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Date

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06/25/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY :

NSC

RECORD NUMBER

145-10001-10182

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 111

===

Feleased under the John

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 0SC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

BRIG. GEN. LANSDALE

TO

TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT

DATE : 01/18/62

PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS : PROGRAM REVIEW

PLANS TO ASSIST CUBANS IN OVERTHROWING THE COMMUNITS

REGIME AND INSITUTE A NEW GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS 1C, 4

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/25/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

MOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

RECES CONCURRENCE Of

DATE:

MAR

-—

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Program Review by

Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale,

Chief of Operations

18 January 1962

THE CUBA PROJECT

I.: OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist

regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the

United States can live in peace.

I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban

people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute

a new governmeat with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement

established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-

wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The

political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure

of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological

operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime,

and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for

sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S. - sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook

the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-

ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against

the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American

countries: Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny

imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the

Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to

defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an

anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement

within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially:

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization

in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal

communications, its own voice for psychological operations; and its own

action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have

the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this

fact known to the outside world.. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans

aro, nat for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what

appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic morant of revolt Will some froni an angry reaction of

the people to a goverament action (sparked by an incident), or from a

fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both: (A major

goal of the Project must be to bring thia about.) The popular movement

Excluded from Autornatic

regrading:: DOD Dir,

5200.10 does not apply

maid document contains.

Copy No.

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will capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt.

Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will

appeal for help to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The

United States, if possible in concert with other Western Hemisphere

nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoples' revolt. Such

support will include military force,

as necessary

Іп.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation

re Cuba.

The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61) of 28 November

1961 contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition

ito its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the

planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April,

The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based

on the hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence.

community: A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba),

due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February.

It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to

start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on

which to base firm estimates and operations.

IV. INITLAL PHASE

(30 Nov 61 - 18 Jan 62)

A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project.

Status: . The President's directive of 30 November 1961 was imple-

mented by creating a U.S. Operations team, with Brig. Gen. Landale

as Chief of Operations, and with tasks promptly assigned. His immedi-

ate staff are Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secre-

taries and Agency Directors are:

State

- Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch)

CLA

- Helms

Defense - Brig. Gen. Craig

USIA: Wilson

B. Intelligence Support

Status:, CLA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate

Cuban refugees in the USA (1, 700 - 2, 000 arriving per month) and on

16. January approved a program increasing the staff at the Opa Locka

Interrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 people to 34. CLA will

build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very

limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). , Special intelli-

gence assets will be exploited more fully. The Cuba project needs far

more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CIA will

require further assistance from Defense and other U.S. organizations

in this intelligence effort, and'is submitting specific qualifications for

personnel on 19 January.

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C. Political platform for peoples' movement inside Cuba.

Status: State has sketched in a broad outline. CLA is to produce

the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will

operate inside Cuba are willing to risk their lives, and upon which

popular support can be generated.

D. Nucleus for popular movement

To date, CIA has been unable to produce the necessary

political action agents for this purpose. Upon re-évaluation of its

capabilities, CIA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight

to ten Cuban political action agents by 15 February, from among

Cubans available in the United States.

The minimum need for the

Project to be effective is 30 such political action Cubans and CIA is

tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S.

and Caribbean area.

E. Deployment of nucleus

Status: CIA is tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba where

political action groups can be established., Initial selection and plang

for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana,

and localities in the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive

priority consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on

this must be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acquired.

F. Diplomatic actions

Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign

Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide. Western Hemis

phere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it

from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer

OAS relief directly to'the suffering Cuban people (similar to U.S.

relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being considered, as a means to reach

the Cuban people sympathetically without going through their Com-

munist government.

The OAS meeting is to be supported by public

demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CLA, and a psycho-

logical campaign assisted by USA:

The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin

American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Pro:

ject, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist

regime. This is yet to be initiated by State and must be vigorously pressed.

G.

Economic warfare

Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the

planning stage under State leadership. State is basing future economic

actions, including plans for an embárgo on Cuban trade, on the outcome

of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic

action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions. 15 February is set for

a report on implementing plans, so that actions can be initiated. CLA was

unable to undertake action to sabotage the sugar harvest, which commences

about 15 January, and upon which Cuba's one-crop sugar economy depends.

(Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking and cane fields was explored. )

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H. TV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts

has been reactivated on a small vessel under CLA control. CLA plans to

attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and

parade demonstrations.

I. Special sabotage support

State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility

of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship-

ments to Cuba are carried in Western Bottoms).

CLA has initiated

action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible resultr

(otoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962 NCIA

ip intoducing Labnel.

We acditive, to Cubin locomative

Cienel fuel oil through commercial suppliere in Belgiun. le wall pe

months before the orat locoiaotives prete down, Cue orpecta to be aule

o bave at least one agent recruited by 28 february to attempt introduce

on of a corrosive additive to jet fuel otorage tanka in Cube

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan

for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help

when their reyolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will

permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions,

and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a

people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense

also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments

of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities

(with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations

inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particulacly

operations torough the Church to resch the ween and farmilies.

arough Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements inctude

enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration

is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts.

This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when ClA can

put it into place.

L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there bas been a

period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required

clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up."

After this second look, CLA has concluded that its realistic role should be

to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support

for. it, to improve CLA operational capability, and to help create a climate

which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action.

This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of

the Cuba project's goals. CLA must take yet another hard look at its

potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine

if it cannot make the greater effort required.

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V. TARGET SCHEDULE

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made

an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CLA

with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsew

Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points

Mencie

eis yand on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such

source points. 15 February target date.

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets,

with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-

ruary. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country

sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by l February for defection of top Cuban

government officials, to fracture the regime from within.

This effort

must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to

be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our

political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CLA

project.

Task 6: CLA to complete plans by l February for Cover and Decep-

tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense,

State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for

initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities

selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltra-

tion, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must

deal with the "underground, " assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S.

Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local

sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the

Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this

assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational

assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments

or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's

goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the

Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals.

objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such

as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

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C.

Economic

Task 11: State to prepare recommendations to the President on

U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (If the minimum

result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accom-

plice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that

Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere,

State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade

between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.)

Task 12: State to plan, with Commerce and other U.S. agencies,

on how to halt the diversion of vital items in the Cuban trade. Due

date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly

Canada and Mexico, is to be explored by State.

Task 13: State, with Commerce and others involved, to plan on

how to make "positive list" items to Latin America be subject to the

same licensing procedures as applied to such shipments to other

parts of the free world. Due 15 February.

Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend

present export controle of technical data (petrochemical, communi-

cations equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-

Soviet Bloc. Due 15 February•

Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendations on

issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense

Production Act of 1950 forbidding U.S. -owned vessels to engage in

trade with Cuba.

Task 16: State plan due by 15 February on feasible extension of

U.S. port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter

vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on this).

Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harass-

ing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (statedly for

security reasons), if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports.

Task 18: ClA-to report on possibility of cooperation of AF'I-CIC

fur the tate Prational Transport Federation to refuse to handle cargo

for or trom Cuba. Due by e rebruasy.?

Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for

obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade

Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call

at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.)

Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain

the discreet cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the

National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having

subsidaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions.

(Commerce to assist on this.)

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Task 21: CIA to submit plan by 15 February for inducing failures

in food crops in Cuba: Capability lo

sabotage of rice, for instance

a available, timing in lae problem.

Task 22: State to report by 15 February on status of plans to

gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum,

as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps

to isolate Cuba from the West.

16

Task 23: State to report by 15 February on status of actions under-

taken with Japan, which has comparatively significant trade with Cuba,

along lines similar to those with NATO nations.

Task 24: CIA to submit plan by 15 February on disruption of the

supply of Cuban nickel to the Soviet Union. It will apsettically con

does bow so block the Soviets (rora re-opetung tueir supply of rackel

Mord Canadio Canadian contract was te

Gated when the Cubar

supply became available to the Soviets.

6(1)(c)

16

D. Psychological

Task 25: USIA to submit plan by 15 February for the most

effective psychological exploitation of actions undertaken in the

Project, towards the end result of awakening world sympathy for

the Cuban people (as a David) battling against the Communist regime

(as a Goliath) and towards stimulating Cubans inside Cuba to join "the

cause. "

Task 26: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule

for a psychological campaign to provoke a relaxing of police state

control within Cuba. This is to include effective means of publicly

indicting "people's criminals" for justice after liberation of Cuba

(not only individual top officials, but members of the Vigilancia, etc.).

Task 27: CIA and USIA will report on progress as of 15 February

in developing identification of the popular movement inside Cuba, as

with songs, symbols, propaganda themes.

Task 28: By 15 February CLA will report on plans and actions

for propaganda support of the popular movement inside Cuba. Included

will be exactly what is planned for use by the movement inside Cuba,

and feasibility of using smuggled food packets (such as the "I Shall

Return" cigarette packets to Philippine guerrillas in World War II)

as morale boosters in generating the popular movement.

E. Military Action

Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S.

military force to support the Cuban popular movement, including a

statement of conditions under which Defense believes such action would

_be required to win the Project's goal and believes such action would not

1401/212

necessarily lead te general war. Due 28 February,

- 14

Task 30: CLA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule

for sabotage actions inside Cuba, including timing proposed for the

actions and how they effect the generation and support of a popular

movement, to achieve the Project goals.

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Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required

support by Defense as early as possible after its plans firm up. Requests,

for all major needs are expected by 23 February.

Task 32: Defense will submit plan for "special operations" use of

Cubans enlisted in the U.S. armed forces. Due 28 February.

VI. FUTURE PLANS

By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for

individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to!

permit a firm time-table to be constructed. Since the President directed

that the Chief of Operations conduct the Project through the appropriate

organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S.

organizations are mainly in the initial inventory and development of

capabilities phase concerning assigned tasks, a precise operations time -

table as of today would be too speculative to be useful.

CIA has alerted Defense that it will require considerable military

support (including two submarines, PT boats, Coast Guard type cutters,

Special Forces trainers, C-54 aircraft, F-86 aircraft, amphibian air-

craft, belio-couriers, Army leaflet battalion, and Guantanamo as a base

for submarine operations):

Also, CIA apparently believes that its role

should be to create and expand a popular movement, illusory and actual,

wbich will create a political climate which can provide a framework of

plausible excuse for armed intervention. This is not in conformity with

the Presidential directive now governing Projecttasking. Actually, the

role of creating the political climate and plausible excuse for armed

intervention would be more properly that of State and Defense, if such

an objective becomes desirable:

1964-314

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Distribution:

Copy No.

¡ 1.

The President

20.

The Attorney General

3.:

The Military Assistant to the President, General Taylor

4.

The Secretary of State (and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson)

5. The Secretary of Defense (and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)

6..

The Director, Central Intelligence

7.

The Director, USIA

8. : =

The Department of State Project Officer, Assistant Secretary

Woodward and Mr. Hurwitch

9. " The Department of Defense Project Officer, Brig. Gen: Craig,

(who will inform the Chairman, JCS)

10. The CIA Project Officer, Mr. Helms

1. - The USA Project Officer, Deputy Director Wilson

12-14 - Brig. Gen. Lansdale

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