Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

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180-10142-10413

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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Lee Harvey Oswald Was Not Associated As An Agent Or In Other

Capacity With The CIA

In 1964, the CIA advised the Warren Commission that

the Agency never had a relationship of any kind with Lee

Harvey Oswald. Testifying before the Commission, John

A. McCone, who was then Director of Central Intelligence,

indicated that Oswald "was not

an agent, employee, or

informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency

never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or

solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated

with him directly or in any other manner...Oswald was never

associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way

whatsoever with the Agency."

— McCone's testimony was

corroborated by Richard M. Helms, then the Agency's

Deputy Director for Plans and therefore the person directly

all CIA

responsible for/clandestine operations. _ Once these

assurances had been received,

the record reflects no

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Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduca

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further efforts by the Warren Commission to investigate

this matter.

The Committee sought to resolve the issue of Oswald's

alleged association with the CIA by conducting an inquiry

that went beyond the threshold level of obtaining statements

from two of the Agency's most senior officials. Instead,

a more analytical investigative approach was utilized.

First, an effort was made to identify circumstances either

in Oswald's life or in the manner in which his case was

handled by the CIA which were potentially suggestive of an

intelligence association of some kind.

Then, an intensive

file review was undertaken which included both the CIA's

144-volume Oswald file and hundreds of others from the CIA,

as well as the FBI, State Department, and the Department of

Defense.

Based upon these file reviews, a series of

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interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings were

conducted with both Agency and non-Agency witnesses. The

contacts with present and former CIA personnel covered a

broad range of individuals, including staff and division

chiefs, clandestine case officers, area desk officers,

research analysts, secretaries,

and clerical assistants.

In total, more than 125 persons, including at least 50

present and former CIA employees, were questioned

regarding this issue.

The results of this investigation confirmed the

Warren Commission testimony given by Messrs. McCone and

Helms. There was no indication in Oswald's CIA file

suggestive in any way that he had ever had any contact with

the Agency. Moreover, the Agency employees who would have

been in a position to know if Oswald had been associated

ith the cIA unitorm

denied that he had been an agent

• assitIcation

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or connected with the CIA in any other capacity. -

Finally, taken in their entirety, the items of circumstantial

evidence that the Committee had selected for investigation

as possibly indicative of an intelligence association did

not support the allegation that Oswald had an intelligence

agency relationship of any kind.

This finding, however, must be qualified because the

same institutional characteristics, in terms of the Agency's

extreme compartmentalization and the complexity of its

enormous filing system, that are designed to preclude

penetration by foreign powers have the simultaneous effect

of making Congressional inquiry very difficult For example,

CIA personnel testified to the Committee that a review of

Agency files will not always indicate whether an individual

was affiliated with the Agency in any respect. Nor was

there always an independent means of verifying that all

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SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

1. CIA Personnel in the Soviet Russia Division

In addition to obtaining testimony from former

directors John H. McCone and Richard M. Helms, the

Committee interviewed

individuals who were chiefs of the

CIA's Soviet Russia division during 1959-1963. * These

individuals categorically denied that Oswald had ever

been associated in any capacity with the CIA.

the Committee interviewed

To investigate this matter further, /the persons who

had been chiefs and/or deputy chiefs during 1959-62 of the

three units within the Soviet Russia division which were

responsible respectively for clandestine activities,

*The chief(s) of the Soviet Russia division from August 1962

to September 1963 was not interviewed by the Committee.

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American legal travelers,

and research in support of

clandestine activities.*

The heads of the clandestine

that

activity section stated during this period/the CIA had

very few operatives in the Soviet Union and that Oswald

was not one of them. Moreover, they stated that because of

his obvious instability, Oswald would never have met the

Agency's standards for use in the field.** The heads of the

*The American Legal Travelers unit used carefully selected

American citizens traveling

in the soviet Union to assess

the

potential

use of soviet officials they had met for future

intelligence work on behalf of the United States. For this

unit, only the years 1959-61 were covered. However,

since every American legal traveler who was involved

in this

program was recruited before Oswald's trip to the soviet Union,

the

relevant year

for Lee Harvey Oswald was 1959 because that

is when he departed from the United States.

**One officer acknowledges the remote possibility that an

individual could

have been run by someone as part of a "rest

pocket" operation without other Agency officials knowing

about it, but even this possibility, as it applies to Oswald,

was negated by the statement of the deputy chief of the Soviet

Russia clandestine activities section who commented that in 1963

he was involved in a review of every clandestine operation ever

run in the soviet Union, and that Oswald was not involved

in any of these cases.

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Soviet Russia division's American Legal Traveler program,

which utilized Americans traveling in the Soviet Union

as a means of obtaining information and identifying

possible subjects for recruitment, informed the Committee

that they met with each person involved in this activity

and that Oswald was not one of them. These Agency officials

also advised the Committee that only "clean-cut" college

graduates were used in this program, and that Oswald did

not meet this criteria. Finally, the Agency officers in

charge of the Soviet Russia division's research section

in support of clandestine activities indicated that, had

Oswald been contacted by the Agency, their section would

probably have been informed, but that this, in fact, never

occurred.

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2. CIA Personnel in

Tokyo, Japan

The Committee investigated the allegation of former

CIA employee James Wilcott, who testified in executive

session that shortly after the assassination of President

Kennedy he was advised by fellow employees at the CIA's

Tokyo Stationithat Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent who

had received financial disbursements under an assigned

cryptonym. Wilcott explained that he had been employed

by the CIA as a finance officer from 1957 until his resignation

from the Agency in 1966.

In this capacity, he served as a

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fiscal account assistant on the support staff at; the Tokyo

Station from June of 1960 to June 1964. Wilcott advised

that, in addition to his regular responsibilities, he had

served security duty on his off-hours..in order to supplement

his income. This additional job put him in contact with

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other employees of the tokyo station who would come by the

office and engage in informal conversations regarding

politics and their work.

Wilcott told the Committee that on the day after President

Kennedy's assassination he was informed by a CIA case

officer that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. Wilcott

further testified that he was told that Oswald had been

assigned a cryptonym and that Wilcott himself had

unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project using

that cryptonym. Although Wilcott was unable to identify the

specific case officers who had initially informed him of

Oswald's Agency relationship, he named several employees

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of the Tokyo Station with whom he believed he had subsequently

discussed the allegations.

Wilcott advised the Committee that after learning

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of the alleged Oswald connection to the CIA, he

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rechecked the Tokyo Station;disbursement records for

never

evidence of the Oswald project.

He explained that this was

because at that time he viewed the information

as mere shop

talk and gave it little credence.

Neither did he report

the allegations to any formal investigative bodies following

the assassination as he considered the information to be hearsay.

In an attempt to investigate Wilcott's allegations

concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the CIA, the

Committee interviewed several present and former CIA

employees who were selected on the basis of the position each

had held with the CIA during the years 1954-1964. Among

those persons interviewed were individuals whose responsibilities

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covered a broad spectrum of areas within the Tokyo Station

during this period, including the chief and deputy chief of

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station

as well as officers in finance, registry, the Soviet

Branch and counterintelligence. _ The Committee's

investigation refuted Wilcott's allegation.

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During the course of their employment in the Tokyo

Station,

none of these individuals

interviewed had ever seen

any documents or heard any information indicating that Lee

Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. _/

This allegation was not

known to anyone until the time of publication of warren

Commission critical literature and the Garrison investigation

in the late 1960's.

/ Some of the individuals, including

the chief of counterintelligence within the Soviet Russia

13

Branch in TokyO,

expressed the belief that it was possible

that Lee Harvey Oswald had been recruited by the KGB

during his military tour of duty in Japan as the CIA's

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Fokyo station had identified a KOB program aimed at recruiting

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U.S. military personnel in Tokyo during the period that

Oswald was stationed there. An intelligence analyst whom

Wilcott had specifically named as having been involved

following the assassination in a conversation regarding

the Oswald-CIA agent allegation told the Committee that he

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was not in the Tokyo stationjat that time. A review of this

individual's Office of Personnel file confirmed that, in

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fact, he had been transferred from the Tokyo stationto the

United States in 1962.

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Tho chier of the rokyo station]Erom 1962-2965 stated

that, had oswald been used by the Agency within the rokyo station

jurisdiction, he certainly would have known about it.

Similarly, almost all those persons interviewed who worked

in the Soviet Russia branch of that station indicated that

they would have known if Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact,

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been recruited as a CIA agent when he was in Japan.

These persons expressed the opinion that, had Oswald been

recruited without their knowledge, it would have been a rare

exception contrary to the working policy and guidelines of

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the Tokyo station.

3. Lee Harvey Oswald's CIA File

The CIA has long acknowledged that, prior to the

President's assassination, it had a personality file on

Lee Harvey Oswald. This file, which in Agency terminology

is referred to as a 201 file, was opened on December 9, 1960.

The Agency has explained to the Committee that 201 files are

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opened when a person is considered to be of potential

intelligence or counterintelligence significance. The

opening of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of

bringing all of the CIA's information pertaining to that

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individual into one centralized records system belonging

to the Deputy Directorate for Operations, that component

of the Agency responsible for clandestine activities.

The existence of a 201 file does not necessarily

connote any actual relationship or contact with the CIA.

For example, the Oswald file was purportedly opened

because he was considered to be a potential counterintelligence

threat. Oswald's file contained absolutely no indication that

he had ever had any relationship with the CIA. Nevertheless,

because the Committee was aware of at least one instance

(in an unrelated case) where an Agency officer had apparently

contemplated the use of faked files with forged documents, _

special attention was given to procedural questions

that were

occasioned by this file review.

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Why was Oswald's 201 file opened on December 9, 1960,

more than a year after his attempt to defect to the

Soviet Union?

A confidential State Department telegram dated

October 31, 1959, which was sent from Moscow to the CIA,

reported that Lee Harvey Oswald, a recently discharged

marine, had appeared at the United States Moscow embassy

to renounce his American citizenship and "has offered

Soviets any information he has acquired as Lan/ enlisted

radar operator."

_ At least three other communications of

a confidential nature which gave more detail on the Oswald

case were apparently* sent to the CIA during the same

*Iwo of these documents, Warren Commission Exhibits 917 and

918, contained routing notations indicating that they had been

sent to the CIA, but the documents themselves were never

found in Oswald's file.

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approximate time period.

Agency officials questioned by

the Committee have testified that the substance of the

October 31, 1959 cable was sufficiently important to warrant

the opening of a 201 file. In fact, however, Oswald's file

was not opened until December 9, 1960.

The CIA was requested by the Committee to indicate

where documents pertaining to Oswald had been disseminated

internally and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file.

In response, the Agency advised the Committee that because

document dissemination records of low national security

significance are retained for only a five-year period, they

are no longer in existence for the years 1959-1963. .

Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when

these documents had been received or by which component.

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An Agency memorandum, dated September 18, 1275,

indicates that Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960.

by virtue of the receipt of five documents: two from the

FBI, two from the State Department, and one from the Navy.

This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the presence

in Oswald's file of four State Department documents dated in

1959 and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. It is, of course,

possible that the September 18, 1975 memorandum is referring

Deputy Directorate for Operations

to State Department documents that were received by the

in October and November of 1960 and that the earlier State

Department communications had been received by the CIA's

Deputy Directorate for Operations.

Office of security but not thel

In the absence of

dissemination records, however, the issue cannot be

resolved on this basis.

The September 18, 1975 memorandum also states that

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Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960 as a result of

his "'defection' to the USSR on 10/31/59 and renewed interest

in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible

reentry into the United States."

_ There is no indication,

to any United States government official

however, that Oswald expressed/any intention of returning

until mid-February

of 1961. Finally, reference to the original form that was

used to start a file on Oswald does not resolve this issue

because the appropriate slot which would normally indicate

the "source document" that initiated the action makes reference

to an Agency component rather than to a dated document.

The Committee was able to determine the basis for the

opening of Oswald's file on December 9, 1960 by interviewing

and then deposing the Agency employee who was directly

responsible for initiating the opening action. This individual

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explained that the CIA had received a request from the State

Department for information concerning American defectors.

After compiling the requested information, she responded

to the inquiry and then opened a 201 file on each defector

involved.

This statement was corroborated by review of/State

letter

Department/which indicated that such a request, in fact, had

been made of the CIA on October 25, 1960. Attached to the

State Depart ment letter was a list of known defectors;

Lee Harvey Oswald's name was on that list. / The CIA

responded to this request on November 21, 1960 by providing

the requested information and adding two names to the

State Department's original list.

Significantly, the Committee réviewed the files of

eleven individuals on the original State Department list

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and determined that the files for each of the five (including

Oswald) who did not have Agency (201) files prior to the

receipt of the State Department inquiry were opened in

December 1960. In each case, the slot for "source document"

made reference to the same Agency component rather than to

a dated document.

Even so, this analysis only explains why a file on

Oswald was finally opened; standing alone it does not explain

the seemingly

long delay in the opening of the file.

To

determine whether such a delayed opening was necessarily

unusual, the Committee reviewed the files of 13 of the 14

persons on the CIA's November 21, 1960 response to the State

Department and of 16 other defectors (from an original list

of 380) who were American born, had defected during the

years 1958-1963, and who had returned to the United States

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during that same time period. Of 29 files that were reviewed,

eight individuals had been the subject of 201 files prior to

the time of their defection. In only four of the remaining

twenty-one cases were 201 files opened at the time of

defection. The files on the 17 other defectors

were opened

from four months to several years

after the time of defection.

At the very least, this file review indicated that

during 1958-63 the opening of a file years after a defection occurred

was not at all uncommon.

In many cases the opening was

triggered by some event, independent of the defection, which

drew attention to the individual involved.

b)

Why was Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file opened under

the name Lee Henry Oswald?

Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file was mistakenly opened

under the name Lee Henry Oswald.

No Agency witness was able

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specifically to explain how this mistake was made. All

Agency personnel, however, including the person who initiated

the file opening, testified that this must have been occasioned

innocently by bureaucratic error. Moreover, the Committee

received substantial testimony to the effect that this error

would not have prevented Oswald's name from being elicited

from the CIA's filing system during a routine name trace done

under the name Lee Henry Oswald.

What do the letters "AG," which are written in the

space for "Other Identification" on Oswald's 201

opening form, connote?

The form used to initiate the opening of a 201 file

for Lee Harvey Oswald containsthe designation AG in a box

marked "Other Identification." Because this term was considered

to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of

Oswald's alleged Agency relationship, the CIA was asked to

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explain its meaning.

The Agency's response indicated that "AG" is the OI

("Other Identification") code meaning "actual or potential

defectors to the East or the SINO/SOVIET Bloc including

Cuba," and that anyone so described could have the OI

code "AG." This code was reportedly added to Oswald's

opening form because of the comment on the form that he had

defected to the Soviet Union in 1959.

An Agency official who was a DDO records expert and

for many years had been involved in the CIA's investigative

efforts concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination, gave

...

the Committee a somewhat different explanation of the

circumstances surrounding the term "AG" and its placement on

Oswald's opening form. This individual testified that "AG"

was an example of a code used to aid in preparing computer

listings of occupational groupings or intelligence affiliations:

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He explained that these codes always utilized two letters and

that in this case, the first letter "A" nust have represented

Commurism, while the second letter would represent some

category within the Communist structure.

His recollection was

that at the time of the

assassination the "AG" code was

not yet in existence because

there were no provisions then in effect within the Agency for

the indexing of American defectors.

He recalled that it was

only during the life of the Warren Commission that the CIA

realized that its records system lacked provisions for

indexing an individual such as Oswald. Consequently, the

CIA then revised its records handbook to include authorization

for indexing American defectors and established a code for

its computer system to be used for the category of "American

defectors." Although this individual did not know when the

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notation "AG" was added to Oswald's opening sheet, he presumed

that it would have to have been following the addition of

the American defector code, thus placing the time somewhere

in the middle of the Warren Commission's investigation. He

explained that it was difficult to determine when any of the

notations on the opening sheet were made, since it was standard

procedure to update the forms whenever necessary so that they

were as reflective

as possible of the available information.

Finally. this individual testified that the regulations

regarding the use of this occupation and intelligence code

specifically prohibited indicating that a particular person

.. ...

was either an employee of the Agency or someone who was

used

by the Agency. .

This prohibition was designed to prevent

anyone from being able to produce any kind of categorical

listing of CIA employees, contacts, or connections.

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Why does the opening form for Lee Harvey Oswald's

201 file indicate that the file was to be restricted?

The form that was used to initiate the opening of Lee

Harvey Oswald's 201 file.contains a notation indicating. that

the file was to be "restricted." This indication was

considered potentially significant because of the CIA's

practice of restricting agents' files to persons on a "need

to know" basis.,

..

"Further investigation, however, revealed that restricting

access to a file was not necessarily indicative of any relation-

ship with the CIA.

The individual who actually placed the restriction on

Oswald's file testified that this was done simply to allow

her to remain aware of any developments that might have

occurred with regard to the file. This purpose was achieved

ecause any person seeking access to the file first had t

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notify the restricting officer; at that time the restricting

officer could be apprised of any developments possibly

necessitating access to the file by someone else.

This testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert

who further testified that, had the file been permanently

cha ged as well as restricted, the possibility of a relationship

with the CIA would have been greater. There was no indication

on Oswald's form that it had been placed on permanent cha ge.

Finally, the Committee reviewed the files of four other

defectors which had been opened

at the same time and by the

same person as Oswald's, and determined that

each of their

files had similarly been restricted. Each of these other

individuals

on the list of defectors that had been

exchanged by the CIA and State Department. None of the files

pertaining to these other defectors had any evidence suggestive

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of a possible intelligence agency association.

e)

Were 37 documents missing from Lee Harvey Oswald's

201 file?

In the course of reviewing Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file,

the Committee discovered an unsigned memorandum to the Chief

of Counterintelligence, Research and Analysis, dated

20 February 1964, which stated that 37 documents were missing

from Oswald's 201 file. According to the memorandum, this

statement was based upon a comparison of a machine listing

of documents officially recorded as being in the 201 file and

those documents actually physically available in the file.

While the memorandum mentioned that such a machine listing was

attached, no such attachment was found in the 201 file at

the time of the Committee's review. The memorandum itself

bears the classification "SECRET EYES ONLY," and is one of the

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documents that had been fully withheld from release under the

Freedom of Information review.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA advised

that because Oswald's file was so active during the course of

the Warren Commission investigation, up-to-date machine listings

were produced periodically. On this basis, the Agency stated

that "it must be assumed that whoever was responsible for

maintaining the Oswald file brought thie file up-to-date by

locating the 37 documents

and placing them in the file."

Because this response was incomplete,

the author of

this memorandum was deposed. He testified that once a

document had been registered into a 201 file by the Agency's

computer system, physical placement of the document in the

file was not always necessary. On this basis, he explained

that the items listed in the memorandum were not missing but

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rather had either been routinely placed in a separate file

because of their sensitivity or were being held by other

individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. He

further stated that in the course of his custodianship of

Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as many as 100

computer listings on the contents of the Oswald file. While

there had been many instances in which one or more documents

had been charged out to someone, he stated that he had never

discovered that any documents were actually missing.

According to his testimony, the 37 documents, in fact, were

available, but simply were not located in the file at that time.

..-.

f) Was there any evidence that the CIA had for some

reason maintained a dual filing system regarding

Lee Harvey Oswald?

Although the Committee was aware from its outset of

the possibility that a dual filing system -- using one

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ostensibly innocuous file and one which contained the actual

operational detail indicative of an Agency relationship with

the CIA -- could be utilized to disguise the existence of an

actual relationship between an individual and the CIA, this

awareness heightened into a concern with the discovery of

certain files which indicated that at least two Agency

officers had contemplated

the use of fake files and forged

documents to protect the purpose of the ZR Rifle project

from being disclosed. The ZR Rifle project was an executive

action (i.e., assassination) program which bore no relation to

the Oswald case. Richard Helms testified that the assassinations

aspect of this project was never implemented and, in fact,

was discontinued as soon as it was brought to his attention,

but the implications of this discovery in terms of the

potentiality for a faked Oswald file were troubling.

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In the Oswald case, there were two items which received

scrutiny because they were potentially indicative of a dual

filing system. The first involved a photograph of him that

had been taken in Minsk in 1961 and the second concerned a

copy of a letter that had been written to him by his mother

during his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of

President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in

the CIA's possession but neither was in Oswald's 201 file.

The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him

posing with several other people. According to the CIA, the

picture was found after the ?

assassination as a result of

a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially

relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union.

The

Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several

others not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in

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1962 from some tourists by the CIA's Domestic Contacts

Division, a component that frequently sought information on

a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad in

Communist countries.

Committee interviews with the tourists in question

confirmed that the photograph, along with 159 other

photographic slides, had been made routinely available to the

Agency's Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had

heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination or even

knew which photographs had been of interest to the Agency.

CIA records indicate that only five of the 160 slides

initially made available were retained.

Committee

interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled the

slides for the Domestic Contacts Division established that

Oswald had not been identified at the

time that these

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photographic materials had been made available.

One

of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been

retained because it depicted a Soviet intourist guide; the

other employee indicated that the picture had been kept

because it showed a crane in the background. _ The

employee who worked at CIA headquarters confirmed that the

photograph of Oswald had not been discovered until a post-

assassination search of the Minsk graphics file for materials

pertaining to Oswald.

Accordingly, this photograph is not evidence that the

CIA maintained a dual filing system with respect to Oswald.

The picture apparently was kept in a separate file only until

1964 when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its

subjects.

The Committee's investigation of a letter concerning

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Oswald that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not

result in any evidence of a dual filing system. This letter,

dated July 6, 1961, had been sent to Marguerite Oswald to her

son, but was intercepted as a result of a CIA mail intercept

program.

/ This program, known as HT-Lingual, attempted

to intercept letters being sent between the United States and

Russia

in an effort to obtain both positive intelligence and

counterintelligence information. _/ Typically, intercepted

letters and/or their envelopes would be photographed and then

returned to the mails.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA explained

that because of the project's extreme sensitivity, all

materials generated as a result of mail intercepts were stored

in a separate projedrs file which was maintained by the

counterintelligence staff.

Consequently, such items were

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not placed in 201 files.

This explanation was confirmed by

the testimony of a senior officer from the counterintelligence

staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project files.*

9)

Was there any evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had

ever participated in a CIA counterintelligence

staff project?

The Committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining

to Oswald** resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four

index cards, two pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and two

*Since Oswald was the subject in approximately 50 communications

during his stay in the Soviet Union, the Committee also

questioned why the Agency ostensibly had just one letter

in its possession directly related to Lee Harvey Oswald.

In essence, this may be explained by the fact that HT-Lingual

only operated four days a week and even then only on a

sampling basis.

**Although the Agency had only one letter in its possession

directly related to Oswald, after the assassination the

HT-Lingual files were combed for additional materials potentially

related to him.

Approximately 50 pieces of correspondence were

discovered. None of these were ultimately judged to be of any

significance.

These materials,

however, were stored in a

separate Oswald HT-Lingual file.

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pertaining to Marina Oswald, which were dated after the

assassination of President Kennedy. The pages containing the

reproductions of these cards are stamped "Secret Eyes Only."

The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald is dated

9 November 1959 and states that Oswald is a recent defector to

the USSR and a former Marine. It also bears the notation

"CI/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations.

The second

card on Oswald places him in Minsk, USSR.

It contains

background information on him and states that he "reportedly

expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain

conditions." This card is dated 7 August 1961 and also bears

the notation "WATCH LIST."

These cards, particularly the

reference to "CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether

Lee Harvey Oswald was, in fact, involved in some sort of CI

project.

The Committee

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may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual

program in general and these cards in particular. Some of

these employees recognized the cards as relating to the

HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning

of the notation, "CI/Project/RE."

However, one person testified that the "CI Project"

was

"simply a name of convenience which was used to describe

the HT-Lingual project"; another person testified that

"CI Project" was

the name of the component which ran the

HT-Lingual project. The latter explained that "RE" represented

the initials of a person who had been a translator of foreign

language documents and that the initials had probably been

placed there so that someone could come back to the translator

if a question arose concerning one of the documents.

Another employee testified that the "Watch-List" notation on

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the second card referred to a list of persons who had....

been identified as being of particular interest in the Agency

with respect to the mail intercept program.

The Committee requested the CIA to provide an

explanation for the terms "CI/Project/RE," and "watch List,"

and for the significance of the handwritten notations appearing

on the index cards. In addition, the Committee requested a

description of criteria utilized in compiling a "watch list."

In regard to the meaning of the notation "CI/Project/RE,".

the CIA explained that there existed an office within the

Counterintelligence staff that was known as "CI/Project," a

cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the

office's functions. In fact, this office was responsible for

the exploitation of the material produced by the HI-Lingual

project. The response further explains that "RE" represents

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the initials of a former employee who is presently retired under

cover.

In responding to a request for the criteria used in

compiling a "Watch List," the CIA referred to a section of

the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities

within the United States, which states:

Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence

interest

(one should also add counterintelligence

interest) were specified in Watch Lists provided

to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff,

by other CIA components, and by the FBI.

The total

number of names on the Watch List varied, from time

to time, but on the average, the list included

approximately 300 names,

including about 100 furnished

by the FBI.

The Watch List included the names of

foreigners

and of United States citizens.

Thus, the full meaning of the notation is that on

9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the "Watch List"

for the HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card --

that Oswald was a recent defector to the USSR and a former

Marine.

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The response goes on to state that the handwritten

number, #7-305, which also appears on the first card, is a

reference to the communication from the CI Staff to the Office

of Security expressing the former's interest in seeing any

mail to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union.

Finally, the

other handwritten notation, "N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59," signifies

that a name trace run through the central records register

indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as per

that date.

The Agency's explanation of the meaning of the second

card is that on 7 August 1961, Mrs. Egerter requested that

Oswald's name be placed on the "Watch List" because of

Oswald's expressed desire to return to the U.S. as stated on

the card. The handwritten notation indicates, in this instance,

that Oswald's name was deleted from the "Watch List" on 28 May 1962.

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In reference to the two cards on Marina Oswald, the

Agency stated that her name was first placed on the "Watch

List" on 26 November 1963 because she was the wife of Lee

Harvey Oswald. The second card served the purpose of adding

the name Marina Oswald Porter to the "Watch List" on

29 June 1965 after she remarried. Both names were deleted

from the list as of 26 May 1972.

Thus, the statements of former CIA employees were

corroborated by the Agency's response regarding the explanation .

of the index cards in the CIA's HT-Lingual files pertaining to

Oswald. The explanations attested to the fact that the

references on the cards were not demonstrative of an Agency

relationship with Oswald, but instead

were examples of notations

routinely utilized in connection with the HT-Lingual project.

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4.

Dia the CIA ever debrief Lee Harvey Oswald?

The CIA has denied ever having had any contact with.

Lee Harvey Oswald, and its records are consistent with this

position. Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division

which routinely attempts to solicit information on a

nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad, the

absence of any record indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald, a

returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory,

had not been debriefed has been considered by Warren Commission

critics to be either inherently noncredible (i.e.,

record has been destroyed) or indicative that Oswald had been

contacted through other than routine Domestic Contact Division

channels.

After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this

issue, the Committee's initial point of inquiry was to interview

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the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research

related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union who

had written a November 25, 1963 memorandum which indicated that,

upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union, * this officer

had considered "the laying of interviews lon him/ through

Lthe Domestic Contacts Divison/ or other suitable channels."

This individual indicated that Oswald was considered suspect

because the Soviets had appeared to have been very solicitous

of him. For this reason, a nonclandestine contact, either by

the Domestic Contacts Division or other "suitable channels"

such as the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

*The memorandum indicates that the possibility of an Oswald

contact was discussed during the summer of 1960, but the author

indicated that the conversation actually took place during

the summer of 1962, shortly before his transfer to a new

assignment.

During the summer of 1960, the author was not

on an active assignment.

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was considered. The officer stated, however, that to his

knowledge, no contact with Oswald was ever made; moreover, if

a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated that he would

have been informed. Finally, he stated that Oswald was

considered a potential lead, but only of marginal importance,

and therefore the absence of a debriefing was not at all

unusual.

The Committee interviewed five other Agency employees

who were in a position to have discussed Oswald in 1962 with

the author of this memorandum, including the person who

replaced the author of the memorandum as chief of the research

section, but none of them could recall any such conversation.

Interviews with personnel from the Soviet Russia Division's

clandestine operations section, the American legal travelers

program, and the clandestine activity research section failed

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to result in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been

contacted at any time by the CIA.

The author of the November 25, 1963 memorandum also

informed the Committee that the CIA maintained a large

volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which

Oswald worked. This information was stored in the Office of

Research and Reporting. → Another former CIA employee, who

had worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet

branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the

Committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence

regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, this individual

claims that during the summer of 1962 he reviewed a contact

report from representatives of the CIA's New York field office

who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk

Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This defector,

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whom the employee believes may have been Oswald, had been

living with his family in Minsk.

The employee advised the Committee that the contact

report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant

which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch,

then a component of the Office of Central Reference. Accordingly,

the Committee requested that the CIA provide both the above-

described contact report and the volume of materials

concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. A review by the Committee

of the documents in the volumes on the Minsk Radio Plant,

however, revealed that no such contact report existed in

that file.

The CIA has stated to the Committee that between 1958

and 1963 it had no procedure for the systematic debriefing of

overseas travelers, including returning defectors.

Instead,

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the Agency relied upon the FBI both to make such contacts and

report any significant results.

To investigate this question further, the Committee

reviewed the files of 22 individuals (selected from an original

list of 380 possible Soviet defectors) who were born in America

and appeared to have returned to the United States between

1958 and 1963.* Of these 22 individuals, only four were

interviewed at any time by the CIA. These four instances

tended to involve particular intelligence or counterintelligence

needs, but this was not always the case.

Based upon this file-review, it appears that, in fact,

the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter

*An effort was also made to review only the files of American-

born individuals who had defected during these years. Not

all of the 22 individuals, however, met this criteria.

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of standard operating procedure. For this reason, the

absence of any Agency contact with Oswald upon his return from

the Soviet Union cannot be considered in any way unusual,

particularly since the FBI did fulfill its jurisdictional

obligation to conduct such interviews.

5. The Justice Department's Failure to Prosecute Lee Harvey

Oswald for Offering to Give Intelligence Information to

the Soviet Union

When Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the United States

Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959 for the purpose of

renouncing his American citizenship, he allegedly offered to

give the Soviets information that he had acquired as a

Marine Corps radar operator.

The Committee sought

to determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute

Oswald for his offer to divulge this kind of information.

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A review of Oswald's correspondence with the American

embassy in Moscow indicates that on February 13, 1961 the

embassy received a letter from him in which he expressed a

"desire to return to the United States if...some agreement

[could be reached? concerning the dropping of any legal

proceedings against /him/." _/ On February 28, 1961, the

embassy sought guidance from the State Department concerning

Oswald's potential liability to . criminal prosecution. —

The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961 that.

it was "not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his

desired return to the United States he may be amenable to

prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation

of the laws of the United States..

.."

On May 10, 1961, Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a

"full guarantee" against the possibility of prosecution. —

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He visited with embassy consul Richard Snyder on July 16,

1961, and denied that he had ever given any information to

the Soviets. /

Snyder advised Oswald on an informal basis

that, while no assurances could be given, the embassy did not

perceive any basis for prosecuting Oswald for an offense

involving any severe punishment.

There is no record that the State Department ever

gave Oswald any assurances that he would not be prosecuted.

Upon his return to the United States, Oswald was interviewed

twice by the FBI. On each occasion, he denied ever giving

any information to the Soviet Union. _/

In a response to a Committee request, the Department of

Justice indicated that prosecution of Oswald was never

considered because his file contains no evidence that he had

ever revealed or offered to reveal national defense information

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to the Soviet Union.

/ In a subsequent response, the

Department acknowledged the existence of some evidence that

Oswald had offered information to the Soviet Union, but

stated that there were, nevertheless, serious obstacles to a

possible prosecution:

It (Department file) does contain a copy of

an FBI memorandum, dated July 3, 1961, which

is recorded as having been received in the

Justice Department's Internal Security

Division on December 10, 1963, which states

that the files of the Office of Naval

Intelligence contained a copy of a Department

of State telegram, dated October 31, 1959,

at Moscow.

The telegram, which is summarized

in the FBI report, quoted Oswald as having

offered the Soviets any information he had

acquired

as

a radar operator.

The FBI report

did not indicate that the information to

which Oswald had access as a radar operator

was classified.

Oswald returned to the United States on

June 13, 1962.

He was interviewed by the

the

FBI on June 26,

1962, at Fort Worth,

Texas, at which time

he denied furnishing

any information to the Soviets concerning

his Marine Corps experiences. He stated

that he never gave the Soviets any information

which would be used to the detriment of the

United States.

In sum, therefore, the only "evidence"

that Oswald ever offered to furnish

information to the soviets is his own

reported statement to an official at the

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U.S. embassy in Moscow.

That statement,

of course, was contradicted by his denial

to the FBI, upon his return to the United

States, that he had ever made such an offer.

In the prosecution of a criminal case, the

Government cannot establish

a prima facie

case solely on a defendant's unsupported

confession.

The Government must introduce

substantial independent evidence which woulo

tend to establish the trustworthiness of the

defendant's statement.

See, Opper v.

United States, 348 U.S. 84

(1954).

Accordingly, in the absence of any information

that Oswald had offered to reveal classified information

to the Soviets, and lacking corroboration of his

statement that he had proferred information of any

kind to the Russians, we did not consider his

prosecution for violation of the espionage statutes,

18 U.S. C. §8

$ 793,793.

Based upon this analysis, there is no evidence that

Oswald received favorable treatment from either the State

Department or the Justice Department regarding the possibility

of a criminal prosecution.

6.

Oswald's Contacts with Americans in the Soviet Union

a)

Priscilla Johnson McMillan

Priscilla Johnson McMillan, author of Marina and Lee,

became a subject of the Committee's inquiry because she was

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one of two American correspondents who had obtained an interview

with Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in Moscow in 1959. The

Committee sought to investigate the allegation that Ms. McMillan's

interview with Oswald had been arranged by the CIA.

John McVickar, a consul at the American embassy,

testified that he had Oswald's case with Ms. McMillan, and

that he thought "she might help us in communicating with him

and help him in dealing with what appeared to be a very strong

personal problem if she were able to talk with him." —

McVickar stated, however, that he had never worked in any

capacity for the CIA, nor did he believe that Ms. MCMillan

had any such affiliation.

The Committee's review of Mr.

McVickar's State Department and CIA files confirmed that he had

never been associated with the CIA.

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According to Ms. McMillan's testimony about the events

surrounding her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald, in November

1959 she had just returned from a visit to the United States

where she covered the Camp David summit between President

Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. On November 16, 1959, she

went to the American embassy to pick up her mail for the first

time since her return to the Soviet Union. The mail pickup

facility was in a foyer near the consular office. Consular

Officer John A. McVickar came out of this office and welcomed

McMillan back to the Soviet Union. They exchanged a few

words, and as she was leaving, McVickar commented that at

her hotel was an American who was trying to defect to the

Soviet Union. McVickar stated that the American would not

speak to "any of us," but might speak to McMillan because she

was a woman. She recalls that as she was leaving, McVickar

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told her to remember that she was an American.

McMillan proceeded to her hotel, found out the

American's room number, knocked on his door, and asked him

for an interview. The American, Lee Harvey Oswald, did not

ask her into the room, but he did agree to talk to her in her

room later that night. No American government official

arranged the actual interview with Oswald.

She met with Oswald

just once. She believes that McVickar called her on November 17,

the day after her interview with Oswald, and asked her to supper.

That evening at supper they discussed her interview with Oswald.

McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald and felt that

the attitude of another American consular official might have

pushed Oswald further in the direction of defection. McVickar

indicated a personal feeling that it would be a sad thing for

Oswald to defect in view of his age, but he did not indicate

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that this was the U.S. Government's position (p.18).

Ms. Millan also testified that she had never worked for

the CIA, nor was she connected with any other federal government

agency at the time of her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald.

According to an affidavit that Ms. McMillan filed with the

Committee, her only employment with the federal government was

as a 30-day temporary translator for the Joint Press Reading

Service, an organization that was operated by the American,

British, and Canadian embassies in Moscow.

Finally, Ms. McMillan testified that because of her

background in Russian studies, she applied for a position with

the CIA in 1952 as an intelligence analyst. The application

was withdrawn, but the CIA completed its security check on

her and denied her a security clearance. She acknowledged

being debriefed by an Agency employee in 1962 after returning

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from her thrid trip to the Soviet Union, but explained that this

contact was in some way related to the confiscation of her

notes by Soviet officials.*

The Committee's review of CIA files pertaining

to Ms. McMillan corroborated her testimony. There was no

indication in the file suggesting that she had ever worked for

*In November 1962, I had

a conversation with a man who

identified himself as a C.I.A. employee and gave his name as

either Donald Jameson or James MacDonald. I agreed to see him

in part because the confiscation of my papers and notes had

utterly altered my situation -- I now had no hope of returning

to the u.s.S.R. and was free for the first time to write what

I knew.

I was preparing a series of articles for The Reporter

which would contain the same information about which Mr.

Jameson had expressed a desire to talk to me. Finally, during

the latter part of my 1962 trip to the U.S.S.R., I had been

under heavy surveillance and the K.G.B. knew what Soviet citi-

zens I had seen.

Many of those I had talked to for the Reporter

articles were Russian "liberals" (anti-Stalin and pro-Khrushchev)

What reprisals might befall those whom I had interviewed I

did not know, but since my notes were now part of the K.G.B.

files, I felt that it might help them if the C.I.A. knew that

which

the K.G.B. already knew. My meeting with Mr. Jameson,

which occurred at the Brattle Inn, Cambridge, was

a reversal of

my usual effort to avoid contact with the C.I.A., and the

subject matter was confined to my impressions of the Soviet

literary and cultural climate.

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the CIA. In fact, there was some evidence suggesting. that the

Agency was reluctant even to debrief her after her trips to

the Soviet Union. An interview with the former Agency official

who had been deputy chief and then chief of the American legal

travelersprogram during the years 1958 to 1961 confirmed that

Ms. McMillan had not been used by the CIA in that program.

There was information in Ms. McMillan's file indicating

that on occasion during the years 1962-65 she had provided

cultural and literary type information to the CIA. None of

this information, however, was suggestive in any way of a

clandestine relationship. Accordingly, there is no evidence

that Ms. McMillan ever worked for the CIA or received the

Agency's assistance in obtaining an interview with Lee Harvey

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Oswald. *

b)

Richard E. Snyder

Richard E. Snyder was the consular official in the United

States Moscow embassy who handled the Oswald case. It was

Snyder with whom Oswald met in 1959 when Oswald sought to renounce

his American citizenship. Two years later, when Oswald

initiated his inquiries about returning to the United States,

Snyder again became involved in the case. Warren Commission

critics have alleged that Snyder was associated in some way

with the CIA during his service in the Moscow embassy.

In his Committee depositon, Richard Snyder acknowledged

that for an eleven-month period during 1949-50 he worked for

*Nor is there any basis, based upon Ms. McMillan's testimony,

CIA files, and an affidavit provided by McMillan's publisher,

Harper and Row, to support the allegation that the CIA

financed the book Marina and Lee.

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the CIA while he was on the waiting list for a foreign service

appointment with the State Department. Snyder testified,

however, that, since resigning from the CIA in March of 1950,

he has had no contact with the CIA other than a letter

written in 1970 or 1971 inquiring about employment on a

contractual basis.*

The Committee reviewed Snyder's files at the State

Department, Defense Department, and the CIA. Both the

State Department and Defense Department are consistent with

his testimony. Snyder's CIA file revealed that at one time

prior to 1974 it had been red flagged and maintained on a

segregated basis. The file contained a routing indicator

which stated that the file had been red flagged because of a

*Snyder also denied contact with any other intelligence

service while active as

foreign service officer.

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"DCI statement and a matter of cover" concerning Snyder.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA indicated

that the DCI statement presumably refers to comments which

former DCI Richard Helms had made in 1964 concerning the

Oswald case when Helms had been Deputy Director for Plans.*

The CIA also stated that Snyder's file had been flagged at the

request of DDO/CI to ensure that all inquiries concerning

Snyder would be referred to that office. The Agency was unable

to explain the reference to "cover" because according to its

records Snyder had never been assigned any cover while employed.

Further, the Agency stated that "It/here is no record in Mr.

Snyder's Official Personnel File that he ever worked, directly

*Responding to a newspaper allegation that Oswald had met with CIA

representatives in Moscow, Richard Helms wrote a memorandum to

the Warren Commission on March 18, 1964 in which he stated the

"desire to state for the record that the allegation carried in

this press report is utterly unfounded as far as the CIA

is concerned."

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or indirectly, in any capacity for the CIA after his

resignation on 26 September 1950."

The Committee does not regard this explanation as

satisfactory, especially since Snyder's 201 file indicates that

for approximately one year during 1956-1957 he was used by an

Agency case officer as a spotter at Harvard University because

of his access to other students who might be going to the

Soviet Union, nor was the Agency actually able to explain

specifically why someone considered it necessary to red

flag the Snyder file.

The remainder

of the snyder file, however, is entirely

consistent with his testimony before the Committee concerning

the absence of Agency contacts.

In addition, the CIA

personnel officer who handled Snyder's case in 1950 confirmed

that Snyder had, in fact, terminated his employment with the

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CIA at that time. Moreover, he added that Snyder did not go

to the State Department under any kind of cover arrangement.

This position was confirmed by a former State Department

official who was aware of procedures for State Department

cover for CIA employees. In addition, this individual stated

that at no time from 1959 to 1963 did the CIA use the State

Department's overseas consular positions as cover for CIA

intelligence officers.

(Insertion to follow -- Analysis)

c) Dr. Alexis H. Davison

Dr. Alexis H. Davison was the U.S. Embassy physician in

Moscow from May 1961 to May 1963. In May 1963 he was expelled

from the Soviet Union in connection with the Penkovsky spy

case. After "Classitication:

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discovered that the name of Dr. Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal

Davison, and her Atlanta address were in Oswald's address book

under the heading "mother of U.S. Embassy doctor." In

addition, it was also determined that the flight which

Oswald, his wife and child took from New York to Dallas on

June 14, 1962 had stopped in Atlanta.

For this reason, it has been alleged that DI. Davison

was Oswald's intelligence contact in Moscow.

In a Committee interview, DI. Alexis Davison stated that

he had been a physician in the U.S. Air Force and was stationed

in Moscow as the U.S. Embassy physician from May 1961 to

May 1963. In this capacity, it was his duty to perform

physical examinations on all Soviet immigrants to the United

States.

He recalls that most of these immigrants were elderly,

but he remembers two young women, one who was a mathematics

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teacher from the south of Russia and one who was married to

an American. The latter was very frightened by the prospect

of going to the United States.

She stated that she was going

to Texas with her husband. Davison said that if she and her

husband traveled through Atlanta on their way to Texas, his

mother, a native-born Russian, would be happy to see her. He

gave his mother's name and address in Atlanta to the woman's

husband, who was "scruffy looking." This was not an unusual

thing to do, since his family had always been very hospitable

to Russians who visited Atlanta. In retrospect, he assumes

that he gave his mother's name and address to either Lee

or Marina Oswald, but he is uncertain in this regard. -

After the assassination of President Kennedy, Davison

was interviewed first by a Secret Service agent and later by

an FBI agent in connection with the entry of his mother's

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name and

address in Oswald's address book. The FBI agent

also interviewed Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal (Natalia

Alekseevna) Davison. Davison indicated that the Secret

Service and the FBI were the only government agencies to

interview him about his contact with the Oswalds. —

Davison admitted his involvement in the Penkovsky spy

case. Specifically, he stated that in connection with his

assignment as U.S. Embassy physician in Moscow, he had received

some superficial intelligence

training. This training mainly

involved lectures on Soviet life and instructions on remembering

and reporting Soviet names and military activities. During his

tour of duty in Moscow, Davison was asked by an Embassy

employee, whose name he no longer remembers, to observe a

certain lamp post on his daily route between his apartment

and the Embassy and to be alert for a signal by telephone:.

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Davison agreed.

According to his instructions, if he ever saw a black

chalk mark on the lamp post of if he ever received a

telephone call in which the caller blew into the receiver

three times, he was to notify a person whose name he no

longer remembers. He was told nothing else about this

operation. Davison performed his role in this operation for

approximately one year. He participated in no other operations

during his tour of duty in Moscow, but he did perform some

desk work for the Air Attache. On just one occasion, toward

the end of this year, he observed the mark on the lamp post

and his wife received the telephone signal. As instructed,

he reported these happenings. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets

reported that they had broken the Penkovsky spying operation.

The Soviets declared Davison persona non grata just after he

eit Moscow because his tour of duty had ended. He does no

massitication

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recall any intelligence debriefings on the Penkovsky

case.

Davison denied participating in any other intelligence

activity related work during his employment in Moscow, and

provided the Committee with an affidavit to this effect.

The former deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet Russia clandestine

activities section during 1960-62 confirmed Davison's position,

and characterized his involvement in the Penkovsky case

as a

"one shot"' deal. In addition, a review of Davison's CIA and

Department of Defense files was also entirely consistent with

his Committee testimony.

Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that dr.

Davison was Lee Harvey Oswald's

intelligence contact in

MOscOw.

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7.

George deMohrenschildt

George deMohrenschildt was a prominent member of Dallas'

White Russian" community who befriended Lee Harvey Oswald.

This friendship has engendered considerable speculation

because of the contrast between the backgrounds of the two men.

DeMohrenschildt was described as sophisticated and well educated,

one who moved easily in the social and professional circles

of oilmen and the so-called "White Russian" community, many

of whom were avowed right-wingers. Oswald's "lowly" background

did not include much education or influence, and he was, in fact,

shunned by the very same Dallas Russian community which

embraced deMohrenschildt.

DeMohrenschildt committed suicide

in 1977 shortly after having been contacted for an interview.

by a Committee investigator.

In his Warren Commission testimony, deMohrenschildt

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stated that he believed he had discussed Lee Harvey Oswald

with J. Walton Moore, whom deMohrenschildt described as "a

Government man -- either FBI or Central Intelligence." _ /

DeMohrenschildt said Moore had interviewed

him when he

returned from Yugoslavia and that he was known as the head of

the FBI in Dallas.

/ DeMohrenschildt said that he had

asked Moore and Ft. Worth attorney Max Clark about Oswald to

reassure himself that it was "safe" for the deMohrenschildts

to assist Oswald, -

and was told by one of these persons

that "the guy seems to be oK."

/ This admitted association

with J. Walton Moore, a known employee of the CIA's

Domestic Contacts Division, gave rise to the question of

whether deMohrenschildt had contacted Lee Harvey Oswald on

behalf of the CIA.

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In 1963 J. Walton Moore was employed by the Central

Intelligence Agency in Dallas, Texas in the Domestic

Contacts Division. According to Moore's CIA personnel file,

he was assigned to the Domestic Contacts Divison in 1948. In

a fitness report for the period April 1, 1963 through March 31,

1964, Moore's duties in the Dallas office included "supervising

and managing a resident agency; exploitation of source's

complete intelligence potential by debriefing...; writing

reports; keeps informed on foreign situations and intelligence

requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources; and

searches for and develops new sources."

In an Agency memorandum dated April 13, 1977 contained

in George deMohrenschildt's CIA file, Moore set forth facts

to counter a claim which had been recently made by WFAA-TV

in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been employed by the

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CIA and that Moore had known Oswald. In that memorandum,

Moore is quoted as saying that according to his records the

last time he had talked with George deMohrenschildt was in

the fall of 1961. Moore said that he had no recollection of

any conversation with deMohrenschildt concerning Lee Harvey

Oswald. The memorandum also says that Moore recalls only

two occasions when he met deMohrenschildt -- first, in the

spring of 1958 to discuss the mutual interest the two

couples had in mainland China; and then in the fall of 1961

when the deMohrenschildts showed films of their Latin American

walking trip.

Other documents in deMohrenschildt's CIA file,

however, indicate more contact between Moore and deMohrenschildt

than was stated in the 1977 memorandum by Moore. In

a memorandum

dated May 1, 1964 from Moore to the Acting Chief of the Contacts

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Division of the CIA, Moore stated that he had known George

deMohrenschildt and his wife since 1957, at which time Moore

got biographical data on deMohrenschildt after a trip to

Yugoslavia for the International Cooperation Administration.

Moore says also in that 1964 memorandum that he had seen

deMohrenschildt several times in 1958 and 1959. DeMohrenschildt's

CIA file contains several reports submitted by deMohrenschildt

to the CIA on topics concerning Yugoslavia, including "Lack

of Interest in Communist Ideology,"

"National Pride/Feeling

of Superiority over Soviet Satellites,"

and "Effect of

Decentralization in the Oil Industry."

DeMohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission

that he had never been in any respect an intelligence agent.

The Committee interview

with Moore and its review of the CIA's

Moore and deMohrenschildt files confirmed that deMohrenschildt

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had never been an American intelligence agent. In this

regard, it should be stressed

that, upon returning from trips

abroad,

of Americans annually provide information

to the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division on a nonclandestine

basis. Such acts of cooperation should not be confused with

an actual Agency relationship.*

8. William G. Gaudet

William G. Gaudet was a newspaper editor who was issued

the Mexican tourist card immediately preceding Lee Harvey

Oswald's on September 17, 1963.

Two days later, he departed

for a three or four-week trip to Mexico and other Latin

*DeMohrenschildt's file also makes reference to an occasion

where he may have been involved in arranging a meeting between

a Haitian bank officer and a CIA or Department of Defense

official.

A Department of Defense official interviewed

by the Committee stated that the meeting was arranged by

Department of Defense officials and that deMohrenschildt's

presence (in the company of his wife) was unanticipated. The

Committee does not regard this incident as evidence of any

Agency relationship because there is no indication that any

United States governmental official actually solicited

deMohrenschildt's assistance with regard to this meeting.

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American countries. This happened to coincide with Oswald's

visit to Mexico City between September 27, 1963 and

October , 1963. After the assassination, Gaudet advised

the FBI during an interview that he had once been employed

by the CIA. Speculation about Gaudet's possible relationship

with Lee Harvey Oswald was created when it was discovered that

the Warren Commission Report contained a list, provided by

the Mexican Government and purporting to include all individuals

who had been issued Mexican tourist cards at the same time as

Oswald, which nevertheless omitted Gaudet's name.

At a Committee deposition, Gaudet testified that his

contact with the CIA was primarily as a

source of information

reflecting information that he had obtained during his trips

abroad; in addition, Gaudet maintained that he occasionally per-

formed errands for Agency personnel. Gaudet stated that his

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last contact with the CIA was in 1969, but that the relationship

had never been formally terminated.

The Committee reviewed Gaudet's CIA file, but found

neither any record reflecting a contact between him and the

Agency after 1961 nor any indication that he had "performed

errands" for the CIA.* A memorandum, dated January 23, 1976,

seemed to confirm the absence of any further contact after

this time:

The Domestic Collections Divison (DCD) has an inactive

file on William George Gaudet, former editor and

publisher of The Latin American Report.

The file

shows

that Gaudet was a source of the New Orleans DCD

Resident Office from 1948 to 1955 during which period

he provided foreign intelligence information on Latin

American political and economic conditions resulting

from his extensive travel in South and Central America

in pursuit of journalistic interests. The file further

indicates that Gaudet was a casual contact of the New

times, he furnished fragmentary intelligence and tried

unsuccessfully to obtain financial loans from the Agency,

*The file did contain a routing indication, which the Agency

has failed to explain, to the effect that someone "agrees with

the manner in which this case is being handled."

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through DCD, to support his publication. There is

no correspondence in the DCD file on Gaudet after 1961.

Gaudet could not recall whether his trip to Mexico and

other Latin American countries in 1963 involved any intelligence

related activity. He was able to testify, however, that he

did not encounter Lee Harvey Oswald, whom he had previously

seen on occasion at the New Orleans Trade Mart, during that trip.

Gaudet was unaware that his Mexican tourist card had been

issued immediately before Oswald's and could not recall having

seen Oswald on that day. Finally, Gaudet did not have any

information concerning the omission of his name from the

list published in the Warren Commission Report.

Based upon this evidence, the Committee does not find

a basis for concluding that Gaudet may have contacted Lee

Harvey Oswald on behalf of the CIA. Although there is a

conflict between Gaudet's testimony and his CIA file concerning

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the duration of his Agency contacts as well as the performance

of errands, there is no indication from his file or

testimony that Gaudet's cooperation involved clandestine

activity. Again, it should be stressed that the Domestic

Contacts Division, which was the Agency component that was

in touch with Gaudet, was not involved in clandestine

operations.

9. Oswald's Trip to Helsinki and the Issuance of His Entry

Visa into the Soviet Union

Oswald's trip from London to Helsinki has been a point

of controversy because his passport indicates that he arrived

in Finland on October 10, 1959 and the Torni Hotel in

Helsinki had him registered as a guest on that date, but

the only direct flight from London to Helsinki landed at

11:33 p.m.; according to a memorandum signed in 1964 by

"/i/f

Richard Helms Classification:

Oswald had taken this flight, he could

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not normally have cleared customs and landing formalities and

reached the Torni Hotel downtown by 2400 (midnight) on the

same day."

Further questions concerning this segment of

Oswald's trip have been raised by his ability to obtain a

Soviet entry visa within only two days of having applied for

it on October 12, 1959.*

The Committee was unable to determine the circumstances

surrounding Oswald's trip from London to Helsinki. Louis

Hopkins, the travel agent who arranged Oswald's initial

transportation from

the United States, stated that he did not

know Oswald's ultimate destination at the time that oswald

booked his passage on the freighter Marion Lykes; consequently,

Hopkins had nothing to do with the London to Helsinki leg of

*Since Oswald arrived in Helsinki on October 10, 1959, which

was a Saturday, it is assumed that his first opportunity to

apply for a visa was on Monday, the twelfth.

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Oswald's trip. In fact, Hopkins stated that had he known

Oswald's final destination, he would have suggested sailing on

another ship that would have docked at a port more convenient

to Russia.

Hopkins indicated that Oswald did not appear to be

particularly well informed about travel to Europe.

The

travel agent did not know whether Oswald had been referred to

him by anyone.

A request for any files that the CIA and Department of

Defense may have pertaining to Lewis Hopkins resulted in a

negative name trace. The Committee was unable to obtain any

additional sources of information regarding Oswald's London

to Helsinki trip.

In contrast, the relative ease with which Oswald

obtained his Soviet Union entry visa was more readily

stigation.

amenable to inclassification:

This issue is one that was also

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of concern to the Warren Commission.

/ In a letter to

the CIA dated May 25, 1964, J. Lee Rankin inquired about the

apparent speed with which Oswald's Soviet visa was issued.

Rankin noted that he had recently spoken with Abraham Chayes

of the State Department who contended that at the time

Oswald received his visa to enter Russia from the Soviet

Embassy in Helsinki, at least one week ordinarily passed

between the time of a tourist's application for a visa and

the issuance of the visa. Rankin contended that if Chayes'

assessment was accurate, then Oswald's ability to obtain

his tourist visa in two days might have been very significant.

The CIA responded to Rankin's request for information

on July 31, 1964. Richard Helms wrote to Rankin that the Soviet

Consulate in Helsinki was able to issue a transit visa (valid

for 24 hours) to U.S. businessmen within five minutes, but

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if a longer stay were intended at least one week was needed

to process a visa application and arrange lodging through

Soviet Intourist. A second communciation from Helms to.

Rankin, dated September 14, 1964, added that during the 1964

tourist season, Soviet Consulates in at least some Western

European cities issued Soviet tourist visas in from five to

seven days.

In an effort to resolve this issue, the Committee has

reviewed the CIA file on Gregory Golub, who was the Soviet

Consul in Helsinki when Oswald was issued his tourist visa.

Golub's file reveals that, in addition to his Consular

activities, he was suspected to have been an officer

of the Soviet KGB.

Iwo CIA dispatches from Helsinki concerning Golub

are of particular significance with regard to the time

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necessary for issuance of visas to Americans for travel into

the Soviet Union. The first dispatch records that Golub

disclosed during a luncheon conversation that:

Moscow had given him the authority to give

Americans visas without prior approval from

MOscOW.

He (Golub) stated that this would

make his job much easier,

and as long

as

he was convinced the American was "all right"

he could give him a visa in a matter of

minutes...

(emphasis

added)

The second CIA dispatch, dated October 9, 1959, one

day prior to Oswald's arrival in Helsinki, illustrates that

Golub did have the authority to issue visas without delay.

The dispatch discusses a telephone contact between Golub

and his consular counterpart at the American Embassy in

Helsinki:

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•..Since that evening (September 4, 1959) Golub

has only phoned (the US consul) once and this

was on a business matter.

Two Americans were in

the Soviet Consulate at the time and were applying

for Soviet visas thru (sic.) Golub.

They had

previously been in the American consulate inquiring

about the possibility of obtaining a Soviet

visa in one or two days.

(The U.S. Consul)

advised them to go directly to Golub and

nake their request, which they did. Golub

phoned (the U.S. Consul) to state that he

would give them their visas as soon as they

made advance Intourist reservations.

When

they did this, Golub immediately gave them

their visas...*

(emphasis added)

Thus, based upon these two factors: (1) Golub's

authority to issue visas to Americans without prior approval

from Moscow, and (2) a demonstration of this authority, as

reported in a CIA dispatch approximately one month prior

to Oswald's appearance at the Soviet Embassy, the Committee

has

found that the available evidence tends to support the

conclusion that issuance of Oswald's tourist visa within

*Evidently, Oswald had made arrangements with Intourist

because upon his arrival at the Moscow railroad station on

October 16, he was met by an Intourist representative and

taken to the Hotel Berlin where he registered as a student.

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two days after his appearance at the Soviet Consulate was not

necessarily unusual.

10.

The Oswald Photograph in the Office of Naval

Intelligence Files

The Office of Naval Intelligence's Lee Harvey Oswald

file contained a photograph of Oswald, taken at the

approximate time of his Marine Corps induction, that was

contained in an envelope which had on it the language

"REC'D 14 November 1963" and "CIA 77978." These markings

raised the possibility that Oswald had been in some way

associated with the CIA.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of

Defense stated that the photograph had been obtained by

ONI as a result of a CIA request for two copies of the most

recent photographs of Oswald so that an attempt could be made

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to verify his reported presence in Mexico City. The requested

copies, however, were not made available to the CIA until

after the President's assassination. Because of the absence

of documentation, no explanation was given for how or when the

Office of Naval Intelligence received this particular

photograph of Oswald.

The Committee's review of CIA cable traffic confirmed

that cable number 77978, dated October 24, 1963, was in

fact a request for two copies of the Department of the Navy's

most recent photograph of Lee Henry (sic) Oswald. Moreover,

review of other cable traffic corroborated the Agency's desire

to determine whether lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact, been

in

Mexico City.

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11.

Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City

The Committee also considered whether Oswald's activities

and possible associations in Mexico City were indicative of

a relationship between him and the CIA. This aspect of the

Committee's investigation involved a complete review both of

alleged Oswald associates and of various CIA operations outside

of the United States.

The Committee found no evidence suggestive. of any

relationship between Oswald and the CIA. Moreover, the

Agency's investigative efforts, prior to the assassination,

regarding Oswald's presence in Mexico City served to confirm

the absence of any relationship with him. Specifically, when

apprised of his possible presence in Mexico City, the Agency

both initiated internal inquiries concerning his background

and, once informed of his Soviet experience, notified other

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potentially interested federal agencies of his possible

contact with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. Finally,

the overt nature and frequency of Oswald's contacts with

the Cuban and Soviet Consulates (i.e., a total of at least five

visits) also tended to indicate that Oswald was not under the

direction of any professional intelligence officers.

12. Lee Harvey Oswald's Military Records

The Committee reviewed Oswald's military records because

of allegations that he had received intelligence training

and had participated in intelligence operations during his

term of service. Particular attention was given to the

charges that Oswald's early discharge from the Marine Corps

was designed to serve as a cover for an intelligence

assignment and that his records reflected neither his true

security clearance nor a substantial period of service in

Taiwan. These allegations were considered relevant to the

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question of whether Oswald had been performing intelligence

assignments for military intelligence as well as to the

issue of Oswald's possible association with the CIA.

Oswald's Marine Corps records bore no indication that

he had ever received any intelligence training or performed

on any intelligence assignments during his term of service.

As a Marine sering in Atsugi, Japan, Oswald had a security

clearance of confidential

and never received a higher classifi-

cation. Based upon the Warren Commission testimony of John

E. Donavan, the officer who had been in charge of Oswald's

crew, that all personnel working in the radar center were

required to have a minimum security clearance of secret, the

allegation has been made that the security clearance of

confidential in Oswald's records is inaccurate. This

allegation, however, was refuted by a review of files belonging

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to four enlisted men who had worked with Oswald; each of them

had a security clearance of

confidential.*

Oswald's military records also dispelled the allegation

that he had served for a substantial period in Taiwan. These

records state that Oswald served in Japan from September 12,

1957 until November 2, 1958. Department of Defense records,

however, do indicate that MAG (Marine Air Group) 11, Oswald's unit,

was deployed for Taiwan on September 16, 1958 and remained in

that area until April 1959, but an examination of the MAG 11

unit diaries indicated that Oswald had remained in Japan as

part of a rear echelon. Oswald's records also state that on

October 6, 1958 he was transferred within MAG Il to a

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron subunit in Atsugi,

Japan. The next week he reportedly spent in the Atsugi

*John E. Donavan, Oswald's immediate commanding officer, did

have a

security clearance of secret.

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Station Hospital. On November 2, 1958, Oswald left Japan

for duty in the United States.

Accordingly, there is no indication in Oswald's

military records that he had spent any time in Taiwan. This

finding is contrary to that of the Warren Commission that

Oswald arrived with his unit in Taiwan on September 30, 1958,

but the Commission's analysis apparently was made without access

to the unit diaries of MAG 11.*

Finally, with one exception, the circumstances surrounding

Oswald's rapid discharge from the military do not appear to have

been unusual. Oswald was obligated to service on active duty

until December 7, 1959, but he applied for a hardship discharge

on August 17, 1958 and two weeks later the application

*Similarly, a message sent on November. 4, 1959 from the Chief

of Naval Operations concerning Oswald, which states that he

had "served with Marine Air Control Squadrons in Japan and

Taiwan" may have been issued without checking unit diaries

which indicated that Oswald had not been so deployed.

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was approved.* It appears, however, that Oswald's

application was processed so expeditiously because it was

accompanied with all of the necessary documentation.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the Department

of Defense has stated that "to a large extent, the time

involved in processing depended on how well the individual

member had prepared the documentation needed for consideration

of his or her case."

_ A review of Oswald's case indicates

that his initial application was accompanied by all of the

requisite documentation.

Oswald had met the preliminary

requirements of having made a voluntary contribution to the

hardship dependent and of applying for a dependent's quarters

*By September 4, 1959, Oswald had been informed that he would be

discharged on September 11, 1959. This explains why he was

able to tell passport officials on that day

• that he expected

to depart the United States on September 21, 1959.

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allotment

to alleviate the hardship. His application indicated

that these measures had been taken, and was accompanied by

two letters and two affidavits attesting to Marguerite

Oswald's inability to support herself.

Documents provided to the Committee by the American Red

Cross indicate that he sought their assistance regarding this

matter, and therefore was probably well advised on the requisite

documentation to support his claim. Indeed, Red Cross officials

interviewed Marguerite Oswald, and concluded that she "could

not be considered employable from an emotional standpoint."

The Fort Worth Red Cross Office indicated a quarters allotment

was necessary for Marguerite Oswald, rather than a hardship

discharge for Lee, and assisted her in the preparation of

the necessary application documents.

Oswald nevertheless informed the Red Cross office in

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El Toro, California, where he was then stationed, that he

desired to apply for a hardship discharge. The unusual aspect

of Oswald's discharge application was that technically his

requisite application for a quarters allowance for his mother

should have been disallowed because Marguerite's dependency

affidavit stated that Oswald had not contributed any money to

her during the preceding year. —/

Nevertheless, the first officer to review Oswald's

application noted in his endoresment, dated August 19, 1959,

that "La/ genuine hardship exists in this case, and in my

opinion approval of the /quarters/ allotment will not

sufficiently alleviate this situation."*

In addition,

five other officers endorsed Oswald's application. The

*This quotation suggests the possibility that applications for

quarters allotments and hardship discharges are considered

independently of one another.

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Committee was able to contact three of the six endorsing

officers; two had no memory of the event,/ and one could not

recall any details. .

/ The Committee considers their absence

of memory to be indicative of the Oswald case having been

handled in a routine manner.

Based upon this evidence, the Committee was not able

to discern any unusual discrepancies or features in Oswald's

military record.

13 .

Lee Harvey Oswald's Military Intelligence File

On November 22, 1963, soon after the assassination, Lt.

Col. Robert E. Jones, Operations Officer of the U.S. Army's

112th Military Intelligence Group (MIG), Fort Sam Houston,

San Antonio, Texas, contacted the FBI offices in San Antonio

and Dallas and gave those offices detailed information concerning

Oswald and A.J. Hidell, his alleged alias. This information

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suggested the existence of a Military Intelligence file on

Oswald, and raised the possibility that he had intelligence

associations of some kind. The Committee's investigation,

however, revealed that military intelligence officials had

opened a file on Oswald because he was perceived as a possible

counterintelligence threat.

Robert E. Jones testified before the Committee that in

June of 1963 he had been serving as Operations Officer of the

112th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.*

Under the Group's control were seven regions encompassing five

states: Texas, Louisiana, Ärkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.

Jones was directly responsible for counterintelligence operations,

background investigations, domestic intelligence, and any

*In his testimony, Jones also clarified and corrected the

errors that appeared

in communications that were generated as

a result of the activities of his military intelligence

unit.

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special operations in this five-state area. He believes that

Oswald first came to his

attention in mid-1963 through information

provided to the 112th MIG by the New Orleans Police Department

to the effect that Oswald had been arrested there in connection

with Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities.

As a result of

this information, the 112th Military Intelligence Group took

an interest in Oswald as a

possible counterintelligence

threat. The Group collected

information from local agencies

and the military central records facility, and opened a file

under the names Lee Harvey

Oswald and A. J. Hidell. Placed

in this file were documentsand newspaper articles on such

topics as Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, his travels

there, his marriage to a Russian national, his return to the

United States, and his pro-Cuba activities in New Orleans.

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Jones related that on November 22, 1963, while in his

quarters at Fort Sam Houston, he heard about the assassination

of President Kennedy. Returning immediately to his office, he

contacted MIG personnel in Dallas and instructed them to

intensify their liaisons with federal, state, and local

agencies and to report back any information obtained. Early

that afternoon, he received a telephone call from Dallas

advising that an A.J. Hidell had been arrested or had come to

the attention of law enforcement authorities. Jones checked

the MIG indices, which indicated that there was a file on Lee

Harvey Oswald, also known by the name A.J. Hidell. Pulling the

file, he telephoned the local FBI office in San Antonio to

notify the FBI that he had some information. He soon was in

telephonic contact with the Dallas FBI office, to which he

summarized the documents in the file. He believes that one

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person with whom he would have spoken was FBI Special Agent

in Charge J. Gordon Shanklin.

He may have talked with the

. Dallas FBI office more than one time that day.

Jones testified that his last activity with regard

to the Kennedy assassination was to write an "after action"

report, which summarized the actions he had taken, the people

he had notified, and the times of notification. In addition,

Jones believes that this "after action" report included

information obtained from reports filed by the eight to

twelve Military Intelligence agents who performed liaison

functions with the Secret Service in Dallas on the day of the

assassination. This "after action" report was then maintained

in the Oswald file. Jones did not contact, nor was he

contacted by, any other law enforcement or intelligence agencies

concerning information which he could provide on Oswala. To

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Jones' knowledge, neither the FBI nor any law enforcement agency

ever requested a copy of the Military Intelligence file on

Oswald. To his surprise, neither the FBI, Secret Service, CIA

nor Warren Commission ever interviewed him. No one ever

directed him to withhold any information; on the other hand,

he never came forward and offered anyone further information

relevant to the assassination investigation because he

"felt that the information that he/ had provided was

sufficient and... a matter of record..."

Communications

Jones' contact with the FBI office in San Antonio is

reflected in a teletype message sent

at 4:25 p.m. on

November 22, 1963, from that FBI office to the FBI Director and

the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas.

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The Committee found Jones' testimony to be very credible.

His statements concerning the contents of the Oswald file

are consistent with FBI communications that were generated as

a result of the information which he initially provided.

Access to Oswald's Military Intelligence file, which the

Department of Defense never gave to the Warren Commission, was

not possible because the Department of Defense had destroyed

the file as part of a general program aimed at eliminating all

of its files pertaining to nonmilitary personnel. In

response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense

gave the following explanation for the file's destruction:

1. Dossier AB 652876, OSWALD, Lee Harvey, was

identified for deletion from IRR (Intelligence

Records and Reports) holdings on Julian date

73060 (1 March 1973) as stamped on the micro-

filmed dossier cover.

It is not possible to

determine the actual date when physical

destruction was accomplished, but is credibly

surmised that the destruction was accomplished

within a period not greater than sixty days

following the identification for deletion.

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Evidence such as the type of deletion record

available, the individual clerk involved in

the identification, and the projects in progress

at the time of deletion, all indicate the dossier

deletion resulted from the implementation of a

Department of the Army, Adjutant General letter

dated 1 June 1971, subject: Acquisition of

Information Concerning Persons and Organizations

not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (DOD)

(Inc1 1).

Basically, the letter called for the

elimination of files on non-DoD affiliated

persons and organizations.

2.

It is not possible to determine who accomplished

the actual physical destruction of the dossier.

The individual identifying the dossier for deletion

can be determined from

the clerk number appearing

on the available deletion record.

The number

indicates that Lyndall E. Harp was the identifying

clerk.

Harp was an employee of the IRR from 1969

until late 1973, at which

time she transferred

to the Defense Investigative Service, Fort Holabira,

Maryland, where she is still a civil

service

employee.

The individual ordering the destruction

or deletion cannot be determined.

However, available

evidence indicates that the dossier was identified

for deletion under a set of criteria applied by

IRR clerks to all files.

The basis for these

criteria were established in the 1 June 1971 letter.

There is no indication that the dossier was specifically

identified for review or deletion. All evidence

shows that the file was reviewed as part of a

generally applied program to eliminate any dossier

concerning persons not affiliated with DOD.

The exact material contained in the dossier

cannot be determined at this time. However,

discussions with all available persons who recall

seeing the dossier reveal that-it most probably

included: newspaper clippings relating to pro-

Cuban activities of Oswald, several Federal

Bureau of Investigation reports, and possibly

some Army counterintelligence reports.

None of

the persons indicated that they remember any

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significant information in the dossier. It should

be noted here that the Army was not asked to

investigate the assassination. Consequently, any

Army derived information was turned over to the

appropriate civil authority.

4.

At the time of the destruction of the Oswald

dossier, IRR was operating under the records

disposal authority contained in the DOD Memorandum

to Secretaries of the Military Departments, OASD (A),

9 February 1972, subject: Records Disposal

Authority (Incl 2).

The memorandum forwards

National Archivist disposal criteria which is

similar in nature to the requirements outlined

in the 1 June 1971 instructions. It was not

until 1975 that the Archivist changed the criteria

to ensure non-destruction of investigative records

that may be of historical value.

Upon receipt of this information, the Committee

orally requested the destruction order relating to the file

on Oswald. In a letter dated September 13, 1978, the General

Counsel of the Department of the Army replied that no such

order existed:

Army regulations do not require any type of

specific order before intelligence files can be

destroyed, and none was prepared. in connection

with the destruction of the Oswald file. As a rule,

investigative information on persons not directly

affiliated with the Defense Department can be retained

in Army files only for short periods of time and in

carefully regulated circumstances.

The Oswald file

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was destroyed routinely in accordance with normal

files management procedures, as are thousands of

intelligence files annually.

The Committee finds this "routine" destruction of the

Oswald file extremely troublesome, especially when viewed in

light of the Department of Defense's failure to make this file

available to the Warren Commission. Despite the credibility

of Jones' testimony, without access to this file the question

of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence

cannot be fully resolved.

The absence of this file, however,

has no bearing upon the Committee's conclusion concerning

the absence of any relationship between lee Harvey Oswald

and the CIA.

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