Document date: 00/00/0000

# DOCID-32176690

## Page 1

Date: 07/27/94

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

FBI

: 124-10186-10063

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

65994 Date: 11-01-2021

BH

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 66-2204-17 THRU 21

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

:

FROM

TO

:

TITLE

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES

0

SUBJECTS :

NAR

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

:

:

:

:

OPENING CRITERIA :

INDEFINITE

U

P

NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED

07/27/94

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 65994 Docld:32176690 Page 1

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## Page 2

Date: August 2, 2021

From: National Archives and Records Administration

Subject: Reconstructed FBI File BH 66-2204, Serials 17-21

To: The File

This memorandum briefly summarizes the status of missing original Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) case files or portions of case files in the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) and documents the National Archives and

Records Administration's (NARA) efforts to reconstruct these records, where possible, from

duplicate copies of documents located in other FBI files.

As the JFK Collection was first compiled and reviewed in the 1990s, the Assassination Records

Review Board and the FBI designated some records as "not believed relevant" (NBR) or "not

assassination related" (NAR). The FBI retained custody of the NBR/NAR records and

postponed their transfer to NARA until a later date. Every document or group of documents

("serials"), however, received an indexed Record Identification Form (RIF) and FBI inventory

sheet for insertion into the JFK Collection.

After an extensive search, neither the FBI nor the National Archives could locate a small

number of NAR documents or case files.

This compilation represents NARA's efforts to reconstruct the original file or portions of the file,

as completely as possible, with duplicate copies of documents located in the FBI field office and

headquarters files within the JFK Collection. Each reconstructed file or compilation contains a

Record Identification Form, an explanatory cover memo, existing administrative documents

available within the JFK Collection, and copies of identified duplicate documents. The table

below summarizes the status of FBI file BH 66-2204, Serials 17 through 21.

RIF Number

FBI File

Number

List of Serials

From Inventory

Sheet

List of Identified

Serials at NARA

124-10186-10063

BH 66-2204

17-21

17, 19-20

Reconstructed

Status (None,

Partial,

Complete)

Partial

NW 65994 Docld:32176690 Page 2

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## Page 3

FROKRAL BURKAU OF INVESTIGATION

POSTPONEHENT INFORMATION SHEET (JER HATERIALS)

85

_Page (s) withheld entirely at this location in the file.

One or more of the following statements, where indicated,

explain this deletion (these deletions).

(1 Deletions were made pursuant to the postponement

rationale indicated below with no segregable material

available for disclosure.

All references relate to

Section 6 of the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992."

[] Subsection 1A (intelligence agent's identity)

[]

Subsection 1B (intelligence source or method)

Subsection 1C (other matter relating to miiitary

defense, intelligence operations or

the conduct of foreign relations)

[]

Subsection 2

(living person who provided

confidential information)

[]

[]

Subsection 3

Subsection 4

(unwarranted invasion of privacy)

(cooperating individual or foreign

government, currently requiring

protection)

[]

Subsection 5

security or protective procedure,

currently or expected to be utilized)

I Information pertained to a matter unrelated to the JFK

Assassination investigation.

[] For your information:.

The following number is to be used for reference

regarding this page (these pages) :

B1 66-2204-11 thsu 21

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxX

NW 65994 Docld:32176690 Page 3

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## Page 4

NW 65994

12

15

15

Page:

03/24/75

03/25/75

05/02/75

05/20/75

06/16/75

05/28/75

06/28/75

09/04/75

09/05/75

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09/12/75

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11/12/75

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Section #: 1

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with-

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held

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Postponements

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## Page 5

NW 65994

18

19

20

21

22

22

23

24

-26

27

28

29

29

29

30

Page:

Document

Date

Document

Type

12/12/75

TT

12/02/75

TESTIMONY

12/04/75

RS

12/10/75

TT

12/02/75

TRANSCRIPT

12/05/75

RS

12/24/75

AT

12/24/75

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01/05/76

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01/28/76

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ACTUAL PERT. Rev.

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Postponements

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NONE

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---

## Page 6

NW 65994

Document

Date

08/31/76

09/07/76

06/28/77

Document

Type

TT

TT

MEMO

33

Page:

Grand Totals.....

End of Report....

Document

From

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Postponements

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---

## Page 7

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES

B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE, FORMER EBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

good

DECEMPER 2, 1975

HANDLE AS

AGENT

"JENSTUDY

12-2368-14

SEARCHED.

ISERIALIZED

INDEX EDE

BEC FILEDOA

DEC - & 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994-Docld:32176690-Page-7

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## Page 8

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to

spread dissention among certain groups that they are

informing on, do you not?

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were

discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one

of the best examples of a situation where the law was

ineffective at the time. We heard the

term, State's Rights

used much more than we hear today. We saw with the

Little Rock situation the President of the United States

sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use

local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement

use the

troops. only as a last resort. When you have a

situation like this where you do try to preserve the

respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical

problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where

the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless

to act. We had

! local law enforcement officers in some

areas

participating in Klan violence. The incidents

mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the

lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action

was taken with that information as he pointed out during

his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the infor-

mation upon being received was not being acted upon.

We

also disseminated

simultaneously through letterhead

NW 65994 -Doëld:32176690~ Page 8 ~

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## Page 9

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.

And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no

authority in the absence of an instruction from the

Department of Justice to make an arrest.. Section 241

and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence

of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation

where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have

authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as

frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information

from

someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable

information--and it was passed on to those who had the

responsibility to do something about it, it was not always

acted upon as he indicated.

In none

of these cases, then, there was adequate

evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

The Departmental rules at that time, and stillão,

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.

You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you

have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil

Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

- 2 -

NW 659945 DocTd:32176690 Page 9

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## Page 10

QUESTION: '

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

individual. ' There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This

was a problem that the whole country was grappling with

the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we

were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking

place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that

we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were

able to obtain in preventing violence

and in neutralizing

the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

•...A local town meeting on a controversial social

issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers

rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this

mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups

organizing or participating in such meetings because

they may result in violent government disruption?

No sir, and we don't....

Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every

aspect of the peace movement?

No sir.

When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor

demonstrations where we have an indication that the

>

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have

an investigative interest in, a valid investigative

interest in, or where members of one of these groups are

participating where there is a potential that they might

change the peaceful

• nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing

on the Ist Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

- 3-

NW 65994-Docld:32176690-Page 10 -

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## Page 11

aware of groups such as we have

had in greater numbers

in the past than we do at the present time. We have had

periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe

and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,

and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect

to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged

to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut

case.

QUESTION:

MR. WANNALL:

MR. ADAMS:

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and

we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one

that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor

the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-

ments fall.

In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just

heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when

violence was known about. I know we have asked this several

times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the

rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe

situation when violence was known.

Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to

that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be

the one to answer the question.

The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem

today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have

police powers

even like the U. S. Marshals do.

The Marshals

-4-

NW 65994- Docld:32176690-Page 11 -

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## Page 12

since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had

authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We

are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,

and during these times the Department of Justice had us

maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the

information to the local police who had an obligation to

act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those

areas where the local police did not act.. It resulted

finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals

down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to

march in protest of their civil rights."

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there

was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the

country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement

agencies in the south at the time either, because many of

them did act upon the information that was furnished to

them.

But we have no authority to make an arrest on the

spot because we would not have had evidence that was a

conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in

that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for

instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army

should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals

should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed

the violations.

We have over the years as you know at the

-5 -

NW 65994 'Docld:32176690-Page 127-

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## Page 13

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the

FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well,

we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan

as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we

exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

What would be wrong, just following up on your point

there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is

obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to

have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on

some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

We do. We have them in Boston in connection with

the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in

Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same

time and this is the approach that the Federal Government

finally recognized.

On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that

kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting

till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from

the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need

a better remedy than we have.

Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have

subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or

50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on

potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

- 6-

NW 65994 'Docld:32176690-Page 13 ..

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## Page 14

QUESTION:

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with

state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice

and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to

protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a

lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government

had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during

the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it

a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that

we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another

infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimate member-

ship.

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

That's right.

I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. • That woula

mean that I out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point

was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the

MR. ADAMS:

figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members

in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an

awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such

as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants

in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it

just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For

example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,

both domestic

• informants and potential informants. Yet, here

we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters

and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

NW 65994^ Docld:32176690' Page 14

+----57

7

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## Page 15

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

we tried

to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan

informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I

think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that

right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan

had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in

the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the

hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was

going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and

considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the

violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as

many

informants as

you possibly can against it. Bear in mind

that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,

was

concerned

about the murder of the three civil rights

workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

I acknowledge that.

Our only approach was through informants. Through the

use of informants we solved these cases.

The ones that were

solved. There were some of the bombing cases we

never solved.

They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told

the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved

informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the

bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he

could see that this could continue forever unless we could

NW.65994 Docld:32176690_Page 15 - -

nin

-R-

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## Page 16

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

create enough disruption that these members will realize that

if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the

Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if

that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I

will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence

stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you

say

20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately

were klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of

violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy

any longer.

I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in

197] we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto

situation?

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year

where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was

the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington

areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the

situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They

weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an

organization.

They were listening posts in the community that

would help tell us that we have another group here that is

getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

... Without going into that subject further of course we

have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt

was made to prevent crime when you had information that it

was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where

you have.

NW 65994 •Docld:32176690~Page 16~-•--

-9=

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## Page 17

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

To a police department which you knew was an

accomplice to

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

the crime.

Not necessarily knew.

Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

The informant is on one level. We have other informants

and we have other information.

You were aware that he had worked with certain

1, members of

the Birmingham Police in order...

That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that

incident by telling the

people who were already a part of it.

We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the

time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department

agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.s.

Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

...This brings up the point as to what kind of control

you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this

kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in

an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer

using him as an informant in spite of the information he had

furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

But you also toía him to participate in violent activities

NW 65994- Docld:32176690 Page 17°

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## Page 18

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

That's what he said.

I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits

are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our

Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your

staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage

in violence.

Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

I do not think they made any such statement to him

along that line either and we have informants who have gotten

involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately

converted their status from an informant to the subject and

have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around

20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws

once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy

of disseminating information on violence in this case during

the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they

found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a

day and he was a little late in disseminating the information

to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed

up in a file review and he was censured for his

delay in

properly notifying local authorities. So we not only

have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards

in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all

informant files.

Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with

an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

NW 65994 •Docld:32176690-Page 18-

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## Page 19

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

to be a Klansman and he

happened to be with someone and they

decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are

words of the Agent. And be a good informant.

He wouldn't

take the lead but the implication is that he would have

to go along or would have to be involved if he was going

to maintain his liability as a

-==

There is no question that an informant at times will

have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights

that take place but I believe his statement was to the

effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do

not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with

chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with

a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is

one thing being present, it is another thing taking an

active part in a criminal action.

It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut

apparently.

How does the collection of information about an

individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming.

involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for

law enforcement or crime prevention.

Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that

they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge

concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any

value whatsoever.

NW 65994 Docld:32176690 -Page 19----

-12-

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## Page 20

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

You don't know of any such case where these instructions

were given to an Agent or an informant?

To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

-13-

NW 65994 Docld: 32176690* Page 20

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## Page 21

1885B WA PLAIN

10:34PM NITEL 12/ 10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENT ALL OFFICES• FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S

QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANIS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS CMY RESPONSE

WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXISI TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARD SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANIS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENIS ' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

62-2368-12

SERACKED

SERIKLIED!

-NDEXED

FILED._

DECiO 1975

FBI- ALBANY

HW 54955 DocId: 32989494 Page 46

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## Page 22

PAGE TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANI GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID. NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM CMY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATED.

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I SIATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT;

THAT

AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE. COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

• TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCI BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDÉRAL

_ AGENCY.

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PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF . .

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR:, I STATED THAI THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH MARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO.

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE IVO AREAS IO BE COMPATIBLE; AND I

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

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FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAI WHEN SUCH REQUESIS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT VE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

PLS ACK FOR 2 TELS

LVV FBI ALBANY

ACK FOR TWO CLR

T KS

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Vol. 15

Ohe Quite Statra Sruate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Salec: Connitica to Study Governmental Operations

Wich Respeck to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT

Tuesday, Dacember 2, 1975

Washington, D. C

800-0

SENStuDY

HANDLE

дАс

WHER

PX.

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Senator Tower.. The next witnesses to appear before the

Committee are MI. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-

Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all

investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant

Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal

security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;

Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations;

Mr. Robert I. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive

investigations; Mi. Homer A. Newman, JX., Assistant to Section

Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigali•

Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. fali.y,

Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener: Int"l-

gative Division.

Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

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• Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give

before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

but the truth, so help you God?

MI. Adams. I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

Mr. Mintz. I do.

Mr. Deegan. I do.

Mr. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman. I do.

Mr. Grigalus. I do.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that. Mr. Wannall will be

the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning

might require, and I would direct each of you when you do

respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow

the members of the committee to return from the floor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower.

The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according

to data, informants provide 83

percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information

on the criteria for the selection of informants?

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TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS,: ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) ;

JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANI DIRECIOR, LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT I.

SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,

ASSISTANT TO SECTION

I. CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT

CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEE,

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you

have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting

Office.

Senator

Tower. That is GAO.

MI. Wannall.

Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate

figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI

itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I

think that

we do get the principal portion of our information from live

sources.

Senatox Tower. It would be a relatively high percert.".

then?

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes.

And your ques!

criteria?

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Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection

of informants?

MI. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with| the needs. In

our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get

an informant who can meld into

a group which is engaged in a

criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set

of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security

matters, I think we set rather high standards.

We do require

that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist

principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field

office indices, checks with other informants who are operating

in the same area, and in various established sources such

as

local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type

who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we

would interview the individual in order to make a determination

as to whether of not he will be willing to assist the FBI

in discharging its responsibilities in that. field.

Following that, assuming that the. answer is positive, we

would conduct a rather in depth investigation for. the purpose

of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability.

Senator. Tower. .How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between

the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to

intelligence. collection?

Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

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Mr. Wannall. Well, MI. Adams can probably best address

the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over

the operational division on that.

Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact

that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you

are trying to develop evidencé which will be admissible in

court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant

alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be

just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality

of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,

through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be

used independently of the testimony of the informant so that

he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to

function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-

tions against using informants as provocateurs: This gets

into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed

by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the

courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage

in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the

opportunity. This does not mean, of course. that mistakes

don't

occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to

avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can

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engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,

especially the

supreme court in the Newark County Case, that

the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that

an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but

because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a

law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant

has to become involved in some activity in order to protect

or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United

States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure

we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our

informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do

instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that

they are informing on, do you not?

MI.

Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,

which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the klan is probabty

one of

the best examples of a situation where the law was

in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used

much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little

Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending

in

the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law

enforcement.

We must have local law enforcement, to use the

troops only as a last resort.

and then you have a situation like this where you do try

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to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have

historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had

situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost

powerless to act. Wehad local law enforcement officers in

some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,

he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't

see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed

out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance. We

also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being

received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated

simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department

of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a

position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction

from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have

evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in

a situation where the Department called in United States

Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement

officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus-

trated

as anyone else was, and when we got information from

someone like MI. Rowe, good information, reliable information,

and it was

passed on to those who had the responsibility to

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do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he

indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was

adequate evidence.of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to

act?

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Mi: Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. . You

can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have

no violation.

Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights

statute, which added punitive

measures against an individual

that didn't have to be

a conspiracy. But this was a problem

that the whole country was grappling with: the President of

the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation

where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from

a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.

The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing

violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one.

of the

reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con-

tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

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Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the

intent to halter political expression?

Mx. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans

Against the War that indicated that there were subversive

groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting

with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending

meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the

International Comnunist Party. We feel that we had a very valid

basis

to direct our attention to the VAW.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was

head of the Communist Paity, USA, and the conments he made,

and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it

split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost

group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point

factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closedi

those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow'

the national organization.

But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we

investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation

and subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. llart?

Senator llart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing

after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information

that clearly has no rclationship to any Federal

criminal

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statute.

Mr. Adams. I agree, Senator.,

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that

stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that.

When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the

violent statements made by the group or do you also show that

you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have

some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,

that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the

statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along

with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with

information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum

cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the

real purpose of

an organization, do you only report the

violent statements made and the. fact that it is by a small

minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization

and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines

we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because

we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in

our files.

Senator llart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process:

you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people

who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment

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exercises, and this is what

hangs some of us up.

Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I

imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either

asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator .

being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-

viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the

-.

FBI?

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Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that

this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our

files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree.

It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our

files, but if they

recognize that we interviewed you because

of considering. a man for the Supreme Court of the United

States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't

see. where any harm is served by having that in our

files.

Senator Hart. of Michigan. But if. I am. Reverend. Smith

and. the vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact.that.I.was.helping

the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years

later a

name check. is. asked..on Reverend Smith and. all. your

file shows. is that he was. associated. two years ago. with a group

that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful patriotism

to justify turning loose a

lot of your energy in pursuit on

them -

MI. Adams. This is a problem.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require

us to rethink this. whole business.

MI. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well

as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about

a wide range

of gIoups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration

and repoit on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition

of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-

taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation

of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation

of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then

informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence

investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations.

The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation

relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,

upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back

again in a world of possible violations or activities which

may result in illegal acts.

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the

right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition,

conceivably may result in violonce or disruption of a local

town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result

in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding

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the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all

groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because

they may result in

violence, disruption?:

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify

spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

Mr. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we

monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that

we have

an

investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,

ox where members of one of these groups are participating where

there is a potential that they might change the peaceful

nature of

the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines

to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the

First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the

past than we do at the present time. But we have had periods

where the demonstrations have been

rather severe, and the

courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,

to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission

of crime.

It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be

too late for prevention.

And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

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case. Our problem is where we have à demonstration and we have

to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly

fits the criteria of enabling is to monitor the activities, and

that's. where I think most, öf our disagreements: fail:

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Senator lart of llichigan., Let's assume that the rule

for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn.

The

Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive

organization should not only report on what that group is

doing but should look at and report on activities in which .

the group is participating.

There is a section g7B3 dealing with reporting. on

connections with other groups. That section says that the

field office shall "determine and report on any significant

connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any

significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive

groups.

Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of

1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the

installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us

remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential

sources reported on the plan's participants and activities

of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,

particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium,

which included speakers from the Defense Department for the

ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reported on the planning for the meeting,

the distribution of materials to churches and schools,

participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on i:

ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat:.

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plans fox a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the

names of local political leaders who rould attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as

pärt of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group . .

participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt

with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the

plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated

to the Stato Department, to military intelligence, and to the

White llouse.

How do we get into all of that?

Mx. Adams. Well --

Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it,

would you do it again?

Mr. Adains.

Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969

was.

The problem we had at the time was where we had an

informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was

going to take place and it was

going to bethe Daily world,

which was the east coast communist newspaper that made conments

about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took

a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28,

1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this

organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look

and get out, fine. We've had

cases, though, where we have

stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security :

in lila

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soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country

and they supported him with total resources: of the Soviet

Union, false identification, all the money he needs, comnuni-

cations netvorks, satellite assistance, and everything, and

you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic

security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations.

So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take

a quick 100k at

and there's nothing to it, and I think that's

what they did.

Senato: Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let

me bring you up to date, closer. to current, a current place

on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President

Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as

he described it, for draft resistors.

Following that there

vere several national conferences involving all the groups

and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is

not against -- while unconditional

amnesty is not yet the law,

we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

MI. Adams.

That's right.

Sonator Hart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors ver

umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse crip:

the country.

rBI informants provided advance i....!ir

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plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on

the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the

participants as having, represented diverse perspectives on

the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human

rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed

in Vietnan, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft

counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,

delegates

from student organizations, and

aides of House and

Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as

a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive

and

it described the topics of the workshop.

Ironically, the Bureau office report before

then noted

that in view of the location of the conference at a theological

seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage..

to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last

fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point

of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional

amnesty, the better for the soul of the country:

Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on

thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad

informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups

in that setting having contact with other groups, all and

everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the

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Bureau files.

Is this what

we want?

Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this.

He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

MI. Wannall. Senator llart, that was a case that was

opened on lovemher it and closed Wovenber 20, and the information

which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular

items. One was that a member of the stecring committee there,

was a three man stecring committee, and oné of

those members

of the national conference was in fact a national officer

of the VAl in whom we had suggested before we did have a

legitimate investigative interest.

senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, I would almost say

SO

what

at that point.

Mr. Mannall. The second report we had was that the

VAl would actively participate in an attempt to pack the

conference to take it over. And the third revort we had -

Senator. Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the

information that your Buffalo informant had given you with

respect to the goals and aims of the VAW gave you a list of

goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected

objectives.

There wasn't a single item out of that VVAl that

jeopardizes the security of this country. at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirely

on the Buffalo informant, but even there ve did

recej..

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fron that informant information which I considered to be

significant.

The Buffalo chapter of the WAW was the regional office.

covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the

five nost active VAN chapters' in the country and at a

national conference, or at the regional conference, this

informant reported information back to us that an attendee

at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba

prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during

the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There

was

also discussion at the conference of subjugating the

WAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals

in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in

agreenent with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the

interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the infornation that we had on the VAN dia

not come froin that source but even that particular souxce did

givé us information which we considered to be of

some

significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the

investigation of that particular chapter of the VAW.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

But does it give you the

right of does it create the need to go to a conference, even

if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VAW

when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we

seck to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

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Mr. Mannall. Our interest, of course, was the VAl

influence on a particular neeting, if you ever happened to be

holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

What if it was a meeting to

seck to make more affective the food stamp system in this

country?

- ..

Mr

• Wannall.

well, Of course there had been some

organizations.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow?

Mr. Mannail. I think that if we found that if the

Communist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and

use it as

a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic

in doing that.

You have a whole scope here and it's a matter.

of where you do and where

you don't, and hopefully, as we've

said before, we will have some guidance, not only from this

committee but from the guidelines that are being developed.

But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was

explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and

not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,

and that was the person who had, who was not developed for

this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other

matters for some period of time.

And as soon

as we got the report of the outrire

tire

meeting and the fact that in the period of some ....

малала.

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discontinued any further interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, my time has expired

but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we

really want to control the dangers to our society of using

informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have

to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And

that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when

my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,

obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged

informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or

individuals.

I know you have objections to. that and I would like to

review that with you.

Senator Mondale, Pursue that question.

senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an

obligation so obtain a warrant before you turn joose a full-

fledged informant.

I'm not talking about tipsters that run

into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources

The Bureau has

raised some objections in this memorandum to the

Committee.

The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement

might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First

Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their

government.

Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that

ought to

• hearten all the civil libertarians.

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But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement

raise a serious constitutional question?

Mr. Adams: Well, for one thing it's the practicability

of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which:

ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has

been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily

with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities

such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have

discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage

in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still

subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time

is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United

States.

Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about

to do it because they're telling you they're not

going to do it

and you know they're not going to do it at this particular

moment.

It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a

criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function,

and

we can't find any practical way of doing it. He have a particula

organization.

We may have an informant that not only belongs

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to the communist Party, but belongs to sevoral other organization

and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist

25

Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

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we don't have probable cause for him to target against

that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa-

tion fcom him that he as

a Communist Party member, even

though in an informant status, is going to that organization

and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.

It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,

the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not.

violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have

recognized the necessity that the government has to have

individuals who will assist them in carrying out their

governmental duties.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything

yet in response to the constitutional question, the very

practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the

use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional

rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress

can prescribe sone safeguards, some rules and some standards,

just as we have with respect to your use of electronic

surveillance, and could do

it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant

procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show

probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a warrant,

therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

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warrant. . It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and

investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities

but which might engage in activities that can result in

violence or illegal acts, and you can't use

the warrant, but

Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to

such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,

including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss

the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to

use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or

unless you present your request to a magistrate. in the same.

fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most

cases, to wiretap.

This is an option available to congress:

Senator Tower.

Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential

security informant and a security informant?

Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,

that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on

him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth

background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is

under

consideration before

he is approved by headquarters for use as

an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

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•On some occasions that person will have been developed to a

point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are

engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished,

but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied

ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does,.

the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and

headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an

approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of.

being an informant, I guess.

MI. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the

preliminary steps.

Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in :the Rowe

testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again

for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having

trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was

in not intervening in the Rove situation when violence was

known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Scriveiker, Mr. Adams did address

himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to

answer that.

Senator Schweiker. All. right.

Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's

the

= in

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problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not

have police powers like the United States marshalls do.

About 1795, I

guess, or some period like that, marshalls have

had the authority that almost, borders on what a sherift.has

We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice

and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain

the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on

activities to furnish the information to the local police,

who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department

of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it

resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United

States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who

were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a

time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was

a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agenciès

in itself at the time either because many of them did act

upon the information that was furnished to them. But we

have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we

would not have had evidence that there was a-conspiracy

available.

We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that

if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and

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next to the Army, "the" United

states marshalls should make them,

not the fBI, even though we developed the violations.

And over the years, as you krow, at the time there were many

questions raised.' Why doesn't the FBI stop this?

Why don't

you do something about it?.

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed

the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course

we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following

up your point there, Mix. Adams, with setting up a program

sincé it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to

have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some

kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection

with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston,

they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this

is the approach, that the federal government finally recognized,

was the solution to the problem where you had to have added

Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instoad of waiting until it

gets to a Boston

state, which is obviously a pretty advanced

confrontation, shouldn't we have somere a coordinated program

that when you go up the ladder of cowand in the FBI, that

on an imnediate'and faiily contemporary basis, that kind of

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help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it

gets to a Boston state?

realize it's a departture 'from the past. I'm not.

saying it isn't.. But it seems. to me. we need a better remedy

than we have.

Mr. Adams.

well, fortunatelyr.ve're at a time where

conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s

and the '70s and periods - or '50s and '60s.' We report to the

Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the

country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be

aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took

place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,

the Department of Justice and the IBI sitting down together

saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the

early '60s.. But the government had no

mechanics which protected

people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the

Robert Hardy case. I know he

is not a witness but he

was a witness

before the llouse. But since this affects my

state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was

the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized

a raid on the Camden draft board. An according to Mr. Hardy's

testimony before our Committee, he s:.: that in advance of the

raid someone in the Departnent had even acknowledged the fact

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Why, Mr:

Wannall, was this true?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the

material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not

a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your

question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department

of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously

as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be

made and

we vere being guided by those to our mentors, the

ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort..

So I. think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that

there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who

under your procedures?

Iir. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,

when they should be made, and decisions with regard to

prosecutions are inade either. by the United States attorneys

or by Federals in the Department.

Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have

departmental attorney on the scene fause there are questions

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conspiracy.

Conspiracy is a tough riolation to prove and

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19:30

someone in the commission of the crime as

further proof,

rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial

evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they

even had a dry run. They could have arrested them on the

dry run.

me.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to

They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on

the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry

run.

Who was this Department of Justice official who made

that decision?

Mx. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,

during the height of the effort to destroy the klan, as you

put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released

figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some

kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10, 000

estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.

That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan

at that point was

an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes on =o indicate that 70

percent of the new members of the Kla: that year were FBI

informants.

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Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people

to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that

you shouldn't have informants in the klan and know what's

going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the

tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total

informants for both domestic informants and potential informants

and that here we had 2,000 just in the klan alone.

Mx. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all

racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I

think the figures ve tried to reconstruct as to the actual

number of Klan infornants in relation to klan members was around

6 percent, I think, after we had read. some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a

group called the Action Group.

This was the group that you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left.

af-

ter the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard

all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,

but he never knew

what was going on because each one had an

action group that went out and considered themselves

in the

missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it'takes, you have to direct

as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in

mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and

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1932

everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights

workers, the Linió Kent, sase, the viola Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.

MI. Adams. Our only approach was through informants

and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the

ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have

never solved. They are extremely difficult.'

These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and

as we told the President, that we had moved informants like

Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the

head

man.

He was in a position where he could forewarn us

of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and

yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever

unless we can create enough disruption that these members will

realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,

even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are

in on it, if that were

the case and with some of them it was

the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and

that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure

and just lile you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of

their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't

dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they

couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

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Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have

one quick question..

Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500

informers for black ghetto situations?

Mr. Adams.

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did

have one year where we had

a number like that which probably

had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities

were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this.. We.

were given

a mandate to know what the situation is, where is

violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penetrating

an organization. They were listening posts in the community

that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting

ready to start another fire-fight or something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there

are three more

Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get

everything in in the first round, we will not have a

second

round and I think ve can finish around 1:00, and we can. go

on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question

that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the

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record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the

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organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts

in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it

has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the

last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped

shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of

the crucial public confidence in an essential. law enforcement

agency of this

country.

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it

was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI

in 19.24.

In World war I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from

its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and

protector of political ideas. And through the interference

of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public

became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and •

Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement

by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department

get involvea in political ideas.

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with

Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even

had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of

Churches.

Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined

impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people

can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the

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tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive

of dangerous: ideas, which I

find strange and quite profoundly

at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started

in politics years ago and the first thing we

had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out.

of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and

I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help

from the FBI or the CIA. We just ramned them out of the meetings

on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't

good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them.

And

yet, we see time and time again that we're going .to

protect the blacks from

Martin luther King because he's

dangerous, that we've going to protect véterans from whatever

it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches

from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and

confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree

with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that

precisely what is expected of the fBI is known by you, by the

public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask

YOU?

Mr. Adams. I agree with that, senator, and I would like

to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement

Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we follied that policy for about

ten years until the President of the ited States said that

we should investigate the Nazi Parti.

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I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in

the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,

there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage

which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could

have investigated these issues of sabotage. .

Isn't sabotage a crime?•

Mr. Adams.

Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams. After it happened.

Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved

in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of

crimes that could have been comnitted. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going

continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you

still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of

Churches, and this can still go on: This can still go on under

your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to

justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics

in terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams. The law does not say we have to vait. until

we have been murdored before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

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law again. You're trying to defend apples with

granges.

That's

the law.

You can do that.

Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which

of the 20,000 Bund members

might have been a saboteur. You

don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can

direct an intelligence operation against the German-American

Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that?

Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?

Mr. Adams.

Because we don't have probable cause to

go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for

probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time

they outlined the Conmunist Party -

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it

wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority

that you could use in the kind of Donn situation where under

court authority you can investigate where there is probable

cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just naking these

decisions on. your own?

Mr. Adams.

We have expressed cemplete concurrence in

that. We feel that we're going to gist leat to death in the

next 100 years, you're danned if you 'o, and damned if you

don't

if va don't have a delineation of our responsibility

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in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we

have

bungled

the intelligence operations in the United States.

I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. MI. Kelley.

has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the

FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think

that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and

Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because

of the necessity that we must concentrate on these areas of

abuse.

We must not lose sight of the

overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I

still fcel that this is the freest councry in the world.

I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have

made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United

States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they

are by the fact that there are 20,000 nurders a year in the

United States and they can't walk out of their

houses at night

and feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an

argument then, Mr. Adams, fox strengthening our powers to go

after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or

continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public

confidence you need to do your job.

MI. Adans. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made

are

what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some

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mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But

at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes

out,

as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity

of zercing in on abuses:

I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think

the accomplishments in the klan was the finest hour of the

FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the klan that we made

some mistakes.

But I just don't agree with bungling.

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Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but

I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble

over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we

need to have new legal standards.:

Mr. Adams.

Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams,

these two instances we have studied at some

length seems to have been an

inclination on the part of

the Bureau to establish

, a

notion about an individual or a group

which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In

the case of DI. King, where the supposition was that he was

being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-

gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating

that

this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go

out

to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to

be a

willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar

that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War,

that

every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau

seemed to indicate that the Bureau was, not correct in its

assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,

of that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist

that this investigation go on, and t: information was used

against the individuals.

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Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that

its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their

course?

Mr. Adams.

We have admitted that. We have also shown

from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after

five days we closed the case. We were told something by an..

individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence

in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King

situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just

dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and

on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were

all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin

Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This

wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that

there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir

Do. King, but it's just like --

Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda

written by high officials

of the Bureau indicating that the

information they were receiving from the field, from these

surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition

was.

Mr. Adams.

That memorandum was rot on Dr. King. That

was on another individual that I thi. somehow got mixed up

in the discussion, one where the issus was can we make people

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prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to

investigate them.

But the

young lady. appearing this morning making the

comment that she never knew of anything she told us that

she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch

as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and

agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-

ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals

from associating themselves with the VAW-wso.

She is most

concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary. Union to take over

the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that we have a basis for investigating the VAW-

WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped

the investigation. They don't agree with these principles

laid down by the --

Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your

continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that

information against members who certainly had not been involved

in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job

or

whatever?

Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the

criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to

prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens.. The

Attorney General has clearly spoken : that area, and even our

statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't -

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Senator Huddleston. . Well, of course we've had considerable

evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent

crime, when you had information that it was going to occur.

But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

MI. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he

reported to us.

Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you

knew was an accomplice to the crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,

hadn't he?

MI. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have

other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huddleston.

Yes, but you were aware that he

had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in

order to -

Mr. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole

lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were

already part of it.

Mr. Adams.

We were doing everything we could lawfully

do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that

when the department, agreeing that we had no further. juris-

diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform•

certain law enforcement functions.

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Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received

documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted

an informant who had been established in a white hate group

to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid

his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being

responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might

have undertaken?

Mr. Adams. I'd like to

see if one of the other gentlemen

knows that specific case,

because I don't think we set up a

specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the

informant we're talking about decided to break off from the

group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of

the United Klans of America,

and he decided to break off.

was in compliance with our regulations.

His breaking off,

This

we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it

on his own.: We paid him for the information he furnished

us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza-

tion.

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Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that

he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that

organization?

Mr. Deegan..

He continued to advi:: us of that organization

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and other organizations.

He would advise us of planned

activities.

Senator Huddleston:

The new organization that he formed,

did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan.

No, it did not, and it did not last that

long..

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI

informant in the Black Panther

Party who had a position of

responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his

FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing

them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the

knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became . came in contact

with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-

pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent,

and

this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with

the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the

knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime

prevention responsibilities.

MI. Deegan..

Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular

case.. It does not square with our policy in all respects, and

I would have to look at that particular case you're talking

about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on that

particular case,

but it brings up the point as to what kind of

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control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind

of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you are supposedly trying to prevent.

Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became

active in an action group, and we told him to get out or

we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the.

information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate

in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent

activities.

Senator Huddleston. That's what he said..

Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But. that's what

lawsuits are.all about, is that there. are. two sides to the

issue, and our agents. handling. this have. advised. us, and I

believe have advised. your. staff, that at no time did they

advise him to engage. in violence..

, Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to

get the information, I believe maybe might have been his

instructions.

Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement

to him along that line, and we have informants, we have.

informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law

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and we have immediately converted their status from an informant

to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I

can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for

violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even

to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence

in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told

me that they found one case where their agent had been working

24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the

information to the police department. No violence.occurred,.

but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for

his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow

reasonable safeguards.in order to carry it out, including periodi.

review of all informant. files.

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is

substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the

agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you

happen to be with someone and they decide to. do something, that

he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,.

and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead; but the

implication is that he would have to go along and would have

to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams.. There's no question but that an informant at .

times. will have to be present. during demonstrations, riots,

fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was

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to the effect that - and I was sitting in the back of the

room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were

beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat

someone with a chain of not, but I rather doubt that he did

because it's one thing being present, and it's

another thing

taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston.. He was close enough to get his

throat cut.

How does the gathering of information -

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that

we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should

we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston.

I'm finished. I just had one more

question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of

information about an individual's personal life, social, sex

life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life

is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams.

Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.

Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no

such knowledge concerning it, and I can'= see where it woula

be.of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston. You aren't aire of any case where

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these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams. To get involved in

sexual activity? No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the fourth

Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants

and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one

time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have

a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you

may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which

there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying

degrees.. It might be in one case that the same individual

will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when

the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first

test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like.

to explore

with you is the difference between a one time search which

requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that

search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or

the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover

agent,

someone who is totally under your control, and is in a

slightly different category than an informant.

MI. Adams.

well, we

get there into

the fact that the

Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does

not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and

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if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't

protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal évidence, that is a protected

item, but information and the use of informants have been

consistently held as not posing any constitutional problens.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about

the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,

but is it true that under existing procedures informants are

given background checks?

MI. Adams.

Yes, Sir.

Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period,

Mr. Adams.

That's right, to verify and make sure they

are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-

ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the

handling agents.

• Mx. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very

practical way agents themselves to the EBI.•

Mr. Adams.. They can do nothing --

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use

of the word:

Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we

instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the

agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into

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an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and

glean all the information that he wants, and

that is not in the

Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a inember

of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require

a warrant?

MI. Adams. No, sir, if a regular - it depends on the

purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by

concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as a member of the

Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he

can enter the premises,

he can enter the building, and there's

no constitutionally invaded area there. .

Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has

a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a.regular

agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation

as an undercover.agent.or as an informant.-

MI. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you.why you feel that it is

impractical to require a warrant since, as I understand it,

headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that

degree of formal action required?

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Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity

which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You

have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify

what you're going after, and an informant operates in an

area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's

going. to be discussed at that meeting.. It may be a plot to

blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the

State Department building..

Senator Mathias. If it were a crininal investigation,

you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't

you?

WARD

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Mr. Adams.

We would have difficulty in a warcant to

use someone as an informant in that area because the same

afficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's

very similar to one that we discussed carlier in connection

say wiretaps on a national security problem.

Mr. Adams:

That's it, and there we face the problen of

where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy

in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy

there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't

show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that

he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,

we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements

which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the

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evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting

espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's

why we're still groping with it:

Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really,

you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.

Mr. Adams. That's right,

except for the fact that the

• President, under this Constitutional povers, to protect this

nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all

national survival, and these are the areas that not only the

President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're

all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle

ground in here.

Senator. Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national

security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular

need.

PAUL

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MI. Adams.

And if you could get away from probable

cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some

method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an

ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,

we may get their yet.

Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that

middle ground?

Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's

more of an open mind between' Congress and the Executive Branch

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and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these

areas resalved.

Senator Mathias.

And you believe that the Department,

if we could come together, would support, would agree to that

kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

MI. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney

General is personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement night

extend to some of those other areas. that we talked about?

Mx. Adams.

I think

that that would be a nuch greater

difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who

reports on many different operations and different types of

activities that might come up rather than say in a soviet

espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little

more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get

together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the

meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that

would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney

General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the

same general process could be used fox informants, since

you come to headquarters any way.:

Mr. Adams.

That could be an alte mitive. I think it

would be a very burdensome alternative i I think at some

25

point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered

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major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think

we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies

have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency

and we can't just keep pushing every operational problen up

to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests

itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally

with one level of information in one sense of gathering

information.

You hear what you hear from the tap:

Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number

also.

Senator Mathias. Smaller nunber, but that's all the

more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his

senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being

can acquire from a situation and has access to more information

than the average wiretap.

And it would seen to me that for that reason a parallel

process night be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main

distinction. to me which I had overlooked fron our prior

discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is

more in the position of being a

concentral monitor in that one

of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like

concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and

anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual

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whose telephone is being tapped is not

aware and there is,

and neither of the two parties talking had agreed

that their

conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept.

If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking

place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived

by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't

consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent

if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan

of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for

someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator lart

raised earlier, that the courts thus far have, made this.

distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that

there may not be some legislative compromise which might be

addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly apprcciate your

attitude in being willing to work on these problems because

I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from.

these hearings, so that we can actually look at the fourth

Amendment as the standard that we.have to achieve.

But the

way we get there is obviously going to i". lot easier if we

can work toward them together.

I just have one final question, i. Chairman, and that

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deals with whether ie shouldn't impose a standard of probable

cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling

the use of informants and the kind of information that they

collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year

informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they

provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover 586 million

in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective

of

what we give the local law enforcement and other rederal

agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost

reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much

left. And in the intelligence field we still, I

think when

carve all of the problems away, we

still have to make sure

that we have the means to gather information which will permit

us to be aware of the identity of individuals and oxganizations

that are acting to overthrow the government of the United

States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard

at, as

we have discussed, but I think informants are here to.

stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement.

Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress

has infoimants, you have individuals in your comnunity that

you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know'

what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly,

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MW 65994- Docld:B2176690-Page 84.

am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history

and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to

avoid is abuses. like provocateurs, criminal activities, and

to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.

But we do need informants.

Senator l'ower..

senator Hart, do you have any further

questions?

Senator llart of Michigan.

Yes. I ask unaninous request

perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the

groups that we have discussed this morning into which the

Bureau has put informants, in popuzar language, our liberal

groups - I would ask unanimous consent that. be printed in

the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters

file by the Bureau of DI. Carl McIntyre when he announced

that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil

Liberties Union and other "liberal and comnunist groups,"

is not a left only pre-occupation. •

Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.

(The material referied to follows:)

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Senator Tower. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this

afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and

I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans,

Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General

Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00

a.m. tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the

above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday

December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a in.)

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