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Date

: 07/08/98

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1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10205

278

Released under

the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Aet of 1992

$44 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10=04-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE : G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

DATE: 03/00/62

PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS : ACTIVITY,

PURPOSE, CONSIDERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/24/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF DEJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE:

MAR

2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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ACTIVITE

Special Operations Room fully

activated, by 1 March 1962

2. Caribbean Admission Center,

Opa -Locka, Florida, fully

activated by 15 March 1962.

Develop additional Interrogation

centers in other areas, during

March 1962.

Expand special intelligence and

other sensitive intelligence cover-

age, as required.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE.

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To provide the Chief of Operations and

the project team with current intelligence

and daily developments.

To provide top

U.S. officials with status briefings, as

useful.

To collect intelligence reguired for the

operations, to identify and earmark

assets as refugees arrive, and to pro-

Vide security against Communist agent

operations.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmos-

phere, at different levels than now seem

possible in the continental U.S., to spot

additional assets for the operation, and

to provide security against Communist

agent operations.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

CONSIDERATIONS

A maximum security room for this project

will be maintained in the inner JCS security

area of the Pentagon. (Defense responsi

bility, with support by ClA and others as

required.)

This operation, in response to early recom-

mendation as essential by the Chief of Opera-

tions, is moving at utmost speed to become

fully active by 15 March, with a new building

completed and occupied, and with a staff of

42 at work. The staff is now being increased

in phases, as quickly as personnel are train

ed, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA

responsibility, with support by Defense,

Justice, State, USIA.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, as

first priority, CLA must survey means and

methods for activating other interrogation

centers where useful.

Puerto Rick, Spain

sur vene an eho center cluded in activated

survey.

as quickly as feasible. (CIA responsibility,

with support by Defense and others as

necessary.)

(Defense responsibility, in collaboration with

CIA. )

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ACTIVITY

5. *Develop intelligence potential of

Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

Develop the means of the Inter-

Américan Defense Board to pro-

vide substantive intelligence on

Cuban activities.

Periodic intelligence estimates, as

required by progress of operations.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

(cont. )

PURPOSE

To exploit the intelligence possibilities

of former residents of Cuba (including

U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

To add to the increased U.S. intelligence

coverage on Cuba and to strengthen the

concern of Latin American states for

security.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current

estimates can be considered at national

policy levels.

CONSIDERATIONS

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C

and other U.S. cities which are "little.

Cubas.". Family, Church, and business

interests provoke unusual personal ties

inside Cuba for some of these residents;

a real potential exists for collection of :

intelligence not otherwise available.

(Justice/FBI responsibility, with support

from CIA and others as required.)

(Responsibility of Defense, with support

by others as required.)

As the operations develop, there will be;

both increased intelligence collection and

a need for as current an Intelligence Esti:

mate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.

It is likely that a more informal method of

producing an Intelligence Estimate for use

at the national level (than now governing the

-issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed.

(CIA responsibility, with support of others

as reguired.)

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