E. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Originator: ROCK
From: GRAY, MARVIN
Document date: 1975-05-22 00:00:00
Document type: REPORT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

CAR/HARDY

RECORD NUMBER :

178-10003-10387

RECORD SERIES: SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: BELIN ASSASSINATION DRAFTS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

1O :

ROCK

GRAY, MARVIN

TITLE: E. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

05/22/1975

20

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

CIA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

GRAY, MARVIN

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

TRUJILLO, RAFAEL

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS :

Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/29/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Part Il of 2-par draft--Dominical Republic only.

v9.1

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DRAFT

GRAY/sIn

5/22/75

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178-10003-10387

E.

The Dominican Republic

1.

Summary and Conclusion

In late 1960 and 1961, the United States, having

• abandoned

its policy of nonintervention in the Dominican

Republic, sought to bring about the overthrow of the regime

of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of

a moderate successor government. To accomplish this result

several measures were undertaken on the diplomatic level

and the Special Group (predecessor of the forty Committec)

approved

a program of covert action as well. At their

direction the CIA encouraged a group of internal dissidents

along with several exile organizations. On May 30, 1961,

members of the internal group assassinated Trujillo.

There was no direct American participation in the

assassination. The idea originated with the Dominicans;

they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they

did the detailed planning. They were never subject to

American supervision

or control.

FROM

THE

FORD LIBPARY

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On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers

in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the

plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware

of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group

of practical problems with several earlier

assassination plans;

it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of

explosives to kill Trujillo.

As a gesture of American support, three revolvers and

three carbines, along with limited supplies of ammunition,

were passed to the plotters about two months before the

assassination. One of the carbines was reportedly left at

the scene of the crime. Four submachineguns were also sent.

zi -

to the Dominican Republic by diplomatic pouch. They were with-

held from the plotters because of last-minute State Department

objections.

PHOTOCOP

It appears that high-level State Department and

White House officials first learned guns had

been provided to

potential assassins some six weeks after the transfer, and

about two and a half weeks prior to Trujillo's death. A state-

ment of policy was prepared and approved by the President,

Leading "'ve must not run risk of U.s. association with

political assassination, since U.S. as a matter of general

policy cannot condone

assassination. This last principle is

overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

The

preparation of this message, and the required coordination,

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consumed about two weeks. There is no evidence of any

effort during this period to recover the weapons or other-

wise interfere with the assassination plans. The policy

statement was cabled to the Dominican Republic on May 29,

the day before the successful assassination attempt. Both

the Consul General and the CIA

Station Chief in Ciudad

Trujillo promptly protested this change in the policy which

they had followed in the belief it had been approved by

appropriate authority. Before these cables were received

in Washington, Trujillo was dead.

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PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R.

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2. (Prososed) General Conclusion and Recommendation

The Comnission concurs in the position taken in the

policy statement. We have concluded that there was an

improper level of American involvement in the death of

Generalissimo Trujillo. That is so even though the assassins

might have been able to procure equivalent weapons from

other sources. We also conclude that despite the apparent.

good faith of the persons concerned, there was inadequate

consideration of the risks of such involvement and inadequate

supervision and coordination of the operation.

We recommend that in the future, weapons should be

supplied

to plotters of a coup or revolution only in the

rarest of circumstances, if at all. In passing on such

activities the approving authority should consider carefully

the potential damage to the foreign relations of the nation and

the feelings of the American people if such activities become

known.

In our judgment eventual disclosure is inevitable.

The procedures of the CIA should be modified to re-

quire the concurrence of the Department of State before weapons,

ammunition, explosives, and similar items are transmitted by

diplomatic pouch.

The treaty obligations of the u.s., including

particularly those under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relation

should be

observed and fulfilled in good faith. e

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PHOTOCOPY

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3.

The Chronology

a. Ihe Background

Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re-

public in 1930. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt and

regressive nature of his regime, because of his systematic

use of torture and murder as tools of government, and because

of his intervention in the affairs of other nations.

The

country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several

attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other

Latin American countries.

The policy of the United States at the beginning of

1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Irujillo's

• downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a moderate

group which

would take power in the event of Trujillo's death,

flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, although

clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Americans

that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo

regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela,

whose support the United States

badly wanted in connection with

operations against Castro, conditioned their support on u.s.

assistance in toppling Trujillo. In April the President approved

contingency planning for a more active U.S, role in the event

the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to:

deteriorate.

HOTOCOP*-FROM THE

FORD 1

LIBPARY

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b. The Rifles

In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re-

public returned to Washington for consultations. Both State Depart-

ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents

needed weapons, particularly, a "small number of high-powered

rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present

recollection of any such request.

He is confident that he

made no serious effort to obtain them. Nevertheless, the

request went forward. Near the end of June, according to

CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American

Affairs approved the provision of "a small number

of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key

Irujillo people from the scene," and requested that they be

supplied at

the earliest possible moment. Neither the CIA

•officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secretary,

now both

retired, has any recollection of this meeting.

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c. Explosives

On June 21, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsuccessful

attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a

result the United States and other OAS countries severed

diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations vere

retained.

The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign service

officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the

severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter.

It was his recollection that the dissidents. had no definite

assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of

that course as the only way out of the conditions under which

they lived. It was not until early 1961, as

he recalls, that

the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kÎll

Trujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to

confirm this recollection.

Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals during

1960 to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination

of Trujillo. A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the ?

dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated from

a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means

of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary

action.

A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears

to have been provided by the dissidents in December.

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On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Plans

presented the Special Group with a program for covert action

to bring about trujillo's overthrow. A portion of the program

called

for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo

to continue to

work with the internal dissidents to promote

an uprising

and the establishment of a moderate pro-u.s.

successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially

•approved by the special Group, contained no provision for

supplying arms or explosives to the internal dissidents.

Two weeks later, the Department of State, on its ow

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE

motion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal

dissidents furnished "limited supplies of small arms and other

equipment," meaning explosives, subject to the condition

that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point

outside the country itself.

The internal State Department

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memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be

no. thought of toppling the government by any such "minor

measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the

hands of the pro-u.s. opposition with a corresponding boost

to their morale and their opinion of the United States. The

station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group

action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower

Administration.

President Kennedy was informed of the Special

Group action not later than mid-February.

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The Commission finds no reason to believe that any

member of the Special Group intended to authorize the furnish-

ing

of

assassination weapons. However, those CIA officials

who

had been involved in dealings with the dissidents very

likely believed that the Special Group had authorized support

of the planned

assassination and armed uprising.

d. Revolvers.

During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station

and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch

with the dissidents, and they were aware of their various schemes

to assassinate Irujillo. Although these officials apparently

took no active role in the development of plans, they did

on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the

dissidents. In mid-February, two members of the dissidents'

"Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination,

came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State

÷.

Department officers. During these meetings they stated

repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the

assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to

permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the

State Department.

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In March matters took an active turn. In a cablè

on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22

the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans

for Irujillo's assassination were coming to a head.

He

requested additional authority to supply the pro-u.s.

• dissidents with weapons.

Similar requests were made by the CIA Station

•Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded

that it could not comply with these requests because the

restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the

introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by :

Americans.

On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his

request that headguarters send him three .38 calibre revolvers and

anmunition by diplomatic pouch. He stated that without

some show of support the United States would lose the

dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it

might have

some control over the timing of their use.

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On the same day, March 22, representatives of the

CIA met with the State Department officer who served as their

point of contact with the Department's Bureau of Inter-

American Affairs.

Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy

Director for Plans cabled the station setting forth United

States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and

stating that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by

diplomatic pouch in the near future.

There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart-

"ПОТОСОРУ".

FROM

ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on this

decision. The memories of the participants are hazy on the

matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the

GERALD

introduction

of handguns into the Dominican Republic and

believed it obtained approval. The then Deputy Director for

•Plans testified that as the territorial restriction on delivery

of weapons was initially imposed at the request of the

FORD

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Department of State, he would

have considered the State Depart-

ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authority

and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for

formal approval.

He observed that the members of the Group

or their staffs might have been advised informally.

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The use of a diplomatic pouch to send weapons

fox such purposes was prohibited by regulations of the CIA's

Clandestine Services, and it is also illegal under inter-

national law. The Deputy Director of Plans approved the

waiver of the internal regulations. There is nothing to

indicate that the Department of State was informed of the

use of the pouch, and the fact that the March 25 cable

instructed the Chief of Station not to advise the Consul

General of the use of the pouch suggests that the CIA acted

unilaterally in this regard.

The CIA files indicate that the revolvers were

passed to the dissidents, and the Department of State files in

dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other two

by Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former

Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter.

e.

Carbines

On March 26, the day after CIA decided to fur-

nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-1

carbines

in the consulate, left behind by departing naval

personnel. It requested magazines for the weapons and

permission to pass them to the dissidents, On March 29 the

Assistant

Deputy Director for Plans

responded that

he was

pouching the magazines, and that headquarters was "inclined to

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....

favor" passing the weapons and ammunition.

Another meeting was held with the Department of

State on March 31.

The State Department memorandum makes no

mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition

or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director

for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same

day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared

the memorandum of the meeting, and the Consul General are clear

in their

recollection that the State Department in Washington

did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul

General was in Washington several weeks after the pass

took

place. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was

coordinated in advance with

the Department of State. It is

possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization

• with respect to the handguns to extend

to the carbines as well.

It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group

restriction on importation of weapons did not apply, as the

carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic..

CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to request

the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the

Department that the arms and ammunition were being passed.

A reassuring reply from the Consul General was received to

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PHOTOCOPY.

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days later. The CIA Station Chief, who would not have been

involved in any coordination at the headquarters level,

speculated that this injunction may have been designed to

Keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that

the weapons were being passed.

It is clear that the coordination on the deci-

sion to provide the carbines was inadequate. It is impossible

to determine from this evidence where the fault lies.

f. Submachine Guns

As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta-

tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in

tonded to kill Trujillo when he visiled his mistress--substantially

the plan followed some two months later. Although the plan

originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress'

residence using silenced weapons, the group requested five

M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self

defense in case the assassination plans went awry and

there

was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces.

In its

March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to

provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the

capacity to receive them at sea or in

a cache on the coast,.,

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but that for security reasons they could not be sent

by pouch.

The Chief of Station returned to Washington for

consultations in early April. He was able to convince his

superiors that the pouch was

the only feasible and secure

means of getting the weapons into the Dominican Republic

for delivery to the dissidents. The Deputy Director for

Plans approved on April 10, and the pouch was sent on April 14

but with the restriction that the weapons not be passed without

further approval. The files show that there was no coordination

with the Department of State in Washington. Because of the

Bay of Pigs landing on April 17, the station and the consulate

were never given authority to supply the weapons to the

dissidents and they never did so.

On May 2, as the result of repeated entreaties

from the station and the consulate, the Deputy Director for Plans

approved a cable for the DCI's release, stating that as it

appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not

the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized

to pass them for the additional protection of the group.

Apparently someone decided this decision

should not be made

without the consent of the Department of State, for on May 3

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the Deputy Chief of the western Hemisphere Division met with

Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task

• Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memorandum of

• the interview, confirmed by

'one of the witnesses, the initial

• presentation stated

the group wished the arms in order to

- overthrow

Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined

that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the

guns were wanted for that purpose. Berle responded that he

could not care less for Irujillo, but that the United States

did not wish to have

anything to do with any assassination

plots anywhere, any time. The Agency officer, who had been

in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for

approximately a year, told Berle he felt the same way.

It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over-

ruled; on May

5 a cable informed the station that

a high-level

State Department decision on the submachineguns was

pending.

Nothing in the files indicates

what this cable might have

referred to. In any event on May 8 the station was informed

that the State Department had disapproved passage of the

submachineguns, and this ended the matter.

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PHOTOCOPY

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g. The Policy, Statement

In mid-may, as a result of increasing indications

that events in the Dominican Republic were reaching a climax,

the White House requested situation reports and contingency

plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National

Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for this

purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines

had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal

defense "attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize

Trujillo.". The report implied that both the revolvers and

the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines,

and therefore the limitations on

the special Group authorization

technically did not apply.

The CIA liaison officer at the State Department

called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had al-.

ready been passed, and apparently submitted a memorandum outlining

the reasons why the United States should not be involved

in this activity. Among them were that the United States

Government should not lend itself

to direct political

assassination, that the moral posture of the United States

could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world,

that the United States would have encouraged the action,

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PHOTOCOPY

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supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned

over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen,

and that the United States could not afford a precedent which

might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are

used to deliver assassination weapons.

On May 15 a joint CIA-State Department memorandum

was sent the President's National Security Adviser informing him

that the plans of the pro-u.s. group were well advanced in the

direction of ousting Irujillo "by any means." This memorandum

did not call attention to the fact that the United States had

supplied weapons to the group.

In the midst of these discussions, the Consul

General, who had been in Washington for consultationy cabled on his

return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident

planned to "execute action against Irujillo" that evening.

The Department replied that it would consider this timing

particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the

Consul General's return from

Washington to the Dominican

Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom.

This

exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer.

The state of the covert action program in the

Dominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18,

and again on May 25.

The Conmission has not had access

to

the minutes.

PHOTOCOPY.

FROM

FORD LEBPARY-

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On May 24, the State Department liaison officer

provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable, stating that

the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter-

vention, and even more so from political assassination,

overrode the need to secure

credit with the Dominican dissidents

and with Latin America generally. This draft was approved

at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was

sent to the White House for Presidential review. After some

redrafting in the White House, the final version

in another

hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.s. association with i

political assassination, since U.S, as a matter of

general.

policy cannot condone assassination." This versionias

approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican

Republic. It arrived the day before Trujillo's death on May 30.

On June I the State Department instructed its Consul General,

¡ he could do so "most inconspicuously", to destroy any

records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related

matters.

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F.

Conclusion

TOP SECRET

President Ford has firmly announced that assassina-

tion is not and should never be a tool of United States policy.

The commission joins in this statement. It is against the

constitutional and moral principles for which this republic

stands for there to be any direct or indirect participation

of any agency of the United States Government in any plans

involving the assassination of any person in peacetime.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE

GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

TOP SEGRET

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