## Page 1

Date

Page

D

06/25/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Released under the John

. Kennedy

AGENCY :

NSC

RECORD

NUMBER

145-10001-10184

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER.: 113

$44 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54214 Date:

10=10-2017--------

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 03/21/62

PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS : MINUTES OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : .

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526

SEC 3.3(b) 5QXS

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR

2016

dS RE-REVIEW DATE: 3/TOCC 2637

OKAY TO RELEASE AS REACTED

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TW 54214 DocId: 32977069

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TOP SECRE

NOPERN

21 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Pollowing are the minutes of the Caribbean Survey Group

held in the National Operations Room 2B 913, 21 March 1962.

Pollowing was the attendance at the seetings

The Attorney General

Mr. Hand

Mr.

01lpatr1o

den Lanadale

Mr.

Mr.

Belas

Gen Craig

Hr •

Harvey

Col Patchell

Goodwin

Mr. Lyan

At Cen Lanadale's request, Mr. Harvey opened the meeting by

giving & general operational atatus report. He discussed teams,

oto., in Bose deta11, Indicating thatthe aision of the teams

was Intelligence collection, controle and the development of

latent resistant areas. The quality of the Ope Locla Interrogation

Center - reporte have been good. 150 are coning in per week on

an average of possible intelligence reporte. Very little of high

level political intelligence has been available. However, treneD-.

dous ansunts of counter-intelligence is being received. Inforae-

Sion en 300 Olen agents per week, for example. Nothing so rar

uncovered la the intelligance area ahanges the basio conclusions

made originally My Oth, a la dethat of this task. However,

for the nost part, conolaalens hate bad fireed by farther informa-

tion. Generally aabotage is decreasing ia Cahi. em

sperational

problems of putting in agents are getting rongher ail tougher.

The controls by the Comunists in Cuba are getting lighter and

tighter and will slow dom the operation. Agents must have

dooments, to get documents you must regiater, when you register

the Bles informer cheoks on you periodically. This makes 1t

tough to get ration cards. Some few Cuban agents have been coming

in through the Opaloaka Center. Mr. Kennedy asked hon abut the

backlog of refugees - some 75,000 people coming in through Ope

Locka in the Miami area prior to beginning of this operations

intelligence center there. How about a program to assure that

these 75,000 sources are exploited. Mr. Harvey indicated CIA

had a plan to get this done, to date they have been unable to hit

a big part of the backlog, but in certain special cases have been

getting information from them, that they have a plan for this

and will handle it when they get the personnel available.

ACLUDED FROM GDS

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Mr. Kennedy brought up the possibility of using Immigretion

Department people, especially the broader patrol types who can

speak Spanish. Mr. 0ilpetrio indieated that Senator Bart's

Committee has recommeniled an additional screening center for

Cubans, possibly in the New Orleans area.

Mr. Kennedy asked CIA what the vote would be in Cuba an

between the Castro and the anti-Castro.

SRарP.дU

Gen Craig was asked to report on DOD partieipation. He

eirst discussed CIA support: in general, that during the first

phase of the operation, DOD's primary role would be to support

State-CIA and US. in the intelligence gathering phase and in

the interin period to be prepared at a moment's notice to inter-

vene in Cuba to prevent & Hungarian type operatien or 8o exploit

any gossible opportunities that night ocour. The results of the

evaluation ef the flak involved 1n!

OSAR sheep-

Aren

mantas supply drope to agenta and to

Cuban guerrilles mes elecaseed.

She Als Jeroe's general con-

clusions were read to the One with the infleeties that operations

Initially would possibly be meh sore enorenette that phose 1n-

the latter phases, inasmuch as they weald be dovellahed with

surprise and before the Cubans had an opportunity to figure the

modus operands, ets., and build up a guard against 1t. Sab-

sequently, they might produce more effeetive eounter-actions but

that on-balance, generally speaking, such operations had a good

chance of success.

16

JCS

the

Bossest

sapping one alrorate

MERCECH

*the Navy Co. Gia in anil boat

ASTEREO

oman beane

(Isoussed.

POLLENSCT 1074

the bes ch

SO MONRESS

specure project

hat the toMorine polley netters among others

Avon

Bustable

Sumpey cestang.

PT

WAS brought ouc

JCS

HH 54214

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LOP SECRET SPECIAL HAND!*** NOFERN

slee

a for polley decision that wust be nade in providing adeguste

ques clone

velne

CLA:

CheeR CONC

03 03502 81

should be uttlized to

iban refugees, the extent to which armed forces personnel w1ll

be employed, caribbean Survey Group projeats, to what extent Us

armed forces personnel will be employed within the territorial

boundaries of Cuba, to what extent over-flights of Cuba, for

par poses of leaflet drops, resupply and diversion,

what exten

vill Quantanano de uses

for agents

Like black

211 gh t

na black broadcasts, to what extent will the use of British con-

troiled and other foreign areas for staging areas be permitted,

and finally, what 1s the priority of operation Mongoose as eon-

pared to other pro.:its and operations such as South Vietnam and

Berlin at the current time. In the latter connection, that 18, the

question of priority of Mongoose, it was emphasized to the Attorney

General that to date ve had not had particular trouble in this

a rea but that inevitably we would run into trouble areas, par-

tieularly in ragan to logistion mttere, that to late, this had

been handled thres

di gerant enamels, for example, den

Decker who had a little treble in all trel la getting stookpiles,

and supplies and equipment, logistie 1194 fon the Arny had hardied

it by making decisions through coumend channels without designating

a priority and that the state to date the preparation and planning

had been going forward snoothly, but that the time would some

when the decision would be made as to which would get the priority

for example, would good, equipment, etc, earmarked for Vietnam and

Berlin and move to stookpiling areas fa those could they be used

or would

1a a Cuban operation?, or would Cuba take priority with others

take priority? Mr. O1lpatrio Indicated he would 11ke to try to

solve this problem at Defense level without referring it to

anyone higher. He asked that he be kept informed of this

situation as it develops into a real problen area. Have Col

Knight keep me inforned on this situation so tat we could let

Mr. allpatric Ion by way of the ics when the time comes that

we should do so.

then discussed reaction times

J

510

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SPECIA

ĐFORN

NH 54214

INOGANT WAS

003a800

TROLOLO

reats postelening.

OCO.

currently

18

Cays and

1m onder.

zesotton

going up to

ortent the

situation in termse

Che

setting not.

Tala would permit

SUNSHIN

did not inroive tipping on

the operation

Co 2

10

condition,

he spectrum in

the ladder,

CECTS

ould not go rurther torands prepazation

hand or take unacceptable rick,

without tipping off

(6.800701

this potat

hate

this kins of planning chart prepare

uture. In the wantina, Latense.

103 8220

roady on the shortest possible notice oreosively

to prevent e

parian type dabacle happening to us sa gros

Am traig this sovered the organisation, staffing and modus

operent of the written Survey-froup Working Group of DO of

JCS and finally enttes inflicted thas the first important nianion

undertaken by the group vas to develop to DO/Sue dualtion as to

the military's stake and proposed role in the emoting ef the

Communist regine in Cuba. Basieally, the polley reflested that

Curing

Defense will support State-CIA, 1f necessary, # the preparatory

paase of operation of Mongoose in terms of supply, transportation,

personnel and bases, establishes the point that the wiltary belteve!

that the continued existence of the Castro Comminist ngine 18

Incompatible with the minimum security reguirements of the us

and makes a point that the miltary sould intervene in Cuba without

serious offense to national or world publie opinion under

the following three conditions:

Pirst - 1f we moved in response to a humanitarian requirement

to restore order.

Second - if we announced instant to going in that we were

moving in to zestere erder and would hold free elections and ve

w111 withdraw from Cubs as soon as the new government advised

that they had the enobility to maintain law and order without

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TOP-SECRE* SPECIAL HANDINA NOFORN

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54214

assistance from the OAS nation.

Third - If the operation is conducted as quickly as

possible and with suffiolent force so that the Comunist bloc

ability to take effective counter-measures was reduced to a

minimum.

It was then emphasized strongly by len Craig that the

JCS were very apprehensive in regard that the Soviets were

capable of taking a page fron our book and estabilsh an overseas

military base or bases in Cuba. It would greatly inorease our

national vulnerability and our defense cost al forces would

have to be developed or shifted to meet this threat from the

South, that the Soviets had an option on which they could

foreclose at any time in this regard. They can make decision

to establish a ullitary base in Cuba as their will and pleasure

Wata as little # 1f any cost, that should khis be done, 10,

wilitary bass established by the Soviets in Cuba before we inter

rago, ve wall llbaly be unable to renove then by initiating

World Var I57. Consorently, ve foel it mandatory ve face the

facts squarely nor sal dateraine al lady as polaible whether

no can rid Cabe Of Communten ly Cowsre Sort of Cubans within

Cuba. It 18 equally important fron lentilles piasting purpose:

that we have an early decision as to whether ve lafinitely intend

to use military force if the sovert means fail. It was emphasised

that in the event the Soviets foreclose the option and establish

bases in Cuba or accept Cuba as the legitimate member of the Warsar

Paot that either one of these aets would place new dimensions and

new facts bearing on the problem and introduced confideretions

which would postpone positive action indefintely if not preclude

for the foreseeable future the elimination of the Communist regina,

since to remove the base might well trigger World War III.

Mr. Goodwin indicated to the group that the views I expressed

in regard to the conditions under which we could go in xithout

causing too much world consteration and condemnation, and to

the options hold hy the Sortet Russia conserning bases in Cuba,

both represented paitical judgnents and were without defense 's

province. Mr. Oilpatric lux indicated he too considered this to be

FAR AFRAFT PAPALIF HI

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TOP SIER

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a political Judgment. I indiested that this was a political-

military judgaent, there was no doubt about it but that 1t

certainly did involve the Defense and JCS responsibilities,

inasmuch as NSAM No. 55 published last June, the President had

inforned the Jeint Chiefs of Staff that he considered them to

be wore than ailitary sen and should advise him on such mattere,

when it involved the security of the United States, that the

J01nt Chiefs of Staff felt obligated to so advise the President.

When I made this statement Mr. Kennedy Indieated to the effeat

that this vas sorreat, that it was the responsibllity of the JeS

to make recommendations of this nature.

Mr. Goodwin did not pursue the mtter further at this time.

Mr. Goodwin then queried me in rogard to the reactions capabilities

of the US feroes in her countries of latin America, that if such

a requirement dourred while we were engaged in Cuba, this Beened

So be the general thust of his queries. I indiented to him that

Gin disor we surrently celing up with estimten based on US

rosetten fin l tradedal Do be solestad by his in the Caribbean

area. Bash one to baro plans fen a campary sise unit and a battle

group aise unit. Mr. 011patole poes prepered to say at this time

that it was the intent ef Defense

Ar. Goodrin then was requested to give a briefing on the State

situation in regard to the Caribbean Survey Group. He began by

saying then vas no proof of Cuban infiltratione into other countries

of Latin Amesica of Cuban exportation of respons and guerrillas

and Communists fron Cube to other Latin Amerisan soantries. H

Indiestel so far we have been unable to get any evidenoe to the

effect that this was being done. Mr. Kennedy questioned Mr.

Goodwin closely on this subjeet asking way he could not find

evidence when we knew this to be a fact. Mr. Goodwin said that

everything possible was being done to turn up this evidence but

without success. Mr. Kennedy then queried him as to what kind

of people were working on this for State. Mr. ielms interceded to

say that it was questionable whether Castro was taking such action

to the extent he used to take them but that he felt this tendency

HH7

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HH

54214

to export Communian by way of ferrillas, aras, eto., had been

temporarily played in the lou key that CIA too had trouble in

turning up positive evidence singe 18 had been unable to do so

to date. Mr. Goodwin added that many allegations hal been made

against Cassto but no proof of Cuban agression had been proven

as yet. Be indicated the proof of 1t would de a distinet asset

to us at this time. He then said the US should probe harder fer

splitting the leaderahip in Cuba. Raul Castro, for examplo, 18 a

good possibility. We need a way to get next to this man. Mr.

Goodwin then said that there were overtones throughout the US that

the US was planning an avasion of Cube, that this vas detrimental

to our relationships worle-wide. Mr. 0ilpetrle and Mr. Kennedy

indiested that no matter what was being done, there would be runors

to this effeet and sush overtones would be veleed about the country,

that it was possibly becsuse we were wearing the anniversary of the

My Road operation. Mr. lookria 8s14 the Cuban Revolutionary Conel:

anarcomtative vas in Vashington and vanted reassurance that the

# Alanal dr dalo One. Mr. lookin inflested thatiay pathy sor

Cube 18 §a1A198 BORNE, Da MIllenal stomala and Argentina as

examples vhere Cabana hal seesebat a longerery gain in pablle

opinion and properande. Mr. Kanasty then shut tr. Sortiln shet-

the prospests were for the future and Ir. Coelute sald that Ca

prospeata for the next 2 er 3 years are terrible.

Mr. Goodwin infleatel that one ef the itess en temorrow's

agenda for the Special GrOUp DeRlA de discussion of trastore fer

prisoners in Cuba. Mr. Balms brougat out the fact that mesbere

of congress had been opposed to this and before anything vas dens

1a regard to spendiag US noney in lala vey, Congress must be

shecked, since they had exprossed & lesire to be brought into the

ploture before such & projeet was laid on.

Mr. Goodrin indieated that the Plat Autonotive Company had

indicated to Castro that they vould provide him with the tractors

needed for $18,000,000, no down payment, ten years to pay. So

far Castro had not accepted this offer.

Mr. 01lpatrig who left at this time, indicated that he

would be out of town from Priday, 23 March, until 1 April. Gen

IOP SECRET

HAFARN

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•IOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDINE NOFORN

Taylor would also be out of town. He indicated I should deal

with Mr. MoNamara 1f anything came up in the meantime requiring

DOD Secretary's guidance. However, he said I was free to bring

up anything tomorrow worning, 22 March, that I would like for him

were

to handle before he left. I indicated there unz several outstand-

ing pieces of business which I would like to get his approval en

and signature before he left and arranged that I would neet him

at 10000, 22 March, In his office. He indioated also he would 11loe

to have the risk paper ready to be referred to the Special drou

on 22 March. I indieated this could be done since JOS had already

approved it and it was ready for his signature and reference to

Gen Lansdale.

Mr. Ryan of USIA then presented the following Inferaation

fron that agenoy. They are inereasing the Caben coyerage 1n

radlo to 3 hours a day. lo direet jenning has yot been experience!

sal tendeney to edge in on wave lengths being used has been

natesl. Do mentiened the sefugee ahildren as being a 8ood

seed perilly, ane which we should explelt. There are

8000 anilenn bosss ill put el date in ordes to aroll the Cormiat

Indoctrination and the Mine live pleases in Ceba son. Dale

shoald be explestel. Shass codto detade beine tropened, targete

being the fast that lemmaten ls the enewy of religion. Another

1ßes 18 the fast that the Cammlate lave taken over the Bavan

HItt

54214

Anather grofeet is the leftster Situatien, which USIA 1e

pushine throuda toloriaton corerase, To. Pren aldol, that IS w1l1

le famel an er18ieisal no satter uhat she does la this area in

Laste Anaries, but vo shoall sot going with a counter-fores epare.

tien to emunter fuch (r1t1e1an. Toe US seems to bave a bails-in

restatance in latin Ameries. Poople Just naturally do not 11lc

the Us, &B far as their verbal seastion to our setions. They

sonsider the US an asgresser verbally. It 1s proper to eritieize

the US in this area. However, a sounter-force can help. Most

Latin Americans realize that the US must do something about Cuba

but their first resotion, nevertheless, will be if we do anything

about, Cuba to aritioize the US, this is the manner of the beast.

FAD SFADET

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den Lansdale indieated that we should exploit the emotional

maa1b1l1ties of the 8000 Cuban ahildren mentionel by USIA.

Follering comments sade by Mr. Robert Kennedy: The work

invelvel in the last & months has helped us to develop the problen

ve are up against in Cuba. We nor fairly well understand the

stepa ve mat take in the futuro, son of these steps ve. lo not

1 1ke but nevertheless, they are inevitable. It 18 not conesivable

at this tim to eall for invasion of US forces in Orba, herever,

this summer, fall and next year my shange all this. In this

firat phase, ve must find out the situation in Caba and maybe

tale stepe beyond that. Velmon were son and we are beeping mer.

selves inferned. We lose what ve san do, ve knon what la roguired.

It 18 sat 11k the situation was last April with regari to eur

Preparedness. The President and his chie? advisers sonsider thia

the highest priority project in the lovernment. A serious sitsa-

81en has been exiating in Cuba for several yeare and 1t will get mon

The President is most anzious ve be able to do something

abars

• 1t. Gen Lanedale's lestership in this project

has pasted forwarl. Yun are making progress, doing good work.

There is a possibility that the larila and South Bast situation

would have an impast on developments la late. No matt be ready

to exploit any shange that ocours for us. All el tale work and

effort 18

essential and the President keeps an appraisal en 18

sost on a daily basia. The Prosident 18 preparod to do whatever

has to be done, we must use our iragination. Mr. Kennady expressed

cosplete satisfaction with the Group working on the project non

with Gen Craig, Mr. Harvey and Mr. Balms. Be did not sentien

anyone else representing other departaenta. He need puah more

effort, inagination. He feels the Group is up with the Fask

he urged for us to go on and he indicatel he would be watching

us closely on a daily basie to see how we are doing and to help

us 1f neaded.

HH

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TOP SECRET SPECTAL HANDL'YE NOFORN

Gen Lanadale then asked CIA to push ahead and got firma

evidence so we can prepare to are groupe in Cuba. By this, he

meant, deteraina where the resiatance 18 and perait us to drop

supplies and equipment. Mr. Kennady then asked hon long w111 1t

be before we ean plan on dropping aras to fuerrillas and agents.

CIA replied 30 days from today. Mr. Kennedy said we need something

badly on what Cas tro 18 doing in the other Latin Amerloan countries.

this would help us sheuld one of our grews be shot down in deliver-

ng supplies to merrillas and/or agents in Cuba. If we could

rove that Castro vas exporting Communisa from Cuba as a base,

I would have moresorle sympathy on our side should we get saught

one sovert operations. Me. Kennedy also asphasized that 1t sheale

top priosity that we should be lining up crews fron Cube, making

of the Cuban airline pilota which were nou available to us.

bad been reported that some 50 per cent of former luban alFline

ste had defectod,

He wants Cuban erers set up and trained with

TCS

1111 te

woe

*tion at the earliest possible date.

^ sked Gen Craig to sake sure that ces/815

-Inded in any plans ve had for

stain that this we-

L bottom of NSC file copy Tore 88 7

HIH

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IOR SECRI SPECIAL HA

118000122

20110

ipped? santolzed

oca.

can do Chia

Cir Kitaball told = thatClA people had been

io Kay Vest to contast Ma Hallroy, sonanding there, requesting

a and als nuppert, ole, Iny Vest seat exelmiro message to

DICTATE - DOPY DO Ada 0r1881n 11 GHO 0f8100, Soth alareszeos

plied that Key West abould de nothing mt1l 18 bears fron this

ne.

Or Nitebe21 vas romested to lock 1at0 this master. Me

unt keep the CIA la ebarmelo, they had apread to dare the mattera

iko this approved hero before soing to the fiela with their

equest.

Mr, Cheever, CIA, salled ve agreed to lleress netters invelving

introverales with esch other befara e1thar Departanas - Defense

• CIA - would lolga complatata er table them at the Speelal Group

Inforzed Mn of the faet that ve had been burned on

to avoid 18 in the future by he and I discuss-

•a Dal sado a cosplains or er1tlelan

containly the best

JCS

brockets /6

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TOP SECRET SPECIA

HANDS TO

papers he had inherited wben he took over the job upon hia

wrival here. these rapers vere obviously of the type with a

shot fun blast for egalpant personnal, ate,, subaitted by CIA at

the Initial conferenos 1n carly january.

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