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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

., н 212.

28 January 1963

Spec.oy

MEMORANDUH FOR RECT'

The Executive Comittee met on Friday, Jinary 25th, and

approved the rew policy as outlined by the coordinator.

iscloions bearing on cuvert operations were reached as followo:

1. The Spocial Group will have the responsibility of

continuing review of thé progran for infiltration of covert intelli-

rence agenta.

Progress will be regularly chockid with the Group.

iligher authortty mada a particular point of saying thai, alchough

tie objective uf 'intensified covart collection'' is approved,

nonethaless, CIA should not feal it da under presaura to "get 8ood

men killed" in the "rocess.

In other words, the advantages to ba

salined from Intensliled collection must.

be continually weighed

against the rioto. This will be done by the Speclal Group.

2. The attorney General expressed great intereat in the

extent io which key members of the Brigade will be brought into

planning and current oporations.

He thought that they should be

thoroughly consulted on plans for intalligence teans and he indicated

that he will personally keep an eyo on progress in this regard.

3. The use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this

time. It apparently was not clear as to exactly how far ClA should

go in maintaining 1t8 current capability for launching balloors.

At MI. Bundy'a suggestion I had a long talk with Cottrell on

Saturday, the 26th. He discussed In particular the method of operation

with the

Brigade. I pointed out some of the security aspects that

would have to be watched, but expressed the opinion that a workable

could po date on ed could ob than b

vithout having to bring them so closely into the details of target

Breas, dispatch, compo, atc., as to constituto a security harard.

I cited the Agaucy's experience with the NIS an a posaible guideline

In chia regard. We agreed that after MI. PiteGerald returns fros

Panana, about the first of February, the three of us should diacuss

thia matter further.

the eat of so at

TAP

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8 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,

and Mr. FitzGerald

1.

Agent Operations in Cuba

Mr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of

6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/

exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.

He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an

intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a

supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means.

In the latter connection, the point was made that information ob-

tained by agents of this type can contribute. to the targeting of

aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process

of photo interpretation more meaningful.

Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed

are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents

available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose

primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have

been weeded out.

The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of

this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of

intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent

with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of

these five should be recommended.

(These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February

1963)

9:8

2. L Subsidy to Venezuelan Newspaper

Mr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been

made in connection with subsidy of, the Venezuelan newspaper, which

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98

was approved at' the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency

•funds on deposit with the Morgan Guaranty, which will serve as

collateral against the bank's loan to the new entrepreneur of this

newspaper, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay

the commercial rate of %. The Chairman expressed satisfaction

with this arrangement;.

Laf aust

homas A. Parrot

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3

1.

Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly Forecast

The Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned.

Mr. McCone alluded, however, to the unexplained military activity

that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of

BOW TIE to check on this.

It was pointed out that the BOW TIE

program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would

probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind.

Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer

with COMOR to find

out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area,

and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special Group.

In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from

Lord Home to the Secretary of State.

Home said that while the RAF

and the Air Ministry will be glad to have the advantage of the

intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents

a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area.

Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer to the

coast than the RAF is allowed

to go. He was willing to agree to the

mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and

on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk

entailed. Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept

this risk.

The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with

higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have

a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date

of 19 March.

Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group

on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by

higher authority.)

In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance

of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system.

Group agreed that thisis a high-priority requirement, in order to]

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98

provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful

Iow-level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have

a USIB paper prepared on this subject.

clude a orgy ay cal the Dysono de

The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now in-

Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the

MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile re-

striction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of

31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography

of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group

agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In

coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real

need for this type of coastal intelligence, there would be adequate

time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; and

further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated

before operations could be mounted based on it.

The revised RED DOG missions, to be flown in C-47's, and the

proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were

approved.

Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the

results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no

recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos (ABLE MABEL) until after

the results of the Agency effort explained below.

The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not

now propitious for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with

low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly

short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant

review by operating elements_]

20 [BaconnaLasance - CIA Manchly Borecas? 8

Mr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened

North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via

Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will

actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed

the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the dis-

cussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on

the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK

mission.

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3.

Removal of Soviet Troops

Mr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the

removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.

Mr. Bundy stated that the

official government position is that available information is in-

sufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets

on the island.

He added that no change can be made in these figures

without specific approval by higher authority.

4.

Testimony on Cuba

Mr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by

officials who are required to testify before Congressional committees

on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees

to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr.

Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt

to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together.

These

include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the

DCI's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary

Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in

the hemisphere.

He added that the basic responsibility for co-

ordinating public statements rests with the Secretary of State.

95.-

• Chu..

Italy = Status Report on Election Operation

The Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still

in its early stages.]

98

6. Chile - Proposed Political Action

The Group approved the proposal dated 25 February,

subject to

approval by higher authority. (This was later granted.)/

7. Agency Operations in Latin America 98

Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the feasibility of mounting

intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel

in Latin America. Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done

but that he will have it studied further.]

8.

Progress on Cuban Operations

Mr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations

approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful.

He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,

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failure of equipment, and failure of rendezvous plans. He said

that efforts are continuing to carry out these operations success-

fully, but indicated

some unhappiness with the results to date and

the prospects of success.

He alluded particularly to the qualities

of the agent personnel.

Japanat

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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14 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Approval of Cuba Papers

All members of the Special Group have now approved the

following memoranda from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

"Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance

and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage," & March 1963.

b.

"Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations in

Cuba - 15 March 1963 to 15 April 1963," 11 March 1963.

HarPanott

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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11 l

26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 26 March 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

DI. Scoville, Mr. McMillan, and Colonel Steakley were

present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 1.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

98

Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

In connection with the USIB recormendation for resumption of

low-level coverage of Cuba, Mr. Lundahl showed the Group examples

of the additional information that can be obtained from low-level

photography as contrasted with high-level coverage.

This had to do

particularly with identification of materiel, spotting of personnel,

etc.

Mr. McCone emphasized that low-level coverage would give us

additional information on the numbers of Soviet troops and possibly

on Soviet intentions, and similar subjects, but that it would not

represent a qualitative shift in the body of intelligence available.

It would not reveal anything that would be of major security interest

to the U.S. and which could not be picked up by high-level coverage.

Mr. McCone

also referred to the progress of certain negotiations

which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photo-

graphy.

He said that there are differences of opinion among people

closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such

photography actually might be on the negotiations.

Mr. Gilpatric said that Defense is not convinced of the urgency

of this proposition and would not favor it at this time,

unless others

feel that there is an overriding political reason for undertaking the

project.

He said that he would prefer to see this capability reserved

for identifying the type of threat that we might otherwise not be

aware of, or used at a time when there was some political advantage to

be gained by low-level flights. 7

See special minutes

for additional item

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98

Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe

that there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation

at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in

the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be

1nadvisable now.

The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage

would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept

under weekly review.

2.

Reconnaissance, Indonesia

98

The Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal

and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss

it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut

differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt

from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in

further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later

disapproved by higher authority.)]

98

3. [Peripheral Reconnaissance Operations

Colonel Steakley gave the following brief reports on a

number of peripheral missions:

(1) The ELINT coverage of the Sea of Okhotsk produced good

results. He said that this area is now so well covered with

radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether

the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be

relaxed.

(2)

The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the

Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars

associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now

arises as to whether these weapons are in fact. SA-3's or

perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.

(3)

A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime

Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their

radars when the ship approached.

b.

The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and

GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment. This includes two in the Baltic

area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from England to the Black

Sea.]

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4.

FLINT Balloons

98

DI. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the

Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars.

He said

that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as

efficient as we had chought, but that further analysis is proceeding-/

5. Covert Operations, Cuba

8.

Procedures

Noting that the shipping sabotage paper of 19 March had

not been considered by the Cottrell committee as a body, the Special

Group asked that such proposals be considered in that way before

submission to the Special Group. In passing the recommendations to

the Special Group it should be indicated what the position of the

various Cottrell members was, just as is done in the case of political

projects coordinated with State and the ambassador. Each member of

the Cottrell committee would see to it that his own agency staffed

the paper in the normal way for submission to the Special Group.

b. Sabotage of Shipping

The substance of the 19 March paper was then considered.

Mr. McCone raised a question as to exactly what the U.S. objective

now is in this and related fields, and questioned in addition whether

we may be trying to manage exile groups too closely.

There was some discussion as tothe actual value of carrying

out the proposed sabotage, that is whether enough damage could be

done to hurt the Castro regime seriously.

The consensus of the Group

seemed to be that activity of this kind should not be undertaken if

it could be expected to yield only small gains, but that if its

effect would be really significant then that would be a different

matter.

Considerable doubt was expressed about the proposal for

sinking and setting fire to ships. None of the members felt that

there was any particular objection to the use of abrasives or other

damaging materials.

The proposal was then remanded for group consideration by

the Cottrell committee. This committee is asked to look at the pro-

posal in relation toeeverything else that is going on or is under

serious consideration, in order to assess its true potentiality.

Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to modify the proposal to the extent

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of considering possible unilateral action as opposed to using an

exile group as a cutout. Mr. Bundy will explore exactly what the

feeling of higher authority is with respect to relations with exile

groups.

c. Additional Programs

Mr. Johnson mentioned the activities of the NIS, which has

been broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet troops over Radio Caribe

in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. FitzGerald agreed to add this to the

possibilities listed under radio broadcasting.

Mr. Johnson questioned the extent to which proposition b.,

involving inciting Cubans to commit aggressive acts against Soviet

personnel, is in accord with current objectives.

On the matter of propaganda balloons, most members of the

Group felt that these might be useful in connection with the particular

target mentioned - the May Day concentration which is expected in Havana.

Mr. Johnson had some reservations which he wanted to check out further

in the Department.

It was agreed that should State take a favorable

view, then

the matter would be presented to higher authority.

As to the request for Defense training facilities, Mr.

Gilpatric asked that Mr. FitzGerald discuss the needs with Secretary

Vance. Mr. FitzGerald

said that the principal requirement which can-

not be met in CIA facilities is adequate space for weapons training.

Members of the Group recalled that the objection to the use of Defense

facilities at the time it was presented during the MONGOOSE period,

was that this would make it difficult, if not impossible, to deny

official U.S. involvement. Mr. Bundy said that he saw no objection

if the purpose was to train Cubans for eventual open hostilities, but

thought that in this case the objective might be better achieved by

having them undergo regular U.S. Army training. The other members

agreed.

Talant

noma

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

M. McCone

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TOP SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION)

[BYE -12693-633

Cy 1

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99

(BYEMAN

... . .

......

WARNING

This document contoins information offecting the national security of the United States within the mean.

ing of the espionage lows U.S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794.

The low prohibits its transmis.

sion or the revelation of its contents in ony manner to on unouthorized person, as well os its use in ony

manner prejudicial to the sofety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of ony foreign govern.

ment to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc-

trinoted and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be

meintoined in accordance with regulations pertoining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

CORONA

IDEALIST

672229

SAA

(CLASSIFICATION)

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•...—ТШімі.

SFOOTS

4 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Mecting of the Special Group, 4 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hughes

De. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for

Items 1 and 2.

Commander. Yates was present for Item 1.

1.

...--

96

DOD Peripheral Reconnaissance

The DOD monthly forecast of peripheral reconnaissance activities

was noted. Special note was taken of mission ULCER GULCH, which all

members approved. Consideration of YANKEE PASHA was deferred for at

least a week because of certain points raised by the Secretary of

State.

Mr. Bundy said that he himself would normally have no objection

to this operation but that conditions at the moment make it in-

advisable to go ahead at this precise time.

Colonel Steakley was asked to brief the Group on the special

navigational

safeguards which would be used in the YANKEE PASHA

operation, at a later meeting when Mr. Johnson could beypresent.

Commander Yates briefed the Group on certain submarine operations.

Mr. Gilpatric undertook to assure himself that adequate" procedures

exist for notifying members of the Special Group and other key officials

in the event of an untoward incident.

2. Reconnaissance Missions, Far East 98

Mr. McCone briefed the Group on the results of two recent missions.

He pointed out that there are now no authorizations oufstanding for

high-performance reconnaissance in the Far East.

The recommendations in the NRO paper for the Special Group, dated

4 April, were approved with the exception of 7. b (Laos), which was

deferred for later consideration, Mr. McCone agreed to mention these

approvals to higher authority, but it

was felt that no further formal

approval was required.

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LAll members of the Group expressed their interest in getting on

with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of thel

principal problems in this area is the question of i base.

It was

agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view

of obtaining a standby agreement with the Indian Government to permit

staging in and out of that country.

Dr. Scoville said that a message

had gone out to the field on this point last night.

The Chairman

asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest

in this proposition does exist in Washington.

[Status Report on Italian Elections

CIA's paper of 1 April wás noted.

4.

Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

The Group took no action on this subject.

5.

Covert Subsidy for Kong

At Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look

into

the possibilities of a covert payment to Kong Le./

6. Cuban Operations

The Group recommended approval of the following papers from the

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a

memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.

b.

Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.

Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack

Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. FitzGerald will obtain final approval from

higher authority.

Lay awatt

Thomas

arrot

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

MI. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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9 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Status of Approvals for Covert Actions, Cuba

1.

Propaganda Inciting Cubans to Commit Acts Against Soviet

Troops

Approved by higher authority, on the understanding that

the propaganda will be non-attributable to the United States.

2. Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Shipping

This was approved by higher authority. It was noted that

the suggestion for external explosive charges had been deleted from

the proposal approved by the Special Group last week. (This will

be considered along with other suggestions in an over-all sabotage

paper, in accordance with decisions reached at the special meeting

of 3 April.)

Soviet. Language Broadcasts

The Radio Liberty proposition has been approved, with the

understanding that there will be no "opening fanfare" in connection

with the inauguration of the program; if a ceremony is unavoidable

it must be played in a low key.

The proposal for a Unidad Revolucion-

aria program is disapproved.

The suggestion for intrusion on Radio

Moscow broadcasts is disapproved.

4. Leaflet Balloons

This proposal has been disapproved by higher authority.

no of anot

Parrott

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Mr.

Johnson

Mr.

Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley

were present for Items 1 - 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4.

1.

Reconnaissance, Northern Laos

It was agreed that the proposal for this coverage, which was

contained in the NRO paper of 4 April and which was deferred last

week, should be approved.

Mr. McCone mentioned the difficulties which have arisen with

Sarit, noting particularly that he is unwilling to give permission

for the renewed use of Takhli until certain Thai officials return

to Bangkok from Paris, which will be around the 20th of this month.

Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of basing the aircraft in the

Philippines or Taiwan, if the Takhli possibility should fall through

completely.

The DCI said that if it proves impossible to mount missions

designed to cover the Sino-Indian border, then three will be required

for Laos and North Vietnam. If on the other hand the Sino-Indian

missions are run, then only two additional ones would be required to

cover Laos and North Vietnam, since some of the area could be covered

in the process of the Sino-Indian coverage.

Mr. Bundy will clear these proposals with higher authority.

2.

Coverage of Sino-Indian Border Area

48

Dr. Scoville reported on the difficulties encountered in ob-

taining Indian approval for staging aircraft through that country,

stressing the fact that the chief of the intelligence service will

not be available in India until the loth of this month, and no

decision can be expected before then. He said that the time before

the onset of the monsoon season is getting short.

Dr. Scoville said

that efforts are continuing to get staging approval from the Indiang,!

as well as approval from the Thais to base in Takhll.

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3.

Inadvertent Overflights by Reconnaissance Aircraft

Colonel Steakley distributed a memorandum listing the four

inadvertent overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. reconnaissance

aircraft, since January 1961.

He commented that in previous years the rate of such incidents

was considerably higher.

Mi. Bundy asked him to provide for the Group

In the next week or so a recapitulation of such incidents, going back

to approximately 1949.

Colonel Steakley said that both CINCPAC and the Joint Reconnais-

sance Group belleve that the Incident of 10 April, when an ELINT

aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles, appears to represent a violation

of established procedures and instructions. CINCPAC has asked for

a full report.

Mr. McCone questioned the efficacy of the system of advising

Special Group members of such incidents.

Colonel Steakley said that

a procedure has been specified and he undertook to provide a copy to

Mr. Parrott for the information of the Group. He said that he would

take special measures tomake sure that these instructions are followed

4.

Cuban Operations

MI. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving

& summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program,.

and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group

approved this

projection. In response to a question about the status

of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with

him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity

against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to

date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,

on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted.

The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed

for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a

proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date

of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date

had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known.

He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to

interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of

sabotage.

The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive

to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and

specific proposals.

On the other hand, all members of the Group

recognized that a

searching examination must be undertaken in the light

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of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the

It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis

for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the

prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from

successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals,

etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups,

it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma.

Particularly In view of the recently-enunclated policy toward exile

raids, it becoues increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly

responsibility for such acts.

The U.S. is thus placed in the position

of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or

of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of

proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an

over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the re-

moval of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also com-

mented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they

would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the

second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more

effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a pre-

sentation should be made to higher authority at which time all

responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their

views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program

for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of

the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected

and the

i tate overal poin

benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of

Internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would

fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the

preparation of this paper.

98

5.

Annexes to Internal Defense Plans

The Colombia annex was noted. In view of the fact that the

basic IDP for Bolivia had earlier been remanded for revision by the

Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over

until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group,

6.

North Vietnam Operationg®

The monthly report was noted and approved.

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18 April 1963

51-63-3278

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and

Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item l.

1.

Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the

meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the

proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching

operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The

Group approved this.

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative

decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability,

which is expensive to keep in being..

He said that if it were

desired

to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take

about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that in a

real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it

was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the

idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be use-

ful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying

too much about attribution under those circumstances.

In commenting

on his opposition to the earlier proposition, MI. Murrow said that he

believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated

program.

The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Co-

ordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April l6th, 17th, and 18th. It was

noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers

and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully.

In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of

of CIA to review the papers, in light of their

estimative content.

It was thus agreed that the papers should be

staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr.

Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper

which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the

Coordinator's paper of April 18th.

This would be followed by a

summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various

types, and then recommendations.

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Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we

are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we

have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is

Ilkely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy

pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of

these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date,

and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this.

He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily

be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level

activities prevailing now.

He was not sure whether, or to what extent,

It would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the

Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this

connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals

for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not

generate a high noise level.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a

"Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and

harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who

may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

He mentioned some of the difficultles that would flow from supporting

one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become

active, it will be obvious that they have U.S. support because it is

well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr.

Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American govern-

ments might be used as cutouts, the U.S. would be blamed for their

activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on

such a course.

a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives.

Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that

time isirunning in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald said that

some of these activities are designed to slow down or, possible stop

the trend of events in his favor.

It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has

already been approved, is in process of possible implementation.

was agreed that this process should not be interrupted?

2. 1 R

econnaissance of Laos

$ 98

A COMOR paper, suggesting that certain targets in Southern Laos

be included in the proposed missions for Northern Laos, was distributed

and no objection was expressed to it.

Mr. Bundy noted

that he had not

yet had an opportunity to clear the ortginal proposal gith higher

authority:

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25 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for

Items 1-4.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3.

Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6.

96.

1.

Forecast of NRO Activities for May

This forecast was noted.]

2.

Reconnaissance of Laos and Vietnam 98

Mr. McCone referred to a paper prepared by the JCS at the

request of the Secretary of Defense, outlining a possible schedule

of reconnaissance missions over Laos and Vietnam, which seemed to

Mr. McCone to be unduly heavy. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the

paper had been drawn up as an annex to a draft contingency plan,

and was responsive to a direct request from the Secretary of Defense

to indicate a sizeable capability for high-level reconnaissance for

intelligence purposes.

Mr. Gilpatric added that it is clearly under-

stood that such activity would not represent a "show of force," and

that the latter would require low-level activity. Mr. McCone agreed

with this point and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high-

level reconnaissance of denied areas.

Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a

contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means

approved.

3.

Proposed. "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK

98

Mr. Jorgensen summarized the paper of the 22nd of April. He

said that these proposals are frankly regarded as experimental.

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98.

Colonel Steakley said that from the JCS point of view, such

feints might represent a tactical advantage, in that they could

divert enemy defenses from actual operations. On the other hand,

the JCS procedures are designed so as not to be provocative in

connection with peripheral and BOW TIE missions. He felt that this

proposal, which is frankly designed to be provocative, could have

the effect of inducing quicker and more intensive reaction to the

JCS flights.

On the understanding that the feint activities would be closely

coordinated with military missions in the area, it was agreed that

the proposed program should be tried for the month of May. At the

end of this period, a report on the results will be made to the

Special Group.

4.

Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

98

The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the

priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba.

Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this

situation.

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence

and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret

a resumption of low-level flights as

an indication of the adoption

by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly,

Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this

time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of

withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at

all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a

manner adverse to

U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman

mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson

said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or

two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher

authority this afternoon.

5.

Proposed New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out

that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba

are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they

will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in

maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes.

Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but

not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on

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a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment.

The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed

to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must

be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level.

He said that a

sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. Interests;

on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the

running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban

retaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of

extreme types of sabotage such

as complete destruction of crops,

contamination of water supplies, etc.

He would prefer open inter-

vention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other

pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate

for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He

foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption

of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly

to the U.S.

In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have

a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympa-

thetic to the regime.

He pointed out, however, that a major opera-

tional obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty

of persuading Andividual Cubans of this type to place their trust

in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them

that the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the pre-

sent government, even though such people may have been former Castro

supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban

exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points

of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use

in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it

will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be

generally belleved; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.s.

interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however,

that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who

ear, undy agreed

in the government should respond to accusations in this field and

what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that

covert action which might be used as a pretext for overt military

intervention is ruled out.

Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that

the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program

is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a

pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if

it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage

operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper con-

tains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay

mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea.

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He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this pro-

position because of the possibility that the explosions would be

attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr.

Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to

the proposals as follows:

a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups

is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be

more carefully defined.

b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further

technical studies.

c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly

attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.

Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land

targets appear worthwhile.

The operations in this category which

can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries

and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations

of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with

other resistance activities.

e.

Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in

conjunction with related operations.

6.

Covert Action,

Cong®

The CIA paper of 19 April was approved with little discussion.

The Chairman said that his only concern was whether we are committed

to spending money at this rate forever.

Mr. Tweedy said first that

if the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in the

U.S. interest to support a successor

government in a somewhat similar

way and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitments

made, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.

Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority.

7. Final Status Report, Italian Election Project

Mr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication for

the Italian elections, as summarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd of

He noted that

virtually all the allocated money will have

been passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast is

generally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.

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8.

British Guiana

Mr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are

scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They

an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed

British operational plan; alternative proposals if thispplan proves

not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative

leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and

an inventory of operational assets.

The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current

strike would require expenditures on the order of $10,000 a day.

The Group felt that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it

would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look

into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the

strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision.

He said he might

see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to

coordinate views.

Falanatt

Thomas A.

Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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spee Cup File

26 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT:

Proposed New Covert Policy and Programs Toward Cuba

As a follow-up

to yesterday's Special Group discussion on the

roposed new covert policy and programs toward Cuba, the following

decisions have been

made:

On Item l. of the summary from the Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs, dated 19 April, additional planning and consultation is

approved. This will include further refinement of the Rules of

Engagement. (in this connection, also see the minutes of yesterday's

meeting); an assessment of the capabilities of specific groups;

and an estimate of the scale and scope of activities which selected

groups could carry out successfully.

Item 2.a. of the above-mentioned paper is approved. To

the extent possible, it is desired that the Special Group be in-

formed in advance of specific proposals under this heading.. It is

recognized that this willin many cases not be feasible.

Item 2.b. is disapproved.

Further planning for individual elements of Item 2.c. is

approved, with the understanding that targets will be justified in

terms of

their usefulness rather than with regard to the noise level

they might generate.

Specific operations will be referred back

through

normal channels (i.e., the Special Group in the first instance)

for final approval before execution.

Item 2.d. is approved.

Gallanat

Distribution

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Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs dated 7 May).

There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/

exfiltration operations.

This approval includes the seven CIA

operations, the infiltration of a radio operator in support of the

U.S. Army, and

approval of rendezvous opportunities which may arise

without adequate time to bring them to the Group.

The Group also

noted Mr. Cheever's description of a proposed exfiltration to be

carried out by the MRR, with some support by CIA.

With regard to the two sabotage missions, Mr. Cheever said that

he thought the chances were excellent of carrying them out successfully.

He said, however, that the critical problem would arise the following

morning, when sea and

air interception night well take place.

emphasized that under the circumstances that could be expected in the

aftermath of such sabotage, the Cubans might well disregard any

territorial limits in the course of hot pursuit of the saboteurs.

He added,

in answer to questions, that there is no doubt that Cubans

would recognize these operations

as being externally mounted, and

that the agents would certainly talk if captured.

Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might

minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that

these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re-

commending them, and further that they did not come within any exist-

ing policy approvals.

The feeling of the Group was that the damage that could be done

to the Cuban economy by successful execution of either of these

missions was not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages. The Group

recognized that the responsible CIA operators feel themselves under

obligation to continue to develop suitable proposals, and they thought

that CIA should be encouraged to keep on doing this.

The difficulty

of maintaining agent morale in the face of continued inaction was

recognized.

Mr. Cheever was commended for his frank and explicit

outlining of the pros and cons.

4. Cuba - NTS Broadcasts

Mr. McCone and Mr. Cheever said that CIA does not object to the

Department of State's proposal to subsidize NIS broadcasts from the

Dominican Republic, addressed to Soviet troops in Cuba. They pointed

out that this concurrence is subject to the caveats that the Agency

will be unable to accept responsibility for monitoring and control of

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the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will

have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than

directly with the U.S. representative of the NTS. With these under-

standings, the proposal was approved

5.

Political Action, Bolivia

98

The CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved.

6. (Air Proprietary, East Africa

98

The CIA paper of 3 May 1963 on the above subject was approved.]

7. Intelligence on Cuba

Mr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelli-

gence on Cuba.

He said that this leads him to favor resumption of

low-level reconnaissance.

The other members of the Group felt that

under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not

meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested

that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive

in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.

Japansti

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone

DI. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2.

Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.

Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.

98

1.

Peripheral Reconnazssance

The Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been

originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that

time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach

the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.

2.

Reconnaissance of the Sino-India Border

98

With particular reference to an incoming message from Ambassador

Galbraith, the Group noted that the Indians had refused to grant

staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country.

In

light of this, all' members of the Group felt that plans for these

missións should be shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that

the

aircraft now at Takhli will, therefore, depart before the 17th of

Máy, the daté on which SEATO exercises begin.,

The Group specified that in conveying the decision to the

Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due

to their own view of the urgency of such coverage; not tó any re-

luctance on our part.

(The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just

concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in

Laos, had been mentioned.

The CI. Group had felt that harder intelli-

gence should be obtained on this network.

Dr. Scoville undertook to

make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional

high-performance coverage of Laos.)]

3.

Cuba - Proposed Agent Operations

Mr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration

operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage

Чта

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o June: 1963

MEMORANDUM! FOR RECORD

SUBJECI: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 6 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mi. Gilpatric (Items 1-?), and

Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 and :.

Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 2.

Mr. George Miller was present for Item 5.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item ?.

Mr. Karamessines was present for items S and 9.

48

1.

JOD F

Reconnaissance

With respect to the two PAYSIATION missions which were deferred

last week, the Group decided that the 1'-mile proposal should be

scrapped and that the 30-mile one should be flown for ELINT only:

2.

Reconnaissance of Cuba

Mr. Lundahl showed the Group sample pictures from the two PEG

LEG missions of 5 June.

Mr. McCone said that before making any recommendation as to

further missions of this kind, he wished to have the USIß consider

the matter.

In the meantine CIA and DIA are analyzing the results.

Mr. Lundahl and Colonel Steakley raised the question of the

advisability of including some color film in future missions. The

Group felt this kind of thing should be left to the best judgment of

the operators:

Far. East Reconnaissance

98

Mr. McCone reported that two out of the existing four authoriza-

tions for high-performance reconnaissance of China have been exhausted.

It was agreed that the

"bank" should he restored to the original four.

•It was noted that no further requirements now exist for this type

of reconnaissance of Laus, but there are some targets

remaining in

North Vietnam.

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9.8

Reconnaissance of the Middle Fast

Mr. McCone reported that tile British will probably not approve

the request to use an RAF base on Cyprus for high-perfomance

coverage oi Middle East areas.

He said that the feasibility of

"sing Whe:lus is being explored and that a new recommendation will

De forthcoming to the Group.

ELINT Collection

98

Miller briefed the Group on ELINT projects PARAGE (Cuba) and

MOONBEA" (Japan).

No objection was voiced to either proposal.

n.

Channels to Castro

The Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels

of Communication to Castro.

All membors of the Group agreed that this

is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro

snould not be nade privy to any official U.S. positions, while Mr.

McCone emphasized the necessity of keuping any such approach entirely

secret so tar as the public is concerned. It was agread that pro-

posals of this kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed

with the Special Group in advance.

7.

Cuba Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/

exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming

month. The latter were approved.

8. (Icalv. Assessment of Results of Election Operation

98

Mr. Karamessines discussed with the Group the results of the

recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the

election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on

tne CIA paper of 4 June.]

48.

9.

Italy, Proposed Aid to PSI Autonomists

Mr. Karamessines briefed the Group further on the proposal

give aid to lenni and his autonomist group of the PSI, as outlined

the CLA paper of 1 June.

in

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98

The Group agreed to reconnend

approval of this propoct to

higher authority.

Mr. Bundy will take this up

on Monday, June 10th.

He suggested that in the meantime all necessary preliminary alerting

be accomplished, so that Nenni can be inforned in the event of

favorable action, before the meeting of the PSI. Central Committee

on June 12th.J

Youp anatt

homas

• Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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JERRET

20 June 1963

MEMORANDUM. FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963

PRESENT:

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.

Colonel King was present for Item 3.

Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.

Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6.

1.

Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia

Mr. McCone reported that all high-performance missions

scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week,

due to bad weather.

24.7230

2.

Sabotage Program, Cuba

In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved

yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special

Group every two weeks. The Group agreed with this procedure. They

felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate,

and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the

preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy

commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes

protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby

given a continuing

feeling of just what is going on.

3. Haiti - Political Action

98

The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has

some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for

Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order

to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King,

in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion

we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in

attempting to unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are

likely to end up with a far worse situation.

Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the

reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes

the necessity of taking some action.

He said the Department is

principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any

such operation might be revealed.)

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98

Colonel King cautioned that we will not be in a position to

know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a

try. Mr. McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most pro-

mising way in which the desired objective

can be obtained is

eventually to accomplish the defection of significant elements of

the Army, the Palace Guard, etc.]

4.

Monthly Report on North Vietnam Operations

Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past

month, and those planned for the

immediate future.

[Congo - Training of Spectal Army Unit 98

The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo

paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in

abeyance.

6. Iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems.

The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper

of the 19th of. June.

Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably

lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the

proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited.

The Group agreed

that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of

conmitment to additional actions.

Plans for Immediate Future

98

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special

Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting.

During the time

that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights,

particularly in the European area,

should be carefully screened.

Japanatt

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

SECRET

EYES ONLY

4mc

---

## Page 36

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98

that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commit-

ments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military

strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.

It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for

higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan

government, with a CLA representative participating in the drafting

of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence

interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.

nom

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

• Mr. McCone

Yonc

---

## Page 37

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LYLS UNLY

27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

British Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance Flights

The Group reviewed the message received from the British

Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during

the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance

flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply pre-

sented by Mr. Johnson.

The Group approved the language of the

reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK sug-

gestion, we do not find it possible to agree to suspend all such

flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and

that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to

the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However,

we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled

during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a

minimum

those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.

In the course of the discussion of these messages, the members

of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the

suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent

to the Soviets. From this point of view, the pattern of DOD

peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that:

(a) Particularly sensitive flights are gcheduled sporadically.

Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would

be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide

political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified.

(b) A world-

wide stand-down during the period of the visit could accomplish this

purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr.

s draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive

areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are

subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept

by fighters.

However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently

routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels off

See special minutes

for additional items.

SECRET

YES ONLY

C

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## Page 38

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98

the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk,

Kowever, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic

flights will be very carefully reviewed.

Black Sea flights should

not require cancellation. In general, all flights around the Soviet

periphery will be subject to special review during this period.

2. 1

VRO Forecast

98

The NRO monthly forecast for July was approved.

Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia

98

The NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese

Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage

of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if

Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to

cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have

no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would

be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the

Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the

southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos. The latter country is

considered particularly sensitive in this respect.

In light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as

at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.

4. 1 Spain - Labor Program 98

The CIA paper of 21 June was

approved as presented.

5. Cuba - Infiltration Exfiltration Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous

month's operations.

Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup

of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light

of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods

of delivery of agents and

supplies against the eventuality that the

patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possi-

bility of such means of delivery as submarines.

STOREX

EYES CHRY

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## Page 39

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Mr. McCone went on to say that continuing reports are now being

received, alleging the existence of various exotic items of materiel

in Cuba.

No one report appears to stand up, but he has directed

that all such reports for the past ninety days be examined in total

context, so as to see whether on this basis any possible pattern .

might emerge.

Mr. McCone added that he personally feels very uneasy

about the situation in Cuba.

Japanatt

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

---

## Page 40

13-00000

st..

11 July 1963

M&MORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963

PRESENT:

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, troubpotoirsanck

Mr. William Bundy

and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Item l.

Mr. R. Jack Smith was present for Item 2.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.

Mr. Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.

98

1.

Peripheral Reconnaissance

The Group approved the agreement reached last week between

State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive

opcrations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved

with the understanding that the nearest point to the Kuriles would

be 15 miles instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN

and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans

will be filed.

It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations

YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of

the Harriman mission.

Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG/HAWKEYE and

the special photographic operation in European Turkey were approved

as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipula-

tion that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles

rather than 10.

The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the

•Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed.

Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such

operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of

a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been unable

to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the

British note, are more stringent than this.

He told the Group that

U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below

2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety,

in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level).

The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vessels

under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for

their own aircraft.

Imc

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## Page 41

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98

State will inform the British Minister that we propose to pro-

ceed in this manner.

2. Cuba - Status of Soviet Personnel and Materiel

Mr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of

intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day

so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge.

said this review is just now being completed, it having involved

examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft

to be available to him by Monday or Tuesday.

This will probably take

the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.

The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great

importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations;

accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of

this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal

paper is fully completed.

Mr. Smith then summarized CIA's latest views on the status of

Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient

evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of

12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets

are

now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet

equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba,

since last fall.

Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on

6 July appears on close examination by photo interpteters to be

communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance

eguipment.

Mr. McCone said that the Japanese)Ambassador to Cuba has ex-

pressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still

remain in Cuba.

CIA and State will debrief the Ambassador on this

point today.

3. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/

exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of

June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals

for the next month.

These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's

paper of 9 July, were approved.

Ymc

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## Page 42

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Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman

negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked

how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as

explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He

said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for

sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times

of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities

should be subject to review.

In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light

factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th,

in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear

that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the

operations

until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much

advance notice as possible should be given the agents, lin order not

to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by the time of

next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some

kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks,

and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to

postpone these particular operations.

4. Vietnam - Monthly Status Report

Mr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations.

In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities

are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal

of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.

5.

Tibet - Status Report 98

Mr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of July, on

the status of projected Tibetan agent operations.

He emphasized that

the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and

that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to

details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for air drops

of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence

98

Guatemala-Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense Plan

This annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was

called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists./

Jay'anott

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

---

## Page 43

13-0000072F49

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel King was present for Item 2.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 3.

Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.

1.

Reconnaissance

98

Mr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance

missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather.

96

2.

Haiti - Political Action

Mr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes

have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group

approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding

with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican

Republic. The developments are:

It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of

very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or

of adequate leadership, etc.

b.

President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling

to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base fonmilitary

operations against Duvalier.

c.

Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due

to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army

officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the

elimination of the Barbot brothers.

Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project

agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However,

in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have con-

cluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to

switch to a different kind of operation.

This would include in the

first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection,

in communications, and in cross-border operations.

Such training]

---

## Page 44

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98

could be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico;

Support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range

objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable

of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an

effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with,

and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive

role in a future

Haitian government; to encourage and support indi-

viduals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti-Communist;

and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to

subvert some of them.

Colonel King emphasized that the $200,000 already approved would

cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate

now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable

opportunities should be identified.

The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher

authority.

(There was no objection by higher authority to the program as

presented, in the light of the changed conditions.)J

3.

Cuba - Sabotage Operations

Mr. FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the

middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July,

in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned

that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negoti-

ating process might have gone into another phase which would make it

necessary

to cancel the operation once more.

4.

Technical Installations - Pakistan 98

The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments,

which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently

in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our

special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized

his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this

asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community.

After some discussion

the Group agreed that the best method of

approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three-

year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and

expansion of U.S. intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential

part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Avub at that time

---

## Page 45

13-00000 1/

15 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1,

2 and 5.C.

DI. Whelan, Colonel Ledford, and Mr. Cunningham were present

for Items 3 and 4.

1. A Non-Violent Program to Inhibit Free World and Neutral Trade

with Cuba

The operational proposal dated 12 August, was approved by the

Special Group, with the two changes in wording made by the State

Department. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that to make this operation

convincing, a "big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before

the operation is implemented. He further pointed out that in paragraph

2.a. of the paper, the reference to "real ... sabotage" applied to

Cuban shipping only. Item 2.c. in the operational proposal was thought

to be of low priority and is to be placed at the bottom of the list.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. FitzGerald recommended that the paper dated 13 August be

submitted at this time for discussion only rather than decision by the

Special Group. This recommendation was made because the members of

the Group had

not been given sufficient time to study the proposal.

The paper had been presented in hasty fashion because CIA had received

reports that the exile group in question was beginning to scatter and

prepare for an operational program not influenced by CIA.

There was some discussion of the effects of using a British

Island for launching these operations and as to the desirability of

striking Cuban shipping on the high seas. Decision on this operation

was deferred until the next meeting.

-

See special minutes

for additional items

"FORET

---

## Page 46

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2

98

3.:

Defensive Armament for GROSBEAK Aircraft

The Special Group approved the paper of 11 August as presented,

subject to confirmation that the sidewinder heat-seeker missile, already

compromised, would not lead to a security problem should a GROSBEAK

plane be lost.

4.

GROSBEAK Overflight of Laos

98

The proposal was approved to overfly Laos in order to fulfill

COMOR requirements for radar order of battle information in support

5.

Miscellaneous Items

98

Mr. McCone briefly described the current status of Radio

Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RadLib). He stated that he hoped

there would be no change in the State Department policy with respect to

the radios because of the extensive commitments, international agree-

ments, and political implications in RFE and RadLib. Mr. McCone

indicated that there appeared to be a feeling in some quarters of the

Department of State. that, because the U.S, may be entering a period of

"detente" with the Soviet Union, efforts should be made to reduce the

causes of tension

and conflict.

Since the two radios are major

ixritants to the Soviets, CIA should, therefore, modify or reduce

some of these activities.

The Special Group opined that this was not

the time to change U.S. policy with respect to RFE and RadLib. Mr.

Johnson said he would look into this further.

B.

The matter of the Soviet attempt to establish a consolidated

headquarters at Lietzenburger Strasse in West Berlin, was raised by

Mr. McCone. He opposed such a development forthe following reasons:

(1) The formation of such a headquarters would lay the

groundwork for future Soviet claims to an equal footing with the

U.S. in West Berlin.

Its establishment would severely handicap CIA operations

against the USSR target in West Berlin.

(3) Such a center would improve on the USSR's ability to

concentrate its operations against Western targets.

(4)

It would in effect increase Soviet prestige in West

Berlin. 7

SIES ONLY

************^•****** *

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## Page 47

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98

Mr. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that

the British who had been reluctant to support. the position of the

U.S. and the French, now concurred that a refusal to the Soviets

should be made.'

no concurred that le eubelteved by e croupe

would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a

consolidated headquarters.

li

Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with

Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza

who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his

brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally.

Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his

operational commitments

In Nicaragua and increase his security.

tasteste

Ecke

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

---

## Page 48

13-00000 [

MONEY

CYSS ONLY

8 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 1.

Mr. Herbert was present for Item 2.

Mr. Baird was present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Of the 13 Cuban operations approved by the Special Group, 2 are to be

externally-mounted sabotage operations which will be subject to

possible reconsideration up to 12 August 1963.

The other ll operations

approved

are designed to meet the need for expanded intelligence

collection activities and to develop viable internal resistance

organizations.

Mr. FitzGerald made a special report oi. Luis Somoza's conversa-

tions with exile leaders.

Somoza wants the Cuban exiles to begin

aggressive harassment operations against Castro and indicated that

the Nicaraguan government was willing to give them a base as well as

support, including military aid. Somoza intimated that this may result

in Castro's launching an offensive against Nicarague.

If this occurs,

Somoza would expect U.S. protection and possibly intervention. Mr.

FitzGerald further stated that Manuel Artime, leader of the Movement

for Revolutionary Recovery, would be in the U.S., at which time all

aspects of his program would be examined. In order to avoid unfavor-

able complications with Somoza, two operational changes will be

suggested:

a. Artime should concentrate on getting resistance started

inside Cuba and de-emphasize armed attack and external sabotage.

b.

Artime should shift the main weight of his operations to

Costa Rica.

There should be no break, of course, between Artime

and Somoza.

In this connection Mr. Johnson raised the Costa Rican Foreign

Minister's question regarding Artime. It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald

would work out the language of the reply with Mr. Cottrell, giving as

See special minutes

for additional items

EVES ONLY

---

## Page 49

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much encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Artime as possible

without showing his activities.

General Carter

mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley to

implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to

create a situation which might ultimately require U.S. intervention.

The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation

organized by Pawley, would not be desirable. Efforts should be made

to bring him into CLA's current operational thinking.

Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sent

Mr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turned

out to be a series of 4.2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mounted

from Guatemala.

It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to being

impractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the

"Somoza plan" and therefore should be discouraged.

2. Bolivia - Covert Action

-98

The CIA paper of 2 August was approved.]

3.

CIA Training Activities

98

Mr. Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, made

an oral report on CLA's counterinsurgency training and courses. Mr.

Baird emphasized that ever

since the establishment of the Office of

Iraining in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspects

of training. It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by the

Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities.

During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166

government and educational institutions. In addition, during the same

year, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses,

all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency.

Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed on

resistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities. The

method of instruction in CIA is based on case studies of current

operations. CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (with

a drop out of less than four per cent and gave instruction to 174

foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields.

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected.

General Carter

replied by pointing out that these courses are con-

tinuously inspected by the Inspector General, the President's Board of

Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine

services.

CACT

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## Page 50

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98

The consensus was that Central Intelligence was meeting its

counteringurgency training obligations and that because of the covert

character of the training, an inspection team external to CIA was

probably not desirable:/

Pour Tokel

Paul Eckel

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

General Carter

---

## Page 51

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EYZS ONLY

29 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Colonel Steakley was present for Items l'and 2.

Mr. Cheever was present

E for Item 3•

1.

Monthly Reconnaissance Forecasts 98

a.

NRO

The NRO forecast for September was approved as presented,

with one exception. This had to do with the second Laos/North Vietnam

flight, which had been requested in order to "replenish the bank."

Mr. Johnson asked that he be briefed on the results of previous

reconnaissance in this area so that he could weigh the value of the

product against the political risk involved.

It was noted that this procedure will not delay operations,

since one approval remains outstanding for Laos/North Vietnam.

b. DOD

The DOD September forecast was approved with the exception

of the proposed trip of the USS THOMASON.

Mr. Johnson objected

to

the proposal to transit the Kita Uruppu Suida Passage.

He said that

the Department is in favor of continuing to exercise our rights of

free navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk; but the projected voyage of

the hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement.

Further,

U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view

of these

considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send

a U.S. warship on this route.

The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's

position.

General Carter said that in view of certain other indications

recently received, YANKEE PASHA is considered by the intelligence

community to be even more urgent than before.

Mr. Johnson raised a question about the mission of the USS

STATEN ISLAND in the Chukchi Sea, asking whether the objective could

not be met by staying 15 miles from shore rather than 12. Colonely

SEGRE

LYLS ON: Y

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## Page 52

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94.

Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain informa-

tion on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the

restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this.

Mr. Johnson then concurred.

Colonel Steakley briefed the Group on certain sensitive

reconnaissance operations.

Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of

MIG fighters in the China coastal areas.

He said that as of now there

are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's

and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE

missions because of these fighters.

2. [Negotiations for Indian Base

98

The Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian

Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the

Prime Minister about the security of personnel on the projected

temporary base at Char Batia,

and that approval for use of this base

has, therefore, been withheld.

Mr. Gilpatric and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is

anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has

not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended

to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its

meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to

bring it up.

The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week.

They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case

for the priority of the requirement, it would be Inadvisable to attempt

to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance.

They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to

revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base

available in December:

3.

Cuba

The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from

the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, "Support of

Autonomous

Anti-Castro Groups." In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever

said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but

not essential. He felt that the economic damage which this group might

inflict would

probably be comparatively minor.

On the other hand there

would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such

operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.

: 1.

Yoc

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## Page 53

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In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone

in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was

agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.

b.

Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of

the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.

Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two

sabotage operations conducted the middle of August.

Mr. Johnson

commented on the amount of

materiel that had been left behind at the

site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that

the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United

States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it

had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner

their first time under fire.

The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing

Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage. He also asked Mr. Cheever

to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the

operations.

98

4. Costa Rica - Re-establishment of Institute for Political Education

The CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented.

5. (GROSBEAK Armament

98

h make it clear

o the Chinese

GROSBEAK aircraft

verification that

a1 can, therefore,

homas A

Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

General Carter

Zinc

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5 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 5 September 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

MI. FitzGerald was present for Items l and 2.

MI. Colby was present for Items 3-5.

1. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald commented on several reports from inside Cuba,

which indicate that the morale of the people was raised considerably

as a result of the Santa Lucia and Casilda sabotage operations. He

cautioned that some of these reports might be somewhat overdrawn,

but it appears certain that the sabotage did have a beneficial effect

in this way.

He then discussed with the Group the general philosophy of these

operations, and plans for the future within the capabilities of the

avallable agents.

Among other things, he pointed out that there is

a limited number of targets on or near the coast and that the most

attractive ones are, at the same time, the most difficult to attack;?.

the available teams are not yet ready for assignments of this difficulty.

On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable targets are being selected.

It 18 proposed to hit a lumber mill in September.

Mr. PitzGerald went on to say, in connection with the scope and

pace of these operations, that it would not be desirable to knock out

all available targets in the near future, even if it were possible

to do so.

This is because this type of attack is designed to stimulate

resistance inside Cuba, apart from whatever intrinsic value it might

have.

The Group agreed with the approach. They felt that the reaction

to the two missions in August was most satisfactory and that it is

essential to keep this sort of thing up, selecting a limited number of

worthwhile targets.

Mr. Bundy commented particularly on the silence

that had been maintained by the agents, which has resulted in the

noise level being of a different character than might have been ex-

pected otherwise. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to proceed with a

relatively soft target, such as a lumber mill.

See special minutes

for additional items

SHEET

7...

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- 2 .

There were some questions as to the feasibility of having some-

what larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not

practicable now.

MI. Burdy suggested that special attention be given

to electric power installations to the extent that adequate assets

are available for that purpose. He also noted that the two August

operations had been carried out in a professional and sophisticated

manner, which leads naturally to the accusation of Agency sponsorship.

He urged that to the extent possible attempts be made to vary the

nethod, for example by launching the attack from the shore side rather

than from the sea, as Mr. FitzGerald had previously said will be the

case with the lumber mill.

Mr. Bundy felt that in this way the "CIA

signature" might be blurred.

The Group then discussed the paper prepared by the Board of

National istimates, on possible Castro reaction to sabotage opera-

tions.. No issue was taken with the conclusions of this paper, but

there was some discussion as to how the Soviets would react to any

requests made of them by Castro to assist him in combatting sabotage.

In this connection, Mr. McCone called attention to the increasing

currents of tension between the USSR and Cuba.

Mr. FitzGerald then summarised the results of last month's

infiltration/exfiltration operations and those proposed for next

month.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Group

The Group then turned to further discussion of the paper from

the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13, on the subject of

Comandos L.

In response to objections stated at earlier meetings to the use

of a British base, Mr. FitzGerald said that it would be feasible to

take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of

the keys very near Cuba. This would considerably reduce the dangers

of hot pursuit.

Mr. Johnson said that purely apart from the British problem,

whether of not such a change in location would alleviate it, he does

not feel that the type of activity proposed accomplishes the agreed

objective of reaching internal resistance elements.

The Chairman, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone all felt that support

of this group in the manner outlined, should be considered as action

additional to that designed to contact the resistance.

Further, they

felt that it would be perfectly feasible, and in fact necessary, to

avoid any involvement with the British in this matter. It was finally

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decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority,

noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson. In the event of

favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this

general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger

numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. FitzGerald replied that

the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence.

In this connection, he noted that the Artime group should be ready to

80 In November.

3. Interdiction Operations Along Route 7

98

Mr: Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful inter-

diction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early

August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed

to adequate operational Intelligence, security, size of the group, and

the support of the Parus.]

98

4.

North Vletnam Status Report Number. 7

Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North

Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the

coming month.

5. (Operations in Denied Areas of the Far East

98

Mr. Colby said that a review has been made of experience with

agent operations in the denled areas of the Far East, Including North

Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that

as a result of

this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be

expected from small teans, either in intelligence or in action. He

said that he proposes to discuss with the DcI in the near future,

certain changes in the method of operation in such areas. This might

take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance

rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out

minor sabotage.

It might also involve much larger groups of people.

In this connection, he pointed to the success of the thousand man

operation against Route 7:

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98

Mr. Gilpatric noted that the Wheeler report, recommending the

use of South Vietnamese nationals for activitles of this nature in

North Vietnam, is to be discussed next week with the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. McCone suggested that the Chiefs should be briefed by Mr. Colby.

Japanstt

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

MI. McCone

Inc

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7.6

24 October 1963

see 41%

МЕНОВАНОИН FOR AILOBD

SUBJUGT: HIDUTOS 01 MaRtINg of tha spochal Group, 14 October 1963

PRESENT: MC. Buody, MT. Jaboros, Mr. G1l parrie, and MI. MoCona

Ht. Belos vas aloo present.

1x. f1tsfarald and MI. Choevar vera prement for Itens 205.

98

1. (Inited sentes Evaluartoa Board (USEB)

Mt. Helma reported that the USES ves establlabed in 1950 by a

NatIonal BacurIty Coual Intelligance DiraclIve. The Board Nea IR-

quited to perfora certaIn funceIons la ConDACtION vith U.S. COVeE

and decapiton prograas. Memberahip on the soard nas linitad to cha

Sarvice Dapartmento, FBI, CIA, ICS, and the Department of State.

ACCOIdIDA tO MI. Halos the USiB has not met la raCent yesIa.

Honraver. It mas astead by the spacial Group that 1k8 functions had

considerablo significance and should ba continuod. SincA USEB Vas

orteinally orgaalsod only to deal la che allitary sphero, It vas re-

comendad by Ms, Belos chat a seu directive be villlen and coordineted,

which vould encompass all national decapiton programs, and be subo

mItrad to cha Spactal Group for approval. It vas also decorainad

Is thea

thas tho neu t'St8 vould repost to the Spoctal Group.

The prepar?

place

2. Cube a 105eceat 01 CLA Sabotage Operations

Why not DET

Tha proposed sabotage operatione fOr Novenber through sanuary

vas noçod by tha Group. The operacion plas agalast petroleva acorago

facilitton In líquero nas delatad and en aparation agalast a semill

located at Canata 11 Morthara OrIentA iTOVINce, nas subatilutad speciêle

aperational proposala for Normabar uill da subaltred to cha Spacial Group

tos approval at tha paxt voaring.

3. CubA - PrOpORal fOI ALI ELTIKOS ABAlAsE CubaR TesSeco

Inla operacional proposal uns defarred by the Spochal Group

pondinz an astlato to decaruina the Cuban reaction to an alt strito

oa che santlago refidesy, and specifically what effect 1t vight havo

os cha U.S. raconsiosanco operation. CIA vill preparo cho estivate.

Ses spectal ainuses,

for additional stewa

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-ROSPREALAN! OL PERMIOVA PrOPOReLA SOS SUPPOrS Of

#. Piescarald iaformed the Group that CXA le dropping 151

sella raida by vartous.U. S, and British sovermuent ayaacios. Be

recomeadod chas a ples of "selectiva relaxation" be adopted, doelgrad

LO TOlAs CUSTaDt AttIagaRE COntrOla On salAcIod AnIl-CaNtIO STOUpS 1n

order to avold all ralde basag charged to cad.

Tha ou88a8f10n la that tha "salectine relaxation" be accoapllated

by authortalaz CIA so call appruprleta U.S. entorconent agente tbat

CATTASA ACLIVILIOR ATA Of INDATADI CO CIA and abOuld por be nolaated.

ClA vould not actually far involved but nould stuply screen chare

stolpa to parait soma frondon of noviment on tha part of the bastar

oxas.. Tia vould be ulchout che knoulodge of the groupo.

MiT. Jobreon salsed che question of diffscultios of controllias

ardle groupe should say group succoad ln engagiay in acrivittos not

to cha 11k1a8 of the U.S. Coveraent, Inla possibility man adultied.

Ht. MItileseld elced che Masolo day grOUp so ona grOup valch a

so novat an 1afIlErasion oparation iron Plorida. la has good cono

oas not enthuslantie about Bay operatlag fron U.S. larritaty.

Me.

Bundy stared he would discuss thia propossl wich higber nutbority.

S. Cube - LABIlEEREIOR OperAtION

Hr. Istaterald reporrad that one of tha mall boats unad in tha

21 Ostober Infiltrazion operation roachod Maxico and 1a 1u the harde

of local authorition, friendly to uni. There varo chiaa persona on

board, ons dead, one lajured, and the othor all righe.

the fate of the cocond anall boat le unknown. The nother ship

waich ascorted the tho mall boats was atracked, but evaded 11a

attackera and ascapod. Thata la a possibility thai sora team ur boat

crou nenbers may hane been captured and 1f e0, a "shon Extal" nay be

espacted.

96

mia project una not approvad as proposed. It vas agreed that

cha concopE vel cound but charo abould do further axploration de to

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•3∞

98

(bathes pritara capteal could not be uned lesiond of sonoranent fuade.

tho projact nan raferred back to CIA with the nuggentlor to explore

whacher tha Horld Coumell of Churches of the Nattoral Counell of

Protestants end Jens ulghe be Iaterested 1a obtalalaz and contributLas

funda for carryas out the alas set forth la the papas.

LETTUE - POLISICaL ASSlOA

98

ala operacion ves approved althouch the Spockal Group menber

groNo EMI uniLI SItes the BlnctiON thera sioUla de Do MA aLfo!

to saltlato operacional activlty anons cha Groak vocarano.

8. Kespep - Sour ?10613413

Mt. Mccona expressed sla leAr tbas the Cop U.S. Aiplomarle aod

EllIeRty Offselala di salgoR ara baconlAs 100 Lavalved in casvaratoRs

botan Censtal Don sod Corals. Such Involverant could destroy

Corala a unfulnere and Lavolve Asbassador Lodge and Cenaral Harkloa

La oparattons difficull so deny.

The spectal Group sultarised the conding of a coordinarad saarage

to Lodge and Harkins engliealsing (1) the patilay up of a nore secura

ayaten of contacte vich Canaral son and other Vlacaamara allitary,

(D) sta preparatdon of as Etanay ancesanent of Ceratal Don's statao.

tha group ha sepresente and futura plans: (c) the tightening of control

spocial Group nethers atrend that they should thin up thalt poldey

thinking vith raspece tO VlotIAn befora AsbAsAAdor LOdgA TELUNAR tO

lastlagton, and then bear what Mr. Lodga has to nay on what courses

of sotton should be talios.

(Signed)

Paul sakal

DIOtO10NE100

Johason

Gilpattle

HoCoTA

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## Page 61

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6 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group,

5 November 1963

PRESENT:

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, DI. Wheelon,

and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2.

Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item

3.

1.

Cuba - Sabotage Operation in Southeast Pinar (No. 3105)•

Mr. Helms briefed the Group on the background of the mission and

on events leading up to the infiltration attempted on 21-22 October.

On the basis of available information, the best estimate is that Castro's

security forces penetrated the reception committee and laid a trap which

resulted in the capture of some personnel.

The subsequent press coverage of this affair renders the further

operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in

the immediate future.

2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111, against

a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba. This activity is to be

carried out by a small commando team which will land on the pier and the

warehouse.

Mention was made by Mr. Cheever of some problems with British patrols

which have unwittingly exposed some of CIA's operations. Mr. Bundy stated

that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow

up on a service-to-service level in order to prevent further unnecessary

incidents.

In addition, the Special Group tentatively approved two other operations.

These are No. 3112, a sabotage operation against a sawmill located in northern

Oriente Province and No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide

communications for a ratline.

Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a "fail safe" basis

pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.

See special minutes

for additional items

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-2-

3. Cuba - Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that is has come to the attention of the White

House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about

some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S.

To hear what Castro has to

say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of

some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk

Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the

United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been

in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the

United Nations.

Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with

Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable

to allow MI. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro.

The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN

status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an

article for Look magazine.

In this way it might be learned how badly

Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to

"war game" this problem and look at it from all possible angles before.

making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo

Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico

with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in

Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the

U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion

In Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious

discussion can take place about a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr.

James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo.

Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan

could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a

firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and

attack it again.

taus Sckel

Cau.

Eckel

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

CEROST

CLY

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265021

i ta

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6 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

At a special meeting of the Special Group on 5 November,

It tentatively approved, subject to higher authority concurrence,

three Cuban operations scheduled for implementation on 8, 10, and

13 November.

On 6 November higher authority disapproved all

Cuban operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before 12 November.

The two operations dated 8 and 10 November are therefore disapproved.

Transockel

Eckel

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mt. McCone

(.):

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Noted by

DOCI

12 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the

above subject.

Present were: MI. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, MI. Robert

Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr.

Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and

Mr. Shackley.

Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside.

Cuba.

He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro.''

There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's

internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has devel-

oped a system of informers which is becoming Increasingly effective.

The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the

enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although

its damage was not as great as originally thought.

The Soviets

appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba

although recently 1,000-2;000 troops have come in.

There now seems

to be a kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training

Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of

missiles.

There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types

of electronic equipment.

Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, esti-

mates run from 25 to 50.

Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main

headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial,

(d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and

(f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.

(a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that

inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton"

(2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net" operations.

While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of

these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentra-

tion of agents in the Havana area.

A question was raised as to how many agents in all of

these activities have been lost.

Mr. FitzGerald said that in the

neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year.

132-

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INLY

The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness

of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when

agents try to obtain

food. No matter how good the documentation, an

outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.

(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are

the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts.

Some 30-40,000 leaflets

per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of

programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that

there is a very excellent listening public.

The programs appeal to

people in a wide variety of jobs and professions.

There is some jamming

but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.

(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S.

economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy.

Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effec-

tive if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have

not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items

essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal

in certain types of goods required by the Cubans.

Commodities going

into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached $101 million. While this

represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.

(d) Disaffections in the Military•

While the military is

loyal to Castro as has

been noted there are indications that some leaders

would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity.

Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report

covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are

some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr.

FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in

the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles.

aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military

personnel inside Cuba.

The principal aim is to get military leaders who

have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot

Castro's downfall with each other.

Sabotage and Harassment

Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four

successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage

facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a

floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publi-

cation of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has

tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such

sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the

growing economic problems facing the country.

(f)

Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question

was asked

from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald

replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned

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EXES CRY

two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa

Rica and the other in

Nicaragua.

Also it was hoped

that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray

would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Ríca.

Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous

groups once they become operational.

A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr.

FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program

as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was

planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction

operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage

facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges,

harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships.

question was also

raised as to whether an air strike would be effective

on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should

proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward

January.

The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage

activities in Cuba.

The thought was advanced that there may be a

relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of

American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as

to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations,

especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directly

attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort

might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in

bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin

responsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must be

ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is

attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any

Latin American country.

The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the

main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some

essential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to

improve the morale of

the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed,

CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end

(November 15 through 17).

The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department

of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed

delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was

determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would

be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships

carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries.

It was hoped that

a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be

3

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Initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month

operation against Cuban shipping.

It was also determined that the

Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the

U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying

weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American

countries.

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15 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 14 November 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

1.

General Taylor and Dr. MacMillan were present for Item 1.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.

98

•S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces

General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc group be formed consisting

of a representative from CIA, Department of State, and Department of

Defense to review U.S. programs involving support of foreign paramili-

tary forces.

The countries given in the following list have internal

security problems and all have received U.S. support for paramilitary

organizations:

Bolivia

Brazil

Colombia

Ecuador

Venezuela

Peru

Guatemala

Iran

Iraq

Cambodia

Thailand

Laos

Indonesia

Pakistan

The Special Group approved General Taylor's recommendation.

MI. Bundy suggested that the agencies concerned make recommendations

for membership on the ad hoc committee to the Secretary of the Special

Group•

This committee will arrange for reviewing programs in the

above-mentioned countries and prepare briefings, reports, and recom-

mendations for Special Group action.

2.

Cuba - Modification of Revised Schedule of Proposed Infiltration/

Exfiltration Operations for the Month of November 1963.

Approval was granted by the Special Group for the following:

Operation No. 31111: The exfiltration.of a previously-

infiltrated agent.

Operation No. 3711:

The exfiltration of two members of

an existing resistance net.

See special minutes

for additional items

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Operation No. 31110: A sea rendezvous with Cuban fishermen

for the purpose of establishing a

ratline into Cuba.

Operation No. 31112: An exfiltration operation to be

accomplished by members of the

DRE using MRR-owned vessels.

3.

Cuba - CIA Reguest for Department of Defense Support of Autonomous

Operations.

Operation approved.

4. [Laos - Rever of the Total CIA Proeras.®

The paper on the above subject was noted by the Special Group.

5.

Ilbet - Status Report.

98

The paper on Tibetan operations was submitted by Mr. McCone to the

Special Group for information.

Since the paper was concerned with

collecting intelligence no Special Group action was required.

North Vietnam - Monthly Report: No. 10.98

This report was noted by the Special Group.

Лаская

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

EYES CALY

3/mc

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## Page 70

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EYES ONLY

ecember 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 6 December 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Also present were Mr. Helms and Mr. Cheever.

Cuban Operations.

Mr. Cheever briefed the Special Group on Cuban operations proposed for

December. Approvals were granted for the following:

Operation No. 3121: The infiltration of agents for the purpose of

establishing a base on an off-shore key for a ratline.

Operation No. 3113: The infiltration of a team, including a radio

operator, designed to establish operational contacts with Cuban

military personalities.

Operation No. 3114: The infiltration of an agent into and exfil-

tration of agents out of an existing internal net.

Operation No. 3122: The placing of a 3,000-pound cache of arms,

ammunition,

and demolitions in support of an existing internal

resistance organization.

Operation No. 3123: The infiltration of a team to further develop

an existing ratline:

Operation No. 3117: An underwater demolition operation designed to

sink or damage a Kronstadt or other Cuban patrol vessels while in

anchorage.

Operation No. 3124: The placing of a 100-150 pound cache of radios

and weapons

on the northern coast of Cuba.

Operation No. 3126: The infiltration and subsequent exfiltration of

a team which will attempt to establish contacts for the development

of a ratline.

The two sabotage operations, No. 3125, against a sugar central, and

No. 3116, against the transformer yard of an electric power plant, were

deferred

by the Group

for further discussion at its next meeting.

Baustestel

Ecke

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

EY2D SLY

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## Page 71

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SEARCT

....-

5 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT:

Cuban Operations

Special Group members approved by telephone on 5 December

the following:

b.

c.

Operation No. 3711, the exfiltration of thrse sembers

of an exlating resiatanca net.

Operation No. 3118, the infiltration of a five-men

team for the purpose of saboraging a rallvay bridge.

Operation No. 31110, the establishment of a ratline.

Into Cuban ports.

(Sigmodi; :

Paul Bckel

Distribution

Mir. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

MI. Mccone

trii

E

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