MEMO: YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
Originator: CIA
From: MURPHY. CHIEF, SB DIVISION
To: GENERAL COUNSEL
Document date: 11/07/1966
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1104-10312-1019:

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SAUTIZED

1999

NOTE: Pg. 6 excerpt (pertaining to Warren Commission/Oswald)

is taken from a 7 November 1966 memorandum written by

David Murphy to the General Counsel, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich

NOSENKO, routed through Chief, CI Staff (w/carbon copy to

DDP) .

The original document,

and its attachments (Tabs A thru N)

is located in file entitled "General Counsel -- SB Discussions

on Legal Aspects of Case."

only

A Xerox copy/of the covering memo is contained in the Pertinent

Documents (to the Study "The Monster Plot") file drawer.

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7 November 1956

WENORANDUM FOR:

General Counsel

SUBJECT

Yuriy Ivanovich HOSENKO

Summary

1.

The Director has requested that there be con-

ducted inmediately an exnaustive examination regarding

the possibility of damaging puolicity and embarrassment

to the Agency should it becone public knowledge that we

have held Subject incommunicado for ovar two years.

This

memorandun seats an advisory opinion from the General Coun

sel on the Agancy's legal basis for its handling of Sub-

ject to date, on the position that could bast be assumes

if the Agency were called upon to defend ita handling of

Subject, and on legal aspects of Subject's eventual ais-

posal.

Background

2. Subject voluntarily established contact with CIA

representatives in Geneva in 1962.

He identified himself

as a staff officer of the KGB's Internal Security Direc-

torate and offered to sell counterintelligence information.

This offer was accepted and he was recruiied as an agent

in place and debriefed on counterintelligence matters dur-

ing five meetings in Geneva.

He then returned to the

USSR.

He came

to Geneva again in January 196% as the

security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation.

After a number of neetings with his CIA handlers ne de-

fected on 4 Februars 1964 and was sacretly taken to rrank-

Furt, Carmany, crossing the Swiss-German order on tne

night of 4/5 Fabruary with alias U.S. Army identity docu-

mants.

crossing the

In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt,

Subject wrote out an asylun request, requesting political

asylum from the U.S. Covernment (see Tab A) .

3.

Because serious doubts about subject's bona fides

had arisen on the basis of the infornation he haú pro-

vided both in 1962 and in the neatings in Geneva in 1964,

it was originally plannad to do a detailed bona fides de-

pande to 00 g

briefing and assessment in Germany before making any

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decision avout moving Subject to the United States.

ever, unprecedented action by the sovist covernment in

respect is the defection of one of its citizens forced

a change of plans:

On 9 February, unirientified Soviet

sources in Geneva

leaked the news

to the press that sub-

ject, described as an 'expert attached to

the soviet Dale-

gation to the Disarmament Conference has disappeared,

and that it was

presumed that he had defecten.

Because

of mounting pressure from the press, wiich included much

speculation that Subject was a high level scientist or

disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Depart-

ment would make a brief announcement acknowledging Subject's

request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying nim as a

member of the KGB.

This was

done on 10 February (see fas

B) .

On 11 Fabruary, the Soviet Government delivered a

note to the American imbassy in Moscow asking how Suoject

left Switzerland and requesting an imnediate interview

with him and his releass.

On 12 Fabruary, Soviet Anbassa-

dor to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPRIN halà a press

conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Govern-

ment of failure to cooperate in locating Subject. Although

the Swiss categorically rajected these charges, the Ameri-

can Anvassador to Switzerlani recommended that

Swiss

authorities be allowed to interview Subject to convince

themselves that Subject had left Switzerland of his own

free will.

On 12 February, on the instructions of the Dirac-

tor, subject was brought to the United States.

Se travelled

by commercial air, again using alias u.S. Army identifica-

tion, and was admitted to the country at Naw York City

(1n true name) on parole under the provisions of Section

212 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (see

Tab C) .

5. On 13 february, representatives of the Swiss and

Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Depart-

ment that they desired interviews with Subject. On 14 Febru-

ary, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO Called in

Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities"

on the part of the u.s. in Subject's case.

soviet press

spokesmen took ar even harder line to Western correspond-

ents, and accused. the u.s. of kidnapping Subjact.

On the

afternoon of 14 February, at two separate interviews,.

Subject spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet

Embassy representatives (see Taw D). At these interviews,

which were also attended by State Department and INS

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3.

officials: Subject confirned that he left Swiczerland of

his

own frae will to seek asylun in the u.S.

In addition,

Subjoct replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy repre-

sentative to the effect that ne was renouncing his soviet

citizensrip.

On the eveniny of 1i february, the .S.

State Department made a brief formal roply to the sovict

protest, then issued a brief statement to the presa noting

that the interviews had been held and trac Subject hau

confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

6.

From the time of his arrival to & April 1964.

Subject was housed in an Agency safehouse in the Washing-

ton sea. During this period, regular systenatic debrief-

ing was commenced. and Subject was made available co

representatives of the FBI

for debriefing on matters affect-

ing their responsibilities.

Although allowed out for

evening and week-end excursions, Subject was at all times

accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, Subject took

a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case

officers

and security guards, Evidence continued to mount

that Subject was a KGB plant, and at the same time it ba-

came obvious

that it would be impossible to proceed fuI-

ther to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions

that had arisen without changing the conditions in wich

Subject was being

Subject was growing increasingly

uncooperative, especially wen sensitive areas were touched

upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his

status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registra-

tion card..

At the same time, Subject's heavy arinking

and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing

difficulties to the

us to per secur

security personnel charged with keep-

ing him under control and out of trouble at all times, and

it was clear that it was only a matter of time jefore he

created a public scandal.

More important, he was in a

position to communicate with the FG3 since physical control

could not be absolute.

7. On. 4 April 1954 Subject voluntarily underwent a

polygragh examination.

The results of this examination

indicated deception on a number of critical points indi-

cating that he was sent out by the kGg to perform one or

more missions which also livolved uis penetration of the

Agency and its operations. It was decides, therefore,

that the physical circumstances of Subject's stay in this

country would have to be crastically changed if the Agency

were to carry out is counterintelligence responsiblllties

and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement.

result, Subject was moved to quarters where his movements

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could be nure easily controllec. and his outing privileges

were suspended, penuing resolution of bond fides.

Ho 41a5

remained in this status to the prasent

time,

8.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above

action but accopted Subject at face valua, it is quite pos-

sible that we would huve proceared with a saries of opera-

tional actions on the basis of subject's informazion.

Thie

results of some of thase actions could nave been very cm-

barrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging

to U.S. national security,

For example, Subject's chief

operational proposal at tile time, one that he was most

insistent we should proceed. with irmediately, involved the

sexual compromise of Vladimir Paviovich SUSIOV, the most

senior soviet official in the Uniteù Nationg Secretariat,

kolding the position of Undersecretary in Charge of Poli-

tical and security Council Affairs.

Bona Fides

Since April 1964, hundreds of hours nave been

devoted to interrogations of Suiject (in which he nas

willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time has been

spent on exhaustive collateral investigations. We con-

clude that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt

that Subject is a KGB agent who established contact with

CIA and subseguently defectes on ice instructions, and

that he came to the United States on a deception missior..

The implications of this mission have a grave and direct

bearing on u.s. national security.

Although our findings

are supported

by the results of two polygraph examinations

(a second one has just been administered), we must note

that the nature of the evidence is inadmissable in a

court of law. In any case, it is clear that Subject has

not been in a position to perform any overt act of trang

gression of U.S. espionage laws since & April 1904 when

he was placed in a restricteù area and deprived of any

conceivable means of communication with tha KGB.

20.

Subject does not adnit that he defected on KGB

orders or that he came to the U.s. on a iGb mission.

has adnitted, however, that he made numerous lies about

his personal

history and about the details of his KSB

service to U.s. officials, both before and after axriving

in the United States. (A translation of a handwritten

statement by Subject about these lies is attached as lao E.)

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USID Members.

In accoriance with the DOCI's

ruling relating to a defector no has bean a member of

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5.

a hostile intelligence servica: Suuject's status

and

handling was discussed at an

executive session of JSIB

and decided on an ad hoc basis,

NOSENKO defected on

General, the Special Assistant to the President on National

security Aftairs, Mceorge bulcy: ceneral cartold, Direc

tor of the Defense

Intelligence Agency and the ral wale

all notified Innediataly. On 5 February, General Carter

reported the defection to an axecutive session

0f USIB

and followed this up with formal statements to USIB me

bers on ll and 19 February (see Tab E), which stated that

Subject's bona fides had not yet bean

estaolissed.

It

was agreed that no Ds number would be issued to subject,

and that he would be handled on a special basis by this

Agency.

In fact, normal USIB interest in Subject as a

defector dropped

off drastically as it becane quickly

apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest

of valus to any part of the community.

12. The President was informed of the full extent

of our suspicions about subject's bona fides by the then

Director, Mr.

McCone, on 11 February 1964.

• Mr. Patrick

coyne,

Executive Secretary of the PFIAS, was given a sini-

lar briefing by Mr. Reing on 19 February 1969.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA vare

also sub-

sequently informed of the problems about Subject's bona

fides (see tab G) .

14.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson,

and other senior officials in the Department of State

were informed of our reservations about subject's bona

a of our reser

fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB

In discussions about the possibility of subject's

move might have on other potential defectors (see Tab il).

informed of the buna fides problem

The Director of Security, State Department, was

at an early date.

have worked closely with this Office since then on the

problem of evaluating the significanca of Subject's in-

formation as it affects the security interests of the

State Department.

16.

The problem of Subject's bona fides took on

particular significance and urgency in respect to the

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6.

work of tha Warren Comission.

According to subject's

story, he

had been in the rGs line of responsibility lor

Lee Harvey Oswald while Oswald

was in the soviet Union,

after the assassination of President Konnedy, Surject

participated in an investigation of oswald's activities

in the USSR.

In the course of his official duties, ne

alleges that he lad read Oswald's dossior.

subject was

therefore in a position to vouch for the fact that tha

KGB had never had any interest in Oswald; considerad nim

to be "abnormal"

and were delighted to get rid of hin.

(For good measure, Subject threw in a story about Oswald's

being a poor shot.) As Mr. Rankin; the Chisf Counsel of

the Harren Commission commented, if Subject's story could

be accepted at face value the Commission could easily

terminate its work sooner than it had expected, Fanxin

was informed

therefore that there were aspects of Subject's

information that caused us grave concern and that we were

not able to say that his information on Oswald should ie

accepted uncritically (sse Tai

I).

17. Because so much of Subject's information affected

U.s.

internal security natters for which the FBI bears

primary responsibility, and bacause of the possibility

that Subject was a KCB plant has a direct bearing on the

validity of certain FBI opsrations, the FBI has been kept

fully informed

on our views about Subject's bona fides

and our progress in interrogating and investigating him

from the moment of his defection to the present time.

Thus, C/CI Informed the FlI Liaison officer about our

reservations on subject's bona fides as early as 5 Febru-

ary 1964? the Director of the PET and ais deputy for

Internal Security, William Sullivan, have been kept com-

pletely up to date ever since, and we have coordinated

all major aspects of our hanüling of subject with them.

After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI repre-

sentatives to review Subject's case on 1 April 196%, the

FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict

Subject's movements and commence hostile interrogation

(sea Tab J) .

subseguently, the FbI has formally agreec

with our findings on subject, at least to the extent that

"On considering carefully the results of your interroga-

tions of Yuri HOSENKO and your analysis of his statemenis

and activities, It does appear he is not wiat ne purporis

to be.

while this Bureau is not in a position to drai

any conclugion in this case, ve do recognize it is possi-

ble that NOSENKO could be a

Soviet plant or agent provoca-

teur.*

(Sae Tab K.)

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7.

13. The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas

Kazzonbach (and several neuvers of his staff) were apprisad

of our reservations about subject on 2 April 1954 and an

opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of

tie exclusion and parole agreement, and as to not we snould

proceed in the event that it proved necassary to deport

Subject from this country. Portinent memoranda are attached

as I'ab I.

querias fron Congressmen, the Press, and the Pubiic

19. There have veen several queries from congresa-

men about subject's status and wheraabouts, and from the

press about the possibility of interviewing Subject.

general formula that was worked out to answer such raguests,

adapted as necessary to fit the specific request, runs as

follows:

*Juriy Nosenko requested asylum in the United States

in February 1964.

His reguest was granted.

The

information Mr. Nosenko is providing is regularly

made available to appropriate agencies of the

Governnant.

However, publicizing this information

and its spurce could only increase the possibility

of soviet reprisal against hi. Nosenio and othera

who may seek asylum in the Frze world."

Several specific examples are attached as Tab N.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness Of

Subject's True Status

20.

If we were to have the time to analyze and resolve this

at to Rave no ind

case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures,

it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from

loarning of our awareness of Subject's true status. Con-

sequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of

suspicions

about Subject, and the implications thereof:

has been rastricted to a very few

people in the Agency

and the

intelligence comnunity. Monetheless, as can ve

seen from paragraphs 11 to 19 above, we did advise key

policy echelons and principals in the intelligence con-

munity, even though this carried the inevitable risk of

leakage.

As you can see

fron Tab#, we have not disclosed

our suspicions about Subject in our responses to press

and

congressmen.

Even in our formal correspondence to the

PrIAB, for example, the most we have

said is that "sub-

ject's

bona fides has not been established" (see taù F),

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SovIet.

- Inseired Inuiries

2.1.

In 1966 there have been several indications

the Soviets

are naking a serious effort to find out

has nappened to subject and to force him to tha

SUI-

The most biatant and unusual of these is the

approach by a

journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known

KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris laton with ar

offer to provide photographs and natarials for

an exclu-

sive story of Subject and his family. According to

ROROLEV, Subject's wife is considering an approach to ar

international juridical organization in an effort to ob-

tain compensation from Subject for damages caused by his

abandonment of her and her childrer...

responding to

this approach through an official french service

, we hava

quoted

a statement, purporting to be from Subject himself,

to the effect that Subject considers this approach to

represent blatant and cruel manipulation of nis fanily by

the KGB and

that he will not lend himself to the scheme

by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Subject's Status

22.

Io recapitulate, Subject entered the united

States on 12 February 1964 on parola to the Agency under

the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Inmigration

and Nationality Act.

As we understand it, parole ra-

sponsibility is delogatad to the Agency by the Attorney

Goneral and the DCI on 10 February 1955, Which states:

"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intel-

ligence Agency will assume responsibility for care,

supervision and control of a kind and degree it

believes consistant with the internal security

needs of the United

States during continuance of

their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement,

and because we have reason to balieve that subjact is a

conscious and

willing agent of a hostile intelligence

service, we have seen

to it that subject was

under our

direct cbservation and control at all times from the

moment of his arrival in the United States. From 12 rebru-

ary to 4 Aprii 1951 it was possible to keep Subject at a

location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement

and of contact with the outside world.

Since & April 1964,

for reasons explained in paragraph 6 of this memorandum,

?

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3.

it nas

been necessary to lcep hin incommunicado at a loca-

tion which la known to no one outside of the agency fand

to very few within it). Authorization for Subject to

romain in this country under the special horsement 2I0-

cedures has been periocically extended by the Imigration

and Maturalization Service.

The current extension is good

until 17 February 1967 (see lab N).

23.

Although his freedom of movement has ween severely

restricted, Subject has not been maltreated and he has not

made any formal complaint about his treatment.

on the

contrary, he have saveral written statements from hin in

the past year in which he states that our handling of him

was

justified ard even beneficial (see Tav E).

Disposal

24.

Fron the time that subject was brought io this

country we have thought about the possibility of his event-

ual asportation as a contingency measure.

You will recall

talks on this in which you participated in tha spring of

1964: at that time ve thought that it might la possible

to mitigate the political ana propaganda drawbacks of a

foIced deportation by announcing that

subject has con-

fessed his true KGS role. With the passage of time. how

ever,

and in view of our much firmer conclusions about

Subject's real role and mission and our clearer understand-

ing of what this implies, It is apparent that great practi-

cal problems stand in the way of his deportation to

either the USSR o a thira country.

=.

USSR: Subject has categorically stated on

numerous occasions that he will never contenplate

return to the USSR, and although ve suspect that he

might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect.

him to act out his part to the end with loud protests

that he was being shipped to his deati, ets.

the possibility of expulsion was discussed with De-

partment of State officiala in 1964, boch tha Secre-

tary of State and Anbassador Thompson expressed

their concern for the adverse effect this might have

on other potential defectors. Forcible rapatriation

of political refugees is against long established

U.S- policy, and would be certain to arouse violent

reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United

States and the congressmen representing them.

Undar

these circumstances land we can be sure that the KGB

will do whatever they can to promote tha furor), an

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10.

alleged confession" sy subject would come undez

very close scrutiny. and might backfire very badly.

Another point that has to be considered is the

possibility that the soviets: again playing their

part, might refuse to accept subjaci on the grounus

that

he has

renounced his soviet citizenship.

The

only iccation considerad so

far fct turnover to the

Soviets has been Berlin, which was used for the

exchange of Abel-Powers and Lonsdale-wynne, and for

the transfer of several Soviet defectors who re-

quested return.

subject does not appear to fit

either category. On the other hand, if subject were

to agree to turnback, there is a real question as to

whether the soviets

would accept him in Berlin as

as to

they did

the others in the past. Their current

practice is to handle repatristion of soviet citizens

through the Soviet Embassy in Bonn.

Finally, if

Subject were accepted by the soviats on the basis of

force repatriation, the Soviets might carry through

the charade, try subject as a iraitor, and give wide

publicity to

stataments by him about his "maltreat-

ment by CIA," ete.

b.

Although we believe it

likely

that Subject would accede to deportation to

a third country, there is certainly no country in

the free world

on which ve could concaivably try to

unload Suvject without first infomning them of nis

true status.

Even if we considered this a cesii-

able objective (and we do not); it seems certain

that thè Depariment of State rould veto such a piece

of inter-governmental duplicity: on the basis of the

political risis

involved.

By the same token, it

appaars very

unlikely that any country would

agree

to accept this dangerous and troublesome Soviet

agent if they knew what they were getting.

Finally,

even if we were sonehow able to induce another cou-

try to take Subject off our hands, it is obvious

that at best wa

would have succeeded in exchanging a

short term, latent problem for actual and persistant

ones.

Once legalised in the west, with his movaments

uncontrolled and with free communication with his

KGB superiors, Subject woule nave tremendous opportuni

ties for creating adverse publicity to the Agency

and creating other serious trouble without ever con-

travening the laws of the country in which ie re-

sided. We cannot even exclude the possibility that

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il.

Subject might be able to convince a liaison security

or intelligence service that he is genuine: in such

a case, the possibilities of trouble and enbarrass-

ment are almost limitless.

25.

Regardless of where Subject is reported to,

several factors must se consiuered.

Would it ba necessary

to serve subject with a formal marrant of deportation?

II so, would he

have the rignt to denand and receive coun-

3€1?

Alternative Course of Action

26. Given sufficient time we believe that we coulä

persuade Subject to confass.

Althougn there have been

certain racent sions of erosion in his acility to stick

to his story, and perhaps even in his will to resist, we

cannot estimate how long a period of time might be re-

quired, but we do not believe that he is prepared to hold

out forever.

Once Subject confessed, we estimate that we

would roguire approximately a year in which to debrief

him, because it would be primarily from minute examination

of the details of how and when he was trained and briefed

by the KGB that we would expect to obtain a better reading

on the true nature and extent of KGB penetration of U.S.

intelligence agencies and activitiss.

During

that period

we would still wish to maintain the present circumstances

of handling subject, and would continue to respond to out-

side inquiries to the effect that subject fears for his

life, doesn't wish to be interviewed, etc.

Upon conclu-

sion of this debriefing period--and depending on our esti-

mate of the sincarity and complateness of suject's

confession--ve would then de prepared to provide subject

a new identity and an opportunity to settle in the u.s.

or elsewhere.

27.

Finally as can be seen from the sumary in para-

graphs 10-17 aboye, and from the material attached in

the tabs, we have coordinated evary significant aspect

of Subject's handling with the other U.S. Government agen-

cies who have a direct stake in one or another aspect

of Subject's case. Specifically, we would not contemplate

proceeding with any specific plan to dispose of subject

without coordinating this with the Department of state,

the Department of Justice and the FBI.

28.

We would like the General Counsel's comments

with particular respect to any gaps he may cetect in any

aspects of the Agency's legal position on Subject's case,

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12.

suggestions for improving this position, and, specifically,

his views on whether the authority for

parole granted to

the Diractor in 1955 nas been validated or updated by

succeeding Administrations or by legislation.

He suggest

that the General Counsel's review specifically include

identification of possible legal actions which the wife

or anyone else could initiate in faderal or state courts,

probable legal and publicity consequences of any such action,

and stormination of legal defenses and ways of handling.

publicity.

In reviewing this case and praparing an opinion

it is requested that the case not be discussed with anyone

outside the Agancy.

Isi Darid E. Murphy

David E. Murphy

Chief, SB Division

Attachments

PaD

A thru N

LEP COREI

EYES GILY

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