## Page 1

Date

Page : :

09/24/98:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: PFIAB

:: 206-10001-10001

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB

FROM

TO

TITLE : MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY BOARD ON SEPTEMBER 12-13, 1963

DATE: 09/12/63

PAGES: 33

SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF SEPTEMBER" 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: 1B, .1C

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

: 09/06/90 08/01/2024

COMMENTS

025 Release under the President John F.

Sennedy Assassination Records Collection Act ol

1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10001

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY BOARD : On SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

206 (t0o/1 00o)

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ITEM

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

TIME

SUBJECT

9:00 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 12:15

12:15 - 1:00

1:00 - 1:45

-6.

1:45 - 2:45

2:45 - 3:15

3:15 - 4:15

4:15 - 4:45

Septeniber 12, 1963

The

Chairman's Mme

Administrative Announcements

Counterintelligence and Counterespionage:

Dunlap espionage case at NSA

Defection to USSR of former NSA em-

ployee Hamilton

Damage to U.S. classified Informatior:

and intelligence

techniques resulting

from recent Soviet espionage operations

In West Germany, Sweden and the U.K.

COMSEC develonments Involving USSR

Alsop article on CIA and Defense

Intelligence capabilities for detecting

violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty

Photo reconnaissance satellite developments

Highlights of intelligence community reports

to White House in response to earlier Board

recommendations

Report of Clifford Panel

Intelligence Community Capabilities for Detecting

violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Doyle Northrup,

Technical Director,

A1r force Technical Application Center

Executive Session

Lunch - The White House Mess

Discussions with Director, National Scourity

General Gordon Blake, USAP

Counterintelligence Programs of CIA

Mr.--James Anges ton, DiA

Nayaise el

Executive Session

status Report on the Organization and Programs

the National Reconnaissance Office

Brockway MacMillan, Director,. NRO

Review of SIGINT and Related Intelligence

Activities In Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the U.K.

Dr. Baker

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ITEM

10:

TIME

4:45 - 5:45

11.

12.

5:45 - 6:00

6:00 - 6:15

13.

14.

9:00 - 9:30

9:30 - 10:15

15.

10:15 - 12:15

16.

17.

12:15 - 1:00

1:00 - 1:30

19.

* 19.

1:30 - 2:00

2:00 - 6:00

SUBJECT

Consideration of Revised SIGINT Report of

Board's Communications Panel

Dr. Baker

Status Report on Covert Action Operations

Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel

Status Report on State Departnent Intelli-

gence Activitie:

Murphy Pane:

September 13, 1963

The Chairman's Time

Covert Action and Inteligence Operations

Kelating to Cuba

Mr. Desinond fitzgerald, CiA

Discussion with the Director of Central

Intelligence

Mr. John McCone

Lunch - The White House Mess

DIscussion with the President's Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs

Mr. MeGeorge Bundy

Executive Session

Preparation of Draft Report to be Subnitted to

the President at a Later Date, rollowing Appro-

priate Review. and Coordination with the Board

Members.

* not taken up it

Board Inty!

2

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-TER SEC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 19, 1963

MEMORAMDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

lecting

of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

September 12: - 13,

1963.

At 9:00

a.m., September: 12, 1963; the Buard began a two day meeting e:

in the: Board's offices,

Executive. Office Bullding.: Present wete Board

members Clifford, Pace, Doolittle, Baker, Langér, Murphy land Grays and

/also present were Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

• In executive

session, Chaliman Cilfford recalled that at the lasti

meeting the Board discussed ways and means of increasing its effectiveness,

and it had been agrced that ample time would be allotted for the discussion

Of

subjects. covered

throughout Board meetings. At this morning's session"

tuo hours lad been set aside, the Chalrman announced, for discussion of the

varlous subject matters referred to in the flist item on the agenda.

Turning to

some administrative matters, in: Clue made reference to

Mr. Coyne's August 5 memorandum regarding a ¡equest male to the spectal

Counsel to

the President for guidance to oard menbers in complying with

newly-revised Federal legislation governing conflicts of interest and

revised

regulations calling for the submission of

statements of.flnanctal

Interest (Board mempers having already submitted the latter

soine

time ago

in compliance with the previous law and Presidential Instructions). The

Chairman asked Mr. Ash to.

summalize the menörandum just received by Mr. Coyne

from Assistant Special Counsel White under date of September 10, 1963;

suggesting the procedure which should now be followed under the new law.

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The Board meeting was jolned at this point by

Raymond G. Rocca (substituting for Mr. James Angleton of CIA)

for a briefing of Board members on CIA's counterintelligence

program.

Mr. Rocca began his brlefing with the statement that

CIA does not have the entire world-wide responsibility

for counterintelligence (CI). To 1llustrate this point,

he exhibited a chart dated September 1962 entitled "U.S.

Organization for counterintelligence" showing the varlous

elements of the rumerous U.S. departments and agencies whose

functions and responsibilitles bear some relationship to

counterintelligence: within CIA Itself the CI function 13

compartmented under the Deputy DUI for Plans:

The headquarters

staff consists of 85 officers and 66 clerical personnel

(although there 1s a large numbei of CIn headquarters personnel

assigned to other intelligence activitles which are related

to CIA's CI programs). At CIA stations overseas, CI functions

are performed by varlous CIA personnel in such areas

as Penetration;

Provocation, Double Agents, Technical Survelllances, Protective

CI Services, Interrogations, and Deception.

Mr. Rocca stated that studies and recommendationg made:

by Geieral Doollutle some 10 years ago nao a

great deal to do

with the fact that there 1s a separation in CIA of the handling

of cI activitles and positive espionage operations:

30

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It wag

emphasized by Mr. Rocca that the CI program of

CIA Is directed

against the soviet bloc espionage apparatus which

Is operating against the United States, and the primary öbjective

öf the cl effort is to obtain Intelligence concerning Soviet

bloc attempts to effect espionage penetrations of the United

States, Mr. Rocca also explained to the Board that within

cIa the responsibility for personnel security and physical

security rests with the cIA office of security wien is located

In the area of the Deputy DOI for support, whereas the CI

program is located 1n the area of the Deputy DCI for Plans.

It became apparent in the aiscussion with Mr. Rocca

that' Board members were primarily Interested in the nature

and effectiveness. of CIA personnel security programs (in com-

parison to the lisa system which did not result in an Identification

c? Sergeant Dunlap during the three years which he acted as a

Soviet

agent while employed in a sensitive area at NSA head.

quarters). Accordingly, Mr. Rocca received a number of

questions from Board members which Involved responsibilities

of the CIA securlty Office and which Mr. Rocca could not answer

on the basis of first-hand knowledge.

within. this. limitation,

nowever, Mr. Rocca

endeavored to be of assistance to the Board

In r'ésponse to varlous members! questions which he answered

to the effect that (1) efforts to uncover a "Dunlap" In CIA

would Involve the personnel security and physical security protective

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measures administered by CIA's Office of security whose programs

Include thorough background Investigations and the use of

polygraph interviews, (2) the identification of a "Durlap" in

cIn might also result iron the cils cI program carried on

outside the United States In an effort to cover foreign intel-r

ligence efforts to penetrate the United States: (3) re-investigationg

öf CIA personnel are conducted at 5-jear Intervals si Mr. Rocea

said that he would have to refer to the cIA Security Office questions

as to whather all CIA personnel are polygraphed and whether

they are periodically re-polygraphed, (4) the best hope of

successiul CI coverage of soviet bloc penetration efforts

13

Cr. AirP

the inducement

and wise exploliation of defectors, (5) the

objective of soviet bloc espionage sonetration efforts-15 to

"¿ó foi the jussiar vein," that 1s, to find and use peopies ho.

are in a position to produce valuable Information "In the clear ou:

thereby overconing the problem of obtalring such Incormation

from communications channels which are Increasingly safeguarded

encryption and other protective measures, (6) although the

United States has made some efforis to use blacimall against

sovlet bloc personnel for cI and Intelligence purposes, with

some success; these efforts have falled insofar as soviet

personnel

are concerned, and (7) the key to Improving the

effectiveness of CIA's CI effort is not a larget budget, but

the obtaining of cl people having the spectallzed knack required

and there 1s also a need for common training of all U. S covernment

32

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personnel. overseas.in ordey

that they may have adequate avare

ness

of: the nature of

the soviet penetration threat.

In answer tö fir. Coyneis question, Mi, Rocca said that:

although there is no evidence of over-all penetration of

U. So Government agencies, we must assume that such penetrations

are being effected, -and we should recognize that the size and

compiexley of our Governmental organization and the members...

of departments and agencies which are targets for soviet bloc

penetration efforts maice us "a stiting öuck."

Upon Mr. Roccals departure at 3:30 PoMo, the Board resumed

In executive session.

hererring

to firo Rocca's appearance before the Board,

Chairman Clifford said 1t was apparent that the Board had been

nearing from a representative of the vrong, CIA area, as indicated

Dy the

fact that Mr. Rocca had found it necessary to say that

most of the Board members! questions. fell In the area.of com-

petence and inowledge of the CIA security office headed by i

Bannerman:

Mr, Gray agreed that Mi. Rocca had been unable to

respond to the questions In which the Board was particularly

Interested.

Chairman Cliffora referred to General Blake's appearance

before the Board earlier In the day, and Mrs Clifford pointed

out that the NSA Director had emphasized his confidence In the

thousands of good and rellable people who are employed at NSA.

33

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Mr. Pace said that he was concerned about the heavy

Investment of time and money on security without a programu

to make It clear what the threat 1s. The absence of puplies

awareness

of the threat has in Mi. Pacels opinion resultedatan

In a popular notion that the word "traitor" Is no longer. roa

an opprobrious term. In peace time, and the peace time impact

of treason 1s less

than In war time.

(General Doolittle. observed

that the impact of treason 1s punishment by death, wnich is auros:

pretty firm Impact.

Next, the Board mecting was joined by lin, Desmond Fitza

serald thead of the CIA headquarters eroup concentrating one

cuba) áng his assistant, Mr. Bruce Clark, who were bresent to

örter the Board on covert actions being direuted against theodo

castro covernment: Charman Chiraord asked the CIA répresentanee

to confine the discussion to 25 inutes in view ör changesta

had been

required In the Board's schedule.

Mr Clark informed the Board that CIA has rept a close

watch on the situation in örder to reach an estimate on the number

of soviet forces in Cuba.

Recently, he sald, the intelligence.

community

arrived

at Its estimate, and at the last Presidential

Press Conference the President had answered questions on the

subject. without getting. into numbers, an approach which Mr.

Clark favored.

He said that CIA estimates there are from 6,000

to 10,000 Sovlet personnel in Cuba, and the ranse of this estimatel

1s indicätive öf the difficulty of estimating the number of Soviet

ground forces. The soviets control and operate the SAM system

and related communications.

There are no longer any Soviet

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ground unitg as such because they were removed along with the

missiles and IL-28's 1n February. Cubans now control and

operate. all the MIG aircrafü although the Cubans continue to

receive training from soviet pilots..

Also the Cubans control

the helicopters and use them effectively in counterinsurgency

activity, Cruise missile sites and the KOMAR boat? are

operated by Cubans.

In air defense there are some 2,30r to 3,000 Soviet

military ter clans, but these personnel are not likely to

be the lind to bear arms against an insurrection In Cuba,

vir. Clark stated.

It was on July 12 that Cubans began to

receive soviet training in SAll site: operations, and the

training will extend over 10 months.

Therefore In April 190%,

Cubars

will bi prepared to take over the SAM sites and related

communications.

Some 300 Soviet personnel are estimated to

be engaged In training Cubans in the operation of 12 patrol

boats.

some 800 soviets are assigned do cruise missile.

activities.

And soviet ground forces number. hetreen 2,000 and

4,000, iir clark stated.

As for communications, Mr. Clark said that all soviet

naval links are down, but a Moscow Havana link remains..

The

traffic on this scrambler circult cannot be read by us,

although useful Information 1s obtained through traffic analysis

procedures, and we do intercept Cuban VHF voice traffic

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In answer to a question from Mr. Clifford, Mr. Clark

said that there have been no substantlal new arrivals of

Soviet personnel in Cuba. However, CIA does not get enough

Information.on loadings and urioadings from vessels because

of cuban port security measures.

Mr. Clark said that from 3,000 to 4,000 Soviets would

be expected to conduct MAAG-tyle: operations In cuba. In :

answer

to Di. Langer's question, he said that CIA has no knowledge

of the number of sovict agricultural advisers in Cuba.

Mr. Fitzgerald began his presentation with the remark

that this as

a good day to be talking to the Board because

yesterday CIA was In a position to disseminate the best intelligence

report recelved to date on the situation In Cuba. He showed

Board members a copy of the agent report which he sald had come

from a "high level Commandante" In the Cuban army vino 1s a

rellable source.

Mr. Fitzgerald also read from another CIA

agent report which quoted a source as saying that not even Fidel

Castro can enter soviet milltary Installations in Cuba, anyone

who reports knowledge of the level of soviet fosces in Cuba 1s

1y1ng.

Mr. Fitzgerald sald that the level of CIA resources directed

against Cuba includes 467 CIA personnel at headquarters and in

Miami, and 45 CIA personnel at CIA stations overseas.

There are

also 595 foreign

sources, mostly cubans.

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SECRET,

At the present time, ir, Fitzgerald said, CIA has a

number of integrated covert operations which were approved by

the standing Group and by the President, The six-part program

1s a long-range one seared to a period of 18 months, and it

1s. within the framework of U. so policy toward cuba,: The elements

of the integrated program are:

11) Intelligence collection, both strategle and operational.

(2, Propaíanda actions to stimulate resistance efforts and

sabotage within Cuba.

(3) Action to stimulate disaffection in the Cuoan military

which Cl, considers 1s the strongest group which can be expected

to successfully seek the overthrow of Castro

(!) A program of economie denial on an Increasing basts.

Mie Cuban economy is already succeringo Ninety der cent of Cuban

Industry uses U.S. machinery and replacement parts rannot be

obtained

‚from the United States?

(Mr Fitzgerald agreed w1th

¡in Murphy that cuba can Icol to canada for needed materiais)

Mo clifford asked Mr. Flizgerald who is responsible for

the raids reportedly launched against Cuba in recent times

The answei was

that ciA is responsible for only a rclatively

few of the raids that have been publicized. on two occasions

August 17 and 19, CIA put ship-borne teams Irito Cuba, but CIA

1sn'e responsible for the bombing raids with planes which have

been staged by cuban exiles trom the Bahamaso

CIA thinks

these raids are Ineffective and would pretex that they be stopped?

58

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Best available image

TOP SECREF

A unilian cald 1o planned ly cra in Orionto Provinon tu

coplehbor, and there will be probings of constal duranton

all month long.

In anower to Mr. Cliffurals question, Mr. Mitruerlo

anil that 1l' the teams are captured they w111 rio doubt anolansh

to the Castro government that they vere cistrilton.

Mi Muraly asked whether Cia nage long rares slin iraiti

rainer the momentarie chend sacre to the carple in sidd

rafter and toata deodacco be be beatenedy tonese

sit cosmet caster.

Doe tone teace plane too drn0t0c06 side

can punche Cries Raéstende do Caccase Feeder 44

2. 109 005: 71m1 7101206 200 1ea darli

CarDs naDe 24226220 5-0020024

mons 2i 0e dega moder core to ta

C 6 z7 72 MetE

Tace each to a calm

772255

i Coco Careers Be e

5822756. 52052

5022

2S 23

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Page 15

me parano di castro peine guate 1o Piratele posero

man me pareraie chine cartera

tisse Parle

people ! an:"

therr

volatilite and there fenderey to bo heintened d sabotane

Ferreeet de décriels:

de sont cote De le ne pen tenne aid

1 stimule cuban ressetance te cistre anner

Land net " Etenke se tet le en intervention

25.5

somet forces 1n. Citei moulet not be

sarres de serer darmes

Dre dien toits:

thet Suban melitary

tores number 150,000 plus 25,000 milite

ment c Costre and M E

and M Elizenk redied that there s

nois in mind but there are three exile groups being considered. (3)

+25E÷528524544

He added that chAis not wörking with State ?

Department in. a

pable tenacement and CIA preter that de leader in erie

Bon considerca

10 10 APA

Best available image

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The DCI then,

recenxed co the problem of cr OD SECREt.

s limited access

to the v.s. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there are sources in

the USSr who would be willing to work with the CIA If the Agency

had personnel on the scene to operate these bources.

Mr. McCone

noted that there are only four CIA people in thelmbassy, along

with some 17 US military personnel. In contrast, fir. McCone

noted, in the U.S. there are 185 Soviet and 93 Soviet satellite

Intellizence officials operating against the US In the washington

Do Co and New York (UN) areas. The DCI stated that on the question.

of placing additional CIA personnel under official cover in the

embassy

at Moscow, the Ambassadur has steadfastly held that the risk

of damage from exposure of such personnel is so severe that it is

not worth the gamble. Therefore, Mr. McCone said, CIA has only four

men in the Moscow Embassy and they would all have to work on any

one case.:

Recalling that several CIA operatives had to be taken

out of Moscow when the Penkurskly case blew up, the DCI empha-

sized that CIA needs to augment its personnel there, In answer

to Mr clifford's inquiry as to what steps were being taken by the

DCI to obtain authorization for the assignment of additional CIA

personnel to the Embassy In Moscow, Mr. McCone said that he has had

conversations with the head of the State Department, However, housing

for Us personnel is limited in Moscow and the net result of in

creasing CIA personnel there would probably necessitate the re

moval of a State Department political officer or some other state

Department representative.

75

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Mr. McCone referred to the Vietnam situation as being very bad, with

a disintegtation of relations between the Diem regime and che, Vietnamese and

the U. So The situation is so bad we may have to get out of the war.. The

U. S could live with Diem's antagonism but he has lost popular support and

winning. the war would be a hollow victory. The U.S. has:had no guccess in

setting Diem to mend his policy. The shooting into a crowd of Buddhists and

the deaths of 8 of them began an Impossible situation, and the August raids on

the pagodas were the last straw."

If the Diem regine were to be disposed of,

there's no one to replace him, and even though a military coup were pulled

off; CIA does not belleve it could stay in power. CIA is maintaining contact

with the milltary to keep watch on them (but there is no ClA support as has

been publicly alleged).

The DCI sald that there have been recelved disturbing reports that thu

1s making a deal woth the North Vietnamese (whó woüld pay any price to get

the U.S. out of the war.

The French Ambassador léft Saigon for Paris last

night.: Mi. McCone added that nur. President and the Executiva Conmittee of

the NSC have been meeting regularly on the problem.

There are differences of

opinion in our Government and in the U. S. Embassy at saigon as to the best

solution.

Some think if we can get diem to do reforms we can win the war and

get out:

Others think Diem should be overthrown.

In answer to Mr. Clifford, the DCI sald that State Department and CIA

collaboration is close on the vietnam sicuation. He added however that there

was no coordination of the hastily composed August 24 cablegram from the

State Department telling the Embassy to begin thinking about "unloading the

Nhus and that a change of the regime was In the offing.

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FOR SEGNES

Mr. Clifford Invited the DCI to take up any other matters he wished to:

cover. Mr. Mccone said there were a few that time didn't permit him to cover,

but he would furnish the Board memoranda on "Deep Cover" and "Soviet Irawlers".

As to scheduled CORONA launchings care should be taken as to

their

freguency having in mind that CORONA shots cost $9 million each and GAMBiT

$12 million,

Mr. Gray mentioned to the ICI a recent remark made by Alexis Johnson to

some of the Board members to the effect that although the U. S. can put a man

on the moor. for a billion dollars, we can't place an agent in Castro's office.

MI. Gray said that he would like to hear MI. McCone's comments to the Board

some time as to the prospect of ClA penetrating the USSR and Cuban Governments

If unlimited millions or billions of dollars were avallable. Mi. Clifford

agreed that the Board

should hear from the DCI on this at the next Board

meeting. Mr. McCone's visit completed, he departed the Board meeting at 12:15.

Following lunch, the Board resumed in executive session. Mr. Coyne

reported some infurmation just received in the Dunlap case. Dunlap's wife

produced another Government document which her husband had apparently removed

from NSA.

She said she found it in a strong box to which her husband was not

supposed to have had a key. NSA Director Blake had Informed MI. Coyne that

the document was from NSA to ovurseas stations on steps to be taken in tests.

of procedures with respect to intercepts of Soviet scrambler traffic.

Dr. Baker noted that this 1s serious, because our only hope for exploiting

Soviet scrambler: communications Is to take advantage of operator and encryption

mistakes, so any reminder to the Soviets that NSA personnel are iooking for

'"busts" will be very bad.

Dr. Baker said that the DCI's remark about Dunlap being at the cross-

roads of NSA Information 18 untrue, because in fact Dunlap had access only

80

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to the crossroads of NSA activity against Soviet SICINI. Also Di. Baker i!

sald that the DOl'a comments on ClA's WALNUI data system were exaggerated,".

for in fact the project has proved to be a useless disaster to say the least,

and it 19: certainly not a "leading edgo" to automation as: the DCIshad cläimed.

Dr., Baker and Mr. Coyne had recently roelved word on the inadequacy of the

WALNUT system

from Mr. Griffith

of IBM, privately.

Focusced

Chairman Clifford agreed with Mr. Coyne's suggestion that at the next...

Roard meeting the DCI be asked to report on the status of coordinatedleffort

In the Intelligence community with a view to achieving o data processing l

capability in. the intelligence fleld.

MI. McGeorge Bundy. Joined the Board meeting at 1:30 and addressed himself

to the items which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's memorandum. tolMe. Bundyu:

dated September 11, 1963 (attached as a part of these minutes) lein

w'" First Mr. Bundy expressed the vlew that there have been significant

A1s6,

Improvements in intelligence comnunity support to the white House. Thls 1s

particularly true with respect to current intelligence toples speclally covered

by ClA's OCI. These submissions are useful to the President and white houseor

staff members because they are more timely than NIE's and supply the needsCat

for information without having to wait for the results of the necessary

slower process of turning out finished estimates.

A1s0, Mr. Bundy said the White House 18 getting goud ad hoc reporting

from Department of State Intelligenco (INR).. Some of it 80e8

the President

and 1t 1s of value to staff menbers in discussions with the President: Also,

DIA's material forwarded to General Clifton 1s a useful supplement to more

formally prepared estimates.

CIA'& Deputy DCI/ Intelligence reports ut My. Bundy's morning staff

meetings and if a pa ticular intelligence memorandum is needed it is asked for,

81

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DR SE

bus largely the initiative is with State, Defense,

and CIA In making these:

current intelligence submissions.

In short, Mr. Bundy sald that che means of access to intelligence are

good, for policy purposes.

As to the

second ltem on the Board's list, Me, Bundy sald he would have

to.throw back.to

the Board the question as to any modificationa considered

destrable in providing Intelligence community support to the White House

(in the light of the Board's Cuba report). Me. Bundy thought that he would

not be as good a witness of the Board on this.

DI. Land remarked that this morning the Board heard optimisticallys

worded reports by CIA on the responsiveness of Cubans di small sabotage efforts,

but when the ClA representatives were asked about a long range plan for use in:

case of a coup in Cuba, they indicated that they lad none. De. Land also

wondered whether we would have advance intelligence on a coup in time for

our Government to act

on It. Mi. Bundy said that we do have

en intelligence

input on the question of whether a coup would result in unacceptable Sovlet

reaction, and the tentative judgment

That there would not be.

Mr. Clifford recalled remarka by the CIA representatives to the effect

that 1f agent teams now being sent into Cuba are caught, ClA will get the !"

blame as It does in the case of non-CIA covcrt actiona detected by the Castro

regime. Mr. Bundy agreed that this is not a very good defense when agent

teams are caught and their activitles are attributed

to. CIA by Castro.

Mr. Bundy said that the Scandlug Group:

file on Cuba 1s large and Mr. Coyne

might well look through it.

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Mr. Murphy wondered whether the intelligence effort is adequately tied

In to the pollcy process, and he cited the August 24 State Department message

to Salgon representatives indicating a policy change. Me. Bundy sald that the

State Departuent message was not very well coordinated in Its preparation,

büt :

there was no failure of Intelligence Involved.

Nexi, as to the adequacy of intelligence comnunity production of timely,

cumulative assessments of current intelligence and indicator-type data, for.

example in the South Vietnam situation, Mr. Bundy said that the intelligence

record on problems developing there since last May is pretty 8o0d. The

difficulty is that when you get into a matter Involving dally operational-type

policy decisiong,

it is not

easy to keep track of the very latest developments.

From now on, Mr. Bundy

said

that steps will be taken to make sure that thei

Standing Group and Executive Committee of the NSC have the same dally "new news!'.

as their

various

intelligence officers do. The principal question regarding

Vietnam 1s what does Diem actually think he is doing. Raw.

intelligence

material 1s not lacking, Mr. Bundy said, but assessment is the problem.

As to the fourth question listed by the Board, Mr. Bundy said that it

would cause a problem. if the Board were to be made reciplents of the dili

CIA Presidential Check List, because the Board would then be setting something

to which the rest of the White House family does

not have acuess.

Mr. Bundy

said that he analyzes the Check List on a dally basis and this has resulted

In the President getting sharper Information. However, Mr. Bundy said that

It would be a good thing if Mr. Coyne would look over past Check Lists for

periods of perhaps a month, with a vlew to analyzing the submissions.

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As to the fifth and last item in Me, Clifford's list iinviting

suggestions for Increasing the Board's access to covert action matters and

Spectal Group actlvitles) Mr. Bundy said that he frankly did not know the

Board's present method of covering NSC 5412/2 matters.

DI. Langer said that

the Board Panel on che subjece gets briefings from time to time on covert

scrion operations.

Mr. Bundy arated thar he himself looks to ClA for reports

asked for concerning the status of particular programs, bur he did not want

¿o have in his: "fice a compliation of all of such sensitive activities.

But if che Board appoints a Panel to do a review of all covert

actions to

date,

of

selected programs, he stands ready to meet the Board's needs.

Mr. Clifford sald that he or Mr. Coyne would be in touch with Mr. Bundy

regarding the desired revlew of NSC 5412/2 activities.

Chairnan Clifford then turned to the subject of the Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty, noting that the Board had looked at U.S. Intelligence capability

to detect violations.

He said that 15 appeared thus far that the U.S.

capability 1s largely based on the acquisition and enlargement of detection

systens in the fucure.

Mr. Buncy said that he is concerned

about the U.S.

capability to apply intelligence safeguards against the treaty violations,

but is unwilling to sign a blank check for detection programs.

So the Board

should keep aware uf the question as to the worth of adopting certain additional

detection systems, and in Me. Bundy's view he need more than we now have.

Dr. Baker.

bserved that only two or three systems are ell established, and

all of the 13 or so under consideracion are probably not necessary. He added

chat chus for only about 30 percent of previous Soviet tests have been learned

of in advance through SICINT, alchough some 60 to 90 per cent alerting could

be achleved through better SIGINT take and better use of the rake.

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SECHOI

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11,, 1903

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBTECT: Covert Action Cerations

The Board Panel on Covert Action Operations (Messro, Murphy,

Gray and Lenger vas formed for the purpose of keepino the

Board fully advised. on the status of the planning and execution

of covert action operations.

on previous occasions, the Panel's activities have Included

& review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (with respect

to cuba only), and briefings by the secretary to she special

Group and by CIA officlals.

Most recently, on september 6,

1953,

the

Panel agaln consulted

with CIA officials and was briefec

on a varlety of developments in the covert action field.

Panel Chairman, Mr. Murphy, Will make an oral report to

The

the.

Board on the foregoing.

j. Patrick Coyne

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September 10, 1963

MIEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Paral on Covert Action Operationg

1903.

The Board Penel mat in the Board's offices on Septeuber 6:

Penel monbery present were nio

Robert Hurphy, Chairman;

are Gordon Grays and Dr. Millan longer. Mossry. Coyne und

ish also attended the meting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed

were as follows:

MESSRS. HELlS and MIDYER

British Quiana

For a 1o-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades

Union Congress maintained a goneral strike which was directed

against tho Jagan regime, and had ide support anong agrarian

and Industrial workers in protest against on oppressive Levor

Bill proposed by communist-oriented Jagan.

CIA worked out

with George Meany a progran of CIA financial support ($35, 000)

to ühe strike under

ne cover of "Arl-CID contributions,

A CIA cover representative ran the strike program.

The actlvlty

was tricky because the United suaces and the british destreo

to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the:

fact thay

the British Governor-General oppesed the strike.

CIA aSSEBsES

the operation as a success cecause even though

Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Lubor Bill was withdrewh

and the iuc survived,

The otrike activity too place against a background of

agreemant between Preaident kennedy and raciallen that the

BIltish will not pull out of culona for an Indefinite future

period, in the hope that a Communist government will not fill

the vacuun wher the British do withcrsi.

Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a

$1 million advance fron Cuba to the Gulana Import Export

corporation (an arm of Jagen's East Indian Peonles Progrosalve

Party) which In turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime,

soviet help was Indicated by a rumorod transfer of over

$100,000 to Jayan's Party through banla.

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CIA at procent 18 providing $5,000 to the INe Party made

and CIA 13 Bending a Nagro

cover representative from New York to ai0 the African taxty.

SIA considers that lies. Jagan, a known Communist from

choago, In the braing and guts of the Jagan operation

Ha26z

CIA has surveyed the intentions and eapabilities of

various Faltian exile groups and has supplied them with token

anounts of money to test chem out. escorta of the groups to

for a united front have falled, and in the Dominican republic

Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Levalier

tor the presente

Ten days ago CiA droppod 100 rifles and

aiminition to one Hastian exila group which has been siven

Banotuary by a Dominican Republic commandos stationed on the

Dominican Repulle

In this country thore 18 a lack of denocratic institutions,

political party structure, Labor unions, or cooperatives of an

effectivo nature. Juan Busch spends more time debating charges

by political opponents than in perioming the administrative

job of running the country

Bosch Is an extreme concervative, ecorchically, and refuses

to spend moneys in excess er assured revenuos

A twenty per cent

unemployment figura is a najor problem. Bosch has strengühened

his cabinet at the urging of the u. so

Ambassador, and has made

peace with church elements (with CIA's help).

moultion to Bosch 18 from the right and fron parts of

the Any. He dias met individual Communist moves as they arioo

but ho in not burng an over all anti-communist progran or

an attenpted Infiltration of the Planning Connission)

Although Bosch is considered by CIA to be anti-Castro

no anti-soriot, he has not clumped dom on returning trainees

te wenty per cent unemployment situation provides the

basle for a coup in the months ahead, Meanwhile the Army

strongamn aubert (one of Trujillo's assassing) waits in the

Vietnam

cinis role in vietnam during the past twe years has been

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fa) Total supuore of the war againat the Viet Cong, Ino

luding the iraining or come 43,000 arrogulare now turned over

so U.S. Speelal Foraed)s support to the mountain peavie ir

operations againet the viet congs and CIA training of Vo So

Special Fordes In South Vietnam.

(2)

CIA support or unreltracion operations in North

Vietnam,

(ot a great sueccas.

figh losses of beaia.,)

In response to/question based on recent U.s. prees allega-

tlong that cIA 1s attempting to overthrow the Diem government:

"C&n has norer engaged in any such operations whatsoever

no sistisation of the Buddhista • nothing

that anti ci expressions of this lind originate with Madame

The viet cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the

Bridahist leader who tool sanctuary in the U.s. Mbassy has

Indicated chat the Buddhist activity is notivated by & desire

to unity what 1s a loosely-joined, Individual-Pacoda-type geligious

movement.

August 20 san the temple raids.

martial law, and then the

urrents of studento.

One U.So

seaction was an August 24 cable-

Bran from tho State

Departmant (presunably has lly prepared)

which, In nice diplomatic linguage

to Stato Dopartment representa-

tives

in saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nus" 1. Ea

indicate to the

anti-Diem plotters anong the Generals that

they thould get moving

flover

the Generals proved to be lack-

Ing In any intentionto pursue their previously professed anti-Dien

sentinonts CIA considers that the August 24 State Department

cablogram was the rasult of a miscalculation of the General s

true capabilities and intentions

CIA understands that subsequently

the Executivo Comnitice of the NSC has net frequently on the sub

ject,

and more recent State Departnent cables have reflected

a rovision of the earlier

"unload the Nhus"

As got the politioal altuation In south Vietnam has not

had an adverso effect on the military effort. nor any increateo

Viet cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (it Helns

departed at this point.

Italy

with approval by the special Ase 5412/2 Groups the Chileclar

Denocratic party.uas. guppogted.by CIA to the tune of 41 Million

In the campalen loading to the June elections (plus 1600, 000

to other political @lements in Italyle

clAia retionale for the

of CoF strength 28 the elections is that (1) there was &

of votes anong the workors fron the south no were given

the communist troatment when they moved to the northem citiess

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(2) Farfant, and (3) the lapal audience given to khrushchev's

son-In-ist had an effect on anti-communist religious deadlans,

Inaluding wives of the worlers who had premiously coon able to

persuade their husbands to vote against the commuist candidates

Meanwhile She Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125,000

to support the CDe in curent developments looking toward the

estabilahment of a center-loft sovomment coalition.

BOlIVIa

The Speolal Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA

In support of Paz Estancernis program to

"rationalize"

tin mines -- 1.0., a projact calling for the firing of surplus

tin minors and rosettling them in new Jobs.

This will take

the Bolivian unar forule in breakine the lettist enriuenco anone

Brazl:

Goulart 1s engaged In coordinatod efforts to (1) discredit

the legislature, (2) obtair. backing of the Army, and 15, make

a damagogle appeal to the Brazillan poople as the only leader

who can serve their Interesto.

CIA 1a carrying out covert action in the labor movement

and CIA believes that Commuist control can be realened.

In student groups, a number of CIA operations are colna

assets are in place

the students, federation. In the top executive committee of

thers 1s no largo-scale

CIA political operation in Bandit now.

MIR, FITZOBRALD

(on the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special droup approved & CIA proposaL f9T

= package of covert actions against cuoa. the covert program:

assumes that noans short of military action aro to be attompted

on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the castro

ragine will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage

of tine runs In Cagtro' favor,

Mr. Pitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CrA

covort actions, remarking that 15 they seened famillar proposals

which vre previously under considert as""interdopendent"

1t should be koot 1r

mind that thy have now been approved ad

actions,

The actions call for (1) covert collection of Inelligence,

(2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage"

, (3) stimulate

aisarfection among the cuban military, (4) an economio dental

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progran aimed at precluding acquialtion of spare parts for

industrial machinory, and ocher produote needed by cuba,

(5' a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support

or anti-Castro autonorous groups, by giving

them money and

the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against

attribution to the united states, and which precludos operations

from V. S. or Britisi 8011.

The ciA philosophy is to bick only

the potentially powerful and erfective anti-castro groups, and

the altay is tolt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from oxtemal raldo to

Internal sabotase actions.

CIA mounts about 10 "blael."

operations, & month, and Castro security forces have taken

toll amo.ig the cIA teams.

Three operations were conducted on

August, 17 and 18, and among other things the objective 1n to

give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military

occicars who see no professional ruture under Castro who 1s

unloading milftary elenents which alded hin In his In1t1a1

(The Special Group, I. Bundy and

other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIl's

sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted.

CIA has found 1t necessary to resiat any duch pressures for

these operations to be increased beyond the present effective

capacity which CIA has at this tima.)

Again, referring

to the cuban economy, It 18 hurting badly.

The United States has a monopoly on the soare parts for induetrial

machinery. nected by cuba, and the USSR cannot supply them.

The Cuban electrical industry Is particulerly hard hit in

respect. Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural atep-up means

Increased efforts to produco sugar, & crop, which presents a epod

sabotage target. Finally, the sovlet did at a rate of i1 million

a day (allitary and economio) 1s not enough to keep the Cuban

cubans ero not. starving but they do not eat

to me met career cities can tends that a major

"comfortably

problem for their

"black" temn is lood re-supply in areas where

Eno cubans ara hard put to reed theme vess

CIA aspsts being used agalnst Cuba:

Staff:

384 (Washington and Milant)

U. So contractor personnel: 33

Foreign nationaler 525 (mostly Cubans)

Porsonnel ut overscas posts:

112

NICa a big effort on V-2 photography of cuba

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CIA considera that of all nationalities, the Cubans are

the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best informa

thon oomer from non-cuban agents.

personnel.

has 200 sub-agonts.

There are 44 logal travelers working;

60 agents in cuban shirping; and tbere ara 31 penetrations of

Cuban Installations abroad.

As to soviet shipping Into cuba, CIA has an agent 1n

every port, but observers cannot say what in In the crates

they see being off-loaded.

Sinco January CIA han disseminatod 150 photopraphs talen

by ogents on-the-ground

In Cuba.

Also CIA has furnished 1t

agents in Cuba more and better radio equigment.

CIA!s estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba:

12,000 soviet

of Czech and

other bloc technicians worldno with the cuban military forces.

CIA considers that in the pest 9 months progress has

been nado in (1) Intelligence collection with respect to Cuba,

and (a) effectiveness of the economic denial program.

feels that tha

"X" factor 1s the volatility of the Cuban people

whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change over-

night 1f they see evidence of successful sabotage operationg

against the Cuban government.

CIA penetration of the cuban military got under way in

April..: An agent brought out a Cuban Army najos and he 1s being

sent jack into cuba next week. The major says that there 13

a medium level acceptance among the milltary of the idea o?

overthrowing Castro, but although this vlew 1s held by

Individual nonpers of the military they are fearful of communicating

it to others within Cuba. The wife of the chief of trelning of

the cuban Army 1s a CiA source, Defectors are naning military

personnel to be contacted. Tere 13, however, a fear of the

Castro secusity systen.

The subject of specific kinds and amounts of soviet military

equipment in Cuba la an area of the worst exascoration and reporting

by nonproressional observers.

however, there is no evidence o1

offansive miss1le5.

There are 47 MIG-2l's operated by Cuban pilots.

are at the SA-2 sites and ars being trained to operate them.

We don't lanow what 1s In the caves, exactly.

Neither CIA agents s

nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the soviot armore cames.

TOP SECRET

A. R. Ash.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11, 1963.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Covert Action and Intelligence Operationa Against Cuba

it Desmond Fitzgerald, who heads up a Cuba task force within

the DD/P area at CIA, has been asked to join the Board mecting for

one hour for the purpose of reporting on covert action and Intelligence

operations relating to Cuba.

When Mr. Fitzgerald last appeared before the Board on April 23;

1963, to brief members on this subject, his presentation included

reference, among other things, do (1) the numbers of agents, teams,

reports, eic., Involved in the Cia clandestine agent effort agalnst Cuba,

with less detail on the substantive Intelligence

collection results being

obtained thereby; (2) the fact that ClA had no policy guidance for.?

"positive covert

action programs of a specific sabotage nature," and tlat

the policy guidance available to ClA In this area vas concerned with

creating

"low hey" resistance

and "subtle sabotage' (e.8., leaflet drops

and shortling out

electric power lines); and (3) the fact that a declsion

regarding such policy guidance

was to be obtalned later in April 1963.

In the course of me. Flezgerald's appearance before the Board

members may wish to raise questions about the following:

(1) The extent to which pollcy guidance has been provided co CiA,

and by tom, pertaining to the execution of positive, major covert

action prograns against Cuba.

The results of efforts to mount clandestine agent operations

designed to (a) obtain on the ground photography of intelligense targets

In Cuba, and (b) attempe intercept of emanations fron Soviet encryption

machines (as recormended by the Board to the President):

(3) A description of covert actions against Cuba which (a) have

approved and are under way or are scheduled for future

execution, and

(b) have been proposed by CiA but for which approval has nou been

obtained.

J. Patrick Coync

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY

BOARD

September 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Discussions With The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman has invited Me. McCone to

meet with the Board

and has requested that he be prepared at the meeting to discuss

the Following subjeits:

coordination of U.S. foreisn intelligence activities:

(Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies

encountered by the DOI in the implementation' of the Prèst-

dent's memorandum of January 16, 1962, concerning coordina-

t1on

and

guidance of

the total U.s. foreign intelligence

effort; and

remedial

actions taken or conteuplated.)

2°

National Intelligence estimating process.

(Status and results

of survey looking to possible improve-

ments in organization, procedures and product.)

current Intelligence assessments and spot reporting on

crisis. situations:

(The DCIs couments on the adequacy of present arrangements

for providing the President and members of is staff with

such assessments and rcports.)

4.

Counterintelligence posture if U.S. forelan intelligence

asencies.

(DCI's appraisal of current eflectiveness. DIs views on

methods

for strengthening posture, in light of damage to U.S.

classified information, intelligence and surces resulting

from recent Sovlet espionage operatlong in several NATO.

countries:)

National. Reconnaissance Office.

DCI's. viewson. adequacy. of.

current organization; opcratlo.s

and funding, status of OXCART and TAGBOARD programs; status of

efforts to eliminate Agena-related faliires.)

Cuba.

(DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. S. clandestine Intelligence

collection activities and U.s.

covert operations curiently direc-

ted against Cuba and his appraisal of the current status of soviet

bloc personnel in Cuba.)

Deep Cover

to fachlitate intelligence comunity

efforts to Improve deep cover intelligence assets ovcrseas.)

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN

CONTROL SYSTEM

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Intelligence collection activities of Sovlet trawlers operating

off u.S.

coasts.

committee on Forcien Intelitzence.

Renewed efforts in the congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog

10. such other topics as the DOI may, wish to raise.

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN

CONTROL SYSTEM

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TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLICENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjecta Susgested By Board Menders For Diacuasion

By the Director of Central Intalligence When Ha

Moets With The Board On Soptember 13i 1963.

Coordination of U.S. foreian Intelligence activities.

(Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies

encruntered by the DCI 1n the Implementation of the Prosi-

dent's momorandum of January 16, 1962, concerning coordin-

ation and guidance of the total U. 8. foreign Intelligence

affort; and remedial actions taken or contemplated.)

2. National intelligence estimating process.

Status and

results of survey.. looking to prasible improve-

ments in ciganization, procedures and product.

Current Intellizence ussessments and apot reporting 22

cristo situationg.

(Thie. DCI's comments on the adequacy. of present errangements

for providing the President and membero of his staff with

ouch assessments and reports:)

4:

Counterintelligence posture of U. S. foreign Intelligenco

agentles.

(DCI's appraisal of current effectivenesis.

DEI's views on

nethods for etrengthening posture, in lighe of damage to u.s.

clasalfled information, Intelligence and sources resulting

from recent Sovlet espionage operationa in several NATO

countiles.)

5.

National Reconnaissance Offico.

(DCI's vlaws on adequacy of current organization; operations

and funding; status of OSCARI and TAGBOAID prOBIanS; status of

efforts to eliminate ligena related fallures.)

(DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. s. clandestine Iritelligence

collection activitled and U.S.

covert operations currantly direc

tod againat Cuba and his appralaal of the current status of Soviet-

bloc personnel in Cuba.)

7. Deer cover

(DCI's puggestlons on mensurea to facilitate Intellizence coumunity

efforts to improva deap cover Intelligence assete overseas.)

Intelligenco collaction activitles of sovlet trewlers operating

oft U. B. coasts.

HANDLE VIA BYRMAN

CONTROL. SYSTEM

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- 2 ..

Ronowed efforts In the Congress to establish a Joint Watch bug

Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

10. Such other copies as the Del may wish to taleo.

HANDLE VIA BYEMAR

CONTROL SYSTEM

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