Originator: WH
From: BROMLEY SMITH
Document date: 7/9/63
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

LBJ

177-10002-10025

RECORD SERIES:

PAPERS OF SMITH, NSC STANDING GROUP MEETING, JFK, VOL. 1, BOX 24

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

WH

FROM:

BROMLEY SMITH

TO :

TITLE :

DATE: 07/09/1963

PAGES:

4

SUBJECTS :

NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY RECORD OF NSC STANDING GROUP MEETING

CLASSIFICATION : #holassified

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

DOC. #26

v9.1

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Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 9/63

July 9, 1963 - 5:00 PIM

1. Progress report on integrated action program toward Cuba

Desmond Fitzgerald reviewed developments and actions of the past

three weeks since the approval by the group of the integrated action

program for Cuba. He mentioned two events which are scheduled

for the 26th of July. He was reading from notes.

Mr. Harriman called attention to the relation of action in Cuba to

his mission to Moscow.. He said he hoped to be out of Moscow by

the 25th or 26th of July. He appeared anxious to avoid giving the

Russians an opportunity to raise with him our Cuban policy on the

basis of actions which had taken place during the time he was in

MoScOW.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be a discussion of the

State/USIA paper containing a draft statement of what we hoped to

see develop in a post-Castro Cuba.

There was a discussion as to how to handle press inquiries about

developments in Cuba such as raids from outside Cuba and sabotage

actions within Cuba. It was agreed that we should flatly deny any

U.S. Government involvement in any of these activities. Eurther

consideration is to be given to the suggestion that President Betancourt

take credit for certain actions as reprisals to sabotage actions which

have occurred in Venezuela.

2.

Report on Spain (copy of paper attached)

There was general agreement with the report on U.S. policy toward

Spain. However, doubt was expressed that the offer proposed in the

report would appear sufficiently attractive to the Spanish to cause

them to renew the base agreement.

There was

general agreement that we must not let the Spanish think

we are eager to obtain the base renewal agreement. Mr. Johnson

said there may be a period of cliff hanging in the fall. However, we

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must not rush matters even though the present agreement expires

in September.

There were two views as to what wald have to be offered, in addition

to our present offer, to induce the Spanish to renew the agreement.

Mr. William Bundy thought that we would have to offer the Spanish

bilateral military consultation even if such consultation was merely

a facade comparable to that we engaged in in CENTO. Mr. Johnson

thought that we would probably have to increase the amount of mili-

tary assistance we are prepared to give the Spanish.

Secretary Dillon doubted that we could give more military assistance

to Spain than that contained in the report. He said there was strong

Congressional opposition to military assistance to Spain. In addition,

Congressmen were strongly opposed to giving assistance to countries

which are buying gold (Spain is one of the most consistent gold buyers

in the present market). Mr. Bell felt that we would have major

difficulty with Congress over the Spanish aid program. He recalled

General Clay's opposition to the amount of our military assistance in

Spain.

Mr. Nitze noted that the military félt that our bases in Spain were a

major addition to our military posture. We should not try to convey

to the Spanish that the bases were valueless to us. Mr. McGeorge

Bundy responded that in a conversation with Secretary McNamara

earlier in the day, the Secretary had stated that as far as he was

concerned, we should tell the Spanish that we could do without the

bases. He asked if there was a difference of view within the Depart-

• ment of Defense. Mr. Nitze said there was not but that he did not

think we should mislead the Spanish to the extent of telling them that

our bases in Spain were worthless to us.

There was a discussion as to when we need to bring to a conclusion

the Spanish base negotiations. Mr. William Bundy said the first time

point was

the decision whether or not to continue our plan to build a

$6 million breakwater in Rota harbor. Without the breakwater,

anchorage in Rota would be difficult. The second time point was the

planned arrival date of the nuclear submarine tender. : Although we

could operate on a temporary agreement extended month by month,

it would be better for all concerned if'we could reach agreement in

the early fall with the Spanish.

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Mr. Bell noted that the report under discussion did not include mention

of the ways Spain now benefits from the presence of our troops in Spain.

He suggested that any document to be used as a background for the

negotiations include a discussion of this aspect of the Spanish problem.

He felt that the Spanish did obtain major benefits from us, including

U.S. Government expenditures in Spain. as a result of our presence.

there.

The Attorney. General recalled that the Spanish Ambassador had told

him thai all our problems with Spain would be resolved if the Presi-

dent would spend an hour with Franco. The discussion which ensued

revealed that the group did not favor the President visiting Franco

but did approve of some device, such as a Presidential letter delivered

by a high ranking emissary which would help satisfy the Spanish desire

for recognition as a first-class ally even though not a member of NATO.

There was a discussion as to when the Presidential letter should be

delivered. The general view was that it should not be presented at

the crucial terminating point of our negotiations nor at the very beginning,

but rather at a time which would not increase the Spanish price for re-

newal of the base agreement.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy called attention to the various people the Spanish

Ambassador. had been talking to and cautioned that everyone should be

alert to the Spanish effort to involve officials in several departments

and agencies of the Government.

Mr. Johnson said he had been assigned responsibility for negotiating

with Ambassador Garrigues.

Ambassador Garrigues had presented

a letter stating that the Spanish Government had named him as the

base agreement negotiator.

However, a Spanish military representa-

tive, Munoz Grandes, had said that the Ambassador was charged with

the political aspects of the agreement while he would negotiate the

military clauses of a renewal agreement.: Mr. Johnson thought that

the Ambassador may have been, given a time period, for example,

three months, during which he would be operating with a free hand.

At the termination of this period, Franco might shift the locale of

the negotiations and possibly the negotiator if Garrigues had not by

then been able to carry out his promise to obtain an agreement highly

advantageous to Spain.

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Mr. Johnson reviewed his efforts to obtain from Ambassador

Garrigues the Spanish price for a renewal. So far the Spanish

Ambassador had spoken only in general terms. The first objec-

tive is to pry out of the Spanish what it is they are asking for a base

agreement renewal. When we know the Spanish terms, we will be

in a much better position to decide how to proceed with negotiations.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested, and Mr. Johnson agreed, that

when we know the Spanish terms, a negotiating guidance memorandum

should be prepared. This memorandum would be circulated to the

group for any comments prior to being approved by the President.

Bromley Smith

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