Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 03/15/1976
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

FK Assassination Syster

Identification Forr

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10128

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-34

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

DATE: 03/15/1976.

PAGES: 76

SUBJECTS :

SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/22/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: CCBOX 324

v9.1

DocId: 32423516

Page 1

---

## Page 2

Date :

Page:

08/07/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

: 157-10014-10128

RECORDS SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-34

DOCUMENT

INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

:03/15/76

PAGES:

76

SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

:

COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DocId: 32423516

Page 2

---

## Page 3

TOP SECRET

Vol: 2 OF: 3.

Ohe Inited Statra Sriate

NATIONAL"" SECURETY INFORVATEO

Unauthorized Disclosure Subleg

to Criminal Sanctions f

R2832

Report of Proceedings

Hearing, held before

Senate: Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations: With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Monday, March 15, 19762

Washington, D. Ch

(Stenotype: Tape and Waste, turned over n

to the Committee for destruction)

DocId:32423516

Page 3

WARD & PAUL.

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 4

HARRIS ash

TOP SECRET

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Intelligence Investigation

Foreign & Military Subcommittee Meeting

Monday, March 15, 1976

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:20 o'clock.

a.M., in Room S-407, the Capitol, Senator Walter D. Huddleston

(Chairman of the Subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding) and Hart of

Colorado.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director: Joseph

diGenova, Al Quanbeck, Rick Inderfurth, Charles Kirbow, Elizabeth

•Culbreth, William Bader, David Aaron, Lynn Davis, Elliot Maxwell.

and Bob Kellev, Professional Staff Members.

-

KARAT

DocId: 32423516

Page 4

---

## Page 5

ash 2

TOP SECRET

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

• 21

22

23

24

25

PROCREDINGS

Senator Huddleston. I think we can come to order, and

I would expect that we could go through here pretty rapidly

todav.

There are only a couple of suggestions that I have.

Ms. Culbreth. Where are we starting?

Mr. Miller. Page 1.

Senator Huddleston. There is some suggestion that we

should have some sort of a disclaimer-type thing some place.

and I was wondering whether or not we couldn't add another

paragraph after the second paragraph on page 1, something to

the effect that it should be noted that while the Committee

has diligentlv pursued its inquiry during the past year, there

are areas of concern which time and personnel constraints

did not permit thorough

studv and evaluation.

Also the Committee was hampered in a number of instances

by a lack of accessibility to some documents and records

either because it did not exist or because of unwillingness

to make them available by the Executive Branch.

Some

findings and recommendations of the Committee are

hased in part on information which must remain secret in

accordance with the Committee's policy of protecting the

valid security secrets.

Are those three statements worth injecting there?

MI. Miller. They're all correct.

TAR ALONE

Doc1d: 32423516 Page 5

---

## Page 6

a.sh

3

TC:P SECRET

3

1

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

23

24

25

Ms. Culbreth. Could you add a section that goes to.

our final recommendations that some things exist but we don't

know quite where to find them?

We don't know exactly how to

describe them so that we can be sure to get them. We can

maybe play with that a little bit.

Mr, diGenova. I thought that you meant that we didn't

find access to them.

MI. Miller.. No. It's not being able to ask the right

questions and the Agency's either being unwilling or unable

to define what it is we are looking for.

Ms. Culbreth. There's something that they know they

have somewhere hut they don't know quite where it is because

of their filing procedure or something.

Senator Huddleston. We could give two reasons for lack

of accessibility, that they did exist and we couldn't get them

and we could add a third, the Committee's inability to define.

MI, diGenova. I have a problem with that, Senator;

personally. I have never had an experience like that in terms

of them not understanding.

I'm not saying it didn't happen but I tend to believe

that if it happened it was basically for one of those two

reasons, that they didn't want to make it available or it

was a tug of war.

Can anyone remember an instance where we couldn't define

what we wanted and they didn't understand and we never got it

TAN СРАПТІ

DocId: 32423516

Page 6

---

## Page 7

ash 4

TOP SECRET

4

1

2

3

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

because of that?

Senator Huddleston. I think what Elizabeth is getting

at is that there may be things that we did not touch that we

don't know ahout.

Ms. Culbreth. Well, that kind of thing - you see one

of these final general recommendations we are making goes to

requiring the Executive to register these classified things

so that we can go look at it and know what it is that falls

in that category.

Mr. diGenova. So

what we're really talking about is

something that neither of the parties may have known about

either because of bad recordkeeping -- oh, okay, sure.

• Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I have only one other position I

would like to make on this.

I was trying to search my mind while you were talking

about this.. Have we yet failed to obtain anything either by

request or by subpoena other than the Nixon papers which are

not available because of an order of court?

Senator Huddleston.

I will leave that to the Committee

staff.

MI. Miller. Yes

certain categories were absolutely

denied us, absolutely denied us. Liaison arrangements, for

example.

Mr. Davis. NSC papers.

MI. Kirbow. Liaison papers is a thing that you remember

DocId:32423516

Page 7

---

## Page 8

ash

5

TOP SECRET

5

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

early on last year they came and gave the Chairman and Vice

Chairman an extensive briefing on certain things and no longer

did we deal in those areas.

MI. Miller. No, but you see, and that's one area but

there are others.

For example, in the present inquiry on academics and so

on we were stopped beyond

a certain point. There was no entry.

MI. Davis. There are also some NSC studies that we

never got.

Mr. diGenova.

Yes, and the general study of command

control, that task force

which generally do not access to

NSC minutes:

The onlv time we ever got

access to NSC minutes was

on the assassination report. That's the only place we han

full access and even then they were edited minutes of

things.

arquably unrelated to Cuba.

Mr. Kirbow.

I think I must say that we did not subpoena

those documents.

In other words, at some point it was difficult perhaps

to det some of them but I just don't recall a single instance

where vou asked the Vice Chairman

to sign on a subpoena or

to warn them that he was going to issue it, that they didn't

thereafter deliver.

I don't disagree

that we may not have done in the depth

that we should have in those but I just didn't think it was a

TAN ALANET

DocId: 32423516. Page

---

## Page 9

ah 6

TOP SECRET

6

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

matter of a record for the Committee of refusal except on the

Nixon papers, but if I am wrong ..

Senator Huddleston. They wouldn't give us

the names of

the journalists.

I think we're not saying here that it was unjutified

unwillingness or even an arbitrary one.

We're just saying here

that there were some things that they didn't want the Committee

to have.

That's just what I'm trying to get at in case something

exnlodes two weeks from now that we have not touched at all.

That kind of gives us an out that we did the best we

could on the basis of what we got, we made our findings

and

recommendations.

But there are some areas which we can't be sure that we

knew everything.

MI. Kirbow. Senator. in talking about this type of

insert paragraph, and I'm not sure where Mr. Miller would think

it would belong, but I think that we should at this point

consider the recommendation that I guess you made or adopted

that on certain of these citations where we are not

going to

put them into your certain comments, that we should make notice

now to the reader that there is a classified groun of

recommendations or a classified group of papers which are not

in this document which support some of the findings and cite

them back to a classified file in the Committee's files.

I'm not sure where it would ao.

TAn GENET

DocId: 32423516

Page 9

---

## Page 10

Ish 7

TOP SECRET

7

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Senator Huddleston. Well. it would be logical to

follow that where I say some findings and recommendations are

based in part on information that must remain secret following

the Committee's policy to protect valid security secrets.

•Also what I'm referring to

here is that there may be

recommendations in here that are not truly backed up by the

information we can give them.. That's what that sentence is

supposed to mean, and the next sentence ought to be that, there

are also some recommendations that are

not made public

essentially for the same reason. We could add that sentence

to this and I think that would do it.

Mr. Aaron. There is one footnote in here that explains

or that goes to the liaison point, for example, that explains

that we have a more detailed recommendation, but the footnote

really is to come out of the final version.

The footnote is really only for the Committee as

it

considers the paper.

Mr. Kirbow. I like that additional paragraph there

and the word about some classified recommendations being made

hoth to the Senate and to the Executive Branch.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, in looking this over I think

perhaps another paragraph would be in order really pointing

out that what these recommendations are, in effect, are an

agenda for action for the oversight committee in the next

vear or so and also for the Executive Branch, and that in these

DocId: 32423516 Page 10

---

## Page 11

TOP SECRET

ash 8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

recommendations have been cast in such a form as to provide

an agenda or an outline for the future, that that really has

been the thrust of this section of the paper.

MI. Kirbow. I especially like that form, Mr. Chairman.

hecause many committees are expected to introduce or to submit

legislative proposals and that is not the intention, apparently,

of this Committee or subcommittee and I would like some referende

made to that.

Senator Huddleston. I think that paragraph would go

either as a continuation of the third paragraph, which ends

un on page 2, or an additional paragraph following it.

MI. Aaron.. MI. Chairman, I would like to suggest that

in addition to that point, which I think is a very important

one, in order to explain what it is the Committee has tried

to accomplish in this area, that we also make the point that

the simple or not

so simple laying out of the facts

• as we

were able to discover them and run the gambit and process of

declassification, the simple facts laid out are a major contri...

bution to public and Congressional understanding of this

enormously complex and difficult operation.

I think that as a Committee it ought to be proud. not

only of the recommendations it makes for changes but the extent

to which it was able to come to grips with the reality of

what the intelligence communities and activities are.

The first task of a Congressional investigative committee

DocId: 32423516 Page 11

---

## Page 12

ash

TOP SECRET

1

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

is to inform the public and I think that was done quite well.

Senator Huddleston. Shouldn't that also come there in

this first section before we get to the general facts?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, I believe that's correct. I would sugges

that we just get together and try to redraft three or four

pages that would capture all those points in some logical

sequence as an introduction to this.

Senator Huddleston. I still have my same suggestion

relative to the second complete paragraph on page 2 where we

find that there is a need in the future.

I still think the sentence is a little out of order

there. I think I suggested the other time that we say the

Committee finds there is a continuing need. And then the

next sentence gets into the future that there will be a

challenge for the foreseeable future.

So we would strike out in the future in the first

sentence and put continuing need.

Mr. Aaron. We have a funny fragment of a sentence at

the bottom of the page. It has over the past 35 years -

Mr. Maxwell. The bottom of page 4, the last sentence

which carries over to page 5 should probably be, the failure

of Congress as a whole to monitor the expenditures of

intelligence agencies.

Senator Huddleston. In other words, you want to exonerate

the Committee's --

DocId: 32423516

Page 12

---

## Page 13

ash 10

TOP SECRET

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Maxwell.

Well, I think that the Appropriations

Committee would probably

have a good claim to say that they

have looked at intelligence as a whole. The Congress certainly

hasn't as a whole.

Mr. Aaron. I wanted to ask

a question with regard to

that one thing, that one paragraph, whether we really shouldn't

be making some reference

at this point to the Constitutional

issue about the budget.

Now I know these

are general findings and they are

amplified later; but whether or not we are adequately fulfilling

our Constitutional responsibility --

Senator Huddleston. Later on we quote that paragraph.

Mr. Aaron. That's correct.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think that is not only

because of the magnitude and character but also because of

the Constitution, which

we could add to that very sentence.

They are of such nature and the Constitution makes such

requirements.

Mr. Kirbow. We should be careful lumping the magnitude

and

the Constitutional

requirements together as if the

Constitution requires it. And the magnitude of it should be

discussed also.

So we should just be careful about the wording.

Mr. Aaron. We're now into page 6, I think.

Senator Huddleston. Gary, do you have anything specific?

Senator Hart. No.

DocId: 32423516

Page 13

---

## Page 14

ash 11

TOP SECRET

11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25.

Mr. Aaron. The first point at which we have, and this

is a question of how you would like to proceed,. we can go back

to look at the various bracketed languages that are left in

the paper and see if we want them to remain that way and/or

we can take up any further comments that people have.

I only have two small comments concerning the papers

which were brought to my attention in the course of the day.

I also must say

that despite repeated requests to include at

an appropriate place some of the recommendations that the

Chairman

has made, I'm

sorry to say that that has not yet

happened here, so we have to make appropriate provision for

those. And they will go in at the appropriate place.

Mr. Kirbow. Chairman of the Subcommittee?

Mr. Aaron. Chairman of the Full Committee.

Mr. Miller. One, of them as. I recall has to do with

the question that we went over -- what he, I think, feels strongly

about is the tenure of office of the director.

Mr. Kirbow. Of

the CIA?

Mr. Miller. Yes!

That would just be a bracket for the

Full Committee.

MI. Kirhow. What

is his suggestion?

Mr. Miller.

I think seven years.

Mr. Kirbow. Does

the lame duck administration and lame

duc's officeholders create any problem for you?

Mr. Miller. Well; it's the degree to which the official

a po at the con

DocId: 32423516 Page 14

---

## Page 15

ash 12

TOP SECRET

12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

is nolitical.

Mr. Kirbow. Who would you get to fill the job for that

last year in an administration?

Mr. Miller.

If it's a fixed term, it really doesn't

matter, does it? If he's there straddling in order to provide

transition, that's the idea rather than starting with cleaning

out the Director at the beginning of each administration. There

ought to be continuity, and that would tend to depoliticize

the office. That is his notion.

Senator Huddleston. I think we hassled with that for.

quite a while. It goes in a bracket and we'll just have to

see how persuasive he is.

MI. Aaron. Also in the cover section we have a sentence

regarding international terrorism and linking that up with the

assassination of Richard welch. It did not come out as it.

was supposed to, so it should be deleted.

Mr. Inderfurth.

That's page 83, and I think

there was

also the decision to take out the reference to welch not

moving out of his house.

Mr. Aaron. No, that's not correct.

Mr. diGenova. I thought we did agree to do that. I

think the Senator took exception to the inference that might

have been drawn from the direct quotation that we were trying

to say it wasn't our fault and this was the reason sort of thing.

We were going to paranhrase that, was where we left it.

TAN ПРАПРА

DocId: 32423516 Page 15

---

## Page 16

ạsh

13

TOP SECRET

13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Aaron.

well,

I

would oppose that but I will be

quided by the Committee.

Senator Huddleston,.

Has this been altered since our

discussion?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, there was alteration in the text that

preceded it.

Before, it said that the tragic death. of the station

chief in Athens illustrates the problem of striking a balance

between cover and onerations. And what we're simply saving here

is that his situation in Athens illustrates the problem of cover

and I think that these further points do make that clear.

On the one hand we have the testimony of the chief of

the cover staff that by the time we get to the station chief

there isn't a great deal of cover left, and one illustration

of that is the fact that he moved into a house occupied by

the

previous station chief.

There was some question as to whether he should stay

in it or not and it was generally felt he should make his

own decision about it and, you know, for all the inconvenience

and difficulty that might be entailed he just as soon stayed

there.

This is the kind of feeling that one has about it and it

does illustrate the problem. The implication is not that he

was killed because he moved into that house. It was really just

the wav of descrihing the situation which station chiefs face

DocId: 32423516 Page 16

---

## Page 17

ash

14

TOP SECRET

14

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

when they're trying to deal with questions of cover versus

questions of convenience or operation and necessity.

Mr. Kirbow. I also have the same objection on page 84

where the chairman said we didn't clearly define that

terrorists killed the man, then we shouldn't infer that it did.

We, can talk about terrorism being an additional problem

for all cover, but not as it directly relates to welch.

Mr. Aaron. The sentence preceding it was modified to

make that point and the last sentence should have been deleted

and it was not. The quote:

Senator Huddleston. Yes, I recall there was some question

about the quote because it seemed to tie him in both with

the cover and terrorism.

Mr. Maxwell. I think in regard to the first quote, I

think we make the point in the sentence directly preceding

it and there is some question as to whether in the cover sectior

we would like to place so much emphasis on Mr. Welch's death,

and essentially by adding the quote say, listen, it wasn't us,

it wasn't us, guys. He takes it on his head.

MI. Aaron. I don't see that you have to read it that

way.

I simoly feel it adds a certain specificity to otherwise

sort of general comments

Mr. Kirbow. Well,' it wasn't objectionable to the Chairman

and I don't see that it contributes anything more than the

fact that official cover is very light by the time you get to

ТПО СЕРАРТ

DocId: 32423516 Page 17

---

## Page 18

ash 15

TOP SECRET

15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the station chief, which

you see in the first sentence.

I wouldn't think that taking it out detracts from the

paper in any way.

MI. Aaron. Whatever the Chairman wishes.

Senator Huddleston.

It seems to me that we also talk

about the fact that both his predecessor and his name had

been carried in foreian newspapers as an indication too of

the lack of deep cover."

Mr. Aaron. I tried

to do that with one sentence just

saying further, Mr. Welch

occupied the house which had been

publicly identified as

that of the preceding station chief

which sort of sweeps up

both thoughts, that both he and the previc

station chief had been

identified publicly.

Mr. diGenova.

believe what that sentence does is

summarize what comes in

the next paragraph which is the direct

quote. I think we can

cut out from the word "according" to

the word "house," because really, all that does is just reemphasiz

the same point.

Mr. Kirbow. I would agree with that..

Mr. diGenova. The sentence is an excellent summary, the

textual sentence is an excellent summary, but I don't know.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I suggest we. delete the

sentence starting with the word "according" and down through

and including the word

"house."

Senator Huddleston. If we're going to use Mr. Welch's

тАП аГАпАТ

DocId: 32423516

Page

18

---

## Page 19

ash

16

TOP SECRET

16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

•13

.14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

name, we have to identify who he was.

MI. Kirbow. We

can do that where we say station chief

in the first sentence.

We could say Richard welch the station

chief in Athens.

Ms. Culbreth. Mr. Chairman, on that point I have one

question. I don't know whether there has been any official

announcement by anybody

in our government that Mr. Welch was

in fact the station chief.

I know the President went and I know. Mr. Colby went,

but I still don't know

that there's been any official written

government document that

said

yes, we recognize this man.

The only reason

raise this is just for the Senators

to decide whether they

want to put that in our report, if in

fact neither the Agencyl

or the Executive has done that.

Mr. diGenova.

would only say this. At no time during

my review of the cover

paper did the Agency ever say to me that

you should not say that Richard Welch was the station chief.

That was the one thing they never objected to.

Really. in the whole cover paper, that was the only thing

they never mentioned. That's just not a problem.

MI. Aaron. I would like to make one suggestion, if the

suggestion of MI. Kirbow is accepted, and that is that the

sentence preceding it be modified to indicate that Mr. Welch

didn't just decide to do it out of thin air. He decided because

he was asked not to do it or it was suggested that he consider

TAR AFARIT

DocId: 32423516

Page 19

---

## Page 20

gsh 17

TRiP SECRET

17

1

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

End 1A, b 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

not doing it anyway.

The point

of the

further sentence is not just that he

decided to move into the

house. That might be normal operating

procedure.

MI. digenova.

I think it does add one dimension and

that is which shows that, as Mr. Isenstead testified, operations

and cover work hand in

hand, and the DDO will oftentimes

overrule the chief of cover and commercial and will sometimes

back him up and sometimes

the individual station chief is

left to make his own decision but it does add that dimension

to it, which is the decisional process.

Thought was given

in other words, to the question of

whether or not his cover

would be undermined by staying there.

Mr. Aaron. I'd

happy to put it in that further,

though headquarters raised questions, Mr. Welch decided

to

occupy the house.

Senator Huddleston. I think it would be appropriate

to do that.

Mr. Aaron. Let me

suggest in the interest of trying

to get through all the material that we have this morning, that

there are two sections

that we do need to look at carefully.

One I take it is the redone section on media, particularly

the recommendations and

the second is the paper on Department

of State and ambassadors,

which I think has been gone over

in nine different ways by the staff, and I'm sure that there are

Tnim

по т к то т т

DocId: 32423516 Page 20

---

## Page 21

ash 18

TOP SECRET

18

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

still more comments.

Mr. Inderfurth. Defense just came as well.

Mr. Aaron. The Defense one may well need more staff work.

What I would recommend is that we turn to the section

on media, unless there are major further questions. That

would be on page 66.

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, before we move, could I.

raise one interim--a sticky question of prior notification is

addressed at the bottom of page 16, recommendation 14, and

the question is whether we should nail that admonition down

perhaps as follows, except that by statute Congress should be

notified.

As you know, the resolution leaves the matter vague on

the oversight committee.

Mr: Kirbow. I agree with Senator Hart, that we initially

start it off with the Committee in a bill and it got changed

to a resolution which is not binding on the Administration and

the Committee has not changed its mind and it should again

recommend that that be enacted.

Mr. diGenova.

Just put the word "by statute?"

Senator Hart. That by statute Congress should.

MI. Inderfurth.. A couple of little things on that same

page under recommendation 1l, the last

sentence - the President

also should continue to certify covert action projects as

provided by, and we might add in there certify covert action

TAN SCENET

DocId: 32423516

Page

21

---

## Page 22

ash 19

TOP SECRET

19

.1

2

5

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

projects is important to the national security of the United

States. I think that clarifies what the certification is.

Just certifving you don't, you don't know what that means.

Mr. Aaron. Page 66, I think Bill Bader would like to --

Mr. Bader. I turn the Senators'. attention to page 69

and page 70. We'll ao first to the covert use of the U.s.

academic community and then the second issue is the use of

the media.

AS YOU

see on 69 we have given an outline of the extent

of operational use of American academics.

I should say that both, for the record, that both at

the appearance of representatives of FRD when they came here

and Bill Nelson, the deputy director for operations, has

subsequently

submitted

paper which gives the Agency's

position and very strongly recommends a continuation of this

operational use of academics and speaks to what they consider

the very important costs that would flow from any prohibition

of the use of American academics.

I would note that on page 69 there has been the addition

of two or three sentences at the bottom of the page which

reflects the facts that were given to us by FRD when they came

to that hearing whenever it was last Friday.

I!ll read those.

" Of all these activities, the CIA gives its highest

priority and assigns its hest case officers to the recruitment

DocId: 32423516

Page 22

---

## Page 23

ash 20

TOP SECRET

20

1

2

3

4

5

6

of foreign students. More than one half of CIA's case officers

working within the U.S., are assigned to this task. Over 60

percent of CIA recruitments within the U.S. last year were

foreign students.

This is directly from the transcript.

Mr. Miller. But is it clear?

Mr.. Kirbow. This manuscript has not gone for saniti-

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

zation?

Mr. Bader. No.

MI. Miller. Would

it clear, then? What is your guess?

My quess is no.

MI. Bader. Well, it should be said at this point that

in the critique that

came. back from the Agency on the entire

larger Katzenbach paper the Agency has taken the position that

any mention of numbers of the fact that the Central Intelligence

Agency uses academics for operational purposes, they've put

in the category of sources and methods, and there should be

no public reference to it.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, we'll have to face

that

problem in the Full Committee.

Mt. Kirbow. That's the testimony of the witness who

was before the Committee just last week when he was asked that

specific question, that what harm would accrue if someone

published the members of institutions or kind of the scope of

this whole program?

DocId: 32423516

Page 23

---

## Page 24

oh ?1

TOP SECRET

21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

He expressed serious reservations at that time.

Mr.. Bader. That's a problem we have to face up to.

• Now on page 70 there are two paragraphs that are

bracketed there which I turn, the Senator's

attention to, and

these are findings, these are obviously alternatives. The

first findiny is that the Committee holds to the view that

the American academics provide invaluable and necessary

assistance in the initial recruiting stage of foreign students.

These foreign students produce important and valuable

intelligence when returned to their countries.. The role of

cooperating academics is limited to passive observation and

therefore it does not undermine the ideals and integrity of

American universities.

The other side of that is the following: The Committee

holds to the view that American academics should not be

drawn into clandestine

-which is underlined - operations

such as

recruiting of agents among foreign students, writing

propaganda or serving as

intelligence collectors overseas.

Such activities undermine public confidence that those who

train our young are upholding the ideals of American universities.

Now from that and these findings, flow these recommendations

and there is a glitch in the recommendations. 43, above 43

should be marked options, and these options, the paragraphs

that follow are in fact options rather than individual recommenda-

tions.

DocId: 32423516 Page 24

---

## Page 25

ash 22

TOP SECRET

22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

•12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

In other words, you could have option 43, first paragraph

A, second paragraph B. That is the sentence that starts,

while

disturbed at the present CIA practice, and the rest of

the paragraphs, 44 would

be Cr.D, and it follows on.

I would call the Senators'

attention to these options.

Let me say that there are some of them that you could endorse

more than one.

Senator Huddleston. Excuse me. Is each sentence an

option?

MI. Bader. Each paragraph.

Mr. Inderfurth.

But they are not exclusive. In other

words, some of them can be chosen. Some of them are exclusive

but towards the end

Senator Hart.

It's a shmorgasbord:

MI. Bader. So the first option A is this Committee has

studied this issue andrecommends that the CIA continue to use

academics for operational purposes. B, while disturbed at the

present CIA practice of using academics, this Committee does

not recommend a prohibition. The Committee views such a

prohibition as an intrusion on the privacy and integrity of

American academic community.

The third option

is the Committee recommends that the

CIA amend its internal directives to include a requirement that

both the individual academic and the president of the university

or college be knowledgeable of the clandestine relationship of

DocId:32423516

Page 25

---

## Page 26

ash

2.3

TOP SECRET

23

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the CIA.

This was discussed at the meeting the other day and I

thought it was sensible to have it included as an option.

D, the Committee recommends. that the CIA amend its in-

ternaldirectives to include a prohibition against the CIA

entering into a paid relationship with American academics for

operationsi purposes. Obviously, C and D could work together.

F, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend its

internal directives to

include a prohibition on the use of

members of the American

academic community for operational

purposes.

And then go to

F

By statute this Committee recommends

the use of academics

for

operational purposes be prohibited.

So you move right through this list and I think it gives you

the full range, and then

the last one is G, this Committee

recommends the Agency be prohibited, whether it's by statute, from

recruiting foreign students in the U.s.

Senator Huddleston. I think we grappled with this

pretty thoroughly and

we came to about the situation which you

outlined. We discussed

lthe various options without being

able

to focus in on one as being our recommendation.

I suggest that the Subcommittee

members thoroughly

review this whole section and try to get in our own mind what

we think we would like

to recommend. or would like to speak for

when we get to the Full Committee and just leave this as a matter

TAM КРАПРТ

DocId: 32423516

Paye 26

---

## Page 27

ash 24

TOP SECRET

24

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

for the Full Committee to resolve.

I don't think we

can make much more progress today

probably. I think it's'a good outlay here of the possible

alternatives that we have and I think there's no question

that

it's an area where we get -

Ms. Culbreth. Could I suggest that the document that

Mr. Bader got from the Agency, speaking to this, be made

available to the Senators for consideration in coming to a

decision on this point? li

Mr. Miller. Which document?

Ms. Culbreth.

The two-page thing that you're just

talking about.

Mr. Bader. This

a paper which I am remiss in not

bringing to the meeting this morning. It's a

two page document

that Mr. Nelson prepared stating -- I'll call over and get that

by the end of this meeting.

Mr. Kirbow.. This

is so controversial too, that I

think that remarks made by the witnesses the other day to you

and Senator Mathias on several of these pros and cons would

be very helpful.

It has been transcribed and should be made available.

One other thing,

it's just a point here and I make

it

before the Committee,

is

that early on when we were discussing

the weight that should

be

given to this program, the difference

was made between the staff, between Mr. Bader and the recommendati

TAN CLANE

DocId: 32423516 Page 27

---

## Page 28

ish

25

TOP SECRET

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that I made about -- at the bottom line, page 69, and carried

over where in the last two sentences. at least it says, over'

60 percent of the CIA agent recruitments within the US last

year were foreign students .At the same time these domestic

recruitments. of foreign students represented only 3 percent

of all CIA agent recruitments.

Mr. Bader. That should say world-wide.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, that was the point I was.trying to

make. I quess it's clear if you take both sentences together.

I withdraw my comment on

that:

Mr. Maxwell.

Mr

Chairman, there seems to have been an

inadvertent problem of

leaving out any reference either in

the gathering intelligence section in the United States or

in this section about the

Committee's decision to amend the

open relationship between

CIA and academics and the provision

of academics of open information to the CIA, and I think we

had agreed that there'd|be at least a couple of sentences saying

that this has continued

and it is applauded by the Committee.

Mr. Bader. I think that's right, Me. Chairman. I did

leave that paragraph out. It was in various drafts and I

will re-instate

it this

time.:

Mr. Chairman, let me, if we have this laid out now,

let me turn your attention to page 75.

We do have two recommenda

tions there. The first

there should be no subsidy to or

distribution of any book,

magazine or publication not attributed

DocId: 32423516 Page 28

---

## Page 29

9sh 26

TOP SECRET

26

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to the CIA inside the United States.

Mr. Inderfurth. Or its territories.

Senator Huddleston. They claim that's the situation now.

though, don't they?

Mr. Bader. Yes.

And the second, the Committee supports

the recently announced CIA prohibitions and the Agency's

decision to commit this

to internal directives, I think this

needs a little language here, to internal directives against

any paid or contractual

relationship with accredited U.S.

forèign journalists.

This is the present situation.

The bracketed language is, I'm not sure if it was a

dispute but we out the

brackets in just to be sure that the

Committee agrees with this:

These recently announced CIA prohibitions should, however,

be established in law.

Now I don't believe we came to that decision and that's

why. I bring it before the Subcommittee again.

Mr. Maxwell. In

1'51, it's against any paid or contractual

relationship with U,s.

or foreign journalists accredited to

U.S. media.

Mr. Bader. Yes.

I think we'd better fix that.

Senator Huddleston. Right. That would be more accurate.

MI. Bader. Now what about the question of having this

established in law?

TAN REANET

DocId: 32423516 Page 29

---

## Page 30

ash 27

TOP SECRET

27

1

2

3

4

5

6

Mr. Kirbow: That's one the Subcommittee should point out

to the. Full Committee, that it's an option on all of this that

we should decide.

Mr. Bader. Does

the Subcommittee want to take a position

on this now?

Senator Huddleston. I thought we agreed on that.

MI. Bader. I thought we'd come very close to agreeing

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

on it.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I favored putting it into

law and I suggested that we might make some reference not only

to media but to religious organizations and others because of

the nature of the organizations, that there should be some

legal prohibition in order to maintain the integrity of those

organizations.

Ms. Culbreth.

the bottom of page 63

On the previous draft that we had at

had the comment that these recently

announced prohibitions on the use of media personnel should be

established in law and it was bracketed there, and it was

my understanding that the bracket was to carry over..

Senator Huddleston. What do you think, Gary?

Senator Hart

It was my understanding that we

recommended that by statute.

Senator Huddleston. Okay.

Mr. Kirbow. In certain places we recommend that it be

enacted by statute, and in other places throughout our paper we

DocId: 32423516 Page 30

---

## Page 31

ash 28

TOP SECRET

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

•8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

recommend that the oversight committee in conjunction with

considering enacting. unless vou feel differently of seeing.

that we would want to be consistent in our paper.

Senator Hart. Well: I think that some things we have

more evidence on than others.

MI. Kirbow. You want to be stronger on the ones that

you think should be a statute?

senator Hart. Yes. I think a lot of the reason for

passing some of these laws is that we feel further study is

necessarv.

Senator Huddleston. That's right, but on this one I

think we can say this.

Mr. Inderfurth. Number 50 is by statute is going to

be inserted there? That by statute there should be

no subsidy?

That's just a statement but it doesn't recommend how

it should be accomplished.

Senator Huddleston.

There is already a statute, isn't

there?

Mr. Kirbow. No, it's just a

policy.

Senator Huddleston.

Oh, the statute refers to the USIA,

does it not?

Mr. Inderfurth.

That's right.

Mr. Bader.. Well,

I'd be most happy to have it by

statute, so if it's in agreement, it shall be done.

Let me turn your attention now to 52. This is in

DocId: 32423516

Page 31

---

## Page 32

ash 29

TOP SECRET

29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

brackets. Not because it's my understanding that it remains

in dispute. It was just a question of bringing language to

you.

9

• 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The Committee recommends that the CIA prohibitions be

extended to include the use of American media organizations for

cover and

the use of any American having a paid or contractual

relationship with the U.S. media organization, whether he is

accredited or not.

That's what we talked about the other day, which

was

in a sense the CIA prohibitions plus. It goes to two questions,

the use of U.S. media organizations for cover and second,

the prohibition on operational use of individuals who have

a paid or contractual relationship with the U.s. media

organization, whether they are accredited or not.

Senator Huddleston. I thought we more or less agreed..

MI. Kirbow. No.!

Senator Mathias excepted on this

point.

Senator Hart. On his own behalf?

Mr. Kirbow. On his own behalf on that one, Senator.

It

was not upon a request through me of any absent member.

He may have had it from an absent member.

Senator Huddleston. I think we should present that to

the

Committee in brackets.

Mr. Inderfurth. : Shouldn't 51 and 52 follow the next

section on page 77, the covert use of U.S. journalists in media

DocId: 32423516

Page

32

---

## Page 33

qsh 3?

TOP SECRET

30

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

• 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

institutions?

You see, you have the two pages but no recommendations

after it, and don't these recommendations follow?

Do you see what I mean?

Mr. Bader. The reason for that is the question of

domestic. If you put it against the issue of domestic fallout

with the impact within the United States, it seems to flow

from the description of the problem of a flow-back into American

society and the use of journalists.

Mr. Kirbow. Wouldn't it make better sense to have

both media papers together regardless of where you put your

recommendations, instead of having the religious personnel

put in between?

Senator Huddleston: Just

move the religious over behind

the two.

Mr. Bader. Okay, why don't we do that?

So then we would be able to couple the recommendations.

together and put religious personnel at the last section.

Is that agreed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Huddleston. Yes.

Mr. Kirhow. On page: 77, Mr. Chairman, there are a few

bracketed words, and I don't remember whether those were

unknown quantities at the time or whether those were sources and

methods.

Mr. Aaron. Yes, the question was whether identifying

TAN REANET

DocId: 32423516

Page 33

---

## Page 34

ash 31

TOP SECRET

31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

ten ll.S. news organizations and 5 publishing houses went too far

specifying which ones,

how many you ought to try to find before

establish which ones

are in fact doing this:

Mr. Miller. There

are a number of items in the

recommendations that deal

with precise numbers, sources and

methods if you're looking at it from the other side.

What's the Committee's view as to whether we should give

our recommendations to the Agency for sources and methods

vetting? And if so, at what stage?

Senator Huddleston. I would think after the Full

Committee signs off with the idea again that it would go back -

Mr. Miller. So there should be no discussion or we

should not show to anyone in the Agency or the Executive: Branch

our recommendations until they are approved by the Full Committee

and what the Full Committee has decided that they should be

vetted?

That would be a desirable policy.

Senator Huddleston. Well, it seems to me after the Full

Committee

acts, if we're going to give them a chance to view

this, they would still have to go back.

MI. Kirbow. Especially in the case of your Subcommittee,

Chairman, there will be adequate time. On the following subcommitte

which comes after us it may be more difficult, but clearly,

lould have time while they were dealing with the other

subcommittee's recommendations to have this made clear.

DocId: 32423516 Page

34

---

## Page 35

gsh

32

TOP SECRET

•32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

End 1b. b. 29

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17.

18

19

20

21

22

.23

24

25

I just think if the Subcommittee could adopt as a

recommendation that the findings because of the nature of what

you have in here, should he reviewed for sources and methods,

I think -

Mr. Miller.

But after the Full Committee has approved

it.

Senator Huddleston. Yes, that would be my thinking

because that would at least eliminate one step.

Mr. Aaron. I think it would be helpful but I would

draw a distinction hetween the recommendations per

se and the

findings which contain factual material.

It would be my recommendation to the Committee that we

do provide

the Agency with an opportunity to review the findings

and indeed, we have in many respects already and they know

what's coming.

But it's my personal view that I see no reason we need

to share the recommendations.

Mr. Miller. I

think in order to reduce any confusion

with the Executive Branch we should not show them any of our

findings. or recommendations until the Full Committee has

approved them because I have already gotten strange noises

from Seymour based on things in drafts from an earlier period

that have no relation to reality. And in order to avoid that

I would hope that no one would discuss these things with them

until the Full Committee has acted. Is that your feeling?

TARGEANT

DocId: 32423516 Page 35

---

## Page 36

gsh 33

TOP SECRET

33

1

• 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

•14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

'22

23

24

25

Senator Huddleston. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. David is making a different point, but

we should probably do the same with the recommendations of the

Subcommittee, as is done with the domstic subcommittee, and

that's probably a matter for the Full Committee to decide.

We shouldn't show

recommendations of the domestic

subcommittee and not these or vice versa.

There's the question of whether all the recommendations

of the Committee

will he

shown to the Administration or not.

And we don't need to decide that.

Mr. Aaron. You can decide it whenever you like, but it's

my strong recommendation that they should not be unless you

wish to take testimony on them.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I don't disagree that there

should not be an orderly, procedure for both subcommittees.

What I do want to stress is that this particular area is in

the foreign intelligence principally and is most likely to

have the sources

and methods information.

I think the same weight should be given to whatever

section of the domestic

covers counter-intelligence because that

is probably the most fragile and touchy area in the whole world

and I think that there, since it involves the CIA for which you

are principally responsible in this subcommittee, that your

recommendations should apply equally there or should certainly

consider that all of those recommendations be at least furnished

DocId: 32423516

Page 36:

---

## Page 37

ash 31

TOP SECRET

34

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

.12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to the CIA. I understand

that there is vehement opposition

from the general counsel

to showing the domestic recommendations

to anyone before they are

published as they relate principally

to the corrective

actions

in the FBI, but I don't think we

get into as much of a security problem there as you do in this

area here.

Publication of some of this information can almost totally

destroy a program and if the committee agrees with the Agency not

do so, I think they should know that in the foreign intelligence

area because their recommendation to the Senate on this Commit-

tee was to do nothing could damage that particular area of

the Agency's ability beyond reason.

Senator Huddleston. I think that's the only procedure

we can follow, really, is after the Full Committee operates,

let them take one quick

view just from the standpoint of sources

and methods and not from

the standpoint of the advisability

of the recommendations themselves.

Mr. diGenova.

In that regard I would note, and this

is not to undercut anyone remarks, but the other day when I

met with the people from the DDo on the cover paper to discuss

this problem, they told me that they were never asked by the

Rockefeller Commission, nor was anyone else at the Agency ever

asked to review the final Commission report.

So that report that was published never got a sources and

methods review hy the

CLA

When that document was puhlished it

DocId: 32423516 Page 37

---

## Page 38

35

ACE SECRET

35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

was made strictly on the

decision that that was going to be

published regardless of

sources and methods. They were never

consulted and Mr. Isenstead, who was the chief of cover

commercial emphasized that he was grateful for the opportunity

to do it.

So there is precedent at least for not having them give

a final view but I'm not

saying that it's the wisest way to

proceed.

Senator Huddleston.

well, the Full Committee might have

some thoughts on that.

Some of this where we get into specific

numbers and so forth may

raise a question and maybe we could

write around the various, numbers and be just as effective.

MI. Kirhow. Mr.

Chairman, I don't think they have to

adopt the recommendations,

but I think that in showing this

to them and getting their

opinions on the record further

demonstrates the high integrity type work that this Committee

has tried to pursue the

entire year and not to just go off

helter-skelter.

Mr. diGenova. In this same area of academics, Bill, it

goes back

to your paper.

There should be a reference back to

page. 36 where we deal with FRD penetrations in American companies.

That's the same area that we

took testimony on the other

day.

It's a bracketed section.

Mr. Aaron. And

the

reason it's hracketed is that we

are waiting for a couple of sentences to describe the situation

DocId: 32423516 Page 38

---

## Page 39

gsh .36

TOP SECRET

36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

hased on that testimony,

and it will be a factual statement

of where we

stand in that regard.

Let me just draw your attention to one other recommendatior

on page 45 which may or may not, the Committee may or may not

want to include. It stems from our discussion largely in the

context of the academics and others concerning the way in which

the CIA operates domestically and it's recommendation number 27.

which is not as precisely stated as it might be.

Mr. diGenova. I was just going to ask, does it have

reference to a particular interest group which is being

protected because it does not appear to prohibit anything?

Mr. Aaron. It relates to the Domestic Contacts

Division and so I should

say the use of overt contacts of the

Domestic Contacts Division for operational support or operational

purposes.

Mr. Miller.

Of

the DCD?

Mr. Aaron. Yes.l In other words, it goes to the long

discussion we had over witting versus unwitting use of

individuals by, not just the foreign resources division, the

man under alias who goes to ask if he can put a thing up on

bulletin board, but actually the man who presents himself

overtly as a CIA person and says, our relationship is completely

above board but who in fact in some unwitting fashion uses

an individual to further some operational objective.

And I took it and I may have been wrong, but it was my

DocId: 32423516 Page 39

---

## Page 40

ash

37

TOP SECRET

37

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

understanding from that

that kind of unwitting use

house.

discussion that we want to prescribe

by the so-called overt side of the

MI. Maxwell. I had raised a question with David about

that. My understanding was that the Committee was concerned

about this but felt that there were some unresolved questions,

i.e., whether a DCD individual who was talking or debriefing

an American businessman who came back from the Soviet Union,

whether that, something phrased like this would prevent the

DCD person from simply saving would you be willing to provide

cover to an American representative of the CIA, because the

difficulty we were having was essentially with the control of

the information which

was enormously useful and has to be gotter

somehow, and the Committee

was concerned that that would have

to be covertly, which would mean FRD people going around under

cover trying to find the same information that was available.

Mr. Aaron. I frankly don't think that those concerns

are raised by this provision hecause A, it does not deal with

information, B, it does

not deal with witting relationships,

or witting use, so that if you go to a man coming back from

the Soviet Union and ask him what he has done or suggest that

the next time he goes there he does something, all that is

certainly possible and reasonable because it's witting and above

board.

Moreover, it does, not go to the information. If he colledts

DocId: 32423516 Page 40

---

## Page 41

gsh 38

TOP SECRET

38

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.9

10

11

12

13

14

15

•16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

information some place that turns out to be of operational

utility, why that's just information that's of operational

utility.

This goes to the question of unwitting use of a relationsh

of trust that has been established on the basis that it is

what it is.

Mr. Kirbow. Would you explain to me then if you don't

have any concern about that, what the purpose is of the first

full sentence on the top

of page 36 at all in the report?

Mr. Aaron. Page 316?

Mr. Kirbow. The Committee is concerned with this

blurring of the line between overt collection of information

that's witting and the exploitation of these relationships

for operational purposes

Mr. Aaron. That's

correct. That's in effect the concern

and finding

that supports

the recommendation.

Mr. Kirbow. I find it inconceivable that we would

be considering cutting off from the CIA the operational use of

American citizens who are simply because they happen to be in

business or otherwise witting would not furnish information

on another person in their company.

Mr. Aaron. This has nothing to do with what this thing

says.

This talks about unwitting use, unwitting use. I

certainly wouldn't recommend that there be no use.

Mr. Kirbow. It

says the Committee is concerned with

this

TAN СЕРПРТ

DocId: 32423516 • Page 41

---

## Page 42

gsh

j')

IRAN SECRET

39

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

•19

20

21

22

23

24

25

blurring of the line between overt collection, which is the

debriefing of the man when he comes back into the states from

the Soviet Union, of information from willing American citizens.

Okay? So that is the businessman who has just returned from

Iran and is over there from the major aerospace corporations doin

business there.

Now the very next sentence, the remainder of that

sentence, unless you want to prohibit that particular interviewee

and the interviewer from

having some further conversation about

the possible use of that particular concern in Iran for

operational purposes, why do you say it unless you're trying

to prevent that?

Mr. Aaron. I would like to take up the two issues

separately. I would like to take up, if you want to discuss

this we can discuss it, and if you want to discuss the

recommendation on 27, we

can discuss that..

But I don't think it helps our conversation here to

talk about them both at the same time.

Mr. Kirbow. Then I would not want to overlook coming

back to that because it's one we mentioned the other day and

the bracket did not carry over to this, and it's a particular

concern that would not prohibit the CIA from utilizing American

businessmen who are witting and willing to furnish either as

a corporation or individual.

Mr. Aaron. And I might say that that is the problem.

TAN AFART

DocId: 32423516

Page 42

---

## Page 43

gsh an

TOP SECRET

40

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

•20

21

22

23

24

are on two pages at once.

I would recommend that we look at page

45 and look at

recommendation number 27 which says the regulations of the

CIA should prohibit unwilling use of overt contacts and please

strike in there of the Domestic Contact Division for operational

support or operational purposes.

Now this does not prohibit operational support or

operational purposes of contacts

at the DCD as long as they

are witting relationships.

It does not permit unwitting use of covert contacts

for operational support. It only goes to the question of -

Senator lluddleston. If you went back to 36, then, and

put it willing American citizens and the unwitting exploitation

of these relationships, what you're trying to say there is.

you don't want to exploit these kinds of relationships without

the knowledge of the person who supplied the information.

Is that correct?.

Mr. Aaron. That's correct. And that would be a more

precise

support for the particular finding.

I think initially, though, that sentence was oriented

towards expressing that concern plus the concern of an

organization that had in effect two missions.

In other words, the DCh, having both the responsibility

to build up an overt relationship of trust as well as the

responsihility sometimes to try to move that relationship beyond

DocId: 32423516

Page 43

---

## Page 44

gsh 41

TOP SECRET

41

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

•18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

its initially stated premises, which is that I meet you, this

is an above-board business. But at some point down the line

I start talking to you about other subjects.

Now I realize this is a difficult area, and I certainly

would not want to prohibit the use of Americans for any operationa

purposes. I think as long as we're going to have a CIA,

this is one of the things that ought to he allowed.. But it's

the question of the two somewhat contradictory functions of the

DCD.

That sentence was trying

to cover both of these points,

and maybe that's a source of some of the confusion.

The recommendation to move the DCD back into the overt

intelligence directorate was in part based upon trying to create

the incentive for this organization that it is a largely overt

character and not clandestine.

Mr. Kirbow. I make the same point now that I made

earlier on the same recommendation and the discussion is

exactly on the same point.. They're talking about problems which.

they are drawing problems from no problem area that has been

called to the attention of this committee.

It is apparently in the minds of certain of the staff

members somehow wrong that during this conversation with a

returning traveller by a certain segment of the CIA, that if he

comes across a willingness to do something operationally, that

he has to withdraw at that point and go get another side of the

DocId: 32423516 Page 44

---

## Page 45

75h 42

TOP SECRET

42

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

House to come do it.

We're talking about an agency operation and unless in

some way we have a record before this Committee that doing

that would

inhibit the returning traveller from continuing

to cooperate and there's still 100,000 that do it 'every year,

and I don't think the record indicates

at all that there's

anything wrong with having an individual that is doing the

interview at the time trying to get what information he can

from pursuing other matters which have to do with the interest

of the Agency on behalf of the Agency if the person is willing

to talk about it.

I just don't see how it muddies the situation at all,

nor does it blur it.. I don't think that we have to decide

that there be within the DO out there a clear distinction

between those two divisions unless we see

some infringement

on the rights of the American that he is interviewing.

And I don't think our record shows anything to indicate

that there has been any infringement of

those people's rights.

And that's the reason for my concern about the position we take

on the top of page 36 and the recommendation.

MI. Aaron. I think the recommendation. and the position

pn

the top of page 36 are different... We can make them coincide

by striking in the word "unwitting" exploitation of these

relationships. The recommendation goes to unvitting use.

That is

the important aspect of that.

DocId: 32423516

Page 45

---

## Page 46

gsh 43

TOP SECRET

43

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Kirbow. May I give the Committee an example of

what actually could transpire at one of these meetings, that

if you leave this in here and say, unwitting exploitation, it

will prohibit, probably, a third of that Agency's action on

the information that it gets.

Do you think that they ever go back and tell the witting

person whom they debriefed when he returned from Russia

that during the conversation that they had with him they

picked up the name of one Mr. X and that they subsequently

go to Mr. X and establish a full working relationship with him?

Maybe they find that by his returning briefing they

find all sorts of sources and methods which they can exploit.

Certainly you don't want to encourage or require by law that

they go back to this man, who has simply kind of emptied out

his travel to Russia to the agent and tell him, well, now, so

that you'd be witting to this we picked up the name of one

Charles Kirbow during your discussion and we subsequently have

developed a working relationship with him and we plan to use

him when he goes to Russia next month.

Mr. Aaron. I think that's a misrepresenation of what

witting use

is.

Mr. Kirbow. Witting is knowledgeable.

Mr. Aaron. If I may respond. The point here is not

that the information is not used for any purpose. If a guy

comes back from the Soviet Union and has some information of

ТАПАПАПТТ

DocId: 32423516 Page 46

---

## Page 47

ash 14

TOP SECRET

44

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16--

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

utility in the formulation of policy or the kind of clandestine

operations, he has told his story, that information is

available to the entire government and it would be acted upon

perhaps by thousands of people he doesn't have any relationship

with or any knowledge of.

There's no question but that that is certainly a

legitimate activity. The knowledge and the information that

is acquired in this overt way, the source is witting of the

fact that it's going to be used in some fashion.

That's not the issue. The issue is different. The

issue is whether he is

asked to perform certain tasks or

drawn into certain kinds of relationship or any number of

ways in which he might be exploited in some unwitting fashion.

Now if the argument is made that unwitting use of

Americans is desirable and useful and should be performed by

this organization that represents itself as completely above

board, then that's another recommendation that can be made.

But I think if we are going to try to draw some lines here

and we are going to try to reestablish some measure of trust

in this Agency, it ought to be prepared to accept

that it is

what it is when it says what it is when it deals with Americans.

Now this does not preclude the Foreign Resources Division

from taking all sorts of clandestine steps and measures.

We step up to that issue in a different part of this report.

This is dealing with the so-called open arm of the government

DocId: 32423516 Page 47

---

## Page 48

9sh

15

TOP SECRET

45

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

and it may make as much

operational use of Americans

as it wishes so long as it is so informing them.

Senator Huddleston. I think what you're asking here is

that the person being advised, is he's advised, first of all --

that whatever information he supplies to this Agency might

be useful to this Agency in different types of operations.

In other words, he might be made aware of the fact that while

a good part of the information they're seeking may relate only

to economic information or something else, that it might also

be helpful to the Agency in its operations and that he ought

to be advised that if that's the case the Agency will use that

information for that purpose..

Secondly, if the Agency wants to approach him on the

idea that because of his contacts they'd like for him on his

next trip to look for specific types of information and again,.

he ought to be advised that the purpose of this is to provide

the Agency with operational information that might result in the

Agency becoming involved in a covert or clandestine type of

operation because of the information he supplies.

Now is that the kind of thing?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, I simply feel, and by and large that's

the way it's done.

MI. Kirbow.

It's done like that to my specific knowledge.

Every time, even if it's the same man debriefing you, he

tells you every time and lind of forewarns you like the Miranda

DocId: 32423516

Page 48

---

## Page 49

ash 46

TOP SECRET

46

1

2

rule

of what your rights are and that they plan to use this

thing.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

They also, Mr. Chairman, use these returning people as

one of the best sources of initial contact for the company to

gain cover in sensitive areas overseas of any of the records -

Senator Huddleston. What's wrong with saying that?

Mr. Kirbow. Well, in many cases you would not want to

tell the returning head of the foreign sales division that you

find that just in debriefing him that that particular company

would make an excellent cover company because of their

activities in the foreign area. They go to the head of the

company and they tell them, and the man never knows maybe that

two of his

salesmen are later, or sales positions are later

picked up.

That's the decision of the management of the company and

not the returning traveller.

Senator Huddleston. You don't have to tell him that

specifically of this regurement.

MI. Maxwell. I think the problem with the phrasing

with regard to that, I think Elizabeth pointed out also that

there wouldn't be a problem with that. The problem is that

the finding was unclear that that was based

on because it did

blur two different things.

I think you can work it out so that it does, in fact, make

the point you are suggesting..

DocId: 32423516 Page 49

---

## Page 50

ash 47

TOp SECRET

47

1

2

3.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Kirbow. My point is is the Committee really concerned

about this and if they're not, we ought to leave that out.

I don't think there's any

evidence before the Committee that

creates the concern that

the staff appears to be recommending

to the Committee.

Senator Huddleston

Let's bracket that and move on. I

personally would feel that

it would be appropriate for the

Committee to say in a more

positive way than this sentence

indicates that exceptional

care should be taken in dealing with

these people, that they be

fully aware that information they

are providing might form the basis of further operational

use within the Agency.

Ms. Culbreth.. Mr. Chairman, in connection with this

whole section, my earlier draft indicated that there were

several sections here that were bracketed, and I thought that

was to be carried forward.

Senator Huddleston. There are some other brackets around

page 36.

Mr. Aaron. Do you have some hrackets, Liz, that did not

get in?

Ms. Culbreth. Yes. On page 45 my notes indicated that

the recommendation that is now recommendation number 26, which

was recommendation number 24 before it got changed, and we

got

the whole thing bracketed.

Mr. Aaron. Who had it bracketed?

ГАМ АРАТРТ

DocId: 32423516

Page 50

---

## Page 51

ash 43

TOP SECRET

13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Ms. Culbreth.

It was bracketed in this text in the brown

notebook.

MI. Aaron. It was my understanding that the Committee

agreed on that.

Mr. Inderfurth. It was bracketed because there was a

question of moving it over to the State Department and it was

resolved to keep it within the CIA.

MI. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, obviously this book was just

made available this morning because it was being retyped over

the weekend and I would like the opportunity at

the staff level

to go through our earlier draft and if there are brackets here

which we either reserved on for the minority or which were from

the record not decided for the Committee, we'll mark them and

call them to your attention.

Senator Huddleston. Yes, I think that would be helpful.

In fact, it would be helpful for me to have my own book in

which I have notes to compare with this.

Okay. Let's move on.

Mr. Inderfurth. I would like to raise a matter. On

page 28 there's a reference under recommendation 18 which I

think faithfully represents what was discussed but I'm not

sure if this is the best way to state it.

The second paragraph under recommendation 18, the term

current provision regarding the status of the DCI should be

extended to cover the DCI's and both deputies. At most, two of

DocId: 32423516 Page 51

---

## Page 52

ash 49

TOP SECRET

49

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

•16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the three could be military officers.

I'm concerned about that because that would allow the

DCI and the man in charge of the CIA both

I to be career military

officers allowing for the third, the deputy director. for the

DIC staff to be a civilian, and I think that's going against

the grain of what was originally considered to be a concern

of those writing the '47 act that at least one of the two

individuals in line responsibility for the CIA be civilian.

But this would allow both the DCI and the person running the

CIA to be military.

I would recommend that at most one of the three could

be career military. .

Mr. Kirbow. This is not the decision, I think, that

the Committee took. What we should do is go back to the original

language so that if the DCI is a military man, that neither of

the other people can be military. If he is a civilian, either

or both of the other people could be military. It's what the

law currently is today, and I think that's the way -- it has

worked very well that way and I think that's what we should

adopt.

Senator Huddleston. This would include retired military,

too, isn't it?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, that's in the '47 Act.

Mr. digenova: You could just say only one of the three

could he career military.

TAN СГЕНЕ!

DocId: 32423516 Page 52

---

## Page 53

gsh 50

TOP SECRET

50

2

3

4

5

6

7

End 2A, b

28

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

•19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Aaron. I might agree with that but that is not

exactly what Charley said because under his rule if you had a

civilian as you had, you could have two military.

Senator Huddleston. Is that the way the Act is?

Mr. Kirhow. Today what it really says is that if the DCI

is a military man, the deputy must be a civilian and they make

it just that clear.

If he is not, the deputy may be a civilian.

Mr. digenova. But that's the problem. If you have both

deputies

being military men under the new arrangement one of

them will run the CIA while he is the Director and that means

that the two subordinates who are going to be in charge of

that Agency are going to be military men.

Mr. Kirbow. Maybe:

Mr.. diGenova. But they can be. That's the point.

Now that is not, I don't believe that that is what was intended

by the Congress in the 1947 Act:

Mr. Maxwell. I think it should be said that the question

is whether the committee wants to do it rather than the '47

Act.

And the other part is whether the Committee wants to

bind

successive Congresses and the President in their choice

because both could be nominated and confirmed.

Mr. Miller, Isn't the principle that we are trying to

achieve throughout

to get the best possible person no matter

where he comes from?

DocId: 32423516 Page 53

---

## Page 54

ash 51

TOP SECRET

51

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Kirbow. Yes, except there was always a genuine

concern that it be taken over

by the military and if that were

the case, Bill, all three of them could be senior active duty

military officers at the time they were serving. And I don't

believe that is the intent of the Committee or the Congress.

MI. Inderfurth. I would suggest saying only one of the

three.

Mr. Miller. Why don't we just say one of the three?

Mr. Kirbow. The other thing is this. If you're trying

to hinge it on the man who runs the operation, if he runs it

and he is a military man, then I think that you should try to

prohibit the kind of, maybe the next key individual and here

you make it the man who is the principal deputy and maybe he

must be a civilian. And under those circumstances I do strongly

feel that if the DCI is military, maybe the other man should

be a deputy also.

Senator Huddleston. But under your plan, if the DCI

were civilian, then both deputies could be military.

Mr. Kirhow. But if he were military, both deputies

would have to he civilian, and I think that's how we ought to

couch the language.

Mr. Aaron. The only problem is that, and it's

a small

one, is that in the absence of the DCI, it's possible for the

first deputy who is military to really have line responsibility

over the other daputy who is military, and I assume that's not

DocId: 32423516

Page 54

---

## Page 55

gsh

52

TRAP SECRET

52

1

3

4.

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

hig deal but --

Mr. Kirbow.

Because principally this is what occurs

at the Agency today if the DCI is not there.: The three star

has control.

Mr. Miller. Let's

say the control of the Agency is

what we have in mind. Civilian control of the Agency should be

emphasized.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, unless you're careful you will

eliminate any military people from being in the act at all.

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I think it has to be nailed down

to who is going to run it, whether one of the three, two of the

three, or whatever.

MI. Kirhow. We have this problem, which is a little

more pronounced, a particular problem which I think Al

Quanbeck could speak to you here because we're going to have to

consider it in his paper, and that's the national security

agency and the rather peculiar problem there that if your

director is military --

Senator Huddleston. If you put in the statement that

we believe that civilian control is essential --

Mr. Kirbow. In the national intelligence function,

absolutely.

Senator Huddleston. And then only one of the three could

be military:

Mr. Inderfurth. Again, Bill, only one of the three would

TAR CECDET

DocId: 32423516

Page •55

---

## Page 56

gsh 53

TOP SECRET

53

1

• 2

3

4

5

6.

allow that it would be possible for the DCI plus the person

running the CIA -- no, I'm sorry.

Mr. Quanbeck.: In the case of the NSA --

Senator Huddleston. A majority of those three must be

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25.

civilian.

MI. Kirbow. Senator, I wish you would hear, because

it's on this very subject to civilian control, the NSA thing,

because it is peculiar to that group out there.

MI. Quanbeck. Traditionally, the NSA has been headed by

a military officer and the deputy has been a career cryptologist.

Now in order: to emphasize civilian: control,. we considered having

the director be a civilian, and we came down to the' idea:

that

one of the two should be a civilian without specifiying, and empha

sizing the civilian control and getting the best qualified individ

without specifying that one be civilian and the other be a caree:

cryptologist.. He could be a well gualified individual.

Mr. Kirbow. And the problem there was that if the

Director were a civilian appointee, he may have no crypto

experience, and then the number 2 man would be a military

man and there. wouldn't be anything out there representing those

career crypto people that have made their whole life in the

Agency.

Mr. diGenova.

So the fix is only one?

Senator Huddleston. I think so and civilian control is

essential

TAN ACARET

DocId: 32423516 Page 56

---

## Page 57

95h54

TOP SECRET

54

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

.8

9

10

11

12

13

14.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. quanbeck. Do you want that to apply in wartime as

well?

Mr. Kirbow. Unless you say desirable, it'll mean there '11

never be a career military man out of the Agency.

If you promise that with the fact that

it is essential

Senator Huddleston. All right, I'll agree with that.

Now let's move on.

MI. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, one of my associates pointed out

that the paper which precedes, that starting on page 37.

and going down through to the beginning of the recommendation

section of that paper on page 43, that in the period required

by the Committee to consider recommendations the other day,

that none of the language from 37 through the first full

paragraph on the top of page 43 had been considered by the

Committee and we might, should --

Mr. Aaron. That's correct, and more than that it reeds

to be severely scrubbed.

Mr. Kirbow.

It needs to be worked on tremendously,

so maybe we can do that today and get back.

We just haven't taken it up, Mr. Chairman. We've been

pressed with other business and this fell through the cracks.

Mr. Aaron. It's been suggested that we expand the section

somewhat since it really only had one paragraph and we tried

to include something about the threat as well as something

about the operations, and I think it requires some further work.

TAN CLANET

DocId: 32423516 Page 57

---

## Page 58

9sh

55

TOP SECRET

55

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now I'll just asl: a question in

1 this regard.

Is it a fair assumption on the part of the staff that even as

the Committee considers these findings and recommendations and

puts in their various fixes, that we will have

some opportunity

to go through here and try to clean up the language once

the policy issues are settled?

Senator Huddleston. Yes, and the members themselves will

probably have some suggestions.

Mr. Kirbow. As I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, we

can do this up to the day it goes to the printer. We did it

on the previous drafts and we did it on the galleys.

Mr. Aaron. If we could return to the Department of

State and the

ambassador's paper, now I hope people have

had an opportunity to look through this. I've tried to incor-

porate, at least as far as I could, various views.

Mr. Inderfurth. This goes with 'page 95, so it should

be page 95 through 101, and then you don't have a page 102, and

then on to page 103.

Mr. Aaron. Now there is some bracketed language as

well as bracketed recommendations. I might just get the

discussion

going with what we know are problems. Why

don't we just take up the first one here and that is there is

an example here concerning coordination of agent recruitment

programs with the ambassador on page 83 and it says, for example,

a

[major] new CIA recruitment program targeted on a friendly

DocId: 32423516 Page 58

---

## Page 59

gsh

56

TOP SECRET

56

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

:13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

[European) country was under consideration in Washington, et ceter

NOW

some people believe we ought to take out major and

some people think we ought to take out European. I think most

everyone agrees that one of those words should come out because

it narrows us down to France, Germany, and Britain, and since

Britain is off limits, it narrows down to Germany and France.

My recommendation is to take out the word major. I

would like to reserve the word European because I think it's

important to give some flavor of the character of the program.

If the word major comes out, there are then more than a dozen

European. countries that this might involve.

Mr. Kelley. What about ; Western or something like

that, not

so much geographic but major allies?

Mr. Aaron. Western would be all right, as a matter of

fact. But what we want to get at is that this simply isn't

just a program like in Brazil where we have done this

stuff

for years and years and years. But we're really talking about

something else.

If Western would do it, I'd be happy to take out major

and put in Western.

Mr. Kirhow. Take out European?

Mr. Aaron.

Yes, and put in Western.

MI. Kirbow. If the example you are trying to make is

a disagreement or

is a fact that the ambassador was not aware

of something that the station chief was aware of, you can

DocId: 32423516 Page 59

---

## Page 60

ash

57

TOP SECRET

57

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

say a major program and leave out European or. Western or

anything else because that is not pertinent to the fact.. He

can be an ambassador in Lower Uganda and have the same right

because he is the number

one man in the country.

Senator Huddleston. Except you're talking about a

specific case.

Mr. Kirbow. We're all trying to avoid pointing out

the country by using the ambassador's name or anything, Mr.

Chairman, because

it is really a touchy subject and goes

directly to a very classified matter in a European country:

MI. Kelley. But we still want to make the point that

this was sensitive, that the size and importance of this country

made these an even more egregious example and I wonder if

maybe if western, Charley, still doesn't fit the bill, we

could use some word like sensitive, in a sensitive country

because it really is different. If it's Lower Uganda rather

than a major, as it was in fact, a NATO

ally:

Mr. Kirbow. I would agree that substituting sensitive

for the word major and striking the word European should give

no foreign intelligence agency a handle up on this particular

program.

Mr. Kelley. Why don't we see what the CIA says.

Mr. Kirbow.. They have.

Mr. Kelley. Why don't we put in sensitive program in

friendly Western country and. see what the CIA says? We

don't

DocId: 32423516

Page 60

---

## Page 61

ash 58

TOP SECRET

58

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.13

14

15

16

17.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

have to vet this ourselves..

Mr. Miller. Isn't the point about, that is being made.

that it's going around the Ambassador

and it seems to me that

if the detail is to illuminate that point rather than where

it takes place, then you don't need the specifics?

Mr. Aaron. No, I think Bob Kelley has the point.

It

isn't just that we have a major program and ambassadors don't

know about it. That has happened for years and years, you know,

around the world.

The important point here is that we're talking not about

just a country in which we've been involved for a long time

which we've had lots of relationships with. We're talking about

a

country in whom the programs of this character could have

a major impact on the country itself and on our interests there

and on their relationship to us.

And in that case, and on vital U.S. interests:

Mr. Maxwell. Could I suggest a fix, which is to be

a

major and highly sensitive program?

Mr. Kirbow. May I suggest that if that's what we're trying

to show by example we're using a very

poor example here because

it

was only under consideration in Washington and the decision

had not been made on this particular covert operation and if

we want to use an example of the ambassador being left out

of the action, this is

not it.

Mr. Aaron. I disagree with that point.

DocId: 32423516 Page 61

---

## Page 62

TOP SECRET

59

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Senator Huddleston. well, we want to talk about whether

not the Ambassador ought to be brought into this.

Mr. Kirbow. It's just a matter of when you bring him

into the action.

MI. Maxwell. For example, a major in a highly sensitive

CIA recruitment program targeted on a friendly country were.

under consideration in Washington.

If it's major and highly sensitive, I don't think we

need to say where it is:

Senator Huddleston. I think that's all right.

Mr. Miller. I challenge the idea that it's major.

Senator Huddleston. Major and/or sensitive.

MI. Kelley. Why don't we see what the CIA says about

the word Western. They may be perfectly happy with that word

as opposed to European.

Senator Huddleston. I think it does

make an important

point, that even involving friends, that we could strain an

already good relationship when the Ambassador was not taken into

confidence.

Mr. Aaron. And we'll take a close look at this as well.

Mr. Inderfurth. In light of the U.s. position in the

world today, friendly may also limit it to the point that it

can he identified..

Mr. Kirhow. Mr. Chairman, I can't emphasize how sensitive

the word recruitment is. When you add the other words to it you

TOM ALPSET

DocId: 32423516 Page 62

---

## Page 63

ash 50

TOP SECRET

60

1

make it very clear to everybody that you are trying to recruit

2

a very high official in that government.

3

4

If the word recruitment doesn't, if you're talking about

major new CIA program targeted and leave the word recruitment

5

out: you will inhibit the enemy from finding out exactly the

6-

individual's name that you're talking about and recruitment

doesn't add anything to it, does it, David?

8

What point are you trying to make in leaving this stuff

9

in?

The fact that the Ambassador was not brought into the

10

11

act, right, and it was an important program:

Senator Huddleston. The nature of the act, I think,

12

has to be defined to some degree before you know how serious

13

it was that the ambassador was not included.

14

Let's leave it there and see what the Agency says if

15

the Full Committee accepts this.

16

Mr. Kirbow. Then will we bracket this to the

Full

17

Committee, Mr. Chairman?

18

19

Senator Huddleston.

We certainly have ar opportunity

to take exception to it.

20

Mr. Kirbow. He had taken that exception at the staff

21

level and obviously we did not prevail and we would like to

22

have that bracketed in the Full Committee.

23

Mr. Aaron. Perhaps we could then turn to the recommendatic

24

where we have a couple of hrackets from the staff level, one

of which does not appear, I'm sorry to say. This is page 86 and

DocId: 32423516

Page 63

---

## Page 64

ash

TOP SECRET

61

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

87. Let me see if

I can just go through them and indicate

some changes.

Let me just call your attention here to the first

recommendation which, in effect, simply says the National

Security Council and the Department of State should issue

instructions implementing: law with regards to the obligations

of ambassadors.

We now make clear in the text that the conflict here that

has led to, in parts, to the absence of

any regulations is

between the Department's effort to implement them through

instructions in the CIA's view that there is a conflict between

this law and their responsibility to protect sources and

methods from unauthorized disclosure.

This recommendation would put the Committee on record

as

saying the law makes ambassadors authorized recipients

and that is how that needs to be squared with --

Ms. Culbreth. Could we get a copy of that to examine

in context with this?

Mr. Aaron: Yes.

I'm sorry I don't have it right now.

That it simply makes

the point that instructions have to go

to other components and the request that such instructions be

made available to the oversight committee.

Now the second recommendation. --

MI. Maxwell. The footnote about the CIA's opposition, is

that a letter from the Agency?

DocId: 32423516 Page 64

---

## Page 65

95}

I SECRET

62

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MI. Aaron. He were just told that by deposition.

Mt. Maxwell. How?

Mr. Aaron. They just told us.

Mr. Kirbow. I don't remember how it was under discussion

there but that is - in other words, it is information that

I also know about.

Mr. Aaron. I don't have the document.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you ask them with regard to examples

that you gave?

Mr. Aaron. We asked them if they had any further

comment on it and I believe they do.

Mr. Kirbow. What is the result of the Ambassador's

trip out there?

Mr. Aaron. He went out and talked with the review staff

They were aware of the sensitive Western program. They were

not aware offhand of the other two examples.

Now the second recommendation should be in brackets

from the staff level, and I would like to correct or suggest

a correction in the first phrase. Instead of saying to this

end. just simply say in the exercise of its statutory

responsibility Ambassadors should have the right to access

to the operational communications of the CIA's clandestine

service.

Any exceptions would have to have the ayproval of the

Department of State and be brought to the attention of the

TAN CEANET.

DocId:32423516

Page 65

---

## Page 66

ast 63

TOP SECRET

63

1

2

4

5

6

8

9

10

.11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

oversight committee,

the point of that being that if you ought

to have full authority to act for the ambassador, he ought to hav

the right, if not the obligation, to read operational traffic

when necessary.

Mr. Kirhow. Who would determine when necessary?

The

station chief?

MI. Aaron. He would determine when necessary. That's

the point of changing the authority around.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I find myself in an awkward

position here hecause I think that the ambassador is entitled

to know practically all of what's going on in this country.

I think that he is entitled to know all of the policies and

the national estimates against which all of the collections in

this country are being made and any other major policy decisions

made in Washington.

I have stressed to the staff, as has Mr. Bader, I believe,

the peculiarity of cables which have to do with agent handling,

and how it is publicly the most sensitive operation in the

entire Agency.

I do not for the life of me see why if the Ambassador

has the control that we give him elsewhere in this thing, that

he should read every operational message that the station chief

or whoever is in charge in that particular area in the

embassy is sending back on the various agents and the manner

in which they are being handled or their names because he can't

DocId: 32423516

Page 66

---

## Page 67

ash

61

TEP SECRET

61

1.

2

help but find out the names of the people and who they are

and exactly what they're doing if you brief the operational

travel.

WARD &

PAUL

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Senator Huddleston.

does not require him to do it.

This gives him the right to it.

It

Mr. Maxwell. I think that's the real difference.

I did

have a question on the exceptions having the approvals only of th

Department of State. The ambassador, as the President's

representative in the country, it would seem that if the

Department of State had the right to overrule, for instance, the

DcI or the deputy in charge of the CIA in regard to a sensitive

matter, that there should be a mechanism by which that can

be resolved.

MI. Aaron. I would certainly be subject to say any

exceptions would have to have the approval of the appropriate

national security council body and leave it at that because-that

would then put the State Department in the process.

MI. Kirbow. MY problem is totally different from that.

I think that today the instructions from the President of the

United States, or at least approved in principle because it's

been in operation for some great period of time, the classified

instruction from the State Department which were joined by the

DCI prescrihes certain situations in which they tell the

aml assador, the station chief need not tell you, and in those case:

where you will request and he doesn't tell you, it says for the

DocId: 32423516 Page 67

---

## Page 68

ash

65

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

65

WARD

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

exact procedures the station chief and the Ambassador both have

an absolute secure channel to refer the matter back to the

Department in Washington where it is reconciled here at a

policy level because a man out at the end of the line

should not

I think in all circumstances have a prerogative that exceeds

that which the President wishes him to have.

That's the current state of the situation. The instructio

is cited at great length in the full paper.

Senator Huddleston. I think this recognizes the

exceptions and just sets procedures.

Mr. Truehart. But the instruction conflicts with the

law on the books:

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Ambassador, it also conflicts with the

law that says that the DCI should protect the sources and methods

in the Agency.

MI. Truehart. From unauthorized disclosure.

Senator Huddleston. We should have to bracket this?

MI. Kirbow. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. Well, ve have to wrap this section

up here right now.

MI. Aaron.

Okay. The next recommendation just authorizes

the Department, and I would suggest here that to clarify it a

little bit, say by statute the Department of State should be

authorized to take the necessary steps to assure that it can

provide the kind of support. We found that it really was not

DocId: 32423516

Page 68

---

## Page 69

gh

TOP SECRET

6.6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

PAUL

12

13

14

15

16

17

End Tape 2b18

19

410 First Street, S.E., Washington,

20

21

22

23

24

25

in the position to provide this in the execution of that law.

This has been'in many forms:

At one point we said there

should be an office to do this and at one point we said to put

it in the hands of a responsible official.

But I think the main point we want to make here is that

the Department does not have the parallel authority as the

ambassador has in law and therefore is not in a position to

help him out when he gets into the kind of trouble that Charley

referred to.

So this simply gives the Department the same kind of

authority.

Mr. Kirbow. The ivords

"can provide," I think we should

require them to provide this, especially instructions on what

the complications of the law is.

Ms. Culbreth. I have a fix on that. By statute the

State Department should provide effective guidance and

support. Just say do it.

My. Aaron. But they can't be told to do something without

also authorizing them to have the information to be able to

do it.

MI. Kirhow. The Department of State has access.to

everything that goes to the National Security Council by the

Secretary sitting as the principal member.

MI. Aaron. Well;

as you know, a lot of these activities

we're talking ahout do not go to the National Security Council.

DocId: 32423516 Page 69

---

## Page 70

15h57

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

TADP SECRET

67

1

2

WARD

& PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

4

5

6

7

8

9

•10

11

12

13

•14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

They will if we had our way but they don't in current law.

Senator Huddleston. Okay.

Mr. Aaron: Number 5 is in brackets. The point is that

it is similar to number 2, the point being that communications

with overseas posts are now in the hands of

the Central

Intelligence Agency for the most part. The recommendation here

is that they he out in the hands of the Department of State

as an overt organization. This is a recommendation which the

Murphy Commission came to, its recommendation which has -

MI. Maxwell. No we have a position of the Secretary of

State and the MCI on this, as well as a cost estimate of what,

if any, changes there would be?

MI. Aaron. No, we don't have any cost estimate.

MI. Maxwell. My.

sense of the findings on which this

is based go to number 2

which I personally support in guaranteein

the ambassador acess, but I think that we have an inadequate

record on which to base

a recommendation that the entire

communications network be passed from one agency of government

to another.

Mr. Kirbow. I agree on 5 and have consistently found

no evidence to support

putting it back under the State Department

who originally had it and agreed to put it over under the CIA.

Senator Huddleston. Well, that's in brackets.

Mr. Kirhow.

On

4,

MI. Chairman, I had an extensive and

fairly supportive, I think, recommendation that we should not

DocId: 32423516

Page 70

---

## Page 71

ash

TRIP SECRET

68

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

410 First Street, S.E., Washington,

1

2

3

4

5

6

•7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

recommend increased money if we have not heard that this is an

inadequately funded program. Nor should we recommend internally

a reorganization of the policies of the Department of State

so that who controls this money without a

record before the

Committee, but rather that the recommendation be that the

oversight committee, in conjunction with the Department of

State, carefully consider the adequacy of the funding for this

program in light of their value to the nation and whatever the

requirements are.

Senator Huddleston. Do you have any trouble with that?

Mr. Aaron. Yes,

I do because I think we do have a

sufficient record from our discussions with members of the

foreign service and the State Department that they are not

adequately funded to carry on their political reporting

responsibility and I believe that we can make a recommendation

that this responsibility deserves increased support.

And so that is taking the first half of the recommendation.

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me. Let me take the first part with

vOu,

He don't have the

Department's position on that.

We

have opinions of some of the individuals in that particular

operation that they need more money. The Department's position

in defending their programs before the Foreign Relations

Committee

as far as I could see from what record was available

to me does not stress that it is inadequately funded and unless

DocId: 32423516 Page 71

---

## Page 72

054 60

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

MOP SECRET

69

WARO & PAUL

410 First. Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

we're going to get the State Department's position

on this

•2

and they say the same thing, then that is not the Administration'

position.

. 4

Mr. Quanheck. It also runs contrary to the points that

5

we make in the budget paper when we say that we have a surplus

6

of collection and that the problem is in analysis.

7

Mr. Aaron.

Wait, wait, wait, that's a very different

8

point.

9

Mr. Kirhow. The paper clearly says excess collection

10

compared to the analytical.

11

Mr. Aaron. Can you tell me why the Administration

12.

opposes this?

13

Mr. Kirhow. I think the point is that if we don't have

14

a position of the Department of State on this, it is unfair

15

for us to recommend to

the committee that they adopt the position

16

from individuals' views

not being the person responsible for

17

"the program.

18

Mr. Inderfurth. I think

another point here is that the

19

ambassadors that we talked with, and I'm thinking right now of

20

21

those in Chile, all said that the overt collection of intelligeng

through their political

reporting was most valuable to them and

22

I think it follows that this recommendation is appropriate becaus

23

we want to beef that side up.

24

Senator Huddleston. It seems like we are beating

25

semantics here.

DocId: 32423516 Page 72

---

## Page 73

rsh

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

70

TOP SECRET

70

1

2

WARD

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington,

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25•

Mr. Kirbow. Inadequate funding against the funding for

their normal

chores, which is representation in the country

where we are accredited.

We're able to take out the business

of the CIA having more funds for this than the State Department

because we don't think it is cause and effect.

Senator Huddleston. Can't we just say there that

consideration should be given to increasing the funding or

something to that effect?

Mr. Kirhow. Or need to determine whether or not it is

adequate.

Mr. Aaron. Let me just make one last point on this.

I don't really understand

Charles' position. If I understand

him correctly, his position

is the recommendations that the

Subcommittee or the Committee makes should all have been either

approved or supported by

the Administration in some way.

Now in this particular case --

MI. Kirbow. Now

don't misrepresent me. What I really

said was I do not think

that this Committee has before it

record from responsible

individuals in charge of the Department

of State that fairly indicates that that is an inadequately

funded program.

Mr. Aaron..

We

have the record before this Committee that

those people who are tasked with this responsibility including

ambassadors. overseas

do

feel that these programs are inadequately

funded and indeed, ve

have

reached a point in Europe, for

DocId: 32423516

Page 73

---

## Page 74

ash

71

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

PAUL

WARD &

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1?:

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

TOP SECRET

71

example, which is of extreme importance to us that there is only

one post outside of the major capitals that has any funds

available or manpower available to do any political reporting,

that that is a major area of the world in which there have been

repeated cutbacks. The record is very clear on this. There

has been enormous cutback in the foreign service as well as

the clandestine service, but unlike the clandestine service,

the foreign service has certain statutory responsibilities in

the field of council

affairs.

They have gotten

to the point now that all they can do

it to take care of their

council responsibilities and are no

longer capable of doing

the political reporting.

But that is the

factual matter, that is what we have

discovered.

I believe that

on

that basis the Committee can make a

recommendation that this

requires further support.

Mr. Quanbeck.

I would argue that if we queried all

of the program managers

throughout the intelligence community,

95 percent of them would

say that they are inadequately funded.

Mr. Kirbow.

The

point that I make here for this is that

there is apparently an

irreconcilable difference of opinion

between

the staff on

the

sufficiency of the record and the

first day that we started

on these recommendations you had

agreed that where there

was a real and sincere difference of

opinion, that the evidence

would be brought forth for considerati

DocId: 32423516

Pae 74

---

## Page 75

72

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

1

2

WARD &

PAUL

410. First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

by the Committee.

I ask that the record on this one he produced to support

that recommendation. I don't think it is adequate.

Senator luddleston. Well, all I think we can do is move

it up to the Full Committee. I would suggest that we put in there

consideration be given to increasing the funds with the earmarkin

left

there when it comes

before the Full Committee. Then we

can expect to have whatever record we have.

MI. diGenova.

The recommendation that you're giving is

that the sentence be changed to say consideration should be

given to increasing the

money.

Senator Huddleston.

That's correct.

Mr. Kirbow.

MI.

Chairman, on number 5, what was the

recommendation that Mr:

Aaron said he agreed was not an

essential recommendation?

MI. Aaron.

đon

't

recall agreeing to that.

Mr. Kirbow.

Excuse

me. I thought you said you were

willing to take it out

if I were going to be insistent on it.

Mr. Aaron. No.

MI. Kirbow.

Well

if that's not the case we can leave

it bracketed.

It always puts us

in a bad position that just by putting

forth the recommendation

from the staff by which there is no

general consensus among

the staff, that we always wind up on

the defensive

when we

want it taken out. I don't think that

DocId: 32423516 Page 75

---

## Page 76

ash 7.3

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

73

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street,

S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

should necessarily be.

think there should be an affirmative

record shown where that

recommendation should be in the recommen-

dation of the Committee

at all.

I don't think that has been shown at all. It's just what

one member of the staff

for sure wants done, and I don't think

the record supports it.

Senator Huddleston.

Let's just leave it there in brackets

Where do we go from here?

Mr. Miller. Defense.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, I can't go to defense.

We're scheduled

for 10:00 tomorrow morning, and meanwhile

would the staff have

opportunity to go through this entire

paper here?

Ms. Culbreth. Could I raise a point?

Several of us on

the staff were talking about this and

I. know you have to go,

but is there some plan or procedure that

has already been decided

for how this is going to be brought

before the Full Committee?

Senator Huddleston. That's the next question.

Ms. Culbreth. I believe that's awfully important.

Mr. Miller. I recommend the following very briefly, that

tomorrow you present the briefing book to the full Committee

with a covering letter saying that this represents the view of

the Subcommittee, that you ask them to look the briefing book

over the following day, i

I mean that same evening, and say that

DocId: 32423516 Page 76

---

## Page 77

9sh 71

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

74

WARD

& PAUL

• 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

you would, and suggest

that the Chairman entertain any suggestion

on the part of Senators

from the other subcommittee for any

expansions, corrections,

deletions, and proceed by suggestions

from the Senators, not

until completed.

from the staff but from the Senators

Mr. Kirbow. Mr.

Miller, I will note that the Chairman's

letter would also point

out, like Mr. Bader did a while ago,

that there are several things in here not yet adopted but

recommended as alternatives.

Senator Huddleston. Yes. I believe that would be well,

plus I believe Dave ought to he prepared to give a quick overlay

and the rest of you available for any questions that might come

up the first day as we

give it to them.

MI. Maxwell. I

don't know what the time schedule is

but could we have it as

early as possible because just an

overnight reading for 120

page document.

Senator Huddleston.

I see no reason why this shouldn't

go by spending the rest

of the day, if you can smooth it out

that it couldn't go ahead and go to the

any at all at that point,

full membership.

Mr. Aaron. Could

I ask a question about the number of

copies?

Obviously we '11

have a copy for every Senator. Now the

question is whether there should be a copy for every Senator and

his designee.

DocId: 32423516

Page 77

---

## Page 78

ash 75

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

TRIP SECRET

75

1

2

3

5

6

Mr. Kirbow. The

only way to work it, Mr. Chairman,

it's

just impossible not to have a copy.

Senator Huddleston. That suits me all right.

Mr. Inderfurth. Let's do one thing.

On the designee

copy let's stamp the Senator's name.

MI. Kirbow. I might add, Mr. Chairman, the security

operation under Mr. Marshall has been exemplary during the

last couple of weeks.

(Whereupon, at 1l:20 o'clock a.m., the hearing in the

above-mentioned matter was concluded.)

WARD & PAUL

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

DocId: 32423516

Page

78

---