COMMENTS ON PASSAGES OF HSCA DRAFT (PHOTOGRAPHS, OSWALD'S ACTIVITY IN MEXICO CITY, CIA PROCEDURES, ETC.)
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1104-10079-10059

INTERCEPTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS "Please, do excence wich ian conflict

p. 122 The above four conversations which occurred on 9/27

and 9/28 contain almost all of the substantive information

that was

available to the Mexico City station. on OSWALD from

the Soviet electronic intercept operation. These conversations

were not linked to OSWALD prior to 8 October 1963 when [MEXI-

6453] IN 36017 was sent to Headquarters reporting OSWALD's

contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963 (494)

The conversations discussed above were linked to Lee

Harvey OSWALD by 16 October 1963, the date that the Mexico 15,104?

City Station opened its "p" file on OSWALD. (495) The process irie

situation

by which, and the events leading up to, the linkage of OSWALD

to the intercepted calls will be discussed in the following

lucin.

section on the Mexico City Station's actions regarding the

OSWALD case prior to the assassination.

A photograph of an unidentified individual who visited

the Soviet Embassy was incorrectly linked to OSWALD priOr to

the assassination. (496) The manner in which this mistake

was made and the consequences of that mistake will be discussed

in the following sections on the Mexico City Station's actions

prior

and subsequent to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy.

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

11452

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p. 81 "An examination of the production from these operations

failed to reveal a photograph of OSWALD. (320) This Committee

has not been able to rule out the possibility that a photograph

of OSWALD was obtained in Mexico City by these operations since

the material made available for review was incomplete. (321)"

[Agency withholding - implication]

p. 90 This Committee cannot state with certainty that a photo-.

graph of Lee Harvey OSWALD was not obtained by the photosurveil-

lance operations. in Mexico City because of three reasons: (a)

the photographs from LILYRIC, the "alternate" photographic

base which covered the Soviet Embassy main gate, and the photo-

graphs from the pulse camera, which covered the Cuban Consulate

entrance, with the exception of a few samples, were not made

available for review by the CIA; (b) testimony from knowledge-

able people that it would have been unlikely that the photo-:

surveillance would have missed someone whom it had at least

five chances of recording; (361) and (c) reports that such a

photo did, in fact, exist. (362)

"... Simply put, this Committee has not seen all of the

photographs produced by the photosurveillance operations in

Mexico City (363) Hence, it cannot conclude that a photograph

of OSWALD does not exist among those photographs it has not

seen. [Writer fails do note that the Station, in November 1963,

reviewed all photographs and found nothings - see cable traffic.]

p. 107 "The Agency's withholding of certain production materials

from the photographic bases has prevented the Committee from

determining whether a photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD was

taken.

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by these photographic surveillance operations. How does one

"withhold" material when thereis none to withhold?]

p. 114 "Material removed from SCODT's safe now

in possession

of the CIA provides critically important circumstancial evidence

that the CIA photosurveillance operations obtained photographs

of OSWALD:

"(OSWALD's) visits and conversations are not hearsay;

for persons watching these embassies photographed

OSWALD

as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he

spent on each visit." (469)

"This Committee believes that a photograph of Lee Harvey

SOWALD was probably obtained by CIA photosurveillance in Mexico.

There are allegations that such a photo was found; there is

testimony that such a photo should have been obtained; the

CIA'S

withholding of materials; Ms SCALETI's strange lapse of memory

regarding the events of 11/22/63; and Mr. SCOTT's manuscript;

these

things, innthe Committee's view, would tend to indicate

that a photo of Lee Harvey OSWALD was obtained. On the other

hand the consistent testimony that a photo was not obtained in

Mexico; the absence of any record of transmittal of the photo

to Headquarters (the weight of this consideration is mitigated

by the fact that there were methods of communication available

that were not incorporated into the CIA's record keeping systems);

and the testimony of Ms SCALETI and Mr. SCELSO that a photo was

not discovered would tend to indicate that, in fact, the allega-

tions that SCALETI found a photo of LHO are false."

[A review of 1963 traffic shows no photograph was found of Lho.

The Station would have reported finding one, if it had.]

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p. 115 This study has demonstrated that the information from

the Soviet Embassy taps and from Headquarters was available to

the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy. In addition to the Agency acknowledged infor-

mation, thare is a distinct possibility that the Station had

available to it one additional telephone intercept transcript,

and one or more surveillance photographs.

p. 117 Telephone intercepts [not related to OSWALD]

9/27/63

10:30am Man calls Soviet Military Attache re-

garding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish)

9/27/63

10:37 am

Man calls Soviet Consulate regarding

visals] for Odessa. (Spanish)

9/27/63

1:25pm

Man calls the Soviet Consulate and asks

for the Consul. (Spanish)

..

1Ö/3/63

?

Man calls the Soviet Military Attache.

(Spanish and English)

[None of the above calls was initiated by Lee Harvey OSRALD.]

p. 118 After the assassination

CIA's Mexico City Station

passed copies of seven of the above listed conversations to

the U. S. Embassy Legal Attache. (471) The 9/27 10:30 and the

9/27 1:25 calls listed above are not included in this dissemina-

tion (472) The cover memorandum states:

"Attached are photostatic copies of transcripts

of all conversations from technical operations of this

office which are possibly pertinent in this case. (473)"

"The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27

10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum.

While the 1:25 call could be considered unrelated, it is unlikely

that the same would apply to the 10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37

call is included in the memorandum.

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"At the bottom of each attachment page to the SCOTT

memorandum, a summary of the conversation is provided. (474)

The Station questioned the relevancy of only one of the seven

calls presented in the memorandum.. The summary of the 10/3

call says:

"By context of other conversations by OSWALD and

the fact that this called sic spoke in broken Spanish

and English rather than Russian which he used previously,

it is probable that this caller is not OSWALD. (47,5)

[OSWALD did not speak Spanish - see DURAN's remarks, etc.

Therefore, any call in Spanish was considered to have been

made by OSWALD. Nor has it ever been confirmed that OSWALD

wanted to go to Odessa.

According to his wife's correspondence

to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., she wanted to go to

Leningrad. There is no record that he wanted to go elsewhere.]

The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27

10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum.

While the 1:25 call could be considered unrelated, it is unlikely

that the same would apply to the 10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37

call is included in the memorandum. [Later review by qualified

professionals of the Agency determined that the four calls listed

on page 2b were not relevant, OSWALD did not initiate them - the

reasons are given above.]

A judgement that this call (10/3/63] did not pertain to LHO

could be paiid based on the following facts:

1) the caller spoke broken Spanish;

2) the caller did not have the number of the Consulate;

3) the caller did not know that visas were issued at

the Consulate; and

4) the caller states that he isseeking a visa, not

that he is checking on an application already

made.

The majority of the evidence indicates that LHO could not speak

Spanish. (476)

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In light of DELGADO's assertions, it is possible that

OSWALD had at least a limited knowledge of Spanish. It

should be noted that the 10/3 transcript listed above indicates

that the caller spoke in broken Spanish. (477) The fact that

this conversation was in Spanish, should not by itself rule

out the possibility that OSWALD made the phone call. ...

The writer choses to ignore the most important and relevant

reason that the 10/3 call was not made by OSWALD - OSWALD

left Mexico City early in the morning of 2 October 1963!1

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P. 139 LILYRIC base production "has not been made available for

review". [Agency withholding]

p. 140 "finds implausible A. GOODPASTURE could make a mistake

in light of her outstanding fitness reports". [impugning G's

integrity as a witness

p. 141 "No record exists that would indicate a reply to this

cable [DIR 84888, 11.23.631 by Mexico City Station. [See reply

by Mexico City - MEXI -7029, 23.11.63, which references DIR-

84888 - writer did not read file carefully.]

p. 141 "The likelihood that a photograph of OSWALD was indeed

obtained makes the "explanation", proferred by GOODPASTURE

et al, even more implausible. (560) At this time the commit-

tee cannot conclude why the original mistake was made even

though it does find the explanation offered by GOODPASTURE et

al, to be highly implausibe.

"Regardless of why the mistake was made, OSWALD's

contact with

the Soviet Embassy and the mistaken [emphasis

added] photographic identification of him were reported to

Headquarters." [There was no "mistake" at the time; station

said photograph Happeared to be an American".]

p. 146 See paragraph 3 of cited cable - not accurately cited;

portion left out; writer did not check his notes.

p. 147 Re SCALETI's testimony - "she claimed (accurate physical

description]could not be disseminated due to a third agency rule"!

This absolute crap - she

cecilmolio tion contained in other agency files without violating "3rd

could have referred to accurate descrip-

roule lie pouted

it sees was agency rule" for it despin was alicus at vaine, she coni luce

mitcanade a Gautal which waved have paintend ens the desciepaneg.i

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330

wheic

-4 ...

p. 149 See citation - "

... she had said that the cable and

teletype had been prepared simultaneously by three lemphasis

added] knowledgeable people. !! she wrote both cables - her

name appears on both!] "She said that it had obviously been a

mistake that doesn't matter now! ..." [shows a lack of profes-

sionalism!] The remainder of her comment is accurate - she would

not have included the physical description. - umph!]

p. 151 - regarding TK's signature on the outgoing cable:

SCELSO claims it went to TK "because it involved disseminating

information on an American citizen..." IBS! The authenticang

officer was C/WH, therefore the releasing officer had to be the

DDP or his assistant - TK.] [Further comment: An indication that

unqualified personnel reviewing raw information do not understand

even after being briefed, how an intelligence agency works.]

p. 153

We could just as well have sent this cable out without

TK releasing it. [obviously SCELSO does not understand how

authenticating

cables were released in the DDP - if C/WH is tEleASiNg officer,

the releasing

DDP iS AKIHERLiNLiNE officer (or his assistant).]

p. 155 "Hence, the assertion in the 1977 TF Report that 'OSWALD

was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA' (595) is

seemingly inaccurate and misleading." [This is hogwash!] The

fact that a person identifying himself A$ by name was sufficient

to warrant a cable to hats. on a routine bais, for a name trace.]

No one in Mexico City had the slightest idea as to whom OSWALD

was. It was not until a name trace had been run in HQDTS that

it was realized that he had defected to the USSR.

p. 155 Even though the CIA denies such an agreement (if it

was

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was in writing) that covered the CIA's investigation of

American citizens in Mexico, this Committee is certain, on

the basis of the above detailed evidence, that such an agree-

ment existed, either formally or informally. (594) Hence,

the assertion in the 1977 TFR that "OSWALD was not an investiga-'

tive responsibility of the CIA" (595) is eemingly inaccurate and

misleading.

p. 156 "... two assertions of the 1977 IFR are important:

(1) that it was not discovered that OSWALD was seeking a visa to

Russia and that he had also been in contact with the Cuban Embas-

sy until November 22, 1963; and (2) that the Station did nothing

other than ask headquarters on 15 Octkber for a photograph of

OSWALD" because no other government agency had made an official

request for further information. (596) It has already been shown

that the 'official request' that the Agency claims was not forth-

coming was, in fact, not necessary and that, as a matter of fairly

routine operating procedure, the CIA headquarters requested a

follow-up on the information already reported about OSWALD.

[See Hadts regulation re reporting on Ameri-ans - was in effect

then. It would have been necessary for the Station to receive a

request (official) from the FBI, the Navy, or State, for the

Station to initated an OFFICIAL investigation. Also, headquarters

did not ask for a follow-up, Headquarters ask that any additional

information which might come to the Station's attention be reported

to Washington. Such a statement is not a requirement, it shows

interest and asks that the Station forwarded additional information

but without setting up an official investigation.! The text of the

cable is as follows: "Please keep HQS advised on any further con-

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tacts or positive identification of OSWALD. -

NB: DIR-74830 was written by BUSTOS on 10 October; it was not

given any priority slug; it went out at 2229z; it could have been

authenticated by C/WH/3 and released by C/WH; the cable was

probably written late in the evening, therefore, C/WH would have

authenticated - KING did not sign, his OPS officer signed - HOOD -

therefore, TK would have relaased for the DDP. It might be in-

teresting to know if ADDP means assistant or acting. However,

whatever the case, its is not suprising that TK signed off. No

matter what SCELSO said.]

p. 156 It should also be noted that the CIA Headquarters also,

by notifying the interested govermment agencies that "Any further

information received on this subject will be furnished to you'

( 597) belied

the necessity of one of the agencies making an of-

ficial request for further action. This latter statement is

a routine statement to indicate to the receipiant that the case

is not closed.. If the recipient is interested, he would ask for

additional information and might giove us specific requiements.

p. 157 There are several marginal notations on this document

IDIR 74830, 11.10.63]. Perhaps the most interesting is the nota-

tion "sic" with an arrow drawn to the "Henry" in the name Lee

Harvey OSWALD". That notation was made by Win SCOTT when he

read the cable on the day it was had received in Mexico. (598)

This notation struck Committee investigators as very strange be-

cause it was a possible indication that Win SCOTT knew, at the

time. the cable was received, that Lee OSWALD's middle name was

not "Henry". [The notation on the cable was not made by SCOTT;

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it was made by ROCCA when he reviewed the file after its arrival

in headquarters ca. 1970.

p. 159 If SCOTT did in fact make this notation prior to the

assassination of John Kennedy, this Committee has not been able

to determine why "sic" was used. (602) [Inasmuch as SCOTT did

not make this

notation, ROCCA did, the entire argument HARDWAY

builds from page 157 - 159 is based an inaccurate determination

as to who made the notation.] In footnote no. 602, HARDWAY states

"SCATT's manuscript may provide a clue when he writes that during

his first contact with the Soviet Embassy, OSWALD 'gave his name

very slowly and distinctly'. (Foul Foe manuscript, p. 267.)

If

OSWALD used his middle name

at that time it would

explain why

SCOTT wrote

'sic'.by "Henry". But it should be noted that OSWALD's

name does not

up in any of the transcripts made available by

the CIA. until 10/1/63, and OSWALD's middle name is not given in

that transcript.

It is possible that there is one additional

transcript, possibly of the conversation that SCOTT, on

of his manuscript, refers to as OSWALD'S

"first contact, Page 267

If in existence, has not been made available to this committees"

From SCB Itr to STOKES, 30 November 1978: I [DCI] understand

the question arising from the draft manuscript of Mr. SCOTT, who

had

served as Chief of Station there. It seems to have been writ-

ten between his retirement and his

death in Mexico City.

While

neither of us

is able to examine him on the thoughts in his mind

at the time of the writing, both of us know that what he put in

that manuscript is inconsistent with what he reported to the

Warren

Commission investigators and FBI representatives at the

time when he was responsible,

well as what he and his Station

reported to CIA Headquarters in Washington.

installation on the day before he left Mexico City to return to

during the

this point, when it was

his

responsibility to report them, but on

other facts as well. His singular version on this point must be

contrary." not lightly but on the basis of clear evidence to the

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p. 160 "Hence, we know that OSWALD's "p" file was opened on or

about 15 October 1963 [See cover sheet to DIR 74830, 11 October

1963] and that SCOTT asked that "all" information be included in

the file. There is substantial reason to believe that most, if

not all, of the information

available to the Station was incor-

porated into the file at that time. (608)"

p. 161 "This Committee believes that Station personnel did, be-

tween October l1 and October 15, go back and recheck the trans-

cripts and connect the important substantive calls to OSWALD.

... It should have been possible at that point to compare tapes

to see if they were in fact the same caller. Indeed, a notation

made by GOODPASTURE on a newspaper article in 1964 suggests that

this was the case. "The caller from the Cuban Embassy was

uni-

dentified until Has sent traces on OSWALD and voices compared/wilk

by (TARASOFF)." (613) [The action taken here was several months

after the fact. As indicated in the Mexico City files, TARASOFF

recognized at the time that there was a similarity between con-

versations between "OSWALD" and the Soviet Consulate. The de-

termination did not become firm (the determination was based upon

what TARASOFF remembered - npot becuase he went back to tapes!]

p. 143 - etc. The writer tries

to make missing facts support

a hyopthesis which does not exist - in other words he's out to

get the Agency, and any supposition on his

part becomes fact!]

p. 149

.. she had said that the cable and the teletype (dis-

semination) had been prepared simultaneously by three knowledgeable

people."

I BUSTOS signed both cables - what's about the 3

"knowledgeable people"?]

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p. 150 The second point of interest that is illustrated by the

10 October cable and teletype is the inference that can be made

from reviewing paragraph 3 of the teletype, paragraph 5 of the

cable, and TK signing off on the cabde, that the CIA was asking

for, and promising, a further investigation of OSWALD without

a specific request from any other government agency who might

have had, as the 1977 TFR says, 'investigative responsibility'."

[Thesstateneht in the cable was a routine request to keep Has

informed if any additional information came to the Station's

attention - this was not a requirement for an investigation.]

"The request for further investigation and dissemination

contained in paragraoh 5 of the 10 October cable to Mexico

was the reason

that the cable was sent to the ADDP for release.

(588)" [This is the opinion of an unqualified person reading

raw

traffic.) [This point has already been discussed above.]

[Much attention has been given to SCELSO's testimony which is

not accurate.]

p. 161 This Committee believes that Station personnel did,

between October 11 and October 15, go back and recheck the

transcripts and connect the important substantive calls to

OSWALD. Under normal

operating procedures a tape of OSWALD's

calls to the Soviet Embassy should not have been erased until

16. October, 4 to 5 days after the case took on added significance.

(611) The one transcript of the call on 10/1/63 that had defini-

tely been linked to OSWALD prior to receipt of the 10/11 cable

core a reference to an earlier conversation by a man who spoke

broken Russian, the text of the 10/1 call allowed that the prior

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call had probably occurred on September 28, 1963. (612)"

[HARDWAY is pushing - The files do not support "the Committee's

belief that the Station did, between October 11 and October 15,

go back and recheck the transcripts. The Russian translator in

the Station did remark that "the same person who telephoned a

day or so ago and spoke in broken

Russian" speaks to OBYEDKOV".

At that time, the identity of a caller and the contact was the

reportable item, it was

done. There was no connection in the

Station's mind that Lee OSWALD was possibly the same as Lee Harvey

OSWALD. The HSCA wants

to say that the reference to an earlier

conversation in "broken Russian" means the Station did check

back (as they would say we should have) and, ergo, we knew about

the Cuban contact too.]

p. 161. "A notation made by GOODPASTURE on a newspaper article

in 1964 [21 October] suggests that a comparison of the tapes

containing "broken Russian" between 11 and 15. October -

"The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified

until HQ sent

traces on OSWALD and voices compared

by [TARASOFF].".

p. 162 "An examination of documents in LHO's Mexico City Station

P file and the cable traffic from Mexico City to Headquarters

after the assassination, raised a possibility that at least

one tape of OSWALD's voice existed as late as 16 October 1963.

(614)"

According to SCELSO, it was belief that the tapes were probably

still in existence at the time of the assassination. The HSCA

notes, however, that the testimony of the persons at the Mexico

City Station "is consistent in saying that the tapes did not

exist at the time of the assassination. See MEXI-7054 (IN

67348

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67378), 24 November 1963 - FOIA No. 84-565 which states that

"a recheck shows tapes for this period already esased". ) This

cable was Station response to DIR 84886, 23. November 1963 which

asked Station to review all LIENVOY tapes and transcripts since

27 September to locate all material possibly pertinent to sub-

ject reference (MEXI-6453). See also MEXI-7023 (IN 67108),

23 November 1963, which states that. "In view OSWALD in the Soviet

Union and fact he claimed on 1 Oct LIENVOY to have visited Sov

"unidentified North American"

Emb 28 Sep, SUBJECT para one (DURAN puts D$WALD on line to Soviet

Consulate) probably OSWALD. Station unable compare voice as first

tape erased prior receipt second call!" - 28 September tape erased

before 1 October tapes

received.

p. 163 HARDWAY refers-to 21.10.64 article by ALLEN & SCOTT and

GOODPASTURE's note to effect TARASOFF compared tikés. voices.*

p. 164 According to HARDWAY statement in MEXI-7023 that a voice

comparison was not possible becuase of the first tape being

erased propt prior to the second tape being received is incon-

sistent with the statements made in testimony and in other cables.

(622) and with the procedure then in effect at the Station at that

time. (623) It is, therefore, considered highly unlikely that a

tape would be held only one or two days, the situation that is

implied by the statement in MEXI-7023.

*There is some confusion in GOODPASTURE's testimony - She stated

that the caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until

HOS sent traces

on OSWALD. Now that would have been in answer to

the cable

dated the 8th October.. Their cable (DIR- ) was 18

October,

"and voices

compared by FEINGLASS [TARASOFF]." He

compared the Cuban Embassy voices with the others, with OSWALD's

call, in which he used his name."

NB: TARASOFF testified that he had not been queried at all about

OSWALD in 1963 and that he had not done a voice comparison. (626)

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MANELL testified that TARASOFF did not do a voice comparison but

connected the two conversations in his marginal comments in the

transcripts on the basis of memory. (627)

P. 166 Whether or not TARASOFF or someone else did a voice com-

parison of the tapes, it is likely that the tapes did exist un-

til at least the l6th of October and would have been available

for such a comparison. It is possible that the connection between.

the 10/1/63 call and the 9/28/63 call was made on the basis of

TARASOFF'S

memory. in any event the record clearly indicates

that the tapes should have been available, and probably were

available, as late as 16 October. (628) This is significant

because

it was after receipt -f the 10/10 cable from Headquarters

that the OSWALD case took on a more than routine coloring.

p. 167 The increased significance that the OSWALD visit took

on during the period from 11

October to 16 October 1963, could

have provided the Station with reason to retain the OSWALD

tapes. (629)

p. 168 On the whole most CIA officers wh. testified stated that,

if a tape of OSWALD's voice existed at the time of the assassina-

tion, they did not known anything at all about it. (631) One

CIA officer (SCELSO) testified that he believed the tapes did

exist at the time of the assassination. "Yes, the tapes were

still in existence. (632)"!

• IIt appears from testimony, etc.,

TARASOFF may have made the comparison from memory. ]

269169 "

... the conversations were linked to OSWALD prior to

the assassination and probably by the time that the "p" file

was opened on or about 16 October 1963. (636)" [HARDWAY is

still pushing.]

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D. 170 On 15 October 1963, [Mrs: MANELl arafted a local dissemina-

tion regarding OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy. (640).

By this date at least the 10/1 10:45 call, the 9/28/ 11:51 call,

the 9/27/ 4:05 pm call, and the 9/27 4:26 pm call had been linked

to OSWALD. (641)

[The 16 October 1963 memorandum to the Ambassador et al refers

only to the l October 1963 call. It makes no reference to any

other calls. "It was determined by the Station (by

OSWALD's

own statement by telephone) that OSWALD had been at the Soviet

Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy :

Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV ... ." There is nothing in the memorandum

regarding the other calls. These other calls were not reported

to the FBI until 25 November 1963. This CSCI included as attach-

ments transcripts of three calls on 27 September, 1 call on

28 September, one call on 1 October, and one on 3 October 1963.

In other words the other calls available to the Station were

not linked to OSWALD until the Station reviewed its holdings

after the assassination of Kennedy. HARDWAY is really pushing

to prove his hypothesis - don't allow the evidence to conflict

with the hypothesis!] - The files do not support his hyposhesis

nor, apparently, do the testimonies of CIA employees; can one

trust their statements after fifteen years. Details become

blurred.

P. 12l When asked why the 10/16 memorandum said that there was

no clarifying information on OSWALD'ss'request' when it was known

by this time that he was seeking a visa, Mrs. MANELL

said that

'They had -no need to know all those other details."! [The reason

why the Station did not know what OSWALD was talking about was the

IntZ

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Station had not yet learned the purpose of OSWALD's contact with

the Soviet Embassy, nor had the Station learned that OSWALD had

first contacted the Cuban Consulate. It was not until after the

assassination that the Station put together the information (trans-

cripts) it had on OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet

Consulates.]

p. 171 Even though the Station's actions after the 10/11 cable

were not highly extensive, it is inaccurate and misleading to

say that those actions were limited to requesting a photograph

Of OSWALD from Headquarters. Other actions included rechecking

the transcripts and discovering the substantive ones that concerned

OSWALD and reporting the information in MEXI 6453 ... in a misleading

manner. This is absolute crap - it's the Gospel according to Saint

Dan! The files do not support this hypothesis.

Hence, the fact that OSWALD was seeking a visasand had been in

contact with the Cubans as well as the Russians was known prior

to the assassination, and the Station's actions prior to the as-

sassination were more comprehensive than merely requesting a

photograph; although if any action other than a file check was

taken, no record of that action has been made available to this

Committee.

p. 172 Possible that information developed by Station after 11

October 1963 was reported to Headquarters - SCALETI said such

a report "would have been expected". SCELSO agreed that such

information should have been reported to Headquarters.

p. 173 SCALETI said she could bot recall that Mexico had sent any

other information to Hqts before the assassination. SCELSO

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was certain

that this information was reported but could not

recall the form of the report or whether it occurred before

or after the assassination. Allan WHITE, DC, had no knowledge

before the

assassination of any information being sent to Hats.

GOODPASTURE was unsure - it was not until after the assassina-

tion that Hats was informed of OSWALD's contact with the Cubans.

p. 174 MrS. MANELLwas certain a second cable reporting OSWALD's

contacts with the Cuban Embassy had been sent to Hots before the

assassination. She did not

send such a cable, but knew that one

had been sent.! PHILLIPS had no knowledge of a second cable.

P. 176 HARDWAY cites SCOTT's manuscript - "(O)n page 777 of

(the Warren) report the erroneous statement was made that it

was not known that OSWALD had visited the Cuban Embassy until

after the assassination! Every piece of information concerning

Lee Harvey OSWALD was reported I immediately after it was

received to: U.S. Ombassador MANN, by memorandum; the FBI

Chief in Mexico, by memorandum; and to my Headquarters by cable;

and included in each and every one of these reports was the con-

versation OSWALD had, so far as it was known. These reports were.

made on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and with

the Soviets. (656) [See remarks above regarding the validity of

SCOTT's manuscript as to an accurate record of events in Mexico

City before and after the assassination.]

177 SCELSO was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized

for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to

do so by CIA Hqts. [There was no specific request from Hqts.

Hats merely asked to be kept informed on any further contacts or

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positive identification of OSWALD. This request was not one to

initiate an investigation.]

p. 178 Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's han-

dling of the OSWALD case prior to the assassination can best be

summed up in Dave PHILLIPS' response when he was asked how he

would characterize that handling: "At the very best, it is not

professional, at the best." (659)

p. 184 In view of what is now known about the standard operating

procedures and about the Station's actions prior to the assassi-

nation, the Station's confusing and somewhat contradictory re-

porting after the assassination is strange. (684) It is possible

that these confusions and contradictions

arose out of the crisis

atmosphere at the Station and the rush to report information.

This Committee has not found any solid evidence that there were

sinister qualities in the reporting after the assassination.

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HARDWAY's argument is to prove that the Mexico City

Station knew

about OSWALD's activities in Mexico City before

KENNEDY's assassination. He makes reference to various cables

which, according to the Agency, indicate that the Station had

not reviewed its

telephone tap or photographic production in

a serious manner until the news of KENNEDY's assassination.

It's true that the Station had transcripts of telephone calls

(five in all) which concerned OSWALD; either he identified

himself or, from the context of the call, the call related

tO OSWALD. HARDWAY does not accept facts, he tries to make a

case out of hypothesis - when the facts do not coincide with

his preceptions he

then manipulates the evidence so that he

can make a case that the Station knew about OSWALD's contacts

with the Cuban

IbAlald and the Soviet Consulates. When the

facts are not there, he hypothesises. This may be acceptable

in a legal summary, but when presenting a counterintelligence

case, facts are the basis

for any conclusions.

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