CLOSE-IN SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA
Agency: ARMY
Originator: ARMY
From: M. DAVIS
To: MR
Document date: 12/00/1963
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/24/201

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER:

198-10007-10076

RECORD SERIES:

CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Released under the John

Assassination Records

collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Cased:NT 54214 Date:

09-12-2017

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

ARMY

M. DAVIS

MR

CLOSE-IN SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA

DATE:

PAGES:

12/00/1963

13

SUBJECTS :

SURVEILLANCE - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Califano Papers. Memo enclosing documents re: close-in surveillance of Cuba.

NO JOINT STAFF OSJECTIONI

TO DECLASSIFICATION

DATE:

MAR 2016

JFK RavioN

Department of the Army EO 13526

I Declassily Exclude

• Exempt

Authority.

Refer To —

Review Date 19 AUG/S By Wilug Catho

NO STATE OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

BY ML DATE 01/18/16

19.1

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

MR: The attached papers were

removed from the Secretary's

briefing book prepared for the

NSC Standing Group meeting on

19. December 1963.

No receipt

was given to OSA.

M. Davis

HH 54214 DocId: 32424069

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Ze Surrellai

-0

Serial 0001031P60

Spen

TOP SECR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Close-in Surveillance of Cuba (TS)

Incl:

(1) Perimeter Patrol Plan

(2) Legal Aspects

(3)

Cuban Maritime Activities

(44)

Cuban Aircraft Capable of Participating in

Arms Traffic

(5) Rules of Engagement

1. A study has been made to indicate U. $. Navy capa-

bilities to conduct a close-in surveillance of Cuban

shipping to Latin American countriee.

The operational

concept adopted for this study is a coordinated surface

and air perimeter patro, enclosure (1), to detect ship-

ping from Cuba to latin American countries.

This plan

would be implemented to establish surveillance, and also

provide for stronger measures, ultimately including

visit and search,

the legal aspects

it directed. Enclosure (2) outlines

pertinent to this operation:

2.

A wide range of craft (boats, ships, aircraft, sub-

marines) can be employed for shipment of contraband.

Enclosure (3) is the intelligence estimate of shipping

activity in Cuban waters.

Enclosure (4) lists Cuban

aircraft capable of transporting arms.

Forces required would be as follows:

a. Close-in surveillance.

1 HUK Group (1 CVS, 7 DD)

1 DESRON (7 DD)

1

VPRON at

• Roosevelt Roads (Puerto Rico)

1

VPRON at

• Key West

1 Oiler

b.

To establish an air surveillance and identifica-

tion capability, forces of the magnitude of one AlW and

one fighter aircraft squadron would be required.

Copy 2 of 6 copies. Page 1 of 2 pages:

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SEC

The forces in paragraph 3.a.; above, would provide

excellent detection of shipping

outbound from cuba to

Latin America.

Their capabilities for visiting and

searching, trailing, and harassment would be limited,;

but could be improved, if shipping patterns were estab-

lished.

Rules of engagement are contained in enclosure (5).

5.

In summary, the concept presented in this study would

be most eitective, It visit and search were authorized.

Tracking and trailing

of all suspected arms carriers would

be difficult, if not impossible.

However, tracking and

trailing could be undertaken on

a selective

basis.

forces listed in paragraph 3.a, above, would be adequate

over the short term.

For long term operations a much

larger force would become involved.

Page 2 of 2 pages.

STORET

SECRET

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80

90

-SECRET

SECHSACOLA

KEY

- WEST

•...

MSO

DD

CVS

FAIR PAT.

SURF.

PAT.

ENCIOSURE (1) IO SELNAV ETR SER 0001031F60

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SEER

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legal Background for Imposition of Close-In

Maritime Surveillance

of Cuba

Actions which do not incur legal consequences

A. Following suspected ships

B. Approaching suspected ships

c. Illuminating suspected ships at night

Broadcasting locations. course.

and

speed of suspected

ships.

Il. Actions which require a legal basis

A. Stopping and/or diverting

B. Boarding

C. Search

D. Siezure of ship, cargo, or passengers

F. Detention

of ship

TUl. legal Bases and availability

A.

Rio Treaty -Art.

ITT - Collective defense against

aggression.

Requires decision be nas. organ of Consultation.

nAs council ran be so constituins, but Mill is tentatively

scheduled

for April 1964 in

Quito.

international law does

not

require that

the first how be struck by an aggressor

before measures of force in sell defense may be employed.

B .

Resolution I.

L. DAS. Punta del Este,

Tanuary

1962

- Urges MAS member states

in take appropriate steps in

individual or collective self-detense aggression,

subversion.

or other dangers. to

peace and security.

(See A above for

implementation procedures.

C.

Quarantine : If precedent of 1962 is followed, PAS

aegis would be

necessary.

Could

be directed

against

weapons vice offensive weapons.

Quarantine

subversive

is designed in

deal with

threat to

peace.

found in be such

by regional

arrangement having jurisdiction. By contrast, blockade

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traditionally been carried out in wartime by belligerent

in effort to secure maximum impact on enemy's economy.

D. Pacific Blockade

. 1.

An effective denial by air and sea forces of

the right

of ingress and egress to and from ports of a

specific country. Laid enly against ships of a blockaded:

2.

regality questionable.

If undertaken unilaterally

but not on the grounds of self defense, is illegal.

(Violates

Art. 2 (3 and 4), UN Charter: Art I, Pact of Bogota). If

undertaken by several states, or on

grounds of self defense,

is

legal.

Piracy - available for use not but rationale

would

be thin. Piracy by definition is an illegal act comitted:

for private ends, (See Hackworth, Dig. Vol

II, Sect 203.

subpara

II page 682).

It would be most difficult to visit

and search a number of ships using this single justification.

F. Suspicion of Piracy - See E above. .

G. Suspicion of flying false colors - See E above.

H.

Suspicion of violating an internatienal conventien

(ie..

fishing, cables) - See E above.

IV. Other considerations

A. High seas - those water areas outside three miles.

B. Guantanamo - participation of the Naval Base in this

type close-in surveillance of Cuba may hazard our treaty

rights.

HAL

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Cuban Merchant Ship Inventory

A.

Over 1,000 GRT:

Freighters

Tankers

Bulk

No.

20

2

Total

26

GRT

87,875

4,579

10,938

103,392

B. Less than 1,000 GRT:

Tankers

Reefers

2,212

1,738

Total

5

3,950

Plus about 250 snailer vessels totding Approximately

20,000 GRT of which 50 are motorized co wal shius and 200

are schooners and small miceltaneo irri

i1. Normal Operating Patterns - Cuben Merchant Marine

Over 1,000 GRI: Trade Routes (arrivals per month)

2. ships from Canada to Cubs

4 ships from the UK and Continent to Cuba

162 ships from British Guiona to Cuba

2 ships from Mexico to Cuba

B.:

Less than 1,000 GRT

Used entirely for!

cabotage trade, where there is a critical

shortage at the

present time.

'(Nó actual movement information

available)

III. Cuban Fishing Fleet

A. Inventory

Total of 8,000 to 9,000 craft, approximately 3,500 of which

are motorized

Oceangoing Fleet: 67 ships - 11,950 GRT

DOWNGRADING AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS

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Lyne

GR'I

wooden Schooners

Japanese-built

Polish-built

60

5

10,000

1,750

200

lotal

67

11,950

The above could conceivably make a round trip to Northern south

America without difficulty,

Of the approximately 3,500 motorized

fishing boats, not over 5CC are estimated as over 50 tons with

some morginal capability to make a

trip

to Colombia/Venezuela.

B. Operations

From the operational viewpoint, the

port of Havana is the only

port that is organized and equipod to provide adequate

support and facilities for the bulk of the Cuban fishing fleet.

A]1

of the Cuban fishing vessels known operating on the high-seas outside

Cuban waters operate from

the port of Havana. However, many small

fishing ports exist along

the Cuban coast which are capable of

servicing small coastal fishing craft.

The smaller Cuban fishing vessels limit their fishing activities

to Cuban waters and in nearby waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

The

larger vessels have extended their activities into the Caribbean,

into the South and Central Atlantic and, during the current fishing

season, Cuban vessels are known to have ventured as far north as

the Georges Banks fishing grounds.

Their primary fishing grounds

lie to the north and

west of Cuba.

SUANGRADING AT 12-YBAR INTERVALE

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 10

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## Page 11

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## Page 13

APPENDIX A

CUBAN AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF PARTICIPATING IN ARMS TRAFFIC

Operational Run-

No

Payload

(IDS)

way

Requirement

Ivoe

An-2/Colt

10

I12/ Cab

II-14/Crate

11

I1-18/000t

C-4+6

C-54

Constellation

Britannia

3

4

5

3

3

Range

(Nautical

Miles)

950

1,175

1,400

2,800

1,600

2,100

3, 100

3,700

1.148

3,300

1,350

4,750

1,550

25,400

3,000

11,000

3,500

17,000

5,050

17,300

4,775

25,000

6,000

All can reach all Central American countries and Venezuela

and Colombia without refueling.

All but Colt can also reach

che Guianas.

In addition, an estimated 40 to 50 light liaison-type

aircraft with a cargo capacity of 250-500 pounds are capabie of

transporting arms to small fields in the Yucatan Peninsula.

114

11

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

A.

THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION METHODS IN ORDER LISTED WILL

BE USED IN CHALLENGING SHIPS AND DIRECTING THEM TO LIE TO FOR

VISIT AND SEARCH:

(1) CALL ON

INTERNATIONAL CALLING AND DISTRESS FREQUENCY

(500KCS) BY RADIO.

USE INTERNATIONAL CODE SIGNALS (HO 87) •

(2) FLASHING LIGHT USING INTERNATIONAL CODE SIGNALS.

(3) FLAG. HOIST USING INTERNATIONAL CODE SIGNALS:

(4) SPEAK TO THE SHIP USING BULL HORN OR MEGAPHONE.

(5) FIRE WARNING SHOT ACROSS BOW IF SHIP DOES NOT HEAVE TO.

IF THE SHIP REFUSES TO STOP AFTER CARRYING OUT THE ABOVE

STEPS AND IF SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED, IN EACH CASE, BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

(1) FIRE AN ADDITIONAL SHOT ACROSS THE BOW AND BY SPEAKING

TO THE SHIP

WARN THAT THE NEXT SHOT WILL BE FIRED TO HIT.

(2) FIRE NEXT SHOT, IF NECESSARY, TO HIT NON-CRITICAL SPOT

WHERE PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WILL BE MINIMIZED.

(3) IF SHIPS STILL REFUSES TO HEAVE

TO USE MINIMUM FORCE

REQUIRED TO BOARD AND SEIZE.

C. VISIT AND SEARCH.

(1) CONDUCT EXAMINATION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION PAPERS.

TAKE INTO CUSTODY DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS:

(2) EXAMINE SHIP'S MANIFEST AND SEARCH SHIP FOR DESIGNATED

SUSPECT MEDIAL,

INFISCATE SUSPECT MATERIAL OR REPRESENTATIVE PORTIONS

(4) REPORT PRESENCE OF DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS AND/OR SUSPECT

MATERIAL.

(5) IF NOT PRACTICABLE TO SEIZE SUSPECT MATERIAL, PLACE

PRIZE CREW ON BOARD AND REQUEST DESIGNATION OF PORT FOR DELIVERY OF

SHIP®

(6) PHOTOGRAPH AND RECORD ALL PHASES OF INCIDENT AS FEASIBLE.

(7) IF NEITHER SUSPECT MATEKIAL NOR DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS

ARE ONBOARD, PERMIT SHIP TO PROCEED.

THIS IS APPENDIX TWO TO ANNEX B - INSTRUCTION FOR AIR ENGAGEMENT.

GENERAL.

CERTAIN AIRCRAFT, DETECTED IN THE CARIBBEAN OR ATLANTIC

APPROACHES TO LATIN AMERICA MAY. BE DESIGNATED FOR DIVERSION, EXCLUSION

FROM A SPECIFIED COUNTRY OR, IF DIRECTED, FOR DESTRUCTION.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

A.

FLY CLOSE FORMATION A BEAM. BREAK IN DIRECTION DESIRED FOR

AIRCRAFT TO PROCEED.

B. ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE INSTRUCTION TO DESIGNATED AIRCRAFT ON

INTERNATIONAL AERONAUTICAL EMERGENCY FREQUENCY FOR AIRCRAFT.

BUZZ AIRCRAFT APPROACHING FROM ASTERN, PASSING CLOSE ALONGSIDE

AND BREAKING OFF IN DIRECTION DESIRED FOR AIRCRAFT TO PROCEED.

FIRE GUNS OR NON-HOMING ROCKETS FAR ENOUGH AHEAD OF AIRCRAFT

TO PRECLUDE ACTUALLY HITTING IT. (MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF TRACER

AMMUNITION). BREAK OFF PASSES IN DIRECTION IT IS DESIRED FOR AIRCRAFT

TO PROCEED.

E.

IF AIRCRAFT DOES NOT PROCEED AS DIRECTED AFTER CARRYING OUT

STEPS

A, B, C,

AND D ABOVE,

AND IF SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY HIGHER

AUTHORITY IN EACH CASE, DESTROY IT.

ENCLOSURE (5) to. SECNAV LIR SER 0001031P60

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