CASTRO
Agency: DUVAL78-67
Originator: WH
From: BUCHEN, PHIL
Document date: 06/00/1975
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

Released under the. John F.

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

DUVAL78-67

178-10003-10318

RECORD SERIES:

ACCESSION 78-67 (UNPROCESSED)

• AGENCY FILE NUMBER: INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION, MISC. (2)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

WH

BUCHEN, PHIL

CASTRO

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS:

06/00/1975

37

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

KENNEDY, ROBERT

HOOVER, J. EDGAR

FBI

EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD

DULLES, ALLEN

CUBAN EXILES

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

CIA

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

BAY OF PIGS

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

LANSDALE, EDWARD

ORGANIZED CRIME

OPERATION MONGOOSE

NSC

MC CONE, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE:

REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

07/28/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Unmarked, but TS elsewhere. Draft. Pages with revisions taped over paragraphs were copied as

originally typed and with changes, for preservation purposes.

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178-10003-10295

CASTRO

IDP SEGRET

1.

As set forth in detail elsewhere, the Central Intelligence Agency was

involved in assassination plots against Fidel Castro beginning as early

as late 1959 or 1960. These plans arose at approximately the same time

as preparations were underway for the Bay of Pigs. The plans involved

a number of bizarre schemes and, in

at least one instance, involved some

contact with organized criminal elements. Among the means considered

were poison,

botulism pills, and the use of Cuban Exile Groups. There

is evidence to indicate that Allen Dulles was aware of these early efforts

to develop plans to assassinate Castro and authorized them. It is unclear

whether other

officials of the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administrations

were aware

of these early plans.

PHOTOCOPY FROM

THE GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

2. The Bay of Pigs operation occurred between April 17 and April 19,

• 1961. Following that unsuccessful operation, President Kennedy directed

Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Arleigh Burke, and Allen Dulles to

"study our governmental practices and programs in the area of military

and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fell short of

outright wai," paying special attention to the lessons which could be

learned from the Bay of Pigs operation.

178-10004-10215

3.

During the course of the Taylor group's review of the Bay of Pigs

operation,

the FBI notified Robert Konnedy, in a memorandum dated

May 22, 1962, that it baTOP SECRETShettield Edwards, CIA Director

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of Security, of Agency contacts with Robert Maheu and Sam Giancana

with respect to "anti-Castro activity, " "clandestine efforts in Cuba"

and "CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government."

Mr. Edwards advised the FBI that "since this is 'dirty business' he could

not afford to have knowledge of the actions of Maheu and Giancana in

pursuit of any mission for CIA." The FBI memorandum added that:

"Colonel Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Deputy

Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were .

aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's

program and that Allen Dulles was completely unaware of

Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He

added that Mr. Bissell, during his recent briefings of

General Taylor and the Attorney General in connection

with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situa-.

tion told the Attorney General that some of the CIA's

associated planning included the use of Giancana and the

underworld against Castro."

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

It should be noted that Mr. Edwards and Lawrence Houston, then General

Counsel of the CIA, briefed Mr. Kennedy again almost a year later, on

May 7, 1962, on the Agency's contacts with the Mafia, betinning in August

and September 1960, concerning Castro. This briefing was apparently initiated b

the CIA. The relationship with Sam Giancana was discussed in detail.

There is no indication that the Attorney General mentioned either the

May, 1961 memorandum from the FBI or the briefing he and General

Taylor had received the year earlier from Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Edwards

IDP SECRET

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has stated that Mr. Kennedy did not disapprove of any of the actions

taken in the past. Mr. Houston has testified that:

"We went down to brief Mr. Kennedy on the full story

(that the CIA) had set up a project with its aim the demise

of Castro, that the project had fallen through, that these

following people were involved, and we gave them the

names, and this is what made him unhappy, because at the

time he felt he was making a very strong drive to try to

get after the Mafia. And so his comment was to us that if

if we were going to get involved with the Mafia, in the

future at any time, to make sure you see me first."

4. On June 13, 1961 General Taylor's group reported to the President.

The report included no mention of the prior CIA activities with respect

to assassinating Castro. The group's recommendations included:

"In the course of its work, this Group has been exposed

to the views on Cuba of many U.S. officials and of indi-

viduals, Cuban and U.S., who have been close to the

Cuban problem.

We have been struck with the general

feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro

as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemi-

spheric community as a dangerously effective exponent

FROM

THE GERALD

R.

FORD LIBPARY

TOP SECRET

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of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a

real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the

elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin

American republics. There are only two ways to view

this threat; either to hope that time and internal dis -

content will eventually end it, or to take active

measures to force its removal. Unless by "time" we

are thinking in terms of years, there is little reason to

place reliance on the first course of action as being

effective in Castro's police state. The second has been

made more difficult by the April failure and is now pos-

sible only through overt U.S. participation with as much

Latin American support as can be raised. Neither al-

ternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a

choice of the first.

"While inclining personally to a positive course of action

against Castro without delay, we recognize the danger of

dealing with the Cuban problem outside the context of the

world Cold War situation. Aution against Castro must

be related to the probable course of events in such other

places as Southeast Asia and Berlin which may put simul-

taneous claims on our resources.

"It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised

in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance

be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda

action against Castro."

ASECRET

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

THE GERALD

R.

FORD LIBPARY

5. The record of actions of the National Security Council meeting of

April 29, 1961 "noted the President's request" that the "Defense study of

the military training of Cubans" be coordinated with "further proposals

from the Department of State with respect to the broader aspects

of the

. Cuban problem." On May 4, a series of papers captioned "Cuba and

Communism in the Hemisphere" were circulated to the NSC members

(President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, Dean Rusk and Robert

McNamara) as well as the Secretary 'Öl the Treasury, the Director of the

JOP SECRET

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Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Director

of Central Intelligence. The papers made the following points:

"There is no sure way of overthrowing Castro short

of U.S. military intervention. There is a possi-

bility, although a slight possibility, that lesser

measures -- covert and overt -- might result in

the overthrow of the Castro regime from within.

As long as Castro thrives, his major threat -- the

example and stimulus of a working communist

revolution -- will persist."

"The cost of eliminating Castro by military inter-

vention would be substantial at the present time and

under present circumstances. These costs might

include significant loss of life and other casualties

and would severely endanger the U.S. position of

leadership in the Free World. It is our judgment

that these costs outweigh the advantages of interven-

tion."

"In view of these considerations, it is the recommenda-

of the Task Force that:

"1) We should not undertake military inter-

vention now.

"2)

We should make no statements or take no

action that would foreclose the possibility

of military intervention in the future.

"3)

We should work to reduce the Castro threat

through measures discussed in the balance

of this paper -- thus seeking to avoid the

need for more drastic and costly action at

some time in the future.

"4)

We should attempt to reduce the costs of in-

tervention should it become necessary.

There

is not a great deal the United States by itself

can do älong these lines as a matter of delib-

erate policy. We can, however, plan for

various contingencies so thät intervention will

be sufficient and more effective. We should

!:

IOP SEGREI

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

THE GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

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strive to develop a creditable doctrine based

on self-defense against indirect aggression

which would justify more drastic action, and

we should seek to have that doctrine generally

accepted by world opinion. At the same time,

we should seek to continue our efforts

to es-

tablish a multilateral base for action. "

"We must immediately develop a longer-range program

for these nations.

This includes the organization of a

Democratic alternative to Trujillo and Duvalier. Such

a group can be formed basically out of exiles since there

is little opportunity for opposition or potential opposi-

tion to exist within the framework of the Haitian and

Dominican regimes, though possibilities appear to exist

in the Dominican Republic. When the formation of

Democratic alternatives is well under way, we should

develop and begin to put into effect a plan for acceler-

ating a transition from the regimes of Trujillo and

Duvalier. In this way the timing and initiative on re-

placement will be ours, and we will gain the tremendous

indirect. in an eriort to erim

inate these dictatorships. The methods whereby this can

be accomplished have not yet been explored.

"In this connection, we should step up our campaign

against tyranny in the hemisphere and, wherever pos-

sible, couple Irujillo and Castro."

(It should be noted that Trujillo was assassinated 27 days

after this report, on May 30, 1961.1

"A political vulnerability of the regime lies in the person

of Castro himself.

It is not clear whether the regime

could continue to operate for long without him. There is

no question that the bureaucracy operates relatively

freely and probably makes many decisions without con-

sulting Castro. However, it is equally certain that the

Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an

important element in maintaining popular support for the

regime. If Castro were removed from the scene, the

regime might.collapse for lack of this central rallying

point.

On the other hand, the bureaucracy might now be

so firmly entrenched that it could function independently --

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FROM THE GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

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_SEGRET

although admittedly without the support it now enjoys.

Further, by using Castro as a martyr, it might be

possible to generate at least a temporary support for

his successor."

"The survival of the Castro regime would probably not

in itself pose a direct threat to the immediate security

of the U.S. The continued existence of the regime

• would, however, fundamentally alter the terms of Latin

American relations with the U.S. U.S. restraint in

allowing the regime to survive would be interpreted

generally by Latin American ruling groups as evidence

of weakness and a demonstration of U.S, unwillingness

to use force against a Soviet-backed government. This

would be true despite the frequently asserted opposition

of Latin Ameriçan leaders to U.S. intervention in the

affairs of any Latin American country and their refusal

to take joint action to quarantine Cuba."

"Aside from its direct effect upon U.S. prestige in the

area, the survival of Castro would have a profound

effect on Latin American political life. It would set the

stage for political struggle in terms long promoted by

Communist propaganda in the hemisphere, with the issue

drawn between "popular" anti-U.S. forces and the ruling

groups alled with the U.S. Governments willing to co-

operate with the U.S. would be faced by political leaders

promising an immediate remedy to social wrongs through

seizure of property and overturn of the society. Evolu-

tionary reform and improvement over a period of years,

even at an accelerated pace, would be discounted as

extremist leaders piayed on mass bitterness and distrust

of the ruling groups. In these circumstances, political

stability in Latin America would be seriously jeopardized."

"In the atmosphere produced by Castro's survival, U.S.

efforts to promote social progress would encounter new

difficulties as political leaders withheld their cooperation

for programs involving domestic sacrifices and attend-

ant political risks. In the circumstances the U.S. Govern-

ment would have to be prepared to underwrite huge welfare

and economic development programs and to involve itself

directly in their success, always under some threat of

withdrawai of cooperation by the Latin American govern-

ments. On the other hand, if Castro were eliminated, the

SECRET

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

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U.S. would be in a much stronger position to insist

upon adoption of a program of moderate, evolutionary

change by the ruling groups in Latin America."

"The overwhelming majority of anti-Castro exiles in

this country hope for an early overthrow of the Castro

regime.

The exiles feel and believe that this is realiz

able; thus they are prepared, each on his own level, to

contribute to and participate in actions necessary to

achieve the objective for a free democratic Cuba which

would mean their return to the Island. Most of these

Cubans are convinced that U.S. leadership and active

participation in this struggle are essential for success.

Therefore, they can be expected to follow and support

the U.S. in any venture promising an early elimination

of Castro. Direct contacts with invasion survivors and

other returnees, indicate that there is disappointment,

hurt and uncertainty as to why the U.S. did not come to

the aid of the freedom fighters; however, there is no

question that these personnel are prepared and anxious

to continue the fight in partnership with the U.S. Exile

political leaders are also anxious to continue to press

the crusade."

ECRET

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

6. The May 4 papers were considered at a meeting of the National

Security Council on May 16, 1961. The record of the actions at that meet-

ing, approved by the President, indicate the following actions with

respect to "U.S. policy towaid Cuba":

"Agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at

the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures

agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the

matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view

toward further action."

"Noted the importance the President attaches to publi-

cation in the Free World press of the terroristic

actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political

actions to end the current terror."

"Noted the President's direction that the Central

Intelligence Agenoy,-with other departments, should

IOP SECRET

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IDE SECRET

make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and

vulnerabilities in the elements which assert con-

trol in Cuba today. "

7. On November 30, 1961, President Kennedy sent a memorandum to

Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, John McCone, Robert Kennedy,

Maxwell Taylor, Edward Lansdale and Richard Goodwin setting forth a

"summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the

Cuba Operation." The President's memorantum went on, to state that

"We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project

HOTOCOPY

FROM

in order to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime." The addressees

of this memorandum became known at the "Special Group Augmented. "

McGeorge Bundy was a regular participant in meetings of the Special

Group Augmented. The United States Information Agency was also

regularly represented at Special Group Augmented meetings. The Special

Group Augmented met formally on at least 26 occasions between the end

of 1961 and October 26, 1962.

FORD LIBPARY

8. The program administered by the Special Group Augmented was initially

known as "The Cuba Project." It later was referred to as "Operation

Mongoose." The objective of the Cuba Project was described in a

January 19, 1962 memorandum by General Lansdale as "to help the Cubans

overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new

government with which the United States can live in peace."

It stated "the"

operation is to bring about the revelt of the Cuban people . . . . The revolt-

JUP SECRET

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requires a strongly motivated political action movement established

within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the ob-

jective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment." It said "The climactic

moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a

government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the

leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Proj-

ect must be to bring this about)." The agencies were given a number of

tasks to implement the project. The overall objectives of the Cuba proj-

ect program were presented to the President and the Special Group by

General Lansdale on January 18, 1962.

HOTOCOPY

9. On January 20, 1962, General Lansdale sent a memorandum to the

Special Group Augmented (then known as the "Caribbean Survey Group")

stating that "At yesterday's meeting, the Attorney General underscored

with emphasis that it is your responsibility to develop and apply the maxi-

mum effort of your Department (Agency) to win the goal of the Cuba projoct."

ARI

The memorandum added that

"As the Attorney General said, it is untenable to say

that the United States is unable to achieve its vital

national security and foreign policy goal re Cuba.

Castro and his Communist henchmen have many diffi-

cult problems to meet in maintaining even a status quo,

and we have all the men, money, material, and

spiritual assets of this most powerful nation on earth.

It is our job to put the American genius to work on

this project, quickly and effectively. This demands

a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing oi

SECRET

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the fact that we are in a combat situation -- where

we have been given full command."

General Lansdale thereafter received, on January 30, 1962, a memo-

randum from the Joint Chiefs' representative to the Special Group

Augmented proposing an "Operation Bounty, " the objective of which was:

"To provide inducement to Cuban citizens to overthrow

the Cuban Communist Regime; to put pressure on Cuban

Communists by creating distrust and disunity. "

The major aspects of the proposal were as follows:

"1. Operation BOUNTY establishes a system of

Inancial rewards, commensurate with position and

stature, for killing or delivering alive known

Communists.

"2. Rewards range from two cents to $1 million

and are determined by the position the individual

concerned holds in the Communist hierarchy of

Cuba.

"3. A reward will be paid to an individual upon pre-

sentation of a leaflet, together with conclusive proof

of death and the party/ revolutionary membership card

of the deceased or delivery to designated locations of

known party/ revolutionary members.

"4. Loaflets will be delivared to Cuba by air.

"5. Leaflets will be designed to indicate phases.

For

example, the first leaflets will contain only names of

Communist leaders; the next leaflets will revise the

names by job; i.e, cell leader, informer, party mem-

bers, etc.; any of the above or subsequent leaflets will

announce the amount of the reward, how and where it

may be collected. One final leaflet may be deemed

advisable and that one announcing a . 02$ reward for the

delivery of Castro.

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

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"6. A proposed price list is

as follows:

a. Informer

b. Cell Leader

c. Block Leader

d. Department Head

e. Foreign Communist

f. Government Officials

g. Castro

$20, 000 - $

5, 000

40,000 -

10, 000

45, 000 - 20, 000

57,500 - 26,000

97,000 - 47,000

100, 000 - 55,000

.02÷ "

The action plan concluded that:

"Once this operation is implemented, covert actions

by U.S, agents could be initiated to kidnap known

party members thereb y instilling confidence in the

operation among the Cuban populace and apprehension

among the Cuban hierarchy."

SECRET

10. On February 20, 1962, General Lansdale distributed to the President

• and the Special Group Augmented a "program review" on the Cuba Proj-

ect. The "action plan"' included a proposal -- to be implemented in

September, 1962 -- for "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key

leaders." The "considerations" listed with respect to this proposal were

stated as follows:

"This should be a 'special target' operation. CIA de-

• fector operations are vital. Gangster elements might

provide the best recruitment potential for actions against

police - G2 officials. Bloc technicians should be added

to the list of targets. CW agents should be fully con-

sidered."

FROM

THE

GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

TUP SECRET

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11. On March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented met in Dean Rusk's

office.

General Lansdale sent a memorandum to Richard Goodwin the next

day stating that:

"At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on

our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of 'other tracks'

which might be opened for the U.S. to achieve its objec-

tive.

He mentioned proof of 'their' plots in Latin America,

as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a 'Bay

of Pigs' in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a national clandestine

action for which 'they' could be blamed."

The memorandum added that:

"Along these same lines, and, in response to direction, I am

asking the Defense representative (General Craig) to give

me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS

believe desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

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direct military intervention. I would appreciate it if

you could provide a companion statement, a brief but

precise description of pretexts which the State Depart-

ment believes desirable in connection with any such

direct military intervention."

The minutes of the March 5, 1962 Special Group Augmented meeting state

that "Mr. Johnson (U. Alexis Johnson) was asked to have a list prepared

of various situations which would serve as a plausible pretext for in-

tervention." The words "would" and "plausible pretext" are bracketed

in pencil in the minutes, and the words "could" and "valid basis" are

printed beneath them in pencil.

12. On March 13, 1962, the Defense Department provided a "status report"

to the Special Group Augmented. It contained the following statement:

"Task 33 b - Plan for Incapacitation of Sugar Workers -

completed 2 February. Task as assigned was to develop

a plan for incapacitating large sections of the sugar

workers by the covert use of BW or CW agents. Study

revealed the idea was infeasible and it was cancelled."

The terms "BW" and "CW"' stand for biological (or bacteriological) warfare

and chemical warfare, respectively.

13. The minutes of the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Aug-

mented state that:

"The Secretary of State said that, at this time, he can see

no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be

justified; on the other hand, this should not be taken as an

excuse to cease activity against the Castro regime. He,

supported by the Secretary uf Defense, took the position

'play for the breaks,' and should take necessary steps so

as to get into a position which would afford the U.S. a

IP SECREI

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

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IDP SECRET

maximum number of choices of action. In this connec-

tion, he and Mr. McNamara suggested that the current

target date for bringing covert operations to a climax

should be removed. Mr. Bundy cautioned that this could

lead to an uncontrollable action internally, which might

come to a head at a time which would be embarrassing

or inconvenient for the U.S."

14. On April 12, 1962, General Lansdale forwarded to Maxwell Taylor

an "advance copy"' of the Joint Chiefs' paper on !'Pretexts, " stating "I am

informed that the Chiefs approved this." The paper, captioned "Justifica-

tion for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (TS), " set forth 9 "pretexts."

These included:

"We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in

the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in

Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at

Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We

could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real

or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of

Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of

wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding

a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest

of a Cuban agent and the release of prepared documents

substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in

projecting the idea of an irresponsible government."

The minutes of the Special Group Augmented Meeting of April 12, 1962,

state that "General Taylor called the Group's attention to the JCS paper

"Justification of U.S. Military Intervention, " which most of them had not yet

received."

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R.

FORD LIBPARY

15. At the Special Group Augmented meeting of April 12, 1962, it was also

decided that a review would be conducted in August, 1962 "oi the progress

made and of the long range objective" of Operation Mongoose.

. On April 13,

TOP-SECRET

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1962, Maxwell Taylor reported on Mongoose to "higher authority"

(President Kennedy).

It was decided that Operation Mongoose would

have no target date. The memorandum of the meeting with "higher

authority" states:

"Taylor was informed that we would have to live with

the consequences of no date, doing the best we can to

bolster motivation. Taylor commented that we can

probably carry out the first phase as planned, with a

review of the situation about August 1."

16. On July 10, 1962 General Lansdale distributed a "Guideline for a

Post-Castro Political Program'' prepared by the State Department to

members of the Special Group Augmented. According to General

Lansdale:

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

THE

"It sketches in the general boundaries of a Cuba with

R.

which the U.S. could live in peace, and is only the first

step in the political work of having a Cuban platform,

created by Cubans, upon which Cubans can rally for the

overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime with U.S.

LIBI

17. On July 11, 1962 General Landale advised the spooled ciroup Augente a

that "the operational representatives are readying presentations to assist

the Special Group assess and review the policy of Operation Mongoose,

as of the end of July." The Lansdale memorandum indicated these papers

would cover "Operational estimates of the potential for resistance in Cuba,

intelligence collection, political, psychological, economic and military

operations (it is expected that these operational estimates will note ways

and means)."

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18. On July 25, 1962 General Lansdale distributed a memorandum on

"Review of Operation Mongoose" to the members of the Special Group

Augmented.

It was a compilation based on the "contribution of each

major participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity

to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be governed by the

policy framework." One of the original objectives of the Operation was

stated to be "Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions,

short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed

intervention. "

It included also a section on "PROJECTION (PHASE II), "

stating that "The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are

as follows:

"A. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Block nation;

protect Hemisphere from it, or

"B. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological,

and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist

regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or

"C. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-

Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure

success, including the use of U.S. military force if re-

quired at the end, or

"D. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist

regime by U.S, military, force."

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19. On August 8, 1962, U. Alexis Johnson distributed to the members

of

the Special Group Augmented a "paper on the effects of the existence of

the Castro Government during the past year on Latin America, the

United States and the USSR. a subject on the agenda for discussion at the

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meeting on Cuba, August 10, 1962. " On the same date, the Joint Chief's

distributed a memorandum on "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention

(in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on

world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained

occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban coun-

teraction, "

20. On August 8, 1962 General Lansdale also distributed a memorandum

on "Stepped Up Course B"' to the Special Group Augmented. The memo-

randum indicated that Course B, as described in the July 25 memorandum,

differed from "Phase I'' in that Course B removed the prior restriction

that Mongoose actions be kept "short of those reasonably calculated to

inspire a

revolt within the target area." The August 8 memorandum in-

cluded papers from the "operational rèpresentatives" of State, Defense,

CIA and USIA with respect to a possible "Stepped Up" Course B. The CLA

paper, prepared by William Harvey, set forth the following "Task":

"Assist and support State in any feasible action

to develop active OAS and individual Latin American

country support for the overthrow of Castro."

"Assist State in the development of post-Castro con-

cepts, leaders, and political groups."

"Develop contacts in the 'power center' of the Cuban

Government as a possible means of splitting the

regime."

"Inducc the population to engage in militant mass

action such as demonstrations: slow-downs, work

stoppages, and sabotage.!

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The CIA paper also recommended a significantly expanded paramilitary

program, including "Commando/Raider Teams, " "Urban Resistance

Cells, "

"Rural Resistance Cells," "Guerilla" teams, and use of "Cuban

Exile Forces."

21. The files of the Joint Chiefs contain an unsigned memorandum

captioned "DOD Task #69 Ideas to beef-up course of action B." Stapled

to this memorandum is an unsigned, undated memorandum setting forth

as follows:

"We believe Castro can be overthrown only by the use

of considerable external military support. The ob -

jective of Operation Mongoose is the overthrow of the

Castro regime.

"If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the

resistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action

without U.S, military support, then the assets pre-

sently in Cuba would probably be destroyed by Castro's

effective means of repression,

"If, however, course B is followed with the intention of

providing U.S. military support, when required, simply

not telling the Cubans, the following things could be done:

(Cubans would do better tho, if they knew)."

The memorandum contains a disjointed list of ideas, including:

"Assassinate Castro and his handful of top men."

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22. On August 10, 1962, the Special Group Augmented met in Dean Rusk's

office.

The following people attended:

State :

Mr. Rusk, MI. Johnson,

Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,

Mr. Hurwitch

White House:

General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS:

Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric,

General Lennitzer,

General Lansdale

CIA:

Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA:

Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

According to the minutes of the meeting, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott

of Maxwell Taylor's staff:

"The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE

program. Mi. McNamara questioned whether we cannot sepa~

rate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions

that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led

to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider

changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the

Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

"In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan

(called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B

described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared

as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact

result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the

stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is

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prepared to accept attributability for the necessary

actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force.

Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting

an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood

bath if unsupported.

Not only would the U.S. be blamed,

but there would also be a high noise level in the press and

eventually a situation would be created which would re-

quire intervention.

"On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would,

in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers be-

cause it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated

his view that the U.S. might,

however, face a stronger

Cuba in the future."

"The principal members of the Special Group felt, after

some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed

further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of

the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress

economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment

a Castro-oldline Communist split.

It was emphasized that

any actions under this

plan must be so designed as to

avoid major attribution to the U.S."

"Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the

possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly

"disengaged"' basis; in other ivords, should they be given

covert financial and material support, with the idea of see-

ing what they could generate on their own."

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R.

FORD

Mr. Harvey, on April 14, 1962, sent the following memorandum to Mr. Helmeg,

attaching a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum prepared by General

Lansdale:

"1. Action. None.

This memorandum is for your informa-

tion.

"2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August, 1962,

concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale.

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Attached is a copy of this memorandum, exe laP SECRET

which are four words in the second line of the penulti-

mate paragraph on page !. These four words were

"including liquidation of leaders."

"3. The question of assassination, particularly of

Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara

at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in

Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the ob-

vious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a

comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject

which has been made a matter of official record. I

took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on

this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not

expecting any written comments or study on this point.

"4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I

called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed

out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of

putting this type of comment in writing in such a docu-

ment. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was

concerned, we would write no document pertaining to

this and would participate in no open meeting discus-

sing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale

that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of

this memorandum, including those disseminated to State,

Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called

back and left the message that he agreed and that he had

done so."

The August 13 Lansdale memorandum had a phrase excised from it. The

blank space was the approximate size of the phrase, "including the liquida-

tion of leaders."

The NSC records of the Special Group Augmented include a one page

uncaptioned, unsigned memorandum dated August 10, 1962. It is typed

on the same kind of paper -- and apparently on the same typewriter -- as

the minutes of the Special Group Augmented of the same day. Stapled to

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the memorandum is

a handwritten note on White House Itterhead.

Al-.

though unsigned,

the handwriting is apparently that of Mr. Parrott.

The memorandum

states:

"The objective of the MONGOOSE program is to cause

the visible failure of the target regime as quickly as

possible as a preliminary to its ultimate elimination.

In pursuing this objective the U.S. will make maximum

use of indigenous and non-U.S, personnel and resources,

particularly for covert operations.

"The current intelligence collection program will con-

tinue essentially as at present. Increased efforts will

be directed at weakening the economy of the target

country, to include a stepped-up program of economic

sabotage. An intensive propaganda campaign will be

maintained, designed to do maximum damage to the image

of the target leader as a successful liberating revolutionary,

while stressing the failures of his regime.

"While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must be

prepared to exploit it if one should unexpectedly occur."

As noted above, the objective of "visible failure" of the "castro Regime"

had been proposed by Maxwell Taylor at the Special Group Augmented

meeting

: a change from the objective of "overthrowing" the regime.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R.

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The handwritten note stapled to the unsigned memorandum reads as follows:

"Attribution? How much will we use Cubans?

"Paramilitary and resistance activities in addi-

tion to intell?

"Use of U.S. personnel for overflights?"

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23. On August 17, 1962 Maxwell Taylor sent a memorandum

to Presideht

Kennedy on Operation Mongoose. The memorandum states:

"As we look ahead in the MONGOOSE program, we

have considered several alternative courses of

action. We have ruled out those which commit us

to deliberate military intervention although we

recognize that an unanticipated revolt might at any

time force a decision for or against the support of

such a revolt by U.S. forces. For the coming

period, we favor a somewhat more aggressive pro-

gram than the one carried out in Phase I, wherein

we continue to press for intelligence, attempt to

hurt the local regime as much as possible on the

economic front and work further to discredit the

regime locally and abroad.

"While we believe that this new course of action will

create added difficulties for the regime and will in-

crease the visibility of its failures, there is no

reason to hope that it will cause the overth row of

the regime from within."

General Taylor attached "Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE, Phase II

August 1, 1962 until

_ Terminal date to be set later." They

read in pertinent part as follows:

"While retaining as its eventual objective the over-

throw of the target government, the objective of the

MONGOOSE program during Phase lI will he the fur-

ther containment, undermining and discrediting of

the target regime while isolating it from other

Hemisphere nations."

"Efforts will be increased to inspire frictions and

schisms both within the target regime and between

its leaders and the Bloc."

"It is recognized that this program may cause the

noise level to rise; however, the importance of

maintaining nonattributability remains unchanged."

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"While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must

be prepared to exploit it should one unexpectedly

occur. The JCS will maintain plans for U.S. mili-

tary intervention."

On August 20, 1962, Maxwell Taylor advised the Specil Group Augmented

that the memorandum and guidelines had been "read and approved by

higher

authority today, 20 August 1962."

24. On August 23, 1962 McGeorge Bundy transmitted National Security

Council Action Memorandum No. 181 to Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara,

Robert Kennedy, the Acting Director of CIA and Maxwell Taylor. It pro-

vided:

"The President has directed that the following actions

and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of

new bloc activity in Cuba."

"The line of activity projected for Operation Plan B

plus should be developed with all possible speed. "

"A study should be made of the advantages and disad-

vantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or

invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus,

in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis."

NSAM No. 181 also made several assignments to White House staff, State

and Defense with respect to the impact and military alternatives with

respect to the establishment in Cuba of "surface-to-air missiles or sur-

face-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S."

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25. On August 29, 1962, William Harvey requested General Lansdale to

secure Special Group Augmented approval for a sabotage operation

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involving the largest Cuban copper mine. The Special: Group Augmented

approved the proposal on August 30, 1962 and "agreed that higher

authority should be made aware of this operation."

1

26. On August 31, 1962 McGeorge Bundy circulated to Dean Rusk, Robert

McNamara, Robert Kennedy, the Acting Director of CIA and Maxwell

Taylor

a memorandum on the probable military, political and psychological

impact of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The memorandum notes that:

"Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen

critics of the Administration's 'softness' on Cuba.

This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and

actions being considered in other responses to

NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the mis-

siles remain in place."

27. On August 31, 1962 General Lansdale provided the Special Group

Augmented with "a proposed projection, of actions to be undertaken in

Phase II, Operation Mongoose."

28. At the Special Group Augmented meeting of September 6, 1962, the

objective of a proposal to sabotage Cuban assets outside of Cuba was

changed from "crippling" to "harassing" Cuban commerce. Also con-

sidered was a proposal with respect to "agricultural sabotage" within

Cuba. The minutes of the meeting state that:

"General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity

of any such operation and the disastrous results that

would flow from something going wrong, particularly

if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went

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on to say, however, that it would be possible tor

accomplish this purpose by means more subtle

than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned

specifically the possibility of producing crop fail-

ures by the introduction of biological agents which

would appear to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy

said that he had nò worries about any such sabotage

which could clearly be made to appear as the re-

sult of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural

disaster, but that we must avoid external activities

such as the release of chemicals, etc., unless they

could be completely covered up. "

29. Additional sabotage and related activities were approved by the Special

Group Augmented during the balance of September, 1962.

30. On October 4, 1962, the Special Group Augmented convened again.

The minutes of that meeting state that:

"The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying

that higher authority is concerned about progress on

the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority

should be given to mounting sabotage operations. The

Attorney General said that he wondered if a new look

is not required at this time in view of the meager re-

sults, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that

'massive activity' be mounted within the entire

MONGOOSE framework: There was a good deal of

discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that

another attempt will be made against the major target

which has been the object of three unsuccessful mis-

sions,

and that approximately six new ones are in the

planning stage."

The minutes do not disclose the identity or nature of the "major target"

referred to by General Lansdale or otherwise shed light on the "three.

FROM THE GERALD R

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unsuccessful missions" or the "six new ones in the planning stage." It is pos-.

sible that the reference involved the Cuban copper mine sabotage operation. The

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minutes indicate that a "major point" emerging from the Special Group

Augmented's discussion was that 'All efforts should be made to develop

new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the

Castro regime."

31. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy, in a nationally-televised

address, informedthe American people of the presence of Soviet missiles

in Cuba.

The "Cuban Missile Crisis" continued until October 28, when

Khrushchev announced an order "to dismantle the weapons, which you

(President Kennedy) describe as offensive, and to return them to the

Soviet Union, "

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

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32. The last formal meeting of the Special Group Augmented was held on'

October 26, 1962 .-- during the Cuban Missile Crisis. A memorandum

was distributed at the meeting concerning "OPERATION MONGOOSE Main

Points to Consider." It stated:

"What is the Policy Objective?

• We need a sharp focus

on exactly what we hope to get from Mongoose now.

This will determine how best to employ these unique

resources -- either to support U.S. military opera-

tions or directly to commit against the Communist

regime immediately.

"Is the end objective the removal of the Castro/Com-

munist regime or to bring it to its knees?

Should

Mongoose help generate a popular revolt with the

probable need for overt U.S. military help as the

regime moves in to crush it? Or, is the aim that of

maximum harassment, to make Cuba a maximum

burden for the Bloc?

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"Undoubtedly, most people in the world now expect

us to move towards removing the Castro/ Communist

regime.

Certainly the Cubans in exile and inside

Cuba, who are the main covert assets of CIA, now

expect this policy goal as the price of risking their

lives. "

The memorandum also contained a reference to the following "Mongoose

Action":

"Harassment of and resistance to Cuban regime.

"Status: 3 teams (2- to 5-man) en route by small

craft today. 6 teams by submarine, starting to-

morrow. One more team being readied to go in by

small craft. 10 more teams being readied to go by

submarine shortly. One team now in Oriente andl

one team in Pinar del Rio. All teams have W/T,

arms, explosives."

Marginal notations in pencil on a carbon copy of this memorandum marked

"Mr. Gilpatric" are as follows:

- 10 teams (3-7)

to date

- 30 sent in

- 12 still active

- 3 teams rolled up

- 1 team in Pinar del Rio

has lined up 200 Cubans

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The minutes of the Special Group Augmented meeting state that:

"I. The meeting began with a discussion of the con-

siderably increased activity in the dispatch, and

preparation for dispatch, of agent teams.

As a re-

sult of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans

for dispatch should be suspended pending further ex-

amination; instructions were issued during the course

of the meeting designed to recall the three teams al-

ready on the way.

"It was agreed that the 'first order of business with

regard to these teams is to examine in detail the re-

quirements toward which they could contribute..

General Lansdale will arrange to get into contact with:

(a) General Carroll, to examine what military re-

quirements such agents could service; (b) similarly,

the State Department for political intelligence require-

ments; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that

Agency. After this examination, it will then be de-

cided what the best use of these agent assets actually

should be.

"2. MI. McCone and Mi. Harvey said during the

course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action

taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and

was not in response

to specific military requirements.

CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of respon-

sibility, and particularly with respect to the first three

teams had considered that it was a continuation of

previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone com-

mented that internal security in Cuba is now far more

stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making

agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore,

that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if

the responsible departments specifically require it for

intelligence purposes.

"In this connection, General Taylor brought out that

the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for

agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the

operation in broader context. The Chiefs had con-

cluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated

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unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it

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and that the military establishment does not wish"

to take over sabotage and similar operations at

this time,

although it should be prepared to do so

if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone

agreed that it is possible that as the situation de-

velops, CIA Cuban-operations might move under

military control, but that such action is not indi-

cated at this time."

The NSC version of last sentence of this reference has crossed out the

words "agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA

Cuban operations might move under military control."! There is the fol-

lowing handwritten substitution: "stated that if an active military

situation develops, CIA ops in the theater would move under military

control."

The minutes continue as follows:

"3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed

agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets.

He said that in the event of invasion, a sizeable num-

ber of Cubans could be trained quickly.

"4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale em-

phasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make

the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an

approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assur-

ances that such activities are in fact approved at a high

level.

"5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning

for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities

during and after any military action. He felt that there

should be established within the government some sort

of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably

should be placed within the Department of State. Ihe

activities of this office would be distinct from General

Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to

them. He pointed out that top priority should be given

to selecting a man to head such an office. Mi. Bundy

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also said that he thought a subcommittee of the

NSC Executive Committee should be established

to deal with MONGOOSE affairs.

"6. Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the

short-term should be considered in the context of :

(a) providing support for action designed to get rid

of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible in-

vasion.

"7. Specific discussion took place on points raised

in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

"a. CIA should continue to develop the

baloon propaganda facilities, although it

was recognized that by the target date of

I December this capability might no

longer be needed because of other methods

of delivery.

"b. No major acts of sabotage should be

undertaken at this time. This decision will

be reviewed in about a week.

"c. General Lansdale should develop further

plans to "help the Cubans to help themselves."

Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into

this planning.

"d. Political planning for the post-Castro

period will be assigned to the "Office for Free

Cuban Affairs. "

"e. Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW trans-

mitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited.

"8. It was reiterated that General Lansdale

is the focal

point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he is charged

with their overall management and that he should be kept

informed of all significant plans and activities in connec-

".

tion with the project."

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33.

Further actions with respect to the "agent teams" were taken on

October 30 and 31, 1962. On October 30, John McCone sent a memo-

randum to Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and Lyman

Lemnitzer advising as follows:

"This is to advise you that there are at the present

time 20 intelligence collecting infiltration and guerrilla

warfare teams who have been carefully trained anc

equipped with communication facilities available for

such use as the JCS may indicate. These teams are.

all Cubans, there are no Americans or other foreign

nationals included, they have been carefully selected

by men familiar with the Cuban community and the

tradecrafts involved and are ready to go. In addition

there are a number of others who are partially trained

that could be brought to a reasonable level of efficiency

in a short time.

At a meeting on 26 October it was decided that General

Lansdale would determine JCS requirements from

General Carroll and State requirements for political

information from Secretary Alexis Johnson and then

determine what resources were available and what

actions would be desirable to accomplish the needed

results...CIA is awaiting word from General Lansdale.

In the meantime, with General Lansdale's concurrence,

CIA has taken steps to inform CINCLANT and several

other Commands of the availability, of the above assets. "

On the same day, General Lansdale wrote a memorandum for. the record,

stating that:

"John McCone asked me to call him on the gray telephone

this morning. I did so. He stated that he didn't know

exactly how I was supposed to get word on this, so he was

informing me to help out: at the Executive Council meeting

this morning, the President had decided to hold back

Operation Mongoose for the time being: Also, during the

negotiations ze Soviet missile bases in Cuba, there were

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to be no Mongoose sabotage or similar militant opera-

tions. McCone said that he had informed General

Carter of this, but was letting me know, as Chief of

Operations, to let the operations team know; he men-

tioned that Alpha 66 and the approved sabotage of

Cuban shipping were to be held, specifically.

"I commented that I had just received a copy of a memo-

randum from him to the Attorney General,

the Sec/ Def.,

etc., dated today, saying that CIA was still awaiting

word from me on sending in 20 teams by submarine for

intelligence collection, after I'd determined JCS and

State requirements. I said that I had been told by

McGeorge Bundy on Sunday, 28 October, to hold up

action on this for 24 hours and had promptly notified

CIA, and that yesterday, upon receipt of a memoran-

dum from Bruce Cheever on this same subject, I had

taken it up again with Bundy -- and Bundy had told me

that he would tell McCone to have CLA hold everything.

I presumed that Bundy had so informed McCone. Also,

Harvey had called me Sunday night, asking my permis-

sion to discuss CIA assets with CINCLANT and JUWTF

for contingency planning; I had given Harvey permission

to assist in this pianning, if he felt that the U.S. military

needed more planning help from CIA.

"After the talk with McCone, I talked with Bruce Cheever

who assured me that he had similar orders from Carter

and that all militant actions under CIA were being held at

a stop. I gave similar orders to General Johnson for

Defense/JCS. It-Col Patchell concurrently informed

State and USIA along the same lines."

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

34. Three memoranda written by General Lansdale on October 31, 1962

are reproduced in full at Tab 1.

35. On January 17, 1963 General Lansdale sent a memorandum on "Opera-

tion Mongoose Files." It stated:

"At the next meeting of the Special Group (541 2),

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request that the disposition of the Operation Mongoose

TOP SECRET

files be decided upon. Much of this material is quite

sensitive and requires continuing protection or secure

destruction.

"The practical solution for the Mongoose files held by

State, Defense, CIA, and USIA would be to turn them

over to the officials within those Departments

and

Agencies now responsible for Cuban activities in the

new coordinating committee. The remaining files, held

by the Special Group (5412), the Attorney General, and

the Mongoose Chief of Operations, might be consolidated

and held in the files of the Chairman, Special Group

(5412). "

On January 25, 1963, Mr. Parrott advised General Lansdale as follows:

"I have discussed your memorandum of the 17th of

January with Mr. Bundy. He suggests that the dis

osition of these files be handled in accordance witi

your proposal. That is, the files in State, Defense,

CLA, and USIA, would be taken over by the people

now responsible for this operation, and the files held

by you as Chief of Operations, could be transferred

over to me as the custodian of the Special Group

records."

PHOTOCOPY

FROM

THE

GERALD R.

FORD

LIBPARY

JOP SECRET

HH 54214

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