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Date

Page

: 06/25/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10198

194

Released under the Johr

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USO 2107 Motel.

Cased:NM 54214 Date:

40-10-2017--

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GORUP (AUGMENTED)

DATE: 08/08/62

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS : CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/23/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION.

TO DECLASSIFICATION

DATE:

MAR

2016

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

54214

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1

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IOP SECRET _SPECIAL HANDLIN" WOFORN

• 4IIc 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject:

Consequences of US Military Intervention

in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation

MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special

Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement

Is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention

(1n Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment),

effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a require-

ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mobili-

zation required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to

this request, the requirement has been divided into lts

separate parts.

2. Regutrements (personnel, units and equipment)

a.

wonder borseize control of key strategie

02120

20

suba within 10-15 days with miniman casualties to

boch

aides about

261,000 lus military personnel would participate

Che

operate on.

• About 71,000 Army and 35,000 Marine, forces will be

engaged on the ground within Cuba. In addition,

approxt-

ma cera

,000. Army troops will be available as on-call

Conces

c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:

Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an

armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/

wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together

with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter

squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

d. Principal equipment includes:

(1) Army - Artillery units and armor (including about

275 tanks.)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

21

2 |

bl

Ts 21

21

bl

cy -

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EGRET SPEC

AL HAI

(2) Marines

Artillery unies

and armor (including

supporting airotart.

(3) Navy

Approximately 175-200 ships, Includin®

two aircraft carters

with approximately 180

aireral

embarked

(4) Air Force

About 490 troop carriers and trans.

pores,

312 tactical fighters, and 65 reconnaissance

and refuelling airorar

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs

units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not

• trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil

Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in

mobilization level would be required beyond the present

authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter

shipping•

c. Air Force - In order to land the maximum number of

airborne troops in the minimum time

fourteen Air Force

Reserve troop carrier squadrons (C-119) were originall

included in the airlift pla

however, CINCLANT and USAF

have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving

any mobilization prior to D-day.

d. Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent

political or military situation exists which would make such

a precaution desirable in order to assure US military

responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic

contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic

areas in Cuba within

10-15

lays. Subsequent to gaining such

control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal

of forces as the situation permits.

JCS 16,21

02l

16i

16,21

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• SECREL SPEE

CAL TIA

3.

hen the assault forces have been committed

uben operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS

Бро suppon CunE

forces for

the renaining five divi-

JCS

Storero that we my aroundon

21

force rould be available for other operations

Jays ai-

ter with rail from Cuba. Substantial Army forces

fron the on-call chelon will roliev: the assault forces

and remain on the islans to perform counterguerrilla opera-

tions and concuct military government activities. This force

will be progressively ithrawn as the new Cuban government

increases in effectiveness.

b.

The Atlontic Fleet amphibious troop

Lift capabil

JCS

16

(Tess

that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be

engeged

fully during

the initial phase of the operation

There

be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeploymen

and counterguer ila activity until order has been restores

It is anticipatel that most of these ships will be available

for other commitments

within approximately 30-45 days

About

0 to 50 per cent oi

the Pacific amphibious troop lift capa-

2)

bility will be employed in the landings in the

eastern end of

Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in

the Pacific

about 15 days after the withdrawal of the Paelfic

2)

Marines Prom Cuba.

In addition to the amphibious troop

l1ft

capability the initial requirements for sealift will include

MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration.

JC ver-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the

2\

mttial 10-20 days of the operation.

C.

tis estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlanti

Connand Marine division/wing tean will be restored within 15

JCS

days of withdrawa.

;combat-readiness of the Pacific Command

Marine expeditionary brigade within 30 days of withdrawal

3. For approximately ten

days, CONUS MATS airlift

would be fully committed.

TOP SFARET

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HAN

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LOP SECRET SPECIAL HAND

IN° _NUPUKN

e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United

States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air

Force forces brought into the area for this operation. There-

fore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas 1s

anticipated.

5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

a. The military reaction will be determined in large

measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as

well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency

in their use, at the time of US military intervention.

b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented

primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are

believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed

by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally

by protracted guerrilla warfare.

c. Guba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be

configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that

survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against

targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of

which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could

attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States.

All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the

Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to

guard against any such attempts at retaliation.

d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counter-

action will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the

Cubans with additional military equipment and training.

Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist

government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly

increasing capabilities.

LAD READET I

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN" NOFORA

6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is

contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban

forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support

a defeated Castro might receive for the conduet of residual

guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an

effective friendly Cuban government.

b. Following the establishment of essential military

control of the island, a substantial US military commitment

may be required in Cuba

for a significant period of time.

Post assault tasks will include restoration ef law and

order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.

c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above,

it is planned that the post assault military presence

initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on

forces with such other

sea and air support as may be required.

This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness

of

the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy

period of providing military assistance is anticipated.

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IND READEI

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