CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET KGB ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: ASSISTANT DEP DIR, PLANS
To: ACTING CHIEF SR DIVISION
Document date: 11/23/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10125-10125

RECORD

SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT

INFORMATION

Released under

the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 53294 Date:

06-14-2017

AGENCY ORIGINATOR

: CIA

FROM

: ACTING CHIEF SR DIVISION

TO

: ASSISTANT DEP DIR, PLANS

TITLE

: CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET KGB

ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT.

DATE: 11/23/1963

PAGES

2

SUBJECTS : JEK ASSASSINATION

OSWALD AND KGB

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

:SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 05/26/04

COMMENTS

: JFK56 : F4 : 20040225-1049119

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10125-10125

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55, 3-5958

23 Hovenber 1963

£x-25550

PENORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Direcior, Plans

FROM:

SUBJECT:

of Soviet KG

1. According to an intercepted phone call. in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD

was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the

Consul, Valerly Vladimirovich KOSIIKOV. This was learned waen OSWALD called

the Soviet Embassy on I October, identifying himsell by name and speaking

broken Russiar, stating the above and asking the guard who answered. the phone

whether there was "anything new concerning the telegran to Washington."

The guard checked and then told OSWAID that a request had been sent, but

nothing had as yet been received. (MaXI 6453, 9 October 1953) The FBI liaison

officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 Novenber that the Bureau has reason to.

believe

that OSHAID's visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or

visa natter Lperhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles/:

2.

KOSTIKOV is an identitied KaBafliser. He was a case officer in an

operation maich is evidently sponsored by the KGB's 13th Dapaztment responsible

for sabotage and assassination) - Ials operation. thich is sontrolled by the

FBI inder the cryptonym TUMBLEWED, involved a German-national resident of

Olahona who was recritted in huare, end met this year vich KOStkoV in Mexico

City and shortly thereafternitma know, 3th Department Oralcer, Oleg BRiKt,

in New yore. the astructiods aven vamp lenithe tre officers, plapointing

left no doubt that both of them were working for

PROHIBITED

3. Of course it is not usual for a 1G3

aghat on a sensitive mission to

have she co do a gotta st my ever is have to see tail

show that very impartant agents can be met in official installations using. as

cover for their presence there some sort of open business:

Vice Admiral

Missa ParEn

1E305

3

Document Number

for FOlA Review on

RECORD COPY

-538

APR 1976

GLASSIFICATION REVIEW

CONDUCTED ON_ 6 APR

1976

ELZ IMPDET CL BY CI32I1

23770263

201-259248

2220/

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I. BEKRIEV, lu a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course

at Military-Diplomatle Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who usenad

Representation, TASS or Sovinio

Propna En soviet trade

lar luse their cover

such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be

restricted to a minimum both as to place and time. Meetings of

this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with

tested and rellable agents in order ta avoid provocation by the

Local counterintelligence service against the Soviet installation

being used as cover. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work

offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours.

It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that

they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt

and transmittal of Intelligence matters, properly camouflaged, be.

carried out discreetly. In setting up such meatings, measures against

tapping must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with

persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually

signifies a relationshi, betreen the two parties that is above and

beyond orricial atter REPROMIICTION

Also,

such contact in officia

aused by the agentis own

carelessess.

NUIDITC

"Some agents, because of unexperience or because of deliberate

violatorol the utes of security through

rashness, in approached our case officers at places not stipulated

as operational meeting sites,

3, others tetephoned the case officer at

his Soviet installation ard" discussed personal contact arrangements,

while others still showed up personally at the Sovtet instattation in

order to contact the case officer.

I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by

phone to his FBI office at 1030 hours on 23 November.

0002786

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