## Page 1

124-10185-10099

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

vass

-

MEVORANDUS FOR: Exccutive Director/Cosptrollcr

VIA

: Acting Deputy Director for Plans •

SUBJECT

:. Agency Sunnort to the ü.s. Scerot service

(USSS) for National Denocratic (20-14 July

2972) anü lational republican (21-24 august

1972) Conventions

1. This nemorandun is for the information of the Exccutive

Discotor/Coaptroller.

2. Suchorization for CIA sunnort to the !.S. Secrot Serviec

fOr

ihe herocratic and denublicon tntional Conventions is con-

tained in a monorandus of ? doril 197? Eron Chief, Cl Staff to

clic ACI irnici

was concurrod in by tie aDu? and approved by tic

DEl On 10 April 1972 (copy attachiod).

• JFK (1)(3)

On 13 Anil 1972 thelcos, Minaures with the Miami

USSS representatiic and it.

Jiscuss preliminary plannine for Station Muliazi suanort to t!

usss prior to and merin?

tho C/m/235 and c/ci/ Ject vich To Lastrovato at leadenarters

Traleuent the prclininary planniny careca con in linni

¿o dcicinine the

cricht of licauquarters support required by the

A. The basic arrochent cutually concurred in by the USSS

and licadquartors rcpresentatives proviced that:

JFk(e) Ma. (Station Mil/: lazl)hould conduct nage traces. on

aIl Cubans of interest to the usss.

• B. CIA Headquarters would conduct nate traces on

all other foreign born persons of interest to the usss.

..

cia mould been the Usss informed of any everts

in the Caribbean and Latin Aucricon arcas

that sould

have any bearing on the USSs proucctive rission during

the contention perious.

This sould include briefines

on Cupa

and Culan policies toward the initer States and

on activiries of cuian intelligence operations which

could affect the security of the conventions.

JFK

00578

---

## Page 2

d.

Coverage of

Latin Macrican exilc

*roups in the

Undred Statco would be the responsinility of the reI

since CIA lad coased tie catensive covcrage foracily

targeted ayainst these groups since it ias non considerca

an internal sccurity function.

JFK (1) (B)

.S.

On 27 April 1972 & aceting was hold at a bufor office

of station it/lisai

with the iSSS Chiof of Communica-

tlons, station persoarol and a liczuquarters roprescatative.

It

Mãr agreed that name traces dould de laudied ty liani security

Ficlu office courier fron the leSs comier office until the SSS

ostablished cosmunications links fron thoir conaasi

convention center, at which tine trace requests sould be sent

iron ine commano post to 0555 teriguaiters and Iglayce to 01a

licadquarices:

cuban nano traces are rolaved to Station infiasa 009)

by the Signal Conter and nor-Curan traces are conjucted by I/COS. uxs

Replias to USsS icquesis on non-Cuians are coordinatou lith

C1/SO.] JPK()Ls)

6. Station Mi/Miami has arranged the rental of a safcicuse

about five mirures iron convention cented which till provide a

cute and nearby mecrino site for l5s5 anu duency perscunal.

This safchouse vill to arilable jusi prior to anu during hot!

JFK

COnyEntIOnS..

• arachuartors oificer will ThY (to lani erior to cous

the contentions and rosair until the conventions aujouir to

assist tic Station in prorlding the suprort doscraldu In рагадтара

four above.

7: Tention Netail is dr dally contect men the less in

JFK

Location bestabun roll as nectar

site hien necessory.

jas not been rcrcalca to

the liSSS. • (Station

2S LOCRiCE SORE DISTANCE LICE buffer office.)

Auditionally, thegliani Security field office maintains nornal JFK(s)

liaison with the focal liSSS diani unit.

8. Thie Station inderstands that no personnel will be prescrt

at the convention hall, that they will not provide any

unique to the agency, nor will it provide the use of any otier

facilities other than

the sulehouse described in paragraph six.

SESHET

00577

---

## Page 3

May 1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

-You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,

I believe, Agency funds were

made available to the FBI.

These funds may still be possibly held in a special

account for that use. This is one of the areas where

TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would

have the details as this was handled through the Executive.

Director's office and of

, course Angleton would have

additional information.

Signed

Chief

Missions and Prograns Staff

67

E2 INPDET CI BY 357737

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00583

---

## Page 4

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR :

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

Areas of Possible Embarrassment

to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or carly summer of 1971, Mr. John

Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to

the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request yas

non-spocific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with

the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the

President's nephew, who was employed by IOs.

2. There were multiple channels from the White Housc to the

Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably laldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director

Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the While House to the DDCI,

General Cushman (sce attached telephone conversation).

Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

C.

John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels

were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by

the C] Staff to ir. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since

' it gives the flavor of White House concern.

It took several days to

uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-

ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.

The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were

coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-,

ject died down and we did not pursue it further.

4. Please return the attachments when they have served your

purpose.

SECKET

EZlIMPDET CL BY 05451 ?

00583

---

## Page 5

5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation JFK (•)(B)

Committee and Staff propared by[Richard Ober.] The original

meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House

and the principal sparkplug for this group activity ira's the then

Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian

and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.

Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and'it is always

possible that he might draw in the Agency. •

JFK(1)(B)

6. Before appointing LOber to the IES Stalf as the Agency

representative, I had allended various inter-agency mectings pre-

sided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to. Director Helms

that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-

perience.

Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split

between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis

one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly

passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This

was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from

the Bureau.

ames Ang-cion

Chicí, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

SECRET

00531

---

## Page 6

Pushed;

MENOPANDU:! FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

counter Intalligence stair.

Police Groun Activities Jus

JFKUN(B)

is

responsihle for staff coordination ithin the

of the benuty Director

for cucrations for activitics and

prograas involvin assistancelto forcin molice/security

forces for the nurose of exploitin; such nctivities and

prograns for intelligence purvoses.

2. cipalmaintains liaison with the office of Pollic

Safet!,

ect for micrational carrion ent 4193/111)

JFK

and its

training facility, the International lolice Acadeny

(IP;).

aled also administers and suvervises Project

IDEN-171

and its training ronrictory facility DEN-172

CEN-108

mn audition, cIlpa coordinates a joint nos/aro tacmareal

Services Sirision, Contral Incelligance Juency (Tor/eri)

Technical

Investigations Course, ClEMprovides guidanc

keeto police/security functions

nel counsel to the iren rivisions in matters sortainin

and activities. Specific

details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISO KIT! OPS/AID

JAL cIpaliaison ith OPS/AID and IPl is conducted on a

daily basis and consists principally of:

A. exchange of infornation on IPA participants, some

of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who

are

of interest to Agency components,

Bo arranging for inclusion of lgency sponsored partici-

pants in IPA/CUS/Ma training prograns,

arrantiar for Ini/ops/ In briolings and tours for

¡orel! pollse/security roaresentatines

Liy CIA Area

Divisions, J

SHADET

00537

Lian a missed

JFK((8)

---

## Page 7

2-

jFK

(1) (5)

D. obtaining biogranhic and assessment data. on

IPA/OPS/AID trainces,.

E. providing general information pertaining to

police/security organizations, activities, equip-

ment, and personalities requested oy Agency

operating components,

coordinating the Incucy's participation in te

Tecinical Investigations course designed to

faniliarizo the trainees viti tie tocinique

required to pronerly investirate torrorist

activitios wherein explosives have been utilized,

G

obtaining OUS/AID cover for ClA personnel to serve

abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employces

JFK

were coverco in Latin Micrica, the Far Last and

Africa. Tiis

tot?l

has been recuced durin the

chast several years

to 1n serving in Thailand,

Il. arranging contact between lesk officers and OPS/AIn

sponsored participants.

PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172- deal suret of

10Er-172 Training Icademy is a comercial interprise.

It was incornorated under tie laus of the state of caryland

in 1952 and conducts iis business

in the District of

Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign

police/socurity personnel under an overt contract viti

,and selling police/security cumment to forcien

police/security personnel and organisations.IDEN-172 also

provides succial

training prograns and briefings to

forcin police/security versonncl of interest to igency

operating divisions. It provides hionranhic and assessnent

data on trainces to country destis. RecentlyIDEN-172 nas

acquired tha capability of providing training to foreign

police/security

personnel in VIP protoctive socurity

for Chiefs of State.

Cla personnel under this cover vill not he replaced as

such and all will be phased out by June 1974.

sells gains -

Dsй..d

consuici

servi:

JFK(10)

JFK

(115)

00538

SERJET

---

## Page 8

CO.PIE.T

• CI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison

eklus sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID oI leN-lawi thout

divulging Agency interost OPS/AID has such contacts

at ione and airoad hocause of the nature of its actiritios

(training of

forcin noiico/security personnel at ho"e

and morond, and its Puslic Safaty prograns around te

world. IDN-l72 has such contacts at hors - local and JFK()(B)

federal lovel - hecause its personnel are personall!

acquaintod with law enforceront officers througiout

United States.

lonbers of the lEN-172 staff (not identified) JPKi

as Cli! tave

appeared

as

quest docturer's

at sue.

feceral

institutions as

the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the 1.5.

Secret Service, and the U.S. Trcasury Inforcement Division.

3. In. adcition to the liaison "entioned in tic

previous pararran, lie frency maintains liaison in varying

JFKU)(s)

legrees wlin lorean nolice securitv organizations throug.

its field!

stations.

The existence and extent thercof

however, is a decision to ie made ly tie rea civision,

and is not the responsibility of CI/Pf.

JFK (1)C)

4. The CI.!

as a menher of the Country Tear in

JFKGB Montoridco, Uruguay, may have had sore contact with can

murdered by the tunelaros.

Jan :itrione,

in Uruguay, and

was nover a cla enployee or agent.

inalcton

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

00593

32ET

---

## Page 9

SENSITIVE

S. uti

vite

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program

1. The MCHAOS program is a worldwide program for

clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign

efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic

U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,

North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the

Arab fedayeen.

2. -The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct:

ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection

purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign oriented

activity in the United States has boen of two types:

Selected FBI domostic sources who travel

abroad in connection with their extremist activity

and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile

foreign powers or with forcign extremist groups

have been briciou and debriefed by Hcadquarters

officers.

The bricfing has included appropriate

operational guidance,

including defensive advice.

b.

Americans with existing

extremist creden-

tials

have been assessed, recruited, tested and

aispatched abroad for PCs

assignnchts as contract

agents, primarily sources offered for such use by

the FEI.

ithen abroad they collect information re-

sponsive to Michaos program requirenents, as well

as other Agency requircments.

They are thus used

primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Con-

munists, the North Vietnamese, otc., as their back-

ground

and their particular access pernits.

should be noted that the MPTROIkI aspect of the

MPLODESTAR projoct of the East Asia Division is

similar to the MICHAOS PROGRAM.

3. As indicated

earlier, Michaos is a foreign pro-

gram,

conducted overseas, except for the limited activity

described above.

The program. is and has been managed so

as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of exist-

ing resources of the Operations Directorate.

No assets

Winna inter

SENSARL MILARED SOURCES

00.503

2 INPOET CL OY. 0612

SENSITIVE

SECRET

---

## Page 10

SECRET

CORPORATE COVER

1.

Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the

placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover

of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.s.

This

process

involves

the sclection of companies; research on

their locations and key personucl; clearances; contacts

with companies to solicit coupcration with the Agency;:

arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the

companics, including letters of understanding; funding of

salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor

ing of each integrated case throughout

the course of the

cover use.

The ovciall objoctive is to match the individial

being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner

that will ensure achieverent of the Agoncy purpose and pro-:

tection of the company integrity.

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover

is provided by 110 companies; 179 integices are located in

17 forcign countrics and 12 are located in the

United States.

To maintain this placement lovel, ces personnel mc' ic-

searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies

at any given time.

3. To minimizo the adverse consequences to a coopcrating

company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equits in

the event of exposure of an individual

under cover, it has

been established policy that no more than two individuals

would be turnished cover by the same company. At the prescht

time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total

number of companies now being used and efforts are under

way to effect fuither reductions toward the goal of one

individual per company.

4.

In addition to the primary corporate cover function

contact with two Us

caid firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit

cards in alias for operational use in the United States and

abroad by Agency personnel. 12 such cards are now being

used by 31 individuals.

SECRET. 1

V00536

---

## Page 11

DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 3i1 back-

stopped notional facilitics which were created to pro-

vide cover for Agoncy personnel in the United States

and

abroad and to provide an attributable source for

Agency funds used in operations

and requiring conceal-

ment of Agency or U.S. Govoinment interest. The lacilities

compriso 13 corporations providing personal status cover,

payrolling and tax attribution sources, and othei miscel-

on status

laneous support such as title to property, lunding, etc.;

G1 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational

cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207

non-registered companics providing support for high risk

operational requirements,

agents abroad, corporate rein-

bursements, and proprictary funding.

224 Agency personnel engaged in opciational

activities are payrolled by the facilities,

an esschtial

procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salarics with-

out docunenting the Agency as the source.

:

3.

The lacilities providc a capability for passing

Agency funds to 30 Agency proprictarios and 97 bona fide

companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts

located in 36 banks throughout the United States providg

the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

JFKU(A)

005:5

SECRET

---

## Page 12

C100 606÷d.

5010-106

TO

MR. W. R

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

OSA GEN. REO..NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TANYAZIL

AssoC. Dit..

FROM

MR. W. OLOREGAR

SUWECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr.

Cochran,

Jr.

1 - Mr.

R. J. Gallagher

,1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

61 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: July 24, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

1

- Mr.

A.

B.

Fulton

1

- Mr.

G. Deegan

- Mr.

R.

Shackelford

- Mr.

- Mr.

F.

L.

S.

Putman

W.

Redfield

1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Dap. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

'Asse. Dira:

Admin..

Comp. Syst. -

Exi. Affairs.

Fllos & Com..

Gon. Inv. -

Ident. -

inspoction -

Intoll.—

Laboratory -

Lagal Coun. -

•Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training.

Tolophona Rm. -

Diractor: S007

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised

you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) 190 pages " extracted from a 693-page document prepared by

CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities

may have exceeded its legal mandate.

Some of the CIA activities

cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of

an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate

Select Committee has

had access to this document.

It was recommended

that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to

the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section

believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for

the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an

assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation

1/00 PI SPLALMAN

Cis involved.

This is to advise that the following pages from

the docu-

ment were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of

the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose

of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:

General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151,

155, 156,

158-161, 178, 180,

181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354

202, 221,

Laboratory Division - But bo 2o 230 0 o 80 2 ae 1e

pages contained information concerning

techniques used and/or developed by CIA

which may be of interest).

Intelligence Division

REC-88

Section CI-l

102

176312-441

Pages 23, 24,

_29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142,

298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.

3 JUL 31 1975

62-116395

TJM:ekw (12)

eKus

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 3 1 1975

---

## Page 13

Memorandum to Mr.

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

W. R. Wannall

Section CI-2

Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3

Pages 40,

368, 371, 373,

T31,, 376-319, 3, m5, 45, 468 470, 39 30

and 615.

Section IS-1

Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS-2

Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,

330, and 482.

Section IS-3

Pages 521 and 549

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to

above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the

Senstudy Project, Room 4063. JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested

assessment.

[nistence of the 693-pagd TA)document and the

information contained therein should be closely

guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know

basis.

2

---

## Page 14

ROJECT NOCKINGBIRD

Project Mockingbirds a telephone intercept activity, was conducted

between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-

based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles

based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency

and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's

office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections

were established with the assistance of a telephone company official

who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.

Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.

John A: McCone, Director of Central Intelligence..

The latter conducted

the activity in coordination with the Atturney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),

the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert Mc.V'amara), and the Director of

the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to

Office of Security, personnel directly involved in the intercepts and

research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency

officials äre on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director

of Central Intelligence (General MarshallS. Carter), the Inspector

General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence

-Houston).

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-

tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources

of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they

received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators

and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,

of whom Il were identified; l6 government employees, including a staff

member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an

Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number

of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span

of the activity precluded positive identification, It was observed that through

these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official

data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen

for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines

were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

T46|5) Since the termination of Project Mockingorrd,)those materials related

it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access

of two Office of Security professio 2: 1/66 345-1475000222

SECRET EYES ONLY

WARNING NOTCE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENGE SCUREES

---

## Page 15

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Soviet Defector

defected Soviet defector, ative of this Agency ir

to a represent

•1964.

The responsibility for

his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of

the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country

After initial interrogation by

representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-

house in

Maryland,

where he

was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when

he was moved

54410

what age spited one bu even gEt ones to

period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their.

contention and he was confined at ISOLATION in an cffort

to convince him to "confess."

This Office together with the Office of

of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under

/ counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality

these conditions

for such a long period of time. Strong

representations were made to the Director LMr. HelnsUby

this Office, the Office of General Counsel,

and the

Legislative

Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 19f, the

responsibility for his

further handling was transferred

to the Office of Security under the direction of the Députy -

Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufüs Taylor.

The Soviet defector

• was moved to a comfortable safehouse in

the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,

sympathetie

conditions by his security Case Officer, Mr

Bruce Solied for more than a yeat:

It soon became apparent

that the Soviet defector

was bona fide and he was moved to

nore comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom

of independent movement and has continued to cooperate

fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this

Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

EZ IMPDET

•CL BY 0009881

SECRET/DA)

EYES ONLY

00023

---

## Page 16

SECRET

valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever

had

and

leads which were ignored by the SR Division were

explorer. and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution

of Soviet

recruited agents

-in several

countries throughout the world.

He currently is living

under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife

and remarried

an. American Citizen. He is happy, relaxed,

and appreciative of the treatment

accorded him

and

states

"while I regret my

years of incarceration, I have

no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

000222-

2

SECRET

EYES ONLY

---

## Page 17

SECPET

EYES ONLY

I..

SURVEILLANCES

A.

-SIESTA

spelle

tionally involved.

survedlance was predicated upon

information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from

employees information in Information Processing Division

files, and that employees were visiting a photographic

studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Junez in Fairfax

City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,

one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was

made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of dunez

aborted because of a door lock problem.

PARAGON

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved -

by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69

and her associates at various times from May to September

, an acknowledged Latin American revolu-

tionary, had long been a source of the Wi Division and

had given intormation regarding a plot to assassinate

or kidnap VIce PrestoentIgnow and the DEI. Surveil.

lances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69

during two visits to the United States, technical cover-

age of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives

In New. York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-

age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of

Although most of the surveillance occurred in

New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals

included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C.

EELOTEX

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-

ducted of

Iden 180

of the

Washington Post during

SECRET

EYES ONLY

E2 IMPDET

[CL BY 000988)

00026

---

## Page 18

(iC)

SECHET

EYES CHIY

the periods

6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971

and on 3 January 1972..

In addition to physical sur-

veillance, an observation post was maintained in the

Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-

tained of the building housing his office. The sur-

veillance was designed

to determine Iden 180

sources

of classified information of interest to the Agency

which had appeared in a number of his columns

D. MUDHEN

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con-

ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg

men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,

from 15 February

to 12 April 1972.

In addition to

the

physical surveillance, an observation post was main-

tained in

the Statler

Hilton Hotel directly opposite

Anderson's office.

The purpose of this surveillance

was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources

highly classified Agency information appearing in his

syndicated columns.

E. BUTANE

At the direction of the DCl, a surveillance was

conducted on Victor L. Marchetti

from 23 March to

20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was

to determine his activities and contacts both with

Agency employees

and other individuals in regard to

his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-

posing Agency operations.

POLICE SUPPORT

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,

the Intelligence Division of the Metropotitan Police

Department was provided a communications system to

monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the

Hashington area.

This system consisted of a radio

receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Diyision

Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency

Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-

mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as well asia

representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan

Police Department.

The benefit to the Agency was that

the communications over this system were monitored at

the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of

possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-

stallations.

00027

SECRET EYES ONLY

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## Page 19

SEGRET

EYES ENLY

B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several

items of positive audio equipment consisting pri-

marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone

dial recorders were loaned to the metropolitan

Police Department, Fairfax-County, Virginia,

Police

Department, Montgomery Gounty, Maryland, Police

Department, New York City Palice Department, and the

esan Francisco, Calfforia, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

SRPOINTER-

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-

cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail

and, at various times, other selective mail at kennedy

Airport in New York City. This operation included not

only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-

tious opening and photographing of selected items of

mail.

The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-

nal security interest which was disseminated to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This program is now

in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether

the operation will be continued or abolished.

B. AELADLE

For several years the Office of Security has pro-

vided support to

a Russian defector of

interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted

of numerous things, including documentation for a change

of identity

on three occasions.

C.

REDFACE E

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious

entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-

pied by a former defector working under contract for

the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and

SERRET

EYES ONLY

:00028.

---

## Page 20

SECREI

EYES ONLY

sonic alarm

system, entering a vault, and entering

a safe within the vault.

The purpose of the opera-

tion was to determine whether the individual had

any unauthorized classified information in his

possession.

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director approved a request

from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and securit)

clearance support to BNDD. This has been

showsh the nedium of a proprietary of the officE of

operating in

Falls Church, Virginia.

Support

includes covert recruitment,

investigation, polygraph,

medical clearance, and training. It has been divided

into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-

viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal

activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment

of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)

Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD

but actually employed by BNdb,

although this fact is

known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.

In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and

other employee benefits to come fromiCion a reim-

bursable basis.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

As a result of a request from the Department of

State,Lapproved by the bole this office has, since

october 1912, provided protection on a 24-hour basis

to twe sons. of a foreign leader who are attending school

in the United States:

This support includes

the financing of

the protection and the detail to the

Department of State of six armed Agents of this office

who are documented as State Department Office of Security

employees.

F. MERRIMAG

From February 1967 to November 1971,

an

Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled

several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring

SEGRET

EYES ONLY

00023

---

## Page 21

SECRET

EYES CALY

dissident groups in the Washington area considered

to be potential threats to Agency personnel and

installations. One of these Agents so,successfully

penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned

over to the FBI for handling.

vent rated one diss den

In addition, during

this period, the Office of Security field offices

were tasked

with collecting available intelligence

on dissident groups.

All such information was in-

cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-

priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside

Government agencies.

F.

ANTLERS

Several months ago,

at the request of CI Staff,

and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this

office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of

a European country via conmercial transportation and

gain entry into the United States without leaving

any trace of his true identity..

5

SECRET

EYES GNLY

00030

---

## Page 22

11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECI: General: Office of Security Survey

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence

of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in

•RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security

questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a

dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of

three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current

interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this

informant is

a female who was employed in RID for a number of years

until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation

of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does

not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at

the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by

reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance

with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also

being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have

an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also sub-

sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among

clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these

employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID

employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the

Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this

capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially

those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought

to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

00053

INIPSET CL BY-

Latini

---

## Page 23

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly estensive,

but it is inconclusive.

He is known to have been a momber of anti-

Castro organizations

this country. There are al

reports that

his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. Tiere are other .

episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part

with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant

in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the

principal informant.

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed

interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good groundso

for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such

•file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence

that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent

contact with her friend,. the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On

one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions

from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no

knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been

levicd on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of

the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees

except social contacts.

8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for

over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-.

gence nature.

Cl Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which

was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-

sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security.

As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions

it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security

has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-

promising the operation. ]

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied

with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures

to resolve doubts about the case. O/S has followed the course of watch-

ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that

would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge

of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current

Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

-2.

00063

---

## Page 24

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made

any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although ic

• continues to see then

ocially. Thus, there is slir

reason to believe

that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.

It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact

with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might

alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly

since a plausible reason for transier would be difficult to develop

for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could

move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the

security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign

nationals.

This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's

. operation.

11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.

The possibility, that the employee in SB Division may be passing

information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further

delay in moving against her.

Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban

has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage

to the Agency seems clearly to outiveigh any. possible gains from

continuing this CI effort.

John a Lasurence

3

00051

---

## Page 25

A MISTRATE ITE

UBL

ONLY

9 May 1973

MENOR LIDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

SUBJECT

• Press

Allegations re Use of Agency

Polygraph

• 1.: This memorandum is for your information only

and confirns a report I made to you by telephone earlier

today.

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on

American proposals rclative

to the SALT talks in The New

York Times over the by-line of Iden 181.

It was

devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from

a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had

sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director,

Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, a

fei

days earlier.

The

President

furious with this unauthorized dis-

closure of classified information and directed a sweeping

investigation within the United States Government to

determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation

was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and

Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman,

Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

•3.

On the basis of investigations conducted by

state security and Defense officials, four indiviauals--

one individual

in the Department of Defense and three

individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--

were tabbed as leading suspects.

Nr. Egil Krogh contacted

me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph

the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect

ADMINISTRATIVZ INTERMAL USE ONLY

00065

---

## Page 26

4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time

in matters involving

the national security the Agency had

detailed to Mr. G. Narvin Gentile, Director of State

Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for

his use

in polygraphing State Department employees who

were recipients of allegations concerning their lojalty.

I emphasized

that this procedure had the Director's

approval and

State clearly understood that the examin-

ation was their total responsibility.

I further informed

him that this was the only way le could undertake to enter-

tain his request and that even then it would require the

• specific approval of the Director.

Mr. Krogh asked me to

obtain such approval and work out such

arrangements with

Mr. Gentile.

5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile

and inquired

to whether the arrangements had been made.

Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same

polygraph operator be used

to examine the Defense suspect.

Mr. Krogh informed ir. Gentile that he considered this an

excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials

to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph

examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182

of the Department of Defense and Iden 183

Iden 184

• and

Iden 185

• of

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The polygraph

examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the

results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature

to NI. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering

memorandum is attached.

7. • Iden 186

a staff writer for The

Washington Post,

in an article dated 3.September 1911,

stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged

at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees

suspected of leaking information on the SALt talks in

July. No. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

2

ADMINISTRATREE INTRIAL USE

CNLY

00066

---

## Page 27

ADAMS RATE IN ERAL

"AL DE GLY

Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a

letter to The Hashingtch Post and said that the polygraph

examinations had deon

conüuited by another agency. Specu-

Lation centered around the Agency,

but after a day or so,

press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186

apparently has never been satisfied

and has been pressing sir. Charles Bray, State Department

spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.

Bray learned today that Iden 186

plans to use a press

: conterence to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press

this point further.

Mir. Bray has been given guidance

Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but it this is impossible

he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State

Department Security officials utilizing an operator and

a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose.

I

do not knoy whether of not the fact that the government-wide

investigation was directed by MI. Egil Krogh is known to

Iden 186

but I suspect that it is and that this is the

reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David

Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an

internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the

White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was

the source.

Director of Security

Attachment

ADMINISTRATE-MATERIAL USE ONLY

00057

---

## Page 28

ane 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Items in John Clarke Memorandum

to the Director of Central Intelligence,

dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not

previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds

and facilities to acquire. U.S, real estate for FBI and pro-.

vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use

against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised

that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA

being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of

buying an apartment building.

There was also

Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other

CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with

some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the

surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem

here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought

the only source of additional information on this subject was

MI. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help

State Department defer Presidential representational expenses

of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

Mr. Clarke said the total amount. of money requested

by State Department was $3, 000, 000 but that the Director would

not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in

those instances where some operational activity was involved of

could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalaction influence

activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

CLASSIFIED A: .

6 M 4 2666

00070

mind to

(aales) isgagilia, inacol dide di er

---

## Page 29

funds used., He felt that only Colonel White could supply

additional detai

He said Senator Russell d

Repre-

sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but

asked not to be briefed in detail.

Inspector

Attáchment

•2

SECRET-EYES ONLY

000%1

---

## Page 30

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the

Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions

at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment

should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point

raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill

Colby is fully conversant are:

JFKA. in Cl activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.

WHBRINEY and WHMUTUAL investments and

accumulation of Government capital.

Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U:S.

real estate for FBI and provision of technical

equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against

a common target in the U.S.

Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer

Presidential representational expenses of I. B. Qui

trip to SEA.

SPRINC

John M. Clarke

00072

EYES ONLY

SECRET

---

## Page 31

ne

1973

MISCHANDUM FOR: Inspector General

to the Director oth

Central Litelligence,

datad 9 may 197.

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not

previously been reported.

The first: "-- Usc of CLA funds

and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-

vision of tochnical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for uso

against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with dír. Clarke, he advised

that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedior CIA

being given to the F'Il in cashiers checks for the purpose of

buying an apartment building

There was also

Agency help given in handling the purchase.

Further, other

CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with

Bome OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the

surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem

hero was in the use of funds, not in the opcration.

He thought

the only source of auditional information on this subject was

Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CLA funds to help

State Department defer Presidential representational expenses

of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested

by State Department was $3, 000, 000 but that the Director would

not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in

those instances where some operational activity was involved or

could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politica/action influence

activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

SEB

00073

253 02Y

CERT MO: ANOR: 421.1!

....:

Limbededia

---

## Page 32

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FBI referred to in paza 1 1s not shown

In other docurents in the Agency. It

has been kest very close with ir. Yale,

Mr. Magnusson, and possibly tr. Colby.

All. flles. have been purged.

00075

(DATET

FRUGS: 101

REPLACES FORM 10-101

WHICH MAY BE USED.

(87)

---

## Page 33

07 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA•

: Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM

: Director of Finance

SUBJECT

•: Special Other Government Agency Activities

1.

Project whorE. - Colonel White, Executive Director-

acting for the Director, authorized the Director

of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 Vovember 1971 to obligate

$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to

disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be

deternined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by

the Chief, CI Staff, DDP.

This authorization was reaffirmed

by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still

active.

2.

GMEDLEY - Rental of office space in New York City

for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,

Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,

Deputy Director for Plans.

Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable: and non-

reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of

Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda

between

the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

Project THOFOLD. - Reimbursement from Bureau of

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by

a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

5.

Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the

Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of

$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated

sensitive services.

Details were kept in the Office of the

Deputy Director for Plans.

POORES:

.. i.

SENSITNE MIELDERER EZURCES

AND METHOSE NVOLVED

SECRET EYES ONLY

E2 IMPDET JFKIA)

CL. BY: 2006567)

000-70

---

## Page 34

MEMORANDIM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT

: Special Report

1.

This memorandun

is in response to a request to

provide information on situations or associations that

might appear to be irregular on the surface.

.. Details to the White House and Goternment Agencies

Background: Lor many years the lentrat intelligence Agency has

detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House

per

se and to components associated intimately with the inrediate

office of the President such as the Council on International

Economic Policy and

the President's Foreign

Intelligence

Advisory Board. We

have furnished secrotarics, clerical

employees and certain protessional employees on a reinbursable

clerical on protessionals assigned to she inmediate nice o

and non-reimbursable basis.

House office,

but we do have one young man detailed to their

Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.

I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as

late as the

fall of 1970 couriers,

telephone operators,

laborer assigned to

invitations

for State dinners.

were apparently available to run the White House and most of

a table o pun

the grounds and a graphics man who

designed

By October of 1970, more funds

our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.

ClA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with

detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and

others on Defense and State and other Government entities

whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present

time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven

clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists

detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and

security officers detailed to the Department of State to

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CI By 003955

00105

---

## Page 35

protect foreign vis

stors. Recently, John Ha

was detailed.

to the Secretary oi

he Treasury along with

aI other Agency

employees.

We have even,

in rare. instances, detailed our

people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

• 3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -

Discussion:

Details to st, the white House, isy and the

National far College are probably quite deforsible., On the other

hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees

currently workirg at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his

secretary when he was the Secretary of Cormerce (she also

made

a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his

present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for

a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112

served" for

over ten years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for

AID. This information has been kept "close

to the vest" during

that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability

retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire

automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House of

other Government agency has been carefully considered and

approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were

involved.

4.

Project THOFOLD: I believe the support we are

providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be.

reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely

sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on

it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more

. general sense,

Contract Personnci Division prepares and

executes

contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out

domestic activities. We also process Staff agonts who are

domestically assigned. None of these assignments

are decided

in OP.

I really have no way of knowing with any degree of

certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangemerts with American Firms: In the interest of

reporting "too nuch,

" I would remind you that Contract Personnel

Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American

firms to provide cover. for Agency assets. The actual assign-

ments are overseas.

The arrangements, however, are backstopped,

in the main, in the United States.

00100

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 36

MAY 1973

MENORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

SUBJECT

Deputy Director for Management and Services

: Sensitive Activities Performed by the

Office of Logistics

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director

of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given

by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May

that Office Directors report on activities, either under their

cognizance of otherwise known to them, the nature of which

could possibly need explanation or justification when viered

within the statutory responsibility and authority of the

• Director of Central Intelligence.

responsibilitles of the

Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters hereir

reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-

quest.of

another

Agency component.

lie have prepared à brief

description of each action involved and then have included the

name of the sponsoring component.

The substantive reason for

the requests for action by this

• Office will have to be deter-

mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3.

Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the

initiative of this Office are as follows:

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-

cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and

related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,

It was organized in 1969. This proprietary

is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to

obtain such materiel without associating the procurement

action with the United States Government.

It is legally

necessary

that the proprietary be licensed by both the

State and Federal jurisdictions.

Since it is located in

Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland

State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

ARIE NONCE

SENSITNE MOLLIGERCE SOURCES

A MarDOs 118438

EYES ONLY

SECRET 023-2758

00120

2 sEE CL S:001777

---

## Page 37

SUBJECT:

Sensitive

Logistics

-tivities Performed

by tr. Office of

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's

association with this proprietary and

have assisted us in

obtaining the appropriate State license.

Similarly, a

Federal license has

been obtained for the proprietary

through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury.

They, too,

nave been briefed on the Agency's association with this

proprietary. .

b.. Under Title 18, Chapte's 2512 of. the U. S. Code

(1968), the sale of electronic intelligence

equipment is

prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local

law enforcement agencies.

in essence,

this law makes it

almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence

equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship

to the United States Government is made. In order for the

Agency to covertly obtain such eauipment and hide any

Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the

Procurement Division. has

relied on an established working

relationship with a U.S. firm.

This firm, a prominent

supplier located in.

Maryland, deals in a vide

range of law enforcerent, police supplies, and equipment.

The Covert. Procurenent Staff has. had a relationship withan officer

• in the firm

for over 15 years.

The officer

agreed to

allor us to place orders

through his corporation to major

suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national

proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any. inquiry

is raised by the

Department of Justice, the firm's officer would

immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff

who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact

the Department of Justice, identify the Agenco's interest

In the procurement action, and clear

responsibility. On 10 September 1972, there was an inquiry

about the proprietary

Iron_an fil agent making a routine

investigation of. the officer's

books.

Through Offica of

Security liaison

the agent was informed that it

with the Department of Justice and the FBI,

is an Agency

and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.

Most of the DD/O area divisions Irom time to time submi:

requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equioment. Th

majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-

gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various

foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

EYES

PHLY

SECRE

00111

pitt

---

## Page 38

Contractua

Relationship - USJPRS:

he Agency

organication, USJPRE

has a contractual association with

approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract

employees.

Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service

of unclassified documents for the Government.

The independent

contractors work in their cun homes and are given assignrents

as the need arises.

The contract employees are

"integrated"

into the bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C.

They are paid and administered by the Bureạu./ CIA reimburses

the Bureau.

Their basic contracts of employment are prepared

in Contract Personnel Division.

8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of

External Employnent Assistance Branch's action on a request

from Howard Hunt for

a lockpicker who might be retiring or

resigning from the Agency:

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38

uf

EEAB

received a call from licward Hunt who asked iden 38 1f he had

te see or gestnes who yesuantionas that who recrod 341

31 July 1971: Iden 39

did not die be peR Tecard une

to show the date of this exchange, but Mr.

Thonas-Hester (who

also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between

March and May 1972.

All of the above information was reported to the Office

of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with

the Agency regarding Howard Fiunt.

9.

Resume Sent to McCord: Ross

Lambert, a contract

employee who retired in septenber 1971, was a client of the

after retirenent.

James McCord's security business.

EEAB. sent a resume to

McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-sumner 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from

Chicago.

(He had a job

there with the Halifax Security Co.,

a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had

CONFIDENTIAL

00107

---

## Page 39

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from

the D.C. area.)

Agent of the FBI wh paid he had been visited

y a Special

: told Lambert that his resume had been

found among McCord's papers.

The. Agent wanted to know if

Lanbert had any connection with McCord.

Lambert explained

After the Agent left him,

OS were notified immediately.

Harry

3. 7uher

Harry B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

00108

---

## Page 40

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

which indicates that there was a break-in at • Identity 61

Information has been recciled from WH Division

on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76 Desk

of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that

time.

2.

I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66

of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised that the FBI did

have coverage of Identity 61,

and the Agency sup

ported this operation.

He indicated that this ias identifica

provide additiona

/s/ Identity 10

: Acting Executive Officer

CORDSITIN

• E2 IMPDET

CL BY 008246

00371

---

## Page 41

DO.222

8 MAR 1973

HELORIOUS FOR:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Deputy Director for Operations

HII Comments on Jack Anderson Column

jack Anderson's Fishington seriy-co-

Bound Column of 3 March 1073:

"Chilean

Break-ins Reflest norgate"

I. WII Division has reviowed the raferonerd column

(copy attached) by Jael anderson and finds that it con-

tains no new infornation. Do the best nowledga of the

Division, there is no soundation to the allegation that

&. Howard Hunt was engaged on belf of Ilt in brocking

Into Chilean diplomatic installations in lashington

aid

2.

Any conuection betweon' ITT and these break-ins

is purely conjectural and the colon takes care to

point this out.

3. Harold dandria, iT lacin erion representa-

¡tive, has told us that he had no relationshi, vich

that Anderson sighs dapty such

on this or any 1lT aatter. He had anticipatc

a rolationshig in bis

coluan and had assured us that this vas not true.

/s/ Identity 81

Chieï

Testein Monispaere Division

Attachment: As Büated

Mr 312 gu

GiMB 3/3/95

(9803 RAS/gel 3/10/94 JFK)

ICH BY 00263

00373

---

## Page 42

USSS-EPS FORM 101

6/70

EALCUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

INCIDENT REFORT

SEPIAL (CASE) AÜGGER

DATE OC 13572-320

73. 45.5 =01

LOCATION

(RATIOK)

ISTREEIL.CORLSS)

5. ALTURE OF INCIDENT

Chile

6, REPORTIO BY:

2736 laserchuetts Merueles

Burglary it

•in"

Hernan Hazarro

10. OFFICE ASSIGILO

Sergeant Stevens E. Eutler

• Scracant Riley l. Richardson

14. WITNESS

IT. DATE

1705 Manlet Street,

Sprirafield, Vi.

8...0ME FED: E

321-7222

785-1746

05-75-72

1S. ROGHISS

1330 hrs.

N/A

• N/h

B. WITNESS

19. RODRESS

1:/::

13. 0F 1/2.

20. ACMI

/A

N/1

21. Office frins

82. DETAILS OF INCIDENT IGRIEFLY DESCRIGE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITERAS AS HECESSARY INDICATING ITEMS

At anproximatol: 1320 hours, lorder 1as: 13, 2972, Farcirn listics Divinici=

chancery of Chilne 113a Paosechasetis Avanite juke, sometime between long have ar

Friday, May 13, 2972, and on 0355 hours this aste.

1355 at 2a1 Potenden ard the wadarioned sara dispatched at epproxias al

The undersirned ras aivised bu lir. Hernan (iJ) loverro, Leninistrative Comester

of the Pabaor of Crile, that the Choncor of Chile ras ontarci and all une officia

were ransactica. it this tire the method of entir on ites telen is valaicia.

Kro levarro avises that he will contect the foreirn Vissious Division ratzk fara

When detchiiation o tissing articlas is rade. (contiruca)

23. PHOTOS

O YES

jam

PUSE EPS FORN 102 • SUAPLENENT TOO ADDITIONAL DETAILS)

FS;

===

24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS, IDENTIFY BY NAILE, NOGRESS, SEX, RAGE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMGER, DOS, EYES, ETC.

PES.

LAST NAME

FIRST

MIDELE

NOURESS

RAGE

SEX

HEIGHT

HAIR

EYES

CATE OF BIRTH

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

NATISAAL.: •

LAST KAME

FIRST

MIDDLE

ACORESS

82}

"RACE

sEX.

HEIGHT

WEIGHT

HAIR

DATE OF SIRTH

SOCIAL SECURITY.NO.

RATIGNALIY

25. ARREST PO

26. ARREST NO.

27. ARREST OFFICER-(NAME AND BADGE NO.

28. OATE GE ARREST

23. n5--

30. INCIDENT STATUS

2.25 OPEH

B. JI CLOSEO

C. O UNFOUNDSO

O. O CLEAREO aY AISE!-

31. REPEATY OFFEND SIGNATURES HONG

32. APPROVIME OFFIGIAL (SICILIURE)

Suprant Ductene to mutter

3J, STATE DEPT, OFFICIAL NOTIFIE

05-75-72

1500 his.

Contain Pete li. Lantros

N/A

HOUR:

N/A

00376

---

## Page 43

INLIDENT REPORT • SUPPLEN

1. SERIAi ICASES,.

Fú=12.-392

MATURE OF INEIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPORTCO BY:

Hernan (MIT) llerarro

7: ADDITIGNAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

4. AODRESS:

S. HOLE

321 -

7605 Marlet Street, Springfield, Val

0.52.

Con Tic

The folloring were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge if 14i,

MP. D.Co,3D, and Officer lichael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, K.P.D.C., 3D, also MaP.I."

Print Cruiser # 735.

S/A Michael F. urphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

jam

B. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTEO PESSONS, IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

LAST NAME Y

FIRST I

• MIDOLE!

ACORESS:

(8):

RICEI

SEX

HEIGHT!

WEIGHT;

HAIR!

EYES!

• DATE OF BIRTHI

.. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

-LAST KAME!

FIRST I

MIDDLE!

ADORESS|

12) ÷

RACE!

SEX. I

KEIGHT\

WEIGHT|

KAIR\

•SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

9. ARRIST POI

10. ARREST NO. I

!!. ARREST OFFICER LiAME & BADGE XO:...I

12. DATE

14. CUSPENT CASE DISPOSTION!

15. USSS-ID EASE NO.

8. 6105c0-1

iscounded!

D. ECLEARED BY ARRESTI

1/k

16. TIANE CASE DISPOSITION!

OPFE

17. A65TBG 0885.E2151

Tier dES

Sergeant Sterons E. Butler

00372

118.OA1C1

19. APSROVED ISIGNATURE & TITLES

05-15-72

Captain Pete li. Mantios

N/A

NATICIALI"Y

NATICHAi:TY

13. M900

05-2:

---

## Page 44

2. PIATURE OF INSIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPOPTED 8Y:

14. ADDRESS

321-2122

Honen (RT ) levarca

7. ADDITICiAL DETAILS OF NACISENT:.

7605 Harlet Straet, Springfiald, val

6. 0rd.

•705765

At approxinately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mir: Havarro contacted Officer

Adrian Poral -Joncalez a: 1310 I. Strcet, lio. and stated the folloring lüens rissi:e:

(4 Portable Radios), onc (1) Sanjo 111/SM Portable Redio, trio (2) Panascnic 1:/F Rad

and one (1) Westinghouse Mi/F1/Sil Radio, 1J.so taken ras one (1) Braun Eloctric Share:

one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an uninoim number oi books.

jam

B. SUSPECT-LIG/OR ARRESTEU PERSO!S, IDENTIFY BY MAIE, ROERESS, SEX, RACE, SECIAL SECURITY RUMDER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

W/1

FIRST

RACE!

SEX 1

HEIGHT!

WEIGHT!

• LAST NAME!

FIRST

(2)

RAGEI

.scx.|

HEIGHT !

WEIGHT!

S, ARREST POI

10. ARREST NO.!

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTIONI

підее і

16. FIHAL CASE DISPOSITION!

OPEN

.B. ENGLOSED 1

-HIDDLEN

ACORESS;

HaiR!

EYES

. DATE OF BIRTH!

MIDDLE!

MEERESS

HAIR .!

•_EYES!

• DAJE OF BIRTH I

!. ARREST OFFICER MIAME & BAGGE 4O!

O. ICLEARED BY ARGEST!

•SOCIAL SECURITY NO.,

KATIGRAL::

•SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

• NATIONAL:T:

17. DATE

13. hers

•15. USSS-ID CASE NO..

18. DATE|

05-25-72

Captain Pete M. Manthos

00378

20. DA:.

05-13.

---

## Page 45

PERSO!! CA PROPERAI

14. EX: COPIES

15, DIST

.3D

10.

DEAT

17.88.1

18. COSPLANANT'S OCCUPATION LÀD HRS

N/A

19, DESCRISE LOCATION OR TYPE Or PICilISE

CHILE

EMBASSY

20. VEMICLE USED - TAG 1D. MAD STATE

21. YEAR

HOUEL

COLOR(S)

Embassy oF chike

3. STREET ADURESS

1736 01A55, Aue

"N.W.

¡OYEC 3. VIHERE EMPLOYED OR SUFCOL ATIE

NJA

7. SEX

FACE

00S

R. CHIME

BUrG. 7:

9. LOCATION OF CRIME (LIÉreSS)

1736 MASS, AUe N.Il'.

J. VILAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR M'ENS USEI

INK

1248-4.2

4. HONE PriO..i

N/A

6. BUS. FIIONE

785-1741

12. METHOD USED

5.11.d0220

PRiOTOS

J YIS

FS 7

13. CLASS:F.01013%

_OHNER R-REFORTIG PERSON

CODE: C-COMPLANT P-PARERIT, GUAR

22. B6Ail.E (Last, Firs", dindie)

"NAVARRE, HERNAN

UNK

CODE:

RES. ADDRESS

Soirrig Fiele NoME PHO:E

R

76.05 Homletsi

VA

321-7121 755-472

24.

25, IDENTIFY SUSPECIS GY NUMBER

Analde dome, Padrass, Ses,-Rose, fes, Ma'ell, Diciall, Eyes, Hair, Clochina eic.)

IF ARRESTED GÉE FOREST AUISER AD CHARGE demit destription il aiseiles)

(1)

N/i

(2)

2G. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATIO: OiS SODY

27. HOSPITÁLIED - JHERE?

0411

20. TRANSPORTED CY

29. TREATED BY

30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TIREN

UNY.

33. EXCT LOCATIONT OF PROPERTY

132. TRADEHARAS, ACTIONS

MA CORVERSATION CE SUSPECT

TAG PiO.

STATE

YEAR ARiO SiAKE

liNsIde EMbissy

3б.

MEGATIC. iS

OF ASOTE MENS to

(2) CHEFLY DESCRISE LCIOST AND

s.s

NARRATIVE:

(3) DESCRiRE

PROPERTY INDICATE DiSPOSITION AD

• DESCHIDE ALL PROFERTY MIVOLVED.

PORT IF' HORE SPACE 15 MEEDED.

RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTINATED SY VICT!!!.

R-/ ReporTs BeTIceN Thelaurs of 1608, 5•15-72 dud 0555,

5-15-73 The Embissy of chike was etered and shL Tis

OFFIES RANSAKEL VANUONNINLATWASTO KON AT ThIS iT

EuhL ReparT To EchLon LasTeri

CAU 291 SETtiLLON SCeNC

PriNT CRU 235 ON SCeNe

OFF LeITz OF A.P.S, NoTifier NoTifierl 1T Arse

8591

39. REFORTING ORMEEh CHT & PAOGE NO. T4J. STATUS iN'oga Cac)

ns.Kiscdikls 303710

43, SECOND GIFICEIL UNIT EI FAOSE FiO.

B.L. DUNNINIG

PO 251 ALVISiO 3111

DATE & TIME THIS REFORT

5-15-72

37. DATE/TiNE TrRE liO.

23. Порідйо?=

CS UNT-REFERRED 10

42. UCR D:S+OS::..

15. KEVILVER

STI G.O. GilL 1YZ

00379

---

## Page 46

OGG 73-0930

.25 May 1973

MEMOR ANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECI: Identity 61

Break In on 15 May 1972

1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned MI. James Robinson,

General Crime Section, Deparment of Justice and asked if he

had any information as to criminal prosecution of porsons involved

in a break in at Identity 61

• in Washington, D.C. on

15 May 1972.

M?. Robinson stated he had so knowledge of this but

suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,

Deputy Assistant Sccretary for Security, Department of State, and

the Sccret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive

Protective Service (EPS). I telephoaed Mi. Gentile and he identi-

fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from

the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated.

15 May 1972, Subjoct: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest

of the Iden 76 Covernment presented to the American Embassy,

and the Slate Department roply to Santiago, No. 0S1655, dated

15 May 1972. Mir. Gentile also identified the EPS report of

investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.

I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison

man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent

Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had icceived

a telephone call from Vi. James Robinson relative to my icquiry

about prosecution. Mi. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington

Ficld Office had recontacted the Vietropolitan Police Department (MPD)

on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 218-424 filed with the 3rd

District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61

between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

00382

---

## Page 47

Reparted loss at tha

ime consisted of four am/fr

adios

and one electric razor. .

The police investigation identified

some lateut fingerprints but no identification of those prints

was made. Since the reported loss was under $5, 000 and there

was. no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did

not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported

that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

PORN K. GRE.

Assistant General Counsel

cc: Legislative Counsel

Inspector General

OGC: JKG: cav

Orig - Subject: Watergate Case

1 - JK& Signer

1 - Chrono

-2

00385

---

## Page 48

EMB 03Y

1. June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Mr. William E. Colby

Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have

searched.my memory and M. McConc's files for examples

of activities which to hostilo observers or to sonconc

without conplete knowledge and with a special kind of

motivation could be interpreted as esamples o1 activities

exceeding CIA's charter: JFK/(B)

2. First, as we discussed,

on 7 March 1962,

DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert

E. hennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists

scott in an cffort 10 identify

their sources for classified information which was apponi-

ing in their columns.

Because the primary source appeared

to be in the Department of

Defense, acConc ordered ne

personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,

orally, which I did. I understand more complete infornation

on this operation is available from the Director of Securily.

I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of

what precise actions were taken, what information was gained,

what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with

IDEN-122

thelJEN-123rcpresentative in Washington,

and

also as a result of certain information convejed by

IDEN-124

, James Angleton, with the approval of

Dick Helms, agreed lo mount a counterespionage operation

against the

IDEN-95

in Washington. This involved

breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

no + 4571599999991

MUST CH D0077SS

FRE GAI

00÷58

---

## Page 49

199797199

2

the •

IDEN -126

On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and

Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally.on

the

operation without going into operational details:

Later

on the same day, Piesident John F. Kennedy was briefed.

Actual breaking and entcring occurred somewhat latei, and

on 15 April 1963, DCI dicCone met with

President Kennedy

alone and

briefed the President on the dotails of this

new phase of the

operation.

On the same day, the Attorney

General was briefed and he agreed that he would not

mention it to the FBI unless

the FBI therselves raised

it with hin.

On 3 February 196%, DCI McCone met alone

with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the

opcration. On 1 February McGeorge Bundy was

briefed.

On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secrefary of State

Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed

rescrvations about the propricty of

an operation.

He raised this same concein in subscquent conversations

with icone on 17 April 1961, 28 Nay 1961, and 11 June

1961. On 12 September 1961 Rusk continued to express

grave reservations and repearedly suggested that the

IDEN'-is be indorned diroctly that we knew about their

espionage operations in

the United States and ask them

to desist.

In a meeting on 28 May 1961 Rusk expressed

these reservations in the presence of DeI licCone and

President Join F.. Kennedy.: ,Sccretary of Defense McNamara

waS

also prosent, and there is no record that he had

previously been made avare of this operation.

• 4. Although certain activities never got beyond

the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples

of. such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.

One involved chemical varfare opciations against the ricc

•crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam.

A second involved

a paramilitary strike

against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-

lations.

Outside the United States Government, General

Eiscnhower was briefed on such planning.

A third, which

assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by

Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence

collection effort against foreign installations in

country.

This planning also involved a scheme for selected

L03 day

00453

---

## Page 50

saudiciardiva

ENES CRUT

3

exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the

Soviet intelligence service.

The reasons are still unclear

•o me as to Jhy the rBl chose to brief the PrIAB to the

effect that CIA was planning to wiretay cxtensively an

indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase

the Agency representation in the

generally

to use KGB-type tactics, also extenst ean anc

Indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange betreen

DCI icCone and dir. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting

taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.

It is clear that the fBI was opposed to any such proposal

then, as now, and the plan never went forward..

5.

During the period when Des FitzGerald was in

charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office

learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured

the coopcration of several prominent US business firms

in denying economic items to Cuba.

There was no question

but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-

ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6.

On 17 April 1961, Mr. Robert B. Anderson cane

to DCJ. McCone on

behalf of Amcrican business interests,

offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a

favorable result in the clections in Panama.

Shortly

after this approach.

WEN'-128

IDEN'-129

mado a sinilar proposal to icCone in connection

with clections in Chile.

On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of

the 303 Comnittoc, it was decided that the offers of

American business could not be accepted. it being neither

a secure way not an honorable way of doing such business.

This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent

forgoiten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing

to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations

and private business.

At the direction of Attorney General Robert

Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President kennedy,

McCone injected the Agency, and particularly

IDEN-36

inta-dande

00459

---

## Page 51

CORENS

Соній

• 2.4 APR. 1972

Foreign Su

It for Activities Plann

to Disrupt

or Harass

the Republican National Convention

SUNMARY:

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts

to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to

disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San

Diego, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic

Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning

Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal

to cooperate with mexican workers and students in a demonsira-

during the Convention.

The San Diego

convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting

on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from

the North Victnamese...The letter is of interest as an indica-

tion of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact

will be required

for the SDCC to implement its carlicr-reported

plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the

•Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in

Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts,

held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS) adopted a proposal

to hold demonstrations at

the San Diogo-Tijuana border during the Republican

National

Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate

with Mexican workers

and students in an action to occur during

a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be

entertained.

The North Vietnanese have given their endorsement to

the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a

Jetter from the Vietnam Committce for Solidarity with the

•American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the

North Vietnanese Government.

The letter, which has been

circulated by the SDCC and

is dated 27 January 1972,

expresses "great delight" with the formation of the

and conveys the Commiltee's "best wishes of militant soil-

darity and friendship."

The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC

write often and "send us materials you have."

CONTENUED DISSEN

00558

---

## Page 52

COmi

2, 3 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or liarass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY :

Indications renain limited of foreign plans or attempts

to inspire, support, influence,

or exploit actions desigred

to disrupt or harass the Republican Mational Convention in

-calami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish

Committee for Vietnam, who 1s also a member of the Secre-

tariat of the Stocknolm Conference on Vietnam, has stated

that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in

the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-

tional Confederation for Disarmament and

distributed a

"Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities

In the United States against the war based on a submission

by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned in connection with

che Republican Convention.

DEVELOPRENTS:

•I. mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee

for V: "nan, who is also an influential and dell-inicrnes

staff :.inber of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference

on Vicünam, stated in a private discussion ef the Sredisn

Comnittee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be

nectic

rignt until the

elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and

Peace, a British-based antivar organization and one of the

more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-

•ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the

April-day 1972 issue of its regular internacional publica-

tion Vietnam International.

The calendar had been furnished

: Dy the People's Coalition

for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and

Included the following entry:

August 21-23

Republican Convention, San Diego:

Demonstrations organized by the San

Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,

San Diego, Ca. 92103.

00557

00000070990.8

• :.

---

## Page 53

CONTROLLED DISSEM

The ICDP cOnmentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations

In support of some of the dates listed but does not specificall:

call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

BIn

CONDOLED DESE

00553

---

## Page 54

14 JUN 1972.

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions. designed

to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in

Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of

interest by a mender of the North

Vietnamese Delegation to

the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antivar

organizations in the United States for demonstrations in

connection with the political conventions of both major

DEVELOPVENTS :

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese

Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to

contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent

trip to the Unitcd States.

The North Victnamese official

gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's

Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National

Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to

inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-

tions duiing the coning summer.

The North Vietnamese

ofticial stated that he was especially interested in plans

for actions in connection with

the Democratic and Republican

National Conventions.

00559

NO FOREIEN BISSOMMO BISSER AGROAD

CONTAUILCD BISSEN

---

## Page 55

тотоо"

- Controlled Bisgsi

28 JUN 1972 •

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial

foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-

tage of

activities designed to disrupt or harass the national

Convention of the Republican Party in Niami, Florida, 21-24

August 1972.

00503

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abread

_ Controlled Dissem

• :.

---

## Page 56

CONFRONED DISSEM

26 JUL 1972

Forcign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMARY:

-..

Nes indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,

support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis.

Iupt or

harass the

Republican lational Convention in Miami,

Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A

Icader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice

(PCPJ) has stated that dcmonstrations will be organized to

takc place at United States and allied nilitary installa-

tions abroad during the period immediately before and during

the Republican Convention.

The PCPJ leader also stated that

repiesentatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will

in activities in connection with the Convention.

"The Anti-lar Union (All), a domestic organization which ha:

cen active in plannine dcnonstrations in connection with the

has sent a delegation to

Paris, France, to mect with officials of the Democratic Repub-

lic of Victnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-

ment of South Vietnan (PRG). No information is presently

available, horever, indicating that actions at the Republican

Convention have been discussed at these mectings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an carly July 1972 meeting with prominent members of

foreign antivar organizations, a representative of the People's

Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-

tant position within that organization, discussed the plans

of the PCPJ in connection with the uncoming clection campaign

in the United States.

The PCPJ representative stated that

during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against

Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manu-

facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and

that similar actions will be organized at United States and

allied military installations abroad.

The PCPJ represchta-

tive further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

0055:

INSOLVE MAIEILIGTRCE SOURCES

Alala Ass sodas 09000810 10 18

MACH63 M

TA T 6B33440 1i8701 407960

Chiselle 5i.

SCHE: 02: 623

0.11.3, 01510061 il! •

(3) 8819 fol: 85: 066.

Impossible to detera.

---

## Page 57

CONTROLED DESE

of the bombing in

ietnam are being organiz

by the "Repub-

Lican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on

21 August 1972.

In an apparent reference to the 21 August

actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the

Stockholm Conference on Vietnan will speak on the subject of

the alleged American bombing of dikes

in North Vietnam.

(Comnent: We have no.present information concerning plans of

Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United

States during the Republican

National Convention; nor do we

have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm

Conference representatives to participate in activities con-

nected with the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Union (ANU), a domestic group engaged in

organizing counter-activities

at the Republican National Con-

vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists

to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Denocratic

Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolu-

¿tionary Government of South Victnam (PRG):

An advance party

has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss

the agenda for

meetings with the full Anu dologation. Although

no infornation is presently available indicating that actions

at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-

and the Dal/PRo ofticials, it is known that nonbers of

the AiJ

advance party have astied for advice from the PG officials

regarding the stance

the AlU should take on cortain questions

relating to the presidential elections. It is also known

that the DRY officials have questioned the AlU advance party

about the political mood in the United States.

One of the

AlU delogation. members has

stated that upon their return to

the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members

will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television,

to "educate the American people about the consequences of

Kixon, for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat.

The delegation member added that the demonstrations

•at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."

CONAZNLED BISSES

NO FORNICH DISSERTED CISSER AGACAD

00583

---

## Page 58

Liona

Diesen

2 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign pláns or efforts to

inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designca to disrupt or

harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August

1972. Although mectings have been held recently in Paris., France, between

Amcrican antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic

af North Victriam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of

South Victnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the

DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the

American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National

Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire

American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials;

• at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private

exchanges. A sccond group of activists, considcred more important than

the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 sugust 1972

for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American

del¿gation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, and the Provisional Revolutionary

Government of South Victnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to dis-

cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-

ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar

movement in the United States, they made no direct refezence to the Repub-

lican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen

Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions

of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention. "

TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagardize the Seven

Point Plan ofiered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part,

refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon-

strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

00553

WANG KOHCE

SENSITIS LRTLINNREL SURELS

CONTROLED DISSEN

NO FEREIRA DIZZIATO COSER ARCHD

CLASSERTA CY

SCHEC ELT. 0: E. C. 11122, 122010: 24i166

impossible to determine

---

## Page 59

COMROLES DISSEM

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,

the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.

Additionally, at least one of the American, participants was invited by

the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there

is no information available concerning the substance of these private

exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with

the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972

for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second

group is scheduled to be led by Rennic DAVIS, founcier and leader of the

ANU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for

discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from

his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at

both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's

_ chief target would be the Republican Convention.

00562

CONTROLLED DISSEM

---

## Page 60

9 AUG. 1972

Forcign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

of Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans

or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed

to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party

in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00565

CLASSIFIED EY

VIARIES NOTICE

SENSITIE 1..

barna sounees

CAl 60R006

impossible to determis

---

## Page 61

:...

CAMROARD DESS

.:06 WAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign

efforts to inspire, support or tale advantage of activities

designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of

the Denocratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972.

The concept

of coordinated international support for donestic activities

in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent

World Assembly for Peace

and Independence of the Peoples

of. Indochina: however

all for international the Conference issued no specific

support of disruptive actions at the

American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At. the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace

and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in

Versailles irom 10-1s February 1972, there las mention oi

American plans for domonstrations at both the Republican

and Democratic National Conventions.

The final draft

resolution from

the conference's "Action Commission" con-

tains an appendix submitted by Ancrican dclegates whose

goal was to socure global coordination for comestic actions

in the United States.

It calls for international support

to six vecks of domestic antivar actions and demonstrations,

from 1 April to

.1s May 1912, and concludes with the state-

ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic farty

•Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

Party Convention in. San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly

for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"

of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission"

states:

• . .

"In the United States particularly, the protest

against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

00508

UN FACH CET 003 192219

---

## Page 62

GOATROSIOD D.65EM

under. various forms, such as draft

-:°

evasions,

desertions, resistance, demonstrations which

now affect even the soldiers.

The Assembly

calls for support to these progressive and

antivar forces in the United States, and asks

governments to grant

asylum to deserters

to support their right to repatriation.

All together, the peoples of the world

•efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-

ment the restoration of peace, independence

and freedon in Vietnah',

Laos and Cambodia."

...

00559

CON

---

## Page 63

09 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned tò Disrupt

or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMBIARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,

support, influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt

or harass the Democratic national Convention in Miami, 10-15

July 1972, are linited to a reiteration by a

member of the

Secrctariat of the Stockholm Corference on Victnam of a

statement previously issued by the lorld Assembly for Peace

and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina.

The Assenbly's

pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of

international

support to a campaign of

anti-Victnam War activities

in the

Unitca States Icading up to the Denocratic and Republican

conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-

ruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

DEVELOPIENTS:

In early April 1972 an influcntial and well-informed

staff menber of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,

in private, the international anti-Vietnam lar activities

conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April.

The Stockholm Conference

menber stated that

these actions were part of an international

•Campaign in support of domestic American

antivar efforts

during the period 1 April to 15 Nay 1972, and

"will culminate

at the election conventions in July and August."

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the

Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was

a major organizer, had carlier enunciated a similar statement

in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's

Commission." The appendix called for international

support to six weeks of domestic antilar actions and denon-

strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with

"This campaign will lead

up to the Democratic

Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

CONNELLED DEGSI

HO FORECH DISCARDO 05531 SCRE

005:0

---

## Page 64

Tortiont

Preda no Gracent Hendr

CONTRGLLD DISSEI

2.3 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUNRIARY :

Indications remain linited of foreign plans or attempts

to inspiro, support, influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in

Miani, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

A member of the Swedish

Connittce for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-

tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated

that the U.S. National Elections are playing a

role in

the Swedish Connittee's work. The British-based Interna-

tional Confederation for Disarmament

and

Peace (ICDP) has

distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities

in the United States against the war based on a submission

by the Peoples' Coalition

for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned in connection with

the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committec

for Vietnan, who is also an influential and well-informed

staff tember of the Sccretariat of the

stockholm Confereace

on Vietnam, stated in a privatc discussion of the Swedish

Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be

hectic right until the elections in the U.s.":

The International Confederation for Disarmament and

Peace, a British-based antilar organization and one of the

more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-

ference, has attached a

April-may 1972 issue of its regular. international publica-

tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished

by the People's Coalition

• for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and

included the following entry:

July 9 - 12

Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.

Demonstrations organised by Florida

People's Coalition, ox 17521, Tampa,

Florida

33012.

MANHOLED DISSES

•Usi

NO FEEEN DESCED CECES MORENO

00572

---

## Page 65

CCNTROLLED DISGEN

The ICDP coamentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations

in support of some of the dates listed but does not specificall

•call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

00572

CONDROLLER DISSERA

10SH 10OR0

---

## Page 66

10M 48

GONTROLLED -BISSEN

?. JUN 1972

...:

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

•or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt

or harass the Denocratic National Convention in

Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is

by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris

Peace Talks in the plans of the major antivar organizations

or ane war organizations

:in the United States for demonstrations in connection with

the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPNENTS:

In mid-day 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-

gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact

him again when the visitor returned from an inminent trip

to the United States.

The North Vietnamese official gave

the visitor the lew York City addresses of the People's

Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National

Peacc Action Coalition (NPAC), and aslied the visitor to

inquiic at their offices rogarding

their plans for demon-

strations during the coming summer.

The North Vietnamese

•official statca that he was espocially interested in plans

for actions in connection with the Democratic and National

Conventions.

00573

CONTROLER DESSE

8:1:9:

---

## Page 67

Erri

•21 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans

or ciforis to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed lo

disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,

Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

con

CONDONED DISEA

00574

---

## Page 68

00575

---

## Page 69

-dis is80.9

EXES CHY

4

into the US

labor situation, and particularly to try

to ameliorate the quarrel between George Neany and

Walter Reuther. IEN-35

stered a very skillful

course in this connection, but the Agency could be

vulnerable to charges

that we went behind leany's back,

or were somehow consorting with Reuther against leany's

wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency

funds which I know to be controversial..

One was the

expenditure of money under Project NOSES in securing

the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners.

Details of

this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mite

Miskovsky

IDEN-131

, and Jares Smith.

Second,

as you well know, when Lou Concin received his sunmons

to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on

1 Novenier 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.

My impression is that the accounting for this and its

use has never been very frank or complete.

Thiid, at

one of the carly Special Group moetings attended by

McCone he took strong excuption to proposals to spond

Agency funds to improve the economic viability of liest

Berlin, and for an investment program in vali. His

general position was that such expenditures were not

within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow

such spending only on the direct personal icquest of

the Secretary of State or the Secrotary of Defense, or

the White House.

2.

I raise these issues of funding because I

remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the

House Appropriations Subcommittce for having spent $3,000

for stamps in connection with a program to buy

tractors

to secure the release of prisoners from

Cuba.

10.

Under the heading of

old business, I know that

any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried

about the fact that conversations within the offices and

over the telephones vere transcribed.

During McCone's

0297499999993

in?,

...

E:B 03Y

00450

---

## Page 70

З00E7/077

500.79

ETS C37

5

tenure, there vere microphones in his regular office,

his inner office, his dining room, his office in East

Building, and his study at his residence on

White Haven

Street.

I do not know who would be willing to

raise such

an issue,

but knowledge of such operations tends to

spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this

score.

11. Also under the heading of old business, I

Union.J Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was

a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,

and the fact that several Alabama Nazional nir Guard

officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced

with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the. Ith floor there was

a special

arrngement with the Office of Communications

wherehy the Director's office guined accoss to non-CIA

This surfaced bricfly at one point shortly after

Admiral Rayborn became DCI.

He had visited the Signal

Center and

removed a coyy of a telegram from the Embassy

in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,

Eyes Only:

He ruturned to his office and proeceded to

discuss this telegram with George Ball who vas naturally

quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as

to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.

Bon Read in the Sccretary of Stace's office and I spent

several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI. McCone, as you and I well know,

opcrated on a very

lofty planc, and I think certain of

his activitics could be. misunderstood: One example was

his decision in July of 1961 to have Aristotle Onassis and

Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens on Air Force KC 135.

Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the

attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

D3CH

004.62

---

## Page 71

7777173979

EXS ONLY

6

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for

Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety

of this action.

14. The use of

IDEN-132

aircraft

has been remarkably secure, but DCI cCone himself

forgot about

the cover arrangement and became quite

exercised whon he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the

San Francisco airport for the Republican Jational Con-

vention in 1961 aboard the

IDEN-133

with

the highly visible tail nunder IDEN+13+. This was, I

explained to him carefully, a perfectly lcgitimate

charter, but he didn't like

it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with

newsmen

in Washington.

In fact, they gave him a gift and a

luncheon when he left Washington, which is

perhaps

indicative of the press's relations with him. However,.

in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible

Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher

and the authors to change things.

They did not change

a comma, and I

doubt that this old saw willever sing

again.

10.

Finally, and this will reflect my fiddle

Western Protestant upbringing, icCone's dealings with

the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII

and Popc Paul

VI,

would and could. raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a

sinking

iceling that discipline has broken down, and that

allegations from any quarter which cast these things in

• the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,

and no amount of denial would ever set the record

straight.

If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further

details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

.".

1$27

00102

---

## Page 72

7

out that I was very much in the position of the

enlisted

man who knew that the commissioned officers

were aware of these activities

and

better able to

judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-

pretation.

WElder

WALTER ELDER

EYES CLY

00483

---

## Page 73

SECRET SENSITIVE

*SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program

which has as its fundamental

objective the long term manipu-

lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division

difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various

parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are

often exposed to and directed against American radical, loftist,

and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing,

radical, communist norld. There is a possibility that an asset

might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the

Agency of the Bureau; or it night happen sone asset

would, for

some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his

Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-

rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each

case is clcared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Burcau is

kept. informed on a regular basis.

SECRET SENSITIVE •

E2

INPDET

CL BY 061090

00483

---

## Page 74

SECRET

2-

6.

As a means

of sharing more fully our operational

experience we have invited three FBI officers to be

students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25

May 1973.

7.. A Soviet defector

was

confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to

September 1907 while efforts were being made to

establish whether he was a bona fide defector.

Although his present attitude toward the Agency is

quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the

press

could cause

undesirable publicity if it were

to uncover the story.

David H. Blce

Chicf

Soviet Bloc Division

SUCRET

00523

---

## Page 75

MEMORA DUM FOR: MI. Colby

Attached is the material we requested of Dick

Ober:

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for

Activitics Planned to Disrupt or Harass the

Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for

Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the

Democratic National Convention

•C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to

Secret Service for Democratic and Republican

Conventions

ober advises ta kennie davisarican we reported

: (1-1 May 73)

deK

• (1) B)

FOR'A NO.

8 AUG SA

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101

WHICH MAY DE USEO.

(47)

•...

---

## Page 76

FERDE.

SECKET

TO

ORFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

NAPE AND ADDRESS

Inspector General

DATE

INITIALS

2

3

4

6

ACHIO:

WEET PErLY

CUiTMENT

CONCURRENCE

FILE

IAFORIATION

CLEARE PERLY

•RESEATIN!

RESURN

SIGHATURE

Heronrls:

Mr. Broe:

Dick Ober as boen advised that inis package

is

being sent to you. Stice knowlodge of the

exislence of this Committee has been strictly

Piralad. I'm ariad that 1 be delivered to yor

unopened. Although it häs an ER nuniber on it,

it has not been sent thirsigh thiat oifice -- I gave

then only the day, subject, and originator.

Eminin

00517

FOLL HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

-.

FROM: 11AE. AUDRESS ANDMIONE NO.

O/ES/MC/barbara Pindar

101-6NO. 237

1-67

Use pretrous ealtions

VATE

15 May 73

SICKF'T

(40)

---

## Page 77

ROUTING AND NECCAO SH32T

SUBJECT: (Oplionai)

FROM:

EBichard Ober

10: 1O firer designsion, room rumber, ord

buildingl

JEL

DATE

EXTENSION

1465

DIFICER'S

INiTIALS

RECEIVED

¡ FORWARSED

NO.

DATE

14 May 1973

COMMENTS INuriber each commen! lo shor don-,

to whom. Drow o line across column eller each cosmen.

2.

3.

. 4.

5.

6.

7.

IDEN- 73

0/ I.CI

il: Collis

Min

Attached are:

1.

liground told 0:

Commitee per

Your rur:.

of this morning.

2. Copies of memoranda con-:

corning goney sui

pc:"

Secret

service (7 doril ard

23 June 1972).

EYES ONIY

22210002

9.

10.

12.

13.

1.

s.

....

00548

6704La2g"

E 960.58• D C6.FC3471:1.

---

## Page 78

EXES CLIV

14 MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1.

Background: Formed December 1970 to produce

fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,

including studies

on demonstrations, subversion,

extrenisn

and terrorism.

"embership:

Department of Justice (Chair-

man); Federal

of Investigation; Departnent of

Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central

Intclligence Agency; and

as necessary represchtatives of

other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-

pated:

Trcasury and State). Staff: IES Executive

Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied

by Departnont of Justico with title of Spocial Assistant

to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney

concial for Internal security Robert mrdian and later

William Olson. Irs has reccived requirements directly

thi te liouse.

The white louse has insisted that the

existenco of this Cormittee be kept secret. Awareness

of its existence within this agency has been linitea lo

C/CI and Tour bitters or this oice

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on forcign

aspects (by nomorandun with no Agency letterhead or at-

tribution). Contributions occasionally include forcign

intelligence providcd. by FBI and ISA.

The Chief of the

Special Opcrations Group serves

as the Agency representa-

sive on the Intelligence Fvaluation Committee Staff and

as the altcrnate to the Agency represehtative on the

Connittce (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff):

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure

of classified Information, november 1971.

This study

was initiaied in July 1971 by the White House as a con-

scauence of the President's concern about the release

Mardian

of the Pant don Panors by Danicl Ellsberg 1

Both Robert

Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking

the IFS to produce this evaluation.

Drafting done by IES

•Staff members from Justice and

FBI. Only Agency partici-

pation was editorial review..

EVES GRIY

SENZITIVE

00549

1 INDET CEDARI

---

## Page 79

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August

1972):

At the request of the White llouse, a series of

estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-

ruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention,

Miami Beach, Florida."

The Agency provided from

February through August 1972 periodic contributions for

these estimates concerning foreign support for activi-

ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican

National Convention (copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July

1972):

At the request of the white House, a

series of

estimates was prepared by the IlS on "Potential Disrup-

tions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami

Florida."

Buly 1973 contributions on

The Agency provided between March and

forcign support for activi-

ties planned

to disrupt or harass the Democratic

National Convention (copies attached).

12x0tas1:

Attachments: a/s

EVER CILY

SENSITIVE

00550

---

## Page 80

O FOREICH DISCERO DOSEN ABROAD

HONTNOLEO DISOR

23 FEB 1Y72

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only linited indications thus far of

foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of

activitics designed to disrupt or harass the National

Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23

August 1972.

World Assembly for Peace and Indeyendence of the Peoples of

World i

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled

Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in PariS/Versallles,

attempted

unsuccessfully to include

call

for international

demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican

National Convention.

A representative of the San Diego

• Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action

groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested

the Anerican Delcgations' Stecring Committee at

the World

Assembly to include a specific call for international

support of activitios against the Republican

convention

in their proposal to the lotion Commission of the lorld

Assembly.

This request, however, was dropped as too

divisive by the Steering Connittce, despite initial indica-

tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of

the Assembly.

3: John LENNON, a British subject, has provided

financial support to Project "YES"

, which in turn paid

the ot leading seatar activist pennie Davis? baris repre-

sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations

at the San Diego Convention.)

Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENVO!-supported pro-

ject, the Election Year Strategy Infornation Center (EYSIC),

of which Ronnie DIVIS is a key leader, which was set up to

direct Now Left protest activities at

the Republican

National Convention. In Paris Ronnie DAVIS'

representative

to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of

the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;

it is not known if the Republican National Convention las

discussed.

COXIROLED DESE

00558

---

## Page 81

CONTROLED DISSEM

The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its

harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft

plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a

special television network to broadcast video-taped messages

from other

countries, including coverage of sympathetic

demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public

address systens of live telephone calls from the. Vietnamese

in Paris and from the Comnunist Chinese and others at the

United Nations.

00550

GOMSEGULED DISSEM

---

## Page 82

CONTROLLED DISSED

81 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts

to Inspire,

support or take advantage of activities designed

to disrupt

or harass the National Convention of the Republican

_Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated

international support for domestic activities in the United

States was generally endorsed at the recent world Assembly for

Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the

Conference issued no spocific call for international support of

disruptive actions at the Anerican national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Sovict-controlled World Assembly for Peace and

Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles

from 10-1s February 1972, there las mention of Ancrican plans

for denonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic

National Conventions.

The final draft resolution from the

Confercnce's "Action Connission" contains an appendix

submitted

by American delegates whose goal

was to secure global coordination

for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-

national

support to six wecks of domestic antivar action's and

demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with

the statement:

"This campaign will lead up

to the Democratic

Party. Convention at Miami

on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

Party Convention in San, Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris Norld Assembly for the

Peacc"and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February

1972; drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against

the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various

• forms, such as drait evasions, desertions, resistance, demon-

strations which now affect even the soldiers.

calls for support to these progressive and

the United States, and asks the

governnentsantiwar forces in

to grant asylun

to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.

All togother, the peoples of the world will efficiently

help

to inpose on

the U.S. Governnent the restoration of peacc

and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

CONTRALLED DIESEM

М ГРАВ СКОЛО ВІРОГІ АРАВІП

00552

---

## Page 83

CONTROLLED DISSEM

DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the

domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-

vention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a

"large exposition in

the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,

which with novies, the vorld displays will portray the strusgles

of people all over

Plans for activitics at

Expose 12 are believed

to include (a) the use of a special

television network to broadcast video-taped messages from

other countrics, including coverage of sympathetic denon-

strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address

systems of live telephone calls. from the Vietnamese in Paris

and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

In addition,

international opposition

can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries

and liberation movemcnts to carry their flags in SDCC demon-

strations."

00555

---

## Page 84

Jink

MENORANDUM!

SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy

in 1971 and 1972

1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in

rashington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of

this Agency in April-May 1971. This oporation, which used

Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed

operationally by the FBI, was initiated only aftor then-

Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former

FBI Diroctor J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-

Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-

continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it

appeared that Director

Hoover intended to testify before.

Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and

¿dentify this operation as CIA instigated. l

2.: The operation consisted of the following three

technical devices:

a.. An AC-powered, masked" transmitter and

-..

two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy.

-Chief of Mission.

.b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the

..office of the Ambassador's secretary khich was

SERDET

00458

---

## Page 85

- 2-

designed to pick up high quality audio of typing

in the office. It was hoped to break these audio

signals into clear text using advanced computer

techniques developed by, Division D: No useful

product, however, was ever obtained.

c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter

and switch concealed in the

door of the

Embassy, which would supply crytographic information

for NSA. (Produced excellena quality signals.

until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of

battery failurc.

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of

the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limitca

value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations

of only noderate interest). Reactivation was requested because

of strong interest in the spocial IDEN-76 government mission

arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level

talks. with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt

-renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the

_two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December

1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting

00499

C.

SECRET

---

## Page 86

-

- 3-

DirectorI. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request

was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of

this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing

to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the

mounting disclosures

about CIA involvement in LEN-76 This

was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining

proper security for the listening post which, as with other

operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

00470

SECRET

---

## Page 87

SECRET

UNB)

Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped

accounts have been estanfished fur contract personnel

whose delationship with the Agency camot be revealed

but who are entitled to Social Security coverage.

Following expiration of the contractual relationship,

at an appropiate time the alias and true name accounts

are merged permitting the individual to recoive com-

plete bencfits upon reaching the ago of eligibility.

Alias IRS Tax Accounts.

54 Social Security

dividual tux accounts have been established with IRS

on an unwitting basis in l1 cities in the United States.

g.

Notional Facilities. 31l notional lacilities

(13 corporations:

•Ei sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers

and 61 telephone answering scrvice addresses are nain-

tained by CCS in 58 citics in the Unitcd States.

h. Alias Signatorics on Bank Accounts. 21 aliases

for signatures on 25 moprietary entity and one notion-

al company bank accounts are in usc by 9 officci's and 1

proprietary-hiro as follows:

Ccs/llas - 5 officer's (12 aliases) on 8

proprictary entities and 1

notional conpany.

CCS/NY PVC: - 3 officcrs (9 aliases) on 13

proprictary entitics.

CCS/NY PNC* - 1 proprietary-hire (1 alias)

on 3 proprietary entities.

CCS/ND PWC* - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2

proprietary entities.

*proprietary Management Company

-3-

SECRET

00510.

---

## Page 88

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise

of normal commercial annuities.

Backstopping for

this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured

bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirecs

are currently being handled.

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected von-

official Cover jersonnel.

DiTiaonas (interest) carned

on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover

are not reportca to the Internal Revenue Service based

on 50 U.S. Code 103g or Internal Revenue Code Section

6041.

Individuals under cover may borrow money from the

Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; howover,

the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared

lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).

Paragraph l. deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

-5-

•0051:

---

## Page 89

SECRETI

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

1.

Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains

three domestic

proprietary management companies which provide funding and

operational support for 19 Agency entities; including 13

controlled and directed by CCS.

2.

The thiee proprictary managenent companies are

staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the

commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going

operations, manage the legal and commercial

affairs of

entities supporting operations, and provide cover and

funding channels for opcrational activitics as required.

Most importantly, professional services are furnished in

a manner responsive to required security standards and

at a cost considerably loss than would be charged by

3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-

vide cover for ten individuals in the united States and

three orciscas.

Opciationally, the companies provide

commercial funding channels on

a world-wide basis and

serve as corporate orici's of equipment, inventory and

aircraft and as

collection mechanisms

for outstanding

notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government

affiliation or intcrest.

005:5

SECRET,

---

## Page 90

628237

7 May 1973

NEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Items for Possible Use in Briefing

the DCI

B

This Memorandun

is submitted in order to

identify to you for possible bricfing of the

be construct as delicate inapprop contexts could

be construed as

2. At the request of the Director of Security,

from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January

1973 safesite number 583 las made available to the

U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence

by an. Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was

under threat of assassination by organized criminal

elements.

SB Division over the past three months has

interviewed four graduate students as prospective

candidates

for assignments under American business

cover in the USSR.

They were encouraged

to locate

cover jobs on their on.

4. For approximately two years the SB Division

has had the cooperation of the Commander of the

Morals Division of the Distrist of Columbià Police

Department in training officers scheduled for

assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to

conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The

arrangement las made through the Office of Security.

5.

Since late 1972/CIA|has taken part in seven

FBl training courses at quantico, Virginia In

response to requests from the FBl. We have shared

with them through loctures and discussions lessons

we have learned which are relevant to their counter-

espionage responsibilities.

E2

IMPDET

CL BY 059953

00502

GUTT

---

## Page 91

SENSITIVE

have been recuited and run exclusively for the MICHAOS

program.

Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-

tation

of new and

old agency assets who have a by-product

capability of a concurrent capability for provision of

information responsive to the program's requirements.

This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-

tion requirements and

operational guidance.

This collec-

tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-

ment and collection programs of China Opcrations, Vietnam

Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet BloC Division opera-

tions and Korcan Branch operations.

Agents who have an

American "Movement" background of who have known connec-

tions with the American "'lovement" are useful as access

agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to dis-

cern possible vulncrabilities and susceptibilitios, and

to develop opcrationally exploitable relationships with

recruitment targets of the above programs.

These assets

are of intcrest to our targets because of their connec-

tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."

over the course of the clichaos program, there have been

approximatoly 20 important arcas of opcrational interest,

which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:

Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,

4. The MCINOS progran also utilizos audio opera-

tions,

two of which have been implemented to cover tar-

gets of spocial interest.

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive

foreign operation:

Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive

Agency foreign operation.

SENSINVE

SPORTY

00593

---

## Page 92

SENSITIVE

5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the

program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted

in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and

who appear

to have extremist connections, interests

or

background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-

ported upon in response to specific Headquarters require-

ments received from the FBI because such

individuals. are

of active investigatory security interost to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the

MHCHAOS program is sent via

restricted channels. It is

not processed by either

the Cable Sccretariat or the In-

formation Services Division. The control and retriev-

ability of infornation obtained, including.

information

received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-

cial Operations Group.

7.

Information rosyonsive to specific FBI requiic-

ments is disseminated to the FBI via spocial controlled

dissemination chamols, i.c., by restricted handling cablc

traffic or via special pouch

and specially numbered blind

memoranda..

. Information of particular signiticance, when col

lected, has been disseminatod bi spocial monorandum ovc

the signature of the Dirictor of Contral Intclligence to

the White liouse (Di. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as

to the Attorney Goneral, the Secrotary of State and the

Director of the FBI.

SENSIDIVE

SECRET

00593

---

## Page 93

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FR 73-183

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Foreign Resources Division Operational

Activities with Possible Flap Potential

FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May

1973, same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be

used as academic

support assots and access agents.

Thesc Americans are used for spotting and assess-

ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-

ments.

Paragraph 1, b. and l. c. are deleted

because they contain sensitive agency

operational methods and techniques.

SECR37/3S SITIVE

E2 IMPDET

CI BY: 057223

00613

---

## Page 94

12/

d. Question: What is the arrangement re recruiting

out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?

Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically

requires approval by the, ADDO or DDO for any

recruitment attempt made in the United States

against an American member of the academic

/ .

community or a forcign target attending an American

academic institution. This regulation is presently in

the process of revision in that this approval authority

for academic recruitments in the United States is to

be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority

for recruitment attempts against American students

outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief

of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions

at the present time are those precluding iccruitment

attempts against foreign students here in the United States

on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockcioller or Fulbright.

2. If you have further questions, please lot mo know.

signed, IDEN-173

Acting Chief

Foreign Resources Division

00612

---

## Page 95

SECRET/SENSITIV

FR 73-180

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Foreign Resources Division Operational

Activities with Possible Flap Potential

I. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational

activities carried on by IR Division in the United States run the risk

that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency.

We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with

our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under

the circumstances.

There are cortain rather unusual activitics in which

FR Division las participated and/or is participating that contain some-

what grater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed

these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

JFK(I)CR)

a. Ihe New York Base provides a fairly considerable

amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the

Chinesc. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines

and Mi. Helms. Thus far there las been no problem other

than the inordinate amount of time spent by(New York Base)

JFKCI)CO)

personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of

money that has been expended in support of these efforts.

b. A CIA Officer

is to be assigned to ER Division.

is presently assigned overseas

The

under deep

cover; this cover is the Mullen Corporation.] This is the cor-) JFk(8)

[poration that employed E. Howard Hunt. JIn discussions between

NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer

would

be pulled out

and reassigned in the United States.

FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.

E2 IMPDET

CL BY: 057223

006.11

SECRET/SENSITIVE

---

## Page 96

SECRET/SENSITI

E

12!

We have concluded that the best solution is to have this

officer attend à university in the Midwest for at least

a year, working towards an advanced degrce until there

has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan

to make no operational use of tie CIA Oifivar wnatsoever,

during the period of time that he is attending the university.

Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the

situation and decide the nesi course of action at that time.

Paragraph 1, c. is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency opcrational methods and techniques.

d. FR Division has been bricfed in general on the

JFK (1)(3)

JFK()(S)

existence of an audio opcration done by the FBI but with close

(ISD support)in San Francisco.

This operation is directed

against

IDEN-62.

I understand the opcration has

been excoptionally well done. However, the responsibility

for this activity has come from Chief, ISD in conjunction. JFK()(S)

JFK(.)66) with SB Division.

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations

in the

IDEN- 61

by the FBI. (The equipment was pro-

duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no

CIA personnel have entered the premises. The operation was

deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however,

are still in place.

If discovered the operation could cause

some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is

unlikely the finger would point to CIA.

SECRET CONCITIVE

00615

---

## Page 97

SUBJECT: Sensitive rctivities Perforned by the Office of

Logistics

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for

one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities

readily available from another. A typical example of this

procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the

Defense Irtelligence Agency element located at NICo In

connection with the curront reporting recuirement, however,

I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and

Attachment I reflects those transactions which appear to be

relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d.

In connection with the disclosures during the sum-

mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly

sareguarding classified documents, this Office undertoo!

two acts.

I directed the Securitu affirer from our. West

Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 -

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy

himself that classified material furnished them by the

LAgency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.

Securit}. Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a

letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming

the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified

information furnished then byfthe Agency; Of residual

interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents

oI a memorandin of 2 July 1971 to thelExecutive Director-

Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports thatLFBIS regularly

disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation

but that instructions had been issued to cease

distribution of classified reports.

While no

other direct dissenination went to

Rand, other

UsiB agencies, primarily USAf, were passing

"many" copies ofLDD/I products to Rand as

thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-

dun also states that Rand personnel had

requested searches and document retrieval from

the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of

Security, there are three relevant items:

The Printing Services Division, OL!'

was requested

by the Office at security to print

a book written by

Harry J. Harphy, Office of Security. The book was pre-

pared by d Muhy ander a Brookings Institution Federal

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00113

---

## Page 98

SUBJECT:

Sensitive

=tivities Performed by ti. Office of

Logistics

JAKUDE

the DD/0,7we will not honor any requisition for surveil-

lance equipment unless it has been approvea cy tre Cl

Staff of theLDD/0,

4

Within the area

of contractual responsibilities, the

following items are pertinent:

In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then

Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a

meeting in his office,

also attended by Mr. William Colby.

colonel sinite explained that the Technical Services

Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance

co the rol for a sensitive projec:

Colonel White did not dis

close®

the purpose of the assistance being provided by ISD

but did instruct me to assist TSD on

purely contractual

matters., Since the Office of logistics

has no information

concerning the mission or purpose of Project

sub-.

stantive questions concerning the subject should be

addressed to TSD. Other procurerent actions accomplished

for the FBlire reoorted belnu.

Specific mention is made,

however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-

proximately sl million,

and the complex technical equip

men't that has been involved in the undertaking.

b.

the Procurement Division, Ob, currently has tic

requisitions in hand fron TSD which would involve rein-

bursable

sales to the FBI. One such requisition

in the

amount of $36,900 is for

two kestinghouse television

cameras. The

second requisition in the amount of s11, 200

is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by

Bausch

and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of

these requlrements pending further instructions which

will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management

and Services.

. Over the years, thist AgencyJhas often supported

other Government agencies fron a contractual or materiel

standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved

request, supported by a transfer of funds, (the Agency) Jab

would either enter into "acconmodation procurements"

the requesting agency of support the requesting agency by

the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are

legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This

Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-

vide a service for, another Governnent agency when such

EYES ONLY

00113

SECRET

---

## Page 99

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Perforned by the Office of

Logistics

Executive Fellowship." The book is entitled "Where's

What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."

It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-

formation that nay be useful to an investigator.

The

book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.

Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made

attribution

The book is classified Confidential,

and it is our understanding that the distribution vas nace

appropriate agencies of the rederal Governaent.

A copy

of Nr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if

desired.

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration (LELl) requested

that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at

LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume.

It

was the intent of LEid to make broad-scale distribution

to Police Departments throughout the country.

The Director

of security and 1 consulted on this matter and jointly

determined that the Lei request should not be honored be-

causelthe Agencyshould not put itself in the position of

publishing law enforcement material for general and un-.

classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-

ing facilities.

b.

On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security re-

quested that I approve his

leasing up to eleven motor

vehicles for use in connection with a special support

operation which would last approximately s months.

The

Director of security intormed me,

in his requesting memo-

randum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has

been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director

• and has his personal approval."

The request las approved.

From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has

requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of

materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by

by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete

listing of such materiel is found in Attachnent 2.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

0031-3

---

## Page 100

SUBJECT: Sensitive nctivities Perforned by the Office of

•Logistics

JAKEIC

6.

In connection with the responsibility held by this

Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all

Agency operating

components, the following information is

relevant.

A safe aäte, identified as "Safehouse 562" which

is Iden 88

"was made available to General Cushman's

office on 23 July 1971.

The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970

as a replacement for a terninated OL standby safe site

and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-

plement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use.

The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older

high-rise building along Iden 89.

The nominal

lessee is Iden 90

a security-cleared

attorney with offices located at Iden 91

• The cover story utilized is that

Iden 90, rents the apartment for business conferences,

meetings, and occasional overnight stays by his staff

and/or his out-of-town clients.

The original lease term

was

for a l-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,

with month-to-month renewals thereafter.

As an OL standby

safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency

components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.

Control of the standby safe site and its security is the

responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of

each user,

component, and date of use; however, no record

is made of those

persons being met at

the site nor for what

purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).

Such information is maintained by the operating component

requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this

Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made

available to General Cushman's office on 25 July 1971 in

answer to a telephonic request.

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance

nor responsibility,

Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National

in than porting the

apartment was rented in Miani

Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National

Convention, 21-24 August 1972.

The apartment was used as

a meeting place for officers of the Niami Station who vere

in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00115

---

## Page 101

SUBJECT:

Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of

Logistics

assistance in connection with the political conventions

that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant

operating component on this matter.

The above recitation of facts represents, to the best

of my knowledge and

nemory, those

ratters which appear to be

relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

-!

John F. Blake

Director of Logistics

..

z Atts

CC:

DD/M&S

EYES, ONL!

SECRET

001.16

---

## Page 102

Requesting

Office

OS

TSD

OS

OS

OS

OS

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

MANURE NOTICE

SENSIT. HOLE: SOURCES

10.009: 106. VIV

Date of

Request

3/23/72

5/16/72

3/23/72

•3/23/72

3/23/72

3/23/72

11/16/72

4/17/72

11/18/71

4/19/72

12/ 7/72

10/13/72

3/26/71

4/20/73

EYES ONLY

Item

Telephone Analyzer

Transmitters, Radio Beacon

Telephone Analyzer

Quantity

Telephone Analyzers

Telephone Analyzers

Telephone Analyzers

Camera Sets

Camera Sets

Actuators, Recorders

Tessina Cameras

Camera, Video

Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,

Equivalent of W L 30691

Tubes, Image, W L 30691

Cameras, Television

EYES ONLY

13

10

20

10

50

fond

Unit Cost

1,350

313

1,350

1,400

1,350

1,375

656

700

488

700

18,045

4,639

4,607

18,300

Receiving

U.S. Depart

ment or Agen

BNDD

BNDD

• White House

"'Communicatin

Agency

Air Force

State

ЛЕС

FBI

FBI

FBI

BNDD

FBI

• FBI

FBI

FBI

---

## Page 103

Requesting

Office

TSD

TSD

TSD

•. TSD

ISD

TSD.

TSD

OL

•OS

OL

TSD

TSD

TSD

Date of.

Request

12/14/72

10/20/72

10/13/72

5/26/71

4/22/71

4/22/71

4/22/71

2/25/71

1/30/71

8/12/70

1/10/73

6/28/72

7/26/71

EYES" OWLY

Item

Transmitters, Radio

Actuators, Recorder

Tube, Image,

Burn-Resistance,

Equivalent of W L 30691

Tube, Image, WL 30691

Transmitters'

Module, Plug-In

Power Supply' - UWP-39A

Telephone Analyzers

Telephone Analyzers

Cable, Special-Purpose

Electrical

Ink, Special Formula

quantity

25

Ink, Special Formula

22

5,000 ft.

1 lot

1.Iot

Transmitter, Radio Beacon

EYES ONLY

Unit Cost

313

591

4,039

4,639

1,372

1,247

• 568

1,350

1, 3.50

. 42

1,825

3,700

728

Receiving

U.S. Depart-

ment or Agenc

BNDD

FBI

FBI

FBI

FBI

FBI

FBI

Treasury

Treasury

White House

Communication

Agency

Immigration i

Naturalizatio

Service

Service

U.S. forcitry

---

## Page 104

JFKULA LOICS -594-73

11 KAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH

SUBJECT

: Deputy Director for Management and Services:

: Activities which might be considered sensitise

issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of

Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which

might be considered sensitive issues.

Most Sensitive Proiects

OJCS

Project Officer

Project

Organization, &

Identification

Telephone

EBANGA]

Richard Ober

CI Staff

Red 1465

Iden 48

OS

Red 9298

CORDSTAT

[. John Hutchings

ORD

3061

Nature

of

Project

A special pro-

ject initiated

by DCI

Machine

index to

security files

OJCS

Reason for

Listing

Type of

data being

collected.

Type of

data in

• index.

Information

storage & re-

trieval of drug

related data

-OFTEN)

oF project /

Type of

data in

files.

Sensitive Projects

(DRUGGS)

Iden 18

OMS

7792

Computer file

of drug data.

EYES

ONLY

SECRET

Type of

data in

file.

00135

ZIMPeer Ci m036490

---

## Page 105

• Sensitive Proiects (Continued)

OJCS

Project Officer

Project

Organization, &

Identifica

Telephone

PROFILES

John Wante

ISD

362-1922

(sterile)

Nature

of

Prois

Statistical

analysis of

psychological

. data.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

Robert Hahn •

SB

Red 1185/

1251

Pattern

analysis of

surveillance

data from

foreign liaison

service

SPIDER

George

stregman

OS

5071

Data on

radio frequen-

cies used for

support of Im

Placc-Monitor-

ing-system,, a

system to identify

unauthorized

transmitters.

DIVREC

Iden 48

OS

Red 9298

File of auto-

mobile license

numbers.

APREGIN

Walter-

Kawalski

CI Staff

Red 9338

File of Agency.

applicants who

were not

hired.

Reason for

Listing

Source of

data. Con-

tractors are

involved

with project.

Nature of

data. Tech-

niques of

• system dis-

cussed with

FBI.

Project

originated by

James McCord.

Nature of

data.

Nature of

data.

2

EYES

ONLY

SECRET

00130

---

## Page 106

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

OJCS

Project Officer.

Nature

OJCS

Project

Organization, &

of

Reason for

Identificatio

Telephone

Projec

Listing

Iden 187

ISD/DDO

Red 1442

Cooperative

program with

Iden 188

Association

with the

named

organization.

in

name grouping

techniques.

Wu. Deghe Clines.

fr

JOHN D. LAMS

Director of Joint Computer Support

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00137

---

## Page 107

[23.15014

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to

Determine Subject Referred to by Tivo Notes

• in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

: DIPPB Memo to DD/ M&S dated 23 May 1973,

Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or

Indirect Involvement

1.

The twò notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval

by the DCI (at that time Mi. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K

for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr. Colby

asked that DDO. records be checked.

2 .DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a

•project called Iden 99.

This is a joint operation with the Iden 100

service for the collection of GLINT intelligence. The activity is

handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.

"3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to Cl on

13 January 1972.: It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that

the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount, ic., $30 to 32K

and not to two scparate.

allocations.

00125

SEGRET

---

## Page 108

73-30÷2

258%

May 1973

HEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Direcior fur Manageineht and Services

SUEJECT:

Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect

involvement

1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request fei

a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969

• with Messrs. Hunt, HicCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

• Z. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

3. My McCord contuct was indirect and occurred sometime

during the late 1960's when I Was Director, Oiüce of Computer

Servicos.. I opposed plans ior Technical Division, Ollice oi

Security (under tIr. McCord) lo acquire a separate computer fer

Iden 101.

Ted Mines of DD/SaT (then ORD)

was the computer individual working with ID and, I think, would

have details.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his

request, first through OliD, that CIA fund sorcign travel on behalf

of the Cabinet Cormittee on Intornational Parcetics Control. Indir

, vidual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency

•föcal points werc Iden 32 and Iden 3;

I ünderstand

Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of

memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are gitached

5. I hell a staff meting yesterday to pass the request lo

all OPPB employees. One oifices who was attending a funcral will

not be available until tomorrow.

OlbbP:Cl=.82amX:0509653119713

J- DIESB ElUE CULÒ S!IS

0x:881 -3991.52266

/s/ Charles A. Brigos

Charles A. Briggs

Director of Planning,

Programming, and ludgeting

Attachment

As stated

00119

SECRET

---

## Page 109

chrient

25 day 19:3

.4 Feb 72

Call from Jin Taylor, OMB re "Dud" Krogh and lis deputy.

Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign

travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was

alerting us to their intention to ask us for, junds for the

travel.

7 Feb 72

Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips ier 3 individuals--

all in FY 1?. Cost probably SiCK. Winnick ready tu maic

first trip. Iden 32 is pluased in. E:Dir said Of re Tehran

visit.

--

7 Feb. 72

See altached menn from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Eill Colby and

follow-on muros iron Seymou! Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Coloy

(2 Aug 72).

1262) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/

Minnich attendance at a Latin American Iden 102

conference un narcotics. He also.

said Joil Shepherd.

White House, was laying un are?

with Iden 32 for

himseli, Shepherd and Mark Algur, OilB to Europe.

23 Jun 72

Iden 3

cominented on Krogh/Minnick interest

in getting CA activitics, including large-scale Pil,

on narcolics front. Iden 3

pushing small-scale PP.

6 Jul 72

Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-lurley filu.

We will send,"

2 Aug 72

1 Nov 72

Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel

orders ready; need tooney this. Fil (No record in my

notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint

recollection of its being to Mexico City).. Sam Hines

and, Iden 73. contacted by Iden 3.

Rulated? Iden 3 call. Agaln noses are cryptic:

WH/GAO-Grace !Iden 32): Survey BiDD problers/

Mexico."

00150

SECRET

---

## Page 110

On Mr. Colby's copy only:

13 Jan 72

20 Jan 72

ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive

Os project - no details.

Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

SFARFT

00154

---

## Page 111

19 Jul

972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman/ JFKU(A)

1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I

581410 rog in do anyone tre yet ago bact Fit da

Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due

to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for

about 20 years prior to his retirement.

2. During a private conversation Jack/told me that he had

been interviewed, three or four times by the FBI in connection with

the cCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed,

and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard

Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security

Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in

January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt

who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Lacks

furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.

Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt

that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in

such activity.

3. According toltack! during the meeting with Mr. Hunt

they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time

they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program

nd a need ior a good security system both before and during th

Tational Convention. (Jack indicated that he sincerely believed tha

the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security

programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even

though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a

problem.

190 31 0578-10

Fakel Food CereaL BS6LA93!

00153

COMDENTAL

EYES 22"

Luisa" 6.

2a!

poless inession, ident dude a cresid

---

## Page 112

=

STAINED

4. When Jack declined, he indicated

Mir.

Hunt asked

for any other reci

mendations he might have.

iccording to jack"

he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the

Agency,Jbut he did furnish the name of!

JOEN-108

who might be

possibly ready to retire from thelagency.

5. [Jackinformed me that he assumed that the Bureau

obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He

said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions

and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning

his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack)

said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any

knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.

: 6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch

with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of

the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-

sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being

removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as

originally reported.

7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr.

Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the

matter other than to comment that I hated to sec thetagency's name

connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation

took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion

relating to this ircident was held. It is being reported for the record

and for information of the Director of Security.

BARBERTAL

00153

---

## Page 113

DD/M&S 73-1S09

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT

• : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

1. Lam addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central

Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such

significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with

the Agency) since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of

such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the

proper format to do so.

2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the

Watergate and related matters was through vir. Jack Bauman a former

Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In

December 1971Vir. Baumanicalled me from Florida and advised that he

wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's

home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a

former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to givel Vr. Baumana call.

I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message.

I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that vir. Bauman/did not have his

home phone and requested he callAir. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for

relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman This seemed of

little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17

of the

Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate

situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from

Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the

Record prepared by. Iden 1? as a result of our conversation.

3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida

and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman MI. Bauman) told me in

a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the

FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

SENSITE U:

: €02205S

AND Licildas M.01150

SECRET 2 MET cL on.

011018

00155

---

## Page 114

(2)

5K0

with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported

this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for

the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the

memorandum is attached.

4.

Other than knowing MIr. McCord through his employment with

the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor

have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related

matters now receiving attention in the press.

Charles W. Kane

Special Assistant to the

Deputy Director

Atts

DES GUY SECRET,

08156

---

## Page 115

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:| Charles W. Kane - JFKULA)

.Iden 108

1.

Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-

tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects

worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests

of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the

subjects.

2. I briefed Mr. Colhy who is the Agency's focal point on

the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBi inquiry.

Mi. Colby suggested that we determine the estent of involvement

and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

of the Subjects'

ubjeWho gly menhwith the Agency tae indicated that

the Bureau does not wish to interview them.

4. The office of the DD/PS will interriel Iden 108

in

the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interrieved.

5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence •

• and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.

I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

6. Mr. Kane) stated that he has no firm conclusion as to

IF how the no one icon in 59 ate the te une wen

Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was

: the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

887/344

00160

---

## Page 116

by the fact that Mr

Lane accompanied a technic

sweep team

to, the Monteviaco station

Mr. Kane stated further that around

Christmas time of 1971 he

received a call irom Jack Bauman

who wanted to get in touch iith Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman sked

Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with nim. Mr. hang obtainer

Mr.

Junt's telephone number through telephone information channel:

whereupon he passed the number on to vir. Bauman.

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman

has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the

current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may

have obtained his name from him.

signed Iden 17

Deputy Dircctor of Security

00161

---

## Page 117

SECRET/SENSITIVE

8 May 1973

MENORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT:

Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved

in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

a. CI Staff - Nir. Richard Ober's program for processing data

of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists,

etc.

b. Fl Staff and Office of Medical Services program

for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American

Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern

listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I bricied police oificers from

New York State and Chicago at the DCl's request (Admiral Rayborn) on

data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified)

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with

possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&I/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103

for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction

System. "

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project

which involved the collection

/

of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms

terminated this program last Fall.

00163

---

## Page 118

CONFIDE TIAL E-2

ay 1973

MORATOL: FOR THE RECORD

S! LJSCI: Research Project on Rotert Vesco

2. On 25 Octoter 197 Liesers reckinridge eneintzel and

in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the

Atlantic/Pacirio Division of tre. Office of Economic reports.. One

project cited las a cuery fro: the cirector, apparentli at tre re-

quest oi secretary Shults, to the effect, "ihat do ie inor about

Vesco," the man then running IDs.

tio of Doil's analists were arsigned

to tre projoct and, working through tre uomestic contact vervicu,

spent a day going over tre

files of the securities and Exchange

Connission, There apparently has sone contact also with EuR vivision

of the Laputy cirectorate for Plans and with ühe Office of Current

Intelligence.

2. The information alove is based on rough notes and obviously

is sketchy.

It is cited no: not to suggest any wrongdoing but because

of the current publicity atult vesco and the prockility of continuing

probes into the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Freckinridge

00173

---

## Page 119

22 Ma

973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Bill--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68,

Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one

with the chapter on radical students in America (pages

25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,

and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the

other version without the references to the American

scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the

Agency. This document without the material on the

US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent

to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more

abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General

in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969),

No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).

3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look

(12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign

Dissem (Copy 98).

Please note that these are our record copies and should

• be returned.

#I-A

4/16/72

1.8.1%•

Attachments

-

ST/4PA)

SECRET /SENSITIVE

Edward W. Proctor

Deputy Director I telligence

00173

E 2.

treer c- se .013329

---

## Page 120



---

## Page 121

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

• : Deputy Director for Intelligence

: Activities Possibly Outside CIA's

Legislative Charter /

gel

1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to

report any activitics which might be considered oulside CIA's.

logislative charter.

2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate

have reviewed the past and present activitics of their components.

I have received responses from all of them, and none reportre any

activitics related to cither the W'atergate affair or the break into

the offices of Ellsbcig's psychiatrist. Although contacts with

thrce of the people allegecily implicated in these incidents were

reporied, these contacts were on matters other than the two

impropci activities:

Hunt:

Mitchell:

Col. White, Richard Lchman, and I talked

to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation

of a recommendation in support of the Agency's

nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National

Civil Service League Award.

While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,

an OCI officer was assigned the task of

providing him with daily briefings on

foreign developments.

63h1* - 80390/gel: 00183

Ber Gins".

UI3329

(9803 RA/fel 3/1/94 55K)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 122

Young:

Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS

• had frequent contacts with Young during the

summer of 1972 in connection with Executive

Order 11652 and the implementing NSC

directive. This involved visits by Young

to ClA to discuss information storage and

retrieval and several meetings of an inter-

agency group dealing with the implementation

" of the Executive Order and directive.

•3: In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported

..domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.

Thair vesponses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly

• 'e

within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be

.,virved as borderline.

-

DCS collects information on foreign students studying

in the US.

DCS collects information on physicians practicing in

the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign

nationals).

- DCS accepts information on possible foreign

involvement in US dissident groups and on the

narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal

with. the FBl and BNDD directly.

DOS assesses the suitability and willingness of

US citizens to cooperate with CIA.

DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,

was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas

calls.

....?.

Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods.

NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery

from NASA programs to identify photography

too "sensitive" for public release.

-2-

• 0018-

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 123

TiES LITT

JfKe

NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special

purposes such as natural catastruphics and civil

disturbances.

OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence

memoranda on possible foreign connections with

the US anti-var movement and world-wide student

dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of

the White House.

CRS is regularly involved with Customs in cxamining

the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to

the Soviet, and occasionally other forcign, embassiès

to acquire positive foreign intelligence.

• FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work

diroctly for another agency, c.g., to the FII to

translate Arabic in Washington.

- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports

covered by copyright. These are circulaled within

the Government and stamped "Official Use Only"

This has gonc on for three dccades without problems.

• ..

FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio

broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens

such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,

and Ramscy Clarke.

FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service

under Departmentiof Commerce cover since 1957.

JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of

unclassified publications in forcign languages

and contracts with private individuals to do this

work. Most of these individuals are not witting.

of the CIA-JPRS relationship.

EDWARD W. PROCIOR

Deputy Dircctor for Intelligence

Attachments

00189

CIA INTERAAL USE ONLY

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## Page 124

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

•7 Mạy 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Centrál Intelligence:

VIA

Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

:

Director of Current Intelligence

: Activity Related to Dorestic Events

1. OCI began

following Caribbean black radicalism

in earnest in 1968.

The emphasis of our analysis was on

black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean

and as a threat to the

security of the Caribbean states.

TwO DDI memoranda were produced on the subject:

"Black

Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black

Radicalism in the Cariboean--another Look" (12 June 1970).

•In each a single paragraph was devoica to ties with the

US black

power movement; the discussion primarily concerned

visits of Stokely Carmichael and other Us black power

activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

2.

In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to

write

a memorandum with special attention to links be-

tween

black

radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of

black power in the Us.

The record is not clear where

this request originatca, but it came through channels

from the DCI:

The paper was to be treated as especially

sensitive, and was to include material provided by the

Special Operations group of the CI Staff.

The CI Staff

material was voluminous but did not providc meaningíul

evidence of important links between militant blacks in

the US and the Caribbean.

This, in fact, was one of

the conclusions of the paper.

The memorandum was produced

in typescript form and given to the DCI.

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY!

1310. e

?.:.

..w??

v:

racial,

00183

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## Page 125

SECRET

SCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

JF(B)

3.

For several months in the first half of 1968

the. Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda

on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad auring a period

when he had dropped out of public view.

is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only,

although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the

Richard Lchman.

Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

00183

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## Page 126

7 May 1973

MENORANDUA! FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT:

DCS Domestic Activity

To the best of my knowledge; DOS has not engaged in any

activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as

illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f

(1) of providing operational support within the US to all

elements of CIA and to the USIB-nember agencies, however, are

perhaps borderline or could be construed as illogal if mis

interpreted. for example:

1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain

foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and

officials.

2. Idontily foreign students in the US through collection

of foroign student lists from certain mivorsities.

3.

Provido personality and assessment data on US citizens

•.

to detormine their suitability and willingness to

coopcrate with the Agency.

1. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians

• to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA

credentials.

• 5.

Collect information on possible foreign involvement.

or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a

passive manner and only when the source has refused

• to pass the information directly to the FBI.

•6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again

only in a passive

manner when the source has refusod to

the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.

SECAST / CBROTE

003.8.

.?.

•PIP.iET CL 7r.001176

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## Page 127

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

collect specific information and supply duplicate or

master keys for foreign hotels.

Collect nedical information from cooperative contacts

on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment

or examinations in the US.

9.

Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing

in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were

foreign nationals, some were US.

The taped information

included school, present business address, date of birth,

and specialty.

10. Acquire routing

slips recording the fact of overseas

telephone calls between persons in the US and persons

overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points

routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted

for approximately six months but has coased.

11.

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods.

SANES R. STURPHY

Domestic Contact Service

00185

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## Page 128

SECRET

EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:. Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for intelligence

FROM

:. Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Activity Related to Domestic Events

I. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then

Spocial Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of

worldwide student dissidence.

Confronted by tinult at

campases like Columbia and mindful of the violence

acconpanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University

and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful.

dissidence was interconnected:

spawned by the same causes;

financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences

hostil to the interests of the Us and its allies; or likely

to come under inimical svay to the detriment of US interests.

2.

The paper was preparca by Paul Corscaddon/ of OCI

with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs.

The DDI,

•/OCI, and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the reasons

for his or

the Presidcht's concerns and to agree on the

sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed,

etc.

3.

Written during the summer of 1968, the most

sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections.

The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,

its motivation, histor; and tactics.

heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students

for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,

the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page)

typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same

author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's irequest in

December 1967. (We no longer have

да сору -!

Classles ly 105520

00193

SECRET

EYES ONLY

:>:°

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## Page 129

SECRET

EYES ONLY

1. Because of the paucity of information on foreign

student movenchts, it was necessary to focus on SDS which

then monopolized the field of student action here and

A second section comprised 19 country chapters--

ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself

as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5.

Because SDS was a domestic organization, the

full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-

wide dissent wont only to nine readers. A copy may be

in the Johnson Library.

Following the paper's favorable reception by

the President and

vI. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC

on student dissent.

The sensitive version subsequently

was updated and

sent to the white House in February 1969.

The less sensitive test was disseminated in

September 1968 and then updated and issued again in

Marcli 1969 and August 1970.

Richard Lehman

Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET

EYES ONLY

00232

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## Page 130

SL 03289/73

8

May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),

Office of Communications, Operational

Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

1.

Prior to 1969 theOC COMINT intercept unit,?

which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact

with the Miami bureaus

of the FBI and FCC, liani Police

and the Miami Beach Police.

The staff provided support

to these activities in monitoring, identification and

DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by

foreign nationals and Anerican citizens in the greater

Miami

area.

Arrangenents 'for this support were made

through the DO's Chief, WH, Miamid

2.

In late Septenber 1972, NSA, through Division/

DDOprequested that the Special

Programs Division initiate

a hearability survey of certain lF long-distance connercial

telephone

circuits between the U.S. and South America.

The circuits carried arug related long-distance calls of

interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies.

Because of

the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,

the survey was conducted

at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92

Virginia, where

the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-

cepted.

On 15 January 1973, fornal ISA tasking of the

intercept was instituted.

On 30 January 1973, all coverage

was terminated by Division D because of possible legal

complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special

Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal

technical liaison with operating components of the FBI

for a number of years.

Initlal contacts and arrangements

for support of specific activities have been made by the

Division@/DDOJ Support has been provided in the form of

Downsided to sun

'pressly 113345780

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY(061947]

TOP SECRET

"il

HANDLE VIA GOMIT, CHANNELS

00140

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## Page 131

ID% SEMILI

S. 03289/73

May 1973

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical

assistance and training, and the loan of agency equipmeni.

In the past several years,

support has been rendered to

sensitive FBI projects NeMa,

UNION and livErItEL.

Support

has been and is presertly being given to FBI projects ORKID

and ROSE.

These projects are described in the attached

sealed

, envelope.

4.

An operational test of an NSA-developed HE DF

system las jointly conducted by sA, civision D/DO and

OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.

A location in Miani Beach, Florida was selected for the

tests because of similarity to the actual target site and

environment in Saigon..

Receiving antennas were placed on

the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/Df site.

A hotel employec asked thy the materiel as placed on the

A team member in effect told him that the group

was an advance security segment for the Democratic National

Convention.

No further questions were asked; the tests

were completed and the equipment was returned to the

Washington area.

• signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.

TOP SEGRET

HANDLE VIA GOMINT GHANNELS

00141

Soonerase to se del

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## Page 132

SENSITIVE

9

1973

MOHAHK. -

Electronic survey of Iden 63.

This operation was terminated approximately two

months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for

two days.

UNION.

- Hen 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by

the Iden 94. Embassy on their diploratic communi-

cation link.

SPD/SEO, support terminated two

years ago.

ORKID -

Electronic surveillance of Iden 64

Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only In planning

• at this time, (attendance at two meetings).

-ROSE

Electronic surveillance of Iden 62

electronic search of the Iden 62

SPD/CUT personnel performed an

area and SPD/SEO

personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording

'of the spectrum covering -to 6. Giz during the

period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin-

ued support by SPD in the future as requested.

•WUGRAVEL - Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk.

SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in

use of device and stood by in Iden 97,

Washington, D.C., to back up case officer is needed.

The operation took place in July 1972.

MANOLE HIM CENT CHAUIELS

Down unded i sneet

DSP SAOCT

SENSITIVE

00142

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## Page 133

TAP SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

=

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUN FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM

: Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT

.:Activity Related to Domestic Events:

1.

In late 1967[OCIJparticipated in the preparation

of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the

foreign connections of US organizations and activists in-

volved in the anti-var movement.

The main purpose of

these reports, prepared

at the request of the linite House,

was to determine wicther any links existed between inter-

national Communist eloments or forcign governments and the

The conclusion reached was that

of ad hoc contacts between anti

war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of

direction or formal coordination.

2.

In October 1967 President Johnson expressed

interest in this subject and ordered a high level intor-

departmental survey.

In response to his personal request

to the DCI, Mir. Helms askea theLCI Staff to collect what,

ever information was available through our own sources and

through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which

was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the

3. LA book message requirement was sent to all stations

to report whatever information was on hana relevant to tri:

subject. ¡ Although agent reports on Communist front opera-

tions overseas were

of some value, the primary source of

information on the activities of US activists--and that was

quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSi,

which had been similarly tasked by the White llouse.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

G.1.4. 0.209!9 8 139:9:

-..

Downgraded » secut

713J45780

tildener:

00333

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## Page 134

P SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

A druft memorandum was jointly prepared by

CocI ani:

CI Staffand forwarded to theDCL. He passed

this tirascript memo, dated 15 November 196%, to the

Presid.nt personally.

The white House copy is 'now in

the fi.us of President Johnson's papers at the library

in Austin.

3: Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and

-forwaiued te the White House on ¿i December and 17°

Janua. • 1968. According to our best recollection, no

furthe

sinished intelligence reports on intcinational

conneciions.of the peace movement were produced.

1.i .....

Richard Lehman

Director of Current Intelligence

DOR SECRET UNBRA

EYES ONLY

.

0019-2

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## Page 135

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

SUBJECT:

Involvement In Domestic Affairs

requast for s memorandum responds to the DDI's

listing of any questionable

involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe

that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable

man coula construe as improper.

2.

CRS

does, of coursc, have several programs

to acquire still pictures, movies, vidcotares

and books either piivately, secretly or without

acknowledgoment that ciA is the acturl end user.

CRS is regularly involved with Custons in looking

at the content of film cans aádressed to the

Russian Embassy in lashington.

Customs occasionally

also providos access to other film from denied

It may be addressed to privatc citizens

or organizations or other embassies.

These efforts

are ained at acquisition of positive foreign

information.

citizens of organizations.

The biographic file-:

building criteria specifically excludes U.s.

nationals unless the person has become of

major importance in the political life of a forcign

country that the file is essential. (l'o my knowledge,

One is

the wife of

the opposition leader of

is Hope Lang.

some persons who are now U.s. citizens but we

i a pardon so lette cyand an

Guvana .and the other

Our Cuban files probably include

have no way to separate them; we have files on

U.s. defectors to. Cuba.

-Zapper ci Dr. 004050.

00137

---

## Page 136

Schind

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

4.

The CIA Library has several informal

snag files intended to aid the librarians in

answering the kinds of questions that they know

they will got on a continuing basis.

An

appointments file is a collation of clippings

on appointed federal officials: who holas what

job when and what is his backgrourd? The extremist

files are a collection of folders on a variety

of organizations and a few people with intricate

organizational links.

Any sort of extremism

is grist for these particular files.

And a few

persons, e.g., Rüp Brown and Eldridge Cleaver,

have cossiers

consisting alrost exclusively of

clippings from public redia.

These files are

unclassified and consist rostly of clippings

fron the public press:

U.s., forcign, undergrouna,

scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of

involvement in dorestic activities that is not

related to development of techniques or logistics

or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

/

"C. EISENBEISS"

Director, Central Reference service

1) C

∞2-

SECRET

00333

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## Page 137

SEGRET

May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: ' DDI

SUBJECT

: Sensitive Activities

1.

FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg

and Watcrgate cases. •

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From

time to time, FDIS linguists arc made available to DDO or Office of

Connunications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving

close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion.

recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several

FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work dircctly for tha FBI on a short-

torm project here in Washington.

The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg

of the DJO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and

that FBIS participation vas approved by tir. Colby and the Director. FBIS

participation was. approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with

the ADdI..

Other. examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help

in the handling and resettlement of crfectors, the recent assignment of

an employee to the. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe

recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another

Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training

of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-

missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes

some material which falls in a "gray"

area of copyright protection, libel,

and privacy of interrational connunications.

Press services controlled

by national governments and transmitted b; radiotcletype without

specific addressees, c.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's BCN^,

are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restric-

tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the

Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,

correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private

point-to-point transmissions. FEIS therefore avoids public distribution of

material monitored from

these circuits by labeling them with an "Official

Use Only" caveat.

The same caveat is used on material which we monitor

from other press agencies which arc protected by international copyright,

e.gi Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (NENA), and the

Iragi les Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

SECRET

JFK

(IA)

SZ37TCE

0071:

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## Page 138

SSUMET

agency material for nearly three decades without problens.

Recently,

however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use

Only"

caveat will not bar such material from the general public under

the Freedom of Information Law and ve are accordingly looking into

alternative neasures, among which arc: (1) the purchase of news services

with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of

those itens vital to the government's business which we nust continue

to monitor and report.

An ultimate decision will be weighed against

the risk of present procedures:

4.

The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often

involves statements or spacches made by U.S. citizens using those radio

facilities.

Examples are statements made or allegedly made

by Anarican

POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ransey Clark in Vietnam.

At the rcquest of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the

approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-

mitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as

part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such

cases, "e have been required to submit nanes of FBIS monitors involved,

prcsumably becausc of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.

In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff cmployce las directed to appcar as

an expert witness in the court-nartial of a Marine enlisted man charged

with aiding the enemy in a broadcast fron Hanoi.) FBIS views all this

wich misgivings.

Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we

rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered

policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

FBIs is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations

is under Department of Commerce cover.

The Joint Publications Rescarch

Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which

great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could

be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United

States on a picce rate basis.

employment.

Contractors are not witting of their CIA

This use of cover is an anonaly in FBIS and contains some

risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public

The surfacing of JIRS was given study in 1969, but after

consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive

Dircctor-Comptroller level not to procced at that time. FBIS is presently

taking a sccond lo0k.

Pitiate

H. KYOCHE

Director

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SECRET

SUNCASE

00203

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## Page 139

"SECRET,

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT

: TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires

that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and

other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for

Operations.

2. Over the years thel chief non-CLA recipients of this

support have been the Department of Delense, the Federal

Burcau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department

of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency

for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these

services have included training and materials, and in a few in

stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,

secret writing and related communications, personal protection,

disguise;

concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-

tion, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are

received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director

or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved

is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the

Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for

coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.

Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development

and Engineering and the Chief of ISD or his Deputy also is re-

quired.

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to

the organizations named in Paragraph two.

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 059098

00215

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## Page 140

• 2 .

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods.

Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,

whether they be GlAJor other Agency requesters, always requires

approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance

would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group

At Ficadquarters of by the[COSjoverseas having responsibility for

coordination of the operation.

BNDD requests are coordinated

with(DDO/NARCOG) Requests for documentation of Immigration

and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs

Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must

be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has

been issued, ISD retains photographs and records of such support

until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material

is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded

of the outstanding documentation.

it-

Attachment

Distribution:

0 & 1 - Addressee, w/att

Sidney Gottlieb

Chief

Technical Services Division

SFORFT

00220

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## Page 141

ATTAC

ENT

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,

flaps and seals counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses

have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department

of Defense and certain elements. of the Special Forces. All requests

are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at

Headquarters and with the Chief of Stationg overseas. In turn

these elements furnished ISD with exemplars of foreign identities

documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing

systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected

audio requirements have been furnished overseas for Cl -type

cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau

in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive forcign

targets in the United States.

Burcau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for

overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,

SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel

responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.

All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCO@ for coordination

with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.

Requests overseas are coordinated with the COSjor his

designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

(CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in

developing tamperproof alien registration cards, 'special

fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests

are forwarded directly to ISD for coordination within ISD if

technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper -

ational.

SECRET

00217

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## Page 142

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United

States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring

and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been

supplied the State Department.

In addition analyses and

exposure of black letter operations against the United States

abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded

to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The

Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,

forcign visas andin ito past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected

personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has

been furnished foreign postal information and has been the

recipient of lctter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent

with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities

(na DO and DDO/EA.) The Post Office has furnished TSD

typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with

for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have

an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert

a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential

campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID

photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval

or graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director lo

Operations.

In each case IS requests approval from the Do.

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical

Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border.

Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under

Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation

is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are

given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

- 2 -

1,9.,00

00213

---

## Page 143

request of CI/PG,

rainees represent internal security or

national police from all countries participating in AID Police

assistance programs.

White House

'Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great

Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy

Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and

Alexandria

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes

reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,

locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry

were given to selected members from the above mentioned

cities.

Overall training was approved by the Director, of

Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for

each course from the Director of Security.

SECRET

00210

---

## Page 144

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJÉCT: pOplionall.

FROM:

Sidney Gottlieb

Chief, TSD

203 South Building

TO: (Oilicer designation, room numbor, ond

building)

EXTENSION

x-2831

NO.

DATE

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

8 May 1973

COMMENTS (Mumber each comment lo show from he-

to whom. Draw a line across columa alier esin commess;

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

DDS&T

2.

Attached herewith are addition. i

explanations of TSD support io

other U.S. Government agencies.

5:

6.

7.

8E77-218 027

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

08220

15.

FORM

3-62

SECRET

COUFIDENTIAL

USE ONLY

UnCLAssiFiE

---

## Page 145

ATTACHMENT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over

the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has

been fully briefed on ISD audio techniques and equipment. The

following are situations where ISI equipment and guidance were

involved in operations:

(A) Identity 59

- Four masked transmitters were

installed. Two have failed and tvo remain workable.

(B) Identity 60

- A TSD built masked transmitter

was installed to collect emanations from a crypto-

graphic machine. The system continues to function

when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C)

Identity 61

- Two transmitters have been

installed and are operating. One is specifically

designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the

other is a straight audio transmitter to colluct con-

versations. A FBl agent is manning the listening

post.

A third system

is not oper-

ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape.

made from this room

was made 'by the National

Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62

- ISD furnished equipment and con-

sultation covering Identity 62

First masked switched trans-

mitters were used in to apartments used as tempor-

ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters

and microwave transmitters were installed in the

permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-

tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install-

ation is not fully operational because the full comple-

ment of personnel have not yet arrived.

SECRET

us /lad-

---

## Page 146

JfK

(E) Iden

-

This is an operation with additional

participation by National Security Agency.

It is

designed in anticipation of the Identity 64

: in Washington. The listening post was

obtained by usingithe Agency covert mechanisms

for procuring the property.

New systems are

being designed and produced by using ISD's covert

contractor mechanisms and ISD engineers.

(F) Identity 65

- Ten masked audio devices pur-

chased from TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install-

ed in November and December 1971, the remaining

equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972.

Tests

made by a TSD officer from a temporary. FBI

listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that

the target equipment no longer functioned and was

believed discovered by the occupants.

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute

an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and

audio surveillance operations which might not be

known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a

relatively unsophisticated device was used against

a domestic target.

- 2

-

002222

SECRET

---

## Page 147

•1.

SECRET

/. TSD/SDB.

Memo +238-73

•8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief, TSD

ATTENTION:

Executive Officer

SUBJECT:

Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

1.. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB

provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for

selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police

departments.

The training was given at the fairiax county

police pistol and rifle range.

Authorization for the train-

ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the

auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of

the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff

and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-

several domestic police

departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection

Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These tech-

nigues had been declassified and are currently available to

the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center

publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities

in the field of countersabotage and counterterior, SDB offi-

cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate

covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City

police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the

Los Angeles Police Dept.

Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi-

cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference

in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA.

When the

recent letter bomb menace

began in September 1972, our liaison

with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in

formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the

Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

CORDAL

/s/

- Identity 120

C/ISD/OPS/S =

00223

B2Ì IMPOST/CI BY 05360

---

## Page 148

73-2384

ORD-2328-73

• 9 HAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director for Science and

Technology

SO SUBJECT

Repeated Survey of ORD for Non:

Foreign Intelligence Activities

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined

with respect to all ORD services or dcalings with

other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.

In

addition, this report covers all our activitics deal-

ing with the rescarch and development of intelligence

equipmcnt for foreign use which has been tested in

the United States and might have collocted domestic

information.

Again, each member of ORD availabic

today was asked cither directly or through his super-

visor to provide the above requestod information,

whether he was directly involved or not.

We have

used all diligence to search our records available

to us during

this time period to ensure this is a

complete and factual list.

oSayre

sing you

Director of Research & Development

Attachments:

1 - Contacts with Other

Government Agencies

2 - Domestic Tests

StK

CLEar - 357323

g=.

in Let .

,.!:

SEGRET

00223

---

## Page 149

CONTACTS WITH

MER U.S. GOVERWENT AGENCIES WHICH

COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED

TECHNOLUGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

LORD represents DD/S&T on the RED Sub-Committee

of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics

ontrol that is concerned with

the narcotics control problem, Jesearch support of

(DI. Leonard Laster, OST)

(Cianci/LS)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures

and

physical security information was exchanged with

them.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation and

tracking was discussed with

B.NDD.

(Mx. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Van Dewerker/TA)

(Noe/TA):

Technical information was exchanged relating.

to the development of simple, portable sensor systems

for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and

narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and

(Parker/DSP)

Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD

Audio tapes were processed to improve their

intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

Bir. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Scott/An)

1091

UHA

00220

• 'ATTACHMENT 1

---

## Page 150

SUBJECT:

SEGRET

Con

ts With Other U.S. Gove

ment Agencies

Which

Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

• 1 BNDD was given'permission in the fall of 1972

to receive proposals from derospace, Inc.,

concerning

a Radar People Dotector developed for ORD.

Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) •

Identity 125 /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed

for the detection of narcotics for application in

Southeast Asia.

BNDD las given a demonstration of

the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST)

(Terek/LS)

(MI. Stan Sobel, BNDD)

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with the

intolligence community regarding

technical surveillance

countcrmeasurs and physical security.

This exchange

of information, reports, and cquipment has been con-

ducted under the auspices of USIß ISCe and involves

State, FBI,

Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and

Navy •

(Noe/TA)

(Noyes/PD)

• State Department

• Two contracts for development of countermeasures

techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA)

2

00223

Bank

---

## Page 151

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Governnent Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah

River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop

radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and

devices.

These Laboratories have used sampling

techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear

plant releases.

(MI. B. Benson, AEC)

(Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard

Cowan,

the walls of the office of the Chairman of the

AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation

occuried one evening and was an attempt to resolve some

anomalies created by the use of the non-lincar junction

detector.

Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC)

(Noyes/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)

Reports and information about the ORD-developed

•Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System

(MI. Les Schubin, LEAA)

Identity 125 /LS)

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical

security information were exchanged with LEAA.

(Noe/TA)

3

SECRET/

00234

---

## Page 152

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which could or have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Treasury

Dy. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department

to assist in formulating their RED program and organization

in anticipation of the establishment of the ney drug

enforcement administration The request for his services

was made by

Identity 3;

the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-

nator.

Identity 3

discussed the request and cleared the

detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating

to detecting

illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over

the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

(Lawrence/DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

•CAbout five years ago, assistance was requested in

domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared

scanners. This was turned down.

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret

Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques

and equipnent.

(Van Dewerker/TA)

4

00732

---

## Page 153

Gad..at

SUBJECT:

Con

its With Other U.S. Gove

ment Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems -

Federal Aviation Ágency (FAA)

The results of our rcsearch work in the detection

of mètals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use

in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

National. Institute of Health (NIH)

At the request ofLORD, OCS assigned a staff technician

to undertake to write a computer program for the Wissiesser

Line Notation (NLN) chemical notation method. This worl was

done in cooperation with NIl.

Ns. Coniver, NIH)

Identity 125 / LS)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

IS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order

to structure ORD's; BW/Cl research programs to support

ACDA needs.

Identity 125 /LS)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of

radio nuclides

in the environment was exchanged with

them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)

(Walker/DSP)

5

007333

---

## Page 154

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developedj Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

EPA (cont'd)

Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning

equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land

fill have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA)

(Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement

techniques germane to I cmoving distortions from some

photography they had on an alleged bank.

robber. Request

for spocific support in processing the imagery was turned

down.

(Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service

FIT

U.S. Customs

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies

Pin terms

of assistance with domestic operations has been

in the field of audio surveillance countermcasures, anti-

hijacking, or drugs.

NT.

Robert Burnell, SS)

(Noyes/PD)

MT.

Thomas Allen, FBI)

(Mr: Martin Pera, Customs)

• NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Projoct TAMPER., I0

• develop automated systems

for exploiting satcllite-borne

multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA)

(Galinaitis/IPA)

Nr. Lconnid Jaffe, NASA)

(General Snart)

0023-7

---

## Page 155

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association

would be SECRET)

LThe Agency is preparing a proposal for

an experi-

mental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat

crop:

A part of the information nould be obtained from

a satellite launched for other announced prograns. Ground-

truth data will be collected on North American crops.

(Briglia/PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics

and Dangerous Drugs

CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre

plot of opiun poppies at a USDA rescarch site in Washington

state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opiun

poppies.

Mr.

Quentin Jones, USDA)

(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD)

(Lawrence/DSP)

(Cianci/LS)

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon

Air Force,

Orrice of the Inspector Gensral

Army, Orrice of Provost Marsuail General

We have exchanged technical surveillance countei-

measures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

U.S. Army

Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,

- Toelle Ordnance Depot

LS/ORD tested environmental samples

from testing,

/ ¡ Identity 125/ LS?

7

00235

---

## Page 156

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Goverhment Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

LIS/ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing

IR remote detector of CW aerosols.

Identity 125 / LS)

U.S. Navy

BSD/ORDSturned over about eight trained dolphins

to the Navy In December 1969, because we discontinued

our dolphin program.

(Lynch/LS)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago

CIA infrared equipment was

made available for USCG

tests

for night search of life boats g

evaluate IR as

a means.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG)

(Lawrence/DSP)

Identity 174

Sheriff's Office

LORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.

Polygraph security findings were compared with the

Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff)

Identity 125 / LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-

ment methods in 1967-68.

• (Sheriff)

Identity 125 /LS)

8

'SECTET

00236

---

## Page 157

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.

Problems

Chief, San Francisco Police

For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of

a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate

Chinese social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief)

Identity 125/LS)

9

'SECRET

002.37

---

## Page 158

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR

AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1.: As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the

research and development of equipment and techniques

conduct experinents and 'tests in the United States.

Clearly, the design and development of our intelli-

gence cquipments can be done more cconomically and

more securely in this country.

Although nost of

the tests of our RaD equipments are performed in

closed laboratories or in secure arcas simulating

the foreign environment, some of the tests and expori-

ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2.

A review of the surveillance equipment or

techniques which have at some time or other been

exposed to domestic tosting is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser

probe dcveloped by ORD was tested by TSD in

San Francisco under very closely controlled

conditions.

portions of the test. Recordings that were

made of laser probe output were carcfully

controlled as classified material and it is

believed that the tapes have long since been

destroyed. (Wood/TA)

bi Microwave Intercept System - About

1968, this systen was es ed in a light air-

craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station

in Identity 127:, California. This system is

designed to pernit intercept of microwave

telephone communication channels of systems

such as

Identity 130

works equally well against the Bell Telephone

1D-L, as they are generically the same.

Re-

cordings of these

telephone

intercepts

were

carefully controlled and were destroyed several

years ago.

visit

ATTACHAI ENT 2

03230

---

## Page 159

SUBJECT:

Domestic Tests for Agency Research and

~ Development Efforts

• C.

Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-

tive of this current program is to develop a

means to utilize foreign telephone systems as

a communication link without the knowledge of

the host system.

In order to carry out this

objective, it is necessary to leain the com-

plete

supervisory signalling and sequencing

control system hicrarchy for the various foreign

telephone systens.

Many of these are patterned

after the U.s. system and, for this reason,

limited monitoring to test the operation of

intercept equipment in the United States

is

planned.

The data to be collected would

be

merely the signal tones from which supervisory

can be extracted. Message content is

of no interest and will not be recorded.

Over-

testing is planned at a subscquent date.

To date, some domestic testing of this

concept

has boon carried out at the contractor's plant.

No recordings have been made of such data.

tremely brief

tests excrcising U.S. and forcign

telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-

nalling have been carried out to verify initial

concepts..

The duration of testing was less

than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of

engineering development tests of special sensors

within the United States include infrared and

(FLIR) flights,

airborne magne-

tomctor surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).

In all these cases, the data output of such

testing has been used for engineering develop-

ment and the content has been restricted to

dissemination to those in Government involved

with the engineering design.

2

SECRET

00230

---

## Page 160

SUBJECT:

Domeric Tests for Agency Rese

Deva

pnent Efforts

ich and

e.

Remote Physiological Measurements -

An ORD-developea cryogenic magnetoneter is

being tested at a contractor's site for use

as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph).

Some test subjects are witting, but most tests

are on naive subjects (they do not know they

are being tested). The magnotometer is com-

pletely harmless to the subject and the test

results are closely hela.

f.

Personality Structure of Defectors

Study - ORD undertook to actermine the per-

sonality structure of defectors during the

period 1966-69.

an

The sork prinarily involved

analysis of the open litcrature on known

defectors.

An ancillary effort was concerned

with a study of the phenomenon of defoction

itself, i.e., lcaving one roligion for another,

or changing one set of political beliefs for

another.

The work was conducted at Stanford

University. Identity 125 /LS)

Trained Birds

- Birds have been trained

and tested in the United States to carry small

intelligence collecting packages such as

audio

surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-

ren't measuring dovices. Any data collected

from unwitting domestic sources would have been

used only for engineering purposes and then

destroyed.

h. Conmunications Link Loading Study - In

the period from 1970 through 1972 various means'

were used to check out an intercept system designed

to operate against Iden 93

communications links.

Under carefully controlled conditions, some U.S.

microwave communications were recorded

and passed

through the intercept system under test to prove

quality of performance.

Al1 intercept material

connected with this was destrojed within a few weeks

of the

time of intercept and the material was never

checked

for substantive content. NSA participated

and controlled most elcments of the U. S. material..

3

00200

---

## Page 161

JAKIND

[ORD-2274-73)

• 7 May 1973

MEMORANDUN FOR: Deputy Director for Science and

Technology

SUBJECT

: Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign

Intelligence Activities

At I1 a.m. today, each division and staff chief

or his representative was instructed to query all of

his people and roport back by this afternoon whether

or not they had provided any services or dealt with

any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.

The attached list is an inventory of all items we

were able to uncover. If additional information on

any of these topics is desired, we can provide either

a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

Chaube 8. M: Binne

naries

McGinnis

Scientific Advisor

to

Director of Research & Development

Attachment:

As stated

SEH83i:

135 2a66 3i3er:

spoil to Deteneis

0021i

---

## Page 162

/Project TAPER, an on-going program which may be

politically sensitive.

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be

politically sensitive.

NarCOtICS

-our foreign activities are. well known

in DDSET.

A negative report from the Support Staff.

ORD'S NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about

three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge,

Robert Scott - Perforned intelligibility enhancement

of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stophan - At the request of FBI, we described

Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing

distortions from some photography they had on an

alleged bank robber. Request for specific support

in processing the imagery las turned down.

SECRET

00242

---

## Page 163

7 May 197

C. V. NOYES

My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance

with domestic operations has been in the field of audio sur-

veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-

fically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings

which included technology exchanges and some equipment ex-

changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.

•I also assisted in x-rajing the office walls of the Chairnan

• of the MEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard

Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening

(date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies

created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Nr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service

Mr: Martin Pera, U. S. Customs:

NI. Marvin Beasley, DASA

Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI

• Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF

Major John Langager, ONI/USN

Mr. Richard Cowan, ЛЕС

SECRET

00243

---

## Page 164

Thomas P. Noe

5/7/73

I. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.

regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and

( physical security. This is an exchange of information and

reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the

USiB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community

State

Navy

Air Force i.

US Secret Service

NSA

Army

DIA

FBI

2.. Joint funding of two contracts with State Depart~

ment (TRI/ILL). Two electret microphones were furnished

to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of

one contract with NSA (Sandia).

Participation in DNA/DOD

contract (Bureau of Standards) •

3. Other DOD and Governent contacts for information

collection or exchange only.

ARPA

LEAA/Dept. of Justice

DNA/ DOD

Office Telecommunications Policy

Office of Army/Provost Marshal General

Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon

Air Force/Office of the Inspector General

Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

SECEST

0021.2

---

## Page 165

7 May 1973

IS/ORD CONTACTS WIEH DOESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

BND/ (Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive

proposals from Identity 135,

concerning a Rader People Detector

developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was ayproved by

D/ORD.

2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the

Navy.

Time:

December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Mon-lethal Incapacitation System.

Reports and infornation was made available to Department of Justice, LJAA

in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for

cavilian crowd and riot control.

CSCRET

01213

---

## Page 166

29 MAY 1973

SFKCD

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary [CLA Management

Committee

SUBJECT

: Reported Identity 61

. Burglary

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the

reported break-in of Identity 61.

An investigalive report

by an officer of the Exccutive Protective Service states that the

offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio

operation conducled against Identity 61

by the FBI, at the

Agency's behest and with its technical support.

This presents a

Felated question that should be notcd. James McCord's' testimony

indicates that he placed telephone calls to the. Identity 75 and Identity

61.

He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping

that if his phone was tappod his attorneys would be able to challenge

the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulficld,

says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure"

they "vere subjects of national security wirctaps."

3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone lap on the

Identity 75

, run by the FBI, about whichCI Stalloclieves McCord

knew.

It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation

aganst Identity 61

', and assumed that it was also a telephone

tap.

One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping

that both his Ielephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and

that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped

because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive

operations. At this point, given the publicity of the

Iden b1 break-in,

and the lestimony of NicCord and Caulfield, the current investigations

may lead to exposure of the operations.

52x9

Attachment:

As. Stated Above

V. Broe

Inspector Gcneral

CL.:

di....

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## Page 167

• 24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Reported Burglary of the Identity 61

1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61

• 13-14

May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive

Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a

number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent

fingerprints, but no identitication was made. The FBI, which states

that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate becauso il deter-

mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61

registored a formal complaint and Ameriçan regrets were expressed,

Identity 61

making it clcar that they suspected something other than

ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.

There had been an carlier intelligence opcration against the Identity 61

which is described below.

aron of technical coverag be danity a

2. On 16 April 1971/lhc Agency proposed to the FBI the instal-

The opportunily

for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign

Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid

for a contract to renovate

Identity 61

Upon securing the

contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate

or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed

to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic

support. The value of such an opcration to the intelligence community

was cited,

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned

down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Dircctor Richard Helms

sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI

turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and

national intelligence nceds to collect positive intelligence..

On 24 April

the Attorncy-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington

Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00383

•--:.:

SG2P

pry

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## Page 168

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the

technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered,

installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency.

personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of

equipment in

Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-

nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions

of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did

they enter Identity 61.

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 : be

stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover

advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and

might have to advise them that the installatior in Identity 61

was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the

best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972

when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The

request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76

delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on

nationalization of foreign holdings,

While the FBI was still

in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of

State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possihle

coverage of Identity 61

and on 22 December 1972 coverage

was partially reinstituted with full coverage in effect by 26 December

1972.

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against

the risks involved, led the agency to conclude that the activity was

not worth continuing. On 16 Fcbruary 197 CLArequested the FBI

tó discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised

that microphone surveillance of Iden 61

was discontinued.

Jolio Richarde

-z.

00353

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## Page 169

etsin

Ints

files

ante

1100.6

our

Addendum

ferred to in JCRichards' 24

a.v 73 memo to IG,

Identity

1. The Foreign

presenates Division asset/was

Break-in

Identity 77

who owned the

Identity 78

• The Agency had initially agreed

to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The linal

amount of remuneration turned: out to be $4,828.53. Another FR

asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79

plumber and

elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.

2. ISD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening

post were:

Identity 80, Identity 30

and Identity 45

of ISD and Haroid Leith of Division D.

00268

3:

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## Page 170

VIII.

SECRE

Coordination.

A. Internal

In developing its cadre of general support assets

and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact

with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for

Intelligence, using their assets wherever and

whenever

possible to support FR's operational activities. To a

more limited degree, FR Bases

maintain contacts with Office

of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives,

pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers

and using their entre to specific individuals who can

provide access to targets of operational interest.

B:

External

FR officers in the field maintain coordination with

their FBI counterparts. There is linited cooperation

with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving

Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are

of occasional help in operations involving other nationals.

The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the

presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on.

occasion provided backstopping on cases. where there was.

some

flap potential.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent

recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between

the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.

The Bases

also have contact with local Immigration

and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts

are less frequent

and less important than the contacts

with "the FBI

offices.

SECRET

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