Document date: 00/00/0000

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File #:

62-116464

Serial Scope:

59

NW 54969 Docid:32989720 Page 1

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The Attorney General

Direçtor, FBI

UNITED STATES HOUSE SELECI COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

1 - Mi

B. Adams

2 - Mr. 2). A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Septembez 4, 1975

11 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Referenco is made to HSC letter dated July 22, 1975,

requesting materials and documents previously provided by this

Bureau to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Cormittee is the original of a memorandum with enelosure which

Is proffered as a partial response to the above-cited request

of the HSC.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for

your records.

_ Enclosures (3)

62-116464

ST: 100:

REC-I6

I - The Deputy Attorney General

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

5 SEP 16 1975

59

ENCLOSURI

nittie

TJM: 1hb lll,

(10)

Assoc. Dir. -.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. w

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -m

Ident.

Inspection

Inteller.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec, Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun

Telephone Rmy.

Director Sec'y;

NW 54969 Docide

-SEP 1,71975

ENCLOSURD IN BULKY 2COM'

MAIL ROOM

TALET

YPE UNIT L

189720 Rage 2,

t...

Lui

pin

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

1P0 954-348

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62-116464

1 - Mr

J.

B. Adams

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

September 4, 1975

1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR ALL INFORMATION

PREVIOUSLY MADE AVAILABLE

BY THE FBI TO THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

Assoc. Dir. --

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. invo

Ident.

Inspection

Intell. ..

Laboratory ..

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. --

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 3

Reference is made to HSC letter dated July 22,

19/5, requesting that the HSC be furnished wich copies of

all documents and materials provided by the fit to the sse.

Pursuant to an agreement reached August 19, 1975, by repre-

sentatives of the FBI, the Departnent of Justice and the

ase, all such material is being nade available to HSC Staff

Members for review at FBI Headquarters, and copies of

material so designated by reviewing HSC Staff Members will

be processed for delivery to the HSG.

On August 22, 1975, upon completion of a parcial

revier of FBI material

furnished the SSC, Richard Verniere,

ISC Staff lember, requested the USE be furnished vich

of internal security matters (b) collect intelligence

information (c) engage in counterintelligence activities;

II - jurisdictional agreements by the FBI and other federal

agencies in matters affecting above three eited areas;

III • IBI organizacional chart at Headquarters level; and

IV - policies and procedures followed by the FBI concerning

Investigations conducted in above three cited areas along

with copies of stipulated sections of the FBI's Manual of

Instructions and liaral of Rules and Regulations.

TJM: 1hb hb

(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

11..1a

TELETYPE UNIT I 7-

(80 954-545

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HOUSE SELACT COMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR ALI. INFORMATION PRIVIOUSLY MADE AVAILABLE

BY THE FBI TO THE SSC

In complianca with the above roquest, there 1s

octached one volume containing requosted matorial subdividod

and described as follows:

I. Legal auchorities.

II. Jurisdictional egreements

III. Organizational chart.

IV. Policios and procedures.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

In response to SSC request dated 3/19/75, all of

the above-described, enclosed material was provided to the

SSC in a series of Bureau memoranda covering the period

4/4/75 through 5/23/75.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 4

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: -

House Select Committee

OLTR DELHM Memo D Report

dated _ 9/4/75

caption or Dousent:

Select Committee on Intelligence

Activities re All Information Made

Available By The FBI To The Senate Select

Committee

wi.

Originäting Office:

Dolivered be Richard Paylor A Dare: 9/4/21

Примір

the Intelligence Division, FB

1a- Hittis

NW 4062 Moold 2089720 Pager

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TE:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO:

Intelligence Conmunity Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FBE

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

so note.)

& DOCUMENT |

BRIEFING INTERVIEw.

I TESTIMONY

OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check

appropriate term;

add specific names if appropriate)

2. DATE PROVIDED

9/4/75

SSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandus and enclosures

to formal request, other-

ESC Letter 7/22/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

Codeword, S or

IS

?. Key under fent rote paropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Legal Authority for FBI; Jurladictional Agreezents;

Orgonizational Chart; Policies and procedures

62-116464

FUR: Emk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH HOUSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-11646159

379| (6-751

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 6

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

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INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is, provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 7

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Offire of the Atturney Erneral

Mashington, A. C.

Septembar 14, 196%

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAI

BUREAU OF INVISTIGALION

Although the bulk of criminal offenses occursing

in the course of recent riots have been

local rather

than federal in nature:

• the question as

to whether

there was en organization wnich la, had made actancea

plans for, and (o) was active auring any ci the

clots

in the summer of

1967 is one that cannot always be

readily resolved by local authorities.

In view of the

resources,

and renort all facts bearing upon the question 25 to

whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy sy

any group of hatever size, effectiveness or aifi2ü_on,

to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In this connection the following federal staüites

could be applicaole dependings. Of courss, moon the lasual

situation that develops:

Title 18, USC, Section 2383, which proscribes

the inciting or engaging in any reballion or

insurrection against the authority of the

United States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2384, nich proseribes

conspiring to overthrow or to dastroy by force

the Government of the United States or to

oppose by force the authority thereos or by

force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution

of any law of the. United States.

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Title 18, USC, Section 2385, which proscribes,

inter aria, advocucy of overthrowing the

Government of the United states or the Govern-

ment of any stats, territory, District or .

possession thereos

: or the Government of any

political subdivision therein by force or

violence.

Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388

Selective Service, 50 USC (4pp.) 462

Iravel and Interstate Transportation,

1O USe 1952 larson

18 USC 831-33 (Explosive)

Assault and Killing of Fedecal Officers and

Employees, 18 USC 111, 114 and 2231

Destruction Öf Government Froperty, 18 USC 1361 et al

Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC 901-909

4. Crimes on Federal Peservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et al.

I appreciate that the Bureall has constantly been

alert to this problem and 'is curcently submitting intelli-

gence reports to us about riots and about the activity of

prod en

certain groups and individuals berore, during and after

a riot. Indeed, the President hes said both publicly and

privately that the FBI is conducting extensive and comprehen

sive investigations of these matiers.

There persists, however, a widespread beller that

there is more orgenized activity in the riots than vie

presently know about. ' We must rezognize, I believe,

that

this is a relatively new area of investigation and intelli-

gence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice:

We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility

of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a

violation of federal law, by a group of persons who make

the uroan ghetto their base.of operation and whose

activities may not have been regularly monitored by

existing intelligence sources.

• In these circumstances, we must be certain that

every attemot is being made to gat all information

bearing upon thess problems; to take every step possiole

NW 54969, Docld:32989720 Page 9

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to determine wether the rioting is pre-planned or

organized:

ana, if so, to determine the identity oi

the people and interests. involved; and to deter this

activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.

As a part of the broad investigation which must

necessarily be conducted, it is requested that all

available information be reported and analyzed regard-

ing each sniper caught in any riot or extremist

activity and regarding those arrested auring the course

of a riot or significant racial disturbances who were

not. residents of the general area: Moreover, sources

or informants in black nationalist organizations, Sacc

and other less publicized groups should be developed

and expanded to determine the size and purpose of triese

groups and their relationshiy to other groups, and aiso

Furtner,

we neea, to Invastigate aulif

allegations of conspiratorial activity that come to our

attention from outside sources such as those reported

regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 28, 1967,

those regaraing the Detrolt riot which were furnishe

to the Depariment by walter Sherican of the National

Broadcasting company (summary. of latter Is attachea).

Mansery

RAMSEY CLARK

Attorney General

NW 54969 |Docld:32989720 Page 10

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Grueral Baront ot Janentigutinit

Quited Stairs Department of Justier

Masingion, D. C.

"August 24, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL, LMORANDUES

This morning, in accordance with the request of the President

conveyed to me personally by him last liednesday in New York City, 1 called

at the thite House at 9:15 and was with the President until 10:15.

He was desirous of discussing the quastion of the suoversive

activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Coumunisa. He

hau preriously received the memorandun mich I had prepared covering y

conversation with Ganeral Smedley Butler and the effort of Father Cougalia

to have Caneralxbutler head an expedition to Mexico. I inzormad the President

concerzing certain recent develooments in the Comminist activities in tre

country, particularly the efforts of the Bridges organization in San Fran-

cisco and tneir progressive control oi the shipping on the Pacific Coast,

the Gulf Coast and teir recent

expansion to shipping operations or the

Atlantic Coast. I told him that nile their contract will empire on

September 30, 1936, they are endeavoring to have it temporarily extended

• :

wtil April 1, 1937, in order to conform to the same date that ine rited

ifine Workers' contract expires, rich organization is headea by John I.

Lewis. I told him that the Briüges organization vas practically cortrollad

by Connunisis and that the Comminists had nor decided to make very definita

plans to get control of the Levis organization.

I called his attention to the activities of the Newspaper Cuila

headed by Heywood Brown, mich has strong Communistic leanings, and which

has been responsible for putting out of oparation the Seattle Posü Inval-

ligencer. I told him that my information ras that the Commnists had planca

to get control of thesa three groups and by doing so they mouia be able at

any tino to paralyze the country in that they could stoo all shipping ir

and out through the Bridges organization; stop the operation of industr

through the hiring Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any newspapers

of the country tarough the Neispaper Guila.

I also related to hin tae activities which have recently oc-

currea ithin Governmental service irspired by Communists, particuiarly

in some of the Departments and in the National Labor Relations Zoard.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 - Page 11

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COISIDEITIAL CHORINDUM

- 2-

8-24-36

I likewise informed him that I had received information to the

iffect that the Comunist Internationale in Mascon has recently issued in-

suructions for all Communists in the United States to vota for Prasideni

Roosevelt for reelection and against Governor Landon because of the fact

trat Governor Landon is opposea to class warfara.

The President stated that he had been considerably concerned

about the movements of the Conmunists and of Fascism in toe United States

and that thile the Secret Service of üse Ireasury Department had assured

him that they had inormants in every Cormunisi group, he believed that

¡i thai vas true it was solely for the surpose of getting any infortation

upon plots upon his life, thereas what he was interested in was obtaining

a broad pictura of ine genaral movemest and its activities as mey affect tac

ocononic and political life of the country as a raole. I tola him thai thera

is at the present time no governmental organization which is getting any.

so-called "general intelligence infornation" upon this subject. He inquired

what suggestions i mignu orter relative to this matier.. I toiu iin tai

the appropriation of the Federal Bureai of Investigation contains a provi-

sion that it night investigate any matiers referred to it by the Departuent

of suate and that ii the State Departnent should ask for us to conduct such

an investigation ne could do so under our present authority in me abro-

priatica already granted.

He stated that he is reluctant to have a forma:

requesi core through the State Departmant because of the many leais therein, !

•but that shat he rould do roula be to put a handwritten memorandu of his.

on in his safe in the white House, stating he had instructed the Secretary

of State to request this incormation to be obtained by the Department O1

Justice.

He stated he rould have the Secretary of State at the Waite House

tomorrow afternoon, and asked me to call at the Thite Housa at 1:45 p.m.

to see him, the Presideni, and the Secretary of State, at minich tire the

natter could be further discussed and an oral request coula be made oê be

by the Socretary of Stata for investigation so as to avoid ary possivility

of any leak.

He suggested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation

along sinilar lines nich might be nade by the Military or Naval Intelligence

Services. He stated that the Secret Service was not being brought in on this

investigation as they should contine themselves strictly to the matuer of

protecting his life and the surver mich de desired to have made was on a

much broader field.

John Edgar Hoover.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 12

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• DIRECTOR

ederal Zurra uf Fursigation

Quited Staten Departurat of Juitire

Fandantan, 1. G.

August 25, 1936.

CONFIDENCIAL LENORANDUM

Poday, in line with the request of the President; I called at tze

White House at 1:45 p.n., and present at the conference were the Presidenu,

the secretary oi sinue and uyseli.

The President related to the Secretary o

State his concern iriative to cominist activities in this country, as well as

*Fascist activitiec.

He stated that he was very desirous of having a survey

made of these concitions and informed the Secretary of State that this surey

could be made by. ¿re Departmeni of Justice if the Secretary of State requested

the Department to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation Act this

Bureau would hava autcority to nake such investigation il askea to do so by

the Secretory of State.

The President poinied out that both of these nove-

ments were interrational in scope and thai Communism particularly was directed

from Moscon, and that there had been certain indications that Ounansly, at-

torhad in the Russian Sovici Erbassy, was a leading figure in some of the

activities in this country, so consequently, it was a matter which feli ritazi

the scope of foreign affairs over maich the State Department would have a rigi

to request an inquiry to be inde.

The Secretary of State inquired it a request should be made in

writing.

The President indicnted that it should not be since he desired the

matter to be handled quite confidentially and that it woula be surficient thai

the President, the Secretary of State and I should be the ones aware of this

request.

The Secrotary of State asked that the investigation be made and then

made several suggestions - one, relative to the making of a protest, either

fornaliy or inforcally, to the Pussian Government relative to its intestereres

with affairs in this country.

Discussion was also had as to the information

obtained indicating that the Trira Internationale had indicated preference fos

Roosevelt as against Landon.

It was the opinion of the President that some

statement should be rade along this line by the Attorney General at an early

date. The President asked that I speak to the Attorney General, woon his re-

turn to the city, about this matter, and he suggested to the Secretary or

State that he talk over the technique to be folloved in this particular asject,

with the Attorney tereral.

John Edgar Hoover.

NW 54969 Doeld: 32989720 Page 13

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11i.0a

Sepucaber 10, 1033,

Simiet 1a Care:62128

In tülking nith üse duconacy Generci

toàs

concomino duo radical sitcatio.;

his of ine coniciores thich I ind riti

?loe

jacno on Copinaben I, 1005g dü raich dini Wa

Cicastary da Stato Hog precoat, and at wich

cino ino Socrotary ca Blaso, at tbo Procidortis

of tno Dopartncui dê Justice, to bava Intessagu"

tici modo of tho suoversire actirities it

this

country, incling comunios and farcita

and tio duiorno; coerül vortally direcios mo io.

tiene nattors in tho possession of tizi

cion, ed tho Lauto Dogartaone.

mathorhu upon which to proceca in cae

conduct of chicy-areate aráong chich shoula, ci

courss, do landled in a nost diacroct and coa-

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover,

Director.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 14

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a + 09-9100310

a arsentimentor ads ear..

D'ERECTIVE OF THE PRESIDERL OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPIENDER G, 1939

"The Attorney General has been requested by me is instruci

the Fedcral Bureau of Investigation of the Department of justive

to take charge of investigailve

work in maitors iciating to espir de

sabotage, and violations of the neutrality t Eulations.

eirective manner' on a national basis, und all Iatornderon ilot Do

carclully saliea out and correlated in ordor to avoid concusion ans

¿reSpOnsibilizy.

"To this end I request all bolice orracers, sherslis,

all other law enforcement officers lu the united stares proopay io

turn ovar

io the nearest representative of the Federal. Sureru o

Investigation any iniormation obiained by then rointing to espiosage:

counicrespionage, sabotago, subversive sctivities and violstions o

the neutrality Inmo."

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--7?

REPORI SECURITY MATTERS TO FBI

"On septender 6,

1939, I issued a di:

rective providing that

the Federal Bureau of

the Deparine.i

of Justice

Inesticationare of investigative work in

should take

malleIs relating

violaiions

io espionage, saborage and

the neutrality regulations,

poinzing out thal the investigations must be

conducted in a comprehensive

ПаДДеІ,

national basis, and all igiormaiion careiully

sifted

out and correlated

order io. avoid

confusion and irresponsibility.

• I then

requested all police officers, sheriifs,

and

other law enforcement officers in the

United

Stales, promptly to tura

over to

the nearest

represenialive of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation any such information.

"I am again calling. the attention of all

enforcement officers

to the request

that they

roport ail jich inicimaiive prumply su the

nearest field

representative of

the federal

Bureau of Investigation, which is charged

with ine responsibiliiy of correlaiing this.

material and referring matiers which

under the jurisdiction

other Federal

agency: with responsibilities in this field

'To the appropriale agency.

"I suggesi ihai all patriotic organiza-

Lions and individuals likewise report

al1

such informalion relating to espionage and

related mailers ló the Federal Bureau oi

Investigation in the same manner.

"I am confident thai all law enforcement

officers, who are now rendering such invalu-

able assisiance tonard the, success o1 the

internal

safeiy of

this

maises. " our ColaIry will cooperaie

timet lead passels

January 8, 1943

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 16

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HE WINTE HOUSE

: July 24i, 1850

INFORMATION ROTATRIE TO DOLESTIO ESPTO

103

SES

AIRD

52S

On Septober 6, 1939 and January 8, 1913 a Presi-

dential. Diractive ims issusd providing that tne jederal Eureau

oi Inrosurgacon of the Derartient of Justice scould takie

chargo et iavestgaulle mork in raubers relating to espzonage,

naboiage, subversive activities and related saliers. It mas

pointod out that the investigations must de conducted in a

councabansive zanner on a lautonal basis and all. information

aciully sifted oui and correlaced in order to avoid confusion.

T.ahnold Tila to egoin mall the attention of did Enêcreamont

Officurs, both Federal and Sicts, to the reouest that they ion

pore all inforration in the above curerated fiulds promotly

to the maraot field Represóntatir of the Fedaral Dureal of..

Invastimation, which is charged mith the responsibility of

correinting this maicrial and refering rators mich are under

tho jurisdicion of any othor roderal igoney ilth responsibili

elus in mis facla to the approplate agency.

I suggest that all palulotic organizations and

indirlanals Likoilse raport all such inoraction rolating to

ospionage, sabotage and subversira activities to tha Foderal

Bureau of investigation in this same sanner.

gl, denis

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 17

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DIRECTITS OR IS PRESIDENT OF LIE UNUTED STATES

DECEMISE 15,

1953

"On Septenber 6, 1039, Janunry 8, 1913, and July 21,

1950, Presidintial Directives Were

Issued requusting all enforca

ment officers, boil redcial and state,

to report promptly ali

intormation relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activilies

and cciated matter. to the nearest fleld represchtative of

the

l'ederal. Bureau of investigation.

"the Mederal Buroan of Investigation 15 charge wich

investigating ill violations of the dionic Fuerly ACi, incLudang

the dilegi export or import of cassionable ildieriai,

the illegal

possession or trinaperiation of fissionable material

transfe, di possescion ei my equipment or

on dionic energy as a militery

vcapon. 'Fissionabie natoriall means plutonlun, urzndul-136 or

other. marcasad wiion the Atonic Gherky Commiesion his asternaded

¿o Do capable of reicasáng substandlal quantities o1 enexey dcugs

nuclear chain reaction.

officers.

I an requestiug that all chiorcemeri

both federas and State, ceport all Information relaine

to violations os the Atonic Energy hot to the nearest 12010 repe

Sentating Or the Prdcual Bureau od InvestigatIOn.

"I suggesi thai nil patriotic organizations and individuris

Jitewise report ali ouch IntOniailon

io the redcral buxceu of.

Irrestigation in the sane nanner."

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 18

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607 1948 12 °

1186601.

UN:TED STATES COVI

Memorandum

MENT

Vir. Dalbey

MOM : J. A. Mintz C

SUBJECT:

FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

NTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

DATE:

5/16/72

You requested analysis of the legal authority ior FBl

criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to ow statutory

jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information"

describes activity not subject to precise definition..

• However, its

general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement.

There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are direcied

toward proft without regard to the restraints or the law. rei, wy the

very natura ni their associations. little actual participation in criminal

acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer.

Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been

detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning

their personalhie-sigles, property holdings, associates, influence, and

access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal

intelligence."

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identily

these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this

need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional

findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly

sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains

billions of dollars from Amorica's economy by unlawful conduct and by

the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and

labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes

are subverted. The problem was declared lo be of of national concern

both as to our economy and the domestic security.

• CONTINUED - OVER

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 19

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Memorandun J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey.

BE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

INTELLICENCE INFORMATION

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making

criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting

racketecring activity characicristic of organized crime including the

use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officer's

were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments

did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains

the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national

menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt.

"Criminal

intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may

be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity

of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those

who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in

United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 4y (Jrd CIr: i57Z) where a Muspectre

enoco in 2

coco found an anonymate mnts on the cost of his

car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut. "

necessity, the sting emana for integried there as of cranitationa

protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a

Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only

through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issuc

will be settled

but, thus lar, the Court has only drawn upon the concept

of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances

such as marital ailairs (Criswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ) and

interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1907)

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal

intelligence function may be found in the First Amenciment protections of

speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonavie

searches and seizwes; and the fifth Amendment privilege against

compulsory self-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on t!

r'clationship between these rights and the collection of criminai intolliya cs

is that, when in direct conflict, the collection eiforts must yield. Such is

• 2 -

_NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 20

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## Page 21

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey.

RE: FBI JURISDICTION; CRIMINAL

-

INTELLIGENCE INFORNIATION

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice.

but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being

safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have

been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of

Constitutional protection, e. g. the administrative search cases, Camara v.

Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized

•as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an

obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home,

relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana V. Johnson, 335 F2d 366

(7th Cir.

1964) cort. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be

expected where an identitied officer loiters in the subject's place of

business (Bee See Books, Inc. V. Leary, 291 E. Supp. 622 (SD I. Y. 1963)

or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence innivits

ammuniritina and tha trancartina of tha hainade nf tha accomila (Tangi

309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates. 75.F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. I956) ).

However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe.

Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of

criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United

States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) ) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 355

U.S. 295 (1966) ) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by un-

reasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is

tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having

the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming ncarest to discussing the

legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills. 106 N. J.

Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complote

record was necded to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970:

New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by

collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have

some relationship to such activitics.

The trial court held the collection

effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment

• 3 -

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 21

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Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

INTELLIGENCE IN FORMATION

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances

"where such information will be used to charge persons with specificall;

defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be

interpreted as calving a distinction between collection of intelligence

information where political or social factors are involved and First

Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection

of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishmen:

of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth

and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it

is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so lar as to

protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly

constitute clements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Cout

of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record

and observed"

the executive branch may gather whatever information

it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to periorm the pouce

roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interiere in the

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further develop-

ment of ther case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information

for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characieristic

of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary.

Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection

efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts

with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program

must be reformed.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 22

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FROM

SUBJECT:

(41DNA1 108A MO, 10

5319-986

10, 81

UNITED STATES GOI

MENT

Memorandum

Mr. Dalbey

DATE:

5/18/72

J. B. Hotis

FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS•

You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct

domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional

basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic

Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one

of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing,

an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that ire

direciou toward the propinf a sporific offense. A large amount of raw cata

is collected, much of nich has no immediate bearing on potential offenses

or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become imporiani

in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are

also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's

political beljeis, habits or associations; or that information collected for

proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government.

Each is a legitimate concern.

The notion of Government prying into the

personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a

strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence

information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the

national security.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence

activities is that they we not supervised or monitored by any outside

agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide

discrotion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, mcthods,

and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made

clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an•

intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawhilly

procced without being directed toward proof of a specific olfense.

IBN:

(3)

•CONTINUED - OVER

-NW 54969_Docld:32989720 Page 23

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Memorandum J

Hotis to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI AUTIGRITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in

security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For anothei,

the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control

over investigative procedures, is not often available in securty cases.

Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the

cow'ts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very

little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters.

and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have

pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a

watchdog committee to oversee our operations.

Senator Ervin, Who chairs

the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular

concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to

gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department

of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the

Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic

intelligence information. He has also suggested inat iegisiaiion migii ve

enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can

be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would

pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallol trend may be developing in the courts. In several

recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information

gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprchend criminal suspecis,

may have a "chilling effect"' on the exercise of First Amendment rights.

These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. sills.

56 N. J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 E. Supp. 308

(E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Libertics Union v. Westmorcland, 323

F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal

functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, gitators of

• violence and possible sibversives.. Tatum V. Laird, 444 E2d 217, 957

(D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 935 (1971); The Filth Avenue

Peace Parade Committce, ot al. v. J. Edgar Hoover,

et. al., 70 Cr. 2640

HRT, decided Echruary 16, 1972.

The Court of Appeals for the Districi oi

Columbia Circuit, has obscived that the identity of the agency gathering

such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill tọ

« 2=

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 24

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Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

to First Amendmentrights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D. C.

Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional

Commitice's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was

insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or

controversy.

This was because appellants had failed to bring the fear oi

investigation by the present Committee home to themselves; their fears

were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings contronting

them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found

that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the

investigation; whenever & Commitice of the Congress seeks punilive action,

the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a

judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional

rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given jerspectire by

the Court of Appeals in 'Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First

Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military

with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

The compilation of data by a civilian investigative

agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the

deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right

of free speech that such action by the military is, because

a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always

being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and

the approval of the courts. ***

There, the Court pantedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in

Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBi

as a source which does not genciate a reasonable basis for inhiitions or

apprchensions. In this connection the Court stated.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 25

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Memorandum

B. Flotis to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Referring to our holding in Davis that the

"source of the chill" is important in determining whether

there is any inhibiting cilect on the exercise of First

Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant

difference between investigative actions taken by a

military agency in reference to civilians and similar

investigative actions taken by a regular investigative

agency of a civilian branch of the Government.

One of the functions of a civilian investigative

agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is

to compile information on law violators, agitators of

violence, and possible subversives. It has always been

recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is

exercised under the direction of the Attorney General.

Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are

under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department,

and the information compiled is only usable and effective

through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison

or to affect his liberty in any way except through the

action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of

iniormants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable.

see Donanoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E. D. Va. 1971) (police -

surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment

rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held

that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does

not violate the Fifth Amchdment privilege against self-incrimination, nor

the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,

admission at trial of evidence obnined by an undercover informant to whom

a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police.

385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 200 (1960) and

Lopez V. U.S., 373 U.S. 127 (1963).

^ 4

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 26

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Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Daibey

RE: FBI AUTIIORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Moreover,

the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Whitc, 101 U.S. 745

(1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate

any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth

Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit

his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a

warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's

constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hotla v. U.s., supra:

and such informants may write down their conversations with deiendants

and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such

conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lce v. U.S.,

343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. V. White, supra, then clearly mere visuai

"surveillance" of plaintitic in plain viow by informants at public moctngs

would not violate their constitutional rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively

in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See

Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1907). Any recording of their

activities by the deiendants does not invade their privacy any more than

does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since

any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action.

Tatum V. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D. C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation.

delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But

even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as

they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Filth and Sisth Amendments

The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committce. et. al. v. J. Edyar Hoovcr.

et. al., 70 Civ. 2016 HRI, decided February 16, 1972. (examination oi

bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967)

(examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S..

312 F2d 632 (3d Cir: 1962)

(trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 12d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covors);

U.S. v. Van Lecuren, 357 U.S. 249 (1370) (detention and examination of

packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 361 (1908) (seizue of

union records); Iloffa v. U.S., Supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of

informants).

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 27

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Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey

Re:

FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment

line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial

impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for

optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We

should be prepared,

therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need

for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy

governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal

controls and carefully developed guidelines.

∞ 6

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 28

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## Page 29

FOSITION PAPER

DOSTORIC INZIESIGRACE DIVISION

S2008EANQUAXOES DE SUEVERAIOU

Siay 23, 1972.

-..°

: 1

...

This paper deals with the conduct by the EDI o

Irichligence-irpo cavestigations supervised by the Docstic

Iubc.22acnee Division.

auchority for those investigations

1s docuuenied and outlined, including suctations wiere 2a21s

13h0 direct violntich of law.

CIlionza and controls ezr

disperination policies implichting this authority nic

detaiica.

NW 54969_Docid:32989720 Page 29

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: TABLE OF CONTRICS

ENZTULIGLNCE COLLECTION

AUTHORITE

Congressionni Enactments

Presidontial. Directives

Policy Inciructions of Attorney General

Mational Security Council Directives

Interagency Agrecrchis

SLOPED INITION OF AUTHORITI

Revolutionnay Croups

subversive,, Revolutionary and Extrenist Individuals

Chrrilladod individuain

Espionage nod Forcign intelligonce Investigations

Restrictious on Investiations

Information Siorage and Retrieval

Diesebination

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 30

20

20

12

23

13

25

27

I9

2.1

21

23

25

27

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## Page 31

INCELLIGANCE COLLECTION

Tho FBI's intelligenco funciion is well established

and documonted. Jet, our work in gathering intelligence has

been the subject of continuirs criticion iron segments of the

press with churges boing nore fun the FBI is conducting without

authorsty socurity Investigntions of persons vio we not 1.11

violation of tho lal. It has nico been charged that our intel

Isrence collection is uncontrollcd, crocicious and dwells on

heroin? riceyncretes withod there boing any security interest

involvod, Fragmonto ot insonation, distortod and ivisiod to

convoy the false improsaion thai the ibI is rantonly dioregarding

the privacy of citizons, have boen published.

The Fbi does not ConduCt LOCuLiY Investigations o1,

Individuals vithou: clcai-cui authority and tighi controls.

Gatos have trien dragments or intelligence which have come to

their actention and built thom up into that is representod as

the end product of socurity intestigations with political over-

tonea. In theso insinaces, the itons upon which such Importance

vas pinced have beon traguchiny iniclligenco Iron substantive

NW 54969-Docld:32989720 Page 31

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..•:

investigations and could not be vicwed in their real significance,

excopt as they fit into the overall perspactive of the case.

This 1s inatcative of the danger of using piecemeal intolligence .

taken out of contest; properly usod, however, intelligence

is a legitimate and necessary part of ail security investigations.

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is

inseparablo Iron efficieni investigative operations. In fact the

twainvestigatich and intelligence.are mutually dopendent.

In the security liold, 1t 1s vital thai tho Federal

Governaent detect factors which have a dixeci bearing on

earible melationa a? for TaTetad +9 640 0109:2228 c9 20242204202

of the Governmeni, intelligence developed to identily individuals

who

have a propensity for revolutionary or racial violence oi

have caffillations with subvossive or revolutionary groups is

essential in tho enforcement of the lows desighed to protcat the

integrity of the Government. Intolligence 1s also essential tó

the detection of attompts or conspiracies to nove against the

Goveriment, actions which may themselves be crines.

' No

constliutional provisions, statutory enactments

os judicial rulings have attempted to doprive law enforcement

of dis intelligence function, although various attempts have

2

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 - Page 32

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beas mado to defina er linit the sucas encomprased by

intoïllgence and particularly the technigues of collection.

it la also recoguined that sono inccillgonco cuthering

activitios uay have ar Incideatal "chilling" cifect on Individual

citizens. The spocire of the Governuore's investigatory

presence cay cause & reaction In CItisons InhzbLting tho

OROICISO DI ChOLI LUll COnCULLUtIOnI LIEDES. Therefore;

& balance botweat the requirements of the Government and the

constitutional rights of citizens must be mintained.

The intolligence sunction of investigation, must be

machs the

BESIOLENOSS Of thO PROVISIOn LE LeOLE tO enSOICe.

It 23 nolines redochablo nor pracizend to launch an agacosive

Intoll genCe COllCotion cilot concorning tho activition of those

"who nicht potentially violate a local antilattoring ordinance.

Dotectiou of a conspiracy to boub che lilte House, on the ....

•other hand, costninly justilles a continuous and intensive

intelligence effost to idently tho participants and gain

knowledge of any specifle pians..

3

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 33

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It 1a mandaton that a Goverinioni protoct 1ta

intogrity and this has boca recognleed by judicial

LUDOTLELES. DIGILITy CHINOS VICtINiZe an Ladividual or

groups; crinos agaiust the erlatence of tio governuont

vicinize society. Carrying these crines io their ultimate

produces ilio ulinaio caino amiusi socioty. the destruction

of thai society.

Ii Is. clear that the aspirationg of nost revolutionary

troups far cacoed their capabllity to achiove their vidinate

objoctives. They arc, hovever, quito capablo oi erodiug

the inierrity of tho denocrutio systen by lesper acir and, 1f

not discomraged os thwarted, night cil accumulato tho till

. and

PONOS SCI DOLE aCCiDIVE aCCION. The drinutiC suceces ci

the Castro sevolution & a sufficioni esample. Conseguoatlys

. .

continuing intelligenco collection rolating io all revolucioury

su individuals and organizations, comensurate with the Immediato

threai posed, 1s imperativo to propar vigilauce.

The fBi selves as a prine produccs of iniciligence

sor the lecutive Branch. Over the years lt las provided

information concerning hostile actions diroctod against the u. =.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720- Page 34

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by foreten soverntents, their intclligence services and

othor's

act11g in their behalf. Oa the domestic scene the FBI has

benoticiod conspiracios ranging fron the connunist underground

to the hooded night tidore of to lian tho ccrrorized our

black citizons. But, In the 1960's caplosive changes occurred

in tho internal security broblons inced by the country. These

•.

changes vere reflociod in both the scope and nature o. the

Fbi's respouce and in the intolligence sequireuents levied

upon the ebl by the mecutive branch,

In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval

adica to the critical arens of the reI's Intolligence

responsibilities the probleas of revolutionty and extrenlot

victivities. America jas stunned by violert student disruptions,

bombings and riacs. Spanning the docado pero civil ciguts

protests, reactions agalust then, and tragically, the burning

and looting of matis in 1905 and the conflagrations In Detroti,

Novarls and Hashington, D. C. And, that had been the youthful

Idealism of the energing new left In the 1952 Port Huron

Statement was drowned out by the obscone Weatherman war cries

5

NW 54969_ Docld:32989720 Page 35

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as they too! theis revolution to the streois of Chicago 12.

1969 durlng their "Days of Rage."

As tho tido of crine and disruption swelled, i

brough nich 1i now aud pressing problems on the domestic

security scone.

LIX drostic secuLty Investigations increased

accordingly. Thuin irs alac an Lumodiato increase in FBI

-.

Intoll gonce collectlon concorning the lawlessness and violcri

tactles of these onarging sovoluticary cicaonts.

Incolliconse coliccilon was coschilal in contending

Math those ben domatic security problong.. Mis face was

recognined by the reports of ino Iresidentin? Consissions.

Tho roport of the lationnl Advisory Coumiscion on Curli Disorders

(ternor Counlesson, 1969) acrossed that the abscnco un accurate

tosormation besoco und during disondona cronted spacial contros

problens. It asphugized that law cufoscenoni organdantions

must develon the mono to obtain adequato intolliganco. for

planning purposes nad that law enfosconent should "gather,

140020.00.

*'ovaluato, analyze and discouinato thiornation on potential 23

Tell as actual civil disorders."

NW•54969 Döcld:32989720 Page 36

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Sirularly, the Prosident's Connission on Campus

UDIeSE (19%0)

took soccial noto of the need for latclligence

in cirective lan enorcenent.

The coumission scared in Lte.

NOBOrt, "It is an undoubted fact that On sou crupuses there

DIO teh and women tho plot, all too oftch successaully, to

burt and boub, and sonetluon to nalu and kill." Tho ropoct

concluded that the beat, and soustines the only, leans

Jay enforcement has to thrart or prevent such plots li

through "clandestine satelligence norl.,"

Provention is the very essence of the propes uao

me be forevarned se in be placed in a

position to carry out countermansuros to noct a threat. During

the mass actions and violont confrontacions of the 1960's,

IBI

intelligonce" colicction was crystallized in dissonination

o1 Informiion to other governent agencios. This iniolligence

providca inca viti an essential noshing tool to coutend nith

public disordero and activities of a revolucionary nature.

In I menOrandu tO thA DirOCtOr o2 tha FEI, 9/11/67,

Atiorney General Clark stressod the inportanco of intelligonce.

The Attorney Generul asserted, "It is most important that

-NW 54969_Docld:32989720 Page 37

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## Page 38

you use the minun avatiablo resources, Investigutive and

intelligence, do collect and report all faces bearing upon

(riot acilvity)." Endorablag on this polut, le said, "I

thead circumstances we must bo cosinin that overy ntcoupt 13

boing made to dei all incoration bearing upon thess problons;

to tako overy stop possiblo to decozuino rhocher tho cloting

12 pro-plannod or ciganized; and, li 50, to determine the

¿dentlis of the poople and interests Involved; and to doter

this actávity by proupü and vigorous logai action." Els

Attorney General's crailation of the imposinuco of

intellinence in this Instanos appales with oquri force to

other arcas of the ThI's socurity work.

In Decembos, 1907, the Departueni of dustice, awarc

or the high palurity of Inichligence in donling with civil

disorders, creatod the tricr-Divichon information tast. Wado

Is & repostiony don "oporto which aclaie in andividual or

• et.

organication acilvities nich may play a pari in Instigatioe

of EDicadinE CiVil dicorders" and includes intciligence

"elating to black power and black natiovailat organizacions,

8

NW_ 54969_Docld:32989720 Page 38

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## Page 39

officors and unhers thereos, racial incidents throughout

the country; and any sochile iconatiations which 2io

boing pinnued aid are of such nacuro ag ic ronder them

subjoco to tho possibility of violonco," Quick ictrioval

of this intolligenco vas euphasized through the use of couputers.

Attorney Gonezai licholl note to the fBi director

on lay it, 2071, conceralag the Intelligones Evaluation

comicteo, created to analjas and ovaluato intelligoaco for

the cuidenco of the Inato House and other departments of

the Biccutive Branch, In this memorandua, the Altorney Goneral

stated, "Intonessied actavitles on the part of m4l1i2nt

"@oups here in Vashtuotos, D. C., and oldewhere li the country

elcarly point up the nood not only don sid gathering os

the highest quality intolligenco avalinile but also 10r an

experi unalysis and evajuation oû the incolligence product

tesoif."

• NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 39

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AUTIIORITI

A11 FBi Investigations and Intelligence collection

functions in the internal security field are based on

authorizutions in Congressional enactments, Presidential

directives, policy insiructions of the Attorney General,

National. Secuiity Council directives and interagency agree-

menis as set lorth below.

Congressioul Enactnents

Aitorney Goneral direction of FBI • 28 U.S.

Code, Section 533

Irenson • 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381

(U. S. Constitution, Articlo III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U.S. Code,

Section 2383

Seditious Conspiracy • 18 U.S. Code, Section 2381

Advocating violent overthron of Government

18 U.S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U.S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388,

2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U.S. -

118 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action"

• and of Individuals as members of such groups

alter hearings by subversive Activities control.

Board - 50 U.S. Code, Sections 181-198 as amended

or rehealed (Internal

Security Act of 1950, Subchapter

I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950

and amendments by Cormunist Control Act of 1954)

See also Exccutive Order 11605 below

=10 -

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Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section

792 et sed.

Sabotago - 13 U.S. Code, Section 2151 et sea.

Private Correspondence with Forcign Goveinments

18 U.S. Code, Section 953 (LogaN Act)

Registration of Ioreign Agents • 22 U.S. Code,

Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy ACt o1 1954 - 42 U. S. Code,

Section 212,2

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U.

Section 1431 (irmieration and Milonlity set 1052)

possession, threatened use, or use oi explosives

• Ios' illicit purposes .18 U.S. Code, Section S13

Travel in or use of lacility o1 interstate commerce

•to pronote or incite riot, to

commit violence in

furtherance of riot or to abai others in inciting

251-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutrality Matiers • I8 U. S. Code, Sections 956,

958-962; 22 U. S.. Code, Sections I931, 401

(Hunitions Ccatrol Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code,

Section 103 (National Security Act)

Presidential Dircetives

Directive of the president - 6/26/39

directing that investigation of all espionage,

counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled

Iby FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39

requesting the Attorney General to instruct BI

to take charge of investigative matters relating

to espionare, sabotage, and violations of the

neutrality regulations.

• 11

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Presidential Directire

1./8/13

relicrator

instructions of provious diroctive o1

9/0/39 and requested law enforcement ofiicers,

patriotic crganizations and individuals iurn over

to FBI all information regarding espionage,

sabotage aid violations of neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 7/24/50

relicratos substarco of 9/6/39 and 1/3/43 directivos,

noting they provided for FBi to take chaige of

Investigative vork in matters rolating to espionage,

sabotage, subversive activitics and related maticis.

Directive of Presiden: 12/15/53

seloried to previous

Presidential. Directives

and added investigation by Fbi of violations

Of AtoMiC EnDLEY ACE.

Bxecutive Order 10450 4/27/53

established progres to insure that tho erployment

De ted Government cantrore 15 rionel,

consistent with the interests of national security.

Requires check of fui Fingorprint Files and, in

where derogatory information develops,

conductsa lull-licia investigation.

Executive Ordes 11005 7/2/71

calls for Subversivo

Activitios Control Board,

when petitioned by the Attorney General, to

determine

after hearings if any organisation is

totalitarian, lascist, commist, subversive, or

miether it has adopied a policy of advocating the

connission of acis

of force or vicience to deny

other's their Constitutional or statutory rights.

By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of

the Attornoy General, would develop evidence lor

hearings required.

Also, FBI, by inferonce, vould

develop evidence of nembership in such organiza

tions, which nay ba basis for denial of Government

employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney. Ceneral

Septcuber 11, 1967: instructions of then Attorney

General Ransey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility

of conspiracy to plai, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

- 12 -

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February 18, 1969.

instructions fron the Assistant

Attorncy Genernl, Internal Security Division, for

rEl to obtain infornation concorning possibility

• that

underlying subveisive groups were giving illoga?

directions or guidance to nunerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions from Attorney. Ceneral and

Department have been recoived, amplifying points

set

forth above; many pi these concernod specific cases.)

Nationnl Security Council Directives

Direcilve on Internal Security, March 23, 1949,

establishing Interdepartnental

Intelligence

Committee (IIC) responsibie to ccordinate investiga

tion of comestic espionase, counterospionage, sabotage,

subversion and other reinted intelligence mutters

affecting internal security. FBI represented on

• TIC.

United States

Intelligence Bonrd (USTB) established

Septembor 15:

1938,

to nantain cooLanation loireen

CiA and ocher intelligence agencies. FBi a member or

USIB t0 provide conestic intelligence for correlation

with icraign intelligence.

Interagency Agracmonts

Delimliations Agreement signed by IIC mombers

March

23, 1919, to establish jurisdiction in

investirations

by menbers of espionage, counter.

espionage, subversion, aud sabotage and io provida

for excharge oi iniormation on above matters.

TBI-Secret Service Agrecrient signed November 26,

1971, to provide for transmittal of information

frOm

FBI to Secict Service regarding individuals

and organizations who, because of their pro-

pensities, represent or may represcut a danger to

the safety of the president and certain other persous.

• 13

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i

IMPIEMENTATION OF AUTHORITI

The criteria and guidelines for FBI Investigations

are furnished to the field in & "Manual of Instructions,"

the "F. B. I. Handbool," and in Letters to ail Special Agents

ill Charge. In addition, ins: -tions and guidance are given

to the field in Headquasters Commurications on spocific cases.

compliance mith critertinis duidclines is obtained by super

vision in both the fiold and at Bureau Headquarters. In

addii101, regular inspections of field and Headquiters

Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning lavestiga

tions are being followed.

'In the socurity field, the basic responsibility of

the rBi is to investigate revolutionary orcanizations dedicated

to the violont overchrow or destruction of the Unliod states

Government. These Include old-line Marxist groups, for example,

the Communist Party, USh, and the Trotskyist Socialist Worlers

Party; and such new revolutionaly groups as the Students foi

& Denocratic Society, the Blacis Panther Party and the Weathernan.

In the investigation of subversive individuals a deterination

is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are

made to ubtain evidence of violations of any applicable

• 14

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• . :

Fodcial, Laws:

To assist in cataloguing the level. of

dangerousness of those individuals and to sotrleve quickly

Information concorning them, the Domestic Intelligence

Division maintains a card ille known as the Administratiic

Index.

Title It ol the Internal Security let of 1950

(Emergoncy Detention Act) before ii was repealed on

Septober 25, 1971, provided Ior emergency detention of

subversive indivícials in the event of a national emergency.

To implonent that provision of the act, the FBI and the

Depariment of Justice naintained the Socurity Index. This

Index vas, of cqurse, discontinued with the repeal of tho

Emergency Detention Aci. By nenorandum of October 22, 1971,

horever, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of

Titlo il "does not alter or limic the FBI's authority and

responsibility to record, file and index information secured"

in this field and concurred in the establishment of an

administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable

and available the results of lis (the FBI's) investigations

into subversive activities."

= 25 -

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To this end, such an index (called Adèx) was:

Instituted for making quickly retrievable Infcrmation on

Lour categorles of individuals in order of dangerousness:

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist

groups, members who have exhibited & propensity for violence,

members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla

mariare, unaltiliated revolutionaries mith a proponsity

for violence, and revolutionaries with access io key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and

extrenist goups, active membors of these groups, and

mailaliceed roulstionaries of extremists with a propensity

toi violence against property rather than persons.

III, Rank-anénfile nonbers of rovolutionary groups

vithin the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolu

tionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies

likely In a national energency to commit acts of espionage;

sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons Iikely to assist, financially or

otherwisé, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to

Influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense:

Investigation of an individual is conducted to

determine whether or not he should, consistent with the

criteria of these categories, bo listed on the Adex. If, as

∞ 26 c

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the result of the investigation, it 1s determined he does

not meei the critorin the case is closed. Il, on the

other hand, he does meot the crileria, he is listed 1n.

tha Adox according to the determinod degrec of dangerous.

mess: Category i cases continue under investigation for

as long as the individual con ricar. to warrant that Category

Ilstiag. When an individuals. fisted in Categories II,

TTI, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject

to periodie reopening to varily his location, in determine

hio activltles and to ascertain wiether he still qualifies

¿ca snclae2o2 in tie aror: Frovision la mado 20r uperadice,

downgrading and purging an indivicun] from the Adex

as his

acilvities and level of daugerousness iluctuate.

Revolutionary Crolis

Investigations of indiviculs for a determination

of whether or not they neet the crltoria for Ades gencrally

involve their degree oi affiliation wich revolutionary und

extremist groups. The purpose of investigntions of basio

revolutionary and nevlelt typergroups 1s to: (1) provide

Inteliigence to the Executive Branch which will chaisle the

President to Îulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

117

17

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(8i) detect developing conspiracies to vioirte substantive

laus and initiate prosecutive action vhoever possible to

prevent such conspiracies fron being carried out; and

(3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to

file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control

Board in accordance with provisions of the Intornal Security

Act ür 1950 and Excoutive Order 11605.

The criterin, guidelinos and restrictions on tie

Investigntions of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

Investigation is initiated upon receipt of

Information indicating

that ciganizrtion

Gorceanent on 2988295

in activity to deny ochers their Conctitutional

or statutory rights.

• Investigation is cónducted to establish alins

and objcetives, location and sire, comination

and control by

hostile loreign power, loontities

..oi all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations

which they have infiltrated:

Investigation 1s initinted upon reccipt of

Information that organization is doninated,

controlled or influenced to substantial

degree by revolutionary organization.

Investigation is conducted to determine

degrce of infiltration, ains and objectives,

1002*10n

and size and identities of all

leader's.

18

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Extremist Groups

Tho purpose of investigations of thita hato

and black extremist organizations is to: (1) Diovide

intclligonce to the Executive Branch which will enable

the president to fulljil his Constitutional responsibilities;

and (2) detect developiag conspiracles to violate substantive

lans and initinso prosecutive action whenover possible to

prevent such conspiracies fron being carried out. Investiga-

tions o white haie groups are confined to those which have

actually or allegedly connitted or have conspired to commit

acts di violence or nave alopied & yuliug us cdrocating so

Inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights

under the Constitution, Investigations of black extrenist

organisations concern thoso groups which take extremist,

anti.l. S. Govornment, anti-white positions and those

activities

have involved them or may involve them in civil

unrest and/or subversive activity.

Sulversive. Revolutionary and Ixtrentst Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are

gonerally affiliated wich old line basic revolutionary

organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new

left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally

NW 54969-Docld:32989720_Page 49

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involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on

•race. Procedures for tho investigation of these types of

Individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as

10110NS:

Membership In & basic revolutionary orgeniza-

tion

Espousing the triede

rEvolutionary novenchts

it lites

Speclal trainLig aerie

i leadership trath

Individuais having access to lcy facilities

who have been membors of a revolutionary

group et any time

Da2s0ne mith raunlutionnoy. terrorisi.

anarchistic or extronist beliois who

Ilkoly to seize upon a national emergency

to endanger public safety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly

committed, conspired to conmit, of adopied

201ic5 to comnit acis of violence to deny

others their rights under the Constitution

Datronists and revolutionaries who have

demonstrated a propensity foi violence,

have involved or may involve themselves

In civil unrest, or who advocate violent

overthron of the Government

Persons who inêluence others to engage in

acts inimical to thr..-.:irml defense or

who are likely to mion financial or other

assistance to revolutionary or extremist

elements because of their sympathies,

associations or ideologies

∞ 20

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Unnifilinted Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and

extromist acilvities, some investigations arc conducted

of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations.

Investigation of an individual is undertaken when informa-

tion is received that the person:

Is a revolutionary aná uneres to the

Weatherman ideology of advocating

revolution now and uses corrorist tactics

in furtherance of revolution

Is & revolutionary or extremist and

demonstrates by acts or sintenents

propensity for violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist

Ideology and is likely to seize opportunity

in national emergency to commit espionage,

sabotage, terrorisn

or otherwise intericre

with federal or local governnents or

defense efforts

Influences others to engage in acts

Inimical to national dafense or likely

to furnish financial or other assistançe

to revolutionary or extremist clemenis

Espionage and Foreign Intclligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI In the

foreign intelligence

fiold is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and

priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated

and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in

doclining priority as follows: (2) the detection and

NW 54969_ Döcld:32989720 Page 51

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identification of intelligence operations and agonts;

(2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose

of control aud the development of intollizence infornation;

(3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through

disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Wriever

the assigned priority, the overall objeciive is to dony access

to information sought by whatover practical means ae available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in

the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registra

Lion and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are

initiated usually on the basis of & known or suspected connec

t10n with a foreign Intelligence service, foreign country or

subversive organization with such concctions. Since these

Investigutions emanate from various sensitive sources and.

involve special considerations, extensive criteria and

•Limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are desiened

to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which

are not justified. The limitations are designed to control

the

scope of investigation in order to insure secuiity of out

Interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

= 22 -

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Restsictions on Investirations

IBi guidclines go beyond the rules for opening,

investigating and closing cases; they also Impose restrictions:

to make certain that ve do not violate the constitutional

rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from

beconing "fishing expeditions."

; In the security field these

are some of the restrictions trich are applied:

Security cases are evaluated continually

to derernine if ve are fulfilling our

responsibilities.

Those cases

n0t

warranting further investigation are •

closed prompily

There are no investigations oi members

of an organization which doos not advocate

use of loic0 to bring about cristing charges

in the Coverinent:

Exemples are

the socialist

Party, -the Independent Workers of the World

and independence Party of Fuerto Rico..

Persons arrested during disruptive demonstra.

tions are identified

since circumstances of

an ariesi, in sone cases, may indicate a

expensity for violence.

arrest in connection with a demonstration is

an insulliciont brsis in itself for security

investigation. The arrest must be coupled

with a denonstrated propensity for violence

or with subversive or revolutionry activity

on the pari of the individual arrested.

Then it is determined hat a security subject

is a menber of the armed services,

the

investigation is discontinued immediately and

the military advised.

Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

" i!

c23

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 53

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dä0.':96.

Ambassadors or heads of permanent nissions

to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the

White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court,

the House and Sonate Office Buildings or

the United Nations.

No telephore or microphone surveillances

are operated vithout prior written

approvaL of the Attor;: inexal.

Bureau authority LuREQUeD i for:

Investigations of officials and diplonatic

representatives of foreign countries.

(Department of Siate authority is also

required.

Investigation of connunist infiliation

OI a DOLITICAL GIGANILÜLLUL.

Developing sources connocted tach an

institution of learning.

Interviews of subjoots of active, current

security investigations.

Investigations oi

faculty nembers.

It

approval is granted, only established

sources functioning in an administrative

capacity may la contacied on the campus.

Other csiablished sourcos and informants

must be contacied

away from the campus.

Contacts with students: graduate students

and faculty menbers must also have Bureau

authority.

Interviers of labor irauers and persons in

-cauestional, hass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstraie & consciousness of the noed

toimpose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposi

tion of then.

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Information Storare and Retrieval

The storage añd retrieval of information 1s a

basic operational necessity of any investigative or

Intelligenec-gathering agoncy. Procedures within tho FBI

for theso functions provide for written iccords of informa

tion received

ton a varietys

samaces confidential

techniques, and open

sourees-and the storage di no invormation in different

types of files. These include active investigative liles

on organizations and individuals and sone generaï liles.

These "ran" filos are maintained both at the seat of Governa

ment and in the various lield offices. Information in the

• I9Ios is thoroughly indexed so thai data can be retileved.

In the intelligence field, then an allegation

vithin the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, & case on

an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending

on the quality of the allegation. Monspecific information

that is received on an individual. or organization is placed

1n the pertinent file, i1 one exisis, or is placed in a

general file 1f the organizat a oy individual is not the

subject of a specific file.

• 25

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Theso files are an integral part of the intelligence

gnthering function, By-the very nature of tho rBl's assignnent

to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance

of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary

that a system for retrioving this intornation be used.

Because these 11 esprey: contain derogatory

infornation that may not sunstanto sed by further investi

gation (the derogatory infornation recoived may not be germane

to & matter within the IBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys

Genciel have long taken the position that these files should

not be available for public scrutiny, incalculable damage

to individuai reputations could resuli fron the disclosure

•os single ltens of information vithout moving the full

background concerning the receipt of a particular item and

the context within wich it was recorded.

• 75

The late Justice Tobert Jackson, In his capucity ,

as hitorney General, wrote in 1911:

Disclosuxe of information contained in the

reports (FBI files) mighi also be the

grossest kind of injustice to innocent

Individuals.

invest:. "ie reports include

leads and suspicions.

ari cometimes even

the statenonts of malicious or nisinforned

people. Even though Inter and more complete

reports conciate the individuals, the use

ot particular or selected reports might

constitute the grossest injustice, and we all

know a correction never catches up with an

accusation.

• 26

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Dissemination

;

To Burcau's general polloy on dissomination 15

that information developed by or coming to tho attention

of the IBI 1s promptly ICIerred to all agencies of the

ExecuiIve Braich of the Federal Government having &

potential interest 1a It on a

angibility ion taking

action concerning it,

WEENGER

INCIest 01 responsi

billty is apparent or known.

this policy is in accordance

With numerous formal agrcements entered into beiween the

Bureau and otber Goverunent agencies. It 15 also in

minico mel Inosidoncint directives ahlignting the

Bureau to act as clearing house foi incormation aifecting

the internal security of the U.s.

Despiic this general llberal policy o1 ilssoming

tion, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive

information a determination must be made on an individual

basis as to what information should be disseninated and hom

It should be transmitied. The degrce of sensitivity and/o:

she security classification will determine level of dissemina-

tion to any interested agency t the method of transmittal.

In certain instances, sensitive tufornation may be furnished

to a high-level official with a request that dissemination

in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-lnow

basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure telcipe,

courier, liaison, and where neceasary, by secure telephone.

Information surnished orally 1s confirned in writing.

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The Autorncy General

Directoi, ril

'ECOME OF ODI JUISMICTION

ANDKUTHORUTY INDO IRSTIC

INTEILIGDICE NVISDGATIONS

August 7, 1973

During our mecting on July 25, 1973, you referred to a discussion

you had with Schator Charles IcC. Kathias, dr., of Maryland during your con-

firmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBl and the Department of

Justico in the lield ol' donestic intriligence investigations. You then arlied

Me. Wiltiom D. Luckclhous to work with the fBI in weighing the pros and cons

with rogard to statutory authority in this arca. I mentioned that research was

touch with fir. Ruckelchaus with regard to this lanter when we have comploted

the ronalts of our concidoration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two

rears as to the scope cf ful jurisdiction and authority in comestic intolligence

invostigations. When Mr. I. Patrick Gray, Ill, wes designated as Acting

Directus of the FBI, he instrueted that a position paper be propared concern-

ing the jurisdiction and authority of the Fbl to conduct domestic intelligence

investigations. A position paner was prepared which in essence stated that

authority of the Fill in this field is bused on legislative enectients, even

thougli we may have publicly relicd heavily on Presidential directives as the

basis for such authority. I'. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the

position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The

following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public

statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBl to conduct domestic

intelligence-lype invecticutions, particularly where there is no clear-cut

legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquirics wes con-

tained in a paper presented by Prolessor John I. Plug el a twe-day conicience

at Princeton University in October, 1371, sponsored by the (omnittee for Public

Justice.

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The Atturney Gencial

A major thrust of Prolessor Built's poper concerned ESt authority

derived fron legislative enactmonts as opposes! to that derived from Presidential

croctives, begiuning with a circetive incued by President Roosevelt in

Sepiemoor, 1935, ¿notessor lilitt is of the opinion thai thie 1939 circetive,

which was reiterated on three subccquent occasions, was magniticd by the

FBI from its original purpose to a dotinitive order to conduct intelligence-type

investigations.

Senctor sam J. lavin, as you know, had bech probing into the

nature and oxichi ol ral intergonce-type investigatons. Sonator Livin had

even unmounced nat he intemped to prcpose logicialion to prohiuit the 2bl

from investigating ony persor without that individual's consent, unless the

Government hes zeuson to bolicre that percon bas committed a crime or is

about to commit e crime. Other Congresemen indicated a similar interest

in fit investicative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a

long period of time that its ze-ponsibilities in the domestic intelligunce field

are authorized under legisluéiva enactments, Presidential directives, and

instructions oi the Attorney Coneral. The Presidential directives are obviously

the i) directivé dated Sepicmber&, 1989, and reiterated January &, 1943;

July 24, 1050; end Decembor i5, 1905, and 2) Esccutive Order 10450 dated

April 27, 1953 (and amendec bui not yet implemented by Executive Order

11605 dated July 2, 1971) •

In curofully anslyzing the lnnguege of the first dircotive, dated

September 0, 1939, and considering that the subsoquent directives are all

hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent

of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the Fll by those dircetives. It

appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FDI to handle

espionage, sabotage, and noutrolity matters, it did not convey any authority

or jurisdiction which the Fil did not alrowdy have from legislative enactments.

It is ditficult to roud into this directive or in any of those which follorred any

authority to conduct intelligence-type investigutions which would or could

not be conducied under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

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The Atturney Generni

4s a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in Awguat,

1936, did request former Directos &. Edger loover to ernduct invortigations

of subvursive retivities in this country, including communion and frectem.

Tis request, however, was a contidontial coal requeat and there le deubt

that any record of it was made outside the Ful. This roquest, or fresdential

mandait, was basco, incidentally, on the fact that the law brovided that the

FEl could concuet auch investigsiions it the Secretary de Sinte should 50

The study roveolod that while the 1000 ct ang, dircotives dild aut

grant coy speciai intelligence-ruthering nothority to the TRI, we were respon

sible under these cancelives to selleet all intelligence infommation furnished

Buy loeni, siate, and Fedoral lui enforcement arencies and patriotie cisens

and to sifi and coordinate ail such indormation ior indications of sulversive

activity covered by fedoral staintos.

The study concluded thot the Flil has the responsibility to con-

duct whatever investigations tre liecessary to dotermine if sictutes relating

to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebeltion, sedition, secidious son-

aptracy, covochey of overthrowiag; the Government, all other such crimes

affeeting the nationai security have beon viclutod. In tis connection ve

note that in a letter dated Septomber 14, Loôt, the Dopartment of duetica

advised that the TBI is continually alert io te problem of eccurring riots

and is sabmitting intolligence roports to the Dopartment of Justice condorn-

ing such activity. 'Inis letter numeratod several Pudorni statutes and

stated theso could de applicable in using maziraum avaliable resources:

investigative and intolligence, to collect and report oll facts bearing on

the question of schemes ur conspiracies to plan, pronate or aggravate riot

activity.

In other worda, the Department was roquesting all possiblo

intelligence-type investigauve activity based on the saistence of curtain

statutes. We see this us being no diûcrent mom our intcligence-lybe

investigadons relating lo plans oi groups or indivinuals to cverthrow,

destroy, intoriere with or threnten the survival of elfcotive operation of

national, state, and local governnents.

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2'i30 Altorney Cencra

Based on this study, we believe that had thera rever been a

zingie one of the Presidontial directives in question the Fil wouid have

corduces andi will, through necessity, continue la conduct the same inioli-

¿enco-type investigitions as were condücted from 1030 to the present dale.

He iso bebove, however, that in order to counto: the criticiom end skept-

cism of such individuals as Professor illift and Senator Sam&. Ervin that

an up-to-dete ixecutive order should be issued clerly establiching a nerd

fur Intelligance type invoctigations and dolineuting a clour authority for te

*Bl to conduct nuch investigations based on guidelines establiched by the

Attornoy Gonoral end adhoring to conctitational principles.

The study conuladed with ino basic accommendationo.

1) That the Depurtment of dustice be paquested to aponsor comprchensive

legislation spelling out the F'Bl's investigative authority in the collection cl

Department of ductice de requested to sock a comprchongive Executive Order

which would cover iny poscible gap betwoon statutory authority and Excouve

necessity in protection of the national sourity.

'Affirst glance those recommendations may appear to contradict

our podition thet we already have stalutory suthority in conduct security-type

invoctigatione; that this being the cuse we do not noed additionol legiclative.

enestinenis, nos do we neeù an Executive pider. But being rodlistio we tniuk

that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct

doestic intelligence investigations noed to be updated to it 1073 nouds.

title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2608, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security.

but the legisletive history d 2893 and 2384 indicatos that they were designod

for the Civil Wur cra, not the wontieth Century, und Section 2035 has been

reduced to a fragilo shell by the Supreme Court, 'These statutes are unquos-

tionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introdueed

as ii.1. 0046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congrass appear to contrin language wlüch

should ill our statutory needs. excopt perhaps for those groups, such as the

Ku flax Klan, which do not seck to overthrow the Government, but nevcr

theless are totalitarion in nuture and sect: to doprive constitutionally guaranteed

righis.

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the Attorney Gckrid

As to the nood for in Executive order, we think that to issues

ace involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive

requirement from the Prosident es to tho rature and type of intoiligence data

he requires in tie Dursuit di his responsibilities based on our ctotutory

authority. in other words, there is a nood, from cur standpoint, los both

authoritative and definitive quidalines. The statutes rive us the authority.

The l'ascutire order would date our nadonel security objectives.

Mcinkers of Congrous, including such mer as Senator Robert C.

Byrd of licot Virgaria, have propoced legialation to opell out jurisdiction ano

authority of the dut in this field. It would appoar that the President would

ratisr apoll out his own requirements in an Executive ordor insicad of having

Congroos isli him What the Fail might do to help him tulall his obligations and

responsibilities in iresidest.

The polliteal clinte of suepicion and distrust resulting from

disclosures coming qui os ibe Ratorgate newings could present on castacle

to getting any such taccutivo order signed in the immediate future. However,

the rationale is nevertheless valid ind when scrutinized closoly, the language

in the Laccutive order we hurcinatter propose establishes definitive guidelines

Which have henatolore bech uncicer. It is my belict that we should go forwsed

with tisis.

We thorofore propose and recommend that an Exceutive order

along the following lines ke submitted to the While House with a strong

recommendation los approval. The language which fellows is merely to

illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate

and dues not necessarily represent an lOcal format of style which should

be submitted to the white liouse.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United Strtes was established lo

insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common

defense; and to pronoto the general welfare for the people of the United States;

and

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.

The Attorney General

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally

imposed responsibility of delending the Constitution and the existence of the

Government thereunder; and

"Whercas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence

perpetrated against the Government of the united States on against citizens

of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the

United States thereby endangering the domostic tranquility, threatening the

commor doiense, and jeopardiring the gendral welfare of the people of the

United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as

treason, ecdition, sabotuge, espionage, insurrection and robellion, seditious

of civil rights, and conopiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whercas the President of the United States as Chief Executive

in the maintenance of the Government thereundor must have intelligence

information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally

Imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Conctitution and statutes

of the United States and in the interest of orderly opcration of this Government

and in furthsrance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general

welfare of the people of the United States it in ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issuc guidelines, conforming

to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the

necessury direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure

that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis

intelligence information essential to the exccution of laws pertaining to sub-

versive activity and other such activity affecting the national security,

domestic tranquility, and gencral welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept

of urban guerrilla torrorism has been adopied by various extremiat elements

in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

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The Attorney General

killing of police officers who, by their unitorm, are a symbol of the democratic

establishment; hijacking of aircrait in furthelance of revolutionary novemonts;

terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic porsonnel and establishments; and opon

decluraticn of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts

which have been perpetruted by domestic subversives who seek io destroy or

seriously cripple our Government. Terrocist guerrilla attacks which were

once confined to far away pluses und reluied to problems oi no immediate con-

cern of our's are now possible in this country. Forcign terrorist groups in

collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for on airport massacre of

the type which rocently occurred in Isracl. Other foreign terrorist clements

have laid plans for terrorist attucks on American soil. Aiready oue foreign

officini has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on

the concept of investigation only when there is roason to believe a erima

invoiving the national security has been committed. The IBI must

obviously anticipate the crimes dcscribed bove. We believe that in

order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolu-

tionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient

investigative authority to conciuct intelligence-type investigations not

normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we

think the President has the inhorent Executive power to expand by further

defining the FEI's investigarive authority to enable it to develop advance

information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolu-

tionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we

also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an

Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney

General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work

in areas where dofinition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Exccutive order delineating

our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intclligence

information relating io the national security to be a very importaut and high

priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney Genoral

under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

=7-

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The sitorney Goneral

For your information, our own invostigative guidolines

tuned in cur timoni of Instructions rclating to domestic subversive investiga-

tons have boce complotely cowriten to conican with the concept that our

¿notio intellecrce-type invcotigationg are based on Fedoral statutes.. Those

gutielinee provido that in each instanco, the doestic intolligenee investigation

must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual

is ongaged in cedrity which could involve a viclution it specific situtes relaưng

to the national eccurity. A copy of the now guidclines was provicusly provided

to the Department of Justice in conncction with the request of Scnator Edward al.

Aunnedy to obtain a copy of the Dil's Section 87 of the Mcnual of Instrutions.

Who alective date of the new guidelines wos August 1, 1873.

1.. The Deputy Altorney Genoral

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is v

•е топы, но. 1о

09, 0nыM 161. 6rнe 108.11.0

C'SIED STATES GOS

MEYT

Memorandum

Clarence M. KClley

fliral Burcau of Investigation

SIin E.

Pommerching

asaistant Attorncy General

fis seministration

rederal Employee Security Program

Executive Order 10450

DATE: NOV .1: 1971

This is in response to: your memoranda, entitled as above,

dated lay 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy

Attorney. General, Criminal Division, and referring to pro-

blems which have arisen as a result öf the promulgation of

Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In

view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I vill

undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the

criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review

both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this

office, of working level representatives of various agencies

in the

security field and is now under study to a lesser degree

an Project #10 of the

"Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instruc-

tions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations

to identify and determine the activities of organizations now.

described in the amended Section 8(a) (5) of Executive Oider

10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in ini-

tiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter

pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and spécifically, criteria to

be utilized in determining whether available information is a

sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a) (5) of Executive Order

20450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those

which

unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts

of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their

rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

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any State, (2) or which scek to overthrow the Government of

the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by

unlawful means: (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate

that the investigation should be initially based on a possiole

violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute

prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful

act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to

detoci organizations with a potential of the above nature, it

is importani that tie

investigation proceed on the basis of in-

formation indicating thai the oiganization may be of the natuse

mentionea. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the

investigation is initiated, but. only that a reasonable evaluation

of the available information suggests that the activities of the

organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The

most recent example of the type of organization,

that you have

advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated •

to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SIA). Organizations. of

this naturc would cieariy lall within the Order and should se

investigated as soon as infonnation is available indicating their

potentiality for violence

and of course, if possible, prior to

the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior

communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations

and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the

investigations of such organizations if their programs call for:

acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the com-

mission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these

programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the

initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling

within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that

offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in.

nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investi-

gation suggests a'determination that the organization is engagea

in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should

continue.

' It follows in answer to your second question that individ-

vals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

2

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izations described above should be investigated when

mation is rcceived indicating their involvement. The

yardstick indicated above for organizations in deter-

ling wiether the investigation should continue, should apply

corning individuals and when a determination can reasonably

e made that the individuals activities, either within the

oganization or as an individual, do not appear to be in vio

lation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

<

3

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

POSITION PAPER ON JURISDICTION

February 13, 1975

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Basis for FBI National Security Intelligence Investigations,

W. Raymond Wannall

II. Authority Granted to the FBI by the Presidential Directive

of June 26, 1939, in the Area of Intelligence and Internal

Security Investigations and Subsequent Pertinent Documents

III. Appendix of Exhibits Concerning thé Directives

IV. Statutes and Executive Orders Affecting FBI Jurisdiction

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•.

I. BASIS FOR FBI NATIONAL

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

W. Raymond Wannall

:. :

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BASIS FOR FBI NATIONAL

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

On July 31, 1972, the Intelligence Division issued

a position paper which in effect drew the conclusion that the

FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations

are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage,

sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious

conspiracy, advocacy

of overthrowing the Government and

other such crines affecting the national security have been

violated. In carrying out this responsibility, the FBI has

tho authority to undertake investigation prior to the actual

commitment of such a crine to determine if groups or

Individuals are engaging in activities which 1f uninterrupted

could result in a violation of a specific statute. . The

position paper noted that the FBI had declared publicly

over a long period of time that Its responsibilities in the

donestic intelligence field were authorized under legislative

enactnents, Presidental directives, and instructions of the

Attorney Goneral. The Presidential dircotives cited were

those of September. 6, 1939, and three subsequent ones of

January 8, 1943, July 21, 1950, and December 15, 1953, which

roitcrated the dircctive of september 6, 1939. It was stated

that It was belloved there was a misconception as to the

extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI bY

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these directives. It was said that it appeared that while

the 1939 directive fixed-responsibility on the FBI to handle

espionage, sabotage and neutrality matters it did not convey

any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already

have from legislative enactments.

The position paper was forwarded to former Acting

Director Gray but no action was taken with respect to it.

Following the appodntment of Mr. lelley as Director of the

FBI, on August 7, 1973, the results of the study were called

to the attention of the Attorney General by letter and it

was suggested to him that an executive order be prepared which

would in effect establish definitive guidelines which it was

felt had been theretofore unclear.

Subsequently on August 24, 1973, at the request

of the Department, we furnished to MI. Milliam D. Ruckelshaus,

the Deputy Attorney General Designate, a copy of the position

paper together with a copy of Section 87 of our manual in

which new guidelines had been promulgated to assure. that the

field thereafter predicated investigations in the internal

security area of our operations on specific statutes.: The new

manual section had been issued and went Into effect during

August, 1973.

The copies of the position paper and our new Section

87, of the Manual of Instructions, were returned to us by

• the Departnent without comment. On Septenber 12, 1973, the

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Attorncy General stated. that he thought it would be premature

to Iccommend to the President that an executive order be

Issued until "we were fairly certain in our own minds as to

how much should be and can be accomplished at each level of

delegation." There has been no followup from the Department

with regard to the Attorney General's statements as of this

time.

On June 1 and 5, 1974, Assistant Director W. R.

, Wannall and former Inspector Thomas J. Smith of the Intelligence

Division appeared before the Committee on Internal Security

House of Representatives (Ichord Committee). The results

of their testimony are set forth in a publication entitled

"Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security

Purposes Part I." Pertinent portions of this testimony

appear on pages 3571 through 3574 and on page 3591. These

sessions of the connittee were under the direction of

Mr. Alfred M. Nittle, Legislative Counsel of the Conmittee,

and he propounded most of the questions.

Referring to the directive of september 6, 1939,

Mr. Nittle said, "Now for the purpose of carrying out that

directive, has the Attorney General by standing and general

orders now in effect instructed the FBI as to precisely

what investigative work is to be enoraced within the expression

'subversive activities?""

3

sia

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In responding to the question, Wannall read into

the record a strictly confidential memorandum dated

September 10, 1936, prepared by former Director Hoover for

MI. E. A. Tamm, Associato Dircator. In the memorandur,

Mr. Hoover referred to a conversation he had had that day

during which ir. Hoover briefed the Attorney General with regard

to a conference he had had with the President on September 1,

1936, during which the Secretary of State was present and

requested Mr. Hoover as the representative of the Department

of Justice "to have investigation made of the subversive

activities in this country, including connunism and facism."

The memorandum shows that the Attorney General verbally

directed

Mr. Hoover to proceed with this investigation and

to coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon

these matter's in the possession of the Military Intelligence

Division and the Naval Intelligence Division. In effect,

this constituted a standing and general order to the FBI fron

the Attorney General with regard to the Presidential directive.

of September 6, 1939. While the Attorney General's order pre-

ceded the September 6, 1939, directive by some three years,

It has never been abrogated and the manner in which it:

relates to the order of 1939 will be explained hereinafter.

MI. Nittle then pointed out that he saw no specific

reference to statutes which would show basis for the FBI to

: Investigate subversive activities. It was explainca to him

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...

that prior to the issuance of MI. Hoover's September 10, 1936,

menorandum he had had meetings

at the thite llousc, one of

which included the Secretary of State, and Mr. Hoover had

Insisted that the Secretary of State request that the FBI

conduct investigations relating to subversive activities,

including connunism and facism, since under Title 28, Section

533, U. S. Code, the Attorney General is authorized to instruct

the FBI to conduct such other investigations as are required

by the Secretary of State in carrying out his authority.

Later during the testimony, Mt. Nittle pointed out that it

was his assumption that at least one of the bases for the

President's authority

• for issuing the directive of September 6,

1939, was his constitutional duty to protect and defend the

Constitution and that it was adequate to lend support to the

Federal investigative jurisdiction without reference to any

statutes. It was acknowledged that the fBI does not question

the Constitutional power of the President to delegate

Investigative jursidiction.

Following his appearance before the Ichord.

Committee, Wannall undertook personally to conduct research to

determine if there is a basis for concluding that FBI intelli-

gence investigations are in fact based upon a delegation of

authority under the President's Constitutional powers. This

course was pursued for the following icasons:

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I. In testimony before the Appropriations

Committees, It. Hoover had consistently stated that the FBI's

responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are auth-

orized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives

and instructions of the Attorney General. He said they include

Investigative jurisdiction over matters relating to espionage,

counterespionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion

and related internal security functions. He pointed out that

subjects of investigation included the Communist Party USA,

Communist Front Groups and other totalitarian organizations

Including individuals or groups who are alleged either to

seck the overthrow the Government of the United States by

force or violence or to conspire against the rights of citi-

zens. He further stated the FBI has primary responsibility

for Investigating matters of these types in the United States,

Puerto Rico and

the Virgin Islands. Following his testimony,

the Congress consistently appropriated funds to permit the

FBI to carry out investigations in these areas.

•2. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin C.

Karoney of the Criminal Divison of the Department made

appearances before the Ichord Conmittee: on February 20, April

1

and April 2, 1971. His testimony as recorded on pages 3366

and 3439 of the publication "Domestic Intelligence Operations

for Internal Security Purposes Part I" contained statements

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bearing on this subject matter. For example, after MI. Nittle

had referred to the September 6, 1939, Presidential airective

and the subsequent ones, li. Nittle asked if he regarded the

directive as embracing within its terms a requirement that the

FBI also take charge of investigative work of subversive

activities generally. Mr. Maroney said that he thought it did

generally direct the FBI to take charge of investigation of

versive activities and, "

...I think through the years what was

embraced through that condition was, in various executive orders,

and in other directives of the Attorney General relating to civil

disturbance matters." On page 3439, Mr Maroney is reported to

have discussed investigations in the internal security area

conducted by the FBI.. He stated that in connection with

particular Investigations

after a period of tine or after an

accumulation of information the FBI submits the information

to the Departnent and the Department will give an opinion

as to whether the facts constitute a prosecutable violation

and will also advise whether additional or continual investi-

gation is requested. Maroney stated, "Sometimes it will be

Indicated no further investigation is desired. However,

If any relevant future information comes to your attention,

please advise.'" Mr. Nittle then inquired if it. Haroney

was telling him in effect that not only are these investigations

being conducted but that he construed the Attorney General's

• directive to be a directive to the FBI to conduct broad,

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on-going Investigations with respect to subversive activities.

Mr. Maroney roplied that' he thought they (FBI) are under a con-

tinuing mandate of the Attorney General to continue

investigations of crines which include seditious conspiracy

anti-riot statutes and many other statutes.

3. In our position paper of July 31, 1972, the

conclusion was drawn that no additional investigative

authority was conveyed in the first paragraph of the

September 6, 1939, Presidential directive wherein the

FBI vas instructed to take charge of investigative work

in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violationg

of the neutrality regulations. Since these were statutory

matters, the position was taken and, I feel correctly, that

this direction nerely fixed responsibility in the FBI to

Investigate previously existing statutes. However, the

position paper did not take into consideration the gossible

significance of the last paragraph of the directive wherein

the President called upon "all police officers, sheriffs,

and all other law enforcement officers in the United States

promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by

them relating to espionage, countcrespionage, sabotage,

subversive activitics and violations of the neutrality laws."

co 8 a

jai

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As noted hereinbefore, Mr. Hoover

in his memorandum

of September 10, 1936, wherein he explained that the FBI had

been charged with investigating subversive activities indicated

that the memorandum was classified strictly confidential.

On June 26, 1939, the President issued a directive

which was classified confidential. In it he stated, "It is my

desire that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage

and sabotage natters be controlled and handled by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military

Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of

Naval Intelligence of the lavy Department. The directors

of these three agencies are to function as a conmittee to

coordinate their activitles." He went on to point out that no

investigation should be conducted by any investigative agency

of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially

any espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except these

three agencies and the directive, which was issued to these heads

of all departments, stated that the President would be glad

if the heads of tho departments would instruct agencies other

than the three named to immediately refer to the nearest

office of the r'BI any data, information or material relating.

to these matters.

•

The directive of September 6, 1939, was not

classifiod. It was issued to the public. In it the President

said the Attorney General had been requested to instruct the

∞ 9 ∞

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FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to

espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regu-

Lations.

It was in this"paragraph that the President

publicly fixed responsibility for investigative work with

respect to statutes relating to these three subject matters

in the FBI. However, in the third paragraph of the.

September 6, 1939, directive the President stated, "To this

end I request all police officers, sheriffs and all other

law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to

turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal

Bureau of Invesigation any information obtained by them

relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive

activitios and violations of the neutrality laws." It will

be noted that in this paragraph he referred specifically to

violations of three statues which he had enunerated in the

flist paragraph but he also asted that there be turned over to

the FBI any Information relating to countorespionage a word

which he had utilized in the confidential June 26, 1939,

directive and also the words subversive activities a phrase

which had been utilized by MI. Hoover in explaining the

delegation of authority in September, 1936.

Mr. Hoover's nemorandum had been classified strictly confi-

dential and memoranda concerning his visits with President

Roosevelt and the Secretary of State which preceded the

Issuance of his September 10, 1936, memorandum revealed that

- 10 -

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the PIcsident wanted this matter treated in the greatest

of confidence. Accordingly, there is the basis for a

strong conclusion that in 1936 and in June, 1939, under his

constitutional authority, the President had already delegated

responsibility to the FBI for investigations relating to

counterespionage and subversive activities in classified

directives. For this reason, the first paragraph of the

Septenber 6, 1939, directive did not include the delegation

of responsibilities for investigative work relating to

counterespionage and subversive activities because of the

classified nature of these matters but there was an acknow-.

Lodgement in the third paragraph of the September 6, 1939,

directive of the previous delegation of authority to the FBI

by the President in these two areas.

since the June 26, 1939, directive indicated that the

FBI and the Har and Navy Departments should function as a

committee to coordinate their activities with respect to

investigations of espionage, counterespionage and sabotage

matters, Wannall requested the Research Section of the

Intelligence Division three weeks ago to undertake a study to

determine how this committce was formed and how it functioned

thereafter.

The results of this study are set forth in

the

attached 35-page paper.

= 11 =

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On page

T of the attachment; it will be noted

that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC)

was formed as an independent cormittee pursuant to the Presidential

directive of June 26, 1939, to coordinate the investigative

efforts of the three agencies. To faciliate coordination, the

IIC adopted the Delinitations Agrcement of June 5, 1940.

The members cited in the preamble of that document that in

conformity with that directive contained in the Presidential

memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augumented by his directive

of September 6, 1939, charging them with investigation of all

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversive

activities the responsibility for these investigations would

be delineated as contained in the agreement. The Delimi-

tations

Agreement was revised on February 9, 1942, and again

on February 23, 1949.

As shown on page g of the attachment, the IIC as

an independent committee ceased to exist in 1919 as pursuant

to the National Security Act of 1947 it was absorbed and then

chartered by the National Security Council presided ovcr by

the President. In the charter, referance was made to investi-

gations of donestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversion and other rclated Intelligence matters affecting

Internal security.

= 12 -

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Page 10 of the attachment clates that supervision

of the IIC was transferred by the National Security Council

to the Attorney General in an Action Memorandum dated June 9,

1962. On March 5, 1961, the Attorney General issued

Instructions to the FBI wherein the Attorney General was

Indicated as the individual through whom the authority flowed

as opposad to the National Security Council. In a memorandum

to former Director Hoover explaining this dated March 5, 1964,

the Attorney General again referred to the coordination of

all Investigations of domestic espionage, counterspionage,

sabotage, and subversion and other related intelligence

matters affecting internal security

A reading of the enclosure will show that the

_IIC

was primarily concerned with matters of internal security

which had ramifications international in scope. However,

It should be noted that on November 1, 1950, an attempt was

made to kill President Truman by two members of the

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico when they endeavored to

shoot their way into the Blair House which he was then

occupying. From a letter to Mir. Hoover as Chairman of the IIC

and Mi. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman of the Interdepartmental

Committee on Internal Security, dated November 6, 1950, signed

by MI. J. Patrick Coyno, National Security Council Representa-

tive for Internal Security, It is apparent that the President

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felt that both the IIC and ICIS had interests and Icspon-

sibilities In the domestic terrorist field, in light of the

fact that he, through the

National Security Council, made

inquiry of the IIC regarding "the recent outbreal of violence

by the Puerto Rican Mationalists." The President requested

that the IIC and ICIS report to the National Security Council

on the lessons to be learned from that incident on donestic

terrorism. Indicated by the detailed questions posed by the

president and the detailed response given.by the IIC, It is

apparent that the President intended that IIC have gicat

latitute in the area of subversive activities and terrorism

as it relates to internal security matters assigned to the

IIC.

Keeping in mind that it was during the admini-

stration of President Truman and based upon recormendations

that he made that the National Security Act of 1947 was

passed, I feel that his reguest of the IIC for a report

regarding the activities of a purely domestic group, the

• Natlonalist Party of Puerto Rico, provides an indication of

what he had in mind with respect to the responsibilities.

of the IIC with regard to investigation of subversive

activities.

I think this is well stated on page 14 of the enclosed

document. "Men do not operate in a vacuum and their acts and

documents are guided by their knowledge, instructions and

• 14 -

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understanding of instructions at that time in history. The

delimitations agreement of 1940 must, therefore, speak to

existing problems and only the anticipation of future prob

lems. All prior knowledge and understanding of instructions

and orders could only have been interpreted to clearly

include investigation of United States citizens."

The foregoing information and the information con-

tained in the attachments are supportive of the conclusion

that the intelligence-gathering activities of the FBI have had

as their basis the intention of the President to delegate his

Constitutional authority as indicated by certain Presidential

directives, the provisions of Title 28, Section 533, U. S. Couc

and the provisions of the national Secuxity Act of 1947. These

intelligence-gathering activities are also based upon statutes

defining violations pertaining to the national security, a

list of which is attached hereto.

15

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II. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BY THE

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN THE AREA OF

INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

AND SUBSEQUENT PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

A. L. Lacey, Jr.

A. F. Watters, Jr.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

i

Synopsis

I.

Verbal Presidential Instructions of August 24, 1936,

and August 25, 1936

II.. The Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, a

confidential Directive

IlI. The Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939, a

public Directive

IV. The Presidential Directives of January 8, 1943,

July 24, 195.0, and December 15, 1953

V. How has the FBI complied with the verbal instructions

of August, 1936, and confidential Presidential Directive

of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of

September 6, 1939, and what other Presidential documents

reaffirm subsequent Presidential approval of this investi-

gative authority

A. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

B: IIC under the charter of the National Security

Council (NSC)

C. IIC under the charter of the Attorney General

• D. What are the primary areas of inquiry

considered by IIC in fulfilling their responsi-

bility? Do they include United States citizens?

VI. What Other Areas of Intelligence Investigation Have Been

Recognized By the Executive to Fall Within the

Jurisdiction Delineated By the Directives?

VII. Has Congress Recognized the Dual Intelligence--Criminal

Role of the FBI Which Results From the Directives

VIII.

Do the Directives in Any Way Alter the FBI's Jurisdiction

as Assigned by Statute or Other Executive Order?

IX.

What Effect Would Be Realized If the FBI Had Not Had the

Directives or If the Directives Were Revoked?

1

3.

5

10

12

17

32.

33°

33

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Synopsis;

:

Oral and written, confidential and public Directives of 1936 and

in June and September, 1939, ordered the FBI to investigate matters of internal

security, to include "subversive activitics," and to coordinate such with the

military intelligence services. In compliance, the FBI and military formed the

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IC) and delineated their areas of

investigative responsibility in the Delimitations Agreements of 1940, 1942, and

1949, basing their authority on the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, 'as

augmented by the Directive of September 6, 1939. The Delimitations Agreement

stated that the FBI will investigate matters affecting internal security, including

United States citizens. This authority for intelligence investigation was restated

and reaffirmed in 1949 when the National Security Council, presided over by

the President, chartered the IIC and adopted the Delimitations Agreement in

total. In 1962, the President assigned the internal security responsibility

to the Attorney General by National Security Action Memorandum 161. The

Attorney General rechartered the IIC pursuant to this authority and therein

reaffirmed the Directives by adoption in total of the Delimitations Agreement.

Pursuant to the Directives, the FBI has had continuous authority.

to conduct intelligence investigations of internal activities which have potential

to subvert the ability of the Nation to maintain continuing existence under the

Constitution. (Emphasis Added) This authority has remained constant though

the nature of the threats has changed. As illustrated hercin by use of examples,

• NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 89

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-

the original problem was global war and how internal subversion affected the

war effort through actual or potential espionage and sabotage. This problem

continued through the Cold War to the present time. In more recent years, a

strictly domestic threat arose; riots, racial militants, hate groups, and terrorists.

Cognizant of the continuing authority for intelligence investigations, these

threats were faced by the FBI not only because of the immediate effect on the

national welfare or possible violation of statute but the evaluation of potential

for subversion during a national emergency.

This authority for intelligence investigation in the field of internal

security precipitated the dual role of the FBI as it exists today; (1) intelligence,

and (2) criminal investigations. This has been recognized by the Executive,

the Attorney General, and the Congress.

in addition to the authority granted under the Directives, the FBI

has (1) a broad field of statutory authority, and (2) authority under Executive

Orders to investigate employee loyalty matters; neither of which is in any way

affected by the authority granted under the Directives.

In summary, the Directives granted intelligence authority and

placed the FBI in an internal security intelligence posture, in addition to the

original statutory responsibility in the investigation of solely criminal matters.

(ii)

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AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BY THE

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN THE AREA OF

INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

AND SUBSEQUENT PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

I. Verbal Presidential instructions of August 24, 1936, and August 25, 1936:

Verbal instructions were given to Director John Edgar Hoover

by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 24, 1936, and August 25, 1936,

to investigate "subversive activities in the United States, including Fascism

and Communism," and "to coordinate any investigation along similar lines

which might be made by the Military or Naval Intelligence Services."

(Emphasis Added) President Roosevelt saw these activities "as international

in scope" and advised the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to request "such

investigation" under the Appropriations Act (Title 28, Section 533, United States

Code), which was done orally as the President wished the matter to be "handled

quite confidentially." President Roosevelt instructed Mr. Hoover and

Secretary Hull to speak with the Attorney General "upon his return to the city"

about this matter. The discussion of August 24 and 25, 1936, covered the

area of communist and fascist "movements" in the United States and President

Roosevelt was interested in obtaining

• "a broad picture" of the movement and

activities "as may affect the economic and political life of the country as a

whole." (Confidential memoranda, John Edgar Hoover, dated August 24,

1936 and August 25, 1936.)

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On September 10, 1936, Mr. Hoover advised the Attorney General

regarding "the radical situation" and his conference with the President

and Secretary of State, wherein he acted as the representative of the

Department of Justice, and wherein the request was made "to have investi-

gation made of the subversive activities in this country, including

Communism and Fascism." (Emphasis Added) The Attorney General

orally directed Mr. Hoover to "proceed with this investigation and to

coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon these matters in

the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence

Division, and the State Department. This, therefore, is the authority upon

which to proceed in the conduct of this investigation, which should, of

course, be handled in a most discreet and confidential manner." (Memorandum

for Mr. Tamm, strictly confidential, from John Edgar Hoover, dated

September 10, 1936.)*

It is noted and emphasized that, throughout the memoranda,

Mr. Hoover referred on a recurring basis to "subversive activities, in-

cluding communism and fascism" and the overall gist of the conversations

as reflected in the memoranda demands the understanding that this

authority was granted for a widespread and diverse look at all subversive

activities within the United States. It should not be overlooked that the

United States was then on the brink of global war and, of necessity,

information regarding subversive activities of all manner were of vital

importance to the President and Seeictary of State.

NW 54969 Docid: 32989720 Page 92

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II. The Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, a confidential Directive:

"It is my desire that the investigation of

..

all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage

matters be controlled and handled by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

• Department of Justice, the Military Intel-

ligence Division of the War Department, and

the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy

Department. The directors of these three

agencies.are to function as a committee to

coordinate their activities.

-9 .

No investigations should be conducted by

any investigative agency of the Government into

matters involving actually or potentially any

espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage,

except by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads

of all other investigative agencies than the three

named, to refer immediately to the nearest office

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data,

information, or material that may come to their

notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,

counterespionage, or sabotagc." (Emphasis Added)

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 93

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In the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, President

Roosevelt clearly and unequivocably ordered that "the investigation of all

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage matters" be handled by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence Division (MID), and Office of

Naval Intelligence (ONI) and that their directors were to act as committee

to coordinate their activities. This is unquestionably delegation of investi-.

gative authority for Bureau investigations of the enumerated areas of activity

to the exclusion of other agencies, save the MID and ÖNI. In the second

paragraph, the Directive also clearly and unequivocably states the President's

intent to have investigation made of actual or potential espionage, counter-

espionage or sabotage as he directs no other agency to enter the field of

actual or potential espionage, counterespionage or sabotage investigations.

(Emphasis Added) On the contrary, in paragraph three, he directs other

agencies to "refer immediately" to the FBI any data, information or material

bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage.,

If such matters are to be referred to the FBI, the President's intent obviously

is that he desired the FBI to "control and handle" the correlation of such

material as reflected in paragraph one of the Directive and as he had pre-

viously verbally instructed Mr. Hoover to do in 1936, in other words, to

coordinate any investigation with the military

Reflecting back to the verbal Directives of August, 1936, as

compared to the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, it is noted that two

major premises can be made, one being the intent of the President for the

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 94

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FBI to investigate "subversive activity, including Communism and Fnscism,"

an area of concern akin to and overlapping in many respects the area of

espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage; and secondly, his intent that

the FBI and Military Services coordinate their efforts of investigation as

assigned by these Directives. (Emphasis Added)

III. The Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939, a public Directive:

"The Attorney General has been requested by me

to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, to take charge of investigative

work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and

violations of the neutrality regulations.

This task must be conducted in a comprehensive

" and effective manner on a national basis, and all

information must be carefully sifted out and correlated

in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility.

To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs,

and all other law enforcement officers in the United States

promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained

by them relating to. espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversive activities and violations of the neutrality

laws." (Emphasis Added)

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Interpreting the Presidential intent in this Directive, a public

document, it must be first noted that in the first sentence the President states

"the Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau

of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative

work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality

regulations." (Emphasis Added) The use of the past tense requires one to

understand that the President, through prior instructions and Directives,

oral or written, had, to his own satisfaction, specifically delegated responsi-

bility for these investigations. The President restates publicly the need for

handling of these matters comprehensively and on "a national basis." He

restates matters previously covered in verbal and written form by expressing

his desire to have the information "sifted out and correlated." One need only

refer to the verbal instructions of 1936 and the confidential Presidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, to clearly see that the main intent of the President

is here again reflected, only in this instance, publicly, and with an appeal for

assistance from law officers.

Further, and a point believed worthy of note, the President

instructs in this Directive that law officers in the United States remand to

the FBI information relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversive activities, and violations of the neutrality laws. Emphasis

Added) Carefully note that the President included in this request that

information regarding subversive activitics be turned over to the FBI as

in

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well as information involving espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and

violations of the neutrality laws. This is the precise language of the verbal

Directive or instruction of August, 1936, and it is logical that if the President

instructed Mr. Hoover to investigate subversive activities in 1936, he would

desire that information regarding subversive activities be furnished to the FBI

by law officers in his public Directive of September 6, 1939, in order to

increase and enhance the tempo of incoming information regarding subversive

activities in which he had a grave interest. (Emphasis Added)

.. i:

IV. The Presidential Directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950; and December 15,

1953, in main, restate and reaffirm these basic instructions and orders based

on then current developments at the time of their respective issuances.

.V. How has the FBI complied with the verbal instructions of August, 1936, and

confidential Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his

Directive of September 6, 1939, and what other Presidential documents reaffirm

subsequent Presidential approval of this investigative authority?

A.

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IC):

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) was formed

as an independent committee pursuant to the Presidential Directive of June 26,

1939, to coordinate the investigative efforts of the FBI, MID, and ONI. To

facilitate coordination, the IIC adopted the Delimitations Agreement of June 5,

1940. The members cited in the preamble of that document that in conformity.

with the Directive contained in the Presidential Memorandum of June 26, 1939,

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 97

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as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, charging them with

investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive

activities, that responsibility for these investigations would be delineated

as contained in the Agreement. (Emphasis Added)

It is apparent that the members of IIC recognized their authority

from the Presidential Memorandum of June 26, 1939, and that their duty

under that Directive was to investigate the aforementioned areas, including

subversive activities, as Mr. Hoover had been directed to do in August, 1936.

(Emphasis Added)

The IIC in issuing the revised Delimitations Agreement of February 9,

1942, again cited the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as augmented by

the Directive of September 6, 1939, as authority. IIC members stated in the

preamble that investigative responsibility of IIC extended to "all activities

coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion,

and sabotage." (Emphasis Added)

The Agreement was redrafted in the Delimitations Agreement of

February 23, 1949, and again the members in the preamble cited the

Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of

September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the

Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947 (pertaining to employee loyalty

investigations), as authority. As before, the IIC members referred specifically

to the delincation of responsibility of investigation of "all activities coming

undcr the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage."

(Emphasis Added)

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B.

IC under the charter of the National Security Council (NSC):

The IIC as an independent committee ceased to exist in 1949, as

pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 it was absorbed and then chartered

by the NSC, presided over the President. The Council chartered both the IC

and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (CIS), which consisted

of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and the

Military Establishments. *The IC charter issued by NSC dated July 18, 1949,

".

reads in part:

"Pursuant to the provision of Section 101 of the

National Security Act and NSC 17/4 as approved by the

President, the National Security Council hereby

authorizes and directs that the Indepartmental

« Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of

all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-

espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other

related intelligence matters affecting internal

security. The IIC shall be guided by the terms

of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

shall be constituted as set forth in the Presidential

Directive of Junc 26, 1939, that is, the Director of

* See Appondis for ICIS Charter

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the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of

the Intelligence Division of the Army, the Director

of Naval Intelligence, and in addition, the Director,

Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force,

which office has been created since the issuance of

the original Presidential Directive." (Emphasis Added)

C. IIC under the charter of the Attorney Genéral:

Supervision of the IIC was transferred by National Security

Action Memorandum 161 issued by the President, John F. Kennedy, dated

June 9, 1962, which reads in part:

"(2) Accordingly, I have directed that the two

interdepartmental committees concerned with internal

:

'security--the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(IC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal

Security (ICIS) --which have been under the supervision

of the National Security Council, will be transferred to

the supervision of the Attorney General. The continuing

need for these committees and their relationship to the

Attorney General will be matters for the Attorney General

to determine."

Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum, the Attorney.

General in a memorandum to John Edgar Hoover, Chairman, IIC, dated

March 5, 1964, which, in essence, restated the IIC charter as issued by

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the NSC, with appropriate amendments, causing it to read in part:

"Pursuant to the provisions of the National

Security Action Memorandum 161, dated June 9;

1962 from the President, the Attorney General hereby

authorizes and directs that the Interdepartmental

Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of all

investigation.of domestic espionage, counterespionage,

sabotage and subversion, and other related intelligence

matters affecting internal security. The IIC shall be

guided by the terms of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

"shall be constituted as set forth in the Presidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, that is, the Director of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of

Justice; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,

Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence,

Department of the Navy; and the Director of Special

Investigations, the Inspector General, Department

of the Air Force (the latter position having been created

since the issuance of the original Presidential Dircctive.)"

(Emphasis Added)

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It is apparent that all authority granted by NSC and the Attorney

General subsequent to the Presidential Directives of August 21-25, 1936, and

June 26, 1939, which authorized the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations

refers to those Directives and recognizes, adopts and reaffirms their instruction.

D. What are the primary areas of inquiry considered by IC in fulfilling

their responsibility? Do they include United States citizens?

A review of the voluminous files relative to IIC reflects that the

primary considerations of IIC were directed at such matters as security of

plants, protection of industry and transportation, obstruction of commerce and

vital utilities, registry of boats, security of wharfs and docks, public radio

broadcasting, alien entry and control matters, diplomatic establishment

radio authorizations, visiting foreign nationals, Communist Party, USA,

and alien seamen, to mention but a few.

Obviously, the IIC was primarily concerned with matters of

internal security which had ramifications "international in scope," as

President Roosevelt described previously herein, and this is only natural

as these were the primary problems during the heat of the Cold War of the

late 1940's to the mid-1960's. These problems continue today. Domestic

terrorism was not a problem in this country at the time, except on a very

limited basis. Mr. Hoover, when preparing proposals for the Delimitations

Agreement of June 5, 1940, suggested to the members that "subversive

activity" be understood to include "espionage, sabotage, groups organized

to assist hostile forces ("Fifth Column") and Subversive propaganda, " all

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 102

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which are matters obviously pertinent to internal security challenges from

without the Nation's boundries. One primary consideration cannot be lost,

however, and that is the central fact that from the earliest verbal instructions

in 1936 through and including all other orders, the FBI, without reservation,

has been directed to "investigate," "take charge," "correlate," "sift out,"

"control," and "handle," all intelligence matters concerning the internal

security of the United States whether it be called "subversive activities,"

"subversion," "domestic espionage," "espionage," "counterespionage,".

"sabotage," or "subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting

internal security."

(Emphasis Added) Secondly, and of primary importance,

is the fact that the thrust of these investigations as ordered by the various

Directives and charters has not been limited to the alien principle or agent

operating in the United States but directed at the United States citizen when

he or she acts or functions in a manner to fall within the above terms used to

indicate a threat to the internal security. Supporting this fact is the Delimitations

Agreement of June 5, 1940, wherein the members, conforming with the Presidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, as they so state, outline their respective areas of

responsibility to investigate. Item 2 of this Agreement reads in part:

"Il. FBI will assume responsibility for all

• investigations of cases in these categories involving

civilians in the United States and in its territories

with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam,

Samoa and the Philippine Islands." (Emphasis Added)

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Men do not operate in vacuum and their acts and documents are

guided by their knowledge, instructions, and understanding of instructions

at that time in history. The Delimitations Agreement of 1940 must; therefore,

speak to existing problems and only the anticipation uf future problems. All

prior knowledge and understanding of instructions and orders could only have

been interpreted to clearly include investigation of United States citizens since

Item 2 of the Agreement speaks so specifically to this point.

1. Has the Executive adopted Item 2 as set forth in the Delimitations

Agreement of 1940?

Absolutely. The Delimitations Agreement of 1940 was replaced by

the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, wherein reference for authority

• is again based on a Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, and Item 2 is

changed in language but not in meaning. Item 2 reads in part:

"II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the

categories involving civilians in the

United States and its territories with

the exception of the Republic of Panama,

the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American

Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and

Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands

and the Territory of Alaska other than

that specifically described in Paragraph III."

(Emphasis Added)

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The IIC issued the Delimitations Agreement of February 23, 1949,

again basing authority on the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, and

again restated the position to investigate United States citizens, which is

clearly stated in Item 2, which reads in part:

"II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these

categories involving civilians and foreign

nationals of all classes in the continental

United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin

Islands, (the State of Hawaii), and the State

of Alaska except as specifically described

hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5."

The Delimitations Agreement of February 23, 1949, was in effect

on July 18, 1949, when the IIC was chartered by the NSC. The President was

Chairman of the NSC. The NSC charter to IIC reads in part:

..

"D. Nothing herein shall be construed as

modifying or affecting the Presidential Directives

issued to the members of the IIC relating to their

individual responsibilities and duties. The

Delimitations Agrecment among the members of the

IIC relating to the investigative responsibilities and

duties of the individual members and other agreements

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:

among these members relating to the same matters

shall remain in full force and effect and shall continue

.. for.

to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the

discretion of the IIC." (Emphasis Added)

The President herein clearly adopted the language of the Delimitations

Agreement of February 23, 1949, to include Item 2 of that Agreement, wherein

it is specifically stated the FBI will investigate United States citizens.

2. Does this adoption apply to the charter issued by the

Attorney General in 1964?

Yes. Pursuant to the authority of the National Security Action

Memorandum 161, dated June 9, 1962, from the President, the Attorney General

:

chartered the IIC and that charter reads in part:

" "D. Nothing herein shall be construed as

modifying or affecting the Presidential Directives

issued to the members of the IIC relating to their

individual responsibilities and duties.

The

Delimitations Agreement among the members of the

IC relating to the investigative responsibilities and ar :.:

duties of the individual members and other agreements®

among these members relating to the same matters

•:.

shall remain in full force and effect and shall continue

to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the

discretion of the IIC." (Emphasis Added)

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In summary, the Executive has, over the years, granted continuing

authority to the FBI to investigate matters threatening the internal security, including

investigation of private citizens of the United States and their activities.

VI. What Other Areas of Intelligence Investigation Have Been Recognized By

the Executive to Fall Within the Jurisdiction Delineated By the Directives?

Examination of the question illustrates that over the years the .

scope of internal security problems has been expanded from the original

category of "subversive activities" as described by Mr. Hoover in

his proposed definition of the term to a much broader field of intelligence

responsibility. It has been illustrated that the oral and written Directives

of 1936 and 1939 vested intelligence investigative authority in the FBI and that

this authority has been reaffirmed over the years. The authority was granted

originally to meet the problems of the 1936-1939 period and has continued

in effect to meet the problems involving internal security as they arose in

subsequent years.

Originally, the problem facing the Nation was obviously the threat

of communist and fascist espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, acts

such as infiltration of vital functions, dissemination of propaganda, and fostering

discontent that would weaken the national fabric at a time when the Nation was

faced with global war. These concerns have grown and evolved over the years

to include domestic "hate groups," anarchists, and terrorists. The following

chronology illustrates this cvolutionary aspect of the recognized problem:

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By letter to Mr. Hoover, Chairman, IIC, and Mr. Whearty, Chairman,

ICIS, dated November 6, 1950; from Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative

on Internal Security, it is apparent that the President felt that the IC and the

ICIS had interests and responsibilities in the domestic terrorist field in light

of the fact that he, through the NSC, made inquiry of the IIC regarding the

then recent Presidential attack by Puerto Rican nationalists. The President

requested that the IIC and the ICIS report to the NSC on the lessons to be learned

from that incident of domestic terrorism' (see App. Section I). As indicated

by the detailed questions posed by the President and the detailed response by

the IIC, it is apparent that the President intended that IIC have great latitude

in the area of investigation of subversive activity and terrorism as it relates to

internal security matters assigned to IIC.

It should be obvious that the concern of the President and referral

of this concern to the IIC and ICIS for answers affirms and illustrates the

President's atritude that such matters as domestic terrorism certainly affect,

the internal security and national welfare and are the responsibility of IIC.

• The FBI is the member of IIC charged with investigation of "subversion" under

the Delimitations Agreement of February 23, 1949. What more subversive activity

could be imagined than an armed terrorist attack on the President?

In a report to the NSC on the status of the internal security program

dated March 5, 1954, prepared jointly by the IIC and the ICIS, the scope of

intelligence investigation of internal security matters was described in connection

with outlining specific major.goals of the program:

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"1. To coordinate the activities of all agencies and

and departments concerned with internal security matters,

including investigations, the collection of domestic

intelligence, and the integration of foreign intelligence

pertinent to the domestic intelligence field.

2. To continue the acceleration of investigations

designed to provide the basis for the apprehension,

prosecution, or other action, against persons involved

in subversive activities.

3. To detect and maintain security indices on

persons considered dangerous to the national defense

and public safety.

4. To neutralize Communist front and Communist-

dominated organizations of the United States."

It may be seen that in addition to their interests in prosecuting

statutory violations, the IIC members recognize their responsibility as assigned

by the Directives to obtain a broad-based intelligence picture regarding the

subversive potential of individuals and organizations.

In a joint status report to the NSC dated August 27, 1958, the IIC

and ICIS discussed the dual aspects of their jurisdiction. It is pointed out

that there is occasional conflicts between the prosccutive jurisdiction under

statutes which might tend to interfere with the intelligence-gathering function.

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In such cases, it was noted that prosecution is frequently foregone in favor

of the more valuable collection of intelligence. The report states in part:

"Following the Supreme Court decisions reversing

the convictions of 19 Communist Party leaders for

violation of the Smith Act of 1940, action by various

Circuit Courts of Appeal has resulted in the acquittal

.. of 20 additional Communist Party functionaries and

the remanding for retrial of 29 others. While selected

cases

are not scheduled for retrial during the fiscal

year 1959, problems have arisen in other cases due

to the lapse of time since the periods covered by the

indictments. In most instances, several years have

been consumed by trials and appeals with the result

that witnesses have died, have become invalid, or

are unavailable for other reasons and at this late date

their testimony cannot be replaced. Another problem

has been the stringent evidentiary standards established

by the Supreme Court in the case of the California

communist leaders

In other cases, the Department of Justice must

consider the loss, through their appearance as witnesses,

of additional confidential informants of the FBI. It

is necessary to weigh the difficulty of developing

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informants within the Communist Party and its related

groups together with the value of the information they

secure against the benefit to be derived from using

such persons as witnesses."

On November 6, 1958, former Director Hoover gave a presentation

to the President and the Cabinet, which reads in part:

"We have still a sixth program under which we

continuously evaluate the espionage and sabotage

potential of individuals whose current activities

indicate that they might constitute a threat to the

country in the event of a national emergency. These

include members of the Communist Party of the

United States and other individuals dedicated to

the violent overthrow of our Government. We,

maintain a special index of such persons to enable

us to effect their immediate apprehension in the event

the President so directs the Attorney General. For

your information, there were 12,835 names on this

index.

Communist Party leaders are hopeful that, by

exploiting such current national and international

issues as racial discrimination and peace., they can

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bring about a resurgence of Party activity and influence.

For example, Ecnjamin Davis, chairman of the Party's

New York District, in a report made in September of

this year to top communist functionaries, stressed

that the Party should concentrate on the integration

issue as symbolized by the Little Rock school situation.

Diligent efforts are made by the communists to infiltrate

Negro groups, particularly at the local level, so as

to agitate and create confusion.

The public usually associates the FBI's internal

security investigations with Communist Party activities

only. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our

investigations encompass any and all organizations based

on a creed of force and violence to determine whether they

are a threat to our internal security or whether they have

violated any Federal laws.

We investigate the activities of such diverse and.

international organizations as the Marxist Socialist

Workers Party, and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. •

(Responsible for attack upon President Truman,

1950, and Congress, 1954.) Further, we investi-

gate such fanatical and so-called 'hato' groups as

the Negro Nation of Islam; the Ku Klux Klan; the

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National States Rights Party, an anti-Jewish and anti-

Negro organization; and the 'Confederate Underground.'

The latter is a name which has been mentioned on

a number of occasions in recent bombing threats and other'

forms of violence.

Since January 1, 1957, there have been over 90

• bombings, or attempted bombings, in the United States.

Of these, at least 69 have involved Negro victims and at

least eight, Jewish religious and educational facilities.

In the early bombings there was no evidence to show

that these bombings could be attributable to specific

organizations. Pather, they were individual acts of

terror strictly within the jurisdiction of local authorities.

When these outrages occurred, we in the FBI have made

immediately available to local authorities our laboratory

and fingerprint facilities here in Washington.

As the bombings directed toward religious and....

educational facilities continued, the FBI extended its

cooperation to cover out-of-state leads which local

authorities could not handle. We extended such

assistance to the Jacksonville, Florida, and Birmingham,

Alabama, Police Departments in connection with the

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bombings of a Jcwish center and a Negro high school

in Jacksonville on April 28, 1958, and the attempted

bombing of a Jewish temple in Birmingham on the

same day.

Recently, however, there has been some indication

of a general interstate pattern to these bombings. For

example, one of the men indicted on October 17, 1958,

(Richard Bowling) for the bombing of the Jewish temple

in Atlanta, received from one of his fellow conspirators

two checks amounting to $200. One of these checks

was dated October 4, 1958, the day before the Clinton,

Tennessee, High School bombing, the other, October 9,

1958, three days before the Atlanta temple bombing.

Recognizing the danger to the national welfare from

a general pattern of organized terrorism, the FBI has moved

to expand its assistance to local law enforcement in the

recent bombings at Clinton, Atlanta, and Peoria, Illinois.

We are now providing all-out investigative assistance

in these cases. We are closely checking the activities

of individuals prominently involved in racial disturbances,

such as the notorious John Kasper, the executive

secretary of the Seaboard White Citizens Council of

Washington. As a further aid to local law enforcement

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agencies, the FBI has scheduled a series of special

conferences for November and December, 1958, to

discuss our cooperative services regarding bombings

and threats of bombings against religious and educational

institutions.

Our entry into these cases at this new level is not to

be interpreted as an attempt on our part to usurp the

jurisdiction of local authorities. To give the FBI this .

jurisdiction would relieve local governments of the

basic responsibility to maintain law and order, and

the ultimate responsibility rightfully rests at the local

level."

As specifically stated by Mr. Hoover in his comments to the President

and the Cabinet, he therein delineates that there is an internal domestic aspect

to the intelligence-gathering function of the FBI and this is based on the fact that

he recognizes the danger to the "national welfare" from a general pattern of

terrorism which does, in fact, affect the internal security of the United States.:

By letter of May 17, 1961, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to

the President, requested of the IIC and the ICIS, pursuant to Presidential wishes,

reports covering current and contemplated internal security programs which fall

within the cognizance of their respective committees. The reports were to

include such items as: description of the program and its objectives, the

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datc of initiation, reference to the Directive or other authority pursuant to

which the program was undertaken, highlights of the results achieved and

significant problems encountered, to name but a few.

Pursuant to this request, Mr. Bundy was furnished by letter of

• July 25, 1961, a copy of the IIC status report dated July 25, 1961, wherein

he was advised in part as follows:

"I. IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIALLY

DANGEROUS PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES*

The FBI maintains a current list of individuals, both

citizens and aliens, to be considered for apprehension

and detention, if necessary, in a period of emergency.

Approximately 12,000 individuals are listed at this time.

This list is kept current on a daily basis by the addition

of new individuals whose activities make them potentially

dangerous to the United States, and by the deletion of

individuals who are no longer engaged in subversive

activities. Included on the list of potentially dangerous

individuals are nearly 200 persons who are engaged in

pro-Castro Cuban activities or who sympathize strongly

with such activities. In addition to members of the

Communist Party, it also includes certain members of such

organizations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, the

Nation of Islam, and the Socialist Workers Party."

*Sce Appendix for additional information concerning-Emergency Detention Law

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As indicated in the last sentence, from information furnished to the

President, it is apparent that the problem area being discussed included not only

members of the Communist Party and their apparent capability of action in the

field of sabotage and espionage during an outbreak of war but also such organi-

zations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, Nation of Islam, and the

Socialist Workers Party, organizations whose potential for internal disruption

in time of emergency is the matter in question.

In further illustration of this point, on May 11, 1961, former

Director Hoover submitted a memorandum to top Bureau officials, wherein

he described a presentation to the President concerning the FBI's intensifi-

cation of its coverage of Cubans in this country, both anti-Castro groups

and pro-Castro groups. During an NSC meeting on April 27, 1961, it is

apparent that the thought in the minds of the men discussing this matter

extended not only to the possibility of espionage and sabotage activities of the

pro-Castro groups discussed but the possibility that the anti-Castro groups

discussed might well be involved in activities which would involve terrorism

or violence of a domestic nature.

• As previously noted, in 1962, the supervision of the IIC and the

overall responsibility for the internal security programs of the United States

passed by National Security Actioh Memorandum 161 to the Attorney General.

From that date to the present time, the FBI has reccived on a case-by-case.

basis specific instructions from the Attorney General regarding investigative

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matters pertinent to the delegation of intelligence investigation authority in

numerous areas involving individuals or organizations which advocate violence

or the denial of rights of others.

Let us pause to summarize the position of the FBI at this time in

history.

The Directives cast the FBI in an intelligence-gathering posture

which was recognized by the Governmeat as a body and the American public.

As herein indicated by the previous examples, the FBI gradually came to be

assigned intelligence investigations outside the foreign controlled espionage

and sabotage matters and into an area of intelligence investigations regarding

"other intelligence matters affecting the internal security," to wit; Puerto Rican

nationalists, anti-Castro groups, Nation of Islam, Socialist Workers Party,

"hate groups," and others advocating the violent overthrow of the Government

or who could, on reasonable belief, cause disruption of the "national welfare"

and in time of emergency, be of assistance to foreign powers. These matters

were automically referred to the FBI because we had been cast in the "intelligence

posture" as a direct result.of the Presidential Directives coupled with the fact

that the FBI has statutory investigative jurisdiction of the criminal violations in

the general area of internal security. Our position had become twofold:

(1) intelligence gathering in the arca of internal security and (2) investigation

of criminal statutory violations, both in the internal security area.

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• During the turbulent 1960's, Executive concern for the internal

security and national welfare naturally increased due to campus riots, racial

unrest, militant groups who ambushed police and bombed, the increase of

activity of "hate groups," both "far right and left," and the open advocacy

of entirely domestic groups to overthrow the Constitution and Government of

this Nation. Because of the intelligence criminal investigative posture of the

FBI in the internal security field, the inquiries and orders were naturally

directed to the FBI. We responded because we had come to recognize and operate

within our dual posture of intelligence and criminal investigation.

Can we illustrate how this dual posture was magnified and

expanded since the 1950's and early 1960's? • .

Clear evidence exists that past Presidents and Attorneys General

have assumed the FBI's intelligence-gathering authority.

For example, by memorandum dated April 28, 1965, to Bureau

officials, former FBI Director Hoover recounted a conversation with the laté

President Lyndon B. Johnson, which occurred on that date, during which

Johnson expressed profound concern that his military and foreign policy

with respect to Vietnam was being undermined by anti-war agitation in

the United States, particularly on the college campuses. The memorandum

of former Director Hoover noted that, during their conversation, he informed

the President of FBI information concerning forthcoming demonstrations and

instructed that a memorandum be prepared for President Johnson concerning

the Students For a Democratic Society.

in:

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Further, by letter of September 14, 1967, the Attorney General,

Ramsey Clark, obviously concerned with recent riots of that period, directed

& letter to the FBI, wherein he instructed that the FBI conduct investigation to

determine whether there was an organization which made advance plans for

and was active during any of the riots in the Summer of 1967. He pointed out

that, in view of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country, it is

most important that the FBI use the maximum available resources, investigative

and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question

as to whether there was scheme or conspiracy. He enumerated various criminal

statutes, which he pointed out should be considered if prosecution was a

possibility based on the investigation but clearly recognized the intelligence-

gathering role of the FBI.

:

To further illustrate, reference is made to the Attorney General's

letter to Director, FBI, dated February 18, 1969, wherein he requests broad-

scoped and comprehensive investigation of the Students For a Democratic Society

in relation to the illegal and violent campus disorders of that period. (For

Details, See Appendix.)

It must be recalled that, pursuant to the National Security Action

:

Memorandum 161, the President had assigned to the Attorney General the

responsibility of the internal security in 1962. As illustrated, no more broad

instruction for intelligence investigation could have been phrased. Thesc Ictters

clearly rccognizc the dual function of the FBI in its intelligence-gathering

role and in its criminal investigative role.

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Further evidence of the recognition of the dual role of the Ecderal

Bureau of Investigation is illustrated by reference to the Intelligence Evaluation

Committee (IEC). Based on the President's need to know, Presidential

• representatives, Attorney General representatives, and others, on or about

December 17, 1970, formed this Committee with the purpose of obtaining reports

and information concerning militant terrorist groups operating within the

United States. This was for a dual necessity, its efféct on the internal national

welfare and how such activity might affect the foreign policy and war effort.

This Committee, composed of members of the Executive, pursuant to their

authority under the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances,

a plan for the Executive to meet emergencies, requested through the Attorney

General that reports and intelligence information be furnished to the Committee

for the benefit of the Executive. This is another graphic illustration of how the

Executive has relied on the intelligence function of the FBI.

In summary, the FBI has had authorization and approval of the

President and Attorney General to investigate matters concerning internal security

since the verbal instructions of August, 1936; the Presidential Directive of

June 26, 1939, as augmented by the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939,

down to and including the charters by the NSC and the Attorney General. The

• FBI has conducted these intelligence investigations under the scrutiny of the

Executive Branch as hercin indicated.

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VII. Has Congress Recognized the Dual Intelligence--Criminal Role of the FBI Which

Results From the Directives?

Absolutely. On November

• 30, 1939, some 85 days after the public

Directive of September 6, 1939, former Director Hoover appeared before Congress

as reflected in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1940

testimony wherein he states that in September, 1939, the General Intelligence

Division was organized based on the Presidential proclamation that all complaints

regarding violation of the National defense statutes be referred to the FBI. He

described in his testimony that the function of the Intelligence Division was to

"compile extensive indices of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged

in these subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any activities that are

possibly detrimental to the internal security'of the United States." (Emphasis Added)

Again, in testimony under Justice Department Appropriation Bill

of 1941, former Director Hoover specifically cites verbatim the Presidential

Directive of September 6, 1939, the public Directive not the confidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, and thereafter in narrative describes the general

intelligence activities of the Bureau, the coordination system between the FBI

and military intelligence services, plant protection, and the opening of ten

added offices to handle the volume of work in the intelligence field. Further

testimony was furnished on June 6, 1940, with reference to the Supplemental

National Defense Appropriations Bill of 1941 and such testimony has continued

in subsequent years to the present, each time setting forth the specific areas of

intelligence investigations. This testimony includes, for example in the 1973

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appropriations testimony, information regarding investigations of New Left

terrorism, antiwar

• demonstrations, student agitation, Communist Party, USA,

Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, racial extremism, Black

Panther Party, Student National Coordinating Committee, Junta of Militant

Organizations, extremism in penal institutions, Klan-type organizations, urban

guerrilla warfare, bombing matters, espionage and counterintelligence to

mention only the work done by the Bureau in the intelligence field.

In addition, voluminous intelligence information has been furnished

to investigative committees of the Congress regarding internal security matters

and at no time did Congress, having been advised as above, offer objection by

means of legislation or enactment to the intelligence field of investigation.

VIII. Do the Directives in Any Way Alter the FBI's Jurisdiction as Assigned By Statute

or Other Executive Order?

Nothing herein alters the FBI's basic responsibility assigned by

the Attorney General under Title 18, Section 533, U. S. Code, to investigate

statutory violations which are the mandate of Congress and specific Executive

Orders of the President relative to employee loyalty matters.

IX. What Effect Would Be Realized If the FBI Had Not Had the Directives 'ór

If the Directives Were Revoked?

The effect of the Presidential Directives of August, 1936, and June 26,

and September 6, 1939, is to place the FBI in an affirmative intelligence-gathering

posture. The FBI overtly secks intelligence information in the internal security

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field based on the Directives.

Should they be nonexistent or revoked, the FBI

would be placed in a position of merely investigating violations of statutes. Investi-

gation would commence only at a point where some set of facts would indicate a

"strong suspicion," "reasonable grounds to believe," or "probable cause" that

a violation of law was about to be or had been committed and a person or group of

people committed it, i.e., no overt, offensive search for intelligence information

in the internal security field regardless of lack of specific statutory violation.

In summary, the question should be not one of whether the FBI has

authority to conduct intelligence investigations, this has been herein reflected,

but whether the FBI has acted reasonably under that authority.

Compare, if you will, the FBI Agent who, having lawful probable cause

to search for three large stolen television sets, obtains a search warrant, valid

: on its face, for a residence and thereby enters and conducts a search pursuant

to the warrant. He is lawfully and with authority in the residence but while

there searches a small drawer in a desk, where no television set could possibly

be secreted. Narcotics are found. Are they admissible? No. The search is

"unreasonable" under Fourth Amendment standards as it pertains to the narcotics,

however, this in no way effects the Agent's lawful presence in the residence

under the authority of the warrant.

This is analogous of the situation in which the FBI finds itself today.

The FBI has the authority to be in the intclligence field under the Directives,

however, will be challenged as to the reasonableness of its activities and conduct

in the field.. (Emphasis Added)

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The FBI has over the years limited the boundaries of this authority

on its own with minimal guidance from the Executive and the Attorney General. In

most instances this self-limiting has been more to restriction than liberalism. If

outside challenge is made to the FBI's conduct to date, it should be properly

addressed to the limits and boundaries of our activities, not the authority itself.

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III. APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS

CONCERNING THE DIRECTIVES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY; 1933-1939

B. CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDA: JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

AUGUST 24, 1936

AUGUST 25, 1936

SEPTEMBER 10, 1936

SEPTEMBER 5, 1936, INSTRUCTIONS TO FIELD OFFICES

C. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:

JUNE 26, 1939

SEPTEMBER 6, 1939

JANUARY 8, 1943

JULY 24, 1950

DECEMBER 15, 1953

• OCTOBER 30, 1947

D: THE DELIMITATIONS AGREEMENT OF 2/23/49, AS AMENDED

E. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHARTERS OF THE

INTERDEPAPTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

AND THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON

INTERNAL SECURITY

: F. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 161, JUNE 9, 1962

G. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM, DATED 3/5/64,

• TO FORMER FBI DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER,

SETTING FORTH NEW CHARTER FOR THE INTER-

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE UNDER

THE SUPERVISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

H. THE PREAMBLE AND SECTION 101 OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY ACT OF 1947

I. MEMORANDUM FROM J. PATRICK COYNE, NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ON

INTERNAL SECURITY, DATED 11/6/50, CONCERNING

NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE MEASURES RELATIVE TO

VIOLENCE BY PUERTO RICAN NATIONALISTS

sia

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J. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY

PROGRAM, DATED 3/5/54, PREPARED BY INTER-

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

K. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE INTERNAL

SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES AS OF

JUNE 30, 1958, DATED 8/27/58, PREPARED JOINTLY BY .

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

AND THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON

INTERNAL SECURITY

L. EXCERPT FROM FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER'S BRIEFING

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDED. OVER BY

• THE PRESIDENT, DATED 11/6/58

M. LETTER TO MCGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 7/25/61,

ENCLOSING MEMORANDUM CONCERNING UNITED STATES

INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE,

MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO WHITE HOUSE REQUEST

N. BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EMERGENCY

DETENTION PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

OF 1950 AND THE EFFECT OF THEIR, REPEAL UPON FBI

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE :

INVESTIGATIONS

0. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 5/11/61,

• CONCERNING FBI INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

RELATIVE TO CUBAN INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

P. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 4/28/65,

RELATIVE TO CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING

EFFECT OF ANTI-VIETNAM DEMONSTRATIONS UPON THE CONDUCT

OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY AND

LETTER TO McGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 4/28/65,

ENCLOSING FBI MEMORANDUM TITLED "COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES POLICY ON VIETNAM" DATED 4/28/65

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Q. MEMORANDUM

FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAI

AMSEY CLARK,

DATED 9/14/67, CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

RELATING TO URBAN RIOT ACTIVITY

• R. DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM, DATED 2/18/69, CONTAINING

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTI-

GATION CONCERNING CAMPUS DISORDERS

S. EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY; FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER;

1) EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1940

2) JUSTICE DEPARTNENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

3) FIRST DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILL, 1941

4) SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

5) 1951 APPROPRIATIONS ESTIMATES. FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION

6) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1973

-3-

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 129

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## Page 131

A. HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY

1,933 - 1939

.

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## Page 132

On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler became

Chancellor of Germany•

On March 10, 1935, Hitler rejected the Versailles

Treaty and ordered conscription in Germany.

On March 7, 1936, reoccupation of the demilitarized

Rhineland Zone (a violation of the Locarno Treaty) was

begun by. German troops.

In March, 1937, the German army under Hitler

invaded Austria.

In the "Hunich" conference of September, 1938,

Bavaria, Britain, and France agreed to Hitler's demands

and Czechoslovakia ceded to Germany Sudetenland.

May 7, 1939, Germany and Italy announced a

military alliance.

In August, 1939, a nonaggression pact between

Germany and the U.S.S.R. was signed in Moscow by the

terms of which each of the signatories was bound to refrain

from any act of force against the other and agreed not to

support warlike acts against either by a third pover.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 132

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On September 1, 1939, German forces invaded

Poland. On September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France

declared war on the German Reich.

• On September 8, 1939, the President of the

United States proclaimed a national emergency "to the

extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding

and insuring. the neutrality of the United States and the

strengthening of our national defense within the limits

peacetime authorizations."

tai

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 133*

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B. CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDA:

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

AUGUST 24, 1936

AUGUST 25, 1936

SEPTEMBER 10, 1936

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ÜIRECTOR

Irueral Bureas st Juertgation

Muited Stateo Departmeat of Justier

Mashington, D. C.

August 24, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL MELORANDUM

POOSEYELT

This norning, in accordance with the request of the President

conveyed to me personally by hin last Weanesday in New York City, I called

at the Thite House at 9:15 and was with the President vatil 10:15.

He was desirous of discussing the question of the subversive

activities in the United States, particularly Pascism and Communisia. He

had previously received the nemoranaun which I had prepared covering ay

• conversation viüh General Smedley Butler and the effort of PathariCougalin

to have Goncral Butler head an expedition to Mexico. I incormoù the President

concerning certain recent developments in ina Communist activities in ine

counts], particularly the effosts of the Bridges organization in San Fran-

cisco and their progressive control of the shioping on the Pacific Consù,

the Gulf Coast and weir recent expansion to shiyping operations on te

Atlantic Coast. i told nin that wile their contract vill expire or

September 30, 1936, they are endeavoring io have it temporarily extended

until April 1, 1937, in ordes to conform to the same date that te Uniuçù

Mine Horkers' contract expires, vaich organization is headed by John I.

Lewis. I told hin that the Briages organization as practically controlled

by Connunists and that the Communists had zon deciued io make very deririte

plans to get control of the Lemis organization.

I called his attention to the activities of the lewspaper Guild

headed by Heywood Brown, which has strong Coumunistic leanings, and which

has been responsible for putting out of operation the Seatule Posi Intoi-

ligencer. I told him that my information vas that the Communists hau plarca

to geù control of thesa thrao groups and by doing so they vouid be able at

any tine to paralyze the country. in that they could stoo all shipping in

and out through the Bridges organization; siop the operation of industry

through the Mining Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any newspapers

of the country through the Newspaper Guila.

I also rolated to him the activities which have recently oc-

curred within Govcranental service inspired by Communists, particularly

in some of the Departments and in the National Labor Relations Board.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 136 •

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## Page 137

CONFIDENTIAL MCHORANDUM

- 2 -

-8-24-36

I likewise infornod him that I had received information to the

effect that the Cornunist Internationale in Mascow has recently issued in-

structions for all Communisis in the United States to vota for Presidcri

Roosevelt for reelection and against Goveror Landon because of to fact

that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare:

The Presidont siated that he had been considerably concerned

about the movements of the Coummists and of Fascism in tie Vizited Statos

and that thile the Secret Servico of the Ireasury Department had assured

him that they had incornants in every Comunisi group, he believed that

If thai was true it was solely for the surpose i feiting any irforuation

upon plois upon his life, hercas wat he ras intarested in was obtrining

a broad pictura of tre genaral movemezt and its activities as may affect ine

economic and political life of the country as a raole. I tola hia thot there

is at ine present time no governmental organization nich is getting any

so-called "general intelligence information" upon this subject. He inquired

what suggestions I night offer relative to this matter.

I cold him thei

the appropriation of the Fedoral Bureau of Investigation contuins a provi-

sion thai it night investigate ay matters referred to it by the departient

of Staüe and that if the State Depariment shouia ask for us to conduct such

an investigation ne could do so under our present authority in the appro

priation already granied.

He stated that he is reluctant to have i forma?

request cose through the Siate Department because of the many leaks thorain, !

bụt that what he would do rould be to puù a handmitten memorandu on his

on in kis safe in the hite House, stating he had instructed the Sacretér..

of State to roost this inforzation to be obtained by the Department of

Justice.

He stated he mould have the Secretary of State at the lihite House

tomorro: afternoon, and asked me to call at the thie House at 1:45 p.n.

to see him, the President, and the Sacretam. of State, at thica time the

matter could be further discussed and an oral request could be made of e

by the Secretary of State for investigation so as to avoid any possivility

of any leak.

He suggested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation

along similar lines wnich might be made by the Military or Naval Intelligenco

Services. He stated that the Secret Service was not being brought in on this

investigation as they should contine themselves strictly to the matier of

protecting his life and the survey nich he desired to have made was on a

much broader field.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 137

John Lagar Hoovor.

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## Page 138

Join duGA

DIRECTOR

ederal Churrar of Inurniguton

Muten Stutes Departurit if Smtics

Mashingtan, 11. C.

August 25, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL MENORANDUM

Today, in line with the sequest of the President, I called at the

White House at 1:45 p.n., and present aù the Conierence were he ®Ґ©sIGnũ,

the secretary of State and mysel?..

The President related to the Secretary of

State his concern relative to Comunist activities in this courtry, as weil as

*Fascist activities. He stated that he was very desizous of havirg a survey

made of these conditions and informed the Secretary of State thai this surrey

could be made by tae Depurtment of Justice in the Secretary of Suate iccuestea

the Department to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation Act Sis

Bureau would have authority to make such investigation il ashea to do so by

the Secietory o1 State.

The President pointed oui thai down of these wove-

menis were international in scope and that Communisn particularly was directed

from Moscow, and that there had been certain indications that. Oumasay, at-

tachea to the Russian Soviet Babassy, nas a leading figwe in some on the

activities in this country, so conseguontly, it was a matier raich fell withi

the scope of foreiga affairs over

maica the State Department woula nava a rigi

to request an inquiry to be made.

The Secratary of State inquired if a request should be mide is

triting.

The fresident indicated that it shoula not be since he desired the

matter to be hardlea quite confidentially and that it would be sufficient thai

the President, the Secretary of State and I should be the orés avare di tris

request.

The Secretary of State asked that the investigation be nade and tien

made several suggestions - one, relative to the making of a protesi, citier

formally or informally, to the

with affairs in this country. Discussion was also nad as to the lilioricuici

obtained indicating that the Thira Internationale had indicated preierence or

Roosevelt as against Landon. It was the opinion of the President thät some

statenent shoula be made along this linc by the Attorney General at an early

date.

The President asked that I speak to the Attorney General, upon his re-

turn to the city, about this matter, and he suggested to the Sacretary oi

State that he talk over the technique to be followea in this particular aspect,

with the Attoney Veneral.

John Edgar Hoovor.

NW 34969 Docld:32989720 Page 138

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## Page 139

220:03

September 10, 1953.

Strictle Concede tiel

LOOKERS: 22 CA

In talking iith be attorney General

today

concernit, the redical situutios,

i incorred

hin of the concorence rhich I had mith une

PIcsi-

donü on Copiumbor 1, 1065, at inica tins

the

Sucretary of Siato Doorprosono, and at mich

tina the Secestary of Slato, at the Prodiductre

suctacude, roguonica où so, the roprosecravivo

of tie Dopazenone of Juctice, to have aprostic--

tion mado of ths crovoroire actirities in this

vianenioneà this roleet to die dstorcy Coneral:

: and the atioancy Corrul varually discotod do to.

i proeced nich undo invocigation and to cossdinates

as the Precidono summested, infosastion 250a

Intelli enos Clusion, Georrural Intellicence, Davi-

sion,

the diade Exportment.

This,

is tauthori. upda which to proceed in the

course, be candled in a most discreet ard con~

fidontial sucher.

Very traly jours,

grom +00887100.0-00

Father......

John Eagar Hoover,

Director.

al portion of indo this

serial declassified is

list in "The FBi Story"

Whitehead. Seo

66-152222 road sto

51-95-694-44423

DEP 15 1903

".:.

NW 54969 Docid:32989720 Page 139

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LETTER OF FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER

TO FIELD OFFICES, SEPTEMBER 5, 1936

Dear Sir: The Bureau desires to obtain from all possible

sources information concerning subversive activities being

conducted in the United States by Communists, Fascisti and

representatives or advocates of other organizations or

groups advocating the overthrow:or replacement of the

Government of the United States by illegal methods. No

the Bureau,

but you should forward to the Bureau information obtained

from all sources, and in those cases in which investigation

is desired the Bureau will issue appropriate instructions

to you.

It is desired, accordingly, that you immediately

transmit to the Bureau

any information relating to subversive

activities on the part of any individual or organization,

regardless of the source from which this information is

received. It is desired that you give this letter your

close persohal attention and arrange through the agents

attached to your office to furnish to the Bureau data or

information of the type outlined above.

Very truly yours!

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, Director

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 140

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 141

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## Page 142

C. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:

JUNE 26, 1939

SEPTEMBER 6, 1939

• JANUARY 8, 1943

JULY 24, 1950

DECEMBER 15, 1953

OCTOBER 30, 1947

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 142

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DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNS. 26, 1939

"It is my resiro thai the investigation of all copionage,

countcrespionage, and sahotage matiers be controlled and handied

by the federal. Burcau of Investigation on the Departent of justice,

tho Mituy Intolligence Division of the war noparinent, and the

0$53.00 nû Naval Juichligence of the Mary Departeont

Tho dirocters

of these three agencion are to junciion as a comitice to coordinate

their accivities.

"No investigations should be conducied ly any duvestigatire

agency of the Governuent into maiters involring actually or

potentlully any espionage, countercepionage, or sabotage, excert

"I sbai3 be alad il you will instruct the heads of nas

other

investigativo agencies than the three named, to teter

immediatly do the nearcst office of the Fedoral Bureau of lvestra

Ton try dats, inconcion, or unictei that ney come to their

notice lening directly or indirecily on espionage, counterespsenage,

at sabotege."

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 143

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## Page 144

DENLSCTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 6; 1939

"The Attorney General lns been requested by me to instrues

the lcdcral Bureau co Invostigation. Of the Department of juctive

to tale charge of investigailue vork In mattors rclating to espi. ie

saboiage, and violations or the neutrallty rculations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprchonsive and

• BIrcutIve manncr on a nailonal basis, and all information must be

carciully sarica out and correlated in ordco to avora contusion unn

"To this enủ i request all bolice officers, sheritis, eid

all oricr lar eniorcement officers in che unoted scares preroty to

turn over to the nearest representative of the federal. Suresu or

Investigation any ¿niornation obiained by then relating to 0571022gc,

counterespionage, sabotage, subversive

activities sud violations os

the noutrality lars."

NIL 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 144

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• RETORT SECURITY MATTERS TO

"On Septemuer 6, 1939, I issued a di

rective providing that the Federal Bureau of

investigation

of the Deparimori

of Justice

should icie charge of investigaiive work in

matters relaiing io espionage, saborage

and

violations

the neutrality regulaiions.

poinzing out

that the investigations nusi

be

conducted in a comprehensive mannci, ou

national basis, and all iniormaiion

carefully

sifted

out

and correlated

i•n

order io avoid

confusion and irresponsibility.

I then

requested all police officers, sheriifs,

and

other law eniorcement oificers in the United

states, prompily to turn over to the nearest

representative of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation any such: information.

"I am again calling the attention of all

enforcement oificers to the reguesi

that they

report all such iniormaiion prompily io the

nearest field

representaïive

of the rederal

Bureau of Investigaiion, which is

charged

with

the responsibility of coreliiing

ihis.

material

and

relerring matters which

are

under ihe jurisdiction

other rederal.

agency with

responsibilivies in this field

to the appropriale agency.

"I suggesi

thai all patriotic siganiza-

iions and individuals

likewise

ICpOrt all

such

information

relating to espionage and

related maiters

10 the Federal Bureau oi

Investigation

in ine same manner.

"I an confident that all lan eniorcement

officers, ho are now rendering such invalu-

able assistance toward the success oí the

internal saleiy of

in this

matier. " our country will cooperate

January 8, 1943

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 145

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WINITE HOUSE

i WASHINGTON

July 21i, 1950

•

SABOTA

JRFORUNGICN RETATRIC TO DOLESTIC ESPTONAGS

w!.,

ACTIVITES

Aro T91

ARS

On Sopterber 6, 1839 and January 8, 1913 a Presi-

dential Diraculve ins issued providing that tno juderal Eureau

of Invostigalion of the Dorzrtent of justice srould take

charge of investigative nock in rauters relating to espionage,

sabotage, subversiva actavvies and related taters.

It tas

politaù out that the investigations must ha conducted in a

•corchensive canner on a Mational basis and 2ll. Inforration

arefully sifted cui and correlated in order to avoid confusion.

I should lino to again call the attontio: of did aniorcemont

Oilicon's, both Faderai. and Sits, to the roguest that they 2o-

port all infornation in the above chuzerated fields prostly

to the nacrest Ficld Representatara of the Podoral Direal: of .

Invastigation, which 15 dianged with tie responsibility of

correinting this material and rescarine mucer mich are mider

tho jurisdiction of any other Federal gener it responsibili.

I suggest that all patronic organinations and

andividuals thorise raport all such incoration rolating to

espionago, sabotage and subvarsira acturities to the Fodoral

Bureau of invesuigation In this same rannior.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 146

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-...

.......

DIRECHIVE OF TID PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 15, 1953

"on Septeber 6, 1939, Janunty 8, 1912, and July 24,

1950, Presidential Directives were Issued requesting ali

enfo.co

ment officers,

both Ecceral and State, to report promptly ell

Intornation relating to espionage,

sabotage, subversive activitios

and clated matters to the nearest field representative of the

rederal. Buieau of Investigntion.

"The Federai Bureau of investigation 15 charged vlüh

•Investigating all v0l0td0ns of che dioniC mercy Aci, IncludinG

the illegal

possession of transportation of dissionate material and the

11lecal production,

weapon. 'Fissionable matarials

means plutoniun, uranzur.13s or

other material which the Atonic Enermy Commission his determinod

to be capable of reicasing substantini curntities of encey tough

nuclear chain reaciion.

I am requesting thai dil choreomens.

vIlIcers boti federal and State, enori all Informution delating

to violations of the Atonic Enercy not to the nearest tield ispie

sentativa of the Federal Bureau of Invesilgation.

"I suggesi thai all patriotic orgenizations and individuals

Inrewise report all cuch iniormation to the Lederal Burcau os

II restigation in the same nauner."

NW 54963 Docld:32989720 • Page 147

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## Page 148

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 148

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## Page 149

COrY

i.

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 149

Cage 196A

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## Page 150

3873012047

NW 54960

Docld:32989720 Page 150

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## Page 151

D. THE DELINITATIONS AGREENENT OF 2/23/49,

AS AMENDED

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 151

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## Page 152

Delimitation: Agreen

The followind agreement

was approved and signed on 2-23-49 by the

Directors of the Fodoral bureau of Investigation; Intelligence Division

at the Army; Oifice of Special Investigations,

Air Force; and the

Chief of Naval Intelligence:

"Subject:

Delimitation of Investigative Duties

of the Federal

Burcau of Investigation,

the Office o1 Naval Intell-

the Intelliganca Division of the Army, and

the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector

General. U.

S. Air FOrCe.

¡or coordination oi the federal Bureau

of Investigation, Office of laval Intelligence, In-

telligence Division of the Army, and the Office of

Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air

"I.

The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the Presi-

dent's Memoranaum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of

September E, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and•

che f'residertial Directive o1 October 30, 1947.

In addition, cognizance

has been tâhen of the provisions of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1946, and

•the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof.

A11

other provisions

this Agreement:are apart from and have no relation

to the stated requirements of the Atomic. Energy Act.. In view oi the

above, it is now

agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all

aotivities

coming

under the

subversion and

sabotage (hereinafter reierred to as

categories of espiorage,, these categories';

counterespionage,

mill be delinited as indicated hereinaiter.

The responsibility assumed

by one organisation in a given siela

carries with

it the obligation to

exchange freely and directiy with the other subscribing organizatiors

a11 information of mutnal

interest.

When the organization with grinary

operating responsibility is unable

for any reason to produce material

in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrange-

ments as may be legal or desirable will be vorked

out through negotia-

tion'at

the national level prior to activity by one agency in another

agency's field.

It is recognized by the subscribers bereto that the

Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such unctions

to its

major subordinate co:manders.

"hen the major subordinate com-

manders of

the Department of the Army cannot effect satisiactory

special arrangements,

the natter will be referred to the Director oi

• Intelligence of the Army for surther negotiations at the national level.

Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organiza-

tions is a mutually recognized necessity.

NW 54969-Docld:32989720-Page-152

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## Page 153

"II. FBI will be responsible for:

"I. All investigations of cases in thesd categories involving

oivilians

and forcign nationals of all classes

in the continental

United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Ithe State of

Hawaii, land

hereinafter in Paragrapa Ve Section 5. .,

the state of Alaska except as specifically described

=2.

All investigations

of violations of the Atomic. Energy Act of

1940.

There are no territorial or personnel linitations on this

provision.

The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian

agencies in the United States, Fuerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,

and the State of Alasia except as specifically described bereinafter

1n Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding

subversive movements and activities in these categories.

*4.

Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important

developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

Activities of inactive reserves of

the armed sertice,

including the National Guard.

"3. Developments affecting plants engaged. in armed forces

contracts.

Developments concerning the strength, composition, and

intentions of civilian groups within its

cognizance which

are classed as subversive and whose activities

are a po-

tential danger

to the security of the United States.

•*do

Developments affecting those rital facilities and ritai

utilities which have been designated by the secretary of

Defense.

ee. Developments affecting critical points of transpontai

tiod and communications systens which have been designated

• by the Secretary of Defense.

"(Por b, a, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

"III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

Ibe inrestigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

involving active and

retired military personnel of the Army.

=2.

The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these

categories involring civilian employees

of the army in the United

States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

*3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

Involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas

other

than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands,

"•Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of

Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

["••Revision

to reflect the statehood of Hawaii vas approved by the

IIC on September 9, 1959.}

MR 34088-To 37989728 Page-157

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## Page 154

excert that pai

such incitigations as

h.?

In the United

States, ruerto

rico, or vig virgin

ramifications

Islands.

"4.

The intestigation of all cases in these categories involving

oivilians and foreign nationals who are not

employees of the

other

subscribing organizations, in areas

where the Army Commander has

supIome jurisdiction over

the armed forces stationed thercin,

including possessions of the United States other than Puerto

Rico

and the Virgin Islands.

"5.

Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important

developments.

"б.

Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity andl

location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

"IV. ONI will be responsible for:

*1. The investigation.and disposal of all cases in these

categories

Involving active and retired saval personnel of

the Navy..

"2.

The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these

categories.involving civilian employees of the Nary in the United

•States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. •

=3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

Involving civilian enployees of the vary stationed in areas other.

than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands,

except that part of such investigations as bare ramifications

in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

"40

The investigation of all cases in these categories involting

civilians and foreign

nationals nao

are not employees of the other

subscribing organizations, in areas

where the Navy Commander has

supreme jurisdiction over

the armed lorces stationed therein,

including possessions of the ünited

States

other than Puerto

Rico

and the Virgin Islands, andlinlthe State of Alaska except as

described

in Section 5, below.

"5.

The

Investigation of all

cases in these categories involting

oivilians and foreign sationals mao are not employees of tre

other subscribirg organizations and with the exception of civilian

employees of the Executive. Branch of the lovermment on jodias and

Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adar Island

in the aleutian Chain.*

=6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important

dovelopments.

arising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and

location of the

plants engaged in Nary contracts.

::

["*This paragraph added.

See IIC Working Conmittee Minutes

September 15, 1954, and June ô, 1955.]

of

Ww 54969-Docld:32989720-Page-154

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*v.

The Office of

cial Investigations, Inspect

leneral,. U.s.

dir Force will be

ponsible for:

*1.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these catejories

Involving active and retired military personnel of the Alr force.

•*2.

The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in thesc

categories involving cirilian employees of the Air Force in the

United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

"3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

involving

than

civilian exployees of the Air force stationed in areas other

the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Isiands, except

that part of such investigations as

United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

21332201

"4.

The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign

nationals who are not employees of the other

subscribing organizations, in areas where the air Force Commander

has supreme jurisciction over the armed forces stationed therei.,

including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islanis.

The investigation of the same cases

described above in that portion of Alaska described in

Section 5;

below, with the exceptien of civilian employees of

Branch of the jovernment.

the Executive

*5.

The investigation of all cases in these

categories involving

oivilians,

except as described bereinabore,

(1) in that part of the

Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn fron Iliamna

Bay northwest to the town oi Olá Ilianna

and thence following the

south shore of bake

Iliaona to the Kvichak kiver to the ivicrai

Bay; (2) in the islanás adjacent to the diasta Peninsula excluding

Kodiak and dogaan Icizzas

which are the responsibility of ibe

Office of Maval Intelligence; (3)

in the Aleutian Islands exciading

:'Adak Islanà waici

•Intelligences and (a) In the Pribilos, Islaada."

ize respoasibilivy oi tie Office of Naval

"6.

Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important

developments.

27.

advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the piants ergaged in dir Force contracts.

"VI. l. Where sections III, IV, and V involve general

territorial

coverage, responsibility ior such coverage will pass iron one

element of the armed

forces

to another automatically when a change

of command responsibility ensues.

This provision is subject to

•modification by direct agreement

between the interested elements

of the armed forces.

"2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in

lormer enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been

provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are

subject to direct adjus-ment with the Department of State if and

when that Departneat

("*Original paragraph changed.

See IIC Working Committee Minutes of

September 15, 1954, and june

9, 1955.1

ww g4969-Doeld:32989720-Page-166

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## Page 156

assumes goverrmental direction in such areas of occupation.

"VII. From time to time it nay be desirablo in the light of changing

conditions to bodily or amend this Dolinitations igrcement.. Subject to

the excaptions already provided fcr above, general amendmonts or modi-

_fications involving all of the lour subscribing organizations shall be

Issued in the lom o1 a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as sep

• arate instructions.

#VIII. During periods of martial lan, or periods of predominant armed

forces. interest not invoiving martial lair, when agreed upon by the sub

scribing agancies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached,

Fall additionally apply.

"IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to tro or more

of the subscribing agencios to the Delinitations Agreement which affect

the basic jurisdiction thereof wnich are now or hereafter mutually entered

Into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; mill

thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations agreement, and dis-

tributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

RAPPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL IAT

"I. It is further agreed that then 'a state of nartial lam has been de-

clared by the fresident, the arred forces commander will assume respon-

sibilities for coverage

in these categories. His authority to direct

and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces mill be limited

only. by such instructions as he nay receive frot the secretary of Defense.

Re till have authority to coordinate the intelligence activitias of the

subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, mithin the limits or

their available persornel and iacilities, by the assignment of missions,

the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control

as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration

or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility,

nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes

stated above.

•RII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility

of the armed forces commander will still send reports. to and be under tre

continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render

such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated

ropresentatives as are possible and practicable. They will lurish all

pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary

and mothods possible consistent mith requisite security. Each head-

cies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been

furnished to the armed forces commander.

NW 54969. Dốcld:32989720• Page 156

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*APPENDIX B

FERIODS OF PREDOLIWANT MILITARY

INTERESTS, NOI INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

MI. In time of war certain areas will come intó prominence as potential

theaters of operation. Then an armed forces commander of such a potential

theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of,

i am army

the civilian life within the area.

In order that the armed forces counander

may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility mich

may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon?

"I. Agents.of the FBI; of CNI; ID, Army; and the USI, IG, U.S. AIr

Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections

II, I1l, IV, and Vo

12. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps

to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which con-

plete coverage will be obtained if artial law is declared. Adequate liaison

with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander

will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the repre-

sentatives of the other agencies.

M3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive

such information from the other thres agencies as he may desire and they may

be able to furnish.

"II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage

furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each

• subscribing agency can undertake. Then the commander feels thai more complete

coverage is required, Iù is recognized that he is authorized to augment the

of the subscribing agencies as are under his

gorara lot such ee ta inrasion of the sheres normally coning under

the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander

should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

"III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have

placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces conmander, wherever

any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of

coverage should be undertaken, it should be so reconmended."

(1) Instructions

The major differences between the foregoing Delimitations Agreement •

and previous versions are as foilors:

The Director, OSI; USAF, is a party thereto.

The Bureau has jurisdiction over all civilians insofar as espionage,

counterespionage, subversion and sabotage are concerned, regardless of em-

ployment.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 157

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20

' did to cal and come a

-.

500.......

Supplemental dircements

to the Delimitations Afrcencut

On 6-2-49, firo vi

mchil agreements to cho De

-itation Agreement

were approved by

cmucrs

of the Interdepartme.

Intelligence

COn-

Ierence, and they are

set out below.

Instructions

where necessary, con-

oerning each of the supplements will be found at the end of that supple

ment:

a. Supplemental Agreement No. [I]to the Delimitations Agreement:

"COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESCIGATION

THE INTELLIGE CS DIVISION OF THE ARMY

THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGBNCE AND

THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECIOR GRIERAL, U. S. AIR FORCE

"The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

the Director of Naval Intelligence

and the Director of

the Office of Special Investigations, lnspector

General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting

the closest

possible cooperation and

mitted to their field installations:

"(a) Special Agests in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent

Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations,

Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, and Naval

Officers will maintain close persosal liaison between those offices

and their representatives, including

a meeting of representatives

the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice

per month, ior the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated

Investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure

that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

*(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between represent-

atives of the iour agencies at ail times should insure that there is

no duplication o1 efiort in any field, and that a proper coverage of

the whole investigative field is naintained.

Particular attention

should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use

of inforners.

"(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative

Interest of individual agencies

the coverage interest.

It is

believed that all four agercies should study, from tine to time, the

coverage of the investigatire field in order

to insure that all

channels of interest and

avenues of information are adequately

• covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

"(a) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other

agencies is interested is information collected, it should be trans-

mitted to the other agency.

"(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes

of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and

NIN 54969_Docld:32989720 Page 158

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## Page 159

Air Force intellirance services in connection with.

background and

knowledge of ispi

mid jabotage organization

ica though the

"military, ilaval, anu

dir Force intolligencelservi

may have no

apparent

direct

investigative interest.

"(1) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the

directors of the four intelligence agencies

feel that with proper

personal liaison, such differences

can be satisfactorily.adjusted

locally by the orficials in charge of the various divisional organi-

zations."

(1)

Instructions

This supplement recommends meetings at least twice monthly of

the interested agencies.

Where desirable or necessary, these

meetings. may be heli more often than twice per month and in

certain areas, because of the travel distances

involred or other

factors, meetings are being held once per month by special

agreement.

It is not necessary that the Bureau be advised oi

the business discussed at these meetirgs, unless there is a

particular matter of which the Bureau should be cognizant.

the

Bureau should be promptly informed.

of any change in the schedul-

ing of these meetings or of any agreement to commence or dis

continue meetings in a field office area.

be supplemental Agreement No. 11 to the Delimitations Agreement: Rescinded.

c. Supplemental Agreement No. III to the Delimitations Agreement:

"INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION ON VESSELS

•OF MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

=1.

categories of

The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the

espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage

on vessels of the Military Sea Iransportation Service is as follows:

"z.

Intestigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the

Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelli

gence.

"b.

Vessels obtained by the Nary through a 'bare boat. charter'

will be under the

investigative jurisdiction of the Office of

Naval Intelligence.

•Ci Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service

which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under

the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

:s=s.

.7om

NW. 54969_Docld:32989720-Page 159

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## Page 160

. Rate

When personnel who are subjects of an investiration under a or b

abore reach a l

.

port or 1 port where the fUT bas a field aferas,

or prior to re:

¿ such. port, if practicable

he Department oi the

Navy will prompt

jurnish the FBI all pertiner

information concerniny

the investigation.

persounel who are subjects of an investigation

as above remove themselves from the vessor upon arrival o1 the vessel

In port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy vill

continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the

FBI has takes over jull responsibility for the case.

However, both

the

Navy and FBI will make

every effort to transfer responsibility upon

arrival of the vessel at the port.

When the FBI opens

an investigation under c above or when an FBI

investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop

ramifications under ?, b,

or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish

all pertinent infornation to the wavy and will thereaiter coordinate

its actions with the vary whenever and wnerever deemed necessary to

Insure proper pursuit of

the case."

¿. Supplemental Agreement No. [IVlto the Delimitations Agreement:

"INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE CONTRACIORS OF THE ARMED FORCES

"It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement

(hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference

•investigatións of civilian employees, applicants

employment

directors and key personnel of prifately owned plants and

facilities,

working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy, or Air

force (hereinafter referred

to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the

following will be followed insofar as practicable.

Exceptions

will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such

persons unless there is

particular reason for requesting that an

investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has

a special interest

in a particular case

and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

"(b) The FBI will conduct complaint investigation of such personnel

upon specific request in each case by one or

more of the Armed

If one of the Armed forces has no further need for an investigation

requested, "but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the

"(o) Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under (a) above

will be terminated and all iniormation passed to the FBI when credible

derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered.

Upon receipt

the FBI will proceed as under (b) above if one of the.

Armed Forces so requests.

When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting

investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected •

with a person or firn it contemplates investigating, so investigation

will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an

investigation in progress.

The investigation agency will make available

to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investiga-

tion made.

Normally, identity of confidential intormants will not be com-

municated from

one subscriber to another; however, when such communica-

tion occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible

safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised.

transmittal of information concerning cofidential informants

subscriber or to another ajency is authorized except by specific con-

sent of the orijinator.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720; Page 160 -

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nIf) A subscrib

--another subscribe:

& third subscribe

who receives a report of inv

ay freely transmit

copies of

xcept as provided in a) abo

ination from

33 Ch

reports to

"(E) 1 report of completed investigation received by the Armed forces

from the FBI will not be reopened without

the approval of the FBI

except to obtain aiditional background information.

In such case, the

FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other

Intormation required by the arned forces will be requested of the fBI.

If one of the Armed forces requests the fBI to conduct an

investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under

above, and if for any reason

the FBI declines or is unable to

conduct such investigation or adiitional investigation, the Arned

Force concerned may proceed with the investigation.

The FBI will

be furnished

copies of the results

FBI so requests

If the armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI

Interest.

*(1) Nothing above is to be construed as alteriny the basio Delimita-

tions Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive

organizations."

Supplemental Agreement No. LVlto the

Delimitations Agreement:

*INVESTIGATION OF RESERVE AND CIVILIAN

COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED SERVICES

*It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that

the Army, the Nary and the Air force nay conduct background investiga-

members of the inactive reserve and National Guard woo arc

tion is undertaken for the purpose of ietermining whether the indi-

• Tidual should be disenrolled irom his military status, or to deternise

rhether the individual may be granted access to classified military

information.

The following procedures shall be pursued in each of

the above circumstances:

"(1) The intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before

undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to

determine:

(a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so,.

no investigation will be undertaken

by the intelligence agencies

except as may be mutually agreeable

to the Armed Force concerned and

the FBI; (b) il tbe FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the

results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) is the

bas infornation on the individual even though it may not have con-

ducted an investigation.

"(2) Il, after consulting the fBI, investigation is undertaken by

the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary

to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all

information developed pertinent to the four categories will be fur-

nished promptly to the FBI."

This supplement has been discussed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence

Conference, and it was agreed on 9-10-58 that the "consultation"

requirement will be satisfied if the FBI is notified, by means of a

statement included in a forn request for a name check, that investiga

tion is being initiated concerning the individual.

NW 54969-DoG|d:32989720-Page 161

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well, !!.

If. Supplemental de

ament No. VI to the Delimitat' is Agreement:

VESTIGATION IN AREAS NOT

SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED

"It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations

Agreement that the relerences therein in paragraphs III. 4.,

IV. 4i, and V. 4. to

'areas where the Army (Nary, Air Force) Commander

has supreme jurisdistion over the armed forces stationed therein'

shall be interpreted

as reierring to areas where the Department of

the Army (Mary, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and

logistic

support of

the Readquarters of Commands established by the

secretary of Defense."

(Approred by IIC Norember 4, 1959.) 1

-N 54969_Docld:32989720. Page 162

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IW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 163

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E. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHARTERS OF THE

INTERDEPARIMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

AND THE

INTERDEPARTNENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 164

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## Page 165

CORNDEnTAL

NSC:

COPY NO-

A REPORT

TO THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

::.!

WASHINGTON

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 165

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## Page 166

WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-

TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF

THE ESPIUNAGE ACT. 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS IRANS-

MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO

AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NW 54969' Docld:32989720 Page 166

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NSC 17/5

June 15, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INTERNAL SECURITY

Reference: NSC 1774

Pursuant to paragraph 7 of NSC 17/4, the en-

closed draft charters for the Interdepartmental Intelli-

gence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee

on Internal security (ICIS), preparea and unanimously

approved by the membors of the respective Committees with

the advice and assistance of the National Security Council

Representative on Internal security, are submitted here-

with for consideration and approval by the National Securi-

ty Council.

SIDNEY. W. SOUERS

Executive Secretary

Distribution:

The President.

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

The Secretary of the Army

The Secrotary of the Navy

The Socretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, National Security

Resources Board

NW 5456C Dbdld2989720 Page 167

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

CHARTER OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National

security Act and NSC 17/4 as approved by the President, the National

security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the Interdepart-

mental Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of all

Investigation of domestic esplonage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting

internal security. The IIC shall be guided by the terms of this

charter.

A. ORGANIZATION.

• (1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference shall

be constituted as set forth in the Presidential Directive of June 26,

. 1939, that 1s, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

the Director of the Intelligence DivisiOn of the Army, the Director

of Naval Intelligence, and In addition, the Director, Office of

Special Investigations, U.S. Alr Force, which office has been

•created since the issuance of the original Presidential Directive

(2) The chairman shall be elected annually by a majority

vote of the IIC from Its membership. A permanent secretary shall

also be selected by the IIC and he shall be responsible for main-

taining the necessary records. Such additional secretariat as may

be necessary and desirable shall be provided as needed.

(3) The IIC, through its chalrman, shall invite non-

momber agency representatives as ad hoc members of the IIC when

matters involving the responsibilities of such non-members are under

NSC 17/5

LNW 54969_Docld:32989720 Page 168

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 169

CONFIDEITIAL

" .

consideration.

• (4) A representative designatod by tho NSC and under the

direction of the Executive

Secretary of the NSC shall participate

as an observer and adviser In all meetings of the IIC. This NSC

representative shall have no power of instruction, direction, or

supervision over operations of the IIC. The reports of the National

Security Council representative referred to In paragraph 6 of NSC

17/4 shall be made avallable to the IIC for observation and comment

within a reasonable period of time prior to submission to the

National Security Council.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

(1) The IIC shall take the necessary action to insure

that there 1s no duplication of effort by governmental departments

and agencies In those matters under Its jurisdiction.

(2) The IIC shall make appropriate

studles and take

action to Insure that complete Investigative coverage is maintained

by appropriate departments and agencies in matters described herein.

(3). The IIC shall endeavor to resolve conflicts of

jurisdiction In the investigative fields named herein and determine

by what agency or department necessary investigations can be handled

most logically and efficiently.

(4) The IIC shall study and make recommendations with

reference to legislation and executive orders needed to achieve the

objectives si; forth herein.

(5) The IIC shall promote appropriate exchange and co-

ordination of infornation among the varlous agencies and departments

of the government.

• NSC 17/5

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 169

=2 .

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTI.!I

(6) The IIC shall Incorporate under it or absorb the

functions of existing Interdepartmental committees which are operat-

Ing in 1ts fleld of responsibility

(7) The IIC shall perform such other functions as may

be necessary or as may be assigned to 1t by the National Security

Council or other

appropriate authority falling within its field of

coordination of activities relating to domestic espionage, counter-

espionage, sabotage, subversion, and intelligence matters affecting

internal security.

(8) The IIC, In 1ts field, shall make the necessary plans

and preparation for edequate internal security in the event of a

•war-related emergency.

C.

PROCEDURE

(1) The IIC shall establish such ad hoc and working

committees as may be desirable and necessary for the purpose of

discharging Its responsibilities.

(2) The IIC shall inttiate and coordinate necessary,.

studies, projects, and surveys relating to its responsibilities.

It shall request, receive, and correlate suggestions or actual

studies, projects, and surveys from non-member agencies in the

field of responsibility assigned to the IIc.

(3) The IIC shall maintain coordination with the Inter-

departmental Committee on Internal Security through the chairman of

the IIC and the representative of NSC. Whenever appropriate, the

IIC will hold joint meetings or establish joint sub-committees with

the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

NSC 17/5

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 170

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

(4) The fIC shall submit to the NSC those problems which

require consideration or sction by the NSC and thoso problems which

cannot be resolved and worked out through cooperative consideration

and action.

Nothing herein shall be construed as modifying of

affecting the Presidential Directives Issued to the members of the

IIC relating to their individual responsibilities and duties. The

Delimitations Agreement among the members of the IIC relating to

the Investigative resonsibilities and duties of the Individual

members and other agreements among these members relating to the

same matters shall remain in full force and effect and shall con-

tinue to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the discretion

of the IIC.

...

NSC 17/5

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 171

CONFIDENTIAL

-4 =

- ..

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

CHARTER OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National

security Act and NSC 17/4, as approved by the President, the Nation-

al Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the Inter-

departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) effect the co-

ordination of all phases of the Internal security field except as

pertains to the following functions which are assigned to the Inter-

departmental Intelligence Conference (IIC): The coordination of

the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage,

sabotage, subversion, and other related Intelligence matters ar-

fecting internal security. The ICIS shall be guided by the terms

of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The ICIS shall be composed of representatives from the

Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice and. the National Mili-

tary Establishment.

(2) The Chairman shall be elected annually by a majority vote

of the ICIS. A permanent secretary shall also be selected by the.

ICIS and he shall be responsible for maintaining the necessary

records. Such additional secretariat as may be necessary and de-

sirable shall be provided as needed.

(3) The ICIS, through its Chairman, shall invite non-member

agency representatives as ad hoc members of the ICIS when matters

Involving the responsibillties of such non-members are under con-

sideration.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

(4) A representative designated bysthe National Security

Council and under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council shall participate as an observer and ad-

viser in all meetings of the ICIS in accordance with paragraph 6 of

NSC 17/4. The reports of the National Security Council represents-

tive referred to In paragraph 6 of NSC 17/4 shall be made available

to the ICIS for consideration and comment within a reasonable perica

of time prior to submission to the National Security Council.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) The ICIS shall make appropriate

studies and take necessary

• action to Insure that complete coverage is maintained by the appro-

priate departments and agencies in all matters in the flald of

Internal security except those matters which fall specifically

within the purview of the IId, as indicated above.

(2) The ICIS, In Its fleld of In collaboration with the IId,

shall take the necessary action to Insure the establishment and main-

tenance of the highest practicable state of internal security!

(3) The ICIS In its field shall assure the existence and

coordination of, and establish guidance for, the necessary plans.

and preparations for adequate internal security in the event of a

future emergency.

(4) The ICIS shall study and make recommendations with refer-

ence to legislation, executive orders and regulations needed tó

achieve the objectives of the ICIS.

(5) The ICIS shall take the necessary action to insure that

NSC 17/5

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CONFIDENTIAL

-6 -

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r.

CONFIDENTIAL

there 1s no duplication of effort by governmental departments and

agencies in those matters under 1ts jurisdiction.

(6) The ICIS shall take the necessary steps to procure resolu-

tIon of any conflicts of jurisdiction that may arise in the field

of Internal security for which the ICIS 1s responsible, and shall

determine by what agency or department necessary action will be

handled.

(7) The ICIS shall promote appropriate exchange and coordina-

tion of Information, as well as action, among the several agencies

and departments of the government.

(8) The ICIS shall Incorporate under it, or absorb the

functions of, existing Interdepartmental committees which may be

operating In Its field of responsibility.

C. PROCEDURE

• (I)

The ICIs shall establish such ad hoc and working commit-

toes as may be necessary for the purpose of discharging its respon-

sIbillties.

(2) The ICIS shall Initiate and coordinate necessary studies,

projects, and surveys relating to its responsibillties. It shall

request, recelve, and correlate suggestions or actual studies, pro-

jects, and surveys from non-member agencies in the field of respon-

sibility assigned to the ICIS.

(3) The ICIS shall maintain coordination with the IIC through

the Chairman of the ICIS and the representative of the National

• Security Counc11. Whenever appropriate, the ICIS will hold joint

MW 5496S Boeld:& 5989720 Page 174

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

meetings or establish joint subcommittees with the IIC.

(4)

The ICIS shall submit to the National. Security Council

those problems which require consideration or action by the NSC

and

those problems which cannot be resolved and worked out through

cooperative consideration and action.

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•••

F. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 161

_JUNE 9, 1962

:

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ThE WINTE HOUSE

88,

NASHINGTON

/ 1;

CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 1962.

• NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 161

8l111

TQ:

Tho Socrotary of Sinto

The Secretary of Definse

The Secrctary of the Ircasury

The Secretary of Commerce

The Attorury Gensici

The Directur of Central Intelligence

Military Reprcacritative of the Presidentr

..-..

Administraior, Federal Aviation Agency

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: U. S. Internal Sccurity Progiams

1. In line with my continuing effort to give primary

responsibility for the initialive on major matters of

policy and administration in a given field to a key

member of my Administration, 1 will look to tho

Attorney General lo take the initiative in the göverna

ment in ensuring the devclop rent of pinas, programa,

and action proposaio to protest the internal. security

yof the United Statce. I will e -pect him to pre are

re,ommendations, in collabo ation with other departs

ments and agencies in the goi ernment having the

responsibility for internal securily programe, with

respoct to those maiters roguiring Presidential action..

CONFIDEI TIAL

•deliries.

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THE WIITE HOUSE

"MASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Accridingly, I have directed that the two inter-

departmental committecs concerned with internal

sccurity--the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(IIC) and the Interdcpartmental Committee on Internal

Security (ICIS) --wilich have been under the supervision

of the National Security Council, will be transferred to

the supervision of the Attorney General. The.continuing

need for these committees and their relationship to the

Attorney General will be matiers for the Attorney General

to determine.

H!?:

118:8

• (John F: Kennedy)

¿. Edgar Hoover, Chairman Interdepartmental s

• Intelligence Conference

•John I. Doherty: Chairman laterdepartnental

Committee

on internalSecurity

no Russell Ash, NSC Staff

1

Nees 1918108

: 111 1:8

111

i..

CONFIENTIAL

:3.

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G. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM, DATED 3/5/64,

TO FORMER FBI DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER, .

SETTING FORTH NEW CHARTER FOR THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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Office at the Alaznry Genial

Washington, 7.C.

March 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman

Interdepartnental Intelligence Conference

SUBJECT:

Continuation of the Interdepartmental

Intelligence Conference

Pursuant to the autnority vested in the Attorney General by

National Security Action. Yemorandun 161, dated June 9, 1962 Erca the

President, and in view of the proposed rescission by the National

Security Council of its document 5425/1, I hereby direct that the

Interdepartmental Intelligence Confezence shall continue in operation

with the present organizational structures and terms of reference.

The IIC Charter is hereby arended as follows:

1. The first pazagraph is arended to read: "Pursuant to the

provisions of lational Security iction Mororandun 161, dated

June 9, 1952 frca the Presidans, the Attornay General hareby

authorizes and directs that the Interdepartnantal Intelligerce

Conference effect ina co-ordizion of all investigation o

domestic espionags counterespionage, sabotage and subversion;

and other relati: - illigenc..atters affecting internal

The tic pen gues

security. The IIC jil be guided by the tems si this charter."

2. Paragraph ¿(4) is deleted.

3.

Paragraph 5(ü) is amended by striking out the words "National

Security Council" ard substituting therefor the woras "Attorney

General"

4. Paragraph C(3) is avended by striking out the words "and the

representative of the National Security Council".

5. Paragraph C(4) is amended by striking out the words "National

Security Council" and substituting therefor the words "Attorney

General."

Attorney General

NW/ 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 182

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CHARTER

OF THE

INTERDEPART OUTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of National Security Action

mcmorandum 101, dated June 9, 1902 from the fresident, the Attorney

General hereby authorizes and directs that the Intcrdepartmental

Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of all Investigation

of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversion,

and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference shall be con-

stituted as set forth in the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939,

that 1s, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department

of Justice; Assistant Culei of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the

Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Departnent of the Navy; and the

Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Department of

the Air Force (the latter position having been created since the issuance

of the original Presidential Directive.)

The chairman shall be designated by the President from the

membership of tha Committee after consultation with the Attorney General.

An executive secretary shall also be selected by the IIC and he shall

be responsible for maintaining the necessary records. Such additional

secretariat as may be necessary and desirable shall be provided as needed.

(3)

The IIC, through Its chairman, shall invite noumember agency

representatives as ad hoc members of the IIC when matters involving the

responsibilities of such nonmembers are under consideration.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) The IIC, in its field, or in collaboration with the ICIS, shall

take the necessary action to insure the establishment and maintenance of

the highest practicable state of internal security, including the maling

of necessary plans and preparations for adequate

internal security in the

event of a war-related

emergency.

(2) The si shall make appropriate studies and take action to

insure that complete investigative coverage is maintained by appropriate

departments and agencies in matters described herein.

(3) The IIC shall take the necessary action to insure that there

i3 no duplication of effort by goverrmental departments and agencies in

chose matters under its jurisdiction.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 183

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(4) The IIC

sall endeavor to resolve confl.

ts of jurisdiction

In the investigative fields named herein and determine by what agency

or department necessary Investigations can be handled most logically

and efficiently.

(5) The IIC shall study and make recommendations with reference

to legislation and executive orders needed to achieve. the objectives

set forth herein.

(6) The IIC shall pronote appropriate exchange and co-ordination

of information, as well as action, among the various agencies and

departments of the government.

(7) The IIC shall Incorporate under it or absorb the functions of

existing interdepartmental committees which arc operating in its field

of responsibility.

(8) The IIC shall perform such other functions as nay be necessary

or as may be assigned to it by the Attorney General or other appropriate

authority falling within its field of co-ordination of all investigation

of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion, and

other related intelligence matters affecting internal security.

C. PROCEDURE

(1) The IIC shall establish such ad hoc and working committees

88 may be desirable and necessary for the purpose of discharging its

responsibilities.

(2) Thé IIC shall initiate and co-ordinate decessary studies,

projects, and surveys relating to its responsibil.:les. It shall request,

receive, and correlata suggestions or actual studies,, projects, and surveys

'from nonmember agencies in the field of responsibility assigned to the IIC.

(3) The IIC snail maintain co-ordination with the Interdepartmental

Committee on Internal Security through the Chairman of the IIC. Whenever

appropriate, the IIC will hold joint neetings or establish joint subcom-

mittees with the Interdepartmental Comnittee on Internal Security.

(4)

The IIC shall submit to the Attorney General those problems

which require consideration or action by the Attorney General and those

problens which cannot be resolved and worked out through co-operative

considerition and action.

D.

Nothing herein shall be construed

as modifying or affecting the

Presidential Directives issued to the members of the IIC Iclating to their

individual responsibilities and duties. The Dalinitations Agreement arong

the members of the IIC relating to the investigatia responsibilities and

duties of the individual members and other agreement. among these meavers

relating to the same matters shall remain in full force and effect and

shall continue to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the discretion

of the Ils.

-2 ..

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HI. THE PREAMBLE AND SECTION 101 OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

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- NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Act of July

917 (61 Stat. 195-510), as amended b

it of dug. 10,

1919 (03 Stat. 5is-502), by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1012

(63 Stat. 1U6T), by leorgnization Plan No. & of 1053 (67 Stat.

63t), by Reorrnizion Plan No. 7 of 2053 (UT Stat. 030), by

Act of April 1, 1953 (07 Stat 639), by Act of April t 1953

167 Stut.

• 19, c. 16); and by P.L. S0-599 § 2; 50.U.S.C. S8 102,

403 The National Security Act of 1947:

"ASCENDING THE DECLARATION OF POLICY

"SEc. 2. Section 2 of the National Security Ict of 1917, as

amended (50 U.S.C. 101). is further amended to read as follows:

"'Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress

to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the

United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated poli-.

cies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions

of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a

Department of Defense, including the three military Departments

of the Army, the dary (including naval ariation and the United

States Marine Corps) and the Air Force under the direction,

authority and controi of the Secrcury of Defense; to provide that

each military department shall be separately organized under its

own Secretary and shall functión under the direction, authority:

and control of the Secretary of Deiense; to provide for their uni-

fied direction under cirilian control of the Secretary of Deíense

but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the

establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a

clear and direct line of command to such commands; to elimi-

nate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and

particularly in the feid of research and ergineering by resting

its orcrall direction and control in the Secretary of Detense; to

proride more erective. eiicient, and economical acministration

in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic

direction of the combatant forces. for their operation under uni-

fed command, and for their integration into an effcient team of

land, natal, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of

Staf orer the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general

staff.'

• "NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

"SEc. 101. (a) There is established in the Executive Office of

the President a council to be known as tie mational Securitv

Council (hereinafter in this section referred to is the Council').

"The President of the United States shall preside over the meet-

ings of the Council: Proviled. That in his absence he mit desig-

nate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

"The function of the Council shall be to advise the President

with respect to the integration of somestic, foreign, and military

policies relating to tho national security so as to enable the mili-

tary services and the other departments and agencies of the Gor-

ernment to cooperite more electively in matters involving the na-

tional security.

"The Council shall be composed of—

the goes try tires:

4(4) the Secretary oi Defense;

"(5) Director of the loreigm Operations Administration,

who shall not delegate this function;

"(G) Director of the Oilice of Defense Mobilization, who

shall not delegate this function;

"(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other erecu-

tive departments and of the mintary departments, the Chair

man of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Ro

search and Desclopment Board, when appointed by the lies-

NW 54989~Docld:32989720-Page-18/dent by and with the advice and consent of the Sente, to

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I. MEMORANDUN FROM J. PATRICK COYNE,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,

DATED 11/6/50, CONCERNING NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE MEASURES

RELATIVE TO VIOLENCE BY PUERTO RICAN NATIONALISTS

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 189

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"XECCTIVE OFFICE O

NATIONAL

RASHINGTUN

SECRET

COPY

November 6, 1950

-HEMORINDEM TOPE

HT. J. Edgar HooUeT, Chalrmon

Interdeportmentel Intelligence Conference

Ir. Paymond f. Thearty, Cheirman

Interdepartmental Comnittee on Internal Secirity

The President has assed that the IIC and IcIs-report

to

the rational security council on the lessons to be learied

from the recent outorian of violence dy the fuerto Risc

Mationalists irsojer as interacl security measureS Gie Concerned,

including suci questions as:

Here internel security responsibilitics clearl!

assigned, properly executed and creguetel! coari

,nated, both in and between the continental

United surtes coo fuerto rico?

De

that cositional or ingroued measures coula be

taten elther in

"Sields to preveni or le ercoores for ruture expua-

Er ve the

the intelligence or operceional

tion3 of this charcoter?

Upon completion it ts suggested thet your joint

report so submitted to this office dor caproprinte reference

to the couroil:

Jo Patrick Coyne

d. So Co REPRESENTATIVE OU INI.RINL SECURITY

1s/ Jo Petrici: Coyne

'iras.

......

senso

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 190

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COP

November 8, 1950

J. Patrick Coyne

National securit! Council

Executive Office Building

Fashington,

Д. С..

Dear Pat:

Reference is made to your memorandum

dated irouember 6, 1950: which advised that the

President has asted that the TIC and the ICIS

reporé to the rational security council on the

lessons to be learned from the recent outoreci

of violence by the

Puerto

Pican ictionclists

insofar as internal security measures are

concerned.

Attached hereto is a report in this

connection which has been prepared by the

Interdeparimental Inielligerce Conference.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman

Interdepartmental Intelligence conference

Enclosure

..:

• ?:

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REPORT RI, THE INTERDEPARTIENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONESZENCS TO THE

NATICAL

85043

2O9A3UIXG

В ASCONT ОПГЕЗДАК О2

VIOLENCE RY PUERTO RICAK

ATIONALISTS

The following summaty has been prepared in ansuer to

request for infornation received from the National security

Council on the lessons to be learned fron the recent outbrean

•of violence by the Puerto Rican Nationalists insofar as internal

security measures are concerned.

The summary has been designed to answer the following

specific questions:

Here internal security resporsibilities clearly

assigned, properly executed and cdequately coorci-

nated, both in and between the continental Unitea

States and Puerto Rico?

B.

That additional or inproved measures could be taken

either in the intelligence or operational fielcs to.

prevent

or de prepared for jusure situations of

this character?

SUIGIATION

• Although investigation is continuing, it would appear

- on the basis of cueilable cate that recent events in Puerto lico

touched off bu a raid ou Insular Police on a

constituted nore or less arontoneous date of vationalist pere a

cache of arms and onmunition.

under сопто.

suce effecalve action reflecus the efficlenc! of

the close, estoblished coring reintionshids between the FBI ano

agencies having intelligence and operating responsibilities in-

volving internal security natters in Puerto lico.

Insular authorities were prepared to meet the assaults

on the peace cue to the previous warnings of Nationalist

preparations for revolution.

Evidence to

support the assumption that these assaults

-reflected spontaneous action and not carejul extensive planning is:

¡o The absence of major acts of sabotage.

B.

The failure to attempt to capture centers and lines

of comrunication such as radio stations, telepiones,

telegraphs, etc.

1...

via rooms:.. .

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Co

No evidence has been developed that Nationalist

Party leader, Compos, ordered of iad inowledge of

the outbreak.

: D.

The acts of violence did not proceed according to

a pattern nor were they choracterized by even

elementary coordination and tining.

HISTORY OF THE MATIONALIST PARTY

The Nationolist Party of Puerto Rico clains that its

•origin can be traced back to september 23, 1868, when a small

revolution took place at Lores, fuerto Rico, for the purpose

of overthroiving the spanish Government, preparatory to establish

ing a Republic of puerto Rico. This revolution was quickly

quelled by spanish autrorities.

Or Puerto Dilend dane rejerren te as the the rena.

the Reoublic

Charter."

shortly thereafter, when Spain vas defeated in a

war with the United states, Puerto Rico was ceded to this country

in accordance with the ciains of the treaty of Paris.

The

Nationalist Party refused to recognize this Irecty, charging it

null and yoid where puerto rico is concerned.

_- :

Although there has long been an indeperdence

novement

in Puerto Rico, the lotionalist Party as it is known today did

•not come into existence until 1922.

In this year it was jormally

established at lio Piedros,

Puerio rico. The declared

purposes

of this party were and still are: (1) to secure the separation

of puerto Rico iron the United states; and (2) to create "a free,

independent, and sovereign nation."

The declared means to this

end include

the use of force and violence leading to open, wide-

spread armed rebellion.

Party.

_University.

He served in the United States Army from May,

1917, to April, 1919, receiving at that time an honorable

discharge. Following this discharge, Campos instituted

a vicious

ing is

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ropaganda compaign crainst the inited states in senals of

Puerto rican independence, which he has continued to date.

Under campos's leadersii?, the rationalist Perty

commitied its first real acts of violence on April 0, 1992

marChing UpOn

the Conitol in san Juan to force

to adont the

the legislators

jationalist flag. One person was killca anc tuelve

others injured.

donate Romantic.

the Party organized the

"Librating Army of the Begublic.

•In Januar! of 1026, nembership in this "Army" sos

made obligatory for all nale

2936, Pedro Albizu Connos and seven oürer lecders of the

Nationalist

party were convicted in the Federal Court at

San Juan for

Govorament of the United sictes." Cunpos uas released from

the benitentiary on June s, 1943.

On larch al, 1937, mineteen persons vere killed ord

approcinciel! 100 others were wounded in a gun batile which took

piace beiveen the police ond ippe members aó fouce, fuerto Fico.

In June, 1937, ten melbers. of the APPe fired upon

U. S. District

Juige Robert l. cooper at son Juan; tue attented assassiration

was unsuccessful.

In cull, 1930, a group or iPPa menbers noce

an unsuccessful citenst to

Fill the honorable elenton rinsis,

Governor of Puerto Rico.

on the some date, these ippi renbers

killed a prominent officer of the puerto licen icional Guard

and wounded corrorinutely tuenty oüher persons.

•Hith reference to the assault on the federal Judge in

June, 1937, eight of the guilty iPPI members vere sentenced to

•

five wears in a U.s. penitentiary cho two other members received

a senience cl tvo and one-half years each. It is intercsting to

• note thai one of the hPP? members convicied for the automot on

the life of the receral Judge mas Rainundo Diaz-Pacheco uno did

•Lead the attack October so, 1950, against tre Governor's Palace

in san Juch and was killed bu Insular Police on suard there.

As a result of the attented assassination of the Governor (in

• which a rational Guera leader vas killed) in Jull, 1529, siü.

NPP? members were subsecuently convicted of murder in the Insular

court at force.

These men were sentenced to lije innrisonment,

but the sentenoes vere commuica and 'ourcruise modified in inci-

vidual cases.

One of the six,

Tomas Lopes-De vicioria, figured

proninently in the recent insurreciion.

...

2/10,04

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.::

0.8.

•÷..

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-

During the period from June, 1913 to Decenber 15,

1947, Campos was in Hew York City.

In the fall of: 1947 in

anticipation of the return of Cairoos to Pierto lico from New

York city, Rainindo Diaz-iacheco oroanized and troined a small

group of young men in military drills. These yourn men were

at the dock on Decender 15, 1917, dressed in the Cadet uniform

of the l'ationalist Party of Puerto Pico's drmy as an Honor Guard

0

receive their President, Pedro Albizu Campos.

During the period, 1948 to 1950, the Nationalist Party

took steps to develos and enlarge its Cadet Corps.

During.

1949, eight Nationalists were convicted and sentenced to the

penitentiary for a violation of the selective service Act of

1948.

•At the Annual Assembly of the Nationalist Party of

Puerto Rico held on December 18,

is reliably reported to have stated,

1949irrhe Cadet Corps

in Puerto Rico, Campos

must be

made the most powerful army in Fuerto Rico, ready for action."

Other information received during 1950 revealed that

individuals connected with the Nationalist Party were engaging

in firearms practice.

SEQUENCE OF RECENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE

The recent incidents in Puerto rico have folloued a

pattera of sporadic outcrecks.

The

first occurred at approvi

mately 12:30 A.l. on October 27, 1950,

viken the Insular Police

at Rio Piedros arrested a group n! Natioralists uno vere

travelina in an automobile accomponuino Pedro Albizu Campos

prom Fajarco where he nad made a speech carlier in the evering.

The Nationalists in the automobile hod attempted to crowd a

.. police car ofs the road on the way to Rio Piedras. Upon arrest,

the individuals in the cor mere found to be carrying concealed

weapors. Also found

in the car vere five gasoline bombs.

• October 28,

1950, a jail hreak occurred from the

Insular Penitentiory, Pi. Piedras during which 112 prisoners

. escaped: Two prison guards were killed

and

four more injured.

At about 4:15 Aal. on October 30, 1950, in the little

town of Penuelas, about sinteen police officers mere proceeding

to a residence in that cree to carry not a searcen

for hidden

arms where they encountered ormed Motionalists who fired pon

the police. Sir police africers vere wounded and several persons

believed to de Nationalists vere

killed.

we dog's..

1 -

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At approximately 9:00 A.M. on October 30, 1950,

there was cn

incident near Fonce

in which one police officer

was killed.. Tuo police officers

who were sent out to answer

a call were ambushed in the jeep in which they were riding.

One of the officers was killed.

On the morning of October 30, 1950, at Arecibo,

group of rationalists citacked the police station and killed

sour policemen.

• At 12:00 noon on October 30, 1950,

an attack was made

• on the Governor's Paloce at San Jua"raimundo Diaz Pacheco,

Mationalists were

Treaster teed a sorty smarto die cacncoanderi.

¿n-Chies of the Nationclist Army, was among those killed.

It this point the National Guard was called out by

GOVErnOr LOUiS MUnOZ liCTiT.

At 2:05 P: ll. on October 30, 1950,

reports of sporadic incidents were still being received.

The

•Post Offices ot Utuado and Jauuya were attacked. At Jayuja

the Post Office was sèt afire and the Post Office, Selective

seruice Office, and the Farm Security Office all burned.

san Juan there was an exchangé of

•gun sure between the National

Guard, Police, and the Nationalists. Vidal Santiago, one of

the rationalists, was wounded.

The town of San Juan

was blocked..

off and the Governor's falace placed under heauy guard.

October 31, 1950, the towns of Jayuya and Utuado were retaken

by the lational Guard and order restored. By lovenber 1, 1950,

all cots of violence had ceased ond the Insular Police vere

rounding up all known Nationclists.

Pedro Albizu Campos, liend

• Of the liationalist Party of Puerto Rico, was arrested by the

Insular Police

on lovember 2, 1950.

No further acts of violence

were reported in puerto rico.

On wovender 7, 1950, the National

Guard wes relecsed from active auty and the Insular Police

assumed full responsibility for mainteining civil order.

ASSIGHHSNT OF INTERNAI, SECURITY RESPOUSIPILITIES

Under the provisions of federal statutes and the

Delimitations agreement, signed february 23, 1949, by the Federal

Burecu of Investigation,

the Intelligence Division of the Arm!'s

the Office of icual Intelligence, and the Office of special

Investigations of the air sorce,

the rederal Bureau of Investigation

has the responsibility for the investigation of espionage,

•counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage involving civilians

....

,i......

....!"..

a5=

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and foreign notionals of all classes in the continental

United States and in the territories of Havaii, Puerto Pico,

the Virgin Islands, and all but a portion of Alaska. Ihe

Intelligence Division of the Army,

the Office of Naval

Intelligence, ond the office of Special Investigations of the

Air force have the responsibility for these investinations in

these areas when they involve active and retired military personnel.

of their respective

services.

osI, in addition, couers trot

portion o! Alaska not covered by the IEI.. These oblications.

carry the responsibility to exchange freely and directly with

the other nomed agencies all information developed which is of

mutual interest.

.

: •

The Insular Govertment in Puerto Pico las police

jurisdiction and is responsible for the enforcement of local laws.

The assignment of internal security responsitilities in

Puerto Rico is, in general, parallel to the assionment of these

responsibilities nithin the Unitea Stateo and are cleurly defined.

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STEPS TAKEN TO EXECUTE AND COORCINATE INTERNAL

SECURITY COVE?AGO

1. •In Puerto Rico.

A. Courage Haintained.

Representatives of the BI, the hit force, the army

and bany are in daily controt with ecch other on all phases

internal

security end other intelligence and counterintelligence

Bo Field Interdepartnental Intelligence Conferences.

Representatives of the FBI, OWI, G-2 (Arm!), OSI

(sir force) uno constitute the Interdepartientel Intelligence

conference meet weekl; to review current developmeris in order

rouise the approprinte authorities of situctions and trenes

involuing potential threats of espionnge, sabotage,

and sub-

version.

special conferences are convened as the situation

reguires.

C. Exchnnge and bissemination of Information.

Intelligence

and infornation ceveloped bu cll IIC

-agencies in Puerto Rico is exchanged freely on a continuing and

current basis:

D.

Relations with puerto Ricon Authorities.

The FBI has long mintained e close working relationship

with puerto Pican nuthorities as well as extensive Licison wien

•foreign intelligence are police officiols inroughout the carriobear..

The EPI reictions with the Insuler Police in Puerto Rico are very

close.

The speciel Division of the Insular Police knoon as the

Internal Security Squi has been in existence sirce 1942 at unich

time it was organizeo onù ircined by the FBI.

Close contacts

are maintained between the I3I and the Internal security squea

which has been conducting security investigations of the Mational-

¿sts for many veers; agents of the EBI work frequently with.

•Internal security Suici

officers on securitu invescigations.

The Insular coverment which had prinery responsihility for the

maintonance of the pence of fuerto Rico was aware of the collection

b! Nationalists of arms and explosives and also appreciated the

significance of such activit: and were familiar with the democr

and baciaround of the inciviouals involved.

wince the recurn

ol rationalist leccer compos to fuerto rico in 1017, the Insular

Government has concorned itself with odegucte protective rensures

•3"8

jagainst the tupe of violence that the ictionclists hod previously

-carricd out.

s . .:....

.....

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The Insular Police have maintained a constant open

surveillance on Capos and have covered all rationalists

meetings.

In addition, they heue carried out numerous investi-

gations of incividuch ictionalists.

Evidence of the efjective

exchange of information and close working rolations is cisarly

shown by the rapid arrest of over sit hundred incividuals on..

uhom the police had subversive recoros.

The Special. Agent in Charge of the FBI Office in San

Juan hos conferred over a period of years with the Governor of

Puerto Rico concerning the Nationalist Party, its leaders and

related matters.

In this conrection, Goverror Louis luno?

Karin is quoted in a press release as cavising secretary of the

Interior chapman on lovember 2, 1950, that "If YOu will

remember when you were here three weeis ago, I discussed this

situation with you and went over the FBI reports on the

Nationclists plons for an uprising and the tie in with a jew

•Communists on the Island - - - the cooneration of the FBI in

Puerto rico and the mainland has been most helpful, ond hoc

these precautions not been token, I feel thet the magnituce

the incicents of the last few days would have been greater."

2. In Continental United States.

Monthly Interdepartmenial Intelligence Conferences

coordinate electively the collection, escharge ana cissemina-

tion of internal security data throughout the united stotes,

its territories and possessions in accoriance with the belimita-

tiön Agreement.

All caditional agencies having an interest in

the internal affcirs of puerto Rico have been kept currently

advised of developments perciring to the liationclist Party of

Puerto rico as mentioned previoisly, such as the departnent of

Justice, the Department of Interior, the State Department, and

the military services.

On June 3, 1913, Campos, lender of the Nationalist

Party, was released fron the penitentiary.

As early as june

4,

1913, a menorandum was furnished the lepariment of Justice unich

referred to the previous data furnished to the Department re-

-_Iating to the revolutionary ains end activities of the

Nationclist Pert! Of Puerto Pico. , This menornnaum requested

the Department of Justice to aquise ij these activities. con-

stituted a violotion of any federal statute.

Secretary of Interior Chopman, on November 3, 1950,

advised the Director of the federal Burenu of Inuestigation

"tis wonde

..".

;:

Costio.

- 8-

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that the FBI had done an excellent job of keeping the proper

officials. informed of every minute dotail as to the happenings

in puerto Rico.

3. Between Puerto Rico and the United States.

There is à continuing exchange of information end

intelligence between the lashington, I. C. headquarters of IIS

agencies and their field representatives in puerto Rico.

FBI headquerters in icshington, D. Co, over the years,

has

carried out closely coordinated investigations of Nationalist

Party activities not only in puerto Rico but also among the pro-

Nationalist Fuerto Rican elements throughout the United states,

particularly in. New York City.

OBSERTATIONS AND CONCLUSIOHS

In view of the constant threat from world connurism,

DIS

well as fron other revolutionary conspiratorial groups such

as the lationalist Party of Fuerto Rico, cots of violence ajject-

ing the internal security of the United states must always be

-- anticipated.

IIC rgencies recognise the necessit! and urgency for pro

viding operational authorities with rdequate

intelligence deta to.

-serue as a basis. for executing

counterreasures.

Intelligence

agencies con provide the facts but these facts must be acted upon

: is inimical forces are to be neutralizea.

-

In the case of fuerto Rico, no positive neutrclizing

action was tale? until the overt acts of uiolence occurred.

The.

broader question naturally arises from this series of incidents

as to whatner it is recessary to cwalt eatensue damage cy

expocted acts of violence from well-identifled revolutionary.

vand or subversive groups bejore tañing positive action.

In conclusion,

it may be said that the effectiveness of.

the work of IIt agencies hos been adequately denonsirated. There-

fore, changes in fundamental policies are not recommended:

is strongly celieved thai security work should be augmented by the

just-eni denocratic arplication of punitive neasures preaicated - -

1роn any clear ond present danger to the welfare of this nation.

1=9-

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5=5t

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J. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM,

DATED 3/5/54, PREPARED BY

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFEPENCE AND

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL, COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

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P SECRET

I. O3JECTI VES

The over-all objective of the Internal Security irogram is to

protect the inited states against the throats of Communism and other

subversive movements, particulurly arainst the designs of Sovict

Russia and her satellites upon the security of the United States.

Sabotage, espionage and subversion within the United. States can cause

not only the loss of imerican lives and the loss of battles anyuhere

in the world, but can cause serious disruption of our productive

capacity and adversely arfect the maintenance of a stable economy•

Communist doctrine provides that a period of peace is to be

used to consolidate and strengthen the Communist forces in the world

while at the same time weakening and dividing the democratic nations

including disruption of the internal life of those nations economically,

politically and socially.

Thus the present Soviet "reace tactics"

• emphasize that our internal security protective coverage must be

maintained at a high level.

Soviet Fussia can continue to increase

subversive, disruptive tactics without risk or cost to herself commen-

surate "ith the potential beneficial results to the Soviet cause.

The Internal Security Program was formulated on the assumption

of a continuance of peacetime "cold war" conditions, Horever, it

includes the ejements to be expanded for a vartime operation. •

The major specific goals of the Internal Security Program are:

lo Io coordinate the activities of all agencies and departments

concerned with internal security ratiers, including investigations, the

collection of domestic intelligerce, and the integration of foreign

intelligence pertinent to the domestic intelligence field.

2. To continue the acceleration of investigations designed to

provide the basis for the apprehersion, prosecution, or other action,

against persons involved in subversive activities.

Зo To detect and mintain security indices on persons considered

dangerous to the national defense and public safety.

La To neutralise Communist front and Cormunist-dominated organi-

zations in the United States.

D-3-ngrade to Secret

C28W34B64

by ADo

NSC 51,07, Part 8

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K. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE

INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM OF

THE UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE 30, 1958, DATED 8/27/58,

PREPARED JOINTLY BY

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

soungrade to Secret

3-13-131

028W34864

ww SAgeS Docid: 32939720 • Page 205

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YOT SECRET

The 1957-1958 plurs of Czechoslovakian military incolligence in

the United btates include insanictions to locate secret rupositories for

radio receitors and transmitteis for eventual use by clandestine agents,

The Hungarian Intellirence Service, which sent agents to this country posine

as refugees in the vaie ai the liungarian revolution, is also angaged in

developing ius clancestine operations.

on Ibveloprant of evidence apon thich legal action can be taken

ageinst, suversire inciviculo ano ciganizations:

Folloing the Supreme Court decisiona reversing the convictions

of 19 Command Faroy Leaders for violation of the Smth Act of 1940

action by various pirouez Counse of Appeal hes resultud in the suquit at

of 20 additional Communist Party Lunctionaries and tho remandina for retrial

of 29 othere, while selocted sases are so: scheduled for retrial curing

: The

fiscal your 1959; reoblena have arisen in ouber cases que to the lapse of tima

since the periods soared by the incicumenüs: In nose insparces, soveral years

have beon consumed by triula and apraais with the zestio slat

witnesses have

diso, nave socore invelid, or ars mavailabie lor other reasons and a- this

late date their testinony cannot be replaced, Another problen has been ine

stringene evicentiany standares established by the Suprana Coit in the case

of the California commist leaders.

In other cases; the Paperinent si justica muni consider the leas

through their apperance no winesses, of adcitional corcidentist jeferaants

of tha FPI. It is nosessasy to weigh the afficuliy on carsloping indecrants

nithin the Commit Fanta and lus zelaled gioups togerior von toe value of

use incision they secure spaindo the benetto to be derived eda aring

such persuas as witnesses.

do..

Obtairing counterintellirence inforation as it relates to

sensitive militasy areas and dorense iacilities:

The IId aconcios, in viam of the continuing effois coordinated by

sorict blor agands in this countzy do secure full knozledge concernin: cur

indastrial and military operations, ramin particularly alert to activities

in Chose fields and contihue to emphasize the investiganton and identification

of scourisy risis in both industrial ane miliary facilitios.

No material chauge in the level of these asmous of the TIC invests

satire progran is anticiputed by the Jc menbers during the nest ricont year,

alt the sueenca si undoroscen thenacional dercioprars: nor legislations

02 are prance imbiaiod by aguer authority nach muld increase on caccoess

?..

D2200000102 0202sc2/221.024 9md IndridanTa

The decisines of lin Waiiod States Suieme Court in Sues, 1957, in he

dune and three roars have deshlled dn t beversal di l0 smith Act cacos

Intravine do Trailerals.

Indierrand Involving 22 Jadendants vere orcured

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......

stiiea

rx.ió;

a'+ +497997795

**

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L. EXCERPT FROM FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER'S BRIEFING

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PRESIDED OVER BY THE PRESIDENT, DATED 11/6/58

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 208

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184

Our fifth procram is"aimed at solving the difficult problem created by

(EXHIPIT I0.

(2)

the use of microdots in espionage. Since it is extremely difficult to detect

these tiny photographic messages once they have been placed in correspondence

or otherwise concealed, we have instituted coverage of the film outlets in this

country which deal in the special emulsions necessary to this process.

We have still a sixth program under which we continuously evaluate the

espionage and sabotage potential of individuals whose current activities indicate

that they might costitute a threat to the country in the event of a national

emergency. These include members of the Communist Party of the United States

and other individuals dedicated to the violent overthrow of our Covernment. We

maintain a special index of such persons to enable us to effect their immediate

apprehension in the event the President so directs the Attorney General. For

your information, there were 12, 305 names on this indexas-of October-27,10557

- 30 -

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Jouti zenchi

T ntegante

sed by leading

Benj. D Deviz- Menhee nid9

• NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 210

',ai ?a

tiw""

e eeceete neg sueo

dleo ertee gue ."e

i .

.:.

.. :

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Communist Party leaders are hopeful that, by exploiting such current

national and international issues as racial discrimination and peace, they can

bring about a resurgence of Party activity and influence. • For example,

Benjamin Davis, chairman of the Party's New York District, in a report made

in September of this year to top communist functionaries, stressed that the Party

should concentrate on the integration issue as symbolized by the Little Rock school

situation.

Diligent efforts are made by the communists to infiltrate Negro groups,

particularly at the local level, so as to agitate and create confusion.

The public usually associates the FEl's internal securit

investigations with Communist Party activities orly. Nothing could be

further from the truth.

Our investigations encompass any and all

organizations based on a creed of force and violence to determine whether

they are a threat to our internal security or whether they have violated

any Federal laws.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 211

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We investigate the activities of such diverse and international

organizations as the Marxist Socialist Werkers Party, and the Nationalist

(005. 2450)

(31)

Party of Fuerto Rico. (Responsible for attack upon Fresident Truman, 1950,

(32)

and Congress, 1954.) Further, we investigate such fanatical and so-called

(35)

States Rights Party, an anti-Jewish and anti-Negro organization; and the

(4625 75. 1055762)(36)

Confederate Underground." The latter is a name which has been mentioned on

a number of occasions in recent bombing threats and other forms of violence.

Since January 1. 1957, there have been over 90 bombings,

or attempted bombings, in the United States. Of these, at least 69 have

involved Negro victims and at least eight, Jewish religious and educational

Pretties SA Sie-90 bound tras;

then Wane hinater Attaina

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 212

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prit 1958

In the early bombings there was no evidence to shory that these bombings

could be attributable to specific organizations. Rather, they were individual

acts of terror strictly within the jurisdiction of local authorities. When these

outrages occurred, we in the FBI have made immediately available to local

authorities our laboratory and fingerprint facilities here in Washington.

" As the bombings directed toward religious and educational facilities

invitatione

continued, the FBI extended its cooperation to cover out-of-state. leads which

local authorities could not handle. We extended such assistance to the

Jacksonville, Florida, and Birmingham, Alabama, Police Departments.

in connection with the bombings of a Jewish center and a Negro high school

(37)

in Jacksonville on April 28, 1958, and the attempted bombing of a Jewish

(38)

temple in Birmingham on the same day.

- 33 a

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Recently, however, there has been some indication of a gencral

5

interstate pattern to these bombings. For example, one of the men indicted

(39)

on October 17, 1958, (Richard Bowling) for the bombing of the Jewish temple

in Atlanta, received from one of his fellow conspirators two checks vorte

nearly $200.

One of these checks was dated October 4, 1958, the day before

• (40)

the Clinton. Tennessee, High School bombing; the other, October 9, 1958,

three days before the Atlanta temple bombing:

Recognizing the danger to the national welfare from a general

pattern of organized terrorism, the FBI has moved to expand its assistance

to local law enforcement in the recent bombings at Clinton, Atlantz, and

(11)

Peoria, Ilincis. We are now providing all-out investigative assistance in

these cases. We are closely checking the activities of individuals prominently

(12)

involved in racial distrubances, such as the notorious John Kasper,

the

- 34 -

fai

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(43)

executive seerctary of the Seaboard White Citizens Council of Washington.

As a

further aid to local law enforcement agencies, the FBI has scheduled a scries

of special conferences for November and December, 1958. to discuss our

cooperative services regarding bombings and threats of bombings against

religious and educational institutions

Our entry into these cases at this new level is not to be interorcted

as an attempt on our part to usurp the jurisdiction of local authorities. To give th

FBI this jurisdiction would relieve local governments of the basic responsibility

to maintain law and order, and the ultimate responsibility rightfully rests at the

local level.

To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the

United States; we have a seventh program designed to intensify any confusion

and dissatisfaction among its members.

During the past few years, this program

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 • Page 215

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• ..

ip

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Serial Charge-Out

RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION

RECORD/ INFORMATION DISSEMINATION SECTION

SERIAL CHARGE OUT

This Document Has Been Removed

TOP SECRET MATERIAL

Document can be located in the SCIF, ICRC

CONTACT UC BETTY WEAVER FOR ACCESS TO

DOCUMENTS

NOTE TO DISCLOSURE:

Please proceed as usual processing other documents in the request.

FOIPA # 1202241-000

File # HQ 62-116464 Section 6 Serial NIA

Date of Mail

Page (s) 16

Date -

12/4/12

Initials TEK

Analyst Travis Knight

Team_WPU

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

Approved:6/24/03 DMH

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neares

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N. BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING

THE EMERGENCY DETENTION PROVISIONS

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

AND THE EFFECT OF THEIR REPEAL

UPON FBI AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT

NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 219

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It will be recalled that Subchapter II of the "Internal Security

Act of 1950" (64 stat. 987-1031) as amended, provided for the emergency

detention of "each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe

that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with

other's to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage." From the time Sub-

chapter II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted until the repeal

of this law by the Congress, the FBI operated under a Congressional mandate

which required the identification of all persons who might be covered by its

provisions in the event of a national emergency.

• •

What is the effect of the repeal of Subchapter Il of the Internal

. Security Act of 1950 upon the jurisdictional basis for investigations conducted

by the Intelligence Division?

Essentially none. During the time Subchapter II was in effect,

lists of individuals to be considered for apprehension and detention under the

provisions of Subchapter II during a period of emergency were compiled based

upon information derived from investigations of subversive organizations and

individuals. However, investigations were not instituted for the sole purpose

of determining whether an individual should be considered for emergency

apprchension and detention under the provisions of Subchapter II. The

identities of individuals who might be appropriate for apprehension and detention

in a national emergency were a by-product of the FBI's investigations in the

subversive field based upon statutes, Exccutive Orders pertaining to national

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 220

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security and instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant

to power vested in that office by the National Security Act of 1947. In summary,

passage of the dotention provisions incorporated in Subchapter II of the

Internal Security Act of 1950 did not enlarge or restrict the FBI's jurisdiction

to collect information pertaining to national security. Our national security

jurisdiction has been delineated by Congressional statutes and Presidential

Directives independent of the detention provisions of Subchapter Il of the Internal

Security Act of 1950. This provision of the law affected how information collected

pertaining to national security was to be administered, retained, and retrieved

should exigent circumstances arise. Consequently, although repeal of the detention

provision of the Internal Security'Act of 1950 eliminated the Congressional mandate

requiring maintenance of lists of persons to be considered for apprehension and

detention during the period of emergency, it did not limit or enlarge the jurisdiction

and authority of the FBI to collect information in the national security field.

In this connection, it is worthy to note that on November 30, 1939;

shortly after issuance of the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939,

Director Hoover offered the following testimony before the House Appropriations

Committee in connection with the FBI Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Bill of 1940:

"Purpose and Work of General Intelligence Division

In September of 1939 we found it necessary to organize a

General Intelligence Division in Washingion. The establish-

ment of this division was made necessary by the President's

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proclamation directing that all complaints of violations of

the national defense statutes and proclamations be

reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This

division now has compiled extensive indices of

individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in

these subversive activities, in espionage activities, or

any activities that are possibly detrimental to the

internal security of the United States.

The indexes have been arranged not only

alphabetically but also geographically, so that at

any time, should we enter into the conflict abroad,

we would be able to go into any of these communities

and identify individuals or groups who might be a

source of grave danger to the security of this country.

Their backgrounds and activities are known to the

Bureau. These indexes will be extremely important

and valuable in grave emergency."

Thus, it may be seen that the compiling of lists of potentially

dangerous persons and individuals had been undertaken by the FBI prior to

enactment of the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of. 1950 as part of

the Burcau's implementation of the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939.

NW 54969. Docld:32989720 Page 222

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0. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 5/11/61,

CONCERNING FBI INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

RELATIVE TO CUBAN INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

. •=

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May 11, 1561

MENORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

MR. PARSONS

MR. BELMONT

1

On Apnil 27, 1091, I attended, at the request of the Attorney Ceneral,

a meeting of tab rational security Council presided over oy the president.

The first part of the meeting consisted of a discussion of the situation in

laos, which in no way involved the t3I.

The second part of the meeting doalt with the Caban situation. There is

was a general discussion by variois menbers of the National security Council a3

to the many pases thai enter into this over-all problem.

The President inquired of me what my views were concerning the then

present sitaction. I told the president that there were approsiantely do, 000 Cubank

nationals in the iarai, Fiorida, general area and this troup posed a socirity

probies because of the fact that many of these individanis are bitter and disillusiono

as a rosalt oi the infusion doieat. I stated that large numbers of rafugees wino

particizated in the invasion forces are coming into florida by plane and by boat

¡rora the training camos anintained in Cantral erican countries. I stator that

a substantial amber will ting it curicalt to become readjustod to civilian lie.

• I stated it must ba remembered that this large group was looting for

and expecting United States leadership and sympathy in their continuinz efforts

againgt Castro. I pointed out thai the sons of Cardona and varora cou were me abers

of the invacion forces and were castired by Castro and I statod that there were no

doubt many other Cuban inmilies in the iriami area who had close members oi thoir

families who particizated in the invasion and have either bean stiled or captured,

and this all pointed no to the necossity for the Unitod states maintaining the care

for those retayees and piving the some guidance. I strassed the importance of

on

cons

IT United States having close lizison with this Cuban group and its several factions

on so as to give guidance to it.

lach

-Sir:EDM (7)

- TERON

MAY 12 1961

REG 73

94-102

62-11-2-05--

Sullivun

Hoam.

19 MAY 12 195}

MANLiBOONI

TELETYPE UNIT L

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Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Parsons, Belmont

May 11, 1961

I outlined to the President the fact that the 2ei had intensified its

coverage of Casaas in this country, both anti-Castro arcaos and pro-Castro

groups. I conmertod brially anon the activities of the fair Play for Cuba

Committes and the clamonia in back of it.

I pointed out that the situation within Cuba would be, li course, even

more acute now than in the past and that Castro no dowdt had ibsen materiaily

strengthened militarily as a rosalt di the fallure of the inregion. I ctated that

Castro's government woud continue to receive military gauincent from the iron

Curtain nationg in view oi the fact thet the port oi barona was onen.. I said.

therefore, evon touca tao econorsic situation in Cuba tay bacozie inore critical,

certainly iron the point oi view ci military control and the runnine of a polica

state, Castro was probadly stroager now inan at any time in the past.

i. I note on the attached memorandam dated jays, 1061, daaling with

the request made üg are conn fairenthaler, Administrative Assistent to tie

Attornay Canoral, to determine how far the President should go in clamping

down on Cusan rsiugees, particulanly as to the security noblem invoivod in

the situation, that it mas sargested by the Domestic Incolligence Division that

the Subanscapes in clorios as a table do not pose any simficant socurity

proble a, *i um at & corapiete logs to anderstand this statoment in riow of tre

bries prefered for may use in the Domestic Intalligence Division, waich is attached

hereto and which on pagea's and i siresses the point that there is a real secrity

problem in the handling oi the refugees in miami.

Very traly yoars,

kit.

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments (with original only)

SENT EPOX D. O.

• 2 c

EAST -

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 226

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## Page 227

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 227

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## Page 228

P. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 4/28/65,

RELATIVE TO CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING

EFFECT OF ANTI-VIETNAM DEMONSTRATIONS UPON THE CONDUCT

OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

AND

LETTER TO McGEORGE BUNDY,

* SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 4/28/65,

ENCLOSING FBI MEMORANDUM TITLED.

"COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES POLICY ON VIETNAM"

DATED 4/28/65

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 228

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## Page 229

• .

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BURLAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please. Refer 10

• File No.

WASHINg04 223y. 01905

MEMORANDUM TOR 108. 201002

NR. 88 20202

20025

20. SULTAT

This craig i adordod los cuaaring ia cásemondes de le Wallo

saricia matiers.

Vlemai Basanos mau Ces S0V010366 2.Cio cоzr6y 20 43 coca

periodicaty tho tacterii daci to bosi diea yeobenday ecatiniag elippingo 2roia

to sio com

et they wazo condes

the disraspacees duct bato diroady osoused.

Z0 Sait to Lad just roccived 2025

and divide tse madacas tani Cun c200g0 21 Gout: Viceaas mould Lavo io be

Withdrama an Cades do Broscavo Cruc:

Vietne mese do sove in ii cace, ma,

of seo Canion Cuéollegenco Agezoy Lacé

2 25 lisatiod do Coisig Cabiazy BeJe5,

postation ca cuzcaos to to guosaiiia

santer ores au bo bad jaci coccirod

33020G 01 20-I VIETRI DE

2'02 verona di to procent tac

Morin Vissaam operating in Souch

c*)

& Vodld incriming sang 2060 mis Ca-

aaanc, baide, to Peesidea

52iead02 03 bonding d00k Diaco

to Chaseco and Dossialy do silastins

SES EDI (2) .

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 229

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## Page 230

Agril 25, 1955

ard to mocla ines. Do in dor a full coucos voalá ver.

comothing do 15 de

mircaram sho coogo cosa Vectrom and to continuo mo jontag ca do Daalo

30 tão Boca dunas

juste, oi comes, intenden do exacáucy oraisets iso

eligeaco Agonoy. Do elatod do would lis

me do tairo poucape não armociado alego to madei de logoi too scaaturo and tro

do ouggosicà à Jos ano Bonaior Erraca dã Minois ded Barior Dode 08 Conecesical.

Do diá not Dupsosi may manco dê cay congradaraca bai lado dact do zay juagenor.

2i0na coming to tho Waite Zouse mai Diam muDoos cade 1202 May & 10

crono sociolo, marca is

nicia end Waic. ine bean

2g à moac cacam. 03120 Biadores 302

stated so as maring dos

wes Leoving dodey a

bộ gead: 2037

whies teas

200 Dorescie Society.

BES CORECE CiO 17.20

ü ia soucuact bisados to cac

ZO CÃO MASCH NEO TORC 206 COLT

cadeto cad de coalà red la coccada id vao a

with espanco agea do core:

¡'belsora no choule intensdig dercuga cii tho dicia cidioca mo inciackor

Seado Por Dozosrcio Socioly Do tat We Wis %0ro

ico do vino Do hovo la tão Ku Kha: tano cd dbe

280000 24052

ü covosage on

Comuna Chuty deck.

do 2 ou

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Rage.230

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## Page 231

Apzil 23, 1005

MOmOCaLRs 402 Liccazc.

Feibos, Rulacai, Doloroh, Fosui, Sullivca

I also toid teo Daoaidont da: Do muze geopaziõ, E 70020236 10

tha zogugre 30 3a6 ziado Mnonza Monor25i0 ZisGcoago Beady ao wo Wacde Meaic

an Ovssaaü raczeosanda.C5

¿is Vacioar derccadciero Crá COre

MSÜLMe2CO

27 Cho ScEO CuC Lo Womtd caceuter to

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deca io diria-geaoaids

Dy tho cori of dnio mosá üo conicaay due danse có dso rocor aoculé dacder te

enorò every cilurd co maujmay goi ludo tno znoctdend tnis mocka go bo ce

snieo it winh hiso do-dro nanca 2oa aca

JELE 2O 205am60R 2a dxcs 22520622-2225,

25Y04XN0N, 10 10 00 20 2÷422208 19

Caynnng m0 2 C23 23 2902 220204 29

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Zicaio 4o cor

to veniouo erono câ tao eountay do sgedl da tao Vuocacra casvatioão erozuit

PEDOÓ T EUR0 & ORuE CaC LSEC Lto ROGg tO BadOVOS Cu LÊcT

corerage cué so &ccoa, dwong zosacerazia:

shai wid grapotre Shad deose

deronobrntiora valda dero eonurcsl, pantieiarla es e cnepares cl 38

CollogeS cod cxzoa5ias6 Acta Bo5a

mogoy CaaaeikeD0y S0awadk

over tbough doy zuy sotzavG

iacictod toar zu thoy só docoi bove feancá

auá dûscod t LnDO Duc& an 220 Béro RoR0 28 Deracioz,

catrorcis, and

as thoy sio doing dó Okão Same Grávesaloy só to gacoong ürno. Cive duis

maties iscicó Eocisa Cad d02 DoLorty Dó Cão Ecodnuc" 45 Feito ¿cnocoace

abosi tné Dutaciioa caá tranto cuoaizi má caièa coclo.

i moud ine do Facairo Euageetcaà es do Buo Gosgrusemca Do xay

contacn, caé a Begasaas me. cace Desdezr,

i co4ss ded C0 Coco Jiag Ös

ondeicà vit

-cterici do uso co tto 0708-018 Vadiucz

xaurdaion

mid Cns

comimuaisù iutacade dn 1a BBuz o6 Do Jeceriai Dei vo Doaid Eunzicà 6o

tão Congaoooraco Woaid 3o inoladoú is Lo mozcosaaáun lnco ¿hova monzicaeá

Ebevo thai ta ane propaaing ãon too Erucidosi do to use ci tao zdciaissraão=

Spoakers ducugaoue do coairg.

The Prosidoai, 20 & indiosacd, inüceaod me h0 205 loaving d0r 50

s2ich aitbougà ao dia noc cay wasn;

but so s biatod, enceumo de wit de Coesoezow

oi possaly Sccarday.

20 inalostod Lat ireracCicscly cpon io zoduza Crot das

raneia, no varioá to madug a sogeler cebeucco son sorang izeacos Wiih tac

vecily cy to cai diceaoo vocacad axcracac

Cescoarnhy Deziseri in tio casc.

in caio cônca Oven Cach c Bato 52222027

JoieZacKioa cao DicD SCErd Ca L3

Rerelga Leict

Eeneo cacoo 1o Cideà Do Do 20b Roto CmiOClodoreà COcoctieno vüs

¿i váci Do ddtala cncalimo cbcnzaadica doat Dao cncen dczassonmaee Criceo,

Very srcy youss,

o sóji Zailai

MW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 231

Tairo, Trie noy 12.

---

## Page 232

Belmont

Mohr

DeLoach

Sullivan

April 28, 1965

BE LIAISON

- Haison

i Baungardner

— Shav

- Kleinkauf

Honorable lcGeorge Bundy

Saccial Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

The White House

Mashingion, D. C.

ODEMON STARLIGNS PROTECTE

Dear IlE. Bundy:

U.5, INTEÄVENTIN IN VARINA,

-

.........

In accordance with your Icquest of Assistant

Director C. D. Deïoach of this Durecu on Anril du, 1005,

there is enclosed a noncrandun setting orch incornation

concerning criticis loveled agrinst the United States

Government's policies in Vietnam oy the Comunist Farty, USA.

Sincerely yours,

REC'D - READING ROOK

Пря 28

177

Enclosure

105-138315

1 - 100-3-51 (Comunist Farty, ISA, International Relations)

JaK: slj :pab

(11)

NOTE:

See-cover monorardun F. J. Baumgardner to H. C. Sullivan,

dated 1-23-J5, captioned "Camunist Letivities Relative to

United States Folicy on Vietnam, prepared by Jill:edb.

=8:

1R1ld

HIS 53

M.!.il' DiREC 44;

Jolson

Belmont.

Mohs -

DeLoach

Casper

Calluhan

jonrad.

ell -

Gule

osen.

ullivan -

avel-

roller -

ele. Hoom -

lolit's

Son NW_54969 Doc|d 32989720

ENCLOSURE'

Rager777r. UNIT L

131315

10.

Cer 17 1905 4 g76

---

## Page 233

"....

::.

: ":

April 28, 1905

1 - Mr. Belmont

-

hir. Mohi

Hr: DeLoach

Mr. Sullivan

Liaison

- Nr. Baungardner

Hir. Shaw

1

- Mir. Kleinkauf

.:.

!'..

COZINIST ACTIVITINS REZATITE IO

UNITOO SELDES BELACE CH VISINAB

NOTE:

See cover memorandum F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Súllivan,

dated 4/28/65, captioned "Communist Activities Relative to

United States Policy on Vietnan," prepared by Jha:pab.

Original sent to the Honorable lcGeorge Bundy,

Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, by cover letter dated April 28, 1965.

• JHIK: CDB: pab

(12)

olson

ohr --

piper

allahon.

Ontadl

ott

ale

osen

Wer

wvNWL54969 Docld:32989720 Page 233

gile

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## Page 234

COMMUTIST ACTITITIES PELATIVE TO

UNITED SZANES FCLECY CH V ZONIAS

For years communist forces hove been varing a

rclentless popazanda camaigu in this country attackin

Unüed States Icroinn polisy on Vicinan. That calpazaz

has constituiad a croscondo oi criticlea cined at nogating

every criore of the Unitod suatos to provent Vieinnn fica being

engulied by comuniss attressors.

Fencuring roncated demands

thay chis country recail aid nilitery corsomol and couipment

INCH VIcüzan, tho compaign sachs to nave Bic way 102 thau

engulinont.

Danictius the United Btades us an azlossor in

the intorni sifairo of othos nations ind accusing C13

country oi suppressing donocracy vile charting a courso of

colonialisa in vicinon, the comunists hove net wieh some

SucCess In diStOrtInG Che Leal lacuas Involica.

Tho intensity

0f the canpaign has nounted coincidontal nith the cigatoning

of tension in Victnan and mry be croccion to nount still

¿urther in lina nich the unalictrole doccomination oi the

comunists in achieve cheir ends.

vio have dononsirated against tho Goverrentis policy in

-

Vietnam are not nonwers ci the Costunist Party or connunisi

controllod DicanicationE.

Tho decisions ci chese peonie

to denonsirate vero nou initiated or cubsenuently controlled

by communisis, Rorovas, the Conmnist inasy, Ula, in line vita

Lus anti terican Vicchan policy bas

vigorously supported those

groups

and excited influence through

propaguada and by 2ay2ng

LEs nenbeis murtucinate in the raconstarsious.

The folloring

intoration is set sorth to roveal many ot tho faccts of this

campaigo of the Coanarist farty, UsA.

COMUNIST PAREY. USA

Long critical of united statos policy in Vietnar, the

Party stopped up its carpaign in September, 1933, then Farty

leaders Luced lacanetlong lant des nonbershly sust Decomo more

nceivo iu the canpaign to geù che ulisd Siates cut o, V1eancu.

These instructions vere folloned by a saados di ciroctives to

Party distrinis cuilinine actiritios to ho conductod io achiere

communist cojectivas.

Foi esemple,

Hascil,

1904,

Farly distriots nere sold in

Theo Che VLCCH2

situation was to be doalt wish

constantiy und thai icltois ald iclogrons conla bo sent io

President joanson urging inediate vindianal of United States

fOrCOS in Vicinan.

Pso incidont welch noved the communist camonien into

-hinh goar vas

the notion waich dook miico in inu Guli os achiln

in caily minust, doudo mo Comunist arty, Una quiCily Cano

-t0 t10

sapoit of Communist North Victhm aid charactcristically

olspn

elmont

ohr

•L.ob

1:5918

allulti?

anros.l

3lr

11114.

avel

coll.

HNV/u5496- Docld:32989720 Page 234

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## Page 235

criticized lalted States forcign policy when United States

alrorait airaared sclested targets in lorth Vicinan 1ollov

10g torpedo-boat autacts against dorican descroyers in tha

Spearing at a neeting of the Party's

Southorn Cali ornia District 0s nagust 1, 1033, District

Chairmon Lorothy lozloy called this action mainst

North Vicinan suirty aggrcasioa."

On the one core that

againat lorth visizan and charged that united itates vai

planes lad sacacht coath to inaucent poople.

The Party

also cisinad turi cads action ras an aspansion oi the var

in the direstica of the policy of baltimanshis.

the release

called ioi all people "to speal out for seaco"

terough

petitions, lesters and telograms to be sens to president

Johasca, Soaators and Congressmen urging negotiation 2ad

the settlonent of all the issues thucugh the cristing

machinery of the lipover teneva conterence and the 5ood

ofilcos of the Unitod Nations.

A Kegotiated Settlchent

.::

By letter dated August 19, 1054, and addressed to

all districus, the Cominico Pasty, UDA, Rational Cananization

Departnent reissued to ide Party's press relcase concoming

"nalitozy E3bI05s10n" b7 tho

North VioLIn. The lotsor siated that it ras oorious that

the cantor oi espansion ci the vu in southeast asia romained

high and that this and sindier doreign rolicy issues vould be

proninent in the cication carpaign.

because o the soic of unicod stares Lucerialica in soucheasi

Asia, do use evea sacater initiciive. to scimiata pressure icr

a negotizied satilemont and the convening or a ication con-

ferenco concerning Vietnan.

Renove Unitod Sintes Forces

In late August, 1051, Norbort Fransdori, ther

Distract curaninor tor the Party's lesion Fonnsylvania

Distric, maintained at a Prity meeting in Picschurgh,

Pennsylvania, that the Government ia south Vicinan would

dissolve lt it MaIc noc don anerican guns and Loacy to

maintain the war.

ianstory sodd that the sisuation in

tho Congo was sinilar to that in Vicinan in thai tho

• do 2 0

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 235

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## Page 236

United States comenced with military aduisors and now has

soldicrs.and pianos involved in the var.

En Sentember 29,

2954, Conmnisi Porty, EJA, Vica Chatrnan doney Viasion toid

tho Ercaicr ios ingoles press Club that the balced

states

military torcos suould be Icnovodi fron vieczane

Ind Mar ia Vaotsan!

At tho chinged reeting of the Comunist Party, USA,

ungcd tho cornunist Party, uol, to utilize the aony organiza-

tions ind "gronnings" wich, be clained, were barbie pessure

on the jactod bictos Covernaont to end the war in vasonan.

Johnson proposed that the party strive fora coniezonce in

Vashingion, i, C., talch would copresent the cotality of

American obinion on vicinan aad vonld atrongo do baiag about

a change in tritod Staics poiley in Vietnai.

In this connec

ton, joanson suggosted that the barty propare, by the end o1

November, 2054,

a distintive documost on visinan and distribuio

50,009 copioy of this isomoat. Such a cocunont vas preparcú

be givon vice sirculation.

Demand for Peace

Duing a neeting of leading Communist Party, USA,

functioneios in late jovember, Luss, jonason again stressed

the reed for the Comunico Party, UsA, to 2inat arainst

he stated that the communist

Party, USA, could do thas viin the forces suruang zor peace,

He suggesied tizi a nezozazian on the Party"s position be sont

to 231 ciscaicts.

The lay point in the monosantum vould be the

denana sor pocco and ai caù to tha mar 2a jobeam.

Johnson

also suggestad a peiltion and posicard campaign against tho

was in Vietnau.

"'Key Test""

Following through on Johnson's surrestlong, the

Conminist Fariy, Usa, lational Carazization Loparinoni sent

an avilriche Oi insicucilOnS tO 2i1 Party Morricts tOr

activitzos designcd to assiova comnist oijectivos in

Eouth Victaa.

In late jovendor, 2051, Party dictricis

vore told thai & comend for neace vas a

key Toint in the

clection mandaie and ray imicmortation of that donand colls

Por an chu to the vai in jonch licenon. Comunist Pa2ty, USA,

distilot lozicio veio insiracicu to ciganizo activiiies in tho

on 3 0

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 236•

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## Page 237

trade-undor novenent, in youth omanizations and In Icllrious

peace is achieved.

ine Farty directivo

pointed

mations taise the question of Peace on Earth, but the

out that as this lo of your eurch and orner organi

test" 1s shat they say on Vietnan.

"Beace on Earth"

The Rational Organization Departuent iscucd another

directive in cariy Dacener, 1954, in wich tho corades vero

Tgeu To bay Checza1 Ztlaation CO Cha Iull usa. Or Che "reaze

on Farta" canression oi the neonle curio? the nonch os

Decenter.

farty dictaicts mare zonuested to advisa Comnundst

Faroy, bad, zacdonal kaacquaziors taat nas bears plannod end

mat was being done by labor, mouth, vonen, churca organizations

and "proiessional peaca cranizadions" in cheir arcao to nala

the grentesi uos ol these cays wuen the norld 1s calling ici

"Peace on Earch."

Appeal to Amarica's Conscience

1n still nother diccive issued in facenber, 1964.

tha

NatIOnaL CaTaLIZTIOL Lapartazzù M22230 ail carcy Cistzicis

that every passing event naires ic nore argent that all seccions

oi the popiation sneas out "to ond tle sar in couth victnan."

Party districts nore cored to make special cifozes for noss

actlvities and cressions of peace curing the neekoni ot

Docender 10 and 2u, 1084. This Party dizcotino colled attortion

to an enciosed lenilez mica urged the roader to "join 1n an

appeal to the conscience où America co end the war in Vietnan."

Mires to the Thite Touse

Ca L'ebruary 7, 1035, loaders 0f the Illinois Comunist

Party net 1n i closed coor conierence in Chicaro, Illinois.

The procecuings nere inccrructed by nons that imbricon rianes

had launched a "onord attacia" upca militery dascallabdons 12

North Vietnam.

Blaci telegran lorms vere inteuiacely obiained

and cach conrade mas ordered to write and sign un jacividual

wire condenrica the inaricen air strikos.

incas vires vere

then sent to ¿resident johnson aù the voile louss.

Reaction of Party Lerders

The renction of Comunist Party lecders on lebruary 7,

1965, mas niodictable.

richin minutes arior the announconont

of the Auericon air sorikes, the Party'o Public Rolacions Dizaccor,

Arnold Johnson, issued a press roicaso condonning tho air strikes

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 237

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## Page 238

as "an act of brutal arression which horrifies the world."

Johnson erred the inerican beople is snoal out in condemnation

of Uniuod sintos innerinlim and to demand the richdrawai ai

a11 GIS IO] Gouth Vietasi.

Support for Demonstratioss

Also 13 Iebruary, 1955, Party districts vere instructed

to take immediate stens to cooparate nith all aacional peaco

organications in regard to activitios involving piciot llnes,

peace palio, sundent assemblies, colorations to the intica's

Capitol and e-circulation di protost scatenants on Vietney

made by trade-maion leaders. In this cans voin, tho Farty

In a larch, 1055, caractive, called ice mauestread sunport o

& Student March of vastincon maca an aznounconent nas usde

that such was to take place the folloring monti.

Party Speakers Active

Both Comminist Party leaders and the Innicand lile

members have particicatoá in denonsirationg or ochor activities

to carry out the Communist Faziy dircotives. Cinade Lighulcot,

a member of tha Comunist Paziy. bal, Matioaal Coznitice, heid

a press conlarchoe 10 log terk Cist ca February 12, 1005.

Lightloot, tao iad ocently returiod luca a trip to Asia.

Africa and zurage, crazod that everywhere he went the poogle,

who had previously bocat Averica tas on the side oi the

oppressed people, am thougat that lacrica's rolicy had changed

to there incrica mas backing oppressive reginas such as in

South Vietnam.

99722° 0E Denonulation"

On Harch 25, 1955, Concunist Party loader Gus Hall

addressed an zudionce of 800 on the occasion cr the forty-first

Nor York City.

DurIng his address, Lall renariod tat Laited Eiries "japorialim"

suands naied and convicted as the cavadar, the castessor and the

murdorer o1 the poone vi Vietnan. Lall brancaiy stated that,

although presidont Jhanson's gross socretary conied that the

Prosident iad Inowledte of the use oz poison gas, it vas being

used tion tie flociaoat visiied Victaaa sone yonrs aro.

in his

conclucing icearks, tall docicrod that the recronsibilliy zor

the policy in vicines must rest on Liesidant doincon, sinco tho

Unitca States is conducting an unpreccuented var oi depopulation.

- 5∞

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 238

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## Page 239

on tho Connus

Torbere Aptacker, another Communist Inrty, USA,

National Comitico norber, las sevorcly criticicod chis

Luci coronotration

et tho baireszaty oi Calidczala, Borkolor, Calciornia, dochoker

10 Viosuan is to cárcer rozult of Triied Statee incervention

o groug ci appeezoataly 200 persong in rew cour Ciero Lothoker

enconsaca tien to mito the frealacaò ead ilsir Conacoco

coressag daois indigantion et Faibed Statos policy and assing

thai the United frates rthczay fooa Vlotraa.

Unido Caits Viotran Policy Ly suatieg Chau

Mas uning cha fer 2s B Ersting C20u26 &0x 264 8029005; Bas

eploitag te Vounruese beobie and Vietcan's coacurces; and

as contanalny the war io durchon ics com musciaidor dosires.

Antickes again mose at a

Czy College o lien lork, lam dor Cabl, Ch inadl 13 and 11,

2035, du debado tho crusa of sotica in Viccaca.

cien rich variod irou 400 to 000, Le severly criticized

the titod cotos position. de ceccivoù a sinding ovation

§r'On ilie ciowd.

Harch on fashiraton

Tho DIrnes Studont larch on Kachingion mes hold-

On April 17:

105, and romeoseaus the lazrero stanlo Conon-

strailon beid to inie to vootect Gaáced &02r0s parion in

Victana, nich 22 caucatod 25,000 perciciaa-ão. Llo dba March

vas 2o5 coranas azaunzed, donanatod or concoddod, Comminist

PasCy Leaborg dIra Creagacat une casion pascicinatod in This

nachael dagezoils laciocad Leuch Alrocuoi, Coazedst 12255, DeA.

Goongo Movers, a neauer of the radional Sabountro Commictea O2

the Concunist Party, UMl, Elcosiaacod contos de ize lorter"

during cho Lnach.

M2C:123 2010 40-11 28 2207Đ 17221 209 2035, 403 1319

the Connaisó Fardy and Individual Comaisso enrcicipated 1n

the Manch on lacidarion and coccaaand tho Xaach as 21

evert."

Lagaroll suaicd au this rocting chor loo" playod a

decisive voie in the larch and arnold johncon roported that

"our" people vore there dich all ovci the couriry.

Nw 54969 Docld:32989720 • Page 239

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1017111 nt I03 Parch

In conjunction with the Student March on Washierton,

an "Eastor Viril" vas organiced to ba noid aù the IDJ Ranch

In Joanson Cist, Taras, over laster nockond.

as a'Concunist

local comanist tir loavor chasized the immortance oi

this acrion and urned Couist Farty nonbers ia attendance

to see poopie. to joia cha viril.

¿prominatol. do individuals

particinuod in tris vigil, rich cock biace co doril 1l

through 18, 1505. Included zor the participanus vere

individunis ceo have ocen identizica as past or present members

Di tha Communist Farty.

Hole of the barty Fress

Distribution of "Ine Monker" curing the larch en

Vachlegton lilusisacos to a dorrie the criensive use the

Party has nade oi lus troporaada media in the claborate

campaiga aralect laided beatos policy in Vloonon. Che

carcel. accive nois the jarty has piaged in the campaign -

Is evidoncod by the frezu count ci coacs all Pazzy cublica-

Lions, such as "re lorber," have devoted to the various protast

doronssrations cricical ci

this lation's policy on the Victnan

situacion.

Jor coachs, arcacios have appoaled in rizeually

every inue 0f "The locher" attackay baited biates policy,

Locusing autontion on denoastrations Iciated is protests

agains cat poiicy and icatizing pross reloages oi the

Party demanding an cad to "the policy of brizimanshiy."

Youth Groan Activity

-

The M. I. B. Dubois CILaS DE Anerica, a karxist-

oricated mouth organization wich mas zormed in Juae, 1954,

as a rosuit of a mandate by the tomunist zarty, USA, has

folloned the comunist paroy line Callic? or nichdamal of

United Saces troons iron Viazany since dis inception.

Locat

chapters ol this orrenisation have participatod in denonstra-

tions protostle, laited saacos acuion in Victaan in major

citics tarabout the unicod Suatos. in March, 1005, a

dircotivo capuioned "Energoady liono en Viet isa Crio13" nas

issucd by tie rational Cirice os the Intois Class rhich

emphasired the coportunity breseniod by the current Vietnam

crisis to nobiliaa nassive support and urned ill Lubols Clus

chapters, noicis and tricaus to join mith octar recups and

Indivicuals in a stepped-Up campaign to end the wai in Victnan.

-

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 240

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Plannin? for the suture

As recently as the week of April 23, 1955, Party

Icaders calica tao zur in Vistaan ona of "u.

3. superialist

aggression" ard called on each fasty district to ongage in

united iront tactico mith "loft" political action croups in

an eflori to end the war.

Plcased with the ranscion aron the

March on lacierton on April 17, 1005, brotoztunz uho maz in

Vietnan, to dominist Farty, Usa, ments anognor suca

denonstration, nossibly around lenorial Day fuey 30, 1965),

or by tho chd oá tia schoot ycar.

They mart to chohasize

United States richcramal ¿ron Fietnan cichor lodore or after

B0gOt1atá0a5.

the Party would lice to have a national yeace

strike naid,

eicher 1de a day or tor a counle oi hours, in

the near luture to illnotrate this policy.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 241

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13a.5.2.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 242

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Q. MEMORANDUM OF FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK, DATED 9/14/67

CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION RELATING TO URBAN RIOT ACTIVITY

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Office of the Attarmy Grueral

Mashington, Đ.C.

September 11, 196°

Dir. Tolera

MI. DULUJe's

Mr. Mour

Mr. Eishop

Mr. Casper

Mr. Callaien

Mr. Conrad

DIr. Felt_

BIr. Gale

Mr. Pоs2r

AIr. Sullivaa

BIr. Tavel

JIr. Trottaz

Tels. Room

Miss Ho!mes

Miss Gand;

lickin

MEMORAIDUM FOR THE DEECTOR,

FEDERAT

BUREAU OF INVESTICACION

Although the bulk of criminal offenses occurcing

In the course of recent riots have been, local rathes

than federal in nature,

the question as to whether

there was an organization which (a) had made advanced

plans for, and (b) was active during any of the riots

in the summer of

1957 is one that cannot always be

readily resolved by local authorities.

In rien of the

seriousness of the riot activity across the country

It is most important that you use the

marimum available

resources, investigative end intelligence,

to collect

and report all facüs bearing uron the question

25 to

whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by

any Ercuo oi inatever size, effectireness or affiliation,

plan, promote os aggravate riot activity.

In this connection the following federal statutes

-could be applicaole depending: of course, upon the lectual

situation that develoys:

Title 18, USC, Section 2383; whick proserites

the inciting or engaging in any reballion or

insurrection against the authority of the

Unitad States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2304, which proscribes

conspiring to

overthron or

to dasticy by lorce

the Government of the united States or to

oppose by force the authoriiy thereor or oy

force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution

•of any law of the United Suases.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 244

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4.

-

Title 18, USC, Section 2385, which proscribes,

Inter alia, advocacy of o'erthrowing the

Government of the United states or the Covern-

ment of any state, territory, District or

possession thereof, or the Government of any

political subdivision therein by force or

violence.

Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388

Selective Service, 50 USC (App.) 462

Travel and Interstate Transportation,

18 USC 1952 (Arson)

18 USC 831-33 (Expiosive)

Destruction of Government Property; 18 USC 1361 et al

Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC 901-909

Crimes on Federal Reservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et al.

I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been

alert to this problem and is currently submitting intelli-

gence reports to us about riots and about the activity of

certain groups and individuals before, during and after

a riot.

Indeea, the President has said both publicly and

privately that the FBI is conducting extensive and comprehen

sive investigations. of these matters.

•There persists, however, a widespread beller that

there is more organized activity in the riots then ie

presently know about. We must recognize, I believe, that

this is a relatively new area of investigation and inteili-

gence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice.

We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility

of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a

violation of federal lan, by à group of persons who make

the urban ghetto their base: of operation and whose

activities may not have been regularly monitored by

existing intelligence sources.

In these circumstances, we must be certain that

every attempt is being mede to get all information

bearing upon these problems; to take every step possiols

NW 54969 Docld:32989720. Page 245

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## Page 246

to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or

organized: and, if so, to deterrine the identity of

the people and interests involved; and to deter this

activity by promot and vigorous legal action.

As a part of the broad investigation which must

necessarily be conducted, it is requested that all

available information be reported and analyzed regard-

in -Ing each sniger caught in any riot or extremist

activity and regarding those arrested during the course

of a riot or significant racial disturbances who were

not, residents of the general area. i moreover, sources

or informants in black nationalisi organizations, SNCC

and other less publicized grougs shoula de developed

and expanded to determine the size and purgose of these

groups and their relationshig to other groups, and also

to determine he hereabones of cersons tomight be

sarines,

allegations of conspiratorial activity that come to our

attention from outside sources such as those reported

regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 23, 1967,

and those regarding the Detroit riot wich were furnished

to the Depariment by Walter Sheridan of the National

Broadcesting Company (surmary of latter is attached).

Ramse.

RAMSEY CLARK

Attorney General

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R. DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM, DATED 2/18/69,

CONTAINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CAMPUS DISORDERS

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578. 1-11

10-1.

UNITED STATES GOVI

*MENT

Memorandom

JEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TO

Director

Federal Bureau of. Investigation

DATE: February 18, 1969

:OM1

J. Walter Yeagley

: Assistant Attorney General

Internal Sccurity Division

SUBJECT:

IllegaL.and/or.Violent Campus.Disorders

Students_for a Democratic Society-

C7:

Seditious Conspiracy: Smith Act; Inciting to

i i

Riot: o

In an attempt to determine whether there is any under-

lying subversive group giving illegal directions or guidance

to the numerous campus disorders throughout the country, it

is requested that you endeavo to obtain information regarding

the following:

Individuals who have been active in inciting

campus disorders who are not stugents at the

college or university, involved, Farticuiarly those

whose activities resultca in violence or the

8/1:

violation of laws or in arrests. It is requested

that inquiries at the colleges be made of college

officials only.

DOIVi!

Individuals who have traveled to other schools?

to participate in studont disorders.

It is re-

quested that such infornation be solicited only

Exom college caricials and fron Bureau and Police

Department recoras and sources: 165: 121):8

Plans, programs and tactics notherali

reported, for the conduct of violent ry

campus disorders. It is requested nat suen infor-

mation be solicited only from Bureau and Polita

Department informants and spurces.

Colicge

officials might be asked if they have seen any

printed material concerning such activitres:

tonimal evermoderi

SPiS

Burial

10 2 10 214531 HOT!

JiG APR 25 1909

I MAY &

105?

NW 54969).Docld:32989720 Page 249

Tea no merit"

supus.

3/4/67

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## Page 250

2

-

Information showing a movement of

information, reports of directivus between

organizatichs,

or branches. of-the-same

organization, at various campuses wherc

violent or illegal disorders have taken place.

It is requested that such information be

obtained from Bureau arù Police Department

informants and sources.

College officials

might be asked if they have seen any such

printed material.

Information as to the source of funds

for bail or payment of fines where any large

number of demonstrators have been arrested.

It is requested that such information be

sought only fion bank officials, couxt officials

or from Bureau sources.

Information not previously reportod indi-

cating a movement of fúnds between organizations

from one carpus area to another to support or

maintain sit-ins where college buildings have

been taken over or occupied without authority.

It is requested that such information be obtained

from Bureau anā Police Department informants and

sources only.

Individuals identified by fingerprints or

otherwise who have been arrested at demonstrations

at more than one campus. It is requested that

such information be obtained from Bureau or Police

Department records only.

It is appreciated that a great deal of information has

already been furnished regarding carpus demonstrations. The

foregoing is only submitted as suggested areas of particular

•interest for future investigative efforts.

•..-

NW 54969. Docld:32989720 Page.250

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S. EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY; FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER;

1) EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1940

2) JUSTICE DEPARTNENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

3) FIRST DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILL, 1941

4) SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

5) 1951 APPROPRIATIONS ESTIMATES FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

6) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1973

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 252

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302

EMERGENOY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIOY BILI, 1910.

THURSDAS, NOvEMBER 30, 1939.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

iNvESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 253

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EMERGENCE STIILENENTAL NPRNKLATION BILI, 1080 303

The regular appropriation for this reur is $7,300,000, und if the

supplemental estimate of 81.475,000 is granted the total appropriation

for this fireal year wail be 48,770,000.

Before 1 take up the maradual Hems, the chraseokey submitteel

for this item by the Burean of the Budget reads as follows:

Salaries and esperses, detection and proscention of crimes: for an ariditional

amount for sularies and

federal Burent of Invratuation, tiseal year

1940, incluring the came abeces and under the came conditions specitied under

this head in, the Hoparmont of Justice Agpropriation Aet, 1940, $1,475.000. 08

not tu corred 5100,000 may be expended for peronal services in

the District of Columbia: 575,000 for the purchase and exchange of motor-propellel

parvenger-carrying vehicles; and $100,000 to meet unforeseen emergencios di &.

confidential charactor (i l

• S. C. 310: 53 Stat. 897, 895), $1,175,000.

You will notice thint this phrasenlogy contains three limititions.

First, for personal services at the seat of governent an increase of

$100,000.15 allowed

Our present appropriation allows unmount of $1.872.480 available

for persoul services at the seat of government, and this proposed

supplemental appropriation wiil increase that amount to $1.972.480.

Phe proposed phscolory in this supplemental estimate allows in

amount of $75,000 for the purchase and exchange of motor-propelled

passenter-carning vehicles.

The original appropriation for the fiscal

year perints the purchase of such vehicles an the amount of 850.000.

If the supplement appmopriation for this items allowed. the lumta-

110n1 for 1h0

exchange of automobiles for the present

iscal wear will total 5125.000.

The supplemental estimate phraseology also includes an estimate of

$100,000 for the contidential fund, in addition to the amount allowed

for 1940 of $20,000, making & totul amount of $120,000 arailable for

the confidential fund.

At the present time there are 47 agents and 1.014 clerks assigned to

duties at the sent of government.

The supplemental estimuto provides

for an additional $100.000 which would aller us to increase the stuff

at the seat of government by o agents and s3 elerks, making a total

personnel at the sent ni government of 49 agents and 1.097 clerks.

The additional personnel requested would be divided as follow's:

One Assistant Director. CAl 14. 20.500: 4 supervisors, C'Al 11,

at 83,800 each; 8 stenographers, CaF 4, ut 81,800 each, and 75 clerks,

CAF 2, at $1,410 euch.

• NUMBER AND SOURCE OF COMPLAINTS OF ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, ETC.,

RECEIVED BY FEDERAL BUREAU OP INVESTIGATION

As a justification for this increase I would hke to point out that in

the fiscal year 1935 we received 200 complaints, involving mutters

pertaining to the national defense which includes violations of the

espionage, sabotare, and colnted mtional defense statutes.

Mr. Cardos. These came from private individuals?

immgmas bnt no from loenl le clorcement declers.

r. Hooven. These compluts were received not caly from During

the Aseal bear 193 1 which chaeel dune 30, 19339, we Persisrel a total of

1,651 such complaints.

Mr. SorDER. From Washington, D. C.?

100118-

•20

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 •Page 254

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304 EMERGENCY SUPPLENENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, I010

Mr. HooveR. From the entire country. At the present time wr

are receiving 214 compiaints necessitating investigntive attention

daily. If that average continues we will receive a total of nyproxi-

• mately 78,000 complaints for the year.

This comparison is indicutive

of the incrense in tho volume of this work. If conditions become more

acute abroad, such complaints will increase materiaily.

Mr. LaMBeRIsoN. They are going over the heads of the local police

officers?

Mr. Hooven. Thut is impossible to determine without first investi-

gating the complaints received.

I do know that the complaints

received by the F. B. I. refer to violations of the Federal statutes and.

not to violations i local statutes

VIr. LUDLow. About what percentaro are vou able to dispose of a

being preposterous on their face?

Mir. Hoover. Jot any of these 214 ara of thut character.

Because

any extensive investizatiplaints, eun be disposed of without making

of the sourco, many

Mr. LuDLow. What is vour experience as to the percentage of the

complaints that have nou any substance?

Mr. Hoover. A comparatively small percentage of them. For

instance we recently rereired complaints of sauntage arainst certain

large linors.

Severul sich compinints hare been given to us in

reference to those ships.

They came irom sources considered reliable.

Steps had to be tuken promptly to make certain that proper protection

is accored to thom.

Mr. LuDLow. You cannot take any chances?

Mrs HooveR. No; we cannot.

This is also true with reference to

the protection of our nailonal deienses.

There has been

an increase in such complaints from 250 in the

nscal Year 1938 to 1,65l in the hscal year 1939, and for the present

year, the total number will be about 78,000.

PURPOSE AND TORE OF GEVERAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

In September of 1939 we found it necessary to orennize a General

Intelligence Division in Washington.

The establishment of this

division was made necessary by the President's proclamation directing

that all complaints of violations of the national deiense statutes and

proclamations be reported to the lederal burenu o1 investgation

This division now has compiled eatensive indices

of indisidunis,

groups, and organizations enguged in these subversive. artivities, in

espionage activities,

or why activities thut are possibiy detrimental

to the internal security of the United States.

The indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically but also

geographically, so that at any time, should we enter into the contlict

abroad, we would be able to go into uny of these communities and

identify individuns or groups who micht be a sourer of crate ranter

to the

security of this country.

Their backgrounds ari activities

are knos'n to the Bureau.

These indexes will be extremely important

and valunble in crave emergener.

As a result of the present dilliculty abroad the mail at the seat of

Government has increased tremendously.

About 10.000 communi-

cations are being received each month from persons and organizallons

ofering their services or secking positions, as well as the many com-

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 255

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...

FMERGENCY SUIPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL. 1840 305 .

plaints of violations of the national-defense statutes. This corre-

spondenee in the majority of instances must be answered.

It has been necessury to estailish a translation section within the

General Intelligence Division whose function it is to review various

foreign-langunge material received ani secured by the Burcau.

A code section also has been

established within the General

Intelligence Division for the purpose of decoring any messages which

we are able to intercept or obtain.

Since September of thus year it has been necessary to maintain &

24-hour-n-diny shit at the seat of Government.

PLANT PROTECTION PROGRAM OF F. B. I.

Another phase of the general intelligence work which will place an

additional burden on our force, is that of plant protection.

Under

arrangements between Government departments, the Military Intel-

ligence and aval Intelligence

have turned over to

Federal

Bureau of Investigation the handing of ail piant protection incusures,

in addition to the investigation of espionge and other activities.

Many factories in this country are minuiacturing products for the

Anne and the tave under finverment contract.

The War. und

Nary Departments lure compiled a priority list of 130 piants which

they have requested the t.

B. I. to consider immediately for the

purpose of determining whether the proper plunt protection freilities

are sriulable.

There are 12,000 additional plants that would come under the plant

protection progran in the event of war between this country und s

foreign country.

Mr. LidIon. Plunts in the first group are already producing, are

they not?

Mr. Hoover. Yes; they are already producing, both for the Army

and the Jasy. In muny instunces it has been found that adequnto

plant protection measures have not been taken heretofore in these

plants.

To cite one instance, in one of the great airplane fartories on the

west coast, a very impostant plant. plans for one of the Army bombers

wore stolen.

We were successful in locating the man who stole them

and in having the plans returned.

The procedire under

which those plans were given out each day

was indicative of the lack of a proper protection program in thut luc-

tom. In the mornmy the drattsmen would secure plans irom the lore-

No inquiry sas mide as to their assuance and no record was kept

of the plans given nus. There ere no chochs as to who had the plans

or where they were.

That is one step we have taken for plant pro-

tection.

We have takon steps to have that sort of thing corrected.

l'nder our plant-protection program we have included the securing

of proper fire-fighting equipment, as well as an efficient and adequate

gunrd service.

It is not the intention of the Government to police any of those

factories.

We have had our agents in the field divisions call in for conference,

tho heads of the corporations listed on the priority list, and we have

outlined to them the things they should do to insure protection for

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 256

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## Page 257

306 ENFIGENCE SCLPLENENTAL APPROPRIATION BILE, 1240

the production of their particulr articles of products that they are

manufacturing under army nud dary contracts.

Mr. Cardos. Your service has been limited to casual conferences?

Mr. Hoorel. Yes; but nitimately it will be a matter of inspection.

Our function will be to surrer the plant to see that the necessary pro-

tertise stops hure beon taken, or to seo that the plant does install

necessary prorisions to protect the plant aguinst sabotage or destruc-

tion.

Mr. Ludlon. Do you get cooperation from the factories them-

selves?

Mr. Hooven. Jes; we have been getting excellent cooperation

from many of the factories in the country.

They welcome the sug-

gestions they have received from us.

We have compiled a manual of plant protection, the first manual

of its kind ever prepared in this couutry.

We sought the advice of

the Burenu of Standards and Army and Tary officials in the prep-

aration of this manual, so that we may in turn be thoroughly equipped

to follow this program through with a mininum delay and maxinan

service.

Mr. LInkeRsoN. I thought these plants all had efficiency people.

or had a honk-ny with a national burean whose representatives visited

them frequently and tole them how to do those things.

Mr. Hoover. Only to a cortain degree, in connection with the nnt-

ter of fire protection, but not arminst sabotage or restruction.

1 hare been vert much surprised at the absolute lack of protective

measures in many of our great industrial piants. Some of the great

plants in the country have utilized practically no measures against

sabotage or destruction di property.

Mr. #unLon. Do they not carry auy lusurance?

NIr. Mooren. Ther do not carry insurance against sabotage; they

do carry insurance niminst fire.

The undervriters give them certam

nevice along that line.

Te luse found in many of these plants hre

barrels thut luve not been tiller for months, and in come instances,

in the northern part of the country. where the water in these barrels

Certain chemieals can be placed in those burrels

to keep the water from freezing, and we have given them the benefit

of this knowledge.

AMOUNT, BOURCE, IND USF OF FUNDS OBLIGATED FOR THESF PURPOSES

TO DATE

Mr. Taken. How much of this money has already been spent?

r. Hoover. I would sur, Congressman, there has already been.

obligated 5022.110.

Mr. Towen And by what authority?

Mr. Hoovel. By authority of the President's proclamation direct-

ing the Attorney Cieneral to nuthorize an increase in the stall of the

Federal Bureal of Investeration by loo special agents and such

adelitional clerical personnes mee erupment as would he needler.

Thare that Droolmation here if

SIr. "Tants. That is in the record"s would like.

•Mr. Hoover. 1 assumed that it sas. The obliention was made

after the President's proclamation vous issuedi

Mr. Tones. Lee me not don mother question: Will an of this

money be spent los angel the purposes for solich funds were ilenied at

The lest salon"?

NIW-54969-Docld:32969720_Page 257

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«бра»:"

EBIERGENCT SUPPLENENTAL APPROPRIATION BILE 1940 307

Nir. Hoover. It wall not. This enture suin mill be spent ior intelli

gence work which has been initiated dunny this year

Mr. WooDREa. Of course there sere certain funds that wer

lenied last rear. and none of the funds are being spent in contection

with operations for which funds were denied last year.

Mr. HoovEr. lo.

Mr. Surden. Mr. Hoover, in other monds. you hare just pulled

soine of thut money out of the 12-month appropriation.

Mr. Hoover. Wint has been authorizai. Consressnan. was that

the monthly quote was maired and we were alored to spend over

the monthly quota, of course. reiving on the delicit to be met by &

supplemental appropriation.

Io have done that, of course, under

the Presidiont's orders.

Nir. H'ouDura, Muil these additional praple he kept on through

the next tisenl year?

Mr. HoovEr. If the emergency continues.

Mr. Woopkin. li the emergency does not continue you anticipate

the force will he reduced!

•Mr HoovER. I'es.

For instance, We have opened 10 new field

offices to conduct this work in

varus paris of the country.

opened nunther oilice at savannal, oe in Baltimore, one at Albany,

in manufacturue and chumpine centers as well as mants whereu huge

naral buses are maintaine.

Mr. WoonrtM: and it the emergency ceases the need for the

additional force will cease?

Mr. HooveR. Yes.

NIr. LoDion. In the field the agent is the unit?

Mr. Hoover. Tes. Of course, we have the field investigators.: ..

Mr. Ludlow. How many agents hare you, all told?

Mr. Hooven. Under the regulur appropriation 797 field agouts are

authorized.

MIr. LuDLow. And hois many are involved in this commendation?

Mr. Hoover. One hundred and fifty more.

¿r. LudLos. Alaking a total of how many?

abr. Hoover. There will be 947 in nil.

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## Page 259

110

..--.

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFPROPRIATIONS

REGARDING THE REGULAR 1941 AND NATION-

AL DEFENSE AFPROPRIATION ESTIMATES OF

THE FBI

FRIDAY, JANTAY O, 19102

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## Page 260

..•

i,.0s, i:

if!:

NATIONAL-DEFENSE WORK

•..

BALARIES AND EXPENSEN

Mr. McANdRews. We will continue our consideration of the items

for the Federul Bureau of Investigation this morning, and I will sk

31r. Rabaut to proceed.

Mr. PiDioT.

Eer the focal year 1941 you hate an estimate of

$2,488.000 for sulares and expenses. detection and prosecution vi

crimes. I notice that there is before the denciency subcommittee alic

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## Page 261

150

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILI, 1911

& supplemental estimate of $1,475,000 for the same purpose. Will

you tell us about that?

Bir. Hoover. I will submit for the information of the committee &

statement showing & comparison of the amounts which have been

approved by the Budget Bureau for the national-defense work for

the fiscal jears 1940 and 1941.

As kIr. Rabaut has indicated, we asked for an amount of $1,475,000

for the balance of the fiscal year 1940, on the basis of 8 months'

operation.

For the nest fiscal year we are requesting an appropriation for

national-defensa matters in the amount of $2.499,000.

This tabulation reilecis & corparison of personal services at the

seat of government and in the fieid, and various other expenses inci-

dent to this work.

(The statement above referred to is as follows:)

Comparison of the amounts approved bu'thr Budget Burear for national defense

10r Mocal years 1940 and 1941

181080p-

plemental

estimate

approved

by Budget i

Burrau

(8-montb

basis)

1911 estl-

Daste 8p-

prooms by

Burtget

. Burcau

(annual

barts)

1941 in-

1т-5

OFer 191N

Persossisstloos, departmenta).

Emplosses:

ApeDLS.....

Chrts.

Total emplostes

PersoDel setTlops, Deld.

Emplosres:

803.773

5218 000

(5)

(83)

(88)

(11)

(138)

$115,207

(6)

(53)

(147)

$1.057.000

(50)

Total employmes

Toisi personal seruines

Totel emplosees:

$131,600

(150)

(213)

$328. 333

(250)

(154)

S0zs. 100

(100)

(61)

{404)

(181)

$1.3172, 000

$771,667

(135)

231)

erts..

(178)

(220

(108)

Total.

(301)

(531)

(220)

Urberespenses:

Supplies and materials

8toras6 of vehlcles...

Communlastion sersio

Tratel expenses....

Tensportation of thine

lect. llabe, and sower

Rentals....

Repairs and alteratons.:

Special and miscellaneous

Confdential (und.

Equipmeat....

185,502

600

8888888

100.

000

321, 385

310,000

13.000

100, 000

250. 000

10.000

3. 000

130, 000

15 000

23. 0U0

100.000

240.000

124,188

400

30.000

100.000

1, 000

10, 000

3, 000

- B&. 383

Tolel, other expenses.

84Q 887

1, 189, 000

911.333

Totel, all as passes..

1, 875, 000

3.147, 000

•1,013. 000

timorzenes lund.

Grand rutal of estimatos, 1410...

1, 175, 000

2. 199 000

1, 013, 000

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JUSTICE DEPARTNEST APPROPRIATION BILL 1911

151

KEMBER DY HEPARIVENTAL AND FIELD EMPLOYEIS RELUFATED IN BIPPLEMENTAL.

DiTIMATE FOR INAU IND IT ESTIMSTE FOR 1I11

Mr. Hower. It will he noted that the supplemental appropriation of

$1,475.000 provides for 43 additional clerks at the sent of govermment.

and 5 agents. and 93 additional clerical employees and 150 agents in the

held, nuking & total of 2i3 employee in the feld, with a total ot 15s

agents and 176 clerks, or a total of 331 employees in both the field uni

at the seat of govermnent.

For 1941 tre are asking for $2.188.000. which will be divided as

follows: 147 employees at the seat vi government. including 11 agents

and 136 clerks; l5t clerical empioyees in the field, and 250 agents in

the field, making a totnl of tut employees in the field.

o wright call to the attenrion of the conmittee the origin of this type

The President in September 1936 issued a formal statement, which

•I will be very glad to submit to the connitter, directing that there

be coordinated under the Federal Bureau

of Investigation all the

matters of inestigative work relating to espionage, sabotage, and vio-

lations of the neutrality regulations, and any other subversive

activities.

(The statement above referred to is as follows:)

The following formal statement wis today issued his the l'reyident at the

United States:

"The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau

of Intestigation of tho Departuent of justice to tuke churse of invesrigative work

in matters relative to espionage, smontage, and riolations ot the nentrality

• regulations.

*This task must be conducted in a minprebensive and effertive munner ou a

national basis, und all infornmtion must be carefully sifted out and correlated in

order to avoid enfusion and irresiansibility.

*To this end I request dil police oficers, sherins. and all other lat enforcement

oficers in the tultel States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative

of the Federal Buren of Intratization duy informacion obtainti by them relatig

to peplouage, conterespimage, sanorage, subversive aetirities, and violations of

the neutrality lntrs."

Mr. Hoover. Under this authority the coordination was proceeded

regulations.

LIXITATION ON PERSONNEL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

"In the phraseology of the national-defense appropriation item for

1941 there is a limitation on the appropriation for the seat of govern-

ment of $245.000. That is to employ acditional personnel. to be di-

sided as follows: 1 Assistant Director at 76,500; 10 special agents at

83,800; 11 stonegraphers, grade Calend, at $1.800; and 125 clerks.

grade CAF-2, at $1.110, making a total incipase at the sent of govern-

STATION ON PURCHABE OF ATOMONE SUrIng

There is also a limitation on the purchase of new curs of $75,000,

providing for the purchase of 10D cars, which will he utilized l the

additional personnel.

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152

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AL'PROPRIATION, IILL, 1041

CONTIDENTIAL FUND

In that item there is also a provision for a confidential fund of

$100,000, to he used for expenditures in conection with confidential

snatters.

GENERAL LITEILIGENCE ACTIVITIZE

I would like to point out the volume of work it connection with

national-defense matters, or what we call general intelligence activities.

During the fiscal year 1938 the Bureau received a total of 250 mat-

ters in that 1 year.

In 1039 this had increased to 1,051 matters. For

the current year te will probably lure i total. at the rate at which

we are now going. of 78.000 complaints under this classification. We

are receiving complaints at the present time at the rate of elt new

matters a Clay, as compared with 200 mattery for the whole year 1948.

I frould also like to point out the congestion that has arisen sa the

result of this increase in work, showing the reason why I am asking

for an additional appropriation.

The Bureau has pending on its dockets 21.916 investigative matters.

of which 7,418 are unassigned. making a total of 3t percent of the

matters unassigned.

STITIS OF NATIONAY. DHFENSE: C'14EN

I would also like to explain. in detail, the condition of the national-

diense work.

Of the total mumber of matters pending, toll are in

connection with national-defense matters. Of that number 1.8tT have

not been assigned, because of lack of manpower. Becanse of un-

aroilable manpower 41 percent of the national-slefense cases ure un-

assigned at the present moment.

There are 1,549 delinquent national.

defense matters on our dockers tolay.

Now, as to the amount of work performed by the agents. the urerage

agent in the Burean is carrying more than 19 cases, which is an exces

sive number of cases for a man to handle.

1s I told you ou Friday:

the field personnel are working from 3 to à hours a day overtime.

Of the entire personnel of the Bureat we have 3X9 agents who hare

already been trained in the handling of this special kind of work.

making a total of to percent of the stat qualitied for this work today.

• COORINRATION REIWLEY MILITARY AND SITA. INTFILICENCE DISINIONS.

The procedure we have followed since this sork was assigned to us

in September has been to bring about coordination between the Mili-

tary Intelligence Division of the War Department and she Marl

Intelligence Division of the Nary Department.

Inder the present

arrangement the federal Bureau of Investisation handles all civilian

investigations arising within the United States and ils territories.

dealing with the carions phases of the national-defense work. The

Military and Naral Intelligence Divisions are confining their setiv-

ities to the armed forces, and they have also called upon as at times to

aid in the handling of those matters in connection with case securring

within the military forces of the country.

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## Page 264

JUSTICE DEPARTHENT APPROPRLATION BILL, IT

153

sIr. RaBaLT. As I understood you, you said that under your nge.

ment. with them the Military and Javal Intelligence Divisions are to

confine themselves to certain activities?

Mir. Hooszr. Yes. sir.

Mr. RABaTT. Are they doing that?

Mr. Hoover. Les: they are romy that: they are conducting no

investigations in matters other than those connected with the military

forces of the country.

We are handling all matters of a civilian

character, but in some mnstances they have called upon us to aid them

in connection with their work in the armed inces.

GENERIL ISTFIIIGANCE DIVISION

In regard to the Intelligence Division which his been set up in the

Bureau, when this work was assigned to us we organized at the scat

of goverment a unit called the General Intelligence Division, wich

• will have supervision of espionage, sabotage, and other subressive

activities, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

That division consists of an assistant director and eiglit super-

visors.

We hare also organized what is called a Translation Section, the

nhject being to keep in touch with any subversire foren-langue

communications. demnents. or papers obtaines be us in the course

of our investigations.

•And we have a Code Section in that division.

used for the examination and breaking down of codes and code mes-

sages which come into our possession..

We have alss initiated special investigations of persons reported

upon as being active in any rubversive activity of in moremonts detri-

mental to the internal security.

In that comection. we have a general

index, arranged alphabetically and geographically, arailable at the

Bureau, so that in the event of any alter emersoner coming tr

our country we irill be able to locate immedately these carous per

sons who may need to be the subject of further investigation by the

Federal authorities.

MAXIATION BE F7E150 DISINTONN

Incidental to the extension of this work at the seat of gosernment.

we have also been compelled to enlarge the field serice. mud we hars

opener nell diverons in the followie sition: albany. f. Y.: Bali.

more, all.: grand Rapids, Mich.: Honolulu. T. H. dunean. laska:

Panama, C. Z; Phoenis, arizo: San Diego. Calif.: San Juan. P. K.:

Savannah, Gi.

These offices have been opened primarily he presen of the inortial

work in connection with national-defend miles.

Yen will notics

that these ofies at leated either in large slipping contess 0112724.

or where there are large military bases.

For instance, we hase nosey had an ote in the Pamma Canal

Ze, and the establishment of us collice there has been of great value

to the Army.

There is a total mow not ã2 troll carers and le as presstole that li

may be come to man mal mice murine the cone of tha

Jerr, dependent upon the volume of work.

MN 54969 Aoclo:37989720 Page 264

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154

JESTICE DEPARTNENT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1041

PLANT PROTECTION WORK

One of the phases of the work to which we have given particular

attention has been the plant-protertion work. We have now assumel

juriscuiction, at the request of the army and the dary of plant-pro-

tection activities at all plants manufacturing any arricles for the

Army or the Nary.

In a time of greater emergency there mill be approximately 12.000

such plants operating in this country. At the present time there are

540 such plants actively engaged in the manufacture of materials,

under contract. for either the Army or the tary.

We have compiled the fist manual of its kind, known as the Plant

Protection Manual. which contains suggestions as to methods to be

followed in the protection of there plants. not only from the point of

viet of fire protection. but also in regard to the safeguardina of

documents and materials in thesé mants so that definite prechutions

can be taken to aroid dets of salotage nu thefts of valuable documents

at plants that are making commodities for the Army and the Nary.

Nr. Rosact. Is that mamml given to the plants?

Mr. Hoorer. o it ina very confidential manual issued only to the

special agents of the Federal Burean of Investigation and Army and

Navy intellicence overs.

The procedure we follow in comection with this work of plant

protection is to call in for conference the sicials of the various plant.

haring these contracts. and outline to them the steps they should sitt

in connection with precautions that must he exercised.

Then we will send one of our agents-and we have now a total of

3o0 men enraged in mtional defene workamen the carious plants

to make an mspection ni ghosiel conditions existine there. aud have

him report to is mpon things that should or should not be done.

Then we submit to the diners of the plant recommendations for

corrections that should le mace.

We do not. furnish protection to the

plant, but our position is as adviser on technical matters in connee-

tion with plant protection.

Since last September we have been able to complete 29 such in-puy-

tions of plants. and l othere de now in progress. We me doing the

best me can with the limited personnel we have.

In all these instances where there conferences are hold-

Mr. Rinurt. To what extent are they complying with your recon-

mendations at they plants?

Mr. Hoosen. He hase receirel very excellent cooperation..

EXMIPPRITIOS WIIN AKSY IN SATS INITILLUENCH: NEXTICEN

At the seat of gorernment the cooperation we have developed be-

tween the Army and Navy intelligence services of the Bureau has

resulter in ahnost daily conferences among the three brunches.

There has loon, in my opinion, at no time as close and cordial a

relationship do exise today lemon the dray und dary intelligenc

services and on Burean.

I cannot pus too hugh a tribute to Col.

E. R. Warmer MeCabe, chiod of the arms Intelligenee Division, and

Admiral Walter

Anderson, diretor of the ollioes of Nurg In-

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JESTICE UEDUCTUENT APNOPRLATIOS BILL 1041

155

telligence. They have been most cooperative and most helpful anil

ve huse all been working as one in this undertaking

• There have been many acts of sabotage, particularly in connection

with projects that have been necossary in the manufacture of articles

for the rearmament program.

?

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## Page 267

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOWMITTEE UN APPROPRIATIONS

MONE GRATIT DT

REGARDING THE 1941 DEFICIENCY AND SUP-

PLEMENTAL APPROFRIATION IN THE AMOUNT

OF $975,000

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## Page 268

FIRST DEFICIENCE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1211

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

179

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF I. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

SALARIES AND EXPENSES, 1941

Mr. Carror. Te have before us an item for salaries and espenses,

• Federal Burcau of Investigation, as follows:

amount for salaries and espeares, federal Bureau of Invertication

detense), focal gear 1941, including personal services in the District of Columbia

and elsenhere, $975,000.

What is the occasion for that deficiency, dr. Hoover

Mr. HooveR. 'The amount of $075,000 is renuested for use for the

balance of the present liscal fear.

•national-defense investigations, and 200

on the

violations of tho Selective service Ict; 19S field stenographers

making a total of S9S field employers.

It niso provides 300 additional

clerical emplovees at the seat of governinent.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 268

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## Page 269

proyees.

ACTIVITIES.OF BUREAU PRIOR TO EMERGENCI

Mr. CoNnor. Prior to. this emergency, what did your nctivities

JIr. HooveR. Prior to, the emergency,

our retisities, covered

generally thr investication of violations of all Federal statutes except

countericating,

mariubes, income tax, and postal siointions.

jurisdiction

included kidnaping,

extortion,

bank robbery,

slavery, motor-relicle theit, impersonation of Government officers,

frauns against the (overnment, antitrust investigations, and so jorth.

Mr. LuDIow. Did it cover lynching?

Mr. Moosen. No; thero is no Federai statute on that.

you recall, a les yours ago, Congress preced a series oi so-called crime

bills; such as the one covering unlawul tgut to escape prosecution.

For instance, a jelony is committed, let us suy, in the State of Jew

York. Now, ii the perpetrator goes to Florida, we have jurisdiction

in the matter or getting him back even though we do not prosecuto

him in the Federai courts.

... -

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## Page 270

FIRST DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILit, ID$1

185

There is also the mutter of stolen property. You may recall that

within the last week there has been a series of very large jewel robberies

in Miami.

Yow, anything in excess of 55.000 that is stolen and taken

from one Stato to anuther, comes within our jurisiction.

Afr. Cussos. There is alin the fugitive law?

Mr. HoovER. Toat is correct.

LEGISLATION INCREASING INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION OF. BUREAU

Mr. Cartos. If you will put sucis a list in the record, I think that

• will be sufficient.

(The list.is as follows:)

LEGISLATION INCREASING INTESTIGATIVE JURISDICTIGN FOR FISCAL YEARS

1934 TO 1941

LEGISLATION AFFECTING FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIOS

Fiscal year 1934

Public Law No. 230, Seventy-third Congress, approved May 18, 1931: To provide

punishment for killing or assaniting Federal officers.

Public law o. 231, Seventy-third Congress, approved may 18, 1934: MlakIg

extortion of money or other thing of value by means invoiving interstate com-

merce & Federal crime.

Public Law No. 232, Seventy-third Congress, approved May 18, 1934: Amending

Federal Kidnaping ict of June 22, 1932, obviated the necessity that crine be,

for ransom or reward.

Public Law No. 233, Seventy-third Congress, approved May 1S, 1934: The Fugi-

tive Felon Act-making it uniawiul to lee from one State to another to aroid

prosecution or giving testimons in certam cases.

Public Law No. 235, serenty-third Consress, approved May 18, 1934: Bank

robbery-to provide punishment for coriain oifenses committed against bankg

organized or operating under lass of the l'nited states.

Public Law No. 231, Növenty-third Congress, approved May 18, 1931: Crimos in

connection with penal

institutions-making it

officer or employere of federal prison to aid in any way the escape of prisoners,

or to conspire to do same

Public baw do. 240, Seventy-third Congress, approvca Ainy 22, 1934: Making it 8

Federal crime to trensport in interstate commerce stoien property valued at

$5,000 or more.

timidation.

Public Law No. 474, Sevents-third Constess, approved June 26, 1934: The Y8-

tional Fircarms det not within the primary juri-diction of Federal Burean of

Investigation; hosever,

Federal Bureau

investiantion does investigate

any violations uncovered in the cour-e of other investigations).

None.

Fiscal grar 193.5

Fiscal yenr 193t

Public Ian No. 215, Seventy-fourtli Congress, approved July 24, 1035: To pro

hibit the interstate transcortation of prion madle arode concept those macie by

Fedoral prisons where such transportation sould ix in violation of lams of

State to Much they were to lo calo"..

Public 1.a8 Mo. 238, Sorents-lourth

Congress, approved Angrixt 3, 1935: To

proside for the procrution

of liederal pri-once who coupe while awaiting

trial making such escape a coparare foreral crime.

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## Page 271

186

FIRST DEFICIENCI APPROPRIATION BILL, 1011

tional Bunk Act Lue. 33:3, extruding sec. 3209

see. 102), amended original set of Mis 15, 1934, to cover robberies or atumpted

robberies of tinancial institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation. This act incroased the number of banks under Bureau's protec-

tion from di. 112 to about 17.000.

Public Law No. 421, Seventy-lourth Congress, approved January 24, 1936:

Amending Kidney Act to make it a crine to knowingly possesy ran on money.

Fiscal year 1937

Public Resolution No. 1, Seventy-fifth Congress,

To prohibit the exportation el arms and areunition on united states to

Spain during civil war.

Fiscal year 1938

Public Lan To. 373, Serentv-fifth Congress, approved August 24, 1937: Bank

ruptcy Act -to prohibit certain acrocinenta lixing fres or compensation or

receivership, bankripter, or torzanization proceedings, to prohibit the appoint.

ment of certain persons as receiver or irustec.

Public Law To. JIS, Seventy-fiti Congress, approved January 12, 1938: To

rohibit the making of photogranhs, sketches, or maps of vital military ano

naval defense instaliations and equipment.

Public I.aw

corporations.

section 3, of Criminal Code (C. Soner side proved Soil delang to teedin

ection 35 of Criminal Códe (C. S. C

Government property.

Public Law JO. 651, Serenty-fifth Congress, approved June 16, 1938: Amending

National Firearms Act.

NoTE.—This act not within primary jurisdiction of Federai Bureau of

Investigation: however, violations thereof are investigated when uncovered in

course of Froleral Bureau of Investication, investigation of another matter

which is"within Bureau's primary jurisdiction.

Public Law No. 779, Seventy-fith Congress, approved June 29, 1933: Prohibiting

the interstate transportation of strikebreakers.

Public Law Jo. 785, Seventy-fith Congress, approved June 30, 1938: An act

regulating the commerce in firearms-cited as the Federal Firesrms Act (refer

to note re Public, To. 051, suprs).

Fiscal year 1939

Public Iaw No. 70, Seventy-gisth Congress, approved May 15, 1939: Amending

Extortion act. Prior to this amendment,

ouly messazes threatening to extort

valuables were penalized.

This act extended scope to cover all messanes trans-

mitted by mails or in interstate commerce which contain threat to kidnap or

harm person, even though no intent to extort money or other valuables is

manifested.

Public Law No. 82, Seventy-sixth Congress, approved May 22, 1939: To pra.

hibit the reproduction and misuse of otlicial badges, identification cards, and

other insignia.

Public Ias No. 121, Seventy-sisth Congress, approved June 13, 1939: To provide

for the confiscation of fircarms in the pussession of persons convicted of felony.

Fiscal year 1940

Public Law do. 232, Serenty-sixth Congross, epproved August 2, 1030: The

Hatch Act-to prohibit the intimidation, coercion, etc., for the purpose of in-

terfering with another's right to vote in coctiona of Federal odicials.

Act also

make is unlurai for any person employed by federal Covernment or pand iron

federal funds to he a mober of any pottieal party or armaniratinn arorating

the overthrow of our constitutionni form of government in tho United Stutes.

•PVV-54969-Docld:32989720 Page 211

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## Page 272

FIRST DEFICIENCE IPPROPRIATION BILL, 1211

187

•Public Inn lo: 208, Sosenty-sixth Congresa, approved August 3, 1939: Amend-

ing diational Stulin I'roperly Act-to Include as a viviation condis feloniously

converter, and interraie tramportating of forged, altered, or counteriert

securities, and tools used in counterfritz, altering, and forging. Also includes

as a viclation the receiving, concealing, selins, eic., these toois. The ameud-

ment alro provides penalties for conspuracies to violate this set.

seventy-sisth Congrees, approved August 4,

provide that the statute of limitations shall not run in olienses punishable by

Public Lan No. 270, Screnty-sixth Congress, approved August 5, 1939: To

piot cathe obtaining of anything of value by traud of false pretenses on the

Public Law No. 319, Seventy-sisth Congress, approved August 7, 1939: Amend-

ing the act requiring registration of agents of foreign principaly- broadening •

the scope thereof.

NOTE.- President's directive of September 6, 1939, directed all locsl lat-

enforcement ofticials to coonerate with Federal Burcau of investigation and

made piblic announcement that Federal Burenu of Investication wes to head

investigations of espionazo, sabotage, alf rolated matters is quoted below:

"The Attorney Generai has been requested by me to instruct the Fecieral

Bureau of Investication of the

Departmont of Justice to take charze of

investigative work in untiers relating to espionage, ssbotage, and violations

of the neutrality rezulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner

on a national basis, and ail information must be carciuily sifted out and cor-

related in order tu arold coninsion aud irresponsinity.

"To this end I request all police onicers, sheritis, and all other lar-enforce

ment officers in the linited sistes promptly to turn over to the ncarest redre

sentative of the Federal Burea of Investiention any information outamed

counterespionage, sabotage, subrersive

activities, and violations of the neutrality laws."

Public Resolution No. 5t, Seventy-sisth Congress, approved Tovember 1, 1939:

Neutrality

Act of 1939.

Public Law No. 401,

seventy-sixth Congress, approved January 13, 1940: To

provide for the protection of withusses appearing beiore any department, inde

pendent establishment, or other azency di the ünited States, or the Congress

of the l'nited Stats.

Act penalizes attempts to influence, intimidate, or impede

such witnesses.

Public law No. 113, Serenti-sixth Congress, approved March 29; 1940: Amend-

ing Espionage Act of June 15, 1917-to increase penalties for peacetime viola~

tion thereof.

Public Law So. 491, Ferenty-sixth Constesa, approved April 30, 1940: Amending

section 35B of the

United State: Crimmal Cude to prominit purchase or receit

in pledse of clothing and other supplies issued to veterans maintained in Vet-

оглі"

Administration facilities.

• Public Lan do. 54S, rerenthsisth Congress, approved June 6, 1910: Crimes on

Federal reservations-amendine section 259 of the Criminal Coie-to bring

up to date (February 1, 19301 the rection of coue providing that acts not

specifically punichabie by net vi Congress, committed on frieral rescreations,

may be punished ander law of State wherein reservation is located, if such act

is criminal in that Sale.

Public Law No. 576, Seventy-sisth Conaress, approved June 8, 1910: To make it

& crime to wreck or atrempe to wreck a train chessed in interstate commerce.

Public

Law Xo. 505,

Sorenty-sisth Congress, approved June

amed the Criminal Code so as l0 conder concurrent juri-diction on courts

of the l'nited Srates over crimes committed on certain loderal recrrarions.

Public law do. 663, Goremisch Congres, approved June 25, 1910: For the

protection emind miamint we of she bades, medal, embiet, or other insanis

urmentions incorporated by net of Congres, aid providine

Public Law do. Mig, Jesenty-oth Congress, approsed June 28, 1910: Amending

Bankrupted Act of 1019.

Public Law

No. lin. Wrontrih Congress, approved June 2S, 1910: Alion

Registration

det (Smith

Act which probabity

certain

subversive artivitics;

armela certain precisions of ls mulle pragued do the danisan and deportation

of aliens, and required the fingerprinting and registraten of aliens.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 272

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## Page 273

.188

FIRST DEFICIENCI AL'PROPRIATION BILL, 1011

Pubtic Ins No. 655, Serenty sioth Congress, approved June 29, 1910: Amending

Bank Robbery Act-to

prohib the

receipt, possession, or di-position

money or property feloniouly taken from a bank organized or operatina under

the lawy of the United States or any member of the federal Reserve system.

Fiscal year 1841

Public Resolution go. 96, Seventy-sisth Congress, approved August 27, 1910:

Authorizing President to call into active duty the lational Gunrd and other

reserve components of the Regular Army.

received by the Federal Bureau of investiration as a result oi tis bill.

Public

No.

703, Gerenty-sisth Coneress,

approved sentember

16, 1940:

The Selective Training and service Act of 19÷0; approximately 600,000 finzer-

printicall be recited un

under this bill cach year for 5 years.

Also increased

over violations for failure to register, conscientious

objectors, induction evaders, irroguiarity of board memberi, recalcitrant indus-

Pate paro in to the die targeton reade and oner desou:

articles on board verials.

Public Law No.

551, Seventy-sixth Constess, approved October 14, 1940 (not

elective until October 14, 1911): Makine unlawtul the interiste transonrustion

in private transactions li. e., nonzovermmental) uf convict-mada gcods.

Public Law No.

$70.

rovemy-sixth Congress, approved October 17, 1940: To

require the registration of certain organizations carrying on military and political

sctivities in Unired sintes and ior other purposes.

Federal burcan of investi-

gation assigned investigative jurisdiction over this act, which became effective

on January 16, 1941.

Public Lass No.

$36.

deventy-sixth Congress, amproved November 30, 1940:

Amending Sabotage Act-to make it applicable to materials manufactured for

United States national-defense program.

Mr. Canvor. Are there any other agencies of the Goremment

covering the same work that these emersener emplovees are corering?.

Mr. Hoover. Before answerig that question. i would like aiso to

lenve with the committee a publication which lists the statutes and

proclamations and Executive orders pertaining to national defense

matters.

in answer to your question, the President in 1939 directed

that ni insestigations dealins with espionage, Subotage, subversive

activities, national defense activities, would be handled by the federal

Bureau of Investigntion, except those arising within the Army or the

Nary.

Other governmental ngencies are instructed under this Execu-

tive order to report to the f. B. I. any iniormation showing any viola-

tion denhing with national defense matters.

MIr. Ludlow. Ilow woull a state of war affect your activities, Mr.

Hoover?

Mr. Hoover. They would by necessity have to be expanded.

Mr. Leprow. Would it change four jurisdiction?

Mr. Hoover. That would depend upon what laws Congress might

pass.

Mr. Ludion. At the close of the present emergency, when peaco

comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessurily

will be discontinued.

Mr. HooveR. That is correct.

Mr. Tanen. Is your set-up for the national-defense work separato

from the other work?

Mir. Ilooven. It is.

Mr.

T'AlER.

It is operated as a separate division?

Mr. HoovEr. Yes.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 273

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## Page 274

L

FIRST DEFICIENCE AFPROPRIATION BILL, 10-11

189-

In the held our field officials are under instructions to utilize ap

proximately 50 percent ef the personnel on national defense work are

the other 50 percent on the regular work.

Mr. TabeR. But if some rush comes up, you might have to vary

that?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct?

Mr. TabeR. According to the situntion.

Nir. Hoover. According to the emergency that might arise.

i the national emorzoner should terminate, the structure dealin

ith national defense can immediatele be discontinued or very mis

terially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720-Page 274

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## Page 275

SCITIENANTAL NATION DEFENSE APROPRIATION, 1941 179

TESTILONY OF THE DIRECTOR BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOSIITTEE ON APPROPRIATICUS

REGARDING THE SUPPLL'ENTAL 1541 ESTI-

MATES OF THE BURCAU IN THE AMOUNT OF

$3,558,800 FOR NATIONAL DETENSE

THURSDAS, JUNE 6, 1910.

DEPARTVENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

SALARIES AND EXPENSES, 1941

Mr. MOODRIs. Now, sir. Moover, we have an estimate here in

House Documont S09 for an additional amount of 53,308,500 for the

Federal Bureau of Investigation as follows:

sear 19.11: For an additional amount for malaries and exponses,

arris and area detection more on decenes, due de limites

nates, one races me are and ser the paci deed the is

purposes speculied

head in the Department of

hastice cypropriation

1911, 23.355.500, Uf

which mount not to exceed 8302.000 mar be expended for personal services in

the District oi Columbi: and 5150,000 for the purchare and exchnnge of motor-

propelled passenger-carrying rehicles.

Tell us nhout this item, please.

INCHISES PROPOSED FOR PERSONNEL AT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT

Mr. Hoorer. I would lilie to make just a brief statement as to how

the estimate is divided, and the reasons for this incrense.

Ne propose to expond seccao for pessonnel. to be divided of

thnt munhor,

for our clerical and file work, at 81,440, and 100 student fingerprint

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 275

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## Page 276

1SO STPPLENESTAL SATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIOS, 1041

classifiers at $1,110, making a total of 230 incrense at the scat of

•Government.

I model like to outline the set-up which we hase effected at the

Mashingion headquarters in accordance sill previous approsal of

This committer and Canaress.

Last fall we camo bofor

emergency nationed defense appropriation and we requested autority

to set up a separate division within the Bureau to handle national

defense mnttors under an assistant director.

For the information of

the committee, 1 have here this mormne an oroanizational chart oi

the Bureau at the seat of Government and in the field, which show's the

five divisions of the Bureau.

The Cational Detonso Division will handle and direct ali investiga-

tions deline with espimage, mintage, nationul-detense matters, and

siolations of the noutranty statutes.

COORDISATIOS OF THE ISTELLICENCE AND OTHER SENVICES, TASH-

INGTON AND THE FIEID

In line with the President's order of last Septomber, there hus been

a vory close coordination of all of the incolligence

Prosident, on septomber d, directed the Burenu to coordinate the

functions on nutionn deine matters in intolluenco work.

been holding workly concroners with Military Intellignes,

Intolligence, and other intriligence units and tody there is a close co-

ordination betwoon all of these serviers.

'This is a tromondous 11n-

provement, I believe, over the situation which existed at the time of

the last emergency,.

shen there vero many divided investigative

agoncies functioning in this fiel.

We have also extended this coordination and cooperation into the

field spryices.

He moss hase do field divisions.

The agents li

chares of the field divisions hoid wooils conferences with the intel-

ligence officers of the Army and Jury, and such other gorerumental

services as may be necessary.

In addition thereto, so have a sa-culled reserve, through the a-

timal lolice academo, wach his boon in operation for abont s

Pears.

We huve s00 police olicers who are gradantes of the send-

cly.

We have arraneed for conforences throushout the country

with police chief and hurdle of other law enforcement agencies, in

order to utilize the facilities of sente and local ngencies in the mu-

securing excellent cooperation from

the Sation's lus-onforcement ollicers.

As the Attory Cieneral pointed out, we are trying to noid the

use ni vrolunter crumps.

June very patriotically inclined individuns

al groups sincerelo decro do assist in intestications of this nature..

It has born our fooling, herever, that the work should be handled by

the constituted las-ondoreoment authorities.

This procedure lis

prosen sery satisfictory.

SHED FOR IN HEED PERONTAL IN DEPARTMENT

In regard to the increased work at the seat of gosernment, for which

so are askine nedditional clericad pessonnel. I soule like to point out

the cranga ratior dati ties alich choose the negersity of that inorense.

To alo been so recried dr do pieces of suil at the sont of govorn-

In ahay 1010 shore was an increase to 50,000 pieres -an

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 276

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## Page 277

SCPPLEMENTAL MATION DEFROSE APROPRIATION, 1941 181

• increase of 20 pooreont. Within the last d weeks, there lus been a 300

percent inerent in otters of cervices to the Baren.

Individuals from

various parte of thin sooners write in and offer their sersives to do

isesticative work.

Alans times these are persons

who possess

special qualifications, such as hmooledge of foreion languages.

names are all beine indered do that. if tho time comes when we can nse

a person with -purial qualiacations, we will be

able to immeumtely

communicate with him.

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE INDEX

There is another inded I want to refer to, for the information of the

committee: that is the index referred to in precious henries us & gen-

eTal intolliernes indes.

That inder includes the names of persons

who man brom potoman nomes to our mornal scrunty, such as

known come agents, known saboteurs. leading membors of the

Commanist Pares. and the binel.

This indes has been compiled very

We hare.

as l indicated, contined it sololo to porsons

ensnare in mrivities detrimontal do the l'nice states.

the been lotting aliens come in without

mannine Them Then Thee mee mil The Bent.

Vr. Mloover. Jes: that has been the procedure.

-NW-54969-Docld:32989720_Page 277

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## Page 278

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR ON FEBRUARY 3 AND

FEBRUARY 72 1950• BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCONOETTEN

ON APPROPRIATIONS RECARDING THE 1951 APPROPRIATION

ESTIMATES POL

111

THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OR INVESTIGATTON

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 278

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## Page 279

DEPARTMEA

OF STATE, JUSTICE, CO

MERCE, AND

THE JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1951

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1950

UNITED STATES SENATE,

- SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

...s

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 279

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## Page 280

142 STATE, JUS

COMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPRO

ATIONS, 1951

That movement, as you gentlemen know, has changed its name

many times, while its party line changes from day to day. Thera

Is, however, one fact that prevails and that is that the party line

is based upon the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

I would like to present to the committee at this time a chart showing

the ramifications of the growth of the party in this country with

its various changes of names over a period of years.

"Kenintom a Criminal that son atrim "S ton" and

Mr. Hoover. They use the term "Ilarsism-Leninisin" as their so

called doctrine and philosophy.

That doctrine, as their own docu-

ments set torth, advocates the violent overthrow of capitalistic gov-

ernments.

They state that in their documents and in their speeches.

That doctrine further advocates the establishment, i place or the

capitalistic governments, of the dictatorship of the proletariat by

the Communists. It further states that that cannot be obtained

except by force and violence.

One of the great instruments and reapons used today by all Com-

munists throughout the world is the resort to propaganda and the

resort to the boring and termite tactics.

That is an entirely new

technique that came into being during the last World War, as I have

indicated, in the fifth-column movement. That is the type of warfare

they are resorting to today to take over countries without a direct

attack. of arms, but rather by penetrating into governmental func-

tions, into schools and into churches, where they will have access to

public expression and opinion.

I will deal with some of those activities in detail as I go on.

COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

Senator FerGusox. If I may interrupt. Mr. Hoover, we have in the

displaced persons bill the use of the word "Communist" or "Commu-

nist Party." Is there any may you could lay down a standard by

which you could teil whether a man coming from a European country

tras or was not a Communist within such a meaning?

Mr. Hooser. As regards that, senator, the only way you can deter-

mine whether an individual is or is not a Communist is through an

investigation of the background of the man and his associations and

contacts.

The Communist-front organizations are the parrots or

the "Charlie McCarthys" for the Communist Party. Those organi-

zations can be determined by just analyzing how they follow the

party line.

The particular man you refer to may not be a member of the Com-.

munist Party of Imerica and prohably would not be coming from

Europe. He may not even be a member of the Communist Party of

the country from which he is coming.

Since the trial in New York

of the 11 Communist leaders, membership cards are no longer issued.

membership lists have been destroyed. and speret stays of communi-

cating with each other have been established, so thrt the only way

in which you could really tind out a man's connections is through an

investigation of him.

Senator Fencesox. What would you say a Marxist was?

Marxist oTher may he see us eat stalled

NW_54969_Docld:32989720 Page 280

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STATE, JUSTICE,

MMERCE, JUDICIARI APPROPRIA

ONS, 1951 140

is, as adhering to the philosophy of Marx but not going as far as

Lenin. I personally think that is a fallacious line of demarcation.

I think they are largists and out-and-out Communists in the sense

that you and I use the word.

Senator FErGusox. That is my judgment-a Marxist is a Commu-

nist.

Mr. Hoover. I believe that very definitely.

Senator AIcCarrIs. Is not that largely true of Leninism?

Mr. Hoover. Exactly. They are synonymous terms, NIr. Chairman.

They call the philosophy alarsism-Leninisin. That is one word, a

lo go further into this matter, many Americans have been lulled

into a sense of complacency by the claim that there are comparatively

few members of the Communist Party of the United States of Amer-

ica. Personally, I would have no fear if the Communists could be

brought out into the open, but so long as the party is a branch of a

world-wide underground movement, inspired from abroad, they can-

not be dismissed lightly:

According to our best intormation, there is a total of 51,171 members

of the Communist Party in the United States at the present time.

I have here and wouid like to submit to the committee a chart show-

ing the distribution of the membership in the Communist Party by

districts and by States.

SECTIONS OF UNITED STATES WHERE CONSIUNISI PARIX IS STRONGEST

Mir. Hoover. Most of the members of the Communist Party in the

United States are in the concentrated sections of population of the

country. For example, New York State has 25,000 members: Cali-

fornia, 6,977; 1llno15, 3.061; Pennsylvania, 2,816; Ohio, 2,83k; Alichi-

gan, 1,200; assachusetts, 1.022; Nevada, 20; lyoming, 10; Tennes-

see 27; Alabama, 141; Yew Hampshire 13; and so on.

Even though

there are only 51,17t members of the party, the fact remains that

the party leaders themselves boast that for every party member

there are 10 others who follow the party line and who are ready, will- V

ing, and able to do the party's work.

In other words, there is a poten-

tial fifth column of 50,000 people dedicated to this philosophy.

Senator SaLToNsTiLL. I saw a report the other day that disturbed

me very much, and it seemed to me something was wrong somewhere.

There are & number of people free under small bonds and sometimes

without any bond who are deportable cases, that is, deportable aliens

who cannot be deported because they are refused behind the iron

curtain. Are they being turned loose or are you people keeping an

eye on them?

DENIAL OF VISAS BY RUSSIA OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

Mr. HooveR. Senator, I am very glad you mentioned that becauso

that is merely one of our many problems. Those people are aliens

who have been arrested and some of them have been proven to be

deportable on the grounds that they adrocute the overthrow of the

Government of the United States by force and violence. The Russian

Government has refused to grant them visas, ind they therefore

MW.54969_Docld:329398153Bage 284 1-10

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## Page 282

144 STATE, JUS

i, COMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPRI

IATIONS, 1951

cannot be sent back to Russia or to one of the satellite countries from

which they came.

Senator McCarriv. Do you think it is a part of the plan to deny

them visas?

. Mr. Hoover. I am not far from having my suspicions along that

line, Senator.

I think it would be a very practical part of this

technique to have them here.

Under the rulings of our courts, those people cannot be held in

custody indefinitely. They must either be deported or released on

bond. When they are released on bond, it is our function to know

generally what they are doing.. That merely adds to those people

whose activities we should follow in this country. • I think it is almost

a travesty upon our democratic processes that you can have people in

this country who have been found to advocate the violent overthrow of

our form of government, yet you cannot deport them nor hold them at

Ellis Island.

Senator SALtOySTaLL. Why can you not hold them?

Mr. Hoover. They are released by orders of the courts.

Senator SArToNSTALE. I understand that:

Mr. Hoover. We do not have any law by which we can hold them.

It would be necessary for Congress to pass a law along that line.

To continue. the Communist Party is not a bona fide political party.

It is a highly organized, militant, and disciplined conspiratorial group

following the whims and dictates of international communism.

was proven in the ew York case which recently concluded with the

conviction of 11 members oi the executive board of the Communist

Party. The Communist Party of the United States constitutes a

fifth column if there ever was one.

EFFECT OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERS' TRIAL

The trial of the 11 members of the erecutive board of the Commu-

nist Party in New York last year took the Bureau approximately 10

years to prepare. We prepared a 1,53r-page brief, with a total of

1,033 exhibits. That was presented to the grand jury and indict-

ments were returned.

I have here a chart outlining the members who were indicted with

& brief statement about the case which I would like to submit to the

committee.

The trial of the Communist leaders removes any doubt in the

minds of right thinking people as to where the loyalty of the Com-

munist Party rests. It was brought out at the trial that the party is

a group dedicated to the overthrow of our Government.

The Communist trial in New York has also resulted in making the

work of the Bureau more dillicult, and I will cite the reasons why.

Before pointing out some of the problems that we have had to face,

let me siy that it was necessary in the trial to use seven informants

of the Bureau. They appeared and testified against the detendants.

We had more arailable if they were necessary, but the evidence was

so overwhelming that it was not necessary to introduce them.

All of the informants who testified were bona fide members of the

party. They had been in the party for some years. Mir. Thilbrick,

who was one of the principal witnesses for the Covernment, had been

NW 54969 Docld 32985926"pale28f the Bureau for some years and was literary director

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## Page 283

STATE, JUSTICE,

OMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPROPR

ONS, 1951 145

of the professional branch of the Communist Party, District No. 1,

in massachusetts. nother intormant who testined in that trial, the

night before ind conterred with and had been in conference with

high ranking members of the Communist Party and the next morning

testified against them as a representative of the fBI.

DECENTRALIZATION AND UNDERGROUND ICTIVITY OF COMMUNISTS

Now, that case, as I say, has raised certain problems because with

that penetration of their apparatus, the Communist leaders have

become increasingly security conscious and hare developed certain

security measures to protect their organization.

The trend has been toward the perfection of a highly developed

underground apparatus and decentralization of Communist Party

operations. This decentralization has almost tripled the number of

Communist Party clubs, the purpose being to do away with their

congregating in such large groups. As a security measure, no Com-

munist Party membership cards were issued in 1919. The mainte-

nance of membership records has been discontinued.. Members speak

in a jargon of double talk, and use codés in correspondence. A cour-

ier system has been substituted to protect confidential party communi-

cations. Public meetings are maintained at an absolute minimum.

Party records have been destroyed or removed to clandestine hiding

places. Secret printing facilities and supplies have been secreted for

future underground operations. Transfers of party members from

one district to another are now controlled through the use of an elab-

orate identification system.

the party today is in the process of selecting individuals for secret

• leadershin of its underground apparatus. To counteract the FBI:

penetration of the Communist Party, its leaders have established a far-

reaching and vigorous lovaity program of its own, calling for the

establishment of investigating committees in each State and a thorough

investigation of each member of the party as to personal history, activi-

ties, associations, contacts, and length of membership. Lach member

, of the party is being gone over thoroughly by the various investigating

gram of their own in operation.

" Now, I state these things because these steps tending toward security

within the party have made more dificult the Bureau's maintenance

of confidential informant coverage of the activities of the party. I

do not mean to infer to the committee that we do not have good sources •

of information or that me do not have good representation in the

party in varging positions of trust.

But it is true that it is more

difficult to penetrate the party today. Those in the party exercise

" greater caution. Investigation of party leaders requires more ingenu-

ity. The accitional budget request will materially aid us in main-

taining the type of corerage necessary for the preservation of our

internal security.

Senator Fencesay. Where are they getting their money?

Mr. Hoover. Various benefits and fund-raising drives are held from

which money is obtained. Then they also receite contributions from

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## Page 284

140 STATE, JU

CE, CONDIERCE, JUDICIART APPI

RIATIONS, 1051

individuals tho

re either members or fellow trav

vers and who aro

individuals of wealth.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they spending a lot of money on their

pur. Hoover. They spent a large amount of money in the No For's

trial with regard to propaganda and legal counsel.

Senator FErGusor. How much wouid you say they spent?

Mr. Hoover. I cannot give you an oihand estimate on that.

Senator FErGUSox. Do they raise money here in Washington?

Mr. Hoover. They raise it all over the country and right here in this

city of Washington.

COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

I would like now to take up the activities of certain of these front

organizations. A new drive is being launched in the Communist

Party circles to revive what is known as the united front program

which characterized the party's greatest growth in the middle thirties.

One of the great dangers of communism is the ability of its espousers

to infiltrate and corrupt various spheres of American life.

The way to evaluate the real electiveness of the Communist Party

is by observing its influence and its ability to infltrate otherwise

thoroughly American phases of life.

Combating the front organizations is more difficult today than ever

before. To prove party amliation is dificult: but their deeds and acts

expose them for what they are. They cannot long survive in the spot-

light of truth.

At the present time scores of known or suspected Communist Party

front organizations are under' investigation by the FBI. Many are

organizations national in scope with chapters in various cities through-

out the United States.

The Communist Party has through its increased activities,

deavored to exploit youths, reterans, civil rights, foreign nationality,

the press, radio, television, the motion-picture industry, educational,

political, women, and labor groups.

That statement can be corrob

orated by overwhelming tacts which we have in our possession.

Senator Hilt. Are you going to give us any illustrations of that?

Mr. HoovEr. Yes, I am.

Now, in connection with the Communist front organizations. the

FBI is primarily concerned with Communist infiltration of such or-

ganizations and the manner in which Communists seek to subrert these

organizations to further the Communist cause.

Experience has demonstrated that many fronts are used as a cover

for espionage purposes and others as a propaganda media.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION. OF BASIO INDUSTRIES

The Communists have long ad-

vocated working through trade-unions as a incans of accomplishing

their ends. Forty-eight percent of the membership of the Communist

Party is in the basic industry of this country. In this manner, they

would be able to sabotage essential industry in vital defense areas

in the event of a national emergency.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 - Page 284

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## Page 285

STATE, JUSTICE

OMMERCE, JUDICIARI APPROPR

ONS, 1851 147

Our investigations disclose that Communist activities are most pro-

nounced in such strategic industrial areas as New York, New Jersey,

Ohio, Pennsylvania, California. and Michigan.

Communist efforts toward infiltration have been intensified in basic

industries vital to our security such as steel, heavy machinery, min-

ing, communications, transportation, the electrical industry, and the

maritime industry.

COMMUNISI PROPAGANDA ACITVITIES

The Communists have developed one of the greatest propaganda

machines that I think modern civilization has ever known.

They

capitalize upon ill-founded charges designed to enlist honest, progres-

I sive liberals to support left-wing causes.

". Of the many projessions, penetration of the legal profession is the

most amazing. As officers of the courts, well trained and educated,

lawyers have made some of the inest contributions to American life.

It is regrettable, therefore, that any association of lawyers till per-

mit itself to be used and parrot the Communist Party line.

Earl Browder, then the acting head of the Communist Party, on

September 6, 1939, while testifying before a congressional committee,

defined what he meant by the term "transmission belt."

/ He said, "Transmission belts reter entirely to the Communist ap-

proach to the problems of reaching the masses. Transmission belts

mean having

Communists work among the masses in the various

organizations."

- He later was asked about & group of organizations as to whether

they were Communist transmission belts.

When asked about tha

National Lawyers Guild, he replied, "Yes; they are one of the or-

ganizations"

-During the trial of the 11 Communist leaders in New York, the

bar was shocked by the actions of the deiense attorneys. Some of

those lawyers were members of the ilational Lawyers Guild.

" Senator IcCarray. dir. Hoover, it is very evident that we cannot

conclude this afternoon.

The committee will recess at this time and will reconyene nest

Tuesday, February 7, at 1:30 p.m.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 285

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## Page 286

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIOR

appropriation

1973

joe 2240

were Fate deat

wowed washes defer

""..

Testimony of John Edgar Hoover, Formcr Director.

before the House Subcommittce on Appropriations

March 2, 1972

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INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

Mr. Hoover. The EBI's work in the internal security field continues

to mount and there is every reason to expect these matters will place

an increasingly heavier burden upon our investigative stali. Constitut-

ing a major responsibility of the FBI, investigations of internal secu-

rity matters are conducted to derelop evidence for legal proceedings

• as well as to enable Government officials responsible for the safety and

welfare of the citizenry to take appropriate corrective or preventive

action.

NEW LEFT TERRORISII

The Ne Left terrorism is best personified by the Weatherman

group, a group which split with the Students for a Democratic So-

ciety in 1969 so that it could build itself into a small, tough, paramili-

taïy urganization to carry out guerrilla wartare in order to bring

about a revolution in this country. The Weatherman, acidicted to vio-

lence and hostile to our society, has from its underground perch

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claimed credit for the bombings at colleges. business establishments

and Government installations including the March 1971 bombing of

the U.S: Capitol. Over 20 Weathermen are currently FBI fugitives

for violations of Federal statutes or local mob action laws.

The prescht-day Students for a Democratic Society is dominated by

the Worker Student Alliance which in turn is.controlled by the com-

munist Progressive babor Party. The Worker Student Alhance tac-

tion is critical of bombing and violence in the belief that such tactics

would impede rather than aid in the development of the revolution-

ary movement at this time.

The Venceremos Brigade, organized in 1969 by a coalition of New

Left groups, has proclaimed its purpose is to perform manual labor in

the citrus and sugar cane fields of Cuba as a contribution to Castro's

economy and revolution. Since December 1969, some 1,550 young

Americans, in defiance of the State Department travel ban, have

journeyed to Cuba as part of the Venceremos Brigade. Another con-

tingent. the fifth. is currently planned for March 1972.

While in Cuba, Brigade members were subjected to revolutionary

speeches and were provided with hard-core revolutionary literature.

Repeatedly they were told they are the vinguard of the revolution

in the United States.

Although some of these college - and high school-age Americans have

rejected the communist propaganda and rerolutionary philosophy di-

rected at them in Cuba, many of the returning Brigade members en-

thusiastically adopted the anti-United States stance promulgated in

Cuba and have aligned themselres with the violence-prone Weather-

man and other extremist groups.

New Left, terrorists present a profound challenge to lan enfurcé-

ment. To their threats. their violence and their total disregard for the

law, the FBI and all law enforcement officers must respond in a lawful

and professional manner. Meeting the challenge mill require continued

vigilance to protect the lives and property of the public and continued

dedication to the task of bringing these terrorists to justice.

ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

Three groups emerged during the Spring of 1971 as the main spon-

sors of the antiwar morement. One group, the National Peace Action

Coalition, is dominated by the communist Socialist Workers Party

along with its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance. The Coall-

tion adrocates mass nonviolent protest demonstrations on the sole

issue of ending the war.

The second group, the Peoples Conlition for Peace and Justice, is

supported by various antivar groups but more importantly it has the

unqualified support of the Communist Party-USA. This group advo-

cates massive demonstrations, including cirl disobedience, to bring

about the end of the war. Into this issue; the Peoples Coaltion for

Peace and Justice injects poverty, racisin. repression and women's

rights, among others, on the premise that the war in Vietnam had an

intensifying eitect on these problems.

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The Vietnam

eterans Against the War, the

a group, tras or-

ganized in New York City in 1967 to stimulate veterans' opposition to

the Vietnam conflict. The group rallied several hundred members to

participate in theSpring 1971 antiwar demonstrations in Washington,

D.C. With a current claimed membership of over 10,000, this group

of Vietnam veterans has engaged in numerous local actions, including

picketing and simulated battle scenes, to protest not only U.S. involve-

ment in Vietnam but also conditions of racism and poverty in our

country:

STUDENT AGITATION

Disruptions on the Tation's college campuses during the 1970-1971

school year took a heavy toll in lost academic time, property damage,

personal injury and death. iearly 600 demonstrations occurred, in-

cluding 49 sit-ins and building seizures. The Reserve Oincers Training

Corps was the target of In attacks. There were over 30 instances of

arson and there were 13 Wombings. Over 150 personal injuries were

sustained, approximately 10t by police and school authorities. Four in-

dividuals were killed during the disturbances and property damage was

estimated at approximately $t. million.

The current school year. which began in the Fall of 1971, has seen a

general lessening of student activism. There have been only 58 dem-

onstrations reported on college campuses, including eight sit-ins. tso

bombings, and four arsons. Inzuries to police and participants dropped

to five. Approximately of arrests have been reported. Damages to col-

lege facilities amount to approximately $322,000. In genora, u chrito

lessening in the leel of student participation in demonstrations is

being reported (February 23.1972).

OMISIUNIST PARTY-USA

Completely under Soviet influence, the Communist Party-USA

consistently follows the lead of the Soviet Union. Party leaders con-

stantly criticize policies of the United States while praising policies of

the Soviet Union as the Party seeks to broaden conflicts within the

United States in areas ot racial, labor, welfare and antimar activities.

A major effort of the Communist Party-US A , has been directed

into the campaign to support Ingela Daris, an admitted communist

Party member, indicted for the crimes of murder. kidnaping and con-

spiracy in Marin County, Callt., arising out of the abortive escape at-

tempt in August 1970, by Negro convicts on trial in a county court-

room. On February 23, 1972, Davis was released on bail pending trial.

The Party has mobilized broad support from diverse clements in the

United States and abroad through its propaganda that Duvis is being

prosecuted because she is i black communist. Every possible ploy is

being utilized to divert attention from the criminal charges and to

imply Davis is being tried solely because of her political beliefs.

Ever mindful of the communist dictum that the revolution must be

led by the working class. the Party in 1970 instituted a new front

group, the National Coordinating Committee for Trade Union Action

and Democracy. Through this front the Party is attempting to regitin

lost influence in the labor movement.

The Communist Party-TSA has long sought to become an effec-

tive force in the peace movement and is presently making a strong

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effort to dominate the Peoples Coalition for Prace and Justice. The

Party favors a quasi-reformist rhetoric and although it is willing to

work with the pacifist radicals and the rerolutionary comminists and

anarchists in the Peoples Coalition, the Party prefers an approach

thich would de emphasize the disruptive and civil disobedience tactics

demanded br the more activist elements writhin the Peoples Coalition.

This is in line with the Party's pose that it represents a reasonable

alternative to the disruptiveness of the radical left.

The Party is making a concerted effort to change its public image

and to gain acceptance as a legitimate political party. In the 1972

Presidential election the Communist Party-l.SA aims to place its

general secretary, Gus Hall, on the ballot for President and Jarvis

Tyner, a Party National (ommittee member, for Tic President. In an-

other move intended to increase its stature. the Party again plans to

issue membership books and dues stamps. practices discontinued as

security measures in 1918. The most ambitious attempt to gain public

favor was the November 1971 filming for television of a portion of a

traditionally secret National Committee meeting..

Party leaders are still in demand as speakers and panelists at insti-

tutions of learning. A listing of appearances made during the 1970-

1971 school year is as follows:

Date

School

Speaker

Sept. 24, 1970.

Oct. 9, 1970.

Nov. 4, 1970.

Dec. 9.

1970

Jan.

15

1971

Jan. 27,

1971

Jan. 29,1971

1971

Feb. 4-5, 1971

10.

1971

Feb.

14

Feb.

15,

1971

1971

Feb. 16,

1971

Feb.

18.

1971

Feb. 25, 1971

Feb. 26,

1971.

Mar. 10, 1971

Apr. 26, 1971

Adr. 30, 1971.

May 11, 1971

May 20,

1971

June 1, 1971.

lona College, New Rochelle, N.Y...

University of California, Riverside, Calif

University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa

Mt. Holvoke

College, South Radiey, Mass

Universite of Calfornia, Los Angeles, Calif

Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa-

i Yale University. New Haven, Conn..

University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla.

Miami-Dade Junior Coilege, Miani, Fla.

Augsburg College, Minneapolis, Minn.

Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.

St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo

Villanova University, Villanova, Pa.

University of Cabfornia, Santa Barbara, Calif

Yale Universit!, New Haven, Conn..

Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

Cerritos College, Norwalk, Calif

St. John's University. Collegeville, Minn

St. John's University. Collegeville. Minn.

New Haven College, West Haven, Conn.

Beloit College, Beloit, Wis..

Hotchkiss School,/ Lakeville. Conn.

Arnold Johnson.

Michael Zagarell.

Charlene Mitchell.

Claude Lightloot.

Hyman Lumer.

Henry Winston.

Gus Hall.

Charlene Mitchell.

Do.

Gus Hall.

Claude Lightfoot.

Charlene Mitchell.

Herbert Aptheker.

Dorothy Healey.

Henry Winston.

Hyman Lumer.

Michel Zagarell.

Charlene Mitchell.

Jarvis Tyner.

Victoria Missic Stevens.

Fred Gaboury.

Matthew Berkelhammer.

• College preparatory school.

Mr. RooNer. At the beginning of your statement you referred to

Angela Davis. That is a State case. is it not ?

Mr. Hoover. Jes. Te entered it to apprehend her. There was a

warrant sworn out by State authorities to bring about her appre-

hension. She was an interstate fugitive whom we apprehended. She

was then returned to California for prosecution.

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The Progressive Laboy Party is a communist organization which

netively advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Gorernment. The Pro-

gressive Labor Party controls the Worker Student Alliance, a faction

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of tho splinter

Students for & Democratic Sa

y. Support and

guidance from the f'rogressive Labor Larty have

melped the Worker

Student Alliance to develop its programs aimed at influencing stu-

dents to adopt revolutionary behavior through campus chapters

throughout the United States.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The communist Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyist organization,

has been actively engaged in promoting und planning antivar demon-

strations through its front group, the National Peace Action Coalition.

Also participating in this antiwar group is the Young Socialist Alli-

• ance, the youth wing of the Socialist Workers Party. The loung

Socialist Alliance is extremelv well organized and continues to appeal

to young radicals in the United States

it has

virtually complete control over the broadly based Student

Mobilization Conmittee to End the War in Vietnam which professes

to be the largest national student antiwar group.

RACIAL EXTREMISAI

The coverage of the activities of black and white racial extremists

continues to place heavy demands upon the # bl.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Most prominent among the black extremist groups is the Black

Panther Party. 'The Black Panthers call for the overthrow of our

Government which the Party claims is engaged in a massive con-

spiracy to repress all minorities, kill all Black Panthers and practice

genocide against the black race.

(Discussion off the record.)

Early in 1971. à serious split dereloped between Huey P. Newton,

self-styled Supreme Commander of the Black Panther Party, and

Eldridge Cleaver, then the Minister of Information and a fugitive cur-

rently in exile in Algeria. Warring factions loyal to each resulted.

Within 2 months. one member of each faction was murdered with each

faction accusing the other and threatening reprisals. The Cleaver tac-

tion is calling for consrant violence and revolution now.

The larger Newton faction, in an effort to improve the Panthers'

image, is calling for "survival pending the revolution" which Newton

explains means working and surviving in the black community until

the revolution occurs.

The Newton forces hare 27 chapters operational throughout the

United States with some 450 hard-core members and the support of

thousands of sympathizers. The Cleaver followers number 250 plus

many sympathizers with the main strength centered in New York City

but with scattered points of support in other large cities.

The chief target of Black Panther violence and invectives has al-

ways been local law enforcement as epitomized by its perennial slogan

"Oft the Pigs." Panther jargon for "kill the cops." The Panthers main-

tain that the police are an extension of the "power structure" of "im-

perialistic" United States and since the police are readily available

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every day, they have urged their followers to attach the police at every

opportunity. The efiectiveness of this campaion is eridenced by the

fact that since 1967 P'anthers have been allegedly responsible for the

killing of 12 police officers and the wounding of 71 others (February 23,

1972).

The Newton-led faction has toned down its public demands for vio-

lence and attacks upon police and has shifted its propaganda to em-

phasize community service in an chort to repay its image. brograms.

such as free breakfasts for children, health clinics. tree clothing for

the poor and free bus service for visitors to penal institutions are being

highlighted. Panther claims to extensive accomplishments in the serv-

ice to the community. however, are highly exaggerated. Much of the

food contributed by local merchants actually is used to feed the adult

members of the Black Panther Party. The health centers are staffed by

attendants untrained for medical work and of little serrice. First choice

o'i clothing is given to Black Panther Party members iith the remain-

der being handed out in the ghetto areas to the accompaniment of much

publicity.

Representatives of the Newton faction made 27 appearances at edu-

cational institutions during the calendar year 1971 as follows:

Date

School

Speaker

Jan. 21, 1971-

Jan. 26, 1971.

Feb. 3, 1971.

Do.

Feb. 11, 1971.

Do.

DO.

Feb. 14,

1971

Feb. 18,

1971

Feb. 19,

1971

Feb. 24,

1971

Mar. 11, 1971

Mar. 17, 1971.

Арг. 30, 1971

May 28, 1971-

Sept. 17, 1971

Sept. 30, 1971

0cL. 7,1971-

Oct. 25, 1971

Nov. 1, 1971.

Nov. 10,1971.

Do.

Nov. 14, 1971

Nov. 15.1971

Nov. 17, 1971.

Now. 22, 1971

Dec. 10, 1971.

University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Elmer James Dixon 111.

Seattle Community College, Seattle, Wash

Do.

Princeton University, Princeton, i.J

Huey P. Newton.

Seattle Community College. Seatile. Wash

Elmer James Dixon IIl.

Central High School, Evansville, Ind.

Frank Adams, Clarence Albert,

Mike Malone, John Bennett.

‹Reitz High School, Evansville, Ind..

Gannon College, Erie, Pa

William Brown.

Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y

Huey P. Newion.

University of Evansville, Evansville,

Rosalind Y. Frazier.

Olympic Junior College, Bremerton,

Elmer James Dixon lll.

Portland State University, Portland, Oreg-

Kent Ford.

Lincoin High School, Portland, Oreg.-

Kent Ford, Jeffery Lynn

Washington State University, Pullman, Wash

Washington.

Elmer James Dixon'llI, Michael

Indianapolis University, Purdue Regional Campus, Fort Keith S. Parker, Donald H.

Wayne, ind.

Campbell.

Seatle University, Seattle, Wash..--

Elmer James Dixon Ill.

Howard University, Washinzion, D.C.

Windsor Witliams.

Washington Student Union Building, Seattle, Wash

Aaron Dixon.

Harvara University, Cambridge, Mass

Eugene Jones.

Oklahoma Stale University, Stillwater, Okla.

Harold Joseph Holmes.

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oreg.

Aaron Dixon, Melvin Dickson.-

Western Washington State Coliege, Bellingham, Wash

Aaron Dixon.

Seattle Community College, North Campus, Seattle, Wast

Frank Anthony Ware.

Winston-Salem State University, Winston-Salem, N.C.

Bobby Seale.

St. Augustine's College, Raleigh, N.C.

Đo.

Adeiphi University, Garden City, N.Y

Do.

Stanlord University, Stantord, Calit.

Do.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Do.

In contrast to the efforts by the Newton group to project a non-

violent image, the Cleaver faction has adopted programs of unre-

strained violence against the existing order. Individuals associated

with the (leaver group have been linked to murders, arsons, attacks

on police officers, aircraft hijackings, and armed robberies. The official

newspaper of the Cleaver faction is known as "Right (n! " This publi-

cation has called for the assassinations of the President. the Attorney

General, the Director of the FBI and other Government oflicials. The

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paper has also urged kidnapings of prominent citizens who could be

held for ransom for the exchange of so-called political prisoners.

Eldridge (leaver dispatched his wife, Kathleen, on a speaking tour

of the United States in the Fall of 1071 in order to gain financial and

organizational support. She made numerous appearances on

college

campuses across the country alternating citribes at the Newton forces

and the U.S. Government. A listing of the 22 appearances of Clearer

faction speakers at institutions of learning during 1971 is as follows:

Date

School

Speaker

Oct. 8, 1971

oct. 22,

1971

OcL. 26, 1971

OcL 30, 1971

Ock 31, 1971.

Uo.-

Mov. 1,

1971

Nov.

Nor.

2,

4,

1971

Nov.

1971

5

1971

Nox 10.

1971

Nov. 11,

1971

Nov. 12, 1971

Do

Nor. 13,

1971

Nor. 16,

Nov.

1971

19,

1971

Noy, 21, 1971

Nov, 22, 1971

Nov. 23, 1971

NOV, 24, 1971

Dec. 2, 1971

Cornell Universitv. Ithaca, N.Y

University of California, Los Angeles,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Jeremiah E. Bucke Scnool, Dorchesier, Mass…

Brandeis University, Waitham, Mass.

Tufts Universit, Mediord, ilass..

City Colleze of New York, New York.

Staye oliversi ow ew York, BYers, N.Y

Wayne State University, Detrent, (lich

Oberin Coliege , Oberun, Ohio..

Antioch College. Yellow Springs, Ohio.

Central State University, Wriberiorce. Ohio

Ohio State University,

Columbus, Onio

Marymount Colleze, Tarrytown, N.Y..

Park College, Parkville, in Tenn

Fisk University, Nashville,

Florida State University. Tallahassee,

Jackson State Colleze, Jackson, Miss.

Louisiana State University at New Orleans, New Orleans, La

Bradley University, Peoria, 1I1

Denise Oliver.

Kathleen Cleaver.

Do.

Do.

DO.

Do..

Do.

Do

Do.

Do.

Do

Do

Do.

Do

Do

DO

Do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

As his wife toured the [nited States, Eldridge Clearer was busy

creating tiro new revolutionary units. The Revolutionary Peoples

Communications Network was established as an international abôre-

ground'liaison organization to publicize and coordinate the activities

of all revolutionary groups. Its underground counterpart is the afro-

American Liberation Army which will foster urban guerrilla war-

fare in the United States. The organ of both new organizations is.

"Babylon," a biweekly publication which parallels "Right On!" in its

call for revolutionary violence and disruption. Cleaver has assumed

personal command of the Afro-American Liberation Army from Al-

geria where he is in exile.

So that he mar devote his full energies to guerrilla activities, Clearer

has relinquished control over the Black Panther Party international

section in Algiers, naming Felix "Pete" O'Neal as his replacement.

O'Neal, also a fugitive from justice, once headed the Black Lanther

Party chapter in Kansas City, No.

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Another all-black rerolntionary

organization is the Student Na-

tional Coordinating Committec which at the time of its founding as a

civil rights group in 1960 iras known as the Student Nonviolent Co-

ordinating Committee. Leaders of the group have included well-

known black extremists Stokely Carmichael, who now lives in Guinea,

and H. Tap Brown. Wanted on local charges of inciting to riot and

arson, as well as on a number of Federal charges, Brown was appre-

hended in New Tork City in October 1971 following the armed rob-

NWk. 54969_Docld:32983P2oY Pfge 95 for which he has also been charged

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William Hunt, currently titular leader of the Student National Co-

ordinating Committee, is spearheading eflorts to revitalize chapters

throughout the country. Included among these efforts are programs

aimed at establishing black, revolutionary labor, student and youth

groups.

OTHER BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS

Other black extremist groups. most operating locally and region-

ally, spread revolutionary rhetoric and promote violence and con-

frontations with law enforcement officers.

One such organization is the Junta of Militant Organizations, also

known as JOMD, with headquarters in Florida. JOMO, dedicated to

the liberation of the black man, has declared it is necessary to bring

down the capitalistic system in the United States and replace it with

a socialistic system. Members of JOMO hare participated in fire

bombings, armed confrontations with police and actual attacks on

police with the use of firearms.

The Republic of New Africa is another militant black revolutionary

organization. Its principal factions are located in Michigan, Missis-

sippi, and Louisiana. In August 1971, at dachson, wliss...Its members

engaged in a shootout with law enforcement oficers who approached

the Republic of New Africa headquarters there seeking four fugitives,

one wanted for murder in Detroit, Nich. Durig the shootout, one

police officer was killed and a second officer and än FBI agent were

wounded. Eleven members of the group. including Richard Henry, one

of the founders, have been charged on a variety of counts including

conspiracy to commit murder and assaulting a Federal officer.

"BLACK ESTRENISTS IN PENAL INSTITETIONS

It is becoming increasingly evident that black extremist activities in

our penal system are increasing at an alarming rate. Rebellion such as

occurred at the prison at Attica, Y.X., has brought into sharp focus

major activities of black extremists, such as the Black Panther Party,

within the penal institutions.

The unrestricted flow of extremist propaganda, including its revo-

lutionary rhetoric, has stimulated the black, hardened criminal prison

inmates into an unholy alliance with the black revolutionary extrem-

ists. With the lessening of the Vietnam issue other extremist groups

such as the Students for a Democratic Society and Progressive Labor

Party are also interjecting themselves into the dangerous situation

that now exists in our penal institutions.

KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

The FBI has continued to investigate Klan-type organizations which

had a slight increase in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approx-

imately 4,500 at present. This increase in membership is attributed to

some extent to renewed interest in Klan-type organizations brought

about. by reaction to school busing directives in order to achieve racial

balance in public schools. In addition to the membership, many thou-

sands of sympathizers lend their support to Klan programs and

activities.

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A number of

ser small hate-type groups, exc

Ively white, con-

tinue in existence. These groups such as the National Socialist White

People's Party (formerly the American Naz Party), the National

States Rights Party and the Jational Renaissance Party, obtain public

attention in excess of their numerical strength by carefully orchestrated

demonstrations and colorful public appearances in order to gain con-

verts and, or sympathizers to their causes.

URBAN UNREST

"...

During the calendar year 1971. 109 incidents involving mob violence

tere reported as compared to 159 for all of 1970. Resulting from

the 1971 incidents were 2.033 arrests. 213 personal injuries, three

deaths and property damage amounting to about $1.7 million.

Disorders in the Nation's secondary schools continue to provide

strong evidence that racial discord is far from being at an end. A

total of 360 disturbances, during which there were.28 personal in-

juries and 2,455 arrests. were reported for the 1970-1971 school year.

During the 1971-1972 school year, 125 school disturbances involving

331 personal injuries and 750 arrests have been reported (February 21,

1972).

According to information received by the FBI through the Uniform

Crime Reporting program, 20 police oficers died in ambush-type at-

tacks, the mark of the extremist or terrorist. in 1971 and 19 oincers

died in ambush-tre attacks in 1970. But. during the previous perioc

from 1961 through 1969 only three ambush-type killings of policemen

were reported.

During 1971, extremists tere known to be or suspected of being

involved in 76 unprovoked and apparently racially connected attacks

on police, resulting in the deaths of 12 officers and the wounding of

47 others! Guerrilla-type ambushes accounted for eight of these deaths.

Although the overall number of extremist-type attacks on police de-

clined in 1971, the increase in ambush-type attacks on police during

the past 2 years is indicative of the growing terrorist threat to law

enforcement.

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

Urban guerrilla warfare by black extremist organizations such as

the Black Panther Party, by white radical groups. such as the Weath-

erman, and by other organized terrorists is a serious threat to law

enforcement and the entire Jation.

Increasing evidence of bombings, burnings and unprovoked attacks

on police led the FBI to convene 51 selected State and local law enforce-

ment oficers from areas where this problem appears most serious to a

seminar on urban guerrilla warfare in Washington, D.C. in November

1971. The seminar explored this problem of secret and planned activity

designed to disrupt and terrorize the Government. Covered specifically

were the robbery or "espropriation" of funds. arms and esplosives to

further the revolutionary obiectives of these tanatical few.

The primary activity of the urban guerrilla is the unprovoked at-

tack on police ofticers which is designed to show that police are power-

less to protect themselves and, thus, to convince revolutionary sym-

pathizers that society can be overthrown. The urban guerrilla also

67

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hopes to provide over-reaction by authorities in order to radicalize

sympathizers who would not otherwise engage in violent activity.

Carlos larighella. deceased Brazilian revolutionary and author of

the "Mlinimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,

" instructed that, "Every

urban guerrilla can only maintain his existence if he is disposed to

kill the police."

The Weatherman group claimed credit for the bombing of New

Xork City police headquarters in June 1970 and Black L'anthers have

been identified in numerous attacks on police. The logic of the urban

guerrilla is simple, but terrifying: it police oncers cannot protect

themselves from ambushes, snipings and bombings, then the private

citizen is that much more defenseless against these weapons of the

revolutionary.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

The Federal antiriot laws, enacted in April 1968, established Fed-

eral jurisdiction for criminal prosecution in connection with certain

activities relating to civil disorders.

In May 1971, Abbott Howard Hofiman was indicted by a Federal

grand jury at Washington, D.C., on charges of violating Federal anti-

riot laws following an investigation by the FBI. The charges were

based on Hoffman's travel from Oklahoma to Washington, D.C., and

his activities during disruptions which occurred during antimar dem-

related matter. Hotiman was previously convicted for violating Hed-

eral antiriot statutes based on disruptions in Chicago in August 1968.

He was also cited for contempt based on his courtroom conduct during

his trial in that case. Both matters are presently under appeal.

Following extensive investigation by the FBI. a Federal grand

jury at Miami, Fla., in December 1970 indicted three leaders of an

organization known as the Black Afro Militant Movement. Two of

the leaders were charged with teaching and demonstrating the use of

explosive devices and possession of a destructive device in violation of

Federal antiriot and gun control statutes. The third leader was

charged with violation of l'ederal conspiracy and gun control statutes

based on possession of a destructive device. One defendant, after en-

tering a plea of guilty, was sentenced to 1 year's probation. Ihe other

tiro defendants were tried and convicted; one tras sentenced to 4 years'

imprisonment and the other was sentenced to serve 2½ years.

BOMBING MATTERS

The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, enacted in October 1970,

• substantially broadened Federal jurisdiction in bombing matters. A

significant portion of the investigative responsibilities has been as-

signed to the FBI by the Department of Justice. While investigation is

conducted only in those instances specifically designated by the De-

partment, the cooperative facilities of the FBI are offered in all in-

stances to State or local law enforcement authorities conducting

investigation.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 296

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Investigations authorized by the Department have involved substan-

lowing casements. of manpower and rusources, as typitiod by the fol-

In March 1971, a violent explosion caused damages in excess of

$100,000 to the original Senate wing of the U.S. Capitol. this tollowed

an anonymous call to the ettect that the Capitol would be blown up

in 30 minutes as a protest against military operations in Laos. Exten-

sive investigation by the FBI is continuing and the matter is pending

before a Federal grand jury.

During the late evening of October 14. 1971, the Iranian Consulate

at San francisco. Calit., was extensively damaged by an explosion.

Damages to the Consulate and surrounding property were estimated

at approximately s1 million. Intensive investigation to identify all

persons responsible is continuing.

In July 1970, a Federal grand jury at Detroit, Nich, indicted 18

members of the Yeatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic

Society, charging them with conspiracy to violate Federal bombing

and gun control statutes. The indictment charged that the conspiracy

originated during a meeting of the leadership of the Students tor a

Democratic Society at flint, alich. during Necember 1969, and that

various overt acts. including bombings, attempted bombings and pur-

chases of explosives, followed that meeting. Five of the detendants

are presently tree on bond, charges against one of the defendants were

dismissed in February 1971 at the request of the Government and the

other seven defendants are being sought as fugitives.

News media in several cities receired handprinted letters in Jan-

uary 1972 warning that during July 1971 nine unusual prototype

bombs mere planted in difterent banks across the country. The let-

ters stated that similar devices could be used to demand the release of

"political" prisoners." Explosive devices were located in safe deposit

boses in banks in Chicago, San Francisco, and New York City. These

devices were bombs constructed of battery-powered calendar clocks,

photographic flash bulbs and black powder. The bombs were capable

of The I31 conducted an intensive nationwide investigation based

i ran roden boring state, katin a bom

being sought as a fugitive.

REPORTS ON BOMBING INCIDENTS

For over a year the FBI has been collecting detailed information on

bombing incidents through its field offices. This data identifies the num-

ber of bombing incidents. types of devices, types of targets, and the

like. Beginning in January 1972, a program was instituted within the

FBI to disseminate this information on a monthly, quarterly and an-

nual basis to all law enforcement agencies through the Uniform Crime

Reporting program. This is another FBI service to keep local, State

and Federal law enforcement agencies fully informed.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720-Page 297

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## Page 298

BODIB THREATS AGAINST FBI FACILITIES

During the 1971 calendar year, there were 170 bomb threats against

FBI facilities or buildings housing F BI facilities. Each of these insidi-

ous harrassments forces us to assign a certain amount of manpower

to perform the required search of our space.

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

• Although shifting political winds periodically cause an individual

communist nation to deviate somewhat to the left or right of its set

course, there has been no indication that any has abandoned its resolve

to undermine the security of the United States through espionage and

subversion.

THE SOVIET BLOC

The Soviet espionage services continue to lead in the intensity of

these efforts and the other Soviet-bloc nations complement their

efforts in rarying degrees.

As has been true over the years, these communist intelligence agen-

cies, shie wor intely enge active es the State as the in enemy?

establishments in the United States. Soviet-bloc official personnel in

this country hare been increasing in number over the years and as 01

February 1, 1972, the count was 2,593, consisting of 1.166 officials anc

1,427 dependents. Not included in the count are couriers, members of

special delegations and other officials temporarily in the United States

but not assigned to omcial establishmenis.

These charts which I offer to the Chairman show the build-up of

Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States since 1967 and a current

breakdown of official personnel by country.

Mr. RooNer. We shall insert these charts at this point in the record.

в.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 298

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## Page 299

IV. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND

EXECUTIVE ORDERS AFFECTING

FBI INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 299

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## Page 300

STATUTORY BASIS FOR INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY INTD

Statutes enumerating violations pertaining to the national security

are as follows:

Activities Against Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 956 - Conspiracy to Injure Property

of Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 958 - Commission to Serve Against a

Friendly Nation

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 959 - Enlistment in Foreign Service

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 960 - Expedition Against Friendly Nation

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 961 - Strengthening Armed Vessel of

Foreign Nation

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 962 - Arming Vessel Against Frienaly

Nation

Advocating the Overthrow of the Government

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2381 - Treason

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2382 - Misprision of Treason

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2383 - Pebellion or Insurrection

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2384 - Seditious Conspiracy

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2385 - Advocating Overthrow of Government

Antiriot Laws

Title 18 u.s.c. sections

2101. 2102 2R7615r

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 231-233 - Civil Disorders

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 300

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## Page 301

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2077 - Unauthorized Dealings in

Special Nuclear Material

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2122 - Prohibitions Governing Atomic

Weapons

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2131 - Production Facility

Title 42 U:S.C. Section 2138 - Suspension of Licences During

War or National Emergency

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2165 - Security Restrictions •

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2274-2277 - Restricted Data

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2278 - Trespass Upon Commission

Installations and Photographing

Bombings

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 844 - Use and Possession of Explosives,

Threats

Civil Rights

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 245 - Federally Protected Activities

Crimes on Government Reservations

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 13, 81 - Laws of States Adopted

Destruction of Government Property

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1361 - Government Property or Contracts

Espionage

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 792-799 - Harboring, Gathering, Transmitting,

Photographing, Sale, Disclosure of Defense Information

Title 50 U.S.C. Section 783 - Attempt to Establish Totalitarian

Dictatorship

in

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Páge 301

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## Page 302

• Firearms Acts

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5812 - Transfers

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5822 - Making Firearms

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5842 - Identification of Firearms

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5861 - Prohibited Acts

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 921-922 - Unlawful Acts

Title 18 U.S.C. Appendix Section 1202 - Receipt, Possession,

Transportation of Firearms

Fraud Against the Government

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 - Statements

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1951, 1952 - Racketeering Enterprises

Loss of United, States Nationality

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1481-1483 - Loss of Nationality, Dual

Nationals, Restrictions on Expatriation

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 911, 1015 - False Claim of Citizenship

Neutrality Matters

Title 22 U.S.C. Section 1934 - Munitions Control

Title 22 U.S.C. Section 401 - Illegal Exportation of War Materials

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 953 - Private Correspondence with Foreign

Governments

- 3 -

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 302

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## Page 303

• Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 116 - Murder

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1201 - Kidnaping

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 112 - Protection of Officials and Guests

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 970 - Protection of Property

Protection of United States Officials and Employees

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 111 - Assaulting, Resisting, Impeding

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1114 - Protection

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2231 - Assault or Resistance

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 351 - Congressional Assassination,

Kidnaping, Assault

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1751 - Presidential Assassination,

Kidnaping, Assault

Registration Acts

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 951 - Agents of Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 611-621 - Foreign Agents Registration Act

Title 50 U.S.C. Sections 851-858 - Individuals with Knowledge of

Espionage or Sabotage

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2386 - Registration of Certain Organizations

Sabotage

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2152-2154 - Fortifications, War Material,

Production of Defective War Material

- 4 -

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 303

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## Page 304

Strategic Facilities

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2155, 2156 - Destruction of National -

Defense Materials, Production of Defective National - Defense

Material

Title 50 U.S.C. Section 797 - Security Regulations

Sedition

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2387-2390 - Activities Affecting Afmed

• Forces, During War, Recruiting for Service Against the

United States, Enlistment to Serve Against the United States

The following statutes have been used to prosecute certain persons

involved in other subversive activities, although these are not within the

primary jurisdiction of the FBI:

*Title 18 U.S.C. Sectíons 2, 1542 - Passport Violations

Title 18 U.S:C. Section 1704 - Renting Post Box Under False Identity

Executive Orders and orders of the Attorney General affecting

jurisdiction.

1) Executive Order #11605, dated July 2, 1971, amending

Executive Order #10450, of April 27, 1953, relating to

security requirements for Government employment

2) Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart P, Sections 0.85-0.89,

delegating authority of Attorney General to the FBI to investi-

gate violations of the laws of the United States and to carry out

the Presidential Directives of September 9, 1939, as reaffirmed

by Presidential Directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950;

and December 15, 1953.

- 5 -

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 304

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## Page 305

B11181210535173930.86

Office Memora alum UNTIED ST

:Direct.co

• Fedoral Bureau of Investigation

FROM

The Attorney Cenoral

SURJECTMICEOPHONE SURVEILLANCE

DATE:

S GOVERNMENT

Huy 201:454.

155-20

deceit ins

Tele:

The recent decision of the Supreno Court entitled Irvine+.

Calzoazza, 307 0.5. 123, dendincing the use of microphone surveillances

by city police in a gamblina casa makes appropriate a reampraisal of

the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation of microonone surveillance in connection with matiers

relaiing to the intemal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone

sure?lence do the only receipts moy of uncoverina the activities

cê capionage agents, mosible sahoto's

;.ard subversive persons, In

such insuances I an of the opinion that the national interest reauires

that microphone curreillance be uilized by the federal Bureau of

Investigation.

This ase need not be limited to the development oi

criconce for prosecution.

The EST has an intelligence function in

connection with internal security matters coually as important as

the duur of developing evidence lor presentation to the courts and

the national security requires that the Ful be abie to use microprore

surveillance for he proper discharge of both of such functions.

The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance

by the fBi under chese circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court

in Izzine v. Califonia, supra, requires a different course.

That

case is readily castinguishable on its incts. Ihe language of the

Court, however, indicates cortain uses of microphones which at would

be well to avoid, is possible, even in internal security inrostigu-

tions.

It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the

Supione Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of

installing a nicrophone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization

of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking.

Court's action is a clear incication oi the need lor discretion and

intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all

cases, including intomal security matters. Obviously, the insialla-

tion

oê a nicrophone in a borroom or in some comparably intimate

Location should be avoided werever possible. It may appear, however,

that imporant intelligence or evidence relating io metical connected

with the national. securiur can only be obtained by the installation oi

a micropinone in such a locution. It is my opinion. that under such

circustances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by tho

---

## Page 306

•2 .

Previous interpretations nich have been fumished to you

as to what nay consüitute trespass in the installation oi microphones,

suggest that the viers enpressed have boon tentative in nature ma

have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow

rather than refleci the present state of the lai. It is realizod

that not infrequently the question oi trespass arises in connection

with the installation oi a microphone. The question of whether a

trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect

oi such a trespass upon the acmissibility in court of the evidence thus

obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circunstences

of each case. The Departrent in resolving the problens which may arise

in connection with the use ai microphone suveillance will revica tho

circunstances in each case in the light of the práctical necessities

of investigation and oî the national interest which must be protocted.

It is my opinion that the lepartment should acout that interpretation

which will permit microphone covcrage by the FBI in a manner most

conducive to our national interest.

I recognize that for the FBI.

to fulêill its important intelligence function, considerations of.

internal securitr and the national safety are paramomt and, there-

fore, may compel the mresüricioù uoo vi inio techaguo in the nations!.

interest.

2463

NM: 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 306

•CORT RIGATE

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## Page 307

POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES

ENCLOSURA

62-11646459

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 307

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## Page 308

MALUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUIE I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE. GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

A. Guidelines for FBI Investigations

B.

Internal Secarity Investigations.

C.

Criminal Intelligence - Organized Crime

D. •Applicant-type latters....

| 6 6 99

F.

General Criminal and Civil Matters..

F.

Goneral Principles...

SECTION 1. PRELIMINARY FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A.

Federal Crimes•......•

B.

United States Magistrates.

C.

Complaints (Rule 3)...

D.

Warrant of Arrest or Summons (Rule 4).

E.

Proceedings Before the Magistrate.

F.

Jeopardy......

Go

Grand Juries (Rule ó).

H.

Indictments........

I.

Informations.........

Jo

Arrest in District Other than District of

Prosecution........

K.

Evidence (Rule 26)....

Extradition of Fugitives from Foreign Countries.

M.

N.

Juvenile Delinquency Act.

Deferred Prosecution System.

Federal Youth Corrections Act

.

Statute of Limitations.

SECTION 2. ARRESIS, INTERVIEWS AND CONFESSIONS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A. Arrests...........

B. Interviews with Witnesses,

Confessions

Suspects, and Subjacts;

and Signed Statements....

C.

D.

Searches and Seizures.

Habeas Corpus Proceedings; Refuting False

Allegations.

SECTION 3. FIREARMS EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

À.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

a.

General...

Care of Firearms...

Use of Firearms..

Safety Levers..

Tear Gas Equipment....

Pistols and Revolvers.

Shotguns..

Remington Model 760, .308. Caliber, Pump-Action Rifles

Deleted

..

Gas Riot

Gun.....

Firearms Training..

Training Dates...

Condust on the Firing Range

Safety Rules..........

Fraining Delinquencies

Firearms Courses.....

Disabling Pistols

or Revoivers.

2c

6

10

13

13

13

9

20

24

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 308

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## Page 309

MANUAL CE INSTRUCIIONS

VOLUME I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 4. SURVEILLANCES AND RAIDS

B.

K.

N.

0.

P.

R.

S.

SECTION 5.

A.

B.

C.

SECTION 6.

A.

Bon

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Survoillances in Genaral....

Training.........

'......... . .

jor

Surveillances

Types. of surveillances....

Survoillance Bquirment..

Dress of Agents on jurveillancos.....

Knowledge of the Subject Under Survaillance.:

Activities of Agents on Surveillances........

Ranting of Premiges

for Use in Fired Surveillances

Surveillance Sugervision...

surveillance Logs.......

Planning Surveillances

'in Advance.

Raids in Ganeral..

' . . ..

Planning raids

Entering the Place Io Be Raided.

Duties of Covering Agents....

Action To Be Taken Alter the Raid

Blocking of Roads.

DESCRIPTIONS OF PERSONS

General.........•

Usual or Minimum Dascription Included in Police ana

I'BI KEp0lIS.........

Specific Discussions

of Items

in Physical

Descriptions....

BUREAU APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS

I.

J.

K

M.

N.

0.

Recruiting Aids..

Inquiries...

Employment of Relatives;

General Qualifications for All Clerical

Specific Qualifications for Clerical Positions..

Qualifications for Special igeni Position..

Bureau Employees Aspiring to Agent Position..

General Instructions for Processing Special Agent

and Clerical Applicants.....

Determination of Draft or Military

Status of

Special

Agent and Mala Clerical Appiicants.......

Physical Examinatione...

the Investigation.....

Maintenance of Indices on Bureau Applicants

classification......

Character.........

FBI National Academy Applicants.

SECTION 7..

A.

B

C.

D

E.

F.

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION DATA

Ristory...

Dissomination of identification

Da ta

Taking of Inked Impressions.

Types of Fingerprint Cards.

Typos of Files in the Identification

Oporation of the Identirication Division.

Division.

9

9

10

10

1

[6a]

7

10

11

14

21

22

22

23

23

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 309

2

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## Page 310

MANUAL UF INSIKUCTIUNS

VOLUME I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[

SECTION 7. IDENTIFICATION DIVISION DATA (continued)

G. Obtaining Records from the Identification Division.

H. Records Furnished by Identification Division.

I. Forms Used for Obtaining and Submitting

Identification Information..

J.

Missing Person [Program...

K.

Return Prints....

L.

Answering of Prints by the Identification Division.

Mo

The Use of the Fingerprint Classification Formula.

No

Surveys of Fingerprint Bureaus.............•

0.

Bureau Pamphiets Concerning Identification Division

Work and Functions....

6 6 6 6e6

P.

International Exchange of Fingerprints.......

Pending Legislation Regarding Fingerprinting-

The Latent Fingerprint Section..

Latent Print Examinations.

Submission of Evidence...

U.

V.

W.

X.

Y.

Ze

Requests for Copies of

Latent Prints...

Liaison With U. S. and Prosecuting Attorneys:.

Court Decisions...

Return of Fingerprints..

Services of Disaster Squad.•

Summary of the Services of

the Identification

Division.

AA. NCIC Fingerprint Classification,

SECTION 8. SCIENTIFIC AIDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

A. Introduction to FBI Laboratory.

B.

Facilities of FBI Laboratory.•

C.

Cryptanalysis, Gambling, Jand Translation

Document Examination....

Blood and Other Body Fluids.

F.

G.

Explosives.........

..

Firearms Identification..

Glass Fractures........

I.

Hairs, Fibers, and Fabrics

J.

Metallurgical Examinations

Ko Paints, Dyes, and Stains.

Pharmaceuticals.......

Mo Soils and Other Mineral Substances.

No. Toolmarks......

0.

Toxicological Examinations..

Field Aids....

Radio Engineering Section..

IR.

Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 310

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Page

12

16

17

118,

119.

L19]

[28]

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## Page 311

NET. TUNE UT IT.

VOLUME I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 9. RECORDS

A. Federal.

B. State..

C. Industry...

D. Teriitorial..

E. Production of Records by the Armed Services for

Court Ust.....

| 6 6 6. 0

[F. Dissemination of Information from Military

Service Records to Foreign Agencies..

SECTION 10. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING

A. Background.........

Publication of Crime Data...

.....

C. Other Booklets Helpful to Law Enforcement...........•

D.

"Why Compile Crime Statistics?" - Suggested

Responses.....•

E. Contacts with Delinquent Contributors.

F.

Contacts with Noncontributors....

.•

...

Go

Uniform Crime Reporting Supplies Available foi

Distribution.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 311

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1

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52

58

58

• 58]

2

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## Page 312

'0:, 0.0.0

[

[

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 11.

GENERAL CRIMINAL PROVISIONS AID

DEFINITIONS

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

A.

Offenses Classified..

Bo

Principals.......

Co

Accessory After

the Fact.

Misprision of Felony...

E.

United States Defined.

F.

Departnent and Agency

Defined..

...•.• .

G.

Definitions - Special Maritime and Territorial

Jurisdiction of the United States..............

H. Definition - Obligation of Other Security of the

United States...

I.

Definition - Vessel of

United states.

Definition - Interstate and Foreign Commerce...

K.

Definition - Foreign Government...

Laws of States Adopted for Areas Within

Federal

Jurisdiction.......

Mo

General Instructions.

No

Confiscation of Firearns

SECTION 12.

ADMIRALTY MATTER

Be

C.

D.

ti.

F.

Go

SECTION 13.

DELETED

Statutes...

Background..

Policy.

Statistics...

'Manating o1 lases

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 14. ANTI-RACKETEERING

*A.

Hobbs Act.......

B.

Elements.

C.

• Related

D.

Statutes....

Departmental Instructions

E.

Procedure...........•

F.

Investigative Guidance.

G. Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence

Investigations.....

H. Venue...............

I.

Classification...

J. Character..

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 312

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## Page 313

...

"VOLUME II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 15. ANTITRUST

SECTION 16.

A. Statutes.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

•Elements.......

Count Docisions..

Policy...........

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..

Classification.

Character.......

APPLICATION. FOR PARDON APTR COMPLETION OF SENTENCE

APPLICATION FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

SECTION 17.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

SECTION 18.

Application for Pardon After Completion of Sentence

Application for Executive Clemency.......

Administrative Rules Relating to Both Types of

Investigation.........

Classification.

Character.

ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY

Purpose.

Policy.

.............

Investigative Procedure.

Clessification..

. . . . . .

Character.

ASSAULTING OR KILLING OF FEDERAL OFFICERS

CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Ge

н.

Statutes....•

Background

and Definitions

Elements...............

Policy:•

.........0.

Investigative Procedure.

Venue.................

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 19. APPLICANT AND EMPLOYSE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED FOR

• OTHER GOVERNMENE AGENCIES

A. Classifications and Administrative Procedures..

B.

The Investigation.......

C. Fraud

Viclations............

D. Special Instructions

E.

and Excestions..

Potential Administrative Indez

Subjects

F.

Name Checks for Federal Judges...

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 313

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do teddie do a code you i

Pa go

1

3

11

13

20

20

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## Page 314

"VOLUME "II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 20.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 - CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

G.

Statutes

Jurisdiction

Violations

Penalties....

prosecutions

Investigations.

Cinrad

Commurist Infiltration into the Atomic

Energy Program).

R.

J.

1s.

Reporting..

......6o

Classification....

Character.

Handling of Radioactive Materials.

SECTION 21.

BANK ROBBERY

B.

C.

D.

E..

F.

G.

H.

I.

Statute....

Elements..

Departmental

Cpinions and

Investigative Procedures

Contemplated Violations.

Administrative Handling

and

Venue...........

Classification

Character.

Court

Decisions

and Suggestions

Procedure

SECTION 22.

BILLS OF LADING ACT

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

"E.

G.

Statute.....

' ........

Pype of transportation Governed by the lot.

Court Decisions.......

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..

Classification...

Character......•

SECTION 23.

BOMB THREATS

EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I

J.

K.

Statutes...

Violations

Penalties....

Departmental Guidelines

Policy

Other Violations..

Plan of Action for Major

Tareats

Suspects.....:....

Statistical

Datâ...

Classification.

Character...

SECTION 24.

BONDSMEN AND SURETIES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Statutes...

Elements..

Policy...

Investigative Procedure

Venue..

and

Count

Decisions

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 314

3

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Pare

3 a

.За

4

11

11

11

3b

[12a]

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MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

:...?..

:.:

.:..

VOLUME II

'TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 24.

BONDSMEN AND SURETIES (continued)

Classification.

Character.

G.

SECTION 25. BRIBERY AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION 26.

A.

B.

C.

D.

Statutes...............

Interpretation

of Elements

Policy end Investigative

Venue.......•

Classification.

Character.

' .. = ..

Penalties - Maximum...

Ra

Bribery.

Procedure.

CENSUS MATTERS

F.

G.

Statutes.......

Jurisdiction.....

Investigative Procedure

Venue.:

Classification.....

Character...........

Penalties - Maximum.

SECTION 27. CIVIL RIGHTS

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

Background..

Statutes........

Related Statues.

policy.....

Investigative

Prosedure..

Exceptions to

Procedure

of Initiating Preliminary

and Limited

Investigations.

Miscellaneous Instructions.

Classification..

Character.

SECTION 28. CIVIL RIGHIS ACT OF 1964

A.

B.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

Iso

Background

Statutes.

Public Accommodations

Public Facilities.....

Public Education......

Employment..

Interference with Federally Protected Activities

Relating to Public Accommodations, Public

Facilities,

Public Education, and

Employment...

Announced Testing of Accommodations or Facilities

Penalties..

Miscellaneous.•

Classification..

Character.

Pa ge

2

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14

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15

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SECTION, 29.

CONSPIRACY

B.

A. • Statute

Elements....

Related

Statutes.

D

E.

F

G.

F.

I.

J.

Statute

of linitations.

Court Decisions..

Policy..

Investigative Procedure

Venue......

Classification..

Character

SECTION 30.

CONTEMPT OF COURT

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Statutes..

Essential Elements....,

Policy........

Investigative Procedure.

Venue................

Classification..

Character.....

SECTION 31. COPYRIGHT MATTER

A.

D.

Statutes.........

Perhey 2=d

Pacedunes

Classification.......

Character..

SECTION 32.

A.

B.

c.

COURT OF CLAIMS CASES

[

Background...........

Procedure for Instituting

Hearings..

E

Magistrate's Report....

Argument Before the Court

F

Docision of the Court..

G

H.

Appeal................

Investigative Procedure..

I.

Confidential Informants..

J. [Accounting Working Papers!.

Office of Origin..

M.

Character.....

SECTION 33.

CRIMES WITHIN THE MARITIME AND

DICTION OF THE UNITED STATES

TERRITORIAL JURIS-

д.

• B.

Statutes...............

Crimes on the High Seas

Crimes on Government Reservations Other Than Indian.

D.

Crimes on Indian Reservations.

E. Other Crimes Involving Indians

SECTION 34. EIGHT-HOUR-DAY LAW

A.

Statutes..

B.

Policy.

C.

Venue.

D. Classification.

E. Character..

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PABLE: OF CONTENTS

::: "SÉCITON 35. 'ELECTION LAWS*

D.

F.

statutos....

[Policy..

Investigative Suggestions

Venue..

....

Classification

Character.

SECTION 36.

ESPIONAGE

B.

C.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

statutes.

Court Decisions.......

Departmental Instructions

Policy.......

Investigative Procedure...

Soviet Intelligence

Functional Files..

Current Espionage Digest

Terminology.

Venue....

Classification

Character.

SECTION 37.

DELETED

SECTION 38.

EXTORTION

B.

C.

D.

F.

G.

B.

Statutes..

Elements.

Departmental Instructions

Policy......

Investigative Procedure

Venue..........

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 39.

FALSE CLAIMS - CIVIL SUITS

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

E.

G•

Statutes.

Elements

Suits by Individuals..

Policy..

Investigative Procedure

Statute of

Limitations.

Classification.

Character

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wadies roy

¡¡" VOLÚME 'II."

TABLE. OF CONTENTS

SECTION 40.: FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE. CARRIERS

A.

B.

c.

D.

Violations by Employaes of Railroads, etc.

Scope of Act

Court Dacisions......

Violations dy Enployees of Telephone, Telegraph,

and Radio Companies.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Scope of Act.

Jurisdiction...

Investigative

Procedure.

Violations by Special Agents,. Accountants, -or

Examiners of Interstate Commerce Commission..

I.

J.

Scope

of Act.......

Classification..

Character..

SECTION 41.

FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP

B.

C.

E.

Statutes Under Burezu Jurisdiction.

Policy......

: ' . . ...

Investigative

Procedure

Classification.

Character...

SECTION 42.

Д.

FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES

C

D

"J.

Statutes..

riviacious.

Background...

Jurisdiction....

Policy....

: : . . . . . s

Investigative Procedures.

Classification...

Character.

Venue.....

Penalties.

SECTION 43.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT

A.

Statute..

B.

Elements.

c.

Policy.....

D.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 44. [BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT]

A.

Baaks and Banking-Type Institutions

B.

Bank Holding Company Act of

1956.

SECTION 45.

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

A.

Statüte..

B.

Venue....

C.

Investigative Jurisdiction.

D.

Investigative Suggestions

E.

Statute of Limitations..

F.

Exceptions to Federal. Mort

Claims Act

Policj.........

H.

I.

Classification

Character.

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total at des

•VOLUME IT

• TABLE OF. CONTENTS.

"SECTION

46.

FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE

Aro

B.

C.

D

F.

G.

SECTION 47.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

i.

I.

IJ.

0.

SECTION 48.

A.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Statute..

violations..

Policy.........

Investigative Procedure

Venue..

Classification...

Character.

FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVEPNIENT

General......

Federal-Aid Road Act.

Anti-Kickback Statute..

Unemployment Compensation

and Training Allonances..

Dependents Assistance Act

oj 1950......

. .?

Public Works and Economic Development Act

of 1965

Lead and Zino Act.....

Trade Expansion Act of

1962

Economic Opportunity Act...

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968).

Policy.•

..........•.

Investigative

Procedure.

Ven'e.

Character.........

Fraud Against the Government

security ispect.

FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING CERTAIN MILITARY

AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS; SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES

OF THE UNITED STATES

Statutes...

General Information..

Policy.......

Venue.

Classification

Character...

SECTION 49. FUGITIVES

Definitions..........

B.

€.

D.

Caution Statements

- Dangerous Subjects

Fugitive Form Lette......

Taentification orders, wanted Flyers, and Check

Circulars...

F.

F.

G.

Apprehension

.....

of Bureau Fugitives.....

Investigations... leads ir Seeking the Appre

Suggested Sources

hension of Fugitives

H. Fugitive Investigations

for

Other Federal Agoncies..

I.

Miscellaneous.

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SECTION 49.4

J.

.

M

N

.

0.

R

• .

S.

T.

U.

v.

W.

Y.

AA.

AR-

AC.

AD.

AE.

dr.

AG.

AH.

AI.

•AJ.

AK.

Al.

AM.

AN.

ДО.

Al.

AR.

AS.

AT.

AU.

AV.

AW.

AX.

AY.

AZ.

BA.

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

25n0/o05:

VOLUME IJ

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

FUGITIVES" (continued) "

Escaped Federal Prisoners

Escape and Rescue (Formerly Federal Escape Act)

Statutes............

General Information..

Investigative Procedar

Policy...

Classification

Character.

Probation Violators

Statutes..•

When Investigatious Are Corducted

Apprehension or Location....

Probation Violator Warrants.

Investigative

jieads..

Deleted

Character.

Classification.

Deleted

Parole Violators and [Mandatory ]Release Violators

statintos:

Distinction Between Parole and[Mandatory ]Release

Issuance of warrants......

When Investigations

Are Conducted.

When Subjecis Are Fugitives.

Punishnent...........

Investigative

Suggestions

Apprehension or Location.

Character.

Deleted

Classification...

Deleted

Unlawful Flight Io Avoid Prosecution, Custody, or

Confinement and Unlawful Flight To Aroid Giving

Testimony

Statutes..

Policy..

...

Departmental Instructions

Investigative Procedure.

statute of Limitations.

International Extradition

Prosecutions...

Classification.

Character.

Deleted

Deserters

Background.......•

Interviews

and Confessions of Deserters.

Disposition of Deserters After Apprehension.

Airtels to Bureau Reporting Location of

Doserter Fugitives...

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11

12

13

13

13

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14

14

14

14

14

14

15

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15

15

15

16

16

16

16

16

17

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2

2

2

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2

2

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24

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VOLUNE II

PABLE OF CONTENTS

•SECTION" 49.

rucitives (continued) wi

BB.

BC.

BD.

BE.

Review of Deserter's Sertice Record and

Identification Division Files......

Courts-Martial, lestimony, and

Deposition.

Investigations

in Foreign

Countries........

Deserters

and Absentees

Fron the Armed

Services.

Located Incidental

to Other Investigations and

Instructions

Re Deserter Inquiries

BE .

BG.

BE.

Classification.

Character.

BI.

BJ.

Harboring

Deserter Fugitives.

General

Fugitives.

BK.

BLo

BM.

BN.

BO.

SECTION 50:

C

F.

Bond Default

Background..

Statutes..

Policy.

Classification

Character.

GOVERNMENT PROPERTY - THEFT, ROBBERY,

ILLEGAL POSSESSION, AND DESTRUCTION

Statutes

Elements

Venue.

Intestizátive Procedure.

Classification.....

Character.

EMBEZZLEMENT,

SECTION 51.

ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION, OR SALE OF

EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA

d.

D.

E.

F.

SECTION 52.

A.

B.

c.

Do.

SECTION 53.

1.

в.

C.

Statutes.

Flements

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..

. . .

Classification

Character.

ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS

Statutes

Policy.

Classification

Character.

ILLEGAL USE OF A RAILROAD

PASS

Statute...

Jurisdiction............

Investigative Procedure.

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26

27

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29

29

30

30

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•; .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 53.

ILLECIL USE OF

A RAILRÖAD PASS (continued)

D.

E.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 54.

ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM AND RELATED STATUTES

A.

B.

Statutes.

D

Pertinent Court Decisions.

Departmental Instructions

F

G.

I

J.

Investigative Procedures

Exceptions.............

Productions.

Classification..

Character.

SECTION 55. IMPERSONATION AND RELATED

STATUTES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Statutes..

Elements............•

Discussion

of

Elements..

Pertinent Court Decisions

Policy.................

Venue.

Intracticetite

Dracadana

H.

Classification...

I.

Character.

SECTION 56.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF

LOTTERY TICKETS

A.

В.

G.

D.

Statute...

Violations....

Court Decisions..

Jurisdiction........

F

Investigative Procedure..

G.

Pull Boards, Tip Boards, and Punchboards

Venue..

H.

I.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 57.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF

OBSCENE MATTER

B:

C.

D.

E.

F

G.

н.

I.

Statutes..

Violations.

Policy...

Court Decisions...

Jurisdiction..:

Investigative Procedure.

Venue........••

Classification

Character.

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SECTION

58.

Ba

Co

D.

E.

F.

SECTION

59.

B.

Co

D.

E.

F.

SECTION 60.

A.

•B.

D.

E.

G.

H.

SECTION 61.

A.

B.

*C.

D.

E.

.

G.

H.

I.

J.

к.

Is.

'MANGAL OF 'INSTRUCTIONS

•a dirt!

VOLUME II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INCERSIATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOÖDS

Statutes...

Violations.

.......

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..

Classification.

Character.

' •

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE

Statutes..

Elements.

...

Investigative

Procedur

Venue........•

Classification.

Character..

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE

OR AIRCRAFT

Statutes.

Elements.

Policy.......

Investigative Procedure.

Court Decisions and Departmental Opinions

VERa....0..0.0........

Classification:

Character.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF

STOLEN PROPERTY

Statutes..

Deleted

Elements..

•Court Decisions...

Policy..•

. .

Investigative Procedure

Credit Card Cases.....

Traveler's Check Cases

Miscellaneous.

Venue...........

Classification.

Character...

SECTION 62. INTERSIATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREARERS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Statute..

Elements.

Policy.

Investigative Suggestions

Venue.

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"Page

SECTION 62.

SECTION 63.

B.

C.

D

F

G.

H.

SECTION 64.

B.

C.

D.

SECTION 65.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

, H.

VOLUME II

TABLE OF CCHTENTS

INTERSTATE TEANSPORTATION

(continued)

STRIKEBREAKERS

Classification.

Character.

INVCLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

Statutes..

Elements.

Departmental Instructions

Policy....

' . ...

Investigative

Frocedure

Venue..........•

Classification

Character.

IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS

Statute.

Policy..

Classification..

Character.

KICKBACK RACKET ACT

Statute.

Elements.........

. .

Legal Interpretations

of

Statute.

Related Statutes..

Policy...........

Investigative Procedure.

Classirication....

Character.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 66. KIDNAPTING

A. • Statute..

B.

Elements.

c.

Explanation of Blements and Court Decisions

D.

Policÿ................

E.

Investigative

Procedure.

F.

Venue......:....

G.

Classification..

H.

Character..

SECTION 67. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947

A.

Labor Managenient Relations Act, 1947.

B.

Deleted

c.

[Deleted]

SECTION 68. LANDS DIVISION MATTER

A.

B.

C.

•D.

Background

•Policy..

Classification

Character....

SECTION 69.

DELETED

DELIJUN

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

* Go

Statute..

Elements.

Deleted

Policy.........

Investigative

Classification.

Character.

Procedure

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VOLUIE III

TABLE CF CONTENIS

.. .

SECTION 71.

A.

B

E.

J.

SECTION 72.

A.

D.

SECTION 73.

A.

C

E

F

G.

J

SECTION 74.

D

F.

G.

H.

SECTION 75.

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

MAY ACT

Statute.....

Violations.

Departmental Instructions

Policy..

Court Decisions.....

Investigative Procedure

Penalty......

Venue..

Classification.

Character...

MIGRATORY BIRD ACT

Statutes..

Policy.........

Classification.

Character....

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

Statutes.

Elements...............

Statute of Limitations..

Venue.

Miscellaneous

Information.

[Scam Bankruptey]................

Departmental Instructions and Opinions.

Policy.....

Investigative Procedure..

Classification.

Character.

FIREARMS ACTS

National Firearms Act....

State Firearms Control Assistance

Act...

Unlawful Possession or Receipt

of

Firearms

Departmental Instructions.

Policy......

. .

Investigative Procedure..

Classification...

Character..

NEUTRALITY MATTERS

Statutes....

Violations..

Policy.

Classification.

Character...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Paige

SECTION 75.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION 77.

SECTION 78

B.

C

D.

E.

F

G.

SECTION 79.

A.

B.

c.

D.

SECIION 80.

Ao

B.

E.

F.

G.

OBSTRUCIION. OF. JUSTICE; OBSTRUCTION: OF

COURT ORDERS; OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL

INVESTIGITIONS

Statutes.

Elements

Policy.

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..

Classification.

Character.

DELETED

PASSPORTS AND VISAS

Statutes.

General

Information. .

Policy...........

Investigative Procedure.

Statute of Limitations.

Classification.

Character...

PATENT MATTER

Statutes

rolicy..

'.. . .

Classification.

Character..

PERJURY

Statutes

Elements

Policy...

Investigative Procedure

Venue.............

Classification..

Character....

and Court Decisions:

SECTION 81. RAILWAY LABOR ACT

Ao

Co.

D.

E.

F.

Statutes.

Elements

Definitions..

Penalty - 8 152

Tenth)..

Go

H.

Related Statute.- Imployers? Liability

•Act

Title 45,

USC, & 60..

Classification.

Character..

1I11H

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[

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME III

SECTION 82.

TAPLE OF CONTENTS

RED CROSS ACT

20004

A.

B.

C.

D.

Statutes......

Investigative Procedure

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 83. REFERENCE MATTERS - VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURIS-

DICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES

A.

Background.

B.

Income Tas...

C.

Tax (Other

Than Income )

D.

Narcotios..

E.

Food and Drugs.

F.

G.

Prohibition.

Civil Service.

H. Postal Violations (Except Mail Frauds).:.

I. Counterfeiting.........

. . .

J.

R.

smuggling...

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959.

SECTION 84. REGISTRATION ACT

E.

* F.

SECTION 85.

A. Background..

' . . . . ... .

Foreign lovernment agents...

C.

D.

Foreign Agents Registration

of 1938, As Amended.

Registration of Persons Who Have Knowledge of,

or Received Instruction or Assignment in,

Espionage, Counterespionage, or Sabotage Service

or Tactics of Government of Foreign Country

or Foreign Political Party.

Interviews ..........

Classification...

G. Character..

RENEGOTIATION ACT - CIVIL SUITS

A.

B.

Background.

Policy.........

... ..

C. Investigative Procedure..

D.

LE.

Accounting Working Papers.

F

Office of Origin....

G.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 86.

SABOTAGE

Д.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Statutes..

Violations.

Venue..

Policy...

Investigative Procedure

Submission oi

Reports.

Classification.

Character.

-Page

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2

1

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5

7

7

7

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

37, LINVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZÄNIONS

AND INDIVIDUALS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Table of Contents.:

Geneial Guidelines..

Investigation of Organizations

Investigation of Individuals..

Dissemination of Data Developed

Administrative Index (ADEX)•.

SECTION 89.

SEDITION

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

• F.

G.

н.

Statutes..

Violations.

Departmental Opinions.

Policy........

Investigative Procedure

Venue............

Classification..

Character..

SECTION 89.

SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940..

SECTION 90.

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

A.

C.

D.

•

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

Is.

M.

N.

0.

P.

0.

R.

• S.

T.

Statutes..

Ragistratinn.

'....

Fenalties of Act (Section

12, Iitle I) (Title 50

App.,

USC, § 462)...

Selective Service Classifications

Oifenses................

Deleted

Delinquents..

No-Card Cases..

Turn-In Cases......

Selective Service

Personnel.

Miscellaneous Complaints. .....•

Counseling Evasion of Act or Regulations; Hindering

or Interfering.....

Malingerers and Aiding and Abetting.

Presenting Cases to USA.

Recalcitrant Industry..

Reemployment Provisions.

Status................

Classification.......

Character.........••••

.. ...

Handling

Delinquents

Outside

United

States

SECTION 91. DELETED

Page.

1

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14

16

16

17

17

18

19

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21

22

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[E VOLUME III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

"SECIION: 92: SOLDTERS' AND GAILORS! CIVIL'RELIER ACI. OF.1940

Ao.

Bo

C.

D.

E.

Statutes..

Penalties.....

Miscellaneous.

Classification..

Character.

SECTION 93.

TARIFF ACT OF 1930

do

Bo

C.

D.

E.

F

G.

Statute.

Elements

Penalty....

Investigative

Jurisdiction.

Investigative Procedure.

VenUe.........

Classification.

Character.

Page NO.

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VOLUME

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 94? THIFT FRON TITERSTASE SHIPMENT

B.

C

D

Go

H.

..

J

M.

SECTION 95.

Bo

C.

D.

F.

Go

H.

1.

SECTION 96.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION 97•

Statutes.

Fossible

violations

section

jection 659..

Under Section

Elements Under Section 2117...

Section 660.

Elements Under

section 660.

Court Decisions.

Policy....

Investigative Proceaure..

Liaison

and Coverage.

Classification

Character.

TREASON

Constitutional Provisions.

statutes................

Related Statutes...

Elements..............•=

Investigative Procedure.

Polic}.....

Venue.........

Classification..

Character.

VETERANS ADMENISTRATION MATTERS

Statutes..

Violations....

Benefits......

Policy..

Department Instructions

Classification.

Character..

VOORHIS ACT

Bo

C.

D.

Eo .

F.

G.

Statute..

Step Taken by Communist Party,

USA, IO ATOid

Prosecution Under This

Departmental Policy...

Act....

Venue..........

Penalties.......•

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 98.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

OF 1938 (WAGE AND HOUR LAW)

Ao

Statute.

B.

Policy...................

C.

Investigative

Procedure..

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1202-3

VOLỤNT, IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 98.

FAIR CABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (WAGE AND HOUR LAW.

(contirued)

D.

E.

Classification

Character.

SECTION 99. DELETED

SECTION 100.

WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

A.

B

C

Elements..........

Court Decisions

Departmental Instructions

E.

F

Policy....

Investigative Procedures

G. Interstate Iransportation

Persons.....

of Venereally Infected

H.

I.

J.

Classification

Character..

SECTION 101.

DELETED

SECTION 102.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Agreements....:....

Investigation and Prosecution

of Military

• Personnel.

Liaison With Other Goverament Agencies.

Foreign Liaison.....

Investigation of

Federal Gambling Violations.

Agreement between the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the United States Secret

Service Concerning Protective Responsibilities..

H. [Deleted]

SECTION 103. FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

A.

Summary.•

B.

Scope.....•••••

C.

Investigations..

D.

Reporting.......•

E.

Classification..

F: Charactei.........

Go Office of Origin.

SECTION 104. DELETED

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17

23

23

26

28

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

'SECTION 105.INTERNAL INTERNAL SECURITY:- NATIONALISTIG TENDENCY

Table of Contents..

Д.

Goncral Information.

Threats, Possible Violenco, or Demonstrations

Against Foreign Establishments or Officials

in U.S....

C. Immigrants and

Refugees From Communist Countries

(Except Yugoslavia)...

Repatriates from Communist Countries.....

E.

Nonofficial Visitors from Communist Countries

(Excopi lugoslavia)....

F.

East-West Exchange Program

G.

Visitors to Communist Countries..

H..

Disaffection of U.S. Citizens Abroad

I.

Redefections to Communist Countries...

J. Diplomatic Couriers from Communist Countries

(Except Yugoslavia).....

/ … … . ..

K. Foreign Officials and

Establishments

(Except Yugoslavia)..

...

I, Defectors (Except Yugoslavia).........

...........

M.

Students from Communist Countries

(Except Yugoslavia)..

N. Contacts of Communist Officials and Establishments

in U. S. and Abroad (Except Yugoslavia).

•• Deleted!

D.

nolatanl

Qa

Yugoslav

Matters..

R. Deleted

S.

Physical Surveillance Procedures

T.

Classification and Character..

•Pa ga

1

10

10

13

15

17

19

21

22

22

23

31

36

37

45

48

49

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MANUAL. US T

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 106.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES

A:

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Jo

Statutes..

Elements.

•Exceptions..

Inspection of Records.

Departmental pinions.

Policy..

Investigative Procedure

Venue... ...

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 107.

[INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCES; LAND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS J

Table of Contents.•

Part I: Internal Security Informants and

Confidential Sources]

A. Definitions......

Bo.

Sources of Potential Informants

C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being

Considered for Informant Purposes.........

•• Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of

Potential Informants..•

E.

Fo

Bureau Policy......

Indoctrination, Direction, and ContIo1 of

Informants.

Go

He

I.

J.

K.

Lo

Mo.

N.

Informants' Information.

Symbols...........•

Indexing..

Indices..........

Informant Files....•

Payments to Informants.

Monthly and Quarterly Letters.

Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and

Statements...

•• Discontinued Informants..

P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and

Naturalization Service..

Q. Corrective Action on False Information.•

R. Confidential Sources..

S. Panel sources. •••••••

1. Deletedl

U. Utilization of Informants and Sources

Institutions of Learning.

V. Classification.........

[Part II: Foreign Counterintelligence Assets]

[w.

Foreign Counterintelligence Assets.

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19

20

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21

22.

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':.VOLUMn IV.

TABLE. OF CONTENTS

SECTION 108. CRIMINAL INFORNANTS:

A.

B.

C.

Definition..

Illustration

Observation..

E.

Development of Crininal Informants.

Procedure in Listing Potential Criminal

Informants and Criminal Informants.....

F.

Go

H.

I.

Jo

K.

L.

M.

N.

Maintaining Files on Criminai Informants.

Criminal Informant Index..

Progress Letters....

Bureau Policÿ...

Paid Criminal Informants.

Department Policy and Opinion.

Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program.

Participation of Agents..

Classification..

SECTION 109.

PROSAB

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Development of Informants

Policy.

Files.................

Prosab Informant Index

Contacts............

Status

of Program..

Classitication.......

SECTION 110.

DELETED

SECTION 11.

UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES

A.

B.

c.

* D.

F.

Statutes.

Elements

Venue..

Policy..

Classification

Character..

SECTION 112.

DELETED

SECTION 113.

INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS

A.

B.

c.

E.

F.

G.

н.

statutes.

Elements

Policy...

Investigation.

Classification..

Character....

Venue..

Penalty -

| 6 69

Maximum.

•?'"

Page:

1

3

4a

6

7a-b

8

11

11

12

12

4

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Win 466

VOLUME IY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 114. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

Ao Statutes and Elements.

B.

c.

D.

E

F.

Go

H.

I.

J.

Departmental Instructions

Possible Violations

iNot

• All-Inclusive)

Pertinent Court Decisions

Policy........

Irvestigative Procedure.

Venue...

Classification.....

Character.........•

Penalties

- Maxinum.

SECTION 115.

INTERSTATE TRAWSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS

A.

B.

D.

E.

F.

Statute....

Violation...........

Investigative

procedure

Venue...........

Classification..

Character..

SECTION 116. MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS

A.

B.

÷.

D.

Background......

Policy.....

Chaostituerariso

Character..

SECTION 117.

DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

A.

B.

C.

*D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Statutes..

Violations.

Venue.

Policy..............

Investigative

Procedures

Prosecution..

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 118. SWIICHBLADE KNIFE ACT

A. Statutes.

B.

Elements

C.

D.

Policy...

Venue.........

E.

Classification...

F.

Character....:.•

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECIIC!, 119.

A.

B.

C.

D

E.

F.

•INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION, OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS

.Statutes....:

Elemerts..............

Policy and Frocedures..

Classification..

Character..

SECTION 120.

AUTOMOBILE INFORMATICN DISCLOSURE ACT

A.

B

E.

F.

Statutes.....

Elements...........

Investigative Procedure

and

Polioy

Venue................

Classification..

Character

WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

SECTION 121.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

E.

Statutes...............

Elements...........•.••

Department Instructions

Policy.................

Investigative Procedure

Classification.......

Character.....

Penalties - Maximum...

SECTION 122• EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UNREST

A. Investigations of Extremist Organizations and

Individuals..........

Bo Civil Unrest..

SECTION 123. LABOR-MANAGENENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF

1959 - INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

A. Statutes

....

B.

Definitions...

C.

Jurisdiction.........

Do Policy....

E.

'........

F.

Investigative

Procedure

Classification.........

G:

Character..

SECTION 124.

DELETED

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SECTION 125.

A.

c.

E.

SECTION 126.

A.

B

D

E

F

G.

H.

SECTION 127.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION 128.

A.

•B.

C.

D.

F.

G.

R.

SECTION 129.

A.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

VOLUME IV:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ittorn.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORIATION IN. AID OF RACKEIEERING

Statute.

• Policy.

Venue.

Classification

Character

INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING

INFORMATION

Statute...

Violations.

Jurisdiction.

Policy....

Investigative Procedure

Venue.

Classification

Character..

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

PARAPHERNALIA

OF WAGERING

Statute...

Violations.

Policy........•

Departmental Policy...

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..

Classification.

Character.

CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT

Statutes..

Elements.

Definitions..:

Statutory Interpretation

Court Decisions..

Investigative Procedure

Classification.

Character.

DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE

PROPERTY

Statute.

Elements

Policy..

Investigative Procedure

Destruction of Interstate

with Union Activity..

Venue......

Double Jeopardy.

Classification.

Character..

Property in

Connection

•Paige

7

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" VOLUME IV

TABLÉ OF CONTENTS

SEGTION 130. EXTREMIST. INFORMANTS AND SOURCES'

A.

C.

Do

0.

P.

Q.

Ro

S.

Definitions..

Development of Extremist Informants.

Authority to Designate as alPotential]

Extremist Informant.....

Investigation for[Potential]

Extremist Informants..

Extremist Informants...

Confidential Source

Extremist

Operation of Informants.

Symbol...

Payments to Informants.

Informants' Files...

Indexing.......••••

Extremist Informant Indices.

Informants' Information...

Indoctrination, Direction, and Control.

of Extremist Informants..

Miscellaneous Instructions.

Discontinued Informants....

Corrective Action on False Information.

Extremist Informant Statistical Letter

Classification...

SECTION 131.

DELETED

SECTION 132.

SPORTS BRIBERY

A.

Statute...

B.

Violations..

C.

Exceptions...

D.

Analysis of Statute..

E. Policy...............

F. Investigative Procedure.

G.

Venue...

. . .

H.

Classification.

I.

Charac.ter..

SECTION 133.

DELETED

SECTION 134. ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AND THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES

A. Assaulting the President of the United

States..

B. Threats Against the President of the

United States and Other Persons

•Protected by the Secret Service.....

SECTION 135. FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT

A. Statute.

B. Policy.

C.

Venue.

Do Classification

E. Character.

,. Page

2

10

13

13

14

14

15

15]

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•"'"

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 136:

A.

B.

D.

E.

F.

SECTION 137.

A.

C

D

E

F.

SECTION 138.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

SECTION 139

A.

B.

C.

D

E.

F.

* G.

SECTION 140.

A.

B.

D.

E.

F.

Go

•H.

SECTION 141.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

ISECTION 142.

B.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 340

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Statutes...

. . ..

Policj and

¡ Investigative

Miscellaneous..

Classification..

Character...

Penalties

Procedures

DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING

Statutes.....

Policy and Investigative Procedures

Miscellaneous Instructions..

Classification.

Character.

Penalties.

DESECRATION

OF THE FLAG

• Statute

Policy.

Venue.

Classification

Character..

EVTODRECUANE CROCEE PRINDACRIONS

Statute...

Analysis

of Statute.

Departmental Policy...

Investigative Procedure.

Venue.

Classification.

Character.

INTERSTATE OBSCENE

OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS

Statute..

Elements.

Departmental Instructions

Policy....

Investigative Procedure

Venue..............

Classification.

Character.

CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT

Statute.......

Departmental Instructions

Policy.......

Miscellaneous..

Classification.

Charactar.•

ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS

Statutes......

Analysis

of Statutes..

C. Investigative Procedure

9

4-25-71

Page

15

15

15

MANANA

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SAMEVOLUME IV:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

.?÷•

SECTION 142. ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS (continued)

D.

Departmental Policy and Seizure Power

E.

Forfeiture.

F.

...

G.

Classification..

H.

I.

Penalties...

SECTION 143.

RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

H.

Statute...

Analysis

'of Statute..

Investigative Procedures

Ventie.

Classification..:

Character......

Penalties.....

Department Policy..

SECTION 144.

POLICE KILLINGS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

SECTION 145.

A.

B.

C.

D

E.

SECTION 146.

Authority...

Policy.....

Investigative Procedures..

Definition.....

Classification.

Character..

INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES

Aims and Objectives...

Investigative Procedures..

Report Writing Procedures.

Classification.

Character...

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL

GUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Background and Definitions.

Statutes..

Departmental Interpretation of Statutes.

Protective Responsibilities of Treasury

Department..

Departmental. Policy......

Investigative Procedures...

FBIHQ Supervision

and Use of office Contingency

Plan.........

H. Administrative

Matters..

[ [APPENDIX]

INDEX

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TOR FDI INVESTIG!

1.

GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

Fundamental to

investigations by the

FBI is

the need to protoct the

constitutiona1

rIghts of any individual while still

thoroughly and

expeditiously discharging those responsibilities with which it is charged

by statutes and Directives of the

President and the Attorney General.

The FBI is a fact-finding agency which sooks

with equal vigor to gathor

evidence which will aid

the successful prosecution, or establish the

innocence, of alloged violators of laws of the United States or of those

who are accused of seeking by force to subvert or overthrow the Government

of the United Statos.

The FBI makes no determination of the guilt or

innocence of any individual or group so accused.

To this end, guidelines have beon established to be followed in the

investigation of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the FBI, to

prevent unwarranted investigations and invasions of the constitutional rights

of any person.

IB. [SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

In matters affecting the security of the United States, under no circumstance

is an investigation conducted of any individual on the basis that such indi-

vidual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies. All inves-

tigations of

subversive or extremist activities are directed to the collection

of information pertinent to a determination as to whether or not the subject

has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of,

one of several specifically enumerated Federal statutes; or are in fulfill-

ment of instructions from the Department of Justice. All communications re-

garaing these cases must be limited to intormation regarding the subject's

subversive activities,

sympathies and affiliations; pertinent background data

covering subversive individuals or groups with which the subject is connected;

and essential background data regarding the subject. No electronic surveil-

lance may be instituted without the specific authority of the Attorney General.

PIiOI FBIHQ approval is required to institute an investigation of a faculty

member or an organization connected with an institution of learning or to

interview a student or faculty member other than established sources. Inves~

tigations of foreign diplomatic or official personnel are not instituted with~

specific approval by FBIHQ and clearance from the Department of State.

No investigations are conducted of active or retired members of the U. s.

nilitary forces under terms of a delimitations agreement entered into betweer

;he FBI and the counterintelligence services of the armed forces..

c.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGINCE - ORGANIZED CRIME

Where matters of a criminal intelligence nature or organized crime are

concerned, investigations are conducted to develon and maintain current

information

on the activities of organized crime in general, and to develop

substantive cases against individual racket figures.

These investigations

are highly selective and are

,concentrated on the leaders of organized crime

and their reported associates.

Any electronic surveillance used in these

investigations requires approval of the Bureau, the Attorney General, ana

authorization by a court order.

D. APPLICANT-TYPE MATTERS

In the area of applicant investigations, specilic standards have been

established to protect the rights of individuals.

111 relevant information,

both favorable and unfavorable, obtained concerning an individual must be

duly reported; investigation is linited to checks of pertinent records and

interviews of persons in a position to furnish rolevant information; persons

furnishing derogatory information are requested to furnish a signed statement.

The FBI makes no evaluation or recommendation to the requesting agency

concerning the applicant.

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PREFACE.

GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

IE..

GENERAL CRIMINAL AND CIV

MATTERS

Our investigative iurisdiction in criminal cases is based on

specific

violations of Federal laws.

Investigations aro conducted when information

is receiveà indicating a violation of a Federal law, over which we have been

given investigative

jurisciction,

Results of our invostigations

are fürnished

to United States Atiorneys or the Department of Justice for

determination

uf the course of any prosecutive action.

The decision may be

made to present the

case to a Federal Grand Jury or, if the facts so justify,

to arrest the subject, in which latter instance the arrest is made on the

basis of authorizod prosecution and the issuance of a marrant.

Upon arrest,

the subject must be brought before

nezrest United States Magistrate or

Federal Judge in accordance with established rules of Federal criminal

procedure.

Requests for FBI investigations in selected civil matters in which the United

States is or may

be a party in interest are received from the Unitad States

• Attornoys and/or tho Depariment of Justice.

These are handled in strict

conformity with guidelines furnished by the Department of Justice, as are also

.investigations ol violations of the civil rights, antiriot, election laws,

and antitrust laws.

iF.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In addition to thase principles, numerous other restrictions apply to all

phases of our work.

For example, our authority to arrest fugitives is

statutory.

The United States Code empowers Special Agents to make arrests

and carry firearms but FBI policy further requires that' only that force may

be used which is necessary

to effect arrest with due regard being observed

for the safety of the arresting officers and others.

Special Agents are not permitted to shoot anyone except in self-defense.

No surveillances are conducted in the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme

court, or the House and Senate Office Buildings.

No surveillance, electronic

or otherwise, may be instituted on any member of Congress, any Justice or

Judge, or any principal functionary of the Execative Branch.

Our Special

Agent's may not engage in entrapment or any other improper, illegal, or

unethical tactics in procuring infornation or evidence; any critical

complaints concerning FBI personnel must be thoroughly investigated; any

testimony by a Specizl Agent

in court must be

given clearly and without bias

or embellishment.

Ihe foregoing is a goneral statement of guidelines for iBI invostigations.

All investigative personnel must follow these rules.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 343

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SECTION 36. ESPIONAGE

[SECRET]

361

rA..

STATUTES| (UNCLASSIFIED) J

Titlo 18, USC, 88 792-798;

Title 50, USC, &783(b)-(1) Intornal Security

Act of 1950):

Effectivo 10-4-51 riclations

may be

prosecuted ragardless

si whero overt act occurs (Public Law 87-369).

§ 792.

Harboring or concealing persons

Whoever harvors or conceals

any person

who he knows, or has reasonable

grounds to bolieve, has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under

soction 793 or 794 is liablo to $10,000 fine or ten years' imprisonment, or

1793. Gathering, transmitting, or losing delonce information

Whoever,

for purpose of obtaining information respecting national

dofense with intent or reason to believe it is to be used to injury of u.s.

or advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon; enters, flies over, or other-

wise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of

defense,

navy yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery,

torpedo station, dockjard,

canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine,

tolegraph, telephone, wireless,

or signal station,

building,

oifice, research

laboratory or station, or other place connected with national defense owred

or constructed, or in progress of construction by U.S. or under control of

U. So, or of any of its officers, deparimenis, or agencies, or within ex-

clusive jurisdiction of U.S.,

or any place in which any vessel, aircraft,

munitions, or other materials or instruments for

use in time of nar

being made,

prepared, repaired, stored, or are subject of research or

development, under any contract or

agreement with U.S., or any department

thereof, or with any person on behalf of U. So, or any prohibited

place designated by President by proclamation in time of war

or national

emergency in which anything for use

of Army, Navy.,

or Air Force is being

or stored, information

to which prohibited place

Frosiioni ino joinininoù muniù vo

Whoever, los samo purpose, and with like intent or reason to

believe,

takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain,

any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model,

instrumant, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with

defense;

Whoever,

purpose, receives

or obtains or agrees or attempts to

receive or obtain

from any person,

or from any source whatever, any document,

writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, etc., of anything

connected with

national defense, knowing or having reason

to believe, at

time he receives or obtains,

agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it,

that it has been or will be

obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any

person contrary to provisions of this chapter; or

Whoever,

lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or

boing entrusted with any document, writing, code book, etc., relating to

national defense, or information relating to national defense which possessor

has reason to believe coula be used to injury of U.S. or advantage

foreign nation, villfully communicates, delivers, transmits,

communicated, etc.,

or attempts to communicate, etc., same

to any verson not

entitled to receive it, or willfully retains

same and fails to delivar it

on demand to officer or

employee of U.S. entitled to receive it; or

(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over

any document, writing, code book,

atc., relating to national defense, etc.,

williully communicates, delivers, transmits,

or causes to be communicated,

otco, or attempis to communicate, etc., or cause to be communicated, etc.,

to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retzins

fails to deliver it to officer or employee of U.S. entitled to receive

(I) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of

any documont, writing, code book, etc., relating to national defense, (1)

through gross negligence pormits

same to be removed from its

proper place

of

custody or delivorod to anyone in violation of his trust, or

to be lost,

stolen, abstracted, or destroyod, or (2) having knowladge that same has

Classified by Director, FBI

Exempt from GDS Category 2

ate of Declassification Indefinite.

SECRET ]

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1

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JUN SO. BUNTUMUL

[SECRET]

boon illegally removec

om its proper place of custo

delivered

to

anyone in violation oi

trust, or lost,

or stolen,

tracted,

or destrojed,

and fails to make prompt

report

of such loss, theft, abstraction, or

destruction to his superior officer -

Is liablo to $10,000 fine or imprisonment, for not more than ten years, or

both.

Il two or moro persons conspire to violate any oi foregoing

and one or more do any act to effect object of conspiracy, each

provisions,

is subject

to punishment provided for offense which is object of conspiracy.

Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government

with intent or reason to believe that it is to

injury of U.

S. or advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers,

transmits, or atiempts to communicate, eto., to any foreign government,

or party or military or naval force within a foreign country,

whether recognized or unrecognized by U.S., or to any representative, officer,

agent, employee,

subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly,

any document, writing, code book, etc., relating to national defense, shall

be punished by death. or by imprisonment for any term of years or life.

Whoever, in time of war, with intent that same shall be communicated to

the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates, or attempts to

elicit any information with respect to movement, numbers, description,

condition, or disvosition of any of armed forces, ships, aircraft, or

materials of U.S.,

or with respect to plans or conduct, or supposed plans

or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with

respect to any works

or measures undertaken for or connected with,

or intended for fortification

or defense of any place, or any other information relating to public defense,

which might be useful to the enemy, shall be purished by death

or by imprison-

ment ior any term of years or life.

(c)

If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more

do any act to effect object

of conspiracy, each shall be subject to punishment

provided for nifense which is shiart of

ronshirary

Title 18, USC, & 798 (temporary extension of section 794), provides section

.794, in addition to coning into full force in time of war, remains in full

force until six months after termination of national emergency proclaimed

by President on 12-16-50, or such earlier date as may be prescribed by

concurrent resolution of Congress, and acts which would give rise to penalties

under section 794 when performed

of war shall give rise to

same penalties when performed during period above provided for.

Photcgraphing and sketching defense installations

Whenever, in interests of national defense, President defines certain

vital military and naval installations or equipment as requiring protection

against general dissemination of information relative

thereto, it shall be

unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map: or grapbical

representation of

such installations or

equipment without first obtaining

permission of commanding officer of military or naval post, camp,

or station,

or naval vessels, nilitary and naval aircraft, and any separate military or

naval command concerned, or higher authority, and promptly submitting it to

such commanding officer

or higher authority for censorship or other action

as he may deem necessary.

(b) Whoever violates this section is liable to $1, 000 line or imprisonment

for one year, or both.

Use of airciaft for photographing defanse installations

Whoever uses

or permits use of aircraft or any contrivance used, or designed

for navigation or flight in the air, for purpose of making photograph, sketch,

picture, otc., of vital military or naval

installations or equipment, in

violation of

section 795 is liable to $1,000 fine or imprisonment for

year, or both.

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[SECRET]

2

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...

SECTION 36.

ESPIONAGE

36A

• ' [SECRET.]

$ 797. Publication anu

e of photographs of dofense

tallations

On and after 30 days fro

date President defines any vi

military or

naval installation or cquipment

as being within category contemplated under

section 795, whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any

photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, etc.,

of vital military or naval

installations or squigment

so defined, without first obtaining permission of

commanding officer of military or naval post, camp, or station

concerned, or

higher authority, unless such photograph,

picture, drawing, eto.,

clearly indicated thereen

that it has been censored by proper military or

naval authority; is liable to $1,000 Line or imprisonment for one year, or

By Executive Order 10104 dated 2-1-50, President defined following as vital

military and naval installations or equipment requiring protection against

general dissemination

information re-ative

All military, naval, or air force installations and equipment classified,

designated,

or marked under authu.:ty or at direction of President, Secretary

of Defense,

Secretary of Army, Secretary

of Navy, or Secretary of Air Force

as "Top Secret," "Secret," "Confidential," or "Restricted," and located

within:

(a)

Any military, naval, or air force reservation,

post, arsenal, proving

ground, range; mine lield, camp, base, airfield, fort, yard, station, district,

(b) Any defensive sea

area established by Executive order and

not subsequently

discontinued by Executive order, and any defensive sea area established

authority of Title 18, USC, $ 2152

(c) Any airspace reservation established undar section 4 of Air Commerce

Act of 1926 except airspace reservation established by Executive Order 10092

of 12-17-49

closed to foreign vessels

(I) Any commercial establishment engaged in development or manufacture of

classified military or naval arms, munitions, equipment, designs, ships, air-

craft, or vessels ior U.S. Army, Navy,

or Air Force

2.

All military, naval, or air

force aircraft, weapons,

ammunition, vebicles,

ships, vessels, instruments, engines, manufacturing machinery, tools, devices,

or any other equipment whatsoever, in possession of Army, Navy, or Air Force

or in course of experimentation,

development,

manufacture,

or delivery for

Army, Navy, or Air Force classified, designated, or marked

under authority

•or at direction of President, Secretary of Defense, etc.

3.

All official military, naval, or air force books, pamphlets, documents,

reports, maps, charts, plans, designs, models, drawings, photographs, contracts,

or specifications marked under authority or at direction of President,

Secretary of Defense, etc.

(Applicability of this Executive order should be determined in each instance

by contact with representative of armed services having security responsibility

for item in question.)

Disclosure of classified information

Whoever knowingly and

communicates, furnishes, transmits, or

otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes,

in any manner prejudicial to safety or interest of U.S. or for the benefit

of any foreign government to detriment

of U.S. any classified information -

(1)

concerning nature, preparation, or use of

any code, cipher, or crypto-

graphic system of U.S. or any foreign government; or

(2)

design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device,

apparatus,

or appliance used or

prepared or

planned for use by U.S. or any

foreign government for cryptographic or communication inteiligence purposes;

or

(3)

communication intelligence activities of U.S. or any foreign government;

[

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6Д - В

SECTION 36. ESPIONAGE

(4)

obtained by procosses

communications

of any foreign government,

knowing it to have been

soobinined -

Is liable to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for ton yours, or both.

(b). For precise dofinitions of terms used in this subscution, refer to Titlo

Nothing in this section shall prohibit furnishing, upon lawful demand,

of information

to any regularly constituted

House of Representatives, or joint comnittee thereos.

of U. S. Senate or

Period of limitation

Statute of limitations for sections 792 and 793 is ten jeais; there is no

statute of limitations for section 794 as this is a capital offense;

statute

of limitations for sestions 795-798 is five years.

Title 50, USC, § 783 (Internal Security Act of 1950)

unlawful for any officer or employee

of U..S. or of any

department or agency thereof, or of any corporation stock of which is owned

in whole or in major part by U.S. or any department or agercy thercot, to

communicate in any manner to any other person whom such officer or employee

knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of any

foreign goverrment or an officer or member of any communisi organization

defined in section 782 of this title, any information of

lind classified by

President (or by head of any department, agency, or corporation with approval

of President as affecting security of U.S., knowing or having reaso!

know that it has been so classified, unless specifically authorized by President,

or by bead of department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or

employee is employed, to

make such disclosure..

(c) It shall be unlawful for any agent or representative of any foreign

government, or any officer or member of any communist organization as defined

in section 782 knowingly to cbtain or receive,

01

receive, directly or indirectly. from eny meticer or amrince me!. &

any department, eto., any information of

kind which shall hava been classified

by President (or by head of any such department, agency, or corporation with

approval of President) as affecting security of U. S., unless

special

suthorization shall first have been obtained from head of devartment, agency,

or corporation having custody of or control over

such infriiation.

(2)

Any person who violates any provision of this section is liable to fine

of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than

ten years, or

both, and shall be ineligible to hold any office, or place of honor, profit,

or trust creáted by Constitation or laws of U.S.

(e) Any person may be prosecuted, tried, and punished for violation of this

section at any time within ten years after commission of offense,

and if at

time of commission of offense person is an officer or employse

of U.S. or

of any department or agency thereof, or of any corporation siock of which is

owned in whole or major part by U.S. or any department or agency thereof,

such person may be prosecuted, tried, and punished for any violation of this

section at any time within ten years after such person has ceased to be

employed as such officer or employee.

Neither holding of office nor membership in any

communist organization

shall constitute

per se a violation of subsection (c) or of any other

criminal statute.

COURT DECISIONS [(UNCLASSIFIED) }

In Gorin v. U.

S., 312 U. S. 19, Supreme Court, in January, 1941, in inter-

preting phrase

"to be used ... to the advantage of any foreign nation,"

that no distinction was made between friend or enemy and it was not

necessary to prove that information obtained was to be

used to injury of

In U.S. v. Heine, 151. F. (22) 813, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, after

finding that Heine was German

agent who collected information about

aviation industry and sent it

to Germany surreptitiously, contended that his

information came

from sources lawfully accessible to anyone who was willing

[SECRET]

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## Page 348

dr 119.

[C.

EUFLUNAGN

JOB - C

(SECRET]

"to tako pains to find,

collate it: Court fe.

at sinco it

cannot be unlawful to

such information within J.

it would be

fatuous to forbid its transmission to citizens of a friendly foreign power.

Court stated, "it is enough in the case involved to hold as no do that.

whatever it mas lawfal to broadcast throughout the

country, it was lawful

to send

abroad

. .

The section is zined at the substance of the proscribed

information,

not at the ast of making it more readily available for use."

Based on Hoine

decision, it appears Government must prove that information

gathered

or transmitted

to some degree limited or restricted and not

available to general public.

DEPARTMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS [(UNCLASSIFIED) ]

According to Department, prohibitions in

section 793(a) b are conditioned

upon suspect having

the purpose of obtaining information respecting

defense with intent or reason to believe

that it is

to be used

Injury of U.S. or advantage of any foreign nation; those in subdivision

(c) require

same purpose plus suspect's knowledge or reason to believe that

it will be used contrary to espionage laws; subdivisions (d and

(e) relate

to suspects who already nave possession of

or access. to information relating

to national defense, either lawfully or unlawfully, which they have reason

to believe could be

used to injury of u. s.

or to advantage of any foreign

sation, and ino willfully transmit it to unauthorized persons or retain it

after demand made by person authorized to receive it la demand is onl

necessary under subdivision (a) where individual has lawful possession - no

demand is necessary under subdivision (a) where person has unauthorized

possession); subdivision (1) applies to suspects who have lawful possession

of national defense information and pernit it to be lost or destroyed through

gross negligence or fail to report its loss to proper authorities.

Department has instructed all USAs that its prior authorization is necessary

before instituting prosecutive action in espionage cases, except in emergency

where subiect is fuéitive or damade may result from delay.

In cases involving photographing violations, Department has advised such

cases can be more expeditiously handled by presenting directly to USA for

•preliminary opinion.

This does not alter.policy of presenting all espionage

cases to Department prior to actual prosecution:

Concerning section 798, Department has advised that classification may be

by written directive,

or by marking or stamping on item classified;

authorization may be established by written directive or oral testimony.

Decodes of unclassified information are covered by act where it can be proved

they facilitated analysis of cryptographic system.

Department holds that photographing or sketching of outside of commercial

establishment engaged in manufacture of classified military or naval arms

and munitions for U.S. Army, Navy, or Air Force would not constitute violation

of section 795 and/or 797, where no classified equipment or material appears

in photograph or sketch.

Department has suggested following procedurés

when obtaining and returning

photographs taken in violation of section 795:

Subject should be requested

to relinquish film.

Receipt should be given to subject and signed statement

film is being voluntarily relinquished. Film taken in

connection with section 795 should be submitted to FBI Laboratory for any

necessary processing and

should then be submitted to commanding officer of

military post, or othar

installation, for censorship. If film contains

photographs in violation

of section 795, it should be delivered to USA either

airectly by commanding officer or through Bureau.

prosecution deemed advisable, film should be retained as evidence and not

returned to subject unless, at

conclusion of case, USA feels that any innocuous

negatives or prints may be

returned. In such event film should be returned

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 348

[SECRET]

5

17013-74

fia.

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D.

TSECKETT

to conmanding officor wi

usA's recommendation; otherwi

prints therefrom should

in in possession of

commandin

their disposition loft to

discrotion. Requosts for

Pilm ind any

offIcer,

and

rn of film can

• then be referred to commanaing officer:

As to rights of Bureau Agents in carrying out enforcement procedures regarding

violations

of sections 795 and 796 by Soviet-bloc diplomatic and official

personnel, Department advised in summary as follows:

In all instances in which photographs or sketches

of delense installations are

made by Soviet-bloc nationals, every reasonable effort should

be made to

recover and confiscate these items in interest of national security.

Soviet-bloc nationals who have no diplomatic immunity are observed by Bureau

Agents to photograph or sketch

military installations in violation of

sections 795 and 796, they may be arrested without warrant and film seized

as evidence.

If observation is by person other than Bureau Agent, an arrest

warrant should be procured

(because misdemeanor rather than a felony is

involved) and search warrant obtained il premises are involved.

Where Soviet-bloc or other foreign officials who may have diplomatic immunity

are observed taking photographs by Bureau Agents, they may be detained until

Burezu is satisfied they do in fact have immunity and film may be confiscated

in interest of national security.

If Agents do not actually observe the

activity but received information from outside source, film may not be legally

since warrant of arrest or search may not be lawfully executed against

person or

premises naving diplomatic immunity.

POLICY

1.

Responsibilities of FBI[(UNCLASSIFIED)]

a..

Investigation of violations of espionage and related statutes for

prosecutive purposes

Tnto22450+00 500702026121+199

By Presidential directive FBI has counterintalligence responsibilities

which it shares with military intelligence agencies and is also

charged with correlating information relating to

making appropriate dissemination.

Coordination in domestic intelligence

field is effected through Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

By National Security Council directive, FBI and

other U. S. intelligence

agencies coordinate foreign and domestic intelligence through U. S

Intelligenca Board. (See section 102A, volume IV, of this manual.)

To aid in interpretation of Bureau's policies, following terms are

defined:

(1)

Intelligence - obtaining and distributing information required

for formulation and execution of Government policy

Espionage - intelligence activity directed toward acquisition

of information through clandestine operations

Counterintelligence

- intelligence activity which is devoted to

destroying effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence

activities and which is undertaken to protect security

of nation,

• and its personnel, information, and installations,

against

espionage,

sabotage, and subversion.

Counterintelligence

procuring,

developing, recording,

disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity

and of penetrating,

manipulating, or repressing individuals,

groups, or

organizations conducting or capable of conducting

2.

such activity.

General objectives (CONFIDENTIAL)

Principal goal is providing adequate protection to our national defense.

To achievo this end

and discharge our responsibilities, investigations

should be directed:

a.

To perfect successful

counterintelligence

b.

To present to Attorney Genoral. for his prosecutive consideration

violations of espionage and related statutes

(SECRET]

6

11-13-74

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[

(SECRET]

'"3. Specilic objoctiv

¿SECRET)]. :

3 .

Development of

able. agents (persóns actively

intelligence or

izations but working secretly

eratod by foreign

bohalf of Buroan

and defectors-in-place

• b.

Development of complete

intolligence information, i.e., idontifi-..

cation of all intelligence personnel; dotermining targots and ob-

joctives; ascertaining. to fullest extent activities and contacts oi

intolligence personnel; and developnent of all information necessary

for protection of national. security.

c.

When a and b have been achieved, to

present caso to Department for

where appropriat

4.

Following general rules apply to opening of espionage cases:

Where specific complaint is received alleging that person is en-

gaged in espionage, together with supporting circumstances to indi-

cate this may be true,

case is opened and investigation pursued to

b.

point where,

if possible, allegations can be established

or disproved.

Whore nonspecific complaint is received which is vague and indefi-

nite, submit iniormation to Bureau,

indicating no further investigation

is being corducted.

However, this does not mean that before case

opened, full or substantial evidence must be on hand. Il responsible

sources, published data, confidential informants, double agenis, or

any reliable citizen makes allegation which would indicate espionage

activities, careful consideration should be given to matter before

decision is made not to initiate investigation.

Investigation of diplomatic or other foreign official personnel, in-

cluding persons within scope of International Organizations Immunities

Act, should not be instiuted without prior Bureau authority.

ever, in emergency situations, discreet physical surveillances may be

conducted of such persons apparently acting outside scope of their

authority.

In such instances immediately advise Bureau.

5. Conducting investigations [(SECRET)]

a.

Investigations must be complete,

tnorough, and expeditzousLy nanaled.

Bureau

should be kept currently advised

of

important dovelopments.

Determine at earliest possible timo

whether allegations have any pos-

sible basis in fact in

order to conserve Agents' time and efforts.

b.

Only photographing cases should be presented to USAs for

preliminary

prosecutive opinion.

Do not contact USAs regarding violations of

other statutes, but

submit to Bureau for presentation to Department.

FBI Agents may photograph, sketch, or make graphic representations

of military or naval installations or equipment without obtaining

permission from commanding officer or higher authority when request

for investigation has emanated from latter

Cr

where urgent nature of

Investigation prevents obtaining such permission.

In latter instance,

photographs, etc., should be submitted promptly to commanding officér

or higher authority for review.

d.

Pursuant to consultations with Department of State and Department con-.

cerning violations of sections 795 and 796 by Sovieï-bloc diplomatic

and official personnel, be guided by following instructions:

Exocutive Order 10104, which defines defenso installations covered by

sections 795 and 796, specifies that installations or equipment must

be classified,

designated, or marked

.ó. as "Iop Secret,"

"Secret,"

"Confidential," or

"Restricted."

Arrests or

seizure of

film

or sketches

must not be undertaken unlass there is no doubt that installation or

material photographed or sketched was so classified, designated, or

marked.

Spacific Bureau

authority must be obtained

prior to any arrests

of any diplomatic personnel or memors of thoir staffs (including persons

affiliatod with embassies, legations, etc., and missions to UN) or

employees of UN Secretariat; or before any seizure of film or sketches

Similar authority should be obtained before any

sketches from other nondiplomatic personnel

(rep-

resontatives of Amtorg Trading Corporation, lass News Agency, etc.)

unless it is apparent that ovidenco will bo destroyed, removed, or

or place where it would not be suscoptible

to

seizuro before authority can be obtained.

[SECRET]

7

11-13-74

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## Page 351

!

6.

Interviews [(SECRET.) ]

As general rule

pionage subjects are not inte

wed without prior

Burcau authority.

'owever, subjects may be inter

wed without such author-

ity when it is a

rent subject is cognizant of

estigation, interview

would not jeopardize investigation, and there is no indication violation

is foreign-inspired.

This would include photographing violations.

jects must not be interviewed at their places of employment or through

arrangements with their employers without prior Bureau authority.

[E.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE [(SECRET)]

1.

Investigation should

be based on premise alleged intelligonce officers

and their agents have been thoroughly trained and their activities

directed by experts.

Most successful

spy is ordinary-appearing person,

who has established

an excellent "cover"

for his activities.

2.

Principal goal is providing adequate protection to national

defense.

tain counterintelligence measures frequently will be more desirable than

immediate apprehension and

prosecution.

It may be desirable to permit

subject to remain at large, whereby cuntinuing surveillance may disclose

information as to his associates, targets, or accomplices.

Every pre-

must be used to prevent subject from becoming

aware of our investi-

3.

4.

Climax of any espionage case is actual transmittal or disclosure of infor

mation affecting national defense to foreign government or its representa-

Investigations should be

view to determining as soon

as possible actual method by which information involved is being transmitted

to foreign government or its representative.

It may become necessary in

some instances to make an arrest to prevent

transmission of classified in-

formation known to be in possession of a subject or to prevent his escape

with information.

Although not all-inclusive, following investigative steps should be con-

8.

Ascertain complete background and activities if possible including:

residences; employment; associates; citizenship status, including date

and place of birth; credit and

arrest checks, including subversive

police records; check of pertinent Government agencies' files; check

of public source materials; photograph and physical description; iden-

tilying information as

to any automobile involved.

b.

Discreet physical surveillance, keeping in mind

surveillance may be

-necessary nuan long perica sa timo.

Quiain piuiographs, IncLuding

notion-pictures, whenever possible,

particularly of espionage meets.

c.

sources of information, confidential informants, doubl

agents, and defectors-in-place

These may be secured through discreet contact with neighbors,

friends,

acquaintances, or

Make every effort to corrob-

orate conversations between informants or double agents and subject

in order that admissible evidence may be available to corroborate in-

formant or double agent.

Make sure latter interprets instructions

d;

correctly and have such instructions properly recorded.

Ascertain method and nature of communications, including mail drops,

through:

(1) Check of communication company records.

Facilities of these

(2)

companies should be used whenever possible and appropriate.

Use of highly confidential techniques.

This is very important

and should be considered whenever security is assured.

€ .

Ascertain financial status

through:

Credit checks

Check of bank records.

When bank account is located, it should

be monitored and all sources

I. Ascertain identity and purpose

of all contacts through coverage as

outlined above.

Also consider:

Interviews- with reliable

current and past acquaintances and

associates.

(2)

Check of recoras at hotels and other places of abode, as well as

public transportation companies when

appropriate.

When feasible,

maintain liaison with such companies.

[sECRET]

12-13-74

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 351

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## Page 352

SAUTION 30. ESPIONACE

!.."

.."[SECRET]

.::'.

36E

i'."

Obtain handwri

and troewriting

specimens

forward to FBI lab-

oratory for cor

rison wich national security

0.

Indicato nother

spocimen may be destroyed if necessary in making examination.

If no

instructions.are.forwarded.onlysuch.tosts.as.resultin no.damage.

.. .:

will be used

and, as this excludos nearly all chorical tests, examina -

tion may not be successiul.

b.

When questionable material is obtained during investigation, foriera

to laboratory for exarination.

Also,

when technical equipment needed

and not available to zield, make inguiry of laboratory.

1.

Bureau must be apprised of contents

02 all pagers, documents, codes,

blueprints, etc., in subject's possassion and no opportunity

should be overlooked to exanine his effects. whenever such material

consists of items of possible military, naval, os diplomatic signif-

or subject is known to be

aware of such intormation, advise

Bureau immediately.

If subject travels

abroad, consider checking Customs' records and

having his baggage

examined by Customs,

Also consider requesting CI

to cover activities abroad.

When thorough investigation

has been made, consider recommending inter-

view of subject.

If interview authorized, consider obtaining waivers

of search to permit search of

subject's residence

and other premises

under his control.

Recommendations should be submitted to Burear relative to placing

subject's name on administrative inder in accordance with

section 87,

volume III, of this manual.

5. When interviews are conducted with person who has admitted being con-

nected with a foreign intelligence service, cover following points:

All information pertaining to organization

and operation of intelligence

service with which he is connected, including setup of files section and

how their material is coordinated.

Identities

descriptione, and cover names of all laballigancs deficese

(both legals and illegals), co-opted workers, illegal agents,

and agents,

particularly those sent to U.S. by that intelligence service; who

trained them; how they were trained; what was their mission; in which

section of U.S. they were to operate; how they were to come

to U. S.;

under what name they entered U. So; whether subject knows of any infor-

mation having been

furnished by them to his intelligence service; 1l so,

nature of information, how they obtained it, how they communicated it,

how they were paid, for what period they were active, and when was last

time they were active.

Where lists of names

are found upon subject, obtain all identifying

information concerning

persons listed and determine whether

d.

merely social acquaintances or are of espionage significance.

Locations of all training centers

of intelligance service, both in

home country and elsewhere,

as well as idontities and descriptions of

personnel connected with these centers.

Information concerning uses of

mail drops in this country or in foi-

eign countries.

6. Where members of forsign intelligence services offer their

services

defectors or defectors-in-place,

they should be

questioned

thoroughly as

to their motives.

Make certain they obtain no information concerning

Bureau which mould be of value to foreign intelligence service since it

is known practice

of intelligence services

to plant person within opposing

intelligance service, and

make every effort to check on latter possibility.

Codes, ciphers, secret writing, and methods of concealment

3..

There is definite difference between a cipher and a code.

A cipher is

made by using individual letters of messago as units.

This may

done eithor by substituting numbers, symbols, or other letters lor

original letters in message; or by rearranging order of letters

messago. Ciphers obtained by first method are called

and latter are called transposition ciphers.

bo

codes are constructea by replacing criginal words,

phrases, or sentences

of message by sode words. Because of regulations

governing messages

[

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 352

[SECRET]

9

11-13-74

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## Page 353

8.

(SECRET]

# D toleraph

radio,

code groups usua

Consist or tige water

letters or five

Code inessages may be ba

on use of code

book which may c

ain as many as one hundred th

and or more codo

words. or

, питьск

Dictionaries are often usca as code books.

Ordinarily codo

messages. cannot be docoded without use of code 000k.

Frequent use has been made of books for setting up ley to cipher.

"Bost

sellers" have been used as their possession does not arouse

suspicion.

In making searches keep this possibility in mind.

munication with foreign countries is irequently accompli ind by

shortwave radio or secret writing in correspondence or ja

While some types of

may be detected with nalud eye,

there are methods with invisible inks that cannot be detected with-

out extensive laboratory examination.

When submitting codes or ci-

phers to Laboratory ior examination,

any collateral information which

might be of aid to solving code or cipher should be noted in cover

Missing

classified documents and disclosure of classified data (See

section 20F,

volume II, of this manual.

3.

These cases generally are referred by other Government agencies.

When documents are reported missing, referring agency

advise why matter was referred and field should

confirn receipt

in writing and state whether or not investigation is being

conducted.

(2)

No investigation should be made of administrative misplacement,

misfiling,

or loss of documents in transmission.

Do not investi

gate if referral by other agencies has been delayed unreasonably;

advise Bureau promptly of facis, including reason for delay.

(3)

Investigate where there is indication of loss or compromise

through gross negligence.

Howaver, locating missing documents is

administrative unction of agency having security responsibility

for such material and no search for missing documents should be

conducted for other agencias without Rurean approval.

• (4)

Investigate where there is theit, disclosure, or compromise with

intent to aid foreign power or injure U.S. or with reason to

believe this

(5) Advise Bureau promptly of

cases of widespread interest, probable

publicity, or where classified information is of great

strategic

importance.

Investigative

steps - determine:

Circumstances

surrounding loss, disclosure, or compronise

Whether persor

disclosing information knew

it was classified and

also knew person to whom information disclosed was not authorized

to receive

Exact classified information involved

Its classification and significance to national defense (i.e.,

would its disclosure to unauthorized persons injure U. s.,

a foreign power), and identities of competent persons who can so

testify

Whether information can be declassified for purposes of prosecution

Evidence of requisite intent or

gross negligence (i.e., associa-

• tions with foreign officials; clandestine conspiratorial meetings;

subject had been

given security briefings or was aware

of security regulations; utter disregard

of such regulations;

excessive carelessness or imprudent handling of classified infor-

mation, etc. Where preliminary inquiries show requisite intent

did not exist

was no gross negligence, discontinue

submit closing communication.

0.

Where there is no indication of foreign-directed espionage but requisite

intent or gross

negligeuce does exist, early interview of subject is

gonerally desirable, at which time

signed statement should be

Conduct investigation to corroborate admissions.

requested.

[SECRET]

10

11-13-74

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 353

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## Page 354

[F.

[G.

[SECRET]

60000464:

Communist intellig

services are placing greate

mphasis on illegal

operations

in U.S.

n

view of security surroundi

such operations, •

methods of infiltracion must be devised apart from

tsual techniques.

Experience has shown: that it. is fatal. to rush this type of investigation

and approach must be painstaking with premium on patience. Technique of

developing person who can be placed in contact with suspecied illegals or

illegal agents for purpose of developing close relationship should be borne

in mind; howevei, illegals and illegal agents are most experienced

extreme care should be exercised.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONAL FILES I (UNCLASSIFIED)]

These files were set up to correlate information concerning methods of opera-

tion and organizational structure of Soviet intelligence services.

tain information secured by field and FBilD throush investigations and Interviews

and from other U.S. and foreign intelligence and security services.

Included are a breakdown of Soviet intelligence services, methods of recruit-

ment, training, communications, payments, travel and entry, security precau

tions, cover stories, targets, and modus operandi.

They should be thoroughly reviewed by all special Agents engaged in counter-

espionage and counterintelligence investigations.

New material received at

FBIHQ is forwarded to field for inclusion in these files; hence, Special

Agents engaged in counterespionage and

counterintelligence investigations

should review this material periodically.

CURRENT ESPIONAGE DIGEST [(UNCLASSIFIED) ]

services are prepared at Fino tor distribution to all offices.

Summaries of new techniques,

of communist intelligence

Issues should be reviewed by all Special Agents handling counterespionage

and counterintelligence investigations.

2a Be alert to recommend pertinent itens of significance.

3.

File should be maintained under custody of SAC with same security as

Classification 134 files. Issues of lasting training and educational

value, however, should be permanently charged out and securely maintained

• by supervisor responsible for counterespionage and counterintelligence

investigations in location accessible to involved SAs. (Legal Attaches

Ho Deleted

[I. VENUE [(UNCLASSIFIED) }

Venue

lies in judicial district in which alleged offense occurred

[J. CLASSIFICATION - 65 [(UNCLASSIFIED)]

[к.

CHARACTER - ESPIONAGE - (Name or approved abbreviation of country) [(UNCLASSIFIED)]

Where applicable, add

dual character of Internal Security Act of 1950.

airar?."

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 354

[SECRET]

11-12

11-13-74

is.

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## Page 355

LA.

BACKGROUND

There are three princi

They are set forth under

registration statutos

within

C, and D.

Man's jurisdiction.

(B.

FOREIGN GOVERIIMENT AGENTS

1.

statute

Title 18, USC, $ 951.

Agents of foreign governments

Whoevar,

other than

diplomatic or consular officor

or attache, acts in

U. S. as

agent of foreign

government without prior notification to Sec-

retary of State, shall be

fined

not more than 35,000 or imprisoned

not

more than ter years, or both.

Term "{creign government," as used in this title, includes any government,

faction, or bodg of insurgents "ithin country with which U.S. is at peace,

irrespective of recognition by U.S.

2.

Department has advised that no definite opinion could be rendered as to

whether agents of

foreign governments

are legally required to notify Sec-

retary of State with regard

to specific nature of duties to be performed

When information is received that agent of foreign government

may be engaged in activity

scope of duties set forth in his

tification to Secretary of State, submit promptly to Bureau for presen-

tation to Department Ior opinion as to possible prosecution or further

[

investigation.

3.

Investigative

procedure

Following suggestions, not all-inclusive, are directed towird obtaining

that subject:

Acted as an agent

of foreign government

Examine subject's bank account.

Intervier reliable associates

subject.

Examine subject's personal records.

Examine Federal and state income tax returns.

compare subject's apparent anuume wiii appareni oponidinis.

Interview subject.

b.

not notified to Secretary of State

This should be done at outset of investigation.

Request Washington

Field Office (WFO) to check records of State to ascertain if noti-

fication filed and, if so, to obtain

full details.

Be alert for

false information or information willfully omitted. State Department

representative who can testify that

subject is not

notified to Sec-

retary of State must be determined

in each case prior to trial.

ecutive summary reports should indicate "an appropriate representative

of U.S. State Department,

Washington, D.C."

as witness who will

furnish this testimony,

Add note for benefit of USA that this witness'

identity will be established prior to trial.

Bureau should be requested

to determine this witness' name and title reasonable time prior to trial.

. Г.

[C.

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED

Original Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, known as McCormack Act, was

superseded by Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended.

1.

Title 22, USC, 8$ 611-621, provides:

No person shall act as agent of

foreign principal unless he has

filed with Attorney General a true and

complete registration statement

and supplements as required by these sections, unless he is exempt from

Supplementary statements must be filed

every six months.

A 30-day grace period is permitted to file these

supplements.

changes ir agent's activities

or relationships with foreign principal

must be reported within ten days.

"agent of foreign principal" includes anyone who:

Acts as an agent, representative,

employees.

servant, public-relations

counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee, or political

consultant for a

activities

principal, or for a person any of whose

are in whole

or in major part controlled by foreign

principal, and who within U. S.:

]

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 355

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## Page 356

0 .

d.

f.

[

-

(3)

(4)

(5)

Term

(1)

(2)

Engages, i

solicits,

litical.activitics..for.intor

or dispensos anything

{toroign principal: ..".

dalue for foreign

principal.

Represents

terests of foreign principal

duore any agency or

official of. U. S. Government

Assumes or purports to act as foroign agent whethor or not a

contractual relationship exists with foreign principal; or

Acts in any other capacity at order or direction of

or of a person any of whose activities are controlled

by a foreign principal

"agent of foreign principal" does not includa:

Bona fide representatives of nows

or press services organized in

U.S. so long as they are not owned or controlled or their policies

determined by any foreign

principal or foreign agent required to

register under this act

Bona fide representatives of newspapers, magazines, or periodicals

holding second-class mailing permits and

not subject to. foreign

Following persons are exempt:

Duly accredited diplomatic or consular officials

3

Officials of foreign governments

Members of staff of diplomats,

consular officials, or foreign

officers other than public-relations counselors,

publicity agents,

or information-service employees.

Latter are not exempt unless

their status is recognized by State Department. They cannot

engage in propaganda distribution.

Persons engaged exclusively in bora fide trade and commerce

Persons collecting funds for relief of human suffering and regis-

tered pursuant to terms of Neutrality Act

Persons engaged in bona fide religious, scholastic, acadomic, or

scientific pursuits or of fine arts

Persons qualified to practice

law who agree to or engage in legal

raproscatation on a linchoose soonion principer bosere say

or agency of U.S. Government provided that representation does

not attempt to influence or persuade U. S. Government officials

other than in course of established agency or court proceedings

"Foreign princival" includes any

entity in

a foreign country, govern-

ment, political party, individual, association, corporation, etc.

Labeling and filing propaganda

Agents of foreign principals distributing political propaganda in inter-.

stete or foreign commerce or through mails to two or more persons must

file two copies with Attorney General within 48 hours with

statement

regarding time and extent of distribution.

propaganda must be

conspicuously labeled to show:

Relationship or connection botween political propaganda and

person responsible for its transmittal

Distributor is registered agent of foreign principal

Identity

of foreign principal

Registration statement filed

by distributor is available for

inspection at Department

of Justice

Registration by distributor does not imply approval of contents

by U. S. Government

This act also requires labeling of speeches, radio addresses, anc

other methods employed in disseminating oral propaganda in interstate

and foreign commerce by registered agents in strict accordance with

regulations prescribed by Attorney General.

A registered agent, in furnishing propaganda to or requesting infor-

mation or advice from any U. S. Government agency or official, must

preface propaganda or request by accurate statement to affect

of such a foreign principal in accordance with act.

Sinilarly,

when registered agent appears. before any committee of confross to es-

tify in intorest of his principal, he must furnish committoo data copy

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 356

2

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## Page 357

SECTION

34.

REGISTRATION ACT

34C

[

2.

his mostyroc

registration statement as

with Dopartment ,

of justice.

Agonts' of foreign principala are requireù to keep books and records:

of activitios as prescribed by Attorney General.

maintained for three

years afier agent terminates his relationship

with foreign principal.

Bocks and records are to be open for inspou-

tion at reasonable times by any official

charged with enforcement

unlariul to, or attompt to, falsify, conceal,. or

destroy, these records.

Responsibility of officers

When agent of foreign principal is organization,

officers, directors,

those performing functions of officors or directors will be re-

sponsible for compliance.

Contributions in elections and political activities

Act prohibits foreign agent, when acting in that

capacity, from know-

ingly naking contribution of anything of value in connection with elec-

tion to any public office or primary election,

convention, or caucus

hold to select candidates for any public office.

prohibitions are

inposed against anyone knowingly soliciting or receiving such con-

tributions from any foreign agent or foreign principal.

Government officials acting as foreign agents

All officers or employees of U. S. Goverrment are prohibited from

being or acting as agents for foreign principal.

Exception is

vided where head of employing agency certifies to Attorney General

that employment ci foreign agent is required in national interest.

Enforcement and penalties

When Attorney General judges a person is engaged in, or has or

is about to engage is,

activity in violation

he may apply

to appropriate U.S. district court for order enjoining such acts

or enjoining person

from continuing to act as foreiga agent until

ne compiles with ail prurisivno i legioncuivi.

give Attorney General's application

preferred action.

If registration

statement is deficient, Attorney General must so

notify the registrant giving specifics.

Ten days after receist

of the notification it vill be unlawêul for registrant io continue

as foreign agent nithout filing amended

statement,

Foraign agents are forbidden to enter into contracts with their

foreign principals wherein agents' fees or compensation is contin-.

gent upon success

of any political activities

carried on by agents.

Upon conviction, violators of provisions of act, except as listed

below, may be fined $10,000 or imprisoned for five years, or both.

Aliens convicted are subject to deportation.

U.S. officials acting as foreign agents - $10,000 and/or.

(b) Agents contributing,

or persons accepting, recoiving, or

soliciting contributions, to elections or political activities -

$5,000 and/or five years

Agent operating

on contingent fee or continuing to act as

foreign agent without filing amended statement as required

in (2) above - $5,000 and/or six months

Agent omitting or

improperly labeling propaganda; failing to

provide statement that he is registered

agent when furnishing

propaganda to or requesting information from U. S. Government

official; or failure to provide congressional committee

copy of most recent registration statement when testifying

before such committee - $5,000 and/or six months

Policy

Investigations may be initiated without prior Bureau authority.

b.

Cases are

not to be presented to USAs or discussed with them nor are

copios of reports to be furnished to them without Bureau authority.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 357

3

---

## Page 358

Although Burear

been authorized to oxamino

registored agent

no such examination should be

ttempted except

a.

•specific Bu

su authority.

Diplonatic and consular officors are exempt from registration so long.

as their activities. are recognized by Department of State as proper

No investigation of diplomatic. or consular officers

is to be corducted without prior Bureau authority.

When activitios

are noted, which would seen to be outside regular activities

of official

in question, advise Bureau

promptly so that inguiry

may be made

State Dopartment to determine exactly what official's status and

3. i

of action are.

Investigative procedure

When it is desired

to check whether subject is registered or, if

registered, to secure a copy of his registration statoment, direct

lead to Wro.

Suggestions

for investigation are being broken down by elements of

principal viciation.

They are not all-inclusive but do represent type

of inquiry most aniformly productive in previous

Investigations

directed toward obtaining evidence that subject:

Was an agent, or held himself out to be an agent, of foreign

principal

In addition to general suggestions set forth in section B, item

3a, above, special attention must be given those agents engaged

(a)eropaganda activities.

Contact subject's printer or publisher, il reliable, and

copies of manuscripts, orders for printing, bills

rendered

copies of publications.

Interview appropriatel postal service authorities

If subject holás second-class mailing permit and for infor-

mation regarding quantity of his outgoing mail.

richted to mabrary of Congress lon all publications copy-.

(a)

Where propaganda agent is lecturer, iniormation may be ou-

tainad from lecture

bureaus, newspaper morgues, interviews

with

member's of clubs before which

subject has spoken, and

(2)

Was

(a)

radio station records, including transcriptions of broadcasts.

not registered with Attorney General

Representative of Attorney Generai who can

that subject did not register must be determined in each

case

prior to trial.

Prosecutive summary reports should in-

dicate

"an appropriate representativa of the Attorney General,

U. S. Department

of Justico, Washington, D. C." as witness

who will furnish

(b)

this testimony.

Note should be added for benefit of USA that this witness?

identity will be established prior to trial.

Within reason-

able

time prior to date set for trial, request Bureau to

obtain name and title of representative of Attorney General.

who should be subpoenaed.

(3) Statute provides that in any proceeding under this act when foreign

principal is located outside U. S. evidence of specific identity

- of foreign principal will not have to be produced.

4.

Miscallaneous

This act requires registration of persons accepting compensation from

foreign principal or acting in U. S.

on orders, instructions,

of foroign principal.

Thus, agent of foreign principal engaged in send-

ing propaganda from

U. So to foreign countries could be required to

register.

This interpretation is based on logislative history of statute.

of limitations

22, USC, § 612, provides: "Ihe obligation of an agent of a foreign

principal to file a registration statement, shall, after the

tenth day of

his becoming

agent,

continue from day to day, and termination of

Buch status shall not relieve such agent from his obligation to file

rogistration

statement for the period during which he vas an agent of a

¡oreign princápal."

4

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 358-

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## Page 359

[D.

Titlo 22, USC, :8.63!

provides

"Dissolution of an

rganization aoting .......

•as an agent of

Ken principal shall not relic

ny officer,.or

person performing

functions of an officor,

director, or person

performing tho

{12n

ons of a director. Iron compe

§ with the

of this: sectioni

..: ....

• ::,Provisions

Title 22, USC, § 618, provides that failure to file any registration stato-

ment or

supplements

thereto

as required shall be

considered continuing

offense for as long as such failure exists, notwithstanding any statuta of

limitation or other statute to the contrary.

REGISTRATION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, OR RECEIVED INSTRUCTION OR

ASSIGIMENT IN, ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, OR SABOTAGE SERVICE. OR TACTICS OF

COVERNENT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY OR FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTY

1.

Title 50,

USc, ff 851-857, provides:

Every person who has knowledge

of, or has received instruction or

assignment in, espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service oi

tactics of government of

forcign country

or foreign political party

shall register with Attornsy General by filing registration statement.

Following exceptions are made. Any person:

Who has obtained knowledge of or received instruction or assign-

nent in espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service

tactics of a foreian povernment or foreign political party by

reason of civilian, military, or police service or employment

with U.S. Government, governments of several states, their

political

subdivisions, District of Columbia, territories, or

Who has obtained such knowleâge, solely by reason of academic or

personal interest not under

supervision of or in preparation for

service with government of foreign country or foreign, political

!?!

Who has made fall disalncure of sunt tanuladdo: instruntinn

assignment to officials within an agoncy of t.

5, Governmes; on

having responsibilities in fiéld of intelligence, which disclosure

has been made

matter of record in files of such agency, and concern-

ing whom a written determination has been made by Attorney General

or Director of Central Intelligence that registration would not

be in interest of

national security

(4)

Whose knowledge of, or receipt of instruction or assignment in,

espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of

government of foreign country or foreign political party, is

matter of record in files of an agency of U. S. Government having

responsibilities in field of intelligonce and concerning whom

a written détermination is made by Attorney General or Director

of Central Intelligence, based on all information available, that

registration would not be in interest of national security

• (5)

Who is duly accreditod diplomatic or consular officer of foreig

government, who is so recognized by Department of State, while he

is engaged

exclusively in activities which are recognized by

Department of State

as being within scope of functions of such

officer, and any member of his immediate family who resides with

(6)

him

Who is an official of a foreign government recognized by. U.S.,

whose name and 'status and character of whose duties as such offi-.

cial are of record in Department of State, and while he is engagad

exclusively in activities which are recognized by Departmert of

State as being within scope of functions of such official, and

•any member of his

immediate family who resides with him

(7)

of staff of or employed by a duly accreditea

diplomatic or consular officer of a foreign government who is so

recognized by Department of Stato, and whose name and status and

character of whose dutios as such member or employee are a matter

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 359

5

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## Page 360

"of rocora'i

hartmont of state, while he

Dead as rely:

in porfornalue

of activitios recognized

=--= 25

boing within

po of functions of

such memb

or ema:-:=

is' an.off

¡ally acknowledged and

repretta-a-ina. it

a fortien governmont. and is inU..s.on'an.officialm....ca:

purpose of conferring or otherwise cooperating with u.

ligenco or security personnel

Who is a civilian or

one of military personnel of a 1:51=-==-med

service coming to U.S. pursuant to arrangements

mutual defense treaty or agreement,

or who has been in--re=-:

U.S. at request of an agency of U. S. Government; or

Who is a person designated by a foreign government

its representative in or to an international organizzi:= ==

which U.S. participates or is an officer or employee

=== en

organization or who is

member of immediate family es. i== ==zides

with, such a representative:

officer,

or employee

Registration statements maintained by Attorney General shaz- = -z= io

public examination, except that Attorney General, having sue =:= =cr

national security and public interest, may withdraw any regis=-===

statement from public examination.

willfully violates any provision of act or any rega-z-i= were-

ment of a material fact or willfully omits any material fact.

or in any resistration statement willfully makes a fare

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more thai se= aers,

Any alien so convicted is subject to deportation.

Failure to file a registration statement as required by act i =

continuing offense, notwithstanding any statute of limitatic= = =-ner

statute to contrary.

Compliance with registration provisions of this act does not Is-===

any person from compliance with any other applicable registra-=== suatute.

2. Policy

Investigations may be initiated without prior Bureau authori:=.

b. Cases are not to be presented to USAs or discussed with the= == wre

reports io be furnished to them without Bureau authority.

Act provides exemption fron registration for certain diploze-==

consular officers and official members of their immediate aziz== mao

reside with them; certzin members

staff or employees of

diplomatic and consular officers; certain

members of an offici="

ERE ssion.

to U.S.; certain members of a foreign armed service in U. §. ======

mutual defense agreements; and persons in U.S. as foreign

29924-222=4a-

cives to certain international organizations, or is an office? = ==

ployee of such an organization or is a member of the immediate immi;

of, and resides with,

such a representative, officer, or empi:-

When information' is received that individual apparently, covete- -act

may be so exempted, immediately furnish information to Bures- =: ===t

inquiry may be made of appropriate department to determine e=z:- -ratus

of individual.

This should be resolved prior to investigatio.

3. Investigative procedure

is desired to check whether subject is registered

istered, to secure a copy of his registration statement, dirs=- Jasa

Investigations must develop to fullest extent possible data s=-T=ma

subject has knowledge

of, or has received instruction ca i-mizz

ment in, espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or =-is

of foreign government or foreign political party.

It must also be shown that subject did not register as reguirs.i.

Representative of Attorney General who can testify that i-==

did not register must be determined in sach case prior i: ==-1.

Prosocutive summary reports should indicate "an appropriata mo

•rosentative of the Attorney General, U. S. Department c≥

-===÷0=,

Washington, D. C." as witness who will furnish

testice.

Note should be added for benefit of USA that witness? ile:-=

will be established

prior to trial.

Within reasonable

to dato set for trial, request Bureau to obtain name cz:

of ropresentative of Attorney General who should bo suipcii..

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 360 .

• 7-13-70

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## Page 361

4.

Statute

Failure

of limitati

to register

continuing offerse for as

lon

such failura exists.

INTERVIIWS

•:.

..

I'o

Interviews with

subjects shoula be corsidered on completion of all logicai.

investigation.

Obtain

Burean authority.

2.

Where, subject

is involved in. revolutiorary group

or engaged in other activity

where

timely interview might prodice riusule investigative

or intelligence

data, expeditiously request authorit; for interview and indicate hy inter

view

proposed prior

to completion of investigation.

3.

Where such early intervier is authorised, additional interviews with

sub-

ject may be conducted on SAC autbority.

F.

CLASSIFICATION - 97

G. CHARACTER - REGISTRATION ACT - (Name or approved abbreviation of country) 1

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 361

7-13-10

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## Page 362

SECTION 86: SABOTAGE

...:

86A

i1tlo 18, USC, 88 2151-2155, and Title 50, ESC, $ 797

: 22%3e

Delinitions

As used in this chapter:

•-ie nords

lirar materiall

include arms, armament, ammunition, livestock,

forest products

and standing timber,

stores of clothing, air, rater,

foodstüffs, fuel,

supplies, munitions,

and ali articles, parts or

ingredients, intended

adapted to,

or suitable for the use

of the United

states or any associate

nation, in connection with the conduct of war or

defense activities.

war prenises' include all buildings, grounds, mines, or other

places therein such nar

material is being produbea, manuractured, repaired,

stored, mined, extracted, distributed, loaded, unloaded, or transported,

together

all machinery and

appliances therein contained; and all forts,

arsenala, navy yards,

saups, prisons, or

other installations of the Armed

Forces oi the United

of try associate ration.

"The words mar utilities!

railroads, railways, electric lines,

roads of whatever description, any railroad

or railway fixture, canal, lock,

dam, wharf, pier, dock,

contrivance,

means of transportation

whatsoever, whereon or whereby such mar material or any troops of the United

States, or

of any associate nation,

are.being or may be transported either

within

the United States or upon the high seas or elsewhere;

and all air-conditioning systems, dans, reservoirs, aqueducts, water and gas

mains and pipes, structures and buildings, whereby

connection with which

air, water or

is being furnished, or may be furnished,

any war premises

or to the irmed forces of

the United States, or any associate nation, and/all

electric light and power, steam or pneumatic power, telephone

telegraph

rianio, puies,

¡iniueco, auù

ristitiss

suavivus, anú

une rulinings

the maintenance and

operation therecf used

to supply air,

water, light,

heat, power, or facilities of communication to any war

or to the Armed forces of

the United States, or

any associate nation Premises

"The words 'associate nation' nean any nation at war with

any nation with

which the United States is at war.

"The words 'national-defense material, include arms, armament, ammunition,

livestock, forage, iorest products and standing timber, stores of clothing,

air, water, food, foodstuffs, fuel,

supplies, munitions,

and all other

articles of whatever

description and any part or ingredient thereof, intended

for,

adasted to, or suitable for the use of the United States in connection

with the national defense or

in or in connection with the producing,

manufacturing, repairing,

storing, mining, extracting,

distributing, loading,

unloading, or

transporting of zny of the materials or other articles herein-

before mentioned or any part or ingredient thereof.

"The words

'national-defense premises' include all buildings, grounds, mines,

or other places wherein such national-defense material is being produced,

manufactured,

repaired,

stored, mined, extracted, distributed, loaded,

unloaded, or

transported, together vith all machinery and appliances

contained; and all forts, arsenals, navy yards,

camps, prisons, or other

installations of the Armed Forces

of the United States.

"The words 'national-defense ütilities' include) all

railroads, railways,

electric lines, roads of whatever

description,

railroad or railway fixture,

oanal, locks, dam, wharf, pier, dock, bridge, building, structure, engine,

naorine, mechanical contrivance, car, vehicle, boat, aircraft, airfields,

lanes, and fixtures or appurtenances thereof, or any other means of transporta-

whatsoever,

whereon or whereby such national-delense material, or any

troops of the United States, are being or may be transported either within

the linits of the United States or upon the high seas or elsewhere; and all

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 362

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## Page 363

air-conditioning systems,

ani,pipes, structores, a

reservoirs,

aqueducts, water

Gildings, whereby or in conn

with which

als, water of las may

to any national-def.cns

d'emises or to

the Armed Forces

of the u

ed states, indiall electric'1

t and power,

stean or pneumatic power,

alephone and telegraph plants, poles, wires,

1xtures. and wireless stations;.

and the buildings connected with the mainte

nance and opcration thereoi

used to supply air, water, light, heat, power or

facilities of communication

to any national-defense premises

or to the Armed

jorces of the Urited States."

§ 2152.

Fortifications,

defenses, or defensive sea areas

"Khoever willfully trespasses upon, injures,

or destroys any of

the works'or

property or material of

submarine mine or torpedo or fortification or

harbor-defense system owned or constructed or in process of construction by

the United States; or

"Whoever willfully

interferes with the operation or use of

any such submarine

torpedo, fortification, or harbor-defense systen; or

wboever knowingly, williully, or wantonly violates any duly authorized and

promulgated order

or reguiation of the president governing persons or vessels

within the limits

of defensive sea areas, which the President, lor purposes

of national defense, may from time to time establish by executive order-

*Shall be fined not

more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,

or both."

Destruction of war material, war premises, or war utilities

•(& Whoever,

the United States

is at wars or in

of national

emergency as declared by the president or by

the Congress,

with intent to

injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation

In preparing for or carrying

on the war or deîense activities, or, with reasor

to believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United

states or any associate ration in prevaring for or

carrying on the war or

defense activities, milliully injures, destroys, contaminates or infects, or

attempts to so injure,

destroy,

contaminate or infect any

war material, war

¡iñoù nui mueo inas piû, dûo ve imprisonei

not more

then thirty years, or both.

"(b) II two or more persoas conspire

to violate this section, and one or more

such persons do any act to effect

the object of the conspiracy, each of

the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a)

of this seotion."

8 2154.

Production of defective war material, war premises,

"(a) Whoever,

when the United States

emergency as

declared by the president or by the Congress, with intent to

injure, interiere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation

in preparing for or carrying on the war or defense activities, or, with reason

to believe that iis aot may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United

States or aly associate nation in preparing for or

carrying on the war or

defense activities, willfully makes,

constructs, or causes to be made or

constructed in a defective manner,

to make, construct, of cause

to be made oi constructed in a defective manner any war

material, var premises

or war utilities, or any tool, implement, machine, utensil, or receptacle used

or employed in making, producing,

manufacturing,

or repairing any

material, war premises or war utilities, shall be lined not more than $10,000

or imprisoned not more than thirty jears,

or both.

"(D) If two or more persons conspire to

violate this section, and one

of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,'each

the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a)

of this seotion."

& 2155. Destruction of national-defense materials, national-defense premises,

or national-defense utilities

"(a) Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, of obstruct the national

defenso of

the United States, willfully injures, destroys, contaminates or

Infects, or attempts to so injure, destroy, vontaminate or infeot any national-

material,

national-defense premises,

or national-defense utilities,

be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,

2

4-18-61

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## Page 364

SECTION 86. SABOTAGE

864 - B

....

•(b) If two or more per

conspire to violate this

3 e

and one or

more

of such persons do any

20t

to effact

the object of the

conspiracy, each

the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a)

of this section.":

?..

§ 2156. Production of defeotive

national-defense material,

national-defense.

premises. or national-defense utilities

•(z) Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with,

or obstruct the national

dejense of

the United States, willfully makes,

make or construct in a defective manner,

constructs,

any national-defense material,

national-defense premises

utensil, or réceptacle used

national-defense utilities, or any tool, implement,

employed in making, producing, manu-

facturing, or repairing any such national-defense material, national-defense

premises

or national-defense utilities, shall

be fined not more than $10,000

or imprisoned not more than ten years,

or both.

two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more

of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,

such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a) o1

this section."

Title 50, USC, $ 797 (Public Law 831, & 21)

"(a) Whoever willfully shall violate

any such regulatian or order as, pursuant

to lawful authority, shall be or has been promulgated or approved by the

Secretary of Defense, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary

of Defense, or by the Director of the National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautios, for the protection or security of military or naval aircralt,

airports, airport facilities, vessels,

harbors, ports, piers, water-iront

facilities, bases, forts, posts, laboratories,

stations,

vehicles, equipment,

explosives,

or other property or places

subject to the jurisdiction,

administra-

or in the custody of the department of Defense, any Department or agency

of which said Department consists, or any officer

or employee of said Depart-

meut us agenuy, ui vi une iravivuai

offioer or employee thereof, relating to fire hazards, fire protection,

lighting, machinery, guard

service, disrepair, disuse or other unsatisfactory

conditions thereon, or the ingress thereto or

egress or removal of persons

therefrom, or otherwise providing jor

safeguarding the same against destruc-

tion, loss, or injury by accident or by enemy action, sabotage or other

subversive actions, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction there.

of shall be liable

to a fine of not to excaed $5,000 or to imprisonment for

•not more than

or both.

"(D) Every such regulation or order shall be posted in conspicuous and

appropriate places."

[(National Advisory Committee

for deronautics ceased to exist

19-30-58, but

section 797 was not changed.)]

B. VIOLATIONS

1. [Title 18, USO, l8 2152 (Fortification, narbor defenses, or defensive

sea areas

[a.

williul trespass upon, injury to or destruction of any submarine

mine, torpedo, fortification or harbor-delense system orned, constructed,

or being constructed by the U. s.

b.

c. Knowingly violating

persons

or vessels in

2. §§ 2153 and 2154 (Destruction or defective production of war materials,

premises,

or utilities during time of war or proclaimed national emergency)

a.

Willful damage to war materials, premises,

to interfere with, or reason to believe act will interfere with, war

or defense activities

b. Willful production in defective manner of war materials, premises,

or utilities with intent to interfere with, or reason to beliere act

will interfere with, war

or defense activities

..

Attempts to riolate

a or b

d. Conspiracy to violate a or b

• National emergency was proclaimed by President 12-16-50

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## Page 365

-68 -0

- 1.

:.**

•.:

3. 8 § 2155

and 2156 (De..

uction or defective. production.

defense material,. pre

or utilities). (These

•in peacetime, •as well

during a proclaimed national

mergency or. war.)

Willful damage to

rational

defense materials,

as with intent to interfere with national defensabremises, or utilities

b. Willful production in defective manner of national defense material,

premises, or utilities with intent to interfere with national defense

c. ' Attempts

Conspiracy to violate a or b

4.

Title 50, USC,

Willful violation oi regulation or order promulgated or approved by

secretary of Defense or military commander designated by him for protection

of property and places subject to jurisdiction of Department oì Defense,

its subagencies, or officer or employee of that Department

VENUE

In judicial

district where illegal act committed.

Venue in conspiracy

riolations in any judicial district where the conspiracy was entered into

or overt act occurs.

POLICY

1.

Cases to be investigated

a.

Specific complaint with prima facie evidence that act of sabotage

has been committed.

b.

Information that actual or potential saboteurs are at large in the

U.S:

C.

Specific request from one of the military services for FBI in-

vestigation

of a definite allegation of sabotage even though the

case is within the investigative jurisdiction oflAir Force, Army, or

Navylunder

the Delimitations Agreement.

The intelligence agency

with investigative jurisdiction under the Delimitations Agreement

must be agreeable to the FBI conducting the investigation

request must be made promptly after the incident occurs and without

prior investigation by another agency.

Il inquiry through local officials or

other informed sources reteals

cause of

incident and eliminates possibility of sabotage, no ir

vestigation is necessary.

Keep in mind in this connection that a

may be expected

to attempt to disguise his work as an

accident where feasible.

e.

Instances of willful damage to or destruction

0f aircraft in inter-

state, overseas, or foreign air commerce are investigated under

destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles statutes,

but bear in mind

sabotage violation could be involted. (See section. 117, volume IV,

.of this

manual. )

2.

Alleged plots of sabotage

Information is frequently received indicating an act of sabotage

will be committed. It is

often impossible to check the source or

(curacy of such information.

Take the following action immediately:

Advise Bureau by teletype.

Advise local representatives offAir Force,

Army, and Navy in-

telligence agencies; llocal police; and officials

of plant,

facility, or utility

involved.

any logical investigation to ascertain basis for report.

In disseminating information regarding an

alleged plot of

sabotage,

the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the report should be

outlined and the facts allowed to speak for themselves.

attempt to

evaluate the information for other agencies and specifi-

cally advise them no evaluation has been made

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 365

82AF7

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## Page 366

SECTION 86. SABOTAGE

86D

Protection of

and property in connection

th an alleged plot

.of.sabot.age is

ponsibility of .company or. mi

ary establishment

involVed and local

authorities:.

Decision regarding action to-be.

"taken

searching. for alleged

bombs will not be made by. PI.

Agents are

not to participate in searches for suspected bombs i

assume responsibility for hardling bomb devices.

of sabotage or industrial catastrophes

ravise Bureau by telephone, teletype, or airtel of:

(1)

Any specific complaint of sabotage or any allegation regarding

b.

c.

d.

(2)

which investigation

conducted

Catastrophes

of national interest

Also advise local representatives of interested intelligence agencies.

Keep Bureau

of pertinent developments.

Information to furnish

if applicable:

Name and location of plant,

Date and time of occurrence

facility, or utility intolved

Available details

Government contracts invoived

Identity of agency with security responsibility and any

interested agencies

00.1 a

Estimated damage or production loss

Any hazardous conditions or carelessness involved

Saltage or repair work under way

Any information indicating the act resulted from labor union

activity, labor dispute, or strike - including identity of

union; extent and duration of dispute or strike; names of union

representatives

and any subversive

tendencies; any evidence

influence; and names of, identifying data regarding,

and information

Statement

from office files regarding any logical

suspects.

as to whether investigation

incestigation bring annanator

fonte must he complete to iustify

this course

no report being submitted, specific statement to that effect

an airtel is used to advise the Bureau of a reported act of

sabotage,

it must be accompanied by a letterhead memorandum,

for dissemination, containing all pertinent information

relative to the alleged act of sabotage.]

4.

If damage reported as

sabotage is definitely attributable to labor union

activity, labor

to round out fasts, advise Butrike (see 3 above), and

conduct discreet inquiry if necessary

await Bureau instruc-

5.

Slondown of production

Slowdown occurs when employees intentionally reduce rate of production.

This might be sabotage during period of national emergency as a

deliberate plan by subversive forces.

If allegation of

sabotage through slowdown received, make discreet

inquiry to develop facts but conduct no investigation.

Advise Bureau of

complaint.

Teletype normally not necessary.

Submit closing report under character of sabotage. Include:

Identity of company

Contracts or production involved

Extent and cause of slowdown

Effect on production

Details of union activity

Any indication of subversive activity

6. Biological warfare

Sections 2153 and 2155 include the words "contaminates or infects."

This specifically covers sabotage by bacteriological, chemical, or

radiological means.

Such sabotage could be used against personnel in defense industries,

military personnel and establishments,

foodstuffs and other material

to be used for national defense or the

armed forces.

siss

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 366

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## Page 367

..cathed did odd delicie

0.

such sabotage cu

be accomplished by the intr

ion of

bacteria,

• chemical agents,

radiological agents in

ing systems,

"water.

d: supplies.

or forage crops.

Advise Bureau immediately

any alection concernane broterdoogical.

•¿hemical, or radiological sabotage.

As preliminary investigative procedure determine from appropriate

authorities,

such as plant physicians, public health

services, or

agriculture

departments, whether cause

oî any epidemic or unusual

been determined.

Title 50, USC, 88 851-857,

requires

registration of

any person

who has knowledge of or has received instruction or assignment

in espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactios

of

a government of a iorciga country or a foreign political party.

In investigating any reported act

biological, chemical, or radio-

logical

sabotage,

determine if

there has been a

violation

statute in zadition to a violation of the sabotagé statutes.

7. [Presentation of cases to Department

Sabotage cases äre not to be discussed with the USA. All questions

of law and jurisdiction and requests for prosecutivè opinions are

to be submitted to the Bureau for presentation to the Department.]

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

1. General

Procedure will depend

on circumstances of particular case. All

cases must be approached thoughtfully and aggressively. Investigations

must be logical ana compiete.

The investigation of an

actual instance of sabotage is not complete

until the cause is established and the identity of the subject

determined.

In a case of actual planned sabotage with intent to

injure the

national defense, consideration must be given to deter-

mining if there are any

associates or accomplices through thorough

Investigation aná surveiiance prive in arpiehensivu.

2. Arson

One of the most effective potential means

• b. Determine if fire protection devices tampered with to make fire

more effective.

c. Make arrangements with local authorities if necessary to protect

scene.

d. Give

early

consideration to establishing Bureau's jurisdiction

prior to extensive investigative effort.

e..

Important step in arson investigation is determining point in

building at which fire originated.

Intertiew

any witnesses immediately

and

ascertain:

1)

Where was witness when fire occurred.

What attracted his attention.

Exact point where fire burning when first observed

Technical information

such as:

•(a)

Color, intensity, and progress of flame,

slow

whether last or

Color and volume of smoke

Unusual odors

a)

•Were

any explosions

General

(8) - circumstances

Action taken by witness after discovering fire

or suspicious

NW 54969 Docld:32989720- Page 367

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## Page 368

ECTION 864; SABORAGE y

Il. fire.

occurred

innanufacturing plant..wi.tness

should be questioned

•with regard to employment and activities and. also questioned as to

iprysical.conditions.is.plant, manufaaturing processes;

type.of..raw.....

material; and other

information to determine if fire hazards

present which could have caused accidental or spontaneous combustion.

Question nitness concerning

smoking habits of employees and experience

corcerning any previous tires.

Check records of local fire department; interview fire

department

official at

scene for leads.

Make intensive

incendiarism.

search at point of origin to determine method

Pay particular attention i0 obtaining suspect devices

or materials

to send to Laboratory.

i.

Important that materials submitted

to Laboratory be accurately

described as to place, position, and location where. found.

3. Consider value oi obtaining photographs.

k.

Search adjacent terrain for evidence, such

as footprints, finger-

prints, containers which may have contained accelerant used, etc.

1.

Investigate all suspects fully not only with regard to evidence

pointing to them but to background indicating motive or intent.

m.

Set out below are some suggested sources for background investigations

of

suspects:

Associates

Credit ard

arrest

records

Bank accounts

State income tax returns

Character and reputation, including discreet neighborhood

(6)

inquiry

Records of Government agencies, INS, larmed forces intelligence

agencies, jetc.

Fellow employees

Telephone toll calls

Telegrams

Surreillance, if rarranted

Develop reliable informants in position to observe subject's

activities.

Obtain complete physical description, including nationality.

-and' identification record.

3. Sabotage by explosives

Investigation follows genéral outline as for arson cases.

Careful. examination

scene siould be made for bomb fragments,

dynamite fuse,

detonators, blasting caps, and dynamite wrappers.

type of evidence should be

FBI Laboratory, for examination.

Also 100k for footprints, lingerprints, and other types of evidence.

Obtain complete photograyns of scene.

d. Assume no responsibility for handling suspected bombs.

e. Investigate suspects along lines as indicated in previous section

regarding arson.

4. Mechanical sabotage

a. These cases in majority and cover wide variety of destructive acts.

b. Obtain all details from original complainant so that investigation

may be intelligently planned and approached.

c. Establish jurisdiction early in investigation.

d. Where

foreigi material caused damage, obtain in order to traoe to

Submit material to laboratory where proper.

..

When damage occurs from foreign substance in lubricants or fuel,

important to obtain

suificient quantity for FBI Laboratory

examination.

suggested one gallon be obtained if possible.

large amount involved, the sludge which has settled to bottom should

also be obtained and

transmitted for laboratory examination.

of unused stock of oil or quel intolved should also be forwarded to

Laboratory for comparison.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 368

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## Page 369

LECTION BE SABOTAGE: so

f. Where tools,

§ implements

part for fBi laboratory comparison with laspect

stain. damaged

cool's

when arailable:

aga All suspects should be fully lavestigated. see prellous section...e

h.

Where incident is of ecurring type,

give consideration to utilizing

dyestuffs as set

forth in section 8,

volume I, of this manual.

1.

Where board of inquiry held by another Government agercy,

records.

should be examined

for possible leads.

Bureau will consider granting

authority for Agent to attend such hearings as interested spectator

in appropriate cases.

5.

Defective manufacture of

var or national-defense materials, premises,

or utilities

a.

In addition to establishing the elements required by the statute,

establish whether the defectively manufactured material will

did malfunction when put to its intended use and what damage will

or did result from this malfunction.

In order to establish

this, the following suggestions are

Determine the exact function of the delectively manulactured

material.

the nature of the defect.

(3) Determine to this detect mall altect the intended funation

of the material.

b.

The following investigative procedures

¿ hate been found to be of

assistance:

(1)

Establish requirements or specifications for material by.

Government

Provisions of contract

Established trade practices

(2)

Establish existence of any deviation Iron requirements.

Tte-tier Careramant on

alant reficials.

( b)

Examination by FBI Laboratory

(3)

(4)

Specimens

defective material to be submitted to Laboratory

'wherever practicable

Io establishpossibility of injury or damage from use of such

material when put to

intended use, consider testimony from one

of following sources:

FBI Laboratory

Army, Naty,

Air Force, or other Government expert

Expert in private industry

Officials of

company involved

(5)

Subjects of the investigation

Istablish that subjects deliberately manufacturing defective

materials.

Review correspondence between manufacturer. and purchaser.

b

Determine if nanufacturing done surreptitiously.

Establish purchase

and use of equipment not ordinarily

used in

this manufacturing process.

(a)

Establish whether contracting parties or Government agencies

have objected to delective material or improper processes.

(6)

Establish motive on the part of subjects.

Foreign sympathies

Desire to increase profit

(7)

o)

Desire to maintain production

General comments

If material manufactured for military, advise local

representatives

[of Air Force, Army, and. Navy intelligence agencies. ) Request

their assistance in determining where material being used and

arranging for examination of material.

6. Aircraft crashes

. 8.

The following instructions

pertain to deliberately caused crashes of

aircraft connected with the national defense which are not covered

by the destruction of aircralt or motor rehicles statutes, (see

section 117,

volume IV.,

of this manual for instructions regarding

investigations under destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles

statutes.)

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 369

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## Page 370

1205506

b.

Majority

of

Fluca arorare result ri

..red nicero goods" option.

LuSES

other

than

.sabotage.

determine cause requires

•"..

Cases

will norm

ly be referred to FBI after.

ical-knowledge.

se of crash

established.:

Make.suro. that all evidence.rhich was.developed. toestablish.cause....co

of

crash-has

been properly identified and protected and that

adequate expert testimony is available to establish cause of crasn

in any subsequent prosecution.

d.

Under special circumstances, FBI

may conduct investigation to

establish cause of crash

or

take charge

of investigation before

exact cause of crash determined.

Specific Bureau authority must be

obtained in such instances.

some suggested investigation to

establish cause of crash follows:

Careful systematic examination of wreckage

Photographs or sketches showing

Entire crash

scene fron various angles

• ro

Close-up riews from Tarious angles

Photographs of parts torn loose

Photographs of instruments and levers in cockpit

Photographs of marks made by airplane on ground

Persons to be interriewed for information

Crew members or other survivors

Persons who heard the plane before the crash

Eyewitnesses

Radio operators in contact with the plane

Ground crew members and mechanics who serviced plane

Information to be sought from witnesses on intertiew

2

Maneuvers of

plane prior to crash

Did plane appear to be out of

control.

Did plane

dive into ground

or was landing attempted.

Were all engines operating.

41

Did plane come apart in flight.

ro

engines sound normal.

Was pilot lost or over unfamiliar territory.

Was plane on scheduled course.

landing attempt in accordance with normal procedure.

Was plane

in radio contact.

Did plane's crew experience any mechanical difficulty.

m

Was log maintained while plane in flight.

Were any defects noted during previous flights.

Weather conditions at time of

In determining condition of airplane or manner in which

functioning at time of crash, it is important to observe and

carefully note exact position of ail instruments in cockpit,

such as fuel tank selectors, switches,

throttles, etc.

condition of all controi

suriaces should also be carefully

observation of all these items and discussion

handling aircraft,

the condition of the

plane and

action being taken by pilot can often be determined.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 370

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## Page 371

DS "(RoTO) casos

Department has de

mined

that ROIC facilities

C1

tute wition:l-

defonse

or

war.

prenuses within meaning of Title

a-deliberate attack by arson, combing, firo bombine

13C,,

:tl5l, and

would

possibly be a

shot neans

violation of Title.

"""" Following additional procedures

USC, 26.2058 Bad 21960.

this

type of case

mrticular

in order to provide information desired by icarrant

for an opinion:

(1)

For a complete investigation all pertinent indiranite must he

interviewed, including members of collego or univorsic: colmanity

unless compelling reasons to the contrary ocist.

(2)

(3)

(4)

Devolop existence oi any plans for protest domonstrations or

other acts

designed to dramatize opposition

Submit any leaflets and/or other publicity afforde:

protest demonstrations as enclosures to communicatione to bureau.

Identify specific property belonging to ROIC unit which was

or destroved; obtain a complete inventory of all groperty

(5)

(6)

maintained

by ROIC unit.

Obtain an estimate of

actual cost in damage to ROIC facility unu

any ROTC property damaged or

destroyed.

Obtain details as

to ownership of ROIC facility, includine

information as to funding and control of space of that iaoiirty

utilized for ROTC training.

(7)

(8)

Determine specific manner by which ROTC unit is identificd on

exterior of building.

Determine whether ROIC training is compulsory or voluntary. is

a subject is developed, determine whether he nas denied;

previously afforded, or is currently engaged in ROIC trainiri.

(9)

Through investigation determine whether subject made any pro-aci

or post-act statements which would aid in establishing his

specific intent to commit sabotage.]

* SUBMISSION OF REPRIS

1. Initial report in two

weeks after complaint received

2. Subsequent reports to be submitted in accordance with existing Burezu

reporting procedures

• CLASSIFICATION - 98

I. CHARACTER - SABOTAGE

NW 54969 Docld:32989720- Page 371

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## Page 372

SECTION S7.

INVESTICATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANI CARIONS

AND INDEEDIAT"

TABLE OI CONTENTS

General Cuidélines..

1.

Investigative jurisdiction.

a.

Rebeliion or insurrection..

bo

Seditious conspiracy.•

Ce

Advocating tlie overthrow of the

Governnent..

Internal. Security Act of 1950 and Communist Contrul Act

of 1954.....

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Prosecutive determination..

Related statutes.........

Definitions...

Predication

for investigation..

Accuracy of characterizations....

Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with

institutions of learning.....

8.

Use of officers from other agencies.

Investigation of Organizations.

1.

2.

Purpose............

Responsibility to initiate investigations.

3.

Scope of investigation....g.gg.gs

4.

Infiltration of nonsubversive groups.

2.

General.....

b.

Caption

and

preface..

C.

Limitations on investigation.•

5.

d.

Conversion to full

scale investigation

subversive publications......

Tnvestioative stops........or

7.

Administrativa and

reporting procedures.

2.

b.

Reporting requirements and status.

Informant coverage.

C.

Topical headings..

d.

Character..

e.

Classification........

f.

Copies..

g.

Closing of case...

Investigation of Individuals....

1.

General policy..

a.

Purpose.................

bo

Individuals to be investigated.

C.

Limitations on investigations...

d.

Investigations requiring FbInQ approval.

e.

Members of U.S. armed forces.

2.

Investigative procedures.•

2.

Scope of investigation.

Investigative steps......

C.

Interviews of subjects...•

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Purpose..............

Approval to interview...

Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview

subject........•

(5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit

letter advising FBIHQ..

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 372

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9

9

10

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11

12

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## Page 373

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDU:'

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3.

(6). Conduct of interview...i.

(7)

Direction of subject's activities.

(8) Reporting results of interview.

Reporting procedures...

2.

b.

C.

General.....

Summarizing information.

Administrative or cover pages.

Office of origin...

Title of communications..

Classification...........

Character..

Copies of reports or LHMS.

i

Closing and reopening of cases.

Subjects traveling abroad.•

Submission of information on members of subversive

gIoups..

.....

Control files on former members of subversive

organizations..

n. Channeling information to case files.

Movement of subjects between offices

D. Dissemination of Data Developed...

1.

General policy.......

2• Specific reauirements.........

a. Members of armed

forces......

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens................

C.

Individuals emploved in or having access to Key

Facilities or employees of private contractors of the

Armed Forcas..

d. Employees of public utilities...

e.

Members of military reserve branches or National Guard

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry.

go

Employees of Fedezal Government....

ho

Individuals who own property or reside in

vicinity of installation or other premises under

jurisdiction of branch of armed forces.......

i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration.

Ja Dissemination to Secret Service.

3.

Restrictions on field dissemination.

E.

Administrative Index (ADEX)

1. Purpose and general policy..

2.

Critcria.............

3.

Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card..

4.

Format of ADEX card.....

5.

Arrangement of ADEX..

At FBIHQ.•

In field office...

(1) Alphabetical

section.

(2) Geographical section.

(3) Unavailable section..

6.

7.

Special interest subjects...

Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects.

8.

Changes in other background data...

9.

Movement of ADEX subjects between offices.

10.

11.

Subject entering U.S. armed forces.

Removal of cards from ADEX..

12.

Reporting Procedures on ADEX subjects

13:

[Deleted].

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 373

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.: 12

12

12

13

13

13

13

13

14

14

14

14

14

14

1.4

15

15

16

16

16

16

16

16

17

17

17

17

17

17

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## Page 374

ORGANIZAFIONS AND INDIVIDUAL

did tond it use dancin id

MiRKERAL. GUIDELINES.

•"':...

:.''

Investigative juriscaction

sil investigations under this soction are based on specific statutory

jurisdiction and Departmental instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the

gathering of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the

subject has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in

a violation of, one

or more of

the statutes enumerated below; or in

fulfillment of

Departnental instructions.

There are

three principal statutes which provide a basis for these

investigations, as follows:

Rebellion of insuirection (T18, USC § 2383).

"Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists

engages in any rebellion

or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the

laws thereof, or gives aid of comfort thereto, shall be fined not

more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;

and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States."'

Seditious conspiracy (TIS, USC § 2384).

"If two or more persons In any

State or Territory, or in any place

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to over-

United but down, or to destroy by force the Government of the

States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force

the authority

thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the

execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take.

or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authorit

thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned

C.

Advocating the overthrow of the tovernment (118, USC § 2385).

not more than twenty years

"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets,

advises, or teaches

the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing oi

destroying the government of the United States or the government oi

government of any political subdivision therein, ey force be

violence, or by

the assassination of any officer of any such

government; or

"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any

such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, seils,

distributes, or

publicly displays any written or printed matter

advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability,

I propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the

United States by force of violence, or attempts to do so; 01

"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society,

group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage

verthrow or destruction of

any such government by force or violence;

or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society,

group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof -

"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than

twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by

i .

fire.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 374

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## Page 375

87A

SECTION

87

INVESTIGATIONS OF SURVIRSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUA'

the : United States or any department: or: agency

seaf, for the

five years next. following his.conviction

"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named' in this

section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned

not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for

employment by the United States of any department of agency thereof,

for the five years next following his conviction.

"As used in this section, the terms 'organizes' and 'organize', with

respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the

recruiting of

new members, the forming of new units, and the regroup-

ing or expansion of existing clubs,

classes,

and other units of

society, group, or assembly of persons."

The courts have interpreted this statute to require advocacy to

action, l.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future, rather

than merely to believe In something•

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, there

are two other statutes which might provide a statutory foundation for

an investigation under this section.

These

d. [Internal Security Act of 1950 (I 50, USC, §-783a)

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined in sub

paragraphs a., bo, and Co,

the Internal Security Act could

provide a statutory basis

for investigation of certain cases

under this Section.

This Act makes it unlawful to knowingly

contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship

within the United States which is controlled by a foreign

government, organization, or individual.]

2e Prosecutive determination

All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investigations

initiated under this section will be conducted by FBIHQ with Departmental

officials.

These cases should not be discussed with local U. S. Attorney's

office without FBIHQ approval.

3.

Related statutes

There are a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative

jurisdiction which should be borne in mind in handiing these investigations.

Information concerning possibie violations of

such statutes is frequently

developed during

these investigations.

Where this occurs the field should

consider the desirability of conducting investigation in line with the

policies and procedures governing the statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investigations

4.

is outlined in an appendix to this manual.

Definitions

The term "subversive activities" as used in this section denotés

activities which are aimed at overthrowing.

destroying or undermining the

Government of the United States of any of its political subdivisions by

the illegal means prohibited by statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. The

term "'subversive organization" or

"'subversive movement" denotes a group

or movement which is known to engage in or advocate subversive activities,

as defined above.

fia.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 375

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## Page 376

• SECTION

$7.

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVI

ORGANIZNTIONS AND INDIVIDI

87A

5.

Predication for

stigation

cases hanilled under the provisions of this section, the first

conmunication prepared for outside dissemination (report or LIM) should

specifically the statute upon which the investigation is based

together with necessary supporting facts. Where investigation has been

specifically requested by Department, this should be indicated.

following examples

are illustrative; however, the basis for each

indivichal. case must be tailored to the circumstances of such case.

"This investigation is based on information that the subject's

activities could involve violation of I 18, USC, $ 2383 (Rebellion

or Insurrection), and § 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy). A source whose

reliabilily has not been determined has informed that the subject

is planning, along with others, to travel to Washington, D. Co,

on April 30

1971, to participate in planned violent demonstrations

during the first week

in May, 1971, to 'shut down the Government.'

Demonstration plans include the blocking of streets and highways,

destruction of personal and Government property, and physical

obstruction to prevent Government employees from reporting to work."

"This investigation is based on information that the subject's

activities couid involve a violation of I 18, USC, $ 2385 (Advocating

the overthrow of the Government).

The subject is an admitted member

(or has been identified as a member by a confidential source who

has provided reliable information in the past) of (nane of group).

The (name of

group) in its public statements and publications

advocates the desirability and

necessity of overthrowing

the U.S.

Government by force or violence, and the assassination of U.S.

Government officers.

The same source has reported that the subject

actively supporis these positions."

the first intra-Bureau communication prepared which

Where possible investigation is beinglconductedlshould specifically

indicates that

indicate the

statutory

• basis for the

investigation. However, there

may be occasions

involving individuals of groups in contact with known

subversive clements where the purpose of the contact is not initially

known and where a preliminary inquiry must be made to determine

whether a statutory basis exists for full investigation.

In these

instances, a preliminary inquiry may be undertaken, through estab-

lished sources, for a period not to exceed 90 days, without specifically

specific statutory basis for the inquiry.

If after the

conclusion of 90 days it has not been possible to establish a

statutory basis but further inquiry appears necessay, FBIHQ must

be furnished a succinct summary of

the facts by letter together with

specific reconmendations as to further action. In all cases, oi

course, investigations must be based on indications that subject

may be engaged in subversive activity, whether or not a specific

statutory basis is cited.

In the event preliminary inquiries fail to establish a sound basis

for investigation, the case should be promptly closed and there is

no need to advise

FBIHQ (unless FBIHQ has been previously advised

of the inquiry).

Nor is there any need to prepare an LIM or report

where no pertinent subversive derogatory information has been developed.

If the statutory basis for an investigation should change or be

expanded to include an additional statute or statutes, the first

communication prepared subsequent to such change or expansion should

specifically show such changes.

Similarly, this information should

be included in the next report or LHM prepared in the case.

tra.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 376

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## Page 377

874 - B

SECTION 87•

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUA':

6. Accuracy of charact

szations

Assure that statements relating to characterizations of an individual

or organization, or relating to affiliations with or membership in any

organization, are founded on firm bases.

Identify sources for such

characterizations or statements of affiliation or membership if such

characterizations, affiliations or memberships are not commonly and

publicly known.

7.

Investigations

and contacts with individuals connected with institutions

of learning

Prior FBIlQ approval is required to:

(1)

Institute investigation of a faculty member or an organization

connected with an educational institution.

(2)

Interview any student or faculty member who is not an established

source.

(Requests to conduct interviews must include individual's

name, position, and an assessment of his reliability and dis-

cretion.

b. Contact's with established sources in an administrative capacity may

be made on campus.

Contacts with other established sources, e.g,

students and nonacademic employees, should be made off campus.

8. Use of officers from other agencies

Members of other law enforcement or intelligence agencies are not to

accompany Agents handling these investigations without specific approval

by the SAC.

B. INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

1.

Purpose

Purposelop evidence of any violations of

To develop evidence of any violations of statutes enumerated in A. 1.

above and to keep the Department and other agencies and officials

executIve branch apprised of information deveioped wiici peraino iu

their areas of interest and

2. Responsibility to initiate investigations

When information is received indicating an organization may be engaged

•In subversive activities or may be a front group for subversive organiza-

ion, field office should initiate preliminary investigation confined to

established sources.

Notify FBIHQ that investigation has been undertaken.

Within[9Oldays submit results by letter with recommendation as to

whether or not further investigation is warranted.

3.

Scope of investigation

Pertinent data concerning following items should be obtained and reported:

Origin and scope

Date and circumstances of founding including any incorporation data.

Identities of

organizers.

Location of headquarters and chapters or

affiliates, if any.

Stated aims and purposes, especially any information showing

advocacy of violence or illegal activity.

c.

Officers

Principal officers and/or leaders with succinct resume of subversive

backgrounds, if

d.

Membership

Total active membership, including logical breakdowns by organizational

structure and geographical area,

if applicable.

If exact membership

figures are not available and estimates are given, be certain they

are plainly shown as

estimates. In cover pages or cover communications,

include evaluation of reliability of membership figures cited, as well

as comments concerning any significant factors involving membership,

e go, increases or decreases, notable shift in composition of group

by age, sex, nationality, etc.

Be certain to secure accurate descrip-

tion of all lists referred to so as to avoid confusion as to exact

identity or significance of such lists.

•Publications

All publications of group with emphasis on any which clearly depict

subversive character of organization.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 377

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9-13-73

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## Page 378

• ***

SECTION ST.

INVESIIGATIONS UI SUBVERAIVE

. i":;

ORGANIZATIONS AND

INDIVIDUAT

....

.875

Furnish FBIIIQ wi

copy of publications which pe

ray subversive

character of group or which advocate violence.

Ascertain sources

.. of funds

for publications.

When it is operated as distinct entity,

a separate investigation should be initiated concerning the publication.

$ :

Finances

Sources of funds and nature of expenditures, in particular whether

any income is received from or contributions made to foreign elements.

Connections with other groups

Develop pertinent information concerning ties with other subversive

elements including material and/or moral support given or received.

Be especially alert to detect connections with foreign subversive

elements or indications of foreign allegiance or control. Also

determine and report any significant connections or cooperation

with nonsubversive groups.

h.

Activities

Describe activities of group. Afford special emphasis to any under-

ground operations or activities involving violence or threatened

violence.

Include any pertinent data showing success or failure of

4.

organization in achieving its stated goals.

Infiltration of nonsubversive groups

When information is received indicating that subversive group

seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a nonsubversive

organization, available data should be submitted by letter with

recommendations as to initiating active investigation.

to undertake investigation should be supported by available background

information concerning target organization (including name and

locations, estimated membership, principal officers, and nature of

activities) and resume of extent of subversive infiltration efforts

including identities of known subversives who have joined target

organization and positions held), provide brief statement as to

investigation planned. If approved by FBIHQ conduct discreet

investigation limited

are related to or in furtherance of subversive infiltration.

instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates as well as national

organization.

Caption and preface

Captions of communications should show that subversive infiltration

of target organization is objective of investigation, not organization

itself, e.g., "Infiltration of (Name of target organization) by (Name

of subversive organization)."

All communications prepared for

dissemination should carry prefatory statement which clearly conveys

this point, e g.: "This investigation is directed solely towards

establishing the extent of infiltration, domination

(Name of nonsubversive organization) by the (Name of su versol of the

organization).

It is not concerned with the normal activities of the

(Name of nonsubversive organization)."

In addition, preface should

succinctly show the predication for out investigation of the subversive.

group involved.

c.

Limitations on

investigation

Other than with established sources, no interviews should be

initiated with members, leaders, or officers of infiltrated

organization without prior FBIHQ approval (except where they

can be handled by suitable pretext). However, this does not

preclude accepting information volunteered to

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 378

7

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## Page 379

87B°

SECTION 87 •

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

BORGANIZATIUNS AND INDIVIDUALS

(2) Informants and sources should not be directedry

FBI to join

oi participate in activities of target organization.

• .

However,

if subversive group requests informant to do so, latter may

Be certain

all persons interviewed, including informants, are

aware that FBI is not interested in normal activities of

organization but solely in efforts to influence or control the

organization by subversive elements.

d. Conversion to full scale investigation

If target organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by

subversive elements, advise FBIHQ on UACB basis that full investigation

is being initiated as subversive organization. Drop infiltration

designation from title of case.

5. Subversive publications

Each office

should reviewlany.independent subversivelpublications produced

in its territoryllas contrasted with publications issued by subversive

groups which are under investigation, see B. 3. e. above) lto determine

whether any advocate violations within FBI jurisdiction.

If so, submit

available information by iHM to FBIHQ with copy of pertinent material and

make recommendations as to further action.

Insure that FBIHQ is aware of

all subversive publications with brief identifying data.

6.

Investigative steps

Efforts should be made to develop reliable

informants at all levels and

in all segments of subversive organization.

Live informant coverage should be supplemented by other logical investigation

including review of appropriate public records and publications,

interviews with former members of group ana, on seieviive vasio, inüngti

such techniques as physical and photographic surveillance.

7.

Administrative and reporting procedures

Reporting requirements and status

When necessary data has been developed concerning organization's

activities (See B. [3. Jabove), submit report.

After initial report,

reports should be submitted

semiannually (unless FBIHQ has instructed

otherwise in individual cases). LHM may be used to provide FBIHQ Or

!..

other interested agencies with significant data of immediate interest

on an interim basis between reports.

bo

Informant coverage

Cover pages of reports should include a brief summary of informant

coverage available with respect to the organization, identifying

informants who report on the group's activities by symbol number and

showing specifically which informants are members of the group.

c.

Topical headings

Both reports and LHMs should be organized under logical headings.

d.

All cases should use character "Internal Security," e.g., "Communist

Party, USA; Internal Security."

In case of subsidiary or front group,

character should show name or abbreviation of the parent organization,

"Young Workers Liberation League, Internal Security - CPUSA";

"Young Socialist Alliance, Internal Security - SWP."

Caption of

subversive infiltration cases should include name of subversive group

and target organization, e.g., "Infiltration of (Name of target

organization) by Socialist Workers Party, Internal Security - SWP."

e.

Classification - 100

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 379

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## Page 380

SECTION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDI

87B - C

...

f. Copies

Furnish S.copies of reports and LiMs except where instructed other-

wise in individual cases.

Closing of case

If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in

subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a.

Purpose

To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated

in A. 1. above and keep

the Department and other agencies and officials

of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains

to their areas of responsibility and interest.

bo

Individuals to be investigated

Investigations should be

conducted to fully identify and determine

the activities and affiliations of persons who:

Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation

of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above.

This includes individuals who

are current active members

subversive organization or movement.

Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it

includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals

of the movement.

Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who

are known or suspected of

being involved in subversive activities

which are of

c.

a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

Limitations on investigations

All Investigations conducici

sivniù aruiù inbulous ün ereoping inquiries

which are not relevant to objectives.

Under no circumstances should

an investigation be

conducted of any individual merely on the basis

that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government

policies.

d.

Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval

Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:

(1) U. S. Government employee

Officials or employees of United Nations or other public

international organizations of a governmental or quasi

governmental nature.

(3)

Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments

or governments, or foreign exchange participants (representatives

of foreign countries who are in U:S. as part of official

exchange program).

(4)

Faculty members of institutions of learning.

FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or

nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence

of unusual circumstances.

If during a pending investigation it

is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories,

suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation

as to further action.

e.

Members of United States armed

• forces

No investigation should be conducted of activelmembers of U.S.

military forces or retirees from the "regular" components of the

armed forces who are subject to Article 2 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice and over whom the military retains control (re-

tirees from military reserve forces are not subject to the Uniforn

Code of Military Justice).] If it is determined that a subiect fits

in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish per-

tinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of U.S.

armed forces. Advise FBIIIQ in form suitable for dissemination.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 380

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## Page 381

SECTION

87.

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS- AND INDIVIDI

87C

[f. Candidates for or occupants of elective public orfice

Upon learning of the candidacy

for.public office of_a.member.of a

subversive organization, the office of origin should promptly

furnish FBIHQ ivith a communication suitable for dissemination

setting forth sufficient identifying data and a brief summary

of the individual's subversive activities together with details

of the individual's candicacy for public office.

of a violation of a specific Federal statute, no investigation

should be conducted until subject's candidacy for public office

is resolved. Information received during the period of the indi-

vidual's candidacy indicating a specific violation of Federal

law(s) should be furnished FBIHQ by means consistent with the

exigencies of the situation along with recommendations as to

additional action warranted. Other unsolicited subversive infor-

mation received from sources and informants or obtained incidental

to other investigations should be channeled to the individual's

file and, when appropriate, furnished FBIHQ in disseminative form

with recommendations as to

additional action warranted.

Results of candidacy in every instance should be furnished FBIHO

under individual castion.

Should the candidate have been defeated,

necessary communication should contain recommendations as to addi-

action warranted.

Should the candidate be elected, necessary

communication should contain statement that in the absence of

information indicating a

specific violation of a Federal statute,

no additional investigation will be conducted. At such time as the

individual ceases to serve in public office, the office of origin

should submit such information to FBIHQ accompanied by recommenda-

tions as to additional action warranted.

Should intormation be

received indicating a violation of a specific Federal statute while

the individual is in ofiice, receiving office should submit pertinent

information to FBIHIQ by means consistent with the exigencies of the

situation

warranted. along with récommendations as to additional action deemed

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 381

9a

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## Page 382

87C.

SECTION 87.

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDU:

2.

Investigative procedures

2.

Scope of: investigation.

Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported,

if pertinent:

(1)

Background information, including

True name and aliases.

Date and place of birth. where practicable, verify through

appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth

registrar.)

Residences, past and present.

Occupations and employments, past and present.

Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.

Family background.

If available, include identities of

immediate family

and any information indicating they are

employed in sensitive positions or by U. S, Government.

member of innediate family is known to be engaged in sub-

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

versive activities, include succinct resume.

Military records, including any service in foreign forces.

Educational background.

Arrest record and disposition of charges.

Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure

photograph.

(k)

Handwriting and/or handprinting

specimens should be obtained,

if readily available, and kept in case file.

Special

efforts should be made to secure such specimens with

to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished

to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be

included in National Security File.

Subvercire activitiee and affiliations:

including

(a)

Information concerning membership in subversive movements,

amassion positions heir a participation in activitie:

admission, positions held

of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other

functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf

• (b)

of organization, contributions, etc.)

Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of

the subversive nature of group, including invoivement in

underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or

violent actions promoted by organization or movement.

Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive

movement of organization, e.go, degree of influence and

leadership exercised, close association with national or

local leaders, participation in policy decisions.

b. Investigative steps

the following steps should be considered, but are. not all inclusive.

(1) File reviews.

Office indices should be checked.

Any pertinent

• information developed

should be included in initial report.

Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or, FBitO.

(2) Public source

material. Make full use of public records and

public sources of information, including hearings of congressional

or other Government committees

both state and Federal, and

publications, including those issued by subversive groups.

(3)

Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and

local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent

information.

tya.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 382

1O

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## Page 383

SECTION S7.

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDU

87C

Obtain pertinent available information

(4) Reon decorat private lies such as past of present a peess

Checks of credit agencies should be limited to

information only.

(5)

Contacts with neighbors and fellow employees. .Such inquiries

should be made only where there is expectation they will develop

•(6)

pertinent information

not otherwise available.

Canvass of established sources and informants. Contact informants

and sources in position to be knowledgeable concerning subversive

groups with which subject is affiliated.

Physical and photographic surveillances.

These should be

considered on selective basis when circumstances indicate they

may be productive.

Interviews of subjects

Policy

Subjects of investigation should be interviewed. unless there

is a sound basis for not doing so. Generally, interviews should

be considered after background inquiries have been completed

and a good picture of subject's activities developed.

If a decision not to interview a subject is made, this should be

fully explained in case file and FBIHQ advised whenever FBIHO

is cognizant of invéstigation.

(2)

Purpose

To develop information regarding subversive activities in which

the subject is engaged.

(3) Approval to interview

All interviews of subjects may be approved by SAC except following

aunter subjects

instances which reauire FBIHQ approval:

(a)

Deleted

(b)

When subject is nationally prominent or where circumstances

otherwise indicate the interview could be widely publicized,

such as labor leaders, educators, religious leaders or

journalists.

(c)

When interview is to be conducted in presence of subject's

attorney and/or aide.

• (d) When subject is connected with institution of learning.

(4)

In those instances where FBIHQ approval 1s not required, case

Irent should prevare a memorandum requesting SAC authority for

interview.

This memcrandum should include a succinct resume of

including a review of office files concerning a subject,

and should indicate the objectaves of an interviewe Memorandum

must be approved by SAC or in his absence, by a designated official.]

Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject

Letter should concisely set out available data concerning

following items:

Residence address, employment, race, date and place of

birth, citizenship

and any health factors which could

affect conduct of interview.

II.

Marital

status, employment

and citizenship of spouse.

III.

Succinct summary of

subject's subversive activities,

membership of affiliation with subversive groups, and

positions held.

IV.

Similar summary regarding spouse's affiliation with

subversive activities.

V.

Similar summary concerning subversive activities on

part of close relatives.

VI. Resume of subject's current sympathies and status in

subversive movement or organization and any indicatin

of disaffection.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 383

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## Page 384

ORGANIZATIUNS AND INDIVIDUALS

VII.

Su

at's arrest record and dispo:

on of charges; any

in

imation indicating a propensi

for violence.

what is. expected. to. be.gained.by intervicw?

List above items by number but headings need not be restated.

If no pertinent data is available concerning a particular

(0)

Submit one copy of letter and additional copy of first page

only which can be returned by FBIIIQ stamped "Approved."

(5)

If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising

FBIHQ:

(a)

Reason interview not conducted.

(b)

(c)

Any new information pertinent to desirability of interview.

Whether efforts to interview subject will be pursued.

There-

after, keep FBIHQ advised at least each 60 days as to progress

of matter.

(6) Conduct of interview.

(a)

Interviews of subjects entitled to the warning and waiver

shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set

forth in Volume I, Manual of Instructions, Section 2B,

If the interview is being conducted for intelligence

information rather than an admission or confession of

Moreover, if the investigation

has failed to develop information indicating a possible

violation of Federal law by the subject, it would be

permissible to interview the subject without a warning as

he does not fit the criteria of those entitled to

a warning

of rights.

Carefully plan interview so there will be no

empromice of snitres:

sensitive techniques or interviewing

personnel.

An overriding consideration to always bear in

mind is that interview

should elicit from, not provide

information to the subject.

(b)

Interview at subject's place of employment

should be

avoided if possible. If attorney or aide is present

during

interview, interview must be conducted by two Agents.

If, during conduct of interview subject desires

that

his

attorney of aide be present, the interview should be tact-

fully terminated, and FBIHQ should be informed with recommen~

dation whether or not to resume interview.

In all other instances, SAC has responsibility and option

of deciding when

two Agents should handle interview.

Safety

of Agents is first priority to consider.

(7) Direction of subject's activities.

PrioI FBIHQ approval is required before taking any steps to direct

the subject's activities even though he may appear to be cooperative

during the interview.

(8). Reporting results of

interview.

(b)

Record results of interview on FD-302.

Pertinent results of interview

should be included in next

report or LHM unless circumstances indicate need for more

In cover letter or administrative

pages,

include observations of interviewing Agents as to

subject's cooperativeness, any relevant information

concerning subject's appearance or characteristics, and

assessment of information developed by interview in light

of other data known to your office.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720- Page 384

12

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## Page 385

SECTION' 87•

INVESTIGATION OF SUBVERSTVIS

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDU!'

870:

Reporting Procedures

2 o

General

'(1): Pertinent information

developed during investigation may be reported

either by report or LiM.

Reports should be submitted:

When setting out results of estended inquiries such as

summary of subject's activities.

(b).

When subject is being recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

LHM should be used to report timely or significant information

regarding subject's current activities.

All communications should be limited to:

Information regarding subject's subversive activities,

sympathies, and affiliations.

(b) 'Pertinent background data concerning subversive individuals

(с)

or groups with which subject is connected.

Essential background data regarding subject.

They should not include information regarding subject's social

or personal affairs or other background data not relevant to

subject's subversive activities or affiliations.

(3)

Information in both reports and LiMs should be organized under

topical headings.

Main headings and subheadings should be

employed to make the communication as readable as possible.

b. Summarizing information.

When reporting information of repetitious or cumulative nature, such

as attendance at regular meetings of subversive group, use summary

narrative statement.

Exact dates are not needed, but

time period

irruiniù sivuii iu iniivaini.

Jumary оіаістсніо тої йю ріаїіні

facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources

should be reported separately and any significant items must be

set forth in detail.

C.

Administrative or Cover Pages

(1)

Material to be included

Pertinent information concerning following should be included in

administrative pages of report or cover communication of LHM:

References to other reports or correspondence, ADEX status,

reference to security flash notice (FD-165) or transfer of

origin

(FD-128), reason for classification, if any, documentation of data

contained in report or LIM, identities of coniidential sources,.

leads, and other administrative or noninvestigative material.

Use form (FD-305) for ADEY cases. If used, nonsymbol source page

should be last page.

(2) .

Documentation

(a)

In documenting information originating with another field

office, file number of original document need not be

shown

provided source,

date information received, and receiving

sgent are identified.

(b)

Do not conduct extensive inquiries to document background

information.

(c) In characterizing persons who associate with subject,

• identify source but further documentation not required..

Office, of Origin

Office covering place where subject's principal subversive activities

occur or originate should be origin.

In unusual circumstances where

NW 54969 Docld:32989720• Page 385

13

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## Page 386

SILLINNOT.

INTESTIGNLINS DE SUBVERSIVE.

ORS NIZATERNS, AND INDIVIDUALS

des ques as agates sicil dies'

there is doubt as

which office should be origi

request FBIIIQ to

designate office of. origin.

e. Title: of communications

Normally, only one subject should be carried in title of each report

or LIM and separate reports

should be submitted for each subject

regardless of relationship.

However, when reporting virtually

identical information concerning

two

data concerning a husband and wife) an exception can be mace

single LIM or report submitted.. In such cases dual captions should

be used

and

an extra copy of communication provided.

f.

Classification - 100

Character

(1)

Designation "Subversive Matter" (or abbreviation SM) should be

used in

Add organizational affiliation when chief

group with which

subject is connected is under current investigation

or has approvedlcharacterization.]

Example:

Subversive Matter - CPUSA

Subversive Matter - SWP

(2)

Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot be showt,

use caption "Subversive Matter."

no Coals instances cant to copies to FBIHa to cover dissemination

to Department (2) and Secret Service (1). Where 1t appears dissemnation

will be made to other agencies at FBIHQ level, furnish one additional

copy for each such agency involved.

Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed at resolving

purpose oi investigation have been completed. As minimum, case

snould be kept pending until essential background data regarding

subjeci has been secured and sufficient information developed to present

good picture of nature and extent of subversive activities engaged in

by subject.

j. Closing and

reopening of cases

If it is determined

that subject's

current activities do not involve

an actual or potential violation of one or more of the statutes

enumerated in A. 1. above, case should be closed.

Case

may 'be reopened at a later date if additional information is

received which indicates subject's subsequent activities involve or

result in a violation of the

statutes cited in A. 1.

Subject traveling abroad (Also

see section 105G volume. IV, of this

manual).

Take following action when information is received that subject of

current investigation intends to travel abroad or has departed on foreign

travel (except where travel is of brief duration and is known to be

for innocuous purpose

such as vacation):

(1)

Immediately notify FBIHO of available details concerning travel.

including places and dates of departure and intended return,

destination,

itinerary, purpose of trip, and pertinent passport

data.

Include full description of subject, including aliases.

Set

out concise resume of available subversive data regarding

subject.

Do not delay advising FBIHQ while developing details

if time is of essence.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 386

14

9-13-74

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## Page 387

070

i, id this probert.

ORGINIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUAI

(2)

(3)

If necessary

let out lead for WFO to check

cords of Passport

Office, Department of

State.

Pertinent information is finished Department of

Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interested Legal Attaches.

Furnish FBIIQ with sis copies of LIM (3-Department, 1-Sccret

Service, 1-State

desattache delice which users area in subjects its era cach

(1-Legat, 3-Legat's sources). Also, furnish one copy of subject's

photograph, if available, for each Legat Office involved.

stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicate

in cover letter.

Set out requests for investigation

abroad on

separate numbered page captioned "Leads" at end of LiM.

Request

should not refer to Legal Attache or request investigation by

any particular service.

(4)

Advise FBIHQ promptly by LHM of subject's return. Reference

any prior memorancia dealing with the subject's travel.

subject has traveled to a communist country, furnish

recommenda-

¿son as to interview and advise whether additional investigatioi

being conducted.

(5)

Take folloving action when information is received that

organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is

forming tour group for foreign travel:

(a)

Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or

as to identities of individuals participating

organization furnish LIM to FBIHQ for dissemination to State

in tour and

Department, CIA, and interested Legal Attaches. Include

readily available information pertaining to tour, such as

(b)

Other offices

should inmediately identify participants

residing within their respective territories and submit

LiMs on those of security interest.

Refer to LIM previously

prepared under caption of

tour group or organization.

cover letter,

information.

list participants on whom there is no subversive

1. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.

• (1) *

Offices covering national headquarters or local units of subversive

groups should promptly furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data

regarding persons affiliated with such groups.

Furnish

information by letter, and indicate list is being furnished

for indexing purposes.

(2)

Information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals

residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to

latter.

• (3)

Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations

should be indexed in field office covering address shown for

subscriber but should not be

m. Control files on former members o forwarded to FBIllo.

subversive organizations.

(1)

Offices having sufficient volume nay, at the option of

the

appropriate supervisor, maintain control files on former

members of subversive

organizations. Such files will preclude

necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who

are in position to furnish• information of value in particular

cases.

(2)

appropriate, make copies of communications for these files.

Insofar as practical these files should

contain folloving infomation

regarding. ex-members of subversive groups: background, type oi

information possessed,

time period covered, availability fur

interview and for testimony.

INW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 387

15

9-13-74

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## Page 388

o cop onside in sole is o

ORGAN LATT

'adio dog is crete

0.

p.

Channeling info

tion to case files

Memoranda

garding membership or activit

subversive organiza-

tions

including surmaries of informant icports, should be

channeled to case files of individuals involved.

When informa-

tion from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual

• case files,

(2)

it should be documented.

When preparing lengthy channeling memoranda reporting material of

interest to other offices, limit number of copies prepared to

two for each other office.

Clearly indicate next

to. names of

other offices the page number containing information of interest

and note on cover page that distribution of material to individual

case files should be handled by recipient offices.

Movement of subjects between offices

If office of origin receives information that subject of current or

past investigation changes residence to territory of another division,

office of origin request verification within 30 days. If new residence

confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin. Office

of origin

should furnish new office with any pertinent subversive data

which has not previously been reported in a form suitable for dissemina-

tion, or suitable for incorporation in an LHM or report.

Destruction of Channeling Memoranda

• *

At the option of appropriate field supervisors, in order to avoid the

accumulation of channeling memoranda in

a case file as well as to

facilitate the subsequent preparation of LIMs or reports, the following

procedure may be used:

Files may be reopened for preparation of an

"investigative insert" for later inclusion. in a LIM or report, using

I symbols identifying informants who have furnished prior information.

showing what serials in the file have been covered by his review and

also identifying all symbol number informants involved and indicating

the location of the original data (similar to documentation in the

cover pages of a report).

review can then be destroyed and the "investigative insert" along with

its cover memorandum can, if necessary, be forwarded to another field

division in the event the subject moves.

[4. Urban Guerrilla Warfare

(Instructions relating

to investigations of above subject matter are con- •

tained in section 122, item A8, Manual of Instructions.)]

D.

DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED

• 1.

General Policy

Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to

other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest.

See

MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities

and

policies in dissemination.

2.

Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing them to insure they

meet current reporting standards.

If they are unsuitable for dissemina-

con, prepare LIM containing pertinent information.

Specific reauiremente

Following instructions cover representative situations which occur

frequently.

a.

Members

of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence

agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires free

exchange of all information of mutual interest between subscribing

agencies.

Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly significant

information develoved concernine nembers of military survices,

including contacts with individuals or groups of security interest,

to military service having primary responsibility.

16

• 4-15-74

NW. 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 388

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## Page 389

ORGANIZATIUNS AND INDIVIDUN!

If it is deteri

ed subject of FBI investigati

is member

of armed

services, discontinue immediately, advise FBIllu,

and disseminate

pertinent information locally to appropriate intelligence

agency.

If it'is'determined subject has close relatives in armed forces,

promptly advise appropriate military intelligence service, and

furnish pertinent infornation, including reports,

on subject involved.

Evaluation of such association lies entirely within province of

military intelligence service.

In all instances, advise FBIHQ concerning any possible subversive

contacts or derogatory information developed concerning military

personnel, including local dissemination made. Enclose four copies

of LHM or report setting out pertinent data.

bo

Aliens and naturalized citizens

Furnish any information which might have bearing on their deportation

or denaturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

locally.

Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities, or

employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces

Under Delimitations Agreements, FBI is responsible to disseminate

pertinent data to the counterintelligence agencies of the Armed

LAlso disseminate pertinent information concerning such

• individuals to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office

(DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attention Chief,

Adjudication Division and advise interested military intelligence

agency of such dissemination to DISCO. However, with regard to

facilities having classified contracts with the

Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC), dissemination to AEC is made only at FBIHQ.]

See section

102, volume IV, of this manual for details.

do

Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities)

Disseminate pertinent data locally to Army and any other Federal agency

whose interest is apparent.

e.

Members of military reserve branches or National Guard

Disseminate pertinent security data loçally to appropriate military

intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including long-

shoremen and waterfront employees

Disseminate pertinent security data locally to Coast Guard and when

circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies,

including NISO.

go

Employees of Federal Government

Any subversive information received concerning an employee of an

agency of the Executive Branch should be promptly forwarded to FBIHQ

for dissemination to interested agencies. No dissemination of reports

in Security of Government Employee cases

should be made in field.

Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under EO

10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

ho

Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of

installation or other, premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed

services

Disseminate pertinent data locally to appropriate military intelligence

service.

i.

Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

FAA issues certificates to airmen (pilot, mechanic, or member of crew);

to individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, over-

hauling, or repair of aircraft; and to aircraft dispatchers

traffic control tower operation.

Furnish pertinent data concerning such persons to FBIHQ by report or

LIM. In cover communication, recommend dissemination to FAN.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 389

• 17

2-13-73

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## Page 390

'0lt

•:.'

*ORGANIZATIONS AND INUIVIDUAI

•j. Dissemination.

ecret Service..

Under

agreement

between FBI and

Secret Service

concerning protective

responsibilities (set out' in section 102, volume IV; of

tli's mariual);

reports and LIMs are disseminated to Secret Service both locally

and at FBIIIQ in all cases which meet standards set forth.

This

includes virtually all cases on individuals where any substantial

information exists as to subversive activities or sympathies of

subject.

When photographs are available send copies to Secret

locally and to FBIHQ for dissemination at headquarters

Secret Service should be advised of reason for referral; i.e.,

statement of class or classes of agreement which apply to

subject.

FD-376 serves as letter of transmittal for both local

and FBIHQ dissemination.

Forward original and one copy to FBINQ

(2)

maintain copy in case file.

After initial dissemination, as changes occur in residence and

employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-366 and furnish

two copies

to FBIHQ. FD-366 must be submitted even though changes

in residence and/or employment are noted in report or LIM being

submitted.

(3)

For instructions governing dissemination-to Secret Service in

matters involving threats against President, refer

to section

134B, volume IV

of this manual.

(4)

Upon

transfer of office of origin, old office of origin should

furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and

business address by LIM or FD-366. Provide copies to FBIHQ and

new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service head-

quarters and branch office covering new residence, respectively.

(5)

As an administrative ald to insure proper dissemination, the Ille

covers of cases in which dissemination is being made to

Secrei

Service may be stamped "SS."

3. 'Restrictions on field dissemination

If security measures are known to be inadequate at local office of

another Government agency, do not disseminate locally: but bring matter

to attention of FBIHQ for

headquarters dissemination.

E. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX (ADEX)

1.

Purpose and general policy

a.

To have a readily available and up-to-date listing of individuals

deemed currently dangerous to the national security.

Objective is to

identify individuals who should be afforded priority investigative

coverage in the event of a national emergency.

b.. Under no circumstance should individuals be included in ADEX merely

because of their opposition to Government policies or because of the

exercise of their constitutional rights of protest and dissent.

ADEX is strictly an administrative device. It should not be treated

as a factor in determining basic investigative decisions, 1.e..

whether an investigation should be opened or closed, the extent of

investigation to be conducted in a particular case, etc.

ADEX should include individuals whose actions or statements have

established that they represent a current threat to the national

security, i.e.,:

Individuals (whether affiliated with organized groups or not) who

government officials, or other

such acts which would result in interference with or a threat to

the survival and effective operation of national, state or local

government.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 390

18

0-1Z-7?

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## Page 391

SECTION 87.

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

87E

sitoria,

.bo

This would includ

leaders of organizations whose

aims include the over-....

throw or destruction. of

the Government. of

government of any state, territory; district, or possession there,

or the government of any political subdivision therein; by unlawful

The term "leaders"

denotes those individuals, irrespective

of title, who are in a position to significantly influence the

policies or direct the activities of the group. Mere membership

in an organization, without the element of leadership or without a

demonstrated willingness and capability described in paragraph a,

is not sufficient for inclusion in ADEX.

Individuals should be considered a "current threat" to the national

security when reliable information has been developed that they have

engaged in activity or exhibited the requisite willingness and capability

falling within the above-described criteria during prior two years

and there is no indication they have ceased such activity. However,

there may be instances where retention of an individual in ADEX is

justified even though no pertinent information is available during

in to individual one can ee to stee paranted

left the country. Following guidelines should be followed with

respect to imprisoned subjects. If already on ADEX and sentence 1s

such that the earliest possibie release date from actual incarcera-

tion is more than two years after sentencing, subject should be rec-

ommended for removal from ADEX.

with facility where incarcerated so office will receive notifica

stop should be placed

tion of release, after which subject should be considered for pos-

sible reactivation on ADEX•

whether or not a stop can be placed,

necessary administrative procedure should be set up so that sub-

juiis uniinued incarceration is verniled at least every

six months.

If case is not pending, it should be placed in a pending inactive

rather than closed status. If a subject under investigation appears

to qualify for ADEX but is under sentence for over two years as de~

scribed above, do not recommend for ADEX but follow procedures

described above to consider for ADEX upon release from imprisonment.

Sentences which permit releases in less than to years should be ignored

as a factor in considering ADEX status.

These guidelines are for

application only as to ADEX status and have no

bearing on whether or

not subjects should be investigated.

For those cases in a closed

status at time these new guidelines become effective, they should be

brought in line with the

new guidelines when the cases are next

reviewed for any reason.

ADEX should not include individuals who may be ideologically committed

to a philosophy which calls for the downfall of our form of

or which favors another form of society but who have not shown a current

Willingness or capability of engaging in meaningful action to promote

their beliefs.

This might apply, for example, to rank-and-file members

of the Socialist Workers Party or the Communist Party, USA, or other .

old-line revolutionary groups which have advocated an overthrow of

our present form of government but where subject's activity is .

primarily ideological in nature and not oriented toward action.

case should be reviewed on an individual basis in the light of the

criteria enumerated above.

30

Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card

When dangerousness of

subject has been

established, office of origin

should prepare recommendation on. FD-122, in triplicate.

Forward,

original and

copy to FBIHQ, and place copy in subject's file.

bo Attach additional page or pages to FD-122 setting out succinct

summary of facts on which recommendation based.

Nonprosecutive sunmary report should be submitted when subject is

recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to FBIIQ.

In latter instance, submit up-to-cate report.

do Do not delay recummendation for ADEX because of absence of complete

background or descriptive data.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 391

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## Page 392

ORGANIZATIUNS AND INDIVIDUALS

HOG1100d0'

e. Do not defer is.

mendation for ADEX because

ect is missing, tem-

porarily.out. of

ne country, or in prison.

If FBING approvas

recornerdation; AbEX cards will be'prepared include

Ing.two. copies for 11eld.. Copy.of. FD-122 will be.returned stampec

"ADEX card

approved, copies attached.". Check cards for accuracy.

• Place one in alphabetical section of

either geographical section or unavailable section.

g.

When subject is approved for ADEX, submit Security Flash Notice (FD-165)

to check records of Identification Division and post flash notice if

fingerprints of

subject are on file. FD-165 will be returned if posi-

tive identification cannot be made.

In latter event, FD-165 should be

submitted every two years as long as subject remains

On ADEX and no

fingerprint record has been located. These submissions should be timed

to coincide with biennial review of case.

4.

Format of ADEX card

2.

Data to appear on face of card

Itemized below are descriptive categories in which subject may be clas-

sified and corresponding abbreviations for use on FD-122 and ADEX card.

(1)

Full name and aliases

(2)

Date and place of birth

(3)

Race

White

Black

W

B

Other

(4)

Sex

•

Male

Female

(5)

Citizenship

F

1. S. Citizen

Alien

AL

(6) Residence address

(7)

Employment (occupation and address)

(8)

Type of activity

Black Extremist

Communist (pro-Chinese)

BEX

CMC

communist (DrO-Soviet

CMS

Communist (Trotskyist

Foreign Nationality

CMT

FRN

Puerto Rican Nationalist

PRN

Revolutionary

Miscellaneous

REV

MSC

Activities connected with "New Left" or anarchistic elements should

be shown as "Revolutionary." The term "Foreign Nationality" covers.

foreign-directed subversion, e.g., Soviet or Chicom espionage, Arab

terrorism.

The abbreviation FRN should be followed by nationality

involved e.go, FRN-AraD, FRN-Cuban.

(9) • Special

Interest

Espionage Subjects

Foreign government employees

U. S. Government employees

(10)

Unavailable section

ESP

FGE

GOV

Missing

MI

Out of country

OC

Imprisoned

PR

(11)

Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from

Department of Defense Key Facilities List), if applicable, anc

agency having security responsibility, which is Army.

(12) Field office and FBIHQ file numbers

Do Data to appear on separate card attached to ADEX card in

geographical or unavailable section.

(1) Physical description

(2) Photograph,

with date taken. It should be most current or best

subject available.

20

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 392

2-13-74

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## Page 393

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

(3) • Dangerous

acteristics öf subject, e.g-

tation if sübject

•carries firerms:

:(4):

Any special information needed to locate subject."

(5)

Notation that security flash notice (FD-165). has been posted

with Identification Division

(6)

FBI number and

fingerprint classification, when available.

Case should normally be kept pending to secure all pertinent identifying

data enumerated in paragraphs a. and b. above. However, if it

appears a considerable amount of effort would be required to obtain a

particular item, use judgment in deciding whether to continue in

pending status solely for this purpose.

Use FD-186 to report above information. File in case file.

5. Arrangement of ADEX

a.

At FBIHQ.

Index is printed on IBM cards, two copies of which are sent to

field.

An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of

subjects is maintained at FBIHQ•

In field office

Index is maintained in three sections:

(1) Alphabetical section

(2)

This section includes one complete set of current ADEX cards.

Geographical section

This section

includes ADEX cards of all subjects except those

who are missing, temporarily out of the country, or in prison.

Geographical section is broken down by residence address in

accord with needs of each office, e.g., by state, county, city,

or if needed, into boroughs or suburbs.

Cards are filed

alphabetically under each such breakdown.

(3)

Unavailable section

This section includes cards of individuals who are missing, out of

the country for an indefinite period, or imprisoned, broken down

into three corresponding subsections.

(a)

Missing subjects

(b)

Subjects out of country for indefinite period

Include foreign residence and employment addresses on

FD-122, if known. Place stops with INS to be advised of

subject's return. Verify foreign residence annually.

(c)

Subjects imprisoned

Identify institution in which subject is incarcerated on

FD-122. Request prison authorities to notify us of subject's

release and set tickler to verify.

6. Special interest subjects

Following classes of individuals could be of special interest in national

emergency:

2.

Espionage subjects

Any action taken in these cases should be handled, if possible, in

such manner as to not destroy the opportunity to penetrate án active

espionage network.

b. Foreign government employees

Any action taken in these cases must be handled so as to minimize the

possibilities of diplomatic repercussions.

•• •

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 393

*21

6-6-73

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## Page 394

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUAI.S

place tered detonating i

:.

C.

U.S. dovernment

loyees

•These subjects ar

of special interest to Departh

ht of Justice.

Cards on "Special Interest! subjects should be filed in regular sequerice

with other ADEX cards:

7.

Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects

Develop sources to insure that any such changes are promptly brought

to our attention.

bo

Submit FD-122 whenever changes occur. Also submit FD-366 to FBIHQ

and

Secret Service locally.

8. Changes in other background data

a larges occur.

a.

Submit any changes, additions, or deletions in data required by FD-122

in an updated FD-122.

If item being deleted, specify "Delete."

bo

Make notations concerning change on existing ADEX card pending

receipt of revised card from FBIIIQ.

9. Movement of ADEX subjecis between offices

Requests from other offices to verify addresses of subjects should

b.

be handled within thirty days.

Upon verification of new address, office of origin submit FD-128

transferring origin.

Furnish original and copy to FBIHQ and two copies

to office covering new address enclosing copies of previous reports,

c.

other partnent serial photograpa a dila tentat cats a devision,

note on FD-128 and designate extia copy for FBIHQ, attention Identifica-

tion Division.

d.

Old office of

origin submit current report or LHM whenever there is

pertinent information to report.

Do not delay submission of FD-128

solely for preparation of report or LFM, but note on FD-128 latter

being prepared. Old office of origin furnish Secret Service locally

wiii suujeuio iün residenco and bucinces addreçcos hu Fn-366 and

provide copies

to new office of origin for dissemination to Secret

Service there.

e.

If new office

of origin plans no further investigation, advise FBIHQ

by letter that case is being closed.

10.

Subject entering U. S. armed forces

Submit FD-122 to cancel ADEX and FD-366 to advise Secret Service,

furnishing copy of latter to local Secret Service office.

Be certain

interested military agency has been forwarded all pertinent subversive

data regarding subject and is aware of

subject's entry into armed forces.

Where appropriate, prepare up-to-date LHM or report for dissemination to

military agency and to Secret Service both at FBIHQ and field level.

While subject is serving in armed forces, appropriate military

complete jurisdiction over his activities and no active invastiggency has

should be conducted by FBI. Geographical card for subject should be

filed in case file marked "canceled" and alphabetical card destroyed.

When subject returns to civilian status, determine if activities warrant

inclusion in ADEX.

If so, submit FD-122 so recommending as well as

current report.

If not, advise FBIHQ by letter.

11.

Removal of cards from ADEX

Subject should be removed from ADEX for any of the following reasons:

Death

Do Permanent departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico

c. Designation as security informant

do Subject no longer falls within ADEX criteria

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 394

22

606-73

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## Page 395

SECTIC

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERS

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIL

87E

:.

In all of the above cases recommend removal from ADEX by FD-122 with

attached succinct summary of facts.

In all instances except c.,

submit

current. LIM of report for dissemination to Secret Service at FBIHQ and

also furnish report or LIM to Secret Service locally.

12°

Reporting procedures on ADEX subjects

a.

An initial summary report must be submitted at time subject is

recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

bo

Additional reports should not be

submitted solely for sake of reporting;

however, in the event complexity of case of other reasons so dictate,

the SAC or FBIHQ may instruct that reports be suomitted.

C.

Current significant pertinent information and/or activities of

subject should be reported on current basis as it occurs utilizing

teletypes, nitels or airtels with letterhead memoranda suitable for

dissemination.

d.

In the absence of unusual circumstances (imprisonment, prolonged

absence on foreign travel, etc.), ADEX cases should be kept pending

and a communication submiited to

FBIHQ at least every 90 days report-

ing on subject's activities.

In the event subject has been inactive

for 90 days, you should comment as

• to whether continuation on

ADEX is warranted.

13. [Deleted]

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 395 •

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## Page 396

CTION 88. SEDITION

88A

CIATUIRS..

Title 18, use, 88 2387, 2388, and 2391

82387.

Activities affecting armed forces generaliy

"(a) Whöever,

with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty,

norale,

or discipline

of the military or zaval

forces, of the United States:

* (1)

advises,

counsels, urges.

or in any manner causes or attempts to

cause insubordination,

disloyalty,

mutiny or refusal

duty by any member

of the military or naval jorces of

the United

States; or

•(2) distributes or attempts to distrioute any written or printed matter

which advises, counsels,

or urges insubordination,

disloyalty, mutiny, or

refusal of duty by any member of the military

or naval forses

United States -

"Shall be fined not more than

$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,

or both,

States or

any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his

_conviction.

*(t)

For

the purposes of this

section, the term 'military or naval forces of

the United

States' includes

the Army of the United States,

the Navy, Air'Force,

Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and

Guard Reserve

of the United States; and, when any merchant vessel

in the Navy or is in the service of the army or the Navy, includes the

master, officers, and crew of such vessel."

2388.

Activities affecting armed forces during war

-..

"(a)

Whoever,

when the United States is

at war, willfully makes or conveys

false reports or false statements with intent

to interfere with the operation

or success of

the military or naval forces of

the United. States or to

argento the enoreds of ito anomies: an

"Whoever, when the United States is at war, willfully causes or attempts

to cause

insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in

military or naval forces

of the United States, or willfully obstructs the

recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the

service of the U.S., or attempts to do so--

*Shall be fined not

more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty

years, or both.

* (b)

Is two or

more persons conspire to viclate subsection a of this

section and one or more such persons do any

effect the object of

the conspiracy, each

of the parties to such

conspiracy shall be punished

as provided in said subsection (a.

"(a) Whoaver harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or nas

reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed,

about to

commit, an offense under this section, shall be fined not more than $10,000

or imprisoned not more than ten years,

or both.

This section shall apply within the

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction

of the United States, and on the high seas, as well as within the United

§ 2391. Temporary

extension of section 2388

"The provisions of

section 2388...in addition to coming into

full force

and effect in time of war shall remain in full force and effet until six

months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the

President on December 16, 1950...or such earlier date as may be prescribed

by concurrent resolution

Congress,

acts which would

give rise

to legal consequences and penalties under section 2388 when performed

during a state of war shall give rise to the same legal consequences and

penalties when they are performed during the period above provided for."

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 396

alert

---

## Page 397

88B -D

SECTION 88• SEDITIL.

B. VIOLATIONS

§ 2387

a. A person with intent to interfere with, impairy or influence 30ja203,

or discipline of military

or naval

forces of the u.?.

or naval forces of

the U.S., or

o. Person with intent. to interfere with, impair, or influence loyalty,

morale, or discipline of military or naval forces of the U.S., did,

or attempted to

written or printed matter which advised, couns.Jod, or

uiged insubordination,

disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty ly

any member of military

or naval forces of

the U.S.

2.

Person willfully made or conveyed false reports or statements

when U.

S. at war, or during period of extension

of this section

provided in

section 2391 with intent to

interiere with operation

or success of

military or naval forces

"of t. S. or with intent to

promote success of its enemies, or

Person willfully caused or attempted

to cause when U. S. at war or

during the period of extension of this

section provided in section

2391 insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in

military

U. S., or

c.

Person willfully obstructed the recruiting or enlistment

of U.S., when U. So at war or during period of extension this

2391, or

d.

Two or more persons conspire to

violate this section and one cr

more such persons perform any act to eifect the object of compirao::

e. Persons harboring or concealing any persus, iuuring un dories roii.

to believe he committed or was about to commit offonse under this

section

"c.

DEPARTMENTAL OPINIONS

1.

To assist in determining types of utterances which fall

within proniciti::

of sedition statutes,

Department of Justice has designated following

of statements as being within prohibition of statutes:

False statements of fact in time of war

intended

to interfere with

the prosecution of war

be Utterances in time of war which cause or attempt to cause insubordi-

nation in armed forces

Utterances which have the direct effect of obstructing enlistment

or the operation of the draft

d.

Advocacy of armed revolt or overthrow of Government by forde and

2. Above types of uiterances not considered all-inclusive of possibilities

presented by sedition

statutes but only guides

Department of Justice has advised that USAs are not to authorizo prosec:-

tion without prior departmental authority in each individual

case; their:

no request should be made of USA for institution o1 prosecution. (Deja?t::

has instructed, however, that in all cases involving sedition in which

facts justify consideration copies of reports should ba designated for .::

office of interested USA.]

Copies of reports will be referred to Department by Bureau

relative to prosecution. / should the Usa authorize prosecution, procee:

in accordance with his instructions since it is presumed he will live

complied and obtained prior authorization.

action is authorized by a local USA and

received indicating knowledge that this action has been approved i:

the Department, immediately advise by telephone or teletype of v':?.

taken.

investigate all cases involving the distribution of seditious

literature and be aware of all such publications, make necessit:

arrangements to be advised or all publications in your district.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 397

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## Page 398

SECTION 88.

SEDITION

".......

d..

might be considered

Within 24 hours afte

seditious article

reaches general publ

each field office must prep

teletype summary

of article for Bureau

which must be followed by two

opies of public-

tiọn in which it appeared.

such articles will be of type which reflect

race prejudice, anti-Semitism and material tending to cause disunity.

Cover all meetings of organizations engaged in seditious activities

and bring to attention of Bureau statements of seditious nature

or having propaganda significance by most expeditious means warranted.

E. INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

1.

General

2..

Ascertain whether persons involved are civilian or uniformed

personnel of Army, Navy

or Air Force.

bo Ascertain whether offense occurred on military or naval

establishment,

reservation, base, field, port or harbor, under jurisdiction of Army,

Navy or Air Force or on merchant vessel commissioned in Navy or

in service of Army or Navy.

If so, communicate facts to proper official of Army or Navy or air

Force and conduct no investigation until a request is received through

proper channels.

General investigation should seck to establish identity and location

of all witnesses.

All persons present when words spoken should be

interviewed immediately and made matter of record before lapse of

time may impair effectiveness

Important

and probative value of their testimony.

establish in greatest detail factual

setiing in which

language was used since recessary part of proof in sedition case.

If member of

armed forces present, ascertain name, address,

rank,

branch of service and serial number.

If men having obligations

under Selective Service dot present, ascertain locality, birth

and selective

status of each

such witness in addition to

otner identifiavie infusmaiivi.

Efforto should bo modo to

determine whether or not speaker was aware of presence of member of

armed forces or persons having obligation under draft laws.

If speech was public in nature and delivered to audience, ascertain

in detail circumstances under which made.

Inquiry should establish

whether speech was delivered extemporaneously or from prepared

script. Inquiry

should include date, time and place of occurrence,

as well as chronology of events leading up to uiterance of

seditious statements: Ascertain age, sanity, sobriety and general

demeanor of speaker.

Manner in which words spoken has important

bearing on speaker's intent and must be clearly established before

facts will warrant prosecution.

Determine li words addressed

generally to all persons within sound

speaker's voice, were

spoken without prompting or in response to a question and determine:

whether words expressed in a deliberate manner or in temperamental

outburst.

h. Witnesses

should be asked to evaluate effect of language upon

persons addressed.

Inquire whether result

of words was to arouse

patriotic ardor of listeners or whether its etfect was demoralizing.

Determine whether alleged seditious words have been repeated by

other persons since

they were first uttered and with what results.

Bear in mind

possibility

that this investigation may uncover other

existing statutes,

such as failure to comply with

postal regulations, income tax or registration law requirements.

2. Written or printed words

of seditious statements appearing in written or

printed material should include inquiries extending beyond analysis

and examination of alleged seditious expressions themselves.

If statemerts appear in a publication regularly issued,

copies of the publication circulated before and after issue in

question and analyze from standpoint of ascertaining its

content and establishing

criminal intent of prospective defendants.

• c. Analysis of seditious statements should seck to determine whether

statements are in fact original or plagiarized reproduction or

quotation from other sources.

NM/ 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 398

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## Page 399

SEDITION

"tiredeen

o da dili.

In some cases, it

for a period

be necessary to examine con

t of eich issue

ral montis to develop seditio

character of

cares, analysis of any

one issue my fail to

disclose clearly seditious statements, whereas quantitative analysis

of number of issues may establish constant emphasis and frequent

repetition oi same themes.

Half-truths, continual slanting of facts,

habitual dishonest presentation

and interpretation of world and

national events are sumulative in effect and may be seditious

Efforts should be made to establish repetition

of same themes and same treatment of them in number of issues.

Completely identify group or organization responsible for authorship,

printing, and publication of printed or written material in question.

should not overlook possible collaboration, sponsorship,

support, and financial assistance oi outside individuals and other

Consider possibility of

subsidy and influence

by foreign sources.

Inquiry concerning foreign travel by principals

involved in investigation snouli be made and circumstances under

which travel undertaken fully developed.

Examine books of account, financial statements, and credit reports

of individual or organization under investigation,

as well as

organization records having to do with membership, dues, contrihutions,

and correspondence.

Take steps to locate and obtain records of printer as

soon as possible.

Printer's complete job

envelope should be obtained and rough drafts

and corrected drafts of printed material examined.

Drafts may

assist in establishing actual authorship of article, collaboration

others in its preparation,

reproduction of material sumitted to printer.

i.

Examine mailine list or other compilation of names of persons to whom

seditious material addressed

or distributed.

Ascertain manner in

which list was compiled and source from which names obtained.

Determine who is responsible for distributior of publications

whether intended to reach particular group, such as persons engaged

in national defense industries.

Ascertain

whether persons responsivle

for circulation made any special

efforts to distribute material among

members of armed forces, or persons having obligations under Selective

Service Act or relatives of

such persons.

Proof that publication reached specific identified members of above

groups will aid in establishing that substantive evils which law seeks

to prevent have resulted.

k. Under first offense defined in Title 18, USC, § 2388, dealing

with false reports or statements courts have

held not

necessary to

prove such false reports or statements were made to persons who are

or are liable to become members of

the military forces:

1.

With reference to mailing lists, efforts should be made to determine

whether issues of publication distributed to persons outside U.s.

m. Determine if such publication exchanges mailing list or naterial

suspect publications.

Determine if

persons receiving publication are paying or nonpaying

subscribers.

0.

Large cities have legitimate concerns engaged in business. of compiling

mailing lists of particular or selected groups ior advertising and other

Inquiry should be made of such concerns to determine whether

suspected individuals or organizations contracted for preparation of

a mailing list.

p.

Deternine

from[U. S. Postal Service ]whether prospective defendants

have been granted

or other

mailing privileges in

•tion with circulation of material under investigation. If privilege

was granted,

examine statements filed with Postmaster General concerning

ownership, editorial control and circulation.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 399

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## Page 400

ECTION 88. SEDITION.

1881 -

: П:.

F.

VENUE

Department has advised no sedition case

has raised question

Venue

inust

in all

cases be determined 'by

office

of

USA.

of

venue.

G. CLASSIPICATION - 14

н.

CHARACTER - SEDITION

Where reports are prepared involving possible violation of sedition

statutes

and Selective Service Act, following rule

case is to apply:

1. Whore individual endeavors to counsel, aid, or abet another individual

to evado provisions oi Selective Service Act, case should be carried

under character,

"Selective Service Act."

2.

or abets a group

of individuals,

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 400

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## Page 401

SECTION 95. TREASON

954 - C

COKSTITUTIONAL PROVISIO

Section 3, Articie 3,

ine Constitution of the United

tates provides:

"Ireason against the United states,

scall

consist only in levying War

against them,

or in anhering to their Eremies, giving them Aid and Com-

fort.

No Person

shall be convicted

of Treason unless

on the Testimony

of two witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

"Ihe Congress

shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,

but no Attainder of Ireason shall work Corruption of Blood, or For-

feiture, except during the Life of the Person attainted."

Bo

STATUTES

Title 18, USC, & 2391. Ireason

"Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against

adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort

within the United States of elsewhere, is guilty of treason and

shall suffer death, or shall be

imprisoned not less than five years

and fined not less

than $10,000; and shall be incapable of hold-

ing any office under the United States."

Title 18, USC, & 2382. Misprision of

treason

"Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having know-

Ledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals

and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same

to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the

governor or

to some judge or justice of a particular State,

guilty of misprision

of treason and shall be fined not more than

$1,000, or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both."

C. RELATED STATUTES

Title 18, USE, & 2389.

Recruiting for service against United States

*Whoever recruits soldiers

within the United States,

or in any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to engage

in armed hostility against the same; or

"Whoever opens within the United States, or in any place subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, a recruiting station for the enlistment of

soldiers or sailors to serve in any manner in armed hostility against the

2.

3.

4.

not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five

or both."

Yetle 18, USC, & 2390. Enlistment to serve against the United

"Whoever enlists or is enfaged within the United States or in

any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, with intert to

serve in armed hostility against the United States, sball be

fined $100 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

Title 18, USC, & 756.

Internee of belligerent nation

"Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, aids or

entices any person belonging to the armed forces of a belligerent

nation or faction who is interned in the United States in

accordance with the law of nations, to escape or attempt to

escape from the jurisdiction of the United States or from tie

limits of internment prescribed, shall

be fined not more than

$1,000 or imprisoned not-more than one year, or both."

Title 18, USC, & 757. Prisoners of war or enemy aliens

procures the escape of

any prisoner of war held by the

United States

or any of its allies, or the escape of any person

apprehended or interned as an enemy alien by the United States

• or any of its allies, or advises, connives at, aids, or assists

escape, or aids, relieves, transports, harbors, conceals,

• shelters, protects, holds correspondence with, gives intelligence

or otherwise assists aly such prisoner of war or enemy alien,

after his escape from custody, knowing him to be such prisoner

var or enemy alien, or attemots to comnit or conspires to commit

any of the above acts, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im

prisoned not more than

ten years, or both."

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 401

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## Page 402

*950 -E

SECTION 95. TREASON

"The provisions

is section shall be in addit

in substitution fomany other provision of law."

to and not

D.

ELEMENTS

1.

TreASOn

Person must owe allegiance to the United States. Statute

applicable to 311 persons oing allegiance to U.S., whether

citizens or aliens,

residing in U.S.

clear that every individual owes fidelity and allegiance to

Government in return for protection he receives from that

Citizen ones absolute and permanent allegiance

to his Government until he renounces his citizenship and

become's citizen of ancther country.

Person must have performed overt act of levying war against

the U.S.

Act of levying war against le See aecording to

court decisions, interpreed as where men mect operly in armed

array or In such crowds that mere nunbers supply elementor

force which might onernice be given by arms, with purpose

inténtion of nullifying or preventing execution of general

Taw of Congress.

Resistance to U,S. in its sovereign capacity is essential

element.

To establish riolation must have proof of prior

Waging of wai against

2.

U.S. requires

authority of

the Government either in whole or in

some territory

or political subdivision.

Overt act must be in

furtherance of treasonable intent,

and words, oral, weatter,

or printed however

treasonable, seditious or crimiral, o

themselves do cot constitute overt act within meaning of

Persón must fare performed overt aot of adhering to enemies

of U.S., giving them aid and comfort within U.S.,

or else-

Applies only to. acts done after commencement of war

would aid or assist enemy or tend to weaken U.

its conduct of war, such as trading with enemy, selling or

giving material or supplies to enemy, assisting enemy in

physical conduct of war

and furnishing information to eneny

which would be of assistance to enemy or injury to u.s.

Misprision of treason

Person owes allegiance

b.

• 0o

Person had knowledge of commission of act of treason.

Person concealed this knowledge and did not immediately dis

close it to President, some judge

of the U. S., governor of

particular state or judge or justice of a particular state.

E.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

1.

Treason involves breach of allegiance and is highest crime known

to this country.

It is only crime embodied in the Constitution.

2.

Constitution expressly provides that

conviction for treason can

be

had only "on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act,

or on confession in open court."

3. •

Treason differs from

other crimes in that there are no accessories,

all persons being regarded às principals.

4.

Any evidence indicating possible violation of treason statute

should receive immediate, continuous and preferred investigation.

Bureau must be advised

5.

immediately of basic facts.

Informants or individuals who furnish infornation

indicating pos-

• Bible violation of treason

statute should be thoroughly and pain-

• stakingly interviewed to ascertain all available details as

words, acts, documents, letters,

et cetera, upon which allegation

of possible treason based.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 • Page 402

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## Page 403

... .

-SECTION ME TREASON

Information received

from any source indicating

'irearms and

ammunition are being collected for possible treasonous under-

takings should be subject of immediate and thorough investigation

to ascertain details concerning type of firearms and ammunition,

source. thereof, place of storage, ardidentity of individuals in-

Investigation must be pursued for purpose of definitely

determining whether arms or ammunition actually being collected

and stored in connection

with treasonous plot or other possible

violations within Bureau's jurisdiction, such as neutrality laws.

Bureau should be inmediately inforned of any information received

organizations purporting to be rifle or gun clubs

are, in

reality, planning activities of treasonable nature.

should be subject to discreet investigation to determine

basis for suspicion of treason.

In latter connection necessary

to ascertain following:

Identity of individuals responsible or sponsoring organization,

together with information discreetly obtained

concerning their

citizenship, reliability, and loyalty

All information indicating any connection between the organ-

ization and any foreign goverment, political party, in-

diviaual, corporation, or other association.. Also, any con-

nection between group involved

and groups,

organizations, or

individuals operating within U.S. and kaown to be disloyal

to this Government.

Correct nature of

activities of organization being under-

. taken.

may be ascertained by ordinary investigative

efforts or utilization of confidential informants, surveil-

lances, and other investigative techniques.

7. In the event specific evidence obtained indicating possible

tacacenable plet an uniontaring: intestigation

, determine entire ramifications

of plot and identity of all indi-

viduals involted.

8.

Actual investigative steps and methods will parallel those mentioned

in other sections of this manual in connection with national de-

fense matters.

F.

POLICY

The Department of Justice must specifically authorize prosecution in

each case.

Inquiry concerning Department's decision should be sent

•to Bureau.

G. VENUE

1.

Ireason - where act committed and if committed outside U.S. in

distriot where first brought or first lound

2. Misprision oi treason - where report of

treason should have been

HO CLASSIFICATION - 61

I. CHARACTER - TREASON Or MISPRISION OF TREASON

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 403

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## Page 404

.:. :.:...

.:":.

SE

N: 97. " VOORHIS ÄCT

B.

Do

STATUTE

Titie

18, Usc, $ 2386. (The voorhis dot wás approved by the ot Congress

on 10-17-40, and it became effective on 1-15-41.)

Registration of certai: orgavizations

This act provides

that the following organizations shall be required to

register with the Attorney

General;

"Every orgarization subjeci to loreiga control which engages in political

activity;

"Every organization which. engages both in civilian military activity and

activity;

"Every organization subject to foreign control which engages in civilian

military activity; and

"Every organization,

the purpose of aim of which, or one of the purposes or

aims of which, is the establishment,

control,

conduct,

seizure,

or orerthrow

a goveriment or subdivision thereof by the use of force, violence, military

measures, or threats of any one or more of the foregoing."

act specifically exempts certain other organizations from the require-

ment of regisüration, such as:

"(a) The armed forces

'b The organized militia or Natzonal Guard of any State, territory, District,

or possession of the United States, or

•(c Any lan-enforcement agency of

the United states of of any territory,

District, or possession thereor, or of any state or political subdivision of

a State, or of any

agency or instrumentality of one or more

States: or

•(2) Any duly established diplomatic mission or consular office of a foreign

government which is so recognized by the Department of State, or

"(e) Any nationally recognized organization of dersons who are veterans of

the armed forces of the United States, or aifiliates of such organizations."

The act outlines in detail the type of information desired in the registration

statements.

STEP TAKEN BY COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, TO AVOID PROSECUTION UNDER THIS ACT

I'he Communist Party,

USA, held

a special convention

in New York City on

November 16 to 17, 1940.

This convention declared "that the Communist Party

of the USA in convention assembled, does bereby cancel and dissolve its organi-

zational affiliation with the Communist International, as well as any and all

other bodies of any kind outside the boundaries of the United States of America

for the specific purpose of renoving itself from the terms

of the socalled

Voorhis Act."

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

(In 1941,

the Department considered holding grand jury hearings under this

act at which leading Communist Party lunctionaries would be subpoenaed.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

stopped any action in this resara.

Then prosecutive action was initiated against the Communist Party and it:

top functionaries begirning in 1948, the Department selected the Smith

of 1940 (Title 18, USC

(Pitle 50, USC, 88 782-816)

and the Internal Security Act of 1950

rather than the Voorhis Act.J

VENUE

Where the violation is the failure to register, venue will lie only in the

District of Columbia; however,

aiders and abettors may be prosecuted in the

district in which their criminal acts are pertormed,

and conspiracy charges

may be prosecuted in the district in which the conspiracy originates, or in

which any overt act thereunder takes place.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 404

---

## Page 405

?78.?"

•:00l.03.

VOORHIS ACT

PION MAT

Fie

PENALTIES

of this section shall be fined not

years; or both.

whouver in a statement filed pursuant to this soction willfully makes

false statement or willfully omits

to state any fact which is required to be

or wiich is necessary to make

the statements made not misleading,

•sliall be

finod 20t more than. $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,:

or boüh."

CLASSIFICATION - 102

Go CHAKACTER - VOORHIS ACT

NW 54969 Docld:32989720- Page 405

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## Page 406

N.

• SECTION 122.

TREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UN.

.122A.

INVESTIGATIONS OF EXTREMIST CRGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

for the purpose of this section,

extremist organizations and individuals

rclate to black extremists, Klan and white hate extremists and American

Indian extremists.

[1.

General Guidelines

Investigative Jurisdiction

FBI investigations under this section are based on specific statutory

jurisdiction and Departmental instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the

gathering of naterial pertinent to a determination whether or not the

subject has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result

in a violation of one or more of the statutes enumerated below or in

fulfillment of Departmental instructions.

There are three principal statutes which provide a basis for these

investigations, as follows:

Rebellion or

"Whoever incites,

insurrection (T18, USC, 82383)

sets on foot,

assists, or engages in any

rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United

states or the laws thereoi, ar gives aid or comiort thereto,

shall be fined not more than $10

,O00 or imprisoned not more

than ten years, or both;

and shall be'incapable of holding

any oftice under the United States."

Seditious conspiracy (T18, USC, §2384)

"If two or more persons in

State or Territory, or in any

place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire

to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government

of the United

by force the authority theredevy war againlei line, ve

iu vyyuse

or delay the execution of any law of the United

or by force to prevent, hinder,

or possess any property of the United States

contrary to the authority

thereof, they shall each be fined not

more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,

(3)

or both."

Advocating the overthrow of the Government (T18, USC, §2385).

desirability,

overthrowing ut destroying the sovernment of the united States

or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possess-

of any political subdivision

the overthrow or destruction

"Whoevcr,

written or

distributes,

"Whoever

violence, or attempts to do so, attempts to organize any society,

organizes or helps or

or violence; or becomes or is a member ofgovernment by force

; or affiliates with, any

such

society,

group, of assembly of persons, knowing the

purposes thercof--

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 406

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## Page 407

1129A...".

CSECTION: 12'

EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL TY

b.

c.

d.

"Shall be

ed not more than $20,000 oF

isoned not more

than twenty: years

inligible for employ-

"It' the five years nest following his conviction.

two or more persons conspire

to commit any offense named

in this section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or

imprisoned not more than twenty years; or both; and shall be

ineligible for employment by the United States or any depart

ment or agency thereof, for the five years next following

conviction.

"As used in this section,

the terms 'organizes' and 'organize',

with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons,

include the recruiting of new members,

the forming of new

and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes,

und sther units of such society, group, or assembly of persons."

The

courts have interpreted this statute to.reguire advocacy to

action, i.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future,

rather

than merely to believe in something.

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, the follow

ing statute would pertain to investigations of. Klan and other white

hate groups.

(4)

Civil Rights Act of 1968 (T18, USC, §241)

In summary, this statute makes it unlawful for two or more

persons to

conspire to injure,

any citizen in the free exercise of enjoyment en, of intimidate

any right or

privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of

United States.

Additionally, it prohibits two or more persons'

going in disguise on

the highway or on the premises of

with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment

of any rights secured by the Constitution or the laws of the

Prosecutive

Determination

All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investi-

gations initiated under this section will be conducted by FBIHQ with

Departmental officials.

These cases should not be discussed with

1ócal U.

Attorney's office without FBIHQ approval.

Related Statutes

There are

a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative

jurisdiction which should be borne in mind in handling these investi

Es frequently developed during these investigations.

Information concerning possible violations of such statutes

occurs, the field should consader the desirability of conducting

investigation in line with the policies and procedures governing the

statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investi-

gations is outlined in Subsection 9 of this section.

FBI Responsibility

The FBI has been charged by various Presidents with the responsi-

bility to coordinate and collect all information relating to the

of this manual.

not to be confused with our jurisdictional authority for conductine

active investigations, set out in A. 1. a. above.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 407

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## Page 408

NICE MATTERS AND CIVIL UNREST: /0406 122A

C: Thie tes

¡tremist activities" as used

this section denotes

•activiti

which are ained at overthrowi

destroying

;.or. under-..

mining ti

government or the United Status or any of its political

subdivisions by illegal means or denying the rights of individuals

under the

Constitution prohibited by statutes enumerated in do l..a..

". above.. The term

"extremist. organizations" denotes a group or

movement which is known to engage

in or advocate internal subversive.

•or extremist activitics as defined above.

Predication for Investigation

In all cases handled unde the provisions of this section, the first

commnication prepared which indicates an investigation is being

initiated (intraoffice menorandum,

letter, airtel

teletype or report)

should show specifically the statute upon

which the investigation

is based together with all the supporting facis.

Such a predication

must be included in the first communication to FBIHO and the first

report or LIN prepared in each case.

Where investigation has been

specifically requested by Department, this should be indicated in

predication.

The following examples

are illustrative; however,

predication for each individual case must be tailored to the circum-

stances of such case.

"This investigation is based on information the subject's

activities may be in violation of T18, USC,

82383 (Rebellion

or insurrection) and §2384 (Seditious

conspiracy). A source

whose reliability has not been determined has informed thai

the subject is planning, along with others, to travel to

Washone demonstrations duit duit the ust week in way, way, he

1971, to participate in planned

"shut down the Government.'

Demonstration plans include

blocking of streets and highways

destruction of personal and

Government property, and physical obstruction to prevent

Government employees from reporting to work."

"This investigation is based on information

the subject's

activities may be in violation of T18, USC, 82385 (Advocating

the overthrow of the Government). The subject is an admitted

member (or has been identified as a member by a confidential

source who has provided reliable information in the past) of

The (name of group) in its public statements

and publications advocates the desirability and necessity of

overthrowing the U. S. Government by force or violence, and

the assassination of U. S. Government officers.

that the subject actively supports these positions."

investigation is based on information the subject's

activities may be in violation of I18, USC, §241 (Conspiracy to

septive a citize a rights united seats secured su the is

The subiect is an

admitted member (or has been identified as

¡idential source who has provided reliable information in the

past) of (name of group).

The group has engaged in activities

designed to deny certain classes of citizens their rights or

privileges secured by the Constitution of the laws of

the United

States.

souIce has reported that the subject actively

supports this position."

1b

6-6073

NW 54969 |Docld:32989720-Page 408

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## Page 409

2.

EXTRENIST NATTERS AND CIVIL U

IST®

122A

If the statutor

basis for an investigation sh

change or be

expanded to include an additional statute or statutes, the first

communication prepared subsequent

to such change of expansion should:

specifically show such changes.

Similarly, this information should

be included in the next report of LiM prepared in the case.

Accuracy of Characterizations

Assure that statements. relating to characterizations.of an individual

or organization, or relating to affiliations with or membership in

any organization, are founded on a firm basis.

Identify sources for

such characterizations or statements of affiliation or menbership

if such characterizations,

affiliations or menberships are not

h.

commonly and publicly known.

Preservation of Evidence

whenever conducting investigation which involves possible prosecution,

insure that admissible evidence is obtained and preserved.

Investigations of Organizations

2.

Criteria

Investigations should be limited to organizations which have, or

allegedly have

b.

defined in A, 1 ens goo in or advocated extremist activities

Scope of Investigation

It is essential that reliable and knowledgeable informant coverage

e developed at all levels of organizations meeting investigativ

criteria.

Pertinent information should be obtained and reportec

concerning the following:

• Tube die an among mine, ana sinia deta rosardingy

Charter,

Incorpuraun daid, un vinee uaia legaiding information

of organization.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 409

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## Page 410

122A. :

÷: SECTION 122

EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL U

(3)

Identities

principal officers.

• (4).

number of active members:

Reports by office of örigin

•. • concerning national groups should include a breakdown of member-

ship by states.

(5).

(6)

Objectives, as

through investigation:

claimed by the organization and/or as determined

Summary of pertinent activities, including:

(a)

Acts of violence,

terrorism or intimidation

or pertinent

statements advocating or promoting such activities.

(b)

Other illegal actions.

(c)

Acquisition of arms, ammunition, explosives, or other

(d)

destructive devices.

Number of meetings or rallics held, both public and closed.

Include highlights with emphasis on

information bearing on

extremist character of the organization.

Training and recruiting activities.

(7)

Finances, including pertinent data regarding bank accounts

(include monthly balances if available) and source of income

and expenditure.

(8)

(9)

(10)

Publications.

Foreign

influence, if any.

Connections with other extremist, subversive or revolutionary

groups.

(11)

Miscellaneous. Any information considered pertinent but not

covered by the above.

c. Reporting Procedures

(1)

Freauency of reports. Submit initial report within 90 days.

Thercafter, office of origin should

submit annual nondrosecutive

summary report (unless FBIHQ specifically directs that a

different reporting schedule

followed). This report should

provide comprehensive picture of national

activities of the

organization, including concise summary of pertinent data reported

by auxiliary offices.

Auxiliary offices should submit reports

to reach FBIHQ and office of origin 45 days before the office of

origin's annual nonprosecutive summary report is due. It will

be the responsibility of the office of origin to appropriately

advise auxiliary offices of the annual reporting schedule.

(2)

Submission of letterhead memorandums (LHMs). In

addition

to

submission of reports as outlined above, all offices should on

a continuing basis keep rBiHo (and office or origin, Where

applicable) advised of significant information developec

concerning the activities of extremist organization. This

would include information concerning public rallies or

•.."

However, if actual or imminent violence is involved,

advise FBIHQ by

telephone or teletype.

d. Administrative Detail

Administrative pages of reports or cover pages of LIM should

specifically identify and state whether or not investigation being

conducted regarding active members who

are identified in

a report

or LHM.

In the event no investigation is being conducted, appropriate

justifications should be set forth.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 410

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## Page 411

XTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL :

:122A

At the time the annual' report. is.submitted

on organizations

offices should provide BIlD by létter with a List of individuals;

with identifjing data, ho are members of extremist groups or

unaffiliated extremists whose names have not been included in any

prior conmunication to the Bureau. This is for indexing purposes at

3: Investigations of Individuals

Criteria

Investigations should be initiated concerning following:

(1)

Officers of extremist organizations who are in policy-making

positions or who are able to direct activities of other

(2)

members of group.

All other members of extremist organization who have demonstrated

propensity for violence:

Persons who, while not affiliated with extremist organization,

have demonstrated strong extremist attitudes coupled with

inclination to employ violence.

b.

Scope of Investigation

Pertinent information should be obtained and reported concerning-

following:

(1)

Background infornation including:

check of indices; birth data;

residence and employment; military service, if any; selective

service status, if

applicable; marital status; educational

background; arrest record, if any; description of automobile,

including license number; photograph; FBI identification record;

relatives; close associates; social security number; and physical.

(2)

Connections

with extremist organizations and pertinent information

regarding extremist activities or sympathies.

(3)

(4)

Full details concerning subject's propensity

for violence.

Interview of subject.

The main purpose for interviewing

subjects of extremist investigations is to develop intelligence

information regarding extremist activities, Federal violations

in which extremists may be involved, and the evaluation of the

individual's extremist potential.

SAC may authorize

interviews with extremist organization members and officers up

to state level or lesser office. SAC may also authorize interview

of unaffiliated extremists.

Prior to interview of these individuals, conduct informant:

arrest, and indices checks on individuals to be interviewed.

Determine employment, establish not employed or connected with

any sensitive area requiring FBIHQ authorization for interview,

Interviews with extremist subjects should be considered early

in the investigation in the absence of any information dictating

otherwise. If

subject not interviewed, closing communication must

show reason for not interviewing.

Rank-and-file extremists may

be interviewed on the authority

of SAC, however, prior FBIHQ

authority must be obtained for interviews of leaders of the

extremist groups (state level or above), individuals of national

prominence, civil rights organizations,

educational institutions,

news media, religious groups, or other sensitive areas. Prior

MW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 411

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## Page 412

SECTION 122

PREMISI MATTERS AND CIVIL UNRI

..::

• FBIHQ authori

salso required. for those. su

its hiving an.".

wear affiliation: wi

known, subversive groups of foreign povers

(Utilize FD=336)

(5)

General

When good judgment dictates (i.e., for reasons of sensitivity.

or security), two Agents should be present at interview.

• safety f Agents participating in interview should be päramount

consideration in arranging circumstances under which intervicws

will be conducted.

FBIIQ authority is not necessary prior to

interview of extremist organization member in crininal or

applicant-type cases; however, confine interview to subject

matter of inquiry unless information concerning extremist

organization is volunteered by interviewee.

1(6).

Candidates for or occupants of clective public office

Instructions relating to investigations of individuals in above

categories are contained in vol. III, sec. 87 C. 1 (f), of this

manual.]

c.

Reporting procedures

Initial investigation should be completed within 90 days after case is

Individuals investigated under these instructions should

be considered for inclusion in the Administrative-Index (ADEX)

(see Section 37 Manual of Instructions

for details). It is not

desired that reports be submitted merely for the sake of reporting;

however, it is the responsibility of

the field to assure that all

significant information is reported in a form suitable for dissemination

on a current basis.

Whether or not an extremist

subject is placed in

the ADEX is not the controlling investigative criteria.

The investigative

criteria should be followed as set forth in 3. a. above.

Our dissemination responsibilities should not be overlooked and FBIIQ

part of subjects especially where substantive violations are

involved. Submit such information by teletype (suitable for

dissemination) or airtel accompanied by LIM depending on circumstances

involved.

do . Informant

development

If individual is cooperative upon interview and has potential as

source, handle pursuant to instructions contained in Section 130,

IV of this manual.

e.

Foreign influence

When an extremist subject travels abroad, advise the Bureau by

teletype if situation so warrants, submit LIM containing details

activities. Place stop with immigration authorities to assure

notification of return and request that a search of luggage be made.

Upon return, submit follow-up LHM and intensify investigation to

subject's activities while abroad including contacts with

any known extremists residing in countries in which traveled.

4. Extremist Photographic Album (EPA)

a. Purpose

Album maintained at each field office as aid in identifying individuals

bo

in extremist field who travel or are likely to travel extensively.

Individuals to be included

Leaders of Klan and similar white hate groups, leaders of American Indian

extremist groups, and leaders of black extremist groups. Also

include extremists who are fugitives in Bureau criminal cases,

extremist informants who travel in behalf of their respective

extremist

organizations, and any unaffiliated extremist whose activities warrant.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 412

4

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## Page 413

•cool did less: 'SECTION.:12.

EXTREMIST: MATTERS AND CIVIL

'' co: Procedure for inchuding individual's in EPA

• .:

On F-432 type: required biographical data

Complete. all: items

..on

form indicating "none".or "unknown" if applicable.

Place original

with photograph in individual's main case file.

Prepare from

original 16 Xerox copies for Bureau and one Xerox copy for each

office,

attach: photograph to each

copy and distribute by FD-432a.

Procedure for amending' infornation

on FD-432

Prepare new FD-432 incorporating necessary changes and distribute by

FD-432a.

Use FD-132a to distribute up-to-daïe photographs of

individuals includad in EPA.

e.

Procedure for deleting individuals from EPA

Submit recommendation in communication to Bureaú utilizing caption

of individual. Following receipt of Bureau approval, advise ali

offices of deletion by FD-432a.

On receint of deletion notice

remove FD-432 fIom EPA and destroy.

f.

Fugitives

FD-432 of extremist who is Bureau fugitive should not be marked

"fugitive" since Album is for identification purposes only and is

not to be used as basis for fugitive arrests.

5. [Deleted]

..:.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 413

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## Page 414

A SECTION 122. EXEMIST MATTERS. AND CIVIL UNREST

@...Infiltrativn.of.law.enfd

ment organizations

Any.

information developed

regarding extremist affiliation.on

part of high-

•ranking officers of state:police; sheriff's office, or local police depart

ments should be furnished to FBIHQ along with your recommendation as to

whether or not such information should be furnished on a confidential basis

to the governor of state or

some other appropriate local official. Consider

advising head.of. law enforcement agency whenever a subordinate is involved.

No information should be furnished to the governor of the state or other

appropriate local official and/or head of law enforcement agency without

specific prior Bureau approval.. The data furnished to such individuals

should be furnished in writing and a draft of the proposed letter must be

submitted for prior FBIHQ approval at the time of submitting your recom-

mendation.

7.

8.

In preparing information for dissemination concerning extremist affiliation

of law enforcement officers exercise care to protect informants and sources,

confine information to data reported by sources who have furnished reliable

information in the past, and do not include unfounded rumors.

In preparing

letter you should state that information is being furnished on confidential

basis in view of official responsibilities of addressee. Letter should in-

clude statement that if any action is taken as a result of information, ex-

tremist affiliation should be established by independent investigation, as

is unable to produce witnesses to testify at any hearing.

Results of investigation on extremist organizations or individuals should

be furnished locally

to Secret Service and to the local branches of

other Federal investigative agencies having a clear-cut interest.

section or, manual of instructions ior more detailed instructions

applicable to extremist investigation.)

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

(Similar instructions apply to section 87, Manual of Instructions, item C4.)

2.

General investigative guidelines

Urban guerrilla warfare concerns terrorist activities against law

enforcement and established institutions including:

"Expropriation" of property by robberies or burglaries.

Thefts of weapons, dynamite, or other materials appropriate

for bomb manufacture.

(3)

Bombings of

revolutionary-type targets, such as banks

refineries, police stations, military and government facilities.

(4)

Unprovoked attacks on and ambushes of police.

(5)

Armed attacks on police facilities.

(6) Aircraft hi jackings.

(7) Political kidnapings.

bo

(8) Action to enable revolutionary prisoners to escape from confinement.

Investigations

(1)

Purpose

(a)

their activities,

(b)

violations involved.

(c)

To assess the urban

guerrilla threat to internal security

of country.

(d)

To keep Department and other appropriate Federal and local

agencies advised on a continuing basis of these terrorists

activities.

• (2) General Policy

(a)

With occurrence of any incident containing possible or

as to be prompter ste weed to bureau were searcome cete

a separate conmunication

assessment is made as to whether or not the incident was

any way involved with extremist or revolutionary activity.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720- Page 414

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## Page 415

SECTION 1220/

-EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UNRE

122A

Io.

If

reau violation involved, one

anunication with

lon includine character for su

tantive violation.

•

followed by "Extremist Matters 'n' Possible: Urban:

Guerrilla Activities" orl"Subversive Matters]-

Violence - Possible Urban Guerrillà Activities,"

•whichever is appropriate.

:.If .no• Bureau

substantive violation apparent; but

indications

of urban guerrilla activity are present;

a new case is to be opened in the field and preliminary

inquiries instituted to determine if extremists or

revolutionaries are involved.

Bureau to be advised by

communication under a caption descriptive of incident,

including character

Guerrilla Activity i but to include "Possible Urban

(A)

Communication should set forth basis for inquiry.

(B)

Contemplated investigation should be succinctly

described.

(b)

When a significant instance of urban guerrilla activity

takes place, Bureau will instruct appropriate field office

to subnit "Incident Profile" by airtel to all offices

captioned "Urban Guerrilla Warfare, (Place and Date),

[Extremist Matters (or Subversive Matters) ]- Violence -

Incident Profile," whichever is appropriate.

I.

Part I should describe incident and include identities

of individuals involved as well as general modus

operandi.

II.

Part II

should highlight newly learned or repeated

indicators of urban guerriila warfare with appropriate

comments iu assisi ail viricis in identifjino,

investigating, and controlling urban guerrilla

III.

Offices receiving will insure indexing afforded same,

and all appropriate personnel are notified of contents.

(c) Results of investigation are to be submitted in form

suitable for dissemination on a timely basis.

I.

If Bureau violation involved, initial report should

contain character

involved as "Possible Urban Guerrilla Warfare."

Three extra copies of such reports to be submitted to

the Bureau in addition to number otherwise required.

II.

If no Bureau violation involved, submit results by LIM

under appropriate descriptive caption

and character to

include "Possible Urban Guerrilla Warfare."

Five copies

are to be submitted.

(d) Reporting and investigating police killings involved in

terrorists' acts are

to be handled also in compliance

with instructions set forth in Section 144, "Police Killings,"

of Manual of Instructions.

(3) Data to be developed

(a)

Method of operation in committing terrorist acts or criminal

activities.

(b)

Identities

of all individuals involved, determining back-

ground, extremist or revolutionary affiliations, associates,

and contacts.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 415

7

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## Page 416

122A

..?.

SạCTION 722•

TAM MA R ND CIT HANG

.(c.).

Identita

of groups or persons assisti

these terrorists

such as couriers, providing "safe houses," supplying weapons.

or. otherwise assisting:

. (d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Methods of transportation.

Communications systems and codes utilized.

Revolutionary material possessed and source of same where

possible

Furnish copies-to Burcal.

Manner in which false identification obtained and/or

utilized.

Possession of weapons and/or explosives and incendiary devices.

Determine source of same.

I.

Check NCIC, state and Federal firearms registries,

and where

possible,

institute factory tracings to

establish

source of

all weapons.

(i)

Source of funds.

Be alert to recent acts of expropriation

which may have been committed locally.

(j)

Association or affiliation with extremist or revolutionary

groups.

c.. Investigative procedures

(1)

Recovered weapons and ammunition to be submitted FBI Laboratory

for firearms identification examinations and appropriate comparisons.

(2)

(3)

Ascertain origin of items of all false identification.

Any handwriting located and/or handwriting specimens obtained

should be submitted to FBI Laboratory for comparison against that

in file of known extremists land revolutionaries.]

(4)

All latent prints obtained are to be sent FBI Identification

Division for comparison against either Black Extremist or White

Extremist certions of latent Fingerprint File.

(5)

NCIC is to be queried on all names

true identities established.

(6)

All telephone numbers utilized should be submitted to Data

(7)

Processing Section for check of Computerized Telephone Number File.

Where individual identified has not been subject of prior investi-

gation, institute investigation promptly.

(8), Check all vehicles and license plates possessed by terrorists

against NCIC and determine source.

(9)

(10)

Maintain close liaison with local authorities.

Informants

and sources must be continously targeted for development

of information concerning urban guerrilla warfare acts as they

are developed.

(11)

Preplanned acts of violence uncovered must be afforded immediate

investigation, reporting, and necessary dissemination.

(12) Deleted

d. Coordination of urban guerrilla activities

Responsibility for coordination of these matters to be placed on desk of

tield extremist supervisor in each office.

(1) Coordination will involve analysis of pertinent data received

from Bureau

and other field divisions to insure indicators of

this type of activity occurring in each division are promptly

recognized and appropriate investigation instituted.

(2)

Afford close liaison in these matters between all Agents regardless

of assignment.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 416

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## Page 417

•'o"

i.".

''.:

...il.d...

..іюї..:

SECTION 122.

EXTRE-IST MATTERS AND CIVIL UNREST

122A

(3) Maintain close Liaison with local authorities to insure urbän

•guerrilla activity is imediately referied to Bureau's attention.

9.. Statutes

Department has noted possible applicability of following statutes to

investigations

extremist. matters." These should be borne in mind

and possible violations should be promptly and vigorously investigated

and Bureau kept advised of

all developments.

Detailed discussions of

these violations appear in Manual of Instructions.

Rebellion or insurrection

Title 18, USC, $ 2383

Proscribes the inciting or engaging in any rebellion or insurrection

against authority of U.S.

(2)

Seditious conspiracy

Title 18, USC,

§2384

Proscribes conspiring to overthrow or to destroy by force the

Government of U.S. or to oppose by force the authority thereof

or by force prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law

of U.S.

(3)

Advocating overthrow of Government

(Smith Act of 1940)

Title 18, USC, § 2385

Proscribes advocacy of overthrowing Government of U. S.,

government of any state,

territory, district, or possession

hereof, or government of any political subdivision therein

by force or violence.

(4)

Activities ditching armed fundeo during was

Title 18, USC, § 2388

Proscribes making or conveying a false report with intent to

interfere with operation or success of U. S. military or naval

forces or to promote success of its enemies, or counseling

insubordination, disloyalty, or mutiny in the armed forces.

(5)

Selective Service Act

Title 50 Appo, USC

, § 462

Violations most likely to be encountered are counseling, aiding

or abetting, refusal

or evasion of any duty under the act or

regulations,

and interfering with administration of act.

(6)

Travel and interstate transportation

(a) Title 18, USC, $ 1952, covers interstate travel to commit

• (b)

Title

18, USC, § 837, covers interstate transportation of

explosives.

(7) Assault or killing of Federal officers and employees

Title 18, USC, § 111, 1114, 2231.

(8)

Destruction of Government property.

Title 18, USC, 8.1361

(9)

National

Firearms Act (Title 26, USC, §$ 5812, 5822, 5842,

5844, and 5861).

State Firearms Control Assistance Act (Title 18, USC, §§ 921-928)

Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms Statute (Title 18

App., USC, §§ 1201-1203).

(10)

Crimes on

Government reservations

Title 18,

USC, 8$ 13, 81, et al.

(11)

Antiriot

laws

Title 18, USC

$245 (b) (3),

Chapter 102 (8$ 2101-2102), and Chapter 12 (88 231-233).

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 417

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## Page 418

22A. -

•.

: 4

inition in: lin.

B.

SECTION 122

TREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL'E

10.

: (12): Conspiracy.

::"

Title 18,

USC., 8:371

Department has emphasized importance of collecting and reporting

a11 facts

concerning possible

schemes or conspiracies by any

group of whatever size,.

effectiveness; or affiliation, to plan,

or aggravate riot'activity.

(13)

(14)

Explosives and incendiary devices and bomb threats

Title 18, USC, § 844.

Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests

of the United States.

(15)

(16)

Various Civil Rights Statutes.

Hobbs Act.

(17)

Registration Act.

CHARACTER

Extremist Matters character (abbreviated EM) should be used as follows:

Organization

Extremist Matter

Individuals

Extremist Matter - BPP

• (2) John Doe

Extremist Matter - Klan

(3) John Doe

Extremist Matter - AIM

c..Unaffiliated Extremists

(1)

John Doe

Extremist Matter - Black Extremist

(3)

Extremist Matter - White Hate

John Doe

Extremist Matter - American Indian

CIVIL UNREST

1.

Responsibility of Bureau

Information concerning nationwide racial conditions and developing racial

trends is required fIom intelligence

standpoint.

Any activities on part

of individuals, groups, or organizations which present potential for

and should be reported to suretio

or other incidents are of interest

demonstrations information of this nature should be

disseminated to interested Government agencies locaily, including Secret

Service, military intelligence agencies of Army, Navy, and Air Force,

2.

Policy

Investigation should be promptly conducted when information is received

indicating possible violations have occurred within our investigative

jurisdiction; however, primary jurisdiction over riots, disturbances or

demonstrations rests with local authorities.

Following are examples of

activities within Bureau's investigative

Instances of possible civil rights violations.

b. Criminal act or conspiracy constituting possible violation of

statute within our jurisdiction (e.g, Sabotage, Theft of Government

Property).

3.

Reporting Procedures

Pertinent information obtained regarding racial developments or trends

having potential for violence should be furnished to Bureau and

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 418

---

## Page 419

SECTION 122.

"stra!'"

RENIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UN

122B

interested agencies by most timely method wairanted under circunstances.

and informants

to promptly report information

concerning any developing

situations having potential for violence.

bo

Actual or threniched riots, disturbances, or disorders by individuals

or organizations should be reported to Bureau by, teletype unless

circumstances warrant telephone call: Teletypes nced

be followed

by LIM provided

all essential details, including statistical data

regarding arrests, injuries, or property damages, can be included

teletype.

submission

of LiM is warranted, transmit by cover

airtel before close of second workday following date information was

received.

C.

Teletypes

should be prepared suitable for dissemination and

not include acininistrative data in body of communication.

references and any further action being taken under administrative

heading at end of teletype.

Specifically state in administrative

section if LIM follows.

Cite in body of teletype pertinent local

Federal agencies notified, Record in file identities of agencies and

individuals notified.

Other pertinent racial information should be submitted to Bureau

in LiM by suitable cover communication

Public source information

of unusual local or national importance should also be submitted by

• LIM, after contact with logical sources.

Furnish Bureau copy of

article from newspapers or publications containing racial information

of interest.

4.

Liaison with local law enforcement

Information received which is within primary jurisdiction of local law

onforcement authoritioo chould be promptly furnished those agenciac

together with supporting data from Bureau files wnich would be of interest

and assistance, provided Bureau sources are fully protected. Were cogent

reason exists for not furnishing local law enforcement agency information,

such as possibility of jeopardizing informant, furnish facts to Bureau.

Include your comments and recormendations for use of trustworthy inter-

mediaries to advise local authorities.

5.

Civil Unrest

Rumors of possible civil unrest or disorder should be immediately traced

to original source, where possible, to determine validity of allegation.

Contact other sources and informants to determine if information can be

substantiated.

6.

Where mob violence or rioting is threatened or erupts, immediately:

a. Establish liaison with appropriate city and state officials.

b. Furnish specilic assignments to informants who could aid in furnishing

pertinent information concerning causes or individuals responsible

for mob violence or riot.

Determine and furnish to Bureau and appropriate local agencies

identities of individuals or organizations responsible for such

activities.

do Keep Bureau advised of developments by teletype or telephone.

e. Furnish daily teletype summary.

7. [Semiannuallassessment of potential

for violence in civil protest activity

In view of the possibility of civil disorders occurring in various types

of protest activity, it is essential that the Bureau be fully aware

of trouble spots where violence is most likely to erupt. This will

require the maintenance of close contact with police officers.

informants, and other sources for information revarding simificant

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 419

---

## Page 420

22B

8.

9.

SECTION 122

TREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UT

devetopments which may have a bearing.on. the potential. for violence in

civil.protest

activity.

In order for the Bureau to be

currently

knowledgeable of the overall civil unrest situation and the potential

trouble spots, each office will submit on al semiannuallbasis an

"asses shen't

of the potential for violence in its division.

The quality of the

ässessment. will be no better than the quality of sources (extremist,

criminal, and security) who are contacted.

Informant programs

should be keyed to produce the results needed to discharge our

responsibilities.

Theseniannuallassessment should be submitted in

the form of an LIM to reach the bureau by the fifth day of April

and

OctoberJof each year.

CLASSIFICATION - 157

CHARACTER AND TITLE.

Title of case should be descriptive of activities involved followed

by character "Civil Unrest."

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 420

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## Page 421

OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

TABiE OF CONTENTS

PART I

SECTION I. CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES

IA. Misconduct..

B.

Confidential Nature of FBI Operations.

SECTION 2.

DELETED

SECTION 3.

EMPLOYEE INDOCTRINATION PROCEDURES

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Noninvestigative Personnel at FBIHQ..

Noninvestigative Field Office Employees

Investigative Employees.

Oath of Office....

Forms Executed by New Employees.

Information Panphlets Furnished

Special Indoctrination Services.

to New Employees.

SECTION 4. LEAVE - PREMIUM COMPENSATION

A. Leave..

B. Premiun Compensation

for Irreguiar, bascheduled

Overtime..

C. Wage Board Employees

SECTION 5. PERFORMANCE RATINGS

A.

B.

c.

D

Official and Administrative Ratings.

Adjective Ratings....

Preparation of Rating...

Deleted

Dictation Ability of Agents..

F.

G.

SECTION 6. PROMOTIONS

Initialing Performance

Ratings...

Review and Appeal of Performance

Ratings.

A. Clerical Placement and Promotion Policy.

B.

Special Agent Promotions.

c.

D.

Special Employee Program.

Radio Personnel Promotion

Policy..........••

E.

Coordination of Promotions

Incentive Awards.

Within-Grade Increases..

G.

Special Clerk Program..

Page

2

8]

17

26

13

13

13

10

11

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 421

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## Page 422

[

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

SECTION 7.

SELECTION OF SUPERVISORS

A.

B.

Special Agent Field Supervisors.

Clerical Supervisory Program.

SECTION 8.

TESTS

A. Clerical

Testing...

B.

Deleted

Foreign Language Tests.

D.

E.

Grading of

Tests.....

Deleted

..

G.

-H.

Instructions

for Affording Stenographic and Typing.

Tests........

. ..

' ... .

in Grading Bureau Steno-

I.

graphic Tests...

Rules To Be Followed

in Grading Bureau Iyping Tests.

Rules To Be Followed in Grading Bureau Teletype-

writer Tests....

SECTION 9. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Introduction..

of Bureau upon Receipt

of Misconduct or Improper Performance of Duty.

Investigation.....

Interviews of Employees Involved.

Reporting.....

.... s0?0

Allegatións Made By Individuals Outside the Bureau..

Suspension Without Pay...

Handling of Resignation Tendered During Personnel

SECTION 10. APPEALS AND GRIEVANCES

SECTION 11.

A. Introduction..

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Performance Ratings...

Position Classifications

Veterans' Appeal Rights

Salary Retention Act..

Within-Grade Increases.

Equal Employment Opportunity.

EX-SERVICEMEN'S RIGHTS AND SELECTIVE SERVICE AND

MILITARY RESERVE MATTERS

A.

B.

C.

D

E.

F.

G.

Introduction...

Veterans' Counselor

Appointment..

Separation,

Furlough,

and Reinstatement

Adverse Personnel Actions.......

Exceptions to Eligibility

for Veterans,

Preference Rights.

Advancement..

Military Leave.

Other Rights...

Selective Service and Military Reserve. Matters.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 422

2

12-27-73

Page

[1]

1a

2-3

5

6

4a.

5

5

---

## Page 423

'90s.

i.:=

..:

OF RULES AND

REGULATIONS

TABLE OF: CONTENTS:

[

[

[

SECTION 1.2.

TRANSFERS - RESIGNATIONS

A.

B.

Transfers.

Resignations..

Exit Interviews{(FBIHQland Field).

SECTION 13. AUTOMOBILE OPERATOR AND ACCIDENT MATTERS

1s.

B.

Motor Vehicle Operator Regulations.

Traffic Violations.

C.

Accidents....

D.

Use of Personally Owned

Automobiles for Official

Business After Regular Duty Tours....

SECTION 14. SERVICES AVAILABLE IO EMPLOYEES

A. Housing| (FBIHO)]....

B.

Housing

(Field).

C.

Bureau-Approved

Recreational Associations (Field)

D. Training Opportunities for Clerical Employees

[(FBIHO)]............

E.

F.

Literature...........

Recognition

Awaras...

.........•... •

employee compensation litters

(Feudiad Emplojoos"

Compensation Act.......

... .

H. FBI Health Service....

I.

J.

K.

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program..

Deleted

Deloted

Volunteer Blood Donors.........:.

M1.

N.

0.

P.

0.

Federal Employees' Group

Insurance..

Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees..

Federal Safety Council.

Charity Campaigns...

Payroll Matter - Voluntary Allotments to Financial

Organizations.......

SECTION 15. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT - SOCIAL SECURITY

A. Introduction....

B.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Application for Retirement

Types of Retirement...

Annuities.....

........

Survivor Annuities....

Benelits upon Separation.

Deductions; Purchase of

Service (Deposit

Redeposit

.......

H. Reemployment of Annuitants by Government

I.

J.

Designation of Beneficiary....

Social Security......

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 - Page 423

":

Page

1

4

10

UNH

3a

4

4

9

11

11b

13

15

16

17

17

17

10

---

## Page 424

[

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL MATTERS

SECTION 17•

A. Personnel Status Form - FD-285.

Bo. Changes in status...

C.

Vocation Records

FD-287 and FD-287a.

D.

Personnel Files (Field)...

E.

Physical Program.

.F.

Availability of Doctors and Nurses

G.

Outside Employment....

F.

Oda-Hour Shifts...

I ..

Work Permits (FBIHQ)

J.

K.

Tours of Duty of Women

Minors......

List of Assigned and Unassigned Stenographers

(FBIHQ) .....

M.

N.

0.

Computation of Clerk-Agent Ratio.

Stenographic Delinquency.....

Firearms Training of Noninvestigative

Employees.

Service Records, Credit Inquiries, and,

Inquiries Directed to Employees.

P. Rest Periods - Vending Machines

Designation of Beneficiary.

R.

Lost Government Checks.

EMPLOYEE CLAIMS FOR LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO

PERSONAL PROPERTY

A. Scope....

B.

Claimants..

C.

Conditions..

D.

Principal Types of Claims Allowable

E.

Principal Types of Claims Not Allowable

F.

Types and Quantity of Property.....

Ge

Computation of Awara and Finality of jettlement.

H.

Claims Procedure..

I..

Evidence in Support of Claim

J.

Settlement......

[SECTION 18. CIVIL SUITS INVOLVING FBI PERSONNEL

A. Initial Handling••

Secondary Handling.•

C. Continuing Responsibility...

. ""

...

...

•*.

....

•'.

....

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 424 •

.. :.

Page

]

. a

3

3b

7

8

9

9

10

4]

---

## Page 425

OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS®

"PART IT

SECTION 1•

AUTHORITY - TRAINING - SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION

A.

B.

C.

Authority.

Training Programs.•.•

Submission of Information.

Copyright..

SECTION 2• SUPERVISION - AVAILABILITY - RESIDENT AGENCIES

Ao

C.

Supervision...

Availability of Employees.

Resident Agencies and Resident Agents.

SECTION 3. ADMINISTRATION OF OFFICES

A. Appearance and Maintenance of Offices

B.

Maintenance of Systems.

C.

Index Systems.

. . .

D.

Administration of Files.

E.

Administration of Cases..

F.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) -

Administration of Cases..

SECTION 4. COMMUNICATIONS

A.

Definitions of Communications.

B.

General Reporting Rules..

C.

Reporting Information That May Become Testimony

D. Cover Page(s) and Investigative Reports.

* E.

Letters......

F.

Letterhead and Blind Memoranda

Go

H.

Teletypes and Airtels..

Telegrams....

I.

CW Radio Network...

J.

Routing Slip, FD-4.•

K.

Deleted

Lo

SAC Memorandums (formerly SAC Letters)

, ...

Mo

Regulations Applicable to All Written Communications.

N.

Codes.....

0.

Reproduction of Material..........

P.

Correcting Errors in Communications.

Qo

FM Two-Way Radio.........

Ro

Telephone.....

- ? ? 66666

S.

Approval of Communications Facilities.

T.

Mailing List of Field Divisions:.....

U.

National. Crime Information Center (NCIC) Terminal....

V.

Facsimile Communications..

SECTION 5. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

A. Responsibility........

B. Basis for Dissemination......

C. Information To Be Disseminated.....

D. Dissemination of Information in Answer to a

Specific Request....

Bo

Requests for Information

on Costs.........•

P. Major Cases - Dissemination of Information...

[

IGo Threat to Life - Dissemination of Information..

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 425

5

10 a7

...

""i-

Page

1

1

12

12

7a

1

4

15d

31

1

1a

4

7

28

33a

36

47

47

50a.

51

51

5

8

60

60

63

63

67

67

67

68

1

6

12

13

13]

---

## Page 426

8 6 9 6242 19209 600%2

AL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

:!.:

• PART II.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

Ao

[

C.

D.

E.

F.

Go

H.

1.

J.

K.

Lo

Mo

No

Press Policy ...

???699

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

Speeches.....••

Interesting Case Write-Ups...

Circular Letters,

Trade and Business Publications.

Radio[and Television]Broadcasts.

Field Office Lists.

Information To Be Furnished to the Bureau.

Visits to Field Offices.

Miscellaneous.....

Sources of Information.

SAC Contacts..

News Media Contacts....

Bureau-Wide Information Program Regarding

Matters of National Interest.

SECTION 7. PAYMENTS - PROPERTY

A. Travel Expense - Transportation Allowances

Transportation of Household Effects.

C. Government Shipments...

D. Contracts.•

E.

Supplies, Materials, and Equipnent.

F.

Automobiles.....

' . ' s...

Go Payment for Services and Goods.

H. Imprest Funds..

I.

Inventories...

........

*J.

Authority to Approve Limited Expenditures for

Investigative Operations.

SECTION 8. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS

...

A.

Concerning Clerical Functions.

B. Concerning Investigations and Interviews

Co Court Appearance and Testimony of Agents:

Freedom of Information Act

Photographs......•

•Go

Ho

I.

Retention of Property..

Forms......

Obscene Matter.....

Signed Statements, Unsigned Written Statements,

and Evidence..

Jo

Ko

Lo

M.

Inventions...

Review of Briefs Filed With Circuit Court of Appeals..

Research Monographs...•

Recording Outside Contacts

Cinal Letter....

0.

Artist's Conceptions......

P.

Legal Instruction - State Legislation - Legal Problems.

Qo Threats Against Informants or Witnesses - Protection

and Maintenance of Informants and Witnesses..

R.

Is.

National Bomb Data Center (NBDC) •

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)

SECTION 9. CLASSIFICATION - CHARACTER - COPIES - ABBREVIATIONS.•••

INDEX

MW: 54969- Doc/d:32989122 Page 426

6

Page

1

2

2a

2a

За

За

5

5c

5c

9

10

1

9

17

17a

18

20a

22

2,5

33

36

22

22

22

23

24

25

27

2,7

28

29

30]

1

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JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENTS

-NW 54989-Docid:32989720-Rage-427

ENCLOSURE

602-1164611

-59

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fire,

February 23; 1949

Subject:

Dezimitation of Investigative Duties of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

Office of Nawal Intelligence, the

Intelligence Division of the

Arnys and

the Office of Special Investigations,

Inspector cineral Cord alre the

The. Agreenent

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Office

of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence

Division of the Army: and the Office of

Special Investagatzens, Inspector General,

U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the

prestocat's Menorandum ci June 26, 19392 as augmented by his

Direcrive of saprember os 1959, The Dezimitations Agreement o1

Februy 9, 1942: and the Presidential Directive of October 30,

194%.

In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions

MaeLgY ACL DI 1940, and the SpEcilic appLICaLlOI

o1 Ina. Act is set forth in Sestion II hereof.

All other prom

visions of this Agreenem are apart

from and

have no relation to

the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Ast. In view of the.

above, it is mi agreedthat responsibility for the investigation

of all activirios coming under the categories of espionage,

counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred

to as

"these raregories") will be delimited as indicated herein-

field carries with it the obiigation to exchange freely and

responsibilliy is unable for any reason to produce material in

that field desired by the subscribing agenciess such special

arrangments as may be legal or desirable will be worked out

through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by

another agency's fieid. It is recognized by the

subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army

has dicentralized such functions ts its major subordinate commanders.

When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the

Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter

will be referica

to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for

further negotiations at the national. level. Close cooperation

and coordination between the four subscribing urganizations. is

a mutually recognized necessity.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 428

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•cop inc.

'"i"

i:'is:

II. FBI will be resi

sible for:

1: 1lT investigations of cases in these: categories: involving

civilians and

foreign nationals of all classes in the continental

United States: Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of

Harajiki, and

the State of

Alaska" except as specifically described

hercinafter in Paragraph Y, -Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Encroy Act

of 1940.

There are no territorial or personnel limitations on

this provision.

3..

The coordination of the investigative activities of

civillan agencies In the Unated States, Puerto Rico, the

VIrgin IsLands!

and the state of Alaska except as specifically

described hereinatter in Paragraph Y, Section 5, Which provide

information regarding subversive movements and activities

in

these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of

Important developments in these categories within its cognizance,

particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed

service, including the National Guard.

Do Developments affecting plants engaged in armed

forces contracts.

C.

Developments

concerning the strength, composition,

and intentions of civilian groups within its

cognizance which are classed as subversive and

whose activities are a potential danger to the

security of the United States.

à. Developments affecting those vital facilities and

vital utilities which have been designated by the

Secretary of Defense.

Developmerts affecting critical points of trans-

portation and communications systems which have

been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

*Iditorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood

of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

in:

*Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the

IIC on September 9, 1959.

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III. D, Army will be responsible for:

1.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving active

and retired military personnel of the Army.

The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these

categories involving civillan employees of the army in the

United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees of the army stationed in

areas other than the united States, suer investigations as have

VirgIn Islands, except that part of

ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the

Virgin Islands.

4.

The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the

other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander

has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein,

including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico

and

the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any

important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsibie foe:

• 1.. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these cate-

gories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

The disposa., but

categories involving civilian empioyees of the Navy in the

not investigation, of all cases in these

United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3.. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving civilian emplcyees of the Navy stationed in

•ramifications

ere co, or he targar stands-

The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the

other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander

nas supreme jurisdiction over the armed

forces stationed therein,

Including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and

the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described

in Section 5, below.

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r..

.".s;

"!:

5. The investigation of all

cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other

subscriving organizations and with the exception of civilian employees

of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak

Aldutds Chasent to the Alasia Peninsula and Adals Island in the

6. Inferming the other subscribing organizations of any

important developments.

7o Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office A special Triest ations, The ector ceneral,

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these cate-

gories involving active and retired military personnel of the

Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases ir

these categories involving civilian employees of the alr force

in tne niteú sidies, Fuerio nico, and the vligin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed

in areas other than the United. States, Puerto Rico, and the

virgin Islands, except thai part of such investigations as have

ramIfIcatIons in the United

states, Puerto Rico, or the

Virgin Islands.

1. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are

not employees of the

other subscribing organizations, in areas

where the Air Force

Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces

stationed therein, inciuding possessions of the United States

other than Puerto

Rico and the Virgin Islands.. The investigation

of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska

described in sections;

below, with the exception of civilian

employees of the executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the

Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

- 4 -

#This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of

September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 431

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northwest to the town of old Illamna and thence following the wey

south shore of. Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak

Bay : (2)

in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding

Kodiak and Afoynak Islands inich are the responsibility of the

Office of Naval intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding

Adak Island which is the, responsibility of the Office of Naval

Intelligence; and (4) in

the Fribilof Islands."

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any

important developments.

7.

Advising the Foderal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the piants engaged in Air Force

contracts.

VI. 1.. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial

coverage, responsibilary for such coverage will pass from one

element of the armed foroes to another automatically when a

change of command responsibilly ensues.

This provision is

subject to nodification by dizuct agreement between the interested

elements of the arnod forces.

2. While invesiagative jurisdiction over the civilian

populace in former enemy iescicorios occupied by the

armed forces

has been provzded

for in Secrions IlI, IV, and y above, those

provisions are subject to direct adjustmont with the Department

of State if and when that Doptment assones governmental

direction in such arcas of occupation.

VIl. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of

changing conditions

So nodify or amend this Delimitations

Agreement. Subject

" the exceptions already provided for

above, general ameramnis or modifications involving all of the

four subscribing

organizations shall be issued in the form of a

revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant

armed forces interest not invoiving martial law, when agreed upon

by the subscribing

agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B,

nereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two

or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations

Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

=5 -

#Original paragraph changed.

See IIC Working Committee Minutes of

• September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

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'to,

•closure?:

7708

TS: 24-208633

now or hereafter mutually entered. into by any of the subscribers

thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become

supplements to the delimitations Agreement, and distributed

only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed)

S. leroy Irwin

Director or intelligence.

Department of the Army

(Signed)

Thomas B. Inalis

Chiei oi Naval Intelligence

(Signed)

J. Edgar Hoover

Director, federal Bureau of Investi-

gation

(Signed)

Joseph F. Carroll

Director,. OuTice of Special Investi-

fations, Inspector General, U. S. Air

. • :

APPROVED

6

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betton.

14228:

102210

..

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

It is further agreed that when a state of martial. law has

been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will

.assume_responsibilities.for. coverage in these categories.

HiS

authority to direct and

control the subscribing agencics of the

armed forces will be linited only by such instructions as he

may receive from

I the Secretary of Defense.

He will have authority

to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing

in his area of responsibility, within the limits of

their available personnel and facilities, by. the assignment of

missions, the designation of objectives,

and the exercise of

such coordinating control as he deems necessary.

He is not

authorized to control the administration or discipline of the

subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibillly, nor to

issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes

stated ahnvec.

II.

Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsi

bility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to

and be under the continued supervision of their respective head

quarters.

They will

render such aid and assistance to the armed

forces commander and his designated representatives as are

possible and practicabie. They will furnish all pertinent informa-

tion, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or

desirable to the armec

forces commander by the most expeditious

means ana methods possible consistent with requisite security.

Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be

advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately

identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 434

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:!:

i: in oh

APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY

INTERESTS:

NOT INVOLVING MARTINE LAW

1.

In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as

potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander

of such a potential theater Is designated, he definitely nas

interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the

area.

In order that the armed. forces commander.may prepare him-

self for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may

affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the

Air

Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI,

IG,

provisions of sections II, III, IV, and V. .

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take

steps to analyze the facilities existing.and to explore the

manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law

is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies

will insure

that the armed forces commander will have the henetit

of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives

of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and

receive such information from the other three agencies as he may

desire and they may be able to furnish.

:.

II.

The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the

coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any

additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When

jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally

coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies,

the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority

from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations

have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces

commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such

a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken,

it should be so recommended.

- 11-

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 435

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painine pot niece

coold od1 1000, daid, or :3i

Supplemental Agreement Nc.

i: -

La the Detentarions Marcement

Cooperation and Coordination Between

The Federal y

The Iner dance Division or ina rmy

The orton or laval. Intellinonce anu

The office of Spectar Inest cations, Inspudior loneral, U:S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director

of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

the Director of Naval

Intelligence and the Director. of the Office of Special Investi-

gations, inspector cereras. Uou. Air force, with a vIew to

promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination

between the Fieid Services of these agencies agree that the

following reccmmendations will be transmitted to their field

(a) Special Agents in Chargé of the Federal Bureau of

• Investigation Divisionai Offises, Military Intelligence Officers

of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of

Special Investigations,

Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and

Naval Distriot Intelligonce Officero wiil maintain close porsonal

liaison

I betreen those

offices

and their representatives, incluaing

a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the

officers in charge, at least twice per month, for

the purpose of

discussing pending and contempiated

investigative activities, and

any other subjest necessary to insure that there is proper co-

ordination of their investigative work.

• (b) The close personal liaison to be maintained

between representatives of the four agencies at all times should

insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and

that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is main-

taptication in connection with the use of informers.

Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the

investigative interest of irdividual agencies and the coverage

from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in

order to insure that all channeis of interest and avenues of

information are adequately covered by at least one of the partici-

pating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the

other agencies is interested in information collected, it should

be transmitted to the other agency.

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at tastill mine, i

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain

classes of

information are of general interest to the Military,

Naval, and

Air Force Intelligence services in connection with

background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations,

even

though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence

Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature

occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that

with proper personal. liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily

adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various

divisional

organizations.

• (Approved by I. I.C. June

2; 1949).

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Supplemental Agreement No.

the Delinitations Arreement

(As Amenged June 8, 1950)

Investigâtive Jurisdiction on

Vessels of alitary

sea transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities

under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion

and sabotage on vessels of the Military sea Transportation service

is as follows:

a.

Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased

by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval

Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat

charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the office

of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation

gemice which ane manned and

superriced by their private ornors

are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an

investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port

where the FBI has a field

agency

or prior to reaching such

port,

if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish

the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation.

If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove

themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and

further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will

continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level

that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility

upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above

or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed

about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI

will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and

will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and

wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 438

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...d.

upplemental scecment no.

to

the bormlintions Agrcement

Invostigation of Private Contractors

of The Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations.

Agreement (hereinafter referted to as subscribers) that with

reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for

employment. directors and key personnel of privately owned plants

and facilities, working or bidding in contracts. important to the

Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed

Forces procurement, the foilching will be followed insofar as

practicabie.

exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual

agreement between the subscilters concerned. .

a.

The Armed Forces will conduct background

investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason

for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or

press atten

the FBI has a special. interest in a particular case and

has

notified the Armed Forces of such incerest.

-...

b. The FBI will conduci complaint investigations

of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or

more of

• the Armed Forces.

It one of ihe Armed Forces has no

further need for an investigation souwested, but not completed,

prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces

under a above will be terminated and all information passed to

the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature

is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed

as under b above if one of the Armed forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that

another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm

identical or closely connected with

a person or firm it

contemplates investigating, no investigation will be under-

taken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investi-.

gation in progress.

The

investigating agency will make available

to the other interested ageney copies of the reports of the

investigation made.

.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants

will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however,

when such communication

occurs, the receiving subscriber will

employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants

are not compromised.

do transmittal of information concerning

confidential

intormants to a

third

subscriber or to another agency

is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 439

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1 • i .

xi santi

A subscriber who receives a report of investi-

gation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such

reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received

by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the

approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background intorma-

cion. in such case, the fbi will be turnished copies of all

IntormacIon obtained. Other information required by the Armec

Forces will be requested of the FBI.

n. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI

to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation

as provided under I above, and if for any reason the FBI declines

or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investi-

gation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investi-

The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof

da the FBI so requests or if the armed force concerned considers

the results to be of FBI interest.

i.

Nothing above is to be construed as altering

the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements

concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C: June 2, 1949)

?? i

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suppicmental Aarcement No

to the Delinitations agrechent

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian

Components of the Armea services

'It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations

Agrocment that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct

background investigations on members of the inactive reserve

and lational Guard who are anticipated

being called back to

active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the

purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled

fron his military status, or to determine whether the individual

may be granted access to classified military information. The

following procedures shall be pursued in each. of the above

circumstances:

(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or

Air Force before

undertaking such

background

investigation will consult the FBI to

determine:

(a) if the FRI has an investication

in progress; if so, no investigation will

be undertaken by the intelligence agencies

except as may be mutually agreeable to the

Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) 1f

the FBI already has made an invesiigation;

the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has

the results will be made avallable to

information on the individual, even though

it may not have conducted an investigation.

(2) If,

after consulting the FBI, investigation is

undertaken by the other agencies, it will be

pursued no further than is necessary to make

the determination required by the other agencies,

and all information developed pertinent to the

four categories will be furnished promptly to.

the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 441

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i?":

Supplemental Agreement No. VI

to the velimitations Adreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the

Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in

paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the

Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction

over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted

as referring to areas where the department of the Army

Air Force) is responsible for

logistic support of the deadquarters

the administrative and

of Commands established

by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

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in dirpig, Plouse Befer 80

Elle No.

SUINGEON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1905

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGRICY

OPERATIONS IN TIE UNITZO STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any

foreign official in the United States without the concuriere

and cooidination of the IDI. In this context, the torm

"investigation" means systematic and dircci inquiries o

pioceduros (such as physical or technical surveillances

or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information

:,=: concornity an individual's activities or background;

-"investigation" does not include the acceptance or the

..development of information thiough social contacts or contac=s

_normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover

functions.

(2) CIA:

will sent concurrence and coordination of

the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign

official or communist-bloc visitor

in the United States.

The Fbi will concur and coordinute it the proposca ace-o-

does not conflict with any operation, curient or plannea,

including active investigation of the rBI..

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned

meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or

communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to

the FBI (this would include all connunist-bloc officials

and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social

development.

(1).. Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic

American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of clA

recruited

abroad tho come to the

United States vill be identified o

the FBI by name or appropriate desciiption depending on

the national security interest involved.

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 1 above, when a CIA agent

arrives

in the United States for a visit or for an

SECRET

GROUP 1

Excluded fron automatic

dorgaading and

declassification

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page/443

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SECRAT

Central. Intclligence Agency

/ Operations in the United States

assignment, the Burcau will be advised and the two agencies

will confcr regarding the handling of the agent in the

United States.

It is recognized that cach case will have

its individurl peculiaritics.

The zoverning principle fill

be positive intelligence interest as weighed agrims

internal

sccurity

-factorS.

CIA Will ContinuC itS

contractual relationship for the purpose of handling

the training, the procurement of positive.

• forcign

intelligence,

the fulfillment of CIA commitments to

the agont; and the preparation of the agent for his

next assignment abroad.

•(6) In those cases there CIA will be handling its.

agent in the United States,

CiA will service BI

security

or counterintelligence icquirements and will provide the

FBI all agent information bearing on countcrinielligence

or internal security matters, including the scope and

nature of the ugeut's

i access

to informatzon and the

identities of the agent's significant contacis, particularly

in the communist-bloc ficld.

In such cases where CIA

servicing has been inadaquate to FBI internal. security

interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent,

.....

2

SECRET

NW 54969_Docld:32989720 Page 444

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INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINIES

TITLE XI, ORCARIZED CRIKE CONTROL ACT OF 1970

REGULATIONN OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

•Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United

States Code, by adding a now chapter 40 with section numbers 9il

through 848 governing

the importation, manufacture, distribution

ane storage of explosive raterials and creating certain Federal

ortenses pertaining to the linlawful use of explosives.

Administration

of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury

as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed

Under authority contained in saccion 845 the

federal Bureau of Investigation (FBl) and the Bureau of Alconol:

Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investicative jurisdic-

tion as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.es, the unlawful acts

proscribed in subscctions (e)s (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section

844. Although not suecifica in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection,

Servico shall have jurisdiction iù investigaie ait

incidenis

involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails

or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal auchority pertaining to

explosives-connected offenses.

At the same time, Congress has

expressly disclalred any. intent to occupy the field to the exclusion

of state law on the same subject matter.:

To effect both Congressional

purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is

essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carafully

allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATf and the FBI

have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investiration (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies

only to those incidents as to nich the Ful had no investigative

jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to

incidents previously sunject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter

65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative

procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging

aircraft and notor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

NW 54969. Docld:32989720 Page 445

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-2 -

(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions

hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged

violations of section 814 which are directed at foreign diplomatic

facilities or at activities: such as transportation and tourist

offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although

not in a diplomatic status, over all alleyed violations of suesections

844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolucionary

groups or inuividuals and all other violations of subsections die a

through (s) which are not direcied at Treasury Department or Postal

Service buildings or functions.

• (c) Type of Investigation to be Corducted

(1) Offenses pernetrated by terrorist/revolutionary

grouns or individuals - The Ful will immediately inttiate a full

investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 nich appear

at the outset to have bein perpetratod by terrorist/revolutionary

yiuuus üi indivinuals no dafined in aurance by the Indorar Gocurity

Division of the Departnent of Justice. If ATF or the Postal

Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and infor

mation is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of

terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall

be relinquished to the fol unless a caterination is made by the

Department of Justice that a transfer of resconsibilities w711

unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleres and Universities -

The FBI will inmediately initiate a

full investigation of any alleged

violation of section 844 which involves the use or attenpted use of

explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the

facilities of a college or university.

Investigation' of alloged viola-

tions involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be

limited initially to the development of background information as

prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleued offenses directed against foreian

diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FbI will imediately

initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844

which are directed at foreign diploratic facilities and related

activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720. Page 446

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## Page 447

- 3 -

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection

844(f) -- offenses involvin use of explosives against United

States pronerty or renorally financed cranizations?

and (9) -

offenses involvins possession of exulosives in buildings auned,

leased,

used,

Ty the linited States - The ful with irmediatcly

initiate a full investication of all violations of subsection 8441g)

over lärich it has prinary jurisdiction hercunder,

and those violations

of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military

facility, or a federal function (e.f.,

a Salective Sarvice or ROTC

facility).

In other violations of 844(f) the FbI will develop and

disseminate background infornation as indicated in paragraph o below.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearis Division (ATF) Jurisdic-

tion in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearns laws violations or

violation of section 042 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Fireams Division

(ATF) of the lepartment of the Treasury will exercise investicative

jurisdiction over violations of section 244 which are ancillary to its

primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearns laws or over, section.

842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transporta-

tion of exnlosives mith unlavful intent and subsection 244(1) -

offenses arainst property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to

paragraon zo, above,

the ATF will exercise primary investigativa

jurisdiction over violations of subsection 5a4(d and (1 and will

conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal

Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of

Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular mauter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department progerty or

functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiccion to investigate all

violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Departient

property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such

violations.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 447

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## Page 448

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary juris-

diction to investigate all violations of section 844 which

directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 804kg)) -

The AlF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction

over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or

postal service property or functions, respectively.

The FBI shall

have iurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon

receipt of information allering or suggesting a violation of subsection

844(e), the investicative agency concerned

will review available

information to determine whether the identity of the offender is

known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence

suggeses a pattern or pian of such offenses by a parcicuiar urfomier

or against a particular victim.

If such a patter appears or if the

offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated

as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony

(section 844(b)) - Violations of 344(h) should be handled as an

adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed

with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the

Department handling prosecution of the underlying feicny offense.

The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will havé

investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank

robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.G. 5861 (destructive devices. -

In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.c. 844. (which

may also involve a violation of 20 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not

exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving

destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance

with the provisions of these guidelines.

This is in no

. way a

relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title

Il of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 448

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## Page 449

- 5 .

6. Development of background Information

Soire incidents such as those directed against Federal

property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full

federal investigation.

Others require a more circumspect approach

and will resuli in full Federal irvestigation only after considara-

Lion of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe

immediate full investigation, the investigative ayency having juris-

diccion will develop background information which includes (a) facts

bearing oh. motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators

in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organizad crine, labor-managerent

disputes, 'or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability

of state

and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigativa

and prosacutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating

inether or not the offense warrants federal investigation and prosecu

such background inforation will be submitted telephonically

(202-739-2745) or by teletype (719-322-0003) to the General Crimes

Section ne the Criminal Divisten and to the appropriate Unrood riates

Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency

concerned whether the matter varrants submission to any other

Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted

the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other

Division or Section.

%. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in

those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In

ocher instances full investigation will be initiated only upon

direc-

tion of the Departmani of Justice after consideration by the Division

having cognizance over the matter of the background information

developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under

these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice

and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 449

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## Page 450

-....

• shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Departrent

of Justice and shall subiit progress reports once each 30 days or

as soon thereafter as possible.

The Criminal Division of the

Department of Justice will be inforted as soon as possible in each

instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation

Such notification is of critical importance to

the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each

agency subscribing to these guidelines siall, upon instituting inves-

tigation regarding possible violations of section

244, lumediately

notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein.

Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall

be maintained to avoid duplication of investigativa effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information

on a tinaly basis and in a manner which will not interfere with

ongoing investigations relative to types, sources; movement, and

storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations.

Information regarding significant developments in investigations

being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelli-

gence nature doveloped incidental to investigationo which is of logical

Interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to

the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible

for any necessary further dissemination within, that Department.

9. Revier, of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by

the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their admin-

istration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of

the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law

enforcement.

10. Summary

Section

842

• Type Violation

Regulatory provision viola-

tions

Primary Jurisdiction

ATF

844(d)

Interstate transportation

(except by mail) of explosives

with unlawful intent

ATF

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 450

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## Page 451

• 7.

Section

844(e)

844(f)

844 (g)

...

844 (h)

Type Violation

Bomb threats - false infor-

mation - Treasury buildings

or functions

U.S. Postal Service buildings

or functions

Other

Offenses against proporty of

the United States or federally

financed organizations -

Treasury buildings on functions

U.S. Postal Service buildings

Other (including colleges and

universities)

Possession of explosives in

buildings ouned, leased, used

by the United States -

Treasury buildings or functions

U.S. Postal Service buildings

or functions

Other

Use/carrying explosives in

commission of a felony

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 • Page 451

:.

Primary Jurisdiction

ATF

U.S. Postal

Inspection Service

FBI

ATF

U.S. Postal

Inspection Service

FBI

ATF

U.S. Postal

Inspection Service

FBI

Agency having juris-

diction over underlying

felony

---

## Page 452

=8-

Section

844(1)

All Sections

Type Violation.

Primary Jurisdiction

Offenses against property

used in or affecting commerce

ATF

All offenses perpetrated by

FBI - Unless another

terrorist/revolutionary groups. agency has started

or individuals

investigation before

receipt of information

indicating terroris:/

revolutionary involve ent.

In this event see para

graph 2c(1) above.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 452

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## Page 453

...

AGREENENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES

• SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES

SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement.

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from

Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective

responsibilitias.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain

activities to protect, the President and certain other persons.

(Certain

other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected

by the Secret

Service under Titie 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The

authority of

the USSS to protect the President of certain other persons is

construed

to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to

interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or cer-

tain other persons.

The FBI has statutory

authority to investigate assault,

killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the

President and other designated individuals.

: "The FBI will make available to the USSS information it mey seguest di iníve-

mutiûn visicis by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the

safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective pro-

tection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear

• division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS.

Such division

also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplica-

• tion' of effort.

"II:. General Responsibilities

with the

the United

•States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the vice

in to vice

President or other officer in

the order of

succession to the office of

President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former

President

and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a

ormer President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a forme

• President until they reach 16 years of age, unless

such protection is declined;.

protecting persons

who are determined from

of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as

major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such

protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting

the at the did cison ne hee resident one destinguished love me visitors

to the United States and official representatives of the United States

i performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 453

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## Page 454

ta..

*The Executive Protective

vice, under the control of th

director,

USSS, is charged by Title

3, U. S. Code,

Section 202, with protection

the Exccutive Mansion and grounds in the District of

of

Columbia; any building

in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions

located in the metropolitan

arca of the District of Columbia; and foreign

diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United

States, its

territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis,

may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investiga-

cive jurisdiction over the assault,

killing or kidnaping, and

attempts or

conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of

the United States

and. other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations

U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating

to the Act

of Title 10'for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests

in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of

the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction

over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

• "The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their

propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the

United States and certain other

To assist the USSS in identifying

such individuals

and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information

¡vince inau pubii source information or information originating wien otner

U.S. agencies, from its files or which may cone to its attention which by

its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain

other persons, or which can be

construed as falling within the categories of

information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations

who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating,

abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of over-

throwing

or destroying the Government of

ment of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision

therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of

any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such

individuals or organizations as requested.

During investigation by the FBI

of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly

notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the

person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or

groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of

the United States without notifying the FBI.

However, when time for

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 'Page 454

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## Page 455

. i.

consultation is

not available, and an indication

ot

immediate danger

the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carry-

ing out its protective responsibilities.

Any information obtained by the

USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as

possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely

for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the

statue ve mich the hat a an elop, see on 75 her othen indica

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investiga-

tion is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and theze-

after to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as

they are prepared.

It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish

the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention

which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code,

Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession.

or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other

statutes

over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction..

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of

Istle 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take

cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department

under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, Ua So Code at k

and tino dues

not limit vi

interfero with the authority of the

the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities.

This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction

with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals

•or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security inclu

ing terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or

insurrection,

sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign

Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to

national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for

any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities

must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in

order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of

the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by

the Federal Bureau Di Investigation

available:

NW 54969 Docld:32989720' Page 455

....

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## Page 456

"Individua

Identification data includin;

Sume or names,

addresses,

tograph (or statement as to

ilability of

such), phys

description, date and plac

birth, employment,

and marital

status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers,

size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support,

background data and such other relevant information as may be

available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of

information described in Section IV B under which the individual

or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of per-

tinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization

referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests

in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records

is desired.

"Bo Types of information to be referred:

"1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies

to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the Usss

or other U.S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.

"2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a

grievance against any public official by other than legal

means, or attempts personally to contact such oficials iur

that purpose..

"3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive

written or oral statements about U. S. Governmeni or foreign

officials.

14• Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-t. S.

demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign

diplomatic establishments.

"5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; •

concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other

implements of war; or other terrorist activity.

• 116.

Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a

desire

to defect from the United States and who demonstrate.

one or more of the following characteristics:

a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional

instability.

bo Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.

c. A propensity toward violence.

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 456

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## Page 457

197.

Information concerning persons who may be considered poten-

tially dangerous

to individuals protected by the USSS

because of

their background or activities, including evidence

of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging

in activities inimical to the United States.

"V.

Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect

the President and Uther l'rotected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Iitle 18, U.S. 'Code, Section 3056

request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS

in order to

augment the capacity

of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be

addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive

operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their

assignment.

The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other

protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to errect the best possible security of the Fresiieni ani certain

other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSs,

the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally

and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and

coordination of information.

be made on

the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director

of the USSS.

"This agreement supers

USSS.

*II prior agreements between the FBI and the

JULY 16N1973

Jat‹

3Y 1sL Clarence M. Kelley

irecto

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Julx 3011973

Date

3Y Ls/ James J. Rowley

Directo.

United States

Secret Service"

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 457

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## Page 458

неміхоніся! вжилочий пром джоні но

ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWNS

--ETA 14485+9905-7.5

ba-11i46459

ENCLOSURE

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 • Page 458

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## Page 459

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

MICHOLAS P. CALLAHAN

COMPUTER SYSTEMS

DIVISION

ESS B'ANT DIFECTOR

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING

SECTION:

'OFFICERS NALIO OR

MITIGHAL CRIME IMFORMATION

CENTER SECTION:

СТ: АГОНЧАТКИ СЕЙТЕЯ

'E-PUSE-N TAL MSTORIES

""'EA M MáL M S:ONY COXYEPICA

DATA PROCESSING SECTION:

COS MESENDCH

EMEN; DESCOOS

A'"' CAL TRELLATICNS

OFFICE OF PLANNING

AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

RICHARD 1 GALLAGHEP.

STUDIES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS

PROCPANS

INTELLIGENCE

DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

W RAYMOND WANRALL

COUMTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIOMACE

FCREICM AGENIS RECISTRATION MET

MTERMAL SECURITY

ESPIOMACE

INSPECTION

DIVISION

ASSISIANT DIRECTOR

HARD:O M BASSETT

МУХУНАПАСИКУИНУМАЖ

ECTIO4S - FIELO ANO

CIAL PROJEC

SURrEYS

CON CORIATON

OCUXENT CLASUFICATIO

ERS

CICRORAN

LOURIS

OFFICIALS

ARTURIOS

RESCA POLCE COCHERA

INTERMAL SECURITY BRANCH:

1S-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND

ORGARIZATICNS ANO SNDIVIOUALS

EXTPEMISES

15-2 SECTION:

SEDITOY

¡ABOTASE

SORTE SERATE POCO FONTAL

15-J SECTION:

TPAL PESSA

YIICAL PESE

TRAMING

CIAL PICC

ENSE PLA

NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 459

LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT

DIRECIOR

LEGAL COUNSEL

JOHN A

MINTZ

LECAL ANALTA

LEGAL INSTRUCTION

LEGAL LIAISOY

LEGAL RESEARCH

FREEDOM OF IAFOPMATIOX ACT

New chitans

NEW YORK

NORFOLK

SACRARENTO

ST LOUS

SALT LAME CITY

TARTA

TOTAL 59

ASSISTANT TO-THE DIRECTOR-

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

(INVESTIGATION)

JAMES B. ADAMS

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE

• DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

ROBERT E GEBHARDT

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAUL TIRC OR XILLING A FEDERAL OFFKER

ASSAULTUNG FOPEICH PEASOTYEL

CONCRESSICKAL ASSASSIMATION STATUTE

ASSALZTINC IME

PRESIDENT IOR VICE-

AUTCYGEILE INFORKATION DISCLOSURE ACT

BAYK ROrGERY

BILLS OC LAO

*С АСТ

RIXE CA INDIAN AND COVENNMEMT RESERYATIONS

CR.KE OM IME HIGH SEAS

DESECRATION OF THE FLAG

DESIRUCTION, OF AIRCRAFT ORMOTOR VEMICLES

FALSE ROVERTISINS OR VISUSE OF MAMES TO

MONCATE SLOLFAR ACLNOT

FALSE ENTRELS IN RECOPOS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS

FEDERAL CICARETTE LACELING AMO ADVERTISIMG ACT

FEDERAL TRAN PRECE STATUTE

SCR OR RECLIPT OS SIRI ARYSI

FRAUDULENE PRACTICES CGACEPNING MILITARY AND

AND SLALS AND SYMSOLS OF

AGEUCIES OF INE UNITEO STARES

ILLEGAL YANUFACIURE, UST, POSSESSION CR SALE OF

ALLECAL USE OF COVERIXENT TRANSPORTATION

USE CE RAILROAD PASS

APIMC OF UNIFGRY

TrE Deall

TELE NONE CHIS

INTEPSTATE IRANSPORTATION CE FIRERORIS

IM:ERSIATE BRATSPORZALIOM OF DOSCENE MATTER

INTERSTALE TRA:PORTATICA OF

PRISON MADE CODOS

M:EASTATE TRAYSPORTATIOY OF STOLEA CATTLE

INTERSTATE TRANSTORTATICK OF STOLEM PROPERTY

MIERSTALE IRANSFORIAIION OF UNSAFE

REFR'CÉRAIO9S

IROSGULARITIES IN FECERAL FEMAL INSTITUTIONS

FOLICE ALLINGS

PROBECTICN DE FOREICH OFFICIALS.

CH:MITAL

SAHICHULADE XMIFE ACT

TMLFS, 1M95,22L(XIM7, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL

ANITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

COMIL RISHIS

EFSECREGALIA DE FUBLIC ACCURNDDATIONS

CESSCRECATINS OF PUBLIC ERUCANON

CESICREGANION DI PUDLIC FACILITIES

bisnianti irr errat

DISCEIPIMRI.OY IN HOUSING

ERECISA LATS

MMVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

MAME CHECK SECTION:

MAME CHECYS

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

ACCCUNTING COMIROL

AOZIMISTRATIVE INQUIRIES

LOPIRALTY RAITERS

ANTIRACHE:EERING

INTESFERENCE MEN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS

A CERTANNE FIANCIAL AMLILY

BANK FRAUD 11O ENSEZZLEMENT

BONOSTEM AND SURETIES

CENSUS MATTERS

CONFLIC: OF INTEREST

CONSUTER CRECHI PROTECTION ACT

CONILYYI OF COYRTI

COURI OF CLAIYS

DEPENUERIS ASS'ERRACE ACT OF 1950

DESTRUCTICN CE INTERSTATE PROPERTY

L lunT•noCK ZAT LAY

FAIR CREMIT SECORTIE ACT

FALSE CLAIYS - CIVIL

CI71ZENSHIP

FEDEPAL NOJS'NG RESINISTRATION MATTERS

FEDEPAL TORT CLAIKE ACT

SCYERYIENT

ON CF CGMRUTICATIONS

*CAT RELATICAS ACT, 191?

LAS0041

XI REPORTIME AND DISCLOSURE

AST OF 1939 UNVESTICATIVE MATTERI

KALE NANNI

MCRATOSY AND LCT

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ALITATURTA

ANCHORAGE

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BALTIMORE

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NW 54969 Docld:32989720 Page 460

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

(ADMINISTRATION)

THOMAS J. JENKINS

ADMINISTRATIVE

DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EUGENE W. WALSH

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING

SECTION:

ADIRISTRATIVE REPORT

QUOCET AND FISCAL MASTERS

PHYSICAL SICURITY MATTERS

EXHIBITS SECTION:

ARTIST'S COYCEPTICH DRAKINGS

CRAPHIC PRESEATATION OF INVESTIGATINE

IRETAPATICH IF CREDENTIALS AND

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J WALLACE LAPRADE

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RADIO COLTUNICATIONS (IXTRA-BURE ALY

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LABORATORY

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

BRIGGS I. WHITE

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PLANCHE AND EVALUATION CRIT

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COLITERATEO RAIT.NOS

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DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

JCHN J McDERMOIT

PRESS SERVICES OFFICE

CORRESPONDENCE AND

TOURS:

COPRESPONCENCE - CITIZEM INQUIRIES

CORRESTONDINLE REVIEN

CASI& BUTION OF REPRINTS

ToRS 05 1840

SPELCE KATIERS

RESEARCH SECTION:

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FUCITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAYS

STEC:22 PROJECTS

HUFE AU-DIDE INFORMATION PROCRAM

PLUTHSUL COLYIYALITY

RADIOTY NEPS VLDIA CONTACIS

ALOS RELEASES

DIREGTOR

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

KICHOLAS P. GALLAHAN

COMPUTER SYSTEMS

DIVISION

ASSISTART DIRECICR

ANDREW'S GECKER IR

UNIFONH CRIME REPORTIKG

SECTION:

EN'SOFS CRIT RIDDRIS

LARENFOREYENT OFFICEPSALLED OR

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NATIONAL CRIME INFORiLATION

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