Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 03/23/1976
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

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TITLE :

SSCIA

DATE: 03/23/1976

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, SUBJECTS :

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Date :

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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SERIES

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SSCIA

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MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE: 03/23/76

PAGES

97

SUBJECTS

SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

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Helen 11461153

Ent see

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Vol. 2 OF 3

Ohe Initen Statra Ornate

NATIONAL. SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctions

R2859

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

F7esdTuesday, March 23, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

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WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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COMMITTEE MEETING

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Tuesday,

March 23, 1976

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 o'clock

a.m. in Room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator

Walter D. Huddleston presiding:

Present:

Senators Huddleston (presiding), Mondale,

Hart of Colorado, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Michael

Madigan, Rick Inderfurth, William Bader, David Aaron, Elizabeth

Culbreath, John Bayly, John Elliff, Burt Wides, Joseph diGenova,

Bob Kelley, Britt Snider, Charles Lombard, Walter Ricks and

Elliot Maxwell.

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PROCEEDINGS

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senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, if I

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might, make one observation about the Domestic Subcommittee.

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We have completed two of three of the so-called major findings

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of which there will be, I think, about eight, and we have

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completed at least tentatively the recommendations that will be

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appended to those findings. Even though there may be some

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further changes, I would like to suggest unless someone has an

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objection that we be authorized to send that to the printer's

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so that we can at least have proofs to work off of. Otherwise

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I am afraid that if we hold everything until the last moment,

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it will be several weeks before we can get everything done.

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And if no one has any objections, I intend to proceed in

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that way.

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Mr. Miller. The findings?

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Senator Mondale. There are two or three findings that we

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have largely completed. The recommendations I think are largely

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although tentatively, maybe the historical section is ready to

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go. I don't know, but in any event, understanding that they are

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still tentative and subject to change, I would like to send them

to the printer, because I think if we don't we are going to

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have one hell of a glut.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Are these things liable to be

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controversial?

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Senator Mondale. I would guess that there may be some

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changes and divisions of substantial nature in the recommendations.

There may be some other findings, but the findings are a product

of a bipartisan committee and staff effort and I think pretty

unanimously reflect views.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Will running proofs on them in-

crease the possibility of leakage?

Mr. Kirbow. Sir, all of these papers, as Mr. Miller

agreed, are going through the security section, the classified

section.

Senator Mondale. The record there is pretty good, isn't

it?

Mr. Kirbow. The record is pretty good on our previous

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report.

Senator Mondale. In other words, we can change it any

way we want. All that is involved is the expense of changing

what we want to change later, but I think we are far enough

along so it is prudent to proceed.

Senator Hart of Colorado. My own feeling is that I would

not want to.

Mr.

Miller. I think you are talking about galleys.

Senator Hart of Colorado. A set of the galleys to get out

before members have had a chance to

see them.

Senator Mondale. I think you are correct in this. I think

your staff had been distributed.

MI. Miller. You are talking about galleys, is that right?

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Senator Mondale. Yes, just galleys. Yeah, all designees

have had them.

Senator Huddleston. The designees have gotten your

recommendations?

Senator Mondale. Are the recommendations out, too?

Mr. Schwarz.

The recommendations? Sure.

Mr. diGenova. No, no, we haven't had any.

Senator Mondale. I am talking about sending to the

printer's the findings that we have completed of the Subcommittee.

Mr. Schwarz. The detailed report is the thing we were

talking about.

Senator Mondale. That's the only thing you want to send?

Mr. Schwarz. That's the only thing.

Senator Mondale.

All right, I stand corrected. In other

words, just the reports.

You don't want to send those findings?

MI. Schwarz. NO, I don't think we are going to do that

because they are going to come to the full Committee next

week of the end of this week.

Senator Mondale. All right, I stand corrected. You see,

the staff report on such

• things as King, COINTELPRO --

Mr. Schwarz. Informants.

Senator Mondale. Have been completed, right?

Mr. Schwarz. About four of them have gone through a

process which includes complete approval by majority and minority

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counsel, and tendering to designees for all other comments

for

incorporation. It is only those that I would propose sending

to the printer's, to get that mechanical thing going.. King is

not yet at

that stage.

Some others like Charlie wants to comment

on NSA, he will have a chance to do that.

Senator Mondale. And even that, these will still be in

galley form and subject to change.

Okay, that is what I will do then.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, we will do the same on our

side.

Did you want to say

something?

Ms. Culbreath. Yes,

I wanted to make

a comment about

when Senator Mondale was

talking about sending the recommendations,

if it is going to be the

full report, it may not be as relevant,

but having worked with the galleys on the assassination report

that we did before we had

really reviewed them, they are

extremely difficult to work with if you are going to be making

any changes, and I just point that out as a cautionary note. They

are hard to read and they

are cumbersome, and it is just very

hard if

you are going to do any substantive rewriting at all

with the galleys.

Senator Mondale. Well, I guess we are not going to do that.

Mr.

Schwarz. Liz, these have gone through an editing

process, but when you get

your find hand on them, there may be

a little more.

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Mr. Kirbow. I think, the point should be made, Mr.

Schwarz, as it was the last time, if there have to be changes in

galleys, they have to be reset anyway,. so you don't save any

time.

So those where there

is going to be any controversy you don't

save any time.

Mr. Schwarz.

Well,

there is nothing going where you have

controversy. It is only

after the process of majority counsel,

minority counsel and all

designees have been tendered copies,

and King, for example, has

not gone because too many people have

comments.

Senator Huddleston.

All right.

I think when we adjourned yesterday we had two matters

before us. One was relating to the covert action section which

we have new suggestions and new proposals to be made and considered

by the Committee. Those

have been put into written form. I

believe all members have a copy of it.

I would suggest that we delay consideration of that

section until at least tomorrow to give time for thought since

it is quite a substantial

recommendation.

We were on page 55,

and Senator Mathias had proposed a

revision.

Mr. Aaron.

Yes, we

were on Section D, starting on page 61,

dealing with the structure of the CIA. I think apart from

Senator. Schweiker's recommendation, which is somewhat independent

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of those questions, it would be my suggestion to the Committee

that we set this aside, because in the covert action options are

some structural proposals

that might significantly affect the

extent to which we

wanted

to recommend consideration of some

of these others.

So I would set those

aside as a package and consider

Senator Schweiker's recommendation.

Senator Huddleston.

If there is no objection, we will move

in that fashion.

Mr. Kirbow. I do think there was a request that on page

62, that the citations be

given so that they can be looked at

by the various Senators or

members of the staff so they can

verify those recommendations.

MI. Aaron. I might

just make a comment on that. We are

in the process of doing that, but as I know the Chairman is

aware, the Committee did

not hold hearings on a broad range

of options and alternatives and what have you, so that the

advantages and disadvantages that are represented here are

a combination of things that one can find in the record as

well as analytical comments by the staff as to what might be

the implications for and against these particular measures.

I think the important

point to be made in terms of these

individual bullets that begin on page 62 is that they fairly

state the advantages and

disadvantages, and if they do not, why

of course, we would like to do that.

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Senator Huddleston. I think that is true, and while we did

not have hearings on any of these specific questions relating

to these, we did ask a large number of witnesses.

Mr. Aaron.

This is, to a large

extent, the staff's effort

to synthesize what we have learned, and if they are not satisfactor

we should improve them.

Senator Huddleston. All right, with those two matters put

on the position for future consideration --

Mr. Aaron. I would recommend we take up Senator Schweikers

recommendation which really applies to a previous section, which

is the role of the DCI in the production of intelligence,

either place, and simply make for the Committee's consideration

the recommendation that the Directorate of Intelligence be

authorized to report directly to the DCI.

Is that a fair statement?

Senator Schweiker. Yes, that's right.

I have some minor differences, but that is really the

main issue as far as I am concerned right now.

So I'll bring

that to an issue by just moving that that be in

the recommenda-

tions and let the Committee dispose of it one way or another.

Senator Huddleston. Is there any objection to that

recommendation?

Hearing none, we will do that.

(Pause)

Senator Huddleston. Now, are we ready to go to the Media

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section?

MI. Aaron. Yes.

Now, this is a section that we have gone over at some

length, and I think that for the Committee's edification we

might ask -

Senator Huddleston. Are you on page 66?

Mr. Aaron. We're on page 66.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed in detail on

that particular section, it has come to my attention

that we

at

one point had under consideration before the Subcommittee

strong recommendations from the staff, a section on labor and

labor unions and whatnot.

This particular copy that I have

fails to show that at this time.

Was this determined by the Chairman that that would not be

for consideration?

Senator Huddleston.

Where did we wind up on the labor

question?

Mr. Aaron. It was never in the draft findings and

recommendations.

Mr. diGenova. Is it in the detailed report, the classified

version?

Wasn't there a section on that? We quibbled over

naming certain individuals.

Mr. Bader. As you will remember, it was discussed atthe

subcommittee level at one stage. What I had in the longer

report, the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations,

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etc., was a short section on labor which I said to the Subcommit+

tee at the time was based largly on byproduct materials that

came from the overall Katzenbach study, that is, what part of

the labor problem emerged from that larger study of educational

institutions and voluntary organizations and the like. I took

some of that material and brought it to the attention of the

Committee, but I thought this was the labor issue, and said at

the same time that the staff and me, in this case, had not

pursued that or explored it in any depth enough to come to

any real conclusions about it. In fact, you will remember the

section itself which is in here did not make recommendations.

In fact, its findings were quite tentative, and that is the way

it was left at that time.:

I have never had a --

Senator Huddleston.

Do we make reference in here to the

labor connections?

Mr. Aaron. Just on the first page. There is

a statement,

talking about the scope of domestic activity, it notes that there

has in the past been collaboration with the American Trade

Union Federation.

Mr. Bader. One of the things,

Senator, that I was going

to say in my remarks here, there has

been no such collaboration

since 1974 when the labor-CIA relationships did in fact come

to an end, with the exception of some personal relationships,

really, or institutional -- personal relationships, I should

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say, that were

only effected through the international organiza-

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tions of labor overseas.

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MI. KIrbow. Thank you, sir.

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Senator Huddleston. I think we might, as we get through

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this particular section, we might reconsider whether or not

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the two references there to the collaboration with the trade

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union, is sufficient, or whether we ought to add a paragraph

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perhaps a little more descriptive to what the evidence

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indicates actually occurred.

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Mr. Bader. We can certainly come back to that, Senator,

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as we go. The references here, the brief references to labor, were

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really references to the full spectrum of CIA activities in the

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pre-'67 period.

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Senator Huddleston. Would the backup paper available on

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this subject have any information on that?

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Mr. Bader.

yes, the backup paper has about 14 to 16 pages

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on CIA-labor relationships.

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Senator Huddleston. Describing what happened in the

case?

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Mr. Bader.. One of the problems that emerges at that

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time, that that section is the one section where the name of

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the prominent American was mentioned, and nowhere else in the

paper are names given, and the Committee felt, I think, felt

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it was the sense of the meeting that whatever we did with the

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probably not wise, and certainly was inconsistent with the

pattern of the overall paper. But it certainly is something

we can return to as we go through here.

Senator Huddleston.

I think that would be appropriate.

Senator Mathias, we were talking about the labor involvement

encountered, and it is not mentioned very prominently in the

findings and recommendations. I think we should consider whether

or not we might need a paragraph on that after looking at this

overall section.

Mr. Aaron. I might suggest that we proceed here now by

having Bill give us a little or give the Committee a little back-

ground on what is a very complicated issue in which we have

some choices between principal and cost on the one hand and

clear benefit on the other, and which has a long history

of concern on the part of the American public and the government

at large.

Senator Huddleston. All right.

Mr. Bader?

Mr. Bader. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it has been the question of the independence

and integrity of American educational institutions has been

on the American agenda for some time.. I would point out

to the Committee which is referenced certainly in the paper,

that since 1967 that the issue was very much in front of the

American public. The headlines here in the Washington Post of

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February 1967, President Johnson Acts to Protect American

Academic Community, Hill Seeks CIA Probe, and at the time, Presi-

dent Johnson in the wake of the revelations that the CIA had

been using the National Student Association and also a wide

range of American philanthropic organizations, moved to establish

the Katzenbach Committee, and the President said at the time,

the President believed strongly that the integrity and inde-

pendence of the educational community must be preserved.

Out of the Katzenbach Committee came a series of restrictions

and guidelines which the Agency has very faithfully followed in

the period since '67. I would only make two remarks about this.

In the first category. I think it is certainly fair to say on

the basis of reviewing the contemporary literature at the time,

post-:67, that the American public in general thought the problem

of the independence

and the integrity of the American academic

community was over as a result of the Katzenbach guidelines.

Let me read something from the Katzenbach guidelines on

the restrictions of operational use, because central to what

we are doing here is proposing further restrictions

on operational.

use of individuals, and after '67, this operational use was

restricted in certain categories, and one category was total

prohibition. And let me read the variety of individuals that

were totally prohibited, because we are now in

the recommendations

that are before the Full Committee talking about further

prohibitions, so there is a consistency in this matter, and

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wanted to point out a few of them to you:

Operational use, under their instruction, is prohibited

for members and trainees of ACTION, Fulbright Grantees, officials

or employees of the International Association for Cultural

Freedom. -- this is the old Congress of Cultural Freedom --

officials, employees or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and

Carnegie Foundations, and employees of U.s. private detective

investigative agencies.

As a result-of the '67 guidelines, the Central Intelligence

Agency shifted its attention both to what it called offshore

institutional use and very heavily to the use of individuals in

American institutions which were not prohibited under these

guidelines.

Let me review the variety of individuals that DDO can use

under the present guidelines. I will just take four of five

of the list here: publishers, producers, journalists or

employees of public information media, and I will go on to

say that now

that prohibition has been established in that

category for

accredited U.S. journalists - individuals engaged

in public relations activities, foreign delegates or employes

of the United Nations assigned to the U.S., staff members or

officials of the Red Cross Society, officials of the Vatican

state, U.S. Government funded professors, lecturers, students

and grantees..

I am talking here about those who are on the

'list where operational use is permitted: members of educational

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or private or voluntary organizations, officials or employees

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of the African-American Institute, and volunteers to America.

These, under the present guidelines of the Central Intelligence

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Agency are in

the permissible operational use category.

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We go on to say that there have

• been further restrictions

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since '67. I have already mentioned that in 1974 labor, for

7

all practical purposes, was put on

the prohibited list, and we

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now have the 1976 prohibitions on Media, and I would just read

9

one section from the Media prohibitions.

10

"CIA recognizes the special status afforded these institu-

11

tions under our Constitution, and in order to avoid any appearance

12

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of improper use by the Agency, the DCI went on to say effective

immediately, CIA will not enter any paid or contractual relation-

14

ship with any full time of part time news correspondent

15

accredited by any U.S.: news service, newspaper, periodical,

1,6

radio or television network or station."

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These are the two basic issues the Committee has in front

18.of us, that is, the operational use of American academics and

19

the operational use of U.S. journalists and those in the

20

media organizations.

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Now, I turn the Committee's attention to page 69 ,which

22

is the central page as far

as the scope of the use of American

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academics are concerned, and make a few remarks about that.

24

The figures are not in dispute with the Central Intelligence

25

Agency. The Agency is now using approximately 300 American

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academics for operational

purposes such as recriting foreign

students on University campuses and writing books or propaganda.

Beyond these 286 there are an additional 41 academics that

are

used in an unwitting fashion, that is, they do not know

that they are being used

for operational purposes such as putting

notices on university bulletin boards, assisting in arranging

student interviews. We have said that we have testimony as to

how this unwitting

relationship works, or what will happen, and

they have given a case here

when the Agency came to testify,

to the fact, is that the Agency would come aboard the campus,

under cover, under the guise of a commercial firm.. That commer-

cial firm would want translators or someone in the economic

business of one sort or another. The unwitting academic would

either arrange the

interview or post a notice to the fact that

this commercial firm is on the campus.

Then the foreign student, he would then respond to that

particular add or invitation and then the Agency would proceed

to recruit them, if they wanted them, and I will read from the

text here from

an Agency representative.

"We have what we refer to as commercial recruitment, where

we recruit them under the guise of a commercial firm, and the

man's mission is to meet the provision of economic intelligence

on his own country once he returns."

Question: "But he thinks he is working for a private firm

and not the CIA.":r

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CIA: "Or a group of investors. But that is a step in the fina

process leading to total recruitment of the individual."

CIA: "We hope that is not to be the case, in the case

of the

guy that is too tough, to go all the way to the point where you

can stop and still have

¡relationship is this commercial

recruitment. ""

Question: "You mean you put them in an interim step

before he knows he is in the Central Intelligence Ageny?

CIA: "Yes, that is correct. That is one form of this

recruitment done generally through the unwitting basis.

The other, the witting Americn academics are, let me say

that at some of the institutions -- there is one other individual

who knows that an American academic is in this process, in 82

of the 134 American colleges, there is one individual aware.

the remaining 52, at- least one university official is aware

At

of the operational use made of academics on his campus.. I'm sorry

that is reversed. 80 institutions, no one other than the

individual is aware of the CIA link. At the remaining 52,

at least one university official is aware of the operational use

made of academics on his campus.*

So in effect that is where we have it with relation to

the American academics, and perhaps we might discuss that first,

Mr. Chairman. The question is whether the recommendations that

we have -- and I will turn you to the recommendations section

for American academics on page 77, give a range of options for.

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Hage 21

the Committee to consider, ranging from a Committee to study the

use of American academics, and recommends the CIA continue to

use American academics for such purposes, and it moves it sort

of gradually

to a spectrum of possible reactions of the Committee.

A

central one is that one option is the Committee might propose

that there be no unwitting relationships, that the individual

himself know that the CIA is using him for operational purposes,

and the responsible official on the campus be the University

President.

J. refer to, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend

its internal directives to

include a requirement that - this is

the one I am referring to

-- that both the individual academic

and the president of the university or college be knowledgeable

of

the clandestine relationship.

And we go on, the Committee recommends that the CIA

amend its internal directives to include a prohibition against

the CIA entering into a paid relationship with American academics.

We move right through

the spectrum into total prohibition.

Total prohibition, of course, is not inconsistent with what the

CIA has done in the past with prohibitions in certain categories

The issues obviously are the ones that David has raised and

the Subcommittee has discussed: is this tradeoff between

operational use which the Agency puts a very high premium on,

to the committee, saying that they think that this source of

recruitment is vital to their operations, and on the other to a

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concern that has been expressed in the paper and at the Sub-

committee level, as to what this would mean in

terms of President

Johnson's original problem, the integrity and independence of

the American

academic community and the image that they convey,

both to their students and to the world as to the integrity of

those institutions and the individuals within them.

I might say one last

thing on the operational use. The

Agency as I have said has made this into a growth-stop, to

use their term. Since 1971-72 they have made a major effort.

The FRD, the Foreign Resources Division, is devoting most of

its resources it is bringing some of its very best agents

from abroad to work in the United States. Of the ten field

stations it has in the United States, eight are devoted solely

to recruitment of students on various campuses.

Mr. Kirbow. Foreign students.

MI. Bader. Foreign students on American campuses, and

they attach, as I say, enormous importance to this. Of their

overall recruitments, a very high percentage of them from the

Agency's view come from this source in the United States, and

they would be most dismayed if this source were denied them.

On the other hand, it should be said that the Agency has

never done, heretofore, has not done an evaluation of the

usefulness of these foreign students. They began one for the

years '73 and '74, but that evaluation has not been completed.

So we, the staff, is faced with a difficult situation which

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the Agency says and has written that these are enormously

valuable, they are retained, they provide good intelligence,

but they have not done an internal evaluation that either is

available at the Agency or finished at the Agency, or obviously

available to the Committee

to that effect.

With that itroduction, then, MI. Chairman --

Senator Huddleston. So the Committee will know, the

Subcommittee presents a number of options here because of the

inability, really, to come down with a firm position on the

matter of academics.

Joe, did you have something?

Mr. diGenova. I just wanted to say something, Senator,

that Bill referred to the high percentage of recruitments. I

think for the Senators who were not at the Subcommittee, because

of their Domestic work, it should be clear that on page 69, the

bottom of page 69, the beginning paragraph, it indicates that

more than one half oï the CIA's case officers are

assigned to

this task in the United

States; over 60 percent of the CIA

agent recruitments within the U.S. last year were foreign

students, and the next point is equally as important, perhaps

more so, that those recruitments in the United States represent

10 percent of. the worldwide recruitment of high targets,

such as the U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, Eastern Europe,

Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam.

Mr. Aaron. I would make one point additionally. We do not

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know whether those hard targets in fäct represent the Soviet

Union and China, or whether they really are what is known as

the

soft-hard target which is Eastern Europe.

MI. diGenova.

Why does it say that?

MI. Aaron. Because

the category includes Eastern Europe

as well as the Soviet Union and China. We do not know what the

breakout is.

Mr. diGenova.

Well,

I don't understand what the point is.

Is that bad?

What does it mean?

We are using the word "hard target." We say the USSR,

PRC, East Europe. Should we not be saying that in the findings?

Mr. Aaron. But what we don't know yet is what the breakout

is. We don't know the fact were there any Soviets at all.

We

just don't know that fact. That, of course, is important.

Senator Mondale.

Senator Huddleston.

Mr.

chairman, Mr. Chairman?

There is a further problem that was

brought up in background information. I think a further problem

the Committee is going to have in regard to this section is

that the Agency intent will want to strike out a great deal of

this information, both in the background paper and

from our

findings and recommendations, too.

We may find some difficulty

in providing enough information to support what we recommend.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, you sat through these

hearings. Do you have any recommendations as to which options

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make the most sense?

Senator Huddleston.

Well, as I say, our Subcommittee had

a little difficulty with this because of the problem of balance

and what not.

It seems to be a repugnant practice, using

academics in this country, of recruiting young college students

who come to this country to participate in CIA activity. Balanc-

ing that, which sounds very undesirable, against which the

Agency claims is the productivity of such action and the need

for it,

so because of that we couldn't come to a firm recommen-

dation, unfortunately.

Senator Mathias. You postponed it until this moment.

Senator Huddleston.

That's right.

Senator Mondale.

just wondered if you had a personal

conclusion.

Senator Huddleston. My personal conclusion goes to this

Paragraph B on page 77, that while we recognize the

problems

with it relating to integrity or whatever, we are not prepared

to totally forbid it at this time.

Senator Mondale. Could we add to the recommendations

that the follow-on permanent committee flag this problem for

special review and further action?

Mr. Miller. Because there is one thing that has become

evident. We really don't know what the value of these recruit-

ments are. There is only the assertion that they are useful,

but we have seen no evidence of the yield.

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Mr. Kirbow. And in all fairness, I must indicate we don't

anything to the contrary. We have no evidence before the

Committee that they are not useful sources. They are devoting

a major part of their resources to this, and it just, I think,

denies belief, almost, that they would be doing this sort of

thing if they didn't figure it was of some value.

Mr. Inderfurth. I think the Domestic Subcommittee talked

to that issue in the FBI intelligence program. They devoted a

lot of energy to it, but the GAO which did a study of it, said

that it wasn't productive.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, excuse me. I am coming in from Mr. Miller's

point that said this wasn't productive.

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, just the argument that it doesn't

seem productive

isn't necessarily true.

Mr. Miller. Well, my problem, Charlie, is picking up

Senator Mondale's suggestion to send it to the oversight

committee is very valuable on the basis that we don't know

whether there is any yield in fact of value.

Senator Schweiker. I would like to ask a question.for

clarification.

The foreign students that they recruit, are they ultimately

a witting or unwitting?

In other words, when they finally end

up, you say they use subterfuge to go to campus and talk to

the student. Now, when he

goes

back and becomes operational,

does he still think he is working for some cover company, or

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does he really know he is working for the CIA?

MI. Bader. It depends, Senator. There are various stages

with the various individuals. A typical case would be one that

I have described, reading from the record, is an individual that

is recruited under a commercial guise, and for

a certain amount

of time he stays under that commercial cover, and he does not

realize that he is working for the Central Intelligence Agency,

and then he is assessed during that period, and if they feel

that he will become a reliable agent, a good agent, a hard

agent, someone that they can use effectively, then they let

him in.

Senator Schweiker.

When he becomes a hard agent, then,

is he witting?

Mr. Bader. Then he is witting. That's what I'm telling

you.

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Senator Schweiker:

That's the difference between a soft

and a hard agent.

Mr. Bader. They would keep an agent in a proprietary,

commercial intelligence, in the commercial

sense of the word,

intelligence, a firm, for X number of years, and he would never

know that it has a CIA relationship.

Mr. Maxwell. There would be a difference probably in

tasking.

Mr. Bader. There would be a difference in tasking. It is

clear from the record, senator, that if it is soft, the

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individual would be doing normally what he does today, and the

CIA would derive some usefulness or some use from that take.

When he goes through the second category, he is tasked. He is

asked to do things. It is at that point that he goes from soft

to hard, where he is then told to please collect intelligence on

such and such.

Senator Huddleston.

Senator Mathias?

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I

have a proxy here from Senator Goldwater, and I thought maybe

we ought to put his views on the record. He says, "I am opposed

to any prohibition on recruitment of foreign students and

academics within the United States. Moreover, I believe that

any American should have

the individual right to cooperate with

the CIA and FBI

as he chooses. I fully respect the right of

organizations to take positions on the degree to which they as

organizations will cooperate with the CIA and FBI. Finally, I

don't believe there

should be any discussion in the public

release of the report of the numbers of academic institutions

and teachers and administrative personnel who may have cooperated

with the CIA. Quite apart from the

security problems, the

problems which it might cause to the universities."

Senator Schweiker. The point I want to try to make is

that maybe one ground of compromise, Mr. Chairman, is to require

what I am calling informed consent. I am not so sure that this

maybe isn't the middle ground. It disturbs me greatly to hear

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that people are duped into working for the CIA. I heard one

case about a guy where -- I don't know whether he was duped,

but he ended up getting killed in his own country. But I am

not sure he even knew who he was working for or who killed him,

I think that is a pretty serious indictment.

But what I am working for is whether we should require

informed consent on the basis that they have got to level at

all stages who the hell they are working for, and then leave

it up to the student to decide. To mislead the students about

who they are working for I think is really questionable. That's

all I have.

Senator Huddleston.

Senator Hart?

Senator Hart of Colorado. This is not an easy area, but

it is a classic example of what I think you would call the

do-other syndrome, that we have got to do what the other side

does, and I doubt that there is anybody in this room that

wouldn't be repelled by American students studying in Moscow

being approached by KGB

to

come back and spy on their own

country, of, for that matter, any other government that would

do that.

I would assume that all

Americans would find that

repugnant, yet we find ourselves saying that in the days where

we have got. to do the same thing. So I do think it is a

thing that we ought to

examine our fundamental principles and

not just talk about what is expedient and what is easy for the

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Agency and what is helpful to them. There are some things more

important to this country

and what it stands for than what is

easy for the CIA or what

is convenient for the CIA.

In any case, I think the sentence that is contained, the

last sentence in Option

B where it says "alert the institutions

that there is a problem and it is theirs," it isn't the

institutions' problems,

it is this country's problems, it is

society's problems, it is not Harvard's problem or the University

of California's problem;

it is our problem... And I do not

think that by tossing the

ball back to some university President

we are fulfilling our function here.

I think we ought to

have

it out and resolve it. We are

the policy making boay of

this government, of this country, and

to say it is the problem

of the academic community is foolish.

The governing principle should not be whether it is best for

the CIA or whether it is

what the CIA wants. It is what is best

for this country and what is in fundamental keeping with what

we stand for.

The CIA will always find a way to get its job done, and

it doesn't need to violate the Constitution or people's rights

to do their job.

Senator Mondale. Well, one of the problems with this is

'it doesn't violate anybody's rights.

Senator

Schweiker.

Well, I am not sure, Gary, if you are

witting about it, that anybody's rights are being violated.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, it is not that easy. You

have got people coming over here to study, you have got

relatives that want to come in to this country. I mean, there

are all kinds of subtle forms of blackmail that can be used.

It is just not an easy question of walking up to a foreign student

and

saying, when you get back home do you want to send us some

information.

You pointed out one oase that people, they get killed for

doing this.

We are talking about people that may want to become

citizens. They feel that this is a tradeoff they can make

to get in here. They may need the money. Who knows?:! i

Mr. Wides. There is a constant problem, by the way,

that I know of working in Senator Hart's office, of foreign

students who are here.-- it has been a legislative matter on

the Hill -- who do not plan to go back and forth to Africa

every summary and come on the assumption that they can get work,

and then there are restrictions on their working, and it is not

clear whether they can stay here or will have to go back, and

so in some ways it is like the person on immigrant status

tiying to get citizenship, in terms of having sources of pressure

from the Government on them..

Mr. Kirbow. Senator; I only have one other thing to

contribute because it was discussed principally by Senator

Schweiker, but I think this witting or unwitting thing may be

a key somewhere along the line.

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Mr. Bader, isn't it clear that even with the academic

of the approach to the foreign student by the undercover man

posing as a

representative of a corporation, that that student

to be recruited at all has to be witting of the fact that he

or she is working for a U.S. firm or some firm, and it is usually

against the best interests of his own country or his own

firm when he goes back to his home. He is made witting of

that at the outset, is he not?

Mr. Bader. No, sir.

Mr. Kirbow.

What is he made witting of that gives him any

control over him reporting information that is of any value?

Mr. Bader. It is not done that way. Let me give you a

specific example of a commercial intelligence firm ör a

commercial reporting firm out of Dallas Texas is one that I

know of.

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Mr. Bader. The individual is recruited, asked and given

a job. He said, we would like you to go to Paris and write

articles and reports for us on the petroleum industry. That

is what the individual does. He is never tasked.

Mr. Kirbow. This would be a French student.

Mr. Bader. This would be a French student. He would.

never be tasked until such time as he moves from the first to

the second category.

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MI. Kirbow. During that period he is not doing any harm

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to his country or anything. He is just reporting on a regular,

commercial, overt type information.

Mr. Bader. Well, I put it to you that an individual who.

is unwittingly working for a CIA proprietary could certainly be

perceived from his country's point of view as doing harm to

that country since he is, you see, he is not in effect -- he

is in actuality working for a foreign government.

MI. Kirbow. But the first time they ask him to ask anything

of detriment to his country, like a state secret, he is made

witting that he is working for the CIA. I think that was

basically the point.

Mr. Bader. Basically the same, but in the first instance

he is. in fact working for a foreign power.

MI. Kirbow. He is working for a

foreign power, and he

knows it.

Mr. diGenova. Now, that is not my reading of the

record, Burt. My reading of the record -- and this supports

what you are saying, you are just getting it the wrong way --

he is reporting information back. He may not know he is

reporting it to the CIA. He does know that he is certainly not

reporting it to his own Ministry of Information. Mr. Kirbow's

point is that even though he may not know he is reporting to

the CIA, he does know that he is not providing positive economic

intelligence to his own government but to some other outside

force.

If it is found out that it is a CIA proprietary, either

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by him or by someone else looking at him, obviously that is a

problem also, but the perspective of the individual supplying

the information is that he is engaged in either commercial

activity which he is wittingly involved in or supplying

information, straight economic information that doesn't have a

top secret label to it, or else he becomes witting and provides

something else.

Mr. Bader. That is find. I thought I just said that he is

in fact working for a foreign government.

MI. diGenova. That just didn't answer his question.

Mr. Kirbow. A final point, Mr. Bader.

Isn't the record of the Agency that the majority of people

that they recruit remain recruited because they do have some

dropouts, as we say, when they go back to their country; know

when they leave this country that they are spying for the

United States Government, and they are hard recruitments that

they are recruiting just to do that job.

Isn't there a large number of these people that go in

that category when they go back to their country?

Mr. Bader. We don't have a record on that, Charles.

Mr. Kirbow.

The CIA didn't speak to that.

Mr. Bader. In numbers or percentages?

Is that your question?

MI. Kirbow. Did they speak to the question of whether of

not

these people are actually hard recruited here and all of theim

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don't go back soft and

then become hard recruits later on.

MI. Bader. I think it is a mix. I couldn't give you a

proportion.

Mr.. Kirbow. And the last thing, Mr. Chairman, because I

think it is of prime concern to many members, as I know it was

to me because of

the age of some of my children, Mr. Bader, isn'

the average age, as reported by the Agency, between 25 and 31,

of these people that they actually recruit, and aren't the

majority of them Ph.D.s. or, you know, the doctoral types?

They are not freshmen in our colleges type students.

Mr. Bader. No, they are typically graduate students, which

would mean that they would be at a minimum 21 or 22, depending

upon the country that they come from.

Senator Huddleston. What is the wish of the Committee?

Senator

Mondale.

What about this possibility? I am

persuaded by Gary's point about the institutions, and I don't

think they are responsible if they don't know about it.

what about saying, of making very strong statement that

Celinanny for stree

we are very concerned about the impact of this programon the campu

students, on the integrity of the institutions, on the

integrity of the academic community, and the vulnerability_of

these students to intimidation in their tender status as

students, but we are troubled by the fact thative do not, the

record does not give us the information we need fully to determine

our policy, and therefore at the very least we recommend C,

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that the directives

require that the academics and the President

of the university or college be knowledgeable or informed, and

that the follow-on committee flag this issue for immediate

concern and action as to whether they should go further.

Senator Huddleston. Are there any --

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one statement on

that fact. As the Committee can appreciate, one of our problems

in this particular investigation and inquiry was the question

of how we could take testimony from the American academic.

community, because taking testimony from the American academic

community, we are breaking them in to this process and they

will become knowledgeable that this use of individuals was

going on, which in itself

is a decision.

So as less than that, we invited on an informal basis

four or five American college presidents who happened to be

in Washington for one of their American Academic Union or

Association of what have you, the Association of American

Presidents, I think it is called, and Senator Mathias attended

that informal meeting, and we came away from it with the very

strong impression that these senior academics, these responsible

academics, were very concerned about. the unwitting, the

problem of unwitting use of American academics.

They also

felt very strongly that their universities should know that there

is a problem, and that they, as a university, then could begin

to deal with it.

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What they wanted to know was what was the extent and

magnitude

of the problem, and the fact that there was a problem,

and they would. like to be in a situation to know that it is

done on a witting basis within the university.

Senator Mondale. So that is consistent with your motion.

Mr. Bader. That is consistent with your motion.

Senator Huddleston. I think it is also consistent that they

do not want statutes guiding this until they have had a time

to assess and correct the misdeeds that might have occurred.

Mr. Bader. Most university Presidents in my recollection

felt that if they were aware of the nature of the problem, that

they could deal with it as. far as their institution was concerned

on an institutional and academic senate basis, but it was

inherent for them to know what the problem was, and that is

obviously an issue for the Committee:

Senator Mondale. Does that motion make sense?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Restate it.

Senator Mondale. That the report flag our serious concern

about the impact of this policy on academic integrity, its

impact on the community abroad, its impact on the foreign

students, that we are very mindful of the vulnerable situation

that a foreign student finds himself in in this country, that

at the very least the record strongly suggests, and we support

that the individual academic and the President of the university

or college be made knowledgeable of the relationship with the

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CIA, and that we

ask the follow-on permanent committee to flag

this problem to its immediate attention, whether further

restrictions ought to be imposed.

Senator Schweiker. Fritz, I would buy that if you would

include something about witting foreign students. I still

think it is really a sucker deal to hook a foreigner and tell

him halfway down the road, you are hooked, buddy, and at that

point he has absolutely no option.

Senator Mondale. Can they do that?

In other words, I

could see why they could flirt with a student before entering

into a relationship with him, but is it possible to do that

without his knowledge?

Mr. diGenova.

Yes. Yes.

They use a commercial guise.

They

recruit him --

Senator Mondale: Oh, I know what the cover is, but mustn't

he know that he is passing information bäck to the United.

States?

Mr. Bader. Not when he is in the first phase.

MI. diGenova. He is passing information back, but he

thinks it is commercial information, but he doesn't know that

it is going to the CIA, but he knows that it is going to the

United States:

Senator Schweiker.. And then after you level with the

student, the student is hooked. He can't do anything. That is.

what disturbs me about it. The guy ought to have an option to make

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a decision before he is

hooked. It is just like pulling a

fish.

Once you are hooked, you are hooked, buddy.

Senator Mondale. Well, let's put that in so that this

guy may think that he is working for a private corporation and

then in fact it is a CIA front.

Senator Huddleston. And if his government found out when

he got

home--

Senator Mondale. He would lose his head.

Senator Schweiker. And then they scare him, and he has

no option at that point.. That is what I object to.

Senator Huddleston. Senator Hart?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Would you accept an amendment

to strengthen the last phrase, insted of just flagging it for.

the oversight committee, to require full and complete periodic

reports of all recruitment activities to the oversight committee.

Senator Mondale. Good.

Senator Huddleston. I think we have that in some other

recommendation.

Senator Mondalé. But he wants in addition a periodic

reporting.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So the oversight Committee

knows periodically what is going on in that area.

Mr. Kirbow.

I think we can take it from the verbatim

record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Huddleston.

Before we vote, let me point to this

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one thing that has come up before in our Subcormittee, Senator

Mondale, and I

don't know whether it has in yours or

not, but

because of the sanitation process, there may well be some

classified recommendations. I don't know that this area might

fall into that category, So --

Senator Mondale. Well, that is a separate problem.

Senator Huddleston. That's a separate problem.

Mr. Bader. We might point out, Mr. Chairman, that part

of the difficulty with that might be -- and I think the Committee

ought to face this squarly -- if we take what we have done

here and put it all in a classified version, the issue that

the academic presidents, are speaking to, that they must be aware

of what the problem is on

their university, that they will not

have that knowledge,

and obviously cannot act on it.

Mr. Kirbow. No, I disagree with that, Mr. Chairman.

What you

do is you squarely put the requirement on the CIA that if it is

going to do this and you allow them to do it, then he must

inform that president, and you make that part of the oversight

committee's report, too, that he must in fact say that.

Senator Mondale. He has got to inform the president, he

has got to inform the academic.

Senator Schweiker. And he has to inform the student he

is using in the recruitment.

Senator Mondale. When he makes the recruit and puts him on

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agent status, that he knows what is going on.

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Senator Schweiker. So that the recruit knows what is going

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Senator Huddleston.

So what is the Committee's pleasure

on the proposal by Senator Mondale and Senator Schweiker

and Senator Hart?

Is there an objection?

Does the Committee want a roll call?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Report me in the negative.

Mr. Kirbow. Sir, Senator Mathias, having read Senator

Goldwater's position in opposition, is that he would agree

on that. He is opposed to any prohibitions against this, if he

could just be recorded.

Senator Huddleston. Senator Goldwater will be recorded as

being opposed. Senator Hart - maybe we ought to call the roll.

Mr. Madigan. May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that

Senator Baker is necessarily absent.. It is my belief, having

discussed this with him, that he would be opposed to this on

the basis that he feels the student has the First Amendment

right if he is notified, but not necessarily the university

president, but the student does have the right of privacy,

and he may, in light of Senator Mondale's proposal, he may --

Senator Mondale. But a foreign student is not protected

by the Constitution, is he?

MI. Madigan. Well, I think the Senator's position is the

foreign student should have the right to make up his own mind.

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Senator Mondale.

That's true, but I don't think that is

a constitutional argument.

Senator Schweiker.. Well, Dee, since this is new, maybe

we ought to postpone. the vote until the next meeting on it

and give everybody a chance.

Senator Huddleston. I am inclined to believe that, that

we ought to put on paper the recommendation, as it was

finalized, and the vote could be held at the next meeting.

Mr. Aaron.

We will come back to you, then, with a

redraft trying tó incorporate all of these various thoughts.

Senator Huddleston.

We will also have to go back, I think,

to this page 70.

Mr. diGenova. And we'll have to go back to the first

paragraph.

Senator Huddleston. I am inclined to believe that we

ought to see what the disposition of the Mondale suggestion

is before we come back with -- to this paragraph and make a

reply to it.

Mr. Aaron. Right.

Now, the recommendation which follows this set of options

goes

to a somewhat different issue, and that is the use of

U.S. Government sponsored grantees and programs which are overt

programs.

This is 44 on page 78. Athletes, artists, any

number of categories of people, sent abroad openly by the

United States for that cultural exchange purpose and then being

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recruited by the CIA to conduct some operational activity. I

might just speak to that issue as well.

Mr. Bader. It should be stressed here that this recommen-

dation we are talking about U.S. Government funded programs

for cultural, educational and other purposes. The thrust of the

argument here is that these programs are funded for various

specific open purposes, where taxpayers' funds in fact go for

a very specific purpose, and that it would seem inconsistent

with that publicly stated goal and publicly stated use of

public funds to have these individuals be used

!. for operational

purposes.

I might underline that the CIA prohibitions which came out

of -- or the guidelines which came out of '67, which I read

to you when we began this discussion, has in its category B,

Fulbright Grantees. The Agency has already accepted the prohi-

bition on Fulbright Grantees. This prohibition would extend

that prohibition, which is limited to those individuals selected

by the Board of Foreign Scholarships to all individuals receiving

U.S. Government grants.

Senator Huddleston. Is there any comment on this?

This ought to be fairly agreeable.

Mr. Kirbow.

There

is only one further comment that has

come from Senator Tower on this subject. As written, it does

not make clear whether of not former CIA employees, officers

or otherwise used in their regular purposes would be prohibited

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from getting one of these grants, would it in fnot prohibit

for a lifetime or just while he is getting the money, or what

are the limitations on

this?

Mr. Bader. Yes.

The question is one of operational use,

not a former employee.

Mr. Kirbow. Yes,

it says operational use of cultural

grantees. If he gets $500, which is a partial payment for what-

ever he is going to do, he gets that as a grant.. from the

government. He goes overseas to France to study for three

months. Once that period is over and that money has "been

spent" does it attach to him for life that he can never thereafter

be used?

Mr. Bader. No, certainly not.

Mr. Kirbow. How about a Fulbright Scholar? Does it

attach to them for life?

Mr. Bader. No, it does not.

Mr. Kirbow. Just while they are under the grant. That

was the question.

Senator Huddleston.

That could be written into that.

Mr. diGenova.

While they are grantee during the term of

the granteeship.

Senator Huddleston. Is there any objection to 44?

There is none to that. All right, it will be adopted:

Mr. Aaron.: Now, the next issue, or the next recommenda-

tion, the next one, 45 deals with the question of the distribution

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of books

subsidized by the CIA within the United States. Again

I might just turn this whole thing over to Mr. Bader.

Senator Mondale. This doesn't deal with the flowback

problem, does it?

MI. Bader. It does not, and it is maldrafted here, but

the intent of this paragraph is to say that there will be no

subsidy or distribution of any book, magazine or publication

that the CIA is responsible for within the United STates unless

that publication is attributed to the CIA.

Senator Huddleston.

Any objection to that?

Senator Mondale. What about the flowback problem?

would you simply go and have the book

published in England

or in Ottawa?

Senator Huddleston. Now, we cannot control the distribution

here.

The CIA can take part in its distribution.

Senator Mondale. But subsidize any book, magazine, inside

the United States.

MI. Schwarz. There surely can be reach paying the Canadian

publisher enough money to permit his sending it across the

line, and these words don't quite reach that.

Mr. Bader.

No, these words don't quite reach that. I am

sure Senator Huddleston can reach that. We have looked very

carefully at this problem

of flowback, and let me give you an

example of a current project of the CIA which is active.

They have given X hundreds of thousands of dollars to a

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certain individual in Britain with access to a British publishing

firm. He has then gone out and acquired a stable of British

authors -- Bieloff. is one of them, for example, very well

known in the United States. They then write a book on a

particular subject such as a tract againt General DeGaulle's

view of Europe. That is published in Britain, but subsidized

by the Central Intelligence Agency, and that book tends to

be picked up and distributed in the United STates through the

normal commercial process.

The agency says as long as it has

a propaganda program overseas, that

this kind of flowback is

inevitable.

Senator Mondale.

Well, then 45 becomes meaningless,

doesn't it.

Mr. Aaron. What it

would preclude is some things that

have happened in the past

in which they actually subsidized and

distributed books in the

United States so that they could then

be picked up and distributed elsewhere.

Senator Mondale. But it is the same thing.. If they want

to do something in the United States, they just go to Ottawa

and find a gifted author.

Mr. Bader.

For all practical purposes, yes.

This would

rule out the major publication programs

of the pre-'67 period at

MIT and Harvard, Praeger, etc.

Senator Mondale. Well, why don't we just deal with what

we are talking about. We are talking about there is a loophole

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in here as big as all outdoors, isn't it.

Mr. Bader. That is absolutely right, Senator..

Mr. Aaron. As long as they publish in English or Spanish.

Senator Mondale. All this says is you can't pay an

American publisher, you have to pay a foreign publisher.

Mr. Bader. The original recommendation said --

Senator Mondale. We don't want U.s. people being paid.

It's the opposite of the DISC program.

Mr. Kirbow. The record of the Agency is that the information

published in these books, pointed at a French audience, may

fall back.

Mr. Schwarz. Any.:

Senator Mondale.

Well, that's the same thing.

Mr. Kirbow. It may fall back into the

United States, but

that is an incidental amount of the information, or the number

of books that come in.

Senator Mondale. That is not what this says.

MI. Kirbow. No, sir, it isn't, and the language could

be broadened

to take whatever precautions you want them to

take against this being a deliberate act, but if you publish

in a certain language, it is going to be picked up worldwide.

Senator Huddleston.

We tried several approaches, one,

not permitting them to participate in any kind of publication

in the English language.

Senator Mondale. That doesn't mean anything. You can

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translate it.

Senator Huddleston. This goes to the distribution.

It might

be that we can

tie it down a little more. The example you

gave of subsidizing a Canadian company would certainly come under

subsidy for the distribution if

the purpose of that was

to

prepare a book which would be distributed in the United States;

it would be in violation of this wording right here, in my

judgment.

MI. Schwarz. Suppose you said something like "and shall

not provide any funds to a

foreign publisher in excess of the

amount needed for distribution, limited to the foreign

country.

Mr. Kirbow. It is meaningless .

Mr. Schwarz. Well, it is at least something more than

this.

Mr. Kirbow. It doesn't do anything to keep it from coming

back into the United STates. Why have additional language.

Mr. Aaron. I think you could conceivably put some

oratory language in there, which, you know, take care of

every conceivable

or every possible safeguard

to attempt to

preclude its distribution in the United States. I don't know

what in fact one would do, but I don't think the funds

would

do it. I mean, once the book has been subsidized, once the

writer has been subsidized, then it is a question of the

number of copies and the amount of books, and if there is a

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big market in the United States, then it doesn': cost any money,

it makes money.

Mr. Miller. Well, one of the key problems, would depend

the propaganda. If it is a suocessful propaganda job, there

is a strong likelihood you are going to have a flowback into

the United States.. If it is a crummy propaganda job, it is

not going to flow back

to the United States and it won't be

noticeable.

Mr. Bader. This prohibition would go to such things

as the Penkosky papers, the book on the KGB, the Barron

book.

It would have some marginal use, but you are absolutely.

right, Senator, I first experimented with language that concluded

that the Agency should be prohibited from all covert English

language books and literature.

Senator Mondale. What about an additional sentence that

moreover, the CIA should be prohibited from indirectly seeking

to accomplish the same objective by publishers, etc., located

any manner in a way which was designed directly or indirectly

to achieve this same result.

That's still --

Senator Hart of Colorado. I still think "no funds shall

be used."

Senator Mondale. Yes, but I think that what we are trying

to find out is to the fullest extent possible, and Kirbow's

point, that the objective is really a clever way of doing the

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same thing by indirection as we are trying to say you can't

do that; where it is for the purpose of foreign readership

alone it is not prohibited.

Mr. Kirbow. You are trying to prevent everything but

the incident fallout, which if it is printed in the English

language it is obvious you can bring it back..

Senator Mondale. You can't do that. The only thing you

can do if you want to prevent that is prohibit it.

Senator Huddleston. Or you can have a bookburning.

Senator Mondale. Well, I think they do that at the

Agency, you know, like with Marks and Marchetti and Agee. They

already do that.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think the one we have to be concerned

about is, for example, the Chilean White Book.

Mr. Kirbow.

The what?

Mr. Aaron. The Chilean White Book, the book published!

by the Chilean junta after it came to power, in English, with

the support and assistance of the CIA, which found its way

into the United States and which it is hard to conceive that

one of its purposes wasn't for the junta to be able to

distribute this propaganda item within the United States as well

as other English speaking countries.

Senator Schweiker. When you say "found its way" what

kind of circulation or volume are you talking about?

Mr. Aaron. I'm not too clear about that.

I know it was

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basically put out by the Chilean embassy. YOu linow, they

got it, it was in English, they sent it around all over Washing-

ton.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think we all understand what

we want

to accomplish. It is just a matter of trying to --

MI.. Kirbow.

Well, Mr. Chairman, since we recommended

over to the next committee to do the language itself, I think

we should just make our intentions clear, that the language can

be put into whatever law they pass. We are just

saying that

by statute it should be done.

Senator Huddleston. Well, what if you added to this thing,

by statute there should be no subsidy to or distribution.of

any book, I think we can change that, there should be no

subsidy..to

the production of or distribution, to writing,

production or distribution of any book, magazine or publication

not attributed to the CIA inside the United States or its

territories, wherever that book might be published.

Mr. Maxwell. There is one problem with the way that is

phrased now, Senator. That is, you would in effect be

prohibited, a subsidy for publication overseas unless -- a

subsidy for production and dissemination.

Senator Huddleston. What?

Mr. Maxwell. The way you just phrased it would prohibit

any subsidy for production, which would prevent the CIA from doing

any production.

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Senator Hart of Colorado.

Well, since the staff -- I

think the staff understands what we are after. We are going to

sit here for an hour arguing.: Why can't they draft what we

want to come up with?

Senator Huddleston. I think you can prevent them..

Mr. Aaron. We'll try to capture this concept of directly

and indirectly and place the responsibility on the Agency to

do what it can.

Senator Huddleston.

Good.

46?

Mr. Aaron. Yes.

No. 46. -- 46 and 47 really should be read together. They

go to the issue of the constraints to be placed on the use of

media by the CIA, both for operational purposes and using

institutions for covert cover purposes.

In effect, this sets out a range of options that go from

simply commending them to establishing the prohibitions in

law, to going further, and pulling under

these prohibitions

categories of people who were left out by virtue of the fact

that they are not accredited.

Maybe you can expand on that, Bill.

Mr. Bader. I think it should be said here that I have

already read the CIA prohibition that they came out with in

February of '75, and that prohibition goes to the accredited

U.S. journalist -- let me read the language -- "to any paid

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or contractual relationship with any full time or part time

news

correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper,

periodical, radio or television network or station. That

prohibition,

as we see it, and the

Agency agrees, after some

long discussion with the figures, involves about one third of

the relationships that the CIA now has to U.s. journalists. or

employees of U.S. media organizations.

Senator Schweiker. Well, Bill, does this prohibit a guy

at CIA from hiring a guy from Reuters, and then Reuters plants

a story and of course, Reuters gets planted back here?

Are we excluding that possibility here?

Mr. Bader. We are talking..

here, Senator, only about U.S.

journalists and employees of U.s. media.

Senator Schweiker. Well, what is U.S. and foreign?

What

does foreign mean?

Mr. Bader. Where do you see "foreign?"

Senator Schweiker. Against any paid relationship with

U.S. and foreign journalists. What does that mean?

Mr. Schwarz. The foreign journalist.

Senator Huddleston. The forêign journalist would have to

be accredited to a U.S. news organization.

Senator Schweiker. It wouldn't mean that Reuters got it.

Mr. Bader. It is credited to you as +-

Mr. Aaron. No. It would be Arnold Buschrow working for

Newsweek. He is a foreigner working for U.S. news media.

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Senator Hart.of Colorado.

Is there any wa! to tighten

up the definition of "journalists?"

Mr. Kirbow.

Senator, that is attempted in 7 to mean that

anybody who contributes to the final printed word in recommenda-

tion 27.

Mr. Bader.

Senator Hart, on page 74 in a footnote we

give the Agency's definition of what "'accredited" means for a

journalist. "Formally authorized by contract or issuance of

press credentials to represent themselves as correspondents."

That is about the best

we have been able to do.

And since the Agency uses this terminology, we thought.

our recommendations ought to go to accepting their definition

and

then moving to those individuals in U.s. media organizations

who are

not covered, if you will, under this prohibition of

which in fact are the majority.

So what we are really talking about here are individuals

who are not accredited,

are administrative personnel in

U.S. media organizations who arrange cover or CIA agents

using media organizations as cover without accreditation,

freelance writers or stringers, and what: this recommendation

goes to is moving the CIA prohibition to cover -- to cover

all of those who have this relationship with U.S. media

organizations.

MI. Maxwell. Let me try to raise the question, then.

The

question is whether there is language that would cover a

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contractual relationship

between CIA

and foreign or United

States journalists accredited to foreign media organizations

which have a substantial relationship to U.S. media organizations,

i.e., if the CIA employed someone in Reuters, it is not a

U.S. media organization, and obviously there could then be the

problem that Senator Schweiker raised and the fact is not

that it is a foreign media organization. It is the foreign

media organization which has substantial contractual relation-

ship to U.S. media organizations: a number of U.S. media

organizations subscribe

to the Reuters service.

Is there a way that you could prevent the contractual

relationship with foreign

or U.S. individuals who are employed

by foreign media organizations that have

a substantial tie

to U.S. media organizations?

Senator Schweiker. It seems to me that unless you cover

that end, you are still paying taxpayers' money to throw

propaganda back into the

United States, and I think you get

back to the contractual relationship between the foreign

news service and this country, and I don't know why we should

not include organizations, foreign news organizations that have

meaningful contractual relationships in this country.

Now, I am not picking out Reuters per se, but I think that

is the kind of thing that is completely a loophole as I read

this thing. I am sure there are many other foreign news

services that have deals with AP or UP on an exchange basis

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back here.

Can't we cover that in some way because we have still got

the same problem.

Mr. Bader.

Well, the Subcommittee's recommendations didn't

go to that.

Senator Schweiker.

But that's a big loophole. Aren't

we kidding ourselves to think that Reuters writes a dispatch

that comes back here where some, whatever wire system buys

it, and we have a planted CIA story back here for domestic

dissemination.

Senator Huddleston.

I think the preponderance of the

evidence, of the statements at least, presented by the Agency

people, would be that the prime value of utilizing media

organizations lies in not the propaganda value and the question

of planting stories as much as cover for agents.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, would it be possible if, instead of

going to the contractual i

you went at regulations on planting

of stories in institutions such as Reuters, where there would

be a feedback problem.

Seemingly that could be done, rather

than ignoring the question

entirely, which the proposal does.

Senator Schweiker.

You could never police that one.

Mr. Kirbow. What is

the record on the views of this?

Mr. Bader..

On what?

Mr. Kirbow. On using Reuters for propaganda?

Senator Schweiker.

Well, I used Reuters because there is

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an allegation against it

right now that they are doing spying

for the CIA and that they

are on the payroll for the CIA and

that their correspondents

feed stories back here, maybe inad-

vertently, but Reuters is

the case in point.

Mr. Bader. The CIA's case in point is, as I understand it,

is they have not used Reuters.

Threy se

Mr. diGenova.. And the CIA's position also is that they have

planted stories in the foreign press and they have no way

of knowing how many times

stories have been reprinted in the

United States. They have

never tried to keep a record of it

and they simply don't know how many stories planted in foreign

news services have ever been reprinted in the United States.

That was Mr. Karamessines' testimony here during Greece, the

hearings on Greece.

Senator Huddleston.

MI. Madigan?

Mr. Madigan. I think we ought to consider, if we ban

the use of a foreign paper, to come back to the United states,

we would also, in fact,

have to be limiting the Agency's

propaganda overseas, necessarily.

There are two sides to the

coin.

While it might

be

beneficial to stop it from coming

back here, it also inhibits it from going overseas.

Mr. Maxwell. Well,

if you do it with those organizations,

they'd have a substantial

connection with U.S. media organiza-

tions like Reuters, allow

people to use it for cover, use

Reuters for cover rather

Ithan for planting stories, then there

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may be a tradeoff that you

can do without crippling it, that

effort.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, what's the thinking over here

about whether we ought

to

include foreign media?

Senator Mondale.

What

is your recommendation?

Senator. Huddleston.

Well, I think we have got to, number

one, look at the total

scope of our recommendations and limit

the extent to which we are reducing sources of our intelligence

collection operation. If we proceed with the premise that we

all said at the beginning that we need intelligence operations,

we have got tó

give them some room to operate. If we reduce

academics, if we reduce institutions, labor organizations,

students, media and publishing companies and whatever, we will

finally get down to the point where we are not left enough

to

carry on an effective operation.

I personally feel like we ought to address ourselves to

the United States media.

Senator Mondale. Accredited?

Senator Huddleston.

Accredited media.

Of course, I personally favor including the editors and

the executives of these organizations.

Senator Mondale.

Is that what the 47 brackets does?

Senator Huddleston.

47 :

Mr. Inderfurth. Is that where by law the prohibitions should

be extended, or are you just saying the Committee should?

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Senator Huddleston. I'm inclined to favor the law.

Senator Mondale. Well; why don't we move

46 and 47 to

see what happens?

Senator Huddleston.

All right, it is so moved. And we

will see what happens.

Mr. Madigan. Well, in 47, the language the way it is

written, it would preclude

some of these op ed pieces to the

New York Times. I am not sure that you want to make that "con-

tributes material." It is so broad that it would prohibit

any -

Mr. Miller. For example?.

Mr. Madigan. Anybody that wrote op ed pieces.. If you

wrote one and I wrote one that was printed in the New York

Times -

Mr. Aaron. I think you could fix this by saying. "regularly

contributes." I think the thought is less one that any of us

who may have sent a letter to the Times, for that matter.

Senator Huddleston.

well, it should be "contributed."

I don't know whether remuneration is the key or not, but it

should be part of the person's regular operations or work,

shouldn't it?

Mr. Bader. Mike, would "regularly" help?

Mr. Madigan. Yeah, I think "regularly" would cure that.

Senator Huddleston. All right, what is the vote on

46 and 47?

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Senator Schweiker.

Well; wait. When you say regularly,

what does

that mean?

Mr. Madigan. My concern, which must number in the

hundreds

for sure, if not thousands, who for one time in his

life has written a piece that appeared in the New York Times

or the Boston Globe or some other paper.

Mr. Maxwell. So William Colby wouldn't be covered by

this.

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60

Senator Schweiker. Well, I thought we were not covering

it when we say the CIA connection. Shouldn't we make that

distinction? In other words, as long as you identify the guy

as a

former

CIA or present CIA guy, I don't think he should

be limited in any way. I think the issue ought to be whether

you identify whether he was with the Agency as opposed to

whether he contributes regularly or irregularly.

Mr.diGenova. I think "operational use" implies clandestinity.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, aren't you talking about two different

things? In 45 you were talking about secret subsidies for

publication. In 46 and 47 you are talking -- you are worried

about the use of people connected with the media in some

substantial way.

Mr. Aaron. That is correct. This is not going to the

question of using journalists for propaganda purposes. This is

the use of journalists in operational activities, be they

covert action or espionage.

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MI.

Schwarz. But isn't Senator Schweiker's point a good

addition to 45, as you are going to rewrite it; that the CIA

would be prohibited from asking somebody covertly to put

an article in the op ed page of the New York Times.

MI: Aaron. Well, I think 45 does say "unless attributed

to the CIA."

Senator Mondale. A book or magazine article or publication.

Senator Schweiker. Well, when they told us here that

their policy was that they identify as the Agency, I would

like to have that included.

Senator Mondale. Well, put "article" in 45.

Mr. Schwarz. And also, Dave, what i regard as a subsidy,

and if

the CIA asks Mr. X to put an article in the New York

Times that is in effect a CIA article, you would want to

reach that.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think that we do, or we will make

sure that we do.

Mr. diGenova. You would also want to reach a covert

letter to the editor which is planted, or maybe we should put

in "any other written matter."

Mr. Madigan. You've eliminated all of Evans and Novak's

pieces.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think those

points ought to

be included in 45.

Senator Mondale. All right. . I move 46 and 47.

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Senator Huddleston.

46 and 47 are moved.

Is there objection?

Senator Mondale. I move 48.

MI. diGenova. I bring up one point:

We don't talk about

films in here.

Should we talk about films? There are lots of films on

Vietnam that they produced which are shown.

Senator Mondale. All right, "and films" in 45.

Senator Schweiker. Yeah, I'll buy that.

Senator Mondale. I move 48.

Senator Schweiker.. Well, can we put "films" in 45?

Senator Mondale. Yeah, that's in there.

Mr. Aaron. Yeah, if you are going to apply to all of the

media, you could put in "video."

Video is more important

than

film.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that a

record be obtained from the Agency on the film aspect if we

include it.

Senator Mondale. Well, let's put it in and then ask for

a

response from the Agency.

trom

MI. diGenova. Of course, if we haven't. done it, we don't

want to recommend that they do it.

Senator Mondale. Well, we know they made a film on:

Sukarno's life, what did they call it?

Mr. Schwarz.

Happy Days.

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Senator Mondale. Well, we are talking about attribution.

in 45.

48:

mean? "Prohibition"?

As interpreted by the Committee, what does "prohibition"

Mr. Aaron. This is the interpretation of what the CIA has

done. It is a little complicated.

Mr. Miller. We should spell it out.

Senator Mondale. w

Why don't you spell it out, tentatively

adopt it and then take

alook at the

Language.

MI. Madigan. This is the wrong bill number. It is 2784,

not 2284.

Senator Mondale. Well, the staff can work that out later.

Senator Huddleston.

This is prohibition against the use

of religious personnel.

Mr. Madigan. I would like to raise one other concern that

Senator Baker has in that this whole section, including the

parts that are in the academic section in terms of describing

books that were sponsored by the CIA, that we at least hear

the Agency, the view as to whether that should be sanitized,

as to the life of the person who wrote the book.

I have talked to Mr. Bader as to whether they should be

camouflaged enough as to whether that could be figured out,

but the Agency feels different about it.

Senator Huddleston. Well, the Agency will have an oppor--

tunity to review all of this.

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MI. Bader. They have seen the longer manuscript, and they

now have the principal findings and they have responded, and

they do want changes in references to books.

MI. Madigan.: This doesn't go to substance. This goes

to whether it should be disclosed publicly or classified.

MR. Bader.. I understand.

Senator Huddleston. Are we prepared to move on, then, to

proprietary organizations?

Senator. Mondale. Right.

1:

MI. Aaron. All right, now, the only question that remains

in the text on the section on cover relates to the discussion

of the Station Chief in Greece, Mr. Welch, and there was

some concern whether in light of the Agency's continued use

of this case, in light of the way they have treated this

particular case, and continue

to treat it, whether the Committee

should not in fact say more about it since their position for

the Committee and their position at least as reported in the

press, seems to be quite at variance with one another. I would

leave it to the Committee to instruct us one way of the other

on that particular point.

Senator Huddleston. Do you see any abjeetion to the final

paragraph on page 83? We have tried and revised that reference

to Mr. Welch to take out

any implication, actually, that the

loss of his cover contributed to his death, even though the CIA

itself has implied that on a number of occasions. Their own

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investigation to date reveals no evidence at al? that anything

to do with his cover or lack thereof contributed to his death,

and we don't want to say that.

Senator Mondale. That's good. In other words, the

question is, the decision to move into that house, and he

did it anyway..

Senator Huddleston.

In fact, they have covered that

themselves.

As a matter of fact, I think the State Department

has announced it is going

to discontinue listing its agents.

The fact is that there

is

no

cover for a working on the payroll

chief of station for the CIA for anybody that can read.

Senator Mondale. And as I understand it, for old CIA

types, this is a fight that they have been waging for 25 years.

They have been complaining that the cover isn't worth a damn.

This is not new.

Mr. diGenova. That's right, Senator, and in fact, the

paper, the longer paper on covert deals with that issue, including

the study which is summarized on page 82, which says that the

Agency has for years had a loose, a lax and a really a lack of

comprehensive theory and policy for dealing with the whole issue

of cover.

Now, the problem with that is we wrote all that out,

dealt with it in a very evenhanded manner. The Agency's

position is that they want nothing written about cover because

it is a method, nothing at all written about cover, and yet

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they continue to use the

death of Mr. Welch publicly, including

in Sunday's magazine section of the Post, and they put it very

funnily in the intelligence section of Parade Magazine. There

was a large section on

George Bush and the conclusion reached

from the article was that the exposure of Mr. Welch's name,

that

the publication of his name led to his death. It says

that in there. And that is clearly not the position of the

Agency before the Committee.

As David' said, they

are taking a position that his exposure

in the press had nothing

to do with his death as far as they

know. It was probably terrorist activity, but they would have

no way of knowing one way'or the other. But they continue

to take the position including that unauthorized briefing at

the Agency on the Israeli nuclear capability, that Mr. Welch's

death was due to his cover.

I think the Committee has to decide what it wants to say

regardless of their feeling about cover, in order to put to

rest these allegations.

Senator Mondale. When in here we don't disclose the

present method of cover.

We don't -- we don't say what it

is so that's certainly not blowing any cover that they have,

and we also-point out that the record shows that welch was

warned and disregarded it.

Rage 66

So I think that is good judgment to put that in there.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Madigan?

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Page 67

MI. Madigan. Senator

Baker has a reservation about Mr.

Welch. He feels, I think, that the Committee ought to distance

itself from that whole instance, and leaving aside the arguments

I just heard from Messis. Aaron and diGenova, whom I normally

agree with, the fact is no one knows who killed Richard Welch,

and until you find out who killed him, if that person wrote

it in that magazine, then there is a connection, and no one

knows who killed him so no one knows whether there is a connec-

tion or there isn't a connection.

And my problem with

this paragraph is the

fear that it

will be

interpreted by

the press as a statement by the Committee

that it wasn't because

his name was published, because we

don't mention that --

Mr. diGenova. We

do

in the larger report.

Mr. Madigan.

Well,

we don't in this paragraph, and it is

an issue that I think we

should keep as great a distance

from

as possible.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I'd like to say there are kind of two

different issues here. One is the fact -- is whether the lack

of cover had anything to do with his death. I think we just

don't deal with that issue. That's not

something -- we didn't

investigate it and we don't pretend to deal with it.

The second question

is whether he had any cover, and if

not, why not, and the record before this Committee is just

perfectly clear on that point, that his lack of cover had to

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with the fact that he was'living in the house of the former

station chief, that he was a station chief, station chiefs don't

have any cover, and so forth and so on. That's a point that

is worth making. It is important.

Senator Mondale. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, why don't

we tentatively leave it in the report, and when the final

report gets out, maybe those who strongly object to this can

be heard and we can finally decide.

Can we get on? Can

we do that and then get on to the

recommendations?

Senator Huddleston.

I'11 agree with that.

We might -- we might be able to accommodate some of

Senator Baker's objections.

Mr. diGenova.: Well!

in the text I would just like to note

one thing. :

There is a word missing on

top of 81, and the

word "sometimes brought" in between those, the words "sometimes

brought"

should be "unsuccessful."

MI. Kirbow.

I would just like to make a suggestion about

84, all of us know the ones that were brought before the

Subcommittee and concerned the former draft to the Agency.

I think there is evidence, both in the public record and private

that there were two former directors who attempted to use

their influence on behalf

of airlines. One is

a former Senator

from California and one

1s a

former Director from California,

Mr. McCone.

I think after the word "on one occasion" I think

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we should say "one or more". That kind of indicates there has

been a problem of former

senior people

at the Agency trying to

come back and influence them improperly.

Mr. diGenova. Well, there is only one thing. :I'm not

arguing whether. Mr. McCone did that or not. My record shows he

did. But this indicates

this occasion dealt with the disposal

of a propriety, and the other occasion dealt with influencing

Agency: polity to help Pan American Airlines.

It is not the same thing, but it does involve high level

influence.

But it is not the same thing as involving a

proprietary.

Senator Huddleston:

I have no objection to making it

plural.

Mr. diGenova. "One or more."

Mr. Madigan. If it

is clear McCone did it, why not mention

his name?

Mr. diGenova.

We have agreed not to use the name.in this

area.

The names are in the broader reporter, however.

Senator Huddleston. All right. Can we go then to the

recommendations on page 84?

Senator Mondale. Any problem with these?

These are pretty good. Any objections? It looks good,

Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Culbreach. I have a question.

Mr. diGenova.

Page 69

What about No. 60 on the cover? Since the

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Senator Huddleston. "We have got a problem on 59 also.

Mr. Maxwell. My understanding is it is now for official

use only. It is not for

sale. Do we want to go beyond that?

Senator Mondale. Are we talking now about the roster?

Mr. diGenova. Yes,

the Register and the biographical.

Senator Mondale. • That's in recommendation 60?

Why don't we go further and say it should not be published,

period?

Mr. Miller. It is useful internally.

Senator Mondale. Well, let them argue that. We are getting

a getting a bad rap. Why don't we just say they don't

publish it, and then-let them figure it out.

Mr. diGenova.

Shall we put "publication in any form,

classified or otherwise"?

Senator Mondale. There should be no public distribution

or publication of personnel data.

Mr. Aaron. Why don't we just turn it around and say

the Department of State should classify personnel data which

facilitates so and so?

Senator Huddleston.

Okay.

Is there any objection to that?

Mr. diGenova. This is the only time that the Committee

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recommends classification.

Senator Huddleston. Well, just above that on page 85,

No. 59, did you have something there, Charlie?

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I was asked by the Subcommittee to

determine the law as it relates to former high officials or

officials in the Department of Defense coming back and doing

business with their military services or with the agencies, and

the Department of Defense has furnished their regulation on

this, and it is 18 U.S.C. 281. In so many words. they are

prohibited for life, they prohibit by law for life the ability

of a senior or a regular military officer from ever doing

business in a contractual.ornegotiating for sale.or that

sort of thing with his own military service, and for three

years with any other military service of the Department of

Defense. Recommending to the oversight committee that they adopt

something along that line is not only satisfactory to the

Agency, but they welcome it because it would skip a lot of

their problems down.

Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Chairman, one other recommendation.

Perhaps it should read, by statute, former senior officials

of the CIA, because certain former officials seems to point

back to the text which means those officials that might have

sought improperly.

Mr. diGenova.

Of the CIA, after the word "officials."

Mr. Kirbow.

The other thing is I think the oversight

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committee may determine that you do not want to go down much

below maybe the Deputy Director level or the influence level.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, they can choose that, when you say

senior officials rather than certain.

Mr. Schwarz. Charlie, shouldn't the other one say by

statute something or other should be done, and this one says.

by statute, the oversight committee should -- just make it

conform.

Senator Huddleston.

All right, with that change, then, we

are agreed on 59.

Mr. Aaron. All right, the "certain" comes out, and the

second "certain"?

Mr. Kirbow. Well, that reads now "by statute, formers er

officials of the CIA should be prohibited from negotiating

with", etc.

Mr. Aaron. And just strike the second "certain" and.

say "other relationships should be prohibited such as," or

shall we say "the oversight committee should do that," because

we haven't really spelled out what they ought to be.

Mr. Kirbow. I think that's where you pass it over.

Mr. diGenova.

The oversight committee should consider

whether.

Mr. Aaron.. I think that takes us through these sections

and if they are so moved, then we can go on to the question

of intelligence liaison.

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Senator Mondale.

So moved.

Senator Huddleston.

Moved and adopted.

We can move over.

Mr. Kirbow.

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Would everyone agree here that this cover problem is so

great that we should not just say the CIA should undertake a

thorough study of this but go

straight to the National Security

Council where they

could have

some clout with the State Depart-

...-..-..

ment or otherwise in 61?

Senator Mondale. That's a good idea, yea.

Ms. Culbreath. Perhaps we ought to say. that the NSC

in consultation with the CIA and the State Department and

others:

Mr. Aaron. They can't

do it any other way.

Senator Mondale.

That

is good.

All right, now, I move, Mr. Chairman, the recommendation

62,

63 and 64.

Mr. Aaron.

We have a

¡question on 62.

Senator Mondale. Why

is it there?

Mr. Aaron.

We have

set of brackets for those. There is

a parenthetical statement.

The recommendation goes to a

very sensitive, clearly area of a relationship in the intelligence

field and other intelligence services, and the recommendation

is a general one requiring or suggesting that the oversight

committee be informed on these relationships.: We don't get.

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Senator Mondale.

Well, why don't we just take the

Vice Chairman's position?

Mr. Aaron.

That the whole section comes out?

Senator Mondale.

Well, we'll just have it classified and

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send the letter classified

Why argue about it?

Senator Huddleston.

think if a case could be made, and

I think if we attempt to talk about liaison we are going to

cause a lot of nervousness

with a lot of people in a lot of

foreign countries. Maybe there is -- maybe it would be best

just to classify this entire subject.

Senator Mondale. You

cannot get specific enough publicly

to do you any good anyway:

MI. Aaron. Well, let me see if I understand what is being

recommended.

Is it recommended that

62, 63, 64 and the entire text of

this be made classified?

Senator Mondale. Well,

the statute has to be public.

We say that in 63.

Mr. Miller. And the explanation of the problem on G

is a minimum.

Senator Mondale. Of course, that whole question, that.

has to be worked out between the executive and the Committee

anyway.

We are not going to

handle that.

Mr. Miller.

That's right.

Senator Huddleston. Well, let's for the time being adopt

it as it is, and if the Agency has a strong case for classi-

fication, then we can consider classification.

I think 63 probably should be public.

Senator Mandale. Yeah.

If they know how to pass a law

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privately, tell them to submit that information

Mr. Schwarz.

63 also is entirely consistent with the

position we have.

Mr. Aaron. I am not

sure where we stand.

MI. Kirbow.

We are going to consider the top of 87 through

the bottom of 88, with thei possible exception of 63, with the

possibility of remaining classified

Senator Huddleston.

¡If the Agency can convince the Commit-

tee or present evidence

tol the Committee that is persuasive,

that recommendation 62 should be classified, recommendation, and

63 and 64 should remain

unclassified, does that make sense to

you, Mr. Aaron?

Mr. Aaron. It does,

indeed.

Senator Huddleston.

All right.

The Inspector General..

•Mr. Aaron. I don't believe there is any issue here save

one, which I will turn tó Mr. Kirbow to explain. It goes to

the question of whether he is nominated and confirmed by the

Senate and the extent to which it is necessary for him to

report directly to the oversight committee.

Am I correct? Is that a proper statement

of the issue,

Charles?

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MI. diGenova. Page 93, recommendation 73 is that issue.

Mr. Miller. Didn't Senator Baker make a proposal?

Mr. Madigan. Senator (Baker's position was that the General

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Counsel is a unique and

powerful - should be powerful position

and it should be confirmed by the Senate.

Senator Mondale. That is consistent with Domestic.

Mr. Maxwell. The General Counsel of all of the Departments

and the independent regulatory agencies are now confirmed by

the Senate.

Senator Mondale. You also want the Inspector General

to be confirmed?

Mr. Kirbow. Not me, sir, because I didn't want the other

one confirmed.

MI. Maxwell. I think it was

that the Inspector General should

not be because you wanted! the Director should have his choice

person.

Senator Mondale. That was the Domestic position.

Senator Huddleston.

Any objection to the adoption of

this?

Mr. Schwarz. Elliot,*

"have you compared the words here with

ours?

MI. Maxwell. They are generally compatible.

I think that any differences are stylistic.

Mr. Schwarz. I think they ought to be 100 percent

compatible.

Ms. Culbreath. You

can

adopt ours.

Senator Mondale.

Well, at least you keep the momentum

going.

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Mr. Kirbow.

I think the important part of these recommenda-

tions is in 74A, and I think there is where these get a hold of

what

is going on in the Agency, and I think it is important that

you understand that. That is what is happening.

Mr. Aaron. .

He is made equivalent to a Deputy Director:

Senator Mondale.

All right.

Mr. Madigan.

On 91, to be consistent with Domestic, I

think you should say the Director should periodically order or

require, not request.

Mr. Schwarz. Why don't we leave it that Elliot will

spot any differences,

or

the staff, and if they can't --

Senator Mondale.

think instead of "request" we should

make it a requirement.

Senator Huddleston.

All right. It is so adopted.

We will move to the

Department of-Defense.

Mr. Aaron. All right, now, on the Department of-Defense,

first of all I want to say that we have a good deal of the work

that was done by the Defense Task Force shows up either in

the budget section of this paper, of the findings and conclusions

where we did a great deal

of work on the question of the budget,

or it is part of the material that has been worked upon on

the Domestic side with

regard

to NSA and some of its abuses and

so forth.:

The recommendations

therefore go particularly to DIA

and its effectiveness, and the suggestions made concerning its

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activities. It also makes

some general observations concerning

the charter of NSA and the consolidation of some of the activities

of the Defense Investigative Service, which I think by all

accounts has got a lot of

duplication involved in it.

We would add to the

recommendations, which begin on page

102 -- I'm sorry, they do

begin on 101 - we would add to

those

recommendations the

suggestion that the Director of

NSA be limited to ten years, should serve at the pleasure of

the President and in no event longer than ten years.

MI. Maxwell. Nominated by the President and subject to

confirmation by the Senate?

Senator Mondale.

May I make one comment?

That last paragraph of observations on 101, before the

recommendations, the study of "How can the technology of

advanced intelligence collection systems be better utilized to

assist the civilian and domestic agencies of the Government

without compromising the principal mission or security of

these intelligence systems?"

Mr. Aaron. Yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. What about civil liberties?

Are you suggesting that we should stop that and use it

there?

Mr. Aaron. The objectiof that suggestion, there is a great

deal of information available, for example, through overhead

photography that might be of use and utility within the

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United States. It can even be photography upon the United States,

watersheds and what have you, that would be useful.

Senator Mondale., What I'm saying is, and with the

fullest concern for its appropriate and legal -- put that.

That's not expressed in there.

Mr. Aaron. No, it's not.

Senator Mondale.

I think we should add that, the due

process concern.

Mr. Aaron. The other

thing that should be added is

the impact on the open processes of government.

Mr. Schwarz. David, it would help a lot, and I think

Senator Mondale's question is the same way, is what you are

saying is how can NSA's technology be used here because when

you use -- how do we predict crops better through photography?

You get a totally different problem.

Mr. Quanbeck. Well,

think you : have the problem of

classification.

Mr. Miller.

Well, I think Senator Mondale has the answer,

that these things done without adversely affecting civil

liberties.

Senator Mondale.

The legal and constitutional rights.

of the American people.

Mr. Aaron. The other question is if these things become

widely available and if you had the statute that the executive

or the President has proposed, then more people on the civilian

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side of the government would have to be cleared and com e under

the kinds of restrictions, decisions are made on perhaps on the

basis of classified information that hasn't occurred before.

Senator Mondale. Well, that can be done.

Mr. Aaron. We can work that out.

Beyond that I don't believe there are any bracketed sections

in this text.

Mr. Maxwell. The language can be made to conform with

the others?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, I think we can fix the format.

Senator Huddleston. You are going to fix the terms, the

term.

Senator Mondale.

The Director of the NSA should be

nominated.

Mr. Maxwell. It says "appointed."

Senator Mondale. That's wrong.

Ms. Culbreath. Well'

I thought from our meeting yesterday

that what we were going to do was have one general recommendation

which would go to all three of these major directors that

we were concerned with, the CIA, the FBI and the NSA, indicating

that they would be appointed at the President's pleasure.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we still ought to be consistent.

Senator Mondale. Well, I'm just getting technical,

lawyerish, but if someone is subject to confirmation, all the

President does is nominate him. He doesn't appoint him, and

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then is subject to the pleasure of the President. within that

2

term.

3

Ms. Culbreath. My question is, do we want one general

4

recommendation or do we want to put it in each one of these

5

sections.. That is what I am trying to get at.

6

Mr. diGenova. Both:

7

Senator Huddleston. Well, today, will one do it? Are

8

we talking about stylistic or simply mentioning them here. We

9

ought to be consistent every time we mention them.

We ought to

10

mention the term.

11

Ms. Culbreath. It seems to me if we had that as

12 general recommendation it wouldn't be necessary to put in

13

each of these sections.

14

MI. Maxwell. But there are people who are going to be

15

reading each of the individual sections for their own interest

• 16

and they ought to see that the head of NSA is nominated and

17

confirmed.

18

Senator Mondale:

I move everything else.

19

Mr. Aaron. All right.

20

Senator Huddleston. All right.

21

We are to the Department of State and ambassadors.

22

23

Mr. Aaron. Right, and in this section we have two

bracketed recommendations, going to the question of the authority

24

of the

Ambassadors and their responsibility in the field for

25

supervising the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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By statute, the ambassadors are

now held responsible for

all activities within their country by elements of the United

States Government. The agencies of the government are

responsible

to keep the Ambassador fully informed of all of their activities

As you know from the hearings that took place --

Mr. diGenova. David, where are you?

Mr. Kirbow. Page 107:

Senator Mondale. Page 108.

Mr. Aaron.

We've turned to 109, actually. Well, the

recommendations begin on 108.

MI. Kirbow. On 107 Mr. Bader and I both

have

some concern

about unsupported charges, but I am willing to go on to

109 and come back to it.

Mr. Aaron. I would be happy to come back to it.

Dealing first with the recommendations on 109, the

statutory responsibilities are to be fully informed for these

activities, both the ambassador is held accountable and the

agencies concerned are supposed to keep him fully informed.

Now, it is a fact today that these instructions have

never been issued, instructions to implement this legislation

have never been issued.

I believe, Senator. Mondale, you were there during the

exchange with Ambassador Porter in which he suggested that

they had been suspended, if you will, the law had been

suspended by the absence of instructions to implement them.

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There are two recommendations here in brackets designed to

give the Ambassador and the Department of State the kind of

access required to carry out his responsibilities.

The first

we might just take up is to give the ambassador the statutory,

or give him the right, if you will, of access to the operational

communications of the Clandestine Service. It provides for

an exception if the National Security Council decides that for

one reason or another certain operational messages should not

be made available to the

bility into the National

ambassador, but it puts that responsi-

Security Council which has the overall

responsibility for directing our foreign policy and intelligence

activities, and does not

leave

it, as it lies today, at the

discretion of the station

chief who may or may not show opera-

tional messages to the ambassadors.

As a practical matter, I believe it is fairly clear from

the record that we have of interviews as well as discussions

that most ambassadors would not want or take advantages of

this kind of access.. What it does is it provides

them with

an opportunity to do so if they feel it is necessary in the

execution of their responsibilities.

On the other hand, there have been many ambassadors who

have taken the position that

-without such

access they can

really never know

whether

they are in control or being kept

fully informed.

Senator Huddleston.

Charles?

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Mr. Kirbow. Yes, sir.

I would like to discuss the broad issue of the responsi-

bilities of the Ambassador, his access to this and to other

communications of the Agency, unless the Agency is relieved

of this responsibility for protection of sources and methods.

I think there is a way to accomplish it without him reading the

operational traffic which, if the Committee is not aware, goes

into great detail on certain -- well, I will give you an

example of the type of thing that we are talking about him having

free access to, and that

is, take one of the agents recruited

in the United States that then he goes back to a foreign

country and they give him, before he leaves here, certain

detailed instructions on how he is to make his first contact.

When that first contact is made there in that country, a

message goes back from that station to the headquarters that

whatever the code name of the agent is has in fact complied

with his original instructions and I have in turn issued him --

and then they set forth the instructions that have been issued

for whatever he is going to do.

It is this type of operational traffic which involves

probably the most carefully protected sources and methods

information in the United States government. It involves at

the outset of the first

contact, grave risk to the man's life

if he is in fact furnishing this type of information.

The Agency is concerned about broadening this. Apparently

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the President of the United States and the Secretary of State

have been concerned about it because they have not seen fit,

although this

other statute has

been around for some time, not

to require that this be done by

regulations promulgated by the

Secretary of State.

I think that it is a matter

that should be of some serious

concern for the oversight committee along with the executive

branch. Something should be done to reconcile these. two

differences in the law.

Senator Mondale. Well, let

me ask you.

Are you arguing now

that the law is ambiguous and not clear?

Mr. Kirbow. Only one point,

Senator.

It is in conflict.

The executive is in conflict with another law on the books, and

in that respect there is a problem as to what information.

Senator Mondale. But the law apparently requires that all

of these things shall be under the control of the ambassador

within each country.

Is that Public Law 93-475?

Mr. Kirbow.

In other words, he is the bottom line.

Senator Mondale.

Is there

another act?

Mr. Kirbow. Well!

the 1947

Act says that the protection

of sources and methods. shall be

the responsibility of the

DCI.

Senator Mondale:

But not that.

Mr. Kirbow. You could go further and say sources and methods.

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Apparently it hasn't been in the

past. The thing with classi-

fied information of this nature,

it has always gone not to just

having the clearance, it has also gone to the additional step,

even here, of having the need to

know.

Senator Mondale.

well, I'm

not getting to this point

of what the policy is, I just am

trying to find out what the

law is.

Mr. Kirbow. Both laws.. Your bottom line is correct.

Senator Mondale. The law says they must do it, but then

you say you must also leave that law in conjunction with the

sources and methods provision of the '47 act.

MI. Kirbow. That is the only point.

My. diGenova. The only thing is the '47 act says sources

and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and the position of

the ambassador is they

are authorized recipients under that

statute.

Senator Mondale.

SO

"you don't think there is an ambiguity.

Senator Huddleston.

David?

Senator Mondale.

Surely the executive does

not possess

the power to suspend a law if it

is clear. No one argues that,

do: they?

Mr. Madigan. I don't

think

that's the case.

Mr. Kirbow. No, sir.

MI. Madigan. The law.

says

they are authorized recipients..

It does not require that they be given these materials.

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85:

There I think is where the rub is. I think it is a --I don't

think it is a question'of the executive disregarding the law,

as I read this section.

Mr. Aaron. I think it would be helpful if I read the

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Senator Mondale. All right, let's try that.. No, let's

argue about it and then read it.

Mr. Aaron. This is the authority and responsibility of

ambassadors.. Under the direction of the President (1) United

States Ambassadors to a foreign country shall have full

responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision

of all United States Government officers and employees in that

country except for personnel under the commander of the United

States area commander; : (2)

the Ambassador shall keep himself

fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and

operations of the United States Government within that

country and shall ensure that all government officers and

employees in that country, except for personnel under the

conmand of the United States area military commander, comply

fully with his directives,meaning the ambassador; (3) any

department of agency having officers or employees in a country

shall keep the United States ambassador to that country fully

and currently informed

with respect to all activities and

operations of its officers

and employees in that country and

shall ensure that all of its officers and employees, except

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for personnel under the command of United States

area military

commander, comply fully with applicable directives of the

ambassador.

Senator. Mondale. Now, does somebody have the language of

the sources

and methods portion of the '47 act?

Mr. Maxwell. The DCI is charged with protecting the

sources and methods of intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.

Senator Mondale. You don't think there is any conflict?

MI. Maxwell. No, there is no unnecessary conflict. There

is potential conflict, Senator, but the conflict, I think, is

spoken to in the recommendation.

Senator Mondale. You mean who is authorized is the

ambiguity.

Well, who is authorized?

Mr. Aaron. Well, the first recommendation of the subcom-

mittee, which has not been questioned, was that these

instructions be issued

quickly and that these ambassadors are

authorized recipients of this information.

Senator. Huddleston. Well, Mr. Lombard has a question.

Mr. Lombard. Well, Id just like to make a comment on

No. 2 in the bracket. First of all, when you say ambassador,

are we really talking about the ambassador, because if the

ambassador is going to try to delve into operational messages,

there's going to be delegation of authority to others. on his

staff, and a proliferation of strictly operations. I think

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the Committee ought to

want to make a distinction between

the reporting that goes from a station and the operational

messages.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Cháirman, may I comment on that?

That is not a useful distinction. The reason it is not

is that the point of the recommendation is to provide the

ambassador with the access to the operational messages if he

deems it is necessary to fulfill his legislative responsibility.

Now, we do not have

to recommend that he have that authority,

but we shouldn't confuse

it by saying that he can't see what

they write, because basically he does see what they write. He

does see their reports, and certainly that would be part of it.

The question is whether you want to recommend that he

be given this access, and

we can either vote it up or down..

Mr. diGenova. Well, perhaps with regard to the first point

that Mr. Lombard makes about the first point of delegation to

other persons would be to put ambassadors personally should have

the right to access, and just dealing with the language which

is bracketed here, to deal with the first criticism.

Personally

should have the right, and make the point that they would not

be permitted to delegate that right of access to another

subordinate, that it is of such a higher nature --

Senator Mondale. That's all right, shall have personal

access, but in any event, the NSC, they can do anything they

want

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Mr. diGenova. NSC can cut them off.

Mr. Aaron. I think that is an important saving clause.

Senator Mondale.

Doesn't that take care of them?

Mr. Lombard. Actually I have a much stronger position on

this; I think, because of the varying qualities of ambassadors

that we have that if we - and I think this is one of the

reasons why the regulations have never been promulgated, because

we have ambassadors in some countries for various reasons

who are not felt trustworthy to have this kind of information.

Now, you can argue that we jought to have better ambassadors,

but we have to take the real world. We have some that are

inclined to spill information at cocktail parties, and we know

who they are, and here we äre opening the door.

Senator Mondale. Well, we have CIA spilling about atomic

bombs..

Mr. Lombard. That was a mistake, and they admitted it.

Senator Mondale. There is a structure that we can set up

that is rational,

and to have several different conflicting

policies within the same country it seems to me is intolerable,

and it is better to put the blame where it should go, with the

ambassadors and say well, let us get a better class of ambassadors.

Maybe we would be more serious about who we send to these

stations, particularly the hot stations. And secondly, we

leave in the NSC the authority to take them out of the loop

whenever they believe he should not be in it.

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So that, in other words, what would happen is that they

would take the ambassador out of the loop, for all practical

purposes, only in important

circumstances where consciously

they have decided this generalized policy of a single ambassador

in charge of a policy within a country must be circumvented.

I think that is a good policy because I think the present

system is totally capricious. Moreover, I think an ambassador

tends to be for all of their problems strong in the one

area

• where CIA action personnel tend to be the weakest, namely

in political sophistication.

Mr. Maxwell. That's also why we focus on the personal

access.

Then the ambassador has to take responsibility.

Senator Mondale. And this will obviously be something up

for review when all the Senators are here.

So why don't we adopt lit tentatively. That way, I

understand, we have to go back to it.

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, 'are you agreed that we should put in

afterward, before the right, the word "right", personal, not

to be delegated?

Miler cautest, p90

Senator Huddleston.

All right.

Does that take us down

to 5?

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Mr. Miller. One question here.

Senator Huddleston.

What about a question after it has

been adopted?"

Mr. Miller. What about if the ambassador is out of the

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country, the charge?

2

Mr. Kirbow. Now you come to the problem that the CIA

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faces.

Mr. Aaron.

I seriously feel this is not the level the

Committee has to get down to. I think if the law sticks to

the ambassador, how the executive wishes the -- if the executive

wants the charge to execute it in the absence of the ambassador,

well, : then, they have to do it.

Senator Mondale.

Well

5, if 2 is adopted, that takes care

of 5. The only reason for

5

--

Mr. Kirbow. No, Senator, that is a totally separate

question here, and one

which we have heard no evidence before

this Committee, and that

is

the reason it is bracketed, of

why that should ever be

taken and given back to control, all

of the communication systems of the CIA be given to the control.

of the State Department.

To my knowledge, there is not one

word of testimony.

Senator Mondale. Well, to my knowledge, though, it got

started with Gronowsky, and I checked this with Porter and he

said, that's right.

What happened was that the international

communications system of the various embassies was in total

disrepair, second rate materials. You couldn't encode

properly. It was all Model-T stuff. And the only agency.

that had any money to put in a modern communication system

was the CIA, and the CIA agreed to provide it, provided they

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could control it, and Gronowsky said that was the single biggest

impediment to an ambassador's control of an agency because

that right of the private loop, where the CIA knows everything

the ambassador is doing, and the ambassador only knowsswhat

the CIA wants him to know

It is a one way deal.

Mr. Kirbow. If you do

• 2, you just strike 5 and leave it

where it is.

Senator Mondale.

If you do 2, you take care of 5, don't

you?

Mr. Aaron. If 2 is

accepted, I think you go a long ways

toward solving that problem.

Senator Mondale.

Why don't we flag 5 and ask NSC to

review in light of this

history who should control communications.

Let the NSC handle that

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think it should be clear on

the record, too, if all of the Senators do not know it, there

is a channel over which the CIA only has operational control.

Any time the

ambassador of any person that he delegates, they

may encrypt a message, go out over the Roger channel I think

it is referred to, and even the CIA man who is transmitting it

from the other end, who also again encrypts it so it cannot be .

picked up by an enemy of the reader who copies it out here

never knows what is

• sáid

'in that message.

It goes to the

Department of State,and only there do they have the decoding

device.

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Senator Mondale.

But by passing this to the NSC again we

don't get into that issue.

Mr. Aaron. So we would recommend that to the NSC or

the oversight committee or both?

Senator Mondale. The NSC take a look at this.

Mr. Aaron. The NSC:

Mr. Kirbow. I think we should consider whether it not

be done.

Senator Mondale.

Is that everything approved?

Senator Huddleston.

Everything up to 110.

Senator Mondale.

Are we going to adjourn now?. I have got

to go.

Senator Huddleston.

think we are up to the budget,

and I think that's probably

more than we can handle.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Huddleston.

Let us come in at 9:30.

Senator Mondale.

He

just said that No. 5 ought to be

reviewed by the NSC without -- and just be neutral on it.

Mr. Kirbow. Not recommending who should control it.

Senator Mondale.

That is all right with me.

Senator Huddleston.

9:30 tomorrow all right?

Senator Mondale. Fine with me.

Mr. Madigan. The text of the State Department is at

variance with my memory of

the record, and Senator Baker would

like to have the Agency's view on the accuracy of this section.

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MI. Aaron.

To what are you referring, Mr. Madigan?

MI. Madigan. I'm

particularly referring to the so-called

pressures on

the DCI changes his view with regard to intelli-

gence estimates.

Mr.. Miller. The SS-9?

MI. Aaron.

well, we

are waiting. We are going to return

to that issue with a stack of relevant documentation, and I

might say, Mr. Chairman, that there are some bracketed sections

in the text. There are some questions that have been raised

concerning examples here.

More than a week ago

we asked the CIA to comment on them.

I have telephoned them on

three occasions.

They have not

yet commented.. I hope they will do so soon.

MI. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. Before we leave

this section, I have pointed out that on 107 there appear to

be two paragraphs which we

asked, in fact, I guess Mr. Aaron

had sent Ambassador Truehart out to the Agency to seek the

evidence on those two paragraphs.

Senator Huddleston.

Which two?

Mr. Kirbow. On page: 107, the first and second

paragraphs. I think Mr. Bader, who did the investigation and

handled CIA should be heard on this matter.

MR. Bader.

Well, Mr.

Chairman, I agree with Mr. Kirbow

that these issues and these

charges should be fully vetted

at the Agency, and the Agency should be given ample opportunity

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to respond to them. And I ithink that is the process we are

now in, which I support.

I don't think the paragraphs should stand until we hear --

or rather, they should stand until such time as we hear from

the Agency.

Mr. Kirbow. There is

a problem with that, Mr. Bader.

Mr.

Miller knows that he only

sent those point papers out there in

which all of this is so-called imbedded for a clearance on

sources and methods. He did: not send it out there for a factual

dispute between the text.

Mr. Aaron. If I may

try to clarify this, I have discussed

with Mr. Elder, I have discussed these examples with Mr. Elder

on three occasions now.

Ambassador Truehart took the text of

these two paragraphs out

the Agency, described the circum-

stances. Ambassador Truehart was in fact present on these

various visits. There has

been discussion at the Agency. They

have -- or their last word

to me was on Friday, they felt

that they would have in hand that day the relevant comments..

I have still not heard from them. I will attempt to contact

them once again this afternoon to ascertain what-their reaction

is to it.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, this section will remain

open.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Miller to make it

clear, because I have been under a misapprehension, and I am

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sure the Vice Chairman has, it was the opinion of the Vice.

Chairman that the documents were being sent to the Agency for

sanitization only of sources and methods, and that you had

specifically indicated that their views on the positions taken

by the Committee and whatnot were neither solicited nor desired,

or words to that general effect.

If it is different,

think it should be made clear now

to the Agency what we expect of them.

Mr. Miller.

Well

let me clarify. On the larger paper.

of the Ambassador, factually if they see any errors of fact

they are to so indicate, and of course, sources and methods.

"On the findings and recommendations, I have asked them for

a factual opinion because

¡there are areas, such as you have

indicated here, sources:

and methods. We are not interested

in whether we like or dislike them, although we are going to

solicit their views on

their likes and dislikes in an informal

setting, but that is the situation.

I have always asked them for factual correction where they

are in a position to do so,. and that includes the findings

and recommendations.

Mr. Kirbow. I appreciate that, but that did not appear

to be Mr. Bush's position when he talked to the Vice Chairman.

He felt he had certain constraints, what he could and could

not do in recommending, but I appreciate the clarification.

Mr. Miller.

That has always been our procedure.

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Senator Huddleston.

Well, I certainly want to correct

any errors of fact.

All right.

We will

adjourn, then, until 9:30 tomorrow

morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:10

o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed,

to reconvene at 9:30 o'clock a.m., Wednesday, March 24, 1976.)

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