BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY
Agency: JCS
Originator: OSD
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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Date :

08/07/98

Page

:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JCS

: 202-10001-10171

: FOIA SERIES

: DOC 172

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

i44 USC 2107 Note!.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

09=13-2017-----.

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE : BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

DATE: 00/00/00

PAGES : 24

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff.

by CIA, State,

OSD.

OPEN IN

2917

Reviewed

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

STATE

MAR

2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Date

Page

:

:

06/22/98

1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JCS

202-10001-10171

FOIA SERIES

: DOC 172

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE : BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES : 24

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED POSTPONED IN PART

CURRENT STATUS : OPEN

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

held to at are on indor

ENTERED

FAST TRACK

CTHIS DOC

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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•SECHE

SPECTAI

L HANDLINE

The Department of State releases this document

in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination:

Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

X7-MOR 155

5

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

A 323 Terested? (10)

OSD! NO OBJECTION

25J0N98

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і

=.

BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

Concerning the status of D0D plans ar

activities to date - our first completed

action was to obtain a DOD/UCS position

as to the military's stake and proposed

role in the ousting of the Castro Communi

regime. Basically, the policy refelcted

in this paper establishes that the milita

6.1 (C)

be gate,

will support State and ClA as necessary

during the preparatory phase of Operation

Mongoose in terms of supplies, transporta-

1/30/98 пр

tion, personnel and bases. It also

Reviewed on

Portion(s) Postponed Under

establishes the point that the military

believe the continued existence of the

Castro Communist regime is incompatible

with the minimum security requirements

of the United States and the entire

Western Hemisphere. It further makes

3.

the point that the military could inter-

vene overtly in Cuba without serious

offense to national or world public

opinion if:

a. We moved in response to a

humanitarian requirement to restore

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TOP SENT STEGAL TANGLINg

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order within cuba;

b. If we announced incident to

:...

going in; that we were moving in to

30

restore order and hold free elections;

and that we would withdraw from Cuba

as soon as the new government advised

that they had he capability to main-

tain order without further assistance

from OAS nations;

c. If the operation was conducted

3

as quickly as possible and with suf-

ficient force so that the Communist

-

Bloc's ability to take effective

counter-measures was reduced to the

minimum.

We feel voy strongly that without

damage to their international position

and simply by making the decision to do

so, the Soviets can take a page from our

4:

book and establish an overseas military

base or bases in Cuba. This wauld

, greatly increase our national vulner-

"‡ci

ability and our defense costs as forces

would have to be developed or shifted

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FUT DEVILI

SILOITE MINES

MUTANTE

6,

to meet this threat from the south.

It

would also provide the Communists with

a secure base for espionage, sabotage

and subversion throughout the entire

Western Hemisphere.

The Soviets have an option on which

they can foreclose at any time. They cai

make the decision to establish military

bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure

and if they exercise this option, we

would likely be unable to remove them

without initiating World War 11l. Con-

sequently, we feel it is mandatory that

face the facts squarely now, and determi

as early as possible whether we can rid

Cuba of Communism by covert support of

Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally

т.

mandatory, for logistic and planning

purposes, that we have an early decisior

as to whether we definitely intend to

use military force, if covert means fai:

We also feel strongly that the Uniter

States should intervene

to preserve

Cuban nationals identified as being

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Unat

essential to the establishment of a

friendly Cuban government if they are

in danger of being exterminated by a

widespread Hungarian type blood purge.

In furtherance of the DOD/JCS policy

that any military intervention should be

conducted as quickly as possible, and

with sufficient force to minimize the

Communist Bloc's capability to react, we

are working with CINCLANT in attempting

to reduce the reaction time of his con-

tingency plans for moving into cuba,

and at the same time to beef up his capa

bility so that there will be no doubt

as to the US ability to move in and

-..---..

take over rapidly. regardless of the

opposition we may meet.

Our primary plan can be activated

Ga, from a condition of no warning

and provides for confronting Cuban force

18

days

b(1

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8b

8C

(9)

TOT OT

with sufficient strength to be clearly

beyond Cuban capability to resist, to

induce early capitulation of their units

and to avoid needless loss of life.

A secondary plan can be activated from

a condition of no warning

L5.

ýs

/

although this plan involves?

regree of

cisk by a piecemeal commitment of forces.

CINCLANT is planning to reduce these

reaction times through prepositioning of

torces and materiel

This planning effor

should soon provides a basis for deci-

..........

sion concerning the extent we wish to go

in prepositioning without endangering

security and the element of surprise to

an unacceptable degree.

We feel that there is an alarming laci

of appreciation that time is running out

that we cannot let this operation drag

on for an indefinite number of years,

hoping to develop a massive resistance

capability within Cuba. We are concerner

that the new proposal de-emphasizes the

time factor by waiting until July before

5

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a decision is made as to

what to do next.

This would permit the Soviets (Communist

•n. ..

regime in Cuba) additional time to fore-

close on the options open to them, viz.,

entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/

or the establishment of Soviet bases in

Cuba. Either one of these actions would

9(4),

jadd new dimensions to our problem, and

introduce considerations which wauld

postpone positive action indefinitely +

not preclude for the foreseeable future

the elimination of the Communist regime.

In the event that the coming months

110.

may disprove the teasibilit

Ximof initiat

an internal revolt in cuba

It is sugge:

ed that Phase 11 might be

marked with

the execution of a Cover and Deception

Plan.

Normal training of US forces wou

be the primary cover; the deception wou

be concurrent efforts to convince the

/он,

communist Cuban goernment that we were

in fact invading Cuba. This course of

action could provide adequate provocati

for Us intervention depending, of couse

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100

buHB

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Cuban rashness in their reaction.

successful, we might not have to

engage in the more difficultand dangerou

game of developing pretexts

a1though

we should include this regatrement as a

final resort to assure successful initia.

tion of Phase il.

As I previously mentioned, one of our

primary responsibilities is supporting

CIA. To date, ClA has submitted coveral

requests for support. In each case,

action was initiated immediately and the

request processed expeditiously. These

requests included:

JUse of Avon Park, USAF Bombing

Range in Southern Florida, as an

exercise area for training agents.

(DOD has approved this request pro-

vided national policy permitted trair

ing, of Cubans on US military bases).

Assignment of a Navy Commander

ill,

experienced in small boat operations

handle their maritime small boat

activities

(The following day, the

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Chief of Naval Onerations approved

the request and directed the Navy

Bureau of Personnel to procure and

assign a qualified offcer without

delay.

c. Advice and assistance from BJ

(' unit to. a in testing oertain almola

tion devices. (Direct contact with

BJ No. 2 and appropriate ClA personne

was authorized)

D: CIA has infomally requested tr

to obtain 6 PT boats for their

use. (Staffing to date indicates tha

te Navy does not have 6 PT boats in

their inventory. They have 2 in moth

balls, 1 designated as a Presidential

escape boat, and 1 hull without a mot

The lead-time required to place moth.

balled PT boats in operation is 30

days at the minimum, at a cost of

$200,000 each. The purchase of

additional PTs requires an estimated

3 to 6 months after signing the con-

tract. The cost

per unit for new

Innboats.isostimated.atnlmillion.i

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The Navy is currently waiting ClA's

formal

request.)

ClA submitted a request to 000

for

use of certain personnel, supplie:

equipment, facilities and bases inclus

ing but not Imited to aircraft, boats

submarines and landing ships dock (LS:

plus the use of US Armed Forces to

furnish air and sea cover for ClA spo

sored activities. This request raise

several national policy decisions

necessarkto permit fulfillment of th

request

These policy decisions ae:

Whether, and/or to what exte

a policy of non-attribution to the

US Government will apply to projec

in connection with the activities

of the CSG.

(2) Whether, and/or to what

extent US bases and facilities shi

be utilized for training Cuban

refugees.

(3) Whether, and/or to what ex

US Armed Forces personnel will be

Taran",

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stateconcer

6111463)

Stale exce

• шви вилія

elsewhere

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employed on CSG projects and if so,

whether, and/or to what extent they

will be non-attributable.

(4) Whether, and/or to what extr

US Armed Forces personnel will be

employed within the territorial

boundaries of Cuba.

(5) Whether, and/or to what ext

overfliahts of Cuba for purposes o

leaflet drops, resupply and divers

will

be permitted.

Whether, and/or to what ext

Guantanamo wi11 be used as abase

agents, black flights and black

broadcasts.

Whether, and/or to what ex

use

itish-controlled and oth

foreian areas for staging areas v

be permitted.

(8) What

the priority of Of

tion Mongoose, as compared to oth

projects and operations.

We have also prepared an assessment

the risk

salved in air resupply missi

over cuba.e

she are, readyingstwo. US,

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sanitized aircraft and "sheep-dipped'

Cỏ t

ous for air resupply missions to

agents within Cuba, and we are assisting

ClA with ats maritime needs, including

help indubtaining PT type boats from

foreign sources, readying "sheep-dippe

bUt(3) crews and equipment as deemed necessary

and providing operational concepts.on

disrupting or destroying Cuban capabilit

of maritime coastal patrois.

In order to accomplish our assigned

tasks, I have a working graup with full-

time representatives from o*

mucH 51.623:226.7

i sis 6, 94/P&B and DIA, who serve,

as representatives of their respective

Directors and as action officers in

dealing directly with their respective

-directorates. Clif

Further, l have representatives of

each of/the services who abao serve full

time

the working

group.

They

WOrk

directly

with thee people on

the Service

staffs; the Operations Deputy, the

Deputy for Plans; and one action

off elinga

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obviously, my working group cannot

staff all the tasks placed upon us,

...

consequently, whenever possible, we

sanitize the tasks and have them accom-

plished by the Joint Staff or the

regular Service staffs.

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