Document date: 00/00/0000

# DOCID-32176524

## Page 1

Date: 07/28/94

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

RECORD NUMBER

NUMBER : 124-10185-10190

RECORDS. SERIES :

TP

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

65994 Date: 11-01-2021

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 105-5390-1 THRU 36

--

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO . :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES

: 0

SUBJECTS

:

NAR

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA:

INDEFINITE

U

NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED

: 07/28/94

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 1

---

## Page 2

Date: August 2, 2021

From: National Archives and Records Administration

Subject: Reconstructed FBI File TP 105-5390, Serials 1-36

To: The File

This memorandum briefly summarizes the status of missing original Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) case files or portions of case files in the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) and documents the National Archives and

Records Administration's (NARA) efforts to reconstruct these records, where possible, from

duplicate copies of documents located in other FBI files.

As the JFK Collection was first compiled and reviewed in the 1990s, the Assassination Records

Review Board and the FBI designated some records as "not believed relevant" (NBR) or "not

assassination related" (NAR). The FBI retained custody of the NBR/NAR records and

postponed their transfer to NARA until a later date. Every document or group of documents

("serials"), however, received an indexed Record Identification Form (RIF) and FBI inventory

sheet for insertion into the JFK Collection.

In September 2011, several years prior to the 2017 re-review and transfer of the NBR/NAR

material to the National Archives, a flood severely damaged thousands of feet of records at the

FBI's Alexandria Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia. In June 2012, NARA approved the

FBI's request for emergency destruction of 10,000 cubic feet of records that posed significant

airborne health hazards. Among the damaged records were FBI field office files that contained

postponed JFK Collection material designated as "pertaining to a matter unrelated to the JFK

Assassination Investigation" or "not assassination related."

This compilation represents NARA's efforts to reconstruct the original file or portions of the file,

as completely as possible, with duplicate copies of documents located in the FBI field office and

headquarters files within the JFK Collection. Each reconstructed file or compilation contains a

Record Identification Form, an explanatory cover memo, existing administrative documents

available within the JFK Collection, and copies of identified duplicate documents. The table

below summarizes the status of FBI file TP 105-5390, Serials 1 through 36.

RIF Number

FBI File

Number

List of Serials

From Inventory

Sheet

List of Identified

Serials at NARA

124-10185-10190

TP 105-5390

1-36

Reconstructed

Status (None,

Partial,

Complete)

Partial

1-3, 5, 7-16,

18-19, 2.1-26, 34

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 2

---

## Page 3

24.)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

POSTPONFMENT INFORMATION SHEET (JFK MATERIALS)

Page (s) withheld entirely at this location in the file.

One or more of the following statements, where indicated,

explain this deletion (these deletions) :

[)

Deletions were made pursuant to the postponement

rationale indicated below with no segregable material

available for disclosure. All references relate to

Section 6 of the "president John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992."

[] Subsection lA (intelligence agent's identity)

[] Subsection 1B (intelligence source or method)

il subsection IC (other matter relating to military

defense, intelligence operations. or

the conduct of foreign relations)

[]

Subsection 2

(living person who provided

confidential information)

[]

Subsection 3

(unwarranted invasion of privacy)

[]

Subsection 4

(cooperating individual or foreign

government, currently requiring

protection)

[]

Subsection 5

security or protective procedure,

currently of expected to be utilized

Information pertained to a matter unrelated to the JFK

Assassination investigation.

[] For your information:-

[4

The following number is to be used

for reference

regarding this page

(these pages):

TP 15-5390-1thRu36

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 3

---

## Page 4

NW 65994

locld:32176524

File #: _

TP

serial

Number

∞0

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Document

Date

03/24/75

TT

03/26/75

05/02/75 TT

05/08/75

MEMO

05/20/75

TT

05/21/75

MEMO

05/28/75 TT

06/05/75 TT:

06/28/75

TT.

06/30/75 TT

07/10/75

TT

07/11/75

TT

07/21/75

08/26/75

08/26/75

09/04/75

TT

Page:

105-5390

Document

Type

Document

From

HQ

TP

SUPERVISOR

HQ

TP

TP

HQ

TP

TP

TP

HQ

Document

To

ALL SACS

HQ

ALL SACS

ALL AGENTS

ALL SACS

TP

AX

HQ

AT

HQ

CI

HQ

HQ

на

AL

ALL SACS

JFK Inventory Sheet

(COMMITTEE FILES)

section #: 1

Other

Direct

Dupes

ACTUAL PERT.

Rev.

Rel

Re: CHURCH CÔMM.

With- FBI Ref

held 3rd Agy

Duplicate

Location

Postponements

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR •

NAR

---

## Page 5

NW 65994

Docld:32176

524

Pa

le

Serial

Number

17

18

19

21

21

22

22

23

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

Page:

Document

Date

Document

Type

Document

From

09/05/75 MEMO

TP

09/26/75

TT

HQ

09/26/75

TT

'на

10/20/75

MEMO

BEALE

11/21/75

RS

HQ

11/20/75

NEWS ARTIC. NY

12/05/75

RS

HQ

12/02/75

TRANSCRIPT

CHURCH COM

12/04/75

RS

HQ

12/02/75

TRANSCRIPT

CHURCH COM

12/11/75

TT

на

12/05/75

RS

12/10/75

STATEMENT

на:

01/05/76

RS

HQ

01/15/76

TT

WMFO

02/10/76

LHM

Tp.

02/11/76

MEMO

Document

To

ALL AGENTS

ALL SACS

ALL SACS

TP

Tp

TP

TP

ALL SACS

TP

Tp

HQ

HQ

SUPERVISOR

TP

02/10/76

AT

TP

HQ

3rd

Agy

Other

Direct

Dupes

ACTUAL PERT.

Rev.

Rel.

with-

held

FBI Ref

3rd Agy

Duplicate

Location

61

14

-

15

61

Postponements

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

---

## Page 6

NW 65994

Serial

Number

32

Document

Date

Document

Type

Document

From

02/19/76

TP

02/19/76

AT

TP

12/30/75

RS

'HO

12/10/75

TRANSCRIPT

CHURCH COM

02/23/76

AT

HQ

04/27/76

NEWS ARTIC

TP

35

36.

Page: 3

Grand Totals...

End of Report..

Document

3rd

Agy

Other

Direct

Dupes

ACTUAL PERT.

Rev.

Rel.

With-

held

FBI Ref

3rd Agy

Duplicate

Location

HQ

TP

TP

231|

•1

Postponements

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR

NAR •

NAR

---

## Page 7

NRO46 WA CODE

8:48PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVIIIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN QF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

• INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNIING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SAGS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENIS

ASSIGNED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES

OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY

CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

65-23681

SEAGShE

dest

6 le

re""

HAR 8 1975

-— ALBANY

Stoops.

MW 54955 DocId: 32989494

NW 65994- Docld:32176524-Page 7

Page 2

---

## Page 8

FEDERAL BURFAS AF INVESTIDATIORY

COMMUNIPATIANS DECTION

MAR 2 G 1970

58

NROID TP CODE

TO STYPE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO

DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATIN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

ASSOC

Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-AdMe

Dep.•A.D.-Inv.-

Asst., ir.:

Admin.

Comp

Sost.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Cum.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Insportion

Lab

ist-ly

Plan.

Eval -

Sper

luv.

Trii:

Legal & on.

Telephone, Rich -

Dira.+

Ser'v

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL

THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COÚNTER-

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS,

SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL

SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF

1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENI TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT

BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 2D PERCENT; AGENIS, 3.5

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENI; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

#MORIG

A I LORIATION COMPATREA

HEREIN IS UNCUZESANLSO

3/06

MW 50118 DocId: 32989628 Page 408

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 8

---

## Page 9

NROT4 WA CODE

193610008881811C0CCCCPM NITEL. 5-2-75 MSE

10 ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-115395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

GAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS IO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESIS

FROM

SEMATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO SIUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS. WITH RESPECI TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC-

IION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES,. STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK

TO INTERVIEW SURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENILY, THE SENATE SELECI COMMIITEE (SSC) STAFF HAS

INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANJICIPATED

THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE

AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-

TAKEN BY THE COMMIITEE WITH RESPECT IO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE

DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE IHAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND

METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

destroyed

Doze

62-DEAD

NW 54955 DocId: 32989494

NW 65994-Docld:32176524 Page 9

Page 5

62-2368-1

SEARCHED SVE INDEXED

SERIALIZED

X FLED

MAY

- 11975

stoops

FBI - ALBANY

ADVISE ALL EMPLOYEES,

Put in wicklil

---

## Page 10

PAGE TWO

PROTECTED.

SHOULD ANY

FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND

HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-

MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST-FBI. EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD

BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACI LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.

YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH

OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER

PROTECIION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES

OF YOUR OFFICE. • HOWEVER, CONTACI WIIM THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD

BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

HOLD

54955

DocId: 32989494

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 10

Page

6

---

## Page 11

1RE36 WA CODE

4:15PM WITEL 5-29-75 PAW

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

(GE+ 116395)

FERSONAL TENTION

SEISTUDY - 75%

REBUIEL HAY E, 1975€

IN COMNECTION WÎTH WORK OF THE SERATE AND HOUSE SELECT

CONMITILES, ITS REPRESENIATIVES AY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR

INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECEUT INSIANCE, A REPRESENTAIIVE OF THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPRONICALLY INGUIRED AS IO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970=

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF REPRESENTATIVE SY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACI ORg

IF IELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONICS BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UILESS INFORGATION IS OF A PUBLIC KATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHO GLEHRANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY

INFORVATION. FBIHO

GUST BE EXPODITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

IUFORAATION FURNISHED.

DID

62-2854-5

MAY 2 ^ 1975

NW 65994 Docld:32176524-Page 11 -

---

## Page 12

M

1

Eách

J. B. Adams

I. J. Jenkins

Assistant Director

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO ALI SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

214

(62-116395)€

PERSONAL ATTENTION

MAY 19, 1975

SENSTUDY - 75.

-I - MI. W. O. Cregar

1

- Mr. S. F. Phillips.

REBUTEL, MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT

COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR

INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAI CONTACT OR,

Assoc. Dir.w

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. —

Telephone Rm. -

is desirable

Pirector Sgeixt

MALL ROOM L

994* Docid:32176524-Page'1

IT TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

URLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHO CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY

INFORMATION. EBIHO MUSTARIAXPERITAAUSLY ADVISED OF ATI

INFORMATION FURNISHED.

COMMUNICATIONS ME MATORMATION CONTAINEO

SEP: CMC

MAY 20E DARE 19/9-01307

(19)

461.(14.11)

NOTE:

TELETYER"

pur

Referenced teletype alerted field to work of the

Senate and House Select Committees and Bureau's handling of

its requests.

Also, it pointed out FBI has pledged full coop-

eration with

1 Committees.

San Francisco teletype 5/14/75 advised

that on that day Lester B. Seidel, Investigator, Senate Select

Committee, telephonically

sought and was furnished identities

of SACs in San Francisco in 1970.

Seidel did not indicate

specific nature of his inquiries. Considering the publicity

wbeing afforded the work of the Committee, it is not inconceivable

some unauthorized persons may attempt to obtain information from

the fBI particularly at field level, under guise of one of the

It is therefore believed this teletype to all

SACS

a cautionary measure.

LETYPE UNIT U

GPO : 1975 0 - 569-520

---

## Page 13

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA

ATLANTA

BALTIMORE

CHARLOTTE

CHICAGO

KANSAS CITY

LITTLE ROCK

NEWARK

OMAHA

PHILADELPHIA

PORTLAND

PHOENIX

TAMPA

NFO

1 - Mr. B. Adams

2 - Mc. J. A. Mintz

(1-Mc. J.B.Hotis)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mic. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975 SiN*SH

TRO"! CONTAINED

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, IN-

CLUDING THEIR CURRENT THEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTER-

VIEVED BY SSC STAFT, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIENS UN-

KNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF

FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENIS,

REC-100

ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

62-11636178

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE

IMMEDIATELY CON-

TACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY. THE

1 - ROME (BY MAIL)

Assoc. Dir. -

Dop. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst, Dir.:

Admin.

Comp.Syst.cou

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com. -

Gon. Inv, arou

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc.Inv.=

Training.

Logol Coun..

(9)

87 JUN 4 1:975..

SEE NOTE-PAGE FOUR**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 2 $ 1975

TELETYPE

• MAdE ROOM C

NW 65994* Dôcld:32176524 'Page 13

TELETYPE UNIT L

1iP0 559

---

## Page 14

TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKTOVIT. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT'

IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEHED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME,

QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS

(SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING

INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT.

BURRAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT OIT REQUEST OF INTERVIENEE, AS A

PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING

CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING

OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAI BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE

IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE

GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BURIAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS

WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSOMALLY BY SAC OR

ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED

BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACIED BY SSC

STAFF FOR INTERVIEH, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IO BE IMMEDIATELY

NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

-

2

NW 65994- Docld:32176524-Page 14

---

## Page 15

TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

IMTIEDIATELY AFTER CONTACI, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO

LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AVAY, SET OUT LEAD IO

OTHER OFFICE IMIEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURILAND J. JONES, 6607 IT. 29TH STREET,

ARLINGIOT, VA.; ROBERI G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERHARD A.' TELLS,

5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN E. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDROR ROAD, SILVER SPRING

MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAI LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND;

ROBERI H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES,

NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OIGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVERTUE, CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. MILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK:'

JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO,

1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH IT. BACHMAIT,

610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEV JERSLY; KARL L. BROUSI,

-3 -

NW 65994 Docld:32176524^Page 15-

---

## Page 16

TELETYPE TO SACS

ALEXANDRIA. ET AL

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, FESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT I. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: IBO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALIS

PROENIX: MILDRED I. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTON,

ARIZONA

TAPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BRACE,

FLORIDA

NFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR

COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

ДОТЕ:

May 14, 1975, SSC letter and appendices requested current

thereabouts individuals named herein. Also included herein names

of Bachman and Brouse who were SAC and ASAC respectively in Newark

Office pertinent period inasmuch as one request from SSC vas for

memoranda from former SA Lea I. Clark to Hewarl: SAC and ASAC.

SSC request named several additional former employees who vere

previously alerted by tel to selected ofiicers 5/2/75. Another

5/2/75 tel, to all offices, referenced herein, gave field general

background re Senstudy 75.

By separate airtel to Rome we are

forwarding copy of instant tel as well as copies of prior pertinent

tels. The caution taken herein in alerting former' employees as

vell as incumbents is same we took previously by 5/2/75 tel to

selected SACs.

After dispatch instant tel, copies will be filed

in personnel files of all named herein. One of the 1964 Rome

employees was Theodore A. Korontjis, currently assigned INTD,

who will be appropriately informed orally concerning this matter.

I wiel!

11513

51799

- 4-

NW65994: Docld:32176524 "Pâge 16 *

---

## Page 17

FADEAL BUREAD DE INVESTICATIOR

"MUNICATIONS SECTION

H0 51975

"YPE

NROMA TP CODE

1: 49PM URGENT JUNE 5,

1975 FD

TO

-DIRFCIOR (62-116395)

ALL INFORMATION CONTANEO

FROM TAMPA

(135-701121)

SENSTUDY 75

EATE 1/218802B55R2ALMIRW

RE BUREA!! NITEL MAY 29, 19.75.

ON JINE, 4, 1975, MICHAFL J. ROZAMS, 6SD GILE DRIVE,

HOLMES RFACH, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACIED. MR. ROZAMUS HAD NOT

, BEEN AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT INTIL THIS DATE BECAUSE OF TRAVFI.

MR • ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE MAS NOT REFE CONTACTED BY ANY

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SNATE SFLECT COMMITIFF RUT HE WAS

ALERTFD THAT HE MAY BE APPROACHED BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEF

STAFF. MR. POZAMUS WAS ADVISTD OF THE CONTENTS OF REPUNITEL

CONCERNING THE FACT THAT HE MAY REQUEST THAT AN FRI AGENT

BE. PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW IN THE EVENT AIRSTIONS. ARF ASKED

RELATING TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPFRATIONS. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ALSO

ADVISED THAT AS A PRELIDE TO THT INTERVIFW ME. MAY CONTACT

THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL. HE WAS

RATE RED

EVISED THAI THE BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE WAS NOT INTENDED

PAGE ONE

TREC 100

COPY

PERSONNE

62-11662905

WN 1Q 1975

Assoc. Dir. .

, Dep.-A.D.-Adma.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv..

Asst, Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext.

Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

indesion

7142

Labnratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

84 JUN 1 1 1975

55168

-DoCId: 32989588

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 17

Paýe 111

---

## Page 18

PAGE TWO

• TO IMPEDE THE WORK OF IHE SENATE COMMITTEE BIT WAS DONE AS A

00O PERATIVE GESTIRE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSIT IVE BIREAL

INFORMATION. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THIS

AND FULLY APPRECIATED THE BUREAU'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

MR. ROZAMUS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY THF TAMPA

OFFICE IN THE EVENT THAT HE IS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE SENATE. COMMITTEE.

END

RECD THRFE

DOW FBINQ CL CLR

Cs. Put man

MH 55168 DocId: 32989588 Page 112

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 18

---

## Page 19

NR003 WA CODE

1:45AM NITEL 6-28-75 IJT

TO ATLANTA

KNOXVILLE

BIRMINGHAM

LOS ANGELES

ALBANY

TAMPA

JACKSONVILLE

CHICAGO

FROM DIRECTOR

(62-416395)

PERSONAL A

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2.g 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENI AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES,

INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT

WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESIS THEY MAY BE

INTERVIEWED, BY SSC STAFF CONCERNING BUREAU'S FORMER INVESTIGA-

TION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND

LASI KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF .

ASSIGNMENI OF INCUMBENIS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUI.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERIED THAT HE MIGHT

BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF ABOUT THE KING INVESTIGATION.

THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT

ASAL DON

6/28

62-23684

SEARCHIE

SGAIAMLE

JUN: 7 1/5

SAC

ASAC

MW 54955

DocId: 32989494

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 19

Page 18

---

## Page 20

PAGE TWO

IN IHE EVENT, THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF

SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED

WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU

OPERATIONS I SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE

AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI

AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF

INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELÜDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE

MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY'

SSC STAFF, CONTACI BUREAU'S

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOF FULL INFORMATION

•ID ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS IO CONFIDENTIALITY

OF INFORMATIÓN ACQUIRED. AS FBI EMPLOYEE. II IS IMPHASIZED

THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TÓ IMPEDE

SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD

SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACIS WITH THESE FORMER

EMPLOYEES TO BE MANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC.. IN EVENT

THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR

SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENI EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED. BY

SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEV!, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

TO

BE

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH. SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

KH 54955 DocId: 32989494

NW 65994 Docld:32176524' Page 20

Page 19

---

## Page 21

PAGE THREE

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE IS

NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD

TO OTHER OFFICE

IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ATLANIA: INCUMBENTS - DONALD P. BURGESS, RICHARD E.

FUGAIT, EDMUND F. HAGGERTY, O. RICHARD HAMILION, CHARLES I.

HAYNES, WILBUR W. SEITZER, ROBERT W. THOMSON. FORMER -

MARION E. CHEEK, 1613 GAIL AVENUE, ALBANY, GEORGIA 31705;

CHARLES T. HARDING,: 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, NORTHEASI, ATLANIA,

GEORGIA 30345.

BIRMINGHAM: LAWRENCE I. GURLEY, 134D WESIMINISTER

PLACE, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35235.

ALBANY: HENRY G. ROWSE, JRO, 39 NORTH MAIN STREET, - Binlingten RA

ENOSBURG FALLS, VERMONT 05450 =

JACKSONVILLE: WILLIAM LEE BOLYARD - INCUMBENI.

KNONVILLE: W. JOHN BENION - INCUMBENT.

LOS ANGELES: JAMES M. KELLOGG. - INCUMBENT.

TAMPA: JAMES E. MOMAHON, 3118 COÇOS ROAD, TAMPA,

FLORIDA 33618.

CHICAGO: JOHN BASSETT - INCUMBENT.

END

GMM FBI ALBANY FOR 3

ALBANY CLR

TELS

MW 54955 DooId: 32989494

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 21

Page 20

---

## Page 22

FEDERAL BUNLAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTIOM

NRBD9 TP. CODE

5830

TO.:

PM NITEL JUNE 30g 1975 JMM

DIRECTOR (62-116595)

FROM;

TAMPA

(105-00 1121)

SENSTUDY 75.

ПЕВЕТУРЕ

—RE BUREAU NITEL SUNE: 28, 1975•

JAMES E. MC MAHON, 3118 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33618,

AND DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, IAMPA,

BORIDA, WAS CONTACTED ON JUNE 30, 1975, AND ADVISED OF THE.

00 NT ENTS OF REFERENCED BUREAU NITEL. MR. MC MAHON ADVISED

THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTER ME

COULD INMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SAC OF THE TAMPA OFFICE AND

ATLI CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO ASSIST HIM AS TO

-HIS OBLIGATIONS' ÀS TO CONFIDENTIAL ITY OF FURNISHING INFORMATION -

ACQUIRED AS AN FBI EMPLOYEE.

END

HOLD

ASSGE.

Vir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. ...

Ident.

Inspection

MIntell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Iraining .

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y

ALL INFORIATON CONTAINSO

(lie Mation)

MOR-16

REC-102 b2=116.385-293

„IUL

1870

ec.

5

1975

NS FoLL Coela: 32989609

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 22

Page 82

---

## Page 23

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

2 - Mr..

J. A. Mintz

(1 - ME July 10, H9545)

TO SAC CINCINNATI

TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

- Mr. W. R. Wannall

Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY

IN

RETAINED

COPY

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

MAY BE INTERVIENED BY SSC STAFF. INTERVIEW OF MORGAN WILL

PROBABLY CONCERN COINTELPRO-BLACK PANTHER PARTY MATTERS IN

SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE WHEN HE WAS SAC THERE. INTERVIEW OF .

MATTER WILL PROBABLY CONCERN INVESTIGATION OF MAREEN LUTHER

KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE LASI KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE

FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE INMEDIATELY . •

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTER-

VIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SANE, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED VEICH

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Iny. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin, -

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv..

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval, _

Spec. Inv. -

Troining

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director See'y -

SFP: dmt

(8)

REC- 107,

360

SEE

NOTE PAGE 3

B UL 16 1975

Musing,

JUIL 10,1975

90300 1010

WOC

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT C

RECORDS:

- 6124181 (

---

## Page 24

PAGE 2

62-116395

RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS,

TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS) ,

THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE

AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEVEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW,

THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAI COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CATI, FOR

FULI, INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBIIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE.

IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED

TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND 10

SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE

FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC.

IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY

A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO

LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO

OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO EBI HEADQUARTERS.

CINCINNATI: HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE,

CINCINNATI, OHIO-45242.

TAMPA:

JOHN M. MATTER, 6777 WINKLER ROAD, APARIMENT I-208,

FT. MYERS, FLORIDA-33901.

•NW.65994 Docld:32176524~Page 24--

---

## Page 25

PAGE

3

62-116395

NOTE:

6/30/75 SSC letter to Department indicated Morgan being

considered for interview.

SSC Staff interview of former

Assistant Director Ivan Conrad, 7/9/75, indicated strong

likelihood Matter will be interviewed.

Procedure for alerting

former employees as is being done is in accordance with what

we have been doing re many other former employees.

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 25 -

---

## Page 26

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NRODT TP CODE

5:22PM NITEL JULY 11, 1975 JFD

TO

FROM

SENSTUDY 75

DIRECTOR (520116395)

TAMPA

(105-5390)

HYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

REBUNITEL JULY 10, 1975.

JOHN M. MATTER, 8505 DOMINICAN COURI, FT. MYERS, FLA.,

TELEPHONE 813-936-1691, WAS CONTACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

REFERENCED BUNITEL.

MATTER, A RETIRED AGENI FORMERLY ASSIGNED IO FBI LAB,

INDICATED HE WOULD TELPHONICALLY CONTACT THE BUREAU, SPEAK,

WITH ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR CALLAHAN, AND THEREAFTER WITH OFFICE OF

LEGAL COUNSEL IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE CONTACT BY REPRESENTATIVE

OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

MATTER WILL KEEP BUREAU ADVISED THROUGH SAC, TAMPA OF

ANY CONTACIS IN CAPTIONED MATTER.

END

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. .

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan, & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm

Director Sec'y

62-116395

LSGERBIHQ CLR FOR TWO AND TKS

RETAINED

Sues

c6-67%

'14. 212, 1975

PERS, REO.

UNES:

84 JUL 2 2 1975.

NW 55037

Docid: 32989617

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 26

Page 227

---

## Page 27

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adio.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

101.

Ext. Affairs

NR 001 IF CODE

8:58010 URGENT JULY 21, 1975 JFD

TO

DIRECTOR

(62-116395)

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

FROM TAMPA

(105-5390)

SENSTUDY 15

DEEDED IS UNGEROCTATED

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval,

DATa 10-10-00

Spes. Inv.:

Tainina/

elephine Rm.

D

rector Sec'y

HE TASPA NITEL JULY 11, -1975.

ON EVENING JULY 20, 1975, FORMER SA JOHN MATTER, TELEPHONE

813-936-1691, WAS TRLEPHONICALLY CONTACTED AT FT. MYERS BY

MIKE EPSTEIN OF SENAIE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF. EPSTEIN

REQUESTED MEETING AT FI. NYERS THE NIGHT OF JULY 22 OR THE

MORNING OF JULY 23.

REC-26

ABOUT ONE HOUR AFTER INITIAL CALL, EPSTEIN CALLED MATTE

517

AGAIN AND FINALLY SET APPOINIMENI FOR FRIDAY, JULY 25, 1975, A AUG 14 1975

11:30 A.M., ROOM G308, NEW SEMITE OFFICE BUILDING.

MATTER WILL TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS MEETING AND

REQUESIS- SUPERVISOR PAUL DALY, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, TO

TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT HIM IN FT. MYERS.

MATTER DESIRES

BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE AT MEETING JULY 25, 1975.

END

SMD. FBINQ CLR

37004

PERSONNEL

1m. Pand Das.

X AUG 2:0,1875. 32

55116

DocId: 32989627

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 27

Page 171

---

## Page 28

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-AdM

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

FEDERAL BUNEAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

N 013 IP CODE

Comp. Syst.

5858: PN NITEL AUG 26, 1975 JMM

AUB 2 A 1975,11

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv..

TOS

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

TELETYPE

Ident. ...

FROM:

TAMPA

(105-5390)

SENSTUDY 75

C. 018

nspectio

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Ru. -

RE BUREAU TELS MAY 2 AND ALGUSI 26, 1975; AND BUREAU TEbiCAl Sey

TO TAMPA, AUGUST 26, 1975.

ON AUGUSI 26, 1975, SEYMOUR PHILIPS, UNIT CHIEF, FBIHQ,

ADVISED IPO HE WILL HANDLE LEAD TO CONTACT FORMER SA PAUL L.

COX:

NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY TAMPA.

END

HOLD

1.1

REC 27

EX-106

62-116385581

9898509

÷ AUG 28 1975

SMDRIG

ALT INFORMATTON CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNOLASOITTED

D17810-11-00 BESP-2 ALMIATE

84 SEP 2 1975

55138

DocId: 32989634 Page 158

NW 65994 Docld:32176524*Page 28

---

## Page 29

CODE

TELETYPE

TO SACS ALBANY

BALTIMORE

MIAMI

PHILADELPHIA

TAMPA

2

Ir. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

NITEL

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

AUGUST 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

#MDR16

SENSTUDY 75

10-11-00 SP.2 ALM/ITE

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY

'BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS

NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILI LIKELY PERIAIN TO

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY

AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO

THE

FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,

COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS.

SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

EMPLOYEES.

SFP:1hblhb

(7)

REC 27

6214325575

SEE NOTE PAGE

AUG 2Y 1975

'EX-106

Assoc. Dir..

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.-

Ext. Affairs =

Files & Com. -

Gon. Inv.-

Ident...

Inspoction ....

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plan, & Eval.-

Spoc. Inv. -

Training

Legul Coun.

Telephone Rm.

NW 65994 ^Dodld:32176324^Page 29*

FEDEAL CEREAU OF INVESTIGATICN

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 2 © 1975

Cr. loan!

TELETYPE

the le

---

## Page 30

PAGE TWO 62-116395

EACH OF THESE FORMER IMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE.

INTERVIEVED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED

WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS

AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE,

INCLUDING IDINTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY

MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE

AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEVEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW,

THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL, COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALI FOR

FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT

IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT

INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE

AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR

ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE

HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

NW 65994 ^Docld:32176524^ Pagé 30°

---

## Page 31

PAGE THREE 62-116395

INMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULIS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BURPAU BI TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION...

IF A FORMER IMPLOYEE NO

LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AVAY, SET OUT LEAD TO

OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WIIH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY,

NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY,

UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA,

MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD,

MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLELT LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E.

LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P.O. BOX 1418,

SARASOTA, FLORIDA. 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS

IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER

THROUGH CANADA. AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO

BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU

DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

NW 65994 Docld:32176524^Pagê 31 -

---

## Page 32

165700

PAGE FOUR 62-116395

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE

INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION

TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR

SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS

FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

NOTE:

SSC request dated 8/20/75 vas for whereabouts of

above former employees. We have separately responded to SSC

with last available information from our files.

Address on

Cox taken from 1975 Directory of the Society of Former Special

Agents. SupervisorS. F. Phillips of Senstudy 75 Project

determined from a mutilal acquaintance the information relating

to Cox.

Procedure for alerting former employees is being done

in accordance with what we have been doing concerning many

other former employees.

The referenced 5/2/75 teletype

furnished all offices background on SSC requests and Bureau's

cooperation with the SSC.

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 32 -

---

## Page 33

NRO33 WA CORE

6:16P 1 9/4/75 VITEL Ae"

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOS

(62-116395)

P5950 42 PEK

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTAIT TELETYPE ARE TO (I REITERATE THAT

FBI HAS PLEDOED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTER (SSC) AND MISHOS TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY

INVISTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FRI;

AND (?) SIT FORTH NEM PROCEDUPE RELATING TO SSC STAFF

INTERVISHS OF CURRENT AND FOPMER FRI EMPLOYEES.

FOP INFORMATION OF THOSE DEFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIDUSLY

HAD CUPRENT OF FOPMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY IMTERVIONED

DY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSE OR

OTTRUISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYTES ARE REING CONSIDERED FOR

INTERVIEW PY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUEE FOR THE

FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMOR EMPLOYTE TO ALERT HIM AS TO

POSSIBLE INTERVICH, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

"ITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTEN FOR

ASAC

62-2365.9

GILBERT

ICC

dist.

SEARCHED

ANDANED

SERIALIZED BRILED BR

KEEFE

LONERGAN

SEP: 4 1975

1H 54955 DocId: 32989494

Page 34

NW 65994" Docid:32176524 Page 33

---

## Page 34

PAGE THO

INTEPVIEW, HE MAY CONTACI THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECI CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. I!! THE USUAL CASE,

AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLMOIS

THAI HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BURRAU

CANNOT PROVICE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS MAIVED IHE

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW VITHIN SPECIFIED

PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED APPAS I!

WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS

ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY CA) IDENTIFY PUREAU

SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/ TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL

IDENTITITS OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREICN INTELLIGENCT

AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (DI ADVERSELY

AFFECI ONGOING BURFAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIFUEES CONSULTATION

PRIVILEGES WHORTBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD RE AVAILAPLE

NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOI ACTUALLY AI INTERVIOW, SO INTERVIENEE

MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS

OF INTERVIEN OR PRIVILEGED ARBAS. THE CONSULIAMI DID NOI ACT

AS A LIGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BURTAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

NW 54955 DocId: 32989494 Page 35

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 34

---

## Page 35

PAGE THREE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST

EITHER CURRENI OF FORMER EMPLOYSES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEVEES

SHOULD BE TOLD THAI, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE

DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACI EITHER PERSONALLY (IF

INTERVIEW IS IN HASHINGION, D. C.) OR 3Y COLLECI CALL, THE

ASSISTANI DIRECIOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. '. R.

WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION

CHIEF t. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUEN AS

LESSENING THE ASSISIANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND

FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE

DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,

WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENI AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT

EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPI ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS

IN THIS REGARD.

END

LVV FBI ALBANY

.CLR

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ER 853 WA PLAIN

110ĐPM NITEL 9/26/75 Pill

TO ALL SAGS

FROM DIRECTOR

LEGAL ADVICE FOR PRESENT OR FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES:

IN RESPONSE TO OUR RECUEST, THE AITORNEY

GENERAL ADVISED IHAT LEGAL REFRESENIATION FOR EMPLOYEES WOULD

BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR PRELIMINARY ADVICE, SHOULD CASES ARISE

WHERE A FORMER OR PRESENT EMPLOYEE REQUIRES MORE PROTRACTED

AID SUBSIANTIAL LEGAL REFRESENTATION; II IS THE POSITION OF THE

DEPARTHENT THAT SPECIAL COUNSEL MAY BE RETAINED FOR SUCK

EMPLOYEES AT DEPARTUENT EXPENSE, GUIDELINES ARE BEING

DRAWN BY THE DEPARTHENI TO GOVERN IHESE MATTERS

HOWEVER, SHOULD THE DEPARTHENT SUBSEGUENTLY CONCLUDE THAT

SUCH CASES INVOLVE MATTERS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PRESENT OR

FORMER EMPLOYEE'S DUTIES, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WOULD APPLY.

ALL LEGAIS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END .

SSP FBI ATLANTA

IKS/ CLR

==1>

623-5854-45

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ER 353 WA PLAIN

1106PM WITEL 9/26/75 Pill

TO ALL SACS

FRON DIRECTOR

LEGAL ADVICE FOR PRESENT OR FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES

IN RESPONSE TO OUR RECUEST, THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL ADVISED IHAT LEGAL REFRESENIATION. FOR EMPLOYEES WOULD

BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR PRELIMINARY ADVICE. SHOULD CASES ARISE

WHERE A FORMER OR PRESENT EMPLOYEE REQUIRES MORE PROTRACTED

AND SUBSIANIIAL LEGAL REFRESENTATION; II IS THE POSITION OF THE

DEPARIVENI THAI SPECIAL COUNSEL MAY BE RETAINED FOR SUCH

EMPLOYEES AT DEPARIUENT EXPENSE, GUIDELINES ARE BEING

DRAWN BY THE DEPARTMENT TO GOVERN THESE MATTERS E

HOWEVER, SHOULD THE DEPARTHENT SUBSEGUENTLY CONCLUDE THAT

SUCH CASES INVOLVE MATTERS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PRESENT OR

FORMER EMPLOYEE'S DUTIES, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WOULD APPLY,

ALL LEGAIS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END.

SSP FBI ATLANTA

1KS/ CLR

=e1>

653-3854-45

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re =

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## Page 38

771

drip

08; (Rev. 12-17-73)

TO: SAC:

Al buny

Albuquerque

¿exandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Binningham

Roston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlolte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

→ Honolulu

(Copies to

tes Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Mansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orl cans

New York City

Norfolk

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Porland

Richmond

Sarranento

SL. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfield

Tamp a

Washington Field

Quantico

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Date.

TO LEGAT:

Beirut

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

11/21/75

Retention

For appropriate

Cy For infonnation = optional i action

_ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your infonnation. If used in a future report,

conceal all

sources, C paraphrase contents.

Cy Enclosed are corrected poges trom report of SA.

dated

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of

an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr.

Church's Cover-j" that appeared in the

November 20, (

'5, issue of "The New York Times."

cockros

62-2854-56

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Enc. (1)

Bufile

¡irfile

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FBI - ATLANTA

—1mm

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## Page 39

*. Church

By William Safire

WASHINGON, Nov. 19-On Oct. 10,

1963, the then-Attorney Goneral of the

United States put his personal signa-

ture on a document that launched and

legitimatized one of the most horren-

dous abuses of Federal police power in

this century.

In Senator Frank Church's subcom-

mittee hearing room this week,

the

authorized

wiretapping and subse-

quent

unauthorized bugging and at-

tempted blackmailing of Martin Luther

King: Jr. is being gingerly examined,

with the "investigation" conducted in

such a way as not to unduly em-

barrass officials of the Kennedy or

Johnson Administrations.

With great care, the committee has

focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, whent

the committee counsel first set forth

the result of shuffling through press.

clips, it seemed as if no Justice

paltment had existed in 1962; today,

an f.B.l. Witness pointed out that iti

Was Kobert Kennedy who authorized

the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the

President of the United States and the

Attorney General specifically discussed

their concern of Communist influence

with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed

no zest for getting further to the Ken-

nedy root of this precedent to Water-

gate eavesdropping. If Senator Church

were willing to let the chips fall where

they may, he would call some knowl.

edgeable witnesses into the giare

the camera lights and ask them some

questions that have gone unasked for

For example, he could call Nicholas

Katzenbach, Attorney Gencral Ken-

nedy's deputy and successor, and ask

what he knows of the Kennedy de-

cision to wiretap Dr. King,

Justice concurred in the recommenda-

tion? How does the F.B.I. know they

President was consulted or informed?

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed of-

fice, and the wiretapping continued,

he was told by angry newsmen that

the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous in-

formation about Dr. King. Why did he

wait for four months, and for a thou-

said elephonic interceptions, in dis-

continue the officiaily approsea tap?

Of course, this sort of lestimony

would erode Senator Church's political

base. That is why we do not see for-

mer Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha

personal contact with the F.B.I. in the

Johnson know ahout the characte:

assassination pine and when did he

know it? What concersationg too!:

Wace between Mr. Doloach and Presi-

done Johnson on ter lapping of Dr.

Kink or ahout the use nf the F.B.l. in

any other intrasions into top lives of

NW 65994 Döcld:32176524 Page 39

Cover-Up

The committee is not asking embar-

rassing questions even when answers

are readily available. A couple of

weeks ago, at an open hearing, an

F.B.I. man inadvertently

blurt out an episode about newsmen

who were iveritapping in 1962 with

the apparent knowledge of Attorney

General Kennedy. The too-willing wit:

ness was promptly shoosned into

lence, and toid that such inforination

would be developed only in exccutive

• session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

That pattern of containment by the

Church committee is vividly shown by

the handling of the buggings at the

196% Republican and Democratic con

ESSAY

ventions which were ordered by Lyn-

don Johnson. Such invasions of politi-

cal headquarters were worse than the

crime committed at Watergate, since

they involved the use of the 'F.B.l.,

but the Church investigators seem to

be determineti not to probe too deeply.

If F.B.l. documents say that reports

were made to specific Johnson aides,

are those men not given

same opportunity to publicly tell their

story so avidly given the

dent's men? If Lyndon

mitted this impeachable high crime of

using the F.B.I. to spy on political,

opponents, who can be brought for-

ward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrass-

Church wants to

agencies only. A new sense of Con-

gressional decorum exists, far from

the sense of outrage expressed in the

Senate Watergate

ing room. When it is revealed that the

management of NBC News gave press

credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964

convention, everybody blushes demure-

y-and nobody demands to know

which network executive made whati

decision under what pressure.

I have been haranguing patient.

readers for years about the double

standard applied lo Democratic and

Republican political crimes, and bod

hoped the day would come wien the

hardball precedonus set by the Ken-

nedy and Jolnson men would ba laid

befure the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat. Frank Church

do it. His jowi-

tive: the trail ut high-level recoonsi-

ility for the crimes commited against

Dr. King and others is evidently guing

to he allowad in cool.

Piy, Youd mink thie after all the

nation has been through

few vars, our political leaders vickil

have carmod that the one ther that

ornes tone door is the act ol cover.

ing up.

...

THE NEW YORK TIMES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1975

PAGE C-41

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Vol. 15

The aluited Statra Sruate

Report of Proceedinge

Hearing held before

salec: Committad to Study Governmental. Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGINCE INVESTIGATION

UNEDItED TRANSGRIPY

Tuesday, Dacember 2, 2975

Washington, D. C.

000-

SENSTUDY

HANDLE

ДАС

WEttER

Ru done 11

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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_INDEXED_

/SERIALIZED_ BE FILED _

DEC 1: 1975

•SL-ALBANY

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Senator Tower.. The next witnesses to appear before the

Committee are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-

Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all

investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant

Director, Intélligence Division, responsible for internal

security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;

Joseph C. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations:

Mr. Robert I. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive

investigations; Mi. Homer A. Newman, JI., Assistant to Section

Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigal!.:

unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. alicy,

Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener.: Int'":-

gative Division.

Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

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• Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give

before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams. I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

Mr. Mintz. I do.

MI. Deegan. I do.

Mr. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman.

•I do.

MI. Grigalus. I do.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that. MI. Wannall will be

the principal witness,

and we will call on others as questioning

might require, and I would direct each of you when you do

respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the recora.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow

the members of the Committee to return

from the floor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower.

The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide 83

percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information

on the criteria for the selection of informants?

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TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

ACCOMPANIED BX: JAMES B. ADAMS,. ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) :

JOHN À. MINTZ, ASSISTANI DIRECIOR, LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION; JOSEPHI G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT I.

SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,

ASSISTANT TO SECTION, CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRICALUS, UNIT

CHIEF: AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANI SECTION CHIEE,

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

MI. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you

have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting

Office.

Senator

Tower. That is GAO.

MI. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate

figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI

itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that

we do get the principal portion of our information from live

sources.

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Senatox Tower. It would be a relatively high percert...

then?

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes.

And your ques!'

criteria?

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Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection

of

informants?

Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In

our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get

an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a

criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set

of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security

matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require

that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist

principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field

office indices, checks with other informants who are operating

in the same area, and in various established sources such as

local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type

who

has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we

would interview the individual in order to make a determination

as to whether or not he will be willing to

assist the FBI

in discharging its responsibilities in. that. field.

Following that, assuming that the. answer is positive, we

would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose

of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability.

Senator. Tower. How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between

the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to

intelligence. collection?

Is the guidance different, of is it the same, or what?

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Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address

the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over

the operational division on that.

Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact

that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you

are trying to develop evidencé which will be admissible in

court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant

alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be

just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality

of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,

through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be

used independently of the testimony of the informant so that

he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower: Are these informants ever authorized to

function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-

tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets

into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed

by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the

courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage

in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the

opportunity. This does not mean, of course: that mistakes don't

occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to

avoid this. Even the law

has recognized that informants can

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engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,

especially the Supreme Court In the Newark County Case, that

the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that

an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but,

because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a

law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant

has to become involved in some activity in order to protect

or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United

States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure

we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our

informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do

instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that

they

are informing on, do you not?

MI. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,

which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the klan is probably

one of the best examples of a situation where the law was

in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used

much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little

Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending

in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law

enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the

troops only as a last resort.

And then you have a situation like this where you do try

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to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement.

You have

historical problems with the Klan coming along.

We had

situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost

powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in

some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,

he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't

see what action

was taken with that information, as he pointed

out

in his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance. We

also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being

received, was not being

acted upon. We also disseminated

simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department

of Justice

the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a

position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction

from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have

evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in

situation where the

Department called in United States

Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement

officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just' as frus-

trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from

someone like MI. Rowe, good information, reliable information,

and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to

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do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he

indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was

adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to

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MI: Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.. You

can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have.

no violation.

Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights

statute, which added punitive

measures against an individual

that didn't have to be

a conspiracy. But this was a problem

that the whole country was grappling with: the President of

the, United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation

where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from

a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.

The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing

violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one.

of the

reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose

in con-

tinuing of urging the continued

surveillance of the Vietnam

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Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the

intent to halter political expression?

Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans

Against the War that indicated that there were subversive

groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting.

with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending

meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the

International Communist Party. We feel that we.had a very valid

basis to direct our attention to the VAW.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was

head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made,

and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it

split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost

group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point

factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed

those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow!

the national organization.

But we

had

a valid basis for investigating it, and we

investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation

and

subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. llart?

Senator lart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing

after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information

that clearly has no relationship to any Federal criminal

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statute.

Mr.

Adams.

I agree, Senator.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that

stuff.off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

MI. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that.

When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the

violent statements made by the group or do you also show that

you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have

some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,

that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the

statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along

with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with

Information in our files. We are

accused of being vacuum

cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the

real purpose of an organization, do you only report the

violent statements made and the fact that it is by a small

minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization

and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines

we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because

we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in

our files.

• Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process:

you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people

who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment

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exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I

imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, eithen

asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator

being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-

viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the

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Now, someone can sayi as reported at our last session, that

this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our

files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree.

It can

have, if someone wants to distort what we have. in our

files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because

of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the United

States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't

see. where any harm is served by having that in our

files.

Senator Hart. of Michigan. But if. I am. Reverend. Smith

and, the vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact. that. I. was helping

the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years

later a name check. is. asked. on Reverend Smith and. all your

file shows. is that he was associated. two years ago. with a group

that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful patriotism

to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on

them

a to

Mi. Adams. This is a problem.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require

us to rethink this whole business.

MI. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well

as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range

of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration

and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition

of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-

taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation

of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation

of such law, and when such

an investigation is opened, then

informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence

investigations

now must be predicated on criminal violations.

The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation

relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,

upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back

again in a world of possible violations or activities which

may result in illegal acts.

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the

right to demonstrate, to assemble,

to protest, to petition,

conceivably may rosult in violonce or disruption of a local

town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result

in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding

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the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all

groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because

they may result in violence, disruption?:

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. VIsn't that how you justify

spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

MI. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we

monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an

investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,

ox where members of one of these groups are participating where

there is a potential that they might change the peaceful

nature of the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the

First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the

past than we do at the present time, But we have had periods

where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the

courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,

to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission

of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be

too late for prevention.

And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

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case.

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have

to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly

fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and

that's where I think most of our disagreements fail.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule

for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn..

The

Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive

organization should not only report on what that group is

doing but should look at and report on activities in which:

the group is participating.

There is a Section 97B3 dealing with reporting. on

connections with other groups. That section says that the

field office shall "determine and report on any significant

connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any

significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive

groups.

Now let's look at this in practico. In the spring of

1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the

installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us

remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential

sources reported on the plan's participants and activities

the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,

particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium,

which included speakers from the

Defense Department for the

ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reported on the planning for the meeting,

the distribution of materials to churches and schools, :.

participation by local clersy, plans to seek resolution on i:

ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat:.

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plans for a

subsequent town meeting in Washington with the

names of local political leaders who would attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as

part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group .

participating in that coalition. Yet the infornation dealt

with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the

plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated

to the Stato Department, to military intelligence, and to the

White House.

How do we get into all of that?

Mr. Adams. Well

Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rcrun it,

woula you do it again?

Mr. Adans. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969

was.

The problem we had at the time was where we had an

informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was

going to take place and it was going to be the Daily worla,

which was the east coast communist newspaper that made conments

about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took

quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28,

1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this

organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick 100k

and

get out, fine. We've had

cases, though, where we have

stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security i in

Ji!

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NW 65994 Docld:32176524^Page 57 *

soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country

and they supported him with total resources of the Soviet

Union, false identification, all the money he needs, comnuni-

cations networks, satellite

assistance, and everything; and

you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic

security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations.

So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take.

quick look at

and there's nothing to it, and I think that's

what they did.

Senator: Mart of Michigan. You said that was 69.. Let

me bring you up to date, closer to current, a current place

on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President

Ford

announced his new program with respect to annesty, as

he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there

were several national conferences involving all the groups

and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is

not against - while unconditional

annesty is not yet. the law,

we agreed that advocating it is not against the

law either.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Scnator llart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors var

umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse camp:

•Und

the country.

BI informants provided advance ii..m.!ir

cil

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Plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on

the conference. The Bureau's own reports described

the

participants as having. represented diverse perspectives.on

the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human

rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed

in Vietnan, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft

counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,

delegates

from

student organizations, and aides of House and

Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as

member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive

and it described the topics of the workshop.

Ironically, the Bureau office report before

them noted

that in view of the location of the conference at a theological

seminary, the FbI would use restraint and limit its

coverage.

to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last

fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point

of view that I

share, that the sooner we have unconditional

amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on

a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad

informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups

in that setting having contact with other groups, all and

everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the

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Bureau Files.

Is this what we want?

Mr. Adams.

I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this.

He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

Mr. Wannall. Senator llart, that was a case that was

opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the information

which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular

items. One was that a member of the steering committee there!

was a three man steering committee, and one of

those members

of the national conference was in fact a national officer

of the VAl in whom we had suggested before we did have a

legitimate investigative interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, I would almost say so what

at that point.

Mi. Hannall. The second report we had was that the

VAN Would actively participate in an attempt to pack the

conference to take it over. And the third report ve had -

Senator Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the

information that your Buffalo informant had given you with

respect to the goals and aims of the VAl gave you a list of

goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected

objectives. There wasn't a single

Item out of that VAr that

jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, ve did not

rely entirely

on the Buffalo informant, but even there ve did.

recej..

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from that informant information which I considered to be

significant.

The Buffalo chapter of the waw was the regional office

covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the

five most active VAl chapters in the country and at a

national conference, or at the regional conference, this

informant reported information back to us that an 'attendee

at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba

prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during

the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There

was

also discussion at the conference of subjugating the

Waw to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals

in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in

agreeinent with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the

interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the information that we had on the VAi did

not come from that source but even that particular source did

givé us infornation which we considered to be of some

significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the

investigation of that particular chapter of the VAw.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

But does it give you the

right of does it create the need to go to a conference, even

if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VAN

when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we

seek to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

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Ms. Wannall. Our interest; of course; was the val

influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be

holding a meeting, or whatever subject

It was.

senator lart of Michigan. what if it was a meeting to

seek to make more affective the food stamp system in this

country?

. Mi.

Wannall.

Well, of course there had been some

organizations.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same, logic follow?

Mr. Wannail. I think that if we found that if the

connunist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and

use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic

in doing that. You have a whole scope hore and it's a matter.

of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've

said before, we will have

some guidance, not only from this

committee but from the quidelines that are being developed.

But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was

explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and

not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,

and that was the person who had, who was not developed for

this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other

matters for some period of time.

And

as soon

as we got the report of the outr.re! ti

meeting and the fact that in the period of some ....

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discontinued any further intèrest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, my time has expired

but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we

really want to control the dangers to our society of usino

informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have

to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And

that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when

my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,

obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged

informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or

individuals.

I know

you have objections to, that and I would like to

review that with you.

Senator Mondale, Pursue that question.

senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an

obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn

Loose a full-

fledged informant.

I'm not talking about tipsters that run

into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources,

The Bureau

has raised some objections in this memorandum to the

Committee.

The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement

might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First

Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their

government.

Now that's

a concern for

First Amendment rights that

ought to

• hearten all the civil libertarians.

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But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement

raise a

serious constitutional question?

Mr. Adams: Well, for one thing it's the practicability

of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which:

ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has

been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily

with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities

such as with the

socialist Workers Party, which we have

discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage

in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still

subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time

is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United

States.

Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about

to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it

and you know they're not going to do it at this particular

moment.

It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a

criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and

we can't find any practical way of doing it. He have a particular

organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs

to the communist Party, but belongs to several other organization:

and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist

Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

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we don't have probable cause for him to target against

that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa

tion fcom him that he as

a Communist Party membex, even

though in an informant status, is going to that organization:

and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.

It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,

the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not

violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have

recognized the necessity that the government has to have

individuals who will assist them in carrying out their

governmental duties.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything

yet in response to the constitutional question, the very

practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the

use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional

rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress

can prescribe sone safeguards, some rules and some standards,

just as we have with respect to your use of electronic

surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant

procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the

fact that you couldn't show

probable cause,

and therefore; you couldn't get a warrant,

therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

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warrant. It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and

investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities

but which might engage in activities that can result in

violence of illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but

Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to

such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,

including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss

the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to

use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or

unless you present your request to a magistrate, in the same.

fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most

cases, to wiretap.

This is an option available to Congress.

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mx. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential.

security informant and a security informant?

Mx. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,

that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on

him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth

background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is under

consideration before

he is approved by headquarters for use as

an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

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On sóme occasions that person will have been developed to a

point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are

engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished,

but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied

ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does,

the field must

submit its recommendations to headquarters, and

headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an

approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of.

being an informant, I guess.

Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the

preliminary steps.

Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in :the Rowe

testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again

for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having

trouble understanding what the rationale, Mc. Wannall, was

in not intervening in

the Rowe situation when violence was

known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Schiveiker, MI. Adams did address

himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to.

answer that.

Senator Schweiker. Ali. right.

MI.

Adams.

The problem we had at the time, and it's the

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problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not

have police powers like the United States marshalls do.

About 1795, I

guess, or some period like that, marshalls have

had the authority that almost borders on what a sheriff has.

We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice

and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain

the role of an investigative agency.

we were to report on

activities to furnish the information to the local police,

who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department

of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it

resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United

States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who

were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was

a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This

doesn't mean to indict

all law enforcement agencies

in itself at the time either because many of them did act

upon the information that was furnished to them. But we

have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we

would not have had evidence that there was a.conspiracy.

available.

We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Iittle Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that

if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and

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next to the Army; the United

states marshalls should make them,

not the FBI, even though we developed the violations.

And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many

questions raised.

Why doesn't the FBI stop this?

why don't

you do something about it?.

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed

the klan as far as comnitting acts of violence, and of course

we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following

up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program

sincé it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going

to.

have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some

kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mr.

Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection

with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston,

they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this

is the approach, that the federal government finally recognized,

was the solution to the problem where you had to have added

Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it

gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced

confrontation, shouldn't we have, som

'ere a coordinated program

that when you go up the ladder of co and in the fBI, that

on an innediate'and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of

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help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it

gets to a Boston state?

I realize it's a departture from the past.

I'm not

saying it isn't. But it seems to me we need a better remedy

than we have.

Mr. Adams.

Well, fortunately. we're at a time where

conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s

and the '70s and periods - or '50s and '60s. We report to the

Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the

country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be

aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took

place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,

the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together

saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the

early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected

people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the

Robert Hardy case. I know he

Is not a witness but he

was a witness before the llouse. But since this affects my

state, I'd like

to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was

the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned

and organized

a raid on the Camden draft board. An according to Mr. Hardy's

testimony before our Committee, he s:.: that in advance of the

raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact

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that they had all the information they needed to clamp down

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on the conspiracy and could arrest; people at that point in time,

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and yet no arrests were made.

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Why, Mr. Wannall, was this

true?

Mc. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based oniy on the

material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not

a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your

question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department

of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously

as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be

made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the.

ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort..

So I. think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that

there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with whio

under your procedures?

Ir. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,

when they should be made, and decisions with regard to

prosecutions are nade either by the United States attorneys

or by Foderals in the Department.

Mr.

Adams. At this time that particular case did have

departmental attorney on the scene inause there are questions

of

conspiracy.

conspiracy is a tough riolation to prove and

sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching

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someone in the commission of the crime as further proof,

rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial

evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well,. in this case, though, they

even had a dry run. They could have arrested them on the

dry run.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to

me.

They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on

the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry

run.

Who was this Department of Justice official who made

that decision?

Mr. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,

during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you

put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBi has released

figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some

kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000

estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.

That would mean that one out of every five members of the klan

at that point was

an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes or

¿o indicate that 70

percent of the new members of the Kla: that" year were EBI

informants.

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Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people

to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that

you shouldn't have informants in the klan and know what's

going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the

tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total

informants for both domestic informants and potential informants

and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.

Mr. Adams.

Well, this number 2,000 did include all

racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I

think the figures ve tried to reconstruct as to the

actual

number of Klan informants in relation to klan members

was

around

percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a

group called the Action Group. This was the group that you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af-

ter the meeting.

He attended the open meetings and heard

all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,

but he never knew what was going on because each one had an

action group that went out and considered themselves in the

missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct

as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in

mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and

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everyone is concerned about the

murder of the civil rights

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bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

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tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.

Mx. Adams.

Our only approach was through informants

and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the

ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have

never solved. They are extremely difficult.

These informants, as ve told the Attorney General, and

as we told the President, that we had moved informants like

Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the

head

man. He was in a position' where he could forewarn

us

of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and

yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever

unless we can create enough disruption that these members will

realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,

even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are

in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was

the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and

that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure

and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of

their members ultimately were klan members and they didn't

dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they

couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

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Senator Schweiker.

My time is expired.

I just have

one quick question.

Is it corcect that in 1971 were using around 6500

informers for black ghetto situations?

Mr. Adams.. I'm not sure if that's the year.

we did

have one' year where we had a number like that which probably

had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities

were

being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this. We

were given

a mandate to know what the situation is, where is

violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penctrating

an organization. They were listening posts in the community

that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting

ready to start another fire-fight or something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there

are three more

Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get

everything in in the first round, we will not have a second

round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can. go

on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question

that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the

record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the

field

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organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts

in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it

has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the

last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped

shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of

the crucial public confidence in an essential. law enforcement

agency of this country.

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it

was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI.

in 19.21.

In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from

its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and

(

protector of political ideas. And through the interference

of civil liberties and Palmer Raids

and

the rest, the public

became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and •

Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement

by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department

get involved in political ideas. ;

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with

Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with - we even

had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of

Churches.

Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined,

impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people

can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the

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tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive

or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly

at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started in politics years ago and the first thing we

had to do was

to get the communists out of our parts and out.

of the union. He did a very fine job. As far as I know, and

I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help

from the FBI or the CIA. We just ramned them out of the meetings

on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't

good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them,

yet, we see time and time again that we're going.to

protect the blacks from Martin Luther king because he's

dangerous, that we've going to protect véterans from whatever

it is, and

we're going to protect the Council of Churches

from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so jummy and

confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree

with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that

precisely what is expected of the fBI is known by you, by the

public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask

YOU?

Mr.

Adams. I agree with that, senator, and I would like

to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement

Mr. Hoover subscribes to it,

we follied

that policy for about

ten years until the president of the ited States said that

we should investigate the Nazi Part.

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1936

I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

I

feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in

the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,

there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage

which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could

have investigated these issues of sabotage. .

Isn't sabotage a crime?

Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale.. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams.

After it happener.

Senator Mondale. You see, every tine we get involved

in political

ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of

crimes that could have been comnitted. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to

continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you

still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of

Churches, and this can still go on: This can still go on under

your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to

justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics

in terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams. The law does not say we have to vait. until

we have been murdcred before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

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law

again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges.

That.'s

the law. You can do that.

Mr. Adams. -That's right, but how do you find out which

of the 20,000. Bund members might have been a saboteur. You

don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can

direct an intelligence operation against the German-American

Bund, the same thing ve did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that?

Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?

Mr.. Adams.

Because we don't have probable cause to

go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for

probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time

they outlined the Communist Party -

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it

wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority

that

you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under

court authority you can investigate where there is probable

cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these

decisions on your own?

Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in

that. We feel that we're going to gilbeat to death in the

next 100 years, you're damned if you i, and damned if you

don't

if va don't have a delineation of our responsibility

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in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we

have bungled

the intelligence operations in the United States.

I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley.

has

set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the

FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think

that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and

Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because

of the necessity that we

must concentrate on these areas of

abuse. We must not lose sight of the

overall law enforcement and

intelligence community, and I

still fcel that this is the freest councry in the world.

I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have

made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United

States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they

are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the

United States and they can't walk out of their

houses at night

and feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an

argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go

after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening of

continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public

confidence you need to do your job.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

The mistakes we have made are

what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some

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mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But

at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes

out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity

of zercing in on abuses.

I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think

the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the

FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the klan that we made

some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

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Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but

I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble

over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we

need to have new legal standarase i'

MI. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at: some

length seems to have been an

inclination on the part of

the

Bureau to establish, a notion about an individual or a group

which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge.. In

the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was

being influenced by. Communist individuals, extensive investi-

gation was made, surveillance, reports

came back indicating that

this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out

to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a

willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that

something similar

to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that

every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau

seemed to indicate that the Bureau was. not correct in its

assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,

of that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist

that this investigation go on, and ts information was used

against the individuals.

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Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that

its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their

course?

MI. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown

from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up! that after

five days we closed the case. We were told something by an

individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence

in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther king

situation there was

no testimony to the effect that we just

dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and

on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were

all approved by the Attorney General.. Microphones on Martin

Iuther king were approved by another Attorney General. This

wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that

there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir

DI. King, but it's just like --

Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda

written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the

information they were receiving from the field, from these

surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition

was.

Mr. Adams. That memorandum was rot on Di. King. That

was on another individual that I thi. somehow got mixed up

in the discussion, one where the issus was can we make people

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prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to

investigate them.

But the young lady, appearing this morning making the

comment that she never knew of anything she told us that

she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch

she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and

agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-

ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals

from associating themselves with the VAW-WSO. She is most

concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over

the VAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that

we have a basis for investigating the VAW-

wSo in

certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped

the investigation. They don't agree with these principles

laid down by the -

Senator Huddleston.

That report was the basis of your

continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that

information against members who certainly had not been involved

in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job

or whatever?

Mr. Adams. It

all gets back

to the fact that even in the

criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to

prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens.. The

Attorney General has clearly

spoken

that area, and even out

statutory jurisdiction provides that ve don't -

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Senator Huddleston.. Well, of course we've had considerable

evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent

crime, when you had information that it was going to occur.

But I'm

sure there are instances where you have.

Mr. Adams.i We disseminated every single item which he

reported to us.

Senator Huddleston, To a police department which you

knew was an accomplice to the crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily;

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,

hadn't he?

MI. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have

other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he

had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in

order to

Mr. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

Senator Hudaleston. So you weren't really doing a whole

lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were

already part of it.

Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully

do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so

• that

when the department, agreeing that we had no further. juris-

diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform.

certain law enforcement functions.

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Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received

documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted

an informant who had been established in a white hate group

to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid

his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being

responsible for what

actions the rival white hate group might

have undertaken?

MI. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen

knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a

specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

MI. Deegan.

Senator, it's my understanding that the

informant we're talking about decided to break.off from the

group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of

the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off. This

was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off,

we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it

on his own.. We paid him for the information he furnished

us concerning the operation.

We did not sponsor the organiza-

tion.

Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that

he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that

organization?

Mr. Deegan.

He continued to advi:: us of that organization

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and other organizations. He would advise us of planned

activities.

Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed,

did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that

long..

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI

informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of

responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his

FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing

them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the

knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became - came in contact

with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-

pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and

this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with

the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the

knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime

prevention responsibilities.

MI. Deegan.. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular

case.

It does not square with our policy in all respects, and

I would have to look at that particular case you're

talking

about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on that

particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of

i

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control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind

of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you are supposedly trying to prevent.

Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became

active in an action group, and we told him to get out or

we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the

information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participaté

in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent

activities.

Senator Huddleston. That's what he said..

MI. Adams. I know that's what he said. But. that's

what

lawsuits are. all about, is that there. are. two sides to the

issue, and our agents. handling. this have advised. us, and I

believe have advised. your staff, that at no time did they

advise him to engage. in violence..

Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was. necessary to

get the information, I believe maybe might have been his

instructions.

MI. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement

to him along that line, and we have informants, we have

informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,

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and we have immediately converted their status from an informant

to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I

can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for

violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even

to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence

in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told

me that they found one case where their agent had been working

24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the

information to the police department. No violence.occurred,.

but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured

his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

for

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow

reasonable safeguards.in order to carry it out, including periodic

review of all informant. files..

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is

substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the

agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you

happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that

he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,.

and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead, but the

implication is that he would have to go along and would have

to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams.. There's no question but that an informant at

times. will have to be present during demonstrations, riots,

fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was

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to the effect that - and I was sitting in the back of the

room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were

beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat

someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did

because it's one thing being present, and it's

another thing

taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston.. He was close enough to get his

throat cut.

How does the gathering of information -

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here,

and I think that

we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should

we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more

question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of

information about an individual's personal life, social, sex

life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life

is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams.

Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.

Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no

such knowledge concerning it, and I can'= see where it would

be.of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston.. You aren't drate of any case where

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these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank You, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Senator

Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth

Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants

and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one

time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have

story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you

may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which

there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying

degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual

will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when

the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the

first

test is

a judicial warrant, and what I would like

to explore

with you is the difference between a one time seaich which

requires a warrant, and which you get

when you make that

search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or

the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover

agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a

slightly different category than an informant.

Mr. Adams.

well, we get there into the fact that

the

Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does

not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and

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if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't

protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected

item, but information and the use of informants have been

consistently held as not posing any constitutional problems.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about

the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,

but is it true that under existing procedures informants are

given background checks?

Mr. Adams.

Yes, Sir.

Senator Mathias.

And they are subject to a testing period.

Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they

are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-

ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the

handling agents.

Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very

practical way agents themselves to the FBI.

Mr. Adams.. They can do nothing --

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use

of the word.

Mr. Adams.

That's right, they can do nothing, and we

instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the

agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into

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an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and

glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the

Constitution as a protected area.

But we do have this problem.

Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a inember

of the FBI attémpted to enter these premises, he would require

a warrant?

MI. Adams. No, sir, if a regular - it depends

on the

purpose for which he is entering: If a regular agent by

concealing his identity, by - was admitted as a member of the

Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he

can enter the premises,

he can enter the building, and there's

no constitutionally invaded area there.

Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has

a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular

agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation

as an undercover.agent.or as an informant.--

Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you. why you feel that it is

impractical to. require a warrant since,.as I understand it,

headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that

degree of formal action required?

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Sen.

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Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity

which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You

have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify

what you're going after, and an informant operates in an

area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's

going. to be discussed at that meeting. It may be

a plot to

blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the

State Department building.

senator Mathias. If it were a crininal investigation,

you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't

you?

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Mr. Adams.

We would have difficulty in a warrant to

use someone as an informant in that area because the same

difficulty of paxticularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias.

I understand the problem because it's

very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection

say wiretaps on a national security problem.

Mr. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of

where the soviet, an individual identified as a soviet spy

in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy

there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't

show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that

he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,

we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements

which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the

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evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting

espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's

why we're still groping with it:

Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really,

you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.

Mr. Adams. That's right, except. for the fact that the

• President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this

nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all

national survival, and these are the areas that not only the

President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're

all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle

ground in here.

Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national

security area

as to curtazlling a warrant to that particular

need..

Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable

cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some

method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an

ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,

we may get their yet.

Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that

middle ground?

Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's

more of an open mind between'Congress and the Executive Branch

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and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these

areas resolved.

Senator Mathias. And you believe that the Department,

If we could come together, would support, would agree to that

kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

Mr. Adams.

If we can work out problems and the Attorney

General is

personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement night

extend to some of those other areas. that we talked about?

Mr. Adams. I think that that would be a nuch greater

difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who

reports on many different operations and different types of

activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet

espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a

little

more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get

together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the

meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that

would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney

7

General must approve a wiretap before it is placed,' and the

same general process could be used for informants, since

you come to headquarters any way. :

Mr. Adams.

That could be an alte sitive. I think it

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point after we attack, the major abuses, of what are considered

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major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think

we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies

have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency

and we can't just keep pushing every. operational problem up

to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests

itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally

with one level of information in one sense of gathering

information. You hear what you hear from the tap:

Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number

also.

Senator Mathias. Smaller nunber, but that's all the

more reason.

When an informant goes in, he has all of his

senses.

He's gathering all of the information a human being

can acquire from a situation and has access to more information

than the average wiretap.

And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel

process might be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main

distinction. to me which I had overlooked fron our prior

discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is

more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one

of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like

concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and

anything else

versus the wiretap itself where the individual

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whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is,

and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their

conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to

accept.

If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking

place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived

by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't

consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent

if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan

of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for

someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe

Senator llart

raised

earlier, that the courts thus far have made this.

distinction with no diffioulty,. but that doesn't mean that

there may not be some legislative compromise which might be

addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your

attitude in being willing to work on these problems because

I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from

these hearings,

so that we can actually look at the rourth

Amendment as the standard that we have to achieve. But the

way we get there is obviously going to i i

^ lot easier if we

can work toward them together.

I just have onc final question, 's. Chairman, and, that

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deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable

cause that a crime.

has been committed as a means of controlling

the use of informants and the kind of information that they

collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year

informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they

provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million

in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective

of what we give the local law enforcement and other rederal

agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost

reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much i

left. And in the intelligence field we still, I.

think when

we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure

that we have the means to gather information which will permit

us to be aware of the identity of individuals and, organizations

that are

acting to overthrow the government of the United

States. And I think we still'have some areas to look hard

at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to.

stay.

They

are absolutely essential to law enforcement.

22.

Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress

23

has informants, you have individuals in your connunity that

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you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know

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what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly,

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am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history

and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to

avoid is abuses. like provocateurs, criminal activities; and

to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.

But we do need informants.

Senator lower. Senator Hart, do you have any further

questions?

Senator llart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request

perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the

groups that we have discussed this morning into which the

Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our

liberal

groups - I would ask unanimous consent that. be printed in

the record, the

summary of the opening of the headquarters

file by the Bureau of DI. Carl McIntyre when he announced

that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil

Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups,"

is not a left only pre-occupation. '

Senator Tover. Without objection, so ordered.

(The material referied to follows:›

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Senator Tower. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this

afternoon in room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and

I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans,

Cartha DeLöach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys

General

Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00

a.m. tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the

above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday

December 3Id, 1975, at 10:00 d'clock,a.n.)

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

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EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE. BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY, ROWE,

FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

good

DECEMPER 2,

1975

p/s,

HANDLE

• - FOR

А тв

JENSTUDY

160-2368-14

• SEARCHED

INDEXED

SERIALIZED

DEC - R 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994- Docld:32176524 Page 101=

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to

spread dissention among certain groups that they are

informing on, do you not?

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were

discontinued

in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one

of the best examples of a situation where the law was

ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights

used much more than we hear today. We saw with the

Little Rock situation the President of the United States

sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use

local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement

use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a

situation like this where you do try to preserve the

respective roles

in law enforcement, you have historical

problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where

the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless

to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some

areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents

mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the

lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action

was taken with that information as he pointed out during

his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the infor-

mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We

also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.

And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no

authority in the absence of an instruction from the

Department of Justice to make an arrest.. Section 241

and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence

of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation

where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have

authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as

frustrated as

anyone else was, that when we got information

from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable

information--and it was passed on to those who had the

responsibility to do something about it, it was not always

acted upon as he indicated.

In none of these cases, then, there was adequate

evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

The Departmental rules at that time, and still do,

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.

You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you

have

no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil

Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

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QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This

was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--

the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we

were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking

wife are.

place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that

we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were

able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing

the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

....A local town meeting on a controversial social

issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers

rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this

mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups

organizing or participating in such meetings because

they may result in violent government disruption?

No sir, and we don't....

Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every

aspect of the peace movement?

No sir. (When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor

demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have

an investigative interest in, a valid investigative

interest in, or where members of one of these groups are

participating where there is a potential that they might

change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing

on the Ist Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

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aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers

in the past than we do at the present time. We have had

periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe

and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,

and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect

to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged

to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut

case.

QUESTION:

MR. WANNALI:

MR. ADAMS:

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and

we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one

that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor

the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-

ments fall.

In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just

heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when

violence was known about. I know we have asked this several

times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the

rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe

situation when violence was known.

Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to

that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be

the one to answer the question.

The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem

today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have

police powers even like

the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals

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## Page 106

since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had

authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We

are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,

and during these times the Department of Justice had us

maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the

information to the local police who had an obligation to

act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those

areas where the local police did not act. It resulted

finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals

down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to

march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there

was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the

country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement

agencies in the south at the time either, because many of

them did act upon the information that was furnished to

them.

But we have no authority to make an arrest on the

spot because we would not have had evidence that was a

conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in

that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for

instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army

should make them.

And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals

should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed

the violations.

We have over the years as you know at the

- 5 -

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## Page 107

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the

FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well,

we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan

as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we

exceeded

statutory guidelines in that area.

What would be wrong, just following up on your point

there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is

obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to

have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on

some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

We do.

We have them in Boston in connection with

the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in

Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same

time and this is the approach that the Federal Government

finally recognized.

On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that

kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting

till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from

the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need

a better remedy than we have.

Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have

subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or

50 's

and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on

potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

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NW 65994 •Docld:32176524-Page 107~.-

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## Page 108

QUESTION:

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with

state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice

and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to

protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a

lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government

had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during

the height of the effort to destroy the klans as you put it

a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that

we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another

infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member-

ship.

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

That's

right.

I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would

mean that 1 out of every 5 members of

the Klan at that point

was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the

figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members

in the Klan that year, were FBI informants. Isn't that an

awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such

as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants

in the klan and know what is going on to revert violence, but it

just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For

example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,

both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here

we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters

and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

NW 65994- Docld:32176524-Page 108 - ---

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## Page 109

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan

informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I

think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that

right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan

had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you

remember from MI. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in

the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the

hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was

going on because each one had an Action Group that

went out and

considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the

violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as

many informants as

you possibly can against it. Bear in mind

that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,

was concerned

about the murder of the three civil rights

workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous

problem at that time.

I acknowledge that.

our only approach was through informants. Through the

use of informants we solved these cases.

The ones that were

solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved.

They're extremely difficult, but, these

• informants as we.told

the Attorney General and as we

told the President, we moved

informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the

bodyguard to the head man.

He was in a position where he

could see that this could continue forever unless we could

NW-65994 Docld:32176524~Page 109--

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## Page 110

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

create enough disruption that these members will realize that

if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the

Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if

that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I

will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence

stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say

20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately

were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of

violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy

any longer.

I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in

1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a, black ghetto

situation?

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year

where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was

the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington,

areas

like this, we were given a mandate to know what the

situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They

weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an

organization. They were listening posts in the community that

would help

tell us that we have another

group here that is

getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

•.. Without going into that subject further of course we

have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt

was made to prevent

crime when you had information that it

was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where

you have.

NW 65994 Docld:32176524-Page 110--

-9-

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## Page 111

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

Io a police department which you knew was an accomplice to

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

the crime.

Not necessarily knew.

Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

The informant is on one level. We have other informants

and we have other information.

You were

aware that he had

worked with certain members of

the Birmingham Police in order...

That's right. ' He furnished many other instances also.

So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that

incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the

time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department

agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.s.

Marshals down to perform certain law

enforcement functions.

...This brings up the point as to what kind of control

you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this

kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

A good

example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in

an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer

using him as an informant in spite of the information he had

furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

But you also told him to participate in violent activities

NW 65994 Docld:32176524~Page 111--

---

## Page 112

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

That's what he said.

I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits

are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our

Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your

staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage

in violence.

Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

I do not think they made any such statement to him

along that line either and we have informants who have gotten

involved in

the violation of a law and we have immediately

converted their status from an informant to the subject andi

have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around

20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws

once it came to our attention

and even to show you our policy

of disseminating information on violence in this case during

the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they

found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a

day and he was a little late in disseminating the information

to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed

up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in

properly notifying local authorities. So we not only

have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards

in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all

informant files.

MI. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with

an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

NW 65994 •Docld:32176524^Pag€ 112"

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## Page 113

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

to be a Klansman and he

happened to be with someone and they

decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are

words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't

take the lead but the implication is that he would have

to go along or would have to be involved if he was going

to maintain his liability as a --

There is no question that an informant at times will

have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights

that take place but I believe his statement was to the

effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do

not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with

chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with

a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is.

one thing being present, it is another thing taking an

active part in a criminal action.

It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut

apparently.

How does the collection of information about an

individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming

involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for.

law enforcement or crime prevention.

Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that

they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge

concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any

value whatsoever.

NW 65994 *Docld:32176524 Page 113---

-12-

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## Page 114

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

You don't know of any such case where these instructions

were given to an Agent or an informant?

To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

-13

NW 65994 Docld:32176524-Page 114----- ~~

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## Page 115

NRO5O WA PLAIN

11:32PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS U

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 1D, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S

QUESTIONS TO

• ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE

WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS

ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANIS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANIS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

Sup 3F1

1166-2743

SEARCHED.

_INDEXED

SERIALIZED, LOS FILED eN

DEC Z 0 1975

ASAC

FBI - OKLAHOINE

6

Kw

62-4107-11

1M 55199

DocId: 32989781

Page 24

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 115

---

## Page 116

PAGE. TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

• THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM ‹MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCI;

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARIMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

• REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY.

MH 55199 DocId: 32989781 Page 25

NW 65994 Docld:32176524 Page 116

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## Page 117

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF

• MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL®

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENI AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

55199

329893 81

NW 65994-Bolds2413229 Page 1a2-

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## Page 118

PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY•

END

HH 55199 DocId: 32989781 Page 27

NW 65994- Docld:32176524 Page 118

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## Page 119

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 7-11-75)

TO: SAC:

EJ Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffilo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas.

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

(Capies to Offices Checked!!

J. Houston

j Indianapolis

Jack son

J Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

Ness Orleans

New York City

Norlolk

TO LEGAT:

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Fracisco

San Juan

Savannali

Seattle

Springlicld

Tampo

Washington Field

Quantico

Bem

Bonn

Brisilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawva

Paris

Rome

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

Date

December 5, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR--

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

12/2/75:

Retention

For appropriate

• For information I optional l

action

• E Surep, by -

La The enclosed is for your intonnation. If used in a future ruport, boy conceul all

sources, E paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected puges from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S Of 12/4/75 which provided

excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

Attached for your information and

assistance, is the complete transcript of

above-referenced testimony.

EnC. (1)

UNEDITEO TRANSCRIPT

Bufile

Urfile

I 83a 8h0531982 BeTa: 292asda are 24* 2368-16

---

## Page 120

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION:

WASHINGTON, D.G. 20535

FOR RELEASE

10. A.M., EST

'WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975

62-2368-13

SEARCHED

SERIALIZIO ReC _FILED -

FID 0 kec

DEC 1 & 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994^ Docld:32176524-Page 120 --...

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## Page 121

I welcome the interest which this Committee

has shown in the FBI and most particularly. in our

operations in the intelligence and internal security

-fields.

I share your high regard for the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement

you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed

by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that :

are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of

legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment

as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate

Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told

the members

of that Committee of my firm belief in

Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most

exhaustive study of our intelligence and security

operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone

NW 65994- Docld:32176524-Page 121 ~

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## Page 122

outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.

At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and

promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in

responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have

had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct

security-type investigations and who are personally involved

in

every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI

officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee

and its staff with all major areas of our activities

and operations in the national security and intelligence

fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of

these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history

of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings

have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors

and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright

recognition that the hearings do not give a full or

balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

- 2 -

NW 65994-Docld:32176524- Page 122 -

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## Page 123

It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings

to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments

of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have

received the lion's share of public attention and critical

comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over-

all work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed

last year to conduct à thorough study of the FBI's

Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the

•five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals

were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this

total, 2,370 - less

than three-fourths -- were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3, 247

proposals were being devised, considered, and many were

rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average

of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been

expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs

is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had

in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have

done less than it did under the circumstances then existing

would have been an abdication of its responsibilities

to the American people.

NW-65994-Đocld<32176524 Page-123 -

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## Page 124

What

I said then -- in 1974 - and what I believe

today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs

did what they felt was expected of them by the President,

the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of

the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private

offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and

educational

facilities; and killings, maimings, and

other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence

from New England to California..

The victims of these acts were human beings

men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril --

whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government,

their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and

other law

enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their

property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members

of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged

by demands... impatient demands...for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt

they had

a responsibility to respond; and,.

in good faith,

NW 65994- Docld:32176524~Page 124 -

- 4

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## Page 125

initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial

efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and

to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made. -

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred

in the Counterintelligence Programs - and there were

some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying

purpose of those

programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred

in the past and will arise in the future where the

Government may well be expected to depart from its

traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi-

gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take

affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent

threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to

be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities

by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or

should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those

instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because.

• of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate

and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of

- 5 -

NW-G5994-Đocld:32176524-Page 125 - -

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## Page 126

whether or not such preventive action should be available

to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed

by a task force in the Justice Department, including, the

FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and

controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent

Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are

used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here

today is what assurances can I give that the errors

and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence

Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some

very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the

FBI's methods of operations

since I took the oath of

office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness

openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank

discussion in the decision-making process which

insures that no future program or major policy decision

will ever be adopted without a full and critical review

of its propriety.

- 6 -

NW 65994-Docld:32176524 Page 126 -

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## Page 127

Participatory management has become a fact

in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters

and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless

of position or degree of experience, to contribute their

thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms

or reservations they may have concerning any area of our

operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine,

and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to

achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without

in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command

structure.

The results of this program have been most

beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined

performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition,

since some of the mistakes of the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities

outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward

Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability --

in his own words - "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper

requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any

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requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper

or which, considering the context of the request, 'I believed

presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I

have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two

and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and

three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or

made overtures - directly or otherwise -- to use the

FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment

consider honoring any such request.

I can

assure you, too, in my administration of

the FBI

I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney

General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those which arise in my continuing review of our

operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise

his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the

FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think

that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon

the character of the person who occupies the office of

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

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I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with

whom it is my honor to serve today.

Their dedication,

their professionalism, their standards, and the self-

discipline which they personally demand of themselves

and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate

assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times

by the FBI.

The Congress and

the members of this Committee

in particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields -

problems which all too often we have been left to resolve

without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or

the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment

have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause

of our failures should confine his search solely to the

FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the

mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been

exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in

1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established

a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been

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commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum

participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts

are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study

this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have

gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But

I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if

they do not lead to the next step -- a step that I believe

is absolutely essential - a legislative charter, expressing

Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for

the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us

in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed;

and

it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither

the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other

way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as

too often

has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a

continuing role, not in the initial decision-making

process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance

upon the courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some

proposals that have been advanced during these hearings

would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages

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of the investigative process

and, thereby, would take

over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend; if unchecked,

would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary

and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors

of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a

substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive

decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable

determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence

field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the

American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police

officer -- a career police.officer. In my police experience,

the most 'frustrating of all problems that I have discovered

facing law enforcement in this country - Federal, state, or

local -- is when demands are made of them to perform

their traditional role as protector of life and property

without clear and understandable legal bases to do

SO .

I recognize that

the formulation of such a

legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding

task.

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It must be sufficiently flexible that it

does not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the

growing incidence of crime and violence across the

United States. That charter must clearly address the

demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply

recognize the fact that times change and so also do

the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that, the Department of Justice has

commenced the formulation of operational

guidelines

governing our intelligence activities does not in any

manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility

for conferring jurisdiction resides with

the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals

which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting

that information needed for the prevention of violence can

be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as

an intelligence investigation

may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.. But

there are some fundamental differences

between these

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investigations that should be recognized - differences

in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In

the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it

remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator

and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. . Since

the investigation normally follows the elements of the

crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly

well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves

the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence.

The purpose may well be not

to prosecute, but rather

to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has

enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency.

The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell

us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent

on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation,

in turn, is dependent on advance information - that

is intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on

these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident

that the continuing need for intelligence work can be

documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress.

We

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recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests.

of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen

of this country. We recognize also that

the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. Io this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee

or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance

as Director that we will carry out both the letter and

the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

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Vol. 20

Ohe United Statra Srnate

copy 5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Incelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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STATEMENT OF :

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The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley;

Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-

stigation

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975':

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10

o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,

the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of

the Committee)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Hudaleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and

Mathias.

Also present:

William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick

Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles

Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob

Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,

Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff. Members.

The Chairman.

The Committee's witness this morning is

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the Honorable Clarence M.. Kelley, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a

troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative

law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City

Police Department for over ten

years, and his previous work as

a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified

to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation

extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over

the past months.

The Committee is also impressed by the

openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and

their willingness to consider the need for legislation to

clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this

Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's '

activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic

intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed

our

admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative

and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance

of counterespionage in

the modern world. But domestic

intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather

than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light

in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

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Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director

Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous

policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse..

The

FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-

gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.

The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in

developing policies and standards for intelligence. These

are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.

Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the

Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress

should take into account in thinking about the future of

FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-

lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons

likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be

outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain

types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;

whether foreign related intelligence activities should be

strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement

functions,

and what should be done to the information already

in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in

the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange

of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice

Department in the next months as the Committee considers

recommendations that will strengthen the American people's

confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That

confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal

law and for the security of the nation against foreign

espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if

you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off

with, please proceed.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and

gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in

the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-

gence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my

35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-

tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs

of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with

law.

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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative

oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of

the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary

Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of

that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study

of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been

undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other

than the present

Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest

cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as

possible in responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

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I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-

dented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type

investigations and who are personally involved in every facet

of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who

have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with

all major areas of our activities and operations in the national

security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these

matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the

Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of

necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I

credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the

hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's

record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus

on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the

organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the

•lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted

/ an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence

Programs has reported that in the five basic ones. it found

3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI

Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. 0f this total, 2,370,

less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat,

the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were

being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era

when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative'

matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed

regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate

and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when

I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it

did under the circumstances then existing would have been an

abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is

that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they

felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,

the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and

buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid seige

to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and

killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such

acts of violence from

New England to California.

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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,

and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or

perceived, they looked to their Goverrment, their elected and

appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies to protect their

lives, their property, and their

rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress

and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other

law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient

demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a

responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions

designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed

revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-

intelligence Programs, and there were

some substantial ones,

should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the

past and will arise in the future where the Government may well

be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's

case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering

agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent threat to human life or property.

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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried

out now; can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating

only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the

ability to

prevent? I refer to those instances where there is

a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to

human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,

the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such

preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task

force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,

and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can

be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress

to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible

manner.

Probably the most important. question here today is what

assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose

under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-

stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's

methods of operations since I took the oath of office as

Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness

both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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NW 65994 Đocld:32176524 -Page 146

in the decision-making process which insures that no future

: 1=f.

program or major policy decision will ever'be adopted without a

full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

First.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and

Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of

position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts

and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or

reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take

full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum

critical analysis among

our personnel without in any manner

weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to

me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and

to

the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past

were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's

guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his

own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi

instructed that I immediately report to him any requests

or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering the context of the request, I believed presented

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the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the

Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as

Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no

one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,

to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper

purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider

honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI

I routinely bring to the attentión of the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including

those which arise in my continuing review of our operations

and

practices.

These are discussed openly and candidly in order

that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities

over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today

is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity

can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the

character of the person who occupies the office of the

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is

my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,

their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the

nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct

at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in

particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,

problems which all too often we have left to resolve without

sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch of the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been

made.

But no one who is looking for the cause of our

failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for

FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the

Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI

Oversight.

Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully

committed to maximum participation with the members of that

Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very

recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee

has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex

problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

NW 65994 Docld:32176524_Page 148

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those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next

step,

a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative

charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence,

jurisdiction for the FBI.

as farce.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the

security. and intelligence

fields is urgently needed; and it

must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Cangress

nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to

the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in

the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role

not in the initial decision-making process but in the review

our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the

, courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that

have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role

of the courts into the early stages of the investigative

process and, thereby, would take over what historically have

been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would

seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast

them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our

Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for con-

gressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional

statement that the Congress finds

" to be responsive to both

the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer,

career police officer. In my police experience, the must

frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing

law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is

when demands are made of them to perform their traditional

role as protector of life and property without clear and

understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative

charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle

the FBI's effectiveness

in combating the growing incidence

of crime and violence across the United States. That charter

must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;

yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and

so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced

the formulation of operational guidelines governing our

intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need

for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-

diction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

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question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that

information needed for the prevention of violence can be

acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may

well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there

are some fundamental differences between these investigations

that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective

and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case,

crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to

identify the perpetrator and to

collect sufficient evidence

for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows

the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is

limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of

information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be

not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the

Government has enough information to meet any future crisis

or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it

must. tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on

our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-

gence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need

for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction

of the Congress.

We recognize that what is at stake here is not

the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every

citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Conmittee or

its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as

Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit

of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note

that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary

Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented

to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time

I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result

in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.

I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that

time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of

the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I

have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this

not as

self-serving statement but in order that we might

place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek

sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the

period these things occurred I was with the local police

department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,

however; I

was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I

was with the police department, I continued throughout that

period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for

the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based

on those observations, we have here a very fine and very

sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there

is much that can still

be done. I know that we are not without

fault. I know that from those experiences I have had.. We

will not be completely without fault in the future.'

But I

assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any

mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at

this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want

to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a

matchless organization, one which I continue to say was

not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of

them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am

only putting in your thinking my objective observations as

a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this

organization. It is too precious

for us to have it in

a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able

to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one

question he would like to ask.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias ánd I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm

' sure they'll be

covered by others, but

the ones that I have is a result of

reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and

it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the

top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about

extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations

suggesting that this might take us beyound the

role contemplated

for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national

security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions

and concern has been on the possibility requiring. court

approval for the use of informants, informants directed to

penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,

pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive

type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device.

It's

really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy

than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere.

He

can ask me questions to get information the government would

like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the

wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate

screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the

informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a

general warrant, and I don't see why, requiring court approval

would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to

my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the

informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.

It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,

by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use

of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.

You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have

basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection

Of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within

the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary

circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and

seizure, which, of course,

can't be unreasonable, but none-

theless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,

we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing

our

job.

Now I'm not arguing with you, senator, that it is not an

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unusual procedure. I'In not even going to say that it is not

an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think

that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that

are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking

jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we

could present the matter to the court but what are they going

to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to

have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.

Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court

given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration

of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my

idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over

the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are

going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this

is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your

reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to

prohibit informants. I was reflecting a

view that I felt and

hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a

third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is

warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand

your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have

questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your

organization and I personally regret that the organization is

in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that

it is, along with other agencies and departments of the:

government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though

that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects

unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives

us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,

at least, to improve the level of competency and service of

the government itself.

With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to

volunteering

for me any suggestions you have on how to improve

the

responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or

indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,

to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on

how you would provide the methods! the access, the documents,

the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its

essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to

see that these functions, these delicate functions are being

undertaken properly?

And before you answer, let me tell you two ór three things

I

am concerned about.

It hasn't been Jong ago that the FBI Director was not

even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe

you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the

United States. I think that is a movement

in the right

direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an

additional importance that requires

it to have closer supervision

and scrutiny by us.

•

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become

involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney

General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that

the Attorney General

needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the

FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the

intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so

that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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look at these decisions and the process by which they were s

made to decide that you are or you are not performing your

services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have

, access to records, and in many cases records don't exist

and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now

departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality

of service of your agency?

How would you propose that you

increase

the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the

United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving

the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that

is required?

Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering

this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure fron telling

what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,

one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very

important is that the position of Director, the one to which

great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will

properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going

over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most

necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means

of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency

toward consulting with other members of the official family,

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that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with

no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen

very

carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those

matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a

second? Who

does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for

the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,

for the Justice Department, for

the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the

FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,

but I think this is such an

important field of influence that

it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the

judiciary, the legislative, and of course, ve are under the

• Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea

of the President of the United States calling the Director of

the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that

the relationship between the FBI Director and the President

is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited

through the ittorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

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has been traditionally some acceptance of

the fact that if

the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he

may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter

report to the

Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I

have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this

was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that

says the President has to go through the Attorney General,

although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary

for the pursuit of effective oversight on the, part of the

Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least

some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of

the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in

a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in

the event I receive such an order, to request that it be

documented: This is a protection as well as a clarification

as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation

I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-

tion.

I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it

can be worled very easily.

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Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney:

General Levi, I

believe, has already established some sort of agency or

function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,

suppose, of an Inspector General. of the Justice Department,

including the EBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has

taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of

professional Responsibility.

MI. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker. Do you have any conment on that? Will

you give us any observations as to whether you think that

will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or

helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your

relationship to it in the future?

MI. Kelley. I don't object

to this, which is to some

extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the

Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it

completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely

subscribe.

Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending

that

concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector

General who is involved with an oversight of all of the

agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionall

protected rights of the individual citizen? would you care

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to comment on that, of would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about

it and let us know what you think about it?

MI. Kelley. I will..

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much.

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mt. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that

existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during

this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the

Bureau felt like they were

doing what was expected of them

by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and

the people of the United

States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction

there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the

country because of certain circumstances rather than any

clear and specific direct instructions that might have been

received

from proper authorities? And if that is the case,

is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,

to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can

logically be incorporated and that --

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuin

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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the

attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because -

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contenplate it might be

a continuing danger, but it certainly would be a very acceptable

guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems

to arise, know what we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which

Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can

provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the

court in determining what action might be proper and specific -

ally in

protecting individual's rights, can't we also

provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various

techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact,

as

has already been done, that informants are necessary and

desirable.

How do we leep that informant operating within the

proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual

rights?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must

be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure

that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten

into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that, the

particular action was necessary, that there was a present

threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been

necessary to have addressed the original threat.:

How do we keep within the proper

balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any

other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's

right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.

There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels

the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,

I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but

there is

still supervisory control over that agent and over that

informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing

basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point

as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be

very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone

else.

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whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported

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Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the

past.

Mr. Kelley. "ell, I don't know what you're referring

to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence

of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that

have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to

light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

The question that I'm really concerned about is as

we attampt to draw a guideline and charters that would give

the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide

range of threats, how do we control what happens within each

of those actions to keep them from going beyond what

was intended to begin with?

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MI. Kelley.

You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents

themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever

intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though

we

may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do

we control the techniques that might be used, that in themselves

might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation

of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's

germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed

out that the association to, the relationship between

the

informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,

and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-

lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors

here

because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.

Insofar as the activities of agents, informants of others

which may_be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of

violations of the law on the part of informants, and either

prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the

United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.

We have done this on many'a time, many occasions. Insofar

as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the

Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and

if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

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pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston.

But it could be helped by periodic

review.

MI. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the

activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection

Division, and

they have a clear charge to go over this as well

as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed. out the

difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in

gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to

attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the

departments, for instance, with not having a nixing of

gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the technique:

definable and different?:

MI. Kelley. Senator, I think they are

compatible. I

see no objection to the way that they are now being handled

on a management basis. I think, as a

matter of fatt, it is

a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as

it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes

information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present

time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for

information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him

to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether

or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such

project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must

come from MI. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,

wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with

a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as

I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in

take care that you just don't follow the request of some

underling who does not truly reflect the desire of

the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about :

techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad

projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional

oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department

with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have

some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent

with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent

with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the

översight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now

see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put

on the use of that information once it has been supplied by

the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions

now?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge

in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason

for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a

very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're

going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules

that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information

your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment

of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I

do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some

inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to

who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed

on what the request, and what they can do with it after they

get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact

that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

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bound to gather a great deal of information about some

individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-

gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras

sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any

effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's

file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific

purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to

doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the

guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which

is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-

able.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time

that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,

too.

Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to

speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the

President of the United States from calling up the head of

the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement

problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction

to the agency.

But how about that?

What about White House personnel

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informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll

discuss our

present activities. I think this is the only way. that we can

exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to

accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect

of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad

direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects

that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such

things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence

is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this

type of thing, it seems to

me

we are leaving a wide gap

again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction

and total permission to move in a certain direction and go

beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI

electronic surveillance of DI. King, several tapes of

specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were

produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

MI. Kelley. Yes, siI.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

MI. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater.

Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.

I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of

this particular section. There has been no review of them

since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to

the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear

them?

Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is

of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to

be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the

Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and •

decided that it would compound the original error for the

staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still

further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from

insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was

unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get

what. we needed to know about the king case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue

never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information

before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of

the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,

and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

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ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase

or whether there was, in effect, some reason... Again, I am

not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would

•be available if the Committee took 'a vote to hear them and

decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-

diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the

Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance

routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a

target of inguiry?

Mr. Kelley. They

are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Golawater.

Ten years.

MI. Kelley. Yes,

sir.

Senator Goldwater.

What is the future value, if any,

to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a

destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those

occasions where we think that matters might come up within

that period of time which may need the retention of them, we

will express our opinion at that time, but other than that

we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate

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with respect to retention of such information, or do we need

the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials

when the investigation purposes. for which they were collected

have been served?

MI. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close

look at the retention of material, and we would of course

like

to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank.

you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. MI. Director, it seems to me that the

most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the

invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,

limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can

and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,

and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and

Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at

criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we

go beyond the authority imposed

upon us to get into political

ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to

draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are

restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

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crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather

than to leave this very difficult to define and control area

of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last

statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that

I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue

in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory

objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based

on statutes in the so-called security field, national or

foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should

be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this

atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have

more personnel working together, covering the same fields..

I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence

matters, because it is a concomitant: It naturally flows

from the investigation of the security matters and the

criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what MI: Stone said was

this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned

with political of other opinions of individuals. It is

concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws

of the United States.

When the police system goes beyond

these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of

justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more

sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's

area of concern some matters which were probably not as important

at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in

touch with the security investigations and the gathering of

intelligence is something which has proved to be at times

troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,

productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely

of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if

that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that

at that point it becomes

so difficult to guarantee, and in

fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't

see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in

the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of

meaningful oversight on a

function as nebulous as the one

you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate

ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's

security, particularly in the light of the record that we have

seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-

cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,

war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developer

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2489

that would provide any basis for oversight?

How can you, from among other things, be protected from

criticism later on that you exceeded your authority of didn't

do something that

some politician tried to pressure you into

doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years

from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be

criticized for doing that which today is construed as very

acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy

for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

MI. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And

the Director especially, and that is

why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines

as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured

to do things, of when, after the fact, people with good 20/20

hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say

well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-

ally say this, and that is your answer.. We have to live by

the law.

If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me

that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's

possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to

be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what

you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

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Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a

great lesson by virtue of watergate, the revelations that have

come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact

that I think that we have a different type of spirit today

in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,

that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they

are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact

that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the

organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we

had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in

the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions,

because we must equate this with the need

and with our

experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're

going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a

flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those

guidelines.

Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think

there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified

law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI:

think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,

from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of

enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you

are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal. field, you

get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that

the

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2491

great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably

going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no

matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get

into trouble.

MI. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost

every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter

of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate

from the normal course.. I feel that within the Bureau there is

less likelihood of this to happen, 'and I think that working

with you we can at least make

some achievements that will be

significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I

think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August

9th, you said we must be willing

• to surrender a small measure

of

our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-

understood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to

clear it up.

MI. Kelley. All that was intended here was.

a restatement

of the approach which the courts historically have used in

resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its

recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth

Amenament, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it

does

not prohibit searches and seizures.. I mention, 'it only

refers to those that are unreasonable....

I came from the police fiedd. What is more restrictive

to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be

more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We

do have to , in order to love in the complexities and

intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our

rights.

Some may construe this as an extravagant statement.

If it

is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there

has to be a balance.

Senator Mondale.

So that when you say we have to give

up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you

mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch: that and ask again, you

have to give up some tights.

Which rights would you have us

give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would

have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the fourth Amend-

ment right.

•

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale.

What right do you have in mind?

Mr, Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

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Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the consti-

tution.

you can have such seizures,

but they must be reasonable,

under court warrant.

Did you mean to go beyond that?.

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able

,to go beyond

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that?

MI. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever

go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale.

well, would you say, Mt. Kelley, that

that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I

made a mistake, because I

should never make a statement which

yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in

law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were

saying something different, that it was taken to mean something

different than I think you intended:

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law

enforcement powers, the rights of individuals

is determined

by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling

of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley.

Senator, I ought to have you write my

speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that

in effect, the rights; of the American people can be determined

not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the

law.

You meant that.

MI. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of

Colorado. Mr.

Kelley, in response to

a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about

laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was

we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the

Congress,. lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably

hamper you from investigations of crime control in the

country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area

that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind

of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau

from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political

figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least

• two of your

predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.

Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use

the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish !

some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer

restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is

not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you

from political pressures?

I'd be interested in that sign of the

coin, if you would.

MI.

Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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protect me or any successor from this type of thing.. I think

that would be splendid. I have not revieved the guidelines

as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might

be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any

consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been

a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley: I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the

Congress ought to address?

MI. Kelley. I think so.

Senator lart of Colorado. The Committee received a

letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the

Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying

out the investigation of their efforts to review the investi-

gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther

King, JI:, in order to determine whether that investigation

should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked

for our transcripts, the testimony before the Conmittee, all

material provided to the Committee

by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-

ment asking this Comnittee for FBI files?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.

I think they're asking for what testimony was given by

witnesses whose

testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department

asking this Conmittee for material provided to us by the

FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I

just ask -

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.

Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did

they have a copy also?

Yes, they had a retained copy. I

don't know why.

Senator Mart of Colorado. So there's nothing you

provided us that's not available

to

the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why

an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee

for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Ilart of Colorado. You released a statement on

November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's counter-intelligence

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program and you said you made a detailed

study" of cOINTELpRo

activities and reached the following conclusions,"

and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was

to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against

individuals, organizations and institutions both public

and private across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this

Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of

occasions he planned violent acts against black people in

groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the

FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that

I have quoted?

Mr. lelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of

his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.

We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it

and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes

and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony

he gave us under oath was not accurate?

MI. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,

and I quote:

"I want to assure you that Director Hoover dia

not conceal from

superior authorities the fact that the FBI

was

engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony. that the New

Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact

told to higher

authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,

but in terms of the bulk of COINTEl programs, the record

seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic

information flowing upward through the chain of command to

Director Hoover's superiors?

Mx .

Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity

to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of. Colorado.

Sure.

Mr.

Kelley: Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in

passing, do you agree with the statement made by President

Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy

DI.

King should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders

the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say

that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar

as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said

to do it and those who are responsible.:

I: took the responsibility for any such program and I

don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have

some reservation, but they do it on my orders.

I'accept that

responsibility.

I think that it should rest on those who instructed that

, that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people

who give the orders should be brought to justice.

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Mr.. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley.

No.

The Chairman. Not. quite?

Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, li. Chairman.

The Chairnan. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the

COINTELPRO program and other political involvenents of the

IBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three

basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee

is concerned, we're now turning our attention to

remedies for

the future, what I would think

would be our constructive

legislative work, it is very important that we focus on hat

we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of

the United States have fron time to time ordered the FBI to

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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the

necessary surveillance to obtain. and to have a purely

political character, that they simply wanted to have for their

own personal purposes.

I think

that you would agree that that is not a proper

function of the FBI,, and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,

including the Director, to turn down a President of the United

States if he receives a direct order from the President. It

is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,

I will resign. But that puts a

very hard burden on any man

serving in your position, particularly if the President puts

a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or

even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say,

you know,

I an considering Senator White for an important

position in my administration, and I need to know more about

his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause

for concern

and I want to be certain that there is nothing in

his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you

to keep

careful track of him and report to me on what he's

been doing lately.

It's

difficult for you to say back to the President, it.

president, that's a very questionable activity for the FbI,

and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real

reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and

you want to get something on him.:

I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that

way, and I'm wondering what we cauld do in the way of protecting

your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this

basic charter that we write.

Now, I vant your suggestions, but let's begin with one

or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that

any order given

you

either by the president of by the Attorney General should be

transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective

and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain

those written orders and that furthermore they would be

available: to any oversight committee of

the Congress. If the

joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee

would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that

orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or

unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind

into a charter for the FBI?

Ir. Kelley. I would say writing into the law

any order

issued by, the President that is a request for action by the

Attorney General

should be in writing, is certainly, in my

opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes

or some that will say no, but I think we could define an

area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could

do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee

of Congress, I would say generally, that I certainly would have

no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request

for something of high confidentiality that the President might

put in writing such as some national or foreign security

matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a

great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review

be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it rould

present a problem.

I have said previously

that I feel I can discuss every-

thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight

committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we

proceeded with this Cormittee. It has worked pretty well,

I think.

Now Senator Goldvater brought up a question on the

Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question,

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs

to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and

since

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Di. King has long since been violently removed irom the scéne,

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why are they preserved? Thy aren't they simply destroyed?

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Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable

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the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information

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that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never

have connected the person with any criminal activity? And

yet, all of that information just stays there in the files

year after year.

what can we do? How can

a law be changed? If that's

not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down

there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Mell, of course, we do have the rule that

they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your

question and why right now are they maintained? Since we

do maintain everything since the inquiry has

started and until

that's lifted, ve can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines

or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be

soile

flexibility and I know that's a

broad statement but there

might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation

himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I thin; you have to deliberate this very carefully, but

it can he done and we are willing to be guided by those

rules.

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The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting/

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thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

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to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I

ever see an FBI agent is when he comes. around and flashes his

badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.

so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.

And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that

as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that

is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved

is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that

file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it

in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old

neighhorhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley.

We have some capability of destroying some

files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. He

have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial

and is developed in cases involving certain members of the

Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not be a proper area

for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much

do you have records that would tell us how much time and moncy

is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands

of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments

to Federal offices?

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Ir. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not

have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost

for the investigation of rederal appointees --

The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other

information that would indicate to us what proportion of the

time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of

activity:

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but

I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the

approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is

a matter we need riore information about. And when you supply

that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number

of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,

but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,

enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the

reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Inrough '70?

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The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

The other matter that is connected to this same subject

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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate

routine Federal offices that are nöt particularly sensitive

in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI

checks.

And so when you respond to the series of questions, I

wish you would include the offices that are now covered by

such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the

rederal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes,

sir.

The Chairnan. Fine.

No! there is a vote. The vote alvays comes just at

the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional

questions for the record, and there may be other questions:

too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask

Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going

to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,

iir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the

way you have cooperated with the Conmittee in the course of

its investigation during the past months.

Mir. Kelley. Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope,

as you do, that as a result

of the work of the Conmittee ie can write a generic law for

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the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll

encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement =-

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third

full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then

to question about what you said.' "We must recognize that

situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the

future where the Government may well be expected to depart from

its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps

which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or

property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what

kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your, general

principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to

that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an

employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's

going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you

have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures,

and

so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent

threat to human life or property.

MI. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it of something, and

he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you

can

extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the

traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

Mr.. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not

gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had

not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,

are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of

human life or property?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act

to buy the poison of to get in the car with the poison, there

is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.

a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,

and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think

take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times

they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to

kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's

not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

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kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreing with me. You're saying

on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible

threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where

we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't

say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to

the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that

we should act independently because maybe we don't have the

judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do

think that we should report it and thereafter see what can

be done.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of

our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mx. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible

threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now; would a fair standard for either action, other than

arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to

prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other

than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what' you have

in mind?

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Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever

is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as

impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz.. You mean have him lose his job or --

MI. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz.

Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening

an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with

a standard which said you would have to have an immediate

threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal

crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out

so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mt. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit

you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from

what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might

be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to

do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for

you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able

to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

MI. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening

of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the

test

immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving

violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz.

Yes.

Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist

activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities

under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United. States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where

it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic

group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious

federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and

they have been well defined as to what is the possible

opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been

discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,

but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations

over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the

most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some

intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of

short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the

intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley.. By intelligence investigation, yes, you

are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and

what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined

with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley,

and

I

appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

MI. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has

been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-

mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that

relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood

of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to

collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning

let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the

political views of a person on the other?

MI. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what

many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define

this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that

within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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lives,

there might be something that is relevant. I would say

ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I

think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or

some view that advocates violence of the overthrow of the

government.

Mr. Schwarz.

Would those be the two limits on political

views?

MI. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political

views that you think are

okay to collect, advocants of violence

or advocants of overthrow?

MI. Kelley. Weil, I don't think because he's a Democrat

or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,

but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's

a member of some other organization.

Mr. Schwarz.

Is the standard you used on collection of

sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything

might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of

balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's

justifiable to collect that kind of information on American

citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been

included in some reports as a

result of the requirement that

that is what is required by our rules, that when a person

reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofa:

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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,

I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether

or not this is something we should retain, and we would not

object to anything reasonable in that regard.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its

applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King

case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to

open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive

groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is

received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group

or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used

in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be

open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of

clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups

inasmuch

as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-

trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered

organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the

benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz.. But is the answer to my question yes, that

under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be

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Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only

of the standards for initially opening

an investigation of a

group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-

gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals

or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely.

I E

you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we

then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the

infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation

of them without any basis for doing so other than that they

are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but

off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz.

Thank you very much.

MI. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of

inqúiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel. was

raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you

talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between

intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions.

Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,

indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects

to distinguish some of this has been made.

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-NW-65994 Docld:32176524 Page 208

Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage

effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the

Domestic

Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of

this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's

law enforcement position?

Mr.

Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does

a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background

of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which

all counterintelligence people have is very helpful'. It is help-

ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also

enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding

of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that

spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type

of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission

if within the Bureau guidelines

were established that

effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of

the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a

situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist

the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question

that there should be access to it-

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that

intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing

of lines there with the information legitimately needed for

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law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide

dissemination, because that just numerically increases-the

possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything

of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile

to review

the dissemination rules to make them subject to

close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about

the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department

regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the

King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel!

I think it would be helpful for our record here to have

some

insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that

an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved

improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it

routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of

procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for

Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the

great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative

Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

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occasion, be a designation

of a special task force made up,

perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is

handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be

reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary

step?

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I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,

I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the

Bureau police itself; and then secondly, is the Department of

Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with

the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered

the action against king should be the subject of investigation

and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those

activities which we construe as improper or possibly. illegal.

There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised

of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own

investigating, and this is something that we feel is a

decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we

have within our own organization sufficient capability to

handle that. But we do not protest it.. It is handled

independently of us.

Mr. Smothers.

Thank you.

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the chair.)

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## Page 212

Raitina

0-7 (Rex

2-17-73)

TO: SAC:

00

Al hany

Mbnquerque

de'randria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Ballimore.

Binningham

Boston

Buffalo

Bulte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dillas

Denver

Detroil

• El Paso

Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked)

Ilouston

I Indianapolis

Jack son

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knosville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orl cans

New York City

Norfolk

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacrumento

St. Louis

Sall Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

Saul Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfeld

T'ump a

Washington Field

Quanlico

TO LEGAT:

C) Beirut.

Born

Bọnn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Carcas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

I Tokyo

12/30/75

RE:

Date

PIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,

DECEMBER 10, 1975

Retention

For appropriate

My for information = optional E

action

→ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

sources, E paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remorks:

conceal all

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is

one copy of the transcript of questions which

vere asked ME Kelley during captioned appearance,

rong with Mr kelley's answers to those questions.

+1 467-2854-557

SEARCHED

. INDEXED

SERIALIZED WE FILED

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

JANZ 1976

FBI - ATLANTA

Pare 747

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