DEPOSITION OF DAVID E. MURPHY
Originator: HSCA
From: MURPHY, DAVID E.
Document date: 08/09/1978
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

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TITLE :

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MURPHY, DAVID E.

DEPOSITION OF DAVID E. MURPHY

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS:

08/09/1978

39

CIA, METHODOLOGY

KGB

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD

NOSENKO, YURI, ASSOCIATION WITH OSWALD

MURPHY, DAVID E., TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS: Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/21/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Box 4

v9.1

NH 50955

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THOMAS/is

ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

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U.S. House of Representatives

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee

of the Select Committee on

Assassinations

Washington, D.C.

Deposition of

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DAVID E. MURPHY

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,

pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room

3370,

Second and D Streets,, Southwest, Washington, D.C., beginning

at 10:01 o'clock a.m., before Annabelle K. Short, a Notary

"Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present

on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

KENNETH KLEIN, Senior Staff Counsel

For the Deponent:

(There was no representation by counsel.)

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Mr. Klein.

My name is Kenneth Klein and I am a senior

staff counsel for the Select Committee on Assassinations.

Actually I am Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel. The time is

10:01 on August 9, 1978.

Would you please state your name.

MI. Murphy. My name is David E. Murphy.

Mr. Klein. And your address?

Mr. Murphy. 1537 Forrest Villa Lane, Mclean, Virginia.

(Whereupon Mr. Murphy was sworn by Ms Annabelle Short,

Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia.)

Mr. Klein. Are you certified to swear witnesses in

Washington, D. C.?

Ms

Short.

Yes, I

am.

Mr. Klein. Mr. Murphy, you have in front of you the

Committee Rules and Resolutions.

Have you had an opportunity

to 100k through them?

Mr. Murphy. I have.

Mr. Klein. And, in particular, haveyou had an opportunity

to

read Rule 4?

Mr. Murphy. I have.

Mr. Klein. And you are aware that you have a right to

have a lawyer present at any deposition, and are you aware of

that?

Mr. Murphy. I am.

Mr. Klein. Are you here voluntarily?

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Mr. Murphy. I am here voluntarily.

Mr. Klein. And you are not under subpoena to appear here

at

all? YOu have not been given any subpoena?

Mr. Murphy. Not that I know of.

MI. Klein. As you can see, there is a stenographer taking

stenographic notes of what is being said. These notes will be

transcribed and a copy will be sent to you and you will be asked

to read it, and if there are any errors in the accurate trans-

cription of what you had to say, you are to inform us of that,

and if it is correct, to sign it, send it back to us and we will

then provide you, if you desire, with your own copy.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Klein. In 1962, MI. Murphy, MI. Yuri Nosenko made his

first contact with the CIA; is that correct?

Mr. Murphy.

Yes.

Mr: Klein. And he then defected to the United States in

1964. Would you tell us, beginning in 1962, in general, what

your contact was with Nosenko.

MI. Murphy: I am not sure I understand my contact with

Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. What your position was in the CIA.

Mr. Murphy. I follow you. In 1962, I was the Chief of

the Eastern European Division of the then DDP, which included

in its area of responsibility Switzerland. When Nosenko made

¡contact with CIA in Switzerland the ther Chief of the Soviet

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Russian Division advised me of this and gave me a general fill-

in on the case.

In the fall of 1963, I became Chief of the Soviet Russian

Division and was Chief of the Division when Nosenko defected.

Mr. Klein. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came

to the United States, was he in the custody of the central

Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe

sO.

I am not exactly sure of the legal -- I mean what his legal!

statis was. Insofar as physical facts, he was in the custody

of the IC.

Mr. Klein. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence

Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. The Soviet Russian Division.

MI. Klein. Of which you were the Chief?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.

MI. Klein. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia

Division?

Mr. Murphy. Beginning in 1968.

MI. Klein. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia

Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. I don't recall the exact time but it was

certainly up until the Springof 1967.

Mr. Klein. The report by Bruce Soley began, or the

investigation by Bruce Soley began at the end of 1967. At that

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time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change

from the Soviet Russia Division to another division?

MI. Murphy. My recollection is that it changed in the spring

or early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over

the Office of Security of which Soley was a member. '

Mr. Klein. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you

have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko?

And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. Murphy. I was responsible for the case.

MI. Klein. Okay.

Mr. Murphy. Although the case was handled by one of the groups

within the Division.

Mr. Klein.. But they would report to you?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And did you report to any specific individual

on Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. I reported both to the DDP.

Mr. Klein. Who was that?

Mr. Murphy. Until '67, until he died in July of '67, it was

Desmond Fitzgerald.

Initially the DDP was Dick Helms and then sometime in '65,

think it was, I am not sure of the date,

'65, he became the

Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence "Dez" Fitzgerald

became chief, the Director of the Operations Directorate. Then

after his death, Tom Karamasines became the Director of the

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Operations Directorate, he was still DDP and I reported through

that chain of command and I reported to the Chief of the

Counterintelligence Staff, Mr. Angleton.

Mr.

klein.

You

stated that in the beginning you reported to

Richard Helms?

Mr. Murphy.

He was DDP.

Mr. Klein.

That was in 1964?

Mr. Murphy.

1964.

Mr. Klein. When Nosenko defected?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Now, in the following years, when different

people held that post of DDP, was Helms still involved in the

Nosenko case?

Mr. Murphy. He was but I don't recall any specific pattern.

I would depend I guess.

Mr. Klein. Can you tell us if you reported to the DDP?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. What did he do? If you, for example, went to the

DDP, whoever it might have been, and said we have a decision to

make with regard to Nosenko, and you gave him the alternatives,

did you have any knowledge of whom eh spoke to, what he did, or

to whome he spoke?

MI. Murphy: I can't give you a specific instance but the

pattern of operations is that the DDP would then discuss it with

the Director and Deputy Direcotr. That would be his chain of

command.

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Or he would make the decision on his own.

Mr. Klein. So with regard to Helms, when he was DDP you

spoke to him directly. When he became Deputy Director or Direc-

tor, which eventually he did become, then the chain of command,

although you don't know of any specific instances, would have

him still involved in the decisions?

Mr. Murphy. It would. In order to be absolutely correct

about it, the DDP as one of the Deputy Directors for Operations,

made his own judgment as to what he would discuss with the

Director, what he would not discuss with the Director.

MI. Klein. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe,

when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that

hostile interrogations began, is that dorrect?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of

the question.

Mr. Klein.

Well, elaborate.

Mr. Murphy. No, the previous pattern of voluntary discussion

of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not per-

mitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would

not want to respond.

Mr. Klein. Could you describe for us what the pattern was

before as far as conditions and how it was changed?

Mr. Murphy:

Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much

permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted

his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a

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reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for

a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time,

which made it difficult the next day to continue to work.

And

the

most important apsect I think of the change was the decision

to confront him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he

said and passing it on.

Mr. Klein.

What about the day-to-day living conditions,

were they changed?

Mr. Murphy. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was

not permitted to depart? Other than that, in his day-to-day

treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but just his

food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't think so. not that early. I don't

remember that?

Mr. Klein. The decision to change the type of interro-

gations, who made the decision? What were the dynamics?

Mr. Murphy. The decision was, the recommendation was made

to me, it was --

Mr. Klein. Who made it to you?

MI. Murphy. Bagley, the Chief of the group, because they

felt they could not proceed because of the problems I have

alluded to, and this was then discussed with both Angleton and

the DDP.

Mr. Klein. The DDP was Helms?

Mr. Murphy. At that time, yes. And the decision to

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proceed to confrontation rathern than continue essentially

a debriefing in which you permitted the person under debriefings,

in this case Nosenko, to believe that he was

being believed when

it was considered the issues under consideration were suffi-

ciently important and the inconsistencies seemed so glaring,

so obvious, that it was thought by confrontation we could resolve

the matter and bring it to conclusion. Whereas the other way,

no, Nosenko would have rightly demanded full freedom, his

regulization of his status, and an office in the building.

That was the reationale at that time.

Mr. Klein. Who actually made the decision to go ahead with

this new mode of interrogation?

You said that Bagley recommended it to you?

Mr. Murphy. "I concurred.

as so, =.

Mr. Klein. You consulted with Helms?

Mr. Murphy.

I passed it on up the line and our recommendation

was

agreed to, except with the proviso that Angleton did not

believe that we should attempt at this stage to confront him, we

ought: to spin it out for a long period of time. There were

practical and legal security difficulties in that. If you pre-

tend to a person that he is okay then you have to be prepared

to live with that pretence.

Mr. Klein. Did Helms concur with the decision?

Mr. Murphy.

Yes.

MI. Klein. Now, you told us sometimes the DDP would make

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decisions on his own.

Do you know if that was one of them?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know.

Mr. Klein.

Helms made on his own?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know.

Mr. Klein.

Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that

Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia

Division?

Mr. Murphy. That is right.

Mr. Klein. And how were the particular sub-areas on which

he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas?

This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision

was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best

opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other

words, I think it was based on points that they had collatoral

on. By that I mean other information which said what this man

is saying is not the truth or this man does not know about this

and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully

tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-

session of information in the hands of the interrogators which

then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the

truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives

you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be

interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the

ebriefing.

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Mr. Klein. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the

subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him,

to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that

would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency?

In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr.. Murphy. that is an accurate impression. The answer is

yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man

was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying were

known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and

although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were

no: clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense

to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could

be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so

many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it,

the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that

the information was not considered acceptable.

Mr. Klein. And by the same token, when Nosenko was asked

this is again all subsequent to April 4 -- when Nosenko was asked

followup questions, say, on Monday he was asked questions and on

Wednesday he was asked followup questions about the Monday's

questions, would that again be determined by the fact that

someone had made a decision that that area had potential for

breaking him and, therefore, followup questions should be

asked?

Mr. Murphy I believe so.

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Mr. Klein.

As opposed to a desire to gain information

of intelligence value, and that might be another reason why you

would follow up?

Mr. Murphy. well, the people at the time, I mean the judgh

ment at the time was it would not have been of intelligence

value because you couldn't put any trust in it. In my cases,

information was sought to enlarge the base against which you

could check things, not necessarily that you would use the

information as valid intelligence.

Mr. Rlein. But, basically, subsequent to April 4th, it was

an operation designed to break?

Mr. Murphy. It was CI interrogation, it was not an informa-

tional acquisition exercise.

Mr. Klein.

Are you awae that many if not all of the

sessions with Nosenko were tape recorded?

Mr. Murphy. I know I thought most of them were after April!

Mr. Klein. And do you have any knowledge of how, if anybody,

listened to these tapes of read the reports of the interrogators

about each day's interrogation?

Mr. Murphy. Well, the daily take was read by the Chief of

the CIA group, Pete Bagley by all the officers, and in reporting,

periodic reporting which went to the DDP, extracts or excerpts

from these tapes were included, all of which I saw.

Mr. Klein.

How close were you to this operation?

Mr. Murphy. Well, because it was the kind of operation it

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was, I had the foiward and I did forward regular continuing per-

iodic reporting,

so I was

aware of what was going on.

Mr. Klein.

Were you involved in every major decision made

at this time?

Mr. Murphy. Well, there were times when I wasn't there,

obviously, but I don't recall any major decisions of which I

would not have participated, at least in the discussion.

Mr. Klein.

Basically what I am saying is, would anybody haye

had the authority to make any kind of a significant decision con-

cerning Nosenko without coming to you and letting you know

about it, would Bagley for example have had that authority?

Mr. Murphy. He would have had that authorityif I weren't

there.

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Mr. Klein. You mean --

Mr. Murphy. If I were on IDY, I was away on IDY, a great

deal on trips.

Mr. Klein.

When you would return, would you be briefed on

what went on?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, and I know, of course, since this never

occurred to my knowledge, he must have kept both Angleton and

Fitzgerald, DDP aware of what was going on, becuase they would

have required regular reporting.

Mr. Klein. But I am more interested in your knowledge.

Would it be fair to say. that you were close enough to this that

if a decision was made of ny note you would know about it, if

not when it took place, afterwards?"

Mr. Murphy. Yes, I would become aware of it.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko

had to say bout Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. From the very first. I mean, when

he fisst said it back in February or March.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. Murphy. No, not exactly, anything. I said would be

polluted by so much back anf forth." I know that the thrust of

the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet

Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and

I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the

affair. There is more detail but I can't really pin it down.

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Mr. Klein. Did you accept this statement by Noesnko, you

personally.

Mr. Murphy. I did not. I did not believe that it would

be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have

remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moseow of a

former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an

active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It

was only later, I think that as the Nosenko case and its other

ramifications began to emerge that it seeme to me that the

Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost

to have been tacked on

or to have been added as though it

didn't seem to be part of the real body of the other things

that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand

that Nosenko was " much of what he said was true.

Mr. Klein. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. Murphy. Yes sir. This one seemed to be tacked on andi

didn't have much relationship and it seemed to be so totally

dependent on not just one coincidence but a whole series of

coincidences,

for him to have been there

and all that sort of

thing. That is what I mean.

MI. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what

bothered you about the Nosenko statements on Oswald? For :

example, what incidences bothered you?

Mr. Murphy. Well, I didn't remember this very well, but

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the one when Oswald tried to commit suicide, Nosenko happened

to be on duty of something, and what is how he knew what

happened. This is very vague, in my mind, but that is one

other thing I recall.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what

you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, that they just - this is part of the

first one - no contact was ever made, that he went up to Minsk

and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union

with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person.

Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman,

what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive

debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It

didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't consti-

tute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange..

Mr. Klein. Would you distinguish between first the fact

that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first came to the Soviet

Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a Marine, as

a radar operator, and,

second, the fact that once they decided

to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he

was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, they would be two different points.

The

first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is

simply

a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time

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just from a military intelligence technical point of view,

telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000

feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had

many American radar operators handling operational traffic

involving U-2s.

MI. Klein. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko

that although the KGB knew Oswald was a Marine, they did not

bother to question him, and because of that never knew that he

was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which

the U-2s took off and landed?

Mr. Murphy. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that

is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial

arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here

that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector,

there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be

properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any Marine.

They will talk to a Marine about close order drill. You follow

me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar

operator or that he be known to have been a - they would talk

to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that

some people think the Soviets are ten foot tall. I don't believe

they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way?

What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that

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they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental

competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore,

we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border

Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a

private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated

to a consul in a: consular office, which is manned by the

Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully acessable to

the soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he

wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell

all. I guess I found it difficult to belive this is one of

the things that made, of many other aspects of the case, but

this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of dis-

belief that there must be something to this case that is

important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't

understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was

very hard to believe.

MI. Klein.

Have you learned anything since then?

Mr. Murphy. No, I have learned nothing new that would

account for that, and I don't know whether he

said anything

new. I presume what youare saying to me, it was

a hypothetical, was that a hypothetical?

MI. Klein. Well, I wanted you to just comment on that

situation.

How many years have you been in intelligence work?

How

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many years did you work for the CIA?

MI. Murphy. I joined CIA in 1948. Before that, I worked

for two years for US Forces Intelligence Division, US Forces,

Korea.

Before the Korean War, from '47-48. So I would say

before that, I was in Germany, a liaison officer with the

Soviet forces.

Mr. Klein. Over 20 years?

Mr. Murphy. Almost thirty.

Thirty years I would say.

Mr. Klein. And on the basis of your experience and know-

ledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you

trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. And other things.

Mr. Klein. Do you

know of comparable

situations where

somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as

Nosenko says Oswald was?

Mr. Murphy. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not

aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is,

thos officers concerned with this case, were handling it

directly. I don't know of any former Soviet

intelligence

officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about

this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone

did, I never heard of it.

Mr. Klein.

During this interrogation period, beginning

in April of 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions

relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been

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discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for

questioning and interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. Probably not.

Mr. Klein. Why would that have been?

MI. Murphy. Because there were many other areas which

posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much

more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral

knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the

Soviet Union.

MI. Klein. Who in the Soviet Russia Division made the

decision as to who would question Nosenko, subsequent to

...=

April 4th?

Mr. Murphy. Bagley, Chief of the Group.

Mr. Klein.. And do you know of any criteria that he used

to pick his interrogators?

Mr. Murphy. Some knowlege of Russian, as Nosenko's

English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed.

Well,

that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try

not to use too many people because you then lose. In the

first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy

who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union or return to the

other side, and so you don't want to propose too many officers!

plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of

people in. You have to have people who studied the case and

became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use

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the officers that they had available and there were a variety

of criteria.

Mr. Klein. As I mentioned to you in our conversations

about a weeks ago, it is our information that the person who

interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background

whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's

background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason

that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

MI. Murphy. I am not sure I understand. I thought the

point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background

in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the

point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of

us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. Klein. Two points.--

Mr. Murphy. The reason that the chap was chosen was

becasus he was levelheaded, extremely toughminded, and was

going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going

to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since

then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good

officer.

Mr. Klein. But wouldn't -

Mr. Murphy. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't,

what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's

case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know..

Mr. Klein. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical

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situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald

knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from

Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not

have, if not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew

about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough, from A to 2,

everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think htat

was unusual, they didn't do that?

Mr. Murphy. I would certainly think so.

Mr. Klein. The second question, part of my question was

the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, is

that to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the par-

ticular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is

----

gained from

all that, it is possible that since I have not

seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be

exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is

that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience,

and my question is would that be -

MI. Murphy. That wouldn't surprise me because there were

very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or

indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience.

We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings.

People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either

abroad, might have had experience, but I know it might sound

strange. There just wasn't aquads and squads of highly trained

fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators.

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Mr. Klein. One thing I would point out to you is that I

have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have

listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. My question is, was Nosenko, the questioning

of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. Murphy. It was an important operation, an important

case.

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Mr. Klein. And yet there was nobody with interrogation

experience who could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. Murphy. I am sure some of the people had interroga-

tion experience. I mean Bagley himself had a lot of background

in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed

him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except

what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a

thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because

we were weak in that area at that time.

Mr. Klein. You say at that time. Did you become stronger

later?

Mr. Murphy. I think everybody became stronger later,

SO

much has been

said about it. That is what I meant.

One of the things that I am sure you are aware of is that

the investigation, primary CIA contribution to the post-

assassination investigative activities and background was

coordinated by CI Staff and a lot of things that are spoken

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about today everybody seems at awe about, the Mexico angle,

we knew nothing about, particularly involved Cubans. If it

involved one Russian case it was because of the coordination

collection was

done by CI Staff. They made information

available to the Warren Commission and it was not lateral, that

is what I meant by saying, I know more about it today than I

knew then.

Mr. Klein. In 1967, the decision was made to allow Bruce

Soley to in effect reinvestigate Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Murphy. Yes sir.

Mr. Klein. And eventually he wrote a report?

MI. Murphy. Bruce had participated in every way in the

case from the beginning. He monitored many of the debriefings

or interrogations, I can't teil you exactly how many, because

I don't know, but I know he was involved, I know I had many

discussions with him about the case, and some of the other

leads that developed from the case. So he was the logical man

for the Office of Security and for CIS management to pick if

they wanted another look taken of the case.

Mr. Klein. You say that you had many discussions with

him?

Mr. Murphy. Well, naturally a dozen over the years.

Mr. Klein. What was his general viewpoint prior to 1967

when he got this assignment?

What was his general viewpoint

on Nosenko?

il

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Mr. Murphy. He didn't know why Nosenko was saying the

things he was saying, but some of the things he said he thought

were true.

MI. Klein.. The first part you have elaborated?

Mr: Murphy. He didn't understand the motivation under-

lying the many contradictions which were evident in what

Nosenko had to say and yet he said, some of the things he has

told us are true, they are leads to people who have indeed

been Soviet agents and who have been rolled up and arrested

and, therefore, we should simply take it for what it is and

as far as the basic resolution of the why, that is your problem.

Mr. Klein.

How?

MI. Murphy. I don't mean, I am not being sarcastic.

He

was concerned with leads which had to do with American security

and there was a lot Nosenko had to say in those leads which

was valid. The purpose of those leads, if you looked at it

from the point of view of CI Staff and the CI Groups or

Divisions, was that they were not leads which went anywhere

because the people had already lost their access, they were

already out of play, and that is what I mean when I said that.

the deeper underlying motivation, the pattern, for what Nosenko

was saying, if there was a pattern, was up to CI Staff and

the SR Division

to figure out.

They were the operational

people. They were the DDP people. The Office of Security

was interested in taking whatever he had to say. I don't mean

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that just exactly as I said it.

Mr. Klein. Were you surprised that Soley was given the

assignment that he was given in '67?

MI. Murphy. No, I was not surprised at all. I thought

that the fact, I was not surprised that the responsibility

for the case was transferred to the Office of Security, as a

practical matter, because I discussed with my deputy at the

time, in hte winter of '66, I mentioned this before, I said

Mr. Klein. Who was your deputy?

Mr. Murphy. Fritz Geisecke. He wasn't there very long.

He was replaced. He was deputy during, I think, part of '67,

when Bagley went overseas, I don't remember the exact dates,

that really isn't important. The thing that is important is

I said this case is not going to be resolved and something has

to be done to find a mechanism for dealing with it, and so

the solution which was proposed, and I was not a part of the

discussions, but I didn't have any great sense of -- I wasn't

unhappy - I also was anxiously thinking about getting overseas

again myself, but I think the fact they gave it to the Office

of Security and Bruce Soley became the leader of that reinves-

tigation made sense.

Mr. Klein. Were you surprised at his ultimate resolution

of the matter, the fact that he found or concluded in his

report that Nosenko was bona fide?

MI. Murphy. Well, I never read his report and I have

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never read it

: to this day. So I just don't --

Mr. Klein. The conclusion you do know?

MI. Murphy. That he was totally bona fide, there were no

caveats? I mean, I just don't - I would be surprised if that

were the case.

I have not read it, I don't know. If the

statement were made this guy is absolutely bona fide from

every point.

Bona fide doesn't mean he is not a dispatched

agent. It is a lousy term, frankly, bonda fide. It means

either personality problems, are there quirks, are there

aspects of the man's background which he has attempted to hide,

which, therefore, have produced contradictions? But on balance

we do not believe he was dispatched by KGB with a mission

against the United 'States. Those are the kind of conclusions

I would expect Bruce's report to have.

I don't think Bruce would ever end his report with the

conclusion he is fully bona fide. I haven't read it, but I

don't think that would be the case. I think there would be

some attempt to explain why some of these, you could blame,

I suppose you would have to deal with some of the strange

contradictions which were evident, quite apart from whether you

think he was dispatched or not, and those could be explained,

and in a conclusion I think by personality, I don't know.

I am just saying, I don't know what he said but I can't believe

it would be stated as baldly as that, as simply as that. I

think he would have to make some general conclusion about the

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man, the personality, then come up with a final decision,

which is the most important one, whatever the reasons for

inconsistencies, discrepancies and contradictions.

If that is what you are saying, I would not be surprised

with that conclusion.

Mr. Klein. Why wouldn't you be?

Mr. Murphy. Because we never were able to develop any

hard legal proof which would support the fact he was a Soviet

agent.

Mr. Klein. Let me ask you this. If you have a situation

where you can't develop any hard proof that somebody is

dispatched and at the same time --

Mr. Murphy. You have reservations.

Mr. Klein. You have reservations.

Is there any kind of

precedent of any kind of criteria for what the intelligence

community or what the Agency would do in a situation like

that?

MI. Murphy. I cannot cite a specific case. It seems

to

me - and this is on the basis of general background as opposed

to a specific case - that in similar cases but not nearly as

spectacular, the level of the personal or the data, in many

cases; the defectors have been talked to, there have been

difficulties with them, there finally has been sort of an

inconclusive determination, not sufficient to impede their

stay in this country, but there would always be a residual

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view, generally in the CI Staff, in the file, that certain

aspects of this man's backgroundwere never resolved, we suspect

this may have been the case. That is all you can do.

. Mr. Klein. What would be your reaction to learning that

the reservations which you and others had concerning what

Nosenko had to say about Oswald, were not resolved in any way

by Bruce Soley and yet he reached an opinion which, whether

it is qualified or not, found Nosenko to be bona fide?

Mr. Murphy. I can't comment on that.

Mr. Klein. Well, do you think from your knowledge of the

case, assuming that there was no additional information or

investigation into the statements Nosenko made about Oswald,

nothing new came up, say in 1968, that you didn't know about

in '64, could this issue of whether he was bonda fide be

resolved without dealing with this Oswald question?

Mr. Murphy. It would certainly seem to me to be difficulti

to make a final judgment without dealing with that question.

Because of the fundamental importance of that question itself,

quite a part from its utility as a tactical interrogation

device.

MI. Klein. What would be your reaction to a scenario

in which the only way that the Oswald matter was dealt with

was to list three or four reasons why Nosenko would not have

been sent to give false information about Oswald and then leave

the subject without ever dealing with the substantive content

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of what Nosenko says about Oswald and the difficulties which

you have discussed which arise from that?

Mr. Murphy. What do you mean by scenarios?

Mr. Klein. Everything else as far as the bona fide

question. In other words, you have a question of bona fides,

you determined that he is bona fide, be it possible with some

qualifications, that is the rest, anything else we have

been discussing, that question is faced by Bruce Soley, and

what would be your reaction to a situation where he faces that

question, comes to the conclusion that it is qualified, Nosenko

is bona fide and only deals with the Oswald issue by listing

three of four reasons why the Russians wouldn't send him to

mislead us about Oswald, but never goes into the substantive

content of what Nosenko said about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. It is very difficult for me to comment on

that. It is a technical professional matter. It seems to me

what is being confused here is the overall question of whether

Nosenko was sent by the KGB, for whatever purpose, and the

individual issue of whether part of or indeed thus the sole

reason for his having been sent or fed the information, or

whatever, related to the Oswald case, very difficult.

Mr. Klein. Can you pass on that question?

Mr. Murphy. That is all I can say, it is a tough one.

Mr. Klein. Okay.

Off the record.

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(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Klein.

Do you know who made the ultimate decision

to reinvestigate the case in 1967?

Mr. Murphy. No, I do

not. I assume the ultimate decision

must have been

made by the Director, but as I told you, this

whole aspect was never discussed with me.

Mr. Klein. If it were proven that Nosenko lied in the

facts that he gave about what happened to Oswald in the Soviet

Union, if that could be proven, what significance would that

have for you?

MI. Murphy. Better wait a minute.

-.

Mr. Klein. You want to go off the record?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

(Discussion off the record).

Mr. Klein. In the situation I have just give you, let

me make it clear that when I say if it could be proven that

he lied, I don't mean a situation where he himself admits I

have lied, but where external facts prove that he lied in his

statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. Well, if such facts were to be found or

were to exist, it would seem to me that at the very least some

effort should be made to determine the true story, because on

that would hinge extremely important considerations for both

his own case, his bona fides, but indeed, the way the Soviets

looked upon or their attitude toward the Kennedy assassination.

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If, for example, Oswald, the Oswald story, were concocted

by Nosenko to enhance his own importance, that would be one

thing, and would have little significance in the context of

what I just have spoken of.

On the other hand, if Nosenko had been given this informa-

tion by some third person, in the KGB, even though he did not

admit that he had been a dispatched agent, it would certainly

be important for us to know in terms of the way in which the

Soviets looked upon the assassination case.

Mr. Klein. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. Murphy. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Klein. Were there ever any conversations in which

you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get

him to tell the truth?

Mr. Murphy. There were many, nay conversations all the

time about various things that could be done, all the tech-

niques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I

know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled

the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt

made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely

to produce results and they all would be very harmful and,

therefore, not produce results.

MI. Klein. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control

over the case, in those years, is it your statement that if

any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth,

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you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

MI. Murphy. That is correct.

Mr. Klein. Is there any doubt in your mind that somehow

an order could have been given to give him drugs which never

would have been transmitted to you?

MI. Murphy. It would certainly surprise me.

Mr. Klein. Does the CIA have any procedures when it

does administer drugs to subjects, record keeping procedures,

for example?

Mr. Murphy. I assume so, but I have no personal knowledge

of it?

Mr. Klein. Do you know?

Mr. Murphy. Because it would be done by the technical

division.

Mr. Klein. What I am getting at --

Mr. Murphy. It wouldn't be -- the record keeping would

not be done by us.

Mr. Klein. Is there some kind of procedure used by CIA

whereby you could simply go to some records someplace and

check the dates involved and you could know beyond a shadow

of a doubt drugs were not administered since they are not in

the record?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know that.

Mr. Klein. Would you dispute testimony given to this

Committee, by Nosenko, to the effect that subsequent to April

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4th and prior to the summer of 1967, he was drugged by the

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Mr. Murphy.

That is his perception.

Mr. Klein. Would you?

Mr. Murphy. I don't gree with him.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie

detector test in '64, in April?

Mr. Murphy. Yes sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Muiphy. It indicated he was lying on several key

points.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any reason to believe that test

was invalid?

Mr. Murphy. No.

MI. Klein.

Are you aware that he was given a secondly

lie detector test in '66?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Murphy. Same thing.

Mr. Klein. And do you have any reason to believe that

test was invalid?

MI. Murphy. No. I believe the operator gave him the

test in '66 was the same operator who gave him the test in

1964.

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Had you worked with that operator prior, or not prior

but any other times other than these two tests?

Mr. Murphy. I knew he was a fluent Russian speaker and

that he was adept and flexible in his use of his machine,

but I don't recall -- I knew his record, I think he had been

in GErmany, I don't recall that I worked with him on any case,

I simply knew he was a good guy, appeared to be a good guy.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that in the second

lie detector test there were numerous questions concerning

Oswald?

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Mr. Klein. Many more than, say, in the first lie detector

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MI. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And I wondered if you knew of any reason why

Oswald should have been given much greater emphasis in the

second test?

MI. Murphy. I don't recall the reasons for it.

Mr. Klein. Was there ever any discussion about these

tests prior to giving them, that you took part in?

MI. Murphy. The only thing that occurs to me is that

the second test concentrated much more obviously than the first

test

on areas of greatest doubt, greatest suspicion, greatest

areas of contradiction or inconsistency of what have you, and

since, although as I said earlier, we knew less about the

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Oswald case in the Soviet Union, it was surely one of the

areas

which would fit those criteria, it was not a topic which

we believed he was telling the truth.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any statement that you would like

to make at this time or anything you want to say?

Me. Murphy. NO.

MI. Klein. The time is 11:14 and on behalf of the

Committee, I would like to thank you very much for taking this

time to come here and give us this deposition.

Mr. Murphy.

Glad to do it.

(Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the deposition was concluded.)

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CERTIFICAT OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Annabelle K. Short, the officer before whom the fore-

going deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness

whose testimony appears in the foregoing depositions, was duly

sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken

by Robert A. Thomas; stenotype reporter, and thereafter

reduced to typewriting by him or under his direction; that I

am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of

the parties to the action in which this deposition was

taken,

and further that I am not a relative or employee of any

attorney or counsel employed by the parties

thereto, nor

financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the

action.

Notary Public in and for

the District of Columbia

My Commission expires November 14, 1980

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CERTIFICATE OF STENOTYPE REPORTER

I, Robert A. Thomas, stenotype reporter, do hereby

certify that the testimony of the witness which appears in

the foregoing deposition was taken by me in stenotype and

thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that

said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by

said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor

employed by any of the parties to the action in which this

deposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative

or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties

thereto, or financially of otherwise interested in the outcome

-.--

- we v.a.

of the action.

Stenotype Reporter

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NA 30955

DocId: 32277207 Page 39

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