APPRAISAL...
Originator: ARMY
Document date: 01/24/1964
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

': JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10001-10058

RECORDS SERIES

:

J-3

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 59

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

ARMY

FROM

TO

TITLE

: APPRAISAL...

DATE: 01/24/64

PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS CUBA CONTINGENCY PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

TOP SECRET

REFERRED 4

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

BEEN POSTPONeD IN PART

:

OPENING CRITERIA

01/017/99

COMMENTS

: Requires review

fxom CIA, C

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

CIA

DATE i MAR

2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Date

Page

02/04/98

]

Army.

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UNGLASSIFLED

EYES

CALY

Jamazy ZA, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT;

Appradeal ol US Sabotage Programa Agalaai Cuba

In June 1963, highor sutharity approred & ClA covert progras

agalues Caba wbich conclated of nix laterrelated contoes of action.

1. Collection of intelligence so meat US satlanal socatity

requitements and support corest aporations.

2. Propaganda Retions to stimalate lom-Jial asbotage

and other forman of active and passive resistance.

3, Economie dental setiona so nupport US oconorale

exploitation sacasures.

A. Exploitatios and stimulatios of disaffection ln the

Cuban armed farces and other pomer centera al the regene.

5. GenEral sabotago and harassmant.

A Support al autorooss and-Gastro Cubas caile groupe

to supplement and assiat the US covert capability.

The ultimate objective of the program la "to encourage dissident

elements and other power centera al the regirae lo bring about the

Eventual liquidation of the Castro/Coramunlat antourage and the climai-

nation of the sovlet presence from Caba," (Tab A) CA set approra-

mately 18 months from June 1963 as the tine frame within which these

objectires could be aubstartially saalised. This tentatus schedule was

bared on the "simultancous, coordinated execution of the individual

courses of action." While this analysis is concerned with courses of

action 5 and 6, the interlocking nature of the covert program must be

kept ia mind in appraisiag the sabotage prograa..

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

[J Retain class'a Change 10...

Declassity in part and excise as shown

Declassif

1 After-

JFK Cut E0+2958. 2571 4x

• With concumence of

= not/obtained

59

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UNSLASSIHLU

SECRET

LYES

UniLY

The intessity of the sabotage program has nover reached the

level plaanod by CIA. O1 18 raids presented lar approval, 10 wero

disapprovad. Of the 8 ralds approved. 3 were abarted due to opera-

donal problers and five were executed. Thase fve raids were

succenatal in the sense that (a) there was substantiel damage to the

tRIgot: (b) all participasta moro nafely recavored, and (6) each was

plausibly dentable, (See Tab Bl las a brtel description of ralds.)

Any 8ss0a91ent of the affoctivanoes of the progIan must be made

against a backgronad of the operational succons as the ralda, the

dacrepascy between the planned and actual levele of intonaity and

the latted duration of the progrant.

In addition to the ClA controlled sabotage, there are too

AUTORIZONA ETOMPIs One la seCeiVinE subatastial (luanchal and lagio-

Elcal support fxom the US Goveromeal, the other 1s recelving auly

relatively innos daancial support. Both are entirely composed al

Cubaas, and with the exception of one or two indtviduale at the top

of cach ol those groupo, no member of them realizes that they are

recaivlag US support. Is la pausible that one of these groaps say

have condurted as least ass rala. We do not expect uny significant

sabotage artivity fxora thoss sroups for 1i least another sonth and

probably longer. The purpose of these prograsso lo to lacteREe

Internal asbotage rather than Intensify exteraal raiding.

Appsalaal of CLA Sabotage Progresa

Spoatanaovo Internal Sabotage.

We have not been able to deterialne any relatloanhip between

the ClA taido and incidento of arozad clashes la Cuba. (Tab C) On

the ather hand, mailo andy l8 spontanesus deto of sabotage mero

reported throughout Cuba fram June Urough September 1963, there

were l8 reports af duct acto in October, 25 la November, and 18

la Decembar. (Tab D) Although lucidents of spontaneous laternal

sabotage tead to bi seasonal (they occus more irequently during the

winter mantha when there la sugar cano to bural, lt la reasonable

to conclude that the increase durlag the latter part at 1963 le ta

some measure attributable to the ClA raido la August, September.

October and December.

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NO ASSIFIED

The nabotago progera bas had subatantial lospact on Cuber

military and rocurity forces. Ai a result of these saldo, certaia

asuas and posta mere placed on special aloft statuss ardars safe

lanned to lnereaso vigliances and strict recurity statured Were

Instituted at induattial and military lastallations throughout the

CountTy. Air and and nARIEhes Mete baguas naty and halicopter

patzola vero expanded, and additional army patrole mere ardered.

Ats, saval and grouad foxto alerteate have beca put on apocial

alert esther an a local or islaad-alde baals on at lenot 16 accuraus

dartas 1963 as a result of tumored os setual maritise operationa.

Almost contions astlolour genty opexations, taratring up to

2500 men, have been conducted.

castro expandod bis coast watchiag netrast iroma 46

abnervallos posta at the and of Juae to 103 at the and al October.

AL LENGI 10 BUTERCe seNTER tadaI stations baro bees establiated

ALACe JURA RId thATe da tARtATiVE eViÁEaCO of l marA. In August

1963, & neu internal asturity lorce, the lucha Contra Pliatos, mao

forziad da an attempt to cape with off-share raldias partias. la

Septamber, new tralAlag COarses Were intiated fat comsaRta

cadres of "populer defense unita, "destgaed to argerine the people

to defend thomanives agalunt enemy attack and to protect induetrial

contero and inatallations frasa debatage.

From the foregalag, it la reasonable to concuide that enter -

wally mounted raide sigailicantly contribute to turbulence voltain

Cuban sallitary and security forcet, with concoraltent diveraion of

badly needed lands, resources and manporter.

Internal Morals.

Thero are firma indications that the GlA sabotage prozzars has

had considerable affect within Cuba. L

L

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UNOLASSIFIED

FYES

ONLY

JA forzaer Majas de tho Cabar rabel army

reported alter lla extilization tram Ciba la Jenzary 1964 thai the

23 DecoInber (A Siguanca rald (ubica dentroyed a P-6 patral boat)

was si great boari to natalo ascong dinallerted Cubana.

Contro's fon al talas diasidenco and lassrgandy la seflected

La bis initiation of a variaty al reprenalto mentared. Ibare include

the forcedul salocation of inhabitante frana disaldeat attas ano stare

attlagent contrale on treedom al movement within Cube, Thore

TeRENTes ATe bound to hare adtasse palitical, paychological asd

«conando reparonarians laside Cuba.

though the prychalogical impatt of the our program an Gub

а вє 10N4тes і preuO! по LOLOWD! опасіте! ЕрроМІ І

lave beon accorapilaked.

Do An AtI201PharE of UnCEILItY and UnGAsinGEE sithin

Cube han been created vith respect to the regima'e ability to control

dissicant alemanata in the popolatioa

1. Opposition elemente have been gires a paychological

E Tão salda revealad to tho antire Cubas papulaco tho

trattations of Cuban defasses.

Excile Gammun

The reparte of succesatal taldo against Cuba baro apparently

reduced the sente of frantiatos within the attle community -- a

frustation which forsesty maidfested itoelt in vitrtallo attacke by

osile leadors against the US Goresament and its leaderehia. Although

the ElA taide nte not directly attributable to the US Goverament, moet

antuto extlee hare concluded tont the satán are (lA aponeared.

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URCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

Effecto on Our Allies.

We are confident that the Britiah are aware of some US

aupport of, or at least acquiescence la, the sabotage program.

simllarly, other sophisticated allles also probably have atrong

suspicions about US support of sequencence, It la reasonable

to bellove thai Gentral Amerions countrles, partleularly Nicaragua

and Costa Rice, bave almiles sunplelons. The extent to which our

allles belleve we ray be supporting or condoning such seido, la

a algnificant indication of our intent to topple the Gastro regirae.

Impact Within the Undted Staten.

Although US sponsorship of the sabotage program has been

credibly destable, it scams clear that discerning elements in the US

such as expertenced Washington reporters and congressmen, reallro

that the US la elther sponsoring of permaltting sabotage raldo against

Cuba, The realisation provides credible evidénce that existing

programs are consistent with our publicly announced polley to replace

the Castro rogime with one acceptable to the US.

Sordet Renctione

Deaplte the likallhood that Castro has provided the Sovlete

with evidence of US sponsornhip of sabotage operations againat Cuba,

Soviet reaction has been testrained. Aside from the unual propa-

ganda, we have knowledge of only one sharp sovlet reaction to

external faldo. In September, following a settes of air raida by

Cuban exile groups for which the US Government had no respansi.

bility, the Soviet Union expressed its concern to the US Goverment.

Prospecte for the Future

Contiauation of the Program.

The alx point covert program is closely related to other on-

going efforte which recelve some impetus from it. These include

programo for overt economic and diplomate leolation, as well as

surveillance and other anti-subversion measures.

5

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EYES UNEV

UNCLASSIFILD

Particularty 11 the ralia are lucreased la sumbar nad scape.

continuation of the CIA prograra should result in a correspondiag

incroses in any favorable resulta mentionad entller. Continuation

of the prograsa should contribute to sone degree to creating can-

ditiona lavorable to a coup or a spontaneous revoli, la addition,

continued raide could provoke Castro dato taking the kind of action

that would justily and, under certain circumstanced, perhaps even

requito overt US snilitary setion to topple bla regiras.

The asbotage program is not without ite slake. To wantever

extent the current United States/ Soviet dlalague la relaxing tenalone.

continantion of the progras, pariicularly ll a fature operation la

conspromiaed, could provide a basis los disruption al the dialogue.

Aldo, while one of the objectives of the programa la ta reduce the

Level of Soviel farces la Cuba, 1t la ponsible that contiation of the

saida (o7 any increase in the scope or intonaity al raide) could result

I1 a stoppage of the sarlet force redaction os even en lacroade in

Savier personaol in Cuba: Allhough some have nuggested that thare

1s a relationship betucas comert US pressure againal Cabe and tre

export of Cubar-supported lasurgency la Latin Arsextea, we do not

bellove contimation al the progian dould allect Castro's sabversive

lactease ln the scope os number al ralde, costisaatos of the programs,

rasy not achieve the origtael objectives sought.

Terminatiora of the Program.

There are two major factors to be considered in terminating

the program. One te the effect it would have on out programs, our

allles and the Communist Bloc. Ibe other le the esdatence of accept-

able alternatives which would accomplias our ulturate objoctives.

The aabotage program la sufficlently interrelatad with our

other overt and covert programs directed againat Caba so that the

effact would be to roduce the lapact of those prograins. With respect

to our allies, and particularly thase lata Americans who are

encouragad by the ballet that tie are condoning or supporting radda

against Cubs, termination could discredit our recognised intent to

renove the Castro regime. This would be particularly true in vies

of developments which have occurred during the last few weeks to

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UMCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

strengthen the Castro position l1 Cube, the hemisphere and the worle.

Theat developments include (a) the expectod continustion of bigh sugar

prices (which enabled Cabs to expend its convertible cutteRty Iederves

in 1963), (D) the Soviet/Cuben trade protocole as 1964, (c) the British

bus deal, which polate to s break la Cube's econorale laalation, (d)

the recent rotay in Params in wbich Cantro had some band, and (e)

the Zansiber coup with ito attendant publicity 1os Cantro whatever

bia actual lavolvement.

Il ln the aftermath of there incidents the sabotage program la

ended, Cantro will energe with a sasjas propagaads victasy and a

greatly strengthened political base. In adiltios, it should be recog-

nixed that nuch a decialas moald seduce the polley alternalives avallabla

to the US. At the present time me have been paraulag a polley track

designed to malatain nasimum secoptablo preasure agalasi Castro,

thus playing for the breaks uhile developlag a broad menu of contia.

gEnCy plans which would enable us to caplialle on say fastaitous

altuation, Dlocontinuation al the care of the CA covert program will

tend to reduce further our current dexiblilty to one of tua broad palley

cholcos, Intentially these alternatives are to pureda al Borne polit

in time a rapprochoment with CAsTo oI to rely on intillary force to

accomplah onx objective. Otter pornibilities, such as the recogaition

of the govertment ln estle, seem somote at thie dose and would roguire

some soft of sanction fas os support of sabolage activity agaiast Cuba

If they were to be crcâible.

We do sot have sulfleient experience de which to judge the value

of the autoramous programs. Homever, ll they are terminated, a signi-

fIcant anti-US reaction can be expected iron the esdle leadera, In the

event that it la decided to terminate only the ClA-contralled sabotago

operations, it should not be assumed that the autonomous groups, des-

pite the greater denlabllity of their actions, could take over entirely

the minsion al fertiahlog proof al vialble resistance to Castro and

inspirinE dinaident elementa withia Cube to take the personal rialo

neCessAry to set a coup la motion. Autonomous groups are as yet

untested la their capabllity to conduct succesaful sabotage and haraas-

meat oparations on a austained basis. It le unlikely that in the nest

months the autonomous groups will develop the abllity to match ClA-

controlled operationa, elther la quantity or quality.

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EisS ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

conclusions

1. The sabotage program to date bas been operadionally

successful and has had salullary effects within and without Cuba.

2. Il costinued at lls carrest pace and in the light of recent

evento, the sabotage program la coafancion wilh our other programs,

will accomplish little more than delaying consolidation of the Castrol

Communist regise.

3. Il the program la continued and the raids axe persaittod

to intenally in mambor and acope, there le a reasonable chance of

accomplishlag out artgtral abjactives. At the dame timo the riela

to the US will be increased.

4. Terraloatios al this program will rosalt la detextoration

al the remainder of the corert and axert programe and will permit

the consolidation of the Castro sagino al a roose rapid pace thas

mould othoruise be paraible. Termination also might be iaterpreted

an a US polley declalon to coesdot with Castro, provided be does not

boldly conduct subveisive activities in Latin America.

S. There is insufficient expertence on which to judgo the

antonomove progIaNA. However, it le wallkely that it will provide

& Bubatitate for the raida performed undes the CLA program elther

ia quantity of quality.

Joseph A. Calliano, JI.

Asslatant to the Depaty

SECtOtAry Of DelessE

(Cuban Affairo)

8

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