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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SCOUT-TER

TABLE 0F COMETES

Fare

The ascessination

sE U.S. Govertent involvenezi

Recollections of Cis sificials •

The orgenization of the coup groun

Way a coup failed to follow the assassination

Intemational sctivity in oposition io Irujillo

Tre first fariana memorandia

Levei of CLA acciving prior to 1900

Aporcash to Prudillo by Ceneral Clar!:

Greration Lancet

State ssics Farlana 18 he could engineer e

Farland replies that be couid

Parland says tire dissidents aced guis

The W.s. 1s prepared to assist in overthroving Irujillo

Rubotton asks tat caiger rifles be supplied the dissidents

Acting DCI approves air droy of 12 Spri-gileld rifies

Special Group approves mall arms for dissidents

COS asks that one weapon de sent in eace pover

Dearborn learns of plan to assassinal ty interceptirg auto

Hispy Berry asts for sucrachune guns lor pioners

Dearborn asks for bree 30-caliber piscols for dissidents

The plou

to kill Trujillo et bis sistress' apartment .

COs protest restriction on polecira wespors

Has guidance cable on policy and objactives

Station asks persission

to pass three carbines to

dissidents

Egs approves jasöing carsines

The carbines are passed to the dissidents

Request for pouch wairer rei pouching submachine guas

Suchachine guns pouched

Pleas irm dissidents that submachine guns be passed to then .

•Egs infoius the station not repeat not to pass submachine guis

Post-Day oi Pigs standdor sable

Statica acmarledges resipt of summacaine gus

Drait cable (not sent) approving release di sumachine guns

State Departuent disapproves passing subvaccine gins

The whereabouts of the

three caroines

Special Group confiras rot passing subachize gues to dissidents

Ide dissidents' assassination plans are fim.

U.S. policy does not condose assassiration

Dearocaz and the Cos protest .

Critic lio. 1 ca une assassi-30102

Vice President Johnson asks acout aras delivery

Discovery of U.S. involvement wish

assassina=zor group

Recapitulation of arus assed or

considared for passing

The rotivations of the assassias

20

21

22

2+

30

35

36

35

40

40

41

42

42

43

÷9

50

51

51

52

3

54

55

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27x 659

Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, ves essacsinated at

about ten poo. on tre night of 30 May 1951. It was Trujillo's

custom to visit one oi his sistresses at tis ranch at San Cristobal

about cuce a week. On most of his travels he

rode in a Carysier

with bullet-proof glass and iiin security guards riding in accompanying

cars.

He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San

Cristoral and substituied a bignly stereo-ured patter of action:

after his nightly valk, he dississed his companions; changed into a

khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristocal In an unescorted 1957

Chevrolet, airays driven by the sare chaufseur.

On the nizat of the slajing, the Cherriet was intercepted on

a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Cludad Trujillo by elzat

arned assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and

his body was removed frow the scere by the assassias. Trujillo's

chauffeur was seriously wounded, sas left bebind by tice assassins,

and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scere. One was

never caugat and as eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed

• waile resisting arrest. Tee ochers ...were arrested, confessed,.

and were later executed celore coming to trial. About elget or nine

otcers, woo sere in on or iner of the plot but did not par-icipate

In the actual assassiration, mere killed vile in custody, alie

resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.

(Ilote: "e use the tera "plotters" to reier to all of those involred

in this attenot to

overthre. Dujiilo.

"issassins" refers to the

orall group that actually did the killing.)

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There vere reporto in Ciudsd 'Inijillo au die tire tret ine

U.S. Consulate had been in sore ray involve? iite the ploiters.

Eventually, after the surriving plotters were granted amnesty,

zany of the details care out. Norman Call, a reporter with the

San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The lied Popublic

issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpes follow:

The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Parael L.

Irujlilo was carried out ith assistance fron the US Central

Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1951 slajing of tee

69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highwaynear his

capital were smuggled by the CIA into tige country at toe

request of the assassins.

The CIA began shipping ares to the Dominicen Republic in

late 1960, follone a sertes of talks between US Coasul. Henry

Dearbora, Chief Poli-leal Officer John Barfield of the U3

Consulate, and Luis Asiana Tio.

Also involved in the plot was

Antonio Imbert, who bad been Governor of Porto Plata province.

As Trujillo's political and Minuncial problems deepened,

talks continued between Dearson, Barfield and leaders of the

ant1-Irujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was

established between Amiana and a CIA agent wno ... was

named Plato Cox.

The key link between the assassins and the CIA in tice aras

shipments vas'a long-tive American civilian resident of Ciudad

1ruj1110, Loreazo Berxy, otherrise known as "Wimpy," who operated

a supersarket in a fabionable neighborhood where Brujillo also

LIved.

"Wimpy" was put under brief arrest alter the silling but

ras later allowed to leave the country.

The weapons vere imported 1a small parts, to be assembled

later by the plotters, anond tie rouire grocery salients for

the supernarse arriving regularly in the capital's port.

Tae

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gus. carts esared the Republic In sectally carted food cans,

whica were

lacer turned over to the conspira'ors.

Plans 23= the inaded a sassination sere worked out duriag

the sare-geriod in rich the abortive assault on Cuua was being.

prepared.

Esrever, when the CIh-organized April 17, 1961,

invasion at ice Bay of Pligs failed and world attention was

focused on Hashington's complicity in that operation, a post-

ponement of ice atiemot on Trujillo's life was ordered because

of the embarrassment anoiner such jailure might cause the

United States. But the order to noid up case too late.

The

needed weaposs were already in the sands oi the conspirators,

who refused appeal's ly Dearbor and Barrield to delay the

assassination.

They insisted of moving at the first opportunity.

Inis came on May 30, when Bujillo and his chauffeur drove out

into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a

rendezvous at a San Cristocal estate, La Fundacion, with

17Uj11l0's Z)-year-oid eistress, Mona Sanchez.

It can be reported on excellent author!ty that close

associates of the slain dictator koes of the US role within

a fer days following the killing.

Dearbors, Barfleid and Berry had neanwhile been rushed

out of the soninican Republie by us officials.

Since the ouster of tze Irujillos, berry (""lapy") has

returned to operate his bandsorely appolated supermarket,

where he treets custorers with calm and courtesy, as 1f

Trujillo had never: 11.ed..

We Interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then

Chief, HE DIvIsio), and J. D. Esterline (thea Chief of Operations,

HE Division). Kiaz recalls the Agency's role as being limited to

monitoring intercal ploiting against the trujillo regine "but. not

pushing or Inst1sasing." Esterline, like Kins, recalls that the

Agency was not directly invoived in coup plottizg. He described the..

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furnisbiig de weapoas as 3 sybol-saething trau all constitute

tanzible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell rerenders tise Agensy

role as belng sonewhat pose positive than that descelsed by Kles

and Esterline. He tiesed the Agency's role as one pi firlag support

to an Indigenous group wose intended actions vere in tse U.S.

Interest. Ee described the affair es "a fairly z0=il operation

Involving seetlegs, discussions, and fursal approvals." de do sot

have firn Information as to nether or not any of tice veapons

supplied by CIA were actially used 1e the assassinatioa of ITujillo.

Both Esterline and King celieve they were not. Bissell, corever,

bas a vague impressian that one of them vas.

The Agency offloers sost Imedietely Involved with the plotters

are nor videly scattered. Lear Reed, ho vas chief of station: .

until October 1960, is now retired. Robert Duen, sho was chief

of station at the time of the assassication, 1s in. Paris... Charles ..

Cookson, the station's operations offloer, 1s in Brazil. Isabel

Ciatron, the station's adninistrative assistant who vas used as a

ommunications link and in the passing of the arns, resigned in 1964

and 1s believed to be Living in Puerto Rico. Fed Holian, the head-

quarters branch chief, is in Gustenala City. We elected not to call

back any of these people for interviews. While they Digat be able

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to furnish uinor detalls that are eisstrgirco the mitten records,

de think it. unlikely that tiey rould be dole to add siacificantly

to the quite complete record that appears 1n tre EMISED operatioral

files.

Agency activities aired at replacing the Irujillo regioe were

assigned the cryptonya dieD. One segment of ElDED was kom as

EMSLEN, the cryptonya lo= the operation to resove Trujillo by

violent action. He have revieved the voluminous EMDEOD flles. Most

of this account is dram iron then. Many of the more significant

documents were not put 1ato the ElDED files but were kept in a

private file by J. C. King. Ee rade that file available to us.

We also have studied another particularly usefui document. The

Dominican MilItary Intelligence Service (SI) officer put in charge

Investigation of the

of the/Trujillo assassination as a ravy lieutenant nased Ortiz.

• The Dominican Republic assigred hin to its embassy in Ottawa in

November 1951 when the Trijillo fanily's attenpt to regain pover

falled.

The New York field office, of the FBI held extensive

Intervlews with bin from 6 April througa 10 Nay 1952. The result

was a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on the

assassination as reconstructed by the SIM fron its Interrogations

of the persons it apprekended.

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ros the recordar de cun trace the origies and the course o

U.S. polley vità respect to the overtaros di Trijillo. We also car

ascertain pros the files the rature and the extent of U.S. support

of she plotters, including the passing to tren of veapons out of the

U.S. Consulate is Ciudad Irujillo, What de carrot discover from tice

files, despite quite massive docusentation, is hon the coup group

was organized. Ice best single account se fird, and it 1s not wholly

accurate, 15 in a book by Robert Crassweller. * The main flaw in

the story 1s 1t3 failure to identity the Individuals with whom the

J.S. Cove: ment ras actually working. Excerpts iollow:

The plot vas organized on the basis of tuo groups of

conspirators linked togetber by a llaison that later proved

too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Bach group

had 1ts purpose and its separate personzel.

The function of the Action Group was to assassinate

Trujillo and Immediately present proof of its succes, 1a

the form of Irujillo's corpse, to the second group, the

Political Group.

The latter would then launch a coup,

taking over the nachinery of the governent and the Arsed

The Action Group consisted of eight ben.

have been örganized originally by General Antonio Inbert

Barreras and Salvador Estrelle. . ... • They were joined

by Lieut. Anado Garcia Guerrero, a neuber of tea military

corps attached to Trujillo in tce lational Palace; Antonio

de la Maza, the brother of. Octario de la Vazz, uho had been

killed by the governsent becuse of his involvement in the

* Robert D. Crasseller, inio De La fies or a

• Caribbean Dictator (New Yors:

" 6

20 las

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Gallatez case; Fugsca- Rejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro

Lito Celero.

Ice elgaà teaber, lancel Caseres Tuati, 's in

Mose of tue ilgat of ie 30ch and sas none o. tre actio..

The Political Grop bad a less distiaci nembersbip. it

Included Luis Aninca MS, Modesto Diaz, Cereal Jusa ICaus

Diaz, and several ochers.

At the very too it had the support

uf Geseral Rosan Farcasdes, Secretary 0? State for the Arsed

Forces, and his brotcer 3loia. . . ..:

The over-all authority appears to have centered p-lacipall;

1n General Diaz, probably the unly oze weo bad sufficieat

prestige to command autority. . ...

tee Action Group sould remain in daily readiness.

Inforiation 1n tre Palace Indicated that Irujillo as going

to calve tu Estancia Fundacion... Garcia Guerrero 1a the

Palase would inform the others by persosal cessage. •...

20231

Tae expected essage froy Garcia Guerrero in tbe Palace

came to the patient piotters at seven o'cloc's on the evening

of Hay 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at

this sorent, but tice enotioral and impetuous de la laza

threatened.to.act by himself if the others lagged..:. In any

event, the plan went into execution. ... • . Each of then

had his revolver or pistol, and de la l'aza also had his own

saved-off shotgus and tro M-1 semiautoratic rifles. • • .

The conspiracy began to come apart wlthin an hour. Never

very professionally contrived, the plot sas hastened prematurely

to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and 1t was

nos afilicted with bad lucis and ineptitude. Inediately after

the assassinalius, the ben of the Action Group vere isable to

reach General Roman. • •

The Political Gross of toe conspiracy rever too's up its

planned jole.

The Action Group scattered, leerinz a trell as

vide as a boulevard.

Irijilio's body was left in the trun's of

de la faza's car, paried in the garage of Ceneral Tomas Diaz,

where the police

found 1t in a few hours.

The conspirators:

vere all hunted down very quickly, except ior. Asiana aud

Imbert, who maraged to conceal thenselres for months until

the danger had passed.

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The FBI report of lts latervieus of Ortiz, the SIl investigato:,

gives an excellent account of way the plot fell apart after the

assassiration toot place. Oze of the assassias, Fedro Livio Cedezo,

was: cerlously wounded (probably by fire froz bis own companions).

¡All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the

killiag. One of then called a friend, Dr. Pobert Reid Cabral, to

treat Li'slo. Dr. Reid found hin so badly injured ticat surgery would

be reguired. Reid ard two of she assassins toos livlo to a hospital.

While 1a dell'm be rumbled the names "de la laza" and "Juen

Tomas." The police immediately picked up to brothers of Antonio

de la Maza. Heither was personally involved 1s the plot, but boto

knew the detail's and the names of nost of the assassins. General

Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lleut. Garcia Guerrero vere killed.

resisting arrest. Anians and Imbert vent into hiding and survived.

The rest were caught ard interrogsted followingtorture. All

confessed.

The confessious led to identification of persons who were 1a

or on the flages of the Political Group: General Roman and his

brother, Antana Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex

Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Mizuel Angel Baez Diaz.

Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a scrunications link betrees

the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not

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.

^11

discover toe lientities o? the political piotiers with whos the

Consulate vas actually voring, because neither of the rea cho sight

have known the identicies vere available for interosatica. Aslapi tiu

escaped and Gazeral Diez bes killed.

Althougi the identities and the intention of the Action Group

were fairly ridely inom to persons not actually cembers si it, tere

appears to have been

easellent coopertmentation betreen tie Political

and the Action Groups--perraps too much compartentation. Tee

assassination 1:sell do: well planned. General Diaz was in over-

all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the ore who did all

of the wori. Ee took "aree cars to a local garage

and had the

engines rebuilt so tirat the cars could reach speeds of 120 aph.

He had possession

of the reapcas from the U.S. Consulate, plus

several

of his own. Ee and the other participants took the cars

to the site selected for the Xilling and conducted dry runs each

night. Everyining wes ready and the assassins were lying in vait

for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided

not to go to Saz Cristosal cecause le wasn't feeling too vell. Tre

assassins continued their dr runs each evening. Alter the assassina-

tion was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup

that nas to follor failed--in far because of bad luck, in part because

of pour planning, and in part because of too much coupartentation.

sard

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Ceneral Roman, iho was to "ake over the govermert after Trijillo's

deeth, was not tuld toat the assassination was to de atteopted on

May 30ch. Alver the slajiez, General Diaz tried to telepcore

General Raran but could zot reach hin. Diaz then took the car

vita Irujillo's body still 11 1ts truis and drove to Romar's house.

He saw so many soldiers in he vicinity toat he gave up and returned

hone, leavlag the car in the driveway with the body still i= the

trunk, where it vas later found by the police.

What had happered vas this: Forcer general and former head

of the SIM, Arturo Espalllat, happened to chance upon the scene

while the assassination was taking place. He vas out for a drive

with his wife and was passed by a car that he recognized as trujillo's.

Ee stopped at a drive-in restaurant and alrost immediately beard

shooting ahead; which he suspected Lavolved Trujillo. Ee drove to

the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back

Into town. He stopped at a silitary Installation and gave the

alam and then drove to the hose of General. Roman to alert biz.

He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination,

arriving simultaneously vith the police. Toe police found ujillo's

chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat

then went to the hospital to try to questlon the caulieur. Baus,

General Diaz could not reach General Revan to Inform Rotan toat

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Trujillo had been illiad and toat it ins dire for Regan to cale iis

nore to take ore: the soverasent.

Rense ste's orly tat there had been

a shooting involving Trujillo and that Tajillo was nissing. He did

not knod shether General Dias' group was invalied in it or sot. fe

vas reluctant to bove until be ras sure that Trijillo as dead. By

the tie Roman concluded that Trujillo must se dead, It was too late

Por him to act; Rector Irujillo and Joanny Abbes had already tasen

charge. Roman did nase a couple of feeble tries at ergineering a

take over, but 1t is apparent that he had zo real advance plan nor

any appreciable chances of succeediaz.

The assassination itself and the plottinz preceding it took

plase against a' background of intersatical activity in opposition

to the trujillo regime, with boid the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-

cut stands. These are some of the highlights:

B. A brieflag paper prepared in ill Division for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned

for December 1959 in toe Dominican Republic but was delayed

pending receipt of arms from Verezuela. The plot was discovered

and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the

DAS that the Dominican Republis was "in flagrant violation of

human right, freedon, and desosracy" follorirg the nass arrests

1n the Dominican Republic 1a January 1950. A committee of the

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DAS arclaned to investizate the charges reported on 8 June 15óo.

that the Doslaical goverment tas gillay as ebarged.

b. A near-niss assassination atrempt against President

Becancourt on 2t June 1950 killed tro: in i1s entourage and

injured bin and several others. The Verezuelan goverasent

annourced after capture of nost of the assassins that the

Doninican goveriment was responsible for the attempt on Betan-

court's life and too its case to the OAS. On 20 August, tbe

OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under

Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agricul sure

Committee 'on 24 August in support of a request by President

Elsenhoser for a cut in the Doninican Repuolic's sugar quota,

1s reported as having said that it was hoped that econouic

sanctions vould result in tbe donatall of Irujillo's dictator-

ship and its replacement by a noderate and free regle. The

United States severed diplomatic relations with the Doulrican

Republic on 26 August 1960, eitbough consular relations vere

continued.

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As a further prelude to a chronclogical rilew of operation

.......

ERSED/2SLEN, we this 1t rould be ureful to Iden:lij the people

Involved, especially since offisers of the Departsent of State

plajed a very prozicent sole.

Wasnizgton - Departzent. of State

Roy R. R.ibottan

Frais Devine

• Joan C. Hill

Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-Averican Aliairs

Special Assistant to Rubotto

Special Assistant to Rubotton

Washington - CIA

J.C. Klaz

Ned Holsan

Chief, WI DIvIsiOn

Chief, Branch III, iS Divisioa

4660022

Cludad Trujillo - Departent of State

Joseph S. Farland

Anbassedor until 29 Juze 1960. It 18

pertirent to note thas King and Ester-

line eutribute U.S. a=d CIA invoiveneat

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Henry Dearborn

John D. Barfield

vith the plovers in the Doclalsaa

Republic to Ancassador Farlaad.

Teay

descrite hin as a former FBI caplogee

who considered himself quite a clardestine:

perator. Esterline, who later rerner

inder him in Panaca, called his "a wil

man ino bugged the Agency to support a

move to assassinate Trujillo." He had

direct dealiazs wiih a number of the key

plotters.

Counsellor of Embassy until 2ó hugust

1960 and Consul Gereral tberesiter.

He

used the code name DELTA in correspondence

vith the plotters.

second Secretary until 26 August 1960

and a consular officer thercaiter.

Cludad Trujillo - CLA

Lear Reed

Robert Oven

Charles Cookson

Isabel Cintron

Chief of Station until October 1960

Chief of Station fron 20 Januasy until

# Jine 1961. Code name used with the

plotters: GAIGO

Operatioas Officer

Administrative Assistant

Key Doninican Plotters

Dr. Jordi Brossa

Juan Vicini

Luls Esquero

Code names: SWORD and EL CHICO

Code Jianes: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATE

Code nage: SOCRATES

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S. Thous Stocker

An Azerican 11 the Bacinican Epublle

with wasn the station tad had an earlier

Lanappy experience.

The consulate

preferred to have .noting. to.do with him,

but the Doninican plotters brought bin in

as a cutout to the consulate.

Ee. took

delivery fron Lorenzo Berry of three

carbines passed to Berry fron the U.S.

Consulate. for use by the plotters.

held them for a few days and then gave

them back-uben Berry insisted they be

returned.

Berry then passed them to

one of the assassins.

Code names: BECTOR asd PLUTARCO

DI. Severo Cabral

Jose Francisco Tapia

Aulio Brea

Andres Freitas

Luis Amlama T1Q

Jose Rene Roman

Juan Tomas Diaz

Donald Reid Cabral

Lorenzo D. Berry

Code name: ANDY

Flerida Berry

Code name: CRISTOBAI®

Code name: CIBAO

"impy" - Berry is a U.S. citizen ho

ored Wimpy's Supermarset in Cludad

Irujillo. He was the main communica-

tions link between the plotters and

the U.S. Consulate. The weapons

furnished the plotters were actually

passed to Berry.

Wimpy's wife - a Doninican citizen of

Syrian extraction.

She appears to have

been even more active. in toe plot than

ber husband.

It was she who had the

contacts with the Dosinicans involved.

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Most samuntsations between the

Dominican plotters and the U.S.

Consulate vere be seans of critten

notes. irs. Berry received the aotes

fron or lassed then to either the

Consul General's secretary or the

CIA Station's adsinistrative assistant.

Two docurents provide a useful point of depature, from an

historical point of vies. One is a seni-official letter from

Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republic io Assistant

Secretary of State Rubotton. The otber document is an internal

CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had

been played by cIA prior to 1960.

16 November 1959

Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Infornal" memorandum

to Rubotton reporting that "the uzderground is more active today

than ever in the history of the Trujillo regine." He described the

principal opposition group as being soout 2,000 strong. He saia:

.. within this group there is growing militant anti-

American feeling based on the premise that the United States

should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) lor the

overthros of the Trujillo regine. Discussions I have heard on

tuis subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the

position of tice United States and its adosted doctrine o? non-

intervention..

• This group is in possession of

clandestine broadcasting equiprent unica vill 80 into operation

when the strike is nade.

CAS kas been inforied and joins with

we in suggesting that you pass this infomation to J. C. King."

a. rations

scarest.

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DILS HALY

...*

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15 Fecruary 1860

A CIA siail paper, addressed to Calci, Ma Division, discusses

a plan for improvicg intelligence

coverage of the Dosinican Republ

In the event of Trujillo's rezoval

frog pover.

The objectives

siated in tre

paper were to ensure

orderly transition in the event

Trujillo abdicated or vas deposed and to prevent a takeover by

Castro-type forces. The folloring excerpt reveals the level of

CIA activity in the Donisican Republic prior io that time:

"The CUS Cludad Trujillo conducts no covert operations;

novever, his official contacts with Gereralissimo Trujillo and

Win the Chief Of the Douinican Security Services has enabled

lin on occasicn to assess the attitud.

criticisas of and activities directed against the Dominicas

governsent by exiles and

to the [minican regise. "Oter Auerican goverments unfrierdly

10 March 1960

This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files

of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft

1s not shown, but it was to be forvarded to President Elsenhower

from General Idvin Clark, a friend of the President from their jears

of nilitary service.

The plan vas for Clark to approaca Irujillo,

with whos he had been on good teres in the past, and attempt to

persuade Trijillo to retire.

It ras to be pointed out that there as

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n0 c39

who could suareed his, and thet to protect his facily and

to preserve his inaze as El Beneractor, be should step down and

allor asylum

to ce

arranged for blu. His faniiy would have the

wealth already outside the Dominican Fepublic, and the forture

by

inside would be placed in trust, to ta administered/interrationally-

known personages for the senefit of the Doriain people.

This proposition received bigi-level attention in Washington,

Including that of President Elsenhorer, Secretary of State Eerter,

and Allen Dulles. In approving Claris's approach to Trujillo,

the President specified that Ciark should travel as a representativa

of the State Departent, rather than as a personal erisiary of tre

President. General Clar's traveled to the Dominican Repliblic and

met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the neeting it

appears that it had been decided that the plan would be preseated

as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what vas doze.

The station thought 1t likely that Trujillo recognized the official

U.S. Goverment kand in the proposal. Di course, nothing care of the

meeting.

22 March 1960

Ambassador Farlard, in a TOP SECRET Lenorandun to Ruboitan,

forrarded a pian of a Dominicar group plotting Irujillo's overthros

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bearing the

coie nace "Operation Lancet." It as basically a

proposal for a

course of political actica reinforced by the tareat

of being

cacked by muscle. The operation was to begin •ith the

who

arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy" /Hould tell Trujillo

to leave the country. "He tells li plainly and decisively; se vill

give his 12

or i8 cours to do it." It would ce made clear tar

1I Irujillo refused, a border incident would ve contrived, inica.

would be solloved by "collective iatervention." Assuming

Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatun, the plan then outlined steps

for transition

io an operating representative government. The aray

would be reduced in size. A caretaker goverrent would prepare for

iree elections. Ambassador Parland iorrarded the plan with tirese

cortenis of his o'm to Rubotton:

•.. this seguent of the dissidents is psychologically

conditiored to a point where 1t will take any step except tee

ultirate, and for the execution of the latter they expect

United States assistance.

'...

"Dick, I thin's the tire has care lor certain agencies of

our Goverment, ilthout atiribution, to establish and ispierent

a definite constructive progran to influence the course of events

in the Dominican Republic.

My conversations with the Secretam

and Allen illes espnasized the problems and the possibilities

of tois type oi approach. . .

30 Marca & 7 April 1950

The Special Grouy considered actions that night be taken in the

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evert of a flare-up in the Dozinican Repuulic. On 30 March, fearing

ticat Cuba night de involied, there vas talk of evacuating U.S.

civillans froo Cuantanano.

There was also discussion of the

possibility c?

sealing off the land entrance to tie Doninican Republic

from Faiti and of

the problem of providing asjius ior Trujillo. On

7 April, there was furtcer tali of sealing of? the country it trujillo

fell, and an appraisal as nade of the chances of his leaving

willingly:

... It is evident that Trujillo will not consider

making any arrangerents for orderly succession to ninseli, but

that te will either nang co tu the bitter end or flee the

country on scort notice, a la Eatista."

9 April 1950

State sent a cable to Farland tarugh CIA channels, fron unica

tibe follorag is an extract:

to indicate to-them that as soon as they had seized power tbey

should imediately request United States recogaition, and ast for

United States military assistarce under Article Ihree of the Rio

Treaty in tce event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored

invastions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-castr

or pro-Connist elements •ithis or outside

"Hoat, if any, ald vould be essential to dissicent elements

prior to takeover .

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1

S20227-2/33 ORY

"FI rish to esprasize strongly that ebove is for contingency

plazales purposes coly and in no my indiates aliber authority

at present contempiates such actica. . . ...

11 42211 1960

rariara cabled his reply througa CLA charcals, in part as follows:

"Uadar instruction, 15 iould be pussibia for ne to za'se

arrangesents alth appropriate civilian dissidents woose leaders

are knor: to se including names toeir selecies ior top

governestal positions, and rita ose miliary dissident, a

Geueral, mao 15 expecting an exchange oi passwords for purpose

secret discussions. •

"Regardless of

•. - reething moes dida exises,

Indicaticas reflaci Donizican dissidents, i2o are aditedly

poorly armed, loosely organized and lace cousing liaisoa isa

milttary dissidents, will clad it diffloult to effect tase-

over of GOD tithout existance one or sore or combination oi

folionna developments (arica we sumarize celow):

(1) Claadestine ares shipments, wila sabotage cateriel.

(2) An investion to serve as a sizeal to the populace.

(3) Implesentation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."

(4) Aávance psychoiogical conditioninz by radio.

(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Irujillo."

(ó) A careful step-ay-step plan for the perlod preceding

the coup and for the period folloring it.

Farland stated a need for "niritu out key cooperation" ira Deniaican

military dissidents. Ee added:

"One of the greatest coatributions .S. coula made to

dissidents would be

to les then knod ie are prepared to assist

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SUSAG-DIES S207

thes; transcission

of artarent and sabotage caterial.

fully substatiate

this cooperation..

9, May 1960

and SUPeR zy P.B. Jarst, Chief, wil/C1,

1. resorandun addressed to Calet, M Dragion, preports steps

taken or recaomended for laproving CL!'s capsoilities in the

Dominican Pepublic. The peper refers to the need for covert action

assets, palacipally to custruct infiltratica of Courists or

Fidelistas. Among things reconsended vere: placerent of a junior

officer in the enbassy; asoigment of a full-tire orricer to the

beadquarters desk for the covert ectica progren; autborization to use

Jose Figures in third country operations; develogent of a

contingency P plan la the event trujillo fell and hostile forces

attempted to seize porer, end establisment of a "U.S. Committee

for Desocracy in tie Dosinican Republic."

A sezorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads,

In part, as follows:

"The dissidents need guns and armnition frcu the taited .

States. In particular toey seed a snail number of high-porered

rifles vith telescopic lenses.

Ine Antessador said that he saw

no problem in tie purchase and delivery clandestinely o? the

eras to the dissidents.

But be said, of course, this raises

the question Of whether the U.S. Goverent wants to engage in

this activity.

"Col. King said that this oi course is a policy decision. He

said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want

to support.

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STORET-EYES ONLY

(Cument: Fariand ras in lashington or consultatices.

Alchoug de 1s listed as having served as Anbassador untl: 23

June 1950, 1ù appears that he did not actually return to duty

in Ciuded Trujilio.

fits successor, Viaton Chapin, was nominated

13 June, but he

never took the post.)

3 June 1960

Parland set with delson H. Saith, the Doninican desk officer

In WE Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if toe

nares CIA had were those with whon Farland had been dealing. Farlard

said, "Those are the boys all rignt." Saith's nemorandun of the

meetlag includes this comment:

"Parland then told me that the underground opposition are

planning to assassinate Trujillo. Fe said that it is planced to

use a poverful bond which could be planted along the rouce uf

Trujillo's nigntly wals and could be detonated by a recote-

control firing device.

He intimated that this plan 15 pretay

well along and

could be executed at any tire.'

Undated Working Paper (illed between papers dated 25 May end 13 June)

The author is not identified nor is there say indication that

the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To

precipitate tie downfall oi the Trujillo regime by 1 August o= a3

soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S, bacase a

prime motive

force againsi the Trujillo regire. "In the event Trijillo

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8279178779

STORET-DES SMU!

refused to susicate, consideration should se given to other covert or

orer actions desigred to efrect his renoval iran the scene."

deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.

17 Jise 1900

Denry Dearbom, who was in charge in the incassador's absence,

queried State throug CIA channels, asring for scafirmation 0s

certain points for a meeting he was having ilti a dissident leader,

Dr. Jordi Brosse. Ee stated kis understanding of the U.S. position

as follows:

The U.S. 1s not prepared to take overt action against

the Irujillo governent while it 1s In full coatrol.

b.

The U.S. is prepared to assist the orposition clandestisely

to develop effective iorses to accomplish trujillo's overiara.

C. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertl;

until such tire as tie dissidents establish a provisionai

goverment anic controls a substantial section of the

Dosinican Republic.

20 June 1960

Dearborn, again throuza CIA channels, asked Rubotton and Farlard

i1 be could ma'se the same statements corcerning U.S. policy in a

retting ilth Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied

in the affircative.

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3208T-D.ES DELY

20 Juse 1350

Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting rita Juan

Vicini. He said

thai vicini felt that the tine to concentzate on,

for planning purposes, was the reriod

extending through the

"incapacitatiod of Trajillo; too nuch planzing ior what would

follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.

Also on 23 June (although the first wiltten record we find 1s

& surmary nemorandu prepared on 18 October), Rubotton told J.C.

King that the Government of the United States was prepared to

participate in the overtarow of the Trujillo regime to the followirg

extent: "to provide a sall number of sniper rifles or otber devices

for the renoval of sey Irujillo people from the scene. .

.. ...

Rubottom added that the U.S. Goverment was not prepared, at this

time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the

undergound to accomplish a revolt.

29 June 1960

Dearbory cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa.

Fe

said that Brossa

had

recomtended

temporary standdoim on "action

toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while deternining Vezezuela's

-caction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.

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5*,

#TRUE BUTT

barbor reported that the dissideats had a spability for picking

In

up ars at sea and for caching/nearby caves. Je alco desertoed an

airdrop site.

1 July 1950

A memorandum

addressed to the Acting DCI reccrmended approval

for the delivering of respons to the Iominican dissidents.

"It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground

opposition forces in the Dominican Repuolic 12 sterile U.S.

rifles, Modal 1903 (Springtield), with telescopic sights, together

rita five hundred rounds of amunition for same...

It is plurred to dellver these weapons in air throuch DPI

facilities provided arrangerents can be sorked out with the

opposition for their reception. If they cannot le delivered by

alr, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for

delivery by sea.

"Approval for delivery of these ams has been given by

Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubotica, who requests that

the aras be placed in tie bands of the opposition at the

earliest possible nocent.

The menorandun was sized by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WE DivIsion; was

concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by

C. P. Catell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.

Dearbora was informed by cable of plars to airdrop trelve

30.03 Springfields, with ermunition, and rita sizats "fixed and

sighted." The cable asked for the

coordinates of a suitable drop

site and for a four-uan reception team wita flasclights.

The cable

min

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## Page 28

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(

added that, "Is air drop delivery noi possicle, los noi studying

Deaas of eilecting delivery by sea ii deeded sore procticaole."

8 July 1962

jeadguarters vabled Dearcorn, in part:

esployed simultaneously rita action to incapacitate Irujillo

and what is needed in way of material support for implementation

of plan of action.

Di particular inportance is inio re extent

of military participation in preparations.

In spite of Vicint/

apcarent lace oi knowledge of opposition organization, most

logical that he 1s actirely collaborating iith a group that

must have some plan and capability for action which will assure

stable interla goverrrent after removal ci Trujillo. .

In your opinion are L'ictoi/ and Brossa Renders of sane group

or if not could the tro groups ce cerged? . . ...

8 September 1960

The Special Group discussed a letter draited by the Cepartment

of State

for delivery to Bujillo (copy in CIA files dated 5 September)

proposing

that be step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom

of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal

approach.

The Group concluded that a personal approach would be

best and discussed Willian Parley as

a candidate fo= the job.

18 October 1950

Chief, Wi Division, prepared

a menorandus sumarizing approvals

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obtainel for action in support of the Dominican intemal opposition.

The

text states that the succary was

"provided in response to your

verbai request on 13

October 196) ... " Mis 1s the renorandm

to which reference is, made earlier under the entry for 28 Jure 1960.

29 December 1950

The minutes of the Special Group beeting of this date read,

In part:

"Bissel gave the broad cutlicno di a tro-prouged plan

for proceeding vith certaia limited covert astivities virected

against the trujilio regime.

le espbasized tbat although

support would be given to tice Figures group tiere is no

intention of establishirg a paramilitary force as such ..

le also emphasized that ste proposed actions would not of them-

sel'res briaz about the desired resuit in the near future,

lacking sore decisive strose against Trujillo binsell.

It was noted thet Mr. Pawley feels that

overt Intervention in the Dominican Pepublic saould be

nuate slau are see pet te crea bosematio de this cine

no matter what the eventual decision on overt Intervention

Day ke."

(Conment: We find nothira in the illes identiflable vItia

such a "plan." We loud no other reference to any specific

plan of about this date.)

12 January 1961

The following is an excerpt fros the minutes of a meeting of the

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920807-3753 G707

Speciai Group on this date:

"Mr. Merubant explained the iceling of the Departeet si

State that limited supplies of sall ams and other meterial

should to made evailaole for dissidents inside the Doninicas

Parrott said that we believe this can be tanaged

securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final tras-

portation into the group being provided by the dissidents

themselres. The Group approved the project."

19 January 1952

• Cacle fron headquarters:

"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,

authority bas been given Has for delivery to internal froa.

of liniced supply of sall aras and oter material on condition

that introduction of naturial into LonRep be effected by Dons.

... . Above coordinated with State."

24 January 1961

Menorandur for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEeD by

members ci the CA Staff and of WE Division:

"It was confired (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the

Special Group now bas approved that a 'limited supply' of

small ams and related equipment may be provided covertly to

the Domiaican resistance elements with whon we have been

dealing.

Tois was additional to the Special Group's approval

on 29 Decenber 1950 of our Operational Proposal."

(Coument: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we ?10%

none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)

- 29 -

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inte

- Fand rude 585 darren

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..w30

?:

31 January 1961

"Official-Inioral" letter frog Dearborn to Davine In State

Departrent:

"With regard to the delivery of exotic equiment, my

friends were of course deligited that suca a decision had been

nade. I hope that 10 will not be necessary to play dom too

long the question of actual delivery since they are eazer

and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only

lead then to question

our sincerity."

6 February 1902

Cable from headquarters:

"1. Realize details not nor available but Igs would

"2. Also request Robert Oren's] Inttial assessent

aissidentsy capability carry out plan of action once l1sited

arned assistance provided."

10 February 1951

The station cabled its reply:

"To solia

reaction except joy as of 9 Feb.

"Initial assessment is /Erossa and Vicini/ could not

carry out plan.

But with access /Dr. Severo Cabrall he nor

approaching point wen vill batter be able evaluate group

potential for action.

He some weeks away frog being able

make solid preliminary assessment.

"Suggest KUSARK consider sending in each pouch one wall

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size high fire cover weepon co at least gesture in rient

directio: can be made it ve

ail chrom out. Amo coold

latex.

I4 February 1961

At the Special Grouy meeting of this date, Mr. Sundy:

... asked that a renomadin be prepared for niger

authority on

the subject of at placs can be made for a

successor goreruent to trajillo.

(Coment: We did not find a copy of such a senorandus

in CIA files.)

25 Februery 2252

Ned Holmen, the headquarters branch chier, set with Juas

Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral 1n New Yor: City. Excerpts iron ais

menorandum record of the meeting follow:

• • • Vicini plajed down scuewnat the necessity for

delivery di ars, althouga be did say that it is desireable

and should be a part or the plaming.

Èe said that meroers of

the opposition could, if they vanted io, obtain scall guanitities

of arms fron Army contacis •

but that any arms so obtaired

would have to le used very quickly before their loss is

aiscovered. For this reason, be said it would be desireable to

have aras delivered by us taat could be stored for use at any

nonent desired.

"Vicint said that the object of obtaining this kind of help

angray is the elimiration of Trujilio and instead of using arns

or grenades he began to speak of nore exotic materiels and rethods

• a porerful bono that coula be planted along tire route of

Trujillo's evening talk and cold be detonated iron a rearoy

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÷

F:

SX007-513 527

cleatronic device .

•(or)... the possibility of poisoning

the dictator's iood or of puttina poison capsales in bottles

of certain medicines thai toe diciator is Inore to take

regularly. ....

exotic and sore practical plan that they put for-ard

was ose that they said had alreeds been planned at one tize

before. They said that en the dictator leaves his office for

his hore there are three autocobiles in bis procession is the

dictator hinself in the first autozobile end the bodyguaris in

the following tro. Ine ides that bas been discussed intemally

1s for several truces to block una progress di trose cars at a

given intersection at which time young meu doo belong to the

action groups would leap out of the trucis with fire arms and

4 March 1961

Headquarters pouched to tre station a copy of Holian's nesorandin

or his reeting, 'ith Vicind and Reid. On l March, the chief of station

cabled his assessent of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage

and kill him with guns and grenades:

!

Vicini idea... alrost certals fail If applied. Isat

type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified

cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement venicles

plus police practice detour traffle blocks away from entourage

nase Vicini Idea fatally coildist 1n Oren's view."

(Carment: The assassination as actually carried ous

through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and

took advantage of a stereotyped pattem in Trujillo's sovesents

in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled aigiarays.)

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749--.

-

" has an'

SWEET-ERS 207

Toe station cabled neadquarers on i Karch:

... if opportunity support pro-us group 20t to be 105*,

believe

•.• imperative vase

sure arab tita amo ready for

immediate entry Domep ... il necessary at air drop sites ...

5 March 1951

As a follow-up

to that cable, the station cabled a comunication

from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands coance to speedup

events. Everything is being plared perfectly. Results may be

assured as nuch as human fallibility peroits. . . ...

I March 1961

Headyuarters cabled the field, 1a part:

"Extsting authorization precludes introduction amas 12to

Don Rep by U.S. personcel. O der prepare contigezes plans

for possible alternate delivery zetood, request stasion

determine additional drop zones and confim those mentioned

... . . Request type and giazilty ars desired. . . ...

8 March 1951

Cable from the station:

"Brossa toid Deazborn an 7 March trat De. Severo Cabral asa

group plan try kill Irujilio in Lintercepting his sarf at poin

ear /Wimpy's Supemarkat]. rate not set and obviously depend.

on Trujillo travel . ..

Severo Cabral not avare Brossa has tola

us but interesting that Coarge' Papal luciatura also aware plot

exists but possibly not of personnel iavoirea."

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72493

26:

ices

8 Marce 1951

Is aquarters cabled the station:

Tigs deeply interested plan..

and request urgently

additional detalis in order save plans tiraly assistance

Uncertainty of plans, timing and cances of success precludes

Has sexing commitzent for such seicific assistance as toat

requested . . ...

13 March 1951

Ecadquarters cabled the station:

"Following elicited fron EMORE-8 (Andres Freitas) :

Freitas speaics for Miaon Mio Eroup which includes elliary

bembers... In six brigade Eas ard which here capability,

et appropriate tire, of taking over milltary garriscas disa

aras already at hand, and appoisting military/civilian junta

1n control provisional govt.

•.. • recyst follornz station

with respect Asiana Tio aroup: A. Identily citry

Bembership; B.

Assess capabilities as claized; C. Indicate

1f assets can be coordizated with overall e?tort.

Egs piaces

special esphasis on identifying allitary Jessership idlara Tio

15 March 1901

Cable fros the station:

"Lorenzo (Niry) berry asked La consulate employee/ for

sun supply seementation grezades "for ise in next wee or so.'

By note,

the chie? of station aneched back rica linor and

learned the dissident group must do buSied all Prujilio% this

nonth or arop it as nunber of fringe persoss with loose mouths

are apperently avare renewal plas..

mispy asied for five

45 ms (sic) rapia fire weapons or sirilar, 1,500 rolads amo for

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1.i:

in cit

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80887-5321V

гага,

• . . 50

incenttion grenades,

... ten Gram ian!:

Toilets.

10 March 1901

Headquarters cabled its reply:

Berty masiag request on om initiative ur is be speaking for

17 March 1952

Cable Irom the station:

"For issue to several Lof tre dissident groug/ Consul

•Gezeral Dearborn

requests three 33 caliber Snith and wesson

Special pistois or sinilar and taree scall boxes cartrleges.

If sending ammo complicates probler, advise and de sill try

get from Marines.

"Caief of Station reiterates suggestion Lio send in each

pouch one stall size higa fire power weapon as Dearior

creasingly concerned lest nosentum which group ras nos ior

assassination/ decline result lack tanzible or too slor actior

on ares by the U.S. Goverment.

Also security these people

increasingly of direct interest US Government "hich esca day

more involved in [the operation. Loss oi one of key people

thru capture could lead revelation details ODYCKE EMILEND

Thus preferable we give them some chance defend

thenselves against SM!."

18 March 1951

Chief of Station Robert, Oren net for the first tine wita Dr.

Severo Cabral. Ee cabled the results:

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SOONET- DELS SLY

"His group Escassication plan nor tais: Group mois

1dentiy Frijillo's sistress in capital. He visits her once

weet or caor 10 tro reess.

Goes her apartsent nuegaiio and

Lanty guarded. Group apprently has soreone in builling to

can alert thes to visit.

fessed as aray officers, sall grous

11l 69 to entrance, distract guard ilta pretext

dispatch si

on tres in silence, enter apartrent and try do (Essassination]

possibly including mistress, in silence.

"To do they need fire !!-3 or ecaparable mechire guns ard

1500 rounds 2710 for persoral deiense in event firefight. Will

use quiet weapons for casic job..

.. • severo Cabral's final

position vas U.S. Goverarent get items bere soonest via pouch.

Evident he actually sorried that delivery by

otter Desas mould coopromise entire project. Obvicus be can

count on osly one group both recelve aras ard do /assassination.

'Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing_risk craos for perico

i imme tittie lengüg aller assassication rainiy because for

securlay reasons his group cannot apprcas military and hope to

get decisive agreerent support before [assassination/.

20 March 1951

Headquarters cabled the station:

*Pegret no autho-lsation exisus to suspend pouca regulations

agalast shipment of arus.. • Will deliver to the group's

representatives outside the Dominican Republic If this feasible.

Coordizated with State Departent.

22 Marca 1951

The station repuied, in part:

• ve realize permission does not nor exist but

Chief of Station mors that he at last two posts received pistols

via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can ce done. Juazing iron

rei, is not prepered take this step. If this unalterably so then

- 36 -

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## Page 38

14-00000

-

8027-23027

please continue try get authorization for air drop of ... ammu

• .. or laport aros by Lottery beaus.

Coopletely negative plea

for ams, malever delivery sethod,

cooperation fevery

and procably or Elimpy and Mrs. Barry. *

25 larch 1951

The above

excerpt is the most significant point in the cable,

but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tore of the

cable. On 25 Marco, Headquarters, in a cable released by tbe DD/P

(Bissell) undertoo's to

set Oven straight. The cable

gives a

fal-ly

complete statement of

U.S. policy and objectives and of Oven's

responsibilities. It 13 sumarized kere. We support a program to

replace the Iridillo regire; de wish to avoid precipltate action 1s

pianning is not well orgarized, as appears to be the case; machine

guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the

dissidents;

the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters

1s planning with State egalast the eventuallty of sudden action by

the dissidents that migat result in the forning of a new goverment

"Il above clarifies .las position, Oven saould proceed accordingly.

In event major points rebair unclear, State Deparinent preparing

orders perait return for consultations."

(Concent:

We do not know whether Den replied to this cable

or not. He do not find a reply in the files. Oren dia 50 to

headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we canot

- 37 -

* Iù is apparent from the ENDED operational files that no ares vere

ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.

---

## Page 39

14:00000.

SEGRET -BICS ONLY

establish that the trip wes a direct result of this cable. Tere

is sace evidence that suggests that the trip ray. have been in

connection vith a request fron the dissidents for subuachine

guns.)

26 Perch 1961

:Cable frow the station:

"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-

automatic M-1 carbires 30 callber and sugply amno which avaliable

consulate f:om departed naval persomel.

Would need fron Aqs

nine 30 cartridge magazioes for respons. Request prompted by

Severo cabral nute if March waich says he wul huid group

together beyond April 15 vithout aras dellvery. • . ...

• (Cament:. It my be helpful to interrupt the chronology

at this point. As ve vill later explain,.. these carbines were

actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of

Antonio de la Mazs, who worked out the details of the assassination

and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They alnost certainly

were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have

no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shootlag.

The little evidence ve have suggests that they vere not actually

used. These three cardines are the veapons referred to by various

sources as having teen passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no

evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)

-:38 -

SECRET-EVES ONLY

read:

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## Page 40

14-00000

27 113ren 1951

Eeadquarters cabled tre station:

"FYI, ref hardare The three pistols the station asked be

pouched] nakes fally sizeable rackege 11 lumped single shipest.

Request soorest COS estimate of risk involved seuding one pacsage;

or whether split shinent preferable."

(Comment: We find no Indication in the files that these

revolvers were ever actually pousbed. We suspect they were rot,

because the request for them vas overtaken by subsequent events.

39 March 1961

Ecadquarters cabled the siation:

" . . . Has inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref

carbines and ammo.

Are carbies carried on local Installation

Inventory, thus requiring paper wors nich may olor CLA's

ultinate use?.. How does station propose to pass weapons in secure

manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees beconing

witting they beirg rade available to Dominicars?

Require

Consul Gereral Dearbors's concurrence... Advise... . ...

Pouching . . • nire ragazines . .

31 March 1961

The station replied:

"3o inventory problem." No paper sork to stos CIA in act

in anjiaj.- Pian file off serial nuncers.

Will cardle paciagdiz

after hours. Onlj consulate person "co knows disposition 1s

Dearbors. Delivery to Himpy Perry by the station's female

administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on ubat

steps seens best here. Dearborn concurred in request end in this

nessage.

We cannot emphasize enouga that we must make gesture of

- 39 -

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## Page 41

SEGRET -2708 CHIY

good will to Severo Cabral not. Tese less are not what he

asked for but they are an iriessent 11 operatlonal continuity.

The security ils's in his naving these l'eas is no greater than

his having similar items delivery which done by sore complicated

and less secure cache or drop."

Headquarters cable to the station:

"Passing tine three carbires approved. Advise las shen

passing.of.this.egulpsent coopleted.

(Conment: This cable vas released by the DD/P (Bissel1).)

7 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[The pouch forrarding angazines for the three carbines]

contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines

as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-l carbine

ragazines."

2 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Ine station's fezale adaints ative assistant/ passed

Lthe three carbines to flapy Berry April 7. No complications."

(Cosment:. The files do not contain an account of how the

carbines were actually passed. As ve will leter see, headquarters

subsequently poucked subuachine guns for jassing to the dissidents.:

Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the

subrachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied:. "Propose

use essentlally same technique as that for Loe three carbires.

- 40 -

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## Page 42

[me siation's fenale adataisstive assistant] arivira con sa=

will go to lozal sugerzarsei Limpy vermy'] for usual Saturday

• noming furchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assisti

from Chief of Station in loadinz package or jackages Into car

trunk sith groceries. [Statlon operations officer ill thes

accompany to adninistrative: assistant's apartent, help tace

groceries in. If no danger sigzal given by operations offices,

(himpy. Berry will arrive in personal car, pick up items fros

operations officer at partially concealed entrance to adairf-

strative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover for

his visit will be comercial delivery.")

I April 1961

Chief, Wi Division, subnitted to Chief, RI,, a nemorandus requesting

waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request

Is submitted for the following reason: Station Cludad Trujillo Las

requested that Headquarters provide four M3 nachire guns and 2'40

• rouads of armunition on a priority basis for issuance to a snall action

group to be used for self protection."

(Coment: Toe entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request

for submachire suns, but there was no follod-up on It from toe statios.

Tois pouch waiver request was subnitted while the chief of statice as

- 41 -:

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## Page 43

7i2.14

30NT-2IES ONY

at readjuarters for consultations. I. is proceale ticat he rade tice

plea la person.. As vill be seen later, toe sumacaire guns (the so-

called "greese, 5:93" Of World War IT) were poucked but approval vas

never zirea tice station to pass them to the plotters.)

12 April 1951

Zeadquariers cabled the station:

"Faulment for Sever Cabral (Eumachtsa guns vinicia suaject

of Chief of Station conversations Eqs being pouched . . . 14

April. Prior to passinz equiment, adilse Has, what scheme of

delvery progosed."

(Comment: The delivery scheme is explaired in comment on

the 9 April entry.)

13 April 1951

An extract. Iron a note sent to Consul General Dearbora frcan•

Juan Vicini:

*The three leica cameras, model M-1 LEke three carbines/,

with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day

or tuo. .

..: • With the small encunt of equizuent which tbey

are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places

and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and

te time factor considerably extended accordingly.

With the

rest of the equi went (four Leicas, model 11-3) Libe sucmachire

guzs the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost

tise greatly reduced."

14 April 1951

Extract fras a note from SOCATES Luis Baquero/ to DELIA

- 42-

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## Page 44

14.00000

103 S2

(Consul General Dearoom/:

"Ine thiee belua cameras and accessories are in the hands

of tina ones that will care the pictures.

iney need sore cameras

1n order to

do scatter and faster doe.

He hope that the nazo

we sent tro

days ago rigat help in lasa. in this regard."

IT April 1901

Note from LAGUATE [Juaz VIcini] and SOCRATeS /luis Bequero to

DELTA Dearbor/ :

"Tue last worà, up to the minute in the matter of cameras:

CRISTOBAL General Juan Toges DiazI says that with the 3 Leica

cameras already callered it to leppssiale to da wit lausandie

He needs to have the rest of the equirment (the

Leicas) before he undertases the job. The ones already delivered

he sees them as good complerentary equipment (defessive) but be

needs

the others for the aggressive part of the job.

It is my

belle? tage the ones already dallvered have served a psychologiial

purpose also:

the sea lavolved have alrays been in doubt the

good faith of your people in rash.

Toeir feeling was that in

several sonths all they have obtained were promises.

Now they

see that you actually sean business. So, nor, all they are doing

Is waiting for the reary careras."

17 April 1961

Feadquarters cabled the station:

repeat not

most important [he susachize guns] not/be

Mussed to Severo Cabral titout additional llas approral.

Please

advise wren equipment received and proposed scheze and timing of

delivery."

- 43-

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SEMET-DEES ONLY

20 April 1961

Heedquarters cabled the station:

"ubnachine gus] should de celd in station custody till

further notice and not repeat not be pascéd to Limpy Berry.

This Egs decision based on judgest that filling vacuu created

by [assassination noi blose= question tar ever view unsettled

corditions ;1n Cariabesa area.

"Request station provice foll into soonest: (e) Eave

the three carbires, been delivered to Severo Caoral? (b)

Letails on an alterate pian to deiiver Furacaine guns)

which would lavolve ground cacning."

(Coumert: It night be noted that this cable vas sent

just three days after the fallure uf the lidiaz at tee Bay of

Pigs.)

20. April 1961

Mote to DELIA Dearbo. Bros YACUATE and SOCRATES:

"The officers that vere to do the photograpbic job are not

only disappolated but really angry at the refusal of the dellvery

of the other Leicas.

They kave decided to five up tice plan and

disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for notking."

20 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Submachtire gurs] here 19 April iith no eatry problems

whatsoever. Excellent basic "rapping reans station's plan can

be simplifled even nose.

fice edinistrative assistant, the

operations officer, ad the chief oi station can share delivery

direct to drop. Request Has advise vien se ney begin."

SEERET-2YES OMY

---

## Page 46

300727-2X3S 0107

(Cortent: The precise nature oe tals "exceilent basie

wrapplaz" Is not further clarified in the file. Monran Gall,

s1t1ro in The leu deplolle, sala seat the seabons tere salaped

to Wlap; lerry lil foca cans. 'Inis soids to us.as if the sub-

sacbine guns were racked in inod contairers for pouching. If co,

we wonder how Gall leerned of this. We can state with fair

confidence that these subachire bus ware never passed out of

the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Boo

Oven sent a cable protesting the polley that forbade his passing

inem. Tnis sounds as if there mist have been a leas fron the

consulate--iron one of tre very ler sho scew of the submachine

guns. We cannot confra that the subeachine guns hire actually

packaged in food containers for pouching. ISD has no record of

having done so. Jake Isterline bas a faint secollection.of.jood

containers, but not in connection vita poucaina.)

21 April 1961

Cable from headquarters to the station:

Subrachine guns/ should be held in station custody til

other notice and not repeat not be passed to Wimpy Bereal

22 Aoril 1961

The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April

regarding disposition of the three caröles:

... Wizpy Barry has given the three carbines

to intercediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up .

- 45 -

SEGMET-EXES ONLY

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## Page 47

14-00000

NER. 551

3BXNET-OUS 0ILY

(Corneat: Tals "Intercediary" appears to kare beea Incas

Stockes. The significasce of tais and the securley probles it

posed vill becase apparent iron ore of the later entries for

31 May.)

35 10-11 1901

Cable from the station:

"Foll fron Dearbora: "I velleve pulitiul consequence of not

delivering Eumachine gung so serius I plas so hashiaston sital-

rext few days for discussion with Departent and CAS Has!"

25 April 1951

Cable fran the station:

"impy Berry] told Coiel of Station... Astonio de la

Maza plans try assassinaticn between 29 April and 2 May.

Severo Cabral possibly not jet avare ples. No soila info oste:

members assassication effort but General. Juan Tuas Diaz. procau

will aid. Will use the three carbires plus whatever else can

get. De la Maza asks Berry add the sumachine guis if possible

30 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Following frch Dearbom: April 28 Lorenzo Berty as exissary

Jugs Vicini and Severo Cabral called on ze with ?0ll 1alo: ..

nain mission BerTy was pleed vith me release subschine guas they

believe in Don Rep and under my control. Action group bas 3

carbines, 4 toó 12-stege snotguns :1th 120 rouds and sare suall

•. • Action entails roadsice anoush near San Cristocal

1÷46-

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## Page 48

and few additional reapons could ce inporant.

• I replied

I had to sucracaine guns under ay control and that any U.S.

controlled itens wich night be in Dom Rep could only be released

on specific authorization from liasaiaztor.

I pointed out that

since. tre. tree carcines were sade available Cuban incident bad

occurre me cope come could saderstand this is perlod of study

and assessuent.

2 N2/ 1951

Cable from the station:

•'•suggest Has review: decision not pass sucmachine

guns. Determination of group to go acead viin possioly inadeqiate

mans could spell end best pre-us force noy working tovard the

overthros or the Trujillo regtae."

2 May 1901

Draft cable prepared at headquarters:

- .

• Since 1t appears that EMord group has comitted

Itself to sction with or without additiosal support, coupled with

fact that the carbines already nade available to them for personal

defense; station autorized pass sumachine guns to: Berry lor

their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. • •'. ...

- (Carsent: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated

by Ray Feroert for J. C. King and Richard Bissell coordinated on

1t. It was forraried to the DECI for release. General Cabell

attached a handwritten duck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div.,.

macted upon.")

- 47.-

SECRET- 2123 OILY

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## Page 49

SENNET-DIES ONLY

L say 125₴

we. The Director, at a seeting of the Special Groug, reported a

nes anti-trujillo plot, sajing that ve never mer if one of these

would works or not.

5 May 1951

Eeadguarters cabled the staticn:

"Regret delay out release Lof the subachine guns awaits

k1gh level State Departent deciston."

8 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"State Departuent has disapproved passing [submachine guns].

16 May 1961

Cable frou the station:

"For Achilles and CoerT frow Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called

on se night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which

plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16.

Stociser's

guns which it understood US agents have 11 Don Rep : . . • •

(Coment: There is an unsigned and alnost incomprehensible

memorandun in the DAD files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and conceras

3 Deeting wite Mrs. Flerida Berry. The transalttal dispatch rases.

48

SEGRET -EXES CHILY

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## Page 50

SHOOT -00S CLY

It clear trat the author was Isabel Cinura, tee station'a:

saninistratlie assistant. Ints 1s our interpretation of what

Mss Cintmz was trjing. to say: Sometice during tine. second...

week üf Maj, Wimpy Berry asked Tacuas Stocker to return the tiree

carbines Berry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at

first refused out finally, agreed. (Presumably Berry then passed

* ;

them to Antosio de la laza.] On 15 May, Stoccer again saw Berry

at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession,

and his group planned to carry out the assassination the folioriug

night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that

Berry had been working irith un behalf of the consulate. SO PAlES

(Luis Baguero) arrived at the supermariet infle Stocker was still

with Wimpy. After Stocker left; Mrs. Berry assed Baguero 1f-Le

had given the Cardines back to Stocier. Baguero said he vas

certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines.and vas.

to do the job did not know each other's identities. While Mrs.

Berry was talking with Baguero, the man to thon Berry had last

given the weapons [presuably Antonio de la lazal arrived at the

supercarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he cad returned the caroizes

to Stocker. Ee replied that' he nad not tbat thet, if she wanted

confirration, she could look in ie trun: of his car wiere he

always carried then.)

lig.

SECRET-SIES ONLY

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## Page 51

73361-108 0.01

18 pay 1951

There vas discussion at a Special Group reeting. of planning with

respect to the Domirican Republic. Chester Boules said be thought

that an internal State planning paper outlizing an ambitious

paragilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approral) exceeded

the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that

inpression. The follosing is an excerpt fron the minutes:

*General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were

pressing fo: the release to them of certain nall arms nor in

U.S. hands: in the Dominican Republic. Se inquired wether' the

feellaz of the Group romaluca that these arus. shoula not be

passed.

The members showed no inclization to take a contrary

position at this tine." *

35 lay 1961

The agends of the Special Group neeting for this date proposed

discussion of "further guidance to Degrborn re contacts vith

dissidents." The mlautes of the seeting, hovever, wake no mention

of the subject.

27 May 1961

The station cabled::

"Departzent fron Dearborn: May 26 I had long talk with

Andreas Freitas. . :

•'• • rreites nade no request for arus rich

Indicates group has accepted fact it mist do with whet it has.

- 50

*The small arms to bich General Cabell referred vere the submachise:

guns, which vere pouched to the station but vere rever passed to te

SECRET - 218S OHLY

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## Page 52

330857-283 ONLY

His caly staterent on this suoject ias that group bas aras but 1s

sozechat concerned dratser enough.

"He stated actich group planning overthror. Trujillo for

past 3 seeks and mementing anti-communist pro-deno ratic

elerents of watch he sember rerains on brink final perforsance

and deterined as ever.

Said he could give me no date because

a:tion depends whea Irujillo follows availed patter which

not known in advance.. Group has arrangerent for beirg infomed

sufficiently in adrasse to get into assigned positions once

sigoal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-

United States Doninicans quickly if they succeed overtarou

•Trujillo.

"I replied... sped with which assistance could be

given would be increased considerably 1i ve could have prior

into on sueir subjects as tining, plans for action, personalities

involved ani identity of proposed junta... ?.. He repliéa

particizants vere not prejured give tiel: noses until afterward

and could not give tire for reasons stated earlier. • •••

"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day, and

could in fact have happened 3 ties in last 2 weeks except that

necessary juxtaposition of forces did not raterialize."

39 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"For Dearborn from State . .

.. • We must not run risk

of U.S. association vith political assassination, since U.S.

as matter of geseral policy cannot condone assassination. Thi

last principal is orertiding and must prevail in doubtrul

situation. ..

. You cust request and receive further

specific instruction for asy scecific covert activity.

At the

present time de are unable to transfer aras to dissidents. ... '"

(Corment: Both Tearsorn and the chiel of statica sent

cables comenting ca this guidanse cable. Their cables were filed

= 51

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## Page 53

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MCNA

STOXC1-DIES OML7

1a Cludad Truilllo on 30 May but vere 205 recelved la lashington

until the early morning hours of 31 Maj--about eight hours

after the assassination toos plase. Exserpis follow.)

31 May 1951

Cable fron the station:

"State Pron Dearcors . . .

• • Il atteupt is vade by U.S.

friends assassinate Tujillo there vill be accusations agalast

us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger

polat is Thowas Stocker. He has given suall number aras by

dissident agent to hold several dajs and has told several persons

dissidents obtained these items ira consulate. Stocker toid ne

same and I have iniored him this cannot, be true or I vould kror

and when he requested se supply arms through him for dissidents

I told bin this impossible. • . ...

Cable from chief of station:

"Assume [the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearbory 1s

final word on present policy on which CIA work here sust be based

This for prastical purposes retreat fron previous policy.

Eowever Iqs aware extent to which U.S. Goverment already

associated with assassination. If ve are to at least try 'cover

up tracks.' CLA personsel directly Involved 1a assassinatioz

preparation must be uitbarawn sow... ... Il assassiration

tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of.

station, the operations officer, and the administrative

assistant mandatory. • .

- 52

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31 119: 29501

Received in Headquarters Signal Centez 1: 03*1 bours,

Hashington tire:

FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO JUMBOR I. APER 2.

SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIPECT TOUCE MUR DISSIEZIT ACTION GROUP (C).

SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL

WEICE MEANT TRUSTLLO KITTED BY ASSASSELTIC SAVE PUCET. MERICAN

CONSULATE PERSONIEL MICOUTTIERED ROADBLOCKS OF CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO

HALA SUPER HIGELAX ÀT ABOUT COSO ECUAS LOCAL IDE 31 MAX. *

INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED •ILITIA ONLY

FEW OF WEOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS ONERS WITE SCHETES. NO

CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF O100 MAY 31. FILED O6OOZ.

L0200 Hashington time/

(Carment:: The station's follow-up operatioral cable

identifled the source of Crit'c No. I as lorenzo (Wiagy) Berry,

who gave the infomation in person to Consul General Dearborn

-and Chief of Station Oren at the consulate. At about 0100 hours,

Dominican tize, Andres Freitas telephozed Dearborn "to ass

cryptically rhether. ve nad-the neus." Freitas said he could add

details when ke had then.)

53 =

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3 June 1961

Memorandus for the record siged by J. D. Esterline, in fart:

"Tre eventag of 2 Juce, 1t as deciled to Imediately

nove out of the Dominican Republic the Station Calef Cren, and

Case Difice= Cookson. It was also decided that Admiristrative

Assistant Isabel Cintion should sot retus to Trujillo: Accord-

1nglj, an operatical incediate mile das sent to the station

the afternoch of 2 Juce issuing approprlate instructions."

9 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject:

"H1gh-Level Keeting on Lominican Crisis" --In part:

"The seeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room

7514 of tse Departent of State. Awozg "bose present vere Vise

President Ijados ishnson, Secretary Kolasara, General Lemnitzer,

Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis" Johnson,

fir. Ed jurrod, Calei, USiA, Hr. irthur Sualesinger, Mr. Riccard

Goodvin, MI. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wis Coert, Mr. Morales Carrion

"Vice President lyrdon Johnson referred to another nessäge

from Consul Gereral Dearcorn which vas in an alarmist tone as to

the possibility of implicatiog the united States in the delivery of

arus to the dissidents.

The Vice President then asked what

was the tirlug and authority on the delitery of arms."

(Comment:

Toe message to wich Vise President Johnson

referred is sot in the EMDIED operatiocal Piles. We did not

find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. jake

Esterlise, so agpears to have ridden heri on post-assassination

planing, dues not recall having beard of Vice President Jobnson's

54

SECRET -DIES DILY

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## Page 56

C80N87-DIS DAV

query. Toe recoid suzzesto that la mer of 1t but does not so

reneniser.. There is an insighed desonaan in tar EDEED file

dated 6 june 19ó1 (the day efter the reetlug at State), subject:

"ODACID Views On Passage of ArIs to Dozinican Dissidents."

The reorindum surarizes State Departzeni-Consulate Involveneat

in karing weapons furaisred to the dissidents. The routing and

record sbeet attacaed to the senorandu snous it vas originated

by Join Poulter, Wi3/DPed, and as furrarded to C/OPS/Mu

(Estetlize).. Esterline laltialed tee routing and record. sheet

and returned the memorandu to Poulter. This surgests to us.

that J. C. King, upon rezurning fron the restleg it State, assed.

Esterlire to have a sumary pulled togetier.

J. C. King remembers the neeting at voich the Vice President

asked about the delivery of arms. He does not nor recall the

specific query. Re-reading his remorandu record of the neetiag

leads him to believe that the Vice President's question vas

directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that,

1f 1t had been directed to CIA, he would have made sention of

that fact in his record of the neeting.

A senorandus for the record prepared by J. C. Firz of a Walte

House reeting on tice Icalnican crisis on 7 June 19ó1 takes no zertioz

of U.S. involverent in passing reapons to the assassins. The seeting

was chaired by the President, and Vice President Jonnson was present.

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H÷XD8 BEY

The preceding, quite detailed, and alrost wholly dochuentary

eccount of U.S: Goverment involvement with persons plotting

tine overthroa of Trujillo carries through the.

actual assassination.

Early in the report ve explained way the coup shat vas to follow

the assassination never: took place. Another essertial part of the

story is the roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery

of U.S. involvement with then. The consulate cabled tbrough CLA

channels on 9 December 1961 nat the Y icienter issue of the

Doslatcan newspaper La Hacion carried a story

" ... based an Huascar Tejeda Pinentel's staterent

to Judge of Instruction tbat Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry)

provided the caliber 30 M-l Caraid autoratic carbizes used

to kill Irujillo."

Wimpy's involvenent with the plotters, Including passing veapons

from. the U.S. consulate to them, beceze known to the Dominican

Military Intelligence Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from its.

Interrogations of the captured assassins. The following summary

1s drawn fran the FBI's report of 1ts interviews of Ortiz, the SIM

officer who headed the investigation of the assassination.

Incediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled

at the house: of General Juan Ious Diaz. Di. Robert Reid Cabral

was called to treat the rost seriously wounded assassin. DI. Raid

was the cousin of Dorald Reid Cabral, one of the bey political plotters,

but appears not to have been in on the plot hinseli. Since Dr. Reid

2-277.26 ME

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1n belag cailed as a paysician leamed the identicles of the assassias,

General Diaz said de could not ellor Di. Reia to 50 free.. General

"Dia? forced Dr. Paid to furatan refuge in Reid's house for four

of the assassins (Gereral Diaz, Antozio de la Naza, Salvador

Estrella, and Foberto Pastoriza). The otcer assassins went their

separate days.

Withis hours alver entering Dr. Reid's aouse, Geseral Diaz

and his three companions tegan to panic. (it might be noted here

that she assassins were so sure that the coum would follo and tsey

would all be national beroes that they had sade apsolutely know

plass for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid and

it.

ordered Dr. Reid out of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs.

Reia 12 the presence of his compations. Pastoriza and Estrella vere

bighly Inoensed over

the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after

& near-fIght and a draun-veapons confrontation. Estrella left after

& ley hours. Diaz and de le Maza left later and were killed in a

gunfight while restatizz arrest. Both Pastoriza and Estrella vere

captured, tortured, and confessed. The folloring are excerpts from

sue FBI's report of Its Interviews with Ort1z, the SIM investigator.

.. after Pastoriza Left General Juan Toras Diaz corposed

a teiegran eddressed to President Ronulo Betancourt of Venezuela,

unice said, "ve ano have killed Trujillo urgently need jour delp

in order to flee the country. Signed General Juaa Tosas Diaz. '

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Diaz requested De. Poid to tave this telegras to 'jimpa,' an

Aerican ino omel a supermarces in Ciudad Pridilio, and to

"ll '"lEy' to take the telegray icrediately to the herican

Consul and to est the Coasui to code the telegra and send it

inrougà the proper coannels to betancourt.

"Reid refused to take the telegran on the vasis that he

had already

iplicated himsel? greately in the plot tarough

no fault of bis or zad state that de tought Diaz ras trying

io have him rilled ay asking bin to take this triegra- to

With that de la Maza cecaze so Incensed trat he

punched Peld and gushed him around and even went so far as to

hold his revolver against the head of Reid's young son.

inen said that tie plotters could it le ellire Reid family

if they wished but that be would sut deliver the telegraa to

"Estrelia was asked to furzish what be loes concerning

'Wimpy's' alieged connection viis the conspiracy.

related that 'niggy' is the one who facilitated the obtaining

of the shotgun and the autonatic rifle for de la laza and

Ganeral Diaz.

Fe ras asted it "Viray" bey the purpose for

which these vespons vere secured and Estrella replied that 'Wimpy"

bas aware of the purpose.

Estrella further reiated that 'Wimpy'

works for the FBI, the State Deparvent, or sone other agency

of the U.S. Coversent.

"Estrella sas asted to explain bou he knew 'Wimp!" was

connected with the Avericans and be replied that he cad beard

Iron the other conspirators that 'Wimpy' was the intersediary

between tire Americon Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella

stated that 'Wimps' was a friend of General Diaz, Antonio de la

Maza ard luis Amiara Ito, and that 'wimpy' cad been the inter-

medlary througa the American Consulate when these three discussed

teir proposed coup with American authorities.

"... tbe source mentioned ticat during tire interrogation

oi the conspizators ino mentioned that United States officials

were involved,

they cure all asked to identify the laited States

officials, but zore of the conspirators vere sole to identify

trese officials oy nare and mentioned only that they cere higa

functionaries of the United States Departent of State.

only name of any herican official which vas disclosed during

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these interrogations +2s the nure 01 American Consul Kill in

connection vice the tolezros trai Generai Dias wanted to sead to

Betancourt.

•.. the

source roted that ine teicg-as never reachad

Consul kill because Diaz tore in va alber the incident 1a Dr.

Reid's house.

"(... tice

source conceated trat the interrogators

themselves did not believe

25

tois time that the U.S. Department

of State was in any way lavolved rich the piot.

Waey thought

the disclosures concerning the alleged involvement .

• • v33

simply a method by which Asiana induced General Roman to give his

approval to the plot. ..... is vas tre interrogators opinion

at that time that if the Norte Americans bad beed involied in

this plot, the plot would save seen auch better organized and

the coup would have succeeded.)

.. of the latter part :? June ISól, the investigation

bad pretty veil establisted ice identities oi all the individuals

Involved in the plot, rany of vace had been arrested end

interrogated.

The oalj ones not accounted for vere Luis Ariana

Tio and Antonio Inbert Barreras.

As previously reiated, General

¿lan Tosas Diaz, Antonio de la laza, and Lieutezant Azado

Garcia Guerrero vere killed then resisting amest.

(At this

polat the source related ibat il Gegeral Diaz, Lieut. Garcia,

de le Maza, Amiana, and Invert bai been captured, and zade to

talk, it is certain that many sany zore prisoners would dave

been taken.)

"As far as the source is arare, toe only individuals who

were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who

were brougiat before the courts vere Tavares and General Rowan.

As far as the source is arare, no other individual arrested la

connection ith this plot was brougat before any Dominicas

"Wimps,' the North Arericar, ras to have been brought

before a court to be deported; apierer, Ramiis ordered tbat be

wes not to be molested in any way and as far as the source is

aware, no setion was taken against 'wiapy.'"

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"Wiery" perry, lis vile, and their cailares vere allored to

leave the Dosinican Reprolic.

Taey went to florida and subsequently

visized Washington, Wize in rashington, Barry ras given $2,000

for "expenses" by CIA. Alter amesty was Grunted ine plotters in

Decenber 1951, the Berrys returned to Santo Doulago and resumed

operating neir eupersarket. They, especially kes. Berry, continued

to involve themselves in political intrlgues.. Toey were stainch. .

supporters of

the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin j Messia faction

and

were Involved in the ections tuat led to the overthrows of the

governeats beaded by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.

To rECap:

a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubotton told J. C. King

on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Govermment was prepared to partici-

pate in the overtaror of tice Trujillo regise to the extent of

providing a small zunber of miper rifles for the renoval of

key Irujillo people frow the sone. General Cabell, as Acting

DCI, on 1 July 1900 approved delivering 12 Springfield Miles to

the Dosinican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles

were never delivered.

b. On 10 Febriary 1961 the chier of station cabled a

suggestion that one sall-size, high-fire-pover weapon be

forwarded in each pouen.

This suzgestion nas not acted upos.

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820.

3 017

On 17 March 1951, ice cade? of siation cabled a request

of consul General Dearbon fur tre poucing of three 38 caliber

Saith and lessor Special pistols for delivery to key renbers

of the dissident group. Headquarters vas preparing to pouch

the pistols but aprarently did zot do so. There is no indication

1n the EMDEED operatioral files that toe pistols were actually

pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken

by a subsquent request for sussachine guns.

d. On 26 March 1961 the station caoled a request for

permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus

armunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition

vere in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel.

The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines.

Head-

quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched"

the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was

released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said 1t would file

off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the

carbines were passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station's female

administrative assistant on 7 April 1961., Berry, at the request

of the dissidents, gave the carpines to S. Inomas Stocker for

temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered tice carbires from

Stocker and gave them to Antonio de la laza, who reportedly kepu

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them in the truak of his autosobile. It is probable that at least

one of the caroires has taken to the scene of the assassination

by de la Maza, but ve bave no ertience that Itias actually used

in the scoting. Ortiz, the SIl Investigator, told the FBI that

the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only

of the firing of a saved-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.

e. While at headquarters for cossultations in early April

1961, Chief of Station Robert Ces cridently provalled upou

headquarters. to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition

to the station. The submachine guns were priched and arrived

at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the stetion

on 17 April that the submachine guas were not to be passed to

the dissidents without additional headquarters approval.. Despite

repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and fron the Consul

General, Hashington continued to refuse authorization to pass

chem. He think 1t is safe to conclude that the subwachine guns

were never passed to the dissidents.

A final, and rather sorry, footrote: We do not know the

motivations of nen such as: Jordi Brossa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral,.

Amiana Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM Interrogations of the plotters

It captured revealed that they were not greatly sotivated by a desire

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## Page 64

to liïe in a free and democratio repubiic. Most o? then vere seeking

vengeance or personal gain. Generai Pozaa, ico mas to have tren over

and for an lnterto goverarent, aditie that he had bad no intention

of peritting iree elections. He had placed to establish hiuself

as the ney Ionialian "strongsan" replasing Trujillo. Ceneral Jian

Tosas Diaz was bitter over barag teen publicly disgraced by Irujillo

and then cashiereá from the army. Antonio de la laza also had a

personai grudge.

ils brs er, Cerario, had been killed by tre

Trujillos to conceal his and their participation in the slaying

of Gerald Murphy In the Galindez case. Host of the others also

had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.

52.

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