FIRST MEETING OF BRANCH 4 TASK FORCE, 9 MARCH 1960
Originator: CIA
From: UNSIGNED
To: FOR THE RECORD
Document date: 03/09/1960
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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UNSIGNED

FOR THE RECORD

FIRST MEETING OF BRANCH 4 TASK FORCE, 9 MARCH 1960

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

03/09/1960

3

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE:

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS :

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

11/03/1995

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Minutes of meeting.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, 9 March 1960

PARTICIPANTS: Col. J. C. King, CWH; J. D. Esterline, C/WE/4; Jack Baumann,

Office of Security; Col. B. H. Vandervort, OTR; George Geyer,

Office of Communications; Mike Ting, Comptroller; Scudder Georgian

DDS; Mr. Robert Macre, PP Staff; Ralph W. Brown, Oftice of

Logistics; Ralph Brown, PP Staff; Col, Charles Cocke, OF/MPD,

HOT

WH/4/PM

Mr. Esterline briefed the group on the current situation in Cuba

with the report that an

alert has been sounded to initiate Phase One of the

unified evacuation plan in Cuba. He added that this group would be working

largely together in operational programming and planning.

2. Col, King told the group that the DCI is presenting a special policy

paper to the NSC 5412 representatives.

He mentioned growing evidence that certain

of the "heads" in the CASTRO Government have been pushing for an attack

on the U.S. Navy installation at Guantanamo Bay and said that an attack on

the installation is in fact, possible.

Col. King stated that the first problem in this operation is how

to reach the mass of Cubans with the truth. To date, he said, we have been

denied use of certain American islands that might be useful for either PP

or PM activities. In addition, a number of Chiefs of State of friendly

smaller countries are, at the moment, unwilling to "stick their necks out

further to support an operation directed at the overthrow of the CASTRO regime.

They are in fact, worried that their respective countries may soon

be the victims of Cuban exploitation. He said that unless Fidel and Raul

CASTRO and Che GUEVERA could be eliminated in Sad package - which is highly

unlikely - this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present

government will only be overthrown by the use of force.

4. Returning to the basic operational premises, Col. King said that

the first problem is to reduce the base of support of the CASTRO Government

with the masses (reportedly the regime now enjoys the support of between

60 and 70 percent of the population). An additional problem is that opposition

forces have no real leader and are divided into many parts with some

of them's

, susceptible to merger than others.

Three groups appear to be satis-

factory for initial exploitation and each of these has been asked to come up

with names of potential candidates for paramilitary and allied training.

After training, this group could become the instructor cadre to train additional

Cuban covert action groups.

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The DCI, Col. King said, has approved the training of the instructor

cadre at a U.S. military installation. The principal installation under

consideration at this time is Fort Sherman in the Canal Zone which is under

the control of the U.S. Army's Jungle Warfare Training Center. The DCI has

also approved the Phase Two training, that is the training of Cuban action

groups, in non-U.S. territory. A given area in one of the Caribbean countries

has been offered and is under consideration, Col. King expressed the opinion

that the minimum time that will be consumed in this training will be between

6 and 7 months. It is hoped that during this period the acceptable opposi-

tion groups will have been merged and will have formed a government-in-exile

to which all trained elements could be attached.

6. Col. King, addressing himself to the enemy's capabilities and

programs, said that CASTRO will unquestionably continue to train and arm

various worker and student groups who can be mobilized into militia elements

in support of the regular military establishment of Cuba. He added that

reports indicate that CASTRO has more arms and ammunition available to him

now than BATISTA had at the height of his power and warned that under no

circumstances should we underestimate the capabilities of the enemy. He

said that the Cuban operation would be far more difficult and complicated

than

the previous one conducted by this Division and that before this prob-

lem is solved, major operations will be necessary.

7.

Capsulizing various intelligence reports, Col. King said the Cubans

are now initiating operations with an objective of establishing revolutionary

movements in the Caribbean area that are not limited to those countries

that are under dictatorships. With Ambassadors acting as chiefs of operations,

the Cuban Government apparently hopes to overthrow the existing national

governments and establish in their place governments that are far left and

that are friendly to, and if possible, controlled by Cuba.

Naturally, he

added, this is generally in line with the objectives of International

Communism which are, and for some time have been, to divide the traditional

solidarity of the Latin American countries to the detriment of U.S. national

security and foreign policy objectives.

8. In terms of operational problems, Col. King stated that he knew of

no Latin American country whose people were less secure operationally than

Cubans. On the CI side, he said that it is known that CASTRO has more than

122 agents in the Miami

area alone.

9. In summarizing the more immediate requirements and possibilities,

MI. Esterline said that the support of all offices represented at the meeting

will be required on a continuing basis. He added that support from the

Office of Security, Logistics, and OTR and others would be needed comparatively

soon in:

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a. Assessment of potential recruits to the instructor cadre.

b. Establishment of an operational base which will probably be located

in the Miami area.

c. The establishment of a secure base in a foreign country for the

training of Cuban action groups.

10. He said that while we are awaiting national policy authorizations,

Branch is proceeding with its planning operations and is preparing two

babjects at this time, one to cover extensive radio operations which probably

will include the establishment of a "gray" radio transmitter and another

subject for the development of air and maritime capabilities for the in-exfil-

tration of men and materiel.

Il. He suggested that the group of specialists meet here at the Branch

weekly. The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 15 March, * Although the

overall Cuban project per se does not, as yet, have a cryptonym, Mi. Esterline

explained the reasons for the formation of Branch 4 in WE Division and

suggested that. use

of "Branch 4'' in communications would be sufficient to

Infotify the subject.

He mentioned that the following Branch 4 personnel would be in

contact with the participants at the meeting from time to time for planning

the operational purposes:

Mr. Robert Reynolds; DC/WH/4

Mr. David Phillips, Radio Operations

Mr. Phillip Toomey, PP

Mr. Robert Whedbee, Economic Action

Mr. Adolf Lium

MI. Ex/A. Stanúlis; Plans and PM Ops

13. Mr. Esterline indicated that an additional step in obtaining policy

for operational support from other elements of the U.S. Government would be

taken tomorrow, Thursday, 10 March 1960, when certain WE and PP Staff personnel

would confer with Captain Spore, USN, a member of the Staff of the Office of

Naval Operations, Department of Defense.

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