility of renoving Lumumba

from power in the Congo was an objective worth pursuing.

Mr. Schwarz. Including killing him?

5

MI. Tweedy. Yes. I suspect I was ready to consider this.

Mr. Schware. That was an objactive worth purauing, right?

Mr. Tweedy, Gotting rid of him was an objective worth

8

purauing, and if the government and my betters wished to pursue

9

1t, professionally, I was parlectly willing to play my role in

10

it, yos.

Mr. Scwharr. Looking back now from the parspective of

:.

1975, do you think the United Statos should continue to enter.

11 " tain assassinations of foreign political Isaders?

14

Mr. Tweedy. I have never thought that assassination 1r.

:: I

mogt cases was anything more than a mugs game, for the gimple

:. 1

reason that. I do not think

in most cases, because I think

ar.

'1:: excallant casa could have bean madle that the early aliminatio..

1::

of Hitler would have saved us all a hell of a lot of trouble.

But that was an almost unique cast.

Most ngonla do not contral

situationg tocally within themsalves. I think Hitler did. in

I know something about that.

In other words, I don't think anybody alsa would have

i: continued if Hitler had wither had a hoart attack or disemi:.

2:

2:

I think the thing would have

folded.

In most cases, I think we kid ourselvas that patting rid

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1,0..002,00, 06.2000*

1

of - Haury II said, "Chia turbulent priest la in affect, take

cara of the lasue.

3

laving to do it all ovar again, 1t would be my strong

rocommandation that we not get into 1t. I was never in any

5

doubt whatsoaver about it on a professional basin, because there

6

always was a possibility that the soviets might try this kind

of thing on what I would call a professional basis.

8

MI. Schwarz. What do you maan, professional basis?

MI. Tweady, Get at our sources, or concalvably aven

10

gotting to stall officars, this type of thing. I was never In

1:

any doubt whataoaver that to engage In anything iike this, if

1:

the soviats should

show inclination to do so would he totally

1:: 101-productiva.

1:

Mr. Schwarz. You mean having a war back and forth between

the two intailigence services?

16

Mr. Tweady, The only reason

I mention it, services have

!:' done this. The soviots cortairly have done it with some of

I': their own operational anants, aurl other servicas have done it.

1: We had a couply of conversations in the Agancy, l remember quire

i informal, if the soviets ever started a game like this whather

i: it would be worth rataliating. I think we all agreed that tho

21

answer would be no. Two car; play at this

name, and there

:: would Do no and to it. In fact, of course, it never has

happaned, to my knowledne.

+ 10

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Mr. Schwarz. What was so special about Lumumba that

2

Justified killing him?

3

Mr. Tweedy, There was nothing special about Lumumba as

4

1

parson.

5

Mr. Schwarz, In that sanse, you would distinguish him

6

from Hitler, whom you did say was special as a parson?

MI. Tweedy. No, let me Exy to answer your question, which

has to be answered more fully than juat discussing Lumumba.

9

The concarn with Lumumba was not really the concern with

1i

Lumumba is a person. It was concerned at this very pregnant.

!! i point in the now African develorment

of the effect on the

1: " balance of the continent of a disintegration of the Congo, are

I% i 1t was tho genural foaling that Lumumbe had 1e within his

i" power to bring about this dissolution, and this was the faar

1:! Chat it would maroly be the start -- the Congo, after all, was

16

,the largest geographical axpreasion." Containod In 1t were

1: enormously important mineral resources. Africa as a whole.

!: tha congo itself, 18 adjacant to Nigeria, which at that point

was considered to be one of the main hopes of the future

i stability of Africa, aid if the conno had fallen, then the

:. chercos wers Nigeria would bo seized with the samn infection.

This was why washinrton, after the point the Western

i: world was so concarned about Lumumba, not because there was

something unique about. Lumumba, hut it was the congo.

Mr. Schwarz, Did you ever consider in your dincussion of

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thia subject what affect lt rould have on the United Statas

position in Africa if it were to be known. the polley makers

In Africa sat around thinking about killing Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy, Policy makars in America?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

MI. Tready. Indeed we did, which was one of the reasons,

ons of the sino qua nons of this operation vas that tha Amarican.

hand would be totally hidden, which was, anongat others, a

critaria that we vare nevar able to achieve.

MI. Schwarz. In fact, lt 1s probably sonathing that 1a

not possible to achiave, la 1t not?

Mr, Tweedy. It ls never possible to achieve anything with

11 ¡ 100 parcent assurance, no. Cartainly you can achiave professional

results with a high dogree of asgurance, but you can never do

15

further than that.

16

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further.

Sanator Huddleston. I have nothing further, and a vote

1&

1:

18 on.

Am I to understand that. Sanator Church is coming back or

r. Schwarz. I did not. have that impression.

Senator Huddleston, We wilt

recess at this time.

(Whareupon, at 5:10 o'clock p.n. the hsaring concluded. )

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