Agency: FBI
Originator: FBI
From: SULLIVAN, W. C.
To: DELOACH, C. D.
Document date: 3/7/70
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

124-10185-10098

4/2|98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

1.

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINSO

FEFFIN IS UNCLASSIFISO EXCH%

Iicant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious

and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the

Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light,

were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging

remarks concerning the Bureau.

Some of this was summed up by

characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming

largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddil Smith, then

Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other

Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the

existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any

covort hostility ageinst the Bureau and maintained that there

He admitted that

there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA

must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other

Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time

guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations

between the two agencies.

I was not able to find a memorandum

of record covering

this meeting. (62-80750-1712, 1715, 1716,

1726, 1728, 1748, 1750)

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's

we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly

was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel.

We vigorously pro

tested, and subsequently, the Agency advised that it would follow

& policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until

the Individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period

of at least thirty days.

The Agent could not locate the back

ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him.

It is pos-

sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file

of some former Bureau Agent.

RV. 5S

CIA HAS NO ORLECTION TO

DEOLASSIRGATION AND/OR,

MALEASH OF CIA INFORMATION

IN TNIS-LOSURENTAS SANITiZED

KP1-8-98

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## Page 2

¡SECRET

JFK

(1)(B)

3.

NIKOLAI KHOKHLOY] (5) JFK(1(B)

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA

for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the

captioned individual, a Soviet defector who had been placed

under CIA control in Europe.. The Bureau hall been interested

in interviewing Khokhloy as soon as he came to the United States,

and this had been agreed to by ciA.

consulting with us, CIA permitted @hokhlood arrive in the Fee 3)

Inited States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional

committee.

We were,

therefore, unable to interview the subject

in any detail. (Re: Wikolai Khokhlov)(S) jFK (1)(8)

4. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the

Agency had evaluated information coming fron the key source

in the captioned case as emanating fron a fabricator. We had

disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originat-

ing in this case to cia.

The source was a key double agent

in one oi the most impuitani cases hondled by the Rureau, and

the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were

concerned. (Re: MOCASE)

CASE OF (SYLVIA PRESS

JFKCILO)

SERINES

(s)/Sylvia Press was a CIA employee thom that Agency con-

sidered to be a communist penetration.

The Agency requested

an investigation which was then initiated by us.

We subsequently

learned that CIA had been conducting its owa investigation which

even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject.

We considered this most uncooperative and re protested.

(Re: Sylvia PressD (5) JFK((B)

6. DR. OTTO JOHN, VISIT TO BUREAU - 1954

DI. Otto John, a West German security official,

defected to the communists in East Germany in July, 1954.

few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States

under CIA

sponsorship.

• He was

afforded a our of the Bureau

and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed

that if all available facts were col-

lected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very

Ineffective job of assessing DI. Otto John and permitting the

United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting

& visit for him to this country.

We could consider this instance

an affront to the Director and

the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to

Belmont October 13, 1954, "CIA Tours Afforded by Bureau")

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## Page 3

1 95004T

7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN

- DETECTORS - 1954.

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong

letter

of protest was sent to General T. J.

Betts of the Interagency

Defector Committee at CIA.

This letter made reference to

political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish

sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members

of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made

by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to

arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an

adverse

effect on the over-all United States Defector Program.

emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been

officially presented before the Defector Committee.

He was

Informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8.

CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION

VITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBIR 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with

Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was

referrea, Lo d

maitei wich bou not yet developed into serious

situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts

between the two agencies.

of aliens in the United States made by CIA gersonnel without

first obtaining the necessary clearance fron the Bureau.

requirement for such clearance was clear cut and pursuant to an

established agreement. (62-80750; memorandm Roach to Belmont

September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

a National Academy graduate to utilize his services in

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approachedJFk0J(B)

This approach was made while the graduate was attending National

Academy classes.

A protest was made to key CIA officials for

not having advised us prior to establishing contact with

Academy graduate. LRe:

S JFK(I(B)

10.

In December, 1955, we received information indicating

that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was

developing for utilization in a double agent operation.

learned that CIA representatives had established contact with

Jand had given him some advice and guidance without ese (.)

first checking with the Bureau, We protested to CIA. (105-19001)(5)

SECRET.

- 3-

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• i

11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

avallable to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis

detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the

United States Government by "Pabian Socialists. " PrudeauTts) JkUJUs

furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to

fall into this category. Many of those listed vere CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that

It could be used to justify that as of that period there was

reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner.

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 11, 1956, "Infiltration

of Fabian Socialists into the High Policy Areas of the

United States Government")

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January I1, 1956, our Washington Field

Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining

results of name check requests submitted to CIA.

These

delays

particularly related to investigations oi appiicani waiters

being handled by the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 19,

1956 "Applicant Matters - Record Checks at CIA")

13. WILLIAM P. BUNDY

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that willlan

P. Bundy would serve as a secretary for the Intelligence Advisory

Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. buncy, son

In-law o1 Dean Acheson, admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss

Defense Fund.

At the time of this contribution, Bundy was In

the same law firm with Donald hiss, brother of Alger Hiss.

Although we did not object to the appointment of Bundy,

this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired

to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect

In dealings with CIA.

14. DR. [SAMUEL ABRAHAM GOUDSMIT

JFK(JCB)

(S)

JFK(D(B).

(5)

Dr. Goudsmit was a leading scientist assigned to the

Brookhaven National Laboratory a He had been used as a consultant

by such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CI..

1955 he met a Soviet scientist and, with the know

Tedge of AÉC and CIA, began cultivating him.

Loudsmit informed

JPK

.. 013. (5)

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## Page 5

JFK

D(B)

us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI

would be furnishing operational guidance to him.

We had never

become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined

that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-

described misrepresentation.

protested the CIA official's

JFKCIXB)

handling of this matter. (Re:/Dr (Samuel Abraham Goudsmit) |

15.

15) JFK()(B)

JFK (IJCB)

$ on July 20, 1956, we determined at name

JFKLI)CA)

JFK (ILB)

the Agency had no information concerning

JFKU(A) contacts with

Toks) He

ater interviewed

f and

it was indicated that,

In fact, had been in contact wit

a CIA official concerning his meetings with

]Military

Attache.

We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology.

(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 19560

J(S) JFK(JA)

16.

1(5) JFK(I (A)

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a state

Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly

had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being per

mitted to enter the United States so that his activities

could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position

to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of

any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry

of the subject for the purpose described above.

The State

Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA

employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not

In a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting

the Agency coming

up with the identity. (Re:

(5) JFK (1VA)

17

JFK(1)(A)

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly pro-

tested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had inter-

viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining

clearance from the Bureau.

united states.

It should be noted that there was

a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon

CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any

alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956,

/ JFK(ICA)

• 5 -

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JFK(1)(A)

18.

SECRET

JFK(CA) CE

Twas a former

student at Columbia University

walal with whom we had been in contact because of his associatior

withal soviet assigned to the United Nations SIn December,

JFK (tA)

JFK (1(1) 1956, 1

made a trip to Bussia where he was contacted by

that the writer was

interested in coopefating with the United States. When l

returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview

the subiect because of the Agency'

ests.

informed us that he had been cautioned by ciA not to furnish

pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such

statement was made. (Re:

P(S) JAK('(A)

19.

CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-

1957

<(1) (A)

The San Francisco Office furnished information

indicating thai cis nad

roquested a firm in California to fur-

nish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries

pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company.

The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that

CIA was not invading our jurisdiction.

We did not develop

evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director

did make a notation,

"O.K., but it does seen to me we give clA

a pretty wide authority to

explore such a field. I"

(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, L'Flow of

Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through

So-Called Channels')

20. I

1(S)JFK (1) (A)

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repre-

JFKCICA)

sentatives in the field had interviewed the captioned Chinese (5)

alien who had agreed to

cooperate with the Agency after he

returned to Red China. SCIA conducted this interview without

first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was

A vigorous

protest was made to the Agency. (Re:

7-100-3858527(5)

JFK (ICA)

R G

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## Page 7

SECACI

21.

CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR

REPRESENTATIVES - 1957

S)

(a)In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several

officials who

were coming to this country under CIA

CIA was told that no tours would be given to the

because in the past a

Ambassador had

grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the

ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge.

(u)

I1 we so desired, we could give consideration to

accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we

considered undesirable in light of the foregoing.

(memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont Representatives

of

by CIA")

(o)

Service) - Request for Bureau four

22.

FREQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957

S(U)

ой November 15, 1057, our New. Yout Office was cor-

tacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be in

formed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the

premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located

across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet -

United Nations Delegation..

The CIA representative indicated

that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions

received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was, concerned about

the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of

conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council.

•It should be noted that the Council includes as members many

including officials of the United

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed

on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used

by CIA in that

such a sensitive matter had been taken up at

the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters.

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council

on Foreign Relations")

-(U)

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(SEGRET

JFK(IJCA)

23.

JPK(LA)

JFK(JA). In October, 1957

we received information fromL

indicating that L

Scientist then visiting in the Unitede

States might defect.

States kept de actisede one weede eas ments throud the

S

serals situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with

We subsequently received information indicating thate

207573)

Ja CIA employee, established contact with

(5)

A protest was made to CIA for not

( properly coordinating their interests with ula bage he pardized Jelle

that the action taken byl

& Bureau operation. (Re:

24.

5 JFK(I)(A)

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a

Plod bubiect la Romantanalien, without first obtaining

• CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the

the nec

cesary clearance from the Bureau. Re:

- 105-62486)J (S

JFKCI)(A)

25.

ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

JFK

A) (5)

On April 23, 1958, we received information Indicating

that a CIA employee allegedly had represented hersest as Dete

with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with

Van official of the international Association oi

Machinists in Washington, D. C

Tgave

a signed statement

in which hesslained that he had received a phone call from a

MissI

who said she was with the ra.

Upon checking with

CIA,

we were informed that Miss

denied that she had made

such

representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25,

1958, "Unknown Subject;!

26.

(S)JFK(!) (A)

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested

to CIA for interviewing-an alien

in the Detroit area without

first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.

Such

clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement.

(Re:

- 105-68013)|(5)

8

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(6)

JFK

(iB)

JFK(I)(B)

27.

-(5)

We received information in May, 1953, that_

a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the

Bureau I(S)

of the District of Columbia fational Guard.

The information was developed as the result of an investiga

tion being conducted by the Bureau for the thite House.

furnished a signed statement indicating that he per-

sonally had no knowledge of the existence oi the above infor-

mation in the National Guard records.

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont May 17,

1958, "Alleged

Representation by CIA Employee of Employment with FBI"')

28. CORNEL MUNTIU

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA

for not advising us concerning that Agency's intervie of an

individual tho was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We

had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and

the Agency should have been aware of our interests.

(Re: Cornel Muntiu - 105-58749)

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF

UNITED STATES AGENCIES

(5)

3y letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, lokyo, gurnishe

normation volunteered to him by Colonel canes Riley of G-2.(

/ Riley]was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. He indicated

that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating

other United States agencies.

He also mentioned that when

Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a

woman; not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

use this information as evidence for supporting a position of

being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

(Letter dated June 3, 1958, from Legat, (Tolto] "Relations withe

CIA" )

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## Page 10

, SECRET

30. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN

1(5)

The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated

June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard

Gehlen,Isthe head of the West German Intelligence Service WCIA

became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative

Informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the

Legat visit with Gehlen Your Legat was instructed by the Bureal

to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as

being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17,

1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE ALIENS -

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning

a's tailure to adnerento an agreement relating to cla:

recruitment of Chinese allens in the United states for over

seas intelligence operations

under the agrcoment, CIA was

not to approach any Chinese lien without first checking with

A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA

allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and

even took some action without first checking with us. We

for Overseas

Intelligence Operations')

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memo-

randum sent to an official in our_ Embassy in Tokyo by l

75)

In his communication j(5)

belittled the value of "Masters

Deceit" as an anticommunist

weapon in foreign countries.

He claimed that the book pertained

only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a

ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated

that the author of

the book. was not an intellectual but rather

a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958,

"Masters of Deceit.")

- 10 -

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## Page 11

PK

SECRET

33.

CIA DEVELOPMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES

J GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN YOU

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and back-

ground data concogans three individuals -e

JFK(N(A)

Sall employees of the

Government and assigned to the United States.

had been developed as a source of intoration by cla

and volunteered one acman cape to A 1d been develope le JECA

a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to

JFK(ISCA)

that in the case ofl

have notified us at an eaflier date in order that we could

have considered exploitation for internal security purposes

at the outset. (Re:

Activities - I00-2547497(5

JFK(1L)(S)

34.

JFK(ICA)

JFKCI)(A)

The subject, a former member of the Polish intelligence

Service, defected to

the United States and furnished extremely

valuable information. The beginnings of this case include

Information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

JPK()(B)

that CIA May have opened a letter in

In June, 1958, we developed Information hich had

InaLCatIne

been addressed facector by an individuate no had

JFKCILA)

Identified himself asl

_LThe writer further

indicated that he might be connected with

. Service.

The letter addressed to the Director had been placed

Intelligence JfkA)

in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of

the l

(s)We subsequently.

received a copy of the particular communication from CIA,

and the contents were such at that time that no action was

required by the Bureau.

He asked CIA for particulars leading

to the alleged opening

of the letter which had been addressed

to the Director.

CIA claimed that it had not opened the

letter.

'e were confidential& intormed by an Agency repre.

sentative that the

mad opened the latter and the

referred the matter to CIA.

The contents were such that inves

tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA

In Europe.

What actually happened at the United States Embassy

is something we may never know.

- 65-65192

JFK (CA)

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## Page 12

UFK(1)(A)

MADA

35.

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern

regarding CIA's alleged interview of a Chineselalien whom CIAS

was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an

approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contra

dicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Re

S)

XBureau file 34-5243] (5)

36. COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE ((S)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for

" permission

to play a recording of a telephone conversation (s)

On June 5,

we had obtained

the contents of a conversation between

The conversation strongly indicated thatl

closely with the Egyptians. & Subseguently, CIA developec

information indicating that

was a ker ligure in a

revolutionary

Lo the objective of which was to overthrow

(3)

returned to

and was imprisoned by

"based upon information made available through CIA.

Idenied any implication in any revolutionary activity and

he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the

I Government. (9

I tola CiA that he was on the

that he needed

proof of

§conspiratorial

activity.

played to

CIA asked if we would permit the Recording

stressing that this was the only way

could be convinced.

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that

the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing

of the recording. (We maintained that if we granted such

permission, our other coverage of a sensitive naturelgould

be seriously imperiled.

On July 21, 1958,

Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau

would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation

in the Middle EastS Pursuant to instructions, CIA was ther

told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been

placed, we acceded to Dulles' request.

that we were seriously consigering the termination of all da

our technical surveillances because we did not intend to be

placed in such a position in the future.

(0)

on July 22,

1958, Dulles

told the Liaison

Agent

that he was very much disturbed over. the Director's reaction

He stated that

he was not interested in holding a pistol to

- 12 - 18

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## Page 13

anybody's head and he lurther indigated that he was deliber-

ating whether or not the Gecording

should be used. It was

recommended that the Liaison Agent folloy the matter for the

purpose of determining if the recording was to be used by CIA.

The Director's notation was, "No..

The fat is in the fire

and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will

probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H."

(U)

The strong position we took in resisting the

dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign

government was fully justified. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont,

dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission toPlay

Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan")

18(0)

(U)

K000

38

Ne expressed our displeasure to CIA in (september

1958, because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in

the United States of a Romanian/ citizen who was here. in connec

tion with an exchange progran.

The Romanian indicated to ant

American friend that he was interested in staying in the United

States, but was not ready for actual defection because of

- JFKCI(A)

fine, i.

- 13-

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## Page 14

JFK( CA)

JFK(I (A)

possible hostage situation in his native country.

The Bureau

was following this potential defection and pursuant to estab-

lished procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of

developments.

On September 15, 1958, we received information

indicating that another Government agency was conducting an

CIA was the other agency.

Investigation of the subjectrel

It was later established that

Bureau file

[105-64024)

JFK(+JUB

→(5) JFK(LA

39.

CIA ACTIVITIES/ I

(v)

The Lega

Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated

september 22; 1958 Nthat l

was a paid, nighly regarded, and very sensitive source,

of CIA.* This information was given

to the Legal Attache by

Colonel John B. Stanley XG2 Head in Japan. According to Stanley,

ciA did not want this information to be known to other agencies,

particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more

of CIA double dealing. H."

(Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated

Septempenes", 2958, "Investigations in

• JFK(I)(B)

40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

(5)

During the period October 20-25, 1958, Bureau

representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which

was given by the U.S. Air Force./s)Among the activities was a

lecture given by

Jof CIA-*Subsequent to thef

briefing, General Millard Youngspf the Air Force confided to

Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the

Tie was particularly critical of S

's reluctance to furnish certain information, using the

excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature.

s Young stated that the position taken by

xcuse for incompetence on the part of Cia. • Ls

was only and

This item is being cited in the event we desire to

use the foregoing

as evidence to support a position that we were

obliged

to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum

October 28; 1958, Roach to Belmont, Joint Strategic Planning> (s)

Seminar, Orlando

Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October (20-25, (s)

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTEROW OF BATISTA GOVERNHENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1,

1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised

questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intel

ligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

14

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## Page 15

show that many more people were involved in the Castro organi

zation than the U.S. Government had realized. Information

coming to.our attention suggested the possibility that both

State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found

reason to question the competency of CIA in Cuba. This could u

be useiul if we wanted to justify the

exietence ot a vera.

Attache office in Havana®

One could also comment that poor

•coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our

operations in the United States.

42.

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our

objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with

whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing

him as a double agents The individual Involved wasl

Ta well-known expert in the field ofes

medical research as It applied to Space flying

a150

a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive

matters for that Agency.J Infapril, 0959,

Jwas preparing

to make a trip to Moscow.

CIX briefed him on matters as they

applied to his trip.

The Agency also interviewed him concerning

his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and,

furthernore, Bave him gutdance concerning the relationship.

We objected

to CIA giving any guidance tol

concerning(S

his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us.

Bureau 111e 105-69694](5)

13.

ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the

• National Strategy

Seminar of the National Far College.

One

of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles.

He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the

communist problem.

The above is' being cited in the event we desire to

utilize the information in justifying a position that it was

necessary to be circumspect with CIA.

(Memorandum W. C. Sullivan

to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National

War College, July, 1959")

44.

"TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an

article captioned "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock,"

which included information of a derogatory nature concerning

the Director and the Bureau.

The article precipitated & crisis

tin

---

## Page 16

is 14 bee

JFK (1)CA

which Led to an almosi

the Bureau and CIA.

The article was writte

-wul McCarry who was connected

JFKA with the International

- urganization in Geneva, Switzerland

The article

was very complimentaty toward ciA.

The author made reference

to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly

indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA

took Agents from FBI; that Agents

did not remain in the Bureau

for an extended period; and he related a story very critical

of the Director.

We learned that the author had been in contact with

CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that lyman

(5) Kirkpatrick a CIA official, had read

and approved the article

prIOr

to its publication.

as a result of this information,

Kirkpatrich became persona non grata with the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles

(5) and Kirkpatrick concerning the matter.

We took the position

that based upon the information made mailable CIA had promoted,

condoned, or possibly even

Dulles denied

cating that he bad been knowledgeable of the author!s article

before it was published.

Theyauthor had contacted betanley

(5)

Grogan, one of Kirkpatrick's"subordinates, and had

discussed the matter with him.

The author allegedly had raised

tions were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless,

the final draft of the article included the derogatory infor

mation and the facts available to us indicate that Kirkpatrick

(5)

had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the

article before it was published. He did not do so. He told

us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison

relations.

It was recommended and approved that liaison continue

and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course

of action we were going to take.

It was suggested that we not

immediately answer letters,which had been sent to the Bureau

by Dulles and Kirkpatrick in connection with this particular

matter.

It was also recommended and approved that we cut off

all contact with Kirkpatrick. (5)

By letter dated September 11, 1959, to Dulles, the

Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of

CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any con-

cern or objection to "True" magazine, and furthermore, had failed

- 16*

---

## Page 17

disappointed In him because he had failed to make any objection

to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending

attack against the Bureau.

(Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,

August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles:

America's Global Sherlock,

"True' Magazine,

September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to

Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")

45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959

We received information in September, 1959, that

the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American

businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between

the businessmen and visiting Soviets.@CIA reportedly was inter-

ested in developing positive intelligence information; but it

so happened that, one of the Soviets was involved in a double

agent operation'being handled by the Bureau.

The, Bureau already

had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet. By letter

dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner

in which CIA had handled this: (Re

j Bureau(S

file [234-84937

46.

APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE. ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, InIormatIon was receivea

indicating that HUA was interested in obtaining Colonel frantises

Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA

advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in

turn, had conferred with CIA.

HUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee

a nd a crated the

Allen Dulles allegedly informed

and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security

instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority

to make a defector available to a congressional committee without

first checking with other interested agencies.

The Director was

because a National

Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not

be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency

Defector Committee.

In this particular case the aforementioned

Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a. CIA

official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative

was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but a that time we

had

not formulated a position.

Allen

Dulles allegedly contacted

the

chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee

had

no objection to making Tisler available.

Panto,

india?.

---

## Page 18

On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were

informed that we were opposed to

making the defector available

to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing

HUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration,

it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November la, 1959, the develop-

ments in this matter were reviewed and it was

recommended that

at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly

protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HUA request.

• (Bureau file 105-33958)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, Ray Tanner, President of Reicco

Company, Caracas,

Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently

held a conversation

JFK Embassy imentray st

5y2th L

an official Poor exception

to complimentary statements made by Ianner concerning the Director

and the FBI L57

stated that the Director should have retired

five years ago foi

the good of all concerned.

A protest was made

to Allen Dulles on April 20,

1960: (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont;

Apr91. 21, 1960; ['Herschel F. Peak, JI."' (5)

JFK(1)(B)

48.

(ROBERT AMORY]CIA

OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING

RECOGNITION

OF RED CHINA - 1960

, Dr. Frank Barnett, Director 0I

Researce the rearrason foundate by Noburt Ared in ration.

concerning statements allegedly made by Robert Amory, a cop

CIA official. Amory

allegedly advocated recognition of nea

China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen

Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent

that he hagsfonducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording

of Amory'st

statement attributed to him.

alk, and was satisfied that Lanor had not made the

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

dispute the position taken by Dulles.

If the evidence clearly

established that Amoryhad made such a statement, we could use

the information to support a position that we would have been

Frobbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, (Robert Amory'" (5)

warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S.

PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau

Mexico City;

- 18 -

---

## Page 19

SECRET

JFK

•(1)(B)

JPK(I (3)

had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had

to know what vas going on in U.S. establishments.

The implication

was left. that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies

through technical installation.

Inquiries developed informa-

tion indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy

in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office

of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to

pin this down in a more specific manner.

We were told by State

that their records did not contain any information concerning

the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal

Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical

installations which may affect Bureau operations.

(Memorandum

L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones

on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50.

JFK(I)CA)

JFK(CA)

' We received

information indicating that the subject

a former CubanJintelligence agent and the subject of a Burea

investigation, had planned to defectl

permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order

to orient him so that maximun propaganda effect would be derived

through nevspaper publicity.

-We were told that the CIA repre-

sentative l

Thad been instructed by his headquarter

to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.s..

Government.

We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency

had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity.

Memoran un

L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, L

51.

JFK

(1)(B)

(S)JFKOX8)

Miss

La CIA employee, obtained afT

position as a secretary in the Office ofl

Srior to receiving this job, CIA checked

with the Bureau.

Liaison Agent subsequently learned that

Thad informed

that she was leaving her

job

The

She

linquired if she could recommend somebody else.

gave

them

the name of another CIA employee, Miss

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was

out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recom-

JFK((6) mending

to

that the Bureau was interested

in developing intelligence information which might be usefúl

to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was

obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with

the Bureau.

(Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960,

(0)

JFK(JIA

JFK(ICE)

JFK()(B)

19

---

## Page 20

SECRET

52.

CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN

A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted

Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance

for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document.

No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensi-

tivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his

subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence

of such errors.

(Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961,

53.

"SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

proofs of the book

" written by Pawel Monat.

A review of these proofs disclosed

several references which

portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable

light.

Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing

which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It

turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of

the book.

We were told that steps would be taken to protect

Purcer interest.

The publishers had indicated to CIA that they

would cooperate

changes. Although some changes were made,

the book still came out with some information which was not

entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file

105-40510)

54• CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE

17 1961 6SS(0)

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache,

received information indicating that the Czech Embassy jin that

city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.s.

• Intelligence.

The Legal Attache was told by the l

that the Agency was not involved. On October 12,

1961, the

same

been involved to a certain extent.

CIA officer changed his position and admitted that cIA had Ku)(V)

The Liaison Agent objected

to these tactics.

It was important to him to know the facts

so he could be guided accordingly.

(Memorandum.,' Allier to

Not viro tober 18

1961, L Czechoslovakian Diplomatic

Activities

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

FRIOCAL

When he defected in December, 1961,

furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American

intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the

Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer,

was a logical suspect. He conferred with CIA and on february

9, JFK()(B)

1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investi

gation.

20

---

## Page 21

JFK(1) (B)

SECRET

On February 7, 1962,

Colonel Sheffield Edwards,

Director of security, cla, informed the hiaison Agent that

CIA was

prebaring a report containing extremely sensitive

Information.

He stated that this information came from &

sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should

be handled.

As a result of a discussion with Edwards on

February 26, 1962, It was ascertained that CIA had maintained

a technical

surveillance onl

lover an extended per10d.

Edwards explained

that he had been reluctant to identify this

•source at an

earlier date because he feared that prosecution

could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want

his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to

CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances.

It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely

necessary that we be provided with all the details and, further-

more, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the

existence of the coverage.

The Director made the notation,

"I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be

depended upon to deal forthrightly with us.

Certainly my

skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on

specific instances of all too many in number.

Yet, there

exists

spots.

wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his

H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February 27,

1962, "Unknöwn Subject; iGo Agent Knowa is

56.

JFK(I)(A)

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested

to discuss with CIA a

case which, in our opinion, clearly

Indicated CIA had failed to keep

us appropriately informed

of developments.

The Bureau's original interest was initiated

as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that

city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were

negative.

On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed

the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately

satisfy the Bureau's request.

(Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan,

February 27, 1962,

and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau

1110[205-9994711 (5)

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had

become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the

assassination of Fidel Castro.

One of the principal ingredients

of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums: CIA

established contact with Robert Mabeu, former Bureau Agent, who

served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious

hoodlum, Sam Giancana.

JFK(I)(B)

JFK

(1) (B)

SECRET

- 21 -

---

## Page 22

SEURES

The entire operation fell apart when we developed

information indicating that Haheu was behind a wire tapping

operation.

In Nevada.

Potentially, there were elements for

possible violation

of unauthorized

publication or use of

communications.

However, prosecution was out of the question

because of the tainted involvement of CIA.

(Arthur James Balletti,

"Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memo

randum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58.

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA

because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the

Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction.

Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in

nandu tronas to 3u4 ever, Detor 2 1863 and Memo

randum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962

59.

On Apxil 23, 1963. CIA requested that the Bureau

establish coverage on

& visitingl

¡national, Hele (v)

Immediately instituted investigation and then determined

that

CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's

trip to the United States.

CIA had been endeavoring to recruit

the subject. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged

with General Carter, Deputy Director Of CIA. (Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963,

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN MCCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating

that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the

Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded

Mccone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry ford and

Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City

Indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to

assassinate President Kennedy The story attributed to McCone

appeared to be related to information which had come from one

Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national.

Interrogation of

Alvarado, Including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated

his story.

This had been made known to CIA and to AcCone.

fore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and

Pearson,

It would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to

ridicule the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on

December 23, 1963.

McCone vehemently denied the allegations.

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations

With CIA")

---

## Page 23

SECRO

61.

JURI NOSENKO (S)

penly defected in 4964jgnd he is currently in the United

States.

He has been the

considerable controversy because 01

questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in 1964J (5)

CIA took a very strong position

indicating that Nosenko was

a commitment on bona

in the meantine, Nosenso agithough controversial, continues to

furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of

bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken

by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important

to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned

(S)

If it is finally concluded that Hosenko is a bona

fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of

the subject over a period of years.

(Turi Nosenko, Bureau file

65- 685300(5)

62.

On April 13, 1964,

the Liaison Agent protested to

CIA because the Agency

had failed to notify the Bureau concerning

the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an

operation directed against the Soviets /in Mexico The individual

in this case was serving ashan

and because CIA did not notify

us concerning the past

could have been jeopardized,

bearing in nind that they our interests

could have been in contact with the Soviets without our knowledge.

CIA had severed its relationship with thell

Iprior to his(S

(S)L

assignment in the United states,

but CIA,

nevertheless

had an obligation to give us proper notilication.

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, April 7, 1964, 'Jose Rafael Suarez-Arcos"J

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY _

—1- 1965,

JFK(I We received information in June, 1965,

that certain

Twere representing

themselves as aly

ascertained that this activity was being

performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the

We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could

cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a

problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients

1,3

• Б

---

## Page 24

JFKOXAS

of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate

steps to correct the undesirable situation.

We were subsequently

informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that

the cover would no longer be used. (Memorandum Brennan to

June 21, 1965, "Central Intelligence Agency - Operations

Sullivan

64.

In August,

1965, both the Bureau

and CIA had an

interest in assessing

the potential utilization of the services

of\

) a Haitianfexile residing in the United States

We were interested in

because he potentially could furnishe

We informed CIA that

would notbe made available to the(S)

Agency.

CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our positio

in the proposed(

1, we determine

that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and

conferring with him.

We subsequently protested to the Agency

who claimed that it had not been out of line in contactingl

because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the

past.

We did not accept this explanation. (Memorandum Bronnen

to Sullivan, September 2, 1965,

JEFCICA)

65. INSECURE HANDLING OF FOPHAL INPORMATION (U) JFKLICS)

JFKEILA

In Burma that the newly designated Soviet Military Attache infe

s RangoonThad cooperated with the FBI prior to leaving the Unite

States[in 1962) and that he had remained in contact followinge

his return to Moscow. 5This all pertained to a sensitive Bureau

source who had been transferred by the Soviet Government from

Moscow to the Soviet Embassy in Burma. By letter dated Decembe:

3

[I965,Jwe made a strong protest to CIA charging that Agency withe

violating an understanding relative to the Tophat operation PluSurKase

Admiral Raborn, then Director of CIA, telephonically contactea

the Director, made reference to our communication, acknowledged

thất his man

had been-out of line, but did express concern

that the Bureau's displeasure had been placed in writing. The,

Director made it crystal clear that he was not happy with the

unauthorized action taken by CIA and instructed that no further

operational activity be taken with regard to Tophat until we

(v)

determined what CIA planned to do concerning

the matter.

(lemorandum Brennaz to Sullivan, December 2, 965, "Tophat "Il

(U)

•jFK(B)

66.

In March, 1966

¡CIA requested coveraga on a visiting

Covernment because of information developes

the Agency indicating that

Twas working for the

KGB

- 24 -9**

SPECULA)

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## Page 25

( SECRET

Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in

New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment

approach.

The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and

a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the

reports we received on CIA intentions.

(Memorandum Brennan to

Sullivan, April 18, 1966, L

5) JFKCIXA)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO

SENATOR ROBERT.C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating

that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by

CIA.

Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established

The matter was discussed vith the Director of CIA and the Jeses)

that one of its employees, _

had submitted S

a name check request to the Bureau concerning one

At that time

CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check

Section.

He admitted that

the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named

- A deploye mane check on an

It is my recollection thai one us vuin CiA employees

were subsequently fired

or asked to resign.

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966,

"Leak of FBI Documents

Concerning

to

Senator Robert C. Byrd'') #=(v)

(5)

68 .

ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT

(u)

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA

connection

with a matter relating

Interest in a

S)

connected with

Corporationin Newark, New

We were utilizing the

as a double agent in an operation

directed against the Soviets sCIA had established a relation

ship with the same person for

the purpose of acquiring positive

intelligence relating to the field ofl

office received information indicating that a ClA oftICer

ithout authorization, compromised our relationship withh

by discussing the matter with the president of the

(4)

firm.

(Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967,

"NK 2264-S, IS - R")

69.

JS JFK(I LAS

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where

the Agency

allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a

communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United

States,

had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular

communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

25 -

---

## Page 26

SECRET

for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United

States.

CIA clained that the exile had been reluctant to

operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to

respond to the communication received from Cuba.

We took the

position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile,

the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to

make its on assessment. (emorandum treanan ta, - Cula

July 20, 1967,

(5) JFK(1)(A)

70. CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION

DEALING WITH THE "ERVIN BILL"

On June 5, 1969, information was received indicating

that Richard Helms had sent Senator Sam Ervin three proposed

amendments to the legislation being proposed by the senator,

all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights

of Government employees.

We had been following developments

relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions

had a very definite bearing' on Bureau operations.

The proposed

amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain

provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security

Agency.

These amendments. were

suggested by CIA without prior

consultation with the Bureau.

Director made the notatiön,

"This presumptuous action of

Helms' is astounding." (M. A. Jones

to Bishop memorandum, June 6, 1969, "S. 782; Protection of

Constitutional Rights of Government Employees to Prevent

Unwarranted Invasion of Their Privacy")

71. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had

been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering

satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable

period of time. It would be necessary to review hundreds, if

not thousands, leads.

of files

to document what we consider delays in

following our

It should be noted that cla, organizationally,

has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way

comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed

as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This

evaluation is made in light of standards followed by the Bureau.

He continually prod and push CIA for responses.

To develop all

of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection

of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses:

hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries;

limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police,

security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority

- 26 -

---

## Page 27

targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign

countries.

Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the

point, It

is believed that in many instances it has not pro

duced

satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence

of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU

RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION.

Although there has been decided improvement in

recent years,

the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite

lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on

the part of CIA employees.

They do receive some training in

this regard, but the impression is left that such training

could be much more extensive.

The Bureau's Liaison Agent has

lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years

and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits.

CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular

basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities.

Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

There has been a sore spot in connection with cla

policy relating to its dissemination of information at a loca

level in our embassies.

1 This policy allegedly has applied toss (o)

al1 other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CiA has

maintained that unless the information it develops or receives

is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it

will only disseminate at the

Seat of Government.

example,

if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S.

criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate

to the Legal Attache.

However, if the

information falls within

the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities,

the Agency has stated that under its system the information is

considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated

at

headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been

received from other countries, and then disseminated to inter-

ested customers. We have not

regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal

Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further

orient him in his dealings with foreign officials.

been exceptions where the CIA chief in an area, on his own

initiative, has given such information to our legal Attache

CU

After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position

communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This

helps, but it would

be much more convenient for the Legal

Attache to receive itfat the local level:]

Cụ)

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## Page 28

receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged

spy traveling to the United States, or the case abroad

simply has ramifications in this country. In these instances,

CIA has

followed a definite

pattern over the years of

not

furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but

disseminating to us at Seat of Government. Here

again, CIA

has maintained that its headquarters must

review the data and

make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised

an issue.

We could by claiming that the Legal Attache could

be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to

follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if we

pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider

that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities

abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

For several years there existed a coordinating

mechanism

In

headed by CIA.

This was a committee

headed by the Agency and composed

of representatives of other

U,s, agencies.

The committee reviewed espionage and counter-

espionage developments in _

which had a bearing on U.s.

Interests.

If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose

among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used' to

establish an agreed-to operating agreement.

Quite often various

responsibilities were divided among the ditterent agencies.

It is my recollection that the Bureau has not been interested

F(0)

In becoming a part of such a committee.

if we did, we could

end up.

with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us.

74. SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including

our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the

relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War 1l. the

seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS. Willian

Donovan, who was

the head of OSS, has been referred to as the

"Father of CIA."

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI

jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters:

There

Was a number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislike

for the Bureau.

The loose administration of OSS, its employment

of known subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets,

and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed

serious problems to the Bureau.

At one point OSS was actually

giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

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## Page 29

"SECRET

NKVD.

became important figures within Cla, It would be logical to

circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau

rightfully cannot forget the troubles with oss.

At the same

time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the

role

played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations

in 1947•

In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files

in our SIS offices abroad, and we did not turn over to CIA a

Large number ot sources and intormants.

There have been many

ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were famillar

with the file destruction operation, and who later became

•connected

with CIA.

It is possible

that the Agency could

argue that the actions

by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S.

interests and impaired CIA's early efforts to establish desired

coverage in Latin America.

seei all

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