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176-10037-10245

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER

: 176-10037-10245

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: Robert W. Komer

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : NUFK

FROM :

TO :

•TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE: 11/8/1962

PAGES : 712

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 415: Cuba 11/1/1962-4/30/63. Box 4.

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CENTRAL

TS#185487

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 Novenber 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Military Reactions to the Cuban

Outcone: Girmicks and Programs

I. In putting strategic nissiles Into Cuba, the USSR

clearly was seeking a najor political accouplishment. But the

venture, and the risks which were accepted, suggest that 1n

addition the Soviets my have been seeking a way to improve the

strategic relationship between themselves and the US. While

they probably attribute their failure primarily to US local

advantage in the Caribbean they also believe that its strategic

superiority bolstered US confidence in responding to the local

challenge. At any rate, the outcone certainly has not reduced

their desire to find some way, in real terns, to counter or off-

set US long-range striking power. And their desire to do this

In apparent terns has doubtless grown, since the course of the

crisis has led many in the world to wonder whether the USSR

backed down because of strategic weakness.

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Group 1

Excluded fron autonatic

downgrading and

declassification

NG. 9 - 195%

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2. There are sone neatures, based on existing programs,

which could be taken fairly quickly and inexpensively to help

rebuild the world Image of Soviet strategie might. These measures,

however, are unlikely to have much effect on US government cal-

culations of relative strength. Changing the real balance 1e

ruch harder. Programs of this sort would necessarily be costly;

they cannot all be pursued simultaneously; any substantial in-

crease in the present array of pingrams will injure non-nilitary

objectives; the USSR would have to expect the US to obtain enough

knowledge of new efforts to begin counterneasures before they are

coupleted. Furthernore, only limited measures can be taken

quickly. It would be virtually iupossible, for exarple, for the

USSR to acquire within the next year any significant new ICEM or

missile subnarine capability over that presently planned.

Demonstrations in the Next Yeat Or So.

3. A number of military and space accomplishments are now

within Soviet capabilities, and some demonstrative feats were

probably scheduled well before the Cuban crisis. None of these

represents a radical advance, and none is likely to change the

world opinion about relative US-USSR strength. Sone have important

political drawbacks.

Nevertheless, the Soviets may believe that

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continuing accomplishnents of this sort would help to restore the

power image tarnished in the showdown over Cuba.

4. Space Feats. A series of space accorplishments during

the next year was certainly programmed before the Cuban crisis,

but the USSR might try to accelerate its earlier schedule in

hoppe of off-setting the impression of inferiority left by the

outcome. In 1962-63, the following individual space missions

will probably be within Soviet capabilities, although it is un-

Itkely that they can all be accorplished during this period:

multi-nanned satellite; rendezvous and possible docking of two

satellites; a ten-day manned satellite; unmnned circunlunar

flight; unmanned satellite placed in lunar orbit; soft lunar

landings of instrumented packages; planetary probes.

5. Yery High-yleld Weapons. The USSR can at any time

detonate a nuclear weapon yielding over 100 MT and expect Western

verification. Soviet spokesmen could go on to imply that many

or all Soviet long-range nissiles are equipped with this warhead.

Such a denonstration would conflict to sone extent with Soviet

protestations of peacefulness and concern for disarmament. More

over, it would not be a radical advance on previous. demonstrations

and claims. The Soviets night therefore choose to demonstrate

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simultaneously a dellvery capability for a very high yield war-

head. They could probably do this now, usint an existing ICEM

to launch and detonate a 100 MT weapon over Noraya Zenlya. Or

they night choose to detonate a nissile delivered lower yield

weapon (around 25 MI) over the Pacific.

6. Anti-Satellite Capability. There 16 sone chance that

the USSR now has a capability to shoot down an earth satellite,

either its own or a US one, and this chance will grow in the

coning year.. The Sovlets would probably believe that such a

demonstration would increase general respect for their power and

fear of their deterination. On the other hand, they would take

on themselves the onus for naking the first military use of

space and, if they considered bringing down a US vehicle, they

would have to concern thenselves about possible US reprisals

against Soviet vehicles or other countermeasures.

7. Orbital Bonbardment Capability. The USSR can at any

tine clain that a newly launched earth satellite 1s carrying o

nuclear weapon, arguing that US accressiveness must be curbed by

such special neans. The US could not nake & convincing denial,

and the USSR would probably expect to win some credibility for

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1ts claim. Again, 1t would incur some general blane and might

provoke us counteraction.

8. Global Rocket. The USSR probably 1s capable now of sub-

stantiating its claims to & "global rocket" which avoids BMEWS

detection by firing a nissile (with a reduced payload) on a

southerly trojectory to Impact in the southern or western Faci-

fic. A prior announcement establishing an impact area would 1n-

crease the credibility of the demonstration. The effect of this

demonstration could be increased if instead of using a ballistic

trajectory, the vehicle was fired into orbit and then brought

down in the announced lapact area.

9. Anti-Missile Denonstration. The USSR 16 1n a position

to stage a demonstration 1n which an anti-nissile intercepts and

destroys an Inconing ballistic nissile. This sort of accomplish-

nent might commend itself to the Sovlet leaders as a beans of

switching attention fron strategic striking power to strategic

defense capabilities, where the USSR bas a better chance to make

credible claims of superiority. Photographs, films, news stories,

and leadership statenents could be used to sustain claims in this

feld, but the chances of inpressing world opinion would be

greatly Improved by an actual achieverent generally accepted as

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valid. This night be an interception over Sary Shagan or

possibly Kanchatka, accoupanied by as nuch publicity as was con-

sistent with security reguirenents.

Real Iuprovements in the Near Term

10. Soviet strategic capabilities are of course constantly

being strengthened, but a number of Immediate measures are

available to Improve the USSR's present nilitary posture. These

Include putting nore submarines on station within striking dis-

tance of the US, dispersing nobile MRIMs, and establishing &

higher level of alert and dispersal for the Long Range Air Force.

The USSR probably believes that these noves, all of which could

have been rade at any time in the recent past, would come to the

attention of the US governnent, which would then conclude that

It faced a greater strategle threat, but not one which gave the

USSR a clear strategie advantage. Measures of this sort would

not reach the world public.

Real Improvenents in the Long Run

11. Existing National Intelligence Estinates project a

continuing Improvenent in Soviet long-range striking forces and

air defenses over the next several years. In the offensive field,

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Intelligence estimates a steady buildup in numbers of ICBMs

and missile-launching submarines, although the numerical 11-

crease estirated in delivery vehicles is not so steep as that

prograrned for Us forces. In addition, survivability will 1n-

prove as sissile sites are hardened and the subrarine fleet

becones larger, while the warheads yeld capabilities for all

systens will Increase. In strategic defense, the major new

elenent is the anti-nissile progran, where deploynent of one

systen has already begun at one location (Leningrad) and re-

search and developient work toward a nore advanced capability

1s continuing-

12. In any reconsideration of defense prograns, we think

it very unlikely that the USSR will abandon the concept of balanced

forces in an effort to maxinize one particular kind of capa-

bility, say long-range attack. The Soviet nilitary leadership

pisces & high value upon theater forces and has already succeeded

|in undoing Khrushchev's plan launched in 1960, to reduce then.

With respect to air defense, the traditional Soviet concern with

defense and the great scale of the USSR's anti-nissile efforts to

date persuade us that this progran will not be abandoned or

drastically cut back to provide resources for competing prograns.

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Thus while sone savings night be effected in various areas, tre

think that any major upward revisions in individual progras

could only be accomplished through roughly equivalent increases

in total milftary spending.

13. The question of the Soviet long run nilitary reaction

to the tuban affair my be posed in terms of whether the

Soviet Union will continue to concentrate on doninating Europe

and the Furasion periphery with strategic weapons and large

ground forces, with their intercontinental weapons systens lilted

to sone sort of minirun deterrent level, or will initiate a

basic change in its strategy and attempt to achieve parity or even

superiority in weapons systens for intercontinental thernonuclear

war. We can also look for sone internediate alternative.

14. One plausible option would be to continue what appears

to be the current strategy with such nodifications as hardening

a larger portion of the ICEM force, possible sone upward revision

of the force level, and ARM deploynent II a number of the larger

urban areas - say 20 to 25 - together with the maintenance and

continued nodernization of the ground and associated naval and

a1r forces

at about present levels. Military space systens night

be linited to nodest reconnaissance and early warning forces.

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15. A second option, at the other extrene, would be to enter

into an ICEM race with the US with the object of achleving parity.

or narked superiorlty in the number of launchers operational and

in the yield and accuracy of the systen. A large subrarine-

Lounched long-range ballistic nissile force would likely be part

of this option. This ICEM force would be supported by extensive

deploynent of reconnaissance and early warning space systens.

Carried to 1ts logical extrenes, this option would also include

large-scale ARM deployment, say 25 to 30 urban areas as a Dini-un,

and naintenance of ground and naval forces at sonething like the

present levels.

16. Under either option, linted orbital bombardment and

other offensive space systens night be added to supplenent the

other forces and to naxinize the politicl effect of Soviet nill-

tary posture. (The USIB is currently giving Intensive study to

Soviet military spoce objectives; 1ts conclusions will appear 1n

NIE 11-1-62, "Soviet Space Programs," due Noveriber 1962.)

17. If the Soviet lenders seek on option falling between

these extrenes we belleve that it will erphasize diversity, seek

to create an trage of technieal superiority, and to naxlize the

political effects which are offered by very large weapons and by

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orbital weapons. Thus we would expect that the Soviet military

posture relative to Europe and the periphery to be sinilar to

that postulated in the first option. Expansion of ground based

ICEM prograns would be nodest, but there would be increased

euphasis on hardening. A sizeable sub-launched ballistic nissile

progranwould be carried out. ARM deploynent might be on the

order of 20 to 25 urban areas defended. The nost spectacular

developments would be in the feld of deploynent of ICEMs de-

livering weapons in the 50 to 100 megaton class and of deploynent

of long-lived orbital bombardent vehicles. If current suggestions

are indicative of future plans, the future ICEMs delivering the

large weapons would not be linited to north polar trajectories

but would be able to approach fron almost any azinuth utilizing

orbital or sub-orbital trajectories.

18. Clearly, the first option is the least costly and the

second option is quite expensive. If the Soviets should continue

to eschew a race for intercontinental weapon systen parity and

settle for a nodest ABM systen, then the current strain on the

Soviet econony could ease considerably within two or three years.

The rapid rate of investuent growth could be resuned and the pro-

spect of catching up with the US, between 1970 and 1980, at least

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as for as heavy industry is concerned, would be relatively good.

The middle option would continue the strain sonewhat longer but

would be nore consistent with Khrushcher's corpetitive coexistence

strategy. The all out arns race option would exacerbate present

nilitary burden, continue the strain for 5 to I0 years, continue

to slow the rate of growth by liniting the investent progran,

and din the prospects of catching up with the US in this century.

It would also draw heavily on the resources required for the

Soviet space progran, perhaps making it Impossible for the USSR

to compete with the US in a manned lunar landing and other oissions.

19. Sone insight into the econonic toplications of various

strategies nay be provided by current estirates of the relative

cost of various advanced weapons systens. We estimate, for ex-

suple, that the full cost of creating and operating & 600 launcher

second generation ICEM force would be in the neighborhood of

15 billion dollars, and that the bill for 60 ABM complexes (60

launchers each) for 20 to 25 urban areas would be about the sane.

One hundred AEM complexes would cost nearly 25 billion while the

cost of defending 100 cities probably would exceed 40 billion dollars.

We estinate that the 600 soft MREM/IRBM launchers have cost the USSR

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just under 7 billion dollars while a hardened program of 150 to

200 launchers night cost on the order of 2 billion dollars.

20. Soviet subariae-lnunched ballistic missile systems

suitable for attacking the US currently are considerably nore

expensive than an ICIM force with corparable capability, but

progress in developing a subnarine/nissile weapon systen with

o larger nissile load per submarine would probably reduce the

disparity. We believe that orbital bonbardnent systens will be

significantly nore expensive than ICIM systems. The relative

cost of large payload IlIMs is difficult to estirate in vlew of

the uncertainty concerning their technical characteristics and

the problens of hardening launchers of this size.

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