HSCA REVIEW AT HQS/COMMENTS ON BOOK V, SSC FINAL REPORT: THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY:PERFORMANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED BY HSCA STAFFERS

Folder Subject: HSCA Review at Headquarters - Comments on Book

V, SSC Fial Rep : The Investigation of the Asgassination of

President Kenned sfor UNSSittIntelligence Agencies

_77-0090k

STAFFERS (Signature)

Conwell

owweet

DATE NOTES TRANSMITTED

(Filled in by OLC)

DATE

1/10/18

1/18/18

11:9/28

1/20/78

2-7-28 0 Hombeds

3-7-78

TR. Genzman

4/1/73

Betay hill

5/3/78

C. BelL

APRONS FOR ROLE SE 180%

CIA RISTORICRL REVER PROGRAN

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APPROVED FOR REEMENSOR

SONICAL NEVER PIGGRAN

77-0090%0

#MATERIAL REVIEWED BY: Mr. G. Robert Blakey on 8 December 1977

(reviewed unsanitized version)

Mr. G. Robert Blakey ard Mr. John W. Horabook fly

reviewed unsanitized version on Saturday,

10 December 1977.

MATERIAL FURNISHED BY: Inspector General - sanitized and unsantitze d

copies

SUBJECT: Comments on Book V, SSC Final Report The Inyestigation of the

Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies.

ONE COPY OF UNSANITIED VERSION --- COPY A7

FILED: HSCA 77-0090/1: Review at Headquarters: Comments on Book V

#Members of House Select Committee on Assassinations

*MATERIAL REVIEWED BY: Mr. G. Robert Blakey on 13 and 14 December 1977

MI. Gary Cornwall on 14 December 1977

Mr. Gary Cornwall on 15 December 1977

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AFPROVED FOR HOLEASE 1004

CIA MISTORICAL REVIET PROGRAM

Table of Contents

Surmary of Findings

Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review

Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries

•

Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba

Tab D. AMLASH Operation

Tab E. Materials Forwarded to Harren Cormission and FBI

Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit

Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments

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1. Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the

Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address thenselves

to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a

series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled,

and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that

the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren

Conmission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations

of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence

on the quality of their support for the Harren Commission investigation.

The following statements appear in the Report:

"It (the SSC Report) places particular

emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera-

tions seemed to have on the investigation."

Page 2.

"They (senior CIA officials) should have

realized that CIA operations against Cuba,

particularly operations involving the

assassination of Castro, needed to be con-

sidered in the investigation. Yet, they

directed their subordinates to conduct

an investigation without telling them of

these vital facts." Page 7.

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The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC

Report, is highlighted as follows:

"Certainly, concem with public reputation,

problems of coordination between agencies,

possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment,

and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge

of sensitive operations may have contributed to

these shortcomings. But the possibility

exists that senior officials in both agencies

made conscious decisions not to disclose

potentially important information." Page 7.

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro

had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into

retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes

it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and

accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention

the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro

programs to see what it might reveal.

The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the

SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the

perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con-

ducting its investigation.

There was a general concern in 1964 that

the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President

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Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding

of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the

Soviet ard Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban

Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to

Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs.

The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile

Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been

perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events

serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at

the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA

operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of

provocation of Castro represents. the result of an evolution in percep-

tions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the

various operational activities against Cuba and Castro.

Organization for the Review

As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved

at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary

to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963

and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are

no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and

detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi

gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for

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the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following

it.

It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted

to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The

organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper.

It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations,

it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper-

ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the

Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to

plotting against Castro.

The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are

contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it,

Tabs B through G.

CIA has now conducted such a revie -- looking at "the other end"

of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have

started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination,

although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In

fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying

to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to

identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President

Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity

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(whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the

assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it.

The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make

the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's

presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.)

We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's

theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance

in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is

compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories

can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones.

Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary

possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee

Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Conmission considered the

possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi-

dence of it. Here it known at the time of the Warren Connission, it

would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a

simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in

the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif-

ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often

• prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of

government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con-

spiracy to suppress evidence.

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ПІ-ЦІВЦІКУ КАТ-Й НАТОВАЛі ТРАНСКАІ

Operations Against Castro

The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a

capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into

a group that could oust the Castro regime.

It was conceived by Cuban

exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to

CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum,

with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. At a

later date, in 1965, it was believed to be carpromised and CIA withdrew

from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in

Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity

from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are

suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having

been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the

reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that

Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range

objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an

irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum

until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely

that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to

assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C.

Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1,

who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime.

The SSC Final Report undertakes

to demonstrate that the operation planned

Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of

Cori

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President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation

shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA

not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his

proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view

was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was

dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC

Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character

of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1

was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot.

Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro

as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against

Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the

justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either

event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and

CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association

that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the

basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail

at Tab D of this paper.

The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that

actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source

for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There

are new considerations that developed in the course of the present

review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate,

but they do not provide a basis.for taking issue with the judgment of

the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided

Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C.

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Its Selected by the SSC for Critical Cument

The SSC Final Report picked out a nunber of selected subjects for

treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in-

vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with

the allegations in rexico City by a man designated as "D". These al-

legations vere denonstrated conclusively by the Harren Connission to.

have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report

is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a

reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from l'exico City, awaiting

arrival of a private aircraft with a mysteriou -.-...

see file on rillerto

was the Cubana flight on the ground for four h

Policarpo LOPEZ

alleged five hour delay in departure) it depar

alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a

Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi-

gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available

for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be

dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially

being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another

instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a

cable from the flexico City Station, replying to a 23 lovember 1953*in-

quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports or contacts with certain

named Soviets. The true name of AMLÄSH/l was given in the Mexico City

reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the

purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December

*DIR 84885, 23.11.63

•TEXI 7045 (IN 67281)

24 Novenber 1963.

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1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern-

ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/I in February

and March 1961. AMLASH/l's name could have been omitted from the cable

altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about

persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the

meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's Inauguration,

which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject

matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to

AMLASH/l's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is

discussed further at Tab D.

Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two

general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous

factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera-

tion (AILASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents.

Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren

Commission could well have broadened its revier to include the anti-

Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for

that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its

treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to

characterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the

problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused

the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. Hhile it has

reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it

has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

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future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited

its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served

to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader

view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific

terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet

or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of

the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous

criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader

initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had

no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place

ofia record of conscious review. The present research effort has

undertaken to conduct such a revier; it is noted that the findings

are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA

cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have

been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of

the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions

already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of

President Kennedy.

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• ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW

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Organization for and Conduct of the Review

1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the warren Com-

mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities

of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President

Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Cormission, are

no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have

retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died.

2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to

this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities

of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A

study group was established to consider the size of the problem and

to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre-

sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also

consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of

Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in

early August 1976. Points emphasized for the revier, because of the

thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full

review of information and operations on the Cuban target to Identify

any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) to review the possibility that ClA activities against Cuba

did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of

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President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached.

3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question

were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations,

with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security and

the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review

of those files is described below.

4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files

for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known

to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the

period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review,

covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy

and the following year. A research group was formed composed of

five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor.

An additional four researchers participated in different phases of

the research, which continued to mid-May 1977.

5. Reference to materiäl for this research was obtained from

the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special

comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information

Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed

that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900

operational folders, plus numerous

related 201-files. It was later

determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional

operational and subject files which brought the total to well over

two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it,

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both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at

Warrenton, Virginia. The remainder is held at Headquarters in the

files

or archival material of Information Processing Group. This

material is eastly retrievable through the use of specific job

numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the

LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein).

6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files

reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and

organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed

(1) Operational

1,729

(601 with findings and 1,128

with no findings)

(2) Subject Files

547

(186 with findings and 361

with no findings)

(3) Cuba Policy Files

101

4) Chief, WH Division Chrono File

(Task Force ₩ Chronos

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

Total

37

100-plus

2,514

b. Criteria Used in the Research

As a suide the research group followed the Terms of

Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of

Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest

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brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis,

and to additional questions raised in the course of the

study.

A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was

reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved

in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel

Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of

a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975,

based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book

that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt

with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi-

nation attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the

subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the

activity, and a copy of those documents) or findings which

contained information believed to be pertinent to the review.

Also included were job numbers, official file numbers,

inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of

volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request

of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or

other government agencies knowledge of information, to the

extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda

were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the

heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document

number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing

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MANPAT SEIZEN TAKE

the gist of the documents) for purpose of easy and quick

reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s)

attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and

subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official

LA Division research group files under the official classi-

fication number 019-604-001 (Yolumes XI through XX). Also

included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X)

containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings.

These records are restricted in LA Division.

7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more

complex than originally estimated. • Research continued to. lead to new

files, and the requirements. for meticulous analysis and correlation

of material further extended the time required to complete the under-

taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency

can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of

Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the

death of President Kennedy.

8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review

its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of

Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points

not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject.

9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point

of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the

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Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com-

mission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising

some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has

accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy

of those documents released under provisions of the FOlA to the public

in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series)

released in September 1976 and March 1977.

10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono-

logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a

chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the

Agency's central repository for information and documentation that

it holds on:

a. The life of Harvey Oswald;

b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted

by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964;

c. The testimony by various Agency officers before

the several commissions and comnittees set up to review

the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should

be pointed out that this portion of this file is not

complete); and

d. The point of record for Agency action taken in

response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro-

visions of the freedom of Information Act.

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11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in

the Oswald files, it soon becase obvious that, in order to be in

a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of

Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book Y of the SSC

Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to

place these coples in folders set up according to general and specific

subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld

information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there

was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi-

gation or gather information," the following files were set up:

a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission;

b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren

Commission;

c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community,

particularly the FBI;

d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting

assistance and information;

• e. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and

f. Chronological sunnary of information on and actions

taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the

SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do

in relation to the Harren Commission inquiry.

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=

12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by

chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on

the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor-

mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the

Investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly

the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b), its response to require-

ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were sunmarized

to record what actually happened in those instances in which it

differs from representations in the SSC Report.

13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one

officer to identify material in its records believed to have some

possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of

this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as

containing material of some relevance. This matenial amounted to

the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed

included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals

connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of

files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time

of the "Garrison Investigation."

14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector

General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against

Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It

also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973

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TRKENR LENENSOELNENALPEELEDOMELCGEGGmragda doe des egedeedo m caege eengo pastaoi eetige

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request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable

activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to

the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research

effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in

Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector

General emplcyed on contract a retired employee who had served as

a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding

President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards.

The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive

review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters

or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in

Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General

are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by

LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of

the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK

file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed

in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify

specific points.

**

*

Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the

respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-

up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the

Inspector General.

-BONFERENTIAL

isibtaeiactiat si ne

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request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable

activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to

the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research

effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in

Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector

General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as

a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding

President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards.

The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive

review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters

or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in

Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in: the Office of the Inpsector General

are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by

LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of

the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK

file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed

in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify

specific points.

detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the

respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-

up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the

Inspector General.

CONTIENTIAL

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR REVIEW OF

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK V, SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT

# AUG 1973

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee ias two basic theses--

(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily

CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility

of Cuban involvement in the assassination oi President Kennedy,

and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative

and may have led to the assassination of President Kerredy. The

former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either

there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection

program to ascertain all possible information on the subject.

Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all

information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this

question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had

to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation

is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back-

ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's

Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these

general activities were provocative. More specific, horever,

is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity

that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory

action against President Kennedy.

The failure of CLA to report

this to the larren Commission, in the context of the provocation

theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information.

Delailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in

support of the thesis.

- .

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3100 7 2 50758:

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(

3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot

be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of

the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro-

vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against

President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un-

qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the

AMLASH alfair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and

in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the

Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as

a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's

investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to

the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these reguirements was

there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard

to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in

response to Hoadquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this

reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to

the CI Stall?

(8) Was this reporting gives to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was

ordered through 1967?

-2-

SEOMET

•tri

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(

(10) What were the parameters of these instructions?

(11) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"

theory was considered during the Warren Commission

enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this

concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an

Oswald/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

subject What exchanges were there with the fBI on this

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and

where are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency

other than the CI Stall and LA Division involved in in-

vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission

(21) What is the total CLA information on the tivo

Rights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further

information on this matter?

(23) Can further information be acquired on this

matter now?

- 3 -

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• ла: тот

STORE:

(24) What is the total CIA information on "D"?

(25) Is further information on "D" needed ir view

of the SSE Subcommittee reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald

FPCC relations?

(27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans

training activity and was anything provided on this to

the Warren Commission?

(28) What is the total CIA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexicó City?

(30) What is the CLA information on the 4 December

1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban

assassination policies and programs up to November 22,

1963?

(32) What is the total CLA information on Castro's

7 September 1963 statemeats re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA

employees contain anything on the above questioas?

If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the

assassination plots against Castro, each of the known 'activities

should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine

any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving

the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who sas witting of the planning for the syndicate

operation?

- 4 -

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• 0447 077.8..

SEBRET

surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or

Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Disision

career agent may have some insights that could throw

light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent

What is the total CIA

(5) What is the significance on the subject of

provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by

Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly

detailed reconstruction from a very complete record,

there are points that should be addressed particularly,

because of their treatmert in the SSC Subcommittee report.

For instance, is there significance in the fact tha: CIA

contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a

long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time

the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1

when making plans for the 22 November meeting

(8) What was the security of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive

Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the

AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

- 5 -

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SEORET

c. What other action might ClA have taken in connection

vith the investigation? An eltort slowel be made to lis

hese, including consultation with gurriving officials t

determine not only what they considored the requirement

at the time, but what was omitted and why.

4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake

to address the entire questios of possible provocation of U.S.

policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's

apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which,

therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the

area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission

requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those

that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued

these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This

will include consideration oi specific new and unanswered questions

raised in the Schweiker report

S. D. Breckinridge

O/Inspector General

Robert Wal

CI Staff

Vil Vie

Живить

William Sturbitts

Led Division

/Securi

- 6 -

C56357

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CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES

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## Page 32

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CONFIDENTIAL

CIA's Performance on the Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha-

sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts

were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or

analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the

years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the

Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every

theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con-

clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is

evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the

intelligence agencies did - in the present instance, what was the

performance of CIA - with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying

a patter of neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case:

a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as

"D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and

saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose

of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both

by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans

instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to

have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in-

conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 33

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.3:c

CORDENTIAL

b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the

AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately.

The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during

the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in

order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Cormission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D

of this report.

c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico

City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60-

63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report,

is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November

flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story

removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The

second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance

arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him

thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC

Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final

Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional!

criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions. .

To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth

and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both

on the part of CIA and the Warren Conmission--consideration was given

to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

see senarate folder

"Unidentified Air Pas

ger"

2

COMFIDENTIAL:

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## Page 34

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..... ...

COINOSTAL—

questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those

questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of

inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent

to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959.

These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The

first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in

October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from

which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA,

there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that

might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final

Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA

as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These

four general areas of inquiry are covered below.

I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962

On 26 November 1963 a cablé*was sent to Paris, Rone, Madrid,

Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

It noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to

the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his

employment and marriage while ir the USSR. The cable requested:

"any scrap information which bears on President's

assassination...."

*DIR 85133, 26.11.63

3

CHRSSTTAL

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## Page 35

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Wl 94077, 2 Necenher 1903

Pras 5573 (IN 73338), 4 December 190.

HACH 6110 (IN 73378), 4 Decenber 1963

3316 (18 75065), 6 Decenber 1903

STUT

5545 (1N 76758), 9 December 1903

1400, 9 December 1963

•7

+ es 29 (IY 68759), 27 ovenber 1963

ROME 1235 (IN 68802), 27 November 1963

OTTA 1275 (IN 62005), 27 rovember 1963

COPE 3169 (IN 69011), 27 November 1903

LOND 6097 (IN 69100), 27 November 1963

OTTA 1277 (IN 69233), 27 November 1963

OSLO 4490 (IN 69290), 27 November 1963

MADR 9789 (IN 69328), 28 November 1963

BRUS 8739 (IN 69852), 29 November 1963

ROHE 1258 (IN 70111), 29 November 1963

PARI 1770 (IN 74234), 5 December 1963

PARI 1833 (IN 77148), 10 December 1963

PARI 1845 (IN 77397), 10 December 1963

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## Page 36

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!

SAFESTIL

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with

Helsinki and Lindon providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British

journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959

there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living

in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Cttawa"

reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy al though

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by

official attitude of Govt to which they accredited." Oslo, on the

same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. • Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's

travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by

a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bona and The Hague:* Various

reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife

from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the

United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

DIR 85973, 29 Hovenber 1963

COND GOT (1 69100)

27 Noverber 1963

i-ar

OTTA 1277

(I:: 69233)

27 November 1963

OSLO 4490

(IN

69290)

27 November 1963

15772

!

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## Page 37

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detailed results although there were some technical operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held

with the Harren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's

assassination of President Kenredy. Book V of the SSC Final Report,

in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the

investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will

not be detailed here.

11. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get

visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive

attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to

Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern

felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit,

and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obrious at

the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City*on

28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possibility

that other as yet unknown persons may have

been involved or even that other powers may

have played a role. Please continue all your

coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations

and your liaison with Mexicans."

Einertes

DIR 85655, 28 Novenber 1963

5

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## Page 38

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would

Ties: k5480,75045k2156598TAS

019-

CONPICENTAC

The allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money

from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Plexico City, received intensive

attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter,

and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively

to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the

time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations

was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations

by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following

statement to the Mexico City Station on 7 December 1963.

"Pis continue to follow all leads and tips. *DIP. 56061, 30.11.63

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on I December 1963**

the Mexico City Station was cabled as

, follows:

DIP. 88650, 12 December

• "Pise continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

proßaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel

in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government)

leaders demanding full investigation of case."

On 17 December 1963 Headquarters" forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stated as follows:

"...Mexico City has been the only major

PI - 12193, 17.12.63

overseas reporter in the case. While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

6

CONTISEITIAL

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## Page 39

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life, we have not overlooked the really out-

standing performance of Mexico City's major

assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded. Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

[Department of State] and [the FBI].

"Your LIENiOY data, the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in

the quick clarification of the case, blanking

out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as

thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or

Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything,

events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as

counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans

and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but nore

simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with

speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press

in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations

inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit;

these are commented on at Tab G.

DIR 84608, 22.11.63

III. General Collection Reguirements

On 22 November 1963*all CIA stations abroad received a cable"

from Headquarters with the following statement:

7

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## Page 40

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"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all

of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence

developments. Although we have no reason to

expect anything of a particular military nature,

all hands should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new President

takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other

than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to

field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be

stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and

this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi-

cance of impertant information and will report it on their own initiative.

It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has

been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant

or significant information on the subject it would have been reported

either in responses to the expression of general interest, or

spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly

involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

8

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## Page 41

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COres sort

would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete

reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis

for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial CIA coliection re-

quirements to the field. Hhat they could be realistically expected to

produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect

at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued,

but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-

what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection

reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in

the Headquarters "catte" to Mexico City on 17 December 1963" (note above)

which contains the follewing comment about the limited reportina from

other stations:

IiCS:-12193, 17.12.03

"... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee incar

Oswald's life. . ."

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10

about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description

of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was

only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were

sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop marements, but

there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor-

mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently

was missed - or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As

stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

"How if you are referring to our capability to conduct

an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was

limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

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## Page 42

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requirements levied on them, in fact, there vas considerable activity

in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case

officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic

activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station

as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be

extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the

United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of

page 58.

The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different

terns than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI

and the larren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of

activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every

question that has been conceived since then.

IV "Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in 3ook V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section

that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the

intelligence ayencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance

on. the Inquiries. This section first addresses, two Cubana flights to

Havana from Mexico City on 22 Novenber (the date of President Kennedy's

murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported

to be aboard those flights.*

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana

flights traveled on a round trip basis between Mavana and Mexico

City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this

time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 lovember. The flights on

10

GONFESIAL

See file on Gilberto

Policarpo LOPEZ

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## Page 43

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іо!" сандаліій""

22 and 25 Movember to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headruäriers. There was one unilateral ClA surveillance

team !!IFIRE) that observer arrivais and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unscral incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

The Mexican authorities also had a surveillance team of its own at the

airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies"

of passenger lists._ Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY)

against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with

the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

11

CONMIDENTIAL

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## Page 44

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Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain,

at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no i ecord

of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori-

ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no

recorded response. The current review revealed additional information

from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion

of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final

Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City

times are used in the following discussion.

The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the

status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it

departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform

at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed

a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft,

one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due

at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround

that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as

servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on

the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the

aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in

the SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City

for a total of four hours and abost ten minutes. It was not

12

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## Page 45

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CONFIDENMAL

delayed five hours, as alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City

time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a

private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts

further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight.

which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded

substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it

allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is

very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported

had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of

these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to

follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC, in its

summary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con-

siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to

the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the

assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the

SSC Final Report state that:

• • • one source alleged that the Cuban-American

was 'involved' in the assassination."

Concurint

13

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## Page 46

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The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBl "almost

immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi-

gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Conmission." Further

down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi-

gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual

travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious

travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had

contacted the Tampa Chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC)

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi-

gation than the FBI conducted..." He do not know just what the Bureau

did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon-

sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report

contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflacting the

results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the

FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting

about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will

be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement

at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who

saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana

on November 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-

up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

14

CONFIDENTAL

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## Page 47

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marty tall dead astern

COMNDENTIAL

except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban-

American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some

inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington

that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable', dated 5 December

1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on

23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at

a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a

certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana

flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of

him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch' the same

date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photo-

graph, and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding

Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana

are suspicious."

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in

history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who

was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as

possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report

of the observation by the source, and is what nas reported to the FBI;

it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal

in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the

nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

15

*" See llemorandum for the

Record, 3 December 4963

*NEXI-7253 (IN 74227)

5 December 1963

**INPIA-22579, 5 December

TAL

Ton They?'

india, nationa

wen crete attent

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## Page 48

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•іве -ш

•serenia smacutes

діln.'":

to have "jooked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way

into the more careful statements that usually characterize official

reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres-

stonistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic

activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing

the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the

context of known facts. On 19 March 1964*, Monterrey Base cabled

that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial

police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the

same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the

report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement

that he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he

entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final

Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts

that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and

times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in-Mexico

City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his

passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued

in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa,

Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number

of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the

hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time,

when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could

not recall it.

147881080

NITY- 0829

19 March 1964

(IN 43193)

---

## Page 49

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beans

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the

record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre-

sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out

that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report

contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When

Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of

Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully

with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63."

It did not jibe in mest respects, other than the date and place of

entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained

today, but wrong it obriously was. It does, however, serve to

highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how

it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information

on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access

to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became

available with such information he was queried and the results

were provided the authorities.

17

# MNEXI-8740 (IN 43940).

20 March 1964

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## Page 50

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OPTIONER EAN DELASE LOUN

CASTRON ARIS PREAS

CIA OPERATIONS

AGAINST CUBA

To en

........ . ....

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## Page 51

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¿perations Auningt Cuba

The SSC Finai Report speals of aparations aac inst Ciba and the

Castre regime, and contends tizi they stould have been reported in

detail to the Warian Cormission as fart of tie subject matter that

li conscicusly took irto consiveration. A case can te made for

specific considerations e these vartsus activitias by the Warren

Commission, at reast as fert of ihe uniqus barkgreund of the times;

it might have prosided it additional investigative leads. However,

to advance the general thought is not te asiard the usual tasis of

evidence that must still contrri tow the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the tine o! the warren Commission

inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy

Administration and the Castro regime. Eusk l of the SSC Final

Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as

the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962

(see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American

policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro

regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-

vocative.

Additional U.S. policies and programs that could have been

viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,

sporty

'it italias, in as iti

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economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re-

ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of

covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963

President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major

policy address in Miami, aücusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban

revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what

"White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban

people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who

conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.

Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other

elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from

private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles

spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban

intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America

and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to

CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration,"

whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took

what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions

between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in

the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of

NiCH

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## Page 53

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Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly

reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request

was not made by the Warren Conmission, nor volunteered by the intel-

ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being

faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it

could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its

staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the

murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary

a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of

public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the

intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention

in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that

there couid well have been conspiracy in the murder of President

Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro-

voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life.

However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it

had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern-

ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S.

operations against Cuba."

In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the

3

CRET

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## Page 54

14-01100

SECRET.

organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This

was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that

could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President

Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security.

Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything

that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in-

quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is. a matter of record. For

instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to

various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with

those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and

weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded

judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera-

tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of

those activities that may have related to the assassination of the

President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way.

While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see

Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what

was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what

might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary --

which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con-

spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom

knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities.

4

• SECRET

data lot eat in de tonde rate ou

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'in

SECRET

Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the

various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's

death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those

persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and sone

are dead, The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture ele-

rants of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing

opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in

response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this

illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues,

today, on a responsible basis.

The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called

AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was

dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative

relationship with this man during fresident Kennedy's life, although

the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis - has attempted

to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten-

sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in

this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President

Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and

without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that

there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under-

taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this

discussion.

5

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## Page 56

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In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report,

it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban

operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964.

The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not

possible to predict the form that information turned up by this

inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort.

In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in

mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review,

it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational

activity were found that either might meet some of the regufrements

of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues

already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the

original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether

there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That

such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but

that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly

to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The areas of operational activity noted above can be described

briefly as follows:

1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK).

2. Operations involving the criminal underworld.

3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro.

6

120021

sissies +559955644 insee

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i.":

Operation ASTRUNK *

•.

There is one other general activis, shat was corsidered in the

course of the present research, which is discussed below, This

activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for splitting the

leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It

never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered

possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here evan though it

never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity.

because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele-

vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed,

by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the

hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to Include it than

try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the

reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject

to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some

purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this

research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thests

of the SSC Report.

In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the

direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor

Antonto Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper-

ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be

known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public fiqure in Cuba,

who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception

of the plan. Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public

Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in.

the anti-Batista movement.

:

i

See

Folder No. 7 - Opcra-

tions to Split CASTRO Re- :

rime: (NITRUNK Operation)

---

## Page 58

$4-00000

:

Morero defected to the United States in April 1961, scttling

in Miami there he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his

associates was Jorge Aibuszyc Volsky, a Cliban citizen of Polish origin.

Volsky had been in prison in the USSP in the 1940's, and enlisted in

the Polish Air Force during lNIl under the British fir Command. After

WWIl he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own

business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was

imprisoned for a few veels following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As

he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961.

Cayardo and lierero discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He,

in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Hitold Szulc, a reporter with

the llew York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the

New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had

developed a wide acquairtance among Cubans. lie was transferred to

the Times Washington Eureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have

an entree to the White ilouse through his uncle, Ambassador John C.

Hiiey. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con-

tact with President. Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and

McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of

this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that

the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval.

In early 1953 Szule arranged an intervier in Washington with

Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szule then met

with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State,

who presented the soncept to the CIA witi Department approval. CIA

assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.

6203

8

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_SEGRET

AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per-

sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of

uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled

certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be

used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station

in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain

security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen-

erously in order for it to proceed independently.

On 17 April 1963 Szule informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station

had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not

the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA

intentions.

In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A

Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases

complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It

emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a

high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three

intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin

Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources,

Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was

dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer -- but at

9

NORNH4+19105-646001 willuri

очний, 0и! чотова тюф іп, тилаик."

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that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap-

proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is

discussed at Tab D.

It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be

separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be-

cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange-

ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con-

nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise

against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through

Volsky and Szule to the president.

In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads

into higher echelons of the military: and civilian leadership. The

operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to

set up infiltration/exfiltratior routes. Although it had success-

fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac-

tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability

for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur-

¡ty became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have

been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re-

lations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz

and AMLASH/1.

10

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SEGRET

The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is

just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses

from the beginning. Szule and Volsky are considered to be highly

suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became

involved in the activity.

a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when

the FBI recordod reports that he was a communist. Re-

portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party

leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus-

picions about his motives or possible connections with

foreign intelligence services, have never been proven.

Niccle Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid

communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary

credits Nicole Szule with having "obtained vital research

materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is be-

lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad

Szule are unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin

Szule became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of

congress.

b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish

origin. He and Szule became acquainted in 1959-1960 in

SECRET

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Cuba. A Cl Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared

by a UNWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: "Volsky's

knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with

his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman

in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent

candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos-

sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or

stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of

these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen

on 10 April 1969.

c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the

son of a native born American citizen. He has educated both

in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the

U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept

moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in

retrospect, his career presents a pattervof changing alle-

giances. He effjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952

first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later

from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista

and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis-

sion in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his

12

SECRET

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entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with

dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when

he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison-

ment he returned to the U.S. and korked with ore of his brothers.

In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became

involved with

the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group.

Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to

set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which

time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural

Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but

was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being

recruited by JMHAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK

activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly

to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba

he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was

set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that

RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations

were never proven.

In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the

tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have

been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access

at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of

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ESOTATI

individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime.

Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of

Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have

exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli-

gence.

Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the

operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress

and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The

eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization

to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress,

although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations

and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965.

An attempt to build support that might eventually have the

capability to attempt a soup against the Castro regime obviously

would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog-

ressed very far during the iife of President Kennedy is a relevant

consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have

provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul

Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because

!

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C53-371

of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories

printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows:

"The third (assassination) scheme involved

planting a bomb in Castro's office. 'I had

access to the Prime Minister's office, ' Sturgis

said. 'I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan

Orta. I recruited him to work with the embassy

(American Embassy in Havana), ''

Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the

years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military

and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's

takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which

time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control .

of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959.

Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the bater-

gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been

an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation-

ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the

Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper

story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan

Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta mas,

15

€22=37

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-

SEBRET.

in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the

operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which

gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison

Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with

it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery

of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961.

Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the

Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave

Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for

Sturgis' assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy,

CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone

during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was

reported in early 1961 as being used in the CIA-syndicate attempt

against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he

left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on

the Cuban leadership.

The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of

intended assassin. Sturgis' identification of Orta in this capacity,

prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised

the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could

1965

SEGRETI.

16

....

....

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## Page 67

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...

have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro

could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of

Information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975

Indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role

of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statenent

in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are

known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach

to the reliability of newspaper stories.

The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another

story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation-

ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman

Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security

wrote a memcrandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New

York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between

Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent

to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to

have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling

activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment

was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once

received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis

and Orta could have known one another because of their connections

17

C021

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## Page 68

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with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with

the men heading the garbling organizations.

The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a

Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an

attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the

1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one

point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means

for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that "soon after

her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters... to

kill Castro..." In the news story she claimed that the plan

involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face

cream; they dissolved and could not be used.

On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 19€0 memorandun

from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA

Deputy Director for Plans:

"During recent conversations with several

friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel

Castro was

to be done away with very shortly.

When doubt was expressed regarding this state-

ment, Giancana reportedly assured those

present that Castro's assassination would accur

In November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already bet with the assassin-to be

e-

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.

SECRET

on three occasions... Giancana claimed that

everything has been perfected for the killing

of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged

with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill'

in some drink or food of Castro."

This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro

with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time

frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various

schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961.

It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own.

Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta,

Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter-

mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader

who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic:

Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received

support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was

dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station

suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In

fact, it is possible that Varana already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to

the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this.

One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal

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19

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underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on

18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving

that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of

Interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster

elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who

would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre-

sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits

of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an

explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached

by Rosell. It also may throw light on a question noted in the

1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called

off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was

reactivated in April 1962. the case officer felt there was something

already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been

terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself

Involved in providing additional resources for independent operations

that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate

had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have

sought on its oun to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri-

butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

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What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious

that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of

which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate

activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were

initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing

the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be

listed as follows:

1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde-

pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve-

ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con-

tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs,

being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan

in April 1962.

& The syndicate operations could have activities such

as those that are reported in the New York Daily News

stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the

criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he

was not a member of it. He could well have been used by

the syndicate in its activities.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his

statements are treated with considerable reserve. He

probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba.

He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the

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21

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'SECRET

role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and

his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been

in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975

newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it

was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation

of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of

or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate,

whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any

of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits

and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami

conmunity after Orta settled there in 1965.

5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations,

that would tend to reinforce

the thought that the details

of its operations would have been characterized by discre-

tion--or security--despite the FBI report in Ostober 1960.

The authors of Book Y of the SSC Final Report felt that the

operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate

would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe-

sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated:

"... it is unlikely that Castro could have

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22

6220m

121.

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## Page 73

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distinguished the ClA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its

provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different

context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations

with the syndicate - that they bore no relation to the assassination

of President Kennedy.

Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact

There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect

of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can

only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or annther

are not within the Agency's' capabilities.

As noted earlier (see Tab B.. page 4), a 27 November 1963

report records statements by a British journalist that during his own

imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos"

who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type

named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that

"Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in

1959. An FBI report of i4 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person

jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.

23

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If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the

British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow

point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material

consideration, as there are reservations about both sources.

It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but

there is no further known relevant information in the Agency

on the matter.

The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in

jall in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit

by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit

Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963

removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as

evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if

Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide

an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signt-

ficance of past assocations or contacts.

Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's

1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby

reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.

24

.. 4.

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## Page 75

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SEBRET

However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify

at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to cuba in late

1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true.

Otier Reported Assassination Proposals

There were other references to possible assassination plots

against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim

Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders. They are sumarized briefly below:

In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee

stated that i. February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission

to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to

enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to

Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter.

As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check

was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited

by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the

Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement.

On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966)

he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro.

He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report

of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas

post. The details of his actual roles unknown to the Agency,

although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in

Tab 6, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the

course of this research effort.

- СБОЛЕТ.

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iRiT

Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to KIll Castro

1. During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were

identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing

such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation,

the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication

that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The

existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimory

before the Church Committee.

In response to a request from the Deputy

Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages

and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged

with serving as an interface with the congressional committees.

Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled.

The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report

on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is

summarized again below.

2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents,

and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated

27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency

asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on

a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that

this could be coordinated "with attempt against Fidel in public

appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that

26

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:

SEGBET

an "attempt against Fidel (is) in accordance with general plan."

There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later,

on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the

same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was

scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an

"assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general

shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime

developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was

answered on 30 March agreeing that a "major effort should be launched

Havana on date you selected." It recommended contacting other named

persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed

the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro.

A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent,

reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms

for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric

company and "possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April,

he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a

clandestine organization in Cuba; "your military aid is decisive. If it

does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that

this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has

been found.

3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the

cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for

one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The

four agents in question are cormented on briefly below:

:

27

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+ *.

...

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a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out-

lining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against

Castro.

(1) 201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was

not issued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on

31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November

1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed

that he had been in touch with people who had

plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed

to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was

infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February

1961.

•(2) AMBRONG/5 was infiltrated again 3 March

1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 1961. This

covered the period of his messages and the Bay of

Pigs. His sole mission was to organize resistance

groups.

(3) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again on 19 December

1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same

mission.

(4) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated finally 2 May

1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed

30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting

that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those

28

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## Page 79

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in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing

his life.

b.

AMCOAX/1 was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan for April 1961.

(1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to

organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in-

filtrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in july

1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered

the above messages.

(2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same

organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 1961,

and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears

in the book given Senator McGovern.

c.. AMPUG/I was another of those AMBRONC/S'was told to

contact for his general plan in April 1967.

(1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in-

filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December

1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following

the Bay of Pigs.

(2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the

mission to organize resistance groups and conduct

sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and

is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those

in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

29

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d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5 was

told to contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960,

a POA being Issued 30 January 1961 (although there was

a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance

groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas.

(2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested

23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His

name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro.

(3) Records relating to this man mention his in-

filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration

in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA).

His "mission" during that period is mentioned tersely

as being "to organize resistance groups... for

mounting sabotage operations. . . and assassination

of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro

entourage..." The records refer to "his own

personal objectives" during this period and criticizes

how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August

to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is

to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return,

which was to develop satotage operations. We were able

to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired

30

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## Page 81

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REGREE

(the other had died), to ascertain his recollections.

Stating that at the time the focus was on developing

organizations for operations, he stated that an

assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7

on his earlfer time in Cuba, not only was not authorized,

but would have compromised the effort to organize.

Any such assassination mission, the case officer states,

would have been at AMPANIC/7's own initiative.

• 4. It is clear that AlIBRONG/S envisioned a general uprising

in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana

and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected

pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off.

While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an

operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific

objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one

recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes

no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro.

5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come

off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset.

Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro. The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassi-

nation fron the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That

their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by

Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts

31

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## Page 82

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rather than to report what he trily believes. They were not

executed, a consideration that may support this view.

6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by

the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs.

The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than

that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event

described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent

infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had

a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the

act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was a CIA

agent: and is not listed among those lastro reportedly believes

had the mission of his assassination.

II

7. Anotner agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a .

man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy,

who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with

one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans

for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A

reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and

that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar

as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name

in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator

of the agent message cannot be identified from present records.

32

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III

8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 Prom a member of

the Revoluttonary Recovery Movement in Cuba said "will try to kill

Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent

and his companions to "Jay low" for the time being, and "will

advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up

messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the

message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did

not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not

been identified.

33

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## Page 84

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AMLASH OPERATION

Mi rin

...e

( TAB 0 |

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SEGRET

1. AMLASH OPEFATIO!

.. ......

i

Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta-

tion in Book y of the Final Report of the SSS, is complicated by the

treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a

unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report."

The actual nature and the significance of the AHLASH operation

differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report

- leaves the inference that A'ILASH/l was perhaps an agent of Castro, with

the mission of provoking a plot againsi Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79),

which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching

Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively,

the Report suggests that AMLASH/l was so insecure in the conduct of his

activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to

castro, thereby providing the sane baste motivation (pages 74 and 75).

Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH

operation should have been reported to the Harren Conmission. Ye believe

that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between

CIA and APLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy:

was so

insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for

29, 31, 35, 36,

86 of the 97-page

of the eight-page chronology following the text.

SE93:

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.

SEDGET

AMLASH/1 to fecl that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting

against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see ALASH/l as either a

double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed

what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak.

***** * * * * * * * *

In preparing the current conment on the ASLASM operation, as

treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two

ways. A sequential sumary of the AILASH Operation is intended to

present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity.

Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed.

It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per-

spective for judging the actual substance of the operation.

* * * * * * *

** * * *

As early as March 1959, AMLASH/I was reported as expressing

directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba.

At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment

and that if he"...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill

Castro himself."

Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1 was met in llexico City

by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was APLASH/l's

presence at the leftist-soonsored Latin America Conference on Yational

Sovereianty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting tas arranged by

ANNHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961,

giving a general

round-up on operational activity against Cubans in

2

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Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows:

"...the Station made an unsuccessful "approach'

to (AMLASH/1)... the 'approach' consisted of a

'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual

friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AIILASH/1) when he last

was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not

pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently

did not report the incident to his superiors and

the ground work may have been laid 'for a similar action

in the future."

Later in March there was a report that ALASH/l and another Cuban wanted

to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil-

tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/l's

intention and plans.

In August 1961 AMHIP/I reported plans by AMASH/l to attend the

French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1

wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The

files do not reveal that such a contact actually accurred.

In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/ll would be travelling

via Praque to the World Youth Festival in Helsinkti. AMLASH/l Mas

reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki

he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet ANNHIP/l. The FBI,

which was avare of CIA's association with AM-HIP/ll met with AMJHIP/1

in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to dIA if he should

contact the Paris Legal Attache.

3

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fin

Septencer 19631

in July 1962 CIA contacted AWHIP/l; who made known his dis-

satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/1's "planned defection" in

A 7 September

Paris in August"1961? Plans were made for a:ClAicase officer and

arorides

&n

AMWHIP/I to travel to Helsinki and anywhere: else: necessary in an attempt

well as entricizin

to bring about APLASH/l's defection, af the cace officers

of how to deri

The first of a series of meetings with AILASH/I was held in

Helsinki on l August 1962. The original objective of his defection

became one of recruiting him in place: AMRASH/l was reported as feeling

that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a

new Cuba,

he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there."

AMLASH/I spoke of sabotage of an oll-reftnery and the execution of a

CIA neacquarter la

top ranking castrò Subordinate, of the Söviet, Ambassador and of Castro

himself.

" the case officer's report statedave for

searre making no coniftients or plans,

perforner and

me pointed die to tAiLASH/11 enat csthemes lIke

spirator alle envisioned certainty had thetraplace, but that

whom we may

a lot of coordinations plannina, information-

distarse and

Collection, Etc! i"vere necessary prerequisites to

Trie cable then vent on tonsure the value and success of such plans."

any action bases on such (Emphasis in ortginal), as ALASH/l may par

together.

The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to

Clearly, at ta

further meetings in stockholm and "Copenhagen? tEAMLASH/1 was next

met on

16 and 17 August in Paris ahere ANAHIP/1 and the case officer

reguming care...

were joined by another Case officer a tAMEASh/Tras given SH training

action that aig-i

and suppites.* On 20 August he was taken to the south of france for

SABREL

і по під-т-т

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SEGNST

carle ra. or. a demolition demonstration.

Is refused to be polygraphed.

The case

officer reported on 17 August:

"Have no

inteniion give (AMASH/11 physical

1.091111910

'Insive 92' 82211

elimination nis son as requirement but recognize

a U.s. plat of actats something fi could or might try to carry

out on his oin initiative."

This suggests a plan of action tarpetied situiticaliy aça:

The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated:

Report, lui the serial languace

"Strongly concur that no physical el trination

missions be given [AMLASH/1]."

Aliss s.:

:22

crin 29 August 1962 ALASH/ loft Prague by afr for havana. This was

crethe last time that he was mat untll he next left cutt in Septemter

A 19630 sH still awaiting - 95 reveal plan of

action.

COMMENT:

It is noted at this point that AMLASH/l was not a

CCIMENT:

At recruited agent at that time nor was he ever for that

man with matter as operational Approval was never granted for

pose. By the erid of August 1962 the ClArela-

as might onshiB crit AMASH/1 ted made no real progress.

reference though he was yewed as an operational contact with

as suggepotentiale Sere year passed betwee A gust 1S2 and

nas cirectes

eptember 1953 when he sas next contacted by cli

the more

tringe.

It was can ters dernae

as alternatively.

relationship that he bad with cis the

siderin Critical perdid for purposes of this paper wie

is there-

the spe. Pore between september and 22 November 1963:

e concotarich

AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto flegre, Brazil

.. From 5 through & Sepiember 1963, as & representative if the Cuban

5

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Government.' He was met there by ANNHiP/1, and by the CIA case

i"':?: officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASi!/1

rott. said that he had written two SW messages (only one had been received).

were les He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because

i. of Cuban postal censorship.

"characteriza:It is 'pertinent to what followed to notélatere the relationship

is dispu between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time.'" At page 13 of Book V

that the of the SSC Finat Report the following statement appears:

conclude tutor'".., the ClA took steps to renew ãts contact

operati.". whient, with a high-level Cuban official namet AMLASH. The

phase" of the matier. CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic;

Aleged istakin: tic' he had not been in contact with the ClA since

the first contact wi:before the missile crisis of October 13052. The

it was uncertain whet exact purpose the CIA" had for renewing contact is

(Page. 5). The suin: not khoin, but there is no-éisdênce the car intended

itself describes the arthis-timé to use AlLASH in añ'ássassination

by AMLASH/1, and the operation: a U.S. resporse (supral.

Any disithe reason:for:there-laving béen nó cortact Strice Augus: 1962 was

time aristaply.that-AMLASH/T.:did not léavé Cubä after Zhat. unt? September

SSC Rep:l$63. 51f It is narrowly correct to state that the "exast purpose"

express:for renewing: contact was not known to the authors of the sSc Report.

SSC Finatt nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was in important

•Thpotentialrasset whose usefulness remained so be explorer. At this

in infe point, not: only vas there "no evidence (that) ... an issassination

with aroperation": was intended, it is quite clear that it wäs not under

consideration. The

Problen at the tine was tow to deal with the man.

At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting

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in September 1963:

" . . . may have been to gain intelligence and to

cultivate him as an asset for covert operations ..."

A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report,

provides an insight as to how AMLASH/I was assessed at the time, as

well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers

of how to deal with him in the future:

"AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always

be a control problem. . (he) will not take time or

have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W

messages, let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong

confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain

• . ."

CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part:

" ... Based on what little feel ve here have for

subject however appears he is hopeless as intell

performer and is best approached as a chief con-

spirator allowed to recruit his on cohorts among

whom we may then find persons susceptible to long

distance and covert disciplines ... "

The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to

any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/I may put

together.

Clearly, at that point, while ALASH/l was viewed as potentially

important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities,

requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of

action that might later ensue.

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Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963

cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AILASH/l as follows:

"AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the

United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an

'Inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting

a U.S, plan of action." (Empahsis added).

This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro

himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC

Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently:

"AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish

change either inside job or invasion he realistic

enough realize latter out of question. According

AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of

action."

COMMENT:

At this point, after a year out of touch with a

man with whom there had been no working understanding,

ALASH/l's views were of interest, but were very general,

as might be expected after such a long time. The actual

reference to an "inside job" did not specify Castro,

as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards

the more general question of how to bring about change.

It was offered alternatively, in the context of con-

sidering both external and internal action, and not with

the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.

1

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The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left

AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S. plan of action." There was

nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things

were left very much up in the air.

Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that

"characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation

is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes

that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination

operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this

phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on

Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From

the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963,

it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba."

(Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book Y,

Itself describes the very general nature of the approach

by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra).

Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that

time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the

SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views

expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of tae

SSC Final Report.

The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents

in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held

with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed

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against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.j. leaders.

The intended inference, as is known from discussions with

SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or

leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected

to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri-

zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary

and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter-

pretation as categorically as though it were fact.

The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have

expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of

any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever

may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time

they could not have stemmed from anything said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and

undertook nothing.

AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a

.

meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an

extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro

after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not

"intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to

the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless

arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already

in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed.

On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that

AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

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[Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." A'SLASH/1

was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official,

preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for

any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that

the request for a meeting:

"be given highest and profound consideration as

feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that

he deterined attempt op against' [Castro] with or

without [U.S.] support."

A 21 October cable to Hashington reported a 17 October meeting with

AMLASH/1-"Basically he wants assurance that (U.S.] will support him

If his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added).

Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff,

was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1.

The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows:

"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled

to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1]

and giving him assurances of full U.s. support if

there is change of the present government in Cuba."

(Emphasis added).

On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris,

• representing

himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person

at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.

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On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high-

lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows:

"Fitzgerald inforned [AMLASH/1] that the United

States is prepared to render all necessary

assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which

succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader-

ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the

United States to render the assistance it is

prepared to give. It was emphasized that the

above support will be forthcoming only after a

real coup has been effected and the group involved

is in a position to request U.S. (probably under

DAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis .

added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not

prepared to conmit itself to supporting an isolated

uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished

in a matter of hours if the present goverment is

still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup

period, the U.S. does not desire that the political

clock be turned back but will support the necessary

iE.

economie and political reforms which will benefit

the mass of the Cuban people."

At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject

in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-

12

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...

called that AMLASH/I spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination

weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some

other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald

stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer,

although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and

had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer

is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum

stated that:

"Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at

the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated

that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now

desired to know what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported

on AMLASH/l's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact

report on what AMLASH/I understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, 1s as

follows:

"The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the

capacity of a representative of high levels of

the Government concerned with the Cuban problem

satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con-

cerned, but he was not at all hapoy with the fact

that he still was not given the technical assistance

for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1]

said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point.

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He could not understand why he was denied certain

small pieces of equipment which promised a final

solution to the problem, while, on the other hand,

the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money

to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets. According to

[АМWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point,

and if he does not get advice and materials from a

U.S. Government technician, he will probably become

fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we

have made to date."

COMMENT:

At this point it is important to note that Agency

documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told,

and what he was told, which matches a later report

of what he understood. In essence he was told there

would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then

only if he was successful. While that may not seem a

very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow

of a government, it is directly relevant to the question

of what AMLASH/l was told and what he understood. It is

contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18)

to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/l inter-

preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.

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"13t:110

Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1's understanding

is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously

at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This

report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1

was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General

Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance

of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the

date of the report is June 1964, this particular information

dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by

Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F.

Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera-

tion..

While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited

11.5

iron

in Book V. of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional.

clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he lad

been turned down at the 29 October meeting.

or the :.

Following the 14

November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what

been :

could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963

outlin

Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside

Cuba.. The cache could, if he requested it, include ...high-power

rifles w/scope..

cats with

On 19 November AMLASH/I told a CIA officer that he planned to

return to Cuba. On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting

that AHLASH/1 "delay departure...(to) permit one more meeting which

AHLASH/1 requested."

On the same day (20 November) in response to

CiA.

15

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a telephonic request, AMLASH/l agreed to delay his departure "if it

is something interesting." The case officer told him that "he could not

assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH

had requested." The cable reporting this exchange roted that it was

a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person

in the room.

The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief

and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he

might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and

quite significantly,. the Report acknowledges that no specific support

had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of

highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

The case officer from hashington arrived in Paris the morning of

22 November and met with AMLASH/l late that afternoon. As they left

the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They

probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/I following the death of

President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President

Kennedy's life AMLASH/I had no basis for believing that he had CIA

support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to castro,

or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed

against Castro.

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I1. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT

Section 1, B

This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it

places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies)

Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation," It states

that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were

relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the

AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been

examined by the Warren Commission.

The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the iMLASH operation

warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as

follows:

"The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Harren

Commission's work than the early CIA assassination

plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier

plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the

time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots,

the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA;

and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed

AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him

being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat

of retaliation for such plotting."

As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was

without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly

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unsulted to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally

accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1

prior to the death of President Kennci;, but that is all. It is incorrect

to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's [roposal," There was no agree-

ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned

of the contacts with him there was nolling to learn beyond the fact

• of the contact.

The relationship was most tenuous and without any

support promised to him for whatever li. jianned. Castro's "threat"

--as noted above--must be considered iriclevant to the substantive

nature of the AlLASH relationship at il: t time.

This viempoint was conveyed to tii Subcormittee prior to publica-

tion of the report. At the same time

it was observed that theoretically

there was greater possibility of leaks irom the earlier operations

involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence

of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have

provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there

were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68

as follows:

"...It is unlikely that Castro could have

distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

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The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final

Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con-

testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC

Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation

was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are

inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously

considered as a likelihood during the Warren Conmission inquiry--

that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed

to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the

presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks

to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion

of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest

a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given

by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S.

Government, including CIA activities.

* * * * t * t t

At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a

meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having:

"stated the United States would support a coup."

Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald:

"also gave general assurances that the United

States would help in bringing about the coup.*

The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at

the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This

presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match

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the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time.

In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it

is noted that the following statenent appears at page 87 of the SSc

Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots:

"Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and

promised him that the United States would support

a coup against Castro."

citing testimony by the case officer who

was present at the meeting.

An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows:

"3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting

stated: 'Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to

(foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1

and giving him assurances of full support with

a change of the present government in Cuba.'"

(Emphasis added).

The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual

document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported

quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what

Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when

matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made

(as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AHLASH/1

understood (as discussed at pages 13-15).

#********=

At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible

SAST

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for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating

to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it

would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is

likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were

responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the

operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was.

********* * * * *

At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following

statement:

"According to the 1967 Inspector General Report,

CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on

the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break

contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi-

nation and to return to Headquarters."

This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of

: the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows:

"[The case officer] states that he received an

OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early

the next morning telling him that everything was

off."

The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on

the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited,

apparently despite suggestive prompting, that:

•.. . he recalled receiving such a cable, but

could not recall whether it made specific mention

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of the President's assassination as the reason for

breaking contact . . ."

It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been

sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event,

the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version.

**

Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the

AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation,

AMLASH/I was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the

Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1.

Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his

fulminations against the Castro regime. Ke do not know, beyond these

generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what

persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships

with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were

he inclined to do so.

Assuming that AMLASH/I was to attempt to organize a coup, he

obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind.

To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey

assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we

do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things

that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the

question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than

one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA

to break relations with him.

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Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's

provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for

consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the

issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although

we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally

arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial

did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to

November 1964. - An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro-

vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the

mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those

included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this

earlier period.

***

* * *

• At page 26 of

the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November

the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names

of known contacts of certain. Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC

Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to

determine the significance of. Oshald's contact with Soviets and to

assess their activities. The SSC Report states that:

"AMLASH's real name was included in the list

of names on the Mexico Station cable."

This is used

as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why

the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification

of the AMLASH operation.

The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest

on a misconception of the context in which the name of AHLASH/l was

mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of

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the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache - in December 1960 --

about a press conference planned for AMLASH/1 In Mexico City in

February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between

AMLASH/I and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the

name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable.

In

any event, the December 1960 date preceded the inauguration of

President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any

relevance to the subject. There was no-reason to check the name.

The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead-

ing on this point.

* x * * t

***

Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con-

cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states "that the

purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of

Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the

earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages

14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under

discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly

mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report

substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is

not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

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************ *

At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testirony of the Chief,

SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He

is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact

tine fraze, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks

of his "ague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related

to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless

gives this opinion full play despite the extensiva qualification as to

its reliability.

********

At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration

is given to what was known of the ABLASH operation by certain CIA

employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or

should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept

as a preaise that the relationship was an assassination plot. throughout,

and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period in question.

There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship

with political action assets; that such was the case with ABLASH/l is

noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties

were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on

positions that would be and were taken with APLASH/l. It is important

to keep this

in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as

presented in the SSC Final Report.

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Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH

affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating

to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What

did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum-

stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps

on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it

was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final

Report did not accord the subject that treatment.

* #

At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made

to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in

mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and

of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made

, It clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/l's 1963 associations with CIA.

This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred

time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it

did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half

after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no

knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When

this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature

of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an

irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this

point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator

McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his

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assassination also container no reference to that period, although

AMLASH/l's later activities were cited.

**************

It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows

that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented

as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection,

which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his

self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was

determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his

own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were

held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically

conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period

preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his

own program before he could expect support from the U.s.

Eventually -- but not until after the death of President

Kennedy - firmer indications of support were offered. Even then

the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a

man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

• [Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow..." The nature of the

relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964

(page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/!

that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step

of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While

one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included

association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those

directly involved structured their thinking differently.

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The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH

operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interia

Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG

report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at

different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that

question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship

developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and

without substance during his life. During that time it was not an

assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC

Report is both imprecise and misleading.

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MATERIALS FORWARDED TO HARREN

COMMISSION AND FBI

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7

Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of

I1mited effort by ClA in the course of the Harren Commission

Inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report,

CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts

of the Warren Cormission. Additionally, it conducted studies and

submitted special analyses and reports.

The following pages list reports and other papers sutmitted

to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation)

and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation

Is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that

effort.

The lists fall into the following sections:

E.1

Dissemination to the Intelligence Community

• E.2

Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission

E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations

E.4 Memoranda to Harren Coumission

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SECRET

AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FIL AND THE HARREN COMMISSION

1 =

Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis-

seminated

to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as

possible after receipt.

The following list of some 100 cabled

disseminations, CScI's, and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, et al.

The listing covers the period from

10 October 1963 through Septenber 1964.

AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORTIAL DISSEMINATIONS)

III

#10 October 1963

DIR 74673

(HH/3/Mexico)

*On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source

in Mexico City reported that an American male, who

Identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

Reciptents: FBJ, I&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Con-

missiond

*24 October 1963

DIR 77978

(4H/3/Mexico)

Request for two copies of most recent photograph of

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipients: Navy. [Harren Commission]

23 November 1963

DIR 34915

(WH/3)

Information relating to telephone call on 23 sep-

tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

- Document Date

I! - Document Number

III - Originating Office

- An asterisk indicates that the document has also made available

the Harren Commission.

. =.

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24 November 1963

TDCS-3/565,829

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulatel in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

(CI/SIG)

Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's

Activities in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

26 November 1963

CSCI-

(WE/BC)

Subject:

Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient:

FBI. :

26 November 1963

' CSC1-3/778,826

(WH/3)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSHALD, Suspected Assassin of

Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and I and

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(WH/3)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

president Kennedy.

(Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD

between 27 September and 3 October 1963).

NB:

This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826.

The above CSCI number appears to

de the correct one, according to a copy of the

• document in CI/SIG file No. 568.

Recipient: FBI:

= =.

*.

2

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26 November 1963

DIR 85069

(WH/3)

so be are one re er 9t.

Travel of Pro-Cormunist Costa Rican Congress-

*26 November 1963

DIR 85089

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey

OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in

a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy In Mexico City".

Received Sopy. Laten Commissions

State, White House; Secret Service

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

(WH/3)

Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSMALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany).

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Telephone communication between Cuban President

CORTicos and Joaquin HERIANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to

Mexico.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject:

HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient: FBI.

3

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27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

sure it e are get or is Activities in

Recipient:

*27 November 1963

DIR 85182

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Subwas resol, an everscan i ving in Switzerla Rd, wro

was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding

latter to a close friend in Bern.

Recipients:

received copy. warren commission

opy: are Come touje: secret service

27 Movember 1963

DIR 85195

(C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage

of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. MCCONE,

and Mr. HOOVER.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

(C/HH/3)

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85199

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. •

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. LWarren Commission

27 November 1963

DIR 85222

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City,

contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

:

4

SEORET

"ang

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!

E.":

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27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

(WH/3/Mexico)

set ent 2 over 969, Aetivities in

Recipient:

*27 November 1963

DIR 85182

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard

Thomas GIBSON, an Anerican living in Switzerland, who

was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding

latter to a close friend in Bern.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 Nov imber 1963

DIR 85195

(C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage

of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. MCCONE,

and Mr. HOOVER.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

(C/WH/3)

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85199

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. •

Received sopy: State Commite House; Secret Service

27 November 1963

DIR 85222

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate) in Mexico City,

contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

Statice sentia

колоб

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## Page 120

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27 November 1963

DIR 35246

(WH/3)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

(C/WH/3)

(WH/3/Mexico)

)

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele-

"""

phone to .S. PAPICH.

Recipient:

FBl.

:: 27 November 1963.

Unnumbered'

(CI/SIG)

Information regarding photographic coverage of

Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed

to S. PAPICH of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

.. 27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to

OSWALD's presenca in New Orleans

in September 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

(C/WH/3)

On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John

WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em-

bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster;*

type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

5

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?".

*28 November 1963

DIR 85662

(C/WH/J)

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte,

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren

*28 November 1963

DIR 85665

(C/WH/3)

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked 40

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who

murdered President Kennedy.

Recipients:

FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

CSC1-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN

and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

(WH/3/Mexico)

DIR 85666

Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO.

de turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation and investigation.

Recipients:. FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mission]

29 November 1963 . .

DIR 85668

(WH/3/Mexico)

Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Mavarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipierts:

FBI, State, White House-

*29 November 1963

DIR 85670

(C/WH/3)

Sensitive sources

have reported that when the

23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to

the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a

great deal of discussion.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren

Commission]

''•'

SECRET

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## Page 122

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SECRET.

29 November 1963

DIR 85676

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85691

(C/WH/3)

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of

the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man

claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to

Recipienate elle State, White House: Secret Service

Recipients:

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

(C/WH/3)

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on

28 November.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85715

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959

to May 1962).

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

(C/WH/3)

Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85758

(WH/3/Mexico)

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

recipients: FBI

received copy Staen Commiss louse; Secret Service

SECRET

12742

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!

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*29 November 1963

DIR 85770

(C/WH/3)

eries of incidents which have produced a report allegi

Ivance information on assassinatio

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that

Oswald had made a bank deposit.

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director'

uggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and saf

deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.

30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778/894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Recipient:

Post sentes ting two men involved in assassination.

#30 November 1963

DIR 86063

(C/NH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

[Harren Commission)

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

(C/WH/3)

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

Recipient: FBI.

#4 December 1963

DIR 86702

(C/WH/3)

Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife,

June 1962.

Recipients: Föl, State, White House; Secret Service.

received copy.

Warren Commission

8

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## Page 124

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, SECRET

5 December 1963

DIR 87189

(C/WH/3)

nown Soviet intelligence officer in New Delh

lemanding full probe into assassination

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*6 December 1963

DIR 87520

(C/WH/3)

Correction of DIR 87502.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Servic

'eceived copy. [Warren Commission'

*7 December 1963

DIR 37667

Reciper tion. Garben Commission concluded.

FBI. [Warren Commission)

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

(C/WH/3/)

(WH/3/Mexico)

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

ceci, Embassy, exico city.

*9 December 1963

DIR 87796

(HH/3)

Letter mailed In Stockholm on 25 November 1963

illeging assassination arranged by Communist

Chinese.

ecipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Servic

eceived copy. [Warren Commission'

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

prepared and executed jointly by the Communist

Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See

JHAVE 8658 IN 75902).

Recipient: FBI.

11 December 1963

TDCSDB 3/658,408

Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding

(a) Moscow views on international situation

following death of President Kennedy, and (b).

resumption of disarmament talks.

Recipients: General distribution.

9

SECRET

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_SECRET

12 December 1963

CSC1-3/779,048

(C/WH/3)

Subject:

WILSON, Carlos John (also: HILSON-HUDSON,

Sect elts° John Hudson.)

tor of

*12 December 1963

DIR 88643

ned:

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Prest-

dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa

Rica.

Recipients:

mision

FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

(C/WH/3)

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

to comnent upon the assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

(C/WH/3)

Subject:

Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

*13 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,136

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Cummission

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy

Assassination.

Recipient:

FBI.

*18 December 1963 .

DIR 89970

(C/WH/3)

Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Recipients:

received copy.

• (arren Commissions

State, White House; Secret Service

10

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*18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

ecipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Servic

eceived copy. [Warren Commission

19 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,225

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

19 December 1963

CSD8-3/658,870

(WH/Reports)

Subject:

a.

Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and

Rauo ROA y Garcia.

b. Probable Future Plan of Action for

Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez

Recipients:

State (Miami) and others (not identified

27 December 1963

CSC1-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.

Recipient:

FBI.

*10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI. (Warren Commission]

11

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## Page 127

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•=^

:

14 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,510

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of

information from CIA.)

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSC1-3/779,814

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSC1-3/779,817

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Soviet Union.)

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DOP 4-0860

emorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

nvestigation. Subject: Assassination of John F

Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of

President John F. Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret

Service.

Subject:

Assassination of President

12

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## Page 128

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ecipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0364

212245

Subject:

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

SETYAEVA and RAHM.)

Recipient:

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Further Information Provided by. Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB

Recipient:

White House (attention Secret Service).

11 March 1964

CSC1-3/780,344

Subject:

Sunmary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina SWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

(SR/CI/R)

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,996

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Recipient:

FBI.

20 April 1964

CSDB-3/660,704

Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination.

Recipient:

FBI (?)

13

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## Page 129

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22 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

(SR/CI/R)

subject on resinatio to Resident soon F. Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

30 April 1964

Unnumbered Memorandm

(CI/SIG)

relephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 Novembei

advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office

of Security for information.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RevKl..

Subject:

Marina OSKALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to F3l.

11 May 1964 CSC.

CSCI-3/781,172

Subtesses Lee Harvey OSWALD, (Traces on Soviet names

and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSVALD.)

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,282

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Identification

of photographs

sent to CIA by FBI.)

Recipient:

FBI.

• 15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELYS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaccion of that Service

•to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

14

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494243

SECRET

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,351

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classifier

Information about the U-2.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444]

19 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,386

Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK).

Recipient: Navy.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

(C1/R&A)

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

(CI/R&A)

Subject:

sebipient: Formation Concerning Jack Ruby.

29 June 1964

CSC1-3/782,058

demorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP,

Subject:

Le peter Moro narren Cormission]

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richärd HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 July 1964

DDP 4-3470

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Statements Reportedly Made by George and

Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSNALD

and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Recipient:

Copy to FBI.

15

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•

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's defection Havin

Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

Government.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.:

Subject:

Joachim JOESTEN.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964

CSC1-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven Photographs Fornarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964

CSC1-316/01709-64

Subject:

Raymond F. FRIESECKE.

Recipient:

FBI.

2: November 1964

CSC1-316/01779-64

"O1"

ubject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report il

he Assassination of President Kennedy

Recipient:

FBI.

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient:

F81.

16

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2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi-

Ret prent ee Harvy and Marina OSWALD.

8 April 1965

CSCI-316/01398-65

Subject:

Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

C pient: FBI. [Copy to secret Service]

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist

Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

9 May 1967

C5C1-316/02153-67

in lift

alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/02669-67

Subject: Allegations of Unidentified Homan Regarding

Mario GARCIAS et al.

Recipient:

FBI

17

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24 July 1967

CSC1-316/03243-67

Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba.

statement of dubious credibility; information passed to

Recipient:, FBI.

7 May 1968

CSCI-316/01678-68

Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged

Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by

Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim

GARRISON's Allegations.

Recipient: FBI.

16 September 1969

CSCI-316/03323-69

Subject:

Charles Milliam THOMAS.

Recipient:

FBI.

DISSEMIMATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF

since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on oskalo,

all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by

cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad-

ditionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison.

Coptes were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form SCI's, coordinated

on short-form CSCI's,

and maintained the CSCI log, the Cl Staft

received copies of all CSCI's.

DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION

(Coamission Document No. 100)

13 December 1963

Menorandum

Subject:

Analysis of World Reaction to President

Kennedy's Assassination.

(Supplied by A. H. DULLES.)

siam

.!!

18

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21 January 1964

(Commission Document No. 300]

Note from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Attachments: a.

Recent Soviet Statements on

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

b. FBIS-28 on OSMALD case.

21 January 1964

Menorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the

Government of the Soviet Union.

22 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 691]

Substand sugges fie are tens or are bee BANKIN.

25 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 321]

Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife.

[Commission Document No. 347]

31 January 1964

Subject:

of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3

October 1963.

5 February 1964

Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN.

Fourteen attachnents including recent Soviet State-

ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964).

5 February 1964

(Commission Document No. 361)

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to

J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appenúix B,

a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.

19

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8 February 1964

[Cormission Docjment No. 1182]

18 February 1964

Matton ament oh irect. PApera Buria of Assasst-

Assassi-

nationa foRes ich might be helped in (perere fing

available materials relating to OSWALD's activities

abroad.)

[Copy to Warren Commission. ]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

gation am entic Director Artera Sure : Ansessi

nation of John F. Kennedy.

Toy to ke ren on son e it es Information

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

gation, attention Mr. S.

nation of tes en on in ence Succeet Tor copies

ration of President John F

ot 10 photographs found among the effects estee Harvey

OSWALD.)

[Copy to Warren Conmission. ]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service;

signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject:

Assassination

of president John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of entry

in "Historic Diary" ralating to OSWALD's attempted

suicide.

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

20

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18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

19 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 384]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(TS No. 187908.) Subject:

;

19 February 1964

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City.

*21 February 1964

DDP 4-0940 [Conmission Document No. 426]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Translations of Interrogations Reports of

Silvia DURAN.

Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 35758, 29 November 1963.

Translation of Interrogation of Silvia

DIRAN and Horacio DURAl Navarro.

CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964. Trans-

lation of Official Mexican Polic Report

on the Second Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

5 March 1964

DDP 4-1171 [Commission Document No. 448]

Menorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to 3. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Summary of Findings

in Regard to Allegations

by Mohammed REGGAB Relative

to Marina OSWALD.

#6 March 1964

DDP 4-1224 [Cormission Document No. 692]

Menorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information in CIA's Possession Regarding

Lee Harvey OSHALD Prior to Novenber 22, 1963.

21

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18 March 1964

DDP 4-1423 [Commission Document No. 528)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewec

by CIA in Moscow.

24 March 1964

DDP 4-1555 [Conmission Document NO. 674]

Subeat normation Dissemi ted to the See PAlKI.

Subject:

Service but not yet made available to the President's

Commission.

*24 March 1964

DDP 4-1554 [Commission Document No. 631]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

CIA Cissemination of Information on Lee

Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963.

Attachments:

OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October

1963.

OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October

1963.

25 March 1964

DDP 4-1576

Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN.

Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey

', dated 23 March 1954.

27 March 1964

DDP 4-1606

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to Thomas L. HUGHES,

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of

stary: Subject: Verification of Entry in "Historic

(Copies to Warren Commission and the FBl.)

*31 March 1964

DDP 4-1655 [Commission Document No. 698]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and Marina Mikolevna OSWALD.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963,

22

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Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December

1963, to the White House, the Department of State,

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to

the Secret Service.

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

oUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

*3 April 1964

DDP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710]

Remorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December

1963, to White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

6 April 1964

DOP 4-1739

(Commission Document No. 708]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

to Questions Contained

in Your Memo-

rander dated 12 Maron 5964. CoCertain questir s Posed

by the State Department Files")

7 April 1964

DDP 4-1787

[Commission Document No. 726]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First

interrogation.

23

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-SECRET

7 April 1964

DDP 4-1786

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Mohammed REGGAB.

20 April 1964

DDP 4-1997 [Commission Document No. 817)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

BND Report Pertaining to Allegations 'Con-

cerning Anton ERDINGER.

21 April 1964

Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN.

Attachment:

CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and

French Publishing Firms to Publish the Thomas

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President

Kennedy.)

24 April 1964

29 April 1964

4 May 1964

6 May 1964

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2099 [Conmission Document No. 844]

lemorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

jubject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD.

DDP 4-2160 [Conmission Doc'ment No. 871]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2256

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2296 [Commission Document No. 902]

lemorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

jubject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information t

the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central

Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection.

DDP 4-2351 [Commission Document No. 911]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

-

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... 1

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13 May 1964

DDP 4-2444

[Conmission Document No. 931]

Subject:

tion about the U-2.

[CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission]

15 May 1964

[Commission Document No. 935]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in

processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to FBI]

19 May 1954

DDP 4-2533

[Commission Document No. 944]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

*19 May 1964

DDP 4-2534 (Commission Document No. 943]

Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

Attachment:

dent Kennedy OUT Message Na. 85770, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, State Department, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

*22 May 1964

DDP 4-2624 [Connission Document No. 971]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

Embassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned

Assassination of President Kennedy.

Attachment:

OUT Message No. 85691, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House,

Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

25

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SECRET,

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2688

[Commission Document No. 985]

Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December

963, to the White House, Department of State, anc

he Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy t

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2692 [Commission Document No. 990]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEV and .

Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

1 June 1964

DOP 4-2747 [Commission Document No. 1000]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November :

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963;

subject:

Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2764

[Commission Document No. 1001]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2770 [Commission Document No. 1012]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject.

George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT.

26

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4 June 1964

Subject:

5 June 1964

DDP 4-2844

[Commission Document No. 1041]

Memorandm from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training

School in Minsk, USSR.

10 June 1964

DDP 4-2922 [Commission Document No. 1054)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

*12 June 1964

DDP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. 1089]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

19 June 1964

DDP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. 1131)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Soviet Brainwashing

Techniques.

26 June 1964

DDP 4-3366

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Brainwashing

Techniques

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

[Commission Document No. 1188)

Subject:

in Tangier, Morocco.

(Copy to the FBl.J

27

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1 July 1964

DOP 4-3389 [Cormission Document No. 1201]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki

on 10 October 1959.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401 [Commission Document No. 1216)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul

Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV).

[Copy to the FB1.]

6 July 1964

DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Statements Reportedly Made by George and

and the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to the FBI.)

22 July 1964

DDP 4-3712 (Commission Document No. 1273]

Sabrani parent in sistencies in Material durin.

nished the Commission by CIA and the Department of

State.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. 1287)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum-

stances of a photograph of an unknown individual

furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November

1963.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3770

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachments:

Translation (original documents included.

28

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31 July 1964

DOP 4-3916

[Commission Document No. 1358)

Negrad eng or trees, ed or rate pasoviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

7 August 1964

DDP 4-4037 [Commission Document No. 1356)

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479

(Conmission Document No. 1443]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J.

Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

31 August 1964

DDP 4-4581

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

(Document No. 50, List 2]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government.

[Copy to the FBI]

14 September 1964

DDP 4-4775

[Commission Document No. 1483]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Wester Europe in 1964.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4793

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Publication of Documents

Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4794 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart-

ment files.

(Revised) (Attachment to CD No. 1479)

29

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11 September 1964

DDP 4-4795 (Commission Document No. 1479)

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4796 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4801 [Commission Document No. 1493]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4823

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

17 September 1964

DOP 4-4838

Menorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

State Department Files.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4893

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DOP 4-4841

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Regarding Agency approval

con the out timey sentrant authorizedly 1964.

30

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18 Septenber 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Communications from the Department of State.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4848

Menorandun from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens

Married to Foreigners.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4850

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Passport and Visa Office.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4873

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow.

18 Septenber 1964

DDP 4-4882

Technical Examination 01

Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4886

Memorandun from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR.

22 September 1964

DDP 4-4921

Sendead frivia Trado Bazas de Du tO J. LEe RANKIN.

Subject:

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban

Consul, Mexico City.

31

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SENNET.

18 September 1964

DĐP 4-4952

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lea RANKIN.

stato's stay in Helsink D

(Infomation regarding

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110 [Cormission Document No. 15321

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Scopies pach in is, statel

13 October 1964

DDP 4-5275

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

16 October 1964

DDP 4-5334/1

Memorandum for The President's Conmittee on the Harren

Conmission Report.

Fublict Trava's Role in the Support of Presidential

20 October 1964

DDP 4-5341 [Commission Document No. 1545]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIM.

Subject:

Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

29 October 1964

DDP 4-5558

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Transmittal of OCR Publication:

"Foreign

Press Reaction to the larren Report", and Follow-Up

Report, dated 22 Octoser 1964.

32

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GENCY DISSEMINATICNS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS ANC

LLEGATIONS REGARGING PRESIDERT KERREDY ASSASSIRATICH

10 October 1963

DIR 74673

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact wich Soviet Embassy, Maxico

•Ity, 1 October 1963.

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House

23 November 1953

DIR 84915

Information relating to telephone call on 28 September

1963 to Soviet Esbassy in Mexico Clty.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

•Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR. 84951

CIA requests informatton

elating to OSHALD's ac.

ivities in Mexico City (from FBi interrogation

of OSdALD).

Recipient:

FBI.

26 November 1963

subject ported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient:

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSKALD, Suspected Assassin of

president Kennedy.

ncloses transcripts of tele.

hone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 an

3 October 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

33

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26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

Subject: Same as above

(Conment:

This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826.

The above CSCI number appears to

betreatrse rie o. bobing eo a copy of the docu-

26 November 1963

DIR 85069

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect

that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Conmunist, pro-Castro deputy

to the Costa Rican National Assenbly; will try to

gather data in Texas to use in pro-communist-pro-castro

propaganda in connection with the assassination of

President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

26 Novewber 1963

DIR 85089

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received a copy. [Warren Conmission]

26 Novenber 1963.

DIR 85176

Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in xest Germany).

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

Subject:

Telephone Communication between Duban prest-

dent DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Am-

bassador to Mexico.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

34

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17o 1 49 100yfetsasstttionia.

ninet tenittede stostr uttnt attliis tlyasa744444 49-494-8409945 dnt itf t t

1a.

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SECRET.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject:

HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient:

FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the

Shitr: House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico

City on 18 September 1963.)

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient:

FBI.

27 November 1963

DIR 85182

Receiven sopy. State Comits touse; Secret Service

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85199

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

35

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27 November 1963

DIR 85222

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cubar

Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with

-ee Harvey OSWALD

lecipient: FBI

26 November 1963

DIR 85246

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports informatior

regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

Subject:

Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone

to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban

and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH

of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

on 26 November a British journalist named John WILSON-

HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in

i

36

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SEGRET

RuBto visited in a around "grican gangster type named

visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

28 November 1963

DIR 85662.

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

28 November 1963

DIR 85665

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who

murdered President Kennedy.

Recipients:

Recipien sopy. arate comes Houses Secret Service

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient:

FBI.

29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

29 November 1963

DIR 85670

Sensitive sources

Sensivere ro arrest of silave burtee ame kuben the

37

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he personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great dei

f discussio

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. (Warren Commission)

29 November 1963

DIR 85691

President Kennedy.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvía DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85770

Series of incidents which have produced a report

alleging advance information on assassination.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. (warren commission,

29 November 1963

Unnumbered memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor

that OSWALD had made a bank deposit.

Recipient:

FBI.

38

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30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778.894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Rect sentes ting two men involved in assassination.

30 November 1963

DIR 86063

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. (Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

Recipient:

Recipient:" relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

7 December 1963

DIR 87667

Recipient: ation farre Co miss 000 concluded.

[Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch witt

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

,

9 December 1963

DIR 87796

Letter malled in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging

for a te can one See serice

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of

a source who claims plot

to assassinate Kennedy prepared

and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans

through

intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658, IN 75902.)

kecipient:

FBI.

12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON,

John; WILSON, John Hudson.)

Recipient:

FBI.

39

. SECRET

:

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## Page 155

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SEGRET

12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Recipients: FBI, State, Hhite House. [Warren Commission]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

o comment upon the assassination

ecipients: FBI, State, White House

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

Subject:

Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House

13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

jubject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Cormission

16 December 1963

CSC1-3/779,135

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

*18 December 1963

DIR 89970

Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

recipien sopy. Stren Commissions

State, White House; Secret Service

18 December 1963

DIR 89980-

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

Recipients:

received copy. " Stren contes iouse: Secret Service

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient:

FBI.

40

SECRET.

..---a."==

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## Page 156

14-00000

SECRET

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Menorandum

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 No-

vember.

Recipient: FBI.

10 January 1964

CSC1-3/779,482

SuBject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Slivia

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 January 1964

CSC1-3/779,729

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/778,814

Subject:

Subjelen: ck L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSHALD.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

Subject: Lee Harvey OSHALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

soviet Union.)

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0360

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

("In connection with our efforts to assist the

President's Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy by providing information which

might be helpful in interpreting available ma-

terials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,

41

SECRETI

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## Page 157

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SEGRET.

we have considered the entry with regard to attempte

suicide.

We consider this entry as being of consider

able importance and one shich might be subject t

verification."

Recipient:

FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

("... 47 photographs which were among the effects of

Lee Harvey OSAALD, . .

It appears that most of

the photographs were taken in the USSR and depict

Soviet contacts of OSHALD or scenes in the Soviet

Union. ")

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to

OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient: Secret Service.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".

Recipient: State. [Copy to Harren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

Annette SETYAEVNA and Lillie May RAHM.)

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

Subject:

subject Mohamed AGAmation Provided by Moroccar

Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service.)

42

a... ..

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## Page 158

140000

:

one andes contro

" SECRET.

..-- -

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Photograph of an individual closely resembling

OSWALD. )

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Information regarding Lydia DiMITRUK.

ecipient: FBI

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Rubiecent: ripy of attachment dorwarded to FBI.

[Warren Connission]

11 May 1964

CSC1-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Traces on Soviet nanes,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

velonging to Marina OSHALD. )

Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964

CSC1-3/781,282

15 May 1964

Subject:

Recipient Preside armed Commission]

:

ISECRET

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## Page 159

12000

SEORET.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla

:ion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Lette

of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROSARIA Milina.)

Recipient: FBI

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY.

Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/782,085

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient:

FBI. [Harren Comission]

2 July 1964

DOP 4-3401

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

sovernment.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Comission]

6 October 1964

CSC1-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Conments on Seven Photographs Formarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

44

SEGRE

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## Page 160

14000

:

..

- SEGRET

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

2 March 1965

CSC1-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with

Recipenat oF of Lee Harvey and Marina OSWALD.

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's In-

tourist Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

ubject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, MEXICA

ewsman, That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortl

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN

CONMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RE=

LATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION

31 January 1964

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the

activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City,

28 September - 3 October 1963.

45

(SEGRET.

•.*

- no.

.!

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## Page 161

100000

• :

J

-SECRET

5 March 1964

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Kokanped REGGAS Relative to Marina OSWALD.

18 March 1964

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed

by CIA in MOScOW.

. 31 March 1964

DDP 4-1655

bject: Reports on Activities and Trav

WALD and Marina Nikolerna OSWAL

Enclosures include the following:

of Lee Harvey

3 Аргів 1964

7 April 1964

4 May 1964

DDP 4-1699

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

DDP 4-1784

Subject: Moharmed REGGAB.

DDP 4-2256

Subservey of Atency ines indicates tee Harvey OSHALD.

information known to the Agency on OSHALD's association

with communists or crininals, either in United States

or abroad has been made available to the Commission.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Subject:

Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

(Compilation of traces on what appear to be Soviet

names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an ad-

dress book identified by Marina OSWALD as belonging

to her.)

46

Mia and saratire d's ta to a

nanow are

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## Page 162

$ 4.00000

SECRET

15 May 1964

19 May 1964

22 May 1964

ubject: Role of the Cuban intelligence Service 1

rocessing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Servic

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2534

Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

DDP 4-2624

27 May 1964

1 June 1964

3 June 1964

4 June 1964

DDP 4-2688

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Cormunists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

(Comment: Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm.)

DDP 4-2741

Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85662, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 86063, 30 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 87667, 7 December 1963.

Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interroga-

tion of

Gilberto ALVARADO.

DDP 4-2769

jubject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished b

he Soviet Government

DDP

ubject: Information Developed on the Activity o

ee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City

.

47

SECRET.

initits to (775199-5810-ttt

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## Page 163

14.00000

-

.

¡SEGNET

10 June 1964

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

12 June 1964

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of

President Kennedy sent to United States Embassy

in Costa Rica.

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD

mas in Tangier, Morucco.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Subject: Lee Harvey OSHALD.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-480%

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4839

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Subject: Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

,

48

israias i inan surgia cerra.

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## Page 164

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= •I

MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

;

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## Page 165

800000.

-

JEERET SENSITI

Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit

to Mexico City in 1963

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April

1947 until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in

1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella

type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multi-line phone taps, three

photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail inter-

cept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of

the local telephone company who was handled by a Station case

officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the avail-

ability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language

(English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers.

Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case

officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who

advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and con-

cealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project

LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a

fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the

street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The

IMPDET

i BN906a

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:

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## Page 166

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gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a

double laned street on the southeast corner of that block (See

attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and opera-

ted strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This

base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the

photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the

Warren Conmission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base.

It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the

same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the

Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located

in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet

Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the

Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get

good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three

photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a

Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father

(deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and

LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then devleoped and

printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was ori-

ginally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the

resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and

LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

1aFATА..

1-73---

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## Page 167

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SECRET

SENSITHE

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American

staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance

team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a

panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by

radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left

the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs

for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept

operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer.

A recruited Mexican agent, who had a semi-official status, obtained

selected letters from a sub-agent employed by the Mexican postal

system.

2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as charac-

terized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The

Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we con-

ducted liaison, was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican

Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied

with political investigations and

control of foreigners. Their

agents were cruel and corrupt. A Station officer trained a number

of them in name tracing and travel control.

In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a

joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation,

an .

SECHE:

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## Page 168

1419000.

which became known as LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer.

The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The

transcription reom was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In

1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals,

the Station Chief, himself, became the project case officer.

A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the

listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes.

There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY

(the joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the

LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet,

Cuban and Satellite Embassies in anticipation of possible cover-

age. The Station immediately disconnected all of the unilateral

telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be dis-

covered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans

soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines,

three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At

the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of con-

versations of interest which were then included in a daily re-

sume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely

recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station;

however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels

which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

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- SECRET/SETSTINE

English were taken to another location for translation and

typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but

because of the volume of Russian conversations, the trans-

lations usually ran about a week behind the date of the con-

versation. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or

English since the Chief of Station could read only these two

languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

As soon as the Station learned that an American iden-

tifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss

Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs.

However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs

were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually

for dates a few days before since the technician who was proces-

sing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs

were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used.

Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the

end of each day regardless of asount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)

and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners,

and cars with foreign license plates.

Human error did occur but

generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy cover-

age had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which

frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

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SECRET SENSITIVE

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post

operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and

taken to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation because the caller

was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because

Station personnel waited to review the photographs coincidentally

with the typed transcript.

4. Airport Coverage:

This is discussed at Tab B.

Must not did a sime

MishA dis

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## Page 171

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-

( 4! Jar Erab gater

1- LIMITED

2. LILYRIe

3. LICALLA

lati Baas.

tat I page d

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## Page 172

14-00000

SELECTED NEWSPAPER STORIES WITH .COMMENTS

( TẠO G

---

## Page 173

$4.00000

In the course of the research effort leading to this general

report, there were newspaper stories relating to the assassination

of President Kennedy and to CIA. Some of these appear to have been

based on specially designed stories emanating from the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. At the time of their appearance they

were the subject of comments prepared in CIA. These newspaper

stories and the comments are attached.

The following newspaper stories and comments are listed below:

Tab G. 1

Jack Anderson colum on 6 May 1977 alleging

CIA activity in Dallas, Texas in 1963.

Tab G.2 Jack Anderson column on 20 January 1977

alleging that CIA is tied to a false Oswald

story.

lab G.3 Norman Kempster story on 1 January 1971

alleging that CIA withheld data on Oswald.

Tab G.4 Clare Booth Luce involvement with Cuban exiles.

Tab G.5 Ronald Kessler story on 26 November 1976

alleging CIA withheld details of Oswald tele-

phone calls, with report on handling of documents.

Tab 6.6 Joat oswald sold the is ans of ris plan to ing

Kennedy.

Tab G.7 Tabloid Midnight story on 2 August 1976

regarding ClA and Castro.

ab G.8 Washington Post story on 1 October 1976 concernii

lA consideration of possibly interviewi

Lee Harvey Oswald in 1960.

79. 50410/9024

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## Page 174

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COME CENTAL

-----

10 tae 1973

• =

MENO36*OUA FOR: Director of Central Intelligani

VIA

FROM

: Deputy Director of Central intelligence

:

Join M. Waller

Inspactor General

SUBJECT

: Jack Anderson 6 l'ay 1977 Column Entitled

"Odd ClA Activity in Dallas in 1953"

REFERENCE

: OLC Marorandum

for Director of Contral

Intelligence - CLC 77-1816 (attached)

1. Action Reguested: lone, for inforcation only.

2. Background:

The attacied Jack Anderson colla

is a

mixture of

fact and error.

It least portions of it sae

to have been leaked by someone connected with che House Selart

Committee on Assassinations.

3.

Factual information on matiers coverad in the article

follo:is:

Organization.

Alpha 65 was an anti-Castro Cuban Exila

Antonio l'eciara was one of its

Veciana contacted the Agency on three

occasions for assistance in an assassination plot

against Castro (December 1950; July 1952 and April

On each occasion ha was turred dain.

Agency had no responsibility for or sponsorsirip of

b. Veciana was registernd in tir: Inter-Service

Pagistry dj the u.s.

Amy for the pariod Roverber

1962 to July 1965 at rärich time ha ros termirated

tithout grejudice.

Veciana reportedly collaborated miti: a Cuba:

Government Intelligence Officer, willerma fuiz, in

connection witi: Alpha 55 activities.

puiz is narrier

cousin vi leciana.

E?, 100

"!..

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## Page 175

$4-00000

Consociate:

andersen ettunts to corrier cale 195.:5

Discop with ClA in Dallas; neuspapers in Di'ies

haye tried to

identify Bishop wita our DCD regie-

sentative in Dallas, Mr. J. Haltor loure.

cording to cur recores, no agency dificers sier

used the name of liarris Biscop as en alias.

one named Horris Bishop lias ever ercloyed by the

The FBl identified the three cen sino

visited lirs. Odio.

Lee Harvey Os.ald was not

one of them.

The Warren Commission Was satis-

fied that Osrald could not have been in Dallas

at the time of the visit.

Attachtent

-1

Distribution:

- Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence v/act.

- Assistant to the Cirector (Public Rifairs)matt.

1 - Office of Legislative Couisal M/ait.

- Office of General Counsel matt

- Executive Registry w/ati

1 - IG Subject yatt.

16 Ct-rono "/att.

1 - J.L. Leader Chrono watt..

01C/S.L. Leader:aal

2

---

## Page 176

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TI FASHINGTONTOS?

Lach Anderson dad Les Willea

Ddd CIA Activity in Dallas la 1963

sinators Contiton contain regorg ol

C-mible vilatisis tava contirged

ou: fait recorts that sho accuard assas.

sia, Lice Larvey Csualit, was in tolica

mita ani casiro Cucans la Dailaz Ono

Oswiid mas sien leavind tan Dalias ol.

lice al dipoa il" This

"vas a Casan

contadio group trainel by ice Cil

A CuoRa CiA operative, iniuraio va

cizaz

hat been summonid lù Driias is Ait

gus: :si3, dy his Cad conuiti ayse

Tious san Tho =2ul by laa ¿ana ol

¿loris Sisaaa Sialis a coni:deucial

sumIary.

•¿isea Maiana artinse.

засо 81 гостіті ву зідет

Eanla10r9y6i3

Arolber micas who ingrated sho

larestigators, Syivia Olio, soid 85em

reat swo anlicaro cuhare had ial.o

ducad ber l0 sa ¿nerican!, y i: namo

of LeOn Gwaid Sae M.2s 10H1 14a8 Di

tail was tin!

•in convinco and

Castro Cubar groups. so lud inest

dent Kenc-dy.

A:ee tha crilo:nz

2on ste serapiral chis Aniericad as

die farey Oswaid

Te rose larssiizaion don't raiily

belare tal le Cal bai uny pail la

le quidee of

Presiúme8 Kanaaly.

Here isely, sey suspact ine Caa riay

maz con 03 sità Crail in Dalas

istirna for

etasgie, inid al a sirande cai h? set

enda

ildeDt

B1st,0)1

wifs:

ralei:

This sii anl:

sild our ci

c.nmi

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phoro

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and si

The

Fin?

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Che 21

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ba

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Hould to:s

C.

siis

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lia de casie is

wail

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Os

fie navy in cinzare

tja Sorie!

ha:3y.

Fring

carain

kol 207. Toe tüi adeniel dei tess?

Ce+6233

waitesovet

saleciude

dd thal:59're

ayed

sedures

soprar

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11.28.

Yet

the F3l

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cirector J. Eaza

T=s.

¿mias? in

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"is

bis resi retariaia

---

## Page 177

14-00000

Antones.

iveccaria..

$ 11:11T

21:1?

14/100/021-18

MEMORADUM FOR: Deputy Director for lperaiions

FRU:1

: Raynons .?.

Chief, Laiin America Division

SUBJECTS

Jack inderson 20 January 197? Column

Titled "ClA Tied to False Oswald Sior!'"

B. Identification of the Mr. " in the

Anderson Column

1.

The attached column, citing the testimony of a sir. Y

alleges that a cla

agent tried to lini Oswald to

intelif.

gence officers in lexico.

There is, of course, no

the

coluen's allegations. The

colus: identifies the source as

Mr. & because of

attcauts or his liie,

subsequentl) gires

enough infornation

on ir. " to establish his idchilly.

2.

According to the inderson coluan, Ar. X has first ret

by his ClA contact in Havana before relations with U.S./Cuha sere

severed.

Mr. & had helped to organise bank accountants to ci-

bezzle Cuban government funds to

finance anti-castro causes.

¡r. I was reportedly recruiied hy a dorris Bishop (Cli contace),

to plan an artompi on Casero's life.

The plan sas to fire :

bazooka

from

a nearby apartnent building while Castro sas deliver-

ing onc

of his narathon spceches.

Iccording to the duerso:

colunn,

the plut sis discovered by Castro's police and dr.

escaped

to fliami.

•Ir. l also reportedly tried to assassinate

Castro in Chile in 1971 in league with the Venezuclan Luis Fessi

LATTIleS

sho is nos heing detained in Caracas for the 6 Percue:

cuhana airline noilbing.

The Anderson column ends dich the cepo!:

that Ar.

Yaolled for ClA until 10s for expenses, but was trid

$253,000 in caste by Morris Bishop sion he

was torninated.

SENSITIVE INTELLIGESCE SOUNCES AND METIONS INVOLUTI

•SECRET

E2 LAPUET

CL BY

025231

11. 42:1

5-

i.. 'it' consultant

9007: 902

---

## Page 178

1000000

3.

Fron the ahore description of air.

1, it is rcasonably

lear that i. 8 is Antonio Carlos VClAlA Blanch 6201-512906).

VECtail, an assistant bank manager and past president of a puilic

accountants association in lavana,

first contacied CIA in Harann

in leconher 100 when he asked the Cos, at thai tine James d. darl,

in an issassination plot against Castro:

ViClAM asked!

for visas for ten relatives of the four nen assignos to kill rastro,

and also requested four ll rifles with adapters for gronades plus

eight grenades.

The COS did not encourage VEClAri and subsequentl!

checked with an Embassy officer who reported that VECInA had mado

similar "wild-eyed" proposals to hin.

On 23 Hoverher 1901 the

ani news published i report of an unsuccessful attempt hr Antonio

VECIA.A tO

kill Castro. VECIANd reporiedly had arranged to

assassinate Castro and Cuban President Osvaldo Vorticos on 5 October

in Havana, but

the bazooka he was using failed to fire.

4.

There has been no agency relationship with VECIANA...

POA, which was granted for his use

January 196г

1. October 1935 in Havana.

expired in November 196, Para-military affairs in

rECINNA las horn on

He was a nember of the People's Revo-

lutionary Movement,

an anti-Castro group in Cuba during 1960-01, and

was one of the founders of Alpha-66.

A certified public accountant

• by trade,

VECLAVA was with A.I.D. in La Paz in 1918-72.

was registered in ISK to the U.S. Aray in Norenber 1962 and he

vas terminated without prejudice in July 1966.

On 23 July 1962

VECIANA was interviered, at his request, by Mr. larry Read tro

the DCD New York office.

VECIANA asied

Real to arrange a neeting

with a senior CIA officer to discuss Alpha-bo's plans to assassinate

Castro and to request ClA's assistance (U.S.$100,000; 10,000 Cuban

pesos; 48 hand

grenades).

There is no indication that this request

sas ever acted upon by CiA.

In April 1966 a lA Division officer, Joha B. Lucy, using

the alias John

Livingston,

net VICIArd in Nes Yorx City.

meeting was arranged by a retired naval officer, Janes Cogsiell,

who had inforned Chief, lill Division that he had information of valuc

concerning Cuid.

then lucy arrived in New York City for the meeting,

he was introduced by Cogswell to VEClAN..

He immediately launchea

a discussion of the Cuban political

situation

and noted his strong

fecling that the

only solution was the assassination of Castro.

Lucy advised Villain that he was

in no position io provide

his with

assistance or enouurage him in an assassination attempt and bas only

interested in gathering information which he thought was the purpose

of the meting.

VECIANA subscquently said that his roommate felix

LABAl, a Cuban relugoe, had excellent contacts in lavana.

clear to Lucy, however,

VECIANA was attenpting to use INBiLA poten-

tially to get

Agency financial support for his organization.

ESTERE

84еx-* tr.

---

## Page 179

14-00000

TECHAVA

suggested that 350, 000 would be needed so got his

•activities off the ground.

lucy indicated to Millid that he

nould look into the

SIPALA matter and rould

probably arrange for

ZABALA to be contacted in Puerto kico.

There 1s no indication in the file that any Agency officer

in contact witli VFClAYA ever used

There

no Moiris Bishop listed in

true lane in the DO toils.

an alias forris BishoP there was

is

never any contractual relationship rich lECIN and he was 101

paid CIA funds.

7. On li January 1977 a sanitisco copy of VECIAl's 201 file

nas made available to staffers fron the Senate Select Conmittce on

Intelligence.

sizard

Raymond A. Harren

Attachnent

DDO/C/LA/COG/OPS:WJDevine: js (9229) (21 January 1977)

• Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - ADDO.

3: 401-31/chrono

-hold

+ Litops

1- ASST. TEDGI

SHERE!

---

## Page 180

114-00000

THE WASHINGTON POST

89.1997

B15

Jack Anderson ard Les Whiten

Mystery Witness in JFK Inquiry

¡ A sysiery winess has guary io cor

acti-castro forses maigti

Mare

gressional inver:galers iha: a Cormal

Low Seccad; trita die. Thes the rab

Inieilizecce igeary 259at iucsuesd

acristi dil Kencriv

D'e souser ai led jesuragiy iba: Xaz.

him 20 Lee Harrey Osazid in Daias

saree scutes ceicre Corala guased

Ate maure oa tais," siates the ma

najy "oas leisatliied 5a2"

dosin Presidaa: Jona F. Kaurady..

mo, truid oi corse da lbe espaca.

con ibar aiter tue dissident tias

shat de had bera la Dajas la Juse,

¡The mists, then i? bire areed :

bilied, Gonait word ii caught er ar

1933, dur Casurd tanag day InOwl.

to ideady caiy as bir. Si acuse al a:-

la his lagny asterrained ite law

e129 01 le Xeready ascarsinalica

resaçts o: his le, is the lonacer ci a

e=lorcerea: autorices aud the pub.

Hotezer, se in'oraani told tha FBI.

Citas

testarist

L'e would ten blese l'e assissinadca

tuat he asked iiiog alier she scock.-

closely wind ite ClA

os ine Caren coreita ent and the coll

iaz wrether bot:

sown aDour itis

The group beid secret spetizzo at

for? sonei ortr broy souid te irre

aIsHICe oT Lad Irriy been guessice.

3195 Solaráale in Dallas betore : se 28

sisticia"

I don't do zay 8=25458" replied ilit.

sassicatos Mot long aller Kezzedy

Eut Footer abrupty blocked this

reer...

was suol, 1 Dallay depury säeril! 123

lise of rcury by retrieg ite ivar-

Bul te nost etate derecament.

tola by as ilorena: lat Osazid bad

bean associating tità some Cubars at

the al hid larated and identied

"3123 Errierdale"

Odio's oziers

them z3

Conzressical mistinalers questored

dr. I's dramate testimony

Lora? Hail, Lawrence

Howard and

the mystery nices riaseiy of ibiet

rew light on ta sore Syira Caia.

Miliam Seyssour.

all aati-Cistoites

separale occasioes They

tiaty cog.

dauzale, of a mealiay cpponeat of Ca.

Esoter aver suggesied "al: Odio corid

cluded ant scintury is strengs

Dan

Presier Fidel Casera, ioid to lue

caüe coclused the anses "Loraa Mail

ered by lie delis to prorices coosist..

col.

Ino scels belome the ressata

eDs prith weil be si us teiere. Sigail.

killing, she relatad, ahe was risied ia

Now tae corg-siccal larestigaion

LES

Dalas ararmeld by larte cien

Lave unsorered er deace lai ail tarte

Cosaid si Rata z

who icenced Lemselves 23 tragila

denied

Mitag Le Cio acartaeat

• of ber laisas

zd tai the a3l bad obariod cheio

One was introduced io ber a3 Le00

desiais

Dejore r.00r?, wrair his letter

Oswaia" Tiben sie saur the piature la

totte

arren Coma

Ree sonypapers o! the tan

Tuto sad

ILe intpsag1

caTe ais ibrained

shot Xenceaz, she 'aattd irca scuot

the Lise 0f a 125

, con::

.satien

Il was ide same Ostiald, sbe 12s eur.

predicing tro

wre'ts in adr

ce sbal

tin, who sad visited hes sparsest

Aeagedy would be s308 "fic.a

за с.l.

Coscessional inTestaators

І Сідабо

reL П

taTe

ne"

now leariad sbat the

"ate J. E:3ar

the preuctas tes tade

by the

•Hoover deiderately misied ie Viar-

12: Josept jlitpe:

ren

Commission about Crio's ay'sizi

bie rouser, =so aiso sapperted

io Lave

ciose

ors visitora She das sucà a persuarze

jercera

wiit

a iii Castro

wissess chas the coremission stall was

precaring lo inutigata ber story

te costeration was laced on No

borouzly.

7. 1933, in Stiza; by a3 32l informan

Sia't embers even speculated, as

named Wille Sonercar tho rumed

cordiaz io one iniercai mezzo, thas de

the tapa over to the 13l the sext day.

witteer is beard on the sape describing

nedy's tülar.

"riben be san il 323 Osaald lat

killed Kensaty," le carestigaiors ro

porazd in a costiesaal 20=2, the

pezrly treastd chi, bas be never said.

25172і&

ne inveschibong ties la ;la dosm

¿li. X on boa be couid de sure 2528

man was Osta't ii. I repied, 2n

coading to le se

1522 de bad

learare "how so resa the charecier..

ios of a persos be bad tacel miosell

2o do itas And i : 220% Oraald, il.

mali, bis exact dossie

---

## Page 181

10 January 1977

MESDRASDUR FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM

Russell 3. fol

! Operations Gro

SUBJECT

trice there end train die.

(copy atrached)

in light of the inaccurate and misleading statements

attributed by K'erpster to Sprague, the following comments are

offered in rebuttal.

a. "The ClA withheld fros the FBI for alnost

tho months in leos iniomatich that Lee Faney Uswald

had talked with Cuban and soviet officiais apout his

desire to visit those countries

Cosment: Oswald's nane did not surface in lexico City until

I October 1963 when a hitherto unison male telephoned the

Soviet Enbassy.

During this telephone call, the caller identi-

fied hinself as "Lee Oshald."

Cr. S October 1963, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters the highlights of the

transcript of the conversation.

(1) On 1 October 1965, an Aperican male who

spoke broken Russian and said his nane has Lee

Oswald (phonetic), stated he was at the Soviet

Erbassy on 28 Septerber ween he spoke with a consul

whom he beliered to be l'aleriy Vladinirovich

Coseckov, Do andesed the Seviet guand hung new

regarding a telegram to nashington.

Obyedkor upon

checking said nothing had been received yet, but

the request had been sent.

(2) Mexico Station said it had photographs of

a male tho appeared to be an erican entering the

Soviet Erbassy at 1216 hours, leaving at 1222 on

His apparent age was 35, athletic

build, about six feet, receding hairline, balding

fore khakis and sport shirt.

---

## Page 182

14-00000

...

-- 2--

3) No local dissemination was being made !

he Station. INEXI 6÷53 (IN 36017), 8 October.

The above information has received in Headquarters on

? october; the following day headquarters incorporated this

infornation in an electrical dissemination to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, the Department or State,

the Nary, and the Inmigration and Naturalization Service.

(1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive

source in l'exico reported that an American male

who identified hinself as Lee Oswald, contacted the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the

Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram

which had been sent to Nashington. The American

was described as approcinately 35 years old, wizeding"

athletic build, about six feet tall, with a

hairline.

(2) It is believed that Oswald may be identical

to Leé Henry (sic) Oswald, bom on 18 October 1939

in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who

defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later

made arrangements through the United States Embassy

in Moscow to return to

the United States with his

Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaeina Pusakova (sic)

and their child.

(3) The information in paragraph (1) is being

disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject

This information is being

made available to the I migration and Naturalization

Service. (DIRECTOR 71673, 10 October 1963.]

Note: It should be pointed out that for some unknown reason

the Headquarters desk responsible

for making the dissenination

neglected to include the

infornation that Oswald had visited the

Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.)

It was not until 22 loverber 1963, when the Station initiated

a revier of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy

• an apr

---

## Page 183

14-00000

330MT

--3 --

that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Enbassy

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility

of the CLA and because the Agency had not received an official

request from those agencies having investigative responsibility

requesting the Agency to obtain further infornation, the Station

did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October 1963 for

a photograph of Oswald.

MEXI 6534 (IN 40357), 15 October 1963.]

On 25 October 1963, Headquarters sent a request to the Department

of the Navy for a photograph of Oswald.

(DIRECTOR 77978,

24 October 1963.]

It was not until 26 lovember 1963, however,

that the lavy Departnent apparently responded to this request by

sending directly to the Mexico City Station a photograph of Oswald.

In response to a question from the Warren Cornission, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 6 April 1963 stated that:

"The investigation of Oswald in 1965 prior to receipt

of the Central Intelligence Agency comunication

ated 10 october 1963 was directed toward the priman

bjective of ascertaining the nature of Oswald

sympathies for, and connection with, the FPOC (Fair

Play for Cuba Cormittee) or subrersive elements. The

Central Intelligence Agency caramication which

reported that

a man, tentatively identified as Oswald,

had inquired at the

Soviet Embassi concerning a

telegram which had been sent to lashington did not

specify the nature of the telegran.

This contact

with the Soviet Embassy interjected a new aspect into

the investigation and raised the obvious questions of

why he has in lexico and exactly what here his

relations with the Soviets.

However, the information

available was not such that any additional conclusions

could be drawn as to Oshald's symcathies,

intentions

or activities at that tine.

Thus, one of the objectives

of the continuing investigation was to ascertain the

nature of his relations with the Soviets considering

the possibility that he could have been recruited by

the Soviet Intelligence Services.

The Central

Intelligence Agency cormunication, dated 10 October 1963,

stated that any further information received concerning

Oswald would be furnished and that our liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City were being advised. On

---

## Page 184

1100000

--4--

in Mexico City at the time of his visit there."

Commussion Exhibit No. 833 (FBl Letter to J. Lee Rankin,

dated 6 April 1964) .]

b. "Chief Counsel Richard I. Sprague said that the

committee staff had learned that a Cli message ces-

cribing Oswald's activities in l'exico to federal

agencies such as the rol had been rewritten to elimi-

nate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet

visas.

The message was sent in Uctober, more than a month

before the November 22,1963 assassination."

Comment:

It is not CIA practice to disseminate raw information in

the form it is received from the field.

Field reports are received

in Headquarters where they are first reviewed by the action desk.

The information is then written in a form suitable for dissemination

to the

intelligence community,

including additional information,

if available,

from the Agency's central counterintelligence files

to make the report more meaningful to the recipient (5).

Upon learning that on 1 October 1963 an American identifying

himself as Lee Oswald had telephoned the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 the highlights of

Oswald's conversation with the Embassy.

time did not know that Oswald was lee Harvey Oswald and that he had

come to Mexico to apply for visas to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the

Station reported only that information obtained through telephone

tap operation against the Soviet Embassy.

On 10 October 1963, the day after it received the information

relating to lee Oswald and his contact with the Soviet Embassy,

Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemi-

nation to the community and included a brief summary of biographic

information obtained from central counterintelligence files on the

possible identity of Lee Ostrald. Since Headquarters had no indi-

cation tefore 22 Vovember that Oswald had gone to Mexico to apply

for Cuban and Soviet visas, there was no question of eliminating any

---

## Page 185

140000

and son

-- 5 --

mention of Oswald's request for such visas.

Be it To the tot aten 0 thou to that repeat reas

of those agencies.

As mentioned above, the action desk in Headquarters neglected,

for unknown reasons, to

include the fact that Oswald had visited

the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963. Had this information been

included it would have indicated to recipients of the report that

Oswald had more than a fleeting reason to be in contact with the

embassy; however, as already stated, the reason for the 28 September

contact and the

subject of the telegran to Washington were, at that

time, unknown.

c.

"The CIA's decision to withhold information

was reversed shortly atter Kennedy was killed."

in Headquarters on 24 November 1976, i.e.,

d. "Sprague told a press conference that it was

impossible without more intormation to know why the CIA

had censored its own message.

Onent: If Sprague needed nore information, why did he not ask

the Agency for an explanation, instead of making it appear to the

public that the Agency has been dishonest in its dealings with the

its destings win the

e. "But he said the incident raised two interesting

questions: what might the other agencies have done

litterently if they had been more fully informed, and

why did the ClA decide to remove

"intormation that was

considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial

draft of the message?" "

Comment:

s already mentioned, the Agency did not know initiall

hy Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in October 1963

CaST

.. to..

---

## Page 186

1080000

-*?*

-- 6--

a to see the aton eat onto eated theo

visited the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald's contacts with the thio

Soviet es on eye contion with his desire to travel to the

As to what "other agencies" might have done had they had more

information, attention is drawn to the FBl's comment in response

to the harren Cormission's question.

According to the FBI's

response, some investigation had been initiated on or about

By the 25th of October, FBI heasquarters had

informed its field office in New Orleans "that another Agency had

determined that Lee Oswald was in contact with the Sosiet Embassy

in Mexico City in the early part of October 1963."

The lew Orleans

field office in turn informed the Dallas office which had juris-

diction over Oswald's place of residence. (For further detail, see

There was, however, no request, official or

otherwise, from any of the responsible departments

and agencies in

Washington for further details as to Oswald's presence in Mexico

and his reasons for contacting the Soviet Embassy.

f.

"The committee said its staff investigators

nad recently questioned a former CIA agent who has

personal knowledge of Oswald's visits to the Seriet

and Cuban embassies in Vexico.

As a result of era:

interview,

the report said, staff members were seat to

Mexico, where they found and questioned additzoral

witnesses.

Coument: Sprague's characterization "a former CIA agent" is probably

in reference to David Phillips.

The latter's "revelations" to staff

investigators (and also to Ronald Kessler) were unfortunate to say

the least, in that they were inaccurate, so far as we ignow. There

is no indication in the Oswald files that Oswald wanted to make a

deal with the Soviets in retumn for a free trip to the UsSR.

"additional witnesses"' in Mexico, it is believed, are soris Tarasov

and his wife, both of whom had been under contract with the Agency

We have not been inforned, officially or otherwise, by

Sprague what Phillips and the Tarasovs told the staff investigators.

""These witnesses had never been sought cut

before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the

fact that they had important intormation concernizz

Statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in exico within co

Lays of the assassination of President kennedy,

report said."

---

## Page 187

800000

--7--

If "these witnesses"' include people other than the Tarasovs

•It would be impossible, at this tine, to make an appropriate comment.

The fact remains, however, that if Sprague had obtained additional

details, he should hold such infomation and noi make it public

until the Agency has had a chance to review it and comment.

Ugarte who, on 36 lovember 1963, came to the U.S.

claimed he had been in the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later

recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill

an important person in the United States. After thorough investi-

about (wald.

i Sitalwer

Russell B. Holmes

Attachment

•Ці ЛАКТ

---

## Page 188

14-00000

GIA Withheld

Data on Oswald

¿Assassinations Panel-s

Issues Report to House

BYSORN RESPSTER

VASTENGION -TrE "CLA'

¡held:iros.

. the FBI for almost

montes in 1953 icformation that

Harray Criraid. had tlied wilh

and Sarial officials about his

visit Lose counties,

com

ze recorted Friday.

dia.

Co:

on

ois

ated in a report to tue

Investiga

•! President Joha F.

HOWd

¡cous ezzly in

1977

Oswas

had

Trade. 10

•Mexico

Darciser, 1953: ir:

PE890/991054

said

Chie Course Pite set 32e

that the commilice

sta'f

¿at a CLA message describ-

a'd's activities in

Merica

10

Sancies such. as the F3I had

en to elimi

west for Cubani and So-

Tre ressage was sent in

Lore than

a month belore

1. 22, 1953, assassination,

Ch discovered Orraid's

e surveillance of those fa:

ies.

Baceure Oswald had coce delected co

Soviet Union, tire CLA ard 55l

Been ingrested in his aslirtes

2s cia doison to Mod La

said las kiled. The agency re-

ported Ostrald's elo.is to risit Caba

¿and le Sorial Union both to ¿e rBl

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

1 January 1977

§ District of Coiter

"coastestond dele

and to lte Warren Commissa1, Tilten cai gote ard the chamane! ee Rene sebcom-

cluded the: Orald tras tee assassia zed

mitted said thair dce aca sad seen made

nad acted 2'3n2.

on accepting Ray's cler."

Sprague told a press conference thit it Morever Serene indicaled Calil pro.-

tas iraprisine inlaout moe intermation

zoly rould be accepied.

o knoir mby the CLa hat consored jii Oisn

"Any and all seeple tria hare :alever.!

Dessage.

information will be intersegaied." Sprague

Dut he said she incident raised no inter-

'said

siing. questions what might the miser

• In a personal statement issued in cos-

igencies bare done caterenty l thay cad

juncton with the report, Rep. Feary'&

seen sacre fully inforned and why sid the

SlA decide to remove "internalior. that - ruties crurmen in the new year, salu &

as considad pertinent enough to begut.

in an incal dait of the resige?""

Se a dressages afaesse3SS5 9 5

¡smera adiads al pressiaz gies-

:. There were no firer cordius. ori

L.e

"Gonales said that the commited nope.

repeat, whica the 12-renter connitice

prepared alter the first

• to dissaver tinether fomen FE: Entele: 3.

hrze meaths of its

Edga- Ricarer's now wellest oin

intestigaton into the murc

i Kennedy

ty toward King had aliecied Me ael's i

•and cirt righs

leader. Di

in lucier

ranigalond die assassir.alion.

King.n

i..ara: Horaser, Gonz

Les said, lie commillse's

Techicag," the co

353 cut of: work could so well heyand the wings ci

business Tuesday with

and o: the sesa

Kenredy and Ki3. 1a

sion of Cagrass in

The purpose of the

forecas

•"The commitee can' shed ligrt on 1.

tras to

langer issue of palilical

master and Yi.

urge the new.

Cong

olish the ; olesce,

" Gonzalez said.

"'fe should ra'

forget that President Foid had his

TOME AC

Lhe

Fut year of whai ci

india atro-

rarow escapes; no meraber o! the licuis

inTesiTalian

•"!!

"*!

"sel: i that the

the

Lee months si

Cablish-

Cal 306320s

'or eat:'

?. He sad the committee's wilmate last

ice

llee has

17.0

and pie-

•Fas "io find cuit not jusi

ed Jezds in .

assassina-

¡but sty."

eport said

compose sad its sia:

recends

it aistres

121

CIA

nal kaow.

dge"". cl

out beiare by 2ag intest?

Twitts 2a ding the fac: tr.at

rant laic:

isa Cance:

Ise Harger Corald in i

da55 ci lee assassination o!"

nedy,

""Le resert said

The reperi said also thi

stat had

ed t

mita d

Earl Ray

that Ray had laid

assctiale in al

•structices. The sto

• porters of a cer

meekg 230. 223 calbeen ve

In alte. to Nen to:

•Antboy lenis, Ray d'i

testly late: oath at a coi

But Sprague ard Walker E.

---

## Page 189

14.00000

:

7853

11711:

MERORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

: President Kennedy Assassination - Hirs. Luce Story

Action Required: None; for information only.

2.

Background: In 1975, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce telephonically

informed Director William Colby

of support she had rendered to certain

Cubans who were conducting their own

independent operations against

the Castro Government in 1961 and 1952.

rs. Luce stated. that she and

Mr. William Pawley, an American financier long associated with the

Dominican Republic, halped finance a rotorboat for three Cubans.

The

three Cubans, concurrently, were members of a CIA supported Cuban

exile organization.

After the 1962 missile crisis,

all resistance

groups against Castro were ordered to cease operations.

At this time,

Mrs. Luce and Mr. Pawley also ceased their financial support.

In

1963, very shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy,

the

Cuban captain of the motorboat, which rs. Luce helped to subsidize,

phoned Mrs. Luce to inforn her that "Aswald was a hired gun".

She,

in

turn, informed him to tell all to the FBI.

At the terest of Director

colby, Mrs. Luce passed the story on so Senator Richard Schreiker,.

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report.

A version of the information was given to columnist Betty

Beale and was published in the Washington Star on 16 Movember 1975

(attached)

A staff member of the Senate Select Committee, on 10

December 1975, inquired as to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was that it had nothing

to add to the news-

paper story and that since

this query

involved U.S. resident Cuban

refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

---

## Page 190

14-00000

The transcripts vere received by CIA's Inspector Gerieral

on 22 December 1976 from fir. Colby's secretary.

At the suggestion

'e do not Yner whether the FBI passad this

This story is summarized here for your backgrourd in th

vent that it should be replayed by the press as a result of release

which may be made by the house Assassination Subcomnittee. While it is

not a new story, the actual CIA transcript of Mrs. Luce's conversation

with fir. Colby could be considered newsworthy and could be presentec

in a manner detrimental to CIA.

jacente

Attachment: a/s

CC: Asst. for Public Affairs w/att

Mr. H. Hetu

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att.

! - DOCI w/att.

! - Asst. for PA/Mr. Hetu w/att.

1 - ER w/att.

•T - I6 Subject (Task Force) w/att.

i = J.L cheater Chrono w/o att.

01G/J.L. Leader:aal

2

---

## Page 191

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Clare Boothe Luce Weav!

a Fascinating Tale

One day in the latter part of ord ser else, Rope.

ived a call from Sen. Richard Schweiner,

Betty Bcale

airman o! the subcommitee investgating the War-

1 Co=mission Raport. He wanied her to persuade

me Crozas she had trovn

- Cubans who had krown :

a harvey Cowaid — io testily before his committee.!

5. Luce's cliores to locate tne Cubans led to a sama i

lai bloodcurdling warning. But let her tell the siory

sm the begirrinz.

•The

year

15

1951, a sear of great American

sre degan her naration to receni diner:

la friendaried so a ley eno was brought in

10a 2a0 Pito was Truman's amcassador to Peru and

azill got to kaow Bill very well in india and Chira

here he had built un a volunary outit called tra

lying Tigers. Bill was also called in by the ClA to re

wii Cubans ic- the Bay of Pigs operation. Aliermaids

14S 3 123 U0DY TaRTa

•One day he called

me up and said, 'How wouid you

se to get in on te Cuban Firing Tiger coeration?' He

ad in mind a fleet of motercoais subsidized by Ameri

ans and manned by Cubars who had teen in the Bay

"Pigs operation —all these young kids who had been

rarded alter the Day of Pigs.

"I said,

•Final So i reined to firasce a mosarcoal

he three lads no marred mira came up to see me

averal times. They would leave the coast of Fiorida

nd land in Cuba and come out wish information. The

dorrcation they came out with was remarkably accy.

zie - trai le Russians were building missie sites ia

uba. I was iold that the iniormation was eventually

ed to Sez. Ken Kealing and fas passed on io te

Tnite He's?. You remember what an impression it

nade and ton accura:e it was.

•THEN CHILE THE MISSILE shodorn. Soon after

he showdown I got a telephone call from Allen Dulles!

gying the Nautrality Act had been invoked ard all

Imericars musi cease and desist in any further elics i

utards the liberaiion of Cuba. Oi course, wa desis!-

Tro yaars laver she and her husbacd Harry (Henry)

see were sitirg in their de York apartment lisien-

ag to the televisad reposes of President Kearedy's i

•isassination

when around midaight she raceived a

• phone call from New Orlegas. "It fias she caplain o.

my moio dost " said Cia:s. "A younz men not more!

• than 25, a young student lazyer. He said.

• 'Mirs. Luce. I

want to tell you about Oswaid."

"He said that immediately afer thé 1351 missile

showdorin. FBi men hed come in lirami and told the

Cubans to break up all resissance groups and disperse.

He and the other 120 members of his crew had moved

to New Oilezas where ley stariad arodier

"Free

Cuba"

3roup. They had been there a jear and a hall

when who made contact with cera but Oswald

"The Cabars all thought he was a look. Oswald

bragged abou: having been in Russia and said he was

an ex-Marine. He said he could shout aaybudy and he

would be happy lo shoci Casao. He had no monay, ha

was living with his wiie in few Orlegas and i: loaked

a he was presenting himselt as a fared gua. Thes

didn't lise the cut of his jig so they curres him cit. By

they followed him and lound he was in a Fair Play for

Cuba Communist cell to those members he las giv

ng the same lice

"And I remember this from the terzationa conversa.

cion - Ostald was telling the call thai re could shout

anyone, inclading the s

Mary di the davy. The Fres

Cubans continued in fail aim

and lound that suddenly

he had money, and he siared going to Mexico Cily. He

made several irips. They co

it their penetratien

of the Cuban Communis: cell.

He said they mace tape

recordings si same of Oinald's meetings and they had

taken photographs of him disirioning handbills for ire

Fair Play

unit.

The next thing they knew Presicert

Kerredy was shot.

"THE YOUNG CUBAN WHO calize ma." continued!

former Ambassador lice,

"said Leat there was a!

Cuban Communis: assassination least working some.

where — in Dallas, Na:. Orleans or wherever I don't!

remember, and Lia! Cairald was their hired guz. Os-i

wald, he suif, had tried to ropor lie Camars: plaas;

do the FBI soma dime tiere tra sisassina:ion. But te-

cause ha as out for the dough ikay didn't believe hit.

continued:

---

## Page 192

14-00000

I ropese shai the FBl must hear from a thousand

cractinois a week.

in any evest, on the telephone my gouaz friend told

me that they had these taee recordings o! Oiraid and

phone-apis and what should they do? I said.

Go to

the rEl and tell them everphing you know. Thai rave

ing been said l pui the whole thing oui ci my mind.

Comes ine Warren Commission and says Cavaid aigre

sas rescorsibie and I ic-got ina whole maiter.

*Then, in 1957,

a feiow named Jim Garrison, dis-

trict arorrey in Naw Orlears, hi: the headlines charg

ing that the assassination was a conspiracy, ni t'at

momar! I was reminded of the information I had re

ceived and i began ta wonder wheiher or roi the

Waiter Commission had goi all the faces. I couldai

remenüar the rames of the Cubars cui l linaty locat-

ed one crewman tiho was living in Miami agair. and I

essed aim what happened after he went to the F3l.

"He said, 'We lumad over copies of everything. We

were then told.8o keep our traps shu! anu inar wie

"souls da deposted it se said anyaring publicly, He

said one of the crei sas daporied to Guatemala, and

one was murdered - stabbed in front of a store.

"TIR INFORMATION, HE SAID, rever appear-

ed in the Warren Commission report. He said, 'I am

married rair, I live in diami and i don't want to get

involied in i: ever again."

• Fien Sen. Schwerier made his raquasi of Clare

Luce less Lhan three weeks ago, she telephoned acoih-

er Cuben friend to see it he could locate and persuade

the young man to lestily behird closed doors. Replied

the oiser Cuban, ii the jestimony was behird 13 closed

dosis it wouid still become public.

"Americars tnick thay are playing games." he told

her.

"They don't know they are involved in a lue or

deain business. No. I son'i tell you where he can be

lourd. The people working for a free Cuba would lose

their lives. A lot of liem

have already.

They are act

interested in making FOu

You this

rical headlines ior pouriciars.

• the Bay ol Pigs, Lie Fol

missiles.

the

assassination of che presidant was the end of the story?

I toll

jo' is is just lie begining. What you Americans

don't understand is. there are trained Communis: it-

ro.5s, assassination, kidrapping, combing and sato

tage teams all over the country and tie word.".

Clare Boothe Luce

"A year of great American trauma"

The very day eiter mat conversation, observedi

Clare gravely, bombs went oll at lie Stale Depart.

mani here, ai the U.S.-U.N. mission and four baaks ia:

New York and at tree places in Chieago, And ciose is;

the same hour she was recounting the marie fascinari

ing

sicay so her quesis.

Caban, 2a1-Comrunisi

leader was expicded into bits in his car in ani.

---

## Page 193

14-80000

UNCLASSIFIED

IMIEKYAL

USE ONLY

1 UTING AND RECORD ST.. I

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (0p.-0001)

FROM,

Inspector General

2 E 24 Has.

bino fion dongroica, roads number, and

T. OLE

ATTN: Lyle Miller

2.

EXTENSION

6565

R-1252

DATE

ASCENZO ROAMALDO

d.

3.

Director of Security

NO

SATE

6 January 1977

corner so olen at seam i or common,

SUBUECT: Attached Transcripts

The OLC and the IG concur that

the attached transcripts should

be provided to the FBI. A blind

memo is also attached.

It is requested that the O/S

pass the package to the FBI.

1D. Buchani

John H. Waller

7.

..

10.

11.

12.

19.

8d.

Less.

The Gifice

seeing sint

enter ere eit

Ite.

bye: 1-58-840

05-7:040

FORM

1-42

610 annous 1 SECRET

• CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 194

14.p0000

6 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Transcripts of October 1975 Telephone Conversations

Between Director Colby, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce and

Mr. Justin McCarthy

1. Attached herewith are transcripts of tiro telephone conversations

between Director Hilliam Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, and one betazen

Birector William Colby and Mr. Justin McCarthy. The conversations took

place in October 1975 and discuss Mrs. Luce's concern that certain infor-

mation, from a former boat captain, a Cuban refugee, regarding the Presi-

dent Kennedy

assassination, reached the proper authorities.

while the

infornation

in these transcripts have been provided to investigating

authorities, they may be of some assistance to the House Select Committee

on Assassinations as it investigates various allegations.

2.

The transcripts were received by the Agency Inspector General on

22 December 1976.

The transcript of the 25 October 1975 conversation was

typed by Ms. Barbara Pindar on the same day.

The other two transcripts

were typed by Ms. Pindar on 21 December 1976 from her stenographic records

unile clearing out the remainder of Director Colby's files. Ms. Pindar

was Mr. Colby's secretary during his Directorship.

3. A version of the telephone conversation transcript was published

in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached).

A staff member of

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 10 December 1975, inquired

The Agency oral response mas

that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this

query involved U.S. resident Cuban refugees, the FBI would be the proper

---

## Page 195

1400000

the attention of ched or schwepter add ate that an utter or i bestion.

Telephone conversation between Director Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce

on 25 October 1975, pages 2 and 3).

Attachments: a/s

•

2

CONFiCENTAL

---