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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSA

RECORD NUMBER

144-10001-10287

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DATE: 10/08/91

PAGE::

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSA

FROM

NSA

TO : ARR

NSA RESPONSE TO AFREE QUESTIONS RE NSA CAPABILITIES/RECORDS

AGES : 04/01/9

SUBJECTS

VSA RESPONSE TO ARRRE QUESTIONS RE CAPABILITIES/RECORDS

CLASSMENCATION: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

RESTRICIIONS : 1A, 1B

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/24/98

OPENING CRITERIA

ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED

COMMENTS :

IR] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Released pursuant to Executive Order 14176, DECLASS. OF RECORDS CONC. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF PRES. JFK, SEN.

REK, AND

THE REV.

DR. MIK, JR.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYLAND 20755Sefial: N5₽/ 017/98

01 April

1998

Mr. T. Jeremy Gunn

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Gunn:

(U) In response to your letter of November 28, 1997, we tasked

appropriate elements of the NSA Operations and the NSA Archives elements to

search for information responsive to your questions. In addition, a member of

my staff reviewed our United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and USIB SIGINT

Subcommittee record holdings. The following represents the composite

response of these elements.

(TS-CCO) Question #1: What were NSA targeting priorities and capabilities

against Cuba in Mexico City during the period 1963-1964? Including

records of the U.S. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Board,

what records does NSA possess on tasking and results from these

capabilities? In particular, did NSA target communications between

Havana and Mexico City? (During the meeting Messrs. Hatch and

Fogarty suggested that the Army Security Agency had a facility in the

American Embassy in 1963 targeting the Cuban Embassy, although its

operations did not meet with great success.) Mr. Hatch stated that

Mr. (Howard K.? Harold? Johnny?) Johnson, a former NSA employee,

might have more specific knowledge of such an operation and that you

could contact him.

(TS-CCO) ANSWER: A record of the SIGINT Subcommittee of the USIB

from August 1993 provides a recap of the USIB SIGINT Subcommittee's Priority

National Intelligence Objectives. Included in this recap are objectives

[requirements] to obtain information on 1) Soviet and Cuban military

capabilities, 2) Soviet and Cuban capabilities, intentions, and efforts to initiate

or support internal warfare in other countries, 3) critically important political,

economic, and scientific and technical developments in Communist countries

[USSR, Cubal; actual or potential conflicts within the ruling groups, major

developments in Soviet and Cuban external policy, and 4) the reactions of Latin

American governments and peoples to developments in and with respect to

Cuba.

DRV FM: NSA/CSS Manual 123-2

Dated: 24 February 1998

DECL ON: X1,X3,X5,X6,X7,X8

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Released pursuant to Executive Order 14176, DECLASS. OF RECORDS CONC. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF PRES. JFK, SEN.

REK,

AND

THE REV.

DR. MLK,

JR.

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(TSC) An NSA COMINT Technical Report (A5/A6 COMINT TECHNICAL

REPORT #1-66- A Survey of Soviet Communications in Cuba) regarding SIGINT

results of the targeting of Cuba was reviewed by Dr. Hall. This appears to be the

most comprehensive record of our capabilities against Cuba for the 1963-1964

timeframe. Numerous Cuban cryptosystems were exploited during the early

1960s, including some Cuban military and illicit agent communications

through depths or diagnosis and exploitation. NSA had an excellent capability

to meet the SIGINT challenges of the 1960's. We had field sites in position to

copy the signals of interest in Cuba, and those communication exchanges

internationally between countries.

(TSC) Product reports based on the targeting of Mexican Diplomatic

communications were reviewed by two members of my staff. Some of these

reports were the result of targeting of communications between Havana and

Mexico City. However, no records responsive to the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Act of 1992 were located other than those already passed

to the ARRB. There were no reflections in any of these products of any activity *

that might have been related to the assassination, only post-assassination

reflections of U.S. political and protocol developments. NSA has approximately

12 shin boxes (4 linear feet] of Mexican Diplomatic records.

(S) In early December 1997 the ARRB staff was provided with the name

and phone number of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

(INSCOM) historian who has information regarding an Army Security Agency

(ASA) collection site in Mexico City during the 1963-1964 timeframe. The

INSCOM historian is Jack Finnigan who can be reached on 703-706-2630.

Mr. Finnigan advised us of information contained in an ASA unit history report

that was written by J. Johnson. In addition, I understand that members of your

staff met in December 1997 with Mr. Frederick Berghoff, former Chairman of

the National SIGINT Committee (previously known as the USIB SIGINT

Subcommittee), who provided the ARRB staff with his recollections of NSA

activities regarding the Central and South American Regions in the early- 1960s.

(V)

Question #2. What, if any, additional NSA capabilities were added to target

communications sources within Cuba between November 1962 and the end of

1964? What information does NSA have on the targeting of communications

sources within Cuba by CIA? Was there any liaison between NSA and CIA on this

issue? NSA stated that it may have between six and tweive boxes of Cuba-

related material. Of what do these records consist? May the ARRB staff examine

these records?

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Released pursuant to Executive Order 14176, DECLASS. OF RECORDS CONC. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF PRES. JFK, SEN.

REK, AND

THE REV. DR. MLK, JR.

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(TS-CCO) ANSWER: The records of the USIB SIGINT Subcommittee for

the period November 1962 through 1964 were recently reviewed. No SIGINT

Objectives were included in the SIGINT Subcommittee's objectives regarding

Mexico for the 1962-1964 timeframe. The August 1963 SIGINT Subcommittee

record recaps SIGINT Objectives and the 5 and 18 November 1963 and the 10

January 1964 records indicate that requirements to target Soviet forces in Cuba

and Soviet-Cuban Agreements were already receiving priority SIGINT coverage.

The 2 December 1963 record appears to show a change in priorities because it

presents "pertinent examples of actions underway or planned...": 1) increase in

intercept and more timely consolidated reporting on Cuban military problems,

2) intercept and analysis of communications related to illicit... activity...seeking

information on Cuban illicit nets in particular., 3) A new attack on the problem

of tracing the movements of Cuban subversive agents and of travel by Cubans

into the U.S., the Soviet Bloc and Latin America, 4) Additional ship and airborne

intercept of Cuban communications is planned, and 5) Increased efforts to

develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military and

paramilitary communications of all Latin American countries.

(TS-CCO) NSA collectors, based on their personal recollections, were

alerted to put greater emphasis on Soviet Block and Cuban military targets to

look for signs of increased readiness in their force posture. Analysts at NSA

were also looking for signs of diplomatic reactions to, and foreign intelligence

reporting on, the assassination. Any voice and cipher traffic was thoroughly

processed from the surrounding timeframe. Analysts on targets that were

unexploitable from a cryptanalytic standpoint reviewed traffic patterns to

ensure that no deviations indicating unusual activity had been overlooked.

(S-CCO) A review of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) records

held by NSA shows CIA and NSA top-level Agency cooperation/ coordination on

intelligence targeting via the USIB. However, according to recollections of

individuals working at NSA in the mid 1960s, liaison between CIA and NSA for

the 1962-1964 timeframe was limited and no record of CIA/NSA cooperation/

coordination at the working levels of the agencies was located. We searched for

records of CIA targeting of Cuban communications, but no records were located.

However, the USIB records make repeated reference to Committee on Overhead

Reconnaissance (COMOR) Biweekly Report on High-Level Coverage of Cuba with

the caveat that the information was distributed through restricted channels.

Because we do not have copies of the COMOR reports, we are unable to

determine if the tasking of these missions was limited to PHOTINT, or if SIGINT

was also performed from the overhead vehicles. COMOR was the predecessor

of the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS). The SORS

committee is a subcommittee of the current U.S. SIGINT Committee. The

Chairman of the SORS is Mr. John Berwin (phone number: 202-496-9828).

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Released pursuant to Executive Order 14176, DECLASS. OF RECORDS CONC. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF PRES. JFK, SEN.

REK, AND

THE

REV.

DR. MLK, JR.

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(TSC) Regarding the "six to twelve boxes" discussed during our meeting

with Dr. Hall and members of the ARRB Staff in November 1997, these boxes

referred to are records regarding Mexican Diplomatic communications. As

mentioned in response to Question #1, a recent review of these records did not

result in locating any records not already identified as responsive to the JFK

Assassination Records Act. The ARRB staff is welcome to examine these

records as well as any other of the records mentioned in this letter. The records

pertaining to Cuba and Mexico for this timeframe held by NSA have been

researched and those believed to be responsive to the John F. Kennedy Records

Act of 1992 have been provided to the ARRB.

(S-CCO) Question #3. What capabilities and targeting priorities did NSA have against

Cuba outside of Mexico City and Cuba itself during the time period 1960-1964?

What records of this targeting and any results might still exist?

(TSC) ANSWER: For the timeframe 1960-1964 NSA targeted and was

successful in collecting Cuban communications to/from its Embassies and/or

diplomatic missions in: Algiers, Athens, Bamako, Beirut, Belgrade, Berlin,

Brussels, Bucharest, Conakry, Colombo, Copenhagen, Djakarata, Geneva, The

Hague, Hanoi, Helsinki, Karachi, London, Lisbon, Moscow, New Delhi, Rome,

Santiago, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Ulan Bator, Vatican City, Prague, Accura, Cairo, Paris,

and Vienna. We maintain copies of SIGINT product reports, which are NSA

reports based on the intercept of communications, for this period. Those

reports deemed responsive to the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Act of

1992 have been forwarded to the ARRB.

(TS-CCO) Question #4. What policy recommendations from the time period 1960-64

might still exist which reflect NSA policy making or tasking on Cuban

diplomatic or military communications outside of Cuba?

(U) ANSWER: As stated previously, the USIB SIGINT Subcommittee

records show the objectives (requirements for targeting) and are available for

review by ARRB members or staffers.

(S-CCO) Question #5. Are there any COMINT Board recommendations or tasking on

the targeting of Mexican communications during the period 1963-1964? Does

NSA have any other independent knowledge of these targets?

(S-CCO) ANSWER: No recommendation specific to Mexico was located,

however, the USIB SIGINT subcommittee record of 2 December 1963 presents

as one of the "pertinent examples of actions underway or planned...:"

"Increased efforts to develop information on the technical characteristics of the

internal military and para military communications of all Latin American

countries"

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Released pursuant to Executive Order 14176, DECLASS. OF RECORDS CONC. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF PRES. JFK, SEN.

REK, AND THE REV. DR. MLK, JR.

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(TS-CCO) Question #6. Including all records of the COMINT Board, what records does

NSA have that refer to the targeting of any Soviet assets in Mexico City that

were in place during the period 1963-1964? What were NSA capabilities and

targeting priorities against Soviet targets in Mexico City from 1963-1964?

(TS-CCO) ANSWER: No records referring to NSA targeting of Soviet

assets in Mexico City were located. Our interest in Mexico and our capability

against any targets in Mexico City was very limited.

(S-CCO) Question #7. Did NSA produce a Technical SIGINT Report (TSR) on Mexican

capabilities in 1963?

(S-CCO) ANSWER: A search for any Technical SIGINT Reports or similar

documents was performed in January 1998 but no records documenting NSA's

capabilities against Mexican target for the period 1960-1964 were located.

(S-CCO) The ARRB staff was provided with the name and phone number

of an INSCOM historian, Mr. Jack Finnigan (Phone Nr. 703-706-2630), who has

information regarding an Army Security Agency collection site in Mexico City

during the 1963-1964 timeframe. In addition ARRB staff members met with

Frederick Berghoff, the former Chairman of the National SIGINT Committee, to

obtain some "recollections" from Mr. Berghoff regarding NSA's interest and

capabilities regarding Mexico in 1963.

(U) If you have any questions or need additional clarification regarding

the information provided, please contact either Lee Schroyer or Claudia Collins

of my staff on (301)688-6798.

Sincerely,

Aunt. The

JOANN H. GRUBE

Deputy Director of Policy

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Released pursuant to Executive Order 14176, DECLASS. OF RECORDS CONC. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF PRES. JFK, SEN.

REK, AND THE REV. DR. MLK, JR.

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