## Page 1

104-10193-10160

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MATERING REVIEWED AT CIA MEADQUARTERS BY

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FILE TITLE NUMBER/VOLUNE :

VITICAL DEMCCRATIC PARTY

LEST EXHANY + ITS ACTION ECOUP

HIRER WELLE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROON:

DELUTIONS, IF AVY:

DATE

RECEIVED

14509178

DNTE

RETURNED

REVIEWED "BY (PRINT NAME)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Phoebe Ow

NO DOCERENTS MAY

BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

5 li

---

## Page 2

14-00000

SPD

Nationadiamokrattache Partel. Drutschlands liational Denocratic Party of Gerrang)

Corbinod Deutsche Rechtsperte1, Deutsche Reichsparte1, He s,21t off Sozialisticke

Reichspartel and the Deutsche Partel.

In Aurust 1?04 Vin Thaden arranged a meeting with other s'pht-wingers to promote

unification of.all nationalist forces. Friedrich Thielen gerrsd as both front

A committeo of 10 drafted a corstitution which was

in fact, long boon the nationalist party.

At this 21 l'arch 1967 meetin

of the NPU Exocut ve Committee, the more moderato Thielen Unrer

Neutsche Partel

was oustod fron the NPD by the more extreme von Thaden Sorers (IRP).. There was

no major

rush to leave the NPD, however.

Recent reportire hes irdicated that those

who did leave the liPD, even Inciuding Thielen, are being invited back into the NPD.

---

## Page 3

NEE SCORS GARD

1. Bundestag Slections 1965

-- ID's. first Effort

20: 13 Marẹn 196ộ,

corranal Slections, Schleswig

„Haistoln. (TP Hus directive

"not to particisato.

A for did)

3. 13 March 1966,

Barrio Cortunl Eleotions

ND sa for effort concenträted

caly in Francaris.

664,157 votes = 29

In Ii communities where

NFD ras candidates,.

aversiged 10.5% of voto

commured with bo in ses

towns in 1765.

1.6 % of total Bavarian

vote bert?

Niddle Franconia =

Ansbach - 5.16

Erlangen - 8.28

Nürnberg- 7.35

Scwhabach-5.65

Upper Franconta

Bayreuth - S.48

Coburg

- 5.38

Kulmbach - 5.$8

* + 2 village movors

3.9 8 (1.58 in 1965)

no candidates elected

27 Marci 1966 Hanburg Burgerschaft Slection

5.

10 July 1906 Northrhain 'estphalis Landtag Electica

No NED candidates oloctod none entereil.

6o. 16 Ootober 1966 Hanlin Byolsction (Communal Coscill

8.16 (865= ) 2 sasts

7. 6 November 1966 Hesse Landtaz Slections

ở Soáth In ten 7.95+

Marburs, "lesbaden, Barastadt

and Giesson =ca 10%

FI/M = 8.126

7 20 November 1966 Ervarian Landtae Sections

8. 23 April 1967 Freinland-Falatire

9. 23 Apr1l 197 Schleswir Holstein

10. 1 June 1967 loser Saxony

11. 1l October 1967 Beren Bürgerschaft

120..25 April 1965 Bader-Huerttesberg

13. dê Sept 1964

radered

votes= 7.16

15 Seats In Lanitag

• 4 Seats, 5.9 % of vote

1, Seats, 5.7 & of vote

10 Seats, 7 & of vote

8 Seats, 8.8 & of vote

12 Seats, 9.8 I of vote

O Suits, 4.3%-frite

---

## Page 4

14-00000

t.12..

JUNE 8: 1974

The Hitler Boom

-ді

WP2.4

by Charles Lam Markmann

Heideiters

Had he issed Adoll Hitler would have been 85 yours

old on April 20 And 18 was og this April 20 that the

forces responsible for the duster of Chancellor Willy

Brandt-door things must be called by their right nanes

- had almost anished prepaung Wese Germany for

her start in the shore march lock to the past One

hears everywhere. "I we only had a strong, man

agarn." On the inchronable North Sed resort lund vi

Syle, Hiller's bertholay was celebrared in the bed No.

tional Socralise sole boy severd doven Gerrnans, none

rv.

o.ngest 15, did all of them arrested un

one careularee or displayed Nazs syn-

mung men wore brown shirts and avastike

nado; the girls frumped themselves up in the

clumely tlue shires and white middy blouses of the

Bund dentscher Nailein (League of German Girlsi, the

auxiliary of the flitler fugend. The walls of the room in

wheels thes held their party were decorated with pie.

tures of killer and other National Socialise emblenis

for which they had scourer Schless g-Holstein. After

they had hotered to records of litler's and order Nazi

leaders speeties and of old pardy march music, tiney

drank à toast do the fuhrer.

When ther were arrested, one of the young men

sald the party had been planned merely as "ein guir

Gas" Perhaps so But for millions of other Grimans

the re-ereation of "the Nazi Pne"" is serious basiness

for some, triause they want those good old days back.

and for a lei because they lear the others niay very

easily ger their wish when the federal Republic of

Germany mad at last put lis domocracy do che dese.

•The lear is be: ¿herned by the stady and at times spec.

tacular rose m so hat is called de Moderwelle -the linder

wave, or flutter boom -which has hepe pace with llie

economi crisis, priso ievols and unemployment The

number of mins h.. doubie since December

It is as much a Matler and Hotler associated boom as

a Nazi loos thes is not to sly that Nazi thinking has

no follussing in list Germany -quite the centrary..

as the letters inche-editor columns of neuspapers

demonstrain. in Bovaria- Nurnerg (indeed where

else?, in a lih-century Franconian castle, a 25-man

"army"' of drouths trains regularlo, with the sease strel

helmets and ries that the Weh nailt used t.om 1934

to 1945. Their leader is a sign-painter named Karl.

LeTT

ist, as de a9d in a loed about shes tied Corman sepullees.

Hema livitinann, shose grools anosimple the destruc-

lose is communes and big capedal, the end of parler-

mentary rule, govornere by on uncleded illi, the

annestion of Andered Gluch, as the dismar Consti-

puries mahes clear in Article al. Mars also the goall of

the sine German "repubir"!, and the roundication of

Me tinieral Republe 0r. Germany and three dierman.

Deranorale Republic.

There is a core ofsome 120 did regular rendersofthe

Narina: donong, whach dor se decides has breen

whirrashing the Nazi era, "proving"' that lie orily

conceatranor and extirminion comps lere those

bade gor line sor by Geram prisoners under Ameri-

can orders, for propaganda purposes there are even

pictures: promourg.abooktiddin Mrimedals. uni-

torms weapons and other monorabla, as sell as

loudo and recordings of speeches poly congre ses,

natalone or millusy conipages doctorious ane.),

and engaging one a tonly subile ante tomorom. There

is no neat lur bratanay, allus all the ler's diere undy the

tirst and more conspalone of dad largels

liceive

orsomillion non.tewsmurdered by thereranedied

just às parnfuliy - facto tinal are dimend dolly boundedd

as "lies" in letters do nosegapers, decodi dully moder-

onsitations, less infrequendly in sivossaidid-1l.onbonggs

and demotery vandalism

But shese thungs-die Suld birthelug parto. Mori.

the desi party's strength rose do dices nientire when

and those minderes dot diego dud tilled doclosevely

wish disheire and especially Natioiral socialise

crie-are onto sapions el the Miller.

it The real thing is losinore dide rend. taroleeper

and more "s spectatle" la best Bestor done diese ase

more shan 5i0 cars brang regi brand places thar,

alter the mandatory "B' por Horind, dorry sint lester

cortistato as So, SA, ill. Nä tetore the paradis

(Else ceordi, sturmation (Sidona Troopo), Alillie

have not then issued crunnely. They are issued by

respeed, and Karl Noeing, le Satal Demoirse wha

i hund- ine sir's tieneinics Department, the issuing

or ire. erplains that under West German lass such re-

quers cannot be retured. Il am not for one moment

inipling that the lei invul i be rerised: one does not

fighe saras, or even bouto haireds, with muzzles.) The

---

## Page 5

sime linds of plites are visilile in many other parts of

Federal Germany

There are now in prine licrally thous.inds of paper-

back titles dealing with every possible aspert of the

Third keich and its personühtied There are serious;

analysical histories thai saintue success for integrity;

on the other hund two big. exhaustive, expensive hio;

graphies.of.thiller are selling. more than well. and pne

of them, by luähim E. Frise, an editor ot the arch-

reactionary. Franklone: Apereine Zestung, his gone

well past 275.1941 mopies de almose $io apreie-the

publishers have 25ck; more ready and walting in

the warhouse. This taw makes much of Hitler's

"modernity," little it his sarbarities: he was necessary

lo his time. The uther, which is much more overly an

apologid-1s byllemnor.M.ser, who teaches the Hitler

era at the Universier di Munich. It has sold 30.00d

copies. It endeavors to create the impression that, had

he not had certain proliens insing, out of misguided

medication in 1933, Mater would have done more good

(oned less harm).

In addition there are the big hardrover editions of

In England and in the l'S there has been a revival of

interest in the Hirler ere paralleling the orie in liest

Gennand de least 12 English and American publesh.

ers have capualized on tus interest. Here's a sampling

at their recent books:

Pictures: Sieg Hei!, an ilustrated history of Germany

trun. Mismart to Hitter, by Stefan Lorant (Norton),

mure than 70l, photographs end a literate text Miler

Cl.u8-19 (Msimillan), interestng because these are

le pritures taken by liner's friend Heinrich Hoid.

with commentan

by contidant and diarist

Henry Picker.

History: Hitler's Rise to Polee. The Nazi Movernint ins

Balal:a, 1923-1933, by Centrey Pridhain (ilarper 8

Roos). In-dopth answer to the question. What made

piegle support Mallor in the early '20s1 Careiul and

scholarly.

Military: Hitter's lo'se tims, The Establishment of the

Nis Order, by Norman Rich (Norsony Itie seiond

vilume of a huge, hugey dirailed study traling with

Millers toreign policies

Tre Rise and Full ul the Luft-

w'3j1e. by David Irong (Little, Brown), the life of Field

Marshall Erhard Much who was seiond in command

1 Gieting and who sun ree to tell much of thes to the

auror The idn ral's to is Paiè, bu lean Voh (Double-

doyl. certaining

sullientic

first-hand accounts

of

U-lude (Grey Hottes) atione Ballle Urer the Reich,

by Allred Ince (Cambridge U'niversity Press), «un.

tains pictures and iral abine the tumlurg and sirating

of German cities and tomina Part of tre revival be-

cause it is Germany seen as desiroyed from the air.

Hitler's Stratesy, 1940-1741 lie Baitan Giue, by Martin

van Creveld (Cambridge University l'ress), a newbierr

THE VET REMUBLIC,

Hitler's spirches (four volumes) and Propaganda Min-

aster taul loseph Grebbcis' (tro volumes);: four new

birds about Rudolt less. ther's deputy who is now;.

at. 80, the lest prisoner in Spandau, innumerable rádio

and telerisin programs dealing with various aspects

ind perinaises of the period. did, mostlately, a fort-

nighly publication, Das dutte Kerili, planned.lô cover

the rindle "US-Zini" for popilor consumption in two

jears, and thori expire.

The Alles-especially the Americans-for a long

time trade any mention whatever of the Hitler

period. and Here Germany, nie it became a more of

less midopendent seale, cominued these bans for years.

Even more than mther peoples, Germans have the

couching noton thai censorship and repression will

ellectisets chminale adeds and facts; and agaunst this,

reither the ioft nor the sight has the fallest concept

ot cival literares. Thus it as sall torbiddlen. cren though

the German Communist pariy has bion legalized

again, de form a raazi" or "National Soaralise" party.

Consequendly the old SA and Si men organized the

corally dad dracondorio detes; he l'artes Deutschlands,

of Hitler's interest in she Mediterranean and his rola-

Relegion: in irman Church: Sereggle und the Molo-

cause pliabie Cindersily l'reus), a collertion ad casays

that gier one it the Filet Internatioral Silolars' Con-

ferenie in 1873.

Refugers: lüial Rifuge, by A. J. Sherman (Carversliy

of Coltonia Pres,)

An interesting study of lew

Brita clanged hes policy abord retugies bum the

Third Rech Bora 1933 10 1939 and shy.

Persons. Taige: Heydrik, by Miroslos Iranov (Afac-

millan). Mip-@j-playacount of the assassination di

Czech druruan lead Benhand Heydrich and the

Nail revenge that animinaied in litrie Miller, by

trenviairo to dscl.dld and Clara Menston of the biog-

raphy in rotte: lord concludes time it thaler hat died

or turn Millet un 19jo "der would lie sitate to call hurt

une of she previesi di German stglcsmen." which may

te shy ine india la saven erghtas over letore ive come

to the Alities of the was yours leiner Slaver's Hirti

dotasies sit see many dads filey else ure the man end

hes worle

Future: to le pubt shed by Viline in dugust. already

published in En lund (Sciber d läarteril, The done.

lest Man it Bar äs "1, the "inside story of the 30-year

imprimaran! i hadult Mless"" iriside briduse the

author, Easino K

ward, was tormer commandant of

Spandau F'isor. 3nd seems to have won Hess' confi-

dence Despots lis promises it says very little that has

not alady tein known or surmised.

- The Editors

---

## Page 6

JUNE 8, 1974.

which, after some initial surcesses, look cover in the

hardly inhospilable Christin Democratic and Chris.

tian Social Chions hue has ferently announced. is

determination lo purge ilsell of' this

rairs."" In

addition in spile or the consentional ban (Aricle

18, on any usc of coil litiertes do endanger lee unile-

lined" frce democratic basic order," the sale of Lower

Saxony alone has 34 active Fascist and Nazi organiza-

Runs, publishing houses, and mail order book dis:

eributors. No one know; how many members and

customers they have herause they operate lurively,

as tie rather stupid law compels them fö do Mill

(Courage), a montlily magazine addressing a frankly

Fascist if not Nazi progiam tu the young in liat stale,

has a circulation of 10.000) and is regarded ly she

Lower Saxon Minister of the Interor as polintally us

lately dangerous.

Everywhere there is curiosily about those mysteri-

ous 12 years. The leichers who laught then are still

resching, unless superannudded, but very few of their

dare su leach what they used to leach, or even 1o talk

abour "the post." That is why bus drille Kerih Was

founded this ycar: to make money out'of that curio.ity.

The idea was that of Hans-Peter Dietse, nus its man-

aging

editor, according lo his editor-in-chief, Dr.

Chrastian Zentner, who stakes a prous claim to a de-

sire to show his young compatriots how the Third

Reich carne to pass, in order to prevent its dyer hap.

-pening again. After four issues, Dr. Zentner is not su

sure that his publisher, the big Hamburg house of

John Jahr Verlag KG, will des much more than break

even, because, he told me, whe millions of people are

insatably interested in is not "the abstrarions" uf

nazism and its history but its personalities, and in

particular Adolf Hitler. "These, he says, are "simple'

people who do not read books but who watch televi.

sion and read magazines, and it was they whun he set

out to capture - lo clarify the past for them.

His magnine is erpensive - about $1.50 a copy, A

treniendous advertising campaign, of dubious laste,

resulted in firse issue salro some 150.000 ahore the

150,000 copies that the editors and publishers er-

peclid. The second issue sold between 330 000 and

340.000 copies, the third something over 250.000 so

far, and the fourth - which is still on the newsstands-

more than 200.000. The overshelming majority of the

purchasers and subscribers, Zintner admits, seems to

irclude few of those young people he was looking lur.

the real circulation is anong lie people old enough lo

remeinher, M'e Nazis who writs furious letters to the

editor because he parnishes their legends. Both Diete

and Zentner fold me that the greatest sales of Dias

dritte Reich are not in cities bur out in the country and

the small towns, in Bavaria and Franconia especially.

One of the reasons for the phenomenal success of a

television program called "Ein Herz and erie Seele"

('One Heart and One Soul"') is its enthusiastically en-

19

joved derogations of the sub-mon, bo rome: the Slavs,

the lows, the Lalas. the levantines A Germen drag.

geration or "All in the Fantly," die program plays also

on thr hysterical driad or the Communis" phat has

been endemic here cher since the general stalt real.

ded in dois thes is had made a reprile missile in

Helping Lenin Cal Es.Chancellor Willy.Brandi.g.dg

a constine purget ticouve us hus allegreemare birth und

his "Pratorious"

aisodered Brom 1935 6 1415, whin he

•Sought agains nasis, ds salt as dis "selling out"' do

"The Reds" The prodrom reclarly atraite enris pes.

cerit of thie natronal dudence, and arily a coccasional

landy for lie darger is is los "lese-liberal" ireator,

Wolfgang Menge, rainis it to be a bullse and so recog.

niced bicause prople sly les primpponese, Alered Ter.

daft, counts pust like Frand Josef Sirruns, the lead of

the CSU: lue then in dool regrond dection this year

more of theme dote dor die Strausses.

lis mid-Alaria she Rosarin Siute Rodio änd Televi-

son breaderie a long inderview satle llstler's cand

Franklin Brinescles adel biend, Force (l'ured Hand-

31.10991, who a n010 So 8hough in the end-shroughad

mother gruesomo proceedi jole he fell lee had to elee.

to the Unitre Sides on 1997, and wis sralerilly is.

sisted by Rooseveit, lus old Harvard classmale, in

gaining antiy diater he lecame an adviser on policy lo

she Amricon dirics). Aindstaong spent lies whole

tune on camera selitig shot anne fedloss Hither, Civer-

ing, Goebbels, Alicater ind the others really were,

when all was sin and done-did marde's of their

prades to bout: fino sellers, geniuses de propoganado,

unl so seiter. Thear Weimar predece, sor he belitiled

one dismissel as nothings, ilogi he indemised lie

had never known mined aloud tiest a perations or

their acnevements. Moever in spite of moving. wett

wite and series. invishly and alriose

mindedly supported thaler from the days before the

1923 Munchen Pris i lo his own abrup deposure for,

had never thoughe do; a moinene shat the unrenithng

vuuleritanti-semitro.dit@s freen.d.inet 1010 18008l.d

ever amount to anyhing sorous d'some of may best

been "super enough du sided war

The real danger it a thaler senorience, in the verio

of Dr. Hugo Mars, a sidolar sho surfered andr the

original, her in the comberatien of a sarante nosedl.

gid and the millennia: dierman taith in authoritanon

rule as the solution du all

pioblems Mermas, aller all.

fasled primanly, si buch William B. Shirer and Kari

Dietrich Bracter lure shovin, because no one, includ-

ing the Social Demiats who proclaimed it out of

desperation sher ires could find neither a blohen.

zollers nos any dires sovilty to accept the throne,

wanted a repubii. Iiion the economic crash came

alter 1929, the millennual seerch for the "strong man"

leist its last restraine.

---

## Page 7

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORITE TOR

SO FORFIGS DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVAIVATED INTELLIGENCE

PAGE 1.OF. 1 PAGES

REPORT NO. CS. -311/01121-72

• DATE DISTR

14 March. 1972

S.F C.R ET

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI

March 4072

SUBJECT

Intcution of the Frecutive Committee of

the

National Democratie. Party

to Urge

Non-participation of the Party in Baden-

Huerttemberg Election

2:

ACQ

SOURCE

Germany, Hamburg (10 March 1972), FIELDNO. EGG -1825

An official Nest German security service at the Land level.

information from other West Germin services should

not

be construed

as confirmation.

The sub-source ig an NPD

official who had ccess to the

information.

The executive committee of the lost German National

Democratic Party (NPD) will mect on

18 larch with officials

of the Baden-wuerttemberg NPD oranization and attempt to

persuade the land organication not to contest the 23 April

land election.

The exocutive committee will point out that

If the NPD does not, run candidates in this election, the

chances for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to

majority in

the Baden-Wuerttemberg election will be enhanced.

This would enable the CDU to retain 1ts Bundesrat majority

and improve the chances of defenting the Eastern treaties of

the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party government.

The background'of the exccutive committec's desire

to avoid contesting the Baden-Wuerttenberg election is its

estimate that

the YPD would capture only two per cent of the

vote this jear

compared with g.f per cent in the last

clection,

a result which the executive connittee is most

anxlous to avoid.

3. Field Dissem: Sent to Bonn and Berlin.

3

• 2

STATE

SECRETINO FOREIGN

DISSEM

(elonrikranon)

ібоко ролной!

dear MarY

INSA

CRS

(for field Dies, burros too hnal paragraph)

FISTEL.

TOTALS

2,

C1 2, FI 3. FR 1, ELR 6

LIAISON

FGG-1825

Hamburg-21038

IN 557585

-CAEROTIC 3

COOFDIMATINO NELLABINO

•HIM

---

## Page 8

TUCS INFORMATIC REPORT

OPO LOIS BARNAAL? KAD

UNI: E7G/R

D: 1118.

DATE CUEDECENBLR 1901.

EUR 11.

FIS, IN. CSDO; DO 4.

11-0610

it man filled dad

TOUTING

DATE DISTPIBUTED

'1 DECENSER 2971

DIESSMINATION."

HER

E/G'/BD-L FLF/R2

TDCS -314/12543-71

PRECEDENCE: 21:

XI ROUTINE I

SASED ON MID. APT. PROIS

EGG-1781

HANGURG 20722

IN

479259

CAEROT IC/3

LIAiSON *

VATUATION 12=

• REQUESTED

0f.

STATE

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RECOMMEND EXO

ARMY

NAYY

•AIR

→ ш

DASIC DOCUMENT NOT

MADE AVAILABLE DOI

UP 2.4

RELAY CABLE ATTACHED

SHOW IW

W

DISSEM ELECTRICALLY

SECR

E T/NO

FOREIGN DISSEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB

USIB PEFSONAL ATTN

ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT

NOT FOR LAISON

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

delor R. anythi

ICCORDINATING OFFICER'S)

CLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

'COsY NO.

JOIN 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS: CONIONS

(89-70-44-40)

---

## Page 9

14-00000

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 179259

PAGE 1 OF §

PAGES

SPATUNT DIA NUCCIME ISCOPIDES ARMY NAVE AT CALVINCE NIE NSA SDO ONE COS XANANDANN

TREAS

XXXXXX

DHREE THATE OP

FLANS

This: min

полетайт: в rovolaron

NO FOREIGN

DISSEN

SECRET

IHIS IS AN INFORMALION FEPORT. NOT HINALLY EVALUAILD INIELIGENCS

CITE TDCS

-314/12513-71

DIST

1 DECEMBER. 1971

COUNTRY WES'S GERMANY

'DO!

SUWECT

• NOVEMBER 1971

SUMMARY OF ADOLE VON THADDEN'S

3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTH-

WEST MINING ASSOCIATION

ACQ

SOURCE

GERMANY, HAIZURG (23 NOVENBER 1971)

FIELD NO. EGG--1721

AN OFFICIAL REST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE AT THE LAND

LEVEL.

ANALOGOUS INFORMATION FROM OTHER WEST GERMAN

SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFIRMATION.

THE SUB-

SOURCE IS AN NPD OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCESS TO A COPY OF THE

DRAFT SPEECH.

1. (FIELD CONNENT: ADOLE VON THAD DE?, FORNER

NATIONAL CAIRMAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC

PARTY (NPD), HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO THE ANNUAL

GENERAL MEETING OF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION,

SPOKANE, WASHINGTOX, ON 3 DECEIBER ON THE TOPIC: A

EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF THS AMERICAN CUARENCI PROBLE!.. SEE

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM

767, 10

NOVEMBER 1971. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION

FROS HIS NPD POST KE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND

• SECRET NO FOREIGY DISSEN

trlesutea1.onl

(colono controle

---

## Page 10

14-00000

1055-314-12513-71

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

•SECRET NO FOREIGN DiSSEN

classication i :

3

2

TO PRESENT THE SPEECH WHICH IS SUNMARIZED BELO.)

VON THADDEN BEGINS BY TRACING THE HISTORY OF

THE UNITED STATES' RELITIONSHIP WITH GERMANS FRON WORLD

VAR & TO THE PRESÉNT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO

THE 1929 STOCÄ MARKET CRASII, HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE

UNITED STATES FOR HELPING. EUROPE BACK ON ITS

FEET AFTER

WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN. BUT POINTS OUT

THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD

AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUIING TO AMERICA'S

FINANCIAL TROUELES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER •

COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT TYSTERIA

AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT TERM BENEFITS FOR WORLD

TRADE; BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC

ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES.

3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECHI BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS

COMPARED WITH THE 21 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH,

AND VON THADDEN SAYS TILAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS

PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S FINANCIAL SYSTEN AS DID

THE CRASH.

HE DEPICTS THE SPEECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROIS

AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED

AT BRETTON-WOODS.

• SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(class calm)

5

1.

---

## Page 11

14-00000

INCS

314/12543-71

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

5

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEN

IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TYPE CE WOrLD ECONONIC

SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN CONTROLS

AND FLOATING OF THE DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM

THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU..

HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE

SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY. THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE

MAKES IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE

AVAILABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE

THE BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE

BELIEVED, BUT MUST BE A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE

AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN-FRENCH

BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD. ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USE

THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS.

VON THADDEN VIENS POMPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE

UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING TO STAY

PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGION, AND

AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONONIC ORDER

EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN THE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST

GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING

THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC

PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEN

sicsebtraron)

(B1A2ATT SONITORA)

1

2

1

---

## Page 12

4-00000

TDES -314/125-43-71

PAGE 1 OF5 PAGES

• SECRET/SO FOREIGN DISSEN

5

4

POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH

1 MOULD BE PROFITABLE

ONLY TO THE CONNUNISTS.

5. VON THADDEN SEES THO ALTERNATIVES IN THE PRESENT

SITUATION, I.E., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRY PARITY WITH A

DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHAYGE TO FLENIBLE EXCHANGE RATES

AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTSED BY

INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE

DEVALUED BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT EUROFEANS.

TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT

LEGALLY FIXED. HE VIENS FLEXIBLE ENCHANGE RATES AS

DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE, BUT NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT

BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM NOULD EXCLUDE THE "THIRD WORLD"

AXD THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.

6. SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY

FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REJAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN

COUNTRY TO RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO

PREVENT DOVIÑATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR-LEFT FORCES. HE

CRITICIZES THOSE WHO SAY TILAT ANERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED

AS A COUNTERWEIGIT TO THE USSK. DECLARING THAT THERE IS

NO OTHER COUNTRY MHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY. ESPECIALLY

NOT PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANS. HE SAYS THAT THE HEST

• SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEN

5

3

2

1

---

## Page 13

14-00000

IN AIYANY

TOCS - 311/12543-71

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET/NO fOREIGN DISSEN

(dearern controls)

GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMUNIST INFLUENCE AND LEADERS

WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO COUMUNISH, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL

CHARACTER AND ARE TOO NEAR TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS

BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD

TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOLGIL TO COUNTER COMMUNISM. (HEADQUARTERS

CONNENT: THE STATENENT OF VOY THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY

ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN

RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY

WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEO-NAZI. IN FACT, THE PARTY. HAS

DECI,INED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT

IS TIREATENED WITH ESTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT

RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY PEPRIVES MIM OF ANY POLITICAL

PLATFORM IN WEST GERXANY.)

7. FIELD DISSE!!: NONE (SENT BONN).

4

2

1

• SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSES

eatisema curterio)

---

## Page 14

Intelligerice Information Report

DIRSCTORITE OP.

11.4.19

SECRET

COUNTRY

West Germany

DOI

March 1971

SUBJECT

Intention of Adolf l'on Thadden

to Resign As Chairman öf the

National Democratic Party

tipionago

sano: lo on

SO FOREIGN DISSEN

PAGE 1 OF2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFO MARON REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELIGENCE

REFORT NO.

CS-311/018G1-71

DATE DISTR

NO March 1971

ACQ

SOURCE

Germany, Hamburg (8 March 1971) FIELD NO. KG6-1683

An official West German Security Service concerned with

right and left radical organizations, from sources described

as NPD officials. who have accoss to the information.

Similar Information received through. other. nest German

intelligence channels should not he construed as confirmation.

1.

In early March 1971 Adolf Von Thadden

indicated to close associntes including members of the

Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party of

Germany (Nationaldenokratische Partel Deutschlands -

NPD) that he plans to resign as Chairman of the SPO

in

the near future.

fon Thadden has not announced the date

when he plans to resign but close associates believe

it will be sometine during the perind l April to l June

1971.

2: Von Thadden's decision las been prompted by his

discouragement

over prospects

for the

NPD,

serious

financial

difficulties of the

party and by severe internal bickering

within the NPD Executive

several

wecks.

Von Thadden

than

many

members of the Erecutive Committee.

Among other disagreenents,

Von

Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the "Resistance

Action" - (Akiion Widerstand)

in which NPD menbors have

recently staged denonstrations

which crupted

into riolence.

Von Thadden was aiso personally humiliated when his sistei

and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral

of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian

Percy Schramn aho died

in Goettingen in January 1971.

5

3

3

2

1

STATE

DIA

EC R

(dan COnToNO FOREIGY DISSEM

ARMY

NAVY

NiSA

Ices

(Fer Field Distribution see final parograph)

CALINT

CA/PEG

2

E/GARJE

E/G/R/BM

B/G/R (NHZ.4) 1

TOTALS

152. C12, FI 3.

DO 1. EIR 6. CA 3

LIAISON

32

EGG- 1682

HAMBURG 19934

282656

HM: JM:

Fs. sam

---

## Page 15

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

C9-311/01861-71

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3 .

(Source Comment:

Von

Thadden's resignation

wi11 1n

alf prountillty. moan tho and of tho NiD as an

effective political organization.

With the possible

"exception. of the Bavarian District Chairman of the NPD.

or.. siegfried/po.ch lman n,

the NPD lacks crfective

and dynamic leaders.

Pochlmann,

however, has health

problems andalso

does not havc

the

stature of Yon Thadden.

The disintegration of the NPD will probably result in a

number offsmaller right-wing groups coming into existence,

some of which,

like the recent "Aktion Widerstand" may

have a propensity for violence. After the NPD disin-

tegrates; nost of Its former

supporters will probably

cast-their votes for one of the three major political

parties in Hest Germany.

• The CDU and CSU stand to gain

most.of these

4. Field Dissem: None.

S

E

C

R

E

T.

NO FOREIGN

DISSEM

poel, 14-3 114.125p00s

---

## Page 16

I elligence Intermation Regait

No materne

DIRDCTORATE OF

NO FORSION DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NEENALLY EVALUATED INTELLGENCE

REPORT NO.

DATE DISTA.

CS -311/02895-70

3 April 1970 11

SECRET

COUNTRY: Nest Germany

0O1.

SUBJECT

Mid-February 1970

'Analysis of the West German Sational

Democratic Party's Election Chances

•and Cohesiveness

ACA

SOURCE

Germany (27 February 1970)

FIELONO. OCHOSE

A medium-level west German gorernment official who follows the

activities of the National Denocratic Party (NP)), from an NPD

official who attended the party congress.

The report is the i

NPD official's analysis of the party's situation in the wake

of the congress.

The information

is also passed to an official

West German service, from which similar information should not

De construed as confirmation.

Adolf von Thad den.

NPD chairman, remains firmly.

control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress

in Hertheiu.

Skepticism

about.. the future of the NPD is increasing among

The NPD is

definitely planning to wage vigorous cam-

paigns in all 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little

chance. that the party will do even as well in these electiong ag it

did in the 1969 Bundestag elections, when It failed to obcain 1lve

percent of the total vote.

3.

At. the congress, several prominent NPD leaders emphasized

the need for party unity; these

arreals were well recelved.by the

delegates.

There are many unresoired questions and problems, how-.

ever, which will continue to plague the party.

For instance,

the

"national conservative" concept,

which was adopted in the manifesto

issued by the congress,

came under strong attack.

One group, which

includes both

older

and younger nonbers, rejects

the concept of the

NPD as a conservative party,

because they consider. that this term

convey's the idea that the party is an

out-of-date

and reactionary

political group.

On the other hazs,

the proponents of

the national-.

conservarive concept consider therselves is upholding "positive

values" in the face of manifesta:sons of disintegration.

Von Thadden

is the party's unifying force,

and

one jelegate accurately summarized

the situation by saying:

his speeches, succeeded in bridgins the many cracks in the party, .or y

"Von Thadden, by virtue of the charisma

Field Dissem: • Embassy Boan, USBER.

• SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(clansification)

(dissom controla)

DIA

AIR

NSA

180

"Foe Field Dismibution noo tiral parogroph)

G/ V

E/G/R

E/R

NGRIP A.

LE ZACK 3. EL 3 DO Je EUR 6

OGA -953

CATERROR

AQ LIAISOY

LIAISON

r.

lah

---

## Page 17

Inte gence Information Repor

aling, "io,

DIRECTOTATE OY

NO FOREIGN DISSEN

THIS IS AN INFONIRATON REPCRI. NOI FINAILY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

PAGE 1 OF3 PAGES

REPORT NO.. CS-311/08556-69

DATE DISTR 26 September 1969

COUNTRY

.. West Germany

Da1 ::

June 1968, l September 1969

SUBJECT

West German Ministry of Interior

Evaluation of the Prospects of

Banning the National Democratic

Party

:. ACQ:.

SOURCE

Germany (1 September 1969)

FIELD NO. OGA-913

A medium-lovel West German

governmont official who follows

the

activities of the National Democratic Party and who had

access

to the study during his official duties.

The informa-

tion was extracted from

the original document and is believed.

to be an

accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary:

In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior

prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the west German

Nätional Democratic Party (NPD): The summary of this study given

below

describes the major charges which the government could bring

against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make

against these charges, and the probable political results which

would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case agalnst the

NPD.

According to the source, this study is still considered the

basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and

1s being studied by senior federal government and

state (Land)

officials...

End of Summary.

1.

(Field Comment:

For several years, West German political

and government

leaders

have debated seeking a constitutional court

ban

on the NPD.

On 13 November 1968, Ernst

Benda,

West German

Interior Minister,

advised Chancellor Kurt Georg

Kicsinger

that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against

the NPD.

Klesinger, however,

opposed bringing a suit,

and the sub-

ject became embroiled in West German politics.

Cn 23 April 1969,

the Federal Cabinet decided not to seck

i court ban of the NPD, at

least until after the September elections; This decision was

prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership guing

and apparently was losing popular support.)

5

SECR

eloseification)

DIA

NO FOREIGN DISSEN

(dissona roarrol»)

ARMY | NAVY AIR

INSA

1 CRS

. (tor Field Distribulion was final parograph)

STATE

C7E7R

EVG/R

F/G/H

E/G/R/P

TOTALS

2

ELG/R'C

E/GIRCAE

2142

E/BERLIN

12

IF 2, CI 2, FI 3,

D0 1,

EUR 8(20)

OGA-913

CATERROR

ODOPDIMATIMO

NO LIAISON

11A10052

srow

HE 1 SOLH

PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

000).

---

## Page 18

Mrige 2 Of is Pagos

CS-311/08556-69

S'ECRE TINO FORKIGN DISSEN

• 50-pake study.

•n day the

the Mest corman Interlor Ministry prepared

prospects for banning the NPD

entitled

'Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party,"

was well prepared and chicfully written.

considered the baste peror direry Paper ta the ND and 18

It 1g st1ll

being studied by sculor officials of both the federal and stato

governments. It evolds plving an opinion on the prospects of ob-

itaining

a court decision agains't the NPD, but from the content of

the study, it: is'clear. that: the nuthors belleved that the courts

would probably rejecta

government proposal. to ban the NPD.

(Pteld Comment: If the study is still consideredicurrent,

it 1s

unclear how It fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there

was sufficent evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD.)

The study summarized the case which could be brought

agalnst the NPD as follows:

a.

It could be shown that there was a simllarity

between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers

Party. (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

It could be argued that the goals, and parts of

the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the prin-

•ciples of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be pre-

sented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without

a hearing..

The study lists the following points which the NPD could

be expected to use in its defense:

2 :

The party could prove that it has given firm instruc-

[tlons to its members not to engage in rowdylam or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former

NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part

of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

which are in accord with democratic principles.

It could point out many features of its program

d.

It could show that its elected representatives

have worked with other parties and have not. disrupted the

Landtage

(state diets) and othar elected bodies in which

they participate.

It could point out that other political parties

have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could

claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not

• opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f.

It would charge that the government's charges were

one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst

Anrich

points were included in the party plat-

form.

"(Field Comment: Anrich is a former university

professor-from Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more

extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

It could claim that the increased violence

(Verrohung) of the political climate in Nest Germany 18

the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

---

## Page 19

14-00000

Page 3 of 3 Pages

SECRETIO FORE... DISSEM

iS-311/05556-69

5.

The study states that it would de very difficult to re-

fute these NPD defenses In court.

The government would have to

admit that since carly 1968 there lave been vory low statements

made iby NPD leaders, or incidets

caused by the NPD,

be used to support the government's case.

Objectively, It would

have to be admitted that many

incidents

of violence in

which the

NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6.

The atudy predicts the following probable results should

the government. win its case

against the NPD:

The NPD would probably respect the prohibition.

it is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to so under-

ground as the Illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their

opinions because of

Many would Join other groups

or partles and continue to work for their political bellels.

C.

NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a cam-

paign for the banning of the new German Commundat Party

(DKP) and other leftist groups.

A ban of the NPD would be well recelved in foregn

countries.

The study concludes that if the government should lose a

case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid

evidence (Beweleschwiertgkelten). In such an event, the following

adverse effects would occur:

publicity.

The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable

b.

The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some

success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would

be halted..

Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the

NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of

the

stigma of being associated with a party which could be

declared illegal, would join the party or become active

supporters.

The party would undoubtedly attract more members.

(Field Comment:

The NPD leadership is known to be worried

because the party's membership has not increased sigalfi-

cantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem:

Embassy

Bonn, USBER.

SECR

.. E I/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2

---

## Page 20

14-00000

Attends

"the lette

217200006"

-14X0:41

е на Дойов, ві, -ó1".;

Chich ol Beate Bolla

Chter of Station, Germans

sit:

Chick, Luropean Division

AGTIOTFLOJINOD - RETIM NEID

KEr: EGUC-21589, dated O September: 1969

1. No hie vory pleased with the quality of the informa-

tion

on the NeD which has been nade available thiough CATirROr.

It. 15 paiticularly useful during this piè-clection

period, but

WO

also appreciate not having to valt 6 to 8 vocks for CAMIISPEr

digest the material nud pass it on.

2. Aftci looling over the Reference, wo are inclined

to stick with the requirements mentioned in DIRECTOR 39281 for.

1tcms worthy of intel disschination..

In this context Bonn

Stato Departmont Telegram 12253 dated 1% September quotes

Forcign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence

that the Bast Germans, undoublcaly with Soviet approval, had

siven financial support to von Thadden.

While we are inclined

to tlink that Brandt's comment may be

wishful thinking,

evidence of Enst German finanuing for the NPD would bo

of great

Interost and utility.

Material not boiling on the requirenents

In DINICTOR 39281 should bn forwarded now lo licadquarters for

is a subject of intercst beyond

Marriet G. COCOLLATO

2 - COB/Berlin

- COS/Germans

CROSS ARTERENCE TO

Group I •

Excluded from Automatic

Downgrading and Declassification

DISFATCH SYNUEL AND NUMEER

EGBS-6522

CLASSIFICATION

IDATE

_8.0. SEP 169

€25

• September 1969

MOS TILE NUMGiR

SECRET

2 - E/G/R

1

• E/G/IS

orFick

E/G/R

_ F./REG/Chrono

OFFICE STAGOL

1

- C/FUR/R

1 - C/F/G/R

ORIGINATING

no. doris aband

TYPIST.

Cassandra Hortou

$I'0

COONGINATIPiG

16196

DATE

orricing there

C/E/G/R

ör rice sug

C/F.R

Голії

NELTALING

freera

---

## Page 21

Intelligence Information Report

14.6

of roofes

ker:

DIRECTORATE OP

NO FOREIG

DISSEN

MIS'IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NO

SECRET

COUNTRY .

West Gernany

DOI

Early August 1969

SUBJECT

Miscellaneous Infornation on

the

National Democratic Party

maoning

PAGE I OF2

PEAUNTED INTEHIGENCE

ESPORT NO.

DATE DiSTR

CS -311/05130-69

(22 September 1909

WP 2.4

PAGES

ACQ

Germany, Hamburg (15 August 1969)

FiELD NO.

EGG-1444

Member of the National Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein

whose reliability has not yet been established.

the information fron two district officials of the Party.

According to a ranking official of the Kiel district

of the National Democratic Party (NUD), Karl-leinz

Knipphals,

the chairman of the

Kiel district of the

VPD, and Adolf von

of the NPD.

are personal enemies.

Thad de "sauce comment: In

the national chairman

January 1969 Knipphals was elected io be his party district's

candidate for the West German Parliazent.

Knipphals, a Kiel

lawyer, is in his carly 50's.

He

was severely wounded during

Yorld Wus. II and has only one arm.)

2.

Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about,

that Knipphals, prior to joining

the PD, participated in

Faster Marches and received unfnvorable publicity.

more

void Thadden is concerned about knipphals' strong and

ruthless political ambicions.

lie has referred to Knipphals

a5 1

"second llitler", and

welcomes and encourages

that there is strong opposition to Knipphals even

Kiel district of the party.

reasons,

Von Thadden, for the above

would very much like to see knipphals remain on the

district level and is anxious

to keep him out of

the liest

German Parliament.

The same official. who made the remarks about von

Thadden and Knipphals.

also stated that many wealthy industrial-

contribute

to. the NPD anonynously,

because they do

their association or sympathy with the party to

become known.

STATE

The chairman of another NPD district in Schleswig-

Holstein stated that, in view

of the fact that each new

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEN

(closs. licorian)

¡Jis som controls!

DIA

INSA 1 CaS

(for fia's Dütid-lon 100 final paragresh)

55

4.1

33

23

• i

C/E/R

FIGR

E'GIRIP

E/G/R/C

TOTALS

NO LIAISON

braison.

IE 2. CT 3. FI 3. DO L. EUR 6

EGG-1444

CA INF ER

¡COOFOINATING, HELEASING

HIS: CHIC

---

## Page 22

14-00000

PAGE 2

OF 2 PAGES

Cs-311/08430-69

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEN

of the West German Parliament Is opened by its oldest

the NPD will insure that the oldest member of the next

Par llament will be an NPD man.

(Headquarters. Comment: The

possibility that an

NPD Deputy mirht open the Bundestag has

already been considered by the CDU.

See CS-31I708164-69:)

Field Dissem: None (sent Bong, Berlin)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN

DISSES!

---

## Page 23

entelligence Information i. port

'DIRECTORITE OF

THiS IS

- CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY Rest Germany

DOI

SUBJECT

1 January 1969

. German Goveranent Evidence against

the National Democratic Party (NPD).

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1. OF 1 PAGES

INFORMATION REFURT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. CS LT-313/01123-69

DATE DISTR

& July 1969)

ACQ

Germany, Bonn (26 March 1969)

FELD NO.

SOURCE An official Nest German security service.

EGN-4107

STATE

1.

A 77-page German-language report, describing the

National Democratic Party

(NPD) and presenting

documentary

and testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects

of the NPD,

has been

deposited

in the files of the CIA Docu-

ment and Pictorial Services Division,

be

from which copies may

The report is the shorter of two

obtained upon request Federal Office for the Protection of

prepared by

the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This

shorter version is said to be complete in substance and is

the version which was made available to Nest German Cabinet

members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the

NPD should be banned. The longer, two-volume version has not

been obtained.

2.

Appraisal of the legal validity of the evidence

against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order

of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an •

assessment of the NPD's "legality.

Also, pages 9 to 13--a

section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege

der Ideologie)--was omitted from the report at the request

of the Minister of the Interior.

(Headquarters Comment:

The cridence in the report appears to be

overt and less than

conclusive.

The West German Cabinet decided in the spring

of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD: substantial doubt

existed

as to whether

there were sufficient grounds to obtain

a legal ban of the NPD.

omissions from the text, referred

• to in this paragraph,.may reflect realization by the

Interior

Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD.)

4. Field Dissemination: U. S. Embassy Bonn (limited).

Distribution of Attachment:

CRS/ADD

CONFIDENTIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEN

(slossiframen)

NAYY ; Aid

(for field Distribution son Snal paragraph)

3

C/E/R

C/ELG

E/GLINT

E/GICE

ELGAR

DE/G/R (WP2: -1)

1E/G/R/L

LE/G/R/P

13/Bonn

2

TOTALS

IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EIR 9(2)

CANHISPER

EGN- 4107

COOPOINATINE!

BELGASINO

LIAISON

32

---

## Page 24

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

miarol ramssina lafarmation

raeline the retreat

Laws Toria 18. USC

and rod, the

please he no stole on i tri ini

i trut

toripod pierson

pratibited by tori.

DIRECTORATS.OP

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE I OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINAILY EVALUATED INIELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO.

..DATE DiSTR:

CS-311/06103 - 69

7 July 1969

COUNTRY

West Bertin/West Germany

DOI

March to Mid-lay.

1969

SUBJECT

ind Plans or he West Berlin vacional

ind Plans or the

Democratic Party

WP2.4

ACO.

SOURCE

Germany, Berlin.

(March

- Mid-May 1969)

FIELD.NO. EGB-24,611

Intercepted.communications,

supplemented by information from a

member

"of the West Berlin National Democratic Party (NPD) with

close contacts among members of the Berlin NPD Executive Council

and a record of accurate reporting.

Summary:

The Berlin NPD has been plagued by n split between the

Berlin

City lendership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders,

and the

"Loyalists

hended by the Berlin district leaders, who oppoged

von Thadden

in October 1968:. Court action led to the thwarting

of the plan for dissolution.

In an effort to keep the Berlin Party

alive, in mid March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party ac-

•tivities until after the september parliamentary elections.

Subse-

quently, von Thadden arranged a postponement of a scheduled Berlin

Party convention unti! October, because of the possibility of a ban

on the Berlin NPD by the Allles

and the

threat of trouble from the

militant left.

At the end of March, Berlin City NPD Chief Rudolf

Kendzia resigned

in an effort to promote party unity in Berlin,

but

he remains active behind the scenés.

Since carly April, the Berlin

NPD leadership has

followed von Thadden's guidelines.

The iniluence

of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with

von Thadden's

instructions party

activities have been circumspect.

Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD

will obtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel,

will

make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters

in Berlin

and enhance NPD chances during the 1971 Berlin communal elections.

Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD

in West Germany, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD strong-

hold.

End of Summary.

: '

1.

(Field Comment: In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had

approximately

dues-paying members.

According to a senior party

official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their

SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14 -o100 0900110000,

1001000108 6998-0-00

STATE

DIA

ARMY

NAYY

AiR

NSA

CAS

(for field Distribution ano fool paragraph)

(CZE/R

E 'G/R/L

F. GRIP

TE/G/CE

21

1

E/G/INT

E/SI

CIOP 'EU

CA/INT

CA/ PROP

2

TOTALS

IE 2,

CI 4,

FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9, CA 3

LIAISON

EGB-24, 611

CAYANK

CAVANISH

DOOMOMMATINO RELEARING

HW/JL

ront

---

## Page 25

" her.

C5-311 '06103-69

membersiip

membership

and ochers are dropping out quietly. In Naich the paid-up

was sboul 300.)

2.

Followinx the nbortive attompo oy the Nadienal Democratie

Party (NPD)

lendership do force the Berlin SPD io

dissolve itself for

tactical reasons in arober 1908, routine party. dertvity resuned al-

most dnmediacely.

It was charactertoed by a split between the leader-

ship.of the Berlin City (Landescerband) party undt and that of dis-

trict (Kreisserband) parts units.

Thie former are gonerally losal to

National Party- Chairman Adolf von Thndden and dlie nacional leadership

in Hanover and their broader tactical concepts, while the latter, re-

co us the

"Loyalists" (Satzunsstreuch defend the letier of the

The Loyalists

initially objected primarily to

the mechod of che attempted dissolution, but ihe friction wich che

clty Executive Committee (Landesvorstand) néaded by Rudolf Kendzia

led to cotal. mutual mistrust..

disloyal statements to the press, and

efforts to get each other expelled from the party by à party court

(Schtedsgericht)

At a seneral membership meeting in Berliw su l5 Narch 1969,

von Thadden attempted to achlevea truce within the party and ordered

that: chere be no "political organtzational activity" until after the

September 1962 parlinmentary elections.

At this meeting von Thadden

approved the scheduling of a Berlin party convention (Landesparieltag)

for 26 'April 1969, at which a new and hopefully more stable city

Exécutive Committee was to be elected.

The 15 Narch meeting provided an indication that the Berlin

NPD may

well stick together under von Thaddeu's guidance untll 1971:

in spite .of the triction

ketween city and district leadership. Al-

though the eigit?

spokesmen .for the local leadership,

floor after

Kendzia's situation

report and von Thadden's iiynote

approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing

the self-dissolutton of the local party, and no one contradicted them,

all but 31 of the 140 members present then voted for a resolution con-

demning District Chieis Johann Ratzek (Scheneberg) ond Philipp

Goelles (Wilmersdori), leaders of the Loynlists,

for anti-party

tivity.

This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the

tactics of

the Berlin :City leadership, and nciording to members present was due

solely to von Thadden's presence and influence.

In the view of these

members; a

meeting withoui the attendance of representatives of the

Hanover

headquarters would have led.to a no-confidence vote in the

Kendzla leadership.

Kendzia's

"Berlin Program,

During the meeting,

von Thadden also rejected

which called for a softer line on East

Germany and

on German reunlfication.

At the 15 March session, left-wing,

anti-NPD protestors

•assaulted a number of NPD

and forced the NPD twice to change

its

This leftist action and the obvious fact that the

militant left las a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seri-

ously

dampening effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in

The

now tentatively planning

lo hold future meetings

rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced

time of the meeting:

The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which

left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt

che 15 sarch meeting.

The Extraparliamentary Opposition .(APO) claimed

the

honor, but the NPD investigation showed definitely that all but a

handful of the protestors were an organized rroup dispatched by the

Spandau branch of the hest Berlin Socialist Unity. Party (SEW) whose

actions. are part of a long-range program of harassment by the East

Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition

Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus

Schuetz to the Allies asking that the NPD in Berlin be banned) and of

further counter-demonstrations by the militant left, on 27 March

von Thadden wrote & letter to the Berlin.Clty leadership asking Chat S

3

2

SEC'R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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## Page 26

5

SECRE T/NO FOREIGY DISSEM

Page 3 of a PAGES

CS-311/06103-69

the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the

normal expiration date.of the term

of the present city Executive

Committee and well after the intional elections.

The letter, which

was read at several distrtet mectings, also stipulated that the city

and district organizations were to restrict themselves to routine

monthly meetings with

no specches and no invited guests until next

Kenazla resigned on

In a tactical move to promote party unity,

Party 'Chlef

to von Thadden's letter,

the Berlin district pur-runit leadership, which otherwise remained

intact, called a session of. the: Berlin Party Counctl (Landesausschusg)

on lo April to approve the postponement of the party convention.

(Fleld Comment: The Party Council consists of the Executive Committee

plus the T2 district leaders.) Walter Seezen, a member of the na-

tional leadership, was present.

The situation wag ticklish because

the Berlin NPD statutes provide thät if füll membership meetings in

-four of the 12 dtstricts had voted for holding of the party conven-

tion in April, the postponement motion would fail; there was i dig-

tinct danger that this could occur.

.At the 10 April meeting, the

district leaders grumbled "but approved the postponement until

11 October.

On Kendzia's resignation, Guenther Mensel, a member of the

Executive Committee, was selected as. Acting Pe. ty

of the Party Council until a new Executive Committee is elected

Mensel, an attorney, was hesitant about necepting the jok

of its possible effect on

his practice, and did not commit

himself until the 10 April executive meeting..

Mensel's age (62)

stability were' the main reasons for his selection.

The only other

replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive

Committee,

whom Kendzia did not trust.

Mensel's duties are to con-

sist of calling

and chairing pro-forma monthly Executive Committee

nettings and. of presiding at the party

congress next October.

Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical re-

treat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin dig-

trict leaders, by von

Thadden's public rejoction of his "Berlin

Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a

hit-and-run car nccident involving a bicyclist on 27 March.

Mensel to remain aclive behind the scenes and set up a

vacant office in his place of business as party hendquarters,

himself ard Exccutive Committce members Frank Schwerdt,

Joachim Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of

Kendzia and a majority

of the NPD leaders hope that the fall

elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members

into the Bundestag.

they feel, will make the party more acceptable to potential

right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing

¿he 1971 Berlin communal elections.

(Source Comment:

NPD's major problem in

its membership intact and

its machinery functioning until 1971.

-Whether Kendzia will hold to

his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefi-

nitely, and whether he will emerge as leader in 1971, are open ques-

because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program

and policies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in

its "General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin

Program."

A Close friend of Kendzla's, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned fron

the NPD. to protest. its participation in the presidential election in

Berlin on 5 March

and has already made overtures to the FDP.)

Since Kodzia's resignation and the 10 April executive meet-

Berlin City Executive Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the-

scenes tutelage)

has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the

Hanover leadership. Executive Committee members (espectally Schwerdt,

Rebuschat and Andreas) have attended annual election meetings in all

12 party distriets.

Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or

neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case. s

The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution

2

SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEN

---

## Page 27

SECRE TINO FOREIGN DISSEN

Page 1 08.8 PAGES

05-311/06103-69

of the Berlin NPD last fall haye been effectively cipelled oi neu-

tralized.

As of early May, Loyalist Influence had bein greatly re-

duced.

Although there is

no no significant internal opposition

group, there das a call pending for formation of on informal group

representing both the city

organization and the districts to propose

organizatlonal changes.

Routine monthly district meetings with

"guests" from fest Germany, anenever possible, are to he continued,

under the watchful eye of the pro-tem Exccutlve Committee, unt 11

next. October when the party convention of the Berlin NPD will elect

new-leadership.

.13:

schuerz' attenpts to have the SPD binned in Berlin have

not been

taren seriously.

Local. party

activists are preparing to

support the NPD election

in West Germany by sending volun-

teer workers.'

•A letter appealing for

such help states that the de

Cisive clectoral campaign which will determine whether

or not. the

gets into the Bundestag will be waged in North Rhine-Westphalla.

and living expense subsidies are being offered to volun-

teers who are to distribute leiflets, put up posters and ring door-

(Field Comment:

The NPD made inroads in North Rhine-

Westphalla during the

economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD

national lendership is counting heavily on salvaging their foothold

in the Bielefeld-Ruhr area.)

The main NPD weapons in the national election campaign are

describing the party's election platform. One

to be distributed beiween 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet,

30 August; and a third pamphlet on the eve

of the elec-

Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies.

Distribution will

be handled by two firms--Velbringer Company

and Erdmann Company.

Ruediger Krauss, head of the NPD's student organization,

the National University League (Nationaler Hochschulbund - NHB),

from Berlin to Bonn to assume

the post of chairman of

Bonn City NPD Executive Committee.

Von Thadden plans to use the

tactic of moving tellable leaders

into critical areas nfter the

elections.

For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to

Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD.

to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy,

a Hungarian law student and good friend of Krauss, is to be ap-

pointed 'Krauss'

successor.

16. Field Dissem:

USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent Bonn) .

5

S

R

E

TINO FOREIGN DISSES

---

## Page 28

14-00000

8C B1

Kir:

Yese 19664

i!tС"

ii""

"eut Cernany

June 1968

Mest Geraso HIalstry of

Interior

Bvaluution of the Prospect:s

Bannion the Nitional Dinocratic

Party

GermaDy (l Septexber 1969)

•Ei-913

A sedlua-level dent German government offlelal sho 101 lous

the acciulties ni the National lamocrable Parsy sod oho har.

10 the study durdog his offleial dutles.

mas extracted iron the uriginal docurent and 18 be-

lleved to be au

accurate auscary ol lto highlighio.

Sunnary: In June 1968, the Hest German Mislatry of tho Interlor

prepared a basic atudy

of the prospacts of banniug the Fest Geraan

Haclobal laocrutic Party (NPD).

The sunaury of this study glen

belon described the sjor charges which the sovernsent could bring

against the NPD, the defeuses the NeD could be expected to eute

against these charges, and the probable poilticri results shlch

sculd follus both a succesafui und an unsuccessiul cage againgt the

MPU, Accordins to the source, thia study la atill considered tbe

haale Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the ed rod

1a being atudied by sentor lederal sovernent dad state (Raad)

officina. End of SurBarz..

1.

(Peld Connent: For deveral yearg, "est terman political

and governucat

-leadern

baye debared secklag a coustitutional court

ban on i2c

MPD. Cu 13 Novender 1968, Br18k

Bends,

Interior dinigter, advised Chancellor Kurt Georz

that there wag

sufilcient evidence

to warrant bringing a suit

8g8116t

cerose poltrica. "n 23 Aptll 1369,0

the: Federal Cabluet decided not to gect

a court ban of the NºD, at

leagt until after

she Septerber elections.

Thia decialon vas

prospted by evidence

thst the NPD was

mating no meatership inlas

and: apparently mas lagiag popular supvort.)

§RE BE TINO YOBRIGN DISSNA

---

## Page 29

14-00000

SACRST NO FONION MISSES

Page

2.

Tu dune 1908, tic Heel Grade lndetlOr Whigiry preparèd

50-paje study of the prospecty dur teleg the NPD

entliled

"Consideratious Begording

a Ban of eir Marional Drescratic Prrsy."

The study.

written

'onsidered the bogic Interior Bluistly paper o

and

18:

Delay studded by sendor mificials or both the cudital dod sence

Is avoids jiving an polaton on loe prospcats of ob

naa1cst the NeD, bue toon the contiat of

chari scody, il is clear that

the authots bollered that the courts'

would probably reject overreat proposal to

Field comment:

If the study lo still considered current,

unclear hou 10 tits with. Bonda'a Movember l0sò statement nat there

was sulficant evidence to dotals a ban agalust tbe upd.

bare ken otder reports, horever, that ine evidence vus uot as

clear-cut as bends

wouid. have bad che Chancellor Sellove.

Example, SGN-3881.)

The study sumoartzed abe case which could be brought

agatost the NPU AN

follows:

it could be shown that thore was a sanilarity

betHECH IDe NDi suù

ine National Sociallot. Grand MIrkers

Party (NSDAP) Mulch Dog ten outlawed..

Is could be armad coat the goale, and

the parry placiora.

of the NPD arE COOLIaTy is

ciples of a frue democritle state.

The sindy concludes that a suiftclently sorony case could be ore

senced de prevent the cast dilns throws out sy.tne courty vithout

The study ilots the inllowing rolais whicb the KPD could

be expected to use

in iti dietcase:

The party could prove that ic has given flin Initrue-

b. It could show thet a sircrble nusdir of toracr

NSDAP meadors have been forced mit of the party as part

Which Is could polli ous sany leacured of its progres

An accord wich denociate prisciples.

d. It could show that lis elected representatives

bare worked wath

utiet parties

and have not disrupted the

Lendtake

(aiate diets) and other clected boddes in which

They participate.

It could polni out that ocher polliteal parties

bave many ex-Nazls lad ex-connunists as sinbre and

claim that che majority of the

28,000 NPD a abera are not

opposid to the concept of the federal Republic.

It would charge cha: the government'a charges were

one-gided, unfairly preseuted, and out uf dare.

It would clala that noc all us protessor (tou?

ABrich

points dere

luciuded lu the party plat.

form.

Anilen is appareatly a rightist

wbose privosals were aure extreme that those incorporated

in the party piacfora.)

It could clain thad the increased violence

(Verronune) of the political climate in Yest Craauy is

the fault of thi Heu loft and not of the NeD.

SEONE TINN FINTICE TISSEU

---

## Page 30

SEUR E TINO FOREIGN DISSEN

F288 3

study yraces coac lo would de very dificult to re-

Sula coese Neu deicases lu court.

The surernuent dould dato so

adait chut, since enrly 1968 there have been very feu statesedis

made by Npo leaders, ur incidunts causc dy inc HPD, prict could

be used to suppore the soverment's case.. Objectivels, lo would

have to be udaitrea, chat uany lacideats o1 revionce in which the

NPD bas ben Invnived vere initiaied by opponinis of lur party.

The

giudy predicts the followias probabie resulss should

the soveruncht ulu lto case agalost the NPU:

s.: The Neo would probably respect tùe prosibicico.

It l8.verj.uultkely tont. the

MPD would attempt to so uader-

ground as the illegal Communist Perty of Goráody (KPD). dad.

b. NiPD members ind ayapathizers would oni clonge cholr

opintons because of a bas.

Many mouid j010 older groups

or parties and contine to pork for their political laliefs.

UPD and rightist syupathizers vould beyin a cas-

for Lho

brandog of the new Cormas Coaturist Party

(DKP) and other leftiat groupe.

A ban of the Mpy would he vell received in forcigs

COURIElES.

7.

The study corcludea that lf the coveronent shoula lose a

СЯЗЄ

agalnst the

ips, lt would be the result of the

lack at raild

evidence (Dewetuschwertakelten. la such an evere, che forlorios

adverge affects touls occur:

The NPD would recelve a neu impetus and valuable

publicity.

D. The policy of

Selbstreintgung which has had 500s

BUCCESS In HEEDiNG LOTUET MULIS

out of sey posicioas could

be halted.

Many middle-class porsong uno syapathize mich the

i', but who

reirained from open support because of

the stigan of bejug

assoclated wiid a party which could be

illegal, norid coin the party or becose sctive

The party sould undoubtedly attracs nore desbers.

(Field Comment:

The NPD leadersalp 18 kaoen to be

sorrted

because

the party's acalership

sas not increased signiti-

cantly during the past is nonths.)

3. Field Disses:

Sabassy Bloan, USBER.

SECRE TINO FORGIGI BISSEN

---

## Page 31

14-00001

Secret

No Foreign Dissem

BETRAL NO

ОЛСЕ АСЕМО

LI

DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

West Germany's National Democrats and the Grand Coalition

.. .

Secret

?!9

61 May 1968:

No. 0022/68A

---

## Page 32

14-00000

Fidg

SECRET

WEST GERMAN'SDITIONAL DEVOCRATS IND THE GRANUCOALITION

Gernas!''s far-right National Democratic Party

(NPD) showed another increase

in strength in recent

elections 'in Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social

Democrats (SPD) lost heavily.

This outcome in a

traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears

to stem in part from the dissatisfaction of many

Socialists

and trade unionists

in

the SPD with

their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian

Democrats (CDU) .

Another

factor was the discontent

of farmers. and refugees with the policies

the

Grand Coalition

in Bonn.

Consern over student dis-

orders contriblited to

the teJ gains, but this was

not

as -decisive

as

some have

supposed.

Despite -

these gains, the NPD

is unlitely

to

achieve

growth comparable to that of she lazi Party in the

early 1930s.

The outcome in Baden-Huerttemberg confirmed

the belief of many Socialists

that their coopera-

tion with

the CDU at both

the rational and state

level is proving to be unprofieaole

for the party.

As a result,

they have

already decided at the

state

level not to renew

cabinet cooperation with the

CDU in Bader-wuerttemberg,

thus

making prospects

for the Bona coalition appear less favorable.

Nevertheless,

SPD leaders in sorn rerain cormitted

to the Grand Coalition and

setious instability at

the federal level seems unlikely.

Over the long

run the outcore

of. this

lates=

election may lave

certain

implications nationally,

including

the

possibility

that

Bonn leaders

nay be encouraged

to take a more nationalist lize.

The NPD's Success

The West German state elec-

in Bacen-Wuertte-berg on

28 horil brcught the far-right

National Derocratic Part!' (NPD)

9.8 percent of the vote,

attained in any state earned

percent of the voters

out, apuroximately three percent

note than in the last Baden-

merttenberg state election in

1954,

but

15 percent

less

than

in the

1965 federal election.

Christian Denocratic Union

(03ü) strength

fell slightly to

44.1 percent (1964:

46.2 per-

cer=l, while the Social Demo-

cratic Party

(SPD) achieved a

vote of only

29.1 percent (1964:

Page

SECRET

SPECIAL REPOST

31 May 68

---

## Page 33

14-00000

PARTIES IN

BADEN-WUERTIEMBERG

19.68

121 Seals

SPD

37

CDU

60

1964

18

KPO 12

120 Seals

CDU

59

SPO

• 41.

EDP 18

37.3

percent).

The liberal Fres

Democratic Party (FDP),

made

slight gain, winning 14.4 percent

of the vote 11964:

13.1 percent).

October's

Bremen

elections,

which the National Democratic

Party won what was then

record

percentage of 8.9,

the Baden-

Wuerttemberg results brought re-

newed cries of

aiarm over

the

dangers of neo-Nazism in the Fed-

eral Repubiic.

More important,

the results also raised doubts

as to the future of a coalition

government by the Christian Dem-

ocrats and Social Democrats, not

only in Baden-wuerttemberg

but

at the federal government level

as well.

Baden-Wuerttemberg:

A Test Case

SECRET

ably lower than elsewhere in

Germany.

The

hotbeds of Nazism

lay in other regions, for ex-

ample in Franconia,

East Prussia,

and Schleswig-Holstein.

The economic and

social pic-

ture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would

lead to expectations of stability

there.

The proportion of the

population now employed in in-

dustry is higher

than in any

other state.

The economy of the

state wag

virtually untouched by

the recent West German recession,

during which unemployment never

exceeded one percent.

Per cap-

ita

income is above

average.

Protestants and Catholics are

almost evenly balanced in pop-

slation, while the proportion of

protestants in the Federal Re-

public is

slightly higher.

few observers correctly

forecast the outcome, but the

general expectation was that

the

vote for the National Democratic

Party would be lower than in

Bremen.

The two major west Ger-

man polling organizations had

predicted in March that

the NPD

would

receive five percent of the

vote.

Federal-level politicians

Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger,

a popular native son, made a

three-day speaking tour, in which

vote in this

area was almost always appreci-

Page

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

31 May

68

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## Page 34

14.00000

SIGREI

NPD Representation in West German Srates

5.88.(4 0e980)

23 April 107

NOSTRIN

1.110151 '%

8.88

ЗÜ: (DжA1»)

si lent in

• LON'ER

78 (10) xents)

* Jure 'si

NESICIALIN

7.95 (8 xc968)

r.Nse i6

6.98 (f seас»)

5.4.11

9.8° (12 16285)

18.Aprl 'N0

7-+8 (1516983)

clin. 10

WUERTTEMBERCE

PCSÃO 3 08

Page

3

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Hay

68

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## Page 35

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The participation by na-

tional figures reflected a feel-

ing in. ionn that this state elec-

tion,

the

last before thé

1969

federal election, might influence

national politics..

Tho analogy

to the federal scene was pointed

up by the existence in Baden-.

Huerttemberg of a coalition of

Christian Democrats and Social

Denocrats, similar to that in

Bonn.

Reaction to. Student Riots

In

looking for explanations

of the NPD gains,

German observ-

ers have emphasized the public

reaction ayainst the Easter stu-

dent rioting, and dissatisfaction

with

the

federal grand coalition.

Conservatives. lean to the former

explanation.

while students

and

trade unionists

stress the latter.

The NPD did not receive less than

6 percent in any electoral dis-

trict.

This suggests that the

sentiment expressed by the vote.

is widesproad,

and may extend

throughout the FRG.

Reaction to student rioting

probably contributed something,

but this aspect seems to have

been exaggerated as a factor in

"ep gains.

In Heidelberg,

the

IPD vote rose to 11.9 percent,

but in three other university

towns,

the party's vote fell

below

the state average of 9.8

percent.

In industrial Esslingen,

where there had been two stu-

dent riots, the PD only

attained

9 percent.

been

Some voters may have

influenced by student dem-

onstrations to transfer their

sates

fron

the SPD to the CDU,

whose spokesmen have generally ad-

vocated a stern treatment of

rioters.

. At the same time,

the "new.

left"

certainly failed to win

popular support. The Democratic

Left, supported by

radical stu-

dents, won only 2.3 percent in

the state as a whole, while mak-

ing better showings in certain

university and industrial local-

ities..

While the Democratic

Left's stato-wide average was bet-

ter than the far left had at-

tained in recent elections under

other names, it fell below the

last,

low

figure gained by

the

Communists before

they became

illegal: 3.2 percent.

Hostility to the Grand Coalition?

There is dissatisfaction

with the

coalition within the

CDU,

and it can be assumed that

some of the party's right wing

voted for the National Democrats.

The Socialists, however,

suffered

the greater loss.

Left-of-center

Socialists often complain

that

the party has

compromised its

principles and lost public favor.

There is an undercurrent of feel-

ing in these quarters that the

party has endangered German democ-

racy

by

abandoning its

long-

time position of opposition and

entering into collaboration with

the CDU.

Although the SPD has pro-

vided much of the impetus to the.

grand coalition's economic and

the con ition en

berg has generally

functioned

well; dissatisfaction

undoubtedly

exists among idealistic members

of the left and among tradition-

ally class-conscious union. mem-

Middle class voters of

this persuasion vrobably turned

Page 4

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to the Frée Denocratic Party.

which has assumed the rola of

respectable opposition.

The

connection'between.thig: left-

liberal criticism and the NPD

gains on. 28 April is not-imme-

diately apparenc..

Some commentators including

Socialists. conclude that

many SPD voters

defected to the

The respected Frankfurter

Allgemeine zeitung fudged some

of the election data to support

its argument that workers had

gone over, to the NPD, but a more

careful analysis has

shown

that

the NPD did indeed win above-av-

erage support in some working-

class neighborhoods.

Many old

Socialists and

trade

unionists,

such

as willi

Bleicher,

the powerful boss of

the

metalworkerg in this state,

are cool to the

coalition and

hostile to intellectuals,

and

some of them

are repelled by an-

archic student

leftism.

Even 30,

most workers are unlikely under

conditions of full employment to

cast what they would consider a

neo-Nazi vote;

certainly

Bleicher

would never

favor such

action.

SPD electoral losses would seem

to be due less to defection to

the NPD than

to the failure of

lower-level SPD functionaries,

apathetic,

or even hostile toward

tho coulition, to get out thu

vote, and to the failure of many

trade union and

normally SPD

voters to go to the polls.

In traditionally socialist

Mannheim,

only

58

percent of

those entitled to vote

turned out.

SPD percentages

dropped 14 per-

cent

in one

district and 13 per-

cent in another.

The percentage

of NPD. strength

rose to 12.1,

10.9,. and 11.? in the three city

districts, büt working class

votes would not be needed to pro-

vide

these percentages, espe-

cially in the face of a low SPD

tutnout.

These votes probably

came mainly from the

CDU, the

FDP, of from those who had not

voted before.

NPD Activity Pays Off

The NPD organization worked

hard during the

campaign, con-

dusting more meetings than all

the other parties put together.

The party has overcome its former

inesperience and disunity.. and

is developing into a well-oiled

political machine.

The organ-

Iration fields speakers

and pro-

Vides canned speeches

and prop-

aganda materials to local groups.

The NPD's heritage is not purely

Nazi.

It encompasses more re-

spectable antecedents, such as

the Deutschnationaler

(German

Nationalists) and other conser-

vative elements.

In the inter-

ests of avoiding a government

ban,

the National

Democratic

Party shuns blutantly Nazi

appeals and tactics.

Adolf von Thadden, the na-

tional leader of the NPD, is a

smooth personality from a Junker

farily who denies charges that

he was an active Nazi.

He seems

to model himself more on De

Gaulle than on Hitler.

The

Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the

is a

party, Wilhelm Gutman"the good

former Nazi.

During

old days," he was Buergermeister

of Tiengen on the swiss border,

where he sponsored anti-semitic

Page 5

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31 May 68

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14-00000

SICKEI

activities in 1938.

He refused

to permit the raising of white

flags

when the Allied forces ar-

rived in 1945. Despite his past,

he won 15,000 votes

in Karisruhe.

In one commune in the northern

end of the state, the NPD gained

an absolute majority with 55 per-

cont of the vote; this was. the

home öf an NPD candidate named.

Valentin Goetz, who had been :

voted

out as Buergormeister.two

years before.

and who have eccently suffered

the los's

of a:state

subsidy on

milk. Rural dissatisfaction pro-

vides opportunities for the NPD,

but this

is not a promising base

tor a mass movement, particularly

sirce the farm population in the

Federal Republic has dropped in

the last ten years from 20 per-

cent to ll percent.

Another im-

portant voting

factor in this.

northern area

is the relatively

high proportion of refugees, who

were probably

aroused by

recent

statements by Willy Brandt about

the Oder-Neisse line and by the

failure of the CDU to react more

forcefully against Brandt.

The NPD won its greatest

districts:

(14.8 percent), Crailsticim 114.5

percent), and l'auberbischofsheim

(14.3 percent).

districts arc largely prot-

estants the latter is predomi-

This northern

lohe section,

is filled with

satisfied small farmers, who now

face Common Market competition

As was the

case in the

early

1930s,

overwhelmingly

Catholic areas, where the Church

influences its

merers politi-

cally, had the lovest right ex-

tremist vote.

One overwhelm-

ingly Protestant district,

Froudenstadt, also produced

ADOLF VON THADDEN

WILHELM GUTMANN

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68

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SECRET

low. NPD vote.

A postelection

poll

of 1967 votors

in Bromen

showed. that, unlike the Hitler

movement, the National Democrats

do not yet attract many women

and youth.. More thin two thirds

of the voters for the party,

were males, and the strongest

participation was in the 45 to

.60 ago bracket.

FDP Gains and Losses

The FDP profited from its

position

in the opposition.

Ralf

Dahrendorf,

a sociologist from

the University of. Konstanz with

an international reputation, has

recently entered

the party and

has assumed a leading rolc, in-

fluencing

the FOP

in a loftward

direction and

attracting

left-

liberal support.

In the Stuttgart

district where he was a candidate,

the party vote rose by 6 percent.

On the other hand, the now pat-

tern is not acceptable

to many

old members

of this tradition-

ally business-oriented

party, who

10oking

askance at Dahrendorf's

readiness to

debate and discuss

with Rudi Dutschke and otner rad-

ical students.

Two of

the

three

districts with heaviest NPD gains

also showed healy FDP losses, as

did

some other former FDP

areas

of

strength.

Perspectives on the Vote

he over-all picture appear:

o be that while both the Chris.

tian Democrats

and the Frec Demo-

crats lost to the NPD,

they gained

at the expense of

the

Socialists.

The Socialists suffered from

apathy and incurred some loss to

both

the NPD and Democratic Left.

The NPD probably garnered some

new and unconmitted

votes.

it

is fortunate

for the SPD leaders

in Bonn that the annual party.

congress came before the Baden-

Wuerttemberg election.

It 1s

hardly likely that the congress

would now defeat a motion with-

holding. endorsement of the coali-

tion,

as it did by a four-vote

margin in March.

Assuming

the

SPD remains faithful to the

Bonn coalition now, the prospects

are for further erosion of its

strength and for greater diffi-

culties within its ranks.

Meanwhile, the NPD probably

will continue to grow in

in-

fluence.

It now

is probably

stronger in some other areas

than in Baden-Wuerttenberg.

change from proportional rep-

resentation to single-member.....

constituencies, which might have

aishe

relished

•Mannheine

Baden-

Wuertemberg

"Heidelborg

Heilbronn.

•Karksrube

Pror:heini

Ochringen

Craltiheins

"STUTTGART

"Enalingen

Freudenstaile

Tichingen

Ulm'

aFrerburg

Tiengen,

Constant

90621 3.68

Page 7

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31 May 68

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## Page 39

SECRET

served to block NPp growth, has

now become even less

acceptable

than before to the SPD, which;

would. have lost three-fifths of

its Baden-Wuerttemberg. scats

under this system:

A ban of the NPD appears

unlikely unless the party

com-

mits

some flagrant violation of

accepted rules.

A Bonn press of:

i the government will.scok a po-

:litical debate with

the NPD, and

not a ban.

NPD may get 40 scats in tho

on present for 1969

Bundestag elections.

in attempt

to set a higher minimum per-

centage of votes (present mini-

for Bundestag.

representation would arouse.

not

seem to be under surious con-

sideration at the moment.

would violate German tradition,

and might produce a reaction in

favor of the NPD,

enabling it

to overstep even

the new margin.

Although the growth of

the NPD is disturbing,

alarm does

not seem

to be warranted.

In the

carly

1930s,

Germany

suffered

from depression

and high unem-

ployment,

and had bitter memories

of a recent inflation which wiped

out savings.

Powerful clements

in the government and society,

including President von linden-

bergy the sury, the nunsy

army, the courts, and

re-

actionary and either cool ur hos

tile to republican democracy--as

were the professors and students.

Racism was rampant and more or

less respectable, and unwilling-

tos

to accept defeat in World

War I provided endless opportu-

nities for demagoguery. All

these conditions

are: nor vir-

tually absent.

The "defeat in

1945, and subsequent disclosures,

to discredit any real Nazi

manifestations..

Moreover, the

fact that no other 'staté will

a new assembly before the

1969 federal elections may help

to prevent a real bandwagon de-

It must be emphasized

that the NPD is still a small

party, if no longer a mere splin-

ter group.

The Coalition Problem

German observers tend to be

more worried about the effect of

the NPD showing on foreign opin-

ion than about the increase in

NPD strength itself, and their

greatest concern is

the grand coalition,

resulting from the SPD losses.

A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD. conven-

tion voted on 18 May against con-

tinuing the coalition in Stuttgart,

and the old state SPD leaders

coalition less favorable.

At the same time, the FDP

appcars not to be in a mood to

return to a coalition in either

Bonn or Stuttgart.

In this event, they

would appeal for an absolute ma-

jority from the voters.

got it and if the NPD rote de-

clined, this would be encouraging,

but new elections might also have

a less favorable outcone.

Page 8

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31 May 69

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SECREI

If the 1969 federal election

follows the pattern of the 28.

April election, the same problems

will arise in Born.

Wịth

this

kind of a breakdown

of-the

vote,

the FDP and

the. SPD together cán-

not form a majority,

and a re-

fusal 'ön. the

part of both of

them

to join

the CDU

means that

-the latter cannot organize a ma-

jority government either--unless

the CDU invites NPD 'collabora-.

tion, which it is far from ready

to do..

collapse of the grand

coalition in Bonn either before

•or after 1969 and a return by

the SPD to opposition positions

would signify more than a passing

cabinet crisis.

In the past,

parties tended to harden into

intransigence, committed to par-

ticular

ideological and material

interests, and unablé to

reach

pragmatic compromises

with each

other.

In recent years, West

German politicians

have tried to

break with this tradition and

to work

ot the consensus prin-.

ciple.

A failure of these ef-

forts would have serious impli-

cations.

If--as does not

seem

• likely at present--the three

major parties were

unable to

form a majority government, this

might lead to severe instability

and the discrediting of par-

liamentary government.

Bonn and Weimar

Many misleading analogies

have been drawn .between the Bonn

and Weimar republics

One weimar

precedent may help,

however,

to

explain why

some observers view.

the coalition problem seriously.

In March 1930, another grano

coalition with SPD participatior

collapsed

ovar the question of

cuts in unemployment insurance,

leading to the formation of a

conservative majority

government

under Heinrich Bruening..

Bruening

was later replaced by the reac-+

tionary Franz von Papen, who in

turn was followed first by a wire-.

pulling general, Kurt von

Schlei

cher, and 'then by Adolf Hitler.

The worst aspect of the SPD with-

drawal was

that it made the par-

liament ineffective and power-

less.

Once minority government was

embarked on, supported by presi-

dential prerogatives, there was

no effective test for legitimacy

except the will of Hindenburg by

then susceptible and old. The

Nazis ultimately came to power,

not by a majority vote, but through

the paralysis

and impotence of the

constitutional system

and through

intriques in the presidential

palace on the part of those, espe-

cially Papen and Schleicher,

could "use" Nazi

In contrast to the 30s,

the presidential powers now are

far weaker,* and aside from all

the other factors inhibiting a

recurrence, the Weimar precedent

itself must influence SPD leaders

in Bonn.

They are completely

committed personally to the pres-

ent coalition.

A decision to

o into opposition is unlikel

under Brandt and wehner

"The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dungers. In a butter parliamentury desalluck, un

illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovermentil elements, mighe be the only way out.

Page 9

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SICKEI

Another possibility might

be a left-wing withdrawal .from

the SPD,

although the

leadership

for a dissident faction has yet

to emerge.

a healthy

outlet

Thet more provide

criticisn

of the system without. a turn to

minority rule.

Unlike the early

19305,

virtually all West Ger-

man politicians now would do their

best to maintain a functioning

constitutional system.

Real.

dangers will probably not arise

unless, as in the late weimar

period, the government finds it-

self confronted with economic

or political problems which seem

to defy compromise settlement or

rational solution:

the extent to which the results

continue to be attributed

student activities, this will

strengthen the demand for firm-

Even before the election,

Brandt sent a telegram to SPD

state headguarters, advising that

speakers should react "completely

hard" against student demonstra-

Immediate Prospects

Assuming

that the Bonn co-

alition lasts until the 1969

elections, its leading members

may

still

modify their policies

somewhat in the light of the

Baden-Wuerttemberg

experience.

The adverse vote of the refugees

in the recent election could act

as a brake on the policy of de-

tente with Czechoslovakia and

Poland;

although there is no sign

of this

as yet.

Chancellor Kie-

singer has

attributed NPD gains

partly to "years

of agitation

neans ser -confidence and against

healthy self-confidence,"

suggests that he may

a more nationalistic note.

not to sound

Although the antistudent re-

action does not seem to have been

as important a factor as some have

believed it to be, constant vio-

lence and provocation on the part

of the students, accompanied by

constant press attention, could

lead to severe official or unof-

ficial counteraction.

This, in

turn, could bring more scrious

student violence,

perhaps with

the support of other elements.

Some matters of student con-

cern have appeal

for others.

Thus

students and many trade unionists

oppose emergency laws, and this

question is

. again

being

agitated.

Because of the Nazi experience,

there

is widespread aversion among

left-of-center elements to the

use of force in the name of

der,"

"or-

however great the provoca-

tion.

But also because of the

Nazi

experience, a really large

increase in NPD votes does

not

seem likely in the 1969 election,

or in an earlier new election ir

Baden-Wuerttemberg,

should that

come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Page 10

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

31 May 68

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## Page 42

14-00000

Secret

ntamge 1a19n 14dMaaret153rea tenidere efergicalr sodanees

Secret

saiaii

---

## Page 43

14-00000

2. 13 larsh 185, carnal Slechlen,

501s.919.

sue to peritalisto.

1 {68 810)

Cyrcal 8100:107g

cnly 1a Frania'il9.

1, 27 Merah 12ó Mrssurg Burroraitort sitatica

So 10 July 1900 Furthrhola-iestatalla Lasitag 51334101

6o 16 Quintor 280 Palin Solsottou (Cuornal Concil)

7 610940. 1966 Forio lasdtag SIrotlong

20 traDur, 186 PararIan leallrg kloatic2d

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schi.ght-80108013

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lover Saxory.

M. 1l Coccher 19i7 Buzen furgraschalt

12.

636, 15900:08 = 251

PD rag.0.0011d0:05,

105=a 1a 155.

1.68 et tubel Errarien

Midlo 7007019

1031909 - 5.15

55223899-

3,29

5520 7-22.91281

sumets - 8.43

- 5.38

A2ahad9 - 5.03

3008 (1.55 1n 1965)

30 ciriliatas alostod

8.05.(098 1 850883

50910:73 7 7,061

sentirgillesbedon, Lessate

aal 61: 1502 =97 1038

N/M= 5.15

vedas = 7.13

15 Sesto 1a Landiag

450a68, 3.78 os roto

10 Sasi, 7 8 0 1010:

5 Sisis, 8.3 $ ci FoCa

12 5-109, 9.8 & of Toto

піч

---

## Page 44

14-00000

Secret

Me Fineigne Dissem

PETE LIGENC

AGENCH

DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

The National Democratic Party in West Germany

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

Secret

N°

310

9 June 1960

SC No. 00773/678

---

## Page 45

14-00000

SECRET

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN WEST GERMANY

The poor showing of the ultranationalistic

National

Democratic Party (SPD) in

recent elections

in several West German

states clearly

disproves the

party''s

claim of providing

an acceptable alternative

to the policies and programs of the country's major

parties:

The NPD's failure to maintain the

mamen tum

suyuested by the successes scored in two state

elections last fall is directly. attributable both

to its own well-publicized internal dissension and

to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and

Socialists deriving from the image of vigor anjo

decisiveness imparted by

their

"grand coalition"

under Chancellor Kiesinger.

Barring some serious

reversal in the fortunes of the kiesinger goverment-

which is unlikely--it is doubtiul that the NPD till

be any more

successful than other fringe groups have

been in

sceking to rally latent right-radical serti-

ment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political

force.

Election Setbacks

The MPD has claimed wide

attention both

in Germany and

abroad and led many observers

to conclude that it was a force

to be reckoned with.

Within two

and a half years of its

founding

in November 1964, the party

elected representatives to

the

legislatures in five of West

Germany's

ten states (l1 counting

West Berlin).

In elections this

April the party was expected to

obtain close to 10 percent of

the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate

and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-

seats

with 6.9

respectively.

election in the party's

base bastion" of Lover saxony,

the NPD's

performance Nas

simi-

larly unimpressive--7 percent

of the. vote and 10 Landiag

seats.

Emphasis by party leaders

on their success in gaining rep-

resentation in all the states

where the party has coaceted

during the past year has not

masked their disappoint-ent that

the NPD's

momentum of groith has

leveled off.

The party's failure

to make a good showir, in

Schleswig-Holstein ars Lower

saxony--areas considered particu-

to nationalist

ard raises fundamental soubt

about the party's future pros-

Page 1

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SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun 67

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## Page 46

SICKEI

NPD) Representation in West German States

9.87 (4 resea)

50M!.0G

11E1.311.1:.

PREMEN

• LOWER

SAXONI

7x (10 жака)

NORIE SHINE .

WEST PHALIA

7.93 (8 sala)

WIRA KATE:

SAAR

BADEN-

WUERTTEMBERG

7-47 (15

.::

BAVARLA

30910

6 07

---

## Page 47

14-00000

SECRET

Origins: and Early Successes

Förmed from the remnants of.

the defunct

German

Reich Party

(DRP) -óne of a number of ultra-

nationälistic: splinter groups

_which häve dotted the political

landscape of postwar Germany--the

NPD. quickly established a polit-

ical apparatus capable of func-

toning throughout the country.

The new party soon distinguished

Itself by its relative success

in attracting the support of other

ultranationalistic-elements and a

variety of political malcontents.

Earlier: attemcts by other groups

to unite disparate nattonalists

invariably had

sonal rivalries and tactical dis-

agreements.

Some were. no more

than platforms for self-expres-

sion by leaders advocating a

particular set of extremist no-

tions.

Even the most successful,

the

Socialist feich Party (SRP),

which at its high water mark

obtained 1l percent of the vote

in the Lower Saxony Landtag elec-

tions

in 1951, was unable to

establish effective working rela-

tions with rival rightist groups

before it was outlawed by the

West German supreme court in

1952.

During its first year, the

NPD encountered many

of the prob-

sors.

or an effective

and obtained only 2 percent of

the votes--short of the 5-percent

minimum

required for representa-

tion in

the Bundestag.

In local

elections in' Bavaria and Schleswig-

Holstein in March 1966, however, .

the NPD showed that it could com-

mand pockets of strength.

Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and

Bayreuth, it received between 7

and 10 percent of the vote and

elected representatives to the lo-

cal governing councils.

gains were facilitated by concen-

trating the party's efforts in

selected'areas such as the Protes-

tant centers of Middle and Upper

Franconia in heavily Catholic

The first clear demonstra-

tion that the NPD could attract

more than the ultranationalist

vote came two weeks later in

Hamburg, where the party nearly

doubled its vote as

compared with

the Bundestag election the year

Although the NPD failed

to elect any deputies, the Chris-

tian Democrats and the Socialists

were concerned about its ability

to secure even 3.9 percent of

The threat to the tra-

dive nole demo party (rope consery

The FDP fell a third

below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of

its 12 seats in the Hamburg city

Profiting from a decline

in the economy which was already

under way and the increasing pub-

lic disenchantment with the lead-

ership of then Chancellor Erhard

in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both

its de anization eage and des

relations campaign.

the party stage axe rough it for

s breakthrough in

Hesse and Bavaria state elections

Page 3

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

9

Jun 67

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## Page 48

4-00000

SECRET

last fall in which it won 7.9 and

7.4. percoit of the vote and

elected

8 and 15 deputies respec,

tively.

"In' Bavaria the NPD

emerged as the orl! small party.

in the Landtag, causing

the FDP

to lose its representation in the

legislaturo for the first time in

I'ts history.

By underlining the

weakness of the fop, the election

outcome contributed

to.

the forma-

tion of the grand ccalition gov-

ernment in Bonn by the Christian

Democrats and the Socialists.

For the major parties, the

ND's successes had disturbing

implications.

In contrast to its

various predecessors,

the NPD

appared capable of robilizing

urban

as well as ruial support

and of altoring the general trend

long evident in most west German

elections toward a tro-party

system.

In Hesse,

the combined

vote of the

Christian Democrats

•and Socialists was a lower per-

centage of the total vote than in

the

provious electior four years

earlier.

Still more significantly,

however, lesse and savaria pro-

vided

further evidence of the

NeD'g

ability to attract

"pro-

test" votes

from various

dis-

affected lower-middle-class ele-

ments including small businessmen

and farmers unhappy with their

lot in present-day Germany.

Basic Characteristics and

Sources of Seaport

I the general public that it is the

spiritual heir of Hitler's Na- i

tional Socialists. The party has

gought acceptance as a legitimate

political party and insists that

it intends tó

established democratic order.

Party spokesmen maintain that it'

the established par

ties primarily

in its allegedly

superior devotion to the national

interest, which they accuse the

governing parties in Bonn of

failed to protect.

NPD says it offers the voter a

genuine choice between bankrupt

policies of

the major parties and

a return to national morality.

As much as some NPD support-

ers might wish to play down the

party's Nazi associations, how-

ever, it has been clearly estab-

lished that the leadership con-

sists of a nucleus of former

Nazis, who nave been active in

neo-Nazi parties throughout the

olice reports,

some 2,000 of

the estimated 25,000 members if

the NPD belonged to the Nazi party

This ratio is roughly

eight times that for the public

libel suits in which

it has chal-

lenged charges of neo-Nazism.

The German Interior Ministry

notes the parallels in political

outlook and philosophy between

*approach the pattie

activities

unconstitutionality.

In the words of one former party

lineage

to dispel

the NPD has tried

Page &

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9 Jun 67

---

## Page 49

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SCRET

The Bong government is gen-

exally reluctant, however, to ban

the NPD, believing that it would

be imprudent to drive the ultra-

rightists underground... If the

NPD were to score impressive new.

successes in future elections,

however, the resulting .concern

in the major parties might prompt

a reconsideration of this policy:

Interior Minister Luecke favors

banning the party as soon as

"enough evidence can be obtained

to assure successful court action.

It is also possible that new

NPD gains would motivate the

established parties to make pro-

posed changes in the electoral

law that would make it more dif-

ficult for the NPD to obtain

Bundestag representation.

Although the NPD program is

strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian

National Socialism, the party's

electoral supporters in Messe

and Bavaria also include persons

• who have no prior Nazi aifiiia-

tions or any particular suscepti-

bility to Nazism per se. It has

managed to attract impulsive

youngsters, as well as political

malcontents of all ages.

Its

membership includes individuals

from a broad range of occupations.

The NPD'S

special appeal among

the lower-middle-class,

ticularly

among

men and farmers

is reinforced by

the

economic squeeze

hese group

are

experiencing

gevernment economy

Hesse and Bavaria,

mee pasty aid

specially well in areas noted

For traditional German nationalisn

and in areas which are predomi-

nartly Protestant.

Many NPD, ad-

herents are expellees from the

territories lost at the end of

world, Nar II.

The makeup of the formal

NPD membership is not radically

different in age or occupation

group from a. cross section of the

general public.

However, there

are certain characteristics of

NPD supporters which set them

apart from supporters of the

three major parties.

The NPD

tends to

attract a

somewhat larger

number of older persons

as well

as young adults, and the number

of lower middle class members,

including pensioners, is dis-

proportionately large.

Formal

membership

among

students,

how-

ever,

is very

small and only 350

of

a total of

244,000 university

students are on the party rolls..

There is no evidence that

the NPD

receives

significant

financial support from German

industrialists.

It is,

however,

able to operate in the black.

The sound state of its finances

is

in part a result of its prac-

tice of charging

admission to its

rallies.

function of making the rank and

file feel that they have

nee pity and ey mayeng stake

necessary for its opponents to

pay for the right to heckle. The

party also derives considerable

sums from membership dues, sub-

scriptions to party publications,

and donations from members and

Page 5

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun 67

---

## Page 50

Party leader Von Thadden at. Second NPD Congress

at Karisruhe, June 1966

NPD audience: a characteristic cross section

65527 dOT CIA

SECRET

---

## Page 51

14-00000

SECREI

Rumors of clandestine fi-

nancial support from the. Commu-

nists or from

sympathizers among

Nazi emigrants to Latin America

nave not beer

confirmed.

Despite NPD claims of wide-

spread sympathy in. the West German

armed forces, there is no evidence

of this:

German

security offi-

cials.

estimate that

no more than

2 percent of armed forces members

are card-carrying NPD members.

Since :the NPD is a legal political

organization, military leaders

are

constrained from openly in-

fluencing members of

the armed

forces to oppose it.

Many Germans are probably

reluctant openly to admit their

support for an organization like

the NPD..

It is significant, how-

ever, that only 6 percent of

respondents to a national opinion

poll in January 1967

indicated a

preference for the NPD.

Leadership Problems

The most notable single

handicap confronting

the weakness

of

the NPD is

its leadership.

None

of its leaders possesses any

great talent

or

stature.

Cer-

tainly no individual with Hitler's

demagogic

genius has yet ap-

neared.

The absence of strong

leadership in what has been called

"fuehrer-oriented party" has

left it divided and weakened by

factionalism.

This was clearly

demonstrated in March 1967 wher.

then party chairmar. Fritz

Thieien

and Deputy Chairman Adolf von

Thadden engaged in a public feud

which further damaged the party's

reputation.

An outgrowth of long-

standing personal antagonism, the

dispute was triggered by Thielen's

resistance to Von Thadden's at-

tempted take-over as party chalr-

man

in

Lower Saxony.

Thielen

claimed that Von Thadden's elec-

tion to the state chairmanship

had been illegal and would

hurt

the party's reputation.

The par-

ty's

federal executive, however,

turned the tables on Thielen and

not only voted to reinstate Von

Thadden but also to diop Thielen

from the national chairmanship and

expel him from the party. Thielen

clung to the helm under a temporary.

court order until finally throwing

in the sponge in early May with

an announcement of his formation

of a new, rival part',

the Na-

ional Peoples Party (NVP).

More of an archconservative

than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was

never

more

than a figurehead.

Real au-

thority and leadership--as well

as

ideological guidance--was provided

by Von Thadden.

Von Thadden is.

a 45-year-old native of Pomerania,

a member of a prominent and

aris-

tocratic Prussian family, a number

of whose members were

prominent

in the anti-Nazi resistance.

Al-

though von Thadden

applied

for

Nazi party membership he appar-

ently was nover formally admitted.

An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden

aspires to become a German De

Gaulle rather than a re-creator of

the German Reich.

Other leaders of some promi-

ence include Otto less, parts

propaganda chiet,

and Waldemai

Schuetz, editor of the NPD's

Page 7

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9 Jun 67

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## Page 52

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official weekly, Deutsche

Nachrichten.

Both were active

Nazis.

Thielen's departure clears

the day

for Von Thadden

formally

to take over leadership of the

_NPD.

has

It is doubtful that Thielen

the personal force or follow-.

ing to organize a party with

significant

strength.

The impact

of the new party on the NPD will

probably be small since the bulk

of the NPD membership appears to

prefer the leadership and ideology

of the von Thadden group.

On

the other hand, the strengthening

of extremist tendencies within

NPD signaled by the triumph of

the

Von Thadden may hurt the

party's

interests in the long run.

The

result is also likely to assist

those actively seeking a formal

government crackdown on the party.

Program

In

addition to its leadershir

difficulties, another failing of

the NPD is its inability as jet to

offer a clear,

positive program

relevant to existing problems.

tenophobic and opportunistic, the

NPD feeds upon nostalgia for an

older German nationalism, discon-

tent with the existing social or-

der,.

and Germany's international

standing and frustration over the

fact that reunification remains

as distant a prospect as ever.

Its stated objectives are ill de-

fined, when not deliberately am-

biguous, and are sometimes incon-

sistent.

Its electoral approach

is generally negative and destruc-

tively

critical rather

than af-

firmative.

Its principal targets

include foreign interests and cul-

which undermine old values

"de-Germanize the

fatherland."

It attacks the renunciation by

power of what the NPD

regards as justified Germán ob-

It deplores what it

considers the miseducation and

corruption of youth,

"crime in the

aid, and the.

competition of foreign workers..

The NPD demands an end to

German dependence on the

calls for the revival of German

national consciousness.

tempts to draw a parallel between

West German - US relations and

those between the East German

regime and the USSR.

In order to

tree Germany from foreign domina-

spokesmen maintain,

American "occupation" forces must

although not before the with-

drawal of kussian troops, which

the PD would have occur

ously with

that of US

Germany must again become master

leaders in-

sist, and the "lie" of war guilt

and war crimes trials must be

ended and a new German general

staff created.

that the reunification of Germany

cannot be limited to uniting West

and East Germany but must include

the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse

order now held by Poland.

-hough it does not advocate the

use of force to achieve this ob-

jective, the party holds out hope

derational nuclear capability for

Page 8

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9 Jun

67

---

## Page 53

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SECRET

The party puts forth slogans

proclaiming

"Germany for the Ger-

nans" and "Europe for the Euro-

peans."

Indeed, 'the NPD favors

a united Europe somewhat along the

lines advocated by De Gaulle.

Europe, it

holds, should be com-

pletely independent of

the US,

and possess it's

own nuclear deter-

rent:

It should be

built on a

Franco-German alliance that smaller

European countries sooner or later

would

have to join.

The NPD would

welcome the decay of NATO as

sig-

naling

the end of sterile policies

which

do not serve Germany's Ical

interests.

In socking to gain the broad-

est popular acceptance, the party

avoids affirming the more extreme

aspects of Nazi ideology.

for example, no obvious anti-

Semitism in the party program

and Jews technically could become

leadership, however,

are said to resemble traditional

Nazi anti-Semitism closely.

NPD makes vague references, *9100

rejects evidence relating

to the Nazi

extermination policy,

makes derogatory references

the Jews in

the party press, and

denounces aid to Israel.

In recent campaigning in

shifted tactics somewhat by no

longer stressing issues

obviously

associated with

the Nazi period

such as war guilt and reparations.

Instead, they sought to exploit

current grievances including

economic recession, unemploy-

lack of progress on reuni-

fication,

and, what they called

the

unreliability of NATO.

Future Prospects

The NPD's failure to main-

tain the momentum of last fall's

successes in this year's state

elections in Schleswig-Holstein,

Rhineland-Palatinate,

and Lower

SaNony

is a serious

blow to the

party's hopes.

The squabble

among

the leadership apparently

reinforced the

celing among

un-

committed elements

that casting

a protest

vote

for the NPD was

not worthwhile under present cir-

cumstances.

The videspread dis-

content among farmers over 90v-

ernment economy measures did not

result in a significant shift of

votes to the NPD.

Moreover,

there has been a strony

resur-

gence of general confidence

in

the

Bonn government.

Although

the NPD benefited last fall from

the popular dissatisfaction with

the Erhard government, the grand

coalition headed by CDU Chancellor

Kiesinger has displayed vigor and

decisiveness which

has been re-

warded at the polls.

Even if the NPD were to fol-

low its forerunners into oblivion

it would not mark the end of right-

ist extremism.

A portion of the

German electorate

will remain re-

ceptive to

this kind of appeal.

In the absence of a party such

as

the NPD, right-wing voters tend

to give

their

support to one of

the insignificant splinter par-

ties, or to one of the more con-

servative established parties.

such as the FDP, when they vote

at all.

SECRET

Page 9

SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun 6.?

---

## Page 54

4-00000

SCRET

It is possible--although in-

creasingly-unlikely--that the NPD

could turn out to resemble other

parties of a national-conserva-

•tive stamp.. Despito the radical

views of some of thoir members;

such groups have.managed.to..op-

erate without subversive mani-

festations.

The 'German Party (DP),

for

example, which had been

rep-

resented in

several North German

state legislatures and in the

Bundestag conducted itself. in a.

responsible fashion.

The NPD at present draws. a

good deal of this traditional

right-wing vote from the old Refu-

goe Party, the DP, and small con-

servative

regional parties such

as the Bavarian Party.

The total

extremist vote, however, has in-

creased very little since the

establishment of the NPD.

Es-

timates of the extent of hard-core

ultranationalist sentiment in

Germany vary between 5 and 15 per-

cent of the electorate.

Under

present conditions this does not

constitute a threat to German dem-

ocratic institutions and is not

greater than the degree of ex-

tremist sentiment in other West-

ern. European countries.

Outlook

Assuming

the NPD survives

the current period of internal...

strife, its potential for further

growth beyond its present 6- to

8-percent range appears to be

limited under conditions now pre-

vailing in west Germany..

The NPD

is still capable of capitalizing

on circumstances which might pre-

sent themselves as a result of a

protracted economic recession or

mujor political blunders

which

would

discredit the present gov-

ernment leadership.

The outcome

of recent state elections, how-

ever, tends to confirm that the

overwhelming majority of German

voters continues to prefer the

moderate, albeit increasingly

independent and nationalist, pol-

icies of the major parties and

the government,

and rejects the

radical alternatives advocated

by the NPD. (SECRET)

Page

10

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun

67

---

## Page 55

14-00000

Secret

Secret

---

## Page 56

EPORIANINFORM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

HON REPORT

material containe information dlialine the jaloonal Helenie of the linutrit Matre within the maunine of lhe Faplonake Lame, Tille

SECRET

NO FORCIGN

DISSEM

CONTROLLEU DISSEN

COUNTRY: Nost Germany

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT

CS DD-312/ 00003-67

5. JAN 1967

¡BlY Program to Monitor and Countor DAlE DISTR.

the Activities of the National

Democratic Party

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

3

23 November 1966

DATE ACQ. Germany,

Bonn (25 November. 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATEO ISFORMATiON SOUNCE GRADIGS ARE DIFINITIVE

APFRAISAL' OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

A qualifiod American official from a senior official of the

West Gorman Federal Offico for tho Protection of the Con-

stitution. (BfV).. This official is responsible for monitoring.

activities

of right radical organizations throughout

West Germany: The information 1s probably true.

(Summary:

The West German Federal Office for the Protection

of the Constitution (BIV) and its regional affiliates

(LIV) have undertaken a progrim to monitor and counter

the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD).

Included in this program are offorts to penetrate the

NPD

at all its levels,

to monitor its membership and iinances,

and to counter its influence.)

... 2.

For a number of goars the BfV has been engaged in

penocruting and monitoring the activities of right

organizations..

Since the establishment of the NPD In,

1964, the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it '*.

s30,

at both the national and regional levels.

This effort has

resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access

to the NPD organizations at all lovels.

In several cases

the BfV or LfV have been able to recruit local NPD county

chairmen and in six Laender have access to the minutes

Illes of the Land organizations.

The BfY has also penetrated

the national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover.'

3.

Through its penetration of the national organization, the

BfV has been able to outain and photograph

the entire mem-

bership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names.

The national list has been augmented by additional member~

ship applications obtained via ponotrations of the

Land organizations.

The BfV is currently in the process

of tracing all of these membership applications against

the master Nazl Party membership files at the American

5

3

2

STATE N

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MCONTROLLED DISSEN

68000 1

Eertaked trans

/Continued/

TOCR

(Note. frold disinbulon-moscated by".".)

INFORMATION REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

FT/D/B

E/R_

ELCR/R

LL ELG/INT

2 ELG/CE

2. E/SAS

E/G/R

E/G/R./T

2

*9E 2, CI 2, FI 4, EUR 9, DO/R 1.

EGN-3098

CAVATA- 1

NO_

LIAISON

LIAISON

32

---

## Page 57

LOGROLLED DISSEN.

Pnge 2

C503.312/00003-67

controlled Berlin Documont Center.

Although this cincing

activity ina. not b.cn

conpleted and is handicapped by lack

of personnel at the Berlin Document Center, the BIV estinatos

Its current file on the NPU 1s far more nccurate than the

f1lcs it. the NPD headquarters..

Because of its accoss to

the Berlin "Document: Center, the BfY will. eventuilly.havo

a bottor estimate uf the numher of NPD members who aro

former Nazi Party members than does. the NPD. Itself.

The BiV 'is also making a concerted effort tò obtain docu

mentary, evidenco on the NPD's sources of income.

The recruits

ment offorts to do this are directed. at spotting and recruit-

ing: clerical help who workin' NPD offices and. have access

' Information. in'the BfV's possession to date,

which includes considerable documentary ovidence regarding

finances, indicatus that the party is not recelving any

substantial financial assistance from'abroad.. The priacipal

sources of funds are as 'follows:

a. The monthly DM 3. membership dues.

For the

20,000 mcmbers,

or.

this amounts' to Du 60,000 pox month

DM: 720,000 a year.

b. subscription fees for publications.

single donations from financially well-to-do

members and supporters.

Admission fees for political rallies.

The BfY

has registered, sinco May 1966 when the NPD began 1t8

campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2,000 polit-

Although at times more than

one. third. of thuse attending such rallies.were

ostinted to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending

the rally pald an admission fee. The BIV estimates

that the NpD has been able through the above sources

of income to collect from DM 3,000, 000 to Wi 4, 000, 000.

The IfV aro watching this funding quite closely,

particularly for evideuce of financing fron Communiat

countries.

Thus far they

have been unable to sub-

stantiaté

the existence of any such support. Although

thero 15: no firm rvidence of actual fInancial support

of the NPD trom Communist sourcas,.

the BfV 1s aware

of an intercat on the pait. of the

Eastern 1ntell1gerce

servicos to penetrate the NPD and monitor 1ts activitles.

5.

At the instigation ci federal Ministe: of Interior Luecke,

the BfV has undertaken to establish a confidential ell-party

committec consisting of members of the Social Democratic

Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party

(FDP), and the Christlan

Democratic Union (CDU) and the trade Union Movement (D3)

to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz urior to the libcoming

elections' in spring 1967.

All of the parties have agraed

to participnte and this activity is moving ahead. Recently

at a two-day conference chaired by the BIV in'a village

on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract

NPD. propaganda during the election campaign, but also to

undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the.

Rheinland-Pfalz and other local governments who have shown

NPD leanings.

These courses will be launched as soon as

the campaign gets underway.

A similar propaganda and

oftentation activity.is also being planned for the elections

in Schleswig-Holstein.in 1967.

6.

The BIV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group

almed at organizing the labor movement into countering the

5

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONTROLLED DISSEN

/Continued/

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## Page 58

SECRET

NO FOREIGN

DISSEN

CONTROLLED DISSEM

Page 3

CSDE-312/00003-67

influence of the NPD.

The BfV is assisting the DGB In

working

out nethods

for the infiltration

of workers into

NPD organizations to report and counteract their influence

within factories and

workers

councils.

The BiV has also

established contact with the

German Industrial Institute

in Colögne,

which is sponsored by the German equivalent of

the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers.

The BfY

used as an argument with the industrialists the fact that.

Increasing influence of the NPD in Geruan industry would

have. a negative.effect.upon foreign trade.

The BfV undertook a survey of

the election results at the

village and county

level in Land Ressa.

This surrey showed

that the NPD had substantial success in areas containing

Geran military installations. It was further

determined

that the NPD had considerable appeal among non-cornissioned

professional soldiers who feel they have failed to find

acceptance in the postwar German society.

This negative

attitude has been

less among Bundeswehr officers and draftee

than anong: non-commissioned officers, who feel themselves under-

"paid

"lacking in social acceptance.

The BfV has contacted

the security organizations of the Bundeswehr to under-

take a program

of orientation to counter the influence of

the NPD within the Bundeswehr.

endouarters Comment

CS-3.11/16288-66 from a different

ource reported that the President of the lest Germai

Association of Military Reservists had stated that a

large percentage of older reseive officers and non-

commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land

Hesse election.

SECRET

..-

÷....

---

## Page 59

14-00000

Animie 1

stellenbesetrung des Budesparteiroratandes der NPD

(Stand: 1.10.1966)

Parteivorsitzender:

THIELEN,

Friedrich (Fri:z) 6eb. 25.9.10 in Bremen,

wohnhalt: Bremen-schönebecs, Brauteichen 19

Beruf: Betonfabrikant

Frühere Organisationszurehörigkeit:

Grundungsmitghea

der Cou,

Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,

1957 Mitglied und spater jandesvorsitzender der

"Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen.

NSDAL: nicht Mitglied

1. Stellvertreter:

GUTMANN,

wilhelm,, geb. 9.6.1900 in Basel,

wohnhatt:

warlsruhe, Kaiserallee 30

•Beruf: Angestellter

1. Vorsitzender des.

Landesverbandes Baden-württemberg

der NPD

Frühere Orcanisationszugehörigkeit/

"Gesantdeutsche Partei"

(GDF/ BAD),

ehem.

Funitionär des "Bundesverbandes ehen, Internierter-

und Entnazifizierungsgeschädigter" (BIE).

NSDAP:

1.3.1932

1933 Bürgermeister in Tiengen

Von THADDEN,

wohnhait:

Benthe,

Adol archenwes

geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglait,

Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:

1949 Mitglied der "'Deutschen Rechte-Partei" (DRP),

Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion

"Nationale Rechte"

1950 Mitgl: u.

Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichsparte1" (DRP),

1955-1959 Nitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

WINTER,

wohnhaft:

Franz Florian, Geb. 23.3.1923 in Anberg,

regerngee,

bahnhoistr.

Beruf: Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur

1. Vorsitzender des Landesvezbandes Bayern der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehor akelt:

CsU-Mitglied u. Mitglied der Landesleitung

GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des landesaus-

schusses und des Kreisverbandes

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

- 2∞

---

## Page 60

14-00000

III. Prac:d1um:

Doual 0t50 Sheodore Erb. 31.5.1906 in Par13*619

tremen-Vegosaci, Gerhard-Rohlfo-Str.

Beruf: Kaurnann

Vorsitzender des Landeste-bandes Bremen der NPD.

inihere Organicationszusehöripkeit:

"Deüische

Partei" (DP),

Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaft

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

HESE, OttOfiscendort,

wohnnaft:

geb.

19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,.

weidendamm,

Beruf: Oberregierungsra: a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,

frinere Cruzrationszuder rigkelt:

Miglied u. runktionar der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DKP),

NSDAP: 1.8.1930

Kreisleiter, Gauirspekteur, Gauredner,

1938 Referent in Gerichts- und R echtsamt der

obersten SA-Führung, SA-Obersturmbannführer.

LANKEN

vonmmait:

a? heete &, Padestorner weg 248

geb. 22.9.1913 in Theesen,

Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und totar

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Nordrhein-Weatf.d.NPD

Frühere Organisationszusehörigkeit: keine

NADAP: 1.5.1933

monar lesener

Haldemare geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,

Felix-klein-str.

Beruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber

"rühere Organisationszugehir ekeit:

Dir-Mitgliea una runktionar

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,

19:9 Fintritt in die HJ,

lors dagutant des cau-pressechels,

kreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch

Freude" (Kaf),

1938-1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,

anschließend Beaustragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,

SS-Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS

schoelMele horst-Günther

geb. 11.2.1913 in

wonnatt: hanburg-Grou-Postbek, Hochrad 7,

Essen,

Beruf: Reedereibesitzer

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hamburg der NPD

Prühere Organisationgzugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.4.1932

SS-Hauptsturmführer und Adjutant

Legationgrat im Auswärtigen Ant

-3.

---

## Page 61

-:

:

Boris :

Digi.

Proto

0080:8a

duchair.

NODAY: maent digried

i2e 59b.

Moratorede:

borus: rechisarnai: une tota=

Frühere DE

"Tr.:

3:220r:22:

mention

ner

Tes und

Mitglied des minigriachoichen Landtages

RöDAi: nocht migised

Ger wit und der Ne-Preunde.

IV. Parti vorstard:

wohnt: Westerst Erh. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothdringon

enzianser.

st: oracunerririgkeit:

NaDAP: nicht MitGlied

rainte geb. s0.11.1310 in Löhnhorst,

wohnhat i:

Hannover, Auf

dem marchenberge 15

Beruf: situdent

Frühure Uranimiionszugehorireit: keine

nonal: nicht Mitglied

Berul: Kaufwenn

Frubero Organi ntionszugehörigkeit:

DRP-Mitginou und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.8.1930

1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)

1936 Leiter der Gauschulungoburg Gau Schwaben

1437 Reichsschulungsleiter in Amt fur Techalk, Munchen.

ü.Düsseld., Kahlenbergweg 7

Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D.

Frühere Orgnnisntionaugchörigkeit: keine

NODAP: nicht Mitglied

X..

---

## Page 62

-4

cb. 18.2.1917 In Prettin,

:

wim burèn dà der Techt 1

Ecruf: Hausfrau

FeTe

Urinirationieu chorirkeit:

urundorin und seiterai des

"Deutschen Kinderschutz-

bundes" olderburé

Chi-Mitglied unä Funktionär

ASDAP: 1.9.1938

b) Scrutai Ander Die COs Parte¿T9=S:82005:

Adolf deb. 21i5.1000 in Saarbrücken,

Jaarerücke!,

Einkircher les 23

Berul: Vercionerungsiaufnann

Vorsitzender des

Landesverbardes Saarland der NPD

Where Orcanationszuschiridiert: richt bekannt

BSDAP: 1.6.1933

_geb. 26.10.1914

in Ostbofen,

wommatt:

Detrofen,

Mainzer

Str. 20

terui: ninzer/nennandder

Vorsitzender des LV Rheinland-Pfalz der NPD

ruhere

Prentiationazurehörigkeit:

Dar-Metglied

ur.0

Funationar

NSDAY: 1.3.1933

Ss-turmbann:ührer

Heinrich,

wohnhait:

Berut: Kaufmann

Vu: iltäonder ius Landesverbandes Hessen der NPD

rutere Orkam intronszugehoragkeit:

Tylo Mitglien ver

"Jeutsch-Nationalen-Volkspartei" (DNVP)

1946

NDP-Mitélied und Mitglied des bessischen Landtagus,

1949

Mitglied des Bundestages,

1955

Übertratt 211r

"Deutschen Partei" (DP) U. Mitglied

der Fraktion der DP im Deutschen Bundestag.

NODA': 1.10.1931

Austritt erfolgte im lovember 1932

geb. 2.1.1908 in Steinbach/Thur.,

wonhalt: Hannover, Im

Beruf: Kechtsanwalt,

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD

rruhere Orranisationszugehorigkeit:

For-Mitglied u. stellv.

Landesvorsi tender

NSDAP: 1.12.1931

183e lechte hauptartichen ur parole-

frierent

Stellvertretera

Duro des

Botschaftere von Ribbentrop.

js-unteroturmfubrer

---

## Page 63

- 5

10 3н4e

6.d.1927 in lazslau/Schl.,

wonnhile:

collesnig,

rolonnenreg 31,

Beruf: Bicker und jugendpfleger

Vorsitzender des inndesverbandes schlestig-Holetein der NPD

•Frühere

Oranientionszuschör akes::

one-medied und runstionar,

Dre-Mitglied und Funktionär auf Kreisebene.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

V. Ämter im Prisidium:

Organisasionsabteilunce Adolf v. THADDEN (o.Stellvertreter)

Finanzabier lung: Otto Theodor BiOthSü (s. Präsidium)

Rechtsabteilund: Prita WINKELMANN (s. Präsidium)

Propaganda- u.schuiungsabteilung: Otto HESS (s. Präsidium)

Pressenhteilung: Waldenar SCHUTZ (s. Prüsidiun)

Heferat z.b.V.: Pritz WINKELMANN (s. Pragidium)

VI. Referenten ia Partesvorstand:

Außenpolitik:

von THADDEN, Adolf (a. Stellrertreter)

Innenpolitik:

HEnNANSDORFER, Benno, Geb. 20.3.1915 in Altötting,

wohnhait: dunchen, Neckenstaller

Str. 178,

Berur: senatorat

Mighion des geschiftsführenden forstandes des Landes-

verbandes

Bayern der NPD,

Vorsitzender des Bezirksverbardes Oberbayern der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörisseit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.1.1938

HJ-Mitglied seit 1933

Agrarpolitik:

RUDOLEl, Heinz, geb.

wohinhart:

Klein-Ilde

7.6.1922 in Elberberg,

Bout: Bürgermeister, Dipl. Lanixirt, Hauptmann d.R.

Keferent für Agrarfragen im li Niedersachsen der NPD,

Kedner aui Landegebene im LV Wiedersachsen der NPD,

1. Vorsitzender an Kreisverband Hildeshein der NPD.

Fruhere Organioationszugehöristeit:

NSDAP: 1.9.1940

-6 =

---

## Page 64

4-00000

- 6 -

Wirtochafts-s rinans- uni Steuerpolitik:

LAUBENDEK, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand)

Vorkchrupolitik:

SCHWINck; Horst-Günther (S. Präsidium)

Jugendirenen:

LOBEl, Karl-Ernat (s. Parteivorstand)

sozialpolitik:

KNurrtis, Kurt, geb. 7.6.1913 in Rippien,

wonnait: Neuenhaug, jainstr. 2,

Beruf: Elektromonteur•

Geschäftsfünrer und Kassenleiter im Kreisverband

Gralschaft Benthein der NPD

Frühere Orgunisutionszugenorigkeit:

DRe-Mitglied

i Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.5.1930

Frauen- und Familientragon:

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud (3. Parteivorstand)

Kulturpolitik:

Geb: 19.4.1924 in Duisburg,

Nussourö-beiderich, Haferacker 13

Berut:. Oberotudienrat

2. stellv. Vorsitzender im IV Nordrhein-Westf. d. NPD

Lindesreaner des iV Nordrhein-Westralen der NPD

krusere Organ-sationozurenoriskeit: nicht bekannt

Novir: nicht itglied

Vertriebenentragen:

GUTENN, Wilhelm (s. Stellvertreter)

Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr:

NITSCHE,

Dieter, 82b. 4.7.1934 in Zittau,

woluhait: Oldenburg,

(z.". Putlos)

Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr

NPD-Stadtrat im stadtparlament Oldenburg

frühere Organisationszugchörigkeit:

AKOk- Mitglied

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

---

## Page 65

vII.

Sonstige Funktionen in Parteivoratand

leiter der duteilung kasse:

SCHUT%, Waluemar (8. Präsidiun)

Leiter der revisionsabteilung in der Finanzabta lung:

nothart:

lannover, Raimundati.

Berus: Versicherungs-Kauinann

Pruhern iranisaticnsaugchorigkeit:

una

runktionar:

Dir-Mitglieu. und runitionar

BSDAP: 1.6.1930

SS-Obersturnbannführer

burassgeschartsführer:

Schak, Mariin, geb.

16.9.19 in Oels/Schles.

nornnart: Porz-Engen, Charlottengtr. 14

Berufsauptmann d.Bw. a.D.

frühere Organisationgzugehör akelt: eIne

ISDAP: 1.5.1932

---

## Page 66

"brutione snichten? (Db) Gabil.

mabE, gou. 1.10.1913 In Dausenau,

wommart: wocuir.ion.

rolix-niein-str. 4

neruls senriltieiter und verlagsinhabor

Frünere Organiontionoauchoricioit:

ud runktionar

NSUAr: 1.11.1936.

1929

¿intritt in die ilo,

19.4

majutant des lau-Pressechefs,

19,7 Treiswart una laureferent "iraft durch

Freude" (kur),

1938 - 1919 dunser

der Ordensourd Vogelsang,

inschliesenu bonuitragter der NODit in Gau Messen,

so-ilauptsturmiunrer des Waffen-is.

von PllidDin, moii. bub. 7.1.1921 in Criegiaff,

LidICHenweg

Beruf: cherredakteur

ruhere Ormnisationssugenörickoit:

T949.11661254

"Deutschen Rechts-partei" (DRP),

ritglied

de3 deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion

"Nationale

kechte"

Mitglie

unktionär der "Deutschen Reichs-

partei" (isr),

1955 - 1934 Miglied des niedersachsischen Landtagos.

NSDAP: 1.9.1929

Otto, Beu. ls.12.1y08 in iossaort,

wonnait:

Biggendort,

wordendamn,

beruf: Overregierungorat a.d. (Jurist), Kaufmann, .

Fruhore organationg ugehörtekeit:

MigT. U. Funationar der "Deutschen Keichspartei" (DRP)

NSDAP: 1.8.19:0

Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,

1yj8 referent in Berichts- und Rechtsamt der

obersten si-fuhrung,

Sa-Obersturmbannführer.

rulöd - vorl, Emil, geb. 26.y. 1908 in &aufbeuren,

womnalt; urobaltingen, Bulnhofstr. 15

seruf: Kaufmann

Frunere organisationszugenorigkeit:

DRP - Mitglieu una Funktionar

ASUAP: 1.8.1920

1y, vauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (Kdf)

19÷6

Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau schwaben

keicusschulungsloiter in Amt für Technik,

München

---

## Page 67

ceD. 24.p.1916 in Ferlin.:

23

miniiist:

Lerli: Kiluimina

1...l:10

Mederisleiter der Haupstreunandstelle Ost, Berlin

Beareo geo.

inadover.

122.1.1911 in chemnita,

1.0.1100

ss-udersiurabarnlu.rer

itl:

ws-serthard, gen.

÷0.2.1903

in Erotzig/ Pounera.

womanact: wuppertal-tearianed, du Osterbolz 55

àur seig mehrer an elter Privatschule

10..er9 Обjdібn620255493023:42168

inie und rañationar

1.2.19:d

Gammlunter der dudir (Gau Ostpreußen)

mamemstatlen-.uisdelder,

Orientticher

incressor der stuatswissenschaften

lexior des alreicus-Universität in Königsberg.

2LieEo deb. 0.10.1900 1n Breslau,

Mds:1102020se2923rse1t:

notte

drey, geo. c2. 10.1950 in Greifswald,

Milligurt-Dao vanostatt, SPreuergasse 45

teil:

rechtsanwalt

'I't'

Dramisi conszugenörirkeit:

Mitglieu

und runationar

nicht bitglied

---

## Page 68

- 3-

9.11. lul0 in Hamburg,

Kadenkampffallee 162

beruf: Kiufwinn

truhere. Ormisitiom zuschorigkeit:

Funktionar

DHP

- Mitglied und Funktioner

NSDAP: 1.4.1936

TiTELel, Fristrien (Prits), seb. 23.3.1916 la Bremen.

sunnhilt: breuen-achonebock, Brauteichen 19

beruf: boton-jeurikant

Mitglied der bremor burgeruchnften,

lysl Matgired und ipitor lindeavorsitzender der

"Deutschon Partei" (DP) in Bremen

NSDAP: nient Mitglied

нол PaTre co arnard-06 18 -0020 61

Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften.

NSDAP: 1.8.1991

02289191

+ 30139989484

---

## Page 69

4-00004

FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY

18 Jaly 1963

VER. TH WAR

KGROUAD READING:

BOOK!

D259. 4083.196

DIC;

DD259, ALBS CIA.

RAIZ,. REIMUT

of Geriany, 1960. Il6p.

DD43. A8 2960 DIC..

BENOISON, JOHN ROBERT.

Rasi vAr alms; the plans for the

thousand year Reich:

, Ill., Augustasa Callego

Library, 1962.: 1558.

Rock elena Eb., gustaca al, 80: 30)

DD256.5.B57 DIS.

RITABLL, JETRO, ed.

DD61.B56 1955 DLC;

DD61. B6 1955

BOSSENBROOK, WILLIAM JOHH.

The German sind.

Detroit, Hayne

Stato Valverolty Prese, 1961. 409p.

DD76.B6T7

39t German I1B1n

D261.4.8713

ai don hen and

CIA.

BULLOCE, ALAN LOLTS CHARLES.

utler; & astudy in tyranny.

Rev.

Nev York, Harper, 1960. 776р.

DD247•H5885

DD247.H5B85 1960

CLAY, LUCIUS DU BIGNON.

Decision in Gerrany.

Gardes City,

M. Yo, Doribloday, 1950. 522p.

DD257.055

DIC;

DD257.C6. CIA.

OLLIER, DAVID S., and KURT GIASER., eds.

Berlin and the future

I Fastora Europe

Chicago, Pegnery, 1963.

(Fondation

for Foreiga Affalsa series, n0.7)

D848.5.06

1

FOR OFFICIAL USE DALY

---

## Page 70

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL

CORANT, JAMES BRYANT.

Gormany and freedom; & personal appraiial

Cambridge, Harvard Univeraity Press, 1958.

117p.

Codkin lectures at Harvard Univeralty, 1958) DD259.2.C6

-DD259: 2062 CIA.

CROC?, ATREDETTO.

Germany and Durope, a epiritual dissensloi

Her York, Randon House, 1959. 83)

2076.074

DIG.

DAVIDSON, WOKE.

The death' and ilte of-germany, an account

of the American occupation. London, J. Cape, 1959. 4220.

DD257.D33 DLC; DD2ST-D33BS CIA.

DENTO, LUDHIO.

century:

New Tori, ops, 2950-11 1232 593 di

DD232. D413

DIE,

... DD232.D5 .CIA.

DICKINSON, ROBERT EATE. jondos,

Germany; a general and regional

geograpby.

2d ed.

Methuein; New York, Duttos, 1961.

716p.

DD43.DS

DIC;

DD43.D5 1961

CIA.

DIC bas 1953 ed. only.

Dile, MARSHALI.

Of Michigan Press, 1961.

cordyi noden bets on tre 14.

рома, JOnl.

Vastersity Press, 1961..

284р.

DD881.D633

DD881-D62

Translatton fran the swedish.

DORNBERG, JOHN.

DD259.2.D6

ALLEN WEISE.

260 eround ten ork, Macela,

A simple, clear account of the opposition to Hitler during the

EPSTEIN, FRITZ THEODOR.

284-3140-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 71

14-00000

.i..

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TRUARD, LUNTO.

Prosperity through competition.. Hey York,

Preeger, 1950.

?60p.

AC206.5.57343 DIC.

XCK; ERICH.

A bistory of the Wolmar Republic.

Cambridge,

Barvard Unlversity Press, 1962;

DD237-5913

FLENLEY, Ariph

Nuren freimin Histery (145%

FREUND, GERALD.

seimany: betreen tro vorlds.

Hor York, Harcourt,

Brace, 2961. 296p.DD259.4.578

BETMARX (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) CONSTITUIION, 1961.

The basic lay of

he Poderal Republic of Geruaay; amendmento ao Of 31 December

1961.

New York, German Infornation Center, 1961. 628.

JN3971. A3A5 1962 CIA.

GORRITIZ, WALTER.

• Estory of the German general staff, 1657-1945.

Nen York, Praeger, 1953. 508p. DD101.G614 1953 DLC;

GOLAY. Jitin.

1p101.061 993h nay f the Federal Rifathi of Germony (1955)

GOTTLIEB, MANUEL

The German peace settlement and the Berlin

cr1s18. Mew York, Patne-Waltman Publishers, 1960. 275p.

DD257.068

DIC;

DD257.668 CIA.

-- --

GI. BRIT. PORRIGA OFFICE.

selected documenta on Germany and

the question of Berlia, 1944-1961, Londos, ANSO, 1961. 4838.

(Its Germany, 1y61, no.2. Gt. Br1t. Parllament. Papers bi

command, cmad. 1552)

DD257 .4.075 1962 "DIC.

GROSSER, ALFRED:

lis colossus soria; Westers lermany frou defeat

to reernament. New York, Preeger, 1955. 249p.

DD257-07413

DỊC;

D0257-0785

ARIDENEEIMER, ARNOLD J.

he goveramente of German

New York,

Crowell, 1961.

24p. JN3971-A58

DIC;

JN3972. A5884

CIA. •"

242p. DD881.H39 DIC; DD881. E4:

BRIZ, FRESDRICH OTT

DD122.844

2011210 Loc

London, Allea & Unwin, 1957- 524p.

Ine Nuremberg trial

$1836.1.0386145

-CIA.

3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 72

POR OFFICIAL USE ONLI

I Viscos, RICEARD.

DD259.4.16 CIA.

London, Hey

DD259: 4.H,

DD256, 5-8563

•DIC; 1832.5.H6955 CIA.

Translation Iron the Coines.

HOLBORN, BAJO. A blotory os sodein Gamany, sev Tors, A. Kaops,

1959÷

DD175.H62

DIC.

vol: The Reformation.

HOLBROOK, SABRA.

Capital Without a country: The challenge of

Berlin. Her York, Covard-McCano, 1961,

HORNE, ALISTAIR.

DD259.4.H8 1956

0025904-13 195605 140

DD259.4.865 1956 DIC;

HUKBENER, THBODORE.

The schools of Heat Gernany; a study of

Gemman elementary and secondary schoola.

New York, New York

Unversity Presa, 1962. 181p.

LA721.82.88

LA721.82.88

INTERNATIONAT COUNCIL, FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ETMANISTIC STUDIES.

the Third Reich; a study published under the auspices of the

International Council fui Fullosophy and Fumaulstic Studies

and with the assistance of UNESCO.

New York, Praeger, 1955.

910p.

DD256.5.158 19550

DIC;

DD256,5.I5

CIA.

JARMAN, IRCHAS LOCKIE.

The rise and fall of harl Germany.

York, New York Unlversity Press, 1956. 388p.

DIC;

DD256.5.J3

CIA.

DD256.5.J3 1956

JORISOX, UNE.

speculations about Jakob. New York, Grove, 1962.

A novel roflecting I1fe during the last decades 1a Germany.

KITZINER, UNS W.

Gorman electoral polities,

campalga.

oxford,

a study of the 1957

Clarendon Press, 1960. 365p.

JH3971.495K5

845971. 4956 1957-17

CIA.

FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY

---

## Page 73

FOR OFFICINI USE ONLY

XOCHAN, ETONEL.

The strusale for Germany, 1914-1945. Bainbürgh,

Unlvereity Prose; Chicajo, Aldine Pub. Co., 1963.

150р.

D0240. 157

DIC;

KOHN,

HANS

The mind of Germany; the education of a nation.

New Tork, Scribeer, 1960. 370P. DD16:859 DIC;

DD76. $59

KRIEGER, IDONARD:

"The German 1d0a Of Ireedon; history of a

political tradition. Doston, Beacon Press, 1957. 540p.

DD112:182 DIC.

LAQUEUR, WALTER ZE'SY.

oung Germany; a history of the Germa

youth novement.

London, Routledge & Paul, 1962

253р.

HN19.L3 DIC;

80799.0513

Могточі, 1948. 308р.

The Cemen ¿eneralo talk.

DIC;

CIA.

HAZO

How Tor's, Praoger, 1962.

383p.

UA646.3.18E5

LOWIE, ROBERT HARRY.

Univeralty of Chicago Pres6, 1954. 396p.

H8445.16

MCINNIS, EDDAR, RICHARD HISCOCKS, and ROBERT SPENCER.

The slaping

of postver Germany.

London, Dant, 1960. 195p.

DD257.M35 19000

DIC; DD257. M35 1960

_ MCCLELLAN, GRANT S.,

1959.

184p.

DD25% M27

DD257.H2

MANDER, JORE.

Boaks, 1962.

Beta, hostage on the kel, 320 ta

Baltinore, Penguin

DIC;

DD881.M2

H2 "CIA.

DD881. M27

MANVELL, ROGER, and HEINRICH FRASAKET.

Goering. New York, 81m0n

& Schuster, 1962.

4428. DD247.G67M3 DIGZ

D0247.G67V2

METHACKE, FRIEDRICH.

The German catastrophe; reflections aar.

recollections.

Cambridge,

Harvard University Press, 1950.

121p.

DD256.5.M42

DD256.5.M4B5

CIA.

Translation from the German.

5

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## Page 74

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MERKAI, HANS JOACHIN YON, and WOLPRANO NETHER, eds.

Germany

today:.. facto and figuros. Frankfürt a.M., A. Metzues, 1954.

4138.

DD259.N372

DIC; DD259.X372

MSTICALP, JOHN CO"

Our stake la Gemany, Hashtagtoa, Hasslagton

College Press,

1961. 96р.

DD259.2.M42 DIC.

ASAL, FRED WARRER.

War and peace and Geranay.. Ney foss, W. W.

Hortos, 1962. 166p. DD257.25.N38 DIC;

D0257. 25.1

MSSSBIRODE, FRANZ VON: Germany's other hall; a jouriellot'o

appraisal of East Germany. London, New York, Abelari-Schunas,

1963..:

DD262.145

DIC; DD261.2.U4 CIA.

PASSANT, ERHEST JAMES.

short blotory of Gerany 1815-1245.

London, dew Yorks, Cambridgo Valveralty Press; 1959. 255p.

DD232.P3S DIC,.

DD232.P2

CIA.

PIKKEY, EDWARD IN

federalan, burosucracy one party pollties 1

estern Gemany. Chapel H111, University of Horte carolina Press

1963.

2бöр.

TN3971.A77P5

DIC.

PIESON, KOPPEL SHUB.

Modern Germany, 1t8 blatory asd citilizatioi.

New York, Macnillas, 1957. 6378.

DD203.P5 1944 BIC;

DD203.P5 1954

CLA.

A useful survey, particalarly Of the intellectuel beckaround.

PLISCHKE, ELMER.

Contemporary governnest of Germary. soato.

Hough ton MiffIle, 1961.

248р.

H3971.A5855 DIC

JH3971.A5P7

CIA.

POLLOCK, JAMES KERR, and othere.

Germany in pover asd eclipse; the

background of German development.

New York, Vas Massiaad, 1952.

661р.

DD89.P64

DIC;, DD39.P6 CIA.

Divided Germany and Berlis.

P0257.25г, 1. J.,.V

DD257.25.P7

PRISTIE, HON. TERENCE CORNELIUS FARMER.

Germany divided. Bostor,

"Brova, 1960. 380p. D0257-872 2961

DIE;

DIc bas Eagliah od.

6

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*

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RETAHARDI, KURT TRAIN

Germany: 2000 years.

Rey, od.

Hey York,

F. Uagar pub. Co., 1961.

DD89.R36 1961

DIG;

0D89: R36 1961:

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RORSON, CiLARLES B., ed.

Berlin-pirot of Genuan destiny. Chape

DD882.B4553

ROTTKIS, HARS.

(Foundation 10

D0256. 3.R6 1962

11838:284 1962

SHIRER, WILLIAM LAWRENCE.

The rise and fall of the Third Reich;

a history of Nazi Germany.

Moy Xoris, B1s0n and Schuster, 1960.

12459.

DD256.5.848. DIC;

This 18 lasued also as a paperback ed.

SHITIL, BRUCE LANNES R.

ndorment for International Peace, 1959. 171-230p.

conciliation, no.525)

5X1907.AB 10.525

TIER, LOUIS IDO.

Basic hlotory of nodern Germany. Princeton,

N. J., Van Nostrand, 1957. 192p.

DD175.858

DIC;

DD175.858

CIA.

SERT, A sitary and golitical Leader se

German rearmanent and atchic war; the viols of

Peterson, 1957.

272P. UA710,856

Brans 02, M., RAY,

UA710.57

SPETER, HAHS, and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, eds.

West Gernen lesdersbi!

asd foreiga policy. Evanston, Ill., Rou, Peterson, 1957. 323p.

D0259.4.36

DIC;

DD259.487

CIA.

D0259. 4.871

Cultural despair and the politics ol

Iscontent; a study of the rise of the "Germanic" ideology

ele So 1a Pre88, 2962. 3678.

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CATIOR, ALAN JOEL PERCIVALE. IDe COUNTO Of COiTRA bLosS; a surves

of the developdent of Germany since 1815. Mey York, sorost-NéCana,

1946. . 230p.

DD203. 13 1946

DIC.

REENS, TATE HARBHS.

The new Germany and the old Haste. Art tort,;

Randon House, 1961. 286p.

DD259.2.14

DIG;

DD255-2.93

TRAYER, CHARLES WIRELER.

The unquet Gemans. Her Jost, Earper,

1957. 275p.

DD257.T45 DIC.

VEREIL, EDMOED.

Gemmary In the twentieth century; a political

and cultural history of the Weimer Republic and the Did Belch.

Hew York, Praager, 1956. 288p. DD232-7413 1956

DD232.Y585

VIERECK, PETER FOBERT EDMIN.

boax, CAP45)

THIZKLE8-BEHHETT, JOHN WHERLER.

me nenesis of pover. Inaut,

How TOr's, Hacmillan, 1953. 8298.

DDZ40.W5

DiC; DE2i-056

Rovised ed. 1963

/WORTRABE, RAYHOND A., and WERNER KRUSCH.

The land and papie of

Germany. Palladelphla, Lipplacott, 195T. Ilôp.

DDIT-tO DIC.

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