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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10000

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

ORIGINATOR

PFIAB

FROM

TO

TITLE

MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964

DATE

: 10/01/64

PAGES: 21

SUBJECTS: AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING

SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1A, 1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

08/14/98

08/01/2024

2025 Release under the

President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection

ect of 1992

[R]

ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 88132

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206-10001-10000

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

MINUTES

BOARD:

MEETING

OF

OCTOBER i and 2, 1964

206 - 10001 - 10000

1d 2490

NW 889921

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ITEM

2.

3.

5.

6.

7.

# 185.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1264

October 1, 1964

TIME

9:00 - 9:45

9:45 - 10:15

SÜBJECT

Chairman's Time

Major Board Recommendaülons - Status Report

Mr. Ash

10:15 - 11:15

Audiosurveillance Collection and Counter-

measures:

10:15 - 10:30

10:45

Final USIB Assessment of Audio Penetrations

Of U. S. Embassy, M

MOSCOW

Mr. Howard Osborn

Director of Security, CIA, and Chairman of,

USIB's Security Committee

Mr. Marvin Gentile Heir 6. Seen

10:45 = 11:45

Director of Security, Department of state

10130-12:75

• USIB Conclusions and Recommendations on

Organization, Management and Coordination

of the Efiort

Mr. Richard Helms finis

Deputy Director/Plans, CIA

Mr. Howard Osborn

11:15 = 11:30 Executive session

11:45

7.30 - 12:15

Highlifnts of Soviet COSMOS (Photographic

Reconnaissance Satellite) Efforts Targeted

12:15 - 1:00

1:00

- 1:30

1:00 - 1:15

1,40

1:15 - 7730

2:10

Lunch - White House Mess

Recent Tonkin Gulf Incident:

General Highlights

Mr . : Coyne

White House Intelligence Requirements

In Developing Crisis SItuations

Mr. Bromley Smith

Office of the Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs.

Handle via DYEMAN

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October 1, 1964 Agenria (Continued):

ITEM

8:

TIME®

:1:30 - 4:30

2:

9.

10.

11.!

12.

SUBJECT

2;10

3:20

2:30-1:50

ZilC

1:50

2120

- 2:70

2:10 = 2:30

i°9:11.5

72:30 - 2:50

3:45

4:05

2:50 - 3:10

3:10. - 3:30

3:30 = 4:30

4:15.5:00

4:30 - 5:00

5:00 - 5:10

Alert Warning and Response Capabilitles of

the U. S. Intelligence Community In Develop-

ing Crisis Situations (Organization and

procedures for analysis of

current intel-

ligence; Identification of Early Warning

indicators; timely appraisal and reporting

to top Government levels ):

National Security Agency

Mr

Louis Grant of mu

act sharrett

Department of. Defense

It. General Joseph F. Carroli*

Cal

Director, Defense

Intelligence Agency

Executive Session A

Department of State

Mr.

Thomas L.

Hughes

Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. R.

Smith

Assistant Director, Current, Intelligence Staff

Executive Session conti

Organization,

Procedures

and Communications

Support of the USIB Watch Committee and

National Indications Center

Mr.

Huntington

Sheldon

Chairman, USIB Watch Committee

Executive Session mild

Application of Executive Pay Bill to Key

Positions in the National Signals Intel-

ligence Community

Dr.

William O. Baker

Chairman of the Board's Communications Panel

5:10 - End of Resume Consideration of Item

.. 2.

DaY.

7:30

Dinner at the Residence of Mr. Gordon Gray

(Address: 1224 - 30th Street, Northwest)

- 2

Nstam

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ITEM

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

405

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October 2, 1964

SUBJECT

TIME

9:00 - 9:45

9:45 - 16ilig

Chairman's Time

Current Intelligence. Briefing on Situations

1n South Vietnam,

North Vietnam, LaOS;

Cambodia, communist China, Mazaysa-

Indonesia

Cyprus, congo,

Do ta Director for he see cig

(or Mx. R. J. Smith)

10:45 - 11:00

Executive

session Motheld

11:00

- 72:00

The National Reconnuissance Program

12:15 Dr.

Brockway

Mallen + Bjug

sens..

Director, National Keconnaissance Office

12:00 - 12:15

12:15 - 1:00

2+00: - 1:45

11!9

1:50

Executive Session mier feed

Lunch - White House Mess

Briefing on Highlights of Recent U.'S.

National notographic Intelligence Activities

Dr. Arthur: Lundahl

Director, National Photographic Intelligence

Center

1:45 - 3:00

3:00 - 4:30

Discussions of Future Board Business

Discussions with the Director of

Central Inteiligence

Mr.

John A..

Executive Session

4:30 - End

of Day

(5:00)

Control System

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AprIl 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting, October 1-26 1964

October 72: 1964

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

convened at 9:00 AM on October 1, 1964 at the Board's

offices in the Executive Office Building. Present were

Chaïrman Clifford; Board member's Langer,

Pace, Gray, Land

and Baker (Mr. Murphy was In Rrazil); and Messrs. Coyne

and

Ash.

In opening the meeting the Chairman pointed out that

ample time had been

allotted during this

two-day meeting fore

Board members to discuss agenda items of special interest.

He then turned to some matters which he wished to bring to

the Bard's attention before proceeding with the regular

agenda.

Chairman Clifford informed Board member's that since the

last Board meeting he had met with the President a number

times for discussions of varlous subjects, and on these

occasions had

taken the opportunity to progressively acquaint

the: President with the work of the Board:

Mr. ClIfford pointed

out to the Board that, unlike President Kennedy who had re-s

constituted the Board

in 1961 and was thoroughly familiar with

Its functioning, President Johnson has not been as intimately

associated with the Board. primarily for the reason that no

Intelligence-related Incidents have thus far arisen in President

Johnson's term

to evidence his special need for the Board's

assistance. However, during

the past few months the President

1s beginning to get a better idea of the Board's accomplishments

as a result of Mr. Clifford's comments from time to time.

Chairman Clifford observed that otherwise It was unlikely that

the President would learn much about the work done by the Board,

and certainly not from the Intelligence community Itself and

probably not from Mr. McGeorge Bundy whose inany duties of a

non-intelligence nature are most demanding:

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a view to keeping the Board luily informed of the

President's indicated reactions to Board's work, Mr.

clifford

that for the time being the President prefers

a quiet,

unostentatious operation of the Board.

It is the President's

try to avoid any explosions

In the intelligence field

and any resignations. In heat by any members of the intelligence

community.

After coming into office under most difficult

circumstances,

the president has found people are eager to help,

heavily on Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and on

others such

as the members of this Boara.

Concerning contacts with the Director of Central Intelligence,

Mr. Clifford said that he has

talked with him from time to time.

Recently., Mr. McCone had called to say that he was going to be

out of the country on a mission, and he asked that General Carter

of: CIA be furnished the usual list of topics which Board members

wished the DOI to cover during this meeting of the Board.

At this point the Chairman asked that the Board tüke up

a matter In closed session, with Messrs. Ash and Coyne leaving

the conference room and rejoining the meeting at the end of the

Chairman Clifford informed. Mr. Coyne that the

Board had discussed a report and recommendation which Mr. Pace

rad prepared for the Board's consideration, and the Board had

inánimously agreed to propose to the President that the position

or Executive Secretary to the Board be placed in level Iv of the

Executive Salary Schedule recently established by

the Salary

Reform Act.

Mr. Clifford said that as a part of this proposai

It would be suggested to the president that meanwhile the salary

of the Executive Secretary be raised to a level commensurate

with the compensation of positions classified in es-18, pending

action to place the position in Executive Level IV.

Mr. Coyne expressed

to the Board his appreciation for this

action not only as 1t applied to him as incumbent of the

position, but also as an action in keeping with the work and

effectiveness required of the position in performing

the president and the Board the responsibilities

Involved.

The Board then recessed for a minute to greet former Board

member General Doolittle who had visited the Board's offices

to pay his respects to the members.

(At the time of the vis1t,

through arrangements made by Mr.

Coyne, General Doolittle was

debriefed by Mr. Henry Thomas of CIA In connection with the

suspension of various special clearances held by General

Doolittle at the time of his recent resignation from the Board.)

Resuming In executive session, the Chairman called attention

to the next Item on the regular agenda dealing with the audio

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national.

security resulting from the 12-year penetration of the

u. S. Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet microphone system

which had recently been uncovered there. In this connection,

Mr. Pace observed that the September 24, 1964 report which the

Board had received from General Carter of CIA (concerning the

status of actions taken in

response to Board Recommendation

No: 35 of June 1962) was not responsive to the Board's

recommendation calling for the organization of a major

and development effort in the audiosurveillance field.

At 10:40 AM the Board meeting was joined by Messrs:

Richard Helms, Karamessines and Harold: Osborne of CIA, and

Mr. Brown who

Lapresented the Director of Security of

State Department:

Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Osborne of CIA (Chairman of

the USIB Security Committee) to speak to the intelligence

community's damage assessment of the Soviet microphone penetration

of the U. S. Embassy at Moscow.

Osborne read from a draft report on the damage assess-

which was scheduled to be considered by the USIB Security

Committee on

the following luesday preparatory to submissior

• to the USIB.

He. noted that the 52-microphone system had been

installed during the Soviet-controlled construction and renovation

of the Embassy bullding prior to 1ts occupation by the U..s.

It was tentatively concluded that the penetration did serlous

damage to the U.s

which 1s not possible of precise proof.

The penetration provided the Soviets at least with the knowledge

of Embassy operations, especially those of the U.S. military

attaches; knowledge of the Attaches travel plans

and inteiligence

1n the USSR; and information on the habits, problems

weaknesses of Embassy personnel as a basis for

possible

exploitation by Soviet Intelligence Services.

Mr. Osborne said

that Ambassador Thompson has expressed the Intention to give:.

the security. Committee a damage assessment which is understood

the judgment that the damage to U.S. political

interests

was not serious and could only have given the soviets

a short-run advantage.

Mr. Osborne said that the damage assessment has pointed

up certain deficiencies which have long been recognized by

•. s. security officers, namely: the fact that soviet bloc

control of U.S, embassies during constructiun periods prevents

security inspections which would identify Installations being

made of clandestine listening systems;

the U. S. does not have

an effective technical capability to detect burled microphones;

and there Is a need for a stronger Interagency mechanism to

develop necessary countermeasures. He added that State now

has a program to demolish at least one room in each U. S. Embassy

located behind the Iron Curtain, and other U.S. agencies have

been Invited to join State in the conduct of

procedures.

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Ore action resulting

from the Moscow Incident has been

the alerting of appropriate U. S. agencies to the type of

installation uncovered in Moscow.

The USIB will be asked to

urge the agencies Involved to seek adequate funds and personnel

to perform

necessary security inspections of facilities overseas.

The agencles will be asked to monitor the U. S. personnel who

ware subject to compromise by soviet technical penetrations,

that soviet exploitation attempts are not successfully

made against them.

It will be proposed that a new interagency

mechanism for countermeasures coordination be established within

the USIB, with a view to achieving such goals as U. S, observation

of the construction of our overseas facilities; the employment

of U. S. personnel rather than local maintenance personnel in

the Embassys; the assignment of more U. S. technicians

security inspections

of U.S. posts overseas;

the assignment of

resident U.S. security technicians at sensitive posts abroad;

intensified security indoctrination and

briefings

personnel scheduled for assignment abroad; and expanded

research

and development in the audiosurveillance countermeasures field.

Chairman Clifford asked whether the USIB Security Committee's

assessment had produced actual showings that the Soviets had

intercepted Embassy messages.

Clifford recalling the

incident last year when Khrushchev boasted to Ambassadors

Harriman and Kohler that he knew the contents of a message that

Kohler had sent to Washington recommending

of a sale of west German pipe to the USSR. against U. S. approval

Mr. Osborne could

no lighi on this.

Mr. Coyne stated that he had followed

up with State Department several times regarding this incident

but the Department never had come up with

a meaningful report.

Mr. Osborne said that. Ambassador Thompson's forthcoming annex

to the security Committee's assessment was expected to go into

the matter of whether the soviets were known to have acted

information which was obtained

through the microphone

penetration.

At Chairman Clifford's request, Mr. Helms spoke to the

He observed that CIA has

over 300 telephone taps and

many other listening devices operated world-wide.

operations not only are for intelligence collection, but they

also provide CIA with an idea of the kind of countermeasures

used by the opposition as, for example, in the case of the

Chinese Conmunists' discovery of CIA's

audiosurveillance operation

directed against the Chinese in Geneva:

Mr. Helms salu that

without audio coverage the CIA would not have

known that

Lee Harvey Oswald sought a visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City In 1963. In Burundi, when a Chicom attache defected to

the U.S. and

asked for asylum, the Chicom Legation pressured

the Burundi Government to

attempt to seize the derector and

return him to the Chicoms

=- but CIA learned of this plan

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through audiosurvelllance coverage and was able to thwart the

Chicoms and spirit the defector out of Burundi to the U.S.

In answer to Mr. Cllfford's Inquiry, Mr. Helms

said that

one major lesson learned from: the Moscow penetra

in Incident,

1s simply that such penetrations are just being Invited when

the host country controls construction of the premises and

supplies the maintenance employees.

Dr. Baker asked what was being

done to protect the U.

'Embassy. In Moscow and whether

there are plans

use plastering

/and paint to cover walls such as

those In which pin-hole apertures

were

found to lead to the concealed microphones.

Mr: Brown'

of State said

that he understood that research

and development

planning is being done on this.. Dr. Baker observed that this

1s not an R and D problem and that auch materials are available

now for use in placing protective cuatings on walls in our

sensitive facilitie: abroad.

Dr. Baker' recalled that the code

room

1s jeopardized in the U.S. Embassy in Paris where the

Embassy

1s Joined

a contiguous building. not

under our control,

and Dr. Baker wanted to know what 1s being done about that

situation.

Mr.

Brown

of State was unable to say but he

pointeo

out that current countermeasures plans are directed to

protection of U. S. posts

the Iron Curtain countries, not

Dr. Land said that there appeared to be some protective

away, such as

"painting and

but it seemed that there is a bureaucratic problem

which prevents such action,

and Dr. Land wondered what was

considered necessary to get the job done -- was it necessary

to obtain a Presidential Executive. Order

to dö these things?

Mr. Helms commented that one of the USIB Security Committee's

recommendations will call for putting the responsibility in

the USIB and the agencies will look to the DCI for guidance in

such matters.

Dr. Baker said that all this seemed confusing

because the individual agencies have responsibility in this

field, and he wondered whether a more change in organizational

labils would provide the necessary coordination and action.

Mr. Helms

thought that one task is to get the agency heads

realize the importance. of the problem of

audiosurveillance

countermeasures.

Dr. Baker observed that there are already in

existenca NSC directives which emphasize the serlousness of

Mr. Gray pointed out in this connection that the

preliminary USIB damage assessment of the Moscow penetration

reflects that in some quarters in the State Department there

Is the view that maybe 15 was a good thing if the soviets did

get our information on the theury that the Soviets were thereby

convinced.of the firm Intentions back of U.S. policy pronouncements.

Chairman Clifford asked

whether anyone in our Government

had ever considered the idea of telling the USSR in direct terms

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that we want to bulld

an Embassy In Moscow ourselves, so that

we can be certain that there are no audiosurveillance systems

Installed

Mr. Helms said that this is one answer and

should be tried, but right. now there 1s a hassle about which

should chairithe proposed new USIB Committee to coordinate

süch matters.

Mr. Brown of State said that consideration had

been given in the past to the possible use of U.S. employees'

Instead of local maintenance people:

Granting this, Mr. Clifford

repeated his inquiry as to whether the Intelligence community

had ever proposed that the U.s.

adopt the policy of bluntly

telling the Soviets: that we want the riont to build a microphone-

free Embassy In Moscow.

Mr. Helms knew of no such proposal

having been made by the Intelligence community, but he thought

that this was a matter which the President's Board could deal

with in a recommendation to the President.

Mr. Coyne at this

point read to the Board the text of Recommendation No. 16 which

the Board had made in the Dunlap Case (adoption of a U.s.

pollcy that the USSR not be permitted to buila a neu Embassy

In washington unless the U.s. 1s given comparable permission

In Moscow), and

the State Department's reply to the effect that

the U. S. was committed to the USSR In writing to help

soviets get a new Embassy in Washington, in return for the

Soviet action a few vears ago in refurbishing and maling available

the North Wing o? the U. S. Embassy in Moscow (Mi. Coyne poined

out that It was in this same North wing that a number of

concealed microphone cable connections and antennae were found

in the course of digging out the recently-discovered microphone

system in the Embassy).

Chairman chifford asked Mr. Helms to provide the Board

at an early date w1th a list of protective acsions

be taken right now to increase defenses against audio penetrations

ci our posts abroad. Mr. Helms agreed to do so.

Messrs. Helms,

Osborne,

Brown, et al, departed he Board

meeting at the conclusion of this

agenda item.

Dr. Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director of CIA for Science and

Technology, joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Mr. Stevens

of CIA, to

report to the Board on Soviet satellite reconnaissance

operations directed against the U.S.

Describing this as

suviet cosMos program,

Dr. Wheelon said that of the total

number of soviet satellite shots (40 1n all1:17 have beer

launched from Kapustin Yar. During the last three years 22

launchings have been made from Tyura Tam, and these were pretty

clearly reconnaissance satellites.

These carried 10,000-pound

payloads in a photographic general search system like our

CORONA. The camera weighs 2000 pounds. Four of the shots,

however, were of

the 15,000-pound payload variety, and are

spotting systems like our GAMBIT.:

The repetition

U.S. targets Is Increasing.

We are getting data on each mission,

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being supplied through Burundi and Brazzaville.

The Congo

situation could become dangerous to the U.S. position in

chinese Communist Influence 1s

Mean, loan not to go can aton into ho a

Communist

The Chicoms

offered a Central African Republic $4 million

diplomatic recognition, and got 1t.

With regard to the Cyprus situation, Mr. Cline noted

although fighting has stopped neither side Is backing

The Cypriot leader will not agree to the Turks' pro-

posal to rotate 1/3 of their troops on Cyprus unless the

Turk Cypriots withdraw from positions along the coast.

USSR wants an independent Cyprus with a Communist-influenced

government.

Nasser wants an Independent Cyprus subject to

Egyptian Influence.

In reply to a question

from Mr. Coyne,

Mr. Cline stated that the Navy SIGINT Installation has been

scaled down so as to be ready for quick evacuation.

cut-down in U.S. SIGINT coverage has been replaced

by installations in some Middle East capital cities.

Concerning South Vietnam, Mr. Cline said that the past

60 days have witnessed increased weakening of the political

fabric of the government of that country.

Khanh's inability

to meet challenges is apparent, and his authority ras

steadily eroded.

Khanh is trying to build support from

young officers

and Bhuddists.

(Mr. W1ll1am Sullivan has

to the U.s. and says that the SVN people

generally feel thatithe U.S. will pull out after the

November elections): There 1s no change in the military

situation, Mr. Cline said, but there is a creeping paralysis

in the SWN army.

The Viet Cong is shifting from terrorism

and fighting to all-out political activity.

In the USIB

yesterday CIA expressed the view that there will be further

political decay in SVN, increased friction with the U.S.,

ana a petering out of the war effort.

In Cuba, there are signs that either the Soviets or

Cubans will begin shooting at our U-2's after the November

elections, and

"303 Committee" Is studying courses of

action which mir.it be taken by the U.S. In such an event.

One objective of

the DCI's recent European trip was to

emphasize to NATO commanders that U.S. U-2 missions over

Cuba are not mere whimsy, but are necessary for intelligence

coverage which cannot be provided by satellite overflights.

At 11:00 a.m.,

Mr. Cline left the Board meeting which

the new Staff Director at the NRO (previously attached to

the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Staff).

B ci.

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the Board meeting was folned by the Director

of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA,

In orde: that the DCI might cover the 1tems

in which Board

members had indicated an interest In discussing with Mr. MeCone.

Mr. Mecone first took up the September Tonkin Gulf Incident,

pointing out that he was out of the country when it occurred.

Mr. McCone sald that previously in a meeting with the Secretaries

State and Defense and the President, Mr. McCone had expressed

the view that if the proposed De Soto patrol remained outside the

12-mile limit 1t would not be attacked by the North Vietnamese

or chicoms.

The DCI sald that the night before he left for

Eúrope he repeated this belief to the Secretary. of Defense,

pointing out to him

the absence of mtlitary attack preparations

and the lack of other indications of hostile intent.

The DCI

felt that there was no real Intelligence requirement for the

De Soto patrol which had in fact been proposed for the purpose

of emphasizing freedom of the seas and our right to enter the

Tonkin Gulf with U.S. vessels.

At the time of

the Incident the

DI was in conference with a NATO officer in Europe;

immediately put in

a call to McGeorge Bundv on the Ky-g and

offered to return to Washington, but was told not to do so

because öf the uncertainties as

to the need for it.

Mr. "McCone

pointed out to the Board that CIA's assessment In the Central

Intelligence Bulletin on Saturday morning reflected that theré

was no evidence that Hanol had ordered

an attack on U.S. vessels

but that North Vietnam naval units had been alerted to avoid

acts of provocation and were concerned with defensive action

only if firca upon.

the Board's expression of interest in

discussing a mechanism to improve current inteiligence assess-as

ment and reporting of such incidents as the Tonkin qulf episode.

He said that he had found room for improvement in one area:

certain NSA intercept messages had been passed back to the

field stations for processing, and had been sent to the

National Indications Center, but were not passed immediately

and directly to the CIA for

analysis.

McCone said that

since corrected this reporting procedure.

In any case

when the NSA messages reached the NIC they were sent on to CIA

without serious delay.

However, Mr. McCone said, there developea

a dangerous situation which the Board should look at, namely,

the fact that top policy officials grabbed onto fragments of

raw Intélligence and made decisions before the information had.

been evaluated In the light of the total information available

and relevant to the situation.

Policy officials should make use

of the evaluating machinery which Is at hand.

Dr. Langer

said he understood that there had been no inter-

agency evaluation of the SIGINT messages in the Tonkin Gulf In-

Mr. McCone said that by the time the entral Intelligence.

Bulletin was ready for piblication on Saturday morning there was

no opportunity for complete interagency coordination of the

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evaluation which CIA had made of the situation.

wondered whether there was sufficient DIA and State Department

representation at the CIA center where the Central Intelligence

Bulletin

was prepared.

Dr. Langer added that the white House

the wrong procedure; that instead of querying

CIA, Mr. Bromley Smith had called

a coordinated evaluation of the situation.

this by pointing out that in fact Mr. Smith had talked to state

and others in the intelligence community; and thereafter called

Mr. Coyne tö obtain nelp in getting an up-to-date comprehensive

summary of the SIGINT messages from NSA, and Mr. Coyne there-

upon spent tivo days at NSA öbserving the work of NSA officials

in reviewing and summarizing the messages which had come in from

NSA field collection points,

and the operational U.S. Navy

messages to the extent that

they had been made available to NSA.

Mr. Pace thoughü it strange that the availability of a

to CIA had

not been known to. Mr. Bromley Smith, and

Mr. McCone said that he too was surprised and intended to

discuss this with McGeorge Bundy.

the Board at

Its meeting before last. CIA has 100 agents re- ou

porting on Cuba; they report comprehensively but under difficult

circumstances requiring resort to clandestine radio equipment

and secret writing reports through the mails.

reasonable number of sources (14) in the Cuban diplomatic

corps, but Castro apparently doesn't have confidants among the

Cuban

diplomatic corps abroad.

fc eign diplomatic personnel inside Cuba.

he is not sutisfied with the information being obtained from

Cuba; the task Is difficult; It 1s a matter of portering a

negative.

•CIA has had to rely mainly on U-2 coverage results to

check on

the 45 reports received this year that there are Soviet turned

missiles in Cuba.

The SA-2 sites have probably beenrover to

the Cubans by the soviets, and a defector from an SA-2 crew has

told CIA about Cuban operations.

Castro has expressed intention

to bring to the UN the matter of U.S. U-?!s over Cuba, and has

told Danish and Norwegian officials that after the U.S. elections

in November, U.S. U-2's over Cuba, will be shot down; Castro

claiming that U.S. can rely on satellite photography of cuba

Mr. McCone said:

that by November 1, 1964, OXCART will be ready for missions

over Cuba at a speed of Mach 2.8 and 80,000 foot altitude:

As for South Vietnam,

the DCI said that It is most difficult

to get Intelligence on the Viet Cong.

He has discussed with

Arnbassador Maxwell Taylor, and the CIA Station Chief in saigon,

now to inorove this intelligence coverage.

SVN Intelligence

organizations get very little Information concerning the Viet Cong

HANDLE VIA

BYEMAN-COMINT

CONTROL SUCTr'.

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## Page 15

THE WHITE HOUS

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WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 24, 1964

SUMMARY

Recommendations Previously made by the Board

for Strengthening Capabilitles of the u. s.

"Intelligence Community in the Timely Analysis

and Reporting of Current Intelligence on

Developing Crisis Situations.

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## Page 16

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Board Report of July 2, 1901

Rec. let:

That the u.S. Intelligence Board create the means

For assessing and reporting early varing Indications o

developing

"cold war

crisis situations in any part or the

worla lauch carly warning to be handled

separately

front"

"not war

indications dealt with in the National Indications

Center of the V. S. Jutelligence Board"s Watch Committee):

Buard Report of July Z, 1901

Rec. 11(7):

That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing

the preparation of national intelligence estimates ou the

Intelligence .community, 12) assuring

the timely flow of

intelligence:

to the white House,

and (3) provining intelligence

brlerings to the president and other White House officiais as

required.

Board Report of January 112. 1962

Rec: 426: (Based

on a review of the Berlin Wall and Sylan

coup incidents):

That (1) a sense of urgency be. Imparted at

11eld. and headquarters levels of U.S. intelligerice, agchetes

with a view

to

ensuring timely reporting, disseminacion

antoin

assessment.of

Intelligence indicating the Imminence of crisis

situations which are of potential significance

to the forsign

POLICY

and

national security interests of the United Staves;

(2) without Imposing undue delay on the transmiesion or nam

Intelligence to Washington, State Department officials at

overseas

posts prepare perlodic appraisals of developing

crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consider-

atton at achine roche mean 5. theine boards

Intelligence Board,

and 1ts subsidiaries such as the watch Committee, ensure that

Intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of

vlew which may develop in the intelligence estimative process

and (4) 1n keeping with the DCI's responsibillty for the turely!

flow of intelligence to the White House,

the Dol be requested

to revlew arrangements and procedures to ensure: that (a) crAs

Intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis

situations are made

avallable for timely consideration by the

president and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments

and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are

furnished to the DCI for Information and for use in preparing

intelligence estimates:

-I-

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## Page 17

Board Report of January 20, 1952

Inat the Director of Central. Intelligence, 1n

consultation

with the U. S. Intelligence Board, revie: t

functioris of the U.S. Intelligence Board's Watch Commltree

and National Indications Conter,

to determine their errestives

ness in carrying out their mission of providing early fring.

Board Rebort of March &, 1963

Rec. Ht9(11) (Based on the review of Intelligence coverage,

assessment and reporting by uos..

agencies: with respect to

the So/let military buildup in Cuba in 1902): That concercou

efronts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism. for the:

Integrated assessment (and cumulative periodie appraisals ore

eariy-warning and Indictor-type Intelligence and prompt

reporting

thereof to policy-making and command orficials;

and

(2) conduct intensified rescarch concerning autoratic data

processing techniques to feuilitate the revier ana asceeonent

of the reat volume of material dealt with in the United States

Intelligence community.

Related Board Reconmendations Regardins

Improved Communications Capability for there

Quie: Transmittal of Vital Intelligence Data

2'"

Board Report of October 17, 1961

In lieu of a recommendation,

this was a report to the

• President on progress achieved by the Defense Department in

performing its share of the responsibility for the efficiency

of the Critical Communications

(CRITICOM) Network for the quicl

transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data

fron overseas posts to headquarters in Washington:

Board Report of January 22, 1962

Rec, 1$27(11) (Based on review of U.S. Intelligence activities

In seven Middle Eastern

countries):

That the Defense Department

equlp field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMA)

Netyork with capability for rapid communication of critical

messages among major and subordinate military commands In the

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## Page 18

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Board Report of October 5, 1962

Bece tell (Based on review of i. s.

foreign Intelligence

activities in Southeast Asia.and

the Far East) : that the

Defense Intelligence agency taie action regarding the militaiy

Special. Security Offices (SSO) Communications System IDi

transmitting sensitive Information with a view to: (1) con-

solidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific

military commands and Washington civilian officials, 'and

(2) reorienting the SSo system to make 1t a primary service

and support

to

Commands In the field and comand as

distinguished from Service) elements In Washington.

3

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## Page 19

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210re: Bustrbuted

7?

Sheldon

ATOMIC

JABIC

MISSILES

SPEC. BERLIN

COMMITTEE

CHAIC

NIN 185

Docld:2490

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INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE/ INFORMATION

STATE

RSB

& FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS

¡NEGRMATION

Politicel

Foreign Policy (US)

DIA

ISIC

Wotch Alert

O UNIFIED & SPECIFIED

COMMANDS

• ATTACHES

• WAFNING CENTERS

INFORMATION

Joint Military Fitimates

Military Operations

Militory Copabilities

CIA

OCI

INDICO

• CLANDESTINE SERVICES

& FOREIGN INTELL LIAISON

INFORMATION

• National Estimates

Economic

Scientifis

ONE

CAR

USI

UiS Diert Sources

Foreign Broodcasts

FBIS

Foreign Documents

FOO

NSA

SIGINT COMMAND

CENTER

• COMINT.

• ELINT

WATCH

COMMITTEE

ASC

"Intell Division

• ATOMIE.

• SCIENTIFIC

EXCHANGES

F81

Liaison Givision

o COMMUNIST.

FARTY: USA

SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEES

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## Page 20

THE WHITE HOÜSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Ecoruary 27, 1863

NACIONAL SECURITY ACTION VEMORLNDUV NO. 226

2C:

Tho Socictory of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secrotary of Deconse

Ihe Attornoy General

The Secretury of Commerce

The Director, Oluce of Emergency Pitring

¿ Diroctor, Bureau of the Budget

The Directos, Urited Scates Information Agency

T.

no Charman, Alonio Baorgy Commission

Dha Chairman, Joint Chiois of Start

Th

e Diractor of Central Intalligence

The Samiristrator, Nasional Aeronautics and

Space Admiristration

Tho Direcior, Federal Burezd Of Fivesugator

Disective Rolating to Traneminal of Loanaccor

to the Waich Committea oi ind United Statas

telligence Board

Enoreby approve to anachod directiva relating to sac

ital of information by appropriate departrents and agencies

ou the Government to the Watch Committee of the United States

Stoligence Board.

101372328

zont

Abovo-reforanced diroctivo

й житно ми

mi stacion

4900

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## Page 21

SECRET

Diroctivo Rolasiny to Pranorital Of Liormation to tho

Watch Committee of the United States intalligence Board

Bursuant to tho provisions of Sochos 10216) cathe Maticeal

Escurity Act on 1917, as arnonded, and for the purpose on providing

rocossary suppost to me Watch Committec of tro Uritod Statos

Mialigence Board (USIB) in to accomplichmon: of its mission, Eli

sppropriate donarimonto and agencios of the Covertmrozi are ausno:

jace and dizocted by the Frosidont:

To mako fully available to tho Watch Committee of the

ssus all indormation and intolligonco di reaconable credibility

portment to its mission and functions las dediadd in DODD 1/5

tow cories), attached horetoy, without restriczion cocause of

source, policy or operational sonsitivity.

To kasy tão Watch Committco of to Usta insumed

concoming signsicant diplomatic, polidical, military, or cica

counces of action by tie U. So appaeved for immecials implo-

monsation of in process of execution, wich might bring about

military reaction or carly hostile action by the UsS?, or its

alies, thüs endangering the security of to U.s. This isicamar

con is for the explicit and exoress uso of ine Watch Cornuco

and those members of the National Indicationo Coator wao roud

to know of it in order to parform theia funchors.

2. Whoa, in the opinion of a deparment of rgeacy, avezziciag

conciaozations alecting the national security exist wauch justiay an

aroption to a. or bo above, the decision an to withholding or delaying

no tansmission of the information to the Maick Committes shall 33

tach co vith the Diroctor of Central Intelligence and, i taro is da

agecomenn, refered to the Frosiaonta

In ino caso oí to Fadazai

Bureau of zavestigation, the matter shall be taion up by the Desector

thoroof with the Attorrey General who shall consule with the Directo=

01 Contral Intelligenco, and it there is disagreomost the matter saul

Ebo scorned to the President:

ador normal air cumotancoa, such dera chould bo pont to 2to

biescto: 01 Dio National Indicalone Contero

Pantagon Building, Vees

stonis considored of excoptional pensitivity, it should be addrossed

SECRES

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## Page 22

to 1a0 Chairman of the Waich Committee, in caro came Director,

National indications Center.

Copy furrished:

Copy o= Dizactor of Cartral

Intelligence Directive (DOW;

No. 1/5 (Now Series)

Zach member of the United Statos

Intelligenco, Board.

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