MEMO: JFK RECORDS-POSSIBLE NEGATIVE PUBLICITY FOR CIA
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: DCI -DDCI
To: JOHN F. PEREIRA
Document date: 4/7/93
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

:104-10331-10090

RECORD

SERIES: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PROJFILES-CORRESPONDENCE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

$44 USC 2107 Notel .

Case#:NW 53217 Date:

06-22-2017

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

: JOHN E. PEREIRA

TO : DCI -DDCI

TITLE : MEMO: JEK RECORDS-POSSIBLE NEGATIVE PUBLICITY FOR CIA

DATE

04/07/1993

PAGES

5

SUBJECTS

JEK ASSASSINATION

JURE PURCHASE

DOCUMENT TYPE

..

PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

AAMINISTRATIVE

1A

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

04/30/03

COMMENTS

JFK-M-16: F2: 2000.02.08.14:23:06:043054

[R]

- ITEM

IS RESTRICTED

104-10331-10090

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CIA SPECIAN

COM EATIONS

RELEASE N FULL

2000

CSI-0118/93

7 September 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Executive Director

Director,

Public and Agency Information

Director, Center for the study of Intelligence Dg

John F. Pereira

Chief, Historical Review Group

JFK Records-Possible Negative Publicity for CIA

In our review of the JFK assassination records we have

identified a document that could generate publicity about

possible CIA involvement in an illegal incident in 1964.

document is a draft version of the published report of the House

Special Committee

on Assassinations and is to be released by the

National Archives.

2. The document describes an attempt by the CIA-funded

Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an anti-Castro exile group, to

purchase $50,000 worth of arms from a California company for

shipment to Florida.

The purchase was illegal.

"The Treasury

Department apparently planned a raid on the arms company and

asked CIA if it had any knowledge of the purchase by JURE.

According to the draft, CIA denied any involvement and advised

JURE to arrange the shipment outside the US..

3. The published report described the arms purchase and the

planned Treasury raid but did not mention the interchange with

CIA.

John I Percina

John

F. Pereira

Attachments:

A. HSCA Report

B.

JURE Draft

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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SUBJECT:

JFK Records-Possible Negative Publicity for CIA

C/HRG/JFPereira/30373

(7Sep93)

Distribution:

original - DCI

1

DDCI

1 - ExDir

1

- ExReg

1

- D/PAI

1 - D/CSI

1 - HRG Chrono

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONEY

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ISCA Report, Nol. $

VIII. JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE)

(266) In a Miami press interview on July 23, 1962, Manuel Ray

Rivero announced the formation of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta

(JURE), an anti-Castro Cuban exile group designed to unite all the

popular splintered factions outside Cuba into an effective working

organizations. (1) Other key leaders involved in the new organization

included Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Bar-

quin and Justo Carrillo. (2) Although Ray felt the Cuban Revolu-

tionary Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive finan-

cial assistance from it until JURE gained momentum. (3)

As its opening promotional salvo, JURE issued a "Declara-

tion of Principles." It called for free elections, the restoration of hu-

man rights and social justice, new economic development programs

and agrarian reform, breaking relations with the Soviet bloc, restora

tion of legitimate property, proscription of the Communist Party anc

release of political prisoners. (4)

Ray's group was considered an "autonomous" anti-Castro

Cuban group by the CIA. (5) The concept of autonomous operations

Tras conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel. (6) Ros-

tow proposed a "track two" approach to Cuban operations to paralle

regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams. (7) This approach would enabl

financial aid, advice and guidance to Cuban leaders such as Ray.(8)

Autonomous operations were approved June 1963. 9

The rule under which the operations functioned set forth th

following guidelines:

1. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals dedi-

cated to the idea that the overthrow of the Castro/Conmunist re-

gime must be accomplished by Cubans inside and outside Cuba

working in concert.

2. If the effort to overthrow the Cuban regime became too costly

in human lives, the United States would

withdraw financial sup-

port and would not consider resumption at any future date.

3. All operations had to be mounted outside the territory of the

United States.

4. If ever charged with complicity, the U.S. Government would

publicly deny any participation in the groups activities.

5. U.S. presence and direct participation would be kept at an

absolute minimum. An experienced liaison officer would be assigned

to each group to provide general adviee, funds and material support.

6. No fixed time schedule would be given to these operations. (10)

Possibly because of this loosely structured control over JURI.

the day-to-day activities of the group mere closely monitored. A IT RP

member, for instance, was in frequent contact with an

and supplied him with a variety of confidential information about

JURE. This source provided information on Ray's meeting with

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in September 1963; (11) Ray's

43-044-79--6

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¿ of JURE; (12) secret JURE meetings; (18)

rovernor of Puerto Rico was purposely side.

INS investition of ileal as pressed the.

animosity toward Manuel Artime and

cation of JURE training bases. (16)

imself was personally critical of the ClA and

te that he thought CIA agents "

... were more

ennedy administration." He maintained that,

istration would end but CIA agents always

ry was longer than the memory of elephant

RE meeting in Miami in August 1962, Ray

ad arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican

lane, territory available for training in Costa

through indirect means from

the United

to an FBI report, JURE was considered one of

sups with clandestine assets (19) and the U.S.

'sted in the group because of its potential. (20)

size and Ray's dynamic leadership, JURE

›le of some importance in the anti-Castro move

set a target date of October 31, 1962 to raise

rould be used to recruit new members, begin

n against Castro and purchase arms and sup-

ar, JURE had membership delegations in 12

ates a chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delega-

ies, mostly Latin American. (23)

3, JURE planned to sabotage a poterplant in

v requested that certain high explosives and

le Cuba or San Juan. (25) It was recommended

inted in order to test Ray's capabilities (26)

27) Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration

es and espressed a desire to purchase another

him to extend operations along the south coast

le to deliver military equipment to JURE that

ted into Cuba. (29) The operation, originally

r 23, 1963, was moved up two days.(30) The

31) The TURE boat failed to make the sched-

Ray offered no satisfactory explanation for

(33) Ray claimed the vessel was lom on gas,

ation, as the vessel arrived at its destination

hysically scheduled to be on the boat during

his activities during the latter part of 1963

it this time. conferring with Attorney General

le Cuban situation (38) and traveling esten-

• seeking support for JURE. (39)

on has been found to substantiate the success

TURE raids or infiltrations during this period

e organization had gained enough strength to

ban exile organizations to merge with it. (40)

coups were the Ejercito Libertador de Cuba

ISCA Report, Vol. &

(ELC) and Cuba Libre. (41) The ELC's union with JURE brought

to the organization former veteran rebel ariny officers in exile and had

the potential of giving JURE the best military expertise and support

in the entire estle community. (42

Carlos Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JUke chief of sup-

port ( 43) and was responsible for acquiring most of the dURE arms

and the large supply of explosives which were stored in Miami and

Puerto Rico. (44)

(279) Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to infiltrate Cuba

in March 1964. (45) He planned to accompany two teams of commandos

into Oriente Province and, once successfully inside Cuba, initiate con-

tinuous bombings of strategic and nonstrategic targets. (46) Ray's

plans, however, were delayed and a new target date of May was set.

Ray's seriousness of purpose was open to question at the time

because he permitted persons from the media to observe infiltration

attempt. (47) Andrew

St. George, on

assignment with Time-Life

magazine, planned to accompany Ray, (48) as did Tom Duncan, then a

Lite photographer. 49) Rogelio Cisneros received word on May 30,

196t, that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators had developed

motor trouble. (50) Ray's group was arrested by the British near Cayo

Largo and taken to Nassau. (57)

Ray's failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his credibil-

ity within the anti-Castro community. Some exiles felt his grand in-

filtration schene was a publicity stunt and others considered

joke. (52) JURE members were confused and undecided over how to

defend Kay. (53)

(282). Another episode on May 1964 compounded JURE's problems.

Rogelio Cisneros had obligated $50,000 of JURE money to an

Monte, Calif., arms manufacturing company for weapons to be

shipped to Florida. (54) The Revenue Division of the Treasury De-

partment considered a raid on the arms company. (55)

At this point, there began a general disintegration of JURE

membership. (56) Rogelio Cisneros announced in August 1964 that he

was resigning from the organization. He contended Ray was incapable

of directing both political and military activities. (57) Then another

lict leader, Carlos Larraga, resigned in September.

JURE received $75,000 during the period of October to De-

cember 31, 1961. The money was intended to underwrite JURE's relo-

cation of its activities outside the United States. (58) Ray's liaison

oflicer noted at the time: "If Ray is successful in Cuba, he will not

need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much good. He is honest

and at least he assumes it will be largely spent for the purpose he wants

to achieve. Whatever Kay may ever say, he was treated the tray he

asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyond

reproach." (59)

JURE continued in existence until August 1968(60) but was

relatively inctlective in its latter jears. (01)

Submitted by:

GAETON J. FONZI,

Investigator.

ELIZABETH J. PALMER,

Researcher.

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JURE Draft

Page 07

Another episode in May, 1964 compounded JURE's problems..

Rogelio Cisneros had obligated $50,000 Of JURE money to an

El Monte, California, arms manufacturing company for weapons

40

to be shipped to Florida.

The Revenue division of the

Treasury Department, planning a raid on the arms company,

asked the CIA if it had any knowledge of this purchase, 41

which was illegal under U.S. laws. Working under the

"autonomous operations" guidelines, the CIA denied any

involvement and advised JURE to make use of one of its Latin

American connections to facilitate the shipment outside the

42

u.s.

At this point, there began a general disintegration of

43

JURE membership.

Rogelio Cisneros informed the CIA on

August 24, 1964 that he was resigning from the organization.

He contended Ray was incapable of directing both political and

44.

military activities.

Then another key leader, Carlos

45

Zarraga, resigned in September.

JURE was given $75,000 by the CIA during the period

of October Ist to December 31st, 1964. Thé money was meant

as a final payment to help JURE move its activities outside

the United States46 The CIA had reached the conclusion that

the JURE books should be closed permanently.

Ray's liaison

officer noted at the time: "If Ray is successful in Cuba he

will not need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much

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