DEPOSITION OF HERBERT MANELL
Originator: HSCA
From: MANELL, HERBERT
Document date: 04/28/1978
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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180-10131-10335

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

10/19/20

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER: 180-10131-10335

RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014733

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

TO :

[Restricted]

TITLE:

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

04/28/1978

65

CIA, METHODOLOGY

(Restricted]

MEXICO

MEXICO CITY

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1A

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

08/21/1993

OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Box 8

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ORIGINAL

HEARINGS

Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OR FERBERT MANELL

Washington.D.C.

April 28, 1978

60955

Alderson Reporting Company,

Anc.

Official Reporters

SOO Seventh StyS. WaWashington, DaC

554-2345

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LaFrance

dog:

FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1978

014733

House of Representatives.

Subcommittee on the Assassination

of John F. Kennedy of the

Select Committee on

Assassinations

Washington, D. C.

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Deposition of

HERBERT MANELL

called for examination by counsel for the subcommittee,

pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee

on Assassinations, Room 3370, House Office Building Annex II,

2nd and D Street, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at

1:00 p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public

in and for the District of columbia, when were present on

behalf of the respective parties:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH; Counsel

DAN HARDWAY, on the staff of the Subcommittee

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TESTIMONY OF HERBERT MANELI

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Whereupon,

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HERBERT MANELI

was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,

was

examined and testified as follows:

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you please state your name and

occupation for the record:

Mr. Manell. I am Herbert Manell, Staff Officer of the

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CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been with the CIA?

Mr. Manell. Twenty-seven years.

Mr. Goldsmith. •Mr. Manell, have you read the letter

dated March 23, 1973, from the acting DCI to the Chairman of

the committee?

Mr. Manell. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that letter?

Mr. Manell. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee's rules, Mr. Manell,

the witness has a right to receive a copy of the deposition

that he gives to the committee. However, by virtue of the

arrangement that we have worked out with the Agency, the

Agency has asked us to obtain a waiver from each witness,

from each Agency witness, a waiver of the right specifically

to receive the transcript. You may have access to it to review

it for accuracy, but you may not have the right to actually

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receive it. That is to say, we are asking you to waive the

right to receive the transcript.

Are you willing to wive that right?

Mr. Manell. Do I have to waive that right?

Mr. Goldsmith. Absolutely not.

However, if you do

not waive the right, we will not have the deposition.

Mr. Manell. I will waive the right, then.

Mr. Goldsmith. You

are testifying here today without

subpoena and freely?

Mr. Manell. I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of background, the committee

is mandated to investigate the assassination of the President,

who did it, was there a conspiracy and to evaluate the per-

formance of the investigative agencies, specifically the CIA

and the FBI.

Do you understand that?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you located in Mexico City in

1963?

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•Mr. Manell. I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your position at that time?

Mr. Manell. I was head of the Soviet section of the

station, of the CIA station in Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were your general responsibilities?

Mr. Manell. My responsibilities were basically two-

fold; one being counterintelligence monitoring and to negate

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the activities, of the Soviets; secondly, to attempt to

recruit Soviets.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you involved in any of the sur-

veillance operations that were mounted against the Soviets?

By surveillance, I mean the tap operation and the photo-

surveillance

operation of the Soviet Embassy compound.

Mr. Manell. 'I was not personally involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. You just received the information

that came from that operation?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we get into more detail, who

was the station chief in 1963?

Mr. Manell: Win Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann Goodpasture an employee of the

station also?

Mr: Manell. She was.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were her station responsibilities?

Mr. Manell. She had many responsibilities. That

included being an assistant to the chief of station. She

was also a person who had some: type of responsibility. for

collecting the photos that we obtained of Soviet Embassy

activity, and I think she was also involved to some extent

in the telephone tap operations that we conducted against

the soviets in Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Is it fair to say. she was Win Scott's

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right-hand person?

Mr. Manell. That is a question of definition there, and

I don't think it is a fair question.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Did she have a very close working

relationship with Mr. Scott?

Mr. Manell. She certainly did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he rely on her a lot?

Mr. Manell. They relied on many of us quite a bit.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he rely on Ann Goodpasture a lot?

Mr. Manell. " Yes, he did.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned Miss Goodpasture was

involved in some way in the photo-surveillance operation.

MI.

Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the extent of her responsi-

bilities?

Mr. Manell. I can't really define it too well at this

distance in time. I don't know whether she actually managed

the people who took the photographs. . That might have been

her responsibility.. It might have been someone else's. '

But she certainly did handle the finished product at the

station.

Mr

Goldsmith. By handling, you mean she reviewed the

photographic tapes?

Mr. Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. After that operation, what was her

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responsibility?

Mr. Manell. : I can't really tell you. I can't remember

whether it was her or someone else. She might have been an

alternate officer in that type of support operation. I don't

think she was the principal. I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Tom Keenan was the

principal?

Mr. Manell. At one time, I think he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann the person who brought the

transcript into the station?

Mr. Manell. At times, yes, I

believe she did, but I

am not entirely sure. Tom did that also, and Frank

Estan

Cona also did that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we proceed, I guess there is one

other question I should ask you.

Has anyone from the CIA contacted you in any way in

reference to your testimony before the committee today or in

reference to the interview that you gave us about a month ago?

Mr. Manell: Yes.

I was contacted, by legal counsel.

who gave me advice to be absolutely forthcoming in my

testimony; and he said exactly what your letter says here;

that the secrecy agreement is waived for this day's

session.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any other contact?

Mr. Manell: No.

Mr. Goldsmith.

I also take it that during the half

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hour lunch. break since your wife testified this morning,

you did not discuss the substance of this in any way?

Mr. Manell. Just briefly. In no significant way.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss the questions that

were going to be asked in any way?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the telephone tap opera-

tion, approximately how many phones were tapped?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall, but we had telephone tapped

in the Soviet Embassy at their commercial section, their

consular section, the embassy proper, and their military

attache office.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is what was referred to as their

liaison operation; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. Yes, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. There was a unilateral operation?

Mr. Manell. Yes, there was.

Mr. Göldsmith. Did that cover a different phone?

Mr. Manell. My recollection is bad on that. I

believe that the unilateral telephone taps were placed

exclusively on the residences of Soviet officials. That is

my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the coverage constant with regard

to these telephone taps?

Mr. Manell. The coverage was constant within the embassy,

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except I think that from time to time, we might have taken

one tap off one line and put it on another. As far as the

unilateral taps; they were not constant. They were placed on

an individual for a lengtn of time to gain information about

him, his habits, his family, his contacts, and then taken off

and placed on someone else.

Mr. Goldsmith. By constant, what I mean is while the

tap was in operation on a particular phone, it was con-.

stantly in effect? Whenever the phone call came in the tap

would be triggered?

Mr. Manell. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the policy decision as to which

phones would be covered?

Mr. Manell. Well, it was basic practice that all of the

phones that we did have covered in the embassy were just

covered naturally and normally because that is what we

wanted to have reporting on.

As far as changing from one

line to another, it would have been a mutual agreement between

myself and Win Scott, or Win might have decided to change a

line.

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Mr. Goldsmith. When were the people actually invoived

in the operation itself, Tom reenan, Estan Cona, Goodpasture

involved in those types of policy decisions?

Mr. Manell:.

Tom Keenan I son't think was ever involved

in that policy decision. I don't believe Estan Cona was

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involved either. As far as Annie, I am not sure, but I

doubt

that

she she could have been involved in making. a

suggestion like that, yes..

Mr. Goldsmith.

With regard to the tap operation,

what

product did you actually receive?

the take from that operation?

In other words, what was

Mr: Manell. Well, the take was both in Spanish and

Russian. Russian when a Soviet communicated with another

Soviet in another part of the embassy, or a Soviet at his

residence or

somewhere outside the embassy communicated with

someone inside the embassy. The Spanish product was, öf

course, when a native called in to the embassy or when an

official called.out.

Mr: Goldsmith. You would get, in effect, a Russian tape

or a Spanish tape of a particular conversation?

Mr. Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be done with the tape?

Mr. Manell. It was first reviewed by my wife --

Mr. Goldsmith. Before that, it would be transcribed,

would it not?

Mr. Manell: It would be transcribed first in Spanish.

The Russian language portions were indicated so that our

Russian language transcribers would transcribe it. At one

time we had a transcriber in the embassy proper in our sta-

tion to transcribe it. After that man's departure, I believe

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that all Russian language translations were done outside the

embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the transcripts that you received

literal translations or transcriptions?

Mr. Manell. They were supposed to be literal, but

I am

sure that shortcuts were taken when a non-essential or unin-

teresting conversation took place, but each conversation had

to be transcribed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would the transcript be filed

after being reviewed?

Mr. Manell. They would be filed in our office, in our

registry.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Would any of the transcripts be sent to

CIA headquarters?

Mr: Manell. Rarely.

Mr. Goldsmith. Eventually, were the transcripts taken

from

Mexico City station and sent to headquarters?

Mr. Manell. Rarely. It would only happen if there

was a rather important and interesting excerpt. that we thought

headquarters needed or headquarters would have asked for.

Mr. Goldsmith.

As a matter of routine, they woulä not?

Mr. Manell.

As a matter of routine, they certainly were

not sent to headquarters."

Mr. Goldsmith. In speaking of files,. what kind of

attitude did Win Scott have towards files?:

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Mr. Manell. His attitude was that most everything

should be kept, recorded,

filed, crossfiled, indexed. He had

a penchant for having materials that some of us considered

even unimportant be filed. His was the most complete

registry, probably, anywhere in the world, outside of head-

quarters.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you served at other stations so

that you could make that comparison?

Mr. Manell. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. As station chief, was Scott very compe-

tent and demanding?

Mr. Manell. He was both.

Mr. Goldsmith. Approximately how much time would pass

from the moment that an intercept came in until a trans-

cript was received?

Mr. Manell.. I can't recall exactly right now, but I

would imaging possibly two, three, four days at most.

Mr. Goldsmith. It might take somewhat longer if it

needed to be translated from Russian into English?

Mr. Manell. Yes. The transcript would then go out

with the original tape to our transcriber.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the photo-surveillance

operation, who regularly reviewed the photographs that came

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in?

Mr. Manell. Annie Goodpasture.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Stepping back for a moment, after the

transcript came in, who reviewed those at first, when they

came in?

Mr. Manell. I think Annie always took an interest in

reading the transcripts, but the actual

responsibility for

reading, analyzing the transcript at the early point of my

stay in Mexico was the responsibility of my wife, Barbara

Manell.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should indicate that we are always

going to be discussing 1963 unless I mention to the contrary.

So your

wife would read the transcripts. Would she

decide to whom they would be routed?

Mr. Manell. Yes, she would, and I would also. But it

was

her primary responsibility to do that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now on the photos, who would review

them when they came in?

Mr. Manell:. Annie Goodpasture would review them.

'I

might make mention, though, with regard to the review of

telephone tap transcripts, I believe, and I certainly

remember, that before the assassination of President Kennedy

and certainly during the period of the latter part of the

summer of 1963, my wife was not working eight hours a day and

not coming in every day necessarily into the office.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you male mention of that?

Mr. Manell. Because you asked the question of who

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regularly reviewed the transcripts.

In that case, I would

review them.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question; who would

review them in your absence.

Mr. Manell.

I would.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would those transcripts be reviewed in

chronological order?

Mr. Manell. Most likely.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many hours a day was your wife

normally working?

Mr. Manell. During parts of the tour in Mexico, she

worked eight hours a day. At times, less than that.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Specifically the period of late summer

1963;

early fall?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly, and I haven't dis-

cussed this with her and I don't know what her recollection

is.

But I know she was not working regularly during August

and September of that year.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say she was not working regu

larly, do you mean she was not coming in every day or that

she was coming in every day but not working eight hours?

Mr. Manell: It was that she did not work eight hours.

and

she did not necessarily come in every day, as I recall.

But then again, my memory is vague about that. I know she:

was not working full time.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I guess at this point, for the purpose

of the record, you did mention before that you did discuss

with your wife during lunch in some way her testimony this

morning.

Mr. Manell. Principally I asked her whether she was

dealt with courteously: That was my principal question.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was her response?

Mr. Manell.. She was.

Mr. Goldsmith. I certainly hope that was the case.

Mr.. Manell. It was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did your wife mention to you that we

had

asked her about the transcripts?

Mr.

Manell. Yes, but with no elaboration.

Mr. Goldsmith.

She did not discuss the substance in.

any other way with you?

Mr.: Manell. No.

So, you see, there might be a variance

between what she

said and what I say because it is a question

of recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.. It seems there was a

procedure whereby, as a general rule, your wife would. routinely

review the transcript or you would review the transcript

when she was not there.

Was there a similar: rule "for the take from the phot-

surveillance operation?

Mr. Manell. No, there wasn't:

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Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Manell. Ann Goodpasture generally felt that this

was her area of responsibility. While my wife and I had

access to the photographs, it was mostly when Ann thought

there was something important to show us that we saw the

product or when we felt that we had to review the product of

a certain day or certain hour to confirm or deny certain infor

mation we had that we asked to see and did see whenever we

wanted the product for the particular period.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, you did not

review those photographs?

Mr. Manell: True.

Mr. Goldsmith. What coordination, if any, was there

between the tap operation and the photo-surveillance opera-

tion?

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Mr. Manell. I don't think I understand the question.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Were the two operations tied in toge-

ther in any way?

Mr. Manell. They certainly were if they were oriented

against the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith.

More specifically, if something of

interest came up on the transcript or tape and that person

indicated he was going to be showing up

at the

embassy,

would the practice be for the tap operation people to contact

the photo-surveillance people?

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Mr. Manell. If you are talking about people who

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actually did that kind of work on the outside, no, that was

compartmented.

Mr., Goldsmith. How would that happen?

Mr. Manell. As far as directing what those people on

the outside did, that was coordinated within the embassy

from my section to Annie or to win or to someone substitut-

ing for Annie.

Mr. Goldsmith.

So the people from the tap operation

. would

contact Goodpasture or Win Scott?

Mr. Manell. It was not necessarily just the tap opera-

tion because it is a little bit misleading. For example, I

was running.

several double-agent operations and would

know beforehand when a meeting was to take place between the

Soviet intelligence officer and my agent.

To confirm at least a small part of what my agent told

me, I would very often want to know when that Soviet

officer exited the embassy that particular time and when

he returned.

So it was not merely from telephone tap

materials that we directed activities of the photographic

surveillance, for a number of other reasons. Or, for

example, I might be working on a Soviet, for any number of

reasons, I might find it interesting or think it

would be interesting to find out when he returned to the

Soviet Embassy or whom he might contact in the soviet Embassy

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Mr. Goldsmith.

In this case, how would you get that

information to the photo-surveillance people?

Mr. Manell. Probably through Ann Goodpasture.

Mr. Goldsmith.: If

the tap people -- getting back to

my original example -- wanted to communicate information.to

the photo people?

Mr. Manell. • There were no such things as tap people.

You mean the recipient of the telephone tap product,

for example, myself, would ask Annie Goodpasture to -- well,

you see the question is not actually entirely logical;

because normally photographic surveillance would be continu-

ous.

I don't remember at this point the days of the week

they might not have been conducted. Possibly the weekends;

I am not sure. Possibly one day over the weekend. Certainly

it stopped after dusk.

I am sorry, I have lost the trend of your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. I will"try to redirect you.

•If you have a person working in the tap operation who

transcribes tapes and he realizes; hey, this is something

important, and the substance

of the conversation is someone

of interest is saying he is going to the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Manell. This person would be on theoutside, anyway?

transcribing, and not in the station., If anything was of an

emergency nature, the person was instructed to call

for a

visit from an officer. The officer would get the message and

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come back to the station and discuss whatever that message

was with the responsible officer - say, the responsible

officer for the Cuban operation or the Soviet operation or

for the satellite operation -- and then action would be

taken, most likely in conjunction

with the discussion with

Win Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. There was a procedure for expediting

matters?

Mr. Manell. Indeed there was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the person contacted by the

Spanish transcriber be Ann Goodpasture?

Mr: Manell. It could be Ann Goodpasture; it could be

other people, such as Tom Keenan or Estan Cona.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned the scope of the phot-

surveillance coverage. Do you know whether the coverage was

constant during daylight hours, or was it coordinated with

the working hours of the embassy compound?

MI. Manell! I can't remember.. I would tend to believe

that it was constant. Possibly, however, they might have

taken off for lunch, but that should not have been the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of the photo-

surveillance operation? By that, I mean what subjects were

they trying to take pictures of?

Mr. Manell. There are two different types of photo-

graph operations:

One was to take photographs of non-

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Soviets visiting, the Soviet Embassy, and the other purpose

was to take photographs of Soviets meeting with other

Soviets within the embassy compound so that we could; using

that method and others also, attempt to identify whether

they were intelligence-connected.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the non-Soviet visiting the embassy

compound, was a picture taken of every one?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. A picture would be taken of every

subject entering: or leaving the compound?

Mr. Manell. I believe so.

I must qualify it to say that I was never in charge

of that activity. The only responsibility I had for that

activity was when I had a particular interest and requested

certain attention be paid to that interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Keeping that qualification in mind,

is it fair to say that essentially pictures would be taken

of everyone and then later on the photographs that were

obtained would be reviewed in light of the purpose you have

just stated?

Mr. Manell. Yes.,

I would like to add

one other statement to that.

Win Scott, our chief of station, was the type of man who

always wanted more, rather than less, done in every respect.

So, in connection with the question of whether there would be

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constant activity in monitoring the entrance and exit of

people in the Soviet Embassy, chenalways wanted more, rather

than.less.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was the photograph

of

Lee Harvey Oswald ever obtained at either the Cuban Embassy

or consulate or the Soviet Embassy compound?

Mr. Manell.. To the best of my recollection, I don't

believe a photograph was obtained.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, was Win Scott

happy about the failure of the surveillance operation, the

photo-surveillance operation, to pick that up?

Mr. Manell: I haven't got. a clear recollection of it,

bút I would assume he must have been very unhappy about it.

I do know that we thought we had a picture of an American

who could have been Lee Harvey Oswald. It turned out that

this

man was not; Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith.

When did you think that this person

may have been Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Probably on the day of the assassination,

when we reviewed our product.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to the transcripts that we

have reviewed, it appears that Oswald made at least five

visits either to the Cuban Embassy or consulate

or to the

Soviet Embassy compound; a total of five visits.

Does it strike you as surprising that, in light of five

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visits having been made, he was not picked up?

Mr. Manell: I can't verify, and I certainly can't

agree that five visits were made."

Mr. Goldsmith.

I summarized that essentially, because

I

wanted to save time. If you went through each trans-

cript, it would indicate that in fact, according --

Mr. Manell: That is your analysis, not mine.

Mr. Goldsmith.

When we get to the transcripts, we will

go into that with you.. We will take that step by step at

that point.

Mr. Manell! I can make this statement. I remember

that on the day of the assassination, when we got information

from the radio that Lee Harvey Oswald had assassinated the

President, my recollection that day was that Lee Harvey

Oswald was the man who had had contact with the soviet

Embassy, had contact by phone. And I certainly didn't know

he had visited the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who at that station thought that the

station had a picture of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I can't remember that exactly. I would

assume it would have been Annie: Goodpasture:

Mr. Goldsmith. When was information obtained by the

Mexico City station reported to headquarters? By that, I

mean what type of information would be reported to head-

quarters and in what form?

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Mr. Manell. You are covering the waterfront there.

Mr. Goldsmith. I can narrow that down. I will be

pleased to. No problem.

Mr. Manell. Would you want to restrict that to the

question of Americans?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can

get it this way.

Would all information being sent to headquarters

be

sent to headquarters by means of a cable?

Mr. Manell.

NO.

Mr. Goldsmith.

What other forms?

Mr. Manell

By dispatch.

Mr. Goldsmith. 'Dispatch and by cable would be the

two

essential forms?

Mr. Manell. Yes:

Mr. Goldsmith. On what basis would you decide to send

that information to headquarters by means of a cable, as

opposed to dispatch?

Mr. Manell. Once again, I think you are covering the

waterfront, because you are asking me to talk about all

types

of operations that the station engage in. It would

be very often a question of just what operations were

engaged in, whether it merited dispatch reporting or cable

reporting.

Sometimes you would use one criteria and sometimes

another. • One section would use onescriteria and onesection

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would use another with respect to whether to use cable

traffic or dispatch traffic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us talk about the Soviet section.

Is it fair to say that routine information would be sent by

means of dispatch?

Mr. Manell. Not necessarily. It depended on inter-

pretation.

For example, I would, at times, report by cable

the results of a meeting between a double-agent and a

Soviet agent, even though there was no priority interest.or

real necessity for immediate receipt of that information at

headquarters. Just a form that I preferred, because you

could do it in a sort of shorthand rather than do it with

long, descriptive reporting in the dispatch. Dispatch

required more writing, so sometimes preference would be for

cable reporting just

for that reason alone.

Mr. Goldsmith.

were there any objective criterio that

governed whether a cable would be sent or a dispatch?

Mr. Manell: Indeed there would be. If there was

anything of emergency nature or anything of great signi

ficance, you would report it by cable.

Mr. Goldsmith.

That would be the general rule, but

are you saying that the mere fact that something was sent by

cable does not necessarily mean that it was urgent?

Mr. Manell. Exactly. You are perfectly right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Once a cable is received at headquarters,

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what is done with it?

Let me backstep. Who receives the cable at headquarters?

Mr. Manell. It depends on the subject matter.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your particular case, then?

Mr: Manell: Once again, it depends on the subject

matter. In my case, with respect to the Soviet operation;

it would be recieved by the host division. In this case, it

was called "WH" division, Western Hemisphere Division.

Secondly, it would be received by the interested division in

Soviet operations. It would then have been called, I guess

it, was called the SR division at that time, Soviet Division.

Additionally, depending on the material, it could be

received by other elements of the agency. For example.

counterintelligence staff would receive it.

Then I can't go further, but distribution was certainly

wider in most cases.."

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would determine that the distribu-

tion would be wider? The sender or one. of the

recipients or

both?

Mr. Manell. It was both, because the sender had certain

cyrptonyms at the head of the cable which would indicate

not merely the subject but the distribution.

For example, one cyrptonym would necessarily indicate

that

the CIA staff, the counterintelligence staff, received

the material in addition to all other interested elements of

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the Agency.

There are also restrictive cyrptonyms, such as if the

matter was occasionally sensitive, the sender could restrict

the distribution at headquarters.. On the other hand, 'as

far as how the headquarters element distributed cables, I

can't particularly speak for that:

Then again, the cyrptonyms

gave the people who formu

lated the distribution just how wide a distribution it would

have.

Mr.

Goldsmith. . Incidentally, has anyone from the

Inspector General staff ever interviewed you concerning Lee

Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City?'

Mr. Manell. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. Concerning the photo-surveillance

operation?

Mr. Manell. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any operation whatsoever in Mexico

City?

Mr. Manell. NO.

As a matter of fact, I was perfectly surprised that I

was one of the last people ever interviewed about the

assassination because, after all, my wife and I were

responsible for the first message sent from the station.

Everybody else was intereviewed before me. The Inspector

General, no. one in the Agency ever talked to me about this

MANY

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operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first time you were formally

interviewed about it was -

Mr. Manell. -- by you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the 1977

Inspector General's Report which, among other things,

evaluated the surveillance operation and attempted to explain

the question that arose by virtue of the photograph being

connected in some way with Oswald, and it turned out the

photograph was not Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Not at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. In order for information contained in

the cable to

go to one of the higher-ups, the head of a

division, DDO, for example, how would it get to him? Could

the sender designate that?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise, if the cable went to

Western Hemisphere, could that person

say, "This sounds

important; let me send it on up"?

Mis Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would he do that directly or would he

have to go through higher levels; go to his boss and then

go to the next level?

Mr. Manell. It could be either way. It depended on

who reviewed the cable and who made the decision. If an

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analyst or desk

officer reviewed the cable and wanted it

sent to DDO, he would certainly do it through channels;

through his branch chief, for example; possibly go to the

division chief or chief of operations and make that suggés-.

tion and have it sent to DDO: Or if that type of decision

started with the division chief, he would send it directly

to the DDO or someone in another division or recipient of

the cable to make that decision.

Mr.. Goldsmith. Would there be any objective criteria.

for deciding what goes up to the top, or would this short

have been a

subjective decision by the particular individual

involved?

Mr. Manell. It would be a subjective decision.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the tape, do you know

whether anyone in the Mexico City station' èver did a voice

comparison of tapes for the purpose of determining whether

the tape contained Lee Harvey Oswald's voice?

Mr. Manell. No! I don't think that was ever done.

don't believe it could have been done.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Manell. Tapes are normally erased after a certain

number of days. So in the case of the Oswald transcript;

which was absolutely unimportant - not absolutely, but

relatively unimportant -- at the time of receipt, there was

no. reason to keep that tape or designate it for retention.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the tapes be erased?

Mr. Manell. So that they could be used over again.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that if Oswald contacted the

embassy in late September or early October about the time of

the assassination, you are saying the tapes would. have been.

erased routinely?

Mr. Manell. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to refer your attention

to CIA No. 208.

208 refers to the page number of the docu-

ment that the Agency provided us. This is paragraph 4 of. a

cable dated November 23, 1963. Could you read that paragraph

to yourself?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In that paragraph, it says that the

person who did the transcription indicates that Oswald is

identical with the individual who contacted the embassy on

September 28th. Do you know on what basis the transcriber

was able to make that statement?

Mx: Manell. Yes.

The transcriber, the Russian language

transcriber, Mr. Tarasoff, was a very capable man, a man

very interested in his work.

I believe that he could recall with exactness that was

Oswald who called in previously, because Oswald's Russian was

faulty, and he would have remembered that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone went to

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Mr. Tarasoff after the assassination and asked. him whether

it was Oswald on each tape?

Mr. Manell. No, I. don't recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you do it yourself?

Mr. Manell. I don't remember. And I did not write

this cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

That cable was sent by

Goodpasture?

Mr. Manell. Yes, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Let us take a look at these transcripts

now.

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I draw your attention to CIA No. 13. Would you please

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read that.

Mr. Manell.: Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Could you describe what CIA No. 13 is?

Mr. Manell.. A man by the name -- a man who identifies

himself as Lee Oswals and speaks with a guard at the Soviet

embassy, saying that he was at the embassy last Saturday and

states that the embassy

person had promised to sena a tele-

gram to Washington.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now CIA No. 13 is a transcript of a

conversation involving someone who identified himself as

Oswald?

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Mr. Goldsmith. It is dated October 31, 1963.

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Mr. Manell. Yes, it is.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Do you know whether the name Oswald

first came to your attention by virtue of this transcript?

Mr. Manell. . I am not

sure, but I guess it is the

first time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this particular contact considered

to be unusual or routine?

Mr. Manell. Routine.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?,

Mr. Manell. During the sumer period, particularly,. or

toward the end of the summer period, a relatively large

number of Americans, for various reasons, made contact with

the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to me, when I had the

information reported,.. to be just another case of an American

contacting the embassy, for no significant reasons.

Mr. Goldsmith. In each case that an American contacted

the embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?

, Mr. Manell. Yes, indeed.

Mr: Goldsmith. In that case, there really should be

a cable in Washington for every American

for whom at least

you were able to get a tentative identification?

Mr. Manell: Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you weren't able to identify anyone,

you would not bother to send a cable?

Mr. Manell. Correct. That was a standard procedure

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at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though this was considered

routine, the information would be cabled up?

Mr. Manell. Exactly. :

Mr. Goldsmith.. Why would it not be dispatched up?

Mr. Manell. Because it involved an American person:

Mr. Goldsmith.

Are you saying then that it was a

standard procedure for dealing with Americans, and part of

that procedure involved sending a cable?

. 'e

Mr. Manell. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith.

What was your response, if any, after

seeing this transcript?

Mr. Manell. My response, or my reaction or my recollec-

tion; what is the question?

Mr. Goldsmith. What action did you take in response --

Mr. Manell. The only action I took was the action my

wife took, was to send a cable to Washington summarizing the

information that we had on Oswald and his contact with the

embassy.

In addition, and it was also our practice, we sent

memoranda to interested elements of the embassy. We also

asked our headquarters for trace of an American. That was

general procedure.

Mr. Goldsmith. By trace, you mean

a name trace?

Mr. Manell. A name trace.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to look at CIA 177:

and tell me whether that was a cable that was sent to

Washington.

Was that cable sent to Washington, D. C.?

Mr. Manell. The first cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. In

response

to the transcript that

appears in CIA" No. 13.

Mr. Manell. I am not sure who wrote this cable.

My wife wrote this cable. Yes, that is the first cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the cable that would have been.

sent in response --

Mr. Manell. I must be wrong, because it says here

there was no local dissemination of the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know if you are wrong or if

you are just confused based on documents you have reviewed.

We will go into that later on.

In fact, I think there was dissemination, and you will

have a chance to clarify that.

Mr. Manell. I am not sure there was dissemination.

The last paragraph of this papers says no local dissemination.

Mr: Goldsmith. We will go into that.

The second paragraph of that cable makes reference to

photograph: Was that a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. We don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever seen that photograph?

Mr. Manell. Yes. The photograph was not of Oswald.

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The assumption was made here that it could have been Oswald

because a male who appeared to be an American entered the

embassy on that date, but there is a correction above the

date 1 October to read 2 October.

So that is confusing to

me at this time.

Mr. Goldsmith. But that correction could have been

put in at some later time.

• Mr. Manell. . It could have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the cable, as it went

out, reported.

a contact on 1 October?

Mr. Manell: That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that the second paragraph

makes an assumption that the photograph was of Oswald?

Mx. Manell.

It makes an assumption, only an assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, was that

in fact

a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. No, it wasn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how that particular photo-

graph was selected?

Mr. Manell. I don't recallrexactly, but I would assume

it was selected because it was obtained the very same day

that Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the selection of the photo-

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MI. Manell. I can't recall whether it was my wife of

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it would have been Annie Goodpasture.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Miss Goodpasture

checked the Cuban photo production materials?

Mr. Manell. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Refer to CIA No. 13. The person who.

identified himself as Oswald said: "I was at your place

last Saturday" -- which would not have been October lst; it

would have been September 28th. Yet the cable reports a

photograph taken of someone October lst.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way that can be explained,

or is that just an extension of the assumption?

Mr. Manell. Just an extension of the assumption. It

is not knowledge, that the photo of a male entering on the lst

of October is identical with the person who phoned the soviet

Embassy and

said he was Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the contact by Oswald occurred on

october Ist, why did it take one week to get the cable out?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly, but it probably

took some time for the people who got the information to have

it transcribed from the tape.

Secondly, since there was a Russian language portion

to that tape, this would have to have been collected and sent

out to our transcriber. That, again, may have delayed the

receipt of the information at the embassy.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I follow the difference

between the second part of the explanation and the first.

Mr. Manell. Well, there were these steps in getting

the product to the station. Number one, the material is

taped.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr: Manell. Those people who handle the tape do not

transcribe. It is sent to the transcriber for transcription

of the Spanish portion. Indication is made on that Spanish

portion that there is a foreign language. Assuming that they

believe it is Russian, the material would then be collected

by a station person who, in turn, would send it out to our

Russian language transcriber.

Finally, the reason for the delay of perhaps a day or

perhaps two days in sending it to headquarters may be this.

The information, when received by us at the station, was not

significant information or important information. There would,

therefore, be no need to work on it ahead of other cases and

materials of greater importance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever discussing sending

this cable out with Dave Phillips?

Mr: Manell. No. He has no connection, no direct

connection with my operation.

I would like to emphasize for the sake of clarity once

again that while cable traffic may be considered the method

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for sending significant information to headquarters, it

is not necessarily so.

Further, that in this specific.

case, a cable was used

to send this information to headquarters only because it

concerned an American, not because it concerned a matter that

was considered to be of importance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could this procedure regarding Americans

contacting the Soviet Embassy be, in effect, not just at the

Mexico City station, but virtually every CIA station where

there was a Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Manell. I can't. speak to that. That was the

procedure at Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about other stations that you

worked at?

Mr. Manell.

Well,: I would personally send the informa-

tion to headquarters by cable of an American contacting the

Soviet Embassy, yes, for a number of reasons.

But to say

that this was standard CIA practice wörldwide is something I

can't speak to.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the photograph referred to in

paragraph. 2 was selected, do you recall whether Goodpasture

ever said "I think this is Oswald"?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it likely that what would have been

done is simply to have reviewed the photo production materials

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for the purpose of taking out every non-Latin person and

then of those who were not Latins, who could not be identi-

fied, it turns out this is the only one who could not be

identified and therefore, this must be Oswald?

• Mr. Manell. Well, that is an involved question, but I

can say that it is rather simple to distinguish between an

American, a normal-appearing American, and a Mexican. SO

let us talk about what was taken out of the batch

• because

of that indication that it was an American on that particular

Friday. I will go further and say that the people we

employed to photograph persons entering the Soviet Embassy

believed they could spot an American easily, and they made

it a practice to certainly photograph that person and bring it

to our attention. One of our responsibilities was to assist

the FBI in identifying people who might become Soviet

agents, particularly in America.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you now review CIA Nos. 14'

and 15

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Is that a transcript of a conversa-

tion.

that took place on September 28, 1963?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. It involves a party speaking from the

Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy; is that correct?

Mr. Manell.: That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice therelis some routing indication

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on this: Does your name appear anywhere on this?

Mr. Manell. My name is not on there. ' However, I

should have seen this. My wife -- I probably saw it because

the handwriting giving the routing indication is that of my

wife.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did your wife give you all transcripts

to review or did she select only those that she thought were

most

important?

Mr: Manell.. It depended on how busy I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. When, if ever, was the man speaking in

this particular conversation identified as Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Probably after receipt of the l October

transcript, CI No. 13.

Mr: Goldsmith. Why do you say that?

Mr. Manell: He is not identified here, is he?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, he is not?. Do you have any reason

to believe that he was linked after

receipt of the 1 October

transcript?

Mr. Manell. That is what confuses me, because

when the

cable was

sent to headquarters, it referred only to the

October Ist transcript. There is no linking in that cable to

this transcript of the 28th of September.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cable of October 8th made no

mention of any contact with the Cuban Embassy.

Mr. Manell. That is correct.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Reading that transcript, is it clear to

you that Oswald

made three visits on September 28th to the

various embassies? He is calling now from

the Cuban and

he indicates that he had been at the Russian earlier, and he

going back. to the Russian; therefore, a total of three

visits.

Mr. Manell. Well, there are two visits and the assumpt

tion that he will go back to the Soviet Embassy. It is

merely an assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by the time the October

8th

cable went out, this had been linked to Oswald?

Mr. Manell. By the transcriber.

Mr. Goldsmith. By the transcriber.

What about you and your wife?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall. that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the earliest time

was

that you did make this link?

Mr. Manell. No, I can't. Once again, let me tell you,

to clarify that point, the cable that went out on the 8th

reported relatively insignificant information. I would not

necessarily have made the effort to do all the research

necessary to determine whether this man had made a connec

tion with other embassies. And I may not have paid much

attention to the cable that went out on the 8th of

October.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, the transcript of October Ist

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does say the same man who called a day or so ago?

• Mr. Manell. Yes, it does. And if these things were

reviewed in chronological order, it is possible that at

that

time, the connection was made.

Mi. Goldsmith. Please review CIA Nos. 17. and 18 on

the translation.

Mr. Manell. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith.

When you are finished with that, will

you turn the page and read the transcript relating to that

conversation of the same day, CIA No. 20, for the record.

Mr. Manell. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now the two transcripts you have just

read are dated September 27, 1963. One conversation was

4:00 to 5:00 p.m.; the other one I think was 4:26, p.m. in

the afternoon; is that correct?

Mr: Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. From the conversations contained in

those transcripts, is it clear that the man involved is at

the Cuban Embassy and he had been at the Soviet Embassy

earlier?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we go on, we know that, accord

ing to the transcript, "if Oswald had been to the Embassy

total of four times and if, in fact, he did return: to the

Soviet Embassy; as

he

said he would in the September 28th

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conversation, he would have been there a total of five

times.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Manell: Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. When

were these two transcripts from

September 27th first linked to Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall.. I find this rather con-

fusing because my recollection of the interview with you at

my headquarters, I didn't remember these at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying you saw these at your

headquarters;

to your memory, this is the first time you

saw this particular --

Mr. Manell. I can't say. I am surprised by this.

The only thing I recollected before I looked at the files

and before my interview with you was only the 1 October

transcript..

so all of this, I don't say I didn't see these

before.

Ido. recall, however, at some point -- and this. is

probably after the assassination that perhaps it came to my

attention or perhaps before :- my memory is not clear on

this. But getting to the reason why, the cable of October 8th

was sent. the way it was was because my wife undoubtedly only

had that information of the lst available to her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Or if she had the earlier transcript

available, she did not make the connection?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 183.

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Mr. Manell. Once again, I don't necessarily want to

repeat myself, but having sent the cable of the

8th. of

October to headquarters, that in a case such as this one

satisfied our requirement; meaning that we have identified:

the contact of an American with the Soviet Embassy. We have

made it a matter of record and have no indication that the

matter is of importance; therefore, it wouldn't necessarily,

prompt us, with all the other important things we were doing

at this time, to devote additional effort to be complete

about that relatively unimportant matter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look now at CIA 183. I

believe that is a cable dated Il October 1963 from CIA

headquarters to Mexico City station.

Why don't you skim that briéfly for content and if I

have a

specific question on the substance, I will draw your

attention to it.

Mr: Manell. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this the cable that headquarters

sent in response to the request for a name trace on Oswald?

Mi. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that paragraph 1 refers to

Oswald as probably identical with Lee Henry Oswald; is that

correct?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is an arrow poingint to the word

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"Henry" and next to the arrow appears

the word "sic" which

is underlined.

•Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe it is Mr. Scott's handwrit-

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ing?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were these marginal notations made at

the time that the cable would be received?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. By writing the word "sic", was Mr.

Scott indicating that he was aware that Oswald's middle name

was not Henry?

Mx. Manell. Not necessarily.

Mr. Goldsmith. What explanation would you have?

Mr. Manell.

I don't really know.

The only information

we had was the first and last name.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Did Scott ever give you an indication

that he knew what Oswald's middle name was?

Mr. Manell. Absolutely not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that paragraph 2 of this

cable describes Oswald as a former Russian defector; is that

correct?

Mr. Manell. Defector to the Russians, correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of having received informa-

tion about Oswald having defected to the Russians, did that,

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in any way, enhance the significance of his visit to the

Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Did that occasion any further response

by the Mexico City station regarding Oswald?

Mr. Manell. At the moment, I can't recall. What we did

do was pass this information from headquarters to various

elements of the American Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith.

At that point, would it have been

necessary to have gone back to check the transcript?'

For

example, the October. Ist contact involving. Oswald at the

Russian Embassy, the telephone call; the transcriber wrote

in brackets "The same man who called the other day." At

that time, would either you or your wife or someone else that

you know of have gone back to check the transcripts to see

if, in fact, the same person had been found on the tape

earlier?

Mr. Manell. • I can't recall. Thinking about it at the

moment, if, for example; I only felt there was one trans-

cript, there wouldn't be any incentive to go back and see:

whether there were others.

Mr: Goldsmith. But the 1 October transcript did say he

had called a day or so earlier?

Mr. Manell.. That is right. I can't recall what I did

at that time.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

From the state of the record as it was

October lIth, headquarter's had not been apprised of the

contact at the Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether they were ever

apprised of that contact?

Mr. Manell:

Afterwards, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the assassination?

Mr. Manell. I don't believe so, but i wouldn't know.

I am not sure of whether they were apprised of it or not.

My belief is that they were not until after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. If they had been, there would be a

cable to that effect, would there not?

Mr. Manell. Surely. There would have been a cable

.and not a dispatch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a 100k at CIA 182. That

is a routing slip that went

with the cable from headquarters,

october Ilth cable from headquarters, and I believe Mr.

Scott's handwriting there indicates "Please set up a 'P'

file"; is that correct?

Mr. Manell: • Correct:

Mr. Goldsmith. The P file is a local personality file?

Mr. Manell: Correct:

Mr. Goldsmith.

"Do you know when Oswald's P file was

set up?

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Mr. Manell: Probably on that date.. Now it is interest-

ing to indicate, by the way, that Mr.

Scott indicated the

file should be set up in

the name of Lee Henry Oswald,

even though he had written

"sic" to the identification of

the man by headquarters as Lee Henry Oswald. He had no

argument with the identification, evidently.

Mr. Goldsmith. Noted. Thank you.

Referring now to CIA No: 19, which is one of the

transcripts from September. 27th, at the bottom it says

"Copy, Oswald 'p' file."

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.

When would this have gone into his

P

file?

Mr. Manell. Where does it say that?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Here.

Mr. Manell. This is my handwriting. It could have

been - I don't know exactly

when. This is my handwriting,

however.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been before the assassina-

tion?

Mr. Manell.. More than likely:

Mr. Goldsmith. It would seem that before the assassina-

tion, Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy on September 27th

had been noted.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Will you look at CIA No. 185. That

cable requested headquarters to send a photograph of

Oswald. To your knowledge, was one ever received?

Mr. Manell. No, I don't believe a photograph was

ever received of Oswald.

Who wrote this cable? I am curious.

I wrote that cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall receiving a photo-

graph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, after the assas-

sination, Charlotte Bustof found a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back for a moment to CIA 183,

paragraph 4 indicates that information concerning Oswald

be disseminated to other feceral agencies, does it not?

Mr. Manell: No, to other elements of the embassy::.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, you are correct.

Why would they make that indication? Was that routine

procedure? :

Mr. Manell: It was routine procedure to send it to

the FBI other than the embassy, but in this case it would

help me out with the cryptonym, who was I. P. Elide.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was the embassy.

Mr. Manell. Odyoke was what?

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Mr. Goldsmith. I&S. I can tell you which ones were

Mr. Manell. O.D. Urge?

Mr: Goldsmith.

I think I know how we can

solve this.

Let

us look at No. 187. No. 187 is the memo that was sent

by Mexico City station to

the Ambassador. At the bottom of

the page it lists the various agencies who received it

locally.

Mr. Manell. Correct. Okay.

Mr. Goldsmith.

was that an unusually wide dissemina-

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Mr. Manell. The only question I have would be that of

why IsS got it? Otherwise, Naval Attache, because this

was a former Marine. There is that connection there, the

legal attache, because the legal'attache is the normal

recipient of this kind of information.

Sometimes we did it to the embassy, depending on the

case.

So it boils down to my question as to why Iss got a

copy of this or why headquarters asked us to send them a

copy. Thatis my only query about this.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the cable received; the llth?

Mr. Manell. Was that a weekend that followed? i"

Mr: Goldsmith. The lst of October was a Tuesday:

Mr. Manell. I am talking about the llth and the 16th.

Mr. Hardway. That would have been a Friday.

Mr. Manell. There again, you see it did not become

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something of great significance that we would have imme-

diately felt we had to do it fast.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA No. 181, which is the

headquarters copy of a cable that was sent, it indicates

that Thomas Karamessines. was

the releasing officer.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it unusual for someone as high up

in the organization as Karamessines to be the releasing

officer for a cable of this kind?

Mr: Manell.

Yes, except that there might have been

some reason that could easily explain it. For example, while

the information is not necessarily significant, yet there. was

another significant piece of information that people at the

desk might have wanted the DDO to see.' It could be as simple

an explanation as that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know; receiving a cable at

Mexico City, who the releasing officer was?

Mr. Manell..

Not at all. We don't have any indication

at Mexico City who writes the cables or who releases cables.

Who wrote this cable?

Mr. Goldsmith.: Charlotte Bustof.

Mr. Manell. It was normal for à person who was an

analyst or a

desk

officer, as she was for the Mexico City

branch, to prepare a terse reply. It was certainly normal,

I would think, to have elements of the

counterintelligence

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staff coordinate the cable. It was normal, certainly,. for

a member of the counterintelligence section of the Soviet

division to coordinate

a cable.

Mr. Goldsmith.

One question about paragraph 5. I

believe it requests that any further contact for purposes of

identification

should be indicated to headquarters.

Mr. Manell. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, does that help you.

in any way as

to whether anything was ever communicated to

headquarters?

Mr. Manell. No.

Let us go further to address ourselves to the question

about Mr. Karamessines and why he released the cable. I

can't really explain that. Otherwise, we see that it was

sent out as a routine cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know

that?

Mr. Manell. Because otherwise, you would have seen the

precedence of either priority or immediate. Certainly you

don't see any restrictive indicators on the handling of this

cable. It doesn't even indicate that it is a counter-

intelligence matter in the heading, and it doesn't give the

restrictive indicator of an important counterintelligence

case, such as Rybat, or that cryptonym is a restrictive

indicator for any type of cable, if you need to restrict the

information, and that is not. on here, either.

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The reason I am

I going into this at length is apparently

you find it extraordinary that Mr. Karamessines signed off

on this cable. I can't explain it, but I want to go further

to say that the preparation and transmission of this cable

indicates that there was no urgency or undue significance

attached to the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. At any time that you are looking at

these documents, feel free, as I see you do feel free, to

give us any clarifying information.

Again, for purposes of clarification, prior to the

assassination was any action taken by the Mexico City station

in reference to the Oswald matter other than sending the cable

to headquarters on October 8th and the dissemination that

was

instructed?

Mr. Manell. Nothing, to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back for

a moment to the

matter of the photograph, if

Oswald, in fact, had gone to the

embassy à total of five times -- for purposes of argument

and making the assumption he did go back when he said he was

going back, does it strike you as unusual for the photo

people to have missed him five times?

Mr: Manell. Yes.

Mr: Goldsmith. Do you have any explanation for that?

I realize the photo operation was not under your control in

any way, but do you have any possible explanation?

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Mr. Manell. Yes; I do. The Mexicans who manned the

photo facility and did it day after day, year after year,

could conceivably not be performing their work as they were

required to perform it. To me, that is

the most straight-

forward explanation for the fact that we didn't receive a

photo of Oswald entering the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if any of them were dis-

missed as a result of the failure to obtain a picture?

Mr. Manell. No, I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA No. 138.

This is

a

cable dated November 22nd. The third paragraph indicates,

among other things, "Forwarding soonest copies of only visitor

to Soviet Embassy 20 October who could be identical to

Oswald. "

Do you know whether the date 20 October is correct or

incorrect?

Mr. Manell. Probably a mistake:

I think I wrote this

cable.

I am not sure.

There is

a correction on the following, right here.

I

wrote this cable. Obviously it was a mistake on my part,

trying to get this information out as fast as I could. .

I did, as you see, put in an immediate precedence on.

the transmission of this cable. As I said before, I linked.

the name Oswald that we heard over the radio with the Oswald

who had contacted the Soviet Embassy; and therefore, I sent

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this cable out as fast as I could on the 22nd of November.

Mr. Goldsmith.

On the 22nd: of November, you read that

one Oswald contact?

Mr. Manell. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Manell, CIA No. 183; the headquarters

cable, contains a

description of oswald in paragraphI

Mr. Manell. • Yes

Mr. Goldsmith. After receiving this cable, were you

aware that the photograph to which reference had been made

in the cable of October 8th was not a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I can't recollect what I believed at that

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Mr. Goldsmith.

As of the day of the assassination,

you thought that there was still a possibility that there

was a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Indeed:

As I recall, we tried to get that

photograph to headquarters as fast as we could. As it turned

out, it wasn't necessary" to send it. But that was our

intention.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA No. 184. This

was a cable from headquarters dated November 23rd.

The first

paragraph instructs you to review tapes and transcripts

since the 27th of September.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith.: Does that indicate that headquarters

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was in some way aware of Oswald's contact with the embassy

on September 27th?

Mr. Manell. It certainly does.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how they would have been

made aware of that?

The reason I ask is because we have reviewed cable,

traffic and have not seen any cable traffic informing them

of that

content.

Mr. Manell. No. There is something I can't explain,

and I am trying somehow to get an explanation for it in my

mind.

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As I told you before, normally the station did not

forward raw transcripts to headquarters.

That would have

been one way for them to know the 27th of September contact.

You say there is no other traffic?

Mx. Goldsmith. Based on our review of the file.

Mr. Manell. Or visit or contact by Oswald earlier

than the ist of October,to the Soviet Embassy? This

leaves me certainly at a loss for an explanation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that that woüld have

been done telephonically?

Mr. Manell. Not likely.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Manell. You don't telephone classified informa-

tion to headquarters, normally.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible - and I do not want to

put words in your mouth - that headquarters knew about

the contact of September 28th and that they instructed

you to refer to the conversation, the contact of the 27th,

just

for purposes of extra

insurance?

Mr. Manell. I can't comment on that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA No. 197, speci-

fically paragraph 3.

Mr: Manell. Wht date is this cable; the 23rd of

November?

Mr. Goldsmith. It is'a cable dated November 23, 1963.

Address your attention to paragraph No: 3:

Let me ask you whether this cable corrects the date

that you had incorrectly reported in the earlier cable.

Mr. Manell. Yes, it does, to l October.

Who wrote this cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe the author of this cable

was Ann Goodpasture; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the second paragraph of

CIA No. 198; which is the Mexico City copy of that cable.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The language in that paragraph indicates

that the station could not compare the voice of Oswald because

the first tape of his voice or his conversation had been

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erased prior to the receipt of the second contact.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The way that is phrased suggests,

however, that at that time, November 23rd, there was still

one tape in existence. In other words, it does not say all

tapes reporting Oswald

contacts had been erased. It says one

tape was

erased prior to the receipt of, the next one.

Mr. Manell. I would not give that importance or make

the assumption you are

making. "It is not completely phrased

in the cable.. It merely says "station unable compare voice

as first tape erased prior receipt second call." That is

all it says.

I don't see how you can conclude the way you conclude.

Mr. Goldsmüth.

Please don't misunderstand me. I am

not

intending to offer any conclusions.

Mr. Manell. No, but you are indicating that a second

tape was kept and not erased.

Mr. Goldsmith. What I want to do is ask whether the

language there suggests that in fact that was the case.

Mr. Manell. I am saying it was not the case; probably

not the case.

Mr: Goldsmith. I would like you to understand,

Mr. Manell, that we are conducting a thörough review of

the files and the cable traffic and we are obliged to address

every question that arises based on that review.

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Mr. Manell. I am sorry, but I felt you were drawing

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conclusion:

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand your position. I just

wanted you to understand mine, that is all.

Mr.

Manell. Right.

I wonder if I might make a short statement at this time.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Certainly.

Mr. Manell. From the questioning by you, I am led to

believe that you may have the suspicion, certainly the con-

cern, that there was a separate communication sent to the

station'by headquarters about Oswald of which you have no

record.

To the very, very best of my knowledge, there was no

separate communication

sent to the station with regard to

Oswald. Certainly if there was a separate communication, I

never had any knowledge of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

What about the reverse of that; separate communication

from the Mexico City station to headquarters?

Mr. Manell. Firstly,: I doubt that there was, because

in some fashion I would have become privy to it.

Second,

once again, I certainly know of no separate communication not

appearing in the record here that was sent by Mexico City

station to Washington.

Is that perfectly clear, that there was no side

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communication, to my knowledge, from either headquarters

to the station or from the

station to headquarters?

Mr. Goldsmith. I certainly: understand your answer!

yes.

Turning back for a moment to the question of the

erasure of the first Oswald

tape prior to the receipt of the

second. My understanding - and we can check the appropriate

cable for confirmation of this - is that the normal time

lag for the erasure of tapes was two weeks. If that is

correct, it would seem that the normal lag period did not

apply in regard to the Oswald contact.

In other words, the first contact was September 27th

or September 28th. The next contact was October Ist, and

the first contact tape was erased well before the two-week

period had elapsed, if in fact

the cable is accurate in what

it reports that the first tape was erased prior to the receipt

of the second one.

Mr. Manell. You are correct in assuming that there

would have been, just for mechanical reasons, the existence

of the first tape in its original form prior to receipt of the

second one, because the transcription process couldn't have.

been completed, since it involved the Russian language,

until after the second call' was made. You are correct there.

I would just suggest here that perhaps in the heat of

writing an immediate cable on the 23rd. of November, the

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language by Miss Goodpasture wasn't absolutely clear. I

think that the only thing she wanted to conver here, reading

into this, is that no voice comparison was made because we

don't have certainly on the 23rd of November either tape

available.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, she wasn't necessarily being

completely accurate when she said the first tape was erased

prior to the receipt of the second.

Mr. Manell. I would say that the sentence does not

convey her intention.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, do you know of any

action on the part of anyone at the Mexico City station

indicating that that person withheld information from the

'authorities at CIA headquarters concerning Oswald's visit to

Mexico City?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have nothing further, Mr. Manell.

I would like to thank you very much for being here.

I also would like to say I am sorry if we inconvenienced you

today.

Mr. Manell. It wasn't your fault.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, customarily when we call someone

to a hearing, a person is given five minutes at the end of a

hearing to make a statement. We have called you here for a

deposition in lieu of a hearing. If you would like an

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opportunity to make a statement on the record, please feel

free to do so.

Mr. Manell. Your questioning leads me to two assump-

tions. One, that either at headquarters or at the

station there was a communication that is not part of the

record that you have.

To the very best of my knowledge, I

believe you are incorrect. in having that assumption because,

firstly, I know that I have no direct specific knowledge to

support that assumption.

Secondly, I believe that in

some

fashion I would have

become privy to that fact if it indeed existed.

The second point I would like to. make does not bear on

what you asked me today, but what you asked during the

interview. I

was led to believe that you had suspicion that

one agency of the government knew that another had more

contact with Oswald prior to the assassination than is a

matter of record and that perhaps another agency was covering

that up.

Here again, I certainly have no information to bear out

that assumption. But in this case, I wouldn't necessarily

have had the means to become privy to that kind of informa-

tion.

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I think that you place emphasis on the fact that

Mr. Karamessines signed off on the name trace cable from

headquarters to the station on the Ilth of October.. That, I

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find strange, but then again, I think that by: thorough

investigation on your part, you could easily determine

the reason for it.

So, rather than have it become an important concern or

reservation on your part, I think that you could nail. that

down one way or the other with a minimum of investigation.

That is it. That is the end of my statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

I have read the foregoing pages

I through 61, inclusive, which

contain a correct transcript. of

the answers made by me to the

questions therein recorded.

Signature is subject to

corrections.

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Herbert Manell

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Albert Joseph Lafrance, the officer before whom

the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that

the witness whose testimony appears in' the foregoing deposi-

tion was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said.

Witness was taken Albert Joseph LaFrance, shorthand reporter,

and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction:

that I am neither counsel "for, related to, nor emplöyed by

any of the parties to the action in which this deposition

was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or 'employee

öf any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto,

nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of

the action.

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What foreple

Tram

Notary Pabli

and for the

District of columbia.

My commission expires:

November 14, 1980

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