COMMENTS ON BOOK V, SSC FINAL REPORT, THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PERFORMANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 08/30/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

кору

SECRET 5A

Comments

on Book V, SSC Final Report,

The Investigation of the Assassination

of President Kennedy: Performance of

the Intelligence Agencies

SECRET

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ENROSTIT

Table of Contents

Summary of Findings

Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review

Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries

Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba

Tab D. AMLASH Operation

Tab E. Materials Forwarded to Warren Cormission and FBI

÷ Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit

Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments

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ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW

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Organization for and Conduct of the Review

1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com-

mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities

of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President

Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are

no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have

retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died.

2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to

this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities

of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A

study group was established to consider the size of the problem and

to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre-

sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also

consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of

Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in

carly August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the

thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full

review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify

any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba

did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of

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President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached.

3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question

"were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations,

with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security. and

the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review

of those files is described below.

4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files

for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known

to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the

period 1 January 1961 to l January 1965 were selected for review,

covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy

and the following year. A research group was formed composed of

five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor.

An additional four researchers participated in different phases of

the research, which continued to mid-May 1977.

5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from

the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special

comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information

Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed

that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900

operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later

determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional

operational and subject files which brought the total to well over

two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, :

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both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at

Warrenton, Virginia. The remainder is held at Headquarters in the

files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This

material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job

numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the

LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein).

6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files

reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and

organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed

(1) Operational

1,729

(601 with findings and 1,128

with no findings)

(2) Subject Files

547

(186 with findings and 361

with no findings)

(3) Cuba Policy Files

101

(4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files

(Task Force W Chronos)

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

Total

37

100-plus

2,514

b. Criteria Used in the Research

As a guide the research group followed the Terms of

Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of

Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest

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brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis,

and to additional questions raised in the course of the :

study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-f7le was

reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved

in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel

Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of

a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975,

based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book

that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt

with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi-

nation attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings.

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the

subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the

activity, and a copy of those documents) or findings which

contained information believed to be pertinent to the review.

Also included were job numbers, official file numbers, -

inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of

volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request

of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or

other government agencies knowledge of information, to the

extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda

were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the

heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document

number (s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing

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the gist of the documents) for purpose of easy and quick

reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s)

attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and

subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official

LA Division research group files under the official classi-

fication number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also

included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X)

containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings.

These records are restricted in LA Division.

7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more

complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new

files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation

of material further extended the time required to complete the under-

taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency

can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of

Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the

death of President Kennedy.

8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review

its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of

Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points

not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject.

9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point

of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the

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Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com-

mission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising

• some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has

accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy

of those documents released under provisions of the FOlA to the public

in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series)

released in September 1976 and March 1977:

10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono-

logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a

chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the

Agency's central repository for information and documentation that

it holds on:

a. The life of Harvey Oswald;

b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted

by the Warren Cormission, 1963--1964;

c. The testimony by various Agency officers before

the several commissions and committees set up to review.

the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should

be pointed out that this portion of this file is not

complete ; and

d. The point of record for Agency action taken in

response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro-

visions of the Freedom of Information Act.

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11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in

the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in order to be in

a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of

Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to

place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific

subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld

information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there

was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi-

gation or gather information," the following files were set up:

a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission;

b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren

Commission;

C. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community,

particularly the FBI;

d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting

assistance and information;

e. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and

f. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the

SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do

in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry.

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12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by :

'chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on

the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor-

mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the

investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly

the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b), its response to require-

ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized

to record what actually happened in those instances in which it

differs from representations in the SSC Report.

13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one

officer to identify material in its records believed to have some

possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of

this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as

containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to

the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed

included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals

connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of

files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time

of the "Garrison Investigation. "

14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector

General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against

Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It

also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973

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request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable

activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to

• the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research

effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in

Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector

General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as

a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding

President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards.

The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive

review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters

or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in

Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General

are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by

LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of

the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK

file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed

in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify

specific points.

***** * * *

Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the

respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-

up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the

Inspector General.

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SUBJECT:

Corments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities

1.

Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the

Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves

to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a

series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled,

and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that

the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren

Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations

of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence

on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation.

The following statements appear in the Report:

"It (the SSC Report) places particular

emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera-

tions seemed to have on the investigation."

Page 2.

"They (senior CIA officials) should have

realized that CIA operations against Cuba,

particularly operations involving the

assassination of Castro, needed to be con-

sidered in the investigation. Yet, they

directed their subordinates to conduct

an investigation without telling them of

these vital facts." Page 7.

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The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC

Report, is highlighted as follows:

"Certainly, concern with public reputation,

problems of coordination between agencies,

possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment,

and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge

of sensitive operations may have contributed to

these shortcomings. But the possibility

exists that senior officials in both agencies

made conscious decisions not to disclose

potentially important information." Page 7.

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro

had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into

retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes

it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and

accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention

the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro

programs to see what it might reveal.

The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the

SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the

perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con-

ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that

the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President

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Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding

of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the

Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban

Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to

Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs.

The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile

Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been

perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events

serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at

the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA

operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of

provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep-

tions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the

various operational activities against Cuba and Castro.

Organization for the Review

As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved

at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary

to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963

and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are

no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and

detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi-

gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for

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the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following

it.

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It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted

to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The

organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper.

It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations,

it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper-

ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the

Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to

plotting against Castro.

The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are

contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it,

Tabs B through G.

CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end"

of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have

started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination,

al though it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In

fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying

to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to

identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President

Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity

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(whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the

assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it.

The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make

" the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's

presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.)

We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's

theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance

in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is

compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories

can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones.

Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary

possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee

Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the

possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi-

dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it

would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a

simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in

the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif-

ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often

prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of

government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con-

spiracy to suppress evidence.

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Operations Against Castro

The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a

capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into

• a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban

exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to

CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum,

with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. At a

later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew

from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in

Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity

from. its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are

suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having

been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the

reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that

Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range

objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an

irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum

until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely

that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to

assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C.

Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1,

who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime.

The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned

Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of

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President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation

shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA

(not)agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had (ejected his

proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view

was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was

dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC

Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character

of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1

was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot.

Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro

as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against

Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the

justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either

event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and

CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association

that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the

basis for. the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail

at Tab D of this paper.

The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that

actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source

for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There

are new considerations that developed in the course of the present

review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate,

but they do not provide a basis. for taking issue with the judgment of

the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided

Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C.

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Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for

treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in-

vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with

the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These al-

legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to

have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report

is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a

reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight'from Mexico City, awaiting

arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only

was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to the

alleged five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before_the.

alleged arrival or

I the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a

Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi-

gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available

for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be

dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially

being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another

instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a

cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 Movember 1963 in-

quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain

named Soviets. The true name of AMLÄSH/l was given in the Mexico City

reply, but not as having had contact with the

Soviets -- which was the

purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December

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1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern-

ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1 in February

and March 1961. AMLASH/l's name could have been omitted from the cable

altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about

=

persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the

meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration,

which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject

matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to

AMLASH/l's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is

discussed further at Tab D.

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Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two

general conclusions. (First,) the SSC Final Report contains numerous

factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera-

tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents.

Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren

Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-

Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for

that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its

treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to

characterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the

problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused

the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has

reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it

has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

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future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited

its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served

to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader

view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific

terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet

or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of

the time. . It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous

criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader

initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had

no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place

of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has

undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings

are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA

cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have

been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of

the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions

already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of

President Kennedy.

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1 AUG 1976

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR REVIEW OF

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses--

(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily

CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility,

of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative

and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The

former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either

• there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection

program to ascertain all possible information on the subject.

Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all

information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this

question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had

to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation

is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of generai back-

ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's

Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these

general activities were provocative. More specific, however,

is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity

that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory

action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report

this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocatios

theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information.

Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in

support of the thesis.

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3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot

be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of

the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro-

vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against

President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un-

qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the

AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and

in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the

Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as

a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's

investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to

the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was

there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard

to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in

response to Headquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this

reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to

the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was

ordered through 1964?

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(

(10) What were the parameters of these instructions?

(11) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"

theory was considered during the Warren Commission

enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this

concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an

Oswald/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this

subject?

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and

where are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency

other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in in-

vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission

tenure?

(21) What is the total CIA information on the two

flights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further

information on this matter?

(23) Can further information be acquired on this

matter now?

- 3 -

...

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(24) What is the total CIA information on "D"?

(25) Is further information on "D" needed in view

of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald

FPCC relations?

(27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans

training activity and was anything provided on this to

the Warren Commission?

(28) What is the total CIA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?

(30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December

1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban

assassination policies and programs up to November 22,

1963?

(32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's

7 September 1963 statements re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CLA

employees contain anything on the abové questions?

If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the

assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities

should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine

any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving

the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate

operation?

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5313

SOMET

(

(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate

operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office

of Security officer may have knowledge that was not

surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or

Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division

career agent may have some insights that could throw

light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent

traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged

assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of

Pigs period to shoot Castro.

What is the total CIA

(5) What is the significance on the subject of

provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by

Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly

detailed reconstruction from a very complete record,

there are points that should be addressed particularly,

because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report.

For instance, is there significance in the fact that CLA

contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a

long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time

the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1

when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive

Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the

AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

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(

...

c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection

with the investigation? An effort should be made to list

these, including consultation with surviving officials to

determine not only what they considered the requirement

at the time, but what was omitted and why.

=

4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake

to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S.

policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's

apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which,

therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the

area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission

requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those

that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued

these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This

will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions

raised in the Schweiker report

→2. Bushiny

S. D. Breckinridge

O/Inspector General

Robert Wall

CI Staff

1.6.0

William Sturbitts

LA Division

for ann

Reardon

@Security

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CIA

PERFORMANCE

ON

THE INQUIRIES

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CONFIDENTIAL'

CIA's Performance on the Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Conmission inquiry, empha-

sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts

were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or

analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the

years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the

Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every

theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con-

clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is

evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the

intelligence agencies did - in the present instance, what was the

performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying

a pattemof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case:

a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as

"D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and

saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City. for the purpose

of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both

by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans

instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to

have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in-

conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

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b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the

AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately.

The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during

the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in

order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D

of this report.

c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico

City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60-

63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report,

is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November

flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story

removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The

second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance

arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him

thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC

Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final

Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional

criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions.

To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth

and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both

on the part of CIA and the Warren Commission--consideration was given

to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

2

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questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those

questions that have developed since then. has rould be the areas of

inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject af investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the azuntry twice subsequent

to his return to private life from the Marine targs in September 1959.

These overseas adventures were appropriate for Cil attention. The

first of these overseas trips was when he went = the Soviet Union in

October 1959 from which he returned in June Teak. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in Ta: Serzamber 1963, from

which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of atvicus scecific inquiry for CIA,

there is the problem of general foreign inte ligence collection that

might in some way produce information on the sutiject. The SSC Final

Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA

as part of a general U.S. program against the castra regime. These

four general areas of inquiry are corered be ow.

I. Travel to and from the USSR 1953-1352

On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Jar's, Pome, Madrid,

Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, -omeon, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey "swa"!. It noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps in Septaber :35= and his travel to

the Soviet Union in October 1959, including staticty details as to his

employment and marriage while in the uss?.

Tre saTe requested:

"any scrap information which tears in resident's

assassination...."

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CORFIDENTUL

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with

Helsinki and London providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British

journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959

there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living

in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by

official attitude of Gort to which they accredited." Oslo, on the

same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's

travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by

a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various

reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife

from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the

United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

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CHERUSNAI

detailed results although there were some technical operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held

with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance.

No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's

assassination of president Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report,

in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the

investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will

not be detailed here.

II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get

visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive

attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to

Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern

felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit,

and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at

the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on

28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possibility

that other as yet unknown persons may have

been involved or even that other powers may

have played a role. Please continue all your

coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations

and your liaison with Mexicans."

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The allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money

from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive

attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter, .

and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively

to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the

time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations

was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations

by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following

statement to the Mexico City Station on I December 1963:

"Pis continue to follow all leads and tips.

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as

follows:

"Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel

in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government]

leaders demanding full investigation of case."

On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stated as follows:

"...Mexico City has been the only major

overseas reporter in the case. While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

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CONFIDENTIAL

life, we have not overlooked the really out-

standing performance of Mexico City's major

assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded. Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

[Department of State] and [the FBI].

"Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in

the quick clarification of the case, blanking

out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as

thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or

Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything,

events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as

counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans

and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more

simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with

speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press

in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations

inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit;

these are commented on at Tab G.

I11. General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable

from Headquarters with the following statement:

CONFICEATL

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CONFIDENTIAL

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all

of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence

developments. Although we have no reason to

expect anything of a particular military nature,

all hands should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new President

takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other

than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to

field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be

stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and

this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi-

cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative.

It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has

been the most limited reporting on the subject.

Were there relevant

or significant information on the subject it would have been reported

either in responses to the expression of general interest, or

spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly

involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

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would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete

reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis

for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial. CIA collection re-

quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to

produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect.

at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued,

but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-

what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection

reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in

the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above)

which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from

other stations:

"... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee

Oswald's life. . ."

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10

about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description

of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was

only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were

sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but

there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor-

mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently

was missed - or ignored - by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As

stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

' "Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct

an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was

limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

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COMMuennAL

requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity

in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case

officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic

activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station

as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be

extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the

United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of

page 58.

The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different

terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI

and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of

activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every

question. that has been conceived since then.

IV "Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section

that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the

intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance

on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to

Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's

murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported

to be aboard those flights.

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana

flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and lexico

City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this

time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on

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CONFIDENTIAL

22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headquarters. There was one unilateral CIA surveillance

team (LIFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

The Mexican authorities also had a surveillance team of its own at the

airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies

of passenger lists. Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY)

against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with

the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office.

The 22 Novenber 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of 3ook V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

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CONADENTIL

Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain,

at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record

of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori-

ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no

recorded response. The current review revealed additional information

from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

In reviewing that information

below, it is noted that the conversion

.of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final

Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City

times are used in the following discussion.

The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the

status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it

departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform

at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed

a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft,

one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due

at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround

that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as

servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on

the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the

aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in

the SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City

for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not

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CONFIDENTIAL

delayed five hours, as alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City

time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a

private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts

further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight.

which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded

substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it

allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is

very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported

had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of

these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to

follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its

summary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con-

siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to

the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the

assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the

SSC Final Report state that:

•• one source alleged that the Cuban-American

was 'involved' in the assassination."

CONFIDENTAL

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CONFIDENIAL

The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI "almost

immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi-

gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Conmission." Further

down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi-

gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual

travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious

travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had

contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC)

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi-

gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau

did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon-

sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report

contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the

results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the

FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting

about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will

be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement

at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who

saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana

on November 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-

up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

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except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban-

American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some

inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington

that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December

1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on

23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at

a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a

certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana

flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of

him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch the same.

date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photo-

graph, and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding

Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana

are suspicious."

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in

history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who

was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as

possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report

of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI;

it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal

memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the

nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

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COMFIBENT!

to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way

into the more careful statements that usually characterize official

reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres-

stonistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic

activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing

the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the

context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled

that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial

police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the

same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the

report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement

that he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he

entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final

Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts

• that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and

times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico

City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his

passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued

in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa,

Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number

of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the

hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time,

when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could

not recall it.

35A7:31

GENFIDEMTAL

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• .

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the

record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre-

sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out

that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report

contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When

Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of

Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully

with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63."

It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of

entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained

today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to

highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how

it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of. CIA's not collecting more information

on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access

to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became

available with such information he was queried and the results

were provided the authorities.

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SECRET

CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the

Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in

detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that

it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for

specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren

Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times;

it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However,

to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of

evidence that must still control how the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission

inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy

Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final

Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as

the Bay of. Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962

(see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American

policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro

regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-

vocative.

Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been

viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,

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economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re-

ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of

covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963

President Kennedy -- four days before his death - delivered a major

policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban

revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what

"White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban

people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who

conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.

Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other

elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from

private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles

spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban

intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America

and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to

CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration,

whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Cormission took

what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions

between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in

the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of

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Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly

reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a reguest

was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel-

ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being

faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it

could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its

staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the

murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary

a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of

public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the

intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention

in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that

there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President

Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro-

voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life.

However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it

had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern-

ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S.

operations against Cuba."

In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the

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organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This

was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that

could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President

Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security.

Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything

that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in-

quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is. a matter of record. For

instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to

various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with

those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and

weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded

judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera-

tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of

those activities that may have related to the assassination of the

president it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way.

While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see

Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what

was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what

might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary --

which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con-

spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom

knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities.

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Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the

various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's

death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those

persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some

are dead. The SSC, for instance - in its attempt to capture ele-

ments of the past - seems to have led some employees into expressing

opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in

response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this

illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues,

today, on a responsible basis.

The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called

AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was

dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative

relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although

the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted

to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten-

sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in

this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President

Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and

without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that

there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under-

taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this

discussion.

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In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report,

it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban

operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964.

The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not

possible to predict the form that information turned up by this

inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort.

In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in

mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review,

it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational

activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements

of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues

already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the

original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether

there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That

such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but

that the records of CIA, in such

a review, do not add significantly

to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The areas of operational activity noted above can be described

briefly as follows:

1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK).

2. Operations involving the criminal underworld.

3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro.

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Operation AMTRUNK

There is one other general activity that was considered in the

course of the present research, which is discussed below. This

activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for splitting the

leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It

never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered

possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it

never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity,

because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele-

vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed,

by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the

hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than

try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the

reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject

to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some

purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this

research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis

of the SSC Report.

In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the

direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor

Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper-

ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be

known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public figure in Cuba,

who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception

of the plan.

Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public

Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in

the anti-Batista movement.

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Moreno defected to the United States in April 1961, settling

in Miami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his

associates was Jorge Ajbuszy Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin.

Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in

the Polish Air Force during WWIl under the British Air Command. After

WWIl he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own

business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was

imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As

he held a valid U.s. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961.

Cayardo and Moreno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He,

in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with

the New York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the

New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had

developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to

the Times Washington Bureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have

an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador John C.

Wiley. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con-

tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and

McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of

this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that

the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval.

In early 1963 Szulc arranged an interview in Washington with

Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met

with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State,

who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA

assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.

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SEGRET

AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per-

sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of

uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled

certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be

used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station

in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain

security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen-

erously in order for it to proceed independently.

On 17 April 1963 Szule informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station

had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not

the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA

intentions.

In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A

Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases

complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It

emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a

high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three

intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin

Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources,

Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was

dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer -- but at

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that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap-

proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is

discussed at Tab D.

It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be

separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be-

cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange-

ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con-

nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise

against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through

Volsky and Szulc to the President.

In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads

into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The

operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to

set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success-

fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac-

tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability

for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur-

ity became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have

been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re-

lations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz

and AMLASH/1.

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The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is

just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses

from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly

suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became

involved in the activity.

a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when

the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Re-

portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party

leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus-

picions about his motives or possible connections with

foreign intelligence services, have never been proven.

Nicole Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid

communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary

credits Nicole Szulc with having "obtained vital research

materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is be-

lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad

Szulc are unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin

Szulc became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of

Congress.

b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish

origin.

He and Szulc became acquainted

in 1959-1960 in

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SEGRET

cuba. A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared

by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement:

"Volsky's

knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with

his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman

in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent

candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos-

sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or

stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of

these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen

on 10 April 1969.

c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the

son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both

in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the

U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept .

moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in

retrospect, his career presents a patternof changing alle-

giances. He enjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952

first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later

from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista

and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis-

sion in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his

SEGRET

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entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with

dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when.

he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison-

ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers.

In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with

the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group.

Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to

set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which

time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural

Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but

was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being.

recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK

activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly

to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba

he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was

set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that

RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations

were never proven.

In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the

tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have

been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access

at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of

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individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime.

Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of

Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have

exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli-

gence.

Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the

operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress

and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The

eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization

to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress,

although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations

and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965.

An attempt to build support that might eventually have the

capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously

would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog-

ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant

consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have

provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul

Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because

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of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories

printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows:

"The third (assassination) scheme involved

planting a bomb in Castro's office. 'I had

access to the Prime Minister's office, ' Sturgis

said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan

Orta. I recruited him to work with the embassy

(American Embassy in Havana), '"

Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the

years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military.

and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's

takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which

time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control

of the gambling interests.. He came to the United States in 1959.

Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water-

gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been

an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation-

ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the

Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper

story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan

Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was,

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in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the

operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which

gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison

Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with

it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery

of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961.

Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the

Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave

Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for

Sturgis' assertion that he recruited Orta

" to work with the embassy,

CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone

during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was

reported in early 1961 as being used in the CIA-syndicate attempt

against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he

left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on

the Cuban leadership.

The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of

intended assassin. Sturgis' identification of Orta in this capacity,

prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised

the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could

SECRETI.

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and t. r1.

S3.dl.

have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro

could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of

information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975

indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role

of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement

in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are

known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach

to the reliability of newspaper stories.

The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another

story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation-

ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman

Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security

wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New

York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between

Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent

to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to

have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling

activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment

was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once

received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis

and Orta could have known one another because of their connections

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with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with

the men heading the gambling organizations.

The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a

Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an

attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the

1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one

point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means

for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that "soon after

her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters ... to

-kill Castro •

.."

In the news story she claimed that the plan

involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face

cream; they dissolved and could not be used.

On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum

from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA

Deputy Director for Plans:

"During recent conversations with several

friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel.

Castro was to be done away with very shortly:

When doubt was expressed regarding this state-

ment, Giancana reportedly assured those

present that Castro's assassination would occur

in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already met with the assassin-to-be

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on three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that

everything has been perfected for the killing

of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged

with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill'

in some drink or food of Castro."

This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro

with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time

frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various

schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961.

It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own.

Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta,

Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter-

mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader

who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic

Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received

support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was

dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station

suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency.. In

fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to

the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this.

One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal

SECRET

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underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on

18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving

that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of

interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster

elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who

would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre-

sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits

of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an

explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached

by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the

1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called

off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was

reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something

already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been

terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself

involved in providing additional resources for independent operations

that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate

had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have

sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri-

butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

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What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious

that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of

which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate

activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were

initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing

the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be

listed as follows:

1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde-

pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve-

ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con-

tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs,

being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan

in April 1962.

Q. The syndicate operations could have activities such

as those that are reported in the New York Daily News

stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the

criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he

was not a member of it.

He could well have been used by

the syndicate in its activities.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his

statements are treated with considerable reserve. He

probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba.

He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the

SECRET

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role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and

his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been

in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975

newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it

was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation

of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of

or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate,

whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any

of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits

and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami

community after Orta settled there in 1965.

5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations,

that would tend to reinforce

the thought that the details

of its operations would have been characterized by discre-

tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960.

The authors of Book Y of the SSC Final Report felt that the

operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate

would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe-

sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated:

it is unlikely that Castro could have

/ SECRET

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distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its

provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different

context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations

with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination

of President Kennedy.

Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact

There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect

of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can

only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another

are not within the Agency's capabilities.

As noted earlier (see Tab B.. page 4), a 27 November 1963

report records statements by a British journalist that during his own

imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos"

who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type

named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that

"Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in

1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person

jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.

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Sabita

If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the

British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow

point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material

consideration, as there are reservations about both sources.

It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but

there is no further known relevant information in the Agency

on the matter.

The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in

jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit

by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit

Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963

removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as

evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if

Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide

an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi-

ficance of past assocations or contacts.

Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's

1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby

reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.

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However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify

at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late

1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true.

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

There were other references to possible assassination plots

against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim

Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders. They are summarized briefly below:

In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee

stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission

to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to

enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to

Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter.

As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check

was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited

by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the

Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement.

On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966)

he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro.

He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report

•of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas

post. The details of his actual role are unknown to the Agency,

although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in

Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the

course of this research effort.

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Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro

1. During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were

identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing

such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation,

the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication

that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The

existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony

before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy

Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages

and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged

with serving as an interface with the congressional committees.

Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled.

The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report

on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is

sunmarized again below.

I

2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents,

and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated

27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency

asset, AMBRONG/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on

a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that

this could be coordinated "with attempt against Fidel in public

appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that

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an "attempt against Fidel (is) in accordance with general plan."

There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later,

on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the

same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was

scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an

"assassination attempt at said place (will

be) followed by a general

shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime

developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was

answered on 30 March agreeing that a "major effort should be launched

Havana on date you selected." It recommended contacting other named

persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed

the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro.

A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent,

reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms

for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric

company and "possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April,

he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a

clandestine organization in Cuba; "your military aid is decisive. If it

does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that

this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has

been found.

3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the

cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for

one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The

four agents in question are commented on briefly below:

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a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out-

lining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against

Castro.

(1) 201 Pile opened 15 July 1960. A POA was

not issued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on

31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November

1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed

that he had been in touch with people who had

plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed

to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was

infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February

1961.

(2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March

1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 1961. This

covered the period of his messages and the Bay of

Pigs. His sole mission was to organize resistance

groups.

(3) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again on 19 December

1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same

mission.

(4) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated finally 2 May

1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed

30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting

that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those

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in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing

those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against

his life.

b. AMCOAX/1 was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan for April 1961.

(1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to

organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in-

filtrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in July

1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered

the above messages.

(2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same

organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 1961,

and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears

in the book given Senator McGovern.

c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in-

filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December

1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following

the Bay of Pigs.

(2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the

mission to organize resistance groups and conduct

sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and

is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those

in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

29

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d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5 was

told to contact for.hts general plan in April 1961.

(1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960,

a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was

a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance

groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas.

(2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested

23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His

name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro.

(3) Records relating to this man mention his in-

filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration

in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA).

His "mission" during that period is mentioned tersely

as being "to organize resistance groups... for

mounting sabotage operations. . . and assassination

of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro

entourage. . ." The records refer to "his own

personal objectives" during this period and criticizes

how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August

to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is

to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return,

which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able

to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired

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(the other had died), to ascertain his recollections.

Stating that at the time the focus was on developing

organizations for operations, he stated that an

assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7

on his earlier time in Cuba, not only was not authorized,

but would have compromised the effort to organize.

Any such assassination mission, the case officer states,

would have been at AMPANIC/7's own initiative.

4. It is clear that AMBRONC/5 envisioned a general uprising

in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana

and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected

pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off.

While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an

operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific

objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one

recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes

no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on castro.

5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come

off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset.

Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro. The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassi-

nation from the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That

their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by

Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts

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rather than to report what he truly believes. They were not

executed, a consideration that may support this view.

6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by

the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs.

The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than

that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event

described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent

infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had

a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the

act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was a CIA

agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes

had the mission of his assassination.

II

7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a

man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy,

who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with

one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans

for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A

reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and

that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar

as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name

in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator

of the agent message cannot be identified from present records.

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III

8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 from a member of

the Revoluttonary Recovery Movement in Cuba said "will try to ki]l

Fidel today."

reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent

and his companions to "lay low" for the time being, and "will

advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up

messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the

message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did

not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not

been identified.

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AMLASH OPERATION

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I. AMLASH OPERATION

Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta-

tion in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the

treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a

unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report.*

The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation

differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report

leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with

the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79),

which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching

Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively,

the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his

activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to

Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75).

Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH

operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe

that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between

CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy,

was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for

86 of the 97-page text,

of the eight-page chronology following the text.

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AMLASH/] to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting

against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/1 as either a

double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed

what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak.

********** * * *

In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as

treated

in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two

ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH Operation is intended to

present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity.

Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed.

It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per-

spective for judging the actual substance of the operation.

*

*

****

* * * *

As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing

directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba.

At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment

and that if he

...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill

Castro himself."

Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1 was met in Mexico City

by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/1's

presence at the leftist-sponsored Latin America Conference on National

Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by

AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961,

giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in

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Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows:

"...the Station made an unsuccessful 'approach'

to (AMLASH/1)... the 'approach' consisted of a

'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual

friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last

was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not

pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently

did not report the incident to his superiors and

the ground work may have been laid for a similar action

in the future."

Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted

to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil-

tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/l's

intention and plans.

In August 1961 .AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/l to attend the

French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1

wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The

files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred.

In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling

via Prague to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was

reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki

he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The FBI,

which was aware of CIA's association with AMWHIP/1, met with AMHIP/1

in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should

contact the Paris Legal Attache.

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In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dis-

satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/I's "planned defection" in

Paris in August 1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and

AMWHIP/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else necessary in an attempt

to bring about AMLASH/l's defection.

The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in

Helsinki on 1 August 1962. The original objective of his defection

became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/1 was reported as feeling

that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a

new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there."

AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a

top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro

himself. The case officer's report stated:

"While we were making no commitments or plans,

we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes like

he envisioned certainly had their place, but that

a lot of coordination, planning, information-

collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to

ensure the value and success of such plans."

(Emphasis in original).

The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to

further meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen. AMLASH/1 was next

met on 16 and 17 August in Paris where AMWHIP/1 and the case officer

were joined by another case officer. AMLASH/1 was given SH training

and supplies. On 20 August he was taken to the south of France for

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a demolition demoristration. He refused to be polygraphed. The case

officer reported on 17 August:

"Have no intention give [AMLASH/1] physical

elimination mission as requirement but recognize

this something he could or might try to carry

out on his own initiative."

The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated:

"Strongly concur that no physical elimination

missions be given [AMLASH/1]."

• On 29 August 1962 AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana. This was

the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September

1963.

COMMENT:

It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a

recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that

matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for

this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela-

tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress,

although he was viewed as an operational contact with

potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and

September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA.

In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the

critical period, for purposes of this paper, is there-

fore between 5 September and 22 November 1963.

AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil

from 5 through 8 September 1963, as a representative of the Cuban

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LECONST

Government. He was met there by AMWHIP/1, and by the CIA case

officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASH/1

said that he had written two SW messages (only one had been received).

He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because

of Cuban postal censorship.

It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship

between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V

of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears:

.. • the ClA took steps to renew its contact

with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. The

CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic;

he had not been in contact with the CIA since

before the missile crisis of October 1962. The

exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is

not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended

at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination

operation."•

The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was

simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September

1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose"

for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report,

it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important

potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this

point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination

operation" was intended, it is quite clear that it was not under

consideration. The problem at the time was how to deal with the man.

At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting

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MESSET

in September 1963:

" . . . may have been to gain intelligence and to

cultivate him as an asset for covert operations . :."

A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report,

provides an insight as to how AMLASH/I was assessed at the time, as

well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers

of how to deal with him in the future:

"AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always

be a control problem. . (he) will not take time or

have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W

messages, let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong

confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain . . ."

CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part:

" . .

• Based on what little feel we here have for

subject however appears he is hopeless as intell

performer and is best approached as a chief con-

spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among

whom we may then find persons susceptible to long

distance and covert disciplines . . . "

The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to

any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/l may put

together.

Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially

important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities,

requiring careful. but long-range development for whatever course of

action that might later ensue.

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Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963

cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows:

"AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the

United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an

'inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting

a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added).

This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro

himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC

Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently:

"AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish

change either inside job or invasion he realistic

enough realize latter out of question. According

AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of

action."

COMMENT:

At this point, after a year out of touch with a

man with whom there had been no working understanding,

AMLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general,

as might be expected after such a long time. The actual

reference to an "inside job" did not specify Castro,

as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards

the more general question of how to bring about change.

It was offered alternatively, in the context of con-

sidering both external and internal action, and not with

the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.

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The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left

AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S. plan of action." There was

nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things

were left very much up in the air.

Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that

"characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation

is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes

that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination

operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this

phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on

Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From

the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963,

it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba."

(Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V,

itself describes the very general nature of the approach

by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra).

Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that

time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the

SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views

expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the

SSC Final Report..

The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents

in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held

with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed

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:.

against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.s. leaders.

The intended inference, as is known from discussions with

SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or

leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected

to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri-

zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary

and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter-

pretation as categorically as though it were fact.

The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have

expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of

any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever

may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time

they could not have stemmed from anything said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and

undertook nothing.

AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a

meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an

extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro

after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not

"intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to

the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless

arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already

in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed.

On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that

AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

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[Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1

was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official,

preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for

any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that

the request for a meeting:

"be given highest and profound consideration as

feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that

he determined attempt op against' [Castrol with or

without [U.S.] support."

A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with

AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him

if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added).

Desmond Fitzgeräld, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff,

was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1.

The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows:

"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled

to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1]

and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if

there is change of the present government in Cuba."

(Emphasis added).

On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris, representing

himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person

at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.

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SEGRET

On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high-

lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows:

"Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United

States is prepared to render all necessary

assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which

succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader-

Ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the

United States to render the assistance it is

prepared to give. It was emphasized that the

above support will be forthcoming only after a

real coup has been effected and the group involved.

is in a position to request U.S. (probably under

DAS auspices recognition and support. (Emphasis

added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not

prepared to connit itself to supporting an isolated

uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished

in a matter of hours if the present government is

still in.control in Havana. As for the post-coup

period, the U.S. does not desire that the political

clock be turned back but will support the necessary

economic and political reforms which will benefit

the mass of the Cuban people."

At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject

in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-

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called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination

weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some

other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald

stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer,

although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and

had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer

is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum

stated that:

"Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at

the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated

that he was satisfied with the palicy discussion but now

desired to know what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in Nex York City. He reported

on AMLASH/1's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact

report on what AMLASH/! understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as

follows:

"The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the

capacity of a representative of high levels of

the Government concerned with the Cuban problem

satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con-

cerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact

that he still was not given the technical assistance

for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1]

said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point.

13

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1979275

Jinked

He could not understand why he was denied certain

small pieces of equipment which promised a final

solution to the problem, while, on the other hand,

the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money

to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets. According to

[AMWHIP/11, [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point,

and if he does not get advice and materials from a

U.S. Government technician, he will probably become

fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we

have made to date."

COMMENT:

At this point it is important to note that Agency

documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told,

and what he was told, which matches a later report

of what he understood. In essence he was told there

would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then

only if he was successful. While that may not seem a

very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow

of a government, it is directly relevant to the question

of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is

contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18)

to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter-

preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.

26h

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Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/l's understanding

is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously

at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This

report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1

was unhappy with the ClA response and that Attorney General

Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance

of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the

date of the report is June 1964, this particular information

*dates back to 29. October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by

Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F.

Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera-

tion. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited

in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional

clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he had

been turned down at the 29 October meeting.

Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what

could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963

Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside

Cuba. The cache could, if he requested it, include ...high-power

rifles w/scope..."

On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to

return to Cuba. On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting.

that AMLASH/1 "delay departure...(to) permit one more meeting which

AMLASH/1 requested." On the same day (20 November) in response to

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a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure "if it

is something interesting." The case officer told him that "he could not

assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH

had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was

a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person

in the room.

The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief

and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he

might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and

quite significantly,: the Report acknowledges that no specific support

had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of

highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of

22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left

the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They

probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of

President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President

Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA

support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro,

or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed

against Castro.

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II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT

Section 1, B

This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it

places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies)

Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation.". It states

that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were

relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the

AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been

examined by the Warren Commission.

The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation

warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as

follows:

"The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren

Commission's work than the early CIA assassination

plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier

plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the

time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots,

the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA;

and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed

AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him

being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat

of retaliation for such plotting."

As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was

without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly

17

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unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally

accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1

prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect

to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal," There was no agree-

ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned

of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact

of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any

support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat"

-as noted above--must be considered irrelevant

to the substantive

nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time.

This viewpoint was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica-

tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically

there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations

involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence

of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have

provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there

were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

The SSC Subconmittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68

as follows:

"...it is unlikely that Castro could have

distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

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The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final

Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con-

testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC

Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation

was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are

inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously

considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry--

that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed

to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the

presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks

to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion

of the report as written.. On the other hand we tend to not contest

a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given

by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.s.

Government, including CIA activities.

************* t

At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a

meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having:

"stated the United States would support a coup."

Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald:

"also gave general assurances that the United

States would help in bringing about the coup."

The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at

the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This

presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match

19

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the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time.

In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it

is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC

Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots:

"Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and

promised him that the United States would support

a coup against Castro,"

citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting.

An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows:

"3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting

stated: 'Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to

(foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1

and giving him assurances of full support with

a change of the present government in Cuba.'"

(Emphasis added).

The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual

document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported

quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what

Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when

matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made

(as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1

understood (as discussed at pages 13-15).

****** * * * *

At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible

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for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating

to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it

would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is

likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were

responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the

operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following

statement:

"According to the 1967 Inspector General Report,

CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on

the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break

contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi-

nation and to return to Headquarters."

This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of

the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows:

"[The case officer] states that he received an

OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early

the next morning telling him that everything was

off."

The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on

the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited,

apparently despite suggestive prompting, that:

" . . . he recalled receiving such a cable, but

could not recall whether it made specific mention

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!

of the President's assassination as the reason for

breaking contact . .

• 18

It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been

sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event,

the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version.

******* * * *

Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the

AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation,

AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the

Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1.

Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his

fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these

generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what

persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships

with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were

he inclined to do so.

Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he

obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind.

To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey

assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we

do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things

that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the

question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than

one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA

to break relations with him.

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Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's

provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for

consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the

issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although

we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally

arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial

did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to

November 1964. An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro-

vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the

mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those

included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this

earlier period.

*************

At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November

the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names

of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC

Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to

determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to

assess their activities. The SSC Report states that:

"AMLASH's real name was included in the list

of names on the Mexico Station cable."

This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why

the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification

of the AMLASH operation.

The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest

on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was

mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of

23

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the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December 1960 --

about a press conference planned for AMLASH/7 in Mexico City in

February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between

AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the

name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In

any event, the December 1960 date preceded the inauguration of

President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any

relevance to the subject. There was no reason to check the name.

The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead-

ing on this point.

* * * *

* * * * * *

Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con-

cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states "that the

purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of

Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the

earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages

14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under

discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly

mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report

substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is

not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

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* * **

*

*

i * *

At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief,

SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He

is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact

time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks

of his "vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related

to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless

gives this opinion full play despite the extensive qualification as to

its reliability.

***** * * **

*

* **

At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration

is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA

employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or

should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept

as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot. throughout,

and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period in question.

There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship

with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is

noted in the discussion

above. In the present instance the uncertainties

were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on

positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1.

It is important

to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as

presented in the SSC Final Report.

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Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH

affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating

to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What

did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum-

stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps

on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it

was--required quite a clear and precise treatment.. The SSC Final

Report did not accord the subject that treatment.

* * * * * * * * * *

At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made

to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in

mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and

of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made

it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/l's 1963 associations with CIA.

This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred

time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it

did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half

after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no

knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When

this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature

of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an

irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this

point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator

McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his

26

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assassination also contained no reference to that period, although

AMLASH/1's later activities were cited.

********** * * # #

It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows

that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented

as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection,

which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his

self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was

determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his

own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were

held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically

conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period

preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his

own program before he could expect support from the U.s.

Eventually - but not until after the death of President

Kennedy - firmer indications of support were offered. Even then

the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a

man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

[Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow ..." The nature of the

relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964

(page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1

that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step

of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While

one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included

association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those

directly involved structured their thinking differently.

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The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH

operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim

Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG

report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at

different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that

question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship

developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and

without substance during his life. During that time it was not an

assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC

Report is both imprecise and misleading.

28

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MATERIALS FORWARDED TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI.

---

## Page 111

Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of

limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission

inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report,

CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts

of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and

submitted special analyses and reports.

The following pages list reports and other papers submitted

to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation)

and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation

is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that

effort.

The lists fall into the following sections:

E.1 Dissemination to the Intelligence Community

E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission

E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations

E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission

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AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION

Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis-

seminated to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as

possible after receipt.

The following list of some 100 cabled

disseminations, CSCI's, and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, et al.

The listing covers the period from

• 10 October 1963 through September 1964.

AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY FORMAL AND INFORHAL DISSEMINATIONS)

II

III

#10 October 1963

DIR 74673

(WH/3/Mexico).

"On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source

in Mexico City reported that an American male, who

identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City ...

Recipients:

FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. Warren Com-

mission]

*24 October 1963

DIR 77978

(WH/3/Mexico)

Request for two copies of most recent photograph of

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipients: Navy.

[Warren Commission]

23 November 1963

DIR 84915

(WH/3)

Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep-

tember 1963

to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

- Document Date

i = Document Number

III - Originating Office

- An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available

to the Warren Commission.

SEGRET

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24 November 1963

TDCS-3/565,829

Subject:

Cuban precautions following Assassination of

president Kennedy.

Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy,

Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE,

OCR,

ORR, 00, EXO.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy Esic - Consulatel in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

(CI/SIG)

Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's

Activities in Mexico City.

Recipient:

FBI

26 November 1963

CSCI-

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

(WE/BC)

(WH/3)

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject:

Lee Harvey_OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and

•3 October 1963.

Recipient:

FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(WH/3)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy. (Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD

between 27 September and 3 October 1963).

NB:

This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to

be the correct one, according to a copy of the

document in CI/SIG file No. 568.

Recipient:

FBI.

2

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26 November 1963

DIR 85069

(WH/3)

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Recipient:

FBI

*26 November 1963

DIR 85089

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey

OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in

a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City".

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

(WH/3)

Subject:

Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany).

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Telephone communication between Cuban President

DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to

Mexico.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

26 November 1963

• Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient: FBI.

3

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27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient:

FBI.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85182

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

On 23 November, Richard

Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who

was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding

latter to a close friend in Bern.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963

DIR 85195

(C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage

of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. MCCONE,

and Mr. HOOVER.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

• (C/WH/3)

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85199

(WH/3/Mexico)

Recipients:

27 November 1963

DIR 85222

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City,

contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4

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27 November 1963

DIR 85246

(WH/3)

r. JOSe GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports informatio

•egarding Lee Harvey OSWALD

, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI

by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

(C/WH/3)

Subterent are, state, Via te Rouse.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

•

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary

of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele-

phone to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information regarding photographic coverage of

Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed

to S. PAPICH of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to

OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

(C/WH/3)

On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John

WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em-

bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster-

type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

5

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*28 November 1963

DIR 85662

(C/WH/3)

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

recipients:

FBl, State, White House. [Warren

commission

*28 November 1963

DIR 85665

(C/WH/3)

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who

murdered President Kennedy.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. warren Commission

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN

and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation and investigation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

(WH/3/Mexico)

Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBl, State, White House-

*29 November 1963

DIR 85670

(C/WH/3)

Sensitive sources

have reported that when the

23 November arrest öf Silvia DURAN became known to

the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a

great deal of discussion.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren

Commission]

6

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...

SECRET.

29 November 1963

DIR 85676

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85691

(C/WH/3)

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of

the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man

claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to

assassinate Kennedy.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

(C/WH/3)

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on

recipients:

FBl, State, White House; Secret Servic

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85715

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959

to May 1962).

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

(C/WH/3)

Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

(WH/3/Mexico)

7

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*29 November 1963

DIR 85770

(C/WH/3)

Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging

advance information on assassination.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that

Oswald had made a bank deposit.

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director's

suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe

deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.

30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778/894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Post suggesting two men involved in assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

*30 November 1963

DIR 86063

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

(C/WH/3)

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

• Recipient: FBI.

*4 December 1963

DIR 86702

(C/WH/3)

Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife,

June 1962.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

Warren Commission

8

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5 December 1963

DIR 87189

(C/WH/3)

Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi

demanding full probe into assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*6 December 1963

DIR 87520

(C/WH/3)

Correction of DIR 87502.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. warren Commission

*7 December 1963

DIR 87667

(C/WH/3/)

Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission)

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

*9 December: 1963

(WH/3/Mexico)

DIR 87796

(WH/3)

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963

alleging assassination arranged by Communist

Chinese.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

[Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity

of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy

prepared and executed jointly by the Communist

Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries.

(See

UMWAVE 8658 IN 75902).

Recipient: FBI.

11 December 1963

TDCSDB 3/658,408

Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding

(a) Moscow views on international situation

following death of President Kennedy, and (b)

resumption of disarmament talks.

Recipients: General distribution.

9

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12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

(C/WH/3)

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON,

John; WILSON, John Hudson.)

Recipient:

FBI.

#12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi-

dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa

Rica.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mision]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

< (C/WH/3)

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

to comment upon the assassination.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

(C/WH/3)

subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO

FBI.

warren Commission

Recipient:

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy

Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

• *18 December 1963

DIR 89970

(C/WH/3)

Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warrer

Commission]

10

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*18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

19 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,225

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

19 December 1963

CSDB-3/658,870

(WH/Reports)

Subject:

a.

Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and

Rauo ROA y Garcia.

b. Probable Future Plan of Action for

Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez.

Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified.

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient: FBI.

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.

Recipient: FBI.

*10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

11

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14 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,510

(CI/SIG)

subject: Assassination of president John F. Kennedy.

(Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of

information from CIA.)

Recipient:

FBI.

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,814

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Soviet Union.)

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F.

Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Nevert get o. hubere sassination eau of

President John F. Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Conmission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret

Service.

Subject: Assassination of President

12

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John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic

Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

eritication of entry in "Historic Diary'

Recipient:

State.

[Copy to warren Commission.

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

SETYAEVA. and RAHM.)

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB.

Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service).

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Photograph of an individual closely resemblin

OSWALD)

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,996

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Recipient: FBI.

20 April 1964

CSDB-3/660,704

Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination.

Recipient: FBI (?)

13

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T

ii:.

22 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)

Recipient:

FBI.

30 April 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November

advising PAPICH to contact SOLlE of the Office

of security for information.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS,

DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

11 May 1964

CSCI -3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,282

Secrete neone to clin ite

(Identification

(SR/CI/R)

15 May 1964

lemorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

-to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

14

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13 May 1964

19 May 1964

5 June 1964

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,351

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified

Information about the U-2.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444]

CSCI-3/781,386

Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK).

Recipient: Navy.

CSCI-3/781,543

(CI/R&A)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla-

tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter

of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROASRIA Milina.

(CI/R&A)

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby.

Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/782,058

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient:

FBI. Warren Commission

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

6 July 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

DDP 4-3470

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and

Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD

and the Assassination of John f. Kennedy.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

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27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

Government.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

•

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Joachim JOESTEN.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964

CSCI-316/01709-64

Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE.

Recipient: FBI.

2 November 1964

CSCI-316/01779-64

Subject:

Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in

the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

16

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2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi-

gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

8 April 1965

CSCI-316/01398-65

Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City.

Recipient: FBI.

[Copy to Secret Service]

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65.

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient:

FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

'Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist

Guide in Moscow.

Recipient:

FBI.

9 May 1967

CSCI-316/02153-67

Subject: BEAUBOVEFF apparently to be used as a pawn by

Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a CIA agent and

was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON

alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or

by Senator Robert KENNEDY authorizing certain Americans

to work with Cubans for the assassination of CASTRO.

This memroandum is intended to record that such letters

never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON'S

possession.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

• CSCI-316/02669-67

Subject:

Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding

Mario GARCIAS et al.

Recipient:

FBI

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24 July 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject:

Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman,

that OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cuban

Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba.

CONTRERAS'

statement of dubious credibility; information passed to

Mexican authorities.

Recipient:, FBI.

• •7 May 1968

CSCI-316/01678-68

•Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged

Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by

Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim

GARRISON's Allegations.

Recipient: FBI.

16 September 1969

CSCI-316/03323-69

Subject: Charles William THOMAS.

Recipient: FBI.

, DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFE

Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD,

all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by

cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad-

ditionally, cables disseminations were released by Cl/Liaison.

Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated

on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the csel log, the cl staff

received copies of all escl's.

DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION

[Commission Document No. 100]

13 December 1963

Memorandum

subject:

Analysis of World Reaction to President

Kennedy's Assassination.

(Supplied by A. W. DULLES.)

18

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21 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 300]

Note from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Attachments: a. Recent

Soviet Statements on

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case.

21 January 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the

Government of the Soviet Union.

22 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 691]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Suggested Questions for Marina OSWALD.

25 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 321]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in

the Soviet Union.

Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet

Union who Were Known to or Mentioned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife.

31 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 347]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Developed by CIA on the Activity

of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3

October 1963.

5 February 1964

Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN.

Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet State-

ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964).

5 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 361]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to

J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appendix B,

a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.

19

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8 February 1964

[Commission Docjment No. 1182]

Letter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee

RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned

in one of

Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents.

[Information passed to FBI.]

18 February 1964

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi-

nation of president John F. Kennedy. Request for

information which might be helpful in interpreting

available materials relating to OSWALD's activities

abroad.)

[Copy to Warren Conmission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi-

nation of John F. Kennedy. (Request for information

relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

[Copy to Warren Commission. ]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: AsSassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy. Request for copies

of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey

OSWALD.)

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service;

signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject: Assassination

of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of entry

in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted

suicide.)

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

20

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18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. HUGHES, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".)

Leopies to warren Commission and the fBl.J

19 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 384]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(TS No. 187908.) Subject: Information Developed by

CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

19 February 1964

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J: Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City.

*21 February 1964

DDP 4-0940 [Commission Document No. 426]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Translations of Interrogations Reports of

Silvia DURAN.

Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 85758, 29 November 1963.

Translation of Interrogation of Silvia

DIRAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964.

Trans-

lation of Official Mexican Polic Report

on the Second Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

5 March 1964

DDP 4-1171 [Commission Document No. 448]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohammed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

#6 March 1964

DDP 4-1224

[Commission Document No. 692]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding

Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963.

21

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18 March 1964

DDP 4-1423 [Commission Document No. 528]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

24 March 1964

DDP 4-1555 [Commission Document No. 674]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Disseminated to the Secret

Service but not yet made avatlable to the President's

Commission.

*24 March 1964

DDP 4-1554 [Commission Document No. 631]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee

Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963.

Attachments:

OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October

1963.

OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October

1963.

25 March 1964

DDP 4-1576

27 March 1964

Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN.

Attachment: Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey

OSWALD", dated 23 March 1964.

DDP 4-1606

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DoP, to Thomas L. HUGHES,

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of

State.

Subject:

Verification of Entry in "Historic

Diary"

[Copies to Warren Comnission and the FBI.]

*31 March 1964

DDP 4-1655

[Commission Document No. 698]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, tO J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963,

22

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to the White House, the Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December

1963, to the White House, the Department of State,

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to

the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

*3 April 1964

DDP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Attachment:

OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December

1963, to White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

6 April 1964

DDP 4-1739

[Commission Document No. 708]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

Subject:

Reply to Questions Contained in Your Memo-

randum dated 12 March 1964.

("Certain Questions Posed

by the State Department Files")

7 April 1964

DDP 4-1787

[Commission Document No. 726]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First

Interrogation.

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7 April 1964

DDP 4-1786

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

20 April 1964

DDP 4-1997

[Commission Document No. 817]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: BND Report Pertaining to Allegations Con-

cerning Anton ERDINGER.

21 April 1964

Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN.

Attachment:

CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and

French Publishing

Firms to Publish the Thomas

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President

Kennedy.)

24 April 1964

DDP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844]

29 April 1964

4 May 1964

6 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD.

DDP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2256

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2296

[Commission Document No. 902]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information

I to

8 May 1964

intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection.

DDP 4-2357

[Commission Document No. 911]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

24

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13 May 1964

DDP 4-2444

[Commission Document No. 931]

Memorandum for the director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Informa-

tion about the u-?.

16561-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission

15 May 1964

[Commission Document No. 935]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to FBI]

19 May 1964

DDP 4-2533 [Commission Document No. 944]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

*19 May 1964

DDP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943]

Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

Attachment:

OUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, State Department, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

*22 May 1964

DDP 4-2624 [Commission Document No. 971]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

Embassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned

Assassination of president kennedy.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 85691, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

25

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27 May 1964

DDP 4-2688 [Commission Document No. 985]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2692 [Commission Document No. 990]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEY and

Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

1 June 1964

DDP 4-2741 [Commission Document No. 1000]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963;

subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2764 [Cormission Document No. 1001]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2770

[Conmission Document No. 1012]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject.

George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT.

26

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4 June 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

5 June 1964

DDP 4-2844

[Commission Document No. 1041]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training

School in Minsk, USSR.

10 June 1964

DDP 4-2922

[Commission Document No. 1054]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

*12 June 1964

DDP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. 1089]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

19 June 1964

DDP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. 1131]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, _DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques.

26 June 1964

DDP 4-3366

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Soviet Brainwashing Techniques

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347 [Commission Document No. 1188]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD waS

in Tangier, Morocco.

[copy to the fBl.]

27

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1 July 1964

DDP 4-3389

[Commission Document No. 1201]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki

on 10 October 1959.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401 [Conmission Document No. 1216]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul

Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV).

[Copy to the FBI.]

6 July 1964

: DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Statements Reportedly Made by George and

Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD

and the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to the FBI.]

22 July 1964

DDP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. 1273]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Apparent Inconsistencies

in Material Fur-

nished the Commission by CIA and the Department of

State.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. 1287]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum-

stances of a photograph of an unknown individual

furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November

1963.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3770

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD

Attachments:

Translation (original documents included.)

28

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31 July 1964

DDP 4-3916 [Commission Document No. 1358]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

7 August 1964

DDP 4-4037 [Commission Document No. 1356]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479 [Commission Document No. 1443]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADOP, to J.

Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

31 August 1964

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 2]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government.

[Copy to the FBI]

14 September 1964

DDP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DUP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Wester Europe in 1964.

DDP 4-4793

11 September 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4794 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart-

ment Files. (Revised) (Attachment to CD No. 1479)

29

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11 September 1964

DDP 4-4795

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Soviet Hunting Societies.

(Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479.)

11 September 1964

DOP 4-4796

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4807

[Commission Document No. 1493]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4823

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4838

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

State Department Files.

17. September 1964

DDP 4-4893

Memorandum from Richara HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

concern hu te have one Not authority royal

concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

30

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18 September 1964

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Communications from the bepartment of state.

DDP 4-4848

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens

Married to Foreigners.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4850

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Passport and Visa Office.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4873

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4882

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee

Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4886

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the UssR.

22 September 1964

DDP 4-4921

Subseat fivia Trado Bazan de DURA J. LEe RANKIM.

Subject:

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban

Consul, Mexico City.

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18 September 1964

DDP 4-4952

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD.

(Information regarding

OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.)

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110 [Commission Document No. 1532]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.

[Copies to FBI, I&NS, State]

13 October 1964

DDP 4-5275

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission

by the Central Intelligence Agency.

16 October 1964

DDP 4-5334/1

Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren

Commission Report

Subject: CIA's Role in the Support of Presidential

Foreign Travel.

20 October 1964

DDP 4-5347 [Commission Document No. 1545]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

29 October 1964

DDP 4-5558

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication:

"Foreign

Press Reaction to the Warren Report", and Follow-Up

Report, dated 22 October 1964.

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AGENCY DISSEMINATIONS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND

ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

10 October 1963

DIR 74673

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico

City, 1 October 1963.

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House.

• 23 November 1963

DIR 84915

Information relating to telephone call on 28

September

1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City;

Contact with. Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's ac-

tivities in Mexico City (from FBI interrogation

of. OSWALD).

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Subject:

Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and

3 October 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

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26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

Subject: Same as above.

(Comment: This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to

be the correct one, according to a copy of the docu-

ment in CI/SIG file no. 568.)

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85069

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on

26 November 1963.

Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect

that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Communist, pro-Castro deputy

to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to

gather data in Texas to use in pro-communist-pro-castro

propaganda in connection with the assassination of

President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85089

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that "on 18 September

1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand

five hundred dollars in

a meeting inside the Cuban

Embassy in Mexico City."

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received a copy. [Warren Commission]

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany).

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

Subject: Telephone Communication between Duban Prest-

dent DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Am-

bassador to Mexico.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

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26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the

White House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico

City on 18 September 1963.)

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient:

FBI.

27 November 1963

DIR 85182

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23. November, Richard

Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who

was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding

latter to a close friend in Bern.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. Lwarren Commission

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85199

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

35

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27 November 1963

DIR 85222

subject:

- Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban

Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85246

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information

regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by

CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of

State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban AM-

besiader so Mexico state, inter touSyARADO.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone

to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered®

Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban

and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH

of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

on 26 November a British journalist named John WILSON-

HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in

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London indicating that an "American gangster type named

RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

28 November 1963

DIR 85662

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Conmission]

28 November 1963

DIR 85665

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who

murdered president Kennedy.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

29 November 1963

DIR 85670

Sensitive sources •

have reported that when the

23 November arrest of silvia DURAN became known to

37

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the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal

of discussion.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85691

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the

Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming

to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate

President Kennedy.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

Recipregation of, iber VA use steret service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Conmission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85770

Series of incidents which have produced a report

alleging advance information on assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren

Commission]

29 November 1963

Unnumbered memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor

that OSWALD had made a bank deposit.

Recipient: FBI.

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30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Pest sentes ting two men involved in assassination.

30 November 1963

DIR 86063

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

Recipient: FBI.

7 December 1963

DIR 87667

Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

9 December 1963

DIR 87796

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging

assassination arranged by Communist Chinese.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of

a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepare

and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans

(See JHAVE 8658, IN 75902.)

Recipient: FBI.

12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also:

WILSON-HUDSON,

John; WILSON, John Hudson.)

Recipient: FBI.

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12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

[Warren Commission]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

so comment upon the assassination.

Recipients:

FBl, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

Subject:

Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission]

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.

Recipient: FBI:

18 December 1963

DIR 89970

Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Recipients:

FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

Recipients:

FBl, State, white House; Secret Service

received copy.

Warren

Commission]

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject:

Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient: FBI.

40

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3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 No-

vember.

Recipient: FBI.

10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission]

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

Subject:

Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI -3/778,814

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Soviet Union.)

Recipient:

FBI.

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

("In connection with our efforts to assist the

President's Commission on the Assassination of

president Kennedy by providing information which

might be helpful in interpreting available ma-

terials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,

41

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we have considered the entry with regard to attempted

suicide.

We consider this entry as being of consider-

able importance and one which might be subject to

verification.")

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

". . . 47 photographs which were among the effects of

the paotographs Were taken in the uss and demist

It appears that most of

Soviet contacts of OSWALD or scenes in the Soviet

Union. ")

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service.

Subject:

Assassination of president John f. Kennedy.

(Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to

OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary"

Recipient:

State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

Annette SETYAEVNA and Lillie May RAHM.)

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

• DIR 03101

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB.

Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service.)

42

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11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Photograph of an individual closely resembling

OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

Subject: Assassination of president John F. Kennedy.

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)

Recipient: FBI.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

[Warren Commission

11 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,282

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of

photographs sent to CIA by FBI.)

Recipient:

FBI.

15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DoP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing

Visa Applicants; Reaction of the Service to the Assassi-

nation of President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

43

(SEGRET

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## Page 155

214.00000

• ..

SECRET.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla-

tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter.

of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROSARIA Milina.)

Recipient: FBI.

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY.

Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/782,085

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

Recipient:

FBI. (Warren Commission]

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(Remarks made by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.)

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Government.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

44

SECRET.

---

## Page 156

14-00000-..

(;

SECRET

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with

Investigation of Lee Harvey and Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's In-

tourist Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican

Newsman, That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortly

After the Cuban Embassy Refused Him a Visa to

Visit Cuba.

CONTRERAS' Statement of Dubious®

Credibility; Information Passed to Mexican au-

thorities.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN

COMMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RE-

LATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION

31 January 1964

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City,

28 September - 3 October 1963.

45.

SECRET.

---

## Page 157

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SECRET

5 March

Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

Bazaanted REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

18 Marar T

Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed

In Moscon.

31 Marcia Ti

3 April It

DDP 4-1655

Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey

S— sand Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.

Fastes include the following:

setype Message No. 87515, 29 November 1963 -

paragraph g - Marina SNETHLAGE

Feetype Message No. 85182, 22 November 1963 -

Remarks made by Richard Thomas GIBSON.

eetype Message No. 85665, 28 November 1963 -

Remarks Made by Maria SNETHLAGE and Third

Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Em-

bassy in The Mague.

DDP 4-1699

- April 1

I May 1265

Richard Thomas GIBSON.

DDP 4-1784

Mohammed REGGAB.

DDP 4-2256

I May 196-

Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

ay of Agency files indicates that all ..

wastion known to the Agency on OSWALD's association

med has been made avasiaste to the Come states

DDP 4-2351

Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

ion of traces on what appear to be Soviet

cadresses, and telephone numbers from an ad-

sok identified by Marina OSWALD as belonging

46

SSCRET,

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## Page 158

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...:""

SEGRET

15 May 1964

19 May 1964

22 May 1964

27 May 1964

1 June 1964

3 June 1964

4 June 1964

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

DOP 4-2534

Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

DDP 4-2624

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

Embassy in Canberra, Australia; Relative to Planned

Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2688

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

(Comment: Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm.)

DDP. 4-2741

Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Enclosures: Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85662, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85666, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 86063,

30 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 87667, 7 December 1963.

Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interroga--

tion of Gilberto ALVARADO.

DDP 4-2769

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

DDP

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of

Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

47

SEGRET.

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## Page 159

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-...

(SEGRET

10 June 1964

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

12 June 1964

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of

President Kennedy sent to United States Embassy

in Costa Rica.

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD

was in Tangier, Morocco.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4808

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4839

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Subject: Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

48

SECRE

---

## Page 160

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MEXICO CITY

COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

---

## Page 161

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SECRET SENSIT!'

Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit

to Mexico City in 1963

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April

1947 until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in

1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella

type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multi-line phone taps, three

photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail inter-

cept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of

the local telephone company who was handled by a Station case

officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the avail-

ability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language

(English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers.

Generally,

these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case

officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who

advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and con-

cealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project

LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a

fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the

street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance.

The

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 004645

RECKET SIONVE

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## Page 162

14-00000

gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a

double laned street on the southeast corner of that block (See

attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and opera-

ted strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This

base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the

photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the

Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base.

It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the

same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the

Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located

in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet

Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the

Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get

good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three

photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a

Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father

(deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and

LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then devleoped and

printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was ori-

ginally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the

resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and

LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

2

-.:

.....

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## Page 163

4-00000

: 1s.....

SECRET

SENSITH:

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American

staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance

team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a

panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by

radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left

the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs

for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept

operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer.

A recruited Mexican agent, who had a semi-official status, obtained

selected letters from a sub-agent employed by the Mexican postal

system.

2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as charac-

terized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The

Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we con-;

ducted liaison, was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican

Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied

with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their

agents were cruel and corrupt. A Station officer trained a number!

of them in name tracing and travel control.

In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a

joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation,

SECRET

• 3

SENSITHE

---

## Page 164

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:

. -

which became known as LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer.

The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The

transcription room was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In

1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals,

the Station Chief, himself, became the project case officer.

A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the

listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes.

There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY

(the joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the

LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet,

Cuban and Satellite Embassies in anticipation of possible cover-

age. The Station immediately disconnected all of the unilateral

telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be dis-

covered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans;

soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines,

three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At

the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of con-

versations of interest which were then included in a daily re-

sume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely

recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station;

however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two.

Reels

which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

4

---

## Page 165

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SECRET / SENSITIVE

English were taken to another location for translation and

typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but

because of the volume of Russian conversations, the trans-

lations usually ran about a week behind the date of the con-

versation. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or

English since the Chief of Station could read only these two

languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

As soon as the Station learned that an American iden-

tifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss

Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs.

However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs

were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually

for dates a few days before since the technician who was proces-

sing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs

were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used.

Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the

end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)

and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners,

and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but

generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy cover-

age had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which

frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

22u:21/E33MtE

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## Page 166

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SECRET SENSITNE

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post

operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and

taken to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation because the caller

was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because .

Station personnel waited to review the photographs coincidentally

with the typed transcript.

4. Airport Coverage:

This is discussed at Tab

B.

!

..se too "

6""}

STISITE

---

## Page 167

4! Sai Erab gate

(- LIMITED

2- LILYRIC

3: LIGALLA

Pirato Bares.

lab. F. 7д.2.:.

---

## Page 168

40000.

SELECTED NEWSPAPER STORIES WITH COMMENTS

....н...

---

## Page 169

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GONGOENGAL

77-0984

10 day 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

Doputy Director of Central intelligence

FROM

John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

Jack Anderson 6 May 1977 Column Entitled

"Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963"

REFERENCE : OLC Memorandum for Director of Central

Intelligence - OLC 77-1816 (attached) •

1. Action Requested: None, for information only.

2. Background: The attached Jack Anderson colunn

is a

mixture of some fact and error.

At least portions of it seem

to have been leaked by someone connected with the House Select

Committee on Assassinations.

3.

Factual information on matiers covered in the article

follows:

a. Alphü 65 was an anti-Castro Cuban Exile

Organization.

Antonio Veciana was one of its

founders. Veciana contacted the Agency on three

occasions for assistance in an assassination plot

against Castro (December 1960; July 1952 and Aprils.

1966). On each occasion he was turned down.

ngency had we responsthility for or sponso ship of

Alpha 6o.

b. Veciana vas registered in the Inter-Service

Registry by the U.S. Army for the period Novenber

1962 lo July 1966 at which time he was terminated

without prejudice.

C..

Veciant reportedly collaborated with a Cubar

Government Intelligence Officer, Guillerno Ruiz,

in

connection with Alpha 56 activities.

Ruiz is marcied

to a cousin of Veciana.

E2, CARDER

C1. BY 1155538

---

## Page 170

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COMFIDENDAL

d. Anderson attempts io connect one Morris

Bishop with CIA in Dallas; newspapers in Dallas

have tried to identify Bishop with our DCD repre-

sentative in Dallas, Mr. J. Walton Moore.

Ac-

cording to our records, no Agency officers ever

used the nane of Morris Bishop as an alias. Mo

one named Morris Bishop was ever employed by the

Agency.

e.

The FBI identified the three men who

visited Mrs. Odio. Lee Harvey Oswald was not

one of them. The Warren Commission was satis-

fied that Oswald could not have been in Dallas

at the time of the visit..

Join to

John H. Matter

Attachment - 1

Distribution:

Original. - Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs) w/att.

1 - Office of Legislative Counsel w/att.

1 - Office of General Counsel Matt.

1 - Executive Registry w/att

1 - IG Subject /att.

1 - 1G Chrono w/att.

1 - J.L. Leader Chrono

w/att..

01G/J. L.Leader:aal

2

---

## Page 171

. THE WASHINGTON POST

:: Fridog. 3809562078

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963

The secret files of the Huusa Assas celved irom his CLA contact after Ken-

Sinations Committee contain repor's of

had been a mix-up but never cleared

strange CLA activitieg in Dallas on the

nedy was called.

the zeatter up."

The CLA man, ilorris Bishop, asked

eve of the John F. Kenuedy aisassina.

Veciana to contact his cousin, Buil

vestigars, meanwilt, tzat laa Cit's

tion.

lamo Ruitz, who worked for the Cuban

Credible witnesses have confirmed

monitering camera happenad to breas

embassy la Medco City. Reiates a con

down on the day that Cs'wald allegadiy

our past reports that the accused assas.

fidential report "Veciana tas to relay

visited the Soviat Embassy. But tie

sin, Lze Harvay Oswald, was in touca.

Bishop's olter to pay Ruiez and his

CLA Lap on the Soviet Embassy's phona

with anti-Castro Cubans In Dallas, One

wife to say that they bau mat with Cr

produani an allegeu telephoud cail

contidential report states that "In 1953);

wald in Mexico City."

from someone who Identilied bimsall

Oswald was seen leaving the Dallas Ofer: This not only would rave placed Cs"' 25 "Lee fleary Oswaid"

fice of Alpha 68," This was a Cuban

wald out of Dallas but would havs

the cas witness claimed that to se

commando group trained by the CLA

A Cuban CLA operative, Antnio Vz

thrown suspicion on the Castro gov.

tual roice recording of the telephone

ciana, also told investigators that ha.

crament The ruse was later called off

conversation "was destroyed in rol

had been summoned to Dallas in Au

lustead, the ClA cited secret tapes and

tine destruction procedures approxi

photographs as evidence that Arraid

mately

one week aiter it was re

gust 1983, by his CIA contack-a mysto

had been in touch with both tha Cuban

ceiveu." Yet more than seven weaks

rious man who went by the name of

Morris Bishon States a confidential

and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

laier, the EBl claimed i0 navs heaid

summary, "When (Yeciana) arrived,

The CIA kept tapes of all phone calls

the talephone conversation tbat tha

Bishop was accompanied ry another

going in and out of the two embassied

CIA said hail been destroyed. The

man, Lee Harvgy Oswalile:

P'hotograpes were also taken ot every-.

Fal's judgment was that the voice did

Another witness who impressed the

one entering and leaving these embas

not beiong to Oswald.

lavestigators, Syivia Odio, told them

sies. On Ock. 1, 1933, the ClA notified

Wrote toe late IBI director J. Edgar

that two anti-Castro Cubans had intru

other U.S. embassiss that "an Ameri

Heover on Nov. 23, 1963: "The Central

duced her to an American by the name

can male, who identified himseit a3

Inteidgence Agency advised that en

of Leon Oswald. Sae was told that D

Lee Oswald, contacter the Soviet Eim

Cot. 1,

1se3, an extremely sensitive

source had reportel that an indivicual

said was trying "to convince anit

bassy in lexico City.

Indentlied aimiall as Jee Cowar

Castro Cuban groups - in kill Presi

Ostrald was describer in the cable as

so contacted the Soviet Embassy in

dent Kenrady.

Ahter

the 20a5sina

"approximateiy 35 years old, with an

tion, she recognized this American as

ataletic build, about six feet tall, with

Mexico City inquiring as to any mrassa-

gas.

Lee Harvey Oswald.

a receding hairlina". Tie committe

The House investigators don't really

files note that this "in no way physt

"Spacial agents of this bureau, 130

have conversat with Oswald in Dailay,

belave that the ClA bad aby part in

cally resembles the Lea Harvey Os

the murder of Presiderit Keonedy.

wald accused ol assassinating Presi

Tex, have observest puctoginia ci

More likely, they suspect the CiA may

dent Kennedy."

the individuai reterred to above anu

have listened to a recording of his

hava tried to cover up some einbar-

The ClA sougat photograpas iron

voice rese special agents are of i

rassing contacts with Os vaid in Dallas

the navy to compare with is pho crinion that the aboverelerradio in-

la anj. case, the CIA trok pains to

tographs of Oswaid at the Soviet en-

dividual was not lee harvey Ovaid"

give the imorgision toat Oswain tvas in

casgy. Declares a committee recort

The flousa investigators are bayin-

Mexico Cly at tbe line that wirnesse.

"These photograpes, though obviously

ring to wonder whether the Cil cor-

claimed he was dealing with the CLA-

not ol the correct Lee friey Cowaid,

costed tue whole Oswall adventur: in

guided Cubang in Dallas. Veriana, for

became the Warren Commizion's ex-

Mexico Cir ia an aitempt to conczai

example, told of a strange call he re

hiolt 237. Tha CA admitted that taer

his resh activives la baller

---

## Page 172

14-00000

In the course of the research effort leading to this general

report, there were newspaper stories relating to the assassination

of President Kennedy and to CIA. Some of these appear to have been

based on specially designed stories emanating from the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. At the time of their appearance they

were the subject of comments prepared in CIA. These newspaper

stories and the comments are attached.

The following newspaper stories and comments are listed below:

Tab G. 1

Jack Anderson column on 6 May 1977 alleging

CIA activity in Dallas, Texas in 1963.

Tab G.2

Jack Anderson column on 20 January 1977

alleging that CIA is tied to a false Oswald

story.

Tab G. 3

Norman Kempster story on 1 January 1977

alleging that CIA withheld data on Oswald.

Tab G.4 Clare Booth Luce involvement with Cuban exiles.

Tab G.5 Ronald Kessler story on 26 November 1976

alleging CIA withheld details of Oswald tele-

phone calls, with report on handling of documents.

Tab G.6 John Goshko story on 13 November 1976 alleging

that Oswald told the Cubans of his plan to kill

Kennedy.

Tab G.7 Tabloid Midnight story on 2 August 1976

regarding CIA and Castro.

Tab G.8 Washington Post story on ! October 1976 concerning

CIA consideration of possibly interviewing

Lee Harvey Oswald in 1960.

---

## Page 173

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219!

: 15.

intonio

Veccasia

SIC: KI: 1

21.120/ 977

11/606/021-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM

Raymond A. Warren

Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECTS

Jack Anderson 20 January 1977 Column

Titled "CIA Tied to False Oswald Story"

B.. Identification of the Mr. X in the

Anderson Column

1.

The attached column, citing the testimony of a Mr. X,

alleges that a CiA agent tried to link Oswald to Cuban intelli-

gence officers in Mexico.

There is, of course, no substance to

the column's allegations.

The column identifies the source as

Mr. X because of attempts on his life, but

subsequently gives

enough information on Mr. X to establish his identity.

2.

According to the Anderson column, Mr: X was tirst met

by his 'CIA contact in Havana before relations with U.S./Cuba were

severed.

Mr. X had helped to organize bank accountants to en-

bezzle Cuban government funds to finance anti-Castro causes.

Mr. X was reportedly recruited by a Morris Bishop (CIA contact),

to "plan an attempt on Castro's life.

The plan was to fire a

bazooka from a nearby apartment building while Castro was deliver-

ing one of his marathon speeches.

According to the Anderson

column, the plot was discovered by Castro's police and Mr. i

escaped to Miami.

Mr. X also reportedly tried to assassinate

Castro in Chile in 1971 in league with the Venezuelan Luis Posada

carriles, who is now being detained in Caracas for the o October

Cubana airline bombing.

The Anderson column ends with the report

that Mr.

X worked for CIA until 1973 for expenses, but was paid

$253,000 in cash by Morris Bishop when he was terminated:

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METIIODS INVOLVED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 025251

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## Page 174

SI: CRIT

Fron the above description of di. X, it is rcasonably

car that dr. X is Antonio Carlos VECIANA Blanch (201-312966).

assistant bank manager and past president of a public

accountants

issociation in Havana, first contacted CIA in Havana

in Decenher 1960 when he asked the COS, at that time James A. Nool,

to help in an assassination plot against Castro. VECIANA asked

for visas for ten

relatives of the

four men assigned to kill Castro,

and

also requested four MI rifles with adapters for grenades plus

eight grenades.

The COS did not encourage

VECIANA and subsequently

checked

with an Embassy officer who reported that VECIANA had made

similar "vild-eyed" proposals to him.

On 23 Novainber 1961 the

Miami News published a report of an unsuccessful attempt by Anionio

VECIANA to kill Castro.

VECIANA reportedly had arranged to

assassinate Castro and Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos on 5 October

in Havana, but the bazooka he was using failed to fire.

January 1962, expired in November 1962.

VECIANA was born on

4 October 1935 in Havana.

He ivas a member of the People's Revo-

lutionary Movement, an anti-Castro group in Cuba during 1960-61, and

was one of the founders of Alpha-66.

A certified public accountant

by trade, VECIANA was with A.I.D. in La Paz in 1908-72.

VECIANA

registered

in ISR to the U.S.

Army in November 1962 and he

terminated without prejudice in July 1966. On 23 July 1962

VECIANA Was

interviewed, at his request, by Mr. Harry Real from

the DCD New York office. VECIANA asked

Real to arrange a meeting

with a senior CIA officer to discuss

Alpha-66's plans to assassinate

Castro and to request CIA's assistance (U.S. $100,000; 10,000 Cuban

pesos; 48 hand grenades).

There is no indication that this request

was ever acted

upon by CIA.

In April 1966 a LA Division officer, John R. Lucy, using

the alias John Livingston, met VECIANA in New

York City.

meeting was arranged by a

retired naval officer, James Cogswell,

who had informed Chief, Wil Division that he had

information of valuc

concerning Cuba.

When Lucy arrived in New York City for the meeting,

he was introduced by Cogswell to VECIANA.

He innediately launched

a discussion of the Cuban political situation and noted his strong

feeling that the only solution

was the assassination of Castio.

Lucy advised VECIANA that he was

in no position to provide him with

assistance or encourago him in an assassination attempt and was only

interested in rathering information which he thought was the purpose

of the meeting.

VECIANA subsequently said that his roommate felix

ZABALA, a Cuban refugoe, had excellent contacts in Havana.

It was

clear to Lucy, however,

VECIANA was attempting to use ZABALA poten-

tially to get Agency financial support for his organization.

SECRET

2

---

## Page 175

14-00000

VECTANd suggested that $50,000 would be needed to get his

activities off the ground.

Lucy indicated to VillANA that he

would look into the ZABALA matter and would probably arrange for

BABALA to be contacted in Puerto Rico.

= 6. There is no indication in the file that any Agency officer

in contact vith VACIANA ever used an alias Morris Bishopphere vas

no Morris Bishop listed in true name in the DDo rolls.

never any contractual relationship with VECIANA and he was not

paid CIA funds.

7. On 11 January 1977 a sanitized copy of VECIANA'S 201 filc

was made available to staffers from the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence.

..

sigied

Farrosa do larren

Raymond A. Warren

Attachment

DDO/C/LA/COG/OPS:JDevine:js (9229) (21 January 1977)

Distribution:

Orig &

1

- Addressee

1

ADDO

1

- LA/COG/Chrono

2

- C/ LAD

0-201-312966

1 - hold

1 LOPS

1- ASST.TEDCI

..-

SECR

---

## Page 176

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednenlay, January 19, 1977

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Mystery Witness in JFK Inquiry

i A mystery witness has sworn to con-

anti-Castro forces might have re

how Kennedy would die. Then the rab.

gressional investigators that a Central

cruited Oswaid, a known, pro-Castro

ble rouser added knowingly that Ken

Inieligence Agency agent introduced

activist to kill Kennedy.

nedy "nows heis a marded man."

him to Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas

"The motive on this,

." states the me

three months before Oswald gunned

wilteer later admitted to the FBI

mo, "wouid oi course be the expecta-

that he had been in-Dallas in June,

down President Joon F. Kearedy.

ton that aiter the fresident was

1903, but denied having any knowl

The witness, whom we have agreed

allied, Oswald would be caught or at

eage of the Kennedy assassination.

to identily oniy as Mir. X because of at-

least his identity ascertained; the law

However; the inormant told the FBI.

tempts of his life, is the lounder of a.

enforcemen: authorities and the pub.

that he asked Miltzer after the saoor.

Cuban terrorist group that worked

lie would then blame the assassination

'ing whether he had known about it in

closely with the Cla.

advance of hail merely been guessing.

the group held secret meetings al

¿to souanuale in Jallas before the ag

a treet orientin let co on do any guest epit it.

sassination. Not long alter Kennedy

But Hoover abruptly blocked this

But the most explosive development

was shot, a Dallas deputy sheritf was

line of inquiry by notilying the War:

1s Mr: X's statement that he met Os

told by an intormant that Oswaid had

ed commission on Sept. 21, 1984, tha

been associating with some Cubans at.

he. FBI had iccated and identifie

wald in the company of a ClA agent.

Congressional investigators questioned

:% "3128 Harlendale"

Mr. X'3 dramatic testimony casts

Odio's callers. lie named them as

me mystery miness closely on saree

Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and

separate occasions They finally con.

William Seymour, all anti-Castroites.

new light. on the story Sylvia Cdio, Hoover even suggested that Odio could

cluded that "his credibility is strength-

daughter of a wealtay opponent of Cu-

ened by the details he provides consist.

ban Premier Fidel Castro, told to the.

have confused the names "Loran Hall"

ent with what he told us before. Signif.

FBL Two morths before the Kennedy

and "Leon Oswald."

icantly, he remains very strong on the

killing, she related, she was visited in

Now the congressional investigators

Oswald sighting."

her Dallas apartment by three men

have uncovered evidence that all three

The encounter occurred in a dowz.

who identified themselves as friends

" denied

visiting the. Odio apartment

town Dallas building, where Mr. X had:

• Older father.

and that the fBI had obtained their: an appointment with his CLA contacr

One was introduced to her as "Leon

deniais bejore Hoover wrote his letter

The agent was accompanied by a man

Oswaid." When she saw the picture la

to the Warren Commission.

whom bir. & later recognized as Ken.r

the newspapers of the man who had

The investigators have alsu obtained

nedy's killer.

soot Kennedy, she fainted from shoes.

the tape of a fasciating conversation,

"When he saw it was Oswald that

It was the same Oswald, she was cer-

predicting two weeks in advance that

tain, who nad visited her apartment.

Kennedy would be shot "froin an oil.

killed Kennedy," the investigators re-

ported in a confidential memo, "he

Ice building with a high-powered ri

Congressional investigatory

have

nearly freaked out, but he never said

• now learned that the late J. Edgar

fe" Fee. prediction was made by the

anything."

"""

•Hoover deiiberately misled the War-:

late Joseps Miteer, a right-wing rab

the investigators tried to pin downi

"ble rouser, who aiso happened to have

ren Commission about Odio's mystarl-

Mr. X on how he could be sure that

close connections with anti-Castro

ous visitors. She was such a persuasive

man was Oswald bir.. & replied, ac:

leaders.

• witness that the commission staff was

.. The conversation was taved on Nov.

cording to the memo, that he had

preparing to investigate her story

learned "how to retain the character-

s, Jair, in blami by an FBI informant

thoroughly.

ics of a person; he had trained himsel!

Stall members even speculated, ac-

named Willie Somersett, who turned

to do that. And il it wasa't Oswald, It:

the tape over to the FBI the next day.

cording to one internal memo, that the

was someone who was exactly like 08

Milteer is heard on the tape describing

wald, his exact double.

B15

---

## Page 177

14-00000

(

SSerST

10 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM

Russell B. Holmes

C1 Operations Group

SUBJECT

Article by Norman Kempster Appearing in

he Los Angeles Times of 1 January 197

and Entitled "CIA Withheld Data on Oswald

(copy attached)

In light of the inaccurate and misleading statements

attributed by kempster to Sprague, the following comments are

offered in rebuttal.

"The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost

two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Oswald

had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his

desire to visit those countries . . .

Comment: Oswald's name did not surface in Mexico City until

I October 1963 when a hitherto unknown male telephoned the

Soviet Embassy.

During this telephone call, the caller identi-

fied himself as "Lee Oswald." On 8 October 1963, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters the highlights of the

transcript of the conversation.

(1) On 1 October 1963, an American male who

spoke broken Russian and said his name was Lee

Oswald (phonetic), stated he was at the Soviet

Embassy on 28 September when he spoke with a consul

whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich

Kostikov.

Oswald asked the Soviet guard Ivan

Obyedkov, who answered, if there was anything new

regarding a telegram to Washington.

Obyedkov upon

checking said nothing had been received yet, but

the request had been sent.

(2) Mexico Station said it had photographs of

a male who appeared to be an American entering the

Soviet Embassy at 1216 hours, leaving at 1222 on

1 October. His apparent age was 35, athletic

build, about six feet, receding hairline, balding

top.

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

2237

---

## Page 178

14-00000

• ...

-...-.=

(3) No local dissemination was being made by

the Station. (MEXI 6453 (IN 36017), 8 October.]

Note: Cablese has been rendered here into readable English,

without substantive changes or omissions. Cryptonyms and

pseudonyms have been omitted or put into clear text.)

The above information was received in Headquarters on

9 October; the following day Headquarters incorporated this

intormation in an electrical dissemination to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of

the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive

source in Mexico reported that an American male

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the

Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram

which had been sent to Washington. The American

was described as approximately 35 years old, with an

athletic build, about six feet tall, with a "receding"

hairline.

(2) It is believed that Oswald may be identical

to Lee Henry [sic] Oswald, born on 18 October 1939

de Net d to the Sovist union in Der bes. 95s and later

made arrangements through the United States Embassy

in Moscow to return to the United States with his

Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova [sic]

and their child.

(3) The information in paragraph (1) is being

disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject

will be furnished you. This information is being

made available to the Immigration and Naturalization

Service. [DIRECTOR 74673, 10 October 1963.]

Note: It should be pointed out that for some unknown reason

the readquarters desk responsible for making the dissemination

neglected to include the information that Oswald had visited the

Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.)

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated

a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy

---

## Page 179

SSCRET

--3--

that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy

on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa

to the USSR.

Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of

Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to

obtain a visa allowing him to transit cuba.

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility

of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official

request from those agencies having investigative responsibility

requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station

did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October 1963 for

a photograph of Oswald. [MEXI 6534 (IN 40357), 15 October 1963.]

On 25 October 1963, Headquarters sent a request to the Department

of the Navy for a photograph of Oswald..

[DIRECTOR 77978,

24 October 1963.] It was not until 26 November 1963, however,

that the Navy Department apparently responded to this request by

sending directly to the Mexico City Station a photograph of Oswald.

In response to a question from the Warren Commission, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 6 April 1963 stated that:

"The investigation of Oswald in 1963 prior to receipt

of the Central Intelligence Agency communication

dated 10 October 1963 was directed toward the primary.

objective of ascertaining the nature of Oswald's

sympathies for, and connection with, the FPCC (Fair

Play for Cuba Committee) or subversive elements. The

Central Intelligence Agency communication which

reported that a man, tentatively identified as Oswald,

had inquired at the Soviet Embassy concerning a

telegram which had been sent to Washington did not

specify the nature of the telegram.

This contact

with the Soviet Embassy interjected a new aspect into

the investigation and raised the obvious questions of

why he was in Mexico and exactly what were his

relations with the Soviets. However, the information

available was not such that any additional conclusions

could be drawn as to Oswald's sympathies, intentions

or activities at that time.

Thus, one of the objectives

of the continuing investigation was to ascertain the

nature of his relations with the Soviets considering

the possibility that he could have been recruited by

the Soviet Intelligence Services.

The Central

Intelligence Agency communication, dated 10 October 1963,

stated that any further infornation received concerning

Oswald would be furnished and that our liaison repre-

sentatives in mexico City were being advised.

On

023T

---

## Page 180

- ..

14400000

+ 797999991

--4-=

18 October 1963, one of our FBI liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City was furnished this infor-

mation by Central Intelligence Agency and he arranged

follow-up with Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico

City for further information and started a check to

establish Oswald's entry into Mexico.

Subsequent to

the assassination, Central Intelligence Agency also

advised us of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico City at the time of his visit there."

Commission tabit No. 833 (FBI Letter to J. Lee Rankin,

dated 6 April 1964)•J

b. "Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the

committee staff had learned that a CIA message des

cribing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal

agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to elimi-

nate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet

visas.

The message was sent in October, more than a month

before the November 22, 1963 assassination.

Comment:

It is not CIA practice to disseminate raw information in

the form it is received from the field. Field reports are received

in Headquarters where they are first reviewed by the action desk.

The information is then written in a form suitable for dissemination

co the intelligence community, including additional information,

If available, from the Agency's central counterintelligence files

to make the report more meaningful to the recipient (s).

Upon learning that on 1 October 1963 an American identifying

himself as Lee Oswald had telephoned the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 the highlights of

Oswald's conversation with the Embassy.

Because the Station at that

time did not know that Oswald was Lee Harvey Oswald and that he had

come to Mexico to apply for visas to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the

Station reported only that information obtained through telephone

tap operation against the Soviet Embassy.

On 10 October 1963, the day after it received the information

relating to Lee Oswald and his contact with the Soviet Embassy,

Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemi-

nation to the community and included a brief summary of biographic

information obtained from central counterintelligence files on the

possible identity of Lee Oswald. Since Headquarters had no indi-

cation before 22 November that Oswald had gone to mexico to apply

for Cuban and Soviet visas, there was no question of eliminating any

......

---

## Page 181

14-00000

ULUNET

--5 -=

mention of Oswald's request for such visas.

Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico Station had

complied with the Agency regulations pertaining to reporting on

Americans abroad. The Station had informed Headquarters which in

turn had alerted those agencies with an investigative or policy

interest in Oswald as an American in the United States. Headquarters

also instructed the field station to inform the local representatives

of those agencies.

As mentioned above, the action desk in Headquarters neglected,

for unknown reasons, to

include the fact that Oswald had visited

the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963. Had this information been

included it would have indicated to recipients of the report that

Oswald had more than a fleeting reason to be in contact with the

Embassy; however, as already stated, the reason for the 28 September

contact and the subject of the telegram to Washington were, at that

time, unknown.

"The CIA's decision to withhold information

was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed."

Comment: This statement is patently false and misleading. It is

totally incompatible with Sprague's remarks to Agency representatives

in Headquarters on 24 November 1976, i.e., "he will not prejudge the

Agency for any sins of 'omission or conmission'."

d. "Sprague told a press conference that it was

impossible without more information to know why the CIA

had censored its own message."

Comment: If Sprague needed more information, why did he not ask

the Agency for an explanation, instead of making it appear to the

public that the Agency has been dishonest in its dealings with the

intelligence commmity?

e. "But he said the incident raised two interesting

questions: what might the other agencies have done

differently if they had been more fully informed, and

why did the CIA decide to remove information that was

considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial

draft of the message?" "

Comment:

As already mentioned, the Agency did not know initially

why Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in October 1963.

C30°3T

---

## Page 182

1,4-00000

-= 6-=

It was only after the news of the assassination had reached the

visited the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald's contacts with the two

embassies were in connection with his desire to travel to the

Soviet Union by way of Cuba.

As to what "other agencies" might have done had they had more

information, attention is drawn to the FBI's coument in response

to the Warren Conmission's question. According to the FBI's

response, some investigation had been initiated on or about

18 October in Mexico.

informed its field office in New Orleans "that another Agency had

in Mexico City thee cardy part of other to she she em orleans

field office in turn informed the Dallas office which had juris-

informed the

diction over Oswald's place of residence. (For further detail, see

IV H 447 and 459.) There was, however, no request, official or

otherwise, from any of the responsible departments and agencies in

Washington for further details as to Oswald's presence in Mexico

and his reasons for contacting the Soviet Embassy.

"The conmittee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had

personal knowledge' of Oswald's visits to the Soviet

and Cuban embassies in Mexico.

As a result of that

interview,

the report said, staff members were sent to

Mexico, where they found and questioned additional

witnesses.

Comment: Sprague's characterization "a former CIA agent"' is probably

in reference to David Phillips.

The latter's "revelations" to staff

investigators (and also to Ronald Kessler) were unfortunate to say

the least, in that they were inaccurate, so far as we know.

There

is no indication in the Oswald files that Oswald wanted to make a

deal with the Soviets in return for a free trip to the USSR. The

"additional witnesses" in Mexico, it is believed, are Boris Tarasov

and his wife, both of whom had been under contract with the Agency

in 1963.

have not been informed, officially or otherwise, by

prague what Phillips and the Tarasovs told the staff investigators.

"'These witnesses had never been sought out

not that the he tiporte in, matrin concong che

statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 60

days of the assassination of President Kennedy, the

report said."

--.

---

## Page 183

--7÷

Comment: If "these witnesses"' include people other than the Tarasovs

It would be impossible, at this time, to make an appropriate comment.

The fact remains, however, that if Sprague had obtained additional

details, he should hold such information and not make it public

until the Agency has had a chance to review it and comment. There

are many examples in the Oswald files of statements made by people

claiming to have knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald which have been

proven to be fabrications.

One such person was Gilberto Nolasco

Alvarado Ugarte who, on 26 November 1963, came to the U.S.

Embassy in mexico City. He claimed he had been in the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later

recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill

an important person in the United States. After thorough investi-

its one a hat ared, he one i Sett hi the

about Oswald.

Dailur

Russell B. Holmes

Attachment

---

## Page 184

CIA Withheld

Data on Oswald

Assassinations Panel.

Issues Report to House

BY NORMAN KEISTER•

WASHINGTON-The CLA, with-

held: from: the FBi for almost trio

months in 1963 information that Lea

Haryey Oswald had talked with Cu-

ban and Soviet officials about his de-

sire to visit those countries, a house

*: The Select Committee on Assassin-

fations indicated in a report to the full

House that its investigation. @ the

murder of Presideat John F. Kennedy.

would jocus early in 191% on a trip

"Oswald had made to:Mexico City in

i Chier. Counsel Richard A. Sprague

said that the: committee staft hed

Tearned that a CA message descrio-

fing: Oswald's activities in Mexico 10

sederal agercies such. as the. JBl had

been rewnitten to ebminate any men-

-tion of his request for Cuban and So-

¿viet-visas. The message was sent in

Ociober, more than a month before

§the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination.

The ClA discovered Oswvaldis.preo

Esence :al, the embassies: through its

_routine surelllance.ol those lactities.

Because Oswald had once delected to

¿tha Soviet Union, the CLA and FBI

shed been interested in his activites

Pere beiore the Kennedy: assassina-:

Te: CLA's. decision to .withhold in-

formation was reversed shortly aiter

Reinedy was killed. The agency. se:

ported Oswald's elforts to visit Cuba

and the Soviet Union both to te FBL

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

1 January 1977

© District of Columbia's congressional dele:

and to tke Warren Commission, which con- gate and the chairman of tice King subcom.

cluded that Ostyald was the assassin and

mittee said that no decisioa bad been made

had acted alone.

on accepting Ray's ofier...

Sprague told a press conference that it

Hosvever, Sprague indicaled thal it prob-

was impossible without more information

ably would be accepled

o know why the CLA had sensored its oist

"Any and all people lino have relevant

pessage.

But he said the incident raised to inter-

information will be interrogated," Sprague

said.

esting. questions, That might the oiner

• In a personal statement issued in con-

igencies have done differently ir they had

junction with the report, Rep. Henry B.

reen more fully informed and why did the

Gonzalez (D-Tex), who is to become com-

CIA decide to remove "information. that i mittee chairman in the new year; said a

was considered pertinent enough to be put

thorough investigation was needed to att-

in an initial draft of the message?"

"swer hundreds ai pressing questons

i.There were no firm conclusions in the

Gonzalez sald that the committee hopsa

report, which the 12-member committee

• to discover whether forme: FBI Direclor J.

prepared after the first three months of its

Edgar Hoover's now, well-nown animesi.

investigation into the murders a Kennedy

ty toward King had affected the FBI's in-

•and civil rigats. leader Dr Baron Luther vestigation of the assassination: si

Technicaly the codite, goes out of vors could go well beyond the killings of

•T Gma Bam se However, Gonzalez said, the commillee's

business Tuesday. with the end of the ses-:

Kennedy and King. 17 19.7035

sion of Congress in which it ivas formed.

" "The committee can shed light on the

The purpose of the year-end report was to

larger issue of political murder and vi:

unge the new Congress to reestablish the olence," Gonzalez said. "We should no!

• committee and to give it. $6.5 milion to pay

-forget that President Ford had his oun

for the first year of what could be a two- narrow escapes; no member of the Houss

year investigation

"In the three months since its'establish.

set on, that the Cool Bides s

0: He-said the committee's ultimate lass

ment, the committee has initiated prelim-

- was "to find out not just that happered

inary investigations into new and pre-

"rously unoursued leads in both assassina-

but way."

tions,

" the report said.

The committee said its staff investigators

had recently. questoned a: loner ClA

agent who had: "personal knowledge.. of

Oswald's visits: to the Soviet and Cuban

embassies in Medco: As a result of that in-

-terview, the report said, staff mesbers

were sent to blexico,. where they found and

questiored additional witzesses: sire

;. These, witcesses had never been sougat

out belore by any investga ive cosy, not

withstanding the fac. that they had impor

tant information concerting statements bit

Lee Harvey: Oswald in Mexico within 60

days.of the assassination of President Ken-

nedy," the report said:

The report said also that the commiltee

staff had interviewed a person who assert.

'ed that he had discussed the King murder

with James Earl Ray, who pleaded guilty

. to the crime. The unidentfied witness said

that Ray had told him about contacting an

associale in Europe to receive. fusther in-

→ structions. The story, whick was told to res

ween go, a set be enter real

In a letter to New York Times columnist

Anthony Lewis, Ray Offered Lis week la:

testliz under oath at a commisee hearing.-

But Sprague and Walter F. Hauntray, they

---

## Page 185

14-00000

72-070.

7194

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

President Kennedy Assassination - Mrs. Luce Story

1. Action Required: None; for information only.

Background: In 1975, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce telephonically

informed Director William Colby of support she had rendered to certain

Cubans who were conducting their own independent operations against

the Castro Government in 1961 and 1962.

Mrs. Luce stated that she and

Mr. William Pawley, an American financier long associated with the

Dominican Republic, helped finance a motorboat for three Cubans.

three Cubans, concurrently, were members of a CIA supported Cuban

exile organization. After the 1962 missile crisis, all resistance

groups against Castro were ordered to cease operations. At this time,

Mrs. Luce and Mr. Pawley also ceased their financial support. In

1963, very shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, the

Cuban captain of

the motorboat, which Mrs. Luce helped to subsidize,

phoned Mrs. Luce to inform her

that "Oswald was a hired gun". She,

turn, informed him to tell all to the FBI. At the behest of Director

colby, Mrs. Luce passed the story on to senator Richard Schwelker,

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report.

A version of the information was given

to columnist Betty

Beale and was published in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975

(attached) •

December 1975,

inquired as to what the Agency thought of the story.

paper story and that since

ting in so set ot to the rens-

The Agency oral response was that

it had nothing to add to the news-

this query involved U.s. resident Cliban

refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

---

## Page 186

14-00000

The transcripts were received by CIA's Inspector General

on 22 December 1976 from Mr. Colby's secretary. At the suggestion

of the Inspector General, the Office of Security sent copies of the

transcripts and a background note to the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation in January 1977. We do not know whether the FBI passed this

information to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

This story is summarized here for your background in the

event that it should be replayed by the press as a result of releases

which may be made by the House Assassination Subcommittee.

While it is

not a new story, the actual CIA transcript of Mrs. Luce's conversation

with Mr. Colby could be considered newsworthy and could be presented

in a manner detrimental to CIA.

John H

John

Waller

Attachment: a/s

cc: Asst. for Public Affairs w/att

Mr. H. Hetu

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att.

1 - DDCI w/att.

1 - Asst. for PA/Mr. Hetu w/att.

1 - ER w/att.

-I - IG Subject (Task Force) w/att.

1 - IG Chrono w/o att.

1 - J.L. Leader. Chrono w/o att.

..

OIG/J.L. Leader: aal

2

---

## Page 187

Clare Boothe Luce Weav

a Fascinating Tale

One day in the latter part of October, Clare Luce re

ved a call irom Sen. Richard Schweiker,

Betty Beale

airman of the subcommittee investigating the war-

3 Commission Report. He wanisa her to persuade

he Cubans she had known - Cubans who had known

e Harvey Oswald - to testily bejore his commaittee.

5. Luce's efforts to locate ine Cubans led to a some

at bloodcurdling warning. But let her tell the story

m the beginning.

19ã1, à year of great americar

she began her narration to recent dinner

ests in her aqua-colored Watergate apartment

'I

I a friend named Bill Pawley who was brought up in

ba and who was Truman's ambassador to Peru and

azil. I got to know Bill very well in India and China

vere he had built up a voluntary outrit called the

ying Tigers. Bill was also called in by the CIA to re-

uit Cubans for the Bay of Pigs Operation. Afterwards

was's very unhappy man.

'One day he called me up and said. 'How would you

'e to get in on the Cuban Flying Tiger operation?' He

d in mind a fleet of motorcoats subsidized by Ameri-

2s and manned by Cubans who had been in the Bay

Pigs oparation - all these young kids who had been

randed afier the Bay of Pigs.

"I said, 'Fine.' So I helped to iinance a moiardeat

ne three lads who manned mine came up to see ma

iveral times. They would leave the coast of Florida

id lard in Cuba and come out with information. The

formation they came out with was remarkably accu-

te - that the Russians were building missile sites in

aba. I was told that the information was eventually

d to Sen. Ken Keating and was passed on to the

hite House. You remember what an impression it

lade and how accurate it was.

.

: 'THẸN CAME THE MISSILE showdown. Soon after

je showdown I got a telephore call from Allen Dulles

aying the Neutrality Act had been invoked and all

mericans must cease and desist in any further efforts!

wards the liberation of Cuba. Of course, we desist-:

Tro years later she and her husband Harry (Henry)

lace were sitting in their New York apartment listen-

if to tre televised reporis of President Kennedy's

ssassination when around midnight she received 3

• phone call from New Orlears. "It was the captain of

my motorboat,".

said Clare,

"A young men not more

• than 25, a young student lawyer. He said, Mrs. Luce; I

want to tell you about Oswald:

t.

"He said that immediately after the 1961 missile

showdown. FBI men had come to Miami and told the

Cubans to brea: up all resistance groups and disperse.

He and the other two members of his crew had moved

to New Orleans where they staried aroiner "Free

Cuba" group. They had been there a year and a half

when who made contact with them but Oswald!

"The Cubans all thought he was a kook. Oswald

bragged about having been in Russia and said he was

an ex-Marine. He said he could shoot anybudy and he

would be happy to shoot Castro. He had no money, he

was living with his wife in New Orleans and it looked

like he was presenting himself as a hired gun. They

didn't like the cut of his jib so they turned him oit. Bit

they followed him and found he was in a Fair Play for

Cuba Communist cell to whose members he was giv-

ing And remember this from the telephone conversa-

tion — Oswald was telling the cell that he could shoot

anyone, including the secretary of the Navy. The Free

Cubans continued to tail him and found that suddeniy

he had money, and he siarted going to Mexico City. He

made several trips. They continuad their penetration

of the Cuban Communist cell. He said they mace tape

recordings of some of Oswald's meetings and they had

taken photographs of him distributirg handbills for the

Fair Play unit. The next thing they knew residere

Kennedy was shot

"THE YOUNG CUBAN WHO called me," continued

former Ambassador Luce,

"said that there was' a

Cuban Communist assassination dea working some-

where — in Dallas, New.Orleans or Wherever - I don't

remember, and that Oswald was their hired gun. Os-

. wald, he said, had tried to report the Commurist plans

to the FBI some time before the assassination. But be-

cause he was out for the dough they didn't believe him.

continued.

---

## Page 188

sugpose that the FBI must hear from a thousand

cracknois" a week.

In any event. on the telephone my young friend told

me that they had these tape recordings of Oswald and

phoiographs and what should they do? I said, 'Go to

the FS! and tell them everything you krow." That hay

ing been said I put the whole thing out of my mind.

Comes the Warren Commission and says Oswald alone

was responsible ard I forgot the whole matter.

"Then, in 1967, a fellow named Jim Garrison, dis-

trici adorney in New Orleans, hit the headlines Charg-

ing that the assassination was a conspiracy. At that

moment I was reminded of the information I had re-

ceived and I bagan to wonder whether or not the

Warren Commission had gor all the facts. I coulda't

remember the names of the Cubans but I finally locat-

ed one crewman who was living in Miami again and I

asked him what happened aiter he went to the FBI.

"He said, "We turned over copies of everything."

¿ We

were teen told.to keep our traps shut and that we

would be deported it we said anything publicly. He

said ore of the crew was deported to Guatemala, and

one was murdered - stabbed in front of a store.

"THEIR INFORMATION, HE SAID, never appear

ed in the Warren Commission report. He said, "I am

maried now, I live in sliams and i don't want to get

involved in it ever again." "

When Sen. Schweiker made his request of Clare

Luce less than three weeks ago, she telephoned anoth

er Cuban friend to see if he could locate and persuade

the young man to testify behind closed doors. Replied

the oider Cuban, if the testimony was behind 13 closed

doors it would still become public.

"Americans think they are playing games," he told

her. "They don't know they are involved in a life or

death business. No. I won't tell you where he can be

found. The people working for a free Cuba would lose

their lives. A lot of them have already. They are not

interested in making political headlines for politicians.

You think the Bay of Pigs, the nuclear missiles, the

assassination of the president was the end of the story?

I tell you it is just the beginning. What you Americans

don't understand is, there are trained Communist ter-

rorists, assassination, kidnapping, bombing and sabo-

"tage teams all over the country and the world."

- Fida Narld Paolas

Clare Boothe Luce

"A year of great American trauma."

The very day after that conversation, observed

Clare gravely, combs went oit at the Stale Depart

ment here, at the U.S.-U.N. mission and four banks in:

New York and at three places in Chicago. And close toj

the same hour she was recounting the whole fascinati

ing story to her guests, a Cuban, zati-Communist!

leader was exploded into bits in his car in Miami.

---

## Page 189

14-00000

USE ONLY

UTING AND RECORD St. IT

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Inspector General

2 E 24 Hqs.

TO: (Officor dosignation, room number, and

building)

70.4a

1. OLC

ATTN: Lyle Miller

DATE

EXTENSION

6565

R-1252

OFFICER'S

INTIALS

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

2.

3.

4.

5.

Director of Security

No.

DATE

6 January 1977

COMMENS (Numbar ooch comment lo sham from whom

to whom Drom a lino across column offer each commant.!

SUBJECT: Attached Transcripts

The OLC and the IG concur that

the attached transcripts should

be provided to the FBl. A blind

memo is also attached.

It is requested that the O/S

pass the package to the FBI.

70 Buchil

John H. Waller

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Scott.

the Offair Le

enter detect

l yo: 8777-149

05-76060

12.

13.

14.

FORM

3-82

610 SERMOUS

SECRET

7 CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 190

6 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Transcripts of October 1975 Telephone Conversations

Between Director Colby, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce and

Mr. Justin McCarthy

between retor hillan oly transert te bothel lu, conver belon

Director William Colby and Mr. Justin McCarthy. The conversations took

place in October 1975 and discuss Mrs. Luce's concern that certain infor-

mation, from a former boat captain, a Cuban refugee, regarding the Prest-

dent Kennedy assassination, reached the proper authorities.

While the

information in these transcripts have been provided to investigating

authorities, they may be of some assistance to the House Select Committee

on Assassinations as it investigates various allegations.

2. The transcripts were received by the Agency Inspector General on

22 December 1976. The transcript of the 25 October 1975 conversation was.

typed by Ms. Barbara Pindar on the same day.

The other two transcripts

were typed by Ms. Pindar on 21 December 1976 from her stenographic records

while clearing out the remainder of Director Colby's files. Ms. Pindar

was Mr. Colby's secretary during his Directorship.

3. A version of the telephone conversation transcript was published

in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached). A staff member of

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 10 December 1975, inquired

as to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was

that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this

query involved U.S. resident Cuban refugees, the FBI would be the proper

agency to contact.

---

## Page 191

24-00000

The attached transcripts indicate that the matter was brought to

the attention of Senator Schweiker and The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(Telephone conversation between Director Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce

on 25 October 1975, pages 2 and 3).

Attachments: a/s

---

## Page 192

+4-n0d

- il

Review Staff:

75/3637

Date 10 December 1975

TO

• CIA Task Force

FROM

: The Review Staff,

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date

Walter Elder

Time

Paul Wallach, SSC staff, asks what we think of the

actached.

He is not writing a fornal request and will

be satisfied with an oral reply.

Comments:

Action

Info

SC/DCT

A/DDA

A/DDI

A/DDO

A/DDS&T

OGC

OLC

IG

B. Evans

---

## Page 193

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BL?

Flo with Mrs CBC

talk -

She

asse

T ching ten

Date

912/15115

3O9Y 101

---

## Page 194

Telephone Conversation Bu. veen Mr. Colby and Mrs. Cla Boothe Luce.

at 12:40 on Saturday, 25 October 1975 (from steno notes of Barbara Pindar

ranscribed the same day)

Mis. Luce:

I have a big problem, a case in conscience. I got rather

deeply involved during and after the Bay of Pigs, and up to the time of

the missile crisis, with a group called the (Directorate Revolutionario

Estudiante; Note:

the spelling of that is just a guess), the DRE. Whether

you know this of not, it was me who fed the missile stuff to Keating. I

knew a number of these leaders well; they were going in and out of Cuba,

and I paid for one of the motor boats. Bill Pawley did too. We thought we

were doing another Flying Tiger. The missile crisis came, and I got a

telephone call from Allen telling me that the Secrets Act had gone into

effect and that henceforth there would be no voluntary American efforts.

That ended that, and I don't know what I was doing -- maybe I went back

to Arizona, or whatever. Then came the assassination. The night of the

assassination, right after Oswald was caught, one of my boys telephoned

me from New Orleans. Didn't I ever tell you this?

Mr. Colby:

No.

Mrs. Luce:

It was the captain of my boat. It seems that after the missile

crisis -- a period of about a year had gone by -- he said that all the young

Cubans involved profoundly in all of this had been told to scatter and

scram, that he and two of my other lads --

Mr. Colby:

Mrs. Luce:..

When, after the crisis?

(Yes.) (were told) to leave Miarai.

Mr. Colby:

In 1962?

Mrs. Luce:

Yes. They were to stop their efforts to free Cuba; and if they

did not, they would be deported. It has a very interesting end involving you.

In any event, this one had been told to leave Miami after the missile crisis

was over, and he had opened a cell in New Orleans. Fle telephoned me to •

tell me that Oswald was -- I am telling you what nis view was -- was a

hired gun; Oswald had tried to penetrate their little cell; that they turned

around and did a counterpenetration job on Oswald; all of this was done

several months before the assassination. He said, telling me on the phone,

he was terribly excited -- he said you see he had no money, all of a sudden

he began to get money, so we checked him and he had a little "Communists

be Free" or "Be Fair to Cuba'' group going in New Orleans."' He said "We

=.:.

---

## Page 195

44-00000 2701

- 2.

had tape recordings of what he was telling his group. " It was a co unter-

penetration they weat on. He said, "We have photographs of Oswald,

passing out handbills on the street, 'Be Fair to Cuba. '" He said, "We

City) by Castro." He said there were three assassination teams. Then

he said, 'We have these recordings, these tapes, and we have these

photos, what should we do?" These fellows always trusted me. I said,

"The first thing you do, the minute you hang up this phone, you telephone

to the FBI, give them everything you have got.". Working in New York

with these Cubans is an extraordinary fellow, one of the most puzzling

characters I have every met; he is a devout Catholic -- Justin McCarthy.

Justin is the American patron -- although he has no money, never had

money -- of all these free Cubans in America. He never worked at CIA,

although CIA tried to pick his brains. He tried to help the FBI. I knew

Justin McCarthy, and he used to send me bulletins; he said he had been

sending them to me for the past six months, and I had never received one

of them. Out comes the Warren Report. I have many other things to do,

and I assumemy lads had reported what they knew, and maybe it had been

discounted, but I had taken the Warren Report at face value without poring

over it -- and I forgot the whole darn thing. Then, this must be nine

years ago, up turns a guy named Lloyd Garrison" -- what was he, a sheriff:

or something? (* she means Iim Garrison)

Mr. Colby:.

District Attorney.

Mrs. Luce:

And he hit the headlines that the assassination had been a con-

spiracy. Then it all flooded back into my mind that I had never been quite

satisfied with what the Warren Report had brought out. Basically, I was

troubled by the whole thing, so I said I thought I would call Garrison.

In order to call him, I had to have the names of the Cubans, which had

gone out of my bean. So I called Justin McCarthy. He, said one of them

was now, my lad, was in Miami. I got him on the phone, my fellow, and

I said, "You remember your midnight call to me about the assassination

of the President, I want to know what happened after that." He said, "We

went at once to the FBI, they took all the tapes and photos and all our

information and told us to keep our moiths shut, and shortly after that they

informed us that if any of us talked to the press or anyone, dire things

would happen. " He said one of the fellows on the boat was deported to

Guatemala or Chile, and one of them was murdered. He said, "I am a

lawyer, have two children, I am making my way in Miami, and I never

want to hear a damn word about the assassination of Kennedy because you

Americans really do not want to know the truth." He said, "We waited,

expecting the Warren Committee would want to have us, and wenever heard

a word. " He said, "I want no part of it." Then the Garrison thing died

---

## Page 196

- 3 -

dowa, and I am a busy woman, and I forgot about it. Three days ago,

a reporter was in here -- a gal*

^- asking about my life style and

said, in passing, "What do you think of the investigation of the

assassination of the President?" I am afraid I hit the r00f.. I said,

"I think everyone must be absolutely off their rockers.

'What possible

motive would the CIA have for murdering their own President?" I

said, "Even to assume such a thing is beyond belief because where

there is a murder or assassination, there is a motive, and there could

be no motive. " I said, "Who had the motive was Castro; but perhaps

not even Castro, possibly just a bunch of Communist Cubans or plain

Communists." I said, "They always had a motive for that sort of

thing. " Schweifker called me up yesterday -- when the reporter said

to me, "What is the name of the young Cuban?", I said, "Well, let's

call him Julio Fernandez. " The Senator said to me "that is a fascinating

story." *I missed the fact that the gind reporter was

• with Knight Newsgapers

MI. Colby: You told the story to Schweiker?

Mrs. Luce: He read it in the Knight paper.

MI. Colby: You told the story to the Knight people?

Mrs. Luce: Not in the detail I told you. Schweiker asked if I could locate

any of these men involved for him, and I said I would try. That was

yesterday. I used that opportunity to say, "I do not know what you are

doing on the Hill." I said, "You are in the (process?) for headlines and

destroying this country's security." He said, "If you have this informa-

tion and you can get your hands on it, it would be a good thing to lay

this story to rest. " He said, "If you can find me these people, I agsure

you they will be listened to in closed session." Now comes the big

thing. Justin McCarthy runs an animal farm in Nyack: telephone

number is 914; 647-8596. I have known him to be a man of complete

integrity. He is a devout Catholic. He may or may not be a fanatic.

What makes one think he is is what he tells you is just so terribly

alarming; as he was the one, along with Bill Pawley, who involved me

with these Cubans, I tracked hima down and had a two-hour conversation

on the phose with him this morning that was really staggering. When I

said to him, "Would you tell these things in the closed session in the

Senate?", he said, "I would find it more expedient and to shorten the

process to hire loud speakers and put them on top of the Empire State

Building." He said, "You don't know, Clare, the Cubans have not lost

their desire to free their country, and there are plenty of them working

---

## Page 197

- 4=

at it, and they trust me, and I trust them, and they all trust me. "

He said, "All these fellows on the Hill give a damn about is a big

headlize and political attention, and if this should involve my testi-

fying and some of my fellows got bumped off, or their apparat shut

dows, I could not live with myself, no I will not testify."

I said,

"You know, Justis, if they send for you, you might have to. " He

said, 'They are not likely to send for me unless you tell them. " He

said, "They do not know who to ask for anyway. " (It doesn't appear

in my notes, but my memory is that he added that the reason the Hill

doesn't get to the truth is that they never know who to ask for. ) He

told me a story about working once with CIA. He said, "We did this --

DRE did one operation with CIA, as a result of which all the Cubans

involved were caught and killed, and I do not want any part with the

CIA. " He said, "It too can be a sieve." I said, "You have me really

over a barrel." I said, "Justin, I have to tell someone, is there

anyone you trust?" He said, "There is only one man in this whole

country whose word at this point I would take. " I said, "Who is that?"

and he said, "Bill Colby." He said, "He is a daily communicant" --

Mr. Colby: No, no.

Mrs. Luce: I did not disillusion him. In any event, if only to put my owa

mind at rest since -- he always says, which is fascinating if true,

that my lads in New Orleans, yes, they did turn over the tapes to the

FBI but they kept copies.

MI. Colby: Really?

Mrs. Luce: So he says. If so, you are possibly, if -- I think you should

get hold of Justin and give him a couple of hours because he has plenty

to say. If what he says is true -- he also told me, which I had forgotten --

that during the time of the missile crisis, and I was the one he came to,

shes int

(*"Harry''' maybe I misunderstood; could she have said "Allen'') because

I could trust him. In a way, Justin McCarthy supplied a lot of background

mateal on the Cubans to (note: could not hear what she said). He said

flesh

a few days ago -- Time is planning to do a (take-out) issue on the

assassination of Kennedy. He said that, going back through their files,

they came across my name as an informant, and he said "they tracked me

down too.". He said, then he told me -- I mentioned in passing that there

- t armand pain time

to her husband illangluce.

heading her meane

listed do an..

inframent,

---

## Page 198

- 5 -

was a wonderful girl on Time that knows more about the Cubans

almost than anyone in CIA, Priscilla Badger. He said the Time

people are now trying to get information. He said, "I will talk to

no one because there are lives at stake" -- except you. For my

own sake, if you have a go at him, I would be very happy to frow how

serious it is.

MI. Colby: I will report back to you by all means. Let me do a little home-

work on just where this (looks). You do not remember the name of the

Cubans in Miami?

MIs. Luce: There are so many names; he talked to me so fast. He kept

saying "Chilo." I asked who "Chilo" is, and he said that was his code

name.

Jose Antonio La Nuza (Note: That last name may be all one word;

she said it means "the nut. ")

Luis Fernandez Rocha

One of those fellows was the Director of the DRE.

Then he also reminded

me of a guy who used to come to see me -- Cardona. (He had been told

by the American Government to get out of Miami) and he died, having

• become the President of a university in Puerto Rico.

These fellows

were scattered all over the place. As I mentioned that to Justin, he said,

"'I know where they all are." The thing that alarmed me is that -- he

does not talk in an excited voice, but the statements are -- he said

"People think of the Bay of Pigs and the nuclear showdown and the

assassination of Kennedy as the end of the story, it is only the beginning."

He said, "If you knew what is being laid on for the U. S.," and he talks

like that. I asked him, "What do you think happened? " He said, "Oswald

went to the FBI." He said, "I know that, he was selling them information,

and they did not believe him." I said, "That is incredible." He said, "I

do not know how much you know about the FBI, but no day goes by without

desks being loaded with letters saying something will be blown up. "

(Note: I missed a little bit here due to something else happening in the

oftice.) I said,

"What happened?" and he said, "The FBI got the word

from on top 'Destroy the letters. '"

MI. Colby: From on top?

Mrs. Luce: From the President, who was Johnson. I contended that if at

that point the FBI had proven that Castro had in mind assassinating the

President, we would have been in war with Cuba.. It might have been

---

## Page 199

= 6 -

an act of State to shut up about it. If I had been the President, I

would have had (Note: missed more due to outside interference).

What is hideous about this is that the ClA is being accused or

Kennedy is being accused - anyone except the people who probably

were involved. If putting it at rest in a secret session will work,

if such evidence does exist, you are the man to present it.

MI. Colby: Schweiker does not know about McCarthy?

Mrs. Luce: He only knows this -- I said there is one man I know who

might be able to tell you where the se Cubans are, and that is a fellow

named Justin McCarthy. He said, "Where is he?", and I said, "I do

not know, I have lost track of him. " He said, "If you find him, let me

know. " After talking with Justin McCarthy, I do not want him to talk

to Schweiker. I do not know what to say if he calls again. Knowing the

Senator, I may never hear from him. I leave it with you.

BITTE SKE

NOTE: Mrs. Luce closed the conversation by referring to a CIA paper

entitled "Restless Youth"' and asked if it had been declassified. Mr. Colby

said he would check on it, and Mrs. Luce said she would like to have a copy

if it has been declassified.

---

## Page 200

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Justin McCarthy at 3:45

on Tuesday, 28 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 21 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. McCarthy: I am glad to know you, even if it is over the phone.

Mr. Colby: Mrs. Luce talked to me yesterday (sic). She gave me a capsule

version of some of her chat with you. It puts me in a bit of a jam,

obviously, because there are some things that really hold some

potential for being very important in these days (of) post-mortems

of everything. I wondered if maybe we should chat about it some-

time, or, quite frankly, one of the main things I would suggest is

that you might want to go to this Senate Committee looking into this.

Mr. McCarthy: No. There are several reasons why not. I am sure we do

not need to discuss them, but there are many reasons. Over the

period of time there have been so many things. We were theonly

ones who had the information about the missiles in Cuba for many

months, and we beat our brains out trying. to get someone to do

something (or believe?) and regrettably (in) Washington there are

too many political (opportunists?), but there are too many lives at

stake. We risked our neck for all these years. We are interested

in doing the right thing.

Mr. Colby: I wondered if you could (slice?) off that New Orleans thing (and

not go any further than that?)

Mr. McCarthy: As I said to her -- (can't read the next few words). For me

to be seen in Washington, it is (can't read the next few words). We

do not trust anyone. We did so many operations for so long, and

we were entirely successful and never lost a man, and then one day

we did an operation for the Government and lost 22 men. Lives

depend on it. Someone sent a Top Secret memo, and the one he

sent it to left it on his desk and someone came in and read (it) and

the men were arrested. She asked, "Would you talk to Bill?" I

said I would. We think it would be a good idea - - for me to go down --

I do not want to blow my cover, but I would like very much to chat with

you and tell you.

Mr. Colby: My problem is then I get information, and then what are my

obligations.

Mr. McCarthy: From the point of view of (seeing?) how to do it through persons

other than me -- to get the end result.

---

## Page 201

z

Mr. Colby: It might be that one of your fellows aware of some of the things

(would not mind telling Schweiker?) under some protection and

assurances of anonymity. That would be enough of a (can't read the

next word) to get started.

Mr. McCarthy: There is plenty to get started on.

Mr. Colby: Then (he?) could cut your people out as a source.

Mr. McCarthy: She said it wo uld be aclosed-door hea ring. I said there (would?)

still be someone come out of the meeting and (can't read next word)

their names in the press. You see Jack Anderson's column on Monday.

It is vitally important, and it is true evidence. It is not conjecture.

I am concerned about what it ties into - it is all the same ball of wax.

We sat on the information about the missiles. This has been going on

for a good twenty years, and we have accumulated an awful lot of

information. We are more concerned today than when we had the

missile information. It is appalling, and it is frightening, and people

do nöt want to believe it. Last night I enlightened people about some of

the things that are going to happen. We feel the time has come that

some of this should come to light.

It is necessary and essential.to go

back and bring out some of these things that need to be brought out, but

not at the expense of (next word missing). We have done this on our

own and at our own expense. One of the reasons my people trust me is

I am thinking of a book -- we did not want to do a book before. The

American public wants to know. It is all part of what went on then.

I think it should be clarified and straightened out what went on then.

But I am so terribly wary. I went to everyone, including the President,

about the missiles.

We had evidence -- what ships they were on,

where they (docked?), and a few days later they came back and said

there is no credibility of what you say.

Mr. Colby: The only thing that bothers me is the story about the existence of

some records (you?) still hold. The important part of that is that

indicates some (part?) of a failure, or possibly even worse -- that

is the kind of thing that does need investigation or (correction?) --

protecting your people that are in on it. The other possibility would

be to ask Schweker or one of his men to go and talk to you or one of

your people who would have factual knowledge of it.

Mr. McCarthy: When (Dorothy) told me about you over a period of time --

(Dorothy) said we have been through this so many times -- I took

this to editors of Life. That was the time when the guy sent the

but don't know what else it

Dorothy Farmer, Mrs. Luce's secretary.

---

## Page 202

14-00000

3

Top Secret memo and it got left on a desk in Miami and we lost a

lot of people on that. Inadvertently so many things happen. We

work so carefully. We have information now that no one else has.

because it has come to the point where so many of the people I work

with find they cannot trust people because of the opportunists. I

have never met such overbearing and obnoxious (can't read next

word). We sat on this year in and year out - we never know when

we might get calls. I was up all night long the night before last.

Time is doing a big cover story on the thing -- the next issue --

the Today Show is bugging me. Washington is a funny place. If I --

by and large, when your life is on the line -- one of (our?) guys hung

himself after one of the escapades we went through. He committed

suicide because he felt guilty about it. Up here it is terrific because

I am an animal nut. A lot of the guys divulging some of this stuff

that they would not normally do.

Mr. Colby: Let me talk with Clare again as to how we handle this. The main

thing is not so much the overall stuff about Cuba -- the main thing

is the story about records, about Oswald.. That comes at a time

when that is a serious subject of study here by the Congress. If we

could in some way shake that information loose without putting the

finger on any of your friends, I think we are sort of obliged to do this

in terms of clarifying the record against the (facts?) -- this is a very

key aspect of it and a very serious problem that if it was suppressed

at the time.

Mr. McCarthy; That is not all that was suppressed.

Mr. Colby: That is the thing. They are looking into it. Let me talk to Clare

again and see if I can figure out some way in which we could talk to

you (maybe?) and if you could in the meantime think of a way of

(can't read the next word) out of (can't read the next word) out this

(feature?) of it so that you give the (final result?) but not the sourcing,

and let the investigators (find their own source later on?), we would

have done our duty. My problem is that I really cannot sit on it with

my obligations. I can be reasonable about protecting other people,

and I have to be, but I also have to have the responsibility for responding

to proper investigations of things that really should be looked into.

Mr. McCarthy: Let me (can't read next word) this in. Some of our guys (can't

read next several words).

Mr. Colby: 'That is what she said.

---

## Page 203

114-00000

Mr. McCarthy: They and I are scared to death. I was Executive Producer

of TV programs for years - I cannot make -- I have earned the

respect and confidence of these people over the years. The other

night I talked all night long. If I try to push my guys -- Clare said

it needs to be laid to rest, and it does. I would like to 'see it get

laid to rest, but my people --

Mr. Colby: I can assure you I am as interested (as) you in protecting that

part of it if there

were some way of having part of the cake and

eating part of it, so that you do not lose the one or the other but to

work out some vehicle -- a way in getting the substantive information.

loose but protecting people involved. There may be ways to do that if

we put our minds to it. Let me talk to Clare and see what really --

I will not do anything except with her without your permission.

NOTE: Mr. Colby tried to call Mrs. Luce on 29 October, but could not reach

ber. He contacted her on 31 October (see separate notes)

---

## Page 204

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Clare Boothe Luce at 4:07

on Friday, 31 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 22 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. Colby: I got the Restless Youth for you. And I called Justin McCarthy.

We had a long chat. He does not want me to do anything about it,

but I said you put me in an awful position. (Note; The "you" there

refers, I believe, to McCarthy.) I understand what you mean about

his strong manner of talking. I think both of us are (hung?) with a

rather tantalizing story.

Mrs. Luce: If I had not known the guy for 25 years, I would take him much

less seriously.

Mr. Colby: The only real point is the thing about the tapes and the photos and

the allegation about the FBI. I tried to (argue?) him into figuring out

some way in getting rid of those but keeping himself out of the act.

Mrs. Luce; He called me back and said he talked with you and that you left

him in a box, and I think he feels now that there is some kind of a

question of conscience involved. He said, "I am going to let you and

Bill Colby decide what is best to do."

Mr. Colby: I said I would be in touch with you and try to figure out something

sensible.

Mrs. Luce: Why don't we suggest that he bring you or me -- perhaps he feels

safer with me -- the tapes and photos if he has copies of them.

Mr. Colby: And then you pass them over to Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: And let them decide, and I will maintain his cover -- he keeps

saying it is not worth it to him after all these years to blowthat --

the paradox, he tells me he is going to have to write a book (and

whether he is indeed going to?) so that he is not altogether a crackpot.

On the other hand, what he is doing is sufficiently crackpot. He is

taking care of broken-down animals from his entire area. However,

Mr. Colby: I think that is a good idea. You say that you and I have talked, and

we are all in a kind of box at this point, and we really in conscience

cannot sit on this stuff -- all these charges that there is remaining

evidence that (can't read next word) was held backand disappeared

.=

---

## Page 205

2

into the FBI, and maybe the way to do it is for him to provide it to

you, and you to Schweiker, and then I would just as soon drop out

it does not really have much to do with me -- and in that way you

would protect him from Schweiker, and you would say you got it from

a friend -- and the source is whatever he and you agree on.

Mrs. Luce: I will do that. .

Mr. Colby: I think that is the best thing to do. If he does not buy that, I do not

know what we do about Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: (I am going to ignore it if Schweiker comes to me.)

NOTE: The conversation continued, but it did not pertain to thia subject.

---

## Page 206

4-00000

SECRET

2606: 19

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Request to the Deputy Director for

Operations

Pict proper title:

This the in reprice te lie ich

Place Froline

Attached, in response to the Senate Select Comnittee

request of 27 October 1975, are separate memoranda on the

DRE and several Cuban exiles.

R. S. Numeri

Richard S.

Sampson

Chief

Latin America Division

Attachments

DeI Brigas

My NDE

16/28/15-

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

---

## Page 207

*4-00000

SUBJECT: Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students'

Revolutionary Directorate)

The DRE was founded by a group of students at Habana

University in 1954 as an instrument of opposition to the regime

of President Fulgencio BATISTA.

The original members of this

group were also members of the

Habana University Student Federa-

tIOn (FEU). Several leading members of the DRE were killed by

Cuban authorities during and following the attack on the

Presidential Palace, Habana, in

March 1957.

leaders, as of 1958, were in exile. The DRE worked as a secret

underground organization in Cuba,

generally in Habana, laying

plans and making preparations.

The theory of the DRE was that

success of the revolution depended on quick

and efficient

elimination of BATISTA which Fidel CASTRO's forces at that time

could not achieve alone.

The DRE finally turned against CASTRO

on the issue of communism.

As of March 1962 the DRE was receiving $9,000 a month from

the Agency for salaries of 55 assets in Miami, Florida, and

$2,000 a month for overhead costs.

The DRE's overseas

program

(AMBARB's) at that time received $12,400 a month from the Agency.

Agency support to the DRE was terminated by mid-1967.

---

## Page 208

14-00000

1E.0.0

Julio FERNANDEZ Molino

(No crypt)

DPOB :

_ 23 March 1934, Havana

201-752511

Subject was of interest to AMWORLD program as a radio

operator in 1964.

A PRQ Part I was submitted to Headquarters

by JMWAVE, but there was no follow-up, and subject was not

hired. He had previously been associated clandestinely with

RESCATE (anti-CASTRO) group in Cuba. He came to U.s. as

exile in May 1964. In 1966, he lived at 430 SW Ilth Ave., Miami.

Julio FERNANDEZ Bencomo

(No crypt)

DPOB: 10 April 1917, Havana

201-742497

Received POA 14 January 1964, which cancelled 24 February

1904, because he was not interested in employment with CIA

since salary was insufficient.

He signed secrecy agreement

and was terminated without prejudice.

He took SGSWIRL 10

January 1964.

No derog, but he had told his wife and one

CarIs MARQUEZ that he would be working for CIA.

He was

originally recruited for AMWORLD by one Pedro BLANCO, and was

to be used as PM asset on a CIA vessel.

Julio FERNANDEZ Gonzalez

(AMOT -99)

DPOB:

10 May 1935, Havana

201-299222

He was employed by the Intelligence and Security Commission

of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (AMIRON/ AMBRUSH) for

about two months in 1961.

He was brought into it by Julio

PASCUAL Abril.

He stated in a letter to Hernan HENRIQUEZ

Lorca, anti-CASTRO Cuban in Madrid who informed the FBI (who

told us in memo dated 2 November 1961) that he "was about to

take a trip to Cuba to take material

to anti-CASTRO elements,

trip being financed by CIA." He received POA 10 May 1961 for

use as member of AMOT Admin Staff. File does not say who dropped

from it, but when last contacted was working for Dixie Lily

Products Company (a wholesale grocery outfit) as an accountant

at $50 weekly in December 1961. POA cancelled 24 July 1962.

?:....

---

## Page 209

14-00000

SERTET

Luis FERNANDEZ- ROCHA Rodriguez

(Formerly AMTOPIC-2, AMHINT-53)

DPOB:

3 May 1939, Havana

201-316766

POA granted 18 April 1962.

According to file, he quit

his job as Secretary General of the Directorio Revolucionario

Estudiantel (DRE) in July 1964 to pursue his medical studies.

He was paid his final salary payment of $425 on 1 September

1964 under the DRE project.

He was to do some unwitting work

for JMHOPE, Swan Island propaganda broadcasting, and WIBALDA.

There is no further indication in file that he was terminated,

no quit claim, no OA or POA cancellation.

However, there is no

information on his use since 1964. Per document dated 7 June

1965, he was studying at University of Miami and working as

swItchboard operator for Cuban Catholic Children's program in

Miami.

According to Cuban Families Yearbook of 1974, Dr. Luis

FERNANDEZ Rocha living at 6021 W. 14th Lane, Hialeah,

Florida,

33012 with wife and four children. He became naturalized U.S.

citizen on 15 September 1967.

Julio FERNANDEZ Travejo

(No crypt)

DPOB :

10 August 1934, Havana

201-297828

POA requested for use as PM trainee 21 March 1961. POA

cancelled 4 April 1962.

FBI memo dated 14 December 1961 notes

that he told FBI of CIA financial support to Frente Revolucionario

Democratico (FRD) and to Antonio VARONA, one of its leaders, to

the tune of "Six million dollars." Subject told FBI he himself

belonged to group led by Rolando

MASFERRER which NOT getting

CIA support.

Subject visited FBI 21 November 1960 after

incident in which some paramilitary trainees of MASFERRER'S

group on No Name

Key in Florida had come to FBI's attention.

That group was called "Ejercito Nacional Cubano."

6131

---

## Page 210

14-00000

2S0227

Jose Antonio LANUZA

One Jose LaNUSA was a leader of the drE, residing in

Miami, Florida, in November 1963.

At that time, he was

an anti-CASTRO organization. Not clear

whether he is identified with the following LANUZA.

Jose Antonio LANUZA

(on microfiche)

201-339258

Only information in file is that Subject is a Cuban

citizen who in 1962 was living at 1705 SW

3rd Ave., Miami.

He is the Subject of Inter-Source Registry No. 9518.

According to a document dated 1 November 1968,

"SD 10658 is

terminated without prejudice by the Department of the Army,

and any additional information should be referred to the Army

Source Registry."

A note in the file also said that there was

no present contact with Subject, dated 29 October 1962.

No traces Justin MacCarthy

---

## Page 211

14-00000

30 November 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Comments on Ronald KESSLER's Article:

"CIA

Withheld Details of OSWALD Call," which Appeared

in the Washington Post of 26 November 1976

The following comments are keyed to the attached Washington

Post article, i.e., the paragraph numbers below correspond to the

paragraphs as numbered in the margin of the xerox of the article:

1. COMMENT: While CIA knew that a man identifying him-

self as Lee OSWALD had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy by

telephone on 1 October 1963, this information had no unusual

significance until 22 November 1963 when President Kennedy's

assassination occurred. At that time an intensive review was

made by the Mexico City Station of conversation transcripts pre-

pared on the basis of the l October telephone intercept.

These

transcripts had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to

the interested members of the intelligence community as a former

Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case, and potentially of inter-

est to

the Department of State). This review turned up "matches,

i.e., similar materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963.

These were reported by cable to Headquarters on 23 November 1963.

There is no indication

in the transcripts that Lee Harvey OSWALD

tried to make any "deal" with the Soviet Embassy as claimed in •

the Washington Post article.

• Analysis based upon actual voice comparison could not

be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice,

had been erased for re-use.

The monitor was able to recall some-

thing of the voice characteristics from memory, however.

He could

recall the very poor Russian spoken by OSWALD, for example.

2. COMMENT: This statement is not substantiated by our

files.

COMMENT: The information regarding the l October 1963

contact with the Soviet Embassy -- received in Headquarters on

9 October -- was disseminated on 10 October 1963 to the Department

---

## Page 212

14-00000

of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department

of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.r

A copy of the 10 October 1963 dissemination was made available

to the Warren Commission on 24 March 1964. (See Memorandum

for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 24 March 1964, from Richard HELMS,

Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: CIA Dissemination of In-

formation on Lee Harvey OSWALD, dated 10 October 1963. On

16 October 1963, our Chief of Station sent a memorandum to the

American ambassador on the subject of Lee OSWALD's contact with

the Soviet Embassy. The original of this memorandum was routed

The orsuinect

to the ambassador,

the minister, the counselor for political

affairs, the regional security officer.

A copy was sent to the

legal attache, naval attache, and the I&NS.

In April 1964, Messrs. COLEMAN, SLAWSON and WILLENS,

staff representatives of the Warren Commission, visited the U.s.

Our Station then indicated that the

Embassy in Mexico City'"all about" the telephone conversations

three men already knew

OSWALD had. According to the Memorandum for the Record of 11

April 1964, the three men reviewed the product from the tele:

phone tap operation for the days 27, 28 September and 1 October

1963 when Lee OSWALD 'contacted and visited the Cuban and Soviet

Embassies. They made a "schedule" of OSWALD's activities as far

as possible for these days from this source. Note: They were

shown English translations of the product, or "take", as it was

called.

(HMMA 23249, 14 April 1964:

This document, in a sani~

tized and declassified version was made available to the public

under provisions of the FOIA in March 1964 as Document Number

274 and in September 1976 as Document Number 658) See Follow-

ing:

a.

Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31

For ara 5; Subject:

January 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by clA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, 28 September - 3 October 1963..

b.

Letter to Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans, dated 10 February 1964, from J. Lee

RANKIN, General Counsel.

c. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 19

February 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

---

## Page 213

4. COMMENT: See conments in Paragraph 3, above.

5. COMMENT: The Agency disseminated the information

concerning OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 Octo-

ber to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and

Naturalization Service on 10 October 1963.

On 23 November 1963

the Agency disseminated to the FBI the transcripts of the tele-

phone calls made on 27, 28 September, 1 October, and 3 October

1963. (The latter call, it was determined, did not pertain to

OSWALD.) (See CSCI-3/778,829, dated 26 November 1963. On 23

November 1963, the Agency disseminated to the FBI information

relating to OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embas-

sies in Mexico City.

6. COMMENT: OSWALD's alleged offer of information and

suggestion that the Russians pay his way to the Soviet Union

does not appear in Agency transcripts of OSWALD's telephone.

conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.

COMMENT: OSWALD was in no sense "under investiga-

tion" (before 22 November 1963). None of the facts of his trip

to and stay in the USSR and return to the United States, 1959-

1962, were known to the Mexico Station before 10 October 1963,

when

the bare bones of his biography were forwarded by Headquar-

ters to it in response to a Station cabled report of 8 October

1963 which forwarded, on a routine basis, what appeared to be

a contact by an American for a visa to Cuba in transit to the

USSR.

It should be pointed out that the voice intercept cover-

age was not processed in "real time"

• The means of acquisi-

tion and the volume of the information precluded anything but

the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor to be of more.

than ordinary interest. Full texts of selected items required

a full transcription and full translation.

One of the "trig-

gers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate more speedy

review and reporting of this kind of raw intelligence was the

mention of a name.

This was what occurred in the second of two

conversations on 1 October.with the Soviet Embassy, during which

the speaker said he was "Lee OSWALD":

This was the first time

that the name OSWALD appeared in the intercepts and was report-

ed by the Station to Headquarters (8 October 1963).

Had, at any time, a person telephoned the soviet

Embassy, identified himself, and offered information in ex-

change for a trip to the Soviet Union, it would have triggered

3

---

## Page 214

an immediate reaction by the monitor and the Station --

first, to identify the speaker; second, to report the infor-

mation to Headquarters; and third, to step up technical and

photographic surveillance.

8.

COMMENT: No comment.

9. COMMENT: Tapes were not "routinely destroyed".

Tapes were erased after transcription had been made and re-

used.

Full transcripts of calls made on 28 September 1963

and 1 October 1963 were forwarded to Headquarters on 23 Novem-

ber. The person who processed the transcripts was identified

There is no indication in the transcripts that

OSWALD offered information or that any omissions were made which

might have contained that information.

10. COMMENT: No comment.

11. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

12. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

• 13. COMMENT: The information "given by DURAN" is sup-

ported by her interrogations.

14. COMMENT: "OSWALD later referred in a letter to

'meetings' he had in the Soviet Embassy." Although KESSLER

chooses not to give details, this statement is in reference

to a letter OSWALD wrote on 9 November 1963 to the Consular

Division of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Commission

Exhibit No. 15, Vol. XVI of the Hearings before the President's

Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.)

15. COMMENT: No additional comment.

16.

COMMENT: With regard to the press statement that

"CIA claimed it did not know of most of OSWALD's activities in

Med no know of his aer the es, sier inan thie revealed in

the intercepts.

It should be noted that after the dissemination

on 10 October 1963 of the 1 October 1963 contact, no requests

were received from the dissemination customers for further in-

formation or follow-up. Without some customer interest being

expressed, particularly from the Navy, the FBI or the Department

4

---

## Page 215

14,00000.

of State, who had the greatest interest in OSWALD at the time,

there would have been little motivation for the Station to in-

dependently pursue such a tenuous CE lead.

17. COMMENT: The discussion in this paragraph of the

article rests on assumptions and allegations developed earlier

in the article, followed by comments by Messrs. BELIN and

SCHWEIKER, apparently based in turn on information provided

them by reporters.

No further comment seems relevant, beyond

those comments made earlier.

18.

COMMENT: Is BELIN here referring to Gilberto

ALVARADO Urgate? If so, information regarding OSWALD provided

by ALVARADO was passed to the Warren Commission as attachments

to a memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 1 June 1964, from

Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.

(See also Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 4 June

1964, from Richard HELMS; Subject: Information Developed on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

This memorandum

became Commission Exhibit No. 3152 contained in Vol. XXVI of

Warren Commission report.)

19. COMMENT: We do not know what BELIN actually said to

the reporters, when, or in response to what. We believe, how-

ever, this may be referring to BELIN's letter of 15 April 1975

to E. Henry KNOCHE of CIA. BELIN at that time was Executive

COME Tien , ferring

Director of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United

States (Rockefeller Commission). In his letter, BELIN refers to

the photograph of an American male and the question whether or

not this male was Lee Harvey OSWALD. He continues:

"The CIA and the Warren Commission both

determined that the picture was not of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and that the picture was taken

after OSWALD left Mexico City.

"Although portions of this record have

been released to the public, other portions

have remained classified because of concerns

by the CIA at the time that a release of the

full picture might disclose sources and

methods which the CIA felt were not in the

national interest to disclose at that time.

In light of the false allegations about the

assassination of President Kennedy and the

5

---

## Page 216

4-00000

false allegations of ClA involvement, 1

feel that it would be appropriate to re-

consider whether or not the entire matter

can be fully disclosed at this time."

An interim reply was forwarded on 23 April 1975 by

E. Henry KNOCHE, Assistant to the Director, CIA.

On 2 May

1975 a review was completed of Agency holdings regarding the

photograph of the unidentified individual in Mexico City pub-

lished by the Warren Commission.

This review also included

knowledge of OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embas-

sies obtained from telephone tap information and interrogations

of Silvia DURAN, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy:

13 May 1975 two

summaries of the above review, one classified

and one unclassified, were forwarded to BELIN by the Agency.

Attachment:

Article

---

## Page 217

CrA winheld Details on Oswald Call

By Monald Kessler

transcript to cither the FBI. or the

So, with the full.coopcraliun of the

Nash1n210% Pose Stall S4rll6s

Warier Commission.

Mexican government, CIA wirctays

In late September, 1063-elght.

Instead, tine ClA gave the rat in

vero installed en leicphone lincis to-.

monks bricre the assessination of

Wei Kennedy-Lee Harrey Os: 5Ing Oswald

Ocloker, 1963, only, a brick report say.

Jig into both embassies.

had' inade contact with

The ClA wes especially interested!

wald feieghoned the Sovict embassy.

tie Bussians. It gave the Warren

In U.S. citizens. uho made cuntact

a deuco Cig and tried to mase i.

Connission a transcript of the taped

ine.

conversation but for unexplained ica-

Thus, when Oswald showed inp in

In exchange for unspecified infor

sens failed to irclude in the transcript

perlos, he wanted a free trip to 6 Osivald's offer of information and his

Mexico City In lale September and

sciephoned the Russian embassy, his

suggestion that the Russians would

conversation. was picked up frum the

is conversation was intercepted:,

want to pay his way to; the Sovlet

• wiretan. A transcriptiwas made and

circulated in the CIA offices in the

Urier,

i recorde:

by the Certral Intel.

Amorican embassy in Mexico City.

•The Post has:also delermined that

Usenee Agency at the timo. But it was;

The station chiel at that lime was

not then turned

over to the FBI,

the CIA, for unexplalned reasons, tole

the late Winston M. Scolt; who per.

the Warren Commission that It

which has responsibility for investi

sonally reviowed all transcripts cma-

learned of most of Oswald's activitics

mira pessible spies, and it was not 7la Mexico cily only after the assas.

mating from wiretaps on Sovict bloc

1n:0o turned cvor lo the Warion Com•

instnllations.

mission euring its inrestigation of the.

sination. The lact is, however, that

The Oswald transcript, according to

the CIA monitored and tapc-recorded

a Cis transialo! who worked with

monassination.

his conversation with both the Rus.

To answered guestion is wily

Seott, arouseel a lot of interest:

sian and Cuban embassies in Mexico

They usually ricked up the trans.

Cily in the fall of 1993, before Kch-

cripts the next day." he said.. "This

The existence cf the CIA Leiephene

tlicy sanled right away."

intercent oi Oswaid's conversation in

It was the CIA's kellef that the two

What that transcript

contained is

Sexico" Cits and the contents of the

l. embassies were heavily insolva in 9a matter of some dispute, and the CIA

sir-secret trarscript have been veri:g

the spy business and that, specifi

Fied by The Mashington Post. The

• cally, thcy were orcrational bases for

says it routincly:destroyed the tape

before. the assassinatior. But sume

Fest las aiso verified that the CiA

intelligenco activities airceted at. tha

failed to turn over the camplete

Urited Statcs.

Sco OSTYALO, A%, Col. 1

LEE HNNVEY OSHALD

•.. ¡elephionca Soviet coriass;

THE WASHINGTON POST

26 November 1976..

---

## Page 218

10

11

12

13

420491

OSTYALD, FrOm AI."

Flag.

wàng sal the transcript or

lic-i me tape befere the assassina.

Jon recall that Oswald was trying to

mirio a deal.

One of them is David &. Phillips, a

jormer ClA officer, sno now heads

the assoclation of Retired Intelligence

Officers and is a leading delender

Di CIA activities. Philllps was stai

tionad in Mexico City at the timc.

The transcript revcaled, Phillips re-

called, that Oswald told the Sovict

have" Information

be interested in, and I know

you can pay my way' to Russia.

acuities. ana dis cyren serie

mado no mention of Oswald's offer

of information in excha: go tor a irce

trip to Russia or of his attempts to

travel to Cuba and Russia. "On Oc.

tober 1, 1903," the teletype message

"a relinble and consitive source

in Mexico reported that an American

male, sho idertitied himself as bec

Oswald, contacted the Sovict anibassy

in Mexico City Inquiring wherer

the eribassy had reccived any ness

concerning a telegram which had been

sent to lYashington."

That was strictly a routine handling

of the matter, and

similar, to the

standard reports made to the FBI at

that time on other contacts with the

coinmunists by Amcrican citizens in

City said the Cin

base. haa

ali. that

souzht to conceal. Tire CiA has ¿

David Wi. Bolin, wito was ai."

sistant counsel to the Warren Cs.

mission end inter exocutive diree!

oi lne Rockofcile: commissior's are

of the Cid, sale that li the tram

Commission had known oi Divei

conversations and other acr ink

mation, it would have neer. jess 3a

that the assassination was sos pe

of a forcian conspiracy.

. Ser. Richard S. Sciwalker 1387.

who leá the senate intruisener ca

mitico's piobe di to 2rsaa01131:

The stenographer who typed up the

invostircoon wri

tarscript and the translator, no pre-

Erch after Kennedy's assessination,

taken on ar "entrcio createni

pared it had similar sccoilections.

the CIA failed to turn over to the

rection and persacative" it the

"Ne said he had some information

Warren Commission the full trans.

mitice han been aware oi Cs it

: to tell them," tie typist said in an

cript of the telephone intercept it lad

"His main con.

made in Mexico City. Oswald's offer

In interviews with The Post, 8e

cerr. was meiting to one of the two

of information to the Russians in es.

who documenica tid Cr 2.0'5 1r

countrics iRussia or Cubal and ho

change for passage was omitted from

his Capachy.

•santed tise to pay for it. He said

the traceipt, and the CIA claimed

director of no Recticinder com

he had to meat tiom."

it did not know of most of Oswald's

sidi?, reverick tre CiA 1164

the iVerren Commission later con.

SYLVIA DURE:

recalls talk with Oswald

activities in Mexico City until siter

Warron Commistion ci

cluded the Russiars and Cubars were

the assassination.

report from or alloard micross is

not inuch impressed by Oswaid. This

view is supported by Sylvia Duran,

would take three to four months' to

The significance of the CIA actiors:

meeting in Mexico City chiicer.

is difficult to assess. The FEI in the"

waid and Cuber. intcllr2Bca 35Sa

= mexican citicon who worked in the

fall of 1963 was already showing ir-

• At the time, Caran agonis eco:

Cuban cmcassy at the timo of'Os.

"got rcally

angry. and red.

termittent interest in Oswald and

nated their more important ac?!!

wald's visit. She taliced to Orsald on

He was gesticwlating": Duran said she

might or might not rave intensified

sita arents of the KGB, lin sos

Sep:, 27, 1963, and recalls the mech

had to call for help from the Cuban

hat Interest it it had been toid os

intelligered sersice.

in in some Gotall.

consul who got into a shouting match

Oswald's converaations.

Selin calleri an tie CiA 1e mi

In a joint interview in mexico City

with Oswald and told him to get out.

•Whether the nei information would • ¿u!! disclosure of lis inamedre

with this reporter and cost saccial.

Duran said sie nover saw him again.

have affecice the

Warren Commis-

Ostrald and

his contects wit

correspondent Marlise Simors, Duran

However, Duran's story covered onivi 7

sion's deliberations is aiso an

Cubars and Russiana

said Oswald told he= that he wanted

to trave to Cuba and Russia and dis-14 the irst.

Eclin, a stauren deider. ci

stay in Mexico City. Oswald laler yC-

gated the possibility of a forcier. con.

Warren Commission's cancision i

ciagon documenis to

ferred in r letter to "meatings" he

spiricy. and concluded there was o

Oswald was tre ione esca?".

"griend" of the Cuban revolution.

had lan tire Sovict Embassy..."

evidence to show Ostraid acted

Arong other things, he claimca to be

How• interested the CIA was in

ocinals of a forcion power.

the CIA: Ca-35 263 2123

ine ClA's careern cia.

a member of the dincrican Commi•

Oswald's dealings srith the tio cm.

Nerertholess, there is yet no ca.

scores seleca and iricinches

bassies is uncertain.

planation for the CIA's handling

nigles. But he sad ê.5raater

Duran saia she informea Oswald

that in order to travel to aussia he

The translator ard typist who han-

Oswald's conversations. The CiA ts.

tonal interest would bo series

¡culd have to obtain permission from

died the transcript of ise intercepica

day reiuses to comment, suirg

disciosing the trita.

we Soviets. Oswald want off and re

conversation recalled that the lcvel

would not se appropriate in the light

A CiA sackooman specialy

snori later in the riag

to informl5 of interest was high. But the CIA's

of an impearing investigation oy tie

riod that lie agenay has a gopa

Dit! that is init obininco tho nec.

own actiona lead to a discient con-

•House Sclect. Committce on Assas.

a mecting debreei Ossaid are

perer lalon. Duran

Sarick cribang ard

¡old Oswald's apolicalien dor a vira

The agency waited. until Oct.

1005, to notity thie IPI ci Oslald's

When asica if they could explain

the agency's aclions, some ClA el.

wes richarded," the saricia:

---

## Page 219

4-00000

(

CONAIDENOAL

710-3320

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

: Washington Post Story of 13 November

1976 "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans

of Plan to Kill JFK"

1. The Post story on Saturday states that a J. Edgar Hoover

memorandum reported that Lee Harvey Oswald told Cubans in

advance of his plan to kill President Kennedy. The attached

package was prepared by Russ Holmes of CI Staff. It is for-

warded for your information.

2. A copy of the Washington Post story has been added

to the package.

John H. Waller

Attachments: a/s

SDBreckinridge:js (16 Nov (76)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/atts

1 - IG Chrono

1 - IG Subject (Task Force File)

w/attsin above file

SDB Chrono

1 - Seymour Bolten w/atts

1 - John Waller w/atts

1 - Andrew Falkiewicz w/atts

1 - Dave Grinwis w/atts

in ten sail fine arine 11906

---

## Page 220

- 900.

SECRET

13 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

FROM

• Russell B. Holmes

SUBJECT

"Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan

..to Kill JFK"' by John M. Goshko, Washington

Post, 13 November 1976.

1. The memorandum"..:by the late FBI Director

J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald reportedly

told Cuban officials.

in advance of President Kennedy's

assassination that he intended to kill the President"

is cited in Conmission Exhibit No. 3152, Volume rivI,

of the Hearings Before the President's Commission on the

Assassination of President Kennedy pp. 154-157 (See Tab A).

CE No. 3152 is cited in support of statements made by the

Warren Commission in it's Report on pages 307-308 (see

Tab B). This memorandum is based upon information which

the Agency had passed to FBI Headquarters and it's repre-

sentative in Mexico City.

2.

On 26 November 1963, the Mexico City Station

a Nicaraguan named Gilberto

came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he

had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18

September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee

Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill an important

person in the United States. (See Tab. A for complete

memorandum.)

The information obtained from ALVARADO was passed

ta be chiet or station on 2 woven or 9, se Tao gon,

SECRET

---

## Page 221

(SECRET

A short dissemination (DIR 85744) alerting customs agencies

to ALVARADO's allegation, was made on 29 November 1963

to the White House, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

and the Department

of State (see Tab D).

A second dis-

semination (DIR 87667) was made on 7 December 1963 (see

Tab E) .

NB: In the latter dissemination, mention was

made that a representative of the FBl participated in the

interrogation of ALVARADO.)

On 13 December 1963, the Agency forwarded under

CSCI 3/779, 136 a translation of the Mexican police

interrogation report on Gilbarto ALVARADO Ugarte (see

Tab F) .

5.

In summary, the Agency and the FBI knew of

ALVARADO's allegations concerning Oswald, which were sub-

sequently retracted by, ALVARADO himself as being false.

In addition, the FBI was able to prove that Oswald was

still in New Orleans at the time ALVARADO claimed he saw

Oswald in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The information

was forwarded to the Warren Commission by the Agency and the

FBI as evidenced by its inclusion in the Warren Commission

Report and accompanying exhibits.

Russell 3. Holmes

SEGRET

---

## Page 222

4-00000

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СДАСЬДО.

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"_SA TILLRAS RO DRODEAICRICDR 31

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COMMIsSION BraKBrE No, 3151- Continuod

657

1968

SUBIFETI

set.

Goss

Rambla

Cornagt

Proslds

ne'o Commalesias on tha

Annasalastion of Proaldent Kennady

Miormalion Dornloped os the Aellvity

Of LEs MArVOY OSWALD IS MesicO CitY

On 26 November 1963 a young Lata american, relatree

o herela as "n", camo to che U.-

•Imbasgy in Ilexico Giry. He

cialmud do had be

on in the Gusen Cannulato in Alexico City on

18 Septamber 1968 whas a man he later pocogalsad lo de beo Herray

OSTÄLO recalved $6,100 la casa to kill na importans parsoa la tha

Unirad States.

1. "D" doneribed ino

eireunslan

Dy a bachroom door abour noon do save a 8

a pallo a lom foot am

ourloualy dye

Incllabo

He ha

rominent

10768 86ghs 81

in chin.

the subloas as

радаротво

a previonaly

Wallo aranding

oup al three parsars cono

a calla this Nesso wies

plety la boer spartos ano

oable esas on tha

on whoro

• Canadies

roen sed

ondian

pompadour hal

The shurd po

ans allegadly

OSWALD.

was coinpialaly cont

nead of shia

From publlahed pRosan al OSVALO following tha ar

pors doss, buttonedour walle andr

11s short collar lalo, 1n le, dark gray panto, and sloar gyogiaeses

COMMISSION EXHIBTT No. 3162

---

## Page 223

4-00000

ДЕЯ

He had a yo

an pasapore la his packat, Mato a solas!

yollou band, and appeared to hero a piesol la a shoul

A Call Cubao jo

iso group momerlarly and ganes

COrTeNCy to the Nogro.

The Negro then allegedly sal

La Englias,

k111 150

=."

Ostand regule

COl MAN BDOUGO.

cRs do 180*

"Tho people are

SAVe OSWALD SG.SI

"TWo duat muct."

Chas he 81

Йобо

OSWALD Y

back

Shsтe."

The Negro

nomicallon U.s. bul

+8+44060148r88810R.

on 20 Sepi

bolore the ar

• an attem

ala ballet

Usas someone Important las

hilled, but was llnally sold by sornoons as lhe Embea

Mastlos the lime.

Jo

*D" MIA ANOMA PO US ALADGY AN & LOEMEI

a SERiA America docurity asTrico.

to sellability

queatlonable by U.J, aulhorttles although de

bad not'

discredited.

fire Cuban Communiade

hoo denied chas to mso acting on lis behallo

Ya she Unlted Stasno ah

ShAL OSWALD GONIO ADE POSI

bROn lA MaNItO CiLY OR

1B Seprambes loe mas kpora 80

siled to stake "D'" ssory.

20 Sionerabar 1963 Rbo

Ае.

peralarod is

bla

Me dang

do a signed slatement thas so senod.

Seleno

Ho admisled do 20

88 24G 508 8808 41

also semiliad do dad n

the U.S. Embanay la

marloualy claimed.

basey aner thei

thía saloo arory 1

so bolp

Stases do thes do couse partlelparo in ac

I bellerod, merld brjp ealso the Wallad 5lal00 do late astes azalarl

Сaa8rд0

(59155895 dixItuT No. 3152-Cantinurd

shas

coolas

130

that be

Dad futh felth las the polyzraph.

tha ranutso, and thas b6

& tha

addition ho changed slo sloTy

Cuban Consulaso, MAliy do-

day, 17 September, Il mao concluded

'YErAph toNs Phas "DU dad debrícaled blo

1080.

"D" son sinca bara deportad by

so so saliva consery.

richardblelon

Richard Heliss

ДАРИТУ ДІТАЄ» ОТРІАТЯ

BONMISSION DAlIBIT NO. 3162- Continued

---

## Page 224

4-00000

LLO ALLICATIOT IT B-SE

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30

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CUBA

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02

XOrTO (10 8999886) § C91 10 8 0116 90000 8 save

OSTALDS TRO DOOBIO REO MAILIAR SOT DO RARE PHOTO.

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COMNISTON EXHIBIT NO. 3162-Continued

---

## Page 225

4-00000

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111 1311

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CASTAO,

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ДОЛО MED CRAPIE TO ОБЛОД Си

оы до діо доб воо рогустара

1851

• 188 ∞

COMMISSION ExHiBIT No. 3152-Continued

COMMIHATIN SXIIIIST Nol. 158-6083868211648

---

## Page 226

Mexico City in early September to receive money and orders for the

assassinntion, 38 that he hnd been flown to a secret airfield somewhere in

or neas the Yucatan Peninsula,see that he might have made contacts in

• Mesico City with & Communist from the United States shortly

before the assassination, and that Ostrald assassinated the Presi-

dent at the direction of a particular Cuban agent who met with him in

the United States and prid him $7,000,570 A letter as received from

someone in Caba alleging the writer had attended s-meeting where

the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would

soon include the death of other non-Communist lenders in the Ameri

cas,° The charge was made in a Cuban espatriate publication that in

a speech ha delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under

the infuence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said,

"The first time Oswald was in Cuba,". thereby giving away the

fact that Oswald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that

country. 33

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who

allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United

States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as

part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then

supply them with firearms as payments Other rumors placed.

Ustrald in blami, fla, at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban ac

•tivities thera. The assassination was chimed to have been carried

out by Chiness Communists operating jointly with the Cubans s

Oswald ias also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in

- & Mexico City restaurt and to have driven off in the Ambassador's

car for a privato taliase. Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after

it

the assassination called for the files relating to Ostrald's dealings with

,, tiro members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union;

the inference drawn was that the "dealings" ind occurred and had

established & secret subversive relationship which continued throughs

Oswald's life." Without exception, the rumors and allegations of

18 conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis,

in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

Illustrative of the attention giver to the most serious allegations.

"is the case of "D," & young Latin American secret agent who ap-

proached U.S. authorities in Mlexico shortly after the assassination

and declared that he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receiving $8,500 to kill

the President. Among other details, "D" said that at about noon on

September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban con-

sulate, he saty & group of three persons conversing in a patio a few

feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously

-dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and another

was a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the

group momentarly and passed some currency to the Negro. The

Negro then allegedly said to Ostrald in English,

"I want to kill the

man." Oswald replied,

"You're not man enough, I can do it." The

Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do."

Oswald replied, "The people are waiting for me back there."

30T

---

## Page 227

Negro then gave Oswald $6,500 in large-denomination American bill

saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, "D" said

that he telophoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several

times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that

someone important in the United States was to be killed, but tas

finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"D" and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensire

investigation. His former employment as an agent for a Latin Ameri-

can country was confired, although his superiors had no knowledge

of his presence in ilexico or the assignment described by "D." Fou

days after "D" first appeared the U.S. Government was intored by

the Mexican authorities that "D" had admitted in writing that his

whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never

seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody-paid moner

in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to tele-

phone the American Embassy in Saptember and that his first call to

the Embassy was after the asgassination, "ID" said that his motive in

febricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United

States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro

Ho said that hs hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up

would be believed and would cause the United States to "take action"

against him.

Still later, when questioned by American authorities, "I" claimed

that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the hier

ican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement,

was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried or

with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of "D." Then

told that the machine indicated that he was probably lying, "D" said

words to the effect that he "must be mistaken." Investigation in the

meantime had disclosed that the Embassy extension number "I" said

he had called tonid not have given him the person he said he spose

. to, and that no ons at the Embassy clerks, secretaries, or officers

had any recollection of hig calls. In addition, Ostyald spoke little, 1

any, spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversatio

with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which tas

supposed to have been in Spanish, was therefore doubtfal. "D" no

said that ho was uncertain as to the date when he saw "someone who

looked lize Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration,

he now thought it was on & Luesday, September 17, rather than Sep

tember 18.. On September 17, however, Oswald visited the Lousiana

State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a

coeck from the Texas Employment Commission at the Wina-Disie

Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made

by "D" when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, ind

on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it ras

concluded that "D" was lying 578

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence

that Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assis-

sination of President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the

308

---

## Page 228

14-00000

i.C.

530257

2 overiver 1753

C MIME POM CES MENES TE

MOORINDUS TO: Mic Clari D. Maiarson, Legal Araces Re!

304

• Minuton II. Scott

SUBJECT

:.

Gilberto Nolasco iLYARADO Ugar*e

1.. On tha morning of 26 November an oificer of this Section,

accompanied by it. Plamback of the Security Office, interviewed.

Subjeci in a parked car on the south edge of the city. The follosing

atatements, walesa otherwise noted, are those of the Subject:

Subject was bors 31 January 1940 in Giudad Rama,

Departamento Zelaya, Nicaragua. He esterad Maxico by

bus on 21 August 1963 on his way to Cuba to study guarrilla zariara

tastics. Ha was to wait is Mexico until false documestation

as a Mexican citizen could be arraaged through the Cubau

Consuate in Mexico. The real purpose behind his travel

involved a penetration mission for the Nicaraguan Secret Sarvice.

His suparior in Mexico City is Major Roger JEREZ, Nicaraguan

ivilitary Attache, whose office is located at Pasaje Latino,

•Interior 513, talepbona 46-33-37, viexico City.

On 2 September Subject reported in Mexico City to

PIOfeSsOr Edelbarto TORRES, Who lives at Genaral Zuazua,

Number 37, Interior 7. TORRES is a Nicaraguan and is in

charga of Nicaraguan Communist travellars to Cuba. He is a

well-known Coramunist and has a daughter in Moscow who

travelled there on faiss Mexica papera.

On 2 September Subject discusaed anti-Somoza guerrilla

activities in Departamento Atlantico, Nicaragua, With IORRES

aná the brotaara Gustaro and Humberto Jerez Talavera:

Fiumberto is a teacher in a Mexican female normal school.

TORRES told Subject that he would receive 500 Mexicza pe303

Tent meyers monthly subaistence allowance peading the arrangement

-ricil 853 844527%

Er.: F2. (3. 3. 5Al

1185N 2156. '3

SEE EL (13)

2719

SEE.

RECORD COPY

*6970

7X-1911

29 Not. 6'3

201-2892489-9583

---

## Page 229

14-011100

SB0:3T

-2-

on his pravel paper i.

i i3 Japiamber Subject went to the lawan Cousuiate is

sure ovar gasaport photos to Consul AzCuE. While siting

in the waiting room, he saw a grous of approximasely 3

persona entar tha Conquiate and go into Azue's difice, bui

he noticed that an unknown person was sitting ai AZUL's desk.

A Cubas employes of tha Consulats krowa to Susject in

alias as Juan Jose, about 10 years old, mustacha, normal

build, straight bair, emerged fron the offica and asked

Subject to tars over his photographs. Ai this point, Subject

asicad to be shown the location oi the men's room and was

directed through à door to a passageway leading to a patio.

The door of the patio opens oil this passageway.

While standing by tha bathroom door, Subject saw a

group of 3 peryoss conversing on the patio a few feet away.

One was a tall; this Nagro with reddisa hair which appaarad

¿o be dyed. Fie had prominant chaakbones and a noticaable

scar on his lower right aida of bia chin. Ha spois repeatedly

with a Cuban accest and also spoke some Inglist. Another

one waa a white mar whom Subject had previously seen

holding a Canadian paysport in the waiting room. Ihis person.

had green eyes and dark blond hair which was arranged in a

"'existantialist" hairdo with a pompadour. He wore glasses of

she type with a mirror-like outer surface. Tha third person

was Laa Harvey OSWALD (Subjaci was completaly convincad

fIon published photos that tais was OSWALD). He azid tara

was noi a shadow of doubt in his mind..

OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned up

saite shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dask gray pante and

clear eyeglasges. (Subject stuck to this story that ha was

wearing eyeglassas despite the fact that they were not present

in publiahad paotos of OSWALD.)

Subject saw a tall Cuban join the group momcatarily and

pass some American currency to the Nagro. This unidenrified

Cuban man had apparandly come ou: oi AZCUE's offica into the

SEGRET

$6976

---

## Page 230

14-00000

SECRET

-3-

pao, ds is described as tali, solidly bulli, i animo mis

curly hair, weariag a brova sui: a:1 5ed-atrizad tie-

Subject estimated his age as approsimataly 37. Subject

10vaI: 301 tais ian alids 13 September.

subject overheard the lollowing conversañon betraan the

ago and OSWALD:

Negro: (in English) I want to kill the mas.

OSWALD: You're not man enough. I cas do it..

Negro: (in Spanish) I can't go with jou. I have a latto da.

OSWALD; The peopla are waiting for me back ziere-

Tha Negro thes gave OSWALD 5, 500 doilars in large

decornisation U.S. bills saying "this isn't much". Of tais aui,

1,500 dollaza was for extra expansas. The Megro also gave

OSWALD about 200 Mexican pesos. Later the Subject saw a

pretty girl believed ta be a Guban employze vi the Consulate

give OSWALD an "abrazo" and tell him that she was living at

Calle Juares $407 is casa he wighed to fiad ber. The girl

aporeated to be abou: 20 years old and hat manner reminded

Subjact of a prostitute. OSWALD, tha Negro and the Canadian

then want upstairs.

Subject left the Consulate buildiag momentarily to buy a

popsicle at the corner and saw these threa persons leave by

the Imbassy gate near the corner oi lacubaya where they

enterst a parced black car, probably a Chaviolat. Subject

reenisred the Consulata waiting room and later was approached

py the tail unidentified Cubaa ino came out si Azcuz'a office

and told Súbjact to return the next day at which time his finger-

prints woulà be taken and be would complete a form for

obtaining travel documents.

Subject returned to the Consulate on 19 Septembar au

about 0345 and filled out the form. He was told at this tire

that he would be approached by an Embassy officer io maje

ug a ciory for his ialse Mexican papers. Many paopla were in

the waiting room on the morning of lf September and the door

SECRET

76776

---

## Page 231

4-00000

J0SP8T

-af-

was linaily closed to kasp oihars from untaring.

Siebject was then told to contast TURABS, vicaresgoa le

Ven jO TORRES' bOne bu TORRES' wife, a Cuaturalia,

tola Subjeci tial he was at the Soviat Babart. Sabject want

to the juvlat Embassy about 1130 but was not allowed io enter

although he bad been there on eacher occasions with IORRES.

At this poist, Dr. Noel JARQUIN Iolado, Nicaraguaz

Communist, who has bear in Moscow, approached and saw

Subject standing at the gate. Ha asked Subject way be was

thare and Subject said ha was looking for TORRES. JARQUIN

informad him that IORRES was insida. TORRES 3002 came

out and accorapazied Subject to the Cuban Consulate.

TOPRES entered AICUE's oifica alone and later emarged

telling Subject "you have nothing further to do here vatil I

contact you." At this point, an unidentified girl entered tha

•Consulate and grasted IORRES. TORRES raplied "not now,

come back tomorrow."

On tha night of 19 Saptember TORRES presided over a

meeting of about 18 Nicaraguan Communiats held at his bome

to diacuss a recent guerrilla astachia the Sagavia Regios of

Nicaragua, TORRIS announcad that a guarrillas had been

killed and said that the next year would ba a tough one becausa

the U.S. policy might change and tha Communist might find

themselvas isolaied. TORRES asked Subject it he lnew the

Laguna de Perlas arsa of Nicaragua where the U.S. is training

Cubass. He referred to it as "zona gringa". Subject replied

that he was not acguainted with the area.

On 25 Saptembar TORRES sai: Earigua CUADRA Collado,

an employse of Carton Envages de Marico, Lago de Gagala 13,

to sell Subjact that ba ghould go to tha Cuban Inrifulate, 'Subject

weat to the Conaulate but was told to waii bacause the Consci

was very busy.

While waiting for tha Consul, Subject yaw the Canadian:

ajair. The Canacias was amoking a cigarette axd wearing a

Rola: wristwaich which a Consulaie employee was trying io buy

from him for 1, 000 pesos. Tos Cazadian relugad to sell, aaying

SECRET®

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## Page 232

14-00000

SECRE?

-3-

tea: ho hud purchased the mate in taxico and was taking it

sume as i gouvenir. Ins Canadian Carried a caine=a

arapped acrosa his chast and also carried i batta si obacuna

pizatograpiss which de was aaowing to Consulaia employaes.

The soul haired Negro mantioned earlier then came in and look

the Canadian austaira. As he was leaving the waitiag coom,.

the Canadias Hashed a large wad of U.5. dollars and gaid "In

juiag. Tae skies are clouding up nad ay're waiting los me

at borna."

At tae end of Septambar Subjeci phoned ta American'

Embassy several timea to report his belief that aoreon=

important is the U.S. was so ba killed. Is making those calls,

be used the same Jorge iSYNAUT (phonetic) to protect hia

identity. He was asked if tha call related to visa matters and

ha replied "no, it involved a palitical natter, he wished to

speal with a person of confidencs." His first call was acreened

by two females and ha finally apoke to a mas who took Subject's

phona number (3U-19-52) and said he would call back. The man

never called. Subject tried repeatedly to contict the Embasay

by prose but was finally old "quit wasting our time; va are

working here and not playing."

When Subject saw the photograph of OSWALD in a local nawg?

paper, he contacted the Embassy Security Cifice on 25 November.

2. The officers interviewed Subjaci on 26 Novemar and agreed

that ha was a young, quita serious person who spoke with conviction.

He showed that he knew enough English to understaad rudizentary

coversation in that language.

Subject said that se had ta'can trainiag la ina Panama Canal

Zona when ha was with the Nicaraguan Army and admitted tha:

he was still a membar of tha Nicarazuan Communist Party:

having originally baen a conviaced Marxist. Later he became

disillusioned and for tha past four years has worked as a pena-

tration agent for the Nicaraguan Government. He said he

expacted to enter Cuba within 2 months.

Subjact explaited that he was outraged by the assassination

o1 President Kennedy which ha was "30 percent sure" was a

SECRET

95976

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## Page 233

14-00000

SCC125

Connunist pio:. He saiu he did sui wina to bacoins involved

in aay big pusiloity aplash and hoped that his naine would ba

kaps secret, bui toat ha would be williag to do "scaravas

zucapsary." Ai thia time, Subject was liviny a: Pio 173,;

Col. Santa Liaria de la Ribara, telephon= 11-07-51.

contact arraagameata ware lada a0 thai be could he picted so and

inistrogated iu ther.

3. On the night of 26 November ha was interrogated by two officers

of thia Section. His stasy remaias substantially toe same as set forta

above. He recognized photograghs oi tha iollowing Cuoar Imbassy.

pergoasel: Silvia DURAN, IraIciaco LIAGOSTIR, Orasias RUlII,

Samuel PEREZ, Rogelia RODRIGUEZ, RaLl APARICIO, Rolando

ESTIVA, Heberto JORRIN, Oscar CONCEPCION, AStORiO EARCIA,.

JOsa Ferzandas ROA, Andros ARMONA, Joaguin 1ERNANDEZ Armas,

"Ra", Peraguita ALONSO, LUisa CALDERON, and Alfredo SURABAL.

He did not know any of thasa jarson by rama, but was asle to give:

partial descriptions such as duties, beight, skia coloring, condition a

Écats," disposition, accent, atc. He identifiad the photograpa of Oscar

CONCEPGION as the tall Guoan mentionad above and a photograpia of

Luisa CALDERON ay tha pretty girl mentioned above. He also identified

F'ILICiaCO LIAGOSTER, as the mistached tubas whom ha had awa

under aliza of Juan Jose.

This was the sama person incidentally who was

irjing to buy the watch from.the Canadian. Subject quickly idantified

the New Orleans raug sèot of OSWAI.D waich had baen supplied by you.

oilice.. He said thai he was positive of thase identlfications,

4. At this interrogation, Subjact said

OSWALD had carried a greas passport in his pociat

and Subject baliaves be saw OSWALD wearing z showder

bulgiar piatal. He did not seem to ba too sure oi this

poist. Hs said OSWALD wors long aboes and had a wrist

watch with a yellow metal band. Ha illustrated OSWALD'g.

manner of slouching in a chair at tha Conaulaja while in

ize waiting room at about noon on 19 Sestember. He said

that OSWALD seemed to ba completely at home and appeared

¿o kno' and ba known by Consulate personael. At one poiat

he heard OSWALD use the Marican slang expression "Cabrar",

SECRET

76976

---

## Page 234

14-00000

*E6?&1

-i-

Subjec: rosaacted tas convaesation 22d money passing

gonè dacribed roove. Hiiy accouat oi lad conve=jasica

was eugentially the same ay reported, sacapi at this time

he bad OSWAiD uda las word ill is his first reply to taà

Neg=o; hesce, "You're nut tha man. I can kill him."

Fie said that tha UJ.S, baak notas ivers in a amall".

pack about 1/ jich thick bound with a papar band which the

Negro brolse balore counting out 1, 500 dollars for extra.

expensaa and 5,000 dollara as "adrance payment."

Subject said that ha is still a sargeant in the Nicaraguan

Civil Guard and that he entared Mexico illegally os 29 Auguat

without travel documerts, paying a bribe at tha border and

having transited Honduras, Guaterala and El Salvador en

route.

He said that ha had baen to Maxico in 1961 on a missica.

for the Nicaraguao Secrer Service aíter a contrived escape

¡rom false arreat is Nicaragua, followed by apariod of asyluna

'in tise Mekicas Embassy. He sail tcat his training racaivad

iz the Cana! Zone t00k place in Fort Glick in March 1956 faote

Subject would havaoaly bean ló years old at that time).

Subject said that da had been to the Cuban Consulata on

Z ar 3 September, 15 or 16 September, IS Septemper;

19 September, 26 Septembar and 25 Novemoer.

He admita to baving viaited the Soviet Embassy approxi-

mataly 6 ox 7 timaa; spout 1 tires wich JORRES. He was

- somewhat fuzzy on reasons for thase visits aad vas not

presaad lot decail at tbia session.

5. In ordar to keep Subjact availabla for further interrogation, ha

was instructed to find other living quarters whare he shoula register

in an alias. On the following morning, 27 November, he rejorted that

ne had regisiared as Alberto SANCHEZ, Room 203, Hotel Necase.

Ca 28 November he was arrested by Vierican police at the hotzl, This

Difice has so furthar contact with Subject.

DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION QUISIDE YOUR OFFICE

SHOULD BE CLEARED WITH OUR FEADQUARIERS IN MASHINGION.

- sitin.

1- 8.7525

=--

SECRET

#6976

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## Page 235

ORIG :

UNIT

EXT,

D

Joan Me hitten

C/SE/3

5523

29 For 1953

D INDEs

O NO INDEX

• FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECREI

•....

THUTS EGUSS

TO :

ERDRZAY BURRAU DE INVESIUGATICH

DEPARTIT CE STANG

ATET 13, DO ALIES JERSOS

FROM:

DIRECTOR

12-52

POUTING

21

3

5

219 HouSE 19

15 z

CONF: C/VH 4

DEFERRES

GeN

ROUTINE

DCI, D/DC!, DDP,

CI

2,

VRA

G3 0077

INLIDIANE

TO

iNÇO

CITE DIR

85744

TEN THAN TEN THEN TECH TATES BECESE TEE MEXICAT OFFICTAT

IONRERCEATEON

EFISARDO ALVARATO, MICARAGAT WHOM HAS CLATHED HE SAW LIE OSTATO

BOND TRY THAN TA CAN CUN CAN TA THN CAN CAN TAG SANTAN TA SEE

THE SAME STORI:

RECOGNIZE A FEDICRADA

TITIA DUAN AS AN EXPLOYES OF THE COAT ENRASSY, WARRAS

ES DIE SO RECESS HER HEAT. IMIERROCATEI FRESIOUSLI BI CA PERSOINEL. THE MEXICAN

DETECIAL DOMIC NES IRDERROCATICY DE ALVARADO SAYS HE "DOUSIS" ALVARADO!S STORY ANTO

KILL ERGI WORK TO "ERBAK" MMM. THIS INFARUATION HAS RECALVED IT LARICO CHY AT

3330 HOURS HASSLACTON MCIS 29 HOVERR 1953.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES.

• CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

CONDUCTED CN 24 MAY 1978

221-6

__IMPDET CL BY 21222S

Document Number

for FOlA Review on

APR 1976

08 3023

588-289248

by cuthority oi

RICEARD FICTIS

DD?.

D: 200-5-41

PELEASING OFFICER.

COORDIMATING OFFICERS

CROy? i

Esclué: a fior automalic

coengiacing.ind

declassication

lean

SECREL

MA THE CODE MERIE IS DOMLRITER

RUTHENTICATING

OFFICER

---

## Page 236

SUES

Halla

C/HE. 3

551₴

D'INDEX

D NO INC

O FILE IN L. FILE NO.

SECRET

5

48ER 1953

DISSIEM TO

DERAI, BUFFAU DE INVESITGADICN

RE. C.ALD.

3

7 DEC63 17:152

CENTRAL, INTE

BOSIES ACCRICY

WH 4

DEFERE GEH

ROUTINE

. DCI,

#D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/S1,. VR

PRIOCHNY

INFO

CITE DIR

87667

SUBJEGE:

INE HARUSY OSHAZO CASS

ITICARACLAZ INVORART WED CLIENA

DO FAYS SET LIE OSSACO MALAITE BONEY TO ASSASSTRATE XINY, HAS PEST CONCLUSI

OUR MENCO CUEY STATICI ADVISES US THAT ALVARADO ADITRO BE BUSE HAVE ES

BISTARET IN SALTIE TEAR IL SAY OSTALD I THE CURAT ENRASST. ALSO, ES HAS.

UNCERTATI 07 DAR LATE OS HITCH ME BLIGRE HAVE SREE SOMEDES LURE OSTIARD AND

PIGLET I HIT HAVE EAT OY A TUSSIAY, WHICE HOULD HATE MADE IN IT SUPERATES

1963. MECCA ME FIA POOR OF IS POLICIATE IN IS TO V

I IS EXCECIBU THAT AUTARADO MITE, ES IMPARIS IN SICARICIA CE 9 DEGENESA

1903.

A REPORSSELNIIVS IN YELS FUSRAU PARLICIPAID IT INS INUEEROCALION OS

ESTARE ALVARADO:

49717

END ON MESSAGE

Document Number

for FOlA Raview on. MAY 1975

• C/S COMMENT:

#DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

201-259247

CONDUCTED ON 24 MAN M.O

ABSTRACT

LASEX

by artcotlty of

ICTARO FATASS

LELEASTS OFFICER

_ 1MPOET CL BY 212303

COORDIMATING OFFICERS

CATE

Exclude frem gutoralle

daengesding and

datiassilestion

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN TIE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHISITEN

ДУТНЕНТІСАТІМО

OFFICER

• Copy No.

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## Page 237

14-00000

13 DEC 1963

rapal; Diascior (Plans)

:025334

DESS ILD GUAIO ZOOD: LOSCO 1T ELa Cabas Ebasay En jesica Cliz La

ia Fa Stata tat Aris

?a.

In 103

:3o

---

S/CI 3/TT9-235

Discriburioa:

0a) - Audresece, s/ati.

1 - R1, 1/05,

1 - CI/Lia W/3tt

12 Dacuaber 1993 .

EAËIC: Mora

FO PROFSON

1 - 17/3/98 2/217

1 - CH/3 w/aut

...:

---

## Page 238

14-00000

"??.

i"20ST CO CilerO 1OBee ditiCijo

1, Tla porsos (siTAiãO) 01a tia: be seo 2a pRaes 31à,

JRTLd I EIOLt, a iUiTèI, MiO CoM ICN CIuid 2o,

ieraon: dI Coln Samulle s dieimi0, Md v:0 lires 1-

13210 i4us0 30n 173 lin trilo sogiial (Karics Clty).

. .

fe Indicgtod coat os Aula: 2y e itis pear te enieres

KEGIES 122009123, EI1ULa1 DE MNZOU DE 190 M,iN Gitios

1i Cluisà Euuictenos, Chioyasy lencico, L0r 250 pesis. De salsa

E'a: de 1a 10p4ÁLAL5, CInCRriNa sEù ICT "Lai JaSOE lde Soices

DI bãi CINiRE É0 SUI09 SS 1O LY 10 ErilliTTiO the jsDa DE

thai st saudos, fon the sost bam Sibam iropps, 2iih tB9 tiai

BatO purposO dl fEsla IiONaSiOR iO LaTto IOSAr JiSE AlSia,

lazlIaiy istacea of tira ileatagian Babasty 1r lacico wira zeoa

Le tas bean collabaacic sor tlorso jears aoi jao paja cis t0s

pasos il zantà for lis eepossas, ta Ineoration iba: la zatlers

De pagisus to patil 111ltay Atracha do ti teria 1i dlesc-ls 20

Jenzma] DusTaTO lIstat, dulel sl 1a Iitalll due lesrico DE

SCO MESTAIRAS irCU, VIlS pesidrace 15 Âema

ALTAMEÙ calà 1ar by prainails, to b0 A Ecia,

SIi LNI) I0:2A+x 551Ea1a 101553, 5011-5003 Mares jura

comenist, te Ent es iadizidoal d za soaa di Surlos J0s0,

22 IINETREt DLLTIAD di U9 DIaS JETABTT. IE LAatRE OSCInTa

Lasi ieptasicea 3 0n fa. I0 2r9tesi, El Wit Isiaidng 335 5tat

FERARIÉD BRSeN tO 5O SO tUCa, alá fax ri Nesssn he LOlà

GIIlON ÚNa -IE". ME 199 S EU0I EEN2n1Si.. En toe ZOti 25 1203

at ê geastlanis n9lad b1z 10ĩ. 1ts 1staraenn, telen

1 hAE ID LINET TeT 15 JE

I 129 190A EXzEer i9 INiZeTted List 15i5; 130201

Besotia i9 00a1ad 15 I7enam the Crion Biskssy Erydrg so

EDIEIM LELEN2SI20N S0 SENS 10 10,I LAND OI 10 FENENI MAII

¿n nos sccayion ?5or soli tds In ice inicansy thai ir dudar to

erable bin to minin 11 te conrtrs (nuiso), thog weng coàng

to base a lasger det tor ala s paeszor, bira cerilieaie,

2 COICT d IltON LUTID 11 1 HETima JIà 13 tLa-

TãT D9 SOUld IEIEl tO Ci

SECNET

---

## Page 239

14-00000

: o220

¿e sbreavai a jorta lariosa di 1 neter IS canticelers ia inigat,

2335, 962:9 3a151 e luna sigla cory 110 ans brosa sassar

đ ai loma to e li a

sal 539 dee tubat sud do das thai torosise ma tanotate & sur

TENER " SIATE I GICH (QUINA I ENO PATEETE ON INTENTET EN ISTIT

cita boras, the 115a, mâdios, alasy balo, ast soantis a brova

E son pessycty e pesper chich shin se colar be juliee ta ba

tanation, Men teo tuo inariamis trinato de istat Americas

ven: into the corsiinia tajetro.

• Foo.

sais, se laus very porma looita, iniiviaal, zi li colos,

Entaas], Decausa ALTAAiO ned sey his there Derons de Eis his

covesia; to tho sen di desnc. Marano meni bues tosare the sari.

25532534,

LE +011552016517

"I dyn to Ià I Cen 113?

SZ0ZT

---

## Page 240

•aià: !

AETUCÃÒ TaLỦ dÃT Ga: O M: CUi t0 14Y M. d0O

crom ailcà, srá vailo dalig tilu de aou da deto, ie icria

ihion In ti Lonilas leavy ii Ditiias and

E I3SO D IS5,

Bn:amalol aunz0b1li, ahich nopean o ta s ubemroet

MARNO IOIA DO CEO2NI TA: 5 CIISE US L0 ÈGE Eakên: sud 1:

cccurined so ii t0 iajany do Ualted ita-es hashasy irt it did

LOT GEOIE 1O TIN t5 10 t0 M TXION DII-aII 0z 27

sep'anbes se tolepibocos tta Anardean Bbassy, tet becauco de

211 0l prezex: biasali 13 persos, tEey EAlù 39 aiiaaiios 1o

11Z j7 DHim i% tEO LOO LAI 1E EUA INI TE ECE S

coaldantlal sna tant ta tantel to bais 1o s tlià vllzttal.

En dáù soS 20 t0 IE AEFionn LaDAiTg 20r feR di LUiTa tBar

dy th0 6-2 0 CibHa Sule, Soà 10 Ion dLa pesuTà Lo IOszos Sba

Incidani, RizAsiro pala chas lo renh la the savasarors aboet

ID9 dista di ito fragisons di ty lnirad ttatas arl tat 5r

szedn the psoiounch di tha assaasls lu reeogriecà yin a5 sis

ROta NcoRdEN siosi LA bEÑ ENia Il tis Gibas Coasulase, le

tErTON 2711 03201 150 Aseitan Enbassy buà szossazaà 1a.

spate3 t0 = ilih czcial v1àa 1a0a la stds aa anprictimni sor

taT S0SA UAT d: 5150 1 T0a6 tE fOLEi leTi IaLL Is

DclEnel or z5 dentebic

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t0?2 thes 3o06 fs Bdota fICt z t2y 15s 2s Ezpoii

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WÊth CIDjCE DIE THENS IENA FiS POÑOLIO FÁTILDNE. FG EDAST

thaç0 Iet ti tut d0 tha CidtI d lLE IDtAl INiI BiTON

LÒici Ly LOrY 00 INA EEn 1 fEX Stret 12 17 2NSbflE. Fx

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MEY UT DIn A 100 2IS0 b11 11 t0N Iin they To0ti 2011 hin st

tte nabes 42-51-31, whica 13 tba mabar oi iha placa uuere

ATYARAZO LUTES-

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to Jieree. Jhay das hia thars zi soe agpalasas :1os,

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DE Tha JOTSI YOTIO ISSDal WETE ESOLE ANTiLS 13 IN

thin, tod touethzo biay craotd aii streas imd neu, to 2s

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Gsos tiero, bi aEir DelaIed e I0inS dN 17 1I LM sE FUrO

zajus iienililed ibs parser wio asa boneg to dua desão, ta sho

CROPTT

---

## Page 241

14-00000

adipo

Par.ul MoRiRe, lo taala Lalia, io biaren crploges oi sic Bubaa

FEDaUO$ 25 PEIL AS 30 DICNS BOTIOTE N.9 iETe taSs 509a 17 16%

Mng:C IiisiB

20.

Aj'èer Ihlàg ine taM :aya jTleldù sil peias, sola bia 5o

i0e mal, 2al 10 1i11 tiad io velst tosel te pe- norias

I

CHT1S114 112 1120ET HHY HAHHON, DH SO

2oi reccetesiod lita dter Esilai tha siura a'atesaato, MusAlaDo

ERICASON ILE IOlIENIESI

isat saeroosouly, and aiver nacorallenttiry bo

LESInS ?1 DUaL IU9i tLE fOTi fReZjan t0 ME bE Mi

JeferTed la ila boio di hia strirount dsd sion le aaa 5a

30 c'optoniser dê tiala yesr in t=o Cucaa Consitata Iooizais 2tay

Ana be saa foy mero ieat de Icosna 7153, Ise Barrey daSalie:.

Iho assaata dl tba Bealieni di ina tiricoà stsças-

Tnt cier the assyaIatias sO SnsalsMy" Ienseãla

AIJARADO CDOS SATDBIISHE DO MIELS ROCLTIEZEES, ELTLTY TESSISCA

BUSh ES tie abUst t0S, B0N de purgeSE of EUYBdE & NüM

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DI FIRS} EAUIO TTA

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RESI EAINS: tEES DI ENEIRU..

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eoore In hãs atrleiseht, lea ta: bada di 12 fepierter s ba

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25 Leptenber, Mis call nao mado so the meaver féngo 20,

WhlCh is tie Dushr dE do MTiCa dRSy. DE SAa ILD2S

Lo sas conceczeù vlih ertensloa Lil is orior 50 ralaco =b9

Iatinionta 22resit so1iiacet.

---

## Page 242

WASHINGTON

13 NON'TE

FEET

Oswald Reportedly rola

Cubans of Plan to Kill JFK

Sy John M. Goshko

1: chinston Post Sen't Trlier

The "Justice

Depariment

has discovered a 1954 memo

• randum by. the late FBI Di-

rector i, Edgar Hoover say.

ing that Lee Harvey Oswald

reportedly. told Cuban offic

lals in advance of President

Kennedy's assassination that

he intended to kill the Presi-

•dent,ii."

Informed sources said yes.

terjay that Hoover, in the

memo, attributed this infor-

~ mation to a highly reliable

informant tno claimed to

have been told it personally

by. Cuban Prime Minister

Fidel Castra ....::.

Castro, according to the

LEE HARVÈY OSIVALD

•Hoover memo found

memo,; reportedly said' he

had been advised by officials

•ot the Cuban embassy In

The assertions reported in

• Mexico City. that 'they had :. the Hoover memo go further

met with Oswald before the :than any information cur-

Nos. 22, 1963, assassination

rently on the. record. con-

of Kennedy in Dallas and cerning alleged statements

that Oswald informed them

made by Oswald in, a prey-

of his, intentions.

lously disclosed visit to the

• Cubari

eribassy

3 Mexico

City prior to the murder of

Kennedy.

• There has been persistent

surmise alout a possible in.

volvement of the Casiro.gov.

ernment lo. the raurder of

Kennedy, possibly as a'coun-

ter stroke against. CIA ef

forts to assassinate. the

Cuban leader..

There has also been spec-

ulation that the assassina.

tion may have been the work

"of Cubari-exile terrorists.

• However, all of these reports

have been fourth-or fifth-

hand accounts originating

with informants of doubtful

reliability:

• .'

The: Hoover memo tras

described by the sources' as

having been addressed. to the.

Warren. Commission,

ap..

pointed by former President

Johnson to investigate the

assassination.

But

former

commission staffers said yes.

. terday that. they. had no

recollection of ever having

See OSTYALD, A9; COS: 1

---

## Page 243

Memo Citt. Informant

On Oswald Cuban Lint

• OSWALD, From A!

sald though that they believed "as in

educated guess" that it was Rolando

received such a memo or having been

Cubela, a high Cuban official and Cas-

told by Hoover or other FBI officials

tro intimate whom the CIA recruited

of the information in'it

in. 1961 and who later figured in ClA

•Officials of the Justice-Departmeat

plans to kill. Castro."

and the FBI relused any comment os

•In the Senate intelligence commit-

the memo's existence or its contents,

tee investigation last jear It was dig-

and other sources. familiar with the

closed that the CLA employed a hishly

assassination investigation said they

placed Castro government. official

had no knowledge of whetber it act.

with the cryptonym AMLASH in ef

ually was sent to the Warren Commis

*forts to assassinate the Cuban leader..

sion.

• Cubela.and ANILASH were publicly

Those sources who told The Wash-

reported to have been the same man..

Ington Post about the document said;

The sources also were unable to say

"its existence apparently had been un.

how Hoover came: into possession of

known until recently.. It was discov.

information from an informant inside.

ered, the sources said, as the result of

Cuba, since foreign intelligence is a

' information that came to the atten.

CIA. rather than an FBI

function.

tion of. the Justice' Department and

Some said they thought the informa;

that prompted Attorney: General Ed.

tion had first been given to the CIA.:

wärd H. Levi to order a search of FBI

which then turned it over to Hoover.

files.

•.•

i However, John McCone,

who was

i. After: the memo was

found, the

CIA director at the time, said in a tel.

sources added; Levl put a tight clamp

ephone interview' yesterday that the

of secrecy on the matter, and only a

information reportedly in the Hoover

small number of persons in the dus-

memo was "unknown to me."

tice Department and FBI knox about" ' "It's the first I've ever heard of it,"

the document's existence. i

... McCone said. "It's hard for me to be-:

As a result, the Sources said, they

lieve that such a memorandum ' ex-

are-unable to answer such questions

isted without it being known to me

as why the memo apparently never

and to the staff of the Warren' Com:

reached

the

•Tarren

Commissiony;- mission."

whether the information was accurate

The same point was made by David

and, if so, whether Castro, was 1n-

W. Belis, who served as one.of the;

formed about Oswald's intentions be"

Warren Commission's legal counsels.:

fore or after Kennedy was killed!

He said, in a teleno me collectien of

Documents released recently.by the

have

absolutely no

recollection

CIA under the Freedom of Informa:

such a memo. It such a document did

tion Act establish that Oswald visited,

exist'I'm sure that we never saw it."

Mexico City less tinan two months be:!. Other documents that have been

fore the assassination and met there.

made public recently indicate that

with officials of the Cuban embassy. i ji Hoover and top FBI officials. knew-

One of these CIA documants, dated"-while the bureau was investigating

the Kennedy-assassination — that the

having Castro killed. However; Hoover

and was in contact with three alleged"; never informed the Warren. Com-

Cuban intelligence agents identified mission of the CIA'S plotting against

as • Luisa

Calderon. Manuel. Vegas, Castro.

• Perez and Rogelio Toáriquez LODAZ.

He also is. known to have talked

with an embassy official named Siliva

Duran. She reporiedly has stid that

.?..

i she dealt with Oswald only about his

• ursuccessful.attempts to obtain a visa

to visit Cuba:

.. The sources were unable to identify

the informant described in the Hoover

memo as having obtained the informa-

ton from Castro. Some of the sources

---

## Page 244

14-00000

SECHET

INSPECTS GENERAL

76-2482

8

AUG 1975

Z Sis!

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

VIA

SUBJECT

:

REFERENCE

Raymond A. Warren

Chief, Latin Anerica Division

Deputy Director for Operations

Citations from Robert Dietz Morrow's Book,

"Betrayal" in "Midnight," a Weekly Tabloid,

entitled,

Backfired,"How CIA Piot to Kill Castro

Memorandum for DCI from C/LA, Subject:

"Possible Accusations Against the CIA,"

Dated 31 July 1976

2 August 157 hed ion etE Sue artiche from the

2. Also attached is a copy of a 24 March 1976 memorandum

for the Deputy Director for Administration from the Director.

of Security relative to Robert Dietz Morrow.

This memo

indicates

that Mr. Morrow was granted a Secret contract

clearance in September 1962 for use by the Office of Commu-

nications which contracted with Morrow Products,

Baltimore,

Maryland, to produce an adapter which would greatly reduce

interference on radio receivers. The adapter was delivered

in February 1965 and found to be worthless and the contract

was terminated.

Subsequently, Morrow became involved with

Mario GARCIA Kohly and made the plates from which Kohly

produced counterfeit Cuban pesos.

Cecily, were arrested along with

Kohly by the Secret Service

on 1 October 1963.

At that time Morrow told the Secret.

Service that he had become

associated with a "certain agent"

after building a device which he demonstrated to ElA.

WARINE NONCE

SENSINE MNTELLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVEN

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 9560

STORST

---

## Page 245

14-00000

To our knowledge the allegations in Subject article

have

no basis in fact nor did we have any relationship with

Jack

Ruby, Clay Shaw of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Sigzed

Raymond d. Harron

Raymond A. Warren

2 Attachments,

a/s

CC: DDCI

CONCUR:

Georgo T. Malaria

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

Theodore G. Shackloy

for

Deputy Director for Operations

•2443

Date

Date

2

SEDGET

---

## Page 246

14-00000

HAR "075

MENORLIDUI FOR: Deputy Director for Adninistration

Y2OM

Robert i. Canbino

Director

of Security

SUBJECT

NortO:, Robert Dietz

1. This menorandan is for your intomation only.

2.

dir. Magus li. Thuerner, Assistant to tae bol, ha.

advisod inat it. Fred Blunenthal

0з агаЛЗ ПадалЛЕ лаС

telophonically contacted hin and

said that a Robart D.

Morrot had vricton a book entitied Bocrayed, mich was duo

for publication in May 1976.

Mr. blunentral advised that

he is currently reviewing this book, and that it contains

some critical couments concorning the Agency, e.g, the

Agency was responsible for the assassination

of President

John F. Kennedy.

Mi. Blumenthal also stared zaat Me. Morrow

clalas to have

been a CIA contract Lan.

"r. Liunenthal

desired to verify No. Morrow's claimed associacion vici

Agency, and it. Tauerner requested that this Offico

revich its

files to ascertain wecher Mr. MorIoN was

in faciassociated with. the Agency, and if so, what infor-

IItion could ba passed to lir. Blumenthal,

The Office of Security doss have a file on

Robort Dietz Morrow, born ad Jazuary 1028 at Pitesburgh,

Penasirania. Ur. Morrow, is of june 1952, was Freaident

locatod in Baltinors, Marylane,

a18 Ths Sacurlty Clal ol tae OiLIca Di

Logistics was

a Secret contract clearanca for use by the Offica

0f Conmunications on 19 Septeaber 1952.

The Agency thos

chiared into

a contract with torror Produsts, Inc.,

produce a procotype of an adapesi to de loed wich a radio

receiyer which purportadly would grontiy roduce incor-

À nodel si cho adapter was dolavored to the

Office pi Coomunications in Febzuary 1005, But tie duvice

1:33

Soma co do vortalass and tho contract tos ustainated.

68 ÷ 1233

.. •

---

## Page 247

4-00000

Sarade area 73-9

07 ?. October 1003,

the U.S. Secret

nail? leader, loris Caccir

Renly

1,000.000

Lucia la sectorioia pesos so

the Castro econosy.

Fohty was the leader of

rule seaene, inile dir. Nerion and his vito vere sharged with

Ho. Norton,

t. fonly supplied hin with

• 3 countorioit 20

POSOS MILI

which Mr.

kohly said mas offsted for sale 10 hin Eros

Bannis do the CiA in Miana.

MorToN also statoà chas

he had becone associsted vith a "cercoin agent" dater

sadading a devics which ho dononstratod so this ageney.

The Secret Sorrice was advised in 1965 that tha Agoacy

did not have any

interost in dr. Kohly.

5.

There is z0 in omation in this file verifying

kohly's allegation ihat he had abrained the councerfeit

0131

• From agents of tho Cia.

6.

air.

Thuaror has been advised that he say toil

Ar. Blurenthal that the Agency ontored into a contract rich

Morgoy Products, inc., in septenber 1052 whereby ve. Morrow

as to uvely a place oi eguipaddi, dut chac the concized

cquipment had been tested and sound to be unsatisfactory.

Rober:

:. Gambino

Distribution:

Orig. &

1

- Adsa

1

1

- D/ Sec

CD Reading sile

1 - Suoject File

OS/PSI/CD/KFCarrollinf

(18 March 1976)

¡ceyped Arcartoll:n 24 March 1976)

---

## Page 248

14-00000

01SMTNS-1227

wi::1

kie!

5$40:64019

INSPECTOR CANERAL

76-3086

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

Washington Star Story, 1 October 1976

1. This is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1976 the Washington Star published a news

story with an Associated Press credit line, headlined CLA

Viewed Oswald As Information Source (copy attached).. The

lead stated:

Contrary to sworn testimony, the CIA once con-

sidered using presidential assassin Lee Harvey

Oswald as a source of intelligence information

about the Soviet Union, according lo a newly.

released CIA document.

In sworn testimony before the Warren Commission,

former CIA Director Richard Helms said the

Agency never had "or even contemplated" any

contacts with Oswald.

The news story, in another section, made the following

statement:

The November 25, 1963, memo explained that

the Agency's interest in Oswald as a potential

intelligence source was due to his "unusual

behavior in the USSR, " to which he had defected

in 1959.

---

## Page 249

14-00000

3. There was such a memorandum, written by a case

officer then stationed in Paris, recently released under FOIA.

Writing three days after President Kennedy's assassination,

this case officer recalled that there had been interest in Oswald.

As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled.

that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed --

sometime in the summer of 1960 -- with the then

Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section

the laying on of interview (s) through KUJUMP oF

other suitable channels . . •

I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the

USSR had struck me from the moment I had read

the first ODACID dispatch on him, and I told my

subordinates something amounting to "Don't push

too hard to get the information we need, because

this individual looks odd."

• . . . I do not know what action developed there-

after . ...

4. The Helms testimony before the Warren Commission

on this subject was as follows:

Mr. Helms. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all

our records searched to see if there had been

any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's

assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence

Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our

card files and our personal files and all our records.

Now this check turned out to be negative.. In addition

I got in touch with those officers who were in positions

of responsibility at the times

in question to see if

anybody had any recollection of any contact having

even been suggested with this man. This also turned

out to be negative, so there is no material in the

Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or

in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was

any contact had or even contemplated with him.

- 2 -

daddamned dramatide clain Delicate

---

## Page 250

14-00000

VEVORAIROM FOR:

FROM

VIA

SUB.JECT

P1 JüL iSTO

Director of Central Intelligence

Raymond A. Warren

Chief, Latin

America Division

Deputy Director for Operations

: Possible Accusations Against the CIA

1.

On 30 July 1976 at 1630 hours,

Latin

America Division

was advised by Mr. Tom White of the Office of Legislative

•.

Counsel that he had just talked on the phone to & staff aide

of Representative Thomas Downing, Democrat of Virginia.

The

staff

aide told. White that Representative Downing had just

received information fron a MI. Robert Morrow, author of a

rocent book (Betrayal) on the John F. Kennedy assassination.

Norrow provided this alleged information to the los angeles

Times, New York Times, a Richmond newspaper (Times or Newsieader,

perhaps),

and others.

the staff aide said is to appear in the New York Times on

Sunday, 1 August:

President Richard Nixon promised a Mr.. Mario

GARCIA Kohly that if an invasion of Cuba were successful;

Nixon would arrange that all Cuban leftists outside

Cuba would be killed.

" The implication was that these

killings would be carried out by the CIA.

b. British overflights from the Bahamas showed

that there were

Soviet missiles in Cuba as early as

1960, and they were not removed until 1964. President

Kennedy knew of this information, but withheld it from

the public.

2.

The staff aide said that Representative. Downing plans

to call a press conference on Monday, 2 August, to disclose

the above

information, but not necessarily to attest to its

accuracy.

• • E2 1VP25.

---

## Page 251

14-00000

..

deceiling in Cly incords, Mario CARCIA Konly was

Pera on do culy 1001 in Garaaa.

He is a forer Cuban business-

son Gas

carrer Croom Arbageador to

Spain. Since

100t no

net arreubted to gain ofilcial t.s. Governeat support,

and tho

support of foreigr

governments, for

various grandiose

schemas to overtiro: Fidel Castro. ' In pursuit of this goal,

he has used numerous high-ievei dovernment contacis in an

effort to

associate himself with

the CIA. In April 1964

currency to introduce into Cuba to depress the econony.

He

clained he did this with the knowledge of the CIA and the

U.S. Government.

CIA denied any Knowledge of Garcia.

This

Agency has had no operational reiationship with Garcia.

Is/ George V. Lauder

Raymond

A.

Warren

CC: DDCI

CONCUR:

231-7 7e F229-

Deputy Director for

Operations

3 0 JUL 10":

Date

---

## Page 252

How CIA Plot To Kill Castro Backfired

- y HARRY ALTSHULER

MIDNIGHT Staff Writer

The ClA and Fidel Castro were

'Kennedy

both betting on the same agent

- and Castro won.

•as

The ClA plotted to murder Cas-

tro by using a Cuban agent

code-named

Am/Lash.

who

Trying

agreed to lead a coup to overturn

the Gastro government.

To Get

But Am/ Lash Has a double agent.

•A longtime Prichrul pal of Casero.

Castro,

named Rolando Cubelo. he look the

ClA's money - and spilled its plans..

into Castro's cir.

But."

In ingry retalation, Castro set up

the assessination uf President John

Castro

F. Kennedy.

That is the sory — alreinly long-

GO: TO

krusen in one Washington circles

= hehind the reopening of the file

on lt'k's murder.

Him First

Bur the truth may he even more

CIA biamed Kennedy

JOHNSON refused to

compler. Now atomer Claupers-

sive. Rober 12. Morrow. has spilled

for Bay Of Pigs failure.

spill any details.

-LEd

il dueen years of secrets into a confessional hook, 'Be- | ployee. working underorders. He bad noidea shatitwasal

trayal." published hy the Henry Regnery Co.. Chicago.

about or where his own actions filled injo the pierure.

Lee Harvey Oswald was not the assassin, Morrow is-

group inside the ClA isself. working closely with tis

serts.

gruntled Cuban exiles, plotted the assassination, says thor.

Oswalled was just the chump set up to like the blame, while

rOW.

she real killers escaped.

Assadel's toss was another ClA employée, Jack Ruby.

According to Morrow, Oswald was a small-time ClA ei-

Ruhy knew the scope of the plot and wanted no part of it.

But Ruby had a racket of his own on the side. Urug-running

from C'uha. It made him vulnerable to blackmail.

Ruby was the Dallas nightclub operaior who walked up lu

ROLANDO CUBELO, almost a Castro lookali:

Oswald and. as the nation watched on TV, shot him at close.

with the beard and cigar, wore his arm in a sir.

range. Ruby too is now dead, hut his claim was he performed

as a result of wounds he received in the Pres

the act our of love for the dead President. Morrow says this

dential Palace takeover in Havana on Castro

is the truth ahout Ruby:

behalt.

He was ordered to liquidate Oswald. to keep his mouth

shus, and threatened with a jail sentence on a Urug charge it

now dead. a New Orleans businessman who was a power

he hesitated.

the ClA. Morrow quoles him as declaring: "The assassin

What did the Cl.A cabal have against JFK? Morrow er.

Ion of a President may sen a monstrous act, but not if ti

plains the ClA group and il Cuban exile friends blaned

alternative is an America under communist rule...

Kennedy for the Bay of figs invasion failure. And they

Long afterward. Shaw was indicted on a conspirai

charged him with playing polities in the Cuban missile crisis.

charge, and acquitted as innocent.

"If our President and his brother sit on the missile infor-

But meanwhile. is Morrow tells it, the plot went ahe:

mation. he won't live through his firstterm," Morrow heard

Oswald was picked as the fall guy, to he fed to she poli.

from an insider.

while the men who actually fired the shots in Dallas th:

The ClA-Cuhan exile plotters regarded JFK as a traitor.

Nov. 22 got away.

They felt he wasn't ready enough to battle Castro, whom

This part of the story fits in with recent Senate Inte

they sill ins a beadly menice to the U.S.

gence Committee revelations of two Cuba-connected fu

Their first plan was to ruin Casiro by counterfeiting

rives following the assassination. One fled Texas for Mexi.

Cuban currency to smash the economy. They were running

the same day, and a Cuba-hound airliner was held back :

their counterfeiting operation with U.S. govemment fund.

he scrambled aboard.

and salaries. but naturally they had to keep it dark from the

The uther reached Mexico the following day. and

White House.

immediately down out to Cuba on an airliner with no ott.

Their secrecy succeeded tex well — for the Secret Serv-

pissengers.

According to Morrow, these were she men with Mar.

ice broke in and arrested them as ordinary counterteiters.. licher rifles similur to the one Orwild owned. who fired

Morow himself was handed a two year sentence, sus.

pended, in connection with the scheme.

the President from hidden vartage points. The explana::

The insiders felt the White House had interfered with

that there was more than one man firing accounts for t.

their last hope - short of violence - of breaking Castro.

puzzling profusion of wounds.

ROBERT MORROW, former CIA man, holds

Mannlicher rifle he was ordered to buy before the :.

assassination. Three men fired at JFK he claims.

"If we can't get Castro because of the President, we'll ge)

If the truth was known or suspected in Washington, it

the President first, so we can get al Castro," one of them

has it been su long coming into the unen?

wamed Morrow.

Current talk in the nation's capital is that the first ones

The kingpin of the group. his book says. was Clay Shaw.

realize Castro's involvement had i lerrible fear that if !

were openly accused. it would lead to a confrontation w::

his hacker, Russia possibly the nuclear holocaust ir.

whole world dreided.

So they kept quiet - even the man in the White Hous:

Lyndon B. Johnson.

News commentator Howard K. Smith has now revealed

contidential conversation with Johnson. long ago.

"I'H tell you sunething about kennedy's murder that wi

rock you."' Juhnson confided, "Kennedy was trying to g

Cuurn, but Custro got to him first."

Smith admits, I was rocked all right. I begged for detail.

hut he refused, saving it will ill coine out some day.

True enough, there have heen rumors for years. in Mit:

NIGHT ind elsewhere, despite the massive efforts to bur

investigation under the Warren Kepiri.

The ClA and the FBl were naturally reluctant to let it:

work lind out they had been hooby-trapped by i doub:

ilgent.

They didn't even want to think aber the truth — that

with the ClA ploming asino Castro that led le the death i

The Americ Mesmen.

Thal Wis shy the Clid and the till kept secrers drom the

ROLANDO CUBELO, left: Cuban Police Chief. Efigenio Amejeiras: Fidel Castro: and

Havana University President Juan Marinello, in the early days of the Casiro viciory.

Warren Commission and eyen failed to tallow up leads i..

lear of what they might learn.

---

## Page 253

14-00000

OH. VOR 01

5. Mr. Helms did state exactly the words quoted in the

news story -- "or even contemplated." But the context of

those words was what was reported to him as the result of

a search of records and memories. To this day those

familiar with the extensive Oswald records state that there

is no reflection in those records that anyone even undertook

to propose or approve a contact with Oswald. It would have

been natural to do so, but apparently any such thoughts did

not progress to formal action. From the memorandum

quoted, it is apparent that someone at Branch level did think

about it, even if nothing ever came of it. This hardly con-

stitutes a responsible or official or serious "contemplation"

of the idea. Mr. Helms' full statement on this point seems

literally correct in the full context of his statement, although

more refined qualifications might have reiterated the basis

for his conclusions. The news story is misleading on this

point.

6. The news story statement that Oswald was considered

due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR, " is exactly the

opposite of the statements of the quoted memorandum, which

reported the care that should be used if Oswald were approached,

because of his strange conduct.

7. The statement in the news story about Mr. Dulles

consulting with Agency personnel on how to answer questions

is basically true. The interpretation to be placed on this

counselling will depend on the interpreter. The inference of

the news story is that Mr. Dulles was counselling slanted

responses on the Oswald issue, thereby tending to reinforce

the interpretation of deception attributed to Mr. Helms.

Scist sala

John H: willer

Attachment:

As Stated

CC: DDCI w/atts

DIG: SOBreckinridge:js (R 1407) € October 7976

Cistribution:

Orig w/acts - Acdressee'

l wlasts - DDCI

7w/atts - ER

7w/atts - IS Chreno

- 3

watts - S0B Chrono

---

## Page 254

4-00000

SIGNAL CENTEN USE ONLI

19

MHO

ACE

Tre

DCI

OMF

0

CIAGGUIEATION

CRET

MESSAGEHIANOLINGINDICATOR

STAFF

DATI-TIMIGROUP

CITa

020046Z

DIRECTOR

CONF: C5S3 INFO: FILE DUS,

D/DCI,

DD03, CS/RF

C/NEL, DD0/DO C/PS/EG?

PAGE

P.AC-E:

B

922257

DISSE: 3Y: 415

NO IDIX

METUAN TO

PER

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN:

UNINTEL RYBAT

I AP WIRE STORY IN WASHINGTON STAR ON FOIA RELEASE OF OSWALD'S

MATERIAL MAKES FOLLOWING STATEMENT, WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AUARE,

45

aUTE: IN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WARREN COMMISSION,

RICHARD HELMS, THEN À BRANCH CHIEF AND LATER CIA'S DIRECTOR.

SAID THE AGENCY NEVER HAD OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED ANY CONTACTS

WITH OSWALD... NEULY RELEASED DOCUMENT, SAYS WE SHOUED IN-

TELLIGENCE INTEREST IN OSWALD AND DISCUSSES..• THE LAYING ON

OF INTERVIEWS. END QUOTE. W

MATERIAL

•2. ABOVE MISCONSTRULD FROM SANITIZED T

DA RELEAJED UNDER COIAT

WRITTEN BY FORMER OFFICER WHO WAS INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE USEFUL IN-

FORMATION OSWALD MIGHT HAVE IN CONTEXT OF SOVIET REALITIES. IN

RESPONSE TO DCI. CALL TO ALL HANDS TO RECORD WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT

MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO WARREN COMMISSION INTERESTS, OFFICER UROTE THIS

111719

20.

THE WEX DOES RECORD BRANCH LEVEL DISCUSSION BUT STATES THAT

URITER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN- E-2I IMPDET-A

DATE:

UPHIT:

EXT:

1 OCT 76

CHAS. BRIGGS:DCM

C/ISS

1,595

CHRONO

DD

COOHDINATINE DETICEAS

THEODORE GE SHASSLET ADDO

GLATBIMICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIDITED

2

LIPPET

SECRET

37:052173

---

## Page 255

ARTICLE APPEIRED

ON PAGE_

Document Contradicts Testimony

CIA Viewed Oswald

As Information Source

contrary to-swom testimony, ine

•CIA once considered using presiden-

tial assassin Ice Harvey Oswald as al

source oi intelligence. information.

about the Soviet. Union, according to

a newly released CIA document.

testimony. before. the

Warren: Commission, former - CIA:

Direcio: Richard Heims. said the

agency never had.""or even contem-

platsd" any contacts with Oswald.

The

newly

released document,

written by an unidentified CIA officer.

three days after President John F.

Kennydy was killed in Dellas Ön Noy.

22, 1963, says teal "we showed intel-

"ligence interest'" in Oswald and "dis-

views"""- theylzying on

of inters

the unideninied-oficer added-inat

"I do not know whai action developed

therealter.""

THE MEMO. YAS AMONG hun-

deeds of pagesior documents. from:

the CIA's dile on Lee Harvey Oswald.

The material was; released to The

Associated: Press yesterday • unders

the Freedom of Information Act. it

• A second-document reveals, that:

•former CIA: Director Allén Dulles.:

while serving as.a member: oi the

Warren Commission, privately.coun-

selec CIA oiticials on the best way.to

answer questions-from.the.commis-

sion about allegations, that Oswald

casa Claageni

Dulles

-gouge language which

sade it clear that. Lee Harvey Os-

wald was never an employe or agent

of ClA would suttice,

an unidenti-

fied CIA piticer wrote Helms in April

1954.

"I agree with him that a carefully

• phrased renial of the charges of in-

volvement with Oswald seemed most

appropciate...

" the unidentitied officer

andled

services, tastified under" oat that

'there's no material in the Central

Intelligence Agency," either in the

records of in the mind of any of the

individuals that there- was any con-

tact had or even cortemplated with.

Oswald.

• THE NOY: 25, 1953, memo expiain.s

that the agency's interest in Oswall

as a potertial intelligence source was

due: to. his "unusual behavior. in the

USSR." to which he had defected in

• 1959.:

ages das

We were particularly interested

in the (deleted) Oswald might pro-

yide on the Minsk factory in wnich he

had been employed, on certain sec-

tions.of the city itsell, and of course

we thought the usual

(deleted) that

might help develop (deleted) person-

/ality dossiers," the memo states.

The memo indicates.that Oswald

sas also oi interest to the, ClA, be

cause .Oi concern that his Russian

born wite, Marina, might have been

•part of a trend for Soviet women to

marry foreigners, leave the country

and setile overseas there they coul

serve as spies:

'is.

THE MEMO ABOUI the agency's

interest. in Oswald said the discus-

sions about Oswaid occurred some-

time in summer. 1960." The author,

continued: I don't recall if this wast

discussed while Oswald and his fami-

ly were en route to our country or if it

was aitertheirarriyal."

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SECRET

SECRET,

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