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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Uver.

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OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Current Intelligence

4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America

Since July 1963

Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America

are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent

major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and

Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when

Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely

in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevi-

tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the

hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however,

Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vi0-

lence and have emphasized other policy priorities.

Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in

Latin America remains high.

2.

.In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re-

captured much of the militant tone of his speeches

in late 1962.

He made it clear that he regards

Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance

for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin

America.

He claimed

that what has been done in

Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many

Latin American countries."

The hemisphere's mil1-

tants,

he said, must take advantage of conditions

presently favoring revolution and "open the breach."

On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial-

1sts believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution,"

the Cubans believe that before that could be accom-

plished "many other revolutions like ours will ap-

pear on the continent."

On 24 November, Che

Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the

hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is

part of our daily preoccupation."

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3.

What emerged from these and other Cuban

pronouncements was the apparent conviction of

Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu-

tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba

can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own

interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be

initiated

wherever possible and as soon as pos-

sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent

official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic

Cuban viewpoint remains the same.

Cuban leaders

continue to believe that the very presence of their

regime will inspire other Latin American revolu-

tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue

to give assistance

to these efforts.

4.

Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi-

sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since

the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a

Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example,

OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending;

despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign,

constitutional government in Venezuela was

success-

fully transferred following President Leoni's dra-

matic election victory last December; and the out-

breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to

upset constitutional processes there.

The April re-

volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over-

thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana.

These

reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that

a breathing spell is necessary.

In addition, Castro

may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary

tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This

year has been designated "the year of the economy."

This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain

needed

commercial and industrial goods from West

also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its

public expressions of support for revolution.

ver, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy

on revolution now may pay dividends after the US

elections in November.

He probably assumes that

conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his

terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the

accompanying country-by-country index shows that

Cuba has continued since the first of the year to

promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-castro

groups and individuals in Argentina,

Brazil, (be-

fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

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Guiana, and other countries.

Indeed, on at least

two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as

restating

familiar Cuban views on revolution. In

an interview published in an Italian newspaper in

March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national

liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to

violence.

He emphasized that violence would be

"necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries,

for "there is no other way." In an April interview

in Algiers, Guevara said:

"It is very, very, very,

very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin

America by employing peaceful means."

6.

A number of reliable clandestine sources

have provided information on the many facets of

Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America.

The most

serious form of subversion from Havana is its train-

ing of other Latin

Americans in the practical arts

of guerrilla warfare.

As many as 1,500 received

Such training in 1962. It is estimated that several

have a a cuban

hundred Fittee no nes, sunbatin mer fcans who

traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train-

ing. It has been learned that "scholarship students"

who go to cuba

ceive guerrilla warfare training.

ostensibly to study This instruction

"agriculture" re-

encompasses the

use and

management of communications

equipment; the techniques of

military intelligence

including methods of establishing intelligence net-

works to obtain information from peasants; training

in a variety of weapons, including rifles

and small

arms,

whích

are"readily

available in most Latin

American countries; training in explosives, and

training in guerrilla tactics,

including instruc-

tion on how to

o operate independently in the country-

side for extended periods of time.

A separate train-

ing school

reportedly trains Communist youth from

other Latin American countries.

The school's one-

year course is divided between

the study of Commu-

nist theory and practical training in political

agitation and subversive activities.

Reports from

returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de-

veloping extensive files on most Latin American

countries on subjects pertinent to the planning"

trainees

requested comments on possible air drop

zones, weather conditions, locations of military

bases, competence of local authorities, border and

frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques-

tions,

obviously designed to build up a body of basic

knowledge on gertain.

3

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7.

Latin Americans returning to their coun-

tries after having received training in Cuba often

take a round-about route to conceal the fact that

they have been in Cuba.

tinto nights to pragte.

They then go through

Europe to some other Latin American country, from

which they

enter their own.

Cuba gives these

travelers documents which show no indication that

they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare

trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments

and are given

en special training in.clandestine.com-

munications, which permits them to maintain 290p-

tact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8.

In addition, Latin Americans who receive

guerrilla warfare and other types of training in

Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass

on what they have learned.

cuba-trained men are

known to have been conducting such training in

costa Rica, "Panama, British

and else-

"Thus, the Castro-oriented

ented report on ese-

Fort in Latin America has a potential for steady

growth even if there should be a lessening in the

actual training program in Cuba.

Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba

is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central

and South American-based extremist groups.

in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene-

zuela on I November, however, has there been in-

controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such

efforts.

A good deal of the undeniably extensive

arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the

hemisphere

is basically a continuation of long-

established patterns of

arms smuggling between

nationals of the countries involved.

Cuba does

possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo

planes which are well-suited to gun-running or

air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used

In addition, Cuban leaders have

always stressed the importance of Latin American

10.

Another important aspect of Havana's ef-

forts in Latin America is centered on supporting

and guiding hemisphere front organizations.

Havana

has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

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labor organization which could serve as a platform

for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban

labor movements.

The embryonic Single Center of

Latin American

Workers (CUTAL), which held its con-

stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends

Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such

a total failure, however, that it is doubtful 1f

in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with

the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup-

port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth

Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This

conference, too, ended in near-failure.

Havana now

is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli-

larity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada 1n

July.

This proposed congress--which, however, is

being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern-

ment--would be modeled on a similar effort staged

1n Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

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ANNEX

Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year con-

firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small

extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab-

lish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina.

and Heati

Maron have been in close liaison with Cuban

agents intrata lasta, and elsewhere, garage

appears to be the principal support agent of a

group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron-

ists believed to be directed

and supported bathe

Last January, sallegg traveled to the provinces

of Jujuy and salta,

near the Bolivian border where

Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla

camps in March.

guerrillas who were arrested

in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war-

fare training in Cuba.

Among the propaganda items

found

at these camps was a book written by Jorge

Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a

director of Prensa Latina.

He is thought to be

"Commandante Segundo" and

is probably in charge

of the small guerrilla bands discovered in north-

ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL

rifles found in the bands of the guerrillas pos-

sessed the same specifications as

the i November Venezuelan arms

those found in

cache. It is be

is be=

Tieved to be 0- Cuban origen.

160Y 3

Too, Au gentares

TOL ON SINTErS

grave musces ved

pLeast.

albumes:

remove suran

Since 2960 a

196

2. Bolivia

Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been

centered

on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro

sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

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President Juan Lechin. Through its

embassy in La

Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup-

porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug-

gle with President Paz Estenssoro for political

domination of the country

wents terender, Cuban

Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government

believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat

cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups.

He said Havana was prepared to supply the required

arms.

gave

him two boxes

of

arms to be distrubuted among

the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time

were in revolt against his goverament

ornoon that the

Cuban government was willing to provate inanciat

and material support to Lechin for his campaign

to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential

elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban

agents in

early April to discuss his financial

needs and to determine what he was prepared to of-

fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist

struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth

group which

aspires to establish a terrorist organization on

the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na-

tional Liberation, was

organized last year with

the help of Mauro Garcia,

then an officer of the

Cuban embassy.

Members

of this group were caught

in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the

home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force

and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia

as a staging area fren which to send trained sub-

versives

into neighboring countires.

It is pos-

sible that

• Cuban support for guerrillas in

northern Argentina may have come across the border

from near-by Bolivia, Bolivia alse has tong deer

a favorite transit area for terrorists returning

training

in Cuba.

munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led

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police to an arms cache which was to be used

to sup-

port guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authori-

ties have uncovered and dispersed

at least three pro-

Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past

year.

161014;

SO ANANAS

imagered

3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba

was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil

providing funds,

guerrilla training, and propaganda

support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operat-

ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro,

Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's

Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel

Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-

in-law.

The former Cuban ambassador privately

described Brizola as having the best prospects for

starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The

ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao

from late 1963 until the April overthrow.

and radio activities

med to finance his expanding press

and to "buy some arms" from his

Popular Mobilization Front. Chewsame sounges reportede

2555.0

to buy arms.

In addition, a usually

reliables

Mercoura

mexico etty reports that about 10 days

before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Ma-

vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster

the Brizola forces.

Four Cuban couriers reportedly

took the money to Brazild

Cuba also maintained

a substantial propaganda

operation in Brazil, primarily through the local

office of Prensa Latina.

A Communist party member

in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that

the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba.

The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues

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had increased

to the point where they covered all

major cities; Rio alone had seven.

Similar or-

ganizations existed at the national level, such

as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National

Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also

broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also affordec Cuba an

exceLlent base Ior promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-

Cuban front groups.

The constituent congress of

the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL) --

which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera-

tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in

Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega-

tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American

Chile on

who brought a letter from the President warmly sup~

porting the conference.

Brazil was also used as

a transit area for some Latin American subversives

returning to their countries after having received

training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party

of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line,

was reported to

have directed two Cuban-trained

leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao

Paulo and Goias.

CPB members have been encouraged

by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in

Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them

direct support.

velegato cubaline

4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly

Cuban activities in British Guiana,

hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to

to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

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Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these

ships also transport arms

to British Guiana which

allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com-

munist countries,

as well as for Cuban funding of

Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex-

POrE (GIMPEX)..

Havana ordered payment @t4:300,000g

tenthemanagert of GIMPEX (inSeptember, ostensibly

for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable

source.

It is unclear, however, whether the money

was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds

in the past both to the government and to the PPp

publishing house.

Another source reports that the

publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan

for ppp salaries and expenses.

Georgetown Moth

officials believe Cuban-

trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic

violence which has occurred during the months-long

strike by the pro-jagan sugar workers union; it is

attempting to gain an official endorsement by the

Guianese

sugar industry.

senior pound official

has told the US Consul General that six or eight

Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support

for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George-

town.

Another source reports some Guianese were

receiving guerrilla training in the interior of

the country in November 1963, presumably for the

newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.

196

5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup-

port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore

Allende.

Allende is the candidate of the Communist-

dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP),

and he has a chance of being elected in the September

presidential elections. Allende has visites Cuba

Havana in January.

Havana ra Januasy. Sinite there, he was promised

financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually

reliable source

reports that Che Guevara

recently

said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri-

country to enter our camp."

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A clandestine source hahastgo enactsawith

SO ferreSt

i Cobs reported in February that

tandecen

red student said some 40 Chileans

vould soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile,?

Source said these

The

e Chileans had received political

training in Cuba and were returning with funds from

the Cuban government for Allende's presidential

campaign.

Chilean police

are reported to have identi-

fied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the

past three years as "subversives," but we have no

evidence of any organized guerrilla training of

Chilean_groups in Cuba.

eled to

6. Colombia

in Colombia Since 1960.

The

pro-Castro, Worker-

Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front

for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) --whose members are

building up the

newly activated National Liberation

Front (FLN), and

the recently organized

National

Liberation Movement have been the principal recip-

of Cuban funds.

A fairly reliable source

Colombta to evaluate the FLN and its prospects

and to pass funds for further activity.

Cuba has established some contact with bandit

gangs intesting.

monite ita

the Colombian countryside. Army

troops who are fighting the

bandits have found

Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits.

Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training

in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had

substantial success so far in directing bandit

activity for political ends.

T. Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)

continues to send members for subversive training

in Cuba.

Some of these militant returnees have

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begun training small groups of party members, but

they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-

government action. Much of the pro-Castro.acti-

been directed

against neighboring Nicaragua.'

revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc-

casion crossed into Nicaragua.

The police in-

spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re-

ported in early February that two unidentified

Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at-

tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in

support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa rican sediety for Friendship with

Peoples, a small Communist-front

group designed"

to propagandize

on behalt of the Cuban revolution

and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other

Latin American countries, is an important Havana

asset in San Jose.

8.

Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist or-

ganizations, the l4th oi June Political Group (APCO)

and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith-

ful supporters of Castro.

Havana Radio quickly

voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ

guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence

of Cuban material support for this effort. The

quick response from Radio Havana suggests, now-

ever, the existence of a communications link with

one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country.

Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican

Republic also was reflected during the transit

workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla train-

ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary

Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old

APCJ and MPD.

The immediate aim of this new or-

ganization is to promote urban terrorisn.

A ter-

rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to

have told police that this group is receiving arms

and guidance trom castro.

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9.

Ecuador

Since the 1l July 1963 military coup, the

Ecuadorean

government's careful monitoring of

anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef-

forts there.

menthos

When the junta began to exile Com-

munists and pro-Castro extremists

last call

several took up residence in Havana. &

evening on sorwa told a clandestine source

in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving

guerrilla varfare training before returning to

Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities.

Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction

of the Ecuadorean

Communist Party (PCE), is re-

portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May

to confer with Castro.

laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by

then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the

Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other

clandestine sources report Cuban aid

has been offered to supporters of former presi

cent Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being of-

fered to followers of former president Arosemena.

1581

10. El Salvador

There has

been little evidence of direct Cuban-

supported subversion in El Salvador during the

past 10 months.

The Castro government

probably

helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party

(PCES) and

its front groups to get to Cuba for

guidance and training. Havana radio, heard

clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda

line which can be echoed in locally published

Communist publications.

Havana has at least one well-trained Salvat

intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on

selected targets.

He was trained in Cuba for a

year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare

but in clandestine communications.

Like many

other

Cuban agents, he is not actually working

in Salvador but in a neighboring country, iron

which he deals

with

Salvadoran operations across

the border on direct instructions from a Cuban

intelligence officer.

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aban in

1964

11.

Guatemala

Cuba has been

giving assistance

and guidance

to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for

over two years.

While we have no firm evidence of

substantial Cuban assistance in 1963

two clandes-

Line sources reportede!

averede

newtons year and returnedt

Monicaceetnersachi

adcation,

another source reports tou

11 2300

in october by the poema tuce. exe

memade bonk ye choyledged by the

makes be Piert

a Cabarr-tratherex

hostives Mexican

victor

Marxist

Journalist

Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent

in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is

said to have urged

him to work more closely with

the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-subversive measures by the Peralta

Government have curtailed, but have by no means

eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala.

The assassination on ll April of a colonel with

special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer-

rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas

of the country.

They maintain reliable communica-

tions and contacts and have the capability to stage

damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have

traveled to Cuba in 1963.

On the basis of clandes-

tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50

traveled secretly and that these received training

lin guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.

12.

Haiti

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to

two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

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A French-language transmission is aimed at the

educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed

to the masses. The speaker has been identified

as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist

exile in Cuba.

The content of Depestre's broad-

casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier.

Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train-

ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any

such trainees have returned to Haiti.

The long-

time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals

in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for

sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so

desire.

enty-threesHarviane travered.tor Cubain

13.

Honduras

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras

appears to be directed toward support of similar

activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala.

The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an

effective internal security force, and the presence

of long-established routes for snuggling into

neighboring countries make Honduras well suited

for such

a role.

Prices

Two recent clandestine sources report the

Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of

the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef-

fective guerrilla movement.

Cuban leaders are

said

to favor the establishment of a new organiza-

tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist

groups.

The Cubans are said to have selected

Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to

begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to

best 2at0

investigate their readiness for armed action

against Honduras' military government.

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14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past

to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in

view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its

embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico.

The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico

City as well as individual Mexican nationals and

exiled Central American residents there to support

subversive activities elsewhere in Central America.

The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico

Galan are a case in point.

Havana may lind itdifficult, however, th

avoid exploiting the endemic peasant_urest which

Is increasing in northern Mexico

A clandestine

source manueded cares torter cupaempassy per

ported

to the Communts te ted

dependentchees

Ants

entra etcet --which has beet

behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul

general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban

consul there was openly preaching revolution and

distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he

had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider-

ably in recent months.

12 Mexicans -traveled ta Cuba 1n:1963;

"Cuba»fron January through April'of

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua

have been channeled principally through the National

Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo-

lutionary organization.

Most of this group's guer-

rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along

with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu-

tionary movements.

Cuban aid to the FLN takes the

form of financial support, training, and guidance,

but details are lacking regarding its current size

or effectiveness.

In August 1963, the FLN launched

an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern

Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ-

ization some of its key personnel. Since then,

the FLN has been the object of harassment by both

Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has

shown no capability to make another move soon.

-11-

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NQ FOREIGN DISSEM

raguns *are knownatoshaventraveled

16. Panama

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly

to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in

Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11

January incidents, Havana had been increasing its

pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in

starting revolutionary action.

Revolutionary

leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the

Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as

the threatened banana workers' strike in October

1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government

Planning quickened after the early

November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly

other Castro agents.

Some of the approximately

100 Panamanians believed to have received training

in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare

courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban

efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May

1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re-

ported to have provided

some funds for campaign

assistance to selected deputorial candidates of

the Radical Action Party (PAR).

Seten.RanamanLansextremistc.perm

ted to Panamal)

In late Marchatter having spent varyingapertods.

oratinentraining in Cuba

rour of these were VAN

members.

Another group of recently-returned trainees

was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking

to establish

a new revolutionary group in Panama

and to launch revolutionary activities in the near

future.

Sixty-onesPuramanfans traveled to Cuba-in 1963.

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against

Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and

training Paraguayan

exiles based for the most part

@n-Montewideoghuguay. The Paraguayan Communist

Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the

Jnited Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are

the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and

-12-

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attention, which-is-given: through- the Cuban embassy

Some FULNA members have received

guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the

Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since

mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping

two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the

program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.

Only-six-Paraguayans traveled-to-Cuba m1963

However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled

to Havana.

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for

armed revolution against the Belaunde government is

the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a

militant pro-Castro organization composed of

some

1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450

and 500 MIR members

Ing abroad

have received guerrita want-

them in cuba.

Police raids in

January and May Probably upset the MIR's timetable

for initiating anti-government action, but the move-

ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized.

It has the

potential for carrying out a subversive

campaign of

considerable disruptiveness.

Luis de

la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on

several occasions, and is on

good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of

lesser importance, but such assistance has been

limited to guerrilla training.

One such group, the

Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by

Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated

bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of

the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN)

is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba

for subversive training. Principal FLN leader

Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re-

curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past

several months and they have been behind much of

the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc-

curred there.

-13-

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noug

Peruvians axe, known. to have

poT or th-91116 traveled-to Cuba:

19.

Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo-

lutionary activity directed at subverting the

Uruguay's importance to

Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans

and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on

subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor-

ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans,

and Brazilians.

The mean embassy in Montevided

transit point For

their ultimate destination.

Uruguay also has been

useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban

propaganda for neighboring countries.

Cuban propa-

ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of

a more subtle

policy of building up Castroism among

Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.

Teast53 nuguay insanewknown -tanhave

aveledsto Cubas 1n 1963

22 traveled to Cuba

rough April ofthis

reat .

20. Venezuela

The current level of Cuban activity in Vene-

zuela is considered fairly low.

International

reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented dis-

covery of the

huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela

on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist

campaign to disrupt the December national elections,

and the presently increased capabilities of the

Venezuelan military and

security forces will prob-

ably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the

short run.

There is no reason to believe, however,

that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high

priority on Cuba's target list for subversion.

Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed

Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly

will continue, and may even increase.

The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activi-

ties, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 19b3.

The decision in late April of the central committee

of the Communist party to continue using violence

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as a political instrument probably presages a gradual

increase of terrorist incidents.

Riots in mid-May

led by Communist-dominated students took place in

Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same

time, one successful student-led robbery of a post

office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery

of the university payroll.

Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means

in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist

activities.

edit

Cubanein

"this:

-15-

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## Page 21

13-00000

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963

SEGRET

NATIONALITY

January

February

March

August

September

October November

December

1963

To From

To From

To From

To From

To From

To From

From

To From

ARGENTINA

18 27 47 34

12 21

13

14

57

12

5

6

0

4

0

37

5

3

15 ° 1

222 126

BOLIVIA

7

4

3

3

5

0

2

5

2

14

5

21

5

17

2

69 48

BRAZIL

22

13

9

18

7

10

6

25

0

24

121

2 162

0

0

219 242

BR. GUIANA

0 4

• 0

0

0

0

17

0

7

10

0

10

0

26

25

51

CHILE

31 44

26 20

13 42

20

8

14

8

20

22

47

175

70

54

18

7

355 316

COLOMBIA

54 39

7 12

13

23

5

7

15

7

29

14

17

8

14

5

1

10

4

182 122

COSTA RICA

0 29

0

8

3

12

8

0

0

1

4

1

10

0

47

56

DOM, REPUBLIC

2

6

2

0

2

8

0

3

3

74

24

ECUADOR

20

20

5

10

4

6

2

0

2

7

3

4

0

0

121

20

EL SALVADOR

2

0

5

0

0

4

4

0

3

0

0

26

GUATEMALA

30

18

5

15

2

0

0

6

3

0

2

0

3

64

23

HAITI

4

0

18

18

.0

0

0

0

0

0

23

22

HONDURAS

=

12

20

11

8

11

'0

8

0

0

7

0

50

39

JAMAICA

0

33

2

0

0

0

38

6

MEXICO

100

81

22

26

38

18

54

14

42

65

28

34

63

36

24

71

49

72

512

530

NICARAGUA

4

2

0

0

12

PANAMA

20

2

2

3

2

3

0

15

6

0

6

3

0

0

3

6

24

PARAGUAY

3

4

0

2

1

3

0

0

0

9

PERU

2

2

4

3

1

5

8

5

3

3

5

0

2

9

2

0

URUGUAY

19

16

8

8

8

5

12

17

15

10

6

3

27

- . =

2

2

33

38

13

158

130

VENEZUELA

26

9

3

9

8

0

4

0

22

0

37

0

11

10

6

0

3

0

139

35

MONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149

223

88

163 144 73 103 319 47 104 214 587 64

76 380

69

99 126 132 2430 1863

The pecky a January, July, and September rolet travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Barista and of the " 26 July" movement, and to the invernonional

8402191

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## Page 22

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NATIONALITY

ARGENTINA

BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

BR. GUIANA

CHILE

COLOMBIA

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

JANUARY

TO

FROM

9

3

1

PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA

1

14

4

11

8

0

15

13

1

I UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.

1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-

nist Youth Congress in Habana, I will attend a course at the

Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.

29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.

Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban

An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added

to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for

December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to

3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan

charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were

sent, to

Habana for 2 January celebration.

attended Architects congress

children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.

SECRET

COSTA RICA

DOM. REP.

ECUADOR

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALA

HAITI

HONDURAS

JAMAICA

MEXICO

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

PARAGUAY

PERU

SURINAM

TRINIDAD

URUGUAY :

VENEZUELA

TOTALS

SECRET

87

1

45

148

91

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13-00000

NATIONALITY

ARGENTINA

BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

BR. GUIANA

CHILE

COLOMBIA

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

JANUARY

TO

FROM

9

3

3

1

PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA

4

11

13

1

1 UNESCO delegate,

2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.

1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-

nist Youth Congress in Habana, I will attend a course at the

Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.

29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown..

Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban

Revolution.

An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added

to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for

It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to

Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.

3 to Cuba to

meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan

charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to

Habana for 2 January celebration.

1 attended Architects Congress

5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.

SECRET

COSTA RICA

DOM. REP.

ECUADOR

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALA

HAITI

HONDURAS

JAMAICA

MEXICO

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

PARAGUAY

PERU

SURINAM

TRINIDAD

URUGUAY •

VENEZUELA

TOTALS

8

0

SECRET

87

1

45

1

1

148

91

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964

NATIONALITY

ARGENTINA

SECRET

BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

BR. GUIANA

CHILE

COLOMBIA

COSTA RICA

DOM. REP.

ECUADOR

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALÃ

HAITI

HONDURAS

JAMAICA

MEXICO

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

PARAGUAY

PERU

SURINAM

TRINIDAD

URUGUAY

VENEZUELA

TOTALS

32

14

IT

130

MARCH-APRIL

TO

FROM

11

10

8

2

14

7

3

cler

2

2

37

3

2

8

PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA

I- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party

leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO

delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban

Construction Ministry.

3- Attending May Day Celebration.

I- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-

Returning are members of delegation

from

School

of Economy of University of Chile.

I- En route to East Germany.

2- In attempt to

obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.

4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.

2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning

from military training in Cuba.

SEGRET

24

1

4

3- Attending May Day Celebrations:

3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action

121

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