Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
To: EISENHOWER, JOHN S.D.
Document date: 07/18/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

Date: 08/06/95

Pade : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10044

RECORDS

SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOCUMENT

INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE : 07/18/75

PAGES

: 24

SUBJECTS

SSCIA

EISENHOWER, JOHN S.D.

: EISENHOWER, JOHN S.D.

U2

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 2

Released under the John

F. Kenned;

Assassination Record

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 53244 Date:

[R] - ITEM IS

RESTRICTED

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Ohr Anitro Statre Bruate

•NA'

ORALS CURITE INPORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctions

R561

Report of P'roceedings

INvENTONICE!

34/22

Ar-.

r..

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

-

6:

1;

Friday, July 18, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and waste turned over

to the Conmittee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

110 FIRST STREET, S. E.

H'ASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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TESTIMONY OF

John S. D. Elsenhower

EXHIBITS

NUMBER

6

Eisenhower No. 1

8

WANDI AFAUL

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Friday, July 18, 1975

1'

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

?.

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:05 p.m..

in Room S. 407, the Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman)

!:: presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Huddleston,

Tower and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, JI., Chief

Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow,

Elliot Maxwell, Michael Madigan, Frederick Baron, John Bayly,

and Elizabeth Culbreth, Professional Staff Members.

...

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The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order.

MI. Eisenhower, would you please stand

and take the

oath?

5

6

8.

Do you swear that all the testimony you will give in

this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing

¡but the truth, so help you God?

MI. Eisenhower.

I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER

Mr. Schwarz. MI. Eisenhower, I understand from your

conversations that you want to make a statement, and

as I told

you, we always go through a procedural matter

in the first

place, which is, first would you just state your full name and

address for the record.

MI. Eisenhower.

John S. D. Eisenhower, 1l1 White

House Road, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania.

MI. Schwarz. And then the second thing is, as I told

you, we always ask all our witnesses if they know that they

have a right to counsel, and so forth.

Mr. Eisenhower. I am aware of that, sir:

MI. Chairman, my opening statement or my whole statement

is first of all to say how delighted I am and how complimented

I am that you all allowed me to come here:

My motivation, of course, is that I understand that a

lot of the testimony

that is before this Committee is getting

into matters of a somewhat conjectural

nature, and perhaps

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I could throw a little bit of light and make a consideration

- .

to it.

WARDS A

PAUL

I am most appreciative to have the opportunity to come,

as I know you all are busy.

I realize that in a situation like this the only prob-

"lem that I am addressing, of course, is the possible Presiden-

• ' tial involvement in any planning, say, the latter part of 1960,

planning for the assassination of any individuals, not

only thinking in terms of heads of states or governments, but

1

any individual at all, Presidential involvement.

I realize that I would be somewhat of a suspect witness

in a case like this, being the son of the President at

that time.

:..

But I would justlike to give a couple of facts that might have

, a bearing.

The facts are that to a very lagge extent throughout

our adult years my father -- 1s that the correct terminology? -

confided in me to a very large degree. As an example,

in July of 1945, the

evening he returned from

the Pottsdar

Conference to Frankfurt, he told me about a new bomb they

had invented thatmight shorten the war but which might have

some terrible consequences, namely, the atomic bomb, which

was dropped sometime after that.

Of course, you realize that this was secret. Whether ar

was correct

in telling me things like that or not I don't

know. But it is factual.

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YOu have seen M.. Gordon Gray, you have seen General

2

Goodpaster. And when you have me as a third of the trilogy, you

will have all of the witnesses who were staff officers who had

access to the President in the latter half of 1960 on national

5

security affairs.

6

7

As such, I was told by my father of the U-2 in 1956. This

is four years before it went down. From the time of reporting

to the White House in 1958, as General Goodpaster's assistant

I was shown the flight plans of the U-2 up until the time that

the U-2 went down May 1 of 1960.

I say all this only to establish that the relationship

1: between my father and I in confidences was. very close, par-

1:" ticularly during that period. And that is my first point.

And the second is pure and simple, thatnothing -- and,

i of course, my exposure to the White House -- can be construed

!' in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowl-

7: edge of or concurrence in any

assassination plots or plans.

' I wouldn't say for one moment that there weren't plenty of

plans being dreamed up in various agencies. I was a member of

the Joint War Plans in the Army Staff, Army General Staff

we made contingency plans

for all sorts of things. Like the

:: umpire said, they ain't nothing until I call them. And to

:

the very best of my knowledge absolutely nothing came-to the

White House.

2:

And I said in a letter to Senator Schweiker when I was

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contemplating requesting this opportunity that I would trust

that I haven't gotten so blase over the years that something

like an assassination plan would have slipped my memory.

That is the end of my statement, sir.

5

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, do you have any guestions?

6

Mr. Schwarz.. Your opinion is that if your father had

7

been told about any CIA activity with respect to Mr. Castro,

and specifically with respect to Mr. Castro and the Mafia,

" that he would have told you, and that your testimony is that

j'? he did not tell you?

!:! . MI. Eisenhower. My testimony is that he did not.

1: " My conjecture, based

on the other things he has told me, is

i." that in all likelihood he would have. But that is only

:; conjecture.

Mr. Schwarz. I think when we talked on the phone you

said something further in support of that conclusion, unless

"I am mixing up something that General Goodpaster said, which

had to do with your father's attitude toward the control of

the Central Intelligence Agency after the U-2 incident.

Mr. Eisenhower.

My guess is that you got that from

General Goodpaster. But General Paster

and I - after all,

I sat as far away from him as I am from you for two and a

half years, or 27 months, going in -- either he or I went

in to see the President when we were buzzed for on those

things. So, quite logically I think that General Goodpaster's

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and my thinking might be very much the same. And, of course,

after the U-2, when you have something. like that, I think

it is only natural that you keep a little bit of a jaundiced

eye on the organization which has done this.

So we made a real point, never to let anyone, even

6

the Secretary of State, get in to see the President unless

7

one of us were there.

We were not according this privilege with Secretary

John Foster Dulles.

MI. Schwarz. In the earlier years?

MI. Eisenhower. But those are earlier years than the

:: years we are covering here.

1:

When Secretary Herter took over in the spring of

14

1959, General Goodpaster and I tried an experiment.

We

it tiptoed in behind the Secretary of State when he went into the

Oval office and we got away with it. And from that time on

we monitored everything.

I saw the document we talked about on the telephone,

I saw the document that indicated 10 minutes where the Presi-

dent was alone with Allen Dulles on the 25th of November

::.

1960. If I had not been made aware of that, or discovered

it myself going through

those same black books that you have.

if I had not been aware of that, I would have testified to thi

i. i

best of my knowledge and belief that the President never

saw Allen Dulles alone.

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MI. Schwarz. We also talked on the telephone about --

I told you the nature of the testimony, We have heard from

an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency who said that

he had no knowledge of such a meeting, but that he assumed

that Allen Dulles would have spoken to your father about the

Maila activity, and that the nature of that conversation

would have been speaking in riddles or circumlocutious form.

And I believe we discussed your opinion as to whether

9

your father would tolerate a discussion which was circumlo-

cutious. It is a confusing question, because your opinion

is that no such conversation occurred. But getting down to

1:

testing the way in which the person who has testified descrihed

irit, and the elements he has put into it, can you cast any

?.;

light on that?

MI. Eisenhower. Now, we are getting into an area of

In! conjecture in which my testimony would be suspect.

"It is very much conjecture. And I would like to point out

that if I were in the position of anybody in this type of

operation, I would certainly have assumed, rightly or wrongly,

:

that I had some sort of authority from above before I went

ahead and did such a thing. I think it is only logical

that this gentleman who was testifying would assume that he

:.:

had some

authority. That is a pretty big burden to take on

yourself. You

say, look, it was my

idea, and I just went ahi..:

and did it.

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That is one part of the conjecture.

2.

The other part of the conjecture having to do with my

father's way of doing things, I think I could say with a

certain amount of assurance that he was never cute, cute

was one thing he was not.

And being circumlocutious and

6

saying one thing and winking at you was not his way of doing

it. Something might get past him. But that is not the way

you make decisions to mount assassination plots, and

...

especially the details of it, no way.

]

MI. Schwarz. Do you have an opinion from your knowledza

i: " of your father as to how he would react to any suggestion

1:: " that the U.S. ought to employ the Mafia?

MI. Eisenhower. Well, highly negative. I would say

i: this, that his viceral reaction to the Mafia -- he didn't

care for that kind of thing.

Now, if you have to do something -- I don't know whether

that would stand in the way ornot. I have in mind -- 100k

at Darlan in November of 1941. There was nobody more

despised in the Western World than Darlan was. But Dad

had to deal with him for a short period of time in order to

::

get the French to stop fighting in North Africa.

::.

I don't think I could really contribute much to that

;::

question.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

We have been wrestling with certain language in minutes.

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And this is one minute of -- were you shown this minute?

т..=..

Mr. Eisenhower.

Yes,. sir.

MI. Schwarz.

-- of a minute of a meeting on September

2, 1960 of the National Security Council.

And you were

present in your capacity as Assistant White House Staff

6

Secretary, I think.

Mr. Eisenhower.

That is listed here, yes.

MI. Schwarz.

Now, on the 15-page of the memo there is

a discussion of Mr. Lumumba in the Congo, in fact it starts

•3.:

on the l4th page. And at the end of the first paragraph of

;:page 15 there is this language:

"Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the

!:Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not jet disposed of and

; remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of".

:.

I suppose you don't have any recollection of that meetingì

Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't have a direct recollection.

I remember in general terms that the U.s. position was very

much anti-Lumumba, there

is no question

about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Focussing on those words, do you take

the words "disposed of" as intended to mean an assassination?

Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't. And I wouldn't be too

surprised -- in other

words, I have no quarrel with this

document. This document fits in pretty much with

any recollec-

tion of the atmosphere.

Now, I would not be surprised if the words "disposed !!:

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are accurately reported, that those were the words that Mr.

Dulles used, I would not be surprised by that. But unless

It is some Freudian, I would not conjecture that the words

"disposed of" meant an assassination, if for no other reason.

than that if I had something as nasty as this to plot, I

E i wouldn't do it in front of 21 people -- I counted the number

;, present before the meeting -- and I wouldn't have quite that

+:

broad an audience if I were talking about assassinating some-

body.

r

ДАНГ

The Chairman. Any questions, Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Is it your testimony that between you

and the General that all activities of the President were

:.

monitored, that you were monitoring both phone calls and

visits and everything that went on

in the Oval office?

MI. Eisenhower.

Essentially, yes. I think I so say --

unless you could find some little exception some place, any-.

thing having to do with national security, which would

involve State, Defense, AEC, CIA primarily, USIA, anyone

from any of those departments of agencies that went into the

Oval office, either General Goodpaster or I went.

Mr. Smothers.

Let me take it a step at a time.

First of all, if there was a phone call, did you monitor

the phone call?

MI. Eisenhower. No, sir. But Mrs. Whitman did sporadica!:.

As a matter of policy, she monitored the phone calls. She

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didn't catch them all, they might have been doing something

?.

else.

PAUL

C:

MI. Smothers. That is what you mean by monitoring, she

listened to the phone calls and gave you a memorandum or

transcript?

Mr. Eisenhower.

She didn't give the transcript to me,

7

she made it for herself. And Mr. Kelley can give you more

details on this than I can. He has been looking in Abilene.

: =

She would put in the files a day's phone calls -- Cliff

Roberts called from Augusta National and he said this and.

" that. And then this might be an official thing on that, which

makes it difficult to clear the papers out of Abilene. I

would not say that her records are complete, but they were as

::complete as she could take memoranda.

The Chairman.

Did she do this pursuant to the Presi-

'' dent's instruction?

MI. Eisenhower. Oh, yes.

As a matter of fact, that

is not an unusual habit, I don't think, in government.

Mr. Smothers. I wasn't suggesting that there was

anything unusual about that or your going in to the President.

But was it your feeling that no one talked to the President

about national security until you were fully aware of the

contents of that discussion?

Mr. Eisenhower.

There would certainly be leaks in thi

system, no question about it.

For example, after the Presiden:

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got back to the second floor of the white House in the even-

ings, his telephone calls would not be monitored. So some-

body could sneak in. If somebody was going to make a plan to

assassinate somebody over the telephone at six o'clock in

6

the evening, at the cocktail hour, my conjecture is that

that is not very realistic.

Senator Huddleston. Maybe that is where this plan was

hatched.

Mr. Smothers. I assumed that maybe you didn't go to the

golf course -- or maybe you did?

MI. Eisenhower. I was there most of the time, but not

?:all. But Allen Dulles didn't go.

MI. Smothers.

Are we saying, then, that -- I am a little

i bit disturbed by the notion that if anybody did it it was

Allen Dulles, and he must have come in at a time when the

office wasn't covered I think as I understand your testimony

the gist of it is that this is not the kind

of thing that

your father would have had agreed with, and to the best of your

knowledge there was no opportunity at least for any extensive

::

consideration of this kind of option.

Mr. Eisenhower. There could have been none, extensive --

Mr. Smothers. To eliminate all would, of course,

require us to have

some control of every possible contact, ani

I don't think you are doing that, are you?

MI. Eisenhower.

We had it pretty well plugged up, but

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not perfectly, pretty well plugged up.

Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Tower?

Senator Tower. No.

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston?

6

Senator Huddleston. Just a couple of questions, Mr.

c....:

Eisenhower.

To your knowledge, did President Eisenhower ever call

• the Director of the CIA and give them specific instructions

on any subject of any operation?

Mr. Eisenhower. You say do I recall it? No.

Senator Huddleston. YOu do not recall it?

Mr. Eisenhower. No, I do not.

Senator Huddleston. Or any other person in the CIA?

MI. Eisenhower. He would have dealt only with Allen

Dulles or General Cabell. But the nature of the CIA operations

is such, or was such, that it is not the kind of thing

that the President dreams up and says, well, we will get the

CIA to do this. Maybe that is in conflict to some of the

things that have happened since then.

But I have no recollets.

tion of any time in which the President took an initiative of.

asking the CIA to do anything.

Senator Huddleston.

But you would say that it would be

inconsistent with perhaps, number one, President Eisenhower's

characterization the way he would operate, and inconsistent

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with the operational procedure that prevailed at the White

?.

House for him to directly call the CIA direct or any of the

Director's subordinates issuing any kind of an --

Mr. Elsenhower. That would be inconsistent with his

5

6

7

habits, yes. And also an operation of this size, or this

significance, I can't imagine that being done without consult-

ing with the Secretary of State, or somebody.

One thing, his philosophy, which I know quite well, was

that no man is indispensible, and so killing somebody off is

10

not going to change the situation that much?

For example, when we were on this l1 nation trip in

1:.

December of 1959, the Presidential

aircraft had to go through

1: a little 80-mile corridor between the Soviet Union and Irag.

And Iraq was extremely unfriendly at that time. And there

1:.

were some people saying, isn't it a little dangerous for you,

President, to be tightrope walking through this 80-mile

corridor?

And he said, the silliest thing in the world they could

do is knock off the President of the u.s.

He just laugher

at it. He didn't regard assassination as a feasible way of

i:

doing business, because

somebody else would step in, and

2:

maybe the fellow who has been asgassinated becomes a party.

•Senator Huddleston. Prior to the U-2 incident did the

President ever express to you

or General Goodpaster any

concern about activities of the CIA whether or not some of

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the things they did had a high risk potential or might get

the country into trouble, or might get the Presidency into

trouble?

MI. Eisenhower. No. To the best of my recollection, I

5

don't remember his saying anything like - for one thing,

6

on the U-?, he may have said something like, this thing is not

going to go on forever -- he may have, I don't know.

He did have -- and I am sure that you have all the

9

reports of the. Committee -- an intelligence monitoring committee.

Ili

or whatever you call it. I remember Mr. Leavitt was one of

the members of it. They were former public servants -- they

were sort of a advisory committee, and they met with the

17 Director of the CIA. And they had recommendations

for the im-

1: provement of CIA procedures, namely, improvement in adminis-

:: tration, because an administration outfit like that really means

i that A knows what B is

doing, which did not seem to

:: be always the case.

And I remember ver well that the Committee was critical

of the CIA operations, and the recommendations were completely

rejected by CIA --

Senator Huddleston.

Does that preface what the state

2:.

of mind or attitude was?

Mr. Eisenhower.

His attitude was that the CI could be

doing better, but MI. Dulles is so indispensible that we have

i..;

to do it that way. That has to do with the administration.

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But the administration is part of the operation.

2.

Senator Huddleston.

So he relied heavily on Mr.

Allen Dulles?

-=

MI. Eisenhower. Yes.

5

Senator Huddleston. And he had great confidence in him?

6

MI. Eisenhower. Yes.

7

Senator Huddleston. Maybe until the U-2?

8

Mr. Eisenhower. Yes, I think the U-2 was injurious to.

9

that confidence.

10

The Chairman. Any questions, Senator Schweiker?

11

Senator Schweiker. Just one, Mr. Chairman.

John, after your father left the white House --

I: we have talked about now mainly your time and his time at the

?÷

White House -- after your father left the White House, did he

ever give intimation or indication to you or to any of your

16

friends or associates about in retrospect any attempts

against either Castro or Lumumba, ever discuss it in any way

as far as assassination is concerned, now?

MI. Eisenhower. Senator, I can't recall any of those

foreign assassinations, I can't recall his ever commenting

significantly on that.

Senator Schweiker. The other question is -- that was

the general question about discussing it in any way -- he

specifically never, after he left the White House, gave any

indication to you of any of your associates that there was

2:

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WARD A

any active participation by, the White House of approval by

?

the white House of any kind of an operation?

MI. Eisenhower.

In his time, no, certainly. I vas

just trying to figure if he had any opinions when Lumumba

finally was assassinated, or anything like that. But as far

as his own activity was concerned, absolutely not.

Now, there is one meeting where he and Lord Hume did

8

some joking, if I remember. I was there. But it was

all just a big laugh - I hope somebody pushes this guy

10

off a bridge or something like that. And

as Iremember, Lord

Hume said, it so happens that we have lost the technique of

old-fashioned diplomacy. And I discount that. I was there.

I! That was during the meeting with the British Foreign Secretary.

To summarize, with all these caveats and so forth, my

3 :,

16

testimony is still pretty simple, that I feel if anything

like that had been going on, I believe, based on the other

confidences that my father had given me, that I would have

1a

known about it, and I could testify and he knew absolutely

nothing about anything.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

(A memorandum was

marked for

identification as Eisenhower

Exhibit No. 1.)

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The Chairman. The Committee will reconvene at two

o'clock for the completion of Mr. Goodwin's testimony.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.M., the Committee recessed, to

reconvene at 2:00 p.m., the same day.)

end nash

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WARD A PAUL

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Essenhour Ex No 1.

9518-75 PEsTmONY

• September 21, 1960

MIZIORANDUM

r

SUBJECT:

Discussion at the 460th Meeting

of the lintional Security Council,

Wednesday, September 21, 1960

Present at the 46Oth NSC Meeting were the President of the

States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon);

the Secrotary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of

CIvil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson).

Also present at the

Necting and participating in the Council Actions below were the

secretnry of the Treasury; the Director, Burcau of the Budget;

the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Comerce

(riems l'and 2); kr- Tou KIllefer Fer the Pest Interior (Rennett)

1 and 2); or. You Killefer for the President, Export-Import

Bank of lushington (Itens 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council op

Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3):

Also attending the Keeting were

thie Chairman,

11genoc;

the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intel-

Special Assistents to the President for liational Secu-

I'lty Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; hosistant

Secreinry of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mir. Robert Tacrurd for the

Department of State; i. Knight Melinhan, Central Intelllience Agenes;

the wilite House staff secrotary; the Assistant white louse Staff

scerciary; the axecutive secretary, NSS; and the Doyuly Executive

Secretary, ISC:

There follows a sumary of the discussion at the lecting

and the mall points taken.

1.

WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE FAST JETROLEU

TISE Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,

sume subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1900;

6011; Nemos for NSC, some subject, dated August 9 und 29, and

September 19, 1960)

Hr. Graj introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of

lir. Gray'a Eriefing Note 1s filed In the Minutee of the Recting

and another copy is attached to thig Memorundum).

At the conclusion of fir. Gray's presentation, the F'resident

snid he lind received the most glowing reporte on the prospecto

for petroleun production in Libyn.

He had been told that the

lipjan reserveo excooded even the Subara rocerves. lie aslied

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1..

r.

kept wider continuing scrutiny by all interested

depriments

and agencies to ensure that it serves

the lurposes of retarding the growth of the war

potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its

Noted that, with respect to paragraph ll of

NSO 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materiala,.

technolow and corvices ao con le unilater-

ally controlled by the United States may be laissed

not only to achieve a vorthwhile adverse impact on

the har potentini of the European Soviet Bloc, but

aldo to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially

with regard to technology and services.

NOTE:

The action in b above, as approved by the President

cubsequently. transmitted to all holders of NSS 5704/3.

S. SIGHLFICAIT WORLD DEVELOIMTS ATECTING U.S. SECURITY

+ (1)(3)

•the Congo.

to saic Lumnbr.

silasser is urging ane. vas, chana, mu Cufres to

consentrate their forces in Ioojoläville and bring pressure to

bear for the unlutenance of Lunumba as Prine Minister. 8r Dulles

remised that the bulk of the in forces now in the congo hed

Licon placed advisedly in north Equateur Provineshile the •

Acin proud a vere in the northem parter set had ane a trince 1e

Passer had asked that

a coincit" de lomiddin liopolaville.consisting of the diplomatic

representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The

WiR Libassador to the Congo had been directea, in consert with

the imbassadors of Ghena, Guinca and lurocco to attcapt to per-

sunde Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On Sep-

teater 20 Kasavubu had announced thrt he had reached no egreenent

with Lurumba but the latter had Inter displayed a piece of paper

butorting to be an agreement with Kasavuba.

Secretary Dillon reported that Lurnba had requestco a visa

für travel to lew fork as the representative of tie Congo to

1.lie Vii and had also requested & visa as an official of thc Govern-

mont of the Congo.

lie had denied both regucats for isas. How-

cier, If lumunba noted for a visa to visit the U.S. as a privto

i1Llien, to rould have difficulty 1a turning hla dow....Dullon

adard thut tlie Congo. Government declares It will arrest Lunumba

di le alleagls to leuve the country.

14.

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Mr. Dulled sald he bellered a sarrant had been issued

for the arreat of Lumunta.

Molde from Lumumon, Mobutu appears

to be the only man in the congo able to act with fliness.

roccht attemot to ascassinate Mobutu had falled:

18

aveloyment has been Mobutu's creation or a councrl of advloere,

most of thon nie graduate students.

The old ministers have

been turned out of office and their offices have been taken

over for the councll, which is intended to carry on for a temp-

orary perlod. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered

• severe blow to its prestige in the Congo.

Nowever, he had

been surpriced at the case with which the sorlets were forced

out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after

degarting from the Congo, went to Acera but he did not know

Whether they had moved on toward the USSR.

Kr. Gray asted

whether the soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary

Dillon sald the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the

soviets luve quit the Condo. Mr. Dulles said the soviet diplo-

mats indicnted. to the press before leaving

that they would be

back. Scoretary Dillon believed it uns clear that the Soviets

hnd

not given un in the Congo.

Mr. Dulles reported that the

soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly

that the Soviet

martings wilch they Ininted over the Congo markings

on their

planes vere still wet when they left. Sir. Dulles said the

Soviet ships off the African coust "ere apparently awaiting

a clurifleation of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the

eflestive. power in the Congo for the moment but Lumuaba was

not yet disposed of and remined a grave danger as 100g as

he wus not disposed of.

kir. Dulles observed that the situation in Inos was still

confising and that little progress had been made toward the

settlement of the crisis during the rast reck. The threatening

situation 1n Jun Neus Province, borever, had been quieted as

a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to thạt

The situation remins troublesone because Pathet Lao

and Vict Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem

of tie contlieting doverments in Inos is no ncarer a settle-

m':nt.: 17n: Kine hos requested that General Quane and General

Thinal call upon him.

A skirnish between luuml's forceo and

Vientine foress has been reported at fui June,

bloviched reculted.

Apparently, Mouni has adopted tactica

of chirjing on a har of nerves agrinst Viontlunc.

ligen firing acroco the fierong fiver into the elty and Phoual

airarently intends to starve out tlic covernment.

Heanubile,

15.

TUr SACHST

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