ESTIMATE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS STATUS
Originator: CIA
Document date: 02/09/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AMWORLD Meeting in Baltimore, 9 February 1964

SUBJECT: Estimate of Operational Readiness Status

1.

Based upon discussions with AMJAVA-4 on 9 February 1964,

I estimate AMWORLD at approximately three months away from being

ready to conduct operations against the target area.

This

estimate is based upon the description of the project by AMJAVA-4,

including personnel

assets, level of organization, state of

training, condition and location of equipment, transportation,

communications, logistics, construction of housing and training

facilities, leadership and technical personnel available, and

relations with host governments in Central America.

My own

experience in 1960 in establishing and managing similar personnel

and physical facilities, for what was planned, initially at least,

as a quite similar program in the same area, has also been con-

sidered in the above estimate. A brief discussion in each subject

matter field follows.

a .

Personnel assets. A cadre group is in Costa Rica

and in Nicaragua at present. They appear tobe sufficient

to proceed with the development offacilities, but in Nicaragua

at least, a period of construction and organization is

necessary before more people should be recruited and shipped

to the camps.

A-4 feels the situation in Costa Rica is

probably about the same.

o. Level of organizatior

The leadership and managerial

assets now on board in the

pilgram are spread very thin.

time for testing and training, fitting people and organiza-

tion together is required. A program such as this one cannot

risk having the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong

time.

C .

State of training. This varies from a few thoroughly

trained,

experienced, and

capable men

(to my personal

knowledge) down through the degrees to completely inex-

perienced recruits.

Various levels of training, from basic

training,

up to refresher training for experienced

men must

be accomplished before competent, functional

teams

and

units

are developed.

After that point, more operational training

for specific missions must be done before teams or units can

be committed.

I would strongly recommend that no operation

be launched

until the operational plan and all

elements

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committed to the operation have been thoroughly and

successfully tested by rehearsal exercises run under

simulated,

but as realistic as possible, conditions

approximating those of the target area.

A-4's des-

cription pointed up too many flaws in the program at this

time, which could prove fatal to any operation attempted

in the near future.

d. Equipment.

Still in the process of being em-

placed where needed, and procurement or training of

personnel for operation and maintenance of equipment

is still in progress.

They are not yet able to handle

breakdowns and mechanical failures without interruption

of support to operations.

Transportation. The most glaring and fatal defect

both operations and support at the present time. Until

the AKL and its crew are operating smoothly and effi-

ciently under

all conditions,

the operation cannot be

certain of proper support.

All operations, plus logistics

support,

are dependent upon this ship.

It is not yet

operating

at the minimum level of efficiency to support

combat type operations.

There are three bases on the coast of Nicaragua,

plus one on

the coast of Costa Rica, and one in the

interior.

Of the four coastal bases, two cannot dock the

AKL,.

including

the

ordnance reception and storage base

in Costa Rica, and the operational Headquarters base at

Monkey Point in Nicaragua.

the five bases, only two

the ore transport aircraft (C-47)

singly necessary as the

program expands and becomes more active. At present, the

entire Nicaraguan portion is dependent upon the loan of a

light aircraft from the host government.

One Cesna-180

With no highways and railraods

connecting the scattered bases, airstrips and aircraft are

going to be required to support and control the various

phases of the program, particularly in times of foul

weather and heavy

seas.

Communications.

A-4 describes communications as

still being developed, both as to equipment, operators

and maintenance.

He is a thoroughly trained,

tested and

competent communicator himself, and I would tend to trust

his judgment.

He is not yet satisfied with his communica-

tions system.

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g.

Logistics. Supplies are still being procured,

received, stored, and processed.

The system

is still

in

the developmental stage, as to personnel and

facilities.

Construction of housing

and training

facilities.

Still in progress, limited to the extent indicated above

sy shortcomings in personnel, organization and other

¡actors indicated in discussions of other related topics.

i.

Leadership and technical

personnel available.

This is

the

heart of any program, but particularly a

paramilitary operation.

There is presently a shortage

of both_ types.

The prevailing philosophy within AMWORLD

present leadership is to screen thoroughly the candidates,

with selection based primarily upon personal commitment

of the candidate on an individual basis to complete support

of AMBIDDY-1 and his organization.

This negates the

possibility of going outside into

the various pools of

personnel and bidding for the services of already competent!

leaders and technicians.

Leadership and organization must

evolve

and grow from within,

and technicians must be

trained within the organization which results.

This takes

time, and there will be many fumbles and falls as they

learn to crawl, then toddle, then to walk, and finally

to run. For what its's worth, I agree with them. This

is on the basis of trying before to marry up basically

discordant elements of Indonesians, Cubans, and Vietnamese

into teams which theoretically contained the leadership

and technical qualities required for good operations.

We

found, in too many cases, the

personality clashes that

resulted were so counter-prodactive as to make us wonder

if we would have done better to stick to compatible group.

of people and try to develop

he required qualities fron

among them.

I certainly believe its worth a try, assuming

we can afford the time and money required, and the patience,

to give it a fair try.

Relations with host government.

A-4 hinted at

some of the problems, but I do not claim to be familiar

enough with

Central American politics to make a meaningful

discussion. As I understand it, Costa Rica is a liberal

mainly on the strength of AMBIDDY-l's personal magnetism

However, unfavorable publicity would

serious came men the surine de to a te present

regime, which

would

have to react defensively by throwing

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then out. Just the opposite case exists next door in

Nicaragua, which is more of a police state,

and where

the main danger seems to be that the Somozas might at

time support the program so vigorously that they end

up by takine de facto control of it,

In each case,

AMWORLD must

try to operate half

a program

in each

country,

not letting the other know the extent of his neighbors

activity, and carefully balancing off one against the

other so

that each feels he is the favored

suitor.

This

is a

ticklish business,

and the technique has not

yet

been perfected, apparently.

the above discussion should be taken as fault-

finding or destructive criticism.. In fact, I feel that,

the circumstances, they have done extremely well. I found no

real surprises in any of the points we covered during the 9 Feb 164

meeting, and actually felt that the description given by A-4 put

the program about where I would have expected it to be.

They arje

fortunate to have A-4 and a few others who went through similar i

problems with me in 1960. Hopefully, they may have learned

something from my mistakes.

3. To get back to the subject issue, as I see it AWORLd

cạn do either of

things,..

out not both.

They can continue

with what appears to me to be a generally sound approach to

divert the attention and effort necessary to prepare and mount

•-

out one or moresmall, simple, quick in and out operations such

as

low risk sabotage, abduction or

assassination, release and

exfiltration of prisoners,..

small

Thid, or other harassment

measures, within a period

or appro

timately three months.

4. On theother hand, the limited AMWORLD managerial

capability and existing assets can be focused entirely upon

mounting out an operation

this could be done in about one

month.

In my estimation, the other problem areas described

above would likely be neglected during that period, with

resulting detriment to orderly growth and development of the

project.

I believe that the chances for success under the

first option above would be measureably greater, a solid founda-

tion for the entire program could be laid down, and the payoff

in the long run much more:

However, it must be pointed

out

that AMWORLD will have to

have successful operations before the

people and support they

wilfrequire are forthcoming in sufficient

numbers to perform their ultimate mission.

So we find ourselves

caught somewhat in a vicious circle, bound round by a chain of

circumstances and factors that are required for successful

paramilitary operations.

I would prefer to weld tightly

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together each of the links in the chain before committing

it to do the job expected

of it.

1e.

Carl E. Jenkins

File:

Program

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