DIEM REPORT (REPORT ON CIA AND U.S. GOVT INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAMESE GENERALS' COUP FO 1 NOVEMBER 1963
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 05/31/1967
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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TABLE OF COMICITS

Foreword

Positibes où progizent people 1a late 1953

The sat-gOverseat Ilots begin

Attacks on pagodas; imposition o2 martial law

Discussion of. Us response. to pagoda. raids

Corein reeting with General Don'

CIA guidance on State telegram re alternative leadership . .

Ricarison's personal views re alterrate leadership

Ear-1=9a Lafors ilas of the substance of Deptel 243

Deptei 243: guidance to Lodge on Improving or replacing regine

Hilstan comment supplorentina Deptel 243 . ....

......

Marguerive Figgins on Deptel 243

Egs joints out danger posed bj Deptel 243; directs CIA support . .

Gen. Kegas requests assurances of U.S. support

Initiai entassy merling to discuss Deptel 243

Lodge presents his credentlals to Dien

Second rougits on authorizations given Lodge in Deptel 243

Saigon reports instructions given CIA offiers seeing the generals

Results of CIA approaches to the generals

More second skoughts on Deptel 213

...

Loise and daridas are ashed for a lnteris appraisal of prospects.

COS believes situation has reached polat of no return

Continuing consern over poor prospects for success of coup •

Taylor cabies Harkias. re Washington's second thoughts

Taylor's cable to Farkins causes Richarison to change scenario .

Steps to be taken to get the coup back on the track

Discussion of where coug plannirg went astray

General Farklas' meeting with General Khien

Discussion of ways in wich ve migat live with Diem regine .

Colby's suntary of differing positions taken

Richardson reports collapse of coup plot in late August

Richardson's damage' assessment report

Press reports of CIA coup plotting . :

......

Further discussion of ays of vorkingilth Dien regine

Press reports of CIA: support of Col: Tung's Special Forces .

David Bell varns of aid cuts

President cenles chaige that CIA rakes its own policy

Richardson's views on prospects for Irmediate future

Krulak * Menderhall reports; opulaisa vs. pessimisa

Bundy stresses reed to unify iS governuent posture

Disagreeuents among country teas rembers

...

Lodge estirates situation vorsening rapidly; urges sanctions

Discussion of steps necessary before decidirg to cut aid . . ...

State begins to see zo alternative to working visa. Dies

Sheldon's view on Vietzan; Lodge still pursuing coup effort

SEEK

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5

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10

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13

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a-D0 CMY

Press Incorts of dissensica in US miasion & CiA siation

= ...

Ricberason's Viais oa

used to dork te

Diom regise

DDP corrersation rita jere Saith re possible Bicardion Caster .

Lodge canges busitlon; agrees aust core din Dies regire

DCI saltes Lodge trat Lenscale not asceptable as CoS ..

DCI briefing on ClA Subcomittee of jsusa Armed Services

Malazar-Taylor repos:

can withdrer troops by end of 1955

Lodge confims his desire that Richardson be replaced

Riczardson deraits .

Discussion oi guidance cased on !cilazara-Taylor. report:

Gen. mino requests assurances te US position o1 coup airera i..

Dave Suits recamends we sot oppose senerals'assessication plan

McCore instructs Smith to vitadras recomendation

Sula coatims se had doze so

.=..

Guidaace to Lodge; suspension of ADD pisject Ica=s

President approves polley of no active encouragement of coup ...

UN fact-linding nission on repression of Buddhists

President comments

on Riccardson transfer; CIA foliors guidance.

Modiiisation oi pollay of so coup encouragement

Aabessador's instructicas re CIA contacis visa gazerals

DCI brieflag of Serate Foreiga Pelations ComitJee

The gererals' plan for a coup in the sees foliorag Cet 25

Budget Bureau Officer reports Lodge charges agairsi CIA

....

Follow-up neetlags setieen Coseir and Cer. Don, 2÷ 0c: .

.... .

Burdy reserations over sazdiina o contacts dim genera

Lodge reports CIA punctilious in carryinz out sis instructions ..

Coup plotting; U'S govement policy; DCI's viers

Lodge confirms Cozein's sora fides to. Gen. Don...

Last Conein/ Dos secting belore the coup vas la:ased

Lodge gires his viers os current coup plottira (39 0ct)

Discussion of chances of success of the planned coup

Bundj-to-Lodge cable giries detailed guidance ne coup posive

Lodge says we bave no pover to delay or discourage a coup

The White House rejects Lodge's views

...

• Lodge thanks washington for

"sagacious instruction"

Coup begins; Conein goes to JGS Egs; saies morey dith his ..

CRITIC reportina on coup identifies Cosein by esse

The assassination

Recap

SENNET-DIES ONLY

Pare

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31 Bạy 1957

FOREGORD

Ibis account of CLA and U.S. Covercent Involverent in the

Vietnarese gecerals' coup of 1 November 1963 1s dravn fros

docuzentary sources. Not all of the docurents simarized or

quoted bear directly on toe coup itiell.. We included sore togt

nay seen irrelevant, because they illustnate the atmosphere in

which U.S. Gover-ent polloy decisions were resched

we Interviewed auly itree people in the course of this

Inguiry: Williar Colby, Caler of FE Division at the time (and now);

Jobs Richardsos, Chief of Station during the coup plotting uf

August 1963; ard David Salth, Actlaz Chief Of Station at the time

of the coup/assassination of November 1963.. Each assured us that

he knew of no CIA assassination scheves against Dies--otber than

the role played by CIA 1n mintaining contacts, by direction, with

the Vietnamese generals.

Many of the documents upon which this report is based are

classified TOP SECRET. Since the report is being delivered

personally and in only one copy, de have chosen not to subject

it to the external accountability coatrols that are entailed in

a TOP SECPET classificatioa.

On the following page is a list of U.S. Goverent officials

whose names are pentired in the report, togetzer with toe positions

they held at the tine.

= 1

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John F. Kensedy

Lyndon B. Johason

Mcfeorge Buady

Dean Rusk

George W. Ball

W. Averell Earrinan

Roger

Joseph A. Mendeniali

Frederick E. Holting

Fenry Cabot Lodge

William C. Truehart

Robert McNasara

Rossell Gilpatric

Gen. Maxwell Taylor

Gen. Victor Krulak

Ade. Harry D. Felt

Cen. Paul D. Barkins

Gen. Richard G.. Weede

John McCone

Cen. Marshall Carter

Richard Helms

.,.:

John Richardson

David R. Salth

William Colby

Tre Presiie=t

Vice Presicer

Special Assistant to me Presizen: fOr

National Security Affairs

Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State for Political

Aflalrs

Assistant Secretary of State for Far

Eastern Affai=s

UN Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

Ambassador (left Saigon 16 August 1963).

Ambassador (arT. Saigen 23 August 1963)

DCA

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Chairan, Joiat Chiefs of Stafi

Counterinsurgency Specialist, ICS

1002444?.

CINCPAC

Camarder, HACY

Chie? of Staff, MACY

Director of Central Intelligence

DDCI

Deputy Director for Plans

CIA Caief of Station until 5 October 1953

CIA Acting COS after 5 October 1953

Chief, FE Division

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The successful coup agalnst the Dien regise in South Vietnas,

wnich resulted in the deaths of lgo Dinh Dies and his brother, Iu,

begaa on 1 fovesiser 1953 at 1315 hours, Saigon tiee (0015 kours,

Washington tire).

This report on CIA and U.S. Government isvolvement in the coup,

consists of a carcrological listing of event:, actions, and

deliberations baving to do with Vietnam. The report 1s dram

entirely the documentary sources, either by quoting selectively

or by sumarizirg. Significant overt happentags having bearing on

official actions are incluled In the chroncilot. Facts on fle,

& weekly digest of world news, was used as the source for these

historical everts.. Also Included are a few excerpts from Marguerite

Higgins' book Our Vletnam Ilghtnere* to demonstrate the extent to

shich some once-classifled irforuation is now comon knowledge...

All dates are in 19ó3.

8 May

Riots erupted in Hue.

1O JULY

SNIE 53-2-63: "The Situation in South Vietnan"

"Il-as 1s likelj--Dien mails to carry out truly and prouptly

**

*parquertte ligatas, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York: Harper & Row, 1955)

SEB47-253

120 29

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the coonitent he. cus rade to the Budlaits, disoners ill probaoly

flare ugain and the chances of a coup or assassination attespis

agalast him will beccae even better. .... . He do not thini

the Communists: vould recessarily profit 1i he "ere overthrom by sose.

combination of his non-Comunist opporents.

A ron-Commurist successor

regice might be initially less effective against the Viet Cozz, but,

given continued support from the US, could provide reasonably effective

leadership for the governsent and the war effort."

14 Auzust

CurTent Intalligence Memorandum (OCI No. 2339/63): "Coun

Pimors in South Vietray"

.. • The coup reports ard rumors which have arisen since

the Puddhist crisis seem to reflect some serous coup plotting,

but we have no fian evidence of advanued planning by any group to-

21 August

South Vietnamese troops and police attackeu and occupied Buddhist

pagodas throughout the country.: Dien imposed ration-wide martial la

Presidestial Meeting on Vietzam. CIA participants: DCI, DDP, &

C/FE. Record by C/FE.

'Mr. Ball recoumended that ve continue to provide asylus for the

two bonses Buddhist wonks until lodge arrives and reviews the matter.

It was agreed that official channels should not ke made available for

transuitting press dispatches by Auerican reporters in Saigon. On the

matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was polrted out

that there was no indication that Dien was not in full control.

2

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21 August (continued)

'Current Intellizence Vesorandum (OCT To. 2341/63): "Coup Rusors

Sout: dierra

"Additional reports o? plotting against the Diem goveresent

have been received.

While there is no hard evidence of firent

action, the Bidditst Issue contlaues to make the situation dargerous."

Salgon Station's Chrozolozy Of August 1963 Coup Actirties

At a neeting betreen Coneln lan officer of the CIA Saigon Station/

and General Don, the latter asked for US Goverment assuraases of

support for moves against the Dien regire.

2 August

CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334)

"'Ref Dept, telegram in process. Reftel (which Igs. not get seen)

Btates basic line to be taken and directs it be pushed at all levels.

Hilsman reguested Egs. send carpanion telegram to station pola-ing"

out that this is one technique to bring about surfacing of here and

who real pover 15. Pressing this line can maximize possibility of

obtaining US objective. Even 11 1t does not succeed, 1t can

substantially assist in identifIcation of alternate or successor

leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, to facor-

•porate in our overall contingency planning and serve as focus of

buildup program. Egs. vill coment in further detail after seeing

message, 1f necessary, but passes above at Hilan's request.".

CIA cable from Saigoa (SAIG 0208)

Chief of Station Job Ricardson forwards his personal vlevs re

alternate leaderscip:

• Recent events have made us jeel

that hope for civilian goverment to replace Dien adninist ailo is

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unrealistic. Ta solution seess even more Isprobable than ever before.

Kould appear that ve saali tave citber Dien or nilitary junta.

View time factor have not coordinated this nessage with embassy but

we have exchanged viers fully on subject satter."

2: August

Telephone call face Ramiran to DD/P. Record by DD/P.

Mr. Harrinan called lº. Helms just cefore 2000 hours and

-t2243

outlined

to bim the substance of voat eventually tured out to be

Deptel 243 to Saigon.

To Feins query, ilarrizan confirmed that the

thrust of the telegran contaised an isplicit puil out of Acerican

forces and support if the laus' were not ousted. Harmiran said that

the message had bees cleared "with Hyannisport," itin the Secretary

of State, and vich ir. Gilpatric.

State telegram to Saigon (Deptel 2÷3)

The Departent Informs the Ambassador that the US goverment

cannot tolerate

a situation 1a inich pover lies 1a ru's hands. If

Diem 1s unwilling to rid himself of Hou, then Dien binself may have to

8O. The Ambassador is euthorized: (1) to inforn the GVIV that actions

against Buddhists must de redressed; (2) to tell ley milltary leaders

that the USG cannot support a Dien regire that includes the Nu's and

that "we will give then direct support in any interim period of breakdown

central governent rechanion;" (3) to make statenents in

Saigon removing

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the bilitary taint on the pagoda raids. The telegra includes tre

following statesent:

"Te Ancassador and country team shoud mazently examiea

possible a remaste leacercaip and sake detatled plans as to roa

ve migas bries about Diez's placement a bels Should Bescae

necessari

You will understand that we Canast Iroy Nesbingion

give you detailed instructions as to hou this operation scould

proceed, but you will also kaow we will cacs you to the hilt

on actions you take to achieve our objectlves."

25 August

Cable from Illsan to ludge (personal) sent via CIA charcels

(DIR 63555)

"State cable sent separately represento agonizing at higiest

Course, outlined is dangerous but all agree that delayiaz

clear cut US stard is even more dangerous. It won't be easy i0r

you, but be assured ie will back you all the way."

(Carment: This is a good point at which to break the

narrative and Insert a serles of excerpts fron Marguerite Higgins'

book:

"The crucel act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy,

opened with a cable.

It was dispatched to Saigon late In the

evening of August 24, 1903, a date made more significant because

It was a Saturday. Wasaington usually empties on summer weekends

or lapses into a somolent bood as officials desperately sees

relaxation.

"'The te ran contaired spectacular new instructions for the

U.S. embassy in Saigon.

It was drawn up at a meeting calied bj

Under-secretary Of Staie Averell Harriman and Roger Hiltez,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs and bead of

the Vietnen task force.

The President's senior advisers sere, for

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90. 3-23 CH

the most fart, out di tom. Dia Deracior Jols MeCona 1as la

+0393732 3077 03 493

• the cable proved historic. For the first time it

save the signal to 'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flaszed

= Green 11521 for the coup agalast Plen lastian the vera als had

Fee: talking or 50 Baby jears.

the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of tbe

previous philosopay of oze war at a time.

It envisaged toe

generals' saiing var on treir cir goverrment, and vito ire

isplicit blessing of the United States.

"The substance of the cable was that the U.S. embassy ras to

rake an effor to persuade Dien to fire his brother, release

the Ruddnist rebels, end press censorship, and restore otcer

democratic liberties suspended under cartial lar.

And 11, as the

cable anticipated, Dien would not do these things, then the

encassy was to contact uce Vietreese generals and tell tron trat

me united states would ao longer stand in the way of a ravolt.

... the controversial August 24. cable was dispatched

fras Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically sumarized

to President Kennedy at the sunce= White Eouse at Hyannis Port.

"The acting Secretary of Defense, Rosell Gilpatric •

had the cable described to him over the telephone.

Mr. Gilpatric

saj's he was frankly surprised teet such an important set of

instructions sould be rusbed out on a weekend. But he did not

feel that ie ought to veto the telegran since . . . it had the

'approval of the President.'

"In McCone's absence, the cable was described, azala

cryptically,

to Ricnari Felms,

dejuty director of the CIA,

uno also did not feel disposed to rato somethirg "approved by

the President. '"

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25 August (contiauce)

VU CIA Cable tO SaLSOR (DIR 63355)

"FII CIA not consulted re cable being sent separetely, which

horever cleared at highest levels.

In circustances believe CIA

must fully accept directives o policy maters and sees ways accomplish.

objectives they seet. While have not seen exact text, understand

1t invites Lodge fical juagueat. .

• Langer in present course

of action appears to be taroring avay bind in and before ve adequately

identified birds in bush,

Or 500g5 wey say sing. Taus suggest a

negl search for courses of sotion whice sight retain opions in our

hands at same time as taking positive stard rather than waiting for

situation to clarify (at untch polat de probably mable to afject 1t.)

This bolls dom to seeistas sore middle ground for at least interim

period. . . ...

CLA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291)

Chief of Station Richardson reports that Geceral Khanh requested

an Innediate neeting with Spera Lan officer of the CIA Saigon Station.

At the meeting Khanh requested essurances that tire U.S. Government

would support the Vietranese aray 1P 1t should nove against the Dien

Regime.

CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296)

Richardson reports the results of a conference among Ambassador

Lodge, ICM Truehart, Cereral Farrins, General Weede, end Richardson.

The group agreed that giring dian an option rad no chance of success.

They accepted Deptel 243 Loi 2 August] as a basic decision tron

Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions.

-T-

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Richardson gives headquarters his views of possiole successor

regimes.

25 August

ONE Stef? Mamorandy, 1o. 60-03, Internal O'S Working Paper,

• Cia Distribution Caly

"On balance,

we beliave the best hope for the preservation i US

Interests and aütainment of US objectives in South Vietnan lies 1a tze

possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Communist rationalists with

sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war.

group might not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might

eventually prove no better than the present regime. Such a development

would, bowever, enable the US and anti-Cormunist rationalist clesents

to make a iresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors

of past years, montas, and weess.

In such 3 tresh start, re belleve,

Les the only viable hope for the attainment of US interests and

objectives in Souta Vietran."

Ambassador Lodge presented his credentials to South Vietnarese

President Ngo Dinh Diem.

26 hug'

Presidential Meeting 07 Vietnam. CIA participants: DDCI & DDP.

Record or DD?.

The question was raised as to whether there had been such a

significant change in the Vietnam situation that it really appeared

desirable to dimp the Inu's and possibly Diem himself. Principal

points discussed ere: Admiral Felt's concern over the dangers

Inherent in the surrent US action in South Vietnan; the fact that

Lodge had not seen Dien to discuss the future role of the Mu's;

a 8

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the reaning of the phrase "give direct support to silitary co: anders"

In Deptel 243; he question of succession; and what would happen 1f the

action teen over the weekend failed.

The resident asked for anothe

session on August 27 with participants to present biographic data on

key SWN personalities and a contingercy plan for tze succession.

CIA cable from Saigos (SAIG 030%)

Richardson reports that the Ambassador decided that the Averican

official hand should not show in the operation. It was agreed that Conein

would see Khien and that Spera could see Khanh. Corein and Spera were

directed to convey the substance of Deptel 243, plus this comment:

"We cannot be of any help during initiai action or assuming power of

state.

Entirely their own ection, win or lose."

CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0330)

Richarison reports the results of the Conein/Spera approaches

to the generals. In essence, khanh said he was not yet ready, and khie

said he would have to check with Mine

27 August

Presidential Meeting ca Vietnan. CIA participats:

DOCI, DEP, &

C/TE. Record by c/s.

The President stated that a coup should not be etterpted unless it

would be successful and asked whether we could turn back at this point.

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The President asked that the jagment of lodge zad Farcina be souzat

or the prospects for victory or defeat

of a coup. A cable was drafted

esking if they still agreed with treir concurrences to Deptel 243.

state telezan to Salgoa (Deptel 355)

"Exasiration oi reports to date gives considerable hope but

leaves unanswered questions.

•. • Proceeding from the concept

outlined in Deptel 243 do zodified, nor desire your proupt interi=

appraisal of present prospects. .

favor beeration as minantly planed bil ceneralar ja visa to 8i7e

you all possible support in best available course but not lo insist on

any decision that developiag ertdence cakes it wise to podisy."

23 August

CLA Cable from Salgon (SAIG 0353)

Richardson reports that:

"Situation here has rescied point of

no return.

... . Unless the generals are neutralized before being

able to launch their operations, ve believe they will act and that

they have good chance to win. . . ... Tie all -derstad that the

cust be mot succeed ard that whatever neede te a cRes a fit part

must be done.

Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants:

C/FE.

DOCI, DTP, &

Recozi by C/FE.

The President inquired into the status of EZE plars ad was told

that these vere all worked cut. State Departzent participasts

insisted that Dion and Ithu had betrayed and double-crossed us and we

had no obligations to them and that we cannot in with Dies and It.

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Tre President concented thet we had been wizzing until Augist. Holting

expressed his conviction that Dien is the caly zan who cas run South

• Vietnam in any fashion to peralt a contimance of the war effort. He

believed

we should make another try to keep Diem. Harrinan directly

disagreed with him. The President directed that a telegran be prepared

to sena

to Lodge and Harkins astlag thelr vier of the chances of success,

expressing concera over the unfavorable ratio of forces, and inviting

their suggestions

&S

to how we could increase their possibilities.

The President called for another meting later in the dess

NSC Executive Comittee Meeting On Vietnaz. CIA Earlelpants not

identitied.

Record by DDP:

The President set privately with Rust, Keliamara, Taylor and

MeGeorge Bindy.

He reported to the rest of the Cormittee merel; that

three telegrams were being sent to Saigon: a personal nessage to

Lodge from the President, a general message from the Department to the

Ambassador, and a telegren fron Taylor to Harkins.

Telegram fron Taylor to Harkins (JCS 3359-63)

"Important Waite House meeting on subject scheduled for 1200

28 August EDI, your views urgently needed on overall feasibility of

operation contemplated. . • :. • EXI State to Seigon 243 was precared

without DOD or JCS participation.

Aurorities are now heideg secord

thy outs

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29 fugust

Salon Stetson's chresology of dugust 1953 coup neti-ties

"At 0745 hours, Richardson, Spera and Conein, latter tao of

Whoa were scaeduled

to contact Generals Minh and Khien at 0615 same

noming, were shom a ressage iron Ceneral Taylor to Generai Parkins stating

aspects of Vietnan situatica being revfewed at White licuse and comenting

that second thoughtsvere beginning in rushington. Faced with this

information and given striesly linited time factors, Richarison

decided that the meeting with Cereralls Minn and Kaien should not be

rostponed but that contactied officers would maxe tuls bests fact

finding mission without encouresias or discourasias Gererel Minh,

"When Spera and Conein returned from their meeting with Khiem

and Mich, we proceeded to Thieneart's pifice to sake our report. The

Arbassador cave in and Richerdson advised him of our meeting with

General reede, of Fayior's caole, und of the decisions which Richerdson

had sade as a result of the Taylor caole.

Lodge nes angry ard

expressed the view that Richardson's decision had destroyed the

possibilitles ai carrying cut a coup. Richardson expresses a firm

dissenting opinion."

VLNSC Executive Comittee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants.

not ideatifled. Record by Dup.

The consensus was that Harkins should confirm to the generals that

the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the

US governzent. There was agreement that better infornatica was needed

on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was

militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was

drafted for Presidential approval.

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30 August

Vice Prestdential Meeting, on Vietnam, CIA participants: DICT,

Di2, & 0/F2.

Recora by 9/52.

Pisk referred to recent cable tralfic and sald that he sas not

even sure whon we were dealing with or that they "ere planning.

Moliemara pointed out there was some question whether the generals ever

did hare a plan. Bundy said he had re-read the earlier traïfic and

noted that they never said they did. her. Carter.

" sale he believed that

the general's coup was not likely at this stage and that in another

week we will be approximately where we were before the attack on the

Buddhist temples. Bundy suggested we consider editionai contingencies

before the group and whether the assumption that Nu 1s Impossible 1s

well founded.

31 August

Salzon Station's chronology of hugust 1963 coup activities

"General Harkins was authorized to seet with Khiem to gire

Khiem assurances of USG backing. Khie showed a reluctance to talk

and suggested that Earkins moet with Cereral. Minh. Kolem commented

that Mich had called off the planning emi des working on other methods

which thier would not describe. Kuies irther stated that the generals

were not ready as they did not have enough forces under their control.

Harkins decided not to give Khiem essurances which he had been authorized

to Impart. Lodze approved Markins' decision on 31 lugust after Markins

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31 Aurast (continued)

Vase Presidential Feeting 0= Vichery. CIA participants: DOCI,

DDE, & C/F3.

Recese Bx C/2.

Rust suggested he loo's at precisely what in the Vietnam

situation bade us think of a coup and what might be done to improve

corditions 17 Vietnazeliarara suggested the first requirement vas

reestablishment of comminication between Loige and Harsias. Rusk

directed that a telegran be prepared for Saigon making suzzestions

as to what ve night ast: the Gi to do.

Chief, FE, who participated in the meetings of late August.

in a neporandun for walter sider provided this surary of

dipperine positioes teren.

"In the discussions duriag the past week, the position of the

Department of State, led by Ball, Harriman, and Hilstan, was that the

Diem-Nnu government had double-crossed the US Government because oe

the attack on the pagodes and that US obligations to the goverment

were no longer valid. Futher, that a government so discredited could

not conduct successfully the war in Vietnam and would prove an

undesirable liability to the US Government elsewhere in Asia.

Because of

these noral, military and political conclusions, the Department

recomerded

that it mist give all support to a group of gererels who

allegedly were disaffected to the point that a clear indication of Us

action was the only inzredient lacking for them to push over a discredited,

unpopular and weak Dien government.

"The position of the Depertsent of Defense was that while it

deplored the sensational aspects of the Eudhist situation,

noretheless felt that an effort should be continued to desl with Diem

and try to bring about a compromise, and at the same time to keep i

touch with the generals and support the coup efforts, it this proved to

e the only alternative leît. This was essentially the view of General

Farsins and of Ambassdor Holting.

This was considered by the Department

of State to be a foot-aragging and weak position.

= 14 -

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## Page 19

SE020T-BIS 007

"The Fresident, viered the State Deparinent's position with

considerable resore but was tilling to explore the coup idea further.

He and the Attorey General (as well as CIA) were appercatly appalled

at the speed with which

the State decision was reached on Saturday

afternoon, 24 Augist, and felt that sore thought, analysis sad

preparation should have preceded the instruction to Lodge."

31 fugust (coatimed)

CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0439)

"This particular cour is finliiad... ¿ Conerals did not feel

ready and did not have su?ilcient balance of forces. ..

There

15 little doubt that GIl ware US role end may have considerable

2 Septenber

CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0523)

Richardson cabled & damage assessment. He concluded that Diem end

the No's are fully snare that the USG encouraged the generals to

attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encourage-

ment. He judged there was an even possibility that all for prograns

could go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilema the

Station's future relationships with Col. Tung. He noted his dissatis-

fection with Tung

; as & CVil liaison rebicle through which to conduct FM

progrars, but noted that the GVI had offered no alternative. Unless we

were willing to discontime our IVil, Leos border, and cross-border programs

we mist contime to wor's with Turg.

- 15 m

STUMET-ZIES ONLY

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## Page 20

SEC

3-278 0X11

2 Septesser (contimed)

The Tines Si Vietnam fublished charges that the ClA ves plotting

and financing a coup and was giving asylum to the chief ant1-Diem

Buddhist lesder. The: story was picked up and widely played by the

New Yor's Dally Hews, the Chicago Tribune, Baltirore Sun, and otber

promisent newspapers.

6 September

vuLt

residential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DDP & C/F

ecord by DOP te C/Fi

Fus's stressed the imediate need for direct contact between lodge

and Dien. Bundy pointed out the necessity of adriding Lodge sot to

have a real show-down with Dien over Mu at this forthcoming neeting,

es one of Lodge's cables indicated he was headed very much in this

direction. Rusk agreed to do this. The President agreed with the

desirability of silencing Madane Nbu but expressed some doubt that

Ni's participation' was as fatal es State seemed to say It was. Rusk

commented that the country tear had stated its feeling that th mist go,

to which the President replied that they may have been operating under

directives received fron here.

- 16 :

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## Page 21

-923 0'1Y

8 September

Wire serrices and promien: newspapers carried i story that the:

Special Forces trcops who raided the pagodas on 21 August were st111

belng paid secretly by CIA. This story was attributed to a hizaly .

reliable source in lasinington and gave detalls al support to cal.

Tung in the amount of $3 million anally, ard a payment of $250

thourand on 3 September. The story vas datelined in Washington and

in Hantle.

David Bell warned in a television interriey that the US Corgress

might cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Die governent

changed Its policies.

(Corment: The U.S. Goverent publicly confled on

8 October 1963 that aid had already been cut, quietly and

over a period of some months. lll Colby, Jocko Richarison,

and Dave Salth each told is that the pualie amounceseat of

the aid reduction was a "signal" to the gererals and that the

reduction was planned with that in mind. It say be that the

cut in aid was deliberately planned to sour, ie generals en, but,

if so, that Intention did not find its way into the wristen

record. The nearest thing to it is in the record of a Presidential

meeting of 10 September 1963.

The President asked Rufus Fillips,

- 17 -

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## Page 22

320021-2:33 ОТШ

of AID, "bat specifie astions Prillips orld reconread and be

suggested "cut ing ala to

• Colonel Tung which would be alexed

by the Generals with much enthusiasy and as an indication of

a vigorous Americaa position." In general, though, aid cuts

were discussed in terns of bringing pressure on Diam li sase

necded changes in his regime. Hoever plansed or however

Inoked upon by the U.S. administration, it is clear that the

Vietnamese generals considered the official confirmation of

aid cuts as a clear toxen of U.S. support of their coup plaming.

Spera and Conein set with Gererals Mino end Kalem on 29 August.

The folloring are exserpts from the cabled report of the

meeting (SAIG 040ó):

"If USA now really ready take different position, generals

want firy evidesce to that effect. •

• • Queried as

to what ve can do to show we sean business, Minh flatly

stated, stop econcuic aid to force lau. to show his hand.

The suspension of aid did not force Diem and Nou to mend their

ways, but 1t did create an atnosphere that made 1t easter for

the generals to asseable the bilitary suypori reeded for a

successful coup.

•= 18-

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## Page 23

14-00000

SCORET-EYES ONLY

10 September

In an lateries by Huntley and Brinkley,

the

dented

the charge that CIA makes its on policy.

CIA cable from: Saigon (SAIG. 0760)

"An Inclined to feel general officers will seek evolutiorary

acccinoda t101 with Dies (LP be pernits them to do so) unless overall

situation clearly deteriorates, there is breakãom of civil order or

governental racainery, or unless var effort begins to go bachvard

seriously. ... • Despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21

August, am Inclined to believe we should be able resume successful

prosecution of var in military and ciril sections. • •

• • Do not

allen myself with the view that USC should suspend aid. . . ...

Presidertisl Meeting on Vietnan. CIA participents: DCI & C/FE.

Record by C/FE

Gen. Krulai reported his findings 1r Vietnam. His conclusions

vere that the war is going ahead at an impressive pace and that the

Viet Cong war vill be won if current US nilitary and sociological

programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who

accompanied Krulak, expressed the view that there vas a complete break-

down of the Saigon civilian goverment and the security situation in

the provinces had deteriorated. The President asked whether the tro

gentlemen had visited the same country. Rust sussested that the focus

be on what happened in July and August that reversed the optinistic

judgents in May and June. Mi. McCone talked from a persoral telegran

he had received fron Richardson recerending against any cut in aid.

-19.

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## Page 24

SHONET-DIES OILY

10 Septesber (continued)

sittee leeting on Vietram. CIA particitants:

DOI & C/Fo

Record by C/re

Bundy stressed the seed to unify, Se US Sorerment fosture, to

coordinate press guidance, and to control outgoing ressages to Saigon.

He emphasized the isportance of folloving the President's guidance on

this delicate Vietnam problem, despite intensely differing views as to

what should be done, how, the risks, minimm objectives, and the facts.

McMinara stated tbat his position was vigorously against throwing out

this governent without seeing an alternative and that none appeared

to exist. MI. McCone commented that the problem was not so much the

existence of an alternative as how to put one into power. Bundy

summarized the President's position as one la which ve must express

our reservations as to the mistakes and misdeeds of Diem but not be

In a position where we cannot deal with him further.

Il September

CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG. 0797)

Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on

a six-page summary cable to ansver a cable from the Departuent requesting

views. The tear was unable to azree ever on the first three pages of

the surmary. Weede and Richardson dissented on the basis that the draft

. -20.0

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## Page 25

SECRET-EVES ONLY

lout.

summary cas too sweeping and too regative, concluding definitively

about the country as a viole on an icadequate basis of data. He said:

"In 'sose says we. seen to have reached the polat 1a official Arerican

amunlty that, if you think 'e can in with present goverment, you

are staply not running 10 righe direction ith rajortty."

"My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is: (a) that

It 1s worsening rapidly; (b) that the time has arrived for the US

to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the

existing goverment'and the installation of another; and (c) that

Intensive study should be given by the best brains in the government

co all tce details, procedures, and variants in connection with see

suspension of aid."

Presidential Meeting on Vietnan: CIA participants: DOI & C/E.

Record by Cru.

McNamara pointed out that lodge has had littie' contact with Dien

and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone comented that he belleved

that ve should move cautlously, that we should talk seriously to Diem

and that lodge should be urged to visht the countryside to obtain ?

more reslistic view.of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCore also

suggested that arother approach be made to Nau to seek his cooperation.

In a departure. The President asked icether ie had carefully studied

the detailed effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared

by Hilman). It was evident that the effects had not been studled.

- 21 .

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## Page 26

SEURET-DIES ONLY

I dept count

Ise President asked DOD aud CIA to acalyze the Illsian paper. Fe

also asked that a telegras be sent to lodge asking his to try to

reduce the pross leakage in Saigon and to establisa scoe real contact

with Dien. Azy current plass. for aid sezotiations should be stalled,

and the President said he should be well informed of any steps taken

in tais context-such as the incident involving CIA payment to

Col. Turg last week.

Il September (continued)

NSC Execusive Comittee Meeties On Vietnam. CIA participants:

DCI &. C/FE.

Record 5: C/B.

Rusk said he belleved that we were not likely to achieve an

Indeperdent Vietnam unless we could eliminate Nau.

At the same time

he was not villing to say that Dies should 5o, as he sar no altercative..

Rusk cormented that we should work through Lodge on Diem to take over

the real leadership and becone the real president. Mr. McCone suggested

also the desirability of negotiating ilth Nau.

Bundy read off a CIA

suggestion for a process of negotiating with iu.

13 September

UVVY

CIA cable for Saigon (SAIG 0990)

Huntington Sheldon, who visited Saigon, reported his views on the

situation in Vietnam. Be Ineluded as part of his report the substance

- 22 -

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## Page 27

14-000000

SECHET- DIES ONLY

of a discussion It's DOll Mazeheart: "ILe Abbessador 15 considertes

charging MACy with rektar amroach to SVY military, he-centiored- Gen-

Don, to atteryt stimilate early coup action with auropriate US

assurances. I Inquired had Arbassador rade such proposal to Washington

and waa tuld this was withis Lodge's antbo=iby."

15 September

Hell Sheehan writing from Saigon stated that the various elements

of the US mission In Vietnar were so badly divided that Hashington

had intervered. He said: "The only civilian official still strongly

In favor of going along with the Neo farily regise is the Chief of

the Central Intelligence Azency kere." On the sane day, David

Halberstan stated that high US civilian officials in Saigon were

making an all-out effort to convince. Washington that the military

and political situation is deterlorating. Ee said that "the Chief of

the Central Intelligence Agency favors all-out support for the present

regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered

over the raids on the pagodas. They also feel their Chief's close

association with Imi, while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence

gathering.

• 23 s

SECRET-ZIES ONLY

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## Page 28

74-00000

PRET-EYES ONLY

Ló Seprenter

CIA cable frog Saigon (SAIG 0922)

Pichardson replied to Washlagton's request for his. judgneat on

the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as dashington vas

tices in the course of constructing an agreed plan. La cabled:

"e must go on trying to via war with current adstnistration

for as long as it persists in pover.

... . . He should not atterpt

publialy to achieve objectives vita respect to Gi ten probability

of attaiment is virtually nil. . • •

We cannot covertly tisser

with or engineer a coup unless general situation is reasonably

propiiitious and if ve are unable to establish recessary working

conmots ulth Vietnonese legders illing and able to do the job

with recessary means.

• Agree we should carefully explore

and percaps carefully experiment with graduated ceasures desigred

to pressure Dies, within context of persuading him, to take steps

needed. Teese measures would be sore effective if they are limited

to practical and achievable objectives. . . ...

11 September

Memorandus for the Record prepared by DDP

"Saith. discussed with ue... reports that Lodge wanted

to get rid of Mr. Jobn Richardson.

• • Mike Dunn . . . had

told Conein... that Lodge was going 'to get rid of Richardson'.

..... On ore occasion Dunn assed Conein, 'Do you think that Dave

Smith can run the station for a tesporary period while a new Station

Chief is being sent cut here?'*

19 September

Lodge to the President: State telegram from Saigon (iTo. 544)

*I agree that no good opportunity for ection to remove present

• 24

SECRET-SIES ONLY

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## Page 29

SSONT-SIES ORLY

ture 1S aDrenant and that re should.

there tore,

evestrality.

a to ever conta se

z=ly reasure pending such

see no opportunity at all

for

sucs-antive crazzes.

Persoral letter Pro McCone to: Lodze :

"I was told by Dear Russ that you had proposed that Gereral

Lanscale . - replace Richardson as Caiei or Station. • •

I wish to empnasize that the Azency vili reorient the Saigon Station

in asy practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including

the Station Caiel, can be replaced. . . . .

• Lanstale vould zot be

acceptable to the orzanization or to no personald. . . .

• If the

declarEa is to abandon a 11 hope ll vorkiez vith the regime, thea

Richardson probally staid be ranisied.

• • 6 We have no current

Intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which would lead us to

veri

the conclusion that the present regine can be disposed of, or that

there exists a replacement regime which would be better.

Ibis 1s

not however to say that a coup might not occur even before you

receive this letter.

23 September

DCT briefing of CIA Subcormittee of House Arsed Services

the Director said there did not appear to be any cobesive

...,.

mIltary group capable of ousting the Dien regime, and further that

there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regine that

was capable of running the goverment.: A new regime probably would be

no better.

Consequently, the Agency sas urging a cautious, slow

approach to the problem.

• = 25 =

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## Page 30

007-775 231/

2 October

Report of Molasara-Taylor mission to Vietnam

The President on 21 Sepiember had directed. General Taylor and

Secretary McNamara to proceed to

South Vietnay to appraise te

situation. Their trin lasted from 21 Septenser to 2 October. This

was

the report in which clararg recouended that a prugram be

established to train Vietnamese so that esseatial lunations performed

by US military personnel could be carried out by Vietramese by tbe

end of 1965. Ee thougat it would then te possible to vitadras the

bulk of US personnel.

3 Ostober

Personal letter from Lodge to McCone

... I agree vita

what I understand McNamara has said

to jou.

The tire has come for a red face.

Bur, I aZse thiz% 0z

Richardson as a devoted and Fattiatic spican

change f

4 October

C.IA.

CIA cable iron Saigon (SAIG 1397)

• In sum, it is clear that Loäge wants a change in

Chief or Station. . .

• . Departing Saigon 1320 nours 5 October

...

(Corment:" Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters

request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible.

• Upon Richardson's departure, his deputy, David R. Smith, becase

Acting Chief of Station."

- 26 -

-ES 007

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## Page 31

-&

5 Octater

Presirestial

3:2 с= У1e*па=. СТА 23т

DOl caly

Record by sci.

The meeting was held to discuss natters that becane the subject

of Dege! 534 [see later entry of 5 Octoiary. DI sald It vas the allust dia

oplatea Of CIA (with tike excepcion of Coloy, C/rs) that fiddliag

Свер

with the Coumodity Import Program as a political lever would be such

nore. likely to create an eccode crisis underuining the var effort

than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cooperative attitude, because

1t would seriously affect the confidence and planing of the Vietrazese

business community and quickiy engender Inflationary reasures among

the population at large of a more serious nature.

It. was the consensus of the meeting that some meantrul

political movements had to be made, but exactly what they should

be was not deterined.

vUV

CIA cable fran Saigon (SAIG 1445)

In a neeting with Conein (approved by the Ambassador 03 2

October), Ceneral Minh requested a statement of the US position witb

respect to a change in tie GVI in the rear future.. He said be did

not expect USG support of a coup effort, but did reed US assurgaces

that the USG would not try to thwart his plars. He outlined caree

- 4 -

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## Page 32

14-00000

ST2RT-883 07U7

possible plens for fire accomplistent of the change of sorerment:

(a) assessinaiion of 1igo Dinh Inu and Ngo Dish Can, 2nepizg Fresidast

Dlem in office; (o) encirclement of Salgon or various military units;

and (c) direct confrontation tetreen bilitary units involved in the

cous and lojalist military units in Saigon.

5 Octoker (cossinued)

CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG I+-7)

Dave Smith, the Acting COS, cabled that he cad discussed this

latest Conel/Minh meeting with Ascassador Lodge and DOM Iruehart.

Smith reported that he had recomended to Ambescador Lodze tinat:

do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot,

since the otcer tro alternatives mean either a bioodcath in Saigon

"We

or a protracted struggle rich could rip the aray and the country

asunder."

(Comment: Smith's recomendation to lodge on assassination

drew a prompt response fron headquarters. The

tro entries thet

follo: interrupt ice chronology. They are put here to complete

the story on this significant episode.)

CIA cable to Seizon (DER 73551 utó Cetober)

_ Vecone directs that you withdred recommendation

to Ambassador concerning assassination plan/ under ileCone

Instructions,

as re cannot be in position satirely condoning suca

course of action end thereby engazing our responsibility therefor."

- 28 -

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## Page 33

SEGRET-CERS SHEV

CIA cable fros Saigon (SALS 1:63 0°? Cetaker)

"Action taken es directede In addition, stace Dal

Trueheart was 3Iso present when original recomendation vas

made, specific vithdraval of recommendatica a: McCone's

Instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Agassador

Lodge commented that he shares AcCone's opinion.

SECRET-EIDS ONLY

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## Page 34

5 Ostober (contlaued)

State cable to Saigoa (Deptel No. 534)

The Departent cabled guidance to the Asbassador resulting from

NSC consideration of the 2 October Mclarara-Taylor report. Inese points

vere included: (1). Edsting suscension of new commitrents under

the AID Cormodisy Import Progran will be maintained. (2) PL 480

(condersed milk) v'11l te bandled on a nonta-to-nonth basis but will.

not be suspended. (3) AID Project Loans sill be "suspended for review."

(4). Ambassador shouid continue his policy of "cool correctness"

towara GVil

50 c

Walte Eouse cable to Saigon (CAP 63550)

• • • President today approved recomendation that no taitlative

should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to & coup.

There should, however, be urgeat covert efort with closest security

under broad guidance of Anbassador to identify and build contacts

with possible alterative leadership as and when 1t appears . ...

8 October

The UN General Assembly agreed to send a fact-finding mission

to South Vietzar to Investigate charges of goverent oppression of

Buddhists.

• 30

CT-083 097

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## Page 35

SECRET-EVES ONLY

(Concent: The fast-rinding grosp left New York. 21. October

and arrived in Salzon on the 24th." It first ret with Ngo Dinh"

Ibu and then visited the Ya lol pagoda, considered the comand

post of the Buddhist protest coverent, where it found only to

nonks and South Vietnamese secret policezen. A planned visit

to the An Quang pagoda was barrer by the Diem govercent. The

mission did manage to visit An Quang on 21 October and

interviewed Thich Tinh Keit in the presence of a number of

secret police. The 1 November generals' coup interrupted the

mission's work, and it left South Vietnam on 3 November.

(The UN General Assembly accepted without vote on 13;

December a decision to discontinue Investigation of alleged •

repression of Buddhists In South Vietnas. Assembly President

Rodriguez said Buddhist oppression by the government bad.

ceased to be an issue since the ouster of the Dien government.

(The fact-finding commission had Issued its report on

11 December. It arrived at no conclusions but merely detailed

testimony taken during its probe.).

-31 -

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## Page 36

S28

9 October

Presidents

Fresident's neus conference

Posit A stir

C iA

phone

"I know that the transfer of Mr. JOin Richardson, woo is a very

dedicated public servant, has led to surmises, but I cas assure

you

flatly that the Cin ras not carried out incepencent actirities,

but

has operated under close control ol the Director of Central

Intelligence operatiaz under the--ita the cooceration or the

National Security Council and under oy instructions."

CIA cable to Saigoa - Eyes Caly for Amcassador (DIR 74228)

.. While we do not visa to sticulate coup, se also do

not wish to lesve sopression that us would thiart a change of

government or deny ecosoic and =illtary assisiance to a ned regise

1f it appeared capable of Increasing elfectiveress of silitary

effort, ensuring populer support to vin war and improving corking

relations with US."

press for"detailed inforsation clearly Indicating that Mina's plans

offer a high prospect of suecess.*

(Comment: William Colbr 1s the origirator of this cable,

and it was released by & Cable Secretariat: Duty Officer by

direction of Colby. The text states that these "additional

general thoughts" had been discussed with the President and

that the cable had been cleared with "high officials in White

House, State, Defense and CIA.")

34

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## Page 37

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10 Ostocer

Saigon Station's "Elstory of the Vietnarese Gererals! Coup"

The Ambassador lastructed CLA sot to lastiate contact vith

Generals Minh or Don, 'but li the generals initiate contact, such

contacts were authorized. In tie courze of reetings idth Mish or Don,

assuranses were to be given as specified in DIR 74228 of 9 October.

DCI briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Camittee

CIA

"We have not seen a successor goverment in the wings that we

could say positively would be an lubrorement over Die. Icerefore faction

1 at out a treat a rest a sorry, as are to Congra,

a situation might flare up nich night result in suething of a

civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by

sitting on the

sidelines."

33 October

Saigon Station's "History Of the Vietasmese Cererals' Coup"

At a meeting with Conein requested by General Don, Don said

the generals had decided to try to stage & coup vithin a week

following 26 Octobet. Cosein, under Instructions, passed the substance

of DIR 7+228 to Don. Don pronised he would seek pernission of the coup

committee to give Corein their political plan for the Ambassador's

eyes only.

New flas.

- 33 -

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## Page 38

14-00000

21 Ostoser

Herorendum for the Record prepared by the Executive Director

folloring e seetinz wich Keneth Kansen,

Bureau of the Buszet

At Fansen's Initlal neeting with Lodge, Lodge nade these crarges:

(1) CIA ras Leproperly dealing ta lau; (2) CIA was reluctan: to

turn over to the military 1ts operations arong the dill tribes;

(3) CIA Lad inadequate peretrations of the GVil and the buddhists ard

was caugat by surprise; (4) Richardson tad a palatial mansion and

entertained goverment officials there; (5) The CIA Station vas too

lance and too visible; (6) CIA acted on its own initiative without

%:

coordination and without any control frey either the Ambassador or

Washington.

Hansen said he later reported to lodge that he thought Lodge's

charges were erroneous. He said be was convinced that everytes

CIA had done In Vietnan had been approved in lashington, coordizated

with and carried out under the directions of the froassador, and had

been carried out with both good judgment and a high quality of

perforeance.

Hansen noted that at the tire of his first weeting with Lodge,

Lodge had not yet bad a full briefiag on wrat the Agency vas doing.: Inis

took place a few days later.

- 34 -

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## Page 39

24 October (continued)

Saigon Station's "Fistory O? the Vietrarese Gezerals" Coup"

Conein beld try neetings with Gereral Don 01 24 October. Ica

reported he had been informed biz Ceneral Earians that the U.S.

military vould not thart any coup plans. Dor said the coup plaes

were complete; thet the recessary military units vere availabie; and

that the coup wouid occur no later than 2 Movember. In the second

meeting, Don said the coup committee refused to turn over the political

plan but authorized Don to outline its substarce, which he did.

ctA cable to Saigon (DIR 78161)

Bandy

Bres Only 20r Lodze and Forcian Son Buns "... .. There

may be danger ibu atteryting entrament througi Don's approaches to

Conein.

... • • Feed culte stronaly that Lodze and Farkins should

stand back fron anx nor-essential involverent.. • . .

• at seets

trise to matatain close control over reetings between Don and

Cone In.

Re CiA

contect teen

DON.

CIA cable Pres Saigos (SAIG 1954)

Bundy from lodge;

"CAS kas been onctllios in cartars ai

Instructions: I care persanaliy arproved esca neetizz ketcen

General Don and Cozein woo has carried out my orders in eRcia

Instance explisial. :

lodge

25 October

Presidential lee

Record DiE DCI

on Vietray. CIA particizant: ECT ozl:-

- 35 -

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## Page 40

The President stated that the purpose of the reeting "es to

consider: (1) recent actions in SVil with respect to coup planaleg

and qualirications of the individuals reporting; and (2) our policy

1n S/H, as he wisted to be assured there as usanlalty within the

Dilailed

soverent prior to the retuza. 05 loage sor esasultations. The Dolling of

stated bis views 1a detail. In essence, he held: (1) DOR Elgat be/RE Gosl

naraged by Nau; (2) CIA has no control and therefore could assure

to Pars.

vour

Ilttle responsibility; (3) Don could bave a coup in tice nacing and

could pull 1i Off; (4) We are bandling a delicate situation in a

non-professional nanner; i5) Successiul coup would lead to confusion

because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) Che coup would

be followed by another and the var sight be lost during period of

political confusion; (7) Civilians capable of running SVN could not

be injected into the governent and exercise effective control; (8)

Cannot discuss important political issues with Diem because, of the

polley of "correct, cool attitude;" (9) We either bave to work with

Dien and Nhu of we have to take aggressive steps to remove them, and

It is not clear that the succeeding government would be much ketter.

28 October

Saigon Station's "Zistory of the Vietnarese Generals" Coup"

General Don asked Lodge i1 Coneia was seasing for the rubassador.

- 36 -

SESRST-EVES ONLY

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## Page 41

SECACT-EVES DREY

Icdge replied in the affimative.

Doa told the Arcassador tbat tae

US. Government snould not literfere wita or try to stimulate a corp:

The Aroassador agreed with Don.

23 Oetober (continued)

Saigon Station's "History of the Vistarmese Cererals' COJo"

Conein met with Genergl Don for the last tize before the coug:

was launched. Don confirmed that he had talked with the Ambassador. who

had vouched for Conein. Don stated he was leaving on 29 Ostccer to

coordinate final plans. Don requested Corein to remain at home

beginning 30 October--until further notice. Don repeated that the

Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but tea.

pressed on his previous commitment to make them avallable 48 bours 1a

advance, Don said that possibly the plans could only be made available

four hours in advance. Don said nothing would be happening ithin the

next 48 hours and that, if there was a good reason for the Ambassador

to change his planned 31 October departure, the Ambassador could be

Inforued in time to make his om decision.

- 37 -

SEGRET-EVES ONLY

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## Page 42

SECRET-EYES CALY

29 Ostober

CLA cable from

Saigon (SATE 2010)

In an eyes only cable seat via CIA channels, Lodge gives his

Vers on the seemingly laineat coup: "In s'mary, li would appear

that a coup attempt by the secerals' group is iminent..: and that

so positive action by tie USt can prevent a coup attempt short of

infoming Diem and Nhu.

• Although tcere have been no requests

to date by the generals for material or finascial support, we must

anticipate

that suca request say le forthconing. .....

Presidential Meetiny Co

8s C/FE.

• CIA participants:

DCI, DDP,

Record by DDP & C/E

It was suggested that in the Amoussedor's absence, Harkins,

Trueheart, and David Snith act as a committee to direct any coup

operation. DCI' countered with the vied that Salth should not be

Involved in such a policy making function, althouga he would be in

a position to provide technical advice to Harisins and Trueheart as

well as carry out their Instructions in the operational field. The

President stated that if the forces in Saigca were not clearly in

favor of the coup, we skould discourage its launching -

The Attorney

General felt the US was risking too muce based on flimsy evidence.

The DCI stated his vies that even a successial coup would create a

period of interregun ard confusion which nigat only be solved by

a second or third coup.

- 38 -

SECRET-LIES ONL/

Minista

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## Page 43

SE

30 Cotober

sCIA cable to Salgoa (DIR 79109)

Sady to lodre."

• chances of action with or sitiout

our approval now so significant trat ve should urgently consider our

attituda end contingency plaa3. . ... • Belleve our attitude to

coup group can still have decisive effect on its decision. : ...

We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable. . .

Conein should express to Don that ve do not find presently revealed

plans give clear prospect of quick results...... We badly need

some corroborative evidence wether Minh and others directly and

completely lavolved...

.. • higtest euphorita desires 1e cleroia

understcod that after your departure larkins should participate 1n

super.islon of all coup contacts and that la event a coup begins,

Le become head of country tean.

CIA cable from Salgoa (SAIG 2063)

Lodge's reply: " .

vich

do not this' he have the pover to

de lay or discourst a couo.

this is a Vietra ese arbir.

Con Las sade 1i clear many tires that

• . I bejieve we should continue

our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor.

and press for more detailed inforsation. CAS has been analyzing

forces for some time and it is their estimate toat the generals have

probably figured their chances pretty closely. •

• It does

not seem sensible to have the military in charge of a matter snich

amb trage

68 K

The extent that trese finds can be passed discretly. I beliere ve

should furish fort. If ve vere corvinced that the coup

was going to fail, we would of course do everything. se could to

stop it. Gen. Farkins bas read this and does not concur.

CIA cable to Saigan (DIR. 79407)

CAP 63598: "

that we have no gover to delay or discourage a coup.

•We do not accept as a basis for Us policy

• We

cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only

conviction of certain failure justifles interention... . . . US

euthorities vill reject appeals for direct intervention fron either

side..

The Waite House repeats its instructions an

command of the country team after Lodge leaves.

= 39 =

SEEMET -BYS ONLY

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## Page 44

30 Ostober (continued)

CIA cable

frON

Sa! 2on. (CAIG 2094)

Cable from lodze (in Its entirets): "man's for your sagacious

instruction.

W1l1 carTi

best of Ey ability

I'lovesber

The coup began at 1315 hours, Saigon tire, which is equivalent

to 0015 hours, Washington time, 1 November. The following account,

1s drava from several sources: tae Saigon Station's history of the

coup and various cables.

At 1315 hours, the Alde de Camp to General Don case to Conein's

house, told him that the coup was in progress, and said toat General

Don wanted Conein at Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters. The

aide also asked Conein to bring with him as much money as Corein

could readily lay hands upon. The station had stored five nillion

plasters (about $68,000 at the official rate) in a safe in Conein's

house against such a contingency. Coneln took three pillion iitb

him. General Don used the nozey to reward opposition nilltary units

who joired the coup group.

up. on 2 Noverber, General Don Informed

Conein that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed

during the coup. Conein gave General Don an additional 1, 750,000

plasters. One bundle of 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found

::= 40.=

SENT-DES OILY

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## Page 45

SJOLT-CE 0227

later In Conein's saie. The passing of these sunds is periou

a very sensitive Eatter. Dave Snith repored by cable on 25 November

1963 that the disbursement had not yet been discussed with the

Ambassador;

The files do not show whetber the Amcassador was

ever tola.

In a State cable fron Saigor of 24 April 1954, Lodge

reports a meeting he had that day with General Mira. It reads in

part:

"He then said: "I want to ask you a question about a money

matter. Did Coneln ever give General Don money for the November 1

coup?'

*I suid: 'Definitely not.

vould certainly have inown it.'"

Ead he done suca a

ting, I

He asked Dave Smith about this, and he said he thought that the

denia ador had eventually been told that the money had been passed. contries

We can neither confirm nor refute from the record.

Thus, Conein weut to JGS headquarters and remained at the

command post throughout the struggle.. Before leaving his home,

Conein alerted the station by radio. Upon arriting at JGS beadquarters,

Conein was told by Cereral Don that Don had tried unsuccessiully to

reach Cosein earlier by telephore. A later chec's reveled that

Conein's telephone was out of order. Cozein was told tiat he was to .

keep a telephone live open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA

officer on the scere and in inticate contact with the coup principals,

- 41-

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## Page 46

the station val able to report alsost aicute-by ninute progress of

#finithe coup.:

MM9ad0442.500 2000101824

The Pact that Conein was at JGS Leadquarters is well known in

Official circles. On 24 October, headquarters bad cabled the station:

"In future do not repeat not put nessage re coup plots or rmors in

CRITIC channel. Rather you sbould slug them INMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR

BRETT. " As a consequence, the first cabled reports from the station

came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network

here at beadquarters.

Tene first cable ves received et headquarters

at OLl7 hours, Washington tine, and was filed on the CRITIC network

at 0159. At 0256 hours, following recept of the sixth don-CRITIC

cable, beadquarters instructed the station to put the coup reporting

on the CRITIC network at the station. Sometime during the day of

1 Movember (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time

stamp) headquarters cabled a varning to the station against including

the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. Conein is identified

H649924644794

by same and as being at IGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,

seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name

being deleted, here at headquerters.]

At 1030 hours 2 Movember (ia Salgon) the Saigon radlo announced

* that both Dien and Nhu bad comitted suicide by taling poison. Later

In the day General Minh said that Dien ard Ihu escaped from Gia Long

42

SECRET - 283 ONLY

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## Page 47

Palace shortly after 0700 hours on 2 lovenber of a tunnel unmom

Wo the generals: They left the tunel in the doc area and vent to

& Carolic church in Colon where they took poison. They were

discorered at the church at 1030 hours.

We do not have a truly reliable account of the circunstances

of their deaths, but they certainly were not by suicide. Accordirg

to one of Copein's reports, Diem called General Don at 0650 hours

2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally. General Minh

Imediately ordered all telephones removed fran rooms in their JCS

cumand post arca. This cut off all communication with the outside

except for radios under Minh's control..

On 16 Hovember 1963 a Meld-grade officer of the JGS, who vas

deeply involved in the coup and whose reliability the station could:

not judge (sor did 1t sane hin), gave a station officer two photograpas

of the bodies of Dier ard hu, which he claimed be had taken at the

request of General Its. The photographs show that the deaths vere

very bloody. The source gave the fallowing accouat of the deaths:

The officer was present when the Military Bevolutionary

Comitter debated tice ultimate disposition of the brotters,

accompanied the force that apprecended them, and vitressed the

events i-ediately aiter their deaths. He was not present in

the M-113 armored personnel carrier at the time of the deaths.

A lergthy argent too's place on the nigat of 1-2 November

as to the ultimate disposition of Dien and Inu, with nost of the

generals favoring their execution. The ultimate decision vas

- 43 =

SECRET-ENDS OURY

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## Page 48

S86M8T-0N53 GLY

to k1l1 tray. h Captaln "ung was dealgrated as executioner.

Cos the porzing of 2 fovenier, the Committee received a

phone call froy a casual infor ant telling dere Dier and

knu could be found. A force was dispatched to apprehend

them. This appears to conflict ith Coreta's report that the

pores bad been pulled out Shortly after 10:00 a.Il., Die

and hu entered the personnel carrier with Captain thung.

Upon arrival at the JCS beadguarters, Dies and fau were

dead. Nhu had been stabbed 21 times in the back with a carbine

bayonet and snot live tines. Dien bad been scot trice in tbe

chest. Naung leaped Iron the M-113 vita the bayonet in band

and proudly displayed it to all observers. His ams were

soaked with blood. From the protos, 1t 100ks as 1f Diem and:

Knu had their bands tied beblad their backs.

To recap:

a. CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the

Dien segize, but faithfully carried out instructions.

b. CIA officers Conein and Spera vere the contacts vith the..

coup generals, but only as approved and under instructions.

C. A CIA Officer, Cozeln, was at the gererals' coumand

post throughout the figating.

d. Conela furnisbed General Don about $65,000 to buy off

opposition military units while the coup vas in progress.

CIA bad no band lu the assassinations and had no

foreknowledge of them

STINCT-EVES ONLY

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