UNSANITIZED COPY OF DIEM REPORT
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 05/31/1967
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Unsanitized copy of Diem Manort

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paze

Foreword

Positions of promirent people in late 1953

The anti-government flois degin

Attacks on pagodas; inposition of rartial law

Discussion of US response to jagada raids

Concin meeting with

Cereral Don

CIA guidance on State telegras re alternative leadership

Richardson's personal vicws re alternate leadership

Harriman informs Helas of the substance of Deptel 243

Deptel 243: guidance to Loige on improving or replacing regime

Rilsman corment supplerenting Deptel 243 . . . .

Marguerite Higgins on Deptel 243

Age points out danger posed by Deptel 243; directs CIA support . :

Gen. Khanh requests assurances of U.S. support

Initial embassy meeting to discuss Deptel 243

Lodge presents his credentials to Dien

Second thoughts on authorizations given Lodge in Deptal 243

Saigon reports ins: uctions given Cli criicero secing the generals

Results of CIA approaches to the generals

• More second thoughts on Deptel 243

Lodge and Larkins are asked for an interia appraisal of prospects.

COS believes situation has reached point of no return

Continuing concern over poor prospects for success of coup . ...

Taylor cables Harkins re Washington's second thoughts

Taylor's cable to Earklas causes Rickardsos to change scenario ..

Steps to be taken

to get the coup back on the track

Discussion ol where coup planning sent astray

•. 0. .

General Harking' meeting with General Khien

Discussion of ways 1n which ve right iive with Dien regime . . ..

Colby's summary of differing positions taxes

Richardson reports collapse of coup plot in late August

....••

Richardson's damage assessment report

Press reports of CIA coup plotting

• .

. .

Furtber discussion of ways of vorking with Diem regine

Press reports of CIA support of Col: Tung's Special Forces_...

David Bell warns of aid cuts

President denies charge that CIA makes its own policy

Richardson's views os prospects for immediate future

Krulak & Mendenball reports;

optimism vs. pessimisa

.

Bundy stresses need to unify US government posture

Disagrcerents among country team members ..

• . . ..

Lodge estimates situation vorsening rapidly; urges sanctions

Discussion of steps necessary before deciding to cut aid

State begins to see no alternative to vorking with Dien

Sheldon's view on Vietnam; Lodge still pursuing coup effort

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Press reports of dissension in US mission & CIA station

....

Richardson's views on

need to work with Dien regime

DDP conversation with Dave Salth re possible Richardson ouster •

lodge changes position; agrees must work with Diem r-zime

ICI writes lodge that Lensdale not acceptable as coS.. .. ...

DCI briefing of CIA Subcosmittee of House Armed Services

MeNanara-Taylor report: can withdriv troops bj end of 1955

Lodge confirms his desire that Richardson be replaced

Richardson departs . ..

Discussion of guidance based on Mcilamara-Taylor report

....

Gen. Minh requests assurances re Us position on coup attempt ..

Dave Smith recommends we not oppose generals assassination plan

McCone Instructs Snith to vithdraw recommendation

Snith confirms he had done so

Guidance to Lodge; suspension of AID project Icans

President approves polley of no active encouragement of coup

...

UN fact-finding mission on repression of Buddhists

President comments on Richardson transfer; CIA follows guidance. •

Modification of policy of no coup encouragement

Anbeccador': "notructions it CLA contacts wits generals

..

ICT. briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The generals' plan for a coup in the week following Oct 26

Budget Bureau officer reports Lodge charges against CIA

Follow-up meetings between Conein and Gen. Don, 24 Oct .

Bundy reservations over handling of contacts with generals

Lodge reports CIA pinctillous in carrying out his instructions

Coup plotting; US goverment policy; DCI's views

Lodge coniirms Conein's bona fides to Gen. Don .

Last Conein/Don meeting before the coup was launched

Lodge gives his views on current coup plotting (29 Oct)

Discussion of chances of success of the planned coup

Bundy-to-lodge cable giving detailed guidance re coup posture

Lodge says we have no power to delay or discourage a coup

The White House rejects Lodge's views

. . ...

........

lodge thanks Washington for "sagacious instruction"

Coup begins; Conein goes to JGS Egs; takes money with him

....

CRITIC reporting on coup identifies Conein by name

The assassination

Recap

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31 Кву 1967

FOREWORD

This account of CIA and U.S. Goverment involverent in the

Vietnamese generals' coup of 1 November 1963 18 drawn fron

documentary sources. Not all of the documents summarized or

quoted bear directly on the coup itself... We included some that

may seem Irrelevant, because they illuminate the assosphere in

which U.S. Government policy decisions were reached.

We interviewed only three people in the course of this

Inguiry: William Colby, Chief of FE Division at the tige (and now);

John Richardson, Chief of Station during the coup plotting of

August 1963; and David Snith, Acting Chief of Station at the time

of the coup/assassination of November 1963. Each asrired us that

he knew of no CIA assassination schemes against Diem--other than

the role played by CIA in maintaining contacts, by direction, vith

the Vielnamese generals.

Many of the documents upon which this report is based are

classified TOP SECRET. Since the report is being delivered

personally and in only one copy, we have chosen not to subject

It to the external accountability controls that are entailed in

a TOP SECRET classification.

•On the following page 1s a list of U.S. Goverment officials

whose ranes are mentioned in the report, together with the positions

they held at the time."

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SEGALI-LIES CHLY

John F. Kennedy

Lyndon B. Johnson

McGeorge Bundy

C

Dean Rusk

George W. Ball

W. Averell Harriman

Roger Hilcman

Joseph A. Mendenha11

Frederick E. Folting

Henry Catot Lodge

William C. Truebart

Robert McNamara

Rosvell Gilpatric

Gen. Marvell Taylor

Gen. Victor Krulnk

Adm. Barry D. Felt

Gen. Paul D. Harkins

Gen. Richard G. Weede

- Joun FuCULe

Gen. Marshall Carter

Richard Helms

John Richardson

David R. Snith

William Colby

The President

Vice President

• Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

Secretary of State

Under secretary of Stale

Under Secretary of State fur Political

Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State for Far

Eastern Affairs

UN Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastero Affairs

Ambassador (left Saigon 16 August 2963)

Ambassaior (arr. Saigon 23 August 1963)

DCM

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staf!

Counterinsurgency Specialist, JCS

CINCAC Sin

• Commander, MACV

Chief of Staff, MACY

Director of Central Intelligence

DDCI

Deputy Director for Plans

CIA Chief of Station until 5 October 1963

CIA Acting COS after 5 October 1963

Chief, I Division

• 11 =

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The successful coup against the Diem regime in South Vietnam,

which resulted in the deaths of Nigo Dinh Diem and his brother, Nhu,

began on 1 Hovember 1963 at 1315 hours, Saigon time (0015 kours,

Washington tine).

This report on CIA and U.S. Government Involvement in the coup

consists of a chronological listing of events, actions, and

deliberations having to do ilth Vietnam. The report is drawn

entirely fron documentary sources, either by quoting selectively

or by summarizing. Significant overt happenings having bearing on

official actions are included in the chronology. Facts on File,

a weekly digest of wor'd news, was used as the source for these

historical events. Also included are a few excerpts fron Marguerlte

Hißgins' book Our Vietnam Nightmare* to demonstrate the extent to

shich some once-classifled information 15 now common knowledge.

All dates are in 1963.

B May

Riots erupted in Hue.

10 July

SNIE: 53-2-63: "The Situation in South Vietnam"

"If--as 16 likely--Dien fails to carry out truly and promptly

Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York: Harper & Row, 1965)

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the commitment he has made to the Buddhits, disorders sill, probably

flare again and the chances of a coup or assacsinatica attempts

against him vill become even better. .

.. . We do Iot think .

the Corrunists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some

combination of his non-Cormunist opponente: A non-Cc-nist successor

regime might be initially iess effective against the Viet Cong, but,

given continued support from the US, could provide reachably effective

leadership for the government and the war effort."

.14 August

Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI No. 2339/63):- "Coup

Runors in

South Vietrza

•.. • The coup reports and rumors which have arisen since

attempt to overthrow the regime. . ..

21 August

South Vietnam se troops and police attacked and occupied Budähist

pagodas throughout the country. Diem imposed nation-wide martial law.

Presidential Meeting O1. Vietnam. CIA participanes: DCI, DDP, &

C/FE.

Record by C/FE.

Mr. Ball recommended that we continue to provide asylum for the

two bonzes [mulahist monks? until lodge arrives and revleus the matter.

It was agreed that official channels should not be made available fer

transmitting press dispatches by American reporters in Saigon. On the

matter of possible alternate leadership In Vietnam, It vas pointed out

that there was no indication that Diem vas not in full' control.

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21 August (continued)

Current Intellence Resorandum (OCI lio. 2341/63): "Coup Rumors

in South Vietney

"Additional reports of plotting against the Diem goverent

have been received.

While there is no hard evidence of irainent

actios, abe Budahlot Iscue continues to take die siluallus inngerous."

Saigon Station's Chronology of August 1963 Coup Actirl-les

At a meeting between Conein (an officer of the CIA Saigon Station/

and General Don, the latter assed for US Goverment assurances of

support for moves against the Dien regime.

22 August

CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334)

"Ref Dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which iqs. not jet seco)

states basic line to be taken and directs it be pushed at all levels.

Hileman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station polating

out that this is one technique to bring about surfacing of bere and

who real power 15.

Pressing this line car naximize possibility of

obtaining US objective.

Even 11 11 does not succeed, 1t can

substantially assist in identification of alterate or successor

leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, to incor-

porate in our overall contingency planning and serve as forus of

buildup program. Hqs. will comment in further detail after seeing

message, 1f necessary, but passes above at Hilsnan's request."

CiA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208)

Chief of Station John Richardson Porvards his personel views re

alternate leadership:

• • Recent events have made us feel

that hope for civilian goverment to replace Dien administration is

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unrealistic.

The solution seeas even more improbable than ever before.

Would appear that ve suail have elther Diem or military junta.

...

View time factor have not coordinated this nessage with embassy but

ve have exchanged vieus fully on subject metter."

24 August

Telephone call from Jarrisan to DD/P. Record by DD/P.

Mr. Harriman called Mr. Eelns just before 2000 hours and

outlined to him the substance of what eventually turied out to be

Deptel 243 to Saigon. To Helme query, Harrinan confired that the

thrust of te telegres contained an implicit pull out of American

forces and support 1f the Nhus' vere not vusted. Harrinar said that

the mescage had been cleared "with Hyannisport," with the Secretary

of State, and with Mr. Gilpatric.

State telegram to Saigon (Deptel 243)

The Department Informs te Ambassador that the US goverument.

cannot tolerate a situation In which pover lles In Kau's hands. If

Dien 1s unilling to rid himself of ihu, then Dien himself may have to

gO. The Ambassador is authorized: (1) to Inform the CVH that actions

against fuddhists must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders

that the USG cannot support & Dien regime that Includes the Khu's and

that "re will give them direct support in any interia perlod of breakdowa

central goverment sechanian;" (3) to make statements in Saigon removing

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the military taint on the pagoda raids. The telegram Includes the

following statement:

"The Ambassador and country team should urgently examine ell

possible alternative leadersbip and make detailed plans as to bod

ve night bring about Dies's replacement if this should recone

necessary.

You will understand that we cannot from Weshington

give you detailed insuructions as to now this operation should

proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt

on actions you take to achieve our objectives."

25 August

Cable from Filman to Lodge (personal) sent via CLA channels

DIR 63054)

"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest

levels.

Course outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaylog

clear cut US stand is even more dangerous.

It won't be easy for

you, but be assured we will back you all the way."

(Carment: This is & good point at which to break the

narrative and insert a series of excerpts from Marguerite Higgins'

book:

"The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy,

opened with a cable.

It was dispatched to Saigon late in the

evening of August 24, 1953, a date made more significant because

1t was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on surer weetesds

or lapses into a samolent mood as officials desperately seek

relaxation.

"ine telgram contained spectacular new instructions for tre

U.S. embassy in Saigon.

It was drawn up at a meeting called by

Under-secretary of State Averell Harriman and Roger Hileman,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs and head of

the Vietnam task force. The President's senior advisers were, for

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the most part, out of lows. CIA Director John McCone vas in

California.

Defense Secretary Robert Mclarara was on vacation.

Secretay of State Dean Rusk vas attending a baseball pare in

Hew Yor%.

Presiden: Kernedy was at liyanzis Port. "General Taylor

says be knew nothing of the reeting intil it was over and the

telegran long on 1ºs way.

• the cable proved historie.

For the flaat iine 1t

gave the signal to 'mleash" the Vietnamese military, flashed

& green light for the coup against Diem of which the generals had

been talking for to sany years.

the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the

previous philosopay of one var at a time.

It envisaged the

generals' peking var on their own government, and with the

Inplicit blessing of the United States.

*The

substance o. the cable was that the U.S. embassy was to

pake an effort to persuade Dien to fire his brother, release

the Buddhiss rebels, eni press censorship, and restore otner

Jerocratic liberties suspended under martial law.

And 1f,. as.

cable antisipated, Dies would not do these things, theo the a ta

embassy was to coatac. ise Vietnanese generals and tell them that

the Volted Sates would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.

" . . • the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched

Tron Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically summarized

to President Kennedy at she slumer White House at Hyannis Port.

"The acting Secreiary of Defense, Rosvell Gilpatric • •

had the cable descilbed to bim over the telephone.

Mr. Gilpatric

says he was fransly surprised that such an Important set of

Instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not

feel that be ought to veio the telegram since ... It had the

"approval of the Presideat."

*In McCone's absence, the cable vas described, again

-cryptically, to Richara seins, deputy, director of the CIA;

who also did not feel disposed to veto sanething 'approved by

the President. "

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25 AuguBt (continued)

CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855)

"FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which

however cleared at bighost levels.

In circumstances believe CIA

must fully accept directives of policy sakers and seek ways accouplish

objectives they seek.

While have not seen exact text, understand

1t Invites Lodge final judgment.

• . Danger in present course

of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before he adequately

Identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing.. Thus suggest a

real search for courses of action which night retain options in our

hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for

situation to clarify (at which point ve probably unable to affect 1t.)

This boils down to seeking some midale ground for at least interim

period. . ...

CIA cable fron Saigon (SAIG 0291)

Chief of Station Richardson reports that General Khanh requested

an lamedlate meeting with Spera Lan officer of the CIA Saigon Station.

At the meeting Khanh requested assurances that the U.S. Goverment

would support the Vietnamese army if it should move against the Diem

Regime.

CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296)

Richardson reports the results of a conference among Ambassador

Lodge, DCM Truehart, General Harkins, General Weede, and Richardson.

Tue group agreed that giving Dies an option had no chance of success.

They accepted Deptel 243 Lof 24 August] as a basic decision from

Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions.

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Richardson gives headquarters his viers on possible successor

regimes.

26 Aufust

ONE Staff Memorand m

CIA Distribution Only

No. 60-63, Internal ONE Working Paper,

"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US

Interests and attairent of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in tbe

possibility of a coup d'etat by enti-(cumunist nationalists with

sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a

group minh: not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might

eventually prove no ketter than the present regime.

Such a development

would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist nationalist elements

to make a fresh start uneücumbered and unnumpered by political errors.

of past years, months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we belleve,

Iles the only

viable noje for the attairment of US interests and

objectives in South Vietnam."

Ambassador Lodge presented his credentials to South Vietnamese

President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Presidential Meeting On Vietnan. CIA participants: DDI & DDP.

Record by DDP.

The question was raised as to whether there had been such a

significant change in the Vietnam situation that it really appeared

desirable to dump the Nhu's and possibly Diem himself. Principal

folats discussed vere: Admiral Felt's concern over the dangers

Inherent in the current US action in South Vietnam; the fact that

Lodge had not seen Dien to discuss the future role of the Nhu's;

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the meaning of the phrase "give direct support to military commandere"

In Deptel 243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the

action taken over the veekend Talled. The President asked for another

session on fugust 27 vith participante to present blographie date on

kes SV persoralities and d contingency plan for the succession.

CIA cable from Satron (SAIG 0304) 29

Richardson reports that the Ambasador decided that the American

official hand should not show in the operation. It was agreed that Conein;

vould see khten and that Spera vould see Khanh. Conein and Spera vere

airected to convey the substance of Deptel 243, plus this connert:

"He cannot be of eny help during initial action of assuming power of

state. Entirely their ovi action; via or lose."

CIA cable PrOB Salgon (SAIG 0330)

Richardson reports the results of the Conein/Spera approaches

to the generals. In essence, Khanh said he was not yet ready, and khien

said he vould have to check with Miah.

I7 August

Preci

Lal: Mee

leg on Vietnam:

CIA participants: DDCI, DDP, &

CEE.

Record by C/F2.

The President stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it

would be successful and esked whether ve could turn beck at this point.

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The President asked that the judgment of lodge and Harkins be sought

on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable vas drafted

asking if they still agreed with their concurrences to Deptel 243.

State telegram to Saigon (Deptel 256)

"Examination of reports to date gives considerable hope but

leaves unanswered questions. • •

• • Proceeding fron the concept

outlined In Deptel 243 as nodified; now desire your proopt irterim.

appraisal of presert prospects. • • •

• Highest authority asks

whether you and Harkins, in light of developing situation, presently

favor operation as currently planned by generals.

We wish to give

you all possible eupport in best available course but not to insist ou

any decision thet developing evidence makes it wise to modify."

28 August

CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363)

Richardson reports that:. "Situation here has reached polot of

no return.

• • • Unless the generals are neutralized before being

able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that

they have good chance to win. . ... . We all understand that the

effort must succeed and that whatever seeds to be done on our part

mast be done. . ...

President1al Meeting On Vietnam. CIA participants: DDCI, DDP, 8

C/FE.

Record by C/FL.

The President Inquired Into the status of E&E plans and was told

that these were well worked out. State Department participants

insisted that Diem and Nhu had betrajed and double-crossed us and we

had. no obligations to them and that we cannot win with Diem and Nhu.

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The President cormented that we had been winning until August. Bolting

expressed his conviction tie Diem is the only man who can run South

Vietnam in any fashion to permit a continuance of the war effort..., He

believed we should make anotior try t0 icep Diem. Harriman directly

disagreed with han. The President directed that a telegram be prepared

to send to lodge and larkins asking their vlew of the chances of success,

expressing concern over the unfavorable ratlo of forces, and irriting

their cuggestions as to how we could increase their possibilities.

The President called for another meeting later in the dav.

NSC Executive Committee Meeting on Vietnan. CIA participants not

Identified.

Record by DDP.

The President net privately with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and

McGeorge bundy. He reported to the rest of the Committee merely that

three telegrams vere being sent to Saigon: a personal nessage to

Lodge from the President, & general message from the Department to the

Ambassador, and a telegram from Teylor to Harkins.

Telegram Pron Taylor to Harkins (JCS 3368-63)

"Important White House neeting on subject scheduled for 1200

28 August FT, your mors urgently neued on overall fessibility of

operation contemplated. . . .

• • FYI State to Saigon 243 was prefared

without DOD or JCS participation. Authorities are now having second

thfoughts."

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39 August

Saigon Station's chrorology of August 1903 coup activities

"At 0745 hours, Richardson, Spera and Conein, latter two of

whom were scheduled to contact Gererals Minh and Khiem at 0815 sane

mornine, were shown a mogenge from Cescrul Tijius iu Geuerti harkias stating

aspects of Vietnay situation being reviewed at White House and cormenting

that second thoughtswere beginnirg in Washington.

Faced with this

information and given strictly linited. time factors, Richardson

decided that the reeting with Gereralls linh and Khier should not be

postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a fact-

finding mission without encouraging or discouraging General Minh.

"When Spera and Corein returned from their recting with Khiem

and Minh, we proceeded to Trucheart's office to make our report.

The

Ambassador came in and Richardson advised him of our meeting with

General Hecac, i Taylor's cubie, and of the decisions which Richardson

had made as a result of the Taylor cable. Lodge was angry and

expressed the view that Richardson's decision had destroyed the

possibilities of carrying out a coup. Richardson expressed a firm m

dissenting opinion."

NSC Executive Comittee Weeting on Vietnam. CIA participants

not identified.

Record by DDP.

The consensus was that Harkins should confirm to the generals that

the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the

US government. There was agreement that better information was needed

on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether 1t was

militarily feasible. A telegran giving the sense of the neeting was

drafted for Presidential approval.

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30 August

Vice Presidential Meeting on Vietren. CIA participants: DDCI,

DIX, & C/FE.

Record by C/FE.

Rusk referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was kot..

open surt riot ve were dealing with or what they were plenning.

McNamara pointed out there was some question whether the generals ever

did have a plan. Bundy said he had re-read the earlier traffic and

noted that they never said they did. Gen. Carter said he belfeved that

the general's coup was not Ilkely 3l lhis stage and that in another

weel we will be approximately where ve were before the attack on the

Buddhist Lemples. Bundy suggested we consider additional contingencies

before the group and whether the assumption that Nhu 18 Impossible 18

well founded.

31. August

Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities

"Ceneral Harkins was authorized to beet with Khien to give

Khien assurences of USG backing. Khiem showed a relucterce to talk

and suggested that Harkins meet with General Minh. Khiem cormented

that Minh hed called off the plamning and was working on other methods

which Khiem would not describe.

Khien further stated that the generals

vere not ready as they did not have enough forces under their control.

Honkins decided aut iu give iniem assurances which he had been authorized

to impart. Lodge approved Harkins' decision on 31 August after Harkins

reported.

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31 August (contimed)

Vice Presidential Meeting on Vicinam. CIA participants: DDCI,

DDP, & C/FT.

Record by C/FE.

Rusk suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam

situation made us think of a coup and what might be done to improve

conditions in Vietnam. Mclamara suggested the first requirement vas

reestablishment of communication hetween Lodge and Harkins. Rusk

directed that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions

as to what ve might ask the GN to do.

Chief, FE, to participated in the seetings of late August,

In a menoranium for halter Elder prorided this summary of

differing positions taken.

"In the discussions during the past week, the position of the

Department of State, led by Ball, Harrivan, and Hilsman, was that the

Diem-inu government had double-crossed the US Governsent because of

the attack on the pegodas and that US obligatiors to the government

were no longer valid.

Further, that a goverament so discredited could

not conduct successfully the war in Vietnam and would prove an

undesirable liability to the US Government elsewhere in Asia. Because of

these moral, military and political conclusions, the: Department

recommended that it mist give all support to & group of generals who

allegedly were disaffected to the point that a clear indication of US

action was the only ingredient lacking for them to push over a discredited,

unopular and weak Diem government.

"The position of the Department of Detense was that while 1t

depiored the sensational aspects of the Buddhist situation, it

nonetheless felt that an effort should be contimed to deal with Diem

and try to bring about a compromise, end at the sane time to keep in

touch with the generals and support the coup efforts, if this proved to

be the only alterrative left. This was essentially the view of General

Harkins and of Arbassdor Nolting. This vas considered by the Department

of State to be a foot-dragging and weak position.

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"The President viewed the State Department's position with

considerable reserve but was willing to explore the comp idea further.

He and the Attorney General (as well as CIA) were arparently arpalled

at the seed with which the State decision was reached on Saturday

afternoon, 2 August, and felt that wore thought, analysis and

preparation should have preceded the instruction to Icdje."

31 August (contimed)

=.

CIA Cable frOs Saigon (SAIG 0589)

*This particular coup

1s finished. . ..

•• Cenerals did not feel

ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces..

There

1s little doubt that GVN avure US role and may have considerable

detall...

2 Septerber

CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0523)

Richardson cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that Diem and

the Mau's are fully aware that the USG encouraged the generals to

atterpt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encoursge-

ment. He Judged there was an even possibility that all major programs

could go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the :

Station's future relationships with Col. Tung. He noted his dissetis-

faction with Tung as a GVN liaison vehicle through which to conduct PM

progrars, but noted that the GVII had offered no alterzative. Unless we

vere willing to discontinue our IVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs,

we mist contime to work with Tung.

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2 September (continued)

The Tines of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting

and financing a coup and was giving asylum to the. chief anti-Diem

New York Datly News, the Chicago Tribune, Paltimore Sun, and other

prominent newspapers.

6 Septenber

Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DDP & C/FE.

Record by DDP & C/F2.

Rusk stressed the tumediate need for direct contact between lodge.

and Diew. Bundy pointed out the necessity of advising Lodge not to

have a real show-down vith Diem over Nhu at this forthcoming seeting,

as one of lodge's cables indicated he was headed very mich in this

direction. Rusk agreed to do this. The President agreed with the

destrability of silencing Mademe Nou but expressed some doubt that

¡m's participation was as fatal as State seened to say 1t vas. Rusts

commented that the country team had stated its feeling that Nhu aust 30,

to which the President replied that they may have been operating under

Airectives received from here.

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" B. Septezber

Wire services and prominent nevspapers carried a story that the

Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on 21 August were still

reliable source in Washington and gave details of support to Col.

"Tung in the anount of $3 million annually, and a payrent of $250

thousand on 3 September. The story was datelined in Washington and

in Manila.

David Bell warned in a television interview that the US Congress

might cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Dien government

changed its policies.

(Comment:: The U.S.. Coverrment publicly confirmed on

8 October 1963 that aid had already been cut, quietly and

over a period of sare months. Bill Colby, Jocko Richardson,

and Dave Smith each told us that the public announcement of

the ald reduction was a "signal" to the generals and that the

reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that the

eut 1n ald was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but,

• 1f so, that intention did not find its way into the written

record. The nearest thing to it 15 in the record of a Presidential

meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips,

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Of AID, what specific actions Phillips would recomiend and he

suggested "cutting aid to Colonel Tung voich would be viewed

by the Generals with much enthusiasm and as an indication of

a vigorous American position." In general, though, aid cuts

were discussed in terns of bringing pressure on Diem to make

needed changes in his regine. However planned or however

looked upon by the U.S. administration, 1t 1s clear that the

Vietnamese generals considered the official confirmation of

aid cuts as a clear token of U.S. support of their coup planning.

Spera and Conein net with Generals Mish and Khiem on 2) August.

tbe following are exc.rpts from the cabled report of the

meeting (SAIG 0406):

"If USA now really ready take different position, generals

vant firm evidence to that effect. . ...: Queried as

to what we can do to show ve nean business, Minh flatly

stated, stop econonic aid to force shu to show his hand."

The suspension of aid did not force Diem and Nhu to mend their

ways, but it did create an atmosphere that made it easier for.

the generals to assemble the military support needed for a

successful coup.)

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10 September

In an interviev by Huntley and Brinkley, the President denied

the charge that CIA makes its own policy.

CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0760)

"Am inclined to feel general officers will seek evolutiorary

accommodation with Dien (1f he persits them to do so) unless overall

situation clearly deteriorates, there is breakdown of civil order or

governmental machinery, or unless war effort begins to go backward

¡ serfously. •'•

.. Despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21

August, am inclined to believe we should be able resume successful

prosecution of war in military and civil sections. . ... • Do not

align myself with the view that USG should suspend aid. . . . ..

Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DCI & C/FE.

Record by C/FE

Gen. Krulak reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions:

vere that the war is going ahead at an impressive pace and that the

Viet Cong war will be von if current US military and sociological

programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who

accompanied Krulak, expressed the view that there vas a complete break-

down of the Saigon civilian government and the security situation in

the provinces had deteriorated. The President asked whether the two

gentlemen had visited the same country. Rusk suggested that the focus

be on what happened in July and August that reversed the optimistic

Judgments La May and June. Mr. McCone talked from a personal telegrar

he had received from Richardson recomending against any cut in aid.

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10 September (continued)

NSC Executive Committee Meeting on Vietnam. CLA participeris:

DCI & C/FE.

Record by C/FE

Bundy stressed the need to unify the US Governent posture; to

coordinate press guidance, and to control outgoing ressages to saigon.

He emphasized the Importance of following the President's guidance on

this delicate Vietnam probien, despite intensely differing views as to

what should be done, how, the risks, sinimum objectives, and the facts.

McNamara stated that his position vas vigorously against throwing out

this government without seeing an alternative and that none appeared

l'exist. Mr. Metone comented that the problem was not so much the t

existence of an altemative as how to put one into power. Bundy

sum rized the President's position as one in wbich ve must express

our reservations as to the mistakes and misdeeds of Dien but not be

In a position where ve cannot deal with him furtber.

11 September

CIA ceble from Saigon (SAIG 0797)

Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on

& 51x-page summary cable to answer a cable fron the Department requesting

views. The team vas unable to agree even on the first three pages of :

the surmary. Weede and Richardson dissented on the basis that the draft

• 923

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summary was too sweeping and too negative, concluding definitively

about the country as a whole on an inadequate basis of data. He said:

"In some ways we seem to have reached the point in official American

munity that, 1? you this it can win with presest surerument, you:

are simply not running in right direction with majority."

Stata telegram from Saigon (B10. 478)

"My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnar 1s: (a) that

1t 1s worsening rapidly; (b) that the time has urrived for the US

to use what effective

sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the

existing governent and the installation of another; and (e) that

Intensive study should be given by the best brains in the government

to all the details, procedures, and variants in connection vith the

suspension of aid.

Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DCI & C/FE.

Record by C/Z.

Michamara pointed out that Lodge has had little contact vith Diem

and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed

that ve should move cautiously, that ve should talk seriously to Dem

and that lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a

more realistic view of the effects of suspending ald. Mr. McCone also

suggested that another approach be made to thu to seek his cooperation

In a departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied

the detailed effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared

by Hilsnan). It was evident that the effects had not been studied.

• 21 .

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The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Milscan paper.

He

also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking his to try to

reduce the press leakage in Saigon and to establish some real contact

with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiations should be stalled,

and the President said he should be well informed of any steps. taken

in this context-such as the incident involving CIA payment to

Col. Tung last week.

I1 September (continued)

NSC Executive Comittee Meeting on Vietnam. CH paraleipants:

DCI & C/FE.

Record by C/FE:

Rusk said he believed that we were not likely to achieve an

Independent Vietnam unless ve could eliminate Khu. At the same time

he was not willing to say that Diem should go, as he sav no alternative..

Rusk comented that we should work through Lodge on Dien to taise over

the real leadership and become the real president. Mr. McCone suggested

also the desirability of negotiating with Nau. Bundy read off a CIA

suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu.

13 September

CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG. 0890)

Huntington Sheldon, who visited Saigon, reported his vievs on the

Eltuation in Vietnam. He Included as part of his report the substance

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of a discussion with DUM Trueheart: "The Ambassador is considering

charging MACY with making approach to SVN military, he bentioned Gen.

Dor, to attempt stimlate esily coup action vitt. appropriate US

asfurances. I Inquired had Ambassador mide such proposal to Washington

and was told this was within lodge's authority."

15 September

Neil Sheehan writing from Saigon stated that the various elements

of the US mission in Vietnam were so badly divided that Washington

had Intervened. He said: "The only civilian official still stronely

In favor of going along w. ih the ligo family regime is the Chief of

the Central Intelligence Agency here." On the same day, David

Halberstam stated that high US civilian officials in Saigon vere

making an all-out effort to convince Washington that the military.

and political situation is deteriorating. He said that "the Chief of

the Centrel Intelligence Agercy favors all-out support for the present

regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered

over the raids on the pagodas. They also feel their Chief's close :

association with Nn, unile necessary, has severely damged Intelligence

gathering.

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16 September

CIA cable from

Sa1g0n (SAIG 0922)

Richardson replied to washington's request for his judzsent on

the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as dashington was

then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled:

"We must go on trying to win war with current administration

for as long as it persists in power..... ... We should not attempt

publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVI when probability

•of attainment is virtually nil. ,.... We cannot covertly tinker

with or engineer a coup unless general situation 15 reasonably

propititious and if we are unable

to establish necessary wording

contacts vith Vietnamese leaders villina and able to do the job

with necessary means. . . . . • Agree we should carerully explore

and perhaps carefully experient with greduled neasures designed

to pressure Diem, withla context of persuading him, to take steps

needed.

These measures would be nore effective 1f

to practical and achievable objectives. . ...

"they are flatted,

17 September

Memorandum for the Record prepared by DDE

"Snith... discussed with me... reports that lodge wanted

to get rid of Mr. John Richardson. • . . • • Mike Dunn •

cold Conein... that Lodge was going "to get rid of Richarison'.

... • On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, "Do you think that lave

Smith can mn the station for a temporary period while a new Station

Chief is being sent out here??*

19 September

Lodge to the President: State telegrem from Saigon (TO- 544)

"I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove present

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government in lusediate future is apparent and that we should,

therefore,

do unatever ve can as an interin measure, pending such

an eventuality. . ..

• Frankly, I see no opportunity at 811

for substantive changes."

Personal letter from McCone to Lodge

"I was to)d by Dean Russ that you had proposed that Generai

Lansdale •

replace Richarison as Chief of Station.

I wish to emphasize tnat the Agency will reorient the Saigon Scation

in any practical vay to neet your desires. Personnel, Includi

the Station Chief, can be replaced. •

.. . . Lansdale

would not be

acceptable to the organization or to

me personally: • . ... If the

decision is to abardon all hope of vorking with the regine, then

Richardson probably should be replaced. . . ... "e have no current

Intelligence nor resulting estinate in hand which would lead us to :

the conclusion that the present regine can be disposed of, or that

there exists a replasement regise which would be better." This 1s

not hovever to sry that a coup might not occur even before you

receive this letter.

23 September

DCI briefing' of CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services

The Director said there did not appear to be any cobesive

m1litary Broup capable of oustlag the Dien regire, and further that

there appeared to be no replacerent for the then current regise that.

was capable of running the goverment. A new regine probably would be

no better. Consequently, the Agency was urging a cautious, slow

approach to the problem.

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2 October

Report of Mclarara-Taylor mission to Vietnam

The President on. 21 September had directed General Taylor and

Secretary Mclamara to proceed to South Vietnas to appraise tbe

situation. Their trip lasted fron 24 September to 2 October. Inis

vas the report in which Mcfamara recomended that a progres be

established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions performed

i by US military personne) could be carried out by Vietnanese by the

end of 1965. He thought it would then be possible to withdraw the

bulk of US personnel.

Z october

Personal letter from Lodze to HcCone

"...

.. I agree with wbat I understand McNamara has said

The time has come for a ner face.

But, I also thinis of

Richardson as a devoted and patriotic American •

4 October

CIA cable fros Saigon (SAIG 1397)

• In sun, It is clear that Lodge wants a change in

Chief of Station..

..•• Departing Saigon 1820 hours 5 October

(Coument: Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters

request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible.

Upon Richardson's departure, his deputy, David R. Smith, became

Acting Chief of Station."

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5 October

Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. ClA participant:

Record by iXI.

DCI only.

The meeting was held to discuss matters that becane the subject

of Deptel 534 [lee later entry of 5 Octöber]. DCI said it was the

opinion of CIA (ulth the exception, of Colty, C/FE) that fiddling

with the Commodity Import Program as a political lever would be much

more likely to create an economic crisis undermining the var effort

than to scare Lien and Nou into a more cooperative attitude, becaure

It would seriously affect the confidence and blaming of the Vletsalese

business comunity and quickly engender inflationary measures arong

the population at lorge of a more serious nature.

It was the consensus of the meeting that some meanirgul

political movements had to be made, but exactly what they should

be was not determined.

CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 1445)

• In a beeting with Conein (approved by the Ambassador on 2

October), General Minb requested a statement of the US position with

respect to a change in the GVN in the near future. He said he did

not expect USG support of a coup effort, but did need USE assurances

that the USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three

4 17

• 27

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possibie plans for the accomplishment of the change of goverment:

(a) assesalnation of Ngo Dinh Thu and Ngo Dinh Can, iceping President

Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon be various nilitary units;

and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the

coup and loyalist military units in Saigon.

5. October (continued)

CIA cable frOm Saigon (SATS 1447)

Dave Sulth, the Action COS, cabled aba: he had discurred this

latest Conein/Minh meeting with Ambassador Lodge and DCM Truchart.

Smith reported that he bad recommended to labassedor Lodge that: "We

do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot,

since the other tro alternatives mean either & bloodbath In Saigon

or a protracted struggle which could rip the army and the country

asunder."

(Comment: Salth's recoumendation to Lodge on assassination

drew a prompt response from headquarters. The two entries that

follow interrupt the chronology. They are put here to complete

the story on this sienificant eplsode.)

CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 73661 of 6 October)

_ McCone directs that you vithdraw recormendation

to Ambassador /concerning assassination play incer accose

Instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such

course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefor."

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CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 1463 01 " October)

"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM

Trueheart was also present when original recommenuation was

made, specific withdraval of recommendation at Mclose's

Instruction vas also conveyed to Trueheart..

Ambassador

Lodge commented that he chares McCone's opinion."

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5 October (continued)

State cable to Saigon (Deptel No. 534)

The Department cabled guidance to the Ambassador resulting fron

NSC consideration oi the 2 October Mcñamara-Taylor report. These points

vere included: (1) Existing suspension of new comitments under

the AID Conmodity Import Progran vill be maintained. (2) PI.480

(condensed milk) will be handled on a ronth-to-wonth basis but vill

not be suspended. (3) AID Project Ians vill be "suspended for review."

(4) Ambassador should continue his poliey of "cool correctness"

toward GVN.

White House cable to Saigon (CAP 63560)

•• President today approved recommendation that no foitiative

should now be taken to five any active covert encouragenent to a coup.

There should, however,

be urgent.covert effort with closest security

under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts

with possible alternative Leadership as and when 1t appears • • ...

8 October

The UN General Assembly agreed to send a fact-finding mission

to South Vietnan to Investigate charges of goverament oppression of.

Buddhists.

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(Coument: The fact-finding group left New York 21 October

and arrived in Saigon on the 2ith. It first net with Igo Dinb

Khu and then visited the Xa. Lol pagoda, considered the corand

post of the Buddhist protest noverent, where it found only two

monks and Souta Vietnapese secret policemen. A planned visit

to the An quang pagade was barred by the diem goverment. The

mission did manage to visit An Quang on 27 October and

Intervleued Thich Tinh Keit' in the presence of a number of

secret police. The 1 November generals' coup interrupted the

mission's work, and it left South Vietnam on 3 November.

(The UN General Assembly accepted without vote on 13

December a decision to discontinue Investigation of alleged

repression of Buddhists In South Vietnam. Assembly President

Rodriguez said Buddhist oppression by the governent had

ceased to be an issue since the ouster of the Diem goverrment.

(The fact-finding coumission had Issued its report on

Il December. It arrived at no conclusions but perely detailed

testlmony taken durinz Its probe.)

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9. October

President's nevs conference

"I know that the transfer of Mr.. Jora Richardson, who 1s a very

dedicated public servant, has led to

surmises, but I can Besure

you

flatly that tue CIA cas not carried out independent activities,

but

bas operated under close control of the Director of Central

Intelligence operating under the--with the cooperation of the

Netional Security Coureil and under my Instructions."

CLA Cable to Saigon - Eyes Only for Ambassador (DIR 74228)

.. • While we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do

not wish to leave Inpression that US would thwart a change of

governent or deny economic and silitary assistance to a new regime

1f it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of ailitary

effort, insuring popular support to vin var and improving vorking

relations with US."

The cable urges that the contact with Minh

press for"detailed Infornation clearly indicating that Minb's plans

offer a high prospect of success."

(Comment: William Colby is the originator of this cable,

and It vas released by a Cable Secretarlat Duty Officer by'

direction. of Colby. The text states that these "additiona)

general thoughts" had been discussed with the President and

that the cable had been cleared with "high officials in White

House, State, Deiense and CIA.")

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10 October

Saigon Station's "History Of the Vietnasese Generals' Cous"

The Ambassador Instructed CIA not to initiate contact with

Generals Minh or Don, but 1f the generals initlate contact, such

contacts were authorized. In the course of neetings with Minh or Don,

assurances vere to be given as specified in DIR 74228 of 9 October.

DCI briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

the haic not seen a successor govemment in the miage that ve

could say positively would be an improvement over Dies.

Therefore,

It has been our counsel that we must proceed cautiously, otherwise

a situation might flare up which might result in something of a

civil war, and the Cosmunists would come out the victor verely by

sitting on the sidelines."

23 October

Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnamese Gererals' Coup"

At a neeting with Conein requested by General Don, Don said

the generals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week

followlag 26 October. Conein, under instructions, passed the substance

of DIR 74228 to Don.. Don promised he would seek permission of the coup

omittee to give Conein their political plan for the Ambassador"s

eyes only.

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24 October

Menorandu for the Record precared by the Executive Director

following a seeing with Kerneth Hansen, Bureau or the budget

At Hansens Initial seeting with Lodge, Lodge mude these charges:

(2) in mãs improperly acalino with Mu; (2) CIA vas reluctani to

turn over to the ilitary its operations among the hill tribes;

(3) CIA had Inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddhists and

was caught by surprise; (4) Richardson had a palatial mansion and

entertained government officials there; (5) The CIA Station was too

Large and too visible; (6) CIA acted on its con initlative without

coordination and without any control from either thr Ambassador or

Washington.

Hansen said be later reported to Lodge that he thought Lodge's

Charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything

CIA had cone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated

with and carried out under the directions of the Ambassador, and bad

been carried out with both good judgment and a high quality of

performance.

14:600

Hansen noted that at the time of his first meeting with Lodge,

Lodge had not yet had a full briefing on what the Agency was doinz. This

took place a few days later.

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24 October (continued)

Saigon. Station's "History Of the Vietnamese Generals' Cou?"

Conein held two meetings with General Don on 24 October. Don

reported he had been Informed by General Earkins that the U.S.

milltary would not thrert any coup plans.. Don said the coup plans

were complete; that the necessary military units iere available; and

that the coup would occur no later than 2 November.. In the second

meeting, Don said

the coup committee refused to turn over the political

plan but authorized Don to outline its substance, which he did. .:!

CtA cable to Saigon (DIR 78161)

Eyes only for lodge and Earkins from Burdy: "

• • There.

may be danger Nau attempting entrapment through Don's approaches to

Conein... . feel quite strongly that Lodge and Harkins should

stand back from any non-essential involvescat. •

•"* • It seems

wise to maintain close control over meetings between Don and

Cone1n."

" 7

• CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 1964)

Bundy from Lodge: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out

- my instructions. I have personally approved each neeting between

General Don and Conein who has carried out my orders in each

instance explicitly. . ....

35 October

Presidential Meeting on Vietnam.

Record by DCI.

CIA particient:

DCI onLY-

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The President stated that the purpose of the meeting vas to

consider: (1) recent actions in SVH with respect to coup planning

and qualifications of the Individuals reportinz; and (2) our polley

In SVN, as he sished to be assured there war unanimity within the

government prior to the return of lodge for consultations. The DCI

stated his views in detail. In essence, be held: (1) Don might be

managed by Khu; (2) CIA has no control and therefore could assure

l1ttle responslbility; (3) Don could have a coup in the esking and

could pull it off; (4) We are handling a delicate situation 1n &

non-professionai manner; (5) Sucœessful coup would lead to confucion

because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) One coup would

be followed by another and the var wight be lost during period of

political confusion; (7) Civilians capable of running SVN could not

be Infected into the goverment and exercise effective control; (8)

Cannot discuss important political issues with Diem because of the

policy of "correct, cool attitude;" (9) We either have to work with

Diem and thu or ve have to take eggressive steps to remove them, ard

It is not clear that the succeeding goverment would be much better.

28 October

Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnapese Generals' Coup"

Ceneral Don asked Lodge 11 Conein was speaking for the labassador.

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Lodge replied in the affimative. Don told the Ambassador that the

US Government should not interfere with or try to stimulate a coup.

The Ambassador agreed with Don.

28 October (continued)

Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup":

Conein net with General Don for the last time before the coup

was launched. Don confired that he had talked vith the Albaccador vo

bad rouched for Conein. Don stated be was leaving on 29 October to

coordinate final plans. Don requested Conein to remain at hoer

beginning 30 October--until further notice. Don repeated that the

Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but hen

pressed on his previous coumitment to make them available 48 hours in

advance, Don said that possibly the pans could only be made arallable

four hours in advance. Don said nothing would be happening within the

next 48 hours and that, if there was a good reason for the Ambassador

to change his planned 31 October departure, ite Ambassador wouid be.

Informed in time to make his own decision.

= 37 -

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29 October

CIA cabie froz Saigon (SAIG 2040)

In an eyes only cable sent via CIA channels, Lodge gives his

vieus on the seesingly iminent coup: "In surmary, It would aypea-

that a coup attempt by the generals' group 1s imminent... and that

no positive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of

infoming Dies and Taù. •

Although there have been no requests

to date by the generals for saterial or financial support, we must

anticipare that such request may be forthcoming. ..:

Presidentiel Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DCI, DDP.

& C/FE.

Record by DDP i C/FE.

It was suzgested that in the Ambassador's absence, Harkins,

Trueheart, and David Snith act as a committee. to direct any coup

operation. DOI countered with the view that Smith should not be

Involved in such a polley-making function, although he would be 1a

a position to provide technical advice to Harkins and Trueheart as

vell as carry out their instructions in the operational fleld. The

President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in

favor of the coup, we should discourage its launching. The Attorney

General felt the US was risking too much based on flimsy evidence.

The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a

period of interregnim and confusion which misht only be solved by :

& second or third coup.

38

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30 October

CIA cable to Sairon (DIP 79109)

Bundy to Lodge:

• chances of action with or without

our approval no. so sienificant that we should urgently consider our

attitude and contingency plans.

• Believe car attituäe.to

colp group can still bave decisive

effect on its decision.

We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable.

Conein should express to Don that we do not find presently revealed

plans give clear prospect of quick results....

•..We badly need

some corroborative evidence whether Minh and others directly and

completely involved.

..• highest authority desires it clearly

unairstood that after your departure harkins should participate in

supervision of ali coup coniacts and that In everit a coup bezins,

he become head of country team. . . ...

CIA cable frou Saigon (SAIG 2063)

Lodge's reply:

"..

delay or discourage a coup. Don has made it clear many times

• do not think ve bare the pour chat

this 16 a Vietnamese affair.

• • I believe we should continue

our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor

and press for more detailed information. CAS has been analyzing

forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have

probably figured their chances pretty closely. ..

•. • It does

not seem sensible to have the military in charge of a matter which

In so profoundly political as a change of govemment..•

As to requests fron the generals, they may well have need of funds

at the last moment with which to buy off potential orposition.

To

the extent that these finds can be passed discrectly, I believe we

should furnish they..

• . . If we were convinced that the coup

was going to fail, ve would of course do everything ve could to

stop 1t. Gen. Harkins has read this and does not concur."

CIA cable to Saigon (DIR. 79407)

CAP 63598: 3 ....

We do not accept as a basis for US policy

that we have no poser to delay or discourage a coup.

• • We

cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only

conviction of certain failure justifies intervention.. ... US

authorities vill reject appeals for direct intervention from

either

side

The White House repeats its instructions on

cairand of the country team after Lodge leaves.

- 39 .

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30 October (continued)

CIA cable from Saizon (SAIG 2094)

Cable fras lodge (In Its entirety): "Thanks for your sagacious

Instruction.

Will carry out to dest of hy ability.

1 November

The coup began at 1315 hours, Saigon time, which is equivalent

to 0015 hours, Washington time, 1 November. The following account

18 drawn from several sources: the Saigon Station's history of the

coup and varlous cables:

At 1315 hours, the Alde de Camp to General Don came to Conein's

house, told his that the coup was in progress, and said that General

Don wanted Conein at Joint General Staff (JCS) headquarters. The

aide also asked Conein to bring with him as much soney, is Corein

could readily lay hands upon. The station had stored five million

plasters (about $68,000 at the official rate) in a safe in Conein's

house against such a contingency. Conein took three million with

him. General Don used the money to revard opposition military units

who Joined the coup group. On 2 November, General Don Laformed

Conein that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed

during the coup. Conein gave Ceneral Don an additional 1,750,000

plasters.

One bundle of 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found

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later In Conein's safe. The passing of tbese funds le obviously

a very sensitive matter. Dave Smith reported by cable: on 25 November

1953 that the disbursement had not yet been discussed with the

Ambassador. The files do not show shether the Ambassador vas

ever told. In a State cable from Saigon of 24 April 1954, Lodge

reports & neeting he had thai day with General Minh... It reads in

part:

"He then said:

'I want to ask you a question about a money

matter.

Did Conein ever give General. Don money for the lovember 1

coup?"

"I said: "Definitely not.

vould certainly have known it, in lad he done such a

ting, I.

We asked Dave Snith about this, and he said he thought that the

Ambassador had eventually been told that the money had been passed.

We can neither confirm nor refute from the record.

Thus, Conein went to JGS headquarters and remained at the

arand post throughout the struggle. Before leaving bis home,

Conein alerted the station by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters,

Coneis was told by General Don that Don had tried unsuccessfully to

reach Conein earlier by telephone.. A later check revealed that

Conein's telephone was out of order. Conein was told that he vas to

keep a telephone line open to the Ambassador. Because there vas a CIA

officer on the scere and In intinate contact vich the coup priacipals,

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the station was able to report almost minute-by-minute progress of

the coup.

The fact that Conein was at JGS headquarters 1s well known in

official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the station:

"In future do not repeat not put nessage re coup plots or runors in

CRITIC channel. Rather you should slug them INEDIATE ATTENTION FOR

BRENT. " As a consequence, the first cabled reports from the station

came in as regular CIA cables and vere put onto the CRITIC network

here at headquarters. The first cable was received at headquarters

at 0117 hours, Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network

at 0159. At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC

cable, headquarters instructed the station to put the coup reporting

on the CRITIC netuork at the station. Sometime during the day of

1 November. (the.confirmation copy of the cable lacks'& date/time

step) headquarters cabied a varning to the station against including

the names of CIA personnel in 1ts CRITIC cables. Cosein 1s Identified

by name and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,

seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, vithout the name

being deleted, here at headquarters.

- At 1030 hours 2 November (in Saigon) the Saigon radio announced

that both Diem and Nhu had cormitted suicide by taking poison. Later

In the day General Minh said that Diem and Nhu escaped fron Gia Long

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Palace shortly after 0700 hours on 2 lovember by a tunnel unknown

to the gencrals.. They left the tunnel In the dock area and went to

a Catholic church in Cholon where they took poison. They vere

discovered at the church at 1030 hours.

We do not have a truly reliable account of the circunstances

of thelr deaths, but they certainly were not by suicide. According

to one of Conein's reports, Diem called General Don at 0650 hours

2 November and offered to surrender unconditiorally. Ceneral Minh

- Irmediately ordered all telephones removed fron rooms in their JGS

conmand post area. This cut off all communication with the outside

except for radios under Minh's control.

$.

On 16 November 1963 a field-grade officer of the JGS, who was

deeply involved in the coup and whose rellabilliy the station could

not judge (nor did 1t name him), gave a station officer two photographs

of the bodies of Diem and Nhu, which he claimed he had taken at the

request of General Kim. The photographs show that the deaths were

very bloody. The source gave the following account of the deaths:

The officer was present when the Military Revolutionary

Connittee debated the ultimate disposition of the brothers,

accompanied tie force that apprehended them, and witnessed the

events immediately after their deaths. He was not present in

- the M-l13 armored personnel carrier at the time of the deaths.

A lengthy argunent took place on the night of 1-2 November

as to the ultimate disposition of Diem and Nhu, with most of the

generals favoring their execution. The ultimate decision vas

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to kill them. A Captain Moung vas designated as executioner.

and hu entered the personnel carrier with Captain King.

Upon arrival at the JGS headquarters, Diem and hu wen

dead. Nhu had been stabbed 21 tires in the back with a carbin

sayonet and shot five times. Diem had been shot twice in th

Nung leaped fron the 11-113 with the bayonet in banc

and proudly displayed it to all observers.

Fron the photos, 1t looks as 11 Dies and

Mbu had their hands tied behind their backs.

To recap:

a. CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the

Dien regime, but faithfully carried out instructions.

D. CIA officers Conein and Spera vere the contacts tith the

coup generals, but only as approved and under instructions.

C. A CIA OfficeI, Conein, vas at the generals' corand

post throughout the fighting.

d.. Concin furnished General Don about $65, 000 to buy off

opposition nilitary units while the coup was in progress.

e. CIA bad no hand in the assassinations and had no

foreknowledge of then.

• bo

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