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Date: 06/25/98

Page

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSC

RECORD NUMBER :

145-10001-10185

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

:126

Released under the Johr

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO : THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS : CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/23/98

32/3/58 H DELETIONS

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

MAR

2016

DATE:.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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• OF

TAL HANDENT NOFORN

47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject:

Consequences of US Military Intervention

1n Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation

MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special

Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement

is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention

(in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment),

effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a require-

ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mob1l1-

zation required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to

this request, the requirement has been divided into its

separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a Ch onder to seize contres aikey straveste areas

cuba within 10-15 days with mintmun

to both

sides about.

261,000 US military personnel would participate

In the operatton.

* DOUG

1,000 Army and 35,000 Marine forces

engaged on the ground within cubar

In addition,

appront

mately 29,000 Army troops N111 be avallable as on cala

forces.

c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:

Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an

armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/

wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together

with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter

squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

d. Principal equipment includes:

(1) Army - Artillery units and armor (Including about

275 tanks.)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

2/Ke

218

21

21

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

126

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(2) Marines

tillery wits and armor (including

bout 85 tanks), plus some 320 supporting aircraft

(3) Navy -

Approximately 175-200 ships, includin

with approzimately 180 aironar

16,21

16,21

eubar cod

(4) Air Force

About 490 troop

carTers and crens.

Orts. 312

tactical

righters,

and

Decorate sent

1tng

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs

units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not

trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil

Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in

mobilization level would be required beyond the present

authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter

shipping.

c. Air Force - In order to land the maximum number of

airborne troops in the minimun time

19 teen 412 Dare

Reserve troop, carrier squadrons (C-119) were originally

included in the airlift plan

however, CINCLANT and USAF

have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving

any mobilization prior to D-day.

d. Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent

political or military situation exists which would make such

a precaution desirable in order to assure US military

responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic

contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic

areas in Cuba within

lays. Subsequent to gaining such

control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal

of forces as the situation permits.

16,21

16,21

21

TOD PrADIT

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JUP SECRL

SPECIAL HAN

NOFORN

when the assault forces beve been committed to the

Cuban operation, the strategic Any fonces in CONUS woul

Shot t

the supporting forces for

the zemaining five divi

Sions an

It is estimates that the Army Airborne two division

force rould be available for other operations

af-

ter with raval from Cuba. The equivalent of an Army division

force from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces

and remain on the islans to perform counterguerrilla opera-

tions and conjuct military government activities. This force

will be progressively ritherawn as the new Cuben government

increases in effectiveness.

b.

The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop

less that deployed with the Sixth

Sleet)

fully during the initial

phase of the operation.

capability

ce engegeo

There may

a Deguuremen i for amphibious litt

варі. перeploynen:

counterguerrilla activity until

order has beenarestored.

It is anticipated that most of these

ships will be available

tor other commitments

within approximately 30-45 days

About

southilot the Pacitle amhibious troop lift capel

bility will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of

Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in

the Pacific about 15 days

atter the withdrawal of the Pacific

Marines from Cuba.

In addition to the amphibious troop lift

capability the initial requirements for sealift will include

MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration.

Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the

initial 10-20 days

the operation.

C.

te, escinated

chat combs i-weady, status

pot the Atlantic

Comans Marine division/ ving tean will

be restored

within 12

0Dwi withdrawe

conbaterogoiness of the Paottee Command

larine expeditionary brigade

within 30 days of withdrawal

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift

would be fully committed.

16,21

2216

21

21

21

2)

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DR SECRC. SPECIAL HANDINE NOFOR

CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United

States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air

Force forces brought into the area for this operation. There-

fore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is

anticipated.

5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

a. The military reaction will be determined in large

measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as

well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency

in their use, at the time of US military intervention.

b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented

primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are

belleved to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed

by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally

by protracted guerrilla warfare.

c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be

configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that

survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against

targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of

which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could

attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States.

All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the

Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to

guard against any such attempts at retaliation.

d. In the future the Castro-Cuban

capability for counter-

action will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the

Cubans with additional military equipment and training.

thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist

government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly

increasing capabilities.

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6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is

contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban

forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support

a defeated Castro might recelve for the conduct of residual

guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an

effective friendly Cuban government.

b. Following the establishment of essential military

control of the island, a substantial US military commitment

may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time.

Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and

order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.

c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above,

it is planned that the post assault military presence

initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on

forces with such other sea and air support as may be required.

This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of

the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy

period of providing military assistance is anticipated.

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