OPERATIONS TO SPLIT THE CASTRO REGIME.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 02/10/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

29090"

INDEX

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

A.

Operations to Split the Castro Regime

1. A Study of the Loci of Power

2. HMMA-19325, dated 10 July 1962, with Att.

3. Draft Memorandum

to the DCl from William Harvey

4. Memorandum to the DCI from Desmond Fitzgerald

B. AMTRUNK Operation

1. Memorandum on Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC, with Atts.

2. 7 February 1963 Memorandum for the Record by

Albert C. Davies, with Att.

3. Memorandum on Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez

4. Memorandum on Jorge Ajbuszyc VOLSKY, with Att.

5.' JMWAVE Dispatch UFGA-8381, dated 8 April 1963

6. Memorandum on Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez, with Atts.

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Operations to Split the Castro Regime. -

Interim Working Draft,

Dated 10 February 1977,

with Attachments

# 00356

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23%1

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INTERIM WORKING DRAFT

10 February 1977

OPERATIONS TO SPLIT THE CASTRO REGIME

Review of this file leaves no doubt that CIA was being

pressured by Higher Authority, as far back as

early 1962, or

earlier, to come up with an operational plan for actions

against Cuba with the eventual aim of overthrowing the Castro

regime. The following three documents of particular signifi-

cance were surfaced. A Study of the Loci of Power,

March - June 1962, and two policy papers:

1. A Study of the Loci of Power, March - June 1962, cites

on page 5 the direction in which Task Force W. (TFW) was moving

in efforts to split the regime. CIA had already recruited or

attempted to recruit certain individuals including the following:

a. (Ambassador Gustavo ARCOS y Bergnes (201-205568).

A sustained effort by TEW to recruit him in Brussels was

unsuccessful. Despite failure, ARCOS remained in close

and friendly contact with TFW sources.

•b. Major Rolando CUBELA Secades (201-252234), ex-

President of the Federation of University Students, and an

M.D. A Mexico City Station dispatch _(HMMA-19325 - Att..)

dated 10 July 1962, cites 11 defections and "recruitments"

of Cuban officials in which Mexico City.

Station had been

involved since about January 1960, and indicated that

none of the agents was ideal from the standpoint of control.

An unsuccessful "approach" was made to CUBELA.

SEGA

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COMMENT: CUBELA might have reported the initial

approach in Mexico City to the GOC and consideration

could have been given to running him back against CIA as

a provocation agent. Several incidents tend

to illustrate

this view:

(1) CUBELA reportedly had let it be known for

some time that he wanted to defect. Word of such

inclination could have gotten back to the GOC. If it

did, it is unlikely that the GOC would have let him

continue to travel outside of Cuba under those

circumstances.

(2) CUBELA reportedly had all the tools necessary

to carry out an assassination of CASTRO, and

probably

some opportunities, had he really wanted to do so.

Perhaps he was sent by the GOC to confirm whether

the U.S.G./CIA would support executive action - or to

confirm information possibly passed to the GOC/Soviets

by Tad SZULC. (See biographic sketch of SZULC attached

to AMTRUNK Operation report.) CUBELA also wanted to

meet with a high-level policy making official.

(3) CUBELA, following arrest, was given a rela-

tively light sentence, considering the seriousness of

the charge.

Upon incarceration he reportedly functione

as a prison physician, and drove around in a jeep

unescorted. Such treatment by GOC is quite unusual

and, if true, is an indication that he was trusted..

30M07SSSTE

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SINVE

c. Juana de la Caridad CASTRO Ruz. (201-218126),

younger sister of

EyFidel and Raul, was recruited

trained, and returned to Cuba.) She Came back out in

1963 and)functioned as a JMWAVE Station propaganda asset

which included broadcasting into cuba.

d. Wife of Major Raul Jaime DIAZ-ARGUELLES Garcia

06,08

(201-269882), reported to CIA from Havana through Virginia

Maria LETTAO de Cunha( (AMSTRUT-1): (201-316646), the wife

of the Brazilian Ambassador to Russia) who travelled to

Cuba for THW from(Rio de" Janeiro) where (he)lived. Raul

DIAZ, a known terrorist, held an influential position in

the Cuban Department of Technical Investigation of the

Department of Information of the Rebel Army (DIER). He

reportedly worked with former U.S. gansters who were

deported fron the U.S.; was affiliated with the narcotics

racket; and was believed to have been in complete charge

of any activity contemplated by two Cubans, Aldo Pedro

MARGOLLES y Duenas and Emilio ARAGONES y Navarro. MARGOLLES

and ARAGONES were involved in a 1961 plot to enter the U.s.,

meet with Cuban agents, and assassinate President Kennedy.

DIAZ allegedly was responsible for assassinations during

the Batista regime, and was trained in the use of explosive

bombs and automatic weapons. He is believe to have

directed assassinations in the past from somewhere

in

Mexico.

DIAZ was killed in Angola in December 1975 when

a land mine exploded beneath his jeep. DIAZ was reported

to be a good friend of Rolando CUBELA.

3

coronand

G/PV

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SECRE AS TVE

e. Raul ROA Garcia (201-170466). An effort to

contact and recruit him in boober 1962 failed; however,

(the brother of Mrs. Raul ROA, who resided in Miami,

was recruited by and worked for TFW. At that time Raul

ROA was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

f. President Osvaldo DORTICOS. Torrado (201-260268) •

An October 1962 approach to him in New York failed. He

became so ired that the agent who pitched him was forcibly

removed from DORTICOS' hotel.

g. Jose LLANUSA Gobel, at that time Director of

Sports in Cuba and one time "Mayor" of Havana; recruit-

ment attempt failed.

h. Major Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3) (201-249386)

then Chief of Rural Housing in Cuba. He refused to work

in place but was willing to defect. Defected to the U.S.

in an INRA plane in December 1962, and was recruited by

JMWAVE Station. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965,

reportedly to attempt the exfiltration of his family. He

allegedly was arrested upon return to Cuba, imprisoned,

and set free in 1967. His file reflects that he might

have cooperated with the G-2, at least

after his return

to Cuba.

COMMENT: RABEL was interviewed by JMWAVE Station

in February 1963 in relation to the AMTRUNK on-island

target personalities. He could have been forced to

reveal all he knew to the GOC when he was arrested,

or he could have been a provocation.

Wpv

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assassanta

One, some, or all of the foregoing individuals

could have reported to the GOC, Agency attempts to

recruit them.. Further research is necessary, and

indeed recommended, to determine whether those who

did agree to cooperate were run back against us.

Knowledge by the GOC of such recruitment attempts

against some of their highest level officials,

together with GOC knowledge of other CIA activities

targetted against Cuba, might have prompted CASTRO

to consider taking retaliatory action.

The retalia-

tion concept increases considering the possibility

that Tad SZULC might have been reporting White House

policy to CASTRO, and the GOC and/or the Soviets all

along.

Of interest is the fact that on the heels of

the aforementioned recruitment attempts, (between

1960

and 1962, to split the CASTRO regime), came

a

request to CIA from the State Department, in early

1963, for an operation to do just that.

Proposal

for

the operation was made to Mr. Hurwitch by

Tad SZULC. It appears that pressurewas exerted on

CIA to support the activity and it became the AMTRUNK

Operation. (See the separate memorandum on the

AMTRUNK Operation.) In view of SZULC's involvement,

this could have been a political action operation

(by the Soviets/Cubans) against the U.S.G./CIA.

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2. A Secret-Sensitive draft memorandum from William

Harvey to the DCI, dated 27 November 1962, which outlined

on-going operations and suggested proposals for continuing

activities. Page 12 made clear that an intensive program

would be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity

to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion,

which was recognized as a long term effort. Page 16, para V. B,

recommended that the plan be discussed with the Special Group

(Augmented) for concurrence.

3. A memorandum to the DCI from Desmond Fitzgerald, undated,

attached to a buckslip dated March 1963, which outlined a program

to exacerbate and stimulate disaffection in the Cuban Armed

Forces. The DCI had requested that TFW submit a plan to split

the military establishment from the CASTRO/Communist regime

with a view to replacing the existing regime with one acceptable

to the U.S. The CIA proposal was

to identify and seek out

disaffected officers and attempt to convince them

that their

future lay in disposing of CASTRO and establishing a new govern-

ment which could be returned to the OAS. (This appears to be

the AMTRUNK Operation.

See separate memorandum.) Pages 9 and

10 cite a statement made by President Kennedy in his speech

at the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida on 29 December 1962 [to

the approximately 1,150 Bay of Pigs prisoner returnees.

Kennedy's statement reportedly had a favorable impact on the Cuban

populace which might have bothered CASTRO.]. Fitzgerald stated that

CIA would also explore leads to dissident elements in Cuba from

journalists such as Tad SZULC of the New York Times, et al.

6

370757/82315

' 892 ?

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14-00J0000)

DDO/LA/Kennedy Task

Force:Chris Hopkins: rp

....

SEL

Fitzgerald assured the DCI that the highest priority had been

assigned to the above program within SAS.

COMMENT: See the AMTRUNK Operation paper and attached

biographic sketch on Tad SZULC, a possible foreign agent.

SZULC claimed to have had direct access to President

Kennedy, Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy on

a continuing basis concerning Cuban matters since early

1961. If true, that would have placed him in a position

to be used as a possible channel by which policy infor-

mation on ClA operations and activities conceivably could

have gotten to the Cuban Government or to the Soviets.

code do

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