PROJECT AND 21 FILES.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
To: MEMO FOR THE RECORD
Document date: 12/1/64
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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T104-10308-101971

SECRET

Job #

File #

Volumes:

Project File #

76-485/10 (4 folders

(Feb 61 - Dec 64)

23

201-009239 (14 folde:

(June 47 - Dec 64)

18 reviewed

23

{68-6-147

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PLSISTEEL-1 (Formerly AMANVIL-], AMELOCK-JJ and (INDEVOUT-33

Project and 201 Files

1. Description:

• .

HANDLE WITH UTMOST CARE.

2. Findings:

a. IDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 Oct 1962 filed 6876-147/14

Minister MOLYAKOV told a Bloc diplomat that he thought

the U.S. action /missile crisis/ was an "election affair;

President Kennedy discovered that his popularity had dropped and

undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again."

20-14357 (OUT 53779) 25 Oct 1962 F1200/6876-17/4

MOLYAKOV commented that the USSR would not let the

American move go without retaliation. That with this measure he

President Kennedy/ had become the "man of the nation" again, anc

the nation was in a state of hysteria behind him

c.

TA376 (OUT 53800) 27 Oct 62 filed 20129250}

At a dinner party on 25 Oct 62 in Geneva attended by

orbit officials, MOLYAKOV reportedly stated that KHRUSHCHEV was

pao star autor he one to given a ton on that, vo control

situation.

"Is

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d.

26-41

4470 (OUT 53909) 19 Nov 62 TDCSDB 2/652, 244)

mul 6856-147/4

SUSTEEL-L reported the tollowing on the probable

reaction of Fidel CASTRO and his principal associates to the

Soviet withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and to U.S.

demands re the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 aircraft and on-spot

inspection:

Source said that CASTRO's vanity was immense and no

matter how it had been explained to him by MIKOYAN or other Soviet

ofticials, he must have been furious at the tact that the soviet

Union had

That becked cons boore

"backed down" before the U.S. and was negotiating with

the U.S. on an independent basis. CASTRO must have considered

himself as being in a desperate situation.

Source said that

CASTRO was dominated by vanity, had megalomaniacal tendencies, and

possessed a compulsion for revenge which was notorious; on occasion

his compulsion caused him to reach back as far as twenty years to

revenge actions taken against him at that time. Source added that

in the current situation CASTRO was fully capable of undertaking

U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba.

e.

5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 63 (TDCSDB 3/653,939)

F1lesL6876-147/4

At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO

haranged a Soviet commander about the "impossibility"' of permitting

U.S. planes to photograph Cuba.

The Soviet succumbed to CASTRO's

persuasiveness and took action which resulted in shooting down a

U-2 plane. The Soviet command was furious and the Soviet officer

was ieturned to the USSR under arrest.

20-11

23

6022 (IN 79271) 12 Dec 63 Filed 6856-147/3

Report that there was no speculation among orbit

r Soviet officials re implications of Johnson's accession

here was a special alert status ordered for Cuban Mission

as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. The alert

was still in effect 9 December 1963.

28-1

g.

6029 (OUT 65853) 12 Dec 63 (TDCSDB 3/658,469)

Fileds 6876-14774

23

of President Kennedy, Cuban dip missions abroad began to receive

a series of messages placing them on a special alert status

l'hese messages were obviously due to apprehension by the Cuba

Government that the circumstances surrounding the assassination

of President Kennedy might lead to hostile activity directed

against the missions. They were instructed among other things, to

9/R0

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be certain that there were "no compromising documents on the

premises."

20-10

23

h.

3313 (IN 30483) 2 March 1964 Filed 201/92393

[INDEVOUT-3 reported at 29 February meeting that

CASTRO was concerned that Johnson would not follow Kennedy's course

which might have lead to negotiations. KHRUSHCHEV was convinced

that CASTRO's Caribbean P-ace must be strengthened.

/COMMENT: Ref. IG Memo dated 25 April 1967 SECRET

.....ia.

Tad SZULC allegedly had access to Hurwitch, both President anc

Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy. Could he have

learned or heard of the plot and let the word out? McCone recalled

that do that on are so ta season at ta 10 up stay

Attachments: 8

Researcher: KGB

LAD/JFK Task Force

3/RJ

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