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104-10210-10068, 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:

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CASE CE YURI IVANOVICH

NOSENKE ( F35 PACE STUDY)

VOL. IL

PAGES 85 TILL 318

(RAPT I)

SE

DELETIONS, JE ANY:

ROOM:

ENGELE CPDATICS DARIAL

DATE

RECEIVED

11 MAT

1978

SHa?

3 Sent 231

DATE

RETURYED

REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)

Kine KLaiN

Midlin

Sohanna Sanitt

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NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM

THIS FILE

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85.

NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER

A. Introduction

During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KGB Secord Chief

Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer to deputy

chief of a department and

from lieutenant to Lieutenant colonel

lor, as he has

stated more recently, only to the rank of captain).

An English speaker, he had specialized in operations against

American targets in the USSR as he steadily advanced to higher

positions in the U.S. Embassy Section of the Imerican Department

Ifrom entry on duty

with the KGB in 1952 or 1953 until 1955,

and from January

1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Depart-

ment (from, June 1955 to January

1960, and from January 1962 until

the defection).

His duties took him to England in 195% and 1958.

Cuba in 1960,

and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in

1962 and

1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips

within the USSR

in connection with

operations, inspestions, ard conferences.

Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him

by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and

1961 and by the head of

the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958: he was one of

70 Second Chief Directorate officers awarded the Order uf the

'Red Star in 1962; and in the same year he received a madal for

completing ten years of "irreproachable service."*

Thus,

according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career

marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel,

and many honors.

NOSENKO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, in-

cluding some in which he had a personal role, either as a par-

ticipant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB

personnel in the First and

Second Chief Directorate about which

he learned through his professional and persoral contacts..

Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this

part of the paper.

All are included in Part VI.

The text of

the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources

and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided

on the same topics.

NOSENKO has admitted recently, however, that he never got

any awards at all in the KGB.

TOP STEGET

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86.

Bo. Entry into the KGB

NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry

on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of

the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a

KGB staff officer.

His statements on these two topics are

presented under separate headings below.

1..

Date of irtry

A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has

been given by NOSENKO as the time

when he entered on duty with

the KGB, bit he has been most consistent in placing his entry

in the month of March 1953,*

in

summary, he has said the

beginning of 1952 (statenent of 31 January

1964), May 1952 with

no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or

7 September 1952

(statement of 6 April 1964): March 1953 with no day (statements

of 9 Jure 196-(statement of 8 April 1964),

24 ipril 1966 and 27 October 1966),

12 or 15 or

17 March 1953

13 or 15 March 1953

(statement of 26 July 19651, and 2 April 1953 (statement of

17 April 1966).

When

iast questioned about this subject, or

27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he

had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952.

His state-

ments about the entry date are arranged in chronological order

below.

9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO) : "In the

beginning of 1953 I came to Moscon Lfrom duty with the GRU in

Primorsk/.

This was 1953, In the beginning.

in January.

Well,

I came on leave to Moscow.

I was staying

at my father's dacha

there...

I was then in the Navy GRU.

So I came to Moscow on

leave

and, while I was home_near Moscow at my father's dacha,

/General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV" dropped in on us.

A con-

versation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?'

I said:

'I'm working in GRU.

I worked ir. the Far East and now I'm work-

ing in the Baltic.

I came here on leave.'

KOBULOV said: 'How

do you like the work?:

I replied:

'Well, speaking horestly. I

don't like the work.' 'Well, ' he

said,

with

'You better come to work

US a

Where do you want to go?

Into Intelligence or counter-

intelligence?'...

I did not want to go into intelligence.

Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into

the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and

when he first learned of the KGB agent 'ANDREY"; the lead

to

"ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which

NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962

(see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY case is discussed at

greater length in Part VI.D.3.b.

** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled

from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did

not return to a position of authority until a few days

after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD. Minister on 9 or

10 March 1953.

As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East

Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining con-

cern.

the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control

Commission.

KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as

BERIYA, along with others in the KGB.

See Part V.B.2.

for further references to KOBULOV.

---

## Page 4

8ба.

consider that only people who have seven,

even ten years' ex-

perience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelli-

gence.

After this, let them go into positive intelligence.

Then they know how counterintelligence operates...

Well, When

KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to

work, I answered:

'It is

better: do courae, to go into counterintelligence.'

'Well,' he

Look, drop

in to see me for a minute sometime.'

This was simple conversation.

Nothing official. A week later

I got & telephone call.

told me to stop by.

I

They were calling from

Personnel and

went.

'Come into this

room, ' Lthey told

me/, 'it's not necessary

to fill out

a questionnaire (anketa).

We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU.

directly to the central entrance,

A pass has already been

Go

issued for you; the pass is already there.

Go to the Secre-

tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.'

Well, I went.

had

KOBULOV

been summoned somewhere high up

in the government,

and his

assistant

received me.

How about working in the imerican De-

partment?' he Lthe assistant? asked.

'"ell, good.

Go there

right. now,'

Well, I wert to the Second Direstorate...

[KOBULOV'S/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-

rate, the American Department,

the

First Section, working with

American correspondents...in

'53, in March,

in March '53.

STALIN

had

just died."*

*STALIN died on

5 March 1953.

india Messian too lit, Bossi:

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## Page 5

87

2022

31 January 1964: Yurly Ivanovich GiK was reassigned from

the KGB Second Chief Directorate "in something like 1952,"

"exactly just about the time when I came

from

He was already gone by that time."*

February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964,

NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography.

He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952. and he shifted

the dates of most of the events during the 1945-1955 perica one

year backwards

from the version given in 1962. This was dis-

cussed with NOSENKO, and he repeated the new dates; he then

studied and approved an official statement on his biography

(for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates,

including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in

about May 1952.

6 April 1964:

Confronted with the above inconsistencies,

NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during

the same month had a conversation with KGB persornel about getting

The interview continued with the following dialogue:

Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?

NOSENKO:

Yo, it wasn't January, it was the second part o1

refore that I was in the GRu..

Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe

it was 5, I don't know.

Question:

...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?

NOSENKO:

I don'* remember.

Question:

Early September 1952?

NOSENKO:

Early September 1952,

first few days was sitting

ting in a ron and the

KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in ROOn 615.

res, it was 7 September when I had joined...

I or 5... And so the first few weeks I had beer

reading cases, studying forms: I worked like

that (during) December, January, February...

No, it was March, yes,

after the reorganization.

And at the end of

March I was transferred to the attaches cases..**

This would place the entry date some time at the beginning

of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that

GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in

January 1952.

NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of;

this transfer®

Part V.C. covers the period when, according

to NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S.

military attaches in Moscow.

20299

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88.

8 April 1964:

The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that

he had on different occasions dated his entry

into the KGB as

January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning

continued:

Question: Which is the truth?

NOSENKO:

After the death of STALIN, in_March 1953.

did I say it lthe other dates??

You see, I

finished the Institute in 1949.. Then I defended

and then came the State exams.

passed all the exams except one - "Foundations of

Marxism-Leninism" the philosophy.

And I had to

take all the examinations over again.

I took four, passed three,

four had to be taken over

For that reason ! graduated, or I received

the diploma from

the Institute in 1950,

although

officially I graduated in 1949.

pleasant ching and I did not want to mention it.

And right after that I was sent to the GRU:*

rest is just as I told you, word-for-word.

was the only thing.

And then,

after I said it.

I did not want to correct it.

And the mistake I made was about my work

in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but

1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March.

KOBULOV

accepted me right away. STALIN was still not

dead and I was already accepted.

March 1953,

about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.

26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from

Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray; near Baltiysk.

I had worked in the

Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there.

My aim in coming to

Moscow was to Get out of this work in the MRP.

I couldn't

I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in

Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't renember exactly

the date of the order appointing me

an officer in the KGB.

was 13 or 15 March 1953.

17 Apr1l 1966 (letter to CIA case

officer):

"From August

1952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval

Intelligence of the 4th Fleet in, Sovetsk, where I received the

rank of lieutenant of the Administrative

From 2 April

1953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Direc-

torate of the MGB-KGB."

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In

the middle of March L1953/ KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel

SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBU-

LOV... I worked in the First Section, First LAmerican/ Depart-

ment from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."

1925

27 October 1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he entered the

KGB in mid-March 1953. He said that he had lied when he earlier

said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was

lying at the times he made these statements.

Asked why he had

sense.

NOSENKO then went on

to explain that because he was only an average student and

because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable

Since. April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU 1n

1951, a year later.

---

## Page 7

by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950.

Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he had been trying to conceal

this fact

from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought

CIA would not have believed him if he reportea that he was

first rejected by the KGB and was later accepted.

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into

the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV, * he has been

inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when

it occurred,

its relationship ir. time to other events (see

Part IV. 8.), and where it took place,

at his father's dacha or

at KOBULOV's dacha.

Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that

there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite

to his entry, he recalled in 1964 that he had had conversations

with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed

a KCB questionnaire and a biographic form.

NOSENKO was question-

ed at length on these points during 1964 and 1965.

As a resilt,

he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at

KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents ne

completed.

In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his

original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with kGB

personnel officers, and he implied that he had

filled

out no

official forms.

His various statements are presented in chrono-

logical order below.

9 June 1962:

"KOBULOV was at our dacha.

Well, he is a great

friend of my father.

He was First Deputy to BERIXA, and my

father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversa-

tion simply began.

He said: 'What are you doing?'

I said:

'I"m

working in CRU.

I worked in the far East and row I'm working

on the Baltic.

I came here on leave.'

KOBULOV said: 'How do

you like the work?'

I replied:

*Well, speaking honestly, I

don't like the work.'

'Well,' he said,

"You better come to work

with us.

Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-

intelligence?'...

I did not want to go into intelligence. I

consider that only people who have seven, even ten years'

eX-

perierce in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelli-

gence.

After this,

let them go into positive intelligence.

Then

they know how counterintelligence operates...Well, when KOBULOV

asked me where I wanted to work, I answered:

'It is better, of

course, to go into counterintelligence.'

'Good.

'Nell, ' he said,

Look, drop

in

to see me for a minute sometime.'

This

was simple conversation.

Nothing official.

A week later I

got a telephone call.

They were calling from Personnel and

toda me to stop oy.

I went.

'Come into this. room, ' Lthey told

me/.

We

'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire

(anketa) •

have already obtained your personal file fron the Gru.

Go

directly to the central entrance.

A pass has already been

issued for you; the pass is already there:

Go to the Secre-

tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV. '

Well. I wert. KOBULOV

had been sumnoned somewhere high up

in the government, and his

assistant received me.

'How about working in the American De-

partment?' he the assistant/ asked.

'Well, good.

Go there

right

now.'

Well, I went to the Second Directorate..• Hls

KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second

Directo-

rate, the American Department, the First Section; working with

American correspondents."

* See Part V.B.l. for further references to KOBULOV.

---

## Page 8

14-00000

90.

8 April 1964: "It was February (1953).

KOBULOV was in

February

= In Moscow.

He was our friend.

He said: "O.K..

George.

I'll help you if you want, with

the KGB.' I remember

exactly.

Yes.

It was in February.

I saw him at the cottage.

By this time I had been in Moscow six weeks...

KOLULOV was in

February.

He went to see my father at the ministry.

It was

the end

of the day.

It was late and my father invited him to

come along to the

summer home.

It happened

to be a Saturday.

KOBULOV's wife stayed in Germany.

He was just here for a short

TDY. *

My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday

at the dacha...

On Sunday we were playing

billiards

and

KOBULOV

asked me what I was doing.

I told him

'nothing,'

that I was at

the

disposal of the (GRU)

Personnel Department.

I said:

'I

don't want to go back to Baltiysk,.

to the Baltic Sea,

because I

don't like the work tiere.

I'm not doing anything there.

I get

no satisfaction from

the work.'

He said:

'Well, you should

De

utilized somchow...

Do you wint me

to call the KGB Personnel -

them look you over?'

I told hin:

'All right.'

He called,

and

he must have giver. our number to them, our home phone.

I was

called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB.

In

February.

They told me to come see them at House No. 12.

They

had a pass for me...

So I went.

Picked up my pass and went...

INOSENKO neXt gives a description of his route to the KGB build-

ing, his rescipt of a pass,

and his visit to the Central KGB

Personnel Office.) They talked to me.

This man - I don't know

who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that.

He said:

'о.к.

We'll request your file from GRU.

We will check

you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.'

That's all."

NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms

or questionnaires.

"No.

Not there.

They gave

me three copies

of forms

to take home.

There were

so mary questions.

About my

parents, my education, my

residences, addresses.

I filled all

this out...

Finally I completed

all

three copies and called

them.

I was told that this time I would not need a pass, that

I should just go to the entrance, and the person (the personnel

officer)

would come down and take the papers from me.

I went,

brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three

copies of my handwritten autobiographat that time another

Then I was called Dy

the personnel people once more.

officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to

me, because I was told to yo to talk to ROZHENKO [first name

unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel

Department].

This was in March...

Just as soon as STALIN died,

KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately.

He must have been

summoned by BERIYA or someone.

And so, in just a few days -

evidently he did not forget - I got a call.

It was Bogdan

Zakharovich's assistant.

lie told me to go to the central

entrance, that I diún't need a pass.

I remember it as if it

just happened.

I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with

a civilian overcoat.

This was, maybe, the l0th of March...

I

sat down lin KOBULOV's officel. I thought it would be for five

minutes.

I waited there almost two hours.

The assistant came

out a few times and told me that Bogdan Zakharovich is very,

very busy, but that he would give me an escort.

Some senior

lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him..:

We went

up to the sixth floor of the old building. I remember: it as

though it just happened.

I sat there about five or seven

minutes.

Then I was told to go in.

I announced myself.

He

said:

'Yes, I know.

Sit down.

Му паме

is SHUBNYAKOV; Fedor

Grigoryevich.' He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the

Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over

and decided.

He said that they wanted to offer me a position

in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American

NOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before

that KOBULOV had been stationed

in Germany and not in Moscow.

---

## Page 9

91

Department....

Then he asked [i. M.J. CORBATENKO to some in.

He was filling in for the Chief of the First Departirent...

He took me to his office...

well, they decided to put me in

the First LU. S. Embassy/

Section

and called Yevger.iy KOZLOV;

the Chief of the Section. He came in and

said: nell; hello;

Yuriy Ivanovich.

I heard of you.

Well, if you re finished

with him, I'll take him along with me and show him around. '

He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to

report...

Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember."

15 April 1964:

NOSENKO again described the KGB question-

naire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and

recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the

personnel office.

He also remembered that he had made several

additional phone calls to the KGS personnel office and described

his second visit there to talk to ROZiENKO:

"At the end of

February I was told again to stop in the Pass Office and pick up

a pass and

go to the same floor,

but another room.

They told me

I would have to talk to ROTHENKO today.

He was a Chief of

Section, of the Personnel Section.

So we had a talk.

the same thing again.

sa

'Tell me about yourself:'

he just wanted to look me over. And after that they said: 'All

right, we have not gotten all your documents yet from your

military/ district.

So wait.'"

26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with

KOBULOV, saying that it took piace at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov,

where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953.

NOSENKO

continued:

"I was called at my family's dacha

in February.

They said it was State Security calling and that I was to

report.

I did this on the next day.

Probably l then reported

to Hoise No. 12. As officer talked to me about my education,

service,

and so on.

Biographic questions.

Then he gave me a

blank for my

autobiography and a four to

six-page anketa (bio-

graphic form).

I filled these cut at home.

called in and

was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer

came down, and I gave him the forms and photographs of myself.

They said they would call me.

i did nothing fron January to

March.

January was leave.

In February and March I was at GRU

Personnel's disposal."

After STALIN'S funeral NOSENKO was

sumoned to KOBULOV's office.

His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told

NOSENKO to wait.

After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY

sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learred that he would

be assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section and was introduced to

the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO.

The official

order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or

15th of March 1953.

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again

NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV

dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953.

The document con-

tinued as follows:

"I saw KOBULOV for the second

on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the

Ministry of Shipbuilding ir. March 1953. 'I had come from the

sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work..

In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go

to the Dom Sovuzov for the funeral.

KOBULOV said he would

concern hinself with the question of my entry into the KGB.

The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days

later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow.

In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,

mar gare

---

## Page 10

92.

called me at heme and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV

didn't see me ard SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief

of the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUENYAKOV. ••

SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appoirting

me a case officer in the First Section of the First Depart-

ment, Second Chief Directorate.

SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief

of the First Department,

Lieutenant. Colonel GORBATENKO, and

introduced me.

Then I went to the First Department and was

introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the

Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV.

KOZLOV said I woüld take

over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain Anatoly/

TORMOZOV and

suggested that I begin work the same day.

I was

accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way.

It is

necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel

Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing

of the order assigning me to the Second Chief Directorate of

the MVD. "

---

## Page 11

93.

C. To June 1955 (American Department)

1. Introduction

Depending upon which date he has given for entering the

NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the

American Department, working on American correspondents living

in Moscon, lasted for about six to eighteen montns.

From that

job, he

said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S. Mili-

tary Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the

same section until being transferred in June

ties, as NOSENKO described them,. and pertinent collateral infor-

mation on his targets while he was in

the U.S. Embassy Section

are reviewed below.

2. Operations Against Correspondents

On the day of his acceptance into the KGß, NOSENKO was

taken directly to the offices of the u.s.

Embassy Section.

There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO

that he would take over the

the departing case officer,

Captain Anatoliy TORMUZOV, in operations against American cor-

respondents in Moscow.

a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

NOSENKO reported for work the following day, accord-

ing to statements made on 8 April 1961, he found a desk in Room

"There were three other guys sitting

running traces, and at the same time I was reading. the files

I think there were seven files in all, and I

NOSENKO listed these files as those on

Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one ch GILMORE's wife

SEREBRYAKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA) , Harrison SALISBURY

During the 1962 meetings with 'CIA, NOSENKO identified

SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He

said that WHITNEY "worked

for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he

refused to work for us when he left the country and would not

contact us in the United States."

GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an

active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not

Likewise, he did not know the

status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during

the early period of his KGB service were developrental files

The developmental files were less sensitive,

(delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents.

and from them

would never be able to figure out whether he lthe subject of

the filel is an agent or not."

NOSENKO explained that, once a

person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent

NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsi-

ble for the more important correspondents:

"KOZLOV himself

was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with

SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife.

I also know that KOZLOV was

working with WHITNEY and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER...

each of these persons there was an operational file which I

did not see.".

According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved

with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS,

both of whom were American

correspondents recruited as agents by the KGB.

---

## Page 12

files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO

statod that he read the files on these seven persens "slowly

and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things

as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remel

ber. ".

He was also given the files on the agents surrounding

these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

b. Agonts Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who

were roporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY

and the GILMORES

and met with

them regularly to learn whether "anything was new,

who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior,

what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting,

etc."

He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a

writton report of his conversations with

the agents.

describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied:

"Let us

case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a monti

or evan two times.

At the meeting I would ask the driver what

was new in SliAPIP!'s behavior since our last meeting, whether

• SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with

icreigners, about his meet-

ings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was

SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man

lagent) would begin his report.

Of course, if he spots anything

suspicious he calls immediately,

and I would see him the next

nomina.

Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I

would see him again

in avout ten days or in two weers, but if

there was something interesting he should call immediately.

It was the same with the maid and the cook.

Upon returning to

the office I would have to report to KUZLOV about my meetings,

either orally or in writing.

If, for example, (V.M.) KOVSHUK

(also of the U.S. Embassy Section) had a meeting with his agents,

he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as conveni-

ent to both.

If the meetings were taking place late in the day

and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written

materials submitted at

the meeting, I could go home and then re-

port the next morning."

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various

agents surrounding the correspondents.

"At first he was teach-

ing me.

Then he would go in cases when something interesting

would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop

but when

there may have been a hint in a case of some other case

officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and

clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their

families.

Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964:

"My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at

GILMORE's place.

She also worked

at the Associated Press later.

Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one" 'SERGEY'.

My second agent was

a Chauffeur whose codename, I think, was

I think he

was driving WHITNEY.

Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a

funny little fellow.

In other words,

charwomen, chauffeurs,

this was my agentura lagent network]." Although NOSENKO was:

able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number

and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he

had forgotten their true names and could not provide detailed

personality information on any of them.. He explained:

remember now.

turned over often.

They all passed by like a river because they were

NOSENKO did recall that it was he who

selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office

as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of

Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

---

## Page 13

95%

He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena

S. RUSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a

list of sov-

jets employed by Americans in Moscow. He. told CIA at that tine

that he had taken over KOSIENKO fro

TOrMOZOV upon entering the

U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked

for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE.

NOSENKO

said that KOSIENKO "never

provided any interesting in-

formation."

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10

to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents.

he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case offi-

cers might have as many as

15. In April 1961 NOSENKO broke his

agentura down as follows:

Target

Eddie GILMORE

Agents

Two agents, the cook and the ariver;

one operational contact; a part-time

cleaning girl; and a girlfriend or

GILMORE's sister-in-law, who

reported

on the sister-in-law and GILMORE'S

Thomas WHITNEY

One agent, his driver.

Henry SHAPIRO

Three agents, SHAPIRO'S secretary

and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman

who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife

and lived with the SHAPIROs in Mos-

(The secretary and chauffeur

later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and.

reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY

temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in

Harrison SALISBURY

1WO

agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SER-

GEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in

that they did not have specific targets on whom to report.

The

first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language

training

in Moscow.

His cryptonym was

The sec-

ond, "VOLODINK," was a female teacher in this same program who

instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and

Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true

name of "VOLODINK."

When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsi-

bility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his

agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with

the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINK,

" whom he continued to

handle in his work with military attaches..

c. Information from Other Sources

SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 196J,

before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously

been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow,

his unusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his

marriage to a Soviet national.

SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB

---

## Page 14

agent by a cryptonym (known to NOSENKO and confirmed by COLIT

appearing in the CHEREPANOV papers."

The KGB defector Nikolav KHOKLOV had earlier identified the

Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KOB agent, an allegation which.

she denied, and it had been long assumed that inflay too had

reached some sort of accommodation with the KGy because of this

fact and because of the long duration of his tour as a correspond-

ent in Moscon.

GILMORE also had

been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's in-

formation was received.

He servea in Moscow for: 12 years, from

1941 to 1953, and 15 married to a Soviet national.

SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each,

in Moscow during the 1950's.

second of these, he

became enamored with the pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife

(see above)

and was during this period a subject of criticism by

other American correspondents in Moscow for has pro-Soviet arti-

cles.

When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's

death, SALISBURY returned

to the United States and his articles

took on an anti-Soviet tone.

NOSENKO claimed no involvement with the other two imerican

correspondents whom he identified

as KGB agents,

STEVENS and

STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory

information in CIA files.

They are discussed in Part VI.D.2.

under the heading of NOSENKO's American leads.

3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel

Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was. relieved of

his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then

until his transfer from the American Department he hanaled KGB

Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer person-

nel of the U.5. Military Attache's office.

NOSENKO's account of

the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of

the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases

from Nikolay KHRE:OV...

When I was leaving

in 1955, I turned

the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

- 10 April 1964:

"I made a mistake...

I said I accepted

the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking

on the Militery Attache

work.

This is not right.

KHRENOV was not working in the First

(U.S. Embassy) Section; he was working in the Fist, (American)

I took over the cases from--let's see, there was

ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my

table. (desk), and I accepted the cases from

Pavel Fedorovich

PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned

over the correspondent files.to. F.v. KISLITSYN (who returned

to the USSR from Australia in May 1954).

NOSENKO asked when

the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was

See Part V.D.T. C. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV

Papers.

---

## Page 15

97.

not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given

then to another

"If KISLITSYN came (back from Australia) in

1t was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was soneone else,, 1953, then

= 18 June 1964:

"KISLITSYN came into the First Section in

1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents.

BUDYL-

DIN also joined the section this year and took

the files on the

Army Attache and his assistants from

PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left

later that year and turned those files over to me...

Yuriy

LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files

on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he, assumed

responsibilities for the attaches.

is noted above, he

said

on

10 April 1961 that he received the files in the beginning of

1954.

le had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents

"only about six months."

If the date of March 1953, which ne

most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct this would

place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he

has

said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases

and began work

against the attaches in January 1954, on still

others that this

occurred in May 1954.

In February 1965, NOSENKO

said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

SO PAY

---

## Page 16

:98.

a. Agents Reporting on Military. Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network

(agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Mili-

tary Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NO-

SENKO replied:

"There were two maids,

a cook, drivers*...

about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY'

and the one

with the code name

'DMITRIYEV'

... These additional two

agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether."

with one ex-

ception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO trans-

ferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955.

He met

each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who

were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the

street.

According to NOSENKO, this network was

"just a

supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile,

the

main source of information on

the Military Attaches being the

microphones in their offices.**

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this

position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl

L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS.

Her

name, NOSENKO thought, was nOVIkOVA.

She was an English-

speaking university graduate but "hid her knowleage of

English in order to overhear

conversations or read letters

without taking them outside."

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was

his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHIVEDOVA,"

Was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira

RICHARDS.

He described NEVEROVA as a

"little, old, thin

oman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest.

They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

Of the KGB agents among

the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identi-

fied Nikolay SANYRYEV, who was used by various of the at-

"He reported where they went, what they

whether they took notes of photographs, whether they had

unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs in September 1964, HOSELKO

icentified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent

"SERVIZNIY." He

had been working in the Embassy since its

estavlishment,

starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time,

performing clerical tasks.

VOROBYEV had no direct connec

tion with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself

did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in

1954.

The main function of this agent was delivering to

NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephore listings of the

Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV'g" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV:

NOSENKO saw this name

on a 1962 phone list and thought, but

was not sure, that this was his agent.

An electrician who

worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems

and eleva-

tor, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and

The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random,

NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior

attache, none were targetted against individual members of the

attache office.

** See Part V.E.3.g, on electronic operations against the U.S.

Embassy.

---

## Page 17

t ддрі

other wires he had observed in the. Embassy as well as on the

eur t no direct connection.

Like VOROBYEV,

"DMITRI-

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a serles of 260 bio-

graphic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Em-

bassy in Moscow.

Each card contained a photograph of the per-

son involved and short biographic notes, including his name

and job in the Embassy.

The first time: he went through these

cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only.

the photographs; NO-

SENKO

did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV

but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that

he thought his name was VOROBYEV.

When shown the blographic

information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them

as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American De-

partment and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously.

In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the bicgraphic information,

which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the Military Attache,"

NOSENKO exclaimed:

"Oh my God,

this is my own agent."

He.

later said it was a good photograph of SHINYRYEY.

b. NOSENKO 's Targets

As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible

for operations against American Military (Arny) Attaches sta-

tioned in Moscow, his main task was not to recruit them but

rather was to prevent the attaches fron collecting intelligence.

He has used this statement about his main task (identical with

that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against

the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S.

Armed Forces Attaches were recruited by the KGB from 1953 un-

til his defection in 196t.

He has also said that this is one

reason he knows relatively little about the personal back-

grounds of his various targets during this period--the empha-

sis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment-

purposes.

Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache por-

sonnel

for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and

1955, NOSENKO gave the following names:

"MICKELSON, MEARNS,

RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."**

His

knowledge. of the activities of these targets and of KGB action

against them, coupled with information from other sources, is

discussed in the following paragraphs.

Naval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NO-

SENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURA-

NOV.

When CHURINOV left the section in early 1954, he turned

over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over

later in the year to KHRENOV.

**This is the order given by NOSENKO.

The list comprises two

generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in al-

phabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow.

It 1s, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKEL-

SON through Captain MULE to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA.

Questioned about these officers in a different context,

NOSENKO

Indicated knowledge of their ranks.

Not mentioned by NOSENKO

was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant

Army Attache in Moscow from

August 1951 to August 1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said

he was responsible for work against the nilitary attache office).

VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was at-

tached to the Army Attache staff again fron 19 March to 19 May

1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible

for this group.

---

## Page 18

100.

(1) MICKELSON

NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKFLSON as a colonel

and the Military Attache in Moscow

during 1954 and 1955.

PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKEL-

SON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954.

When asked about agents who night have been working against.

MICKELSON, NOSENKO

said that there was one cook, a KGB

operational contact whose name he did not recall, and

MICKELSON's maid,

whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA;

the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NO-

SENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section:

In addition to

these two, the only other

source reporting

On MICKELSON was

his chauffeur, whose name. NOSENKO also did not remember.

NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about

MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or

surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruit-

ment was attempted.

There was, in tact, no interesting or

derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

According to information in CIA filos, MICKELSON was

involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union

which NOSENKO has not reported.

In lay 1954 he was arrested

in Tbilisi on the

charge of having photographed &

bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges.

In August 1951 SICKCISON was arrested again for illegal

photographs gouth of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held

for two hours before being released.

(i1) MEARNS

NOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON'S

replacement and said that he was

the responsible case

There were two agents and one operational contact

working against !!EARNS.

Of these,

NOSENKO could recall the

name only of NOVIKOVA,

the same maid tho reported earlier on

MICKELSON.

Besides being told to attempt to overhear NICKEL-

SON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his

clothing and tu copy any notes she might find, but she

never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB.

NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal elfects were searched

by the KGB while they were being shipped to iloscow from the

United States,

and that all his service records had been

NOSENKO described MEARNS

as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and

said that information from concealed microphones showed

him to have a strong character.

Nothing of interest con-

cerning him

was received fior

these microphones or

from tele-

phone taps.

CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant informa-

tion on LEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.

(111) RICHARDS

NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant

colonel who served

Assistant Army Attache in Moscow.

NOSENKO said that he was

the case officer working against

#NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.

---

## Page 19

14-00000

101.

RICHARDS.

The one agent reporting on RICHARDS WhOM NOSENKO

could nanie

was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym

"SHEDOVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile in-

formation

about RICHARDS.

In addition,

some soviet drivers

reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from

then.

according to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow

fron July

1954 to july 4956.

microphone in

office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with

MEARNS.

RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his

maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart

attack during the period she was

employed by him.

incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.)

For about four

months of his Moscow tour,

took Russian-language

lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment.

During

these lessons,

KICHARDS often ciscussed

labor conditions and

wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her

record her speech on his tape recorder.

GROMAKOVA was preg-

nant and unmarried at the tine.

(NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA

as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her

contacts with RICHARDS.) * RICHARDS identified one "Volodya"

11.0.r

first nane Vladimir) as his principal driver.

About

62 years old

in 1354, Volodya was the son of a rich

jeweler

in Moscow during the

Revolution.

Volodya himself was well

educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Mos

he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS

about the

Revolu-

tion, propaganda, and

news media.

(NOSENKO did not know of

Volodja.)

Further details from RICHARDS are given in the

following section on FELCHLIN.

(iv) FELCHLIN

NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant

colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and

stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer.

FELCHLIN was in

the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being

declared persona non grata.

NOSENKO did not recall the

name:: of

any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN,

although he thought FEICHLIN must have had a maid and she

would

have been

a KGB agent.

Additionally, NOSENKO said,

the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and

drivers, and these were his agents.

Unable to recall the

precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to

some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States

for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kinú.

NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCH-

LIN,

but said the action

was based on information which had

been accumulated from

a number of sources

and incidents.

For example,

FELCHI,IN had beer caught

taking

some photographs

and a report had been written; along with other similar

indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents

in contact with FELCHLIN, the report

was filed away for pos-

sible

future use.

NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCH-

LIN during the February 1965 interrogations.

He said then

that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non

grata,

and that no other attaches had been involved.

NOSENKO

See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN,

to whom she also taught Russian.

---

## Page 20

at staken

102.

explained his having but few details concerning this action

by the fact that it took place after NOSENZO had trans-

ferred from the American Department to the

Tourist Depart-

ment in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN'S

background.

Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the

as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before

arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache.

latter capacity

for one year, until July 1954, when he was

asked to leave the country.

(He had previously served in

Austria and West Germany and had been in official, contact

with known GRU officers at both posts, as well

United States.)

During his entire tour in Moscow

the subiect of intensive KGB interest.

Shortly after his

arrival, in September

with fellow Assistant

Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and

two Air Force attaches

a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted

American attaches in many years.

Six months later, on

25 March 195%, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article

that FELCHLIN

and his companions had lost some of

"spy documents"

the. train.

FELCHLIN said this

On another cocasion,

while travelling

with a British Miiitary

Attache, FELCHLIN returnad to his

train compartment to find a scantily clad soviet female in

his bunk.

(NOSENKO recalls neither of these

incidents.)

In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J.

YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCLIN was arrested in

Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military

(NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when

told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENIO

said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was

the Air Force Attache.)

A large crowd gathered and, after

some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia

station where

they

were ordered to sign a confession.

were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the

American

ambassador to deliver a strong protest note.

FELCHLIN was

toid on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the

Soviet Union.

No specific charges were mentioned.

Walter A. MCKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN's

travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were

allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same

time.*

Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN

immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the

general chauffeurs

assigned to the Office of the Military

Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his

first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the

* Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial

Soviet refusal, that his personal

plane be

USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out.

In February 1965

NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances

under which FELCHLIN left.

NOSENKO said he could not, in-

asmuch as he was no longer in the American Department

the time.

Told that the expulsion took place in 1954,

NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

tendent?.;

---

## Page 21

103.

attaches referred to SINYPYEY as either "Nikolay Perviy"

(Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the

second to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with

the same name.

FELCHLIN said that SHiRYEV drove primarily

for the Military Attache hinself, but sometimes drove for

the Assistant Milithry Attaches, and he remembered that

SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered

fron war wounds, and had

continuing chest or lung trouble.

(Asked whether SHNYRYEV

had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not avare of

any .)

FEICHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOPOVA (not specifically

named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's.

when she spoke with

FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for bout 120 rubles a month,

which seemed excessive, so FEICHLIN offered 80.

FEDOROVA

refused and ieft.

Two

days later she returned

She spoke little

English.

and accepted.

Other

maids

came

to the back

door of FELCHLIN'S apartment to

"chat" with her, and sus-

pecting that they were reporting to PEDOROVA, FELLIN

teased her about it.

FEDOROVA's previous employer at the

Embassy gave her full nome to columnist Drew PEARSON with

a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the Iccal

"boss"

of the Enbassy network.

the allega-

tion.

In the sunmer of 1953 or 1954, according to FEICHLIN,

the maid approached FELCHLIN

with the article, waved it in

his face, and accused him of being PEARSON'S source. (NO-

SENKO did not recognize FELOROVA'S name and did not recall

hearing or reading of this incident.

(v)

BENSON

NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a

major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow.

He did not

recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but

said that BENSON

was with MUiE and STROUD (see below) in

Stalingrad in 1955 wnen ali three were caught by

the KGE

with electronic "spying" devices.

They were declared per-

sona non qrata.

The KGb had no other derogatory information

on BENSON from any other source.

(vi) STROUD

NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an

Assistant. Army Attache.

The only agents working against him

were

the Military Attaches' drivers.

From concealed micro-

phones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before

STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of

electronic spying apparatus.

in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with

them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB

ло вода вс

lle wus with BENSON and MULE

knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any

source.

CIA files show that STROUD was,

with BENSON and MULE,

the victim of the soviets'

of technical eguipment

in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on

On 31 January

1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Mos-

with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an

can defector living there.

(According to NOSENKO, SISCOE

was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was.

in fact, a CIA cooptee.)

---

## Page 22

14-00000

(vi1) MULE

NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army

Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible

for him.

NOSENKO described

an operational approach to MULE,

in which he himself participated:

In 1953 or 1954 there

had been several defection

approaches to Soviets in the

United States on the basis of money and the pronise of a

new life.

After the KGB Second Chier Directorate decided to

try the

same easures,

MULE was selected because he was only

a captain despite his

lengthy service in the Army and because

material from concealed microphones indicated that he was

often

disparaged by the other attaches.

When MULE received

letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the

maids

turned

these over to

the KGB; from this nail it was

understood that MuLk

did not have a house in the United

States but lived with his

family in a trailer.

The father

of two children, MULE had

sent his wife from Moscow to Ger-

meny for en abortion,

as a third child would have imposed

too great an econonic

burden.

On the basis of all this the

KGB

appointed N.d.

BURODIN, a recruiter of the American De-

partment, to attenpt

to defect MuLh.

Together with BORODIN,

KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from

the Second Chier Directorate's

special technical section) HOSENKO travelled

to Leningrad

for the operation.

LEBEDEV installed a ciock containing a

concealed camera as well as microphores in MULE's hotel

room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return.

When NULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of

to back out, but

_ NOSENKO and_KOVSHUK

closed the door from

and prevented his escape.*

BORODIN reviewed lor

Hurt the Tacts

the KGB had

accumulated

about hiS lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his

fellow attaches,

and his shortage of money and then

offered

a job as a "consultant."

BORODIN had either $5, 000 or

an envelope to encourage MULF to accept.

Ac -

cording to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright,

telling

BORODIN

to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was

& captain in the American Army.

CIA files

show that MULE reported this incident.

that be was locked in his hotel room

and subjected to

a recruitment attempt by an WVD agent calling himself Jack

SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range

basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required

to procure documents from the Embassy,

and according to

SIEGAL was avare of facts concerning MULE's personal

from listening de-

vices in MULE's apartment or

SIEGAL left after about

20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident.

-MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.

(viil) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist De-

partment in 1935, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets

of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being

*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the re-

cruitment approach

to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO.

(See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)

---

## Page 23

105.

declarca persona non grata.

NOSENKO save the following

account of this incident:.

For some time the

Second Chief

Directorate had boon trying to acquire a small, convenient

plece of electronic equipment which

American Intellizence

officers were known to be using during their travels inside

the soviet Union.

As early as the beginning of 1954, the

Anerdonn Department hnd been given authorization from the

Central Courittco of the Conmunist Parly to sterl thig

equipment fron tho Americans, provided that the success of

such an operation was assured.

Before his transfer to the

Tourist Department in 1955, NUSENKO hinself had helped to

develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an

abortive etreapt lo steal the equipment from

an attache at

a railroad station outside doscow.

while BENSON, MULE,

and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO'S

tran3-

fer) it was learnud that they had the equipment with them,

and the KCB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.

To carry out the operation, Licutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV,

then Chief of the KGB Second Chier Directorate, and A.M.

GORBATENKO, Chier of the Auerican Departnent, flew with

other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad.

The hotel rooms

of BENSOY,

STROUD and MULE were watched

constantly from a visual observation post, and it. was noted

that they never ato in the hotel restaurant but always in

their rooms.

It was also noted that the apparatus was

placed under a pillow before they began to cat.

while

they

were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB

officers suddenly entered the roon and

seized the equipment.

In order to partially cover the illegality of this

act,

was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and

STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the

persona non grata action.

According to information from other sources,

the equip-

ment was seized from BENSON, JULE, and STROUD on

5 May 1955,

and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a

nonth before NOSENKO ciained to have transierred to the

Tourist Department).*

When the 7 May date

was given to

NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied

that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he

did not directly participate in it, but that he had been

Involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment.

It was pointed out to him that he had always sald ho was in

the fourist Department at the time of this operation, and

that he had consistently said that

he transferred

from the

American to the Tourist Department in June 1955.

NOSENKO

shrugged, but offered no comment.

*The

source Kaarlo R. TUOll, who served in the United

States

as a GRU Illegal

from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA

in. 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in

the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. 4111-

tary. Attaches travelling on a train.

TUOMI believed that

he night have contributed information leading to the three

mericans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being de-

clared persons non grata.

It would appear that TUOMI's

targets

WEre BANSON,

JULE, and STROUD.

---

## Page 24

149947553

106.

(1X) CARDELLA

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an admini-

strative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA.

The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning

CARDELLA from any source, ard NOSENKO could say nothing more

about his.

CIA files show

that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served

in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955.

Other than the

fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA'S MoscoW Em-

bassy office in 1954, no significant collateral information

concerning him is available.

(X) VAN LAFTHEN

NOSENKO identified George VAN LASTHEM as an Assistant Air.

Attache at the U.S. Embassy against

an operation. was at-

tempted in 1953 or 1954.

He sald that during this period

Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going

from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquain-

tance with VAN LAETHEM whish could be followed up in moscow.

She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her acidress and tele-

phone: nurber.

Although she was certain that

she would hear frcm

him, he rever did call her in Moscow.

NOSINKO said that he had

heard

about this frou P.F. PANKRATCY, the case officer handling

LARIONOVA.

He added that

CHURANOV was the case officer respon-

sible

for vAn LAEThEr,

as he was for all members of the Air

At-

tache's office at that tine.

NOSENKO knew of no other interest

or activity concerning

VAN LAETHEM.

CIA records show that VAN LALTiEY was not an Assistant Air

Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from

March 1951 to March 1953.*

As cryptographic security officer

and officer in charge of

the Embassy code room, he had super-

visory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics,

including Dayle SMITHI, and he was on fairly close personal terms

with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Mos-

cow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried respon-

sibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.**

He was again in Moscow from

19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time

when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S.

Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be

only a TDY, it

was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant

Army Attache assignment because of the extrerely sensitive na-

ture of his business there.

He was project officer for the en-

tire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to

review the operations including the planned use of the new

electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and

STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above) •

Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in

March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he entered the KGB,

he was succeeded in his post by walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO

has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his posi-

tion as Assistant: Army Attache ana MULE's predecessor would

presumably be

available to NOSENFO.

Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of

"ANDREY" in the June 1962 meetings.

he related it

to Roy RHODES.

Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that

It was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of

special electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy.

RHODES had no

access to such information.

---

## Page 25

107.

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. Introduction

By his account NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-

British Section of

the Tourist Department, * KGB Second Chief

Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department

was created to operate with and agaiast foreign travellers.

in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in

that directorate in January 1960.

He was a case officer

until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958.

In stateients made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimes to

have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year

period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or

September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 19€6 he

said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.

NOSENKO has described his personal and direct partici-

pation in the section's activities as consisting of:.

-Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual

agents, **

with NOSENKO

their handler from the outset until

they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents tar-

getted against American tourists; their number varied from

eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.

-Operations involving i foreigners who visited the

USSR for various lengths of time.

-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Com-

pany representative in Moscow,

whom YOSENKO continued to

meet following his reassignment in January 1960.

-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was

of no operational interest to the KGB,

and subsequent par-

cicipation in the KGB investigation of

OSWAlD's activities

in the USSR.

Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

2. Soviet Homosexual Agents.

Because he had been

seen meeting a foreigner in a

public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded

that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some

operational value.

The KGB therefore mounted an operation

which verified this possibility in 1987: A homosexual agent

of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked

VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had

previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated,

was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interro-

gated him, he admitted his honosexuality and agreed to

"These couponents are also known as the First Section and

Seventh Department, respectively.

**This tera refers to agents whose honosexuality is ex-

ploited py the KGB against certain nale targets:

---

## Page 26

NOSENKO's proposal

to work. for the KGB among homosexuals.

VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a hozo-

sexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronyni: not recalled)

YEFREMOV.

The two agents subsequently worked as a team

against foreigners under NOSENKO's dirortion; in addition

to specific targets, they had the general assignment of

associating with foreign visitors in Mo:.cow for the pur-

pose of spotting possible hoosexuals.

NOSENKO described

on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents:

"Although I an

a chief of section there I have all sorts of. agents.

have a good agent apparatus.

I have beautiful girls,

beautiful girls, whom

I can

use

as I like--anything you

want.

I have honosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular,

have one special pair.

I am afrald they are known to both

you and the British.

I permitted this padr to work in

general (without specific assignments/.

I send them. out to.

look on their own.

I give them money and tell them to go

out.

'Stroll about.

Here are theater lickets. Look around,

but only Americans.

Look for American pederasts.'

They are

¿ couple, that

is, they love each other.

They are able to

do anything desired, cither active or passive, anything.

They call me at night:

'Yuriy Ivanovich.

There is a mister

so-and-so here.

He

wants to go to bed with us."' I say:

'Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.'

So the next

day they go to a special hotel room.

Wo make photographs.

Then we think about what he represents.

Is he worth it?

Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--

depending on his position, what he can give,

what he can

tell.

If he can give something, I say:

'Well, let's have

a go ligrat'l.

After

this, I speak to these boys:

•Well,

go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish.

Do whatever is wanted.'

All this is seen (observed by the

KGB] •

The (hotel)

administrator enters.

'What are you

doing?'

The administrator calls the Militta.

An akt is

drawn

up.

•well,

you are a foreigner.

This is not our

business. We don't know what to do with you. ' Then the

Chief arrives:

'What's up.

Aha, I sce.'

Well, then & con-

versation begins:

'Listen, what shall we do?

Pederasty 1g

punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of

recent legislation, by up to eight.

Understand, if your

friends find out

help but find out?...

that you are a pederast--and how can they

When

NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the

Second Chief Directorate's Anerican Department in January

1960,

he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him.

They were

never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy, but, NOSENKO:

said, the Tourist Department "used to call me on homosexual

prospects."

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB

agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they

could not be used further since they had become too well

known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB

archives in 1962 or 1963..

The last operation in which these

two agents participated was during January 1962.

During interrogation on these agents, NOSENKO has been

unable to tell where they lived in Moscow,

their family

situation, or other such details. He said that he never

net either in a safehouse (always

on the street) and never

not either of them alone, without the other being present..

---

## Page 27

sir.

109.

NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans

based on

compromibing evidence obtained with the assistance

of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which

Americans were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis

of the evaluation of these two.

Additionally, CIA records

Indicate that at least six Americans; not reported on by

NOSENKO, have had contacts

with one or both of these agents

Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S.

graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Sovlet

institutions; and the last. Charles w. THAYER; the well-known

diplomat and author.

With one or possibly two exceptions, all

the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREYOV reported by NUSENKO. Or

other sources took place during the period from April to

November 1959.

The known exception was the KGB approach to

W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was

the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place

In 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely.

Finally,

NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV;

YEFREMOV,

and the American Robert BARRETT in the summer of 1959 but

does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1962,

shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of com

promising information obtained in 1959.**

3.

Other Soviet Agents

The Tourist Department, Just established when NOSENKO

was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for

operations against American and British tourists.

Conse-

quently, NOSENKO said,

he and the other case officers had

to "start from the beginning."

As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow

officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these

were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to

the KGB so that a KGB man could approach

one of them with

questions about somebody or something."

NOSENKO began to

collect information on these individuals and others with the

alm of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955,

he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all

of then Inturist interpreters.

During the following

four

years,

the number of agents

when NOSENKO handled varied:

Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,

some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing

all the time, back and förth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had

about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about

•eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return

to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14.

NOSANKO has provided information on five of these agents,

all of whom he says ha recruited from within Inturist during

1955. These were:

-Larissa SOBOROVA:

An: Inturist interpreter and. one of

the first Inturist agents recruited by. NOSENKO.

"SOBOROVA

waS NOSENKO's agent until 1959 (when she married and retired)

and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as

an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation

"S0e Part V.F.A

4*Se Part V.D.4.I.

---

## Page 28

14-1000re718

SUM

against

san the summer of 1957.*

NOSENKO reported

specifically on her possible sexual involve-

ment with two other tourists, one

Anerican and the other British.

during 1957-1959.

NOSENKO mentiored at one point that he "even

told Larissa about his last name."

- Vladimir HURONTSEV:

Kg3 cryptonym "LESIDEV," recruited

in 1955.

(NOSENKO has also said

that KURONTSEY had been a

Second Chief Directorate ayent

"since 1958.")

MUROMTSEY wag

called into the irmy in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet

Air force academy in Central Aste, where he dorked

as an inter-

preter for Syrian

students studyirg there.

Diring this period,

his file was held by the local KG in Central Asia.

Later he

returned to Moscow and das reactivated by the jecond Chief

Directorate.

- Nikolay ROGOV:

Kib

cryptonym "Ozero," recruited in 1955.

ROGOV haù formerly been a "confidential contact" of the KGB.

He worked in the central office of Inturist wrich assigned

interpreters to British and merican citizons visiting the

Soviet l'nion.

- Natalya SHULGIN'.:

Recruited by NOSEiKO in 1955, ar.

Inturist interpreter.

Short SHULGINA's photograph on 6 Februery

01964.

NOSENIO failed to recognize u: when be das given her nene.

however,

ne said that this was a

imer Directorate agent.

on whom boris FELITSKIY haà reported to Cla,"

NOSENKO's only

other statement on SHULGIlA ras made

on

17 Ap.il 1964.

when

discussing tie agents he acquired in 1955:

He said:

"So, for

example,

I had this

SORUROvA, then 1 had NuROr-sEV. I recruited

him.

Who Fise?

Natalya SHULGINA, KUNSAKUVA.

well, eryway,

during this short period. during

1955 untid

the end of '55,

]

had about eight people, all of trom translators from Irturist."

VOSENKO LOELDEDIE-EaLd he handled SHULGINA and inplled that be

recruited her.

(Informacion fron other sources indicates that

SHULGINA worked for two years as secretary/interpreter for the

NBC correspordent in Moscow:

Irving R, LEViNE. Who arrived in

the Soviet

Union in vuly

1955.

Although there is no evidence

that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to re-

cruit LEVINE In November 1955.

She has travelied abroad twice.

the first time to Paris in 1956 and the second time as an inter-

preter at the Brussels Fall in the

sunmer of 1958.

AS NOSENKO

indicated, BELITSKIY

reported on SHULGIlA, who he said was a

close friend.

BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved,

probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation,

in the recruitment of a mencer of the British Parliament.

BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO

said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case was in Geneva

•in the spring of 1962.)

- Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in

1955 (according to NOSENKO's statemert in April 1964 - see

above on SHULGINA).

In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was trang-

ferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British

are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.

**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KGS controlled BELITSKIY,

a sOurCe Of CIA (see Part VI.D. 6.).

---

## Page 29

111.

Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958.

In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise

operation against an American professor, which did not

reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957

or 1958 and 1900 she was working against an American tourist

named Philip NIFLSEN who was suspected of connection with

CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the

KGB. #

KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two livod in :,

England.

The KGB was still interested in NIELSEY at tho

time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO be-

lieved there was no recruitment. Urs. NIELSEN died in 1965.

Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several

other agents whom he recruited

or was given while in the

Tourist Department.

These included tha following:

-Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TO!O," a can-

didate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a special-

ist on Japan and Thailand.

DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and

English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow.

NOSENKO did not indicate how DMITRIYEV was used operationally

or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British

target..

- (Inu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of

Foreign Trade in Moscow.

NOSENKO did not personally re-

cruit this agent.

IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic

area and his provious handlers there notified the Center,

suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital.

NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the

British Commonwealt' Department of the Second Chief Direc-

torate which,

NOSENKO believed,

"planted him in the British

Trade Mission or sorething like that."

-Marina RYTOVA:

KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about

1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of

Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist

students from

foreign countries.

There she studied military

subjects as well as foreign larguages.

She speaks English

and Greek well.

NOSENKO could

not recall who recruited her,

but she was turned over to him by i.A.

Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957.

56 or 1957. "At that

time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian

Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until

about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek

language school of the Institute of International Relations.:

She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained

on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the

Exhibit in Moscow.

As she was often invited by the Ministry

of Agriculture to

interpret during meetings between soviet

officials and delegates from America, England,, and Greece,

she also reported this information to NOSENKO.

RYTOVA

served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and:

once participated in a conversation he had with' Iowa farmer

GARST.

In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as interpreter with &

small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United

States and. was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,

NELSEN was, In fact, In contact with CIA at the time (see

---

## Page 30

TIZ.

D.C., to report on observations enroute and while there.

RYTOVA is married to a man who worke in one of the military

offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major.

They have

one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

-Yevgendya ("'Jane"). DANKO: KGB cryptorym "OKSANA."

She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow

for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL'S SUCceSSOr,

Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO was handled by I.A. KONSIANTINOV

from about 1955 to 1957 and was then turned over to NOSENKO.

She reported on JELISACIC, who was not approached, according

to NOSENKO.

4. Operations with Forcign Visitors

NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with

foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-

Canadian Section of the Tourist Department.

Nine of these

operations resulted in recruitments

(excluding one who later

was recruited by

another element of the KGB, but including

another whom NOSENKO classified

as a borderline case).

Of

the remaining five operations which did not end with a re-

cruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one

case, one

target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was

unable to obtain compromising material

for an approach to a

third,

and for political reasons the KGB decided against

approaching the final two.

Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of

these operations does not always agree with that from other

sources, these cases can

be grouped chronologically as

follows:

1955 - one; 1956 - one; 1957 - three; 1958 - two;

and 1959 - seven.

The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with.

one exception, 1959

were homosexual provocations.

The re-

cruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was basca on heterosexual

compromise.

These fourteen operations

are sumnarized briefly below

in the approximate order in which

the cases began.

each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by

a summary of

the results of CIA investigations.

The description of the

BURGI

case is more detailed than the others, for reasons in-

dicated in the text.

a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

NOSENKO's Information: Martin MALIA, a graduate student,

spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was sus-

pected of having connections with American Intelligence.

Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA

was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to

be a homosexual.

The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and

NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had

homosexual relations. with MALIA.

After. NOSENKO had arranged

for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent,

the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room

1n Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in

touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a

*See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL, and JELISAVCIC.

---

## Page 31

Hoscow restaurant,

and from an observation polat in a

neigkboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and HALIA

having relations. With MALIA insistire on the lights being

turned off, however, :1t was impossible to obtain compro-

m1s1ng photegraphs (tho KGB did nut set have infra-red

photograuhic equipmont, NOSENKO sald) and therefore no re-

crultient approach

was made to MALIA. During this and a

later trip to Moscow In 1961, MALIA Has "very cautious,"

and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's

honosexuality for a recruitment approach.

Investigation Results:

MALIA, a U.S. Navy intolligence

officer during world war I1, has visited

the soviet Union

in 1955 and twice in 1962.

while buying books for the

Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA

travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was

sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity.

in 1955 and 1962 he had contacts with dissident soviet

citizens and clandestinely brought to the lest literature

for fublishing abrord.

In December 1963 MALIA was the

subject of an

attack in the Soviet press which charged that

during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for

dissension

debaucnes, """ the ranks of young intellectuals at druzken

saLIA had been in periodic contact with CIA

In recent years; in the spring of 1903 he claimed to have

had no involvenents with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or

females tunide the Soviet Union

at any tine.

ile made a

sirilar statenent torerat

October 1963.

XALIA has

not been interriewed

in connection with NOSEYKO's informa-

tion about him.

b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

NOSENKO's Inforuation:

At the first meeting in 1962

and despite his stated lear for his own security and his

deternination to discuss only the two leads hu wished to sell

CIA,

NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor

Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provocation

oper-

ation which began in Moscow and culainated with an approach

In Kiev in June 1956.

NOSENKO reported that he received a

letter

of comnendation (blagodarnost') and & honus of one

month's pay for this recrultuent, but in 1966 he retracted

this claim.

The BURGI case was

the first operation in which

NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB,

and NOSENKO said he counted 1t

as a turning point in his

personal and professional life:

It was with this success-

ful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" fron

a spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counter:

intelligence officer.

The BUNGI operation was the first

rocruitment carried

out by the Tourist Department after it

was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO.

In 1964 NOSENKO

reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV,

Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also

taken part

In this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible

case oificer.

August 1965;

when asked ho had recruited

BURGI, NOSENKO replied:

"KOZLOV and NOSENKO."

Asked who

recruited him first, NOSENKO said:

"KOZLOY, naturally,

He

was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of

the materials (in preparation

for the approach, was in the

hands of Case Officer NOSENKO. "

Because of the personal and

general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO,

1t 1s discussed in detail here:

---

## Page 32

14-00000

114.

In August 1965 NOSENKO reported that at the time of

BURGI's

arrival in the USSR, his

file

contained a copy of

his visa application

(anketa), "naybe" an excerpt from a

cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying

that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist

giving BURGI's anticipated

date of arrival and his itinerary

inside the Soviet Union, and

the results of traces of the

general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate

Archives.

NOSENKO hinself ran the traces, which proved to

be negative; there was no information on record concerning

SURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the

naterial available on BURGI, no other traces were made.

The

KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from

the lact that

he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had con-

tact with students who might sone day work

for

the u.s.

State Department,

American Intelligence,

and

other target

NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested

an altonot to

BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union,

he came in

contact with a number of KGB agents, and

their reports were

placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.*

SENKO could not recall in 1965 how nany such agents

have been, their names, or what they might have reported

concerning BURGI.

(BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but

NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.)

source, name forgotten by NOSINKO, the KGB obtained indica-

was a homosexual, and it was decided to

try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual com-

NOSENKO therefore

approached ru.A. LOPUKHOV, an

of the Britis' Department who handled the homosexual

agent Viktor BELAYOYSKIY, and asked permission to use his

agent in setting up the compromise.

After permission had

been received to mount an operation on this

basis, LOPUKHOV

and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make

BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room.

to plan:

BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the

of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was

invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts

took place and photographs were made.

NOSENKO was

adjoining room and dirceted

the compromise.

BURGI at this point, horever,

is the result of NOSENKO's special request, the com-

promising photographs were ready by

the following day.

report of the compromise and a request for permission

attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors.

The request came back with the approving signatures of o.u.

GRIBANOV and A.s. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Depart-

rent of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed

interest in using BURGI in the United States.

BURGI's itin-

erary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short

while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with

instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to

prepare the operation.

BURGI arrived the next morning and

was met at the airport by (fou) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of

the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist

*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists

until 1960--only "collections of materials."

---

## Page 33

7KP29

115.

cover.

was unable to recall how the car was ac-

quired, whether it was a KGB or Iniurist vehicle, who the

driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local AGB,

or other details.

In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB

officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels

in Kiev were full at the moment because of various confer

ences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for

about

a day in a private apartment in the center

of town;

he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible.

car arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa

in Kiev, NOSENKO,

KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer,

and (fnu) KASTYKAITE

housckerper,

were haiting for

them.

NOSENKO could

not remember how

or whether he intro-

duced himself to BURGI.

The recruitment conversation,

he

said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSEIKO," but NOSENKO had for-

gotten by 1965 who said what:

"I don't remember what I

talked about and I don't remember what KoZlOV talled about.

Many things were discussed.

It started with how he liked

his stay

inithe Soviet Union...

Then we slowly proceeded

to say how unfortunate

it was that information had been re-

ceived

about his conduct in Moscow.

We told hin that his

homosexual activities were known,

that this was punishable

under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the

criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no

diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court ac-

cording to the

Soviet law...

Nell, he nas scared, confused,

upset, and

felt uncomfortable.

Then we slowly proceeded

to

say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand,

the basis was prepared for the man to say:

'All right, 1

agree to help.'

embarrassed

...

We

showed him the pictures.

He was

of course--he was naked.

Then we prepared the

basis:

'You have a noble task.

You teach; you have stu-

dents; the students

might become future specialists on

Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these

students could be used by intelligence.

They might be sent

somewhere with special tasks.

Maybe you will tell us who

among

the students

is

preparing for government service,

how

they are distributed,

etc.

During the first conver-

sation everything was made completely cloar...

He was not

at ali willing to help or work for soviet Intelligence.

He

was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping

Soviet Intelligence'

was a very broad term.

I remember that

I told him:

'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that

you help our friends

over

there, or

me, if I should be there,

or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subver-

sive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.'

After the Soviet Union,

he was supposed to go to Italy,

to visit the Russicum

of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV

grabbed the subject and

began to ask questions

about this

school.

He told us a bit about the Russicum

and we asked

him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the

professors who teach Russian subjects..."

According to

NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end

BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist

the organs of Soviet Intelligence."

NOSENKO first said that

it was

he who took this statement from BURGI but later said

he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI

was then

taken to a

hotel.

---

## Page 34

116.

This was the first tine NOSENKO net BURGI. Following

the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor

above RURal,

and

for the remainder of BUlGI's stay in Klev

became his

constant companion and guide.

An attempt tas

made "to

smooth

out all the dirty business that had teen

brought up during the recruitment talk." NOSENKO took

SURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PaTRENKO

they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENkO's

grave in

nearby Kaniv.

the subject of homosexuality was not inised

again.

Fron

Xiev, BURGI went directly to the west, without

returning to Moscow.

Before the approach, ROSEtTO tad

visited the American Department of the first Chief Directo-

rate and had

arranged with its chief, FAKLISOV, for? re-

contact plan

in New York City should BURGl be recruited.

Before lie

leit

BURGI

war briefed on

these arrantenchts,

which called

10r ?

first meeting in tho box York. Public

Library.

PURCI was fiven a recognition signal and & KGB

cryptonym, but the

latter was not discussed with Hir.

About live days after returning to Moscow, SoStro

tarned over all his natorials of

the BURGI operation to

the

First Chief Directorate.

Sonowiat later sergey GuSkov,

Chief of the

American-Canadian-British Tourist Section,

KOZIOV, and tOSEiNO visited tEaLISOn the lirat Chiet

Diroctorate and

expressed an intorest in further auvelop-

nonts in the case.

FEKLISOV told then tha: BURGl bed

al-

rived for his first nocting, but the KGB had not established

contact; the

first meeting in Now lork City took place the

second

or third time BURGl appeared and the New York Legal

Residency continued to meet with him until the Resolution in

Hungary

In late 1956.

HOSENKO later heard from soneone in

the American Department, First Chief Diroctorate that the

case was closed.

For

their roles in this first recruitment

of the Tourist

Department, NOSENKO said in 1905, he and

KOZLOV reccived letters of commencation and conuses of one

month's pay by order of KGB Chairnan

SEROV; PETRENKO waS

given a letter of

commendation and half a month's salary;

and eich RASTiKAITE,

the housekeeper, got a commendation.

In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award

was for his longevity uf service.

Investigation Results:

BURGI

was first interviered

22 November

1957

concernind its corruittent

on

by the ACE.

---

## Page 35

11c0mc6nd

ti Mosesh.

---

## Page 36



---

## Page 37

:::

---

## Page 38

BUral anon continued to ilé

119t

PATEEIN

102447

rie the reminder or his

Approach to

(1957)

NoSENko's information:

in 195:

the basis;

01

next

1: 20n-

conneroin!

activiiirs

55R

Orig-ally

the

rusponsibir case

otticor

e:

1. VERRUININ

the

Sixth Suction 'oi

clie Tourist

impartmont;

this section

WaS

then

responsible

for

operations

grainat

foreign

seanen.

Since

VERENIKIN spoke no Gersan and

Te known to

speak English, NOSES.O was selected tu

Lil

approach

because lie

"knew English a liitle."

asked

why à Germatio

speakire KCB case nificer tas not

uard

NUSENKO

arsiered:

"The higher-ups said go worl

all."

After

beirg robufled by

seveial more lines during the i!

NOSENKO altempted tr rene contact

the Soviet Unton in 1955, the latter

"Investigation

Results:

ars irterviewed by

CIA On 19 -Julj

1965,

and,

whiie

¡unconnerative,

described alrild approach" in Mosco. during

1950 or 1957

which may be the one described by NoSEsko.

He wes.nat

questioned on tle identities of the Sovicts

involved.)

---

## Page 39

untätara. pr have

commercia.

{4)

savint

1: 2 v

witch:

minesimon tacts

fort

Commany and

merelated

a sirable shipping

Recruitaent

1:.

818064

Kaled

officer,

Ґ.?.

АЛКНІРО7:

Rade

handled

the

ent:it

opcration

aige

self playou a role.

It had nei

diad a fondness for girls:

himsed to lim.

using the nitr

posing as a painter, and told

for hin. A party was arrangré,

1959

SovieL

"rownil Chist

Directorain

acquaintane.

anu

hі.::

bus

COSENTO him-

been

determined that

TUrENKO therefore presented

Or "SERGEYEY"

and

int he could

91:7

men

KGB agent as

*See Part. V.I.8 for more discussion of this point.

**This incident is described pore fully in Part IlI.A.

---

## Page 40

date and a Second China Directorate secretary as 503FNKO'3

Late

thr evining

ind. its

dato exeused thouselves,

and

hai sorial relations

with

the temala

agent.

Photogiapis

515.76

NO-

SENKO

and

5.74

see another

the

nourced.thai

:: nad

80.9

aIt101

that

hid

wan! to :cll

rkut.

to arrange thi sule aid

10.k

MOSCUN.

they arrived

hufor:

asked

to give

miss.

t!:

10÷10

in- inent

115.

fis.

21:1t

ilsc,

MOSR:K0 oldered

section

ої

hovst..

SOORTRO

this

an't

nIrestud

for

blacknacketeering.

trial!tea

station,.

T&S

riruitedirk.!.

ther Chiet ci

the Tourisi

nartmert.

Threat dd imprisorront.

(it 83:

DUBAS

Wi:0

cid

had

motortiphs

previous

crering.)

Tiera

wal!

further

inataut with

arter

die left

the CäSR, herever,

i)i!

return

Dslo

publicted an

ju wntch lit

deserthud

lis exporierces,

"Dui

not

a11

if tlien.

investigation

f. Recruitment of MAarb. (lus;

NOStiKu's Informalich:

Hosenio in 1950 recruited Gisella

HARRIS, an caployee of

fleet

American

Hoppens Congany in Salt

Lake City, based on tri romantic

and

sexual involvement with

a soviet citizen.

The soviet told HARels that he was in

trouble with soviet authoritios and porsunded her to accropany

hin to the volice.

HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with

the soviets if they established contact with her in Salt Lake

city,

but the case was turned

over to the First Chics Directo-

rate,

and NOSENKO was unaware uf any further contact with her.

---

## Page 41

NOSENKO'S Information:

Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman

from the

Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as a

tourist in 1957 05

1958, and NOStri was assigned to ba the responsible case offi-:

cer.

During an curlier trip to the usek, the KGB had learned,

KRAFT had been intimate wit! a Soviet woran.

NOSENTO arranged

for her to come in dosion fron tier,

where

she was living

in

1957 or 1i58, in orcer to compronise

"RAFT.

Although his wife

was

accompanying him in Moscow, NAFT and thr Soviet doman wese

intimate in the latter's room in the Grund Hotel.

HOSENKO waS

present at the time

supervising the operation:

Photographs

were täken.

Then Militiaron broke into the room; finding KRAFT

and the woman in the nude; a recruitmont approach was then made

by DubaS, the Chief of the Tourist Departmeni.

(NOSENKO had

been the

case officer and had handled the opcration thus far,

but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach

"because DUBAS

wanted it for hinself.") Although the recruit-

ment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS

"hau an agreeient" that

nothing would be done about the compronise if KRAfT did not

criticize the soviet Union in lectures

about his trip there

which he was to give in the United States.

DUBAS again con-

tacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, and aftir this his

file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSPHXO

récalicc that the first Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was

not in a good region of the United states.

And also it smelled

like he had spoken of the approach mie to hin."

Therefore,

Nosenio concluded, he probably hau not keen contacted in the

United Stites.

Investigation Results: M

h.

Recruitment_of DREW (1952)

JOSENKO'S Information: George DReii,

an Aterican who

visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, had originally

been the responsibility of V.N. IVANOV,

a CaSe

officer of the

section dealing with Anerican and Canadian tourists.

By chance,

however, DREW became involved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents

VOLKOV

and YEFRENOV (see Part V.D.2), and they reported this

to NOSENKO,

then the depuly chief of

the section.

NOSENKO and

IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the

section chief,

and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the

approach.

(IVANOV was not considered to be sufficiently ex-

perienced and his English

was not good.

NOSENKO arranged for

DREW to be compromised in a leningrad hotel room with a homo-

sexual agent of the local kGB handled by a Leningrad officer,

(fnu) PERELETOV.

Using the name

"Mr. SERGEYEV,"

NOSENKO

---

## Page 42

124.

alone recruited DREW in in sifice of the hotel.

The KGB First

Chief Directorate was inicrts.cd aà

DRess recrsitment te-

cause he might be ablu to sure other horseracis, possibly some

in the U.S. Government.

I..

ication

Frisalts:

1.

Recruitment of

NOSENKO'S Infairition:

(1959)

In Jun:

or possibly July 1959

oria in Leningrad

arter

been compromised oy NOSEirD's lionosexual agents VOL-

KOt and YaFRENOV

(see Part t.d.?.).

The case ins thea surned

over to Yc. A. TARABRIN;

at that tire Chief of the British De-

partmont of

the First Chier

licectorate.

NOSLUKO furnished

no more information

on this

case ind

did not toon its current

status,

but he believed the KGB his not been in contact with

sübsequently.

vestigation:

Results:

sit

Recruitrent ve

+ 11922)

NOSENKO'S Information:

Ey binsol! NOSEiKo recruited

the

lova

Hoskorstay last

the Bucharest)

Hotel

July leis, after editanad buen compromised

by either

VOLKOV Or TIER.

' nis honosexual agents (see Part

V.D.2.).

153°

citican and his casa was also

tarned over

to

TARABRI

•stinatic:

k.

Recruitment of

(1959)

NOSENKO'S Irformation:

NOSENKO personally and alone re-

cruited the Moscon representative of

NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals

by saying that,

after 1958, the Tourist Departrient had two

geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens

and the other with tourists from

other countries.

NOSENKO

was involved in the first of these, "so they assigned them

to me.

---

## Page 43

• 125.

whose anma NoSENiO did not recali, at the liotel Mucro-

pol in Moscin during the turnor of 1959,

cousibly in Auguet.

The

approach was bases on hinoseyuni corprorisa

IDO TiNG NOSENKO' 3

agents VOLlO: and YIFFiN (500

Tant

v.s.z.j

inver-isation Pestlis

1.

Receditcart

: 122221

Nostro's infomatich:

Then Goint

soviet Unic:

in suit

et thouse tre".

come acquairied

as part on theat todd

assignant to be-

with barceckuals isnt

wi.d.i, aucidentally

net HErONS in Mescur mrd mergitri

ARCAt RIGGiNIOrS tO NOSENKO.

NOSEnKO wiete a ruport of this con. or an ransted authority

to take corercuising photogiegle in pieceiteror tir a recruit-

ment approach,

and besto, tis chint, lin assigte: the case 10

him:

(e30E05 hod proutcosiy loosite cap asibility of A.à.

VELITSA1.,

another

tomosexual

relatiors sitween

se Chalecide 201:

taken of

this suparate

occasions

in doscow.

men MenTors laid travolind to tangorod

he was

"arrested" hy as officers rasing as miscramon) while

he was

engaged in relaiions with a horosaxial

are:? of opera-

tional cortsat fron Cicssa.

NOSENIO arringed by phone to bring

this homosexual to lingorod; he did not iscall his name,

but supplice CIA with a physical

inscription.

(NOSENRO

could

give no bickground on the agent and wien asted why

not,

said

he "wasn't interested."; MERitis was

then brought before

NOSENNO,

who recruited hin during a session insting approxi-

mately five hours.

HOSENKO later travelius with MERTENS when

he visited ivov and Minsk before leaving

the USSR.

NOSENKO

said that he hüd used the nami "George"

sit: HERTErs, but he

.could not recall what lost namic lie had

Investiaation

R:

NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had

a section dealing with commercial representatives, which

was responsible .for the fid nan, but hau

asked NOSENKO's

section

for help.

"they

said they didn't have any agents

or anything

and

dian't know what to co.

So sonebody said,

"well look,

why

don't you ask the chief of the, section?

He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange every-

thing for you.'

So I wound up handling the case, and

TARA-

BRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report

to him."

In this passage NOSENKO scened to be referring

to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the

section; the chief of the section at that time. M.A. LEONOV,

is not known to have participated in operations stemming

from the

homosexuality of the prospective agents

-

---

## Page 44

1 5 sa

220

26.

19.

Congre

34.8:7.7.

12952)

BOSENKO'S

InfcImation:

RONCLE KARELTT,

"guide at the 11.3.

Exhibitien

in

Ncticow

socone frionliy with the hore-

sexual agents VCroV

aNd YEPRI"SV (see Part v.r.del, whor he

met ät the

fairground.

Although BARaNTT was nos a honcsexual,

VOLKOV succucini--after a long period oi developaent--in invoiv

ing him in homosexual

acts, which were photographed by FiGh

purschnel from in adjoininy hotel rooni.

as case officer for

VOLKOV and YEFHENOY, NOSENKO

was

responsibie for arranging the

campromise, was present when ine

photographs name taken, and

has

described the occasion in actail.

hore hid been much co.-

plairing among the photographic technicing decause of thie

amount of time ircy were

forces

to spond wildin; for VOLKOV to

succeed in his mission, and NOSE:rO recallus that he "had to

provice them with drinks and trous then wall" bacause "they

were a big

halp" to him in this opcration.

The plotographs

were good,

but the kois was unable to uso them an 1359 because

of a general ban placed by sueLirIt on the recruitment of u.s.

Exhibition guides due to the possiale

repurcussions on KHRUSh-

Ciev's planned visit to the tritei scatos.*

(NOSEIRO reported,

however,

that PAAREIT was recruitsd on the basis of the 1959

photography wien he returnoi with nother exhibition in 1961.

This recruitint was cariod out vy moter component of

the

KGB Second Chief Directorate, and inStikO tail nosiing to do

with it.t*)

Investigation Results:

See the discussion

of the HILLERFORD case, below, for addi-

tional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.

# 86

In 1961, shortly before his recruitrent,

BARPETT had osten-

•sibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow.

NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

!"":

---

## Page 45

127.

n. Compromise Of WILLEMESZ

NOSENIO'S Information:

FieUeriCK MILLLAICPD WAS BARPETT'S

roomnate during the 195g scribition in roscow.

initially he

was a target of the local i0e cryorization for the city of

Moscow, which believed MiLLiPFORD to be ar pal agent and had

been

collecting caterials o. him.

At thr sane tine and, with-

out rnowing of thie interest of the local oruanization,

VOLKOV

and YEFRElOV had rade WIllErFORD's acquaintince,

And MOSANKO

had arranged for compromising photograpis of MiLLikrOso and

YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel roor.

loSiNto watched WiLLERFORD

and YEFFEMOV through a tro-way mirror and was aule to describe

the scene in detail.

It sias only aft.r this conpromising matzi-

ial had been obtained that NosEnko lourned of the local KGB's

interest in WILLERFORD. MOSENio's department and the local KGS

unit then nade a joint requese for operational appreval to

approach hiLLerroad, but permission was refused because of the

general ban on

recruitment approiches at this time, the case

fIle was

retained by the Moreon KO3 organization,

and NOSENKO

did not know whether WILLEREORD has buen approached subseguently.

"evestiontian Results:

Note:

There is a similarity between NOSENKO's descrip-

tien of

the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which

prevented the Tourist Department fron taking advantage

of its compromising photography of intrETT and WILLER-

FORD, and informätion provided by the carlier defector,

GOLITSYN.

GOLITSYN reported that an imericon employed

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code cleri., was

prepared

for recruitment on the basis of homosexual com-

promise during 1959 and 1960, according to information

he said he iearned from U.s. Erbassy Section case offi-

cer.

G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB ha:!

photographs of the

American

in various stages of a homosextial act, and

there was no question about the recruitnent being achieved:

"The only question was to where." At the time, however,

SHELEPIN had just become Chairnan of the KGB and was

stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments.

He was shown these particular photograpis bit decided that

an approach on their basis would be too crude and that

another way should be found.

ilthough SHELEPIN did not

exclude the use of these photographs sone time in the

future,

according to GOLITSYN,

he had reservations against

using them at that tine for fear of the propaganda reper-:

cussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed pub-

licly.

GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was

subsequently carried out. The essential differences: be-

tween this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN

implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that

GOLITSYN appeared to ke speaking of a general prohibition,

---

## Page 46

128.

whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to

the u.s.

Fixhibition

it Sokolniki Park which

4 September 1959.*

Ir. speaking of the 1953 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki

Park, Moscow, Salian told

Gas with that both the

KGB

and the GRU launched an

Tinue effort to recruit

Americans employed at the Exhibition.

All officers at GRU

Headquarters were assigned to

this

by the KGB in

an attempt to compromise

taskine Americans:

and some were used

V.A. GRUSHA

(identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer

special-

izing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate)

directed many of these KGB activities

in which Gru person-

nel were involvea.

As a result of this endeavor,

"more

thar one American" was recruited, and

here indicated

that the technique of comuromise--such as

"bed pictures"--

was employed.

When

questioned

on this

subject station

Guns Eat reported that to handle

the Exhibition, the

CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form

a cormittee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of cre

saction of this committee) and to which the GRy gasthale

CRanes contributed

fold:

personnel.

Its purposes were two-

protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to dis-

rupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence:

and to recruit.

24321

Miss and that the GRU did not recruit

any Americans at the Exhibition.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 47

• 129.

5.

the FRIPPFL Case (1953-1963)

As a menuer of the Tourist Departront, POSENIO in 1959

personally took part in to recruitmini of the Averican Express

company representative in Moscow,

Arsene FRIPPEL.

lie continued

to be one of this agent's

two KGb handlors

üfter toursferring

to the American

Departront ir. 1960, and

"RIPPEL was asked to

report on the U.S. Embassy as weil as or tho. Babassy officials

FRipped left the Moscow job in 1901 but returned

on trips to the USSR in 1562 and 1963, when NOSENiO met him.

The only recruited Anerican whom NOSE

this operation by H0sr.id

several de-

tails, but both agree that tiffEl prosied the KGB with

significant infornata0.

"hoor the versions

are presented supa-

ratcly below.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENND first mentioned TRIPPEl turing the thirs meeting

in Geneva in 19u2 while uscissing

KGB successes

"There was another ayent ikGB cryptoyal

'ARTCR.'

lie was not

a correspondent.

ne knew me as Georgu, Yully Ivanovich, and

my lust name as NINCLAYEV. He was a permanent represertative,

not in the Embassy, but cs the merican lapress Company in Mos

cow.

FRIPPEL.

Arthur FRIPPFL.

But he

also has the cryptonym

'ARTUR.'

He liked drinking, always drani.

lie was also strongly

attracted to women.

I provided him with pointiful women... Well,

we decided to have a tair with him.

any?

that could he

give?

He new worls in the Anerican lixpress Company lain office in

New York Cityl.

A new department has now

the soviet Union and the Peopa's' Democratics.

"ern organized for

And he is chief

of the department...

He is no lorger ir. Moscow, but he was here

two ünd a half or

three years.

he hope that he

will return.

We are waiting for him to come back.

He snow that the company

wants to send him'again, because he kions the Russian language

very well. He is, in

fact, on cmigro, this tRIPPEL.

And he

also did a good and intelligent

job of establishing relations

with Inturist.

Hc had

vers good relationships with ANKULINOV,

the Chairman of Inturist, and with other poopie, both the chiefs

and the low-level workers...

But, why was FRIppEL recruited?

I was interested in knoving precisely ly wich, by name, and how

approaches were being made to our deleuitions

(in the

United

States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view.

of counterintelligence, not intelligence.

What kinds of

approaches are taking place to cur people in America and by

whom?

This is what interested us.

But he didn't know arything.

He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial infor-

mation, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been

useful for coverage;of Americans visiting the Soviet Union.

He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this

by other means and launched into a long description of the

methods of covering foreign tourists in the ussr."

NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL WAS

compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinovna

GORBACHEVA.

NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail

as well as

the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pic

tures of these activities

through a two-way mirror, and the

confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the roon.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 48

130.

After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent

debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following

additional staterents concerning the FRIPPEE case:

- Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he

did not do so

alone; Col. V.D.

CHEL'OKOY, Deputy Chief

(and later Chief) of the

Tourist Departnent, was present;

he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitrent together" in

early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL'S

case officer.

- NOSENKO

attricuted his involvement in the FRIPPEL

recruitment to

following:

"In 1953, after 1958,

when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area

of activity was narrored down.

I didn't handle all the

tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of

the section and I had

my owr. little area--for example, the

permanent representative of the Aericar. E:press Company,

and vesides that I began to collect all the material on

all American tourist firms which have anything to do with

Inturist and who send tourists to the U'SSR."

- FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to

Soviet tourist operations.

- Wnes NOSENKO began to work in the u.S. Embassy

Section of the Anerican Department in 1560, he took FRIPPEL

with him because FRIPPEL was

acquainted with some Ameri-

cans at the Embassy.

NOSENKO was

asked to question FRIPPEL

about the U.S. Erbassy and such Embassy officers as George

NINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO

anything along this line.*

- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during

NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when

FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

- NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during

the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife,

in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at

FRIPPEL'S home, where they met Mrs.

FRIPPEL.

Odette

FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent,

and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover

for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL.

Although unusual for

KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents

in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that

he went because he

"was invited,"

and CHELNOKOV went "be-

cause he was also involved in the recruitment."

- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist

Department and later

as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of

the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department,

NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels

and restaurants.

Throughout this period, he was almost

invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV:

"Perhaps one time

I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with

See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.s.

Embassy Section.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 49

131.

CHELNOKOV. "

Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings

with FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the tho continued

to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, be-

cause they "kept hoping he would give something."

In a

different contest, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO eX-

plained:

"You

see, never mind if you are a chief or a

deputy chief of a

department, you must have one,

two, oI

three agents.

GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget

how to work.

The Chiefs of the (Second Chief) Director-

ate do not demand that they have i2 or 13 agents, but they

must have two or three.

They will have important agents

or those in leading positions. "

- NOSINKO continued to act as FRIFPEL's case officer.

after

FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had

been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy

Chief of the

Tourist Department.

He met twice with FRIp-

Pal during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the

Soviet Union as a

guide with groups of foreign visitors.

Both of these meetings were handled by NUSENiO alone, with-

out CHELNOKOV.

- The first meeting took place in the sumner of 1962,

after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva.

had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some Ameri-

can journalists.

(NOSENKO was unable to give the compo-

sition

of the journalist group or to recall where they

stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the sov-

iet Urion.)

HOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what

questions

the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during

a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged

that standard practice required visiting journalists to

submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing

to Soviet authorities prior to interviews.

After the

interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction

of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader.

NOSENKO could

not recall their specific reaction to the

KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were

"satisfied."

Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL,

NosaNno added in a later discusgion,

was to learn whether

any of the journalists might hive joined the group at the

last moment

the United States, which might suggest

intelligence connections on their part.*

- NOSENKO met. FRIPPEL alone for the second and last

tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a

day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Mos-

COW

and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where

the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away

NOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one of

were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute

additions to a tour group to the USSR; this night signify

intelligence affiliation.

2321325226

ICE SENNET

---

## Page 50

* *

192.

from his group, FRippEL called on POSENKO in the latter's

hotel come and the two drank

and talked.

NOSENKO had

given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift,

and FRIPPEL

said he ranted to give NOSESKO some whiskey in return.

They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO

waited in the car while FRIPPEi, went aboard for the

whiskey.

(He had invited SOSENKO to visit the ship but

could rot obtain a pass for him.)

When FRIPPEL returned.

he brought another Americar, so

MUSENKO had to invent for

hinself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot.

The three

returned to the hotel and arani.

some nore,

everyone getting

drunk.

During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of

importance," and his most interestiny news

was that he

night again

we raassigned to Muscow in Decerber 1963 as

the Americon Expregs Company represertative.*

- On 3 February 1961,

"n1)e

reviewing the CHEREPANOV

papers** in Geneva, MOStike i13

asked

about the following

passage which appearad in the AGD operational plan

against

BOWDEN, dated rebruary 1960 und signed by t.A. KUSKOV of

the. U.s. Embassy Section: "In iDOWDEd) shried himself

to be an indiscreet porso....

ircnically, che uay as

though by chance, ho ISOlDEs) #luriel out to our agent

SuMerove Ithe fact of! "aRron's" affiliation with Ameri-

can Irteiligence."***

NeSEiko confirmed that the "ARTUR"

of the CHinEraNor pagers was PalfpEl,

but he said he

"could not say" whether ipipper bod

any affiliation with

American Intelligence.

NOSENKO said he later read

a report that FRIPPEL had been

reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent

would return to Moscow; this report has submitted by

V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal

Residency and overtly an Inturigt

employue in New York City,

wlio was à former second Chief Directorate colleague of

NOSENKO.

The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part

VI. D.7.c.

There is no other report of BOwDEl makiny such a remark

and no basis for it.

Although never contacted

by of

associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEr during 1960 was

under

consideration for operational use in Moscon, and

in this connection bacharourd inquiries ibout him

were

submitted to

FBI

While in the Soviet Union ir August 1962 and shortly be-

fore. his recruitment on homosexual grounds isee Part

VI.D.2.), the American Spencer RUBERTS was approached on

the beach at Sochi by a young soviet male.

ROBERTS and

the soviet, who spoke Fiench, suon became

friends, and

the Soviet

told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent

in several operations against French-speaking foreigners

in the USSR.

One of these was FRIPPEL,

the soviet said,

adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an

American Intelligence agent.

NOSENKO, who has provided

much detail on the ROBERTS

case, did not mention the

unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing

FRIPPEL.

18 2301

---

## Page 51

?.i..

the carter triode tiled

ri.at

i::

t82::.

toot apartne.

= 8.

D. HIERO'S

24262

'it

Wits

i.c:

:.

ti

aii.

ists

colican

12

* See ParE TIT

which

dasuribas bosilko's enchitic refusai

during the

1si2 meetings to have any cont.ots

with ciA

in-

sire

the soviet Union.

During the

rotebor 1466 incaurcaations,

NOSENKO SaiL

that in

11e2 ne had "absolutely no ideal concern

ing

the possisility of

TRIPpe...as.an intermedlars

for contact inside the Soviet trion.

---

## Page 52

HE HSOWOO GOAL COCACE 10 1.

ABIDIAN (EeN PArT

mostant said

war'e cardet John

"ArY

aid. ret incr

one anocher.

tioned

on there contacts by dostard duit thisckoy.

* *

I February 1905 MOSENTO donied the 63 meeting

took plaer.

Department of Siato resorde

shai tailin forciber

i961 FRiT

FEL applied. fo:

a new passport

incitag that he intended

to depart

the inited States in

1362 aboar the

"olympia".

for a cruire sion

visit

the sovies Union.

---

## Page 53

NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to

request permission to board the vessel.

In February 1965, NOSENKO did not recall having

told FRIP-

PEL these details of his life

and said that, if he had done

5o, it was while he was drunk.

---

## Page 54

196.

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963);

As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with lee

Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to

the

Tourist Department of the

Second Chief Directorate (1955-

1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chief öf the Anerican-

British-Canadian Tourist, Section, NOSENKO had a direct hund

in the decision in October 1959 that USWALD nas of no oper

ational interest.to tha KCB Ind should be returned innediately

to the United States.

Before President Kenriedy's assassi-

nation in November 1963; when NOSENÜ was again in the

Tourist Department as its Doputy. Chief, he vas present at the

time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD'S

application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter.

the USSR.

After the assassination, he also played a role in

the KGB investigations of OSWALD's

activities during residence

in the Soviet Union from Octover 1959 untii June 1903.

Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in tho

Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he

may have had

with Soviet intelligence,

is

meager and indirect.

It derives almost entirely fron indications ci

primary

interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in

every desector to the USsk, and from infererces which may be

drawn from certain entries

in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" ano

certain statements made by his wife, Marina,

during inter-

views on behalf of the warren Commission.

After President

Konnedy's death, the Soviet Government provided

the United

States with official documents and letters pertaining to

OSWALD's defection to the USSK, his suicide attempt, his

marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union.

This

information from the Soviet Governnent generally agrees with

the information fron NOSENKO.

The materials furnished by

the Soviet Government make no mention aL any Soviet Inte).

ligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSkALD•

In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique:

It was

and remains the

only such information

available

on the 32

months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.**

NOSENKO'S access to

" for continuity of presentation,

boin periods of NOSENKO'S

alleged involvement,

1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in

this part of the paper.

an. Independent sources,

however,

reported on visits by OSWALD

to tho soviet and Cuban

Embassies in Mexico City between 29

September and j October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) con-

tact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet

Embassy there.

NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any

such contact.

In October 1966 he revised this to say that

OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO

explained that he had been sitting in the office

of Tourist De-

partment Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head-

quarters from the KGB legal. Residency in Mexico: The cable,

which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that

OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting

permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with

Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

---

## Page 55

137.

information

on ICB involvoment with OChkiD in 1959,

at the

tilE

of OstAlD's request

to derain

in 263

U:S?, derives ex=

clusively fron

the clained feet that he, POSiNio, dis repusy

Chief of the NGB Session

conline

with

Amirican tairists

at thas tire.

He sild he then ci

laior develurceit:

VICINIO

of his rosition.is ¡enucy Chicí oi

the Tourist

Heretilent

1÷01

niü-1962 urtil 196..

The contral chens of dusti0's is-

formation,

üs given

to Cid and

it.e

is 112.

the wid

determincú

cardi

c: 16 October 1235,

shen OStialS alo his

firsi declaration

intent to rendin

in this USSr.,

WES

"not nor-al" and

"nashed ito honda"

:: 1.F3

Accordlag to 100k0i0,

cir 169 had 10 coccidiona!

Interest in

ParAlD and nade no attonge do rearuit et wich to

debrief his

during

ike bine he

in tosco: and this

or düring

his tilp

to tried shortly beidre killis tre

P'resident.

2.

Statemente

10 210

---

## Page 56

OSWALD aiterared

American Embassy cr

hospital.

Fron

his

reccited permission

to-yrar vasis about

he moved to kinsk.

00051013 411

to renounce

his U.s.

citizenship at the

31 Driober.

three

CONS

leaving

the

diary,

the kürsen

Ccimission concluded he

to reside

in riestoriet.

Union

and year.

- January 190?, approxinately the time

---

## Page 57



---

## Page 58

I TOSENIO TUTET TOTE TITON

one

Jensick Chai

To "only

skined the file" and on another that he had it in his pos.

session abou:

2o minutes.

in October 1:56 le

again said that

he reid the file

alid

that while

doing

SO

san

i Picturo of

OSWALD for the iirst

time:

NOSENkO. added chat.he. never me:

OSWALD personally.

** in Octobe: 1005 NOSENiO said he leained that usralu was

a poor shot from vivikRivostel,

a felion kob officer who had

been:told this while visiting binsi.

---

## Page 59

b.

Statements to ClA

On the basis of the fbl interviews of NOSENKO and the

sinilar infornation which he hai previously piovides clA,

further debriefings were conducted ly cli on

3 and 2?. July

1964.

New and explanatory information received Juring these

debriefings is presented below:

(1) KGB Interest in OSWALD

Until CSWALD mentioned to the lazurist guide his desire

to remain in the Soviet Union, he was treated

routinaly by

the KCB.

When OSWALD made his

request, this was reported

innediately to the Tourist Department,

and it was from this

moment that the KGB began to pay attention to hin.

All

available naterials on him were inercupon collected and

examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters'

reDoILs.

reports

fron

hotel agents,

and the rosults of &

• heck of NGB Archives.

KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter

to whom OSKALD had stated his desire.

Although the KGB con-

sidered it possible thai OSWALD might be an Anerican agentis

the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as

would be done

after

the person

is allowed to stay in the

Soviet Union."

Surveillance of OSWALU was not increased

after his request, and OSWALD was not inte-viowed by the

KGb in an attempi

to establish his intentions.

Theic was

no attempt to debrief OSivALo because

"He was not an inter:

esting person and wasn't normal."

OSWALD was never questioned

on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.*

From the

* NOSENKO provided details on this point to CIA (see below) and

made a similar statement when asked in 1961 why KGB agent

Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own

developmental target) and

then enigrate to England; See Part V.D.3.

** When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his citizen.

ship on 31 October 1959, OSKALD told the counsellor officer that

he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a

Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information

concerning

the Marines and radar which he possessed.

TSE AS

---

## Page 60

material's

and reports immediately available it was decided

chat something wes not quite normal about usiard,

and the

Kub therefore had Inturist.tell him that he wouid have to

leave the USSR when his visa expired. OSALD's suicide

attempt supported the Tourist Department's feelirg that

it had been

right in deciding to refuse OSkALD's request

for citizenship, parsicularly as the hospital also re-

ported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department

decided: "We will do nothing; we

don't want to know him."

Inturist was suusequently told: "'There is no KGB interest

in him.

'Do what you rant'..

The KGB thought that he was

of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was

not normal, and that he

should leave the country."

The

Tourist Department and the KSB in general thereupon "washed

their hands" of this natter.

There was never any

operstional use of OSWALD nor was

there anything

in OSKALD's

file to indicate that the KGB

attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.s.

Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a

very little person and also it is felt that he is not nor-

mal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him.'

The GRU

was not informed of OSWALD's defection.

Neither was any

attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes

in Moscow or in Minsk:

In short, there was no intelligence

interest or contact with OSWALD after the initial assess-

ment of abnormality.

(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD

The KGB had no lnowledge or interesi in Marina (nee

PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to

register marriage.

In fact the KGB did not know that she

was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no

surveillance on OSWALD to show that he

knew her.

When the

KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the

Archives of the Minsk KGB as well

is neighborhood .checks and

checks at her place of employment.

The people where she

lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple

gIrl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active

member of the KOMSOMOL.

She was a simple "philistine," an

uncultured girl more interested in

gossip than ir anything

important. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an

informant on OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to

recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it con-

sidered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the

United States, "because she would tell him and also: she

would probably.tell the Americans, based on the assessment

of the type of person she was."

(iil) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR

NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties

in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her

departure from the Soviet Union.

lie replied:

'"The Soviet

law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner. It was

" NoSENKO subsequently delined this Xol reservation about.

OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable pei-

SOD.

TG

---

## Page 61

easy In this case because OSWALD was already living and

working in the Soviet Union.

It would be sore difficult,

of course, with tourists of others who are in the Soviet

Union only for a short period and want to marry Soviet

citizens.

•*: Asked whether it is not unusuilly difficult

for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO

explained:

"In this case it was easier because Marina

was already married to a föreigner."

NOSENiO was next

asked what office of level of the Government or Party

must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage

to OStiALD.

He described

the procedure as follows: "They

would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply

to register their marriage. (There) they will be told

that they will have to wait a week of two while they think

it over to be sure they want to get married.

During this

period the necessary checks are conducted.

The Regional

Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call

the Minsk KGB.

The Minsk KGB said that it is all right

for them to got married--that the KGB has no objection.

But it is the law that allows them to be married. There

are no formal approvals necessary."

Concerning the decision to permit the couple to leave

the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision

would be made on the local level, in Minsk, and that there

is no need to check in Moscow.

1964 he corrected

this statement to say that, while local authorities make

the decision,

the Ministry

(IV) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico

Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's visit

to ::xico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew oniy

that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come

to the Soviet Union.

The Mexico City Legal Residency of the

KGB reported his visit to leadquarters by cable, requesting

inforrs:ion; this was the first that the KGs First Chief

Directorate had heard

of CSWALD.

M.I. TURALIS, Deputy Chief

of Service Number Two

(KGB counterintelligence

abroad),

of the Tourist Department, whom

learn whether any information was availaule.

that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV OF A.G. KOVALENKO

to ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he hinself was

present at the time.

ALEKSEYEV was given the background on

OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he

was not considered normal, and was told to advise the first

Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-

enter the Soviet Union.

ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN

to relay this message.

NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD

had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew

"By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had

already written the American Embassy in Moscow, through soviet

of his desire to return to the

The lotter,

and was received by

the Embassy in Moscow

married on 30 April 1961.

February. The OSWALDs were

---

## Page 62

fao: contacts " between OSWALD and Cubans or representati

of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere:

(V) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involverent in the

Assassiration

When first discussing the OSWALD case with YOSENKO on 23

January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: "'It is a very un-

fortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the soviet

Union. "

(NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's

intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the

assassination, but only that tho fact of OSvAlD's "defection"

placed

the USSR under probaby untounded suspicion.) NOSENKO'S

immediate response to this remark was:

"That is not correct.

This is putting a false color to it. I am your friend.

I am

completely with you,

and. I will continue to work with you and

agäinst the Soviet Union in all respects.

But the truth

should always remain the truth.

No matter how I may hate

¿cannot speak against my convictions, and since

know this case I could unhesitantly sigu off to the fact that

the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way.

I say

this because I know they were frightened of this nan

(OSWALD)

and that everything should have been said to him or that he

should have been in

any way worked an,

in any was. (by the KGB!

•-God forbid!...

I know this because

1 sat

on this matter for

several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President.

To investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly

by the local authorities,

that is, by the local KGB in

Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and

even sent several workers down there to investigate--not

trusting official papers.

Even without specific orders I had

to make a complete investigation on my end of things because

this

is a serious matter when the head of a government is

assassinated...

If you want to know,

it would be a

greater

advantage to the Soviet Union if the

President were still

Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked

at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any

intelligence service there have been assassinations of one

kind or another.

I can say this: That in our organization,

not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by

che assassination-to think

that this should happen in the

twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful

jovernwent in the world."

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## Page 63

Supervisory-Responsibilities.and Knowledge. of Tousist

operations

Information from NOSENKO

In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist

Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

The Second Section,

which had theretofore

concerned itself with operational activity

against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into

separate sections; one section dealt with tourists from the united.

States, Canada; and Great Britain, the other with tourists from

Europe, Latin America, and all other countries.

NOSENKO said

that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief

of the first of these new sections.

NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey

OSWALD, sters entirely from his having

held this position.

It

is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all

recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958 until he

returned to the American

Department at the beginning of 1960.

His knowledge about recruitments

is based additionally, he

said,

on the fact that some time between lay and October 1959, during

the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV,

GRIBANOV's secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the

use of tourist cover

by foreign intelligence organizations during

the period from 1955 through 1958.

NOSENKO gathered this material

from earlier

annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talk-

ing with various case officers in the department.*

On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in

the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper,

NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department opera-

tions prior to 1960 (taken

from the protocol he signed on this

subject on 25 February 1965) :

"Operations against tourists were developing slowly

during this period and very little was known by the KGB

about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the

time I wrote the report in 1959.

No agents were definitely

uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or

1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were

'caught in the act'

of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting.

agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE.

Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he

did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nOI

could he recall any examples of the material he included in

tourist operations, or what

as

• an operational cover in this period. He did remember, how-

ever.

that it incorporated statistical data on the growth

of foreign tourism.

---

## Page 64

46

not. krow any details concerning the operational activity

which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing.'

"I know of no case in which an imerican tourist was

definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence

and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during

this period.

"I do not know of any

such Imerican tourists who were

CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this

period.

"In addition to M-GUIRE, the Seventh Department de-

veloped suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but

didn't learn of any specific

intelligence connections.

Some were taking pictures, others vere disseminating

literature.

Although various operational measures were

taken agäinst them, including ryemka (covert baggage

search)

and the use of KGS agents, rore of these tourists

received real operational development.'

b.: KGB Knowiedge from Seorge_ELAKF

During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was

held in London, England, between representatives of CIA ana the

British Secret Intelligence Service

(sIS, commonly referred to as

MI-6)

on the subject of 'legai-travel' intelligence operations

against the USSR.

At the conclusion of this meeting there was

drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed

at the meetings.

This summary spelled out CIA operational doc-

trive pertaining to tourist operacions, including

agent-spotting

techniques, criteria for agent selection, agent assessment,

agent

training,

and tasks to be carried out

by tourist agents during

the coming (1959) tourist season.

It stressed CIA's reliance

on tourists for the spotting: recontaiting, assessing,

and

communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union.

copy of the document as weil, presunably, as other British docu-

ments relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE,

who has admitted having made a phorographic copy which he passed

to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of

1959.

* One Robert Alan MCGUIRE,

a forner: staff empioyce of CIA,:

travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and

May 1958.

Although he was debriefed on his return,

he had

no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and

mailed no letters for CIA inside

the USSR,

While in the

Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions

by Soviets

seeking blackmarket deals., American girls, and

assistance in defecting to the Americans.

While en route to

Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs

employee,

who confiscated a Radio Liberation script.

MCGUIRE

reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated

that the script had been confiscated,

but the reasons for the

action were left blank.

NOSENKO

who has reported none of

these details,

appears to have confused McGUIRE with Edward

MCGOWAN,

a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August

1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said

MOGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.

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## Page 65

second joint meeting on this sate subject took place in. e

mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 21-page summary of

the sessions.*

c. GOLITSYN'S Tourist iocument

hinen he defected to Cin in Vecember 1961, GOLITSYN broug't

with hin a top secrut IGB docuent dealir with tre use uy

American Intelligence of tourisis for espionae inside the so!-

iet Union and with iGi counterreasaros.*: This study relied

heavidy upon

the two ducunents supplied so the KGB by BLAKE,

and although it purports

study of incrican tourist opera-

tions during 1960, it cites as examples many cascs which occurred

in carlier years.

In these examples, the imerican agents de-

tected by the GB are named and their operational roles accurately

described.

lAs noted above, NOSENKO said that McGüIRE/MCGONA

was tre only Anerican definitely determined to have intolligence

connections prior to 1960.)

cited belci are excerpts from the

GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA

recoris and investigations.

rhe docurent states:

"NeGORAN, Edward, born 1335, passing

himself off as a post-graduate student of Haryard University,

in lioscow, after a thorough checi. (for surveillancel sent an

espicnage letter containing secret writirg.

tion of McGUrAl showed that he specialized for a long period of

time on Russian and Polish questions at the Russian Rescarch

Center of Harvard University, wich is a branch of CIA.

te came

to the USSR at

the expense of

ROCKEFEILLR and MORCAN, who are

finarcing the so-caller

'Research' work on kussia."

= This occurred at a time that Nostako clains to nave been in

the Amirican Deparineni.

hiring

the 1962 meetings in Geneva,

when NOSENKO said se

vas Chiaf

of. the inurican rourist section,

the was asked about kinki.

lic replie: only that BLAKE had been

"an agent of the hritish Departnent of the Second Chief Direc-

torate" and that r. was not ncarij as valuable as the Caracian

Ambassador was or "the other Englishman" (VASSALi).

At the time of his defection, NOSENkO said he was first Deputy

Chief of the entire tourist department.

Asked about BLATE

after his defection, HoStiKO replies:

"Who's ELiKE?"

the February 1965 interrogations, NOSENFO was first asked

whether the KGB had received any

siarificant information con-

cerning

the use of courist as operational cover by cla during

1960 and 1961, wien

he was in the inerican bepartment, and

has then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained docu-

mentary information on this subject from an agent source. He

replied "no" to both questions.

** This docunent was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow

to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961.

content it

is similar to the general description of the docu-

NOSENKO Said in

that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that

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## Page 66

w..;

During his trip to the soviet Union in the summer of 1958,

MCGOWAN mailed in Mingk an operational letter containing secret

In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the united,

MCGOWAl descrited a number of incidents in the USSR.

20 August 1958,

for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel

in Moscow, MCGOWAN met Alan

BALLARD and Gertrude SAMUALS, fel-

low Americans, and the three of them were protographed by a sur-

veillance team when leaving the hotel.

Within several days of

his arrival in Moscow, MeGONAll found he was incompatible with

his female Inturist interpreter/guide and

succeeded in having

her replaced..

Mis new guide

was V.L. ARTEMO:, who assured that"

McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit.**

The document from GOLITSYN also states:

"SIMARD, Lionel,

born in 1939,.

college instructor, expressed an abnormal inter-

est towards military literature of

the USSR; he made contact

with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of ship-

building factories in Leningrad.

Later it "as recorded that this

'pedagogue'

secret writing.

while in Moscow, sent espicnage letters containing

The letter

contained the coordinates of a dead-

for an American agent."

SIMARD wert to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and

he believed that he was under conplete KGB coverage while there.

He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each

time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB

observation equipment.

un one occasion SILAPD was introduced to

and went out to dinner with Svetlana N. IVANOVA, who attempted

to cultivate him.***

The characterization of his activities in

the GOLITSYN document is correct.

NOSENKO has not mentioned

Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says:

"An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor

University, sent three esplonage letters contalning

secret writing, wnile in Kiev.

In Stalingrad he was detained

while he was photographing a military factory."

GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been

trained by CIA in countersurveillance

and briefed on his letter-

mailing mission and other assignments in the Soviet Union.

tween midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed

four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the

**

NOSENRO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by

BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.

This is the same ARTINOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow

case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American De-

partment and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY

case in Geneva in 1962.

ARTEMOV appeared again in operations

against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as

Inturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which in-

cluded a CIA officer.

On one occasion, when this officer re-

turned unexpectedly to his hotel from

the theater to which

ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his

hotel room.

NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of

ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was deputy

Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In

October 1966, in answer to a specific question,

NOSENKO stated

that ARTEMOV never had any connection with the American Section

of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an agent of the U.S. Embassy

Section of the American Department, but has not described her

earlier activities against tourists.

TOP SEGRET

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## Page 67

wallings,

but GRAY detected surveillance dally thereafter until

he left Kiev and later in Yalta.'. He was approached on 17 Novem-

ber in Baku by an attractive woman who persistently offered hèr.:

services despite his refusal, and on 18 November by a girl in

Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made

similar overtures.

GRAY was also approached by blackmarketeers

and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 Novenber he

was arrested in Stalingrad while photographing industrial in-

stallations and was released

after interrogation and confiscation

of his film.

NOSENKO made no references to GRAY.

The KGB document elsewhere states:

"E guide of a tourist

group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian

at a college of Yale University, when in Odessa with a group of

tourists--American students--separated himself from the group

and travelled through the city alone.

In a notebook which was

lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the

fact that hu utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting

suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking

those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents.

In Moscow he selected routes which were used. to check and dis-

discover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards

and following stillful methods.

At the present time FRANCIS is

the chief irterpreter of the State. Department, servicing Soviet

delegations in the USA."

FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a

notebook with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not

mention

losing his notebook.

In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in

freguent contact with V.V. KKIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who

served there until the late 1950's, has been identified

First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in

the Correspondents Department, KGB. Second Chief Dixectorate.*

FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the

year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part

V. D.4.b.).

NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did

not recognize his name.

Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN

gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandes-

tine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the

Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960.

KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON

case to which NOSENKO provided the, lead (see Part VI.D.3.c.).

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## Page 68

TDY's to London (4957 and 1955)

the

NOSENKO reported tiat his first villaid ravel outside

Soviet Union oucurred in the fall ui

hieh he las

selected

to accompany a group of athies

is lind baer invited

to visit London.

As he explained on d tori: 1904, it is

necessary for a security officer to accent any such ucle-

gation, and the bloveal Deportrent of tic

chief birce-

torate, responsible for recruitin; secol miet Directorate

officers for

this purpose,

relephoned

i..i.

chie.

of tie tourist departrent,

to refust

1:0

spoke

English.

DUBAS aSked MOStAKO whether we im to male tie

trip.

NOSEO replies:

"ithy not?

have

novor boon abroad

yet." MUSENiO consequently travelled to Loi.cu,

using thie

alias Yuriy ivancvich

"ANOLAYEY And posing

is

lid acyuty

chief" of

the delegation.

lic was

succinically instructed

to

observe one nonber of the deleration,

whose father ha! boon tilled

in a soviet prison and whose

political reliability has incertai:.

idditionally, ie had

tie gencral tash of waiching ali nembers of tre delegation

for

possibly

suspicious contacis with foreigners.

Tin deido

gation

consisted

of approximately to persons

ine c delp hin

in carrying

out these

'juties,

justito was assigned thier

:

four agents

and several operatiinal contacts anong the dcic-

gation menuers.

He was the only staff security officer

making this trip.

The second trip to london tock place a year later, ir

the fall of 1958, again

as a security waichdog.

This time

he acconpanied a

delogation of 11 or 12 boxers, and ugain ho

used the alias NIKOLAYEY and the cover nosition of deguty

chief of the delogation. doStino was the only security of-

ficer with the delegation, and he had tro agents and two

opcrational contacts

among the boxers.

ilis assignncht vas

general; nobody in particular was kept under observation,

and the

KG3 had no derogatory information concerning any

members of the delegation.

NOSENKO has associated his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias

in London with the use of the same name with the british

in (see fart V.D.t.d.) shortly before

the first of these two trips.

On 17 April 1964 NOSENNO

Cx-

Plaseda

this situation as follows:

used the nune ilkOLitlY, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative

of the ministry of Culture.

And then when

the question was

raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation

to ingland,

I was forced to

go there as NINOLAYEV.

I was forced to.

under the cover of the Ministry of Culturc.

Be.

cause (of this) I ient as the assistant head of

the dele-

gation, representing the Ministry of Culture.

•I didn't

go under my own name occause it was decided that when

these peopic anat

is came back to England, they

tell who they vere with [report their contacts in

the USSR). They would probably

question a

as one who used to work in intelligence..

especially

so would say:

'There was this man fron the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV.

le was with us all the time: even went to Leningrau witli

So they would say:

How does he look fwhat does he

look likel?'

He would say:

'He loolied so-and-so.'

So,

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## Page 69

of course, I would go there the same year.

I'd go there, and

they would look at me and say:

"Hoin come

this man--his name is

NOSEliKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by

That was why it was decided I have to go again under the rama

NIKOLAYEV.

Just a matter of conspiracy.

Since I already became

known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable.

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## Page 70

151.

of course, I would go there the sane year.

l'u go there, ara

they dould

look at me and say:

"ito'n

come this man--his name is

NOSEXO, and yet he is very sinilar to the one described by delta.

That was why it was decided I havs to go again under the nire

NIKCiniEV.

Just a matter of corspiracy.

Since I acready besee

know? is NIkOLAYEV to the britishers, this rould to noticeable.

2ve 00 203205

arrears at

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## Page 71

E. January 1960 to January: 1962 (American Department)

1. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S.

Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief

Directorate.

from sometime in January 1960 until the first days

of January 1962.*

This section, in his. words, was working

against "the most important counterintelligence target in the

Soviet Union," the permanent American representation

in Moscow.

It regarded every American stationed there as a possible spy

and, simultareously, as a target for eventual compromise and

recruitment.

The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by

NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by ambassy par-

sonnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information

collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees:

and third, to use this infornation as a basis for planning and

carrying out recruitment approaches.

The Americans' personal-

ities, jobs, parsonal relationships, weaknesses,

daily routines,

security precautions, contacts with

Soviet citizens, and the

major and

minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis

for this sork.

To gather such information, the section's officers

directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants.

including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizeng

moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with

American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assim-

ilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their.

disposal, and

they read and tried to exploit materials from tele-

phone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of

the Americans.

Each officer had a limited number of American

targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with ach:

annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit

the knowledge they had gained of their target.

During 1960 and

1961,

NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section

on

"identifyirg intelligence officers at the Embassy and active

development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed

and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions un

the basis of which they can be recruited."

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had

access to all information concerning its activities:

"Nothing

was hidden" from him.

On this basis, he expressed certainty

that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans

associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the

Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this

period. and that,

in fact, the KGB had recruited no American

Embassy personnel

since

with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also

claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the

time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964

trip to Geneva.

In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed partic-

ular emphasis on his activities during the period January

1960 to January 1962, since this information was of speciai

importance to

U.S. Government security.

See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB

agent "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been

variously, dated by NOSENKO between the years 1949 and 1953.

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## Page 72

Meanwhile, no one replaced NOSENKO as Deputy CHief"of" chie

Tourist Department's American Section because (as he explained

on 29 January 1965) the Tourist department, which had earlier.

operated against members of delegationg and various other

categories of foreign visitors; was being reorganized in January

1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot

was eliminated.*

With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina

RYTOVA,

and

tne homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned

over all of his agents

to another officer in the section named

TIMOFEYEV.

NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two

separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file

and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to

TIMOFEYEV. and the latter to V. D. CHIELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the

Tourist Department.

During later interrogations, however, NOSENKO

has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S.

Embassy Section and was

the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits

to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.**

2.

NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the

Averican-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department,

NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of

plans

to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief.

NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in

the Tourist Department:

"I was used to it there and wanted to

continue.

I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department.

This

Lthe transfei/ was no promotion.

Here I was the Deputy Chief

of section

and would be the same there.

But, of course, Its more

important there.

The American Department is, of course, the most

important.

But here I was working against Ameriçan tourists.

This is also important.

Furthermore, I showed Chad proven my-

self there in '55,

'58, and '59 and was considered to

be not a bad case officer.

And here, in the American Department,

I must show /prove/ myself with new people."

asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay."

DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second

Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to

no avail.

In January 1960 the official orders transferring

NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the

American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report

to GRIBANOV's office.

NOSENKO again expressed mis-

givings about the change of assigrment.

GRIBANOV replied that

DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, "had

his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that

043.

**

There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section,

however;

as before, it continued to be responsible for

operations against tourists from the United States.

England, and Canada.

FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO: continued to meet him

until he left the Soviet Union in January 1961 and again

when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in

1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.J.

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## Page 73

14-0002d

107591

•"154.

he thought rosenko could bring "fresh air"

to the U.S. Embassy

Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention

to operations against American code clerks, the "number ore

target."*

Neither GRIBANOV nOr KLYPIN told NOSEKO why he had

been selected. for this position. or who had recommended him for

it.

NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved

upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Sectior..

"Nobody."

He replied:

He was then asked to identify the persons from whom

he had assumed certain of his duties as Deputy Chief of the

section (these are discussed in detail below). HOSENKO said that

he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on

the security of

v. M. KOVSHUK, **the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section,

Regarding his responsibility as case officer

NOSENKO explained

cause former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE nad been declared

persona non grata in October 1959 and because his successor John

was not to arrive until March 1960, no ore in the section

had this responsibility wher he,

NOSENKO, arrived in January

Asked who had been L'iGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO IE-

plied: "LANGELLE was handled by several people - by LA.S.I MALYU-

GIN, then after that by LV, A,/ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then

* In late December 1961,

GOLITSYN also commented on this subject

to his CIA handling officer:

"The task of strengthening of

wor:: against the Americans has been a standing requirement,

both in the past and most particularly at this rime.

work was particularly intensified after the appointment of

SHELEPIN to the KGB...

In 1960, it was recomnended in

KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.s.

Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other

countries...

This question of intensifying work against the

Americans

was up before the Collegium of the KGB.

Thereafter,

there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensifi-

cation of work against the American cipher-clerks."

**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's desig-

nation of KOVSHUK as Chiaf-af the First (U.S, Embassy) Sec

tion in 1960 and information earlier supplied by GoLiTsy.

GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in

•January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V,E.3:C.2. concerning a

recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORS-

BERG)

but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American

Department officer,

without indicating his position.

only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was

in the

context of questioning concerring KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret

Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956, GULITSYN; said that at this

time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of

the Second Chief Directorate,

On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN

identified Vladimir PETROV as. Chief of the "section concerned

with the American

Embassy of the

American Department of the

Second Directorate in 1960,, NOSENKO had identified PETROV

as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department,

which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence

operations inside the Soviet Urion..

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14-00000

PIN. Yes.

"TANGELLE was betore my time.

* Two months later,

on

24 June 1964, NOSTIKO stated:

"In 1959 and possibly in 1958,

Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.s.

Embassy Section.

I replaced him in this position in 1960 and

he went to the Fifth (fastern Countries) Departnent as Deputy

Chief. "*

On .8 Septemcer 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for. the first

time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been

the case officer for LANGELLe. Under interrogation

in early

1965, NOSENKO added that BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for

maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy.

At

this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKH-.

VALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the

file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor:

The file continued to

be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however. even though he was

no longer in the section, and NOSENKO arranged for the official

change of custody sortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E.

3.f.).

NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV

had shared

responsibility for supervising code clerk operations

with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties him-

self.

NOSENKO had been given a rumber of opportunities prior

to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, but

he did not do so. These are summarized below:

count in this o8.

25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern

Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO

Artem DAVIDYAN.

He is an Armenian.

His Deputy is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."

27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A.

ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from

July to September.

1961 as a member of a trade delegation.

NOSENKO inmediately

recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief of the Fifth

Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

He said that he

did not know this person's last name, but that his first name

and patronymic were

Mikhai Fedorovich.

when shown the last

name ALEKSEYEV, NOSE:iKO recognized it as an alias, but pro-

vided no further information concerning his true identity or

earlier service in the American Department.

10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the

names of KGB officers who had received various awards for

their service.

He wrote:

"The following got either the

Order of the Military Red Banner of the Order of the Red Star,

I'm nọt sure which:

Mikhail BAKEVALOV, Deputy Chief of a

section

in an unremembered department of the Second Chief

Directorate."

18 June 1964:

NOSENKO was asked to list all the

officers who had been assigned to the American Department

for each year since he joined the KGB.

He named the chiefs

and deputies of the U.s.

Embassy Section from 1953 through

When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could

not provide accurate information as to which officers were

assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was

Nith reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has

furnished only one other item of information:

ported that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959,

the Israeli Section was transferred to this department

after having been a component of the American Depart-

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## Page 75

allegedly in the Tourist Department in this period) and could

not describe their functions.

on this basis NOSENKO was then

asked to list the officers who had joined the section between.

1956 and January 1960, when NOSE KO said he had returned.

• He

provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not amorg them.

Asked

to name the officers who had left the section in the same period.

he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV.

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## Page 76

3.

Duties and Knowledgeability

: 80

Introduction

Shortly after reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy

Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV,

NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN and

.. Section Chief

KOVSuUK to discuss

his responsibilities

and functions in

the section.

Repeating what GRIBANOV had already

said,

KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's sost important single respon-

sibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB

operational activity against American military and State

Department code clerks stationed in Moscow.

As for the

other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division

of labor under which KOVSHUK

would be resporsible for super-

vising operations against State Departrent personnel and

NOSENKO would supervise work against the Arny, Air Force,

and Naval attaches and their assistants.*

NOSENKO HaS alSO

made responsible for maintaining certain files in the section.

On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation proto-

col which he agreed contained a listing of his principal

responsibillites during 1960 and 1961. It read in part:

"During the eptire

period in the First lU.s.

Embassyl

Section,

irst American Department ir

1960 and 1961 my

position vas Deputy Chief of Section.

My responsibilities were the following:

-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section,

Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of

Section in his absence.

-Immediate supervisor for the operational work

against American code clerks.

In this capacity I

closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy

GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.

-Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer,

John ABIDIAN.

-For about the first six months of 1960, super-

visor of the work against the offices of the U.S. M1l1-

tary, Navel, and air Attaches.

-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.

-I maintained the log

books for the reports sent

• to the First (U.S. Embassy) Section by the Operational

Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information

obtained from all the microphones installed in the

American Embassy.

I read all the reports and gave the

pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers 1n

the Section.

In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK

or GRYAZNOV. **

*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for

supervising at-

tache operations for the first time in 1965.

These functlong

are discussed belon.

**The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the

time the protocol was signed.

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## Page 77

-During this period I was

the agent handler for

agents 'SHNELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and

'SARDAR'. *

"Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618

of KGB Headquarters at House Number

2, Dzhershinskly

Square, Moscow.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this of-

fice with me throughout most of this period."

b.

(1) Access

Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under re-

peated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with

the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he

had acces: to all information on the section's activities

and was obliged to keep

current on this information.

On

this basis he has been able to assure his questioner's that

the KGB was completely unsuccesstul in its attempts to re-

cruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years.

NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to

section files and his discussions with section officers made

it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to

1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964.

His statements

on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in

a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February (quoted in

full):

"1.

As the only Deputy to the Chief of the

American Embassy Section,

First Department,

Second

Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOV-

SHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my func-

tions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to

assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the

Section during KOVSHUk's absence.

In order to perform

this function I had the right and the obligation of

knowing the details about every important activity of

the section against the American Embassy and its per-

sonnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from

me.

"2.

As Deputy Chief of the Section I know defi-

nitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy

were agents of the

KGB or reporting unofficially in

any way to the KGB during my service in the Section.

There were no approaches or recruitments made by the

Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962

against personnel of the American Embassy,

including

personnel of the State Department, the offices of the

Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department

of Agriculture and USIA,

including Marine guards, Army

sergeants,

State Department code clerks

and Army code

clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both un-

successful approaches.

AVOLKOV, YEPRENOV, Johan PREISFHEUND, FRIPPEL, and

respectively, who are discussed in other parts oi

this

paper.

At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents

he handled in this period; they are discussed below.

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## Page 78

14.00000

"3:

There were no approaches or recruitnents

made against any employees of the United States

Government who were assigned to the American. Embassy

on temporary duty during this period.

I have read and

understood this report and certify it as correct."

•(11) Duties

On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning

his supervisory duties.as Deruty Chief of the section, par-

ticularly his function of supervising activity against code

clerks.

The transcript of this discussion is quoted here:

Question:

To which of the major responstbilities you have

mentioned did you have to devote the most time?

Answer:

I don't know.

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

: Q:

A:

Q:

What was the most important?

Everything was important.

Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy

Section?

GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir| DEMKIN,

and later

(Yevgeniy) GROMIXOVSKIY who worked with DENKIN.

Then there was {N.A. | GAVRILENKO, [I. Ya. | KURI-

LENKO; and BELOGLAZOV: working with the Attaches.

They were all in the First Section?

Yes.

What were their responsibilities?

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks..

DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in

except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY

America HOUSe AVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches

helped him.

and (their) assistants, and also he had the plane

of the Ambassador.

He

must think about watching

the pilots who were living in a hotel.

KURILE KO--

Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy

Attache, assistants, and Marines.

What 1s your

understanding of the meaning of the

word :"supelvisor"?

Persoraily 1o be at the head, to direct.

So,

tr..

i :

1l-polstiirities of supervising all

¿Si al!

ine code clerks, this meant

...

tur lead of this work,

that you vere

direc: 1''g

sil, wok, that you were participating:

in discussio s'concerning this work, and in these

discussions you

were talking about what measures

vere necessary.

8306 402

49, Pile dist of

18 1

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1:

Q:

A:

Q:

A :

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

interruptIng. when hecessary, because there

little questions which the case officer must de-

cide himself.. When it was necessary.

And, participating personally when necessary?

Yes.

What sort of case officer questions were you

answering?

All kinds.

If I couldn't answer them,

authority isn't enough for

to discuss then with KolSHlK.

this; was discussing

it is necessary

witt. KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with (KLYPIN's suc-

cessor as Chief of the Ancrican Department,

S.h.) FEDOSEYEV.

Several tines, not once,

were discussing

questions with GRIBINOV.

concerning measures, concerning future steps.

When it was necessary.

What other duties did you have as a supervisor?

I told you.

When it was necessary I was going

to agent, meetings with case officers.

shen it

"PROKHOK" was working against STORSCENS,

"SARDAR

against zuJus.

I was working nyself with them.

You personally worked agents "PPOKHOR" and "SARDAR"?

Yes.

When did you find it necessary to go to an agent

meeting with a case officer?

Well, for cxample, DEWKIN would come to me and

•You know Ella (UMANETS,

an agent in

America Housel. Ella said that MORONE had looked

sniling."

This is just an [hypo-

theticall example....Okay, I am going with him,

hearing Ella myself, (to

learn what happened,

(whether) it is possible to make something or

You met Ella and talked with her?

Yes, with DEKIN.

Very, very difficult to say,

why

and how we are going. When it was necessary

to go.

As a rule did you try to make it a practice to

visit the agents of the section who were working

against the American target?

am telling you.

There was such an agent,

GRYAZNOV was meeting with her.

It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we

knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And,

you see, they don't like it when a new case off1-

cer appears.

But, maybe,. for the sake of the file,

STOP SEC

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## Page 80

14.00000 . ! :

Q:

A :

Q:

A:

Q:

Q:

A:

• A:

:

A:

..*., 14.2

LIAM

1t was necessary to go, to hear her. Not because

you do not belteve GRYAZNOV.

No.

But, you see,

to hear from the source (emphasizedl.

"directly.

what is going on, and how it 15 going on, to get

a feeling.

Because the source will tell the case

officer, then the case officer will tell you.

Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail,

overy intonation.

But in some cases, it is neces-

sary to feel this.

But, of course, it depends on

the agent, on the target, whether you will 60 or

not go.

It's very difiicult, again, to say.

Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the

section's

agents?

No, I can't say.

Fifty per cent or 75 per cent?.

I can't answer you.

What about your functions as a

supervisor in re-

gard to salehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s"

Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yevochnaya

kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh

Tourist

Department.

It was my own.

GRYAZNOV

had his own yavochnaya kvartira.

KOSOLAPOV had

also his own

yavochnaya kvartira. And not one of

us had a conspirative apartment.

And you took the "Ya.k."' from...

(Interrupting.)

Which I had from the Seventh.

And, by the way, when

was leaving the First

(American) Department, I took this file again

to the Seventh.

And not one of you had a conspirative flat.

No, because the section had only--how many?--

[P.I. | MASSYA had one conspirative.

(v.P.l

FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was

one conspirative flat, where, in fact,

an agent

was living.

In the First Section there were

three or four conspirative flats.

But among you, GRYAZNOY, and KOSOLAPOV there was

none?

Only "Ya.K.'5".

*А "К.K." (konspirativnaya kvartira-conspiratorial apart-

ment)

is delined by NOSENKO as a safehouse or apartment owned

and maintained 'by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira--

neeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who

1g perhaps subsidized by the KGB and absents himself when

there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other

activities.

The "K.K." is used for nore sensitive operational

purposes, he said.

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## Page 81

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A:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

→ 162.

Who kept a record of these three?

The case officers.

Where was your "Ya.K."?

Vorovskogo Strect.

And where was GRYAZNOV's?

GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.

And KOSOLAPOV's?

Don't remember.

Don't remember. (Pause.) It

was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard.

KOSOLAPOV'S or DESKIN'S.

In the region of Arbat

Square.

KOSOLAPOV'S Or DESKIN'S. KOSOLAPOV'S.

DEMKIN's I don't remenber.

And you didn't have any responsibility for super-

vising the activity that went on at these flats?

I don't understand.

Was there some central control of the use of the

What kind of control?

Who would be using then, when they would be using

them, under what

conditions?

No.

The case officer who was working with it

decides how to use this flat or how not to use

it, et cetera, et cetera.

often we were using rooms in hotels.

So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational

activity to his "Ya.K."?

He would also meet with his agents, with his

operational contacts in hotel rooms.

KOSOLAPOV

was meeting his agents in his own "Ya.K."; NO-

SENKO was meeting his agents or operational con-

tacts in his own

"Ya.K.".

Of course. It's their own flat.

But you're supervising their work?

Must I kéep them like a little, little child?

No,

no.

They don't have to report to

me:

"Today

I go to meet my agent at my flat."

They can use them whenever they like without checking

with you as supervisor?

Of course, of course. They are meeting their own

agents.

Aur d2

---

## Page 82

You have no idea who they are meeting, or when

they are meeting then?

A:

When they are meting an active development agent;

they tell me afterwards.

They are telling "this,

this,

this, this" and I an answering "this, this,

th1s."

But usually they are going to meet maids

or they don't have to report.

There is nothing

active and thore is.... The file is going on.

What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?

A:

You see, we lad one automobile for the whole

department.

Besides

this, we could apply, wher

necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second

Chief Directorate and he would give a car, be-

cause he has a number of cars at his disposal.

Q:

approximately how much of your time did you spend

supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?.

A:

I can't say.

Has it the most important function?

•A:

Yes, It was important.

All work in the First

Section was important.

This was the most impor-

tant.

But one day I could devote the whole day

to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day,

maybe two hours

in

the day.

The rest of the day

I will be absent.

I will be neeting with KLYPIN,

or I will be having a meeting with surveillance,

or I will be at another place.

The third day,

again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it.

No, I

can't tell you. It depends on the situa-

tion.

(111)

Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence

As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of

NOSENKO's responsibilities was

to serve as Acting Chief

when KOVSHUK was absent from the office.

NOSENKO recalled

that he fulfilled this function during

KovSHUK's two 30-aag

leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember

when this leave occurred in those years.

He also

served as

Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when

KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for &

week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was 1ll again..

NOSENKO wag unable to recall any operational or inspection

trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other

specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent

was for several days in connection with preparations for

President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in

1960.

NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's ab-

Bence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March

1965:

"I do not remember any particularly important

operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Sec-

tion, nor any unusual things that happened during

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 83

these times.

The poly specific responsibility KOVSHUK

had which I handled in his absence was to report to

the Chief of the First Departuent about all mall going

out of the First Section.

I did not rect any of KOV-

SHUK's agents during his

absences because there was.no

His only Russian agent whos I

remember

whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I thick.

The

only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I renember was the

correspondent Edmund STEVENS.*

The only. thing that was

different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was

that I had to go every day tu see the Chief of the de

partment.

C.

Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations

(1) Introduction

Among the numerous KGB activities against American code

clerks in Moscow which SOSENko has discussed are five opera-

tions wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for

recruitment/defectior purposes..

According to NOSENKO, none

was successful.

The five major cases are reviewed separately

below, one of then in the context of duty trips abroad by

NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for

supervising operations

against American code clerks,

"difficult situation."

assignment

Of KOSOLAPOY to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all

operations against code

clurks had been handled by A.S. MALIU-

GIN, but during MALYUGIX's two years of effort. there had

beer no operational approaches and no successes.

*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.

**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identitied KOSOLAPOV's photograph

as that of a veteran KCB officer

with whom he was personally

acquainted.

GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB

1s about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a

member of the First (American] Department of the KGB First

Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City;

subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the

First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters.

According to

GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB

Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with.

• KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad.

As of

1960, GOLITSYN said,

KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks

stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow.

He added that

KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English.

Prior

• to GOLITSYN'S

Identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence acti-

vity on KOSOLAPOV's part:

Between February 1953 and April

1955 he was assigned

to the United Nations Secretariat Trans-

lation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an

interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection;

1n September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to

the United States (sce Part V.F.3.d. which desoribes the

role of NOSENKO's target. John ABIDIAN in connection with the

KHRUSHCHEV trip).

KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 84

14-00000

5. 153:

NOSENKO toOr ove, diapa mere no active devcloprental opera-

toons a5a1nst cole clicke scorwas, and the oig agents or

operational conta-ld lein, used against ther were poorly

educated maids airl

impiresus, none of clion hau accomplished

angthing or 15804888006

mo foreign

agents were ting used

In operation 86-1r11

relegra personnel,

and a? the time

NOSESKO had no deral-el his own in Amarica

louss, or in

the Embassy, win, sumid tee rised in these operations.

In Jaguary

" PITUaT; SE 1900 GRYAUNDY das essigaed

to

the u.s.

Estriady dillon as a sceond

asilitant to NUSEYXO

1n his code clip mcivilios.

Tron this point on, NOSEiO,

KOSOLAROV, and PaYA/riv

tharrd the same tub Hradquarters

OffICO (ROCI

tors all KGB files on Ancrican code

clerk:,

as well

11r.

11lo5 on agents available for work

against

thes,

Is one large sife, acressible

to

all three ottlira,

MOStaKe supervised all

of the sectiun's

work alons these lilos, and no provocations, compromises,

recruitient atlance, ef rreruitrents could

been planned

or carried our ittle lin prior knowledge and aircement

*COLITSYN FAISA MUN INSAlON as a case officer of the

American Departaini

•crand Chior Directorate, on 31 Decen-

ber 1961.

lie told do that iine that he had been personally

acquaintod mith uriner niace 19.15 and that, as of the

epring

of 1900, raiddY mis "working only

against code

clerks of

tre 1400d. an Enbassy in Moscow.

GRiAZNOV had

travelled to tha

Mited Statos at said time in

the past,

COLITSYN Edded.

хіт.

On

5 June 1962

10l8

GRYAZNOV during

11147

CIA

that

he had boon a classmate of

and

1'9.169

at the "SWERSil" counterintelli.

gence school in

#10850.108;

tir; describud GRYAZNOV as a specialist

In operatiors

American code clorks,

saying that

GRYAZZOV

WaS

"pripy "sporterced" and had had "some successes."

As an exampio, lin

"Is of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the

spring of 1960 wifi. Mo, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S.

Embassy Sectlun of th

Anurican Dopartment in connection with

his forthcostle antlunment as a First Chief Directorate

counterintellige uffleer in Helsinki.

GOLITSYN had com-

plained to GRidinur that the KGB had no

U.S. assets in Helsinki

at the tine,

all ter C1A he quoted GRYAZiON as replying:

"Maybe we will luly you."

According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV

went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code

clerk in the UH, thbassy in sioscow,

who was about to be

transferred, péplus to Helsinki; he

told GOLITSYN that the

KGB had receiven

Intormation from this American code clerk

and classified

"le as a "real agent." NOSENKO has not

mentioned such al Akont. (who has yet to be identified) and

has denied that the KG" had any

agents in the U.S.

Embassy

at this time.

MATSYN Identified a photograph of G.I.

LAPIN,

who travelled with lin Halseyer Dance

troup to the United

States and Canade In 1958, as being identical gith GRYAZNOV.

CiA had no prior indication of Intelligence activities by

GRYAZNOV, under the allas LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV

In true nano.

TOP SECRET

i career dro.

---

## Page 85

when he was in Moscow.

IP NOSENKO

sent array on

said, he would huro been told about any such autully

1IN

pills

his return.

When NOSENKO took over responsibility

10r

Meet it distri

against code clerks;

he dead available

11l05 on

agents, discussed

the situation

with 'wYLGIN, !!

Labello and

MKId

U.S. Embassy Section case

officer responsible for

111:40

180:4

of America House) i GRYAZNOV.

and kosOLiPov, and

Pandal

findings and recorncidations

to his

superiors, devality

KLYPIN.

Soveral

changes were made as

a result,

111

during a new progran

for the work of

ine'

soctidi!,

suggested the use of third-country nationals

and not Sovict) for agent

work against

code

e:1&1't

with this

suggestion,

he personally recruited a

tary officer, wazrat nocryptonym

"SARDAR"

him against the Ancrici House.

(Afta his

I'esw

lil tedd

#rivas specifically targetted againct

Matthew ZUJUS.)

another such

agent directl

SENKO was the

Finnish businessman Johan

figured in the case of the military code clort lumo

BERG.

NOSENKO aiso suggested tuitiating activtly buntial die

clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and sundari-elly

proposed that operational measures be undertakan of flint

operational

possibilities be studied in Helsinkl, lendly

through which most of the code clerks passed an they

to Moscow.

Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the spurat tunn

against code

clerks was successful

auring the lau yuirg hu

spent as Deputy Chief of tho American Fbassy inotaul: 1u

did the KGB have any success between January dude audi

ary 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva.

11311180

that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any succesatul Migranhon

had taken place during this latter period.

(11) Approach to STORSBF.RG

From the start of his

emphasized

association with CIA, NOflin han

that the primary mission of the U.", Frittany Heda

tion in 1960 and 1961, during his incumbency at bujuty l'll

of section, was the recruitment of an American millIngs realto.

He has explained the special stress vinced in llla

requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State bopopenund

code clerks) by saying that, while the dozend brake area

U.S. State Departrent cipher systers and could

messages up to and including

tiste saged are piered

had bees do such success with Ameristo ta has mind gren

remained secure in this period.

repeatedly that the KGB hed not been able to vecruit

can code clerk,

cither State Department or milllary:

the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1959. MurimE

Aners.

*See Part VI.D. 3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" CAge,

TUP SZOMET

---

## Page 86

167.

On the several operations against military code clerks

which NOSarKO has described and in which he has claimed a

personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given

to the case of James Harry STORSBERS.

In 1952 NOSENKO said

in line with GRIBANOVis instructions that he pay parti-

cular attention to code clerk operations,

he deroted most of

almost a year to che STORSBERG operation, and

played a personal role in the unsuccessful KGE approach; he

the first person his

conversatior. with STerSBERG.

During tre 1964 to 1966 period, NUSENKO denied not orly that

he had personally participated in this wäy but also tha: he

had ever claimed to have done: he continued to say: horever,

that he supervissa the operation from

beginnirg to

end.

Ac-

cording to NOSENKO, this operation got under

way with the re-

cruitmert of a third-national agent (johan PREISFRECiO, a

Finn) sore time in the first half of 1963,

The specific aim

in usir this

agent was to Involve STORSBERG in compronising

activities, which

would then form the basis for the approach.

The operation dragged on through 1960 ana

until the spring,

summer, or autum: of 1961; at this time N.s

SKVORTSOV, a KGB

officer, "as introduced in the guise of a wealthy frerch busi-

nessmas to contire the development of compromising informa-

tion.

PREISFREUTD waS then withdrawn from the operation.

Several weeks later STORSEER$ was approached, principaily on

the basis of his financial need,

but he rejected the XGs bid

and the coeratior: was over.

NOSELiKO was certain that STORS-

BERG had rot reported the approach and said that the kes would

use this fact as an additioral eiement of pressure should

STORSBERS again te posted outside the United States.

NOSENKO

also kred that GOLITSYN had reported to CIA corcerning KGB

modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND'S part in

it.

GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about

PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation againg

an American stationed in Moscow,

Contrary to NOSENKO S Infos

mation, ke said that this American had been approached--and

recruited--by the iGBat the erd of 1960,

A second iten from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORS-

BERG operation:

SOLITSYN told of learning in the spring of

1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Mos-

cow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured.

AC-

cording to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks

were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior

William S. HURLEY,

the military communications officer who

additiorally performed cryptographic duties.

NOSENKO has

said that there was no KGb operation against HURLEY, and

HURLEY has reported no approach.

In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO

this case, the FBI and Army. Inteiligence have interviewed

STORSEERE (Who confirmed NOSENKOs account and denied recruit-

ment) and CIA has talked to the KGS agent PREISFREUND (Who

also generally corfirmed the information given by NOSEyKO

but did not know the outcone of the case.

The results of

these isterviews. together with information from GOLITSYN and

'fron otber sources, are summarized in this order below.

STO: SESHET

---

## Page 87

14-00000

115.

January

1960:

Early 1960:

Summer

1960:

Early 1961:

About May

1951:

June 1961°

STOPSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was

suppiied by the interrogator ane was accepted

• by lUSENKO as acourate, which it 15).

PREISFREUND WaS recruited by KOSHUK.

was consistent with easlier staterents, and

NOSEiXO had always said he first met PREISFREUND

a reek or so after his recruitment.

On 21 Octo-

however, NOSENKO said

that he and

1r. the middle of 1960,

summer ca

witt. the

generai date

He subsequently stayed

-1d-1960.'j

PREISFREUND

first supplied a woman to STORSBERG.

Corpromising photographe of SiORSBERG and a

Soviet female mere fits= obtaired at the hotel

Perine in Moscow,

PREISFRZUHD was ditharan from the operation

SKVORTSOV:

alias MINAUD, was introduced.

(NUSEO dated this by saying in was about

thrce weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)

Unsuccessful iGS approaci. to STORSBERC in the

Leningiad Hotel, losios.

(Earlier on 20 October

1960 lOSENKO had sald trat the approach was made

"a ronth or a month and a half before

STORSBERG

lefe Moscow."

Told thet STORSBERG was reassigned

in riovember

1961, NOSENKO said that the approach

•Jure 1961, 1.e.: five monihs before

STORSBERG'S departure date.

STORSBERG has re-

ported that tre approan das in October 1961:

NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSSERG case later

in the October

1966 Interrogatiors.

He asserted on 21 October

that he had first net PREISFREUD in the summer of 1960 and

that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity

after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG.

He saw PREIS-

FREUND most recentiy. he said. in Mosion during 1963. NOSENKO

also explaired how PREISFRELND first came to know his tre

name:

Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only

by first name and patronymic. Yuriy

ivanovich: on one occasion,

however, NOSENKO was visiting FREISFRELND's hotel room in

Moscow and "lost his iGB certificate there.

Thereafter

PREISFREUND knew

him as NOSENiO,

On 25 Ostober 1966, NOSENKO

repeated his earlier statements

chat the STORSBERG case was

which PREISFREUND participated, although he

may have reported casually on other Avericans he met during

his visits to America House.

For the first time he specific-

ally named GRYAZNOY as the case officer holding the operational

file on STORSBERG.

He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO.

supervised the operation against STORSBERG.

125

---

## Page 88

Ha?:

576÷30

".e'

{10

cords.

indicata.

ransferied from

Moscey

tö Lisbon, Portugal.

in

If these records

are, correct

stopse-pe could hot have seen MoroNe with nIchaud

this

ght

in

october 12ol

---

## Page 89

This is in reference to NOSENiD's statement that PREISFFEUND

involved STONSBERG in speculation which PREISFRUEND also

claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second leji, discussed below.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 90

POr

179.

(c) Information from PREISFREUND

CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in

Helsinki.

(NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISEREUND

would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.)

Durirg this

first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly

identified photo-

graphs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG.

He maintained, how-

ever, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly

on a

business level, that he had never had anything to do with

the KGB, and that he

did not know what the initials "KGB" stand

fOI.

Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that

he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity against

STORSBERG and agreed to tell

the "entire truth" the following day.

On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been

in a blackmarket operation in Moscow and

this basis,

cruited by KOVSHuk "either at the end of 1959 or early 1960"" el

Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who

explaired that KOVSHUk was unavailable and that the iGs wanted

him, PREISFREUND,

introduction between STORSBERG

and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.*

PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two

months latar, he took STORSBERG to the Peking festaurant, where

the introduction was effected.

PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina,

and another girl then went to

PREISFREUND'S

hotel, where STORS-

BERG and Irina were intimate.

PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain

his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or

At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what the KGB

wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it

later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to

undertake anything detrimental to Finnish

KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND,

telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him.

PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions,

Just as he was beginning to believe

that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at

his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow.

Asked

to explain his

earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks

after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember

exactly how long

it was, but that it was definitely on another

trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.

PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG.

first replied that it had been at America House and recalled

that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;"

it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to

strike up an acquaintance at the bar.

On second thought, PREIS-

FREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in

the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaint-

Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made

repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG tO

the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more

demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB.

PREISFREUND added:

According to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA,.

an

agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was handled by A.V..

SUNTSOV..

---

## Page 91

alsor

*Both NOSENKO and HOVSHUK used to make all sorts of protises

me about helping me out in my business and so on,. but they never

did a damn thing for me.

On the contrary.

The only promise they

kept was that I would not le asked to do

anything except the

But, as for the

rest of it, they didn't help me

at all."

PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introduc-

STOPSBERG to Irina as NOSEiD wishei and the three of them

returned to PREISEREUD's hotel room on a summer evening.

FREUND slept in the horel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina

He told his cli interviewors on 10 July 1965

that at one point during the evening he caugut a glimpse of

NOSENKO in the corriion nearing a rubber apron and from this de-

duced that NoSeNto had been taking surreptitious photographs of

STORSBERG and Irins cogether.*

orders fron HOSENKO ard joy-

SHUk, it was the lasi time he su: scoRduerG.**

Toward the end si the 10 Jaly lubs morting PERISFREWND

said that about six nontls clapsed between lic recruitment ard

the beginning us his involvement witt. StelEsipE.

drayged out i long

Die tiffarmed

that this was

the only opuration

in which he parcicipoted ind

toid to the best of his ability all he knes of it.

He acrittad

that he was a heavy drinker

said that for this reason se

could not de sure about his dates.

added that he

would not have forgotten, however, if hc had persormed other

survices for the kei.

PREISPREUHD was shown GOLliSYN's photograph and remaried:

"Was he here lin Finland)?

I don't krow nin."

Shown the photo-

grapi during a later necting, he

said that he had once invited

a large group of sovicts to go fishiny with him in Finland and

that this person may have been arong then.

When given the name

which GOLITSYN

Finland in 1960 and 1961, and

told that it was

alias, PREISEREUND asked whether KLIMOV had

signed visas.

ile was told this was correct and was

the true nare. PREISFREUND replied:

"GOLUB?

Yes?"asked for

At the close of the 10 July 1905 neeting, PRelseRduND men-

tioned to his interviewors thit he was clanning

to travel to

Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days,

beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned

his business contacts in Moscal and fro: hotel personnel there

that the soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in

NOSENKO's defection and

was therefore apprehensive of the forth-

coming trip.***

he said that he vas particularly concerned about

NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said

it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a

fire in a Moscow hotel, which was in 1961..

liaison

An official

service has advised CIA that in discus-

sions with V.

Ya.

CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth

(Guards), Directorate

• a repre-

sentative of that service nas asnce sy utEndruv. for whom

PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the

soviet Union.

CHEKALOV told the representative of the

service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent

Anerican Intelligence.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 92

14-00000

what his response should be if the KGs accused him of confessing

to American Intelligence

asked his interviewers to brief

him in

this regard.

on 13 July

1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation

was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all.

Reliable information shows, however,

that he did go to the sov-

iet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July

1965.

.---

that se.

TOP SEGNET

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## Page 93

4-00000

*TOP SECRET

192.

Information from GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, who had serveri the KGB most recently as a counter-

intelligence officer in Heisinki during 1960 and 1961, reported

separately two possibly related leads to operations against Am-

the united States Erbassy in

One of

these was a developmental operation against a military

code clerk which the KGB

felt was aimost certain of success,

other a recruitment approach to an Emoassy employee which GOLIT-

SYN was told had been successful.

GOLTISIN Learned these two

items

of information

from different Kis Second Chief Directorato

officers

at different times.

GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads

1961, when he reported information he said he

learned during

conversations with his personal friend GRYAZNOV at KGB Head-

quarters in Moscow some time between april and July 1960.*

that time GOLITSYN was

Ancrican Popartinent

Second Chief Directorate

In connection dith

for assignnent in Helsanki as a First Chief Directorate counter-

intelligence officer.

GRIARNOV told corirst that he, GRYAZNOV,

had personally prepared an operation involving an American mili-

tary code clerk

the point

that the

"99 per cent sure"

that the recruitment

approach to this code clerk would be suc-

subsequently narrored the time of his conver-

with GRYAZNOV down

GPYAZNOV as saying that the kGB

or May 1960"

certain that the recruitment

is preparea and will be successful."

GOLIPSYN also said that

the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a

woman," but could provide no further details.

During these same

talks, according to GOLiTSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the

KGB had earler recruited U.S. Department of State code cierxs

in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk

in the office of the American Military Attache since the estab-

lishment of the Second Chiuf Directorate's American Department

(in the 1940's) .

GOLITSYN reported on the second

operation on 26 February

1962, while discussing the iGB agent PREISFREUND.

said

that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the

Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application

for travel to the USSR.

On several later occasions, GOLITSYN

said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes.

According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruit-

ment in Moscow of at least one Americän who

"could have been a

code clerk or a diplomat."

He also knew that the recruitment

had been accomplished

"in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that

PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow,

had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach

by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his

introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought

that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after "he had helped

to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in

According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at

this time.

NOSENKO did not

recall visits by GOLITSYN to the

U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.

77 12

• in.

---

## Page 94

'ET

183.

the approach, which was made ky KGB officers.

View by the FBI on 18 June 1962, SOLiTICA

During an inter-

This second lead, COLITSY i sald,

stened frch his conversa-

tions with KOVS!Jk whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of

-the American Depärtment, * while: COLITSIN vas temporarily in MoscON

during

"December 1960."** GOLIISNi related that he had visited

the inerican Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND

operationally

in Helsinki.

Thie request was refused with the

explanatic:

"You see, he

(FREISFREUND) helped us in one recruit-

ment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months

GOLITSYN could mean either Ionoshchik (assistant) or Zamestitel!

(deputy).

The CHERrPANOV papers snow

that KOVSHUK was Deputy

Chief of the Department as late us 1953.

NOSFiKO said that, as

a result of a drinking incident, KOVSHUK was demoted from De-

puty Chief of the imerican lepartrent to Chief of its American

Embassy Section in 1959 and heid this position until carly 1962.

GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSiUK for about ter. years and

characterized him as a capable officer with aboat 15 years of

KGB experience, at least ter of then in the Anerican Department,

Second Chief Directorate.

In about 1956,

according to COLITSYN,

KOVSHUK was handling KG3 agent Henry SHAPIRO.

CiA records show

that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Wash-

ington phases of the "AYDREY" case (he was idertified by Dayle

SMITTi; see Part VI.D. 3.b.) and in the jevelopment in Moscow of

CIA officer George

WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see

Part VI.D.?.C.).

According io MOSEiko, KOvSliUk took personal

part in the recruitments of

Roy RHODES ard Dayle SMITH,

in

the

approach to Arny Attache Walter MULE, code clerx iouis MANNHEIM,

State Departmert Officer Richard HARNSTONE, ard code clerk

James STOPSBERG, ard in the interrogations

of CIA officers

Russell LiNGELIS and Richard JACOB.

**GOLIISYN's passport and travel records heid by CIA confirm that

COLITSYN travelled only twice to the soviet Union after his

arrival in. Helsinki on 20 July 1960.

The first of these trips

was on 19 January 1961, nhen he flew directly from Helsinki to

Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28

January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from

9 to 15

April 1961, when he appears to have spent all of most

of this period in Leningrad.

A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN

had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with

GOLITSYN in Leningrad

on a daily basis

from 10 through 13 April

1961.

Moreover, GOLITSYN has never rentioned being in Moscow

during this time. ' Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from

April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that

he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversa-

tions in the American Department and that he learned of the

second lead some

time during the week of 19 January 1961. This

ia the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times

in 1962 and subsequently (see above) • NOSENKO has always

maintained that he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of

GOLITSYN's visit

and that this was in the summer of 1961. When

he was told in February. 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow in:

January 1961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong of

was attempting to deceive him.

NOSENKO declined to change

his story of che summer leave.

TE SEUST

---

## Page 95

184.

(e) Information from other Sources

Infornation available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of:

the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared

a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that,

except for overlapping assignsents during periods of turnover,

there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the

Embassy at any particalar time.

This military code clerx was

responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all

three military services.

In practice,

at least one other men-

ber of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic

clearance and has been trained and has performed the function

of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the

latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability

to per-

form his functiong for other reasons.

STORSBERG

was the only military code clerk assigned to the

Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett

HOBSON, was reassigned, until Septenber 1961, when his successor,

Mathew

ZUJl'S, arrived.

STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in

January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up

cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communica-

tions Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY:

HURLEY performed these duties on

a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to

and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.*

tionally,

STORSBERG he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines

and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy.

HURLEY's tour in Moscow began

shortly before STORSBERG's, in

December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the

military code root

the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS,

who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to

the office of the Air Force Medical Officer.

As a concurrent

secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the

office of the Air Attache.

From february until mid-April 1961,

as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code

room where

he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer.

He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low

* Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's func-

tion as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties

as "mili-

tary code machine mechanic, he said on one occasion that

he considered both to be within the general category of

"military code clerks."

NOSENKO reported that there was no

KGB operation against HURLEY.

---

## Page 96

4.00000

185.

aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from

Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*

NOSENKO has described an operation against

KEYSERS (see

below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival

in Moscow,

he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GoLIT-

SYN's two leads discussed above.

On

the basis of available

information, it appears that the subject of this lead must

have been either STORSBERG OF HURLEY, the only two "military

code clerks" in Moscow in the spring

of 19E0.

The subject

of COLITSYN's second lead could have been STOPSBERG, HURLEY.

or, in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN

suggested that he might be a code cleri and might be a mili-

tary man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation

against HURLEY, together with his description of the opera-

tion against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and

his (and PREISFREUND'S) assertion that PREISFREUND took part

in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--

NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were

to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure.

This con-

flicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved

in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960.

There are

also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads

as regards the progress of the operation.

GOLITSYN reported

that recruitment

code clerk was. "99 per cent" assured

in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISPREUND describe

an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that

time.

GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the

operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in

late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which

PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to

STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn

1961.

Jor saha

---

## Page 97

TOP" SECRET

(111) TY'S UY ROSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases

(a)

Introduction

Accordirg to NOSENKO, the U.S.

Embassy Section officer

KOSOLAPOY travelled

only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at:

that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--togetr.er.

with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul

Francis JENNER, by train to Moscow.

(The KGB later learned

that JENNER was not a code clerx but a pouch cleck who also met

couriers at the Moscow airport, HOSENKO said, and this KGB iden-

tification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department

of State files.) Ine report by NOSENKO On KOSOLAPOV is contra-

dicted by two sources, travel records available to CIA and the

KGB defector GOLITSYN.

Statements made by JEUNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those

of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young soviets,

a man and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later

JENER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport.

recoris contradict NOSENKO's statement that

KOSOLAPOV waS the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the

"24-hour journey.

Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single

to Finland,

in early

1960, travel records show that KOSOLA-

(under a different identity) went to felsinki in both the

spring and fall of 1960.

Travel records on the second Helsinki

TDY by KOSOLAPCV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne

Out bY GOLITSYN.

GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay

the groundwork for a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied

a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November

1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on

the basis of travel records, it has been deterrined that on

16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an Aterican

code clerk naned john w. GARLAND on the daily train from iel-

sinki to Moscow.

The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is

divided into three parts:

KOSOLAPOV's false identity for

travel, the early 1950 TDY, and the November 1960 TDY.

Each

part incorporates the information from all sources, including

NOSENKO.

(b) Palse Identity for Travel

Vadin Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 Febru-

ary 1928.

According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich

KOLOSOV, born in Perm'

on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from

31 March to 2 Fril 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 Noverber 1960,

and in Dennark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965,

Johan PREISFREUID (see Part V.E.3.c.Ii. ;on STORSBERG operation)

identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB offi-

cer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow

NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in

1961 to recontact the YOUNGERs, an American man and wife who

vere arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 98

in the sall of 1954 to

ask whetlier he knew angering about NOSENKO's

defection.

Shown

KOLOSOW's photograph in October. 1966, HOSENKO

immediately identified hin as KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENrO told

sausiguently

Dires

signed, corroboriting its accu-

PIOtOCOL

racy.

This protocol reads:

"I do rot know ahout this trip of kosoLapov's to

Helsinki

in loverter 1960.

I do not inow that he

accompanied a coie cleik back to Muscon at thut time.

"I wos insuLApoly direct supervisor from January

1960 to January 1962 and would nare to inon and approva

any operatioral travel by KOSOLAPOY outsice the USSR.

In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki to

accorpany Paul JEiver, I taled with hin about it, and

then approved after he srote

jt, the cable

to the

Hei-

sini residenture legal Residencil informing thein of

his mission, and oi course received his report astero

the tri?.

in advance.

"Normally, I would kuor about and 2910ve this trip

would läva heard about the trip utor 1 return. Hoi

ever, i don't ronenber anything abour c:i! trip either

beiure or after recuLapov's trip to lolsinii.

If thera

wie fuither developients in this case, i certainly

would huve known abous them. "*

(c)

The Early 1960 TDY (WESTER Case)

NOSENKO first rentioned a Thy be jasolarov in an interview

by

the FBI.

* NOSENKO reminded his interviewer that he had travelled to

Cuba in November 1960.

was toid that CIA travel records

show that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba

from Moscow on 15 lovember 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV

arrived in Helsinki.

NOSENKO was then asked if he would have

learned of the trip

in any case, whether of rot he was in

Moscow, and he stated that he would have..

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 99

188.

NOSTPO was interrogated by ClA on the JENNeR CaRe on

15 February 1965.

hasis of this

interrogation,

i proto-

drans up in question-and-answer

form, incorporating

NOSENTO'S ISENORSES,

on l% February 1965, NOSENKO signed

the protocol, attesting to its accuracy.

The following is taken

stalenent:

Did you supervise the work against JENNER?

Question:

MOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO :

Question:

NOSENKO :

YEs.

Did you nad the file on JENNER?

¡ don"t renember.

Did you inad re orts on JENNER?

yeS.

1 read materials on JENER, everything which

into the scation on JEllick and the other code

clerks.

Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?

NOSENKO:

Yes. We had his anketa (visa application).

Question:

NOSENKO:

What was the operational plan on JENNER?

Before his arrival we had only the arketa, nothing

more.

He was listed as secretary/archivist,* and

there was a date on this anketa which was the date

he was due to cross the finnish border--the middle

of the month, the 15th.

It was the beginning of

1960, not long after I had arrived in the First

Department.

We decided to create an active opera-

tion. We knew the date, and we thought he was to

The position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in

in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, but as pre-

viously stated, this was not true in JENNER's casE.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 100

be a code cler"..

We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Hel-

sinki with the mission of returning with JENNER on:

the same train; during which time OSOLAPOV was to

study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was

KOSOLAPOV.

Question:

NOSENKO:

How old was JENNER at the time?

I don't know.

We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina,

to Vyborg as

part of this operatica.

think her

first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last

name; her

code name was "SOLISTKA"

..•

She was placed

on the train in Vyborg as if she nad been visiting

someone there

and was returning to Moscow.

The main

idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he

even arrived in loscow.

We wrote a proposal to the

Chairman of the KGB giving the reasons for doing this.

We explained that we had usually only one year in

which to

work.

The agent "SOLISTKA"

met JENNER and

spoke with him.

KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted

with JENNER and spoke with him, cut I can't say that

they were all speaking together at ohe time. She

gave JENNER a telephone number.

Question:

A KGB telephone number?

NOSENKO:

Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but

he didn't call her.

We then noticed that he wasn't

working in the code room but in the mail room.

o.k..

that was interesting too.

We waited one or two

months for the call to come, but nothing happened.

When JENNER once went to the railroad station or

airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with

GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet

again.

JENNER saw her but did not approach (her).

Instead, he turned in the other direction.

Only

later did we learn that he is a very quiet person.

There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a

suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but

there was no proof.

He was like a child.

Question:

How much time did you have between the time of the

anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival?

NOSENKO: A month, plenty of time to prepare.

Question: A month?

NOSENKO:

Well, approximately a month.

The usual approval

from

the Central Committee was necessary so that

KOSOLAPOV could go abroad.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Who wrote this?

question:

I prepared the kharakteristika (official form on

KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel

Office.

Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against

JENNER?

TGF SECREL

---

## Page 101

190.

IISSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO :

Question:

LOSENKO:

It was the idea of the group.

Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be

before he left--what: he was to do?

I was discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSO-

LAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the

day: before KOSOLAPOV left.

Was "SOLISTKA" an experienzai agent?

She had been working before 1960, but I don't know

for how long.

Who handled her before GRYAZNOV?

Question:

HOSENKO:

question:

I don't know.

How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with

other units,

for example, with the (KGB] First Chief

Directorate

(FCD) ?

HOSENKO:

KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming

for two or three days.

question:

Did you approve this cable?

NOSENKO:

I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it

to KLYPIN for his

signature.

Once it was gigned,

KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department,

FCD.

question:

What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: What name did KOSOLAPOV use?

NOSENKO:

I don't remember if he used his own name or another.

Question:

what other correspondence was there?

NOSENKO:

question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

Correspondence?

What other cables or letters were sent to or re-

ceived from the Helsinki Rezidentura (Legal Resi-

tripy of the KGBl concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV's

Only this cable, nothing else. KOSOLAPOV was to dis-

cuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining

their help in Helsinki with the work against code

clerks, to see what agents they had, of to study the

situation, the possibilities.

We wanted to use agents

against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants,

to use girla...

With whom was ROSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 102

14-00000

NOSENKO :

Question:

He spoke with the Resident and the Deputy Resident:

He discussed this question with them and they said

they would see about it, but we were told that the.

Residency has more important questions.

What was more important than the work against code

clerks?

NOSENKO:

Question:

They didn't tell us.

well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what

was

so important?

NCSENKO:

Code clerks

in Helsinki would be more important for

them; this.is the work of the FCD.

Question:

How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to recog-

nize him and make contact?

NOSENKO :

KOSOLAPOV had his photograph, knew his name, and

The Then they to nat tick mhe sane train

for KOSOLAPOV.

We knew JENNER must cross on the

15th.

Question:

When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki?

NOSENKO:

I don't know.

Question: When did he return?

NOSENKO:

I don't know, don't remember.

Question: How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?

NOSENKO:

About one week, not more than one week counting

travel time.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: By train, both ways.

Question: was he alone on the way down or did someone go with

him?

NOSENKO: He was alone.

Question:

How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the

right train?

NOSENKO:

GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to. Vyborg and had the

local KGB officers there meet her and place her on

the correct train.

establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train

before placing her aboard...

Also on 15 Pebruary 1965 NOSENKO made the following addi-

tional statement not included in the protocol:

"The agent was

'SOLISTRA.'

She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960.

NOV briefed her for the mission...

KOSOLAPOV wiote areport: On

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 103

14-014191.

7974926015007130874

his trip.

Nothing unusual or interesting in it.

"SOLISTRA' also

gave a report to GRYAZNCV, but there was nothing there, either."?

NOSENKO was questioned on

20 October 1966 about his respon-

sibility for and knowledgeability of KGB operations against

American code clerks.

He was reguired to give only brief ansiers,

without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions

and his answers were as follows:

Question:

Did

you supervise

all code clerk operations in 1960

and 1961?

NOSENKO:

Question:

Yes.

Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPSV your subordinates during

this period?

NOSENKO:

Yes.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

How many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in

order to travel to Moscow on the train with Ameri

can code clerks?

I know of one.

When was that? Which one?

Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960.

Which code clerk?

Question:

NOSENKO:

It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was founc

tatarmonie me sort amassy section

thought he is a code clerk.. Found out later that ie

Question: JENNER?

NOSENKO:

Yes.

Question: Do you know of any others?

NOSENKO: No.

what do you mean?

Question: Only one?

NOSENKO:

Only one--JENNER.

Question:

Was the operation successful?

NOSENKO:

No it wasn't successful. But it was interesting.

It was the first try to send an officer to Helsinki

When did it happen?.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

First part of 1960. I think approximately 15 March

or April.

Other than the trip to meet JENNER, did KOSOLAPOV

make other trips abroad?!:

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 104

14-00000

NOSENKO:

He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple (the YOUNGERs)

and was in the laited States at one of the, 50°g. No

Assemblies. That's all.

That was in the

others.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Did KOSOLAPOV personally meet JENNER?

Yes.

Question: Did you read his report of this meeting?

NOSENKO:

Yes.

When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photo-

graph fo: the first time, the following discussion ensued:

Question: Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17

(Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, empingee of Vneshtorg,

born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSRI?

NOSENKO:

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer

of First Chief Directorate,

First Department.

ment, Second Chief Directorate.

Question:

We have information that a Viktor--

NOSENKO:

(interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.

Question: Anything else you want to say about the name?

NOSENKO:

KOSOLAPOV.

Question:

Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March

of 1960 under cover of neshtorg, does that mean

anything to you?

NOSENKO:

I was telling you that there was trip when he was

returning with Paul JENNER.

Question:

NOSENKO:

JENNER, the code clerk?

He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as

a code clerk. He was working with mail.

Question:

well, according to official records he arrived in

Helsinki by train from Moscow.

01:

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: On the 31st of March 1960.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question:

And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the

train with him. Right?

NOSENKO :

i was thinking and I'm not sure. '60 or '61.

I'm

not sure.

"GO or '61.

I'm not

•I'm not sure

'60 or '61. I was telling '60, but i'm not sure.

Anyway, I

cannot tell exactly.

I know he was in

Helsinki; that he was going to Helsirki.:

TUF SECRET

....t..t:

---

## Page 105

SECRET

Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 Marcia and! 2 April 1960 (See

•Part V.E.3.c.iii)

antarajala, noo

31 March 1960

B0210

iIcIt+839171707931616

2=25p121021, B0:r0 -

01513338-10.06.53

nttor1a81r..uc.

salias, 12 03.1

tyinles

1:111 tan

1211391719.

J51E818

Ie:ee9-18511954217

TI:50310-5HaT

Ela - tosti

5003807-7056, 1180

ATIO

094-/70311

12,5g

111-28505080

loo!

Colman

- sook

2011010

helena

? April 1960

SECRET

TER SHET

---

## Page 106

14-00000

OP

SECRE

19%.

Question:

It's 1960. He made a trip

in 1950, in March, to

Helsinki by train using this name.

KOLOSOV,

and us-

ing this cover,

Uneshtong, and we also have

a report

fron official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki

by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow.

NOSENKO :

I don't remember the dates.

Don't remember.

Must

be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March

or 1 April.

Question:

No, he didn't arrive until 31 Maich.

We have the

official record on his travel.

we have his photo

here, which you just saw.

NOSENKO:

On the visa certificate,

anketa, with this picture

of Paul JENNER, it was

said that he must come; we

knew that he must come i April or 15 Narch, or some-

thing of this kind.

Question:

But we hav the official records showing KOLOSOV's,

or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.

NOSENKO:

I cannot give you any details. All I have

said,

everything

what I knew.

If you need something on

KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember.

Question:

The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left

Heisinki on 2 April.

JENNER, Paul JENNER,

to the same official sources:

left Helsinki by train

to go to Moscow on the 31st.

Trio days before.

NOSENKO :

They weie going in one train.

Question: They

weren't even on the same train.

NOSENKO :

Here, please, they were going in one train.

KOSOLAPOV remained

in Helsinki.

Question

NOSENKO:

(interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one

even carriage with Paul JENNER. Then...

Question:

NOSENKO:

(interrupts) How do you know this for sure?

I was reading his report after his coming.

reading also the agent's report of the female agent

who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in

this train,

and at the station Vyborg, the first

Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was

taken by

GRYAZNOV,

in the same carriage, and she

was acquainted with jENNER.

it

was a

try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but

JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her.

That's all.

It was finished... And she was acquainted

and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV

himself was speaking with JENNER.••

I was reading

KOSOLAPOVIs otchet (official account about his (tripi.

question:

That's quite possible.

It's quite possible that they

gave you a report

read concerning this.

fact that official records show that the two men. y

were not on the same train.

They were two days apart.

NOSENRO :

No (whispered).

---

## Page 107

question:

JENNER left on the 313t.

I don't kion. I don't know. I don't know.

Maybe

this is a mistare of Pimish officiais.

know, but he was on the same train and he was return-

ino

fron lelsirki with Paul JENNER. The same

train,

six +4449164771

The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV'S TDY in early 1960

comes from other sources:

- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER

reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki

by two young

Russians,

"a boy and a girl, probably uni-

versity stusents."*

The tho

Russians struck

up a conver-

sation and were

soon baiting him on

the question of racial

discrimination in

the United States.

They

gaid that they

might see JENNER in Moscow.

About

three months later, on

29 June, JENNER was performing his normai duty of escort-

ing Enibassy

couriers to Sheremetevo Airport when he was

again approached by the russian girl, Yuli, who acted

surprised

to see him and asked him to go outside to

talk.

Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to

friend who was leaving on 3

flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had

seen

the Irkutsk flight depart

a half hour earlier) and

toid

JENNER that her male

companion on the train trip to

MOScOW, Yura,

had returned to his studies in Vyborg.

Interspersed

with Yuli's questions concerning JENNER'S

impressions and

personal activities in Moscow were others

about how often he came to the airport and how he liked

his job at the Embassy.

When JENNER said he must leave,

she gave him her telephone rumber in Moscow and insisted

that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be

better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."

- Besides information about his Soviet companions on

the Moscow journey, JENER also toid U.S. Department of

State security officials about sexual advances made by

his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing

worn by his second maid.

(NOSENKO has not indicated that

either of these two women was u KGB agent, but has said

in another context that all

maids of American code clerks

were KGB agents or informants.)

- CIA investigations showed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV,

KGB officer and

the

Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted

the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assist-

ance in locating

an American named Paul F. JENNER who was

due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.***

SERGEYEV

explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he

* KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.

** NOSENKO has mentioned

several times that GRYAZNOV's agent

"SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.

***GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet

Intelligence agent from "about 1945 on."

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 108

14-00000

136.

did not specify its nature.

Reportedly this was the first

time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police

chief.*

- CIA travei

records shon; that JEINER arrived in Hel-

sinki

en route to Moscow on 30 Marci: 1950 and departed by

train the following day.

KOSCLAPOV arrived in Helsinki

the

same day

that JENNER left,

31 Karen 1960,

and renaired

there

until 2 April 1950 when he too departed fo= Mosca

by train.

The Finnish

train manifest for 31 March 1960

indicates that there was only one passenger abcard the

daily train leaving lielsinki ior losson on this cate,

Paul JENNER, Listeù as a U.S. citizer and secretary/archi-

The manifest for 2 April 1960 carries the name

Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSOLAPOV)

and shows that no American

citizens were aboard.

(8)

che November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)

Apart from denying that it ever tock place, NOSENKO has said

about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPOV in lovember 1950,

but GOLIISYN saiù

such a trip occurred and related it to an in-

cipient KGB operation against an American sode clerk.

COLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Resicency in lel-

xini until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPOV's first trip to

Helsinki, under

the KOLOSOV

He has reported that at

"about the end of 1960, about loverber of possibly ty the begin-

ning of 1961," the KGB Secord

Chief Direczorate sent a teleg:an

to the Helsinki Legal Residency.

The teicgram advised that ar

American code clerk would

arrive in Helsinki in trr.sit to

Moscow; the responsible case officer would be KOSOLAPOV, Who

was being sent to lielsinki under an alias and under Vreshtora

strike up

an acquaintance to be con-

zinued with the American in Moscow.

The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's

further remarks on this subject in early 1962:

Question:

You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came

to Finland?

GOLITSYN: Came to Finland.

He came under cover?

Question:

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question:

Under

a new identity? With an alias?

GOLITSYN:

Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg) •

But, of course, there

may be sone different dates.

Maybe November.

I suppose (believel it was the

end of 1960 or it can

be the beginning of

1961.

And he waiting

for some days, a beek or so.

question: In Helsinki?

A similar request to the police chief vas made by SERGEYEV

mith regard to GARLAND (see below).

TOP SECRET

1, 52

---

## Page 109

14-00000

SECRET

Finnisi Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960

(See Part V.F.3.c.lii)

Lescttolo motirstojineio, juiào

Suiu, la eiussiraes

"lisuenvloie, sonne

Jrawro, 1alr

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l'Otonagsir'1, 199r de?

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s 'Ak. 121010, 03:=

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riin y

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Syniyindaile

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k1TJ012110

d102. lur.

d1pl.

1020

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11:111800

1922

11N:0121ja 19.05.27

J.10

3: N7*01%.

1913

idipl.kur.

17.08.0%

Blntrort

5=.03.33

leato alht, d1r1.

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aark.asont, 20.09.00

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8.11ngn, 20.B.30, 10820

KIvaltOrInE. 23.00 H180

B. Cinmoiene

Baukkonon

SECRLT

---

## Page 110

14-00000

GOLITSYN:

Question:

GOLITSYN:

Question:

GOLITSYN:

Question:

GOLITSYN:

Question:

GOLITSYN:

197

Yes.

Maybe four days:

Then we knew that the Areri

can Embassy took a ticket

for him (the American .tar-

get for the train...

and KOSOLAPOV took a ticket

in the same. compartment.

And before the departure

we knew exactly from the guide (conductor) of that

train that it's the sare person--lI'm not certain.

whether he was al code clerk or not a code clerk*--

but his name,

his real

name.

It was listed.

And I

was at the railroad station at that time.

I went

to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.**

See them off?

yes,

the delegation.

And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV:

"Who is this person?

I suppose

Ine is an) American?"

I suppose (believel he said: "He's a fat man, a

young fat man."

ip t

The American?

Yes.

And I suppose (believe KUSOLAPOV said] bespecta-

cled.***

And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were

smiling and looked through the window before depart-

ure.

In the compartment? The train compartment?

Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from

KOSOLAPOV's division Ithe U.S.

Enoassy Section, Ameri-

can Department, Second Chief Directorate).****

When was this?

It was in summer or maybe September or so of 1961.

And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...

Question:

GOLITSYN:

Who was this? Do you remember?

I don't remember because he changed his

know him but I...

And I asked him how as that case

that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want

That's why I came toi the conclusion

that this case was a success.

Otherwise he would

have told (me).

And I am not sure but I can try to rec-

ognize... this person in pictures.

Question:

You think that you could?

When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the

American as a code clerk.

GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation.

There

were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.

KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is,

however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.

**** NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the KGB officer

remains unidentified..

TOP SEGMET

---

## Page 111

lee.

GOLITSYU: Y05, protubly, He reminus me a little di one of iny

friends.

Question: He looks a little like your daina?

COLITSYN: YeS.

Aristion: Which one? KOSCLardy?

SOrTSY: No, no, This Annicisin

¡e Finnien curatond manifest

thens the prisengers travelling

from Helsirii to Moscow

i toucar

19:0.

X0S0E80Y 433 072

cE eicht somets aboard tie tram:

M: Jon de MilAND nas the

only Anerican.

sinki on 14 Moveinher 1960:

he was tien .ling to doscor to assune

the duties nt rupertant of the Baiti

the l.s. Encussy.

Aa he had with reunid to that litti

the fai lugal musideny

anne tie lan i police chict

Card don agent, arcolding to solitail ae li nooner 1969 for

help in locaring Garlii. au deser ms mild are lve there oi

14 lovember.

GARLIND WOS FIST InCItINeG Dy Jhe MiDiAy, the Ebassy

Security Ufficer In lioscou

in connection nith the GOLITSY lead

on 17 June 1962.

In this arters CoralD denied having met

any Soviet of KOsOlAisvi physical descriptior during the rel-

sinki-to-boscow train trip and ulso derror having ever been

approached by soviet intelligene.

(..

interviered by the FBIe

NOSENKO on 28 January 1961 identified 20 Americans em-

ployed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow

ano were of

interest to

the KGB because they were

suspeit intelligence officers or

agents, or because they fell into some other category of in

terest to the KGB.

He gave a short starcment concerning each

of these 20 persons.

One of theT was CARLAID.

NOSENKO said:

songe clerk, but rothing doing. " NOSENKO was

asked on 2 September 1964

to review this list

foi the purpose

of supplying any additional infornation re might have concern-

ing the individuals named,

stated::

• As with all code

clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND!

in order to gather

enough material to make a recititmen.

The case officer was

KOSOLAPOV.

I don't remember the names or descriptions of any

agents,

and I dian't hear of any derogatory information.

AS

far as I know, there was no operational approach and

rore..

cruitment."

Although he could not recall whether he had read

the KGB file on GARLAND Or nOC. NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said:

he thought that he must have read current materials concerning

GARLAND as they came into the l.S. Embassy Section.: NOSENKO

also said that. there was no operational plan drawn up for GARLaiD

because the KGB had no derogatory

information whatsoever concern-

ing him. NOSENKO has not provided additional information con-:

cerning GARLAND, whom he had presumably rever seen, and was unable

TOP SOMET

---

## Page 112

14-00000

199.

to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any

details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Mos-

cow.

In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV's travels

to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October

1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had

The following is a transcript of this portion of

the discussion on that date:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Well, we started to look for other trips by KoSo-

LAPOV, OF KOLOSOV, and we did run across another

trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.

To Copenhagen?

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

No. This was a trip to Helsinki.

Oh. I don't know.

Maybe after.

after '61 maybe.

I don't know--'62, '63, I don't'know.

No, this was in 1960.

when you say you were in

the First (U.S. Embassy) Section, First (American)

Department, Second Chief Directorate.

He was on

the train, according to official recoras, on 16 Novem-

ber 1960, going from Helsin'i to Moscow.

I know about one, he has took trip, when he was re-

turning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.

We looked at everybody else, all the other records

concerning this train trip to see who was on the

train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the

name he used.

NOSENKO:

Yes?

Question:

We found there was one American on that train with

KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO:

Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can

say, of course?

Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.

NOSENKO:

He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul

JENNER.

Question: You don't know this man's nane?

NOSENKO:

(silence)

Question:

Well, we checked further and we found 'öut that

GOLITSYN had told us about a trip.

NOSENKO:

when he was returning from Heisink with Paul JENNER.

COLITSYN was then out, yes?*

COLITSYN arrived In Helsinki in July 1960, over four months

after JENNER passed through Finland en route to Moscow.

TOP SECT

---

## Page 113

Question:.

NOSE: KO:

Question:

NOSENKO :

Question:

NOSENKO :

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO :

Question:

NOSENKO :

GOLITSYN told ug that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to

Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November: 1960.

You understand what I'm telling you?

Yes, I understand.

And KOSOLAFOY must tell him abo'st

the

code clerk, tut we found out that Paul JENNER is

not a code cierk when he began to nurs at the Embassy.

This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time

of year--

(interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.

This is not March 1960.

This is November 1960.

different time.

It's

the sale

year, but a different

time.

I know only about his trip when he was returning with

Paul JENNER.

well, how do you explain that this man, who's supposed

to be under your supervision

one of your

in the Erbassy

section,

is aboard this train with this American code clerk,

one of your targats, in November 1960?

I know only about one trip (by] KOSOLAPOV to Hel-

si? Ey, when he was returning

with Paul JENNER, about

he was thinking also that he was a code clerk.

KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with

jENNER.

We have the names; we have the facts; we

have the official records.

We also have GOLITSYN'S

information about November 1960.

GOLITSYN went with

KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.

inceit of course h

intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department.

Of course

with him.

KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode

with this American code clerk

from Helsinki on the

train back to Moscow.

But GOLITSYN was not in Hel-

sinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.

With Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody

You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't

know, I don't know, I don't know.

It's no bluff.

Do you have any idea who this other

code clerk was?

No. There wasn't such a one.

Well, I'll tell you who it was...

the name GARLAND?

Did you ever hear

Yes, I heard GARLAND.

And there wasn't any approach

made to GARLAND.

There wasn't any attempt to recruit

him. There was a study of him, yes, but there wasn't

recruitment or something else...

TEP S

---

## Page 114

14:00000 • 7

(iv)

(a)

RGS-Polish IB Activities Against MORONE

Introduction

In 1961 CIA learned from a Polish source who furnished

much

reliable

and sensitive information that, with the assist-

ance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB),

the KGB in November 1960 began

using a female agent against

Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State code clerk assigned

to the Anerican Embassy in Moscow in August 1960.

The woman

accompanied MORONE on a train trip from loscow, became inti-

mate with him in warsaw, returned to Moscow twice in February

1961, and there had sexual relations with him.

The compromising

scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were

photographed.

This information

on the KGB operation was received by CIA soon

after the winan's second visit to Moscow.

on the basis of this

report, MORONE was interviewed and polygruphed in Oslo in May

i961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August

1961.

NOSENKO gave a few details on the

same case, without men-

tioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in

Geneva.

In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on

the

MORONE case, identifying three KGS agents (besides the polish

female) who participated in the operation. NOSENKO, however,

said that two of them added no information of use to the KGB

against MORONE, and that he was unable

to remember what the third

agent reported: statements by other sources indicate thai re-

garding MORONE

all three agents could have acquired information

of operational potential

for the KGy.

NOSENKO has not reported,

as have other sources,

that. a fourth

KGB agent named Ella UMANETS

was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV-

posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least

one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was

approached

by the KGB (see above) • NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case

with another by saying

that a fifth KGB agent was directed

against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the

American code clerk ZUJUS (see below).

The sensitive source of

the original report on MORCNE stated

that a KGB officer "VOLODYA"

(Vladimir,

last name unknown) personally met the Polish female

agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the

officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO at first

claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case re-

ported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed

him that travel records on NOSENKO made it impossible for the

technician to have spoken to him as he described.

According to

NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could.

take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates

MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities'

concern

over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.

(b)

NOSENKO's Information

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made

a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a

female agent of the Polish

service in contact with an Anerican

from the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting warsaw.

Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow. in

order

to obtain further compromising materials on this Anerican.

¿aliens.

---

## Page 115

202.

Asked on Il June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents

working against the

U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having

introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans.

afraid of contacts with Russian girls. He said that he himself

had several of these third-national agents, that he sometimes

would ask

the German and Polish services to supply him with

agents,

and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their

interded use in operations against Americans:

NOSENKO thei

gave ar. example:

"Listen,

the sergeants (enlisted men) who

lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go-to

America,

so where did

they go to rest lon leave)?

To Finland

or Poland.

Why Poland?

Because they car find woren there, the

rate of exchange is

good, and so 011.

What do we do?

We planted

a female Polish agent lon

an American) in Poland.

Then she

comes

to Moscow.

le arranged a chancé meeting,

and things de-

veloped.

Once two guys,

a Marine guard and a cose clerk went to

Warsaw.

They were on

leave for a loex and a half.

We knew

when

they

would be going.

I made an intojiate phone call to

warsaw.

'Give

me

roman,' I said.

'Get a good whore for me

there, a pretty one but

not one who strikes the eye particu

larly.'

Well, they sent me such a girl.

Ard I placed this

Polish agent on the sane train,

in the same cas, even in the

same compartment.

The train left.

One of the knericans,

the

one in thom ve were particularly interested, the code clerk,

wanted the girl and there, in the corpartment,

they went to bed

together wit.

le the other American

slept.

I toid the Poles in

warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs.

They arrangod ar apartment and he came there.

Everything was

o.k.

After

a week

and a half he retirred to lescow.

We did

not rush things.

A month passed.

Two months.

¡et's not rush,

I said.

A half a year

went by.

I insisted the: nothing further

may be done any earlier.

Then I said,

'All right, let's give

him this girl, this Pole. ' She arrived lin Moscow)

and they met

one another.

I created the conditions: se created the condi-

tions.

They slept with one another once, twice.

A (Soviet]

girlfriend

showed up.

The same thing.

ànd he also began to

sleep with the girlfrierd.

The Pole left and he was with this

Russian, and she was our agent.

You see, first the boys are

afraid

of Russians.

ferred him to a pussian, " we gave hial a

Pole

and then transe

NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: "I remember we were

working on one of the members of

the guard of the American Em-

bassy, who was going to warsaw for a good time,

for a few days'

relaxation.*

We wrote to our advisors

[KGB officers attached

to the Polish UB) to do éverything possible--to get a pretty

Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate

scenes.

The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they dio

nave intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without

any intimate scenes.

Just how they are sitting together, how

he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs

and some time went by and then we asked that the Poles send

us this polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They

The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man

who accompanied MORONE to Warsaw.

to relate to MORONE, who has described his encounter with

the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow.

BEGGS has also reported (see below) that MORONE met a Polish

firl on the train to Warsaw and that she later contacted.hin

In Moscow: BEGGS has denied that he, hirselt, was contacted

by any such girl in the Soviet Union after the trip to warsaw

with MORONE.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 116

14-00000

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ste.

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ter.

carlagine

in:

1:=v

1141!:

ift:

chat.

hi:d

?0!

c...

cuiled :::

CO:t9

En 1101:1

11t1

i::

My 81..

ліст!.

k=:"

NOSENKO has ulso mentioned a plohibitio.on re: rusthent

attempts aurirg the 1909 sokoiriil exhibition irrause of tha

need to avoid incidents aficiting. U.s.-covet relutior ships.

GOLITSiN told CIA of such a prchibition plausaron the use

of honosexual compionise

matcriw,acainst.a U.gu Enbassy

employee

in 1960 becausero the impending visis of President

EISENHOWER o the Soviet yaionaAs a reguluros the u-2

incident on. 2, May 1950, this visit never cook place, and

u.s.-soviet relations. deterloratoo.

Thoughout the rest of

1960 and most of 1961 they remained vory straired, and Soviet

pressures ans hard lines culmirated. in the

Berion crisis and

wali-building in Berlin in August of

1961

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 117

NOSENKO further

reported to CIA that the foB ease officer

working against MORDiE waS NOSEIKU's subordinate and special-

ist in code clerk opcrations, KOSOLAPOV:: NUSE:iKO read the file

on MoRoNe and saw his visa photograph, but he rever saw him in.

person and so could not provide a physical description.

"CSEURO

had discussed

the MORONE case with KOSOLAPDY and GPY?ZNOY on a.

nuncer of occasions.

ROSENKO said that the YGB agents working on MORONE were:

- Svetlana IVilOVA, a maid or waitress at zerica

House

who reported to DEMilli, the case officer responsi-

ble for hmericans living there, on everything she saw or

heard concerning MORONE.

times with DEMIN to discuss MORONE, and HOSENIO hinself

net her once of twice in che of the two safe apartments

that DENIM had at his disposal.

any specific information on MOROlE which was interesting

or usefu. from chis sourse.

an Egyptian cholored at the

Egyptian Luba-sy

ino lies en agent of the sixth linder-

developed icuntries)

Directorate.

Department of the 1G3 Securd Chief

but lie dis not

renkered.

East Cornan fenales imported for use

against the inhabitants of America House.

In EaIlY 1960

GRYA/NOV went to Fast Berlin to obtain tio Gerran worer•

who could be used for this purpose.

The tirst of thege

nas Hanna, blonde, documented

a hest Gorman travelling

met hor but instructed PREIS-

(see the STORSBERG casel to take her to American

House und leave her on her oin.

Hanna sent several tines

to imerica House in 1901,

but NOSENHO can recall nothing

that she way have

refcited on MORONE.

Ser-

man girl was documented

NOSENTO never

met her but recalled that she was asked for her documents

at Anerica House on her first or second

visit there.

She

replied that she had left them

House, and never returned.

at her hotel, left America

NOSEiKO did not remember the

time when this incident

occurred, beyond

the

fact

that he

was still in

the t.s.

Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN

was the inbassy security officer at the tire.*

an Italian

Embassy and

heard or saw about Americans

Mov's agent, reported everything he

at the Arerican

to KOSOLAFOV.

NOSENKO rE-

called nothing specific that swine had said about MORONE.

CIA has no information concerning

such an incident in 1960-

1961, but the circumstances described by NOSENKO sEem to

apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman

named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code

clerk ZUJUS.

These details are given in Part V.5.3.c.(v).

In askevent, the incident involving Lilliar occurred after

the date when NOSENKO says he was transferred fron the U.S.

Embassy Section.

At the tine, Hugh MONTGOMERY ratrer than

ABIDIAN was the Embassy Security Officer.

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 118

205.

•Fros one of these agents,

on possibly in some otr.cr man-

the KGB learred that

"ORONE was plannirg to go on.

to harsal.

NOSE:IKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZ:OV thereupon decided

to employ a Polish tenale agent in ar. attenpt to compromisa his.

KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the cperational plan for tre atresse,

which was approved by GRIBArO

after some editing by NOSE:TO

and KOVSHUK, chief of the section.

KOsoLAPOr next net with &

Poligh LB counterintelligence

officer in KGB leadquarters to

discuss the pian.

The fole sas roid that the target was a u.s.

Embassy employee, but not that he ras a code cleri; this fact

was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a polish girl was obtained

by the polish UB ard sent to josco. iy

Upor ner arrival

she was net by KOSOLAYOV, who too% her to a Moscon hotel, where

he gave her instruciions

corcerning her role in the operation.

The girl was told to meet Hokus on

the train, flirt with him,

have him fall in love with her.

associatio?, ars

stuly hir..

She was to toil hin that she had been in Moscow a9

a guest of her uncie, a mender of the polish trade representa-

in koscow, and thât she could meet him ayaln on ter next

Arrangerents

wore made with tre 10b Operatioral Technical

Directorate ior a technician to be glaced en the trair in the

compartrent nexi to that of Morola and BiGGS und for audio and

visual (but not photugaaphic! coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when POPCHT and BEGGS left Moscow.

The Polish agent did, horever,

succeed in making "OrONE's

acguaintance, and the rechnician cron che Operational Jecinical

Directorate reports back to NoSEio the day

after the trais

reached Warsaw.*

The technician toid dustuko the girl had er-

caged in sexial intercoursi durin; tie trio.

The technicia.

also reported that the tape recordings obtained ware of

psst

guality..

LAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be

Because the RGS still lacked compromising materials, brought

to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography

during her visit.

The requests were approved by higher iGg

the girl

arrived, KOSOlAPOl met her alone and

took. her to the Hotel

a specially equipped room.

The girl called MORONE at America ilause, and MOROlE subsequently

visited her ir the hotel room two or three tines; during which

photographs were taken.

These were placed in the KGB's file on

He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had

hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

CIA travel records show that roSENko transitted. Amsterdar on

15 November 1960 on a through flicht fron

Moscow to Cub

rel

ned

TIOn

cuba approximately di

Dacencer

9б0.

when told

this, NOSENKO stated that irstead of talking to the teche::

nician himself, he may have read the report and seen the fila

strips after his return.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 119

L SECRE

206.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was

felt that' there were

insufficiant materials for a resruitment

approach

to морон.

The KGB warted to trap him in the apart-

ment of a Soviet

rioran,

to

catch him in something that is defi-

nitely prohibited.

For this purpose, Svetlana IVILOVA

(see

above)

was supposed to lure MOPCiE into the city, but before

anything fürther could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE

out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they

were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore,

NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE

and no recruitnent of him.

(c) Information from

_Other Sources

sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 Novem-

Polish ferale,

an experienced English-speaking agent

of the Polish UB,

Moscow where she was met oy a KGB

case officer named "VOLODYA."

She stayed at the hotel Warsaw

in Moscow.

The VGB case officer, apparently from the American

Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorute, on 10 November

1969 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in

MOSCOW.

Under KGB insisuctions, the Folish female met MORONE

on

the

train to warsaw, where intimacies began.

In Warsaw on

12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with moroliz, but pur-

suant to instructions,

she refused all overtures to

engage in

intimacies.

The next

day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safe-

house suitably prepared

for

clandestine photography, and reveal-

ing photographs of an intimate nature were

taken of MORONE

and hersert.

The fenale agent again travelled to Moscow on

5 February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further com

promising photographs were taken of her and MOPONE on this

trip.

The female

agent travelled to Moscow a third time and

on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her

and MORONE.

GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on

16 February 1962:

Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of

*he Second Chief Directorate who worked against the

American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"

GOLITSYN:

Yes; I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against

'the U.S. Embassy.

Later he worked against the

British Exbassy and later he was sent to Denmark.

Question:

GOLITSYN:

Question:

GOLITSYN:

Wher was he sent? Do you know?

It was in '57 until probably '60...

I suppose that

he will continue to work now in the First Chief

Directorate.

He transferred there from the Second..•

Do you know anyone who used the name "VOLODYA" in

the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall

of 1960?

There is another person.

It is (Vladimir Ivanovich]

PETROV.

the employee of the American Department,

Second Chief Directorate who works against the Ameri

can Embassy.

He evidently knows English.

worked in the American Department. I know him and I

met him in 1960.

He was Chief of the American Saction::

the Embassy Section...

TOP SECHET

sinite

---

## Page 120

14.00000 : 1.

207

Question:

well, in VOLODYA, i'r interesterl in & KGB Case offi-

cer who would he working againis imerican code clerks

in the fall of 1960.

GOLITSYN:

yes he (pEthov) is the chird oe this section.

That

is why.

works.

in the Chiat o.

this section where GRYAZNOV

carlier identiried GRYAZNOV as

a coue cleri. specialist in tha U.s. Erbassy Gection. l

Question:

And GRYAZOU is undoi him!

GOLITSYN:

Yes, he wis

an assistant. at ore tine, but is not

(rowl, ansi

then there

tie resiganization ard he

becane a littir "liguicated" Idegraded in position).

In.

an october 196% intervie, follovirg his witharawal tro

MOSCOi, MOROVE

stated thut he his

ravelind dith Frank BEGGS' to

Warsaw on 12 licverker 1960.

on the prair he saw a Polish girl

outside their compartmens end asted her does laaquages she spoke.

Later she entered his comportrent, did itia ho tricd to engage

in sexual relations with her, she sidppid his face.

A day or

two after they arrived in liaison, the girl catacted him at his

hotel, and he sent to her soim

were triot had sexual relations.

According to kRoNe, he had sexual inlating ith

at least tho

other woren snide in Warsaw.

Me ond iGGs returned to Moscow

without incident.

On 6 rebruary isoi to folish giri fron the

train called nin

at imerica house, and the folioring day he

visited her in her

room at the

peking Hored, where

they had

several drinks and sexual iclatiors.

Or tils occasion or earlier

the girl told him that she had in

uncle i. tuscon

MORONE Lad

denied being approached or recruited by soviet Intelligence, a

statement which was supported ly a polygragn exariration acmini-

stered in 1961.

intervien of Morone

are inserted in a later paragrac: contülring information from

MORONE's associates in "los.ow.)

The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in

general, with the

exception that hu hus stated that the two

travelled to Warsaw on 13 loventer 1960 and that, after meeting

the polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower

bunk in their train compartment.

They arrived in warsaw on

14 November and returned the 20th.

REGGS rad heard from MORONE

that the latter had been recortacted by the Polish girl in Mos-

cow in February 1961.

The U.S. military code

clerk' STORSBERG has reported that

MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVOPTSO%), who

laid some groundwork for the KGB approJon to STORSPERG in the

fall of 1961.

when interviewed by the fi dares tet war

In february 1905 NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly net

other Americans on his visits to imerica House, but he did

not remember who they were.

He added that the KGB would not

be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerkg

because. "we told him not to squander his forces, to concen.

trate on Jim (STORSBERG). Jim was his target."

---

## Page 121

¿allow code clerks

and residents of America louse

have

described rin as a heary diiner.

a heavy gables,

and a

ladies' ran.

Various repertg indicate that iPONs vas involved

in a currency-speculation ring operated by trava kiss the

KGB acant mentiored by nOSt

and MOPoNe his confirmed that.

on.at

Least

one occasion, &

M arranged the introduction of

Morons and ocher code clerks

Foviet females.

MORONE had rela-

tions with che of them ir th

sis's apartmert in the spring of

196:.

was also said

io be a close friend of the Embassy

a saunter identified by HOSiNKO as in agent de koso-

Larov,

CUT ICT

sentioned by him in connection with the kOPONE

OpEration.

(SORONE admitted that along with other Americans,

he

made

it a cornon practice to purchage rubies illegally from

One report stites that fo

as ashed a sarine guard to

eliver blachmarket rubles to MoRa.r.

the

„Stake Department

code Icom, à Instricted arca to which

¿had no access.

number ci

reports

indicate

that MORONE

sexually intimate

wit. Svetlana IVANOVA,

DriKiN's agent, and vith alla UMANETS,

another KGB avent at Anerica House identified by NOSENKO but

not renticred by hin in correction with MoRaNt.

(HORONE denies

having had relations with iTINOVA

but said that he told his

friends that he had been intimate with her.

He said, however,

that he krew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had

once

asked IVANOVA

to arrange astes for him aná

another code cier.

with two Russian females.

Ivacova did, and sexual relations

ensted.

MOROtE has also innitted sexual relations with a num-

ber of wores from varicus rostern embassies in Moscon.)

TSP SENE

---

## Page 122

56209.

(v)

(8)

Developmental Operation Against ZuJüs

Introcuction

NOSED reported that he personily recruited and handled

the

"zain agent" in the kGB developmental opera-

r10.

Inst U.S. Arny Sergeant Matther Peter ZuoUS, although

GRYAZNUV

was

the

officer responsible for the jus case.

MakEshmilitary oificer posted to Moscow for training.

only in

this operation,

bur deserko continued to meet

him even after transferring from the U.S, Embassy Section to

the Tourist Dapartient.

while being interrogated in February

1965, NOSENKO said that his could vouch for his bona ices,

and he suggested that cli approach

for this purpose.

ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in

Septenter 1961 to

assune

tho military code cleri duties of StORSEEkG (see above),

and

he remained there until January 190%.

After initially

confusing auJUS with James KEYSERS**, NeStino first descrabed

the XoB operation against hin in february 1904.

According

tO NOSENKO,

neither

anor any other source supplied sig-

nificant informaiion

the KGs, and tre *Gü therefore did

not

attempt to recruit

Claiming not to knox the names of

KGB agents besides

no participated in the oporation,

HOSENKO nevertheless

other contexts las mentioned tio

female agents we sporcodly associated with zujus.

One is

ELla UMANETS, the ocher an base Geran womall posing as en

Austrian.

NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with

MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZuJus was the

Ancrican code cleri who met this wonan.. The jate that she

and ZUJus were together, however, iulis during cha sunner

of 1962 when,

roston said he was no loiger cajaged in

operations againsi the U.S, Embassy.

Infornation from NOSESKO

The first reference by NOSENKO to che ZUlUS case was

made

on 2 February 1964:

NOSENKO: With respect to cuJus, l'll sell you exactly what we

tried to do with him because l spotted this in some

notes. This mistake (confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS)

nade me so mad,

I completely forgot about zeus

until I

saw my

little note.

In 19ó1 1 recruited

Syrian.

hino was

from

Damascus.

and

Te became ac-

quainted

with

ZUJUS.

The reason why they had

sone.

thing in common was

that soretime carlier ZUJUS had

been stationed

in Lebanon and the Syrian hinself was

frem Danascus,

which is a relatively short distance

away.i.

Here

his name.

He wrote it out hinself.

It is

• and he wrote out his own address

The

paper.

KEYSERS case is discussed in the next pair of this

TOP 270022

---

## Page 123

210.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

here lon one of the notes NOSeiKo brought with him

to the meetingl.

We did not work with nit,

retired the

case to Archives, and did not turn him

Wastreet

ras leaving Yoscor

here for the Disarmement Conforence 1n 1992

I turned him over for contact

10 GRYAZNOV.

goodbye to hin and lie cas schoduled to leave the

permanently in April, back to Syria.

lihat did you do against ZU.IUS?

Nothing at all.

lie

and

devloping

kim.

Has nercly studying

Durin'b

the convurtiation lat

Amerier. liousel

they even spoke of how nice it

would bu to

have sone

Lebanese vodia, aid we

specially had

some

shippped in

fron the (KGB Legall

Residency lin Beirutl, and the Syrian brought

it to ZUJUS saying

it had come from lis

friends.

ZUJUs by character is a very quiet, unexcitable,

caln person...

Nothing disturks hir.

didn't you turnd

over to the First Chief

Directorate?

There was no reason for this because he was a

to the Shu.

it and put the case into

decided to hell with

Archives.

Question:

know LbJUS when you decruited him?

NOSENKO:

No, he didn't hardly know

anyonc--even

So we showed hin photographs, and when he sala

that he had met ZuJUs, then me directed lin to

develop ¿loUS and not to pay aitention to any-

one elsc...

If you want

to approach him you

can use my name, simply furly Ivanovich.

NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment

whereby a ClA representative

would approach

saying

that he was from

the KGB

A year later JOSENKO

"Fold CIA

that if ClA talked to eat

the latter would be able to

vouch for NOSENXO's bona

lides.

his own agents on 20 Apr1l 1964,

even though I had

Department [in January

But it had been decided

that no ore else knew him

the First [American! Department; it would have taken

some time before anyone would get used

But he was

working in the development of ZuJUs.

First Department| said that they were

asking me to continue

meeting with him, and they were counting

on my cooperation.

also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the

Seventh Departnentl

so that I would not have to stop

meetings with ZUJUS."

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 124

Y490000

?ll.

when reviering lis:s

of employees. uf the U.s. E-bassy

between 1960 and 1961,

NOSENKO CH

19 Septenber 1964 iden-

tified ZUJUS IS STORSBERG's replaceron:

and said that the

case officer working against hin was. GRAzio!.

lie

said that

his (NOSENKO's) agent y

Lad was working against ZUJUS, but

that he did not know the

names of othor agerts involved, nor

of

any unusual

or interesting inforration corcerning his,

although he had icad

the

second Chisi Directcrate file on

ZUJUS.

There was 20

information or ZUJUS fron KGB micro-

phones, relaphone taps, or surveillance.

The KGB, NOSENKO

stated

üid not nake an

operaticnal approach to ZUJUS

and did

not recruit his.

NOSENKO reported on 2 february 1965 that he hiasel:

had

supervised GRYA&NOV'S handling ca

the geration

and

personally handled the nain azens, tura

NOSE.SKO

read all current reports on UJUs as

ta.a into the

U.S. Erbassy

section,

and he discussed the case with

GRYAZHOV, KOSOLAPOV,

DEMKIN iche case office: responsible

for the imerica liouse) and his superiors:

GRYAZNOV wrote

tho operational plan, 9y

ZUJUS, which called for thoroug..

developsent by faren

and in order to learn

everything

possibie about

tentuglli lo introduce an agent

to ZUJU'S chroighis

Marias to invire ZUJUS to a

restaurant in

March

Aprilvia, and a "friend" has so.

be introduced to ZUJUS at that tire.

This had not been

acconnlished as oE NOSENKU's departure for deneva in 1962.

Progress was slow because lUJUs lias quiet and reservod

and often

stayed alone,

even

in Ancrica House, plus the fact

that although reland zuJus were

quainted,

they did not

becone good

friend

On the days

swas to visit merica

House, NOSENKO met hir in hoteis

or

restaurants (never in

1015

every week or tio,

depending

They would meet again the

follchira

report on which Americans were

drinting heavily and

which here carossing

she girls froa

foreign embassies

in Moscoi. Although

cht to America

House orce

cr

twice

a month and drank there

with ZUJuS, he

reported little of interest.

The KGS loürnes sonething

about ZUJUS's fanily in the United Siates, the details of

which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSEYke was

sure, however.

that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's

family background.

NOSE:NO stated that the KGB was not

aware of any vices or vulnerabilities tha: zUJUs may have

had.

There was no recruitment and

no approach by the

KGB-•if there had veen,

even after NOSENKO left the U.S.

Embassy Section, his friend GRiAZNOV kould have told hin

about it.

Infernation from Other Sources

In connection with a security investigation at the U.S.

Embassy in Moscow.

ZUJUS prapared & statement in January 1963

which acknowledged his having had sexual relations wich only

опе копап іл Мосо,

an employee of the Finnish Embassy,

During a routino debriofing by U.S. Army authorities later in

1903, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations

with a girl who said sha was an Austilan.

The U.S. Embassy

Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that, zuJus

bad been intimate with an Austrian vonan, Lillian (last

name unknown), uho had gone to America louse wich sogeone

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 125

14-00000

212.

fron the United Arab Republic and had returneu alone a

few days later,

then

she wis picked

up by

ZUJUS.

Since

ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of america House

decided

to intervier the woran.

She told hin that she

was fron Vienna and nas travolling ili bit encloyer,

Czech.

The manager tien reported to dia security officer,

who Icarned froin

the susirian ambassy that no passport

had been issued to this woman.

The

security Citicer went

to America House, and asked Lillian

for her passport;

she replied that

she diad forgoiten it, and sie then left

saying she was going to ner lure: lur the passport.

Sho

never retuined

to America louse,*

The U.S. Arri

of

1ng

of IUJUS states

ZUJUS was interviewad by a Cli representative in

November 1955.

Asses whether le had ret in! intionals. of

Near Eastrin

countries while in Moscor, curls

razed

anong

others a person from Deirut wie had boch in Damascus or a

person

from Damascus who had been

beirut-he could sot

renonber which.

ZUIU'S sand that le had been acting as

coorman at Anerica licuse when this person entered,

and that

the two

"shot

the breeze" for

about la minutes.

l!JUs could

not recall

what they had calied about, but

their conver-

sätion apparently did not interest the visitor,

beezuse he

left after a short while and went to tie bar.

ZUjus may

have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could

supply lic additional inforsaiion.

not recall that

this person zare him

Lebanese voJk,

but did say he favored.

this beverase.

CUJUS said that he dou not know

this man's

name or why he was in Moscch, and he could provide no physical

description.

ZUJUS

said that,

as

manager

of the America club, he had

frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-tine agent named

by NOSENKO).

ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his

dealings with other soviet emplojees of America House and was

able to provide a considerable amount of background infor-

mation concerning her.

He repeated his carlier statements

that he had never been approached

or recruitca by Soviet Intel-

ligence.

FBI investigations indicate

See also NosENKo's account of the Not using one of two

East German wonen,

who represented trenselves as

Austrians, at America House in an operation against.

MORONE •

The genarr

---

## Page 126

Ur SLUnLi

213.

(88) ApPrOaCh tO KEYSERS

(a) Introduceion

U,S. Army Specialist Fifin Class Janes HEISERS began his

tour in Moscow on

20

lecember lyco

27

assistant to the

Erbassy Medical Officer,

Donald C; MARtin, an nir Force cap-

rain;

as an suditional duty he as assigned administrative

functions in the office of the dir doticho,

For

short per.

iod in early 1901 KEYSERS was rained

io perfore back-up

cryprographic duties under James

StOkSBEPG in the military

code room,

but he was relieved of this in daril 196! because

of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest,

Because of

his admitted

nomosexual iendencies, coupled with his attitude

and behavior, NEYSERS was removed from

loscow by his iverican

superiors in

june 1901.

The decision to tränsfer him was

made on 13 June, and

KEYSER?

tias

inforned of it the fol-

lowing

day; approximately

tho nours before leaving America

House

for

the airport on 16 June,

KEYSERS rcceived a letter

fron tho KGB suggesting that he jefect,

This was followed

by an approach lu him at the Moscci airport.

NOSENKO has clained that he was the 13B officer

spoke to KEYSERS

who

oicasion and has said that this

face-to-face contact with an American

arget during his 1900-1961 period of service in the b.s

mbasgy section (excepting the alleged brief encounter wiel

STORSBERG- - See above),

MOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and

ZUJUS cases, bur corrected this

error prior to defecting.

In most particulars NOSENKO s

of the case matches

the

details from KEYSERS and other sources:

NOSENKO stated (without indicating how

lichever, whereas

the KGB obtained

information) that the KGB knew

authorities of having

received

KRYSERS had not told American

the lettcr, KEYSERS did so

before leaving Moscow;

this conversation

iook place in an

Embassy r00m

NGB microprone was then located.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO flISt SpoKe

of the case, nichout naming

KEYSERS, on 12 June

"Non' i remember,

came to Mos-

the Eabassy®

to replace

the military cipher

clerk (STORSBERG] ,

le sensed at once ithat he was a homo.

sexuall.

Well, everything has thrown

I stayed with

this case constantly.

I didn't spend tire on anything olse.

We chased hin all over Moscow but were late.

lie tiere in an

operational car.

It happened like chis.

When there was

you couldn't get through,

Whether we went up the

or on the sidewalk where people were wallingo in

the opposite direction, no maizer.

Therefore de vero

18E80

1ase l1.e., could not catch hin ai anythingl.

Bur such

i Nichough KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume backoup

ssyprographic duties, he was nor STORSBERG's replace-

ZUJUS,

who arrived in September

1961, was.

KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as

a reclacement fos

Staff Sergeant J.C.

BRADLEY, Who had

earlier been soo

BUrRed frOn MOSCOW

for seasons of honosesuality.

TOM SPORET

---

## Page 127

214.

were not mistaken about this sellow.

He proved to

iie

soid himself, so to say.

The

American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived.

There sere

many such fellows (homosexuals) "ith it, and he has extremely

and was emoracing and kissing

a man.

The Americars also

And decidrà not to...

I thougit, what to do?

Let's

write him a letter, in real English,

on

an English typewriter.

We'll send this letter to his room.

knew that he das supposed

to leave today,

Ard he wrote it:

Lastar.

they know

about you,

You have seen : aight.

It will go very badly for you

back there.

Stay here.

We

are waiting for your

answer:'

as 1s customary,

You

had someone

accompary him.

The Assistant Military ittacre

escorted him.

I dor:' remember

who right row.

Perhaps it was NIXO!, NIELSON. & leutenart

color.el.

What was his nate?"

He arcorpanied him to Fin:and

ard then returned by piare, Well, chere has no answer from

him to this lettei.

had it was already the last nonent, and

suddenly--'Listen, they are taking you away. nait, trey know

who you are, what you are, it's

all over.

If that's che viay

it is, stay

here."

No anawer.

Whac to do?

lete's what happered:

We got into a cai.

They (KGB

surveillancel has reported that he

and the Assistant Military Attache had puiled ou: fron Kropotkin-

skaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the alrport to take the

plane.

so we put on all speed to get there tirst.

he got there

first, in order to have got to him.

No.

It WaS WILSON."

The

interview then continued:

NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied

KEYSERS to the airport. lie replied:

"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe.

He dian'e leave hin

for a moment at ine airport.

I am turning around here, walking

there.

There

I must separate them.

is coffes there and cognac. what about their

He didn't leave him.

so l saia

documents?

Make some pretext to separate them.'

They were

separated for tho mirutes.

I approached him

and said:

'Hello,

hello,

what acout the letter?

You think about it?'

He said

something to the Assistant Military ittache, that

-trey tried

to approach me.'

So he was in Moscow in all orly three or

four months. He gave himself away you see.

If this ice ballet

had not come we nould have worked on rim.

At the start we did

not know who he was or what he was: 1,e.. we kren that he came

to replace the military code cieck, on whom we had spent much

NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG

operation without naming KEYSERS.

After describing the recruitment approach to STORSBERG,

NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964:

Then his replacement

came. It was ZUJUS,** Wa began to study him carefully and

it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily

in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he

Inis officer's name is MASON.

See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February

1964 (below).

ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who

completed his Moscow tour in November: 1961, Five months

after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 128

TE

5949-

215.

vas a homosexual.

It appears. that theie was some visiting

ballet troupe in

which some of the nale nenbers were hozo.

sexuals.

Ho net them in the America House and his behavio.

towards them

was reported to the

Anerican Security Officer

and at the same time our agent had reported him

to us.

wanted to mount an oporation against hia but the duericans

had already decided to give him up.

All we could do las

to have a lotter delivered to him; the letter warned his

that he was being sent out because he was a homosexual

and that he would

get into consequent trouble,

and an oifer

was made to him to stay in the USSR.

He did

not answer

the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure.

He was escorted

to. the airport by two officers of the

Military Attache's office.

there

At the airport--I even went

with a group

of assistants

to see if we could get a

few words to him to change his mind.

lie left his group

for a nonent to get a drink of water.

When

I made this

offer to him that he would not regret it if he stajed,

that he woüld receive great benefits, he panicied and ran

back to his group and

shortly thereafter

he flew off.

he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been able

to get at him."

While reviewing a list of personnel assignes to the

American Embassy in

Moscow in 1963, NOSENiO said on 28

January 1964:

"Matther ZUJUS--how come?

That man can't

be in Moscow.

That's the homosexual code clerk !

told

you about, (the homosexual who was urgently sent pack o

the States with military guards.

How cone ne is back in

1963?

In August 1903?

ile couldn't be there.

It is

¡apossible"

He was asked whether he was sure of his

facts, and NOSENKO answered:

ryes.

this must be the

same man, but this must be an eror in your document.

He just cannot be in Moscoi."

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February

1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had

something important to

say.

The meeting with ClA opened

as follows:

"I was thinking last nigh: and I realized

that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so i

wanted to be sure to call it to your attention coday. Re-

member when I told you we were working on Jin StOrSBERG,

the code clerk, and

after

that a replacement cane for him?

And I said that

we wanted to get a hold of hin because he

was a homosexual?

It has not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS.

In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to

KEYSERS."

"I don't remenber having any face-to-face encounters

(with Americans)

except then KEYSERS was

leaving," NOSENKO

stated on 17 April 1964, "When he was being taken to the

airport we decided,

"Why not try, in case he's aione; why

not approach him and ask hin if he wants to stay?'

And Sure

enough he stood there with these two officers and then he

walked into the restaurant alone...

So I innediately ap-

proached him right there in the restaurant.

"I don't se-

nesber what his name was--i think it was Jis.) So I said"

•Jis, did you think about staying perhaps?

Because you

know

what will happen to you when you return.. Say, pleaso.'

He looked at me and turned around and without saying a word

he went into the walting roon and started tallang rapidly

vich the officers."

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 129

÷1

when questicror

2963,

HOSENKO

tie dib laiter

be cuid

Latt

10

thre

le trag depresid

Fica.

Matteised

atteng had ace revorted

al che marion frassy:

lastica 10

d.÷.

Tabassy.

in lerich price do t:s

üriciings,

16iSE

inidifetent in

thier

in :

scorg

ü1?

AsciaCi

Marina

Seitrii!

ün1 thie

Otiers

Ice capavis

trivio

tha.

aier rai.

sais

crilasci

His

200n al Marian touse

die.

indoti ies.

a:d his

Incluchin

duella ind

{OU>

C!:"

vi:?

?::

appronch

rebüiled.

Tontis of

ine

10.

ic denied

ii!

...:.':

nis

1322

caratte

pärtist

-2d610n9

"S!

26

- 8.

60.

TOr SECHET

---

## Page 130

fice and in

¡cre

subjec

she

cifise

has reporte:

chat

botli

HerE

Coinci

diniges!

[ou?501105.

being

renitored

on a

COSE

tajecus basis'in 1961:

his is'

not "in

accurate description of MiseNto who mas

enr.

old at

the

tine

several

inches taller, ani

Öt

---

## Page 131

Ai: t41a

vari

Statenert

aicrophones

---

## Page 132

219.

NOTE:

Part VI.D.2..

a tabulation of NOSiNiD's

leads involving imerican

cases, includes

several operations against U.s. cose

clerks for which he was the supervisor;

heir names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY,

Joseph GAFFSY, John ThYLOR,

and Maurice

ZIANG .

STEP 9500E

:

inners

---

## Page 133

OP

220.

d. NOSENKO's ReEponsibility for Coverage of AbIDIAN

(1) Introduction

John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer

in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately

the U.S. Enoissy

Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate.

During his Moscow tour. ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perfora a

number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter reilings

to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Urion and servicing a

dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of

communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOV-

SKIY.

During his 1962 meetings. with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN

on several occasions,

Identifying him as the Embassy Security

Officer and as a CIA officer.

In 1962 he described ABIDIAN'S

letter metling aettvittes, and he said he was himself concerned

(zanimat' bya) with ABIDIAN.

Aftes resontacting CiA in Geneva in

January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB case

officer rusponsible for coverage of AbIDIAN in Moscow; for the

first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIN to the

PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.

The discussion below is divided into three paris:

NOSENKO ' &

case officer responsibilities and the information he learned

about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO'& knowledge of clardestine letter mallings

by ABIDIAN, ard NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN änd the Pushkin

Street dead drop.

(11) Duties as Case Officer

On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from

the Hourist Department to the American Department in January

1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was inter-

viewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and

V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of

the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told

that

as one of his duties he

would be the case officer in charge

of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near

future.

NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for cover-

age of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSEliKO said, ABIDIAN

was the only American target for whom he, personally, was offi-

cially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for

six days in January and February 1965.

He produced the infor-

mation in the following paragraphs at that time.

When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section,

ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow.

The section, however,

already had received some information

on him, and this was given

to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN'& VISA

One type was early-warning information, the other notifi-

cation of his forthcoming absence from Moscow.

as of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in

Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the

British businessman. Greville WittE.

1a discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.•

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 134

14-00000.

тEY:

"SEG""

221;

application, the negative results of checis of KGB Headquarters

files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the

First Chief Directorate.

iscording to this report, based on

correspordence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United

States, ABIDIAN had served as a Departmen: of State Security

Officer concerred with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV

when he visited the United States in 1959:

from the way ABIDIA

had acted at that time, the Legal Residences concluded he has an

intelligence officer, probably with CIA."

NOSENKO remarked that

the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the

known

CIA officer Russell LAVCELLE as Security Officer, made

ABIDIAN One

of the most important counterirtelligence targets

of the U.S. Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second

Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later

assigned him the cryptonym "'ARSEN,

"since this cryptonym had been

used by personnel of the Sevench (Surveillance) Directorate,

KGB Second Chief Directorate, Who were working against him,

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about

the life and career of

ABIDIAN.

He visited the Chief of the

American Department of the KCB First Chier Directorate, but this

unit had no information in acdition to that already included in

the original information report.

NOSENKO requested that the KGB

Legal Residencies

in the United

States be asked for further de-

tails;

but they were never received.

For these reasons, NOSENKO

said that he did not know and never

obtained details about ABID-

IAN's education and study abroad: date of entry into the Depart-

ment of State, promotions, personal rank. previous foreign assign-

ments, military service.

or Status as Foreign Service Reserve,

Staïf

or Officer (FSR. FSS, FSO),**

records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50

and then secured employment with the Department of State as

a clerk/typist.

He remained in Paris until 1954, After spe-

cial training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird

Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving

for Moscow in 1960

as a special

agent in the State Depart-

ment's office of Security.

A iarge part of his work in this

period was arranging the security of

and accompanying foreign

dignitaries visiting the United States.

These included the

visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956,

MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of

1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact

with a large number of KGB offisers stationed in New York and

Washington.

One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage

was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S.

Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became

NOSENKO's subordinate in operations against American code

clerks.

**NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, ESS,

and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department

of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN'S:

background, he replied that this publication is not available

in: the U.S. Embassy Section. ' He subsequently recalled that

the Chief. of the Section; KOVSHUK, did have a copy dated:

about 1956, which was of no use in gathering information on

ABIDIAN.

MD 0

---

## Page 135

14-00200

FU OLÜ-165

222.

Because: ABIDIAN was considered to be a CiA officer. he was

made

a. "special target" of surveillarce iron the date of his

arrival..

He was always under 24-hour surveiliance by it icast

two and ofter three KGB teams.

so that at any hour a team was

available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy.

Tre only

time this intensity of covirage might have beer. Irduced, NOSENKO

said, was during a perioù of about one and one-hale months in

1961, wren surveillance of the inbossy was gererally reduced in

order to allow increased coverage of tritish targets.*

As the

responsibie case officer, HuSENkO directod the surveillarce of

ABIDIAN ard evaluated the operationai

possibilities offered by

pertirent information

in the surveillaree reports.

Prior to ABIDIAN'S

arrival in Moscor, the decision was reach-

ed not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or

provocateurs unless he first demonstrated sons personal vulner-

NCSENKO stated,

It was considured better to corcentrate

on surveillarce coverage ir. the hope that, as LANGELLE's succes-

sor, he might lead to another Popey, Therefere, ne-operational

plan was written on ABIDIAN until about Uctober 1960.

This plan,

which NOSENKO wrote, callca for nu direct action but did specify

- ABIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FELOROVICi, an operational

contact of the U.s.

Embassy Section, was to continue to

apply metka to ABIDiAN's clothira and NEFTUNE-80 to his

shoes.***

(She put metka on AbIDliv's clothing approxi-

mately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time

she was

employed by AFIDIAN.!

The only item of operational in-

terest from her during this period was evidence that

ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female em-.

ployee at the erbassy.

FEDROVILI waS linable to find

personal mail or personal papers in ARIDINI's apartment.

& KOSOlAPOV's agent, was to try to

cultivate

and report whatever he learned corcerr-

ing him.

never obtained significant information

On ABIDIAN'S

sonal life.

ARIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was

developing lar

remas an informant on American personnel

at the Embassy. Dut NOSENKO did not recall any specific

report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest

to the U.S: Embassy Section.

NOSENKO tola CIA in 1952

In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of

British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.

**

The. POPOV case,

is discussed in Part VI.D,7.a.

***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described

by NOSENKO.

The former. a "thief powder" applied to

clothing, leaves a trace. on anything with which it comes

Into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter

mailings is described in greater detail below.

NEPTUNE-80,

a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on

the ground wherever he walks and permits

the KGB to carry

out surveillance long after the target has travelled a

particular route.:.

Dogs are used to follow the target's

tralle

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 136

14:00000

1349 90.576

:223.

thas Ableir hod recrusted

•for an isrecisis

intelligener mission 1r

Pratit

snortly before shin

left

the Sorrue Union In Deceaber

1960 and that the Keg's. U.s.

Embassy seciion toerslifon

quind the cose over to the KGB

First Chrei Directurüld.*

Tao Inbuscy chauffeus "ere to apply tipiNe-80 to

the floorcoaras und foot

Mials Of ABIDINi's car if neces-

sary.

- All other agents and oparatical contacts of ite

section wore to be instrucied to report every detail about

ABIDIAN see belon.

surveillance toure dore to le instructed to check all

PisCES there ARIDIA might se mailing lette.

- Ecverage o AbIDlAVe mall ids to is continued.

Apart fron those sporjiico ly the operatorai plan, the oniy

two jOb agerts or opucational contada: win met ailDidi vere Lyud-

mila Grovokot and "KaNo" licb cryptough, ramp no: remenuered by

NOSENKO!,

CROMOKOVA, a latguage instructor for j.s. Embassy per-

sonicl, was a KGS agent hardled by the o.g.

Fabas:y Sortior. o151-

cer !i.A. GAVRILEIKO

ABIDIZ tOOK

"only several" Russian language

lessons frOM CRONOKOVA and NOSENKO did not krod wrother these were

privete or class lessons.

is did not loarn arthirg of operation-

al significance fron GROsUkOln's contacts with ABIbizi, and there

was no regular reporting irom her.""

"KiND" was ar agent of the

MoScow CitY KOB organization who accidentally net ASIDIAN at the

claimed he concoated this story

for the KgB in order to

extricate hinself when

the keS attempted to recruit him shortly

before his departure fron Moscow.

** NOSENKO first identified GROVCKOVA as a KGB agert when viewing

Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1954.

The list on wrich

her name

appeared irdicated she was a Russian language teacher.

and NOSENKO

said she

was handled by &.d,

GAVRILENKO during 1960

and 1951.

NOSENKO WaS

later shown Groyckuva's photograph and

failed to recognize it; wnen told her name, however, he again

said she way GAVRILEYKO'S agent and that she was valuable be-

cause she haa a good education and was able to provide per-

sorality sketches or her students. He did not associate her

with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in Febru-

ary 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students.

NOSENKO

then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDiA.

reported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKOVA,

normally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning shortly.

after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure.

The first few lessons were with a group of

other Embassy per-

* sonnel,

and then ABIDIAV switched to priväte lessons for the

remainder of his tour in the soviet Union:

In reporting his

contacts with GROMUKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawn

into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian

language conversation but kept the topic limited to his past

personal life, travel, education.

his fiancee, ard his trips

.an which he saw his fiancee.

AbIDIAN also reported that on

23 June 1960 GROMONOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a

letter to departing personnel officer MarY GORINHA fOI for-

warding to Jean: LIEBERMAN, a former, student.

when ABIDIAN

refused, saying that this is against

Soviet

LaW, GROMOKOVA

tore up the letter.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 137

14-00000

224.

Baku Restaurari.

When informed that ABIDIAi gave "KAYO" his

telephone rumier, NOSENKO recommended that 'KAyo" try to develop

a relationship with ABiDIAN.

After arguing that this was agairst

tha policy of isking no aggressive or provocative

actior against

ABIDIA, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phored

ABIDIt twice on KGB Instructions.

ABIDIAN, however, refused to

meet rim, and no further action was taken.*

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in

the Embassy or on what floor it was located,. but said that he

could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of

the Envassy telephore list published

monthly with the office roem

rumber of each American employee.

ABIDIAN'S

office was in the

of Security" fa.e.,

secure office areas.

A report from

some agent, wrose name NOSENKO did not recail, irdicated that

there nas a sion on ABIDIAn's office door which said

NOSE:KO did not kron erd

said he was unable to deter-

mine whether Asidiail had a secretary:.

to dictation or conversa-

was heard from AbIuIm's office because no kGB microphore

and HOSENKO said that he did not remenber any specific

important information about AbIDIA from other

microphones in the Embassy.**

NOSENKO did

not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in

the Embassy building:

nor how it was furnished,

He said that

he did not consider data of this nature to be operationally

significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was

under active development,

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times

stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries

of year when the trips were madett such

formation, he stated, would have beer of

interest to him as

ABIDIN's case officer since, like iNGELLE 5 earlier trips

abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed

to be for operational pur-

There was, however, no possibility for the kGs to find

out where ABIDIAN

had gone;**** even if the U,S, Embassy Section

did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done

See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involv-

ing a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.

** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a

room where an in-

operative microphone was discovered in 1954.

#*#ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years

ir. Moscow.

in August 1960 he took personal leave to visit

his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met

with a CIA officer while there.

In February 1961 he flew on

the Ambassador 's

plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and

then took personal leave to visit his fiancee.

In Septenber

1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to

New York City and Washington for briefings connected with

the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.

perhen CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have

photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return

to Mascow,

NOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not

photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the

While this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO

added, it was not considered

so important as to justify the

spacial effort involved.

= 13

---

## Page 138

- 4-01000,

29.45T99t585-9949-7

'225.

about it because the foreign legal Residencies of the KgB First

Chief Directorate would not accept a rejuest for operational

action against an merican diplomat coming fron Moscow.

In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times

whether he knew of ary occasions on which ha:plil took trips in

the Soviet Urion outside of Moscow.

He replied each time that he

knew of no such trips and that if

ABIDIAN had made such a trip or

trips he would have known of them and would remember then as it

would have beer his responsibility as case officer to take cer-

tain actions.

- Receivirg notification of ABIDIAl's request to travel

from the UPDi (the Soviet Government organization which pro-

vides services to tre alplomatic cormurity in Moscow).

- Notifying the UPDK Of KGB approval for the trip.

-notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN'S

itirerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and

other operational activity if desired.

- Recelving. reading, and filing all surveillance

reports

and lepolis

of

other operational activity carried

out by locak iGb units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps.

He stated

further that even if he were absent when such

a request for travel

was made, he would have seen all docunents upor. his return and

that he did not retember seeing such cocuments in ABIDIAN's file.

NOSENVO's interrogators then cola NOSENKO that ABIDIAN

travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1950.*

Thereupon

NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave

in October 1950.

He said that he could not resall exactly the

dates of this leave (which he had rot mentioned before!, but he

did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at

a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel

time.

NOSENKO said further that he also remenioered that he had

ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publi-

cations Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 Octo-

(ABIDIAN is of Armeniar origin, and speaks the

Armenian

language with a high degree of proficiency.) while

there ASIDIAN visited with various churchren and their

parishioners ard an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece

in 1946.

They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating

the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I.

and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near

the city of Yerevan. After returning to moscow, an Armenian.

whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN

at the Embassy: but ABIDIAN refused to see him.

When NOS-

ENKO was told

that on 7 October 1960 ASIDIAN attended a ser-

vice celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Kato-

likos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN. had gone to

Echmiadzin and

that an agent had reported a contact with him

there.

This agent, NUSENKO recalled, was a priest of a monk.

and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIANg

the agent had no further contact with him...

NOSENKO said

that this was his sole recollection concerning. ABIDIAN'S.

trlp, and that he remembered no other details.

---

## Page 139

14-00000

êZE.

left the sovier union for cuss ino or three, b'it nos more

than

five,

days after his return f:em leave; he could not recall

the date of his departure for cuba

Except for the misscar roman with whom AlIDIAN was thought

to have beer intimato. NOSEtitio coula not rame rEIDIAN's close

i loser an one.

american friends in Moscow or ils close friends and professional

contacts with foreloners there.

NOSENHO received ard rezá transcripts of all telephone calls

That MBIDIdi majo or receives at his office and ¿partment via the

Moscon city telephore system.

He did rot remenser the names or

nationalities of peopie wrom AcIDIAN called or who called ABiDIAN.

because there ras rothing of arterest in these corversations.

NOSENKO did not lain anything fion telephone trenscripts about

ABIDIA'S rElatIOnShID ich any foreigner in rescon.

* NOSENKO departed Moscow for nuba on 15 Novemoer 1950 and

therefore,

by his owr

statement,

would have been back from

leave by 10 lovenber at tre earliest (five days detore

departurel.

It uas pointed out to NOSENKO that. in this

case, his 30 days of leave could have begur: no earlier than

10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty

on

5 October 1950 when ABIDIAY left Moscow. In October 1966.

however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in

interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February

1965 when he said he had

taken this leave.

had no reaso. for this lie other than he had claimed to

be on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies and

truths were all a porridge,

He told CIA.

first time. that his 1960

leave was taken in January of

immediately after joining the U,S, Embassy

Section.

that year additional details on this January leave period

are given below, In discussion of NOSENKO's claimed

responsibility for operations against U.s. mlitary

attaches in 1960.

12 82:

---

## Page 140

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227.

sii) ABIDIZi'S Letter fallings

During the 1952 meetinus in Corera, MOSailo reported K03

knodledge of one type of operalional tast. per

2 by ABiDir

in Moscod in addition to his recruitmort of docta

(see above) .

This task, NoSaiko said, irvolved mailing at least three clan-

destine letters, in each case to dos double ajents.

According to NoSENto an 11 june 1962, tre KGB detected all

the

letters mailed by riDidi; he said that this nas ashieved

through the use of tetie:

"Stop mailing letters from the Enzassy,

by Embassy employees.

After INGELLE you didn't mail letters

sever year and a half, dra troye begin again.

¿BiDiti mailed

ABIDIL, JOhn ABIDIAG

the Embasay

Security Officer.

Lister, we have this coid dice. complote courage of clandestine

malliage/.

have & machine,

ar.

the machine tiros the letters

which

mailer.

introit suricillance.

Tro machine ilself.

This 1s a big, big secret.

Here's how it works.

They chter

your room - you live in cogcor, nock and noon live in the Em-

bassy.

They Loviet maids/ clean is the rost and simply pour

a ponder or apply it tach a reg lio your ciochesi.

A rag,

even

like a handkerchies

Treid

is no sTell.

They put it in

* ne

pockets where you micht put

alerter.

And there

IS

a special

little machine at a

statior in roscod...

il1 Letterg which are

mailed in moscow pass through this machine, under a fotpapparat

Literally a canera; NOSEKO probably means some sort of light-

sensitive device/.

He son have la ¿machines/ and hope to have

100 in Moscow.

ind all the

letters pass through the apparatus

end the machine itself selects

the letter which nas mailed by

you or him.

Do you undrrstard?

The machine itself finds it...

This is how it was with the jetters that ¿bible mailed.

We had

then all because this machine

gave thom Lio us/.

I even would

phore surveillance and say:

'tie's

out

ralking around.

ABIDIAN

is sui walking around, checking, enecking,'"

I would say: 'Drop

him.

sut give me all the letters today.

The rachine deter-

Ties whether there is a special letter there."

Three days later.

at NOSENKO's fiftt. ard final meeting

with.

Cià in 1962,

was jered whotrer he inar to vitom these

letters dere addressed. NOSENKO replied:

"Iu inca diá ABIDIA'i

mail letters?

First he railed a latter to a guy ir Odessa.

Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still someche else.

or three letters.

One letter vas to the Baltic ared.

same Kind, that is ie nas plantes this rai on vou.

it was to Riga, to our couble agent.

W0 Stil

• I think,

two or three other letters, also to double agents.** But we

* NOSEiKO's information is substantially correct.

was declared persona ron grata

connection witt the arrest

of CIn agent FOFOV in October 1959.

Tro letters vere mailed,

one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960

lone of which was to an agent now known to have been under

KGe control at the time): no more letters were mailed until

8 April 1961, when John

ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-

controlled agent.

LANCELLE'S arrest.

however, was not the

cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension se-

sulted from other considerations.

EIR 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA,

one to an agent in starson 1 April.

the second to an

agent in manson 2 July, and the third to a de.

agent on l September.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 141

186039120

228.

didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed:

There weren't any.

1 was comerati with ABIDIr: therefore

know.

I can't tell you anythirg acout the agent in the Baltic

area

because he was handied by

tre Secord Section of the Am-

erican Departineri:

tt.e

Active lare - penetration."*

NOSETKO has described in grecter detail hod ABIDIAY was

detected mailing the

letter to Caessa

ihile discussing per-

sonnel assigned to the emerican Department of the Second Chief

Directorate,

he

said

on

24 Jure 1964:

"I first saw Aleksey

Konstantinovich

SUMIN in the Secord Section in 1960, although I

heard

that re was there in 1959...

He 1s considered a specialist

on working against letters contulring seiret wrlting...

SUMIN

sees all the letters malled by Americans. even

the American

tourists.

The lerters are caughr alther by surveillance or by

use of metka.

There are several types of metka. with different

colors.

and one type i111

be used on imelican Embassy personnel.

another type on British Encassy persorrel

and another type.

fOr

tourists.

**** The same type is no: always used against the same

group.

They are swir.lied around

Ar. example 1s in 1961 when

ABIDIL mailed a letter to ar agini la Odessa.

This was a

'game Ligra - double ager operaitor.

HANGELSKIY

LiGh crypionya/ I think.

The agent was 'Ark-

¡sislal used to park his

car ard walk around,

visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street.

He

went to one commission shop stere

there was a large mirror in

the shop window. and he would check io=

surveiliance,

'He was

even followed to a post utiise

ard cre of the surveillance

mer got in thele ahead of tin, but he didn't do anything.

Then

NOSENKO has explained that the so-called'Active Line" Section

of the Ameriran Department was

concerned wich the penetra-

tion of U,S: intelligence, primarily by serving up KGE-

controlled agents fol recruitmert.

***CIA has conduited a series of tests designed to determine

whether a substanie such as metka was being used as a KGB

control device

For the purpose of these tests, articles

of clothing worn by renters of che l.S.. Embassy

and those

of other selected ilestern embassies were sent back to CIA

Headquarters.

The clothing

each case had been sent to

Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted

to hang unattended in unrestricted area's of the Embassy or

in the apartments of Embassy

employees

Special filter

paper was applied to these articles of clothing.

The same

paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers.

and the like.

The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet,

chemical, and microscopi: analysis as well as to examination

for traces of radioactivity.'. Results have been consistently

negative with a single ex-eption,

Orie test, on one item of

clothing, produced a sharpiy positive reaction..

This article

of clothing belor.ged to a chiid natioral diplomat who was a

CIA operational support agert in Moscow; he was aiso the

only persar known to CIA to have been a victim of radio-

active isotope tagging in correction with an operational

task (not letter-mailing) which he had performed for CIA.

There were no positive reactiors for this agent's clothing

in subsequent

tests.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 142

4p00do cit

229,

he walked by a post box on the street and was checking it.

TWO

or. thiee times he was followed by this post tox. but the sir-

veillance never saw him maul a latte..

jelli.

The KGB wou!d

rEnove

the contents

of ine letter box and serd it in.

On the

second or third time

Fusin tourd the lerter he mailed with

metka:

He had also ralled a cover letter to his parents.

of

course, SUMIN also knew the addiess of the agent. since it was

'game'.

Under

interrogation ir january 1965 NOSENKO described now

had been applied

To ADi's clotherg sy his maid and how.

in particula:

this 1e0

corte discotery of the letters ABiDIAN

malleà to the agent

ARFHANGELSKIY

in diessa and to his parents

1n the United steies

Ire folloring 1s taken from the protocol

of these interrogations

whain dOseste signed as being accurate.

on 4 March 1905:

"ABIDIAN 5 mard In MoscoN was tatyara FEDOROVICH.

she-wae-aroperatoral_coniac repoilag to ARTEMOV.

She.

started to wor 101 abidin, a fin ronths after his arrival,

peihaps three months but no longer than six monchs after

his arrival.

I met her

shortly

after

she began to work

fOr ABIDIAN in order to see acguairred

with

her, in order

to evaluate her and give her general instructions about

her work for ABIDIAN,

i do not kron the exact date of

this meeting but li was before

I wrote

the operational pian on MIdlat in cuca October 1960.

At this time FEDOPOVICH was aiready working for ABIdI.

This operationai plan stated that

FaDoRovIC: would con-

tinue to put malka regularly on acidials cloching.

"FeDorovIr put metha on AbIDiA:s clothing during

the entire period time

she worked for him.

She did this

Every two o: thise weiks except for a fer times when she

was sick or on leâve

else had access to abIdIaN's

apartment and therefore no otter perser. had the possi-

bility of putting metka on his clothing.

"I have said that ABIDIAN marled an operational

letter to the Kol aouble agent 'ARKSANGELSKIY,

mailed it at the mailbox on Iverskaya Yanskaya where he

had gone several

chines earlier.

Survelliance did not

see ABIDIAN mail the ierter but the mailbox was cor.-:

trolled and the letter to

ARKHANGELSKIY was found,

alorg with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these

letters had metka on them. as I was toid by SUMIN.

cannot renember the date

that ABIDIAN marled this letter

except that it was sometime in 1961.'*

In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a

photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for

Marion ALEAMONTE and Myra KEMMER: Embassy secretaries, until

KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961,

There-

after FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-

time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at

all for the "first year ou so"

"of his Moscow. tour and that

PEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there, when

ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy

*TOP SECRET

---

## Page 143

230.

(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E. 3.C.i.).

CIA records

show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his

clardestine

letters

or. 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to

"ARKHANGELSKIY".

on 2 July 1961.

IE MEIDIAN'S

recollec-

tion is correct la review of Embassy phone lisis shows that

KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in

August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could

nOt

have been responsible for the metka which, NOSE KO said,

led to discovery of the first

of

these letters; algo,

it

is possible that she was not employed by ABIDiAl at the time

the letter to "ARKHINGEISKIY" was mailed.

ABIDIAN's third

clandestine letter was mailed on 1 Septerber 1961, appai-

ently

after FEDOROVICH came to work for him.

when NOSENKO

was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVIa. could not have

been applying metre lugularly to sIDin's clothing at the

time of the

"ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated

that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing

30 and that he was sure she had. When his interiogators

suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned

ASIDIAN'S apartment on an informal basis before being

formerly hired as his maid. NOSENKO sold that this was

possibly the case.

iciA does not know whether this was

so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression

in Decemier 1964 that he did his own housekeeping untid

hiring FEDOROVICH.?

TOP SEGRET

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## Page 144

TOP SECRET

331.

ABIDIAN'S Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the firse time that KGB sur-

weillarce had observed a visit by iBIDIAN to a probable dead

drop on Pushkin Street in Moscor a= the erd of 1960. This dead

drop figured prominently in the PErKOVSKIY case.

NOSENKO's first remarks on this subjece were made on 20 April

1964:

"I left Lthe U.S. Embassy Section/ ir 1962.

There was an

interesting move.

This address where JACOES" was caught in the

PENKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in

1960, or at the beginning of 1961.

And at that time I went there

together with LV. AL KOZLOY, the Chier of the Surveillance

Directorate.

LM. G./ MAIVEYEV LDeputy cries of the merican

Department/ also went there with us.

We went to that address

several times, at Pushkin Street.

it was very interesting, this

radiator and

everything,

but the

orly thing we did there was to

place an obsorvation post there.

and that pont was there for

about three morths

after

That was in 1960,

196%...

They watched for three morths.

AHIDIAN'S visit ne surveillance teans

had tu.

be occupied there for 24 hoirs every day.

I was there

then Lin the U.s. Embassy Section for the ertire time that sur-

veillance was watching the Pushkin Street site/...

At the be-

ginning I came there two or three times.

I came there with

MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSllUk; "e came there with Venyanin

KOZLOV...

But no one appeared here and so they were not writing

anything meaning that the Surveillance Directorate was not sub-

mitting written reports/.

No one appeared.

That's why,

only

orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.'

" week passed - 'nothing,'

the next week passed

'nothing'... I shall tell you why ¿i

didn't mention this to you in June 1962/. Because I had

occasiong where there were many such places, and they were

wetched for nothing.

And it would just pass away and in a

month it would be forgotten..•

So we waited a month, two,

three.

Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten.

Of course, the surveillance team had it all recorded. but we

had forgotten about that in the First LAmerican/ Department...

In 1962, I was in the Seventh /Tourist/ Department.

I trans-

ferred in January 1962."

On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during

April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965

on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street.

The following, which is

consistent with and somewhat more detailed than earlier state-

ments not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interroga-

tions:

- In 1951, while NOSENKO das the responsible case

officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from

the U.S.

embassy

to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow.

A stationary

surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN

leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the

Embassy in a chauffeured autonobile.. rather than in the

car he normally used.

The surveillance team assigned

specIfIcally to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to

& bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servic

ing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962.

---

## Page 145

-57

%.

J

=32

shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone.

He walked arourd

the corner and

entered a residential building next to a

meat market on Pushkin Street.

ABIDIAN emerged after a

few seconds.

The surveillarge team saw him go in but did

not follow him.

This unusual incident was reported by

the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)

Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day

by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance

Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the

American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,

MATVEYEV.

Taking into account the character of the building

and its

inhabitarts, the duration and circumstances of

ABIDIAN'S

visit.

and the suitability of the hallway -

particularly the radiator in it - for use as a dead

drop

site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief

Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a station-

ary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover

this location. Because of the short time available, It was

not possible to place this post inside the building.

so it

was set up across the street,

In addition, the raciator.

was checked daily to see if anything, such as a macnetic

container, had been concealed behind it.

This stationary

post was maintained

around the clock for 30 days,

after

which it was

maintained from 0800 until midnight for another

two months.

If a package or magnetic container had been

found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,

it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger

a signal should someone remoye the package.

At the sane

time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed

on the landing

of the staircase in this building, out of:

sight from the

hallway below.

During the three months

that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed

behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen

entering or leaving

the building.

The post was then dis-

continued, but the

address was placeá on a list of sus-

picious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Direc-

torate.

The true significance of this location became

known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOV-

SKIY in 1962.

- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the sus-

pected dead drop

the day it occurred.. He was

sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone

call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although

NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVShUK was Chief

of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the

stationary surveillance post on this location was made at

a higher level: neither of them was involved in it or in

the later decision to discontinue the post.

self visited the building on Pushkin Street the following

day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes

and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that

there was a radiator there:

- As ABIDIAN 's

case officer, NOSENKO recalled re-

ceiving the surveillance report of his visit to the

Pushkin Street building and placing this report in

ABIDIAN 's file.

(This is the case file which NOSENKO

TOP SECRET

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## Page 146

1400000.

B S25H21

1242

233.

turned over to his successor, CRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December

1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)

- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results

of the stationary surveillance post.

but he did discuss

this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during

the first month of surveillance, periodically after that.

These discussions took place either by telephone.

or when

KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO

visited #OZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters.

FrOM KOZLOV

or perhaps someone

else, NOSENKO learned that the post hed

been discontinued after 90 days.

Un the basis of these

conversations with KOZLOV, NUSENKO knew that nothing of

interest occurred during the period of the stationary sur-

veillance.

- NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section during all

the period that the stationary surveillance-post was watch-

ing the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard

from KozLow that the post had been replaced by periodic

inspections.

- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance

on the Pushkin Street dead

drop site to his CIA contacts

in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been

discontinued by this time without anything unusual or sus-

picious having been noted.

Therefore he thought that this

incident would not be particu arly interesting to the CIA.

CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street

dead

drop site only

once.

on 30 December 1961, a year later than

NOSENKO sayS,

in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY.

The sequence of events was as follows:

On 27 December 1961,

following reccipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal

from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded.

Air Force Captain

Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to

alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN

left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence

where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station,

Paul GARBLER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso

House with the other guests at akout 0200 on 28 December in

ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part

of his "drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark.

Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own

car drove from the Embassy to DAVIDSON's apartment, where he

first checked the telephone pole visually from the window and

then walked by it for a closer examination.

Although it was

not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December

had, in fact, been a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no

supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision

was reached to check the drop.

Therefore, at 1115

on 30 Decem-

ber 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Enbassy Economics

Officer.

left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet

driver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin

Street.

At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop

site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and

left one minute later..

The pair then returned to the Embassy.

These facts were outlined to NOSENKO during the February

1965 interrogations.

It was pointed out.

that. by his own most

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. 234.

recent account; NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. Embassy

Section to the Tourist Department about 28 Decenber 1961 and

that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to

American citizen Wi. E: JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been con-

firmed by JOHNSON himself.

Therefore. NOSEiKO was told, much

of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin

Street affair became untenable.

NOSENKO'S IESpONSE tO this

observation is described

in Part V.F. 3., Which discusses

NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.

Also during the February 1965 interrogationg NOSENKO refused

to sign the page

of a protocol which read as follows:

"I have teen

told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's

only visit to the Pushkin

street site took place on 30 DEC-

ember 1961.

Therefore, I was told that:

a.

I could not have placed the surveiilance

report in ABIDIAN's case file because I had already

turned over the file to GRYAZiOV.

b. I could not have received

reports about the

stationary surveillance unile still ABIDIAN's case

officer,

since I was already in the Seventh Depart-

ment in January 1962.

c.

The three month period in which the sur-

veillance post was watching

the Pushkin Street

site

did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more then two

weeks after I left for Geneva.

Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveil

lance of the dead drop site had failed to produce results

or that it had been discontinued."

Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involve-

ment with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said

the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look sillj."

On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols

dealing with other subjects.

NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concern-

ing ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO -eaffirmed that

ABIDIAN was under special survellance coverage throughout his

Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from

the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date this

only as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB sur-

veillance had detected any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during

the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop

site la reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961

as described above).

He replied that he knew definitely that

gurveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that

ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB gurveillance at

any time during this period.

On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion,

at the time he did.

In re-

sponse, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 an

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## Page 148

235.

American tourist or delegation member had gone to the pushkin

Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief

Directorate" that this Anerican had selectea it as a dead drop

site, * It was thought that ABIDIAN. went there merely to check

the suitability of the proposed site.

he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited

the Pushkin Street address

several days after ABIDIAN had been

as he had earlier said.

NOSENKO replied: "I don't

I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop.

don't remember now whether I visited it or not.

It seems to me

that I visited it, but I don't remember.

It seems that I visited

It with KOZIOV, but I cannot say 'yes,'

and I cannot say 'no.""

As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day

ARIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December

1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV,

inspected the Pushkin Street buildsthe United States from.

The FBI had reported

however. that Kozlov was on

25 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December

1351, travelling via France.

The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to

Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern

Standard).

time, would appear to precluce the possibility of KOZLoV's having

gore to the dead drop site

on the day NosaNKo said he did.

the pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOV-

SKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initi-

ally contacted CIA. The only known visits by Americans to

this address and the only ones connected with its use as a

dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December

1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address

from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY

returned and entered the building to check the precise

dead drop location.

See Part V.E.3.f.. for a discussion

Of ROSENKO's knowledge of MaHoNEY.

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236.

SuperVisor of Activities. Against Anerican Service Attacheg

At the beginning of the interrogation sessioa on 29

January 1965, HOSENKO las asxed to list the duties he as-

Bused lipon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in Jan-

UarY 1960.

As he had on a nunber of earlier occasions,

NOSENKO replied that he was giver. responsibility for the

supervision of code clerk operations, was nade the KGB

case officat for American Security Jifices John ABIDIAN

who has to arrive in the near suture,

and was charged

with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of

the U.S. Enbassy and his section's file on the materials

fron microphones in various

Erbassy officed.

Later in

this same sesgion NOSENKO recailed--and soid CIA for the

first time--that he was also given

the duty of supervising

activities against officers assigned to the U.S.. Army,

Navy, and Air Force Attache offices:

The pertinent

portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogatic was as fol-

lOwg8

Quéstion:

NOSENKO S

Questions

NOSENKO &

Who brieted you of gave you instrustions or.

what was expected of you in the Section?

I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.

Wnat dia KLYPI!! say?

That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I

consider that you must also pay special atten-

tion to code clerks.

We must study then and

make an approach

to

one of then.

It's necessary

to work on

trols."

KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN's

office and I remember also that he raised the

questions

He will supervie

this kind

guestion!

yes and dic not say no.

I couldn't say arything

because I had not begun, I dids't know how much

I couldn't say.

nosk this would involve let's try it a short

had,

you see, KLYPIN

period of tine, said:

It was that way.

It was

decided that I will supervise the code clerks

and then the three attaches.

And kovsHtK took

the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But,

of course, in the absence of KOVSUK I aust

take everything and in my absence, ROVSauk

must take everything, But later, 1,2,3 - 1

don't remember dates • later I was not supei

vising the military attaches but concentrated

only on code clerks.

Later you vere not supervising nilitary attaches,

but only code clerks?

ROSENKO &

questions

JOSENLO&

Yes.

What do you mean you were supervising military

attaches?

What coss it mean? If the case officers if the

thire attaches. have any quastions. or any papers

to report to the Chief of Section, they go to

ding, dis steera. a

itside:*

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## Page 150

237%.

Questiuns

To,

not to KOVSHUk. They were deciding all

questions with me.

This is what supervising

the work on thase three attaches means.

were deciding all questions with me.

They

ample, the case officers who were

working

againgt diplomats -= KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDSAYIN,

HERSPANOV - they were Ieporting any questions

aDy papers!

to KOVSHUK.

You see, there was

such a division (of labor).

Am I correct that by military attaches you

mean Army, Havy, and Air Force?

NOSENKO &

Yes.

Questions Aütaches and their assistants?

NOSENKO, YeS, YeS, Yes:

Questions Ard enlisted personnel?

--_-

NOSENKO:

DEIKIN was handling enlisted persorel, and he

was also coring in to

me for advice.

Questione

Roughly how long did you have the responsibil-

ities for the attaches?

NOSENKO &

(paure) I don't remember.

Several ronths.

Question! By several, you meas...?

NOSENKO,

Five or six.

Question!

And why was this responsibility removed fron

you?

NOSENKO &

I didn't have time. No time. No time.

You see,

besides this, which is simple to explain, there

were too many other questions which...

Question!

What occupied most of your time?

NOSENKO:

Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of

Department to study and develop this question,

then this question, then this question.

nonething to prepare for ERIBANOi, then omen

thing to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report,

then something to prepare for uyself...

question

To which of the najor responsibilities

mentioned aid you devote the nost time, You have

NOSENKO&

I don't know.

question. What was most important?

NOSENKO&

They were all important.

questioni

Car you tell ne where you were spending nost of

you; time to cause the renoval of your respon-.

sibillty for military attaches?

TUP SECNET

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## Page 151

184 19051F

238.

HOSENKO:

questions

No. I can't tell you.

Who was given the respensibility for military

attaches?:

NOSENKOS

Just a noment.

Ithirk be was...

I don't re-

member hoi,

of what date, when there appeared in

the First (Aparican) Department a Deputy Chief

of Departient.

It was either before I came,

of it was in January, or it was a littie bit

later.

Questions

Who was this?

NOSENKO &

ALESHIN.* And his joi was such -- it was a

new one supervision of work against military

intelligence officers,

act only Americans, but

of other departments ziso, the first, the

second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth.

CO-

ordination of the whole vork against all military

intelligence officers.

And that's why, later,

KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said.

"field, sty are you

supervising this?

Let MESHIN do it.

You zIe

the Depaty of the Chief."

It was not only be-

cause of the lack of tire.

Also it wasn't con-

venient to the case offices.

They were re-

porting to me.

Then ALISHIN

would invite than

in

and they would hava to report tie gama thing

to him.

questions

NOSENKO &

Who were you supervising?

••GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and

assistants; KURILENKO dad the Army' Attache and

assistants; and BELOGLA-OV the Naval Attache,

assistants and marines."'

During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO

changed his sarlier statement that the only operational

file he held in the U.S. Embassy

section was that on

ABIDIAN.

it the same time, he described a leave

that ne

had not mentioned

earlier.

NOSEN save period

"when

I begas to work lin the U.S. Embassy Section!, after a

month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches: And

* NOSENKO had mentioned this earlies, Un 18 June 1964 he was

asked to list the names and functions of Ú.S. Embassy Sec

tion officers is 1960.

He said.

"In 1960

the Chief of the

First Departnent was KLYPIN., MAIVEYEV was still there as

First Deputy.

The Second Deputy was, Yergenly Nikolayevich

ALESHIN.

He

was given the special assignzent of coordina-

ting the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against

all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned

to the first Departuent.••

In the First Section, KOVSHUK

was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to

general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising

the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security OfficaI."

"* In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that tikolay DRANOV MAR IA-

sponsible fo, the Naval Attache's office in January: when

BOSENXO arrived, but he vas transferred and his duties vere

taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with hin

agalast this target.

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## Page 152

Tor sau

239.

then

after two nonths I jave then to BELOGLAZOV. I la-

mediately went on vacation after I cane.* After two weeks

I went on leave for a month.

¿ took over the files either

before or after the leave. """ NOSENKO was asked why he

had assumed responsibility only for the laval ittaches and

replied.

It was decided by kovsiuk.

I should take only:

the Navy while I was getting acquained kith the section.

At the same time, the case officar DRANOV was retiring and

he handled only laval officers. I didn't take the Army

OI ALI FOICE.

NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he

vas responsible

only for the liaval Attaches during Bariy

He answered,

"I took the files only on the Navy,

but I was working on all of thes."

In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody

of a file with case officer responsibilities.

There-

fore, he seems to have indicated here. that for the

approximately two months when these files were in his

name, he was officially the KGB case officer charged

with the Anerican Naval Attaches.

* During a subseguent interrogation session, NOSENKO Was

asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 and

1961. He repeated that he took a sonth's leave in

mediately upon joining the U.s.

Embassy Section, "part

of January and part of February" 1960,

ho said,

to the Caucasus with his wife and nather.

He had gone he

then added, "You want ma to say I was not telling the

truth in February. (1965) vhes I said I vas on leave be-

fore I went to Cuba (11 Nov-ber 19601. I knou. this."

(See Part V:. 3. do; Which describes this November 1960

Leave and 1t8 ralationship to NOSESKO's [esponslbilitles

as case offical for Joha: abIdIaN.)

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## Page 153

240.

Knowiedge of the Target

(1) Introduction

His position and duties as seputy Chiof and sonetimes

Acting Chief gave NOSENKO aCCess to,

and required hin to

knos, the axtent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge

of its target.

He has therefora beun questioned at length

by CIA about the locationg and occupents of the Embascy

offices as hell as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB

had identified as CIA officers.

The information fron

NOSENKO on these two topics is presentud below.

(11)

Physical Premises

NOSENKO has said that tie krowledgo of the physical

layout of the Embassy cerives both from his genciäl super-

aisory function during 1960 and 1961 and fron nis respon

sibilities as the officially registerod custodian of the

KGb's file on the security of the Erbasay.

According to

NOSINTRO, he recelved the latter from his chief, ko!shok,

when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly

thereafter he arranged by a phore call to the Secretariat

of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred

officially to his name fron that of M.f. BAKHVALOV, his

predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section.

NOSENKO explained

that aAKAVALOV had already left the soction by this time

but that, under KGB pIcse lures, it las permissisle for an

officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging

to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the imerican

Department, so long

as he remained

in the Second Chief

Directorate.

Until he turred this

file over to GRYAZNOV

approximately duriny the pariod 25 to 28 December 1961, no

one eise had access to it other than KOVSHU, Chief of

the

section, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPO!, who shared the office

and safe where this file was kept.

NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never

studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention

to this file.

he would necessarily have been in a

position to knor,

NOSENKO also said he is certain that no

operational analysis or

planning by himself or others was

done on the basis of this file during his to years in the

section.. The file consisted of two volumas, one for the old

building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch

thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy

street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for

reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was

impossible for a Soviet Citizen to penetrate the secure

areas. of the Embassy because. of the security precautiong in

effect.

Apart from these

file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was

generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy.by

virtue of his position as Deputy. Chief of the section.

HOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected n

the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statarenta

are given in the next paragraphs.

'AlL KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("70ne."

of Security") of the Embassy. on the seventh through tenth floore*

tha seventa 21001 is not one of the secure areas, the

eighth, ninth, and tanta are.

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TOP SECRET

:. 241.

.were carefully. guestioned.on what they sad, because these

areas were of special interest to the Kus.

NOSENKO knew

no kGB employees who enterad tha secure arcas during

1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of then.

He did not remember any information that such KGs employees

ever reported to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV,

an electrician whöm he personally handled in 1954-1955,

had observed antenna wiring in the attic, the details or

significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of

1965.

NOSENKO personally piaced some reports by KGB agents

in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it.

None of the Information, he said, was interesting, lm-

portant, or useful enough for him to remember, and he

could not name the agent sources of the KGB.

In another

cortext and at another time, however, NOSENKO gaid he

had received a report from some agent (name unknown)

that there was a sign.

"Security Office" on the office.

door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embasay Security Officer.*

NOSENKO did not study the Envassy security pio-

cadures in detail and did not remerber where the classified

trash was burned.

He said that nothing could be done with

this infornation operationally, because

the trash was al

ways burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard ac-

companied by an officer.**

located or any

individual worked during the years 1960

for the offices of the ambessador,

the political officers,

eithor knew these locations at the time he was Deputy

Chief of the section or could have found then in the

In the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these

regularly tIch agent sjuIces.

and the lists gave office

numbers and phone numbers. **"a

There never has been such sign NoSEs sesponsi

bility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIiN is discussed

in Part V.E.3.d.. All Soviets who enter the top three

floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.

A check with two former Embassy security officers in

dicates that there has never been such a regulation.

The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "in-

variably does it alone."

One of the security officers

questioned said. "I can think of no reason why the sov-

jets would think this to be the case, since whatever

collateral information they have on it would point to

the truth."

Part V.E. 3.C. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and parti-

numbers.

They do, however, provide apartment numbers.

782. 338157

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SECRET

242.

In 1960 a notallic chamber" (acoustical roon) arrived

at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and fos

BACIAL COnVerBatIONE.

NOSINKO was not certain where it was

located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an

unknown source that in 1960-19ú1 meetings were held in a

secure room in the "zona of security."

He did not know any

of the technical details of this room.

The KGB acconplished only one theft of classified

material in any form from the U.S. Embassy durirg 1960

and 1961. À charwoman (name or cryptonyn not recalled)..

who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG-

LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office uf the Naval

Attaches.

Most of the papora were turn or crumpled. They

includod a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting

of ships and factorios while on a trip to Leningrad. Since

this report was of only routine intercät to the KGB, NOSENKO

said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft,

including the date, except that the charwonan was granted

& cash award.

(211) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover

According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy

of grastest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section

were the identified CIA officers.

when questioned on

Septerber 1954 corcerning his knowledge of intelligence por-

sonnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO

stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated

with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member

of American Militaly Intelligence and any diplomat.as

"suspect

American Intelligence," the latter rotation always

meaning

CIA.

ne of the tasks of the saction was to determine which

›f. thesa diploratg' was the CIA "Resident» (KGB nomenclature

{or:Chies of station) , which were CIA case officers, and

which were tha CIA agents or cooptees.

The KGB knew that

code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions

and that the sane probably held true for the Ambassador and

the Marine guards.

NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a pro

tocol which included his statanent that, as Deputy Chief and

occasional Acting Chief of the section,

he would

necessarily

know whom the KGB knew or suspected to

Embassy."

de a CIA officer in the

NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all

American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and

1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select

those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers.

persons he so identified, together with his couments con-

cerning them were!

-BOIÍS XLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident"

In Moscow during this period..

NOSENKO did not know why

KLOSSON was considered as such but said, "Every officer

In the Pirat (U.S. Embasay) Section thought he was the

Resident."

KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's Job,

NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the

CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB.

Burveillance and of his letter nailing." NOSENKO did.

Li WaS A chi cooptee vaiLa In MOsco, not a ClA aLiCaTE

B00 Part: II.B.

THE SENET

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## Page 156

14-00000

1Pa5 belt eNte

243.

not récall the names of KGB agents working apecifically

against: KLOSSON and never read

any agent or surveil-

lance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged

clandestine activity.

NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON's

position: in the Erbassy, where he had been previously

stationed, what trips he took inside the soviet Union,

where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSO:!'s wife or

whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything

about his personal life, the naios of close American

friends and his Soviet contacts.

"I didn't read the

file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said

on 3 February 1965.

The respongible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV,

(the file).

I can't tell you wily (we believed

FLOSSON was the CIA Residentl.

There was opinion--his

attitude.

Little, little details.

Congidered to be a CIA officer

on the basis of tis conduct as a U.S. Department of

State security officer in coinection with frenior

KHRUSHCHEV's 1950 visit to the United States and be

no replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE

Surveillance established the fact that he

nailed operational lotters and visited

possible dead

drop site in Moscow (see part V.E.3.d.).

-George WINTERS:

Known to be a CIA cfficer and

was given

special attention because of his opezational

activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERs was in personal

contact with XOVSHUK, who used the

Ministry of Foreign

Affairs as cover.

case oificar responsible

for covering WINTERS was

V. A. KUSKOV.

Known to be a CIA officer.

far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WiSHENAC

as a CIA officar on the basis of his mailing one or

two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic

In addition, from a KGB microphone he was over-

heard dictating

intelligence report shortly after he

returned from a

trip in the USSR.

LeWis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer,

but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK,

under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact

with BOWDEN.

* See below, wiltiam MORaLL was identified by KLOSSON to the

Soviet Minister of Foreign Affaiis as a CIA officer be-

fore MORELL arrived in Moscow.

** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in

Part VI.D. 7.a., further KGS information on WINTERS 15 re-

*** The. CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan for

operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he

was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy.

NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February

1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BoNDer

later occasiony also. Ses Part VI.D.7.C. on

CHEREPANOV.

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:. 244:

- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected of being a CIA

officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union,

particularly economics.

NOSINKO did not

remember the

names of any agents

working against H'UNKHOUSER nor any

derogatory information concernirg him.

William HORBALY:

Suspected of being a CIA case

officer* because the KGB heard

him, by reans of micro-

phones in the Embassy, aiscussiny

a report he had

written, or dictating it, about his observations on

a trip he had taken in the Soviet Unior.. NOSENKO said

that he did not know the names of agents working

against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained deroga-

tory information concerning him.

As far as NOSENKO

operational approach to or

recruitment of HORBALY.

Of the seven J.S. Enbassy officers desigrated by

NOSENKO as known

three--WINTERS,

WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in faci CIA

officars.

When

HORBALY has first assigned to Moscoi, however, he was

detached from overt employment as an economis analyst in

CIA.

In January 1962 he severed his connections with CIA

to become a full member of the Foreign Agricuitural Ser-

vice of tr. Department of Agriculture.

When HORBALY first

arrived in Moscow he openly discussed

the fact that he had

Come

to the Embassy from CIA.

While in Moscow he had no connection

with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities.

WASHENKO was

similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst

with CIA wnen he was assigned to Moscow,

but was coopted by

CIA for limited operational support activity,

chiefly mailing

agent letters.

After his return frem Moscow le reverted to

his overt CIA employment.

John ABIDIAN was a State Department

officer coopted by CIA; although not a cIA staff employee, he

was for all intents the CIA

"Resident" in Moscow from Febru-

ary 1960 until November 1961.

The remaining three--KLOSSON,

BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.

During the time NOSENKO said. he belongeú to the American

Embassy Section there were stationed in Mosco:: two CIA

officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status

as such was subsequently found to have been known to the

In addition,

one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA

employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affars before

arriving in Moscow.

Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page

374) reported having been asked by ore of the two KGB offi-

cers trying to recruit him whether MORELL waS a CIA employee:

when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer

stated:

ley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the

U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to

the Embassy.

• The latter two were not engaged in clandestine

activities in Moscow on behalf of CIA, but the first two CIA

officers vere.

NOSENKO indicated that he did not know about the intel

sgence affiliation of any of these four persons:

- NOSENKO was shown a photograph. of HONEY, whom

he did not recognize.

He was then given MAHONEY's

name, which he recognized as being that of an employee

of the Administrative Section Of the Embassy:

NOSENKO

125?:e8 5050430 23€

CA cooptee.

39 Sicie

£:=₫

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## Page 158

TOP SECRET

...245:

said that, other than this, he did not know arything

about MAHONEY--his previcus

career. his knowledge of the

Russian language, when he arrived In roscow, wien he

departed, where

he lived, his activities there, or

evicence

that he was ar. irtelligense officer.

wasn't known he was a CIA officer," NOSESKO

3 February 1965.

was evidence I would have

known.

But there was none."

POSENKO was told that

MAHONEY'S CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by

a KCH penetration

of British irreligence

was certain that the u.s.

Embassy Section's file on MHOsEY containod no infor-

such a solice concerning MAlONEY, and that

had there been such infomatic. avaiiabie, he hould

have been a special turget ard sould dive been handled

by one of

added that he could not understand why this infer-

mation about MAHONEY was not gian to the section ky

the KGB First Chief Diroctorute.

- NOSENKO identifica Paul CARSIER as a naval officer

who worked in the office or the ravai

case officer working against him as BOLOGLAZOV.

that he could provide no other deralis on GApeLeR.

NOSENTO specifically said that no cis not inor the rames

of. any agents working against CARBiER, that ne krew of

no unusual or interesting fernatic concerning GARBLER

contained from concealed micruziones.

or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he

had read GARBLER's fale or otrer "materials" concerning

- NOSENKO did not identis; Willian MORELL as a CIA

officer.*

Nor did he know that while "ORELL was in the

Soviet Union, he was under direct

cultivation by NOSENKO's

superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRIOV, a case officer

of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley

BROWN. As shown on a list whuh NOSEliNO brought to cIA.

BROWN shared an office with HOrgiLY, wiom NOSENKO said

was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB

microphone with good reception but insignificant pro-

auctica, according to tosaute."e Peratedig Brent ard

member of the Enbassy siali "ere under constant

surveillance during a trip wiiiin the USS? during 1961,

and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with

WINTERS, correctly identified ¿y NOSENKO as a CIA officer.

CIA records

show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served

in Frankfurt during

1955 and 1956 i=s nas connectes with a

joint CIA/MI-6. projest ühich hardies the SIS, a Russian enigre

organization.

work brought his into liaison in true name

with both MI-6 and the French Service: he was known to NTS

personnel by his true first name only.

See first footnote, Page 243.

22/22.1

ReeN 94547440994954

La discussung ine microreres

JOSTINO SELE

that in late 1960 or early 1961 me Ü.S. Embassy Section

had decided to withiras the requirement for continuous

ward history till dare dude po pitro ere por

Diso 110sel

Globes (001d d0e8 d0608: 809808 80909261d

dedutiers: +81018088.

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## Page 159

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1-0151

246.

HAHONEY arrived in Moscow on 1 Öctober 1960 as the

Assistant General Séfvices Officer at the U.S. Embassy.

His specific CIA mission there was to support the handling

of PENKOVSKIY inside the

Soviet Union.

MAHONEY lived in

America House.

From the start of his tour he was active in

his attempts to faniliarize himself with loscow and he

frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In

checking locations connected with the PENKOVSKIY case.

MAHONEY

went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location

on

two occasions during Novenber and December 1960,

and he

nade a thorough examination of the dead drop itself

as

well as of its related signal site on 21 January 1961.

Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive KGB surveil-

lance.

In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN

сош-

mented on this as follows:

"I find this type of coverage

(five surveillants on a recent trip to the barlier shop)

completely out of character with that which is usually

given a new arrival of similar rank.. My only inference

is that the KGB has at least strong

primary role (ClA officer.

As

suspicions of MAHONEY's

for

surveillance on my-

gelf, it continues to be occasional and extrenely discreet."

George BLAKE, the KGB penecration of MI-6, was arrested

in London on 11 April 1961.

In his confession

he said

that

he had passed the KGB a master list of the

names of persons

connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which

MAHONEY had been connected in Frankfurt, as well as other

materials on this project. On this basis, "'AHONEY was

relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with

support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn fron

Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.

CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA

by

the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover

„In Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955.

of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956

he was

assigned as a ClA officer to the U.S. Embassy in

Stockholm.

GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the

cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer

(FSR) .

On 3. June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy,

and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as

Assistant Javal Attache to lloscow, with the rank of Commander.

In. September 1961 his official biugraphic data was forwarded

to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who

had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER

made an official call at the Soviet Embassy.

GARBLER arrived

in Moscow on 29 November

1961. He was the CIA Chief of

Station there.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in

Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE.

1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-HI-6 discussions

in Washington on the question of tourist operations into

the Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access

to information on the agenda and participants for these talks,

admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed

the minutes of this meeting and had passed then to his Soviet

handlers.

identified to the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the

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## Page 160

Ur SOPRET

247.

end

01 1961..

(BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) he

was definitely identified as such in an article carried in

the Soviet Government newspaper

Izvestiya in October 1963.

This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson,

was allegedly

written by Artbur HAMAS, an Estonian who defected to the

Hest in 1955 and returned to the

Soviet Union

in 1963; in

It HAyAN atteapted to expose how

"the U.S. Secret Service,

riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty, recruits agents

for subversion and espionage against the

Soviet Union and

other countries...naking active use of the official U.S.

missions in Stockholm, newsmen,

tourists..."

HAWAY named

GARBLER as having been involved in this nork.

This article,

which appeared

at

about the same time

as the

arrest:of.

WENNERSTRO!!, described a number of fabricated activities

of CIA in Sweden

and,

in fact, GARBLER had no connection

with HANAY or with anything which HAVAN descriues.*

GARBLER'S

dead drop

site

V. E.3.d.

part in ABiDIAN's visit-to the PENKOYSKIY

On

Pushi: in

street is discussed in Part

Page

for other KGB operational use of HAMAN.

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## Page 161

248.

Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Exbassy

(1) Introduction

NOSENKO had three basic pleces of infornation on KGB

aud 1o

and other elcctronic operationg

against the U.S. Em-

bassy in Moscow:

The preseace of nicrophones in the

chancery building, the absencé of audio-technical devices

In the north wing of the Embasay, and the existence of a

bean which monitors and jans transnissions fros the Embassy.

These are discused separately below.

Except for knowing

that a resonant cavity

(wireless) nicrophone had been found

in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953,

NOSENKO

said he was unaware of audio

surveillance devices and tech-

niques (other than the chancery nicrophones) in use against

the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by

such measures.

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to.

the best of his knowledge, there ree no wireless micro-

phones (1.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters)

in the Embassy,* His Information on KGB electronic opera-

towa meet the target ated mabalsy rectabe, Arera when

he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy

Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and

derives from his special responsibilities in this period;

from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NO-

SENKO said, he learned only that audio installations

existed.

(11) Microphones in the Chancery

Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important

information, the microphones in the chancery büilding

were

first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetiogs in Geneva.

In these and subsequent debrielings NOSENKO reported in de-

tail on the ways in which he acquired this infornation, on

the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of

reception, and the value of production.

the dato when the microphones became operative, but pre-

sumed (in agreement with the KGB defector COLITSYN) that

they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was oc-

cupied by U.S. Government representatives.**

microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the lapor-

tance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellur,

the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and

subsequently confirmed by technical investigations.

1962 NOSENKO sald that the audibility of the nine-year-old

#NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American

counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the micro-

phones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy.

Since

a alcrophone-and-vire system cannot be turned off,

this re-

mark suggests aither that there was an external power sOurCe

for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or.

that NOSENKO hinself did not have rudimentary knowledge of

such natters.

"*Tho Inventigations by American techaicians leave no doubt.

that the nicrophone-ind-nire systes would have had to be

in place at the time of occupancy.

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## Page 162

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249.

system

varied from very clear ito zero; he said in 1964

that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or

two they (the microphones) will be coupletoly inoperative. "

Althougt the microphones

produced a great deal of politi-

cal intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothing worthwhile

for use against U.S. code clerks or others u? operational

interest to him.**

All pertinent details fron NOSENKO and

other sources on the microphone system in the chancery

büilding is presented in the foli wing portions of this

paper.

(a) NOSENKO ' s

Sources

Nearly all of NOSENKO'S knowledge about the microphone

system in the chancery

building

was, he said, derived fron

two circumstances:

Fitst,

his responsibility as Deputy

Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and

disseminating transcripts.of conversations there; and

second,

a special neeting which he attended in his dual capacity

ag

Deputy Chief of the U.S.

Embassy Section and custodian of

the microphone information.

Additional information was ob-

täined by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his

former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the

Section.

In

several discussions with GRYAZNOV duting this

period NOSENKO learned that some of

the microphones were

dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's

reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962.

NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources' óf infor

mation on the microphones are presented in chronological

order below.

"He are listening to everythiug the military attaches

say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches,"

NOSENKO said

on 11 June 1962.

"All the reports go through

ne.

I read them....Only a linited group of people read

these reports.

They are all in the First Department of the

Second Chief Directorate.

Who are they?

The Chief of the

Department (we don't give then to his deputies), the Chief

of the (U.S. Embassyl Section, and I--altogether three people.

Sometimes

we report

to GRIBANOV things

we consider important.

He conceal the

fact that we are listening to the Americans

from our workers in other departments, from the English

Department,

from the French Department... We are listening

to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor.

Don't

even send coded cables abbut me (to Moscow).

If you do it

will be the end of me....Only three people krow that we

are listening to you.

Even within the Second Chief Directo-

rate it is a tremendous secret that ve are listening, to you."

NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which

he received the audio intercept reports and whether these

reports were delivered to his office:

He answered:

"No:

Here's how it is done. He have a special unit concerned

*Tests of the KGB equipnent by the Anerican technicians

Inter. in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility

1n certain lastances.".

/**Vulnerability data on Anericans in Moscos could be obtained

fron the nicrophone. systen,

according to the danage report

by the Securtty Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB):

and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache whose

office in the Embassy was the alte of a aicrophono..

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## Page 163

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250.

with this fusction which is called the Second Special

Department.

It 1s a part

of the Opcrationai Technical:

Directorate (OTU) The Special Department has several

sections

within it.

Take, for example, the section under

Colonel [N. Ya.| KUZMIN.

He has the entire English line,

everything.

He has young girls. and boys there who have an

exiellent command of English.

They all sit in a room with

special equipment and listen continuously.

Besides this,:

everything goes on

tape and later they transcriba it.

They

listen to it two or

three times so as to get every word....

(They prepare

the materials.

The materials from the

American Eabassy used to come to me...and I decided what to

keep

and what not to keep.

Why?

A summary report would

come to ne with the notation

that the

information

in it

was Top Secret or Confidential.

This was all nonsense, but

I was required to return the report within two days' time.

So, I would read through the materials to see what was use-

ful and what was not..

It's not all suitable. And I would

underline this the

significant items)

with a percil.

NO.

(I was wrong!.? The report first went to the thief

of de-

partnent and then I underlined with a pencil what was neces-

Sat

and

TUl.

gave it back to them (the Second Special Department,

They collected it.

I signed a receipt that I had

received it from then and they gave me a receipt when I

returned it.

And then

they gave me extracts.

Fron these

. extracts alcne one cannot tell where the naterial caue fron,

but from the report one realizes that the Americans aro

being listened to.

It is necessary to have these extracts

to place in the files.

He have a file on each person working

in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formular (developmental

filel. We keep

one on every Embassy employee."

During the second of the 1964 series of neetings in

„Geneva,

on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes

from

his wallet.

Pointing to one of them, he said:

"This piece

of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents

the statistics for the years 1960-1961,

listing those micro-

phones which are actively used in monitoring conversations

in the U.S. Embassy."

This list named eleven offices and

apartments in the chancery which contained microphones.

When asked whether he had copied the list from records

or

had drawn it up from memory,

NOSENKO explained that it came

from an operational review of what "listening points we had

in the U.S. Embassy."

A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written

list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:

Question:

How did this list come into your hands? What

caused you to write it?

NOSENKO:

question:

I came to KLYPIN (Chiel of the American Depart-

nent] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK (Chief

of-the .U.S. Embassy Section in the Department|

was writing and he put the list on my book.

KOVSHUK said this one (microphone]

is working

well, this one badly, and so on.

What was the date of this? that year and nonth?

NOSENKO:

Ob, I don't remember, 1960. ..naybe the begtaning

1961-

Question:

•At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961

you and KOVSHUK net In KLYPIN'S OffICE?

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## Page 164

"19, 952!

251:

NOSENKO:

Yes...

Or maybe it was at a meeting.

It 18 d19-

ficult to say.

Maybe we

went to report to KOVSHUK

in his room ur maybe KOSHUK was writirg in

KLYfI"'s study room.

I don't remember.

NOSENKO then described the purpose of the seeting::

To dis-

cuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from

some of the

chancery nicrophones and of assigning these re-

leased positions to Vladinir (patronymic unknowr) PETROV,-

Chief of the American Department's section for work against

American tourists and delegates suspected of being con-

nected with American Intelligence; PETROY had earlier re-

quested English-language monitoring positions fron the Chiel

of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special

Department but had been told that all such interpreters were

already engaged on priority targets.

At the neeting KOVSHUK

and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery

to decide which rooms offered information of little value

and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV.

KOYSHUK drew up a list of

the

Embassy offices and apartments

then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those

of lesser importance.

At the end of the neeting, KOVSHUK

gave the list to NUSENKO, who retained it in his safe until

bringing it to CIA in 1964.

NOSENKO has added nothing fur-

ther on the locations of microphones in the chancery building,

and much of his information concerning the quality and value

of the production by these microphones came from this

mecling.

Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his

responsibilities in coonection with the daily transcripts

received from the Second Special Department.

He said on

14 May 1961:

"All the materials after they were read and

signed were

returned to the Second (Special Department of the

Operational Tchnical Directorate.

Some of the material fron

this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read

It would never know where it came from.

He wouldn't know

that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK und I read all of this.

From this we gave information

to those

who needed it, de-

pending on their interest.

If there was something inter-

esting,

it was given to KLYPIN to read.

If KLYPIN

saw

something interesting he could take it 'and give it to GRI-

BANOV.

Tatyana GRISHNYAT (from the Second

Special Department)

cane by car with this naterial. . She went to KLYPIN. Some-

times she left them with me."

A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states:

"One of

my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department,

Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give

to appropriate case officers the production from microphones:

in the American Enbassy on a daily basis.

I also maintained

the control book (journal) for these trarscripts.

These

transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Direc-

torate of the KGB.

Every day a female worker of the OTU

brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy

fron the previous day.

I regularly returned all of the ori-

gloal transcripts to this fenale rorker; they vere usually

In ay possession for one day:' In my absence tals duty

waS

perrored by lay superior KOVSHUK or (my subordinate)

GRYAZNOY."

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## Page 165

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dur dil,

252.

(b) Suaber and Locations of Microphones

The information

from NOSENkO on the number and locations

of the kGB microphones in the chancer; building

in the ü.S.

Embassy is separated iron that furnished by other sources.

NOSESKO'S Information

11 June 1962: NOSESKO has just been essured that none

"well, because you are such

good guys, I will five you even rore.

Haid: the Minister

Counsellor stop dictating, to himsell in his office....

insten, nove the Minister Counsellor

from his present office

to the rorth

wing of

the Embassy where NOSEYKO said there

were Do

listening diviers; see

below.

He are not listening

to the Ambassador.

But move the Minister Counselior....

And we are

listoning to ald your military

attaches there.

All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the

Air Force Attache....We have jour

or five points fror which

we are getting intercepts!.

He hear the linister Counsellor,

all three

attacher-that's four points--and the

fifth

is

where

one of the Stali: Department ooployees sits.

And yes,

there's another, a sixth point.

We are listening to the

Agricultural Attache.

IC. Staries, BROWN is working there

now and someone else, a young man (rillian fORBALY,.

So,

we are listening tu

those six points.

This is our biggest

secret.

Only a few people know this.

I was Deputy Caiel

of the section and received this information.

i decided

what to give the Chief of Repartment and what not to give

niir.

Is you understand?

This is to say

nothing about the

other departments and the (U.S.! Embessy Section Itsell."

12 June 1962:

"We lost the microphone in the private

residence of the

Ambassador.

This was not THOMPSON,

but the

one before hin. BOlleN was thele Inen.

ne once had some

thing there, but you found the lüreat! Seal where it was

located.

But in the Embassy itsch,

in the Anbassador's

office,

we have nothing.

Ine one

ve hear now is (Minister

Counsellor FREF.KS.

Bill FREERS, in particular,

walks around

his office and dilates. All this is recorded. Well, this

is important material."

14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American

Embass; Section T received reports on the microphone material

If there was something important in

it, I reported

to the Chief of the department.

The rest KOSHUK and i

read and then distributed to the workers the parts that con-

cerned them.

Well, the worisers who were operating against

the three attaches

knew about this (nicrophone! equipnent....

was received from the code

These machines

were corking and there were no

alone and there was nothing.

conversations.

[NOSENKO is evidently describing

the ailitary code room. ...There is a point there iron thich

se hear the Agricultural Attache.

there in nothing

They talk about what interests them in the field of

agriculture.

Nothing Anteresting."

24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 Iist which

NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following

offices

and apartments in the chancery contained aicrophénes:

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## Page 166

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*"TOP SECRET

253.

"Office of it Minister Courerllor, FREERS:

of the Naval Attache, lioleNTON;

Mistary Attarre, ARBAN;

"Office or

NEILSE":

"Office of

the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR:

"Office of

Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO

and SACHANEN;

"Office of üle

Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ

the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;

"Office of Agricultural Attaches, BORBALY aNd BROWN;

"Military Code Roor;

"State Department Code Room and Tolstype Office;

Of FREERS,

HOTGHTON, URBAY and NEILSEN;

"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

Altogether,

sixtion spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO

the microphon: in one

Marine bar) had never

worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the

four tabassy apartments.

eleven; wher presenting to: list to CiA, NOSENKO said that

the ros. Embassy Suction,

"there were a total

of elevon listening

(in discussing the late 1960

or carly 196i mocting at whith icissilk and KiiPl: received

the microphone coverage, NOSENKO -aid on 14 May 1944 that

decided to solras the mcrophor positiors

OLEYSTEEN office, the lOhBAri-BROK office, the state De-

partment code room and

the teirtype office.

a total of cight 'listening posts.")

14 May 1964:

Questiosed on the total number of micro-

phones in the TS. Embassy, NOSEYKO said that

"mary" were

building before the Amcricans moved

not know how many were instailed in

all,

how many wede in any one of the rooms included in KisHUk's

list, or where they were lorated in specific rooms.

recall that nost of the microphones were placed in the

the wall rearrst Cha;korskiy Street,

as nost of

faced this strest and thi piacement of

the micro-

would maki. it more difficult for

American technicians to tind them if they examined only the

inner walls.

January 1965:

JOSENKO volunteered that there were no

Pixed microphones in Anerica House, the residence of enlisted

men at the U.S. Embassy

in Moscow.

He said that there was

discussion during 1950 and 1961 of using the KGB agents

employed there to place temporary

audio devices for one or

two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as vell as

In the Embassy garage.

These plans were vetoed, however,

cause

such

devices are too easily found.

For the same reac

son, NOSENKO said,

was no attempt rade in this perlod

to place temporary devicus in Spasso House (tha Ambassador'g

residence) or in the apartments of suen Embassy officers

as John

ABIDIAN.

The KGB was

"afraid that they will be

detected and that there will be a scandal."

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## Page 167

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254.

Information from Otrer Sources

In 1956 a sensitive nurce holding a senior position

in

the KGB submittTe

a

irport to the l'.s. Ambassador

in Moscow with he cantinodly camark:

"Du not -ppak about

this inforratioa in the coons of tre American timbassy."

The report ilsell contain, a portior reading as follows:

"Because all roons in lat

Amarir an Embassy in lioscow are

being

monitored by tir KiB, I strongly ask that there be no

conversations

ind disruasions

oncerning

this

information

in the Amorican Embassy.

1le- 111p

involving the American

direction- finding specialist. in Staringrad during the

summer of

1955 was organired hy the Kof because conversa-

tions

were overhoard

in the coons of the American Emvassy.

As you know, as

a result of this

flap,

the KGB saized valu-

able direction.inding raulpment from the American

intelli-

gonce officer's.

The sub did not possess this type of

valuable equipment: and it nould

have been necessary

for

Soviet leuricians to

work and experiment dor a long time

in order to acquire

suri

valuable cqungment.

The listening

devices are so skiiitully

ltistail.d

in

the walls,

floors,

and ceilings of the rom

ut tno Americar Embassy that it

is impossible to lad ime rven

sprcial-perpose instru-

monts."

GonI"SyN, who deferted in late 1961, reported the exis-

tence of a micropiond

Ia thie offire of the Minister Counsellor

and said that many norr had been installed in the chancery

prior lo 1953.

OSY was debrarfed in carly 1962 and

his information or this subicot as disseminated within the

U.S. Goverrmerit

appensately two weeks belor. lOSiNKO's

initial contait mit: cl!..

said he had learned of

the microphone in

Minister Coursellor's office when by

chance he happened to see

a particuiar document in an office

at KGB Headquart'r:.

Accordirg to COllISY", during one of his

visits to the Amersian bipartment in 1960* he heard and saw

*This

is a refarenes to iro alrest of lS. Military Attaches

BENSON, MULE, and SPRUlD and the scizure of sensitive elec-

tronic

equipment they hed witr them in Stalingrad in the

summer of 1955.

NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of

this equipment was based on intormation obtained from micro-

phones in the Ui.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b. (vi11).

**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the l.S. Embassy Sec

tion of the American Department on a number of occasions

the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment

in July of that year; he has also said that he

returned on temporary assignment to Moscow

and again con-

sulted with U.S. Embassy Scution officers in December 1960.

With regard to the latter visits, however, COLITSYN's pass-

port and CIA travel rerords indicate that he was in Moscow on

temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that be 1s

therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits

took place.

On this basis it appears that by his statement

this incident occurred in 1960

the has not been more

specific), he could have been referring to either his visits

to the American Dupaltment in the spring of 1960 or his visits

In January 1961.

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255.

that a report or reports concerning the results of

surveillarce in the U.S. Eubassy had been nisplaced.

GOLITSIN was in the office,

the Chier of the American De-

partment ordered all personnel present to search for

and all the KGB officers searched again through

without success.

GOLITSYN noted a large nun-

ber of reports with red stripes across their covers, ind1-

cating that they were the property of the Operational Tech

nical Directorate.

The only office in the U.S.

GOLITSIN recalled

being mentioned in connection with this

search fas that of the sinister Counsellor.*

No technical investigations were undertaken as a result

MOI GOLITSYN's Information, and so it was

largoly on the basis

10S NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the

chancery building for the presence of microphones in the

spring of 196:.

The results have been described in the

damage report submitted by

the USIB Securit: Committee on

"On 23 April 1961, a low-impedance dynamic

microphone

and associated

seven-inch probe tube wers dis-

covered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the

Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in loscow.

The cable to this

microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several

inches under the outside surface of the cast face of the

Chancely.

This major cable run consisted of

twenty (20) pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed

audio cable which ran along the cast face of the Chancery

to the roof area of the North Annex of the Embassy.

this point,

spliced into & one hundred and

one (101) pair cable along with two

ten. (10).pair cables....

A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten,

twenty, and thirty pair cabies to the various microphone

installations.

Fifty (50) nicrophones have been positively

Two (2) microphones not physically located

#On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the

of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy

Section had received from

the Second Special Department

the Operational Technical Directorate "in

1960 or 1961.1,0p1

This document, according to NOSENKO, was

"one of the reports

with {Minister Counsellori FREERS dictating"; as a result of

its loss,

"the month of December,

the whole month, the U.s.

Section was in a turmoil"

searching for the document.

The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful,

however, and. in

was closed with the con-

that the document had probably

been burned inadver-

without a record of destruction having

been drgun up.

In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in Decen

ber 1960, which

approximates GOLITSYN's secund series

visits to the U.S.

Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSIN's

erroneous estinate of when these visits took place).

bag never reported that COLITSYS was present in the offices

of the U.S. Embassy Section during

search for this docu

ment and, in fact,

has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section

either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961.

visit by GOLITSYN do the U.S. Embassy Section reported

was one in the spring or

sunner of 1961,

time NOSENKO clains to have been on leave; GOLITSYN vAS DOE

in Noscon at the time.

#Pour nore

vere. subsequently located, for a total of 54.

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256.

can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment ej based on

the synnetry of the known installatioss.

The microphones

located were situated so that all microphones and probes

were behind radiators.

The microphons system discovered

covered every outside

roos on floors six though ten, with

the exception of those offices with doors entering

onto

balcontes and when exterior

building constructions

were ad-

jacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."

The first nicrophone found was in Roon 1008, in what

1s now the

Army Finance office and which in 1950-1961 was

the office of the Hilltary Attache, where NOSENKO reported

a microphone to be.

All other microphones were ultimately

this discovery.

Theit were microphones in all

rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in ochers besides.

the latter vere inoperative when found--ore in t o imbassa-

office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being

the other in

the Eccurity Office where

NOSENKO eaid there was

The danage report concluded

that all the microptones

were installed before the u.s.

Government look possession of the chancery builuing in 1953.

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257.

(c) Receptivity and Audibilty of Microphones

NOSENKO nade the following evaluations of the quality

of intercept received from the chancery microphone tostalla-

tiong:

11 June 1962: "They are dying, the nicrophones, and

we cannot do

anything about it,

because we can't get

into

the Embassy ito make

new

installetions/.

In

that respect

your Embassy and the british Embassy are the only ones we

can't get into."

14 June 1962: "The most interesting naterials, of

are from the...( Note:

are unintelligible here;

from earlier and subsequent rezarks,

particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), 1t is clear

that ROSENKO is speakig of the microphone

Counsellor's.office.l

And I toll you honestly that it 1s

becominicrophone;,

increasingly difficult to

work with this.

is fading ard only two

or three people are

what is being said.

That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere

sorewhere in the cellar, soneone is speaking in a whisper.

It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when 1t 15

But, what can jou do?

They tell us categorically

and directly--KuzMId, the Chief of the section of the second

Special Departnent responsible for this, tells us that

soon we will not have anything there.

nurber of microphones there,

but they don't work.

that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work.

They have all gone deal."

"Now, we also listened to the code

and the teletype vifice, but we could never get any-

thing out of the teletype office because of interference

probably speaking of machine noise. Fron this point

pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he

about) the reception became progressively

weaker until

It finally stopped: evidently it wore out.

Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor.

This one never worked even though it was installed.

out of the eleven points,

nine were working...(NOSENKO then

referred to infornation he learned in 1962 and 1963, after

leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.

GRYAZNOV said that the

equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches

of conversation and that

in a year or two they will be com-

GRIBANOY is insisting on getting to

•.". 31 January 1964:

"Here in HORBALY's and BRON's roon

office of the

Agricultural Attaches!,

there is no acoustical

sic' and nothing comes from here.

I'11 come back to this,

but they complained that they're not getting anything. (These

nicrophones were installed) when this building was being

built.

It wasn't later

but when

the building was under construction... (NOSENKO was

asked whether nore or fewer than nine microphones are now our-

rently active.! It couldn't be more, anyhow."

14 May 1964: Very interesting Information uss heard

fron Minister Counsellor FREERS'

office, NOSENKO said,

for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, It was very

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258.

difficult to hear.

I was sitting with (S.G. | DHITRIYEV

(Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second

Special Departneat) and they toid me how difficult it was.

The nike was lying.

Only very experienced interpreters

were sitting

on this.

They listened 10, 15, even 20 times

to the same place lon the tapel....! After 1961) GRYAZNOV

was telling me that they were getting alnost nothing from

this point.

(He said this in 1962, 1963.

I was thinking

you had given a command (had cautioned FREERS) •

We were

getting

alcost nothing.

I heard this from GRYAZNOV several

times in

1963.

Thr. makes were working not bad at all in

960 and 1961 in the attache roons--Navy, Ail force..•

• don't know lhow receotion vas in 19621. I know only thai

GRYAZNOY was traling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting

little, little,

and

almost nothing.

He said we are losing

everithing.

We have no naterials.

He have little, little

pieces

but nothing... in general !from all of the micro-

phones."

NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this

was the fact that the Anericans in the Erbassy were not

saying anything

significant,

but he said he did not know

thls to be

the case.

Speaking of the

nicrophone in GLEYSTEEN'S

office, ro said:

"There was something heard.

In 1960 and

1501 it was working 1 l'emember.

Reception was good but

there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY'S

room was

gond in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961--good re-

ception."

According to NOSENKO,

reception was good from

the State Department

code aid

teletype room "only always

the sounds of lisletypel machines.

In 1960 and 1951--machines

Reception

was good when conversation came through.

only t know labout reception in 1962 and 19631... Reception

was good [from the military code roon in 1950 and 1961.

On-site tests made by American technicians after the

that the following microphones

In the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of Decen-

ber 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB

danage report emphasized that it had not been possible to

long these microphones had been inoperative:

one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval

Attache;

three microphones in the apartment of the senior A1r

one merephone in the apartment of the Economic Counsel-

-the microphone in the office of the Publications Pro-

curement Officer;

The microphone in the Marine bar;

-the microphone in the Internal Affairs office

-the microphone

-the microphone

in the office of the Security Officer;

-the nicrophone

in

the office of the Chief of Chancery;

-the nicrophone

the office

of the Air Attache;

-the microphone

In the office of the Assistant Al8 At-

tache;

othe alcrophone in the office of the Assistant Naval

Attaches;

othe picrophone in the Navy administrative offico;

-the nicrophone in the Air Force administrative offico.

This list includes the office of the Ambassador (Broa thick

LOSINKO SOld DO intercepts vere

being received in 1960 and

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259.

1961) and the office of the security Officer (there NOSENKO

has said no microphone das installed).*

On-site recordiigg

nade fros trelve selected nicrophones

10 1964 Indicate that

the microphone in

the office secupied by the Minister Counsel-

lor 1o 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelli-

gibility" as of 1964.

The 1964 tests of toe microphones in

the military

and State Departuent code rooms in

the office

of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intell-

gibll1ty.

As pointed out belor, horever,

the possible pro-

duction by the code roon sicrophones would have been sharply

reduced by the installation of acoustical roons during 1962.

*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e.,

NOSENKO reported that the U.S.

Isbasay officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having

been approsched by the XGB for recruitaent in May 1959.

HARKSTONE did, in Iact, report the approach, and the report

vas nade in the office of the security officer.

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260.

(d). Amount, Type, and Value of Production

Evaluations of the quallty of production tave been

gIven by NOSENKO as sell as U.S.

authorities concerned

with the microphones in the chancery building.

NOSENKO'S Statements

11. June 1962:

"Well, perhaps, there doule be some rind

of fitness repurt (kharakteristika)

Soretires there the

Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before ECSHEENEY, dicteted

sonething; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weak-

neSSES.

We had not known that.

We are listenias to your

mIlitary attashes

there.

we know where they intend to travel,

what they want to find-out.

He know what sachinery and what

targets

interest then--always....They chatter sosetines.

Some of the things they say are surprisig (fron the point

of view of securityl.

They discuss,

anong other thiogs,

where to go, what to see,

what to take with then--electronic

equipment or not.

And

we are

hunting for this electronic

equipment end now have permissio,

if

#e are absolutely cer

tain that one of your people is taking electrouic apparatus

with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to teke it,

to steal it.

le now have authorization to taxe

any necessary

steps to steal it.

Because you now have inpired your

equipment.

He

stole some equipment in Stalingred in 1955,

but now you have botter apparatus....Naat au we do [when we

know the attaches are taking apecial equipnent,?

Well, they

are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data

interests them.

We give then disinformation; we rake them

think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's

absolutely

nothing there, understand?

Absolutely nothing.

We make it

appear on

the radio lby spurious transnissions)

that there are rockets there; we even leve patrols standing

there and everything....They talk about interestleg things,

but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent

operatioas, not once."

Service AttachesT

12 June 1962: They say:

[Speaking again about coverage of the U.S.

"Today, let's go to such-and-

such a place.'

They go to the military attache, the two

assistants,

and say:

"This region is interesting.

They have

sonething there.?

He know it at once.

I personally tele- -

phone surveillance at once and tell the Chlef of the depart

ment to come at once.

He arrives and I say:

• Throw in

three, four, five brigades (surveillace teans!.'

We work s1-

most

openly against the attaches.... PEERS, Bill FREERS,

1n

particular, walks around in his office and dictates.

A11

this 1g recorded.

well, this is very important asterial. We

do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Con-

fidential cables (in the clearl.

We receive the clear text

and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or

not. If ve decide that this nust be reported to the (KGB!

Chairman immediatoly, GRIBANOV way call hia right away."

24. January 1964: "Now, ve also listened to the code

roon and the teletype office, but ve could never get anything

because of interference [teletype nachine noise, ....Ne dida't

get nuch out of the (nilitaryl code roon; to could hear (the

code clerk Janes| STORSBERG, swearing on occasion, and thes

he rould nention a group of numbers." This vas, al course,

"80o Part V.I. 3. Co On the STOR

SBERG CABE.

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261.

all recorded,

and

we turned it over at once to

Directorate,

dealing with coding and decoding." the Elgath

14 May 1961:

Discussing the l1st drawn up by KOVSHUK

and the decision to withdraw U.S.

EmbassyiSection.requ1rer

ments for full-time monitoring of certaln aicrophones, ND-

SENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting infornation tron the

rooms of the attaches,

the Counsello:, and the Agricultural

Attache.

Tha flats (Embassy apartnents)--no; the bar--

nothing.

Of course, I know it is necessary to keep

the room

of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there 1s seldom

anything receled except several numbers.

The code clerk is

saying aloud several numbers.

Bist the flats you can take,

not pernanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued:

"KOVSHUK said

to give then these

flats... But you see,

nothing was going on

in these

flats.

They weren't speating

or were talking about steak and eggs.

There

waS

nothing

of intorest fron an operating standpoint.

sonotimes te

heard there sould be guests.

to hear something.

Okay.

There is a possibility

[English-language

In this case we would call DMITRISTY

Section

of Second Special Departnert/ and

say:

'This evening, this day, this flat.

käybe we will

get somethiug.'

The mikes were working not bad at all 1n

1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force.

then

the man

was alone we heard nothing.

But when two or three

nen were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we beard.

For example, when they returned from a trip and discussed

what they had seen of when they were preparing for a trip....

But we heard nothing about agents."

Later on this occasion the following diagogue took

place:

NOSENKO:

GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that

they were getting little, little, almost sothing.

He said we are losing everything. We have so

materials.

He have little, little pleces, but

nothing.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Was he talking about the Hilltary Attaches?

In general. I think they were speaking very

little.

God knows.

Then, you see, we were thinklag

they were taking new neasures.

FROOSEYEY, and KOVSHUK considered that there vag

в ГООП-іп-а-гооп--а room (acoustic) for the

neeting.

Question:

When did you first hear about the roon-inside-the-

NOSENKO:

-m..

First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower. vas

going to come.*

In 1960 or 1961 ve had informa-

tion that the Embassy had such a chamber sade out

*President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR vas scheduled for

the sunner of 1960 but as cancelled over tie'U-2 incident

on. 2 May 1960.

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262.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENXO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

of steel....In 1960 and 1961 the nike in GLEY-

STEEN'a office was working, I renenber. Recep-

tion fas good,

but there was no secret inforna-

tion..

I don't know labout reception fron this

mike in 1962).

What about GRYAZNOV's statement. (concerning

diminishing production of the Embassy microphones)?

Ibig was only one conmon phrase.

He didn't tell

which room. I think he was speaking about the

group...

How was production fron the mikes in HORBALY's

office?

Not good, but we did get something which made us

suspect he was connected with intelligence.

HORBALY.

What about the code room and teletype office?

At State, yes.

Only always the solnds of machires

in 1960 and 1961.

Machines only.

Three times

during these two years maybe somebody said one

phrase or ono of the guys said several numbers.

Woat about the military (codel area?

The reception was good. He [STORSBERG, seldos

spole.

Sometimes he repeated numbers to hinself.

And soretimes a nechanic of code nachines case

to him, a military guy, a sergeant (Willian

HURLEY, an Army Marrant Officer.

They

said two

or three phrases.

"Did you check this?" "Yes."

"This side good." Et cetera.

In all this time that you read all this material,

there must have been something that impressed

you as extremely valuable.

NOSENKO:

Extrenely valuable-nothing.

A little was in-

teresting from FREERS' room. It was given to the

special group of GRIBANOV.

They were writing

special information to the (KGB Chairman to the

ICPSU: Central Committee.

There were polltical

questions, for example.

26 January 1965: The following is taken from an inter-

rogation protocol signed by NOSENKO:

"I regularly reviewed

all of the transcripts fron microphones in the American

Embassy for & period of approximately two years, fron Janu-

ary 1960 to January 1962.

The following is the only infor-

nation which I can remember as being important, interestiag

os operationally useful to the KGB:

Fron the micropnone in the office of the

Minister Counsellor, FREERS,

I remember that he oc.

casionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evalu-

ation of certain declarations or acts of the soviet

Government and advised the State Departnent on posty

tians for negotiations with the uss&.

This information

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263.

was of such importance that special reports were

written to the Central Compittee of the CPSU.

ever, I cannot renenber arj specific incidents or

events which these cables reported nor any specific

evaluations or recommendations made in tiese cables.

Also from the microphone in the Minister

Counsellor's office, I renenber trat he dictated fitness

reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers

the Embassy.

•I cannot renerber who any of these offi-

cors were or any details fron the reports.

nothing in these reports which was interesting or

useful to the KGB.

From the microphone in the Military Attache's

office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly

discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the tar-

gets that they wanted to cover.

They also discussed

the results. of these trips after their return:

ever, I cannot remember any information about speci-

fic

trips planned oy spicific lilitary Attache per-

sonnel or any specific targets that they planned to

cover or any specilic resulis from any trip.

I do not

remember any specific operationai activit; taken by the

organs of the KGB

against lilitary Attaches

on trips

within the USSR which was based on infoination obtained

from this microphone.

There was no interesting, impor-

tant, or useful

information about the personal or pro-

fossional lives or about the vuinerabilities of anyone

in the Military Attache's office (Arty, Navy, and Alr)

obtained from this microphone.

I remenber that from the microphones in the

State Department code room occasionally a code clerk

would read numbers.

These numbers were only of inter-

est to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Crypto-

10gj) 0P the KGB.

I do not remember any conversations

Irom this microphone.

There was no information from

this microphone on any of the code clerks which

interesting,

important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy

Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate,

during the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed

the production from all

the microphones in the Anerican

Embassy I do not renember any information on any American in

the Embassy which was

interesting, important, or useful to

me as the Deputy Chief of the Eabassy Section except the

‚Points noted in the above paragraphs."

28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember

any report fron the mikes about agents.

Never.

Nothing

about work with agents or work with contacts.

But FREERS

or HALMSLEY (Vinister Counsellor 1954-1956) were dictating

interesting opinions of the Embassy. concerning the political

situation and this material was looked at by the information

group and then they were preparing special reports for

KHRUSHCHEV. "

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264.

Evaluation. by Others

Theodore I. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow Irom Hay

1959 to May 1961, has been Interviewed concerning the micro-

phone discoverlas.

(In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN

fias succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While 1n

HOSCOW,

Colonel HOFFHAN occupied room 1008, There the first

microphone was found and his statements belor relate to

matters prosumod to be of general and

specific interest. to

the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO

claims to have

been its Deputy Chief.*

"James H. STORSBERG [nilitary code clerk) was

dating

foreign rational, l bellove a secretary in

the British Embassy, name not recalled.

one or

two occas/ons, he

wag needed either to decode or to

encode for dispatching a nessage and was not avail-

ablo.

He would be off with his girl friends, and we

couldn't find him.

He was verbally reprimanded in my

office in regard to the two incidents of absenteelsa.

"M/Sgt. Peter BINDER Ananager of America House)

and I discussed frequently the

administrative problens

encountered in his operation of the America House.

We also discussed the importance of his keeping me

informed of the conditions, personality problens,

drinking habits, and any other incident of importance

that night occur in the America House or the America

House ciub.

All discussions were conducted in my

office.

"In May or June 1961, Janes C. KEYSERS (billtary

code clerk, was found to have allowed one or nore

nale members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group

touring the Bloc countries to spend the night 1n his

room at America House.

He was suspected of honosexual

actlvitles, and he admitted to

ne being a participant

in bonosexual activities.

I believe these admissions

and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in

roon 9, identified now as the shielded code room, l0-

cated on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave

SAVAGE {his enlisted administrative assistant| verbal

instructions in my office to inmediately prepare the

necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the

station and instructed him to Inform ACSI by cable ag

to the details of the incident.

"I remember... a discussion I held with the U.s.

Alr Attache in his office (where a KGB microphone was

located, concerning homosexual activities on the part

of two of the Alr force enlisted personnel on statlol...

The discussion in his office concerned the administra-

tive procedures necessary in renoving the ladividuals

fron station:

*Apart from his general

duties as Deputy Chief of the U.s.

Bnbassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responslbilities for

each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFHAN: He super-..

reed the IGB Offloers operating axalnat codo alerks and the

donte of Asertca Nuure, and ho personally partlotpated in

accog to the tro code clerke named. STORShERO and KEYSERS.

STORBBIAO Bad XBY8ERS casos are dinourned in Parg V.l.J.0.

- TEP SESHET

---

## Page 178

M4286

SECRET

265.

(Summing. up)

"To be perfectly frank, I would

assune that...some of our modus operandi,

some of our

targets, some of the results, and all of our personal

weaknesses were comprosised.

•This is not a very de-

finite answer; however, it is the best estimate I caD

nake."

In its general introduction, the USIB damage report

states:

"Although there has been no observable indication

that the

Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment

of the United

States based. upon information considered pose

sibly. compromised, it must

be concluded that due to the or

tensive period of

penetration, the cumulative. effect has

resulted in serious damage to the United States.

"The

Soviets havo gained considerable knowledge as to the effective-

ness of United States operations within the, Soviet Union,

particularly

the military attache collection program.

Soviet knowledge of U.S. esphasis upon certain intelligence

collection areas has made it possible for then to identify

priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby

permitted them

to implement specific counteractions..

The

Soviets over the years must have

amassed considerable infor-

mation concerning the personal habits, problens, attitudes

and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which

can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any

time of their choosing in the future."

The following extract from the USIB damage report con-

cerns the declining value of the production from the micro-

phones in 1962 and 1963.*

"The

security practices and procedures appear to

have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at

which time the first plastic room was installed.. A

change occurred in the work habits in that the nore

senior State Department officers utilized the plastic

room for sensitive discussions and dictation.

The

room could accommodate only a limited portion of the

Enbassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number

of classified discussions were held outside this secure

In the April 1953-Hay 1960 period it was an ac-

cepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy

Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices

routine classified operations of the Embassy and to

dictate classified documents and telegrams....In Sep-

tember 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for

the typing section for the handling of sensitive classi-

fied material. Fron December 1963 to date

it was indi-

cated that no classified telegrams have been dictated

*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963

he learned there was alnost no production from the babassy

aicrophones.

One reason was the natural decline in effi

clency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB

belleved that other reasons were

the installation of

acoustic rooms in the Eubassy and tightened security pra

CodUreS.:;

TOP SE

---

## Page 179

266.

outside of the acoustic roons....The military attaches

reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or

typed by the originator and then turaed over

to the

code clerks for transmission:

In certain instarces

cables were dictated in

the offices.

There were many

discussiong in the offices relatiag

tö official duties,

office routine, proposed travel, personal observations

and nornal office talk not specifically in themselves

considered classified.

Fron 1953 to 1959, sensitive

classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the

accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and--

street noises....In 1959 a secure inner roon was con-

structed in the attache section and has since been

utilized for classified discussions and debriefings....

here adi citieste

---

## Page 180

267.

(111) Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices

were installed in the north ving (as distinct from the chancery)

of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962.

(For this

reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive

offices gradially--to protect NOSENKO's security--fron the

chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.)

He has commented

several

times on this subject, and these remarks are presented

below.

11 June 1962: "The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy

Street.

When they decided to give the rorth wing to the Embassy,

I wrote an entire report about it.

SWELSPIN was still there

then las KGB Chairman.

• proposed that! equipment be installed

in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc.

SHELEFIN

wrote:

'Is it worth it?'

At the time trere was an improvement

in mutual relatiors (between the Soviet Union and the United

States).

SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that... and tafore

saw, *You found 18 or 20 microphones in the

new building in War-

SHELEPI! wrOte:

'is it worth it?

We row have good re-

lations with America. It isn't worth ie.'

He didn't want com-

plications.

And. then tire was lost.

Two or three months passed

and we again wanted to try it.

SHELEPIi also wanted to,

was already too late.

AIDIAN was going there all the time, the

Security Officer.

It was already too late

because this can

done only while the building is being built.

When the windows

and doors have been begun it is already too late...

The north

wing was almost ready.

We don't have

anything there.

So, You

should move the Minister Counsellor there.

Move him to the

north wirg

from his present office...

Don't do it at once.

DO

it slowly.

Don't hurry; don't be

In a hurry.

Have him say that

he doesn't like this room and wants to move there...

We hear

all the military attaches--the Military Attache, the Naval

Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow,

Everything is

recorded.

But again, don't do anything at once.

Don't make

any (sudden) charges.

Quietly transfer one and then another

there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assist-

ants...

You must be very, very clever ard very, very foxy...

Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the build-

ing, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and

won't have anything."

31 January 1964:

"When the construction of this right

(north)

wing nad begun, inen you started the right wing, the

new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as

many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick them.

everywhere.

It really wasn't important how many of them would

really work.

The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was

SHELEPIN.

He didn't go for this. Whether it. was the flap

with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether

it

was something else or whether it was the international situa-

tion, they were afraid that this may be uncovered.

But then,

later, when the building was finished, and when you were

finishing or putting up the addition yourself,. at that point

It was too late to put these things in. It was impossible

to do. 1t.

A06344 99

NOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of 1960 of

19 microphones: in the new U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 181

OP SECRET

268

After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965, that a lead

cable had been found in the north wing,

NOSENKO

said:

personally can assure you that nothing was done in that

right. w1Dg.

Nothing,

absolutely nothing.

There was nothing

done there, so 1t must have been something else.".

No extensive counter-audio chacks have yet been cerried

out in the north wing of the U.S. Enbassy, and no wired

microphones have been

Investigation of the

microphones ia the main section of the tubassy led, however

to the discovery of other Soviet lechnicel equifment installed

In the north wing.

The USIB damage report stated:

"Three -

coaxtal cables were discovered running parallel to the one

hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof

ares to the basement of the North Annex...(All three cables

were severed by

American technicians in 1964.) The cable

runs

were as follows:

inchese rest erced cere in resort need attic.

The certer conductor was connected to the lead sheath

of the 20-palr and of the 30 pair cable which in turn

come iror. the east face of the chancery.

The shield of

the coaxial caule was unconnected.

"2.

The second coaxial cable... followed the same path

as the first coaxial cable.

The shield was interminated.

The center corductor was terminated in an

insulated

metal grill.

The grill is located in the upper crust

of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension

in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the

Chancery and the North Annex.

The long dimension is

normal to the street in front of the Embassy.

The

grill is nade of one centineter steel reinforcing rods

spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches).

The

overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7".

The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the

grill....The grill is located as close as possible to

the old common

wall and is about thirty

feet below the

State Department code room.

The grill 'points' in the

general direction of the code room as the plane of the

grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.

"3.

The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate

path of the uther coaxial cables to the block of rein-

forced concrete that contains the grill nentioned above.

This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of

fine Lits wire.

The shield of the coaxial cable was

unterninated...

The damagé report added:. "The coaxial cables appear to be

of recent installation probahly prior to Russian evacuation

of the North Annex.

The outer shields of all the coaxial

cables were carefully insulated.

The conxial cables and their terminations were evaluated

as follows. in the damage report:

"All tests that have been

performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths

of| the cables: 20. and 30 pairs were used as antenias....

No function has been determined for the third coasial cable

which terminated in a short plece of lits viro....The location

TOE SEGRET

---

## Page 182

V25 Sader 13?

TOP SECRET

269.

of the grill in such close proximity to the State Departent

Code Boon indicated that an operation vas directed agalast

that ares.... The lead sheath nay have had other uses:

The

possible uses that have been suggested are listed below.

The soat likely use is as an antenna although the other

pog-

sibilities have not been completely discarded.

"a.

Antenna for collection effort directed against code

"B. Antenna for use in connection with sone other

surveillance device or technique.:

"C. An alarn system to 'protect' the microphone

system.

"d.

Part of a hun removal system connected with the

microphone installation.

"e.

Not in

use. "

---

## Page 183

270:

(10)

MonItOr 1D?/Janming Bear

NOSENKO waS questioned on 31 JanUary

1964 about the

Bo-called

"Mascon Slanal:"

(This

is an

"S" band signal

that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure

area"-of the lis.

Embassy since the early 1950'8 IrON eD

apartment building located about 200 feet away.

Detalled

Investigation of the signal has beea underway

sinco Octo-

ber 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been

establishod.

Although there 1y sone speculetion that the

signal 16 neart for harassrent purposes only, the vier som

generally accepted by U.S. technicians 1s that 1t has son.

intelligezce-collection fuaction.

so change in the signal

has beer. noted since the discovery and the cutting of the

cables referred to in

the preceding section.) The inter-

view weat as follows:

NOSENKO:

There is a beam,

there is a ray which works

agrinst the Embassy. I k00».

Question: Do you know what It 1B?

NOSEYKO:

No, I don't. But I know that they work and they

put things

In, and they listen and they do sone-

thing, and they...

Question:

NOSENKO:

(Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?

Yes, they keep working: all the time.

Perhaps

periodically, but it's working.

Yes, there 15

sonething in the back.of the Embassy on this

Chaykovskly Street, and there is sonething 10

front of the Embassy, too.

•Question:

And it is for listening 1n?

NOSENKO:

No, it's in order to deprive you of working with

stationary equipsent.

Question:

What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't

operate properly?

NOSENKO:

Look, l'm not a spocialist.

I don't know the

details.

I know only that the work is being

done in

this particular area, in this particular

direction. But what they do, I dontt really

know.

question:

But this is not for the purpose of obtaining ln-

forsation?

NOSENKO:

Let's say you go on the sir.

So we:find out

whether you're listening in on some of our con-

audications or sonething like this.

question:

To what extent could

Hould you have

Hould you know the details of these

things?

TOF SEGRET

---

## Page 184

TOP SECRET

271.

NOSENKO:

No.

No.

This is sonothing that the menbers of

the (KGB) Righth Directorate (responsible for

connunicationg and cipbers) should concern then-

selves with, the ones who work in OTU.

This

doesn't concern us in the American Department,

1n the U.S. Eabessy Section.

Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal

was sed to Jan U.S.

equipment working in the Embassy bullding.

It wag this

systew,

he said,.

which had determined that the

Americans had intercepted sone GRU

agent radio communications.

Tho beam was designed

""both to monitor and to jam" trace-

'alssions from the Embassy.:. NOSENKO repeated that "not being

a spoclalist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the

Job, or any further details.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 185

*-TOP SECRET

276.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been

submitted

to the U.S. Fmbassy

in Moscow in connection with this visa request,

NOSENKO added, it was henceforth

necessary for him to use his

true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as

result of the cancellation

of his planned trip to

the United States, NOSENKO travelled with

a delegation of nickel industry experts to cuba.

He first men-

tioned this trip on 11 Jure 1962,

during his second meeting with

• CIA.

His account of his

activities was given in answer to the

question of whether he had

ever visited Germany:

"I have been

in Germany.

Yes, yes.

I wag in Cuba

Well, as NIKOLAYE!.

I was there a month

and a half.

This was when your

there and we wanted to prepare*...

well, I looked it rier to

see what kind of people you had working there.

They astied me

to prepare,

so to

spea',

an accounting on how

things were going.

I arrived there and asked how they were working

against you, just

on you.

Everyone there is vorsing for you.

One, two,

five days went by...

I had uniimited funds,

any arcunt.

I could

go to any restawant, any show.

so that's how it was with me.

The fellows reported:

'He lan American) is there.'

My mission

was to get a general

picture.

Not for one, two, or three days,

but for a month or two,

to provide

an opinion...

I worked pretty

cleverly on trem.

He (the

Anerican) would go

to a restaurant.

They would say to me:

'lie is at such-and-such a restaurant and

can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in

the mir-

ror or soileno..

I an sitting in the restaurant, dinking, and

that's all.

But I would watch him to

see how he behaves,

etc.,

is, I nould begin to feel if he has the mark

of an

intelligence officer.

...But this was not enough for me.

would go ayair and again.

I would see that, yes, he is

an in-

telligence officer...

We were asked to share our experiences

them (the Cubans).

Tiey didn't know a thing...

They had

turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party.

The

Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in

the suoject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-

called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba

and that his function there

was that of security officer.

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO:

1960, November and December 1960.

Question:

NOSENKO :

Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO.

I will explain

how this happened.

I was supposed to go to America,

sometime in November, with a group

from Gosplan,

automotive specialists, etc.

Data had already been

gubmitted for coordination and, in particular, my

name had been given to the American

(Moscow].

But the American Embassy Enbassy there

announced that

this delegation could be accepted, but a little

later.

And my passport had already been issued.

My passport had already been signed authorizing travel

abroad.

but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic

one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January

1961.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 186

273.

Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting

happens

and sorebody interesting comes to the library, but prac-

tically robody ever went to the library.. Then, what could ste

tell us akout these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons;

that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place.

they

were lazy buns.

They wouls go to a lesson once and then

miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one

or two."

In september 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never

been targetted ayainst any particular irdividual and had never

provided any interesting reports on her Aserican contacts.. At

the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she

was released from the Emtassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because

she was a little deaf and one had to speas loudly to her to be

understood.*

NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer be-

fore he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the Eritish

Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canad-

jan Embassies.

CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as

a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, whea she

vas released.

Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy

in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications

Procurement Officer from MaY 1959 until approximately Septem.

ber 1961, wen he left Moscow.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 187

:274.

- 4.

Overseas Assignments

a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment in Ethicpia (1960)

During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for

a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had

prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma.

O.M. GRIBAIQV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved

his request, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned

it

down shen a

file review revealed

potentially dangerous character

weaknesses.

NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows:

"Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Department of the Second

• Before 1956 he was stucying in the

Higher School of the KGB

and when he finished the school in 1956

he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came

to the American Department in 1958.

SO GRYAZNOV had very good

cornections in the Personnel Department.

So in 1960, when I

wanted to leave, to yo abroad on permanent assignment I said to

GRIBANOV:

'Let

me go for two years to Ethiopia.

When the Par-

sonnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have

to know what was there in my personal

file.

I had to learr. what

it was that was causing all this.

By that time GRYAZNOV was in

the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and hap-

pened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire

directorate, and he at one time had worked in the Personnel Office:

himself.

He said:

'Give me this thing and I'll see what I can

find out about it.' So he went to the

Personnel Department and

through his friend there got my personal file.

Ther. he gave me

a call

and said to come over.

I went to his office and he locked

the door.

Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't

let me hold it in my

hands so to speak.

So he read this case

to me, this 1954 case to

me, about the

woman and so forth," and

then said that at that time they made an investigation of

my

previous residence.

And they found out that while I was study-

ing at the Irstitute (of International Affairs) and was living

on Pervaya Meschangkaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me;

different girls,

new girl would visit me almost every week.

This was in my file.

Then

this case that took place in 1954.

And then in 1960--and, incidentally,

GRIBANOV mentioned this to

me also--the file said

that I was drinking quite a bit, and for

this reason I had many

fights with my wife.

And that was all

that appeared in my file.

Nothing else, whatsoever, besides

these things that I just mentioned."

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October

1960 reguest to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members

of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled

NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in

1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true

Identity while seeking treatment for venereal disease.-See

Part: IV.B•

TOP SECRET

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## Page 188

TOP SECRET

275.

to visit the United States in mid-November 1960.* HOSENKO was

listed as an engireer employed by the State Scientifis-Technical

Committee (GNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had

been scheduled to accompany this delegation as a secilrity offi-

cer but that the delegatior's visit to the linited States had

been postpored at the last moment.

He therefore did not travel

to this country.

He further explaired, on 17 April 1964, why his visa appli-

cation had been submitted

in tzue name and under a different

cover:

"In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKCLAYEV reprE-

senting the Ministry

of culture.

Then in 1953 I didn't go anj-

where.

Then when this question came up of my going

to the Staing

in 1960, I said: 'I'm rot

going.

I've been going under the

Ministry of Culture (cover! and with sports delegations.

This

has to be changed somelio's at this point.'

So we thought about

it and finally sonebody said:

'Lock, how about this?

Perhaps

lyou can usel this comnittee cE RUbNEV's (GNik).'

So I said:

'Well,

it's up to you.

You ducide.' by that time my passpurt

vas ready, but the inericans and the soviets hadn't come tu ar

agreenent yet.

It was decided that this delegation rould go to

the U.S. in 1961."

NOSENKO was then asked why he could not

have used the NIXOLAYEV name for his trip to

the United States.

He replied:

"Sure, I could have gone as NIFOlAYEV, but I just

didn't want

to.

Pecause, look, it was krown to us that the

British and American Intelligence exchange information on people

they suspect of being iGs, ana that the Britisi,

of course,

had probably watched me when i was in England lin 1957 and

13581

and probably there it was noticed that here's this man

under

the cover of Ministry of Culture.

He's tot a sportsman.

It

kind of looks suspicious.

Then he goes to the soviet Embassy.

Also suspicious.

So then I have to go to the States.

ind if

I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't uge

the same cover of Ministry of Culture because of the type of

the delegation.

I'd hive to use a different cover.

so I'd go

there and

they'd say:

'Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different

cover now.'

But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard

the nare.

Nobody knows the name.

Everything would be o.k.

NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under

SOmE

other alias.

He answered:

"That's the way it was de-

cided.

I guess

so as not to get all mixed up they decided to

send me as jOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in

charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide."**

This visa

after the

application was submitted approximately six months

KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to

Ethiopia.

** With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENO

said that he had been forced to use the name NIKCLAYEV because

this was the name he had used with British citizens fishest

Writhen they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he

could not, he said, have shown up in England with another nage

supon their return from the ossk ibee Party...u

This apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name

for the U.S. visa application, for NESENKO had used the name

SERGEYEV in his approach to American George DREW in 1959 (Part

V. Dilah.) and the name: PETERSON when he recruited Pröfessor

Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part: V.D.4.1.):

NOSENKO was in

contact with Arsene FRIPPEL under the name NIKOLAYEV during: this:

period... NOSENKO and other: sources have said that the XGB Bus-

pected that FRIPPEL was an inerican agent (see Part V.D.5.).

TOP SEA

---

## Page 189

14-00000

276.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been

submitted

to the U.S. Embassy in Moscot in

connection with this visa request,

NOSENKO added, it

was henceforth

necessary for him to use his

true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation

of his planned trip to

the United States, NOSENKO travelled

a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba.

He first men-

tioned this trip on 11 Jure 1962, during his second meeting with

• CIA.

kis account of his activities was given

in answer to the

question of whether he had ever visited

Germany:

"I have been

in Germany.

•es, yes.

I was

in Cusa

in 'ó].

Well, as NIKOLAYEV.

I was there a month and a half.

This was when your

Emoassy nag

there and we wanted to prepare"...

well, I looked it rier to

see what kind of people you had working there.

They asked me

to prepare,

so to speak,

in accounting

on how

things were going.

I arrived there and asked how they

were working against you, just

on you.

Everyone there is working for you.

One, two, three,

five days went by...

I had

uniinited funds, any arount.

I could

go to any restwant, any show.

The fellows reported:

'He

lan

So that's how it was with me.

inerican) is there.'

liy mission

was to get a goneral

picture.

Not for one,

two, or three days,

but for a month

to provide

an opinion...

I worked pretty

cleverly on trem.

to a restaurant.

They would say to ne:

'lie is at such-and-such a restaurant and

can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mir-

ror or somehor.

I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and

that's all.

But I would watch him to see how he behaves,

etc.,

etc.

That

is, I vould

begin to feel if he has the mark

of an

intelligence officer.

...But this was not enough for me.

I

would go ayair.

and again.

I would see that, yes, he is an in-

telligence officer...

We were asked to share our experiences

with them (the Cubangl.

riey didn't know a thing...

They had

turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party.

The

Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in

1962

the suoject of his trip to Cuba

came up again; NOSENKO re-

called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba

and that his function there

was that of security officer.

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO:

1960, November and December 1960.

Question:

Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO:

No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO.

I will explain

how this happened.

I was supposed to go to America,

sometime in Novenber, with a group irom Gosplan,

automotive specialists, etc.

Data had already been

submitted for coordination and, in particular, my

name had been given to the American Embassy there

(Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that

this delegation could be accepted, but a little

later.

And my passport had already been issued.

My passport had already been signed authorizing travel

abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic

one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January

2968

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277.

go to cuba.

GRIBANCY's deputy (S.5.) BANNIKOV,

said that

a worker (KGs officerl should be sent.

But they decided not to send a worker to Cuba.

"Why bother?" (they saidl.

"Is Cuba worth it?"

Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central

Committee lof the Communist Partyl.

Scheone fron

the Central Committee said:

there is a direc-

tive that one of our workers

must go neverthelesg."

And only two days remained before the departure of

the delegation.

Who could they send?

Question:

The first person they come across.

NOSENKO:

Those who have passports.

And they decided:

"Get going immediately.

We flew through

insterdam, through Gencia.

a night in Ansterdam

then made a short stop in

then the Azores, Santa Maria

Island, then we

to Curacao.

But we had a head-

the pilots "ere evidertly afraid that ve

wouldn't have enough:

so the plane went out

of Its way ana made a lunding on the island of bar-

This was not a Soviet piane, but KL™.

to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by kid.

Then from Curacao we flew to Arube.

We also spent

interesting island; the water

and natural surroundings are beautiful.

we flew througn kingston,

through Jamaica, and then

to Cusa.

we flew the same route back, but we

spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we

landed in Caracas

for about 40 minutes, and' through

Guiana-racicss the ocean, sOTe

island or anoiner there, and fron there again Lis-

bon, Geneva,

and Amsterdam.

But here the entire

delegation flew (to "loscow) after a day or two and

I took a train through west Germary (to East Berlinl.

All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have

been generally consistent with that given on 14 June

story has beer as follows:

In the latter part of 1960, at the

time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the

United States,

delegation

of nickel industry experts

from Gospian,

the Soviet State Planning

Commission, was prepar-

ing for departure to Cuba.

The delegation was a routine one,

consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the

soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of sus-

picion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abicad) Department of

the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be

necessary to include a security officer.

Two days prior to the

departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the

Conmunist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case

officer must go along.

Because of the short time remaining be-

fore the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh

Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suit-

able person and

necessary papers ready in time.

this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said:

*Just a minute.

We have a man who has his passport all ready.

His passport has been formalized. NOSENKO.

He was supposed

go to the states...

and his foreign

and signed.

don't you take him, Passport has been issued

NOSENKO's statement con-

"So somebody said: "How about a visa?'

And KUZNETSOV

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## Page 191

278.

says

'Never Iind.

The Cubans will give hin an entry

And then I had to get a transit visa because ve were flying

through Arsterdam.

And this whole thing was

care of in

two days.

The Cubang gare

their visa inmediately arc The

Netherlards issued their visa also right aray."

NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this deleça-

tion

were purely of a security nature.

He flew with

gation to Cuba in October or Noverber and spent about a month

and a half there.

During this tine he accompanied

the delega-

tion everywhere

"I was with the delegation.

to a plant--I do with

to the plant.

I was with them all

the time.

They went co

¡ifferent

to watch the produc-

tion.

They met with some representarives

of the so-called Insti-

tute

of Agrarian Reform.

They would neet with these people and

they rouid

have

many discussions about how to increase produc-

tion."

nostriko's cover assignent was deputy chief of the deie-

gation and shortly before departing losccw he was introduced to

the other members as

such.

agent within the delaya-

tion and developed several "confidential contacts" wring the

trIp, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO,

somewhat long änd dudd.

ile explained that we would not have

accepted

the assignment had he hrown how long the trip was to be,

and

that he

nad really wanted to go on! i. ine United States.

un his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO "as given a special

learing fror Havana Airport, the KGB

Resident in Cuba, i.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with in

structions to deliver it to Mosco.

NOSENKO did not know the

conterts of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route

There the wrappings became loose lit was bound only by

and Nosauto took the opportunity to determine that

it contained copies of

"letters betrees. MiKOYA" and KHRUSHCHEV

concerring the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between

the Soviet Urion and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

and Rumania.

Arriving with his delegation

at the airport in

Ansterdam, NOSEtiKO was toid that a message

had teer. received

from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing

that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che GUEVARA,

who was touring the Satellite countries and was then in Berlin.

While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore

was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague,

and in the late

evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train

for East Berlin.

When he arrived, however, he found that

GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any

The package was delivered

tO GUEVARA's deputy in

Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.

CIA travel

records show that NOSENKO, listed as a mineral

engineer, transitted imsterdam en route to

on 15 November

1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 17 Novem

ber 1960; and that

on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas

en route to Havana."

Our records also show that NOSENKO again

arrived in Ansterdam en

route to Moscow from Havana on 13 Decem-

ber 1960 and that he left for Moscow

on 15 December.

There is

no record that he travelled to Berlin.**

CiA ootained a photocopy of NOSENKO's passport uhile he was

passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.

It appears possible that his name was not removed from the

original passenger manifest for the 15 December tlight so

Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went uno

noticed.

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## Page 192

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279.

d.

The Bulgaria TDY ard the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961; four months after returning from

Cuba,

NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a

month to sofiò, the only trip he cook in other than a security

"watchdog" capacity.

According to NOSENKO, it happened this

way:

"I think I first heará that I was going to Bulgaria, a

week or so before I left, from s.I. YEGOROY,

Chief of the

section having contact with the counterintelligence representa-

tiveg

of the Countries of the Peoples'

Denocracies in Moscow...

He said:

'You must go to Bulgaria.

GRIBANOV has decided.'

He asked, 'Do you

know about this?' and I said

"1o.'

He said:

'KLYPIN (Chief of the American Department) must tell you.'

But

this was the first I had heard about it.

YEGOROV said that the

Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the

KGB

to

send

an officer fron the American Department of the Sec-

ond Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the

- American Department, Second

Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria..

After one or two days kLipI! told me about it.

He repeated

the same thirg and after about one and a half weeks I flew to

sofia."

The discussion continued as follows:

Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before

you left?

What briefings or discussions were held

concerning what you were to do in Scfia?

NOSENKO:

I was told:

"You are goirg for consultations. There

are KGB advisors there.

They will discuss it with

you."

No one was speaking with me about my trip.

Question: What discussions did you have with your department

chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this

trip?

NOSENKO:

Nothing.

He told me: "You will go. You will see

what they are doing.

You will tell them how to

work."

Question: Did you have any meetings or discussions with the

representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow be-

fore you left?

NOSENKO: NO.

Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV of his

section about what you were going to do in Sofia?

NOSENKO:

YEGOROV said:

"You will go. You will tell us what

they are doing."

Question:

Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know any-

thing about the size of the American Department of

the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO:

No. Nothing.

questions: Did you know the names of any of the officers of the

127

- American Departnent of the Bulgarian MVR?

BOSENKO: No:

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## Page 193

UP. SEGRE

280.

Questions pid you know what any of their particular problems

were?

NOSENKO: No.

Nothing.

Question: Did you know just what was the area of responsibility

of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO:

No. Nothing.

NOSENKO fled from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met

at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOILOV, a former Second Chief

Directorate officer whom he had krown in Moscow.*

The follok.

ing morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and wes

taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far

away.

NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was

told that "they want to know about how to work against the Ameri-

can Legation.

He said he wanted me

how to work, right from letter 'A""tO tell them everything about

NOSENKO was. then intro-

duced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and

to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he

was assigned an office in the MVR tuilding.

During the ensuing

weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases

with individual Bulgarian officers vorking aguinst the imerican

target.

On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers

on the principles of operations against foreign military person-

nel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MR surveillance

post opposite

the American Legatior.

He discussed. KGB methods

of operations against foreign tourists.

He also addressed the

entire American Department for about five hours and told them

"what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work."

At the end of his visit, sone

time in nid-May, NOSENKO conferred

with the First Deputy Minister

of the MVR about what had been

accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations

against Americans.

As an outgrowth of his IDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has pro-

vided one lead to a case in which he said he took personal part.

About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around

the end of

April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists

of foreigners who were

scheduled to visit Bulgaria: in the near future.

and he came

across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man

named LINT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him

in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV oI

YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual.

He asked the Bulgarians

whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages.

When

the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO de

cided to check his recollection against KGB records and an

immediate phone call was placed to yoscow. asking for traces.

* NOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the

Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate,

until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to

Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been

Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

For the two years

Immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been

Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief

Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked

why KOZLOV was unable to "advise" the Bulgarlans in this

Instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on

higher levels and that he had been away fron the vort for

a sumber of years..

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281-

A reply was received almost at once:

"yes.

This

is the sane

Lu who was in Moscow. : Homosexual."

NOSENKO told CIA that

the KGB had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's

homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not pre-

viously known of then.

NOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows:

"KOZLOY and the Chief of the American

Department were very in-

terested.

KOZLOV said:

(NOSENKO). you must help then.

They never recruited an American.'

I said that I would do what

I could.

The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the

Chief of the Second Directorate,

I asked them

if they had a homosexual ayent.

and said they

had one who is an operational concact.

I said, acquaint

then, prepare a flat, make the pictures.

This is the first

stage.

I also told then, of course, to

find out how long he

had been there, why, who

his acquaintances were, etc.

Ther. we

wert to YEGCROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and

KOZLOV. called

GRIBANOV. GRIZANOV,

I later

found out,

was in a meeting with

the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was

not in a good mood.

Why', I don't know.

lie didn't understand

what KOZLOV was saying.

GRIBANOV thought that I, myself, wanted

to make the approach to LUNt.

KOZLOV got confused on the pione.

GRIBANOV asked to speak

to me. I took the phone.

'what are

you doing?' he said.

"You are not at hore, you are abroad.

You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if

you were at home.

'O.K., O.K. I wasn't going to do

anything.'

He hung uf.

I told

KOZLOV that even

if the Bulgar-

ians were to ask me, I could not do it myself.

YEGOROV became

upset.

He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians

were

asking.

'What they ask, I will tell,' I said,

"but I am

not leaving

the office to go

any place of do anything.

I can

only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is

caught.

I can dictate the questions to be asked. But the

approach

and recruitment I cannot do myself.'

"The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active

participation,

but they didn't know what to do.

I told them

to get two agents.

Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one.

The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long.

told them that if they wanted

to take pictures and make a pitch

later, that's one thing.

But if they wanted to do it all in

one step, that is another.

I told them they should sonsider the

time element...

The Chief of the American Department, KOVACHEV,

and the chief

of the section dealing with tourists and American

delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was

made at the end of April, I think."

NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the

approach.

I told

them I would not leave.

'If you need my

advice,' I said,

"come to me.' KOZLOV and I were sitting in

his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next

day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached

LUNT.

I only advised them that after the first conversation with

him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. I said

Take him sone place nice to finish the conversation.

mat's what I suggested."

TOE SECRET

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## Page 195

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282.

was not known to NOSENKo, for he said: "I

didn't read any report of

the results, and I didn't ask to see

I. took a restral position.

They said everytiing was o.R.

The next day Lujit was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief.

I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April,

2; and 3 May.

returned they said everything was O.K.

chat he i-lur) had

I asked them what they had decided for

the future, a contact in the United States or not.

They said

they decided against it because he was to core to Bulgaria in

or 1963 for a Slavic conference."

This account, which NOSENKO gave on & October 1964, differs

somewha- from what he had

said earlier,.on 1l June 1962, during

his second meeting with CIA.

claimed then that he per-

sonali? participated in the recruitnent of LilT against GRIDANOVE

sent me in '61 to Bulgaria.

The Minister of Interral

Affairs there

asked for a specialist to help them.

professor arrived, a very prominent special-

ist on the slavic countries...

They (the Bulgarians) had never

tried ito recrit!

an American.

'Let's try,' I said.

The sov-

iet advisor in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that

NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American.

GRIBAiCY das in a conference at the time.

GRIBANOV said:

the hell's NOSENKO?

Let me talk to him...

what the hell are

you doing?

I sent you orly as an advisor.'

Then he hung up.

What couid I do?

The Buigarians had already made all prepara-

i was embarrassed, but what could i do?

ind they were waiting for me...

cided to go aheas.

I was sure that it would work.

I felt that

it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited...

I spit on everything and went ahead with

the Bulgarians.

I

told trem to grab hin.

If it will be difficalt for you, tell

me and I myself can recruit him.

Weil, they began and I came

there.

INCSINKO is

speaking

of himselfl was under the guise

of a Bulgarian and spoke

in

English, although my English was

poor...

I said:

'You are a pederast.'

He also proved him-

self to be a homosexual there lin

'well, what will

society think of you,

Well, what did

this person decide?

He agreed."

The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated

directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still

in Geneva.

He volunteered the following:

*In Bulgaria in

April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate

in this, I went there, and. I helped them there with the whole

process of recruitment of this professor.

I helped the Bul-

garians with what to do and how.

He was

the professor of

philolom, LiTiT."

NOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation

against LUNT.

In the account quoted above, he said that the

approach was made the day before he left on his. May Day holi-

day. On 24 April 1964 he said:

"I remember that it was at

the very beginning of May that this name came up.

And we got

the information from Moscow the same day, telling us it was

the same LUNT.

I went on a trip the ist,

2nd, 3rd of May.

That is the 30th of April, lat and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of

May in the morning I was back.

So it was in the very beginning

after the night of the trip.

And Moscow was called right away.

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283.

given

all the data, and they called back right away and said:

'Yes, this is the same LUNT sho was in Moscod...

As.: 300n 88

this was established, the next day the Bulgariars plarted this

homosexual or hin.

They planted this man either next to him

or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNt and they got te-

gether and decided to meet with each other the same day or the

sext day.

This was all done very rapidly.

According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took

place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had

contacted an official in the l.S. Embassy.

He travelled on

9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia,

at once re-

ported the incident to U.S. Massador George KENNAN, an aca-

demic acquaintance.

LUNT told the Ambassador,

and later CIA,

that he had visited sofia on ore earlier occasion, from 8 to

28 November 1960.

During

this first

trip he became involved

with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he ergaged in homo-

sexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to

whon he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended

to sell on the black market.

On one occasior during the first

visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian

civil police while walking on the

street with LINT.

leaving Bulgaria

in November 1960, LUNT received tho letters

fION ALEXSIEV and prior to his next visit, en 25 April 1961,

LUNI wrote ALEKSIEV saying

he would be returning.

SO TOP SECRE

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## Page 197

284•

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department in January 1962.

In

the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis

of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Depart-

ment.

GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NoSEnKO Iron.

the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the

post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO'&

superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had his eye on this job,

however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the Ameri-

can Department for it.

(In fact; NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had

once held the job, lcsing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.)

NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation

which his on promotion to this post would have created.

NOSENKO

. descriked his transfer in the February 1965 interrogationg. The

following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:

"The decision for me to return to the Seventh (Tourist)

Departrert. in Jaruary 1962 was actually made in about Septem-

ber or October 1961.

GRIBANOV planned to appoint me deputy

chief of the First (American) Department, but the new Chief

of the First Department, FELOSEYE!, wanted KOVSHUK to take

this position.

position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of ELDOSEYEV,

I want to GRIBANOV and reguested that I be transferred back

to the Seventh department, in any position.

spoken to (V.D.) CHELNOKO!, Who was then Chief of the

Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested

that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh

Department is Chief of the First (American-British-Canadian)

Section with the understanding that I would be appointed

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this

position would be vacated by (B.À.) BALDIN [who was retiring

in July 1962].

...GRIBANOV did not teli me his reasons...

for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Depart-

ment in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and

later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962.

did not discuss witi me my personal qualifications for.

each of these positions."

Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity

during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tour-

ist Department.

There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV,

faniliarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist

Section, and discussed current operations and operational possi-

bilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal

order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 Desen-

ber 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file

and the U... Embassy security file to his successor as leputy

Chief of the American Erbassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the

next few days.*

As he had when he transferred from the Tourist

to the American Department in 1960, NOSENXO said, he took his

active agents and his safehouse on

Vorovskiy Street with him when

he turned to the Tourist Department in 1962.

These specific dates were arrived it under interrogation in

February 1965.

• On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said

that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date);

be said in. February. 1965 that he was "officially" transferred

at the end of December and reported to his new position at

the beginning of January (see below).

"TOP SECHEY

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7 F.

January: 1262 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)

.1.

Date of Transfer

NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left

the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Departmert to become

Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist

Department.

During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on

different occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and

in

February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between

15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSINKO gave the

date as 2 or 3 january 1962.

He has also reported that he was

in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN

serviced

the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus

placing NOSENKO in the U.s.

Embassy Section until late March

1962) and that he had transterred

to the Tourist Department by

the time GOLITSyN defected (which NOSeNKO place

in mid-January

1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E.

JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operation**

con-

firmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 january 1962.

In Fabruary 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct

date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962.

interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described

on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site or Pushkin

Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post

for three months afterwards; during all of this period.

had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Depart-

ment.

NOSENKO was told that CiA records show that ABIDIAN made

only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961,

days before the approach to JOHNSON.

might have been confused,

"facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any corre-

lation of dates.

2. Functions and Activities

As Chief of the american-British-Caradian Section of the

Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the

American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO

said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all

KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as

for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case

officers.

He had no deputy.

NOSENKO told CIA that he required

several months at the beginning of 1962 "to get the feel of

things", "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the

initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the

influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season

consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the

tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965 .

Stateuents by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in

Part VI.E.. and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street

dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

See Part V.F:4. for details on this operation.

TE: SECRET

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## Page 199

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236.

whether, in his first several months in the Tourist Department,

origina-ed any new methods for

operations against An-

erican tourists.

rie replied that during this period he had

proposed a stuây

of representatives of foreign courist firms

in Moscow with

toward the KGb attempting to recruit

This suggestion, NosEyk? said, had been accepted.

In March :955, NOSENKO was

asked whar new knowledge con-

cerning the use of

tourism for espiorage purposes by foreign

incelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during

his two-year

absence from the Tourist Department.

lie replied

that. the

KGB had noted an increase

in automobile tourism and

that American intelligence had increased its use of multinational

tourist groups.

NOSENXO was then asked wrat new information

concerning the use of tourism as a cover for uspiorage activity

had

been obtained by the kGB from any agent source during this

period.

NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any suci: new

information nor had he heard of such

an agert.**

NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief

of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.N. GRIBANOV, he was pro-

moted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist

Department in July 1962, irmediately after his return from

A year later he was made fires Deputy

Department,

a prorotion which irvoivea only a change in title

as there was no second Deputy Chier at the time.

Apart from

saying he was V.i. CHELIOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962

to january 1964 and as such general supervisor

of all KGB tour-

ist operations, NOSENKO has not detailed the functions attached

to this position; NOSENKO has nut been questioned

specifically

NOSENHO's first operational activity after transferring to

the American Tourisi Section was supervision of a homosexual

tO N.E. JCHISIN on 5 January 1962.

Additionally, during

the 1902-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO took part

in the recruitrent approach to Horst

ERAUNS, in the interrogation

of Yale University Professor Frederick BAPCHOORN, and in the

arrest of the iterican tour guide Bernard KOTeN.

For a short

time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexander

SVENCHANSKIY,

owner of a tourist agency

in New York Ci=y***

and a Russian

language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois.

* NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal

Part 5.5.3. Forming the basis of the FRIEPEL operation isee

See Part V.D. Yob., which discusses the KGB agent George

@ staff officer of MI-6,

who confessed after his

in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet

handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by

CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington

during April 1960.

These meetings were held to coordinate

the American and British programs fcr legal travel opera-

tions,

mainly with

tourists, into the Soviet Undon.

Part V.D.T.C. describes a top secret KGB document on

western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was

prepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB

Second Chief Directorate.

This document, which the

derector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain

portions of the minutes given to the KGB by blake.

DE*ROTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR

by this tourist agency.

TOP SECRET

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287.

supervisory position in

the Tourist Department NOSENKO also be-

came involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent.

(These six cases -

JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are

discussed below.)

NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the

approach to Natalie BIENSTO (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented

by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962.

NOSENKO

said he pa-ticipated in the

Harvey OSWALD after P-esidert KBINEDY's assassination in Novem-

ber 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).

NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962

to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the

considerable anount of time spent on temporary duty assignments

outside Moscow during these two years.

In mid-February 1962,

soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the uterican Tourist

Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which

lasted

from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III. B.).

ENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six morths outside

Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments.

These included a two-

day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL,

ar inspection tour of the

Leningrad KGB organization,

conference on border control,

a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for

a conference on tourist travel with KG3 representatives from

the Soviet Central Asian repubiics, and an eight- or ten-day

inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a tean headed by

GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO said he travelled to

Gorkiy Oblast on 16-17

December 1963 to assist in the

search for CHERsPaNov, who had

passed

secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see

Part VI.D.7.c.).

3. NOSENKO 's Agents

when NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the

first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had

been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.

These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO'S COm-

ments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*

a. Arsene FRIPPEL:

FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but

NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case

cer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him.

had no KGB cortacts in New York City.)

Describing FRIPPEL'S

past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he

said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said:

"FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing..•

a weak agent...

I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he

was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped

that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future

When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in

1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once in Moscow,

The only other agent. whom NOSENKO handled during this

period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY.

Part V.F.6.).

TOP SECRET

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## Page 201

288.

but FRIPpEL provided nothing useful on these occasions.*

imereas NOSENKO had rormally met RIFPEl, in the company of

CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL'S Moscow tour, he dent alone to the

tio 1963 meetings.

b. Johan PREISFREVID:

AftEr COLIISYN'S defection, NOSEUKO

said, the KGs considerca

PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore

ineligible for

further use against inericans at the Embassy in

For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.s. Embassy

Section to continue to tardle PREISEREUND while serving in the

-Tourist Department, but as PREISEREUND spoke only lanish and

Russian, he was of

no use against Erglish-speaking tourists.

Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND

latter's visits to

Moscow in 1952 and 1953, this agent wüs rot used operatiorally.

c. VOLKOV and YEERONOV:

NOSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFRENOV took

entrapment approach to w.E. yoroN several days

after NOSEiKO retuined to the Tourist Departnert.

This

was

first operational activity since 1959,

for they had rot

been used

in any homosexual operations while NOSENKO was in the

U.S. Embassy Section.

according to NOSENKO, the last

time they were engaged in kGB activity.

At the end

of 1952 or

the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and

sent by NOSENkO to deB archives.

NOSEIiO explained that VOLOV

and YEFREYOU had bECoMe

well known for their operational

activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate.

d.

NOSENKO waS

transferred to the Tourist Department,

he was instructed

Devartment Chief, o.M.

FEDOSEYEV, and VoM. KOVSHuK,

the U.S. Embassy Section,

to continue to handle @2AS9001TEN74YS10

studying

in Moscow.

NOSENKO had personally recruited als

and had used him in the developrient of ü.s. mlitary code

clerk Matthed ZJJUS (see Part V.E. 3. c.) in 1961,

an

operation

which

was still underkay at the

zilne

of NOSENKO's transfer.

NOSENKO continued to meet delus during the first months of

1962, and he recallei that in February ur March of that year

he instructed tally to attempt to arrange a social meeting

ZJJUS in a Moscow

restaurant so that another KGB agent

could be introduced to

the KGB target.

This meeting had not

taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva.

before leaving Moscow,

around 12 March 1962,

NOSENKO turned

Mess over to G.I. GRYAZNOV,

according to NOSENKO, then the

Deputy Chief of

the U.S. Embassy Section. Class was scheduled

¿o finish his studies

in Moscow in May 1962,

and NOSENKO be-

lieved he left at that time to return to syria.

11.

FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV

1n Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State

Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended

¿o visit the USSR at that time.

NOSENKO said there vas

.:no such meeting.

See Part V.D.5.

sprais

ATr:

SOR SEONES

---

## Page 202

289:

Marina RYTOVA:

Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSEKO by I.A. KONSTAN-

TINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956 or 1957.

At that time

she was working as an interpreter at the Russiar, Permanent

Exhibition in MoscOw. In 1960 or 1961 she. became an instructor

of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations,

and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Thereafter

she ceased all

agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as

her case officer until his defection in 1964.

He did not andi-

cate that RYTOVA took part in ary operations

fror. January 1962

until she begar work for the Central Cormittee.

4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON

a. NOSENKO 's Information:

NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American

tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1552. He did not name

JOHNSON at this time:

"In January

of this year I recruited Lan

American/.

I cannot remember his name.

He is from California,

He loved men.

I have an agert network

capable of anything and, in particular, although I head a section

there, I have

¿ good agent apparatus, i.e., I have beautiful

girls...

and I have young pederasts,

homosexuals.

In partic-

ular.

I have one special pair LVOLKOV and YEFRENOV/ - I'm afraid

that

they are known to you and the English...

Here is what

happened.

He gave me a signature.

I told hir: 'write it your-

self.'

So he typed it on a typewriter.

I said: "No, I don't

want it typed.

write it out lonahand.'...

He had a very re-

actionary attitude toward the

Soviet Union.

His attitude was

such that he insulted us terribly.

He visited Baptist groups.

churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the goverrment horribly.

He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e.. the

government is lousy and

everything here is poor.

I said to him:

'Write, damn it, that the best country lin the "orla is the

Soviet Union,

that the best government is the Soviet Government.

write, write.'

In general he did everything LI asked/ but then,

right away,

he ran to the Embassy_and told everything. This

was in January

of this year L1962/.

He told everything.

know that he told.

But he gave me his signature that he would

help the Soviet security organs, etc.

I kaod this... I was

there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying.

sat down and waited.

Surveillance was on the job.

•Tell

me

when he comes, ' LI ordered/. I sat down.

'He has come,' ¿the

surveillance

team reported/.

his room, ' Lthey

said/.

"where is he?' LI agked/.

'In

'We'll wait,' (I replied.

Mey re-

ported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went

there at once. He was sitting alone.

I approached him:

'Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him.

_I knew

that he had told everything in the embassy. LI said:/ "How

are you? How about our connection in the States?

And our

work in the States?

what do you think about it?' I said to

him:

"Will you work?

Can you give us something

important of

not?' He answered:

'I have nothing..'

I said: '"And if I

Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have

reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendenctes.

Tur scher

so set...

---

## Page 203

P3010

290.

make it public that you are a pederast, what will happen then?

•No, ' he said.

'I will do anything you want.'

But I couldn't

tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said:

"Listen, brother, I don't believe you.

You are a bad person.

he decided that we couldn't do anything with hin.

'Go home.

damn yo:.' I said.

'But if you write one irsulting article

about Russia I

will find you, even in the U.s.'

He

is

Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy.

ird I left.

He

pushed aside.

his food and ran to a pay telephone and called

Lthe Embassy/: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was

frightening

me.'

vie know he called the Embassy. Ne hear

everything.

NOSENKO's first reference to ¿CINSON ir. 1964 was at a meet-

ing

on 2 february, when he produced a note bearing that rame and

the

date 5 January 1962.

"Here I have a rame jotted down,

Everett wallace Lsig/ JOHNSON, " NOSENKO said.

"The date was

5 January 1962,

but what took place i have assolutely no recol-

lectior.. I don't think it was a

recruitment, but it

was some

sort of contact, or he was being studied or worked on, or some-

thing like that.

But I remember nothing."

NOSENKO rext mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April

Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name,

eventually rementered that "it was semething

like JOHNSON,

JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a

'J'" ard that he was

a Baptist irom the California

NOSENKO placed the opera-

tion sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow

from Geneva, because he also remeritered wearing "just a coat,

no overcoat at the time."

JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet

Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this

basis the KGB Secona Chief Directorate considered him as a

recruitment target.

Second Chief Directorate checked

whether the KGB First Chief Directcrate wold have any use for

JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest

in JOHNSON:

He had no access to important information, and he

lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United

States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON

mailing some letters in Moscow.

When read by the KGB they were

found to be

"so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical..

that they /the KGB/ decided something had to be done"

to stop

him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on

his return to the United States.

At about the same time there

was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided

to entrap him on this basis.

The sole reason was to halt

JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR - no recruitment has attempted.

because neither the Pirst nor the Second Chief Directorates

had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had detere

mined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal

anyway.

NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the

approach to JOHNSON, except. that "BOBKOV said I should go."

(P. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate,

supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.)

NOSEN-

KO's homosexual agerts. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to

compromise JOHNSON: *

In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received Its first

indication of JOHNSON's homosexuality from one or both

these agents.:

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• 5 Глін

291.

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the

Metropol Hotel.

They told JOHNSON that they had recently ar-

rived in Moscow and invited JONSON to visit their hotel room.

JOISON agreed because "they urderstood

each other right away.

Tiey knew they were the same li.e..

homosexuals) and so he came,

and when they were engaged

in treir business,

our people walked

in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and

one militiaman."

Protographs of the incident had been taken,

but these had

developed at the time of this, the first

corfrontation of JohNso!i.

A report describing the circumstanses

(ar.

prepared,

ard JOINSON was then transferred to another

rOO.R.

By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel fron his

office, ard he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in

accordance with KGB orders.

NOSENKO discussed the situation

with Jordisch, then asked

him to type and sign a statement that

he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union."

JOHNSON did as he was told.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had

been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of tre

Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his

When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSeNKO

preserted him with an envelope containing copies of the photo-

graphs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press

if JOINSON were to break his promise.

The KGS later learned

that JOHNISON had visited (or phoned,

according to a later ver-

sion) the U.S.

Embassy and assumed that he had reported the

NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had

used during this operation.

Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that.

upon his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise,

the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's pre-

sence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said:

"How come?

How

could you do such a thing?

What are we going to do now?

After

all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from

five to eitht years for such relations. It used to be three

to five, not it's from five to eight.

Frightened by this,

JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate

Union in the future.

NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an

operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary

letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't

jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this. way. And not

everything that is written this way gets into their hands.

In this case there was a coincidence. " There was something we

coule hit him on.

For instance, if the fact that he is a

homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably

just say: 'All right, to hell with him.

we have to get rid

of him.

Let's see that his trip is cut off.'".

hile discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January

1965, the following dialogue took place:

HOSENKO

This (the

of '62 or'''63.

approach) cook place in the sumertime

Question:: In your notes, you have the date 5 January, 1962.

No, it doesn't concern JOHNSON at all. I remember

It was sumer: I think it vas ' 63.

---

## Page 205

NO: 14 2291

296:

course, because we haven't seen him yet. But even that first

signal is very helpful.

so if he goes on a Soviet plane. they

will start watching him fron the time the flight starts.

Now.

83 sOOn

as he crosses the korder. he will be watched by the

border guards; he will be watched the entire route of his travel.

This is a very important busiress, because the main task in re-

gard to tourists 1s

to uncover within the gereral flow of tourists

those persons wiao are of

interest from the operational point of

view...

Let's just say that this person is processing a group

of American tourists who are going to the so-iet Union, and.

vit.en the processing is almost finisted, another person is added

to the group.

lobody knows this person in the group... but he

was added_at the last mirute.

So this is an indication.

This 1s

what he lthe agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was

being trained in Moscow...

Now, if some official government

agency makes a request that a man be sent to the Soviet Union as

•a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicio., of course...

In

such things he has been traired...

He comes to Moscow onie or

twice a year.

You krow, such a little Jewish fellow - an emigre

from fussia - in the past, you know, scared of everything.

The

last time he cane

he told us:

'You know, I'm thinking about it

all the time, ' he says.

So they asked him: 'Are you afraid?

Why are you shaking?'

He says,

•well, I'm not airaid: I'm not

shakirg.

But why should I be caught like an idiot...'

Kis

pseudonym is 'AUD' and his last name is SVE:CHANSKIY, Well.

I'll give you all this later."

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was

recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSaiKO, had taken over

the handling of this agent from tourist Department case officer

Ye. N. NOSKOV. *

SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KG3 many open code

messages such

as those described arove, and a number of these

messages have been considered to have been of definite opera-

tional interest.

NOSENKO identified SVENCHAISKIY as the presi-

dent of "Aftor. Tours" in New York City and the owner of a

Russian-language bookstore in Chicago.

There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time

of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO Ieported on 1 March

1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had cortacts with ANTORG in New

York city.

The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in con-

tacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this

was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was de-

termined that SVENCIANSKIY

was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO Ie-

plied: "NOSKOV felt it;" he had no further explanation.)

The

recruitment was based mainly on ar agreement that Inturist

would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated.

NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for black-

marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement.•

NOSENKO took over the case from NOSKOV in September 1963,

and

his name was entered 'in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY

as the handling officer as of that date.

Together with NOSKOV,

NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when

the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September

and one towards. the end of 1963.

bo

Information from Other Sources:

CIA records reflect that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY was born

fon 6. March 1909 in Theodasia, Russia..:

He lumigrated to the

United, States. in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen on hts

At this time, NOSENKO has stated, he (NOSErKO) was Plest.

Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

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## Page 206

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3)?.

father's

His carliest erployers vera the "All-

fussian

tc: Mirch 1931,

by AuTORG in New Yoik City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by

the soviet Goverancis Purchasing Conmission in ilashington from

May

1942 until Desericer 1942.

Lucing the

second world war.

SVENCHANSKIY serves in the U.S. Army Air fosce as "official

tranglater at the shite Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had

frequent contacts with members uf Soviet aircraft crens.

FroN

October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for re-

fusing to answer questions by tre MeCarran Committee corcerning

alleged subversive activity, SVENHANSKIY was employed

at United

Nations leadquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the

USSR.

As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of

Aftor. ours, ins., lew York City, and presidert of Cross world

Books and Periodicals, Chicaço.

Afton Tours is a branch of the

Package Express and Travel hercy, which is a registered agent

of Inturist.

Cross dorld Books and Periodicals was registered

in 1961 as an agent of Mezhunaroinaya Knige,

the Soviet Foreign

Trade laministration dealing with the distribution and sale of

Kussiar:-language books, periodicals, films.

and visual

aids.

SVENCHANSKIY haS made

numerous trips to the USsR, including one

in dagust ara Septenter 1963.

Allegations of SVENGiWSKIY's Conmunist sympathies and pro-

bable soviet espionage actly

dat:!

tack

Force service In midska. 0%

0273869

soof his strong pro-sciet

bias

anu

suspiciously

CLOSE

го1-

hith Soviets.

In Aujust 1950 Harry Goid, then in prison

as

admitted soviet agent, linked

SVENCHANSKIY to the soviet

espionage retwork in the United Statrs.*

sold stated that in.

March 1942 SVENC!ANSKIY, Under the

name of SkiN, had been

in-

strumental in introcuring his

"co-conspirator" Abraham PROTHMAN

to "another AlTORG man to engage ir industrial espionage."

CIA report of 14 doventer 1950 sites a "tested

source" la Czech

national employed at the United Nations as stating:

"I believe

that Alexarder SVENCIANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of

the

Russian Division of the United Vations, is a Communist

and

possibly a Communist

agent

Identifica

Soviet agent

by

Eliza-

bEth

BENTLEY,

KALIEVICH has since emigrated to the soviet

UnIon: he was identified as an agert of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtualiy all the

individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business

arrangements since leaving the United Nations have of had con-

nections with the U.s. Communist Party or with the Soviet

Intelligence Services.

His business dealings have also brought

him into freguent contact with Soviet officials in this country,

including a number of identified intelligence officers. (two of

them reported on by NOSENKO).

The 21 October 1953 edition of the New York Times carried

the story of SOLD'; testimony under the headline

"Ex-U.N.

Aide lirked to Spy Ring by Gold:".

the Times reported that

GOlD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week:

before.

TOP SECHEN

---

## Page 207

299

An EUI. LETOI!

SVEN HANSKIYE

?.

KOTEN'S ArEESE OE3 LIE KER 2226'

B. .

Information Fron 2022

310

NOSENKO waS asked in

warava on 25 January 1954 whether he

had bean involved in the orrect of an inericer toirlat ir the

visk in the rall of 1903

Almost at onus, dronito resegrazed

this as the case ot terrora koler, ü guir for tito: Tours in

Nor Xord City fand hence an erployee es

see below who nad boon apprchended ca tomoscruai charges in Kiev.

NeStro explain d that, ihrio in hau nos personaliy participated

in the arrest ard har?

rover met k00E8, in had rupervised the case

from KGB Headquarters and

"the cave was trportre is me."

NOSENKO said that Morti had dore boon a member of the An-

arican Comunist Party

and was a

fre turnt visitor to the Sovle.

Union after merid des

on these trips he had a large number

of contacts with dissient literary tigires ars with

soviet

citizers in general, particularly amoro kussian Jens.**

Because

of these many

suspiciou: coriacts, both the hus Firit ard the

Second Chief Direclorate harl cone to the conclusion that KOrEi

night well be a provocation aneut planted in or recruited from

the ranks of the Comurast l'arty of the Unitra States.

More-

over, on the eve of kolE': 1903 trip, the Tourist Department

learred fron V.u. BAilOUsilY ot the First chies Directorate's

Scientific and Technival (Sar) Directorate that KOTEi wa3

arrying with him the acuress

relatives of an important

bagert of the KGB's f

Logal Pesiderry, aud that KOTEi

incended to visit them

walde

1n

the UsEe

NOSENKO

said he did

not know the nave of this ayent

This agert ros a naturallied imerican citizen, about 40

to 45 years ola, an engineer born in Russia, "no "is employed

in an

"interesting industrial company or technical organization

in the New York City area:" For some time ha had been working

CIA told NOSTRO of this information about SCHCLON. in March

1965.

He recalled that a woran named Sonja worked for

SVENCHANSKIY but

said that "we considered

that he (svan-

CHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)."

NOSENKO

did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLON.

** NOSENKO has

explained in another context that the Second

Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet

Jews because: the Israeli Intelligence Service has fre-

quently sponsored such contacts:

TOP SEMEN

---

## Page 208

TOP SECRET

209

actively for th

Legal Residency and had provided the

KGB with

"good, 5011ù

Irformation" with

"very valuable material

fOI

technical intelligerce;" at the same time the agent had been

asking to be repatriated

to the USSR, to becone a Soviet citizen,

but the Kg! had been putting him off in order

to continue to

exploit his eccess.

Since the amount and quality of the agent's

production had recently deterioraced, the KGB decided to accede

to his request for repatriation.

Now, however, the agent de-

clined, sayirg

that

was not ready to go just yet.

First he

nas practically veggirg to cone to tre Soviet Union ard now ha

was balking,"

This by liself appeared suspicious to the KCB, but

in addition, it was alast this time that the agent came irto

con-

tact with KCTEN

NOSEUKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN

"useà to go to some vookstore that sells Soviet literatura and

through a saleslady ir this story whom Kotal knows, he became

acquainted with the agent. Wro also used to go to this store.

After

that, he used

to meet with the agent without the saleslady."

On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Direstorate

suspected that kOTEl had been directed specifically to this store

in order to meet ard

"work on" the agent and that, having learned

that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo,

atout 17 ki10-

meters from Sochi.., he had evidently received

the assignt.ent

(to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence.

Evidently

they had gotten on the irall of this agent and were

checking on

him."

The KGB

also had suspicions concerning the relatives,

former kulaks who were still well-off financially.

It was knomn.

to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister

In Startsiya loo that he wanted to return to the soviet Union.

and

she had replied:

"Is there any sense in your coming here?"

KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to sochi.

From

there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband

in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him.

When

they arrived at ¡OTE!'s hotel: however, the hotel

adninistrator

told them that KOTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow

& meeting.

KOTIN ther took it upor himself to travel to Start-

siya Loo where he eventually contacted

and spoke to the rela-

tives.

In the course of this meeting KOTE took photographs

of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the

sister to the agent on a tape resorder he had brought along.

From this the KGB deduced that

"U.S. Intelligence wants to get

documentary data" and it therefore

decided to "try to get hold

of KOTEN. "

There had already been some indication during KOTE's

earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual. but the

KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a

loyal Communist Party member.

With these recent developments,

the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors

were absent from KGB Headquarters at the time, immediate action

Mas required.

NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on

myself because everybody got excited.. Everybody said: 'Let's

go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are

here.

the situation is right, the decision must be made right

By this time: KOTEN had travelled to Tbilist, and there

• homosexual KGB agent managed to entice him into relations

In a public park.

These were suitably documented, and he was

then picked: up by the local Militia. (In the absence of: his

TOP

---

## Page 209

TA-000001

superiors

and fearind the roarinte truercussions, NOSEYKO had

insisted that the

1110H31

Carmin

T1id='

it

pablle piacs,

and that the tea not participair in

dure's aperchension.

hEter ruescioni.aly the

malitia. KoTa: ins permitted to con-

tanue has itinerary to liut, tore le die acheiled to stay

for two days tilord' lesring the USSH

Hearnhile, the

Filst Chis!

e-torate.

which

was gravino

incresslagly corcerned

that thes

Resijency mould li apprcherded by

2P=, warded to Go: ran 0u:

of the United Sistrs

before thin happenes

To establish, the

true purpose cE

korais presence i?

the ISS?

ard

whether he res

an hmerican agent.

well as to hold hin unti the all agent had

arrived

safeiy

ir. the USS.

(as lOSE:KO told the FBI on 24 Feb-

ruary 1964), it was requested that rOTE! Do dotained in the

Sovist Unich.

the scision dos made to arrest him

at sace on

the basis of tre complomisird materials cotained in Tbilisi.

Following the arrest ky the kiev Militia, KOTal was turned over

to the kGB for interrogation; the purpos,

NosENKo said, ins to

"breax him," to secure the comissior tise ravas an american

intelligerce agrat,

is..

the sant

time Gun Alias the tiny agen

had failed to seep a buber ce

scheduled

"cetings with his Y:S3

case officer, and the legal Residency feared that something nad

gone wichg.

re did eventually appear.

herever:

and NOSEiKO has

descried the subsequint meetings as follows:

"They asked him:

'Are you going to leave the states?:

he said: 'well, I don't

I häve tu think about it

soie more."

So we said: 'No.

you have to leave or else we wall

was!: our hinds of the whole

affair.'

so de said:

YoU KNOw

I was thinking

of leaving with.

my wife, but my wife does int want to icave. '

Io make a long

story short,

they scent thise

nictings toving to talk him into

leaving, ard he kept lustrating.

He didn't sect to want

to

leave, so then they told him:

1:00K:

we are breaking off con-

tact with you.

If you dride to go, jou kion how to do it.

You are to do fion

the United States

to some place in Europe

and go to the soviet Embassy there.

They will give us a signal

and the visa vill be 155urd to you

Fut as far as we're con-

cerned, we're breaking contact with you.:"

After this, according to NOSENKO. the KCi released KOTEN

when

the American Comunist Party

and other organizations

strongly protested his aire it did imprisorment,

b. Information from Other Scurces Senserning KET

At the tire of his irrest KOTEN "as an instructor of

Russian at New York University director of the Library for

Intercultural Studies. aid a regular cortributor to the New

Horld Review ard the

magazine Jewish life. Both the Library

for Intercultural Studies

and Jewish life have been designated

"Cormunist fronts" by the House Committee on Un-American

Activities; the lew world Review has been cited as a propa-

ganda organ of the Soviet Goveinment.

KOTEN has said that,

despite his arrest and impisonment in the USSR, he hopes to

return there in the future and that he "still loved the

Russian people and believed in the basic humanitarlanism of

ithe.

Soviet Covernrent.'

Regarding the arrest

the New York Ilmes on 29 August

1963 carried an article under the headlire "U.S. Guide Missing

TER SECKET

---

## Page 210

• clunt :

years tr.

aur.

ifter soviet

Trip:" the

artiste stated that.

of tra Suvia.

Print trood

Jadest

appulelt errest co tre tri tor:

pride

1r.se

•i-=

1168w1th 47.3

intrar? L.

Mote:.

of nitor c0ur..

¡ascon, reported :ha:

"an manitant of ti

organization 50a1 today

Inturist

Lou. arrested

07

cilogi of tinosexual

acti.ttira

said

that tro doten...

Miested

1 Flet TurkEy Glent 12? 215-

USE)

358 #3.3

weing hits in

ate thr alliga

offense 100k

finà in Mosco:: or.

28 Septemüer

1942.

arrestes on

25

August, had been

raleined on 20 200t.nb4r 302 d2g 67701t6 00

Vierna; the intacla

aian noted that

"officiais

1 Intari:

ported did, noter's salrase,

we declinà to corint on tr. te350r3

¿ña

clicunstances of his arre.t."

soveral of ortis irends have also camented on his ariegt:

-Isadore Gibby NeEDlet,

eter York langer, self-

avoidEd

Marxist,

And allegedly a Futies coperace agent in

reportes Ly

dr. Fat

- Eda GLASiR, a 'alose associate a: joral" and

ste

ot

the four Contineats topi Store.

50:1et

book outlet do ded fork, tremed

tre

ire incident

?9

"fantasiis

and 3

Earcat 1o?.

suaicalishiy, nho ruturned io ine tnited

Statria fron

MOECOW

while nolit ves still tears iric.

stated

that

tie

morals chage acalast mr vas tre bot te israialisery

had been

thos

tio matter would be cieared up and

that dorai ricola it reicased.

Ful sources Ieportià that mutal later made the follodiag

renarks concer.iro his

alrrist

and imprisoment:

Ist SL

---

## Page 211

Man tos:

malice

€3.

nis reicie.

---

## Page 212



---

## Page 213

14.00000.

306 24

-SECRET

304.

8. Arrest of BARGHOORS

Information. from NOSENKO

At the first of the 1954 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO

described the provocation

and

arrest of. Yale Uriversity

Professor Frederick BARGHOOR} in •lato 1963; he was ques-.

tioned further on this case on 3 February

1964 and again

whilo

waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United Statos.

NOSENKO'& most corprehensive statement, from which the

following paragraphs were largely drain, was made on 9 June

On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the pur-

pose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORY Has to retallato

for persona non grata action

taken against three Soviets

11 New York City In The case of John W. BUTEN50 and to

secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in tho

EUTENKO case who was jailed.

In Geneva, however, NOSENKO

maintained that the operation against

BARGIOO?N

discourage future arrests such

as that of IVAvor! the

jailed Soviot),

not because of any special importance of

IVANOV himself."

NOSENKO said that in 1963 four NGB First Chief Direc

torate officers assigned

to the New York Legal Residency

were caught in operational activity in the United States.

Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one vas a

chauffeur and had only a service passport.

The three

Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the

American authorities and

IVANOV, the chauf-

feur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.*

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,

learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed

by KGB Chairman SEHICHASTNYY to take

"necessary meagures."

GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G.

KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZ-

NOV and Ye.J. RASHCHEFOY, both Deputy Chiefs from

the Ameri-

can Departrent.

After explaining tho arrest, GRIBANOV

asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on

any American--U.S. Invassy employee or tourist--that could

*The detail of NOSENKO'S information on the BARGHOORN case

raflects both the extent of the ClA debriefings and the

depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact,

fur-

nish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting

with CIA.

NOSENKO was also able to describe at length

BARG:OORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB

suspicions of intelligence affillation, and he provided the

general outlines of other operational activity centering

around BARGHOOR" during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.

**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 Octo-

ber 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent,

BUTENKO, an Auerican engineer.

Two of the Soviets,' GiA.

PAVIOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mis-

sion to the United Nations; they claimed diplonatic imnunt-

ity and were released; a few days later they were declared

persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV.

Sho was named. In the charges by the U.S. Government, but was

not arrested.

Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver

IOT AUTORG, did not have diplomatic lamunity and mag

jatled.

All have been identifled as KGB officers

TOP SEGREV

---

## Page 214

305:

serve as naterial for an arrest.

RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV

said that at that very moment there were three or four

American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the

opinion of the inerican bepartment, these officers night

be carrying electronic apparatus.

It was knowr that they

had cameras,

that they had been taking

photegraphs, and that

they had been observed taking notes.

If permitted,

they

could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return

plane to Moscow.

GRIBAVOY wanted to know what other pos-.

sibilities existed and instructed the two representatives

of the American Department to

write a report on this.

also told them to request permission to arrest abd search

the military attactes.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent inforration was held

by the Tourist Department.

Ho was told thet there were re-

latively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that

time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned

to GRI-

BANOV along with une otber (name not recalled). : NOSENKO and

KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KCB had no "strong"

materials against then.

They were ordered to make an im

mediate study of the situation and to report back to GRI-

BANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and

KOVALENKO

gathered the entire American Tourist Section in

their office.

In a general discussion, it was decided that

BARGHOORN was the only American on

whom the KGB had anything

worth consideration.

All the materials or BARGHOORN were

gathered together,

and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to

GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility.

GRIBANOV read all the

materials and was pleased with them;.

he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with

American

Intelligence.

He then asked what could be done.

NOSENKO

and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi

and that, in fact,

Ye.N. NOSKOV (case orficer, Anerican

Tourist

Section!

was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from

the KGB Operational Technical Directorste for the purpose

of working against BAPGUORN; the doctor had sone special

Item which

had been used to make BARGEOORN so violently sick

to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized.

While he

was in

the hospital, a careful search had been nade of his

belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been

found.

In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN'S

room

as a patient; he

made anti-Soviet statements ard offered

BARGHOORN

"materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the

bait.

At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOY, BARGHOORN

was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following

norning, and the KGB knew. from a phone tap that he had an

appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy

at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving

"materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow..

NOSENKO said that this

would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made

no difference to him.. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO

*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number at

"about 60."

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 215

14-00000

• 306.

to locate an agent

who could be used to pass the damaglog

materlals

to BARGHOORN and told then to write a sucmary of

BARGIOORN's background with a proposal that the Second

Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials

which are of interest to American Intelligence."

This was

to be

sent in letter form to SEMICHiSINYY over GRIBANOV'S

signature; the letter was

not to indicate how BARGHODRY

was to receivé the materials (i.è., the fact of provocation

waS

not to be mentioned).

GRIBAIDY took a one-page letter on BARGHOOP.., along

a similar letter from GRYAZNOY and RASHCHEPOV con-

cerning the military attaches, to SENICHSINY:

Khile

the four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO,

GRYAZNOY and KOVALENKD=-

were waiting in GRIBAYOV's office for his return, GRY:ZNOV

received

a telephone call from the local iCB organization

in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in

the air on their way back to Moscow.

Shortly thereafter,

GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the

KGB

had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well

as BARGHOORN.

(KHRUSHCHEV was absent fron iloscow at the

time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his

approval.*)

When GRIBINOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military

attaches were already on

their way back to Noscow, he be-

came furious and sent GRYAZNOV out

"to do the job

or die."

leanwhile,

arrangements were made with the

"Department I"

(the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate

to the First Chief Directorate)

to provide some

materials

on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN.

were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returred to

their office to plan the provocation.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon

his arrival in Moscow.

At 1810 hours a radio message was

received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHUORN

had gone to the U.S. Embassy,

and it was decided that the

agent (nare not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be

placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The

KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the

British Embassy at 1900 hours,

but at 1900 hours a report

was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.s.

Embassy in

the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but

for the

Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGIOORN was in

the moving car.

A check on ORCHARD established that he was

in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting.

It was there-

fore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at

the hotel.

#NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN re-

turned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN

was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned fron

Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on

31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on

30 October, the day before the arrest, XHRUSHCHEV greeted

Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and

later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor.. On 31

October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA at-

tended a performance of Swan Lake' in Moscow. BREZHNEV yaS

not seen in. Hoscow fron 29 October until 2 November 1963.

10P SECRET

---

## Page 216

firs

307.

SHU

11i;

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than

the agent approached.

asked.

"You are an American?" the agent

"Yes."

"Please take it," the agent

said.

The

agent

put tle packet containing the naterials on

rocketry

In BARGHOORN's inside. coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taker only one or two steps when he was

seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of

the American Tourist Section, and

told he was under arrest.

A surveillance car pulled up.

BARGHOORN was placed in the

car,

handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets

arrested in the United States had received similar treat-

ment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where

a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFRENOV and K.G. KRÜPNOV from the American

Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV

to interrogate BARGlICORN and YETRENOV to be the interpreter.

When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident

report" form was filled out,

and a resolution was prepared

requesting permission to hold him 48 hours.

Between 0200

and 0300 hours BARGiOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison.

At 0400 hours the Tourist Departnent case officers were

released with instructions to report for duty at 0930

hours.

NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the

questioning in Russian at 1000

hours the next day.

Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian,

YEFRENOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret.

NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions.

(Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARG-

HOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBAYUV

had. told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they

reached the point where BARGHOURN was to tell how he obtained

the damaging naterials.)

on general

matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.*

After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGROORN

agreed that the

materials

were on him when he was arrested,

but he maintained that they had been placed on his person.

He said that he thought they were "newspapers or sonething,"

that he did not know what they were. The closed package

was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; It contained about

•20 to 25 pages of information on missiles.

"BARGHOORN

was

not,

of course, given

a close look" at the materials.

*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had

been present on the day after the arrest.

At this interro-

=Yost of gation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning

"OSENKO, personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked

valid.r.s.

BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials

to ine FLi

on his person at the time of his arrest.

When BARGHOORN

could le

admitted this, NOSENKO left.

IentatTOn.

As noted below, BARGHOORN

reported. that

the materials were not discussed at this par-

=-Apart frog

ticuler interrogation.

the USSR in: 193s

to the soviet

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 217

BP SECRET

292:

The CIA interviever then read to him the report which fixed

the date of

the approach

as 5. Jaauary 1962,

the date contaïned

in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSeiKO used the name

NIKOLAYEV. (see belor).

Acknowledging that "naybe" he had used

the name Georgiy Ivarovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO

said:

"I don't know why I made this mistaxe with the dates.

I

think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in

the Seventh (Tourist) Departmen:.

I saw myself that he had

(homosexuali intercourse...

Your date is absolutely right, but

this reminded me that it was soor after I had come in

the

Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this irportant?"

Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?

NOSENKO:

Now I remerber that it was imnediately - one or two

days.

I know I returred in Jaruary 1962.

i knew I

would be going to the Seventh (departrent) already in

December.

I was visiting the Severth already then.

I had not too many papers to turr over to the First

(Arerican Department), and now I remember that I

moved to tre. Seventh immediately (NOSENKO's emphasis)

after 1 January 1962.

b. Information from JOHNSON:

JOHNSON reported to the U.s.

Ericassy in Moscow on 5 Jaruary

1962 that he experienced an

"incident with

Soviet plainclothes-

men in the Hotel Metropol earlier

that day."

JOHNSON, who

arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer

that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the

evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet

citizen who

identified himself as a doctor from Riga.

(This

was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOY.)

According to JOHNSoN,

little conversation

transpired because the Riga

"doctor' spoke

English poorly.

Before JOHNSON left, however, the

'doctor.

said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who

spoke English well.

JOHNSON then agreed so come by the 'doc-

tor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON

said that he dropped by the 'doctor's'

room about 10:00 the

morning of January 5.

Soon

after he entered, the

'doctor' and

his 'student' friend

(NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV)

began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he

protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen

suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under

arrest.

JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was

asked to sign a statement in Russian...

tie signed this state-

ment and was taken to a man in a third room who identified him-

self as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivarovich NIKOLOV.*

The

police chief first iold him that Soviet la' had been violated

and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or

perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for

NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv

Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV.

He has said that he was normally

called Georgiy, a variation of Yurly, by family and friends

in Moscow.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 218

14-000 1-- #'

remande"

40| 2206

27067640

293.

a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his poder

to disties the unsle affair, provided JO:Sal would do him a

fajor.

The favor turned out to be a signed comnitment that he

would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the

United States."

In the afternoon of 8 January, JODiSu! called the Embassy

to say that he had beer.

recontacted by the Chiet of Police,.

sitio

reminded hin o: nis pledge and showed him iou= pictures.

JCHINSG!

said:

"I don't iron where they got trem,

Fur they were dillies

During the intervies by the fBi careeran

1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially uno sene story, cortinaine

to dery that he nad actually been compromised.

Ir addition

letters to his parents, JOHNSCH said he wrote to about 20 other

ptople.

mostly "minister friends" abroad; apparently he dic rot

tell the FBI of their content.

Shown pictures of VOLKOY ard

NOSENKO On 13 May 1965, JOHNSON said he had seen VOLKOV "some-

where" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was tra: of

& yourger man whom he hüd seen in Djakarta in 1962-1963.

5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS

a. Information. from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO made the following statemert or. 2 February 19€4:

"In 1962 some U.S. citizen by the name of Forst BRAUNS' came to

the soviet Union.

I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that

time could not recall his name.*

de tried to recruit him b'it

did not succeed.

le lived somewhere in leringrad, and in 1942

he wert back with the German troops to Germany.

And he served

in the German irmy, and after the war le changed his name and

went to the USh and became a U.S. citizen.

ile is either a

skilled mechanic or a worker.

His real name is different.- it is

Russian - because he changed his nans when he was ir. Germany."

NOSENKO wert into the operation against slAurs in greaer

detail on 17 April 1961:

"This was LK.GJ KRUPWOV's case.

This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in lenin-

grad.

In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Lenirgrad, when the

Gernans came, and when the Germans were retreating they took

him along and sone other people, local people.

and so he found

himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he

was kept in various prison camps and

when the war was over he

worked in West Germany and_then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - 1

don't remember. which year - he came to the United states and

settled dows..

why we became interested in this fellow...

NOSENKO thought his name was somethirg like 'BRUNKS'

or

•BRONX is because he came from Russia.

So,. according to

Soviet law. he never lost his Soviet citizenship...

Leaving

with the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor

of your country.

So there was something to talk to him about.

Besides. KRUPNOV found gut either in the Information Section

or some other section Lof the KGB First Chief Directoratg/

that the man is working in some: very interesting company that

makes, computers of adding machines or some other instruments.

But when I talked to him he already left the company. He

wasn't working with this company any more.

siting did not arrive In Moscow unttl after NOSENKO: had

returned to the Sovlet Union from Geneva. in 1962, accord

ing to travel records.

---

## Page 219

294.

"Tey-called him to Irturist.

They gave him

a room 1r. the

incurist (Hoel.

Then KRUFICi

ransferred him fiom

the intürist

arother hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and stited

talking to hin.:

Tren

he left him in his roon and callec i3 up -

said that

ine

reeded help.

ther. Le can't do anything with the

man.

I thought that he

self.

would

able

to handle hin

ali by hin-

50 I sais to kOVSkUK:*

I thought he'd be able

to hardie it.

He tells me that he dousn't seen to get anywhere.

so I guESs

l'¿ rave to go relo him.

I got t'ere and I see that

the man

spared

stiff.

He joesnie tali. about anything, doess'=

wart to

later. to any of these reasons.

He was told that, after

all, he is a

traitor to has courory, that li dent with the ser-

riars...

Th13

fellor nas a corard, a real cunard, so he gave his

consent, he agreed

1o help lis.

"The next day lie were lo leningrad.

j0 : felt that this

agreement wasn't very fira, reliabie.

so the next day kRuFtov

and. I

we..t

to see MiSLiCKOV Ichief of the fourist. Departmery.

And I told him:

"I feel that tris agreement of his is quite

sacky.

I'm not pure stout it.

59 elece to failow

through? Is

ve decide to do so, then me'll nate to go to iringrad.

EO

MaUPtiOV vent anu cailed the mar, and the marcused to talk to

so tren I vas told ee go.

I ner: 1t0 ioningrag/ ard...

i went to his totel resi.

He jockes the door, and te wouldn't

let me in.

The only thing, fortrately for us, the lock in

ine noor rain't à very yood ont, so is calied a locksmita,

and

he found a key snat opened the door.

So we entered the scon,

and ve started talking to hin.

Tha

fellon was terribly scared,

tie was

sceking.

it was quite jovises that he would never work

fc us.

So is finally decided: •Look, it'sukay. ile don't wart

arything from you.

Go ahead, irajo.

coodoye.

And that was

ali; that was tre end of it.

I dare trow whether it was brooks

Or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States.

but his true name was Ivallov."

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came

to be irvolved in the BRAUNS case.

tie also sand that he did

not know why äRilNs had visited the Soviet Union, and that he

could not name ary Soviet citizens with whom FRiUNS was in con-

tact in Moscow.

D.

Informatio. from BRAUNS

Interviewss by the

NOSENKO is apparently in error.

At this. time.. he has re-

ported. V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but

in the American Departnent.

He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV.

Chief of the Tourist Departnent:

TGF SEGIT

---

## Page 220

6.-

PSST. Case

rosendo provided the 20ad In hlexarzor svEcHadSkIr. N33

cryptiny

"ANCD,

"on to Jonuary 1966 ir. the course: of discissioni

of 1'3B use of foreign travel bureau persornol to spot rcurists

of possible uperational ircerest.

"all, hera's an exampled

Che. of cur agents

is tre director of a saall. tourist agency,

NOSENKO said.

"He takes the tourist's application forn which

hes a photograp

ard

if he suspects the tourist of having sies

to knerican Intelligence, he,gill move the photo slightly. for

exarfle.

Parcher,

the fifth line. where, to says

ality.

"nation;

he can make a

snall plaprick.

And at the end, where

the, stamp ofithe courist agercy is placed, re can make a check

mick with

a pencil.

Trate all.

Ile indicates an agent to us.

but my helthe tourist is suspected ie don't krow yet. of

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 221

TOP SECRET

"308.

Following BARGHOOR!'s admission, another resolution

HAS

drawn up by KRUPSOV and signed by KRUFNOV, KOVALENKO;

and GRIBANOV:

NOSENKO and KAUPNOV

then took it to the office

of the Chief

prosecutor where the incident report,

the first

interrogation, and the

first and second resolutions were

reported to (fnu) MISHUT'IN (Or MISHUSTIN),

the First Deputy

to the Chief Prosecutor.

GRIBANOV further directed that all

materials on BARGIDORN, including infornation from KGB

Archives,

be given to

the Department of Prosecution of the

KGB so

that they could begin the legal proceedings against

BARGHOORN.

After

this,

all.interrogat.ions were conducted

by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from tlie case,

but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

D..

Information fron BARGHOORN

SARGHOORN, who had made five carliar trios to the

Soviet Union since 1955, arrived there on 2 October 1963.

The

purpose Of his visit, as stated in his visa application,

was to gather information for a book on how effectively the

Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political ed-

ucation and political systen.

His itinerary took hin to

Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 Octo-

ber,

Tbilisi from 10 to i7 October,

and short visits to

Tashkent,

Bukhare,

Samarkand, and Alm-ita fron 17 to 25

October.

He flew

fron Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and

was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October.

On the

latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until

16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he

was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no

intelligence mission.

Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was

debriefed by the U.S. Department of State

and by CIA.

His

information indicated a high degree of KGB operational in~

terest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with

at least five probable KGB agents during his first reek

there:

an attractive

waitress who invited him to "do the

town," a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attrac-

•tive unattached girl who sat next to him on

the

flight from

Moscow to Tbilist, and two young Armenians whom he met his

first day in Tbilisi.*

The two Armenians were instrumental

in the drugging described by NOSENKO.

At dinner in his

hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met &

joung man claiming to be a student at

the Leningrad Music

Conservatory.

They left the hotel for a walk and ran into

a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the

three of them went to a cafe for coffee.

None was arailable,.

*Questioned about this in February 1965,

NOSENKO said that

BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, wes

of operational interest throughout the trip.

He vaguely re-

called the girl on the plane but either did not know or had

forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO

said that none of this activity was directly related to the

provocation.operation: which. nas based.ona last-minute de

claton.

TOP

---

## Page 222

14-00000

174121

SEGREN

309::.

but the youn, student went to the kitchen "to arrange things,"

and

shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coflees"

appeared.

Within an hour, BARGHORN was. in the hospital, acutely-111.

He was assigned to a room where there was another patient,

and a woman doctor took care of his. case.

He was in the

hospital for four days. During this period his clothes,:

notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authori-

ties.

Upon his roturn to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARG-.

HOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel.

The next six days

were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with

his research.

•In

the late afternoon of 31 October he called

on frierds at the l.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910,

already 10 minutes late, be left in the Ambassador's car for

a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metro-

pol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.

BARGHOORY's account of the subsequent events closely

parallels NOSENKO's.

laving been handed the incriminating

Station No.

forned Militia officer.

The KGB was called.

Within 30

minutes a

KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name night

have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him,

assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.*

All question

were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of then

in English.

The package of materials was opened and con-

tained, according to BARGHOORN,

13 or 14 photographs of

rockets.

This session lasted until about midnight and

centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs

and his "intelligence mission."

He was then taken to the

Lyubyanka prison.

Interrogations were conducted the next mornirg by the

original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARG-

HOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO.

The

questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was

asked about the compromising raterials.

The following day

the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (inu)

PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB

officer again.

At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN

was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his

arrest.

BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick-

witted" and as giving

"the inpression that he ras not a

dedicated careerist,

but opportunistic and adaptive; he

seemed

not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good

Job nevertheless."

*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interro-

gations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons..

that he had to sign documents connected with the interroga-

tions.

BARGHOORN confirmed that. YEFREMOV had participated

throughout the.entire series of interrogations and had

signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of

translation.

- TOP SECRET

---

## Page 223

310 .

in Andres ShuBLE

sha Ands. saluto end his car of birti

es which SuStiko trought to the 1964

in Gencia.

of Russian extraction, a kussian speaker.

rofessor in dew for: City.

mccording to

rsonally torolved in Sillilt's fourtr trif

162 Or 1503.

sauBit had becomr Enorn to

gent: durino his third visit to the Soviet

ifessor of cconomics at Nex

viously known to the FBl

Paratis

followirg

paragraphs

ormation iron Nostrio and other sources on

ornation

been

hopreise in Jacing ShUBIs's third

t Union."

He said on 20 Janutry

1961 that

con some tine during the pirod 1955

0

1 1964 JOSLIKO said no was uneuro of the

thy shills but thorat it occurrod in

any event, prior tu igin mid triic he was

tour at duty (Jure 1935 to January 1960)

I De partness.

NOSESKO indicated on

2ú June

IlTSKIT

was the rase officer in the Tourist

sible for SHUBIS, and sinor at another tine

VELITSkiT "transited fion th. department

would apprar. that he was placing the date

irip asi

sume time befure ine transfer.

rted that SHUBIS was placed under surveil-

during the third trip.

Ile Las offered

as to

why:

On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO

as that SHiBin had visited the Soviet

e;** on 2 february 1961 he explained-the

illance as having been founded on the KGB's

ing for this trip, as variously biven

by

nflict with the

fact that SHUBIN had no

rt between 1940 ard 12 June 1961, according

xplanation

for this discrepancy,

however,

JIN went to the USSR without valid docu-

"N's own adaission about having gone to

there is nu

uther

evidence of

his travel

ion prior to 1961.

• He "

---

## Page 224

inasinziir.

Ot:

l etri

nd

kften

---

## Page 225

TOP SECHET

313.

10.

BOLSHAKOY, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

a. Iatroduction

JOSENKO volunteered at his s+cond meety with CIA

in January 1904 that GoN. BOLSHAKOŸ was his "old friend"

and that he was a colonel in the CrU.

On. 26 January,

I February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV'S

name,

enphasizing that he was a GRU

officer and a "good

friend."

In the 1 February interview, after displaying an.

initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive"

subject, he provided a numbor of details on BOLSHAKOV's

alleged rclationship in 1962 with tle then Attorney General,

Robert Kennedy.

His

information on this subject,

he said,

derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOY in Moscow, where

BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour

in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the

magazine USSR).

JOSENKO ciained a personal role in this

afrair,

in that he personally proposed to the KGB leader-

ship that the KGB. take over BOLSHAKOV's forzer (GRU) con-

tact with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of con-

munication between BOLSHAKOV aud the Attorney Ceneral had

developed at Kenredy's initiative.

He described in detali

the circumstances of their introduction at a social function

by a journalist (whom he did not name).

He said that be

"thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOY was a

"military intelligence officer," and he implied that they

regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as &

useful instrument of diplomacy.

According to JOSENKO, the

KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship-it

was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way.

NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States

"during the Cuban missile rrisis,"* no one took over his

role as a confidential channel to the White House.

After

the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the

Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through

their close triend, the artist Milliam. WALTON, during the

latter's visit to Moscow in Dicenber 1963. NOSENKO reported

that he had urged

that the KGB try to take over the Rokert

Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two

plans which would have enabled this to take place, the

second involving WALTON.

Neither came to fruition, however.

Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSE KO said that the

GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell

Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba whereas

there actually were such weapons there.

According to other

for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962.

on 23 august, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently

to the President that "something new and different" was

going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Anbassador

DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN. (Special Counsel to the

President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet

3222

sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington

*The Cuban nissile erisis oceurred durtag October 1962, and

as indicated above,. BOLSHAKOY was not reassigned fron

Vashington until two nonths afterward.

TEP SECRET

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## Page 226

14-00000'

z.

314.

activity: in Cuba.

•On 1 Septenbor LOBRITTY gave Robert

Kennedy

"an unusual

personal message iron: KHELSiCKEY for

tbe President':

khansachts pledged that fir would not stir

up ary ineldents bifore the upconirg U.S. cloctions.

the same day, the pacsidunt stated publinly that the linited

States had no proof of a Soriet offensive missile capablilty

in Cuba.

Also on the sane day,

tho Soviet Union sent a

harsh note to the U.S. Coverinent concerning the (uninter-

tional violation of Soviet airspace by aù Amrican l'-2

plane on 30 lugust; the note throatened "aporopriate re-

talistory neasures" against lo? bases should

such incidents

be rupiated.

Thie: following day (5 September) l-? flights

over Cuba were imporarily suspended, and they did not re-

sune until la October.

On o September DOBRYNIS again told

SORENSEN that the soviets had "done nothing new" in Cuba

and gave his assurances

that all their stops were defensire

in natura

and did

not represent any threat to...the United

States." On 13 October

DOBRININ irformed Chester BOWLES (&

Special. Representative and Advisor to thr President) thut

the USSR would never sund offensive weapons to Cuba.

lar assurances

were given by KHRUSIlCHEl to l.S. Ambassador

roman in Moscoy on l6 Detover (the same day that the Pregi-

dent was shown the l'-2 photographs which lerealed the pre-

serce of offensive missilns) and by Forein Mirister GROMKO

to President Kennedy in person on l8 October.

Also on 18 October,

the FBI renorted, &

ATE MANNERATO

TwO

days later

BOLSTiAKOY told

narnington correspondents Joseph ALSOP aud

Charles BARTLETT that the soviets had no offensiva warons

in Cuba, ard

said he had been instructrd hy MINiSHCIEY and

MIKOTAN

on 1 October (the day bufore nis departure fion

Moscow to inform Prosident Kenedy of this tact. CIA bas

• no indication that. BOLSINKOV dolivered this missage to the

President, or eval directly to the Attorney Coreral, or

that, prior to his neetire with BEGLOV in lew York City.

he

made any rerarks about

Soviet mans in Galla

Were is no

report of

BOlSHAkUV's having played

any

role in the Cuban

nissile crisis beyond making these ronarks to ALSOP ard

BARTLETT.

Discussions at the White House, State Departzert,

and Deferse Department about the crisis culminated in the

decision to impose a blockade un Cuba; this decision iRs

announced by President Kernedy over nationwidr television

and radio on 22 October 1952.

Soviet overtures for a peace-

ful settlement of the situation wore initiated or 26 Octo-

ber by

the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S.

FEKLISOY, **

in contacts with the American Journalist John SCALl.

FEKLI-

SOV's proposals were along tha same lines as those received

*BEGLOY came to the United States to attend the "Third Un-

official US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at

Andover, Massar husetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962..

present at this confercace was Boris BELITSKIY, Identified

Dy: NOSANO four nonths carlier as a KCB-controlled:source

of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.).

time that BEGLOV night bo affiliated with the KGB.

**FEKLISOV, wao served in washington under the allas FOWN,

was the nuthor of ore of the incuments among the CHEREPINOV

papers (see Part VI.D.T.C:).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 227

315:

at the White House late that right in a

KIKESHCHEV.

secret. lctter from

At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December

1962, Presidential Press Sicretary Plurre

SALINGER aSked

BOLSHAKOV who anuld "do his work." HOLSHkOT arplied that

ro ora gould du preilsely the sari job, but that if SALIN

CER had "arything special to say," he night coatact 1.1.

ZINCHUK.*

b. Soviet Sours. = Durink the Crlsis

NOSENKO has rot indicated that BOLSTAKOV had an Infor-

matlon-collection role during the Cuban eissile crisis.

As

for soviet sources at this time, soSENO stated on several

occasions in 1954!

is different contoxts, that the KCB

"had

not had luck in gitting irtelligence from high places in

the V.S. Goverrmint" in October 1u62. On sore than one oc

casion he said that cho Küß axert "SASIlA"** ras unable to

furnish any infornation of value in this regard.

He sald

this on 25 february 1964 and agair wille being questioned

about "SASHA" on. 1 August 196%.

On the latter date NOSENKO

said:

"During the Cuban rissile crists the (KCD| First

Chief Directorate,

the Iniclligerce, couldn't tell what

U.S. will do.

the

KIRUSHCHEi** was rot satisfied with the

work

of the intralia..res.

lio agents wer: producing

inforration

on this."

NOSEiKO coitinued by saying that

"SASHA" re-

ported nothing to tie

KCB duriog the Cuban missile crisis.

In fact,

"he couldn't know anything.

I heard that this was

very tightly held irioration.

There wore just & len

peoplo around President Kennedy who knew the plans, aud they

were sworu to keep it sucret."

*ZINCHJK

was idertified by DERY!BIN by name ard photograph

in October

1954 as a NCB staff officer.

NOSENKO has said

that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptce rather than a staff officer.

**For a discusston-of-the "SASiA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.

***Speaking before the Suprent Soviet on 12 December 1962,

KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the

United States for a peacrful settlement of the Cubar situa-

tion had beer influerced by "information from our Cuban.

comrades and other [unspicified) sources."

This informa-

tion had been received,

KIRISHCHEY statad, on the morning

of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated,

however, KHRUSHCHEV's suret and conciliatory letter to

the President was received at the white House on the night

of 26 October. 1952.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 228

316.

c.

SOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV

NOSENKO repeatedly eophasized BOLSHAKOV's CRU affilia-

tion

and the

fact that the KGB was in no way irvolred in

tr.1s

charnel to the U.S. Coverrment via Robert Kennedy.

He first volunteered BOLSHAKOl's rase during a discussion

of the use of Novosti as

a cover organization for Soviet

Intelligence officers.

"Suriy BOLS:liKOV of the GRU also

sits there, " he said.

"He is a colonel and a friend of

nine."

Two days

later,

out of context with

the preceding

discussion, he introduced the name again:

"Then

there is

this BOLSHAKOV.

He is fron GRU who was in the United

States."

NOSESKO then cormented that this was "a very in-

teresting case" and added:

"We shall talk about it later."

when his case

oflicer trercupon turned to

another topic,

NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say:

"I know BOLSHAKOV

very well.

He is my old

friend...l met him through Yurly

GUk... (who was with hin in the

United States...and we are

now very good friends.

He calls me up and consults me for

advice...

On 1 February 1964 NOSESKO said no thought the

Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military inteiligence

officer; "yet for sore reason they chose hin" as a channel

between the li.s. ard Soviet Goverrments.

BOLSHAKOV, NO-

SENKO added,

"reported directly" to

the Chief of the GRU

concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.

JOSENKO Said BOLSHAKOY was introduced to Robert Kennedy

by an

American journalist (unnamed) at a ricoption in the

United States.

The jourralist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for

a walk,

and

as they

strolled "down an alley," there was a

"The jour-

man sitting

on

nalist said:

'Listen,

•1stech derrie (BOLSHAKV), are you acquainted

with Robert Kennedy,

the brothar of the President and the

Chief of the Departuent of Justice?'

BOLSHAKOV said:

'No.

Of course, I have heard of him.

•Would you like me to

introduce you?'

"Of course, " BOLSHAKOV said,

'please do.'

He led him to the man on the banch.

There was this feeling

that all this had been pra-arranged. "

This contact'was at the personal dosire of Bob Kennedy...

BOLSHAKOV was called ia for this.

As you know, the whole

idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy

froM KIPUSHCHEV and from Kernedy to KHRLSHCHEV....It happened

to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not

BOL-SHAKOY who sought to

have the meeting....Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV

was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's inouse.

They would first

talk about ordinary things,

and then the conversation

turned to other mattars...Robert Kennedy did not say:

"Please tell KHRUSHCHEY

so-and-so.'

He would say:

•You

know, some of these problems seem

insoivable." And BOL-

SHAKOV would say:

'And you know, at hore they think this

and that way...

without sctually saying that this was coming

IrOn KHRUSHCHEV.

But, of course,

this was clear sithout

explanations.

It was ar exchange of views on important poll-

tical questions

of the soment.

He was like an intermediate

point..."

NOSENKO commented that he persorally thought

that it was a "case of mutual

"feelers' being sent out by

both sides-exploring some given current political situation."

After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, NOSENKO stated, Do one

replaced him as a chancel to the U.S. Governnent..

Asked:

whether ZINCHUK could have taken over upon BOLSHAKOV'g

TOP SECREV

---

## Page 229

14-00000

- In

317.

departure, NOSENKO sald: "Oh, no.. There is no contact.

like there was belore.

It was broken at the tine BOL-

SHAKOV left. ZINCilY. was an agent or a cooptre....No,

there is no guch contact since BOLSHAKOY left. He pRsses

no more nessages."

Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts, NOSENKO

told CIA on 26 January 1964:

"You have shown considerable

interest in him !BOLS!LAKOVl, even after his return to the

Soviet Union... because all this was done by by-passing clA."

Ho said on l February 1961:

"It was pretty obvious: that

this

relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had

nothing to do with ClA,

and CIA was not witting of 1t.

It

was at the perschal desire of Bob jenredy."

The KGB

determined that CIA was uraware of the exchange between

Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOL-

SHAKOV was subsequently invited to a receptiou at the U.S.

Embassy. In Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and

Malcolm A. TOON+--tried to slicit information fron him

about his relatiorship with President Kennedy.

"The most.

important thing" they had tried to find out,

accordanz to

NOSENKO, wag whetter the President and BOLSHAKOV had met

personally.

Although BOLSHAKOV did rot adait the fact to

them, he did have one

meeting with President Kennedy--"he

was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door

into the ihite House, "

NOSENKO said.

NOSENKO reported that will am WALTON visited

Moscow :in Docem-

ber 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had

previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy.

Part of

their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's

future political plans:

"WALTON said that Bobbj... did not

expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presi

dency.

He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of

running for Goversor

of lassachusetts..."

NOSENKO said he

felt that there were "some feelers sent out on

the part of

VALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion.

WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that every-

thing was left without an answer....My personal opinion was

that these things were told to wALton so that he coule pasa

them on as, so to speak, Bouby's plans for the future."

Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions,

NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy. **

"As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion re-

flected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was

no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No

suspicion at all."

NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take

over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy.

first of these plans, the Sovlet Minister of Justice would

personally invite the Attorney General to cone: tä the Soviet

Union.

There the KGB would "set him up in private. living

quarters, give his everything he wants...so that he would be

"Neither KEKST, ko NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB

of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was

affiliated with CIA in any way.

**See also Part Y.D.6. on NOSENXO's Inforsatios cOncerning

Le HaryeY-OSWALD::

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 230

318.

pleased....fot to make au eyent or countra

but just to progote

rapprrche.ent.

In addliion, i on tho

basis u!

thaT BOLSHAKOV Had a0ld HuSEIKC about lobert

Kennedy's laterryt in a Sorder ballerina, this plan called

for the

too in su brought together, and to ballertra;

"Is quite free in her bebarior rita the oppostic sr::,

would do "everythiro arcessarg for the state.""

NOSEiKO's superiors could make a decision on

thas plan,

the Frosident was assassinated and the ratter yas dropped.

PosEino concelved !ils

second plan during kAlTO"'s trip to

Hoscuw in veccabor 1903:

"BOLSHAKOY tOld Mo

gOIng 10 LeEt MALTON,

that

ho. wag

and asked me whettor we had an in-

terest in 1t....d told the chiefs about i: ind said:

utIlize HALTON OUrSelves.

'Lot's

why should ie let the GRU use

hiu?'"

rosendo suggested that the kGB "tell BOLSHAKOV

that we are orking on into-that this Is a Jumber Cae

target ri far as no are concerned.

BOLS:LAKOV will do any-

ching we ask him."

However,

"the boss. salü:

"Hold, you

know,

it will worsen relations botween

the KGB

and the GrU.

As long is they are working on 1t, let the do 1t.'"

cOstsko indicated that If the KiB had actually assuned

aulliority for the opcration in Moscow irug the onu,

as ho

liad proposed, tue KGB Ligal

Posidency

in washington would

Dave than taken over, and "someone new" probably would heve

been sent Pron KGB Headquarters to develop the association.

alids KGB officer would liare

bein "soncone dith a broader

outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts."

d. Inforcation frur.

In audition

ldentified SOLSHAKOY as

NOSE:60,

one other Scriet rource bad

•. GRU officer

3977901

another neuber of the the

legal

Residency

S. bad

"recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOY an informant 110 was

an Americki

respondent based in iashington.

This jour-

nalist, fr

Ses had accompanied Vice President Nixon

to the

USS& Ir. July 1959 and while tiere had agreed to coop-

erate by "furnishing political infornation."

BOLSHAKOV wag

to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*

131

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 231

S¿CRET

ITME: 71:01

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ФИНО

КОМНІК ТА ГОСЯ КАРСТВЕЛНОЙ ВЕЗИВАСНОСТИ

про COI LIY: МИНИСТРИЙ ССС'Р

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Reverse

Temporary Duty Authorization

December 1963

SECRET

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 232

Committee for. State Security

Under the Council of Ministers

USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to:

Lieutenant Colonel

NOSENKO,

urty Ivanovich

For duty to:

TKGB of Cor kaya

Oblast

Length of tem-

porary assign-

ment:

15 davs

through: 30 December 1963

Authorization:

directive of

Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of

identity document No.:

NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate

of Department

Committee .for State Security

under the Council of Ministers, USSR

Front

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES

OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1965.

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963

Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chlef Militia

Section, Militia Major -

_ (illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63

Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militi

Section, Militia Major

(111ogib1e)

"Loft Gor'kiy 17 December 1963

Did not use free quarters"

s./

_(illegible)

Reverse (endorsements only)

TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV

---

## Page 233

319.

-G. NOSENKO's-KGB Promotions and Awards

1.

Rank

NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his

from lieutenänt to lieuten-

ant colonel.

He has volunteered additional infornation on

this subject himself. ils various stateuents follow in

i chronolugical order.

"As a Chief of Section, I now receive

2,500 Trubles per monthl, plus 700 for my rank, for major,

plus pay for longevity.

I receive more tian 1000, i.e.,

450-170-480 [rubles per monthl in new money.

enough for me...I am now a major but I should receive

lieutenant colonel soon.

I have already completed my time

in grade.

he have a systen of tine in glade:

From major

to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years.

My time in

grade was up in December, in December of last

year (1961)."

At the first of his 1964 meetings

with CTA in Geneva HOSENKO lad in his possession the ten-

porary duty authorization which he said he had been issued

in December 1963 to travel ¿rom Moscow to Gorkly Oblast in

connection with the search for CHEREPASOV.* This official

igB paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the

second Chies Directorate, and authorized. "Licutenant Colonel

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local kgB organiza-

tion in Gorkij Oblast on official business between 15 and

30 December 1963."

It bure official starps of arrival and

departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the

town of Shakhunya.

10 February 1964:

In Frankfurt, while awaiting ex-

filtration to the UnIted States, NOSENKO was asked to review

a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case

officers on the basis of statements he had made during the

1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva.

NOSENKO went over the

biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated

that it was correct.

The biography included the inforcatios

that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy

Section of the

American Department as a senior lieutenant Prom 1952 [sic)

to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major

in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly

before leaving Moscow for Geneva.

8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date

when he became a

senior lieutenant, and he replied:

think in the end of i53 or the beginning of '54 I got the

senior lieutenant."

Question:

That's less

than a year after you entered the

Serrice (KGBJ.

*See Part VI.D. T.C. for a description of this search and

Of NOSENKO's claimed part in

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---

## Page 234

320:

• NOSENKO:

Mell, I had the GRU service.

That counts two

years, as military service, of course.

it was

considered as a continuance of military service.

Question:

NOSENKO :

So you got it when? At tha end of 1953?

At the end of 153 or bezinning of '54. Then I

got captais in 1956.

Question:

When in 1936?

NOSENKO:

I don't reneaber.

You see, they are not given

exactly in February or in

March.

Sometimes the

scheduled tine

passes before they give it. So,

• 56--Captain, '59--Hajor, and '63--

16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the

date

"i his promotions within the KGB from the date of

entry, NOSENKO stated:

"I began in the GRU as a junior

lieutenant. While in the GRH I became a lieutenant: and I

entered the KGB with this rark in 1953.

Not long after I

entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but i don't

know the month. It was still 1953.

In 1956 I was promoted

to the rank of captain.

I don't know the month.

I became

a major ir 1959.

I don't know the month.

In October 1963

I wi." made a licutenant colonel... Personnel called

me on

the elephone and said I had been promoted. Later I was

told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me.

I went to his office,

but, of course, I didn't let hin know that I already knew

that I had been promoted.

He gave me his congratulations.

You never see the attestation. It goes into your official

file."

26 January 1965:

While discussing his role as case

officer for V.S. Embassy Security Officar John ABIDIAN,

NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never offi-

clally been a major.

He explained this situation as

follows:

Having been promoted to the rank of senior

Ileutenant in April 1953, he vecame eligible for the rank

of captain in 1956.

when this time came, however, he was

not promoted because a senior KGB official held against

him his illegal use of KCB documents to cover treatment for

gonorrhea in 1954.

NOSENKO therefore remained

a senior

Ileutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible

for promotion to the rank of major had he received his

captaincy on schedule.

Although GRIBANOV had promised NO-

SENKO that he would be promoted directly from senjor lieu-

tenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an

admini-

strative error was made by the KGB

Personnel Office,

and

NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had in

stead been pronoted only to captain.

Instead of rectifying

this mistake, GRIBANOY persuaded NOSENKO that it would be

to his advantage

to renain a captain until he became eligible

for promotion

to lieutenant colonel in

1963.

NOSENKO there.

fore was a captain fron Septenber or October 1959 until

October 196j when; as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted

TOF SECRET

---

## Page 235

321:

directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

-In-this manner- ft

turned out that he

never officially held the rank of major."

O August 1965; under questioning by DERiABIN, NOSEYKI

epeated the chronology of his pronotions given an 26 Januar

1965.

He again explained. that he was put up for captain in

1956, but this time sald that the:pronotion had been blocked

on the grounds that he should he made to wait because of

shortconings in his work.

Asked why he had told CIA that he

had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the

biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he

thought the true story would not be believed.

17 April 1966:

In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wroto

the

following: In March

1951, with the rant of jundor lleu-

tanant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh

Flcut in Sovetskaya Gavan...Fron August 1952 until 1953, I

worked it the intelligence base of the Naval Intelligence of

the Fourth Fleet in Sovutsk, where I received the rank of

Jieutenant of the Administrative Service.... In 1950 I received

was recommended

fo: the rank of major.

I liave never held the rank of lieuten.

ant colonel and the travel cider which you know of, with the

rank of lleutenant colorcl, was filled out erroneously.**

19 April 1966:

In a new version of his autobiography,

NOSENKO Included The following statement:

"in July 1956. 1

became & candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I re-

ceived a pronotion at work: I became a senior case officer

and was given the rank of serior licutenant.

In August 1957

I was accepted into the OPSU, and during the second half of

1958 was appointed Dejuty Chief of thr Second Section, Seventh

Departuent.

On 29 Decenber 1959 1 was pronoted to the rank of

captain.

26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant

colonel in 1954.

"Twas only a captain."

Asked why he had

said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied:

"There was no conversation about rank in 1962.

About my po-

sition, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all."

To summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while

•serving in the KGB:

He became a senior licutenant in 1952,

April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain ir.

1956 or September/Octo-

ber/December 1959: A major in December 1958 or 1959; and &

lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963.

(The latter

claim was verified by the official KCB document listlng him as

& lleutenant colonel as of December 1963.)

the other hand,.

NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was

captain, and that he never advanced

to a majority or a lieu

tenant colonelcy.

*At about this time, in carly 1965,

NOSENKO was only a captain and had

advanced to nis senior

KGB position because of his close relationship with GRIBANOV.

shortly after NOSENKO's defection,& Breported

eceived: information from fellow KGB officers which

nade it "appear quite certain" that NOSENKO was & Ileutenant

colonel

**See above; NOSENKO was referring to the TDY authortzation

tasued for the CHEREPANOV.-

Search in December 1963.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 236

322.

2.

Avards and Decorations

Not long alter reestablishing contact with CIA in

January 1964, NOSENKO mertioned that he had received the

Order of Lenin

"shortly after the 1962 meetirgs" in Geneva

as a reward

for the ideas which he had developed

to "'en-.

large the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second

Chief Directorate staff personnel in Moscow.* Diring the

first series of interrogations, NOSEYKO on 6 April 1964.

claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for:-

his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Direct

torate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962

for his performances while in the American Department.

The following discussion of the subject took place on

6 April 1964:

JOSENKO: Yes, -I received a big gold medal.

Question: It was the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO:

It was at first the Order of the Red Ranner--the

Red Star, I mean. In '63 I receired the Order

of Lenin. In

'63.

Question:

YOSENKO:

What for?

GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working

a long

period in the Second Chief Directorate--[V.D.)

(A.G.) KOVALEYKO got one--

many, many Precelved the Order of Lerin).**

Question:

You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant

service?

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

No.

For working in the Seventh (Tourist| Depart-

ment, which is considered good.

What is good? Were there recruitments?

That

rscruitments?

You must know that the main task of the Seventh

Department is rot recruitients.

The main task is

countering the intelligence activities of the op-

position.

So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department got the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: Yes.

#NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest

decoration for which a KGB officer can

be eligible.

**In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Direc-

torate officer whom he knew to have. received this award was

V.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who re

cruited William John VASSALL (see PART VI.D. 5.b.).

On the

same general topic, NOSENKO asked his CIA case offteer whether

he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his part tu:

the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO.

He asked this in January 1964

In Geneva:

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 237

141000001

323.

Questioo:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSESKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

CHEIYOKOY and KOVALENKO?

Yes.

else?

1S.!. I FEDOSESEV gO? 00 !:.N.| KONSHUK also got

the Order, the second lint.

The first time he

got it several jears ago, aid this has the second

11mc.

Kien did you got the Order of the ked Star?

Red Star I'got -l dun't know for that.

But then ore jear later they gave you another

bricause this lieder of tit Red Starl wasn't

enough?

Because the awards are given out--now, wait one

noment:

up until idol, is inore wre any awards

for

the Cickists Nul personnell it was very rare,

and

they were orl: araided fur a specific thing.

Such üs CliParO, for istance.

!. was rewarded

for i spucific deed the recruitment of VaSSALLi.

But

in 1962, 2963--these

first years--whether it

was the idea of tie Party to encourage the

workers. trey decided to let SAKHAPOUSKIY (Chief

of the KCB First Chief Dircitorate declare his

nodals and GRIBASOl 1u eclare his medals.

They

get together with their deputies and decide to

whom they will give ther.

They don't say to

whon--thry

say, for

instence:

"One order to your

department; you decidi ano should have it.'

Like that.

Then we could get together. 1

CHELSOKOV, KOVALESKO, ard se decided lüho would

get onel.

In our departient. !.l. l YAKOVLEY

got a medal.

nho olse put a medal?

In 1962, 1

got one,

and then LEO"Ot no mas Chief of the

Second Section..e gut tle Order of the Red Star.

We decided on these individuals.

is lar as we

ourselves were concerned. trut decision "as made

by GRIBANOV and his ceput!.

Did the Seventh Departrent catch any spies?

Well, as I have alread; told you, there was this

Italian fellow Swas.

This was considered a

good case because

the First Department later--

the Seventh Department fas only' involved at the

time of the arrest--began necting with bin.

So you got the Order lof the Red Banner| in 1962

because of your work

in the Tourist Department?

I think in 1962 GRIBANOY gave it to me not for

the Seventh Department,

but for my work in the

First (American) Departeent in 1960, 1961.

You think so?

I think so.

The Order just came. without any explanation?

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 238

324.

FOSZiKO:

Question!

NOSEN.O:

it vee just done st the order of the Chairass.

And the Order of Lents was the nees?

The samo.

Mall, the way it aBys. "for nork toll

done for the organs of the KOB" there la no 10d1-

cation exaotly what it do for.

NOSENKO adaitted on @ Apr1l 18648

"In 2084 (in General

REad Has siout the order of Lone she d

ines

NOSENKO. then explained what he sadd to bo the true

circunstances and gave the reason for thion he ves to have.

received this decoration..

GRIBANOY, NOSENKO stetod, had

prosised In 1993 that NOSENKO, CHRINKOV; And KOVALENKO

would get the order of Loalas

"He said!

"I aM BubnIttIng

Your names jol the Ordor of LenIn Ior C1SAtIne ThS 10011

Central Operational Communicationg Rigton of the 8o0ond

Chief Diroctoratel, for

create in touriat

I left (for Goneval and nothing happoned. "*

NOSENKO waN aBLed On 15 April 1984 to list the dates,

reasons, and types of awards, docorationg;

and bonuses te

hed received duriag hia KGB eRredI, AB teLl aB tO 1DU1g&Ee

fron shon he had recolved edoh oi these.

Ria reply vac

as follows!

"I recedved nothing in 1953, 1854,

and 1955.

In 1956 I received a coumendation and one nonth's pay.

SEROY, the Chairnan of the KGB, awarded se thie

for the

recruitrent of Richard PURGI [see Pert V.D.4.bol while 1:

was working in the Seventh (Tourist) Dopartmont of the

Beoond Chief Directorate.

It was signed by tho Chalraan,

and GRIBANOV told me about ato

As usual, this Ordos of

the chairman of the KGB was circulated, and l sna All 0&B€

officers saw my nane listed.

There is no certifieste of

anything.

Personnel just nakes a note in your official file

that on a cartain date you recolved the commendation fras:

the Chairman of the KGB.

"Fros 1956 on, I received sonething almost

but it was nothing special.

Perhaps it was the KGB anniver

Bary or lay Day of Army Day.

In 1957 or 1958, I got Bone-

thing fros GRIBANOV.

Maybe it was the d0th anniversary of

the Sovlet Army.

I don't remember.

It pas given to no and

a group of people in the hall (auditorium between the third

and fourth flcors (of the KGB Headquartera building). PIR-

FILITY, Deputy Chief of the Seoond Chief Direstorato, aado

the presentation.

"In 1959 I recelved & commendation end one nonth'r

PSy fION SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several re-

cruitments, anong them the professor from Tennessee (HERTINE)i

DRIT, FRIPPEL, and three British poople.: Thore N9re a1x din

#HOSINKO later reverted to his original statenent, uhloh

related the sward to his efforts to "inaptre" the work of

the jourtat Departrents:

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## Page 239

325,

all; three Anericans and three British. I can't remember the

British names just now.*

"In 1960 I got a commendation from GRIBAVOV for good work

in general.

A lot of officers got this.

In 1961 I received

the Order

of the Red Star.

With à group of case officers I got

this for general good dork in the Second

Chief Directorate.

KOVALENKO and KOVSHUK got this too.

IVASHUTIN gave it to me

(made the presentation!.

Personrel makes a note in your official

file, but you car take

the medal and the little certificate that

goes with

it and either keep it at home of in your study rcom

(office).

* *

"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRiBAYOV for gereral

good work.

I also reserved the Unblemished Service livard

for ten years'-service. They courted this from October 1950.

when I joined the GRU: and they were late by tho years in

giving it to me.

This 15 not unusual.

SHCHERBAK, DEputY

Chief of the second chief Directorale, gave it to me in the

See Farts V.D,4.J.and h., Part V.D.5., and Parts 1,0,4.1.,

j., and k..

respectively,

for descriptions of these recruit-

ment operations and NOSENKO's role in chem. NOSEiKO also

said during

interrogation by DERYABIN on 10 August 1965

that, in 1959, his name was sübmitted

for the Order of the

Red Banner in conrection with these recruitrents, but that

he did not get it, probably sciause he was transferred to

the First Department at that time (January 1950), NOSENKO

has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third

highest award a KGE officer may receive.

Asked what KGB

officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on i0 June

.1954 that GRIBANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY: and several other high-

ranking KGB officers were awaided it for che important role

they played in smashing the Huagarian Revolution in 1956.

** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the

Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second

Chief Directorate oificers, at the end of December 1962.

He recalled this because they were planning the presenta-

tion for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but

the presentation was delayed and was not made until the

end of the month.

NOSENKO and about

70 other officers of

the Second Chief Directorate, Ircluding KOVSHUK and G.I.

GRYAZNOV, received the award "simply

' for achieverents,

for

good results in work."

NOSENKO cold DERYABIN in August 1965

that the order accompanying his award had read:

"For ex-

ceptional performance of mission."

When asked what mission

was involved, NOSENKO replied chat the award was just for

good work

in

general.

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## Page 240

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326.

ball along with a certificate.*

In 1963 I received a

commendation from GRIBANOY for general good work.

Also,

GRIBANOV told me that 1, along with some others, was to

receive the. Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB

anniversary date, but I left for Genova."*! was to re-

ceive it for arousing (inspiring) the Seventh Department."

NOSESKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never re-

ceived any KGB award or decoration

for his operational

The only awards he received during his KGS career,

he sald, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the awaid

for satisfactory completion of trin years of service.

#NOSENKO's wording

here reflects earlier intensive ques-

cioning concerning the ten-year service medal.

NOSENKO said

on 15 April 1964:

"In 1962 I had ten years of service in

the KGB and got a medal for unblenished service. It is

usually given for ten years and to KeB men only....That was

in 1962.

I had ten years of service then."

When it was

pointed out that, according to his: most recent statement,

he had Joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would

have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he

did not understand why but that he was certain that he had

been given the medal, after his return from Geneva in 1962.

(The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statenents

that he joined the KGB in 1952.

The following day, 17 April

1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received

the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled,

is awarded to servicemen as well as KGB officers, and prior

nilitary service is taken into accoust in computing the

service time for the latter. NOSENKO had entered the GRU:

in 1950 and therefore should have received. the ten-year

medal in 1960. Because o a nix-up in the-KGB Personnel

Department he did not receive it until 1962.

•HOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.

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## Page 241

327.

H. NOSENKO's. Relationship with GRIBANOV

1: Information from NCSENKO

a. Summary

From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO

maintained that he had a close personal and professional

relation-

Ship with Major. General O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of tre second Chief

Directorate.

NOSENKO has described recruitment approacties in which

he and GRIBANOV took part together,

conversations they had on opera-

tional matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promo-

tions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing

with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate ccunterinteiligence

officer Ye.A. 'TARABRIN.

NOSENKO has also freguently mentioned the

role which GRIBANOV played in nis, HOSENKO's, professional advance-

ment within the KGB:

GRIANOV was wholly responsible, against

NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy

Chief of the U.S. Embassy

section of

the American

Department

in

January 1960; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him

Deputy Chief of the

entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged

his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American

Tourist Sectior. and

his later appointment as Depity Chief of the

Tourist Department.

NOSENKO's remarks concernirg

his direct involvement with

GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are included in other

parts of this paper.

Among then are his early statements on the

approach to code clerk James STORSBERG

(Part V.E.3.c.), bis 1962

account of the arres: and attempt to recruit ClA sificer Russell

LANGELLE (Part VI.D. Toa.), and his early reports on the attempt to

reCruit CIA officer

Edward Ellis SMITil (Part VI.D.2.).

In all

three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played

the role he

originally attributed to himself ara denied having had personal

contact with the Americans involved.

NOSENKO has also altered his

original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration

for operational activity and that he had not received the promo-

tions he claimed.

b. Details

The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his

personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted

his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Direc-.

torate.

12 June 1962:

"Oleg

Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy.

A real pal.

We,

used to feet one ancther illegally

and had women together...

so to say? CRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on

me.

It was the very best that can be given, brilliant.

GRIBANOV

wrote the very best fitness report on me.

He had an excellent

regard for me,

excellent...

I am supposed to become Deputy Chief

of (the Tourist) Department.

I believe that GRIBANOV is promot-

ing young pecple, new people, who already have experience, good

experience, who have made recruitments.

I know two or thiee. lof

the people he is moving ahead).

I personally have about 12 re-

cruitments, four or five

cans.

of them were British ard the rest Ameri-

He (GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the

question of my advancement is right now under consideration...

I

will be Deputy Chief of Department.

You must give thought to the

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328.

fact that I have been talking with

you.

You can ruin everythirg.:

I have a career.

I have bright prospects.

"y boss GRIBANOV, my

highest boss, has a very high degree

of respect. for me.

He some-

times bawls

me out and I--

I make it look like

this is un-

pleasant for me.

But, in fact, it is a ple sant thing because,

inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone

else.

know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me.

He

sometimes

calls me personally (to his officel and süjs:

come with

me.

I have

to

meet an ambassador.'

'You

I go with him..

We arrive and have the conversation.

He is there all night.

comes out and says:

'Well, where shall we go for a drink?"

I

know beforehand

(that he will say thisl

and everything is ready

at the Aragui Restaurant.

he go there.

'well, what shall we

drink! ' (GRIBANOY says).

I answer:

'well, Oleg Mikhailovich,

cognac, of

course!

He

is the highest chief.

'I don't drink

cognac.

I'll have vodka,' I say.

Well, we'll have vodka

then, '

(GRIDANOV says)..."

One of NOSENKO'S CIA handlers suggested at

this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older

brother would. NOSENKO replied:

"That's his attituce toward

ne."

23 April 1964

Question: • Did you ever go to GRIBAliOV's house?

NOSENKO: 'I never went in the house. I have driven to it.

Question: Did he ever come to your house?

NOSENKO :

No.

Question:

Were you ever out at night with him, after work?

If so, how, under what circumstances?

NOSENKO:

After work? Yes, once.

Question:

Who else was there?

NOSENKO:

TARABRIN.

Question: What was the occasion?

NOSENKO :

No specific reason.

GRIBANOV called me at midnight.

I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked

Question:

NOSENKO:

the evening...

GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down

to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep.

I

drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 0:00

a.M., gave him some pills to help him.

when did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?

I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did not

have a chance to

group operational Speak to him then.

Once I was in two

discussions (about 15 people present)

about work against Military Attaches in

1954, that was

the first time I ever spoke to him..

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14-00g00;

329.

Question:

when did you first have any personal conversation with

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO :

I don't remember.

He gathered groups of people:

Maybe I was with hin with KozLov anu

others in Tourist

Department li.e., between 1955 and 19601.

when did you develop a personal relationship with him?

It is difficult to say how it got started.

I was

still working in tre Seventh

Department.

It was in

1958, 0r maybe 1957.

KOZLOV suddenly called me and

said

I should immediately report to GRIBANOV.

I did,

and GRIBANOV said:I should quickly be ready to go to

a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him

and Vera [Ivanovnal ANDREYEVA.

question: Why you?

NOSENKO:

I don't know...

Oh, yes, this is the story.

this is it, this is

why he started favoring me.

Earlier,

some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nira

on

Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA,

friends of (Yu.I.) GUK and (V.M.) KOVSHUK and (V.A.)

CHURANOV.

CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was

a friend of GRIBANOV.

Through TARAbRIN he got acquainted

with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV'S

dacha one night.

The girls were talkative and told me

all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told

CHURANOV who warned me not

to mention it.

I never did,

and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he re-

marked once: "You are not a gossiper..."

Question:

How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell any-

one?

NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.

Question:

NOSENKO :

Who wrote your fitness reports?

My last one was written by (V.D.] CHELNOKOV.

The one

before that by (V.A.l KLYPIN, in the First Department.

Before that in the Seventh Department it was written

by [K.N.] DUBAS, before him by [V.A.l KOZLOV,

then

(S.V.) PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Depart-

ment, by (A.M. I GORBATENKO.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?

He may not have actually written them, but he signed

them, those reports written in connection with pro-

notions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general

reviews of personnel.

15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965) :

"Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of.

Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him.

AS (F.G.)

SHUBNYAKOY, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the

Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the acti

vities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,

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330%

it may have been several montis after I

began my KGS service that

GRIBANOV

first came to my attention.

I don't know when I first

saw GRIBAYOV but it may have been approximately 1953 at a meetirg.

before May Day or the 7 November holiday.

I would not

necessarily

remember this as I frequently met much more important

people.

who

were friends of my father, and seeing GRIPANOV wouid. t

have

been

particularly important to me.

Sometimes during 195: and 1955, it

was necessary to obtain the signature of a Depicy Chief of the

Second Chief Directorate on a cable that. I had written

and, if

SHUBNYAKO: was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV

for approval.

Though I was only a junior case officer at the

time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved ty the

Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directiy to GRIBANOV,

who would simply sign it with

no discussion.

I do not cerember how

many times I

took cables to GRIBANOV nor do I rementer the contents

of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV

that

I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956.

I think it was

in June.

I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing

a SpravKa on BURGI, PERFILYEV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBArOV.

KOZLOv didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, out GRIBANDV

knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BugGI operation

said that I would participate and because PERFILYEV had made an

appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIS'WUV at this time.

The neeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOV read the re-

port on BURGI's recruitment and asked sore questions.

KOZLOV

answered some of these and I answered others.

Other than asking

what Ukrainians

took part in the operation, I can recall none of

GRIBAlOV's questions nor do I remember any of the conversation

which took place at this meeting.

When we were through, KOZLOV

and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBAYOV..

Perhaps the

first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended

a reception giver by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetsiaya Hotel

in Moscow.

Usually (A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBAVOV on such

occasions, butyhe was sick at the time.

I don't knos why SUNTSOV

usually went with GRIBANOY, why I was

selected to go, or what I

was supposed to do at the reception.

I think GRIBANOV called the

Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know

why he picked

ne.

GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was

to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV.

I was to

introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use

the last nane NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used

the name vera Ivannv.:i. After work, I went home to change my

clothes and we went In GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel

Sovetskaya.

GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in

back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen

GRIBANOV altogether.

From 1959 on I saw him more frequently.

Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and

their deputies and I would take part in these.

call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I

was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Departnent,

chop ot the savi

I had begun tc

but at these meetings I called him 'Comrade General.'

• In 1959

I also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with tie

PRIPPEL case and, sometime-between lay and October 1959, took

him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist

cover by foreign intelligence organizations."

23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February) :

"GRIBAÑOV. was never in my own office, my home, my parents hoze

or my parent's dacha.

My father never knew him. I was never

1n. GRIBANOV's home or his dacha.: I was never in any KGB opera-

tonal apartment with GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my

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331.

arenta to GRIBAYOV.

GRIBANOV knew about agents

discrosed then with GRIBAIOV. I Sià

disouss with Shibrilok the

agent 'PRONIOR' (PREISEREUiD). On three occasions : rave been

with GRIBANOV in social clrcunstances." On all three ocr.gions

TARABAIN nag also present.

ifter two of these occasions, we

liad parties wish yir's.

I don't rememier when tie lirat tie

was, but the last time was in septenter or jotcher 1961.

this occasion

tiey called me at home late it nigt and deked me

to join then at the Prague Restaurant:.

arranged for female

companiorship and this party lasted until eaily morning:

• It

was at this party that

i gave GRIPANOV sone pilis I had for

hangovers.

I had

brought a supply of these baci from Geneva in

1962.

A few days after this paruy (GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.s.)

KIRPICINIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking

me for sone

more of chese pills.

This is the note I gavo to my

CIA case officers

in 1964.9*

I have ridden in GRIBAliOV's cars

perhups four or.

five times, once when I went with him to an

Indiar. Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps

two or three times to

ricetings with SUSLOV and two or three times

in connection

with

the drinking farties with GRIBANOV and TArABRIN.

GRIBANOV played

abspiutely no part

in my entry into the KGB.

I think he could not

have played any personal

part in my assigarent to the firge

Sectica, First Departient, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since

at that time GRIBANOV was

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-

torate supervising

the second bepartrent aid not the tirat be-

partment.

I do not kno's nho mace the

decision to transfer me

Irom the First Department to the Seventh legartment in 1955, but

I did rct have uny personai contact or conversation with GIBAlOV

concerning this decision.

I do not know if RiBANOV played anj

persoral part in ry appointnent as Deputy Chieï of Section in

the Severin Departrent in

1958.

I do not:

renerter just who was

resporsiule for my

appointrent

to this position.

i did int per-

sonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANoV.

GRIBINOV decided

at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chiet of che

First Section,

First Departnent, Scound Chies Directorate, und

this appointment took piace sometire in January 1969.

DUBAS,

the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959,

told me that GRISANOV

planned to appoint me

to this

position and that le had spoken to

GRIBAVOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get

GRIBANOV to change his plans.

I spoke

to GRIBANOV myself about

this matter once or twice.

GRIBANOY did not tell ne

who had

recommended

me for this now position and did not tell me any

reason for my having been selected.

GRIBANCV did tell me that my

appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more

senior positions

a number of younger officers, including myself

and Aleksey SUNTSOV.

The decision

for me to

return to the Seventh

Department in January 1952 was autually made in about September or

October 1961.

GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the

First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,

FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position.. Since I did not

5. See below for a more detailed version of this affals..

se when NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note

addressed:

"Personal to NUSENKO, Yu.I."

In translation the

note read in full:

"Yu.I., get me please sore more tablets

like the one you gave me once.: (signed! GRIBANOV."

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331.

own agents to GRIBANOV.: GRIBANOV knew about agents

we and

'ARTUR' (PRIPPELY,

but I never specifically

disclissed them with GrIbalov. I did discuss with GRIBAYOV the

agent 'FROKHOR' (FREISFREUD) •

On three occasions I have been

with GRISANOV in social circumstarces.

on all three occasions

TARABRIN

was also present.

After two of these occasions, we

had parties with girls.

I don't rerember when the first time

was, but the last time

was in Septarber or Ostoker 1963.

On

this occasion trey called me at hose late it right and asked me

to join their at tre Prague Restaurant.

I arranged

for female

companionship

ard this

party lasted

until early morning:*

It

was at this

party that I

gave

GRIP'NOV some pilis I hai

for

hangovers. I had brought a supply of these

back fron. Geneva in

1962.

A few days after this party (GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.)

KIRPICHNIKOV care to my office with a note from GRIBMOV asting

me for some more of theye pills.

This is the note I gave to my

CIA case officers in 1964.**. I have ridden ir. GRIBANOV'S Cars

perhaps folt or five times, once when

I went with him to

an

Indiar: Embassy reception in 1958, perilaps two or three times to

meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with

the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.

GRISANOV played

absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB.

I think he could not

have played any parsonal part in ry assignment to the first

Section, First Department, second Chief Directorate in 1953 since

at that time GRIBANCY was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-

torate

supervising the Second bepartnent and not the First De-

partment.

I do not knon who made the

decision to transfer me

from the

First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but

I did ict have any person"i contact or conversation with GRIBANOV

concerning this decision.

•I do not know if GRIBANOV played any

persoral part in ry appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in

the Seventh Department in 1958 to this position.

I do not remember just who was

responsible for my appointment

I did not per-

sonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV.

GRIBANOV decided

at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed

Deputy Chief of the

First Section, First department, Second Chief Directorate, and

this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS,

the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959,

told me

that GRIBANOV

planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to

GRIBANOV two or three times about it,

but had been unable to get

GRIBANOV to change his plans.

I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about

this matter once or twice.

GRIDANOY did not tell ma who had

recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any

reason for my having been selected.

GRIBANOV did tell me that my

appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more

senior positions a number of younger officers, including

and Aleksey SUNTSOV.

The decision for me to return to the Seventh

Dapartment in January 1962 was actually made in about September of

October 1961.

GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the

First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,

FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position.

Since I did not

* See below for a more detailed version of this affair.

** When. NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note

addressed:

"Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I.". In translation the

note read in full:.

"Yu. I., get ve please some more tablets

like the one you gave me once. (signed] GRIBANOV.*

TUF YECHET

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## Page 247

.332.

want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the

wishes of PrONSEYEY, I went tO GRIBAiOV and requested that I be

transforied lick to the Seventh Departrent, in ary position.

had already spoken to CHELNOKOV, who vias then Chief of the Seventh

Department, about this matter:

and he had suggested that I go to

GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Departmert.

GRIBAROY

finally agreed that I should

return

to tre Seventh Department as

Chief of the first Seccion with the

understanding that I

would be

appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this

position would be vacated by (B.n.) BALDIN.

In July 1962 I was

appointed Deputy. Chief of the Seventh Department.

This decision

was male by CHELOKOY and GRIBANOV in

accordance with the intertion

stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appninted

to this position as soon as possible. I had no further personal

di cussions with GRIBNIOV about this

appointment at this time.

In

1963 CHELNOKOV ¡GRIBANOV'S Deputy, F.D.I BOBKOV, and GRISANOV

decided that I should be named

First Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Departrent.

they id not discuss this with ma beforehand and no

order was issued about this appointment.

I was simply told that

from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of tre

Department.

At this time I was, in sact, the only Deputy Chief of

the Seventh Department,

since KOROBOV did not come to the seventh

Department until about

November or December 1963.

GRIBANOV did

not tell re his reasons for appointing me

Deputy Chief of the

First Section, First Department in January 1960,

for warting to

appoint ne Deputy Chief of the first bepartment in late 1961, or

for appointing me Section Chief ind later Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department in 1962.

He did not discuss with me my personal

qualifications for each of these positions.

GRIBM"OV had nothing

at all to do with my assignment to Geneva

in 1962.

I thirk that

the kharakteristika witten about me for this trip was signed by

BOBKOV,

since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-

torate who supervised the Seventh Department.

I did not personally

discuss

this

trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow.

My candidacy for this assignment was supported oy BANNIKOV, the

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who

supervised the

work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file

on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would

go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected

• of possibly being a western agent, was to be in the delegation.

There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted

on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.

assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Person-

nel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel

Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the cest.

GRIPANOV

had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964.

The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV.

FOI

the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of

the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of

the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip.

KHLOBU-

STOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as

a personal favor

to me. I did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva

with GRIBANOV prior to my departure.. In fact, I was even afraid

that GRIBANOV would find out that I

was going

and would object to

my making this second trip."

---

## Page 248



---

## Page 249

:333.

23: February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social

With GRIBAYOV and TAPARPIN.

The following, which was

not included in the protocol quoted above, is tikur fiom case

officer notes.

Question: Teil me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV

and TARABRIN.

NOSENKO:

Three times--drinking in cafes.

Twice afterwards there

were girls.

The most recent time was ir. September or

October 1963. I don't remenber the firit time..

In

1963 I received a call from TARARI!! at home.

Then

GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car

and come join them

at the Praga Restaurant.

I didn't

take his car because I didn't want to call the duty-

officer.

I took a cab and vent to the Fraga.

They

were sitting there and drinking in a private room.

I

joined them.

They were drinking chanpagne, but I took

cognac.

TARABRIN suggested girls about. 1230 and GRIBANOV

made

me go to the office to get my nutebook. I called

one girl I knew--ner and her sister.

wein" I got back

to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and

TAPÄBRIN still there.

We lent to the girls' (apartment).

They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.

Question:

Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurart (i.e..

to provide girls)?

NOSENKO:

I think so.

It was the second time I had participated

in this.

This last time CRIBANOV told the

girl his

name.

The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief

Directorate.

At that time of night I rasn't able to

reach anyone else.

Her name is Galin likhaylovna.

Her mother works in the Central Committee.

I don't

remember her last name.

GRIBANOV was drinking and she

told him that she had

quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief

of the First Chief Directorate Archives.

GRIBANOV

told her that he would give her a job and told me to

arrange for a job in the American Department of the

Second Chief Directorate for her.

Galina's flat is in

the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on

Kutuzovskiy Prospekt.

GRIBANOV's driver drove him

home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.

3 March 1965:

Speaking of the damage his disclosures must

have caused the KGB, NOSENKO

"I believe they will punish

people in the Second Chief Directorate (SCD]...

Even GRIBANOV...

He was personally responsible, as head of the

SCD, for pushing

me ahead."

Question: What sort of punishment?.

NOSENKO: Even firing.

Question:

Do you think any others would be punished, or even

fired?

NOSENKO:

Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBROV, and people in the Eleventh

Department. Many others, too.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 250

334.

Later

in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject.

The following is a transcript of the discussion:

Question:

You said you trink GRIBANOV might be fired.

Yet, there

is nothing in the protocol you signed. (see ajovel about

your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make

him personally responsible for you.

Is there something

else, something you haven't told me?

NOSENKO:

Question:

No.

Why then do you think GRIBANOV wouls be fired?

NOSENKO:

(no answer)

Question:

(repeats)

NOSENKO:

Don't know.

Question: Hell, what is your opinion at lcast?

NOSENKO:

Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.

Question:

NOSENKO :

why not?

It's simply my opinion, that's all. I don't know why.

Question:

NOSENKO:

well, what is your cpinior?

He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of

Department.

Question:

But you had already gotten ahead before: you said he

didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?

NOSENKO :

It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief

of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Why would BOBKOV be punished?

le was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary o

ne kGB Party Organization

Question:

Would others in the Party Organization be punished?

NOSENKO:

Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh

Department and of the SCD.

Question:

• Would BANNIKOV be punished?

NOSENKO:

No.

Be did nothing, just supported my candidature for

Geneva:

Question: Would KOVSHUK: be punished?

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 251

335.

NOS ENKO:

Of course they would speak with KoVsHuk, GuK, GRYAZNOt,.

who talked to me.

Question:

How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh

Directorate?

NOSENKO:

No. I wasn't close to them, except GuK.

Question:

NOSENKO:

How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?

Question::

(S.I. ) GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.

You must be withholding something about your relation-

ship with GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO:

Question;

NOSENKO :

Question:

NOSENKO

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

No, I was telling you I visited his office.

He told

me:

'I found out you're drinking too much.'

I said

no, not especially.

He said:

'stop this rinking

with kovSHuk.

It's not good for you."

But this couldn't harm GRIBiNOV's position now.

They would review my file, and find trat it contained

the report about the woman in '54;* the fact that I

was turred down

for assigntent to Ethiopia, deinking,

scandals--GRIBANOV KNEW

about this, but he

approved

my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Lepartment) anyway.

Why did he promote you?

GRIBANOV thought I was a young, astive guy. Six re-

cruitnents--oh,

they weren't much,

but it

sounds

great for the First Department, which was having no

success with Americans in the Embassy.

But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?

He thought I was a tough juy, good case officer. In

159 I saw hin often and was involved in a lot of

operations which were reported to him.

But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you

Deputy Chief of Department.

(shrugs)

Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Depart-

ment?

Must be higher than a Department Chief--bec. ise

GRIBANOV signed.

They could get him for his, especially

those who are against GRIBANOV.

Who?

Question:

NOSENKO:

well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to deputy

Chief of-Department in 59-60 but didn't. " He was in an

Inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh

Department.:

Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal

disease (see Part IV.C.2.) •

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 252

14-0000D

Question:

NOSENKO:

question:

KOSENYO:

But GrIBANOV must have afaroved all the

other seputy

Departreat Chiefs, 100.

kould

the sare happen if ore

of then dofecte??

well, if It was

from the Second Departient, for exurpi:,

no, because GRIENio! wasn't personally supervising it.

It

wouid he sonone eise's proposal.

I: my case it was

his own iniciative.

Nas arjone in the First Chie: Directorate punished as

a result of GolirsiN's deluction?

sie, absolutely not

2. Information fron

As indicated in Part III.I.,

a numbar of sources have reported

that GRIBANOV and other KC3

officars were

dinat.arged from

tre K33

in

the lalie of NOSE:KO's defec

According

to

15 KCB

orricers had diready seen

dismissed

from the KGB beczuse

of the defection, and that gRIBMiOV and three of his depaties vare

included

in this number.

Ore of the deputies wis named

"BRONIK"

(BANNINOU) .

GRiBINOV's quilt was said

to rest in the facts that,

as Chies of the second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimateiy

resporsible for NOSE!NO's flight; that NOSENKO was his personal

friend and

protege:

and that,

therefore, lie should have been

of NOSENKO's intentior. to defect.

Accordir, io ser

SOUrCe

when

rOS

Eido

seing consicerad

for

inclusion

in the Sotiat dele-

gatio.. to go to Geneva, a summary statement oe NOSElkO's activities

ard capabilities was prepared by employees

of

tie Second Chief

Directorate and was sent to

GRIBANOV...

said he understasd

this summary contained considerable 'comprorising' irforation re-

garding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have renoved

NOSENTO from future

consideration for the trip to Gereva.

stated, however, that he understood fron conversations with other.

KGB employees,

whom he could not recall specifically by name,

that

GRIBANOV read the sumnary material, ran a line through all of it,

In addition, a western Ambaseador with whom GRIBANOV was in

operational contact-in Moscow-has-stated that GRIBANOV disap-

peared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was raplaced by-

another KGB handler.

(le has also indicated that GRIBANOV

"disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October

1964.)

T87 SECRET

---

## Page 253

3.37

and put the rotation on the summary,

'Sand him to Caneva.'

arrests the genecal

feeling arong. KGB person-

nal

RIbArov was williag lo overloos a lot of dericiencies

ADOLE PCSENKO because of GRIBaNOV's long-tire friendship with

NOSENiO's father.

iccora ru, to carsitive

GRIBANOV'S C1S11680}

took

place

innediately after

HOSEUKO's

derustion in inbruary düd and no. 103y

than

50

other officurs;

most of them from the sucond Chief Mircotorate and many of then

ciose rilende of GilBaiov, had been

fired subacquently.

a prior to NOstliko's defection, NOSaliKo has

been

tia

deputy to a Department Chief in the Sacond Chief Direc-

torste but that he held only the rank

of captain in the

KCB.

mad attributed liOSENKO's high position to the

influerce

which

GRInNOV exerted on his schalf.

Many rather than being fired, Major General "BinTR" (BANNINGY)

had

baer

appointed Acting Chief of the second Chief Directorate in

GRIBANOV's steaci.*

after

the defectica of NOSENKO, the Key conducted

in ex-

tensive investigation of personnul in HGB Headquarters to find out

which KGB offices knew him.

•One or these questioned was TAPAB!I!!,

who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relation-

ship was only casual and was limited to occasional official con-

tacts within t'e

KGB.

Subsequent investigation determined, hovever,

that TARABRIN and GRIBANCV were close friends socially and had

atterded several

parties which NOSENKO had

arranged and attended.

Girls provided by MOStliko were at these parties."". As a result of

his

willful concealment of this information, TARiBRIN, like GRIBANOV.

was discharged from the KGB and dismisseu from the Communist Party

of the soviet Union.

BANNIKOV was the acting Chief of the

Second Chie! Directorate.

NOSENKO, as noted above, said that

BANNINOV would not be punished as a result of his defection.

NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who spongored NOSENKO's

196% trip to Geneva and

that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it

or the 1962 trip.

*o These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKo (see

above).

aris at the time of

his renoval trem-the nob,

was-the Chief of the British

Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO said

that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was

promoted-to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established

'Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the Flyst Chlet

Directorato.

SECRET

---

## Page 254

338.

1. Confirmation fron other Furces

1. Introduction

Sinco NOSErso's dofcation ioveral sovier spurces aid

dofectors. have provided

infernation.

supporting.loSENKC's

clains of having nell cartrin goritione in the

K53. at cor.

rair sinas.

Sador

sovict acicutist

mith suspecied intelligence connections

no was apprcached vy

ClA,

inviet caso officers for an

ejoublo aiont la MOSESAO lead), anu

the FiGS

cfficer

handling loberi Leo SCiliSON (al:o

a HUSaNKy lead), a Sov.

¡et jourraliat nho contacted tre magazine Paris

with a proposal in write di

article

On NOSTANO,

and two

defectors.

Sure de these sources

had

supportei NOSENKO

directly by reporting that de mas

a second Chief Diroc-

toraie officer in tho various positions he say he was.

Others have

offored indirect support by confirming HOSENiU's

dinGtiledgo

uf particular pieces ci

information co con.

115a1ng

tt.e

val

ijity of

nformation which vostito said he

lestrod

while

in particular KGB Jobs.

1s will be notod,

the infornation

fron

one source sonatinos contradicts

that learned fron another or frot HOSENkO himsolf.

has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly

by

HalS

escriptions of lne reparcussions of the descetion

within

X83

raarticul

174213243

DECE MELY

ilv

t:1€

fixin?

by

his

cronis

CONCErNINg

tig

anu

that

th

defection. nouid have

KGB

upe

futiful?

reported

at

various

tha: NOSEiKO is "nore

valuable than PEN-

KOVSKIY

thai re

is "vastly more

important than DERYABI"

OI

that the 4GB

"will

not be able to overate

normally

for tio

ve3T

it

inanimous opinion

of

"HOSENKO could

do tremendous

harin

to the IGB," and

that this damage would

be severo

"for

several years to

come"

has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's

starcient

that he was depui% Chief of the u.s.

Embassy

soction...

RYAn NOSENKO'as a "chicf" had

access to desai

tivities against the U.S.Em-

bassy, and tradat

Knigho loss sufforod by cho

KGB as a resuli or

knowlodgo.of. tha.micr.orhones

installed

in the Embasgy.

¡NOSENKO has said that this in

formation dies available

so hin only because

Has Deputy

Chief of she Anericun Embassy joetton.

that NOSENKO's position as a "chict

the Second

Enter Directorato save hio access to eno namos and backerone

however, is not known to have stated specifically

ther

JUStiO was a senior oflicial in the Micrican Eabassy

Section of the American Department in

: 1960 and 1961.

TOP SENTET

---

## Page 255

339

Pssp and

183

cE many kuB citacers

18.

and to

serisit: ve

inföm..

and mechod..

This

status

10. 10.5010

4."30=ang6 р21

shone List

rica

•3'

*dip

tons,

available

tr-pige

was

Jonn

RUF&.

named

Leningrid

in January

information NOSE!iNO

americon rourist

Sec

Further

exaroles

ZIE

reviewed

TEIG

recruited in

1362 or homosexual

Grounds:

this

said

i.e

learnes

as chief

8..6

11.3

FLUrist

Depart:it

supporting

HOSENED

this

an i

e!.e

CHENL

Inbasant

an fare

150

jiterei.

:ific

that fron the very

beginning ot

ena:

the AGE NOSENKO rocked in

the second Disoctorate.

Crus he once worked against persoral

of

tie

U.:.

in Moscow; later he was assigneù to work against

journalists in doscow.

suring his last years with

he was assigned to the task of worting against rabrican

the KGB,

and

MOSENRO has never mationed these documents.

The gaRET

---

## Page 256

TUP SECRET

Furcein

tourists in MuscUla

His hast

Has

that

of

vosury to the

second.chief Directerise!

NOSENKO SeCurOl LiS

r.013.21

of

help he roceives.

fron

lide

Chief

of the

Second Directorate.

Out

NOSENko's career GREatsOY haU

SuW

that to hias

promoted,.

with regard to NOSENKO's: Kot

BRIBAYOY,

oase through-

sin and

"it appoired qu

cortain.

inat

Hate Colonel tedia

XCD.

reported having los

СЗІ.

that NOSENKO

AGB Of-

a-captain, ca

feels

replied

convinced

KGB .

SCENTO

has

that

his

might

be

that

fron

his

Owl.

that

JOSE!

KO's

3C1U21

knowledge

defection

or whether

by

KUB.

siis

matter

is.net

2

sensitive source

3

the

from

various persons

Moscow.

NUSENKO

personally:

SalL

NOSENKO

in the KGB.

said

he

did

not

departnent NOSENKO hud

been

in.

tinued

that when

• NOSENO

ra's

}

GRU Military Academy"^*

and

then

was

mation

Department. of the. GRU

for

ard

asout dOSENtO

has nevcr

an

impertant

Boss

crate

ne

ras

sEnt

tine;

she

in

the

Infer-

ail,

Untii

January 1965 NOSENNO maintainod that he had pro-

SIESSed

through the KGs.rants ir nutral sequence,

izon

lieutenant 20

licutenant colonel. on 2u january 1905,

however,

he

said that because of aininistrative confusion

and GRIPANOV's advice he had skipped the runk of major and

had moved directly fron captain to sieutenant colonel in

late 1963.

In April 196ó SOSENiO told Cli that he had

never hold the rant of lieucenant colona! and was really

only a captain (see Part F.o.1.).

The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intel-

ligence school of the GRU. AlthousA USENNU said he

attendod various naval-type schools before joining the

GRU, he insisted

thai he was never errolled in a fernal

intelligence course of any trainins establishent of the

Soviet Navy'.

He.

clained to have turned down an offer to

attend the Military Diplocatic Academy (which he called the

GRU Military Acajeny) because it Sifered too rany political

courses that he had already taken. See Part IV.B.'

ISP SESTET

---

## Page 257

511

perhaps

been

FEAT

very

Very

ile

Lowever.

1:15;

datiict

li:e

Silastry

of

Ship

ferred

1l.e

KGB.

SOIS

from

ition

14.

lie

rustski

iadd

K1ve1

VA"T

detcation

üis

10 763 Informalin:

v1

People

nassats.

1:9S5Y

had

intimation.

been

Ci!:l.

from

NOSESKO -17d

3110

the

VIl;

discharged

influ.i.idl

üa!"

103t

will

internatina to the lis.

1002"30

luüc:

had

troil accors

all

•' 2.15

(1

11t)

fion

was

incident

che:

inly CAt

mureid his knowledke of

which printed

abrat

1959. while dOSESad said

Tourist

Dejartweni.'9

TAs indicateu is purl W.E.3.6..

but not entirel

1.1i.

final senterer. is largely

**Sce Part V.F.8

Tor.

---

## Page 258

342.

8&

the

tIMe

the

defection,

NOSEINO

was rooming

Geneva

with Nikolay RESHETNYAÀ, a representativo of tlio

Inter.

national Organizations

Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry

of Foreign

Affairs.

KESHETNYAK told N

that NOSENXO

often

left

his

quartors wicheut

saying where he

was going,

but

it

W3S

assumed

that NOSENKO vag

"Intolligeneo"

and had

g0ne

mi

sgion.

accomplish

RESHETNYAK had been

Interrogated

the KGB

nection

with

tho NOSENKO

defection.

RESHaTNYAK also toid

that

he

had attended

the

Moscow trial of dostoo,

hold

in

absentia,

at

which NOSENiO las found

quilty of

treason

and was sentenced to death. tested thought

the KGS mighi go so

far as to send

someone to the United

States to locate and kill NOSENKO.

Finally, he has reported

on the dismissa! of large numbers of XGB officeis:

in-

cluding GRIBANOV and Yuriy duk, and other repercussions

within tho KGB of NOSENKO's delection (see fart Ill.l.4.)

E. GAMKRELIDZE

NOSENKO's service

in the American Department has cor-

fimed in the fall of 1964. by the Soviet mathenatician R.V.

GAMKRELIDZE. ***

At that time an American scientis: brought

up with GAMÄRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchango*aa

See part 1ab.1.c.

NOSENKO identified KESIETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs officer on the stafi uf the Disarmament

Dologation.

Asked on 21 Jaruary 1901 whether RESHEINYAK

might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with ClA,

NOSENKO replied: "Ho thinks I'm KGS.

so of courso thero's

no problem if I come back late.",

ported that PESHETNIAK had been dishissed: iron

the KGB 83

a result of the defection of NOSENKU.

CIA has no other

rOpOTES Of RESHETNYAK having sorved in the KGB.

GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections

with Soviet

Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as

we.1

as his unusual freedes of novenent, often alone, while

on visits to the United States.

When approached by & CIA

representative with & recruitment proposal in

1964, GAM-

KRELIDZE declined but added that he

"welcomed the

portunity to-meet with an American Intelfirence officer...

since this enabled him to compare che Soviet Intelliganco

officers he has met with their American counterparts."

During this meeting, GAMiRELIDZE raised the subject sf

NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to

his country."

The exchange of the KGB. Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL

for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-z pilot, took place in

February 1962•

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## Page 259

3÷3.

and asied whither the russian prorie tol boon told aboot it.

GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not doe

told ifficially but

knew it had taken place

since

thore".d

Moscon.

Às an example, he

said tha? ":;

li. thes

disg that lis

had heard about the NosEtro driectia dud lur signalcance.

E1-

panding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that

the "grativin:"

indicated thi

the defection

"was very dana?"

Intlogence in thit

NOSENKO was the Chiof of the american diction, and noirew

thr

identities of all soviet agunta di

the united itutes.

7. GOLITSYN

The defector colity is the caly courer of intomation ca

NOSEX"O's KGB career who claims to move men persoudly acquainted

with hin.

GOLITSYN. said that he mor bootto for the first time in

1953 when visiting the Americin coppinent ot the kob decond Chice

Directorate on business,

and that to sab and

spoke with dusetro on

ü number of occasions subseguently, not recentiy ir 1959. This

first-hand information from Gollisi:.

miover, 1s not always con-

sistent either intornaliy or 11 corpurison with that suoplied i

CIn has no record that collisi, price to the piblicity

attending NoSEikUs defection,

mentioner him buy name or in

cornection with the KGB Second Chics Directorate.

1962, prior to NOSENhO's first coctacl with CiA, GOLIESEN was

HOSENKO's name among those of

other roviets in Geneva fo.

the Disarmament Corference. lie faried lo coment on it.

26 June 1962, after ClA's intial seatings with NOSENKO

and because of the large overlap o: dustrio's information anc

curtacts with GOLITSY!'s, one of tie diA case officers "ho has

met NOSENKO In Geneva mot with GOLITSYN

to cutain his commerts

on some of the NOSENKO material.

GOLITSY: was told that CIA had

receired in Switzerland

anonymous lut: er which reported cer-

tain information from within the woB; the cli official stated

to GOLITSYN that the irfoimation so clusuly overlapped his oun

reporting, including prominent nication of coLlISyd's

friends GuK,

KOVSHUK, and CHURANOV, that the péssikility of disiufernation

was suspected, perhaps

in relation to GU'ITSYN's cun defection.

Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with

GOLITSYN, all

pertaining to Second Chief Directorate operations, and a list

shown him, Identified is nancs of

second Chief

Directorate personnel whom the letter wiltur had names.

({nu) NOSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had

previously reported on him; CiA records, however, shou that

GOLITSYN had reported only on, one Aleksandi Feioseyevich NOSENKO,

who had been a KGB officer in Japan when RASTVOROV defected to

the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these

except to say that one identified as KGB had left that

organization in 196l for the MVD. GOITSYN said that in general,

lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could

say that there were

serious signs of disinformation in what ne

had scen; he wanted to see the full information on

the case.

Subseguently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this informa-

tion, complaining to Attorney General Robert KENNEDY and senior

CIA officials because his request had not been granted.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarma-

ment delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, was publicized, including

his RGB affillation

when GOLIISTY heard this news he immediately

recalled the June 1962 "letter" In Switzerland and Linked NOSENKO

to it; he thereupon stated that ne recalled ROSENKO as a menber

of the Second Chief Directorate working against merican citizens

GOLITSYN on ll February 1964 raised the possibility of hit

participation in efforts to "break, NOSEsKO, and at this time he

was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's

OP SECRFT

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## Page 260

344.

reservations acout NOSE KO's bung fides.

crer, the next sevgral

mor ths GOLITSyN was provided

witis maicrial fron the 1952 and

1964

meetings with MOSaiKO in Switzerlani,

and as his request nas

Sup-

plied with all the available hiographic dare to assis? im in

analyzing the KGa operation:

On 29 June 1904; GOLITSti nas inter-

vjewes 1n

detail on the subject of nestio.

ie confirmed isse:-

Ka's identity as the son of the forner Mirister of Shippildim

and said that he was a huB officer in has torted in

ine American

Department and the Tourist Department of tre

i3B's Secord Chler

Directorate.

tie was

shown a photograph of wisEnko inot burder

in a photo

spread, bus singly) and he said tat the photograph

depicted NOSEiKO.

COLIISIN

snid he knew this bocause re has per-

sonally acquainted with rUSENKO, having mee hir evo o= there

tires an the U.s.

Emmaisy section while thore on MeE

Firs.

Chiet

Lirectorate business

1953.

lie nad also sren NOSEiNO COESSIOn-

ally at work duria 1959

and :959.

and when BOLITSYN asked him

where he was workirg in 1993, Mr.sbiK0 teld com that he was

1n

the Tourist separinent.

Finilly.

said. he

end NOSE IKO

knew ore another through their mutual

frierdships with yu.

UCK, V.À.

CHURLiOV,

and. Ye...KASHCHEYEV.* #cording to GSLITSYN.

NOSEiRO SerVEd 1n

the u.s.

Embassy Section from 1953 uncll 1957

or 1959 ind was spechiisally meironsacle for kon coverage of iner-

ican malitary personnel in Moscow during the first yes. of this

period.

For the remainder of lus servior in the U.S. Embassy

Section, until 1957 or 1953, GLITSYN said. NOSENKO may have had

these,same responsibilities or ne may have

been working

agginst

other imbassy personnel or coricspondents.

He was definitely in

the American Department during this entire period.

In 1957 or

1958. NOSENKO transterred to the Tourist Deportrent and kis a

senior case officer there as of 1959." GOILISYN was ce:tair that

NOSEiKO did not work 1a

the mirzican deparment of the second

Enief Directorate at any tine durirg 1960.

This he said he knew

because he had visited the u.s.

Enibassy Section on at least three

occasions during the early part of 1950

and again in about secem-

ber 1960 \ 510.

accually January 19011. *** COLITSYN sa:d that he

knew in detall who was in the

seition.

and that he wouid have

known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were

the

Deputy Chief.****

NOSENKO. on the other hand.

talled to identify coliTso's

photograph and has consistently denied ever seeing or meet.

ing him.

After the defection, insinko was asked what ne krew

uf GOLITSiN.

a derailed account of

an incisent which COLITSYN himself hid previously reported

tO CIA:

GOLITSYN and KASHCTEYEV in 1351 or 1952 had written

a letter to the central Committee of the Communist Party

proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief

Directorate intelligence actlvities: as a result of this

letter COLITSYN

and KASHCHSYEV had been received by MALeNKOV

and STALIN, and their proposals were accepted.

This was

NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV,

but he added at this

time tilat he was personally acquainted with him, had seen

him periodically at KGB Headquarters.

sometimes had a drink

with him after work, and had once entertained KASHCHEYEV at

his dacha in: 1953 or 1954: GOLITSYN saW MOSENKO's reply to

his question prior to making the above statement, ard NOSEN-

Ko's claims of friendships with Yu.I. Gui and V.A. CHURANC

were includea in the file COLITSYN studied.

(Footnotes continued on next, paye.!

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## Page 261

on 1

3443.

(Continuation of footnotes fion precediry page.)

*This chronology differs fron that provided by NOSENXO and

described

previously:

• According to Nospiro, he serves in

the inerican

Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Depart-

ment from 1955 until january 1960.

in the Americar. Depart-

ment during 1960 and 1961, a-d again in the Tourist Depart-

ment from 1962 until

his defection.

NOSE:NO's confimed

1955 operation 29ai1

EURSI

and his 1957 operations

against

Pand Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm

his connec

carast operations in 1956 and 1957.

GOLITSYN had spoken as ea:ly as December 1901 of these

visits to the U.S. Embassy

section.

****COLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I, GRYAZNOV was acting

as the assistant of the chief of section at this time.

has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S, Embassy

Section

nor indicated that

such

a position. was

on

the

table of organization.

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## Page 262

Director3:o

self-prosessed former son second chief

47881

, that she did not thin

NOST

rotes. d

KGB officer.

it the same tare, however.

stie. knew.that.NCGENiD.nad told

the Angricans a..out

the microphones in the

U.s. Embassy in Moscow.

The following in

from the tranucript of her remarko:

Question:

DO yOU know

anything about OSENKO, the one who

defected

in Geneva?

I didn't have any real information.

I heard some

gossip,

and the yossip wag that he in the son of

a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his

involved in soud blackmarketing,

that his father had great concern sier the fandly.

This is, you know, iu'e talk. I don't really know--

it was just gossip.

Question:

Question:

Question:

Question:

Question:

would you say that this idle tali nus among rGis

scople oi--

You know, 1 didn't inon many AGh rogle. It tig

only i!r.

SVIPIN.*

But he told you about this?

l'e didn't tell me, he told

Msband), ah--you knoi, incy tire to think they

are all-ponerful, that lili mün of course will

Le exterminated one cay.

They always repeat it.

riell, somelody committed suicide.

The old de-

fector, that GUZENKO, I think.

Yes--I read in

the paper.

But what vere you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO?

His mother is Jewish, his lather is a general.

What was his father in?

I really don't know.

were there others who suffered as a result of this?

I really don't know. . I never heard.

I never knew

that defector.

I never knew. He wasn't a KGB

person.

I beg your pardon?

He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.

V.G. SVIRIN was said by

to have been a KGB

officer under

cover of the State

Committee for Science: and

Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's em-

ployment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit con-

ducting operations against the boS. Insassy: He-maintained

a friendly association with fli

and her husband to

the date of her defection.

According

tO MOSENKO, SVIRIN wag

a KGB officer who participated in the

PENKOVSKIY

"Investigation

(see. Part VI.D.7.b.).

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## Page 263

346.

Question

Question:

question:

Question:

question:

question:

question;

The fellon iron lienera?

No. He wasn' a diß person.

No? What was he?

He was a civilian, I think.

You never heard anything about his family, his

friends?

No.

But you say he was not a lüi person?

I say I will tell you one thing:

They don't have

on these things.

It is: never safe.

So gossip isn't popular.

besides, each of then

have their own grudge, sort of department, and he

knon's very little except gossip, very little gos-

for insiance, maybe

Mr. SVIRIN

wasn't in a position to inon about

this person straight, so hu repcated the tiny

scraps he heard.

And that was only that he hid a

Jewish nother and

a general

for a filther, but nothing

about hin.

Nothing...

I don't inow.

Everybody, sas saying

that he was detestable, when he ran away.

tipped

mnericans...

He cipped the Mericans

about the microphones and things in the Embassy.

In the Embassy in Moscow?

In Moscow, yes.

But jet, he was not a NiB person?

But you know every Russian who is allowed to see

foreigners is connected lin some way with the KGB}.

You know, i l'GB person is considered to be a person

who works

at this place, as an officer, and every-

body else

involved is sunehow related to the KGB

but not KGB persons themselves.

During a later debriefing by ClA,

sourcing of this information.

All of

it

che microphones in the U.s

limbassv

except

that

SVIRIN

clarified her

concerning

when he

visited the met a

mation that NOSENKO had conpromiseu.

AiD

microptione system to

the Americans was also received fron SVIRls during another social

visit d

in On thiscoccasion SVIKIN rc-

marked to

that destino had done corsiderable danage

to the Soviets by relealing the fact of the microphones to U.s.

authorities.

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## Page 264

TOP SECRET

11.

Sariet Journalist KORoL.

In Gorober lied, Yu.l. dokonly. iliu

journalist, offered

To write

astory on la fire telesoviet

the

family of

"Soviet secret agori" for the ironch marrie

March. * *4

The story

has

incir Tire in ius.

con siace NOSINi's defection.

to concern bosesco's fand boround statement ch

# short

santo which kokol!" handed,füris Macch eliiers sialed

in part:

about 54-39

in officer of ine coviet fordet Police

Jetecred to the Usa wielnur lis

famii; about two

wais ago and ashed for polition asylmm in the bobc it was

The JOhNsoN lead fron dostake is dirased in detail in

Tan v.нa.

NO-ESKO provided information.on

•* See Part 1Ilall. for more dotalls concertire KOtoil's ofter

re Paris: dares.

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## Page 265

14-00000

wet.

"it.

ranied to hin.

That nas. the nest strinus defeat: the Soii:t

Security orrans as NoSEr%o

occupiel important positions

espion.

age and

and also

dias closely acquainted

hones.

• ' o w.

70P

SECRET

• sens

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