Document date: 04/17/2018
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10216

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :,

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 9/3/1963

PAGES : $5

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM- 685-63

3 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US-USSR Negotiations on the Establishment of

Observation Posts and Related Matters (U)

1. By memoranda, dated 10 and 13 August 1963, tho Assistant

Secrctary of Defense (ISA) requested the viows of the Joint Chiefo of

Staff on several alternative possibilities for negotiating an agreement to

establish observation posta in NATO and Warsaw Pact areas.

2. In his 10 August memorandum, Mi. Nitze asked specifically that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the current US position on ground and air-

field observation posts as found in the 11 April 1962 "US Position Papor

on Moasures to Reduce the Risk of lar by Accident, Miscalculation,

allure of Communications, or Surprise Attack."

In their reviow of

March of 1962 (JCSM-170-62), the joint Chicis of Staff had no specific

reservations concerning that portion of the position paper which dealt

with tho establishment of observation posts, but they did stress that before

seoking agreement with the Soviets, the basic concepte of the paper should

bo fleshed out, with assistance from our Allies.

3. In lino with these earlier views and to prepare for the approaching

discussions in NATO on these matters, the Chairman, Joint Chiofs of Staff,

has directed that an outline plan for observation posts be developed. When

approved by proper authority, this study could then provide a basis for the

US negotiating position on this aspect of the negotiations. It will list

preferred locations of observation posts for NATO, with suggested priorities

wherover feasible, and will list certain type areas where Warsaw Pact

posts in NATO territory should not be located. It will spell out the functions

of the observation posts' teams and will also suggest the manning and

I equipment for each of the various types of posts and teams. Finally;, it will

CopY

of.

_copies sach

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR

INTERVALS; NOT AUTOUATICALLY

DECLASSIFIED.

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addrons the dogrce and type of advid cosification, lf any, of military

maneuvers nocessary for the succo.. lul implomontation of the agroement,

and compatible with US military conailertions.

4. This study will be forwardou to you carly in September.

and until the alternative nogotiating pounitilitied have been thoroughly

ovaluated, it is recommended that the Dopariment of Defense take the

position that the United States should not initiate detailed negotiations with

our Allies, or with tho Soviet Union.

5. In his 10 August memorandum, Mr. Nitio also requested that the .

Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze cortain alternatives to the 28 November 1958

Soviot proposal. Each of the alternatives is discussed briefly below:

a. Agreement limited to control posts alone.

Although limiting

agreement to control posts alonc would reduce considerably the

possibility of detecting a rapid concentration of forces for a surpriso

attack, the establishment of such posts would be militarily acceptable

as a separato arma control agrcement if (1) the control posts were

located and allowed to operate só as to piovido optimum safeguards

against surprise attack and (2) the procedures for advanced notifica-

tion, if any, were restricted to military movemonts directly related

to NATO and did not include NATO assignod submarine movements

or unilateral US force deploymenis outside the Allied Command

Europe-Warsaw Pact area of NATO naval movements.

b. Agreement limited to control posts plus aerial photography.

The United States should seek this proposal in preference to tho

previous one, with the abrial surveillance being carried out in the

defined area on a 24-hour, all-weather basis, with no rostriction on

sensing equipment.

With rospect to the defined aroa, the Soviet 1958

proposal suggested an aerial photography zone in Europe extending

800 kilometers to the east and west of the dividing line between the

NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forcos, and also in Greece, Turkey,

and Iran. If these three countrics are to be included, the border

areas confronting them should likewise be' included.

As a general

rule, the United States should attempt to make the zone for aorial

observation as large as possiblo. In addition, negottations on ground

obsorvation posts should seck provision for the use of unarmed air-

craft to augment the capability of those posta.

2:

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c. Agreement providin! ior control posts, aerial photography.

and a reduction of foreign troops in Luzope:

The United States should

oppose any major reduction oi limitalion of NATO forces in Europe

until the causes of world tention have been reduced and an adequate

verification systom to police any foice reduction agreement has been

agreed upon and is in operation.

An agreement on observation posts

could be a firet step toward achievement of this objective. Further,

all proposals to reduce troops in Europe must be carefully analyzed

to insure that they do not piace NATO at a military disadvantage

because of the shorter Soviei nilitary lines of communication, and

the resultant relative ease with which they could reintroduce their

forces into Europe. Assuming a reduction in the causes of world

tensions, any major reductions would also have to be evaluated in

terms of their impact on NATO strategy and force planning. A

significant general purpose force reduction will result in a greater

reliance upon nuclear weapons and could lead to a downward trend

in Europe's defense efforts at a time the United States is encouraging

further build-up of forces.

Vith spocific referenco to Mi. Nitze's request for evaluation

of a proposal to roduce all foreign troops in Europe to five divisions

on oach side, such an agreerent might be militarily acceptable under

the terms described below if it followed establishment of observation

posts, aerial surveillance (because of the increased importance of

having early warning of enemy concontrations), and their associated

adequate verification procedures. If adopted in the near future, the

proposal would result in the withdrawal from West Germany to

within their national boundarios o approximately six plus divisione ..

two plus British, two French, iwo Belgian. As proposed, it should

entail no substantial reduction in US ground forces.

It would, however,

clearly add to the relative burden of the United States and probably

would be domestically unsatisfactory, particularly to the Congress.

An alternative to be explored should allow for sorne reduction of US

forces with other Allies moving forward to roplace them.

The Soviets, to satisfy the terms of the proposal, would have

to withdraw 15 diviclono from East Germany.

With arrangements for

rapidly moving NATO forces into their positions in times of tension,

NATO thus could conceivably make a relative gain from an agreement

of this kind. At any rate, the proposal has enough advantages to

NATO to warrant its consideration in conjunction with our Allies, at

the appropriate time, although the imbalance in the reductions probably

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would make tho proposal unaccoptablo to tho Soviets.

In any such

profosal, however, the risis that the Soviets may station volunteera

or disguised units within Easi Germany must bo rocognized.

d. An agreement providing for control posta, aorial surveillance.

and a reduction of foreign troops in Europe, and removal of weapons

of mass destruction from Germany. There appoar to bo no satisfactory

methods for determining the yicla of a nuclear warbead by verification

procedures that would be acceptablo from a security (restricted data)

point of viow. Further, there i: no present indication of soviet

weapons of mans destruction in Easi Germany. Thorefore, this

proposal has disadvantages to NATO with no compensating gains.

It is thus militarily unaccoptable and should not be negotiated.

6. On 13 August, MI. Nitze forwardod a supplementary memorandum

and roquested that a furthor altornative bo oxplored. It would include air-

flolds among the observation posts, would climinato aerial inspection,

and reduco forcos by ono third in Germany rather than in Europe. After

evaluation, the Joint Chiofs of Staff have rcached these conclusions: It

would bo most desirablo to include airfielda in the array of observation

posta. Aerial inspection should not be eliminated. The roduction of

foroign forces by ono-third in Germany should bo opposed since the reduction

of US forces of such a magnitudo is not militarily acceptable at this time

because it could destroy tho military and political cohesion of the Alliance.

The Soviet proposal could be modificd and Inade accoptable militarily if

any troop reduction war undefined in magnitudo at this point in time and

was made subject to negotiation following a successful poriod of operation

of offective observation posts and aerial inspection. Alternately, it could

bo mado acceptable by reducing lo,cign troops in East and West Germany

to fivo divisions, If the reductions were made as discussed earlior.

7. Any agreement on the establiahment of aorial inspection, observation

posta, and rolated matters will require agreement in principle with our

Allies prior to furthor exploration of basic Soviet views. Before oither

of these stops is undertaken, the specific conditions of implementation

the Unitod States would profor must be determined. With respect to

obgorvation posts, this should include the types and locations of posts, and

the composition of the observer teams.

The study now being carried out

for tho Joint Chiofs of Staff will provide a basis for a more detailed US

position on these aspocts of the problem.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not

baliovo tho llot of suggostod posts in the 11 April 1962 paper is adequate,

and they cannot endorse it for negotiating purposon.

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3. Basod on tho analyolo above, the jolni Chicís of Staff beliovo that

tho United Statos ahould offor a comprohonsivo altornativo to the Soviot

proposal which would procludo the poacibility of NATO's becoming

immodiatoly involvod with tho Soviets in lacussing troop reductiong in

Europo or romoval of weapona of mans dastruction from Germany.

We

should sook a proposal that to more compatiblo with NATO political

sensitivitios and military planning. The US proposal should be based on

tho fundamental principlo that the fixst stop towerd agroomont botwoon

the two blocs should be that of acgulzing agreod knowledgo of the military

forcos and movemonio of the other sido, It ahould set forth as thia initial

atop a comprohonsive control and inspection plan for the NATO and Warsaw

Pact aroas. Roduction in forces would follow lator.

The inspoction aros

should includo as wido an aros so poosiblo. Aorial inspoction, obsorvation

posta with scam mobility, and ovorlapping sadar coverago ahould be included.

Thero should bo, however, no control os inspection of nucloar weapons

as such; inspaction procedures rathor should concontrato on delivery moana""

and vohicles.

9. The Joint Chiolo of Staff boliova that a plan along the linos outlinod

In tho procoding paragraph would bo more accoptable than any of tho

altornatives discussod above. Its principal advantages are that it lo

limitod in scopo but, at tho same timo, lt provides for a soduction in tho

causos of tension and a bania for tecting Soviet intentions concerning

futuro moro significant stope.

Tho Joint Chiefo of Stoff thorofore recom

mond that a plan along those linda bo ovaluatod no the United Statos

proforred negotiating position for coordination with our Allios.

For the Joint Chiafu of Staff:

Sigred

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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