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176-10036-10173)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

, JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER

: 176-10036-10173

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : WH

FROM : Bundy

TO : Lodge

TITLE

DATE : 10/30/1963

PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA

Reports. Box 2

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, CIA

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October 30, 1963

lub

loce

CAS. 79407

SÉR

SANITIZE D

VERSION NIX CO: 370

+ DOUNGRADED TO

GECPET

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

FROM McG. Bundy, White House

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a

significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see

next para) and on one or two lesser matters eagily clarified.

2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have

no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say

that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of

course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same

basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay

any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give

high prospect of success.

We have never considered any betrayal

of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We

recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that'

our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot

impliEs iN yOUR MEsSAGE

limit ourselves to proposition that only conviction of certain failure

justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention

should be that stated above.

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a

high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals

in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are

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better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best

advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the

generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize heed to

bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and

your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice

given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.

With raspect to money for

coup-group you are authorised t

make-such.clandestine-disbursemests, asyou consider secr

afe: and effective

from available-GAS.piaster

We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute

assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126.

We fant continuous exchange latest assessments or this topic.

5.87

To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded

and we restate.our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country

team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are

sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to

use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup

contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither

Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would

like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination

among generals.

b.. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart

will be chief of the country term. Our only modification of

existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish

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100

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10/30/63

all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate

consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know

what is said to Conein. Any disagreement among the three on

such instructions should be reported to Washington and held

for our resolution, when time permits.

C. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe

that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that

direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with

experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view

is Harkins.

We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final

responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of

course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow

in paragraph ?. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have

the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions

for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct

intervention from either side, and U.S. -controlled aircraft and

other resources will not be committed between the battle lines

or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may

in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,

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(Ob)

1.Oa

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10/30/63

such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.

In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid

appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest

of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing

government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup,

U. S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those

to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort.

We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest

and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek

protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point

should be made strongly if need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has .

begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S.

Government that it should succeed.

78. We have your message about return to Washington and it

all public comment!

they not atready been mades we suggest that it be kept

as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible

you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly

sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this

should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided

we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

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FOP SECRET EYES ONLY

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