MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Document date: 1961-05-12 00:00:00
Document type: MEMO

# DOCID-32276732

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

5/5/2016

AGENCY: NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10261

RECORD SERIES: RICHARD GOODWIN PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:N\

66000 Date: 11-04-2021

DATE:

05/12/1961

PAGES:

6

SUBJECTS :

CUBA, COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMO

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS :

Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

07/07/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

From the Papers of Richard Goodwin: Subjects, Cuba, Covert Action, Box 4, Item 3a

v9.1

NW 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 1

45

---

## Page 2

exeet, 298-Santed ARRE in 1998

44p 1-2.554

EYES ONLY

SECRET

12 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

Meeting with ing, Manuel Ray

PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Manuel Ray

Ernesto Betancourt

Rogelio Cisneros

James A, Noel

Ray did not return to Washington until early morning on friday,

12 May 1961: He called me at 0700 from the airport. He was unable

to flea definite houx for us to get together due to the fact that he wab.

expecting an appointment with a person he did not name some time

duriag the morning. He later called a number of timee from the Hotel

Ambassador to advice me that he still had had no word on hle appoint-

ment. At 1145, MTy Betancourt called to day that he was with Ray

and Eugento" (Rogello Cieneros) and could we get together it oug-

gested they drive out to the Clarendon Hotel Court on Wilson Boulevard

where I had taken room for holding our meeting. They errlved in

Mr. Betancourt's Cor at approrimately 1230 noon time and we firet

went to the nearby Hogate Restaurant on Wilcon Boulevard for lunch

before we got down to the bustness of the prospectus.

Duriag lunch we did not discuss the plan but I did take the OP

portunity to stress in a moat sertoas way the need for absolute secrecy

concerning our discussions today and any future discuestone or devel.

opmento which might teke place in the future with respect to our relation-

shipAll agreed on the need for tight security,

After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately

1330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus.

Using Mr. Barnest out.

line as a general guldo, I strested the importance of being able to present

EYES ONLY

SECRETE

NW. 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 2

---

## Page 3

EYES ONLY

SECRET

-2-

to the proper people at the earliest possible time a carefully thought-

out plan of action which would set forth clearly the objectives - what

the project hoped to achieve; a statement of the problem; the strengths

of the Castro regime following the lil-fated invasion; the status of the

underground and its morale and capabilities; the extent of internal

support for and discontent with the regime,

etc., etc.

4. Talso spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities

which the Ray organization planned to engage in and the assets and

capabilities which they have or can acquire to do the job.

The need for

explaining the relationship and coordination of the plan with the Revolu

tionary Council was discussed at some length.

5. I buggested that be include in the plan an iterization of the kinde

of support which he would expect us to supply immediately as well as the

kind and quantity of support which would be required of us as the project.

developed:

6. 1 also suggested that the plan include their views on bow U. S.

liaison and coordination could best be worked out; how funds would be.

funneled into the project; what commo and other training would be res

quired, whether U.S. "real estate" would be needed, etc.

7. Ray outlined some of his thoughts regarding his proposed plan

of action. According to bim it contemplates action in three broad fields:

(a)- Underground activity - principally sabotage - In tbe

urban areas.

(6): Gradual buildup largely through clandestino infiltras

tons of small bodies of men -- of guerrtila forces la mountain-

ous and defensible areao.

(a) A psychological warfare campaign within Caba and abroad

almed at discrediting Castro and at the same time providing the

people of Cuba something to fight for

It 1s Ray p intention to depend almost entirely on maritime opera-

tions for the inflitration of personnel and materiel into Cuba, He also

rules out of bie plan the creation of another invasion army but does con-

template the training of groupe of perhaps up to 150 men in other friendly

EYES: ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 3

---

## Page 4

EYES ONLY

SECRET

-3-

countries of South America (be mentioned Venezuela as a poseibility)

and said he would explore the possibility of basing maritime operations

in non-U. S. porte.

Ray said some means, other than Swan Island, must be found

for reaching the Cuban population by radio broadcasts. He spoke of

the possibility of short wave broadcasts from Venezuela and utilisa-

tion of a commercial station in Miami which be understands Can be

clearly heard in Cuba.

10. Ray spoke of the desirability of stimulating the organization

of "Bro-True Cuban Revolutionary" etudent groups in many countries

of latin America (he said a successful organisation has been formed

in Puerto Rico) and of sending qualified representatives to those latin

American countries where there is Soviet diplomatic representation to

contact student and labor groupe and leaders in an effort to present to

them the true picture of the sorry state of students, workers, and

intellectuale in Castro's Cuba

11.

Ray is also interested in the possibility of putting out a "Newe

Letter" under MRP sponsorship which would discues various aspects of

the Cuban picture and set forth plans for Cuba after the fall of Castro.

He thought such a news letter could go a long way towards correcting

mistaken impressions among American university professore and la

other circles as to the true nature of the Castro regime, He pointed

to the rocent letter from 63 Harvard professore which was recently

published in the N. Y. Times as a "horrible example" as to how mis-

informed even university professors are on present day Cuba.

12.=Wben the discussions got around to the need for conducting

operations at least "under the timbrella" of the Revolutionary Counchl,

and the need fot obtaining Dr, Miro'e concurtence before the U.S.

would be able to support any operation, it was obvious that neither

Ing, Ray nor Mr. Betancourt holde a high impression of the Council.

Both feel that there in a strong possibility that the close public

identification of the Council with the recent Invasion may well have

discredited the Council to such an extent that it commande no eupport

or respect within Cuba:

for the sake of argument they were willing to concode that th

political advantages of maintaining the Council for the purpose of forcing

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 4

---

## Page 5

EYES ONLY

SECRET

-40

unity of the various exile groups may well outweigh its other obvious

shortcomings. However, both feel, and Mr, Betancourt wae quite

emphatic on this point, that the Council as a body is not capable of

directing clandestine actions against Castro and as a matter of fact

is opposed to say further efforts at overthrowing Castro by sabotage

and other subversive actions since they are completely "sold on

the thesia that Castro can only be removed by direct U.S. military

action and therefore a continuation of Cuban underground activities

can only result in needless and futile loss of lle. In the fact of this

attitude, Ray said he does not expect to receive much encouragement

for his plan from the Council, although he is fairly confident that

Dr, Miro's approval can eventually be obtained.

Mr. Betancourt thought that a workable solution might be found

to their problem it the Council would agree to concern itself exclusively

with (a) the current task of unifying the opposition, and (b) plänning for

ite future assumption of power as the provisional gövernment. Under

this arrangement, operatione aimed at the downfall of Castro could be

entrusted to those leäders and groups (such an the MRP, MRR, and

possibly the MDG) which bave both the assete and the will to do the

job. Mr. Ray thought that it raight be feasible to create an operations

planning board or command among the groups with demonstrated ansete

and thus avoid, unnecessary duplication and confusion and make possible

overall planning. " was obvioue, however, that he would prefer to act

autonomously in the execution of his program.

Mr.

Ray was very critical of Artime and claimed he was la possession

of sufftcient "facts" to convince him that Artime, in collusion with ele-

ments of the camps, were planning to eliminate the MRP and its leadere

from the picture, when the invesion succeeded, Me said he "know"

thet Artime was being financially eupported by wealthy ex-Batietlance

of the Miami area

133

Ray hinted at varlous timee that the MRP may at some potat

find itself faced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Council and

going it alone. He saye that the Council is composed of "good men" but

they havs no assete or cigaificant followinge and heve nothing to otter

the people of Cubs" and although the proclamation of the Council, ae

finally drafted, was a good one the "progressivel aspecte of the proclam-

ation were forced on the Council by the Americane and do not represent

the true feelings of the majority of the Council membere,

He said the

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 5

---

## Page 6

EYES ONLY

SECRET

- 5-

Cuban people are not likely to want to risk their lives on the basis of

promises made by the present membership of the Council. He feels

that acceptance of the Council would be improved by adding to ita

membership two or three more people whose names would be signi-

ficant and meaningful to the Cuban people. He did not name any

specific candidates.

14. Mr. Ray let me read a 13 or 14 page report which he had

just received from the MRP coordinator in Cuba (Reinol Gonzalez)

which painted a dreary picture of conditions in Cuba since the fallure

of the invasion, was critical of the inclusion of Batistianos and ninos

bonitos" in the invasion force; conveyed the strong feeling that the

Cubane had been betrayed by the Americans; and indicated that while

the MRP organization was still pretty much intact physically, morale

was almost completely shattered. Mr. Ray said he would provide me

a sanitized copy (there were some operational and personal details)

of the report for our information.

15. n view of this report from within cuba, Mr. Ray eaid that

he will wish to defer submitting his plan for our consideration until

he is able to receive word from Cuba concerning the capabilities.

willingness and feasibility of carrying out some of the activities he

has la mind. He said it le useless to submit a program of action i$

the human elements to carry it out are lacking or completely demoral-

eed. He thought he might be able to present bis proepectus within

approximately ten day. He said naturally he will not give the people

Inside any Indication that he has been diecussing a plan of action with

16. Turged Ray to consider submitting at least a preliminary and

admittedly tentative proppectus at this time based on the assumption

that his assets are still intact and will be willing to cooperate in order

thât it may recelve early consideration. However,

he stuck to his

belief that thie would not be practicable and reiterated the need for

prior evaluation of the strength and morale of his following

17. Ray asked concerning the detainees at McAllen, Texas, and

wondered il they have been released. He was told that as far as 1

know they aze still under detention. He said Mr. Goodwin had taken

their bames and promised to look Into the matter, Mr. Betancourt

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 6

---

## Page 7

EVES ONLY

SECRET

6 -

said be would check directly with Mr. Goodwin re their statue.

18: 1 invited Mr. Ray and/or Mr. Betancourt to call me over

the weekend in case either should want to discuss the matter further.

Thad the feeling that Mr. Betancourt was personally in favor of sub-

mitting now a plan covering "short term" needs of their organization

and it may be that such a paper will be submitted after he has an

opportunity to talk with Mix, Ray in private.

JAMES A. NOEL

JAN /dia

Distribution:

Original & 20 A/DDP/A

1 - C/WHD

1 1 AC/WH/4 & circulate

1 - Manuel Ray 201

•EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32276732 Page 7

---