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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10014-10017

RECORDS SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 05-H-01

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCSGO

FROM

TO :

TITLE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

: 02/11/76

: AMLASH

CIA

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED

WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 05/12/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

: Box

2

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 88608 Docld:32423405 Page 1

Date :

Page

08/04/95

1

Released under the John F. Kenned!

Assassination Records Collection Act o

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:Nw

BEGOR Date: 03-18-2025

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ORIC ANT

11,0183

The Sutra Brutes Brute R3574

Report of i'rossedings

0794

Hearing held before

Senate SElect Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

Mednesday, Pebruary"11, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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TESTIMONY OF:

AMLASH Case Officer

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AMLASH Case Officer Exhibit No. 1

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

...

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 o'elock

am., in Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard

S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Staff: Paul Wallach, Ed Greissing, Jim Johnston, Dan Dwyer

and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.

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Phone (Area 202) 341

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PROCEEDINGS

Senator Schweiker. Will you stand and raise your right

hand.

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Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to

give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

8o help. you god?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

MI. Johnston.

First of all, sir, we'll start with some

procedural matters. I'm not going to ask you to state your

name for the record because we have agreed before beginning

here today that you would testify under an alias so as not to

jeopardize your ongoing activities.

Is that the way you understand our agrecment?

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TESTIMONY OF AMLASH CASE OFFICER

AMLASH Case Offidor. Yes.

MI. Johnston. Is that satisfactory to you?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Johnston. Now, you understand that at any time we

refer to your participation or your authorship of a document or

receipt of a document, we are prepared to substantiate the

reference that we are making, and we are not trying to avoid

proving the fact that it is indeed you that were involved in

the incident. It is simply because we were not able to use

your name.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Now, you've previously testified before this

Committee, and I assume you've had a copy of the Committee

rules, and we have another copy available in case you want to

refer to then.

And are you appearing here voluntarily today without

a counsel?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. Do you understand that at any point during

this examination you are free to stop answering any questions

and request the advice of Counsel?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. And do you understand as well that all your

constitutional rights are intact here before the Committee

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Including the Fifth Amendment rights to romain silent, 1f you

choose.

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. All right.

Let me state that the purpose of this interview is to

refine and clarify certain questions about the AMLASH operation.

It is my understanding that you were the case officer on

the AMLASH operation from the time perlod, say, of the first

of September on through, for all relavant purposes, December '6.1,

and November '64, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

MI. Johnston. At this time you were a member of what was

called the Special Affairs Staff, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. And that's abbreviated SAS.

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Would you describe your position in SAS

and your relationship to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was Chief of

SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was a special assistant to Mr.

Fitzgerald, charged with the responsibility of attempting tor

organize a military coup inside Cuba against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Did you report directly to MI. Fitzgerald

or. your work?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

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MI. Johnston. Nas there anyone alsa knowledgeable in

SAS of what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only the other people who were

involved working on the project.

MI. Johnston. What was the relationship between SAS and

the Western Hemisphere Division under, at that time, I believe,

Mr. J. C. King?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall exactly what the

organizational relationship was at that time. I do know that

we operated on a somewhat -- I wouldn't say autonomous basis

from the Division itself, but the chain of command was certainl'!

from MI. Fitzgerald, not necessarily through the Division

Chief, but up to the DDP at that time.

MI. Johnston. Who was Mr. Helms.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

MI. Johnston. In other words, there could be direct

reporting from Mr. Fitzgerald to Mr. Helms.

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Is: it necessary that Mr. King was knowledgeable

of all operations of SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Not necessarily. I don't know if he

was kept fully advised of all the operations or not.

Mr. Johnston. Did he know generally what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. I presume he did, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And how often did he and Mr. Fitzgerald

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meet to coordinate. They do coordination of their work?

AMLASH Case Officor, I don't know. I wasn't involved

in that part of it.

MI. Johnston. Was SAS targeted directly at Cuba, or

were there other countries under its jurisdiction?

AMLASH Case Officer.

No. SAS was strictly a task force

set up to deal with the Cuban problem.

Mr. Johnston. And finally on this general matter, who

did -- who gave the counterintelligence support for SAS operations?

AMLASH Case Officer. We had a Counterintelligence Branch

within SAS.

Mr. Johnston. Who headed that in the fall of '63?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. There was a change.

I don't recall the name.

MI. Johnston. Let me -- as I stated earlier, you of

course have testified before, and I have before me the

transcript and I'm not proposing really to trap you in any natuge

with this transcript. However, there are some things that were

not asked before that I would like to clarify.

First of all, how and why was AMLASH first contacted to

set up the September meeting that you attended?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had been contacted the year before

in Helsinki, and we found out at that time that he was coming

out to a sporting event in the Western Hemisphere, so we went

down and contacted him.

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Mr. Johnston. In my revlew of the file -- and I don't think

we have the document hare today, but my notes indicate there

was a cable from Langley to Rome on 19 June 1963, that is in

the AMLASH file.

AMIASH Case Officer. Would you repeat the question?

MI. Johnston. In my review of the AMLASH file, there is

a cable from headquarters to Rome dn 19 June 1963 which states

that MMWIIP,, who was your contact with AMLASH, had sent a letter

as part of "an activation effort to reluctant dragon."

I ask. , do you have any recollection or any knowledge

that this was a sign to AMLASH that CIA was back in contact

with him or wanted to go back in contact with him?

AMLASH. Case Officer. I can't comment on that because

I didn't get into the operation until September of '63, and

this took place before I became involved in that part of the

AMLASH operation.

MI. Johnston. So in other words, you're saying you don't

really know who made the contact with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. We had contact with AMLASH from the

year before. He had been contacted by a CIA case officer in

Helsinki.

Mr. Johnston. In July and Mugust, 1962.

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Then he returned to Cuba.

AMLASH Case Officer. And this was the first time, to

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the best of my knowledge, that he had come out from Cuba

since the Helsinki trip.

Mr. Johnston. In other words, you're not aware of any

prior contact between CIA or an intermediary and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not between that period of time.

MI. Johnston. All right. You met with AMLASH in Brazil

on

September 5th through 9th. I don't mean you specifically,

but the general meetings with AMLASH were in that time frame.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall seeing a cable, or receiving

instructions from headquarters to the effect - and this is

after your series of meetings -- instructions to the effect

that headquarters felt that AMLASH appeared hopeless as an

intelligence performer, and should be approached as a chief

conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should

be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him

initially in FI and ops reporting and then progress to sabotage

and more serious matters on a more orderly basis.

Do you recall seeing something to that effect after your

Brazil meetings with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall the cable

itself, but certainly that would be in line with the thinking

at that time.

If I may state, he was not considered a controlled asset,

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shall wa say, and it was somebody with whom no

felt that we

could collaborade in organizing the internal group.

Mr. Johnston. But my summary of the cablo would indicate

thit on September 9th, or after your meetings in Brazil, you

really didn't think of him as a gatherer of information, but

as someone who wanted to go on to other things, as a

conspirator of some kind.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

MI. Johnston. The file also has a document in it, the

AMLASH file, dated 16 September, marked OFPA 72775. I don't

really know what an OFPA is.

AMLASH Case Officer. It's a dispatch.

Mr. Johnston. In any event, it reports a transcript of

the conversation, and to the best of my ability to understand

the document, it's a conversation of an intercept in thefcuban

Embassy in pari

The document says "Mary: I don't want to

imagine things, but this thing of" AMIASH -- uses his real

name. I have sanitized this -- "Moreno. It is either a

tremendous secret or a top secret matter." And then there is an

unreadable portion, and then

a word either "treason" or

"reason" I'm not sure what is referred to, and then a partici-

pant whose name is Betty says, "I believe it is a top secret

matter."

My question to you is, did you, in September of '63, kno

about this intercept?

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AMIASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall today

that I would have known about it. I prosume if we had it in

file, that I was working with it, that I would have seen it.

MI. Johnston. Do you have any information about any recoller-

tion about something on this order?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. And assume that at least the portion I

quoted seems to reflect on the Cubans' view of AMLASH's

activities in Paris.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it may have. As I recall, I

think that he was also at that time -- I may be wrong, and we

would have to go back to the files to check, but he was rather

outspoken to some of his closer friends in the fact that he was

no longer happy with the revolution, with Castro.

MI. Johnston. I don't want to dwell on this, if you don't

have a recollection, but this conversation seems to indicate

that the employees in the euban-embassy? think that AMLASH is

there on a top secret mission.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so because of his independent

way of comportment. He didn't

answer to anybody.

Senator Schweiker. What was his role in government at

that point?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was -- excuse me, this must have

been '63. He was a personal representative of Castro to the

games, first in Brazil, and I don't think he had a specific

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post in '63, as I recall. He had been Deputy Minister of

Interior. He had beon a military attache in Spain. I don't think

he had a spocific post at that time.

Excuse me, if I may add just one more point. Before that he

had been President of the Student Federation at the University

of Havana. He may still have been in that post, or about the

time that he was getting out of it, and this is, I think, where

really the trouble between this particular fellow and the Castro

brothers more or less came to ahead.

MI. Johnston. On the 19th of September, Jim Wave sent a

message to headquarters basically warning, giving a warning,

making the statement that there was an anti-Communist group in

Cuba, and the name AMLASH is part of that group, and it conclude

by saying that Fidel is allegedly aware of both the anti-Communist.

group and a Communist group, and that he acts as a moderator

between them in order to maintain cohesion in the government of

Cuba.

Do you recall receiving that information?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically receiving

that information, but I do recall that at that time Fidel

Castro himself was talking about -- was concerned

about a

Communist takeover of the revolution, and he did meet with the

subject and some other friends of his in order to prevent this.

MI. Johnston.

When was this?

AMIASH Case Officer.

This was in the early '60s sometime.

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Senator Schwelker. What year were you in?

Mx. Johnston. '63.

AMLASH Case Officer. This was before '63. This must have

been in '62.

MI. Wallach. This is before his trip to the Soviet

Union?

MI. Johnston. Before Castro's trip?

Mr. Wallach. Right.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MR. Johnston. The question being put is after your

meeting in Brazil with AMLASH, Jim Wave cabled headquarters that

AMLASH was part of a group of anti-Communist Cuban government

leaders and that Castro was aware of that fact.

AMLASH Case Officer. My answer to you is that he certainly

was because he had been talking with these people, including

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AMLASH, a year before.

Yes.

Senator Schweiker. Castro was aware that he was anti-

Communist?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Yes, that he was one of the anti-

Communist group.

Senator Schweiker. Why would he be so trusted and be the

special representative at that point in time if he war: known

as anti-Communist?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the relationship with

Castro. Castro himself had not declared his Communist, more of

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less intentions, as of that time.

Senator Schreiker. Wait, this was after the Cuban missile

crisis. This was '63, and the Cuban missile crisis was '62.

I'm confused here.

AMLASH Case Officer, Let's go back to the dates here.

Senator Schweiker.

The Jim Wave date is September 1963,

and he knows at this point, allegedly now, that this AMLASH

was a member of an anti-connunist group. I have trouble

reconciling that with not pinpointing AMLASH and his possible

subversive agent. I think that is what Jim is getting to.

AMLASH Case Officer. Again, my answer is I don't know

specifically why or what the origin of the '63 J. M. Wave

cable was.

My angwer again

to the question is that Castro, from his

previous knowledge, going back

to '62, did know and had consulted

with this group of people of which AMLASH was one, who were the

group of Anti-Communist officers in the revolution.

Mr. Johnston.

So --

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why in '63 this report

would have come out, but it would confirm Castro's knowledge

of this group, yes.

MI. Johnston. Let me move on

into October.

There was a

meeting with AMLASH.

Senator Schweiker. How long did he tolerate anti-Communist

officers in high positions in his government? I've got to

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bellave there's some cutoff here. I realize the uniqueness and

broadness of his support earlier, but it would just seem to me

that at some point he really had to weed out, nottnecessarily

weed out or be suspect of anti-Communist officers who had too

high decision making in his government, would he not, or am I

missing something?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not really, because out of this

group that was mentioned, and with whom he himself discussed

the need in the early '60s to keep, say, the Communists out,

some of those officers are still in his goverment today.

Now, they may have changed, or Castro may have changed, but

he didn't purge all this group of officers. Maybe he won them

over, and if they are still there, evidently he has some

confidence in them.

MI. Johnston. According to the file, there was a meeting on

October 5th, apparently, in Paris, and I'm not sure that you were

the case officer at that meeting, and the cable from Paris

sets the tone of that meeting as AMLASH apparently was trying

to get things off his chest

in talking to you.

Were you the case officer at that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer during that

period of time.

Go into a little of the detail because we did talk about

these problems.

Mr. Johnston. There appeared from the file two meetings

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In early October 1963, the flrst meeting on dr about October

Sth that AMLASH comes in and says I want to get things off my

chest, and seems to express great dissatisfaction with the

CIA's position.

Then there's a second meeting on October 13th or so where

he specifically asks to meet with Robert Kennedy, and you

previously testified about that second meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Now, the file indicates there was an

earlier meeting on October 5th, and AMLASH was complaining

apparently about the low level espionage matters that had been

discussed in Brazil, and implying that he had a more valuable

role to play, and the file says the case officer provided the

necessary assurances that his feelings were not in fact

true, and that his case was receiving the consideration at

the highest levels.

With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering

AMLASH off his chest, a much more relaxed AMLASH departed,

stating his desire to return

to Cuba to undertake the big

job.

Do you recall that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. I think you are getting those two

meetings mixed up. In other words, the later one, yes. I

was there and talking to him in the second meeting. In the

first meeting I don't recall precisely, but there could have

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been a meeting with a contact in Paris, in other words, not a

case officer, but the contact we had in Paris. I don't remember

who that was, one of the officers there.

MI. Johnston. In addition to you he was in contact with --

AMLASH Case Officer. Only for purposes of contact. I mean.!

only to make contact with me, not to carry on the case. But

he knew that the other officer was a frlend of mine, and he

was in touch with him, and when he came to Paris he would get

in touch with him. So I would be notifled.

MI. Johnston. I think you have used his name in the

prior transcript, tired Stent

the case officer?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Yes, because he was the one who

furnished the quarters where we had the meetings.

MI. Johnston. In furnishing the quarters, did you have a

taping system going as to the discussions that would take place?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't believe we taped any of

those meetings?

MI. Johnston. Is it procedure to tape meetings with

Agents?

AMLAS" Case Officer. Sometimes. It is not a standard

procedure. Sometimes it

is not physically possible.

MI. Johnston. Let me go back into this meeting of October:

5th, which you don't recall that you were at this meeting, is

that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. There probably could have been

the

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meeting when he first arrived in Paris, and the meeting that he

had -- I don't recall specifically.

I do recall, 1f I may, I do recall that he said he was

unhappy because of the Ic juirements, the intelligence requirr-

ments that we had levied on him in Brazil, and it is true that

his position was at that time, even in Brazil, and later in

Paris, that he was not disposed to cooperate just to furnish

intelligence. In other words, he felt that he wanted to do

something about the removal of Castro but was not just prepared

to keep us advised as to what was going on. He recognized that

this was certainly part of a needed operation, but he did not

consider himself just as a provider of information.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go off the record for a minute

because I want to use a code name.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Johnston.

Having

mentioned the code name that is

used in this cable, you now recall you were at the 5 October

meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And the cable, you can look at it, indicates

that AMLASH was in a confessional mood.

My question to you is, after recalling that meeting, was

it basically one where he was expressing

his concern about

the CIA role for him?

MI. Johnston.

He was expressing his concern for what?

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MI. Johnston. The CIA!s plans for using him.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. He was concerned as to how and

in what way he was to cooperate with CIA. He was also -- and

we must underline this, right from the beginning, dubious

as to our resolve to really follow through on initiating a

coup against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Is the cable correct in stating that he was

assured that his case was receiving consideration at the

highest levels?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Was the word "highest level" used, or was

a name used?

AMLASH Case Officer. Highest levels, but at that stage

of the game he knew he was talking to CIA, so highest levels

in CIA is what was meant at that particular time.

Mr. Johnston. That's the word you used?

You didn't say Director McCone?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not use names, no.

Mr. Johnston.

On October 5th, you reassured him that his

consideration, that his case was receiving consideration at

least at the highest levels of CIA, and the cable reflects

that when he left that meeting he seemed much more relaxed about

the case.

Is that an accurate portrayal of the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

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MI. Johnston. As. I mantioned; thara was another meeting

on or about October 13th, where, as I understand it, AMLASH

made his demand of his request to meet with Robert Kennedy, and

he made that request to meet with kennedy by name.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did.

Well, he said somebody such as, somebody high in the

administration, again, to receive the assurances that we were

prepared to -- that we were serious about developing and

organizing a coup.

MI. Johnston.

After that meeting, you were recalled to

Langley for discussions, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was traveling back and forth

between Paris and Langley, yes. I don't recall if I was

recalled at that particular time, but I would go there --I

was TDY.

Mr. Johnston.

I want to set the stage. There is a

message from the Director, 15683, to London, directing you to

return to headquarters for discussion of all facets of the

case.

This. is after you reported that AMLASll wants to meet

with someone like Robert Kennedy.

Do you recall that flow of events?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Johnston. What discussions did you have at Langley,

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and I don't want-to go through your previous testimony again,

but basically are ve correct in understanding that out of the

discussions at Langley came a decision to go to paris with

MI. Fitzgerald representing himsalf as a personal representative

of Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer.

That's right.

MI. Johnston. Then you met on October 29, according to

the file, with AMLASH, Mr. Fitzgerald, in Paris.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. Can I go off the

record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Wallach. I think you stated that AMLASH said that he

would like to meet with one of the U.S. leaders such as

Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. A high representative in the U.s.

Government.

MI. Wallach. Did he mention any other names that you

recall?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

Mr. Wallach. Just Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Such

as Robert Kennedy.

Mr. Wallach. Did AMLASHl, to the best of your knowledge,

from what he told you, know about any prior assassination

attempts that had been run by the u.s.?

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AMLASH Case OffiCer. No.

MI. Wallach. Did he have any reason to bellove that robert

Kennedy had been involved with any of the sabotage operations

as contrasted with any assassination attempts?

AMLASH Case Officer. If he knew, he never mentioned it to

me. We never discussed that.

MI. Wallach. In other words, you didn't say to him,

how did you know that robert Kennedy -- or why did you pick

Robert Kennedy.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all. I mean, it's a

perfectly, I think, logical name to have been mentioned at

that time, because by him, since he was the President's brother

and since he was the Attorney General, he wanted somebody high

in the Government; at one time he had mentioned the President,

you know, I want to talk to the President.

Mr. Wallach. It seems strange to me he didn't pick the

Secretary of State or someone like that.

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at --

AMLASI Case Officer. He wanted somebody directly to the

President. In other words, he wanted the assurances

from the highest authority, again, from the President of

the United States.

MI. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is we, from our

examination of the alleged assassination attempts, have also

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gona into the sabotage attempts, MONGOOSE, eto, and found out

that Bobby Kennedy did play a role in the sabotage attempts.

What I'm trying to get from you is your understanding of

whether of not. AMLASh, from his Cuban side, knew that the

Kennedy's had played that role and would necessarily say I want

to talk to Robert Kennedy for that reason.

AMLASH Case Officer. No. He never mentioned it, not at

all in any way.

MI. Johnston. Let me finally go to the October 29th meeting,

and before we went on the record this morning, you were

explaining to us how you characterized the AMLASH operation.

Would you repeat in summary form what you told us before

we went on the record?

AMLASH Case Officer. The operation was never conceived,

certainly, carried out during the period I was associated with

it, but was never conceived as an assassination plot. It was

conceived as a coup in order to organize a military group

within Cuba to overthrow Castro.

MI. Johnston. Did you have the understanding that if

necessary AMLASH was proposing to assassinate the Castro

brothers?

AMLASH Case Officer.

Assassination was not a subject of

discussion that came up at every meeting or contact that we

had with AMLASH. It was so stated by him that he felt that

the only way to initiate a coup in Cuba was to direct the

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first blow at the leadership.

Since na vera not tilling to discuss apecifically eliminating

Castro, this was never discussed in terms of the operation.

We certainly had no doubt that in his mind this was the only

way to go about it.

MI. Johnston. And you dealt with him on that basis?

AMLASH Case Officer. Irying to temporize this, and 1f

possible we were not looking-for a bloody coup at that time,

planning a bloody coup inside Cuba, but we were trying to

sertainly get him to think in terms of much more than just the

elimination of the leadership.

Mr. Johnston. And to broaden it.

AMLASH Case Officer. To broaden it into a coup. our

interest was the coup, not the specifics of how he got it

started.

MI. Johnston. You: were: concerned about whether his

plans were realistic, weren't you?

AMLASH Case Officer. Very definitely, yes.

Senator Schweiker.

Did you personally evaluate AMLASH

as fully capable of leading a coup and being able to implement

it and carry it out if support were given?

How did you evaluate AMLASH?

As I understand from the dialogue here, and also from

reading a summary of these, at first the operations talk was

fairly low level sabotage, which he out of hand rejected, and

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no pictured himselt as a leader of a top level effort on the

condition that it had assurances of

government support and top

level support here.

Now, I guess my question to you is, how, as case officer,

did you evaluate his capabillty? Did you evaluate him as

someone who could lead a coup and who would, that our government

could put trust in, faith in in terms of his ability to carry it

out or not?

AMLASH Case Officer. At that time we did not evaluate

him as the leader of a coup. He was not our candidate to be

the next ruler of Cuba. He was only evaluated in our dealings

with him on the basis of what he and his group could contribute

to a coup inside Cuba.

So I don't recall at any time that he was selected or that

anybody ever talked of him as the next leader in Cuba.

MI. Baron. Wasn't there some thought that he would be a

good rallying point for strong leaders of a new government in

Cuba, that he had an ability to attract good people to work with

him?

AMLASII Case Officer. He had proven this because he had

been one of the two leaders, or the two top leaders of the

Directorado Revolutionario, which is the Revolutionary Directorate

which is a group not part of the 26th of July Movement, but a

separate group, which is - he was one of the leaders, and

became a military commander of that group, separate from the 26

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of July movement.

so he had a group in the DR which we knew about, and he

afforded himself very well in the fighting -- this was in the

province of lasvillas, during the time that Castro was -- he

was in a separato area of the country.

MI. Baron. I had a recollection which I haven't checked

against our transcripts that when we discussed this before,

you had sald although AMLASH might not be considered the leader

of a new government, that he was a potential candidate for that

job. He might not be a good military leader, but he would have

an ability to bring good people together in a new government.

AMLASH Case Officer. Of the people left in Cuba at that time,

we didn't have much of a choice.

I mean, you know, we weren't

In contact. He was one of the few who could travel.

Senator Schweiker. You put him up near the top but not

necessarily at the top.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, as one being able to

contribute.

Senator Schweiker. And you didn't have too many options

at that point.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. One of the documents that CIA previously

provided us in a sanitized version is a memorandum for the

record dated 19 November 1963, and the subject is Plans for

AMLASH Contact, and let me:just show you that and ask you

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If you not necessarily prepared that document; because it is a

sanitized document, but whether you prepared a document

that that apparently came from, the memorandum for record of

November 19th.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I recall.

MI. Johnston. You prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer. I believe I prepared the memorandum

from which that extract was made, yes.

MI. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

AMLASH Case Officer. It had to be late October sometime.

Mr. Johnston. November 19th is the date.

AMLASH Case Officer. Early November, certainly after

my October meeting with him in Paris, and before going back,

19 November, that's probably it.

Mr. Johnston. Is that the date you prepared it?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's the date I prepared it. I

don't remember when I returned from Paris after the October-

meetings.

Mr. Johnston. You prepared a memorandum for the record

on the contact before you went to the meeting in Paris on

November 22nd?

AMLASH Case Officer. On, yes.

MI. Johnston. Part of that document, Paragraph 3, states

that you would show AMLASH a copy of the President's speech in

Miami.

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AMLASH Case officer.

"No. I didn't show him a copy of the

speech at all.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you Paragraph 3 of that.

They were talking about leading up to the November 22nd

meeting with AMLASH.

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AMLASH Case Officer." It way have been planned to show

him a copy of the speech, but ai I recall it was. not shown him.

I talked to him about it, but I don't recall having shown him

the speech. But it was probably clear that I could have taken

a copy of that speech to him and shown it to him.

Mr. Johnston. Paragraph 4 of that document states...

would you just read it?

AMLASH Case Officer. "Chief SA has requested written

reports on AMIASHI operation be kept to a minimum."

Mr. Johnston. And that's Desmond Fitzgerald, is that

correct?

AMIASH Case Officer.

That's correct.

Ms. Johnston. Did MI. Fitzgerald tell you that on

November 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. It might not have been the first

time he mentioned this because -- in other words, on sensitive

operations it was always a case of trying to limit the number

of people aware of sensitive operations and this certainly is

considered in that category.

He reiterated, I presume, since I put it in the memo at

that time that the written communications would be minimized.

Mr. Johnston. And this is a memorandum for record.

AMIASII Case Officer. Remember also this is primarily the

cables because I had to communicate with headquarters and the

station in Paris. I didn't have my independent communications.

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MI. Johnston. Where were you on November 19th?

AMLASH Casa Officar. At headguarters. He told me this

personally.

Mr. Johnston. Okay, Is it normal to prepare a memorandun

for the record about plans for contact'of an agent?

AMIASII Case Officer. Normally, yes.

Mr. Johnston. So there's nothing unusual in your preparing

this memorandum for record. Is that your testimony?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there wasn't anything unusual

about it. That's the usual thing unless advised to the contrary.

Mr. Johnston. The last time you testified before the

Comnittee you mentioned on November 22nd you had a pen-like

device with a hypodermic needle on it. This memorandum for

record of November 19th does not mention that.

Is there some reason that it doesn't?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't remember why it would

not have been mentioned. I don't recall when I left for Paris.

I may have left for Paris on the 21st and --

Mr. Johnston. I think that's correct.

MILASH Case officer. I don't know if the decision had!

been

made that we would even

show him something lie this

that time.

11s. Johnston. You're talking about the lyth?

AMLASH Case Officer. About the lyth, when I wrote the

memorandum.

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Mr. Johnston.

When you left for Paris my understanding

Is that you carried the dovice.

ANIASI! Case Officer. That's right, I carrled 1t with me.:

MI. Johnston. And you had approval to show it to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I had approval to show it to him.

MI. Johnston. The file indicates that AMLASH was contacted

on November 20th, I belleve, in order to set up the November

22nd meeting and he was telephoned by, I assume, somebody in

Paris.

Did you arrange that or were you knowledgeable of that

fact?

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AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I was going to go there to

see him. We would have made arrangements to set the meeting up.

Mr. Johnston. The cable reporting the telephone call on

November 20th states that somebody apparently was in the room

with AMLASHl when he was telephoned, and that therefore there

had to be a telephone conversation by the CIA agent calling

him and the CIA agent --

Pardon me. AMLASH asked if the neeting would be of interest

to. him, and the CIA agent said, I don't know if it's going to

be of interest to you but it's the meeting you requested. And

I ask you your understanding of what was meant by the meeting

that you requested?

AMIASI! Case Officer. Probably to give him an answer on

the caches that he wanted inside Cuba, and I understand that was

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the primary point which had not been, he had not been informed

of this at the previous meeting with fitzgerald, so were wo

going to give him that materiali In other words, it was given

to him later in the caches, was that material going to be given

to him?

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Mr. Johnston. What about the pen device?

AMIASH Case Officer. The pen devico was something again.:

it could have been part of that package. I don't think he was

specifically asking about the pen device because we had been

so reluctant to even discuss something like this with him and

he knew it that he was primarily concerned with the caches.

MI. Johnston. Is it correct to say that at the October

29th meeting AMLASH

was happy with the U.s. policy but asking

for equipment to do the job?

AMIASIl Case Officer. To

initiate the coup.

In other words, he didn't want a massive amount of

equipment but he said we do need some equipment to get the

thing started.

Mr. Johnston. And that that was in his mind on November

20th.

AMLASH Case Officer.

When he made the call?

Mr. Johnston. When

the call was made to him and he was

told that the November 22nd meeting was the one that he had

requested.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

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Mr. Johnston

and that AMAsh would have understood that

that was what you were going to give him, some or all of the

things discussed at the October 29th meeting.

ALASI Case Officer, To see what could be given to him,

not if it was or anything like this because Paris didn't know

what we were prepared to tell him at the 22 November meeting.

MI. Johnston. As you said before, you were at Langley

on the 20th. There's a cable indicating you loft Washington

arIiving in Paris on the morning of November 22nd.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did anyone go with you from Washington

to Paris?

AMINSII Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Pitzgerald was where at the tine?

AMLASH Case Officer. At Langley. He was present at the

meeting, at the late October meeting, not at the 22 November

meeting.

Mr. Johnston.

Okay, Let's go then to the November 22nd

meeting. You previously testified as you recall it was late

afternoon or evening

hecause it was dark when you came out.

AMIASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston.

where was it held? What kind of place

was

it held?

MILASH Case Officer. I don't recall that we used a sale

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house of in the study. our

rhome:

Mr. Johnston. Who was there at the meeting? you and

AMLASH.

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AMLASH Case Officer:

The October meeting?

Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, November 2ind meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer.: AMLASH and myself.

Mr. Johnston. Nobody elie was there?

AMIASIl Case Officer.

Is it was Red Stoathe, home, It

may have been in arother part of the house but he was not at

the meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have that meeting taped?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

not that I recall.

MI. Johnston. If you did have it taped, where would the

tape be today?

AMLASH Case Officer. In the file.

Mr. Johnston. In this file?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I don't recall that that

meeting vas taped. I don't think it was possible to tape it.

MI. Johnston. Who was knowledgeable of that meeting

outside yourself and MiLASIl? Generally, were the people at

the Paris station aware of it?

MILASH Case Officer. Not generally, no.

It could have

been the Chief of Station, naturally, and

Red

1 stent

Mr. Johnston. At a meeting like that did you have some

kind of back-up support, counter-surveillance, any kind of

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back-up support so that you could be assured that you were not

under surveillance at the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I took the necessary precautions

In going to the meeting to assure myself. i didn't have somebody

else following me to tell me if I had any surveillance on me.

MI. Johnston. What about AMLAS!l?

MIASH Case Officer. We don't know. I don't know if

he was counter-surveilled.

Senator Schweiker. Could AMIASIl have been a double agent?

AMIASH Case Officer. That's a good question. I can only

give you an opinion. I didn't think so then and even with

everything that has happened today, I don't think so today.

Again, that 1s strictly my opinion.

Senator Schweiker. In a nutshell, and I realize this is

a very difficult, complex area, why don't you think so?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the power play that

was taking place in Cuba at that time between certainly the

26th of July people and Castro trying to consolidate his

position, this was the early 'Gos now, around his people and

his movement, the fact that we had information from several

sources that he was disillusioned with the revolution.

Senator Schweiker. He, meaning AlILASH!?

AMLASH Case Officer. He, AMLASH, was disillusioned.

Senator Schweiker. And he wasn't in the 26th of July?

AMLASH Case Officer. lie was not in the 26th of July.

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He was DR. So he was not a member of Castro'" July 26th movement

He was one of the other revolutionary groups which had student

support primarily and urban support and compared to Castro's

rural so-called support.

So there was a struggle going on there. In other words,

this was not an imaginary type of thing. The background that

we could check did not, to the best of my recollection at any

time lead us to belleve in our relation with him at that time

that he was playing a double game.

The other reason that I felt that way at the time was that

we had to persuade him to return to Cuba to stay. He was

ready to defect, to leave. He didn't want to come to the

United States with all the rest of the Cubans who were here

because he had stayed on, he felt, too long with the revolution.'

But he was ready to leave Cuba and to defect. He was fed up

with the way life was. A lot of the travel that he did was

that he would take any opportunity to get off of the island.

lle had told us, me personally, that and this was also confirmed

by other sources.

Senator Schweiker. Wouldn't one of your reasons also

be that he is in jail now?

AMLASII Case Officer.

That would be a very good reaso?.

I think I mentioned

that the last time, certainly when I was

talking ahout this. If he was

taken back --

Senator Schweiker. Are we absolutely certain he's in

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jail now??

AMLASH Case Officer.'

We checked that I belleve the last

time, I think the last report we had was what, a couple of

years ago?

Mr. Baron. I was given the name of a CIA

.contact in

Florida who had been on the Island of Plies at one point and

said as far as he knew, although he hadn't been in Cuba for

several years, AMIASi was a prisoner, but he wasn't in prison.

He was doing some sort of hospital work which was considered

part of his rehabilitation program.

AMLASHI Case Officer. He was a doctor, wasn't he, for

the prison?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

AMIASIl Case Officer. He had more freedom because he

was being used as a doctor for the prisoner but he still was

still on the Isle of Pines.

MI. Baron. It is my understanding that he was working

as a doctor even outside the prison and again, this is just

hearsay of one contact that I called on the phone.

Mr. Wallach. Are you positive that someone just not

using his name is there, that he switched over using an alias?

You wouldn't have intelligence of that type?

AMISIl Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. I want to quickly follow-up on somethin:

that Jim and the Senator were getting at.

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Why were you not willing to discuss with AMIASll the

assassination of Castro?.

AMIASH. Case Officer. We?

Mr. Wallach, You have told us --

AMLASIl Case Officer: We were very reluctant to discuss

the subject.

Mr. Wallach. Why?

AMISH Case Office. I guess we didn't want to get involved

In assassinations.

Mr. Wallach. But you had them before this.

AMLASI! Case Officer.

I didn't know this, and certainly

In this operation the objective of this operation was not to

go in and assassinate Castro but a much bigger type of progran.

Mr. Wallach. But that was the first step, or at least

the potential first step.

AMLASH Case Officer.

He was convinced that was the only

first step. AMLASIl. We weren't convinced that it had to be,

at that time that it had to be the first step, and that's why

we didn't want to discuss and we didn't discuss and we were

reluctant to discuss this subject with him.

Mr. Wallach. At the late October meeting I think you

said before that - what did you request that led to the giving

him of the pen, the hypodermic needle?

AMLASH Case Officer. The pen he requested was something

with which to protect himself now.

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Ms. Hallach, A pen with a hypodermia needle yould protect

himselt?

AMINSI Case Officer. He put himself in a situation and

asked us the question. He said I may be confronted by Castro

or by raoul or by one or the other of Castro's people in a

meeting in which I am not armed, and I may be confronted with

an accusation of plotting against the regime.

And at that time he said this would be before we are

ready to move in formenting the coup, and he sald, I would like

to have something with which I can protect myself at that time.

In' fact, the words that I think I mentioned here before was,

If I fall, I don't want to be the only one going down.

So he was seeing himself in a situation of going back into

Cuba, of being in a meeting in which he could have been, because.

again, of the relationships. Fidel Castro himself or Raoul

Castro could confront him in their office, accuse him.

Iir. Wallach. Couldn't he use that pen offensively and

not defensively?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Yes, he could have. He was not

at that time talking about using it offensively and we weren't

discussing the offensive use of that pen.

Sanator Schweiker. Following up the point that I

switched away from as to whether Cuban intelligence might have

been trailing him or following him or observing what you were

doing with him, we have some knowledge, I gather, from a summar:

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here that AMIASH's one-time Cuban mistress was belleved to be

"sy'!

931e428437 2002

working for Cuban Intelligence and her brother was known to

ba Cuban intelligence.

If this is correct, wouldn't that pretty well mean that

whatever he was doing over there might well be observed by

Cuban intelligence even though he might have been a straight

single agent in terms of working with us and not a double agent

that they may well have known or monitored what in fact he was

doing with us?

AMIASH Case Officer. This 1s possible, Senator. We

had no indication at the time that they were monitoring his

activities. Again, he was at such a level and the people

certainly in Paris and the Cubans overseas knew that he was

at such a level that we never heard that they were ever given

this mission.

Senator Schweiker. Have you heard that his Cuban

mistress was working with. Cuban intelligence?

AMIASI Case Officer. Which one of his mistresses,

because he's had several, including his sister who worked for

the Presidency, his own sister.

Mr. Johnston. We extracted that from a file and I'm

sorry but in the respect and the need to keep that infornation

compartmented I did not take her name down and I don't thin!: sc

have the file that indicates that.

My recollection is that he had a mistress for a consideral!:

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period of time who was, who was suspected of being the GI,

anc certainly her brother was actually known to be an employee

of the GI.

AMINSK Case Officer. I don't recall the specific case,

but let me remind you that he was the Deputy Minister of

the Interior, which did have the security services at that time

under that ministry, So it wouldn't surprise me that there would

be somebody he would know in that ministry.

MI. Johnston. MILASiI was?

AMLASH Case Officer. AMINSIl was at one time before he

was President of the Student rederation.

MI. Johnston. Not in '63?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Senator Schwelker. And Cuban Intelligence would have

come under him?

AMLASI! Case Officer. Some of the security apparatus

was under the Ministry of Interior, but he was in that job,

I don't recall, a very short period of time.

Mr. Wallach. If Castro knew about the assassination

attenpts, you would assume that MilASh would have known, wouldn't

you, from being in that position?

AMIASH Case Officer. He don't know if at that time that

he knew that -- well, he was saying, in other words, he was on

the radio every day saying that the Yankees were making an

attempt on his life but that he knew the specifics of operations

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I'I don't think we have that information, or at least I never

have seen it.

After the Bay of Pigs every occasion that he had he would,

accuse the imperialists of mounting another operation against

him.

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MI. Baron. Just a couple more questions on this point.

Did you take any special precautions aside from the standard

precautions that you would take in dealing with any foreign

contact?

Were special precautions taken in dealing with AMLASHl

to guard against the prospect that he was either a double agent

or under surveillance by Cuban intelligence?

AMLASIl Case Officer.

What would you mean by special

precautions?

• Mr. Baron. You would have to tell me more about the

techniques that you could use, than I could tell you.

MILASH Case Officer. What I would do is to make sure

that I wasn't under surveillance in going to the meeting or

at the meeting, and we would certainly check the meeting places

to make sure that the meeting places were not under surveillanco

by them, which would adso hopefully would have picked.up in

the surveillance that he would have had on him coming to the

meetings.

I don't recall that we ever put him under surveillance

in Paris, which would have meant disclosing our interest in him

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either to our aurveillance team or the French police, or whoever

So we never did that, because, again, of our interest in

protecting and minimizing the number of people who knew we were

in contact with him.

Again, I refer you, I think, to what the Sénator raised

before, that he was arrested and sentenced, and as I recall,

I may he wrong but as I recall the contacts that we had with

him in Paris never surfaced in that trial. He never, as far

as the transcript that we have of the trial, he never reported.

he never testified about the contacts that he had with us.

It was only afterwards when he was in contact with the exile

group.

MI. Baron. So you never took any affirmative action

against him or investigated him or treated him in any way that

you would treat a person suspected of being a double agent

or being closely watched by an intelligence service?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not in mounting an investigation

against him because in doing that we would have to show

our

interest in him to other people, so we did not do that.

What we could do with myself and with the other knowledga-

able people say in Paris, of him, we did do and did everything

we possibly could do.

In other words, to check where he was and who he was

seeing and through the telephone taps and to ensure that when

he came to meet us that that meeting was secure,

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that we did.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go back to the November 22nd

meeting.

As you recall, afterayou met AMLASH there, did you give

him the newspaper article about the kennedy speech?

AMIASH Case Officer. I don't recall. I may have shown

him the article. To the best of my recollection, we talked about

the speech and he had, I think, at that time, the article had

already appeared in the French newspaper and he had read it.

Mr. Johnston. What did you tell him about the article?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Well, he Ilked the article. It

was one in which I think the laministration, as I vaguely recall,

was taking a rather positive stand.

Mr. Johnston.

Was this Kennedy's speech before the

Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 18th?

AMLASI Case Officer. I believe so.

Mr. Johnston. I have an extract from that.

AMLASI! Case Officer. I'm not 100 percent certain, but

I think it was.

Mr. Johnston. There's an indication that you told him

that fitzgerald helped to write the speech.

Do you recall doing that?

ZILASIl Case Officer. I could have.

Mr. Johnston. Do you rocall specifically?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Specifically, no, but we did discuss

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the speech.

MI. Johnston. You have testified a,great deal about the

poison pen or the pen device and my only question 18 what is

your best recollection about what happened to the pen? Did

he take it with him? did you take it with you when you left

the meeting?

‚AMLASH Case Officer. Again, as I mentioned to you the

last time, I don't remember specifically if I kept the pen and

threw it away or if he kept it.

What I do remember; was his reaction when I showed him

the pen. I can't today tell you for sure that he kept the

pen.

Mr. Johnston. It seems to me that's rather compromising

evidence, if he kept the pen and you recall that. It's also

such compromising evidence - I have difficulty belleving you

would have thrown it away.

AMLASIl Case Officer. Yes, because it was compromising

evidence. I had carried 'it one way. I mean I wasn't going to

carry it back. It was nothing but a Papermate pen in which

a hypodermic needle had been inserted.

In other words, it wasn't a $10,000 piece of equipmeni

or anything like this.

Mr. Johnston. I agree, but it's a very compromising

piece of evidence to have around.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right. But what I can't

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recall specifically is whather it was broken, thrown away or -

MI. Wallach. Why do you belleve he wouldn't have taken

it with him?

AMIASI Case Officer, l'e said he wouldn't. I specifically

remember this. He says, and then later on he saja, I'm not

going to take any compromising material back with me.

This would have been a piece of compromising, material.

He did not like the pen. The only point probably that we made

with him is that we were willing to consider, because he knew

our opposition to something like this, that we were even willing

to consider showing him something that - whether he could

again defend himself.

He did not think it was a good idea.

Senator Schweiker. What kind of weapon of substance

could he get that would not compromise him? I'm a little

confused. He wanted something to defend himself, but he

doesn't want anything

that will compromise him.

Unless you have a disappearing weapon, what could he

possibly get that would not compromise him to take back?

AMIASI Case Officer. Well, we were talking also about

eaches Inside Cuba at that time, so it could have been dropped

to hiin inside Cuba. He didn't exactly have to take it back

with him.

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In other words, here again, the whole idea of this was

not to give him something there that he would be able to take

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back with him. . :

No. Wallach. Were arrangements made for caches inside

Cuba if he was worried about defending himself?

AMLASIl Case Officer. lle had asked for caches inside

Cuba.

Mr. Johnston. Can you be positive that he did not leave

the meeting with the pen in his possession?

AMINSIl Case Offiner. I cannot be positive that he didn't!

I'm almost sure that he didn't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask him for the pen back?

Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back before the

meeting concluded or after the conclusion of the mecting?

AMLASHI Case Officer. Since I recollect his reaction to

It that, you know, it's no good, I just can't logically belleve

that he would have kept the pen. This is the point. But I

don't specifically recall what was done with it except that

it was probably destroyed.

In other words, you know, broken, throw the needle out

of it and break the pen.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall asking him to give you the

pen back?

AMIAS! Case Officer. No, but I don't recall that he

took it in the first place, because what I recall is, gee, is

that the best that you can come up with type of thing.

so he was not in any way enthused about what we had shown

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Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, is it correct you did

promise him at this meeting that you would drop Iifles with

telescopic sights for him in Cuba?

MIASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston.

Was there any mention of paying him money

to support his coup plans?

ALASIl Case Officer. He had never really asked for

money. In promising him full support for the coup, if money

was required I presume that could be conjecture that he could

get that also, but he did not specifically ask for money.

Mr. Johnston.

Was there discussion of his escape in

the event he assassinated Castro or killed Castro but did not

pull off the coup?

AMIASII Case Officer. At the last meeting I don't believe

that was discussed.

MI. Johnston. At your prior neeting?

ASIASII Case Officer. If it was, it was touched upon,

but as I recall, and this is from reading the file afterward.

where this was discussed was a year later when he was in contass.

with the exile group. I thin'. it was with the exile group t'.!.

ha was then concerned about, how do I yet out if something

goes wrong and we can't pull the coup.

But we did not at the 22 loveber meeting, I don't lili:!!

we discussed that. In fact, I'm sure ve didn't discuss it.

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MI. Johnston: When aid, the

meeting and? About what

2'

time?

What time did the meeting end?

AMINSI Case Officer. Approximately 10:00 in the evening.

Mr. Johnston. And we basically discussed while we

were off the record the fact that the assassination occurred

at 12:30 in Dallas, which we think would have been around 7:30

in Paris, and the meeting was then over at 10:00 o'clock.

When you walked out of the meeting you testified previously

that you heard about the assassination.

Is that correct?

AMIASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Ms. Johnston. And that's the first word you heard about

the assassination?

AMIASIl Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. You previously said that AMIASHl made a

comment about that. Was there any other discussion of the

assassination by MMLASI?

M'LASIl Case Officer. That was it, because I left hin

at that time.

Nir. Johnston. I don't understand. If the meeting is

either in a house or

somewhere else how you would leave togetier

and you would have access to a radio or something to hear the

report.

AMIASIl Case Officer. If it was in the house, it could

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have been the occupant of the houre tho told un In fact, I

We shayes

am sure it was the occupant of the house, red stent

who:-told

us he had just heard on the radio about the assassination when

we came out of the meeting, Ne didn't go or come together

to the house. He left on his own and then I left after he loft.

Mr. Johnston.

So in other words, what you're saying is

that you're not walking out of the building but you're in the

house and the meeting is over and rod Stent. knows that the

meeting is over and that he tells you.

AMLASI! Case Officer. We came out of the room, out of

the:study in which we were holding the meeting, and when we

came out of that into his living room he told us what he had

just heard on the radio.

Mr. Johnston. And then AMLASIl made this comment and

walked out of the door?

AMLASIl Case Officer. AMIASIl made this comment and

shortly thereafter I don't recall, ve finished our business.

He was -- I don't remember the exact quote. You have it on

the record there, like why does it have to happen to somebody

like that.

Hir. Johnston. Did you know who committed the assassinatio::

at this time?

AMLASIl Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. And even with that you don't recall whether

ALASH walked out the door with the poison pen?

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AMIASH Case Officer don't bellevo he did, I don't

belleve he did and it could very well be that what I would have

done is pull the hypodermic needle out of 1t, that's very

simple, and then it's just a pen, throw the pen away of keep

the pen.

It's not a complicated object, in other words. It was

very simple to just pull the hypodermic needle out of 1t, and

that's probably what was done. But I don't recall specifically

that I did 1t.

Hir. Johnston. Did you do that after the meeting was over?

AMIASH Case Officer. No, it was during the meeting, not

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after.

Ms. Johnston. Now there's an indication that you got

instructions from Washington after the meeting to break off

contact with AMIASHl.

Do you recall receiving those instructions or instructions

to that effect?

MILASI Case Officer. Yes, there was a cable, I

believe, as I recall. It wasn't necessarily to break off contact

with MILASH because everybody knew that that was the last

meeting. He was preparing to, we knew this, he had been preparin;

and we had been talking to him since October since he was out

about his return to Cuba.

Senator Schweiker.

Did the arms drop cache ever occur:?

AMLASH Case Officer. I had left, I wasn't involved in

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that part of 1t, Senator.

Again; only from the record that I

read afterwards, I think a couple of drops were made to him.

In fact, the next year or something ilke that.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure exactly what was left or

what he received of what was available.

MIASH Case Officer. And I don't know if he ever picked

them up. I don't think we know that.

MI. Wallach. Why did he tell you he wanted the rifles

with telescopic sights?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Well, he wanted grenades and he

wanted dynamite too to storm the headquarters later on. We

said, well, look, could you expand this somewhat too, and he

was talking about, well, yes, and we should probably attack

the radio station at the same time. It was a matter of attackino

a building, whether it was a radio station or whatever it was,

In order to, in his mind, he was probably thinking of attacking

the headquarters, Castro's headquarters.

MI. Johnston. Let me

your previous testimony with

refresh your recollection. In

the Select Conmittee on page 114

you stated:

"When we came out of that meeting le heard the news

of President jennedy's assassination and I received a cable

after that which I thought that this was probably the reason

the hole operation was being

re-assessed.

ALAS!l Case Officer. That was strictly my thought at that

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Mr. Johnston:: And on page 115 of your prior transcript

you said, "well, the whole Cuban operation, the way I interpreted

It, was being called or."

Did you receive a cable to that effect?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was,.a.very cryptic cable saying,

you know, return to washington, which I was going to do anyway,

so this is why -

Mr. Johnston. Did It say to break off contact with

AMLASH?

AMLASII Case Officer. I don't recall that it did but

It didn't make any difference because headquarters knew that

that was the last meeting with him before he was returning to

Cuba anyway.

So there was no reason to tell me to break off contact

with him. This is what I'm trying to say.

Mr. Johnston. Supposedly the 1967 IG report, and I

don't know where they got their information, said that was an

OPI! cable.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's Operation Immediate. In

other words, it's an inmediate cable. That set precedence

on the cable.

Mr. Johnston. And what does that mean for transmitting

AMLASII Cage Officer. It was transmitted before a routina

cable or a priority cable. It's just the precedence --

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Mr. Johnston:

It has the highest prlority next to Laby.

AMIASI Case Officer. That's the one below FlAsil.

Mr. Johnston.. And that tells you to break off tha meeting

or to come back to Washington?

MIASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall receiving that?

AMLASI Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Johnston. And you read that?

AMIASH Case Officer. Yes, or I was told about it because

I didn't go into the embassy to read it, so I don't think the!

brought the cable out to me but I was told to go on back to

Washington.

Mr. Johnston, Let me state that that cable is apparently

not in the MINSll file and the 1967. Inspector General could not

find that cable.

Does that surprise you?

AMIASH Case Officer. No, it doesn't really because

I don't think there was that much importance given to that

kind

of cable at that time.

What you say

about the Operation Immediate, we handled

all of our traffic, more or less, in this case on an immediate

basis because of the short periods of time that we had with

ALASIL.

So if you are implying that because of the OP AM cable

that there was something else behind this, no, I don't think that

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wab.

In anyway twas dust, you know, return to Washington,

and

as

I assumed, and l'assumed at that time that certainly the

whole Cuban operation was going to be ra-assessed after what

happened to President Rennedy,

Mr. Johnston. Now there is in the file a cable reporting

from Paris to Hashington reporting that you planned to depart

Paris that morning of November 23rd and arrive in Washington

8:10.

Did you in fact take that flight?

AMIASIl Case Officer: Did you ever find that cable?

Mr. Johnston. I saw the cable of your return to

Washington.

AMIASIl Case Officer. If it referrod to a cable, that

was the one telling me to come back. This 1s a travel-type

of exchange.

Mr. Johnston. Did you in fact arrive back in Washington

I said 8:10. I'm SOrry, It would be 18:10, which would be

6.00 Hashington time.

AMINS!! Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Where did you go when you arrived in

Washington at 6:10 in the evening on lovember 23rd?

MILASI Case Officer. I don't recall specifically if

I stopped by my home, which is en route to the office, whether

I went right back to the office before going home

Mr. Johnston. But you did go to the office sometime that

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AMIASH Case Officer. I may have.

Mr. Johnston. Did you go to the office on the 24ti?

AMLAST Case Officer. Oh, yes.

MI. Johnston. That was a Sunday?

AMLASII Case Officer. It could have been.

Mr. Wallach. One question about the cable that we can't

find.

Did you have any other business in Paris besides AMLAS!!?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Not specifically at that time.

Mr. Wallach, Has there a date that you intended to

return?

MIASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. when was that date officially?

AMIAS! Case Officer. About the time that I returned.

MI. Wallach. Why would they have sent you a cable

telling you to return if you intended to return that day?

AMIASH Case Officer. I don't know. This was "probably

a reaction to what had happened. But again, I want to point

out to you that travel cables of this type, even if your plans

such, and the way I was travelling at that time I vas not

travelling on a listomattered nortgor anything like that. toü

don't even need a regular passport to travel France. It was

just to keep tract. and record of our personal travel.

In other words, it's our security to make sure that

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that headquarters knows that ve are coming back and I sent a

cable saying I'm arriving on such and such a date, the same

nay I sent a cable to Paris telling them I'm arriving on such

and such a date.

Mr. Johnston, Would you have sent your cable without

getting a cable first from them?

MILASIl Case Officer.

I could have, sure.

MI. Johnston. I'm not sure I understand the purpose

of their cable. Were you saying it's a regular thing that they

will send extra traffic?

AMLAS! Case Officer. I can't tell you what the purpose

of their cable was except what I'm trying to explain to you

is that keeping headquarters informed or headquarters inquiring

of you in such circumstances,. it's not unusual to get a cable,

you know, advise us when you're going to return or please

return or us sending a cable.

If there was any other reason for sending that cable,

I can only conjecture, I don't know, that it was because of

what had happened.

Mr. Johnston. I'd like the record to show that senator

Schweiker has left and you are aware that without the Senator

being here you have the prerogative to stop your testimony.

Do you understand thät?

AMLAS! Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And that if we proceed, that you can continue

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to stop at any time during the testimony and ask for 1t to

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continue when we have a'sonator present.

Do you understand that?

AMIASIl Case Officer. Right.

Me. Johnston.

Are you willing to continue under the

conditions of not having a Senator here?

AMIASIl Case Officer. Yes, I am.

MI. Johnston.

We have you back in Washington at 6:10

on November 23rd, and you may or may not have gone to the office

that day and you said you definitely did go to the office on

November 24th, on Sunday.

ANLASIl Case Officer. Probably so. Scratch definitely.

I'm probably not that definite about 1t, but I'm sure I touched

base with the office as soon as I returned, either telephonically

or physically going there.

Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection then and

remind you that Oswald was killed on November 24th, Sunday.

Does that aid you in recalling where you were at that

time?

M'ILASI! Case Officer. No. I mean I was home, certainl!.

Mr. Johnston. You mean home in Washington?

AMIASIl Case Officer. In Washington.

Mr. Johnston. But you don't know whether you were at

the office or at home on that day?

AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on the hour that we

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may have been working.

If you're going back

to asking about normal hours that

we kept during that period of time, Sunday was just another

working day, so you know, it wasn't because it was Sunday that

we would not have been in the office.

MI. Johnston. But you con't recall being in the office?

AMIASIl Case Officer. I don't recall being in the office.

When we heard the information that Oswald was Involved, I

could very well have been home.

MI. Johnston. Do you recall being in the office when

you heard that Oswald was shot?

AMIASI! Case Officer. No.

MI. Johnston. Did you hold, when did you first talk.

to the chief of the section about your meeting?

AMINSI! Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall whan.

What would have been ususual is for me to have called the offica

when I got in and whether I went there of not, I don't recall.

And then I either talked to Fitzgerald who would have been,

he would have been the only person I would have talked to. If

he was in on that sunday and I went in, I would have talked to

him on sunday, and if not, it would have been on Monday.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. Helms about the

November 22nd meeting?

MIASli Case Officer. No, I did not talk to Helms.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. McCone about the

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November 2and meeting?

AMIASIl Cape Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to anyone in technical

services about the pen device: or: the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not at the time, no.

Mr. Johnston.

So it was your recollection that the only

one you talked to in this time period of November 23rd

and

November 24th, November 25th about the meeting in Paris is

Mr. Fitzgerald?

MILASI Case Officer. To the best, of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And what is your recollection of that

discussion?

MIASH Case Officer. The report, as to what had taken

place, reporting that he had not thought highly of the device

that we had provided him with, that he did not intend to carry

It back, that he was pleased with the fact that we had decided

that we would put caches down for him inside Cuba, the

reaffirmation of U.S. support for his movement inside of Cuba,

the fact that he had decided definitely to return and had

made his reservations to return, and his dismay and his

reaction when he had heard that Kennedy had been assassinated

when we got to the meeting.

Mi. Johnston.

Was there a discussion about any link

between ALAS!! or your Cuban operations and the Kennedy

assassination?

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AMLISH Case Officer. None whatsoever that I can remember

MI. Johnston. No discussion betwean you and Fitzgerald

at all about any connection?

AMLASH! Case Officer.

No, not that I can recall.

Mr. Johnston. When you say not that you can recall, are

you saying that 'it's possible but you don't recall it, or are

you certain, fairly certain to the best of your recollection?

MMLASH Case Officer. I'm fairly certain to the best

of my knowledge that there was no connection botween the MYLiSil -

in other words, that we discussed it, we discussed the Kennedy

assassination. I'm sure we did. I mean who wasn't discussing

the Kennedy assassination at that time. That we tied the

Kennedy assassination in with AMLASIl, I don't recall any kind

of conversation of that nature.

Mr. Johnston. On November 23rd and November 24th and

November 25th?

AMLASI! Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. All right. Let me point you to one of

the documents we wanted to ask you about and it is a contact

report dated 25 November, and let me just show that to you.

Is that a document -- let me

state for the record what

it is.

It's the original, apparently copy, of the iovenber 25th

contact report of the November 22nd meeting.

Did you prepare that contact report?

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Mr. Johnston. And Is that the docuient you prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. I'm asking you dlrectly is that the

very document you prepared? That's a very specific question.

AMIASII Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

‚MMIASIl Case Officer. The date 1s 25 November.

Mr. Johnston. Is it your recollection that that's the

date you prepared that?

AMLASI! Case Officer. Probably so.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of doing it

on that date?

A-IAS!! Case Officer. Not specifically on the 25th, but

if the document is dated the 25th, I presume that's the day

that I did the memorandum.

Mr. Johnston. low how did you prepare it? Did you

dictate it to somebody who then typed it up, or did you yourseld

personally prepare it? And in asking you that question, is there

any way to tell from the document how it was prepared?

A'ITASHl Case Officer. No, the secretary probably typer!

it.

I mean I didn't type it myself.

11r. Johnston. You did not type it yourself.

Is there any way to tell from the document? There are

no initials on it or anything that would indicate that it was

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dictated and typed? s

ALAST Case Officer. No.

What are you asking me?

MI. Johnston.

I'm just asking you if you're the one that

prepared that of how it got prepared?

AMINSH Case Officer.

Yes, It's a contact report of my

meeting with MILASH.

Mr. Johnston.: And you prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer.

That's right.

MI. Johnston. But you did not type it?

MMLASIl Case Officer. I did not type it, so I could have

dictated it to a secretary or wrote it out longhand and gave

it to her and she typed it.

Ms. Johnston. What about the fact that on November 19t!

in your memorandum for record you indicated that Fitzgerald

wanted written reports to be kept to a mimimum?

With those instructions why did you prepare a contract

report?

AMIASH Case Officer. Because I probably contacted

Fitzgerald about it and he said prepare the one on this mactin:.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall that?

MILASH Case Officer. I don't recall that but that woui:

be a

normal thing.

"ir. Johnston. That he would have in effect ..

MILAS!! Case Officer. I briefed him on this, and t

said, let's have a memorandun, a contact report on that.

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In other words, when ho sald, minimize the written:

communications on the operation, he didn't say we won't have any

other communications on any other memos on it or any further

memorandums on it.

So what would happen if you put things within the dates

here, I had briefed him on this and then it was by agreement

or maybe by his order that he told me to write up a contact report.

MI. Jolinston.

llave you had an opportunity to examine

that report either before you came here? I'm not sure we've

given you enough opportunity to look at it closely while here.

Maybe you could take that time right now to look at the document.

AMLASH! Casc Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston, Look at page 3 of the document. Comparc

page 2 and page 3.

Page 3 is in a much different type than

paze 2.

Do you notice that? It's much fainter.

NILAS! Case Officer. Yes, it's fainter, and I don't

know if the type looks 'Ilke It's the same but it's fainter.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any explanation for that?

AMLASIl Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Was page 3 what you prepared on Novenber !!:

AMLASH Officer.I didn't personally prepare it again, so

I could have given the secretary my long hand report, somethin

could have happened, and then I finished it and she put it on

a second page. That is possible. I don't have any explanation

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why 1t's lighter, than the other one.

The type appears to be the

same.

MI. Johnston. Are you saying that the way you prepared it

It's possible that the second page and third page were prepared

on different days?

AMLASII Case Officer. No, it could have been at different

times of the day. If I had writen out the first part of the

contact report and I hadn't finished it, the secretary could

very well have started to type it, and then when I finished 1:

I would have given her the last page to type because it was all

on the 25th.

Mr. Johnston. Are you saying --

AMLASH Case Officer. Because there's no date on the

second page.

MI. Johnston. You're stating that your recollection is

that that document was typed on one day by one person.

MMLASH Case Officer. Yes, probably so. That's the

usual case. I have no reason to doubt why it would have been

done any differently.

Mr. Johnston. What about the information on page 3?

Is that the substance, in fact? Is that exactly what you wrote

on November 25th about the contact?

MILASH Case Officer. Yes, and in fact I draw your

attention to the part on the secret writing material because

we were very concerned as to how we would continue to communicatr

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with him Inside Cuba and this was one of the subjects that

were discussed at the last meeting, communications. So that

1s not a new subject matter. That is definitely part of the

subject matter that was discussed at the last meeting, which

was communications with him.

Mr. Johnston. And it's your testimony that this report

as it exists in that file 1s exactly the report that you prepared

on November 25th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes..

MI. Johnston. You'll note that the report does not

mention the pen device or MilASil's reaction to your giving it

to him.

AMLASH! Case Officer. That's right.

M5. Johnston. You left that out of your original report.

You did not make a written report on -

AMLASIl Case Officer. I did not make a written report

on that.

Mr. Johnston. Why was that?

MILASH Case Officer. Probably because Fitzgerald saiu

not to.

MI. Johnston. Do you recall Fitzgerald saying not to?

ANIASI! Case Officer. I don't recall it, but that's

cartainly what I'd have to assume.

In other words, don't include that part of it.

Mr. Johnston. Should it have gone in there in a normal

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report?

AMIASIl Case Officer. In a normal report, yes. But this

certainly was a rather, again, sensitive subject that we were

talking about. He did not accept it and I don't think that at

that time it was felt that anything else should be said about

it.

Mr. Johnston. Why is that?

AMIASIl Case Officer. I don't know why. Again, because

of the sensitivity, I presume, of the subject.

Mr. Johnston. And again, is it your recollection that

Fitzgerald, is it your testimony that Fitzgerald told you not

to put a reference to the pen device in the report?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if he specifically

told me not to put it in or if when I gave him the report he

was satisfied that it was not in.

Mr. Baron, Why would a reference to the pen device be

any more sensitive than references to arms caches or suggestions

of assassinations or all the other kinds of things that were

already in the file?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because again, in conjunction with

this particular operation it was not an assassination operation;

It was a coup operation. This was one of the aberrations of the

operation which ve got involved in strictly to provide bona

fides to the man that we were dealing with and we were concerned

for his personal security.

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In other words, 1t was not part of the operational plan

to provide him with any such devices for the purposes of

assassinating Castro. The rifles and the grenades and all of

this was something that was necessary to start a coup.

In other words, it was not directed at one particular

person.

I think this was probably the thinking at that time and

Why such points did not get into it because this was not part

of the AMIASH plan of operation.

MI. Baron. For the sake of the accuracy of the records

and the protection of the people who were involved at the Cin,

wouldn't even the tender of such a device to AMIASil for whatever

purporses normally be put into the records?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Not in a contact report because in

a contact report this goes

into the regular file. Whether

Fitzgerald would have made a note of this some place else I

don't know, but in the regular contact report which goes into

the regular file -- in other words, say the secretary would'

know about it and this could have been the other part of it.

In other vords, to reduce the number of people, to contai:.

the nunber of people.

Mr. baron. Do you recall anything in your discussions

with Fitzgerald that led you to believe that one of the

factors that was in his mind in assessing the sensitivity of

this tender of a poison pen device was the day on which it

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happened as opposed to aimply the fact that such a device was

offered?

AMIASH Case Officer. Il it was in his mind, he never

stated it to me. I think it was just the overall sensitivity

that the Agency had been, has now, and always has had on

assassinations.

I mean it's not the specific of what had happened that

time. Assassinations were not part of the routine business of

the Agency.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, you have mentioned the

secretary who prepared it. Do you recall the name of the

secretary who prepared this document?

AMLASII Case Officer. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have a regular secretary?

AMIASH Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Johnston. What was her name?

MILASH Case Officer. She could have prepared it or

It could have been Pitzgerald's secretary because, again, o

the days, the sunday.

I don't recall the name.

Mr. Johnston.

You don't recall your secretary's naii?

AMIASI Case Officer. Well, I don't remember. 1f a gir.

by

the name of Bobbie Hernandez was still with me. She was

my secretary during part of that time. She was probably my

secretary then.

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I don't recall Fitzgerald's secretary's name, and she

could have typed it, but it would have been one of the two girls

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the report again and on

page 1 of the report, I think it's paragraph 2 of that that

discusses the newspaper article, the Kennedy speech. Paragraph

two:

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Phona (Aros

MARD SPAUL

"AMINSI! stated he was returning to Cuba'' The second

sentence of that 18 --"subject was pleased to read a copy of

President Kennedy's 18 November speech in Miami and was even

more pleased to hear that Fitzgerald had helped to prepare

the President's speech. You the case officer reiterated the

assurances given by Fitzgerald of full l.s. support if a

real coup against the regime was successful."

AMLASHI Case Officer. Yes, that's right.

MI. Johnston. Does that refresh your recollection about

whether or not you gave him the speech?

ALASH Case Officer. No, because at that time it

could have already been printed in the Paris newspaper and

he could very well have read it in one of the Parisian newspapiir.

But again, I could have had a copy of a newspaper clipping of

the speech with me.

Mr. Johnston. But in the least does that refresh your

recollection that you told A'LASHl that Fitzgerald helped preparc

the sneech?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Yes, Fitzgerald told me that ve

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could tell him

Mr. Johnston. "Would you recall the portion of the

speech you pointed out to AMIASH?

AMI.ASIl Case Officer. No portion was pointed out to him.

It was just that Fitzgerald had helped in preparation of the

speech.

Mo. Johnston. I could show you a copy. This is an

extract I have prepared from the November 19th, 1963 Washington

Post, page 115, which carries an AP story of November 18th

saying:

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"The following is the text of President Kennedy's address

tonight before the Inter-American Press Association."

And I have extracted the only portions as are relevant

to Cuba. Now I'll give you a chance to read it.

Incidentally, I'd like to have this narked as Exhibit 1

for the record.

(The document referred to

was marked for identificition

as A'LASIl Case Officer

Exhibit No. 1)

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MI. Johnaton.? point out that in that speech, do you

have a recollection of thie being the part of the speech or

you discussed this aspect of the speech?

AMLASH! Case Officer. He did not discuss the speech

paragraph by paragraph. All we did was a very small passing

remark

"about the speech.

lie had probably to the best of my recollection already

read it in one of the Parisian newspapers, or if I had a news-

paper clipping of the speech, he glanced at it while we were

there, but I don't recall that. But he was certainly satisfica

with the tone of the speech.

ir. Johnston. You must have read the speech

before

you mentioned it to him. Is this the portion that you had in

mind that would satisfy him about the tone of the speech?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Certainly this sets the tone for

the whole speech. The extracts that you have made here sets

the tone for the full speech and specifically the one in which

once the harrier is removed, we will be ready and ansious

to work with the cuban people in pursuit of those progressive

goals which in a few short years stirred the

hopes and the

sympathy of man! people throughout the entire hemisphere.

MI. Johnston. Was it your intent by making reference to

the speech in your meeting with MiLAsil to show that higher

authority was behind what you were doing?

AMLASIl Case Officer. Yes, precisely.

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Mr. Johnston. And you felt that this speech coincided

with what you were telling AMIASil?

AMIASH! Case Officer. Yes, that the U.S. Government was

prepared, the. asgurances at first that Gerald had given him

and I had been giving him that the U.s. Government was willing

to support the Cuban people.

Mt. Baron. In the excerpt from the speech that we have

just shown you it says:

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba fron

my country and from all the American countries. It is the

fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban

people of their frendom and handed over the independence and

soverignty of the cuban nation to forces leyond the hemisphere.

Then it continues:

"This and this alone divides us.

As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it,

everything is possile.

Once this barrier

is removed, we will

he ready and anxious to worl: with the Cuban people."

That's the end of the quote.

Is it your understanding that this reference to a small

band of conspirators is a reference to the Castro government?

NIASIl Case Officer. Precisely.

Mr. Baron. And in your report of lovenber 19th, or your

memorandum for the record of lovenber 19th, you had mentione

that - well, I will simply quote from the report. It says:

"Show AMLAS!! One copy of President's Miami speech (remar!:

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to Mins" one that blankthelped with speech).

AMASH Case Officer, Fitzgerald.

Mr. Baron. Blank 18 Pitzgerald.

AMINSII Case Officer. Yes. This memorandum was written

before I went to Paris, so, in effect, these were my marching

orders that I could use showing that the U.S. Government, indeed

Mr. Baron. Would support a move against the Castro

government.

AMIASI Case Officer. Nould support the move against

Castro.

MI. Baron. And did you know for a fact that fitzgerald

helped with the preparation of the speech?

AMIASH Case Officer. Only from what fitzgerald told

me.

Mr. Baron. What did Fitzgerald tell you?

MILASH Case Officer. I can't give you a specific quote

but I presume that he had had some input into the speech. This,

again, wouldn't necessarily be Fitzgerald himself. It could

be but it could also be the sas, the CIn input into the speech,

which is normal in Presidential speeches that there are inputs

from different agencies.

Mr. Baron: Did Fitzgerald say anything to you about

preparation of this speech that led you to believe that the

President or anyone close to him who had been involved in the

preparation of the speech had been made knowledgeable of the

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AMLASH operation?:

AMIASK Case Officer. No. Eltzgerald never told me

specifically that the President had been apprised of this.

The general objective, I never had any doubts in:my mind that

the general objective of organizing a coup against Castro dia

not have the highest governmental approval. I mean this was

never a question, I don't think, in my mind. Again, not

specifically assassination because what I mentioned before,

I don't think fitzgerald or lelms or anybody olse would

specifically have brlefed anybody that the AMLASH operation was

an assassination plot because it wasn't.

MI. Baron. So you had no basis for belleving that the

President was informed that a component of the AMLASIl operation

was assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I have no reason. I don't

know. Nobody told me that he had or he hadn't.

MI. Baron. Did fitzgerald make it clear to you that

in providing input to this speech he had the specific purpose

in mind of giving a public signal to AMLASli that he would receivi

support from the highest quarters of the U.s. Government if lie

would move for a coup?

AMLASH! Case Officer. Yes, this was my understanding.

MI. Baron. That the speech was to be a specific signal

to opponents of Castro inside Cuba as opposed to a general

statement of u.s. policy?

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MIASH Caso Officer. That's right.

MI. Baron. Can you regall anything about your conversation

that produced that understanding?

APLASHI Caso Officer. No, just the general conversation

of the time and what we were trying to do.

In other words, we were trying to organize a coup and

the problems that we had been through specifically with AMLAS!!

In trying to persuade him that the U.S. government was serious

about supporting Cubans who were opposed to Castro.

So this statement that appeared in the speech was

certainly public notice that this was the case.

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald or anyonc else say anythiny

to you that led you to belleve that the President had been

specifically informed that representations would be made such

as the ones on Octoher 29th that Robert Kennedy or other high

American officials would stand behind AMLASH?

AILASIl Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically tell me.

Mr. Baron. Did your conversations with Fitzgerald about

this speech, his input to this speech, lead you to believe that

the President had been specifically informed that a poison

pen device was being prepared to be tendered on lovember 22nd?

M'ILASIl Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you in a different contest

now, was there a decision after the assassination to break off

further contacts with ALASH?

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AMIASH Case Officer, Yes, but that decision evolved,

It wasn't an automatic decision right after the assassination.

In fact, as you recall from my previous testimony we had

contact with AMLASIl again in late '64 when ho came out. I

think the only hesitancy at that time was what's the new policy?

Does the new President want to continue to, in our attempts

to

organize a plot against Castro, a coup against Castro --

That probably was the hesitancy, not the fact that it

was immediately decided to stop contact, which, as I said before,

It wasn't, because we saw him again.

Mr. Johnston. Nas there a discussion at all in lovember

or December 1963 ahout the relationship hetween the AMLASIl

operation and the assassination of President fennedy?

NASIl Case Officer. Not that I recall.

MI. Johnston. Let me show you, we have in several versicas

and the one that is most available is this document here, and

I have got the document you're looking at is in Volume 12,

I belleve, of the AMLASHl file.

AMIASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And it is a yellow legal size paper.

AMLASH Case Officer. Let me correct. It's not a docunen..

It is evidently somebody's type-written notes of probably the

recollection of what had happened.

Mr. Johnston. Diay, and it's on yellor legal-size pasca

typerl. And I also have a document that I'm sure is in the file

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but we don't have it painted out.

It's the sanitized verdion

of a memorandum for the record datod 29 March, 1965, subject

MIASIl, and both of them convey the same subject, the same

information. And on the paragraph that has the marking at the

left and the language of those documents, those jocuments say

"22 November, '63, Mr. Iltzgerald and MI. Sanchez assured subject

that this Agency would give him everything he needed."

Is that the portion you're reading?

AMZASH Case Officer. Yes.

Me, Johnston. "(Telescopic sight, silencer, all the

money he wanted). Situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and

Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President

Kennedy had been assassination. Lecause of this fact, plans

of sulject changed and it was decided that this Agency coul!

have no part in the assassination of a government leader linci":

Castrol, and It would not aid subject in his attempt.

"This included the following: ' we would not furnish

the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination»!

furthermore, we would not lift a finger to hel! subject escau

from Cula should he assassinate

Castro.'"

niil you prepare this document?

AMIASIl Case Officer. I did not prepare this document.

I was not with the tast force with SAs at the time this docursit

was prepared on 29 March, '65. I had already left.

Again, the only thing I can state for you here on wat

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478

I knew of the operation;. that this was somebody trying to put

together, this was a memo from Chief FI probably in the task

force trying to put togethar by this time, 29 March, what had

happened. The other document since it's, 1t's probably a later

date, the yellow document was somebody probably again trying to

reconstruct what had happened. The facts are not as I knew

them at the time.

Both paragraphs have condensed an evolution that took

place over a period of a year and the decision probably was not

made until '65 after I had left the operation, that we were

pulling out.

But the facts as stated here in those two documents are

incorrect, and certainly the timing that they insinuate is

wrong.

Mr. Johnston. I think we should develop that on the

record and if you want to point out what facts are incorrect,

why don't you do so?

MMLASH Case Officer. "The situation changed when Mr.

Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that

President Kennedy had been assassinated." That's incorrect.

Fitzgerald wasn't with me on the 22nd of November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. What about the sentence before

that, that Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that

this Arency would give him everything he needed, with your

qualifier that Fitzgerald was not at the meeting?

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179

AMLASH Case Officer, Thia was at the meeting in October

and not at the November meeting. because that is correct,

provided you put it in the right context.

Mr. Johnston. What about the statement, all the money

he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. Inferred. I mean I don't recall

that money was ever discussed with this man at any time. In

fact I was asked this question before and I couldn't really

recollect: when I had given him some money.

It turns out that the record shows that I did give hin

$350 for his expenses. But money, specifically, again, that

is somebody else interpreting. I don't know of any other

document or certainly any memorandum for the record that I

prepared in which money specifically was mentioned.

MI. Johnston. But would you disagree with the statement?

AMLASI! Case Officer. Well, the statement as a whole,

if you leave out the money, which again, anything that he needs.

MI. Johnston. Well, that's what we want to leave in.

the money.

MMASI! Case Officer. If he needs the money, I think it

was not excluded in the offer. But what I'm saying -

Mr. Johnston. This makes a positive statement, him

saying that you and Mr. Fitzgerald assured AMLASHl that the

Agency would give him everything he needed, all the money he

wanted.

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And I'm asking you directly either on October 29th;or

November 22nd did you make that assurance. to him?

AMLASI! Case Officer. I can't recall that such an issue

was made of money because he never asked for money and we

specifically didn't have to respond to telling him that we

would give him money. In telling him that the support necessary,

all of the support necessary for a coup, I think it is implied

that he would get whatever he needed, which would mean supplles.i

but not specifically money, and the reason I state this is that

money was never a subject of contention between the Agency and

AMLASHl. lie never asked for money, he never was offèred

specifically money.

Ms. Johnston. Mas he assured that he would get all the

money he wanted?

AMLASIl Case Officer. All the support he needed, not

the money that he wanted. le never asked for money.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you what he asked for.

I'm asting you what you told him. In this thing it saye

you assured him that you would give him all the money that he

wanted.

Did you give that assurance to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not because I did not

write this document. And the person who wrote this document

that I know of didn't write it from any factual report at any

time.

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This 18 not a document?

This 1a somebody's notes In

putting together. These are rough notes typed on yellon, legal

sized paper of somebody trying to reconstruct what happened

here

prohably two or three years afterwards.

Mr. Johnston. I guess what I'm asking is a yes or

no answer. In October or November, 1963, did you or MI.

Fitzgerald, to your knowledge, assure AMINSil that he would

receive all the money he wanted?

AlIASI! Case Officer. No, and I must qualify that. Unless

you want to infer that in giving him the support that he needed

he would also receive money. But money specifically, all he

wanted, was never a part of the conversations, to the best of

my knowledge.

MI. Johnston. We have talked about the next sentence

and it continues.

"Because of this fact plans of subject changed and it was

decided the Agency could have no part in the assassination of

a government leader, Including Castro."

Is that accurate?

I'm giving you an opportunity to

rebut the document.

AMIASH Case Officer. It's accurate from the point of

view ..

You have to put it in the right time frame, in the

right context. Then he was met in late '64, after having visit.i

and lived in Cuba for a year or almost a year, he came back more

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182

convinced than before that the only way a coup could be launched

in Cuba was the climination of Castro and when he expressed this

conviction, not in '63 but in late '64, la when the Agency, and

I presume the U.S. Government at that, time felt we can't

continue that directly involved with AMLAsil.

MI. Johnston. And the last sentence of that:

"This included the following -- 'He would not furnish

the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination.

Furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help the subject

escape from Cuha should he assassinate Castro.'"

Was that the substance of the discussion immediately

after the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMIASH Case Officer. No. A year later in November of

'64.

MI. Johnston. And you're saying that this does not

describe the fall AMLASH meeting?

AMIASH Case Officer.

It does not. It is a mixture of

what happened over at least a tvo year period.

Mr. Johnston. It perplexes me somewhat that your

failure to leep written records would so warp later thinkers

as to what was going on. I mean take the March, 1965 document.

As of March, 1965 CIA is going on the assumption that you

and Fitzgerald net AMLASH in Paris, that you assured him that

he would get all the money he wanted and that your plans

changed after the meeting because of the Kennedy assassination

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ALASH Case OfficerS can't sit here and presume to

give you an explanation for that as to where the person who

prepared that particular memorandum got that Information. The

I1le Itself indicates, as you are hell aware, that Iltzgerald

did not travel to Paris in November. lle travelled in October.

So the person who prepared the 29 March, 1965 memo came

up with this particular type of information, I don't know.

Me. Johnston. Who is that memo addressed to again?

AMIASI Case Officer. This is to Chief, PI from Chief.

Reports.

Mr. Johnston. So your only explanation, your explanation

for the memo is that it is inaccurate but even if it 1s

inaccurate, it indicates that in March, 1965 these people had

it all wrong as to what the AMLASH operation was all about.

AMIASH Case Officer. If you want to interpret exactly

what they wrote here, yes, it was wrong. Now I'm not saying

that it was wrong because it could have been. I don't know.

I'm just saying it could have been that they didn't have access

to all the restricted files because this operation until it

received its recent publicity was hept on a very restricted

basis.

So the Chief of Reports, I don't even know, well.

probably the Chief of

Reports in the division or maybe some

place, probably did not have access to all of the operational

files.

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M5, Greissing,:

You're saying that the information Itself

1s Inaccurato only in a chronological way, that it is developed?

AMIASI Case Officer. Certainly wrong in its chronological

context, definitely because it throws everything into one

very small period of time. In reporting or trying to report

what took place over a much longer period of time.

Mr. Greissing. But the facts that are there over a

period of a year would be true?

ALASH Case Officer. But not in this context:

Ms. Greissing. But I'm saying over the period of a

year from l November to the following Novemher when you actuall:

informed MIASHl of the feelings that the Agency had developer

at that time, I belleve it is the next sentence down.

AMLASHl Case Officer. What is wrong

here, what is wrong

is that after we left that meeting, which I presume they left

the mecting, I presume they're talking about, yes, the 22

November, '63 meeting - this is absolutely

wrong, that when

we left that meeting to discover that President Kennedy

had

beer assassinated, we had told him, you know, that this was

all off..

That is wrong. It was not at that meeting that he

was told that. lle went back after that meeting with the idea

of organizing a coup inside Cuba.

"Ir. Gratssing. I believe it clarifies that later in

the next paragraph. It says that this information was given

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85

to AMASIl the following November in 1964.

AMIASH Case Officer, Yes, So I don't know why ve're

taking that particular plece of information out of context

because in that same memorandum it does state that.

MI. Johnston. Let me move off these documents. The

file on AMLASIl contains a Movember 27th report from Paris which

Indicated a source in the Cuban embassy in Paris.

AMLASHl Case Officer. Excuse me. November 27th of

what year?

MI. Johnston, 1963. A source in the Cuban embassy

in Paris was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the

revolution.

Did you see that report on November 27th, 1963?

AMIASH Case Officer. I probably did. I can't

specifically recall that I did..

MI. Johnston. And as I read the report, or my statement

to you of its substance, it would suggest to you that AMlASi

was known by given diplomatic personnel in Paris to be putting

down the Castro revolution.

MIASIl Case Officer. It depends on who. In other words,

who did he say this to because he did have friends in the

different

erbassies.

Mr. Johnston. The Cuban embassy?

AMLASH Case Officer.

lle stayed at the Cuban embassy: He

was a Cuban official at that time. So he had friends who were

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of 11ke mind that he was.

revolution was moving.

evere not happy with the way the

MI. Johnston. So that fact would have been more broadl!

known say in the Cuban embassy?

AMIASH Case Officer. Oh, yes. This was fairly well

known.

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MI. Johnston. The cable seems to indicate that the source

of the information was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating

the revolution, and went on to say that she or he wished he

or she had a tape recorder to record what AMLASH and another

person were saying, suggesting it is not a friendly source to

AMLASHE

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, that suggests -- and again, I

can't give you any definitive explanation for it -- what that

suggests is that she overheard AMLASH talking with somebody

else of like mind, and she didn't like what she heard, I guess.

MI. Johnston. Let's go now to again what you talked about,

any link in your mind or in Fitzgerald's mind in November and

December 1963 between what you had been doing with AMLASH and

the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever, none. whatsoever,

and no discussion, and again, again, I go back and take you

back in time, if you can place yourself back in 1963 and not

1976, after all of this has taken place, after we have had

all the public theories expressed of the connections, all built

on circumstantial evidence of what and who were involved in

the Kennedy Assassination. I take you back and try to place

yourself back within the context of this operation in 1963

when this happened.

First of all, I have to preface what I have to say by

saying that this was not an assassination plot, so there would

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be no reason why we would be connecting Kennedy's assassination

with this assassination plot. This was not an assassination

plot, it was not conceived as an assassination plot. As a coup

against Fidel Castro, yes. The fact that the U.S. Government

was not happy and was supporting people who were opposed to

Castro, this was well known. This was in the aftermath, '63, of

the Bay of Pigs. So there was really in the context of the

time the fact that this was not an assassination plot conceived

as an assassination: plot, there was really no reason to

connect this one particular operation with the tragedy of

President Kennedy.

MI. Johnston. Okay.

We do know that on the 29th of October Fitzgerald told

AMIASIl that Robert Kennedy was behind the plot or behind

AMLASH's proposal, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. What we told him was that the U.s.

Government was prepared to support a coup against Fidel

Castro.

Mr. Johnston. And AMLASH had previously told you that

at least one of his plans for a coup would require the assassi-

nation of the Castro Brothers.

AMLASH Case Officer. He had not exactly put it in those

terms, but he certainly felt that the first move would have

to be against the leadership, yes. In other words, we never

talked to him in terms of assassination, and I want this

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perfoctly clear.

Mr. Johnston. And he told you before the 29th meeting that

the first step would probably have to be the assassination of

the Castros?

AMLASH Case Officer. He never told me assassination because

he didn't even like to use the word "assassination."

MI. Johnston. What word did he like to use?

AMLASH Case Officer. The neutralization, the ellmination

1f you will, of the leadership.

The first move in any coup attempt, in order for the

other officers to fall in line, would have to be the removal,

the removal of Fidel Castro, because of the loyalties that he

still had personally with some of the officers.

Mr. Johnston. And after he told you that on October

29th, you gave him an assurance that Robert Kennedy backed his

proposal generally.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, the U.S. Government and

Pitzgerald as the representative of Robert Kennedy, supported

a coup against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. On the very day of the assassination, you

referenced the speechof President Kennedy's talking about

an ouster of the current regime in Cuba.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the September 7th

statement of Fidel Castro's, threatening the lives of U.s.

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loaders, and let me "Thave a poor xerox copy, but especially

a portion of that statement by Fidel Castro on September 7th

at a party at the Brazilian embassy in Havana, he talked to a

reporter, Daniel Harker of AP and said, among other things,

"we are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. The United

States leaderg-should think that if they are aiding terrorist

plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be

safe."

I would think.from your description of the AMLASH operation

that AMIASH had a plan to eliminate Cuban leaders, and that

it is very possible --

AMLASH Case Officer. So did everybody else. So did every

other Cuban exile who was plotting against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. But this is in the Brazilian Embassy on

September 7th, and you started - meeting with AMLASH on

September 5th in Brazil, and it may be coincidence, but Castro

does give a warning about United States leaders aiding terrorist

plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and you were doing that very

thing.

AMLASH Case Officer. There is probably a coincidence

there. I don't recall that i knew of this at that time. I've

certainly heardof it since, but I don't see the point that you

are trying to make, because if Castro is behind or was behind

AMLASH to involve him in the assassination of an American

leader, then are you proposing that he would also publicly

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'91

in the Brazilian embassy state that this was going to take

place?

In other words, was he telegraphing this plan that he

had?

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MI. Johnston. 'I don'tiknow: I assume not...

AMLASH Case Officer. I would find it highly unusual that

if he was serious about being involved in something like this,

that he would publicly announce his plan, but I may be wrong.

That's just my opinion.

MI. Johnston. So we have this Castro speech of September

7th, whatever that means, and we have the AMLASH operations

we talked about in November and October, and then almost

at the very moment of the Kennedy assassination we have your

meting with AMLASH and giving him the technical equipment or

the assurances of technical equipment that he had requested at

the October 29th meeting.

You knew on November 24th, certainly November 25th, that

the alleged assassin of President Kennedy was pro-Castro, Lee

Harvey Oswald was pro-Castro.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't even know that at this

time.

Mr. Johnston. You don't know that at this time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, where did you get that?

Mr. Johnston. You don't know?

AMLASH Case Officer. That he was pro-Castro?

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MI. Baron, Hasn't that a logical deduction from the fact

that he was part of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been, but I haven't

seen that.

MI: Greissing. He had come out publicly in interviews

stating that he was for Castro and would defend Castro if the

U.S. took action.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, probably so, but I never had --

MI. Johnston. And In fact, Oswald had visited Mexico City, and

on November 25th, the very day you wrote your contact report,

the Mexico City chief

of station cabled headquarters and reminded

them about the Castro speech threat, and I assume that our informa-

tion is that Mr. King was handling the activity in Mexico

city.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. So on November 25th he was aware of the

threat, reminded of the threat.

I think it is fair to say that Mr. King knew that Oswald

had visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. He knew that on

November 25th.

Another CIA document indicates that Chief of Station Wynn

Scott --I don't know whether you knew him -- in Mexico City,

on November 25th read a message to the President of Mexico

In which he said, Mr. Scott's memo says there are still some

important questions concerning Oswald and his visit to Mexico

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City. Mas the assassination of President Kennedy planned by

Fidel Castro, and were the final details worked out inside the

Cuban ambassy in Mexico?

That's againion November 25th.

There's no reason for you to have seen the document.

AMLASH Case Office. I don't know that, but again, I'll

just question, this was just a question that was asked. I

wouldn't report it as fact.

MI. Johnston. No, on November 25th that is a question

being raised.

Knowing now, looking back at Mr. King, we have the Western

Hemisphere Division on November 25th is informed that Castro

has made a threat against U.S. leaders, that the chief of

08

station in Mexico City is telling the President of Mexicol

that there is a possibility that Castro was behind it,

Oswald was known to be pro-Castro, and on November 22nd, you

in turn were meeting in Paris, giving a high level Cuban

assurances that his coup plot. that might include assassination

of Castro was backed by the U.S. and that yet you made no

connection between those, all those events, and there was no

discussion of any connection.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there was no discussion between

the -- the connection between the assassination of President

Kennedy and the AMLASH operation.

Mr. Johnston. Was there an investigation?

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AMLASH Case Officer.

Not to my knovledge. I left the

operation right after that, so I wouldn't know if there was

or wasn't. But the coincidence that you are talking about,

if you are connecting of trying now to imply that there was a

connection between AMLASH and the fact that it was on the 22nd

of November, the same date as President Kennedy's assassination,

they must have had a very terrific system of communication.

Mr. Johnston. Although you had set up the meeting on the

20th of November, is that right?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but he didn't know specifically

What we were going to say. In fact, the answer that we could

have given him could have been reversed.

Mr. Johnston. Well, you said he requested it.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested it before he left,

but the assurances, you can go back before that. You can go back

to the October meeting when the assurances of support were given

to him.

So I can't -- I find it very difficult to follow what you

are trying to imply or to relate AMLASH directly to the

assassination on 22 November. This is what I find difficult to

understand.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you a copy of a cable, no

indication that the cable went to SAS. The cable is Mexico

City, 7045, dated 24 November '63 and by way of background,

tell you that immediately upon the assassination, the personnel

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In Mexico City then started putting the entire sovlet apparatus

in Mexico City under surveillance and pulling the records, and I

don't want to read this into the record because it uses a

true name.

Lat's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Johnston. Let me read it, except for the true name.

It says "Provided below sufficiently definitive summary

of local contacts of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev." It gives his

contacts, It says'23 December 1961 with the Third Secretary of

Cuban Cultural Attache, naming her, and arranging a press

conference for AMLASHl. It's a very tangential relationship

with the AMLASH operation, but again, on November 24th, 1963,

Mexico City is reporting KGB ...or ... Alferiev's contacts, and

It includes a contact in '61 with AMLASK.

So I have difficulty belleving that they are, in hindsight.

not related, and that on November 24th or November 25th no

one at CIA related the two events.

AMLASH Case Officer. What I'm telling you is -- I'm not

telling you that no one at CIA relates the two events. You

asked me the specific question, did you and Fitzgeraldidiscuss

any relationship. My answer to you was that Fitzgerald and I

did not specifically discuss that.

MI. Johnston. Do you know of anyone who discussed it?

AMLASH Case Officer. ' No.

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MI. Johnston. Do you know of any Investigation that was

conducted?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

(A brief recess was taken.):

Mr. Johnston. Let me now talk - and again the groundwork

is that you were unaware of any investigation of a connection

batween the two, and you were unaware of any discussion about

a connection between AMLASH and Kennedy's assassination.

Is that a correct summary?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. I will show you a document. For the record,

this is a document appearing in Volume IV of the AMLASHl

f1le, and the first page of it has AMLASH's name on it, but

I call your attention to the red handwriting in the upper right

hand corner of that, on that cover sheet, and it says, "not to

leave this office, per" blank's "orders."

Is that correct?

This document has handwriting in the upper writing hand

corner that it is not to leave this office, whatever that is.

AMLASH Case Officer. Without specific clearance, without

orders.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of such orders

being given by any one, yourself, or Mr. Fitzgerald?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, what we have talked about before,

that Mr. Fitzgerald gave orders to minimize the knowledgeability

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of this particular, operation because of its sensitivity.

08442214744

Mr. Johnston. And that is the reason that this instzuction

was given about the file, this particular file or this

particular document?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.:. I can't see at this time that

anything else would have been thought of at that time.

Mr. Johnston. What suddenly required that order to be

given?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, nothing specific except that

by December of '63, the man with whom we were dealing, AMLASH I,

was going back, or was probably back by that time already in

Cuba. It was primarily probably I would say as much to protect

his security as anything else.

MI. Johnston. So that nobody else -- did this have the

effect of blocking knowledge of the AMLASH operation from other

people within the Agency?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably from my office down. Certainly

not Fitzgerald, not the Director or not anybody else who needed

to know about the operation, absolutely not. This was just

circulation within other components of SAS. That would not --

in other words, a note of this type would only mean that I

would be, or whoever would clear the order would be asked

before this file was allowed to circulate or was given to

anybody.

MI. Johnston. And I don't want to indicate -- my question

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does not Imply Intent os anyone & purpose, but voura this

notation have blocked anyone but Mr, kelma or Mr. Flezgerald

from getting access to this file?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. This 1s tuo Informal. If you

want to block a file like this, there is a much more formal

procedure to go by, to block the file for, say, the Director's

use only, or even at that time, the Chief of SAS. A note

like this 1s strictly, can only be interpreted to restrict the

circulation of this file for the other people in SAS below my

office, not restricting it for anybody else.

MI. Johnston. Upwards.

What about laterally? What about to the other divisions?

AMLASH Case Officer. Laterally also. In other words, they

would have to be checked out. It would have to be. We would

have to know who got the file. It is a matter of control. This

is what it amounts to, really. It is to know who the file

goes to. It 1s to control the file.

Mr. Johnston. But you do that anyway, right?

That's routine procedure. This seems to be something more

than that, of saying don't let this leave without my approval.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it isn't anything more than that,

and I think that you're really much more into it than what it

is.

I don't even recall giving -- telling the secretary this

particular thing. It probably came about from the miminized

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circulation order that fitzgerald had given vay before in

October, as I recall.

MI. Johnston. Did you expect this instruction to be carried!

out, that the file would not leave the office until you had

given your personal approval or Fitzgerald had approved it?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I would have thought that my

secretary would not have permitted this file to leave unless

cleared.

MI. Johnston. We previously discussed whether Mr. King

knew about the operation.

Did he specifically know, to your knowledge, about the

AMLASH operation in the fall of 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer.

I don't know. I never briefed him

personally.

MX: Johnston. Did you have any reason to know that he

did know about AMLASH eperation?

EMILASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Our notes indicate that on February 4th,

1964, MI. King sent a memo to you requirements for AMLASH, and

I'11 show you our notes.

They basically detail questiong,

intelligence information to be gathered from AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically remember receiving

this, but if we have - certainly the fact that we have an

asset who can surface any intelligence requirements

from the

community or ,anybody else

in the Agency, it would be perfectly

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normal for anybody to send these reguirements.

Mr. Johnston. Would you agree, at least. from that sunmary

of the document, that really he's asking you to get intelligence

type information from AMLASH?

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MI. Johnston. And given the October 5th, 1963 meeting when

AMINSll sort of indieated he didn't want anything to do with

that, this would be very inconsistent for someone who was

knowledable about AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. What are the dates?

Mr. Johnston. October 5th, 1963, is when AMLASH complained

about the low level espionage reguirements.

AMLASH Case Officer.

He did not want - he did not say

that he would not surface intelligence requirements. He did

not want to exclusively be that type of an asset.

So therefore it would be perfectly normal, regardless of

what he thought himself to be, or what even we may have thought

for him to be, that if he had access to information, we were

going to levy the requirements on him.

Mr. Johnston. My direct question is, then, having read

the summary apparently prepared by MI. King, and sent on

February 2nd, 1964, do you think that Mr. King knew about the

AMLASHI operation, the events of October and November?

AMLASH Case Officer. If he sent us a memo giving us

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requirements for AMIASH, at a minimum he had to know that we had

an agent with this particular access. But he knew about the

operation?" Not necessarily so.

Mr. Johnston. Do you find this consistent with the

nature of the operation as of November 22nd, 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. Explain that. I don't understand.

What are you - what is your question?

Mr. Johnston. As of November 22nd, 1963, you were now

involved in coup plotting with AMLASH, and were delivering or

planned to deliver the equipment, rifles, sights, explosives,

to assist him in that coup. It seems inconsistent, suddenly in

February, to go back to trying to get espionage information

from him.

AMLASH Case Officer. First of all, I have to address

that question from this point. Receiving a memo from king at

that time doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to levy

the reguirements on AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. Oh, I agree with that.

AMLASH Case Officer. So, to clarify the other part of your

question, that if we needed intelligence after the October

'63 meeting in which he said I'm not going to be strictly a

source for intelligence, I want to do something more for my

country, it would not be in any way out of the orderinary to

ask him to send information that we felt was. required on the

outside.

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Mr, Johnston. so you are saying you would not infer from

this document: a conclusion one way or the other about whether

MI. King knew the details of the AMLASH coup plotting.

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

MI. Johnston. As a final matter from my point, as we did

In your past meetings, could you briefly summarize, were you

contacted prior to today's session at the Agency, and did you

discuss your testimony of the ramifications of your testimony

with anyone at the Agency?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was called yesterday morning,

February 10th, by MI. Walter Elder, and informed that I was

to come here at 10:00 o'clock to discuss the AMLASH operation,

and that you would be over yesterday afternoon to mark those

portions of the file that you wished to discuss.

I picked up the files from the review staff last night

came hore this morning.

MI. Johnston. Did you discuss the substance of proposed

substance of your testimony with anyone?

AMLASI! Case Officer. No. I read the file and informed

myself as to those points that you wanted to talk about.

Mr. Johnston. That's all the questions we have.

I want to thank you very much for spending the time with

us

today.

Is there any other comment you would like to make?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all.

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•You're guite relcome.

(Whereupon, at 1:15. o'clock p.mi, the hearing in the above-

entitled matter was concluded.)

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An Extract From Kennedy'& Address to Press

Washington Post, Tuesday, November I9, 1963, p. AlS

(AP) Nov, 18 -- The following i1s a text of President Kennedy's address

tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyran-

ny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and

concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in tige Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country

and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band

of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and hand-

beyond stems poete do kivet ine other erican repus test int

and this alone divides

us.

As long as this is true nothing is possible.

Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work

with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which,

a few

short years ago,

stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people

throughout the

entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken prom-

ises of foreign conununism

and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere.

For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of

friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic insti-

tutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

---