ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LHO IN NEW ORLEANS
Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 03/00/1979
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

4/28/201

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10240

RECORD SERIES: CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 63-01-02

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

CIA

TO:

TITLE: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LHO IN NEW ORLEANS

DATE: 03/00/1979

PAGES:

293

SUBJECTS :

Released under

the John

Kennedy assassinatior

records collection Act

If 1992 (44 USC

2107

Case# :NUT 53080

06-05-2017

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA, FILES

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA

COMMITTEE

NEW ORLEANS

FERRIE, DAVID

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

06/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Box 36

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Classificarion:

1R803

• Asse

(This forn is to be used for material extracted

from CiA-controlled documents.)

Ruse Holmess

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cover Sheet

The attached package of paper is the property of the House

Select Comnittee on Assassinations, and is on loan to CIA under an

agreement whereby CIA is not to reproduce or copy the draft or any

portion thereof.

Notes may be taken on materials in this package, and rough

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constituting sensitive papers on a need-to-know basis.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy !

of

7

21993

Classification: L

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Classified by derivation:

cataly

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[COMMITTEE PRINT]

CC

Anti Casino Activists ge Disanizaliss

EPOr THE STAT

Lee Narr @scalel in New Ortanz

STAFF REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

mareh, 1979

inations

31-255

WASHINGTON: 197S

For sale bthe.stpecintendentof-Dosrzeesputis

ashiusto, D.C. 20102-Stock No. 052-08mo Priating Ollie

H/ 53080

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Table of Content

Introduction

(1)

I The Ingredients

of an. Anti-Castro (9)

Cuban

Conspuscy

II The Odio Incident

III Antonio VecIANA BLANch

III Cuban Revolutionary Corincil: A

Cincise history

CaRaderas

Cuban Revolutionary Council:

New Orleans Chapter

VI Brigade 2506- Manuel Certeme-

Maimiento de Recuperacion

Revolucionaria (MRR

VII

VIT

Movimiento Demociata

Cristiano (mDC)

pista Revolucionario

Cubana (JURE)

iX

Dirictorio Revolucionario

Estudiantil (DRE)

X Movimiento Insurreccional de

Recuperacion

Revolucionaria

(MERR).

and

Orcando Bosch Avila

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(62) V

(1(4)

(205)

216)

(232) 1

(247)

(266)

(286)

(324)

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XI

junta Del Gobierno De

Cuba En

El Exilio

AGAE

l lan

• Ca

(342)

UKE

DAvid Ferrie

(389)

544 Camp Street And Related Brents: (460)

TIV. Manuel Ray Rivero (MRP- suRo

Ardendess

EN EL.

to the Junta Del Gabierno De CuBA

Gerry Piteick HemmIng

(*"

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Introduction

REPO

REGARDING

CUBANS AND

OR

ANIZATIONS

FArt

Oreleans

(1) Two primary reasons prompted the Committee to

investigate anti-Castro activists and organizations.

First, the Committee ascertained that as a consequence

of the failure and eventual unwillingness of the Kennedy

Administration to

liberate Cuba from Castro, these persons

and organizations. meng located primarily in the

United States,

whighly militaristic in natured

a possessed

the means, motive, and opportunity to assassinate the

President. Second, the Committee felt that Lee Harvey

Oswald's verified association with

anti-Castro

Cubans while living in New Orleans during 1963,

together with his possible contacts with other anti-

Castro

activists,

possibility

ia, further enhanced the probability of the

involvement of anti-Castro elements in the assassination.

For these reasons, the Committee thoroughly investigated

numerous anti-castro organizations and operatives

and Oswald's activita while living. in

New Orleans to

determine their connection, if any, to the

assassination.

(2) The committee initiated its investigation by

selecting the most active

anti-Castro groups and their

key leaders

from

among the more than 100 anti-Castro

organizations

in

existence in November 1963. These

groups included Alpha 66, JURE, Commandos L, the

Directorio Revolutionario Estudiantial (DRE), the Cuban

Revolutionary Council (CRC), which includes the Frente

Revolucianario Democratico (FRD), the Junta Gobierno de

Cuba in Exilo (JGCE), the 30th of November,

the

International Penetration Forces (InterPen),

Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR), and EIC.

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Their

selection.

evolved both from the Committee's

independent field investigation and the examination

of the files and records maintained by.

the federal

and local agencies then

monitoring Cuban exile

activity. These agencies included local police departments,

the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration

and

Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense.

(3) These groups can be described as "action groups."

These were the movements most active on both the

military and propaganda fronts, the enouge len not

only talked about

anti-Castro operations, but actually

carried

out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted

Castro assassination attempts, participated in a

multiplicity of

arms dealings and possessed the most

vociferous and aggressive leaders. These were the

groups and individuals who received the crux of the

Kennedy Administration's crackdown on

anti-Castro

operations following the Cuban missile crisis. These

were

also the ones who, in the end, were the most

bitter at president Kennedy and felt the

most

betrayed.

(4) AFTER SELECTING

te, the Committee

focused

ThEsE groups

the key members in each group and concentrated on

uncovering links to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee

found evidence ode

contactabetween Oswald and fur

who were

individualsnassociated with f

as anti-Castro groups.

on intestigating

These persons were JURE member Silvia Odio, Alpha 66

leader Antonio Veciana, CRC designate Frank Bartes,

and DRE

member Carlos Bringuier.

Oswald encountered

both Bartes

and

Bringuier in New Orleans

during the

summer of 1963.

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(5) The committe also focied it

investigation a Ostialdio actintes nhill

linng in New Orleans fim April

10 Augurt, 1963 It apnears trat

Ooraed estblished associations il

non Cubans of anti - Castio sentiment

who ice not alignel mich any group

DAvio Ferre 1o an example

(6) The pollaing materiel ai

staff reperts q

ситота

te inrestiation so che ant-

Some

Cretio arer and New Orleans area.

mowy

of chiese reports de

eit

то л

а диск алек

2)..

inclusione, The

стоє

d in the final

report()P the slaft reports ese comprice

elocing

sections:

Section One: The Ingredients of an Anti-

Castro Cuban Cnspuacy:

Section TWO: The Odio Incident ;

Section THREE: ANtonio Veciona Blanch

Section Four Cuban Revolutionary Council

A Concise Mistory ;

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Sectun Five New Ortears Chapter

of the CuBAN Revolutionany Council (CRC);

Section Six: Brigade 2506- MonuoL ARtime -

Movimiento de Recuperacion

Resolucion ara (MRR) .

Section Sever: movimiento Dernocrata

Cristiano (moc);

Scon Na!

Junta Resol Revolucionario

Cubana (JuRE);

Secten

DIRECTORIO ReVOluCiOnARiO

Section

cas Movimiento Insurreccional

de Ricuperacion Revolucionaria (miRR

SectoRINeliO ANd ORLANdO Bosch Avilla i

Section

• JunTA DEL GOBIERNO

DE CUBA EN EL

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section

There leew

Lectin Fourteen

644 Camp Street and Pelaled

trent

Мати

Cay kivero Стко мяс

oden dus

Lution Fifteen

the Commillio allo varstigaled

here

to duncely e

sistement or tho

Winesse

seven pains iho claim.

they saw

Oscall fogither init David Ferre

Clay Shaw,

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скву.

Leptate,

1965

fall.

вра савезогу

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Team

3

CopE

THE

INGREDiENTS OF AN

ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACYA

Fonzi

(9) Was the John F. Kennedy assassination a conspiracy

involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles? There were at

least two significant factors which led the committee

to consider that

question:

the Warren

commission's decision not, to further) investigate|the

issue despite the urging of staff counsels involved

and

in that area of evidences

- the

apparent fact that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles had

the means, motivation and opportunity to be involved

in the assassination.

daddition

(18)

Fustberaa

•, the area of possible Cuban exile

involvement was one in which the Warren Commission

was not provided with an adequate investigative

background. According to the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, which looked into the sole

of agency passesment in the ina

Kennadyas

intent

(11) "Despite knowledge of Oswald's apparent interest

in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities and top level

awareness of certain CIA assassination plots, the

FBI...made no special investigative effort into,

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2

spire

questions of possible Cuban government or Cuban exile

involvement in the assassination independent of the

Oswald investigation. There is no indication that

the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of

Cuban sources or of sources within the Cuban exile

community. "I

(12) Nevertheless, even from the paucity of

evidence that was available to them

in 1964, two

staff

attorneys for the Warren Commission speculated

that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture

as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of

anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investiga-

tion of that possibility, Assistant Counsels William

Colemand and W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum to

stoat,

ine

the Commission

:

(13)

The evidence here could lead to an anti-

Castro involvement in the assassiantion

on some sort of basis as this: Oswald

could have become known to the Cubans as

being strongly pro-Castro.

He made no

secret of his sympathies,

and

so the

anti-Castro Cubans must have realized

that law enforcement

authorities were

also aware of Oswald's feelings and that,

therefore, if he got into trouble, the

public would also learn of them...

Second,

someone in the

anti-Castro or-

ganization might have been keen

enough

to sense that Oswald had a penchant for

violence...On these facts,

it

is pos-

sible that some sort of deception was

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3

used to encourage Oswald to kill the

President when he came to Dallas...

The motive of this would, of course,

be the expectation that after the Presi-

dent was killed Oswald would be caught

or at least his identity ascertained,

the law enforcement authorities and the

public would then blame the assassina-

tion on the Castro government and a

call for its forceful overthrow would

be irresistible...

(14).

"important in considering the possi-

bility of anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy

toderei.p.on

assassination m

i historical

awareness of the waves

of political and emotional impulses which coursed

through the Cuban exile communities in Miami, New

Orleans and Dallas while Kennedy was President.

The Background:

if The logine of Fidel Cacro Kuz

(15) If it can be said to have a

beginning, the

anti-Castro Cuban exile movement was seeded in the

early morning hours of New Year's Day, 1959, when a

DC-4 lifted from the fog-shrouded Camp Columbia air-

field in Havana.

3

Aboard the plane was Fulgencio

Who had been

Batista,

such years the military dictator of

for the previces sti years.

Cuba.

Batista was fleeing the country, his regime

long beset by forces from within and without, now

crumbling under pressure from rebel forces sweeping

down from the mountains. When dawn came, the bells

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tolled in Havana and, 600 miles away, Fidel Castro Ruz

began his triumphal march to the capital. $

For

seven days Castro and his 26th of July Movement rebels

moved down Cuba's Central Highway while thousands

cheered and threw flowers in their path 6

Castro

finally arrived in Havana on January 8th and character-

istically gave a speech. Clad in his green fatigue

uniform while three white doves, which someone had

dramatically released, circled above him, Castro

coldly proclaimed: "There is no longer an enemy!"

16) He was wrong, of course, and knew it. A

hard core of Batistianos had fled the country early,

many long before their leader, and

were already

con-

cocting counter-revolutionary plots from their

refuges in the United States, the Dominican Republic

and elsewhere, &

11) And it was not very long after Castro took

power that a sense of betrayal began to grow among

those who had once been his strongest supporters.?

As each day went by it became more apparent that

Castro's Revolution was, as one chronicler noted,

"leading inexorably toward an institutionalized

dictatorship in which individuals were contemptuously

shorn of their rights and dissenters were met with

charges of treasonable conduct, counter-revolutionary

activity or worse. "10 Then too, there was a large

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number of public executions. Within two weeks of

his reign, Castro shot 150 ex-Batista officials.l1

Within three months, there were at least 506 execu-

12

tions.

18) The disillusionnent for many Cubans deepened

when it became obvious that the form of Castro's

rule was turning toward Communism and that Castro's

attitude toward the United States was engendering

hostile relationship. The publishing

of Castro's

Agrarian

Reform Law in May, 1959, was a significant

sign. 13

It was

far more radical than had been ex-

pected and was obviously designed to strip both

Cuban and American-owned sugar firms of their im-

mensely valuable cane lands.

A few weeks later

the Chief of Castro's Air Force, Major Pedro Diaz-

Lanz, resigned, charging "...there was Communist in-

fluence in the armed forces and Government. ,I5

Then,

when Castro's own hand-picked President, Manuel

Urrutia, announced at a press conference that he

rejected the support of the Communists and said "I

believe that any real Cuban revolutionary should

reject it openly," Castro immediately forced him to

resign and accused him of actions "bordering on

treason. "16

(19) And so, after the broken pledges of free

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elections and a free press, the mass trials and

executions, the assumption of unlimited power and

the bellicose threats against the United States, it

slowly began to dawn on many Cubans

that Fidel

Castro was not the political savior they

had ex-

17 M

pected. (20) Then, on October 19, 1959, there occurred

an incident which precipitated the formation of the

first organized anti-Castro opposition within Cuba.

Major Huber Matos, one of Castro's highest-ranking

officers and considered by most Cubans te be one of

the key heroes of the Revolution, resigned from the

Army in protest against the increasing favoritism

18

shown to known Communists.

The next day Matos was

arrested, charged with treason, subsequently tried

and

sentenced to twenty years

in

prison. Shortly

afterwards, Castro himself called a secret meeting

of the National Agrarian Reform Institute managers

at which he outlined a plan to communize Cuba within

19

three years.

There the suspicions of Dr. Manuel

Artime, the manager in Oriente Province, were con-

firmed. "I realized," Artime later said, "that I

was a democratic infiltrator in a Communist govern-

ment. "20

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(21) Artime returned to Oriente and began of-

ganizing

students and peasants to fight against

Castro and Communism. By early November each pro-

vince in Cuba had an element of Artime's new under-

ground movement. It was called the Movimiento de

Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). It was the first

anti-Castro action group originating from within

Castro's own ranks.

(22) By the summer of 1960, it had become ob-

vious both within and outside of Cuba that the founda-

tion for an eventual confrontation between Castro and

anti-Castro forces had been laid. The Eisenhower

Administration had cancelled the Cuban sugar quota.

22

Mikoyan had visited Havana and Raul Castro had gone

to Moscow, 23 Ernesto "Che" Guevara had proclaimed

publicly that the Revolution was on the road

set by

Marx, and Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence

Agency

had said in a speech that Communism had per-

verted Castro's revolution.

24

1a3 By then,, Castro

had seized more than $700 million in U. S. property

within Cuba. 25

(23) 0n March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower

authorized the CIA to organize, train, and equip Cuban

refugees as

a guerilla force to overthrow Castro.

26

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Soon it became common knowledge within Cuba that a

liberation army was being formed and that a political

structure in exile had been created. 27

As the

flight from Cuba increased in size and fervor, the

exile community in the United States grew in spirit

and confidence. One historian captured the special

characteristics of the new arrivals:

They were new types of refugees.

Instead

of a home, they were seeking temporary

asylum.

They found it along the sandy

beaches and cursing coastline of Florida.

They arrived by the thousands, in small

fishing

boats, in planes, chartered or

stolen, and crowded into Miami.

Along

the boulevards, under the palms, and in

hotel lobbies,

they gathered and plotted

their counter-revolution.

Miami began

to take on

the air of a Cuban city.

Even its voice was changing.

Stores and

cafes began advertising

in

Spanish and

English... Everyone talked of home only

one hundred miles away.

And everyone

talked about the great liberation army

where far away. 2ghe secret camps some-

24) By April, 1961, the more than 100,000 Cubans

who had fled Castro's Revolution lived in anticipation

of its overthrow.

They had been buoyed in that hope

by public pronouncements of support from the United

States Government.

In his State of the Union address,

President Kennedy had spoken of "the Communist base

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established 90 miles from the United States," and

said that "... Communist domination in this hemi-

sphere can never be negotiated. i29

In addition, the

Cuban exiles had been organized, directed and almost

totally funded by agencies of the U. S. Government,

principally the CIA. 30

(25) From an historical perspective, in light of

its later radical change, the attitude of the Cuban

exiles toward the U. S. Government prior to the Bay

of Pigs is especially significant. Author Haynes

Johnson who, in writing a history of the invasion,

collaborated with the top Cuban leaders, including

Brigade civilian chief Manuel Artime, described that

attitude in detail:

From the beginning, the Cuban counter-

revolutionists viewed their new American

friends with blind trust.

exception.

of the Cubans involved, believed so much

in the Americans -- or wanted so desper-

ately to believe -- that they never ques-

tioned what was happening or expressed

doubts about the plans.

it, they agree now that their na veck was

partly genuine and partly reluctance

to

turn down any offer of help in liberat-

ing their country.

In fact, they had

little choice; there was no other place

to turn.

Some, of course, were driven

by other motives: political power and

personal ambition

were involved.

Even

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more

important was the traditional Cuban

attitude

toward America and Americans.

To Cubans the United States was more than

the colossus of the North, for the two

countries

were bound closely by attitudes,

by history, by geography and by economics.

The United States was great

and powerful,

the master not only of the hemisphere but

perhaps of the world, and it was Cuba's

friend. One really didn't question such

a belied the mysterious,

It was a fact; everyone knew

anonymous,

ubiquitous American agents who dealt with

the cubans managed to strengthen that

oellet.

(26) This "blind trust" by the Cuban exiles in

the U. S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs was

specifically noted by the military commander of the

2506 Brigade, José (Pepe) Pérez San Roman:

"Most

of the Cubans were there," he said, "because they

knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by

the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did

not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the

Americans. So they were going to fight because the

United States was backing them. "32

27) The debacle at the Bay of Pigs was not only

a military tragedy for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles

but also a painful shattering of their confidence in

the U. S. Government. The exile

leaders claimed that

the failure of the invasion was

a result of the lack

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Goby

of promised air support, and for that they directly

lamed President Kennedy. 33

Particularly galling

to them was Kennedy's public declaration to Soviet

Premier Khrushchev at the height of the invasion,

when the Brigade was being slaughtered in the swamps

of Bahia de Cochinos: "...I repeat now that the

United States intends no armed

intervention in

Cuba. "34

28) Even those exile leaders who were willing

to rationalize the extent of Kennedy's responsibility

were dissuaded when Kennedy himself admitted the

blame. Cuban Revolutionary Council leader Manuel

antonio do varona, an hisicestimony bazare the con-

mittee, told of the President gathering the Council

members together at the White House when it became

clear that the invasion was a disaster.

I, verona se-

called: "We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with any-

thing; we just wanted to clarify. We knew that he

didn't have any direct knowledge of the problem, and

we knew that he was not in charge of the military

effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy,

to finish the talks, told us he was the one -- the

only one responsible. "35

A few days after that

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meeting, the White House issued a public statement

declaring that President Kennedy assumed "sole re-

sponsibility" for the U. S. role in the action

36

against Cuba.

(29) The acceptance of responsibility did not

cut the bitter disappointment the Cuban exiles felt

toward the U. S. Government and

President Kennedy.

Much later, captured and imprisoned by Castro, Brigade

Commander San Roman revealed the depth of his re-

action at the failure of the invasion: "I hated

the United States," he said, "and I felt that I had

been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then I

was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get

a rifle and come and fight against the U. s. "37

(38) Prominent Cuban attorney Mario Lazo wrote

a book caustically titled Dagger In the Heart.

38

"The Bay of. Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted

in Washington," Lazo wrote!

Kennedy told the truth when he publicly

accepted responsibility...The heroism

of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had

been rewarded by betrayal,

defeat,

death

for many

of them, long and cruel im-

prisonment for

the rest.

The Cuban

people and the Latin American nations,

bound to Cuba by thousands of subtle ties

of race and culture, were left with

feelings of astonishment and disillusion-

ment, and in many cases despair.

They

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had always admired the United States as

strong, rich, generous -- but where

was its sense of honor and the capacity:

of its leaders?

The mistake of the Cuban fighters

for liberation was that they thought

too highly of the United States.

They

believed

to the end that it wogld not

let them down. But it did...

(31) President Kennedy was well aware of the

bitter legacy left him by the Bay of Pigs debacle.

It is not now possible to document the changes in

Kennedy's personal attitude brought about by the

military defeat, but the firming of U. S. policy

toward Cuba and the massive infusion of u. s. aid

by TAyloR BRANch

to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake

and George Crile

880 in

Of the Bay of Pigs WAs as

4 editorially characterized Harper

magazine

as "the Kennedy vendetta. "40

(32) What can be documented is the pattern of

u. S. policy between the period of the Bay of Pigs

failure in April, 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis

in October, 1962. That pattern, replete with both

overt and covert maneuvers, had a significant effect

on the re-shaping of Cuban exile attitudes and, when

could

it was abruptly reversed, mog have provided the

motivation for involvement in the assassination of

President Kennedy.

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v =

14

(33) In retrospect, the period between the Bay

of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis can be considered

the high water mark of anti-castro activity, almost

every manifestation of the U. S. policy providing a

reassurance of support of the Cuban exile cause.. As

a matter of fact, only a few days after the Bay of

Pigs invasion, President Kennedy delivered a particu-

larly hard-line address before the American Society

of Newspaper Editors on the implications of Communism

in Cuba. "Cuba must not be abandoned to the Com-

munists," he declared. In appealing for support from

Latin America, he indicated that the United States

would expext more from the nations of the hemisphere

with regard to Cuba and asserted that the United

States would not allow the doctrine of non-interven-

tion to hinder its policy. Said Kennedy, "...our

restraint is not inexhaustible," and spoke of Cuba

in the context of the "new and

deeper struggle. "41

(34) when Castro, in a May Day speech, declared

Cuba to be a socialist nation, the State Department

retorted that Cuba was a full-fledged member of the

42

Communist bloc.

(35) Another U. S. response was the establishment

of the Alliance for Progress, after years of relatively

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little attention to Latin America's economic and

social needs. 43

President Kennedy gave the Alliance

memoRable

concept a fasts launching in a speech in March,

1961 when he called for vigorous promotion of

social and economic development in Latin America

through democratic means and, at the same time,

pledged substantial financial

and political support. 44

36) While the campaign to broaden its Cuban

policy base was being pursued, the United States

was

proceeding on another course. In one of

the first unilateral efforts to isolate Cuba from

its allies, the United States in September, 1961 an-

nounced it would stop assistance to any country that

assisted Cuba: In December, Kennedy extended the

denial of Cuba's sugar quota through the first half

45

of 1962.

(37) Meanwhile, the secret policy aimed at removing

Castro through assassination continued as FBI chief

J. Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General Robert

Kennedy in May that the CIA had used the Mafia in

"clandestine efforts" against Castro. 46

In that month,

poison pills to be used in a plot to kill Castro were

47

passed to a Cuban exile in Miami by a Mafia figure.

In November, 1961, the CIA initiated Operation

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MONGOOSE, designed to enlist 2000 Cuban exiles and

48

dissidents inside Cuba to overthrow Castro.

(38) apptough the bitter aftertaste of the Bay

of Pigs invasion lingered in the Cuban exile com-

munity, those who remained active in the fight

against Castro came to realize that these subsequent

actions of the Kennedy Administration were

manifesta-

tions of its determination to reverse the defeat.

What Kennedy has euphemistically termed "a

new and

deeper struggle" (supra) became, in actuality, a

secret war:

...the new President apparently

perceived the defeat as an

affront to his

pride.

Within a matter of weeks he com-

mitted the United States

to a secret war

against Cuba that eventually required the

services of several thousand men and cost

as much as $100 million a year... Kennedy

entrusted its direction to the CIA,

...conducted an operation that could be

described either as

or a small crusade. " large-scale vendetta

(39)

The fact that the agency of the U. S. Govern-

ment the anti-Castro exiles had most dealt with and

relied on prior to the Bay of Pigs became, after the

invasion

failure, the controlling force of the "secret

war" was

another indication to the Cuban exiles that

the Kennedy Administration was, indeed, still

sincere about overthrowing Castro.

Within a year of the Bay of Pigs, the CIA

curiously and inexplicably began to grow,

to branch out, to gather more and more

responsibility for the'Cuban problem'.

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The Company was given authority to help

monitor Cuba's wireless traffic; to ob-

serve its weather; to follow the Castro

government's purchases

abroad and its

currency transactions; to move extra-

ordinary numbers of clandestine field

operatives in and out of Cuba; to ac-

quire

a support fleet of ships and air-

craft in order to facilitate these

secret agent movements; to advise, train,

and help reorganize the police and

security establishments of Latin

countries which felt threatened by Castro

guerrilla politics; to take a hand in U-2

overflights and sea-air ELINT (Electronic

Intelligence) operations aimed at tracing

Cuban coastal-defense communications on

special devices;

to pump...vast sums into

political operations thgyght to be helpful

in containing Castro...

(48) The nerve center of the United states'

"new and deeper struggle" against Castro was estab-

lished in the heartland of exile activity, Miami.

There, on a secluded, heavily-wooded 1571-acre tract

that was part of the University of Miami's

South

Campus, the CIA set up

a front operation, an elec-

tronics firm called Zenith Technological Services. 51

Its code name was JM/WAVE and it soon became the

largest CIA installation anywhere in the world

outside of its headguarters in Langley, Virginia. 52

41) The IM/WAVE station had, at the height of

its activities in 1962, a staff of more than 300

Americans, mostly case officers. 53

Each case officer

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employed from four to ten Cuban "principal agents"

who, in turn, would each be responsible for between

10

and

30 regular agents. 54

In addition, the CIA

set up 54 front jarporations -- boat shops, real estate

firms, detective agencies, travel companies, gun

shops -- to provide ostensible employment for the

case officers and agents operating outside of JM/WAVE

headquarters. 55

It also maintained hundreds of pieces

of real estate, from small apartments to palatial

homes, as "safe houses" in which to hold secret

56

meetings.

As a result of its JM/WAVE oepration,

the CIA became amonge Florida's largest employers, 57

(42) It was the IM/WAVE station, through its case

offieers, which monitored, more or less controtted,

and in most cases funded the anti-Castro groups.

58

It was responsible for the great upsurge in anti-.

Castro activity and the lifted spirits of the Cuban

exiles as American arms and weapons flowed freely

through the training camps and guerrilla bases

59

spotted around South Florida.

Anti-Castro raiding

parties that left from small secret islands in the

Florida Reys were given the "green light" by agents

of the IM/WAVE station. 60 The result of it all was

that there grew in the Cuban exile community a re-

newed confidence in the U. S. Government's sincerity

and loyalty to its cause.

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(43) Then came the Cuban missile crisis. The

more fervent Cuban exiles were initially elated by

the possibility that the crisis might provoke a

final showdown with Castro. 61

For several months

prior there was

increasing pressure on President

Kennedy to take strong measures against the build-

up of the Soviet presence in Cuba, which was becoming

daily more blatant. In a report issued at the end

of March, 1962 the State Department said that Cuba

had received from the Soviet Union $100 million in

military aid for the training of Cuban

pilots in

Czechoslovakia and that the Soviet Union also had

provided

from 50 to 75 MIG fighters as well as tons

of modern weapons for Cuba's ground forces.

62

For-

tifying the Cuban exile's hope for action was the

fact that the increasing amounts of Soviet weapons

moving

into Cuba became the dominant issue in the

news in the succeeding months, leading to Congres-

sional calls for action and a series of hard-line

63

responses

from President Kennedy.

In September,

Kennedy declared

that the United States would use

"whatever

means may

be necessary" to prevent Cuba

from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force

or threat of force" against "any part of the

western Hemisphere. "64

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44) The fervent hope of the Cuban exiles -

that the Cuban missile crisis would ultimately result

in the United States smashing the Castro regime --

was shattered by the manner in which President

Kennedy resolved the crisis. Cuba itself was rele-

gated to a minor role as tough negotiations took

place between the United States and the Soviet Union,

specifically through communication between

President

Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

The crisis ended

"when President Kennedy announced

that all IL-28 bombers were being withdrawn by the

Soviets and progress was being made on the withdrawal

of offensive missiles and other weapons from Cuba.

In return, Kennedy gave the Soviets and the Cubans a

66

"no invasion" pledge.

(45) If Kennedy's actions at the Bay of Pigs

first raised doubts

in the minds of the Cuban

exiles

about the President's sincerity

and determination to

biing about the fall of Castro, his handling of the

missile crisis confirmed those doubts. Kennedy's

agreement with Khrushchev was termed "a violation"

of the pledge he had made three days after the Bay

of Pigs invasion that the United States would never

abandon. Cuba to Communism.

Wrote one prominent

exile: "For the

friendly Cuban people, allies of

the United States, and for hundreds of thousands of

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exiles eager to stake their lives to liberate their

native land, it was a soul-shattering blow. "68

(46) The bitterness of the anti-castro exiles

was exacerbated by the actions the United States

Government took to implement the President's "no

invasion" pledge. Suddenly there was a crackdown

on the very training camps and guerrilla bases which

had been originally established and funded by the

United States and the exile raids which once had

the Government's "green light" were now promptly

disavowed and condemned.

(47) on March 31, 1963 a group of anti-castro

raiders were arrested by British police at a train-

ing site in the Bahamas. 69 The U. S. State Depart-

ment admitted it had given the British the informa-

tion about the existence of the camp.?0

That same

night another exile raiding boat was seized in

Miami harbor.71 On April 3ra, the Soviet Union

charged that the United States "encourages and

bears full responsibility" for two recent attacks

on Soviet ships in Cuban ports by anti-Castro exile

commandos.?2

The United States responded that it

was "taking

every

step necessary

to insure

that

such attacks are not launched, manned

or. equipped

from U. S. territory. "73 On April 5th, the Coast

Guard announced it was throwing more planes, ships

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and men into its effort to police the straits of

Florida against anti-Castro raiders.

As a result

of the crackdown, Cuban exile sources declared that

their movement to rid their homeland of Communism

had been dealt "'a crippling blow"

and that they had

lost a vital supply link with anti-Castro fighters

inside Cuba.

48) There were numerous other indications of

the U. S. crackown on anti-Castro activity following

the missile crisis. The Customs Service raided what

had long been a secret training camp in the Florida

Keys and arrested the anti-Castro force in training

there.75

The FBI seized a major cache of explosives

at an anti-Castro camp in Louisiana.

Just weeks

later, the U. S. Coast Guard cooperated with the

British Navy which had captured another group of

Cuban exiles in the Bahamas."

In September, the

Federal Aviation Administration issued "strong

warnings" to six American civilian pilots who had

78

been flying raids over Cuba.

Shortly afterwards,

the Secret Service arrested a prominent exile leader

for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency

destined

79

for rebel forces inside Cuba.

In october,

the

Coast Guard seized four exile ships and arrested

22

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anti-Castro raiders who claimed they were moving

their operations out of the U. S.

(49)

The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles

was given reinforcement by prominent sympathizers

outside their community, as well

as by Kennedy's

political opponents. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker,

chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine,

asserted: "The Kennedy Administration has committed

the final betrayal of Cuban hopes for freedom by its

order to block the activities of exiled Cuban freedom

fighters to liberate their nation from Communism. "81

Senator Barry Goldwater accused Kennedy of "doing

everything in his power" to keep the flag of Cuban

exiles "from ever flying over Cuba again. "82

Richard

Nixon urged the end of what he called the "quarantine"

of Cuban exiles.

(50)

Of course, the most strident reactions came

from within the anti-Castro community itself. Follow-

ing the U. S. Government's notification that it woula

discontinue its subsidy to the Cuban Revolutionary

Council, its president, José Miró Cardona, announced

his resignation from the Council in protest against

u. s. policy.

The Cuban exile leader

accused

President Kennedy of "breaking promises and agreempêts"

85

to support another invasion of Cuba.

Cardona

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said the change in American policy reflected the

fact that Kennedy had become "the victim of a master

play by the Russians. "86

(51) The extent of the deterioration of relation-

ships between the Cuban exiles and the Kennedy Admin-

istration is indicated in the State Department's

reply to Cadfona's charges. It labeled them "a

gross distortion of recent history. "87

(52) Against the pattern of United states crack-

down on Cuban exile activity during this period,

however, emerges a counter-grain of incidents which

may have some bearing on an examination of the

Kennedy assassination. These incidents involve some

very significant Cuban exile raids and anti-Castro

operations which took place, despite the crackdown,

between the time of the missile crisis and the assas-

sination of the President. In fact, in the midst

of the missile crisis, one of the most active Cuban

groups, Alpha 66, announced that it made a successful

raid on the Cuban port city of Isabela de Sagua,

killing about twenty defenders, including Russians.

88

On October 15th, the same group sunk a Cuban patrol

89

boat.

On October 31st, the day after the blockade

90

was lifted,

it struck again.

Immediately after

the crisis ended in November, a spokesman for the

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group pledged new raids. 91

(53) During this period, e

a. other anti-Castro

atto

groups remained active. In April, a group calling

itself the Cuban Freedom Fighters reported bombing

92

an oil refinery outside Havana.

In May, the Cuban

government confirmed that anti-Castro rebels had

carried out

a "pirate" raid on a militia camp near

Havana despite U. S. promises "to take measures to

prevent such attacks. "93

Later that month, the anti-

Castro Internal Front of Revolutionary Unity reported

it had formed a military junta in Cuba to serve as

"provisional government of Cuba in arms." Shortly

afterwards, a group of returning Cuban exile raiders

claimed they had blown up a Cuban refinery, sank a

gunboat and killed "many" of Castro's soldiers.

94

It

is not known exactly how many incidents took place

during this period, but in April of 1963 one anti-

Castro fighter asserted that, by then, the United

States Government knew of eleven raids on Cuba since

the missile crisis and did nothing.

(54)

One analyst, reviewing that period of U. s.-

Cuban relations, noted: "The U. S. Government's

policy

toward the exiles was equivocal and inconsis-

96

tent.

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(55) It cannot be determined to what extent, if ,

any, the military activities of the anti-Castro

exile groups were sanctioned of supported by the

oe botte.

Kennedy Administration for by the CIAM At a

press conference in May, 1963, in response to a

question as to whether or not the U. s. Was giving

aid to exiles, President Kennedy was evasive: "We

may well be...well, none that I am familiar with...

I don't think as of today that we are. "97

And it

is known that by June, 1963, the CIA was supporting

at least one Cuban exile group, a tuRE, under

what was termed an "autonymous operations" concept. 98

(56) In retrospect, this much is clear: With of

without U. S. Government support and whether or not

in blatant defiance of Kennedy Administration policy,

there were a number of anti-Castro action groups

which were determined to continue -- and, in fact,

did continue -- their operations. The resignation

of Miró Cardona actually split the Cuban Revolution-

ary Council down the middle and precipitated a bitter

99

dispute among the exile factions.

The more moderate

contended that without U. S. support there was

little hope of ousting Castro and that the exiles

should concentrate their efforts in mounting political

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pressure to reverse Washington's shift in policy. 100

Other exile groups announced their determination to

continue the war against Castro and, if necessary,

to violently resist curtailment of their paramilitary

activities in the kennedy Administration. 101 In

New. Orleans, for instance, Carlos Bringuier, the

local leader of the Cuban

Student Directorate (DRE)

who, coincidentally, would later have a contact with

Lee Harvey Oswald, proclaimed, in the wake of the

Miro Cardona resignation, that his group "would con-

tinue efforts to liberate Cuba despite action by the

U.S. to stop raids originating from U. S. soil. soil."102

(57)

It's peshape sigmitreant yo nute that Fhe

seeds of defiance of the Kennedy Administration may

have been planted with the exiles

even

prior

to the

Bay

of Pigs

invasion. In his history of the invasion,

Haynes Johnson revealed that shortly

before the

invasion, "Frank Bender," the CIA director of the

invasion preparations, assembled the exile leaders

together at the CIA's Guatemala training camp:

It was now early in April and Artime was

in

the camp as the civilian representative

of the Revolutionary Council.

called Pepe (San Roman)

(Erneido)

This time he had startling

information. There were

administration trying to block the in-

vasion, and Frank might be ordered to

stop it.

If he received such an order,

he said he would secretly inform Pepe

and Oliva. Pepe

remembers Frank's next

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words this way:

'If this happens you come here and make

some. kind of show,

as if you were putting

us,

the

advisors, in prison, and you go

ahead with the program as we have talked

about it, and we will give you the whole

plan,

even if we are your prisoners.'

Frank then laughed and said: 'In the end

we will win.'

(58)

That, then, is the context in which the

Committee approached the question of whether or not

the John F. Kennedy assassiantion was a conspiracy

involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Also kept in

mind was the testimony of the CIA's chief of

its

Miami JM/WAVE station in 1963, who noted: "...'as-

sassination' was part of the ambience of that time... "104

(59) In this section is detailed the result of

the Committee's examination of the most active anti-

Castro exile groups and their key leaders. These

groups were specifically selected from the more than

100 exile organizations in existence at the time of

the Kennedy assassiantion for

Their selection was

the result of both independent field investigation

by the Committee and the Committee's examination of

the files and records maintained by those federal

and local

agencies

monitoring Cuban exile activity

at the time.

These agencies included local police

departments, the

FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics

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and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA, the Customs

Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service

and the Department of Defense.

(60) The groups selected can be termed the

"action groups." These were the ones most active

on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ones

which not only talked about anti-Castro operations,

but actually planned and carried out infiltrations

and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination

attempts, were involved in

a multi@plicity of arms

dealings and had the most vociferous and aggressive

leaders. These were also the groups and individuals

who took the brunt of the kennedy Administration's

crackdown on anti-Castro operations when it came

after the Cuban missile crisis.

These were the ones:

who, in the end, were most bitter at President

FiNALly,

Kennedy, the ones

who felt the most betrayed. UnaS

these were the groups and

individuals who had the

means and motivation to be involved in the assassina-

tion of the President.

(61)

The Committee, however, found no hard evi-

dence that any anti-Castro Cuban group or

individual

was involved in Kennedy's assassination.

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30

howerer,

that there was some kind of association between Lee

Harvey Oswald and individuals connected to at

least two of the

groups

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UdIO

Fonzi

The Odio Incident

(62)

Within the pastier aft question of a possible

anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination,

the Committee examined one incident which, over the years,

has particularly intrigued critics of the Warren Commission's

investigation. It has become known as "the Odio incident,"

the principal person

involved being a young Cuban

exile

named Silvia Odio.

(63) Here, in part, is how the warren Commission detailea

the

incident and its conclusions in its final Report:

The Commission investigated (Mrs. Odio's) statements

in connection with its consideration of the testimony of

several witnesses suggesting that Oswald may have been

seen in the company of unidentified persons of

Cuban or

Mexican background. Mrs. Odio was born in Havana in

A537, and remained in Cuba until 1960; it appears that

*both of her parents are political prisoners of the

Castro regime. Mrs. Odio is a member of the Cuban

Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an anti-Castro organization.

She testified that late in September 1963, three men

came to her apartment in Dallas and asked her to help

them prepare

a letter soliciting funds for JURE activities.

She claimed that the men, who exhibited personal familiarity

with her imprisoned father, asked her if she were "working

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2 -odio

sive

in the underground," and she replied that

she was

not. She

testified that two of the men appeared to be Cubans,

although they also had

some characteristics that she

associated with Mexicans. Those two men did not

state their full names, but identified themselves

only by their fictitious underground "war names."

Mrs. Odio remembered the name of one of the Cubans

as "Leopoldo." The third man, an American, allegedly

was introduced to Mrs. Odio as "Leon Oswald,"

and

she

was told that he was very much

interested in the Cuban

cause. Mrs. Odio said that the men told her that they

had

just come from New Orleans and that they were then

about to leave on a trip. Mrs. Odio testified that the

next day Leopoldo called her on the telephone and

told her that it was his idea to introduce the American

into the underground "because

he is great, he is kind

of nuts." Leopoldo also said that the American had been

in the Marine Corps and was

an

excellent

shot, and

that

the American said the Cubans "don't have any guts***because

President Kennedy should have been

assassinated after

the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that,

because he was the one that was holding the freedom

of Cuba actually."

Although Mrs. Odio suggested

doubts that the men

were in fact members of JURE, she was certain that

the American who was introduced to her as Leon Oswald

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was Lee Harvey Oswald. Her sister, who was in the apartment at

the time of the visit by the three men, and

who stated

that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering

the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey

Oswald. By referring to the date on which she moved from

her former apartment, October 1, 1963, Mrs. Odio fixed

the date of the alleged visit on the Thursday or Friday

immediately preceding that date, i.e., September 26 or

27.

She was positive that the visit occurred

prior

to October 1.

During

the course of its investigation, however,

the Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been

in Dallas on the evening of either September 26 or 27, 1963.

It also developed

considerable evidence that he was not

in Dallas at any time between the beginning of September

and October 3, 1963....

In spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain

that Oswald could not have been

in Dallas

at the

time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested

the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine

the validity of Mrs. Odio's testimony. The Commission

considered the problems raised by that testimony

as important in view of the possibility it raised that

Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico.

The Commission specifically requested the FBI to attempt

to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated

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- Odio

with

were with the man she thought was Oswald....

On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran

Eugene Hall in Johnsandale, Calif. Hall has been

identified as a participant in numerous anti-Castro

activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963

he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with

anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs.

0d10. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-

American

from

East Los Angeles and one William Seymour

from Arizona.

He stated that Seymour

is similar in

appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a

few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio had testified one

of the men who visited her did. While the FBI had not

yet completed its investigation into this matter at the

time the report went to press, the Commission has

concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald

was not at Mrs. odio's

apartment in

(1)

September of 1963.

(69)

The unequivocality of the Warren Commission's

conclusions. was.not supported by the evidence. The Commission

had based its definite conclusion on two points: One was

the "considerable" evidence that Oswald could not have been

in Dallas on the evening Mrs. Odio alleges she saw him; (2)

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5 = Odio

Siste

the other was the FBI's report of Loran Eugene Hall's

speculation that odio misidentified his companion, William

Seymour, as Lee Harvey Oswald. (3)

(70) Although the warren Commission Report states that

odio "fixed" the date of the alleged Oswald visit on

September 26 or September 27, she actually

told the FBI

that she was not at all positive about the exact date. (4)

Shersaid it might have been as early as September 25. (5)

(7/a) The warren Commission asserted that Oswald left

New Orleans by bus for Houston, on his way to Mexico, on

September 25. (6) Yet there was no documentary evidence

to: substantiatenthat, and neither the bus driver nor any

passenger could recall seeing Oswald on that bus. (7)

In

fact, Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin

asked the FBI to investigate the possibility that Oswald

left New Orleans on September 24, 18) when a neighbor saw

him leaving his apartment carrying two suitcases.

(9)

Rankin pointed out

in his letter to J. Edgar Hoover that

"Marina Oswald told the Commission that her husband told

her he intended to leave New Orleans the very next day

following her departure on September 23, 1963. She has

also indicated that he told her an unemployment check

would be forwarded to Mrs. Ruh Paine's address in Irving

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from

his post office

box in New Orleans....

It also seems

impos-

sible to us that Oswald would have gone

all

the way back to the

Winn-Dixie store at 4303 Magazine Street to cash

the

unemployment

check which he supposedly picked up at the Lafayette Branch of

the Post Officeg when he could have cashed it at Martin's Restau-

rant, where he had previously cashed many of his Reily checks

and

one unemployment check. That is particularly true if he received

the check on September 25, 1963, as previously

thought, and had

left his apartment with his suitcases the evening before. "10l

(7/b) The FBI never came up with any evidence which resolved

the questions raised in Rankin's request.

In sum, the Warren Com-

that

mission developed no hard evidence which could substantiate the

fact that Oswald. was or was not in Dallas during the time period

Odio said she saw him.

(71e) Although the Warren Commission

stated that the FBI had

not yet completed its investigation at the time its

report went

to press, I/ it was only two days after its September 16, 1964,

interview of Loran Eugene Hall that the FBI interviewed William

seymour, who denied he ever had any contact with

silvia Odio and

that he had

been in Dallas with Hall in September, 1963.12/ The

FBI subsequently.confirmed the fact that Seymour was working in

Florida during September, 1963.131

On

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7 - Odio

September 23, 1964, the FBI interviewed Loran Hall's

other associate, Lawrence Howara. (14)

Howard also denied

he had ever contacted silvia odio. (15) The FBI then

went back

and re-interviewed Hall who then said that he

had been accompanied on his

trip to Dallas not by

Seymour but by a Cuban friend he knew as "Wahito" and

that he no longer recalled any contact with odio. (16)

The FBI determined that "Wahito" was Celio Sergio Castro (17)

who, when interviewed, said he had never heard of or met

silvia odio. (18) on October 1, 1964, the FBI showed

Silvia Odio photographs of Loran Hall, William Seymour,

Lawrence Howard

and Celio Sergio Castro. (19)

She examined

the photographs and said that none of the individuals

were identical to any of the three men who had come to

her apartment door in Dallas. (20)

(72) In view of the prematurity of the warren Conmission's

conclusion based on the impeached Loran Hall allegation

and the unresolved question of Oswald's whereabouts at the

time; the Committee considered the odio incident one of

the lingering enigmas in the original assassination investi-

gation. Unfortunately, the nature of the incident makes

it, from

an

investigative standpoint, particularly suscept-

ible to the erosive effects of time.

The canvassing, for

instance, of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in

Dallas, New Orleans and Miami in search of descriptive

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similarities to the men who visited Odio might have been

т...:......

fruitful at the time; today it would be inappropriate.

construction of a compostie sketch of the individuals when

their features were still fresh in odio's memory might have

provided productive evidence 15 years glo, today it would be

of questionable value considering the natural adulteration of

recall over that period of time. A search for the car whoe

the men were driving might have been very productive at the

time; today it would be useless. The Committee was therefore

handicapped by the limitations of the initial investigation

and the paucity of evidence developed. The valid investigative

approaches remaining were distressingly limited. Nevertheless,

because of the potential significance of the Odio incident

to a possible conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, the

Committee decided that, in addition to pursuing any substantive

leads it possibly could, it would also attempt to verify the

record regarding Silvia Odio's credibility and the details

of her allegations.

(73) Also of interest to the committee, of course, were

the initial assertions of Loran Hall that he and two associates,

William Seymour and Lawrence Howard, were the ones who had

visited odio

in september. (21) All three had been actively

involved in anti-Castro activity and were members of a group of

soldiers of fortune called Interpen. (22)

The group was arrested

at No Name Key, Florida, in December, 1962 as part of the Kennedy

Administration's crackdown on anti-castro operations. (23) That

policy, which highly incensed the anti-Castro and right-wing

factions, was the result of an agreement Kennedy had made with

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(24)

Khrushchev and Castro.

Those factions considered

the

agreement a "betrayal". (25)

(14) Joran Hall provided sworn testimony to the Committee

at an Executive Session on October 5, 1977. Here is an

excerpt from that testimony:

Q: Did there come a time when the FBI spoke to

to you about whether or not you visited silvia odio in

September, 1963?

Hall: Yes, there was.

...Q: Who spoke to you?

Hall: An FBI agent.

l: At that time were you advised why you were

being questioned about Silvia Odio?

Hall:

I really don't recall. He stated as

recall, he stated something to the effect that were you

ever

in Dallas, Texas, and I said yes. He said do you

know a Mrs. Odio, and I said I don't recall knowing a

Mrs. Odio. I think I knew a Professor odio, who was a

professor at Texas, some univerity in Texas, just outside

of Dallas, as I recall. He asked me anyway about the

apartment building on Magellan, and I said it is possible,

I don't know. I said do you have a

picture of her

and he

said no, I do not have. And I said, it is possible I met

her but I don't recall. He then asked me who was with me and

I told him I was with Alba and Howard, and then it was like

maybe a month or two.

...Q: And you told him you were there with Howard

and Alba?

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Hall: Yes.

I: On the first trip?

Hall: Yes. ...we both read the same FBI report.

You know it is directly contradictory to what I am saying.

I: So it is your testimony that at no time did

you ever tell an FBI agent that you were in Dallas accompanied

by Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, is that your

testimony?

Hall: That is true.

Q: Were you ever directly or indirectly involved

with Silvia Odio in acquiring military equipment for anti-

Castro raids?

Hall:

No, I was not. (26)

(75) Connittee Lavestigators interviewed tawrence Howard

on May

23, 1978. Howard stated he has never

met Silvia

odio. (27)

Committee investigator also interviewed William

Seymour, who acknowledged his relationship with

Hall

and

Howard but did not recall any

details

of a trip

to Dallas,

including meeting any Cubans there. (28)

06) The committee felt is important early in its in-

vestigation to examine in detail the substance of Silvia

odio's allegations as well as their credibility. One of

the problems faced by the Committee was Odio's negative

attitude toward a governmental investigation

of the Ken-

nedy assassination. Her attitude, she said, was the result

(29)

of her relationship with the Warren Commission.

She

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expressed sharp disillusionment with the Warren Commission

and

said that

it was obvious to her that the Commission

did not want to believe her story. (30) A committee in-

vestigator noted that her whole demeanor was "one of sharp

distrust of the government's motives. She claims she feels

she was just used by the Warren Commission for their own

ends and she does not want to be out in the same position ,(as,

Nevertheless, after contact was established by the Com-

mitteels fiald nestigator, odio's cooperation with the

Committee was excellent and she voluntarily.

submitted to

interviews and, subsequently, sworn testimony.

errance indicate

(77)

Basically the Comitteo ete- that Odio's

story remained consistent with her Warren Commission

testimony. There are, however, details concerning odio,

her background and certain points of her story developed

by the committee which should be noted.

(78)

Silvia Odio was one of ten children of Amador

and Sarah Odio who were sent out of Cuba when their

parents began

taking an active part in a counter-revolu-

tionary movement shortly after Castro took power. (32)

Amador Odio was among Cuba's wealthy aristocracy, the

personal friend of diplomats and ambassadors, including,

during the last days of the United States' presence there,

American Ambassador Phillip Bonsal. (33)

odio was owner

of the country's largest trucking business and was once

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described in Time Magazine as the "transport tycoon" of

Latin America.

(34)

Yet, from their youth, both he and

his wife were active, front-line fighters against the

succession of tyrants who ruled Cuba. During the reign

mother"?.

of General Gerardo Machado in the '30s, Sarah Odio was

barten sag

captured and beaten with a machete until her ribs were

(35)

broken.

Twice during the dictatorship of Fulgencio

Batista, the Odios were forced into exile for their

revolutionary activity. (36) Amador odio's trucks were

the main supply line for the weapons and ammunition which

kept Castro's hopes alive in the mountains. Yet when

the

odios decided that Castro had "betrayed the revolution, " (37)

they were among the founding members, with Manolo Ray,

of one of the early, most aggressive anti-Castro groups,

the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), (38)

(19)

Amador and Sarah Odio were arrested by Castro

on October 26, 1961. 139) Their arrest was the result of

the capture of MRP national coordinator Reynald Gonzales

in hiding on their country estate. (40) Ironically, the

Odios had once hosted the wedding of one of Fidel Castro's

sisters on the very estate, a large, resort-like retreat

in El Caño, outside of Havana. (41)

Later, Castro would

turn it into a national women's prison and Sarah Odio

would spend eight years incarcerated there, while her

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husband was placed in a cell on Isla de Pinos

(42)

" Reynald Gonzales had been wanted in connection with his

involvement in the

assassination attempt on Castro that

had been organized by Antonio Veciana. (43)

(85) silvia was the oldest of the Odios' ten children.

(44)

She had been sent for her early education to a private

girls' school near Philadelphia and later returned to

cuba and attended vitam faw school there.

(Bi) when her parents were arrested, silvia Odio was

24 years old, living in Puerto Rico with her husband and

four

young children. (46) The next year her husband, sent

to Germany by the chemical firm for which he was working,

deserted her and the children. (47) Destitute and alone,

she began having emotional problems. (48) By that time,

Silvia's younger sisters, Annie and Sarita, were settled

in Dallas. (49)

Sarita, a student at the University of

Dallas, had become friendly with Mrs. Lucille Connell,

the leader of a women's club at a local Episcopal church

who had organized a club program to provide financial and

(50)

social support to the Dallas Cuban Refugee Center.

Connell also happened to be very active in the Mental

Health Association of Dallas and, since her son was a

psychiatrist, had personally acquired an interest in mental

(51)

health problems.

When Sarita told Connell of her

sister Silvia's plight, Connell made arrangements to have

Silvia move to Dallas and to also receive

psychiatric

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13 - Odio

treatment for her emotional problems at the Southwestern

Medical School. (52)

(82) According to Connell, who for a period was

Silvia's closest confidante, Silvia's emotional problems,

brought on by her suddenly being left alone with four

young children, her parents being imprisoned and her life-

style abruptly changing from one of wealth to one of deep

destitution, were manifested in attacks of total loss of

consciousness "when

reality got too painful to bear. " (53)

Connell said

she personally witnessed odio

suffer these

attacks in her home when she first arrived in Dallas, but

with psychiatric treatment their frequency subsided and

they subsequently ended: -- until the Kennedy assassination. (54)

(83) Silvia odio had moved to ,allas in March Of 1963.

(55)

By September of 1963 she was well-established in the com-

munity, had a decent income from

good job, had her

emotional problems under control and was doing well enough

(56)

to be planning a move

into a better apartment.

She was

scheduled to make that move on October 1, 1963, a Monday. (57)

The week before, she recalled, she had done some packing in

preparation for the move and there were boxes scattered

across her living room floor which she had to jump over

(58)

to get to the door.

Her sister Annie, who was then 17,

had come to the apartment to help her and babysit with her

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sign

(59)

children.

When the doorbell rang early one evening

in that last week of september, it was Annie who went to

the door to answer it. (60)

(84) the complex in which silvia odio lived at 1084

Magellan Circle in Dallas was a series of garden-type

rental apartments, two-story units with four apartments

to each unit. (61)

The two lower units had front doors

which faced

a common inner vestibule which, in turn,

bordered a small, open cement porch elevated a few steps

above the ground level. (62) Both the vestibule and porch

had overhead lights. (63) Silvia Odio lived in Apartment

A of the 1084 unit, a first floor apartment. (64)

(85a) Annie odio provided the Committee with a sworn

statement of her independent recollection. (65)

She re-

membered the evening

when three men came to the door of

Silvia's apartment in Dallas. (66)

One of the men asked

to speak to Sarita. (67)

He initially spoke English' but

when Annie answered him in Spanish he subsequently also

spoke Spanish. (68) Annie told him that Sarita didn't live

there. (69) Then, according to Annie's recollection:

"He said something, I don't recall exactlywhat, perhaps

something about her being married, which

made me think

they really wanted

my sister Silvia. I recall putting

the chain on the door after I told them to wait while

I went to get Silvia. I don't exactly recall but they

may have also said something about belonging to Jure,

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the anti-Castro movement. "I0l

(85b) Annie also recalled that silvia was

initially reluctant

to talk with the strange visitors because she was getting dressed

to go out. But she remembers silvia coming out in her bathrobe

to go to the door. Ill Annie said that she could only recall what

one of the two latin men looked like, but it is not a specific

recollection, only that he was heavy set, had dark shiny hair

combed back and "looked Mexican. "I21 she said "the one in the middle

was American. " 73/

(85c) In testimony to the Committee, independent of her sister's,

Silvia Odio also recalled that

it was early evening and that she was

getting dressed

to go out

when the three men came to the door. 14!

She recalled that it was

a weekday because

she worked that day. I51

She said

the men identified themselves as

members

Of JURE, spoke

of both its founder, Manola Ray, and her father, who had worked

closely with Ray, I61 Odio said that almost all the conversation

she had was with only one of the men, the one who identified himself

as "Leopoldo. "I!!

(85d) odio was positive in

her recollection of the name

"Leo-

poldo"?8/ but said that the men admitted to her they wer giving her

aliases or "war names. "I9/ she is less certain of the other Latin's

name, but believes it

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might have been "Angelo" or "Angel." (80) She described

him, as her sister did, as being stocky, with black hair

and looking"more, Mexican than anything else." (81)

The

third visitor, the "American, " 182)

was introduced to her

as "Leon Oswala. " 783)

She said "Leon Oswald" acknowledged

the introduction with a very brief reply, perhaps in

idiomatic Spanish, (84)

but she later concluded that he

could not understand Spanish because of his lack of re-

action to her Spanish conversation with "Leopoldo." (85)

(86) Silvia odio has been relatively consistent in

her testimony to the Warren Commission and to the Committee

in her specific descriptions of the three visitors. (86)

Her description of "Leopoldo" is especially noteworthy

because he has certain very distinct features, including

(87)

an unusual hairline that is sharply recessed on the sides.

Her description of "Leon Oswald", is, of course, similar to

the characteristics of Lee Harvey Oswald.

(88)

There is

absolutely no doubt in her own mind that her visitor

was,

in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald. (89) she points out that she

did have ample opportunity to view him, her conversation

with the three men lasting more than twenty minutes, her

viewing distance being only about three feet and the light

available more than adequate. (90) She also recalls, but

not very clearly, that "Leopoldo" may have

told her that

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17 - Odio

(91)

they had just come from New Orleans.

(87) odio told the committee, as she did the warren

(92)

Commission,

that the reason the men came to her was to

get her help in soliciting funds in the name of JURE from

(93)

local businessmen.

She said: "He (Leopoldo) told me

that he would like for me to write them in English, very

nice letters, and perhaps we could get some funds. " (94)

That is not inconsistent with the vague recollection of

her sister Annie, who was in the apartment

at the time

the conversation was

being conducted

through the open

door in the vestibule. She recalled that the men came

because "they wanted something translated. " (95)

(88)

According to Silvia Odio, her conversation with

"Leopoldo" ended without her giving him any commitment to

do anything, but he gave her the impression he would

(96)

contact her again.

The visit ended without "Leon"

or "Angelo" having any conversation with

her aside

from

a brief greeting word of two. (97) After the men left,

odio decided to go to the window and watch them. (98)

She

saw them get into a red car that was

parked in the drive-

way in front of the apartment. (99)

She said she could

not see who was driving the car, but did see "Angelo" on

the passenger side of the car. (100)

(89) The cloudiest part of odio's recollection con-

cerns the telephone call

she later received from

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18 - odio

insterdy

"Ieopoldo. " (101)

It could have occurred, she said, the

day after the visit or two days after the visit. (102)

She

thinks it was in the afternoon, but she cannot remember.

(103)

She thinks it was on a Saturday, when she wasn't working,

but is not certain. (104) She is, however, relatively

clear in her recollection of the gist of what "Leopoldo"

told her when he called her on the telephone and that, too,

is consistent with her testimony before the Warren Commis-

sion. (105) She said that "Leopoldo" told her that "the

Gringo" had been a Marine, that he was an expert marksman

and that he was "kind of loco." (106)

She recalled: "He

said that the Cubans, we did not have any guts because we

should have assassinated Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. " (107)

(90) On the day that President Kennedy was assassinated,

Silvia Odio was coming back from lunch when she heard the

news. (108)

"As soon as we

got back to the office, every-

body had their radios on and everybody was listening to

it." she recadet?By the time the news came that the

President was dead, the president of the company told us

that we could go home. I started going back to -- I was

very frightened and very upset...I started moving across

the warehouse towards the parking lot where we kept our

cars...I think next I had

passed out. My mind was going

around in circles... " (109)

(91) During her testimony before the committee, Odio

asked if, when

she heard that Kennedy was assassinated,

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she thought of the three men who had visited her apartment

almost two months prior. Her reply: "Oh, very

definitely,

very definitely. "(-10)

She added:

"I had put them out

of my mind, but they came back that day. " (Ill)

92) The next thing she remembered after blacking

out was regaining consciousness later in a hospital room. (112)

She recalled that her sister Annie had just walked in.

(113)

She remembered watching the first image of Oswald

she saw

coming across

the television screen in the hospital room:

"Annie and I sort of looked at one

another

and sort of

gasped. She said, 'Do you recognize him?'"

I said yes,

and

I said, 'Do you recognize him?' She said, 'It is the

same guy, isn't it?' I said, 'Yes, but do not say any-

thing. '" (114)

(93) This is an excerpt from the independent sworn

statement given to the Committee by Annie Odio:

On the day of the assassination

of President

Kennedy I had gone with my girlfriend, Cherie

Matlock, and some other friends to a place

where we could see the President's motorcade

pass by. I don't remember where it was, only

that it was quite a distance from downtown

Dallas and Dealey Plaza.

After the motorcade

passed by we went to a drive-in restaurant

for some hamburgers.

When

we were coming

out of

the drive-in we heard

that Kennedy

was

shot.

When I first heard that Kennedy

was

shot I did not make any connection be-

tween the shooting and the men who came

silvia's door.

Later in the afternoon I was

by myself in the Matlock home when I first

saw Oswald on television.

My first thought

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20. - Odio

was,

'My God, I know this guy and I don't

know from where!

But I'm

not going to

tell anybody because they're going to

think I'm crazy.'

'Where have I seen this guy?'

sister Sarita called and told me that

Silvia had fainted at work and that she

was

sending her boyfriend Jim, who is

now her husband

to pick me up

to the hospital to see Silvia.

did not tell me then why Silvia had faint-

ed.

I remember that it was getting dark

when Jim picked me up and that we had to

drive by Dealey Plaza.

I don't remember

Jim coming up to the room in the hospital

with me when I saw Silvia.

I don't re-

member anyone else in the room, but it was

a very small room.

Silvia was in bed.

The first thing I remember when I walked

into the room was that Silvia started

crying and crying.

I don't remember her

saying anything.

I think that I told her:

'You know this guy on TV who shot Presi-

dent Kennedy?

I think I know him.'

And

she

said:

'You don't remember where you

know him

from?'

I said:

'No, I cannot re-

call, but I know I've

seen him before.'

And then she told me: 'Do you remember

those three guys who came to the house?'

And that's when I realized I had seen

Oswald before.

And then when I realized

I had seen Oswald before.

And then she

told me everything, including the fact

that one of the men had called back, that

she called him 'Leon,' that he said he

wanted to be called

'Leon,' and that he

said something like the Cubans should

kill Kennedy because of what he did with

the Bay of Pigs.

Silvia also told me

that when she first heard that President

Kennedy was shot, she started saying:

'Leon did it! Leon did it!'

I remember

that Silvia was very excited at the

hospital and that she kept

saying that (115)

she knew that leon was going to do it.

(94)

Because they were extremely frightened, concerned

for their brothers and

sisters

and their own safety, worried

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about their mother and father in prison in Cuba and

terrifyingly bewildered about the meaning of the three

men's visit, Silvia and Annie Odio decided not

to reveal

the incident.

(116)

And it was, in fact, only circuit-

ously that the FBI came to learn of it.

(95) According to Silvia odio's close friend, Lucille

Connell, she received a call from Silvia's sister Sárita

who told her that Silvia had fainted and was in the

hospital. (117)

Sarita also told her why Silvia had

fainted and the fact that Silvia had met Oswald and that

he had come to her apartment. (118)

Connell cannot recall

exactly

when Sarita called; she said it was either the day

of the assassination or the day after.

(119)

However, that

Sunday, Connell said.: she was speaking on the telephone

to a friend of hers, Mrs. Sanford Pick, then working as a

receptionist in a Dallas law firm office, when they both

saw Ruby shoot Oswald on their television sets. (120).

Connell recalled: "And she said to me, 'Oh my goodness,

Ruby was in our office last week and had power

of attorney

drawn for his sister. " (121)

(9a) Connell said that later that

same day she happened

to be speaking with another friend, Marcella Insua, the

daughter of the head of the Dallas Cuban Relief Committee.

Connell mentioned

to Insua what her other friend had said

about Ruby being in her law office. (122)

Insua, Connell

said, happened to have a class of American children to

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(123)

whom she was teaching Spanish.

In that class, she

got into

a discussion of the Kennedy

assassination

and

mentioned that she knew someone who knew someone who had

some dealings with Ruby. (124). It also happened that

(125)

there was a son of a local FBI agent in Insua's class.

Thate how..subsequently, the FBI came to contact Connell

(126)

and learn about the odio incident.

(97) The committee decided thrat A

factor in judging

Odio's credibility is evidence which indicates that she

told someone prior to the Kennedy

assassiantion that three

men visited her, that one of them was introduced to her as

"Leon Oswald," and that she was told that this "Leon" had

suggested assassinating President Kennedy.

(98)

Silvia Odio told the Committee that immediately

after the visit of the three men, she wrote to her father

in prison in Cuba to ask him if he knew who they were. (127)

Amador Odio, who was released from prison in 1969 and is

now living in Miami, told Committee investigators that he

received Silvia's letter and replied to it. (128)

He did

not recall

when he received the letter, but his reply,

dated December 19, 1963, indicates it was very likely in

late October or early November, 1963. (129) He wrote:

"Tell me who this is who says he is my friend -- be careful.

I do not have any friend who might be here, through Dallas,

so reject his friendship until you give me his name. "(130)

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(99) silvia odio told the Committee she recalled,

although her recollection is "not very strong," that she

also told Lucille Connell prior to the Kennedy assassina-

tion that three men had visited her apartment. (131)

She

said it had to have been before the assassination because

she did not see Connell after the assassination as the

result of a falling out between them. (132) Prior to that,

however, Odio said, she was frequently at Connell's house

and she specifically recalled

a dinner party; "which may

have

had

something to do with the Mental Health Associa-

tion or been given in honor of some doctor ór psychiatrist,"

at which, during a conversation in the library, she men-

tioned the visit of the three men. 133) She said it would

have been very likely that she told Connell because "she

was the type who was a very curious person about the

details of your life. She always asked a lot of questions

about my life and what I was doing. " (134)

(100) Lucille Connell told the Committee she does not

recall Silvia Odio specifically telling her about Oswald

at any time, before or after the assassination. (135)

She

does not recall talking with odio at a dinner party prior

(136)

to the assassination, although, she said, she may have.

She said her contact with Silvia Odio had not been frequent

within the months prior to the assassination. (137)

(101) The one person that Silvia odio is most positive

in her recollection of telling. prior to the assassination

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about the visit of the three men was her psychiatrist at

(138)

the time, Dr. Burton C. Einspruch.

At the time of

the Kennedy assassination, Odio had

been seeing Einspruch

for about

seven months, (139) usually on a weekly basis

and occasionally more frequently. (140) She was suffering

from what Einspruch described as "a situational life

problem. She had a large

family, she was semi-impoverished,

she was an immigrant, her parents were imprisoned... she

had all the difficulties one might anticipate a displaced

person would have. " (141)

(102) Both the FBI and the warren Commission staff

questioned Einspruch after the assassination. (142)

The

FBI report noted that Einspruch believed odio "is telling

the truth. "(143) The Warren Commission staff report

noted that "DI. Einspruch

stated that he had great faith

in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Oswald. " (144)

Neither report indicated that Einspruch had been questioned

about the specific details of odio's allegations, whether

he had been asked if odio told him about the visit of the

three men and, if she did, when she dia. (145)

(103) In sworn testimony to the Committee, Einspruch

(146 )

reiterated his judgement of odio as a "truthful" person.

He said he no longer had any files available to document

his recollection, but he believes that odio's visits to

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25. - Odio

him had been scheduled, at around the time of the assassina-

tion, on Wednesdays. (147)

(104) inspruch specifically recalled that odio had

told him, during the normal course

of

the "format" of

the sessions with her in which she related what happened

during the previous week, (148) that she had been visited

by three men. (149)

He recalled that she told him of the

visit prior to the assassination. (150)

He is definite

that she told him that two of the visitors were "Cubans

or Latins" and that the third was an "Anglo." (151)

He

is not

sure

she mentioned the name "Leon" at his session

with her prior to the

assassination. (152)

He did remember

that when he telephoned odio on the day of or the day

after the assassination, she did mention "Leon" and she

did "in a sort of histrionic way" connect the visit of the

three men to the Kennedy assassination and did recognize

one of those men as "Leon." (153)

Einspruch could not re-

call, however, that odio told him prior to the assassina-

tion

that "Leopoldo" had telephoned her and spoke of

"Ieon" suggesting Kennedy be assassinated. (154)

(105) As noted earlier the Committee's ability to

investigate the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations was

severely restricted not only by the time that has elapsed

since they were originally made but also by the lack of

material available in the basic investigative files. Both

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26 - odio

the warren Commission and the FBI were lax in the pursuit

of investigative leads when those leads still held a

potential for development. The description provided

by

Odio of at least one of the Latin visitors, for instance,

was detailed enough to justify a thorough canvassing of

both

the anti-Castro and pro-Castro militant Cuban com-

munities in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami for individuals

with

similar

striking characteristics. That, in conjunc-

tion with a search

for the specifically described car the

men were seen driving, might have been fruitful. Committee

reviews of Warren Commission files and FBI reports reveal

no such investigative approach. The focus, instead, was

on attempting to determine the possibility of Oswald

being in Dallas when Odio reported she saw him.

That..

approach proved inconclusive.

Nevertheless, there were other points th

mister could be examined in attempting to determine

the identity of the Silvia odio visitors.

The fact, for

instance, that the men claimed to know her father and have

knowledge of his activities appeared to be of possible

nvestigatory significance. The Committe discovered

however, that a front page article in the Dallas News on

May 5, 1962, could have provided a source of background

information on odio's parents. (155)

The article featured

a large photo of Annie and Sarita Odio and detailed the

plight of their parents in prison as well

as their back-

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27 - Odio

(156 )

grounds.

It also could be related

to the fact that

"Leopoldo" initially asked for Sarita when

Annie Odio

answered the door. (157)

(107) Although the committee considered the

possibility

that the Odio visitors were being deceptive

in claiming

an association with the anti-Castro organization JURE,

it nevertheless attempted to determine if they were, in

fact, members of that group. The Committee conducted

extensive interviews with Amador Odio, (158)

who was very

active with JURE in Cuba prior to his imprisonment, and

made

an attempt to contact remaining members of the Dallas

chapter of JURE. (159)

Although the results of the Commit-

tee's efforts must be viewed in terms of the lengthy

period of time that had elapsed, the committee could find

no present recollection of JURE members active in 1963

who used the war names of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" of fitted

the descriptions provlded by silvia dion 260)

(103) In addition, the Committee also interviewed the

founder and leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now living in

Puerto Rico. (161) Ray said he had been questioned by the

FBI about the Odio incident some time after the Kennedy

assassination, but he was asked only about

silvia Odio's

reliability and credibility. (162)

"They told me that

she had met Oswald," Ray said. "I don't remember them

telling me that the men who came to her said they were

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28 - Odio

members of JURE...

(163) Ray told the Committee that he

knew of no members of JURE traveling through Dallas in

September of 1963 in search of money or arms. (164)

He

does not recall anyone by the name of "Leopoldo" or

"Angelo" associated with JURE at the time. (165)

He said

he had no American contacts in Dallas, nor did he receive

(166)

any major financial support from anyone there.

(109) In addition to these attempts

to identify the

Odio visitors, the Committee asked

Silvia Odio to review

some

300 photographs of Cuban activists, both pro-Castro

and anti-Castro, and individuals who had or may have had

some association with Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy

assassination. (167) She could not identify any of the

individuals in the photographs as being the two who came

to her apartment with "Leon Oswald."

(11s)

Finally, the Committee requested the CIA to

run a

est check on

all individuals who used the

"war names" of "Leopoldo" and "Angelo" during the period

of interest. (168) The CIA comply resulted in the photo-

graphs of three individuals who might have been in Dallas

in september of 1963. 169) The photographs were shown

to Silvia odio with negative results. (170)

CONCLUSIONS It applaus

(111)

thesfommittee facts that Silvia odio's testimony

is essentially credible. From the evidence provided in

the sworn testimony of corroborating witnesses, there is

no doubt that three men came to her apartment in

Dallas

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29 - Odio

prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified them-

selves as members of

an anti-Castro Cuban organization.

-

From a judgement of the credibility of both Silvia and

Annie Odio, it must be concluded that there is a strong

probability that one of the men was or appeared

to be

Lee Harvey Oswald. The committee could teach họ

could be rcache.

conclusion as to the significance of that visit atthea

consider in that

it considered bet? the possibilite

Oswald

actually

balong some association with JuRe, the anti-castro group

headed by Manolo Ray, and the porcibility that Oswald

wanted it to appear that he had that association in order

to implicate the group, politically a left-of-center

cuban organization, in the Kennedy assassination.

(112) 17e committee atrocoute keas no definite

could be reacts,

conclusion on the specific date of the visit The possi-

bility that it could have been as early as September 24th,

the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans,

exists. The visit was more likely on the 25th, 26th, or

27th of September. If it were, then Oswald, judging from

evidence developed by both the Warren Commission and this

Committee, had to have had access to private transporta-

A22402t

tion, a situation which almost mandates a conspiratorial

involvement.

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30 - Odio

(113) Ine committe sound the scope of its investiga-

tion in the odio incident dance limited as a

result of the inadequate investigation performed by the

FBI and the Warren Commission at the time. The lack

of immediate recognition of the enemes significance

of the odio incident produced a far from comprehensive

investigation at the only time a comprehensive and,

perhaps, fruitful invesitgation would have been possible.

The Committee ancludes that the warren commissione

definitive conclusion regardinathe

sident, which

baseless.

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Tessious

Fouzi

Antino VECIANA BLANCH

(117)

On March 2, 1976, a

United States

officeof

staff investigato

Senator Richard S. Schweiker'interviewed

Antonio Veciana Blanch, the founder and former leader of

Alpha 66, in his home in Miami.I At the time, senator

Schweiker was a member of the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence and CoChairman of the Subcommittee on the

2

John F. Kennedy Assassination.

The staff investigator

told Veciana that he was interested in the relationships

between U. S. Government agencies and Cuban exile groups,

he did not specifically mention an interest in the Kennedy

3

assassination.

During the course of that interview,

Veciana

revealed that from about mid-1960 through mid-

1973 he had been

directed and advised in his

anti-Castro

and

anti-Communist

activities by an American he knew as

Maurice Bishop.4 Veciana said that Bishopaguided him

in

planning assassination attempts on Premier Fidel Castro

in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop had

directed him to organize Alpha 66 in 1962; and that Bishop,

when breaking their relationship in 1973 paid him

$253,000 in cash for his services over the years.

further

ji! Veciana ate revealed, that at one meeting with

Bishop in Dallas in late August or September, 1963, he saw.

with him

a young man he later recognized

as Lee Harvey

Oswald.

1:

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Veciana - 2

(116) veciana told senator schweikar's investigator

that he had not previously disclosed that information

7

to anyone.

DANSEN

(117) The sabrat Committee, took an intense interest

in the Veciana allegations. From Senator Schweiker, it

obtained the complete files of his office's investigation;

it

The Committee also conducted additional interviews with

Veciana and other witnesses who might have had know-

Furden,

ledge of Veciana

Stor Bishop. Anton April 25 and 26,

1978, Veciana was questioned under oath before the com-

mittee in Executive Session.

These sancs

uncored the tallouing

(118) lero, trem those sourcese the general

details of the relationship between Veciana and the

American he knew eney

• as Maurice Bishop:

veciana's

Ily To the best of his recollection, se

HArtnes

the middle if

Virst approached « Maurice Bishop in thante or

1960, *

At the time, Veciana was employed in

the Banco Financiero, owned by Julio Lobo, the "Sugar

King" of Cuba. 10 Veciana himself was

well-

houriner,

knownpas president of the professional accountant's

11

association.

(128) Veciana said Bishop introduced himself with a

business

card which indicated he was with

a construction

firm headquartered

in Belgium. 12

Although Veciana ini-

tially

assumed

he was

a new bank customer, Bishop's

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• Veciana - 3

conversation with him soon

focused on the Castro Revo-

lution.

"He

also made me aware of his concern regard-

ing the Cuban government leaning towards Communism and

tried to impress on me the seriousness of the situation, "

13

Veciana recalled.

(121) Bishop then invited veciana to lunch and during

that and subsequent lunches convinced Veciana to work

against

the Castro Government.

Veciana admittedly did

not need much convincing because he himself had concluded

only thirty days after the Revolution that Castro was a

communist. 14

(127) veciana said he did ask

Bishop

during their

first meeting if he worked for the United States Govern-

ment.

"He told me at the time," Veciana testified, "that

he was in no position to let me know for whom he was

working or for which agency he was doing this. "Is

Bishop also said he could not tell Veciana whether or

not it was Julio Lobo who

suggested he contact him.

"Supposedly Julio Lobo had very important contacts with

the United States Government, " Veciana pointed out. 16

Veciana, however, she later suspected that it might

have been another very close friend, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet,

le c

who put Bishop anto him. 1? Lopez-Fresquet, although

then

Castro's Minister of Finance, was a covert anti-

castroite, and the centre enline any hear

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Veciana - 4

Into derangoney as a liaison with the castro

18

Government.

(123) Once veciana agreed to work with Bishop on

anti-Castro activity, he was put into a "training

program. "I9 veciana described this as a "two to three

week" program which consisted of nightly lectures.

He

was the only one in the program, which was conducted by

a man he knew only as "Mr. Melton."

The lectures were

held

in an office in a building which Veciana could re-

call

as

being on El Vedado,

a commercial thoroughfare.

He also remembered the building housed the offices

of

a mining company "with an American name" and, on the

first floor, a branch of the Berlitz school of Languages. 20

(|24) Although veciana said he was given some train-

ing in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques,

most of the program consisted of lessons in propaganda

and psychological warfare. "Bishop told me several

times... that psychological warfare could help more than

hundreds of soldiers, thousands of soldiers," Veciana

testified. ?1 veciana saló saia: "The main purpose was

to train me to be an organizer so I was supposed to

initiate a type of action

and other people would be the

ones who would really carry it out. "22

(125) Following the training, veciana worked with

Bishop on several very effective psychological warfare

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Veciana - 5

operations, including a program wish resulted in the

destabilization of the Cuban currency and the creation

of public distrust in its value. 23

Meanwhile, Veciana

also became chief of sabotage for the Movimiento Revo-

R

lucionario del Pueblo (MP), an anti-Castro group headed

MANuel

by Manolo Ray. 24

(|26) Before the American Embassy in Cuba was closed

in January, 1961, Bishop suggested to Veciana that he go tore and

contact certain officials thes for help in his anti-

Castro activity. Veciana said the names suggested by

Bishop were "Smith, " "Sam

Kail"

and "Joe D'Acosta."

Said Veciana:

"Maurice

Bishop suggested

the names

of

these individuals because we needed specific weapons to

carry out the jobs and he told me that these were the

people that could help me. "25 Veciana, however, also

said that Bishop asked him not to reveal his name to

these people. 26

(127) veciana teen has never assumed that Maurice

Bishop was a true name. At one of their early meetings

in Havana, Veciana noticed a Belgian passport which

Bishop had in his open briefcase. Examining it when

Bishop(briefly left the roomy Veciana made a quick note

of it on

a scrap of paper. Veciana kept that scrap of

paper and showed

it to Senator Schweiker's investigator.

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Veciana - 6

The name on the paper

was "Frigault". 27

(128) A few months after the failure

of the Bay of

Pigs invasion

in April, 1961, Bishop called Veciana

to a meeting. According to Veciana: "At that time

Bishop decided that the only thing left to be done was

to have an attempt on Castro's life. "28

Although

Veciana himself did not participate in the attempt, he

recruited the action men and organized the operation,

including renting the apartment from which the shot

was to be fired.

However, The day before the actual

attempt, cana escaped from Cuba by boat with his

mother-in-law, in whose name the apartment had been

rented. 30 His wife and children had left

few months

prior. According to Veciana, it was Bishop

who urged

him to leave because, he said, Castro's agents were

becoming suspicious of Veciana's activities. 31

(129) shortly after he settled in Miami, veciana

testified, Bishop again contacted him.

Veciana said

it would have been easy for anyone to locate him in the

close-knit Cuban exile community in Miami. 33 The re-

sult of their re-establishing contact eventually led to

the founding of Alpha 66 which, according to Veciana,

was Bishop's brainchild. "Bishop's main thesis was that

Cuba had to be liberated by Cubans, " veciana testified. 34

Veciana established himself as the civilian chief and

principal fund-raiser for Alpha 66 and recruited the

former head

of the Second National Front of the

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Veciana - 7

Escambre

(SNFE), Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, as the military

chief. 35

Menoyo had a reputation among Cuban exiles

of being socialistic and Bishop had some doubts about

his loyalty, but Veciana insisted that Menoyo could

be trusted. Besides, he said, "if he did not work

out right we could get rid of him. "36

• Veciana said

that Menoyo was not aware of the existence of Maurice

Bishop.

(130) Alpha 66 became one of the most active of the

anti-Castro exile groups, buying guns and boats, re-

cruiting and training commandos

and conducting

raids on Cuba. 37 At one point, Veciana

proclaimed

numerous

war chest of $100,000 and announced that

all the major

exile organizations were backing

Alpha 66's

efforts.

He alsorpublicly said that all the planning was being

done by leaders "I don't even know. "38

(131) According to veciana, the man behind all of

Alpha 66's strategy was Maurice Bishop. Over the 12-

year period of their association, Veciana estimates he

met with Bishop more than 100 times. 39 Veciana, however,

claims he had no way of getting in touch with Bishop

and that all the meetings were instigated by Bishop, a

40

procedure Bishop established early in their relationship.

To set up a meeting,

Bishop would call Veciana by tele-

phone or, if Veciana

was out of town, call

a third

person whom Veciana trusted, someone who always knew

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Veciana - 8

his location.

where herwas. "1 Veciana said that this third person

never met Bishop but "knew that Bishop and I were

partners in this fight because this person shared my

anti-Communist feelings. "42

Bicides

(137) In addition to contacts with Bishop in

Havana and Miami, Veciana also had meetings with him

in Dallas,

washington, Las Vegas

and Puerto Rico and in

43

Caracas, Lima and La Paz in South

America.

(133) veciana specifically recalled

some meetings

with Bishop because of their special nature.

For in-

stance, shortly after re-establishing contact with him

in Miami, Bishop took Veciana to an office in the Pan

American Bank Building in the downtown section of the

city.44 Veciana does not recall the exact floor of

the building nor if there was any name on the office

door. 45 Bishop unlocked the office with a key tentana

saises and in the presence of two men who were in the

office asked him to sign a piece of

46

part in a "commitment" ceremony.

paper and take

"It was like a

pledge of my loyalty, a

secret pledge," Veciana

testified. "I thinkthey wanted to impress on me my re-

sponsibility and my commitment to the cause. "47

Veciana

could not identify the two men who were

present with Bishop at this ceremony, nor does he re-

call if he was introduced to them. "They were like

spectators," he saia. 48

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Veciana - 9

(134)

From August, 1968 untilJune, 1972, Veciana

worked in La Pz, Bolivia, as a banking advisor to

Bolivia's Central Bank.

His contracts were financed

50

by the U. S. Agency for International Development,

and his office was located in the passport division

51

of the American Embassy.

Veciana believes that Bishop

was instrumental in his getting the AID job, because he

himself was

surprised that the Agency would hire

a

52

known "terrorist" and

anti-Castro activist.

The records

indicate that Veciana was hired

by the Agency even

though his application was never

signed.

53

(125/ while supposedly employed as a banking advisor

in Bolivia, Veciana actually did very little such work,

but instead was engaged mostly in anti-Castro and anti-

54

Communist activities with Bishop.

Among the operations

instigated by Bishop at the time was an attempt to assas-

sinate Castro in Chile in 1971.55

(136). According to veciana, that aborted

assassina-

tion attempt eventually led to the dissolution of his

relationship with Bishop. 56 Although Bishop directed

the operation and provided Veciana with intelligence

information,

Veciana himself

recruited.

• anti-Castro

58

Cuban associates in Caracas to take part in the attempt.

Without his knowledge, Veciana

said, these

associates

introduced a new element into the plan, a scheme to

blame the assassination on certain Russian agents in

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Veciana - 10

59

Caracas.

The associates even produced phony documents

and photographs ander ts do thas 60

When Bishop

later found out about this unauthorized part of the

scheme, he was extremely upset and accused Veciana

of being a part of it. 61 Although veciana told Bishop

he had no knowledge of it, Bishop apparently did not

believe him and eventually suggested that their rela-

62

tionship be terminated.

(137) On July 26, 1973, Bishop arranged for Veciana

to meet with him in the parking lot of the Flagler Dog

Track in Miami. 63

When Veciana arrived, Bishop was

waiting for him with two younger men in an automobile. 64

At that time Bishop gave Veciana a suitcase which,

65

Veciana later ascertained, contained $253,000 in cash.

Since,

at the beginning of their relationship, Veciana

had refused Bishop's offer to pay him for his work with

him, the lump sum payment was meant as compensation for

66

his efforts over the years.

(138). The committee's spanies interest in the rela-

tionship between

Antonio Veciana and Maurice Bishop

is,

of course, predicated on Veciana's

contention that he

saw

Bishop with

Lee Harvey Oswald

in

Dallas

a few

months

before the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

(137) veciana cannot specifically pinpoint the date

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Veciana - 11

of that meeting with Bishop. He believes it was in

67

late August, 1963.

Over the years that he knew

Bishop, Veciana had at least five meetings with him in

Dallas. 68

The meeting at which Oswald was present took

place in the lobby of a large office building in the

downtown section of the city, perhaps a bank or an

69

insurance building with a blue facade or lobby.

When

Veciana arrived for the meeting, Bishop was there talk-

ing

with Oswald. Veciana does not recall whether he

was

introduced

to Oswald by name, but said he did not

have any conversation with him.

Oswald remained with

Bishop and Veciana only for a brief time as they walked

towards a nearby coffee shop. Oswald then departed and

71

Bishop and Veciana continued their meeting alone.

(140) veciana testified that he recognized the young

man with Bishop as Lee Harvey Oswald after seeing

72

photographs of him following the Kennedy assassination.

There is absolutely no doubt in his mind that the man

was Oswald, not just someone who resembled him.

Veciana

pointed out that he had been trained to remember the

physical characteristics of people and that if it was

not Oswald it was his "exact" double. 73

(141) veciana's next meeting with Bishop was in Miami

about two months after the assassination

of President

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Veciana - 12

Kennedy.14

Although they discussed the assassination

in general, Veciana did not specifically ask

him

about Oswald. "I was not going to make the mistake

of getting myself involved in something that did not

concern me," he testified.?5 also, he said, "...That

was

a very difficult situation because I was afraid.

We both understood.

I could guess that he knew that

I

was knowledgeable of that and

I learned

that

the best

way is not to know, not to get to know things that

don't concern you, so I respected the rules and I dian't

mention that ever. "76

(142) Bishop himself, however, did suggest to veciana

the possibility of some involvement. At the time there

were newspaper reports that Oswald had met with some

Cubans during his visit to Mexico. Veciana said that

Bishop was aware of the fat that he had a relative,

Guillermo Ruiz, who was a high-ranking officer in

Castro's intelligence service stationed in

Mexico City."7

Bishop told Veciana that if he could get in touch

with

Ruiz he would pay Ruiz fa large amount

of money

(publicly.) sawthat it was

him

and his wife who had

met

with Oswala.?8 Veciana agreed to make the attempt to

contact Ruiz because, as he testified, "I knew that Ruiz

would be tempted

with money; he liked money. "79

Veciana, however, was never successful in contacting

Ruiz and when he mentioned it to Bishop a couple of

months later, Bishop told him to forget it. 80

That was

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Veciana - 13

the last time Veciana ever spoke about the Kennedy assas-

sination or Lee Harvey Oswald to Bishop, and, he testified,

he never told anyone about seeing Oswald until questioned

81

by Senator Schweiker's investigator.

(143) In assessing Veciana's testimony, the Committee

made an attempt to evaluate his general credibility and,

concurrently, take the necessary steps to determine if

there

was a Maurice Bishop or someone

using

that

name

and, if there was, with whom he was

associated.

(144) In retrospect, the timing

and

circumstances of

that initial interview with Veciana by Senator Schweiker's

investigator may be a factor in determining his credi-

bility. Two weeks prior to the interview, veciana had

been released from the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta

after serving 27 months on a narcotics conspiracy con-

viction. 82 Veciana, although having served his time,

insisted he was innocent, but claimed that the case

against him was so well fabricated that the Federal

prosecutor actually believed he was guilty. 83 Accord-

ing to Senator Schweiker's investigator, Veciana appeared

confused and frightened by the situation

in

which

he

found

himself, but said he believed

that in

some way his

legal

problems were related

to

his

previous

association

with

Bishop, although he did not know exactly how. 85

The

investigator

speculated that Veciana felt that by

reveal-

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Veciana - 14

ing his association with Bishop to an official repre-

sentative of the U. S. Government, he would be providing

himself with an element of security. 86 Much later,

however, Veciana apparently changed his position and

decided that Castro agents, not Bishop, were responsible

for his drug arrest. 87 This is inconsistent with in-

formation provided to the Committee by one of Veciana's

closest

associates, who said that Veciana told him that

he thought the CIA framed him because he

wanted to go

ahead

with another plot to kill Castro. 88

This associate,

Professor Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, Castro's former Minister

of Finance, said, however, he was not aware that Veciana

had had any association with anyone like Maurice

Bishop and that he, himself, could not identify Bishop. 89

(145) The committee conducted numerous interviews of

other key anti-Castro associates or former associates of

Veciana, not only as part of its efforts to locate

Bishop but also to further aid in

assessing Veciana's

credibility. Generally, Veciana's reputation for honesty

and integrity was excellent. A former associate, who

worked with him

when Veciana was chief

of sabotage for

the

MRP in Havana,

said: "Veciana

was the

straightest,

absolutely trustworthy, most honest person I ever met.

still,

I would trust him explicitly, "9o sortstaro not one.

of

his associates -- neither those who worked with him in

anti-Castro activity in Cuba nor those who

were associated

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Veciana - 15

with him in Alpha 66 -- said they were aware of any

American directing Veciana or of anyone who had the

characteristics of Maurice Bishop.

(/46) Nevertheless, there were many aspects of

Veciana's story wash the Committee attemptedsto cor-

roborate. Veciana's claim, for instance, that he was

the principal organizer of the

attempt on Castro's

life in Havana in October, 1961, was documented in a

Cuban newspaper report at the time. 91

Early in their

relationship in Miami, Bishop asked Veciana

to monitor

the activities of

an

anti-Castro operation called

"Cellula Fantasma. "92 Veciana

said he

attended a few

meetings of the group and described the operation as a

leaflet-dropping mission over Cuba which involved known

soldier-of-fortune Frank Fiorini Sturgis. 93

Veciana

said he did not know why Bishop would have been interested

in the operation, but the Committee reviewed files which

confirmed the existence and mission of the group and the

involvement of Frank Fiorini Sturgis at the time. 94

(143)

While Veciana was still in Cuba, among those

at the American Embassy Bishop suggested he contact for

95

aid in anti-Castro operations was a Colonel Sam Kail.

The Committee

ascertained that there was

a Colonel Samuel

G. Kail

at the American Embassy

in

Havana in

1960

at

the

time Veciana said he contacted

him. Kail, now retired,

was located and interviewed

in

Dallas.

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Veciana - 16

(148) colonel kail served as the U. s. Army attache

at the United States Embassy in Havana from June 3, 1958

until the day the Embassy closed, January 4, 1961.96

His primary mission as a military attache was that of

intelligence. 97

Later, in February, 1962, he was

transferred to Miami where he was in charge of the unit

which debriefed newly-arrived Cuban refugees.

Although

he reported directly to the Chief

of Army Intelligence

in Washington, Kail said he assumed his unit was actual-

ly functioning for the CIA. "I

suspect they

paid our

" he saia. 98

(149)

Kail said that prior to the American Embassy

closing in Havana, there was a "constant stream" of

Cubans coming through his office with anti-Castro

schemes, including assassination plans, asking for

American assistance in the form of weapons or guarantees

of escaping. "We had hordes and hordes of people

through there all the time," he said.

For that reason,

he said, he did not specifically remember Veciana visit-

ing him.

"I think it would be a miracle if I could

recall him," he said, but does not discount the possi-

bility

that he did meet him.

(150) (onever, all sala, maents of the cIA nould

frequently use the names of other Embassy

staff person-

nel in their outside contacts without notifying

the

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Veciana - 17

staff individual it was being done. 100

It happened

"a number of times"; he said that a Cuban would come

in and ask to see Colonel Kail and, when

introduced

to

him, tell him that he was not the Colonel Kail he had

met outside the Embassy. 101 Kail

said he would then

take the Cuban through the Embassy to have him point i

out the CIA agent who had used his name. 102

(151) Rail said he was not familiar with a Maurice

Bishop, nor had he ever heard of anyone using that

name. 103

.....

volvement in the assassination

attempt on Castro in

' Chile in 1971. In a report given to Senator George

McGovern in 1975, Castro provided information detailing

the plot 'and accused "counter-revolutionaries from

Alpha 66" as co-conspirators. 104

Veciana himself,

however, was not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless,

Committee intert gates probing the anti-Castro Cuban

community in Miami,found that Veciana's involvement in

the plot was known by many of the active exiles. Max

Lesnik, editor and publisher of Replica, the most pro-

minent

Spanish-language weekly publication in the com-

munity, said he was aware of Veciana's involvement in

the assassination attempt at the time. 105

He said,

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Veciana - 18

however, that Veciana told him that it was "his own

plan," and did not mention the involvement of a

Maurice Bishop. 106

Lesnik could not identify Bishop

but said he always did think that Veciana must have had

"some high government contacts, probably CIA. "107

• (153) The Committee also attempted to confirm

Veciana's sole in the Chile plot by locating two other

anti-Castro Cubans allegedly

involved with him. They

were interviewed in Caracas, Venezuela, and, because

they

are not United

States citizens, they could not be

subpoenaed for sworn statements.

(1547)

One of those named was Lucilo Pena. A Cuban-

born graduate of Auburn University in Georgia, Pena is

now a Venezuelan citizen and a sales manager for a large

chemical firm. He has lived in Venezuela since 19%1. 108

(155) Although Pena denied any involvement in the

Castro assassination plot in Chile, he admitted to know-

ing Veciana since "1964 or 1965," when he was active in

Alpha 66's "Plan Omega," a plot to invade Cuba from

base in the Dominican Republic. 109

He said he first

met Veciana

through a friend, Secundino Alverez, who was

the Caracas chapter

leader of. Alpha 66.110

(Alverez

was among those named by Veciana as also being involved

in the Chile

plot.) 111

Pena admitted he had been in

contact with Veciana during the period the Chile plot

was being planned

but, he said, their meetings were

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Veciana - 19

only casual, usually at boxing matches which Veciana

promoted.

112 Pena

also admitted that Veciana

may

have

discussed

the

possibility

of assassinating Castro

with

him during one of these

encounters

at

the boxing

matches.

"I think he asked

some help in

raising money,"

Pena said, "but that's all I know about that. "113

Pena

denied any knowledge or involvement in any plot to

blame Russian agents for the planned Castro assassination

in Chile. "I am not the type to do that kind of

counter-intelligence work," he said.

"I am too open

and honest. "114

(156) Pena, however, admitted to knowing, perhaps

since 1963, Luis Posada, another anti-Castro Cuban in

Caracas who Veciana claims was

also involved in the

plot to kill Castro in Chile. 115

('s orite sente interviened

Luis

Posada in

the Venezuelan political prison, Cuartel

San Carlos, in Caracas. Posada had been

arrested in

October, 1976, along with well-known anti-Castro Cuban

terrorist Orlando Bosch, and indicted for being in-

volved in the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in

which 73 persons were killed. 116

(158) posada had earlier been linked with assassina-

tion plots against Cuban officials in Chile, including

two who disappeared in August, 1976.117

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Veciana - 20

(15) posada's background as a military and intelli-

gence operative is eclectic. He was a member of Brigade

2506 but did not take part in the Bay of Pigs landing. 118

In 1963 he joined the U. S. Army and was commissioned

a first lieutenant.

119 | He resigned his commission in

1961 lend became an agent for the cran

He went to

Venezuela in 1967 and shortly afterwards joined the

Venezuelan secret police, called DISIP, the Direccion

de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevencion. 121 From

1971 to 1973 he was chief of operations of the General

Division of Security for DISIP, which included counter-

intelligence. 122

He resigned from

DISIP

in 1973

and

went to Washington, D. C. to take training from what he

termed "a

private company" in the field of lie detection. 123

He then returned to Caracas to open his own private

detective agnecy.

(160) posada told Committee investigators that he

was not involved in the Castro assassination attempt in

Chile in 1971.124

He admitted that he knew Veciana but

said he only met him twice, once in Miami and once in

Caracas at the boxing matches. 125

He said he did talk

to Veciana about the

time the Chile plot was being

planned, but Veciana never mentioned

anything to him

about it.126

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Veciana - 21

(161) Another aspect of Veciana's allegations

that

were

of seen interest to the Committee was Bishop's

suggestion of developing a misinformation scheme involv-

ing a Castro intelligence agent and Oswald.

127 Veciana

said that Bishop knew that a relative of his was in the

Cuban Intelligence service assigned to Mexico City at

the time of the Kennedy assassination. 128

According to

Veciana, a news story was circulating immediately after

the assassination that Oswald had met

a couple on the

Mexican border while on his way to Mexico City prior to

the assassination. 129

Bishop, Veciana said, suggested

he attempt to get in touch with his relative

offer

him

a bribe to say that it was

he and his wife who met

Oswald in Mexico. 130 veciana said he was never able to

get in touch with his relative about it and eventually

Bishop told him to forget it, 131

(162) The name of Veciana's relative is Orestes Guil-

lermo Ruiz Perez and he is, in fact, a relative by

marriage, the husband of a first cousin to Veciana.

Veciana said he first learned of Ruiz's affiliation with

Castro's intelligence service shortly after Castro took

power.

He and Ruiz were walking in a Havana park when

they were

stopped

and

searched by Castro's police.

RUiZ

was found

to be carrying a gun and was

taken away.

Con-

cerned, Veciana immediately placed a call to

a close

friend

inside Castro's government, Minister of Financed

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Veciana - 22

Rufo Lopez-Fresquet. Lopez-Fresquet

told Veciana not

to worry about Ruiz because Ruiz was actually working

for

the intelligence service. 133

(163) Although Ruiz was a Castro' agent and Communist,

he warned Veciana that he was being observed visiting

the American Embassy in Havana and told him to be care-

£u1. 134

is

That ,why veciana later thought that he might

be able to turn Ruiz into an anti-Castro agent. Sometime

after the Kennedy assassination, 'Veciana said he was ap-

proached by another anti-Castro Cuban named Robert Vale•

Whom he knew to be working for the CIAl135

Vale asked

Veciana to attempt to contact Ruiz about possibly be-

136

coming

an asset for the CIA.

Ruiz, at the time, was

stationed

in Spain

and when Veciana

found

friend,

Roblejo Lorie, who was traveling to Spain, he asked him

to carry a letter to Ruiz. Lorie gave the letter to

Ruiz but, according to Veciana, Ruiz tore the letter

up in front of lorie and told him that he did not want

to have any contact with Veciana because he knew Veciana

"was working for the CIA. "137

(164) The committee was able to interview Orestes

Guillermo Ruiz in Havana. 138 Ruiz acknowledged that he

was related to Veciana through marriage. 139

He said

that "everyone in Cuba" knows that Veciana is associated

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Veciana - 23

with the CIA and was involved in assassination attempts

on Castro. 140

He

said, however, aside from

what he

read in the American newspapers he has no knowledge of

Veciana's association with Maurice Bishop or who

Maurice Bishop could be. 141

He said he was never con-

tacted by Veciana about Oswala142 and, in fact, has not

seen Veciana since 1959.143

(165) Ruiz expressed disdain for Veciana,

said he con-

sidered him a cowara144

and "a

person you cannot believe."

He said Veciana had personality problems and was under

phychiatric care from the time he

was 16 years old until

145

he was 21.

Ruiz said that "another

counter-revolu-

tionary," a cousin of Veciana's who is a doctor "in

Miami dr Chicago" and whose name is Jose Veciana, could

attest to Veciana's psychiatric problems because he had

146

advised the family about them.

(1666)

Committee investigators located Dr. Jose

Veciana in Martin, Tennessee, where he is chief of

pathology at Volunteer General Hospital. He confirmed

that he is a first cousin to Antonio Veciana and that

147

he had known

him

when he was a child in Havana.

DI.

Veciana

said

he has never known his cousin to have person-

ality problems

to

have ever been under psychiatric

care.

He said

he himself has never provided Veciana any

psychiatric

advice nor offered it to his family. 148

He

said he

feels that Veciana must be of sound mental con-

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Veciana - 24

dition because he knows that Veciana had to undergo

vigorous tests in his rise in the hanking business. 149

(16% veciana hinself denied Ruiz's allegations that

he had had psychiatric problems as a young man.

His

mother confirmed his denial. 150

The Search for Bishop

(168) One of the factors utilized in the Connittee's

efforts

to locate Maurice Bishop

was the description of

him provided

by Veciana. When he

first met him in 1960,

Veciana said, Bishop was about 45

years old, about 6'2"

tall, weighed over 200 pounds and was athletically built.

He had grey-blue eyes, light brown hair and a light

V that

complexion.

However, Veciana said, 'Bishop appeared

to spend a lot of time outdoors or in sunny climate be-

cause he was usually well-tanned and there was

some skin

152

discoloration, like sun spots, under his eyes.

He

appeared to be meticulous about his dress and usually

concerned about his weight and diet.

the latter

years that Veciana knew him, Bishop took to using glasses

for reading. 154

(16) shortly after he revealed his Bishop relation-

ship to Senator Schweiker's

investigator, Veciana aided

a professional artist

in developing a composite sketch of

Bishop. Schweiker's office provided the Committee with

a copy of the sketch. Veciana told the Committee that

he considered the artist's composite sketch of Bishop a

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Veciana - 25

"pretty good" resemblance. 155

(177) Prior to the Committee's efforts, Senator

Schweiker's office, as well as the Senate Select Sub-

committee he headed, looked into certain aspects of

Veciana's

allegations. Schweiker, for

instance, re-

quested the Belgian Embassy to conduct a record check

for information about a passport issued under the name

of "Frigault." The Belgian Embassy

said that, without

additional

identifying information, it could not help. 156

In addition, Schweiker's investigator showed Veciana

numerous

photographs of individuals who may have used

the name of Bishop, among them Oswald's friend, George

deMohrenschildt, who was then a teacher at Bishop College

in Dallas. The results were negative. 157

(171) It was senator schweiker who focused the Con-

mittee's attention on David Atlee Phillips, former chief

of the western Hemisphere Division of the CIA Deputy]

Directorate of Operations, as perhaps having knowledge

of Maurice Bishop. Immediately after receiving the

Bishop sketch, Schweiker concluded that Phillips, who

had

earlier

testified before

the

Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence Activities, bears a strong resemblance

to the sketch.

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VECIANA E

a - page 25-a

(172) when veciana was shown a photograph of David phillips

conclusive

by schweiker's investigato, he did not providé a an absolutely

sadne response.

For that reason, it was decided that

Veciana be given the opportunity to observe Phillips in

+576159

person.

we) Schweiker arranged for Veciana to be

present at a luncheon meeting of the Association of Retired

Intelligence Officers in Reston, Virginia, on September

152009150

17, 1976. Phillips was one of the founders of the Association.

Veciana was introduced to Phillips prior to the luncheon.

He was introduced by name but not by affiliation with Alpha 66

or involvement with anti-Castro activity. According to

Schweiker's investigator, there was no indication of

163-15759958

ms recognition on Phillip's part. As Following the

luncheon alciand had the opportunity to speak with phillips

in Spanish. Veciana asked Phillips if he was in Havana in

16515745570

1960 and if he knew Julio Lobo. Phillips answered both

questions affirmatively and then asked Veciana to repeat

mer declana did and then asked, "Do you know my name?"

Phillips said he

he did not.

Phillips asked if Veciana was

on schweiker's staff?" He was told that he was not but that

was helping Schweiker in his investigation of the

Kennedy

assassination? Phillips declined to be interviewed by

Senator Schweiker's investigator, but

said he would be happy

to speak with any Congressman or Congressional representative

"in Congress " rollowing the encounter of veciana

Phillips,

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25-8

Schweiker's investigator stater asked Veciana

if

David Phillips was Maurice Bishop.

?'-ra veciana said he was

not!" renaven

d 172 chie

lker's investigator expressed some

doubt about veciana's credibility on the point teren

of Veciana's renewed

interest in continuing his anti-Castro

operations and his expressed desire to re-contact Bishop

to help him in addition, schweiker"s investigator

expressed doubt that David Phillips, who was once in charge

of Cuban operations for the CIA and whose career was deeply

entwined in anti-Castro operations, could not recognize

the name of Veciana as being the founder and vociferous

public spokesman for one of the largest and most active

anti-Castro Cuban groups, Alpha 66.

1>4

(174) the committee considered other jactors in exan-

ining Phillips.

Until 1963, Phillips' principal area

I expertise and operations with

158/75

the CIA was propaganda and

psychological warfare.

In 1960, when Veciana said

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Veciana - 26

he first met Bishop

in Havana, Phillips was serving

as

a covert operative in Havana,

running a public rela-

tions agency as a fronts 55176

From 1961 to 1963, Phillips

was Chief

of Covert Action in Mexico City. When Oswald

visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in 1963, Phillips

was in charge of Cuban Operations for the CIA in Mexico

City. Phillips had earlier.

talitived in and had numerous as-

sociations in Chile.

He had also served as Chief of

178

161

Station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela.

(175) The committee adeo developed other information

When further validated an interest

in Phillips in

relation

+ 26

to Bishop. In Miami, its investigators inter-

• for present purposes

to wilßedl/ PoN Cross.

viewed a former career agent for the CIA, named Ross

September, 1960 until November, 1962,

CROSS

was a case officer

at the CIA's JM/WAVE station,

the operational base which coordinated the Agency's

16Z179

activities with the anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

handled one of the largest and most active anti-Castro

1,80

groups, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil. (DRE). +63

CRoSS

At the time that crozer was at the Miami JM/ WAVE

station, Davia Phillips was responsible for catam

the-psycho-

logical warfare aspects of the CIA's anti-Castro opera-

tions, errores coordinated the DRE's propagandal opera:

tions with Phillips, who would occasionally visit the

IM/WAVE station from wasington.

Generally, however,

crozier worked with Phillips' direct assistant at the

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Veciana - 27

station, who used the cover name of Doug Gupton.

(176) In his book about his role in the Bay of

Pigs operation, former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt

uses a psuedonym when referring to the chief of [propa

ganda for the operation. #45182

The chief of propaganda

was Davia Phillips. Hunt called him "Knight. fa/83

(177) when asked bycommitted tests if te

was familiar with anyone using the cover name of

CROSS

Bishop at the JM/WAVE station, Crozier said he was

"almost positive" that Davia

Phillips had used the cover

name of Maurice Bishop.

7677184

He

said he was "fairly sure"

that

Hunt himself had used the cover name of knight, tear85

CRoSS

Howeves, crozier said, the reason he was certain that

Phillips used the name of Bishop was because he recalled

sometimes discussing field and agent problems in the

area of psychological warfare with Phillips' assistant

Doug Gupton and Gupton often saying, "Well, I guess Mr.

•Bishop will have to talk with him." frozier said:

"And, of course, I knew he was referring to his boss,

David Phillips. "162 186

(170) The Connittee ascertained that the cover name

of Doug Gupton was used at the JM/WAVE station by a

foxmer CIA employee miam kent rud interewed sim. o

See INSERT, Gupton

INSERT -- get. Kent. insert

CIA security room safe in

FONZI - INSERTS file)

179181

187-198

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## Page 101

insert Veciana write up

181

insert GUPTON

179) The Gommittee staff interviewed Doug Gupton on August

(302 187

22nd, 1978 at CIA headquarters. feaSi

japan Gupton said he worked for the

CIA from December, 1951, until his retirement. in June,

a semin start office.

1978, much

of that time on the Covert Action Guidance

CIT5135

Staff. (s

Gupton confirmed that he was in charge

special

ofitoregate operationsfat the Miami IM/WAVE station

47227/89

and that his immediate superior was

David Phillips.

Ron

coreir name)

Gupton acknowledged that

mwas a case officer

Cross

who worked

for him and that he saw

crosset on a daily

67735170

basis.

(and)

Gupton said he does not

recall whether

E. Howard

or David Phillips ever

used the

name of

7247191

"Knight.

He said he does

recall Phillips

(175) 197

ever using the name of Maurice Bishop.

When

Cross'

about scariests recollection of him referring to

Phillips as "MT. Bishop'"Gupton said: "Well, maybe I

did. I don't remember."

He also said, however,

that he never heard, the name of Bishop while he was

(127.194

stationed in Miami. te

When shown the sketch of

125>195

Bishop, he said it did not look like anyone he knew.

(8) explaining his yorking relationship with David Phillips.

Gupton said he was in contact with him regularly in Washington

by telephone and cable and that phillips visited Miami "quite

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62277196

often." is

Gupton said, however, that there were two

sets

of operations. His set of operations was run out of

Miami

and he kept Phillips informed of them. Phillips

ran another set

of operations personally out of Washington

and, Gupton

said, Phillips did not keep him briefed about

(650) 197

them. (ths, Gupton also said he knew that Phillips

sed many of his old contacts Itor

Havana in his personal

51190

operations:

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Veciana - 28

4

(181) David Atlee Phillips testified before the

Committee in Executive Session on April 25th, 1978.

in Executive: Session on April 25, 1978.

.He said he never

132197

used the name e Maurice Bishop.

He said he did not know

183 200

of anyone in the CIA who used the name @ Maurice Bishop.

He said he had seen Antonio Veciana only twice in his life,

the second time the my morning of his hearing before the

Committee when Veciana, who had testified earlier, emerged

201

184

from the hearing room while he, Phillips, was in the hállway.

Phillips said the first time he met Veciana was at a meeting

of the Association of

Former Intelligence Officers in Reston.

He said that Veciana was brought to that meeting by an

investigator from Senator Schweiker's office but, said

Phillips, Veciana was not introduced to him by name but

185<203

only as "the driver."

He said Veciana asked him some

questions in Spanish but at the time, bes

he diasm not

know who Veciana was or why Senator Schweiker's office had

18z 204

sent him to the meeting.

182) Phillips also testified that he had never used the

205188

name Of Frigault and had never used a Belgian passport.

(185) phillips was showa the sketch of maurice Bishop but

could not identify

it as anyone he knew.

He said, however,

169 206-

"It looks like me.

(184)1n sworn testimony before the Committee in

Executive Session on April 26th, 1978, Antonio Veciana

said that David Atlee Phillips is not the person he

knew as Maurice Bishop, 790207

He said, however, that

there was a "physical similarity. "9 2od

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## Page 104

(185) on March 2, 1978, the Committee requested"

the

ÇIA to check all its files and index references per-

taining to Maurice Bishop. 1972 On March 31, 1978, the

CIA informed the Committee that its Office of the

Inspector General, its Office of the General Counsel,

its Office of Personnel and the Deputy Directorate of

193210

Operations had no record of a Maurice Bishop.

(186) on August 10, 1978, B.H. 120

a former covert operative of the CIA, was interviewed by

tha

Committee in a special closed session.

go B.H. was a CIA

(agent

from 1952 to 1970.

Between 1960 and

(126) 213

1964 he was assigned to Cuban operations.

As such, he testified, he was involved in "day-to-day"

operations with David Atlee Phillips. He characterized

Phillips as "an excellent intelligence officer" and "a

(477) 714

personal friend." $

(181) when asked if he knew an individual named maurice

Bishop, B.H. said:

"Again, Mr. Bishop was in the organization but I had

no personal day-to-day open relationship with him.

Phillips,

(2966)0215

yes; Bishop, no. I knew them both..."' (amas

(128) Although he coulan't describe Bishop"s physical

characteristics, B.H. said he had seen him "two of three

720217

17216

= in the "hallways or cafeteria"

<-22 at CIA headquarters in Langley. B.H. said he thought

(2o) 218

Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division Tru

(6393) 0/

and that he had a position "higher than me."

He could not be more specific. The two or three times he

saw Bishop, he said, was between 1960 and 1964 when he himself

was

in Cuban operations, although, he said, he didn't know

(₴62)

2200

if Bishop worked

in that area also.

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2,

B.H. insert

not

(189) Asked how, if he didol personally know Bishop, ha

knew the person he saw at CIA headguarters was Maurice

Bishop, B.H. said: "Someone might have said, 'That is

Mauson lane and it vas different from Dave phillips

201 221.

or Hal Swenson, guys that I know." d

(90)

However,

When shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop. V

B.H. could not identify it as anyone he recognized.

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Insert IOr VECIANA

tonzi

20%

100

letone inser

січ

spor

(191) On August 17, 1978, the Committee deposed John A.

McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

(02) 2222

{xom October, 1961 until April 30th, 1965.

-testimony, 8/17/78, p.4)

192) During the course of the deposition, the following

questions and answers were recorded: XIB&0 xI

l: Do you know or did you know Maurice Bishop?

A: Yes.

l: Was he an agency employee?

A :

I believe so.

l: Do you know what his duties were in 1963?

A: No.

... Q: For instance, do you know whether Maurice Bishop

worked in the Western Hemisphere Division or whether he worked

in some other division of the CIA?

A: I do not know.

I do not recall.

I knew at that time

but I do not recall.

Q: Do you know whether Maurice Bishop used any

pseudonyms?

A: No, I do not know that.

(Ibid, pp. 45,46)

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VeciAnA - 29

(193)

vieu

In light of the information developed in the

interviews with H. and former Director McCone, the Com-

mittee asked the CIA to renew its file search for adel

files or index references pertaining to Bishop.

It

also asked for a written

statement from the CIA indicat-

ing whether an individual using either the true name or

pseudonym of Maurice Bishop has ever been associated

in any capacity with the CIA 208225

(194) 2 2ep1y was received on Septemker 8, 1978, From

the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel indicating that

all true name files, alias files and pseudonym files

were again checked

and, again, proved negative. "No

person with such a rene has a connection with CIA,"

sidd the reply.

Added the Agency: "Quite frankly,

it is our belief -- from our earlier check, reinforced by

octions are concerned. 70-*) ==2ge, so far as ciA

› So attached fa. -

(195) Additional efforts to jocate Maurice Bishop

and to the Department of

Defense. 73 227

Both proved negative. 21=30

(196) Although file reviews of Maurice Bishop proved

negative, the Committee learned that Army intelligence

had

an operational interest in Antonio Veciana during

one period. Veciana was registered in the Army Informa-

tion Source Registry from November, 1962 until July,

214≥31

1966.

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Footnote:

page 29.

*On October 19, 1978, the Committee's Chief Counsel received

a letter from the Principal Coordinator in the CIA's Office

of Legislative Counsel. The letter

said, in part:

"This is

to advise you that I have interviewed Mr. McCone and a

retired employee concerning their recolletions about an

alleged CIA employee reportedly using the name of Maurice

Bishop....

employee would recognize one of them.

"Mr. McCone did not feel it necessary to review those

photographs, stating that I should inform you that he had

been in error....

"The employee continues to recall a person of whom he knew.

who was known as Maurice Bishop.

He cannot state the

organizational connection or responsibilities of the

individual, not knowing him personally, and feels that

the person

in question was pointed out

to him by someone,

perhaps a secretary. He unable, however, to recognize

any of the photographs mentioned above....

'In summary, Mr.

McCone withdraws his statements on this

point.

The employee continues to recall such a name, but

the nature of his

recollection is not very clear or precise.

We still believe that there is no evidence of the existence

of such a person so

far as there being a CIA connection...."

(JFK Document No. 012722.)

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Veciana - 30

(199) the nature of the army's contact with vecdana

appeared to be limited to attempting to use him as a

source of intelligence information about Alpha 66

activities, with Veciana, in turn, seeking to obtain

weapons and funds. * 2e

Veciana acknowledged and detailed

to the Committee these contacts with Army Intelligence

and said that, aside from keeping Bishop informed of

them, they had no relationship with his activities with

Bishop. 216 233

(199) caven the sray's acknowledgement of an interast in

Veciana and Alpha 66, the Committee made the assumption

that the CIA,

anviza any

may

opm must also have had an interest in

Veciana

and his Alpha 66 activities as part of its pervasive

role in anti-Castro operations during the 1960s.

(200) In a review of its own files on March 15, 1978,

the CIA noted that Veciana had contacted the Agency

three times -- in December, 1960; July, 1962; and

April, 1966 -- for assistance in plots against

234

Castro.

(Ga»

According to the CIA:

"Officers

listened to Veciana, expressed

no interest,

offered no encouragement

and never recontacted him

on this matter:

There has been no

Agency relationship

with Veciana."

235

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as a condemnit.

C.S. Cert.

(20l) The cormittee's own review of the Agency's files

basically confirned the stated conclusions about

the meetin

meetings with Veciana in 1960 and 1966.

Averin of terrently. +01962

pols Dated pel 7, 19620,

Kee that tea, teo, and received

veciana

$500 from tontacted a- wealthy Puerton Pican

finincier and industrialist den STONE R-I

Cong standing operAtional

The CIA had a "cooperator relationship.?

This prison gave teciana " 500.

for operational actinity. Fool: 236. Although

the files. do not explicitly state wherere

sets originated wih the cIA,

the men 5, hid ever though Feuning

tenti-eAst no groups

SKEWER-It

uvolationaries, it Appears that in lecitad's

case the money was provided by the soldy

industrialist, and was by the Agency.

(207)

Puresto.

Prison, from his personal funds.

In a final effort to locate or

identify Maurice

Bishop, the Committee issued a press release on July 30,

1978 and made available the composite

sketch of Bishop

to the press. The Committee warned that it should not

be assumed that the release indicated

the Committee be-

lieves the person in the sketch was involved in the

Kennedy assassination, only that information resulting

from possible citizen recognition of the sketch might

"shed additional light on the assassination."

The Com-

mittee asked that anyone who had information contact

304237

the committee by mail, not by telephone.

(203)

By November 1, 1978, the Committee received

238

from the general public a total

of four written responses.

21₴

None of the responses was, upon analysis, deemed

a valid

lead to the identity of Maurice Bishop.

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Conclusions:

(204) The ea

No definitive

could be reached

Fat conclusionas to

the credibility of Antonio Veciana's allegations re-

garding his relationship with a Maurice Bishop or

Bishop's alleged relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald.

definitive

could he drawn as to the

firm conclusionsAn

identity or affiliations of Maurice Bishop, if such

While

individual existed. Theremitt

a no evidence was tound

to discredit Veciana's testimony,

=a, some

evidence to support it, although none of it was con-

subwent to indicate thre

Astonis VerianA during

thas he was willing is icive the fintucis! Support

he weeded for the mili tomy openstions of his

Aat-cAstro groups from those sourcEs. Flow the

files of those Aglucies, it toes AppeArs

AsSocAtioN SimilAr to then

this nested. Bat where decid's code wots

really Named Mannice bishop, on if he was, whethere

he did All of the things lecions claims, sad it 50,

witwhat U.S. intelligence Afluen he wits

manda could not be deteried

Associated, ste

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Clessification: -

DRAFT 11/20/78

Betsy

Palmer

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

A Concise History

205) The forerunner of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was

the Frente Revolucionario Democratico. (FRD), Formed in May, 1960%

- dy

At the head of it were the leaders of five major anti-

Castro groups. The proclaimed purpose of the FRD was to establish

a democratic government in Cuba through the use

of military force.

(206) The FRD (nitially set up headquarters

in Mexico, but recruited

most of its proposed invasion force from Miami.

The military arm

of the FRD was known as Brigade 2506.$4

The Brigade eventually was

composed of 1,443 men who were trained by U.s.

Army specialists

at two sites on the south coast of Guatemala.

207) The leaders and their organizations which composed the ERD

Executive Committee were: Aureliano Sanchez Arango of the Triple A

group; Justo Carrillo of Montecristi: Antonio de Varona of

Rescate; Manuel Artime of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR) ;

and DI. Jose Ignacio Rasco of the Christian Democratic Movement

116

(MDC) •

Antonio de Varona served as General Coordinator

and the

membership

was soon expanded to include DI. Antonio Maceo, a

noted Cuban surgeon; former Cuban President Carlos Hevia; ana

conservative leader Rafael Sardinas 48

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Classification: -

DRAFT

- CRC

Page 2

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

pressured

(200/ In March 1961, The State Departnent petroressure

FRD leaders to accept the Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo

(MRP), headed by Manuel Ray Rivero, into the FRD. $ 9

The in-

clusion of Ray's group into the alliance of Cuban exiles was

reportedly also "terribly important to the White House" which

wanted to broaden the political base of the FRD. 4'0

In an

effort to attract Ray and his group into the FRD, Antonio de

Varona voluntarily resigned and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was

112"

elected its new president.

DI. Miro was a former Havana

jurist who broke with Sastro after serving him as his first

187/2

prime minister.

(209) shortly before the April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion,

the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was formed to coordinate

Groveru menit

and direct FRD activities with a

so very mene support.

34/3

The new organization had direct access to President Kennedy

and top white House aides. 7344

All the groups within the CRC

maintained their separate identities.ogrs

the leaders publicly

expressing their unity, especially during the period prior

to the planned invasion.

The regrouping

included the

following

Cuban exile leaders: Chairman, DI. Jose Miro Cardona; Board

of Directors - Antonio de Varona; Justo Carlito,

Antanto Maced, Manuel Ray: and Manuel artime tille connieres

Classification:

5001

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Classification: -

DRAFT - CRC

Page 3

(This form is to be used for materiel extrected

from ClA controllad documents.)

were organized in key cities in the United States and dele-

gations appointed in Latin American countries 'l!

210) The failure of the Bay of pigs invasion resulted in

Castro capturing and imprisioning over 1000 of the Brigade's

members 24818,

The dejected leaders of the CRC, who had been

sequestered for security reasons at the start of the invasion,

2819

were later taken to the White House for a personal visit with

assumed

President Kennedy who expressed his regret and toar responsi-

bility for the invasion failure.M20

@ll). shortly after the unsuccessful invasion, Manuel Ray,

withdrew his organization, the MR?, from the Council,

27 21

by October 1961, the CRC had completely absorbed the ERD.24 22

DI. Miro remained at the helm of the Council, which had been

enlarged to include the Revolutionary Action and a faction

of the 30th of November Movement 1423

•While some unification

had been achieved through the FRD and CRC, the Cuban exile

groups were plagued by factionalism, personal rivalries for

leadership roles and conflicting programs.

226124

Nevertheless,

the CRC was stil1 considered the principal unisying organization

of the Cuban exile community

although no anti-Castro leader

emerged who could command broad support of the community 1ll26

(212) ASter the Detober, 1962 inissile srisis, she poliss of

the United States toward the Castro regime changed drastically.

200060 1

Classification:-

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DRAFT- CRC

Page 4

Classification:.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

In his book, The Losers, Paul Bethel, former Press Attache

at the Havana Embassy, noted: "There is no doubt that President

Kennedy and his brother, the Attorney General, consciously

set about the business of stopping all efforts to unhorse

Fidel Castro -- from outside exile

22yattacks, and from Cuba"s

internal resistance movement."

When two Cuban exile groups

made raids against Russian installations in Cuba and a Russian

freighter in the Cuban port of Caribarien, the Attorney General

dispatched 600 Federal agents to Miami in an effort

to pre-

1728

vent further actions against the Castro regime.

A directive

was issued which prohibited key anti-Castro leaders

in Miami

213) Bearing the area without federa approvals

Although individual groups

received financia)

aid

from

overument 30

# the effectiveness of the CRC as a

unifying organization deteriorated. In April, 1963, Jose

Miro Cardona resigned his position as president in a clash

88331

with the Kennedy Administration over Cuban policy.

Miro

câyimed that Kennedy had promised another invasion would be

launched and had instead

chosen a course of peaceful coexistence

all 32

wtih the castro regime.

The CRC was revamped and DI. Antonio

2.1090A

Classification:

Classified by derivetion:

5977208-500

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12/13/78

I.

NEW ORLEANS CHATTE

CUBAN

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. (CRC)

New Orleans Chapter

(al6) Nine days after the assassination of President

Kennadia, the United States Secret Service began an investigation

into the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his residency

in New Orleans. -

(217)

Oswald had been arrested there in. August, 1963, while

distributing Fair Play for Cuba literature. Some of his leaflets

had the address 544 Camp Street stamped on them.

The Secret

déternine

Service endeavored to

Sad if Oswald maintained an office

2

at this address.

(2i8)

During the course of its investigation, the Secret Service

Ascertained

that the New Orleans chapter of the Cuban

Revolutionary

Council (CRC) had occupied an office

at 544 Camp Street for about

six months during 1961-62. At that time, Sergio Arcacha Smith

was the official CRC delegate for the New Orleans

area.

The

Secret Service also learned that Arcacha had been fired from

his position by the Miami CRC headquarters in early 1962,

New Orleans

allegedly because he did not have the confidence of theCuban

Luis Rabel

exile community musing

Smith

ma replaced sast

Anda moved the CRC offices to his home. 3

219) At the time of the secret service investigation, another

Cuban exile, Frank Bartes, headed the New Orleans CRC delegation

and maintained offices in his home in Metairie, à suburb of

4

New Orleans.

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Draft - New Orleans CRC

Page 2

(a20) After an extensive investigation by the FBI and the

Secret Service regarding the possibility that Oswald rented

office space

at 544 Camp Street, the Warren Report concluded

there was

no evidence that Oswald ever maintained an office

at sarcamp street-des not ulate lu relationship of Orald to the

54y Camp shut addro, it

(27)) What the committee discovered about the renationshippo

detailed

elsewhere

pertains 4

the CommitteeS attempt

This material

tie tidi

to ascertain if any activities of the

CRC had any relationship to Oswald's activities in New Orleans.

(237) The Comme 13

The first New Orleans delegate to the CRC, sergio

Arcacha Smithe

Arcacha

told the Committee that he arrived in Miami in August 1960 and,

at the request of Antonio Verona, a director of the CRC, agreed

to establish a chapter of this group in New Orleans. Initially

imitrally.

Arcacha was afforded

free office space

in the Balter Building and

later rented space at 544 Camp Street.

(223)

During his tenure as head of the New Orleans delegation,

Arcacha endeavored to raise funds by selling CRC bonds, and

was instrumental in organizing several rallies to promote the

cause of the Cuban exiles.

(24)

Arcacha said he had never seen Dswald in New Orleans and,

from what he had read, Oswald was not even in that city at the

same time Arcacha lived there.? When he was relieved of his

official position with the CRC in early 1962, Arcacha left

New Orleans. 10

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DRAFT - New Orleans CRC

Page 3

223) Arcacha's replacement, luis Rabel, assumed the delegate

duties in January, 1962, but, he told the Committee, found it

necessary to resign by October of that year because his job

entailed extensive traveling. Il During his short tenture, Rabel

said he organized several rallies and brought in prominent Miami

speakers to enthuse the New Orleans Cuban exile community!2

Other than going to the Camp Street address to remove office

materials left there by Arcacha, Rabel said he had no connection

with the building and never saw Oswald in New Orleans. 13

(226) Frank Bartes, former President of Consolidated

Railroads

in cuba, I4 became the third designated delegate of the New

Orleans CRC chapter. He reported the activities of the group

regularly to the FBIls and was primarily concerned with

solicitation of monthly pledges from Cubans for the purchase of

arms for their countrymen actively engaged in the fight against

Castro. 16

He reported that he had purchased an M-2 rifle with

collections and displayed it at an October, 1963 meeting for

"psychological reasons". 17

however; because of

apare Bartes said,

#^the rate of

collections at that time, the group was able to send only enough

money to the Miami CRC headquarters to purchase one gun per month. 18

(227) on November 15, 1963, a CRE meeting was held at Gallier Hall.

Tony

Varona was invited to come to New Orleans to speak to the

Cuban exiles and bolster their morale 18219

Varona stayed at the

home of Agustin Guitart, 18320

uncle of Silvia Odio.

(228) Bartes

told the Committee he headed the New Orleans dele-

gation until the CRC was dissolved in 1964 7971

During his tenure,

he said,

2022

he maintained the CRC office in his home.

He could

not recall ever having visited the 544 Camp Street office

maintained by Arcacha in 1961-62.2723

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DRAFT - New Orleans CRC

Page 4

(221) After carlos Bringuier and Oswald had been arrested

in a street scuffle, (see detailed discussion in another

section of the Report) Bartes appeared in Court with Bringuier.

Although not a CRC member, Bringuier was respected by Bartes

and it was in a show of support that Bartes appeared at

-231980 25

Bringuier's hearing.

(238) after the hearing, the news media surrounded Oswald for

a statement, Bartes said. At this point, Bartes got into an

argument with the media and Oswald because the Cubans

were not

1826

being given

an opportunity to present their views.

He also

spoke to an FBI agent that day, warning that Oswald was a

potentially dangerous man.

8827

Bartes declined to identify

the agent to the Committee, saying only that he had had

frequent contact with him during this period of time.

said he had no other contact with Oswald.

87 Ry8

(231) The Committee concludess

that the New Orleans chapter of the CRC had no relationship with

Oswald other than the brief encounter with Bartes, and in no way

was tid disa

officially involved in any activities which touched

upon those

of Oswald.

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Classification:-

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled decuments.)

BRIGADE 2506 - MANUEL ARTIME -

MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR)

232) Noithez anti-Castro Cuban group more naturally attracted

the initial attention of the Committee than Brigade 2506, the

organization specifically formed/for the Bay of Pigs invasion

and the one which experienced the most dramatic relationshi?

with the Kennedy administration in terms of its hopes and

failures.

(233) Following their release from Castro's prisons in December

of 1962, the members of the Brigade harbored deep-seated emotional

• conflicts in their attitude towards the Government. An observer

who watched them arrive in Miami noted: "There were earnest,

bewildered, still in a state of shock at their sudden liberation,

still nursing a bitter sense of betrayal at the manner in which -

they were sent ashore and abandoned, still torn between trust

and cynicism, still in awe at the power of an American govern-

ment that could, at will it seemed, pluck them out

of the

darkest dungeons in Havana and on the Isle of Pines and deposit

them back in florida with their families by Christmas Eve." I

(234) In the perspective of an investigation of the kernedy

assassination, the members of Brigade 2506 had to be considered

of primary interest if only in terms of motivations and means.

Classification:.

Classified by derivation:

pergent

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Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Brigage 2506

eto.

Page 2

As one member, who later became involved in anti-Castro

terrorist activity, explained: "We learned from them.

the tactics that we learned from the CIA because we were

We use

trained to do everything. We were trained to set off a bomb,

we were trained to kill

....

(235) The formation of what was to become Brigade 2506 can be

traced to March, 1960 when President Dwight Eisenhower authorized

the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees for the

purpose of eventually overthrowing Castro. 3

To head the group,

was classes

Ehe CIA chose a young physician

ho had organized the Movimiento

de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), the first anti-Castro

action group inside Cuba:*

His name was Manuel,

Artime

and,

who then

with the aid of

the CIA, hejhad been spirited out

Cuba

the

previous December.

Castro had appointed him a member of

the

National Agrarian Reform Institute but when, in October of

1959, he heard Castro outline a plan to communize Cuba. Artime

publicly resigned his position and denounced Castro, $6

(236) The group which eventually grew into Brigade 2506 originally

consisted of only 28 men.*7 The nucleus was 10

former Cuban

He told them

military officers whom Artime had recruited.

that he himself was told by a group of Americans who claimed

to have no association with the United States Government that

Classification:

2. 1111

Classified by derivetion:

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Classification: -

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 3

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CiA -controlled documents.)

they would receive a huge amount of arms, equigment and funds # 9

The Americans tried to give Artime and his men the impression

that an anonymous Cuban millionaire was paying the bills, but

the Cubans eventually began referring to their benefactor as

"Uncle Sam." A 10

(251) At secret camps in Florida, in Panama and eventually in

Guatemala, the CIA trained the core of future Brigade leaders

in guerilla warfare. Ha"

By September of 1960, this initial cadre

was part of a group of 160 men undergoing vigorous military

conditioning in the treacherously dense mountain jungles of

the Sierra Madre in Guatemala, k112

That month, one of the men,

Carlos (Carlyle) Rodriguez Santana, was killed in training. k

In his honor, the members of the unit decided they would name

the Brigade after his serial designation, 2506. 1914

(238) A1though Manuel Artine, through his MAR organization

transplanted in Miami, was the principal recruiting apparatus

for Brigade personnel, chosen as military leader of the Brigade.

was Jose ("Pepe") Perez San Roman, a graduate. of Cuba's military

academy who had also undergone United States army officer..

training at fort Benning, Georgia, 1,15

He had been freed by

Castro from a Batista prison, then

later re-imprisoned by

Castro before escaping from Cuba, 15/6

(239) revertheless, it was artine who

remained the key figure

in the U.S. Government's relationship with the activist exiles

Classification: -

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Classification: -

Brigade 2506,

etc.

Page 4.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

and the Brigade. When,

as the Cuban exile population in Miami

grew and the political squabbling among anti-Castro factions

spread to Guatemala and sparked a camp mutiny that almost

stopped the training, it was Artime the CIA called upon to

help resolve the problem.

Artime had been jade a director of

the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD)

Lorganization

de political

several

formed

and propaganda

namespanti-Castro groups

7 17 May, 1960.3819

The Brigade was to be its military

2920

arm.

led

Bits dissolution

its

Solition sightine aton the groups eventually

creaton

a-broader-

based organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC),

before the Bay of Pigs invasion:

Artime was made a director

of that, also.pdd

23

(240) The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April, 1961.

More than 1200 Brigade members were taken prisoner by Castro.

24

Before they were released in December, 1962,

in an exchange

for $53 million in medical supplies,

the members of the

Brigade suffered not only the ignomy of defeat and the humilia-

tion of capture by Castro, they also were subject to the agony

of false hope when, within a few months of their imprisonment,

they saw Castro's offer to exchange them for 500 tractors

become inextricably bogged in the muck of partisan United States

politics.

As one historian noted: "The prisoners

suffered more

from

domestic politics than they did at the hands of Castro....

Classificarion: -

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Brigade

Page 5.

Classification: -

2506,

etc.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Had the political climate in the United States been less

inflammatory, it is not at all unlikely that Brigade 2506

could have been released in June of 1961 for $28 million

• In

tractors, cash and credits. Instead of freedom through

tractors, however, the men were doomed to the degradation of a

year and a half longer in prison. "1,26

(241))

•The final formation of Brigade 2506 took place at the

Orange Bowl stadium in Miami on December 29, 1962. President

Kennedy was there to welcome back the surviving members who

had spent almost 20 months in Castro's prisons 2g27

The crowd

of 40,000 friends, families and relatives cheered in tearful

joy as Brigade chief Pepe San Roman

presented Kennedy with the

Brigade flag which had flown over the Bay of Pigs beach for

three days 2728

The President accepted the flag and declared:

"I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this

Brigade in a free Havana!" Mrs. Kennedy spoke in Spanish

and called the Brigade members "the bravest men in the world."

It was a dramatic and emotional scene but it may have been a

misleading.gobf Although the event/publicly reflected a

concordant rapport between the President

and the Brigade,

beneath the surface there ran a vein of bitter resentment

among those who felt the event was a display of political

hypocracy. E. Howard Hunt, once bias

Classification:.

assigned liaison duties

11?9

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Classification: -

Brigade 2506,

etc.

Page

6

(This form is to be used for material extrected

from ClA-controlled documents.)

with the Brigade, (later claimed that the Brigade feeling

against

Kennedy was so great that the presentation of the flag nearly

did not take place 3930

(248) Nevertheless, it is difficult to finalize an assessment

of the Brigade's collective attitude toward the U. S. Government

and the Kennedy administration following the Orange Bowl event.

Kennedy's resolution to the Cuban missle crisis, in which he

promised Castro that raids against Cuba from the u. S. mainland

would be halted, was considered an act of betrayal to their

cause by many

of the exiles in the anti-Castro communities.

Yet

most of the members of the Brigade seemed to maintain a basic

confidence in the U.S. Government's resolve to topple the Castro

regime, and, in fact, nearly half of them enlisted in the u.s.

armed forces through a special arrangement made by President

3831

Kennedy himself.

(243) Although Brigade 2506 officially ceased to exist after.

December, 19629232

Manuel artime, luno had become known as the

CIa's "golden boy 033

was soon scouting around Latin America

for sites on which

to establish guerilla training camps. By

October, 1963, he had established four bases, two in Costa

Rica and two in Nicaragua.

Artime's

300-man force consisted

mainly of veterans of the Brigade.

а та

• j

Classification:.

Classified by derivation:.

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Classification: -

Brigade 2506, etc.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Artime would later admit that his

resources included two large ships, eight small vessels, two

speed boats, three planes, and more than 200 tons of weapons

and armaments and about $250,000 in electronic equipment arse

During the year of his operation, Artime was

able to conduct

four major operations, three of which failed: One was the

mistaken shelling of a Spanish cargo ship (which caused an

international uproar); another an infiltration mission in which

all the participants were captured;

the third an unsuccessful

37 305

assassination attempt on Castzo.

3825287

mission did succeed.

(244) 42 though Artimed

received CIA SUpport,

there re-

mained the question of whether President Kennedy was knowledge-

able of or approved Artime's anti-Castro operations after the

Cuban missila crisis. Following the assassination of both

John I. Kennedy and Robert I. Kennedy, Artime/publicls said

that both the

president and his brother were responsible for

his establishing the Latin American

He said that

after his return from prison in Cuba,

he met President Kennedy

in West Palm Beach, Florida, and that Kennedy referred him to

40-4083

his brother.

Artime said he met Robert Kennedy in Washington

and that the then-Attorney General promised him military aid

41 v40

if he, Artime, could get the bases.

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245) Artine claimed that his anti-castro operations from the

bases ceased "when Bobby Kennedy separated from the Johnson

42 eat Nevate 0 44

administration.

However, in December of 1964, the Costa

Rican police ordered the camps shut down when it uncovered a

$50,000 contraband whiskey operation involving a plane from

Artime's group. The camps in Nicaragua were also closed, al-

though Artime kept close personal ties to that country by

becoming a beef broker for Nicaraguan President General Anastasio

43

Somoza, the country's largest beef producer.

246) when Artime was first contacted by the Conmittee he stated

that he had had direct contact with both President Kennedy and

Robert Kennedy and, through them, was given full support by

the CIA for his anti-Castro operations. He said he felt the

death of President Kennedy marked the end of the U. S. Govern-

44

ment's attemots to liberate Cuba.

He agreed to be interviewed

in depth by the Committee

451e2 before that was possible, he

died of cancer at the age of 45 after a very brief illness:

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11/14/78

Betsy

Palmer This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (MIC)

(247)

After Castro's assumption of power in 1959, it became

evident to many Cubans that political parties were being

surpressed and the 26th of July Movement was

being infil-

trated by Communists. This political atmosphere gave rise

to the creation of underground organizations such as the

Christian Democratic Movement of Cuba (MDC). I

Proclaining

the doctrine of Christianity as its foundation, the MDC

published a manifesto in March, 1960? denouncing Communism

and strongly advocating the free enterprise system.?

One

of the founders of the MDC, 35-year-old law professor,

DI. Jose Ignacio Rasco, was elected head of the organization

and immediately criticized the violence prevalant in the

Castro regime." This public criticism produced pressure on

• 6-

him to leave Cuba and he arrived in Miani on April 22, 1960.

By June, Rasco had allied himself and the MDC with the Frente

Revolucionario Democratico (FRD)? and thus became one of the

five original exile Cuban leaders brought together by the

State germandsthere to form the nucleus of a Cuban.

government-in-exile.®

(248) After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the MDe split into factions

Rasco remained head of the largest faction and organized

delegations in Miami, New York, Chicago, Venezuela and Cuba. 10

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The clandestife Garsoholese anglin Cuba was lead by Berin

foregoing Cuban

Eernandez-Badue who used the alias "lucas". Il when Herrandez

arrived in the U.S. in October, 1961, he presented his

credentials to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, (CRC) ,

claiming he was the representative of the MDC movement in

Cuba. -2 Council president, Dr. Miro Cardona, accepted him

into the CRC hierarchy. 13 The "Iucas" faction remained with

the Cuban

the Council but its role was ineffectual because Hersandez

eventually failed to hold the group together. 14

(249) The "Pasco" Faction Of MDC had as its Military Chief an

independently wealthy young Cuban, Laureano Batista Falla.15

Free-spirited and under no financial pressures, Batista Falla

organized and partially financed the infiltration attempts

of the MDC. 16

It was one of'the most active and effective

underground groups in Cuba during

the early 1960's.17

250) at that time, most underground groups worked together,

sharing supplies and information.

1= eldes, the repressive

measures of the Castro regime after the April 1961 invasion

caused members of the Cuban underground to live in fear of

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$319

discovery and made inter-group liaison extremely risky.

Despite the inherent dangers, the underground movements

of

the MDC and Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP)

worked jointly for an all-out sabotage effort in the fall

Z€ 20

of 1961.

(251) The "Batista" faction of the MDC (so named after the

youthful military chief rose to the position of president

in 1962/252

entered into similar cooperative alliances with

other exile groups for the purposes of propaganda, sabotage

and supplying the Cuban underground. Many MDC members joined

the Cuba Committee in 1962 which was formed to counteract

the propaganda of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-

Castro organization in the U.s3e22

The MDC and the Directorio

Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) worked together to formulate

plans for an underground organization to infiltrate Oriente

82723

Province.

The active operations betveen the MDC and other

anti-Castro groups peaked in the year 1963. One involved

the MDC, the Movimento Insurrecconial de Recupueracion

Revolutionaria (MIRR) and the Movimento Recuperacion

Revolutionaria (MRR). In April, Frank Sturgis, Miami-based.

soldier of fortune, supplied information that Batista Falla,

Orlando Bosch Avila, Manuel Artime and Alexander Rorke were

2824

jointly planning an air strike over Havana on April 25.

According to Sturgis, the strike was to originate from an

alIstrip in Classification:

and the target was a sugar refinery.

The bombs were homemade, assembled by Batista.

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anne manormer the old taide) had taken place as scheduled,

publicly that

#727

which took the other planners by surprise.

Sturgis claimed

the strike was still in the planning stage and financial

backing had not been completed.

This incident created a

stir and resulted in an intensive FBI investigation of Rorka's

3329

allegation.

Since Radio Havana, contrary to usual policy,

330

made no innediate protest over the bombing,

the FBI concluded

3531

that Rorke's story was probably untrue

and, according to

86 32

Sturgis, merely a publicity stunt.

(252) In early June, 1963, the MDC made a unity pact with

Commandos I in which the latter group was to provide training

and assistance in military intelligence and the MC to provide

=33

three small boats and a team of men to infiltrate Cuba.

MDC also made a pact with Dr: Carlos Prio Socarras, former

President of Cuba who donated $50,000 to the group for military

89-34

aid in return for its promise of political support.

3935

(253) Richard Rudolph Davis, a cuban alien,

had a preipheral

association with the MDC through his contact with Batista Falla.

in the summer of 1963. This association was noted in Book V,

Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study GoveIn-

#336

mental Operations.

(254) Davis was residing in New Orleans and, although not an

MDC member, claimed to have once been a "coordinator" for the

group and

the New York Police Department.

He was a friend

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of Batista

Fala can ente men because, he said, Batista

cotected

Falla was in a position to recommend men in the Miami area

1238

who needed

work.

Davis claimed he could provide employment

for a small group of Cuban emigres. He said he had entered

into a business deal with geologist David I. Raggio and

a wealthy, right-wing New Orleanian, Gus de LaBarre, forming

4939

the Guatemalan Lumber and Mineral Corporation.

It was their

intention to train the Cubans on some land in Lacombe, Louisiana

to which De LaBarre had access through his nephew, Frank

4 40

de LaBarre.

After a necessary

training period, the group

was to be sent to Guatemala to cut mahogany trees, he clained.

(255) A gIOUp of about 18 Cubans did arrive in New Orleans in

the summer of 1963. Leading them was a well-known Cuban

4 41

exile, Victor Paneque

who used the military code name of

4842

"Commadante Diego".

Paneque was closely associated with

43

Davis

Batista Falla in the military activities of the MDc.

(later ladmitted/ to the FBI that the men had arrived dressed

1844

in khakis

and thought that they were to receive military

$945

training.

(256) In the latter part of July, 1963, the FBI conducted a

raid on

property near that of the "lumber company" training

camp.

Bureau seized a cache of dynamite and other ex-

= 46

plosives.

This raid, according to Davis, unnerved his

€747

trainees, and they elected to return to Miami.

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(257) A somew isend dearion)of this episode comes

from Gus de LaBarre's nephev and attorney, Frank de LaBarre,

who first related his story in 1966 to his former law school

5*48

classmate, Jin Garrison.

258) De LaBarre said his "Uncle Gus" had introduced him to

Davis, whom De LaBarre described as a "floater." They came so

see De LaBarre about drawing up articles of incorporation

for the Guatemalan Lumber Company and that is when he says

he learned of their plans to bring unemployed Cubans from

Miami to train as lumberjacks. Uncle Gus sent provisions to

the exiles on a daily basis and solicited money for food and

93,49

clothing from friends and relatives.

259) Although he suspected that military training was being

conducted at the camp, Frank' de Labarre said he didn't pay

much attention to the

activities of the group. however, When

he heard on his car radio that the FBI had seized a cache of.

ammunition at a house in Lacombe, he immediately called his

uncle. Although receiving assurances that the lumoer group

was not involved, De LaBarre called the officers of the

corporation together and insisted that the Cubans be taken

out of there. Davis Norer told him that the Cubans dia.

not want to leave, whereupon De LaBarre said he had to do

some real "brainstorming." He rented a Hertz ton-and-a-half

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truck and

instauddedcavled courtake it to the cump ind iell

the cubans "that the invasion'is on." Davis complied, and

the Cubans loaded their gear, jumped in the truck and were

brought to

the Greyhound bus terminal in New Orleans.

Each

was given

a one-way ticket to Miami plus a small amount of

cash and told they would get their orders when they reached

Miami. Looking as though ready for war, with knapsacks and

guns bulging from under their clothes, they boarded the bus.

That was the last, De LaBarre said, he saw of them.

(260) The last he heard of Davis, he said, was in 1964 when

one of De LaBarre's friends reported he had gone into businese

with davis and was left with a lot of bills. 550

2o1) other than providing the manpover for the training camp.

Batista Falla was not involved in this episode or was the

MDC as an organization.

(262) concurrent with his involvement with leaders of other

exile organizations, Batista Falla was dealing with foreign

governments in an effort to gain support for his faction of

the MDC. After the World Congress of Christian Democrats in

officials

strasburg, france, two wasternitiatsotine thista

"Denerates tart" conferred with the MDC in Miami.

According

to one of the officials, the west Germans after months of

study, had decided to help finance the MDC, not because they

were

particularly fond of them, but felt once Cuba was liberated

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the Cubans would have a moral superiority over the rest of

56,52

Latin America.

Nicaraguan

(263) Another offer of help came from Intsasomoza formen

Exest fial vicaragus, who provided the MDC a base for

A Venezuelan official

operations in that country.

5351: venezustan President Ronulo

Betancourt, allegedly also offered to make a base available

5854

for the MDC and provide it with personnel and supplies.

Recognizing that these Latin American bases of operation

were important to the MDC, Batista Falla nonetheless pre-

ferred to work out of the Miami área. Its proximity to

Cuba, good facilities for operating boats and the availability

of a large number of Cubans to serve as machanics and do other

necessary labor made Miami more desirable than the Latin

American facilities Fus

The major drawback in Miami was the

presence of U.S. government officials determined to strictly

enforce the Neutrality Act and other Federal statutes.

(264) U.s. Custons raided MDC headquarters in Miami on

April 21, 1964 and confiscated a large cache of arms and

anmunition. indeterred, the MDC simply relocated the

military section in separate headquarters, continued to store

materials for infiltration and attack missions against Cuba'

and conducted study courses in military training and theory.

In July, Batista Falla and Victor Paneque infiltrated men

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and equipment into Cuba. to form a nucleus of guerrilla bands.

who, once they got adequate arms and ammunition, planned to

go into the mountains of Cuba. E$59

(265) The MDC eventually suffered the fate of other anti-castic

organizations -- finding it increasingly difficult to finance

infiltration and sabotage missions, and experiencing in-

creased surveillance by U.S. authorities determined to limit

their activities.

The organization's activities gradually

declined, Batista Falla eventually gave up his anti-Castro

astivities, moved to Washington, 'D. C. and received a doctoral.

degree in political sciencs da 60

In the spring of 1970, he

moved to Venezuela.

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Betsy. P

"ner

Classification: -

JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANA (JURE)

(This form is to be used for material extracted

266) In a Miami press

m2 press Intervie nt. July 23, 1962, Manuel Ray

Rivero announced the formation of JURE, an anti-Castro Cuban

exile group designed to unite all the popular splintered

factions outside Cuba into an effective working organization.!

Other key leaders involved in the new organization included

-= =

Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Barquin and

Justo Carrillo.? Although Ray felt the Cuban Revolutionary

Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive

financial assistance from it until Jure gained momentum. 3

267) As its opening promotional salvo, JuRE issued

"Declaration of Principles.". It called for free elections,

the restoration of human rights and social justice, new

economic development progians and agrarian reform, breaking

relations with the Soviet bloc, restoration of legitimate

property, proscription of the Communist Party and release of :

political prisoners.

268) Ray's group was considered an "autonomous" anti-Castro

Cuban gIoup by the CIA.5. The concept of autonomous operation:

was conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel. 6

Rostow proposed a "track two" approach to Cuban operations so

parallel regular CIA-controlled Cuban teans.?

This approach

would enable

• financial aid, advice, and

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JURE DE=

Page

2

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quidance to indepertierentelled decontrolled Cuban leaders such

as Ray. 8

Autonomous operations were approved

9

in June, 1963.

(269) The Rules of snament» under which the operations

functioned set forth the following guidelines:

Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban

nationals dedicated to the idea that the overtheow

• of the Castro/Cormunist regime must be accomplished

by Cubans inside and outside Cuba working in concert.

2..

If the effort to overthrow the Cuban regire became

too costly. in human lives, the U.S. would withdraw

•financial support and would not consider resumption

3.

at any future date:

All operations had to be mounted outside the territory

of the United States..

4. If ever charged with complicity, the U.s. government

would publicly deny any participation in the group's.

activities.

5.

presence and direct participation would be

kept at an absolute minimun.

An experienced

liaison officer would be assigned to each group to

provide general advice, funds and material support.

6. No fixed time schedule would be given to these

operations. 10

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270) Possibly Masaise info tassetoßselterdrantused control over

JURE,

had the day led deededivities of the group were

closely monitoredo!

DI. A JURE member, t

for instance;

"not for ther

was in frequent contact with an individual identified s

and supplied him with a variety of confidential

information about JURE wa

m this source provided

Hole denformation

Ray's meeting withfRobert f. Kennedy in September 1963;11

Ray's negotiations on behalf of JURE: 12

secret JURE

meetings; 13 allegations that the Governor of Puerto Rico was

purposely sidetracking an FBI and INS investigation of illegaj.

arms possessed by JURE; 4 JURE animosity toward Manuel Artine

and the MRR; 15

and the location of JURE training bases. 16

27)) Manuel Ray hinself was personally critical of the CIA

and töld one JURE associate that he thought CIAagents"

more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration."

He maintained

that, "The Kennedy Administration would end but CIA agents

always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of

elephants and they never forgot or forgave. " 17

(272) During a JuRE meeting in Miami in August, 1962, Ray

claimed that JURE had arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican

Republic; a B-26 airplane, territory available for training

in Costa Rica; and support through indirect means from the

United States.

•18 According to an FBI report, JURE vas

considered oneclassification:

major exile groups with clandestine

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JURE

Page

Draft

4

(This form is to be used for material extracted

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19

assets

and the CIA was interested in the group because of

its potential for infiltration into Cuba. 20.

(273) Because of its size and Ray's dynanic leadership, JuRE

seemed destined for a role of some importance in the anti-

Castro movement.

21The group set a target date of October 31,

1962 to raise $100,000. The money would be used to recruit

new members, begin a propaganda campaign against Castro and

purchase arms and supplies. 22 Within a year, JURE had

membership delegations in 12 cities in the United States, a

chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delegations in foreign countries:

23

mostly Latin American.

(274)In August, 1963, JURE planned to sabotage a powér plane

24

in Havana

and Ray requested that

certain

cached

high explosives and grenades inside cuba or san Juan? It was

JURE

reconmended the

1250

regales tus peat ted an order to test Ray's

capabilities.

260

Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration

and exfiltration purposes and expressed a desire to purchase

another vessel which would enable him

to extend operations

along the south coast of Cuba, 25g 28

(275) Plans were made

which

world

GURE

to deliver military equipment to

then

be tr

ANS DELICI

3 which would they

€ 2013

as into Cuba, 19829

The operation, originally

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page

5

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30

25e

scheduled for November 23, 1963, was moved up two days.

- The

eache

was

›, completed

25£3

The JURE boat failed to make

25g 32

the scheduled pick up

and Ray offered no satisfactory

25k33

explanation for this failure to perform.

Ray claimed the

vessel was low

254,34

on

25

the

gas

vesse

arrived

which was a Epubtful explanatio hedule.

destination.

25j 3.9

276) Ray was not physically scheduled to be on the boat during the!

25136

operation

his activities during the latter part of

1963 being political in nature. He was, at this time, con-

38

25137

erring with Pabarton, Kenned

about the Cuban situation

and traveling extensively in Latin America seeking support for.

25039

JURE.

277) No documentation has been found to substantiate the success

-or failure of any of the JURE raids or infiltrations during

this period, but by January, 1964, the organization had gained.

enough strength to induce several other Cuban exile organizations

8640

to merge with it.

The largest of these groups were the

87.41

Ejercito Libertador de Cuba (ELC) and Cuba Libre.

The ELC'S

union: with JURE brought to the organization former veteran

rebel army officers in exile and had the potential of giving

JURE the best military expertise and support in the entire

2842

exile comunity classification: -

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Page 6

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278) 025105 Zarraga of Cuba libre became the Just chief of

and was responsible for acquiring most of the JURE

arms and the large supply of explosives which were stored in

Miami and Puerto Rico.

3044

€79) Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to infiltrate

3745

Cuba in March 1964.

He planned to accompany two teams of

commandos into Oriente Province and, once successfully inside

cuba, inietate continous borings of strategie and nose

strategic targets.

Ray's plans, however, were delayed and

a new taiget date of May. was set.

(280) Ray's seriousness of purpose was open to question at the

•time because he pemitted persons from the media on his infil-

tration attempt.

Andrew St. George,

344807 assignnent with Time-tirE

magazine, planned to accompany Ray,

4955

as did Tom Duncan, then a

LIFE photographer.

Rogelio Cisneros received word on

May 30, 1964 that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators

3650

had developed motor trouble..

Ray's group was arrested by the

$751

British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau.

(281) Ray's failure to infiltrate cuba severely damaged his

credibility within the anti-Castro community. Some exiles

felt his grand infiltration scheme was a publicity stunt and

3852

others considered it a joke.

JURE members were confused

39.53

and undecided over how to defend Ray.

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DrE

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(282) Another episode in May

from ClA-

-controlled documents.

carpounded stRE's problems.

Rogelio Cisneros had obligated $50, 000 of JURE money to an

El Monte, California, arms manufacturing company for weapons

4054

to be shipped to Florida.

The Revenue division of the -

cousidered

Ireasury Department,

mang a raid on the arms company.

and chucked wants

other governnent outkoutes

oct.

283) at this point, there began a general ouncestation of

5613572 .

JURE membership.

Rogelio Cisneros M

August 09, 1964 that he was

resigning from the organization.

He contended Ray was incapable of directing both political ana

57 1458

military activities.

Then another key leader, Carlos

45593

zarraga, resigned in September.

(284) JuRs ree

received.

$75,000

during the period

inteuded

of October Ist to December, 31st, 1964°, The money was

undermate JURE!!

relocation of

activities outside

the United States:

40: 603

Ray's liaison

officer noted at the time: "If Ray is successful in Cuba he

will not need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much

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JURE DIa+

Page

Classification:

90od. He is honestorand tbalenstidheaodestited be largely

from CIA - controlled documents.)

spent for the purpose he wants to achieve. Whatever Ray may

ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated.

We

have played the game in a manner beyond reproach. " 18i6ls

{85) JURE continued in existence until August, 1968

406₴

but

was relatively ineffective in its latter years.

Vialien, Lie

20191

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DRAF

Balmer

tion

DIRECIORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE)

(286) The Directorio Revolucionario Estudtantil (DRE)'

was the outgrowth of an activist student

group in Cuba which originally fought against Batista.

2

In the late spring of 1960, 3 three DRE leaders,

escaped from Cuba 4

and arrived in Miami. s

They

immediately offered their services to the Democratic Revolutionary

Front (FRD) with the intent of organizing an anti-Communist

student organization within this group.o rites, it later

was decided that the DRE would be an "affiliate", but not a

7

member of the Frente.

The leaders of the DRE were kept on a

LU.S. Government,,

regular monthly retainer by the sis/as were all members engaged

in training for paramilitary operations and propaganda dis-

semination.& They wertalso supplied the group with weapons and

annunition on occasion.?

287) the first

DRE infiltration team landed in

=

Cuba in November, 1960;

with the objective of organizing

anti-Castro student propaganda and conducting general harrassment

operations.

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288) By April, 1961, =

a 400 guerillas13

were operating

effectively from the Sierra Maestra mountains. I4 Mule,

Iwere.

failure to

a 74 men captureats concur euly with a

receive

i air-dropped supplies.16 This.

capture was a severe set back for the DRE underground prior

co the Bay of Pigs.17

(289) lOne

leader

was also arrested in April, 1961, but his true

identity was unknown to the authorities and he was released

following an interrogation!

Escaping again to Miami, he made

three daring attempts to re-infiltrate Cuba in 1961. Although

he failed, his exploits reportedly made him an underground hero

to the students in Cuba.

19

290) BRE ChieS Of MilItary Operations M

# 20 also

infiltrated into Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and

told the Committee that the Cuban underground felt it had the

total backing of the

however,

United States. 2

leader testified

that

by March, 1961,/ avie

the undergroundgrealized the invasion would be a failure,

because the CIR/had failed to perfoz even before the Invasion. 22

"It never got us the supplies it promised

and never did the

things it was supposed to do," he claimed, alAndey was aiso

upset about Agency performance and once wrote to friends

threatening to kill CIA personnel if anything ever happened to

2001121

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an ineliuravel

24

Mer

Hersas a result of Agency bumbling.

told Lne Committee,

i result of agency bunbling ?" The DEE Chief of Military

Operations he thought the invasion was designed to fail and that

it was only conceived to relieve the pressure building in the

anti-Castro exile community.

(291) Although tim

DRE members had a deep-

lying opposition to U.S. plans and policies,

26 the continued terrile

"Wenfart

accept US. funding, continued despite ensluation of the group as at =7

CIA Liezd quarters receired... a

report

that the

oracles,"

top officials of the DRE had escablished.

a position for themselvest

acquire

because of their

ability to glean money from

$728

the US, Government. This support s

the DRE to

play an inordinately influential role in the exile community.

DRE Chief f

Military operations,

a according to benja, by July, 1962, the DRE had taken to

= soliciting support for proposed propa-

ganda operations but actually using the funding for military

#9 30

operations.

the

292) For instance, in gael September, 1962,

DRE official

sere said he

Lanother

received a call from tires notifying him of an impending majos

military operation:

3128l The told him the DRE had all the

weapons, ammunition and support it needed. & sa

The raid turned

out to be the attack on the Blanquita Theater in Havana, which

received a great deal of publicity a 33

Castro even raged about

3334.

it, claiming it was an attempt on his life by the CIA.

official

fact, according topia, the raiders did not know that Castro

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was scheduled

to be at the theater the night of the shelling.

3435

In any event,'there was

a tremendous 'uproar when

the raiders

returned to the U.S. The DRy leaders were called to Washington

V.S. Gor officials includin,

to confront, U.s. Attorney General, Roberty Kennedy and CIA

Operations Chief, Richard Helms, who both told then they were

doing a great job but wasting their time in such independent

880 37

actions.

(293) As a result of the Blanquita raid publicity, the DRE was

subsequently able to raise about $200,000 in private funds.

That enabled the group to establish an operating base on Catalina

Island near the south coast of the Dominican Republic

from which

it hoped to make a major strike against Cuba.

38 So Nevertle

'after

39 00

the October, 1962, missle crisis,

the Dominican Republic

government informed the DRE leaders that the U.S. was putting

great pressure on it to shut down the DRE operations and it

therefore could no longer permit the

group to operate out of its

country 294)

Thus, the DRE was, of all the anti-Castro groups,

one of the most bitter towards President Kennedy for his "deal"

400 41

with the Russians.

In a letter zer

= dated February 21,

1963 and addressed simply to "Sirs," the DRE said it was grate-

ful

for the initial support of the u.s. but could no longer

operate under restrictions of U.S. policy. The DRE demanded

that the U.s. government, "

... understand that the Cubans cannot

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continue waiting for the international policies, because those

dying of hunger are Cubans, because it is our country that

bodily suffers slavery, because it is our blood that runs in

Cuba. * 8242

(295) Despite such strong sentiment, the DRe continued to accept

support =

although is

been urged

its more militant nembers/to join Manuel Artime's Movimiento

$@ 43

de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) forces,

82344

Whether or not this

suggestion was ever taken by any DRE members is not documented,

but the top leaders remained a homogeneous group

and, Government.

were soliciting additional financial support outside there.

They were successful in receiving some funds from the Bacardi

4845

Run family in Miami.

LU.S. Gorernments

296) Although the DRe continued its relationship with they sa

until the end of 1966,

the group's activities, like those of

other anti-Castro organizations, declined in intensity and

effectiveness.

(297) Because the DRe was a very militant "action" group, the

Committee was especially interested in DRE operations prior to

the assassination of fresida kennedy on November 22, 1963.

(293) as noted, one of the effects of the Blanquisa rajd in

September, 1962, was to garner the DRE a blast of national

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publicity, which, in turn, gave the leaders of the group the

opportunity to solicit additional funding from wealthy indi-

4847.

viduals who were sympathetic to their anti-Castro cause.

Among those who wound up supporting the DRE was Miami multi-

millionaire William Pawley, a strong right-wing conservative,

friend

former owner of the Havana bus system

$$ 48

former CIA director Allen Dulles.

Another supporter the

DRE got was a friend of Pawley's, former Ambassador to Italy

48 49

Clare Boothe Luce,

then the wife of Time-life publishing

empire boss Henry Luce and a later Nixon appointee to the Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board.

(299) In its review of DRE activities, the Conmittee took special

interest in a relatively recent series of events involving Clare

Boothe

Luce. In October, 1975, Luce was being interviewed by

Vera Glaser, a reporter and columnist for the knight chain of

newspapers, when she told Glaser of an alleged incident involving

8950

members of the DRE and Lee Harvey Oswald.

At the time,

Senator Richard Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart were in the

midst of their subcommittee investigation of the Kennedy

assassination as part of the Senate Select Committee inquiry

into intelligence activity.

(300) According to Glaser's report of the interview, this is

basically what luce told her:

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Page 7

301) Ince said that after the

failure of the Bay of Pigs

invasion, her friend, William Pawley, persuaded her to help

sponsor a fleet of motor boats for a group of anti-Castro

Cubans who, Pawley

envisioned, would be Cuban "Flying Tigers,"

shooting in and out of Cuba on intelligence-gathering missions.

Pawley had helped start General Claire Chennault's original

Flying Tigers in World War II. Luce said she

agreed to sponsor

one boat and its three-man crew. She said she met with this

Cuban boat crew about three times in New York and, in 1962,

8051

published a story about them in LIFE magazine.

(352) Following the missle crisis in October, 1962, Iude said

that the Kennedy administration clamped down on exile activities

against Cuba and the Pawley-sponsored boat raids were dis-

continued. Luce said she never saw her "young Cubans," as she

8052

called them, again.

(303) Then, on the night of Kennedy's assassination, uce said

she received a call from New Orleans from one of the boat crew

Cubans. Luce told Glaser she would call him "Julio Fernandez".

She said the Cuban told her he called because he wanted to tell

her about some information he had concerning

the President's

sg 53

killer, Lee Harvey Oswald.

304) Iuce told Glaser that, according to "Julio Fernandez,"

Öswald had approached the anti-Castro group to which Fernandez

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belonged and offered his services as a potential Castro assassin.

The Cubans, however, didn't trust Oswald, suspected he was really

a Communist, and decided to keep tabs on him. They eventually

penetrated Oswald's Communist "cell" and tape recorded his talks,

including his bragging that he could shoot anyone, even

the

56 54

Secretary of the Navy.

305) Then suddenly, luce said fernandez told her, oswald came into

some money, went to Mexico City and finally to Dallas. Luce said

Fernandez told her he still had the tape recordings of Oswald, as

well as photographs of Oswald and samples of handbiils Oswald had

distributed on the streets of New Orleans. Fernandez, she said,

5055.

asked her what he should do.

(306) Iuce said she advised him to contact the FBI immediately, she

then told Glaser that she did not think about the story again

until the Garrison investigation hit the headlines in 1967. Luce

said she then contacted the Cuban who had called her. He told

her his group had followed her instructions

and turned their

material over to the FBI. But, he said, they

were advised to "keep

their mouths shut" until further contact. Further contact was

$556

never made, he said.

307) luce said that Fernandez ther told her that one of the membess

of his group had since been suddenly deported and that another had

been murdered. He himself, he said, wanted nothing further to do

5$57

with the Kennedy assassination.

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(3o8)/hiter luce told her this story, veza Glazer imediately vient

to Senator Schweiker and told him about the alleged Oswald

5758

encounter.

Intrigued, Schweiker contacted Luce directly

and asked her for information about the Cuban who had called

8859

her. As a result, Schweiker sent a staff investigator in

search of "Julio Fernandez". No such individual was ever found.

309) During the coursa of lts own investigation into the luce

allegations, the Committee reviewed the 1977 CIA Task Force

Report, which dealt with the newspaper reports of the incident.

According to the Task Force Report, Luce called then CIA Director

William Colby on October 25, 1975 and told him that Schweiker

had called her to ask her for details about the allegations.

She said she had given Schweiker the name of Justin McCarthy

who, along with Pawley, had initially aroused her interest in

helping the anti-Castro Cubans.

Nevertheless.

she saide she did

not tell Schweiker how to locate him.

Ea 62

(10) Lue told Colby that after she talkad to schweikes, she had

contacted McCarthy. He told her that he doubted that anything

would come of a Congressional probe and

suggested instead that

she contact Colby. Luce then told Colby that McCarthy gave

her the names of three Cubans with whom he had

been associated

in DRE activities. They were: Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jöse

Antonio Lanusa and someone

he remembered only by his code name,

"Chilo".

600 63

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(31l) According to the 1977 Task Force Report, as a result of

Luce's call to him, Colby contacted Justin McCarthy and

attempted to persuade him to call Senator Schweiker and provide

him with any information or evidence he might have. McCarthy

said he didn't want to get involved because there were too

many "political opportunists" in Washington. €64

317) with this background of information, the Committee decided

to conduct its own investigation into the Luce allegations.

313) luce told the committee basically the same story given to

Vera Glazer! uce was specifically asked if she was certain

the late night call on November 22, 1963 came from New Orleans.

She was definite in her answer that it dia.

The Warren Report

account of the Bringuier/Oswald association was outlined for

her.

She responded that it sounded much the same as the type

activity in which her "boys" were engaged. Luce also told the

Committee she did not recognize the name Jose Antonio Lanusa,

mentioned in her conversation with Colby in 1975.898 66

(314) amittally, The Committee located in Miami three anti-Castro

Cubans who were among the leaders of the DRE in 1963. One of

them, Juan Manuel Salvat Rogue, was a founder of the group.

was interviewed by Committee investigators on February 7, 1978.

Although Salvat did not recall Luce's involvement with the

DRE, he said he "heard" William Pawley had provided the group

868

some support.

Classificaton: as far as he remembers, the group

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never received a large amount of money from any single

individual, but received small contributions from a great

869

many people.

He said that, according to his knowledge,

Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate of the DRE, was the

only member of the group who ever had any contact with Oswald.&

(Committee records indicate that Carlos Bringuier be

came the New Orleans delegate to the DRE in the summer

of 1962.8871

As detailed elsewhere in the Committee's

Report, Bringuier and Oswald had a confrontation on

Canal Street in New Orleans in August, 1963, when

Oswald was distributing "Fair Play for Cuba" leaflets.

Both Bringuier and Oswald were arrested, but were later

Further,

PriOrp

brought together to engage in a radio debate.

previously

howevero Bringuier had arranged for a friend of his,

Carlos Quiroga, to approach Oswald and talk to him

on the pretense of being interested in pro-Castro

79.73

activities.,

315)

Isidro "Chilo" Borja, another leader of the DRE, was inter-

viewed by the committee on February 21, 19787773

Borja said he

knew luca was supportive of the DRE but said he did not know

the extent of her financial involvement.7

He also recalled

Bringuier's contact with Oswald and the fact that the DRE

relayed that information

to the CIA at the time.

Borja said

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his responsibilities with the DRE involved only military

operations

77

and he suggested that jose Antonio Lanusa, who

handled press and public relations for the group, knew Luce

and had been in contact with her. 7>8

(311)

Jose Antonio Lanusa was interviewed by the Committee on

April 22, 1978. Lanusa said that on November 22, 1963, he and

a small gIoUp of DRE members were at a Miami Beach hotel when

they heard the news of the assassination of the President. $ 79

When Oswald's name was broadcast, Lanusa recalled the name as

that of someone who had had something to

do with one of the DrE

delegates, so Lanusa and those who were with him went to the

Miami DRE office to search the files to determine if Lanusa's

suspicion was right. *80

By late afternoon, they

had found

delegate Bringuier's report from New Orleans detailing his

encounter with Oswald. Along with it was a sample Fair Play

for Cuba (FPCC) leaflet and a tape recording of the radio

debate. JAwith thia discovery, someones meately called.

contact

" told them not to do anything

or contact anyone else

for

at least an hour. He said he needed that time to contact

82

Washington

headquarters for instructions.

79

Nevertheles

Herever, Lanusa

said, he was so anxious to release the information that Oswald

was associated with a pro-Castro group that he contacted the

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3|1 When the CIA da

we called back, he told them the

FBI would contact the group. The next day, Lanusa said, Miami

FBI agent James J. O'Conner showed up at DRE headguarters. He

was given Bringuier's report, the FPCC leaflet and the tape

recording of the radio debate. Lanusa said O'Conner told

them they would get a receipt for the material but, Lanusa

said, they never did. Neither, he said, was the material

8184

ever returned.

318) Ianusa also told the Committee that soon after the DRE

shelling of the Blanguita Hotel in 1962, he was introduced to

Clare Boothe Luce by Justin McCarthy, whom Lanusa said was the 85

DRE's public relations contact with the New York major media.

Lanusa said Luce told them she wanted to publish the Blanquita

raid story in LIFE magazine and that she would give the DRE

the $600 she would receive from the magazine as payment for

As far as he knows, Lanusa said, that was the

8487

only contact any member of the DRE ever had with Luce.

also said he strongly doubted Luce or William Pawley ever paid

for motor boats for the DRE because, he said, he knew how all

of the boats were acquired. Lanusa said he had no knowledge of

9588

any DRE member having been deported or murdered.

Lanusa said,

"I think Clare Boothe Luce shoots from the hip without having

her brain engaged. * 8689

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319) In investigating her allegations, the Cormittee considered

the possibility that Luce incorrectly identified the source

of her information. The source of the documentation of Oswald's

contact with the DRE was New Orleans-based Carlos Bringuier.

Kevenly, Bringuier toid the Committee he never engaged in any

87,90

paramilitary DRE activities

and therefore could not have

been one of the crew members of the alleged Luce-sponsored

motorboat. Bringuier's New Orleans associate, Celso Hernandez,

889!

the secretary of the chapter,

also said he never received

any paramilitary training and did not know Oswald prior to

encountering him passing out pro-Castro literature on Canal

8e92

Street in New Orleans.

Bringuier also told the Committee he

knew Luce by reputation only, had never contacted her personallly,

and had never given her any information about his experience

with Oswald.

9093

He further said he was not aware of the fact

that luce was involved in any Cuban exile activities.

Bringuier

maintained that no member of his DRE gIOup in New Orleans had

92,95

any contact with luce during this period of time.

CONCLUSIONS

The

use select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA)

feels

it has adequatels

investigated the allegations of /clare Boothe

Luce tha

lee Harvey oswald was an agent of the Government of

Cuba.

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(320) the investigation of the warren Commission documented that

Oswald was interested in establishing a chapter of the FPCC in

New Orleans and had contact with the New York headquarters of

9396

this pro-Castro organization during the sumer of 1963.

Luce raised questions as to the nature and extent of involvement

the New Orleans chapter of DRE had in monitoring Oswald's

activities, and its association with the FBI regarding Oswald's

communist activities.

evidence.

•indicates that..

321) The cohe fee den detec nee that

the official DRE delegate

in New Orleans was Carlos Bringuier, and that he was aided by

two Cubans, Celso Hernandez and Miguel Aguado. In an attempt

to monitor Oswald, Bringuier approved the efforts of his

friend, Carlos Quiroga, to call on Oswald to relicit add-

itional information about FPCC activities in New Orleans.

then been datermined that Abne of the New Orleans

individuals associated in these events had any involvement in

the paramilitary activities of DRE. The New Orleans chapter

engaged solely in propaganda and fund raising activiteis.

rat to New Orleans DRE member had any

association with Luce.

(323)

The Cernetee-established.tinat the first report of Oswald's

contact with the DRE in New Orleans came from the group's

headquarters in Miami. This information was released

to national

3:1151

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Page 16

news

media, the CIA and the FBI shortly after the identi-

fication of Oswald as Kennedy's assassin. The Sulcul

illited that the luce allegations, although related to

certain facts, cannot be substantiated, due to the reluctance

of key individuals to corroborate her story.

20

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Betsy Palmer

This form is to be used for material extracted

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MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL de

RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA

(MIRR)

and

ORATINDO BOSCH AVILA

(324) when four of castro's army officers and lod mer

deserted and left for the Las Villas mountains in August,

1960, they formed the nucleus of the Movimento Insurreco-

ional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR) . Helping ay the

groundwork for this organization was the former Chief of

the 26th of July Movement in Las Villas Province, DI. Orlando

Bosch Avila.? Bosch had left Cuba one month previously and,

from Miami, issued a call for rebel army men to desert. 3

Promoting the defection of army personnel and carrying out

sabotage operations throughout Cuba were the early prinary

activities of the MIRR. 4

In both, it was very effective.

(325) Former rebel army officer Victor Paneque assumed

military leadership of the group and, within a few months

of his escape from Cuba, organized a

team of infiltrators

to re-enter the country to continue MIRR operations. 6

(326)

Orlando Bosch became general coordinator of MIRR,

working. with individuals and other groups involved in

operations against Cuba and securing necessary financial

backing.?

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DRAFT-M. IR/BOSCH

Page: 2

Massiticarion:.

(327) A pedia toned lied tunes:)

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Bosch became totally

immersed in his political movement and for 18 years

has

carried out a crusade to overthrow Castro. His efforts at-

times have been characterized as "bumbling", but he has

also been termed "single-mindedly" and "morally committed. "9

widely viewed in the U.S. press as a Cuban patriot when he

first began his anti-Castro activities, Bosch's increased

acts of violence gradually changed his image to that of a

terrorist.10 The intensity and violence of his activities,

which have always been widely publicized, were a major

factor in the Committee's decision to examine Boach and

the MIRR among those Cuban exile organizations considered

capable of involvement in an assassination conspiracy.

(328) Bosch was interviewed by the Conmittee in Cuartel San

Carlos prison in Venezuela. He is charged with complicity

in the October 6, 1975 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane

which resulted in the deaths of 73 people. 11 Although deny-

ing involvement in the airplane bombing, Bosch said he

approved of it.12 Claiming terrorism a necessary evil in

fighting Castro, Bosch has stated, "You have to fight violence

with violence. At times you cannot avoid hurting innocent

people. "13

(329) The activities of the MIRR in the early "60's were

carried out by a small group of individuals.. There

were

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reportedly nénerChlorentisle doctoeren) members in Miami. 14 In

1966, Bosch claimed to have only 20 men outside Miami,

located in various seaport cities in the u.s. 15

One of the

major interests of the MIRR was to blow up vessels trading

with Cuba. ISaIn this it was

effective, but the MIRR successes

in the early 1960's was a result of its association with a

number of other anti-Castro organizations and individuals.

(330) Bosch said that in late 1961 he was contacted

by Evelio

Dugue, leader of Ejercito Cubano Anticommunista (ECA) who

indicated he might be getting CIA support for his group and

wanted Bosch to join him fly

Together they subnitted a plan

to the Agency outlining their conditions for CIA support and

were informed about a month later the plan had been approved. =7

Acting as the political leader in this alliance, Bosch joined

Dugue,

the military

leader, at a camp in Homestead, Florida,

and

with a CIA liaison officer.

819

(33)) Bosch soon came to the conclusion that the camp was an

exercise in futility. He felt the CIA had no intention of

mounting another invasion or initiating attacks against Cuba.

He felt the U.S.-sponsored camps were merely a means of

His

keeping the exiles busy and, privately and unofficially.

(CIA contact

confirmed his suspicions, Bosch said. tado

After nine

months of frustrated inactivity, he published a pamphlet,

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IIRR BOSCH

Page

14

classinication: -

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The Tragedy gincuRa-confioraidozurentsaccused

the u.S. of mis-

leading the Cuban exiles. He sent a copy to President

Kennedy and then closed down the camp.:

8221

After this, Bosch

2122

said he had no more dealings with the CIA.

(332) Bosch maintained an ongoing relationship, beginning in

late 1960, with Frank Sturgis, well-known anti-castro soldier

of fortune; 3223

Alexander Rorke, former clerk at the FBI and

an informant for that agency, Ray

and William Johnson, an

provided

American pilot who, along with sturgis, was a source of:

2425

information for the CIA on Cuban exile activities.

Johnson

had full control over all MIRR operations, 3526

Bosch was

concerned with financing raids against Cuba and did not

know the nature of the missions until their completion. 282>

(333) According to Johnson, American pilots were placed under

26a28

contract to fly three air strikes over Cuba for the MIRR.

They were to receive $2000 per mission.

2729

Johnson admitted

his own motive was purely mercenary. rg 30

(334) Although relatively inactive in 1962,

the MIRR engaged

in a series of bombing raids over cuba in 1963 primarily.

aimed at destroying the production of sugarle

32

-in an effort

to disrupt the economy. It also reportedly conducted air

strikes

against a MIG base in Cuba 313}

and various other

strikes aimed at

strategic targets. 8p34

The raids were

effective but not without risk. In several instances, 35

the raiders' planes were shot down and pilots killed. 93

Classification: _

Classified by derivation:

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DRAFT-

Page

IRR/ESSsificarion: -

This form is to be used for material extracted

(335) Concurreat CAtkontaledssaciasion with Anerican ad-

venturers, the MIRR also had associations with other exile

organizations.

It planned raids against Cuba in cooperation

with Commandos 1,3436

and discussed unity raids with members

Of RECE, 3537

Bosch, at this time, was interested

in establish-

ing a base of operations in the Dominican Republic to

facilitate long-range planning. $6 38

(336) The documentation the Committee has examined fails to

explain how the

MIRR was able to

finance its extensive

turther, booch duno specuyany soce.

operations,

Bosch told the committee that his association

at with Frank Sturgis alone culminated in 11 air strikes over

Cuba. Nat that time, he said, they usually ranted a plane

for

$400 plus $60 an hour 3840

Bill Johnson charged $4000 for

pilot fees for each mission. $4i

Bosch said he knew the pilots

only got $2000 and Johnson pocketed the rest, but, his

purpose

was

to

fight Castro whatever it cost. Bosch's

comnitment to fight castro extends to the present. 9743

(337)

initially

, funds were furnished MIRR from a Chicago-

based cuban extie, saulino do Sle, who allegally collected

monies from gambling interests.

some money came from

anti-Castro supporters in Puerto Rico. 4345=:

It is known that

the FBI was long interested in the source of finances of

the MIRR and in March, 1964 authorized a 30-day mail check 46

on it and Bosch in an effort to identify possible sources. 44

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1 : Classified by derivation:

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DRAFT

- MIR? Sassification: -

Page

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

During this time, several wealthy Cuban exiles received

threatening letters demanding large contributions for the

4547

fight against Castro.

Bosch was implicated in these

1648

4749

extortion attempts,

brought to trial and acquitted.

He

told the Committee that in 1967 he once used the funds he

had cozlected in settlement for a personal injury automobile

accident to buy explosives and weapons.

Whatever

methods of raising money, there is no indication he ever

4851.

used it to enrich himself.

(338) 7e11 financed and totally dédicated, sosch managed to

run afoul of the U.S. government authorities at least seven

times in slightly over a four-year period. Several of

these

5052

encounters resulted in his arrest,

but he was always

acquitted.

(339/In July, 1967, Bosch and the MIRR became assimilated

into a new novement, known as Cuban Pows. 5254

and the tempo

of violent activities increased. On September 16, 1968,

Bosch was arrested for firing a bazooka into the hull of a

Polish ship anchored in Miani harbor $a55

He was subseguently

$456

tried and sentenced to 10 years in a Federal prison.

FIOD.

his prison cell in Atlanta, Georgia, Bosch allegedly was

making plans to resume bombing Japanese and Spanish ships

trading with Cuba as soon as he was released 857

granted parole on November 1, 1972 and immediately began

58

.avelina thepugh.cat1

America, in violation of that parole..

Classified by derivation:

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DRAFT - MIRR sesaification: -

Page 7

(This form is to be used for material extracted

rom ClA-controlled documents.

He said his aim

Latin. Anerica

was to forge alliances

with countries which had powerful Cuban exile communities.

So effective was he in making solid political alliances,

that in the ensuing years he was able to travel freely.

5860

with forged passports, throughout Latin America.

(340) whether of not Bosch was the principal conspirator in

the bombing of the Cubana airliner, it is known that his

Cuban Power movement, which merged with other Cuban activists

in 1976596)

to form a Cuban Secret Government 5062

has engaged

in acts of terrorisn.8, "This latter group

has been linked

with runerous recant bonbing ineidents,

an assassination

attenpt against Henry Kissinger,

the assassination of

Orlando Letelier in Washington, D. C.

and the bombing of

the Cubana Airlines plane.

(341) Orlando Bosch is a zealot. In retrospect, he turns out

to be the most aggressive and volitile of the anti-Castro

leaders. That alone would validly raise the question of

possible association with the assassination of President

Kennedy. In addition, the Committee

was presented with

67

ain allegation

information that specifically connecta him to a conspiracy; but

Investigation of *

Hegation failed to support the claim

that Bosch had been in Dallas in November 1963 in the

company of Lee Harvey Oswald. When asked, Bosch told the

Committee he was

at his home in Miami when he heard President

Kennedy had been shot.

8 68

Classification:.

Classified by derivation:

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JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA

EN EL EXILIO

(342)

In April, 1963 the spirit of the exiled Cubans who

hoped to

return to a liberated Cuba reached a new low.

v.S: Government

The

a

Ere Cuban anti-Castro u

, which had been subsidizing

organization, the

Cuban Revolutionary Council, dropped its extensive

backing of this most visible example of American

assistance to the Cuban movement.

The move came on

the heels of an announcement of a tough new policy

of the Justice and State Departments. They planned a

igorous entorcement

olvigoroaclynenforcenthe laws breached by anti-Casti

Cuban raiders, who were operating hit-and-run guerilla

2

attacks from the U.S. on Cuban and Russian targets.

These events resulted in another shuffling of alliances

between various Cuban groups, but no bright new hopes.

(343) Despite a common desire to overthrow Castro and

return to Cuba, the exiles differed in many ways. They

represented the extremes of the political left and right

and everything in between. Many had carried arms against

Batista; Others were former Batistianos. They differed

accomplished

as to how the counter-revolution could be carriedout

They differed as to what type of government and which

leaders would take the place of the ousted government.

Unification of these diverse stances seemed doubtful.

(343) DI. Paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban exile and lawyer

foster

change.

from Chicago, hoped to changerall that.

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page

(344) Arriving in Miami in May of 1963, Sierra scheduled

a series of meetings at a local hotel and invited Cuban

exile leaders of all political persuasion to discuss

unification for the purpose of military invasion of Cuba. 3

(145) To many cubans the idea

seemed ridiculously naive.

Sierra was hoping to unify elements which had remained

splintered throughout most previous efforts, attempting

to draw well-known exile leaders when he himself was

virtually unknown. in the anti-Castro movement.

(346) But Sierra came with some big ideas and big pronises.

He claimed to represent a group of Americans in Chicago

interested in combining their efforts with those of the

Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime with or

without U.s. government approval. sierra told them that

American financial interests

would participate on con-

dition there was a true unity of the majority of Cubans

in exile." For military planning he claimed he had the

assistance of several high-ranking U.S. Navy and Army

officers, who would also help arrange for arms and the

establishment of training bases in a latin American country.

Most surprisingly, Sierra claimed the Chicago backers

were willing to lend assistance to the extent of $30 million

no small sum even for a large-scale government-

backed operation. For a private group it was unheard of.

(347) while many Cubans did not innediately jumpronto, Sierra, s

bandwagon, by July 1963 Sierra had built a coalition of

predominantly right-wing anti-Castro groups and attracted

some impressive names from among the exiles

to form an

HH 53080

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organization called the Junta de Gobierno de Cubu en el

exilio (JGCE - Junta of the Government of Cuba in Exile).?

(348) Anong the groups to join sierra's junta were the

10

Unidad Revolucionaria

faction headed by Juan Medina Vega

and the major faction of the 30th of November group

headed by Carlos Rodriguez Quesada. Sierra could also

boast the participation of Jose "Pepin" Bosch, President

of Barcardi Rum, and Alberto Garrido, a much-admired

12

Cuban entertainer.

349) In the selection process by which the Committee

chose those anti-castro groups to be further investigated,

certain factors about the Junta discovered in preliminary

research indicated a need to look more carefully into

the purpose and activities of this group.

650) The Junta was active during the critical period of

interest to the Committee. Sierra

surfaced in March

196313

and the organization abruptly ceased activity by

January 1964. The Committee hoped to discover what

sparked the group's genesis and what contributed to its

final demise.

(351) Its financial backing appeared to be remarkably.

impressive, and although Sierra clained the group

was

to received funds from American companies whose financial

assets in Cuba had

been nationalized, it was widely

rumored that the money was actually from "gamoling

15

interests" of organized crime.

There were other rumors

that wealthy individuals from Texas were behind

the

HH 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 170

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page

group.

I5 The Committee hoped to determine exactly what

means

were available to the group and from what source.

(352) preliminary research also indicated that the Secret

Service in Chicago was investigating a "Threat to the

President" case at the time of President Kennedy's

assassination, in which Paulino Sierra was of interest.

The Committee wished to explore the nature of the

allegation and the extent of Sierra's involvement in

the case..

(353) The Committee was able to obtain considerable information.

from the contemporaneous investigative reports of the

Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI and Immigration and

Naturalization Service regarding the structure, membership

and activities of the Junta...

Field interviews

and research into reports of the Secret Service probed

those questions raised by the alleged threats against

the President.

(394) Paulino Sierra Martinez was a tallidar and dapper

lawyel"employed in the Legal Counsel's office of the Union

19

Tank Car Company in Chicago.

Before his inmigration to

the United States, he had reportedly been employed by

20

Carlos Saladrigas, a minister under Batista.

He had also

worked with Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, former senator

21

during Batista's regime. Sierra left Havana in 1960

and settled for a tiae in Miami where he worked as a

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Judo instructor and translator (Sierra speaks, reads

and writes English, Italian, French and Spanish) 22 In

1962 he moved to Chicago and was admitted to the Illinois

Bar sponsored by William Browder, general Counsel of Union

Tank. Car Company, for whom Sierra soon began work.

(355) By early 1963 Sierra had organized a Cuban Lawyer's

Association in Chicago

and gained somewhat of a reputation

24

as "coordinator" of Cuban activities in the Chicago area.

In March 1963, he was mentioned in an article in the

Chicago Tribune for his active role in Cuban exile affairs

25 Nevertheless,

in Chicago. However, he still had not made a national

name in Cuban exile affairs.

( 356) yet, as noted previously, sierra's meetings

with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami in the spring of

1963, produced the official structure of a Cuban government

26

in exile by July.

Sierra was named Secretary General,

Felipe Rivero Diaz was named Vice Secretary General;

Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was appointed head of Internal Affairs;

Juan Medina was to head up finances; Manuel Lozano Pino

was named head, of External Relations; Alberto Garrido

was put in charge of Propaganda; Reinaldo Pico

was given a position in charge of Labor issues; and

27

Gilberto Rodriguez was asked to run Military Operations.

(357) The Junta was formed after an organizational

meeting in Chicago in June 1963 with Union Tank Car Executive Vice=

President J.W. Van Gorkum and General Counsel William

#=28

Browder.

Information regarding the meeting is scant.

One source who attended said that van Gorkum and Browder

HH 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 172

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page

6

discussed the unity plan only insofar

as suggesting that

if the group could successfully establish a government

in exile, it then night be able to obtain .s. government.

support and financing from other sources.

358) But evidence exists to suggest that.

Union Tank Car

had a greater role in the Junta.

The company

was reportedly

paying for Sierra's personal and travel expenses plus

3030

his salary. Browder also told FBI agents in October, 1963

that although he did not know the identity of Sierra's

backers, he (Browder) kept the group's funds under his

control to avoid any possible criticism of misappropriation

50031

or mismanagement of funds by Sierra.

Browder would not

==

indicate the exact

amount under his control other to say

it was "considerable."

(359) There have been several contradictory reports to the CIA

and FBI regarding the source of Sierra's funds.

(360) Early reports indicated Sierra's backers were Chicago :.-

gamblers. The Miami News headline for an article reporting

on Sierra's meetings read "Gamblers Pop Out of Exile Grab Bag.

The source of such reports is unclear although there are

indications it may have been Sierra himself.

(361) At Sierra's initial

meetings withh cuban groups, he was

accompanied by an American named William Trull, who may have

been Ayrtly responsible for circulation of runors of the involvenes

of gambling interests in Sierra's proposals, but whose

ultimate relationship to sierra is obscure.

(362) In an interview with the FBI in June

1963, Sierra said

TIull had called him after seeing the March 10 article

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page:

35 88

about Sierra in the Chicago Iribune.

Sierra said Trull

talked about sponsorship of a unified group of Cuban

exiles and vaguely mentioned the owner of the ring

Ranch and a MI. "Jarvis" who Trull identified as a

millionaire in Texas.

Sierra said he was concerned

about Trull being involved with "impure" financial sources,

$837

and would have nothing further to do with him.

(363) Trull's story is differant. A formez entertaines

from Dallas, Trull said Sierra had first contacted him

in March 1963 and proposed that he hele sierga explain

Sierra's plan to the Cuban exiles in Miami.

said Sierra had wired tickets so that he could join

$039

Sierra in Miami for the series of meetings with the exiles.

Sierra carefully outlined the proposal Irull was to explain

to such Cuban leaders as former Cuban Prime Minister

€ 40

Carlos Prio and Eusebio Mujal, a former Cuban labor leader.

Trull reiterated the plan to the Cubans, telling them

he represented wealthy American interests who had a business

proposition for the Cuban people if they would unify

with Carlos Prio as President and Sierra as Secretary of

42 4/

a provisional government.

(364) Reports by Cubans who heard Trull lend credence to

his tale. Irull was found to be "contradictory" and

8042

"vague" about his plan, as might be expected of a person

who was just repeating what he had been told.

(365) Trull later told FBI agents that he had aropped names

to sierra such as clebrug of the king Ranch, but sierra

had told him he did not need Irull's financial influence.

43

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8

Sierra claimed, according to Trull, that representatives of

Las Vegas or Cleveland gambling interests had contacted

him and offered up to $14 million in exchange for 50%

interest in gambling concessions in Cuba, provided Sierra

48044

was able to organize a successful ouster of Castro.

(366) Trull told the FBI that because

he had frequently

preformed before Cuban audiences,

he felt he had been

chosen by Sierra and used as an "actor" to sell the Cubans

on Sierra's plans.

4B 45

(367) sierra had other assistance at his early meetings

that

which disappeared as quickly as Trull had. According to

a CIA report, one of the promoters for a meeting in May

with exiles was George Franci, a Haitian national who

had previously been involved in gambling interests

in

19016

Havana.

Franci's name does not show up as involved

paiticklarly

in any later activities of Sierra, inotably alter the

stories of gambler's backing hit the newsstands.

(348) As late as July, 1963, Sierra himself was the source

of another report that gamblers were backing him. Miguel

A. "Cuco" Leon, a colleague of Manuel Artime Buesa, reported

that when Sierra visited Nicaragua that month, he told hin

48247

he represented U.S. gambling concessions in Cuba.

(369) another possible basis for the stories about sierra's

"gambler's backing" are separate reports of an actual offer

to Chicago Cubans in March 1963.

DI. Cesar Blanco of the Chicago-based Cuban Bar

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Association of Illinois repotted a meeting of Cuban exiles

D 48

on March 11, 1963.

He said that a Burt Mold of the

American Education League of Los Angeles had asked Blanco

how much money the Cubans needed to work out a program to

free Cuba. Mold, according to Blanco, stated that the

"Nevada group" would help since the U.S. government could

5850

do nothing. Blanco said that Mold even offered Blanco

the job of head of police in Cuba when the country had

8251

been freed.

(370) A CIA report of March 1963 reported that Blanco and

Sierra had been approached by gamblers from the west to

52052

work with them.

54

It was.

reported that Sierra spoke

about an

$10 million in backing for guarantees of gambling

offer.of

4:53

concessions in Cuba after Castro was overthrown.

(371) In his public meetings in Miami in May, Sierra

had publicly named the American

Educational League

5865554

of Los Angeles as being in support of his proposal.

When

that.."= group Challenged Sierra's claims, Sierra backed

off, indicating he had received assurances of assistance

575855

from other sources.. But it is not known whether Mold had

made the offer at the behest of the American Educational

League or for some other party.

His affiliation with

1555756

the League was just as a member.

(372 If an offer from gambling interests was ever made,

it appears that Sierra either backed away from such an

offer or began to dress it in legitimate clothing after

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page lr:

the adverse publicity.

373) The backers were identified in public in only the

most nebulous terms. Sierra claimed several U.S. companies

weze behind his plans and these at first were only identified

as the Lawyer's Corporation and the American Bankers.

Later, he frequently named such large corporations as

United fruit, 5505 Standara 011, Dupont and U.s, steel,

among others.

(3'74) The chleago office of the FBI closed its investigation

of Sierra's activites in June 1963, concluding that he

was involved in a "con job" rather than any real activities,

€H6059

hoodlum or otherwise.

remaras:

The question

who was conning whom?

375) The FBI's decision to close the investigation may have

been justifiable at the time, since

there was no indication

either through

money spent or by actual group-sponsored

825460

operations that Sierra had a viable organization. The activities,

however, were just beginning.

(376) As soon as the organization was formally set up,

Sierra and Felipe Rivero left on a trip to Nicaragua

and colonbia to dissuss plans for a miltary base of operations

outside the U.S. The reportedly spoke with luis Somoza in Nica-

ragua and also attempted to obtain the use of the Isle of Andres

off of colombia. It was also reported that Sierra and Rivero..

traveled to New York, Chicago, st. Louis and washiogton, D.C. to

meet with backers and make further arrangements. Later it was

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page 11

learned that Sierra alone had spent a little over $11,000

on travel expenses by October 1963.

851564

(377) The group was also spending money on arms and equipment

by late summer 1963. Rich Lauchli, a well-known arms

dealer from Collinsville, Ill., was contacted by Sierra in

GET 65

August to purchase a quantity of guns. Soldier-of-fortune

and Gerry Patrick Hemming associate, Steve Wilson, was

600966

asked by Sierra to deliver the arms to Miami. Sierra also

6808

67

ordered a two-man submarine from California in October 1963,

which was transported to Miami for storage in the garage

2064 68

of Cuban exile Manuel Aguilar.

(378) The FBI zaceived information that Sierra had been on

an arms shopping spree in Detroit accompanied by Jose

Cardoso, and purchased $6000 to $7000 worth of weapons

7920 69

to be transported to Miami.

Dennis Lynn Harber, another

Hemming associate, assisted Sierra in the transport of

1260 70

military equipment.

(379) sierra was also holding discussions with several

"action" groups for assistance in a military operation

70878471

against Cuba.

Among those contacted who reportedly

signed. "pledges" of support were Aldo Vera Serafin of

132

• 72

the militant MAPA gIOUD (American Patriotic Action Movement);

Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Antonio Veciana Blanch of the

757413

SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance;

Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez of

1215974

Comandos Li

Eduardo Mor Ruiz, an independent anti-Castro

7576 75

TRaz776

Cuban fighter; and Orlando Bosch of MIRR.

(380) Reports of funds given to those groups indicata sierra

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page 12

siera was advancing modest sums from the alleged $650,000

at his disposal. Aldo Vera Serafin reportedly received

$3500 and Tony Cuesta of Comandos I received $1000.

79>8

Members of the Junta's board of officers also received

contributions from Sierra. Carlos Rodriguez Quesada

recieved $2800; Felipe Rivero Diaz received $1890;and Gilberto

8 19

Rodriguez got $1500.

(381) There are vazious descriptions of the miltary operations:

allegedly being prepared by the Junta. On October 30, 1963,

information was received that the Second National Front

of Escambray had plans for an operation from a base in the

8280

Dominican Republic. The arrangements were allegedly

being made by. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, head of SNEE, and

& 81

Abel Camacho in Key West. The plan called for action

against a bridge in Oriente Province and had been master-

minded by Antonio Veciana

and one of the engineers who

81382

had designed the bridge. Consistent with this information,

it was also reported to the FBI that the Junta

offered

soldier-of-fortune Joe Garman $11,000 to lead

a raid on

88083

Oriente Province.

(382)

There were other reports that an attack on a Havana

8P4

oil refinery was planned. Still other reports simply

indicated that although all-out war against Castro was

the objective, a hit-and if raia for publicity puzposes

would be attempted first.

(383) while 111 these activites were getting underway i

Sierra had some conflict with other officers in the

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page 13

Junta. Gilbeto Rodriguez Hernandez was replaced as military

coordinator in

the summer of 1963 because, according to

886

Sierra, Hernandez was feared to be a Castro agent. In

turn, Hernandez, who had returned from Cuban prison in

April 1963 in the prisoner exchange, called Van Gorkum

and Browder at Union Tank Car Company and complained:

8987

bitterly about Sierra's lack of leadership.

384) After Sierra had signed a pact with Alpha 66-SENE,

another member of the Junta, Manuel Lozano Pino, resigned

from his position as head of External Relations.

objected to the inclusion of such a "left-wing"

organiza-

tion, but also protested Sierra's expenditures.

(385) These complaints nay have had something to do with

Sierra's summons to Chicago in early November 1963 for

90

a stormy session with Browder. Sierra was blasted for

91

wasting funds, reportedly totaling up to $50,000.

According

to sources of the CIA and FBI, Sierra was accompanied to

the Chicago meeting with Armando Fleites of SNFE and

Browder allegedly ordered Sierra to turn over all monies

and supplies to the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance. But although

several of the Junta officers had asked for Sierra's replace-

ment and had specifically named Jose "Pepin" Bosch as

an attractive alternative, Sierra remained in place as the

94

"guiding spirit" for the next two months em the remainder

of the group's existence.

(386) A CIA memo reported on vovember 20, 1963 of the strange

activities of Sierra and

the Junta:

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page

1₴

"Although he (Sierra) has been

some

what ubiquitous

among Cuban exile leaders

in Miami since March 1963, he still remains

somewhat of a mystery-man in terms of his

means of suppg5t, and indeed, his long-range

objectives."

The report also raised the question of how Sierra managed

to remain in the exile political scene so long. "Perhaps

his mysterious backers are providing him with sufficient

funds to keep the pot boiling for the present," the memo

conjectured.

(388) Indeed, Sierra's activities vere not only contiruing.:

but he also soon found himself subject of interest in

a Secret Service investigation into a threat against the

president. See the Agincy Repomano dection

SIERRA-ECHEVARRIA AELEGATIONS

of the Findl Repoil of the Conmitter for

whore information about this threat

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3

Pati

=:.

DAVID FERRIE

(389) 0n Monday afternoon, November 25, 1963, David

William Ferrie voluntarily presented himself for ques-

tioning to the New Orleans police who were looking for

him in connection with the assassination of President

1

Kennedy. (Fir) The New Orleans District Attorney's

Officet had earlier received information regarding a

relationship between Ferrie and accused assassin Lee

Harvey Oswald. (E) Among the allegations: Ferrie had may have

been acquainted with Oswald since Oswald's days in the

Civil Air Patrol youth organization in 1954-55; Ferrie may

hael given Oswald instruction in the use of a rifle and

may have hypnotized Oswald to shoot the President; and

that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination

Mantatat have been Oswald's get-away pilot.

(Fn)

(390) Ferrie stament

to denied them all He.

that

at the time of the President's user he

stir he had been in New

Orleans, busy with court matters for organized crime son fue

Carlos Marcello, who had been acquited of immigration-

related charges that same day. (ma) Other individuals,

including Marcello, Marcello's lawyer, the lawyer's

secretary and FBI agent Regis Kennedy backed up Ferrie's

alibi.

(FE)

Ferrie also gave a detailed account of his where-

abouts for the period from the evening of the assassination

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## Page 183

David Ferrie - 2

until his appearance at the New Orleans police station.

(Fn) Interviews of Ferrie's associates and the results

of a field

verified

investigation depene

fy Ferrie's

statements

(Fn)

(392) Ferrie's assertion that his stinson voyager

airplane was unflyable at the time of the assassination

was later verified by the FBI. (Fn)

Jack Martin, a New Orleans private detective and

colleague of -

Ferrie,

= who had originally

voiced

concerns about Ferrie to New Orleans officials, subsequentl:

informed authorities he had no specific information to support

his allegations!

Thus the

Mencha

FBI and

the Warren Commission concluded that the stories

relating to an Oswald-Ferrie relationship were unfounded.

Ferrie diEd

393)

•n 1967, shortly after New Orleans District

Attorney Jim Garrison announced he was reopening the

Kennedy probe and was interested in Ferrie's activities

in 19630 Pert

While there was much speculation

that his death may have been suicide, the New Orleans

coroner determined the death was a result of natural

causes. Nevertheless, tus

further fueled suspicion -about his activities.

394) The committee determined that Ferrie's activities

during the months prior to the

assassination of President

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David Ferrie - 3

Kennedy warranted examination. The Committee paid particularly

close attention to a possible relationship between Oswald

and Ferrie.

What emerged

were several parallels in

the

liferof+the two:

a complexity of personality and political

belief; a difficulty in attaining normal social adjustment;

and a indidences of being in the same locality at the same

timelinvolved in similar activities.

(395) Fa,

exter chinen

ily detailed record

currents

of Ferrie's life and associates islavailable. The Com-

mitee examined FBI and Secret Service investigative re-

ports generated immediately after the assassination and

FBI and INS reports ante-dating or post-dating the as-

sassination; it received information developed during

the 1967-1968 Garrison investigation; andVexamined the

files of the extensive investigation of Ferrie con-

ducted by the Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern

Airlines and the New Orleans police from 1961 to 1963,

an investigation whict was the result of criminal

charges against Ferrie filed in 1961.

Additionalle

the

Committee conducted its own field investigation.

(356) Ferrie was born in 1918 in Cleveland, Ohio, the

son of James Howard Ferrie, a police captain and attorney.

11

(Fn) Ferrie attended parochial grammar and high

Altronah

school. !?There lie no indication his childhood was any

thing but normal

, numerous

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David Ferrie - 4

ton.csz

acquaintances and associates of Ferrie reveal that he

grew to be a complex, even bizarre individual.

One aptly stated, "Not inappropriately, he (ferrie) was

described as a paradox. "

397) His unusual personal appearance was partially

induced

a result of the loss of his body hair by a rare ais.

Fa caster

he wore a makeshift toupee

nd exaggerated take eyebrows/crudely affixed with glue as compen

ersons who shew min

consideredMoppy and

with a proclivity for

unkempt,

foul language.

(398)

Ferrie was often described as "very

aggressive"

and "highly obnoxious"

He resented authority,

= was

opinionated, and often difficult to get along with.

Yet he was able to exert a tremendous influence over his

close associates, including many young men in his Civil

Air Patrol squadion.

20

399) Several of Ferrie's associates indicate he was

a homosexual and a mysoginist.

His sexual ex-

ploitation of younger men-

would eventually

cause him numerous problems.

(1408)

Although his formal education was not exten-

brilliant.

sive, Ferrie was considered highly intelligent, even

He had originally studied theology in

the hope of becoming an ordained priest, but he left

seminary school before graduation because of "emotional

instability".

Later, in 1941, he received a

24

bachelor of arts degree from Baldwin-Wallace College,

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David Ferrie - 5

majoring

25

3 in philosophy.

He also received,

through a correspondence course, a doctorate degree in

sychology from an unaccredited school, Phoenix Uni-

veristy, * Bari! Italy,'

26 In August 1957, he travelled

go to Italy to take

* the final board exams.

401

Ferrie spent considerable time studying

medicine and psychology, last especially the techniques

of hypnosis which he frequently practiced on his young

associates.

Ferrie had even set up a laboratory

over his garage,

where, he claimed

he lost his hair, alternately attributing

it to a radiation experiment, chemical explosion and

cancer research experiments.

#- He listed his name

32

in the telephone book as "Di." David Ferrie;tenand

many friends did erroneously believe he was a medical

doctor and a psychologist.

7a This veneer of re-

spectability and

achievement could be why Ferrie referred

to his Ph.D. degree as his "most prized possession".

A02) Ferrie was also philosophically and politically

complex. He considered himself a devout Catholic, and

made several attempts to become a priest, the bi

36 even though

37

he described himself as a "theological liberal".

He also claimed to be liberal in his civil rights at-

titude.

a fe was rabidly anti-Communist, to however,

and frequently critical of each Presidential administration

for what he perceived to be sell-outs to Communism.

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David Ferrie - 6

(453) Ferrie often spoke to business and civic

groups about politics. T

Ferrie associates told

FBI agents

in 1961 that Ferrie had been "critical of

the Roosevelt administration.

42 associ was to naito

Associals alaSae

drive us into Communism." (*wYFerrie "was also

critical of the Truman administration for the same

reason."

(404)

Ferrie was asked to discontinue his remarks

at a speaking engagement in July 1961 before the New

44

Orleans chapter of the Military Order of World Wars.

His topic was the

§residential administration and the

Bay of Pigs fiasco.

The organization put

a stop to.

Ferrie's remarks when he became too critical of Presi-

dent Kennedy.

4705)

He apparently expressed his views to anyone

who would listen. During an interview with an IRS

auditor in 1960, Ferrie was "outspoken" in his derogatory

comments about the United States..

WE) He complained

bitterly about his alleged tax persecution to such

an

extent that the agent reported he

thought Ferrie was

48

actually deranged, a "psycho".

706)

Ferrie's major avocation and occupation, however,

was flying. Even associates who were critical of Ferrie's

character considered him an excellent pilot.

An

early acquaintance believes that Ferrie first started to

fly at his father's suggestion to take his mind off of

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David Ferrie - 7

50

his failures at the seminary.

Fair,

He took lessons

at Sky Tech Airway Service in Cleveland, Ohio between

1942 and 1945.

He then worked as a pilot for an

oil drilling firm which had jobs in South America.

When the company went out of business53

Ferrie tried

teaching at Rocky River High School, Ed

but he was

fired in 1948 for psychoanalyzing his students instead

of teaching them.

(407) In 1949, Ferrie left the Cleveland area after

runors that he had taken several young boys to a house

ciroulated

55

of prostitution

ad through his neighborhood.

Although Ferrie's exact movements are not known, he

appears to have gone to Tampa, Florida, where he received

his instrument rating at Sunnyside Flying School.

(a) In 1950, ferrie returned to cleveland. He

worked as an insurance inspector, and joined the Army

Reserve for a three-year stint, leaving with an honorable

discharge in 1953.

4409)

Life started going well for Ferrie. In 1951 he

submitted an application to Eastern Airlines, omitting

details of his past emotional and occupations difficulties.

Eastern Airlines hired him in Miami, and soon

transferred him to New Orleans.

(/0)

Internal memos for Eastern Airlines indicate

Ferrie was accepted for employment, but consideration

was given to firing him almost immediately for falsify-

59

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David Ferrie - 8

ing parts of his application.

The New Orleans

branch was advised to keep Ferrie only until a replace-

ment could be found and a "close watch" on Ferrie's

62

progress was recommended.

63+

Initial reports, how-

ever, were favorable.

Ferrie was considered by

his fellow pilots to be doing a good job, althouch he

was "odd" at times.

Eastern decided to him

approached

(4411)

Ferrie

Sed his job enthusiastically,

devoting his own time to talking at schools and clubs

to promote interest in aviation and travel in the South-

65

west area.

In 1953, the president of Eastern:

wrote him a letter personally commending Ferrie's

efforts on behalf of the company.

This early

record of

dedication and competence may have accounted

for Ferrie's longevity as an Eastern

Airlines captain,

"the years.

67

Thrown

despite complaints

Ultimately,

the infractions became too serious, and, after a long

investigation and a hearing process which lasted from

1961 until 1963, Ferrie lost his job.

40) Ferrie had always been deeply engrossed in

other activities related to flying, including the Civil

Air Patrol, which he had first joined in Cleveland.

Over the years his difficulties with the hierarchy and

authorities of the Civil Air Patrol would increase, but

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David Ferrie - 9

Ferrie remained intensely popular with many of the

members and enjoyed a reputation as a first rate in-

69

structor and organizer.

Fail Jean Naatz, an aviatrix

of national renown,

stated,.

• "He had done more

for the Civil Air Patrol than anyone else and built up

the squadron to one of the biggest squadrons in the

state of Ohio."

4/3 Ferrie also built the same reputation with

many CAP cadets in the New Orleans area.

One CAP com-•

mander said, "David Ferrie is a good organizer...He made

the CAP at the New Orleans Airport everything it is

today.

He has a large following among the cadets of the

71

CAP, and is an excellent flying instructor." M

.By

1953, there were about 80 cadets assigned to his

squadron.

Ferrie spent about six hours a week in

official CAP activity and much more of his own time

73

associating

with his cadets. T

Ferrie became known

for his enthusiastic approach to cadet training, emphasiz-

ing tutoring in science and mathematics and putting .

74

cadets in charge of their own discipline. The squadron

had an award-winning drill team.

14140

His appeal to several young men may have been

related to his taking an extraordinary interest in them:

he gave them

flying instruction and flight time in his

own airplane;

where liquor flowed freely;

a he often gave parties at his residence

he offered his home as

a place for the boys to stay when they were unhappy at

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David Ferrie - 10

78

home.

He urged several boys to join the armed

79

forces,

take careers in aviation

or en-

81

• couraged them to join seminaries.

Many of Ferrie's

cadets became involved in Ferrie's wide spectrum of

activities.

415) Ferrie's tremendous influence and close association

with these young men eventually became a controversial

subject with many parents.

416)

Ferrie did not bother to renew his CAP commander

charter when it ran out in 1954,

although.he.con-

tinued to wear the insignia of the CAP on his fatigues.

He did renew his commander charter in 1959, when

he augmented his cadet's standard CAP rifle training by

instituting an association with the

New Orleans Cadet

Rifle Club.

Ferrie also started a group called

the. "Falcon Squadron," composed of Ferrie's closest CAP

associates.

A group within this group,

the "Omni-

potents," was allegedly started to train cadets in what

to do in the event of a majore attack on the united

States.

417)

ernes job and ownership of an airplane enabled

him

= to travei around ine country with relative ease.

He tola ofilcials s

s he frequently traveled to Texas

89 апа

and other parts South,

including Miani,

2 visited

90

New York on occasion.

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David Ferrie - 11

*It is unknown how much time Ferrie was spending

in these other cities.

4, In august 1959, while

in Miami, Ferrie was put under a 26-hour surveillance

by Customs agents who believed Ferrie was involved in

gun smuggling.

Following a brief investigation, in-

cluding a tapping of his telephone conversations, it

was determined that

Ferrie was not involved in any

illegal, but merely planning an outing

for his "scouts".

The investigation was dropped.

@ 418) Ferrie also became involved

In 1959, he had found an outlet for

cism in the anti-Castro movement.

in other activities.

is political fanati-

By early 1961,

Ferrie and a young man whom Ferrie had first met in. the

CAP, Layton Martens, were working with Sergio Arcacha

Smith, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Front delegation

955

in New Orleans.

419) Ferrie S00h became Smith's eager partner in counter-

Revolutionary activities.

He reportedly to

beibe built two miniature submarines which he planned

to use for an attack on Havana Harborj

obtained

98

several rifles and mortars for the proposed invasion

and

* was reportedly teaching Cubans how to fly.

Further, several of ferrie's cadets claimed to have taken trips

to Cuba in Ferrie's airplane.

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David Ferrie - 12

(20) perrie was also involved with Arcacha smith,

adventurer Gordon Novel and Layton Martens 101 Additionalys in

on a munitions dump in Houma, Louisiana.

September „1961,_the U.S. Border Patrol received informa-

tion that Ferrie was attempting to purchase a C-47 air-

plane for $30,000 and reportedly had a cache of arms in

102

the New Orleans area; The report was never

verified. There were also unverified reports that

Ferrie provided Arcacha Smith with personal financial

167103

assistance.

Mali Arcacha smith wrote fastern airlines then-

president Eddie Rickenbacker on Ferrie's behalf request-

ing a 60-or 90-day leave with pay for full time work for

the CRC

немотал

HH

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## Page 194

howeve

Ferrie's vacation in April 1961,

coincided with the Bay

of Pigs invasion.

106

Ferrie's role, if any, is not

known.

(122)

CRC in New Orleans

was affiliated with the main branch

which had been receiving funds fron the cia.

of the CRC in Miami,

these funds may have been disseminated to the New Or-

leans branch to cover operating costs.

Some of

=, There

however, that

is no

evidence, Ferrie received funds from either the CRC

or the

Ferrie's assistance and interest appears

to have been completely voluntary.

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David Ferrie - 13

423) During this time

3 Ferrie had continued to have

personal problems. In 1960 he had provoked the ire of

108

other CAP commanders while on a cadet campout.

The incident ended with Ferrie withdrawing his cadets

from the outing and eventually led to his permanent

resignation from the CAP in 1960.

(424) Tezrle's troubles, intensified when charges

were brought against him by parents of boys who had

run away from home. • In one instance, Ferrie had gained

entrance to the New Orleans Youth Detention Center to

visit one runaway boy by signing himself in as a

111

doctor.

to authorities that

(425) The parents of another boy complainea their son

was staying with Ferrie. #E As a result, are

Ferrie was arrested on August 8, 1961 for contributing

113

to the delinquency of a juvenile.

(26) cuban exile leader Arcacha Smith intervened

on Ferrie's behalf by telling police that the boy would

be returned to his parents if they did not press charges

against Ferrie. But Ferrie was arrested again on

August 21, 1961 for crime against nature on =

But perile was areated again de

year-old boy and indecent behavior with three others.

Arcacha Smith was having problems of his own.

(421) He had moved the office of the CRC to the New

man Building at 544 Camp Street in 1962, but

lack of funds caused him to leave town in mia-

1962, his reputation among anti-Castro Cubäns

tarnished by his association with Ferrie.

He

was also accused by several cuban exiles of

misappropriation of funds.

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David Ferrie - 14

It Z8/ an intensive New Orleans police investigation

of the charges against Ferrie produced statements from

several boys that Ferrie had committed indecent acts

117

with them.

The boys also told investigators Ferrie had

told them he had had homosexual relations with a married

118

man in Houston.

. On August 26, Eastern Airlines

119

removed him from the payroll for an indefinite period

and the Federal Aviation Administration then opened its

120

own investigation into the charges.

429) with his problems mounting, Ferrie sought

121

legal aid from New Orleans attorney G. Wray Gill, Sr.

Ferrie later testified that he and Gill had entered into

an agreement in March,, 1962 that Gill would represent

Ferrie in his legal difficulties in return for Ferrie's

122

research and investigative work on

other cases for Gill.

430)

Ferrie also testified that he also entered into

123

a similar arrangement in February, 1962 with Guy Banister,

124

a former FBI agent who ran

a private investigative firm.

By the terms of the agreement, Ferrie's work for

Banister included analyzing autopsy reports in payment

for Banister's investigative services.

Banister stated

126

he handled Ferrie's case "personally".

(<431)

Ferrie may have first met Banister late

in 1960

or early 1961 when Banister, also a strong anti-Communist,

was helping to establish the "Friends of Democratic Cuba"

organization as

a adjunct to Sergio Arcacha

Smith's CRC.

At the time, Banister's investigative business

and the

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David Ferrie - 15

128

CRC were both located in the Balter Building. In Febru-

ary, 1961, Banister was conducting background investi-

gations of the members of the CRC from a list provided

by Arcacha Smith. In early, 1962, both moved their

offices to the Newnan Building, which carried the two

addresses for the two

streets it faced: 531 Lafayette

13I

and

544 Camp Street.

432) Jack Martin, a private investigator associated

132

with Banister, may also have been contacted by Ferrie

for assistance on his case. Ferrie testified in August

1963 that he had helped Martin on a case involving a

phoney religious

November, 1961. Later, Martin wrote letters to the FAA

134

and Eastern Airlines on Ferrie's behalf.

(433) With this assistance, Ferrie was able to xe-

solve many of his difficulties.. At the end of February

1962, Ferrie was tried and acquitted of the charges

of extortion.

The other charges were nolle prosequied

136

in November 1962.

434)

Ferrie sit managed to stay afloat financially

despite his loss of income from

Eastern Airlines in 1961.

Although he was categorized as a "poor" credit risk in

October 1962 by the New Orleans

137

Retail Credit Bureau,

made

net

Ferrie

se payments on his car and meet

living expenses. Meanwhile he was also attempting to

be reinstated

as an Eastern pilot. Attorney G. Wray

Gill notified Eastern when the last of the charges

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David Ferrie - 16

against Ferrie had been nolle prosequied;

Eastern re-

sponded. with

a letter inviting Ferrie to discuss the

charges at a meeting in Miami. Ferrie did not go.

Instead, several individuals, including one of the

who had been named in

a sex offense charge against

him, Yaste to Fastern to plead that ferrie be rein-

stated j44

Ferrie also filed a "grievance" against

Eastern. Then, in February, 1963, he went to Miami

with attorney Gill for the hearing

14 regarding his dis-

missal. Eastern ruled against him; Ferrie filed an-

other grievance.

435). Hearing dates were scheduled and rescheduled.

During this period, Ferrie

I was often seen

at Banister's

offices in 544 Camp Street as he prepared his case.

436) Ferrie's final grievance hearing was set for

July 15, 1963, in Miami. Ferrie, Gill and Banister

were in Miami on July 15, 16, and 17 while Eastern Air-

151

lines presented its case against Ferrie. The record of

these hearings reveal that the company's charges were

based on Ferrie's deliberate omissions and inaccuracies

in his original application to the company; charges of

Ferrie's moral turptitude; and his having misrepresented

152

himself as a medical doctor and psychologist..

153

437) The hearings were resumed on August 5th. Testi-

fying in Ferrie's defense were former CAP cadet John

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David

Ferrie - 17

Irion, Ferrie's long-time friend James Lewallen,

I54

Ferrie's investigator Guy Banister and Ferrie himself.

Layton Martens provided a sworn deposition in defense

155

of Ferrie's character. Banister testified to Ferrie's

good character supposedly based on his own investigation

156

of Ferrie.

In cross-examination Banister

could not rationalize to the satisfaction of the hearing

board the reasons for Ferrie's vitugerative remarks in

1961 against President Kennedy® nor could he adequately

explain Ferrie's involvement with a questionably legiti-

158

mate church group.

(438) On September 30, Ferrie received the final

decision from the Eastern appeal board:

a unanimously

160

upheld his discharge.

(439) By the Fall dE 1963, Fezrie had become actively.

involved in the defense investigation of Federal

charges of a fraudulent birth certificate against Carlos

Marcello, an alleged organized crime leader in New Or-

161

leans.

UU) Ferrie's ties to the Marcello organized crime family

apparently continued at least until July 1966. As of that

time, Ferrie was involved with Jacob Nastasi, a known associate

of the Marcello family who had been the subject of an FBI probe

of racketeering in the New Ofleans area, in

a commercial

cargo airline venture, Space Airfreight Lines, Inc.

Previously

he had been involved in the United Ait Taxi Service with

1633

other suspected Márcello associates.

(441) Ferrie's involvement with

Is cello may have

begun as early as the Spring of 1961.

An

unconfirmed

from the Immerarice and Naturalizarion service

Border Patrol report of February 1962Valleges that Ferrie

was the pilot who flew Carlos Marcello back into the

United States from Guatemala after he had been deported

in April 1961 as part of the U.S. Attorney feneral

Robert Kennedy's crackdown on organized crime. This

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David Ferrie - 18

may have helped Ferrie establish an enduring relation-

ship with the Marcello organized crime family-

442) The return of Marcello to the United States

(chronologically coincided with Ferrie's activities with

the Cuban Revolutionary Counsel

According to Carlos

Quiroga, a Cuban who had been involved with the.

CRC,

Ferrie often provided Arcacha Smith with fundso

stating;

"Ferrie lent him (Arcacha Smith) money

when he needed it for his family...He (Ferrie) had

hundred dollar bills around all the time,"

he had lost his job with the airlines

even after

(443) An FBI report of April, 1961 indicates Mar-

cello offered Arcacha Smith a deal whereby Marcello

would make a substantial donation to the movement in

return for

concessions in Cuba after Castro's over-

EM69

throw. One explanation of Ferrie's ability to provide

funds to Arcacha Smith may be that he acted as Marcello's

financial conduit.

(444) Another indication of an early ferrie relation

ship with the Marcello organized crime family may be

the legal assistance pathat Marcell Janyer, Jack wasserman,

provided to Ferrie associates, Layton Martens, who identified himself to

police

as

Arcacha

Smith's second-in-command, and Andrew

172

Blackmon. Both had been arrested shortly after Ferrie's

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David Ferrie - 19

173

arrest for indecent behavio

445) Ferrie's ties to the Marcello organized crime

family continued through his association.."

with G. Wray Gill, Sr., who was also attorney of re-

cord for Carlos Marcello.

(446) Ferrie told the fBI that he had begun work

on Marcello's case after his last Eastern grievance

175

hearing.

In telling the Bureau about his

work for Marcello, the mentioned only activities in

October and November.

(uT) He sald de wait to quatenala on bustress for

Marcello from October llth to October 18th and from

October 30th to November Ist. The day after Marcello's

trial started, November 5th, Ferrie purchased a -38

revolver. On the weekends of November 9th and 16th,

Ferrie stayed at Churchill Downs, Marcello's countryside

estate. He said he had gone there to map out strategy

180

for Marcello's trial.

THE DAY THE PRESIDENT WAS SHOT

(448)

New Orleans Police records for November 22, 1963

indicate that Guy Banister pistol-whipped Jack Martin

on the evening of the assassination in a heated

181

argument over 'long-distance telephone calls."

Although Martin reported the assault to the police,

Banister 182

he refused to press charges against tians.

Within

48 hours, however, Martin had the entire New Orleans

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David Ferrie - 20

police department out hunting for Davia Ferrie.

He

told the police

Kennedy assassination.

Let t agent, es polya in the

warerit that Ferrie was in

Texas on the day of the assassination; that he was

supposed to have been the getaway pilot in the assas-

sination; and that Ferrie had known Oswald from their

days together in the Civil Air Patrol, when Ferrie had

185

given Oswald instructions in the use of a rifle.

(449) In an attempt to locate ferrie for questioning.

police arrested two Ferrie associates, Layton Martens

and

Beauboeuf,

Ferrie's residence and charged

them with vagrancy.

187

Beauboeuf was uncooperative during

the questioning,

Martens was more talkative:

said

Gill had come by to relay a message to Ferrie that his

library card was found among Oswald's effects; allowil Minas

net the tase.

450) ferrie returned to New Orleans on the after

noon of November 25th. He and attorney Gill appeared

at the DA's office around 4:30 p.m. He was questioned

by the New Orleans police, the U. S. Secret Service

192

193

and the FBI. He denied ever seeing Oswald before.

(451) Fexrie said that he had been in New Orleans

until at least 9 p.m. on November 22nd, celebrating

194

Marcello's trial victory at the Royal Orleans.

He said

he then left the city with two friends for a little rest

and relaxation.

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David Ferrie - 21

(452) Ferrie's account of his travels between Novem-

ber 22nd and November 25th contains some contrdictions.

Ferrie said he left New Orleans by automobile, bound

for Housten and accompanied by Melvin Coffey and Al.

196.

Beauboeuf. The group checked in at the Alamotel early

November 23rd. That date on the motel registration

198

card was written over a November 22nd notation.

The motel employee said that was because of the early

howevey,

morning hour of the check-in,and that he is certain of

the correct date as the 23rd.

(453)

On the afternoon of the 23rd, Ferrie said he,

Beauboeuf and Coffey went figure skating at the Winter-

200

land Skating Rink. Wiret

201

The three then went to the Belair Skating Rink before

driving one hour to Galveston, Texas, where they arrived

at 9 p.m. and, shortly after, checked into the Driftwood

202

Motel.

(454) Check-in and check-out tinas for the Houston

and Galveston hotels conflict.

Alamotel records in

Houston indicate that Ferrie and his friends checked

into

the hotel early on

2othe 23rd and did not leave until & or

9 p.m. on the 24th. Yet the registration records and

witnesses at the Driftwood in Galveston show the three

registering 204

late on the 23rd and checking out at 10 a.m.

on the 24th.

455)

Records from

the motels indicate the group made

205

a number of phone calls. Two calls made from the Ala-

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David Ferrie - 22

motel

went to radio stations WSHO and WDSH in New Or-

206

leans:

A collect call went to the Town and Country

"Motel, Marcello's New Orleans headguarters®

756)

Evidence indicates that ferrie conducted his

own investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

Oswald's former landlady in New Orleans, Mrs. Jesse

Garner, told the Committee that as she recalls, Ferrie

visited her home on the night of the assassination and

208

asked about Oswald's library card. Mrs. Garner would

209

not talk to Ferrie.

(458)

Ferrie also talked with

several former members

in an attemst

of the Civil Air Patrola

to find out if any

former cadets recalled Lee Harvey Oswald in Ferrie's

squadron. Among those contacted was former cadet ROY

McCoy, who told the FBI that Ferrie had come by looking

for photographs of the cadets to see if Oswald was

21₽

pictured in any photos of Ferrie's squadron.

HH

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544 CAMP STREET

(460) on August 9, 1963, Ice Harvey Oswald was arrested

on Canal Street in New Orleans and charged with disturbing

1

the peace. The arrest was the result of a confrontation

with anti-Castro Cuban exile Carlos Bringuier and two

of his associates, Miguel Cruz and Celso Hernandez.

3

Oswald was handing out pro-Castro leaflets when Bringuier,

Hernandez

and Cruz approached him.

When Hernandez

tried

to take the leaflets from Oswald, a shouting match

The New Orleans police then intervened, arresting

began;

all four individuals.

(461) samples of the literature were.

confiscated by the

police.

One of the pamphlets bore the hand-stamped

imprint of an address for the Fair Play for Cuba

Committee of which Oswald was the president and only

member

8

in New Orleans-- as"544 Camp Street, New Orleans, La."

(462) This pamphlet was among the materials turned over by

the New Orleans police department to the Secret Service

9

following the assassination.

The Secret Service and the FBI

10

then set out to investigate the 544 Camp Street address.

These agencies established several facts:

(463) The address had been stamped with a home printing

kit in the same manner Oswald had stamped other literature

with his alias "A. J. Hidell" or "L. H. Oswald,"

indicating

it was by Oswald's own hand that the 544 Camp Street address

was printed on the pamphlet.

(404) It was learned also that Oswald had written to the

national president of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee,

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544

page

camp

Vincent T. Lee, on August 1, 1963, eight days before his

arrest.

In the letter, Oswald mentioned he had rented

an office for his local FPCC chapter, but was told to

vacate after three days because the building was to be

remodeled.

(465) The FBI and the Secret Service investigation

apparently focused on whether or not Oswald actually

14

had rented an office at the 544 Camp Street address.

(466) In interviews with the FBI and the Secret Service,

the building owner, Sam Newman, denied renting an office

to Oswald. .

Others renting office space at 544 Camp

Street were questioned and none recalled seeing Oswald

at the Newman building or elsewhere in New Orleans.

rowiener,

(467) Hower, During the course of that investigation"the

Secret Service received information that an office in the

Newman Building had been rented to the Cuban Revolutionary

Council from October 1961 through February 1962.

Leaders

of the CRC were contacted and asked if they had any associa-

tion with or knowledge of Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba

Committee.

The Cubans said they had none because they

had vacated the building fifteen months prior to Oswald's

19

appearance in New Orleans.

(See

soff

#63/ The investigation of a possible connection between

20

Oswald and the 544 Camp Street address was closed.

The

Warren Commission findingg concurred with the Secret

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544 Camp

page 3

Service report that no additional evidence had been

found to indicate Oswald ever maintained an office

21

at the 544 Camp Street address.

(469) The committee investigated the possibility of

a connection between Oswald and 544 Camp Street with

gure different results.

471) The Committee learned

fan its research that the

Newman building occupied the corner lot facing Lafayette

Square. On one side its address was

544 Camp Street.

23

Its other entrance was addressed 531 Lafayette Street.

It was

three-story granite structure owned and operated

by Sam Newman as a rental income property

for

commercial

offices.

(470)The Committee interviewed Sam Newman and other witnesses

to obtain a complete list of the occupants of the building

for the period from

May, 1963, when Oswald arrived in New

Orleans, to September, 1963, when he departed.

4T@/Newman told the .Committee he had great difficulty

renting space in the buidling. Consequently, there were

few tenantsvin the summer of 1963; The Camp Street address

was the main entrance to offices for two worker's

associations.

the Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Worker's Union and the

Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway

and

Motor Coach Employees

26

of America.

It was also the entrance

which led to the quarters of the the building's janitor,

27°

James Arthus. There was only one office at the Lafayette

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544 Camp

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Street address, that of Guy Banister Associates, a private

investigative firm.

The offices once rented by the

29

Cuban Revolutionary Council at 544 Camp still lay empty.

"Mancuso's", a small coffee shop, was located on the ground

floor with its own entrance onto the corner of Camp and

Lafayette streets.

(473) The Cormittee located and interviewed individuals associated

with these organizations. Whenever possible, the Committee

obtained relevant records from the organizations to check

for any link to Oswäld or persons implicated in the

assassination investigation. The Comittee investigation

produced no evidence of any connection between Oswald

and

any

person or organizations occupying

the

Newman Building

in 1963, except for that involving Guy Banister's private

detective agency.

(474) Before Inching tito a discussion of the investigation

of the Banister office,

this nateual set forth at the results

of the investigation into the other occupants of 544 Camp

Street.

(475) The Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employees Union is

known today as the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartender's

31

Union (International). Although the Committee was unable

to locate personnel who had worked in the office at 544 Camp

Street and had been interviewed by the Secret Service

following the assassination, the Committee did obtain

• a "master"

membership list from the union. The lists contained names of memkers for th

years. 1962 through 1964

were studied for names of

associates

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544 Camp Street

page 5

of Oswald or others of interest in the investigation.

Among the names appearing on the list as a member from.

33

October..30, 1962, "through April 1963" was Kerry Thornley,

who had been an dequaintance of Oswald's for "three or

four months

when both were stationed at the El Toro Marine

34

Corps base in Santa Aña, California.'

Later, Thornley

learned from newspaper accounts of Oswald's defection

to the soviet Unions

Thornley found the story so interesting

36

that he set out to write a novel based

on Oswald's defection.

(476) Nevertheless, the committee's investigation of kerry

Thornley uncovered nothing of significance in the appearance

of Thornley's name on the list of members of the union.

As reflected in the union's records, Thornley dropped his

37

membership after April 1963. Thornley had left New Orleans

to travel to California and Mexico and did not return to

38

New Orleans until August 1963, leaving little overlap of

time in which Oswald and Thornley could have possibly come

in' contact.

(477) In testimony before the coumittes Thomley has firmly denied

contact with Oswald at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans or

at any time since his Marine Corps days.

His statements

have been feund bugg

CoDe arenade and no evidence

has been found to contradict him.

(47) Committee investlantars located and intervieved leorge

S. Gay, present president of the Amalgamated Association of

Street Electric Railway and Motor Employees of America. Gay

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544 Camp Street

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has been president of the union since 1960

and confirmed

for the Committee that the union's office was located in the

42

Newman Building in 1963.

While Gay reiterated what he had

told Secret Service agents, that he did not recall

ever

43

seeing Oswald in the building, he told the Committee he

not in the office very much due to frequent business

trips.

He said he did not mingle with the other tenants

45

in the building. Gay believed the union's searetary at

the time, Mrs. Eugenia Donnelly, would have more information

46

about others in the Newman Building.

Subsequent attempts

to locate Donnelly proved futile and she is believed to be

47

deceased.

Unfortunately, she was not questioned by investi-

gating officials following the assassination of President

Kennedy•

(479) Jack Mancuso, owner of Mancuso's Coffee Shop located on

the ground floor of the Newman Building, was interviewed

48

by Committee investigators and

questioned about his

customers.

Mancuso recalled that Guy Banister and his associates Jack

Martin and David Ferrie were "steady" customers, but Mancuso

personally

49

could not recall ever having seen Oswald.

Mancuso was not

interviewed by FBI or Secret Service agents following the

50

assassination.

(480) James Arthus was interviewed by, Secret service agents

immediately following the assassination.

He told the

agents that an unknown man had attempted to rent an office

52

at 544 Camp Street, but that he had discouraged him.

Arthus

could not describe the amn and recommended the agents

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544 Camp Street

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speak with "Mrs. Downing", presumed to be Mrs. Donnelly,

since she had also seen the man and could possibly provide

53

a description of him.

As pointed out above, Mrs. Donnelly

was not interviewed by either the Secret Service of the FBI

on this matter. Arthus could not be

interviewed by the

Committee because he died in 1967.

481) The FBI and the Secret Service apparently failed to

question all the occupants of 544 Camp

Street, including

a witness who may have had information

about a man who

had attempted

to rent space there. While the FBI did

speak to Guy Banister, there is no indication from the

report of that interview that Banister was asked any

questions about Oswald. Instead, he was asked about

55

Sergio Arcacha Smith and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

($2) The overall investigation of the 541 Camp Street issue

at the time of the assassination was not thorough.

It is

not surprising, then, that significant links were never

discovered during the original investigation.

The

Committee concentrated on an investigation of the activities

and individuals in and around the office of Guy Banister,

since this was

the area of the least investigation in

the days following the assassination. Various resources

consulted

were tapped by the Committee for information regarding the

Banister and his colleagues a Then induded:

original.

documents from Banister's office collected during the

1967-69 investigation into the Kennedy assassination by the

New Orleans District Attorney; investigative reports

of

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544 Camp Street

page 8

the District Attorney's office dating from that investigation;

materails

amassed during the 1961-63 investigation

of David

Ferrie by Federal Aviation Administration officials

including

transcripts of Ferrie's grievance hearings;

information obtained from Aaron Kohn of the Metropolitan

Crime Commission of New Orleans; and information obtained

from reviews of relevant files of the FBI, Secret

Service, DOD and CIA. In addition, the Committee staf

Severa!

interviewed

many surviving witnesses, many of whom had

worked for or with Guy Banister.

483) According to one of Banister's own

biographical sketches

dated March 1964, he was born in a log cabin in rural

Louisiana in 1901, the eldest of seven children.

palice 'partment 0 f

started his carper in criminal justice with the Monroe,

Louisiana podiao deparineat?

In 1934 he became a Special

chas

Agent for the agency

of the Department of Justice which

58

was

soon to be named the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Banister served in the FBI for 20 years, 17 of those years

as Special Agent in Charge. He retired in 1954 to become

an assistant superintendent for the New Orleans police

department and was assigned the task of investigating

police corruption. After a falling out with the Mayor

of New Orleans, allegedly over Banister's attempt to

have the Mayor indicted on charges of "malfeasance, etc."

Banister quit public service and formed his own private

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544 Camp Street

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61

detective agency, Guy Banister Associates, Inc..

(414/ According to FBI files reviewed by Committee staff,

Banister also became very active in anti-Communist

activities after his seperation from the FBI and

testified before various investigatin bodies about the

62

dangers of Communism.

The CIA file on Guy Banister

indicates the Agency in septaban

•considered

utilizing Guy Banister Associates [as a cover mechanism

in september;

for collecting foreign intelligence.

The idea was

dropped when "derogatory"'data about Banister was

discovered during the Agency's security investigation

into Banister's background the files indicate there

64

was some concern over Banister's clash with the Mayor.

Early in 1961, Banister helped draw up a charter for

the

Friends of Democratic Cuba, an organization set up

as the fund-raising arm of Sergio Arcacha Smith's branch

65

of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

tee strif report

Banister described his work for the Council:

"Our work was primarily to gather food and

clothing for the refugees.

However because

and others, I have had high-ranking Cuban

refugees in my office asking me how to go

underground, and I gave them diagrams for

I have talked to military and political leaders

from the various provinces of Cuba that have

slipped out and slipped back."66

(445)

: The FBI files also indicate Banister was -forming

another service for the Cuban exile group. He ran

backround investigations off those Cuban students on the

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544 Camp Street

page 10

campus of Louisiana State University who wished to be

members of Arcacha Smtih's anti-Castro.

group, ferreting

67 Basister als:

out any pro-castro sympathizers who might be mong when Rewhere

(486) It was probably a result. of such anti-Castro activities

that Banister became acquainted with David Ferrie. Ferrie,

an Eastern Airlines pilot, was also very active with

6869

Sergio Arcacha Smith's anti-Castro group.

Ferrie shared

5970

Banister's anti-Communist and anti-Castro fervor:

(187) Both Ferrie and Banister were implicated in

a raid in late

1961 against a munitions depot in Houma, Louisiana,

in which

7071

various weapons, grenades and ammunition were stolen.

Banister's role may have been limited to storing the

materièl which was reportedly seen

stacked in Banister's

7172

back room by several witnesses.

Others who actually

participated in the raid, include Andrew Blackmon, a Ferrie

associate and former Civil Air Patrol cadet, and Sergio

7273

Arcacha Smtih.

(4) Intebruary 1962, Ferrie dague ask Banister's assistance

737%

in fighting his recent dismissal from Eastern Airlines.

Banister investigated the case for Ferrie's defense to

charges brought by the

airline and local New Orleans police

7475

of crimes against nature and extortion.

In exchange,

Ferrie provided Banister research services, such as analysis

75.76

of autopsy reports.

Banister worked with Ferrie's lawyer,

G. Wray Gill, on this matter until its

culmination

in Ferrie's

hearing before

the

Airline Pilot's grievance board in the

7677

summer of 1963.

Banister

testified on Ferrie's behalf

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544 Camp Street

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78

the

during those hearings.

According tonstatements of witnesses

in the fall of 1963, Ferrie and Banister worked together

again with G. Wray Gill for the defense

of New Orleans

78

organized crime head Carlos Marcello on a deportation case.

Little is known of Banister's exact contribution to that

investigation which ended in acquittal on the very day

79

and almost the very hour that President Kennedy was shot.

451) The long-standing relationship of Ferrie and Banister

is significant since Ferrie became a suspect in the Kennedy

808|

'assassination soon after it had occurred.

The information

to the District Attorney's office that had put the spotlight

8482

on Ferrie had emanated from Banister associate, Jack Martin.

As detailed elsewhere in the report, although Ferrie was

cleared of suspicion in

the assassination during the

original investigation, the Committee found persuasive

evidence of an association between Ferrie and Oswald.

(490) Although Banister was questioned by the fBI following

the assassination in regard to the activities of the CRC

at 544 Camp Street, the FBI and the Secret Service failed

to discover the significance of Banister's connection to

544 Camp Street; by vintue of ene buttaty chere betig the.

Location for his office

e Banister's close association

with a suspect in the assassination, David Ferrie;

and

Banister's close association with Ferrie's accuser, Jack Martin --

all of which begged the question of what; if anything,

was Banister's relationship to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(491) witnesses interviewed by the committee Indicate

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544 Camp Street

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Banister was

aware of Oswald and his Fair Play for

Cuba Committee before the assassination. Banister's

brother, Ross Banister, who is employed by the Louisiana

State Police, told the Committee that his brother had

mentioned seeing Oswald hand out Fair Play for Cuba

literature on one occasion. Ross Banister theorized

Oswald had used the 544 Camp Street address on his

04

literature to embarass Guy.

Ross Banister did confirm

Guy's interest in the assassination and Oswald, but knew

of no direct association between Oswald and Banister.

(U2) Ivan E. "Bil1" Nitschke, a friend and business associate

and former FBI agent:5

corroborates that Banister was

cognizant of Oswald's leafite distributing.

Nitschke

was deposed by the Committee in July 1978.

He testified

that he had known Banister when they were both in the

FBI and for a short time worked for Banister in the

37

office in the Newman Building.

(193) vitschke said he never saw lee Harvey Oswald at

544 Camp Street and does not know if Banister ever met

8 Muelles

Oswald.

However, Nitschke recalls that Banister became

"interested in Oswald" during the summer of 1963 when

Oswald had been distributing handbills.

Nitschke recalls

Banister had some of these handbills in his office or

90

made reference to them.

From the context of the conversation,

however, he was not pleased.")

(494) Delphine Roberts, Banister's Long-time friend and

secretary, stated to the Committee that Banister had gotten

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544 Camp Street

page 13

very angry with James Arthus and Sam Newman over Oswald's

92

use of the 544 Camp Street address on his handbills.

(495) The Committee questioned Sam Newman regarding

Roberts' allegation. Newman could not recall ever seeing

Oswald or renting space

to him.

He did recall, however,

asking a young man who was in the office once used by the

Cuban Revolutionary Council to leave. Newman did not

think this person was Oswald.

Newman theorized that if

Oswald was using the 544 Camp Street address and had any

link to the building, it would have been through a connection

960

to the Cuban Revolutionary Council or Banister's office.

496) The Committee questioned other individuals once

affiliated with Guy Banister, including: Joseph Newbrough, Verno

Gendes

an investigator who had worked with Banister in 1963; Mary

Helen Brengel, one of two secretaries in Banister's office

from approximately June 1963 to December 1963; Louise

Decker, a secretary in Banister's office for the period

19

from October 1961 to January 1962; Joseph Oster, one time

partner of Banister's who set up his own private detective

100

I agency, Southern Research, in 1958; and Carlos Quiroga,

the Cuban exile who visited Oswald at his home on

approximately August 16, 1963, endeavoring to learn more

198

about the FPCC.

Quiroga told the Committee he frequently

visited Banister's office and Mancuso's coffee shop in

the company of Sergio Arcacha Smith and David Ferrie when

102

all

were heavily involved in Cuban exile activities.

103

this would have been

in 1961 and 1962.

None of these

However,

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544 Camp Street

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individuals recalled seeing Oswald at 544 Camp Street.

Several witnesses recommended the Committee speak with

Jack Martin of Delphine Roberts since there were in most

contact with Banister.

(497) Martin and roberts have both been interviewed by

the Committee on several occasions.

Roberts, who initially

refused to speak with the Committee staff, told the

Committee she was very active in anti-Communist activities

10g

in the early 1960's.

She said she worked with Banister

as a volunteer typing correspondence, making

files and

clipping newspapers because Banister was working for what

Roberts believed in.

Roberts claimed Banister had

extensive file on Communists and fellow travelers, including

one

Lee Harvey Oswald, which was kept out of the

original files because Banister "never got around to

assigning a number to it! Roberts does not remember what

was in the file other than that it contained general

108

information on Oswald such as newspaper clippings.

Roberts

also related the incident described previously in this

section

in which

Banister became angry over Oswald's use of the

109

Camp. Street address.

Roberts fethersnerated her version of an

incident that took place late in the evening on the day of

the assassination. She said

Jack Martin came into the

office and

approached the area of the office where the

files were kept, when Banister walked ih!

Banister accused

Martin of

stealing several files and hiding them in his coat!!

When Martin protested, Banister pulled out his gun and

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544 Camp Street

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110

struck Martin on the head, causing him to bleed..

Both

men then went into Banister's

private office and continued

111,3

their discussion beyond Roberts' earshot.

498) During another interview, Roberts told the committee

that Oswald came into the office seeking employment and

sometime later brought Marina in with him. Contrary to her

statements in the inital interview, that she had never seen

oswald; she stated that she saw oswald come into Bansiter's

office on several occasions..

Because of such contradictions

in Roberts statements to the Committee and lack of independent

corroboration of many of her statements, the Committee

cannot attest to the reliability of her

statementsch hot be daisemined

(499) New orleans police complaint filed by Jack Martin.

òn November 22, 1963 corroborates Roberts' story

insofar

as it established Banister's assault against Jack

Martin with the pistol.

According to the report, Martin

and Banister had been drinking at a bar neighboring the

Newman Building, then visited the Banister's office and

became involved in various discussions about "personal and

political subjects." - They then began to argue about

unauthorized long-distance telephone calls which

Banister

Lie 11ỡ

accused Martin of making from the office.

The discussion

became more heated and Banister pulled out a .357 magnum revolver

and hit Martin on the head four or five times with the

butt of the gun.

When Martin began to bleed, Banister

stopped hitting him and Martin went to the restroom to

(an destig

clean up.

Banister told Martin to watch himself and be

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544 Camp Street

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121

117

careful.

Martin then went to Charity Hospital for trea

147

returned home and called the police to file the report.

Martin refused to press charges as Banister was "like a

father" to him.

(500) Martin was questioned by the committee regarding the

incident and for information about Banister's office.

Martin told the Committee he is a part-time investigator

122

124

and writer, as he was in the early 1960's. Martin was

one of the members of Banister's investigative "pool"

323/25

was frequently in and out of Banister's offce. Martin

told the Committee that on Nomeber 22, 1963, he was having

176 124

drinks with Banister at a local bar and they got into an argument.

They went to Banister's office and, in the heat of the quarrel,

Banister said something to which Martin replied, "What are

125127

you going to do -- kill me like you all did Kennedy?"

126168

Banister drew his pistol and beat Martin in the head.

Martin

beleives Banister would have killed him but for the intervention

of Banister's secretary, who pleaded with Banister not

127129

to shoot Martin.

(501) It was the day after this incident that Martin related

his suspicions about David Ferrie to the New Orleans

129130

District Attorney's office.

Martin had at one time been

129131

a close associate of Ferrie. Ferrie told the FBI he met

Martin in the fall of 1961, probably not long after Ferrie

13-9. 132

had met Banister.

Martin apparently shared Ferrie's

interest in obtaining a position with an ecclesiastical

order, although Ferrie insisted he became involved with

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Department

of Healli, Educatio:

these religious orders only to assist Martin in an

and Welle

Hew investigation into the sale of

13113 Phony certificates

of ordination and consecration.

Ferrie said he and Martin

had a falling out when he put Martin out of attorney

6. Wray Gill's office in June, 1963, because 6321 did

not want Martin "hanging around the office."

Gill said

Ferrie and Martin had been "close friends" until they

got involved in an "ecclesiastical deal wherein Martin

was supposed to represent a large territory of the Holy

133135

Apostolic Catholic Church of North America!'

Martin held

Ferrie responsible for not gettis?, the job and has "slandered

Ferrie at every opportunity."

(502) Martin has"told the Commitee he saw.

Lee Harvey Oswald

13-135 Nevertels

with Ferrie in Guy Banister's office in

1963. In light of

Martin's previous

statements to authorities

shortly after

the assassination in which Martin made no such allegation

about having

seen oswald, the do maybe assued that

platea

credence in Martin's statements to the Committee.

(503) The committee sought to trace Banister's office files

that had been reportedly scattered to various individuals

or agencies soon after Banister's death in June 1964.

(504) Mary Braister wilsoy fuy Braister's widow, told the

Committee she had not retained any of the files but had

given many away to various state agencies a 1g

Mrs. Wilson

said

she sold some of Banister's files fem shoe to the

Louisiana State Police in a transaction involving Russell

Willie anantag

-ptr Cambre of the State Police.

She said

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544 Camp Street

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another portion of the file was given to Aaron Kohn of the

New Oreans Metropolitan Crime Commission. i Several books

from Banister's collection went to Banister's associate,

1401470

Kent Courtney.

The rest of Banister's "extensive" library

of books It donated to the Louisiana state university

Library.

(505) 2usse11 Willie and Joseph Cambre of the Louisiana

State police confirmed for the Committee that they purchased

from Mary Banister in late 1964 a five-drawer file

cabinet containing file folders belonging to the late Guy

Banister. The "half-filled" file cabinet contained ten

743/45

large manila folders, each subject titled and numbered.

One of the folders contained a group of 3" by 5" index

M4176

cards.

index cards contained numbers and subject

145147

headings corresponding to the file folders in the cabinet.

Not all the files listed in the index were among those files

given to the Louisiana State Police; most of the files obtained

by the state police dealt with communist groups and subvers tig

organizations, according to State Police Officer Cambre.

Cambre recalled that although Lee Harvey Oswald's name

was not incided among the main subjects of the files, Oswald's

name was

included among the main subjects of the file

1047/449

on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Cambre had read the

FPCC file and found news clippings and a transcript of a

in which,

had parkopated,

radio program Oswald warren, presumably a transcript of the

August 21, 1963 debate between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier

148/50

on WDSU radio.

Unfortunately, this file was routinely

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544 Camp Street

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destroyed in keeping with the requirements of the Privacy

149/51

Act.

S00) Aaron Kohn, Managing Director of the New Orleans

Matropolitan Crime Commission, acknowledged that he

received files from Mary Banister Wilson after Guy Banister's

T50,15 b

death.

The files received by Kohn dealt with

an

investigation of corruption within the New Orleans Police

Department, which Banister had conducted while he

was

Assistant Auperintendent of Police in New Orleans in

the

1515}

mid-1950's.

C7) While the Committee was unable to trace or recover

all of Banister's files, a partial index of the files was

made available by Jim Garrison, former District Attorney

152/574

of Orleans Parish, Louisiana. Garrison had sent investigators

to the Louisiana State Police Intelligence Section in 1967

auring his investigation into the assassination of President

Kennedy•

The index did not include the name of Lee Harvey

19-5415%

Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

(SCO

Thus, the Committee could find no documentary

proof that Banister had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald

nor could

the Committee find credible witnesses who

ever saw Lee Harvey Oswald and Guy Banister together.

There are indications, however, that Banister at least

knew of Oswald's leafletting activities and probably

maintained a file on him. As for Jack Martin's reasons for

calling attention to Ferrie

as a suspect in the assassination,

they may not have been based on personal knowledge -- Martin

never claimed

such information -- but his action seems to

have been based on sincere concerns and some legitimate

ensequentl.

suspicions. The committed a mable to definitivelt.

determineVthe reasons for Banister's assault on Martin

the night of the assassination, Speches lether it had

anything to do with Martin's suspicions of Ferrie.

HH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 223

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## Page 224

IMPLICATIONS

559)

The primary import of the 544 Camp Street address

must be analyzed within the context of evidence of a Ferrie-

Osald link.

Unfortunately, the precise nature of

suet their relationship may never be known.

Ferrie

could have become familiar with Oswald and his background,

habits and motivating factors, and groomed Oswald

for

use in clandestine activity, perhaps initially along

the model of private investigator. MIs can be seen by

the Committee investigation into Ferrie's associations

and activities throughout his life and especially

during

the summer of 1963, there are several factors which

explainwhy Ferrie and Oswald could have become closely

associated, as improbable as this may seem.

611) A)

Both men spent considerable time in the same

locale:

Ferrie frequently visited the office of Guy Banister

in the building at 544 Camp Street,

Oswald worked only

one block

away and had used 544 Camp Street as the address

of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Additionally, the

ahundrey

witness Diggr

testimony of the "Clinton Witnesge

* placing Oswald and

maybe

Ferrie together in early September, 1963, jo credible.

(see tha ratinGastro comppinac/ section of that inadetent).

Evidence also exists to support the belief that Ferrie's

closest colleague, Guy Banister, was knowledgeable of

Oswald's pro-castro leafletting. edeces honaliste

512 BI

Both men had

similar, fervent interest in political

topics, especially the Cuban question. Although Ferrie

stood firmly on the anti-Castro side of the issue and

HH 53080

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---

## Page 225

pore

(573)

Strangely, although Ferrie seemed to be straightforward

during his interviews with FBI agents in discussing his

opposition to Kennedy, his conflict with Jack Martin, his

involvement in the Marcello case, etc.,

Ferrie denied outright

that he had ever known

"of the Cuban Revolutionary Front

maintaining

an office at 544 Camp Street, nor does he have

any knowledge of Sergio Arcacha Smith maintaining an office

at that address during the time he-was head of the organization

and later

after he was replaced. "I5T This is clearly in contra-

disction to the accounts of the witnesses on this subject.

HH 53080

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Page

225

---

## Page 226

Oswald was involved in pro-Castro activities, this alone

would

not rule out the possibility of

an Oswald-Ferrie

association. Oswald, on at least one occasion, made a

friendly overture to a known anti-Castro activitist,

Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate to the Student

Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and even offered Bringuier

assistance in military training of Cuban exiles. The

Oswald-Ferrie association may have begun in the same

manner.

14) S4 significant to the argument that Oswald and ferrie

were associated in 1963 is evidence of prior association

in 1955 when Ferrie was Captain of a Civil AIr Patrol

squadron and Oswald a young cadet.

(ste"Section on IM

emi Batyahh. This pupil-teacher relationship

could

have greatly facilitated their reacquaintance and Ferrie's

noted ability to influence others could have been

utilized with Oswald.

515) 2) Ferrie's experience with the underground activities

of the Cuban exile movement and as a private investigator

for Carlos Marcello and Guy Banister might have made him

a good candidate to participate in a conspiracy plot.

He may not have been knowledgeable of what was to be the

outcome of his actions, but once the assassination had

been successfully completed and his own name cleared,

Ferrie would have had. no reason to reveal his knowledge

of the plot. Further, fear for his life may have prevented

him from doing

SO.

(516)

While great gaps exist in discovering whether

Ferrie

HH

53080

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Crime

---

## Page 227

had any contact with Oswald after Oswald left New Orleans

on September 24, 1963 until the day of the assassination

only two months later, the Oswald-Ferrie relationship

is the most significant of the Oswald

associations in

thoerizing an assassination conspiracy.

of report de organet

HH 53080

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## Page 228

ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACY?

Footnotes

1.

"The Investigation of the Assassination of President John

o 2.

Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence

Actly 4723/76,

Memorahdu a Villam T. Coleman Jr.

and W. David Slawson

to Warren Commission, pp. 110-111, JFK Document No. 013/05).

3. "The Longest Night," Miami Herald, Tropic, 12/28/75, p. 7.

4. Ibid.

5. Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs. Norton, 1964. p. 17:

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid, p. 18.

8. "U.S. Seizes Batista Backer in Miami," New York Times,

4/9/61, p.

10. Paul Bethel, The Losers. Arlington House, 1969, p. 102.

11. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," March 10, 1952 - Octo-

Bier, 221, 19.02," • Legislative Reference

Congress, P. 6. JFK Document No.Ol3lo5yace, Library of

• 12. Ibia.

13. Mario Lazo, Dagger In the Heart, Funk & Wagnalls, 1968, p. 186.

14, Ibid.

• 15. * Sotnote # 11,

"A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro,"

016. Ibid.

See footrole "5

17-La-

Bag-Johnson

p. 23.

p. 7.

18. Ibid.

19.

Ibia.

HH 53080

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Page 228

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## Page 229

2.

footnotes - Anti-Castro

20.

Ibia, p. 24.

21.

122.

set a necta intonology on cuba and castro, " ere

,23.

Ibid.

see Footnok #5,.

24.01

Hones Jehnson ep leite p. 18.

Ibid.

1/26/60,

1809 p. 9.

28.

Ibid, p. 28.

Ibid, p. 19.

Ibid.

, 29.

"U.S.-Cuba Relations,

1959-1964: An Analysis," Congressional

Research Service, (JFK Document No. 011478)

see botnoe #5

30.

Hagnes Johnson, op, eit. pp. 23-31.

31.

Ibid, p. 27.

32.

Ibids p. 76.

33.

Ibid, p. 222.

34 SenSelected Chronology on Cuba and Castro, "@BEl 4/18/61, p.26.

Executes Asson Testiny 3/16/78 Runs oute HOUSESINATION:

See footnote #il,

"A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," @PlOdel 4/24/61, p.29.

seetootnote #5,

37.

Heynes Johnson ancierp. 213.

See tootrote # 13

38.

39.

Mazo lazor one gie.

Ibid, p. 299.

40.

Taylor Branch and George Crile III, "The Kennedy Vendetta,"

Harper's, 8/75, p.49.

botnote st 29,

Sel iT.S.-Cuba Relations,"

CRedity p. 39.

42.

43.

44.

Ibid, p. 40.

Ibia, p. 41.

Ibid.

HH 53080

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## Page 230

3:

footnotes - Anti-Castro

Ibid, p. 42.

See footnok #!,

46.Л #The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F.

Kennedy @ Book V, OR loD p. 11,

footnote 4.

47.

Ibid, p. 99.

Ibid; See Also: "Our Heritage--The Exile Cuban Terrorists,"

Washington Post, 11/7/76, p. C3.

See footnote $40,

49.

Branch and Crile, COOl p. 49.

50.

Andrew St. George, "The Cold War Comes Home," Harper's, 11/73,

p. 70.

51. "How the CIA Operated in Dade," Miami Herald, 3/9/75, p. 1.

52. Ibid.

See totnoke #40,

Branch and Crile, eleciel p. 51.

54. Ibid.

see foonde #51,

56. 1 "How the CIA Operated in Dade," 01

57.

Ibid.

58.

p. 1.

of interviewor Ross

See footnote #40

ASSASSiNATIONS,

59. 1 Branch and Crile, m

2400 pp. 52, 56.

60. Ibia, p. 58.

63.

64.

65.

Ibid, p. 62.

So, footrole " Relations, " erecto p. 48.

Ibid, p. 49.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 53.

Ibid, p.

eit. p.

364.

68.

Ibid, p. 378.

HH 53080

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## Page 231

4:

footnotes - Anti-Castro

litt

69.

"A Selected Chronology on Cuba, April 1,

1963 - April 30,

1963." Legislative Reference Service, p. 1, (JFR Document

No. 013101)

70.

Ibid.

71.

Ibid.

72.

Ibia, p. 2.

73.

Ibid.

74. Ibid, p. 4.

75.

"U.S. Nabs Anti-Castro Fighters," Miami Herald, 12/5/62,

p. 21A.

it 77.

76.

New Orleans Times-Picayune, 8/1/63, p. 1.

"U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963: Neutrality Enforcement

and the Cuban Exiles

During The Kenned

Administration,"

ongressional Research Service, p. 12, JFK Document No. 013097

78.

Ibia.

79. Ibid:

80.

Ibid.

see sootnote * @ 69,

81.

"A Selected Chrondogy on Cuba, " 08200l 4/6/63, p. 4.

82. Ibid, 4/7/63, p. 5.

83. Ibid, 4/20/63, p. 18.

84. Ibia, 4/10/63, p. 7.

85.

Ibid, 4/15/63, p. 10.

86.

Ibia, 4/18/63, p. 12.

87.

Ibid, 4/15/63, p. 10.

See footnote # 69

88.

'A Selected Chronology on Cuba,

see footnote $ 77

89.

"U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963," o

210/10/62, p. 24.

p. 8.

90.

91.

Ibia.

Ibid

HH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 231

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## Page 232

rootnotes - Anti-Castro

See footnote #69,

92. ^"A Selected Chronology on Cuba,"

Cite 4/26/63, p. 24.

93.

Ibid, 5/21/63, p. 10.

94.

Ibid, 6/12/63, p. 5.

see footnote $ 77

"U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963, Neutrality Enforcement,<

94 p. 9;

See footinete * 29

96. 1"U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1959-1964: An Analysis,"

00688 р. 69.

97.

Ibid. p. 71.

за 100.

jummary of Financial Support to Manuel Artimé.

See footnote+ 60

99. ^"A Selected Chronology on Cuba," @VOlita 4/19/63, p. 16.

Paris Flammonde,

Document No. 013106,

"Why President Kennedy Was Killed." ps: 69, JFK

101.

Ibid.

102.

Ibid›aa Associate Press dispatch, 5/10/63.

103. See fate Johnso

Haynes Johnson, spOlert pp. 75-76. (In a footnote in later

saltions, Johnson notes that after initial publication of

his book

"the CIA let it be known that Frank Bender denied

-- in writing -- making such statements.")

104. he navestigation of the Assassination of President John.

F. Rennedy, Book V, coit

p. 14.

105.

"Our Heritage-The Exile Cuban Terrorists," Washington Post,

11/7/76, р. С3.

HH 53080 DocId: 32273595

Page 232

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## Page 233

Footnotes

-

Odio

1. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination

of President Kennedy -- herein after, Warren Report --

1964, pP. 322-324.

2. Ibid.

FBI report LA 105-15823, 9/23/64, Warren Commission

Document 1553, p. 4.

4. FBI report DI 100-10461, 9/10/64, pp. 2,3, Warren

Commission Exhibit 3147.

5. Ibial

Report of the Predent's

Commission a le Assassination of

6. Warren Repast, Pu333, OffICE

friendent Kennedy, zest 4) p 333 (hereing une

U.s. Greemed Punting

warren Repent).

7. Commission Exhibit 2134; Commission Exhibit 2962.

8. Commission Exhibit 3045.

9. Warren Report, p. 730.

10. Commission Exhibit 3045.

11. Warren Report, p. 324.

12. FBI report PX 105-1529, 9/18/64, Commission Document 1553.

13. FBI memorandum, Miami 9/26/64, Commission Document 1553.

14. FBI report LA 105-1582, 9/20/64, Commission Document 1553.

15. Ibid, p. 8.

16. FBI memorandum, Miami, 10/2/64, Commission Document 1553.

17. Ibia.

18. Ibia.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibia.

21. Warren Report, p. 324.

22. "U.S. Nabs Anti-Castro Fighters," Miami Herald, 12/5/62, p. 21i

HH 53080

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## Page 234

tootnotes Ud1o

23.

Ibid.

24.

25.

"A Selected Chronology on Cuba," Congressional Research

Service, p. 54, (JFK Document No.

Statement of the chairman of the Committee for the

Monroe Doctrine, "A Selected Chronology on Cuba,".

Before the House telect Committle

Governient

26.

Punting Office, 1979, PP: 50-54) House Screet Commi tree

27.

A 5/23/78,Vp. 5, (JFK Document No.

ASSASSINATIONS,

Staff Interview of Lieuirence Howard,

008962)

Зін меси ст ма ва, 12/3/77 48р. 1 8К Досие то

ASSASSINATIONS,

003537)

aude jelect Cimmitte

29.

ASSASSINATIERS,

ain memorandum, 1/8/76,NJFK Document No. 013336

30.

Ibie.

31.

Ibid.

32.

"Exiles Fear Parents Shot By Cuban Red Firing Squad,

dis a ten Fonta

33

4/30/76,1p. 1, (JFK Document No. 013337)

34.

1/16/76, P. 4, (JFK: Document No. 013339)

See footnote 322,

35. ^ Dallas News 5/5/62, #

Fonzi interview 4/30/76, •

37.

fbia.

38.

Ibid.

AmAdoR

39. Stuff interview of lee Odio.

Slawse Seteet Committee on

3, 9/5/77, (JFK Document No. 013334)

ASSASSINATIONS

40.

Ibid.

see footnote, 33,

41. ^ Fonzi interview, 4/30/76,

42.

Ibia.

43.

See section of report dealing with alleged relationship

44.

45.

XI, p. 370 &Hereinafter the

warren Commission Hearing)

Ibia.

46..

FBI report NO 100-16601, 9/21/64, Warren Commission Document

1553.

1H 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 234

---

## Page 235

3.

47. Ibid

48.

Ibid.

See footnote # 32,

49. Л

5/5/62, 291371

Seleet Cmmittee

ASSASSiNATiONS,

50.

4/5/76, JFK

ocument No. 013342)

51.

Ibid.

Ibid.

52.

53.

Ibid.

54.

Ibid.

House Select Committee

ASSASSINATIONS,

55.

Deposition of Silvia odio, 5/2/78,^p.. 6, GFK Document

009088) See footnote 501 memorandum re

56.

Ibia, p. 6; also taff theme of lucill connell;

sara and FBI report DL 44-1639, 11/29/63, Warren

Commission Document 205, p. 641, (JFK Document No. 000200):

See footnote # 55,

57. 1 Odio deposition,

p. 8.

? See tootnake"

oF Silvia Odio

Interview, 1/16/76 8

Affidavit of

59.

No: 012269)

P: 1. House

Selent Committee

Assessimations,

Annie Odio, 9/20/78, (JFK Document

60.

Ibid.

see allo fodnake * 55,

61.

Ibid

Odio deposition,

5t089

pp. 8, 15, 21.

62.

Sekeet Committer on Assassinatin

Ibid; also

memorandum and photographs, 8/23/78, ^

UFK Document No. 013335)

63.

Ibid.

e footrak #5.

• Odio depositior

See banded 59, Affidait of

65.

¡ Annie Odio,

p. 1.

66.

67.

68.

69.

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 2.

Ibid, p.

1.

HH 53080

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## Page 236

70. Ibid

71. Ibia, p. 2.

72. Ibid.

73.

Ibia.

See footnoe $55,

74: ^ Odio deposition,

pp. 9, 14.

75. Ibia.

76.

Ibid, pp. 11, 12.

77.

Ibid, pp. 10, 11.

78.

Ibid, p. 10.

79.

Ibid, p. 13.

80.

Ibid.

81.

Ibid, p. 16,

ce sootroti" 59, Albidavi

82.

1a of Annie Odi0,

p. 2.

Soe toonote $ 55,

83.

Odio deposition, ensemi

8 p. 15.

84. Ibia, p. 20.

85. Ibid. p. 33.

de tootnote $55

86.

Warren

Commission Hearings, Vol.

XI,

p.

370; "Odio

deposition, ausras pp. 11, 16,

35.

See footnote +55,

88. ^ Odio deposition, m

pp. 11, 70.

89.

Ibia, p. 70.

90.

Ibia, pp. 15, 21,

24.

91.

Ibid. p. 60.

Warren Report, p. 324.

See tootnote $55,

93.

Odio deposition,

• p. 53.

Ibid.

Bedron 459, Allidail

of Annie Odio, 7

p.: 2.

HH 53080

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## Page 237

See footnote 955,

96.

Odio deposition,

p.

53.

97. Ibid, p. 12.

98.

Ibid, p. 28.

99.

Ibia.

100.

Ibide

101.

Ibide p. 30.

102.

Ibid.

103. Ibide, P. 31.

104.

Ibid, p. 32, 50.

105.

Warren Report, p. 324.

see toutrok* 55,

106. Odio deposition,

p. 44.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid, p. 62.

109.

Ibia.

110.

Ibid, p. 63.

111. Ibide

112. Ibid, p. 64.

113. Ibia.

114. Ibid, pp. 65-66.

see foom ot d59, Affidarit

115.^

# of Annie Odio, En

116.

117.

pp. 2-4.

Ibia, p. 4.

Contact Report with Lucille Connell, 5/15/78, (JFK

Document No. 013340).

soe also joumote,

on state mender if Lucille

Ibid;

Connell interview, &

ama Connel da

p. 2.

119.

120.

Ibia.

121. Ibia

HH 53080

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## Page 238

122.

123.

124.

125.

126.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid p. 3.

Ibid; Also FBI report DL 44-1639, 11/29/63.

N.B.: The

Committee is puzzled by and cannot resolve

the

inconsistency of the substance of this and certain

elated FBI reports.

DI 44-1639 states only that

Connell said that Odio told her that she knew Oswal

and that he had spoken to groups of refugees in Dallas.

Nothing is noted about a visit of three men.

told a Committee investigator (Fonzi memorandum, op.

cit. p. 3) that she doesn't recall ever telling the

FBI that.

Neither does the FBI report of the Bureau's

initial

interview with Odio on 12/19/63 (report DI 100-10461)

€ does not note Connell's report of her conversation

with her friend, Mrs. Sanford Pick, regarding Ruby's

visiting the law firm where Pick worked.

Connell

said she is positive she told that

to

the FBI.

The

Committee has found that neither Pick nor the attorney

who handled Ruby's case at the law firm were questioned

by the FBI.

(Fonzi memorandum, op. cit. pp. 4-6)

But because neither Pick nor the attorney, Graham R.E.

Koch, could specifically recall Ruby requesting power

of attorney for his sister and because, according to

Koch, his firm's records on the case were later

routinely destroyed (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit),

the Committee was unable to further pursue the possibility.

see footroke * 55,

127. 1 Odio deposition, p. 43.

see footrole "39, Statt

al interview, arraora p. 2.

129. Warren Commission Odio Exhibit No. 1, Vol. XX, p.690.

130. Ibia.

131. Contact Report, 5/17/78,(JFK Document No. 013341).

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Contact Report with Lucille Connell,

HH 53080

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## Page 239

136. Ibid.

137.

Ibid.

see soatmek *s?

138. a Odio deposition,

p. 40.

139.

Griffin memorandum to Slawson, 5/16/64, JFK Document

No. 002969

140.

Deppitin ot, 2 utm C Ei1 1h1/18 ,

, p. 5, JEK Document

No. 010069 J

141.

Ibid, p. 5.

142.

See

Footnoke &139,

FBI report DL 100-10461, 12/19/63; also Griffin

memorandum.

143.

FBI report DL 100-10461 op. cit.

144 Frtetin mer

Griffin memorandum, meraty.

1450

Ibia.

See footrote

140, Depostion of De. Burton C. Einspruch,

146.

07 szrata p. 4.

147.

Ibid, p. 6.

148.

Ibidu p. 13.

149. 1

Ibidy p. 9.

150.

Ibid, p. 10.

151.

Ioid, p. 9.

152.

Ibid.

153.

Ibid, p. 17.

154.

Ibid, pp. 14-15.

See footnok d

32

155.

Dallas News, 5/5/62, B4

156.

Ibid.

i sootok *3a, Abf. dand A

Fitu RiEea

'Sce foomoke a 39, staft

-= Annie Odio• tr

see also footrote* 33

158 .

soegahaa interview, syckntshus Fonzi interview.

Staff interruew

159.

icTare Tomas and Alentado,

8/26/78,

JFK Document No. 013338.

>House Select Committec on AsSASSINATIONS,

HH 53080

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Page 239

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## Page 240

8.

160.

161.

Ibia.

osa interview of Mando Kay,

Faram.

meet tor

Housessass, nations,

Seleet Committee on

6/28/78,"(JFK (JFK Document NO. 013333)

162.

Ibid, p. 8.

163.

Ibid.

164.

Ibia

165.

Ibia.

166.

Ibia.

See foothole * 55,

167.

Odio deposition, i

STAft

168.

Steal memorandum, 8/30,78, (JFK Document No.013332).

169.

Ibid.

170.

Ibid.

TH 53080 DocId: 32273595. Page 240

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## Page 241

VECIANA

FOOTNOTES

Interview of Antonio Veciana Blauch by Gaeton Fonzi,

m 1: Ball estatices, 3/2/16, p. 1.(JFK Document NO. 012927).

2.

The Investigation of the Assassination of President

John F.

Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence

Agencies, Book V, Final Report of the Select Committee

To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To

Intelligence Activities.

94th Congress,

2nd Session,

Senate Report No. 94-755. FanGaeton Fondl,

3.

* Memorandum to Marston, 3/3/76, JFK Document No. 012924).

See footnote *!,

d 4.

Fonzi intervie

p. 4, (JFK Document No.012927)

5.

see

Ibid, also pp. 1, 2, 5,6.

6.

Eleéttivé session, 4/26/78, ppo 23-27.

7.

Lever srom Sénator Richard S. Schweiker to House Seleet Committee on

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16:

17.

18.

19.

Excut me tons 216/1871614. See footnok #l, p.t.

llinSe228L8)"'Sugar King a Many-sided Man," N.Y. TIMES,

Executive Session

275, 57}

7/20/58.

101a

, p. 6.

restimony"

Antonio Veciana Blauch, 4|25/78

teaump Before the House Select Committee i

Ibid,

p.

7.

AssASSINATIONS, pit (hereinäfter Exccutre

Ibid.

p.

5.

Session Testuony, 4(25/18)

Ibid,

p. 8.

Ibid, p. 9.

fRom gacton Fonzi,

told Memorandum, 1/17/77, (JFK Document No. 0 12922).

My 14 Months With Castro, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet,

world Publishing Co., p. 111.

Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 10.

20. Ibid, p. 11.

21.

Ibid, p. 12.

22.

Ibid.

23.

Ibide p.

.15.

HH 53080

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## Page 242

Veciana footnotes - 2'

Blanch, 4126/78, Hearing

24.

Ibia, p. 14.

Before the House selet

25.

Ibid, p. 18.

vecia emmittee an AssASS INATIONS,,

26.

Ibid, p. 19.

antonio

95 Congress, 2nd Session, wAshington

27.

Immunized testimony 064/26/79-p- 68. OFFiCE,

.. is gorerament frinting

19, p. 68. (hereinafter

28.

Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 21:

Immunized testimony

412688)

se footnote!

WN 29.

Bonzi Interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 012427)

30.

Ibia.

Tent mony

31.

Executive Session, 4/25/78, pp. 21, 59.

32. Ibia, p. 22.

33. Ibid. p. 26.

34. Ibid p. 25.

35.

Ibid, p. 26.25.

36.

Ibid, p. 24.

37.

U.S. News & World Report, 10/29/62, p. 40.

38.

New York Times, 9/14/62, p. 13.

39.

Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 72.

Testimony

40. 'Executive Session,

4/25/78, p. 27.

41. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 88.

42. Ibid, P.89.

Committee

Assassinations,

на 43.

outside Contact Reporton 8/30/78,1 JFK Document No. 0 11267

44:

Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 26.

45. Ibid, p. 28.

46. Ibid, p. 27.

47. Ibid, p. 28.

48. Ibid

49. Ibid, p. 38.39

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Veciana footnotes - 3

иа

50.

Ibid;

Department of State, Telegram, JFK Document No. 012920)

51. ^ Executive Session,

To a tonio Vecion lau, See mean Before

Sotrok # 1

52.

i piterview notes, 3/2/76, g:.

919, р- 38,5. Ските Ексна

53. Separtment of State, telegrams

JFK Document NO. 012920) 14770n

54.

Done fantasket dotes, 3/2/76, p. 5: (1FK Doument NO. 012927).

Testimmy,

55.

Executive Session,

56.

Execute so are too a rapid of cut A 9.

57.

Immunized testimony,

4/26/78,

Tertiming,?. 53.

58.

Hoid. Executive SessIona 4/26/18,p.42

59.

IBiP., p.43

see footnote

60.

veer teetes, 3/2/16, p. 9, (iFK Document NO. 012927)

61.

Ibid.

Interview of Antonio Veciana Blanch by gaeton Fonzi,

62.

Rolates 3/11/16, JFK Document No. 012929

63.

64.

65.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Immunized testimony#62

4/26/78, p. 73.

66.

iN 69.

67:

Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 19. Ibid, P.4.

4/20/78

68..

attle Executive Sesam Testimony p: 19

see toothole # 1,

70.

Ibidi Mona Intervier nokes 78/242 7, (El Document No. 012929

Ibid.

71.

Executive Session'

Testimony,

72.

da 73.

74.

75.

76.

Ibid, p. 21.

5629 09 018

Hoverange

see toothoket!

Fenzi interview notes,

• 3/2/76, P. 7. JFK DoCUMeNT No. 012927

Testimony,

Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 31.

28,

Ibid, pA., 36.

Ibid, pp

29730.

WH 53080 DocId:32273595 Paye 243

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## Page 244

Veciana footnotes

77.

Ibidy p. 28.

78.

Ibid, p.

29.

79.

Ibid.

80.

Ibid, P. 37.

81.

Ibid, p- 32.

AN 82. FaCe, footnot a notar, 3/2/76, (JFK Document NO. 012927)

83. Ibia

frem gacton FonzI

AM 84.

Form Memorandum to Marston, 3/4/76, p. 1, (JFK Document No.012923)

пул 85.

86.

some need no, 2217602,10, (X Document No. N0.012927)

from gacton

«ela Memorandum to Marston' 3/4/16, (k Document No. 012923).

87.

Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 9.

House Select Committee

ASSASSINATIONS,

88.

@ll staff interview with lopez-Fresquet, 5/30/77? p. 13,

JFK Document No. 001512

89. Ibid, p. 9

from Gaeton Fonzi

ur 90. Bonzi Memorandum, 1/27/76, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 012919)

91.

"Revolucion," 11/7/61, p. 1.

ма 92.

Rote footroteion notes, 3/2/76, p. 6, (JFK Document No. 012927).

93. Ibid.

andum

94. CIA Memo

to FBI (Secret), 9/11/62; Rorke pamphlet attachment.

95.

Testimony,

Executive Session^ 4/25/78, p. 18:

ra 96.

Staff mememorandum,

Document No. 010307 kai1 interview, 1/24/78, p. 1, (JEK

97.

Ibid,

98.

99.

Ibia, p. a.5.

Ibid, p. 2.

100.

Ibid.

101.

Ibia.

102.

Ibid.

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Veciana footnotes - 5

103.

Ibid, p. 4

104.

Castro Report, (JFK Document No. 000593.

105.

StRE venerandum teenis interview, 3/30/78, p. 4.

(JFK Document No. 008888)

106.

Ibid.

107.

Ibid.

108.

109. Ibid.

of Lucilo

Staff Memorandumh Pena interview, 6/12/18, (JFK Document No. 009270

110.

Ibia.

111.

Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 54.

112

Staff Memorandumor Pena interview, 6/12/78, P. 2, JFK

Document No. 009270).

113.

Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid; Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 54.

116.

Miami Herald, 10/16/76, p. 8

117.

FBI file #2-2173, Sec. 6, Serials 231.

118.

Sta Memora dunesada interview, 6/17/18, p. 1, (JFK

119.

Ibid, p. 2.

120.

Ibid.

121.

Ibid.

122.

123.

Ibid.

Ibid.

124.

125.

126.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 1.

Ibid, p. 3

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• 487 Veciana footnotes - 6

Testimony,

127.

Ba 128.

129.

130.

Executive Session^ 4/26/78, Pf. 28=30.

Fo otroester notes, 3/2/16, P. 8, JFK Document No. 012921

Ibid.

Ibid; Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 28.

131.

of casts quelermo Houre Select Cammittee an ASSASSInAROns,

-132. Del interviewA 8/23/18° PP. tHaire Seket CommitE in AssAsSInATIONs,

4133. Outside Contact Report, 8/30/78/ p. 1, JFK Document No. 0 11267

by gaeton forz

Uo1134.

«@zi) Interview notes? 3/16/18, P. 5, (JEK Document NO. 012928)

м. 135.

Outside Contact Report, 8/30/78, P. 2, (JFK Document No. 011267)

136.

Ibid.

137.

• 138.

' 139.

140

141.

Ibid, p. 7.

Ibia, p. 12.

Ibidi p. 13.

Ibid.

Ibid. p. 7.

Ibide p. 9.

Ibid, p. 11.

Ibie

House Select Committee on AsSASSinATIons,

Outside Contact Report, 9/12/78, (JFK Document No. 011465)

Ibid.

Ibid.

House Select Committee on ASSASSINATIOnS,

Outside Contact Repoxt, 8/30/782 p. 1, (JFK Document No. 011267).

151.

Immunized testimony'lecono

Stast

of Antonio

4/26/78 Länch,

65÷66.

w4152.

Forzi Interview notes 1.3/11/76, p. 4, (JFK Document No. 012929,

153.

Ibid.

HH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 246

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## Page 247

• $88. Veciana footnotes. - 7

154.

Ibia.

155.

156.

Let a 22412 utile Document 10. 000 521)

mit to 1e

8Ol Memorandu 016/16, p. 2, (SEX Document No. 012921).

175

158.

Executive Session, 11/27/76.

176

159. Ibid.

Nightwatch, David Phillips, 1977, Atheneum

p. 5.

Ibid.

fost

Houre Seteet Conmittee an AssASSINATIONS,

1767.

180

163.

16

182

165

183

166.

18Y

167.

185

168.

Staff interview of erozier, 1/16/78, pp. 1,3; JFK

Document No 005063004721)

Ibid, p. 2.

Ibid, p. 4.

Give Us This Day. Popular Library edition, p. 26.

Ibid.

Memorandum

OF

Crozier interview, 2/4/78, p. 1, (JFK

Document No. 005063)

Ibid, p. 2

Ibid.

198,

see Gupton insert - CIA, INSERT B

194

see Phillips insert - cIA Insertc

21

07

Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 70.

08

Ibid.

elertrom the Chief Counsel of the House telect Committee

MASSASSIMATIOnS

can to CIA Office of Legislative

3/2/78.

Houe Seleet Committee on ASSASSiNATIONS,

Outside Contact Report, 3/31/78,0p. 4, JFK Document No. 006911..

2"',

see H. insert & McCone insert - CIA Insert D

1H 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 247

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## Page 248

INSERT

add to footnotes - Veciana

158

€t5Za.

fem Gacton Fonzi,

Ponri Memorandum to Gustavson, 9/20/76, (JFK Document

No. 013455.

Ibid.

Ibide p. 3.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 4.

Ibid, p. 3.

HH 53080

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## Page 249

footnotes for VECIANA

Gupton section

INSERT B

House Select Committee in

of Doug Guptos,

1 ASSASSINATION,

187 770.

Staff interview, 8/28/78, JFK Document No. 002102

188-777.

Ibide

189772.

Ibia.

190173.

Ibid.

191774.

Ibia, p.2.

192.775.

Ibia:

143 776.

Ibid.

1585-179.

Ibid.

195778.

Ibia.

196775

Ibia.

198180.

Ibid

198-757.

Ibia.

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, 99250

200 F83.

201 1et.

202 185.

203185.

204 z87.

205-188

206 t8s.

footnotes

for VECIANA - Phillips section

tearings before the MassAsSIAnos

Select

of

David Atle Phillips,

Executive Session, classified testimony, 4/25/78,2 p. 89.

Ibia

Ibia, p. 86.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Ibia, p. 95.

Ibia, p.

88.

Ibid, p.

90.

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DASENt D

footnotes for VECIANA -- B.H. section + M Cme

Comm.Htee Interviewof Be

211 191. Classiciot Top

Secret closed session, 8/10/78,

House Select

Committee on ASSASSINATIONS.

217795.

Ibid, p. 6.

213756.

Ibid, p.

8.

214197.

Ibid, p. 29.

215198.

Ibid, p. 30.

216799.

Ibia, p. 31.

2i7-270.

Ibid, p. 33.

71820t.

Ibid: p. 31.

211202.

Ibidi p. 32.

220203.

Ibid; p. 35.

221204.

fbid, p. 33.

222

223

Deportios of John A. McCane, House delit Committee

an AsSASSINATInA, 8/17/78, p.%.

Ibid.,

7p. 45-46.

HH

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Veciana footnotes

8

224 better fron the Chuf Counsel, Seket Ammtte a

Assass i marions,

SOCHiE Caundo OlEd to CIA Principal Coordinator,

8/16/78.

225

208.

Ibid, p. 2.

Houre Seleet Committee on Assassianims,

226

209.

CIA Principal Coordinator letter to

Chief Counsel,

9/8/78, Classified Confidential, IFK DoC. No.

#F---HSEA-Chief-Counsel-letter-to-S

27?

210.

212.

Z1I

Letter from the Chef Counsel, House Slut Committee 1, Aess, nprems,

Justice Department,

He ChidE Counset letter Attorney General,^ 3/9/78.

225

Letter from

House Setect Committee on ASSASSINATIN,

2IZ.

get Chief Counsel belter to Secretary of Defense, 3/9/78.

230

213.

FBI letter, 3/17/78, JFK

Document No. 006622);

Outside

contact Report, 4/19/18, (JFK Document No. 007369).

231

214.

Department of Defense file #AA 90 49

16; HSCA file

232

JAN

218

233

soats Interviem abels, 5/10/76,p.1,

JFK Document N0.012930

Etee. onAssassinations mat 30/h&

05281 010508130105245 0110189

234

235

236

237

238

CIA

DIR. 188531, 3/15/78

Ibid

die cable

CIA FilE, IN 2+738, 1/7/62.

Release: House delet Committle in Assassinations, 7/30/78

JFK Documents 0105283

010508; 010524; 011018.

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1.

CIA

Meno

Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

FOOTNOTES

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

10/30/67,

Hearumps Before the Horese

Selest Committce on Assassuations,

2

3.

.

4.10.

5.

6.Cl

7

9.110.

.

112.s0.

13.0

140.

115.00.

16.183.

delarona, p. 10.

HSCAME01 269.2

and

#105x78162=4

Teletype to Director

Cod Document

Elean E Miami, 9/1/60,

Bure u N6. 105-78462-4,

Dagger in the Hearty

By Mario Lazo,

Funk and Wagnalls,

p. 258.

Ibia

Give Us This

Day,

E. Howard Hunt,

Popular Library

Edition, n

ESCA: 01269D, (Sergzo

Arcacha Smith Black Line file,

FBI Airtel

to Director from SAC, New Orleans, 12/12/60-(5F Dicumant 012691)

Sas foo give Us

This Day, pp. 71-72.

Ibid. pp. 172-73.

Ibid p. 173.

Ibid. p. 154.

'"Battle of Miami"

Theodore A. Ediger,

Dallas Morning News,

7/1/62.

CIAA

Sub=

Ibid.

CIA

HSCH

Security File #020,

piran Handbook,

Memo alaska: 10/30/67,

House delut Committee on

assassinations

CIA/

file,

Classification:

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

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## Page 254

Classitication:

Footnotes

- CRC

Page

2

17. 018.

,9.

10).

20.122

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

2698. Su fr. 8

NSCA 1012743, Library of Congress

Selected Chronology on Cuba,

12/21/62• (JFK Document 012743)

See fn. 7

@partite

Give Us This Day, pP. 191-192.

See on.

HSEA Subcommittee Hearing Merchai6.19689R, Testimony

of Antonio de Varona. p. 23.

CIA/D

Cable.

4/9/63.

23.

124.

CIALOG.

Memo

10/30/67,

See f. 13,

aporciter

STAFF

Dallas Morning News/ House: delet Commelatio

Assasscrations,

•ISCA Security File,

JFK #0092,^FBI Senstudy Document, Volume 37,

Item 1, Cinal 100-422089, National Security Information -

Latin American Activities, 10/18/61.

29.26. Ibid

→.27. The

Losers by Paul D. Bethel,

1969 Arlington House, New Rochelle,

6028. Ibid: pp. 398-399.

1.29 трід. р. 399.

SOCIA

30.

eum, 1/4/64; CIA undated Document.

1331. 00

cited HSCA

#012743, 5/8/63.

237. Ibid, 4/15/63.

233. "Maceo Quits as

• Head of Cuba Group", Dallas Morning News,:

6/23/63.

а 34.

6751/63.(58k Docume

FBI #105-107224-126, Report from Miami;

ut 012 689, Item4)

Ibid

Classification:

1093!

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

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## Page 255

Classification: -

Footnotes - CRC

Page 3

37;

29.

38.48.

39.49.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

"Raid a Hoax. Cuban Exile Boss Quits"

Hendrix,

Miami News, 6/23/63.

Ibid.

19,

op Cites HSCA#0T2743: 6/24/63.

"Cuban Anti-Castro

Chief by Day Selling Cars in Jersey by Night",

New York Times, 8/22/64.

2:N0O0

Classification:

Classified by derivation:

17H 53080

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Foamotes

New Orleans Chapter

Cuban Revolutinary Council (CRC)

La Secret Service Report,

Lee Harvey oscados

12 9 63 cre ervic No. 0 2 34,030

CJFK Document NO. 003759)

16:0

3.

4 1 BID

5

Rapart of the President's Commission an the

ASSASSINATION OS President Kennedy,

Washington, DC Us Gorenment

Printing

1092

• House delut

Cimmellio a Assassiations, CER

Document No: 010458

10

Deposition of Ley Räbel

511178, Ноши

telet Committie an Aracsination PP 23,47

(JEK Document No 009 080)

EBID PP 21-22

See footnote NO. Lip 4.

HH

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12

See Sootnote, No 8; p. 45

1В10 2 41

FBI Report, 1 20/65, (JFK Documeit NO. 006305,

tem 9)

165

17

A BAND

19

20

CB ID

21 Saff Interrees of Frank Bartes,

House telect Committee as sassinations

3) 5/78, PaCOF Document No 007352)

22

23

ТВіД, р. 1

124

P (2

N# 53080

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25

1B0

IBID

AB 10

28

HH

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Footnotes - Brigade 2506 - Manuel Artime - Movimiento de

Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR)

1. "The Bay of Pigs", by Haynes Johnson, Orlando Sentinel

Star, 6/12/77, p. 1C.

2.

Ibid.

3.

Haynes Johnson,

The Bay of Pigs, W.w. Norton & Co.,

New

York, 1964, pp.

28-29.

4.

5 4A.

6

5.

t.

7

8

7.

98

Ibide, p. 24.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Ibid. , pP.

Ibid.

28-29.

Ibid.

10 я.

Ibia: : p: 37.

1/10.

Ibid...

pp. 34-42.

12NJ.

Ibid.

13 F7.

Ibid.,

p.

47

Ibid., p. 56.

15=4.

Ibid., pp. 32-39, 55.

16F3.

1778.

18 37.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., pp.

60-63.

FBI Report #105-87912, MRR miscellaneous references,

JFK

Document #012383.

19 =.

CIA/

* Document, 10/30/677

20.79.

21.70.

Ibid.

see fn.3

/Haynes Johnson, p. 62.

Classification: -

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HH 53080 DocId: 32273595

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## Page 260

Say of figs

Commander

Dies al 45

E FROM PACE TA

A stocky, gravel-voiced man, Ar-

idenis from

Eisenhower

Robert Kennedy.

When

President Kennedy

"ad-

dressed thousands of Cuban exiles

in the Orange Bowl in 1962; Artime

presented Kennedy the flag of Bri-

gade 2506.

* Engade leaders recently. demand.

jed return of the historic fiag from

the Kennedy library after Sen. Ed

ward Kennedy advocated renewed

¿relations with Castro.

& ARTIME. LED

guernilla

efforts

-against Castro with the support of

the ClA, although his active role in

¡commando

raids against

Cuba

ended in 1965.

His most recent exposure was on

- the CSS

News

documentary

"The

¡CIA's Secret Mamy,"

deschloed the Miami-based guerrilla

• War against Castro..

remembered as a fiery leader who

alter his split with Casiro wrote a

book - 20.000 Graves Cry Treason

- denouncing Communism.

As a prisoner for 21 months after

pressing his anguish for his home-

sand.

Antime

deplored terrors.

acts

within this country.

"AN ACT OF terrorism is a bomb

in the U.S. Post Office and the FBI

•(as occurred in a wave of Miami

order

to

paralyze

enemy," Artime said.

or hurt the

reasons for terrorist acts here.

less acts, like terrorism ..

- sald.

"You must understand it was

with an enormous pairiotic sense

and it is bad to hick them out to the

sircet...

dived i

con's edminic.ratinn

withdrew ils

suppoiled pringo: commandos.

grited the sii ailed was in priali.

atina for Sowin's trade with Cuba.

The commande. mid they had trit-

beat tiny intended to atiack.

Si PROMIS

"Aline Was spilled out ut cuba by the CiA.

Miami, NeRAld.

18.1877

A physicior, poet and frieud of presidents, Artime

Mas ched dy friends as "the best

orator we had in

a vile and a true patrlod."

11e 100gar with bidel Castro against Cuban diclator

•algenico Balistie, but broke with his comrade in 1900

iled Casio began leaning toward Communisin.

Iy' GUILLEMO NANTINEZ

ANd SATE WHEELER:

Herald Siall Wrllers

10. Mannel Arlime Mucza, Ieader of the 1961 Bay of

incasion did a respecled spokesinan in Miami's

1n rsile community, died of cancer Thursday night

In the abortive by of firs innston me a key planner

Captured along with 1,200 of his men, Artime spent

21 months In Cuban prisons, most of it in solitary con-

finement, until the Kcanedy Administration ransomed

the exile force in 1962.

Pedro Pablo Rojas, spokesman for Brigade 2506 of

the Hay of Pigs

Velerans Assoclation, said Thursday

thnt Artime dedicated his life lo the light against Cas-

tro "until the moment of his death."

Artime Icarned list

month that he bad terminal

cancer of the liver.

Even before the illness, he Teared

Tor Tus Tie because of his continuing chloris against

Fidel Castro.

He died at American Hospital. Funeral

arranges

iments at Rivero funcral home are incordre. Artinic's

parents still live In Cuba.

He also is survived ly his

ividov Adclaida and six children. They lived in a large

home in Northeast Miami.

"WITHDUT A DOUBT this is an irreparable loss 1o

tie cause of the Cuban crile,

said Miami Cily Co'i-

missioner Manolo Reboso, a Bay ol Pigs veteran and i.

close friend of Artime.

"As the leader of the Bay of Pigs invasion and is is

doctor, Artime was alivays ready to help humanily,"

Rehoso said.

"There can be no argument, he was the best craler

Tura to Page 45A Cul. 1

HH

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Day of Pigs Leader Artime

Is Beud

45

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Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Footnotes - Brigade 2506 - Artime - MRR

..41. Ibia.

42. Ibia.

43. Ops see.

• fп.33

Orlando Sentinal.

44. JFK Docuemnt #003175

68.45. Ibia.

4. Miami Herald, 11/8/77.

Classification: -

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

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Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Footnotes - Brigade 2506, Artime- MRR

22 77.

23.72.

Ibia.

Library of Congress

Selected Chronology, 4/17/61,

JFK Document # 013100.

24.23.

25.75.

26.25.

27.76.

28.77

29.38.

30.29.

Ibid., 6/2/61.

Ibid.,

12/21/62.

see Fn. 3,

Spirata. Haynes Johnson, p. 246.

See In. 22,

OgAsmine JEK $013100, p. 31.

See In. 3,

Haynes Johnson, p. 344.

Ibia. pp. 342-346.

E. Howard Hunt,

Give Us This Day, Popular Library Edition,

New York, 1973,

p.

22I.

See sn. 3

3. 50.

32.33.

33.37.

34.53

opsette.

Haynes Johnson, p. 353.

Ibia., p. 352.

"Manuel Artime" by Helga Silva, Profile, Miami News, 7/2/77.

"Artime Had a Little Help From Friends in the CIA,"

by Leonard

Novarro, Orlando Sentinal Star, 6/12/77, p. 2C.

35.24.

Ibia.

Seen. 33,

Orada orlando Sentinal, Artime; also "Manuel Artime,

Miami News,

7/2/77 p.

37.

See fr. Miami News.

• Ibid.

39. Ibid.

got Ibid.

Classification:

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

DocId:32273595

Page 262

---

## Page 263

Classification: -

FOOTNOTES

(This form is to be used for material extracted

MOVIMINICADELET dO AESTIANO (MDC)

studi

1. CIA/AU

2.

Ibid

3. HSCA $009538, Item 4, P. 2, FBI #105-87909-5, 1/30/61)

4: Ibid

Stud

5. CIA/REE

6. HSCA #009538, Item 4, P.2, FBI #105-87090-5, 1/30/61

7. Ibid

8.

Give Us This Day by E. Howard. Funt, Popular Library

Edition, pp. 43-44.'

Document

9. CIA/18

58/16/62

10. Ibid

11. Ibia

12. Ibid

13. Ibid

14.

HSCA Security File #092, Senstudy Document, Volume 32,

Item

#97-4110-72

15.

Ibid

16.

17.

HSCA #009303, FBI #97-4623-149, Section V

Security File

#092.

Senstudy Document, Volume 37,

Item

#105-95461-15, p.

Section v

Classification: -

2:1

Classified by derivation:

NH 53080

DocId:32273595

Page 263

---

## Page 264

Footno:

Page 2

- Brassification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

FOREIA - controlled documents.)

18.27.

ESCA Security File #092, Senstudy Docurent, Volume 37,

Item 4, 7105-95461-15, p. 4

19.73. Ibid p. 2

20.74. Ibid

21 75:

ASCA $009303, p. 8, Item 4, FBI $105-183815

22. 76.

mut cable t

23.37.

24.79.

25.25.

26.77.

27. 07.

28.27.

2. 75.

30.77.

31.23.

32 39.

33.7F.

34.58.

35-371

36.=5

ty 6/21/62

Cable

= 3/14/64

ESCA #009303, p. 1, FBI #9704623, Section 1

Ibia

Ibid p. 5

Ibid

Ibia

HSCA #009303, p. 3, FBI $97-4623, Sections II

through VI

Ibid p. 3, FBI $97-4623, Section IV

Ibia p. 2, 497-4623-35

Ibid p. 2, Item 1 (9), FBI #97-4623

CIA/50

9/3/63

report it

-3536

Ibid

HSCA

#012981

Book V, Final Report, Select Committee to Study Govern-

mental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities,

United States Senate (SSCI).

On page 12 of the SSCI, the

group of Cubans connected with the Guatemalan Lumber

Company project

are identified as the same group arrested

when the FBI raided and

seized dynamite on property in

LacombeClassiftation: It should be noted that the FBI

Classifiad by derivation:

HH 53080

DooId:32273595

Page 264

---

## Page 265

00. л. д. 9.19,

37. 4.

38.7.

39.19.

40.74.

41. А5.

42.276.

43. 17.

44.18.

45.289.

346.80.

47.83.

48.52.

49.89.

50.287.

51.85.

5256.

53797.

Classification:.

Footnotes - MDC

Page

3

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

raid occurred on July 31, 1963 at property owned by

William J.

McLaney, whereas the Guatemalan Lumber

Company trainees were on property owned, according to

Frank de la Barre, by a friend of his.

Although

de la Barre did not mention the name of the owner,

the FBI Report from Miami, Bufile #2-1821 Section

33

lists the names of the Cubans arrested on McLaney

property and Victor Paneque was not among them.

HSCA #012981

Ibid

Ibid

Ibia

Ibia

HSCA

Security File

$97-4110-123, p. 2

Ibid

$092, Senstudy Volume 32, Item 2,

ESCA 006716, p.

4, FBI:

Richard Rudolph Davis, Volume I

Report from New Orleans,

7/3/64

Ibid p. 2

Ibia

Ibid

ESCA

#012981, Fonzi memo 9/6/78

Ibid

Ibid

report.

-4531,

1/29/64

Ibid

CIAA

Report

7/26/63

Classification:

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

DocId:32273595 Page 265

---

## Page 266

54.73.

FootnoLes

- Massification: -

Page 4

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

report

СІА/ ОДАРНі

86 11/14/63

55:57.

HSCA Security File #092, Senstudy Document 33, Item I

#97-4110-86, p. 13

56.60.

Ibia, Volume 32; Item 2, #97-4110-123, p.1

57.81.

Ibid

58.87. Ibid, Volume 33, Item 2, 797-4110-132, p.2

59.83.

Ibid

60.57.

HSCA #009303,

р.7,

Item 3, FBI #97-4110-207, Report

fIOm

Miami, 1/28/70

Classification:

Classified by derivation: .

HH 53080 DocId:32273595

Page 266

---

## Page 267

Classerration:- JURE

1.

Cable.

CIA/ DER

7/25/62

, from ClA-controlled documents.)

Infrinatio kopeito:

2.

CIA/ DEO.

Report, September 1962

3. CIA,

Dispatch, 7/11/62

4.

, Junta Revolucionario Cubana

Declaration of Principles

5.

CIA

st, Memo

б.

bi

7.

8.

Ibia:

Ibid

9.

Ibid

10.

Ibia.

11.

-CIA

12.

CIAABE

cable

, Cable *

13.

CIA/72A

D Dispatch

10/21/63

14.

CIA/

Cable&

15.

Cable

16. CIA/

Cable

17.

CIAZ

* Dispatch

7/22/63,

18.

CIA,

# Cable (

19.

ASCA 005990, p. 4, FBI File #97-4546, Section 1 ÷

Correlation

Summary 5/30/63

20

Ibid, Item 2, page 4

Classification:

9/11/63

810/11/53

1/300/64

3413/

4/26/63

8/15/62

Classified by derivation:

1H 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 267

---

## Page 268

switch

Classification: -

Footnotes - JURE

Page 2

21.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

USCA+009974, Item 9, FBI File 105-114543-5, JURE,

U.S. Army Intelligence Report, 72215 217,

September

Subject: Jure Established - classified SECRET

22.

23.

Ibia

24.

HS6A2-009974mprantz, FBI File #105-114543

Volume 1,

Serial 46, p. i2:, (JEK Documeut 00.99.74).

CIA/

Meno M

8/2/63.

25.

Ibid

CIA

12/3/63.

CIA/A

Cable

Memo

Jang

8/23/63.

25028 Ibia.

25229

25030

CIA/

9/11/63.)

CIA/BRA

11/18/63.

Cable

Cable.

25831

CIA,

Dispatch

12/13/63,

• (sie dia dementia cotta!

Cable

25932 Ibid.

25t.

33 CIA/

3425i.

35 29j.

36 25K.

37

251.

38 25m.

12/3/63:

Ibia.

CIA,

Memo

12/13/63.

JFK Document #009005, p. 7.

CIA/S

10/11/63.

, Cable

CIA/10

9/7/63.

Cable

39

257.

10/22/63

Cable)

HH 53080

DoCId:32273595

Page 268

---

## Page 269

Footnote

-JeRkassitication: -

Page 3

This form is to be used for--asterial extrected

40 25.

4127

HSC:

Ibid

•4228.

CIA/

Bad.

43-89

Memo

cable t

. Cable tr

Memo

4/13/64

Cable

* Cable

Cable *

400%

Cable

Cable*

, Meno

432404

CIA/D

+/33 CIA/DES

48. 34.

CIA,

49 35. CIA/

50 Sé. CIA!

5137. CIA,/ARRESTA

S298. CIAN

5339.

Ibid.

5440.

CIA

65 x.

Ibid.

Tbid

56 STA

157-5803

CIA/

CIA/

58559

159

CIA,

Document

CIA,

6050/

CIA

61.

Cable

14/21/63

3/28,

3/28/64

6/6/54

5/20%

6/3/54

5/30/84

6/3/64

6/6/64

5/20164

., Memo 5on

dated)

Memo

227:

¿ CAble,

¡cation:

1/4/69

6/6

189/11/64

• Repost, 9/23/64

9/22/64

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

DooId:32273595

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## Page 270

Classification: -

This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Footnotes: Directorio

Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE)

Document

1. CIA

-11/9/67.

2. Ibid.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Interview with Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, by re

2/7/78, UFK Document 005259)

→ House

delet Committee On Ascassisations

Undated news article,

"Red Terrorism Rules at

Havana

University" by Hal Hendrix,

Miami News.

Opcite JEK #005259275 See

fn. 3

xe

reike

Conzales,

7.

8.

Document

CIA NEE

MASH,

9/13/60.

Interview

1/16/78

Cable to Director from

beFonzid Conzates,

9.

Ibia. pp. 2-3.

JIO CIAN

MASH, 11/4/60.

Ibide

pizIbid

Cable to Director from

ument

13.

CIA/Đ4

, 11/1/61.

14.

15.

FBI Report

from San Francisco, 5/26/64, Warren Commission

Document #1085 ₫ 1.)

Ibia.

16.

17.

HOGUINCU

it Footnote 3e)

Kiss see fr.

13

petro far teportetrom San Francisce

18.

CIA;

JMWAVE, 5/9/61.

Cable

from

19 .

Ibid.

Classification: -

22.1161

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080 . DocId:32273595 Page 270

---

## Page 271

Classification:.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 2

See

En.

3

20. OpcitesJFk Documenta#00525.95,

DRE

21.

Interview with

JFR Document #005765.

22.

Ibie.

23223.

24 23

fn.

25 24.

opcite. tex +0057657 p. 2.

Document

26 25. CIA

3. Sce fn. 13

House Scleet

Cimm. thee on AssAsSiNaTioNs

p. 2,

2726.

2827.

29.28

30.29.

3130.

32-31

3332.

3433.

35-34

3635

3730

38-37.

39

3s,

40 39.

4140

CIA/

1/4/63.

Dispatch

**12395

11/8/63.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See

fn.21

pette. WEK #005765, p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibia.

Ibid. p. 3.

Ibia.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Classification: -

Classified by darivation:

HH 53080

DooId: 32273595

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## Page 272

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extrocted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes

- page 3

Document

1271.

CIA

86 Letter

8; 2/21/63.

Datument

Dispatch *

43-72.

CIA

04-12395 &

11/8/63:

4473

FBI #105-85440-28, Correlation Summary, 8/11/67, p.2

JFK Document #012383, Dan2.

4544

4645.

CIA/2

S, Cable

"......

6/13/64.

CIAAI

5y, Memo da

1/3/67.

21

4746.

Opcite. TEX: 0057657 p. 3.

4877.

"The Bayo-Pawley Affair" by Robert K. Brown and Miguel

Acoca, Soldier of Fortune, 1975, pp. 18-19.

See

4978.

OpcitesmJen #005765, p. 4.

50 49

JFK Document # 013605, attachment p. 1.

F.

51 50.

Ibie., attachment p. 9.

5013605;

5251.

Ibid.

5352.

Ibid., pp. 9-10.

5453.

Ibid., p. 10.

55 54.

Ibid.

56 55.

Ibid., pp. 10-11.

57.55.

Ibid., p. 11.

58-57

Ibid., Cover memo.

59 58

Ibia.

60.59.

Ibid. TaSK

Force

61 60. CIAMON

#* Report 1977.

62a. Ibid.

Classification:.

2611151

Classified by derivation:

IH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 272

---

## Page 273

Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 4

63-62. Ibid.

House Select Committee

ch Assassinations,

Outside

64.63. Ibia.

66-6-38.

Ibid.

637. "Contact Report, 12/13/78, (FR Document #013678)

See fn. 3

0764. Operte JFK #005259, p. 1.

6865.

Ibid. p. 2.

69 66.

Ibia.

706%

House diliet Committee in

Ibid.

Assassinations

p. 13,

7/68.

Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, /JFK Document

#009084)

7269.

73 20.

See Also, ISCA final section on Carlos Bringuier

Deposition of Carlos

Quiroga,

JFK Document #009394.

See Also,

23, 1978,

Warren Commission

th volume &,

p. 41.

74:74

75.72

7673.

7774

7875.

7976,

opertemurks:Q05765.

See fn. 21

Ibid. p. 4.

Ibid.

bid. p. 3.

Ibia. P. 4.

Interview with Jose Antonio Lanusa by Fonzi/Gonzales,

4/22/78, P. 1.y JFK Document #007463,

8077.

8178.

0272.

8380.

8481.

8582.

→ House Jetect Committee On Assassinations

Ibid.

Ibia. p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. p.

3.

Classification:

115.

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 273

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## Page 274

Classification:.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 5

86 83. Ibid.

87 84. Ibia. p. 4.

8885.

Ibid.

89 86.

Ibid.

See fn. 21,

9087.

Opeite JEK 7009084, p. 23.

House Seleet

41 88.

Ibid. pp. 15-16.

Committee On AssassinaTions

4289.

Interview of Celso "Macario" Hernandes, by Brown, 2/14/78, 1

(JFK Document #007486.

House telect Committee on Cessassination

93 90.

Contact

#013420.

report, carlos Bringuier, 12/2/78, (JER Document

94 96.

4592.

9693.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See Also, Warren Report pp.

407-08, 728-29; Warren

Connission Volume X,

PP.

87-90,94; V.I. Lee Exhibits.

Classification:

!!":

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595

Page

274

---

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Classirication:

(This form is to be used

Footrote for material extracted

RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA

and

(MIRR)

ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

1.

106РMH998423

FBI +97-4474, MIRR MISCellaneous

Refer Doesment Nex

(JFK

int dex 0 anti-Castro organizations, 2/8/60, pl,

009427)

2.. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4.

FBI #97-4474, MIRR Section 1,

Cable to Director from Miami, 11/2/60, Item 1, p.2 (JFK

Document 009427).

5. Ibid, p. 1

6.

CIA/S

Cable to Director from MASH, 11/2/60

7. CIAN

undated report

8..

HSCA $009362, Memo to G. Robert Blakey, 6/15/68, Interview

with Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila by fonzi/Gonzales, P. 1,

JFK. Document 009362)

9.

"Fiery Bosch Courts Terrorist Lable" by Gloria Marina

and Arnold Markowitz, Miami Herald, 11/8/76 japin

10. Ibia

Ser

fn.

11. opasite seash009363, p. 1

12..

"Caracas to charge Bosch, trio in bombing of Cuban airliner

Miami News, 8/23/78 /-)

Ibid

13.

14.

report Iron miami by

JFK Documen

15. Ibid, Item 3, p. 15, FBI #97-4474,

Section 6, Memo to

16 15ta)

3. Ibia

Walter Yeagley from Director, 6/22/66

See

fo.

17 16. OpreitesHSCA #009362, p. 3

1817. Ibid.

1978. Ibid

Classification: -

Classitied Sy

• derivation:

HH 53080. DocId:32273595

Page 275

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## Page 276

Footnoi

Page 2

:- Cilssinestion: -

20 19.

21 z8.

2281.

2323.

Ibia

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Ibid

Ibid See fn.

Operte ESCA: $009427, Item 3, p. 2, FBI #97-4474

MIRR Section 1, Report from Miami 1/23/61

24.83.

Ibid, Item 2

2524. Ibid, Item 14, p. 6

2625. Ibid, Item 15, p. 6

27-36.

zơ za lal thia See fn.

2927

Op Cite HSCA$009362, p. 5

sec. fn. 4

3088.

Opaite ISCA 7009427a Item ¿. p. 12

3129.

Ibid, Item 9, p. 5

3230.

Ibid, Items 10,11,12, p. 5

3333.

Ibid, Item 14, p. 6

3432.

Ibid, Items 1,2,3, p. 8 and Items 4,5, p. 9

3533.

Ibid, Items 2,3, p. 11 and Item 1, P. 12

3634.

Ibid, Item 5, p. 14

37 55.

Ibid, Item 2

3836.

Ibid, Item 8. p. 9

see fn.&

3957 Opacite ASCAr: Q09362, p. 2

4038.

Ibid.

4139.

Ibid.

4270.

Ibid.

4371.

MaT 12N8129478

44x2.

Op EfteFFSCA: $009427 Item 16, p. 6

45 к3.

Ibie, Illassification:

Classified by derivation:.

HH 53080 DocId:32273595

Page 276

---

## Page 277

Footner?s - MIRR/Bosch

Page i

Classification:.

Ibid, Ilestorm is ta be used for material extracted

4795.

ASCA A 30C SecretS dent, p. 5, FBI 79-42758

3, Orland

Bosch,

1CTEK Document 88058908013071)

4876.

Ibid.

See fni9

4917. Op cite Miami Herald t/8th6

501. Opacite Facto 62 mR

5/40. OpseitS Mr al Herahen 11/8/16

5250. Oprette fsER 4609427, Item 6, PP 15,16,17

53 37. Opacite #scAl: 013072, Item 1, P. 2, FBI #45-10848

5452. OpaeStHSCA 14009A27, P. 18

55153.

"I am going to declare war" by Blake Fleetwood,

New Times, 5/13/77, p. 46:

5634.

Tbid See fr. 47

5755.

Opucite HSCA+0130%1, Section 4, P. 3, FBI $45-10848

5856.

OR cite dent: 5575/29/77, PP- 46-47

5957.

Ibid.p. 47

6058.

Ibid.

6159.

Ibia. p. 48

6270.

Sec fn. 4.

Octe HSCA4009427, Item 3, P. 2

see fn.

6361. Opacite HSCAf01J071, Item 1, PP. 1-2, FBI

#45-10801

6462. Ibid. See fn. 4

6'63. OpreiteRHSCA: $009427, Item 14, p. 5

See fn-55

6664. Op citer New times, 5/13/77, p. 51

Classification: -

Classified by derivation:.

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 277

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Footr

Page 4

-Gess/ lisation:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

67

.

ESSA

Inmunized

frau Led sedled do Testimony of Marita Iorenz,

Session

May

31, 1978.J Marita Lorenz, who had publicly claimed

Hearings

Before

Eshe was once Castro's mistress (Miami News 6/15/76),

told the Committee she was present at a September 1963

the Hose

meeting in Orlando Bosch's Miami home during which

Committee on

Lee Harvey Oswald, Frank Sturgis, Pedro Diaz Lanz' and

assassinations,

Bosch made plans to go to Dallas. (pp. 31-34).

She

further testified that around November 15, 1963 , she,

9,5% Congress,

Jerry Patrick. Hemming, the Novo brothers, Pedro Diaz

Lanz, Sturgis Bosch and Oswald travelled in a two-car

12 Senio,

Washrayton, NC.; caravan to Dallas and stayed in a motel where they were

contacted by Jack Ruby. There were several rifles and

U.s. government

Lorenz said

„All possible individuals involved in this allegation

were questioned by the Committee with the following

results.

Interviewed on June 16, 1978, Orlando Bosch told the

Committee he had met Lorenz once in 1962 at which time

he was planning

an air raid over Cuba with Alexander

Rorke.

Lorenz later called him and said she wanted to

get involved in anti-Castro activities, but Bosch

turned her down and never saw her again.

He further

stated he had never travelled west of New Orleans in

his life.

In a March 21, 1978 deposition in Miami, Florida, Jerry

Patrick Hemming responded negatively to

the questions:

"Did you ever drive from Miami to Dallas with Marita

Or Frank Sturgis? Or a man identifying himself

as 'Ozzie'?" (pp. 170-71)

Immunized testimony was received in Washington, D.C. on

April 28, 1978 from Pedro Diaz Lanz, Who denied Lorenz's

allegation, (p. 64) and explained his whereabouts on

November 22, 1963 (p. 65).

In a March 20, 1978 deposition in Miami, Frank A. Sturgis

asked if he did, "

in the company of

Marita Lorenz,

Leon Oswald and others. drive from Miami

to Dallas a day

or to before the assassination?"

Sturgis responded:

"Sir, that is an

absolute lie. I have

Marita Lorenz and Osie, as she calls him, or

with Pedro Diaz Lanz, of Marcus Diaz Lanz, or DI.

Orlando Bosch, or Jerry Patrick, which she claimed

all,of us besides some other cubans, were in two

av@asslueation:left Miami, Florida

two days before

the assassination of the

president of the United

States.

She is a liar.

I toodasra914a7aah examini-

nation to that effect that I have never been

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 278

---

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Footr

Page 5

s Crassinestion:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

introited ioneredcoaspiracy to kill the President

of the United States,

nor was I with her at any

time conspiring to kill the President of the

United States,

nor was I with her in any automobile

with these people or any other people going to

Dallas to plot to kill the President of the United

States. She is an absolute liar."

(p. 157)

66.

Sturgis

said that on November 22, 1963, he was in his

nome in Miami, Florida. (p. 155)

The Committee found no evidence to support lorenz's.

allegation.

See fi. 8.

Opacite tEx Document +009362, p. 1

Classification: -

Classified by derivation:

HH 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 279

---

## Page 280

JUNTA

DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA

EN EL EXILIO

FOOTNOTES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

11.

10.

12.

CRS Chronolgy of U.S.-Cuban Relations,

(JFK Document Ma. 010426)

Ibid.

House Select Committee: on Assassinations,

7

JEKE028

Staff summary of FBI file for

Paulino Sierra Martinez Mp. 1, Malal

A.

(JFK Document No

012887)

(Ref *FBI LHM, Re: Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez,

at

2.

June

3, 1963

Ibid., at 1.

also

HSCA Staff summary of

CIA file m

P. 1, (CHA Dispatch &

S12627, November 20, 1963.

report.

82701

April

30,

1963,

A9 p.l3Ref. CIA

May 7,

to

1963,l and(FBI 105-121010-3,

May

1963, Teletype

Director

fIOm SAC,

Chicago, Re: Paulino

Sierra Martinez, p2

(JFK Document

452 012887)

Ibia., atpi (Ref CIA

report

K; APril 30, 196314

report

Ibid.,

May 7,

1963,

1aS); p. 3 (Ref.tFBI

#105-121010-3

Memo to Attorney General from Director; p. 5

fRef to #105-

121010-35, Memo to Director from SAC Chicago, May 3,.

1977

House Seket Committee as Dosassinations,

Staff

summary of CIA file, wo

C-298

.

(Ref {Dispatch

•12627, November 20, 1963

and attachments)

JERE

4sAd Staff Summary of FBI file

for Carlos

August 28, 1963)

ASSASSINATIONS, p.2,

#97-11-19234 5FK Documend

CIA

012655).

setert

Staff Summary of

Handbook, Handle a

(JFK security #020).

STaff Summary of CIA files,

Dispatch

1 12627, November 20,

1963)

Ibid.,

also

Staff Summary of

Of JEK Security

$020)

HH 53080. DocId: 32273595 Page 280

---

## Page 281

JGCE, Footnotes,

2

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

1.24.

CIA

Staff: Summary of

Handbook,

A, (JFK Security $020);

(Ref.KFBI Report February 25; 1964,

€4150 Miami, Re: Paulino Sierza Martinez), (TAk Document 18.012881).

Staff Summary Of d

section on JGCE, (Secret), JFK Security #020,

72a abook, me on,

Jee fn. 3

JEK 1012881 P. 4, (Ref. FBI Memo from Chicago, June

1963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez)

JEk 007601 U.S. Secret Service Report, November 27, 1963,

to Chief from SAIS Martineau, Chicago, Re: Homer s.

Echevarria, P. 2 & 3.(5FK Document AD.

007601)

See also

Secret Service Report #1266,

File #C0-2-34,104, 12-19-63,

From Tucker and Noonan, p.

ruses Staff Summary of CIA file

Haus Selet Canmilte on Assassuations;

M

a (rough notes) (Ref.

14 November 7, 19t

See fn. 3

repors;

•KM 9120807 p. 1, (Ref.

FBI Report #105-121010-

of departure, January 8, 1963)

report

Ibid.,

at 2, (Ref. CIA

May 7, 1963,

Ibid.,

at 3,

(Ref. FBI Memo, June 3, 1963, Re: Santiago

Alvarez Rodriguez)

Ibid,

at 4

(Ref. FBI Memo, June 26, 1963, Re: Paulino

Sierra Martinez)

Ibid.

Ibid., at 8, (Ref. FBI Memo November 2, 1963 from Miami.

SATA NewS

article, Chicago Tribune, March 10,

1963, (JFK Document

013397)

CIA

Horene selet

BEAS

*?.Handbook, Committee

7- JFK Security Number $020)

seassisatio

26.

27.

28.

Ibid,

Ser. fno 3

37K: 01288), p. 6,>

(Ref. FBI Report, February 25, 1964 from

Miami, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez, information from

Gilberto Rodriguez Fernandez)

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 281

---

## Page 282

JECE, I

atnotes, p. 3

29 э9.

3039.

3/72.

Ibia.

PSUA

P.

Summary of CIA fiels, E

Houre Seleet Committee as Assassinations,

6,

Undated report

passa AscA Staff summary of FBI file

for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada, (Ref. FBI Report #105-

3289.

3385.

3480.

35 28.

36C0Д.

31 88.

40 80.

42 мо.

43 (00.

44

(0).

45

16 CD.

47

Ibid.

fn. 3,

JER #0128872 p. 1, (Ref. News article, May 19, 1963,

Miami News, Miami

report

Ibid., P: 2, (Ref. CIA

, May 7, 1963,

Ibid, p.

4,

FBI Memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963,

Re: Paulino

Sierra Martinez)

Ibid.

Ibide

Ibid., p. 2, (Ref. FBI report #105-121010-2, June 14, 1963)

Ibid,, p. 2, (Ref. FBI Report 105-121010-3, May 25, 1963,

Teleytpe. to

Director from SAC, Chicago, Re: Paulino

Sierra Martinez)

Ibid,

Ibide

Ibia, p. 3,

(Ref. FBI Memo, June 3, 1963, Re: Santiago

Alvarez Rodriguez)

Ibid., p. 4 (Ref. FBI Memo, June 29, 1963, Re: Paulino

Sierra Martinez)

Ibia.

Ibia

report

Ibid.r p. 2, (Pef. CIA

May 7, 1963; SeC

Ref Paulino Sierra: Martinez)

also

HSHA

CIA

Staff Summary of sa

Handbook,

p7. House selet Commille an Assassinations.

See fn

3,

JKs u1232e, p. 7,

(Ref. FBI Memo, September 23, 1963,

Re:

Paulino

Sierra

Martinez)

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595

Page 282

---

## Page 283

JGCE, E .

tnotes, P. 4

Undated

report

48#5.

aSGA Staff Summary of CIA

4957.

Ibid.

5071.

Ibid.

5/5T.

Ibid.

-

5233.

Ibid., p. 3,

CIA undated

repart

Attachient to #amA(5) 3 255/815D

53

54 5.63059

Ibid.

Jec

fn.3

JER 1012887 p. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo to Director from SAC,

Miami, December 10, 1963, Ie:

Americanism Educational

League)

Ibid.

Ibid.

*Note:

Mold was also listed as a member of

"Americans for Freedom!"

at the same address as the

American Educational League.

There is no evidence

that this group was

ever investigated by the FBI

¡See ASCA Staff Summary of CIA file @undated cIA report

p. 6,5

sas und ated

See

3

report

JEn2884, p. 1 (Ref. CIA *

April 30,

1963, confidential)

Ibid, p. 11 (Ref. CIA

Secrets

report

report

July 5, 1963, -

AlSO, P. 2 (Ref. CLA

House select Cham, thet a

Also,,

ises Stati Summary of CIA file for Sierra,?p. 6,

wan, May 9, 1963=

CIA

memorandum

See the 3

TE: 1012887 p.

3

(Ref. Memo to Director from SAC,

Chicago, June 26, 1963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez)

sea Conclucion bared on revrew of all documents prestore, pertaining

6x26/J5K 4012887

10 (Ref. CIA

1963,

and p.

11

406,

July

5,

1963,

rested

(Ref.

November T

report

Hats

House

helet Committe on

Assassinations,

Staff Summary of CIA files,

p. 10

(Ref.

CIA

1963)

report cuba/clumbia,

November 7,

See fn. 3,

6403 JK887,

p. 9 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963

from Miami,

JGCE, p.

41)

a.=

NH 53080

DoCId:32273595

Page 283

---

## Page 284

IGCE,

itnotes,

p.

5

Sg5.64 Ibig, p. 9 (Ref. CIA

1963,

report

November 14,

6oo 8765 Ibid p. 1 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 14, 1963 from Miami

Re :

INTERPEN), p. 8 (FBI

Memo, November 2, 1963,

from Miami,

Re :

JGCE, PP. 29-30)

Also,

#Gerry Patrick Hemming Chronology

from FBI files

17 966

JEK 44012887, p. 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963,

from Miami, Re:

JGCE, pp. 29-30

The use of soldiers-of-fortune types such as

Wilson and Garman may have been a result of prior

contact with Hemmings' men by Carlos Rodriguez,

Quesada and the MILTN.

See FBI notes - Quesada;

Hemming Chronology)

repott

48686) Ibid., p. 10 (Ref. CIA

• October 16,

1963,

Confidential

6o Ibid.

*Note:

Aquilar's group affiliation is unknown.

However,

he was known to be acquainted with Loran Hall,

Lawrence Howard, and William Seymour, who spent much time

at Aquilar's house.

See Memo 6/5/68 of conversation with

Aquilar.

See also 11/1/63 Mian PoLice Memo

Re:

Hemming

complaint that Hall stole rifle.

Notes that Hall staying

with Aquilar at that time.

fr. 3

10.20:69. TEKs+01288 p.

6

(Ref. FBI Memo, November 1, 1963.

from

Miami, Re:

SNFE)

report

Ibid. i p.

7 (Ref.

CIA

1963,

Confidentiall

Howe

Also,

Staff Summary

November

14, 1963)

November 22,

delut

Commeltee an Assasinations,

72.

738225.

Ibid., p.

9

(Ref. FBI Memo November 2, 1963 from Miami,

JGCE ,

p. 43) and p. 5 (Ref. CIA«

report.

May 17,

1963)

Also,

ESCA Staff Summary of CIA file, m

an dude, midle massaunation

(Ref.

attachment

hment tch he 2627. November re 1963 with

" House Lieut Committee on Assassinations,

Summary of CIA file, die

pp. 1-2 (Ref.

DIspatch

+12627, November 20, 1963, with attachment

Ibid., pp.

1-2 and p. 5

(Ref.

CIA Memo

April 18, 1963)

HH 53080

DocId:32273595

Page 284

---

## Page 285

IGCE, l itnotes, p. 6

p. 2 (Ref. Dispatch 4

12627 г

with

attachment

Matn:15. Ibig., also JFK $012887, p.

Report, September 27, 1963,

(Ref. CIA

Confidentrat)

16.701

haid

Start Sun Cus september 14, 1963)

November 20, 1963,

17.77.

78.289.

19.88.

80.557.

81.87.

82 85.

83.884.

84.80.

85.778.

86.2т.

87.88.

88.804.

BE, P. 2 TREE: ICEA

* November 14, 1963)

Sec fo, 2800, p. 8 (Bef. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963

from Miami, Re: JGCE, pP. 29-30)

Hous

deleit Commetter on Assassinations,

ESCA Staff Summary of CIA file,

- p. 2 (Ref.

ECIA

report

November 14, 1963) =

10K 022831,

p.. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 1, 1963,

Miami, Re:

SNEE)

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.,

Miami,

Re:

8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963 from

JGCE, pP.

29-30)

report

Ibid,, p.

10

Ret

October 15,

1963,

House selut Commette an Assassinatio.

AlSO,

ASGA Staff Summary of CIA

Ille,

(Ref.

October 15, 1963 Extract)

2 repore

bise sunmary,

-SEA Handbook

Howie select.Cansmettee.ih

assassinations.

See

fn. 3,.

JK$01288), p.

from Miami,

(Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963

JGCE, p.

37)

report

Ibid., po. 10-11 (Ref. CIA a

september 13,

1963,

Grani

House Select Commiltee on Assassinations,

at crA lenfor Sierra p. 2 (Ref. CIA por

1963 extract);

9 (Ref.

CIA

# Repurt

89a

90.

Also, JFK

#012887,

November 14, 1963,

aSCA Staff Summary

, November

14,

xe.

3

JaKe, 0123841

1963,

.

8

(Ref. CIA

report

December 11,

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 285

---

## Page 286

JECE,

91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

otnotes, p. 7

Ibid

House delet Contre

nassassu

(Ret, Dispatch Sun 12620, Corne 20, 1963, Ph

(Ref. Dispatch

attachment (CAS-63-154)

See fn. 3.,

JFK 7012887,

December 11,

1963,.000

See fo.

September 13, 1963, €

HSCA) Staff Summary of CIA file, r

storm delut Cannille a Cessassations,

p. 2 (Ref.

Dispatch 1tA12627, November 20, 1963, with

attachment 8%

Ibid.

Ibid.

HH 53080

DocId:32273595 Page 286

---

## Page 287

ble numbes

have

timptront

of tomore

Theis thei

shot det

To atine end st. the

you fines

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

DAVID FERRIE

FOOTNOTES

Memo from Sedgabeer

to Giarmusso, New Orleans DA's.

office, '5/22/64,

CUFK #003840 g

New Orleans Police Report of Francis Martello, 11/25/63

FBI Report, #62-109060, Interview of Jerry P. Stein,

11/25/63,

(p- 300);

FBI report,

#62-109060, Interview of Jack S. Martin;

11/25/63, (p.309);

Note:

All FBI reports were obtained from File #62-109060

unless otherwise specifically noted.

at rain dector to robert Robey Of FA, 12/25/63;

FBI report, Interview of Jack Martin, 11/25/63, (p-309);

New Orleans Police Report, Interview of Edward Voebel,

11/27/63,

FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63

Heaump Befere the House telet Connillic an

assassinaction,

Set ba

wized Test oarlos Marcello, 1/1 78,? p. 67.

FBI Report, Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63;

FBI Memo, #62-109060-5255, Regis Kennedy, p.2,

5/18/67

Note:

There are discepancies as to whether Ferrie was

in the courthouse or in Gill's office on

assassination:

the day of the

Marcello and Kennedy said Ferrie was in the

courtroom.

(Both Statements taken some years after the •

event

he knew Ferrie was in Gill's office at

12:15 p.m. on 11/22/63, because Gill had called his

secretary at that time

to tell her the Federal Grand Jury

had returned a verdict in favor of Marcello.

secretary told Gill Ferrie had left Gill's office at that

time (12:15p.m.) stating he would return at 1:30 p.m. which

he failed to do.

Gill's secretary,. Alâje Guidroz, was not

questioned as to Ferrie's whereabouts.

Ferrie told the FBI he

was in New Orleans "all day"

on November 11, 1963.

The date, November ll, may have

been a typographical error meant to have been 11/22/63,

HH

53080

DocId: 32273595

Page

287

---

## Page 288

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.2.

since there is no significance to 11/11/63. (See FBI report

11/26/63 for interview with Ferrie)

6. FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63

7.

FBI Report, Interview of Melvin Coffey, 11/20/73.

cofrey told of plan for trip since November 20,

although

he did not know the destination.

He said Ferrie and

Beauboeuf particularly interested in ice skating so they.

went to Houston.

8.

FBI Report Interview of M. Coffey, 11/30/63, Said Plane

not airworthy for some time. Last heard it used Feb. '63;

FBi Report, Interview of James Lewallen, 11/27/63, ₽- 214;

ver vallete

9.

SS Report #C0-2-34, 030, 12/13/63, p.5:9

up berkeli

assist

1W 53080. DocId: 32273595 Page 288

---

## Page 289

Vol. 4

FERRIE, Footnotes, P.3

16.

Ferrie

11/19/62

p.10 Meister intervier:

Said Bem

"wears a toupee, possibly self-made"

FBI Report 9/22/61, p.5.

see said he wears a wig. Mrs. Nichols who knew of

FAA tenth, Robey Report, p.9, Interview of

Mr E.W. Christiansenjp.10 Interview Col Joseph G.

Ehrlichey.

BHiFAR Vol.2, ExhibitIII, Statement of Cadet;

FBI report, Interview of Mrs. Dunnand Mrs. Nichols

9/22/61. F777

17.

18.

Ferne

19.

Saulenn

kesearch

psycho

20 .

Prazza

.vol.2

JFK Document

YSK I1-N-224,

11/15/62, p-10, Interview of Al Meister, 44904):

Ferrie

Exhibit XX.

from St. Charles Seminary 12/1/61.

described as "critical of authority",

"careless

about

observing rules", ignored authority",

"indulges freely

In criticism of his superiors".

FAA VOL: 4 Robey Report, p.10 Interview of Col. Joseph

G. Ehrlicher -.

"resided authority"

FAA Vol-z

11/19/62 Ihtervies of George Plazza who

i Invented an expert in amate a individual

who fancies himself an expert in all matters and, hence,

believes himself infallible. To this end beme woula „Ferrie

express his philosphical ideas in no uncertain terms.".

FAA Vol. III Exhibit XX Ferrie file from St. Charles

Seminary;

FAA Vol. 4, Report of Robey, p.7.

Rev. Francis B. Sullivan, professor of Theology at

St. Charles Seminary - Feels Ferrie to be a "pre-

conditioned papde", impresses people by pretending

to be an expert on

everything, definitely has a talent

for character assassination"

p. 11 Douyear McGray -

called Ferrie "Eccentric and dictatorial" p. 12 -

Al Meister - "Officios and dictatorial."

'File, Vol

Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet (

#c) 12/1/61 Ferrie seemed to hold

the cadets in the palm of his hand", p. 4.

S.R. 11-N-224,

influential. Interere of Meister, Ferrie, very

"seemed to have a certain talent and background in the

use of psychology and would use this as well as his

philosophical ideas to influence some of the youths in

House delut Carmittee a Crassnition,

interview of Bob Boyleston, 10/17/18,(JFIC Sociment 012865))

FBI Report 10/30/61, "David William Ferrie" Interview of

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 289

---

## Page 290

FERRIE, DAVID Footnotes, p.4.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

John Harris - "Ferrie has a group of young boys whom he

supports and controls completely% g

Interview of Col.

Harry A. Webb I had ability to get affection of the cadets

and that they would do almost anything forhin."

Na 13-N-244, 11/19/52, P.10 Meister advised thät he had

heard through cadet sources... That subject is possibly

a homosexual.". Also, Ferrie

"hated women. " ;

FBI Interview of

A: Gifford, 11/25/63;

"FAA Vol.

4 Robey Report, p.ll, Joseph Howard - Ferrie told

inferior to men.

dense. (JFK Document 014904)

21-N-224, 1/25/63 p. 16, Mrs. Jean Noatz;

FBI Report, 9/22/61, #105-104-340-3, p.4,

Interview

of Joseph Lisman, and Interview of Mrs.

Ruby Nichols p. 5.

38-16 0-224, 12/19/62

Ferrie was treated for emotional problems in 1944 (TFRDezument

014904) ;

Petter 2 J.H. Terrie to st. Charles Seminary

8R Had 22

101a1 P. 18-19-

FAA,

Vol III, exhibit

Ibic fol III, exhibit

FAA

Transcript

of grades

from Baldwin - Wallace College,

Berea, Ohio, 6/9/41, Lists all courses

WEX # 04939, Smopsis of

ISBA Hearing,

testimony of Ronald Hubner,

Southern Research,

Investigator,

55K:94904

• FAA file - ALPA

D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63,

EAL EXH #6,

of 12/17/62 from ver

U.S. Foreign Service to MI. Risley, Southern Research.

JAK :014930

SBA Hearing,

Ferrie Testimony, Synopsis, p.4,

Ferrie claims he also wrote a doctor's thesis for his

degree on an aspect of the psychology of vision -

the use of hyphotherapy in fetinitis.

NH 53080

. DocId: 32273595 Page 290

---

## Page 291

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.5

28.

anui

29.

30.

JFK*

YEAA VOI

0144 Robert Robey Report, p.1l, John Johnson, -

Robert Morrel (FAA Vol 4, Robey

led people to believe he was studying medicine at

Tulane University.

Cp. 15 - Karl Kosteid Fola him he studied medicine, ferrie also

rad a copy of a

PHD degree in psychology on wack his wall

IT* 014930) Synopsisot

SEA Heartha

'Testimony of John Irion;

vol.

Robey Report, p.8 Edward W. Strubo advised

Ferrie

tried hypnosis on the students.):)

10 Robert E. Morrell,. "he

had seen David Ferrie

use hypnosis"

House detect Committe. Or

ASSASSINSATIONS,

#e Staff Interview of John Irion, 10/19/78, p.3

JEK #012754

TEA #014904

FAA VOL 4, Robey Report, p.8

FAA Vol 4,

Report,

8/22/61 Jefferson Parish PD, Juvenile Division

serum,

FAA, Vol 4, RobeyReport, P. 10 Robert Morrell

Ferrie clair

le lost his, hair in an experiment with Cancel

He-does p.

11 Landry"Ferrie told him loss due to chemical explosion

Landry's father was told it was due to radiation,

P. 13 Larry C. Adams/"lost in a Chemical experiment"

TIKA 014950SynopC

theught it had bson

32/SiS of SBA HearIng , Dx. Isadore Yager p.219

"DI.

Of David see, p. 15 - Ferrie admitted

but

My legitimate reasonsee PhD degree

using

Phoenix niversity, Bari, Italy.

He claimed he had.

from

1F7

7574

JFK#014904

VOL K FAA File ALPA SBA,

DW Ferrie, 15-63-29-63,

BAL Exhibit sa photocopy of telephone boook with

Ferrie listing.

NH 53080

DocId:32273595 Page 291

---

## Page 292

FERRIE, • Footnotes, p.6

bid,

33.

VrAA Vol. 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet

"he was believed to be a medical doctor

and a doctar of philosphy.;

FFK* 014,930

SBA Hearing,

testimony of DI. Isadore Yaget, Synopsis, p.2-

34.

Sis Hearing, Perrie Testimony Synopsis, p-1.

5PK014904

35.

FAA, VOI 2,

Exhibit III, P.4, Statement of Cadet t=

#ste) Ferrie constantly preached to us on the

subject of religion.

•. • insisted we attend church .

and remembere to pray. "e

36.

37.

38.

Although Ferrie denies applying for ordainment to any

church,

(SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony)

•man, he

has shown such

a desire since his youth - SR-11-N-224-

12/19/62,5J5K=014904

See FBI Report #52-109060-4595, 3/2/67, p.1 Interview of

Card John Stanley , "Archbishop of the Metropolitan

Eastern Province, American Othodox Catholic Church,

told the FBI he consecrated Ferrie as bishop in July 1961

but deposed him in January 1962 when it was learned

le nad been discharged from his as eftarlines positio

ecause of homosexual activityth

Vol. 2 Exhibit III, p.4,

Statement of Cadet (F

at identig) Several times he (Ferrie) considered

becoming a priest."

TFK # 014930

TSBA Hearings, Testimony of Ferrie Synopsis, p.4-,

FBI report of SA's E. Wall and I. Viatel, Interview

of Ferrie, 11/27/63 62-109060 Supported Kennedy

Civil Rights program

39.

40.

41.

42.

(Ferrie letter to Capt. G.E. Greiner 10/30/61

suggesting persecution of himself by Communists.

FBI Report

9/22/61,

Interview of Joseph Lisman

Ibid.

Ibia

HH 53080

. DocId:32273595 Page 292

---

## Page 293

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.7

43.

44.

Ibid

8K# 014904

file, ALPA, SBA EAL EXH#7, D.W.

Ferrie, 15-63,

29-63,

48-63 Title of talk - "Cuba" - April 1961 Present, Future

45.

46.

47.

47

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

Ibia.

Ibia.

FBI report 11/27/63 p. 199 Ferrie later admitted that after

the Bay of Pig$ invasion he severely criticized President John

F. Kennedy, Both in public and in private...

Yer He said he had

also been critical of any President riding in an open car and

sad de the statement however, he denied de making a state-

shoot a president.

ment that Kennedy should be killed with the intentention that

be done.

JFK* 014904

FAA,

Vol

4, p.17 Robey Report, Interview of Charles Williams

IRS Agent.

Ibid.

Synopsis of SBA Hearing,

JEK*014930 testimony of Cornelius Michael Kramer, P.

ПК* 014904

Vol 2, Exhibit GGG, 11-N-224, 1/25/63, p.10

Bid

/ FAA

for

Vol. 4, Attachment J. Ferrie application for employment

Eastern Airlines 4/16/51.

FArA 101.2

1R 11-N-224,

1/25/63, p. 15.

bid.

¡FAA VOl 2 Exhibit FFF SR-11-N-224, 12/19/62 p.20

1bio

+.20

zie,

p.21

55.

55.

HH 53080

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---

## Page 294

57.

58.

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.8

Ibid,

FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit GGG, SR 11-N-224, 1/25/63, p- 13-14

Civil Service Commission, report of Record search, 9/29/61

for David Ferrie, gives military record (Ba Ye

909)

Ibid.,

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

'Of Eastern Airlines

Ibid.

vol.

R - EAL file, Ferrie, D.W. Personnel Records

6/15/51 - Transferred to N.O. "due to domicile preference."

FAA Vol 4, Attachment I, Memo from J.H. Halliburton to

Capt. J.E: Gill, 5/23/51;

EAL received derogatory info. from Retail Credit Bureau

5/21/51

Ibid.;

Memo Erom J.F. Gill to Capt. G.E. Thomas, 6/26/51 Attachment M;

Memo from F.A. Stone to G.E. Thomas 7/5/51 Attachment O

FAA Vol. 4 Attachment @,

(Meno 7/13/51 from G.E. Thomas to Capt. F.A. Stone. "I have

had him

with a couple of Captains here and their reports are

nothing but the best."

They say he has excellent possibilities.

loid

Attachment P,)

Handwritten

from "George" to Capt. John on Memo from

J.H. Halliburton to Capt. G.E. Greiner, 7/61/59

Ibid

¡FAA Vol. 4, Attachment T. Memo 3/19/59 A.T. Thornhill to

Capt. E.V. Rickenbacher.

FAA,

Vol. 4, Attachment H

Letter E.V. Rickenbacker to D.W. Ferrie 3/23/53

Rickenbacker had noted to the file "This man's efforts

bear watching

and his

qualifications justify his being

used

and helped whenever possible in line of duty - and

even beyond."

HH 53080. DocId:32273595 Page 294

---

## Page 295

FERRIE, Footnotes p. 9

67.

6.8.

69.

70.

70a.

71.

72.

letter to Ferrie from R.W. Tyler.

Acting regional counsel for Eastern. Re:

use of Ferrie's

plane by student pilot carrying a passenger. Plane not

propertly certificated or registered.;

SR-11-N-224, 11/19/62, laganding: Allowing use of rider

to George Piazza

who ferrie claimed was his "ward".

Also PAA; Vo1. 3, Exhibit EE;

Pa Vor 3, exhibit 7 Men tardent a near Foster of 2/145air

11/24/59

ASR-11-N-224, 12/19/62 Exhibit FFF, p.21

FBI Report + 105-104-340-1, 9/22/61, p.4

TER OLDL

SR-11-N-224, 1/25/63, p.15,

TrAA,

from

Vol. 3, Ex YY, Letter to Col. D.H. Hass, 10/21/58,

Robert E. Morrell

FBI Report #105-104-340-1, 9/22/61, p.4.

- 014904

«FAA

vol.

Col. D. Haas

Exhibit XX, letter 10/21/58, Robert Morrell to

73.

74.

FBI Report # 105, 104340-1, 9/22/61, p.4.

5014930 Synopis of $34 Haung

,Testimony of John Irion;

EX YY,

Letter 10/21/78 From Robert Morrell to

Col. D.A. Haas,

75.

Vol. 4, Robey Report, p.9 Attach XX;

5FK5014904

CAP

TheYDrill Team once went to Dallas, according to Bob Boyleston,

HSCA Interview,

10/18/78.

Ferrie made

appeared

all the arrangements and

to have had contacts there. Date ofithe alleged trip Bunkroun

П* 014904

Flight

instructions

p. 14-15 Robey Report - Interview of Ted Abernathy. He saic

and flight time forbidden to CAP cadets.

HH 53080

• DocId: 32273595

Page 295

---

## Page 296

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 10

77.

JFK#014930

SBA

Synopsisof

• Hearing

Testimony of Ronald Hubnet.

"Synopsis"

P.

3.5

JFKEt 4904 FAA,

00: 2, BX) p-211, Statement of cadet

78.

FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet (=+-A

thy

¡titet, p.2 Ferrie's house

"center of operations

for his group."

79.

81.

82.

83.

Dot Vor. 1, Robey Report: P. 10, Interview of Robert MorTell.

Iksto1y930.synopsisof

VSBA

Hearing

Рук, р. 8

,8/8/63, Testimony of James R. Lewallen,

K+ 014904

II-N-224, 11/19/62, p.21, Interview of Spontenelli

FAA Vol. 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet (*

Ferrie "encouraged the boys to

hecome priests if the felt inclined in that direction."i

FAA Vol.

Robey Report p. 11, Father Ward, Priest,

Ferrie called him up and

started sending him CAP members

a desire to go into the priest-hood.

p. 13, Al Meister - Ferrie was instrumental in persuading

go into seminary.

House delit Carmillee on Cissassinations.

(JFI DOCHAEH 008629)

contact Report of layton Marten 0/25/78 CARA 00327

from Fich cardison

1/14477x

JFK* 014930 Synopsis of SBA Hearing, Testimony of

_-John Espenan, a

Iather oi Cadet

11-N-224, 11/19/62 ex. EEE, P.9=

MEtra, Vol, 4, Robey Report, P.10 Interview of Col. J. Ehrlicher

JFK 80149303ynopsisof.

84.

SBA Hearing,

testimony of John R. Espenan,

Testimony of David Ferrie, synopsis, p.6;

8, p.2-3;

SРКДOW9СU5R 11-N-224, 11/19/62, Exhibit EBE, P.9

1progo1 R. FAA file, ALBA SBA, D.W. Ferrie, 15-63,

29-63,

Brief of EAL on grievance of Ferrie, p. 13

86.

FAA VOl 2, Exhibit GGG SR - 11-N-224, 12/19/62, р.6

87.

1K#014930

пороВої

eSSA Hearing,

Testimony of Ferrie, Testimony of John Ernest

58к+ 014904

FAR VOl

4,

Robey Report p. 14

HH 53080.

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Paye. 296

---

## Page 297

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 11

88.

tbid

PAS V. 4, Attachment I-

10-30-61,

Report;

SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62, p. 7

Flag-staterer.

While would-be members claimed approaches were made to them

to join the group, Barister testified there never was such

a group by that name, SBA Hearing, Fat

mal testimony.

89,

Ibids

58k-4003840 secret service

90a.

* Report,

12/13/63 #C0-2-34, 030

p.

=a Travelled to San Antonio, Corpus

Christi,

Brownsville

пет 014904

FAA VOI.

Exhibit FF. Memo to C.J. Simons from S.J.

Minnisale, 8/14/59 -

He emphatieally denied ha had beer

tast @ 10 years.

to Dallas

the

92

Ibia

94

Ibia:

PR*014904

FAA,

vol.

3

Letter to Capt. G.E. Greicher, 10/30/61 from Ferrie

008629

95.

HSCA iontait kirit-Layton Martens, 5/25/79;

• 014904

FAA, VOI.

~4 Robey report, Attachment I FBI Report 10-30-61

Interviewed .

one 8/22/61, D.4; 00

FAA

file, ALPA SBA D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63;

EAL EXH;

Juvenile Bureau Report 8/18/61, Item #H8507-61, Pg-2

FBI 8/22/61 Report

Note:

It was also reported that Ferrie had applied for visa to

Venezuela on 11/15/61, which request was denied. Ferrie had

also applied for a passport. His purpose unknown.

MEAA Vol. 5, Attachment el

97. ink:

The subnarines were found in a 9/22/61 search of Ferrie's house.

Also discovered among Ferrie's effects:

a Morse code key, four

HH 53080. DocId:32273595 Page 297

---

## Page 298

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 13

FRI 01A0S)

Synopsis of

110.

SBA Hearing, Testimony of Roland P. Fournier, Re:

Ferrie

involvement in Alexander Landry and Albert Cheramie cases, 7. 142

111.

H-8507-01 p. 6,5

112.

biBA Hearings Testimony of Roland P. Fournier, Sergeant, New

Arleans - Juvenile Bureau

JFK: 0 149040

29-63,

48-63,

8/18/61 Item

FÁA Vol-D Vol. 4, Attach C,

Investigative

results - Jefferson Parish Pd

Juvenile Division 8/29/61,

Ferrie "suspected of harboring the juvenile and also

encouraging him to run away from home.";

Alpa $48-63 - Letter from William G. Bell to Capt. V.O.

Rowland,

5/2/63;

Vol. K.

FAA file ALPA, SBA,

D.W. Ferrie 15-63, 29-63, 48-63,

113.

114.

Ibid:,

homsiana

~SR-11-N-224, 11/19/62, ExA EEE, p.3 from I State Police

Criminal Record for David N. Ferrie;

Alpa #48-63, Letter from Bell to Rowland 5/2/63

Snipa file #48-63, Letter from William Bell to Capt.

V. G. Rowland 5/2/63 ;

FAA File - ALPA, SBA,

(D.W. Ferrie, 15-63,

29-63, 48-63,3

(EAL Exhibit, Insert #I, Juvenile Bureau Report,

8/18/61, Item #H-8507-61, p. 4

HH 53080

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Page 298

---

## Page 299

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 12

Enquish.

98

1903 model springfield rifles, two .22 calibre rifles, one

Eastith rifle, a flare gun,

38. calibre revolver, a sword

a quanity of ammunition 3 maps (of Havana Harbor, the coast

of Cuba, west Indies, Cuba and North Coast) plus

FAA Vol. 4 - Attachments E thru I-fe said he purchased the

two submanpes.

guns at the Crescent Gun Shop, N.O.

191K+ 008846) HSCA interview of

Carlos

Quiroga

materials; interniew of

nato, interrew of quiraga: by

"attached material. Also in FBl 62-109060 FOIA

, New OMeans District Attorney's Office

JFK # CITE

FAA VOl.

Robey Report, p.12, Michael Finney said Ferrie

had been training Cuban pilots in the New Orleans area.

1OD.

10d.

102

CIEK# 012124

Interview of John priore, d/z8/78; JFK 1012754, interriew

John IrOn; 10/19/78.

FBI Teletype 5/7/67, to Director from New Orleans, 62-109060-

5237•

JEK IO10TA

FAA Vary, Attachment

FBI Report 10/30/61 New Orleans, LOS Angeles, for David

William Ferrie.

(nFravot.i, Attachnent 1)

103-

104

104

Tintervieul MCarlos: Quirega, lati

h

Ott2178

1221.

See JEK # 00834,

Statment of Herbert R.

Wagner

I Herb wagner Finance, service.

Arcacha Smitte

12/6/67, indicating Ferrie iseisted

JFK* 0149040

TAFAA VOL. '5,

Exhibit BB, 7/18/61 Letter from Arcacha Smith

to Capt. Eddie V. Rickenbacker

LidA vol.

5, Exhibit CC.

Letter to Arcacha Smith from

Halliburton, 8/1/61

105 - bid, EAL Fle

Kerne Tw Vacanon luformation brm, 4/1/61. Request for

107

109.

PSR-11-N-224,

11/19/63, p. 14;

SBA Hearing, Fearie Testimony,

SR-I1-N-224,

11/19/63, p. 14,

JER# 014930 synopsis of

HH 53080

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---

## Page 300

FERRIE, Footnotes, P. 14

115.

Bic.)

11-N-224,

11/19/62, Exhibit EEE,

3 from La. State Police records for David W. Ferrie-;

News article

"Times Picayaune, New Orleans, La-,

8/22/61, Attach B; FAA, VOl. 43

FAA Vol. 4 Attach C,

Jefferson Parish Police Department Investigative

Report:

116.

(bid.

~ SR

11-N-224,

Lt.

12/19/62 FFF, p.10

Marte 1o, P. 9-10;

ore service intervies 2ame 63. by sAs derrets and Rice

2S59

JFK* 014930, Synopsis of

117.

SBA Hearing, testimony of Sgt. Roland P. Fournier

of New Orleans Police - Juvenile Bureau

JEK#014904

118

V. FAA VOl.

4, Attachment C, Investigative Report of

Jefferson Parish, Police Department, New Orleans,.

8/22/61, Statement of St413

tat juvenile.

Battlette;)

118.

DidAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit HH,

8/26/61

Eastern Airlines to FAA, informing them Ferrie

removed from payroll;

Exhibit JJ. 8/29/61, Greiner to Ferrie.

120.

DA Vol. 4, Exhibit A, Case of "Good Moral Character"

opened 9/8/61 by Richard E. Robey.

Summary of Report.;

_Airlines

FAA, Vol: 3, Exhibit KK - Easternropened investigation

121

58K #014930) synopsis of 504 Matering, testimony of David Ferrie

JFK #014904

128

1283

VSR I1-N- 224, 11/19/62, p. 6.,

Ibid:,

EAL File.

Grievances of David W. Ferrie, 8/5/63;

Vol. 3,

Testimony of Banister, p. 840.

noes

$ Basictos, p.825

0, 075/05,

1265

Ibid p. 855

Ibia

p.

855

p.

840)

House deket Commattee ar

Staff

(JES: 012799)

Summary of FBI file for Guy Banister A Assessenalt"

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 300

---

## Page 301

FERRIE, Footnotes, P. 15

128.

57K*001986,

Gay Banister File, Ganisan Papers, £/14/77.1

129.

HSCA Staff Summary. of FBI file for Guy Banister, JFK#-012799

Note:

Banister explained before the Airline

Pilots Board about his work with "Arcacha Smith and others".

Banister, had high-ranking Cuban refugees

in my office

asking me how to go undergound and I gave them diagrams

for that:

* I have talked to military and

political leaders from the various provinces of acia

• Cuba

that have slipped out and slipped back." path

vol..

EÀI, File - Grievances of David W.

Ferrie;

8/5/63, Vol. 3, Testimony of Banistex, p.841

130.

131.

4,030, 12/37651,

Se SA'"A: Vial, He Palt. Re

secret service file # CO-;

rating Klephon

He# Staff

Interview of Jack Martin, fisc

interview of Sam Newman

12/5-6/77 (JFK# 005212)

fact staff Interview of Sam Newman, 3/7/78(505962)

2/74/78 75KH

132.

ISHA Staff Interview of Jack Martin, HSCH

12/5/77,

14617 interviews

JFK# 005212);

-Staff interview of Jack Martin," 12/6/78

(JFK# 005213)

3A Hearing, Perrie Testimony, 9. 516, (TFIC O14 930)

133

14

135.

136.

137.

138.

139.

140.

141.

142.

Bid.

11 * 724, 12/19/62, p. 14.

SR 11 # 224.

SR11N N-22%

Alpa #48-63.

Letter from

Wray Gill to Capt. George

Greiner.

1/8/63.

Vik, Vol. 3, Exhibit Xi letter from Capt, Greiner

to Ferrie, 9/1/61.

DAn, vol.

3,

Exhibit LL, letter from Ferrie to Capt.

Greiner,

9/5/61.

YEAA, VOL

Crouchet

Exhibit AAA, letter of Eric Michael

to FAA, 10/22/62

143.

HH 53080

DocId: 32273595 Page 301

---

## Page 302

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 16

29z antó.

Among those who intervened on Ferrie's behalf were Congressmen

Morrison

and Long, old friends of Bir G&Wray Gilles

5522163,572 10149049x from WilLiam G. Bell to Mr, J.O. Jasvard,

144.

Alpa #48-63,

Letter from EAL 4/11/63 to Ferrie.

Grievance #15-63. filed 1/21/63

145.

U3jO1. K., FAA FiTe,

ALPA SBA D.W. Ferrie,

#1563, 29-63, 48-63

Minutes of meeting 2/18/63, Miami

146.

147.

148.

149.

150.

151.

Ibide

Ibid

Grievance

Grievance

#29-63 filed 2/18/63

#48-63 filed

2/13/63;

Alpa #29-63,

6/4/63 to J.B. Railsback, EAt, from

Charles H. Ruby, Airline Pilots AssoCy

Letter from Ferrie to EAL 2/15/63

in ALPA 29-63

YSee Alpa files for correspondence: Alpa

529-63

Alpa file #48-636*

Letter to Capt. J.T. Robertson from J.B. Railsbaik

Alpa 45-62

Letter to D.W. Ferrie from R.W. Rivenbark

*ser-Staff Interview offlouis Decker, 2/5/75 Slit Cantter

vernon Gerdes, sardins

(JFK$ 005207)

House

ASSASSINATIONI,

#see Staff Interview of Carlos Quiroga 2/22/78,(TFK#006190)

HSCA

Staff Interview of Jack Martin, 12/15/77, (JFK# 005213)

58K7014904)

VolS - Miscellaneous

-Letter to Capt. George W. Youngehan et al, from J.B. Railsback

alask, EAL Pilots

System Board of Adjustment, 7/8/63

EAL File,

Grivevances of David

erasint of toring 7715, 28, 19, 63 vor. t

W. Ferrie, Miami!

152.

Thid

Wol.

K. FAA file, ALPA SBA, D.W. Ferrie, #15-63,

29-63,

48-63

Brief of EAL on grievance

of David W. Ferrie, p. 9-10

HH 53080

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---

## Page 303

FERRIE, Footnotes p. 16

Ibide, Vol. U,

153.

* EAL file - Grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami Transcript

of Hearing, Vol.II

Ibid,

154.

Vol. V, EAL file,

Grievances of David W. Ferrie, transcript

of hearing, 8/5/63 Vol. 3 p. 461-743

155.

156.

157.

158.

159.

160.

161.

1DO1. K. FAA File, ALPA SEA D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63

Brief of lAL on grievances for David Ferrie, P. 10 (ALPA

lbid

Vol.

VEAL file Grievances of David W. Ferrie 8/5/63, Vol.

3 Testimony, p. 856-857.

Ibig, P. 842, 858

Ibid, p.8

Ind Vol. 4, Robey Report p. 17

7/30/63,

Attachment DDD,

Letter from William G. Bell.;

Vol M,EAL file, D.W. Ferrie ALPA

#15-63 filed 1/21/63

Decision of the Board, 9/25/63

M, EAL Ille, D.W. Ferrte, ALPA

#14-63, filed 1/21/63 Decision of the board 9/25/63

Note: Ferrie was awarded $1635.90 in full settlement of all

claims.

See memo fronT.J. Kennedy to Capt. C.F. Hamher, :

10/11/63, Ferrie, D.W. file

Fel Report:, Interriew of David W Terrie, 14/5/53

162.

163.

(JFK #014904) FAA Vol. 1, Attachment I.

Ferrie was reportedly fired

foom the

job with Space Airfreight fobrowing

complaints by FAA officials that operations

under Ferrie's direction were not being

carried out according to FAA regulations.

FBI Report 92-10976-2, 11/27/68, p. 1-4

IN 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 303

---

## Page 304

Seles

164.

165.

166.

167.

168.

169-

170.

171.

172.

173.

174.

175.

176.

177.

178.

179.

180.

181.

(and total

#SeA Staff Summary of Immigration

and Naturalization Service file for David Ferrier

Ibid.

, HEC

Asiness iron

Ibia;

JFK #010904

FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report, Attachment I,

FBI Report, 822/61, Interview of David

Ferrie

FBI Report, Interview of Carlos Quiroga by New Orleans

District

Attorney's Office, 1968.

Ibid.

48€A Staff Summary of FBI file for Sergio Arcacha

Smith, JFK $004110

ін 2 14

HECA Outside Contact Report,

3/13/79, 014933•

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid:

FBI Report, Interview of G. Wray Gill, SI., p. 2

FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, p. 3

Ibia.

Ibid.

JFK #012523

10/16/78.

"Receipt of Purchase, Ewing materials,

197299199.9949

FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, p. 3

Ibid.

(JFK #001985,) Guy Banister

New Orleans

Polce report,

File,

Garrison papers,

11/22/63.

Note:

There are conflicting reports as to

why Banister attacked Martin.

Martin has

told the Committee that it was over a remark

he (Martin) had made in jest ha about the

Kennedy assassination.

Banister's

secretary,

Delphine Roberts, who was also present, told

the Committee the two men came

to blows when

Martin tried to take remove certain files from

the office.Csee HSCA Internicuch

MCk MAn, 2/15/78, 7.3, 98K # 005 212 12213

HSCA berriew of Delphine Points Roberts, 1675, pi,

indicates

about

endacte

deers aler

DeSore and Delinea sualect

•vilentle materes

"Tire.

1TH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 304

---

## Page 305

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 18

i82,

183.

bid

FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63,

p. 219,10. SA J. Smith;

FBI Teletype - 11/26/63

SAC Dallas, and Director from

SAC, New Orleans p. 2-3, 7, 15.

184.

185.

186.

187.

188.

189:

190.

191.

192.

193.

194.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 2-4,

JacinTo, ute Promised Marn to 2, her, Pete A Juvesneats,

FBI report, 11/25/63 Interview of Layton Martens, St.

Horerson, p. 2 (p. 302)

FBI Report; 11/25/63 Interview of Alvin

Beaubeen

SA Scheffer, (p. 307)

FBI Report, Interview of Layton Martens, 11/27/63, SA Hoverson

p. 2 (p. 303)

Ibia.

FBI Teletype, 11/26/63, to Director from SAC, New Orleans

p. 16.

Ibid.

SS Report, 12/13/63, CO-2-34, 030, p-4

in JFK #003840

_FBI Teletype 11/26/63 to Director from SAC New Orleans,

p. 11-17

SS Report, 12/13/63, CO - 2-34-030, р.3 in JFK #003840

FBI Teletype, 11/26/63 to Director from SAC New Orleans,

Statement by David W. Ferrie in FBI File, p. 580, Mo. 144-2064,

12/10/63

FBI Teletype 11/26/63, to Director from SAC New Orleans,

p. 13;

FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63

HH 53080. DocId: 32273595 Page 305

---

## Page 306

FERRIE, Footnotes, P. 19

195.

196.

197.

198.

199.

200.

201.

202.

203.

204.

205.

206.

207.

208.

89-69, p. 3-4

Perrinter yepay tr the period 16322-2593 are described

Ferrie's in

in most detail in this report.

FBI interview of Melvin Coffey, 11/30/63 New Orleans SA E. Wall.

FBI Report, #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63

FBI Report #62=109060-2143, 12/18/63, P.1 Interview of Lee

Fletcher.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p.1

Interview of Chuch Rolland-Ferrie called ahead on 11/22/63.

Arrived 11/23/63 between 3:30 and 5:30.

operating rink as Ferrie had suggestedhe would.

FBI Teletype, 11/26/63 to Director

p. 14.

from SAC, New Orleans,

FBI Report #62-109060-2143; 12/18/63, p.2.

FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63; p.1

FBI Report: #62-109060-2143 12/18/63 p. 2

Hotel registration

Checked in 1lp.m. 11/23/63;checked out 11/24/63

Mrs. Shirley Dial, Clerk Driftwood recalled 3 individuals

checked out at around 10 a.m. on 11/24/63.

FBI Repole #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63 Five calls made from

Alamotel, Houston and

One call made from Drift wood, Motor Hotel, Glaveston.

FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p.1

FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p-l indicates Ferrie

called 947-6435 in New Orleans collect

House delut Consattie an ASSASSiNATION,

7 Deposition of Mrs. Jesse Garner p. 34.

Note: While Mrs. Garner balieves it was the night of

NH 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 306

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## Page 307

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 20

of the assassination it would appear given that Ferrie

left New Orleans that evening, that Ferrie may have

come by her house on a later date.

209.

•2.0

210.

Ibia.

IKE E05440

reme Fle, Item. DF-7; 3/11/68, Eurison file.

FBI Report,

105-82555÷10, SA Callendel

11/27/63, interview of Roy P. 212 McCoy

1H 53080.

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## Page 308

544 Camp Street

Footnotes

1.

Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination

of President Kennedy (1964), p. 728

(Hereinafter cited

as Warren Report)

2.

Ibia./

Heau Befrie tre President's Cummissio on the ASSASSINATiOn OF

President Kennedy, Washinsten, De.: U.S. government Printing OFFICE, (1964),

3. Ibite

Vol. XXVI, CE 2966 A & B (hereinatter Warren Commissio

warren Report

4.

Hearings)

•Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, 5/12/78, House Select

Committee on Assassinations, pp.126-129

009084)

5. Ibid.

6.. Warren Report, p. 826

7.

Ibid warren Commission Heavings

8.

Vol XXVI, CE 3120, Pamphlet "The Crime Against

Cuba,

" Corliss Lamont, p. 39

9.

Vol. XXVI, CE 3119, Secret Service Report, 11/30/63,

C0-2-34,030, p. 11

10.

Ibid;

Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3

11.

Warren asia Can XXVI, CE 2966 A & B

12.

Ibid, vol.

• Lee DE 7

13

Ibid.

14.

warren iletivat,

Kirk, p. 408; Warren Commission Hearings, Vol. XXTT, CE 1414;

VaL. XXII, eE 1114;

FBI Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3

15.

Ibid.;

Warren

Hearing!

eport, Vol. XXII, CE 1414

16.

17.

Ibid.

Ibid.

18.

19.

20.

Ibia.

Ibid.

Ibid.;

FBI Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3

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308

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## Page 309

Footnotes, page 2

21. Warren Report, p. 292 and 408

22.

Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee

on Assassinations, p. 21

(JFK Document 014020)

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

Ibid

Ibid., p.

5

Ibid, p.

22

_Commission dieatings,

Warren Bopera, Vol. XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report,

CО-2-34,030, p. 4-5

Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, HOuse Select Committee

on Assassinations, p. 12

Ibide, p. 9, 21

Ibid:, pp. 23-24

Ibid., p. 13

Outside Contact Report (with Mrs. Anna Stewart), 4/11/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations, with

Attachment

(JFK Document 007364)

Ibid., Attachments:

1963,

and March 1964

Rosters through October 1962, April

Ibid., Roster through October 1962, p. 14 (First List);

Roster through April 1963, p. 16 (Second LIst)

FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, р. 9

Kerry

Thornley Affadavit, 1/8/76, p. 1

(JFK Document 012740)

Note:

This

statement, while rambling and confusing,

remains consistent on

the major point;

that Thornley

had

no contact with Oswald after service in the Marines.

Ibid. i

Testimony of Kerry Thornley, Hearings Before the Warren

Commission, 5/18/64, pP. 96-97, Vol. XI

Outside Contact Report (With Mrs. Anna Stewart), 4/11/78,

House. Select Committee on Assassinations

(JEK Document

007364), Attachment Roster through March 1964

FBI TEletype, FOIA MAterial, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, p. 9

Ibid.;

Secret

Service Report, 12/2/63, CO-2-34,030 (JFK Document

003675);

Testimony of Kerry Thornley, Hearings Before the Warren

Commission, 5/18/64, p. 110, Vol. XI

1H 53080 DocId: 32273595 Page 309

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## Page 310

Footnotes, page 3

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document

005191)

Commission Hearings,

Warren Repent, Vol XXII,

CE 1414,

Secret Service Report,

C0-2-34,030, 12/9/63, p. 5

Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78,

Select Committee on Assassinations

(JEK Document

005191)

Ibide: Compission Heavng?

Warren Report, Vol. XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report

C0-2-34,030, 12/9/63, p. 5

Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

005191)

(JFK Document

Ibid.

-

Ibia.

Outside Contact Report

(with George S. Gay re: Eugenia

Donnelly), 6/6/78,

HOuse Select Committee on Assassinations,

(JFK Document 009115)

Outside Contact REport (with Jack Mancuso), 1/26/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

(JFK Document 014120)

Ibide

Ibid.

Comiciscon

Warren Report, Vol.

XXVI, CE 3119, Secret Service Report

11/30/63, CO-2-34,030, p. 15

Ibid.

Ibid.

54.

Outside Contact Report: (RE: James Arthus), 6/1/78, House

Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009047)

55.

FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-2668, 11/26/63, p.. 2

56.

Material received from files of New Orleans District

Attorney's office pertaining to INvestigation and trial

of Clay Shaw,

1967-1969, Attachment D, Section 5, Regarding

Guy Banister,

(JFK Document 007271)

57.

Ibid

58.

Ibid,

HH 53080

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## Page 311

Footnotes, page 4

59.

Ibia.

60.

Ibid. i

FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance

Hearing of

David Ferrie,

Testimony

of Guy Banister,

8/5/63, p. 828

(JFK Document 014904)

61.

Material

recieved from filed of New Orleans District

Attorney's office pertaining to Investigation and trial

of Clay Shaw, 1967-1969, Attachment D, Section 5,

Regarding Guy Banister,

"Biographical Sketch"

(JFK

Document 007271)

62.

Staff

pp. 1-2

Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78,

63.

CIA Document

file on Guy Banister

64. Staff Review

of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78, p. 1-2

Note:

Coincidentally, Gerard F. Tujague, owner

Gerard F. Tujague, Inc. Forwarding Company,

who had

employed Oswald as a messenger from November 1955 to

January 1956, was also a member and officer (vice-

president) of Friends of Democratic Cuba (See FBI

Teletype, 62-109060-1668, 1/26/63, p. 5)

65. Ibid.

66.

FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance

Hearing of David

Ferrie,

Testimony of Guy Banister, 8/5/63,

(JFK Document 014904)

67.

Staff Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78,

Mile, on

Staff Report of Anti-Castro organizations,

Activities anf Lee Harvey Oswald's activitiies in

New Orleans. House Select Committee on Assassinations,

95th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1979, Para. 419ff

hereinafter the

Anti-Castro Cuban Staff Report)

1690 Ibia., para. 402 & 418

707| FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-5237, 5/7/67, pp. 1-2

MEGA

p. 3,

(JFK Document 005208);

assussiahans

1273 FE Telety»

Teletype,

5/7/67, pp. 1-2

7374 FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance Hearing

of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister,

8/5/63, P. 825

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## Page 312

Footnotes, page

5

7175 Ibia., p.841

7576 Ibid.,

76" Ibid.

77.78 Ibid., p. 825-855

7871 Outside Contact Report (with Mary Helen Brengel), 4/6/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

(JFK Document

008861) ;

Anti-Castro Cuban Staff Report, para 439 ff

22.d0 Ibia., para 390

808/ Ibid., para 390ff

82dL Ibid., para 392

8283 Outside Contact Report (with Ross Banister),

2/20/78,

House

Select COmmittee on Assasinations, p. 2

(JFK Document

005967)

83.044

Ibid.

8485 Ibia

856 Deposition of I. E. "Bill" Nitschke,

7/31/78, House Select

Committee on Assassinations, p. 5&12 (JFK Document 012308)

86i7 Ibia., p. 12-14

8z8tIbid., p. 36-37

8889 Ibia.

8990 Ibia., p. 38-41

ra9l Ibia.

912 Outside Contact Report, (with Delphine Rpberts) , 7/6/78,

House

Select Committee on Assassinations, p.

(JFK

Document 009979)

Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee

Assassinations, p.

(JFK Document 014020)

93t4 Ibid., p. 35-36

9495 Ibia.

956 Ibia., p. 30

964/ Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Newbrough),

4/10/64,

House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.

(JFK

1H 53080. DocId: 32273595 Page 312

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## Page 313

Footnotes, page 6

Document 009113)

Newbrough was associated with Banister's

ragency from approximately 1958 to 1964;

Outside

Contact Report (with Vernon Gerdes), 1/10/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

(JFK Document 005208;

Gerdes was associated with Banister for period 1960-1963.

Outside Cont-act Report (With Mary Helen Brengel), 4/6/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations. p. 1

(JFK Document

9899 Notes of an Intervieu of Louise Deckers. 5/30/18, House

Select Committee on Assassinations

• (JFK Document 015045)

90100

Outside Contact Report. (with Joseph Oster), 1/27/78, House

Select Committee on Assassinations

Document 005207)

Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, 5/23/78, House Select

Committee on

Assassinations, p. 21-27

(JFK Document 009394)

IDa" Ibid., p. 50,

51, 57.

12ja3 Ibia.

303/34 Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee

on Assassinations, p. 31,380FK Document 014020)

Newman

recommended the Committee speak with Martin because he was

in Banister's office

"90 percent of the time;

every day

almost" and he "kept up with all that stuff"

related to

the Cubans.

Deposition

of I.E.

"Bill" Nitschke,

7/31/78, House Select

Committee on Assassinations, p.

59-60

(JFK Document 012308)

Nitschke told the Committee,

•..If you were trying to

explore this to the fullest extent, I would say that Delphine

(Roberts) would be number one..."

104105

Outside Contact Report (iwth Delphine Roberts) , 7/6/78, House

Select Committee on Assassinatinas, p. 1

Document 009979)

105106 Ibid., p. 3

106/0? Ibia.

10z10dIbia.

107a0 bid.

Iosj1° Ibid.

Ma. VIbia.

122113 Ibid.

NH 53080. DocId: 32273595 Page 313

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## Page 314

Footnotes, page 7

112114 Outside Contact Report (with Delphine Roberts), 8/27/78,

House Select Committee on

Assassinations, p.

Document 011196)

114

Ibia.

Guy Banister File - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item GB-2,

Report of Offense Against Persons, 11/22/63, New Orleans

Police Department

(JFK Document 002066)

The report

indicates the incident took place

at 5:15 PM and was

classified as

"Aggravated Battery"; the motive "sudden anger"

176l* Ibia.

11zJ Ibid.

N8l20Ibid.

12a)?" Ibid:

17473

Ibid.

I82g4

Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House

Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1

(JFK Document

005212)

Deposition of I.E."Bill" Nitschke, 7/31/78, House Select

Committee on Assassinations,

p. 9-16

(JFK Document

012308)

(JFK Document

18517 Ibia., p. 4

N6-& Ibia.

127rtibia.

8, 11/23/63

1883gFBI Interviews of Jack Martin, 11/25/63, Bureau file NO 89-69

189;31 FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau

file NO

89-69,

130.

T32FB1 Interview

of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,

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## Page 315

Footnotes, page 8

137.

133

Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/6/77,

House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1

Document 005213);

FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,

p.

FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,

See also - FAA Systems Board of Adjustment Grievance

Hearings for David Ferrie, July 15-17 and August 5,

1963

for more discussion of Ferrie's and Martin's involvement

in unusual religious orders.

FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,

13331 FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,

134,6 Ibid.

135:27Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House

Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2

(JFK Document

005212)

136

Ibid.;

138 See also - FBI Interviews of Jack Martin, 11/25/63 & 11/27/63;

Secret Service Interview of Jack Martin, 11/29/63 reported

in Report of 12/13/63, p. 5

Martin makes no mention of

the alleged sighting of Oswald and Ferrie together.

Outside Contact Report (with Mary Banister Wilson) , 4/7/78,

133 House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 012448) .

13840Ibid.

13974Ibid.

140

utside Contact Report (with Kent Courtney), 3/19/78,

142 House

Select Committee on Assassinations

(JEK Document

006676)

14%43Outside Contact Report (with Mary Banister Wilson), 4/7/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations. (JFK Document 012448)

142

Outside Contact Report (with Russell R. Willie), 6/8/78,

14i House Select Committee on Assassinations

(JFK Document 009262)

Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009263)

yOutside Contact Report (with Russell R. Willie), 6/8/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Document 009262)

Ibid.

IH 53080 DocId:32273595. Page 315

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## Page 316

Footnotes, page 9

145!4%

Ibid.

Tudoutside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

(JFK Document

009263)

117/4/Ibia

1487/OIbid.

149Tg1 Ibid.

150% Select Committee on Assassinations

Outside Contact Report (with Aaron Kohn), 1/20/78, HOUSE

(JFK Document 005121)

151 tbia.

I SyGuy Banister file - Garrison Papers, 8/11/77, Item GB-1,

Index of Banister file

(gFK Document 002066)

153,55 Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78, House

Select Committee on Assassinations

(JFK Document 009263)

15413"Guy Banister file - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item GB-1,

Index of Banister file

(JFK Document 002066)

255 PEr EAteriON of Davia Perio, 12/26/63, Bureau 812e No 89-691

HIH

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