CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Originator: JCS
From: V.H. KRULAK
To: COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Document date: 03/22/1963
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10007

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10007

RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: JCS

FROM: V.H. KRULAK

TO: COMMITTEE MEMBERS

TITLE:

CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES

DATE: 03/22/1963

PAGES:

8

SUBJECTS :

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

INTELLIGENCE SHARING, LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS:

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Memo to members of the JCS Sub-Committee on Cuban

Subversion transmitting revised paper on the exchange of intelligence concerning Cuban subversive

activities.

JFK Revien

Department of the Army EO 13526

7 Declassify

/ → Exclude D Exempt

v9.1

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SUB-COMMITTEE CN CUBAN SUBVERSION

THE JOINT SPART

22 March 1963

MEMORANDUM 20 COMMITTEE MEMBERS

1, Attached is a redraft of the intelligence paper,

prepared by CIA in accoräance with the agreement reached

by the Cottrell Committee last week.

The paper is

identical

with the version which we agreed upon, with

two exceptions:

a. A section has been added (Paragraph 2, page 2)

on categories of exchangeable intelligence; in other

words, a delineation of the scope of the paper.

b. Certain of the actions proposed in our agreed

paper, which are in some degree in progress now,

have been withdrawn from the action category and

restated as

"Existing Programs.

(Section III,

page 5)

2. The President, at San Jose, committed the U. S.

to participate in a multilateral

discussion of intelli-

gence exchange in the Ministerial Meeting which will

take place in about ten days at Managua. Therefore,

It will be necessary to move this paper forward rapidly,

content.

I therefore propose that our Committee come

to a conclusion on the subject at its meeting on Satur

day, 23 March.

mineda

V. H.

KRULAK

Major General, USMC

Chairman

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I.

Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion throughout

Latin Americas

: there is a fundamental requirement for intelli-

gence - a requirement which involves the timely acquisition

and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination,

on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are

now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to

improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus tar

has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with

this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily con-

cerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a

stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding

Communist

subversion in Latin America among those who need to

know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to discour

age the exchange of intelligence on an international

basis, even among allies.

National privacy with regard

an intelligence system must be

preserved. Compounding the problem further, where Latin

America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and disputes

which have characterized relations among the nations con-

cerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and

groupings of nations are not completely healed.

There is

lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving

from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at

odds over the Rio Lauca

and the question of Bolivian

access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents

are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and

Honduras.

It could hardly be expected that these countries

would be

eager to exchange intelligence on a full and

frank basis.

b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous

entity in social, political, or economic terms, and

attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace

vary widely. A completely unified approach toward

exchange of

intelligence concerning this menace, therefore,

cannot be regarded as attainable.

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c. Additional impediments to intelligence exchange

are the generally low level of competence of most Latin

American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure

means of communication,

the absence of adequate security

systems, and the lack of security consciousness.

Deficien-

cies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the

exchange of Intelligence obtained covertly by any of the

nations involved,

and particularly the United States, which

has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest

need

for protection.

¿. These defects promise to persist, since the govern-

ments of some countries have little desire to develop a

competent career security service.

the existence of an efficient service would constitute a

threat to further activities of members of the existing

governments at

such time as they might find themselves

out of power:

Moreover, many Latin American intelligence

services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to

the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact that multi-

lateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most

circumscribed basis. It should not be concluded, however,

that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally.

With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange

to matters directly related to communist subversive

activities, such as the movement to and from cuba of

sub-

versives,

the production and movement of propaganda

materials which threaten internal stability,

, the movement

of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practi-

cable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In

pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp

distinction between secret intelligence gained by covert

means and information obtained openly. The former involves

the requirement to protect national secrets both as to

sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter,

which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear

of compromise.

2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

a. Travel information - Unevaluated information

devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement of indi-

viduals between Latin America and Cuba or Soviet Bloc

countries. Such reports can be reduced to a few elements

such as identification of the individual, point of depar

ture, date and time of departure or arrival, destination,

and carrier.

When presented in an abbreviated form such

information

offers minimum security problems with respect

to exchange with one or more countries.

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b. Intelligence information reports - Unevaluated

Information derived from clandestine collection operations

or confidential sources reporting on plans and activities

of Cuban or communist connected subversive individuals or

Because continued receipt of such information by

the United States is dependent on careful protection of

sources and methods of collection, the exchange of this

information with other countries must be carefully con-

trolled by the collecting department.

c. Intelligence studies - Evaluated intelligence pre-

pared by an appropriate element of the US government in a

form which is releaseable to other Latin American countries.

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news stories

drawn from press, periodical and other overt publishers.

Selected for maximum impact on other countries particularly

where such information is not freely avaliable to security

services,

as

in the case of foreign broadcast reports.

3. Current Exchange Arrangements.

a. At present there is little organized exchange of

intelligence among the Latin American nations.

There is

a limited amount of informal exchange, oiten on a basis

of personal relationships between government officials

having a community of interest with respect to a particu-

lar matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established

working liaison arrangements in those Latin American

countries where such relations have been considered to be

In the best interest of the United States.

Most of the

intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America avail-

able to the CIA is derived from covert operations or

through contacts with another intelligence or security

This inhibits the passing of such information

to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a

substantial amount of intelligence available from overt

or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other

countries.

In 1962, CIA received information report.

from 26 services with which liaison is maintained in Latir

America and released reports to 35 recipients.

Intelligence

items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelli-

gence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

c. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges

of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay,

Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.

Information provided by

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the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities,

communist infiltration, weapons movements and related

matters.

Reciprocal intelligence received has been of

small value.

The Army also provides selected information

on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and

Mexico, without reciprocation.

The Navy has established

a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence

among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the

U.S. Navy.

d. Exchanges of information are also effected from

time to time through channels of the Department of State.

e. As yet, however, the program for the provision by

United States agencies of information on subversion to

Latin American governments has not been developed to an

adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the

most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the

only secure and reliable means of rapid

communication

throughout Latin America (currently in process of improve-

ment), the development of an integrated United States

system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi-

bility of achieving the results desired.

I. United States experience in the matter of intelli-

gence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the

world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrange-

ments

ara more fruitful than multilateral arrangements

such as those established within the framework of NATO,

CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown

also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use,

particularly in creating an awareness of the need for

intelligence exchange.

g. The concept of an exchange of information among

members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities

has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings,

but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set

forth in Section II.l. Under the Punta del Este decisions,

the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening

their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,

subversion or other dangers to peace and security.

The

Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance

technical advice on request to governments and the Council

on matters relating to subversion..

All American governments

have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommenda-

tions by the Council of the OAS on how to counteract them.

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Since the Punta del Este meeting, the OAS has been making

slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there

has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence

through its machinery.

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has also

demonstrated an awareness of the need for exchanging intelli-

gence regarding communist subversion. Annex 4 of the

General Military Plan prepared by the IADB requests the

American States to report information to the Board and to

establish agreements among themselves for exchanging infor

mation of collective interest.

The United States has

approved the General Military Plan, but similar action has

not been taken by all member countries.

1. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there

is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence

exchange arrangemerts among the Latin American nations

themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a

need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelli-

gence exchange between the United States and individual

countries,

and finally, a requisement to develop the possi-

bilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized

limitations involved.

III. Existing Programs.

1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being conducted

by CIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies wiüh their Latin American

counterparts in instances where it has been found possible to

establish appropriate arrangements for exchange of selected

information consistent with security requirements.

2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the feasi-

bility and desirability of establishing military intelligence

centers of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier,

Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as

appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System,

for rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of

intelligence on subversive activities directly to the countries

concerned through the U.S. Ambassador.

3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean Com-

mand by CIA and other elements of the U.S. Embassies in Latin

America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further dissemination

as appropriate.

4. Various agencies of the U.S. Government are now dis-

seminating to Latin American governments unclassified studies

and reports and other non-sensitive information concerning

Castro-Communist subversion.

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5. U.S. Government communications systems throughout

Latin America are being expanded and Improved upon on a high

priority basis.

6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the

training and equipping of Latin American internal security and

Intelligence services. Additional programs could be established

in other countries where it is found to be in the best interests

of United States and

acceptable to the country concerned.

7. All information received by CIA concerning travel to

and from Cuba is put into a computer system capable of producing

lists by name, by country, by point of travel, or sorted on

various other bases.

IV. New Actions Recommended

1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral exchange

of intelligence, as described in Section III. 1. by recommending

that the U.S. Ambassadors utilize the existing Country Team

mechanisms as an intelligence

advisory committee to coordinate

procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom

from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange

with the host governments.

2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral

exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

3. Arrange for the rapid dissemination to appropriate

Latin American governments of daily summaries of radio broadcast

material as monitored by the FBID of CIA.

4. Make available to as many countries as security per-

mits, the appropriate sanitized results of the extensive travel

coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already

processed by machine, listings of which can be made

available

readily. (See paragraph III. 7.)

5. Increase where feasible emphasis on the provision of

U.S. intelligence advisors to Latin American countries. Dis-

courage the employment of intelligence advisors from nations

other than the U.s. except in instances where the U.S. can

arrange to provide

for the training and control of any third

country intelligence advisor.

6. Arrange for the preparation by CIA of periodic studies

of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can be

disseminated to selected Latin American governments.

7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments

to keep the Council and the SCCS fully Informed on a continuing

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basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in

their respective countries:

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the

General

Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB),

and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB

intelligence information and estimates

concerning Castro-Communist

subversive activities.

9. Undertake action in the OAS to establish a Security

Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of senior representa-

tives of the appropriate services of each government to deal

with all major aspects of subversive activities in their respec-

tive countries, consider new coordinated plans of action to

actions to insure the most effective and timely exchange of

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