Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

176-10036-10126]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10126

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS

FROM :

TO : Lodge

TITLE : DOS Outgoing Telegram

DATE : 9/3/1963

PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 199: Vietnam,9/1/1963-9/10/63. Box 2

---

## Page 2

29 :

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Lepartment of State

INDICATE: D. COLLECT

E] CHARGE TO

00724

• Origin

SS

ACTION:

Indes

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

Amembassy SAIGON ENTRAINY

MCLUSIVE

CINCPAC POLAD/for Admiral Felt

317

SEP. 3 9 35PN'63

903

INFO:

EXES ONLY

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE.

CES OUT

Re your 403.

Results your talk with Nhu promising on surface but we fear stalling

tactics especially in light of CAS 05l and CAS 0537. Thus, Nhu in Dalat

would be some improvement, but he could still be power behind throne;

Madame Nhu's tour could be plus for her local prestige unless she stays away

a long time and takes a vacation rather than a speech-making woe world tour

(we would emphatically oppose her speaking in the US); dealings with

Buddhists depend on concrete action not expression of intent; broadening of

cabinet may or may not be real. In short, everything depends.on there being

real substance to Nhu's various proposals and change in GVN policies and

actions. If Nhu is sincere in his desire reach accommodation rather than

merely stalling, his initial offer may be subject to negotiation upward if we

maintain momentum. Accordingly, we should start negotiations with optimum

position, expecting that GVN and we might meet somewhere in between.

ONLY

Dralled bys

FE:RHilsman:mk 9/3/63

Clearanens.

The Secretary (draft)

White House

Mr. Forrestal (draft)

Telegraphic transmission and

cinssification soproved byr.

FE - Roger Hilsman

DOD - Secretary McNamara (draft)

DOD/ICS - Gen. Taylor (draft)

S/S - Mr. "Nobbe

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS

COPY IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

UNLESS

"UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM

8-81. DS-322

---

## Page 3

Page 2 of telegram to.

Amembassy SAIGON

SECRET

In this situation feeling here is that it is essential that central negotiations

should be conducted directly with Diem and that you should proceed to a first

meeting as soon as in your judgment you think it desirable. Bargain with Nhu would

only confirm his ascendancy. We should be inclined to press for earliest such meeting.

(Harkins should resume his routine military contacts; and, following your talk with

Diem, should resure frequent contacts with Thuan and Diem on military matters to

get on with war.))

You will have President's broadcast comments separately. You should

emphasize to Diem that President has expressed his views because of his concern

for the success of the war effort and his hope that the GVN will recognize the need

for changes in their policy and improvements in their government.

Subject to these specific comments, the following is guidance for your frst

conversation with Diem.

(a) General Posture: We will continue to assert publicly and privately US

discontent with repression which has eroded effort toward common goal of winning

war wntil there are concrete results in GVN policies and posture. Us not trying

to overthrow government, but engaged in candid and critical talks to improve it

Purpose of general posture is to give you leverage with GVN; avoid false public

impression US tried something and now backing off; and to avoid seeming to

acquiesce in repression; which would put US on wrong side fence with majority of

SECRET

---

## Page 4

Page.

3 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

SECRET

people inside Viet-Nam and the world,

(b) First Meeting with Diem: You should make points Deptel 294 re common

interests in defeating Viet Cong; difficulty for US Goverument in maintaining support

of American people in face daily juxtaposition US casualties and aid with repressive

measures; and common problem, under time urgency, of working out set of GVN

policies and actions that will make continued support possible.

Additional specifies are: release of remaining students and bonzes,

including satisfactory guarantees safety of three bonzes now in US Embassy;

removal of press censorship; restoration of damaged pagodas by the GVN; repeal of

Decree 10; and honest negotiation between GVN and true Buddhist leadership on

outstanding issues. You may assure Diem that if he takes appropriate action, USG

will do all in its power to improve public opinion of GVN in the US.

GP-L.

End.

RUSK

SECRET

---