L. FLETCHER PROUTY
Agency: ROCKCOMCOP
Originator: ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
Document date: 04/15/1975
Document type: DEPOSITION

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY : ROCKCOMCOP

RECORD NUMBER :

178-10002-10394

RECORD SERIES :

ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ASSASSINATION MATERIALS, L. FLETCHER PROUTY

Document Information

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

L. FLETCHER PROUTY

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992 144 USC 2107 Notel

Casef:NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

04/15/1975

15

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

PROUTY, L. FLETCHER

DOCUMENT TYPE :

DEPOSITION

CLASSIFICATION:

Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B; 1C; 4

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

07/12/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

v9.1

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A -II (F)

178-10002-10394

178-10004-10418

STAFF INTERVIIW

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

1 of 2

Thursday, May 15, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD &PAUL

Verla

Spoken

nolant-

wards flu-

scripta

written.

manent

words endure

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STAFF INTERVIEW

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washington, D. C.

Thursday, May 15, 1975

The Staff met, pursuant to notice at

1:00 o'clock: p.n.,

at 712 Jackson Place, M. ".,

Washington D. C.

PRESENT:

MARVIN L. GRAY, JR.,

Staff member

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The reupon,

L. FLETCHER POURTY

called for interview by Counsel for the President's Conmission

on CIA Activities, having been first duly sworn by the notary

Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. GRAY:

Sir, would you state your full name for the record?

A.

My name is I. Fletcher Pourty.

., And you are a retired Air Force Colonel, who for a

substantial period of time, and particularly around the late

1950's and early 1960's served as a CIA appointed liaison

with the Air Force with certain support of a paramilitary nature,

is that correct?

But it should be the other way around, I serves as an

Air Force officer in support of CIA, I was in

the Air Force.

And your office was in the hir Force?

A.

Yes, my office was in the Pentagon, in the Air Force.

Before the reporter arrived you told me that in

December 1959 or January 1950 or possibly as late as February

1260, you were approached by the Air Division of the Covert

Action Staff of the CIA, who said they hau a special jos

requiring Air Force support, and they wanted an I-23, is thas

correct?

-SECRET

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Yes.

And I don't think I can repeat what you explained to

me about the I-2s, so maybe you had better repeat that.

A.

The I-20 was a special single engine plane that had

been purched by the CIA called the lielio Courier.

The Air

Force owned a number of these air craft. So we provided

cover for CIA by giving them Air Force insignia and Air Force

designation, the I-28, and Air Force serial numbers. And these

aircraft, or at least some of them, were based at Eglin dir

Force Base in Florida. They were at Eglin Air Force Base

because that is where the CIA kept most of its aircraft in the

country.

I And how was this mission originally described to you?

1. Originally it was one of a number of missions that we

were operating over a period of time. But it was one of the

few that we operated with L-20's. The people who came over

from the Air Division stated that they had a place to land the

plane in Cuba on a road, on a small road, and they had a photo-

graph

of it. And they were going to let two men out there and

then fly the plane back with a pilot and copilot to Eglin Air

Force Base. And the men that were being left off would be

equipped with a high powered rifle and a telescopic sight.

They were Cubans.

We never saw then, of course. This is what

we were.

told they were, because we didn 't interfere with who

was on the plane, we simply out the plane in the air. But this

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was

a normal procedure. And the object of their mission in

Cuba was to go to a building in Havana where one of the men

knew his way around and was pretty sure that he could get into,

and if possible, he would shoot castro.

Did you recall who told you this?

A.

No, I don't, because we were working every day with

these people. And I think if you had a listing of the Air

Division staff at that date I probably could tell you it was one

of four men, something like that, a Division of maybe 30 men,

it would have been one of three of four, or two of three or four

The thing was, we were doing these things every day, it was not

an odd thing that came up,

it was something that we were doing

quite regularly.

& It surprises

me that the CIA would describe the

I mission to you in this much detail, it doesn't seem

consistent

with compartmentation and need-to-know particularly in view of

the sensitive nature of the mission.

A.

That is an awfully good point you are making.

In

those days it did, because the more urgent part of my job was

to brief my boss, the Chief of Staff, Air. Force, and through

him the Secretary, Air Force, or the Secretary of Defense,

or whoever, as reguired.

Q.

Let's go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the record.

MR. GRAY: Back on the record.

Dra tron

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THE WITNESS: And since that was a real serious respon-

sibility, ve wouldn't fly the mission unless we knew that it

had the approval of the Security Council, or that at least

the overall program had approval of the Security Council. And

this was understood for years. We had no problem with that at

all. I don't think that I ever sent out a mission that we

didn't know what they were going to do and where they were

going. And this seems, at least in certain applications,

to

have ceased in this day and age. But I think that is due to

other things. But in 1959-60 we would now where it was going

-+-

even to the point that I would want to know when they came back,

I would really want to know if they went where they told me.

ie were pretty sure about how we did it.

BX MR. GRAY:

Do you recall briefing the Chief of staff or any of your

other superiors on this mission?

A.

Yes. My usual arrangement was to brief the Director

of Plans, the Major General who vas my inmediate boss.

Did you remember who that was at that time?

A.

In 1959 I would say that was feneral Cary, or possibly

General Martin. . Again, it is a question of who was where at

that time. But I think if we put those two names down we will

be awfully close to it.

"as this mission concerned at all as to the proprietary

or moraiity or whatever? Diù thoughts of that nature concer

you when you heard it?

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A.

The concern that we would have was that the military

would not be involved. We just wouldn't participate in it.

And actually the CIA haù the same icea at that tine. What ve

wel

doing was helping Caoans. And if the Cubans, with their own

little connand structure, wanted to operate and could, you

might say, convince CIA that this was something that was import

ant to them, or that they thought they could achieve, on their

own, if we would just give them so much as a little help, the

missions would be sent. As a result, we didn't concern ourselves

with too many of them, for the simple reason, we weren't asked

for. It was almost like mechanics, you linor. There were

missions that we turned down, but mostly because we thought

they wouldn't suceed or that we would not be able -- the

favorate phrase -- to disclaim plausibly that the military or the

Government of the U.S. was involved. And we were serious about

that business in those days.

Did you recall anyone else that you briefed on this

raising any questions about this particular mission?

A.

No, with no, what you might say barriers to the

operation, with everything cleared and laid on in a perfectly

normal manner, we got on with other business.

We knew right

away that it didn't succeed - I say right away, within 10

days -- and there were so many other things going on, it was on

with the rest of it.

a Did you ever hear what happened to interrupt the

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A.

I don't think I have a clear memory about it. But

all of us in that business kind of felt that most of those

Cubans were not able to do what they thought they could do.

Castro was operating the bloc system, and I think it was

lot more effective than we gave him credit for.

How are you able to place a time as to December 1959

or January 1960 or February 1960? Why are you sure it is in

that two- or three-month period.

A.

I will tell you why that is pretty easy to figure.

The Agency wasn't running what I would call hard missions until

late in 1959. You know Castro came in at the beginning of 1959.

And things didn't really jell until later in the year. And

a good reason for that, the training of Cuban exiles haun't

produced really professionals in terms of pilots or drop teams

or saboteurs or what have until after they had had quite a bit

of training. At the other end of the calendar, General Eisenhove:

had made it very clear to all of us who were operating over-

flights that nothing was to be done. A little later in 1960

when he was supposed to meet at the summit with Khruschchev

and other world leaders, we haulted every overflight. And to

this day I can't understand why the U-2 ient out. But all the

flights that I had anything to do with, the Tibetan flight, the

Laotian flights, the

Cuban flights, all of that overflight

program we haulted on direct orders. And since the meeting in

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Paris was scheduled for May 1, I doubt if we flew anything

after larch 15, or even maybe March 1, because there would

be no interfarence with it. So I can put it between those

dates without any trouble.

You said at times it. was a matter of concern to malie

sure that the operations you had requested to support, or at

least the type of operation, had been approved by the National

Security Council, or whoever else was required. Did you recall

when you made any such inquiries in this case?

A.

The way we would work that is, having briefed, you

might say, the Air Force chain of conmand, if I was not told

to stop, it was gone. Again, it was a matter of working

with

people that I had been with for years. It wasn't one lind.

They knew me, they knew the progran. And if I briefed them

and there was nothing to interfere within a day or two, we

would go. Now; sometimes they would want additional briefings.

But I don't remember one in this case.

@ I believe at some point one of the news coverages

had the name of one of the Cubans involved.

I don't put much story in that. I lookeû up some

notes that I thought might be pertinent, but I don't -- we

didn't work with the Cubans -- there were a few Cubans we got

to know, like Artemo, but they were not involved in this kind

of operation.

Did you ever get a projact name for this, or is there

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anything that you can suggest, in other words, that we can go

to the Agency indecies to try to track down the paperwork behinci

it if any.

A.

No.. You see our overall projact was called tAb-6.

That was

the code, an

international code, Agency and military.

And if we called it TAE-o, just like a TAD-7 Or TAB-S in à lot

of documents, people all over the world knew that Tab-s was

certain type progran.

And most of the time when. it was like

this, pure

nechanical program, we would just continue calling

it TAB-é, maybe with a date and an airplane number, but

nothing else.

Now, sometimes a program would be broken off

TAB-6, and we would have a separate code number. This was just

an ordinary flight.

You say the use of the b-ze was fairly rare. mould

there be any Air Force records which vould enable us to pin

sown any flight this war or pin it down to one of a few, some-

thing like that?

A.

well, there were two things I think you would find.

He usually went to élaborate detail to cover the flight. For,

example, if a plane leaves and is not in the air -- if it doesn't

land it is presumed lost. Now, we would put another plane in

the air to cover it, one with the actual numbers of the one

that was supposed to be in the air. Me would put that one in

the air from some field where nobody knew it took off.

And

if the one would pick up the flight, come in and land, so that

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control towers, air

tarffic controllers could show a record of

a plane coming in.

Now, this was normal procedure for the people at Eglin,

whether the plane was going to Guatemala, or Nicaragua, anything

what we called black flight would be covered that way.

I would presume that you have got a record of those,

or that it could be

available?

A.

Now, sonetimes when the crew would, say, be mercenaries

like Air America, they would just take off. And they knew we

had them covered in Air Defense Command. And there would be

no record at all, nothing, they wouldn't tell anybody where

they were going. We would have to see what Eglin had on its

record. But I would think, my personal view would be that they

ran this very professionally, and you will find there was a

flight.

Would that be preserved after 15 years, or be

destroyed?

A. I say there are two sides of this. The man in the tower

at Eglin would just know plane number 1, 2 or 3 was left, and

I think it would be dropped

from the book with the others, and

I think the law requires 90 days or something like that.

The

other thing is, the Air Defense Command would have a record,

because it is harder to tell the Air Defense Conmand not to go

after a bogey in the sly than to have them go. But again,

15 years is a

long record.

-SEGRET

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What about on the Agency's side, would you be familiar

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enough with their records and records-keeping processes to offer

5

any guidance

as

to how we might try to run this down.

weil, the Cuban program was a big program that hag

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general approval so lone as only Cubans were involved. And up

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to the point that the Agency was involved, I think you would

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find them very professional, I think you would find that

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they have records. But to say what happened after it left the

9

Agency control, then I don't think there would be a record.

10

That is the base program. And of course, I imagine you have

11

heard that from other people too, that you have got to disclaim

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plausioly.

We went so far as to tale the decals off the motors,

13

to take the decals off all the engine parts, to take all the

14

American language fuels classification symbols, or vhatever,

15

so that the plane was what we call sanitized. Now, if that

16

plane went down, everybody would just disclain entirely that

17

they had ever even heard

of it anywhere. Which means that you

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don't have any records anywhere, not even the airplane. That

19

is the kind of mission the thing was.

20

But the pilots would normally at least have been Agency

21 people, and not Cubans, is that right?

22

In this instance

they would be either Agency contract

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employees -- not Agency full-time employees, but contract.

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enployees, or Cubans, because that is what we were. doing

in

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cuatenala, we were training them. You would find either one.

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JETKET

but in either case they would have been people flying, you

might say, under Agency supervision. We never knew what

nationality they vere, whether they were like Air American

pilots, of indeterminate nationality, or whether they were Cubans

I would presume, if I look bach at it, since th I-28 was very

easy to fly, that it was a Cuban crew.

Is there anything else you can think of that would

jive us more lead on running this down, either through the

Agency or through the Air Force or some other suitable source

A. I have been looking through the New York Times

micro film. I have a little flickering memory that there as a

little announcement from lavana. I must adnit that it was only

a light recollection, and I have been trying to find it in the

New York Times micro film myself since I talked with Dan Shore.

To date I haven't found it. But that kind of thing -- Havana

used to blaze every time they got one of those. And that was

one way we knew how far they got sometimes.

0.

If you find that, would let me know?

A. , I certainly will.

Aside from this instance, was there any other similar

operation, Agency operation that you knew of, similar to the

one that appeared to be designed to assassinate a foreign

leader or support an assassination attempt upon a foreign

leader?

A.

•Hell, I don't know how deep you go into these subjects.

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But I know what you might call the anatomy of an

assassination

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doesn't begin with the assassination. If

you can remove

the

3

government or

assist people who are probably going to remove

4

it inevitably, a successful one,

and not assassination - there

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are

a number of those called coup détats. There

were quite

6

few of those things

where,

for many reasons, the Agency would

be keeping in touch with a group who were not in power, but

8

who, with the run of events, or with a little assistance, or

9

even in some cases up to the point where if the man doesn't

10

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leave he may be killed - he doesn't have much choice -- sure,

the Agency was involved in that, there has

been a record of

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that for years.

13

What specific one do you have in mind?

14

A.

I think one that is pretty clear is that over a period

15

of time the Agency worked rather diligently with General Rene

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Barrientos in Bolivia when he made his move. DI. Victor Paz

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Estenssoro, who was President of Bolivia left. So there was

18

no assassination, he took over.

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The Agency for a long time had worked with Barrientos.

20

Now, I doubt if the Agency ever got to the point with any of

21

"them where they said, if he doesn't go by tomorrow we will have

22

to shoot that guy, because events roll up, you see.

23

Another case where this kind of development took place

24

was one removed from Trujillo -- I believe Trujillo was

25

followed by Juan Boscit -- it might have been Bleager -- but I

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think Juan Sosch. Juan Bosch, I recollect, was replaced by

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Donald Reid Kabaral. Now, Kabaral was in my office in the

Pentagon at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening the day before

4

he became President of the Dominican Republic. Now, the only

5

reason he was there was because somebody in the Agency sent him

6

there. And we gave him a little bit of help that he needed.

7

He took an

Eastern Airlines plane out of Washington for San

8

9

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Juan that night, I think at 9:30, and transferred out of San

Juan for Santo Domingo. The change of government, took place

that night, and he was the President. of the Dominican

11

Republic the next day. And nobody was killed.

12

But that iw really -- you know, the Agency can say,

13

and the government can say, that an assassination is not our

14

business. An assassination is when everything else fails.

15

Or like in the case of Dien, the President of South

16

Vietnam, where the government went to every extreme to persuade

17

hin and his brother to go to Europe. Madame Nhu vas already

18

in europe. And they, had brought tickets or arranged his flight

19

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to Europe, and they had arranged for him to make a speech and

all that. But he didn't go. Well, what happens when you expose

21

the palace guard like that, they all know that thousands of

22

people hate them. Any palace guard is hated in most cases.

23

And they leave, they run for their own lives. And so when ir.

24

Diem came back to the palace there was nobody there to protect

25

him. He made a mistake. And when he realized that he went in

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tunnel,

and they found him at the other end of the tunnel, and

2

he was killed.

There was

no assassination plan. All that tall

3

about the assassination of Diem is by people who don't know the

4

inside. There was no assassination of Diem. But there was a

5

removal of Diem. And when it didn't work he got assassinated

6

by others. And that was, I think, the reasonably spontaneous.

7

Once another government knows that the support of the

8

CIA, or the support of this government, is being removed, then

9

10

many, many people are exposed, and they begin to run. Just as

ve saw in Saigon. And if they don't run, they get killed.

11

So where a lot of people make a mistake is -- and I

12 worked on so darned many of these -- is that you don't start with

13

a plan to assassinate, that is what is wrong, that is why the

14

Agency says, no, we don't do that. Now, in that fine sense, I

15

could agree with the Agency. But all the rest of the machinery

16

is there. And it gives the people on the outside the initiative

17

to go further. And a lot of time the initiative improves the

18

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gun and the bullets after everything else.

Assassination

has to

be treated wisely, or it becomes complete aberration.

20

MR. GRAY: We will conclude here.

21

(Whereupon at 4:30 p.m., the interview was concluded.

22

23

24

25

SECRET

Photocopy

from

Gerald R. Ford Library

NW 53244 DocId:32204721 Page 17

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