CIA FILE ON FORMER DC/CI FILE, CLIPPINGS, NOTES, ETC.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10 196-10029

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

The attacher preseniatten

was firen ty

Sir, Narrian Smith of EI/SPE:

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Talk to be given at an OSI Intelligence Collection Seminar 8o

be heldion 22 and:23 February 1971.

Yesterday and today you have held discussions on the intélligence

collection process, targetting, and exploitation. Ta this hour long diss

cugelon of counterintelligence, I am going to continue shas process. I

am going to tall about intelligence collection, the process of targetting.

and the procees of exploitation. However, in contrast to the other

speakers in the seminar, I am going. to discuss you as a target.

for most of us serving in the Directorate of Science and Tech-

nology or the Directorate of Intelligence, security on a daily basis

consists of showing your badge to the man at the door and making sure.

that your safe is closed at night. During the day we associate with our

colleagues who wear badges to testily to the fact they have been cleared.

Outsiders who come into view also wear badges indicating that they too

have been cleared. Thus wrapped in this cloak provided us by security,

few of us give much thought to the fact that a major power " ith endless

funde considers the United States and in particular the Central Intelli-

gence Agency to be the "main enemy, the primary adversary, the

prime target. " There le documentary proof of this. I can jo on to

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say that in this age of sechnology where, in my view, the United States

has no equal, the Directorate of Science and Technology and lls offices

such a's the Office of Scientific Intelligence rate pretty high on the

priority list of targeto. It has to -- look al the publicity -- and look

at: thé fact that as ao many of you know, the Soviet technological gap

is something the Soviete are trying to close fast. Interestingly

enougb, the KGB S&T elfort has expanded in roughly the same time

frame as DDS&T. Before 1956, there were small S&T sections which

were part of geographic area divisions. Aböut 1956/57, these Isolated

sclentific units were consolidated into an S&T department and in 1963,

the department was upgraded into a full fledged directorate. Ad far

as overseas representation is concerned, the USSR has 41 slots. in

IAEA. Iwenty percent of these are occupied by KGB S&T case officero.

O.K., so you never heard of any Russians snooping around OSI

and besides security is there with badges and locked safes, etc...80

we are protected from' attack,

Don't you believe it. Let us for a

moment pretend that we are KGB or GRU operations officers and that

we wish to penetrate OSI. How do we go about it? Do we send one of

our nice Soviet lads to call? Do we use a case officer from one of the

Eastern European satellites? Just for an idea of the magnitude of

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the known resources available lo us as KGS dificers, consider that

in 1969 there were more than 21, 000 Soviet citizeng resident in some

77 non-Communist countries. Of lese almost air thousard were

official Soviets and sixty percent or 3,560 of these official Sorlets

were intelligence officers. Putting this in local terms, there are 100

Soviets officially listed as diplomats al the Embagsy kère in Hashing-

ton. It would be möre than prudent to assume that at least 60 of these

people are Soviet intelligence officers. In addition to this formidable

array to which I have Just ailuded, the seven Eastern European Commus

' Diet countries have among them nineteen different intelligence services.

Adding to the Washlngton contingeat from these services brings our

number tip to about 100. Bloc intelligence officers. Ah, but you day

the FBl watches them. Do they? Consider the atatiaties. Assuming

a 3 man aurveillance team, which is far too few for a good surveillance

operation, 24 hour per day coverage of thesé people would on the basia

of 3. eight hour shifts require 900 people in the street seven days per

week. With these figures, you are talking about some 20% of the

entire FbI stall of agents just to handle thia small piece of lbe pro-.

blem. Nevertheless, If all we had to worry about were these 100 Bloc

agents in Washington, we could rest easy. At the moment for example.

the FBI Is terribly concerned about the proposed new Soviet

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¡Consulate in san Francioco which will turn louse the KCh un the

No, the chancés are that the fellor: we need to sorry absue lo

a nice irlendly Americin or hio liaison counterpart wio is in the

bullding and who is wearing a badge. In other words, a penetration

agent.. With the use of that term, let me digress for a moinent and

try to lay out for you , hüt counterintelligence la all about.

There are-several waya to look at counterlitelligence. One

ching that it l0 not la another name for security, even though there

are security factors lavolved. Within ClA, we try to defend or protect

thrce things: our people, our installatluns, and our activitico. Pro-

tecting people and thinga lo the primary job of the Office of Security.

Within the Clandestige Service the third item, protecting our activitica,

19 a joint responsibility between the various area divisions and the

• Counterintelligence Staff. Traditionally speaking, there has not been

, a function similar to a Counterintelligence Staff In DO)S&T because

traditionally they were not engaging in operational activities which

had to be protected. This, as you are aware, is no longer true. Some

of us who have been exposed to both sides of the house are somewhat

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uneasy that auch lipbly seasicire scientifle and dectrical information

and operationa

are 10e botier prurected than they are.

lioever, this

la, los my paro, a. perasmil spinion.

L'ader the derma of NSCIO NU. 5, tue CLA and da dura the Cl

Staff has USIU responsibility for counterintelligence abroad. This

means shas Cl Stall is lo provise due lead in developing a central register

of people of counterinselligeace interest, developing cousterintelligence

doctrine, setting up channels for abaring Cl Information, etc. & does

not meani that wo act as policeman for the communley. Fact agency l

responsible for poldeing its ora house; and frankly some io.a better

job shan others, However, inere la direct overlapping in the jet age

berveen Cin's reuponalbilities and the internal sécurlly responsibilities

of she FBI. There lo nó cléar line d demarcation boween U.S. Agencies.

All work together..

As an activity, Cl work can be considered to le firo matching

halfo; security and counterespiorage. Security conolato of establishing

pasaira on stalle defonaco againsi dil hurtiie ind concraled attempte

to interier with our intelligesce funetlons regardless of who tries to

Interfer and protecting our secrets. Counteresplunags un the other

hand reguires the identification us a specific advereary, a knowledge

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cóstal apacitie ope rallona he lo carrying out and lie countering or

neutrall-ing of hls operations ly pencirating or manipulating. them so

thas their tbrust de turned back lipon the agreasor.

•Finally, andichla to me lo the real guis of Cl as I know 1e, a

defensive service, auch.io a Countertrelligence Stall, cannot simply

sit and-build delenelve barriera. It must accept a responsibility

bevond the requirements of security if we read accurity to mean pro-

lection agalnal clandestine ur covert arracks on our people, Installátions,

and activitles. I tala is all we seck to do, any sopbisticated intolligence

service such ad the ¿GB of GRU, will be tou strong for us; and we will

fiad ourselves unequal to the taglió Cood counterintelligence must be.

aggresalve. I must learn all is can abou our enernies, learn their

secrets and be privy to their councils. In other words, the one tran-

scending objective of counterintelligcnce is the penetration of the eneuy

Intelligence service, A Soviet defector is of inuch less value than a

clandestine penetration of the Soviets service becauae with a defector,

the Soulets know precisely wial le inew and inus how badly they are

burs. With a penetration, you have the unly means of really knowing

whether you yourself are penetrated.

Insofar as the organiialion and activities of a counterintelligence

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spall are iccierned, lla structure dai titions are to a large extent

determined dy the acilvidles of lis alie; aireraary and by national ube

Jectires. li our case thie would of course be the kGU and GRU.

Basically speaking, inost El Stallo Dreai doira loço an operations group

and a rescarchand inalysis group, wi: the usual administrative supe

port including a very strong rechnical anii." The operations group.

carries en such activitles as durveillane and countersurvelllance.

penetraticas, provocalions, doble aird eperationo, technical operations

ánd countertechnical operations, courieriatelligence interrogations and

debrieflngs, she handling of walkoins and defectors and joint operations

wis various foreign Halson acrrices and operational security reviews.

I will be glad to deline and/or expand is lãe méaning of any of these au

you desire. Are there any queations?

A Cl operations group with worlionide responsibilities is usually.

broken don into geographle areas wich sa operations branch fur each

area. A typical operations branch tould dave a countercapionage unit,

a countersuureralon unit, a counterpropaganda salt, 'and'an operational

security. unit.

#bile the operations group and branches are worrying about the

day-to-day problems involved in the basiliag of operations uf the typi

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•e have just described, she is de A unde is analysing all of the dala ola

ladned, revioine doclaire dod audiance and putting out reporea abous

developrients and trends as call ao apecific stúdies re the enemy in

much the same manner as you write a repori in D5l, « ith uf course

the big difference that Cl reporta are Intended primarily for Cl audiences

and policy purposcs so luat the claculation is much lege thap is she case

To an OSI or EMSAC produci.. The l la 1 unli looks de the activities

ol an individual KG officer as täctical reporting: Actiully of the

Sorter Embaday an a wasle do considerei to be operational reporting

while operationo of lbe 1.OL la toto are abscased as virategic reporting.

Stace all intelligence organizations handle certala altuations in certain

ways and each has its hallmarke which reflect among ather thlags tue

society which it represents, long-term analysis by the R8: A unit la

crucial to establiah the standard operating procruures for recognizing

Soviet operations for shat they are and then countering them.

Now, back to you as a target.. Naturally the KGB would like to

achieve that ultinate sucèess - a penetration of CIA. Having an agrit

in the enemy Intelligence service lo a particularly rewarding pastime

because people in latelligence services inow so much about what 19

going on in their own country that is classified. Many of you, for instance.

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iris a great deal abing highly claseified projecte in the Pentagon which

have little or nothins do du with our intelligence cóllection or analysis.

Il you are working the Sories ADri problem yoù get to know a great

deal about our own AbM.

Many people work long hard hours to try to loure that the KGU

doca not succeed in getsing a atall employee on their payroll.

Over the past five yeare attempts by forclen intelligence offcero

priricipally Soviet, to recruit U.S. Government employees have been

reported at the rate of about two a day." During thia perlod there were.

more than 1, 000 Incidents la which the foreigner fell he had devéloped

the employce to the point that he could. come right out and malic the

recruitment pitch. Mods of those targeted were State Repartment

employees, with the Agency and the Department of Defense led for

second. This at least shows that the KGB li trying. But perhaps the

most signifleant thing to think about is this. If this many cases were

reporied, how about the recruitment attempto that were not.

dy purpose In reviewing the above is not to make you start

looking crosseyed at your colleagues, but merely to suggest that you

give the matter some thought from time to time.

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Let's adourne that we have been auccessful in keeping any hol

agent off the payrull. Vibad do they do next? Who else comes into the

ClA Headquartern building?

•I found out socently, lo my great surprise,

¡bat there are 100, 000 visitore to thia building in a year's time. But

let's get specllic, let's talk about.0s1..

Between Mugust 1970 and carly this month, OSI had 793 visitors..

Of this number, the bulk, or 454, were from other Government agencieo,

138 were contractore cleared by CIA, while the remülning 201 were

private inuividuals who either hold no clearances at all or hold some

kind of clearance from another Government agency:

Unfortunately, GIA is rather unique in spending the sloto, money

and manhours in clearing people. As you know, we have our own clear-

ance system and do not, rely on the checko of othere for our employees or

our constractors..

With other agencies, and particularly with the Departo

ment of Defense, with employees and coutractora in the millions the kind

of investigative checko we perform la ClA would run to the thousands of

people and the billions of dollars, and in all likelihood the whole defense

effort would grind to a screeching halt if they did.

Too often then an individual with a top secret clearance from

another agency le simply an Individual whose name, when checked

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againsi the lists dá the varione occurity agenciea (National Agency

chocid, failed to diaclose any so-called derrogatory information.

can tell you off the record that there are a number of individuals who

worked abroad on classifled projects for foreign governments for several

years who then returned to this country and promptly were granted top

secret clearances by U.S. agencies without a word asked.

With this the case it followó that some of these people may well

be working for someone besides Uncle Sam.

Along that line, I can also

say off the record that there were among those 793 OSI visitors In the

last six months people who were in fact working for someone besides

Uncle Sam.

Again, the foregoing is not calculated to make you into a suspi-

cious security officer type at all. Hopefully it will get you away from

the state

of mind where this sort of thing never occura to you. In

conclusion I have some specific suggestions to make which are not big

deal but which, ií implemented, can be of help to us all.

I you are dealing with people outside the Agency, or inside for

that matter, there is no need to tell them everything you know about

everything just because they are cleared. If they come to tali about

apples, stick to apples. Don't give them i gratis tour of the orchard.

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¡ une di your contractors or a foruer colleague in industry

really tries to pump you about things that are moza of hie concern, sout

Isim ofi. il her persiota, tell someone.. "tile he is probably trying so

gei more business from us for hia firm, there may be sione to it thas

chiar.

Il CIA Headquarters icene a glamorous place to your former.

colleagues and neighbors, leave it that way. Qua's give them a gulded

sour just for the hell of it.

Don'i assume that just because she guy does nos bare a Russiaa

name or speak with an accent that he is 1005 Ch. The ideal KGS agent

1a the W.A.S.P. With a Yale degree and a pedigree shat geis him intu.

the Sons of the American Revolution. • Fven if your guy is just great, be

may have a boas or colleague back at the ranch who is nos do great.

This le something, to be kept particularly in mind when dealing with

foreign liaison people. Be particularly wary of the liaison type --

remember Fuchs, Vassal, Philby, and Bossard. And finally, juat

because your friend was cleared for top secret whatsis sit months ago,

don't automatically assume be atill is. Check. He may have been fired

in the interim.

Are there any questions ?

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