STUDY: THE MONSTER PLOT" AKA THE "HART REPORT"
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: NONE
Document date: 1976-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32404871

## Page 1

Date:

02/13/01

Page:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

: CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10534-10205

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: NOSENKO RECORDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

CIA

FROM

TO :

TITLE

: STUDY: THE MONSTER PLOT" AKA THE "HART REPORT"

• DATE

00/00/76

PAGES

189

SUBJECTS :

NOSENKO

NBR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

SEGRET

1A, 1B

CURRENT STATUS

POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

02/12/01

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS:

JEK-M-24: F57 2001.02.12.14:02:03:553084: NOT BELIEVED

RELEVANT

(NBR) . DUPLICATE

IS

104-10211-10004.

Gamessyas when dan ease saaan same galands Callection Ast of 193.

[R] - ITEM

IS

RESTRICTED

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 1

---

## Page 2



---

## Page 3

SECRET

THE MONSTER PLOT

Introduction

Chapter I

Organizational Background: CIA's

Handling of Soviet Positive Intelli-

gence and CI Matters

Chapter II Biographical Data: 1927-1962

Chapter III Chronicle: 1962-1969

A. Initial Contacts

B. Bona Fides

C. The Case Against Nosenko

D. Defection . . .

E. The Problem of Disposition

F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath

G. The Decision to Incarcerate

H. First Polygraph Examination •

I. Incarceration and Interrogation

J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory

K. Life in a Vault .

L. Inter-Agency Disagreement

M. Voices of Dissent . .

N. Helms Takes Control

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 3

1

3

7

12

12

13

16

18

27

28

31

32

36

41

43

65

67

73

---

## Page 4

SECRET

-ii-

0. Resolution of the Case

Chapter IV

Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary

Evaluation

..

•.

A. Information on KGB Personnel

B.

KGB Recruitment Efforts Against

US Citizens . ..

C. Moscow Microphones

D. William John Christopher Vassall

E. Leads to Foreign Nationals

F. Summary Evaluation

Chapter V.

Chapter VI

The Analytical Foundations of the

"Monster Plot"

A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation

B.

Faulty Record of Conversations

With Nosenko

•

•

C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding

Nosenko's Life Story

D.

Errors or Omissions in Available

CIA Headquarters Records

E. CIA Assumptions about the Second

Chief Directorate . •

...

..

F. The A Priori Assumption of

Disinformation as Applied to

the Popov and Related Cases

Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept

and Application in the Nosenko Case

Chapter VII

Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: A Comparison of

Their Handling By CIA .

•

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 4

76

81

81

82

84

84

85

8:5

86

86

90

93

100

101

106

113

123

---

## Page 5

SECRET

-iii-

Chapter VIII Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko

Case

Chapter IX Psychological and Medical Findings

A. The Role of the Psychologist

B: The Role of the Psychiatrist

C. Conclusions

Chapter X

Impact of the "Monster Plot" on CIA's

Positive Intelligence and CI Missions

A. The Case of -

B. Effect on Other Potential Opera-

tions . .:.

→...

C. How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself

Chapter XI Methodology and Leadership

A. Lack of Counterintelligence

Methodology .

B.

C.

Influence of Chief, CI on

Methodology • •

Impact of Faulty Counterintelli-

gence on Positive Intelligence

Collection

D. What Went Wrong?

E. Summary . :

Chapter XII Conclusions and Recommendations

A. The Letter of Instructions

B. Recommended Action

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 5

136

142

142

149

157

159

159

173

175

177

177

178

178

179

181

182

182

184

---

## Page 6

SECRET

Introduction

On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official

temporarily

assigned to Geneva, contacted an American Foreign

Service

Officer in a move that was eventually to lead

Nosenko's defection.

This act was the first in a chain of

events that is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet

operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since

its establishment.

Because the case still has important

implications for the overall Soviet intelligence effort of

the United States, and because it raises many basic questions

about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors,

a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency

in June 1976.

The results are embodied in this report and

its annexes.

Although United States officials of many agencies, up

to and including a president of the United States, were briefed

on the case and either played some role in making decisions

concerning it or actively participated in running the opera-

tion, it does not now appear that,

single individual has ever been fully informed as to all

between 1962 and 1976 its

any

aspects.

The complexity of this investigation therefore

stems in large measure from the fact that the case has pro-

ceeded along at least two, and often more, compartmented

tracks.

Thus, the effort

to get a total picture of what

transpired has involved an unusual amount of research in the

files of various components of the Agency, plus personal in-

terviews with a large number of present and former Agency

employees.

The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not the

result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a

corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most,

decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on

the

basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes con-

flicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other

senior colleagues.

Thus, this

report must, if it is to be

comprehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process

in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the

individual participants.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 6

---

## Page 7

SECRET

- 2 -

The quintessential quality of a report such as this

is that it be objective.

We have not, on the other hand,

retrained trom expressing our opinions. Even to have tried

to do so would have been futile for two rather obvious

reasons.

First, into the reconstruction of events of the

complexity herein described there always enters a degree

of selectivity and judgment; in this sense, "opinion" pro-

vides the essential

matrix of our product.

Secondly, we

have viewed our task as one of constructive criticism.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 7

---

## Page 8

SECRET

- 3-

CHAPTER I

Organizational Background: CIA's Handling

Of Soviet Positive Intelligence and CI Matters

The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended

tioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole.

In

Fact, opinions

regarding the handling of the Nosenko case may

differ substantially according to individual's differing

views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning.

This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make

explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually func-

tioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from

how it might theoretically have functioned according to

Agency organizational charts and regulations.

The two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day

operations in

the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division

(known successively by this and several other names*) and

the Counterintelligence Staff.

In the nature and interrela-

tionship of these two organizations we find the key to much

of what was to happen in

. the Nosenko case.

Although the SB Division was considered a "line" organi-

zation, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's

formal

organization were to be taken at face value) that its

function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact,

such a distinction was never enforced.

"CI Staff"' was

actually a misnomer, because the organi-

zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any

appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of

the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on.

the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries.

Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called

Soviet Cl Group, which was in many respects a competitor of

the CI Staff.

It concerned itself, during most of the

period to be covered in this report, primarily with informatior

*This area component during the period of this report was

known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and. Soviet Bloc

Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter-

changeably.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8

---

## Page 9

SECRET

-4-

the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the

USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant,

since

the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff.

Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there

was during most of the period with which we are concerned a

between the SB/CI Group and

CI Staff that militated in favor of coherent operational

policy, even though the two organizations might disagree on

matters

of detail.

One curious aspect of the organizational problem should

be mentioned at this point because, while seemingly minor,

it may have played a significant role. While the SB Division

understandably. had a number of competent Russian linguists,

the CI Staff did not have a single Russian linguist who could

be brought to bear on either the Nosenko or Golitsyn case.

The staff was therefore dependent for its data on translations

of Nosenko material and, in the case of Golitsyn, on informa-

tion obtained

from discussions conducted with him in English,

a language in which he was not fully fluent.

A third organizational participant in the Nosenko case

the Office of Security.

This office had overlapping

jurisdiction with CI Staff

and, to a lesser extent, SB Division

in any matter that involved a suspected Soviet or Soviet Bloc

penetration of the Agency.

While not usually a problem, the

overlapping jurisdiction

was considerable in both the

Golitsyn and Nosenko cases because so much of the activity

in connection with both operations revolved around allegations

that

the Soviets had penetrated the Agency at a high level.

Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited

Agency staff employees did not first originate with Golitsyn,

it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a

complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi.

He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which

to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the

Agency were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the

ideologue's ideologue.

Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had

been hard hit by its dealings with

high-level Soviet penetra-

tions of Western governments. There is no need to go into

detail on them, since they have been well documented else-

where, but they included British representatives, such as

Kim Philby and George Blake.

Another important

penetration

was Heinz Felfe, who rose to be Deputy Chief of Soviet

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 9

---

## Page 10

SECRET

- 5-

Counterintelligence in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).

Felfe case is particularly significant because it was

believed by a number of counterintelligence specialists in

the Agency that Felfe's career had been systematically pro-

moted by the soviets through what came to be known as the

"throw-away" technique.

According to the theory of this

group, a considerable number of valuable and productive

Soviet intelligence operations in Germany were made avail-

able to felte so that, by detecting them and signaling their

presence to

the West German

authorities, he could build up

nis reputation as a counterintelligence

specialist.

While

there is debate about the value of the assets the soviets

made available, there appears to be enough substance to this

theory for it to have had a strong impact within the Agency,

particularly upon those persons who were members of the former

Eastern European (EE) Division of the Plans Directorate.

In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB

success in penetrating Western governments made it the more

feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence

services.

Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the

Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place

Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy

Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event.

Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details

regarding Golitsyn, because this case has

been covered exten-

sively in a recent

study.

However, two points are worth

noting:

1. First, Golitsyn was

1962 as a "paranoid personality gnosed early in

Although account

taken of this psychological problem, it was

considered in the light of a threat to the con-

tinuity of the debriefing process rather than as

*ather than as

a factor reflecting on the validity of the purported

intelligence he gave us.

It was apparently felt

chat, it we could maintain his stability, we coulo

lepend not only upon the objectively verifiable

facts he gave us but also upon his often very

theoretical generalizations.

2. Secondly, Golitsyn presented

us right from

the beginning, continually elaborated throughout

the years, a complicated rationale for believing

that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoth

program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the

SECHET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 10

---

## Page 11

SECRET

- 6 -

United States and its Western allies. This ratio-

nale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of

this report.

It is against this background that we view the approach

to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling:: In doing so,

we shall for ease of reference from time to time allude to

the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions--elaborated

by Golitsyn and others--as the "Monster Plot." In fairness,

it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not

by the thesis' proponents but rather by its detractors; yet

no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers

envisaged as a major threat to United States' security. If

the term carries with it emotive connotations, the latter

were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy; and

this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster Plot"

in the lexicon of this study.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 11

---

## Page 12

SECRET

- 7-

CHAPTER II

Biographical Data: 1927-1962

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in

Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko

and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in

1902 and died on 2 August 1956.

At the time of his death,

the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, a member

of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Supreme

Soviet of the USSR;

and recipient of

a number of the highest

Soviet awards and medals. He received a state funeral, and

he is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young

Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student at

the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.

From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev.

In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenko in

Leningrad, where the latter was working as chief engineer

at the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant.

Nosenko continued his

schooling in Leningrad

until late

1938, at which time he

and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where

he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Ship-

building Industry.

In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and

his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the urals.

Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the

, but they

Nosenko entered

were caught and returned home.

At age 14

a Special Naval School that,

in August

1942, was relocated to Kuybyshev.

Later, this school was

forced to relocate again, this time to Achinsk in Siberia.

Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and, through the in-

fluence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval

Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to'be confused with

the Frunze Higher Naval School, also in Leningrad), which

this time had been relocated to Baku.

Some time after August 1943, Nosenko tried on two

separate occasions to get to the

front, but failed. He

and a friend did succeed in returning home to Moscow with-

out authorization.

These escapades seem to form part of a

behavior pattern that

was eventually to culminate in defec-

tion.

By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the

Frunze Naval Preparatory School, which had returned to its

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 12

---

## Page 13

SECRET

- 8-

original location in Leningrad.

Cadets from this school were

sent to a forest (some two hundred kilometers from Leningrad)

on a wood-cutting detail.

In about November of that year he

wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and was hospitalized.

He decided not

to return to the Frunze

Naval Preparatory

School and again, through his father's intervention in about

January 1945, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in

Leningrad.

At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow.

He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of

the shipbuilding college that attested to his study in, and

the completion of, the tenth class.

At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his

father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers.

For purposes of that trip, Nosenko received temporary rank

lieuten, No rento

as an Army senior lieutenant, with appropriate documents and

uniform.

Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations

in Moscow in July 1945. Upon completion of the second year

at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a

military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC,

Nosenko received the rank of junior lieutenant in the

"administrative service" (sic). (The exact meaning of this

term is unclear.)

In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his

had gotten pregnant.

General (Major General, US-style) Telegin. This marriage,

was neither successful nor long-lived. Nosenko reported

he had found his wife in bed with her brother. A giri was

later born with a harelip and a cleft palate.

Nosenko in-

sisted that this was not his child.

Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute

I International relations,

but he actually received his

diploma

a year later, in 1950, because he

had failed the

examination in Marxism.. He had had to wait an extra year in

order to retake this examination.

In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned as an English

language translator in naval intelligence (Naval RU),

serving first in the Far East. While on leave in Moscow

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 13

---

## Page 14

SECRET

- 9 -

(late April 1952), he developed an illness that caused him

to cough up blood, and he entered a tuberculosis sanatorium

near Moscow for treatment.

For reasons of health, he did

not return to the Far East but was sent instead to the

Baltic area.

While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied

his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a

certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko

indicated interest in changing jobs, the general made a vague

offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State

Security. (MGB) •

In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko

was called to Kobulov's office. Kobulov had just returned

from

Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD

(Ministry of Internal Affairs). Nosenko did not see Kobulov

personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the

deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal coun-

terintelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he

was hired.

His first MGB assignment was in the First (American

embassy) Section of the First (American) Department of the

SCD.

In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy

Beriya emerged from the resultant reshuffling of the top

leadership as chief of both the MVD and MGB. In March 1954,

the new "Committee" for State Security--the KGB--was formed.

In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila

Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow

State University.

Nosenko, a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was

elected secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and

served as secretary of that unit until about June 1954.

However, earlier in 1954, Nosenko had contracted venereal

disease

and

gone to a clinic; to disguise his identity, he

operational documentation

in alias in applying for

treatment.

When he did

not go back for final treatment

as instructed, the clinic sent a letter to his ostensible

place of work

as shown on the alias document. The MVD found

out about this improper use of alias documentation and re-

ported it to the SCD.

Nosenko was not only disciplined

by the chief, SCD (reprimanded and placed under arrest for

15 days), but the Komsomol also removed him as secretary

and expelled him from its organization.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 14

---

## Page 15

SECRET

- 10-

In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor

kharakteristika (performance evaluation), which described

him as unsuitable for work in the First Department. None-

theless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred.

Although Nosenko survived the 1954 episode

as well as

the poor performance report, these events caused him to go

on what he has described as

a "big drunk

;" which

resulted

in his having to spend a month under hospital care.

keep Nosenko out of further trouble, his mother intervened

by making a telephone call to Petr Vasilyevich Fedotov,

chief of the SCD.

seemingly as a result of her efforts,

Nosenko was transferred in the latter part of May 1955 to

the Second Section (which operated against tourists) of

the Seventh Department, SCD.

In late 1955, Lieutenant

General Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov was appointed chief

of

the SCD. From a number of indications, Nosenko's relation-

ship with Gribanov developed, despite the difference in rank

and position, into a social relationship involving evenings

on the town together, heavy drinking, and women.

Despite

indiscretions, Nosenko's survival within the

KGB

and his subsequent promotions to increasingly responsible

positions may

well have resulted in part from Gribanov's

patronage.

To a considerable degree, of course, his rise

must also be attributed to his being

the son of

a highly-

placed member of the Soviet government.

At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his

Komsomol membership and not achieved

CP-member status. It

was not until 1956 that he was

accepted as a candidate mem-

ber of the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a

full Party member.

Once this

happened, according to Nosenko,

the Komsomol removed its reprimand from his file.

In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of

captain. He held this

rank until his defection in February

1964, despite having been promised he would be promoted and

the

fact that

he had held several positions that were

usually filled by officers of higher military rank.

Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD until

January 1960, when he was transferred back to

the First

Section (American embassy) of the First Department.

he held the position of a deputy chief of the First Section.

He was retransferred back to the Seventh Department as of

late December 1961-early January 1962. In July 1962, he

was appointed deputy chief of the Seventh Department.

He

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 15

---

## Page 16

SECRET

-11-

continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date

he left Moscow on

TDY to Geneva.

Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving

ehind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters.

lis prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to

England in 1957 and 1958, a TDY to Cuba in 1960, and

the

first TDY to Geneva from

mid-March until June 1962.

He

also went on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his de-

fection and subsequent developments are covered in Chapter

111.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 16

---

## Page 17

SEGRET

- 12-

CHAPTER III

Chronicle: 1962-1969

A. Initial Contacts

When Nosenko first approached the CIA on 9 June

1962, he had been assigned, as a representative of the

KGB Second Chief Directorate, to be security officer of

the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference

being held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

Taking

advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog for the

delegation whereas its members could not watch

him,

Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the

Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance.

As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with

Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs

of official

funds that he had on his person at the time; inability

to reimburse this relatively trivial amount (about US

$250

at the time) would jeopardize his career. In ex-

change tor 4,000 swiss rrancs, he therefore proposec

that he provide us with two items of information.

These items, subsequently verified, related to:

1. KGB recruitment of a US Army sergeant

while he was

serving in the American embassy

in Moscow as

a "code machine repairman."

2. A Soviet official whom the Agency

had ostensibly recruited but who was being

run against us under KGB control.

At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response

to general intelligence requirements on which we tried to

quiz him, excluded the possibility of becoming an agent,

and flatly refused to consider meeting Agency representa-

tives inside the USSR.

Nevertheless, he "agreed

'perhaps'

meet us when abroad" again at a later date.

For our part,

our interest in him was whetted by his identification of

his deceased father as a former minister of the USSR.

In addition, such information

as he gave about himself

indicated that he would be of high operational interest.

Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as

head of a KGB sub-section working against American

tourists.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 17

---

## Page 18

SECRET

-13 -

B. Bona Fides

By It June, the two case officers (one a native.

Russian speaker) who were handling Nosenko sent a

cable to Headquarters that read in part:

SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES.

PRO-

VIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY

SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING

MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND

AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.

With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved,

the principal case officer flew to Washington carrying

the tapes of the meeting. His arrival and sojourn at

Headquarters

were described by Chief, CI on 23 July 1976

as follows:

Chief, CI:

• we got the first message .

Nosenko from Geneva, and [the principal

case officer] was ordered back, and we

had

a big meeting here on Saturday morning,

and [the principal case officer] thought

he had the biggest fish of his life.

I

mean he really did

• and everything I

heard from him was in direct contrast from

what we heard from Golitsyn.

I mean, we

nad no agents, this, that anc

... yet

nere was a Second Chief Directorate mar

weekend.

Q:

What you're saying is that it was unreason-

able for a Second Chief' Directorate man to

be there . .

Chief, Cl: Under the circumstances, getting drunk and

needing $300 to

"not to be recruited

but to give us three full, big secrets"

for an exchange for the money in order

that he could replenish the account from

which he embezzled the money on a drunk.

So I brought [the principal case.officer]

in here one evening, I think it was Friday,

Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 18

---

## Page 19

SECRET

-14-

10 to 15 volumes of Golitsyn's interroga-

tion, without prejudicing him in any way,

Just to read it,

and he had all the

books out, and at the end of it all he

said that there was no question about it,

that they were being had.

mean, mind

you, he was of split motivation because

this was the big case of his entire life

and yet there he was reading material,

etc.

So we went to Dick [Helms, then

DDP] and we put up a proposition that we

should permit Golitsyn to read the real

material, I mean the transcripts and

everything from Nosenko.

And he wouldn't.

agree to that, but we made a compromise

and that was to take the material and

falsify it as though it was an anonymous

letter sent to the embassy by an alleged

KGB person.

So the anonymous letter was

drawn up, and [the principal case officer]

interviewed Golitsyn with the anonymous

letter, and Golitsyn's statement was that

"this is a person under control, l want

to see the letter"' which created a situa-

tion because we didn't have a letter.

But he began to point out in some detail

exactly what was instigating and inspiring--

in terms of what he'd already given to us

and he very wisely stated that he wanted

everything on tape, because he knew that

as time passed in hundreds of interviews

their counteraction took place, there

would be people accusing him of not having

divulged certain information.

The principal case officer's réview of the Golitsyn

information had indeed converted him to the view that

Equally convinced, as

clearly indicated by a number of documents that he

drafted, was his superior, the person who had become

Chief, SR Division in December 1905. The reasons for

Chief,

SR's conviction may not have been the same as

the principal case officer's, but for all practical pur-

poses the

views of the two men at the time were identical.

A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was

therefore made to Richard Helms, the Deputy for Plans,

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 19

---

## Page 20

SECRET

- 15-

that the

transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be

made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed

the single reservation that Nosenko not be identi-

As a result, a number of

items of information from Nosenko were embodied on a

letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source;

in this form, it was assumed, the information could be

shown to Golitsyn without disclosing the source.

ruse seemed plausible enough, since a previous defector,

Michal Goleniewski, had written CIA a number of anony-

mous

letters before eventually defecting and disclosing

his identity.)

In carrying out the plan, the principal case offi-

cer made his own views clear to Golitsyn:

I told. (Golitsyn] that

.. . I thought it quite

possible, in view of his own statements about

disinformation, that this was the beginning of

a disinformation operation possibly relating to

This] defection.

Golitsyn felt, in general and without having

the full details necessary to an assessment.

that there

were indeed

serious signs of disin-

formation in this affair.

He felt such a dis-

information operation, to discredit him, was a

LIkelihood, as he had

earlier said. A KGB of-

ficer could be permitted

to tell everything he

knew, now, if he worked in the same generai

field as Golitsyn had. When told that so far

this source had

not done anything to discredit

Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB

is greatly upset about Golitsyn's defection,

and asked what he thought the purposes of such

a disinformation operation now might be?

Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was a likely

"to arrange an exchange for me." Also,

on divert our attention from investigations

of his leads by throwing up false scents, and

to protect their remaining sources.

added, "There could be other aims

as well.

should be looked into.

serious

to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first

series of direct meetings with the KGB officer,

to build up our confidence, and then in the

next session do whatever the operation's purpose

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 20

---

## Page 21

SECRET

- 16 -

C.

might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass

serious disinformation items, etc.).

The Case Against Nosenko

During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division

continued to build up a case against Nosenko. Virtually

any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by

him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation."

If his information was in accord with that from other

sources, this fact not only confirmed our suspicion of

Nosenko but was interpreted as casting doubt on the

other sources as well.

While the above aspect will be covered at length

in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight

the attitude that prevailed. Nosenko had, during our

meetings with him in 1962, contributed information that

materially aided

in the identification

and arrest of

William John Christopher Vasagent. a British Admiralty

official who was also a KGB

Because Golitsyn

had previously provided similar, but less specific,

information, the usefulness

of Nosenko's intelligence

was discounted; once Vassall had been identified, it

was concluded that Nosenko had been allowed to expose

him in order to support his own bona fides.

The argu-

ment ran that Vassall would in any case have been identi-

sooner or later on the basis of Golitsyn's leads.

In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva ac-

companying another Soviet delegation.

By now, the case

against him had been well established in the minds of

those dealing with the matter, and the record is there-

fore replete with manifestations of

suspicion.

A particu-

lar example of our tendency to interpret untavorably al-

most anything Nosenko said is provided by notes that

Chief, SR forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with

the suggestion that

they "convey very well the flavor

of the man

.. and the complexities of the operation."

By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at

this juncture was AEFOXTROT, he had previously been

designated AEBARMAN. This bit of history led to the

following incident during a safehouse meeting:

I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark

AEFOXTROT made on 24 January. As I went

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 21

SECRET

---

## Page 22

SECRET

-17-

behind

a bar which stands in the apartment;

to serve drinks to AEFOXTROT . . . AEFOXTROT

saw me standing there behind the bar and his

face lit up and he said with

a smile, "Ha.

You are the barman."

Now this could be an

idle pleasantry about my standing there like

a bartender, but it is not funny as AEFOXTROT

(ex-AEBARMAN) seemed to think it was and I

am afraid it means that he knows his own CIA

cryptonym.

The above incident exemplifies a main theme that CIA

was itself penetrated. This fear had existed before

Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the lat-

ter's allegations that information concerning him was

leaking to the KGB, and the conclusion that the

leaks

must have originated within the Agency.

Thus it was that a memorandum from Chief, SR on 27

January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began

as follows:

Our goal in this case must be eventually to

break

Subject and learn from him the details

of his mission and its relation to possible

penetrations of US intelligence and security

agencies and those of allied nations as well

as to broader disinformation operations in

the political sphere.

Ideally, our interests

would be best served if Subject were broken

as early as possible but since this is

unlikely, our actions must be conceived and

carried

out in a manner which contributes to

our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly

at any stage.

Far from "alerting Subject unduly," on the surface

the Agency welcomed Nosenko with both cordiality and

generosity. The following excerpts from a 30 January

1964 meeting make the point clearly:

Nosenko:

. the only thing I wanted to know and

I asked this question, "What should I ex-

pect in the future?"

Principal case officer:

The following awaits: As I presented it,

you wanted to come to the United States and

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 22

---

## Page 23

SECRET

- 18-

nave some job, some chance of a future

life, which gives you security and if

possible the opportunity to work in this

field which you know. Is that correct?

Nosenko: Absolutely...

Principal case officer:

Mr. Helms said yes, flatly absolutely yes,

in fact I would say

enthusiastic

that's the only word to describe it.

We

talked about,

and since this was a business

liscussion I'll repeat all of it whether

it was pleasant or unpleasant.

So the next

thing will be some details that we spoke

about. We talked about the means by which

[you] could have

a solid career with

certain personal independence.

Because

of

the very great assistance you've been to us

already and because of this desire to

give

you a backing, they

will give you a little

additional personal

security... [salary

details follow].

D. Defection

As might be expected, the principal case officer

devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva

visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place. Nosenko,

however, dismissed out of hand the possibility of remain-

ing in contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union,

he became increasingly anxious to defect immediately.

When the principal case officer continued to press him

in Geneva long enough to effect an audio pene-

tration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the :

At a meeting on 4 February, he announced that

cable

had been received from Moscow ordering him back

home for a "tourism conference."

Though this claim was

subsequently to be the source of almost endless contro-

versy, it was accepted at the time without apparent

question. Preparations therefore immediately began for

evacuation to the United States.

A layover in another country en route to the United

States lasted about a fortnight. It was

used for further

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 23

---

## Page 24

SECRET

- 19-

debriefing

and assessment,, but, while useful from

the

operational handlers'

standpoint, the delay raisec

oroblems as their charge became impatient:

CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW

DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES.

SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY

NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD OPS KNOWN TO

HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND

PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID

ARRIVING WITH EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS

MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ

NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS

REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS

NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND

INDEFINITE DELAY. REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST

MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURNING

POINT IN HIS LIFE. SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE

TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE

OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY

WHAI HE EXPECIS.

REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEAD-

QUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ.

AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE:

A.

[CHIEF, SR] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DIS-

CUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND AD-

MINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD

MOVE . . .

The above cable triggered a visit by Chief,

SR.

Nothing that happened during this visit modified his al-

ready well-formed views.

After a conference with the two

principal handlers he wrote:

• were unanimous in their view that

a genuine defector. His

contact with us in Geneva and subsequent

defection were, according to these officers,

clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB.

I was particularly interested in lone officer's]

statement that he had suspected Subject from

the very first meeting on

the basis of Subject's

emotionless and mechanical delivery of his

statement announcing his intention to defect.

After my talks with the case officers,

I had

my first visit with Subject at the safehouse.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 24

---

## Page 25

SECRET

- 20-

This lasted

from 2000 to 2230 and included

dinner with Subject and the case officers.

Conversation during this first meeting was

general in nature and followed no special

agenda.: However, it did give me an oppor-

tunity

to take Subject's measure.

I started

by telling Subject that I had come to form my

own impressions of him as a person and an

intelligence officer who desired to place his

knowledge and experience at the disposal of

the United States government. I added that

I wished to determine for myself why Subject

had come to the West, a most serious step

which neither we nor Subject should under-

estimate in terms of its lasting effect on

Subject's own life and those of his family

left behind.

Subject rose to this opening by

first assuring me in a most fawning manner

that he, as an intelligence officer, fully

understood the need for a senior officer to

make his own judgments on the spot.

He then

went on to explain his motivation for

first

contacting us, his reasons for defecting and

his intense desire to collaborate with

us in

Soviet operations since he has no specialty

other than intelligence.

These remarks were

repetitious of his original statements

delivered in the same mechanical tashion, the

major difference being that Subject was intensely

nervous at the outset, calming down only after

it appeared that I was accepting his statements

at face value.

By the end of the evening I had come to the

same conclusions reached by [the principal

handlers].

The totality of our conclusions

are treated in detail in a separate memorandum.

However,

in reaching them, I was beset by a

sense of irritation at the KGB's obvious

con-

viction they could pull off an operation like

this successfully and by a feeling of distaste

for the obvious and transparent manner in which

Subject played his role.

Chief, SR's distaste was sufficient to overcome any

interest he might otherwise have had in a recruitment

opportunity suggested by Nosenko:

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 25

---

## Page 26

SECRET

. -21-

One other subject touched upon

• was the

possible recruitment of Vladimir Suslov, Under-

Secretary in the UN Secretariat and top-ranking

Soviet in the UN organization

..•

Subject

[described] Suslov as

a playboy who liked liquor

and women and who could be easily blackmailed

into cooperation for fear of hurting his career

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I objected

to the blackmail angle saying that it could

cause a tremendous political flap if it back-

fired.

Undaunted,

Subject modified his position

to assure us that

it would not have to be "crude

blackmail" in which we would have to get

directly involved. I certainly got the impres-

sion that Suslov's recruitment is part of the

plan

and that we would succeed no matter how

half-heartedly we tried.

Despite his misgivings, however, Chief, SR remained

convinced that the Agency must continue to dissemble:

It will be necessary to maintain an effective

degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge

of subject's

true status and our plans to try

to secure from him a full confession. If

Subject, or the soviets, become aware of our

intentions, we will probably be forced to act

prematurely.

With these considerations in mind, he therefore re-

newed the commitments previously made by the principal

case officer:

I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he

was

genuine.

Based on this and assuming his

continuing "cooperation," I said we would pro-

ceed to make arrangements to bring him to the

States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to

pay him . . . [financial details follow].

On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments,

Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a

safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of

Security.

Now that he was in the United States, the

Agency (and the US government

as a whole) found

them-

selves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial

than the problems facing them while he remained abroad.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 26

SECRET

---

## Page 27

SECRET

- 22 -

The Agency's perception of the dilemma, and

the possible

solutions to it, are covered in paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and

7 of a memorandum written by Chief, SR and approved by

Helms on 17 February 1964:

While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB

directed mission, it has

been generally agreed

by both us and the FBI that he still possesses

valid information which we would like to obtain.

It the same time, we, at deast, believe that

Subiect must be broken at some point if we are

to learn something of the full scope of the

KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and

the role played by others in it.

we must have this information if we are to

in intona

In addition,

decide what countermeasures we should take in

terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in

our security practices,

and planning for future

operations

against the

Soviet target.

Admittedly,

our desire to continue debriefing to obtain

additional information may conflict with the

need to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem

is one of timing.

How long can

we keep Subject,

or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our aware-

ness of this operation and how long will it

take us to assemble the kind of briet we will

need to initiate a hostile interrogation in

conditions of maximum control?

If we are to proceed along the lines indicated

above we should accept in advance the premise

that we will not be able to prevent subject

from evading our custody or communicating with

the Soviets unless we place him under such

physical restraint that it will become immedi-

ately apparent to him that we suspect him.

This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is

not, we should so determine right away and

decide on a completely different course of

action.

If this is to be the case, we should

agree

to forego additional debriefings, place

Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the

Washington

area under full-time guard and com-

mence hostile debriefing on the basis of the

material we already have (although the prospects

for success would not be great).

Disposal would

probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 27

---

## Page 28

SECRET

- 23-

release to the effect that Subject had con-

fessed to being a plant and had been allowed to

return to Soviet control. IIn the meantime,

SR Division would:]

--Advise Subject that during

this phase he will

continue

to live and work in the safehouse

and will

escorted

at all times when on

nopping trips, visits to movies

because of his

faulty English and unfamil-

Larity. with the country, customs, etc.

While we can explain this regime

as needed

for his security, we cannot keep him locked

up in the house 24 hours a day.

--Provide Subject with "flash" documentation in

another name to be carried on his person

during excursions from the house.

They may

also help persuade him he has been accepted.

--Make available to Subject a portion of the

[money] promised him which he can use for

purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal

effects, etc.

--Agree that whenever this first phase is over

(four to six weeks.) that he be permitted to

take a two-week vacation with escort.

greater benefit to

us since it will provide us with an opportunity

to review and make judgments on the value of the

information already obtained and also to con-

sider the progress made in the other aspects of

the case outlined below.

During the vacation we

can decide whether we should proceed to the

second phase or are ready to commence hostile

interrogation under controlled conditions.

If

it is the former.

we will have to reckon with

the need to modify the living and working

arrangements for Subject in a way which will

inevitably give him some additional freedom.

At the same

time, we would be expected to

move forward with Subject's legalization,

i.e.,

final decision on a name he will use,

securing an alien registration card, estab-

lishing a bank account, etc. Therefore, it

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 28

---

## Page 29

SECRET

- 24-

will be terribly important to make the proper

decision at the end of phase one.

This decision will depend not only on our

evaluation of the material obtained during

the debriefings but on how far we have been

are related to Subject case and form an impor-

diate to grant on of an

in this operation.

Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambi-

valence and uncertainty. On the one hand, he was housed

in circumstances that his principal day-to-day handler

describes as

luxurious style

. " He

continues by saying that

"our typical, there was all the food and drink

one could possibly want

it I remember all of the effort

and the money we spent to get a billiard table .

On the other

hand, this handler, who was assigned to this

case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair, was told

at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had been

sent by the KGB ... "

Writing of his first meeting with Nosenko on 13

February, the handler recorded his first impressions of

Nosenko:

In this brief meeting lasting actually less than

two hours, I couldn't prevent myself from

putting him in three successive

categories.

In the first few minutes I put him in the cate-

gory of a Cuban exile

living in

the Harlem section

of New York City.

This impression came to my

mind strictly on the basis of his clothing (dark

trousers and sport shirt, black elevated shoes,

sharply pointed and with

a design) and his

mannerisms

Half way through the session I put him in the

category of a big city but small-time con man.

While dictating .

from his notes, he knew

exactly what he wanted to say and how he wanted

to say it. But when I

had brief conversations

with him on other topics, or when saw him

stealing glances in my direction to size me up,

I could almost see the con man's wheels turning

rapidly in his head. I had an urge to check my

wallet just to make sure it was still safe.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 29

---

## Page 30

SECRET

- 25-

As the session ended and we moved into the

living room

I put him in a third category.

Before leaving the debriefing room I noticed

how he touched [another case officerl on the

shoulder.

When (that case officer] went down-

stairs for a few minutes, [Nosenko] and I

walked into the living room. During that

brief walk I decided to give him a President

Johnson handshake (hand and elbow grasp, Texas

style) on departure and a few sincere words

about how pleased I was to meet and talk with

him, but his actions soon changed my mind.

As soon as we reached the middle of the living

room he gave me an unexpected and prolonged

hug around the shoulders and waist, the type

that one man gives another well known to him

only atter some

achievement such as making

the decisive point in a football game. His

embrace really took me by surprise and I had

to pull

away from him without hurting his

feelings. At this point I realized that I

couldn't go through with the President Johnson

handshake; he'd have to settle for less.

•In

this, the

third category, I saw him as a jazz

musician who sells heroin on the side and has

homosexual tendencies.

A week later, on 20 February, however, the handler

reported more favorable impressions, those

of the Office

of Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenko at the

safehouse:

Subject is not at all concerned about his own

security or the threat of assassination or

kidnapping.

He seems to think the present

security system

is fine

(This was in

marked contrast to Golitsyn's

behavior.]

Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never

"under the influence" . .

Subject is not a heavy smoker . .

At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table

with the guards and acts as if he is one of

the boys.

He does not sit at the head of the

table but to the side. He always offers the

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 30

---

## Page 31

SECRET

- 26-

boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and

kids them. . .

He does not play cards, has shown no interest

in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. He

does not

gamble and doesn't seem to have any

hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy.

He has shown a desire to play pool :..

Subject does not say anything for or against the

USSR or the Communist Party. Even when viewing

the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented

on how good the Soviets were and how poor a

showing the Americans

made.

The same could not

be said for

• [Golitsyn] . .

On the con-

trary Subject wants to be an American as soon

as possible.

Subject's sexual desires appear to be normal . .

Subject has made several joking references to

their all going together to a house of prosti-

tution

Subject definitely wants a woman

and the sooner the better ...

subject has not commented one way or another,

tor or against,

any person associated with him,

including

the housekeepers.

Compared with other

cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid,

doesn't have a drinking problem, doesn't have

a mental problem, and wants to become an

American and work like and with Americans as

a and ronk inte

soon as possible.

Subject became angry only once and even then it

was not a loss. of temper in the true sense.

The day that [the principal case officer] dis-

cussed the schedule with him, subject became

moody and

started to drink alone.

He told the

guards that he wants to use his brains and work

hard as Americans do.

He feels that the present

schedule does not utilize his talent to the

fullest.

The "schedule" referred to above had been outlined to

Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which the

principal case officer had assured him that "both [Chief,

SR] and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 31

---

## Page 32

SECRET

-27-

future cooperation with him in operations against the

USSR. "

Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted

to

systematic debriefing with the statement that this

"might represent an

attempt to extract all his informa-

tion

from

him, after which

he would not be needed."

He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date

in order to help him forget and get over the strain

and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly

the strain of leaving his family behind."

E.

The Problem of Disposition

Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation"

with Nosenko, Sk Division was discussing the possibility

of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the "overall

effort to break him" came to naught.

In addition, an

alternative plan was being developed for the incarcera-

tion of Nosenko, so that "there can be no question of

[his] escaping after he becomes

Finally, it was agreed that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile

agreed

aware of our attitude.'

recognized Nosenko as the author of

the ostensible

"anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought

into the operation to back up our interrogation.

Helms

originally had some misgivings about this procedure but

appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn

"full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to

Nosenko himself.

The FBI Viewed Nosenko much more favorably than

did CIA. As early as 8 February 1964, Chief, CI had

sent a cable reading in part:

[FBI liaison officer] STATED

• THAT

FRIEND OF HIS WHO IS EXPERT IN. FBI QUICKLY

SCANNED AEFOXTROT PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED

US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASES

KNOWN TO THEM.

Later, in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Chief, SR

stated that "the FBI personnel on the case

have so far

indicated

they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB

defector." By implication, both Chief, SR and Chief, Cl

regarded this divergence of view as a

serious problem.

Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent

paragraph of the Chief, SR memorandum contained plans

for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 32

---

## Page 33

SECRET

- 28-

1964, which would not be appropriate if CIA were

forced, as a result of inter-agency consultations,

to treat Nosenko as a bona fide defector:

a .

Subject to be moved to a high

security safehouse under maximum guard.

b.

The DCI to inform the President,

Secretary of State, Director, FBI, and

USIB principals that Subject

is a

KGB

plant whom we intend to return to Soviet

control after (1) trying to break him,

and (2) publicizing his case.

c .

Retain Subject incommunicado for

about three weeks during which time we will

continue efforts to break him.

At the

same time,

commence the

publicity campaign which will precede

Subject's deportation.

As a first step,

there will be a brief official announcement

probably by a State Department spokesman

to the effect that Subject has confessed

to having faked his defection at KGB

direction in order (1) to penetrate US

intelligence and security agencies, and (2)

to discredit the act of detection by soviet

citizens.

At the same time, a press back-

grounder will be made available which will

characterize this KGB operation as an act of

desperation following a decade of defection

and disloyalty to the regime on the part of

a score of senior Soviet intelligence of-

ficers ...

F.

Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath

While planning was going on for his confinement

and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken on a trip

for two weeks! relaxation, beginning on 12 March. During

this period, his consumption of alcohol was enormous, and

his behavior became increasingly erratic. Prior to his

departure, he had on several occasions been violent; on

one occasion he took a swipe with his fist at the princi-

pal case officer and on another tried to strangle one of

the Office of Security escorts.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 33

---

## Page 34

SECRET

- 29-

The handler who spent the first part of the

vacation with Nosenko recorded these impressions:

In my opinion Subject is under extreme ten-

sion and pressure.

Any man who skips break-

fast and starts the day off with alcohol

is on his way to becoming an alcoholic.

He drinks not for the enjoyment of it, but

with an attempt to erase or lessen problems

of a serious nature.

tensions are the result of two things:

one, fear on his part that he cannot follow

through with his assignment; and, two, his

homosexual desires.

I predict that the

situation will not

improve but grow worse.

Yet

the handler concluded on the following note:

Despite our oral arguments and the various

incidents we experienced, Subject and I

parted on the best of terms.

He gave me an

affectionate embrace on the night of my

departure, and in front of [the principal

case officer] thanked me for my attention

to his needs and patience in dealing with

We agreed to see each other upon his

return to Washington.

During the last half of the vacation, the principal

case officer arrived

and took charge of the escort team.

Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had

seen previously,

but the principal case officer had no

success in eliciting information from him during this

period.

Not only was Nosenko uninformative, according

to the

principal

case officer, but he was also very tense

and unable to sleep more than

a few'hours at a time.

Although debriefing was resumed upon returning to

Nashington, it cannot have been very successiul.

Nosenko

was still drinking enormously and had by now aiscovered

unfettered night life; it is doubtful that he was physi-

cally able to respond meaningfully to interrogation during

the day.

On 30 March 1964, Chief, SR wrote a memorandum to

Helms entitled "Final

Phase Planning," which Helms

initialed and returned without written comment. Inter

alia, Chief, SR had this to say:

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 34

---

## Page 35

SECRET

- 30 -

We have concluded that there is little to

be gained by prolonging the status quo

beyond next weekend and

every reason to

suspect that if Subject learns we doubt

nim, he will try to escape.

Accordingly,

we have instructed the security guards to

be alert to any attempts on Subject's part

to elude them . .

Further scheduling must depend in consider-

able degree on the results of the interroga-

tion. However, since we do not anticipate

that Nosenko will ever break to the point of

becoming completely cooperative, and since

we must assume that within five

or six days

after the confrontation begins, news of our

action will have leaked out through the

briefings (however necessary they may have

been), we should be ready to take this action:

State Department

spokesman issue

low key statement indicating that

Nosenko is plant with mission to

seek

out and report on bona fide defectors

living in the United States.

Mail letter in Moscow (or from Helsinki

to Moscow) addressed to Lieutenant

General Oleg Mikhailovich Gribanov

which makes it clear that we were on

to operation all along but also that

choice of Nosenko as key figure in

operation was a mistake. To emphasize

latter point include as an attachment

a description of Nosenko behavior.

This would be couched in dry, almost

clinical, language

Aside from

the not inconsiderable satisfaction we

will have in preparing it, this letter

will serve to dissuade the Soviets from

an overly hasty reaction to our press

stories and should also make them

reasonably anxious to get Nosenko back

to determine what happened.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 35

---

## Page 36

SECRET

- 31-

Since failure to "break" Nosenko--i.e., force

him to admit that he had come to us not as

a genuine

defector but as a KGB-dispatched agent--was considered

virtually certain, plans were also being laid to re-

turn him to the Soviet authorities. Before doing

this, however, it would be necessary to:

Discuss with Legal Counsel the legal

problems which might be encountered in ar-

ranging Nosenko's deportation.

The simplest

method still appears to be [flying him] to

Tempelhof in Berlin.

Thence to S-Bahnhof

lergarten where subject, In his best

civilian clothes, with diplomatic passport,

would be placed on an S-Bahn which then

stops inside East Berlin only at the control

point S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse.

G. The Decision to Incarcerate

Although Nosenko had already contributed con-

siderable intelligence of value (see Chapter IV), in-

cluding information that led directly to the arrest of

Vassall in 1962, there is no indication in the files

from this period that the possibility of his being a

bona fide defector was given any credence whatsoever,

either within the Agency or in discussions with other

parts of the government.

On the contrary, Nosenko was treated as one whose

guilt had been established.

Nevertheless, even while

Chiet, SR was registering with certainty his lack of

hope for a favorable resolution, plans were drawn up

for an "arrest," strict confinement:and hostile interro-

gation.

The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered

on 4 April 1964.

It did not, however,

take place under

standard conditions. In his report of 8 April 1964, the

polygraph operator stated:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with repre-

sentatives of SR Division, the undersigned was

informed that the polygraph interview was part

of an overall plan to help break Subject and

elicit the truth from him. SR Division's

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 36

---

## Page 37

SECRET

- 32-

instructions were that, regardless of whether

Subject passed his polygraph test or not, he

was to be informed at the termination of

his

polygraph interview that he was lying, and

had not passed his polygraph interview.

H. First Polygraph Examination

To raise Nosenko's level of apprehension and reduce

his supposed defenses against the polygraph interroga-

tion technique, an additional mechanism was also attached

to him, which he was told was an electroencephalograph

(EEG) •

Chief, SR later commented that "Nosenko was com-

pletely confident of the polygraph when told that it

would be used until he discovered that an electroencephalo-

graph was used at the same time. The unexpected addition

of the EEG; to: the polygraph was successful and materially

aided the interrogators.

Nosenko proved

to be an excel-.

lent reactor

!.

Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the

examination:

the polygraph operator's

conclusions,

stated in his report of 8 April 1964, were categorical:

It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject

is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched

agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific

mission or missions.

According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the

different phases involving various pertinent

areas were covered with Subject polygraphically.

Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect

and "soft."

On no occasion did Subject even

attempt to volunteer any explanation of the

possible causes for his polygraph reactions.

He continually denied and refused to admit

that there was anything to any of the ques-

tions which were asked of him. When the final

test questions were completed and a record was

obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic. re-

sponses, the nature of the challenge and

probing

was changed.

Subject was told that he was lying to numerous

pertinent questions and was accused of being

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 37

---

## Page 38

SECRET

- 33-

a dispatched

agent.

Subject's only explanation

to the undersigned's direct accusation was that

he could not be a dispatched agent because of

the amount of information he had volunteered to

American Intelligence.

Subject, who before and throughout testing

reflected complete self-control and composure,

now exhibited a completely different picture.

His composure was nonexistent, his eyes watered,

and his hands trembled.

Prior to being con-

fronted with the undersigned's opinion that

Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject

was asked on one of the last test runs (a)

if he was

sent to penetrate American Intelli-

gence, and (b) if Subject received instructions

from

the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph,

his

answers were given in a voice that actually

trembled.

After completion of the interview, the SR repre-

sentative at the safesite was informed, in front

of Subject, of the undersigned's opinion that

Subject was lying and was a dispatched Soviet

agent.

The Subject was taken into protective

custody and escorted to his new place

of resi-

dence.

Once arrived at the place of confinement, Nosenko

was contronted by the principal case officer who broke

the news that Nosenko had been under suspicion since

1962.

The record of the meeting, a stormy one, is too

Long y

long to reproduce here, but the following excerpt will

convey its tone:

Principal case officer:

Everything you have said in 1962 and

1964 is prepared, based on disinformation ;

All disinformation is true in parts. That's

all right, we know that. Now if we can

talk--what I want to do is talk the real

truth

We want to talk about the opera-

tion which sent you and others to us :

Nosenko:

(In Russian)

• I don't understand. What

has happened?

What has happened?

What's the

matter?

. I don't understand.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 38.

---

## Page 39

SECRET

- 34-

Principal case officer:

What happened in 1962?

Nosenko: What happened in general?

Principal case officer:

Your operation was known from the beginning.

Nosenko:

(In Russian) I can't understand anything.

I give you my word, but then my word means

nothing to you. I can't understand anything.

All that I

could do I tried to do. I triec

to do it for my soul.

Chief, SR reported these subsequent developments as

he saw them

to Helms on 7 April:

The results of the polygraph were reviewed with

the DDP on the basis of our sessions on 6 April

with the polygraph examiner.

He obtained signi-

ficant reactions on those areas in which we were

convinced Subject was withholding information or

passing deception but also uncovered for us that

Subject is somehow concerned about his biography.

The first interrogation after the polygraph was

conducted

on the afternoon of 6 April.

[We] monitored the interrogation through a two-

way mirror in an adjoining room. It was agreed

before beginning this first interrogation that

its purpose was to determine whether or not

Subject would respond to questions or simply.

clam up after making some

The areas we planned to hit at of statement.

tests were some

of those on which we knew he was passing

deception material.

We were all gratified by the fact that Subject

was ready and eager to explain himself and in

responding to questions under tense cross-

examination, particularly with regard to the

sourcing of

some of his information, he became

quite erratic, contradicted himself

many times

and became upset physically.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 39

---

## Page 40

SECRET

- 35-

As a result of this session, we know that

Subject can be thrown off balance by aggres-

sive questioning in those areas which we know

to be important parts of the entire KGB opera-

tion.

Thus, we will continue along these

lines for several days with a specific inter-

rogation plan mapped out for each session.

ERNE

At the end of the first interrogation session,

Subject noted that he had not harmed the

United States in any way and that if we did

not believe him, he would consider going to a

not return

not recou to bee use he envitegin the

"I could

next session with him, we will tell him that

his statement with respect to not having

harmed the US is erroneous.

We will refer

to his direct participation in the Barghoorn

case

and to the fact

that his very mission it-

self is directed against US internal security.

If he again raises

the third country approach

(but only if he raises it): we will advise him

that were he to go to a third country at some

point in the future that country would be fully

apprised to our information concerning his mis-

sion to the West and the details of his personal

behavior.

Whether Helms was informed of the peculiar conditions

under which the polygraph was administered cannot be as-

certained from the record. Chief, SR simply told him

that the examiner had "obtained significant reactions"

and that "Subject can be thrown off balance

In

this connection, it is useful to note here that, in a

number of documents related to this

examination is referred to as valid. Case, this polygraph

evidence of Nosenko's

Even in the lengthy

study of February 1967 (commonly referred to as "the

thousand-page paper''), and in the shorter "green book"

formally published in February 1968, one finds no

cautionary notes.

To put in perspective the developments

of this case, both those already reported and those still

to come, we shall therefore jump ahead briefly to quote

from a formal Office of Security report covering a review

of the 1964 examination.

The senior of the three poly-

graph specialists who reviewed it stated his conclusions

as follows,. in a memorandum dated 1 November 1966:

SEGRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 40

---

## Page 41

SECRET

- 36-

Even without the review by reviewing examiners,

I considered the formal report dated 8 April

to have been in error in that the con-

clusions reached in the case were a gross

misinterpretation of the extent to which the

reactions added up.

In fact, in some instances

the Subject was deemed to be lying when it is

known he was telling the truth. With the re-

view by the reviewing examiners, I can conclude

only that the initial examiner did exactly what

the requestor asked; i.e., he was told to

collect reactions and he did. The fact that

reactions were not consistent (and indeed may

not have occurred) was not important since it

had already been decided Subject was wrong and

the polygraph was used only to support his de-

cision.

I. Incarceration and Interrogation

Many aspects of this case did not go according to

plan, but one that did was the incarceration of Nosenko.

An Office of Security representative who periodically:

guarded Nosenko from November 1964 to May 1968, when

questioned on 21 July 1976, described the regime as

follows:

Security Officer (SO) :

While he was [incarceratedl, he was being held

in a room in an old safehouse down there

it was an attic room

. and he was afforded

24 hours visual custody observance by the security

team.

Q: What does visual custody observance mean? You

mean there's somebody in the room with him?

SO: No, the room had a special door. The top half

the door was a metal screen type where we

were actually positioned outside the door on a

24-hour basis.

There were two security escorts

on duty 24 hours a day, and we were instructed

to maintain visual observance of him--just ob-

serve his activities.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 41

---

## Page 42

SECRET

- 37-

Q: Now, what was the purpose of visually observing

him 24 hours a day?

SO: Apparently to see that he made no attempts to

escape, made no attempts to injure himself.

There were never any problems along these lines.

For much of his confinement, the principal break

in a day's monotony occurred when Nosenko was under

interrogation. It is not necessary here to cover the

various interrogations in detail; suffice it to say that,

although they were conducted fitfully, with bursts of

activity followed by long periods of quiescence, almost

every technique of interrogation short of physical violence

was either tried or at least considered. A few of the

high points will be summarized in the succeeding para-

graphs.

After he "failed" his polygraph on 6 April 1964,

Nosenko was interrogated

on an almost daily basis for

nearly three weeks.

During this period a participant

commented that "we have received daily support for our

conviction that Subject was sent on a KGB mission ... "

and by 25 April the interrogators concluded:

We have gone about as far as the time permitted

for the "information gathering" phase of the

interrogation will allow

The task now

is to sort out and analyze the results of the

past three weeks of interrogation, to mark

out the strong and the weak portions of

Subject's story, and to plan the strategy and

tactics of the next phase

-...

In the mean-

time, Subject will be given

a short haircut

to dramatize his situation, and a week or so

without interrogations to emphasize our willing-

ness to keep his

[sic] indefinitely and to

heighten his tensions.

Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case

and was being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant

in connection with the interrogations. Golitsyn was

given for analysis voluminous

material relating to the

case and was told that "one of the most perplexing aspects

of the Nosenko case to us at the present time is not

whether he was sent (we all certainly agree with your

view that he was sent on a mission) but the

exact nature

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 42

---

## Page 43

SECRET

- 38-

of his service with the KGB." Golitsyn's role will

be covered more thoroughly in a separate chapter.

To ensure

cooperation in the interrogation, an

"Outline of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse

to Answer Requirements" was drawn up on 25 August 1964.

The tenor of this outline, which essentially set the

basic policy of the incarceration until late 1967, is

conveyed by the following excerpt:

Should Subject refuse to answer the case offi-

cer's questions, subject will be returned to

his cell at a time chosen by the case officer,

there will be no further conversations between

Subject and the guards except that which is

absolutely necessary, and the case officer

will notify Chief, SR. At the case officer's

discretion, Subject may lose his cigarette

privileges immediately. Each day for an in-

definite period the case officer will

return

and begin

a session with Subject.

If Subject

refuses each day to discuss the questions, he

will lose an

additional privilege in the fol-

lowing order: cigarettes, table,

chair, reading

naterial, ruler, paper and pencil. In no case,

however, will any of these privileges be removed

except with the prior approval of Chief, SR.

The basic policy to be followed during interroga-

tions was outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandum

of 2 November 1964. Like all other documents on this sub-

"trapped, assumed that Nosenko was lying and had to be

How the Interrogation will be Begun: Subject

will initially be confronted only by interro-

gators already known to him.

They will begin

detailed and apparently routine questioning

on carefully selected operations or other as-

pects of the 1960-1962 period.

This time,

however, the interrogators will be prepared to

stick doggedly to the particular subject. They

will probe deeper and deeper for detail, never

allowing Subject to dismiss them with such state-

ments as "that is the way it was" or "that is

all I remember."

We would prefer to begin in

this way so that Subject will already be under

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 43

---

## Page 44

SECRET

- 39-

pressure, cornered and in trouble by the

time he realizes that this is not a routine

questioning but the climax of his long period

of detention.

In view of Subject's personality,

one psychologist believes that Subject would

otherwise welcome this climax and

sharpen his

wits

for a

final battle to hoodwink us and

regain his freedom.

Position Into Which Subject is to be Put:

Once Subject has been trapped and cornered a

few times,

the basic theme of the interrogation

will be put to him. He has protested his sin-

cerity and desire to convince us of his truth.

He must do this now; otherwise he is here to

stay.

He can only talk his way out by convinc-

ing us. In fact, he has shown in the present

session and over the past months that he is

unable to support his legend.

He simply does

not know the facts that anyone in his alleged

position would have to know.

We will confront

him with our collateral knowledge, and insist

that he answer our questions and prove his

point. As he repeatedly fails to do so, he

will be repeatedly accused of lying and of

proving what we already know:

that the entire

service in the American Department was a clumsy

fabrication, and he must confess

it in order to

get out.

Interrogation Guides: We will identify every

detailed weakness, contradiction and omission in

priortoris design tent maxith are at on ing to

ject, and prepare interrogation briefs accord-

ingly.

The Question of Attacking Him Personally or

Placing the Blame on his KGB Superiors:

planning this interrogation we have examined

two

alternative methods of approach: (1) to attempt

to destroy his own self-confidence by attacking

him personally, exploiting our knowledge of his

weaknesses and

misbehavior, or (2) to pin the

ultimate blame on his superiors, who sent him

out under serious misapprehensions and with

inadequate briefing. Psychologists who have

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 44

---

## Page 45

SECRET

-40-

examined Subject agree that he is pathologically

self-centered.

Since his own pride and his

illusions of infallibility may constitute his

last bulwark of self-protection, he may resist

us more doggedly in this area than any other.

The other course seems best. As he increasingly

rails to answer our questions, we will point out

to him the inadequacy of his brieting and the

stupidity and fraud of which he has been made a

victim.

We will confront him with actual inci-

which he must know about and then ask him

for details.

Over and over again, we will demon-

strate and emphasize how inadequate his training

and preparation was.

We will demonstrate to Sub-

ject that the KGB consciously and callously sent

him on an

impossible mission and purposefully

deceived him

about the information that Subject

himself considers the most important to the

establishment of his bona fides . ..

The possible outcomes foreseen as a result of the interro-

gation were also based on the assumption that he had been

lying about his reasons for coming to us:

Full Success:

If Subject confesses fully, he will

have broken with the KGB and will become depen-

dent upon us for his security and well-being.

After full debriefing and establishment of bona

fides he will presumably be returned to a con-

ventional safehouse and a life similar to the

January

to April 1964 period in which he will

be permitted to go out with a security escort

while we continue his exploitation and plan his

future.

Partial Success: If Subject makes significant

admissions and falls back on

a second level

cover story, he will be kept in the present

safehouse.

His personal circumstances and

intensity of interrogation will be determined

by the situation obtaining at that time.

Failure: If the interrogation fails, we would

plan to put him

I "on ice" for a period, then

interrogate him again. For this interim period,

Subject would be transferred to visibly more

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 45

---

## Page 46

SECRET

-41-

permanent and more secure quarters.

From the

makeshift physical set up of his present

quarters, the large number of guards who rotate

weekly and the round-the-clock visual observa-

tion by two guards, it is obvious to Subject

that his quarters

(and

therefore his situation)

is temporary. As long as he knows that, he can

hope.

Our only hope of breaking Subject will

be to allow him to convince himself that he has

got into a situation from which he can extricate

himself only by cooperating.

This could be

best achieved by breaking sharply with the

present situation, placing him in permanent

quarters, preferably remote and more primitive

than his present quarters, physically secure

and resembling jail, and capable of being manned

by a

minimum of guard personnel who would not

keep

him under constant direct visual observa-

tion. No Headquarters case officer would visit

him, until he has given sign that he has changed

his

mind. . This

period would last for several

months, pending

another attempt to break him

based on information obtained in the interim.

J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory

The stringency of the rules governing treatment of

Nosenko varied from time to time, but the

general trend

was to take an ever harder line towards him.

Since it

was assumed that he was a KGB-dispatched agent, he could

only satisfy his interrogators by admitting that such

was the case.

But, while he would from time to time at-

tempt to placate his questioners with admissions of having

lied or incorrectly reported certain past events, he would

never admit to the key accusation of being KGB-controlled.

The inevitable result was not only greater harshness

toward him but a gradually spreading suspicion in regard

to super tens one tides this development is marrowed

to support his bona fides.

in a memorandum that the principal case officer wrote

after a visit with Helms on 19 November 1964:

In connection with Nosenko, Mr. Helms referred

to it as one of the greatest time consumers

he had ever seen.

I remarked that I felt the

time was well spent since our examination of this

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 46

---

## Page 47

SECRET

-42-

case

had opened our eyes not only to security

threats in our own midst and within the US

government, but also had revealed that many

other important sources were in fact KGB provo-

cations and in fact that our entire counterin-

telligence effort, double agents and all, may

be contaminated and useless.

According

to the theory being developed, no Soviet

or Soviet Bloc agent was immune from suspicion if his re-

porting tended

to confirm anything that Nosenko had said.

Agents who were then

currently producing intelligence,

not only for CIA but also for the FBI and certain European

intelligence services, all came under heavy suspicion.

The single exception was

Golitsyn. The latter,

although

he had confirmed Nosenko's identity (which had

itself been

in doubt at one point as well

as his affiliation with the

KGB, also contributed the elaborate rationale according

to which the KGB was sacrificing Nosenko and a host of

other agents and

operations to protect even more important,

if somewhat nebulous, assets and plans. Golitsyn thus be-

came the touchstone

against whom the trustworthiness of

all other agents was judged.

Because Nosenko refused to "break," however, it was

hard to adduce proof of Golitsyn's theory substantial

enough to convince Helms, the FBI, and other officials

and organizations not so

A lengthy paper on SR/CI's findings on this subject was

always in the offing but was continually delayed; it did

not finally materialize until February 1967. On the

other hand, no one had at his fingertips the vast array

of facts, and suppositions masquerading as facts, on

which the case was based. The theory was therefore

difficult to challenge; there may even have been reluctance

to do so, because the main proponents of the disinformation

theory frequently referred to unhappy consequences that

would flow from abandoning the course upon which the

Agency had embarked. Should the Agency change course,

for example, by simply returning Nosenko to Soviet hands,

terrible, though ill-defined, consequences would cer-

tainly ensue.

As the principal case officer said (again

to his 20 November 1964 memorandum of conversation with

Helms) :

I pointed out the potential dangers of return-

ing Nosenko unscathed and within a short time.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 47

---

## Page 48

SECRET

- 43-

I thought the KGB would be

concerned

[by implication, amazed and delighted] only

by the fact that a defector thrust into our

mits (sic] could expect such an easy fate

if uncovered.

K..

Life in a Vault

The unforeseen stubbornness of Nosenko had meanwhile

brought SR Division to an impasse from which there was

but one escape--the more-or-less permanent incarceration

of Nosenko.

Nothing that the latter said would be be-

lieved except the one admission that he

steadfastly re-

fused to make li.e., that he had been dispatched by the

KGB), and, although Helms wanted to solve

the problem

thus

created by simply turning Nosenko back to the Soviets,

this solution was resisted by the division.

The upshot

was that, on 27 November 1964, Chief, SR wrote:

If he fails to convince us (which he

can't) and refuses to confess what we already

know, the US government has every intention

of protecting itself

against this dangerous

provocation by detaining him indefinitely.

The

decision was therefore taken, with Helms' approval,

to build a new detention facility.

The cell constructed

for Nosenko's occupancy was

essentially a vault enveloped

by a barracks-type building. Its projected amenities were

described as follows:

a. Small cell with concrete floor and

ceiling and walls lined with metal.

b. No electrical outlets in the cell,

lighting to be recessed and grilled and con-

trolled from the day room.

c. No window in the cell.

d. One entrance to the cell which will be

of the metal bar type with an exterior door in

front of this and a sliding panel in the exte-

rior door which will permit a complete view of

the cell area.

Plexiglass will be used in the

observation panel rather than glass.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 48

---

## Page 49

SECRET

-44-

A toilet facility which will adjoin

the cell and contain a shower, basin and com-

mode.

With the exception of the commode,

which will be the prison push-button type,

all controls will be in the day room area and

will also contain a plexiglass observation

port with

a sliding panel on the exterior.

f.

An exercise

area just outside the

nearest door which will be fenced and screened

(so that Nosenko can only look up and

see only

the sky).

As the new installation neared completion, Chief,

SR on 15 June 1965 wrote Helms:

We

believe that we have gone just about as far

as normal interrogation techniques will take

and that the time has come to prepare Sub-

ject for his move to the ostensibly permanent

detention site.

It will be ready for

occupancy on or about 1 August. Chief, SR/CI

visited the site on 11 June and reports that

the installation is excellent from every point

of view.

marginal note next to the above paragraph:

like both you and [Chief, CI] to examine this site."

If Helms had had any doubt about the site's suitability,

he must have been

reassured by a 28 July 1965 memorandum

addressed to him by the Director of Security:

On Tuesday, 2? July, the Chief, CI Staff, the

Chief, SR Division and the undersigned lin-

spected] the newly constructed special detention

facility.

As you know,

• it is planned

to utilize this facility to hold AEFOXTROI for

an indefinite period.

By mid-August,

the time had come for Nosenko's transfer.

The events surrounding it are recounted in a 19 August 1965

memorandum for the record:

As planned,

• [the principal case officer]

had

a brief "confrontation scene" with Subject

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 49

---

## Page 50

SECRET

- 45-

on the same evening, immediately prior to his

removal to new quarters.

The purpose of this

session was not to deliver a new message of

any sort, or to give Subject "another chance

to confess"; everything that could be said had

already been said by . . . the previous inter-

rogators, and there was no doubt that Subject

understood perfectly well the meaning

and

importance of what had been said to him; also,

it was recognized that Subject would sense

an

impending move or change of some sort, and that

it was inevitable that he would hope that the

change would be for the better until he saw

otherwise. The purpose of the confrontation

was rather to close the circle: to show him

that although [the principal case officer] had

not seen him for over a year nothing had changed,

and

nothing would change until he told the

truth.

An additional effect would be to empha-

size

that the interrogators who had worked with

him in the interim were fully responsible and

authoritative, and that just as Subject had been

told when he was first locked up in April 1964,

what he was up against was the collapse of the

operation in which he was involved. Finally,

[the principal case officer] would stress ...

that the "investigation is closed" and that

Subject had only prolonged and total isolation

to look forward to now unless and until he

decides

to confess.

The meeting took place just about as planned.

It lasted for 15 minutes only (2100 to 2115)

and was essentially a formality, although it

is hoped that Subject will have reason to re-

flect on it in the months ahead. As can be

seen from the attached summary transcript,

Subject did not display any hesitancy or

indecision, and his answers and statements

were made in a mechanical manner.

The 19 August memorandum concludes:

Immediately upon termination of the interview

with [the principal case officer], Subject was

blindfolded and led out of the house according

to the prearranged plan. He was clearly frightened,

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 50

---

## Page 51

SECRET

- 46-

but did not put up the slightest resistance.

The move to the new quarters took place exactly

as planned.

The new detention facility had been designed and

staffed with the intention of engendering in Nosenko a

feeling of hopelessness, from which the only escape

would be through confession that he was a KGB agent

and revelation of the full details of how he had been

briefed and dispatched by the Soviet authorities.

With

the exception of being allowed certain books, carefully

selected for him by SR Division, Nosenko was

confined

under conditions that were as close to stimulus-free as

was consistent with maintaining him in good physical

health.

For example, the TV used by the guards was

fitted with earphones, so that there was no risk of his

overhearing snatches of dialogue. The principal case

officer was assured, in answer to an inquiry, that

"while he does note planes going overhead

if Nosenko were

to attempt to open conversation with

them on any subject,

nicone coupe exer

as well as

animal noises from the woods during exercise periods,

everything

else

• . . is excluded." As to the guards,

in rude terms to shut up., suards should instruct him

At this point, we must pause to consider for the

moment how the period that follows is to be covered.

Because there were long periods of time when no human

being other than the guards was in contact with Nosenko,

and because he was not allowed to keep a diary, the

story of his sojourn from August 1965 to October 1967

does not lend itself easily to narrative presentation.

Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted

over half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that

three-and-a-half-year period amounts to five percent of

the total life span of a man who lives to be 70.

Obviously, then, this period will weigh heavily

in the findings made at the conclusion of

our study.

For these findings to be valid, they must be made on

the basis of as much empirical

evidence as can be

gathered. Because the effect on Nosenko of this long

period of confinement can only be dealt with speculatively,

such few remarks as we have on that subject

will be

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 51

---

## Page 52

SECRET

-47-

confined to the relatively discursive chapter on

"Psychological and Medical Findings."

Within the

body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to

coverage of the main

recorded events, none of which

are seen

I through the eyes of Nosenko himself.

We now

resume our narrative.

On 13 August 1965, before Nosenko was locked into

his cell for the first

lowed from• then on:

Ce11

This is your cell. You are to keep it clean

and will be given cleaning materials for this

purpose.

Reading Privilege

You will be permitted one book a week which

you may retain in your cell.

Smoking Privilege

You will receive a daily cigarette ration.

Exercising Privilege

every day, weather and other factors permitting:

you will have an exercise period.

Writing Material

Writing material will be provided only for

correspondence with the appropriate authorities

concerning your confession.

Schedule

This prison operates on a schedule. You will

become familiar with this schedule and adhere

to it at all times.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 52

---

## Page 53

SECRET

- 48-

Within the framework of the above rules, which were

strictly enforced, Nosenko's only diversion was reading

the one book per week that he was at first allowed.

He

did not even have the distraction of being questioned,

for, when queried by Helms on 12 January 1966, Chief,

SR stated that no one from SR Division had seen Nosenko

since the beginning of his confinement there, five

months earlier.

On 1 November 1965, his privileges began to be re-

record. for reasons that are not always clear from the

From that date on, for instance, he no longer

received books to read, and for minor acts of indiscipline,

soap, towel and toothbrush were temporarily denied him.

Some time in January or February 1966, Nosenko

claimed to be suffering from auditory hallucinations.

In a memorandum dated 18 February 1966, Chief, SR re-

ported:

There are hopeful signs that the isolation

is beginning to have an effect on subject. lA

doctor's visit may have had further impact in

this direction when [the doctor] told Subject

that his visit constituted an "annual" physical

exam; as

he left Subject's room, [the doctor]

also

remarked, "I'11

see you next year."

Sub-

ject's reaction was visible.)

Now we have just received

further confirmation

of the development of Subject's attitude.

On

the evening of 16 February 1966, he shouted for

a few seconds in English, apparently to guards,

that he would commit suicide and kept repeating,

''You'll see.

You' 11

see." He

asked to see the

local "doctor" (he has

been told that the medical

technician at the base is a doctor), but the

guards told him it was

too late in

the evening.

When the technician came the following day,

17 February, Subject talked at some length

about his worries that he might be going mad.

He has repeatedly stressed his belief that he

is being

drugged, but said on this occasion

that he recognized that there are no drugs

designed to make a person mad.

Consequently,

he said, he was concerned about the fact that

during the past day or two he had heard

voices

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 53

---

## Page 54

SECRET

- 49 -

emanating from various objects, such as his

shoe and his spoon,

the engine of an aircraft

overhead, and a bird in a nearly tree.

When

questioned,

he said that the voices were say-

ing in English "first die" while the bird was

saying "kid." He asked if the "doctor" con-

sidered him

insane.

He was told that

he did

not appear to be so, upon which he reiterated,

his worries and spoke of his desire to die.

He expressed his recognition that his present

circumstances do not afford means to commit

suicide.

Nosenko's alleged hallucinations triggered a special

meeting on 24 February 1966. The resultant memorandum

for the record, written by a member of SR/CI, is worth

quoting at length:

Representatives of SR Division, the Office of

Security, and the Medical Staff met in the SR

Conference Room from approximately 1400 to

1430 hours this date to discuss recent inci-

dents in Nosenko's behavior and

a forthcoming

examination of

Nosenko by [a doctor]

The undersigned entered the Conference Room

after discussions had begun, so some of the

initial remarks are not noted here.

[An Agency psychiatrist] first described to

those present his examination of Nosenko on

21 January 1966 and stated his opinion, based

on observations made at that time,

that the

recent outbursts by Nosenko and his threats

of suicide are all contrived and do not

represent an involuntary reaction on his

Nosenko's recent behavior started with

suicide threats, then progressed to auditory

hallucinations, and has now reached the stage

where every inanimate object in his environ-

ment, including the trees and the wind out-

doors, are talking to him.

[The psychiatrist]

expressed his view that,

if Nosenko actually

does hear voices, it could normally be expected

that they would speak to him in his native

language, rather than in English as he told the

base medical technician during a recent visit.

Nosenko apparently now realizes this (Ithe

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 54

---

## Page 55

SECRET

- 50-

psychiatrist] didn't describe how, but

presumably the technician commented on it

to Nosenko) and Nosenko, in [the psychiatrist's]

opinion, has now picked this up and is trying to

recoup by saying that he now does everything in

English--think, speak, everything.

At this point, [the principal case officer]

described Nosenko's recently begun word games,

in which he takes a Russian word and then figures

out as many root derivations as possible, as

an illustration of how ridiculous Nosenko's

claim is.

[The psychiatrist] continued to say that Nosenko

is now agreeing to take medication and is asking

for additional medication to help raise his

spirits. Ilhe psychiatrist has told the base

medical

technician not to answer Nosenko directly,

but to "let it be known" to Nosenko that the

medication he is now receiving will help him

out in this respect. [The psychiatrist] then

repeated that he thinks that Nosenko is reacting

to his isolation, his lack of human contactinand

his environment

but that he is responding

planned, contrived, and non-spontaneous way,

from

a psychiatric point of view.

[The psychiatrist]

added that the only thing that is worrying him

at present concerning Nosenko is his possible

urinary problem, which is now being look into.

[The principal case officer] next explained to

those present that Nosenko's current behavior

is consistent with our knowledge of Soviet training

in techniques of resisting interrogation and

imprisonment. However, because of intelligence

and

cunning (although he has a fair share of

each), Nosenko has made some mistakes.

The

principal case officer agreed that Nosenko Is

probably feeling the effect of isolation

and is

making this try to get out. When he finds that

this doesn't

work, he may eventually decide "to

hell with it" and start to talk.

...

[the

principal case officer] said that he and [the

psychiatrist] agree that, should Nosenko raise

the issue of his alleged insanity during the

upcoming examination, the best

response should

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 55

---

## Page 56

SECRET

-51-

be to the effect that, if Nosenko actually

is going out of his head, the best possible

thing for him is isolation, lots of rest,

and a place where he can't hurt himself.

This is what is usually prescribed and this

1S, In fact, the situation Nosenko already

enjoys. Ilhe principal case officer, added

that the wording of

any such response would,

of course, be up to [the psychiatristl.

In support of the above, [the psychiatrist]

then said that he had gone over things very

carefully during his January visit and, on

this basis, can see no basic change in

at the site he had remarked that he had come

for Nosenko's annual physical examination

and when he was leaving he told Nosenko that

he would see him again next year. In Ithe

psychiatrist's] opinion, Nosenko reacted to

this by saying to himself: "How can I get

out of here?"

He has apparently decided

that the best way to escape his present

situation is to be sick with something that

can't

be handled locally and then it will be

necessary for him to be moved to a hospital.

[The psychiatrist] said that, from Nosenko's

point of view, any change will be for the

better and agreed with the principal case

officerl that it is important to indicate

that there will be none.

The simple state-

ment suggested by [the principal case officer]

may give Nosenko the message and no further

explanation is necessary.

[An Office of Security

representativel then

asked if, under conditions of prolonged con-

finement, there is not a chance that a person

actually will go off his rocker. The

psychiatrist] replied that this is absolutely

so, that this happens in many cases under less

stringent conditions of imprisonment, and

that the person usually improved quickly when

these conditions are relaxed. [The psychiatrist]

does not believe however that Nosenko fits in

this category.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 56

---

## Page 57

SECRET

- 52-

The Office of Security representativel then

asked what sort of behavior can be expected

in a person who is actually so affected by

his imprisonment.

Whether he could be ex-

pected to become violent or behave errati-

cally.

[He] said that he was asking this

question from the point of view of his respon-

sibilities for guarding Nosenko.

[The

psychiatrist] replied that such behavior

can take almost any form, that there may be

changes in physical behavior, eating and

He added that there

certainly has been a change in Nosenko since

the January 1966 examination, that he doesn't

know for certain what it means, and that there

surely is a risk that he may go out of his

head.

[The principal

case officerl pointed

out

that [the psychiatrist's] remark about

the "annual physical" may have triggered this

reaction. [The psychiatrist] agreed, saying

that while he cannot dismiss true insanity

as a

real possibility, he doesn't think that

this is what is going on right now.

[The Office of Security representativel next

commented that Nosenko is again asking for

casing cerate wanted to me henan.

(The principal case officer] replied absolutely

not and (the psychiatrist] concurred that no

changes should be made.

[The Office of Security

representativel then asked whether Nosenko has

any sort of skin disease, pointing out that the

guards have to wash his shirts'two or three

times to get them clean. Both doctors said

that Nosenko is not afflicted as far as they

know and [the Office of Security representativel

asked whether it is still policy that Nosenko

is to have a clean change of clothes only once

a week. [The psychiatrist] expressed the opinion.

that nothing should be changed, at least until

after the examination on 1 March.

[The psychiatristl remarked that things are

bound to change as far as Nosenko is concerned--

he is either going to stop faking or things will

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 57

---

## Page 58

SECRET

- 53-

get worse.

[The principal case officer] added

that we (SR) are working hard on other sources

of information, that things seem optimistic

right now, and

that this is no time to falter.

He added that Mr. Helms is keeping current of

the situation and goes along fully with

present plans, without changes.

[The psychiatrist was] asked what medication

Nosenko is now receiving. [The psychiatrist]

replied that he is getting 1/4 of

a grain of

phenobarbital together with an antispasmodic

(tor gas), which won't have any medical effect

on Nosenko's mental state.

This is why, he

explained, he had instructed the base technician

to let Nosenko know that the medication will

help him.

It can have no real effect and if

Nosenko suddenly improves,

this will be added

confirmation that he is faking.

On 1 March 1960,

the principal case officer and

and SR/CI representative accompanied the two doctors

to another examination of Nosenko. One doctor conducted

the examination, while the other members of the party

observed it on a

television screen. None of the four

men gave much credence to Nosenko's claim of hearing

voices, but the following was noted:

Though Nosenko's mental difficulties are

apparently a sham, it is also evident that

there has been a change in his outlook since

SR last had direct contact with him in August

1965. If by nothing else, this is evidenced

by the single fact that he has taken a new

tack in his relationship with CIA: He has

apparently given up hope that his legend or

"another source" can help him escape his

predicament and, as (the psychiatrist earlier

proposed, is using his "voices" (except for

which Nosenko claims to be sane) to force

some sort of change.

For the first time in

the undersigned's recollection, Nosenko said

that he now knows that his CIA handling offi-

cers will never (Nosenko's emphasis) believe

him because of his behavior and for other

reasons, and that there is nothing he can

about it. But, beyond this, it is difficult

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 58

---

## Page 59

SECRET

- 54-

to interpret the significance of his remarks

and behavior during la second doctor's] inter-

view--on one hand there were indications of

deterioration; on the other Nosenko is an

astute actor, who was clearly playing a role

for that doctor. Bearing in mind that these

superficial indications may well be a part of

this act, Nosenko appeared far more subdued,

almost despondent, compared with six months

ago.

For most of

the interview, he slouched

or sat listlessly in his chair and only sel-

dom did he lean forward and, by the motions

of his hands,

attempt to reach and to secure

the understanding and belief of the interviewer.

There appears to be a slight deterioration in

his English-language fluency (see transcript

below) and his replies were broken by frequent

pauses, incomplete sentences, and confusing

Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two

letters to the principal case ofticer, written in mid-

April 1966 (although incorrectly dated, because by now

his calculation of

the passage of time was no longer

completely accurate).

The first, and briefer of the two,

read:

I ask you to excuse me for my baseness in 1962

and 1964.

Now I have completely realized all

my delinquencies and have reevaluated my past

"life."

I want to live an exclusively honest and modest

life and I am ready to work in whatever place

that it may be possible, taking into account

my knowledge of Soviet Russia.

I' believe that

I have sufficient strength to live only a real

life.

I ask you to help me.

The second letter was even more self-accusatory, and

was clearly modeled after the self-criticisms exacted

from prisoners in the Soviet Union.

It began:

My despicable behaviour from the beginning of

my acquaintance with you in 1962 led to it

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 59

---

## Page 60

SECRET

•- 55-

being necessary to create special conditions

for me and to assist me, which has finally

helped me to realize all my delinquencies

and mistakes and to reevaluate all my past

"life.

I should have honestly told you everything

about myself, about my moral principles and

my life in Soviet Russia in order to start

a conscientious life in June 1962.

This letter next summarized Nosenko's career from

childhood until his arrival in the United States, and

admitted that although he had been documented "errone-

ously" as a lieutenant colonel he had actually never

held a military rank higher than captain in the KGB.

It concluded:

Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding

period of my degradation--drunkenness,

debauchery, baseness, and falsehood.

I should have told you all about this in

1962 or in 1964, before flying to America.

I started my life in the United States of

America absolutely incorrectly. My behaviour

was base, dirty, and boorish.

The creation of isolated living conditions

and the appropriate assistance were necessary

for me.

But I was unable to honestly and

directly tell everything about myself in

1964 or in 1965, right up to the last con-

versation with you.

And only in 1966 did

I gradually begin to realize and to correctly

understand all my mistakes and delinquencies

and to think about my behaviour.

And only

here was I able to reevaluate all my past

"life."

Now I can think correctly about real life

and work, and therefore I address myself to

you because you know me more and better. than

anyone else, with the request to decide. the

question of my future life.

By work

against

the Communists, and only with real life, I

will try to justify the confidence placed in

me.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 60

---

## Page 61

SECRET

- 56-

The Chief, SR commented:

The letters themselves do not represent a com-

plete break but they reveal that his defenses

are weakening and he may be seeking a way out.

He tells essentially the same story as before

but with more discrepancies of detail which

suggest further deterioration and, by this

consistentnability most signe heat change

is that he now admits he was only a Captain

in the KGB and not à Lt. Colonel.

On the other

hand, this may be a prearranged fall-back posi-

tion.

We recall that [a Soviet agent]--who,

in telling us repeatedly in 1964 of the importance

of Nosenko, said he was a Lt. Col.--informed [us]

in February 1965 (after our doubts about Nosenko

had

become

well known and Nosenko himself had

possibly missed pre-arranged contacts with the

KGB) that la Soviet agent had heard that al-

though Nosenko was a Deputy Department Chief,

he was only a Captain and not a Lt. Colonel.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that

the rank of Lt. Col. was part of the KGB pre-

pared legend for Nosenko, and not simply his

own improvisation. This

is proved by the fact

that one of the personal documents that Nosenko

brought with him to Geneva in 1964 was a TDY

travel order which Nosenko claims to have used

to travel to Gorkiy . . . [and] was clearly a

deliberate plant by the KGB and there can be no

question of its being filled out erroneously.

Furthermore, the rank was necessary to sustain

the fiction of Nosenko's high supervisory posi-

tions, which in turn were necessary to explain

his access to the information he claims to have.

Aside from the hope they offer for success in

breaking Nosenko, the most interesting aspect

of the letters is their tone.

He does not com-

plain of our treatment of him but on the con-

trary expresses appreciation for it and says

that it was entirely justified.

They are the

latest in a series of indications that Nosenko

is weakening. They follow an attempt to feign

insanity, an abortive hunger strike and some

erratic behaviour concerning his exercise period.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 61

---

## Page 62

SECRET

- 57 -

We plan to answer him along the lines that

we are willing to forgive his "baseness and

falsehood" and discuss his rehabilitation

but only when he is prepared to drop the legend

which he seems to maintain in his letter. If

he 1s, as we think, getting desperate to get

out, he may reply with further admissions.

We have clarified the medical questions which

were delaying further interrogation.

We are

now reviewing with Chief, TSD the proposals

discussed with you earlier concerning the use

of special interrogation techniques.

attached letters afford an ideal opportunity

to resume discussions with Nosenko whenever

we wish.

(The reference to "special interrogation techniques"

harked back to a 13 January

1966 discussion with Helms,

during which the latter had stated that "he was inclined

to try special techniques on Subject in the hope that

they might somehow provide the answers we are seeking."

In this context, "special techniques" was a euphemism for

the use of drugs as aids in interrogation.

As will be

shown later, although Helms was willing to discuss the

use of such techniques in this case, he in tact never gave

his consent and they were never employed. Nevertheless, -

the use of drugs for interrogation purposes seems to have

been contemplated for some time, since it is foreseen in

handwritten notes made by the principal case officer as

early as November 1964, and Chief, SR and the principal

case

officer continued

to press

for permission to employ

them until a final negative decision by Helms on 1.

September 1966.)

On 26 April 1966, Chief, SR again wrote Helms to

say that a response to Nosenko's letters had been delayed

in order to allow time for discussion with Chief, CI and

the psychiatrist. Their combined judgment seems to have

been

that the letters were "an attempt to relieve the

isolation by reestablishing personal contact, if only

with his interrogators."

He bolstered this view by an

appeal to medical authority:

....

It is [the psychiatrist's) opinion, in which

we fully concur,

that any such contact would

in fact constitute a relief for Nosenko and

that it would be a serious mistake to grant

SECHET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 62

---

## Page 63

SECRET

- 58-

him this at the very moment that his

psychological defenses may be cracking.

On the contrary, Ithe psychiatrist teels

we should cut off any

hopes Nosenko may

harbor that he can alter his present situa-

tion without a full confession.

Since it is the technique of isolation and

rejection that has led to the recent promising

changes in Nosenko's attitude

and behavior, we

believe that it is logical to continue along

the same lines and that there is a reasonable

expectation that this treatment will produce

further results in the near future.

therefore intend to send Nosenko the attached

letter and to wait approximately 60 days before

changing our tactics.

The letter thereupon sent to Nosenko in the principal

case officer's name read as follows:

I have

received

"autobiography."Your letters and so-called

We understand fully what

degradation the Soviet system has forced you

into and as you have been told

we are willing

to help you establish a real life.

As I told you in August, however, we have no

further interest in reading or listening to

the legend (or its variations) that you con-

tinue to repeat.

We are only interested in

evidence that you really want to talk truth-

fully.

In the future we will reply only to a

true written account of your life and how your

legend was prepared. Do not waste our time

with the lies of the past.

This legend cannot

be the basis of a new life for you.

Chief, SR's next report, dated 11 May 1966, was the

following:

As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note

was passed to Nosenko in response to his earlier

note and slightly amended biographical state-

ment.

He made no response upon receiving our

note (although he did not touch his meal that

night); but on the evening of 4 May he asked

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 63

---

## Page 64

SECRET

- 59 -

for a pencil and paper, indicating, in reply

to a question from

the

guard, that he had a

statement to make in response to our note.

After writing his note, he sealed it in an

envelope and gave it to the guard to be

delivered.

The note, written in English, states:

Allow me to thank you very much for your kind

letter.

Now I understood fully what degrada-

tion to the Soviet Russia had forced me into.

At last I can tell you that I really want to

talk truthfully.

I want to begin the job against the Soviet

Russia.

My only wish is to establish a real

life with your help as you are willing to do

50.

[signed] George Nosenko

We have discussed his note with (the psychiatrist],

who feels that the final sentence of the

first paragraph probably reflects no real

desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truth-

fully at this time, but is rather a further

attempt by him either to generate a personal

dialogue with us or at least to continue

this written exchange.

We feel that it would not be in our interest

to answer this latest note with another note,

phys omitting necessary contact me entere-

ment--albeit impersonal. In order to cut

ott this effort on his part, but at the same

time to allow for the possibility that this

latest note might actually convey an intention

to talk truthfully, we intend to deliver to

Nosenko the attached statement. The require-

ment for direct "YES" or "NO" answers accom-

panied by his signature allows for no mis-

understanding of the questions and does not

permit lengthy discourses on peripheral.

matters.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 64

---

## Page 65

SECRET

-60-

[The psychiatrist] concurs in our plan and

recommends that

it be carried out as soon as

possible to achieve maximum effect.

If we

get a positive response we will follow up

immediately.

In accordance

with the above memorandum, the follow-

ing form was passed to Nosenko on 13 May 1966, apparently

by the Security guards:

Answer "YES" or "NO":

1) Do you admit that you came to the United States

on a KGB mission?

YES [

NO [ ]

2) Are you ready to tell us about your KGB mission

and how your legend was prepared and taught

to you?

YES [

NO [

Date

Signed

If the answers to both questions are "YES" someone

will come to talk to you. If not, there is no

need to write any more letters.

The next major maneuver on Nosenko's part was a

hunger strike, in the course of which he lost some forty

pounds.

This tactic was counteracted with the help of a

medical officer while administering a physical check-up

on. 22 June 1966:

In the course of the examination, (this doctor]

questioned Subject on the reasons for his fast

and got him to admit that this was a deliberate

tactic. As planned, the doctor showed no

concern, assured Subject that he was still in

good health, described to him in some detail

the physical and mental consequences of prolonged

undernourishment, and emphasized that Subject

would not be allowed to do himself any damage

in this manner.

The doctors' description of some

of the standard methods of forced feeding and his

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 65

---

## Page 66

SECRET

- 61-

matter-of-fact emphasis that all appropriate

medical measures could and would be taken at

an instant and evident

impact on Subject, who nevertheless continued

had no need or desire for

Despite the weight loss, the

re-

sults of the medical exam showed that Subject

On 23 June, the day following the doctor's

visit, Subject began to eat ravenously and

he has been consuming all his meals since.

By 6 July he had gained 15 lbs.

The Agency's next step was to have the principal

case officer see Nosenko.

This interview, which

place on o July 1900, lasted for about 45 minutes and

"was the

first time that a case officer had talked to

Subject since he was moved

The interview re-

sulted in another stand-off

, the principal case officer

insisting that Nosenko admit to being a KGB agent and

the latter refusing.

Once again, however, Agency offi-

cers in charge felt they were making progress:

[The psychiatrist], who monitored the entire

interview, was impressed by the tact that subject

had used it solely to appeal to the pity and

sympathy of the interviewer, and felt that the

way in which the interview was conducted would

very effectively slam shut still another psycho-

logical door.

It is believed that for the first

time Subject has come to appreciate the measure

of our resolve and determination, and that he is

actively grappling with the realities ot his

present situation.

Subject's pattern of behavior

over the past few

months suggests that he will

need some

time to fully digest the import of the

[principal case officer's] interview, but that

he will then be impelled to initiate some new

effort to releive (sic) his lot. Very few

alternatives short of confession--real or false--

appear to be left to him.

On 23 August 1966 Helms, who had become DCI on 30

June 1966, instructed the DDP and Chief, SR to close the

case "within about sixty days assuming there are no new

developments which would warrant reconsideration of this

development." Chief, SR gave this account of Helms'

reasoning:

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 66

---

## Page 67

SECRET

- 62-

• the Director advised us that in his

view the time had come to consider disposal of

Subject.

He was willing, he said, to proceed

with the immediate plans we had for the sodium

amytal interview and to consider proposals for

use of special techniques within the time frame

we suggested but unless these steps developed

new information or indicated definite progress

in resolving the case, he wanted us to wind it

up.

Helms' decision triggered a new rash of activity

within what was now the SB Division. Chief, SR, noting

that "there is no appeal. . . unless we uncover new,

compelling data," reconstituted a special Task Force

to work on the

case, headed by the principal case officer.

A problem which the principal case officer found

particularly thorny, to judge by his notes, was posed by

the FBI's unwillingness to accept CIA's evaluation of

Nosenko.

Our case is based primarily on analysis, not

confirmed by juridically acceptable evidence,

and

this analysis is so complex that it pro-

bably could not be made more understandable

to laymen than

it has been to the FBI, which

has largely failed to understand it.

Despite Helms:

expressed preference for returning

Nosenko to Soviet hands, the principal case officer con-

tinued to have misgivings about such a course:

Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in

holding him, but in bringing his case to public

notice again, and especially in allowing the

Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our

denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly

if they are in some doubt about his real

status/loyalty,, is a form of guarantee

that

the Soviets

cannot take the many damaging

actions available to them if they had the

body.) The course of action therefore must

balance the respective dangers.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 67

---

## Page 68

SECRET

- 63-

Helms, on the other hand, hardened his position.

He was perhaps influenced by [the psychiatrist's]

pointing out that in his experience with sodium

amytal it had only worked once, and then by accident;

Helms promptly revoked his permission for use of this

Helms remarked that Nosenko was "one person

whom these techniques were never going to be used."

The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms

limited the interrogators

to the polygraph in any

future interrogations, and reiterated his preference

for "having Subject turned back to the Soviets ... "

On 2 September, Chief, SB saw Helms again, to ask

deadline

be extended.

Helms agreed on an extension until the

end of the year.

A discussion of a final report and

"disposal" then ensued, reported by Chief, SB as follows:

• it would be imprudent I thought not to

have ready for any eventuality a detailed

study of our findings.

This would provide

backup to our final report to the intelligence

community principals, the Secretary of State,

Attorney General and

others.

In the case of

the FBI, I added, we would most certainly

have to

have such a document. "This remark

stemmed from the fact that the FBI had never

fully agreed with the Agency's views on

Nosenko.]

As for disposal, Director Helms, believed

that return to

Soviet control is the only

practical solution. Third country disposal

might only delay our having to face the same

problems and if accusations are leveled at

the agency it would be far preferable to

have Subject in Soviet hands. The Director

did not believe the Soviets would refuse to

accept Subject and felt we could take the

sting out of any Soviet reaction by our own

statement concerning Subject's mission.

If

our position is publicized first, anything

the Soviets or anyone else says about the

case thereafter will have very little effect.

In the conclusion the Director emphasized the

need to bring this case to an end in a manner.

which will permit us to arrange events and

timing to our advantage. He does not want

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 68

---

## Page 69

SECRET

- 64-

to be stampeded by publicity beyond our

control.

Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the

preparation of the above-mentioned final report, was

recommenced on 18 October 1966. Assisting in the in-

terrogation was the polygraph operator whose 1964

polygraph tapes were at this very time under review

by the Office of Security; on 1 November, thirteen

days later, they were officially and in writing

pronounced

to have been invalid.

This is what Chief, SB had to report on 25 October

1966:

Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive

areas and this is worrying him because he is

not sure how much we know or how we learned

it.. Nosenko's reactions have given us hope

that we may be this procedure have begun to

strike home.

We do not know what it is that

keeps this man sitting month after month in

his present situation. We speculate that one

factor may be confidence that the KGB will

get him out. Related to this may be the

thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply pene-

trated that it would be unhealthy for him

to confess.

Our current line of interroga-

tion, expanded and used even more forcefully,

might break down some of his obstacles to

confession by showing us in a different and

stronger posture.

Despite eight days of interrogation employing the

polygraph, however, SB Division did not achieve their

goal:

Nosenko did

not "confess" to being a "provocateur."

Operating under the constraint of Helms' injunction to

wind up the case by the end of the year, the principal

case officer made one last attempt to shatter Nosenko's

resolution. In a long letter, the principal case officer

outlined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation and

adduced a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication,

derived in part from

a fictitious "KGB officer

..

• sent

out as a provocateur" whom the SB Division leadership

invented for purposes of this letter.

A possible tactical

error on their part, however, was the inclusion of informa-

tion about Nosenko, ostensibly received from the notional

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 69

---

## Page 70

SECRET

- 65-

source, which Nosenko himself would obviously recognize

as false:

"He heard that you had been in prison in the

USSR, and that you received a Government award for your

meetings with us in 1962."

According to the SB Division

officer who delivered the letter, Nosenko responded to

this allegation with a belly-laugh, but he certainly was

depressed, as his rambling remarks

to the SB Division

emissary showed:

I know about my lies and I corrected all

my false statements, my chattering. I know

everything what is necessary for me to know.

And I will be here, I understand this, I will

be here so many years as you will consider it

necessary. You consider five ..

• I will be

five; you consider ten .

•. I will be ten.

I have no, I have no exit and I have no way

out of this situation, and ...

L. Inter-Agency Disagreement

of seeivinion mouset me to ta preparati do

This docu-

ment,

frequently referred to as the "thousand-page re-

port," was

described by Chief, SB as follows:

[It] will reflect all of AEFOXTROT's state-

ments concerning his personal life, alleged

KGB career and other matters as well as sub-

sequent contradictions or denials of earlier

statements plus the results of our investiga-

It will also cover statements pertaining to

AEFOXTROT made by various Soviet officials

some of whom have been or are now in opera-

tional contact with the CS [Clandestine

Service] or the FBI. This factual portion

will be followed by analysis and conclusions.

The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on

these points:

a .

AEFOXTROT is a dispatched

KGB agent whose contact with us and

ultimate defection were carried out

at KGB direction.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 70

---

## Page 71

SECRET

-66-

b.

AEFOXTROT's claim to service

in the KGB was an integral and vital

part of his KGB agent mission, forming

as it did the basis for all that he has

had to say about KGB operations and

personnel.. Yet,

the results of our

interrogations of AEFOXTROT supported

by polygraph examination demonstrate

conclusively that AEFOXTROT did not

and could not have served in any of the

specific staff positions he has described.

c. Whatever the ultimate goals

of this KGB operation might be, it has

been possible

to determine

that among

the most significant KGB aims in

directing AEFOXTROT to us were: (1)

to persuade us of KGB ineptitude and

lack of success in developing technical

and human penetrations of the US

government, its security and intelli-

gence services while at the same time

deliberately diverting these services

from specific areas of investigation

in which the KGB has been successful;

(2) to offer us leads to new sources

and

new investigations which had they

all

been pursued would have absorbed

our limited manpower in handling cases

in which ultimate control rested with

the KGB.

Preparation of the report was somewhat complicated

by disagreements between CIA and the FBI, as well as

between SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency.. The

intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on

the validity of Golitsyn information. Whereas SB Division

insisted that Nosenko, during his KGB career, had never

"served in

any of the

described," Golitsyn had in some respects supported

Nosenko's claims regarding his KGB service.

After a con-

ference with Chief, Cl, the Chief, SR summed up the

problem on 29 March:

Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could

submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it con-

tained suggestions that Golitsyn had lied to us

about certain aspects of Nosenko's past. He

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 71

---

## Page 72

SECRET

•- 67-

recalled that the Director of the FBI had stated

that in his opinion Golitsyn himself was a provo-

cateur and penetration agent. On the other hand,

most FBI agents have accepted that when Golitsyn

was speaking on facts known to him he was accu-

rate even though they do not accept most of his

hypotheses or inferences drawn from facts.

Chief, CI went on to say that if we submitted

to the FBI a report on Nosenko in the form we

now have it, it would most certainly cause us

difficulties. It might cause us to lose whatever

impact our report would be able to make on the

overall question of Nosenko's bona fides ...

The

disagreements between the Agency and the FBI were

never to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within

the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the CI Staff.

Within house, Chief, SR and Chief, CI eventually papered

over their differences sufficiently to publish a second,

compromise report on

the Nosenko case in February 1968.

But by then the case

had been taken out of their hands,

and the report was a dead letter even before it went to

press.

M. Voices of Dissent

Meanwhile,

although the top leadership of SR Division

remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding

Nosenko as a KGB-dispatched agent, there was some dissent

at the lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were

not well received by the leadership, however, and thus

had no effect on the handling of the case. A former

member of SR/CI remembers that it was sometimes possible

to discuss alternative ways of presenting very specific

points in preparing the written case against Nosenko

(which was

page paper"), but no qualification of the

basic thesis

was tolerated.

The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from

outside SR Division, and it was a tentative one.

senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to

interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series

of meetings between

3 and 21 May 1965.

As a result of

his questioning, he became convinced that at the very

least Nosenko was in fact Nosenko.

Even this rather

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 72

---

## Page 73

SECRET

- 68-

you do not know about are nice thn sua na up

the sessions, the psychologist had this to say:

I am totally at a loss to even attempt to

rationalize why a story with this much

pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing

could be served other than to discredit the

man to whom it was assigned. In some remote

sense--to me--it might have been felt it would

evoke sympathy but this is really far out and

a very dangerous gamble on their part. The

manner in which he has told his story and

the nuances he has introduced would require

great ingenuity and preparation.

From my

standpoint, he has been essentially convincing

and accurate in general if not always truthful

in detail. Here I am talking about the psycho-

logical data only--I am not prepared to ex-

press an opinion on other aspects. Within

whatever frame of reference I can operate, 1

am torced to conclude that all the psycholog-

ical evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko,

the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life story is

essentially as he has described it.

It is

obviously distorted in places but in each case

there is a probable psychological reason for

the distortion and deception. No man is a

good reporter on himself and we all use

rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as

others see us.

My opinion, for whatever it

is worth, is that Nosenko cannot be broken

outside

the context of his life story and

personality structure. It should be noted

here that the life story is completely com-

patible with the personality structure

as

projected by psychological tests.

The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts

about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko than he

felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from

a

memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives

his memory of the situation facing him:

In discussing his lengthy series of inter-

views with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, [the :

psychologist] said that he was very hesitant

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 73

---

## Page 74

SECRET

- 69 -

to express the full extent of his doubts

about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-

dispatched agent. The reason for his hesi-

tation was that, when (Chief, SR] got a hint

of [the psychologist's] doubts about the

theory, IChief, SRI told [the psychologist]

that such

doubts might make [the psychologist]

suspect of himself being involved in the KGB/

Nosenko plan.

There is no evidence in the files to indicate that

the psychologist's doubts were accorded any impartial

consideration. Chief, SR, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum

to Helms (who was by then DDCI, but still riding herd

on the case), described the interviews as "unrewarding

in terms of producing new information or insights ...

It was obvious that Subject had given some thought

to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher

spots in his story."

By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division

who doubted the thesis,

and one of them was willing to

risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in

31-page memorandum

to Chief, SR commenting on a "sterile"

version

of SR/CI's "notebook" documenting

the case against

Nosenko. It began:

Introduction

At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko

notebook and I hope you will honor my right to

dissent.

I find the evidence that Nosenko is a

bona fide defector far more convincing than the

evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as

a KGB agent.

It is because I am concerned about the

serious

ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to

set forth my dissenting views in considerable

detail.

If the present verdict of "guilty" is

right I believe there must be satisfactory

answers to the questions raised herein; if it is

wrong--as I believe it is--it should be

rectified as soon as possible.

Intelligence Production

There are several references in the Nosenko note-

book to the extent and quality of the intelligence

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 74

---

## Page 75

SECRET

-70-

he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to

DDP, It 1s asserted that "A comparison of

his

positive intelligence with that of other

Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom

we have had an operational relationship shows

that all of them were consistently better able

to provide useful

has been Nosenko, „Positive intelligence than

Tab D of this same memo

states "His positive intelligence production

is practically nil," and later: "Viewed

overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelli-

gence production has been so meager for a man

of his background, training and position as to

case doubts on his bona fides, without refer-

ence to other criteria." All

of these

state-

ments are incorrect.

The three persons in the Clandestine Services

with the background and experience to make such

a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and

access agree that they are incorrect. . No KGB

officer has been able to provide more useful

intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has

shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB

officers in general is "practically nil."

Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in the proper con-

text, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence produc-

tion

cannot be used in his defense, but neither

can it be

said honestly to cast any doubt what-

soever on his bona fides. In the realm of sub-

stance, judgment regarding his bona fides must

therefore be made on the basis of his counter-

intelligence information.

Counterintelligence Production

The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona

fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others

indicate, must be based on his production--how

much did

he hurt the Soviets.

I believe that

the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet

intelligence effort more than all other KGB

defectors combined.

Chief, SR later wrote:

I have read this document and am of mixed minds.

First, it shows clearly that the so-called

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 75

---

## Page 76

SECRET

- 71-

"sterile" book in the hands of a person with

none of the other background on other cases

or appreciation of the penetration problems

affecting us and the FBI can be a very

damaging document. I question seriously.

whether we should

make it available to

others in its present form. Second, the

book's weaknesses are principally its

language and the fact that it was made up

of memos from various periods and as our

evaluation matured, or we developed additional.

information, the tone of the subsequent memos

changed but the reader can suggest our approach

has been superficial or inconsistent:

Third,

we cannot make the book available unless we

are prepared to deal with the totality or

near totality of the picture.

book is to be used at all in briefing

individ-

uals, it should be re-written and questions of

the kind posed by this

•paper trrated [sic]

no matter how irritating we find them to be.

If one person has this view, others might at

some point ...

In replying to Chief, SR, another SR officer also

attempted to take a balanced view:

The paper suffers from many faults. These

include bias, intellectual arrogance, and

lack of CI background. Needless to say, the

conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I

found

it to

be a usetul paper, and I think that we

would be wise to treat it seriously, because

it does highlight some problems which we have

all been aware of for some time.

It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us

who contributed substantially to the black

books will feel personally attacked by many

of the uninformed judgments and intemperate

comments contained in (this] paper.

I urge

that we all strive to overcome the temptation

to reply in kind. Despite the paper's short-

comings, it is one reader's serious and sincere

response to the black book, and it reflects

some serious faults in the

book which we must

correct.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 76

---

## Page 77

SECRET

-72-

This is not the first indication we have had

that some of our analytical methods, and

particularly the style and language we have

become addicted to, are not easily understood

by "outsiders."

We have all been on this prob-

lem so long that we've gotten into the habit

of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical

proofs, considering the gaps and omissions to

be self-explanatory ..

When the author of the dissenting paper wrote to

Helms on 4 April 1966, he included the following com-

ments:

My primary reason for bringing the attached

bootleg copy of my memorandum to your atten-

tion is the morbid effect that the Nosenko

case has, and will continue to have, on intel-

ligence collection against the USSR by all

agencies of

the US government. The accu-

sations against Nosenko, which I believe to be

entirely false, have contaminated all current

agent operations against the USSR and most

of the past operations, ex post facto

Any case which we get from now on which sup-

ports Nosenko,

especially the GRU and KGB

cases, will likely be considered tainted.

Since

all such good cases are bound to sup-

port him, US intelligence faces a bleak

future.

The explicit ramifications of the

concept of an all-powerful KGB, which can with

impunity present us one of their senior per-

sonnel, or a knowledgeable facsimile, are.

already apparent in the negative moods of CIA

personnel here and overseas.

Not long thereafter, Helms called the author by

phone and told him he was having a great deal of trouble

with the Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore

going to turn it over to the DDCI, who he hoped could

get to the bottom of it for him.

Helms also asked the

author if he would agree to Helms' passing his paper to

an Agency psychologist..

A few days later, Helms again

called the author by phone and asked if he would agree

to his paper's being passed to both the DDCI and

the

Director of Security.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 77

---

## Page 78

SECRET

- 73-

N. Helms Takes Control

With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement

drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight.

The FBI continued to take what Chief,

SB described as a

"neutral position" in regard to Nosenko.

The conflicting views of the various interested

parties are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of

this study to require a detailed coverage.

What is

relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms'

impatience with continued delay.

He therefore initiated

a number of measures that gradually took handling of the

entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division.

The first of these measures was to instruct the DDCI to

undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case.

When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21

September 1976, the former DDCI remembered his involvement

as follows:

DDCI: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms

[saying] that there was a matter that worried

him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he

doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst

the people in the Agency who handled it so far

to arrive at any kind of a really objective

solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive

indeed, would I please look into it and let him

know my conclusions.

Then he went on to tell

about Nosenko, the detector, who was at that

e was a dichotomy of views

And he mentioned that

whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether

case he, helms,

him confined and we had to do something with him

one way or the other.

Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?

DDCI: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that

this fellow had been in confinement

so long and

that they had never been able to arrive at a con-

clusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether

he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved

and something had to be done to get this fellow

in a ... oh, I've forgotten just how he put it,

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 78

---

## Page 79

SECRET

- 74-

Q:

but in a more acceptable position.

So, I

said, yes, I would undertake this job and I

sent for all the background papers

on it and

studied them first.

Then I interviewed (Chief,

CI and Chief, SB] and arrived at the conclu-

people in

think I

talked to some other

the Soviet Division of the DDP also,

I arrived at the conclusion that people

their feet so mired in concrete of opinion

as to one side or the other of the case, that

it was just damned near impossible to get any

worthwhile information out of interviews.

I then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I

indicated that I had, after reviewing the . ...

making a preliminary review of the case, that

I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a

plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was

planted for.

Nor could I get out of anybody

else what he was supposed

what his mission

was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis ..

' My second memorandum to Helms was to the

effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe

that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the

Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and

I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with

the idea of rehabilitating him. And [the Director

of Securityl then had him moved ...

Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms'

reactions to your recommendations?

DDCI: He seemed rather pleased with the information.

I got the impression from discussing the case

with him that he never had been able to get what

he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from

anybody; and I got the impression that he felt

at last

he had a fair appraisal of it.

On 26 May 1967, the DDCI called the Director of

Security to his office, and the Director of security re-

corded the meeting as follows:

[The DDCI] started by asking me whether or not

I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing

the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and ex-

ploitation of [Nosenko]. I said that I had not

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 79

---

## Page 80

SECRET

- 75-

read it personally but that la member] of my

Security Research Staff was now in the process

of reviewing it and commenting on selected por-

tions of it.

He then asked if I agreed with

its conclusions.

that it had been the consistent position of

this Office that while we did not, under any

circumstances, consider him bona fide, we were

not convinced that he ve

that he was a provocation dis-

patched by the KGB with a specific mission.

Rather, our position has always been that there

is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story

but we do not know enough in order to make a

final decision.

I went on to point out to the [DDCI] that I

had thought, and had so recommended on numerous

occasions in the past, that it would make a lot

of sense for la member] of my Office to take

over the interrogation of [Nosenko] in order

to resolve several discrepancies that had always

concerned us.

Further, I

said that the polygraph

examination

given [Nosenko]

at the outset was

designed only to "break him" and was not an ob-

jective polygraph examination designed to establish

or deny his bona fides.

I indicated that the

Director had approved this idea but that I had

been unable to sell the idea to . ... SB Division.

[The DDCI] said that he thought this was an

excellent idea.

He agreed with me that we had

everything to gain and nothing to lose through

such

a course of action and that he would so

him that one of the things that had always con-

cerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had

never released any verbatim transcripts covering

their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that

we could make our judgment only on the basis of

written summaries prepared by the Division.

Thus, acting under the DDCI's orders, the Office of

Security transferred Nosenko to "a decent

• respectable

safehouse."

SB Division was cut out of the case, as was

the CI Staff.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 80

---

## Page 81

SECRET

- 76-

0. Resolution of the Case

The Office of Security took over the handling of

Nosenko in October 1967.

The officer in charge immedi-

ately inaugurated a rapid transition to normal living

conditions.

Throughout this process, he found Nosenko

fully cooperative,

and without any tendency toward

drunkenness or other aberrant behavior.

The following is a summary report prepared on 16

November 1967:

Nosenko was moved to his current location on

27 October 1967 and the first interview with

Nosenko occurred on 30 October.

During the

first interview, particularly the first hour?

Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain

reticence to talk.. This condition ameliorated

rapidly and it is considered that the current

situation

is better than could have ever been

anticipated in view of the conditions of his

previous confinement.

Nosenko on his first day indicated his complete

willingness to answer all questions and to write

his answers to questions on areas of specific

interest.

It was determined that his English

is adequate both for interview and for prepara-

tion of written material.

Interviews are not

usually over two and a half hours a day, six

days a week, with Nosenko preparing from six to

ten pages of written material

each day. Pre-

pared material has included life history, in-

dividual cases, trips of Nosenko, reason for

defection, and

detailed drawings of pertinent

offices during his claimed period of KGB employ-

ment.

There does not appear to be any impairment of

his memory.

His current living conditions,

although physically secure, are luxurious com-

oared to those he had been in during the past

three years and have resulted in a relaxation

of physical tension.

Definitive resolution of the complex problems in

this case will require a considerable period of

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 81

---

## Page 82

SECRET

- 77-

time for further interviews, preparation of

written material and a comparative analysis

against his previous statements and information

rom other sources, interviews and investigation.

Vosenko treely admits certain previous lles con-

cerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and

having received certain awards or decorations.

All interviews with Nosenko are recorded and

transcripts of the interviews are being prepared.

In addition, all written material from Nosenko

is being typed with certain explanatory re-

marks . .

In addition, the Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence has

been orally briefed

by the Director of Security.

As of the

present time, it is estimated that there

1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting

completion.

All of the finished material is

in a form which will permit dissemination to

the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemina-

tion is considered appropriate.

Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a

clarification of certain areas of previous

controversy. As an example, it is considered

that there can be at this time little doubt

that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approxi-

mate period which he claims to have been in

the KGB. The matter of the actual positions

held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953-

early 1964 period is not considered adequately

resolved at this time and any speculation con-

cerning the dispatched agent aspects would be

completely premature.

if even a degree of optimism is realistic, 1t

is felt that the additional interviews and work

in the Nosenko case together with a detailed

comparative analysis of all information will

provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion

of the Nosenko problem.

Nosenko has been very

and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at

least condition Nosenko more favorably for what-

ever future action is taken relative to his dis-

position.

SECRET

• NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 82

---

## Page 83

SECRET

=78-

This questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a

separate investigation conducted by the FBI. Results

were covered in two reports published at about the

same time, the FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA

Office of

Security's on 1 October 1968.

The essence of the Office of Security's findings

was expressed in a covering memorandum to the Director

of Security:

In brief, the conclusion of this summary is

hat Nosenko is the person he claims to be

that he held his claimed positions in the KGE

during 1953-January 1964, that Nosenko was

not dispatched by the KGB, and that his pre-

vious lies and exaggerations are not actually

of material significance at this time.

The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweep-

ing:

1.

The current interrogations and collateral

inquiries have established a number of significant

omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968

CIA paper and have invalidated the vast majority

of conclusions on which that paper relied to

discredit Nosenko.

2. The current interrogations and the poly-

examination* disclosed no indication of

deception on the part of Nosenko. He is know-

ledgeable in the areas and to the extent he

should be; he furnished logical explanations

for acquisition of information which would not

normally have been accessible to him in his

claimed positions.

There is no substantial

basis for doubting his bona fides as a defector.

3. The variety and volume of information

provided by Nosenko is such that it is considered

impossible that he acquired the information

only by KGB briefing. It is also illogical and

*Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examina-

tion of Nosenko performed by CIA between 2 and 6 August

1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by the Office

of Security.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 83

---

## Page 84

SECRET

- 79-

implausible that the KGB would have dis-

patched an officer of his caliber with in-

structions to disclose the variety and volume

of valuable information furnished by him. No

compensatory objective is apparent.

The current interrogations show that

Nosenko is in possession of information not

previously obtained.

In the interest of both

intelligence and counterintelligence agencies

of the government, interviews should be con-

tinued to exhaust his knowledge.

5. There should be a thorough re-examina-

tion of all information and cases emanating from

Nosenko

and other defectors where the decision

for action, or lack of action, was previously

influenced.

by the presumption

that Nosenko was

not a bona fide defector.

Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave

up its contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent.

On 31 January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept

Nosenko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the

only proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of

time

which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA."

An undated memorandum written by the Office of

Security officer in charge of Nosenko essentially brings

this chronicle to a close:

Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private

residence and since June 1969, his own automobile.

Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko could have, if

in a way seriously

adverse to the best interests of this Agency

since control was not of such a nature as to

preclude independent action by Nosenko.

It is the opinion of Agency representatives in

regular contact with Nosenko that he is genuinely

interested in maintaining the anonymity of his

current identity, that is, not becoming publicly

known as identical to Nosenko. As an example,

he was very interested in having a facial birth-

mark removed. However, he has on numerous

occasions indicated his interest in participating

under the Nosenko identity in some action or

SECRET

; NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 84

---

## Page 85

SECRET

- 80-

activity which would "hurt the KGB." Nosenko

considers that he has certain capabilities

and knowledge which could be useful in the

effort of the United States government against

the KGB. This interest has not been associated

with any particular curiosity in regard to the

activities of this Agency...

Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep

interest in obtaining United States citizen-

ship as soon as possible. He realizes that

under normal circumstances, citizenship could

is aware that citizenship can be obtained in

less than the normal waiting period by legisla-

tive action.

Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and

FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have

made

an unusual adaptation to American life.

He lives like a normal American and has an

obvious pride in his home and personal effects.

His home life from all appearances is quite

calm.

The fluency of Nosenko in the English

language has greatly increased and there is

no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in

his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously

his accent and occasional incorrect sentence

structure (and misspelling of words) has not

been eliminated and

probably will never be

entirely eliminated.

Nosenko continues to complete work assignments

expeditiously and with interest..

As indicated

above, Nosenko is

very interested in doing

"something active" which is understandable.

Full consideration should be given to this

interest since if properly controlled and

channeled, could be used in a way adverse to

the best interest of the KGB.

Nosenko has since become a United Stated citizen,

nas married an American woman, continues to lead a norma.

life, and works productively for the cia.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 85

---

## Page 86

SECRET

- 81-

CHAPTER IV

Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation

Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the US govern-

ment

must begin by pointing

out that he might well have been

ble to contribute more had he been permitted to do so

Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious

considera-

tion to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments

of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions

along this line as possibly part of a plan

to embarrass the

There is no telling what potential recruit-

ment targets might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's

defection, briefed him with such targets in view.

In this part of our study, we therefore confine our-

selves to a summary of the contributions that, despite con-

siderable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take them,

very briefly, one by one.

A. Information on KGB Personnel

The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up

Nosenko's contribution in this field as follows:

Nosenko has furnished information concerning

perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents

or operative contacts here the terms agents

or operative contacts are used to refer to

Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief

Directorate or internal KGB organizations.

However, he has identified approximately 250

former or current First Chief Directorate

officers and there is a considerable exchange

of officers between the FCD and SCD.

In

addition, numerous officers of the SCD and

other internal KGB organizations travel abroad

with delegations, tourist groups, and as

visitors to various major exhibitions such

as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this

time to estimate the number of KGB officers

identified by Nosenko who have been outside

the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who

By No since

will be out some time in the future.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 86

---

## Page 87

SECRET

- 82 -

There has been very little

attempted exploi-

tation of information furnished by Nosenko

concerning other KGB officers and, therefore,

the possible value of this information to

United States Intelligence cannot be esti-

mated nor can the potential damage to the

KGB be estimated.

B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens

Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with

the KGB involved efforts against Us citizens, either

visitors to the USSR or members of the US embassy ir

Moscow. As a result of this background, Nosenko was

able to provide some 238 identifications of, or leads

to, Americans in whom the KGB had displayed

some interest.

Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in

"recruitments" that, according to Nosenko, were more

statistical

than real; the KGB played the

numbers game,

for purposes of year-end reporting.

Nonetheless,

Nosenko's reporting did result in the uncovering

of

certain US citizens genuinely working for Soviet intel-

ligence:

1.

US Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson,

who had been recruited in 1953, was arrested

in 1965 on the basis of a Nosenko lead to an

agent assigned to a US military installation

outside Paris who was providing the KGB with

important documents as

of 1962-1963. Johnson

was custodian of classified documents at Orly

Field Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station

during this period, and he provided documents

from there.

Excerpts from a preliminary

damage assessment are included below:

The full extent of damage will only

be known when the current review of

documents by all affected agencies

is completed.

The damage assessments

evera eased on a review e theces docum

ments to date,

indicate that as a re-

sult of access

to documents in the Orly

vault, the Soviets may have learned:

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 87

---

## Page 88

SECRET

-83-

[a]. Details of the Single Inte-

grated Operational Plan (SIOP) includ-

ing the attack plans of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the identity of Soviet

targets,

the tactical plans of USAF

elements including weapons systems

and methods of delivery.

(b].

US Intelligence holdings on

Soviet military capabilities, atomic

energy production, weapons storage

facilities, industrial complexes and

order of battle.

[c]: Daily US Intelligence sum-

maries

including our comments and reports

on military and political developments

around the world.

[d] •

Comprehensive comparisons

of US and Soviet SAM Systems.

[e].

Indications of the scope and

success

of the US national SIGINT effort.

[f].

A wealth of material for use

in crypto-analysis.

From these preliminary reports ... it is

evident that Sgt. Johnson's cooperation

with Soviet Intelligence has resulted in

most serious damage to US national security.

repairman"s Second sed magniten"recrumachine

by the KGB while serving in Moscow during the period

1952-1954.

Smith, while initially denying any con-

tact with

Soviets, finally admitted he had been

recruited and had passed information to them.

3.

James A. Mintkenbaugh, formerly a member

of the

US Armed Forces, later in the real estate

business as a civilian.

In connection with

Nosenko's lead to Johnson, Mintkenbaugh was inter-

viewed after Mrs. Johnson identified him as a

friend of her husband's.

Mintkenbaugh unexpectedly

volunteered that he, too, had been recruited, by

Johnson himself, to

provide cover for and

assist

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 88

---

## Page 89

SECRET

- 84-

the latter in his work on behalf of the KGB.

Mintkenbaugh described his KGB role as a

spotter, collaborator with Johnson in

clandestine photography of documents, and

later as a courier between Johnson and his

KGB handlers.

C.

Moscow Microphones

In 1962, Golitsyn had in general terms reported on

the existence of microphones in the US embassy in Moscow.

This information was promptly sent to the Department of

State, but no action was taken; lack of specificity was

as one of the reasons.

It was not until Nosenko's

more detailed information was communicated to the Depart-

ment of State in March and June 1964 that action was

taken that led

to the uncovering of a system of 52 micro-

phones, beginning in April of that year. Of the micro-

phones

found, 42 were active at the time of discovery.

These microphones covered most of the offices in the

embassy most significant from the Soviet standpoint.

D. William John Christopher Vassall

Nosenko, in June 1962, told us the KGB had an agent

in the British Admiralty.

Though this information

eventually contributed to the arrest and conviction

of

William John Christopher Vassall, CIA for some time

tended to give Golitsyn credit for this success.

The British counterintelligence service stated in

1976 that, although Vassall probably would "eventually"

have emerged as a

"leading candidate" for suspicion as

a result of the Golitsyn information,

it was in fact

Nosenko's information that "was to clinch the identifica-

tion of Vassall as

the spy."

The British added that "[Nosenko's] information

affecting UK interests seems to have been consistent with

his position and we cannot recall any indication in the

leads of UK interest that [Nosenko's] object might have

been to mislead or deceive."

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 89

---

## Page 90

SECRET

- 85-

E.

Leads to Foreign Nationals

Altogether, Nosenko is estimated to have provided

some 200 identifications of, or leads to, foreign

nationals (including recruited agents) in some 36

countries in whom the KGB had an active interest.

F.

Summary Evaluation

It is not feasible, within the

terms of this study,

to make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelli-

gence production and that of other similarly qualified

defectors.

Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate

on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and

quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of

great value to the US government.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 90

---

## Page 91

SECRET

- 86-

CHAPTER V

The Analytical Foundations of the "Monster Plot"

For the purposes of this study, we have not chosen to

duplicate the mammoth effort put into analyzing and validating

Nosenko's information by the Office of Security in CIA and

by the FBI; we have reviewed their work and

can find no pos-

sible reason to challenge their findings.

There remains,

however, the question of how senior officials could have

drawn

so many erroneous conclusions from data tendered by a source

whom we now believe to have been cooperative and acting in

good faith.

A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation

At no time between June 1962 and October 1967 was

Nosenko aftorded the kind of systematic, objective, non-

nostile interrogation by well-informed professional in-

telligence officers which had otherwise been standard

operating procedures in dealing with defectors and in-

place sources from Soviet and East European intelligence

services.

We now examine the manifestations and consequences

of this problem at various stages of the case.

1. June 1962 Meetings

The transcripts of the 1962 meetings reveal a

disastrous problem of communication:

Russian

very rapidly, and his voice ranged from

loud and dramatic to excited whispering.

--The senior case officer spoke fair Russian, but

he preferred to speak English when saying any-

thing important. He was largely unable to fol-

low Nosenko's "machine-gun style" of delivery

in Russian.

Nosenko and the senior case officer

frequently interrupted one another at important

moments.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 91

---

## Page 92

SECRET

- 87-

--A second case officer, with native Russian,

arrived on the scene for the second meeting

filled with assurance derived from his involve-

ment in two important operations concerning

CIA sources

in Soviet Military Intelligence:

Popov from 1953 to 1958, and Penkovskiy (who

was still working in-place as of the June 1962

Nosenko meetings). Unfortunately, the com-

munication problem was exacerbated, not only

by the case officer's showing off his know-

ledge to Nosenko rather than listening to what

Nosenko had to say, but also by the case offi-

cer's inaccurate summarizations in English

rather than translations of Nosenko's state-

ments in

Russian.

This case officer's presence

was justified by the fact that the senior case

officer could not cope with Nosenko's Russian,

but the second case officer distorted so much

of what was said that he was a

munication.

barrier of.com-

The second meeting, the longest of the five,

was

further disorganized by the fact that Nosenko

arrived half-drunk from partying the previous day

and most of the night.

Even during the nearly eight-

nour interview,

Nosenko continued to drink.

This

point was consistently overlooked or ignored in later

examination of boastful claims Nosenko made during

this meeting; e.g., Nosenko personally handled the

Langelle/Popov case, Nosenko personally ran the

operation against a US security officer, Nosenko

personally talked to a US code clerk to try to re-

cruit him, etc. When confronted in hostile interroga-

tions in 1964

and 1965 with these claims, he denied

personal participation in all three instances (other

than directing the code clerk case behind the scene)

and said that if he had said such things in 1962 it

was because he was either drunk or under very strong

tension at the time.

Such

explanations were not con-

sidered acceptable by his interrogators, and the

claims were let stand as evidence of his mendacity.

While Nosenko provided a substantial amount

of information during these five meetings, there

was little or no follow-up questioning on most of it,

partly because of lack of time but also because of

the case officers' lack of background on the KGB in

general and the Second Chief Directorate in particular.

• Ignorance of the Second Chief Directorate was only to

SECRET

NW 65990 Docid:32404871 Page 92

---

## Page 93

SECRET

- 88-

be expected, of course, since Nosenko was the

first KGB officer ever

to talk to CIA who had

spent his career in this component.

2. January-March 1964

The second series of meetings in Geneva, in

January and February 1964, were somewhat better

organized, but--given the already prevailing belief

that Nosenko was a KGB controlled agent--he was not

carefully questioned on the information he gave.

This was partly because it was considered of

primary importance not to reveal even by implica-

tion how much we already knew, lest his mission

include elicitation of information CIA had received

from Golitsyn or other sources considered bona fide.

Debriefings in the United States after Nosenko's

defection were similarly limited to noncontroversial

generalities and were not noteworthy for attention to

accuracy and detail. (Although most of the debrief-

ings of this period were taped, none of these tapes

was

ever transcribed. Notes were taken, and reports

were then written up on the basis of the notes.

This three-stage process did not always result

in

an accurate version of what had been said.)

3. April 1964-October 1966

The hostile confrontation that took place for

some two weeks in April 1964 cannot be considered

systematic interrogation; "shouting matches" would

better characterize these sessions.

During one period--May to November 1964--Nosenko

was systematically debriefed in neutral fashion to

obtain additional information on leads to Americans

and other Westerners recruited by the KGB, in part

meet requirements provided by the FBI. The other

to

two objectives of this debriefing period, of greater

importance to the CIA concerns in

this

case,

were:

--to obtain answers to questions posed in writing

by Golitsyn, whose aim was to trap Nosenko into

exposing his ignorance or "lies" about topics

Golitsyn considered central to Nosenko's "KGB

missions. "

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 93

SECRET

---

## Page 94

SECRET

-89 -

-- to acquire fuller background on Nosenko's

alleged duties

and activities in his various

KGB positions in order to use his own informa-

tion against him in the hostile interrogation

period that was to follow.

The January-March 1965 hostile interrogations

were carefully structured and systematic but were

not designed

to collect information.

The information

Nosenko provided in these sessions was consistently

and intentionally ignored, as the stated objectives

were

to force Nosenko to agree with his interrogators

that (1) he did not know what he should have known

(according to CIA assumptions), and (2) that he had

not held the positions in the

KGB that he claimed.

This objective was "successfully" achieved in the

eyes of the interrogators by bringing Nosenko to

sign statements that purported to summarize his

statements of inadequacy of both knowledge and

pertormance in regard to each of the positions he

had held.

Each time, in signing these so-called

"protocols," Nosenko

objected that the way they

were worded distorted what he had said; however,

he acknowledged his inability to get his interroga-

tor: to listen to what he was trying to tell him and

therefore his inability to reword these papers in

any manner satisfactory to him.

When given

one key

"protocol" to sign--one that was a "confession"

that he had been sent by the KGB to deceive CIA,

and that he had lied purposely on behalf of the

KGB--he said that, if his signing this document

would serve some good purpose of CIA or of the US

government in general, he would do so, but only with

his interrogators' clear understanding that the

entire

"confession" was untrue.

• Under these circum-

stances, his interrogators declined to have him sign

this document.

Thus this series of interrogations

failed in its ultimate objective--that of "breaking"

Nosenko.

Subsequent interrogation sessions were not con-

structed to collect information any more than the

previous ones but were designed to collect further

damaging evidence of Nosenko's ignorance about the

KGB and of the areas in his reporting to which he

was "most sensitive" and that therefore were most

revealing of his "true KGB missions." In sum, while

a greal deal of personnel time was spent in talking

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 94

---

## Page 95

B.

SECRET

-90 -

to Nosenko and a large amount of paper was

generated in consequence, the canons of proper

interrogation were rarely observed.

4. Time Devoted to Debriefing or Interrogation

A point that can

easily be overlooked is that,

of the total period of Nosenko's incarceration, a

relatively modest amount of time was devoted to

actually debriefing or interrogating him. The most

generous estimate we can make is that approximately

estriating oc

292 days were at least in part devoted to debriefing

or interrogating Nosenko, out of a total of 1,277

Thus, from the standpoint of

a polit of

obtaining information, about 77 percent, or more

than three-quarters, of the detention period was

downtime.

Faulty Record of Conversations with Nosenko

The outcome of the Nosenko case was prejudiced at

the outset by the establishment of a faulty record.

happened during the June

1962 meetings.

The inadequacy of the principal case

officer's Russian for use

in an interrogation has already

been mentioned.

The problem was exacerbated, however, by

the fact that he nonetheless took notes on what Nosenko

is purported to have said, which became part of the of

ficial record without their being compared with tape

transcriptions by a more competent Russian linguist.

If anything, the role of the second case officer,

who had a native command of Russian but little patience

with detail, simply compounded the errors. Returning

from Geneva

on 15 June, the principal case officer on

18 June began to dictate, using his own notes, a series

of 30 memoranda covering highlights of the meetings as

he had understood them.

These memoranda were reviewed

by the second case officer as they were typed, but he

made only minor additions or corrections.

The so-called "transcripts of the tapes" from the

five meetings were then prepared by the second case of-

ficer between the week of 19 June and mid-August 1962.

Contrary to the usual procedure, the second case officer

did not first

transcribe from the tapes into the combination

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 95

---

## Page 96

SECRET

-91-

of Russian and English (predominantly Russian)

actually used in the meetings, and then make his

translations on the basis of transcriptions. Rather,

he dictated them into English directly, using the error-

filled memoranda of the principal case officer's for

guidance.

In March 1964 a KGB defector of 1954 vintage was

brought into the case to examine Nosenko's reporting

in terms of his own

expertise on personalities, file

procedures, reorganizations, etc.

He concentrated on

the early years of Nosenko's career, particularly 1952

and 1953. In a resultant memorandum dated 12 March 1964,

he commented as follows:

The undersigned began work on this special project

by reviewing the taped recordings of the meetings

only, without reference to the meeting transcripts,

believing that it would be possible and preferable

to get all the necessary information and other

material firsthand in this way.

From the begin-

ning, however, it was obvious that this would be

very difficult, if not in many cases impossible;

the early tapes (Nos. 1-6 and especially No. 1)

were very poor

in quality. (These are the tapes

for meetings No. 1 and 2.)

After proceeding thus far in a review of the

tapes, the undersigned then switched over and

began

anew, reviewing the transcripts alone and

without reference to the tapes.

This method

also quickly proved unsatistactory; from his

memory of the discussions as actually presented

on the early tapes, although poorly reproduced

and hard to "catch," the undersigned soon was

able to tell that the transcripts are, to say

the least, faulty.

A point-by-point review of the tapes and tran-

scripts was then initiated and has been pursued

until the present time

by the undersigned.

In

the course of this review, a large number of

errors--omissions and other discrepancies--

have been discovered scattered throughout the

transcript coverage of the meetings recorded on

the tapes.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 96

---

## Page 97

SECRET

- 92-

It is impossible to make enduring pronounce-

ments of the following

type without knowing the

whole situation and being fully aware of all

the motives and factors--personal and profes-

sonal--involved, yet it should be noted that

the undersigned in many places throughout the

rarene in mar

records of the meetings has encountered examples

of what he would consider errors in the handling

and conduct of those meetings.

Let it suffice

merely to register this point here; notes on

this subject will be drafted and presented in

later papers.

He then proceeded to cite nine major examples of

errors, omissions, distortions, and procedures characteristic

of the second case officer's transcripts (and performance

during the meetings). He concluded by saying:

The foregoing present but a few examples of

errors, discrepancies, distortions, etc., to

be found throughout the transcripts.

A com-

plete report of all

such errors, etc., will

be prepared upon request.

The "complete report" was never prepared, and it may

never have been requested.

Later, the first series of hostile interrogations of

Nosenko, beginning on 6 April 1964, was monitored by

the 1954 defector,

who listened from an adjacent room.

On 17 April, Nosenko was challenged concerning a claim

he had supposedly made in June 1902 (according to the

second case officer's "transcripts") that he in person

had recruited an American professor of Slavic languages

visiting in Bulgaria during the time Nosenko was on TDY

for briefing sessions with the Bulgarian internal coun-

terintelligence service.

Nosenko denied ever having

made such a claim and went into lengthy detail explaining

just what had happened.

In effect, because by chance he

was in Sofia when the Bulgarians were planning their

operation against Professor Horace G. Lunt, he gave the

Bulgarians advice on how to go about the compromise opera-

tion--a homosexual one--and how to handle the actual

confrontation and recruitment. Apparently as

a result

of listening to Nosenko tell his story, and his vehement

denial of any claim to personal meetings with Lunt, the

1954 defector went back to the 1962 tape recordings and

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 97

---

## Page 98

SECRET

- 93-

retranscribed exactly what Nosenko had said on the two

different occasions in 1962 when he had referred to

this case. The

retranscription clearly verified

Nosenko's detail. Nonetheless,

all subsequent papers

on the Nosenko bona fides question included

reference

to his having claimed in

T1962 that he recruited Lunt

in person. His denial of such a statement in all sessions

from 1964 onward was lost from sight.

In the course of the second series of hostile

interrogations in January-March 1965, a still further

discovery was made by the 1954 defector when Nosenko

was challenged on another "claim" supposedly made in

1962, which Nosenko also denied having made.

Reviewing

the tape recording of the 1962 meeting in which the

alleged claim had been made, the 1954. defector once

again established that the

record was erroneous, and

that Nosenko was right again.

Later in 1965, retranscription of the 1962 tapes

was begun, faithfully transcribing Russian when Russian

was used,

and English when English was spoken.

transcripts were not translated into full English,

however,

until mid-1968 under the auspices of the Office

of Security reexamination of the entire Nosenko case.

In late 1968-early 1969, a line-by-line commentary

on the more significant

discrepancies between the two

versions was prepared. It required some 35 pages to

cover only the

major errors and the effects they had

had in supporting

the charge that Nosenko was a false

defector who "lied" and "changed stories."

C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's Life Story

The first step in debriefing a new defector is to

obtain his most "perishable" information; i.e., positive

intelligence and important agent leads.

The next step

usually is to obtain a biographic statement, highlight-

ing his personal history, family members, education and

career.

In February 1964, all information relating to his

life story, collated from transcripts of meetings with

Nosenko (in Geneva, 1962 and 1964), was presented in written

form to Nosenko for him to correct or expand upon. This

draft was so full of errors derived from defective

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 98

---

## Page 99

SECRET

- 94-

transcripts that only in the most general terms did

it correspond to his actual statements.

At this time,

however, Nosenko was restless, tense, and impatient

with the tedious interviews with which ClA was trying

to keep him occupied. It appears obvious that he paid

scant attention to the dates or terminology used in

this draft, because he made only one noticeable change:

ne insisted on deletion of a statement attributed to him

to the effect that he had attended a one-year course in

counterintelligence at the beginning of his KGB career

(a mistake dating from the 1962 "transcripts" by the

second case officer).

Given the volume of other

erroneous

statements in this "biography" that he left

untouched, one can only assume that he considered this

biography an exercise of no particular importance.

When hostile interrogations began on 6 April 1964,

the inaccurate biography was used

as the base point for

measuring so-called "lies" about Nosenko's entire life

story.

It therefore caused him to be accused time and

One of the first wrangles that arose in the hostile

interrogations concerned his responses

to questions on

his schooling.

Among other aspects of this subject,

Nosenko told

his interrogators

that he had spent approxi-

mately three years during World War II in various naval

preparatory schools--(rough equivalent of American high

school-level military "academies").

The problem that

arose in this instance was traceable first to a careless

transcription by the second

case officer but was exacerbated

by ignorance on the part of

the interrogators concerning

the subject under discussion. Because it typifies other

misapprehensions that complicate the Nosenko case, this

" Nose cas, chig

example is worth relating in detail,

The second case officer "transcribed" the tape of

the 25 January 1964 meeting in Geneva, quoting Nosenko

thus (underlining is ours):

When I first came here I graduated from

the Institute of Foreign Relations.

I specialized

in International Law and on the USA there.

I

came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this

Institute I was in a naval school.

I also

studied in Baku in a navy preparatory school

and I even studied in Frunze. And then the war

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 99

---

## Page 100

SECRET

- 95-

ended. The only time I participated in war-

time activities

was when heavy combat was going

on near Novorossiysk. They threw the students

from Baku into the battle.

After we lost Novorossiysk the remnants which

were somewhere between one third and one half

and I was demobilized.

ten i had not yog at and

I didn't want a military

career so I went to the Institute of Foreign

Relations in 1945 and graduated in 1949.

Toward

the end of the year in early 1950 the placement

commission (raspreditelnaya komissaya) Iwords

missing in original transcripti where

I wanted

to work.. I said that I've had some military

experience and I'd rather have something along

that line rather than go to MID [Ministry of

Foreign Affairs]. They said I would

be called

on the phone and they would let me know. I was

called up by the personnel section of the old

MGB.

To Nosenko's interrogators in April, "Frunze" meant

only one thing--the Frunze Naval Academy, equivalent to

the Us Naval Academy at Annapolis. Untortunately, the

naval preparatory school to which Nosenko referred was

named Frunze also; it was the prep school for those soviet

boys with aspirations for naval command positions who

would later go on to the Frunze Naval Academy.

When Nosenko was asked in April 1964 to discuss his

schooling, he referred to having entered a naval preparatory

school--at roughly the high school level, and in Russian

no in Respir

called a uchilishche. This was, said he, the Leningrad

Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze*.: In 1942,

ho that shorta

the school was relocated to Baku because of the fighting

around Leningrad. Nosenko's interrogators clearly did not

understand what

he was talking about, as they had no back-

ground on these naval preparatory schools; the only Frunze

they knew of was the Academy, and every time Nosenko men-

tioned the prep school carrying Frunze's name confusion

*In the Russian language, the fact that a school is named

after a great man is always made explicit. Thus, in Russian,

the George Washington University would be called the "University

named after George Washington."

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 100

---

## Page 101

SECRET

- 96-

erupted.

At the

end of several heated exchanges on this

topic, with the interlocutors

invariably at cross pur-

poses,

the conclusion was reached that Nosenko had lied

in saying originally that he had attended the Frunze

Naval Academy.

The claim was then made that he had been

made

to admit

that he had not done so.

cused of telling stories, which were confused and contra-

attended, about the secondary schools he claimed to have

Asked

repeatedly if he was then saying that he did

not attend

the Frunze Academy, he consistently replied

no; it was the Frunze preparatory school. This discussion

was repeated several times during these interrogations,

without the problem area's being resolved in the minds

of the interrogators.

Because of the lack of background on the part of

the interrogators, a memorandum for the record, dated 14

April 1964, Subject: "Interrogation of Yuriy I. Nosenko,

4-11 April

1964," contained

the following relevant quota-

tions

(underlining 1s ours):

five hours.

Questioning covered his early

schooling, his studies

at the Institute [of

International Relations, and his service in

the naval GRU, both in the far East and in the

Baltic.

Gaps

and contradictions in his accounts

about the early years of his life and even

dealing with the real Nosenko •

had not entered the Frunze Higher Naval School

(Vysshaya Voyenno-Morskaya Shkola imeni Frunze)

in 1944,

but that he had merely attended the

Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (Leningrad-

skoye Voyenno-Morskoye Podgotovitelnoye

Üchilishche) of the Frunze Higher Naval School.

His story now is that he attended the Moscow

Naval Special School (Moskovskaya Spetsialnaya

V.M. Shkola) in Kuybyshev from 1941 to 1942,

then entered the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

School in Baku, completing two classes of this

school in Baku (1942-1943 and 1943-1944), and

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 101

---

## Page 102

SECRET

- 97-

the third class in Leningrad (1944-1945).

Subject insists that he was given credit for

successfully completing each of the four years

of secondary schooling, but says that

at the

end he had the equivalent of 10 years' educa-

tion.

He can offer no explanation for the

discrepancy--by his chronology he would have

completed ll years of schooling plus one year

of kindergarten.

Subject has been very weak

in providing names of teachers and classmates

and descriptions of school layouts and curric-

ulum for this period, particularly for the

period in Baku. It is interesting that

[Nikolay Artamonov*], who has

identified pictures

st subject as being identical with the son-of-a-

minister Nosenko whom he

knew at the Leningrad

Naval Prep School in Leningrad in the period

1944-1946, has provided information about the

history and make-up of this

school which is

incompatible** with Subject's story, as is

[Artamonov's] statement that Nosenko was a

class junior to [Artamonov] and would not have

graduated from the prep school until 1946.

Subject has never mentioned (Artamonov], and

has not yet been challenged on this part of his

story.

Further compounding the confusion on this one subject

the development of suspicion that Artamonov, cited in

the memorandum above, was himself not bona fide. This

doubt arose because Artamonov claimed to have known the

Nosenko in question.

and,

as shown in the paragraph cited

below from a 21 April 1964 summary of interrogations for

the second week, because his "own elementary and secondary

schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's

(underlining is ours).

The following is quoted as an

excellent example of the reasoning process by which one

could at one and the same time be suspicions of Artamonov's

bona fides because some of his information supported what

Nosenko said, while also citing his reporting as evidence

*Nikolay Artamonov is a Soviet naval officer who defected in

1959.

**This is not a true statement. Artamonov's statements are

more confusing than clarifying. The possibility that

Artamonov's memory might have been unclear was not considered.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 102

---

## Page 103

SECRET

- 98-

that Nosenko was lying because Artamonov's memories of

the schools differed from Nosenko's:

' Adding to the mystery of Nosenko's war-

time years is the information provided by

Nikolay Artamonov, the Soviet naval defector.

When Nosenko's defection was first made public,

Artamonov volunteered the information that, if

this was the same Nosenko who was

the son of a

minister, he had attended. school with him in

Leningrad. Later, when shown photographs of

Nosenko he positively identified him as the

same man he had known in Leningrad in the

period 1944 to 1946 and gratuitously provided

the names of six schoolmates from Leningrad

that Nosenko should remember because they were

prominent members of the student body there.

Nosenko was subsequently queried about three

of these names, but out of context and with

no indication of who and what they might be.

He immediately identified them as schoolmates,

but positively affirmed that two of them had

been the roommates in Kuybyshev in 1941-1942,

while

the other had been in the school in Baku.

According to Nosenko, none had gone on to

Leningrad.

Of the names provided by Artamonov,

Nosenko mentioned a fourth one independently,

but although he originally placed him in

Leningrad he later moved him to Kuybyshev and

stated categorically that he saw him for the

last time in Moscow in 1942, before going to

Leningrad.

Artamonov, whose own elementary

and secondary schooling is a curious parallel

to Nosenko's, has provided other information on

the schools and dates which Nosenko claims to

have attended which is incompatible with Nosenko's

story but it has not been believed advisable to

requery Artamonov on this until we can be

certain that Artamonov is not deliberately

trying to substantiate Nosenko's bona fides

according to a prearranged plan which misfired

owing to crossed signals or Nosenko's poor

memory.

In May 1965, in preparation for his own set of inter-

rogations, it apparently occurred to the 1954 defector

that the original "transcript" should be rechecked for

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 103

---

## Page 104

SECHET

-99-

accuracy (he was right). After transcribing it into

Russian first, he then transcribed it into English,

but with one unfortunate mischoice in wording.

He

translated the Russian word "uchilishche" into English

as "academy." The Russian equivalent to the English

"academy" in the sense of a college-level institution

is "akademiya." '

the the tollow

The following is the 1954's defector's

translation of meeting No. 3 on 25 January 1964:

Telling about his entrance into the Naval GRU,

Nosenko says:

• . I went there .

.. I com-

pleted the Institute of International Relations

in 1949. I studied in the Juridical Faculty,

specialist in international law and spe-

ciallzing in the US. Before the Institute, I

studied at the Naval Academy (voyenno-morskoye

In the beginning,

uchilishche) special School (spetsshkola).

still in the

the Frunze Academy [sic--uchilishche]. The

war ended.

We weren't successful in

getting

into battle. The only time they sent us in

was when we were in Baku.

There was heavy

fighting near Tuapse.

We students were sent

in near Nov., i.e., near Novorossiysk.

There

was heavy fighting there. We took part in these

battles there and then

returned when Novorossiysk

surrendered. Our health

was gone: less than

one-half of one-third of all the students re-

mained, and they sent us back' to the school.

So, the war ended and I didn't finish Frunze

Academy [sic--uchilishche] after demobilization.

What to do?

Be a soldier? I didn't want to.

Study? Where?

I went to the Institute of

International

And I graduated from there in 1949--the end of

1949 or the beginning of 1950.

When the place-

ment commission asked me where I wanted to work--

it is mandatory for the commission to ask--I

said that I was a military man and asked that

they give me something related to military.

To sum up, the following problems typical of the

whole case are evident in this episode:

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 104

---

## Page 105

SECRET

-100 -

D.

1.

Nosenko had been misquoted in the

second case officer's transcript, because

the second case

officer did not understand

what he was talking about. He had referred

specifically to the "Leningrad Naval

Preparatory School named after Frunze," a

fact once again uncovered by the 1954 defector's

rechecking of the meeting tape, but not until

May 1965.

When Nosenko "admitted" to his

interrogators in April 1964 that he had not

attended the Academy,

he didn't know this was

considered an admission: he never realized

his interrogators had thought he had made such

a claim.

In general, Nosenko's interrogators

overestimated their

substantive background.

Nosenko's "stories" about the several naval

preparatory schools he had attended during the

war are difficult to follow, because war

conditions brought about a number of reloca-

tions of these schools:

the Leningrad School

was relocated to Omsk oblast but was still

called Leningrad School;

the Moscow School was

relocated first to Achinsk, then to Kuybyshev,

but was still the Moscow School, etc.

Nosenko's

interrogators were almost totally ignorant of

these matters but did not know they were.

Because they were unable to follow his detailed

description of all these changes (documented

by other informed sources, including Soviet

historians), they thought

something

was wrong

with Nosenko, not with themselves.

Errors or Omissions in Available CIA Headquarters

Records

In this category lie many of the causes of error

in building the cast against Nosenko. We are not

speaking here of transcript errors but rather of some-

times quite understandable lacunae in CIA's collateral

records.

Two important examples concern John Abidian, the

State Department Security officer in Moscow who was,

according to Nosenko, an American for whom Nosenko was

operationally solely responsible.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 105

---

## Page 106

SECRET

- 101 -

One point at issue was whether Abidian employed

a maid in Moscow who would have been in a position to

treat Abidian's clothes with a so-called "thief powder"

used by the KGB to facilitate postal surveillance.

Nosenko claimed that there was such a maid, and that

her actions enabled the KGB to pick up three operational

letters Abidian mailed for CIA, when the powder activated

a sensor in the soviet postal system.

The second point concerns the question of whether

Nosenko lied in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop

site in Moscow that we assumed Nosenko knew was crucial

to the KGB apprehension of Oleg Penkovskiy.

On the first point, CIA had no record of Abidian's

having a maid, because he did not formally hire one until

a few months

after his last letter mailing for CIA. How-

ever, the maid who served an American woman in the

embassy also informally took care of Abidian's apartment

throughout the time period in question.

Thus, we were

wrong., Nosenko was right.

The second point has yet to be subjected to con-

tIrmation, but there is strong circumstantial evidence

that Abidian

"cased" the Penkovskiy dead-drop site not

once, but twice.

The CIA officer tasked with the first

casing had been too afraid to go himself, as ordered,

and therefore apparently prevailed upon Abidian to handle

the job for him.

The report submitted by the case off-

cer, however, could lead the reader to believe that the

CIA man had carried out the first casing mission--under

circumstances and in the time period when, according to

Nosenko, Abidian handled the assignment.

Both these problems seems minor in and of themselves.

But they were not minor in the context of the inquisition

to which Nosenko was subjected. Rather, the discrepancies

involved were evoked, as was every other discrepancy

arising from whatever cause, to bolster the case against

him.

E. CIA Assumptions about the Second Chief Directorate

Lacking contemporary information on the organization,

responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB's

Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources

other than Nosenko, it was necessary for Nosenko's

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 106

---

## Page 107

SECRET

- 102 -

interrogators to extrapolate from pre-1954 defector

information plus that received from Goleniewski and

Golitsyn.

Not one of the sources cited below by the

principal case officer had ever been regularly employed

in the Second Chief Directorate--except Nosenko.

In a memorandum of 20 October 1964, the principal

case officer set out to demonstrate at great length

that Nosenko's claim to the position of deputy chief of

the American Embassy Section between early 1960 and late

1961 was completely false.

Having informed his

readers

that this position was one of the most important in the

entire Second Chief Directorate, he then proceeded to

present a "job description" for it:

Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief: Within

this framework;

an understanding of the functions

and responsibilities of any deputy chief of sec-

tion

in

the KGB is important.

The following

description of this position has been confirmed

by Deryabin, Rastvorov, Golitsyn, Goleniewski,

and even in large part by Nosenko when speaking

in general terms:

a .

He must be broadly informed

on the section's operations and individual

case officer duties in order to act in

the chief's absence, when he assumes

responsibility for the entire section's

work.

b. He approves and retains monthly

schedules for planned use of safehouses

by the section.

c.

He discusses agent meeting

schedules with individual case officers

and approves and then retains a list of

planned agent meetings for each case of-

ficer on a monthly basis.

d. He approves the acquisition of

new agents and new safehouses and their

transfer from one operation to another.

e.

He usually maintains liaison

with other KGB units on matters related

to the section's target.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 107

---

## Page 108

SECRET

-103-

Based on file reviews and

discussions with individual case offi-

cers, he assigns priorities for the

operations that each case officer

handles.

g.

He reviews and approves by

signature the periodic written reports,

general operational plans of the sec-

tion, periodic section progress reports,

and

specific operational proposals of

individual case officers which are re-

quired by the KGB. If the department

•[sic--meant to read "section"] chief

signs these papers, the deputy chief

still reads

them in order to keep him-

self informed on the section's activity.

h.

He assigns priorities for

processing microphone material and

telephone taps, for selecting targets

for surveillance, etc.

i. He participates directly in

important operational

activities and

is often in contact with agents or

agent prospects.

As a senior officer

responsible for the section's opera-

tions, he or the section chief are

almost invariably present during the

compromise and recruitment of important

target individuals.

He periodically

participates in control meetings with

the section's agents in order to check

on the development of individual opera-

tions and case officer's performance.

Hostile interrogations in January 1965 produced a

different picture.

Nosenko said that, as deputy section

chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise

operational

activity against American embassy

code

clerks.

His detailed knowledge of this activity and

his description of innovative programs he had instituted

in this area of operations have, with few exceptions, been

fully verified by investigations and already existing

collateral reporting.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 108

---

## Page 109

SECRET

-104-

As for other aspects of his "job description,"

Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chief

told him to do, and, while he granted that he did

from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined

above, he denied that he had any such fixed administra-

tive responsibilities.

He contended that the other

officers in the section were not children and did not

require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to

do it.

The outline of the duties of a "deputy chief" was

erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation

of the Russian word zamestitel,

the term Nosenko applied

to himself when speaking his native language.

When the

meaning of this terms was researched in 1968, a clear

distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet

conceptions of a "deputy":

"Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureau-

cratic practice and usage is not limited to

denoting what we think of as the number 2

in the office, but rather is a broader teri

which can perhaps most accurately be

rendered in English

as "assistant."

Soviet

offices, at least at the higher levels,

commonly have several "Deputies"; some

may

have five or six or even more.

In keeping

with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does

not carry with

it the same sense of responsi

bility and authority paralleling the Chief

and of automatic replacement as the American

term.

The Soviet position of "Deputy" is

probably not as intimately associated with

specific slot as is the American position

of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at

all.

In addition, the outline of a "deputy chief's"

duties can be considered tendentious because it was de-

signed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that

Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had the principal case

officer examined the validity of the criterion more

closely, he could easily have determined for himself that

it was unrealistic.

How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be

was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 109

---

## Page 110

SECRET

- 105 -

Division officers in January 1969. The following ex-

cerpt is instructive:

[Officer No. 1l In the absence of a firm

informative base, we were obliged to formu-

late

a stereotype of the Second Chief

Directorate (SCD) against which to compare

Nosenko's information.

That stereotype con-

tains a variety of quite fixed assumptions

regarding the authority of the SCD in the

USSR,

the extend of SCD cooperation with

the First Chief Directorate, and the manner

in which the SCD operates. Of particular

relevance, with respect to some anomalies

found in Nosenko's statements, are assumptions

regarding the relative weight the SCD placed

on the recruitment of agents among foreigners

as compared to the control of foreigners, how

much the SCD itself might know of certain

events, and how much a specific SCh officer

(Nosenko) should have known and recalled.

I believe that some of our assumptions are

too finely drawn, with the consequence that,

at least in some instances, Nosenko's asser-

tions have

been improperly impugned.

[Officer No. ?] The SB Study is, I believe,

generally reflective of an exaggerated view

as to the overall capabilities of the SCD.

There are implicit judgments made that the

SCD had to be aware of certain things; there-

fore, Nosenko should have known about them

in his various positions. For example, there

is some question in my mind as to the validity

of the assumption that KGB suryeillance of

Americans, even suspected CIA officers, is

such as to make it suspicious when Nosenko

is unaware of certain operational activities

these CIA officers are known to have performed.

This possibly exaggerated view is also apparent

when we question Nosenko's ignorance of inci-

dents that we know occurred and which we con-

clude, or at least suppose, are KGB-inspired.

Finally, and possibly the most important, is

the question of control as opposed to

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 110

---

## Page 111

F.

SECRET

-106 -

recruitment of American officials (excepting

code clerks).

While these two missions are

not mutually exclusive, in either Nosenko's

or our eyes,

many times (particularly in the

case of Abidian) we have faulted him for not

knowing information that would be significant

only in terms of interest in recruitment.

If control was the main interest, as in

appropriate

context (perhaps a comparison with the FBI's

mission with regard to Soviets would be help-

ful) than in the context of CIA operations

against Soviets abroad. I sense that the

latter was the case.

Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn,

the Agency greatly exaggerated the competence and, in-

deed, the authority of the KGB. Even though this

defector's claims were often extravagant, they were re-

ceived with very little reserve by senior officials who

in turn applied them across-the-board.

On a different

conceptual level,

this pattern of exaggeration was applied

to individual positions within the KGB; since that organiza-

tion was conceived as an all-seeing eye, it

seemed to fol-

low that individual officers within it would partake of

its omniscience.

such habits of thought, regrettably,

vere selt-reintorcing in a situation where the obiective

of CI analysis was not to uncover the truth, but rather

to prove that a particular present or former Soviet

official was

part of a grand plot against the security

of the United States.

It made possible. constant exciting

discoveries of duplicity on the part of any Soviet source

who came under analysis, simply because he could rarely

ever measure up to our expectations of what he ought to

have known, accomplished, or said.

The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to

the Popov and Related Cases

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a

retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involve-

ment of Nosenko therein.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 111

---

## Page 112

SECRET

-107-

1. Prologue

It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn

should have become so involved in the retrospective

analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a

great deal about it.

Perhaps they would not have

become thus involved had it not been for the dis-

information hypothesis.

Some time after 19 June 1962 the principal case

officer was given access to tape transcripts of de-

briefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who

had defected in Helsinki in December 1961. Debrief-

ing of Golitsyn had been going on for over six

months, compared with five relatively short, hec-

tic conversations with Nosenko.

In a memorandum written by the principal case

officer dated 27 June 1962, the day after his inter-

view with Golitsyn, he set

forth his views on

"Possible Control of [Nosenko]." He opened with a

statement:

"Detailed study of

[Golitsyn's] produc-

tion in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the

possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major.

Soviet disinformation operation . ..

2. Implications of the Popov Case

Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end

of his first meeting with the principal case officer

in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell you how Popov

was caught."

Feelings ran high over this case,

with which the principal case officer had been

personally. concerned in a minor capacity.

Petr Popov was a CIA sourcé within the GRU

from January 1953 to October 1959, when the KGB

rolled up the operation in Moscow.

He was the most

important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the

advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any informa-

tion Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned

of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of

great interest.

In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise,

he explained that, in January 1959, the KGB had had

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 112

---

## Page 113

SECRET

-108-

under surveillance a member of the American

embassy in Moscow who, they were certain, was

a CIA officer--as indeed he was.

When they

observed this man, George Winters, clandestinely

mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted

the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr

Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was

working for CIA.

He was arrested soon there-

after and sent under KGB direction to make

several clandestine meetings with another CIA

officer, Russell Langelle.

Finally in October

1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle immediately

after such a meeting, with material in his

possession just received from Popov. The Popov

Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information

concerning the Popov case had been slight. As

of the time of his defection in 1961, he knew

or believed only that:

a.

There had been an agent leak-

ing Soviet military, political and intel-

ligence information to the US.

b. When CIA officer Russell Langelle

was assigned to Moscow, he was

going

there to handle "a special agent or mis-

sion ..

C.

Surveillance of Langelle in Moscow

then led the KGB to Popov.

Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing

but added that the KGB had

been led to Langelle

through their surveillance of another CIA officer

in Moscow, George Winters. Unfortunately, to the

principal

case officer no

statement meant what it

purported to mean.

Under Golitsyn's influence,

his doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led

the use of an analytical technique that he described

as trying "to read the case through a mirror to find

its implications if it is bad.

By the time

this June 1962 memorandum was written, the principal

case officer had decided that the story of the Popov

compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area

determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by

the KGB.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 113

---

## Page 114

SECRET

-109 -

Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov

was compromised, i.e., identified by name

through KGB surveillance of Langelle in Moscow

in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the

name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn

report was actually completely omitted from a

17 April 1963 memorandum.

(Why this omission

passed unnoticed is not explained in any records

in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave

a com-

pletely different story of the compromise in June

1964, after he had read all the Popov case

materials, this story became the Golitsyn gospel

and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's

argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964

version shortly, but first some additional back-

ground is needed..

Since Nosenko had said that Popov was com-

promised through KGB surveillance of Winters, the

"mirror" technique indicated that this was not

the case. The mental leap from this postulate

was that

if surveillance of Winters was not the

cause of the compromise,

then recruitment of Winters

by the KGB was the logical possibility to be ex-

plored.

George Winters had met a Soviet known to him

as Vladimir Komarov, who had spent nearly a year

assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.

Winters reported meeting this Soviet in Moscow.

The man called Komarov was known to Golitsyn

and to Nosenko as Vyacheslav Kovshuk, a Second Chief

Directorate case officer who was chief of the sec-

tion working against the American embassy, Moscow.

Winters' documented association with Komarov/

Kovshuk came to light immediately when name traces

were run on the Soviet.

The same reporting docu-

mented his one-time meeting with a friend of Komarov/

Kovshuk's--a TASS correspondent just returned from

Washington named Aleksandr Kislov.

Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962; was his

friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in

Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several

occasions.

Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer,

Nosenko specifically denied that he was.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 114

---

## Page 115

SECRET

-110-

A review of FBI reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's

TDY in Washington brought to light a close regular

association with Kislov, in company with a number

of identified KGB officers, leading to a strong

circumstantial case that, contrary to Nosenko's

denial, Kislov probably was a KGB officer. His

contact with George Winters in Moscow, introducec

by Komarov/Kovshuk, was therefore held to be not

a coincidence but:

We cannot find a convenient explanation

for Kislov's role in this theory, but

find

it appears significant ...

A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and

Nosenko's reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY to

Washington.

Both sources agreed that it was re-

lated to recruitment of an American who had earlier

served in the Moscow embassy (speculation by Golitsyn)

or reactivation of an American already recruited

In Moscow (also Golitsyn speculation; but state-

ment of fact by Nosenko, supplemented with specific

details that would eventually lead to identifica-

tion of the agent).

Nosenko said Kovshuk came to Washington to

reactivate a code machine mechanic, KGB code name

Moscow in the had entered the had to denevan

cable of 9 June 1962, in the principal case officer's

memoranda, and throughout the second case officer's

"transcripts" of 1962, this agent was consistently

misdescribed as a garage mechanic, although Nosenko

in fact always called him a code machine mechanic.

Thanks to this major error in notes and transcription,

the FBI was hindered in its investigation of this

lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in

January 1964.

The FBI already had located the one

possible candidate for this lead but could not

actively pursue the investigation until this con-

fusion was cleared up. By December 1965, they

finally succeeded in obtaining a limited confession

a code machine mechanic who had been at the

American embassy, Moscow,

•from 1952 to 1954, and

this confirmed the essentials of Nosenko!s reporting

of 1962.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 115

SECRET

---

## Page 116

SECRET

-111-

3.

Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise

Theory"

Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy

case, it is important to know that in October 1962,

only

four months after the first Nosenko meetings,

the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another

penetration of the GRU--Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy.

This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious

than the Popoy arrest, and a great deal of worried

thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's ex-

posure.

Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions

within CIA--especially Soviet Russian Division--

that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for

two such calamities

to have occurred within three

years.

When in April 1963 a KGB officer, working

within the KGB as a Western agent, reported that

Penkovskiy (like Popov) had been exposed to the

KGB through its omnipresent surveillance in Moscow,

senior SR Division officers interpreted this report

as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal

KGB penetration of CIA.

4. Golitsyn's 1964 Story

In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's

version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated

that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962

stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov

as a double because he could not be trusted.

He

then went on to give a completely new story of the

Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his

original information.

Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov

(first name not given), who had been in the KGB

in Vienna during the period Popov was there, sus-

pected Popov of being a Western agent and made

known his suspicions.

At the time,

no action was

taken by Kotov's superiors.

In 1957 or 1958, how-

ever, when the KGB received similar information

from

another source, Kotov was sent to Germany be-

cause he knew Popov and was familiar with his back-

ground. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here

implied strongly that Popov, by name,

was identified

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 116

SECRET

---

## Page 117

SECRET

- 112 -

by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957

or 1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated

within the framework of the facts that follow.

On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the

passage to Golitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all

materials passed to CIA by Popov, including

English language transcripts of all operational

meetings held with Popov in Vienna in 1953-1955

and all operational meetings held with him in

Berlin 1957-1958.

Thus, by the time Golitsyn

was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov

included Popov's mention of a KGB officer named

Kotov, who arrived a week of two before Popov

was recalled to Moscow, and another KGB officer

named Zhukov, who had worked against the Yugoslav

target at the same time that Popov worked on this

target for the GRU in Vienna.

In view of the fact

that Golitsyn's story in June 1964 varied drastically

from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate

to suspect that he had recreated a

story of Popov's

compromise based on deductions he had made after

reading the Popov transcripts.

Thus, the 1964

decision must be thrown out of court.

5. The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated

Unfortunately for the course of events in the

Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version that

was ignored in favor of his "facts" of 1964, which

condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962

version had supported Nosenko:

to be treated

as fact, with the result that the sub-

is tset, with

ject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus

paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet

source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed with Nosenko

that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent--

a penetration of CIA--had compromised Popov, then

that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever-

growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration (s) :

of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to

produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 117

---

## Page 118

SECRET

-112a -

compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was

interpreted

as proof that indeed such a penetra-

tion must exist.

The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn

guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be

seen as bona fide, but also that all other soviet

sources must be considered suspect if they supported

Nosenko's story.

The overall result was to distort

seriously for a number of years the ability of the

Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona

fides of any defector or agent.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 118:

---

## Page 119

SECRET

-113-

CHAPTER VI

Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and

Application in the Nosenko Case

There can be little doubt that the handling Nosenko

received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken

place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet in-.

telligence practice known as dezinformatsiya. Furthermore,

the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of

Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some

of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and

Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the

KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a

dezinformatsiya operation--all these factors combined to

"normal" professional treatment of Nosenko. As a

defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established,

or not

established, on the basis of careful and sound

analysis and investigation of the information he provided

under standard interrogation procedures.

In actuality, he

came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before

he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was

therefore based upon this prejudgment.

Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of

long standing that has been defined or described by numerous

sources through the years. Two representative definitions

are as follows:

Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the

deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false

information regarding accomplished facts and/or

intentions, plans of action, etc., for the pur-

pose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations

may be

accomplished by means of the press, radio

and television, agent reports and communications,

operations, etc.

The term also reters to the in-

formation

itself.

Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the

term dezinformatsiya is used to denote false, in-

complete,

misleading information passed, fed or

confirmed

to opposition services for the purpose

of causing these services (and their governments)

to reach

erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR

or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to

the USSR.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 119

---

## Page 120

i....

SECRET

-114-

By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to

Golitsyn, the Soviet government hopes

to ensure that the

policy decisions of a given country will be based on a false

impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture.

Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed

to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless

research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely

affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world,

to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting,

individuals who are considered a threat to the national

Interests of the Ussk,

or to weaken or dissolve, create or

strengthen certain political parties.

With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin,

Golitsyn and others have spoken

from knowledge gained as Soviet

state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions

is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an activity that is

the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It has

always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as

an activity that at times may involve the security organs.

Before 1959, there was

no separate dezinformatsiya de-

partment within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations),

although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from

time to time.

Each

geographic component handling foreign

intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya

work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was

carried out with the approval of higher authorities within

the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of

Foreign

Affairs and

the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

It was

not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya

insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign

intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized

within that unit, and

not until 1961 that the concept of

dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking

of CIA counterintelligence officers.

The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for

CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who

initially provided information by anonymous correspondence

starting in 1958 and later while under interrogation follow-

ing his defection in January 1961.

The information he provided

was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the

subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953 and was in

fact not only a ranking Polish

intelligence officer but also

a KGB agent.

While Goleniewski was not the first source to

refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 120

---

## Page 121

SECRET

-115-

CIA consciousness as

a technique to be reckoned with in our

analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim

that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence ser-

vices played a major role in the implementation of such

policies.

Specifically, Goleniewski provided information that was

to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would

do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer.

Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB

dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means

of action designed to mislead Western security services.

listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya

operations those designed to confirm unimportant true informa-

tion, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the

reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes mislead-

ing information to anti-Soviet governments.

Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation

might be designed to discredit accurate information of signi-

ficance received by the opposition through sources not under

Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the

veracity of the source or sources of this true information.

Goleniewski stated further that the information passed

through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis

of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e,

could stem from defector damage assessments.

• One means

obviously might be the channeling of information at variance

with that provided by the defector. Another means might be

the provision of "give away" material, which neither added

to information already in the hands of the opposition nor,

by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB.

In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some

of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the

reputation of an agent penetration of one of the anti-Communist

intelligence services.

(That this latter technique was used

to advantage by the KGB in building Heinz Felfe

as: a pene-

tration agent within the German Intelligence Service has been

assumed in most analyses of that case.

Felfe was a KGB agent

for all of the ten years he worked for the German Intelli-

gence Service, from 1951 until his arrest in 1961. During

this period Felfe was able to work his way up to the position

of chief of the Soviet Section of the German counterintelli-

gence staff. It has been postulated that Felfe's rise in the

German intelligence ranks was assisted by the KGB, which was

willing to sacrifice less important agent assets to enhance

Felfe's reputation and position as their long-term penetration

agent.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 121

---

## Page 122

SECRET

-116 -

essentials, the information provided by

and elaborated upon by Golitsyn,

who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant

Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after

Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of

dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or

GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya

unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit

the situation, after review of the probable areas of informa-

tion revealed

to the opposition by the defector. He indicated

in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the

KGB maintained extensive files organized on a topical basis,

containing all information on a given topic that was known

(from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double

agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposi-

tion intelligence services.

For example, a KGB officer

assigned to Beirut to work against the American embassy who

defected

to ClA would be assumed by the KGB Department of

Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about

KGb operations against the embassy and embassy personnel.

By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Depart-

ment of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent

to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to

CIA.

On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be

assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have

received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinforma-

tion and by ClA upon their arrival as defectors to the West.

However, the two men were not similarly received by ClA when

they presented themselves as defectors; they received com-

pletely different handling, based on quite different assess-

ment of the information they provided and their motives for

defecting. Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in

relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected

as a bona fide defector, as explained bélow.

Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of

the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961.

Information that he provided relating to the organization

and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual

and true,

at least in part because there was relatively little record

information against which it could be compared, but also

because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable.

In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information

on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were

limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 122

---

## Page 123

SECRET

-117-

be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these

holdings. Finally, he provided a theory of KGB operations

that was not only accepted at face value but received

with

outright enthusiasm.

Given the value of his information,

plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included

an obsession with the evil inherent in the

KGB and

an

emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona

fides was accepted in March 1962.

The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in

1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did

not receive standard treatment

as a defector whose bona fides

would be determined on the basis of the information he pro-

vided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves

reference to Golitsyn.

As explained in Chapter III,

Golitsyn

himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the

trust placed in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to

label Nosenko as a deception

agent.

This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts

with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities

that was similar

to that provided a few months earlier by

, Golitsyn.

Because CIA counterintelligence

officers had been

warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by

false information fed to them through no matter what channels,

the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko

was viewed

with extreme suspicion.

This original doubt led

to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn

soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn

immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or

even assassinate him.

Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence offi-

cers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an ana-

lytical technique that has been

referred to variously as "double

think" or "mirror reading."

This "analysis" led to the con-

clusion that Nosenko, as

a dispatched agent, was feeding us

what the KGB wanted

us to believe.

Thus, everything Nosenko

said had to be "interpreted." If

he said that the KGB had

been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy

in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had

been quite successful in doing so.

If he provided information

on a given

topic that we had already received from another

source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that

particular piece of information, hence the other source un-

doubtedly was a KGB agent as well. .

And so on.

Facts were

discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 123

---

## Page 124

SECRET

-118-

that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources

whose information confirmed, tended

to confirm, or dealt

with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded

as "contaminated"--that is to say, they were considered

part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko

figured.

Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical pro-

cess."

As soon as Nosenko's defection became public

Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's

interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed

that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and

given full access to the "Nosenko material."

The reasoning

at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's

function as

false defector, was that the Nosenko operation

"the reverse of

the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's

assistance was required to pursue it properly. Accordingly,

over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with

material from the 1962 and 1964

meetings with Nosenko and at

his request was supplied with all available biographic data

on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation.

On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was

interviewed by Chief, CI

Staff, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief, SR Division.

following is quoted

from the transcripts of this meeting:

Golitsyn: I have made a study of the docu-

ments and information which was provided to

me about Nosenko and his interrogations.

would like now to make known my conclusions

... my conclusion is that he is not a

bona fide defector.

who is on a mission for the KGB

mislead, chief in the field of investiga-

tions

•

on

Soviet penetrations made

mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate

to Moscow

Why did they choose Nosenko

for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was

recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk

and Guk*

for the mission.

Nosenko could have been

*Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich

Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk.

Churanov and Kovshuk were

colleagues and good friends of Nosenko's in the Second Chief

Directorate.

Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a

one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he trans-

ferred

, to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the

Soviet

Mission to the European Office of the United Nations

in Geneva

at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in

1962.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 124

SECRET

---

## Page 125

SECRET

- 119-

named or recommended by them and the KGB

gave these people a chance. They are

very energetic--all of them. And, of

course,

they discuss things among

themselves.

Many of them had made mistakes--they had

told

too much. They were, therefore, in

the damage report (on my defection) and

for them the only way to act was to suggest

an operation against me in order to

save

their face, to save the situation.

It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests:

(a)

•to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre-

eminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence

services) on Soviet intelligence matters,

and (b) to promote

his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the

Soviet Union in political and strategic matters, and thus

to enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall

Soviet political matters.

Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When

he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified docu-

ments from

the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, which he made

clear

he wished to discuss with President

Kennedy and the

Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them

to what was

going on and to measures needing to be taken.

Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other

US government agencies underwent changes from time to time,

depending upon whether his demands for access to and inter-

views with specified ranking officials of those organizations

were granted.

Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy

and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival. of

Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all

of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing ClA with

an "interpretation" of the latter's role.

In any

event, the

idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's hammer-

ing away at this theme that we were being "had" by the

Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of

clever KGB counterintelligence

operations, and that Nosenko

had to be "broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make

clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet

machinations.

Further, it was deemed expedient not only to proceed

with efforts to "break" Nosenko but also to study past

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 125

---

## Page 126

SECRET

-120-

operations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what

could be learned from these cases about how the Soviet in-

telligence services had

carried out their activities against

the West through the years.

This study of historic Soviet

cases, designed not to explore a hypothesis but to prove an

already-accepted

information about an

some "enemy," cunning contes lavishing money and man-

power on operations that were almost invariably successful.

The fact that

many of these cases were primarily of historic

interest, undertaken at a particular time to take advantage

of or exploit a particular situation that no longer obtained

or had little or no pertinence to Nosenko's defection, appears

to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases

included

the study were considered to have been hugely

successful in duping or deluding the Western intelligence

services and governments, it was concluded that we were con-

tinuing to be deluded

and duped.

It was reasoned that, as

CIA and

other Western intelligence services became increas-

ingly aware of and informed on the Soviet operational tech-

niques being used against them

and changed their operational

tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new

situation

and continued to outwit us.

With Shelepin and

succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central Com-

mittee, it was assumed that those KGB operations that could

be (or

were) classed as dezinformatsiya were not only

important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as

the KGB, through its chief, was involved in the

policy making

body of

the Soviet Union.

Consequently, any operation

important as the one that involved sending a senior KGB

officer, Nosenko, to the West on a dezinformatsiya mission

must have been an exceedingly important one, involving high-

level staff coordination.

Any other agents who provided

confirmatory information or whose information could in any

way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be part

of the overall operation.

Given the importance of the opera-

tion, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the

whole thing himself.

No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the

assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known

case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a

previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence

service. After brief consideration of the notion that

Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was

decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 126

---

## Page 127

SECHET

-121-

Conclusions

In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that

(a) in the years

since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent

defection, no information has ever been developed to sub-

stantiate

the charges

made against him either by Golitsyn

or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with

respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent;

and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of

theories presented has not been able to support his claims,

despite the wealth of information made available to him for

analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper,

dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims:

Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet

leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy".

(peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics,

united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable

as a

statement of the "Right"

strategy

developed during the mid- and late-fifties

and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow

Manifesto.

Golitsyn's depiction of this

policy as, in toto, a "misinformation"

operation

rests upon his extremely broad

use of that term:

"special deliberate

efforts of the communist governments to

mislead Western studies and to direct them

in wrong directions" by means of official

Soviet speeches and Party documents, off1-

cial press and propaganda outlets, travel

controls, diplomatic activities,

cava in genetit handine of ches

lis vocabulary and general handling as, etc.

new Bloc policy gives the strategy a con-

spiratorial quality not justified by its

essentially open and public character.

The role of the KGB in the execution and

coordination of this policy is constantly

alluded to, but no evidence is provided to

define the precise nature of its role and

no actual "covert" disinformation operations

are cited

for the years from 1959 to the

present.

Golitsyn provided factual evidence

for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959,

but its new role may also be interpreted to

cover routine operations of covert propa-

ganda, political action, recruitment of

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 127

---

## Page 128

SECRET

- 122 -

agents of influence and specific "disinforma-

tion" operations without involving the KGB

(or the Bloc intelligence services) in any

broader role.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 128

---

## Page 129

SECRET

-123-

CHAPTER VII

Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko:

_A Comparison

Of Their Handling By CIA

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differ-

ences in handling by ClA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy

Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko.

Comparison is material to this

since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain

theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent that helped

to establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when

he walked in some months after Golitsyn.

It is also material,

since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko.

Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows.

Interrogation

The defections of Golitsyn and Nosenko cannot be con-

sidered directly comparable, since some five meetings were

held with Nosenko about eighteen months before his actual

defection.

There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn

before his defection. However, the following statements can

be made.

Golitsyn was brought to this country within days of his

defection in Helsinki in December 1961. Standard interroga-

tion procedures were initiated, which included his systematic

debriefing regarding his own biographic data, family back-

ground and career, and his knowledge of the structure, organiza-

tion, personalities and operations of the KGB. What he said

was checked against CIA files and

formed the basis for his

acceptance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a

bona fide defector.

In Nosenko's case, he cannot be said to have been inter-

rogated at all, in the strict sense of the word, during

initial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. for one

thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply

offered certain pieces of information that he thought would

be of interest to CIA, in exchange for a specified sum of

money that he claimed

to need.. Also, time with him was

limited.

When Nosenko actually defected in February 1964, he

was interrogated in a manner that contrasted sharply with that

applied in Golitsyn's case. In the interim between initial

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 129

SECRET

---

## Page 130

SECRET

- 124-

contacts in 1962 and his defection in 1964, as previously

explained, it had been concluded that he was a dispatched

agent.

Voluminous papers had been written during this

period "proving" that such was the case, and because of

the accumulated "evidence" it was decided to attempt to

"break" him as soon as possible. Accordingly, and because

it was also believed imperative

to act quickly, Nosenko's

interrogation took place in various pre-planned stages or

phases, ranging from ostensibly friendly to hostile.

In Nosenko's case, then, the entire effort was to force

him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain in-

formation from him in any logical or systematic fashion.

rather that t fastaon

Efforts were made to "trap" him or "throw him off balance,

by indicating that CIA had "proof" that he was lying, that

his only option was to

"confess" that he had been sent by

the KGB, etc.

His denials of charges or refusals to "con-

fess" only resulted in increasingly hostile treatment.

While

his statements did contain inconsistencies, and there were

questions for which he gave no adequate or consistent and

logical answers, the manner in which he was questioned was

in no way that afforded the usual defector. Moreover, the

pressures put upon Nosenko contributed to the creation of

a climate not conducive to proper interrogation. It was not

until October 1967, in fact, that he received a proper in-

terrogation.

Polygraph Examination

As with other phases of their respective handling, the

account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked con-

trast with that of Golitsyn.

Golitsyn was given two polygraph examinations, on 27

and 28 March 1962, by a polygraph operator of the Office of

Security.

The tests were administered under special ground

rules that were established initially during discussions held

on 16 March 1962 between Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Deputy

Office of Security.

agreed at that time

that Colitsyn was to be regarded as a "special case" ishis

"flap potential" was regarded as high, because high US

government officials were aware of Golitsyn's allegations

that the US government and CIA were penetrated at a high

level, and these allegations had been accepted to that

point by CIA without reservations.

had reacted adversely to the idea of taking a polygraph

examination and had consented only after it had been brought

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 130

---

## Page 131

SECRET

•-125-

home to him that the test was an absolute requirement for

receipt of resident alien status in the United States.

The unusual manner in which the tests were conducted

is illustrated in the following quotations

from the report

later submitted by the polygraph operator:

The undersigned had a series of prepolygraph

conterences with Chief

SR/CI [a] CI Staff

officer, and lan officer of the Office of

Security. The general consensus of the

interested parties regarding what areas

should and should not be covered during

polygraph testing all reflected the fact

that

Subject [Golitsyn] should be disturbed

as little as possible by the questions asked

during the polygraph test so that he would

not feel personally offended and as a result

become "sour," unmanageable or uncooperative.

Furthermore,

that no indication by given to

• [Golitsyn] during testing that there were

any doubts as to his reliability or defection

motivation.

[Polygraph] coverage was to deal with

questions pertaining to whether [Golitsyn]

was a dispatched KGB agent, if [Golitsyn]

had a mission in connection with his defec-

tion, if Golitsyn] was intentionally mis-

forming his (American intelligence, inter-

viewer, whether he had any

secret prearranged

means of contact with Soviet officials, if

he had a concrete plan to return to the USSR,

as well as questions dealing with his motiva-

tion (the latter to be asked

as discreetly

as possible so as not to disturb).

It was also pointed out... during

the pre-polygraph conferences

• that re-

gardless of how [Golitsyn] reacted specifi-

cally, even if there were consistent specific

indications of deception to the questions,

under no circumstances should [Golitsyn] be

made aware of the fact that [wel had conclu-

sive polygraph evidence which reflected that

[Golitsyn] was attempting deception to the

pertinent questions.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 131

---

## Page 132

SECRET

- 126 -

Although the operator was fluent in Russian, the test

was

given to Golitsyn on 27 March 1962 in English; Russian

sperat 2

was

used only when Golitsyn failed to comprehend

the full

and accurate meaning of a question.

Golitsyn raised no

objections to any questions asked, but the operator did not

onsider the day's testing conclusive,

because of the dif-

Ficulties that had arisen owing to Golitsyn's poor compre-

hension of English plus

a malfunctioning polygraph.

A second test was therefore given the following day,

28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of

which Golitsyn was asked the same questions as on the previ-

ous day. Before the test could be initiated, however,

Golitsyn again had to be convinced of the necessity for

taking it.

He stated that he had thought over the ques-

tions he had been asked the previous day, and he considered

them "insulting." He resented having been asked whether he

had been sent by the KGB, whether he had a mission connected

with his defection having to do with misintormation, his

motivation for defecting, etc. In the operator's words, he

resented "all in all, any and every question which may have

reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent on the basis

of only his own explanations and assurances."

Nevetheless,

the test was finally conducted. Upon its completion,

the

operator informed Golitsyn that he (the operator) had

con-

cluded that Golitsyn was substantially truthful in his

answers and that, as far as the operator was concerned, the

results

were favorable.

Six months later, the Office of Security reviewed the

polygraph charts, as well as the questions that had been

posed, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final

report.

On 19 September 1962, a memorandum was prepared for

the chief of the Interrogation and Research Division of the

Office of Security. The report contained the following

initial statements:

testing of Golitsyn] reflects everything

except a clear-cut statement of whether

or not Golitsyn lied or did not lie to

any or all of the questions.

The report

states that the first day's testing was

inconclusive.

The results of the second

day's testing is not set forth..

The re-

port is rather remarkable for this reason.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 132

---

## Page 133

SECRET

-127-

This review indicates that the first day's charts

showed that Golitsyn was very nervous during testing on

that day, but considerably less so on the second. No partic-

ular interpretation was placed on this lessened apprehension,

other than to note that Golitsyn knew what to expect in the

way of questions and procedures on the second day, and

also

that on the second day he was tested in Russian rather than

English. Of more interest is the reviewer's conclusion that,

while the charts for 28 March show no noticeable reactions

to relevant questions, they also show no noticeable reactions

to any other questions: the reviewer was unable to determine

which, if any, of

the questions were designed to be "hot" or

control questions that could provoke a response indicative

of deception; thus, the reviewer concluded that the questions

were not well conceived. In addition, it was noted that

Golitsyn was not asked any detailed questions on his personal

biography that might have indicated whether he was withhold-

ing information.

The ultimate conclusion was that the charts,

with the limitations noted above, did not show reactions in-

dicating that Golitsyn was a dispatched Soviet agent.

How-

ever, the

report also contained the following conclusion:

This should not be considered any definitive

[polygraph examination].

The conditions and

limitations placed on the [polygraph] offi-

cer as reflected in the body of the report

imposed a set of conditions that preclude

and make impossible any unequivocal state-

ment that a conclusive [polygraph examination]

was conducted.

*

*

The use of the polygraph in Nosenko's case contrasts

sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn.

We shall not

go into detail here, because Nosenko's polygraph examinations

are covered at length in Chapter VIII. It is relevant here,

i both colinaya and Rosen o

invalid.

Access to Classified Information

With respect to their relative access to classified

information, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not

stand in greater contrast.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 133

---

## Page 134

SECRET

-128 -

20221

Practically from the moment of his arrival in this

country, Golitsyn began to demand access to CIA files.

He largely achieved his ends and was soon being given

transcripts of his own debriefing sessions as well as

"valuable library," including

reference publications classified up to SECRET.

Starting

in November 1963, voluminous information was made available

to him, including:

A. Thirty-two documents concerning the

Penkovskiy case.

3. BIographical sketch on, and all (8s.

reports obtained from, Nikolay Artamonov, :

Soviet naval officer who defected in 1959.

Popor casto uninous s sacets pertainingsagete

meeting transcripts and contact reports.

D. Copies of the first four substantive cables

from Geneva relating to the circumstances of

Nosenko's contact with CIA in Geneva in 1962. The

cables included details of the first meeting with

a US Foreign Service Officer.

E.

Transcriptions of all meetings with Nosenko

in Geneva in 1962 following those noted in the

cables described above.

F. Transcriptions of meetings 1 through 13

with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.

G. Material requested by Golitsyn in connection

with his "work on the Nosenko case"' :

biographic

information provided by Nosenko before he underwent

hostile interrogation; a copy of the documents and

handwritten notes that Nosenko brought out with

him; a resume of the first week's hostile interro-

gation of Nosenko; Nosenko's comments on Yuriy

Krotkov's manuscript entitled Fear

(Krotkov was a

writer and KGB agent who defected in London in 1963);

and a nearly complete collection of photo identifica-

tions made by Nosenko as of that date.

H.

Sanitized copy of a cable summary of

Nosenko's reactions to Yuriy Krotkov.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 134

---

## Page 135

SECRET

-129-

1. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow,

with a list of operations in which he was

; involved.

J. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

former CIA staff officer at one time stationed in

Moscow, with a list of operations in which he had

been involved.

K. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

former

CIA staff employee who had served as

Security Officer of the American embassy in Moscow.

L.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA

during the period of his assignment to the

American embassy in Moscow, plus

a list of opera-

tional actions carried out by him for CIA.

M. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA

during the period of his assignment to the

American embassy in Moscow, with a list of opera-

tional actions carried out

by him for CIA.

N. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American

embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA

affiliation.

0. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American

embassy in Moscow

at one time.

He had no CIA

affiliation.

Golitsyn was provided with a copy

of an interview of him conducted by US govern-

ment security officers (not identified as to

agency affiliation).

P. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American

embassy in Moscow at one time.

He had no CIA

affiliation.

Q.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

CIA staff officer at one time assigned to Moscow.

R. Information on a Russian-born American

citizen employed as an interpreter by the United

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 135

---

## Page 136

SECRET

-130 -

Nations in Geneva who was the object of a KGB

recruitment attempt while on loan to UNESCO for

conference work in Tbilisi in 1968.

S.

Biographic information on CIA-connected

personnel mentioned in the Cherepanov papers.

This information was additional to sketches on

the same persons given to Golitsyn with the tran-

script for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva

in 1964.

A nine-page summary of the status of

The nose sent it poten examen then,

on his confrontation and subsequent interrogation,

on his life history, on CIA conclusions ("daily

support for our conviction that Nosenko was sent

on a KGB mission"'), on CIA plans for future

handling of Nosenko (continued interrogation),

and on Nosenko's circumstances (confinement under

observation, without cigarettes or reading

material).

U.

• Copies of two reports on the subject of

KGB audio-technical operations, one prepared on

the basis of information provided by Golitsyn

himself in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of

information brought out by Nosenko in 1964, with

notation for Golitsyn that recent sweeping oper-

ma that recent ste

ations in the American embassy in Moscow had

located all the microphones identified by Nosenko

and

a number not mentioned by Nosenko.

V. A repeat of Nosenko's commentary on

Krotkov (identified above), expanded to include

identifications Nosenko made of the KGB people

involved with Krotkov.

A list of questions that Krotkov had

suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify

information given by Krotkov.

X.

Biographic sketches on Vladimir Kovshuk,

Yurly Guk, Aleksandr Feklisov alias Fomin, and

Igor Ivanov.

Kovshuk and Guk were KGB officers

known to both Golitsyn and Nosenko; with Vladimir

Churanov, they were credited by Golitsyn as having

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 136

---

## Page 137

SECRET

-131 -

recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be sent to

the West to discredit Golitsyn in the eyes of CIA

and other Western intelligence services.

Feklisov

was a KGB officer who visited the United States as

part of Khrushchev's party in 1959 and later

(1960-1964) served as Counselor of the Soviet

embassy in Washington, DC. Ivanov was arrested

by the FBI in 1963 in connection with the case of

John W. Butenko, an electronics engineer who was

arrested as a KGB agent.

These reports were given

to Golitsyn

as his request.

Y. A chronology of the case of Boris Belitskiy,

a KGB-controlled CIA source.

Golitsyn had asked to

"re-read" the file on Belitskiy, whose status vis-

a-vis the KGB was first reported to CIA by Nosenko.

Golitsyn was also given a background sketch of

Belitskiy and transcripts of "all four contact

periods."

Z. File summary of the case of Mikhail

Fedorov alias

Razin, a GRU colonel who served as

an illegal in France in 1958-1959.

AA.

Case descriptions of two operations ser-

viced by CIA personnel in Moscow. Both were KGB

couriers dispatched on emigre operations into West

Germany, where they

were apprehended, agreed to

work for American intelligence, and later returned

to the USSR.

BB.

Responses by Nosenko to questions drafted

by Golitsyn on:

recruitable Soviets (by name and

background); American double agents; the Popov case;

recruitment of US intelligence personnel; KGB

operations against US embassy (Moscow) personnel;

surveys or studies done by the KGB Second Chief

Directorate about arrested American spies (including

Popov and Penkovskiy); KGB awards (including those

given to persons who participated in the investi-

gation of Penkovskly, Popov, Stashinskly; the

Penkovskiy case; Golitsyn.

CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had reported

on KGB operational interest in specific persons

(i.e., operational "leads"), and what CIA had been

able to develop on them through investigation, with

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 137

---

## Page 138

SECRET

-132-

comments as appropriate; an outline of infor-

mation provided by Nosenko on the structure and

personnel assignments in the KGB as he knew them;

a chronology of Nosenko's life "in varying ver-

sions.

By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation

of information to Nosenko is indicated by the following state-

ment taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by Chief,

SR Division, dated 30 March 1964:

.. I think we should make absolutely

sure that Subject [Nosenko] does not learn

a single thing from us that we do not want

him (and eventually the KGB) to know.

I

think CIA has to take a very firm position

on this issue, otherwise the FBI might urge

a delay in confrontation while they present

case after case to [Nosenko] in an effort

to learn more from him.

For information on Nosenko's deprivation of reading matter of

any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence

files of the sort given to Golitsyn, see Chapter III.

Physical Confinement

Golitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined

at any time.

The following description of the protective

custody afforded him and his reaction to any type of control

is quoted from

the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study

(No. 3) on Golitsyn:

Golitsyn always felt the need for protection

against possible KGB retaliation, but quite

obviously believed he alone was the best

judge of what this entailed.

He wanted

guards around, but not underfoot.

The record

is replete with his complaints against the

guards and his attempts to isolate them.

This became a key issue in the adoption of

the codicil to the Statement of Agreement

in July 1962, when Golitsyn moved into his

own house and was given complete personal

control of the guards, their hours of duty

and their responsibilities.

From that point

on, Golitsyn was essentially unguarded. His

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 138

---

## Page 139

SECRET

-133-

wife also railed against her "companions"

in the early days.

She made frequent trips

into Washington to shop or attend movies,

theater or ballet.

At these times, she

would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy

periods.

On two occasions she took the bus

alone to New York for the day, and Golitsyn

also visited New York in November 1962, at

which time he roamed the city unescorted.

Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a similar

pattern.

He suddenly left the United States for the United

Kingdom in December 1962, and while in England he lived where

he wished and had no security protection.

The British asked

Golitsyn to keep his whereabouts to himself, not to stay in

one hotel for any length of time, and to call when he wanted

to meet.

According to the study quoted above, this loose

method of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped in maintain-

ing a cooperative attitude on his part; it also apparently

set a precedent for his attitude toward the manner in which

he would live upon his return to the United States in July

1963.

Upon his return here, he was given complete treedom

to set his own pattern of living and working, following the

British example.

He obtained his own residence in New York,

moved

several times, developed the concept that he was the

best judge of his own security, and at times lived "almost

under

the eaves of the Soviet

Mission"' in New York while

simultaneously refusing to talk to CIA officers because CIA

was

"penetrated."

Nosenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even

minor amenities from the time of his defection in early 1964

until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treat-

ment afforded Golitsyn. This matter has been covered so

fully in Chapter III that it requires no further comment.

Conclusions

If summation is needed, the following can be stated with

respect to the five areas dealt with above:

A. Golitsyn controlled his own interrogation,

withholding information if he chose, refusing to

answer questions according to his own whim, and

on occasion refusing even to talk to CIA officers.

Nosenko was not really listened to (or even talked

to for long

stretches of time), much less properly

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 139

---

## Page 140

SECRET

-134-

interrogated, for several years after the date of

his defection.

B. Golitsyn was given a signed agreement

covering the conditions of his cooperation with

the US government, which met all of his demands.

Nosenko was specifically denied a written contract,

on the grounds that an oral agreement was the

"bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his

relationship with the US government, until five

years after his defection (1969).

C. Golitsyn's polygraph examination was admin-

istered under ground rules imposed by SR Division.

These rules produced inconclusive test results,

but full assurances were given Golitsyn that he

had

passed his examination.: No further attempt

was

made to establish Golitsyn's bona fides.

Nosenko, on the other hand, underwent three

separate

series of polygraph tests.

Two of the three were

conducted

in such a manner as to prejudice the re-

sults against Nosenko; under the ground rules im-

posed by the SR Division officers on the polygraph

operator, the latter was under instructions to

"find" evidences of deception in the polygraph

charts, whether they were there or not.

D. With respect to access to information,

Golitsyn was provided with literally safes-full

classified documents, including files on cases

that were regarded as highly sensitive within CIA

and to which only a very small number of CIA staff

officers had access. Nosenko not only did not see

any intelligence material but was denied access to

newspapers, books, radio, or even personal contact

with other human beings.

E. As to physical confinement, Golitsyn was.

simply never confined; the thought of confining

him did not even arise.

Nosenko spent virtually

all of his first five years in this country as

a prisoner, given fewer amenities than he would

have received in most jails or prisons within

the United States, or in some form of protective

custody.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 140

---

## Page 141

SECRET

- 135-

It seems self-evident that these two defectors should

received the same treatment, that one was as suspect

as the other until completion of

all appropriate processing

aimed at determining bona fides.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 141

---

## Page 142

SECRET

- 136-

CHAPTER VIII

Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko Case

Nosenko was first polygraphed on 4 April 1964, in a

series of six tests.

That the procedures followed

were

somewhat unorthodox is indicated by the following quotations

from the report of the polygraph operator:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with

representatives of SR Division, the under-

signed was informed that the polygraph

interview was part of an overall plan to

help break [Nosenko] and elicit the truth

from

him. SR Division's instructions were

that, regardless of whether [Nosenko]

passed his polygraph test or not, he was

to be informed at the termination of his

polygraph interview that he was lying, and

had not passed his polygraph interview.

The question

of [Nosenko's] willingness to

participate in the polygraph test was one of

minor consideration, since he had, on previ-

ous occasions, agreed that he would take the

test. However, whether (Nosenko] would con-

tinue with the polygraph testing, it he was

confronted with attempted deception after

an initial test run, was one of the considered

problems.

Consequently, in order to preclude

the possibility of [Nosenko's] terminating the

test prior to its completion, it was decided

that a minor deviation from

the accepted

polygraph technique would be used during the

polygraph testing, specifically to ensure that

a polygraph record of [Nosenko's] reactions

to all the pertinent questions be obtained

prior to challenging him on

any significant

polygraph deception indications his charts

might reflect.

Because of the extenuating

(sic] circumstances of the case, this plan

was followed throughout the polygraph inter-

view.

the the those olarined forings west,

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 142

---

## Page 143

SECRET

-137-

evident both to [the operator] and the

examining physician who checked [Nosenko]

prior to Nosenko's] polygraph testing

Although [Nosenko] had used both alcohol and

some unknown drug prior to testing, there is

no question, based both on analysis

of

[Nosenko's] polygraph charts as well as

personal observation during the interview,

that [Nosenko] has attempted deliberate

deception in the specific pertinent areas

[on which

he was questionedl.

According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the

different phases involving various pertinent

areas were covered with (Nosenkol polygraph-

ically.

Challenge of [Nosenko's] reactions

was indirect and "soft."

•. • Subject was

told that he was lying to numerous

pertinent:

questions and was accused of being a dis-

patched agent.

After completion of the interview, the SR

representative at the safesite was informed,

in front of Nosenko, of the operator's

opinion that Nosenko, was lying and was a

dispatched Soviet agent. [Nosenko] was taken

into protective custody and escorted to his

new place of residence:

A second series of polygraph tests were

administered to

Nosenko between 18 and 25 October 1966. Although by this

time the operator had transferred from the Office of Security

to SR Division, it was desired by SR that he conduct the new

polygraph tests. He was allowed by the Office of Security

to do so, as an exception to the rule that all polygraph

testing be performed by Security personnel, on the basis of

Chief, SR's statement that, for Nosenko's polygraphing, use

of a person of his "temperament" was essential.

The following is quoted from an interim report dated

24 October 1966 (i.e., before completion of the new polygraph

series), which was attached to a memorandum from Chief, SR

to the DCI.

Our aims in this phase of the interrogation

have been limited: in view of the possibility

of losing access to Nosenko, we have sought

SECRET

# NW 65990 Docld:32404871. Page 143

---

## Page 144

SECRET

-138-

(a) to strengthen our basic report, now in

preparation, by testing his

story further,

clarifying points of confusion and reveal-

ing new contradictions, and by polygraph

examinations in key areas,

and • (b)

to lead

toward his eventual confession by directly

exploiting our hypotheses about the true

background of Nosenko and this KGB opera-

tion, to convey to Nosenko the impression

that

we know more than before,

that we

possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and

that he has no prospects for release.

We

retrained from doing this in earlier phases

of the interrogation, but at this point

there seems

little to lose.

[Regarding his identity]: Nosenko was

questioned extensively on the polygraph con-

cerning his identity

He was also given

a series of tests asking for the first letter

of his given name.

The whole alphabet was

covered, and the polygraph charts show that

he became increasingly tense, culminating

at the letter S (or perhaps

T) on both runs.

While we recognize that testing of this sort

may not give valid results, it certainly

gets over to Nosenko the degree of our doubt

and

may even help us determine who he really

is.

Nosenko's becoming "increasingly tense" during this

1966 polygraph examination must be evaluated in the light of

certain facts that were not brought out in this report. Let

us begin by giving a schedule of the hours during which he

was under continuous polygraph interrogation:

Date and Times

Hours and Minutes

19 October

1330 - 1530

2

20 October

0930 - 1215

1530 - 1910

2:45

3:40

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 144

---

## Page 145

SECRET

-139-

Date and Times

Hours and Minutes

21 October

0930

1645

1245

- 1810

3:15

1:25

25 October

1350

1630

1545

1805

1:55

1:35

26 October

1000

1755

- • 1320

1925

3:20

1:30

27 October

1020 - 1345

1700 - 1913

3:25

2:13

28 October

0955 - 1020

1024 - 1125

Total hours of continuous

polygraph examination

:25

1:01

28:29

When queried during the present investigation about the

advisability of such long sessions of continuous polygraphing,

a responsible official of the Office of Security's Polygraph

Branch stated that such sessions are counterproductive and

contrary to their organization's policy: The long confine-

ment, plus operation of certain of the polygraph sensors,

artifactitious reactions.

Re-

sults of a polygraph examination conducted under such

condi-

tions are not dependable.

In addition, it should be pointed out that during this

period the days began early and ended late for Nosenko, be-

cause when he was not being polygraphed he was being intensively

interrogated. The record shows that in addition to the

approximately 28 hours of polygraphing, he was subjected

to

15 hours of straight interrogation.

The dividing line between

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 145

---

## Page 146

SECRET

-140-

polygraphing and hostile interrogation is not always clear

from the record, however, because the polygraph operator

participated in

both. For example, at one point the typed

record reads:

[The operator] told Nosenko] he is a fanatic

who was told too little to support his legend

and that his future is now "zero."

It is

also probable that Nosenko's physical movements

were restricted for long periods of time during this whole

period. In a report he wrote on 16 November 1967, the

Director of Security stated:

[Nosenko] was left strapped in a chair

between periods of interrogation for as long

as four or five hours at a time. As you

know, the role of this Office in the Nosenko

case during the past three years has been one

exclusively of support under the direction

I so Division personnel. None the less,

nave consistently instructed my personnel

who were guarding him that I would not con-

done or support any treatment involving

physical abuse.

I have confirmed this one

example of what I consider to be physical

abuse and regret that it was not brought to

my attention.

Nosenko's final polygraph examination, conducted under

the direction of the Office of Security, was quite at

variance with the first two.

Initiated

on 2 August 1968,

aporated cases transe pes and repated materials

had been compiled during the course of Nosenko's new interro-

tion undertaken in late October 1967. About 60 questions of

a pertinent nature were covered in the interview.

Nosenko

was completely cooperative, no problems were encountered,

and the conclusion of the polygraph operator was that Nosenko

had been substantially truthful in answering all relevant

questions put to him.

In the course of the present investigation, the Office

of Security was requested to make a further reevaluation of

the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October 1966,

and August 1968.

The resultant report, dated 30 September

1976 and signed by the Director of Security, states:

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 146

---

## Page 147

SECRET

-141-

This memorandum is in response to your

request for a review of the polygraph

charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained

during polygraph

interrogations in April

1964 and October 1966

..• [and] in August

1968

After a thorough review of the charts

obtained in April 1964, it is our opinion

that the polygraph charts obtained do not

contain sufficient technical data on which

to base a conclusion of deception or to

support that Mr. Nosenko was a dispatched

agent of the KGB . .

Finally, the polygraph patterns produced

to pertinent questions during the August

1968 polygraph examination substantiate

that Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he

had not given false information to his CIA

debriefing officers. It is our opinion

that the examiner in that testing was

correct in his chart analysis.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 147

---

## Page 148

SECRET

-142-

CHAPTER IX

Psychological and Medical Findings

A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two

Agency specialists, respectively a psychologist and a

psychiatrist, in the handling of Nosenko. Like so much

Ise that occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying

nainly in the negative sense of

demonstrating how the ser-

vices of such professionals ought not to be exploited. In

sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally involved

in this case were given enough misinformation about Nosenko's

bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an accurate

personality assessment.

We now examine in some detail the roles played by the

psychologist and

the psychiatrist.

In doing so, we have

very much in mind the fact that both these gentlemen are

members of organized professions, both of which impose

explicit standards of

conduct upon their members.

We must

therefore look for possible conflict between demands the

Agency made of these professionals on one hand, and their

professional standards on the other.

A. The Role of the Psychologist

The psychologist's role will be dealt with first

because, to judge by the written record, he was the

first to assess

Nosenko from the psychological point

of view, by means of a brief interview and test administered

on 23 June 1964.

His initial report is dated 9 July 1964.

In addition, he interviewed Nosenko at length in 14. ses-

sions during the period 3-21 May 1965. He then wrote a

chronicle of Nosenko's life and an overall psychological

evaluation based on these interviews.

By way of background, it should be said that the

psychologist is an extremely insightful person with

clinical experience acquired both before joining CIA

He has developed

his own system of interpreting the Wechsler intelligence

tests (Wechsler-Bellevue and Wechsler Adult Intelligence

Scale), which he calls the Personality Assessment System

(PAS) •

It is PAs that, for over two decades, has

been

the main resource used

by the Clandestine Service in the

assessment of personality for operational purposes.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 148

---

## Page 149

SECRET

-143-

Like any other scientific practitioner,

however,

a psychologist can only function properly on the

basis of valid data.

If you put a cube of ice in a

patient's mouth before inserting the thermometer, you

do not get an accurate temperature reading. If you

provide an examining psychologist or psychiatrist

with erroneous data regarding a defector, the findings

of his examination will inevitably be in part erroneous.

Personality assessment instruments, or "tests,"

also have their limitations.

They yield results that

should be read only as statements of the statistical

probability of the presence of a given personality

predisposition or characteristic. In other words, the

results give the psychologist a suggestion as to what

to look for in a person, as he collects further data.

In the case here under consideration, the personality

might have the characteristics of a sociopath.

psychologist's task was then to evaluate this datum

within a framework that included the following elements:

1. His judgment of the validity of his

own test results.

Note that he depended on a

single, english-language measurement instru-

ment

when he examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964.

2. Personal interviews.

He

had time for

only a limited interview

at the time of

test-

ing, and it was conducted without benefit of

an interpreter in English, a language Nosenko

spoke with far from idiomatic fluency.

Lengthy interviews were conducted later, in

had been

conducted in

English.

3: Collateral data, obtained from senior

SR officers, which were uniformly prejudicial

to Nosenko.

The latter was described as one

who lied and changed his story constantly, and

who had been sent to the United States on

a

mission for the KGB. Doubt was even expressed

as to whether Nosenko was the person he. professed

to

be.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 149

SECRET

---

## Page 150

SECRET

-144-

Subsequent

events have revealed that Nosenko's

falsehoods were in fact minor ones.

But the psychologist

did not know all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly

and knowing that manipulative lying is part of the

psychopathic syndrome, he diagnosed Nosenko as a psycho-

path.

The term "psychopath" (another term used inter-

changeably is "sociopath") itself deserved a word of

explanation, because its connotation is misleading.

LIke so many psychological terms, it evolved out of the

fact that psychologists tend to be involved primarily

vith people in trouble, very often with those who end uf

in prisons and mental institutions. A survey of psycho-

one quintessential criterion of a psychopath

is habitually given to criminal or delinquent behavior.

The criteria that psychologists use in distinguishing

between psychopaths and non-psychopaths have been

developed almost entirely from studies of

juvenile

delinquents, criminals and mental patients, and thus the

term is really only applicable with any certainty to in-

dividuals belonging to one or another of those groups.

Despite this fact,

testing of many people who are not

delinquent or criminal may yield a score or profile

of scores

suggesting psychopathy. To illustrate

point, let us take an example. On the Minnesota

Multiphasic Personality Inventory one of the most widely

used clinical testing instruments in this country, the

profile that suggests psychopathy has also been generated

in testing persons who turned out to be good WACs in

World War. II and others who have been predicted as

likely to succeed in the life insurance business. Yet,

good WACs and life insurance agents are obviously not

groups to whom we would ordinarily apply the term

"psychopath." Thus, the fact that you have a predis-

position to psychopathy does not mean that you necessarily

become one; the psychopathic profile on either the MMPl

or the PAS

test is merely a warning signal of what you

might do under certain adverse circumstances.

When he tested Nosenko, the psychologist was not

fully aware of all the pressures under which this defector

was functioning.

He was unaware of the manner of his

sudden confinement after glowing promises had been made

of rewards for defection; of the falsified polygraph

results, and the fact that Nosenko had been informed

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 150

---

## Page 151

SECRET

-145-

that the examination showed him guilty of deception;

or of the fact that the principal case officer had

told Nosenko that the latter's information (later to

prove of great value) was all "crap." Given these

factors, we would have to conclude a priori that the

resultant PAS personality profile was likely to be

partly spurious.

The exact extent to which the psychologist's test

results were inexact cannot be determined, but one

example is illustrative of the possibilities.

One part

of the profile suggested that Nosenko was endowed with

a well-below average memory. That his memory was

functioning at less than average level at the time he

took the test cannot be doubted; but it has already

made clear that he was

functioning under extremely

adverse conditions, and, since the Wechsler subtest that

measures memory span has been experimentally shown to be

vulnerable to so-called state (i.e., temporary) anxiety,*

aspect of the personality profile must be considered

spurious.

From Nosenko's performance during extensive

debriefings since he was released from confinement and

began to receive normally humane treatment, we know that

memory is in

fact exceptionally good.

We can only

conclude that, if it functioned badly at the time of test-

ing, this was

largely owing to anxiety induced by treat-

ment received at the hands of CIA.

As to the psychologist's characterization of

Nosenko as

a psychopath, the limitations of such a

liagnosis have already been made clear.

Since his re-

when he wants to be,

sirable traits associated with psychopathy.

Quite to

the contrary, as of this time at least, he has since

1969 comported himself with both dignity and discretion.

The psychologist's evaluation contained a section

entitled "Vulnerabilities" that was, once again, clearly

based on the premise that Nosenko was dissembling, when

he denied being under continued KGB control. The psychologist

*Matarazzo, J. D.,

Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelli-

gence. Baltimore:

Williams and Wilkins, 1972. Page 444.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 151

---

## Page 152

SECRET

-146-

Under prolonged pressure he will

admit almost

anything to get relief.

Another vulnerability

is that he will "break" in order to get relief.

Care should be taken to continue pressure for

some time after an initial break is secured

to allow for vacillation and modification.

Long periods of isolation after these breaks

may be useful in evaluating the reliability

of his information.. In general, it is better

to give him slight rewards (e.g., cigarettes,

baths, etc.) tor no apparent reason than

tie them to periods of cooperation, etc.

The psychologist's last major involvement in the

case appears to have been the series of debriefings having

to do with Nosenko's personal history, conducted during

the period 3-21 May 1965. These led the psychologist to

the following conclusions and recommendations:

1.

Nosenko's story was consistent with

the previous diagnosis of a "bright sociopath"

(i.e., psychopath).

2. The psychologist was "totally at a

losS

to even attempt to rationalize why a

story with this much pathology would be used

as a

legend.

than

Nothing could be served other

to discredit the man to whom it was as-

signed.

3. New approaches were necessary, as

described in the following paragraph:

I have few specific recommendations.

The first is to consider a pentothal

sodium [sic] interview..

Second,

he can be hit with a hostile, or a

better term would be a needling, in-

terrogation on his psychological

weaknesses.

His reaction to my mild

needle on him running away from a bad

situation suggests he may be highly

vulnerable in this area.

Third, some

consideration could be given to turn-

ing him back to the Soviets. The

publication of his life story with

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 152

---

## Page 153

SECRET

-147-

the proper editorial changes --

emphasizing the class distinctions

and privileges in

classless society

could be most humiliating to the

Soviets.

In addition, we could take

the gamble of demonstrating that de-

fection is an honorable act of moti-

vated men. The US has no room for

the misfits and failures of the Soviet

system.

The above findings were still insufficient for some

of the SR Division personnel, who then drafted a series

of very specific questions to be put to the psychologist.

Of these the first three will be quoted, together with

the psychologist's answers:

1. This man's story is full of demon-

strable lies.

Often these lies seem point-

less--no matter from what point of view

they

are studied.

When challenged, he will

sometimes retreat from one of his stories;

in other instances, he will cling adamantly

to one even when it is clear to all that he

is lying and even when he has an easy. way

out.

In other words, his lies, distortions

and rationalizations

are harder to under-

stand than those of most "normal" people.

In your opinion, when he lies, does he do so:

a. because he is a compulsive

liar;

(Answer: No.)

b.

because he seeks

•to boister

nis stature and ego for his own reasons:

(Answer: Essentially yes.)

c. because the KGB told him to.

(Answer: Perhaps.)

2. Do the incidence and nature of his in-

accuracies and distortions add up to a behavior

pattern that might reasonably be called "normal"?

If not, how can it be described in layman's

terms?

(Answer: Not a "normal" personality but legally

normal and not hospitalizeable.)

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 153

---

## Page 154

SECRET

-148-

If his behavior pattern is not

"normal," could it be counterfeit, either

for personal reasons or because he was

briefed to comport himself this way?

Could he play such a role over a considerable

period of time?

(Answer:

Absolutely not.)

When at long last, in February 1968, SB Division

concluded its long-awaited study of the Nosenko case,

the findings of the psychologist were included in the

following abbreviated form:

Nosenko is a rationalizer, a distorter, and

an evasive person clearly capable of dis-

sembling for personal reasons.

He is not

a compulsive liar.

He is inclined to relate

what he thinks he is expected to say rather

than to tell the truth as he knows it.

He

lies by design as well as for effect, however,

and he does not always embroider just to

bolster his ego.

He is neither "insane"

nor

psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions."

Nosenko's rationalizations are not the pro-

duct of derangement.

The

most notable quality of this summary is its

selectivity.

For example:

1. The summary nowhere mentioned the

diagnosis of Nosenko as a psychopath/sociopath.

The fact that psychopaths generally try to

evade the penalties of their misbehavior by

adaptive role-playing (e.g., sudden religious

"conversions" to win sympathy and "prove" they

are changing their ways) could'have served

dangerously to undercut the thesis that

Nosenko was

sufficiently dedicated to

in carrying out a long-term KGB plot ¿persist

of the sort of treatment he had received

since 4 April 1964.

2.

By the above-cited omission, lt tends

to establish a dichotomy between the

"insane"

or "psychotic," who suffer "delusions," and

"normal" people, who tell the truth.

carefully skirted the existence of

a middle

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 154

---

## Page 155

SECRET

-149-

ground between normality and psychoticism

in which people do not behave "normally"

but are not insane. Yet this distinc-

tion had been drawn specifically in answer

to one of the SR Division questioned quoted

above.

Enough has been said to make clear that the psycholo-

gist was put in an impossible position. On the basis of

the "facts" provided him, he was frankly puzzled as to how

Nosenko could have been selected for a KGB mission in-

volving extended dissimulation.

The psychologist was not sure enough of his ground

to stick to his guns.

As a psychologist who had dealt

previously with a number of. Soviet defectors, he had

great degree of insight. On the other hand, he knew

that he did not have all the facts, because Chief, SR

had specifically told him so. Insight is of very little

use when not based on adequate data.

Helms tried to help. When told by the psychologist

that the latter did not have all the facts necessary to

make a judgment about Nosenko,

Helms called Chief, SR

and instructed him that the psychologist should be fully

informed.. This instruction appears to have been disre-

garded.

We can only conclude that the psychologist did what

could legitimately be expected of him, within the con-

straints of the Agency's command structure. The weak-

nesses that in retrospect we can perceive in the

psychologist's diagnosis and recommendations can be as-

cribed directly to his being asked to make professional

judgments based on inadequate knowledge. The propriety

of the Agency's employing a professional in this manner

should be carefully reviewed.

B. The Role of the Psychiatrist

The psychiatrist's role in the Nosenko operation

was more extensive and of longer duration than the

psychologist's.

In addition to physical examinations,

it included giving advice on how Nosenko should be treated

while in confinement, advice on special interrogation

techniques such as the use of sodium

pentothal, and an

assessment of Nosenko's personality.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 155

---

## Page 156

SECRET

-150-

The psychiatrist has stated (in discussions

with the senior author of this report) that he had

been told when he was first assigned to the case that

Nosenko was concealing information of great importance

to the US government.

That he worked throughout the i

case under

this assumption is evident from the total

context of his reporting.

On the other hand, there

is no evidence that either SR Division or CI

Staff

shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a

sufficient extent for him to have evaluated their

claim, even had he been qualified by professional

background to make such an evaluation. He knew and

accepted his limitations in the latter regard; for

example, in a report dated 23 February 1965, after

he had spent an hour observing an interrogation, he

remarked:

[Nosenko] comes off lin] his responses to

questions (at least when I saw him) in the

same fashion as always though I am not

competent to judge the content of what he

says. [Underlining added.]

even though the psychiatrist was not an "opera-

done hit on association tier eng Coach or uded

34 examinations of Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he

acted in more than a purely medical capacity.

Not only

did he check on Nosenko's health and endeavor to safeguard

it, he also advised the operational component of the

Agency on certain aspects of their own specialized

activities

to which his medical and psychiatric knowledge

appeared relevant. In this latter capacity, the psychi-

atrist's name was invoked frequently in operational

correspondence,

generally without his knowledge; for

example, in a 21 November 1904 memorandum to the boP,

concerning arrangements for forthcoming interrogations,

Chief, SR

stated:

Given

the assessment by both [the psychi-

atrist] and [the psychologist] that Subject is

a compulsive talker, we are hopeful that we will

make

some progress.

By implication, this

and other similar references evoked

the recondite expertise of the psychiatric and psycholog-

ical professionals to bolster claims of impending success.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 156

---

## Page 157

SECRET

- 151-

It should be made clear that throughout the

Nosenko affair, the psychiatrist was entitled to

feel that he was acting properly in line of duty.

His component, the Office of Medical Services/

Operational Services Division, was specifically

charged with providing assistance to the operational

components of the Agency. It had long been Agency

practice, both at Headquarters and in the field,

for medical doctors to function in a partly opera-

tional capacity, even though they were not neces-

sarily cognizant of all aspects of the operations

in which they became involved. The

assumption was

that senior operations officers knew what they were

about and that, within rather vaguely defined

limits, a doctor of medicine could accept their

authority as guaranty of the rightness of what he

did to assist them.

Thus, it was only natural that the psychiatrist,

having been told by senior Agency officials that

Nosenko was consistently lying about his true mis-

sion, should accept their views.

Unlike the psycholo-

gist, he did not even have the advantage of having

systematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history;

had he done so, he might have shared the psycholo-

o he gene have

gist's suspicions that the SR Division opinion of

Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge.

Nevertheless, the anomalous situation in which

the psychiatrist was placed had two unfortunate

consequences:

1. Because he was led to assume that

Nosenko was systematically lying, his

diagnosis was somewhat distorted.

2. The same assumption led him to

play a quasioperational role in the handling

of Nosenko.

Let us 100k

in greater depth at the first consequence.

In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a

qualified psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to

ascertain whether this particular professional, well

known to his colleagues for his devotion to duty, was.

in fact given a fair opportunity to make an honest

evaluation.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 157

SECRET

---

## Page 158

SECRET

-152-

The psychiatrist's diagnosis of Nosenko, which

he labeled "Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20

December 1964.

It read in part:

Psychiatric impression is that of

an individual

who shows -an

above average intelligence capacity,

is shrewd and perceptive. While he claims to

have desired to cooperate and work with US

officials, his antisocial behavior was destruc-

tive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed

to pursue.

His own needs and desires are of

paramount importance to him and he manipulates

those around him without regard to consequence

in order to

satisfy his needs.

As such he tends

to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and

exhibitionistic.

In satisfying his own desires

there is no concern for the feelings or interests

of others. There has been no evidence of a

sense of honor or of shame. He has seen

nothing wrong with his own behavior, being unable

to view this from another's viewpoint. For most

of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect

that he has operated in this manner--without

conscience, without guilt and has directed his

efforts at

satisfying his own needs. He may

at times give the impression of being a reliable

and steadfast person, but after gaining

• security

for himself and the confidence of others, can

shrug off major obligations easily. As with

many individuals of this personality makeup,

his disregard for the truth is remarkable.

Whether there is a good chance that he will get

away with a lie or whether detection is almost

certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and

can coolly maintain his position.

While com-

mitting the most serious of perjuries, it is

easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye.

Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to

uninviting or destructive behavior

Emotional attachment is shallow. Aithough he

may give at times the impression of being

cordial and affectionate, beneath this is

an

astonishing callousness.

As a youngster, this man might well have been

looked upon as

a juvenile delinquent with

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 158

---

## Page 159

SECRET

-153-

constant brushes with authority. As he grew

older this behavior most likely continued in

the same pattern with occasional brushes with

the law and

perhaps some punishment.

But the

effectiveness of his ability to manipulate

and protect himself by personable appeals may

have kept him in circulation in society on

the fringe, so to speak.

His reaction to his

restricted

environment is not unusual, as

some such individuals come to accommodate to

some limits imposed by authority while at the

same time not accepting the seriousness of

their situation and believing that, as in the

past, they can talk their way out.

This man

is capable of playing a role and playing it

effectively.

With this view of his personality, it seems

unlikely that he could have achieved much

stature as a staff intelligence officer. He

could, however, have been effective in various

types.of intelligence operations.

Jn l October 1976, the above evaluation was

discussed

with the psychiatrist in the light of facts previously

unknown to him.

Inter alia, he was given (in writing)

background on the following aspects of the Nosenko case:

1. CIA promises of substantial monetary

rewards and an opportunity for Nosenko to work

with CIA on a salaried basis:

2. The conclusion of the Director of

Security, as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr.

Nosenko was truthful and that he had not

given false

information to his CIA debriefing

officers."

Acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides

by both FBI and CIA.

The memorandum of conversation dictated by the

senior author following the above discussion

reads in

part:

[The psychiatrist] agreed that his 20 December

1964 memorandum, as well as subsequent psychiatric

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 159

---

## Page 160

SECRET

-154-

judgments which he had made, were

all heavily

lependent on "collateral information" which

he obtained from representatives of the SB

Division.

He agreed that, had he known the

facts as

stated in my memorandum, his psychi-

atric judgments might have differed from

those he actually made.

In connection with some of the specific points

raised in my memorandum, (the psychiatristl

made the following observations:

Lal: he was not aware of the

financial or other promises made to

Nosenko, and perhaps assumed that

Nosenko, like most defectors The

angling

for large rewards.

psychiatrist] mentioned Golitsyn

as among the precedents which he

probably had in mind

[2]. In regard to Nosenko's

alleged. lying and deception, he was

totally dependent upon the judgments

of SB Division personnel as well as

that of [a polygraph operator].

[The psychiatristl stated that, until he read my

1 October 1976 memorandum, he had never known

that Nosenko had contributed valuable informa-

He had also never received any informa-

tion concerning Nosenko's behavior since his

being released from incarceration . : .

We are thus justified in concluding that, in the

psychiatrist's case as in that of the psychologist, a

professional was not given the proper "collateral in-

formation" on the basis of which to render a sound profes-

sional judgment.

More explicitly, because neither the

psychiatrist nor psychologist was

accurately informed

even about such basic aspects of the case

as the promises

made to Nosenko (which could not possibly be considered

to have had sensitive security implications), neither

man had

an accurate criterion for judging the appropri-

ateness of Nosenko's behavior in seeking better treatment.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 160

---

## Page 161

SECRET

- 155-

Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's

leadership that there were good and sufficient reasons

for incarcerating and trying to "break" Nosenko, it is

not surprising in hindsight that the psychiatrist offered

judgments and advice extending well beyond the bounds of

conventional medicine and psychiatry. Since his quasi-

operational participation in this case has been covered

to some degree in Chapter III, we need only reevoke a

few examples here:

--His judgment of 24 February 1966 that "things

are

bound to change as far as Nosenko is con-

cerned--he is either going to stop faking or

things will get worse."

--His judgment, reported on 26 April 1966,

that reestablishing contact between Nosenko

and the interrogators would be a serious mis-

take because it would constitute a "relief."

--His opinion, offered after monitoring the

6 July 1966

meeting between the principal

case officer and Nosenko, that "the way in

which the interview was conducted would very

effectively slam shut another psychological

door."

Admittedly, the above comments come to us secondhand,

via memoranda written by others.

Nonetheless,

they are

consistent with everything in the psychiatrist's hand-

written reports of his visits to Nosenko in confinement.

It will suffice

here to illustrate our point with one

example, quoted from the psychiatrist's 14 July 1964 re-

port of

a visit to Nosenko:

Subject was seen for [the] first time in over

two

weeks. His general physical condition is

satisfactory and his weight is now 170 lbs.

There is evidence however that he is reacting

psychologically to his detention and is show-

ing increased

tension, anxiety and is misin-

terpreting various stimuli in his environment.

More significant is his conviction that he is

being constantly photographed in his room and

in the "privacy of his bath."

The latter is

most disturbing to him especially being

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 161

---

## Page 162

SECRET

-156-

photographed totally nude. He describes

hearing the sound of movie cameras especially

in the bath and was quite disturbed over

having pictures made without his "panties."

(This is the exact word he used.)

1 asked

how pictures were being taken in his room

and he got off the bed,

walked over to the

door to his room and pointed to pin holes

on each side of the door through which he

was being clandestinely photographed.

said he had taken photographs of people in

compromising positions for operational use

in thel KGB and he understood the reason

for this. But he did not understand why

the guards continued to take pictures of

him--especially in the bath. In the guard

log.is a notation last week about a request

from him that picture taking be stopped.

This sequence, I am convinced, was not

play acting.

The nebulous situation he

finds himself in is beginning to take its

toll: From the psychiatric standpoint

this

is viewed as first sign of disintegration

of personality and loss of contact with

reality.

It may progress or it may remain

at this level. It is interesting that this

first indicator centers around his "privacy,"

being in the nude and is concerned with

sexual identification and his underlying

concern over this area. At this juncture

I do not recommend any changes in his manage-

ment underlining is ours] other than those

previously suggested, i.e., reading material,

material, chair and table in his

He has been given reading material

and

I understand from [the principal case offi-

cerl who is aware of the above visit, that

chair, table, and cigarettes in the room are

forthcoming in the next day or so:

Although the psychiatrist later changed his mind

and expressed the conviction that Nosenko had been faking

his

signs of psychological deterioration, the reasons

at least to the

lay mind.

bey mind. there have reen ample studies ot the effects

of isolation and sensory deprivation on human beings,

triggered in large measure by the demands of the space

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 162

---

## Page 163

SECRET

: -157-

program.

They are only partially relevant to Nosenko's

situation, because no experimenter in the non-Communist

world has

ever attempted to impose social isolation or

other forms of deprivation on experimental subjects for

more than a few days at a time.

(The Soviets, who are

bound by fewer restrictions than we, have employed

durations of up to o0 days. Nevertheless, while vari-

ous researchers

have obtained diverse results, there

is ample evidence that certain psychological, physiolog-

ical, and behavioral impairments do indeed result from

severe restrictions

being' placed on physical activity,

sensory stimulation, and social interaction; and this

generalization seems to apply to Soviets in much the

same way as it does to Americans. The psychiatrist's

judgments were not doubt based in good faith on his

clinical judgment, but the question remains as to

whether the latter was not distorted by his apparent

commitmert to the cause of "breaking" Nosenko.

Thus we

are led inevitably to the problem of whether such a

commitment is appropriate in the case of a doctor of

medicine.

C. Conclusions

The senior author of this study spent 1972 making

a study of Soviet agents-in-place.

Two of the conclusions

of that study are worth requoting in part four years

later:

..

We have not always used our Agency

psychiatrists and psychologists to best

advantage.

When we deal with computers,

we know that we have to call on specialists

to help us, but we have a false self-confidence

in dealing

with people.

self-confidence

is allowable when we are dealing with people

who are normal, but untortunately many soviet

defectors and just about any soviet who is

willing to serve as an agent-in-place are

not psychologically normal.

They therefore

require very specialized handling ...

An operational death wish seemed to

overwhelm us,

as we insisted on ascribing

every aberration of the agent(s) to some

sinister design of the enemy.

Granted that

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 163

---

## Page 164

SECRET

-158-

we must always keep in mind the possibility

of an agent's being under opposition con-

trol, as long as there is a change that he

is genuine we

should never let him become

aware of our suspicions.

We have missed

some major operational opportunities by

violating this rule.

In the Nosenko case, the problem lay not in our

failure to make use of the psychologists/psychiatrists

but in out gross misuse of them. CIA officials in

charge of the Nosenko case until 1967 sought assistance

of professionals from this field, as they did from

similar people in other fields, only to help shore up

certain conceptions.

For their part, the psychologist/psychiatric

professionals were not of as much help as they could

have been.

They had become accustomed over the

years to playing a subordinate support role to the

operators and had developed a "you call--we haul"

attitude that is inconsistent with the independent-

mindedness legitimately to be expected of a professional.

In addition, because of the doctrine of compartmentation,

the knowledge that the Agency's psychological/psychiatric

professionals have had to contribute has,

at any given

time, been much less than it could and should have been.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 164

---

## Page 165

SECRET

-177-

CHAPTER XI

Methodology and Leadership

A. Lack of Counterintelligence Methodology

We accept without question the necessity for counter-

intelligence, as a category of the intelligence

concerned with the activities of hostile powers provert

and clandestine activities against the United States and

our allies.

But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill

Its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic

methodology.

Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no

such thing.

We are forced to conclude that, in the 1960s, when

Golitsyn; Nosenko, and

contacted CIA, the Plans

Directorate and its Clandestine Service were

intellec-

tually, technically, and procedurally unprepared to handle

them.

A useful study entitled ICIA] Counterintelligence

Interrogation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the

handling of Nosenko gives no indication that any of the

Agency personnel directly involved had profited from it,

if indeed they had read it at all.

Insofar as we can

ascertain, in respect to Soviet nationals the Directorate

lacked:

1. Explicit written criteria to be applied

in evaluating the bona fides of a defector or

prospective

agent.

2.

Explicit written procedures for the

collection,

analysis, and

• evaluation of the

counterintelligence product of a defector or

prospective agent.

3. Explicit written procedures for psycho-

logical evaluation of a defector or prospective

agent.

4. Any broadly-based systematic data base

(or systematic written procedures for employing

it, had it existed) regarding the relevant

psychological

characteristics of Soviet agents.

There did exist some psychological data regard-

ing defectors, but they had not been collated

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 165

---

## Page 166

SECRET

-178-

and analyzed, nor were they objectively

applied to the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn.

The latter was himself never even tested.

B.

Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology

The predoninant influence in the counterintelligence

field within the Agency until 1975 was the then Chief, CI.

His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly

unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political

role.. In truth, no one could compete with him as an expert

on this subject.

His analyses, based on fragmentary and

often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than

systematic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor

replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike

the Emperor

and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never

vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he

surrounded such data

as existed with

a wall of secrecy.

His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number

of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence com-

munity, both American and foreign, he doled them out

selectively--seldom in written form--to prove whatever

point he was trying to make at the time.

Chief, CI's preference for oral over written communica-

tion

is worth emphasizing.

During his incumbency

as its

chief, the CI Staff, though it supposedly had in its

possession information concerning a horrendous hazard to

both the United States

and its

allies, never committed to

paper any complete, written, documented report on the sub-

ject. Inerefore, the threat could never be systematically

analyzed and evaluated.

Only when Chief, CI finally departed

did dispassionate analysis of CI Staff's data holdings

finally become possible, and these have consistently failed

to support his central claims regarding the KGB's massive

influence in world affairs.

C. Impact of Faulty Counterintelligence on Positive Intelli-

gence Collection

There is an important interrelationship between coun

terintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s, and the

collection of positive intelligence from human sources.

Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full im-

pact of the events we have been describing be comprehended.

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 166

SECRET

---

## Page 167

SECRET

-179-

At the time CIA was established, the primary mission

of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's

Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection

of strategically-significant intelligence from clandestine

human sources.

How successful was the Clandestine Service

in fulfilling this mission?

Agency claims of success in the human-source col-

Lection field have often been so phrased, whether inten-

clonally or not, as to give the impression that our

achievements stemmed largely from the process called

"development and recruitment."

The impression that we

"recruited" our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources fol-

lowing a period of orderly development must be dispelled,

desert a deficiencies.

before there can be meaningful discussion of previously

In most major Soviet cases prior

to 1970, it might be more nearly correct to say that the

sources

"developed" the Americans.. In the case of

Penkovskiy, to cite an extreme example, US officials made

even the latter process so outrageously difficult for him

that he had to write a letter to both the Queen of

England and President Eisenhower in order finally to

achieve a clandestine working relationship with the British

and American intelligence

services.

If our most significant positive intelligence and

much of our most significant counterintelligence from

human sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact

nationals who volunteered their services, why did we

fail to systematize their handling more fully? Even more

to the point within the framework of the present study,

why would we not give such persons the benefit of every

reasonable doubt rather than treat them with suspicion

and, in the cases of Nosenko and

outright

inhumanity?

D.

What Went Wrong?

There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless,

a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of

those who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on

the problem and permit the formulation of constructive

recommendations for future action.

The leaders of the Clandestine Service in its first

quarter century were, for the most part, people who had

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 167

---

## Page 168

SECRET

- 180 -

emerged from world war I1, oriented toward action

rather

than contemplation. Chiet, Cl was almost unique in his

interest in long-range analysis.

Within the Clandestine

Service, his

generation was in general

suspicious of

theory and ill-prepared in most cases to cope with it.

On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders

--and there were many good ones--were successful because

they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called com-

mon sense.

Its value should not be underestimated.

For

example,

when Penkovskiy was producing strategic intelli-

gence that remains of value to this day, it was the com-

mon sense of these other leaders that led them to resist

Chief, CI's

allegation that Penkovskiy was a "disinforma-

tion agent."

Nevertheless, senior Clandestine Service supervisors

of the period 1948-1970 had seldom themselves been

trained

in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus

they seldom

were in a position to demand high standards of analysis

of their subordinates.

Until the massive outflow of

retirees in recent years changed the demography of the

service, most senior operational supervisors had received

their higher educations before systematized analysis be-

came routine even in

such "soft" subjects as political

science (for which a knowledge of inferential statistics

is now required at most universities).

Many, probably

most, of these same gentlemen were also educated during

sort of interregnum in academe, when the study of classical

logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced

by emphasis on scientific method.

In the realm of

technology, almost all

senior

executives

in the Clandestine

Service before 1970 had finished college before the first

digital computer, an invaluable analytical tool, became

commercially available about 1951.

There also have been, of course, a number of bright

spots.

Some of the Plans

Directorate's divisions and

staffs had subordinate components that specialized in sub-

stantive intelligence and built up great expertise on

specitic subjects over the years.

From time to time

there were also bursts of enthusiasm for the use of

psychological evaluation techniques in the assessment

of prospective agents.

But these cases were exceptions;

primary reliance within the Clandestine Service was on

judgments

that, though sometimes bolstered by impressive

figures and arcane terminology, were nevertheless essentially

intuitive and non-systematic.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 168

---

## Page 169

SECRET

-181-

Such systems and criteria as did exist were

largely in the heads of various individuals, and there

is no evidence of any appreciable long-term consensus

among the latter. Every defector case tended to be

subject to the vagaries of the momentary line-up of

CIA

leadership. The existence of an Interagency

Defector Committee, subordinate to the DDP, introduced

some

uniformity of

approach, but its concerns were

limited for the most part to superficial administrative

and procedural formalities.

E. Summary

If we seem to have wandered far afield from the

nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko

bona fides studies, we have done so because the unfortunate

handling of Nosenko was not an isolated event.

Rather,

it was symptomatic of some fundamental inadequacies of

the

Plans Directorate. What this means to us is that the

long-needed improvement in our conduct of counterintelli-

gence activity, now well underway, must be carried on

within the framework of a searching reexamination of the

analytical techniques employed by the Directorate and its

Clandestine Service.

Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that

the last quarter of this century is going to be even more

exigent, though

in a different way, than the past twenty-

five years.

We therefore sum up the implications of this

chapter by posing a single question: How can we

ensure

that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders

is better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges

that face them than were those who ran the Service in

the sixties?

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 169

---

## Page 170

SECRET

-182-

CHAPTER XII

Conclusions and Recommendations

A. The Letter of Instructions

General guidance for the preparation of this report

was contained in a Letter. of Instructions

signed by the

Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976.

It as-

signed the following tasks:

You are tasked to write an analysis of the

Nosenko case which will address the following

matters:

[1]. The bona fides of Nosenko.

(2). The value of Nosenko to

the United States and allied govern-

ments.

13]. The relationship and

significance of Nosenko to other

agents and operations.

[4]. The identification of unex-

ploited Nosenko penetration leads and

information.

[5]. The nature and validity of

methodology of previous Nosenko bona

fides studies.

We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather

liberally, because the ramifications and implications of

the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we,

and probably the framers of the above letter, anticipated.

Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter

with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs

a. through e.

1. Bona Fides

Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of

our own making. Had the job of initially assessing

him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating

the intelligence

he had to offer, been handled

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 170

SECRET

---

## Page 171

SECRET

-183-

properly, he could have been declared a bona fide

defector

as readily as have many other Soviet in-

telligence officers.

This is not to say that we can be

certain of

the genuineness of any defector.

It will always

remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet

government, acting through the KGB or some other

instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended

"disinformation

agent"

or prospective penetration

of our government on our doorstep.

But the useful-

ness of the Soviets' doing so, in the manner as-

Slight to the the tehe Misinto castiet probably as

using native-born citizens of other countries to

spy on their own homelands has been considerable.

By contrast, there is no record of the USSR's suc-

cesfully infiltrating the government of a major

non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged

Soviet citizen, least of all one whose career has

been spent in a

• Soviet intelligence or security

service.

We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from

the beginning a bona fide defector.

2. Value of Nosenko

Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in

Chapter IV.

He has been of great value, but he

probably could have been even more valuable had he

been properly handled.

3. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations

As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the

Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector him-

self, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine

operations in the Soviet field.

4. Identification of Unexploited Leads

We have not felt that this subject was one we

could feasibly or properly investigate. To do so

would have meant delving into the past

and current

operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff

to ascertain the extent to which there might have

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 171

SECRET

---

## Page 172

SECRET

-184-

been "exploitation" of any of the hundreds of

persons whom Nosenko identified by name. Time

would not have permitted us to accomplish this

task, nor would our doing so have been consistent

with

the principle of compartmentation.

5. Methodology

It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the

variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did

term "methodology. „Senerally accepted sense of the

not conform to any

B. Recommended Action

Most of our recommendations for action have been

previously stated or implied.

In the following para-

graphs, we

recapitulate them, with such supplementary

remarks as

seem necessary.

1.

Examination of the Role of Professionals

We recommend that the role that can properly be

played within the Agency by members of the organized

professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law,

and others--be given

careful study, within the con-

text of (a) ensuring

that the Agency puts their skills

to the best possible

use, and (b) refraining from in-

volving them

in matters not properly within their

professional purview.

2. Improvement of Intellectual Standards

We recommend that the Operations Directorate,

and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps

are possible to ensure that

the intellectual caliber

of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the

future.

We realize that the present personnel

selection

system sets high standards for those entering on

duty at the professional level, particularly as

regards IQ and education. But

the standards presently

in force do not by themselves guarantee that future

selections will possess independence of mind, analytical

ability, and objectivity.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 172

---

## Page 173

SECRET

-185-

In the case of personnel already on board,

it should bekept in mind that we live in a

rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented

civilization. Knowledge and intellectual

skills adequate at this time may be inadequate

a few years from now.

For an intelligence or-

ganization, we define "inadequate" as anything

that is less than the best.

We suggest that a board of expert consultants

be established, drawn primarily from research

in-

stitutions, high-technology enterprises,

and the

academic world to recommend a program of screening

new entrants and improving the analytical skills

of those already on duty, with the aim of achiev-

ing and

maintaining a high level of intellectual

excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.

3. Detection of Deception

We recommend that high priority be accorded a

program

to develop new methods of detecting deception.

Some steps are already underway in this

regard,

but they should be extended and given greater

emphasis.

Present methods, based mainly on the use

of the polygraph, are clearly obsolete.

Specific criteria of bona fides will follow

naturally from improved methods of detecting deception.

4.

Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and

Personnel Selection

We recommend a multi-track program of psychologi-

cal research, geared specifically to the Operations

Directorate's needs, to develop a new generation of

personality assessment techniques

necessary for both

defector/agent handling and selection of DDO person-

nel. This program should be under direct DDO control.

A surprising amount of relevant expertise now

exists within the Agency, and some valuable research

is underway, but it is not being geared to DDO's

needs to the extent it could be.

Instead, it is

being handled by another directorate, which currently

accords it a low priority.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 173

---

## Page 174

SECRET

-186-

It is theoretically possible to establish,

within the reasonably near future, certain

measurable physiological correlates of a number

of personality types.

It is also theoretically quite possible,

though not yet demonstrated, that by establishing

such physiological correlates we could take much

of the guesswork out of personality evaluation.

We would thus substantially reduce the threat that

the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities

poses

for the Agency, and particularly for the

Operations Directorate.

5. Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors

We recommend early, systematic psychological

evaluation, by clinical

psychologists using standardized

measurement techniques, of all denied area agents,

as well as defectors from the denied areas.

We

recommend against dependence on psychiatric examina-

tions, unless the psychiatrists are willing to use

the same standardized instruments as the psychologists

would.

Although few, if any, of the Soviet or Soviet

Bloc agents

to whom we have had direct and continuing

access have ever been tested as long as they remained

in agent status, we do not accept as valid the reasons

usually given for not testing them.

Implementation of this recommendation would,

if the other programs above-recommended are also

car-

ried out, contribute substantially toward authentica-

tion of

agent sources and information.

SECRET

NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 174

---