AMERICAN C-118 AIRCRAFT DOWNED IN SOVIET AZERBAIJAN 27 JUNE 1958 BY SOVIET MIG-17'S.
Originator: CIA
From: CIA
To: CIA
Document date: 11/01/1958
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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I November 1958

SUBJECT: American C-118 Aircraft Downed in Soviet

Azerbaijan 27 June 1958 by Soviet MIG-17's

On 27 June 1958, a C-118 cargo plane, assigned to the U. S. Air

orce in wiesbaden, was fired on and lorced down near Gendarkh, Soviet

The plane was carrying nine U. S. airmen, three of whom 24

are assigned to this Agency) They are Colonel Dale D. Brannon, Major 03,03,03

Robert E. Crans and Major Bennie A. Shupe, (The other six men were ¿4

regular Air Force members)assigned to Wiesbaden, Germany. The nine men

The plane, while en route to Teheran from Nicosia and as a result

of bad weather and navigation error, went off its plotted course and

crossed into Soviet Armenia. There it was intercepted and fired on by

three MIG-17's and caught fire in the left wing. Five of the crew bailed

out and the other four rode the aircraft down to a safe landing on a

small airstrip at Gendarkh in Soviet Azerbaijan. The crew members who

had remained on the plane to its landing got out safely and the plane

struck at the crew members. One of the men, Major Bennie Shupe, CIA 03

employee, was taken by the mob to a telephone pole and narrowly escaped

hanging before being rescued by the Soviet military.

kajor Shupejand the reninder of the crew were turned over to the

Soviet military, and after an overnight stay in a Soviet military

garrison near Stepanakert were taken to a city believed to be Yevlakh,

and then flown to Baku, Russia. There they underwent interrogation by

Soviet intelligence officers, at least one of whom had served in the

United States, as a Soviet Purchasing Connission employee 1943-45, and

later in Canada in 1949-55 as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

This RIS officer, Vladimir Bourdine, later served in 1955 as a personal

interpreter for rusnchev in a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru o.

india.. Bourdine interrogated Colonel Brannon of CIA at considerabl

length during ühe period 30 June - 3 July 1958, while the crew was im-

prisored in the MVD Headquarters building in Baku. Following their

individual intersogations, the crew members tere required to appear

separately before a Commission of Soviet officials at the Baku MVD

Headquarters tho questioned them about the border violation by the

C-118 aircraft, and requested them to sign staiements attesting that

they led buen cell-treated and need antate radical care sy the

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Soviets. The inquiry by the Commission was perfunctory and did not

involve an interrogation in the intelligence sense.

The crew was

then transported to Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border on 7 July

1958 and turned over to the American Air Attache.

On 2 July 1958 this Agency received information indicating that

the Soviets might be considering releasing the nine fliers. Since no

date or place of release was indicated, cables were sent to the various

peripheral CIA stations around the Soviet border indicating the possi-

bility of impending release.

The Air Force agreed to alert its Air

Attaches in the same areas of the possibility of impending release. At

the same time a team of Agency personnel, including a medical officer,

an Air Maritine officer, and

two representatives of the Security Office

were dispatched to Wiesbaden from Headquarters in anticipation of the

release of the fliers.

Three hours aîter the team arrived in Germany,

the place of release was learned from the Soviets to be Astara on the

Soviet-Iranian border, and a USAFE plane was dispatched that night from

Wiesbaden with the Air Maritime team member aboard destined for

Teheran to await the turnover of the American fliers at Astara. The

Illers were turned over on I July 1950, were immediately flown to

Wiesbaden, Germany where an initial joint CIA-AF debriefing of them

was begun, and where initial press interviews were held, following

careful briefing of the crew as to the text and limitations to be

observed. Two days later, two members of the crew, one of whom was

03 (Major Shupe, a CIA employee, were permitted to give an interview to the

Pent dune chest e intere net appeal tea vengements,

to furnish guidance (to the CIA personnel

Following the initial debriefing, the entire crew was flown to

Washington, D. C. on 18 July 1958, for a more extended debriefing.

These debriefings were completed on 6 Augurt 1958 and covered the

various aspects of possible compromise if the security of CIA

personnel, operational ana cover units activities, )as well as various

intelligence and counter-intelligence matters.

men aboard the plane were extremely knowledgeable

Air Support Operations in Europe was knowledgeable of CIA operational

activities on a worla-wide basis, with many of these projects being

extremely sensitive?, Colonel Brannon and Major Robert Crans) eagl

carried briefcases containing classified material, and Brannon carrie

an adaress book containing several names, addresses and telephone

numbers of CIA personnel and cover units.

The two briefcases are

believed to have been destroyed by the fire in the aircrait after

landing. The address book of (Brannon)was taken from him by the Soviet

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peasants on landing and was later turned back to him by the Soviet

Commission members at Baku. Neither he nor other members of the crew

were questioned about either of the briefcases, their contents, nor

about the address book and its contents.

We assume that the Soviets

have or will process the names in the address book through their Moscow

files. Some of the other crew members carried personal notations in

their wallets relating to a few other CIA personnel.

We have received no indications that Colonel Brannon or the other u

crewhen were arugged or otherwise tampered with by the Soviets. (Bránnon

and some of the others did receive shots the first night and second day

from the Soviet military for their wounds and burns; however, these

shots are believed to have been for legitimate medical reasons.

The substance of the questioning, treatment and techniques of

interrogation has been exhaustively explored with all the crew members

in the course of the debriefings.

In summation, the interrogations

of the crew members were superficial and do not appear to have been

backed up by close coordination and communication with Moscow for

intelligence research purposes.

It is possible that the quick ac-

knowleagment by the Soviet Foreign Office of the landing of the C-118

In soviet territory precluded the MVD from fully exploiting the crew

memberS. (Colonel Brannon and Captain Kane) were separated from the

group and given preferred treatment, apparently with the intention of

developing them for information purposes.

We are convinced that both

men handled themselves extremely well and did not disclose any infor-

mation concerning the Agency or its activities.

To date we have no indication that the soviets knew at the time

they interrogated the crew men, that the flight of the c-11o was con-

nected with clA in any way, nor that they knew three of the men aboard 24

(Brarront address, We do believe that in time the sovieis, through

book, which lists the open Agency telephone number

EX 3-6115 below his name on the first page, will connect him and

possibly others in the address book with CIA. Since the Soviets

questioned him about the 7170th Support Group and the 7405th Support

Squadron in Wiesbaden, it is therefore presumed that they will asso-

ciate those units with this Agency.

In addition to this report,

debriefings of the

cremen

were taped and typed,

which will total some

7,000 - 9,000 pages

when completed,

are being distributed to the

CI Staff

and

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other interested components of this Agency as they are completed.

Questions were solicited by this Office of all interested components,

in order to cover all matters in the debriefings of interest to the

Agency.

Careful arrangements have been made with the Air Force in

order that Agency interests will be adequately protected and proper

security will be maintained in the handling of information and reports

derived from the debriefings, and so that no compromise of the Agency

interest in the flight of the C-118 will be made to the press.

CONCLUSIONS:

A. It is our opinion that the possible compromises arising out of

this incident are relatively minor in nature and that no major

compromises occurred.

Bo

That the Soviets "missed" on the true nature of the flight and

personnel of the C-118.

C.

That the reasons the crew members were given an early release

were as follows:

1. Primarily, the Soviet interrogators failed to use all

of the leads at their command, particularly Brannon's, 03

address book, and failed to break the crewmen through

interrogation

The crew did not inadvertently disclose through in-

terrogations, the purpose of their flight, its relation

to the igenoy and hat or faired of sta exer ta ClA.

3. The Soviets apparently failed to check out the names

and other data in (Brannon's)address book through their

files prior to release of the crew.

4o No incriminating information or material was immediately

recovered from the burned aircraft.

5. Several of the crew destroyed incriminating building

passes and notations in their wallets while on their

way down in their parachutes, or imnediately after

landing in their chutes.

There were either no leaks or insufficient leaks of

incriminating infornation through any room conversa-

tions at Baku among the crew, which may have been moni-

tored by the Soviets, or such conversations as there

may have been were not properly interpreted, or inter-

preted soon enough to tip the soviets that there ras

sore thing unusual, about the flight or the crew.:

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The crew members were all' in uniform and not in mixed

civilian and Air Force clothing, which properly estab-

lished their cover.

8. Sufficient pressures were exercised by Agency, State,

Air Force, and Executive action upon the Soviets to

effect the release of the crew as soon as possible.

9.

A factor that probably had an important bearing was the

early acknowledgment by the Soviet foreign Office of

the dorning of the aircraft and the attempts by the

Soviets in the early stages to make this appear as a

deliberate violation of the Soviet air frontier. This

tended to take the "play" away from the MVD and military

intelligence.

In addition, this Government was stepping

up the pressure for the release of the nine Army person-

nel who landed in Bast Germany in a helicopter, and the

soviets probably had no desire to create a duplicate of

10. Safeguards taken by the Agency and the Air. Force were

Do That it is not believed, based on the evidence at hand, that

the crew was drugged or

otherwise tampered with medically.

E. That there are valuable points of guidance from a cover, opera-

tions, policy and code of conduct standpoint which can be

gathered irom experiences of these crewmen in the hands of the

Soviets and can aid the Agency and its personnel in any future

situation of a similar nature in which the Soviet military and

RIS interrogators are encountered.

ACTTON TAKEN TO SAFECUARD AGENCY INTEREST IN THIS MATTER:

A: All possible steps were taken during the period immediately

preceding and irmediately after the release of the crew to

effect the minimm of publicity and to safeguard and limit

such publicity as was given out, in order to avoid disclos-

ing the CIA connection of the flight and some of its crew.

B.

Throughout the entire debriefing process in Germany and in

the U. So, the maximum care has been taken to safeguard

the information taken by transcript and classily it so that

there would be access to the information therein on a need-

to now basis. and by only properly cleared persons.

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1...

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the doming of the C-118 to change

steps were taken immediately by the de a stations after

the safes and locks in the buildings to which the crew

had access.

the three men from this agency who were aboard the flight,

with the Air force from the Agency.)

Steps are continuing to be taken to properly safeguard

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A.

Continue to take all possible steps to prevent any disclosure

to any unauthorized persons, particularly the press, about the

CIA personnel aboard the C-118, or the true nature of the

flight.

B.

Continue to take all possible steps to Change the cover desig-

ation of the units appearing in Brannon's address book tr

revent any further compromise of these units.

Co Permit no further publicity about the flight itself, in order

to minimize the possibility of the press learning of the CIA

interest in the flight of the C-118.

D.

Carefully follow all matters relating to the International

Court of Justice interest in this flight, in order to prevent

any compromise of Agency interests.

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