## Page 1

1704-10310-10020

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO:

DSCI

.1.

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.

109 59 241

BUILDING

REPLACES FORM 36-8

WHICH MAY DE USED.

EXTENSION

CRO. 1857-0-430415

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## Page 2

13-00000-

(CLASSIFICATION)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

165-1507/1

In reply refer to

Action Memorandum No. A -42!

Date 2 april 1905

TO

Weputy Director for Plana

Dopaty ElIactor los intalligence

: Dapuly Director lor Scioaco & Techrology

Deputy Direcior los support

Apronnient Bertreen the Valted dates secres service

dad the Cansral Iotalligonce Agency Cosceralag

SUBJECT : Fraaldoatial Prosection la the United states

REFERENCE: AiGOrAAdUDE ITOR DOCI LO LD/L LD/T, ADE DD/:,

carod 8 Juno 1963, subjects The CLA Role la Support

al Fresidestial Tripe Abroad

lo Allachod los the laformalas of addranacos la a copy al saojeci

agroeteal denalopod by the Cales ol the SeCrel jerVice And til; la ACCOrdAsEr

mila the recosumesdalions ol le larson Committalos and she scilova of lse

Preadons'a Commites as the Wastes depart.

Lo Tha Deputy Director lor Plane la responsibla los lasartar

with the secrer sertlee, The suall tuaction is this razard la balay perforeced

In she Conster intelligasco Staff al te DD/P. All AfRACy CaDIpOReHIs lo

liaras with the sacres sarrice are to keop the Countas Intalligence stall

laformied ol their desllago utta the factor servica, The Conster istalligence

stell will provide advice lo olber Ayasoy composesto tao recalve requests

los suppors fron the sector service.

3. Tala agreement does so ameso as alter cutters Agoncy policy

s8 espreaded la diy FAmOsandal el 8 Juse 1953 concaralDE suppori ol

¡'rostdential tripo abroad, in aádivonal afreer-ens with the jecror iervice,

Invalrlag CLA Rod olber GonerDIeDl agencies dealleg ulta t'realdontial travel

abroad, lo to process al dovelopi, ent.

(Signed), Marsball S. Carter

¿straball so Carlos

MONtesRDI GALerAl, USA

Nepusy Direcior

SUSPENSE DATE:

Attachaost

Ce:

nis

(CLASSIFICATION)

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## Page 3

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65-15C7

CONFIDENTIAL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL

PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of infor-

mation, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so

that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person

of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The

CIA role in support of Presidential trins abroad is the subject of a

separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection

of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect,

the Vice President of other officer next in the order of succession to

the office of President, the Vice Presilent-elect and former Presidents.

I. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the

person of the President. It undertake: to identify individuals who, brause

of their individual propensisics or cia:acteristics, are dangerous o 10

may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever

actior is required to counteract any th eat to the person of : e President

posed by such individuals.

CONFIDE: TIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection

of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation

and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter

intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on

organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of

performing its statutory unctions. It also originates, and receives from

other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the

Agency has no police, sulpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-

security functions.

II. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will jurnish to the Secret Service information that comes

into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement

concerning individuals coning to its attention of the classes set forth in

Appendix B to this Agreeinent. The information may be furnished in more

than one report, and in energency situations priority attention will be

given to its preparation and delivery.

B. After reportirg an individual to the Secret Service, the CLA

will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to

the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or

obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will urnish o the Secret Service intelligence and

intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate

assassination of government officials as a political weapon

and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the

President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B.

above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile

intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons

so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to

the President of any person named in Article I, Para-

graph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate

a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA

and the Secret Service annually, or ai such more frequent occasions as

either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that

the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions

may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the

Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is

required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to

such factors as the size uf the crowds, the number of persons to be pro-

tected or the existence oi a national emergency. At such times CIA may,

at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers

CONFIDENTIAL

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COVADENTIAL

to the Secret Service in order io augment the Service's capacity to carry

out its protective functiors in the mosi secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of

the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief

of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless

he has qualified in the us of firearms either in accordance with standards

established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accord-

ance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA.

Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform

such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as

provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Se:vice and the CIA undertake to maintain an active

liaison to insure the prorit passage of available information concerning

individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by

the Secret Service as dargerous to the President or any person named in

Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible

security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such

steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are

fully carried out.

Dated: 27 Mars 19665

Daïcd:

ti..

Ceral Intelligence Agency

Marshall S.

Carte:

Duputy Dirictor

Urind States Seer. i Servicü

=:-

CARDETAI

-.-.

James J. Rowiey

Chiei

-

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## Page 7

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1.

2.

3.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central

Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

Identification Date - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of

individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms),

address, photogriph (or staternent as to availability of such), physical

description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes

in Appendix B, wich the individual reported fits;

A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any

CIA file on an ind: vidual reported which cause him to fit any class

or classes in Appendix B.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency

to the Secret Servise

Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have

attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal,

state or local Governments or foreign government officials while

they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country;

provided that such threats of acts are made against the Government

official or employre because of his official status;

Individuals who theaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary

grievance against federal, state or local Governments or any

employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;

Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR

and Communist Cliina) located in the United States, and who have

escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside

such jurisdiction ind control, are unwilling to return thereto, and

who have been of : peciai interest or value to the United States, and

who cannot be eliriinated as a possible source of danger to the

President or any jerson named in Article I, Paragraph B;

Subversives, com nunists, racists and fascists in the United States

who meet one of rlore of the following criteria:

CONRIDENTIAL

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COVFIDENTIAL

(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or

suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record

of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States

sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct

or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antip-

athy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of

the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who

knowingly or willfilly advocate, abet, advise of teach the duty,

necessity or prop-iety of overthrowing or destroying the Govern-

ment of the Uniter. States or the government of any state, district

or possession the eo or the government of any political subdivision

therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer

of any such government.

CONFIDENTIAL

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LAST MONTH

1969 OCTOBER

1983

MT WTF

12 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

Friday

AM.

8:45

8.00 Enkettigene strating

9:30

9:45

10:00

10:15

10:30

10:45

11:00

11:15

11:30

11:45

12:00

12:15

12:30

12:45

MEMORANDA

1963 NOVEMBER 1983

S

M I WI

F

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10 11

• 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

22

1:00

1:15

1:30

1:45

2:00

2:15

2:30

2:45

3:00

3:15

3:30

3:45

4:00

4:15

4:30

4:45

5:00

NEST MONTH

1889 DECEMBER 1963

S MTWT

F

S

1234567

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31

November

Geunat Garke

sturned form ISA

ose à.

326

Friday, November 22, 1963

39

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LAST MONTH

1069

OCTOBER

1969

SMTWIES

1

2

6

7

3

4

5

8

9 10 11 12.

13 14 15 16

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

24 28 29 30 31

Sat. - Sun.

1963 NOVEMBER 1963

M T WI

S

S

1

2

3

5 6

7

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

23-24

NET. MONTH

1969 DECEMBER 1869

SMTWIFS

12346

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31

November

P.M

1:00

9:00K

9:15

9:30

9:45

10:00

10:30

10:45

11:00

11:15

• 11:30

11:45

12:00

12:15

1:15

wkif.octms.crnf.cBk.=

1:30

1:45

2:00

82:15 mi Rise race te

Mr rider

10:15 met w/whalin+ Kirkpetrien

2:30

i hate hill

2:45

a while

3:00

3:15

3:30

3:45

4:00

4:15

4:30

4:45

5:00

MEMORANDA

w/s 1f Intell Bridin:,

327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963

38

328 Sun, Nov. 24, 1963 37

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LAST MONTH

3863 OCTOBER

S M

1963

S

1.2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

1983 NOVEMBER 1963

NEXT MONTH

S

1089 DECEMBER 1089

1

2

SMIWIF

S

3 4 5.6

7

8

9

12 3 45 6 7

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

29 30 31

Monday

25

November

AM.

P.M.

8-70-BEI

8:45

Kanaresease Is mith

1:00

9:00 -

1:15

9:15

1:30

9:30

1:45

-

9:45

2:00

10.00 kid pier fars gut

2:15

10:15 st. n-atthew's

2:30 г

10:30

2:45 Ret unned frun Finend

10:45

after going do Quarters

3:0Q

11:00

3:15

Jar mrittetres

11:15

3:30

11:30

3:45;

11:45

4:00

12:00 Preside angle i funerad

4:15

12:15

4:30

12:30

4:45

12:45

5:00

(1D. I will is'p boy

329 cm cler Manday Nevember 35, 1963, semedy

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## Page 13

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14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone,

MI. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann,

General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General

Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban

item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor

mentioned to Mi. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After

some jocular bantering, Mi. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion

of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was

purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might

go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He

stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information

from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara

might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip,

he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that

there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months

and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while.

In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM com -

mittee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General

Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time.

MI. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with

Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of

the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert

Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly

for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

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the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it.

Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the

paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in

accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the

committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone

stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba

and that this particular paper really does not go far enough.

He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding

away and that the courses of action proposed by Mi. Vance's

memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation

without really accomplishing anything. Mi. Vance stated that

prior activities in this regard had created great consternation

in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr.

McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand

down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise

level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to

reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President

that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy

pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated

to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were

not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that

Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out

that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on

these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position

before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache.

Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was

ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro.

At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mi. McCone stated that

we should do everything possible to create provocations and

distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low

risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have

too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more

homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled)

and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet

Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The

agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work

on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses

of action to include pros and cons, noise levels,

estimated results, etc.

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b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution

which was prepared during Martin's time.

C. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance

memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an

Administration commitment) that items l and Za were

OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified;

3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-

list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against

Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we

should see just what our opportunities are, and on para-

graph 2 CLA should determine just what we think the

local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities

might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance

requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided

to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday,

and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday.

Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend,

DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the

covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and

China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness

of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could

not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor.

MI. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of

activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action

officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to

have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance

specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern

operations.

6. MI. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U -2

aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February

which was not given any distribution. MI. McCone said that ever

since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance

flights over denied and unfriendly territory of covert flights over

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friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of

Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special

Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper

direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organiza-

tion and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance

stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent

requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon

learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel

control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed

that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the

State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that

the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He

stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with

luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mi. McCone

pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by

Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he

aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of

difficulties. Mi. Vance stated it would be the regular cover

plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-

shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the

planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and

McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC

had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single

mission. He said they could understand the need for two air-

planes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent.

He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad

coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for

this.

?. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the

Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for

approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining

the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever

it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever

it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy

stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to

this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special

Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

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-5 -

to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest,

most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter

Lieutenant General, USA

Deputy Director

Distribution:

Original - DDCI

1 - Elder/ Enright

Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO

Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

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## Page 18

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STORET

Notor

Tre

Lir

11x=

18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964

at the White House

1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that

there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in

the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his

proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was

expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place i was

handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed

that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have

had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed

and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was

struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as

given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken

exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new

draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone.

The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to

what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take

rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied

by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk,

McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and

myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the

revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to

it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about

opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection

(paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of deter-

mining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he

simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning

the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

ST3027

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£ 3T

- 2.

said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the

plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that

whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence

of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain

complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we

chose.

This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working

steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on

a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only

thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on

page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said

if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern

was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would

lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the

Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a num-

ber of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would

hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America

and Africa for example. The President said that when the

crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that

he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on

nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there

was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some

problem areas ta our a degelo amber on the se pointe

on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said

that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there

were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany,

and particularly France, that should be considered. The President

then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather

hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the

same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing

out those portions of DCl's letter concerning his member ship on

the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

SECRET

EYES CLY

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S33237

EYES CY

- 3 -

level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter.

(Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked

all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original

draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought

that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the

statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President

then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the

statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been

eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated

that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an

international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on

verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that

as a statement by the President there was adequate protection

in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United

(I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured

me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the require-

ment for adequate verification and that the additional words

inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior

objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter

of record with the President and the other principals at the

meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intel-

ligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was

obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to

indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.)

The President then directed a number of actions as regards

Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make

to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference

statement. In connection with this speech for American con-

sumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant

farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sen-

tences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev

but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents

mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which

such a letter would be made public.

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## Page 21

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

b. The President then expressed his great concern

over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he

had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem

yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the

OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts

were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the

Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by

snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc.,

etc.. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course

by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and

others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's

New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article)

that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were.

He said he still felt if was a good idea and that he thought

Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should

assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and

tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He

thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did

not get the impression that a decision was made in this

regard. nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of

this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then

on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President

expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness

and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete

inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately

being in the papers of getting around town. He made some

very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State

Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard.

He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past

two months since he had become President and did not recall

any such problem when he was meeting periodically with

President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house

wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed

out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing

new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was

worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years

on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had

never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been

¿ RET

---

## Page 22

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£337

EVES C."Y

- 5 -

bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he

was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no

actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indi-

cated they would immediately take whatever steps were

feasible to improve the situation.

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that

he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were

the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they

were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he under-

stood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of

internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the

morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these consider-

ations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace

and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the

side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this pro-

gram and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara

said that he too had never been in favor of this program and

questioned our participation. I stated that while this program

was conducted by the ClA, every action taken had the full

approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State

and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented

and that the program was designed in part for the specific

purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with

a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro

and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activi-

ties in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such

as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had

some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I

said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro

regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little

bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months

a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from

internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control.

I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this

policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive

although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with

Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North

SECRET

EYES CHIY

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## Page 23

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EYES CY

-6

Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point

Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an

entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor

and this point was not developed further. General Taylor

noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept

Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily

occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that

this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally

seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out

that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of

this type since to completely desist would eventually lead

Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The

President then directed that he wanted a complete review

of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking

developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train

in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and

McNamara nodded their agreement.

The President said he

would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their

proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that

he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our

Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and

compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba.

He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could

count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to

cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar

discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders

and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions

they might have.

There was minor discussion as regards the situation

in fork Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm

or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation.

The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a

speech indicating that things were improving and then to have

a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon

that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting

poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined

to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and

that he had in the past several months based his actions on

UL

EYES 1.

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-7-

the advice and guidance he had received from his principal

advisers whom he considered professionals and experts

in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious

doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number

of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been

wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and

was certainly no more immune than anyone else from

making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was

mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a

result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling

that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own

intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what

should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in

the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President

noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional

Committee leadership had been a complete success and that

he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He

had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from

the people who had attended and many of them indicated it

was the first time they had ever been in the White House and

certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by

the Administration leadership. The President said that he

had received a phone call saying that he should continue this

and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been

promised that at least in large measure as a result of this

briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday.

The President then said we could do a lot better. He told

Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the after-

noon prior to these two dinners so they would be much

fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job

but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the

labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have

been better.

The President said he had planned for the

briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted

an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that

Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He

SESHET

EYES ONLY

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-8 -

then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have

only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for

fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute

maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr.

Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with

Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the

Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk

covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as

covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I sub-

sequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether.

this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr.

McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr.

Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to

this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed

the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abun-

dant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered

any further discussion either with Moyer or the President

inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President

had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown

only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will

be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a

very short,

sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by

cable.

Marshall S. Carter

Lieutenant General; USA

Acting Director

SEERST

EYES O2Y

---

## Page 26

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4 January 1964

MEZIORANDUN FOR INE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meung with President Johnson on 31 December 1963

1. The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered

in my Memorandum for the Record dated 1 January on my visit to

Independence to see Mr. Truman.

2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon

of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport shortly before

3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back

yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their

We were taken to the Johnson residence and made com-

fortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining

room. Coffee was served and in a few moments the President and

Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch,

Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.

3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions

memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a

much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental

agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the

junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for

my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last

paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that

I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or

was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction

was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90%

on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly

nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt

some caution should be exercised in just how MI. Truman's assets

might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note

---

## Page 27

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- 2 -

wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory

but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The

President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman

more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have pre-

vented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA.

The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover,

Presiden in over, an

President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on

the international situation as well as on the domestic situation

and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up

with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone

and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he

thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while

Cla can handle the international situation, we should have some

other agency handle the domestic situation.)

4.

The President then made a number of statements which

seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a

repetition of his conversation with Erhard.

It was difficult to

separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and

when he was stating a Johnson principle.

5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard

and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much

more appealing than Adenauer.

Erhard apparently attempted to

feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and

positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that

Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President.

Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was con-

cerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful

world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military

strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to

promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist --

on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate

friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort

to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly

with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time

for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their

---

## Page 28

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- 3 -

own judgments without the need for U. S. persuasion in the form

of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President

intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just

how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he

would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk

about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive

them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and

something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that

during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two

wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any

situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long

as he was President. He said he would not be a party to any shilly-

shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own

mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be

toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the

United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove

it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more

effort in the way of more money and more support of United States

policies.

He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there

was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President

Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two

nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this

frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.

6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from

USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He

said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just

as well fold up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was

concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had

really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the

President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was

being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one

and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the

(I subsequently had

a CLA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger on l January,

pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on

Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along

---

## Page 29

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-4.

later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat

sensitive sources.

7. The President then went on to say that people seem to

have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things

on an even keel

so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He

said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that

he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining

and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy

had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic

policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the

United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits

back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of

its own.

He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others

react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about

during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative

thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his

ends can be attained. He pointed out that this was not going to be

easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be

looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however,

that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting

peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because

it was an election year in which he would be politically involved.

8. The President then said that he had been totally dis-

satisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to

Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and

had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to

Khrushchev.

He intended to continue to promote every possibility

for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated

that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.

9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations

that he should be brought up to date on. I brought him up to date on

Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that

he had read recent Checklists.

---

## Page 30

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10. As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our

present policies and actions connected therewith and said that

shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the

State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review

of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most

imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing

what else could be done.

He did not feel the sabotage efforts

would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S. interests

but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal

dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working

with in Cuba. He stated he was not at all satisfied with the

Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade

with Cuba. He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate

West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him

that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it

as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that

thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the

United States, MI. Johnson can take him on in the same manner

and similar preparations should be made for other free world

countries doing appreciable business with Castro.

1l. There was then a discussion with Stats and Murphy

about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled

and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent

exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic

letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented

that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate

Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the

President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for ClA.

12. There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjust-

ment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14,

would save some $800 million this year.

Neither Mike Forrestal

nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting

withholding tax deductions.. In any event, no decision was reached

by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and

not for the rest of the group.

---

## Page 31

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- 6 -

13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that

he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether

or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia.

This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign

aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary

Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations

as to what his decision should be. He also wanted to get reactions

from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He

quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The

wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and

consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his

recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat con-

fused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of

$60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down

and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any

action on PL 480 funds.)

14. The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied

with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently

suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum

of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-

created poverty administration. He said he wouldn't touch it with

a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill,

they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a

defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would

give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly

result in graft or pork barrel activities. Any program for the

reliel of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass

roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by

existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are

geared in this

direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility

of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal

and State organizations.

He said that if roads are to be built, they

should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to pro-

vide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities

and not, repeat not,

for the improvement of major trunk lines and

highways.

He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this

---

## Page 32

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- 7

type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads

where they would see the results of what they were doing and the

purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new

administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get

off the ground before the year was out and would merely result

in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy.

He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the

relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept

for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would

follow through on this.

15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best

of my recollection. I shall write a separate memorandum of the

tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular

attention to the fact that he built and paid for every improvement

on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the run-

way lights, and the dam across the river.

MSC

---

## Page 33

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MR

fore

President:

Erhart-much taken-ament-article-appesed mare than Aderoner-

Prea say his going to stry home a Thinks of ways to get prace-

If others want to come tack Of - but he hot make trips just for trips-

Geway to say which way they 30- put more into thre We has

to fight 2 Wald Was becamef Camay - This Pros, want going

to be a powly to ciry shinky dealing like that a The Elech as OK.

Pres, wante round upfrom FBIS(1) and USIA on uned reactin to

Endant wait said i didit make many on that deal night as wed

give up- we got cintiged as lo frigue poling - bied up a story -

highly frontle aparting. -

---

## Page 34

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I January 1964

1.. The President has not yet approved the 1965 budget

and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirenients

totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion.

Further cute are quite obviously in the mill. The '55 total

request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be

less than '64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense,

state, MEC, Agriculture, with increases in FiEl and Labor.

With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budgot will be

the smallest aince 1751. This will be the first time in ton years

that there bas been a decrease in personnel, amountlaz to

approximately 100. The amallest locrease durlag this period

was 7200 in 1757.

2. Major legialative proposala will be those that are

left over from last sension, such as Cluil Righte Bill, tax cut.

etc. Now programe will include a procedure for attack on poverty,

new program for ald to education below college level, new program

fos medicare, preparation for next year'a forelga ald bill, etc.

¡v ajor emphasla on human needs continues.

3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of

our Cuban policy aftor returning to W-shington. He particularly

wants a more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on

economic denials through pressures on third countries.

This in

line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.

4. President por sonally wrote New Year'o message to

Khrushchev, relessed today.

5. Fresident faced with decision on whether or not to

continue $25 million ald program to indonesia. An you know, thie

¡s primarily civic action, Ho manto a study of pros and cona

with secommendation in writing from you, secretary of State, and

others.

Also wanté reaction from sonator Russell and othere on

Filll. Will take up when he returns.

6. jalinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he

wrote on conversations with the Russians as to Fresident's Intentions.

---

## Page 35

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1. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard

and things are looking up in that area.

8. President greatly concerned over continuing altuation

in South Vletnam.

9. President wante General Eisenhower, Mis. Truman,

and Me. Hoover brieied monthly on international and domestic

affaira. Stated that had President Iruman been getting these

regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of

CIA article, In connection with Truman artiele, this matter not

argued at Independence.

President much interested in foreign reaction to ithard

talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to salinger today.

---

## Page 36

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TOP SECRET

"UNCLASSIFTED when blank - TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document - Automatically downgraded

• to SECRET when illed in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

REGISTRY

SOURCE

CIA CONTROL NO.

DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED

дос. мо.

DOC. DATE

сору мо.

NUMBER OF PAGES

NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

R. D. SHEA

25 May 1961

LOGGED BY

This form vill do placed on top of and attached to each top Secrot document recoived by the Contral Intel-

ligenco Agoncy or classilied Top Secret

attached to the document until such

dougraded, destroyed.

do Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control

Secret Control Officero uho

Each individual

sha Top Secrot

doculone end, 'edic end Pedicato the date of handi he in ane

SIGNATURE

DATE

DATE

TIME

OFFICE

Mr. Shaffer

Mr. DilaikA

Mr.Kirkpatrick

Mr. Shes

SIGNATUST AND OFFICE

Thats

5fm

Joses

71.252

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:

apacos below and trans

DOWNGRADED

Then this fore

leted to Central Top Secrat Controle Se

detached

DESTROYED

et material it shall be completed in the appropriato

TO

BY (Signature)

BY (Signature)

WITNESSED BY (Signature)

DATE

DATE

FORM NO. 26

1 APR 55

USE

PREVICUS EDITIONS.

(OP-2). 12-59

TOP SECRET

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)

то

or (Signature)

OFFICE

DATE

(40)

---

## Page 37

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TOP SEGRET

2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales, GS-14, Chief of CI Section,

Miami Base, 25 May 1961

1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish

parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former footbal

player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years

at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job

In organizing, within the Frente, the future intelligence service

for the new government of Cuba that the Invasion force expected

to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with

the help of a Chilean instructor that was supplied by headquarters,

and withmaterials training that wE/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons,

sent down to him.

2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated

Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future

intelligence service.

They are known as the "AMOIS". Alter being

trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly

important tasks for the good of the station. These were as

follows:

a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.

b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami,

the so called 2oth of July organization.

Preparation of biographical information on all

prominent persons in the Frente.

d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three

months.

e. A special section of the AMOTS monitored all radio

transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations

that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis.

f. Screeing of all persons recruited for the grade B:''a.

(but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300

or 400 men had already gone to camp).

military trainees really amounted to a field check since the

various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information

present in Miami.

IN ESET

---

## Page 38

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g. Mail censorship. All mall coming from the military

camp in Gustemala was censored by this group before being released

for transmittal to Cuba.

h. Four of this were seat back to Cuba with Instructions

to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.

3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected

Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civi:

government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent tr

the pan ed the enda on rating it, he or ade a baty two

were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the

circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles

which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its

troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as

fast as possible with the troops and identifing and seizing records

and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were

to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were

yips known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back

to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were

the AMCHEKRS, & group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical

Individuals, who received training from Morales as & reserve en

Intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April

1961 for eventual legal return.

4. Morales stressed that POA's had been received on members of

all three groups and that the AMOlS received tradecraft training

far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.

5. After the Invasion the Treate leaders endeavofa to change

the AMOTS: into a political organization and renove the chief leaders

of the AMOT group.

Such a development bad been anticipated by the

base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of

organization.had been microfilmed (see my interviews with

Simmons for more details on this protective maneuver).

The chief

AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized

under Morales as a shadow Intelligence organization.

6.

Personnel shortages.

Morales accomplished all of the

foregoing with the aid of only two girls one a GS-9 analyst. He

who were in Miami on I'DY, but the Jol office refused to release them

tha on the ground that it would interfere with their training.

Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more 1n

- 2 -

T:7 1 FORET

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## Page 39

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three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal

As & result of being so short handed, Morales had to work

bout 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he

received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the

other sections of Miami Base.

As for suggestions for better operstion in the future,

ir, shin

R. D. She&

TOP SESTET

---

## Page 40

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UNCLASSIFIED when blank - TOP SECRET -when attached to Top Secret Document - Automatically downgraded

to gECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

REGISTRY

SOURCE

CIA CONTROL NO.

DOC.

NO.

DOC.

DATE

COPY NO.

NUMBER OF PAGES

NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

R. D. SHEA

1 June 1961

DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED

LOGGED BY

Mr. Shaffer

Mr. Dildine

Mr. Kirkpatrick

Mir. Shea

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:

When this form

transritted to Central

DOWNGRADED

detached from Top Ser

DESTROYED

ial is shall be completed

l in ine appropriate

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)

TO

BY (Signature)

BY

(Signature)

WITNESSED BY (Signature)

DATE

Br (Signature)

DATE

FORM NO.

1 APR

55

26

OFFICE

DATE

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(OP-2) 12-59

TOP SECRET

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## Page 41

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5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD.

SUBJECT: Intervlew with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section,

1 June 1961

This memorandum should be read after Morales Interview)

1. Simmons 1s & dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years

chiefly on Cl matters largely under OIR auspices. He spent two years

In Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff,

apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OIR since then and

came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960.

He is about to be transferred to

the

WH Division Staff andhis replacement will be Louis Napoli who will

head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the

charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere

in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering

the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior

to the Invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters and Seehafer

will head the FI part both under Napoll.

2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales

at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told

Simmons that he had a Chilean CI officer who was available for training

Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOl plan

and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for

execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of

training the AMals (future chubstrelaland the ANcHoRs, & reserve

intellgence corps consisting 8t 8ldr

wen. These matters are discussed

in detail in my memorandum on Morales.. Morales also organized a group

of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available

when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the AMOIS

have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top

AMOIS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft.

The top

nen thus fired had anticipated such a move, and, in addition to micro-

filming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda

of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new

22 of them of whom a four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; all of

them producing FI and CI reports.

By December 1960 the AMOIS had

produced 1,800 Intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports.

: not

rarden.it

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## Page 42

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3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simons stuck strictly to

command channel was,

Miami Base to Morales. He and Morales understood each other

perfectly and there was no ather obstacle of any sort in their, it

collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering

in CI matters.

4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly

from Headquarters.

He referred to the following:

A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance

among the top Castro people.

A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the

Agency as a penetration In Communist maritime unions in various

countries.

A certain

sho has been living In/t Spanish intelligence officer Amshad,

home of the chief of G-2. Unfortunately,

an expected Castro official appointment did not materialize and this

operation has not proved to be of much value.

d. A former U.S. negro citizen now In the Cuban service.

e. Juan Orte, former chief of Castro's executive office,

now out of office.

5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of lour basic documents.

Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960

Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service,

late August 1960

contreas

lab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961

1ab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961

In addition, Morales gave me a copy of a dispatch summarizing Miami's

CI assets currently in Cuba, (Tab E).

6. Relations with PM Section: Sirmons' relations with the PM

section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction,

perhaps more than always results from the resentment operators feel at

the Inhibiting Influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a IM agent was

lost, a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing

what the agent knew, etc.

Simmons showed me a large file containing

about 50 of such cases.

This work was made nore difficult because the PM

people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,

...-2-

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## Page 43

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the tras

trained

iri.

, 4

17.:2-

also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for

the use of freedom signals.

When the absence of such signalswas

pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had

merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to

i eat to stop i ate trait to see -

such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was

delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his

quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their

confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.

Simmons and his section prepared a 225-page study of

Castro's intelligence organization.

This document was distributed

generally throughout the U.S. Intelligence community, as were also

some extensive studies on Cuban blockwardens. They also issued CS/

CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to

higher chain pee were a le to da

They were able to identify 14 provocative activities

by the Cuban services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They Identified

agent in 1960.

staff officers.

8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Simmons spent half of

his time working on the case of the three st EsCALalE members, 1.e.,

the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still

under arrest.

If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before

departure they would have wäffled not to go. Simmons regards this

matter of the greatest potential danger_to the Agency e 6, 1f these

men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.

9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:

8. Hissection was not fully staffed until October 1960,

although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people.

He first had & machine run made for a list of CI personnel having &

knowledge of Spanish.

He checked the records of the individusls

, thus disclosed. He sent the names thusselected to the WE/4

personnel officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able

i to get a man taken off his present job.

He feels that the DD/P

should in the future tell all his senior officers of the importance

of such & project so that the latter will cooperate when thei

valuable/s requested. After borrowing Melberg from covert trainin

for two thy trips, Simmons could not face going to marchand with a

further request, and instead asked Jack Earman in the DCI's office lo

help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training

complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so

Informed his senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have

received better cooperation.

The result of lack of personnel was that

they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case

of a directed assignment to the project. As it was he personally

had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with

the result that he could only spend 20 per centof his time on operations.

His final I/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists

and one secretary.

3

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## Page 44

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Working space was also a great problem. From May

through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single

room.

c.. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to release two

JOl's whom Morales wanted as assistants In Miami. One of these is

named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.

10. For the future Simmons recommends:

a. That an ICFLUTTER operator be assigned to each base

permanently, not withstanding the expense. The need for such a man

(at times can be very urgent.

b. There should be one cleared Staff D room containing

all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room.

This means all Staff D files Involved, all operating cards

personality

and report cards, so that, for instance, a CI analyst can gothere and

o & complete job in perfect security. The Staff

D yield was_ a

"gold mine"

c. If CI section had been told the time and place of the

Invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the

adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for

document seizing, etc. In the towns that would be passed through.

11, Despite difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that

he results of his section's work were very good

and that one

Indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent bin

many matters for bandling that were not strictly of & CI nature; for

Instance, Inguiries from the DCI,. from Congress, etc.

In cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent

communicating by radio was not using hissafety signals, CI would belp

the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communica-

tions so that he would be kept alive. This sometimes required that

requests by the agent for supplies be complied with. In one case LUGLOG.

Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at

the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop

and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed

to the Cuban aircraft & crew

that was to make the air drop that the

agent was a double agent.

Accordingly the crew did not even go near

the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that

this had occured.

The result was that the man was Immediately taken

off the air and Simmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons

had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could

have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.

it shes

R. D. Shea

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## Page 45

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.d..

!:,:

ca. I:n:

MARC COUNTERINTELIGENCE PLAN

I. MISCION

To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other

covert means, Intolligence corerage of the organization, personnel, target

interests, nodus operandl, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence

and Security Serricos and the Cuban Communi 3t Party, to sinilarly develoo

Intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Carlbbean ares which aro

conducted by the U.S.S. Bo, by the U.r.io, and by the Chinese Communiots of

other pro-CASTRO deflalala and grouD8s to protect current and futuro CI, FI

and CA operations through analyals of their operational plans and through

examination of nev operational proposalas and to coordinate designated CI

nettors with the CI Staff and with stasi and geographic coronents of li

01v1810n.

II. REFERENCE

JHAS OPBRATIINALPLAN

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It 1a assential that an aggreastro counterintelligence program be

devised and laplemented to ensure sound operational escurity for JABC

operations, The MAPC countorintolligence offort u1ll, thereforo, le

directed towards acquiring Infornation concerning the organizations, personnel,

target interosts, nodus operandi, operations and asjets of foreign intolligence

and socurity services actire in the Carlbbean ares; towards analyzing JMAIC

oporational proposala and stans in light al what 18 learned about opposition

Intolligence capabilitios and activitios; and towards containing ininical

activitios directed agalns: JARC assets and operations.

SECRET

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## Page 46

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...--

• 2.

IV.

ORGAN. LATACN

Tho following dorsomel and facilities are required for successful

attelment of JMARC CI objectives.

a. Porsonnols One sonior CI officor; four oserations officers,

Iiro analysts (throe with a proflelony rating of high" in

roading spanish)s throe clork typists; one secretary. Initially,

two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JHANC

Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed

belor. Two analysts (with at least high proficlency rating in

reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screming certain

Inforuation roports. Ivo analysts (one sendor) and a clork typist

will form a rocords unit for the CI Section at Headquarteras tro

operations officars and a clark fypiat vill fora an operatione

unit for the CI soction at Headquarters.

b. Pac1l1t108s To CI soction a 1 Headquertore u1ll roquire vorting

spaca for ton personnel and for the following heavy alftoo equip

wants eight deske and chairss right standard typeuritera, one

card safes three four-draver salas. Standard offico sudolles should

Do provided. The Ci operatione undt at the FOB will rejulre support

commensurate to 1ts sizo.

V. PHASINO

L. YRETAHATORI PHASE

1. Principal Objoctives: To acquire current CI information on opposition

services in Carlbbean ares through developing courterintelligence

oberations and through recording ci intormation.

SECRET

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## Page 47

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S20

TA.:'

• 3 .

2 Operational Taskss

2. The Branch/L/CI officer vills

(1) Jeep "h10f, Branch/l Informod on CI soyulrements,

aprortunities and developnents affecting his branch.

(2). Koen PI Doputy, ill DIvIsion and Deputy Onlof, CI Stats,

and the Lattor's appointed staff roprtsontatives (VIctor

Wallen, Robert Bron, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), Informed

on CI mattors In which they hare an agreed interest (dee below).

(3) Direct asslatany: (I personnel in perfornance of those jobs

relating to the responsibilities citod belon.

(4) Carry out such other tasks which may be assignod to him by

ChioS, Branch/L.

The sendor CI afficor end Indiridual section afficers designatod

by hin will accomplish the sollorings

(1) Fantliarizo theselves with solocted Branch and Cl Staff

rodord assets and with designeted branch and diri son

personsel pertinent to their responsibilities in ordor to

affectitaly explat those assats and to coordinate vork on

CI operations with the eppropriate persons.

(2) Familiarize themselras with current Ci operations affecting

Cuba which are directed by Branch/l, by CI Staff, and/or by

i Division with the objectire of assuning responsibility

for those.

(3) Plan, coordinato, initiato and conduct CI operations not

specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI

Staff.

SEGRET

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## Page 48

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-4 =

(4) Propare draft CI rejuirements for FI/D analyste (accomplished).

in addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/u

officors sertinent CI requirements and operational guidance

paners pertinent to those officers' assigned responsibilitios.

(To date, I have forwarded my own study on "Utilization of

Exole Orcups in Clandestine Oper tons" to jerry Drollor.)

(5) Prepare an operational sunmay forat for use by operations

officers revlewing cases (acconoll shed).

(6) Prepero a defector register format cary (accomolished) and

organiza and maintaln a register of defectors.

(7) Explolt cortiin research and operational support assets of the

Clandestine Services in order to help all branch/y soctiona

in the achlovement of their objectives. To this end, one

analyst will work on astorials controllad by CI stall.

(8) Exasino currant operations and/ or programs in the fI and

CA flolda in ordor to onsure that CI opportunitios are fully

exploitad and to idantily operational socurity threats and

to recommend sound courses of action which will drevent or

counter such threats.

b. CI Staff condonents (eited in each instance) will have the followin

responsibilities:

(1) Chiof, SiD, CI Staff: iction rosnunsibility for penetration

and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and

Security Services at home and abroad las agreed to by Chief,

i Livision and Deputy Chief, (I Staff). Coordination wili

be afiacted with WH/W/CI and all traffic will be reloased by

SZONET

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## Page 49

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".!.

.;.

(2) Deputr niof, Ili, CI Staffs dotion responsibility for

ponetration of Cuban Communist Party ta third countrios,

usdng. Cubans as agents (as agrood to by Chief, Wi DIvIolan

and Deputy Chief, CI Staff), Coordination will be effected

with wH/W/CI and all traffle will be released by ii/4.

(3) Victor Mallon, Operationo Divisior, CI Staff: Responsibility

for commiling recorda end studios on Cuban Intelligence and

Security Services. To this end, I1ctor Wallen wills

(a) Frepare and maintain a briafing notebook on Cuban

• Intolligence and Security Services (accomplished).

(b) Preparo a guide for screening ii//Reports personality

cards and other record agsets in order to identify sus-

pact porsons alding or abetting Cuban clandestine actio

Titos (accomplioned).

(e) Propare lists of suspoct parsons and maintain these

lists on a current badla for exploltation by all Branch/4

sections and other igency comnonents vith operational

Interest. (Initlal lists have been propared in 13 books).

(d) Propare or assemble CI re uirements, as requested, which

pertain to the maintenance of lI actebooks on the Cuban

services. (Initial requirements have bein drawn up for

Ernie Sparks use.)

(4) Doouty Chief, GI/ICG: Pes-onalbility for compiling recorde

and studies on Cuban Communist Farty. To this end, question-

naires have been arenared for Agency officers assigned the

task of interrozating persons k'owledgeable of Cuban Cormunist

Farty persornel and sotivities.

S30P57

-

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• 6 .

(5) Wi/FI 11l preparo studios of CisinO subversire activitios

abroad.

3. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE

1. Principal Objectires to advance our Inowledge of OpDosttion dervices

and to develop a security service for the Cuuan Govemment in exile.

2. Operational Taokes

8. WH/L/CIs During tals second phase, i/WCI personnel will,

(1) Sereon overational correspondence and cable traffic for leada

to CI operations against the Cuban Intolligence and Security

Servicos and the Cuban Communist Party and forward pertinent

loads and CI Information to appropriato CI Staff component

and/or authorised securlty officers of agencios of U.s.

Intalliganco commund ty.

(2) 1a coordtration vita Pallitoel Action Soction of Wi/L, outlina

an organisation for a sacurity intelligance servico for the

Cuban Govemmant-1n Idle and 118t 1ts funations la detail.

(3) Continue and/or complato all tasks citod in Phase I.

(4) Start the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst

to serform those functions necossary to the Initiation and

conduct of socure Ci o prations and CI paytection ictivities.

bo

CI Staffs The SIO, ICQ, and OPS/WH, a8 Indicatod, will earry out

the following aoti 1tioss

(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intolligenco and Security S-rvicas

as required (OPS/MI).

(2) PreDare organizatt nal studles and Ulacklists of Cuben Intelli-

Rence and S curtty Seerleesporsonnel, and black lists as

person bie or abetting cuba clandestine actreese in

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## Page 51

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SECRE:

•7.

three catagorios of sensitivity for use by the agency, by

designatod mombers of the Unitod Statos Intelligenco community,

and by authorized components of the Cuban Gorurnment-11- Bdle.

(OPS/NI)

(3) Reviso liato of suspoct persons as roguired. (OPS/WH)

(4) Prepare special studios on Cuban Intelligence and Sacurlty

Services and on the Cuben Cormunist Party and other groups and

organizations activi in the Carlbbean area, as required. (0iS/N1)

c. WiNI u1ll continue atudlos of CASTRO subrorifre actiritios abroad.

VI. COOROINATION

Coordination en lI operations and on oparational sipport sotivitles

which lavolro Wil/TI, CI Stall and l/WaI v1ll bo affected by sendor CI

OffICar of l/l. Communieations on those nattors vill be by talophone

and/o5 personal nestinga, CI aspocts al lE/W/PI and CA operationa 111 bo

discussed by appropriato section offscors and the senfor CI officer or the

Lattor's designates.

SECRET

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRU SECURITY SERVICE

Jeet

TAB B

I. HISSION

To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRI

personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRO,

Its personnel, installations, secrets and activitles iron sabotage,

subversion and espionage.

II.

REFERENCES

A. Projeot Operational Plan

Bo Project Political Action Plan

C. Projest Counterintalligence Plan

D. Project Counterintalligence Budget for Fiscal lear 1961

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It 1s essential that the Agenoy create an aggressivo Berrace for

FRD Project activitles. Since there is no cartainty that the loaders

of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a nou

Govertment of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that

political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective

Project instrment, it 1s essential that the Agency's role in creating

an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER CARR

group. It 1s also essential that the leaders as vall as rank and filo

members of the FRD pay nore than 11p servico to the roquirements of

an affective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictato

a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members.

To this end the BaNdei-cARi group must direct the Fil to accept, in

return for its support, controls and limitations which must be imposed

by the security service 11 operational socurity lo to be achloved.

The Agency's objoctives in establishing and supporting a security

service for the FRD are:

1. To protect 1ts operational interests in the FRi; and

B. To acquire counterintelligence Infomation through participation

1n FRD operational security activities.

The security service of the FRD will have as Its objectives:

A. Screening all personnel holding significant FU positions;

B. Screening new adherants to the FRD;

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## Page 53

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=2-

C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRI personnel;

D. Maintaining physical security of FiD Installations;

E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers,

I. Enforcing personnel security regulations

G. Indootrinating FRD members on personel security;

H. Monitoring malcontentss and

lo Noguiring both positive and counterintelligence information.

To bulld a security service for the FRI capable of attaining Agency

and FRD objectives, 1t 18 necessary for the Agency,

1. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of

eight candidatess

B. To anton and odoo at ed to proto a ure fours,

training site in Mani,.

C. To create an organization whiah can fulfill assigned seourity

runotions.

D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates

to staff the organization,

I. To support the organization through the BENDER-GARR group by

providing sanitized record data, spealal training, financial

backing,: and, at need, operational faallltles; and

?. To supervise through the BENDE? CARR group the organization's

lay-to-day activitles.

To implement the plan for an FRD security service, BINDER CARR reprE-

sentatives in Medco CIty, Mian, washington and New lork will be

briefed on the plan for an FRI security service.

The Chief, FRD/Intel-

ligence and Security Subconnittee, will be directed by BENDER to select

seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing

will include medical examination, polygraph, and paychological assessment

of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and

functions of the security service by a representative of the BEiLER CARR

group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer

who vill be recommended to the FRI by the BENLER-CARR group. The

training u1ll cover subjocts pertinent to the service's day-to-day

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## Page 54

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security responsibilitles as spelled out in the organizational plan.

The FRi security components in Merco City, Washington and New York

will be Initially assigned one afficer each from the first group of

aight candidates. "The remaining five candidates will be assigned to

Mlan1. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the seourity

service, two additional men will be assigaed to lashington, six to

New York; six to Martoo Citys and eighteen to Miami.

OF GANIZAT ION

The organisational atructuro of the FRD security servica and of the

Agency's relatod support atructure are outlined in Attachment "A";

the facilitles and personnel required to staff and support these

structures are discussod belous

A. Facilities

1. Seourity office sites in Mosdoo City, Mlam1, Washington

and New York. (These will bo selooted by the OffICe of

Security, the Offico of Security vill Identify these

sites to the BENDER GARR group, which in turn will direct

their use by appropriate FRD componento.)

2. A training aste vill be seloctod In Mleal ly the DIFICO Of

soourity and identified to the BUNDER CARR group, which

In ture will recamend 1t to the Chias, FiD/Intalligence

and Socurity Suboommittoo.

3. One four-dravor salo will be acquirad by the office of

Security for uso in each office alto in the above-numed

atlos.

4a Appropriato offico supplies will be assembled by the FRD

oomponent in each alte.

B. Lorelen Personnel

1. A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited

as training officer for the security service. The bENDER

GARR group will recommend him to the FRI for this job as an

Indildual who, in 1ts experience, la best suited for the

Job, and as one who is nost acceptable to the BENDER CARi

organization.

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## Page 55

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2. The BENDinGARR group will direot chief, FRD Intelligence

and Security Subcommittee, to Immediataly select seven

officers for processing and training prior to assignment

1n tha FiD security BerTloo. Later, thirty-tro additiona

officers vill be salected for processing and training.

C. Start Personnal

Lo BENDER CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief

RD/ Intelligence and Socurity Suboomnittee, in all matter

pertaining to the security servloo.

2. Project CI offloers will provide through BENDER CARR

rapresentatives all advico, guidance and support to the

security sarica and 1to abial.

;

V. PHASING

1. Breparatory Phasa (25 111942t - 15 September):

1. Benary Oblastsya!

To implement the plan for the seoulty sandoe by salooting,

nasonaing and training an Initial cadre of algat offloore,

inaluding ables of the proposed sertior.

2a Reactional serical

8. Advise BENDER CARR representatives In Meddoo CIty, Mlen1,

HaBningion ünd iow JOrk, by dispatch vasto appropriato,

bofora 26 huguet, of the Agenay's plan and objootives

ragarding an FRD BOOUrIty sorrIOo.

• Advise Chief, IRD/ Intelligence and Socurity Suboomnittoo,

through BENDER, to saloot seren officers to participate

with hin In processing and training for assignent to

the FRO security servico.

o. Procure from each candidate a complate PHS, a certification

of health dated this jeer, and three lotters of recomendation

•from as many IRD sponsors.

do Arrange for polygraph examination of candidates through

the iroject security offico.

Prooure through the Project socurity offloo an appropriate

training alte in the Miani ares which will accommodate a

minimus of eight trainees and an instructor.

---

## Page 56

13-00000

I. Assign trainer to Mlami aftor BENDER gots concurrence

of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Suboomittee.

lo ArTange for ProjeCt CI OffIcer In Miani to brief trainer

on his assigament.

ho Quarter trainer in training alto.

1. Advise FRD representativo to purchaso minime offico

supplies fron list to be provided by the Projoot CI

offloar.

J. Provido trainer with a currioulun and a training sabodulo

which encompass on-the job applioation of techniques and

aktils.

ko Discuss with Chief, FRD/ Intelligenon and Seourity Sub

committee, the organization and funotions of the proposed

socurity service.

1. Initiate tralning of eight candidates (Including Chier

of the servion) and processing of othars.

s. Got signed secroay agreement and loyalty oath fron

sach student.

Do Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent.

candidatos as Aganay-sontrolled sources.

B. Deralesment Frazai (16 - 30 September)

I. BORATE Ob1R012191

To pee the outer not on a will vel enable 1t

2. Peerational Terkel

a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the alties nanod above.

b. Complete processing of remaining candidates.

c. Procure secure office sites in the citles named above

or chock the sites previoualy selectod.

do Initiato training of renaising candidates.

---

## Page 57

13-00000

-.-

•. Aotivato a recordo center in Miaml and provido 1t

with sanitized reoord data.

• forward physical security plan and physical socurity

ogulations to Chief, IRD/Intolligence and Security

subcommittee, through BENDER.

g. Forward operational security regulations for socurity

service to Chief, through BENDER,

b. Forward administrative procodures (Involving communica-

t10n8 anong FRD elements, dooment controls, otc.) to

Chief, through BENDER.

1. Give remaining trainoes thair security service assigments.

j. Rocrust casdidates selected in Preparatory Phase.

Go Antion Phase (30 September on) i

1. Bomary Obleetires

To 1dentlty and contein rabid CASTROITES, Cuben Coruniots,

members of the Ouben Seourity Services, and Orbit esplonaga

and sabotago personal.

2. leecational Tenka

2. More the seourity apparatus into Ouba with the FRI.

Do Provido FRD seourity Bartloe with black liats and

record data pertinent to the above objectivo.

c. Monitor FRD soourity activitios through the BENDER CARR

groupo.

D. Consolidation Phases

1. Prinary Oblective:

To direct the FRI security sertice in ite efforts to maintain

public security and to contain foreiga services activities.

2. Operational TaBle!

a. Roquest odeting security unite in the country to stay

on the job and to protect arn supplies, record assets,

and security force faollltles.

---

## Page 58

13-00000

--.

-7=

b. Contime to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting

CASTRO security personnel to the FRI.

o.. Monitor FRD seourity service activities in Cuba.

VI. COORDINATION

The above plan will be coordinated vith the Political Action,

FI, and Support Seotions of the Project.

VII. SUPPORE

See SUPPORT ANNEXES.

---

## Page 59

13-00000

FOR FUTURE

(preseut)

TABE

20 Aprll 1M1

sonestion roy chlee, uns

SUNJECT

8 0. Ростел вог ЛАТ Project

1o 0090931009....

vado de cossetinee, operacsone en

?toux

Mid-la 0st

Дит 1503

soares?

1e la anelelparad chas etbar

condtlate

dombla afons oparallons will is Idastillad

la the states chalr exploftation vill la coordianted ulis

tha relaTal BrisaRa of Innestigarion.

.: Do riopport dns direct de AMON allloara and aparte sor los

CADe, La tha collecelos el latellipanca partidase to frojare

inda, und la the mistliness of suel othar comero astlo

alpara vales nay bo desses wilhia their comparanco

8. To latrodesa Luto Cuba unilatarally controllad counter

8o to Interally the stoject' a Conarcador party pararrallon

ргодтом.

RO TO 1DC1RA8A COURRATIAtAlILyanCR aparationA rua Lato Cube

la conjusciton vita lialaos services of filendly constries.

1.

To counter the capica.ja, sabreralue and aiiclago sparationi

¿dractad by che Castro services agalast olte: states vitula

tho Hastarn Besfsphare.: Mila lo ba dona la confActlon MeA

la parrices of thase constitos vila valch na nalatala

11a1900.

---

## Page 60

13-00000

2. 198828:

cometelal del raseblar efrelen la Cuba), alsa located la

Hend.

da agenty-controlled Coomalet. Party pasatration afast

locarad la lavesa.

a la Aptery edafra Med afras vick escasa to leftles an

canalet estelas de the bartera Icalopharo, son la the

Sack CAty:

Romeas, sha M111 Do avallable los callpanas la Cabo la

suna of this poar.

¡'Bals country azori undar dif loarala soner son analesad lo

hes 13 299019 199100. 00b

a Refortty ol soon are Asty elffeers, bad ladleated

dafries ts piens rnl balp tha opposittos farses

indthough the rehallson nas erushed before

La conld seva

mesetasty sor la su lasluiduala to 1u1111l

al semitmanto. Is ser be essured that sous of thase poopl

1 MIII VIIlLIE dO DOSpATAtO DAS MAY DA TECTUILOA tOT 8L

aspose ol sunidalin incomarion non dealed un sad porasaly lol

astorals entrals operationi! txart100s Nuch es astabllehlm

Bots and roRTelkIny apanke. AI tha Branas Base, lor extaple,

AYOsOSAli PArDA CApCALRA LATA LAdICARRd MIlILASICIS tO COOpeTAtO.

The salant ly compendas afteed to ETY lo take isr bide und tse

nossty asdas acbool. Andalas that be had that capability, 1t

mey se further assumad that be could recraft agents and laforaante

El thesa bases.

Ottar passiala assara of ella type suelude the calala al lha fourea

POd FUIEN INRA LORAS LA PLARI del lla sad ChA Calel of Palica La

SaNte ClAra, Les. Y1llas Pronlace.

la adestlos na tuve os deró a llor al paraatial defrerors vuo bovo

pRora cLalllusLomment vitA CASTRO, and Mão hora bees approsched

bart uso have nos pel deelared loenselnes. It la passible that the

tura di erante ser bove belftesed their diall li forerat; toy bri

---

## Page 61

13-00000

=.

-ofe

NOT-LUBLIS BElAILOTTLIT. ThO AJeRCY ReSt rACOgaiTS tbe

POOLE! IET 0% strALIsd ¿Relleza becaure of the fallure of

tha LovestoR, It la balloNAd ChAt REA ATODEY rAprADestitITe

La Hoal vill be able, bacausa of lla escalless peracoal

ralettonsalp sdtà tha Calel al Che ADS seTTICe, tO NeLAtALE

A ARTLAFACTOTY NOTKLAS TALArIORSHIP.

tha ment chals porlilone bacons ustereble..

1asldo Cuba la Vien of che LASTRADad DeCATItY neRMITes DALEE

implemasted by the Castro sarticas.

JDS ELA PATECJONLATY eRBArS LaTIdo CeDe LenA probably bees

COmprODie Бу СЕТІГ РОИТІУ dOUt клавЕте чЛЬА я КА

Rius el tRA IMPastOR, lacA ol thera esseta or dal tere la

trarloas.

1 - WV4/CI Carono

---

## Page 62

13-00000

SEGRET

TAR

29 17x12 1863

o Negra ter neet Prufacto, doted d0 harti 1961. bate paper ve

Es apatieton la the pacotto sersa.

S20.31

---

## Page 63

13-00000

T'C-LASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, Task Force

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

RECEIVED

th

FORWARDED

FFICER

IMA

NO

DATE

10 July 1962

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

a whom..

Drom a line across column offer each commont.)

1. Deputy Director

(Plans)

MI.

Elder for DCI

2.

3.

10.

11.

12.

EYES ONLY

SEONEY

BY, HAND

13.

14.

15.

FORM

FORE So 610 USE RENOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

180151

ITERNA

SE ONI

GROUP T

assitication

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 64

13-00000

LIEU

20162-4797

10 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THROUGH:

SUBJECT:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director. (Plans) ut

Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz

1. ACTION: None. This memorandum is for your informa-

tion.

2.

In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the

Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz,

half-sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz.

A number of reports

have been received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed

the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was

prepared, at least to some extent,

to cooperate with

anti-

regime elements.

In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and

recruited Mrs.

Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of

the Brazilian

ambassador to

the USSR and a long time personal

friend of Juana Castro Ruz.

3.

On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha

proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact

with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until

1 July 1962.

She discussed. the current regime quite frankly

with

Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she

obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the

Cuban political leadership and

to work against the Cuban

communist regime, short of

engaging in activity which might

result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel.

According to. Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to

Mexico or. the United States in this connection

and return to

Cuba after discussions

with "the Americans"

4.

We are

making the necessary arrangements with

Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed

to Mexico as

soon

as possible in order that we may attempt a direct re-

cruitment. You will be kept advised of any future develop-

ments of

importance in this case.

lilliar liarma

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

C/ TFW

SEC

-727

73

LILS

---

## Page 65

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

IMILKMAL

USE ME VIC@

COA CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

I SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executito Registry

6V-310

FROM:

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

1317 Barton Hall

TO: (Officer designation, room numbar, and

DATE

building)

DeI

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

DDCI

203 Admin. Building

z.

IFFICER'

NIAL

admintile

NO.

DATE

10 January 1962

COMMENTS (Number ooch comment to show from whom

to whom.

Drom a line ocross column after each comment.)

orig to DDCJ-1/13/i2

4.

5.

7.

8.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORMA

I DEC SO

610 USE RONS

PREVIOUS

SECRET

'CONFIDENTIAL

D

180085

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 66

13-00000

EVE

801f-2-0128

11513-62-0173

Executiva Regisiry

67- 310

20 Jarary 1962

MEKORANDUN PORs Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJEGT

rocamsandetion epproved by the preaddent,

a Asgast 1961, Subjocts Gorart Aot1on

progras Agarnet Cabe

C/eID tenorendas to DaI, subjaets dotion

usta rospect to the Agonoy Reserto 1or

Contingency held by the barem of the

Badget, approvod by DCI 19 October 2961

the tolerinons olles establlehed the ourrent sarg

sotltity and obta1nad fende 14 the aromat at 15.36 1221009

so operato the projost durlag the perlad 1 Jely -11 sacabos

1961.

la do net forta 1a paragrapa sour ol referenos "so 11

Lo intendod that the fiannadal and sule ragueresente os tal

projest be regalarizad to the estout parelolo assaloreet nlta

oparational regeirante.

3o. In the Projoot Astbority, raformos neo, os l sagust

1961, and is mbsegreat discussions, the president approned

conert oporations inoladlag the funding of vertona persoas,

sroupe, or aotltitles, cubar and sor-vubes, maloh, la es

opinios, nay be able to advanos the oner-ell abjectivas of

JATE. Ibese Individualo, groups, and sotivitler dre end

will be sany and teriad.

In sany instances de till be able

o exaroise little os no control over tao sundo, material,

arms, or equipuant civen suce entitles nor receito any multable

eccounting fras then.

SECT

---

## Page 67

13-000Q0

L. I hars, therefore, authorised the Doputy Director (Plans)

to pass to such persons, groups and activities, much MATi sonies,

materlel, ars and equipment as in his opirdon say be necessary

o suppor ser paraors, groups and activitles. une baputy birecto

Plana, 18 authorired to delegate this authority to the OP/doe, th

Giles, Hestora Headophere DiTialon, the Chlas, Mi/4, and Onlef,

So fundo adranoed la sacorderos dith thie ruthority shall bo

rocounted for in rocordanco with normal Agesay raquiremente except,

that, with respect to activitles not controlled or acentatered

by the Agency, ouch as thore deserlbed in peragraph 3 ebove,

oertificallons by the person prosing funde to the activity may be

accepted as final rooonting when approved by an afflolal dasignated

aboTe. such certifiantions shall state the anount passed, dato, und

general purposs of the payment, and that further accounting 1n sot

practioal.

6. During the project development, unting of sub-projecte

aB set forts in paragraph lour of referenco ab" vill be deferred.

In 1104, thereof, the project uill provide you with coples of

reference na" shich vill be supplemented by nore formal docusen-

tation shen spocitle projects evolve as deterainad by the deputy

Diraotor (Plans) With the arception of the notitlides eltod

La paragraphe three and four abore, notivitios unlch in the opinion

il the Departy Direstos (Plans) lend themselves to ragelerisatior

trongh scindatratito pluss or flocal andexan tall ba po doca-

lo This anthority does not anend ragulatory authoritsas

li respoot to addaistretive settara covering agency personnel.

SIGNED

JOHN A. KC CONE

Director

COtiCUN?8

13/

Carp troller

Tt62 ZaW 62

1Sls

Dato 1

CES DICI

DIP

DIS

Comptroller

c/Audit stef$

---

## Page 68

13-00000

...

-

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PRO.

POSED

TO

ürief, «: 11v15:00

INFC.

FROM

PROCESSING

ACTION

MARIE: FOR INGEKiNG

NO NECKING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFICE

HEASQLARTERS GESK

LAR " UGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

MICROF LM

ACCOM

PLISHED

Shier of Rare, d. 1'1

SuBE perational/S Ari/üC

CTION REQUIRED. REFERI

Action loquireds for infornation ard files

Following 1s a brial surnary of JuliusuriSt current assets in the

Target Area (CuBa) &

do IMCT-218 Subject 1s a sourco of operational intelligenco In Fabana.

tie are radntaining contact via Sio

subject had a W/T set, cached 1t

and no longer kas access to it. A'Yal has been instricied to deliver

arotbir one to him.

Do AliT-Lis Subject 18 a sourca of operational intellijence in Uriento

irovince, ¡e are in contact vith subject via a citout at to Guantanaso

Naval 3ase.

• METAL 2000d 2001 1 10 580 So a ta ano 18076. They provido

• lolando MARlA.T Mlies Subject 18 an AXI Eub sOUrCO 1n Minar del 210

ubject 18 curruntly reorzanising his a:sets in that provinci

a. Jose inuel FLiNAliDu? fuintangs Subject 18 al AiCI eub source 1n the Port

of Habana.

1. VIOlate YACIAS 18 89 AMCT I1T0 drop 11 Habana and 18 BIlll actino.

• ¡OrDeriO ARTHEL l8 In AIT Muo source and 18 ACtIVe In iRDeRS An

¡nas cal Rio irovinces

2o SHAVE/NUDiST current and futuro plans are to continuo to support and

direct the edsting prosts 1t has 18 Cube as outlined in paragrapa l abore, Moroner

plens are non in notion for the followings

8, Berlitrato, aitber legally of block, MANGUART aod MARTINEZ for further

training and retura to the targot area

3 kHD

§CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED

22 My 62

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UrGAs 1639

DATE DISPATCHED

LASSIFICATIOI

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

19-5-3

ORIGINATING

E

---

## Page 69

13-00000

SECRET

UPRAS 1639

Page 02

Do sacruit and alopazoo in una poar future of at leest tour other Agente

to the targot arse.

c. Parlerato 1401-68 for trainanz and rotart la the largot area. plan 1o

eleo to priorion lla volt a trainad redso pereton

3. MATE/KUNKSE 18 1n E he prObatE os roosendelay Do dh the 140I and Al'AST

souplAn do follows!

d't sa being a

and/a

•To support of other Bare AVE sectione, the lust Bection

‚demelop and recruit assets sor see la the tarzot area. ln cemale la sett

end, an int

a, tão detection, Identifleation end seutralisatios of hostile letalligence

action.

Do isoriso security ctiroico on acerts, porential aene and assolo, and

mill continie ie sevelop a aparados do be used as an deert corpe Wilch dan de ide

In troll of an and is We A SECRETTY

•support of tie post-castro

to the rain source to? thl

---