Document date: 00/00/0000

# DOCID-32989494

## Page 1

File #:

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

65944 Date: 11-01-2021

62-AL-2368

Serial Scope:

I thru 23

DO NOT

DISINGY

FUNAR NA

NW 85994-Docld:32989494-Page 1

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## Page 2

NRO46 WA CODE

8:48PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELANGENGE ACTIVILLES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN QF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES

OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY

CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

62-2368-1

6t0 2885

SEARChe

dest.

Oper

ball

ле зд

GAR 24 1975

Stoops

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 2

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## Page 3

PDAS (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

TELETYPE

Via

CODED

FBI

Date: 3/26/75

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

PAUT

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM:

SAC, ALBANY

ATTN :

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALI SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED

BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED

ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE

OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT

15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1

AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; I AGENT AT 50 PERCENT;

I AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; I AGENT AT

85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS

ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND

THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

12 ALBANY

GIS/mma

(1)

101.

Approved

Sent

Special Agent in Charge

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 3

8: lapor

uS go 1306-177

vernment Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 4

* FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI.

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT;

4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS

AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT;

I AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 4

Sent

M

Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 5

NR074 WA CODE

193500000888001C0CCCCPM NITEL 5-2-75 MSE

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS IO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS

FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECI COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENIAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECI TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC-

TION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK

TO INTERVIEW SURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECI COMMIITEE (SSC) STAFF HAS

INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED

THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE

AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-

TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH. RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE

DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION IO INSURE THAI SENSITIVE SOURCES AND

METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

destroyed

pose

62-DEAD

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 5

62-2368-18

SEARCHED,

VA INDEXED

SERIALIZED

* THIED_

MAY - 11975

Hoops"

FBI - ALBANY

ADVISE ALL EMPLOYSES,

Paton weekly mend for st/s,"

---

## Page 6

PAGE TWO

PROTECIED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYER CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND

HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-

MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST-FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD

BE INSTRUCIED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.

YOUR CONVERSATIONS WIIH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH

OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER

PROTECIION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES

OF YOUR OFFICE. • HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD

BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

HOLD

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 6

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## Page 7

4/9/75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

SENSTUDY 75

Members:

Democrats

Frank Church - Idaho, Chairman

Gary Hart - Colorado

Philip A. Hart - Michigan

Walter D. Huddleston - Kentucky

Walter F. Mondale - Minnesota

Robert Morgan - North Carolina (Freshman)

Republicans

Howard R. Baker, Jr. - Tennessee, Vice Chairman

Barry M. Goldwater - Arizona

Charles M. C. Mathias, Jr. - Maryland

Richard S. Schweiker - Pennsylvania

All SRAS

watertown

Rutland,

othere s

Best!

code

Bus

utica.

зуласике

62-2368-2

"get tree

-1:10

---

## Page 8

HOUSE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES

Members:

Democrats

Lucian N. Nedzi - Michigan, Chairman

Ronald V. Dellums - California

Don Edwards - California

Robert N. Giamo - Connecticut

James V. Stanton - Ohio

Michael J. Harrington - Massachusetts

Morgan F. Murphy - Illinois

Republicans

Robert McClory - Illinois

David C. Treen - Louisiana

Robert W. Kasten, Jr. - Wisconsin

NW 65994-Đocld:32989494 Page 8

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## Page 9

'R"?

1 0058

4819PN MITZL 5-27-75 2AW

TO "LL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

•(69-11:6395.)

PERSOUAL

ITONTION

75.

• PEPUTEL MAY ?, 1975.

• I! CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT

COUMITTESE, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MY CONTACI YOUP OFFICE FOR

INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE

SOLECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

Il HANDLING SUCH INGUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF REPRESEITAIIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR,

IP TELTPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UNLECS INFORMATION IS OF A PUSLIC NATURE! AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR IO SUPPLYING AWY

INFORMATION.

FBIHO MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

INFORMATION FURNISHED:

END

62-236

8-2A

SEARCHED

INDEXED

SERIALIZEE

PRIED T

MAYA

18107

ALBANY

litt

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 9

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## Page 10

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES

RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting

an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former

and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation

with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement

(copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment

in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal

Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of

Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority,

produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of

the performance of his official duties or because of his official status

without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the

Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24."

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order

Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among

other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony

to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent

with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for

purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as

required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before

furnishing information, testimony, or record material.

602-

2368-3

Enclosures (3)

SERIALIZED.

DO FILE

Clarence M. Kelles

Director

JUN 4 0

1975

---

## Page 11

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

1

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United

States Department of Justice, and as

a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare

that 1 intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the

President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations

issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal

Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or un-

authorized disclosure or production of national security information, other

classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of

the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files

of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could

result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or

result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects

of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its

responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; there-

fore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge,

publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to

any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the

Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory

files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the

performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden

is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed

and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each

such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to

the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand

that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed

in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but

it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be

contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is

in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official

duties with the FBl and all official material to which I have access remains

the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand

by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any

material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal

law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may

be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment

in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and

following termination of such employment.

(Signature)

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

, 19

, by

(Signature)

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 11

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## Page 12

!

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, 0. 0. 20530

Tanuary

18, 1973

ORDER NO.501-73

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Title 28— JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRATION

Chapter I-Department of Justice

[Order 501-73]

PART 16-PRODUCTION OR DISCLO-

SURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMA-

TION

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

This order delegates to certain De-

partment of Justice officials the author-

ity to approve the production or dis-

closure of material or information con-

tained in Department files, or informa-

tion or material acquired by a person

while employed by the Department. It

applies where a subpena, order or other

demand of a court or other authority,

such as an administrative agency, is is-

sued for the production or disclosure of

such information.

By virtue of the authority vested in me

by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301,

Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of

Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is

revised, and its provisions renumbered,

to read as follows:

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure in Response

to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other

Authorities

deal prace and coate

or disclosure prohibited

unless approved by appropriate De-

partment official.

6.23 Procedure in the event of & demanc

or production or disclosure

16.24 Final action by the appropriate De-

partment official or

the Attorney

General.

.6.25 Procedure where a Department deci-

sion concerning & demand

made prior to the time a response

to the demand is required.

6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse

ruling.

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C.

101.

iubpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

§ 16.21 Purpose and scope.

(a) This subpart sets forth the pro-

sedures to be followed when a subpena,

order, or other demand (hereinafter re-

ierred to as a "demand") of a court or

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 12

son was an employee of the Department

as a part of the performance of his of-

ficial duties or because of his official

status.

(b)

For purposes of this subpart, the

term "employee of the Department" in-

cludes all officers and employees of the

United States appointed by, or subject

to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control

of, the Attorney General of the United

States,

including

U.s. attorneys,

marshals, and members of the staffs of

those officials.

§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohib-

ited unless approved by appropriate

Department official.

No employee or former employee of the

Department of Justice shall, in response

to a demand of a court or other au-

thority, produce any material contained

in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material con-

tained in the files of the Department, or

disclose any information or produce any

material acquired as part of the per-

formance of his official duties or because

of his official status without prior ap-

proval of the appropriate Department of -

ficial or the Attorney General in accord-

ance with § 16.24.

§ 16.23

Procedure in the event of a de-

mand for production or disclosure.

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon

an employee or former employee of the

Department for the production of ma-

terial or the disclosure of information

described in § 16.21(a),

he shall im-

mediately notify the U.S. attorney for

the district where the issuing authority

is located. The U.S. attorney shall im-

mediately request instructions from the

appropriate Department official, as desig-

nated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials author-

ized to approve production or disclosure

under this subpart are:

(1) In the event that the case or other

matter which gave rise to the demanded

material or information is or, if closed,

was within the cognizance of a division

of the Department, the Assistant At-

torney General in charge of that divi-

sion. This authority may be redelegated

to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.

(2) In instances of demands that are

not covered by paragraph (b) (1) of this

section:

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## Page 13

demand, an afidavit, or, if that is not

feasible, & statement by the party seek-

ing the testimony or his attorney, setting

forth & summary of the testimony de-

sired, must be furnished for submission

by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate

Department offcial.

816. Departme a colony oke ap Atoring

Ceneral.

(a) If the appropriate Department of-

ficial, as designated in § 16.23(b), ap-

proves a demand for the production of

material or disclosure of information,

he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and

such other persons as circumstances may

(b) If the appropriate Department

in § 16.23(b),

decides not to approve & demand for the

production of material or disclosure of

information, he shall immediately refer

the demand to the Attorney General for

Upon such referral, the Attor-

ney General shall make the final decision

and give notice thereof to the U.S. attor-

ney and such other persons as circum.

stances may warrant.

Procedure where a Department

decision concerning a demand is not

made prior to the time a response lo

the demand is required.

If response to the demand is required

before the instructions from the appro-

priate Department official or the Attor-

ney General are received, the U.S. attor-

ney or other Department attorney des-

ignated for the purpose shall appear with

egulations contained in this subpart anc

form the court or other authority tha

the demand has be entes being he

referred for

prompt consideration of the appropriate

official and shall respect-

cully request the court or authority to

stay the demand pending receiot of the

requested instructions.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 13

Dated: January 11, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,

Attorney General.

(FR. Doc.78-1071 Filed 1-17-73;8:45 am]

i

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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGION, D. C.

May 15, 1956

ORDER NO. 116-56

possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from

departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of depart-

ment personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners.

are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be

mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department.

March 23, 1953, and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formal-

Izes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing

procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized repre-

sentatives to Interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners.

It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order

No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum

of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated

January 13, 1953), Insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be

Order Na

followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In

support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter

dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney

General's Memorandum which accompanied it. 1

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARIMENT FILES

1. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files

or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by

the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,

who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and

congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information

sought as vell as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy

Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a

reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signa-

ture and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

2. If the request concerns a closed case, 1. e., one in which

there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated,

the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence

of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure

shall be followed in such cases:

a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the

file is available for examination and set forth the

name, telephone extension number, and room number of

the person who will have custody of the file to be

reviewed;

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 14

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## Page 15

- 2 -

D. Before making the file available to the committee

representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI

as well as investigative reports from any other agency,

will be removed from the file and not be made available

for examination; provided however that if the committee

representative states that it is essential that information

from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available,

he will be advised that the request will be considered

by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents

of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be

prepared which will not disclose investigative tech-

niques, the identity of confidential informants, or

other matters which might jeopardize the investigative

operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded

by the division to the fBl with a request for advice as

to whether the fit has any objection to examination of

such summary by the committee representative. The file

will not be physically relinquished from the custody of

the Department. If the committee representative desires

to examine investigative reports from other government

agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he

will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose

reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, 1. e., one which Ilti-

gation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may

not be made available for ezamination by the committee's representative.

The following procedure shall be followed:

a. The reply letter should advise the committee that

Its request concerns a case in which litigation or

administrative action is pending or contemplated, and

state that the file cannot be made available until the

case is completed; and

b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in

as much detail as is practicable and prudent without

jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or

administrative action.

B. REQUESIS FOR INTERVIEVS WITH DEPARIMENTAL PERSONNEL

1. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding

any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing,

signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney

General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the

employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with

the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting

open cases and data in investigative reports;

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 15

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## Page 16

- 3 -

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee repre-

sentative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a

copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney

General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONCRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

1. Then an employee is requested to testify before à congressional

committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney

General shall be promptly informed. When the Deputy Attorney General's approv-

al is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations

prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee

on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy

Attorney General.

In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229

(Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning

of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare

a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head

and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONCRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which

their public testimony may affect the discipline and well-being of the institu-

tion, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners out-

side the penal institution in which they are Incarcerated for the purpose of

being intervieved or examined under oath by congressional committees. However,

when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be

adversely arfected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise

adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath

by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated

under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the

Deputy Attorney General.

1. Arrangements fox intervieving and taking of sworn testimony

2.

Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days

prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony

and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the

interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the com-

mittee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the sub-

jects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of

all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who

will be present.

3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be

present during the entire time of the interrogation.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 16

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## Page 17

=4-

4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal

prisoner is Incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the

time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned

of the proposed interview or taking of svor testimony; and shall further

advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any

other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete

authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the mainte-

nance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at

the interview and taking of testimony.

The warden or his authorized representative shall be present

at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice

shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout

the interview and taking of testimony.

7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript

made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy

of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVERS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEN HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in

matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney

General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and

its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a

congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of

the proceeding which

should be sent to the division head and a copy routed

to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

NWV 65994 Docld:32969494

Page 17

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## Page 18

NR003 WA CODE

1:45AM NITEL 6-28-75 IJT

TO ATLANTA

KNOXVILLE

BIRMINGHAM

LOS ANGELES

ALBANY

TAMPA

JACKSONVILLE

CHICAGO

FROM DIRECTOR

(62-116395)

PERSONAL ATION

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENI AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES,

INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESIS THEY MAY BE

INTERVIEWED, BY SSC STAFF CONCERNING 'BUREAU'S FORMER INVESTIGA-

TION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND

LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF

ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT.

BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF ABOUT THE KING INVESTIGATION. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT

ASAL ad

6/28

дур

62-2368-4

SUN & 7 1515

MBANTY

ASAC

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 18

---

## Page 19

PAGE TWO

IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF

SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED

WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU

OPERATIONS & SOURCES, METHODS,

TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE

AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI

AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF

INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE

MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY

SSC STAFF, CONTACI BUREAU'S

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECT CALL FOF. FULL INFORMATION

• TO ASSISI HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY

OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED .

THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TÓ IMPEDE

SSC WORK BUT. IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD

SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER

EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC.. IN EVENT

THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, IO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR

SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENI EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY

SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, L'EGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH. SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 19

---

## Page 20

PAGE THREE

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION.: IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE IS

NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD

IO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ATLANTA: INCUMBENIS - DONALD P. BURGESS, RICHARD E.

FUGATI, EDMUND F. HAGGERTY, O. RICHARD HAMILTON, CHARLES I•

HAYNES, WILBUR W. SEITZER, ROBERI W. THOMSON. FORMER -

MARION E. CHEEK, 1613 GAIL AVENUE, ALBANY, GEORGIA 31785;

CHARLES I. HARDING,: 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, NORTHEASI, ATLANIA,

GEORGIA 30345:

BIRMINGHAM: LAWRENCE I. GURLEY, 1340 WESIMINISTER

PLACE, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35235:

HENRY G. ROWSE, JRe, 30 NORTH MAIN STREET, - Bustingten RA

ENOSBURG FALLS, VERMONT 05450.

JACKSONVILLE: WILLIAM LEE BOLYARD - INCUMBENT.

KNOXVILLE: W. JOHN BENTON - INCUMBENT.

LOS ANGELES: JAMES M. KELLOGG. - INCUMBENT.

TAMPA: JAMES E. MCMAHON, 3110 COÇOS ROAD, TAMPA,

FLORIDA 33618.

CHICAGO:

JOHN BASSETT - INCUMBENT.

END

GMM FBI ALBANY FOR 3 TELS :

ALBANY CLR

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 20

---

## Page 21

FD-36 (Rev, 5-22-64)

00l

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date: 6/28/75

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) LRF

FROM: SAC, ALBANY (62-2368)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 28, 1975, FORMER SA HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., WAS

CONTACTED BY ASAC JOHN J. HINCHCLIFFE AND ADVISED TE CONTENTS

RE BUTEL. ROWSE STATED THAT SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY SCC, HE :

WILL CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION. ROWSE CURRENTLY

RESIDING C/O P.O. BOX 65, SHELDON, VT., 05483, TELEPHONE NO.

802-848-7418, OR 73 HIGHLAND AVE., RICHFORD, VT., 05476.

JER: 1VV

62-2368-5

SEARCHED..

SERISLIZED BOP

INDEXED

Approved:

RER

Speial Agent in Charge

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 21

Sent

ASAC th

3:47 PM Per Sur

---

## Page 22

NR65 I WA CODE

9:37PM NITEL JULY 29, 1975 MSY

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR .

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST RE SENSITIVE INVESTIGAIIVE

TECHNIQUES.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NOTING THE DEPARTMENT IS REVIEVING

ACIIVITIES CONDUCTED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR •

USE OF WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, REQUESTED

A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER ACIIVITIES WHICH ARE OR CAN BE CONDUCIED

BY THE BUREAU INVOLVING NONCONSENSUAL, WARRANTLESS INTRUSION

UPON REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY; NONELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING

UPON CONVERSATIONS THOUGHT BY THE PARTICIPANIS TO BE PRIVATE;

INTERCEPTION OR OTHER RECEIPT NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE SENDER

OR RECEIVER OF THE CONTENTS OF VIRE, RADIO OR WRITTEN

COMMUNICATIONS; AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES, WHETHER OR NOI

INVOLVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR PHYSICAL INTRUSION, THAT

MIGHT BE CALLED INTO QUESTION OR SHOULD BE REVIEWED

66-2617

Ebui

21-6

ĐB

JUL 3 0 1970

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 22

---

## Page 23

PAGE TWO

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REQUESTED A DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPES

OF SUCH ACIIVITIES NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE BUREAU, AND ALSO

ANY ADDITIONAL TYPES WHICH THE BUREAU CONSIDERS IISELF

AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT. IN ADDITION, A REPORT ON ANY SUCH

PAST ACTIVITIES WAS ALSO REQUESTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

CANVASS YOUR PERSONNEL FOR ANY SUCH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES

CONDUCTED IN YOUR OFFICE AND NOTE WHETHER USED IN ORGANIZED

CRIME, GENERAL CRIMINAL, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, OR DOMESTIC

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS •

SUTEL BY CODED AND APPROPRIATELY CLASSIFIED NITEL,

ATTENTION INTD:

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

LVV. FBI ALBANY

CLR IKS

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 23

---

## Page 24

!

NROGS WA CODE

6:10PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS

TO ALBANY

BALTIMORE

MIAMI •

PHILADELPHIA

TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY

BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS

NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEUS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY

AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE

FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,

COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS.

SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

62-2368-7

AUG 2 6 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 24

---

## Page 25

PAGE TWO

EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE

INTERVIFWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED

WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS

AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE,

INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THEY

MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE

AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW,

THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR

FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT

IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT

INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE •

AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACIS WITH

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR

ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE

• HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 25

---

## Page 26

PAGE THREE

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACI, RESULIS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO

LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO

OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY,

NEW YORK 123B9; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY,

UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12309.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA,

MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 145@ WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD,

MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEENFZOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E.

LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A. I. O., P. 0. BOX 1418,

SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS

IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER

THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO

BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU

DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 26

---

## Page 27

PAGE FOUR

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE

INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION

TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR

SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS

FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

END

EXSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

FBI AL CLR FOR ONE TEE CJK

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 27

---

## Page 28

NROGS WA CODE

6:16PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS

TO ALBANY

BALTIMORE

MIAMI

PHILADELPHIA

TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY Zy 1975*

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY

BE INTERVIEVED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEUS HAS

NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEVS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES* DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY

AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE

FORMER BUREAU*S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JRO,

COMMUNISI INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS.

SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

62-23687

{SEARCHED.

< INDEXED

SERIALIZED

_FILED.

AUG 2 G 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 28

---

## Page 29

PAGE TWO

EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF• THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE

INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED

WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS

AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE,

INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY

MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT: BUREAU WILL PROVIDE

AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEU,

THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACT BUREAU*S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR

FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT

IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT

INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE

AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR

ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE

HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 29

---

## Page 30

PAGE THREE

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYÉE NO

LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO

OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY,

NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECIOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY,

UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308-

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA,

MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD,

MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS- KATHLEENZOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RIGHARD E.

LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL La COX, UnSe NaAoI,Da, Pa 0. BOX 1418,

SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX*S WHEREABOUTS

• IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER

THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-VESTE INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO

BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU

DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 30

---

## Page 31

--w---

PAGE FOUR

• .

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE

INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION

TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR

SOONER. TAMPA"S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS

FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

END

ExssssssssssssssssssssssssSSSSs

FBI AL CLR FOR ONE TEE CJK

• .

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 31

---

## Page 32

SACS CONFERENCE

8|25115

Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Interviews - Privileged Areas

In connection with the staff interviews there has been

general agreement between the SSC,

the Department and the Bureau

that there are four main privileged areas and that current and

ex-FBI employees need not answer questions which fall into these

areas which are as follows:

(I) Information which indentifies or may identify FBI

sources.

(2) Information which may adversely affect ongoing

FBI investigations.

(3) Information concerning sensitive methods and

techniques.

(4) Information obtained from third agencies, in-

cluding foreign intelligence agencies.

62-2368

7A

SEAR ISLO

SERIALIZED

2 FILED _

INEXE BR

AUG 2 6 1975

FEI-ALSANY

'RIL

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 32

---

## Page 33

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

IT - ITFI

CODE

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR

(62-116395) SMD

FROLI SAC, ALPAIY (62-2368)

SENSTUDY

REBUTEL Al'GUSE 26, 1975

OF: ATGIST 27, 1975 JOHN H. KLEINKAUF WAS

COl TACTED

BY ASAC AIRAIY ADVISED COIT ITS FO ETEL.

JJH; jjh

62-2368-8

SAC RE

Apsioved: RETT 1A

Spocial gent in Charge

• NW 65994 Docid:32989494 Page 33

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

---

## Page 34

NRO33 WA CORE

6:16PM1 9/4/75 NITEL AJ"!

TO ALL SACS

FRO& DIRECTOR

(62-116395)

PERSO"AL

SINSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE ID (I) REITERATE THAT

FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTET (SSC) AND MISHOS TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE AMY

INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FRI;

AND (2) SET FORTH NEM PROCEDUPE RELATING TO SSC STAFF

INTERVIDUS OF CURRENT AND FOPMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOP INFORMATIDN OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIDUSLY

HAD CURRENT OR FOPMER EMPLOYEES IN IIS TERRITOY INTERVIENED

DY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSE OR

OTHERVISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYTES ARE REING CONSIDERED FOR

INTERVIEW DY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUTD FOR THE

FIELE OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYTE TO ALTRI HIM AS TO

POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAI IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

ASAC_

GILBERY,

62-23689

ICC

dest.

SEARCHED.

-INDEXED:

SER ALIZED

BB FILED_

KEEFE

LONERGAN

Last)

SEP 41975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 34

---

## Page 35

PAGE TO

INTEPVIEW, HE NAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLICI CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE,

AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD(IS

THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU

CANNOT PROVICE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS NAIVED THE

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW VITHIN SPECIFIED

PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN

WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRID TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS

ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY PUREAU

SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL

IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIAN INTELLIGENCS

AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY

AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIFWTES CONSULTATION

PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILAPLE

NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIFWEE

MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULM QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS

OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS.

THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT

AS A LIGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 35

---

## Page 36

PAGE THREE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST

EITHER CURRENI OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVITNEES

SHOULD BE TOLD THAI, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE

DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF

INTERVIEW IS IN MASHINGION, DO C.) OR 3Y COLLECI CALL, THE

ASSISTANI DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS MR. I. R.

WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF I. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUEN AS

LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND

FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE

DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,

WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT

EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS

IN THIS REGARD.

END

LVV FBI ALBANY

CLR

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 36

---

## Page 37

10OA5 WA PLAIN

732PMMITEL EL 10/9/75 GHS

TO ALL

S42S

FROM DIRECTOP

INTERV

TS OF FBI EMPLOYEES BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTSES

MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES DATED MAY 28, 1975,

CAPTIONED "INTERVIES OF FBI EMPLOYEES," ALL EMPLOYEES WERE

• ADVISED OF THE NECESSITY OF SECURING FBI HEADQUARIERS APPROVAL

PRIOR TO SUBMITTING TO INTERVIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF CON-

GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. THE NECESSITY OF SECURING THIS AP-

PROVAL IC PROMPTED BY THE EMPLOYMENI AGREEMENT ALL EMPLOYEES

HAVE SIGNED.

YOU WERE ADVISED THAI CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS

WERE CONCUCTING INTERVIEUS OF FORMER AND/OR CURRENT EMPLOYDES

AND THAT IHIS BUPBAL HAD PLEDGED ITS COOPERATION WITH CON-

GRESS• OUR COOPERATIVE EFFORIS, OF COURSE, MUST BE CONSISIENT

WITH BUREAU PROCEDURES.

RECENTLY, WE HAVE HAD ATTEMPTS BY CONGRESSIONAL

COMMITTED STAFF MEMBERS TO INTORVIEW CURRENT EMPLOYEES WITHOUT

PRIOR CONTACI WITH FEI HEADQUARTERS! YOU ARE AGAIN REMINDED

62-2348-10

SEARCHED.

SERIALIZED

_INDEXED_

_FILED

OCT 9 - 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 37

---

## Page 38

PAGE TWO

THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE SHOULD

CO:TACT A BUREAU EMPLOYEE, THAT EMPLOYEE SHOULD DECLINE IC

RESPOND TO QUESTIONS POSED TO HIM AND ADVISE THE CONGRES-

SIONAL STAFF MEMBER OF

THE NECESSITY OF RECEIVING FBI

HEADQUARIERS APPROVAL BIFORE RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS

END.

• LVV FBI ALBANY

ACK FOR

THREE

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 38

---

## Page 39

PTIONAL FORM NO. 1

JLY 1973 EDITIO

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: ALL EMPLOYEES (62-2368)

DATE:

10/10/75

FROM : SAC ROBERT E. KENT

SUBJECT: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

ReButel 10/9/75.

By memorandum to all employees dated May 2ö, 19/5,

captioned "Interviews

of FBI Employees," all employees were

advised of the necessity of securing FBI Headquarters approval

prior to submitting to interviews by representatives of

Congressional committees.

The necessity of securing this

approval is prompted by the employment agreement all employees

have signed.

You were advised that Congressional staff members

were conducting interviews of former and/or current employees

and that this Bureau had pledged its cooperation with Congress.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent with

Bureau procedures.

Recently, we have had attempts by Congressional

committee staff members to interview current employees without

prior contact with FBI Headquarters. You are again reminded

that if a representative of a Congressional committee should

contact a Bureau employee,

that employee should decline to

respond to questions posed to him and advise the Congressional

staff member of the necessity of receiving FBI Headquarters

approval before responding to questions.

All employees of the Albany Division are instructed

that contacts received from representatives of Congressional

committees should be immediately referred to the SAC without

exception.

- Each

EmpLoyee

- 6'2-2368

1 - 66-11

REK: pac

sent rolf

02-2348-11

SEARCHED

INDEXED

SERALIZED 12

- TIED CE

OCT 1 4 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 39

---

## Page 40

Church's

Cover-Up

The committee is not asking embar-

By William Safire

rassing questions even when answers

are readily

available.

A couple of

WASHINGON, Nov. 19-On Oct. 10,

weeks ago, at an

open hearing, an

1963, the then-Attorney General of the

F.B.I. man inadvertently started to

United States put his personal signa-

blurt out an episode about newsmen

ture on a document that launched and

who were weritapping in 1962 with

legitimatized one of the most horren-

the apparent knowiedge of Attorney®

dous abuses of Federal police power in

General Kennedy. The too-willing witt

this century.

ness was promptly shooshed into sil.

In Senator Frank Church's subcom-

lence, and told that such information

mittee hearing room this week, the

would be developed only in executive

authorized wiretapping and

subse-

session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

quent unauthorized bugging and

at-

That pattern of containment by the

tempted blackmailing ni Martin Luther

Church commiltee is vividly shown by

King Jr. is being

gingerly

examined,

the nandling of the buggings at the

with the "investigation" conducted in

1964 Republican and Democratic con-

misuch a way

as not to unduiy em-

barrass officials of the Kennedy or

ESSAY

Johnson Administrations.

With great care, the committee has

focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when

ventions which were ordered by Lyn-

the committee counsel first set forth

don Johnson. Such invasions of politi-.

the result of shuffling through press

cal headquarters were worse than the

clips, it seemed as if no Justice De-:

crime committed at Watergate, since

pariment had existed in 1962; today,

they involved the use of the 'F.B.I.,

an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it

but the Church investigators seem to

was Robert Kennedy who authorized - be determineti not to probe too deeply.

the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the

If F.B.I. documents say that reports

President of the United States and the

were made to specific Johnson

aides,

Attorney General specifically discussed

why are those men not given

the

their concern of Communist influence

same opportunity to publicly tell their

with Dr. King."

story so avidly given the next Presi-

But the Church committee showed

dent's men? If Lyndon Johnson com-

no zest for getting further to the Ken-

mitted this impeachable high crime of

nedy root of this precedent to Water-

using

the F.B.I. to spy on political,

gate eavesdropping. lf Senator Church

opponents, who can be brought for-

were willing to let the chips fall where

ward to tell us all about it?

they may, he would call some knowl-

But that would cause embarrass-

edgeable witnesses into the glare of

ment to Democrats,

and

the camera lights and ask them some

Church wants to embarrass profes-

questions that have gone unasked for

thirteen years.

For example, he could call Nicholas

gressional decorum exists, far from

Katzenbach, Attorney General

Ken-

the sense of outrage expressed in the

nedy's depuly and successor, and ask

Senate Watergate committee's hear-

what he knows of the Kennedy de-

ing room. When it is revealed that the

cision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at

management of NBC News gave press

Justice concurred in the recommenda-

credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964

tion? How does the F.B.I. know the y

convention, everybody blushes demure

President was consulled or informed?

y-and nobody demands to know!

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed of-

which network executive made what

fice, and the wiretapping continued,

decision under what pressure.

he was told by angry newsmen that

I have been

haranguing

the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous in-

readers for years about the

patient

double

formation about Dr. King. Why did he

standard applied to Democratic and

wait for four months, and for a thou-

Republican politicai crimes, and had

sand telephonic interceptions, to dis-

hoped the day would come when the

continue the elbicially apprued tap?

hardbal! precedents set by the Ken-

of course,

this sore or festimony

nedy and Johnson inen would be laid

wouid erode Senator Church's political

before the public in damning detail.

bas?. That is ihy we do not see for.

Obriously, Democat Frank Church

mer Assistant F.B.I. strecior Cartri

i. nou the man to do

it.

His just-

(Deke)

Deloach, Lyation

Johnson's

staking indignation li all to: seles-

personal contace with tre F.S.1. in the

live: the trail of high-letel responsi-

witness

chair.

What did

jchuson

know

President

bility for the crines committed against

about the chaiacter-

Or. ring and ciners is evidently going

assissination plot and when did he

to be alloved to cool.

know

i:? What conversations took

Pliy:

ind think that after all the

Dare iciween Mr. Deloach adil Progi.

nation yas born through in: tie pasé

dent dolirson on the lapping of Dr.

few years our political leadore would

tina, do about the lise cê the FAl, In

Have learned that the coon ther that

any other intriviano into the lives of

brenes jo: down is the art a faer-

ing up.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 40

JAsAs, i

supe

GiVE

62-2368-1117

1do 2885-7

SEARCHED

DERIALIZED

_ FILED-

NOV 2 4 1975

FBI-ALBANY

THE NEW YORK TIMES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20ch, 1975

PAGE C-41.

---

## Page 41

Routing

Slip

0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Allanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

• (Copies to Öffi

Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orl-cans

New York City

Norfolk

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

airtin Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

Beirut

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Bong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

Date

11/21/75

Retention

For appropriate

- For information Ca optional E action

→ Surep, by

= The enclosed is for your infornation. If used in a future report, (J conceal al)

sources, a parphrase contents.

C. Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA.

dated

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of

an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr.

Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the

November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times."

SEARCHED

, SERIALIZED

_INDEXED-

_FILED.

NOV 2 4 1975

FBI-ALBANY

Eic. (1

Bufile

NW 65994 Docld:32939494 Page 682-2368-118

---

## Page 42

NR. 05O WA PLAIN

19:34PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S. APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 19, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECI COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACIIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENI ALL. OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S

QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1): REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANIS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS CMY RESPONSE

WAS THAI THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANIS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHIS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUSI BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENTS' WORK, THAI INFORMANIS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

ASAC

GILBERT

KEEFE

LONERGAN

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 42

fiLt

51211-120

SENICKED

120

SERILAZEG

FMEDAW

DECAT MYS

FBI- ALBANY

---

## Page 43

•PAGE IWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENI WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMIITEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT IO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAI THE INSPECIION DIVISIÓN HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT;

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARIMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAI OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARIMENTAL PERSONNEL,

- INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE, CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 43 '

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## Page 44

"PAGE THREE

( 3)

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENI OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING; JR., I STATED THAI THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICK RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE IHE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR II, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT. THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAI WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOI TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCIED: THAT I HAVE. NOI

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED. IO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUESI WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE IO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANIAGEOUS TO SEPARATE IHE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGAIIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INIELLIGENCE FUNCIIONS, I STATED

THAI WE HAVE FOUND THE IWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I.

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH. AREAS •

(5) IN RESPONSE IO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY .

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS. FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGAIIONS OR FOR INFORMAIION

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 44,

---

## Page 45

PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING: THAI. WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL IRANSCRIPI OF IHE QUESTIONS AND ANSUERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

PLS ACK FOR 2 TELS

LVV FBI ALBANY

ACK FOR TWO CLR

T KS

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 45

---

## Page 46

!

12950 WA PLAIN

10:34PM NITEL 12/16/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENT ALL OFFICES• FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPS IZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S

QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS CMY RESPONSE

WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANIS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENIS ' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

62-2368-12

SERACKED.

SERLALIZENRP

-THENED.

-FILED.

1910

DECE O 1975

FBI- ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 46

---

## Page 47

PAGE TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS>; AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENGE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE) •

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT;

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGAIIONS OF DEPARIMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE. COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 47

--+--

---

## Page 48

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL•

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGAIIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE; AND I

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 48

---

## Page 49

PAGE FOUR'

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESIS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

PLS ACK FOR 2 TELS

LVV FBI ALBANY

ACK FOR TWO CLR

T KS

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 49

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## Page 50

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

FOR RELEASE

10 A.M., EST

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975

62-2368-13

SEARCHED

SERIALIZIO ReC_FILED.

DEG 1S 1975

FBI-ALBANY A

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 50

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## Page 51

i,

I welcome the interest which this Committee

has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our

operations in the intelligence and internal security

fields.

I share your high regard for the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement

you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed

by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that.

are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of

legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment

as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate

Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told

the members of that Committee of my firm belief in

Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most

exhaustive study of our intelligence and security

operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 51

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## Page 52

outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.

At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and

promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in

responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have

had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct

security-type investigations and who are personally involved

in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI

officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee

and its staff with all major areas of our activities

and operations in the national security and intelligence

fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of

these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history

of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings

have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors

and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright

recognition that the hearings do not give a full or

balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

-2-

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 52

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## Page 53

It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings

to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments

of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have

received the lion's share of public attention and critical

comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over-

all work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed

last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's

Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the

five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals

were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this

total, 2,370 -- less than three-fourths - were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247

proposals were being devised, considered, and many were

rejected, in an era when the FBI was

handling an average

of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been

expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs

is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had

in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have

done less than it did under the circumstances then existing

would have been an abdication of its responsibilities

to the American people.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 53

- 3 -

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## Page 54

What I said then -- in 1974 - and what I believe

today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs

did what they felt was expected of them by the President,

the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of

the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private

offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and

educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and

other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence

from New England to California..

The victims of these acts were human beings --

men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril --

whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government,

their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and

other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their

property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members

of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged

by demands... impatient demands...for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt

they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith,

NW 65994 Docld: 32989494 Page 54

- 4-

---

## Page 55

initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial

efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and

to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred

in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were

some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying

purpose of those programs.

We must

recognize that situations have occurred

in the past and will arise in the future where the

Government may well be expected to depart from its

traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi-

gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take

affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent

threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to

be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities

by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or

should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those

instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because

of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate

and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of

- 5 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 55

---

## Page 56

whether or not such preventive action should be available

to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed

by a task force in the Justice Department, including the

FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and

controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent

Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are

used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here

today is what assurances can I give that the errors

and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence

Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some

very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the

FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of

office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness -

openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank

discussion in the decision-making process which

insures that no future program or major policy decision

will ever be adopted without a full and critical review

of its propriety.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 56

- 6 -

---

## Page 57

Participatory management has become a fact

in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters

and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless

of position or degree of experience, to contribute their

thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms

or reservations they may have concerning any area of our

operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine,

and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to

achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without

in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command

structure.

The results of this program have been most

beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined

performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities

outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward

Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability --

in his own words - "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper

requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any

-7-

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 57

---

## Page 58

requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper

or which, considering the context of the request, I believed

presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I

have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two

and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and

three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or

made overtures - directly or otherwise -- to use the

FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment

consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of

the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney

General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those which arise in my continuing review of our

operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise

his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the

FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think

that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon

the character of the person who occupies the office of

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

-8 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 58

---

## Page 59

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with

whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication,

their professionalism, their standards, and the self-

discipline which they personally demand of themselves

and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate

assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times

by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee

in particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields --

problems which all too often we have been left to resolve

without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or

the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment

have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause

of our

failures should confine his search solely to the

FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the

mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been

exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in

1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established

a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been

- 9 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 59

---

## Page 60

commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum

participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts.

However, those efforts

are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study

this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have

gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But

I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if

they do not lead to the next step - a step that I believe

is absolutely essential - a legislative charter, expressing

Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for

the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us

in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed;

and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither

the Congress

nor the public can afford to look the other

way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as

too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a

continuing role, not in the initial decision-making

process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance

upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us.

Some

proposals that have been advanced during these hearings

would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 60

- 10 -

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## Page 61

.

of the investigative process and, thereby, would take

over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked,

would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary

and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors

of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a

substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive

decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable

determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence

field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the

American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police

officer - a career police officer. In my police experience,

the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered

facing law enforcement in this country -- Federal, state, or

local - is when demands are made of them to perform

their traditional role as protector of life and property

without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a

legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding

task.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 61

- 11 -

---

## Page 62

It must be sufficiently flexible that it

does not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the

growing incidence of crime and violence across the

United States.

That charter must clearly address the

demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply

recognize the fact that times

change and so also do

the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has

commenced the formulation of operational guidelines

governing our intelligence activities does not in any

manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility

for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals

which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting

that information needed for the prevention of violence can

be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation

may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.

there are some fundamental differences between these

But

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 62

- 12 -

---

## Page 63

investigations that should be recognized - differences

in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In

the

usual criminal case,

a crime has occurred and it

remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator

and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution.

. Since

the investigation normally follows the elements of the

crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly

well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves

the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence.

The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather

to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has

enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency.

The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell

us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out.

The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent

on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation,

in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that

is intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on

these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident

that the continuing need for intelligence work can be

documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 63

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## Page 64

recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests

of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen

of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee

or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance

as Director that we will carry out both the letter and

the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 64

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## Page 65

OFFICE OF THE DIRECIOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

FOR RELEASE

10 A.M., EST

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

40

SEND AGENTS

copy sent

sto all

SAC eC

DETACHED

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975

bede

62-2368-13

SERIALIZED

DEC, 12 1975

FBI-ALBANY

7 1776-1976

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I welcome the interest which this Committee

has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our

operations in the intelligence and internal security

fields.

I share your high regard for the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement

you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed

by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that.

are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of

legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment

as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate

Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told

the members of that Committee of my firm belief in

Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most

exhaustive study of our intelligence and security

operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 66

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## Page 67

outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.

At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and

promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in

responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have

had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct

security-type investigations and who are personally involved

in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI

officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee

and its staff with all major areas

of our activities

and operations in the national security and intelligence

fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of

these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history

of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings

have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors

and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright

recognition that the hearings do not give a full or

balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

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NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 67

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It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings

to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments

of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have

received the lion's share of public attention and critical

comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over-

all work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed

last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's

Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the

five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals

were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this

total, 2,370 -- less than three-fourths - were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247

proposals were being devised, considered, and many were

rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average

of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been

expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs

is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had

in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have

done less than it did under the circumstances then existing

would have been an abdication of its responsibilities

to the American people.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 68

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## Page 69

What I said then - in 1974 -- and what I believe

today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs

did what they felt was expected of them by the President,

the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of

the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private

offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and

educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and

other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence

from New England to California.

The victims of these acts were human beings -

men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril --

whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government,

their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and

other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their

property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members

of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged

by demands... impatient demands...for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt

they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith,

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 69

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## Page 70

1

initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial

efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and

to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred

in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were

some substantial ones - should not obscure the underlying

purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred

in the past and will arise in the future where the

Government may well be expected to depart from its

traditional role - in the FBI's case, as an investi-

gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take

affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent

threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to

be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities

by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or

should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those

instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because

of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate

and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of

- 5 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 70

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## Page 71

whether or not such preventive action should be available

to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed

by a task force in the Justice Department, including the

FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and

controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent

Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are

used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here

today is what assurances can I give that the errors

and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence

Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some

very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the

FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of

office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness --

openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank

discussion in the decision-making process which

insures that no future program or major policy decision

will ever be adopted without a full and critical review

of its propriety.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 71

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## Page 72

Participatory management has become a fact

in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters

and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless

of position or degree of experience, to contribute their

thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms

or reservations they may have concerning any area of our

operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine,

and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to

achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without

in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command

structure.

The results of this program have been most

beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined

performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities

outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward

Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability --

in his own words - "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper

requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any

-7-

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 72

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## Page 73

requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper

or which, considering the context of the request, I believed

presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I

have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two

and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and

three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or

made overtures -- directly or otherwise - to use the

FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment

consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of

the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney

General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those which arise in my continuing review of our

operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise

his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the

FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think

that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon

the character of the person who occupies the office of

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

- 8 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 73

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## Page 74

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with

whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication,

their professionalism, their standards, and the self-

discipline which they personally demand of themselves

and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate

assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times

by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee

in particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields --

problems which all too often we have been left to resolve

without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or

the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment

have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause

of our failures should confine his search solely to the

FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the

mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been

exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in

1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established

a Subcommittee on FBI oversight.

Hearings had been

-9 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 74

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## Page 75

commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum

participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts.

However, those efforts

are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study

this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have

gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But

I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if

they do not lead to the next step - a step that I believe

is absolutely essential - a legislative charter, expressing

Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for

the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us

in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed;

and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither

the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other

way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as

too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a

continuing role, not in the initial decision-making

process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance

upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us.

Some

proposals that have been advanced during these hearings

would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 75

- 10 -

---

## Page 76

of the investigative process and, thereby, would take

over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked,

would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary

and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors

of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a

substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive

decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable

determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence

field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the

American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police

officer -- a career police officer. In my police experience,

the most

: frustrating of all problems that I have discovered

facing law enforcement in this country -- Federal, state, or

local - is when demands are made of them to perform

their traditional role as protector of life and property

without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a

legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding

task.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 76

- 11 -

---

## Page 77

It must be sufficiently flexible that it

does not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the

growing incidence of crime and violence across the

United States. That charter must clearly address the

demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply

recognize the fact that times change and so also do

the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has

commenced the formulation of operational guidelines

governing our intelligence activities does not in any

manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility

for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals

which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting

that information needed for the prevention of violence can

be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation

may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.

But

there are some fundamental differences between these

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 77

- 12 -

---

## Page 78

investigations that should be recognized - differences

in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In

the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it

remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator

and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution.. Since

the investigation normally follows

• the elements of the

crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly

well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves

the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence.

The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather

to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has

enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency.

The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell

us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent

on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation,

in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that

is intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on

these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident

that the continuing need for intelligence work can be

documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress.

We

- 13 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 78

---

## Page 79

recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests

of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen

of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress.

To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee

or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance

as Director that we will carry out both the letter and

the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

- 14 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 79

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## Page 80

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

good

DECEMBER 2,

1975

162-2368-14

SEARCHED,

HANDS

AGENT

JENSTUDY

DEC - R 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 80

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to

spread dissention among certain groups that they are

informing on, do you not?

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were

discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one

of the best examples of a situation where the law was

ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights

used much more than we hear today. We saw with the

Little Rock situation the President of the United States

sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use

local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement

use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a

situation like this where you do try to preserve the

respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical

problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where

the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless

to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some

areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents

mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the

lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action

was taken with that information as he pointed out during

his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the infor-

mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We

also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 81

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.

And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no

authority in the absence of an instruction from the

Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241

and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence

of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation

where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have

authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as

frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information

from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable

information--and it was passed on to those who had the

responsibility to do something about it, it was not always

acted upon as he indicated.

In none of these cases, then, there was adequate

evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

The Departmental rules at that time, and still do,

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.

You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you

have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil

Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

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QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This

was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--

the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we

were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking

place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that

we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were

able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing

the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

....A local town meeting on a controversial social

issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers

rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this

mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups

organizing or participating in such meetings because

they may result in violent government disruption?

No sir, and we don't....

Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every

aspect of the peace movement?

No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor

demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have

an investigative interest in, a valid investigative

interest in, or where members of one of these groups are

participating where there is a potential that they might

change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing

on the Ist Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

_3 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 83

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## Page 84

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers

in the past than we do at the present time. We have had

periods

where the demonstrations have been rather severe

and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,

and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect

to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged

to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut

case.

QUESTION:

MR. WANNALI:

MR. ADAMS:

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and

we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one

that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor

the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-

ments fall.

In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just

heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when

violence was known about. I know we have asked this several

times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the

rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe

situation when violence was known.

Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to

that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be

the one to answer the question.

The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem

today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have

police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals

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since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had

authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We

are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,

and during these times the Department of Justice had us

maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the

information to the local police who had an obligation to

act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those

areas where the local police did not act. It resulted

finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals

down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to

march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there

was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the

country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement

agencies in the south at the time either, because many of

them did act upon the information that was furnished to

them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the

spot because we would not have had evidence that was a

conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in

that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for

instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army

should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals

should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed

the violations.

We have over the years as you know at the

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the

FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well,

we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan

as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we

exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

What would be wrong, just following up on your point

there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is

obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to

have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on

some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

We do. We have them in Boston in connection with

the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in

Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same

time and this is the approach that the Federal Government

finally recognized.

On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that

kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting

till it gets to a Boston

state. I realize a departure from

the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need

a better remedy than we have.

Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have

subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or

50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on

potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

-6-

¡ NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 86

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=

QUESTION:

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with

state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice

and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to

protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a

lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government

had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during

the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it

a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that

we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another

infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member-

ship.

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

That's right.

I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. ' That would

mean that I out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point

was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the

figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members

in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an

awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such

as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants

in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it

just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For

example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,

both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here

we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters

and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 87

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan

informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I

think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that

right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan

had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in

the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the

hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was

going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and

considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the

violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as

many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind

that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,

was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights

workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

I acknowledge that.

Our only approach was through informants. Through the

use of informants we solved these cases.

The ones that were

solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved.

They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told

the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved

informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the

bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he

could see that this could continue forever unless we could

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 88

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## Page 89

create enough disruption that these members will realize that

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the

Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if

that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I

will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence

stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say

20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately

were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of

violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy

any longer.

I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in

1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto

situation?

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year

where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was

the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington,

areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the

situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They

weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an

organization. They were listening posts in the community that

would help tell us that we have another group here that is

getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

... Without going into that subject further of course we

have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt

was made to prevent crime when you had information that it

was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where

you have.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 89

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MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

the crime.

Not necessarily knew.

Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

The informant is on one level. We have other informants

and we have other information.

You were aware that he had worked with certain members of

the Birmingham Police in order...

That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that

incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the

time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department

agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the u.s.

Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

...This brings up the point as to what kind of control

you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this

kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in

an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer

using him as an informant in spite of the information he had

furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

But you also told him to participate in violent activities

* NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 90

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MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

That's what he said.

I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits

are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our

Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your

staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage

in violence.

Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

I do not think they made any such statement to him

along that line either and we have informants who have gotten

involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately

converted their status from an informant to the subject and

have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around

20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws

once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy

of disseminating information on violence in this case during

the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they

found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a

day and he was a little late in disseminating the information

to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed

up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in

properly notifying local authorities. So we not only

have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards

in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all

informant files.

Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with

an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 91

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MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they

decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are

words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't

take the lead but the implication is that he would have

to go along or would have to be involved if he was going

to maintain his liability as a ---

There is no question that an informant at times will

have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights

that take place but I believe his statement was to the

effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do

not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with

chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with

a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is

one thing being present, it is another thing taking an

active part in a criminal action.

It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut

apparently.

How does the collection of information about an

individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming

involved in that sex life or social life is a

requirement for

law enforcement or crime prevention.

Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that

they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge

concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any

value whatsoever.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 92

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...e

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

You don't know of any such case where these instructions

were given to an Agent or an informant?

To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

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Routing Slip

0-7

"(Res. 7-1

TO:

SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Allanta

Baltimore

Binningham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

Ll Paso

Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked)

→ Houston

| Indianapolis

Jack son

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City.

Norfolk

• Oklahoma City

1 Omaha

3 Philadolphia

Phoenix

Pillsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt. Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattic

I Springfield

Tamp a)

Washington Field

Quantica

•LEGAT:

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottarva

Paris

Rome

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE:

Date December 4, 1975

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE

Retention

For appropriate

• For information

optional

7 action

_] Surep, by .

= The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

CJ conceal all

sources, l

paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated •

-

Remarks:

local

For your assistance in responding to

press inquiries, attached is a copy of

uned,

ted excerpted remarks by Assistant to the

Ditector--Deputy Associate Director James B.

Adams while testifying before the senate select

Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI

made by Gary, kowe,

42- RB68-147

INDEXED.

SERIALIZED CFILED OLIV

Enc.

(1)

Bufile

Urfile

DEC - $ 1975

FBI-ALBANY

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 94

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(doun; Clipping in Spoce Below)

In our opinion

FBI betrayed

nation strust

A disgusting tale is unfolding before the Senate Intelligence

Subcommittee::

It is a story of the FBI in the 1960s and early '70s üsing its

awesome power to subvert traditional constitutional rights of

citizens: 3

FBI, threats and intimidation of the late: Dr Martin Luther

King are getting the headlines, but as Senator Philip A: Hart (D:

Mich:)E says, Lots of people named Jones and Smith, who

never came close to a Nobel Prize (which Dr King received in

1964) have had their First Amendment rights trampled on.

SjA couple of examples:

The: FBI would send anonymous letters intended to break

up marriages of dissenters, or it would send similar letters to

colleges and/or newspapers aimed at getting speakers the FBI

didn't like barred from using campus facilities:

James B. Adams, deputy associate FBI director, conceded:

that the FBI had "no statutory authörity" for its harassment"

äctivities: That's certainly an understatement..

The current hearings point up the reed for tighter control

over the FBIF We should never again have a situation where the

FBI director can "run amuckie? free from control from the

Attorney General and Congress: That's exactly what happened

during the last years of J. Edgar Hoover's tenure.

The FBI - and Hoover - served the nation well for many

years.

But that is not, and should never be, a license to be above

the law.

•If our law enforcement agencies. cannot stay within both

the letter and spirit of the law, our "nation of laws" may soon

become a nation of thugs.

Ice in

-q45

• 81

(Indicaio page, roma o!

newspaper, cliy and siote.)

THE DATEY STAR

ONEONTA, N.Y.

PAGE 4

Date.-

Edition:

Author=

Editor:

Title:

11/22/75

Chiracter:

Classlileetion:

Submilling Oile=:

C)Eving Insestigused

100-18751

ALBANY

-_ARCHED

•INDEXED

VEGA: 1975

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 95

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## Page 96

=

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 7-11-75)

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas.

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

I Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked),

_ Rouston

¡ Indianapolis

1 Jackson

1 Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New Yorks City

Norlolk

] Oklahoma City

] Omaha

| Philadelphia

| Phoenix

] Pittsburgh

1 Portland

1 Richmond

1 Sacramento

1St. Louis

1 Salt Lake City

¡ San Antonio

San Diego

] San Francisco

San Juan

7 Savannah

] Sealtie

TO LEGAT:

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

J Springfield

J Tampa

) Washingion Field

] Quantico

Date December 5, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR--

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

•BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

12/2/75:

Retention

For appropriate

• For information

optional

action

→ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future roport, bag conceal all

sources, Ej paraphrase contents.

1 Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided

‚excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

Attached for your information and

assistance, is the complete transcript of

above-referenced testimony.

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfle

NW 65994 Dold- 3298994 Poole 2 + 2368-16

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## Page 97

Vol. 15

Ohe United Staten Sruate

Report of Proceedings

...".

Hearing held before

Slect Connittoo to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intolligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESIIGATION

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT

Tuesday, Dacember 2, 1975

Washington, D. C.

080-

SENSTABY

HANDLE AS

дАС

WEHER

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 97

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

68-2368-160

66-2885

• CAKCHED.

INDEXED_

SERIÄLIZED _ BB FILED_

DES 1: 1975

S1* ALBANY

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WARD & PAUL

• First

, S.E., WashIngton, D.C. 20003

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Senator Tower.. The next witnesses to appear before the

Committee are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-

Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all

investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant

Director, Intélligence Division, responsible for internal

security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;

Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations;

Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive

investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, JI., Assistant to Section

Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigall

Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Inlicy,

Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener.: Int.":-

gative Division.

Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

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Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give

before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams.

I do.

Mr. Wannall.

I do.

MI. Mintz.

I do.

Mr. Deegan.

I do.

Mr. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman. I do.

Mr. Grigalus. I do.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that. Mr. Wannall will be

the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning

might require, and I would direct each of you when you do

respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow

the members of the Committee to return from the floor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide 83

percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information

on the criteria for the selection of informants?

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TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION •

ACCOMPANIED BX: JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) :

• JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L.

SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,

ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT

CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF,

CIVIL RIGITS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you

have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting

Office.

Senator Tower.

That is GAO.

Mr. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Tower.

Would that appear to be a fairly accurate

figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI

itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that

we do get the principal portion of our information from live

sources.

Senator Tower.

It would be a relatively high percert.

then?

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your ques!'." •

criteria?

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NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 101

Senator Tower.

What criteria do you use in the selection

of informants?

Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In

our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in, order to get

an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a

criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set

of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security

matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require

that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist

principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field

office indices, checks with other informants who are operating

in the same area, and in various established sources such as

local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type

who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we

would interview the individual in order to make a determination

as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI

in discharging its responsibilities in. that. field.

Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we

would conduct a rather in depth investigation for. the purpose

of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability.

Senator. Tower. How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between

the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to

intelligence. collection?

Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

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Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address

the use of informants on criminal matters

since he is over

the operational division on that.

MI. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact

that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you

are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in

court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant

alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be

just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality

of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,

through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be

used independently of the testimony of the informant so that

he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to

function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-

tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets

into that delicate area of

entrapment which has been addressed

by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the

courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage

in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the

opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don't

occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to

avoid this. Even the law has

recognized that informants can

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engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,

especially the

Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that

the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that

an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but

because there

is lacking this criminal intent to violate a

law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant

has to become involved in some activity in order to protect

or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United

States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure

we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our

informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do

instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that

they are informing on, do you not?

Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,

which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably

one of the best examples of a situation where the law was

in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used

much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little

Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending

in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law

enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the

troops only as a last resort.

And then you have a

situation like this where you do try

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to preserve the respective

roles in law enforcement. You have

historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had

situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost

powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in

some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,

he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't

see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed

out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance. We

also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being

received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated

simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department

of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a

position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction

From the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have

evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in

a situation where the Department called in United States

Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement

officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus-

trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from

someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information,

and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to

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do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he

indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was

adeguate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to

act?

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Mi: Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.. You

can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have.

no violation.

Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights

statúte, which added punitive

measures against an individual

that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem

that the whole country was grappling with: the President of

the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation

where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from

a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.

The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing

violence, and in neutralizing the Klan - and that was one.

of the reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con-

tinuing of urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

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Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the

intent to halter political expression?

Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans

Against the War that indicated that there were subversive

groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting.

with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending

meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the

International Communist Party. We feel that we had a very valia

basis to direct our attention to the VAW.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was

head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made,

and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it

split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost

group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point

factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed

those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow!

the national organization.

But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we

investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation

and subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. Hart?

Senator liart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing

after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information

that clearly has no rclationship to any Federal criminal

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statute.

Mr. Adams.

I agree, Senator.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that

stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that.

When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the

violent statements made by the group or do you also show that

you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have

some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,

that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the

statutes.

You have to report the good, the favorable along

with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with

information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum

cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the

real purpose of an organization, do you only report the

violent statements made and the fact that it is by. a small

minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization

and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines

we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because

we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in

our files.

• Senator llart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process:

you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people

who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment

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exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

MI.

Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I

imagine every one of you has

been interviewed by the FBI, either

asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator •

being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-

viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the

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FBI?

Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that

this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our

files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree.

It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our

files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because

of considering. a man for the Supreme Court of the United

states, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't

see. where any harm is served by having that in our files.

Senator Hart. of Michigan. But if. I am. Reverend. Smith

and. the vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact.that.I. was.helping

the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years

later a name check. is. asked. on Reverend Smith and. all. your

file shows. is that he was associated. two years ago. with a group

that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful. patriotism

to justify turning loose

lot of your energy in pursuit on

them --

MI. Adams. This is a problem.

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Senator Hart of Michigan.

This is what should require

us to rethink this whole business.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well

as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range

of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration

and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition

of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-

taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation

of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation

of such law,

and when such an investigation is opened, then

informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence

investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations.

The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation

relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,

upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back

again in a world of possible violations or activities which

may result in illegal acts.

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the

right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition,

conceivably may result in violence or disruption of a local

town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result

in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding

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the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all

groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because

they

may result in violence,

disruption?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

Isn't that how you justify

spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

When we monitor demonstrations, we

monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an

investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,

or where members of one of these groups are participating where

there is a potential that they might change the peaceful

nature of the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the

First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the

past than we do at the present time. But we have had periods

where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the

courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,

to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission

of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be

too late for prevention.

And that's a good

statement if applied in a clearcut

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case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have

to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly

fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and

that's where I think most of our disagreements fail.

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Senator Hart of lichigan. Let's assume that the rule

for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The

Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive

organization should not only report on what that group is

doing but should look at and report on activities in which

the group is participating.

There is a Section 97B3 dealing with reporting on

connections with other groups. That section says that the

field office shall "determine and report on any significant

connection of cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any

significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive

groups.

Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of

1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the

installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us

remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential

sources reported on the plan's participants and activities

of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,

particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium,

which included speakers from the Defense Department for the

ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reportod on the planning for the meeting,

the distribution of materials to churches and schools,..

participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on i'

ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat:.

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plans for a

subsequent town meeting in Washington with the

names of local political leaders who would attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as

part of an investigation of an allejedly subversive group

participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt

with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the

plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated

to the Statc Department, to military intelligence, and to the

White House.

Ilow do we get into all of that?

Mr. Adams. Well -

Senator Mart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it,

would you do it again?

Mr. Adans.

Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969

was. The problem we had

at the time was where we had an

informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was

going to take place and it was going to be the Daily World,

which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments

about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took

a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28,

1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this

organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look

and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have

stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security : s lila

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soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country

and they supported him with total resources: of the Soviet

Union, false identification, all the money he needs, comnuni-

cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and

you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic

security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations.

So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take

a quick lo0k at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's

what they did.

Senator: Hart of Michigan. You said that was

'69. Let

me bring you up to date, closer. to current, a current place

on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. Pxesident

Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as

he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there

were several national conferences involving all the groups

and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is

not against - while unconditional amnesty is not yet the

law,

we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Sonator llart of Michigan.

some of the sponsors var

umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse pimp:

the country. FBI informants providca advance iris

cil

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the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human

rights groups, G.I. rights

spokesmen, parents of men killed

in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft

counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,

delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and

Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as

a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive

and it described the topics of the workshop.

Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted

that in view of the location of the conference at a theological

seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage..

to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last

fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point

of view that I share, that the soner we have unconditional

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amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

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Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on

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a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad

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everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the

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Bureau Files.

Is this what we want?

Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr.

Wannall address himself to this.

He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

Mr. Wannall. Senator llart, that was a case that was

opened on Novenber 14 and closed November 20, and the information

which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular

items.

One was

that a member of the steering committee there,

was a three man steering committee, and one of those members

of the national conference was in fact a national officer

of the VAW in whom we had

suggested before we did have a

legitimate investigative interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Nell, I would almost say so what

at that point.

Mr. Mannall. The second report we had was that the

VAN would actively participate in an attempt to pack the

conference to take it over. And the third report we had --

Senator Hart of Hichigan. And incidentally, all of the

information that your Buffalo informant had given you with

respect to the goals and aims of the VAW gave you a list of

goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected

objectives. There wasn't a single

Item out of that VAN that

jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirely

on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did recej.

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from that informant information which I considered to be

significant.

The buffalo chapter of the VAW was the regional office.

covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the

five nost active VAW chapters in the country and at a

national conference, or at the regional conference, this

informant reported information back to us that an attendee

at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba

prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during

the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There

was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the

VAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals

in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in

agreenent with us, but Mx. Adams has addressed himself to the

interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the information that we had on the VAN did

not come from that source but even that particular source did

givé us information which we considered to be of some

significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the

investigation of that particular chapter of the VAw.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

But does it give you the

right or does it create the need to go to a conference,

even

if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VAW

when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we

seek to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

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Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VAl

influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be

holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.

Senator lart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to

seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this

country?

Mi..

Wannall.

Well, of course there had been some

organizations.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow?

Mr. Wannail. I think that if we found that if the

Comnunist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and

use it as

a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic

in doing that. You have a whole scope here and it's a matter.

of where you do and where

you don't, and hopefully, as we've

said before, we will have

some guidance, not only from this

committee but from the guidelines that are being developed.

But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was

explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and

not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,

and that was the person who had, who was not developed for

this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other

matters for some period of time.

And as soon as we got the report of the outrere i thi

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discontinued any further interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, my time has expired

but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we

really want to control the dangers to our society of using

informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have

to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And

that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when

my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,

obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged

informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or

individuals.

I know you have objections to that and I would like to

review that with you.

Senator Mondale, Pursue that question.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an

obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn joose a full-

fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run

into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources.

The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the

Committee. The Bureau argues

that such a warrant requirement

might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First

Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their

government.

ought to

Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that

• hearten all the civil libertarians.

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But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement

raise a serious constitutional question?

Mr. Adams: Well, for one thing it's the practicability

of it or the impacticability "of'getting a warrant which:

ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has

been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily

with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities

such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have

discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage

in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still

subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time

is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United

States.

Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about

to do it because they're telling you they're not

going to do it

and you know they're not going to do it at this particular

moment.

It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a

criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and

we can't find any practical way of doing it. He have a particular

organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs

to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization:

and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist

Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

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We

don't have probable cause for him to target against

that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa-

tion from him that he as

a Communist Party membet, even

though in an informant status, is going to that organization:

and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.

It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,

the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not

violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have

recognized the necessity that the government has to have

individuals who will assist them in carrying out their

governmental duties.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything

yet in response to the constitutional question, the very

practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the

use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional

rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress

can prescribe sone safeguards, some rules and some standards,

just as we have with respect to your use of electronic

surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant

procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show

probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a warrant,

therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

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warrant. It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and

investigate groups which may

only engage in lawful activities

but which might engage in activities that can result in

violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but

Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to

such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,

including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss

the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to

use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or

unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same.

fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most

cases, to wiretap.

This is an option available to Congress.

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential

security informant and a security informant?

Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,

that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on

him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth

background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is under

consideration before he is approved by headquärters for use as

an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

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•On some occasions that person will have been developed to a

point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are

engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished,

but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied

ourselves that he meets all of our criteria.

When he does,

the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and

headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an

approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker.

So it's really the first step of

being an informant, I guess.

Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the

preliminary steps.

Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in the Rowe

testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again

for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having

trouble understanding what the rationale, Mc. Wannall, was

in not intervening in the Rove situation when violence was

known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Schveiker, Mr. Adams did address

himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to

answer that.

Senator Schweiker. All. right.

Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the

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problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not

have police powers like the United States marshalls do.

About 1795, I

guess, or some period like that, marshalls have

had the authority that almost, borders on what a sheriff. has.

We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice

and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain

the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on

activities to furnish the information to the local police,

who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department

of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it

resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United

States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who

were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a

time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was

a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies

in itself at the time either because many of them did act

upon the information that was furnished to them. But we

have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we

would not have had evidence that there was a.conspiracy

available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that

if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and

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next to the Army;

"the" United States marshalls should make them,

not the FBI, even though we developed the violations.

And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many

questions raised." Why doesn't the FBI stop this?

Why don't

you do something about it?.

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed

the Kian as far as committing acts of violence, and of course

we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following

up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program

sincé it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to

have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some

kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection

with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston,

they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this

is the approach, that the federal government finally recognized,

was the solution to the problem where, you had to have added

Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it

gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced

confrontation, shouldn't we have som

were a coordinated program

that when you go up the ladder of cow'and in the FBI, that

on an imnediate'and fairly contempor.ry basis, that kind of

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help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it

gets to a Boston state?

I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not

saying it isn't. But it seems to

me. we need a better remedy

than we have.

Mr. Adams.

Well, fortunately. we're at a time where

conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s

and the '70s and periods - or '50s and '60s. We report to the

Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the

country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be

aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took

place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,

the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together

saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the

early '60s. But the government had no

mechanics which protected

people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the

Robert Hardy case. I know he

is not a witness but he

was a witness before the llouse. But since this affects my

state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was

the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized

a raid on the Camden draft board. An according to Mr. Hardy's

testimony before our Committee, he s::: that in advance of the

raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact

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that they had all the information they needed to clamp down

on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time,

and yet no arrests were made.

Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the

material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not

a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your

question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department

of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously

as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be

made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the

ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort..

So I think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that

there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who

under your procedures?

Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,

when they should be made, and decisions with regard to

prosecutions are inade either.by the United States attorneys

or by Federals in the Department.

Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have

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departmental attorney on the scene #ause there are questions

conspiracy.

conspiracy is a tough siolation to prove and

sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching

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someone in the commission of the crime as further proof,

rather than relying on. one informant and some circumstantial

evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they

even had a dry run. • They could have arrested them on the

dry run.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to

me. They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on

the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry

run.

Who was this Department of Justice official who made

that decision?

Mr. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,

during the height of the effort to destroy the klan, as you

put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released

figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some

kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000

estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.

That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan

at that point was an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes or "o indicate that 70

percent of the new members of the Kla: that year were FBI

informants.

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Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people

'to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that

you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's

going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the

tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total

informants for both domestic informants and potential informants

and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.

Mr. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all

racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I

think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual

number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around

6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a

group called the Action Group. This was the group that, you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af-

ter the meeting.

He attended the open meetings and heard

all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,

but he never knew what was going on because each one had an

action group that went out and considered themselves in the

missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct

as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in

mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and

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everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights

workers, the Linio Kent sase, the Viola Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.

Mr. Adams.

Our only approach was through informants

and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the

ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have

never solved. They are extremely difficult.

These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and

as we told the President, that we had moved informants like

Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the

head

man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us

of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and

yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever

unless we can create enough disruption that these members will

realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,

even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are

in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was

the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and

that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure

and just like you say, 20

percent, they thought 50 percent of

their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't

dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they

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couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

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Senator Schweiker.

My time is expired. I just have

one quick question.

Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500

informers for black ghetto situations?

Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year.

We did

have one year where we had a number like that which probably

had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities

were being burned, Detroit,

Washington, areas like this.. We

were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is

violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penetrating

an organization. They were listening posts in the community

that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting

ready to start another fire-fight or something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more

Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get

everything in in the first round, we will not have a second

round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can. go

on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question

that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the

record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the

field

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1934:

organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts

in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it

has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the

last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped

shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of

the crucial public confidence in an essential law enforcement

agency of this country.

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it

was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI

in 1921.

In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from

its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and

protector of political ideas. And through the interference

of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public

became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and •

Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement

by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department

get involved in political ideas.

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with

Martin Luther king, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even

had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of

Churches.

Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined,

impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people

can't protect themselves, that you sonehow need to use the

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tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive

or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly

at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started in politics years ago and the first thing we

had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out.

of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and

I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help

from the FBI or the CIA. We just ramned them out of the meetings

on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't

good union leaders when

we didn't want anything to do with them.

And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to

protect the blacks from

Martin Luther King because he's

dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans from whatever

it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches

from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and

confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree

with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that

precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the

public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask

you?

Mx. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like

to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement

Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we follied that policy for about

ten years until the President of the ..ited States said that

we should investigate the Nazi Party.

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I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in

the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,

there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage

which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could

have investigated these issues of sabotage.

Isn't sabotage a crime?•

Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams. After it happened.

Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved

in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of

crimes that could have been comnitted. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to

continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you

still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of

Churches, and this can still go on: This can still go on under

your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to

justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics

in terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams.

The law does not say we have to wait. until

we have been murdered before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

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1937

law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges.

That.'s

the law. You can do that.

Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which

of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You

don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can

direct an intelligence operation against the German-American

Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that?

Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?

Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to

go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for

probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time

they outlined the Communist Party --

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it

wouldn't he better for the FBI for us to define authority

that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under

court authority you can investigate where there is probable

cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these

decisions on your own?

Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in

that. We feel that we're going to gistipeat to death in the

next 100 years, you're damned if you i, and damned if you

don't if va don't have a delineation of our responsibility

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in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we

have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States.

I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley.

has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the

FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think

that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and

Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because

of the necessity that we

must concentrate on these areas of

abuse. We must not lose sight of the

overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I

still feel that this is the freest councry in the world.

I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have

made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United

States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they

are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the

United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night

and feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an

argument then, Mr. Adams, for

strengthening our powers to go

after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or

continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public

confidence you need to do your job.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

The mistakes we have made are

what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee.

I'm saying we made some

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mistakes and in doing

so this is what has hurt the FBI. But

àt

: the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes

out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity

of zercing in on abuses:

I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think

the accomplishments in the klan was the finest hour of the

FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the Klan that we made

some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

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Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but

I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble

over it in the political idea

trouble, and that that's where we

need to have new legal standards.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some

length seems to have been an

inclination on the part of

the Bureau to establish, a notion about an individual or a group

which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In

the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was

being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-

gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that

this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out

to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a

willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar

to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that

every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau

seemed to indicate that the Bureau was not correct in its

assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,

or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist

that this investigation go on, and il's information was used

against the individuals.

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Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that

its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their

course?

Mr. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown

from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after

five days we closed the case. We were told something by an

individual that there was

a concern of an adverse influence

in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King

situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just

dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and

on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were

all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin

Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This

wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that

there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir

Dr. King, but it's just like --

Senator Huddleston.

The Committee has before it memoranda

written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the

information they were receiving from the field, from these

surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition

was.

Mr. Adams.

That, memorandum was rot on Dr. King. That

was on another individual that I thi:. somehow got mixed up

in the discussion, one where the isows was can we make people

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prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to

investigate them.

But the young lady appearing this morning making the

comment that she never knew of anything she told us that

she considers herself a true member of the VAW-WSO inasmuch

as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and

agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-

ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals

from associating themselves with the VAW-WSO. She is most

concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over

the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that we have a basis for investigating the VAW-

WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped

the investigation. They don't agree with these principles

laid down by the --

Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your

continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that

information against members who certainly had not been involved

in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job

or whatever?

Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the

criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to

prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens.. The

Attorney General has clearly spoken : that area, and even our

statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't --

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Senator Huddleston.

Well, of course we've had considerable

evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent

crime, when you had information that it was going to occur.

But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

MI. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he

reported to us.

Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you

knew was an accomplice to the

crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,

hadn't he?

MI. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have

other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he

had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in

order to -

Mr. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole

lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were

already part of it.

Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully

do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that

when the Department, agreeing that we had no further juris-

diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform.

certain law enforcement functions.

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Senator Huddleston.

Now, the Committee has received

documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted

an informant who had been

established in a white hate group

to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid

his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being

responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might

have undertaken?

Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen

knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a

specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the

informant we're talking about decided to break off from the

group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of

the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off.

was in compliance with our regulations.

His breaking off,

we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it

This

on his own.. We paid him for the information he furnished

us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza-

tion.

Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that

he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that

organization?

Mr. Deegan.. He continued to advi:: us of that organization

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and other organizations. He would advise us of planned

activities.

Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed,

did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that

long..

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI

informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of

responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his

FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing

them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the

knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became -- came in contact

with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-

pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and

this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with

the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the

knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime

prevention responsibilities.

Mr. Deegan.. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular

case.. It does not square with our policy in all respects, and

I would have to look at that particular case you're talking

about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston: I don't have the documentation on that

particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of

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control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind

of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you are

supposedly trying to prevent.

MI. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became

active in an action group, and we told him to get out or

we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the

information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participaté

in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent

activities.

Senator Huddleston.

That's what he said.

Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But. that's what

lawsuits are. all about, is that there. are. two sides to the

issue, and our agents. handling. this have advised. us, and I

believe have advised. your staff, that at no time did they

advise him to engage. in violence..

Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to

get the information, I believe maybe might have been his

instructions.

Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement

to him along that line, and we have informants, we have

informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,

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and we have immediately converted their status from an informant

to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I

can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for

violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even

to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence

in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told

me that they found one case where their agent had been working

24 hours a day, and he was

a little late in disseminating the

information to the police department. No violence.occurred,

but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for

his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow

reasonable safeguards.in order to carry it out, including periodic

review of all informant. files.

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is

substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the

agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you

happen to be with someone and they decide to. do something, that

he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,.

and be a good informant.. He wouldn't take the lead; but the

implication is that he would have to go along and would have

to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams.. There's no question but that an informant at

times. will have to be present. during demonstrations, riots,

fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was

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to the effect that -- and I was sitting in the back of the

room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were

beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat

someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did

because it's one thing being present, and it's

another thing

taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston.. He was close enough to get his

throat cut.

How does the gathering of information --

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that

we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should

we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more

question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of

information about an individual's personal life, social, sex

life and becoming involved in that sex life or social Ilfe

is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.

Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no

such knowledge concerning it, and I can'= see where it would

be.of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where

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these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams.

To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower.

Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth

Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants

and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one

time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have

a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you

may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which

there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying

degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual

will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when

the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first

test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like

to explore

with you is the difference between a one time search which

requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that

search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or

the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover

agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a

slightly different category than an informant.

Mr. Adams. Well, we

get there into the fact that the

Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does

not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and

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if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't

protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected

item, but information and the use of informants have been

consistently held as not posing any constitutional problems.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about

the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,

but is it true that under existing procedures informants are

given background checks?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period.

Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they

are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-

ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the

handling agents.

•Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very

practical way agents themselves to the FBI.•

Mr. Adams.. They can do nothing -

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use

of the word.

MI. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we

instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the

agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into

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:

an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and

glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the

Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

• Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a inember

of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require

a warrant?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular - it depends on the

purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by

concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as a member of the

Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he

can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's

no constitutionally invaded area there.

Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has

a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular

agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation

as an undercover.agent.or as an informant.--

Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you why you feel that it is

impractical to.require. a warrant. since,.as I understand it,

headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that

degree of formal action required?

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Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity

which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You

have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify

what you're going after, and an informant operates in an

area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's

going. to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to

blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the

State Department building..

Senator Mathias. If it were a crininal investigation,

you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't

you?

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Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to

use someone as an informant in that area because the same

difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's

very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection

say wiretaps on a national security problem.

Mr. Adams.

That's it, and there we face the problem of

where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy

in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy

there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't

show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that

he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,

we couldn't get a wiretap under

the probable cause requirements

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evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting

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espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's

why we're still groping with it:

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Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really,

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you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.

Mr. Adams.

That's right, except for the fact that the

• President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this

nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all

national survival, and these are the areas that not only the

President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're

all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle

ground in here.

Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national

security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular

need.

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Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable

cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some

method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an

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ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,

we may get their yet.

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Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that

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middle ground?

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Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's

more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch

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and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these

areas resalved.

Senator Mathias.

And you believe that the Department,

if we could come together, would support, would agree to that

kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

Mr. Adams.

If we can work out problems and the Attorney

General is personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement night

extend to some of those other areas. that we talked about?

Mr. Adams. I think'

that that would be a nuch greater

difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who

reports on many different operations and different types of

activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet

espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little

more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get

together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the

meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that

would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney

General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the

same general process could be used for informants, since

you come to headquarters any way. :

Mr. Adams.

That could be an alte sitive. I think it

would be a very burdensome alternative

i I think at some

point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered

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major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think

ve're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies

have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency

and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up

to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests

itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally

with one level of information in one sense of gathering

information. You hear what you hear from the tap.

Mi. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number

also.

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Senator Mathias.

Smaller number, but that's all the

more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his

senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being

can acquire from a situation and has access to more information

than the average wiretap.

And it would seen to me that for that reason a parallel

process might be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main

distinction. to me which I had overlooked fron our prior

discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is

more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one

of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like

concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and

anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual

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whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is,

and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their

conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept.

If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking

place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived

by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't

consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent

if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan

of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for

someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator llart

raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this

distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that

there may not be some legislative compromise which might be

addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your

attitude in being willing to work on these problems because

I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from

these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth

Amendment as the standard that we. have to achieve. But the

way we get there is obviously going to i*', lot easier if we

can work toward them together.

I just have one final question, ?is. Chairman, and that

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deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable

cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling

the use of informants and the kind of information that they

collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year

informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they

provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million

in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective

of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal

agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost

reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much

left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when

we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure

that we have the means to gather information which will permit

us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations

that are acting to overthrow the government of the United

States .

And I think we still-have some areas to look hard

at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to.

stay.

They are absolutely essential to law enforcenent.

Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress

has informants, you have individuals in your community that

you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know

what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly,

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am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history ".

and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to

avoid is abuses. like provocateurs, criminal activities, and

to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.

But we do need informants.

Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you have any further

questions?

Senator llart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request

perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the

groups that we have discussed this morning into which the

Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal

groups - I would ask unanimous consent that. be printed in

the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters

file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced

that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil

Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups,"

is not a left only pre-occupation. •

Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.

• (The material referied to

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Senator Tower. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this .

afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and

I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will 'hear from Courtney Evans,

Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General

Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00

a.m. tomorrow morning.

(whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the

above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday!

December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a in.)

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Vol. 20

Ole United Statra Sruate

Copy 5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

62-2368-17

sac the

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CONTENT

STATEMENT OF :

PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,

Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-

stigation

2451

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Wednesday, December 10, 1975

--.

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10

o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,

the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and

Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick

Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles

Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob

Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,

Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff. Members.

-

--

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

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the Honorable Clarence M.. Kelley, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a

troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative

law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City

Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as

a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified

to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation

extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over

the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the

openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and

their willingness to consider the need for legislation to

clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this

Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's

activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic

intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our

admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative

and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance

of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic

intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather

than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light

in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

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Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director

Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous

policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse.. The

FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-

gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.

The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in

developing policies and standards for intelligence. These

are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.

Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the

Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress

should take into account in thinking about the future of

FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-

lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons

likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be

outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain

types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;

whether foreign related intelligence activities should be

strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement

functions, and what should be done to the information already

in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in

the future.

The Committee lo0ks

forward to a constructive exchange

of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney •

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice

Department in the next months as the Committee considers

recommendations that will strengthen the American people's

confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That

confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal

law and for the security of the nation against foreign

espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if

you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off

with, please proceed.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and

gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in

the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-

gence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my

35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-

tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs

of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with

law.

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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative

oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of

the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary

Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of

that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study

of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been

undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present

Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest

cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as

possible in responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

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I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-

dented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type

investigations and who are personally involved in every facet

of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who

have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with

all major areas of our activities and operations in the national

security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these

matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the

Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of

necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I

credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the

hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's

record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus

on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the

organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the

lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted

an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence

Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found

3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI

Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,

less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were

being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era

when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative

matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed

regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate

and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when

I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it

did under the circumstances then existing would have been an

abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is

that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they

felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,

the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and

buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige

to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and

killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such

acts of violence from New England to California.

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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,

and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or

perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and

appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their

rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress

and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other

law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient

demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a

responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions

designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed

revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-

intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,

should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the

past and will arise in the future where the Government may well

be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's

case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering

agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent threat to human life or property.

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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried

out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating

only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the

ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is

a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to

human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,

the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such

preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task

force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,

and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can

be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress

to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible

manner.

Probably the most important. question here today is what

assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose

under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-

stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's

methods of operations since I took the oath of office as

Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness

both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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in the decision-making process which insures that no future

program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a

full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and

Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of

position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts

and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or

reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take

full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum

critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner

weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to

me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to

the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past

were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi!s

guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his

own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi

instructed that I immediately report to him any requests

or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering the context of the request, I believed presented

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the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the

Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as

Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no

one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,

to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper

purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider

honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI

I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including

those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and

practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order

that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities

over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the. FBI today

is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity

can be assured only through institutional means..

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the

character of the person who occupies the office of the

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is

my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,

their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the

nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct

at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in

particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,

problems which all too often we have left to resolve without

sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been

made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our

failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for

FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the

Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcomnittee on FBI

Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully

committed to maximum participation with the members of that

Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very

recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee

has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex

problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative

charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence

jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the

security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it

must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress

nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to

the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in

the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role

not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of

our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the

courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that

have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role

of the courts into the early stages of the investigative

process and, thereby, would take over what historically have

been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would

seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast

them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our

Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-

gressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional

statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both

the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a

career police officer. In my police experience, the must

frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing

law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is

when demands are made of them to perform their traditional

role as protector of life and property without clear and

understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative

charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle

the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence

of crime and violence across the United States.

That charter

must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;

yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and

so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced

the formulation of operational guidelines governing our

intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need

for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-

diction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

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question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that

information needed for the prevention of violence can be

acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may

well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there

are some fundamental differences between these investigations

that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective

and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a

crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to

identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence

for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows

the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is

limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of

information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be

not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the

Government has enough information to meet any future crisis

or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it

must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on

our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-

gence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need

for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction

of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not

the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every

citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee of

its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as

Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit

of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note

that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary

Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented

to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time

I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result

in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.

I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that

time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of

the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I

have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this

not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might

place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek

sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the

period these things occurred I was with the local police

department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,

however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I

was with the police department, I continued throughout that

period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for

the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based

on those observations, we have here a very fine and very

sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there

is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without

fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. We

will not be completely without fault in the future. But I

assure you that we look upon this inguiry, we look upon any

mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at

this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want

to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a

matchless organization, one which I continue to say was

not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of

them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am

only putting in your thinking my objective observations as

a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this

organization. It is too precious for us to have it in

a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able

to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one

question he would like to ask.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be

covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of

reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and

it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the

top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about

extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations

suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated

for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national

security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions

and concern has been on the possibility reguiring court

approval for the use of informants, informants directed to

penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,

pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive

type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's

really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy

than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He

can ask me questions to get information the government would

like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the

wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate

screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the

informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a

general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval

would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to

my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the

informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.

It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,

by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use

of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.

You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have

basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection

of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within

the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary

circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and

seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-

theless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,

we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our

job.

Now I'm not arguing with you, senator, that it is not an

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unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not

an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think

that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that

are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking

jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we

could present the matter to the court but what are they going

to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to

have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is; of course, urgency in the other contacts.

Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court

given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration

of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my

idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over

the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are

going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this

is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your

reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to

prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and

hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a

third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is

warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand

your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect. for you and your

organization and I personally regret that the organization is

in political distress,

but we've both got to recognize that

it is, along with other agencies and departments of the

government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though

that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects

unfortunate, that it also has

a plus side. That is, it gives

us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,

at least, to improve the level of competency and service of

the government itself.

with that hopeful

note, would you be agreeable then to

volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve

the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or

indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,

to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the Fresident, and

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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on

how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents,

the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its

essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to

see that these functions, these delicate functions are being

undertaken properly?

And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things

I am concerned about.

It hasn't been Jong ago that the FBI Director was not

even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe

you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the

United States. I think that is a movement in the right

direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an

additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision

and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become

involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney!

General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General

needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the

intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so

that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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look at these decisions and the process by which they were

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made to decide that you are or you are not performing your

services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have

access to records, and in many cases records don't exist

and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now

departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality

of service of your agency? How would you propose that you

increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the

United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving

the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that

is required?

Mx. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering

this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling

what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,

one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very

important is that the position of Director, the one to which

great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will

properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going

over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most

necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means

of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency

toward consulting with other members of the official family,

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that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with

no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very

carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those

matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who

does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for

the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,

for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive. of the FBI, the Director of the

FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,

but I think this is such an important field of influence that

it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the

judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the

Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea

of the President of the United States calling the Director of

the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that

the relationship between the FBI Director and the President

is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited

through the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

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has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if

the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he

may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter

report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I

have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this

was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that

says the President has to go through the Attorney General,

although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary

for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the

Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least

some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of

the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in

a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in

the event I receive such an order, to request that it be

documented: This is a protection as well as a clarification

as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.

I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-

tion.

I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it

can be worked very easily.

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Senator Baker. Ir. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I

believe, has already established some sort of agency or

function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,

I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,

including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has

taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of

Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will

you give us any observations as to whether you think that

will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or

helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your

relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some

extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the

Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it

completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely

subscribe.

Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that

concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector

General who is involved with an oversight of all of the

agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally

protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

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to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about

it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will..

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much.

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The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that

existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during

this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the

Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them

by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and

the people of the United States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction

there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the

country because of certain circumstances rather than any

clear and specific direct instructions that might have been

received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,

is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,

to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can

logically be incorporated and that --

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the

attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because --

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contemplate it might be

a continuing danger, but it certainly would be. a very acceptable

guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems

to arise, know what we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which

Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can

provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the

court in determining what action might be proper and specific -

ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also

provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various

techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as

has already been done, that informants are necessary and

desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the

proper linits so that he in fact is not violating individual

rights?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must

be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure

that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But

this is an aware we've gotten

into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the

particular action was

necessary, that there was a present

threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been

necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any

other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's

right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.

There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels

the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,

I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is

still supervisory control over that agent and over that

informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing

basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point

as to whether or not a law enforcenent agency ought to be

very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone

else.

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If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do

something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to

whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported

by the FBI.

Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to

our attention should either be handled by us or the proper

authority.

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Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the

past.

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Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring

to but I would think your statement is proper:

Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence

of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that

have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to

light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

The question that I'm really concerned about is as

we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give

the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide

range of threats, how do we control what happens within each

of those actions to keep them from going beyond what

was intended to begin with?

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Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents

themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever

intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we

may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do

we control the techniques that might be used, that int themselves

might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation

of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's

germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed

out that the association to, the relationship between the

informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,

and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-

lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here

because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship

Insofar as the activities of agents, informants of others

which may_be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of

violations of the law on the part of informants, and either

prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the

United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.

We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar

as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the

Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and

if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

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pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic

review.

MI. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the

activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection

Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well

as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed. out the

difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in

gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to

attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the

departments, for instance, with not having a nixing of

gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques

definable and different?:

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I

see no objection to the way that they are now being handled

on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fatt, it is

a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as

it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes

information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present

time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for

information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him

to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether

or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such

project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must

come. from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,

wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with

a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as

I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in

take care that you just don't follow the request of some

underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston.

Just one more question about

techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad

projects undertaken.

would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional

oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,

with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have

some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent

with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent

with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the

översight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now

see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put

on the use of that information once it has been supplied by

the FBI?

------

Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions

now?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge

in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason

for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a

very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're

going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules

that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information

your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment

of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I

do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some

inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to

who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed

on what the request, and what they can do with it after they

get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact

that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

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bound to gather a great deal of information about some

individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-

gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras-

sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any

effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's

file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific

purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to

doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the

guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which

is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-

able.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time

that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,

too.

Senator Huddleston.

I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to

speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the

President of the United States from calling up the head of

the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement

problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction

to the agency.

But how about that? What about white House personnel

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informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our

present activities. I think this is the only way that we can

exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to

accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect

of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad

direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects

that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such

things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence

is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this

type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap

again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction

and total permission to move in a certain direction and go

beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI

electronic surveillance of DI. King, several tapes of

specific conversations, and later a composite king tape were

produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.

I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of

this particular section. There has been no review of them

since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to

the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear

them?

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Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is

of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to

be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the

Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and •

decided that it would compound the original error for the

staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still

further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from

insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was

unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at

what. we needed to know about the King case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue

never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information

before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of

the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,

and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

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ourselves whether MI. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase

or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am

not advocating it, I am merely asking à question. They would

be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and

decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-

diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the

Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance

routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a

target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,

to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a

destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those

occasions where we think that matters might come up within

that period of time which may need the retintion of them, we

will express our opinion at that time, but other than that

we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate

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with respect to retention of such information, or do we need

the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials

when the investigation purposes for which they were collected

have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close

look at the retention of material, and we would of course like

to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank

you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the

most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the

invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,

limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can

and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,

and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and

MI. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at

criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we

go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political

ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to

draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are

restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

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crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather

than to leave this very difficult to define and control area

of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last

statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that

I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue

in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory

objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based

on statutes in the so-called security field, national or

foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should

be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this

atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have

more personnel working together, covering the same fields..

I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence

matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows

from the investigation of the security matters and the

criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr: Stone said was

this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned

with political or other opinions of individuals. It is

concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws

of the United States. When the police system goes beyond

these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of

justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more

sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's

area of concern some matters which were probably not as important

at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in

touch with the security investigations and the gathering of

intelligence is something which has proved to be at times

troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,

productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely

of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if

that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that

at that point it becomes

so difficult to guarantee, and in

fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't

see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in

the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of

meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one

you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate

ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's

security, particularly in the light of the record that we have

seen how that definition can be stretched to include pracii-

cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,

war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

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that would provide any basis for oversight?

How can you, from among other things, be protected from

criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't

do something that some politician tried to pressure you into

doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years

from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be

criticized for doing that which today is construed as very

acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy

for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is

why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines

as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured

to do things, or when,

after the fact, people with good 20/20

hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say

well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-

ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by

the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me

that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's

possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to

be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what

you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

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Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a

great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have

come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact

that I think that we have a different type of spirit today

in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before. you came in,

that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they

are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact

that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the

organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we

had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in

the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions,

because we must equate this with the need and with our

experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're

going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a

flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those

guidelines.

Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think

there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified

law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I

think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,

from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of

enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you

are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you

get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

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great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably

going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no

matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get

into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost

every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter

of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate

from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is

less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working

with you we can at least make some achievements that will be

significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I

think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August

9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure

of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-

understood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to

clear it up.

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement

of the approach which the courts historically have used in

resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its

recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in

the Fourth

Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it

does not prohibit searches and

seizures. I mention, it only

refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police fiedd. What is more restrictive

to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be

more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We

do have to , in order to love in the complexities and

intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our

rights.

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Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it

is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there

has to be a balance.

Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give •

up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you

mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch. that and ask again, you

have to give up some tights.

Which rights would you have us

give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would

have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. "You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-

ment right.

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale.

What right do you have in mind?

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Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Consti-

tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,

under court warrant.

• Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond

that?

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Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever

go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that

that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I

made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which

yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in

law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were

saying something different, that it was taken to mean something

different than I think you intended:

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law

enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined

by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling

of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my

speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale.

What you are saying in effect is that

in effect, the rights: of the American people can be determined

not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the

law.

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You meant that.

Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale.

All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman.

Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to

a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about

laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was

we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the

Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably

hamper you from investigations of crime control in the

country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area

that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind

of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau

from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political

figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your

predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.

Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use

the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish

some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer

restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is

not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you

from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the

coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think

that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines

as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might

be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any

consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been

a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. J. think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the

Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a

letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the

Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying

out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-

gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther

King, JI., in order to determine whether that investigation

should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked

for our transcripts, the testimony before the Conmittee, all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-

ment asking this Comnittee for FBI files?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.

I think they're asking for what testimony was given by

witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department

asking this Committee for material provided to us by the

FBI?

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Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I

just ask --

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.

Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did

they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I

don't know why.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you

provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why

an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee

for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator llart of Colorado. You released a statement on

November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's. counter-intelligence

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program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO

activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was

to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against

individuals, organizations

and institutions both public

and private across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this

Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of

occasions he planned violent acts against black people in

groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the

FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that

I have quoted?

Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of

his statenents contrary to what we have said is the truth.

We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it

and we know of no instances where,. for example, 15 minutes

and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony

he gave us under oath was not accurate?

MI. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,

and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did

not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI

was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony that the New

Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher

authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,

but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record

seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic

information flowing upward through the chain of command to

Director Hoover's superiors:

Mx. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity

to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in

passing, do you agree with the statement made by President

Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy

Dc. King should be brought to justice.

MI. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders

the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say

that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar

as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said

to do it and those who are responsible.

I: took the responsibility for any such program and I

don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have

some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that

responsibility.

I think that it should rest on those who instructed that

that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people

who give the orders should be brought to justice.

Mr.. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

HIr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, lií. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Conmittee's review of the

COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the

FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three

basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee

is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for

the future, what I would think would be our constructive

legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what

we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of

the United States have fron time to time ordered the FBI to

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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the

necessary surveillance to obtain. and to have a purely

political character, that they simply wanted to have for their

own personal purposes.

I think that you would agree that that is not a proper

function of the FBI,, and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,

including the Director, to turn down a President of the United

States if he receives a direct order from the President. It

is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,

I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man

serving in your position, particularly if the President puts

a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or

even invents some excuse. It is alwavs easy for him to say,

you know, I an considering Senator White for an important

position in my administration, and I need to know more about

his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause

for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in

his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you

to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's

been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, ir.

president, that's a very questionable activity for the FSI,

and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real

reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and

you want to get something on him.:

I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that

way, and I'm wondering what we cauld do in the way of protecting

your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this

basic charter that we write.

Now, I vant your suggestions, but let's begin with one

or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you

either by the President or by the Attorney General should be

transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective

and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain

those written orders and that furthermore they would be

available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the

joint cormittee on intelligence is established, that committee

would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that

orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or

unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind

into a charter for the FBI?

Hr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order

issued by. the President that is a request for action by the

Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my

opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes

or some that will say no, but I think we could define an

area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could

do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee

of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have

no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request

for something of high confidentiality that the President might

put in writing such as some national or foreign security

matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a

great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review

be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would

present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-.

thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight

committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we

proceeded with this Cormittee. It has worked pretty well,

I think.

How Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the

Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs

to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since

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why are they preserved?

Why aren't they simply destroyed?

Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable

the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information

that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never

have connected the person with any criminal activity? And

yet, all of that information just stays there in the files

year after year.

What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's

not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down

there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that

they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your

question and why right now are they maintained? Since we

do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until

that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines

or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be

some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there

might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation

himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but

it can he done and we are willing to be guided by those

rules.

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting

thousands of investigations

every year on possible appointees

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to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I

ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his

badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.

so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.

And we have a very brief conversation in which •I tell him that

as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that

is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved

is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that

file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is

in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old

neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some

files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We

have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial

and is developed in cases involving certain members of the

Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not he a proper area

for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much --

do you have records that would tell us how much tine and money

is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands

of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments

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to Federal offices?

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Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not

have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost

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for the investigation of Federal appointees -

The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other

information that would indicate to us what proportion of the

time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of

activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but

I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the

approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is

a matter we need more information about. And when you supply

that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number

of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,

but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,

enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the

reach of these investigations may be.

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Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

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The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

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that I would like your best judgment on is whether these

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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate

routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive

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in the national security sense

from the reach of these FBI

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checks.

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And so when you respond to the series of questions, I

wish you would include the offices that are now covered by

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such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the

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Could you do that?

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Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

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The Chairnan. Fine.

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Now there is a vote.

The vote always comes just at

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the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional

questions for the record, and there may be other questions:

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too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will as!:

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Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going

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But before I leave

I want to thank you for your testimony,

ir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the

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its investigation during the past months.

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Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

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The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result

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of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

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the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll

encounter in the future.

Thank you.

WARD & PAUL

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement --

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third

full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then

to question about what you said. "We must recognize that

situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the

future where the Government may well be expected to depart from

its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps

which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or

property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what

kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general

principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to

that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an

employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's

going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you

have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and

so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent

threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the

principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and

he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

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Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you

can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the

traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not

gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had

not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,

are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of

human life or property?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

MI. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act

to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there

is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.

a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,

and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think

take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times

they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to

kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's

not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

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kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying

on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible

threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where

we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't

say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to

the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that

we should act independently because maybe we don't have the

judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do

think that we should report it and thereafter see what can

be done.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of

our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible

threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than

arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to

prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other

than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have

in mind?

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Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever

is necessary in order to make it impossible of at least as

impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

MI. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening

an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with

a standard which said you would have to have an immediate

threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal

crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out

so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mx. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit

you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from

what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might

be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to

do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for

you to, not with the presence of the possibility, not able

to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening

of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the

test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving

violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

MI. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist

activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities

under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where

it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic

group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious

federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and

they have been well defined as to what is the possible

opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been

discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,

but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations

over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the

most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some

intelligence investigations

which should, of course, be of

short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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or a viable intent.

Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the

intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley.. By intelligence investigation, yes, you

are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and

what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined

with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and

I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has

been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-

mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that

relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood

of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to

collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning

let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the

political views of a person on the other?

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what

many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define

this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that

within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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202)

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phone

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lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say

ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I

think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or

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some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the

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government.

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Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political

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views?

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Mr. Kelley. What?

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Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political

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views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence

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or advocants of overthrow?

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Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat

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or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,

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but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's

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a member of some other organization.

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Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of

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sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything

might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of

balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's

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justifiable to collect that kind of information on American

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citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

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Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been

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included in some reports as a result of the requirement that

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that is what is required by our rules, that when a person

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reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,

I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether

of not this is something we should retain, and we would not

object to anything reasonable in that regard.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its

applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King

case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to

open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive

groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is

received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group

or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used

in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be

open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of

clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch

as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-

trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered

organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the

benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that

under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be

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opened today?

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Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only

of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a

group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-

gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals

or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely.

If

you mean that we go into the

non-subversive group, that we

then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the

infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation

of them without any basis for doing so other than that they

are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but

off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

MI. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of

inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was

raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you

talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between

intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions.

23

Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,

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indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects.

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to distinguish some of this has been made.

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WW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 231

Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage

effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the

Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of

this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's

law enforcement position?

Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does

a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background

of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which

all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-

ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also

enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding

of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that

spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type

of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission

if within the Bureau guidelines were established that

effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of

the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a

situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist

the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question

that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that

intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing

of lines there with the information legitimately needed for

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law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide

dissemination, because that just numerically increases-the

possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything

of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile

to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to

close guidance in the guidelines

that we're speaking of.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about

the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department

regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the

King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel

I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some

insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that

an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved

improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it

routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of

procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for

Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the

great majority of the cases

turned over to our Investigative

Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

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occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,

perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is

handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be

reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary

step?

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I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,

I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the

Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of

Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with

the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered

the action against King should be the subject of investigation

and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those

activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.

There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised

of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own

investigating, and this is something that we feel is a

decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we

have within our own organization sufficient capability to

handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled

independently of us.

Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

NW 65994 Docld:32980494 Page 233

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the Chair.)

--

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WARD & PAUL

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NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 234

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## Page 235

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 12-17

TO: SAC:

Albany

00

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Allanta

Baltimore

Binningham

Boston

Buffalo

Butle

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

(Copies to Offices Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

All waukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

1 Norfolk

Oklahoma Cily

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond®

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Springfield

'amp a

lashington Fiel

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

• Beirut

• Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

I London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Roine

Singapore

E Tokyo

Tel Aviv

RE:

Date 12/30/75

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,

DECEMBER 10, 1975

Retention

For appropriate

[ For information :] optional

] action

1 Surep, by ..

Cy The enclosed is for your infornation. If used in a future report,

way conceal all

sources, CJ paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is

one copy of the transcript of questions which

were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance,

along with Ms

Kelley's answers to those

questions.

62-23684717

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

NW 65994 Doold: 3

FIlE

SENSTUDY

Page 23.

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## Page 236

Routing Si

0-7 CRew.

TO:

SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

#==:

Anchorage

Atlanta

hoe;

2,1."

Haltimore

Birmingham

ALLA

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cievelund

Culumbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolula

(Copies to Offires Checked)

-73)

Houston

Indianapolis

•Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Vortolk

J Oklahoma City

| Omaha

| Philadelphia

Phoenix

1 Pittsburgh

Portl and

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Frencisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfield

Tampa

Washington Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

[J Beirut

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

Loncion

Madria

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE

Date -

1/5/76

BEFORE SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES @2:2368-18

DECEMBER 10, 1975

Dead

SEARCHED_

B3B

_INDEXED

SERIALIZER REE FILED.

Retontion

da for infonuation optional L action

aet appray ciate

$A8, 037 1976

The enclosed is for your infanion, If usedin a future SPAL BANg pal all

sources, Lad paraphrase content.s.

Melosed an corrected pres from report ass aC

Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and

captioned as above, all SACs and Legats were

furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr.

Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Activities.

Although the data contained in

the transcript may be made available to news

media

representatives, used in answering

questions received

from citizens, and other-

wise treated as being of a public-source nature,

the transcript itself should not be reproduced

for, or given to, anyone outside the FBI.

Вr.c.

Bulle

Urfile

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 236

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## Page 237

09 /ñev. 2-1774)

FBI

•Airtel

Transmit in

----

(Type in plaintext or code).

Via

To:

SAC,

Albany

From: Director, FBI

COST OF RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES FROM

OTHER AGENCIES, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

AND REQUESTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

AND PRIVACY ACTS (FOIPA)

(Precedence)

1/14/76

PERSORAL

(Date)

ATTENTION

As you are aware, the FBI is currently responding

to inquiries from various Congressional committees and agencies

such as the General Accounting Office.

In addition, we are

having to devote ever larger amounts of resources to the

handling of requests under provisions of the FOIPA.

(This line for LEFT MARGIN.)

While much of the effort required to process these

matters is expended at FBIHQ, the field offices are increas-

ingly being called on to give responses. From time to time

In the past, the cost of responding to the inquiry of a

particular committee or agency has been monitored when

this was

deemed appropriate.

Since it appears the high volume of inquiries will

continue for the foreseeable future, it is necessary to

provide for an efficient, standardized mechanism of collecting

cost data

and reporting the time spent servicing requests

all oversight groups which will be instituted immediately.

The time spent on FOlPA matters

will also be reported through

this centralized system.

As major inquiries from new groups

are received, the time

spent servicing these

requests should

also be reported.

Under this system, each field office will submit

an appropriate communication monthly reporting the time spent

2 - Each Field Office

(Do not type

BEYOND THIS MARGIN.)

(Do not type below this line.)

8 516-66-2577

(ESIPA)

68-2368-19

-444

send

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 237

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## Page 238

Airtel to Albany

Re:

Cost of Responding to Inquiries From

responding to the requests of various groups and handling

FOIPA matters.

This information must be received by the

fifteenth of the month following the month being reported on

and should be directed to the attention of the Budget and

Accounting Section.

For uniformity, the information should be reported in

the following sample format:

ffice: Alban

lonth

January, 1976

General Accounting Office

Agent Hours.

21

Clerical Hours: 11

Freedom of Information Act

Agent Hours:

61

Clerical Hours: 13

Agent Hours:

viv Houst 17

Clerical Hours:

A DO

CiviL suits

CLETERERS

Field offices are not expected to keep detailed

time records. Reliable estimates are acceptable and time

should be reported to the nearest whole hour.

The groups and activities which are being monitored

at the present time are as follows:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

General Accounting Office

Freedom of Information Act

Privacy Act

Statistics should be reported on any oversight afforded

to the FBI and should not be restricted to the committees and

agencies described above.

For accountability purposes a report should be submitted

by each field office each month, even if there is little or

no time to be reported.

The first report is to be submitted by

February 15, 1976 for the month of January.

- 2 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 238

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## Page 239

Airtel to Albany

Re:

Cost of Responding to Inquiries From. . .

The adoption of this system will eliminate the

need to send numerous reports on individual groups or projects

each month. Also, the form of

data collection will now be

uniform.

The information obtained will be of value to FBI

management for planning and staffing requirements and will be

useful for budget

justification purposes if it becomes

necessary to seek

additional personnel to handle this work.

Your

cooperation is appreciated.

- 3 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 239

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## Page 240

-

JASAR

Supr 3

1 Sepu 4.

CHERIGOL

ADVISE

SAAMANN

0F

AbL

PENDING

SUITS.

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 7-11-75)

TO: SAC:

I Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

(Copies to Office

1 Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

I Las Vegas

B

Little Rock

1 Los Angeles

• Louisville

7 Memphis

1 Miami

Milwaukee

5 Mobile

Minneapolis

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk.

Checked)

ention

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pitts burgl

Port anc

Richmond

Sacramento

St.. Lou1s

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfield

Tamp a

Washington Field

Nuantico

TO LEGAT:

Buenos Aires

Caracas

] Hong Kong

] London

Mexico City

RE:

Date _

1/30/76

Airtel to all SAC's, 1/14/76, captioned "Cost

I Responding to Inquiries From Other Agencies

'ongressional Committees and Requests Unde

the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

(FOIPA) "

Retention

For appropriate

• For information . optional

• action

[ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ( conceal all

sources, • paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA -

dated

Remarks:

Effective immediately, an additional activity

is being added to those contained on page two

I referenced airtel - the time spent preparin

nd defending lawsuits where the Bureau and/o:

its employees are named as defendants or are

parties in interest.

roports ander the cause be a un- do

SEARCHED.

SERIALIZED BR

_FILED

Enc.

FEB 4.1976

"Bufile

Urfile

fiLE.

tear

AONERCAN A

556 ME

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62-2368

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 240

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## Page 241

TO

:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL. FORM NO. 10

JULY 1973 EDITION

GSA FPMR 161 CFRI 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G

ERNMENT.

Memorandum

SAC, ALBANY (66-2877)

DATE:

2/4/76

SA LESTER I. AMANN

COST OF RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES FROM

OTHER AGENCIES, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

AND REQUESTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

AND PRIVACY ACTS (FOIPA)

RE: Bureau airtel to Albany, 1/14/76.

Referenced airtel pointed out that the FBI

is increasingly being called upon to furnish information

to Congressional Committees, other agencies, and also to

answer requests under Freedom of Information and Privacy

Acts (FOIPA). As a result of this, a monthly report must

be submitted

setting forth the time spent, both agent and

clerical, under each of the different headings (FOIPA,

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,

etc).

In order to facilitate the compiling of this

monthly report, a separate.control file has been

established 66-2921.

Each supervisory desk should be

aware of the necessity of channeling to this control

file a break down by agent and clerical hours whenever

an inquiry is responded to under any of the Congressional

Committees, other agencies (GAO), or FOIPA.

C-SAC

I-ASAC

1-Supv. GILBERT

1-Supv. KEEFE

062-2368

-Sup. LONERGAI

10.00

1-66-2921

1-66-2877

LLA: bah

(8)

62-2368-21

SEARCHED-

ENDER ReC

_ FILLO

A MAN

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 241

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## Page 242

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

JANUARY 26, 1976

62-2368-22

SEARCHEE

SERIALIZO FIND One

MAR 5 1976

FBI-ALEANI

"RE

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 242

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## Page 243

I want to thank you for giving me the

opportunity to

appear before this Committee concerning

a most important issue -- that of oversight.

For some months now, the FBI has undergone a most

exhaustive review of its intelligence operations, as have

other members of the intelligence community. This review

has covered both domestic and foreign intelligence

operations of the FBI.

And I am hopeful that the results of these

extensive reviews will be helpful to the Congress as it considers

practical recommendations for legislative oversight.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 243

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## Page 244

The FBI has in the past recognized and, indeed,

requested a clear delineation of its intelligence responsi-

bilities and authority to conduct investigations in this

extremely sensitive area.

We realize that Congress faces a difficult task

if it decides to draft oversight legislation that will be

of lasting benefit to the American people. Many issues are

involved, and most of them are not easily resolved.

The primary responsibility for correctness

of FBI activities rests in its Director - a responsibility

I readily assume.

I would like to offer for your consideration some

of the basic questions I believe must be answered:

(1) Should Congressional responsibilities

for oversight of the FBI be consolidated?

(2) Should Congress become actively involved

in the decision-making process of the

administration of the FBI?

(3)

(4)

What is the proper degree -- and mode --

of Congressional access to FBI information?

What clearance procedures and controls should

be established for staff members of a

Congressional oversight committee?

- 2 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 244

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## Page 245

As I have previously testified before a

Congressional Committee and mentioned here today, the

decisions in the FBI are mine and I assume full

responsibility for them. I think the point merits

reiteration.. Some of the mistakes in the past were

occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI.

We have welcomed Attorney General Levi's guidance,

counsel, and his continuous availability, in his own words,

"as a

'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any requests

or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering

the context of the request, I believed presented

the appearance of impropriety.

I can assure you, also, that in my administration

of the FBI I bring to the attention of the Attorney General

and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those that arise in my continuing review of

our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly so that the Attorney General can discharge his

responsibilities with regard to the FBI.

There is no question in my mind that the basic

structure of the FBI is sound; but it would be a mistake to

- 3-

→NW-65994-Docld:32989494_Page 245

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## Page 246

think that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. And the integrity

of the FBI therefore is dependent upon the character of the

Director of the FBI and every member of the FBI under him..

It will always be so.

I am sure you are aware the Attorney General

created a committee of Department and FBI representatives

to draft guidelines governing

FBI investigations. These

quidelines have been discussed with various committees of

Congress and although not finalized at this time, they

could prove beneficial in the administration of the FBI.

I would like to comment briefly on the matter

of determining the degree and

method of access to FBI files

granted to a committee having oversight responsibility.

I believe

such determination must carefully

consider the questions

raised as to the protection of the

integrity of such matter aside from privacy considerations.

Much of the information received by the Bureau is furnished

voluntarily, not only by individuals but by cooperative

foreign governments. They do so in return for an express or

implied promise of confidentiality.

The FBI regards such

promises as binding.

- 4 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 246

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## Page 247

The establishment of unlimited access could

seriously jeopardize the flow of volunteered information

which is the lifeblood of our investigative organization.

As the number of persons having access to highly

sensitive materials

is increased, the chance of an intentional

or inadvertent disclosure also

increases.

A perfectly well-intentioned person who legitimately

comes into possession of sensitive information may well

forget,

at a later time and in another position, the

circumstances under which he acquired the information.

Law enforcement in this Nation is largely dependent

upon citizen cooperation. Should citizens no longer have

any assurance their identities will be protected, the very

foundation of cooperation upon which the Bureau is so reliant

will be shaken.

Our legitimate concern in this area is borne out

by the fact courts continue to recognize the special legal

status accorded informants in the law enforcement community,

in that their true identities are protected.

Should the identities of informants be jeopardized

by the unnecessary proliferation of information, there will

be a severe impact on the ability of the FBI to discharge

its mandated responsibilities.

- 5 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 247

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## Page 248

We are also concerned about the countless

public-spirited citizens who come forward voluntarily with

information essential for the FBI to function effectively.

Other extremely valuable sources of such information

are cooperative agencies in this country and abroad: Should

the FBI be required to relinquish, over our objections,

information of this nature, it is quite likely we would be

denied such information in the future.

The Select Committees have received unprecedented

access to information from the FBI, within agreed limits; but

we must ask whether the same degree of access should be

allowed, or is essential to, an ongoing oversight committee.

The Select Committees came into being in the Watergate

atmosphere.

Issues were raised that needed to be resolved.

Most of them have been resolved with regard to the FBI.

"I must point out that our diligent cooperation in

the endeavors of the Committees stems, in part, from our

own commitment to review the actions of the FBI in the past

in order to better judge the proper role of the FBI in the

future.

An excellent example of this commitment is the

fact we have reduced the number of our domestic intelligence

investigations by 64 percent since July, 1973.

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NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 248

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## Page 249

As of July 31, 1973, we were handling 21,414

such investigations. By October 30, 1975, we had reduced

that total to 7,686 pending domestic intelligence cases --

a decline of 13,728 cases.

I think this is solid evidence of our responsiveness

even prior to the drafting of proposed guidelines for such

investigations. It isn't necessary for a house to fall on us --

much less two houses.

So I feel compelled to raise this question:

Will the good of the country be better served by

continuing an extraordinary degree of direct Congressional

access to FBI information, or will it be better served by placing

emphasis on requiring the FBI Director to be fully accountable

to an oversight committee through sworn testimony?

I think the Congress and the FBI can perform their

respective tasks with the most advantageous results by the

latter means.

Now, also, I would strongly suggest that consideration

be given to the employment of a permanent, professional staff --

to the extent necessary -- for any proposed oversight committee,

with stringent clearance procedures.

This would allow the staff members to become

thoroughly knowledgeable concerning the FBI's procedures and

practices and, thereby, facilitate the work of the committee

with proper security.

- 7 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 249

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## Page 250

As we seek to define the proper degree of

oversight, or review, of FBI operations, we must consider

the administrative burdens such oversight involves.

I should point out that in responding to requests

of the two Select Committees, the FBI at its headquarters

alone expended 3,976 days of Agent personnel and 1,964 days

of clerical personnel from April through December, 1975 --

manpower diverted from investigative duties.

In dollars

and cents that represents a cost of approximately $640,500.

Additionally, the cost of conducting background investigations

of committee staff members had reached about $393,699 through

last month.

Now these figures do not take into account personnel

utilized in responding to requests of other committees of

Congress, which have substantially increased during the

past year.

Many of the requests we receive from Congress are

duplicative in nature.

Though we diligently try to respond

fully and accurately in each and every instance, it is a

time-consuming and costly chore. And I feel strongly that

the interests of the American people would be best served

by Congress consolidating its oversight functions.

The manpower of the FBI is limited. With the

increased burden placed on the Bureau by Congressional Committee

-8-

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 250

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## Page 251

requests, and Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act

requests, we have reached the point where the Bureau's

ability to perform its normal investigative functions has

been impaired.

So I would urge you to consider these matters in

your deliberations concerning oversight legislation. I

assure you we will continue to cooperate to the best of

our ability. And I can further assure you that under a

Director held fully accountable and reporting

at intervals

to an oversight committee, the FBI can perform effectively .

and honorably.

Thank you.

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NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 251

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## Page 252

Testimony before

he Committee on

Government Opera

cons, 1-26-76

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR RIBICOFF

QUESTION:

Mr. Kelley, Do you believe that there should be a

Congressional Oversight Committee handling

intelligence matters?

MR. KELLEY:

I believe in oversight, Senator. I do not know

whether you mean one which is separated from

the criminal activities performed by the FBI

or not.

It it be Iragmented, I do not

believe that such should be done.

I subscribe

to an oversight of both the intelligence activ-

ities in the domestic and foreign security and

the criminal.

QUESTION:

I do not think it is anyone's intention in the

oversight committee to take care of the day-

to-day problems that the criminal oversight

has domestically, but in the counterintelli-

gence field, do you believe that there should

be such an oversight committee?

MR. KELLEY: I do believe that it is necessary that we do

have oversight.

QUESTION:

Mr. Colby testified last week that, in his

opinion, after reporting to eight committees,

he feels that the sooner such an oversight

committee is created, the better off the

intelligence community would be. Do you believe

with Mr. Colby?

MR. KELLEY: I do.

QUESTION:

In your statement on page 3--I quote you--you

state that "Some of the mistakes in the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher

authorities outside the FBI." Could you please

tell us what mistakes

and which higher authorities

you

are referring to?

MR. KELLEY: I am referring to the reguests, the orders that

have come to us from members of the Department

of Justice, the Attorney General, and these stem

from the installation of some of

our electronic

surveillances and from programs that we have

followed which have been with the authority of,

and approval of, those in this area.

There are

not--I do not have a complete outline of them,

but we do have instances where the FBI did not

initiate these.

The orders came from outside

our organization and from, of course, The White

House on some occasions.

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 252

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## Page 253

QUESTION:

Do you believe that such requests have been

improper under the authority of the FBI?

MR. KELLEY: I do not think by any means that they come

under

the purview of the FBI.

QUESTION:

What should a director of the FBI do if he

receives an order from the President, or the

Attorney General or someone in the White House

staff that you believe contrary to what your

responsibilities and authorities are?

What

should a Director do under those circumstances?

MR. KELLEY:

First, I think that he should deliberate and

talk with the Attorney General, if it be one not

coming from the Attorney General and get his

determination. If it be one where there is

some doubt, he should get it in writing. If it

be one that

he does not under any consideration

nor as a result of deliberation wherein an

effort is made to convince him, but he himself

does not feel that it is advisable then he should'

withdraw, he should resign.

And as I was once told

by Senator Byrd during confirmation, it is hoped

that in such an instance that he would come to the

oversight committee of the Congress and consult

with them about what should be done under these

circumstances•

Of course, that is a matter which

the Director himself has to arrive at, and I am

already committed to, and still subscribe to, the

proposition that I am not going to give way just

because it comes from higher authority.

QUESTION:

If the President of the United States makes

a request of you that you believe to be

improper, and

of course, he is your boss,

you would feel honor-bound under those circum-

stances to resign as Director of the FBI?

MR. KELLEY: If it came to the final crunch, yes.

QUESTION:

Do you believe that an FBI Director should

have a definite term in office?

MR. KELLEY: I have been asked this before. I am not uncom-

fortable under the present system where my term

of office is from day to day. I do not believe

that there should be any greater tenure than that.

Insofar as

a limitation on how long he can be

Director, I feel that nine or ten years is

sufficient. I do subscribe to that.

-2 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 253

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## Page 254

QUESTION:

You say also on page 3 that when Mr. Levi

became Attorney General, he instructed you to

report to him any requests or practices which,

In your judgment, were improper or presented

the appearance of impropriety. Have you made

such reports to Mr. Levi?

MR. KELLEY: Yes, sir.

QUESTION:

Are they confidential, or could you describe

generally the nature and frequency of such

improper requests?

MR. KELLEY:

Most of them have been in the area of Cointel

Programs which we have discovered ourselves in

ome of our tile reviews

I can remember

nother where we determined that there wer

certain mail openings which we did not know

about until we accidentally discovered them.

It was not a failure to inform us, but

they thought that this was an ongoing program

that had been given official approval.

There was no thought that it was something that

should be hidden.

We did discover them in the

top echelon of the FBI and, therefore, the thought

is they were new to us--they were also new to

Levi and we informed him about them.

QUESTION:

MR. KELLEY:

In your testimony you stated that the Bureau has

reduced a number of pending domestic intelli-

gence investigations from 21,414 in 1973 to

7,686 by October 30, 1975. How do you explain

this?

Were there too many investigations being

conducted two years prior?

Senator, when I first came in, I talked with the man

in charge of our Intelligence Division.

That is

the one where we handle the security matters, and

it was our opinion, together, that there were too

many investigations being conducted in the

security field.

I asked him to review the

bases on which we conduct our investigations.

Obviously it became apparent that some of our

fields of attention could be under close

scrutiny. I felt some undue extensions of our

investigatory capabilities and this was a contin-

uing process, and the reduction was not something

that was immediate' , 73 when we got ourselves

but extended from, I would say,

the latter part of

lined up, right through to october, as it says

in my statement, of '75.

We looked over why

- 3 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 254

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## Page 255

are

doing certain things, and

It might

well be, as is many times true in investigative

circles, that you might get a little too

concerned about something that on close scrutiny

may not have been quite as alarming. as it first

This is not at all unusual. It is,

however, unusual that it comes from within

and yes, as

a result of the realignment of our

goals--realignment of our procedures--our

basis for investigating matters, we did bring

about this reduction.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Senator Percy?

QUESTION:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would

like to thank Mr. Kelley for his demonstrated

desire and willingness to work with members of

Congress and to help us fulfill our responsibilities.

Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified

last week that he often did not know what the

FBI was doing.

What is your own working

relationship with the present Attorney General?

Do you keep him informed of all the major

activities that the FBI is undertaking? Does he

participate in deciding whether or not you

undertake major undertakings?

MR. KELLEY:

Senator, we certainly keep him informed of

any major program. I would say that perhaps

we may, on occasion, over-inform him.

We may

tell him about things that are antici-

patory

as far as problems are concerned. We try to

keep him fully informed. For example, if there

happens to be something we learn about that

may cause press inquiries of him, we inform

him of that.

Many times they are made.

I just point this out inasmuch as we are trying

valiantly to keep him informed.

QUESTION:

When do you anticipate new guidelines for the

FBI being finalized?

MR. KELLEY: I cannot give you this response.

It has been

several months in preparation.

I know that it

has now been thrown back into the hopper for

re-evaluation. I cannot tell you--perhaps

Mr. Levi can give you better information in

-4-

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 255

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## Page 256

QUESTION:

As a

follow-up on that first question, to

be certain that I complete the record on it,

can you think now in retrospect in anything

• in

your term of office as Director of the FBI

that you really should have advised the Attorney

General of that you maybe subsequently did,

but did not at the time?

MR. KELLEY: I cannot think of anything, Senator.

QUESTION:

I asked that, because Dean Rusk said that he

subsequently has now learned of certain

things undertaken in foreign countries by, say,

the CIA that he thought at the time he knew

everything going on, he now learns he did not

know, and I wanted

to complete that record.

You talk about unlimited access to your files

being dangerous, and I do not think anyone contem-

plates that whatsoever, but I do not think

either that you should be left in the position

where just your word is the only thing that an

Oversight Committee has. What do you think is

proper in this respect with respect to reference

to files?

MR. KELLEY: I think that there should be a working arrange-

ment between our people and whatever group

might have oversight, and there is a strong

requirement that there not be presentation of

material which would first compromise a source

of information, whether that be a citizen,

a government, or an informant. The confiden-

tiality of the work done by the FBI is an

extremely important thing. Names are not just

all that reveal the identity. It may

be that certain circumstances, when revealed, may

pinpoint what might be the source of

information.

There might be also too great

a proliferation of information about some activity

of the FBI.

For example, we have, of course, warrantless

wiretaps.

We feel that there should be

confidentiality of that. These have been

authorized through the approval of the President

through the Attorney General's delegated

authority in this regara.

I would say generally

that if there be a reasonable basis whereby we

can explain that

it should be maintained confidential

that it be so maintained. On the other hand, we

should extend ourselves in the spirit of

-5 -

NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 256

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## Page 257

QUESTION:

cooperation to inform and to report on measures,

and if they want a review that we extend

ourselves to let them make such review.

You have been able to reduce your domestic

intelligence investigations by 64 percent

since July, 1973. Can you tell us how you have

done that?

MR. KELLEY: By a review that we started in mid-1973 looking

over the

bases for our investigatory needs and

our intelligence operations, and generally to

take an inventory and say which should we

continue, which should we now perhaps give

additional emphasis, and we culled out, in

other words, those

which we did not feel were strictly

productive insofar as meeting our commitments.

QUESTION:

Did you find that you eliminated some of those,

Kelley, because they were illegal, in

retrospect, as you look back and decided

that the FBI should not, as

a law enforcement agency,

should not engage in illegal practices in investigations?

MR. KELLEY:

You know, when you speak of illegality, we have

great difficulty. Sometimes, in the context of

the time, you may open matters which later are

determined to be perhaps possible civil rights

investigations, invasions of privacy, or other

background objections.

I do not know of any

which, I would say, were actually illegal. I

just do not recall

classification.

any that would meet that

QUESTION:

Were some eliminated because they may have

been borderline, and in retrospect in numerality,

you decided not to go ahead?

MR. KELLEY: I would say that that is a possibility: Ir

a strict classification or interpretation

they may be termed an invasion of privacy

or rights or something of that type.

QUESTION:

Were most of them eliminated because

you felt they were not productive, and to

use a phrase, they were not really cost-effective,

for the amount of energy and effort put into

them? They would not have paid off?

-6 -

NW 65994 Docid:32989494 Page 257

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## Page 258

MR. KELLEY: I would say that those would be

two great and

major reasons.

QUESTION:

With the workload declining 64 percent, has

there been any decline at all in manpower?

Have you shifted manpower to other Division--

..person power, excuse me; man or womanpower--

nave vou shifted it to other divisions:

MR. KELLEY:

There has been some shifting; much of our

so-called overload of manpower or investigative

attention by this Division has been picked up

by the terroristic activities investigations.

Of

course, we have had a great rise in that: doubled

each year. And, strangely enough, during 1975, it

even increased more than that.

We had more

terrorist-type of bombings in 1975 than we

had in 1974.

QUESTION:

You mentioned the burden that has been placed

I presume that

there is not any question that the cIA could

rightfully maintain that a tremendous burden

has placed on it by the Congress

nOW.

I think, in retrospect and in fairness, a part

of the burden is unfair, unwarranted, and not

cost-effective.

But a

large part of

the burden is

placed simply because we have recognized that we failed

the American people in the past, and no one has

more clearly admitted this than

the Majority

leader of the Senate, Senator Mansfield, in his

opening

statements before the committee.

So

that we have to rectify that. We may overkill,

in a sense.

I hope we will not. I hope that we will

go a prudent, moderate path and not overreact

to the situation.

But a large part of that

burden is because we simply did not perform the

function in the past and the American people

know it, they are holding us accountable for

that.

I wonder if you could for the record,

however, just give us a sense of your own

personal burden, which worries me, both about

he Director of the CIA and the Director of the FBI.

How much of your personal time, since you have

assumed office, do you think you have devoted

to preparing for, giving testimony before

Congressional Committees, and then following ur

on the testimony that has been given, or looking

at the

• testimony being given by others?

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NW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 258

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## Page 259

MR. KELLEY:

I would say that about 25 percent of my time

is consumed in going over testimony, reviewing

material, acquainting myself with the progress

of the various committee activities, in pre-

paring myself for testimony, and in

testifying;

and I think that the others in the top echelon

of the Bureau who are involved in this type of

thing may have even more than this devoted in

their time. It has increased my work day

considerably, and I find myself many times

reading until

the wee hours of the morning.

I am not complaining about it.

I assumed this.

Much more time is devoted to doing my job

now than ever before, again, about 25 percent

of that time is in this area.

SENATOR:

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Are we going for

one more round of questions?

MR. CHAIRMAN: If there are more questions.

SENATOR:

I have just a few left. I would like an

answer to how much time you think is appro-

priate for you to spend on this activity,

I will wait until we come back.

QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR BROCK

QUESTION:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you clarify for

me something you said earlier. With regard to the

oversight function, I thought that you said that the

oversight should include all FBI activities. If that

is the case, you might be in some disagreement, with

those that say we should separate the oversight

of the domestic operations, primarily FBI, from

the international oversight function which

would

more relate to CIA.

MR. KELLEY: 75 percent to 80 percent of our time is on criminal

activities. There is, on the other hand, a

great interrelationship between our security

people and our criminal investigations.

We may

have a case where

we need additional

people in a security matter. We will call on

some people in the criminal activity section.

It is true, on the other hand, we will have

a big bank robbery or some big fugitive case.

We may call on security people and have them

do it.

We have difficulty in setting aside

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## Page 260

that portion of our budget which

goes solely

to the so-called intelligence activities.

In

the area of intelligence, we have quite a bit

of work in the intelligence field in the

criminal work.

We would suggest that it not

be fragmented, and would hope that we could

present all of our difficulties to one committee.

I realize that there is the thought that this

thrust should be just toward security matters

foreign and domestic. We have problems other

than this. I can see where it would be very

helpful to us to have an overall oversight

which would take care of both of our branches

QUESTION:

The reason I asked the question, there has

been at least some indication among members

of the Senate, that they would like--at least some

members would

like--to separate the intelligence

from the criminal aspect, and give the oversight

committee which this committee might create,

jurisdiction over all intelligence, counterintelligence,

domestically and international intelligence but to

leave to the Judicial Committee, the principal

oversight responsibility for the FBI. I gather

that you would not find that a very happy end product?

MR. KELLEY: We report to the Appropriations Committee, and

they outline our programs.

Under this possibility

we would be reporting to an Intelligence

Committee, we would be reporting to the Senate

Judiciary Committee on general oversight.

Right away we have three within the Senate.

QUESTION:

If we did give this committee full and complete

jurisdiction, would you also suggest that they

have jurisdiction in terms of appropriations

as well?

In other words, you would limit the

oversight to one committee. It would have

both authorization oversight and appropriation

authority.

MR. KELLEY:

Senator, I am not really prepared to give you

an opinion on that. I would say that probably

this should be reserved to the Attorney General.

Personally, of course, it would probably give

us a closer definition of oversight and might

be that such a committee certainly could

become best acquainted with our work in ongoing

programs, but I do not know that I can answer

well that particular question.

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• QUESTION:

I am

not sure that we can either

As a matter of

fact, there are some of us that feel that rather

than

trying to define this thing too precisely,

we should create an oversight committee and

assign to them the responsibility of a study

of the extent of the jurisdictional question.

That may be the best thing that we can

achieve at the moment if we are going to get

any response.

two more questions, again in this same area,

I am reluctant to limit the right of an Over-

sight Committee in terms of access.

I think

that is almost something that we can do by

experience, as we have with the Joint Committee •

on Atomic Energy. There the experience has

proven to be good, and I think, healthy for both

sides, Executive and Legislative. I am distressed

by the leak of information that is ongoing now.

I think it is extremely dangerous yet I

find it difficult to find a way in which we

would limit an oversight committee which may

need some access in order to reach this

definition of responsibility. I do not

know how we would do what you are suggesting,

essentially depends upon the Director and

his testimony before the Committee.

MR. KELLEY:

Under our recommendations, we conclude that there

should be investigations and clearances granted to

members of staff, that their numbers, as well as

others for the Committee, should be as limited

as possible. We feel that matters that might

compromise our sources of information are those

that are most important. I think, Senator,

that probably we could start off in such a rela-

tionship being a little extended insofar as

our own

desires, we can be a little more

open, and see how it works. I would hope that

it would be sort of an open-end type of thing so that

we can get some history of experiences. I

would he thing so that

do not want to foreclose the right of review in this

I think, as a citizen, I am compelled to

say that there should be a better flow of infor-

mation than has been true in the past. I am

willing to at least explore such a possibility.

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QUESTION:

That is

really what I am reaching

for, and

I

appreciate it. We are treating this as if it is

going to be de novo every six months.

It is not.

You are going to create an expertise in this

Committee and its staff a knowledge of the general

problem area, and I think these matters will begin

as it gains maturity and experience.

I am reluctant to eliminate it now because

I think

we may

create an adversary relationship which I do

not think is helpful, where, as an alternative, if

we kept it fairly open, I think a development of that

experience would lead to a good relationship, as we

have done with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

earlier.

MR. KELLEY: There are misunderstandings about why we

think things

are confidential.

Take for

example, a small thing, a release of our telephone

directory.

It is not generally understood that,

by virtue of the release of the telephone directory,

you therefore list the identity of our Agents.

They are listed in the telephone book.

There-

after, they get a lot of crank calls. I

never did release my address, and as soon as

it was listed--and it was listed of course in

the Congressional Record--I am not complaining

about this--I started receiving crank mail

at my home and some of it was on post cards,

some of it my wife read, it was not the

best thing.

People do not realize that we

try to protect it for reasons that we could

possibly explain in an atmosphere of cooperation

with such a committee, and I would look forward to

that opportunity.

We have not communicated

properly, possibly. If it is determined this is

too far fetched, all right, we will drop it. We are

willing to discuss it.

QUESTION:

Thank you. My time has expired. I think what I am

that there is a clear distinction between

a one-shot investigatory committee which is trying

to get short-term information and a continuing over-

sight committee with a developed relationship on a

maturing basis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Senator Weicker, while it is your turn, since

Senator Percy has used up his time, he has

requested a few more minutes, if you would yield

to him.

WEICKER:

I yield.

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QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR PERCY

QUESTION:

Regretfully, I have a witness upstairs in the

Foreign Relations Committee. I was anxious to

follow up, Mr. Kelley, what proportion of your

time do you think is appropriate and proper that

you should devote to Congressional oversight? In

other words, we have the same objective to reduce

the burden on your Department because of the

duplicative activities of the proliferated committees.

What proportion do you think is appropriate for you

to spend?

MR. KELLEY:

I have never really considered it, but I would

say that during my ordinary, everyday operations,

I should keep this in mind and should review

each program with the thought prepared to

discuss it with an oversight committee, maybe

QUESTION:

That is a goal I am not sure we will ever

achieve but certainly if we can cut if in half,

it will help, because your principal duty

obviously is

• to administer a

very able department

and agency. The thought has been orbited--I threw

it out originally--to just try to cut in half

in area of intelligence because of the tremen-

dous amount of knowledge a person has to gain to

properly authorize in authorizing legislation, and

yet the law--and we are not specialists in this field;

we are dealing with specialists in the law enforcement

field--to cut it in half to see if possibly we can

consider in this one oversight committee, giving that

committee both authorization and appropriations

authority so the service would only have to go before

one committee in the Senate and one in the House and

have his job done with and thoroughly inform, say,

a group of nine Senators that would rotate in that

position. Would that, in your judgement, be of

material assistance and help if we could work it out

MR. KELLEY:

If we could, Senator, in one committee, I feel this

would be advantageous.

QUESTION:

I have long proposed that the Attorney General be

procedure or precedent

State, has not participated

in politics as such. The Attorney General has

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## Page 264

MR. KELLEY:

been a politically oriented office, many times

being the campaign manager. Do you feed that

the Director of the FBI is

not a political

position and it should never be permitted--do you

think it would be a good idea for the Attorney

General not to engage in party politics while he

is holding that office?

I have never had experience with it

since I have come here, in any dealings with

me or with the Bureau by the three Attorneys

General under whom I have worked. There has been

no indication of political influence.

QUESTION:

Do you suggest consolidation of Congressional

oversight of the FBI. Should that be done by

the same committee overseeing agencies dealing

with foreign intelligence in your judgment?

MR. KELLEY:

In my judgment, all of the operations of the FBI

would advantageously be joined in one committee.

QUESTION:

One committee?

MR. KELLEY: Yes, sir.

QUESTION:

Could you explain in layman's term the difference

between foreign and domestic intelligence in

criminal cases as managed administratively by

the FBI?

And I ask that with the understanding

that criminal activities involving foreign powers

are not necessarily handled in the FBI's foreign

intelligence division. For example, if another

country were to finance terrorist acts within

the United States, the entire case might be

handled in the Criminal Division.

Therefore, it

would help us in our understanding if you could

differentiate between what activities are handled

by each of those bureaus.

If you would like to

do that for the record, to make it more complete,

I would certainly accept that.

MR. KELLEY: I would prefer to prepare this in a response to you

and will do so.

QUESTION:

Mr. Kelley, finally, FBI activities seem to be at

the heart of one of the gray areas of oversight.

*one dy the gay

I think we are in general agreement that Congress

should create a committee that would oversee the

CIA and NSA. What aspects of the FBI that should

be looked at by this committee is another matter.

What are your views on this?

MR. KELLEY: Could I also give you that response--may I respond

to that in writing also?

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SENATOR:

Yes,

you certainly may. I think

hat that winds

up.

I would simply like to say having known

Attorney General Levi for a quarter of a century

as a trustee at the University of Chicago, I

think the tone and attitude that he is establishing,

the relationship that he has established with you

and which has been a cause of great concern between

the FBI Directors of the past have not been fully

satisfactory and fully cooperative.

I think that relationship that has been estab-

lished has been an outstanding accomplishment,

and I think your testimony to that effect here

is very important indeed, and I certainly

commend both you and Attorney General Levi, because

a great deal has been accomplished already.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Senator Weicker?

SENATOR:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR WEICKER

QUESTION:

I notice in your statement you make mention

of the fact that since 1975, or April through

December, 1975, a great amount of time, effort,

and money was expended on responding to

Congressional inquiries, et cetera.

I think we

both might also allude to the fact that that

is directly attributable to the fact that there

was no Congressional inquiry for many years before

that, and what in effect you have seen is an extreme

reaction to an extreme situation. As a matter of

fact,

as I understand it, and prior to the impeach-

ment inquiry neither the

House nor the Senate Judiciary

Committees held any hearings on FBI oversight. Is

that correct, to your knowledge?

MR. KELLEY: I do not recall this, Senator.

QUESTION:

I believe that was before your time, but that is

the record.

MR. KELLEY: I am thinking only during the time that I have

been here. I do not recall just when we first

reported to the Oversight Committee. It was

during the time that Mr. Saxbe was Attorney General.

We appeared three times. Prior to that I do not

know.

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" QUESTION:

I think it is important to point

out that I am

sure the American people are just as appalled

about your being overburdened with Congressional

inquiries as they are with no Congressional

inquiries.

But that is the record. There is nothing

in between. I think that is important to point

out as we try to devise some system, some apparatus,

to bring balance to all this.

We need the FBI.

AS

I said the other day, we need a CIA.

There is no

reason why a choice

has to be made between 0 and 100

percent insofar as it is using up your time,

the CIA or any of our law enforcement agencies.

My concern, believe me, Director, is not that

you are going to be overburdened

with oversight.

As I have indicated, unless this Congress acts

very shortly, the whole thing is going to be

forgotten and we are going to go back to zero

again.

That is a far greater danger in my

book than your being overburdened. I would

suggest to you, it is very strange to say, that

I would hope that you, along with Mr. Colby and

others in the law enforcement community, would

fight very hard to see this oversight legislation

implemented, because on that depends the survival

of your agency, on that depends a restoration of

confidence as far as the American people are

concerned in the law enforcement and intelligence

agencies.

I fear the bureaucratic footdragging

is going

to go on around here two years, five

years from now. We will be right back at square

A, except the next time that any other abuses

"next time

get uncovered, that is going to be the end of

your agency.

There is going to be no way of coming

back in the

room to construct something that

makes sense. That is my concern.

MR. KELLEY: I went on record during my confirmation sponsoring

oversight, and I still feel that it is a very viable

and proper precedure. I have no objection to it

whatsoever, and I welcome it.

QUESTION:

I notice you say you favor a new oversight

committee. Is it your feeling that the present

oversight mechanisms are not adequate?

MR. KELLEY: I hope I have not

indicated that I am critical of

the present oversight. I hope that we can have

a centralized oversight whereby our intelligence

and our criminal investigatory responsibilities

are best included in this one.

Under the projected

possibilities, the Bureau would be fragmented,

e the nation an

we would have an oversight of the security

of the national counterintelligence field and

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## Page 267

QUESTION:

the criminal field maintained in

the present

oversight system.

I would hope that it would

be together.

We

do report to the Appropriations

Committee and we do report to the Judiciary

Committee on Oversight. If it were fragmented

further, we would have three oversight committees.

Do you feel that the present system of oversight

as embodied in the House and Senate Judiciary

tha the e pec

Committees should be supplanted by a new Oversight

Committee, or are you satisfied with the present

system?

MR. KELLEY: I would reserve the final determination to

consultation as I would want to do, of course,

with Mr. Levi to get together and do this.

I

would say, primarily, our goal is to have

it centered not in any particular committee.

I think that is the responsibility of Congress, actually.

What we want

to do is not fragment it, not

proliferate it, but to have it so that we can

have one group to which we can go for considera-

tion of our problems and outline our procedures.

QUESTION:

I can appreciate, Mr. Director, that

you still have to work with the Senate and House

Judiciary Committees and obviously we don't

want to ruffle any feathers. We want to

plot a future course.

We are not trying to

find out how we can live with the past.

The

difficulty is, as I perceive it, not that the

mechanism was not there for oversight--it was

there.

The problem was that it was a secondary

function of the particular committee, in this

case the Judiciary Committee, something

down the line. Do you feel that your agency and its

activities are of sufficient importance that

that should be a full-time job, rather than a

secondary job, for a Congressional committee?

MR. KELLEY: I responded to a question asked by Senator

Percy about how much time I thought I might be

devoting to the oversight requirement. I

thought about 5 percent.

That is just a

ballpark figure. I do not think that that would

necessarily mean that one committee would

be set aside for just that type of deliberation.

I think that if it were to include all of our

activities, criminal as well as security, that it

might take

a little more, but still, I do not

think that things come up that frequently

where it would be a real heavy task for any

committee.

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* QUESTION:

You understand what we are contemplating here

would be a committee whose intention would

be directed toward the FBI, the CIA, the law

enforcement intelligence community?

It

would not just be the FBI; it would also be the CIA.

What I am saying, I think what others are trying

to get across is, is this sufficiently important

to this Nation, to its life and to its Constitution,

that that is a full-time job and not a secondary

job for some other Committee, be it the FBI which

is a secondary function of Judiciary, or the CIA,

which is a secondary function of Armed Services.

This is a primary function. At least, I do not

find it a primary function of law enforcement

intelligence.

That is why my question to you, whether

you are satisfied with the present system, which

obviously has not worked in the past, with a warning

could work, or whether we are best just having one

committee that would work with these law enforcement

intelligence agencies and start from scratch and once

again try to rebuild confidence.

It really does not make any difference what you think

or what I think or what Senator Ribicoff thinks or

our colleagues here think.

The fact is that the

American people have lost their confidence.

That is

the group we have to reach.

Whether I am satisfied

that you are a fine man with great integrity

and a fine Director, it does not mean anything,

and your opinion of me, that is not important.

What the American people think is what is very

important.

That is what is jeopardizing your

Agency now and, indeed, the Congress.

MR. KELLEY: I would construe anything which is developed

by Congress as something which we would certainly

try to work under.

We will not complain.

You will not have any beefs from us. I told

Senator Brock that I would certainly work as best

we can with the system that is devised. I repeat

that to you, too.

I am not going to argue about

it. I would like to work with you just as closely

as we can.

QUESTION:

I appreciate it.

I am not trying to lay all of

this at your doorstep.

I think Senators Brock

and Ribicoff were talking earlier, we were talking

earlier, I was talking earlier with Senator Brock,

we are going to try to pry these things loose

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## Page 269

in the Congress.

They are the owes that do

not want any change.

That is why I am trying to

get all the help we can publicly. Please

understand what I think all of us here are

saying.

We are not against your agency. We

want to see it survive, but it cannot survive

unless the American

people feel that they

have a handle on this policy. Thank you.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Senator Nunn?

SENATOR:

I have no questions.

CHAIRMAN: Senator Brock, do you have any more questions?

SENATOR:

CHAIRMAN:

NO.

Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. It may

very will be, as we proceed to mark up this

legislation, that we

may have occasion to talk

to you and your staff.

I would hope that you

would be available to

us in the

future.

MR. KELLEY:

We will be available.

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## Page 270

0-9 Rev. 2-14-74)

F BI

Airtel

Transmit in

- --

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via

TO :

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

(Precedence)

2-20-76

(Date)

-

(This line for LEFT MARGIN.)

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

U.S. SENATE, JANUARY 26, 1976

Enclosed for your information is one copy of

the statement I delivered before the Committee on

Government Operations of the U. S. Senate on January 26,

1976, as well as a transcript of the question-and-answer

The latter can be used in answering

inquiries from newsmen and others but should not be fur-

nished to any outsider.

The enclosed material may be of assistance to

you in responding to inquiries you may receive from the

public or the press.

(Do

not

BEYOND

THIS MARGIN.)

Enclosures (2)

1 - All Field Offices - Enclosures (2)

1 - Each Legat - Enclosures (2)

(Do not type below this line.)

Supr AND

SRI.

Sect 5/15176

62-2368-23

SEARCHED

MAR 5. 1976

INW 65994 Docld:32989494 Page 270

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