JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANA (JURE)
Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
Document date: 11/1/78
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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180-10142-10229

DRAFT 11/1/78

Betsy Palmer

JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANA (JURE)

Box 23

FOLDER 24

#17

In a Miami press interview on July 23, 1962, Manuel Ray

Rivero announced the formation of JURE, an anti-Castro Cuban

exile group designed to unite all the popular splintered

factions outside Cuba into an effective working organization.1

Other key leaders involved in the new organization included

Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Barquin and

Justo Carrillo.?

Although Ray felt. the Cuban Revolutionary

Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive

financial assistance from it until JURE gained momentum. 3

As its opening promotional salvo, JURE issued a

"Declaration of Principles." It called for free elections,

the restoration of human rights and social justice, new

economic development programs and agrarian reform, breaking

relations with the Soviet bloc, restoration of legitimate

property, proscription of the Communist Party and release of

political prisoners.

Ray's group was considered an

"autonomous" anti-Castro

Cuban group by the CIA.S -The concept of autonomous operations

was conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel. 6

Rostow proposed a "track two" approach to Cuban operations to

parallel regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams.?. This approach

would enable the CIA to give financial aid, advice and

THIS COPY IS NOR

FOR RELEASE.

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guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such

8

as. Ray.

Autonomous operations were approved by the CIA

9

in June, 1963.

The "Rules of Engagement" under which the operations

functioned set forth the following guidelines:

1. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban

nationals dedicated to the idea that the overthrow

of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished

by Cubans inside and outside Cuba working in concert.

2.

If the effort to overthrow the Cuban regime became

too costly in human lives, the U.S. would withdraw

financial support and would not consider resumption

at any future date.

3. All operations had to be mounted outside the territory

of the United States.

4. It ever charged with complicity, the

U.S. government

would publicly deny any participation in the group's

activities.

5. The CIA's presence and direct participation would be

kept at an absolute minimum. An experienced CIA

liaison officer would be assigned to each group to

provide general advice, funds and material support.

6.

No fixed time schedule would be given to these

10

operations.

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Possibly because of this loosely structured control over

JURE, the CIA had the day-to-day activities of the group

closely monitored by individuals identified in CIA files only

by cryptonyms.... JURE member, (Rogelio Cisneros, for instance,

was in frequent contact with an individual identified as

wrAUP/2)and supplied him with a variety of confidential

information about Jure which AMIAUP/?)reported to the cIA.

From this source the CIA was able to learn about the

substance

of Ray's meeting with Robert F. Kennedy in September 1963;11

Ray's negotiations on behalf of JURE:12 secret JURE

meetings: 13

allegations that the Governor of Puerto Rico was

purposely sidetracking an FBI and INS investigation of illegal

arms possessed by JURE; 14 JURE aninosity toward manuel artime

and the MRR; 15

and the location of Jure training bases. 1g

Manuel Ray himself was personally critical of the CIA

and told one JURE associate that he thought CIA agents "

... were

more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration." He maintained

that, "The Kennedy Administration would end but CIA agents

always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of

elephants and they never forgot or forgave

During a JURE meeting in Miami in August, 1962, Ray

claimed that JURE had arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican

Republic; a B-26 airplane, territory available for training

in Costa Rica; and support through indirect means from the

18

United States.

According to an FBI report, JURE was

considered one of the five major exile groups with clandestine

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19

assets

and the CIA was interested in the group because of

its potential for infiltration into Cuba, 0

Because of its

size and Ray's dynamic leadership, JURE

seemed destined for a role of some importance in the anti-

21

Castro movement.

The group set. a target date of October 31,

1962 to raise $100,000.

The money would be used to recruit

new members, begin a propaganda campaign against Castro and

purchase arms and supplies. ?2 within a year, JURE had

membership delegations

s in 12 cities in the United States, a

chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delegations in foreign countries,

mostly Latin

American. 23

In August, 1963, JURE planned to sabotage a power plant

24

in Havana

and Ray requested that the CIA cache certain

25

high explosives and grenades inside Cuba or San Juan.

The

plan was code named "Operation Bola" 25a

and Ray's case officer

recommended the request be granted in order to test Ray's

25b

capabilities.

Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration

and exfiltration purposes and expressed a desire to purchase

another vessel which would enable him to extend operations

-.

25c

along the south coast of Cuba.

Plans were made with JURE to deliver military equipment

brought by a CIA vessel and transferred to JURE which would

25đ

transport the material into cuba.

The operation, originally

25e

scheduled for November 23, 1963, was moved up two days.

The

CIA boat,. Rex, completed the cache and kept the appointed area

25f

under

surveillance for 3 days.

The JURE boat failed to make

25g

the scheduled pick up

and Ray offered no satisfactory

25h

explanation

for this failure to perform.

Ray claimed the

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vessel was

low on gas~.

which was a doubtful explanation.

The Agency noted that the ship was able to arrive at Puerto Limon,

Costa Rica, on November 27 as scheduled.

25j

Ray was not physically scheduled to be on the boat

during Operation Bola, 5k

his activities during the latter part

of 1963 being political in nature. He was, at this time,

conferring with Robert F. Kennedy251about the Cuban situation 25m

and travelling extensively in Lating America seeking support

for JuRe.

25n

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JURE

Draft

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ANo documentation has been found to substantiate the success

of failure of any of the JURE raids or infiltrations

during

this period, but by January, 1964, the organization had

gained

enough strength to induce several other Cuban exile organizations

to merge with it. 26 the largest of these groups were the

Ejercito Libertador de Cuba (ELC) and Cuba Libre.??

The

ELC's union with JURE brought to the organization former veteran

rebel army officers in exile and had the potential of giving

JURE the best military expertise and support

in the entire

exile community. 28

Carlos Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JURE Chief of

support 29

and was responsible for acquiring most of the JUre

arms and the large supply of explosives which were stored in

Miami and Puerto Rico.

30

Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to infiltrate

Cuba in March 1964.31

He planned to accompany

two teams of

commandos into Oriente Province and, once successfully

inside

Cuba, initiate continuous bombings of strategic and non-

strategic targets. 32

Ray's plans; however, were delayed

and

a new target date of May was

set.

Ray's serious

of purpose was open to question at the time

because he permitted persons from the media on his infiltration

attempt.

Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-life

magazine, planned to accompany Ray, 34 as did Tom Duncan, then

a Life photographer. 35 Rogello Cisneros received word on

May 30, 1964 that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators

had developed motor trouble. 36

Ray's group was arrested by the

British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau.

37

Ray's failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his

credibility within the anti-Castro community.

Some exiles

felt his grand infiltration scheme was a

publicity stunt

and

others considered it a joke.

JURE members were confused

and undecided over how to defend Ray. 39

DD NOT REPRODUCE

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Carlos Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JURE Chief of

29

support

and was

responsible for acquiring

most of the JURE

arms and the large supply of explosives which were stored in

30

Miami and Puerto Rico.

Manuel Ray again began

formulating plans to infiltrate

31

Cuba in March 1964.

He planned to accompany two teams of

commandos into Oriente Province and, once successfully inside

Cuba, initiate continuous bombings of strategic and non-

32

strategic targets.

Ray's plans, however, were delayed and

a new target date of May was set.

Ray's seriousness of purpose was open to question at the

time because he permitted persons from the media on his infil-

tration attempt.

Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-LIFE

34

as did Tom Duncan, then a

magazine, planned to accompany Ray,

35

LIFE photographer.

Rogelio Cisneros received word on

May 30, 1964 that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators

36

had developed motor trouble.

Ray's group was arrested by the

37

British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau.

Ray's

failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his

credibility within the anti-Castro community.

Some exiles

felt his grand infiltration scheme was a publicity stunt and

38

others

considered it a joke.

JURE members were confused

39

and undecided over how to defend Ray.

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Another episode in May, 1964 compounded JURE's problems..

Rogelio Cisneros had obligated $50,000 of JURE money to an

El Monte, California, arms manufacturing company for weapons

40

to be shipped to Florida.

The Revenue division of the

Treasury Department, planning a raid on the arms company,

asked the CIA if it had any knowledge of this purchase,

41

which was illegal under U.S. laws.

Working under the

"autonomous operations" guidelines, the CIA denied any

involvement and advised JURE to make use of one of its Latin

American connections to facilitate the shipment outside the

u.s: 42

At this point, there began a general disintegration of

43

JURE membership:

Rogelio Cisneros informed the CIA on

August 24,

1964 that he was resigning from the organization.

He contended Ray was incapable of directing both political and

44

military activities.

Then another key leader, Carlos

zarraga, resigned in September. 45

JURE was given $75,000 by the CIA during the period

of October Ist to December 3lst, 1964. The money was meant

as a final payment to help JURE move its activities outside

the United States.

46

The CIA had reached the conclusion that

the JURE books should be closed permanently 47 Ray's liaison

officer noted

at the time:

"If Ray is successful in Cuba he

will not need our help; if he

is not, our help won't do much

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good. He is honest and at least the money will be largely

spent for the purpose he wants to achieve. Whatever Ray may

ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated.. We

have played the game in a manner beyond reproach. " 48

49

-JURE continued in existence until August, 1968

was relatively ineffective in its latter years.

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FOOTNOTES - JURE

1.

CIA/DDO, JURE, Volume I, Cable to Director (from San Juan,

2. CIA/DDO, Manuel Ray Rivero (Ray) Volume VIII, Information

Report,

September 1962

3. CIA/DDO, JURE, Volume I, Information Dispatch, 7/11/62

4. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume VIII, Junta Revolucionario Cubana -

Declaration of Principles

5. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XVI, Memo to Director from Chief/WH

Division, 9 July 19,64, Subject: Chronology of Concept of

Autonomous Operations

and Summary of Financial Support to

Manuel Artime.

6. Ibid

7. Ibid

8. Ibid

9... Ibid

10. Ibid

11. CIA/DDO Ray Volume X, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 9/11/63

12.

. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XI, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 10/11/63

13. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs

from CS/JMWAVE,. 10/21/63

14. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XII, Cable to Director Exom JMWAVE, 1/10/64

15. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XIII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 1/30/64

16. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XIII, Cable to Director from IMWAVE, 4/26/64

17. CIA/DDO Ray Volume IX, Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs

Staff from Chief of Station, JMWAVE, 7/22/63, Subject:

Manuel Ray Rivero's Opinion

of CIA

18. CIA/DDO Ray Volume VII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 8/15/62

19.

HSCA 005990, p. 4, FBI File #97-4546, Section 1 =

Correlation

Summary 5/30/63

20 Ibid, Item

?, page 4

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Footnotes - JURE

Page

21.

HSCA #009974, Item 9, FBI File #105-114543-5, JURE,

U.S. Army Intelligence Report, #2215 217;

24 September

1962, Subject: Jure Established - classified SECRET

22.

Ibia

23..

HSCA #009974, p. 12, FBI File #105-114543, Volume 1,

Serial 46

CIA/DDO Ray Volume X, Memo for Record from Alfonso

Rodriguez, 8/2/63, Subject: Meeting with Ray

..

25.

Ibid

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to JMWAVE from Director,

12/3/63.

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume X, Memo for Record from A. Rodriguez,

Subject: Ray Contact Report 8/23/63.

25c. Ibid.

25d.

25f.

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume X, Cable to Director from JMWAVE,

9/11/63.)

CIA/DDO Ray Volume X, Cable to JMWAVE from Director.

11/18/63.

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Dispatch to Chief, Special

Affairs

Staff from COS/JMWAVE, 12/13/63,

subject:

Operation Bola.

25g. Ibid.

no.

25h:

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to JMWAVE from

Director, 12/3/63.

25i. Ibid.

25j ..

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Memo for Record from Alfonso

Rodriguez, 12/13/63.

25k.

JFK Document # 009005, p. 7.

251.

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to Director from JMWAVE,

25m.

25n.

10/11/63.

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume X, Cable to Director from JMWAVE,

9/7/63.

Affairs

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to Chief, Special

Staff from JMWAVE, 10/22/63.

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Footnotes - JURE

Page 3

26.

HSCA #006468, PP 3-4; FBI File #97-4546, Section 2

27. Ibid

28. CIA/DDO Ray. Volume XII, Memo for Record From Alfonsc

Rodriguez, 2/12/64, Subject: Meeting with AMBANG) (Ray)

29.

CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XII, Memo for Record, 2/12/64

30.

CIA/DDO, Zarraga File, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 4/21/64

31.

CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 3/28/64

32..

CIA/DDO. Ray Volume XIII, Memo for Chief/WH Division from

Alfonso Rodriguez, 4/13/64

33. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/5/64

34. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 5/20/64

35. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director Erom JMWAVE, 6/3/64

36. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Intelligence Information Cable 5/30/64

37. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/3/64

38. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/6/64

39. Ibia

40 ..

CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIV, Memo for Record, 5/20/64 from

Samuel Halpern, Subject: JURE Purchase of Arms

41.

Ibid

42. Ibia

43. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/6/64

44. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XVII, Memo for Record, 9/11/64 from

Alfonso Rodriguez

45. CIA/DDO, Zarraga File, Field Information Report, 9/23/64

46. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XVII, Autonomous Operations - Operating

47. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume. XVII, Memo for Record, draft, 9/22/64

Alfonso Rodriguez

48.. Ibid

49: CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XVIII, Cable dated 1/4/69, CITE

WH/Miami, #2233

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