CABLE: FOLL REPORT COVERS TOPICS CITED REF PARA 3A, 3 B,
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: GENEVA
To: DIRECTOR
Document date: 12/19/1962
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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19 DEC. 62

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: DIRECTOR

PON.

(GENEVA) 19-11

iriTION: C/EE 3

(MR. MINNEY NOTIFIED. AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1730

19 DEC 62. DM)

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PRICRITY

RITY DIR INFO (BERN CITE GNVA) 4623

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MBAT (INDEVOUT 3) PPRUMEN

PET GIVA 4619 (IN 37981) 24

1: FOLL REPORT COVERS TOPICS CITED REF PARA 3A, 3P,

3C- INFO ACQUIRED EN PRAGUE 13 THRU 15 DECEMBER)

UNLESS

OTHERWISE STATED INFO WAS OBTAINED FROM RAULITO ROA KOURI,

CUBAN AMBASSADOR PRAGUE. WHERE ROA IDENTIFIED HIS SOURCES

THEY HAVE BEEN NAMED. , IN GENERAL ROA DID NOT IDENTIFY SOURCES.

HOWEVER. SUBJ POINTS OUT THAT ROA IS IN CONTINUAL LETTER CON-

TACT WITH HIS FATHER, RAUL ROA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND

PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY: RAULITO ROA

SUBJ BELIEVES THAT THRU THESE LETTERS THE SENIOR ROA KEEPS,

HIS SON POSTED RE THE SENIOR ROA'S THINKING ON CUBAN DEVELOP-

MENTS AND OTHER MATTERS. SUBJ ALSO NOTES THAT ROA HAS CON-

VERSED WITH VARIOUS CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE PASSED THRU

PRAGUE ON TRIPS TO AND FROM HAVANA AND THAT ROA HAD LONG CON-

VERSATIONS WITH BLAS ROCA, CUBAN PSP LEADER, WHEN THE LATTER

WAS IN PRAGUE FOR

SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO 15 DECEMBER.

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BACKGROUND TO PRESENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE MISSILES

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IN CUBA.

A.

SOVIET OFFENSIVE MISSILES WERE INTRODUCED INTO

CUBA AS PART OF A TWOFOLD SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN WHICH WAS AGREED UPON

"SEVERAL MONTHS AGO". UNDER THIS PLAN THE EMPLACEMENT OF SOVIET

DEFENSIVE MISSILES WAS TO CONSTITUTE THE FIRST PHASE•

IN THE

SECOND PHASE A MAJOR SOVIET FLEET UNIT SUCH AS THE BALTIC FLEET WAS TO

HAVE SEEN INVITED TO VISIT CUBA ON. A CRUISE • ONCE ALL PORTS OF CUBA

MISSIES

VERE SCREENED BY SOVIET FLEET UNITS, THE PRESENCE OF V-LES-V VAS ANTICIPATED

THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE U.S. REACTION, BUT THE PRESENCE OF

SOVIET FLEET UNITS SURROUNDING CUBA WAS CONSIDERED AN EFFECIIVE

GUARANTEE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT RESORT TO IMMEDIATE INVASION OR

OTHER ARMED ACIION TO ELIMINATE THE MISSILE THREAT.

B. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTION WAS TO FORCE A MAJOR

CHANGE OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS CUBA. IT WAS

ANTICIPAIED THAT U. S. REACTION WOULD BE VIOLENT, AND FROM THE

BEGINNING THE PLAN CALLED FOR THE ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE

OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THIS WITHDRAWAL WAS TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED

AT THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT BY THE U.S. THAT IT WOULD END ITS HOSTILE

ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA. /

•C. SOURCE COMMENTS:

¿1) RAULITO ROA DID NOT SAY WHEN AND UNDER WHAT

CIRCUMSTANCES THIS SOVIET-CUBAN AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED.. THE STATEMENT

THAT IT OCCURRED "SEVERAL MONTHS AGO" MAY INDICATE, HOWEVER,

THAT IT WAS AGREED DURING THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT TO MOSCOW

OF PAUL CASTRO EJELIER THIS FEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, RAULITO.

ROẠ INDICATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE AT

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PRESINT, REGULAR LETTER CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PREMIER

KHRUSHCHEV AND CASTRO. THIS CORRESPOWDENCE IS CARRIED BY

COURIERS IHO HAVE TRANSITED PRAGUE. THIS LETTER CORRE-

SPONDENCE HAS BEEN USED BY THE TWO LEADERS TO KEEP EACH OTHER

IN PERSONAL TOUCH RE VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST:

12) RAULITO ROA GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE OR

CUSAN LEADERS WITH WHOM HE MAY HAVE HAD CONTACT, NAMELY HIS

FATHER VIA CORRESPONDENCE, HAD SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD

ANY MOTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE 'ABOVE PLAN OTHER THAN

THAT OF EFFECTING THE CHANGE OF THE U.S. POSITION, TOWARDS CUBA

WHICH WAS DESCRIBED. FOR INSTANCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION IN

RAULITO ROA'S CONVERSATION THAT HE SUSPECTED THAT THE

SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE INTENDED TO USE THE PRESENCE OF THEIR

MISSILES IN CUBA TO FORCE CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS

OTHER AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE RE BERLIN. . RAULITO ROA APPEARED

TO BE GENUINELY CONVINCED THAT THE PLAN VAS AS HE DESCRIBED

IT. : HE DID. NOT STATE THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION.

D. THE DECISION TO ACCEDE TO U.S. DEMANDS RE THE :

EVACUATION OF THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WAS TAKEN UNILATERALLY

BY THE SOVIETS WITH NO PRIOR WARNING TO OR CONSULTATION WITH

CUBAN LEADERS. DESPITE THE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF THE

PRESENCE OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO WAS SO

CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET FLEET WAS GOING TO ARRIVE IN CUBAN

WATERS ACCORDING TO PLAN THAT WHEN HE HEARD THAT PREMIER

KHRUSHCHEV HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT AMERICAN DEMANDS RE THE

EVACUATION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA HE CONCLUDED,

THAT THIS STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT MIGHT WELL BE A KHRUSKCHEV TRICK

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TO GAIN TIME FOR THE FLEET TO: ARRIVE. WHEN HE LEARNED THAT THIS

MAS NOT THE CASE, HE WAS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED AND VERY ANGR!•

3. CUBAN REACTION TO THE SOVIET FAILURE TO ADHERE TO

THE SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN OR TO CONSULT LEADERS ON THE SOVIET

ASSENT TO U.S. DEMANDS.

A. THE ATTITUDE OF CUBAN LEADERS, FROM FIDEL

CASTRO ON DOWN, TOWARDS THE SOVIET FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN BY MOVING THE

SOVILT FLEET INTO PLACE, AND THE SUSSEQUENT FAILURE TO

CONSULT WITH CUBAN LEADERS BEFORE YIELDING TO U.S. DEMAND

FOR THE MITHDRAWAL OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES WAS ONE OF DISMAY,

ANGER AND DISAPPOINIMENT• THE REACTION OF THE CUBAN LEADERS WAS

CONCENTRATED FAR MORE ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BROKEN THEIR

WORD RE THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOVIET FLEET INTO CUBAN WATERS AND

ON THE SOVIET UNILATERAL ACTION IN ACCEDING TO AMERICAN

DEMANDS, THAN IT WAS. ON THE FACT IMAT THE SOVIETS HAD

CAPITULATED TO THE AMERICAN DEMANDS PER SF. THE CUBAN

LEADERS CONSIDERED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BESMIRCHED

IIS OWN HONOR AND THAT IT HAD OFFENDED THE PRIDE OF CUBA. AT

PRESENT THE CUBAN LEADERS CONTINUE TO POSSESS STRONG FEELINGS

ON THESE POINTS•

3.. THE ANGER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP AGAINST

THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS

STRENGTHENED BY THE FACT THAT THE LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE

SOVIET CAPITULATION BEFORE AMERICAN DEMANDS WAS UNNECESSARY.

THE CUBANS FEEL THAT HAD THE SOVIET FLEET PROCEEDED TO ITS

CUBAN STATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN, THE UNITED STATES WOULD

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HOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN ANY MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST CUBA OR

AWE PLACED

, A NA'AL. BLOCKADE ABOUT CUSA.. THE CUBAN LEADERS

ARE SO STRONGLY GONVINCED THAT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS POINT ARE

CORRECT THAT CURRENTLY THEY ARE MAKING A STRONG. EFFORT TO

LEARN THE "TRUE STORY" BEHIND THE SOVIET DECISION TO BACK DOWN

IN THE CUBAN CRISIS.

C. SOURCE COMMENT: AT ONE POINT IN, THE CONVERSATION

RAULITO ROA EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT "THE NEW SOVIET POLICY"

IS ONE OF CONCESSION TO THE UNITED STATES"• TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE

CUBAN SEARCH FOR THE "TRUE STORY" CITED ABOVE, THE ROA STATEMENT

MAY BE AN INDICATION THAT CUBAN LEADERS SUSPECT THAT

IN THE CUBAN CRISIS CUBAN INTERESTS WERE DELIBERATELY. SACRIFICED

TO SOVIET "HIGHER INTERESTS"•

D. THE ANGER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHI® AND OF

SENIOR CUBAN OFFICIALDOM CONCERNING THE SOVIET ATTITUDE

IN THE CUBAN CRISIS HAS BEEN CLEARLY REFLECTED

IN THE RELATIONS

BETWEEN VARIOUS CUBAN OFFICIALS STATIONED. ABROAD AND THE

SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THEY COME IN CONTACT. DURING HIS DECEMBER

TRIP TO PRAGUE FOR THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS BLAS ROCA

DID NOT HESITATE TO CHARACTERIZE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO

PRACUE, MIKHAIL.V. ZIMYANIN, AS "A CLOWN AND AN IMBECILE" IN THE

PRESENCE OF A SPANISH-SPEAKING MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTES

OF THE CZECH CONMUNIST PARTY.

E. 'SOURCE COMMENT: BLAS ROCA'S. COMMENTS WERE

MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN UNIDENTIFIED SPANISH- SPEAKING

MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY:

APPARENTLY

ZIMYANIN HAD RAISED SOME POINT OF PROTOCOL

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YCIPLOATIC OR SOCIALS IN A CONVERSATION WITH

BLAS POCA. SUBSEQUENTLY ROCA REMARKED THAT ZIMYANIN APPEARED

TO HAVE IMPERFECILY DIGESTED A BOOK OF OUTMODED PROTOCOL:

FOCA ADDED THAT ZIMYANIN WAS NOT A REAL COMMUNIST SINCE

COMMTINISTS DID NOT BELIEVE IN A LOT OF PROTOCOL IN THEIR

RELATIONS. ROCA REMARKED THAT "MANY SOVIETS ARE CLOWNS"

AND THAT "ZIMYANIN IS A CLOWN AND AN IMBECILE". WHEN RAULITO

ROA SUBSEQUENILY CALLED TO ROCA'S ATTENTION THE FACT THAT

HIS REMARKES. HAD BEEN OVERHEARD BY, THE SPANISH-SPEAKING CZECH

AND THAT THEY PROBABLY WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE SOVIETS,

POCA RETORTED THAT HE HAD MADE THE

REMARKS ON PURPOSE BECAUSE

HE WISHED TO HAVE IT REPORTED THAT HE HELD A LOW OPINION

OF ZIMYANIN AND OF CERTAIN OTHER SOVIETS.

4. SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV APOLOGIZES FOR SOVIET

FAILURE TO CONSULT THE CUBANS DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS.

A. DURING THE FINAL DAYS OF THE CONGRESS OF

THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY IN PRAGUE IN DECEMBER RAULITO

DOA HELD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID

BREZHNEV, WHOM HE HAD KNOWN IN MOSCOW. DURING A IWENTY-

MINUTE PERIOD WHEN THE TWO MEN WERE ALONE AND WERE DISCUSS-

ING MATTERS IN RUSSIAN CROA SPEAKS RUSSIAN WITH SONE

FLUENCY BREZHNEV APOLOGIZED TO ROA FOR THE UNILATERAL

NATURE OF THE SOVIET ACTIONS DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS. •

PREZHNEY STATED THAT DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING 22. OCTOBER

SOVIET LEADERS, INCLUDING PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV, HAD

SPENT MANY NIGHTS WITHOUT SLEEPING. THEY HAD NOT RETURNED

TO THEIR HOMES BUT HAD SIMPLY TAKEN NAPS ON. THE COUCHES IN:

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THELP DEFICES. ALL OF THEM MAD PECONE EXTREMELY FATIGUED..

PRE"LEP KHRUSHOVEY HAD PERSONALLY COMPOSED THE LETTER TO

PRESIDENT KENNEDY PROPOSING A DEAL CONCERNING SOVIET MISSILE

BASES IN CUBA AND AMERICAN BASES IN TURKEY. AT THE TIME

KHRUSHCHEV HAD COMPOSED THIS LETTER HE WAS SO FATIGUED

THAT IN CONTRAST TO HIS USUAL CUSTOM 'OF WRITING IN LONGHAND

THE TEXT OF THOSE PRONOUNCEMENTS TO WHICH HE ATTACHED GREAT

IMPORTANCE HE HAD DICTATED THE TEXI TO A STENOGRAPHER. IN

TALKING CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT BREZHNEV INTIMATED THAT

KHRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN SO TIRED THAT HE HAD NOT FULLY GRASPED

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE HAD WRITTEN.' BREZHNEV. IMPLIED

THAT SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER THE LETTER HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO

PRESIDENT KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV HAD REGRETTED THE PHRASEOLOGY

WHICH HE HAD USED, AND FURTHER HAD REGRETTED THAT HE HAD

NOT CONSULTED WITH CUBA CONCERNING IIS VIEWS PRIOR TO THE

DISPATCH OF THE LETTER.

B. SOURCE COMMENT:, FROM RAULITO ROA'S -

DESCRIPTION OF THE ABOVE INCIDENT AND HIS COMMENTS CON-

CERNING IT, IT APPEARS THAT BREZHNEV MADE NO REFERENCE TO

THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-UNION TO CARRY OUT ITS

PART OF

THE SOVIET-CUEAN "JOINT PLAN". (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE), NOP DID

HE INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS REGRETTED THAT THEY HAD ACCEDED

TO U:S. DEMANDS CONCERNING THE WITHDRAVAL OF OFFENSIVE

WEAPONS FROM CUBA•

5. POA COMMENT RE MIKOYAN TRIP.

A. ROA STATED THAT IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT

DEPUTY PREMIER ANASTAS MIKOYAN HAD BEEN DISPATCHED. TO CUBA

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#HITROT TO PLACATE FOOL CASTRO AND TO AUSTIFY TO

HE TE COVIE COUROS CE ACTION IN THE CHAN CRISIS. ROA

CONTENCY PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT CASTRO HAD MADE CLEAR TO

MIXCYAN HIS ANGER ANP DISTLEASURS AT THE VARIOUS FAILURES

OY THE PART OF THE COVIET UNION DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS.

P. COURCE COMMENT: RUA DID NOT MENTION ANY OF THE

EEVELOPHENES AFTER MIKOYAN'S ARRIVAL IN CUBA, NOTABLY THOSE'

WHICH WAD RESULTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET IL-28

AIPCPAFT FROM CUBA.

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