## Page 1

Date

Page

: 06/25/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10180

68

Released under the John

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note).

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC

FROM

: GORDON CHASE

TO

TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 12/19/63-10:55

AM

DATE: 12/27/63

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS

: CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO. JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQURES CONCURRENCE OF

CIA

DATE:

MAR

2016

RI - ITEM IS

RESTRICTED

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECR

December 27, 1963

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M.

SUBJECT: Cuba

Others Present:

Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy

Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin;

John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary

Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon: Acting

Director General Carter; Richard Helms#

gerald Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy:

William Moyers; George Reedy; Gordon Chase.

The primary puzpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about

some of the basic Cubar issues. Essentially, the discussion described where

we have been since Jaruary, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go.

(An outlinc, which was prepared for the discussion is attached.)

1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by

and a general discussion or Cise presco save

Ind on the U.S.

Government's economic demal program. Essentially, this part of the dis-

cussion covered 6 areas.

Piezeerald described covert intelligence activities dined d

RESCEONE TRA SANDEL

including the numbers, characteristies, and geo-

raphic spread of CIA assets within Cuba

0-MOLE CORONES

described Cla-controlled radio programs and other

Dropagaada media directed 2l Cuba which haverbeen uscario encourage-tow

risk, simple sabotage and orber forms of active and passive resistance, and.

to stimulate tension chin the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloe,

he noted thornecess

crease of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba

(c) Me. Fiz gazuld said that CLA has workod with Statc and othor agencies

deny to Cuba contradities trom the Erec World waid are critiest to the.

Conomy These sulethave been mixed. For example, while we nave been able

openetrato corin feropoan Cums which deal win Cuba.

equipment vitally necded in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via

Canada and Great Britain.

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The group agreed that this is not an casy problem; Mr. Ball said that our

allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have

always had a diffcrent view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had.

Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our cfforts and that

there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could

consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Author-

ization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry

commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program.

Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items

would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on

December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World gov-

ernments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a

detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities in-

volved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his

forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson.

Lagg=ala spoke about ClAls program to identily, seek out, and

blish contact with potentially dissident son-Communist elements in the

powes centers of the regime with a view to stimulating as interal coup which

would distodge Castro, Our effost is based on the premise that a popular up-

Pising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling

Fan uprising Instead, ve are trying to penetrate the Cuban regimels

to this regend, we have had only limited success.

On the

no hend, we have been able to male an important penetration in the Cuben

Tray-On tile other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to ad are not

co willing to act together.

Tasy simply don't trust ee ch other mataly becaus

Stones seen successful

PERA

penetrating dissident groups

The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba:

perore some be but these le no mational move 96209

nich we can bulle. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suf-

fer heavy losses at Castro's hands.

(e)

Ma Ellagere tsaid that ClA has directed four small scale, externally

ounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resistance and

on a major targot --the Matanzas power Plant) Mr. Fitzgerald noted that this

would have a sigrifican: favorable impact, psychologically as well as econom-

estly: the dissidents would view the attack as evidenco thatine Johnson Admin

istration is not giving up the light for Cuba.

TOP SEE

MATT

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FOR SE

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=3=

(3)(3) pedacted

ut there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First.

the

, no one caught) are less thar

50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are

only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will

undoubtedly admit their CLA connection. (General Carter believed this point

was weak

we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third,

such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise level. In this

regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro,

Presently under

strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able.

to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might

slow up the withdraval of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fith, Ambassador Thompson

said that the timing seemed bad -- the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation

where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba!

of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big

Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more

Sovict aid.

General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want

to ty to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there

have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out

that an ais strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights.

In response to a question, Secretary Nance ndicated that he was in favor of an

attack on Matanzas.

It was decided that there will be no air of ground attack on the Matanzas power

plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and be-

cause of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low-

risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the plaru.ing necessary to

develop an air strike capability.

(1) Mr. Fitzgeraid described CLA's program in aiding to autonomous

Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group,

which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and

Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is some-

what to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both

of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send

teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dis-

sidents Mr. Fitzgerald added that there are some disadvantages in these oper -

ation -- the groups aren't trained by CLA and they operate outside of CIA control.

But chere are advantages too -- they operate from outside United States territory

and we will have sclatively little trouble denying U,S. association with the

* troupe

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Bundly noted, and S

aesold ayrsed, that these groups operate a

pao distancs ewes from the target:

we canteL expect too much affect from

here taids

2.

Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current

Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CLA situation brief.)

(a) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength on the island, Mr.

Bundy noted that one of our primary objcctives is to ensure that there is no

reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and,

sg

far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added

that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about

mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the

Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals

are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly.

(b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to

the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American

countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel

between Letin America and Cuba are also important.

(c) M=. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal

contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's

part and we aze essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are

prepared to listen to waat Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S. /

Cuban contacts could tave an unsettling effect on Soviet/ Cuban relations.

3.

Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we

can take in the future to make life difficult? » Castro.

(a) 3420

attacks, usleaching of exales (allowing thera to use

3 base for attacks on Cupa), and low level flighis are aggressive type acts

which have distinct avantages but which are similar in that they all tend to

raise the noise-level, Low level flights, for example, would provide us with

more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they

could precipitate the sbooting down of a te

(b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures

-- e-g. close ports and deny U.S. -financed commodities to lines engaged in

Frce World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through

pest experience that bilatoral measures are more effective in reducing Free

World shipping to Cuba. At the säme time, we should not deceive ourselves.

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We should recognize that the Soviets arc capable of handling all Cuba's

shipping needs even if we are able to climinate Free World shipping to Cuba.

(c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in

the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past. He noted

that in his November 18 speech, President Kennedy made two points about Cuba

-- the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to

revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in

the Hemisphere.

(d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against

Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target.

NOTE: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion

about the exiles in Florida. Mi. Crinmins said that resettlement remains our

basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettle-

meat is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time.

5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of

the discovery in Verezuela of the Cuban arms cache.

(a) Mr. Heims gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms

cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas.

(b) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms

cache.

The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba.

The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be

able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report

should be ready by about January 10.

(6) Mi. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS

as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the

surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices -- we may want

to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the

bigh seas; this implies the possible use of force.

Or we can push for a system

involving the search and seizure of Cuban véssels in territorial waters; this

evades the issue of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know

how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We

have put out feclers.

6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans

who wish to go to Cuba. Mi. Ball noted that a great number of students want to

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go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department

recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably

be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be

embarrassing. M.. Ball addcd that the State Department is tentatively opposed

to lifting the travel restrictions bocause of the effect it will have on Latin

American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose

restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will

be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the

Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.

Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel

restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution.

Gordon Chase

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