MEXICO CITY STATION HISTORY
Originator: CIA
From: ANNE GOODPASTURE
Document date: 11/16/1978
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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CONFIDENTIAL.

ILL Recordcops

#SCA

OC =18.4017/2

16 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT :

HSCA Access to Mexico City History

HSCA requested access to some 200 pages of the

three-volume history of Mexico City - about a third of

the material. The substantive content runs the ganut from

the history of Mexico University through detailed operation-

al support capabilities and high level political connect-

ions and activities.

It is an impressive accumulation of

operational activity - classical sources and methods, as

well as detailed revelations about past events.

2. We pointed out that the agreement between Chairman

and DDCI Carlucci directly faced

the issue of the

irrelevancy of the vast majority of the history,

The HSCA position had been that it had

to verify this, and the access given to senior levels was

to satisfy this. Now it was being requested in connection

with depositions, which would serve to get this material

into a Committee transcript. Since some two-thirds of the

station's history (the work covers 1947 through 1969) pre-

ceded the visit of Oswald to Mexico in 1963 and assassination

of the President, that clearly had nothing to do with the

Committee's charter.

I added that Mr. Carlucci is out of

and will not be back until some time Sunday beyond the

not go back to him.

The request was

agreemenat I speak to the Director.

that I felt I could not modify it. Cornwell then

3. I saw the Director at about noon, and summarized

the agreement and the dilemma, also going over the above.

He stated that I could offer access

to one senior staff

member (in addition to

that material from the history not be used in depositions.

I spoke with Cornwell, giving him the message.

said that they may wish to use

some of the material.

replied that the history is based on other sources:

related to the portion that is within the Committee's charter

"CONFIDENTIAL

2 MODET CL EY 13190

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'CONFIDENTIAL

was based entirely on sources to which Committee investi-

gator's have had access.

Our problem was the overall

collection, and particularly some of the substance of the

history.

He asked if he could come back and ask for it.

wanted to use something in particular.

that we had never closed a door completely,

but that the

Director's condition

was fairly clear.

Those things

relevant to their authorized inquiry were already in

heir hands, so I could not think what they would have

this. They will ask us, and we can react

when they do.

5. Goldsmith came over to start reading.

S. D. Breckinridge

Distribution:

1

- F. Hitz/OLE

1

.: H. Smith/SA/DDCI

- N. Shepanek /PCS/LOC

W. Sturbitts/LA/DIV

OLC/ Subj :

- OLC/Chrono

'CONFIDENTIAL

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SICK

MC #240 19X1

ASCA

24 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Examination by Mr. G.

Portions

Robert Blakey of Sanitized

of History of Mexico City Station

1.

At 1745 hours on 23 August 1978, Mr. Scott Breckinridge,

Mr. Norbert Shepanek and the undersigned

met with Mr. G. Robert

Blakey, Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee or

Assassinations (HSCA).

The meeting took place in Mr. Breckinridge's

office.

The purpose of the meeting, inter alla, was

to make

available to Mr. Blakey certain sanitized portions of CS HP 329

(SECRET), a three volume history of the Mexico,City Station

covering

the period 1947 - 1969.

The portions selected for

sanitization were previously designated by Mr. Gary Cornwell as

neing of interest to the HSCA.

Mr. Edwin Lopez, of the HSCA

if, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico

City Station material.

Mr. Blakey was furnished the following

sanitized portions

of the Station history which

he read in my presence:

Volume I, Chapter II (C) - Station Expansion and

Joint Operations (1959-1969), consisting of pages 34 through 57.

Volume

II, Chapter III (A-3) - The Cuban Embassy,

consisting of pages

221 through 256.

Volume II, Chapter III (A-4) - Operational Supyort and

Technical Collection Activities, consisting of pages 257 through 298.

• Volume II, Chapter III (B) - Covert Action Operations

(portion relating to student operations only), consisting of pages

327 through 336.

Volume II, Chapter IV - Joint Operations and Projects

Using Mexican Government Officials (portions relating to Proiert

LIENVOY and LITEMPO only), consisting of pages 409 through 423.

f.

Volune III,

Chapter X - Merida Base

(1962 - 1965),

consisting of pages

485

through 494.

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3.

I assured Mr. Blakey that I would be happy to discuss

with him any

of the deleted

items

and explain

the nature

of

the content and the reason for its deletion.

I told Mr.

Blakey

very candid in describing the deleted

portions. Mr. Blakey

thanked me, but did not at any time raise

any questions about

deîetions.

After he had finished his reivew I repeated my

offer to

discuss

any portion of the material. He again thanked

me and said he had no questions.

Mr. Blakey did not indicate (nor did I ask) whether

he would continue to seek access to the entire three volume

history in its unsanitized form.

Mualnu..,

Hawkins

C/LA/MGSB

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MEXICO CITY STATION listory

200 selecteu pages

Blakey reviced on 23 August 1978

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Historian's Note

This paper covers activities of the CIA sta-

tion in Mexico City and bases in Monterrey, Nogales,

and Merida from 1947 to 30 June 1969. While re-

search on this paper was being done from late 1969

to mid-1970, some projects of long duration were

terminated for security or economic reasons. In

those instances, the descriptions of these activi-

ties extend beyond 30 June 1969.

Because the paper is not indexed, the table

of contents contains a detailed synopsis of each

chapter. The reader will note some repetition of

operational events in the text. There is a reason

for this. Chapters I and II were an effort on the

part of the writer to reduce to a reading minimum

a chronological summary of

the origins of CIA oper-

ations in Mexico from 1947 to 1969 for persons who

do not have the time or the need to read several

hundred

pages of station history. Subsequent chapters

treat the projects in more detail.

For the convenience of the reader, the writer

has grouped together those projects which pertain to

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the same target.

Each of these target categories

begins with

an

introduction which is nothing more

than a brief history of

the target for the benefit

of persons not familiar with the Mexico operations.

The Mexico City Station had one of the most

extensive and expensive unilateral technical col-

lection programs conducted by the Agency. For that

reason, those projects are presented together,

although they are also mentioned in station coverage

of specific targets. These unilateral projects had

two characteristics which should be remembered:

the majority of those still current in 1969 were

sources turned over to the station in 1947 by the

FBI or were recruited from contacts of these sources;

the agent networks in the unilateral operations were

a series of family relationships.

Readers may be confused by a Mexico Station

practice of changing cryptonyms of sources when '

they were switched from one project to another.

Some sources used by Mexico were identified by as

many as four project cryptonyms. Insofar as possible,

the writer included all the previous cryptonyms for

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the convenience of readers who may wish to review

the inactive projects in which the sources were

used.

Inactive project, chronological, and subject

files were provided by Lucille Long and Dorothy

Kishter of the Records Integration Division (RID),

both of whom devoted considerable time to search-

ing indexes for records which were not included in

the Clandestine Service records system. A presenta-

tion of the current projects (1969) could not have

been written without the cooperation ard genelous

assistance of all personnel of the Mexico Branch

of the WH Division in making available their oper-

ational files which were excellently maintained in

comparison with other records.

Anne Goodpas ture

Historical Writer

Western Hemisphere Division

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responded by asking that Jones be assigned to

Mexico City as a "civil attache" to investigate

the activities of German residents.

Jones opened the FBI office in Mexico City

in June 1942 on the second floor of an office build-

ing at Londres 85, across the street from the US

Embassy chancery and residence which was located

in a compound at Londres 101. He had a staff of

two men, the assistant civil attache, Marion Stokes

Davis, and the chief clerk, Charles Turnbull. In

the fall of 1942 Clarence Moore replaced Jones,

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-

and in August 1943 Birch D. O'Neal replaced Moore.

By mid-1943 the FBI had between 25 and 30 agents

working under

gover throughout Mexico. One of them

was Raymond J. O'Mara) who became the chief of the

32

CIA station in Mexico in 1951. The number

of

)slots in the Mexico City

32

office had also increased to eight. These agents

concentrated on two cases which involved extensive

investigations, the code names of which were ALTO

and CLOG. The ALTO case involved censorship of

letters of persons trying to obtain the release

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and Captain W. C. Ford (USN). They visited 16

countries in Latin America to examine relationships

between station officers and those in other Embassy

components, station morale, and operational and

administrative matters. A memorandum prepared by

these inspectors after their return to Headquarters

noted that Ambassador Walter C. Thurston

was com-

pletely satisfied with the manner in which Doyle

was handling his operations. The same memorandum

reported that the administration and operations

were

in excellent condition, and that the Mexico

City Station gave every indication uf being the

177

outstanding station on the circuit.

In the early years the station acquired some

surveillance assets for sporadic use on the CP and

leftist groups, but they had no organized team that

could cover the activities of Soviet Embassy offi-

cials. The FBI refused to turn over

the background

• data from their files on the Soviets. Furthermore,

it soon became apparent that the Mexican Government

could rot be relied upon to provide detailed cover-

age of the activities of such a large number of the

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Soviet Bloc officials who had complete freedom of

movement all over Mexico and clandestinely into the

United States. The Mexican security agents had

neither the training

nor the motivation for this

sort of effort. Accordingly, the station embarked

on a program to develop unilateral support operations.

This was not to the detriment of the other

targets which, according to SOI 23, took priority

over the Soviets. LIFTER, LIBETHENITE, and

LIONHEART (turned over by the FBI) were covering

Communist and leftist activities. LIBELER (turned

over by the FBI) was a high-ranking Mexican Govern-

ment official who kept the station fairly well in-

formed on events that were happening inside govern-

ment circles. He also provided some personality

information on the Soviet officials with whom he

came in contact.

B. Development of Unilateral Operations (1951-1958)

The first significant, productive unilateral

support operation was developed by Charles W. Ander-

son, III, in October 1950. This was LIFEAI, which

in 1969 passed its 19th anniversary. Initially a

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small telephone tap operation with a yearly budget

under $5,000, it developed into a large, sophisti-

cated, audio operation covering telephones, TELEX*

systems,

and

microphone plants with capabilities

limited only by the availability of persons to man

the recorders and transcribe the take.

In 1969

the LIFEAT budget was $102,000.

In the process of getting the telephone tap

operations under way, other support agent prospects

were developed. LIMESTONE (201-150706), a Mexican

employee of the Hoof and Mouth Control Unit, US

Department of Agriculture; and LIMEWATER (201-

183704), a telephone company supervisor, were the

original LIFEAT agents. They suggested

their sons,

daughters, parents, in-laws, and friends for recruit-

ment. From this assortment, the first 12 agents

were recruited for an umbrella-type project (LIPSTICK)

to provide mobile and fixed surveillance teams to

parallel LIFEAT and to man three photo observation

posts around the Soviet Embassy. These agents were

all untrained in clandestine activities; they were

* Autonatic Teletypewriter Exchange Service

(of Western Union).

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mechanics, clerks, salesmen, a housewife, and the

quarterback on the football team at the University

of Mexico.

Their one common bond was that they

were related in some way to LIMESTONE and LIMEWATER.

This project was developed by Charles Anderson and

Harry T. Mahoney.

These original LIPSTICK agents

formed the nucleus for the extensive operational

support projects in Mexico, and in 1969 many of

them were still on the job.

E. Howard Hunt opened the first Office of

Policy Coordination (OPC) station in Mexico in

Decender 1950. This office was combinod with the

Office of Special Operations (OSO) in 1952. The

base

in Monterrey, Mexico, with a staff of two,

was opened in the US Consulate in June 1951 by

John HI. Jenkins, J.

While the station was developing unilateral

support operations, contact was continued with the

head of. the Mexican Security Service (Direccion

Federal de Seguridad - DFS). In 1952, a police

training officer, Robert L. Melberg, was assigned

to Mexico under official cover. His assignment

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was to develop and train a liaison investigative

unit to be used jointly against the Communist target.

The head of the DFS designated a group of five

agents who could be used in this project (LIVESTOCK).

No sooner had the training program started, than

LIVESTOCK-2 (the team leader) shot a politician.

This killing by a member of the President's secur-

ity service caused

such

an uproar in the newspapers

that LIVESTOCK-2 was

jailed until the public forgot

about it, which was

almost two years later.

In early 1954, while Harry T. Mahoney and

his wife were occupying temporary quarters after

their arrival in Mexico City, a young Mexican-

American student tapped on the door one day. He

introduced himself to Mahoney's wife as a student

at Mexico City College. He explained that his

mother was an American schoolteacher, and that he

was working his way through college by selling

eggs, chickens, and cheese to people in the apart-

ment building where the Mahoneys lived. That even-

ing Mahoney learned about the egg salesman and

stayed home the next day to meet him. After that

!!

...

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meeting, Mahoney checked citizenship files in the

Embassy and gathered enough background information

for a request for an operational clearance. The

salesman was Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) who

became the principal agent for the photographic

bases, acted as a transcriber for LIFEAT, alternated

as a handler for the unilateral surveillance teams,

and performed various other operational tasks from

1955 until 1970.* His family and friends provided

a recruitment field for several other agents within

the operational support agent network of the station.

In 1954, the budget requirements for tue

18/

Mexico City Station were $463,692.

The five cate-

gories were:

Station Support

$275,545

FI

133,795

FI/OA

15,000

PP

35,352

pP Project Development

4,000

There were 19 foreign intelligence (FI) and six .

political and psychological warfare (PP) field

projects. The same year, the Deputy Chief, FI,

at Headquarters, Ronald A. MacMillan, sent Walter

Jessel to Mexico to chserve what MacMillan regarded

* GERENDE was terminated on 26 June 1970 because of

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as the finest technical surveillance operations in

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the Agency.

The table of organization (T/O) at

that time totaled 18 (10 officers and 8 clerical).

From January 1953 to March 1954, the station for-

warded 337 FI reports to Headquarters of which 324

were disseminated to customer agencies.

By 1955 the-Mexico City Station had tapped

every telephone line in the Soviet, Czechoslovakian

and Polish embassies, as well as the Communist Party

headquarters. In addition, Projects LIFEAT and

LIPSTICK had the capability for a quick swing off

to cover targets of opportunity as they arose. There

was contact with the Mexican Security Service and the

FBI. The latter then had a large staff of 20 to 30

people in Mexico and used the cover of legal attache

in the US

Embassy.

Operational support projects by the end of 1955

included two indigenous surveillance teams, four obser-

vation posts, @ photosurveillance truck, a 20-line tele-

phone tapping capability, and several independent in-

vestigators.

All of these operations were handled on a

unilateral basis.

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The CIA base in Nogales, Mexico, with a staff

of two was opened

ir

in May 1956

by Robert T. Shaw.

Another person recommended by LIMESTONE was

LIKAYAK-2 (201-119970). He was recruited by Ander-

son in 1956. LIKAYAK-2 developed the unilateral

mail intercept and Mexican Government file search

project (LIBIGHT). Indirectly, LIKAYAK-2 laid the

groundwork for the joint telephone tap operation

(LIENVOY) by introducing his Mexican mentor

(LIELEGANT) to his station case officer, Alfonso G.

Spera, in 1950. In 1969 the LIBIGHT Project, with

LIKAYAK-2 as the principal agent, passed its 13th

anniversary.

Shortly after Winston M. Scott* was appointed

* A native of Alabama, he had served as a professor,

FBI officer, and a naval officer assigned to the

X-2 Section

of the Office of Strategic Services

(OSS) in London during World War II.

He was Chief,

Office of Special Operations (OSO) in London from

January 1947 to January 1950.

At Headquarters from

January 1950 until December 1952, Scott was Chief,

WE, and from 1952 to May 1956 he was Chief

tion and Review Staff.

While Scott had ha' Inspec-

vious experience in Mexico, he had served with the

FBI in Havana and had a broad understanding of intel-

ligence operations from his Headquarters and European

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COS in early 1956, the WH Division (WH) prepared

a proposal for reclassification of the Mexico City

Station I/O which raised the COS slot to GS-17 and

the deputy Chief of Station (DCOS) slot to GS-16,

contingent

on the simultaneous reclassification of

chiefs and deputy chiefs of station at Rio de Janeiro,

Buenos Aires, and Santiago to GS-16 and GS-15 to be

compatible with emphasis placed on these countries

20/

by the stepped-up program for Latin America.

When Scott arrived in Mexico on 8 August 1956,

Lyman D. Kirkpatrick and Turner Smith were there con-

ducting a review of the Station. The inspectors noted

in their report that lack of clerical and operational

personnel had caused problems in administration and in

the utilization of operational data from the technical

operations.

The inspectors further noted that Ambas-

sador Francis A. White.* and Counselor William P. Snow

* White,

at age 61, was appointed as Ambassador to Mexico

in 1953 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

been a career Foreign Service officer (1915 to 1933)

and resigned as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-

potentiary to Czechoslovakia when Franklin D. Roosevelt

was elected.

At the time White was appointed to Mexico,

he was a banking executive. He followed flamboyant

William D. O'Dwyer.

The atmosphere at the Embassy

to reflect the appearance of the chief.

was elderly, portly, quiet, business-oriented, and very

conservative.

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the same title of other embassy section chiefs

(Consular Section, Political Section, Economic

Section,

and United States Information Service

(USIS) ) •

Headquarters agreed with the title

for the station but the chief's title was changed

from "attache" to "First Secretary." The DCOS

and the covert action (CA) officer had the title

of "Second Secretary." No other officers were

In December 1956 the station rented a small two-

story house which had a maid's room on the roof that

was an ideal lookout into the adjoining garden of

the Soviet Embassy. This was used as a third photo-

graphic base to observe the activities of the Soviet

officials and their visitors.* In September 1957,

the station (through LIMOUSINE, 201-5762) purchased

* This project first had the cryptonym LIPSTICK/

LICALLA.

mbassy in separate apartments

nanaged through the LIEMPTY Project

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the property adjacent to the Soviet Embassy. * The

four houses, including LIPSTICK/LICALLA, were re-

modeled by CIA. The three vacant houses were rented

to selected tenants. It was planned to place a moni-

toring device in

of each house.

were purchased and

sent

to Headquarters where the installation was made.

When the

were returned by special plane, it

was discovered that the audio unit had been put in

the which faced the street instead of the one

adjacent to the Soviet Embassy compound. This origi-

nal disappointment did not alter the later importance

of the property for very sensitive, highly classified

close support audio operations.

The station offices until mid-1957 were located

on

building in downtown

Mexico City.

After the 1957 earthquake, the offices

were moved to

of the same building

LIMUST Project.

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elaborate briefings took place with various visual

aid props prepared by the station.*

Unilateral agents in the umbrella support

project (LIPSTICK) numbered 49 in early 1958 with

members of the surveillance teams, basehouse oper-

ators, transcribers, and

general handymen all re-

lated to each other.

This relationship of the

agents was thought to be good security until

LIEMBRACE-1 and LIPSTICK-47 were arrested by the

Mexican Secret Service while on surveillance in

June 1958, and the whole network fell apart.

Through hasty recruitment of a prominent American

lawyer, the station paid

for release of the agents,

but not before they had revealed all of the cases

they were working. on and the identity of their

CIA case officer. The remnants of the project

were separated into four operations.

* This project continued until August 1961 when

Ambassador Thomas C. Mann said he did not want

any American businessmen involved in these

briefings.

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c.

Station Expansion and Joint Operations

71959 -

1969)

The only new requirement in the Related Mis-

sions Directive (RMD)* for 1959 was the addition

of the Chinese Communists as a minor reporting tar-

get even though there was no official Chinese Com-

munist establishment in Mexico. (The Mexicans had

diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist

Government.) There was a flurry of l

acti-

vity

which resulted in

having a troupe of Chinese Communist acrobats

31/

denied entry to Mexico.

The outstanding achievement of the station in

early 1959 was the setting up of a joint 32-line**

telephone tap center (LIENVOY), backstopped by the

32/

President of Mexico.

-

This gave the station the

capability for intensified coverage of the Soviet

and Satellite installations.

In July 1959 the Nogales Base, after operating

33/

for three years, was closed.

* See Appendix D

** Two of these lines were reserved for testing

equipment.

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vacatese

General

James Doolittle of

the President's Board

of

Advisors on Foreign Intelligence Activities visited

Mexico for a study of

station activities. Pat M.

Holt of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was

briefed on Soviet and CP activities during the same

42/

month.

In November 1961, two inspectors from the staff

of the Inspector General (IG) spent four days in-

specting the station. The inspectors reported that

the Mexico City Station was the best in WH and pos-

sibly one of the best in the Agency:

It had a broad

range of assets commencing with a close personal

relationship between the station chief and the Presi-

dent of Mexico, high-level telephone taps, photo-

graphic surveillance, unilateral intelligence assets,

and a broad scale of CA capabilities. The station

had

been aggressive and well managed with

the excep-

tion of a possible tendency to neglect administra-

tive details. During 1961 the

station

produced 722

intelligence reports of which about 45

percent

came

from telephone tap operations. The technical facili-

ties and capabilities were described as extraordinary

and impressive.

The intercept operation under

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for offensive purposes.

On 25 October 1962, with

the approval of Headquarters and Ambassador Mann,

Scott met with Lopez Mateos in Mexico City and

showed him photographs (supplied by Headquarters)

of some of the areas where Soviet missiles and

launching sites were located in Cuba.

Lopez was

49/

very grateful for this briefing.

In November 1962, approval was obtained to

open a base in

lerida, Yucatan.

Jack StewartJopened the base in December 1962. The

base was to provide support to possible paramilitary

50/

operations against Cuba.

In January 1963, four additional secretaries

arrived at the Mexico City Station with designee

cover. They were needed because of the increased

• emphasis on technical operations against the Cuban

and Soviet installations and the vast quantity of

paper produced by these operations which could not

51/

be processed by the

previous staff.

At the request of Headquarters and the Guatemala)

Station, the Mexico City Station devoted a great

deal of time and manpower to the coverage of the

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activities of Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo (201-006803),

former President of Guatemala, and a candidate in

the 1963 presidential elections of Guatemala. Sta-

tion operations against Arevalo included a LIFEAT

telephone tap, an informant (LICOOKY), and physical

and photographic surveillance (LIEMBRACE and LIENTRAP) .

From some

of the information collected through these

sources, the Mexico City Station prepared a compos-

ite photograph of Arevalo and the Soviet military

attache to Mexico, Alexander G. Sidorov (201-018498),

standing together in the lobby of the apartment build-

ing where Sidorov lived. This photograph appeared

52/

in at least three Guatemalan newspapers.

In May 1963, Scott learned "confidentially"

from Gustavo Diaz Ordaz that he would be selected

53/

by Lopez Mateos as the next President of Mexico.

Later in the year, Diaz became the PRI candidate

(tantamount to election) which assured LIENVOY, of

an extended six years under virtually the same

54/

managenent.

In 1963 the routine reporting of an operational

lead by LIENVOY developed into a long investigation.

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SECKLI

A man with a US accent, speaking broken Russian,

telephoned both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies on

26 September and 6 October 1963.J He identified

himself as Lee Oswald and Harvey Oswald. This

information was cabled to Headquarters for traces

and identifying data. After the assassination of

President Kennedy on 22 November 1963 in Dallas,

Texas, the Mexico City Station spent several months

investigating leads

in connection with Oswald's

55.

visit to Mexico.

The outside counterespionage/counterintelligence

(CE/CI) unit (LILINK) was activated in December 1963

and was envisaged as an unofficial composite of the

station which would reduce the number of official

cover positions.*

During January 1964, Headquarters approved and

furnished equipment (radio central and four auto-

mobile radios) for the chief of station to give on

loan to

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz as an aid to the future

56/

President of Mexico during his campaign.

• In addi-

tion

to the equipment, CIA gave Diaz Ordaz $400 per

* The project failed and was terminated in

1967.

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month as a subsidy from December 1963 to November

1964. It was ostensibly to pay for his two body-

guards during his campaign tours. In reality, it

was paid to LITEMPO-I (Diaz Ordaz' nephew) and may

well have gone into his pocket. This

was

in

addi-

tion to

a regular salary of $512 per month paid to

LITEMPO-1 as a station support agent.

The LITEMPO Project provided cover for a

16-millimeter passport camera concealed at the

Mexico City International Airport.* For the first

two years, Robert Zambernardi, the station technical

officer, serviced the camera and picked up the film

during meetings with the Mexican Chief Immigration

Inspector (LITEMPO-10) in locations other than the

airport. In 1964 the operation was turned over to

their replacements, Lewis D. Humphrey, Jr. and

LITEMPO-11). Later, the operation was turned over

completely to indigenous personnel under LITEMPO-12.

The film was delivered by LITEMPO-12 to his case

officer for processing by the station.*

All pass-

ports of travellers arriving in Mexico City from

Havana were photographed.

This was a strategic

* This camera was installed in 1962 by Warren L.

Dean and two LIFIRE agents. 57/

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spot because Mexico was the only direct air link

between Cuba and Latin America.

Station personnel devoted considerable time

providing support for JMWAVE and other stations on

a worldwide basis in their coverage of the Cuban

target. This support consisted of: obtaining

travel permits for Cubans to enter Mexico; obtain-

ing visas for Cubans to enter the United States;

renting and servicing accommodation addresses; and

briefing, debriefing, training, and dispatching

agents to and from Cuba. The station also handled

Cuban defectors who chose to make the last minute

59/

jump in Mexico City rather than return to Havana.

One of the most demanding of these support cases

was the reception

and protection of the younger sis-

ter of Fidel Castro Ruz

who was

surfaced in Mexico

City on radio and television on 29 June 1964. The

station then kept her sequestered for the better

part of a month. She and her two friends were first

accommodated for four days in the luxurious guest

house of an American in the outskirts of Mexico City.

Before the group could become a burden to these good

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people, another American offered assistance in ar-

ranging very comfortable quarters at no cost in the

remote but comfortable resort town of Puerto Vallarta

on Mexico's Pacific Coast.

The party, including the

JMWAVE case officer who remained with the three

women throughout the unorthodox situation, was flown

to the destination and back in the private plane of

still another friend of the station. Finally, when

the delights of the Pacific retreat began to pall,

the group was taken to a career agent's ranch located

a couple of hours south of Mexico City. In eddition

to protective custody, the station was called upon

to provide daily mail service to the group for the

two weeks they were at the ranch. On 24 July 1964,

60/

they were restored to their relatives

in Mexico City.

A team

from the Inspection

and Review (I&R) Staff

at Headquarters conducted a thorough review of the

Mexico City Station administrative and operational

program

in July 1964. They wrote: "The Mexico City

Station approaches the classic type station in op-

portunities and in operations." It had high-level

liaison operations, unilateral operations, and joint

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operations with the host government, as well as

Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist

Party operations. There was local collaborative

liaison with other US agencies (the State Depart-

ment, the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (I&NS), and the military attaches). To

accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station

was organized into Soviet, Cuban, Satellite, Covert

Action, Communist Party, and Operational Support

Branches.

The last branch was an operational catch-

all responsible for direction of all technical,

surveillance, and liaison operations.

In reality,

operational support operations were an extension of

the chief of station's personal clandestine capa-

bilities, particularly those projects involving

61/

Mexican officials.

The extensive support capabilities, which con-

centrated on the Cuban community, included: a waste-

basket trash operation from the Cuban Embassy handled

by LITAINT-2; recruitment of staff officers of the

Cuban Embassy; a tap on every telephone line from

the Cuban Embassy or official residence by LIFEAT

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Or LIENVOY; photographic coverage of the entrances

to the Cuban Embassy by a high speed "impulse"

camera handled by LIONION; mail censorship of

selected addresses by LIKAYAK-2; complete passenger

lists from LIFIRE of all incoming and

outgoing

flights by the 45 international airlines which made

daily connections-in Mexico City; mobile surveillance

of any target in Mexico City; and concealed micro-

phones in the wall, in the telephones, in a love seat,

and even in the leg of the coffee table in the Cuban

62!

Ambassador's office.

A Cuban Relugee Reception and Orientation Center

(LICOMET) was also run by an American contract agent.

This center screened refugees (about 350 per week

during 1964 and 1965) for possible operational leads,

and

debriefed those with information of intelligence

63/

value.

During 1964 approximately 47 percent of the

station's cable traffic was concerned with Cuban

operations, and 70 percent of the positive intel-

ligence concerned Cuban travel. The staff of the

station had increased to 87 (54 inside and 33 out-

• side) in addition

to about 200 indigenous agents.

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64/

The budget for fiscal year 1964 was $2,278,219.

In the CA field, the inspectors noted in 1964

that the Mexico City Station had a comprehensive

and competently managed program. It had effective

projects in media,

and

and in the

and

fields.

Three of the station's media operations

(LILISP-E, LILISP-H, ard LISIREN) included press

placement in two major daily newspapers, a weekly

press bulletin with wide distribution, a weekly

magazine for mass distribution in rural areas, radio

and TV programs, and a mechanism for publishing vari-

ous pamphlets and bulletins on a spot basis.

In 1964,

the three principal media projects constituted the

•

most costly in the station's operational program

(each amounted to over

annually) and com-

prised

station's CA budget

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did not approve of CIA support to this type of

organization.

67/

The inspectors in 1964 also looked over the

file room. They considered the Mexico City Station

files as being more complete than those of any other

station in the Western Hemisphere Division. There

were more than 9,000 personality files, a large

number of subject files, and a vast accumulation

of 3 x 5 cards. The volume of the files was in-

creasing at the rate of almost two linear feet per

68/

month.

The file

section also had responsibility for

name tracing for other Embassy components, * prepa-

ration of pouches to Headquarters and lateral sta-

tions, indexing, cross referencing, and filing.

The smooth functioning of this section was hampered

by a lack of trained clerical employees. It was

difficult to get people to accept an assignment in

the file room because the tasks were dull, tedious,

and infinitely demanding of the individuals' time.

* From December 1957 through December 1958, the

station provided 69,135 file traces of which

65,000 were visa applicants. 69/

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During 1965

two key officers were transferred

from Mexico City to the Dominican Republic.

They

were David A. Phillips, chief of the Cuba Section,

and James M. Flannery, chief of the CA Section.

In response to an

amendment in the RMD for

1965, the station began reporting information on

leaders and activists of the Communist and extrem-

74/

ist movements for the Key Subversive Watchlist.

For budgetary and operational reasons, the

Merida Base was closed

in May 1965 and emphasis was

concentrated on covering

the Cuban target in Mexico

City by an increase in

the outside case officer com-

plement and inside offical staff of the Cuban

Section.

Through Projects LIFEAT and LIENVOY, the sta-

tion tapped the telephone lines and planted trans-

mitters in the newly opened offices of the New

China News Agency (first Communist Chinese repre-

75/

sentatives in Mexico).

The top personnel figure for the station was

In FY 1966, when its size had increased to 90 Ameri-

can staif employees (51 were inside the station

using official cover, and 39 were outside using

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nonofficial cover). Of the total group, 28 were

case officers and

62 were administrative, clerical,

and operational support personnel. The number of

indigenous agents and informants continued to be

76/

around 200. The budget was $2,300,000.

In response to a request from the Bureau of

the Budget (BOB), Headquarters prepared an evalua-

tion of the clandestine collection program in Mexico

for FY 1966. This study included a brief descrip-

tion of the operational climate, CIA targets, and

the general manner in which the Mexico City Station

had satisfied the regunements.

The paper was well

received by the BOB

Several significant personnel, organizational,

and requirement changes

were made in

late 1966 and

early 1967. Francis

S. Sherry was transferred to

Mexico as

chief

of the Cuba Section. Daniel S.

Watson, who had been chief of CA activities, was

assigned as deputy chief of station. Albert F.

Reynolds was named as chief of the CA Section.

The nonofficial cover technical unit was abolished

with the transfer of the outside technical officer

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to Panana. The station gained a temporary official

cover slot in 1967 and 1968, that of assistant

attache for the Olympic Games, which was filled by

Philip A. Agee. This Headquarters-directed assign-

ment was of marginal value to station operations.*

The station holdings of classified material in

the file room continued to expand to the point that

by the end of 1967, they measured 1375.5 linear

feet (874.0 for subject files and 501.5 for index

78/

cards).

This tremendous influx of paper came

largely from the extensive technical operations.

The chief of station maintained a close personal

hold over the administration of files and felt

strongly with regard to his need for this volume of

classified material. To a Headquarters survey team

in late 1967, he pointed out that he felt he would

get adequate advance warning of any critical emer-

gency, in which case his plan was to ship

the clas-

sified material to the United States. It was esti-

mated that it would take approximately six days and

nights uf steady burning to destroy the quantity of

material on hand.

It was also estimated that over

* Agee resigned from CIA after the Olympic Games

October 1968.

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III. Unilateral Operations

A. Foreign Intelligence Operations

The FBI and the I&NS reparded Mexico as the

most important &t base abroad from the point of

view of US internal security. CIA-thinking in

early 1950 in regard to an intensification of sE cI

effort within the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP)

complex led to the concentration of effort on the

more important operating centers instead of dis-

persing assets thinly throughout a given geographic

area. The plan was to establish a "model" c pro- ci

gram in Mexico which would be beneficial in the

general improvement of CE work and standards through-eT.

out WH as well as the DDP. This was the principal

reason for the increase in the stalf from 18 Ameri-

cans in 1954 to 76 in 1961 (with a corresponding

87/

budget increase from $463,692 to $1,697,500):

To accomplish the CE and FI mission, the FI

operations officers

were assigned to four admini-

strative sections, named for their targets or type

of operations: CP and International Comnunism;

- 59 -

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Soviet and Soviet Bloc; Cuban; and Operational Sup-

port and Technical. The official cover complement

of these sections from about 1961 to mid-1969 con-

sisted of

for the CP Section;

for the Soviet Bloc Section;

for the

Cuban Section; and,

for the Operational Support Section. * The CP,

Sovict Bloc, and Cuban case officers handled in-

formants and penetration agents on their targets.

The telephone taps, surveillance, and technical

operations were run by the two Operational Support

Section case officers. The processing of the large

volume of transcripts, reports, and photographs was

handled by the section concerned. Each section was

responsible for the operational handling and station

support. for its respective case officers under non-

official cover.

• *This did not include a Technical Services Division

(TSD) officer who occupied an official slot from

1957 through mid-1969.

He usually made the techni-

al installations but did not handle the agents.

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Two other acquaintances of LIFTER-8 were

Haitian exiles, Gerard Pierre Charles and his wife,

Suzy Castor de Pierre Charles (201-350227 and 201-

796149). They were studying and teaching at the

University of Mexico and were active in the Con-

munist movement in Haiti. LIFTER-8 and his wife

In 1968 Lombardo Toledano died and the PPS

hierarchy underwent a change which did not improve

LIFTER-8's position. However, he continued to be

a valuable source on the WFTU and Haitian exile

activities.

LIFTER-8 was besieged with personal and fi-

nancial woes. His daughter, a perennial student,

was married in 1962 but a year later left her hus-

band and returned home with a baby girl. His wife

had a chronic illness dating back to 1952, and con-

stantly suffered from real or imaginary illnesses.

At no time during the 22 years he worked for the

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monitoring of telephone conversations, and inter-

cepting of mail. They talked constantly and were

voluminous writers.

These operations were directed by the CIA

case officers for LIFEAT, LIENVOY, LIKAYAK-2, and

LIEMBRACE. Some of the tapes from the telephone

taps were. transcrived by the FBi which then re-

turned the unerased tapes with copies of the tran-

script for station records and information. Most

of the exploitable leads were in the nited States

and were investigated by the Fbi. Surmaries of the

more interesting of these cases follow:

Albert Maltz (201-5239) was a motion picture

screen writer who serve a prison tern foi contempt

of court when questioned regarding his membership in

the CP of the United States. Fe was. one of the

"Hoilywood Ten"* convicted by the US Government.

Maltz arrived in Mexico in spril 1951 after being

released from the penitentiary. Gorion Kahn, one

-

* Ten motion picture writers and executives whose

Conmunist Party activities were exposed by the US

Department of Justice in 1948 and 1950.

- 125 -

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schoolteachers, cooks, and domestic servants.

Some 16 families (guards, code clerks, and chaui-

jeurs) lived in common quarters inside the walled-in

compound. The others lived in apartments in the

10S/

area near the chancery."

The Soviet Union had only two diplomatic

agreements or treaties with Mexico. One established

diplomatic relations. The other was a cultural-ex-

change agreement signed in April 1968 by Antonio

Carrillo Flores, Mexican Foreign Minister, when he

110/

visited Moscow.*

The officials of this very large Soviet

installation in Mexico were not there all those

years to conduct diplomatic business or promote

foreign trade. This was the headquarters for espi-

onage operations againsi the United States, Mexico,

ünd other countries in Latin America. Some two-

ünirds of the male staff were intelligence officers

who did little or no overt work. These officers,

with diplomatic rank and titles in most cases, were

scattered throughout the Soviet official installa-

tions of which there were seven in Mexico City as

of 1969. These were the Soviet Embassy, the office

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3

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University in Moscow under Soviet scholarships.

Young leftists or CP youth members started out by

enrolling in Russian at the cultural centers where

they were carefully screened by intelligence officers

from the Soviet Embassy who used the cover of cul-

tural officer. The students who learned Russian

and were considered politically reliable were given

scholarships for four to six years of study in the

113/

Soviet Union.

There were 12 non-Soviets who worked for the

Soviet Embassy (Mexican chauffeur for the Commercial

Office, eight Spanish Communists who edited the

Soviet bulletin, and three Mexicans who ran the

Films Office). They were all rabid Communists, and

efforts to recruit them by the station and

114/

met with failure.

For the Soviets, Mexico was also an escape

route for their espionage agents who got into, trouble

and were about to be caught by the FBI in the United

States. The Sterns and Halperins used Mexico en route

to the Soviet Union. William Martin and Vernon

Mitchell, two National Security Agency (NSA) code

clerks, also escaped by way of Mexico. Rudolph

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Abel made it to Texas en route to Mexico before

he was arrested. Americans in the. pay of Soviet

intelligence also went to Mexico for meetings with

Soviet case officers.

In addition to the Soviet Union, Czechoslo-

vakia and Poland _had resident commercial missions

in Mexico. While both the Soviet and Czech commer-

cial offices were sizeable and active, only Czecho-

slovakia had any serious commercial interests in

Mexico." Under the aegis of a commercial treaty

of 1949 and a payments agreement effective in 1950,

the Czech commercial office actively worked to re-

capture its prevar market for textile machinery,

machine tools, and consumer goods in the face of

strong competition from Germany and Japan. A

degree

of

success

was

evident from the fact that

Mexican

imports from Czechoslovakia in 1956

($1,900, 000)

were more than double those of 1955.

However, Mexico's trade with the Soviet Bloc was

marginal to the Mexican econony, averaging less

* The commercial officer positions in the Bloc

embassies were primarily cover for intelligence

activities.

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through the Mexican Government security service to

talk with the NCNA representatives to try to re-

cruit them but they all failed.*

During 1966 the station learned from the

LITEMPO Mexican Security Service contact that the

Mexican Government had refused to renew the tempo-

rary resident permits for the NNA representatives.

Working with the Nexican Security Service, the sta-

tion made plans again for an approach by a Chinese-

speaking officer from Headquarters. The NCNA rep-

resentative refused to talk with the officer when

122/

approached

on the street in Mexico City.

Station coverage of the Soviet Bloc instal-

lations consisted of

telephone taps, surveillance,

photographs, mail intercepts, and audio. In addi-

* On one occasion a Chinese-speaking Headquarters

officer,

on temporary duty in Mexico, planned to

take the same plane with one of the NCNA represen-

tatives from Mexico to London via Bermuda.

At the

airport the Headquarters officer checked his ticket

and baggage for the

flight, seeing the Chinese in

the waiting room

with others departing on the plane.

Just as the passengers were boarding the plane,

the

NCNA target walked

out of the waiting room into the

airport terminal, leaving the Headquarters officer

no choice but to

board the plane and depart for

Bermuda or lose his baggage and the price of his

ticket.

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tion, from 1950 until 1966, the station maintained

an extensive network of double agents. These were

terminated one by one as individual evaluations of

these operations revealed them to be of dubious

value to CIA as compared with their greater value

to the Soviets. This program was followed by the

development of access agents through recruitment

of informants who had a bona fide social or busi-

ness relationship with Soviet officials.

From the time the station opened, several

Soviet officials

WErE

singled out for recruitment

approaches but none

were successful. One of them,

AEIMPULSE (201-185353) was approached through

LIEMPTY-3 (an access

agent) in 1961 by Herbert

Manell, the Soviet Bloc case officer in Mexico.

AEIMPULSE remained under development for several

years in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America un-

til it was decided by Headquarters that he was

probably a provocation agent.*

The station obtained unique intelligence on

* A history of this operation and damage assess-

ment of CIA personnel and assets exposed was pre-

pared by William C.Bright of the Soviet Bloc Divi-

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the Czechoslovakian Embassy with the recruitment

Of LIBRIFORM and the surreptitious entry of LINI-

MENT. A move of their Embassy shortly after this

operation thwarted plans for future entries.

LIFEBLOOD (201-30789) was a station informant

on Polish diplomatic activities from July 1948 when

she was first introduced to Robert L. Brown by

LIBRIFORM. LIFEBLOOD was the private secretary to

from 1945 until she

resigned to remain in Mexico in 1949 with her hus-

band, a medical doctor, who had immigrated from

Polard to Mexico.

From 1964, DMPETAL, the Mexican secretary of

the Yugoslav Ambassador, was used as an informant

by the station.

Some of the more interesting of these opera-

tions were LIMOTOR, Alfred L. KONITZER, LIMAGPIE,

LINEB, LIJENNET, LICOZY, LIOYSTER, LIMYSTIC, and

DMPETAL; a synopsis of each follows:

123/

LIMOTOR

This project provided for the use of an un-

limited number of American students at universities

In Mexico City from August 1957 through September

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1964. A controlled staff agent enrolled at the

University of Mexico School for Foreigners and

acted as a spotter of agents in contact with Soviet

intelligence officers, also enrolled at the school.

The purpose of

the project was to obtain information

concerning the personnel, targets, and methods of

operation

of the Soviet intelligence service and to

identify American

students being developed by the

Soviets. The first yearly estimate of the cost

for the

project was $9,840 for the period 1 August

1957 through 31 July 1958.

The Mexico City Station

case officer who developed this operation was

Charles K. Jett.

The University of Mexico School for Foreigners

was set up as a place to provide Spanish language

training for foreigners, primarily American students

who planned careers in Latin American studies.

The

University of the Americas (formerly Mexico City

College) had a similar curriculum. Some liberal

arts courses and fine arts workshops were taught in

English while the students were learning Spanish.

This atmosphere

of several hundred students pre-

sented the Soviet

intelligence service with an

- 148 -

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ideal pool of candidates to choose from. Most of

the students were impressionable and naive, re-

sponding to the attention of other foreigners in-

terested in them.

Four young Soviet intelligence

officers from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

were enrolled at the schools and quickly made head-

way contacting the students. Some of these stu-

dents reported their contacts to the US Embassy,

and others were spotted and developed by the out-

side LIMOTOR staff agent. LIMAGPIE was one of the

first students to walk into the Embassy. He was

handled as a project separate from LIMOTOR. Alfred

L. KONITZER (201-185999) was recruited at Headquarters

and enrolled

at the University of the Americas in

October 1957, acting as an agent spotter for the

LIMOTOR Project.

Within the first few years of the project

some 20 sources

had been used at various times to

report on contacts with the Soviets but their short

one-quarter schooling in Mexico (in many instances)

then going on to another location, created all

sorts of security problems. Nevertheless, a

stable of double agent operations threatened to

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!

develop within the LIMOTOR complex. In other pro-

fessional areas, the Mexico City Station already

had

a half dozen time-consuming double agent opera-

tions against the Soviets. In the LIMOTOR Project,

the Soviets were not so interested in obtaining

Information as they were in guiding the young stu-

dents into a US Government career.

This raised

the policy question of how far CIA could go in en-

couraging these students to maintain contact with

the Soviets, knowing that this contact would sur-

face (perhaps against them) if they should seek

employment in some sensitive US Government job at

some later date. In one test case the Mexico City

Station was advised by Headquarters that LIMOTOR-21,

who had passed the Foreign Service examination,

should not be considered for recruitment as a double

agent. It was also stated that while Headquarters

could attempt to clear him with the State Department

security that "at best LIMOTOR-21 would never be

124/

fully trusted by State Department Security."

This raised the question of why CIA was engaged in

these operations involving young, naive American

students if they could not be protected (assuming,

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• Doeana la, a pe innaliiintalli", , a 10ard0: uap gpeo tooaa.

0er 30sx02

-300

-?31 - 347

-372-585

- 398 -423

-438-459

- 500

-503-505

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---

## Page 55

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uft.

E Haward Husti- opened orc

mexica, Dec. 1950:

, 8 hue:

LIFEAT-224 I teleplone tap

p. 226, 258 et 59.

opciation.

MONION - PP. 130-231

so hues is by us-ale sono de ore

LIENVOY -L247 telepliale top op.

8.408-418.

LEMBRACE-L 24 ] Jurieillance

HFIRE - tavel coutrol op.

ct 359.

ALICALLA -P.213-

#414481C-8.292-299.1

LIHAIBIT

Lialion p.ert "

LITAREN

cub.

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by the CIC in coordination with CIA and

l the FBI.

Soviet intelligence officers recruited a US Army

corporal and used him for the collection of posi-

tive intelligence concerning US

Army cryptographic

piocedures and equipment. The agent met his soviet

case officeis in Teheran, Iran, and in Mexico City,

Mexico. CIA's role in lexico City was that of pro-

viding surveillance and investigative assets to

CIC when the agent met his Soviet handler in Mexico

City.

The case is summarized here to show how easy

it was los the Soviets to meet in Mexico City their

agents operating

in the thited States.

The costs for this acuivity by the Mexico

City Station were absorbed

in

the operational sup-

Hort projecEs of LIdNor

(Joint teiezione tap opera-

tiO:), LIFEAT la

unilateral telephore tap operation),

29

Lic dilateral photo base), title unt

Interal photo base), and LITEMPO la joint support

project which photographed passports and provided

police backstopping).

24

-

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3. The Cuban Embassy

Fidel Castro Ruz assumed power in Cuba fol-

lowing the collapse of Fulgencio Batista's govern-

133/

ment on 1 January 1959.

Castro had launched

his drive for the liberation of his homeland from

the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico in 1957, and many

Cuban leftist exiles were still in Mexico as

of

1959. One of them, Teresa Casuso Morin

(201-

169119), a former Cuban commercial attache in

Mexico (1949-1953), assumed charge of the Cuban

Embassy in Mexico on 1 January 1959.

Salvador Massip y Valdez (201-218391, was

the first Ambassador to Mexico under the Castro

government. Massip's tour in Mexico (February

1959 to March 1960) was characterized by a series

of unpleasant incidents. Soon after his arrival,

he alienated the Mexican Foreign Ministry by re-

fusing to pay the normal courtesy calls upon many

of his colleagues in the diplomatic corps because

they represented "dictatorship countries." He

also ignored

many Western ambassadors at formal

receptions, and associated principally, if not ex-

clusively, with Soviet Bloc representatives.

In

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October 1959 Massip appealed to the Mexican public

for

support of Cuba in

a "moment of imminent dan-

ger" from aerial bombardment by planes operating

from "foreign bases."

In January 1960 Massip

publicly aligned himself with the Mexican Commu-

nist painter, David Alfaro Siqueiros, during the

latter's attacks against Mexican President Lopez.

Mateos. * The Mexican press charged Massip with

interfering in Mexican affairs. He was subse-

quently recalled to Cuba and assigned to Ghana.

Jose Antonio Portuondo Valdor (201-40662)

replaced Massip i. June 1960 as Ambassador to Mexico.

After experiencing difficulties in using the Mexican

press as a propaganda outlet, he turned to direct

agitation among students and labor. Portuondo, a

former university professor, invited Mexican pro-

fessors to teach in Cuba and reportedly paid $8,000

to 12 students of the National Polytechnic Insti-

tute in

Mexico City to organize and pay for agita-

tion in support of Cuba. The Mexican Government

retaliated by confiscating all incoming propaganda

* In 1959 Lopez Mateos ordered raids on Communist

arrested Siqueiros and a number

of pariy leaders,

and expelled two Soviet diplomats

for plotting in a nationwide rail strike.

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materials from Havana. The searches at the Mexican

airport of baggage of incoming travelers from Cuba

were so intensive that Portuondo went to the Mexi-

can Foreign Ministry to ask that Cubans be permitted

to travel through Mexico to other countries without

having their baggage searched. The Mexicans, of

course, went right on searching baggage of those

who had a stopover in

Mexico. Furthermore, the

Mexican ringleaders in the pro-Cuba demonstrations

were arrested and thrown in jail, and kept there

for as long as six months before they were sentenced.

They

were charged with "social disruption" which,

under Mexican law, resulted in sentences of from

five to ten years. •

Carlos Lechuga Hevia (201-262106) replaced

Portuondo in May 1962 as Cuban Ambassador to Mexico.

Lechuga was not particularly active in Mexico and

soon went on to become Cuban Ambassador to the

United Nations in New York. This appointment led

some to believe that Cuba no longer considered

Mexico as its key springboard for Latin America.

Joaquin Hernandez Armas (201-301755) arrived

in Mexico in May 1963 as a replacement for Lechuga.

..'•

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Hernandez did not participate in the Castro revo-

lution to any extent, but his CP membership dated

to his student days in law school at the University

of Havana. In 1946 he was head of the CP in Pinar

del Rio Province where he was said to be active in

party espionage activities.

He served in the Cuban

Foreign Ministry under Castro and then was Ambassador

to Brazil (1961-1963).

Mexico was the only country in Latin America

which had continuous diplomatic relations with Cuba

from the time

Castro assumed power. The Cuban Em-

bassy in Mexico City was staffed

with four officers

in 1959 and expanded to 28 Cuban officers by 1968.

Half of those were known or suspect Cuban intelli-

gence officers. There were three Cuban consulates

in Mexico in the port cities of Merida, Veracruz,

and Tampico. They were staffed in Veracruz and

Tampico by a consul in each and by two vice consuls

at Merida. All were known or suspect intelligence

officers. They handled Cuban fishing boats and

served as collection and shipping points for send-

ing needed materials to Cuba which could not be

134/

obtained directly from the United States.

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There were

five branches of the Mexican-

Cuban friendship associations run by Mexicans but

supported by Cubans. They were located in Veracruz,

Monterrey, Tampico, Morelia, and Mexico City. They

distributed pro-Castro propaganda and maintained a

steady program of free cultural events attractive

to students. From 10 to 20 such students were

given free trips to Cuba each month beginning in

1968 as "scholarships." Travel from Mexico City

to Havana was provided by Cubana, the Cuban Govern-

135/

ment airline.

The Cuban consul in Mexico City was the co-

ordinating point for arranging travel of a steady

stream of pro-Castro revolutionaries to Cuba from

throughout the Western Hemisphere. Some went for

sightseeing trips, and otherswent for guerrilla

training. A large percentage of these travelers

were dissident students from the United States.

During 1968 there was a sharp increase in

the number and type of Cuban travelers. These in-

cluded visits to Mexico of a Cuban ballet group, a

theater group, lecturers, artists with exhibits,

delegations to international conferences, and

137/

travelers to the Olympics.

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Prensa

Latina was the Cuban Government press

organization which operated worldwide.

In Mexico

City, it had a staff of 13 employees in 1968 and

138/

had direct teletype service with Havana.

CIA operations against the Cuban target were

developed by Thomas J Hazlett who was assigned to

Mexico City under official cover in February 1957

as the

officer responsible for CP exile operations.

Hazlett was an unusually energetic and imagi-

native officer with fluent Spanish, who had the

personality

and background that appealed to exile

intellectuals.

He assembled information from in-

formants among exiles, such as LINLUCK, and targeted

the unilateral telephone tap, LIFEAT, against leaders

of the groups as they were identified. He used

agents from the Mexican security service (LIVESTOCK)

to supply information from their files on the activi

ties of various exiles. Thus, he located their hang-

outs and meeting places which were usually restau-

rants and coffee shops, then circulated in these

places developing friendships. In 1958, Hazlett

chanced a meeting with Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, a

leader of the pro-Castro 26th of July Movement

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in Mexico.

An avid reader, Hazlett visited every

leftist bookstore in Mexico City collecting paper-

backs published by leftist exiles. By the time he

met the

authors, he had read most of their books

and had mutual topics to engage their interest and

gain their confidence.

In August 1959 two officers of the Cuban Em-

bassy in Mexico (LITAG-1, 201-267743, naval attache,

and LITAINT-1, 201-98818, air attache) walked into

the US Embassy office of the naval attache and ex-

pressed

their dissatisfaction with the Communist

influence over the Castro government. Hazlett

talked with them and they agreed to remain in their

positions and cooperate with CIA. Both of these of-

ficers were used as sources until early 1960 when

they defected to the United States.*

In October 1959 Hazlett made contact with

LITAMIL-I who helped develop a network of 18 access

* LITAG-1 crossed the US border at Laredo, Texas, bs

automobile on 30 March 1960.

LITAINT-1 was flown

an Antonio,

Texas, in a private plane of LIENVOY-1

on 12 April 1960 through arrangements made by the

station in Mexico.

The CIA Office of Security in San

Antonio arranged admission to the United States.

Both officers were subsequently handled by the Miami

Station.

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agents consisting of former Castro followers.*

In April 1960 Hazlett recruited LITAINT-2

(a close friend of LITAINT-l) and developed, from

information supplied by him, a network of 14 access

agents who performed various tasks.** Five of

them formed a "goon" squad which carried out harass-

ment operations such as tossing "stink" bombs inside

Cuban installations, painting city walls with anti-

Castro slogans, saturating the Cuban Embassy gate

with false telephone calls, distributing false in-

vitations to Cuban Embassy receptions, and scatter-

ing anti-Castro leafiets clandestinely at night.

Another one recruited the garbage and trash col-

lector from

the Cuban Embassy.

When the chief

of station returned from a

WH regional conference held in Panama City on

23-28 May 1960, the Cuban target was put at the

top of the list for the Mexico City Station. As a

result of this, every investigative asset of the

* The long-term significant agents of the LITAMIL

and LITAINT networks

were incorporated into the

LIRAVINE Project in 1964.

** See above footnote.

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station was directed against the Cuban Embassy and

the Cuban exile community in support of the JMARC

operation. Jack Stewart was assigned as a second

case officer under official cover to work with

Hazlett on the C. target. During 1960 the Mexico

City Station had

agents who were members of the

Cuban Embassy staff and

others who were closely

connected with the Embassy staff. The station also

had the cooperation of the Mexican Government through

LIENVOY and LITEMPO for support and security protec-

tion. Travel control was provided by LIFIRE. An out-

side covert action group working on the Cuban target

was set up by Stanley M. Moos in August 1960 but was

compromised in November 1960 when two briefcases

filled with classified information were stolen from

an unguarded station wagon on a Mexico City street.

During February 1961, the first transmitter

was installed in the office of the Cuban Ambassador

to Mexico, * 139/

It functioned well and provided a

for short-term multiple audio installations.

....

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check on information provided by CIA agents in the

Embassy.

In March 1961, Jose Pardo Llada, "mouthpiece"

of Fidel Castro, defected in Mexico. He was hidden

by the station (with the help of LITEMPO) until he

140/

gave a press conference and left for Madrid.

Two months later three officials from the Cuban

Embassy defected with

subsequent, station-arranged,

press conferences. All had been sources of the

141/

station.

In June of the next year, the assist-

ant conmercial attache at the Cuban Embassy, Pedro

Lucas Roig Ortega (201-324221) defected and, after

a press conference arranged by the station, departed

142/

for the United "States.

He had previously

been

recruited by Hazlett.

In October of this same year the station set

up in an apartment just across the street from the

front gate of the Cuban Embassy a photographic

surveillance project which provided photographs of

visitors and license plates of automobiles of in-

terest. By tracing license plate numbers and show-

ing photographs to penetration agents inside the

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Embassy, the station identified most of the visitors

and exploited some of them for intelligence purposes.

This photographic surveillance project was identified

by the cryptonym LIONION.

The Merida Base was opened in December 1962 to

provide support for Cuban operations in Mexico.*

Robert I. Shaw was assigned to Mexico City as

the case officer for Cuban operations in April 1963

as a replacement for Hazlett who was transferred to

the Dominican

Republic. In October 1963 David A.

Phillips, former chief of the CA Section, was added

to the Cuba Section as the senior officer responsible

for both FI and CA activities. In April 1965 Phillips

left Mexico City for temporary duty at Headquarters,

preparatory to a transfer to the Dominican Republic.

Shaw resumed charge of the Cuba Section until 1966

when he was transferred to Nicaragua and replaced by

Francis S. Sherry.

By 1964 the station had at least 50 agents

working as sources

against the Cuban target. Their

usefulness was reviewed

to

eliminate nonproductive

* The Merida Base was closed in May 1965 because

the cost

of maintaining

the base outweighed its

value to CIA and the intelligence community.

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informants

and

to consolidate their administrative

control into three formal projects:

LIRAVINE,

LICOMET, and LIRENO. Information from these

in-

formants was supplemented by that obtained from

surveillance teams, telephone taps, audio opera-

tions, and the Mexican security service.

The

telephone taps (LIFEAT and LIENVOY) and

audio operations (LISANPAN) revealed Cuban involve-

ment in subversivé activities in Latin America.

One example of this activity was a naturalized

Mexican of Spanish origin, Victor Rico Galan (201-

336474). He was one of the founders of the pro-

Castro National Liberation Movement

in Mexico.

He visited Cuba

for two months each in 1962 and

1963. In late 1963, at Cuban direction, he visited

several Central American countries, Venezuela, and

Brazil, contacting key Communists.

He again

visited

Cuba in 1964 and

1965. In Mexico his

contacts with

members of the Cuban

intelligence service at the

Cuban Embassy increased sharply. In 1964 and 1965

he took trips to Guatemala and

the Dominican Repub-

lic. The Mexico City Station had followed his

activities from the unilateral telephone tap project

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unversess

(LIFEAT) and passed some information

on him to

the

Mexican Government which whetted their appetite

enough for them to put him on the joint telephone

tap coverage (LIENVOY).* This revealed intense

criticism of the Mexican President Diaz Ordaz and

that Rico Galan was trying to form

a new leftist

political party in opposition to the PRI.

The re-

sult was that the Mexican Security Service picked

him up in 1966. He was

subsequently charged and

convicted of being a part of a conspiracy

against

the Mexican Government.

The Mexican Security Service (through LITEMPO)

cooperated closely with the station on Cuban opera-

tions. This included security protection and

•ex-

change of information. For example, in September

1966 a wooden box fell off a delivery truck in

Mexico City and broke open. The box contained guns.

The security service investigator called to the

scene was a station agent, LITEMPO-12. He and'

another agent went to the address on the box, a

small residence in Mexico City, and arrested the

* The LIFEAT coverage was dropped when it became

apparent that the LIENVOY group intended to cover

this line.

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two people there. Two agents remained in the empty

house and a short while later, after a tap on the

door, the cultural attache from the Cuban Embassy,

Julian Lopez Diaz, walked in.

He flashed his dip-

lomatic identification but the Mexican agents (after

checking with their headquarters) tore it up,

searched the man and discovered $6,000 in $20 bills

in his wallet. They took Lopez to the security

service detention room and held him incommunicado

for 72 hours while he was being questioned. By

almost sheer accident, the Mexican service had

stumbled onto a shipment of arms intended for the

Guatemalan CP guerrilla group. The police seized

an additional $4,000 and a large quantity of car-

bines, submachine guns, and ammunition at the resi-

dence which was the home of a Guatemalan revolution-

ary.

Lopez was released to the Cuban Ambassador

and declared persona non grata. The Guatemalans.

and Mexicans were sentenced to prison terms.

The Cuban diplomats in Mexico resorted to

terrorist tactics when it suited them. In September

1968 they kidnapped from a Mexico City

street a

Cuban (former code clerk AMDAUB-1, 201-802332) who

...

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had been granted asylum in Mexico

The Cubans took him to the Cuban Embassy

and drugged him

until departure of the next Cubana

flight when the Cuban Ambassador and two Cuban Em-

bassy diplomats waving pistols attempted forcibly

to put him on the flight to Havana. Fortunately,

AMDAUB-I's caretaker had advised the station that

AMDAUB-1 was missing when he did not return from

an unaccompanied trip into the city. Thestation

notified LITEMPO-12 who arranged for a "stake-out"

at the airport and at border points. When the

Cubans arrived with AMDAUB-1, LITEMPO-12 inter-

vened and took them into a small oifice where he

asked the Ambassador and his two aides

to wait

while he and AMDAUB-I talked in an inner office.

Once inside the inner office LITEMPO-12 locked the

door and had AMDAUB-l sign a statement that he was

being

forced

to go to Cuba against his

wishes.

Next, LITEMPO-12 telephoned for a

ladder to be.

brought to a window from the inner office to the

outside of the building below. He and AMDAUB-1

climbed out the window and down the ladder to a

security office car which took them

to a safehouse,

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leaving the Ambassador and his two aides waiting

in the outer office. They

were furious when they

learned that

the defector

had gotten away. Both

the Cubans and the Mexicans had considerable press

play over this episode.*

LISAGA-1 proved

to be an embarrassment to CIA

and the Mexican Government.

He was a Mexican opera-

ting in Cuba for CIA under Mexican diplomatic cover,

who was discovered by the Cuban intelligence service

and exposed publicly. Their complaints to the Mexi-

can Government were brushed off as improperly pre-

sented. **

For reasons dictated by a nationalist foreign

policy, Mexico appeared to have "bent over backwards"

to avoid a break with Cuba, in spite of considerable

evidence that Cuba used Mexico as a base to conduct

subversive operations in the United States and Latin

America. There was no reason to believe that Mexican

foreign policy would change so long as Cuba's subver-

* Later at the request of the Mexican Government,

IA arranged for AMDAUB-1 to enter the Unite

'tates at Miami

** See Chapter IV

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sive activity was not a

threat to

the Mexican

Government.

143/

LIRAVINE

This project was submitted in late 1964 by

Robert T. Shaw for the purpose of consolidating

into one administrative group a number

of active

Cuban informants, some of whom had been working

for CIA since 1959. The objective was to develop

positive intelligence and counterespionage

informa-

tion on the activities and personnel of the Cuban

Embassy complex in Mexico, with a view toward re-

cruiting intelligence officers ard placing techni-

cal devices inside the official installations.

Both of these objectives were realized.

The agents

inside the Embassy provided CIA with sufficient

casing data to permit the installation of the only

unilateral audio network (LISAMPAN) in any Cuban

Embassy in the world.

The project was approved in 1965 at a cost of

$20,000. Through

some expansion and turnover of

agents who left the area and were replaced by new

recruitments, the cost edged up to about $30,000

for 1967 but dropped again to $20,000 in 1969 when

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some of the fat was taken out of the budget by re-

moval of marginal informants.

The first project provided for 11 access

agents. The most productive of these were the

LITAMIL's and the LITAINT's. Marginal agents were

LIOLEO-1, LISICLE-1, AMSEVER-2, AMPACA-1, and

LICARD-1.

144/

LITAMIL-1 (201-267298)

This agent was born in Cuba in 1913. Becom-

1ng extremely anti-Batista, he went to Mexico City

as a young man and went to work in a printing com-

pery which he later bought. He was an original

member of the 26th of July Movement and had contribu-

ted $50,000 to this group. The leader of this group,

Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, was

also a close friend of

LITAMIL 1.

Hazlett, in the course of developing informa-

tion on Communist exile activities during 1957 and

1958, had met Arcos and held several conversations

with him. LITAMIL-1 knew of this acquaintanceship

because he

had taken

telephone messages from Hazlett

when Arcos was not at home.

He had also telephoned

_ Hazlett on one or two occasions when Arcos could not

keep an appointment.

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When Castro took over the Cuban Government,

Arcos returned to Cuba and

received an appointment

as Ambassador to Belgium. Hazlett was still fol-

lowing unilateral telephone coverage of exile ac-

tivities and learned that Arcos' old friend,

LITAMIL-1, was becoming disillusioned with Commu-

nist influence in the Castro government.

In October 1959, Hazlett contacted LITAMIL-1

as a friend of Arcos and arranged a meeting.

LITAMIL-1 agreed to cooperate with Hazlett and pro-

vide information on persons in the pro-Castro Cuban

colony who still considered him as a part of the

revolution. This cooperation led to the recruit-

ment of practically all of the early sources on

Cuban activities in Mexico and lasted until 1963

when Hazlett left Mexico. LITAMIL-l received no

CIA salary but was given a loan of $800 in

1959 for

which a request for repayment was not made because

of his valuable service to the station.

LITAMIL-2 (201-275992)

Hazlett met LITAMIL-2 on 13 April 1960 in com-

pany with LITAMIL-l in Mexico City. Hazlett had

learned (from LITAMIL-]) that LITAMIL-2, once a fan

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of Fidel Castro, had "soured" on the revolutionary

government of Cuba sometime during 1959 when a

hoped-for job in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico did

not materialize. He agreed to cooperate with

Hazlett and was recruited for use as a cutout for

LITAMIL-3, consul of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

(1959 to 1961).*

LITAMIL-2 was born in 1918 in Cuba and lived

in the United States from 1936 to 1941 when he

moved to Mexico City as an employee of the Venus

Pen Company.

When Castro was in Mexico, prior to 1957,

LITAMIL-2 joined the 26th of July Movement and

worked as a support-type officer. He rented safe-

houses, automobiles, and other equipment which were

needed. On occasions, he fed and housed the train-

ees in his home in Mexico City. LITAMIL-2 worked

closely with Castro but did not join

the expedition

back to Cuba in the Granma*, he remained in Mexico

City assisting the revolution by collecting money

*LITAMIL-3 was the uncle of LITAMIL-l.

** Name of

Cuba in 1957.

boat used by Castro to return to

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which he used to buy arms and equipment for Castro

and the group in the Sierra Maestra Mountains of

Cuba.

He also took part in the establishment of a

clandestine radio

station in Mexico which served

the Castro forces with information and propaganda.

Following the Castro victory, LITAMIL-2 went to

Cuba but,

to his dismay, was snubbed by Castro who,

according to rumor, thought LITAMIL-? had leaked

information to the Mexicans. LITAMIL-2 returned

to Mexico somewhat disappointed by this treatment.

He also was distressed by Castro's turn to Commu-

nism. At this point, Hazlett net him and made the

recruitment.

LITAMIL-2 agreed to play a middle-of-the-road

role as a CIA agent and continue apparent friendship

for pro-Castroites and anti-Castroites alike.

He was a source of information on all types

of Cubans, and he provided information of a person-

ality nature to use as a means of determining if the

person might be of use to CIA and susceptible to a

recruitment approach.

During 1966 he became friendly with members

of the New China News Agency in Mexico and exchanged

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dinner invitations with them at station direction.

While in their residence he memorized the interior

of the house and supplied detailed descriptions

and drawings

which assisted the station in making

a technical installation. In fact, he was the only

station source who had

been

inside the house before

the clandestine entry was made to install the trans-

mitters.

LITAMIL-2's wife

was an Am-

erican citizen who was also recruited by the station

to process telephone tap and audio tapes.

LITAMIL-2 was paid a salary of $280 from 1961

until 1963 when he was raised to $300 per month.

This salary continued until 1968 when it was raised

to $320 per month which continued until 1969 when

his salary was cut in half because of a

decreased

access and a different approach by the station to

the Cuban target.

LITAMIL-3 (201-290894)

Hazlett recruited LITAMIL-3 on 29 November

1960 at a meeting arranged by LITAMIL-1. The meet-

ing was made after the station CA assets placed a

newspaper article brutally attacking LITAMIL-3

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(pointing out his alleged pro-Communist activities

in the Cuban Embassy). LITAMIL-3 was very upset

over the article and wanted desperately to talk

with

some US official to see if this press cam-

paign could not be stopped since he was pro-United

States and wanted

to explain that his work in the

Cuban Embassy had always been that of a dedicated

career diplomat. He was anxious to clear his name

with US officials.

LITAMIL-3 was born in Cuba in 1907. He had

spent 31 years in the diplomatic service and served

in Mexico as attache and consul from 1938 to 1952

and fror 1959 to 196i.

This agent was a proud old man who would not

take any salary from the station. He arranged the

recruitment of four officials from the Cuban Em-

bassy, all loyal friends of his, who agreed to co-

operate with Hazlett (LITAMIL-6, 7, 8, and 9).

These were known as "deathbed" recruitments because

he introduced Hazlett to each of them at different

times when he was in the hospital awaiting surgery

for kidney stones. As a token of appreciation, the

station paid the hospital bill.

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LITAMIL-3 resigned his job from the Cuban

Embassy in 1961 to remain in Mexico. To support

himself, he took a job working for his nephew,

LITAMIL-1, as a salesman at $200 per month. Dur-

ing this time he continued to cooperate with the

station by providing information and identifying

photographs of Cubans and visitors to the Cuban Em-

bassy until mid-1968 when he became a semi-invalid

suffering from a recurrence of kidney stones.

LITAMIL- 7 (201-330173)

This woman was the Cuban secretary of

LITAMIL-3 at the Cuban Embassy. Hazlett met her in

the hospital room of LITAMIL-3 the day before he

was to undergo surgery in July 1962. In LITAMIL-3's

presence, she agreed to cooperate with Hazlett and

provide information on persons in the Cuban Embassy.

From 1962 until 1967 (when she retired after

30 years' service) she provided the station with

personality and background information. This was

a valuable source for identification of new employees

and their positions. She also was helpful in identi-

fying LIONION photographs of visitors to the Embassy.

LITAMIL-7 cooperated with CIA out of loyalty

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to LITAMIL-3 and, like the proud old man, she re-

fused to accept compensation for her services.

During 1968 she became ill and was not available

for contact for some time.

After her retirement,

her access to information of value to CIA became

virtually nil. The only remuneration she received

was some flowers sent when she was ill and a few

inexpensive gifts.

LITAMIL- 9 (201-329609)

Hazlett approached LITAMIL-9 on the night of

18 July 1962. The scene of the meeting was the

hospital room of LITAMIL-3 who lay near death await-

ing the kidney stone operation the following day.

He had summoned LITAMIL-9, an old friend, to the

hospital and then introduced Hazlett. This meeting,

in the presence of LITAMIL-3, lasted three hours.

LITAMIL-9 talked freely of Cuban personalities and

activities but expressed reluctance at becoming in

volved in clandestine activities with a US official.

At a subsequent meeting, however, he agreed to pro-

vide information. His position as cultural officer

in the Embassy provided no access to classified

information, but his observations gave the station

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an additional source on personality data and rela-

tionships inside the Embassy.

He also traveled to Cuba but would not com-

municate with

the station from there. In the

spring of 1965 he was transferred to Cuba and re-

mained there until December 1966 when he left his

position with the Cuban Government and obtained

permission to reside in Mexico. When he contacted

the station in December 1966, he was paid $5,000

which represented accumulated salary while he was

in Cuba, although he had not been productive during

that time. He had no access of particular interest

to the station after his return from Cuba, but he

could be contacted if desired.

LITAINT-2 (201-275934)

This agent was recruited on 28 April 1960 by

Hazlett who met him when he was trying to contact

LITAINT-1 who, without prior station knowledge,

had crossed the border at Laredo, Texas.*

LITAINT-2 was born in Cuba in 1930 of a Mexican

I do Can to cached the Betes at ones?

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mother. He had lived in Mexico City since 1957 and

was a salesman for a television firm when he was

contacted by Hazlett. LITAINT-I and LITAINT-2 had

been close friends

for many years. As a result of

this friendship, LITAINT-2 knew all of the Cuban

diplomats and

many of them patronized the store

where he worked. Hazlett developed LITAINT-2 for

access to Cuban

intelligence officers.*

In 1962 LITAINT-2 was also used to direct a

harassment team of lower-level agents (LITAINT-8,

9, 10, 11, and 12). This harassment team created

confusion at the Cuban Embassy by throwing "stink"

bombs into the installations, painting signs on the

walls of the Embassy compound, and making anonymous

telephone calls. By late 1963, the station discon-

tinued these operations because they were coming

under the eye of the Mexican Security Service and

the Cuban Ambassador was protesting loudly that it

was the work of the American Ambassador. LITAINT-9

was transferred to the LIRICE surveillance team.

The other members of the harassment group were terminated.

* LITAINT-2 was sent by CIA to Miami, Florida,

November 1960 for clandestine training by the AMOT

group.

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LITAINT-2 was also in charge of the Cuban trash

operation. A "rag-picker" sat in the truck that

picked up the garbage and trash from the Cuban

Embassy and sorted out the waste paper that had

writing or photographs. This little garbage-spattered

bundle was turned over three times a week to LITAINT-2

who passed it to the

station where the bits were pieced

together and, to the surprise of the station, contained

some worthwhile information. One item was a draft of

a report that concerned contact of an access agent with

a US official. The operation also identified persons

seeking employment with the Embassy or trying to get

visas to go to Cuba.

LITAINT-2 was paid $256 per month salary in

July 1962, and was raised to $304 per month in 1968.

LITAINT-7 (201-288953)

This agent was the second secretary at the

Cuban Embassy and was a source of LITAINT-5 (201-

287689) * until June 1961 when LITAINT-T and his

* LITAINT-5 was a Cuban vice consul in Los Angeles,

He was in

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wife (a consul at the Cuban Embassy) and LITAINT-6

(an employee in the Cuban Embassy Consular Section)

went to the Mexican Minister of Interior and asked

for permission to remain in Mexico after resigning

their positions. LITAINT-7's greatest contribution

was a dramatic defection speech which received wide-

spread covert action coverage. He was retained by

the station as

a source until 1965 when he and his

wife emigrated to the United States. He received

no salary.

LISICLE-1 (201-350663)

This agent was a Mexican medical specialist

who first came to the attention of the station in

1964 when he walked into the US Embassy to report

that he had been invited to Cuba to participate in

a medical congress.

He was interviewed by a sta-

tion officer and was given some operational train-

ing and guidance for his travel to Cuba. This.

initial assignment rattled him and he returned to

Mexico full of cooperative spirit but psychologi-

cally incapable of performing any task which he

considered risky. He subsequently dabbled at the

Cuban target, attending cultural institute meetings

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LICOMET -1 (201-285165) was the titular head

of the unit and principal agent for the project

from

1964 until 1968 when

he obtained full-time

employment with a private firm and was replaced in

the LICOMET operation by LICOMET-2: (201-327270).

The project expanded in size from a

staff of

five in 1964 to twelve in 1969. The group consisted

of a principal agent, four interviewers, two secre-

taries, a visa processer, a guard, a janitor, a

receptionist, and an informant in an airline office.

The project cost $30,000 in 1965, $56,000 in 1966,

$50,000 in 1967, and less than $30,000 each year

for 1968 and 1969. The production in 1965 was 52

positive disseminations. During 1966 the figure

increased to 165 disseminations.

In 1967, despite a 75 percent drop in the

number of Cuban refugees arriving in Mexico, intel-

ligence production showed an improvement in both

quality and quantity. During this year, 175 dis-

seminations were made. Of special importance was

information obtained on live practice firings of

SA-2 missiles in Cuba. The project also provided

the station with Prensa Latina pouches which were

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opened in the station by the TSD officer, who photo-

graphed the contents, resealed the pouches, and re-

turned them to the LICONET agent for insertion in

the mail channel to Cuba. These pouches contained

communications from Cuban intelligence assets

throughout the Western Hemisphere. In 1968 the pro-

duction dropped to 46 disseminations, primarily be-

cause

of the continued decrease in the number of

Cuban

refugees, as well

as in their knowledgeability

of information which

was of interest to CIA.

One of the problems of the project, over which

the station

in

Mexico could exercise little control,

was a constant change of LICONET personnel.

The

project staff consisted of refugees rather than per-

manent residents. These refugees were, for the most

part, in Mexico waiting to go to the United States.

No one could predict the processing time for US

visas. As a result, it was impossible to plan. for

personnel changes. Oncethevisas were issued, the

refugees, with very little notice, left for the

United States. It was then necessary to train others

to fill the vacancies.

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4.

Operational Support and Technical Collection

Activities

The Mexico City Station had an extensive net-

work of investigative operations which, for want of

a better term, was called operational support. These

included a unilateral telephone tap capability of

18 lines (LIFEAT); a joint telephone tap capability

of 30 lines (LIENVOY); a unilateral surveillance

team (LIEMBRACE); a travel control operation (LIFIRE);

liaison

with the Mexican Security Service (LITEMPO);

a mobile surveillance phototruck (LIENTRAP); six

photographic surveillance basehouses (LIMITED, LI-

CALLA, LILYRIC, LIHABIT, LIONION, LITABBY); a mail

intercept (LIKAYAK-2); audio operations (LIPALLET,

LIROMANCE, and LISAMPAN); and highly sensitive tech-

nical operations (LINIMENT, LIMESA, LICASA).

From 1961 through 1969, the station spent ap-

proximately a

dollars annually for these

operations. Most of this money was used for payment

of salaries of the large networks of agents required

to maintain the operational bases for these projects.

These operations were the primary sources of

operational information on Soviet Bloc and Cuban

...•

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.....

official installations. Mexico City was also a

location with a continuous requirement

for short-

term targets and support to other CIA

stations

throughout the world.

This consisted

of

surveil-

lance of agents traveling from

Latin America

through Mexico en route

to Cuba, providing accomo-

dation addresses, arranging meetings for agents,

hiding Cuban defectors, and providing clandestine

transportation of agents to the US border.

147/

LIFEAT

The basis for unilateral telephone tap opera-

tions was laid in the fall of 1950 when two employees

of the telephone company were recruited by Charles W.

Anderson, III. One was a supervisor for repairs and

maintenance (LIMEWATER-1), and the other was one of

his subordinates (LIMEWATER-2), a lineman who did

repair and maintenance work. These two telephone

company employees were handled by an outside prin-

cipal agent, LIMESTONE.*

* LIMESTONE worked for the FBI during World War II

and knew that LIMEWATER-l and 2 placed telephone taps

for the FBI from 1941 to 1945.

After World War II,

LIMESTONE worked for the Department of Agriculture,

Hoof and Mouth Control Unit,

until about 1950 when

they closed some of their offices.

He

was then hired

by CIA.

He died of a heart attack in 1956 while still

employed by the Agency.

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The principal agent (as of 1969) was David M.

WILSTED (201-9195) who was

hired in November 1951

as a transcriber of Polish in one of the LIFEAT

basehouses.*

During

1951, taps were placed on the telephone

lines of the

Soviet, Czech, and Polish official in-

stallations.

The cost for the first year was about

$5,000. By the middle of 1955, the operations

coverage had been extended to leaders of the local

CP and Communist-front organizations, and the cost

had increased to $78,000 a year. In 1955, LIFEAT

produced 19 positive and six counterintelligence

disseminations. The Soviet Bloc country desks

judged the operational information of this tap op-

eration to be the best CIA had anywhere. In 1956,

LIFEAT produced 36 positive and 74 counterintelli-

gence disseminations. The cost of the project for

this year shot up to $132, 519 which included the

* WILSTED was a technical sergeant with the Air

attache in Mexico from 1946 to 1948.

He then worked

for the Department of Agriculture, Hoof and Mouth

Control Unit, until 1951 when the

office he was with

He was married to a Mexican, Olga A

PARFINIK, who was the sister of Oliver G. SCANTLING

(201-79171) of the LIRAZOR Project. 148/

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salaries and allowances ($35,000) of

staff.

employees under nonoffical cover, and salaries

($21,000) 0f

US contract employees under non-

official cover.

During 1957, LIFEAT had 23 target lines and

produced 141 positive intelligence disseminations.

It also covered the lines of several US Communist

expatriates (at the request of the FBI). There

were seven listening posts located near the various

intercept points. The station had plans to add

four or five more lines, but expansion came in the

form of a new operation (LIENVOY).* This was an

unofficial but joint teiephone tap operation with

149/

the Mexican Government.

The targets of LIFEAT were adjusted to com-

plement coverage by LIENVOY. For instance, in 1960

it was learned that LIENVOY coverage would be placed

* LIFEAT and LIENVOY were handled independently,

and represented two concepts of telephone tapping.

LIFFAT taps were made from

As a result.

LIFEAT required a listening post nearby for each

tap. LIENVOY had

from which taps

were made

All 30 LIENVOY taps went

into the same listening post.

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on all Soviet and Satellite official installations.

LIFEAT taps were taken off and placed on other

targets of interest to the station.

LIFEAT maintained an average of six listen-

ing posts (as of 1969) and

could operate about

three lines from each (in instances where there

were three targets close enough together to run

wires without security problems). One of the

problems with LIFEAT was its cost, which hovered

around $100,000 a year.

Salaries and fixed allow-

ances for this network of

Americans and

Mexicans were $73,241 in 1969. Rent for listening

posts amounted to $16,600 for the same period.

Positive intelligence declined to zero in

1969. The reason for this was elimination of the

disseminations of marginal information. Also,

LIFEAT was used to concentrate on residences of

Soviet Bloc and CP personalities considered sus-

ceptible to recruitment.

There was no indication that the Mexican Gov-

ernment was aware of this project.

The LIFEAT Project also gave the station a

capability for mounting other unilateral operations.

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LISAMPAN was a multiaudio project covering the

Cuban Embassy and the residence of the Cuban Ambas-

sador in Mexico. David M. WILSTED and the two

LIFEAT telephone linemen, LIFEUD-2 and LIFEUD-3,

made the installations. The group also tapped the

TELEX system of two Soviet Bloc official installa-

tions.

150

LI EMBRACE

This project consisted of a network of nine

agents (a six-man surveillance team, a radio repair-

man, and a two-man phototruck team). This was an

outgrowth of the LIPSTICK Project which was handled

unilaterally from 1952. The surveillance team used

four radio-equipped vehicles in addition to the

panel truck which had a camera with telephoto lens

mounted in a concealment device.

As of 1969 the

agents were LIEMBRACE-1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 14.

LIEMPTY-10 and ll manned the phototruck.

LIEMBRACE-1, 2, 4, and 5 were recruited in

the 1950's under the LIPSTICK Project and were

handled by Joseph G. Sancho, an outside case offi-

cer, until June 1958 when four members of the team

were arrested by the Mexican Secret Service while

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conducting a surveillance of the code clerk of the

in Mexico City. * LIEMBRACE-8,

the radio repairman, was formerly LINSTOCK. He

was recruited in 1953 by LIMESTONE, the principal

agent of LIFEAT. LIEMBRACE-10 and 14 were added

to the team in 1960 and 1968 and were recruited by

team members. LIEMBRACE-1 and 2 were brothers and were

married to sisters. LIEMBRACE-4 was, according to

the record, the nephew of LIEMPTY-10.**

LIEMPTY-10 (formerly LIPSTICK-2) was recruited

in 1952 by his brother, LIFEUD-1 (the telephone con-

pany supervisor for LIFEAT) and handled by him until

1955. LIEMPTY-11 was recruited in 1955 by LIEMPTY-10.

Team members arrested were LIEMBRACE-1, 3, 6 anc

the onl

tion arranged to evacuate him across the US border

** A similarity of names (mother of LIEMBRACE-4 and

wife of LIEMPTY-10) suggests that LIEMBRACE-4

might

have been a stepson of LIEMPTY-10.

-.

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These two agents were turned over to Oliver G.

SCANTLING * from 1955 until 1958 when they were

turned over to Raymond H. GERENDE and his brother-

in-law, LIEMPTY-4. In 1968 LIEMPTY- 10 and 11 were

incorporated into the LIEMBRACE Project.

LI EMPTY- 10

by the Mexican secret Service while using the photo-

and LIEMPTY-2 until 1965 when he became a singletor

agent under Project LIRAZOR.

He provided cover fri

an office and the automobiles for the LIPSTICK Project

until the police roll-up in 1958.

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During 1958, the project cost an estimated

$24,000 of which $16,200 was for salaries of six

team members. By 1966 the cost had increased to

$50,663. Team members received a monthly salary

of $250 each for the two leaders and $200 each

for their subordinates in 1958. These salaries

had doubled by 1966, increasing the cost of the

project. However, the team members were recruited

when they were young men, some just out of college,

and in order to prevent their leaving for better-

paying positions in private industry, the station

had to periodically increase their wages.

The team was handled by a case officer under

official cover who held clandestine meetings in

various downtown areas with LIEMBRACE-1 to pass

assigninents and receive reports. During demonstra-

tions of when the team was used during visits of

US Presidents to provide current information on

the security situation, the team leader communi-

cated with his station case officer by radio to a

base inside the station.

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151/

LIRICE

The LIRICE Project provided for a surveil-

lance team handled unilaterally for investigations

against the CP of Mexico. This project was the

outgrowth of the LIJERSEY surveillance group, re-

cruited in 1957 to parallel the LIPSTICK (LIEMBRACE

group). After the arrest of team members in 1958

by the Mexican Secret Service, one surveillance

team was given the cryptonym LIEMBRACE. The other

team (LIJERSEY) was included in the LIEMPTY Project.

In 1960 the LIJERSEY agents were taken out of the

LIEMPTY Project and included in the LITEMPO Project.

Their cryptonyms were changed to LITED.

This change

was made because their outside case officer, Simon D.

CLACKETT, resigned and returned to his home in

Arizona.

In 1961, CLACKETT asked for his job back.

Since the team had not been effective under the

LITEMPO Project the agents were again put under'

CLACKETT. A fourth cryptonym, LIRICE, was assigned.

agents

were

included in this project for

various periods of time.

They consisted, primarily,

of marginal

assets

from other projects who were

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assigned to surveillance and investigative tasks

under CLACKETT

after efforts to use them effectively

in other areas had failed. However, at no one time

were there more than

persons in the group.

These men lacked the education, interest, and moti-

vation to ever develop into good surveillance assets.

The LIRICÊ Project was approved in May 1961 for

$29,815, of which $13,115 was used for CLACKETT'S

salary and allowances. Salaries for

agents

were $10,200. Approximately $6,500 was earnarked

for operational expenses, including the purchase of

a $4,000 automobile.

On 29 Maich 1955, Jeromy ¼. BENADUM, career

agent for the LITEMPO Project, called his station

case

officer and advised that LITEMPO-4 agents had

arrested two men

on the previous Saturday morning,

27 March. The men were

conducting a surveillance of

a Panamanian, HYSAGE-1, who met another Panamanian

under LITEMPO surveillance.

As the two surveillance

teams came together, the LITEMPO team arrested LIRICE

agents. The LITEMPO surveillance was being conducted

at station request. Clearly, there was a lack of

proper station coordination of surveillances.

The

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LIRICE agents were taken to the Mexican Security

Service headquarters and interrogated throughout

the weekend.

The two men had a meeting with

CLACKETT scheduled for Monday morning at 1100 hours.

They gave their meeting instructions

to the Mexican

police, and LIRICE-I went along to

identify CLACKETT

who was known to him as "Ricardo." Three Mexican

Security agents walked up to CLACKETT, put a gun in

his back and

escorted him to their headquarters.

He

was relieved of his identity documents (true name),

money, and other

personal papers. After questioning

by the Mexican

Security Service and intervention of

the station through the LITEMPO Project, CLACKETT

was permitted to leave the country. He resigned

again on 31 March 1965. The agents (LIRICE-1 and 7)

were also released with the project automobile which

had been impounded.

After the above episode, the team members were

again placed under the LITEMPO Project. This arrange-

ment lasted until October 1966. Wade E. Thomas, the

station's CP case officer, was not satisfied with

the LITEMPO handling of the team, justifiably because

the communications were poor and investigations were

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conducted in a haphazard manner. Thomas took over

direct handling of the team with LIRICE-5 as his

routine channel of communication to other team

members.

By November 1967, it was apparent that LIRICE

would not become an effective investigative unit.

Team members were constantly being replaced for

various reasons. They had annoying personal problems

that had been tolerated, such as constant requests

for loans and histories of family illnesses for

which they needed money. Their salaries were com-

paratively small for their large families. LIRICE-1

received less than $300 per month.

The other agents

received from $80 to $175 per month. By January

1968 there were only two

members of the team left

(LIRICE-1 and LIRICE-7) reporting on the CP target

and neither of them had cover employment. They con-

tinued in contact with the station CP case officer

until 1969 when a decision was made to pay them ter-

mination bonuses and release them.

152/

LIEMPTY

This project was approved in 1958. LIEMPTY

was a new cryptonym for the LIPSTICK Project which

.....

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had provided the station with visual and photo-

graphic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City from 1954.

The original agents were recruited

by Charles W. Anderson, III, and Harry T. Mahoney.

One two-story house (LIMITED) and two apartments

(LILYRIC and LICALLA) were used as observation posts

overlooking the front and back of the Soviet Embassy

chancery in Mexico City.

The LIMITED base was used until 1955 as a

LIFEAT basehouse and was occupied by LIPSTICK-7*,.

the sister-in-law of LIMESTONE, the first principal

agent of LIFEAT. In June 1955, the house was for

sale.

It was located diagonally across a four-street

intersection from the front gate of the Soviet Embassy

compound, the only exit and entrance to the compound.

The station, using a US real estate dealer in Mexico,

LIMOUSINE, purchased the two-story colonial house in

1955 for $12,000. Another $3, 500 was spent for reno-

vation, including a concealment area

which faced the Soviet

Embassy gate. This small area, hollowed out of the

* LIPSTICK-T was terminated in 1957.

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SEUKLI

corner of the stone building, concealed a camera

and balscope lens with room for one person to operate

the camera (provided he was not very large and did not

stand up). Philip Roettinger instructed LIEMPTY-6

(formerly LIPSTICK-14), the agent who moved into the

house after renovation, how to operate the camera

and how to prepare daily operational logs of events at

the gate of the Soviet Embassy. This base operated

without

a major security problem until September 1964

when

it was closed. The station received

word from

Headquarters of a decision to publish (in the Warren

Commission Report) an operational photograph taken

from this base in September 1963 during the time Lee

Harvey Oswald was in Mexico City. Furthermore, the

publication carried the statement that the photograph

was made by CIA in Mexico City and showed

an unidenti-

fied person leaving the Soviet Embassy. The photo-

graph (of an unidentified man who appeared to be a

Caucasian) was passed by the station to Eldon Rudd,

FBI agent in Mexico City, on 22 November 1963. Rudd

carried the photograph to Dallas, Texas, where it was

shown to the mother of Lee Harvey Oswald to see if

she could identify the person. Subsequently at a

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oft'

-C°

nll.00/ft

SECRET

press conference, Oswald's

mother accused the FBI

of showing her a photograph of Jack Ruby, taken by

the CIA in Mexico City. To prove that the photo-

graph was not Ruby, the FBI insisted that it be

published in the Warren Commission Report.

To protect the LIMITED agents, the station

had no choice but to remove the photographic equip-

ment and relocate the agents. The LIMITED house

had suffered from a long rainy season in 1964 dur-

ing which time the concealment area caved in,

leaving a gaping hole in one corner of the front

of the building. LIEMPTY-6 and family were moved

to another location in late 1964 in the same

apartment building which housed the LILYRIC base).

The LIMITED property was sold to LIMOUSINE for

$12,000.*

The

LILYRIC

base was first opened in 1957

and was maintained by LIEMPTY-14 (formerly

LIJERSEY- 12).

She was recruited by Raymond H.,

GERENDE. She became the best source among the

* LIMOUSINE razed the old house and erected a nev

apartment building. In 1967,

LILYRIC agents move

their base to the

top floor

front apartment in this

building.

LIEMPTY-6 was terminated in 1968 because

of age and lack of interest.

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photographic assets. Her daily logs and reports

were detailed and complete. The photographs were

shap and clear. When the time came to select

agents to move into LIMOUSINE's new building, there

was no question that LIENPTY-14 was the best ob-

server in the group.

The LILYRIC base was moved

into the apartment with no security problems. As

of 1969, she had completed her 12th year with CIA.

The LICALLA photobase was located in a row

house, also owned by CIA (through LIMOUSINE) along-

side the Soviet Embassy property overlooking the

garden and back. of the chancery. The agent

in this

base was LIEMPTY-9 (formerly LIPSTICK-39). He was

recruited in 1956 by LIEMBRACE-1 as a

member

of the

LIPSTICK surveillance team. LIEMPTY-9 was the

brother of LIPSTICK-47 who was arrested by the Mexi-

can Secret Service in 1958 and resigned when released.

The LICALLA base provided photographs of Soviet activi-

ties in

the garden areas. From the LICALIA reports,

the station determined which Soviets worked in the

same offices, identifying intelligence personnel by

association. The LiCALLA work base was located in

the maid's room on the roof of LICALLA and afforded

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a view into the windows of the Soviet chancery.

The LIEMPTY Project was approved in 1959 for

$95,000. This included salaries for agents in

the

three photobases, Oliver G. SCANTLING, Raymond H.

GERENDE, the LIENTRAP truck and personnel, and a

man (recruited but untrained) surveillance

team with LIJERSEY cryptonyms who were directed by

an outside case officer, Simon D. CLACKETT. In

1960, the costs declined

to $53,000 when CLACKETT

resigned and returned to the United States and the

LIJERSEY agents were

transferred to the LITEMPO

project. The costs for 1966 were $45,300 (as a

result si SCANILING's transfer to Project LIRAZOR).

With the transfer of the LIENTRAP truck to the

LIEMBRACE Project, the cost for 1969 was $43, 500.

Approximately $32,000 was spent on salaries for

agents in this group (1969); the remainder was

spent on vehicle maintenance, rents, utilities, and

equipent.

153/

LI DOGTROT

This project was approved in 1954. It was

developed by Charles K. Jett to provide information

on the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Mexico City.

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154/

LIONION

This project provided the station with photo-

graphic coverage of the entrance to the Cuban Em-

bassy. Jack Stewart

started this activity in 1962,

using a

mother and

son

team of Cuban

exiles as

basehouse operators

in an

apartment directly across

the street from

the entrance to the Embassy. The

first project was approved in 1965 for an

estimated

$11,000, of which $6,000 was for salaries and bo-

nuses.

The remainder was used for rent, utilities,

and miscellaneous expenses.

Two types of photographic equipment were

used.

One was a 35-millimeter Exacta, equipped with a bal-

scope telephoto lens.. The other was a high-speed

"impulse" 35-millimeter camera devised by the TSD

at Headquarters. The lens of this camera was acti-

vated

as persons appeared near the entrance of the

target. It photographed continuous shots until the

person moved out of the line of sight

of the lens.

Two rolls of 100 foot 35-millimeter film were pro-

duced each week.

This film was developed at the

station but sent to Headquarters for exploitation

because of its sheer volume.

The manually-operated

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balscope provided the station with sufficient daily

coverage of

persons visiting the target to satisfy

local operational requirements for identification.

The average

yearly cost of

the project from 1966

through 1969 was $10,000.

The value of the project was the identifica-

tion of Cuban Embassy official personnel and visi-

tors to the Embassy, for future operational ex-

ploitation such as the recruitment of access agents.

155/

LIROMANCE

In January 1965 the Mexico City Station of-

ficer for Cuban operaiions, Robert T. Shaw, noticed

in the telephone tap

transcripts from the LIENVOY

operation that the Cuban Embassy was negotiating

with an upholsterer for repair of certain furniture.

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LISAMPAN

zou/

LISANPAN was a unilateral audio penetration

of the Cuban Embassy and consulate in Mexico City

from September 1967 until May 1969 when silence

came to the last of six audio devices. It was the

only unilateral audio operation which CIA had

against any Cuban official installation in the

world. The operation lasted 20 months and cost

CIA about $60,000 for rent and salaries for the sup-

port mechanism. This did not include salaries of

the principal technical specialists, David M.

WILSTED, LIFEUD-2, and John J. McGee who were paid

from other projects. The project produced no positive

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intelligence. It did yield useful background data

and some very valuable operational leads. Initially,

it also produced a volume of noise, which, if noth-

ing else, added texture to the lives of the six

monitors and transcribers.

LISAMPAN was first proposed in October 1966

when the Mexico City Station learned one of its

agents, LIFEUD-2 (LIFEAT Project), a lineman for

the Mexico City telephone company, would have access

to the Cuban compound in connection with a moderni-

zation program of the telephone system.

Between April and August 1967, during three

entries, LIFEUD-2 installed five hot-miked tele-

phones and one carrier current transmitter in the

Cuban Embassy and consulate offices. The installa-

tions were

supervised by David M. WILSTED, American

principal

agent of the LIFEAT Project, who in turn

was directed

by the

inside case officer for the

project, Michael J.

Farmer,* and the station's

technical officer, John J. McGee. Management of

the monitors and transcribers was handled by

Janes E.

Anderson replaced Farmer as inside case

officer for LIFEAT in

the fall of 1966.

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Francis S. Sherry, chief of the Cuban Section at

the station. Transcripts were processed by station

personnel in this section.

Two separate listening posts were established

to monitor the devices, LISARI, located behind the

Cuban compound, and LISASH, located

directly in

front of the gate to the compound. In addition,

another listening post was established, as a part

of the LIONION Project, directly across from the

door to the Cuban consulate on the corner.

From

this site, LIONION-1 and his mother ran an

"impulse"

camera aimed at the doorway of the consulate, and

through a carrier current circuit running through

the LISASH listening post, could also listen in

on

conversations of visitors to the gatehouse of

the

compound. LISASH and LIONION were reportedly not

witting of one another.

LISASH monitored two hot-miked telephones

(DOG and EASY), while LISARI monitored one of the

other three devices on a rotational basis. The

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177

following indicates the location of each hot-miked

Installation.*

ABLE : The telephone of the chief

of Mission.

BAKER : In the office of the Ambas-

sador's secretary.

CHARLIE : In one of the inner offices

originally; the roon

was

later changed into a waiting

room, and the take was not

of significant value.

DOG

EASY : In one of the consular offices.

FOXTROT : In an upstairs consulate of-

fice.

In March 1968, ABLE was lost.

Through

routine telephone company maintenance, the tele-

phone instrument was removed by a telephone com-

pany employee and replaced by another telephone.

The company employee was not aware of the CIA opera-

tion. The telephone was lost in the shuffle.

* The LIENVOY Project tapped every telephone in

"o' turned.

irit

the Cuban Embassy. This was a joint project shared

with the Mexicans.

The advantage of LISAMPAN

(which to some extent duplicated LIENVOY coverage)

was that it also provided conversations in the areas

of the telephones by persons other than the callers

Thes, LISAMPAN supplemented the product from LIENVOY.

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In October 1968, EASY was lost. The tele-

phone company in another routine action cut the

100p

• connection for its own use. Efforts later to

reactivate EASY from another listening post were

unsuccessful.

BAKER was lost during the installation of a

new TELEX machine in the secretary's office on

7-16 January 1969. The last tapes did not indicate

that a search or sweep was made for the device, but

rather that the wall block was removed as part of

the normal TELEX installation.

On 6 lay 1959, a countermeasures sweep was

conducted in the gatehouse where DOG was installed.

Since DOG was live-monitored at the time, the loop

was not disconnected and the countermeasures activity

was recorded.

The audio device was disconnected,

then reconnected by the sweepers, and at that point

quit functioning.

The station was of the opinion

that it was possible that the block was changed

during the test, suggesting that it was not compro-

mised. It was later determined by LIRING-7 (a pene-

tration of the Cuban Embassy) through visual obser-

vation that the wall block was changed.

In spite

1

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of this fact, the transcripts indicated with a

reasonable degree of certainty that the device

was discovered by the sweepers, by the comments:

'Hey ... there is something here. It is inside."

These remarks were accompanied by whistling, sing-

ing, "yoo hoo-ing," high frequency tones, scratching,

and knocking. Furthermore, FOXTROT was either live-

monitored or taped until 12 May. The conversations

of the Embassy employees indicated very clearly

that they suspected that the Embassy telephone sys-

tem had been tampered with and that, in the future,

telephone company employees would not be allowed to

enter to make repairs and adjustments.

On 12 May, the station disconnected the loops

to the LISARI and LISASH listening posts and re-

moved all incriminating equipment. (The LIONION

carrier current circuit had already been discon-

nected on 30 April.) LISARI was still able to

live-monitor FOXTROT.

About a week later, still in May 1969, the

DOG and FOXTROT loop connections were remade to

LISARI. The devices were negative, although the

telephones functioned normally. As of 1230 hours,

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24 May, CHARLIE was still functioning, but at 0900

on 26 May CHARLIE was dead, though the telephone

performed normally.

In addition to the LISAMPAN devices, there

was a hot-miked telephone in the residence of the

Cuban Ambassador. This was not continually manned

but could

be monitored from a nearby listening post

(LIHACK-4).

Sometime between 22 and 23 May while

the Ambassador was out of the country the device

was removed, apparently by the Cubans. Although

the station had instructed LIHACK-4 to continually

monitor the

device or watch the residence, he ad-

mitted that the surveillance was limited to spot

checking by his wife. The station was, therefore,

unable to determine when the Cubans entered the

residence to take action resulting in the loss of

the device.

It was

not resolved whether all the devices

were discovered as a result of a special or routine

sweep.

(It appeared

obvious enough that DOG, and

subsequently FOXTROT, and the device in the resi-

dence were discovered as a result of the search.)

It was not clear whether BAKER was discovered

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accidently as a result of the TELEX installation,

11 discovered at all. It was equally unclear

In statements made by AMBEDEW, a Cuban intelli-

gence officer who defected to CIA. He disclosed

that in February 1969, Armando Lopez Orta, Cuban

intelligence chief in Paris, briefed his subordi-

nate officers on a device found in the Embassy in

Mexico. It was not clear whether this discovery

was that of BAKER, or whether Lopez referred to a

much older installation (LIROMANCE) which had long

since been abandoned.

There was also a question whether the arrival

and departure in Mexico of possible Cuban sweep

specialists was connected with the losses. The

sweep on 6 May, which resulted in the loss of DOG,

was probably conducted by regular Embassy employees.

A possibility considered was

the

Cuban Ambassador. The

was ap-

proached under a "false flag" (Mexican Government)

by LIEMBRACE-4, a member of the station's unilateral

surveillance team, on 15 January 1969 to provide

Information on the residence and to allow him to

enter and take photos. At first she was generally

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uncooperative and failed to appear for a scheduled

sceting, but on 1 February she accepted the re-

cruitment, reluctantly. On 15 February, he obtained

a plan of the residence from her; she accepted money;

and, subsequently let him enter and obtain informa-

tion on the telephones. On 24 February she permit-

ted LIFEUD-2 to enter the residence.

He changed

the telephone instrument in the office of the Ambas-

sador leaving one which was hot-miked. He had been

instructed to change only the inner component of

the instrument, but found that the screw holes on

the bottom did

not match

those with the component

he had, so he changed the whole unit instead. The

new telephone was similar to the old one except that

the old one had a cracked dial.

The audio device in the residence worked per-

fectly. LIHACK-4 monitored a conversation between

the Ambassador and unidentified visiting Cubans

that indicated either he and his visitors were un-

aware of the device or were pretending to be unaware.

No really sensitive information was discussed, how-

ever. The device fiom the residence was the last

to be removed but the Cubans may well have noticed

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the new telephone and left it there, since the

house was empty from March to 1 September 1969,

knowing that no conversations could be reported on

it. It was considered that

The discovery of DOG led to a telephone-by-

telephone search resulting in the finding of FOXTROT

and the device in the residence. It was speculated

as to whether this could have been prevented if all

the loops had been disconnected for sometime after

the loss of BAKER. It would have made the detection

more difficult, but the station could never have pre-

vented the eventual loss of the devices installed in

the telephones because LIFEUD-2 lost access to the

Cuban compound (because of his assignment to another

area, and could not control the telephones. Without

such control, there was no possible way to prevent

their routine replacement, as was the case of ABLE.

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was

made possible through the expert knowledge and

craftmanship of

During the period of this operation, about

two weeks, every man in the Mexico City Station

maintained his regular

working schedule,

and then provided surveillance or other support

assistance to this operation during the night.

This was necessary to prevent any indication of

unusual activity on the part of station officers.

158/

LINESA

The operations of this project centered around

a basehouse (Unit 11) equipped with an electrical

apparatus which conducted a technical surveiflance

of the Soviet Embassy. The basehouse was a part of

a four-unit complex, collectively known as LIMUST

and owned by CIA. It was

purchased by Harry T.

Mahoney (through

LIMOUSINE) in September 1957.

The

six LIMESA personnel were husband and wife teams

who acted

as basehouse operators for three of the

four units in the complex. The fourth unit

(LICALLA) was a photographic surveillance base

administered under the LIEMPTY Project.

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The property cost $50,000 in 1957. Another

$50,000 was spent during the next two years for

rebuilding and furnishing the properties. From

1966 through 1969, the project cost approximately

$12,000 per year, of which about half was spent

for salaries and bonuses. The remainder was spent

for equipment and operational expenses.

This was one of the most important projects

of the station and provided highly sensitive in-

formation.*

.59

LICASA

This project was developed in 1958 by

Winston M. Scott who was introduced to the Minister

of Communications at a diplomatic reception.- Scott

expressed an interest in communications and was

introduced by the Minister to the Chief of the Inter-

national Section. This was LICASA-l, the only

agent in the project, who was developed socially

by Scott. He was offered $1,000 a month to provide

copies of all Soviet Bloc cable clear text and

coded traffic. At first, LICASA-l was possessed

* For additional details of this operation, the

reader may wish to consult project records.

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with

a fear of being discovered but $1,000 a month

was too good to turn down. Scott

set up an elabo-

rate meeting system

for the first year which

in-

volved

four persons plus LICASA-1.

Harry T. Mahoney or Frank R. Estancona ac-

companied

Scott to a

street location where LICASA-1

was parked in his-automobile. Scott, LICASA-1, and

the station case officer

then drove in Scott's

quasi-personal car to a safehouse apartment where

Scott and LICASA-l sat in the living room and

chatted while Mahoney, Estancona, and Anne Good-

pasture copied the telegrams on a high-speed

Rekordak set up in the maid's room off the kitchen.

LICASA-1 was not willing to let the material leave

his possession during 1958. The copying operation

took three people two hours because LICASA-1

brought copies of traffic for three to six months

periods of the previous year.. At the first meet-

1ng on 17 June 1958, six rolls of 100-foot micro-

film were needed to copy these files. Meetings

were held

once a month. By 1959, traffic was ob

tained with only a one-month backlog and kept

overright at the station.

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1

Oliver G. SCANTLING was inserted into the

operation as a cutout for Scott from 1962 until 1969

when the station case officer began meeting LICASA-1.

In addition to Soviet Bloc traffic, the proj-

ect expanded to include traffic of most other coun

tries throughout the world and was considered useful

to the NSA. In June 1968, NSA advised that when the

LICASA production was compared with that from simi-

lar collection resources, it was rated "among the

most valuable." Two-thirds of the production for

1967 concerned Cuba, some 40 percent of which was

unique. NSA published 140 reports on Cuba during

1967 as a result of LICASA production. The critical

element in dissemination of this information by NSA

was the delay in receiving the material as the

agent was met only once a month. To speed up this

process, the station began weekly meetings to re-

ceive information on priority targets.

The project cost was approximately $13,000

per year which included $12,000 for the agent,

gifts, and entertainment.

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B. Covert Action Operations

Establishment of the OPC in Mexico was char-

acterized by misunderstanding and confusion.

Head-

quarters advised the Mexico OSO Station Chief,

William H. Doyle, that E. Howard Hunt would arrive

on 15 December 1950.

Instructions to OSO regarding

160/

Hunt were:

1.

Hunt was being assigned to the

OSO office for cover purposes and was

to be provided suitable desk space.

2. Complete agreement had not been

reached at Headquarters regarding Huni's

relationship to OSO. Pending agreement,

Hunt was not to engage in operations.

3. Hunt was

subordinate to the OSO

chief for administration and discipline,

but operationally he was responsible to

OPC, Headquarters.

• 4. OPC operations were to be coor-

dinated with OSO to the extent necessary

to avoid duplication.or confusion. In

the event of disagreement, the matter

was to be referred to Headquarters.

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5. OSO was to provide OPC pouch

facilities with the understanding that

OSO had a right to see OPC dispatches.

6. Hunt was to be completely inde-

pendent of OSO financially.

On 20 December 1950, Headquarters advised

the OSO station chief that a letter in regard to

Hunt's assignment had been pouched for delivery to

the Ambassador. The station was asked to find out

Is the letter had been received and if so, to have

Hunt report for duty.

The OSO station chief

162/

in Mexico replieu:"

Letter to Ambassador arrived.

Doyle called in by Counsellor of Embassy

to interpret letter which referred to

Mr. Hunt by his pseudonym and also to

Mexico by cryptonym.

violation of security was embarrassing

to both Mr. Doyle and Mr. Hunt.

In a meeting in Mexico in the Ambassador's

office, Hunt advised the Ambassador that he (Hunt)

mas assigned to Mexico to set up a new and separate

facility. Operational responsibility was to run,

not through the OSO station, but directly from Hunt

to the Ambassador. Doyle's position at the same

secting was that, as the ranking CIA officer in

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Mexico, he should be responsible to the Ambassador

for all CIA activities and operations. At the

dabassador's request, the matter was. referred to

Headquarters for clarification. Headquarters re-

plied that Doyle was not responsible for opera-

163/

pions of Hunt.

Hunt was to have his own cable

facilities when personnel were available and was

responsible only to OPC, Headquarters, and to the

Ambassador. Further, Doyle was not authorized to

see OPC pouches. The Ambassador was not satisfied

with this explanation because he did not wish to

deal with two senior persons representing different

activities of the same government agency. By this

time, Doyle was awaiting a transfer to another sta-

tion. The OSO replacement was Raymond J. O'Mara

who would not arrive in Mexico until June 1951.

Clarence W. Moore, Jr., was sent to Mexico for tem-

porary duty as acting chief of OSO until O'Mara

arrived. Both Moore and Hunt were directly under

the Ambassador until July 1951 when O'Mara was

164/

designated as chief of all CIA activities in Mexico.

Hunt was named deputy chief with specific responsi-

bility for OPC activities. O'Mara was charged with

..•

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operational responsibility for both OPC and OSO

nctivities and was authorized to direct, supervise,

coordinate, and control all OPC functions.

At a meeting with State Department officials

in Washington on 19 July 1951, senior CIA officials

were advised

that, as

a matter of policy, it was

most desirable that normal overt activity in Mexico

165/

be supplemented by a CA campaign conducted by OPC.

The CA program in Mexico included all areas of the

public media: press, radio, television, motion

pictures, private journals, and editorial/opinion

publications.

In 1954, the station had four CA projects at

a total cost of about $35,000. The first project

was a funding mechanism using the cryptonym LILISP.

As other projects, dependent on this mechanism for

funding, were approved, they had cryptonyms

LILISP-A, B, C, D, and through the alphabet to N be-

fore the practice was stopped when the funding

mechanism folded because of the illness of the

pricipal agent. LILISP-X was a cryptonym which

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1

identified the funds available for operational de-

velopment activities for any type of CA capability.

In 1961, there were

CA projects with a

total budget of $229,600. This increase was part

of an overall WH expansion

in political action and

covert operations on Cuba in order to combat and

overcome threats to US security arising from revo-

lutionary turmoil centered in Cuba and the Caribbean

166/

in general.

For the same reasons, the CA budget

and program continued to expand until in 1964 there

167/

were

projects al a cost of $542,000.

Inspec-

tors

from Headquarters

in August 1964 noted that

the Mexico City Station had a comprehensive and

competently managed CA program. It had effective

projects in media,

11

The most important gap was in

the field of

which was extremely difficult

to develop because of the firm government control

In this area. LIETHIC, an outstanding Mexican

impressed the inspec-

tors as particularly valuable in exploiting fast-

breaking stories. The inspection revealed some

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168/

duplication and overlapping in CA operations.

Subsequent termination of marginal assets and

refinement of projects reduced the CA budget to

$(370,000) in (966),

169/

and to $208, 82) in (1969).

170/

At this point, there were

)CA projects.

The bulk of station CA activities were direc-

ted towards the support of other stations in the

Western Hemisphere. This was accomplished through

use of placement media in the replay of articles

and broadcasts in support of activities in other

countries in Latin America.

24

Historically, there were never more than

CA case officers under official cover at the Mexico

City Station at any given period, as compared with

a top figure of

FI case officers in (966) 172/

The reason for this was that CA operations were

much more sensitive than most fI operations and

could not be traceable to an official installation.

All of the CA operations were handled by

outside

contract agents or staff employees using nonofficial

cover.

There were

of these outside case offi-

cers in (964) but the number was reduced to

in (1969).

24

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also approached the station but he was told that he

should seek support from businessmen such as LISIREN-1,

which he did. Thus, the Mexico City Station did not

believe that LISIREN-3 knew the source of funds

which he received from LISIREN-1.

As the propaganda activities developed,

LISIREN-3 refused to take the advice of LISIREN-1

on communications matters, and the relationship be-

gan to sour.

In March 1963, LISIREN-3 advised David A.

Phillips, the station CA chief, that LISIREN-5

(201-725283), a close personal friend of DCI John A.

sicCone, had arranged for LISIREN-3 and LISIREN-5 to

meet with McCone in Washington. The station cabled

Headquarters to be prepared for a request for finan-

cial support. LISIREN-3 and LISIREN-5 briefed the

Director on the activities of the Social Studies

Center and asked for a direct subsidy of $80,000

per. month.

When LISIREN-3 returned to Mexico City, he

contacted Phillips and advised that he did not

really expect to receive $80,000 a month but expected

to receive at least $40,000 per month from CIA which

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which included the cost of termination payments.

ARLISS received a salary of $3,000 per year.

LITEAR- 1 was

paid a salary of $245 per month.

LITEAR-2 was

paid no salary because she was the

wife of ARLISS and a full-time employee of the

USIS library in Mexico City. LITEAR-3 was paid a

salary of $235 per month.

Student Operations

The University of Mexico was founded in 1553

(some 80 years before Harvard). It was a faithful

copy of the medieval University of Salamanca until

about 1929 when President Emilio Portes Gil, in a

wave of enthusiasm for democratic processes, rein-

corporated the National University as the National

Autonomous University, entrusting its government to

a mixed directorate, half of the members of which

were elected by the faculty and half by the student

body, with the power of hiring and firing all-per-

sonnel. The result, which should have been antici-

pated, was that the university became a training

school for politicians. The professor who failed

a student had to be prepared to defend himself, and

& professor who wanted a job had first to electioneer

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among the student leaders. University politics

took on all the excitement of national politics:

the same cleavages appeared, and rival student

• leaders

used the same methods

as their elders.

In 1944,

for example, the rector (who stood with

the right wing) appointed a director of the National

Preparatory School. The left wing was

annoyed, and

on 26 July a battle was fought between

those who

were in favor of the rector and those who were not.

Students climbed to the roofs of the buildings and

dropped bricks on the heads of their enemies, two

of whom were killed. That was all it cost to pro-

cure the resignations of the rector and the newly

181/

appointed director.

A new rector, approved by the left wing, was

elected; he was Alfonso Caso, a distinguished

archaeologist. By this time the right wing was un-

happy and raised a row. A self-styled "Committee

for the Defense of the University" staged a noisy

demonstration against Caso, accusing him of being

a Communist because he was the brother-in-law of

the Marxist Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

In April 1948, left-wing students issued an

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1

1

1

ultimatum to Caso's successor demanding more lenient

examinations. A right-winger, he refused to yield,

and the students threw him bodily into the

street. Called "hoodlums" by the Mexico City press,

4,000 students marched in protest against the insult

of being called "hoodlums." President Miguel Aleman

wearily intervened and managed to quiet the storm.

In 1950, the student body of 27,000 was moved

to the new University City where it was hoped that

the gymnasium, athletic fields, space, and fresh

air would siphon off student surplus energy.

If

anything, the students became wilder. In 1952, the

right-wing group ousted the rector; in this opera-

tion

the LILISP-C

group.

1

During 1956 the National Polytechnic Institute

called a strike of 25,000 students demanding re-

placement of the administrative staff. Student

demonstrations broke out all over Mexico City in

August 1958 over

a rise in bus fares, with students

wrecking and seizing new buses. Other strikes and

demonstrations occurred periodically, but the big

outburst came in 1966 when striking law students

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took control of the National University and demanded

the resignation of the rector, Ignacio Chavez.

An

estimated 2,500 students stormed the administration

building and forced Chavez and at least 35 other

faculty members to submit theirresignations in

writing, which were accepted. The strike began

when two law students were dismissed for distribu-

ting Communist literature. The left-wing law stu-

dents touched off the strike with demands that the

law school dean be dismissed and the students rein-

stated. Chavez refused and was forcibly ousted.

The internal struggle at the university closed

classes

to the entire 70,000 student body for two

and one-half months before a new rector could be

agreed upon. Meanwhile, the Mexican Government

proclaimed that university autonomy was a status

related only to academic matters and one not to be

exploited by subversive elements for their ulterior

182/

purposes.

To put some muscle into the proclama-

tion, the office of the Attorney General announced

the arrest of eight Trotskyites, including three

183/

Argentines who were among the student agitators.

Student demonstrations continued through 1967

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and 1968 and forced a showdown on the night of 2

October 1968 between the rioting students and the

Mexican Army in the Plaza of Three Cultures in

downtown

Mexico City. It developed into a shoot-

ing contest

and the students lost.

Some 200 stu-

dents trapped in the army cordon were taken to a

•Ilitary camp to cool off and answer questions.

One station asset, LIEMBRACE-4 (201-110542), was

Included in this sweep when he was caught in the

area (at station instructions to report on the

demonstration) and could not get out.*

• He was released after several days detention

during which time he managed to convince the

mIlitary interrogators that he was in the demon-

siration area by accident.

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a sicita

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188/

Theft of Two Briefcases

On 29 November 1960, two briefcases contain-

ing classified information on Mexico City Station

operations, and on US Government support of the

Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Revolucion-

ario Democratico - FRD), an anti-Castro Cuban exile

propaganda group, were stolen from Stanley M. Moos.

Moos was a 45-year-old US citizen who had served

• Not included in this figure was a $10,400 pay-

ment to the family of LIAGOG-1 (201-327871) who

died in 1969.

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as a career agent in Mexico from 1951 to May 1960.

He worked exclusively on CA projects, using commer-

cial cover.

Moos was hired as a contract employee

at $5,000 per year but was raised to $8,330 with

career agent status before he resigned in May 1960

and moved to Houston, Texas. In August 1960, Moos

nas recruited again by E. Howard Hunt to work on

CIA projects on a part-time basis on business

trips made between Houston and Mexico City. Moos

received a salary of $30 per day as a contract

agent for those days he actually performed CIA

work.

]

Moos visited the station offices in Miami and

Headquarters in November 1960 for a briefing on

aspects of his job. He then spent Thanksgiving in

Houston with his family, and on all of these travels

he carried

two large briefcases of classified CIA

papers.

Moos arrived in Mexico City from Houston

on Pan American Airlines at 1115 hours on Tuesday,

•29 November 1960. He picked up his station wagon

at the airport parking lot, where he had stored it,

then dropped off a traveling companion, and proceeded

to his office at Rio de la Plata No. 56-502.

He

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Airing

1

1

1

parked the station wagon around the corner on

Calle Atoyac in front of No. 21. Moos went in the

back seat of the station wagon and opened the two

briefcases, and extracted some papers pertaining

to his personal business. He closed the briefcases,

covered them with a suitbag, and laid them on the

floor in the rear of the station wagon. He then

got out and locked the doors and windows of the

station wagon. Some 30 minutes later, Moos re-

turned to the station wagon and, after glancing

to the rear to note that the suitbag was in place,

proceeded to his apartment. When he picked up the

suitbag, the briefcases were missing. Examination

of the station wagon revealed that a small window

in front had been forced open. Moos returned to

the Atoyac

area and drove around for about a half

hour, then

went back to his apartment and telephoned

his Mexico City Station contact, Jack Stewart, to

report the bad news.

Stewart then advised COS Scott and subse-

quently began a detailed debriefing to ascertain

the contents of the briefcases and to itemize the

dariage. Scott sent Frank R. Estancona to alert the

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LIFIRE team, which had access to the Mexican Security

Service, to spread the word that a $400 reward would

be paid for the return of two briefcases stolen from

an American's station wagon on Calle Atoyac. Lorenzo

B. Sanchez was sent to canvass the Atoyac area to

see if the briefcases were being peddled.* All sta-

tion case officers were called in and notified of

the loss. LIFEAT and LIENVOY case officers began to

live-monitor all telephone lines of the Soviet, Czech,

Polish, and Cuban Embassies. By 1800 hours that

evening, no traces of the missing documents has been

found. Scott sent a cable to leadguarters and Miami,

notifying them of the loss.

Headquarters sent a representative of the Of-

fice of Security to Mexico City. Materials in the

briefcases were reconstructed from station records.

A list of these items was sent to Headquarters.

Every investigative asset of the Mexico City Station

combed the city, even the thieves market, in search

of the briefcases, but no clue to their whereabouts

was ever found. All leads came to a dead end.

Moos

Sanchez was the only person in the station who

could pass for a Mexican.

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was returned to Headquarters for a technical inter-

rogation on 19 December 1960. He appeared to be

truthful in the reporting of the loss and circum-

stances surrounding the incident. There was no

evidence of deception.

A survey of the damage caused by the loss of

the briefcases, dated December 1960, indicated that

Moos not only had classified data on current opera-

tions but documents and data on CA operations dating

back several years. Among the missing papers were

the true names of the following CIA employees:

Joseph Baker, Gerald Droller, Jacob D. Esterline,

John Heyn, David A. Phillips, Grace Roberts, Stannard

K. Short, Jack Stewart, Philip Toomey, E. Howard Hunt,

and William Kent.

The following official cryptonyms

and pseudonyms were compromised:

AMCIGAR, AMGUPPY-1,

AUHAWK-1 and 2, AMRASP, AMWAIL, AMWAIL-1 through 12,

JMASH, Samuel G. ORRISON (pseudonym for Moos),, and

Walter C. TWICKER (pseudonym for Hunt).

Details of CA operations were included in a

calendar-type looseleaf notebook and an accumulation

of two years of back fillers. The following Mexico

City CA operations were considered as compromised by

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this loss:

JMARC activities of the

LILISP-E, a press placement

project; LILISP-11, distribution of a biweekly bul-

letin; LILISP-N, an area-wide anti-Communist front

group;

The following miscellaneous agents and con-

tacts were also identified in the missing papers:

AMSAIL-1, LIMASK, LITAINT-6, LITAINT-7, RNIABILE,

Rodrigo B. Rodriguez, Raul E. Ruffo, Adolfo Desentis

Ortega, Florencio R. Maya, Ray Fisk, and LIBELOW.

I&NS officials named in the papers were

Allen Skinner and John Robbins of the I&NS office

in Laredo, Texas.

The briefcases also contained keys to three

post office boxes in Mexico City which were used

for operational correspondence.

It was obvious from the investigation that

the loss was caused by lamentably poor security

practices developed by Moos over a long period.

Security practices by his station case officers

were equally poor as evidenced by the volume of

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original copies of cables and dispatches taken out

of the Embassy without any attempt, made to para-

phrase the contents or protect the papers against

loss.. Moos had resigned as a career agent in May

1960, with no apparent effort made by his station

case officer to relieve him of his operational

notes at the time of his resignation. If it had

not been for that breach of security, Moos could

not have lost these operational notes in November

1960.

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This project was an

attempt to establish a

nonofficial cover CI unit in Mexico City. In Octo-.

ber 1960, Charles W. Anderson III, and Frank w. 3

Hughes submitted a proposal to the Mexico City

Station in a detailed project outline.

The pri-

mary objective was to develop a long-rarge program

of counterespionage and action operations against

agents in Mexico who were used by the Soviet Bloc

countries and Cuba.

The

first süaffing pattern

24

called for

a team of

>4

_CiA employees (one GS-15

chief;

_GS-14 intelligence officers;

GS - 9

junior officers) with ai estimated budgei of $46ô, 262) 24

per year. The Mexico City Station responded by cable

in january 1961, recognizing the need to move oper-

ations iway fron oificiai cover in the generally

favorabie operational ciimate of Mexico. However,

the mexico City Station feit that CI operations

should be directed by case officers in the official

installation, and suggested that the easiest opei-

ations to move outside were CA projects. CA oper-

ations were then handled outside under nonofficial

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City Station that the FI Section official positions

for support projects

be transferred to the outside

unit.

In May 1961 Winston M. Scott, COS, Mexico,

was at Headquarters on temporary duty. The pro-

posed Ci unit was the subject of discussion between

Scott and senior CI stafi personnel.

Scott was in

agreement that a CI unit should be formed and re-

quested that Headquarters proceed with the planning

and the selection, training, and dispatch of per-

sonnel to the field. Scott wanted all personnel of

the unit to go to the field as career agents, and

he requested that all be experienced CI/CE operations

officers who were fluent in Spanish. He also speci-

fied that they be prepared to concentrate on the

Soviet and Satellite targets. HAg a result of this.

conversation, the budget for the proposed CI unit

was inciuded in the WH Operational Program for FY

1962, which was approved by the DDP in July 1961.

At a WH regional Conference in Mexico City in

August 1961, Jacob D. Esterline (WH chief of oper-

ations) and Ned. P. Holman) (Mexico Branch chief) dis-

cussed the proposed Cl unit with Warren t. Dean)

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DCOS, Mexico.

(Dean) indicated that the Mexico City

Station was not generally in sympathy with Head-

quarters! proposal to set up an outside CI unit.

In contrast to

Scott's

remarks in May while at

Headquarters, Dea?) ielt that the outside unit should

include both CA and Ci components and should be made

un principally of junior officer trainees using stu- c4

dent cover at places such as the University of Mexico.)

instead

of resolving the divergent views of

Scott and(Dean in Mexico during the regional confer-

ence, WH officers returned to Headquarters and dis-

cussed them with representatives of the CI Staff and

then forwarded a dispatch to the station.

The reply

iron the station was in curt language. In essence,

it charged that Headquarters was trying to set up a

CI outside unit responsible to a Headquarters staff

mission with too much independence from the station.

This insinuation was a station interpretation of the

original proposal which in no way implied that the

unit would be autonomous or exempt from station con-

trol. Nevertheless, the station insisted that CI

operations be run from oificial cover positions, and

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I October 1963 through 30 September 1964 for a

total of $73,480). From December 1963 until August

1964, ETSINGER and REYMANDER spent time establish-

ing and working on their cover business, though no

business developed from the efforts of foing through

the motions

2L/ of preparing investment surveys. Sev-

eral (surveys )were prepared, both from information

from the files of Matson and independently.

LILINK was under the direction of the deputy

chief of station, Alan P. White. The first case

turned over to LILINK in August 1964 was Natalie

K. MICHNOFF, a staff agent with Student cover at

24

the University of Mexico School for Foreigners,

She was sent to Mexico in 1963 to act as principal

agent for the LIMOTOR operation, which from 1957

to 1962 had been an active "umbrella" type project

supporting young American students in contact with

Soviet intelligence officers. By the time MICHNOFF

arrived in Mexico, the enthusiasm of CIA for this

type of short-term double agent operation had worn

so thin that the LIMOTOR Project was redirected

toward collection of positive intelligence instead

of counterintelligence.

As a resuit, all but two

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IV. Joint Operations And Projects Using

Mexican Government Officials

The branches of the Mexican Government of

particular interest to CIA were the Presidency,

the Ministry of Interior, and the Mexican Secur-

1 ty Service (called the Department of Federal

Security - Direccion Federal de Seguridad, DFS).

Federal

executive authority in Mexico was

vested in one single person who was elected as

President of the United Mexican States or, more

commonly, President of the Republic. Despite the

fact that the Mexican constitutional system shared

some of the characteristics of the parliamentary

system, it was frankly, presidential.

In fact,

the President was head of state and head of govern-

ment, contrasting with the parliamentary character-

1stic of collective responsibility for government.

The internal structure of the Federal executive

authority possessed a certain degree of flexibility

because the number of ministries and departments

was not fixed by the Constitution, but by lesser

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laws which could be modified (as in the United

States) according to the circumstances and the

personality of the President.

The Ministry of Interior (called Secretary

of Government - Secretaria de Gobernacion) was

responsible for the conduct of relations with the

other Federal authorities, with the governments

of the Mexican states, and with the

municipalities.

It also provided the Federal judiciary

with the

aid it required for the proper exercise of its

functions. This Ministry was

responsible for the

appointments of high officials of the administra-

tion, magistrates, and judges after their designa-

tion by the judiciary. A function of this Ministry

of great importance in the political life of the

country was that of controlling, administering,

and monitoring elections.

It was responsible for

the supervision of all printed matter together with

all radio and television broadcasts. Furthermore,

it directed the internal demographic policy of the

country, with the exception of the colonization of

unoccupied land and, finally, it exercised control

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=1

71

over all affairs related to internal politics.

This Ministry was often a springboard to the

Presidency (all but one of the nine Presidents

of Mexico between

1928 and 1969 served as Minister

192/

of Interior prior to election as President).

Upon recommendation of the PRI, President

Miguel Aleman Valdez created the DFS by presidential

decree in January 1947. The DFS was placed under

the Ministry of Interior. General Marcelino

Inurreta was the first DFS chief and a most ardent

promoter. It quickly became influential as a per-

sonal intolligerce service of the Presidert. No

provision was made for the DFS in the national bud-

get. Funds were, siphoned from the appropriation

of the Ministry of Interior Police (an agency ex-

clusively for law enforcement). At its inception,

the DFS's primary responsibility was the investi-

gation of national security matters; in façt, its

principal attention was given to domestic political

affairs. These functions had been the responsi-

bility of the Attorney General of the Republic,

the Attorney General of the Federal District,

and

31

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the Political and Social Section of the Ministry

of Interior. During the Aleman administration,

the DI'S had representatives in each state of the

Mexican Republic and attempted, through its sources,

to penetrate the political parties and movements

opposed to the government.

The DFS also engaged in

placing informants with civilian governmental agen-

cies and

military installations to report on dis-

loyal employees. The DFS had no power of arrest

and

was obliged to depend upon other police organi-

zations

for this function. Sometimes

the DFS in-

vestigators merely borrowed

and used

credentials

belonging to other policemen for this purpose.

early days of the DFS were marked by illegal ar-

The

rests, killings, detentions, extortion, blackmail,

and

outright thievery. The Ministry of Interior,

to which the DFS was nominally subordinate, was

precluded from exerting any control over the DFS

organization and operations. General Inurreta was

responsible only to the President, who was con-

vinced of his personal loyality. When the general

left the DFS at the expiration of the Aleman admini-

stration in 1952, he took large quantities of modern

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7

police equipment, which had belonged to the DFS,

and established a private investigation and strong-

193/

arm group.

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Aleman's successor to

the Presidency, continued the existence and powers

of the DFS by verbal decree and, at the same time,

personally ordered the illegal activities of the

DFS investigators to cease. Without the driving

influence of Inurreta, the DFS relaxed its activi-

ties and became relatively innocuous in comparison

to its first five years of life. Colonel Leandro

Castillo Venegas replaced Inurreta as head of the

DFS until 31 December 1953. His deputy was Luis

Suarez Torres. They were replaced in 1954 by

Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Rangel Escamilla as

director and Captain Fernando Gutierrez Barrios

as deputy director.

When Adolfo Lopez Mateos came to power in

December 1958, he retained Rangel Escamilla and

Gutierrez Barrios in their positions

in the DFS.

Al though

there were

frequent rumors that Lopez

Mateos intended to fire Rangel Escamilla, the

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latter remained director of the DFS until 1963.

The real power in the DFS was Fernando Gutierrez

Barrios, who as deputy director revitalized the

service and, under more than normal handicaps,

attempted to give it the semblance of a genuine

nonpartisan investigative agency. Most of the

strong-arm men were dismissed and were replaced

with young lawyers and graduates from the schools

of higher education and from the military academy.

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was Minister of Interior in the

Lopez Mateos administration and succeeded in bring-

ing the DFS under control of his Ministry.

He was

able to do this because he and Lopez Mateos were

195/

close personal friends with mutual interests.

In 1964 Diaz Ordaz became President of Mexico,

and in May 1965 he named Gutierrez Barrios as direc-

tor of the DFS.

The DFS was responsible for investigating

activity which endangered

the political security

of the country, including espionage, sabotage, and

other subversion. It investigated frauds involving

membership lists of political parties and other

political irregularities. It was charged with

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monitoring the activities of foreign embassies;

most of this effort was directed at the Cuban

Embassy from 1960 to 1969. With regard to the

other foreign missions in Mexico City, the DFS

generally restricted its activity to periodic

interviews with responsible embassy officials

concerning events of interest to their respec-

tive establishments. The DFS monitored Cuban

travel, overtly and clandestinely, at the inter-

national airport in Mexico City and collected

intelligence on all political parties, labor unions,

governmental ministries, and other orsantrations

of political interest.

There were 150 agents assigned to the DFS

as of 1966.

The service was organized into three

groups: the Operations Group which was respon-

sible for political investigations, special in-

vestigations, and regional representatives;, the

Support Group which operated a telephone moni-

toring unit, archives, photo laboratory, and a

criminal laboratory; and the Administrative Group

which handled vehicles, weapons, credentials, office

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197/

supplies, and messenger service.

CIA relations with Mexican Government offi-

cials began in July 1947 when Gus T. Jones, a CIA

contract employee and former head

of the FBI in

Mexico, introduced William

H. Doyle, the first

COS, to Inurreta. There followed an exchange of

information on

the CP and Soviet Bloc official

installations in Mexico until July 1948. Doyle

advised Headquarters that the personnel comprising

the DFS were by and large unreliable, self-seeking,

and generally disinterested in work of importance

to CIA. DFS interest had shifted to investigations

of contraband (where the payoff was greater) and

Doyle felt that DFS demands made upon the station,

resulting from association with them, outweighed

any future usefulness. He indicated that a "social"

relationship would be retained in the event that

the station was ever required to call on the DFS

198/

for assistance.

Headquarters advised the station that, follow-

ing the Mexican national elections in July 1952, liai-

son with the DFS would be initiated through Project

1

]

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LIVESTOCK. Robert L. Melberg was assigned to Mexico

under official cover in June 1952 as the officer re-

sponsible for police training and liaison.

1

1

1

Melberg a group of eight DFS

agents under LIVESTOCK-2 for training and joint oper-

ations against the CP. The group had just begun

functioning when LIVESTOCK-2 shot and killed a poli-

tician on 31 August 1953. He was in the Mexican

federal penitentiary until 20 April 1955. During

this time, he remained on the station payroll, but

the DFS agents who had been under him were inactive.

The group functioned again under LIVESTOCK-2 from

1955 until 5 October 1959 when it was terminated

for payroll padding, blackmail, providing false

information, 199/

and the general unreliability of

LIVESTOCK -2.

Two agents from the LIVESTOCK

Project were retained as the LIFIRE Project. They

provided airline manifests and limited surveillances.

When the LIVESTOCK Project was functioning,

Charles W. Anderson III was in contact with

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LIKAYAK-2 and had established a mail intercept

operation in 1957 (LIBIGHT) which functioned with

In August 1958, Ambassador Robert C. Hill

brought Winston M. Scott, COS, into contact with

a confidant of former President Miguel Aleman in

order to discuss Communist activities. Shortly

thereafter,

An in-

formal agreement was made to cooperate in the col-

lection of information on Soviet and Communist

tar-

gets. CIA provided technical assistance

for a joint

telephone tapping installation with Mexican Govern-

ment cover.

This led to a productive and effective

relationship between CIA and select top officials

in Mexico which proved to be of substantive value

to both. * The relationship between Scott and top

1

1

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Mexican Government officials was in essence, a

political one. It became an unofficial channel

for the exchange of selected, sensitive

political

information which each government wanted the other

to receive but not through public protocol exchanges.

Ambassador Hill

and his successor, Thomas C. Mann,

gave their blessing to this relationship but Fulton

Freeman, who replaced Mann in 1964, felt that he

should be the one to confer with the Mexican Presi-

dent on sensitive political matters.*

The telephone tapping operation (LIENVOY) was

successful as a producer of positive intelligence

and was considered by Headquarters as a "model" for

imitation by other stations, particularly in the

area of efficient processing and exploitation of

raw take. The reason for this success was the

presence of

staff agent Arnold F. AREHART, inside

the listening post. This assignment was vital to

the preservation of CIA's equity in this operation

which cost $150,000 for the installation. Even with

AREHART's presence, there was petty theft of equip-

ment and periodic laxity in processing the tapes.

* See VI. Relations with the US Embassy.

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Independently of the LIENVOY mechanism and

LIBIGHT, CIA maintained a working-level relation-

ship with the DFS through Project LITEMPO. This

project initially evolved around a senior FBI agent

(Jeremy K. BENADUN) who resigned from that organi-

zation

in Mexico

and was recruited by CIA in November

1960. BENADUM had been in the FBI office in Mexico

since 1953 and was the assistant legal attache.

During that time he was responsible

for police liai-

son with the Mexican DFS. He knew Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

in the

Ministry of Interior but he knew his nephew,

Emilio Bolanos Diaz,

even better. BENADUM and

Bolanos were godparents to each other's children.

BENADUM had hired Bolanos when he was a messenger

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in his uncle's (Diaz Ordaz) Ministry of Interior.

BENADUM proposed to bring his sources with him

when he was hired by the station. It was expected

that through BENADUM and Bolanos (LITEMPO-1), the

station could develop an effective penetration of

the Ministry of Interior. As it developed, both

BENADUM and LITEMPO-1 were so self-seeking that

the project floundered for lack of management and

initiative. It became a network of 1l fairly un-

productive and expensive agents until October 1963

when $10,000 of fat was cut from the budget.

It

did provide the station chief covert access to Diaz

Ordaz and to the DFS deputy director, Gutierrez

Barrios.

Through the LITEMPO Project, the station sub-

sidized the campaign of Diaz Ordaz for President by

providing special radio equipment for automobiles

and a monthly payment of $400 for salaries of two

additional bodyguards. The LITEMPO Project also

operated a concealed passport camera at the inter-

national airport which was used to cover travelers

from Cuba. In 1965 at the request of Gutierrez

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Cn return to Mexico, one of these agents (LITEMPO-12)

was placed in charge of investigating subversive acti-

vities and was assigned to

The other was assigned to the Presidential staff as

a bodyguard and was of no use to

the station.

From

that time, the LITEMPO Project became a producer of

positive intelligence and the course of the liaison

changed to one of operational support and security

for station operations. During 1968, LITEMPO was

expanded through the LIARBOR Project to irclude

201/

LIVESTOCK

The purpose of this project was to provide a

liaison relationship between the Mexico City Station

and the Mexican DFS. Robert L. Melberg was assigned

to the Mexico City Station under official cover in

June 1952 as the officer responsible for police

liaison.

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LIFIRE

This project was the outgrowth of the LIVE-

srock project. Four agents handled

by LIVESTOCK-2

Fire recruited by Warren L. Dean in

1959

when

the

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LIVESTOCK Project was terminated. These agents

were: the team secretary, LIFIRE-2, formerly

LIVESTOCK-19; a photographer at the international

airport, LIFIRE-4, formerly LIVESTOCK-18; a sur-

veillance agent, LIFIRE-3, formerly LIVESTOCK-20;

and a surveillance team leader, LIFIRE-1, formerly

LIVESTOCK-23. LIFIRE-3 was discharged for unreli-

ability in 1961 and replaced by LIFIRE-5, a former

DFS agent and friend of LIFIRE-1.

The team leader, LIFIRE-1, was the brother

of the chauffeur of President Adolfo Lopez Mateos.

Through his political connections, LIFIRE-1 received

a position in northern Mexico along the US border in

1963 and resigned. He took LIFIRE-4 with him, but

LIFIRE-4 quickly became disillusioned and returned

to Mexico City and was hired again by the station.

The secretary, LIFIRE-2, was terminated when LIFIRE-1

and LIFIRE-4 left Mexico City because the remaining

two agents did not have enough work to warrant full-

time employment for her.

The two agents (LIFIRE-4 and 5) had credentials

as employees of the Mexican Government and were sta-

tioned at the international airport where they

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1

1

]

obtained a copy of the passenger manifest of every

Incoming and outgoing commercial flight.* These

1ão men also extracted information from passports

of persons traveling through Mexico of interest to

the station. They provided a limited surveillance

capability and could follow a traveler to his hotel.

However, obtaining travel manifests consumed most

of their time because of the sheer volume of inter-

national flights. Mexico had one of the busiest

airports in the world, which had an average of 75

international flights arriving and departing each

203/

day.

These manifests were of great value in

checking travel for the Mexico City Station and

other stations throughout the world.

The Mexico

City Station was constantly called on

by the local

FBI office for confirmation of travel of persons

of

1

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interest to that office. These manifests were

delivered to the station case officer in clan-

destine meetings in an automobile at various loca-

tions in the city three times per week and were

packed in suitcases. The two agents also used a

necktie photographic concealment device for spot

clandestine photography.

Headquarters rated this project as perhaps

the most prolific and reliable source in CIA of

timely information about travel to Cuba. Frequently,

It was the only source of information about Cuban

travel of Latin Americans no snowed only Mexico

as their destination and concealed their true desti-

nations from their governments. During the period

1 June 1963 through 30 April 1964, the LIFIRE Project

was the source of 615 reports on Cuban travel and

air shipments. The volume of reporting from this

project was consistently high, and much of the travel

data was reported by cable on Headquarters instructions.

In addition to air travel and spot surveillance,

this couple operated a mobile phototruck equipped

with a concealed camera and telephoto lens that oper-

ated through a periscope in a specially-built turret

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in the top of a panel truck. The truck was sold as

an economy measure in April 1967 since it dupli-

cated a phototruck operated by the LIENTRAP team.

The LIFIRE Project cost approximately

$30,000

for its first year (June 1960 through May 1961)

because of the large investment of equipment, in-

cluding the purchase of two automobiles with radio

communications. However, costs averaged about

$12,000 from 1966 to 1969, of which approximately.

$10,000 was paid for salaries and bonuses to the

tro agents.

204/

LIBIGHT

LIKAYAK-2 was an employee in the Mexican

Ministry of Interior in the early

1950's and be-

came disillusioned with his job.

With another

former Mexican Government official, LIKAYAK-2

formed a private investigation agency. He was

recommended to the Mexico City Station by LIME-

STONE, the principal agent for LIFEAT, as a cover

mechanism for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team.

LIKAYAK-2 was recruited in March 1956 by Charles

W. Anderson III, who decided not to use the business

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for cover purposes. Because of LIKAYAK-2's pro-

fessional background (chemist and former director

of the technical laboratory in the Ministry of

Interior), Anderson developed the agent into a

postal intercept operation. With the permission

of

31

LIKAYAK-2 organized a network of 22

agents between 1957 and 1969. The group was capable

of intercepting any item from any post office in

Mexico City. Sixteen agents had credentials as

"postal inspectors" and made the intercepts for

LIKAYAK-13, a postal department official.

He de-

livered the letters to LIKAYAK-4, a government

official, who processed them in the laboratory

of

LIKAYAK-2.*

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The LIBIGHT Project also provided access to

she immigration files of the Ministry of Interior

shich included all foreigners except diplomats.

These dossiers could either be copied by LIKAYAK-2

or loaned to the station for a day. This

was a valuable asset for checking biographic data

on agents or target individuals. The files con-

tained photographs, copies of passports, marriage

data, residences of the subject, and a notation of

travel to and from Mexico.

Other agents in the LIBIGHT Project had pub-

lic utilities credentials and could gain access to

offices and residences for casings and audio

instal-

lations for the station.

1

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* LIKAYAK-2 was subsequently handled by

• Alan P.

White and James E. Anderson.

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tis dit int dd dn de di diei dut i

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The project cost approximately $40,000 per

year for the entire network. Almost $37,000 of this

amount was paid for salaries and bonuses. LIKAYAK-2

was paid $400 a month in 1957 and had been raised

to $500 as of 1969.

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205/

LIENVOY

In August 1958, the US Ambassador, Robert C.

1111, entertained Carlos Trouyet (owner of the

Mexican telephone company and Mexico's richest

Industrialist) at a breakfast to which Winston M.

Scott, COS, was invited. Scott was introduced as

an "expert on Communism." Trouyet, an extremely

piO-US Mexican, offered his assistance in collecting

information on Communist activities.

discussed recommending a new method

of telephone tapping with Scott's help.

Meanwhile, the Mexico City Station was in

contact with other persons close to Aleman. One

of these persons was LIELEGANT (201-225439), a

Sexican lawyer and presidential adviser.* Scott

* LIELEGANT had used LIKAYAK-? to establish contact

with CIA in May 1958. See LIBIGHT.

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1

and Alfonso G. Spera, case officer for LIKAYAK-2,

had talked with LIELEGANT in general terms about

Communism in Mexico.

Lopez Mateos became President of Mexico on

1 December 1958. According to LIELEGANT, Lopez

sent for him

and told him he wanted to establish

a security unit under him. LIELEGANT reported this

to Scott who met with Lopez Mateos on 16 December

1958.

In the discussion that followed they agreed

to cooperate in the collection of information on

Soviet and Communist targets, with LIELEGANT to act

for Lopez Mateos in heading a telephone tap unit.

This was put under the jurisdiction of Benito Coquet,

who was then the director of Mexican social security.

Trouyet was aware of the plan and agreed to provide

a 30-pair cable from the telephone company.

Headquarters agreed to supply the equipment.*

This equipment was delivered to Mexico by a special

aircraft with a team of TSD engineers who made the

and 11 Revere tape recorders for transcribers.

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30

installation, first in

an office with LIELEGANT's

law firm, and later in a residénce near the main

relephone central. This residence had the cover

of a restricted government office.

Mexican

Army officers were detailed as tran-

scribers and monitors. Other employees of the

listening

post were friends of the Army officers

or persons known to LIELEGANT or his son, LIENVOY-2,

who became the Mexican responsible for the listening

post. The station placed a staff agent, Arnold F.

APEHART, in the listening post as an outside case

officer responsible for supervision and mainten-

ance of the equipment. As of 1969, AREHART com-

pleted his tenth year in this position.

The initial project provided for a listening

post and a separate unit to investigate leads from

the taps. The separate unit (LITABLE) folded quickly.

The agents consisted of semi-illiterate bodyguard

types who could not respond to training. The train-

ing officer, Bernard

E. ELAKMAN, was returned to

Headquarters in 1959 (shortly after his arrival in

Mexico) for health reasons. He was not replaced.

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The LITABLE agents were terminated soon thereafter.

Another early personnel problem evolved around

shu senior outside case officer. He did not have a

Spanish language capability, and he was also re-

surned to Headquarters when he could not adjust

lo the outside role of a staff agent. He was not

replaced.

By the end of 1959, the project was covering

30 lines; 15 of these were selected by the station

and 15 by the Mexicans. The installation costs

were around $150,000. The first targets selected

by the station were CP personalities not covered

by LIFEAT, but in June 1960 LIELEGANT indicated

that

wanted to cover the Soviet Bloc

installations. LIFEAT

taps were removed to prevent

LIENVOY from accidentally finding them and tracing

the wire to a listening post. From 1960 through

1969, the 15 target lines of the station were Soviet

Bloc installations.

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The LIENVOY Project cost about $60,000 per

year

after its first year. This figure did not

include salary

and allowances for the outside staff

agent, AREHART, who worked exclusively on LIENVOY

but was paid from "support" funds. There were ten

Mcxican employees working in the listening post who

prepared the daily transcripts and a summary of

information from the lines which were not fully

transcribed. This summary was delivered each morn-

Ing about 0800 hours to the station case officer by

AREHART.

Any items of unusual significance were

brought to the attention of the chief of station

before 0900 hours.

Russian, Czech, Yugoslav, and

Polish language tapes were transcribed by other

contract agents not tied in with the LIENVOY Project.

These

persons

usually had one room in their resi-

dences

sealed

off

as

a work area for handling tapes.

Alfonso G. Spera set up the LIENVOY Project

and acted

as

the station case officer until 1960

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when he was replaced by John B. Brady, who handled

ise project until October 1961.*

From November 1959 until mid-1964, the project

opcrated under the original group of Mexicans

(LIELEGANT, LIENVOY-2, and Lopez Mateos, with Coquet

and Trouyet both knowledgeable but not taking a posi-

fion in the management). In mid-1964 it became ap-

parent that Gustavo Diaz Ordaz would replace Lopez

Mateos. In August 1964, Lopez Mateos briefed Diaz

Ordaz on the tap unit and recommended that he re-

tain it without change. Diaz Ordaz agreed to re-

taIn LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2. Coquet, whom Diaz

Ordaz did not like personally, was phased out of

the project. New cover for LIENVOY was provided

by the Presidential staff as a unit of the Census

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The Headquarters FI Staff considered the

LIESTOY Project as a model for imitation by other

•tations, particularly in the area of efficient

processing and exploitation of raw take.

From

1959 through 1968, the project produced an average

of 100 positive intelligence reports a year although

some of this information was of marginal value. The

operational information from the project on Soviet

Bloc officials and their contacts was considered

outstanding and essential to developing operations

against those targets.

During late 1968, LIELEGANT asked the station

In early 1969 LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 again

requested CIA training for another investigative

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571

group similar to LITABLE. Wade E. Thomas went to

Mexico on temporary duty and provided training to

a group of

agents in mid-1969.

The project had many frustrating situations

in dealing with LIENVOY-2, who was basically dis-

honest and conniving. Neither he nor his father,

LIELEGANT, were subject to any control by CIA

except through the tightening of purse strings.

The two of them met with Scott and acted as a com-

munication channel to the President of Mexico.

Typical of LIENVOY-2's demands on the station

=hich toro of no value was the LISALAD mail inter-

cept unit. At station request, Headquarters sent

John J. McGee on

temporary duty to Mexico in 1966

to provide training in "flaps and seals" to LIENVOY-19

for a unit (LISALAD) to intercept mail. It was

thought at the station that this was an attempt on

the part of LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 to undermine

the position of LIKAYAK-2. Like all other requests

from LIENVOY-2, this was presented as a "request

from the President." However, once LIENVOY-19 and

LIENVOY-2 learzed of the tedious work involved in

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177

processing mail intercepts, the function was aban-

doned as far as the station could determine. Nev-

ortheless, LIENVOY-2 continued to bill the station

for office rent and the salary of LIENVOY-19 even

though the office no longer existed and the agent

not doing anything for the station. Scott de-

cided to continue making the payments rather than

confront LIENVOY-2 with this fraud and offend him

or his father, LIELEGANT.

LIENVOY-2 also claimed to Scott that two of

the LITABLE agents were retained as investigators.

Scott agreed to subsidize their salaries as a part

of a monthly stipend paid to LIENVOY-2 for oper-

ational expenses. According to AREHART, he paid

all the operational expenses at the listening post

from his station revolving fund. Therefore, the

payments to LIENVOY-2 represented a flat subsidy

of $500 per month in addition to a salary of $480

per month.

This payment of $980 per month to LI-

LNVOY-2 was recognized by Scott as an ante for main-

aining the relationship with LIELEGANT who received

no salary from the

station.

The

project would have functioned better and

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could have cost considerably less without LIENVOY-2

or LIELEGANT.

On the other hand, LIELEGANT and

118.170Y-2 were both part of the package presented

Is Adolfo Lopez Mateos when the project started.

Only experience in dealing with them revealed that

their contacts with succeeding presidents were not

as close as the relationship they shared with Lopez

Xatcos. In their dealings with the station, LI-

ESVOY-2 and LIELEGANT gained a considerable knowl-

edge of the station's operational assets and capa-

bilities. From a security viewpoint, they knew too

such to terminate them with prejudice unless the

station was also willing to terminate the operations

they knew about, which included LIFIRE, LIBIGHT,

LITEMPO, and LIENVOY.

206/

1.1 TEMPO

The LITEMPO Project provided for operational

support and security backstopping for the Mexico

City Station operations from 1960. The principal

agent was Jeremy K. BENADUM, a career agent. He was

a former FBI agent in Mexico and had been the assis-

tant legal attache from 1953. He resigned from the

-

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IBI in the face of a transfer to the United States

and was hired by Winston M. Scott, COS, because of

BENADUBI's numerous contacts in the Ministry of

Interior. One of BENADUM's main contacts was LI-

TT:NPO-1, the nephew of the Minister, then Gustavo

Diaz, Ordaz.

The budget for the first project year (1961)

cas. $55,353 which

supported four employees of the

Ministry of Interior ($9,000), a five-man surveil-

lance team of agents transferred from LIEMPTY who

had been recruited under LIPSTICK/LIJERSEY ($10,000),

salary and allowance for BENADUM ($21,000), and sOme

$15,000 for operational expenses.

The project suf-

dered constantly from lack of effective management.

The surveillance team reports were of little or no

value because the agents did not receive proper

direction. They were removed from the LITEMPO

Project and placed

under LIRICE in 1962. BENADUM

and LITEMPO-1 were so occupied with station requests

for operational support and security backstopping in

connection with the JMNET operation that all other

sitivities were neglected. They arranged through

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Mexicon officials for such things as the purchase

ard storage of 200,000 liters of aviation gas and

11,000 liters of oil on the Mexican airfields at

Chetunal and Cozumel for use during the Bay of Pigs

uperation, the evacuation of an unmarked C-54 Agency

plone with a Cuban exile crew which made a forced

landing in Chiapas, the location and arrest of

Cuban nationals who had deserted their training

posts in Guatemala and were "at large" in Mexico,

and the legal entry into Mexico of Cubans whose

gresence was necessary in connection with operations

against Cuba directed from Miami and other stations.

In the handling of these sporadic security and sup-

fort operations, day-to-day management of the LI-

TEMPO Project personnel was neglected by BENADUM

and LITEMPO-1.

Once the project got off on the wrong foot in

Ine way of effective management, it was difficult

to repair the damage.

None of the original agents

had the slightest concept of positive intelligence

reporting. As a result, the project produced noth-

sk during its first few years.

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During 1962 the contacts of BENADUM in the

Xinistry of Interior asked the station to provide

equipment for a 20-line telephone tap operation at

a cost of approximately

This request

received Headquarters' approval in principle but

ras never implemented as a project because the

1.I TEMPO group, under BENADUM, had not convinced

the station that they could manage such a tap

center. Their concept of operations consisted of

retting people out of jail, putting people in jail,

und arranging meetings for bribes. They did not

have the discipline required for day-to-day manage-

acht of the routine required for processing tele-

phone tap information. Also, their concept of tele-

phone tap operations was to listen to the conversa-

810n, jot down an address or name but make no tran-

scripts. Further, their targets were criminal cases

or political enemies rather than those of interest

so the station.

Although the original surveillance team mem-

Pers were removed from the project, the cost con-

¿inued to increase, amounting to $59,235 for 1963.

Headquarters asked the station to provide closer

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supervision of the project in an effort to increase

1es production and reduce its cost. After a sta-

Iron review, $10,000 was cut from the project by

surinating marginal agents and cutting operational

cxpenses.

The project did not produce positive intel-

ligence until LITEMPO-12 was recruited. He was a

Nubordinate of LITEMPO-4 (the director of the DFS)

When LITEMPO-12

returned to Mexico, he was assigned to work with the

*tation. From early 1966, LITEMPO-12 heid meetings

cach morning with BENADUM and passed copies of re-

ports received from LITEMPO-12 agents (about 20)

assigned to subversive targets. This produced

(for the next three years) about 20 percent of the

positive intelligence production from the station.

The reports covered activities of the CP, Cuban

cxiles, the Trotskyites, and Soviet Bloc cultural

kroups. The results from police raids against

ilbrersive groups were passed to the station via

:ITEMPO-12. During 1967 and 1968, his group also

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cooperated with the station on covering the acti-

villes of US radical students travelling to Cuba.

N

• In 1965 the LITEMPO Project also took over

sanagement of a concealed passport camera at the

international airport which photographed documents

of travellers from Cuba and selected Soviet Bloc

countries. This was the primary source for the sta-

Ison for identification of Cuban and Soviet Bloc

officials who were assigned to Mexico.

207/

LISAGA

The LISAGA Project was a third-country oper-

allon. A Mexican citizen, LISAGA-1 was selected by

she COS, Mexico City, and

for assignment as

in Havana, Cuba, for the purpose

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V. Clandestine Collection, Concept and Assessment

In examining the collection product, two

types of information must be distinguished. The

first, positive intelligence, was a clearly defined

item, collected for customer agencies, disseminated

according to their needs and interest, and was sub-

ject to evaluation. The usefulness and importance

of each report was manifest when the report was

weighed against other information on the same sub-

ject, considering the source's access and reporting

record.

Security inteiligence, on the other hand, de-

fied precise definition. It was largely self-

generated in response to Agency internal require-

ments or in pursuit of obvious, but not necessarily

formalized, security objectives. It received limited

distribution to a few other agencies with security

responsibilities (11 it was disseminated at all?.

On receipt it was sometimes impossible to evaluate

with any degree of accuracy. In fact, its importance

did not become apparent for months or even years un-

til it was matched against other information received

from a different source, or until a sudden, specific

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and often urgent need arose (in connection with a

Presidential visit, for example). Security intel-

ligence included all information concerning the

Identities, activities, contacts, and movements of

US and foreign subversive personalities, foreign

intelligence personnel, and other persons known or

suspected of being engaged in activities inimical

to the United States. It was used to improve US

security or to assist in the implementation of US

national policy.

The station produced a large volume of security

intelligence concerning: US citizens initiating or

maintaining contact with the Cuban and Soviet diplo-

matic installations; travel to Cuba by US citizens

and residents; activities of Cuban and Soviet intel-

ligence personnel; travel of Mexican and other Latin

American key subversive personalities; and methods

used to support

subversive

groups outside of Mexico.

In FY 1966, 82 formal disseminations of security

intelligence were made

to the FBI, the I&NS, the

military services, and similar customers. More than

half of these related to the activities of US na-

tionals. The bulk of the security intelligence,

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however, was retained by operational elements of

CIA for

analysis

and

internal use.

The Mexico

City

Station referred daily to indexes

based on this

material in tracing applicants for US visas, and in

support of its own and other stations' operational

programs. The same indexes were also regularly

consulted

in tracing applicants for US Civil Ser-

vice positions, employees of private industry whose

access to classified information required a US secu-

rity clearance, and Mexicans visiting the United

States as members of official delegations scheduled

to receive classified briefings. The station ser-

viced approximately 35,000 name traces annually

(including visa checks) from 1957 through 1958 and

uncovered substantive information in about 12 per-

209/

cent of the cases.

In 1962 FI/INT/RE,* conducted a review of

210/

Clandestine Service (CS) reporting from Mexico.

This included a thorough study of 415 CS reports

disseminated during the six-month period ending

31 March 1962. The appraisal was based on a general

* FI Staff, Intelligence Group, Requirements and

Evaluation Branch (FI/INT/RE).

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review and comparison of information from overt

sources during the same period and interviews with

customer analysts to determine the adequacy of past

CS reporting and needs for future CS reporting.

Collection guidance on Mexico was also examined to

determine its adequacy and relevance to the report-

ing.

The study reflected that the Related Missions

Directive largely, but not completely, provided for

the intelligence community's needs for CS reporting.

In general appraisal, CS reporting on Commu-

nist and leftist activities in Mexico was found

necessary to complement and confirma

volume of

similar information produced by the FBI and the

Office of Operations (00). There was need for more

information

on Communist influence among individuals

such

as

prominent Mexicans who supported Communism

on individual issues, particularly leftist influence

in the Mexican Government.

The overall Soviet 'plans

for the numerous leftist assets in Mexico were not

sufficiently covered in the CS reporting.

Informa-

tion was also needed on the extent of Soviet influ-

ence and subversion in all its forms throughout

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Mexico. Reporting on students' domestic activities

was considered insufficient in relation to the im-

portance of the subject.

One-third of the reporting related to the

Communist Party, the National Liberation Movement

(MLN) and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). Over

one-third concerned trips by Mexicans to the Soviet

Bloc or Cuba for international Communist activities,

and visits of Bloc and Cuban nationals to Mexico.

Many of the reports were too general in nature to

meet community requirements for detailed data.

All reporting

was consonant with objectives

of the RMD. There were no significant areas of

marginal reporting where the CS should not be sup-

plying information.

An assessment prepared by FI/INT/RE of CS

reporting on Mexico for the period 1 February

through 31 July 1966 covered 359 reports dissemi-

nated from Mexico City and Monterrey during that

period.

The findings revealed that the collec-

tion objectives of the RMD for Mexico, approved 22

July 1965, well represented the community's needs

and judgments as to priority. Among the customer

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reactions, two were outstanding. There was urgent

need for more and higher level CS reporting on the

and

the leftist influence in the Government. The volu-

minous reporting on low-level affairs of the PCM

greatly exceeded customers' needs or their ability

to absorb it.

Other noteworthy findings were: Only 10.3

percent of the total product reviewed could be

related to RMD Priority A objectives, which con-

cerned Cuban and Soviet activities in Mexico, and

the Mexican Government. The reporting relevant to

RMD Objective B-1, which concerned the CP and re-

lated subjects, accounted for 78 percent of the pro-

duction reviewed. Low-level domestic activities

of the PCM, the PPS, and front groups were over-

reported. Lacking was more information on active

militant groups.

Customers had nothing but praise for the

coverage of the Government's security precautions

surrounding President Johnson's visit. The 24 re-

ports on this subject, relevant to RMD Objective B-3,

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were hailed as complete, timely, and very well

handled.

Another review of reporting against the Opera-

ting Directive Objectives was completed in early

212/

1968.

This covered 337 disseminations to cus-

tomer agencies during the period July through

December 1967. The study revealed that while there

was some excellent reporting from the Mexico City

Station, on an overall basis the same gaps, needs,

and overreporting characteristic of the 1966 review

continued in 1968. The station had the same low-

access agents and continued to disseminate their

reports even though customer agencies did not want

to receive this information.

To correct this

situation, Headquarters

recommended

that the station attempt to obtain

higher access agents among Communist groups.

Also,

some of the political information was passed tò

the Embassy Political Section for background and

situation reports. The

elimination of this low-

level information

cut sharply the overall volume

of formal dissemirations from the station but it

resulted in a better quality product. To meet

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customer requirements for information on Cuban and

Soviet subversive activities, CIA prepared working

papers.

These studies were well received by

customer agencies and provided them with security

intelligence not available from any other source.

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VI. Relations with the US Embassy

During the period covered by this history

(April 1947 to June 1969), there were six US Am-

bassadors

assigned to Mexico:

Walter

C. Thurston,

Ma y

1946 to November 1950; William

O' Dwyer, December

1950 to November 1952; Francis White, March

1953 to

April 1957; Robert C. Hill, May 1957 to November

1960; Thomas C. Mann, April 1961 to January 1964;

and Fulton Freeman, March 1964 to November 1968.

Relations between the first COS, William H.

Doyle, and Ambassador Thurston, a Foreign Service

Career officer, were cordial and friendly. To

Captain W. C. Ford and William G. Tharp, who in-

spected the Mexico City Station in February 1949,

Thurston volunteered that he had no problems what-

soever regarding CIA operations in his area.

He

stated that he was completely satisfied with the

manner in which Doyle conducted his operations,

although he did not know what these operations con-

sisted of, but added that Doyle in his own quiet,

efficient manner appeared to be well informed and

to have good coverage concerning

subversive activi-

ties in Mexico.

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Doyle served in Mexico from April 1917 until

February 1951.

1

1

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Relations between Doyle and O'Dwyer were

strained by circumstances surrounding the attempt

by Headquarters to set up an OPC station in Mexico

independent of the OSO station. O'Dwyer refused

to deal independently with two senior CIA officials

when

neither could speak for all CIA activities in

Mexico. His insistence that one person represent

all these activities led to the designation in July

1951 of Raymond J. O'Mara as the chief of both OSO

and OPC.

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O'Dwyer also objected to the opening of the

CIA base and the FBI office in Monterrey.

In a

cable to

O'Dwyer asked

214/

what three additional people there would do.

The only difficulties between CIA and Ambas-

sador White occurred after the arrival of Winston M.

Scott in 1956. This was over

an increase of

slots in station personnel in the Embassy.

White

was adamant in not wanting to increase the

size of

the Embassy. He reluctantly agreed

to

the

use of

"tourist" documentation for these

persons, provided

the Embassy would have no responsibility

• for them

and they would not admit that they

were

employed by

the Embassy.

Scott's relations with William Snow, Minister-

Counselor of Embassy, were excellent.

In fact,

Snow was so

impressed with Scott that he asked him

1n September 1956 if he could persuade Headquarters

to send a team of file experts to Mexico to survey

the Embassy records and made recommendations for a

complete reorganization of their filing system.

As

a result of this request, Lorenzo B. Sanchez and

John M. Scott were sent to Mexico City from

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Headquarters and conducted a review of the Embassy

files as a part of their reorganization of the sta-

tion files.

There was a marked increase in services per-

formed by the station for all Embassy components

after 1956. This included traces of names of visa

applicants, persons on the Ambassador's guest lists,

and employee applicants. Station photographic

facilities were made available to the Embassy.

The COS took an active part in the Ambassador's

staff meetings, and he briefed visiting US Con-

gressmen and newspapermen. Headquarters permitted

Ambassador Hill to detail Thomas J. Hazlett as the

Ambassador's secretary during Lopez Mateos inaugu-

ration ceremonies. The increased dependence on the

station for Embassy service led Headquarters in-

spectors in 1961 to suggest that the COS might need

command guidance on the extent of station services

for the Embassy to insure that CIA activities would

215/

not be neglected.

Through Ambassador Hill, Scott met a wide

range of Mexican political figures. Hill promoted

Scott as his "expert on Communism," and was instru-

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mental in placing Scott in contact with President

Lopez Mateos. Because of this friendly relation-

ship, Hill endorsed Scott's request for additional

personnel with nominal cover rather than "tourist"

cover. He assigned to the station office space

twice the size assigned under previous ambassadors.

Ambassador Thomas C. Mann was briefed at

Headquarters on station operations and Scott's

clandestine contact with President Lopez Mateos.

Mann had grown up in Laredo, Texas, and was aware

of the sensitivity of the Mexican President to

close and open association with an American Ambas-

sador for fear that he might be subject to criti-

cism by opposition nationalist elements. Mann was

perfectly satisfied to use Scott as a channel to

the President of Mexico for certain sensitive

political matters. Mann also considered the joint

telephone tap project the best intelligence opera-

216/

tion in Latin America.

Mann's successor, Ambassador Fulton Freeman,

did not share Mann's viewpoint and felt that he,

Freeman, should deal with the President of Mexico

on all matters. In November 1964, Mann (then

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Assistant Secretary of State) ordered Freeman to

Washington and held a private conversation with

him regarding his relationship with the President

of Mexico. Raford W. Herbert, Deputy Chief, WH,

met with Freeman and Mann at this time.

Freeman

agreed that the COS could continue to have his own

channel to the President-elect, Diaz Ordaz, pro-

vided that Freeman was kept thoroughly informed of

all that transpired between him and Diaz Ordaz.

CIA, as evidenced in the LISAGA Project, did not

keep the Ambassador fully informed on all discus-

sions with President Diaz Oraaz.

Freeman exhibited some distrust of CIh. For

instance, in November 1965 he advised the COS that

beginning 22 November he wanted to see all cable

-----------=--=-

traffic between Headquarters and the station to

see what was going on; cable traffic was made

available by the station but sensitive sources

were not identified in these communications.

Freeman made the same request of the local FBI

217/

office.

The station had access to consular files and

Political Section records. The visa and security

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offices were cooperative in permitting use of

their offices by station officers for interviews

of "walk-in" cases or persons of operational inter-

est who called at the Embassy for pretext interviews.

One example of cooperation by the Embassy occurred

in 1962 when Roger Abraham, the Embassy administra-

tive counsellor, gave the station

In 1967 the Mexico City Station provided the

Embassy with file traces of 32,197 names. Memoranda

with derogatory information were written on 1,333 of

218/

these names.

Relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI)

The FBI used the cover of legal attache, and

the size of its staff inside the Embassy compared

roughly with that of the station's integrated

personnel.

Relations between the station and the FBI

were generally cooperative. Every COS from 1947

until 1969 had been a former FBI agent. John N.

Speakes, Jr., was the senior FBI representative

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in Mexico when Doyle opened the station. Speakes

remained in that position until his retirement in

1958. He was replaced by John Desmond, who served

in Mexico until 1963 when he retired and was re-

placed by Clark Anderson, who remained in Mexico

until he was transferred to Santo Domingo in April

1965. Nathan Ferris, who had served in the Wash-

ington FBI office as the senior representative for

the Westem Hemisphere, replaced Anderson and was

still in Mexico as of 1969.

Headquarters recognized that Mexico was in a

unique position as a consequence of its proximity

to the United States and its obvious utility as a

base for third-country operations directed against

the United States. In view of the fact that the

FBI was charged with responsibility for the internal

security of the United States, the necessity for

FBI activity could not be denied.

The Mexico FBI office received copies of all

disseminations from the station. It also received

counterespionage or security intelligence on all

non-US citizens of interest to that office. In-

formation on US citizens, except those in contact

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with the Cuban or Soviet Embassy, was passed at

Headquarters. Copies of legal attache reports

220/

were passed in Mexico to the station.

From 1947 until 1959 legal attache officers

concerned

themselves with criminal cases (fugitives

from justice, stolen cars, and fraud), espionage

investigations involving US citizens who fled to

.

Mexico, and US Communist Party leaders in temporary

exile in Mexico.

From 1960 on, the legal attache targets were

identical with those of the station, plus criminal

cases with which CIA was not concerned.

This led

to some unavoidable duplicate reporting by the FBI

and CIA.

Liaison with the FBI in Mexico sometimes be-

came delicate because many persons of interest to

them were US citizens on whom CIA had acquired

information as a byproduct of technical operations

against the Soviet Bloc and Cuban official instal-

lations. The station was prohibited fron passing

this information locally to the FBI without first

sending it to Headquarters and receiving clearance

to pass it locally. By this time, the value of the

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infornation had perished. For instance, US citizens

telephoned the Cuban Embassy to pick up visas to

221/

travel to Cuba.

They usually gave their name

over the telephone. By the time the station re-

ceived permission from Headquarters to give these

names to the local FBI office, the visitors had

gone to Cuba. When

this was pointed out to Head-

quarters, an

exception was made to existing regu-

lations, permitting the station to pass locally

information on Americans who contacted the Cuban

or Soviet Embassy.

The station began placing telephone taps for

the FBI in the 1950's. These were on the US cp

leaders and persons who were wanted in the United

States for questioning on espionage activities.

The targets were named by the FBI and consisted of

at least two simultaneous lines and sometimes as

many as four.

Their chief clerk transcribed 'the

reels and returned them with copies of the tran-

scripts.

The station occasionally checked the

reels against the transcripts to make sure that

they were complete. The same group of FBI targets

were covered by the station mail intercept opera-

tion.

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]

1

Between 1947 and 1969 there were a number of

FBI double agents who met with their Soviet case of-

ficers in Mexico. The station provided support to

these operations in the form of surveillance and

photographic coverage of the agent meetings and the

agent activities while in Mexico.

The FBI did not always protect CIA sources.

An example of this was the handling of a CIA clan-

destine photograph in the Oswald case when the FBI

told Oswald's mother that the photograph was made

by CIA in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City.

As of 1969, the FBI maintained a staff of

three officers

in the consulate general in Monterrey,

one officer in the consulate general in Guadalajara,

222/

and one officer in the consulate in Mazatlan.

Relations with the Department of Defense

Relations with the military officers were

formal but not particularly close when the Mexico

City Station was opened. The military attache com-

plained that, when Doyle assumed charge of activi-

ties formerly handled by the FBI, the military

officers were cut off from the distribution of

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reports which they had previously received. Doyle

had provided them information in response to specific

requests, but

the military office wanted to receive

copies of

all local CIA disseminations.

From Septem-

ber 1947, all local disseminations were

sent to

the

military and naval

attaches.

In 1956 Lt. Colonel Oscar M. Doerflinger was

assigned to the military attache office in Mexico

City in response to a specific request from CIA.

Doerflinger had served at Headquarters as the branch

chicf for Mexico just prior to his assignment to

Mexico. During his tour in Mexico City, cooperation

223/

with the station was excellent.*

At the station's request in 1956, the air

attache flew at low altitude over the Soviet Bloc

official installation and made aerial photographs

with a 70-millimeter aerial camera. The photo-

graphs were so clear and sharp that they showed a

powerful radio antenna concealed in a well of the

roof of the Soviet Embassy. The air and naval

attaches also made their aircraft available to CIA

on special flights for cargo from the United States.

On these occasions, CIA paid the operating costs.

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In an economy move in 1967 the US Government with-

drew the aircraft which had formerly been assigned

to the Ambassador.

Military officers worked closely with the sta-

tion in the investigation of servicemen who were in

Mexico without leave from their bases. Periodically,

these persons were in contact with the Soviet Bloc

and Cuban official installations attempting to

travel to Cuba or the Soviet Union. In several

instances, information provided by the station

assisted in locating the men and returning them

to

their US military bases.

The LIOYSTER operation was an example of sta-

tion cooperation with the military officers and

the FBI when an enlisted man in the US Army came

to Mexico, under military guidance, and met with

his Soviet intelligence case officer.

Military and naval attaches were members of

the attache association and provided the station

with personality information on the Soviet Bloc

attache. In one instance, based on derogatory in-

formation from a CIA technical operation, the US

military attache made a recruitment approach to

the Soviet attache which was turned down.

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Relations with the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (I&NS)

There were two representatives from this ser-

vice stationed in the US Embassy in Mexico City.

Their relations with the station were cordial and

friendly. They were particularly helpful in some

cases involving Cubans of interest to the station

who had problems with the US immigration laws.

Before the I&NS had a representative in the

Embassy, the station handled one of their infor-

mants, Liborio Santos, who later became a local

employee of the Consuiar Section of the Embassy.

Santos was paid by Doyle for three months in 1951

at the request of the Washington, D.C., office of

the I&NS.

I&NS inspectors stationed at El Paso, Texas,

cooperated with personnel of the Monterrey Base in

the development of sources on the CP. LIOXIDE

was recommended to CIA by that office. Another

source suggested by the I&NS was LIVACATE-3.

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Appendix B

Chronology of Key Station Officers

MEXICO CITY

Chiefs

William H. Doyle

Clarence W. Moore, Jr. (Acting)

Raymond J. O'Mara

Robert L. Brown

Winston M. Scott

James B. Noland

join R. forton

Richard

Sampson

Deputy Chiefs

Robert L. Brown

Charles W. Anderson, III (Acting)

William G. Rogers

Charles W. Anderson, III (Acting)

Alfonso L. Rodriguez

Harren L. Dean

Duane L. Puckett (Acting)

Alan P. White

Daniel S. Watson

Albert Reynolds (Acting)

Paul V. Harwood

Apr 1947 - Jan 1951

Jan 1951 - May 1951

Jun 1951 - Jan 1953

Feb 1953 - Aug 1956

Aug 1956 - Jun 1969

Jul 1969 - Jun 1970

Jui 1970 - Jun 1113

June 1973-

Aug 1948 - Nov 1950

Dec 1950 - Jul 1953

Aug 1953 - Sep 1955

Sep 1955 - Jun 1956

Jul 1956 - Jul 1958

Oct 1958 - Dec 1962

Dec 1962 - Apr 1963

May 1963 - May 1967

Jun 1967 - Apr 1969

May 1969 - Jul 1969

Jul 1969 -

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it distantstand:4012411109-0966 PER 1003000 WhE

SECRET

He and his wife also transcribed the LIFEAT and

LIENVOY Czech language portion of the telephone tap

tapes from the Czechoslovakian Embassy. Beginning

in 1957 they were included in the LIDOGTROT Project.

They were identified by pseudonyms David B.

SCHLAGETER and Teresa W. HERIKSTADT. File No.

50-6-44, Job No. 62-644/16, Box 5.

LICAPER - Proposed joint telephone tap operation

with the Mexican Ministry of Interior,

Federal

Security Service, approved in principle by Head-

quarters but not implemented for local security and

economic reasons, March 1964.

File No.

Job No. 64-459/75, Box 17.

50-6-109/1,

LICHERRY - Spanish Republican (Basque) political

exile in Mexico who reported

on

activities of Spanish

exiles from 1949 to 1958

when the project was ter-

minated for lack of

production of information' useful

to CIA. File No. 50-6-34, Job No. 59-124, Box 17.

LICHEW - US citizen and professor at the University

of Mexico, Leo C. REDLICH, who as a contract agent

served as the outside case officer for CA projects

LIERECT, LIPLUM, LICOAX, and LINLUCK between March

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1

1962 and September 1968 when REDLICH was terminated

because of his diminishing interest in operational

activity. File No. 50-124-24, Job No. 69-249/50,

Box 10.

LICOOKY - US citizen newspaper reporter who reported

on Guatemalan exile activities from 1964 to 1966

when she lost access to information useful to CIA

and returned to the United States. This source was

identified by the pseudonym Joyce P. PINEINCH. File

No. 50-6-129, Job No. 67-86/77, Box 27.

LICOOL - Umbrella project for several surreptitious

entries into the residences of Soviet Bloc officials

from 1953 until 1960 during which time audio devices

were placed there. The LICOOL Project was terminated

when the decision was made to prepare a separate

project for each audio installation.

File No. 50-6-19,

Job No. 61-312/76, Box 17.

LICRAFT - Former Cuban Government official and engi-

neer (201-356959) who was used as a source of in-

formation on exile activities of Cubans in Mexico

from 1964 to August 1966 when he left the area.

File No. 50-6-118, Job No. 68-772/38, Box 10.

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LIDABBER - Production manager (201-68647) for

who was used as an

access agent to a Soviet Bloc official during 1959.

File No. 50-6-53, Job No. 61-810/80, Box 18.

LIEARTH - Double agent, PETANG, who was transferred

from the Near East and Africa (NEA) Division

(Project PENISTONE) to Mexico and was directed

against Soviet Bloc officials from 1957 until 1959

when he returned to Beirut, Lebanon. File No.

50-6-63, Job No. 22-1228/26, Box 4.

LIELOPE - Project which supported and directed the

activities of

grantees to the United States from Mexico

who were engaged in Mexican trade union activities

from 1961 to 1964 when the project was terminated

as unproductive. File No. 50-126-29, Job No.

65-273/22, Box 11.

LIEMBROIL - Students at the University of Mexico who

provided information on activities of Communist stu-

dent groups from 1961 until 1964 when the sources

were terminated for poor production. File No.

50-6-76, Job No. 64-54/75, Box 23.

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Appendix D

Operational Directives

From April 1947 until 1 March 1948 general

operational priorities were outlined in National

Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 5

(NSCID/5). Grouped in order of importance, these

priorities were: espionage and counterespionage

operations against the Soviet Union; Soviet activi-

ties outside the USSR; scientific research and

technical developments relating to atomic, biologi-

cal and chemical warfare, sulded missiles, and

electronics; and collection of information on

political, economic, and military developments

likely to affect the security of the United States.

Correspondence between Headquarters and

Mexico City Station indicates that Special Opera-

tional Instruction No. 23 (S0I/23) dated 1. March

1948, established the following more specific

targets:

a. Communist Party of Mexico.

b. Activities of the leading Marxist

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, and his labor

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organization and leftist Popular Party

(Partido Popular - PP).*

c. Soviet and Soviet Satellite

officials.

d. Spanish Communist Party.

e.

Political and financial plans

1

1

of

This directive was valid for three months.

Progress of the Mexico City Station in covering

these targets was reported monthly to Headquarters.

In July 1948 SOI/23 was extended for six months and

reporting requirements were changed to quarterly

intervals. Headquarters continued extensions until

the SOI was replaced by the first RMD dated 27 July

1954 which defined the CIA mission in Mexico.

The

chief of station was assigned responsibility for:

a. All US Government foreign intel-

ligence (FI) operations in Mexico, except

for agreed intelligence activities con-

ducted by other US Government agencies.

b. All US Government political and

* Later named the Popular Socialist Party

(PPS).

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psychological (PP) operations in Mexico,

subject to coordination at Headquarters

with the International Organizations

(IO) Division on pertinent international

programs and with the United States In-

formation Agency

(USIA) concerning gray

propaganda.

c. Any paramilitary (PM) operations

that might be necessary for Mexico.

This directive outlined the station's position

on relations with other US Government and foreign

agencies. Relations with the State Department were

to be in accordance with the provisions of State

Department-Office of Special Operations (STOSO)

agreement. Coordination with the FBI, I&NS, Depart-

ment of Defense (DOD), and USIA was authorized by

Headquarters in cases of mutual interest. No formal

liaison was authorized with foreign intelligence

services, but the station was permitted to continue

contact with the Federal Security Service and the

British intelligence representative.

The basic FI mission in Mexico was to promote

the security of the United States by the development

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and use of clandestine FI assets to collect informa-

tion on the intentions, capabilities and courses of

action of Mexico, the Soviet Bloc, and of other

countries likely to affect the security of the

United States.

The basic PP mission in Mexico was to promote

the security of the United States by covert opera-

tions, planned

in such a way that the US Government's

role would not be evident but if uncovered could

plausibly be denied. The purpose of these opera-

tions were to:

a. Contribute to the worldwide

objective of reducing the political and

economic power and potential of the Soviet

Bloc and its capability to wage hot war.

b. Discredit the ideology of inter-

national Communism and exploit its prob-

lems.

. c.

Combat the activities of Communist-

oriented parties and other radical groups

in Mexico.

d. Combat the activities of elements

hostile to the United States.

Y

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e.

Contribute to PP objectives in

other parts of Latin America.

In order of priority, the objectives listed

in

the first RMD were:

PRIORITY I

A. Information about official and

semi-official Soviet Bloc activities,

intentions, personnel, sabotage and

related plans and communications, and

connections with subversive activities

in Mexico and worldwide;

B. Information about the activities

and intentions si Soviet Bloc intelli-

gence services, and their relations with

indigenous Communists;

activity in

D.

Information

on the organization

financing and activities of the Commu-

government.

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PRIORITY II

Counteract and negate overt and

covert Communist and other anti-US

activities

all segments of Mexical

life and

where possible outside Mexico.

in the fields

of propaganda, political

and economic action;

F. Information about

7

^ .

information about international

travel of US Communists residing in Mexico

and of Soviet Bloc nationals;

H. The plans and activities of

Information about secret ship-

Throw ate to Soviet Boc courtes.

PRIORITY III

activi-

including

k.

Details of scientific and techno-

logical developments in nuclear energy,

biological and chemical warfare, elec-

tronics, aerodynamics and ordnance; pro-

duction of raw materials for atomic

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L. Counteract and negate overt and

covert Communist activities and promote

pro-US sentiment in intellectual and

cultural circles in Mexico and when

feasible throughout Latin America.

(One of the PP

tasks listed with this

objective was to "obtain and widely

publicize the confession

of the murder-

er of Leon Trotsky,

thus exposing the

terroristic and brutal nature of Commu-

nism and Communist rule.")

PRIORITY IV

M. Readiness for general war situa-

tion.

The next year the same RMD was approved with

objective "K" deleted because the 1956 Operational

Program for Mexico contained no provision to cover

it. It also provided for an area-wide anti-Communist

front organization with chapters in all Latin Ameri-

can countries and yearly congresses to coordinate

anti-Communist activities.

In 1956 the RMD had only 10 objectives ("K"

and "M" were deleted and "J" was included with the

Soviet Bloc requirement). The need for CE and CI

operations against Soviet officials and the Soviet

intelligence services was emphasized. Soviet Satel-

lites and their services dropped to "Priority II."

This directive also called on the station to identify

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and report on the activities of US Communists in

contact with Soviet officials in Mexico.

The 1957 RiD represented a complete change in

format but very little change in content or opera-

tional emphasis. The long-range purposes of US

policy remained that of counteracting

international

Communism and

encouraging democratic governments

friendly to the United States.

In 1958 one additional task was added. This

was recruitment of third country national diplomats

who might be assigned to Soviet Bloc countries.

About the oniy change in the 1959 RMD was the

recognition of the Chinese Communists as a Priority

III objective. This was a worldwide activity and

not of special significance to Mexico since there

were no Communist Chinese officials in the country.

Another objective included in this RMD was the plot-

ting of Latin American revolutionary exile groups.

An effort was made in 1960 to revise the RND

to more accurately reflect operational conditions

and capabilities. Coverage of Cuban revolutionary

groups in Mexico as made a specific requirement

under Priority I because of the threat presented

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by Communist Cuba to US interests in Latin America.

Covert

action operations were authorized against

the Cuban targets in Mexico. The same instruction

remained in effect until October 1963 when the opera-

tional priorities were reduced to three major targets:

the Cubans, the Soviets, and

These remained the primary reporting targets in 1964,

1965, and 1966 though the Mexico City Station pressed

for higher priorities for the CP of Mexico and Soviet

Satellite activities.

In 1967 the RMD's were replaced by Operating

Directives which were included as a part of the

operational programs.

The Operating Directive dated January 1967 re-

peated the unchanged long-range United States policy

toward Mexico. Operational targets in order of

priority were:

A. •Cuba

B. Soviet Union

Communist Party of Mexico

1

Soviet Satellites

Latin American Exiles

F.

G.

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In 1968 the Operating Directive format was

changed back to the Priority I and II categories

used from 1956 through 1966. This directive was

effective through FY 1969, the cutoff date for this

paper. In general terms, the Priority I targets

were:

A. Soviet Union

B. Cuba

D. Communist Party in Mexico

The Priority II targets were travelers to the

Soviet Bloc, Satellite intelligence services, and

anti-US extremists.

Generally, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was

the main target of the station. From 1947 to 1954,

S0I/23 gave higher priority to the CP and the Popular

Socialist Party coverage but by 1954 when the first

RMD was written, it was recognized that the Soviet

Embassy was the number one target.

During the

period 1960 through 1967, Cuba was placed ahead of

the Soviets as an operational target because of the

threat posed in the Western Hemisphere by exporta-

tion of Castro-type revolutionary and guerrilla

activities. In 1968 the Soviets again became the

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isthiinotininscs.toedaiths.inat kmdesimitiatia.iatctii@adini bkk.isih@imnis.cntitic.@acin@indamaaei.d

SECRET

priority target when Cuban revolutionary activities

in Latin American countries were disrupted by the

assassination of "Che" Guevara, the Latin American

revolutionary, and it appeared that the Soviets

were

pressuring Castro to discontinue these opera-

tions.

The

and CP activities

were of continuing interest but of

a lower priority.

Soviet Satellite intelligence services

were of

lesser

interest. They, like the Latin American exiles and

targets of opportunity, followed behind the Soviets,

Cuba,

and the CP of Mexico.

The Soviets used Mexico as an important base

for their operations against the United States, and

two-thirds of their officials in Mexico were experi-

enced intelligence officers. They also enjoyed a

permissive attitude as far as the Mexican Security

Service was concerned. For these reasons,

the

Soviet Embassy was the primary target of the station

during most of the first 22 years of its history.

..••

- 522 -

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## Page 232

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]

1

1

ADSO

BOB

CA

CCS

CE

CI

CIC

CIG

CMA

CNE

COS

CP

CS

C/WH

DCI

DCOS

DDP

DFS

DOD

D&TO

FBI

FI

FI/INT/RE

FRD

IG

IISE

I&NS

SECRET

Appendix E

Glossary of Abbreviations

Assistant Director of Special Operations

Bureau of Budget

Covert Action

Central Cover Staff

Counterespionage

Counterintelligence

Counter Intelligence Corps

Central Intelligence Group

lexican Aviation Company

Vational Confederation of Students

Chief of Station

Chae fool Neclaphere Division

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Chief of Station

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Foreign Intelligence

Real Rosay Bene a te roto Berna

Inspector General

Institute of Social and Economic

Investigations

Immigration and Naturalization Service

- 523 -

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---

## Page 233

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10

IPN

I&R

KGB

MI-6

MLN

MSS

MSWT

MURO

NCNA

NSA

NSCID

CAS

00

OOA

OPC

OSO

OSS

OWVL

PAN

PARM

PCM

PM

POCM

PP

PPS •

PRI

PSP

RID

RMD

SECRET

International Organizations Division

National Polytechnic Institute

Inspection and Review Staff

Soviet Intelligence Service

British Intelligence

National Liberation Movement

Mexican Social Secretariat

Medium Speed Wireless Transmission

University Reform Orientation Movement

New China News Agency

National Security Agency

National Security Council Intelligence

Directive

Organizat on of American States

Other Operational Activities

Office of Policy Coordinatior

Office of Special Operations

Office of Strategic Service

Party of National Action

Authentic Party of the Mexican

Revolution

Communist Party of Mexico

forkers and Farmers Party of Mexic

Political and Psychological Warfare

Popular Socialist Party

Institutional Revolutionary Party

Cuban Communist Party

Records Integration Division

Related Missions Directive

- 524 =

SAIDET

---

## Page 234

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71

SAS

SOI

SR

SW

TDY

TELEX

T/O

TSD

TUI

UCI

UN

UNAM

UOM

USIA

USIS

WETU

WH

SECRET

Special Affairs Staff

Special Operational Instruction

Soviet Russia

Secret Writing

emporary Dut

utomatic Teletypewriter Exchang

Service (of Western Union)

Table of Organization

Technical Services Division

Trade Union International

International Civic Union

United

Nations

National Autonomous University of

Mexico

lexican Workers Universit:

IS Information Agenc

US Information Service

World Federation of Trade Unions

Western Hemisphere Division

- 525 -

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---

## Page 235

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SECRET

• ..

]

]

2.

3.

4.

6.

10.

11.

12.

Appendix F.

Source References*

The World Almanac, Newspaper Enterprise Asso-

ciation, New York, 1968, p. 512. U.

Deadline Data on World Affairs, Deadline Data

D. 1: N.

New York 1963,

"Mexico Domestic Affairs",

National Intelligence Survey (NIS),

General Survey, NIS 70 GS, March 1968, p.

Me 10040.

Mexico 1966, Banco Nacional de Comercio,

TMM-39,.

THe Pop 14r AS 1D One 6. Plans

NIS Mexico, op. cit. (3, above), pp. 79-81.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid., p. 78.

Memo of Conversation with Birch D. O'Neal,

4 Feb 70, WH/HO.

Memo for the DCI from Captain W. C. Ford, sub:

Inspection Trip to Latin America, Jan and Feb

49, HS/CSG 100, Folder 95.

MMA-21, 6 May 47, sub: Informants and Investi-

ators turned over to this office by the FBI

Job No. 65-696.

* Unless otherwise indicated all source references

cited in this appendix are classified Secret

- 526 -

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## Page 236

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13.

1

]

1

]

i

r14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

1

1

1

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

SECRET

Memo to Assistant Director, Special Opera-

tions, Colonel Donald H. Galloway, from

201-216903.

TMM-540, 7 Apr 48, sub: SOI 23, Job No. 65-696.

TMMA-200, 22 Jan 48, sub: Budget Estimates for

Projects, Job No. 65-696.

IMM- 579,

5 Oct 48, sub: Expenditure Guide,

Quarter 1 Oct - 31

Dec 1948, Job No. 65-696.

Memo for the Director, op. cit. (11, above).

Memo for Record, Dec 56, sub: Operations

in Mexico, Notes by Winston M. Scott and

B. H. Vandervoort, WH/HO.

Ibid.

6 Jul 56, sub: Reclassification

IG Report, 18 Dec 56, 158874 IS.

HMMA-5430, 8 Oct 56, sub: Files - Embassy and

Station, WH/HO.

MEXI-470, 30 May 57, WH/HO.

MEXI-557, 13 Jun 57, WH/HO.

MEXI-870, 3 Aug 57, WH/HO.

HMMW-5123, 10 Sep 57, sub: Current Table of

Organization, wH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 67, 12 May 64, WH/HO.

Project LIMERRY, File No. 50-6-51, Job No.

61-948/56, Boxes 17 and 18.

DIR-25923, 12 Jul 57, WH/HO.

- 527 -

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## Page 237

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]

1

1

1

30.

-31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

-36.

37.

- 38.

39.

40.

41

42.

43.

44.

45

46.

47.

48.

SECRET

MEXI-792, 22 Jul 57, WH/HO.

HMMA-13398, 31 Jul 59, sub: Report of Progress

on the RMD, WH/HO.

Ibid.

WH/HO.

Project LITEMPO, File No. 50-6-91/1.

ISTHMUS No. 17, 15 Jun 60, WH/HO.

HMMA- 15945, 16 Nov 60, sub: Report of Progress

on the RMD, WH/HO.

Ibid.

Operational Program, 1961, 153441 TS, Job No.

62-288.

sub: Data on Case Officer

City Station, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 31, 33, 10 May 61 and 18 Jul 61,

WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 34, 9 Aug 61, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 35, 8 Sep 61, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 32, 12 Jun 61, WH/HO.

IG Report, 2 Dec 61, 173085/1 TS.

DIR-12294, 17 Sep 61, WH/HO.

Project LITEMPO, File No. 50-6-91/3.

ISTHMUS No. 45, 6 Jul 62, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 46, 3 Aug 62, WH/HO.

- 528 -

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---

## Page 238

13-00000

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

SECRET

ISTHNUS No. 49, 15 Nov 62, WH/HO.

ISTENUS No. 50, 6 Dec 62, WH/HO

Minutes of COS Conference in Panama, 27 Jar

63, remarks by Winston M. Scott, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 54, 11 Apr 63, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 55, 6 May 63, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 62, 6 Dec 63, WH/HO.

Ibid.

ISTHMUS No. 64,13 Feb 64, WH/HO.

Project LITEMPO, File No. 50-6-91/3.

Ibid.

HMMT-4949, 8 Oct 64, sub: ZRFANCY/RMD, _ WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 70, 6 Aug 64, WH/HO.

I&R Report, Dec 64, 185215 TS.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

HMMA- 12149, 27 Mar 59, sub: WH FR 81-58,

File No. 50-2-4.

I&R, op. cit (61, above).

- 529 -

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## Page 239

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7

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

1

SECRET

Records of the WH/Logistics

Section as

of Jun

ISTHMUS No. 73, 10 Nov 64, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 77, 3 Mar 65, WH/HO.

RMD Amendment, 1 Feb 65, WH/HO.

ISTHMUS No. 78, 8 Apr 65, WH/HO.

HMMS-5534, 16 Aug 67, sub: Benchmark, WH/HO.

HMMS-5547, 21 Aug 67, sub: Clandestine col-

lection program in Mexico, WH/HO.

1967 Survey Report, 19 Feb 68, WH/HO.

Ibid.

Operational Program, 1969, WH/HO.

TMMW-579, op. cit. (16, above).

I&R Report, 1954, WH/HO.

HMMA-17494, op. cit. (39, above).

I&R Report, op. cit. (61, above).

HMMS-5534, op. cit. (76, above)

Operational Program, op. cit. (80, above).

CI Staff Memorandum, 4 Apr 55, 107822'TS.

Karl M. Schmitt, Communism in Mexico, Uni-

versity of Texas, Austin, 1965,

pp.

14-15, U.

Ibid.

NIS Mexico, op. cit. (3 above), pp 79-81.

Karl M. Schmitt, op. cit. (88, above), p. 236.

- 530 -

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## Page 240

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]

1

1

1

92.

NIS Mexico, op. cit. (30, above), p. 96.

93.

Karl M. Schmitt, op. cit. (88, above), p. 21.

94.

NIS Mexico, op. cit. (30, above), pp. 91-96.

95.

HMMA-34613, 8 May 68, sub: Communist Party

Penetration Program, File No. 50-120-6.

96.

Project LIFTER, File Nos. 50-6-80/1, 201-30792

and 201-213893.

97.

T™M-816,

2 Nov 48, sub: British Intelligence,

File No.

201-16137.

98.

Project LIONHEART,

File Nos. 50-6-31/1,

50-6-31/3 and 201-102716.

99. Project LIVACATE, File No. 50-6-110.

100. Project LIOXIDE, File No. 50-6-126/1.

101.

Project LIREBEL, FIle No.

50-6-141/1, Job No.

69-512/69, Space No. 72075.

102.

Project LINLUCK, File Nos. 201-2225 anc

50-6-50/1, Job No. 67-566-99, Box 21, Folder 2.

Space 34800.

103.

104.

US Communists in Mexico, File No. 50-4-20.

NIS Mexico, op. cit. (30, above), May 1958,

7-33.

105.

Boris Morros,

My Ten Years as a Counterspy,

Viking Press, New York, 1959, p. 245, U.

106.

Harry Bernstein, Marxism in Mexico 1917-1925,

a lecture to the American Historical Associa-

tion in 1956, WH/HO, U.

107.

John W. F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, Uni-

versity of Texas,

Second Printing,

1967, p. 480. U.

- 531 -

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## Page 241

13-00000

SECRET

108.

NIS Mexico, op. cit. (30, above), May 1958,

pp..

109.

Working Paper, 23 August 1967, sub:

Soviet

Embassy activities in Mexico, CIA-319/00008-67.

110. Ibid., 6 June 1969, CIA-319/00008-69.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. NIS Mexico, op cit. (30, above), May 1958,

pp. 7-27.

116. Karl M. Schmitt, op. cit. (88, above), pp. 215-216.

117.

NIS Mexico, of. cit. (30, above), May 1958,

pp. 7-23.

118.

Project LIENVOY, Project Renewal 1966, File

No. 50-6-75/1.

119.

MIS Mexico, op. cat. (30, above), May 1958,

120. Project LIENVOY, OP cit. (118, above).

121. Source DMPETAL, File No. 201-738456.

122. Project LITEMPO, File No. 50-6-91/3.

123.

Project LIMOTOR, File Nos. 50-6-55/1, 50-6-55/3,

50-6-55/4, Job No. 65-273/21, Space No. 81835.

124.

05-273/25, Spare sTate No. 50-6-55/3, Job No.

65-273/21, Space No.

125.

Alfred L. KONITZER, File No. 201-185999.

- 532 -

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## Page 242

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idealism devei

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126.

Project LIMAGPIE, File Nos. 201-115834 and

50-6-47/1, Job No. 62-560/85, Box 20.

127.

Project LINEB, File Nos. 201-204930 and 50-6-66,

Job No. 65-710/70, Box 20.

128.

Project LIJENNET, File Nos. 201-104199, 50-6-37/1,

and 50-6-37/3, Job No. 66-287/28, Box 4.

129. Project LICOZY, File No. 50-6-111/1.

130.

US Army source LIOYSTER, File No. 201-735850.

131.

pr-bec/25, XSace No: 7998: 50-6-59/2, Job No.

60-535/15, Space

132. Source DMPETAL, File No. 76-6-55/3.

133.

Teresa Casuso Morin, File No. 201-169119.

134.

Working Paper, 18 April 1969. sub:

Cuban

activities in

Mexico, CIA-319/00006-69.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. ISTHMUS No. 29, 8 Mar 61, WH/HO.

140. ISTHMUS No. 30, 19 Apr 61, WH/HO.

141. ISTHMUS No. 32, 12 Jun 61, WH/HO.

142.

ISTHMUS No. 45, 6 Jul 62, WH/HO.

143. Project LIRAVINE, File No. 50-6-128/1.

•144. Project LITAMIL, File 50-6-101, Job

No. 66-4/7.

145. Project LICOMET, File No. 50-6-114/1.

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SECRET

1

1

1

146. Project LIRENO, File No. 50-6-133/1.

147. Project LIFEAT, File No. 50-6-32/1.

148.

Project LIRAZOR, File No. 50-6-130.

149. Project LIENVOY, File No. 50-6-75/1.

150.

Project LIEMBRACE, File No. 50-6-72/1.

151.

Project LIRICE, File No. 50-6-95/1.

152.

Project LIEMPTY, File No. '50-6-74.

153.

Project LIDOGTROT, File No. 50-6-35.

154.

Project LIONION, File No. 50-6-122/1.

155.

Project LIROMANCE, File No. 50-6-131/3, Job

No. 67-566/75: Space No. 34795.

156 .

157.

Project LISAMPAN, File No. 50-6-145/1, 50-6-145/3.

Project LINIMENT, File No. 50-6-4, Job No. 59-31,

Box 129.

158.

Project LIMESA, File No. 50-6-58/1.

159.

project LICASA, File No. 50-6-69.

160.

WASH 22915 OUT 75778, 12 Dec 50,

JBEDICT

Mexico, Job No. 59-3, Space 84237.

161.

WASH 23755 OUT 76808, 20 Dec 50, WASH-CIA-

PRO 3562, Folder 1, Box 21.

162.

MEXI 678, 23 Dec 50, WASH-CIA-PRO 3562,

Folder 1, Box 21.

163.

WASH 24248 OUT 77423, 26 Dec 50, WASH-CIA-

PRO 3562, Folder 1, Box 21.

164.

TMMW-1784, 20 Jul 51, sub:

Designation of

Functions

Under Organization Change, Job

No. 65-696.

-534 -

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## Page 244

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1

165.

Memo of Conversation, 19 Jul 51, sub: OPC

in Mexico, 64323 TS.

166.

Operational Program, 1961, 175492/2 TS.

167.

Operational Program, 1964, 186723/2 TS.

168.

I&R Report, op. cit. (61, above).

169. HMMS-5534, op. Cit. (76, above).

170. Operational Program, 1969, WH/HO.

171.

HMMS-5534, op. cit. (76, above).

172.

AMMA - 33090, 19 Sep 67,

sub: CA Program for

MexiCO, File No. 50-120-2.

173.

174.

Project LILISP-E, File No. 50-126-22/1.

Project LILISP-B, File No. 50-126-22/1.

175.

Project LILISP-C, File No. 50-124-29.

176.

Project LILISP-D, File No. 50-124-21.

177.

Project LILISP-M, File No. 50-126-23.

178.

Project LISIREN File No. 50-126-31/1.

179.

Project LIETHIC, File No. 50-126-27.

180.

Project LITEAR, File No. 50-124-21.

181.

Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos, University

of California, Berkeley, Fourth Edition, 1966,

pp. 354-355.

182. NIS Mexico, op. cit. (3, above), pp. 92-93.

183.

Deadline Data on World Affairs, Deadline

Data Inc..

New York, 1964,

"Mexico Domestic Affairs,

" 1963,

p. 22. U.

184. Project LICOAX, File No. 50-124-23.

185. Project LINIX, File No. 50-126-28/1.

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71

]

1

]

186.

187.

188.

189.

190.

191.

192.

193.

Mexican Social Secretariat, Project LIAGOG,

File No. 50-124-33/1.

Project LINOODLE, File No. 50-124-25.

Stanley M. Moos, File No. 201-121193.

Project LIMERRY, File No. 50-6-51/1, Job

No. 61-948/56, Boxes 17 and 18.

Project LILINK,

File Nos. 201-226902 and

50-6-99/1, Job No. 68-496/28, Space 60793.

HNMA- 17494, op. cit. (39, above).

Mexico 1966, op. cit. (4, above), pp. 41-42.

NIS Mexico,

op. cit. (3, above),

Section 56,

sub:

Intelligence and Security, Mar 66.

194.

HMMA -1357, 30 Dec 53, sub:

Status of Mexican

Federal Sccurity, File No. 50-6-4-737.

195.

NIS Mexico, op. cit/ (3, above), Section 56,

sub:

Intelligence and Security, Mar 66.

196. Ibid.

197. Ibid.

198. TMM-1249, 19 Oct 49. sub:

Quarterly Report in

Compliance with SOI/23, File No. 50-6-4-90.

199.

Project LIVESTOCK, File No. 50-6-30, Job No.

61-65/30, Box 28.

200. Project LIENVOY, File No. 50-6-75/3.

201. Project LIVESTOCK, op. cit. (199, above).

202. Project LIFIRE, File No. 50-6-80/1.

203. Project LIFIRE, File No. 50-6-80/3.

204. Project LIBIGHT, File No. 50-6-42/1.

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## Page 246

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205. Project LIENVOY, File No. 50-6-75/1.

206. Project LITEMPO, File No. 50-6-91.

207. Project LISAGA, File No. 50-6-149.

208. Project LIARBOR, File No. 50-124-34.

209. HMMS-5547, op. Cit. (77, above).

210.

Memo from Hayden Estey, C/FI/INT/RE, 19 Jun 62,

sub:

CS Reporting on and from Mexico - Appraisal

and Guidance, WH/HO.

211.

HMMS-5126, 11 Jan 67, sub:

Reporting on

Mexico, WH/HO.

212.

HMMW-16266, 20 Mar 68

sub:

Mexico, File No. 50-120-014

Reporting on

213.

214.

Working Papers, op. cit. (109, 110, and 134,

above).

US Embassy

3 May 51, sub:

Opening Monter-

215. IG Report, op. cit. (44, above).

216.

between

Relations

of Station,

Mexico City, prepared by Raford

W. Herbert, DC/WH, WH/HO.

217. DIR-60340, 23 Nov 65, WH/HO.

218. Operating Directive, 1968, sub: Mexico, WH/HO.

219. HMMW-9749, 17 May 61, sub: Responsibilities

for the Coordination

of Espionage and Counter-

Intelligence Activities Abroad, WH/HO.

220.

HMMW-1431,

bilities

*of CIA and FBI in Mexico, WH/HO.

Relative Responsi-

221.

DIR-30343, 14 Dec 61, WH/HO.

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]

222.

Sancassy telephone directory, 1968, WH Mexico

Branch.

223.

IG Report, op. cit. (21, above).

224.

MEXI-3672, 4 Dec 67, WH/HO.

225.

226.

227.

228.

229.

230.

231.

232.

233.

234.

235.

236.

First Secretary Charles R.

Burrows, WH/HO. C.

Memo for Chief, Budget and Liaison Controll

Staff, 8 Aug 50, by William M. Wheeler,

C/WH,

Proposed Opening of Sub-Station

at Monterrey, Mexico, WH/HO.

US Embassy cable, op. cit.

(214,

above).

Secre-

tary of State cable, 2 May

51,

57236 TS.

Ibid.

pey, trent o State/ Post Report, 1968, Monter-

US Embassy directory, op. cit. (222, above).

Project LIRABBIT, File No. 50-6-26/1, Job No.

65-80/86, Space 89741.

Project LIPAIL, File No. 50-6-83/1, Job No.

68-860/16, Space No. 81575.

Project LIPALLET, File No. 50-6-81/1, Job No.

61-373/2, Space No. 87577.

Project LIDANCE, File No. 50-6-45/1, Job No.

61-702/86, Space No. 38613.

Project LIDATE, File No. 50-6-68/1, Job No.

61-312/88, Space No. 25380.

Project LIDASH, File No. 50-6-57/3, Job No.

61-312/87, Space No. 25380.

- 538 -

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## Page 248

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237.

238.

239.

240.

1

SECRET

Project LIJULEP, File No. 50-6-123, Job No.

67-200/60, Box 12.

Project LIHALT, File No. 50-6-112, Job No.

65-710/86, Box 23

650716787, 40K, File No. 50-6-108,

Job No.

LITAU-3, File No. 201-299287.

539

-

---