Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10182

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10182

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : DOS

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Vietnam Status Report

DATE : 7/1/1962

PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 4/4/63-7/11/63. Box

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COPY 2 OF6 a COPIES

•FINAL REPORT - TASK FORCE VIET-NAM

eily 1, 1962

I Presidential Program (Initiated May 23, 1962)

I. Seek to increase VN confidence in US by Vice-Presidential visit.

Achieved.

tion.

2. Attempt strengthen Diem's popular support by reappraisal and negotia-

Continues:

Our attempts contime, but Diem's popular support has

decreased.

The January 4, 1962, GVN-US Joint Communique spelled

out a program aimed 'at providing every Vietnamese with

a atake in the outcote of the war. The communique res

sulted from negotiations which began with Vice President

Johnson's visit and the Staley Mission. Negotiations

aimed at producing action which will increase popular

support continue.

The December 4, 19Q1 Memorandun of Understanding

between Diem and Nolting specifically recognized the

importance of developing democratic institutions.

The GN has taken a number of actions following from

and related to this understanding which are calculated

so Increase popular support. These include the estab

Rishment of Provincial Councils, a National Econome

Council, a Constitutional Court, a national flood re-

Lef organization (which included oppositionists),&

contiming purge of officials charged with various

abuses, an organisation within the fresidency charged

with the responsibility for collecting and acting on

popular complaints, the contimed toleration of at

least a minimm of opposition activity (example: the

opposition candidates in the 1961 Presidential elections

are at large and have organized a Democratic Bloc; an

other oppositionist group has been permitted to set up

the Front for National Unity which has publicly demanded

a forum and legal status for opposition groups)

A more vigorous civilian cive action program has.

been

set in motion, combining the personnel of the

former.

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former Youth, Information and Civic Action Ministries.

U. S. officials have influenced this program through

constant colicact and assistance to the information

program and to the civic action aspects of counterino

surgency plans.

3.

Begin negotiations looking toward bilateral arrangement with VN.

Suspended:

The December 4 Memorandum of Understanding, plus ou

on-going joint programs constitute an adequate bilateral

'arrangement" for realizing our objectives in VN. A

bilateral treaty would probably bring us into conflict

with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, commit us

Irrevocably, and Diem has shown little interest in suc

a treaty since General Taylor's visit, and the increaser

American assistance which resulted.

cal cameras on to sland i relat opinionath other coumertoe, espe-

Continues:

Vietnamese-Cambodian relations continue to be bad. In

spite of many US efforts to bring the two parties too

gether, little progress has been registered.

VN 's stand-

ing in world opinion has probably improved as a result.

of clearer international understanding of the nature of

the hostilities there.

In contacts with other goveraments, the U. S. bas

consistently sought to present the facts of the Viet.

Nan situation. In December 1961, the US pablished the

evidence linking the DRV with the VC and documenting

DRV aggression against SVN in our report "A Threat to

the Peace": At ou suggestion, President Diem on

March 31, 1962, sent a letter to all beads of Govert-

ment and Chiefs of State o

outlining the facts of the

DRV attack on his country." The June 2 ICC Report

charging the DRY with a deliberate campaign aimed at

the violent overthrow of the GVN has been used by our

diplomatic Missions to focus world attention on the...

DRY attack.

5. Strengthen

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5. Strengthen border control arrangements with Cambodia.

Continues: In spite of repeated efforts by the US, joint VN-

cambodian control has not been effected and incidents

are frequent.

This continuing friction and the

absence of effective joint border controls has helped

the VC.

.60.

Cooperate with GWN in planning effective use of assistance from

other goveraments.

Continues:

The British have sent a special advisory mission to Viet-

Nam under R. G. K. Thompson. In cooperation with the

Thompson Mission, the US and the GWN have worked out the

Delta Plan.

The Australians have agread to send a mili-

tary training mission which will be integrated into MAAG

activities.

The Koreans have sent a military survey

mission, the Thais are being approached to send observers.

We intend to approach New Zealand.

Malaya has trained

several hundred Vietnamese in counter-guerrilla opera-

tons.

The US is currently seeking to coordinate economic

assistance to Viet-Nan by means of a special coordination

group of donor nations.

We are urging other countries

to increase their assistance to VN, particularly in the

form of conmodity imports formerly financed by the US

aid program.

Over the past few years economie aid from countries

other than the US has amounted to more than $100 million,

Including both grants and loans. Donor countries Include

Japan, France, Germany, Australia, United Kingdom, New

Zealand, Canada, China, and The Philippines.

7. Examine diplomatie setting for commitment of U.S. forces to VN.

Suspended: Accomplished by the Taylor Miss10n. The present level of

U.S. assistance, l.e. training and logistic support plus

some limited operational forces, appears to be the most

effective "nig" at this time.

8. Astess

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8. Assess political implications of increasing GVN forces from 170, 000

to 200,000.

Achieved:

The current strength level 18 over 197, 000.

9. Request recommendations from Nolting to accomplish actions 1 and 2.

Achieved®

10.

Install radar to obtain warning. of Comunist overflights for latell-

fence or air supply.

Achieved:

Temporary installations were set up and operational at

Danang in Cetober 1961. Permanent Installations are

under construction with a target date of early Spring

1963.

il.

proved.

Military Assistance Program for 20,000-man increase in ARVN 18 ap-

Achieved.

12. Increase MAAG as necessary for 20,000-man ARVN increase.

Achieved.

13. Consider case for Increase ARVN strength above 170, 000.

Achieved:

Current ARVN strength is 197,000. Target for the end

of Fiscal Tear 1964 1e 225, 000.

Provide MAP support for Civil Guard Force of 68,000.

Achieved.

15. Expand

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15. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include support end advice to Self-

Defense Corps.

Achteved.

of Jund Provide MA support for Vetnamese Junk Force, Including tretning

Continues:

See Action 5.

17. Ascelerated Special Forces Training.

Continues:

Eleven Special Forces teams are engaged in training pro-

grams in Viet-Nam.

18. Collaborate with OWN in use of military, health, welfare and public

works specialists for activities in villages.

Continues:: With Uoso assistance, ARVN's Civic Action Program has

improved steadily

However, this program still requires

a great deal of effort to realize its full potential.

19 Study jointly with GN border control techniques.

Continues: The use of defoliants, dogs, portable radar, invisible

chemical markings and other devices and techniques

are undergoing study and tests at the combat develop

ment test center in VN. See also Action 65.

againt Conne sell ment in SEA of testing act 14o for new technt ques

Achieved: Combat test development centers have been established

and are in operation in VN and Thailand.

21. Full

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of cold at o5e orto de elze and complet tion forces required in caco

Continues: Contingency planaing is under continual review.

Dispatch to VN economic and fiscal experts to work out with aww

a joint

'financial plan

Achieved:

The Staley Mission completed its work in June of 1961.

Its plan was adopted as the Joint Action Plan (SEE

Actions 34 through 4L below).

23. ICA (AID) 18 authorized to undertake rural developmat - elvie

action programs.

Continues: The January 4, 1962 Joint Communique outlined these

programs.

USOM/Saigon has mounted an impaet crop

protection ptrogran, including rat destruction and

eradication of rice destroying insecte, which will

directly benefit 50,000 failies. A program for

Montagnard relief and

The International Voluntary Service under contract

Civic action in connection with the two clear-

and hold operations; plus the country wide strategic

hamlet program

Is being planned and supported

dispensaries to

demon is to done one de pt prosen o e mama of

Continues:

contime to contribute significantly to the long®

range development of the econonic infrastructure,

including both agricultural development and

chature

industrialization

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Industrialization.. U.S. aid continues to make

important contributions to education, medicine,

and other social services.

Assess econonie implications of an ARVN force increase of

170,000 to 200,000.

Achieved.

36. Assist CVN public information programs to build public under-

gtanding of actions required to combat VC and increase public confidence

In oW.

Continues: USIS has worked closely with the GVN to develop 1t8

information program.

Accomplishments Include the

establishment of a radio net serving the entire

nation, production and distribution of lins, an

the development of rural newspapers. We are

rently negotiating for the establishment of joint

branch USIS-VIS posts throughout the country.

27• Country Team in coordination with GN should compile documented

Pacts of Commnist infiltration and terrorien for dissemination In Vi and

Throughout the worid.

Continues:

The US publication "A Threat to the Peace" and

Under Secretary Ball's speech on Viet-Nam, pub=

Lished by the Department in June, brought the

evidence of Commnist aggression to the attention

of an international audience.

USIS in Saigon

works with the Vietnamese authorities on a con-

tinuing basis to collect and cross-file such

information for use in media throughout the world.

28. In coordination with CLA and GVN, USIS will publicize unfavorable

conditions in NWN.

Continues: Infornation which can be declassified is not plenti-

ful, but USIS continues to cross-file stories on

umfavorable conditions whenever available.

29. Development

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29. Development Agricultural Pilot Projects throughout the country

Suspended:

Security conditions make this type of project diffi

A US-financed center near My Tho 1a in

operation, however, with IVS personned (who have

been fired on by the Vo. Ten pilot agricultura

stations are conducting tests and demonstration

work in erop and Ilvestock development.

30. Exploit rehabilitation of vc prisoners and broadcast their stories

to Commnist areas.

Continues:

The GVN does not have a well-defined rehabilita-

for interviews.

Communist NVN have been made and broadcast, hows

ever.

32.

levels.

31. Provide funds for US participation in Saigon trade fair.

Cancelled: The fair was called off.

• . :

Covert action to be carried forward and coordinated at appropriate

Continues.

33. President reserves judgment on levels of funding proposed.

No Task Force action required.

B. Joint Action Program (Staley Report)

3u. Provide equipment and assistance in training for an increase in

armed forces irom 170,000 to 200,000. To increase effectiveness of increase,

mutually

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mutually agreed geographically phased plan, understanding on training and use

of 30, 000 additional men, and rogulation of rate of increase for most effi-

cient absorption should be accomplished.

Continues: The force level now stands at 197,000. We have

encountered difficulties in setting up and imple-

menting a geographically phased plan. The Delta

plan meets this requirement, but we are not sure

that it wild be completely implemented.

Decision regarding increase above 200,000 wall be postponed wati.

next year (1962).

lamhile, training and equipment for Givil Guard an

Self-Defense Corps should be expedited.

Achieved:

Force levels now stand at 197,000.

The ultimate

target is 225,000 by the end

of Fy oh.

On the

Self-Defense Corps and the Civil Guard see Action 55.

Continues:

The commodity import target for FY 62 was set at

8135 w11110n. The Vietnamese economy has been

able to absorb only $110 million. Other external

resources, l.e. equipment for econonic and mili-

tary projects, have been provided as needed.

37• W should be strongly urged to undertake generation of plasters

by the means spelled out in Joint Action Program.

Continuess The GWN Instituted fiscal reforma, including what

amounted to a devaluation, In January 1962. These

reforms are a direct result of U.S. urgings.

Internal tax receipts have increased over

196%o Plaster revenue remains inadequate, however,

to cover counterinsurgency needs. The GVN has

been unwilling to use deficit financing to met

this shortfall and has requested a cash grant

iron US. The problem is under negotiation.

38. Strongly

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Strongly urge GW undertake tax reform and adopt prinC]PLe O& sing®

and realistic rate of exchange.

Continues:

Although the January 1962 fiscal reforns represent

considerable progress, the GVN still has a mitiple

exchange rate which is set too high. Tax collec-

tions should also be improved.

39. Ambassador should make clear to Diem that we attach great Impor-

plaster rate. Indispensablo,

not be used as reason for reducing U.S. ald.

Continues:

GN has abided by the agreed criteria for imports

in spite of shortfalls in the commodity import

progran. The January reforms raised the effective

plaster rate but at the appropriate time it should

be raised further.

40. President directed ICA to conduct through review of new proposals

for emergency social action and of programs already under way.

Achieved: Review continues.

41. Encourage long-range planning and urge Vietnamese create more efo

fectivo planning nachinery to develop a long-range plan.

Continues:

The GVN has recently announced a five-year plan,

but this plan is more-in the nature of a catalogue

of projocts than an integrated economic plan..

power planning is still very haphazard.. One ster

doctors are subject to the draft and

medical talent will presumably be allocated to the

most urgent needs.

m be to pro to pie the do hope one one guest rot joint efforta

Continues: Our joint effort has markedly improved Vietnamese

morale.

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morale. Diem has been understandably concerned

that the extent of U.S. assistance may make the

GVN appear to be the creature of the U.S.

43.

Parallel committees should be given maximum delegation of authority.

Suspendeds Parallel committees have been discarded in Pavor

of direct contact and negotiation beteen the

action people on both sides at each level.

4l. President shall be informed of matters arising in implementation

of joint progran requiring his attention.

Continues:

TF/N provided the White House with regular Status

Reports, the NSC has provided an observer on TF/VN,

and the Director of the Task Force appears bi-weekly

at meetings of the Special Group (Counterinsurgeney).

C.

Actions under NSAM 10h

159inse surely preparations for publication white paper on DRY aBBression

Achieved:

"A Threat to the Peace" was published in December 1961.

46. Develop plans for action. in ICC based on white paper.

Achieved: The ICC report of June 2, 1962 confirms the U.S.

position, toe. the hostilities In VN are caused,

directed, planned and led by the DRY.

47. Develop plans for presentation of VN case in UN.

Suspended: After studying matter several times it was con-

cluded that in present circumstances presentation

to UN would result in more complications than gains.

48. Introduce

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.**

48. Introduce Jungle Jim squadron into VN for training purposes.

Achleved. See Action 53.

49 o

Initiate guerrilla ground action against Communist aerial supply

missions. 1n Tchepone area.

Suspended: Due to possible effects on Lao negotiations.

50. General Taylor should undertake mission to Saigon.

Achieved: General Taylor went to Viot-Nam in October 1961.

51. President agrees that certain other actions developed by TEVN

"which do not require specific prosidential approval should be underteken on

an urgent basis.

Continues.

Do

Actions under NSAM 11!

52. Provide increased airlift to GVN forces.

Continues: The U.S.-provided airiift has sharply increased

RVN mobility and reduced reaction time. Perhap

nore than other factors, it has enabled the GVN

÷3:

operations in Viet-Nam.

Intelligencé.

Continues:

execution

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"t?.

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execution of air-ground support. Results have been

good, with evidence that many VC attacks and bages

have been disrupted by air action. Equipment and

personnel have also been provided for air reconnais-

sance and photography and for special intelligence.

5k.

Provide small craft, including advisers and operating pergonnel, for

control of coastal waters and inland waterways.

Continues: A joint Junk Patrol has been organized with the

Vietnamese Navy and elements of the Seventh Fleet

to cut infiltration from North Viet-Nam®

tion is underway to develop a Junk Force of 28

Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four Junk Divi

sions are now operational. Three Junk Force train-

ing centers are operating,

and recruitment of

Vietnamese fishermen is satisfactory®

The U. S. has provided the GVN with 713 craft

in all.

These include 693 boats for inland water-

way patrol and to increase ARVN mobility in the

delta, 9 harbor support and logistics type vessels,

and 11 vessels with off-shore and major river capa-

55. Train and equip CO and SDC with objective relieving ARWN of static

missions.

Continuess Training of the Civil Guard by MAAG began January 1961

at a single training center. At MAG's urgings the

training was speeded up by establishing four other

centers and reducing the training period from 2u to

1,2 woeks. By mid-June, 128 companies were trained,

51 were in training at the centers, and 21 additional

were in training on-the-spot under MAAG contact

training teams.

The target for FY 62 1s 372 trained

companies. By the end of FY 6h, total strength will

be 90,000. Current strength, trained and untrained,

1s 75,000. FY 63 strength 13 set for 78,950 and

FY 64,. 80, 000.

56. Provide personnel and equipment to improve intelligence system from

provincial Level upward

Continues.

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194 U.S, military intelligence personnel are in

Viet-Nam working at all levels to improve the GVN

intelligence capability. CIA has regional intelli

gence advisors in place and worke closely with the

Vietnanese Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)

at the national level. CIO has assumed unified

national intelligence responsibilities, and with

U.S. advice, 18 reorganizing itsell.

as required by norene responsibility

reorganization and additional personnel

Continues:

A military assistance command under General Harklas was

established In February 1962 to direct our increased

operational and training activities in VietNam.

U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nan have been Increased

to 9,069 to carry out our increased responsibilities.

58. Provide increased economic ald for flood rolief and to support the

counterineurgency program.

Continues:

Emergency food relief assistance from the U.S. included

medicaments and PL 400 foodstuffs. Major Items in

our increased economie aid in support of counterin

surgency to date include: funds and equipment for

two clear-and-hold operations now in progress (Hal Yen

and Binh Minh or Sunrise), funds and equipment for

Montagnard refugee relief

and resettlement; the estab-

lishment of a special stockpile of supplies and equipo

ment for fast servicing of rural counterinsurgency

59, Encourage GN to request international or multilateral assistance for

food reliet.

Suspendeds Assistance was received from Malaya and Australia.

60. Provide

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overton, Prode administrators and elvisors for the Vl as agreed by too

Continues:

The GV has not yet formally requested advisers.

MAAG advisors are operating in all provinces.

61. Provide personnel for joint provincial survey.

Continues:

Three joint provincial surveys were completed by

formal joint US-GVN tean. Joint intelligence sure

veys of all provinces were made by CIA. Formal joint

surveys have been abandoned, since it is found that

che int one on can

the information can best be obtained by continuing

local contacts. All agencies continue to collect

the required information in cooperation with the GN.

62. GV action to place nation on war footinge Including measures to tap

full potential all non-Comminist elements.

Continues:

See Action 2. In addition to the measures noted under

Action 2, the GVN has reactivated 1ts National Internal

Security Council, which Diem promised he would use as

a war cabinet, created an Inter-Ministerial Strategie

Hanlet Comnittee under Ngo dinh Nhu, provided uilitary

training for civil servants and women, and in Central

Viet-Nam organized a promising political-military irreg-

ular force to operate in the hamlets.

little or no

genuine effort has been made to get the support of

opposition cliques or to realize the potential of the

religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.

A great deal of effort has gone into programs

designed to give the rural population a stake in the

war.

The war will be won or lost in the provinces.

63°

Vitalisation of appropriate governmental wartime agencies.

Continues:

An acute shortage of sidlled administrators plus the tem

permental reluctance of Diem to delegate authority

(a reluctance understandably reinforced by the real

dangers of subversion or another coup attempt) have

made progress on this action slow. The National

Internal Security Council has apparently met only

five

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1.i95.

-160

live times since its inception in January and the

Strategie Hanlet Committee 1s little more than an

extension of Nhu. Progress has been registered in

cutting red tape and increasing efficiency, Best

results will probably be achieved by ad hoc arrange-

ments and continued steady but patient pressure from

the U.S. rather than by insistance on dramatie struc-

64. Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure.

Continues: Considerable progress registered on this item.

With U.S, assistance, ARVN has eut its reaction

time and markedly improved its mobility. A field

Conmand, a Joint US-GVN Operations Center, a Joint

General Staff and a Tactical Air Command, have

been organized and are operating, U.s. advisors

have been accepted and are operating effectively

with all units, with the Provice Chiefs, and 10

the intelligence organizations. The GVN has in-

creased pay and benefite for the Civil Guard and

the lower ranks of ARVN. The weakest Link in the

GN military 18 still ite citizen defense forces,

the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, but as

noted in Action 55, this problem 1s being rapidly

solved.

E: December L Diem-Nolting Memorandum of Agreement.

In addition to the Actions above, the following specific actions should

be added from the Diem-Nolting agreement.

65. Border Ranger Force.

Continues:

Ten companies of ARVN Rangers and ll companies of

Montagnard Rangers were made available for the

Border. Ranger Force on March 20. However, the old

MAAG border control plan has not beem implemented

because high ARVN officers feel it 1s unrealistic.

Plans and concepts for border control are under

study by both RVNAF and their U.S. advisors. The

forces presently engaged in border control total

about 7, 000 in 88 posts.

66. Develop

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1.4r.

017

66. Develop more contacts between GWN officials and people.

Continues: Increased activity by Civic Action cadre plus frequent

tripa to rural areas by the President, National

Assembly Deputies, and Cabinet Ministers have helped.

The President has been unwilling to undertake regular

"fireside chats."

The basic problem is a change in

attitude by Distriet and Provincial officials. This

is well understood at the top, but changing atti.

tudes is slow work.

67. Bring non-Coumnist prisoners promptly to trial.

Continues: No non-Commnist prisoners of note have been brought

to trial. The principal civilian leaders of the

November 1960 coup are still being held without

trial in spite of reports that Diem intends to re-

lease them.

68. Develop and announce an annesty policy for VC defectors.

Continues:

The GN has developed a nationwide plan approved

by Thuan and General Ty, but it has not yet been

coordinated with all Ministries. Surrender leaf-

lets and rewards have been used locally in a number

of areas with varying success. Although it seems

to have great pronise, the GVN has not yet really

given this tactic a trial.

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