MEMO ON QJWIN
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

QJWIN

According

to statements by a senior CIA officer in 1967, made

to the Inspector

General, the Agency was instructed to develop a

capability to conduct assassinations.

Termed an "executive action

capability, " such a project was initiated in 1961, apparently assuming

an existing cryptonym, ZRRIFLE. At the request of the case officer

(the same officer providing this information in 1967), a clandestine

asset in Europe, QJWIN, was to be used in the project. The case

officer understood that QJWIN had been considered in 1960 for use

in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, but that the proposed

operation was never carried out because the designated CIA case

officer declined the assignment.

The case officer in charge of ZRRIFLE also was involved in an

operation to assassinate Fidel Castro, running from early 1962 to

mid-1963. However, QJWIN was not used in this effort, reliance

being placed instead on a Cuban exile leader. QJWIN was never

briefed on the Castro operation,

according to the officer handling

ZRRIFLE and the Castro operation.

Records do show that QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo in

1960, being

there in November and December 1960, prior to the

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death of Lumumba at the hands öf Congolese. However, there is no

evidence to suggest that QJWIN was in any way involved in Lumumba's

demise.

The case officer who was the source of the information of

the contemplated use of QJWIN in such an activity understood that he

was never

used in this manner. The following information reviews

existing knowledge beyond that summarized above.

A 13 October 1960 dispatch from Rome transmits notes to

headquarters from one of the two officers who subsequently met

QJWIN in Luxembourg. The notes list the names of police officials

and criminal

elements and allude to the possibilities of finding safe-

crackers and document-suppliers.

QJWIN was met in Luxembourg on 19 and 20 October 1960 by

two Agency officers and was

asked if he would undertake a trip to

Africa, presumably Dakar. (The appropriate dispatch, dated

2 November 1960, lists only Luxembourg and Dakar as addressees.)

He was not given the true objective of his mission because of its

extreme sensitivity and pending a final decision to use him. Instead,

he was told that the Soviets were operating in Africa among nationality

groups, specifically Corsicans, and he was being asked to spot,

assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for

our use.

He agreed to go on the trip. On 2 November QJWIN was

met in Frankfurt by an Agency officer, and he accepted an offer to

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proceed to Leopoldville.

(Presumably the idea for sending him

there originated at headquarters because someone must have

considered him qualified to handle a potential operation there.) The

precise mission was not conveyed to QJWIN,

and he was only informed

that the mission might involve

a large element of personal risk. We

do not know and at present are unable to determine what the assignment

was.

Subsequent cable traffic discusses arrangements for QJWIN to go

first to Leopoldville and then to Dakar.

• On 8 December QJWIN was in Leopoldville where he cultivated

a close personal relationship with a Yugoslav Air Force pilot. There

follow suggestions in cable traffic on what approach QJWIN should use

to recruit him. However, a special channel FI/D cable of 14 December

rates this target as marginal when considered against the framework of

plans for QJWIN and instructs

him to desist if action has not already

been taken.

The first paragraph of this cable states that we "would

like restrict QJWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission

Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere

(e.g., Milan) for FI/D purposes.

He our only asset of this type and

we wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that

originally planned for him." This cable would tend to rule out

involvement in an assassination plot, since it is highly unlikely that

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SaGA

BE CIT

an individual picked for such a sensitive and dangerous assignment

would be burdened with other chores or assignments immediately

thereafter.

Lumumba was still alive, albeit under arrest, as of the middle

of January 1961, and it seems clear that QJWIN had left the Congo

in December 1960. A 19 December cable to Leopoldville authorizes

his return to Luxembourg on 21 December and instructs Luxembourg

to pay him 1000 dollars for December salary, which is the final

payment for his services on this operation. Also, headquarters was

working out the details of a Congo assignment. An I1 January 1961

headquarters

memorandum, which refers to T/A's dated 21 December

1960, states

that the referenced amounts were given to OrWIN by the

Chief of Station, Luxembourg. This suggests that QJWIN was in

Luxembourg on or before 21 December.

Subsequently, it appears that QJWIN operated in Europe trying

to spot and

assess individuals whom the Agency could use in safe-

cracking operations, in line with one of the principal missions of

FI/D. A 24 May 1962 cable to Luxembourg mentions that a decision

was made to keep him in Europe and that the Leopoldville assignment

had been cancelled. A transfer to Baden-Baden is deemed a good

choice. Also, a 24 April 1961 disptach from Luxembourg, which

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mentions the termination of QJWIN's contract,

refers to the fact

that his only assignment since January 1962 has been to establish

cover.

Agency officers who were handling QJWIN in Europe were almost

certainly unaware of the fact that he was being considered as an asset

by the senior Agency official who had begun to become active in

February 1962

in the assassination plot against Castro. An undated

(EYES ONLY) memorandum from the Deputy Director (Plans) refers

to a 19 February 1962 memorandum and authorizes the retention of

the services of QJWIN in activities which we have identified as

coincidential with the assassination plot against Castro. The date of

the reference memorandum coincides with the time that the senior

Agency official became actively involved in this enterprise. A

memorandum of 27 June 1963 dealing with the further handling of

QIWIN mentions that this enterprise has been terminated, except

for one precautionary "life line. "

In summary, it is almost certain that QJWIN had nothing at all

to do with the assassination of Lumumba, even though the contents and

language of available files are often cryptic and imprecise. If he had

been, it is highly unlikely that the number of Agency officers handling

and contemplating

assignments for him would have been

so large.

The

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(

BRACE

headquarters division for whom he worked was concerned, inter

alia, with obtaining foreign cipher and code books, and it is reasonable

to conclude that QJWIN's primary

and exclusive responsibility was to

find individuals who could do this kind of job. One of the officers who

first met QJWIN in Luxembourg was on a trip overseas to find safe-

crackers and document-suppliers. The 14 December 1960 cable

mentions keeping him clean and using him in Dakar and possibly Milan,

which was specifically mentioned in the 13 October dispatch

as offering

good possibilities for finding safecrackers and document-suppliers.

Further, good tradecraft practices would dictate that the last thing

that would keep an individual clean would be involvement in an

assassination plot. Although the Chief of FI/D coincidentally was

later

assigned responsibility for the Castro operation, there is

no evidence to suggest that he was privy to assassination plots prior

to his briefing

in late 1961.

While QIWIN was considered for use in the "executive action

capability"', there is no information available to suggest that he had

ever

been approached in this regard, much less used in any of tha

planning.

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50057

Based on available evidence it seems clear that the Agency

was in no way involved in the assassination of Lumumba. However,

in the course of our research, two aspects of the Lumumba story

surfaced that indicate Agency involvement in a plot. In the one

instance, our 1967 source mentioned the name of an Agency officer

who was designated as the case officer for an assassination plot

against Lumumba, but reported that he had declined the assignment.

That officer was the originator of a 19 December 1960 cable to

Leopoldville in which he authorized the return of QJWIN to

Luxembourg on 21 December to await further instructions and the

payment of 1000 dollars to him for his December salary by the

Luxembourg Station. The last paragraph of the cable advises

Leopoldville that headquarters is working out the details of a Congo

assignment for QJWIN. The same officer was the originator of a

31 January 1961 memorandum dealing with payments to QJWIN.

In the second instance, a 17 December 1960 cable from

Leopoldville deals with the activities of a newly recruited agent,

WIROGUE, whose mission was to try to spot persons for a

surveillance team, intelligence assets (with emphasis on Orientale

Province), and paramilitary assets.

The second paragraph of the

cable mentions that he resided in the same hotel as QÜWIN (although

neither knew of the others CIA connection) and that he approached

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the latter on 14 December with an offer of 300 dollars per month to

participate in an intelligence net and to be a member of an "execution

squad. " When QIWIN said that he was not interested, WIROGUE

added that there would be bonuses for special jobs. The cable

mentioned in paragraph 6 that the Station was concerned with the free

wheeling of WIROGUE, his lack of security, his inability to handle

finances,

and his unwillingness to follow instructions. The Station

was willing to keep him on probation, but believed his recall would

be the best solution. A suggested alternative was to put him in

Stanleyville to try to obtain immediate intelligence on that area.

In an attempt to reconstruct events, Africa Division was apprised

of the above and was asked to search its records in an attempt to

clarify what WIROGUE was up to in the Congo and his reference to an

"execution squad." The research did not clarify the matter to any

great extent, although some assumptions can be made on the basis of

circumstantial evidence. On 19 September 1960, two members of

Africa Division met with WIROGUE to discuss an operational assign-

ment in that division. In connection with the assignment, he was to

be trained in demolitions,

small arms, and medical immunization.

In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that he was being

prepared for a deep cover assignment to arrive Leopoldville late

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November.

Headquarters noted the intent to use him as a utility

agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b)

intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assign-

ments requiring positive action.

His utilization is not to be restricted

to Leopoldville.

Indeed, he may be subject to call by other African

stations although it is expected for him to be resident in Leopoldville. "

WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on 2 December 1960. His case

officer gave him the following instructions: (a) to build cover possibly

by opening a photographic shop; and (b) to try to spot persons for a

surveillance team, intelligence assets and paramilitary assets.

Shortly after

arrival, WIROGUE ran into QJWIN, who later told the

station that WIROGUE looked like an intelligence agent. In attempting

to recruit QJWIN for his "execution squad", WIROGUE exceeded his

instructions to avoid making approaches without checking with

Leopoldville Station.

In January 1961, at the request of the Leopoldville Station,

WIROGUE was given permission to take flying lessons. By March,

he had obtained the position of adviser to the Congolese Air Force

with the rank of major; in that capacity he was used by CIA for the

purpose of gathering intelligence on the Congolese Air Force.

By

April, the Congolese were trying to use him to obtain arms

and

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fEr.

instructors in Western Europe.

Also, he

was then teaching the

Congolese to fly aircraft. He departed Leopoldville in July because

he had run into difficulty obtaining a residence permit, and his CIA

contract was terminated in September 1961.

Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was recruited for his

Congo assignment because of his third country national background

in order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the

time the Congo was in chaos, we had few assets there, and the

likelihood existed that the political situation would degenerate

quickly. The Station possibly also wanted to have a latent paramilitary

capability. An October 1964 assessment of WIROGUE indicates little

flap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency. He spent

most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved

in any particular operation.

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EZSCaT

QJWIN

According to statements by a senior CIA officer in 1967, made

to the Inspector General, the Agency was instructed to develop a

capability to conduct assassinations.. Termed an "executive action

capability, " such a project was initiated in 1961, apparently assuming

an existing cryptonym, ZRRIFLE.. At the request of the case officer

(the same officer providing this information in 1967), a clandestine.

asset in Europe, QJWIN, was to be used in the project. The case

officer understood that QJWIN had been considered in 1960 for use

in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, but that the proposed

operation was never carried out because the designated CIA case

officer declined the assignment.

The case officer in charge of ZRRIFLE also was involved in an

operation to assassinate Fidel Castro, running from early 1962 to

mid-1963. However, QJWIN was not used in this effort, reliance

being placed instead on a Cuban exile leader. QJWIN was never

briefed on the Castro operation, according to the officer handling

ZRRIFLE and the Castro operation.

Records do show that QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo in

1960, being there in November and December 1960, prior to the

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