Agency: FBI
Originator: ARRB
From: MARWELL, DAVID G.
To: WH
Document date: 05/23/1996
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hotel.

DATE: 11-14-2017

JFK Assassination System

Date:

3/31/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: FBI

RECORD NUMBER: 124-10376-10374

RECORD SERIES: HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62C-HQ-1029205-1189

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ARRB

FROM: MARWELL, DAVID G.

TO : WH

TITLE:

DATE: 05/23/1996

'PAGES: 42

SUBJECTS :

JFKARCA OF 1992

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/27/1999

OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

INC RESPONSE

v9.1

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Released under the donn f.

Ketty Hebassination Records Colleet For

DATE: 11-14-2017

SIN

ATION

VIE

BOAR

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

SECRET

May 23, 1996

The President.

The White House

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor of enclosing herein a copy of "The Assassination Records Review

Board Response to the May 10, 1996 Petition for Postponement by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation." The Bureau is appealing the Review Board's formal determinations to

release information in thirteen records related to the assassination of President

Kennedy. The Department of State is joining the Bureau's Petition.

Although the Review Board is mindful of the extent to which the Bureau has released

information under the The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992, it is our belief that, with respect to the thirteen records at issue, the Bureau

and the State Department have chosen to assert general policy preferences rather than

to provide the "clear and convincing evidence" that is required by the Act.

We believe that when the redactions at issue are carefully analyzed, with due regard to

the information that is already a matter of public record, it will be clear that there are no

meaningful "national security" or "foreign relations" concerns that warrant suppression

of the information from the public.

Under the controlling legislation, you have the:

sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or post-

ponement of such record[s] or information under the standards set forth

in section 6, and the President shall provide the Review Board with an

This document contains derivatively classified information

62: 49-1029 205-1184

Because the information is drawn from numerous sources,

portion classification is impracticable.

SECRET

3/12/99 5668-54nde

(0fK)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

BOARD MEMBERS: JOhn R

Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall - william L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: DavId G. Marwel!

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 199 05t 210) huteT

DATE: 11-14-2017

SECRET

The President

May 23, 1996

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unclassified written certification specifying the President's decision within

30 days after the Review Board's determination and notice to the

executive branch agency as required under this Act, stating the

justification for the President's decision, including the applicable grounds

for postponement under section 6 ....

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C.

§ 2107, Sect. 9(d)(1) (Supp. V 1994).

We would be pleased to provide you and the White House Staff with any additional

information that you require.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Enclosure

CC:

The Hon. Warren M. Christopher

The Secretary of State

U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C.

The Hon. Louis J. Freeh

The Director

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C.

SECRET

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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Released under the John I. Kennedy As5as51nat10n Records COllection Act of 1992 141 05C 2107 Hote).

DATE: 11-14-2017

SECRET

The President

May 23, 1996

Page 3

The Hon. Jamie S. Gorelick

The Deputy Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C

The Hon. Peter Tarnoff

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C.

SECRET

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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was not looking at the proposed redactions, which say nothing about the circumstances,

abilities, interests, or uses of the information, whereas the information released by the

Church Committee and the Bureau itself does. If the circumstances of the Z-coverage

program are among the Bureau's most "closely guarded secrets," one fears for those

secrets that are not so closely guarded.

D. Electronic Surveillance (Exhibits 10 - 12)

The Bureau proposes to redact information in three documents that relate to

electronic intercepts of telephone and teletype communications involving Russian,

Polish, and Cuban officials.

Exhibit Number Text of FBI's Proposed Redactions

Ex. 10 (10396)

Ex. 11 (10048)

Ex. 12 (10222)

(Miscellaneous redactions on pages 1 and 2]

C"498-S* "Polish national," "Polish newspaper," land (SJ

numerous redactions on pages 3 and 4]

[according to] WF 1196-S*Jadvised that the Cuban [5 ]

Ministry of Foreign Relations advised the Cuban

Mission to the United Nations (UN) that," [and

additional redactions on page 2]

The Bureau offers essentially two reason to support these postponements: first,

the decisions regarding which lines to tap are secrets, and second, disclosing the

information would have the adverse foreign policy ramification of revealing the

particular targets of investigative interest.

(a) The Government already has acknowledged that the FBI conducted

extensive electronic surveillance of foreign establishments during the 1960s. The

Bureau has already disclosed that, in 1963, it installed 244 national security wiretaps

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also, the Review Board cannot agree to postponement of this information under the JFK

Act.

(b) The Bureau has failed to offer any evidence showing why disclosure of

these particular intercepts would compromise the national interest. The issue,

therefore, is not whether electronic surveillance itself is a secret. Rather, the issue is

whether the disclosure of the particular intercepts at issue here would reveal a source

or method currently requiring protection. The Review Board staff repeatedly invited

the Bureau to provide evidence that there is some particular sensitivity associated with

the specific intercepts at issue. The Review Board staff suggested, for example, that if

the same telephone or teletype lines are used today or if individuals whose

conversations were intercepted are of current operational interest, such information

would be highly relevant under the standards of the JFK Act.

The Bureau, however, was unable to provide evidence that any of the appealed

intercepts have any current operational significance. Rather than providing the specific

evidence contemplated by the JFK Act, the Bureau resorted to citing its policy against

disclosure of such information generally? In fact, the evidence that is available

suggests that there is no current intelligence interest in the telephone and teletype

intercepts now at issue. The Bureau's Petition does not disclose that the source in

Exhibit 10 was actually discontinued in 197028 -- a fact that seriously undermines the

conversations and retained the tapes for several years); William C. Sullivan, The Bureau:

My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI 178-79 (1979) (former Assistant to FBI Director describes

FBI phone taps on Soviet and Czech Embassies); Pierre Thomas & John Mintz, Petty

Officer Arrested on Spy Charges, The Washington Post, Apr. 24, 1996, at A3 (wiretaps used

on "Russian embassies and other facilities"); John Mintz, Spy Watchers Outmanned by

Communist Operatives, The Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1985, at A1 (FBI monitored Soviet

Embassy phone conversations in 1980).

27For example, rather than provide the specific evidence requested, the Bureau

merely states that the "[hlow, when, where, and under what circumstances" the Bureau

implements electronic intercepts are among its "closely guarded secrets." Petition, p. 6.

28 See Assassination Record Number 124-10067-10273. The FBI has advised the

Review Board that the source discussed in this record was NY 1519-S*. S

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FBI's claim for postponement. 29

The FBI also asserts that the Review Board's decision in Exhibit 10 to postpone

the symbol number for this tap, while releasing the names of the conversants and other

identifying information, is inconsistent. Petition, p. 8. In this regard, the FBI fails to

mention that, in another record of an intercept from this same tap, the FBI unilaterally

released the identities of the conversants and the entire report of their conversation,

while postponing only the symbol number designating the tap.3 Given this release, it

would have been inconsistent for the Review Board to have protected anything more

than the symbol number in Exhibit 10. The "inconsistency," therefore, lies with the

Bureau and not the Review Board.

The FBI further suggests regarding Exhibit 10 that the Review Board's decision

would disclose that, in 1963, the FBI was tapping a transoceanic cable for a circuit

dedicated to phone traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union. Petition,

p. 9. This is not accurate. The Review Board's decision discloses only the fact of the

intercepts and does not disclose the method by which the intercepts were made. That

the intercepts were accomplished through a tap on the transoceanic cable, rather than,

for example, a tap or listening device specifically targeting a conversant, is not

revealed. 31

The FBI finally argues that release of such information would "reveal the speed

with which we were able to translate and digest these conversations,] ... our interests,

and priorities, and what we considered important or trivial. Such information will be

used to develop and deploy effective countermeasures." Petition, p. 9. But

29Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act requires, among other things, that a postponed

source or method be "currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized."

30 See Assassination Record Number 124-10062-10391.

31 Postponing the symbol number (NY 1519-S*) prevents a reader from <5]

comparing records and seeing that the same source in New York intercepted phone

conversations between Moscow and New York and also between Fort Worth and

Leningrad: a fact that, if disclosed, would tend to reveal that the source was a tap on

Athe transoceanic circuit.

[.S)

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If, on the other hand, the concern is about information withheld in other

assassination records, the Review Board is open to any evidence of a current national-*

security need to postpone its release. The Review Board has voted on thousands of

redactions of classified information, upholding postponements where the requirements

of the JFK Act were satisfied. The Review Board is committed to applying the JFK Act

to the merits of each proposed redaction, rather than to broad-brush categories of

assertedly sensitive information.

D. The Government of Russia Has Officially Acknowledged That, in Past

Years, the KGB Conducted Electronic Surveillance Against the

• American Embassy in Moscow.

By way of underscoring the evils that allegedly would follow upon release of

these records, the FBI states that, to its knowledge, "no other country officially

acknowledges using specific investigative techniques to target the establishments or

officials of foreign countries within their territory or elsewhere." FBI Petition, p. 11.

The State Department knows otherwise. In remarks to the National Press Club

on December 13, 1991, then-Ambassador to Russia Robert S. Strauss related in dramatic

terms how KGB Chief Vadim V. Bakatin had personally admitted to him "not only ...

that his agency had bugged the new American Embassy in Moscow but also turned

over detailed plans that he said showed how it had been done," along with a suitcase

filled with electronic equipment63 Additionally, one of the authors of this

memorandum was personally assured by an American Embassy official in Warsaw,

Poland, on Wednesday, April 17, 1996, that the Polish intelligence service had advised

62 The FBI cites as potentially damaging disclosure of intelligence activities

directed at allies such as France, Israel, and Venezuela (FBI Petition, p. 10). The Review (SJ

Board has voted on postponements relating to the FBI's electronic surveillance on

establishments of all three of these countries. In these records, where immediate release

in full posed a more plausible threat to foreign relations, the Review Board voted to

protect most of the information the FBI had classified. The FBI did not appeal the

additional releases.

63K. G.B. Passes Secrets Back to U.S., The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1991, at 6.

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