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176-10037-10249

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10249

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: Robert W. Komer

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : NUFK

FROM

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 11/8/1962

PAGES : 77

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

• DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 415: Cuba 11/1/1962-4/30/63. Box 4. •

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CENTR

A L

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

8 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Sovlet Foreign Poliey in the Wake of the Cuban Crisis

I. The Cuban crisis 1s not yet fully resolved, and 1ts

further course may involve prolonged and severe tensions. This

might lead the Soviets at some point to adopt a generally aggres-

sive stance toward the US, which could affect their behavior on

other Bast-lest issues. Nevertheless, it now seens possible to

gauge the general outlines of the policies which the USSR wishes

to pursue in other natters of contention, especially on the questions

of Berlin and disarmament, In the period Immediately ahead.

2.. The course of the crisis 1n Cuba has undoubtedly shaken

the confidence of the Soviet leaders. They will feel obliged to

reassess the validity of their own policies and judgments about

their opponents. This process of reassessment will focus mainly

on the general Soviet posture toward the West. But this in turn

will be Influenced by internal Soviet politics, which may already

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Excluded fron automatic

downgrading and

declassification

NOV 8 - SEN

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be. In a state of division and confusion, and the status of Bloc re-

lations, particularly the Sino-Soviet conflict which has been notably

worsened by Soviet conduct in the Cuban crisis.

• 3. For the Immediate future, however, extreme alterations of

course in foreign policy seem unlikely. Retaliation is of course

appealing, but the mood of the US, the coalescence of support be-

hind the US, and the temper of the uncommitted world all argue

strongly against 1t. There has been no evidence of a Soviet dis

position to seek occasions for reprisals, and in fact the official

Soviet position - that the outcome is a victory for the USSR -

puts a little additional weight against this response.

4. The chances for an early move toward genuine detente seem

even lover. Soviet bargaining power is at a low ebb, and they would

conclude that, when the West was under little pressure to make conces-

sions, general settlements could only be at the expense of Soviet 10-

terests in such matters as Berlin and disarmament. They will almost

certainly wish, as a general principle, to repalr the present dis

array and find means to restore an image of strength before they

are ready to consider any real diplomatic give-and-take.

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5. Thus the likellest immediate outlook, in our view, 1s for.

a period of reconsolidation masked by verbal activity and propagan-

distie In1tlatives.. There are opportunities for limited gains in

this approach, Insofar as the USSR can play upon the war fears which

heaved up during the crisis, and the general hopes that the super

powers will now have to find a more resconable way to live with each

other. The newly dramatized issue of foreign bases will evidently be

employed In this connect101. But in general we believe that the USSR

will find this a pour time to alter its positions and a good time to

talk for talk's seke, especially on such prime issues as disaruament

and Berlin.

Disarmament

6. There 16 as yet nu evidence to suggest any charge in the .

Soviet position on general disarmaneut, and sone reason to expect

that none will soon occur. In the Cuban affair, the USSR has sought

to avoid the principle of Inspection and to insert in 1ts place the

principle of verification of completed disarnament measures, thereby

staying in line with its stated position. The less the Soviets want

to negotiate serlously, however, the more important they find 1t to

pose as the champions of negotiations. Disarmament has always pro-

vided a ready forum for the agitational abuse of diplomacy, and now

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Is a better time than most for reasons suggested above.

The foreign

base question, the concept of the nuclear-free zone, and an attack

upon upon US surveillance policies all might be expected to find

considerable resonance in the post-crisis period. The outlook 1s

therefore for a considerably show of activity in this field which

1s unlikely, however, to Include any substantial changes in Sovlet

positions.

To A nuclear test ban, however, poses a more immedlate problem

for Soviet decision. There 1s some evidence that prior to the Cuban

crisis and during it the Soviets saw this as an issue which could be

resolved with minimum concessions. If the Soviet leaders feel that

an early move to arrest the arms race and reduce tensions is now

necessary, they may be prepared to give serious consideration to

ending tests, either in agreemest with the US or under a general

moratorium.

8. Berlin. One of the most notable features of Soviet bebavior

during the Cuban erisis was the failure to explolt the Berlin problem

1n any way agalast the US. The Sovlets evidently regarded the Cuban

crisis as so dangerous in Itself that any move to broaden the con-

frontation would bring Intolerable risks. With the tensions over

Cuba reduced the Soviets may belleve that they can safely revive the

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Berlin Issue. They may even be stimulated to do so by a sharpened

appreciation of the importance of a predominance of power and tac-

tical advantage in the Immediate area of contention, these factors

being in their favor at Berlin as they were in the US favor over

Cuba. Moreover, Berlin would be the most meaningful area for Soviet

action 1f the USSR 1s seeking

a gain to offset its defeat in Cuba.

go on the other hand, the Soviets wist recognize that the us

has a publicly established and. much firmer commituent in Berlin than

the USSR had in Cuba. Thus they are still confronted with the choice

of risky unilateral actiors and unattractive negotiations. They prob-

ably believe that unilateral encroachments would now be more dangerous

because the US, having prevailed in Cuba, would be encouraged to take

stronger countermeasures. At the same time, the alternative of ne-

gotiating for a mutually acceptable compromise is perhaps more dif-

ficult for the Soviets than before, because any important concessions

would tend to confirm before the whole world that not only in Cuba,

but 1n other questions as well, the Soviets were acting from weakness.

10. We belleve that the Soviets are likely to reject these ex-

treme alternatives, pending a general re-evaluation of both their own

policies and the attitude of the West. Recent public and private

statements by Sovlet officials, Including Kosygin's Bolshevik

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Anniversary address, suggest no major initiative on the Berlin issue

Is contemplated at present. As a temporary expedient the Soviets

may submerge the Berlin question in the broader negotiations over

& NATO-Warsaw Pact deteste, thus obscuring and rationalizing their

refusal to take decisive action. If they follow this line, the

Soviets will probably not move toward an early agreenent, until the

general line of their pollcies 1s determined.

The Longer Run

11.. Although the sumediate Soviet reaction to the Cuban affair

may be an effort to gain time for rebutldiag and consolidating, the

Cuban crisis poses insistent questions about the future course of

Soviet policy. And these questions have become sharper at the very

time when economie problems are getiing barder to solve and the

Sino-Soviet breach widens. Moreover, this whole constellation of

problems must be faced by a leadersaip which has experienced a

serious reverse, and it 1s difficult to belleve that this experience

left undisturbed the structure of that leadership and the individual

judgments of its members.

12. These considerations suggest that 1963 could be a year

of unusual Importance in the evolution of Soviet polley making.

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Arguments can be constructed for substantial and even fundamental

changes, and while the arguments themselves point in different

directions, each of them constitutes a stronger case than could

be made a year ago. We should not expect a smooth and massive

shift onto a new tacis; contradictions seem much nure Likely. But

the contradictions may well be more acute, the policy fluctuations

wilder, and the implications for the US more far-reaching than we

have become accustomed to In the years of "peaceful coes!stence."

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Sherzai

SHERMAN KENT

Charman

Kent

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