## Page 1

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1-50

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

38608 Date: 03-18-2025

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 1

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## Page 2

5010-106

TO

a OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GC

RNMENT

Memorandum

: Mx .

W. R. Wannall

CONFIDENTIAL? :

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

A Asst. Dir.

Admin.

Comp. Syst..M

3/10/75

Ext. Affalrs —=

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

FROM

1 - Bach Assistant Directori

VICIASSITIED EXCEPT 1 - Mr.

Cregar

Laboratory

PALT

Legal Cour

Rien 2& Eval.

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Soc'yL

07. 11-7-00

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting

of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of

the Intelligence Community, (hereafter referred to as the

Group), held on 3/7/75.

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made

up of representatives of agencies and departments having

membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future

testimony before various Congressional committees..

At the meeting of the Group on 3/7/75 the following

items were discussed:

Congressman Robert McClory has been designated as

I the minority leader of the House Select Committee.

Copies of

the annexes prepared by various members of the Intelligence

Community have been delivered to both the majority and minority

leader of the House Select Committee.

Congressman McClory. is

very security conscious, is concerned that sensitive relation-

ships are not inadvertently disclosed during forthcoming hearings

and according to Mr. John Clarke appears to have no questions

regarding FBI authority to engage in domestic surveillances.

CIA has prepared a draft letter to Senator Church releasing

CIA employees from any obligations imposed upon them by CIA's

Secrecy Agreement (draft copy furnished the Legal Counsel

PerA is hav

they have any objections to ithEGlight a dic: 15-5

CIA anticipates that staff employees of the serate

Select Committee (SSO). will have. direct access to CIA buildings

but will not have direct access to CIA files or CIA persoRpet. 1975

Arrangements for the staff of the SSC to interview

CIA personnel

will be made through Mr. John

1. Clarke:

0962998

WOC: ebc

(17) ,15

Kun 11 3975

CONTINUED

~ OVER.

•U AUR 1 1 1975

'APT

88608 Docld:32989530 Page 2

AL COUNSEL

---

## Page 3

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

CONFIDE

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney

General, and Mr. John Warner, General Counsel, CIA, will

have a meeting with the Counsel of the SSC on Tuesday,

3/11/75, to work out precise wording for a Secrecy Agreement

that all members of the SSC staff have agreed to sign.

On 3/10/75 the staff of the SSC will convene to

develop a list of requirements that they expect to levy on

all agencies making up the Intelligence Community.

Mr. Clarke will have some information on these requirements

prior to the time they are levied on the individual agencies.

As a result of Mr. Colby's appearance before the

House Government Information in Individual Rights Subcommittee,

Government Operations Committee, 3/5/75, CIA is getting many,

many, calls from Senators and Congressmen asking how they can

find

out whether CIA has a file on them and what its contents

Mr. Clarke noted that members of the Group should

(anticipate receiving similar calls from Congressmen. (U)

Mr. Hank knocke, who heads up the ClA task force

responsive to the Rockefeller Commission, advised that staff

members of the Rockefeller Commission have been issued CIA

badges, occupy CIA office space, and have authority to

personally contact any CIA employee without clearing such

contact with CIA officials. In addition, the Rockefeller

Commission staff employees

have been granted access to CIA

files.

After reviewing these files, if the staff decides to

make certain portions of the files

matter of official

Commission business, CIA has a right to excise the names of

any sensitive sources. In the event information contained in

these files originates with another Agency of the Government

CiA has insisted and the staff concurs that the originating

Agency must be consulted before such information can be

released to the staff. dE(V)

Mr. Knocke also advised that it is his understanding

that both Mr. Kelley and Mr. Colby will receive in the mail

shortly a request from the Commission to prepare a joint

response covering

the activities of foreign intelligence officials

In the U. S. dU)

- 2 -

CONA

CONTINUED - OVER

WW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 3

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## Page 4

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

CONFIDENTIAL

CIA as well as the rest of the Intelligence

Community is concerned over requests received by" Morton

Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act. Treasury,

National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency,

CIA, State Department and

the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB), have received requests from Halperin.

According to Mr. Clarke, a meeting will be convened by the

OMB Involving interested parties in an elfort to coordinate

a response. Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of

Central Intelligence, is very concerned that in responding

to Halperin's requests one Agency does not deny providing

information to Halperin that another Agency expects to give

Halperin.

To date the Bureau has not received a request

From Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act. & (V)

ACTION:

For informationand record purposes.

mise

This may possibly he consedered a

all such implications

Nite Cigare eleca

- 3-

CONTAPENTIAL!

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 4

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## Page 5

Assistant Attorney General for Administration.

March 7, 1975

shake

Nicholag P. Callanan

Associale Direcior, FBI

SENsTudy 15

INQUIRY BY

GANGRAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) AND

THE OFFICE

MANASEMENE AND BUDGES (OMB)

CONC DErIN

GENCE ACTIVITISS

pole+1014961

"APPROCAN TIONS 1974

On the alternoon of March 7, 1975, Mr. James F. Fooler, L

Director, Management Programs and Budget Stail, firnished a copy of a

memorandura loma GAO to the Depity Director of the OMB which requested

information conserhing appropriatioas, outlays and legislative authority

for such appropriations and exuanditires.

With regard to the FBI's Intolligence Divisioa, a response

was requested concerning the amonts of budgat authority for lical years

1974 and 1975 and actual outlaya for fiscal year 1974; an indication of where

in the Todaral burget these amounts or any fortion of them appear; any

langage in the budget wich emplains or incicates the parpose of pirposes

for which sich amounts will be spent; and the logielative authority for each,

of the liatod empropriations and enrapitares.

The BI does noc receive badget authority or account fos

budget outlayo sgecifically for interual seuirity or intolligence activities o3

for any organizational corporat hariling sich ratiers. The FBI's budgot

request for funds to hurdle internal accurity or intelligence maiters is sat

fern nuder the budget activity "Crewity and Criminal Investigations."

Based cu repayes mallertion sarrays which have been coadicted, it is

estimated that approzamately 25 percent of the FBl's resorces go to siprori

activities undex the sagravision oi to Intelligence Divicion. It is estimates,

terefore, thre in the fiscal yoar 187% the IuT's budget awhority contaiued

fenis amounting to 5o ne 901 natlica and that it had outlays of abant $33 million

Assoc. Dir. «

Dio suppé lazo retivities. The amona containet in tua rBI's budget anthoriti

Dep AD deos the Escai yeor 1970 is suitmates to ke $103 million.

Magin 41

Comy, Syst.

Tho puscoesa for which these finds are ex aneú are sei lose

Ext. Affalrs.

Fllas & 5.03.

in jostification intoriumeernyonyurg bidget estimates sub pitted to the Conger

Gon. Int. -

Ident. --

62-116395-

Inspostion.

Intall..

Dee designated and note on page two....

2 INCIOSURE

NOT RECORDED

WAY 1 -1975 4C

59a8530°

---

## Page 6

Assistant Attorney General for Administration

In the FBI's matarial for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 these parposes are

set forth under the section "Objective" and they are captioned "Domestic

Intelligence" and "Coordination and Dissemination of Security Data."

Additional data is furnished in each of those years under the section "Status

of Base Progzam"' and is captioned "'internal Security Operations."

The legislativa autbority for the appropriation and expenditares

for the fiscal year 1974 is contained in the Departments of State, Justice,

Commerce, and The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,

1974

(Public Law 93-162). The legislative authority for fiscal year 1975 is

contained in the Appropriation Aet for the same agencies (Public Law 99-193).

1 - Mr. James F.-Hoobler, Director

Management Programs and Budget Staff

1 - Mir. Wannall - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Moore - Enclosure

NOTE: The attached inquiry from GAO is being coordinated by the OMB. It

was received by us from the Department at 1:14 p.m., 3/7/75, with a request

that the information be furnished by the close of business the same date.

NW 88608

* Docld:32989530

so cite a

Page 6

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## Page 7

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'

ROBTE SLIP

TO_ Mr. Hoobler

Jim Purcell

Talo nocessary action

Approval or signature

Commont

Preparc reply

Discuss with me

For your information

So remarks below

1 im

ParcellDATE 3-7-75

FROM.

REMARKS

Mr. Hoobler:

Will you please provide the requested

information indicated by jir. Scantieburg's

memo of February 24 pertaining to the FBI.

Item

| "8" which refers to the FBI Internal

Security Division should be interpreted

as the FBI's Intelligence Division.

I would appreciate having this information,

if possible, by close of business, today.

ATZ PEL INFORNAMION CONTAITEO

ONE FORMA

"EV HUG Ti

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

23

197

NW_88608_Docld:32989530 Page 7

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## Page 8

NITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUI.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20513

CÉFICE

DIVISION OF FINANCIAL AND

GENERAL MANAGEHENT STUD:ES

FEB 24 1975

Mr. Paul I1. O'Neill

Deputy Director

Office of Management and Budget

Dear Ar. O'Neill:

We have recently received a request from a Member of the Senate

Budget Committee for our assistance in obtaining budget data with

respeci to various intelligence activities of the Federal Government.

We have the budget data that is publicly available.

However, as you are

avare, most of the requested information is not readily available and

is usually provided to the Congress in limited briefings.

discussed this matter with representatives of the Sonate Budget Committee.

and it is their desire to obtain the requested data by other than oral

briefings.

The request involves amounts of budget authority for fiscal years

1514 and 1975 by eaci uf the following aguncies, and the actual outlays

by each such agency during FY 1974.

1. Central Intelligence Agency

2. National Security Agency

3. "Defense Intelligence Agency

4. Army Intelligence

5.

Naval Intolligence

6. Air Force Intelligence (including the National

Reconnaissance Office)

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research

8.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Internal Security

Division

62-116375

ENCLOSURE

1p

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 8

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## Page 9

9. Atonic Energy Conmission Divicion of Intelligence

10. Ircasury Dupartment Intelligence Division

The Cormitice would also like to know the following:

"Where in the foderal. budget does cach or any portion

of the above mentioned amounts appear? Indicate to

the closest possible digree of specificity, dcsignating

such amounts by the accounts or line items, or combina-

Lions of accounts or line items, under which the

amounts are included, and any language in the budget

which explains or indícates the purpose or purposes

for which such amounts will be spent.

"What is the legislative authority for each of the

above-listed appropriations and expenditures?"

We would appreciate your reviewing these items and responding at

your earliest convenience.

We have advised members of your staff of

this request.

We will be happy to work directly with your staff to meet

this congressional need.. To the extent that any of this information is

not available, we will need, in writing, the legislative citations or

precedents for not supplying the data.

Sincerely yours

sCantichin

D. I..

Scantlebury

Director

2

NW 88608_Docld:32989530 Page 9

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## Page 10

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10'

3010-106

MAY 1982 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. MO, 37

UNITED STATES GO

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Dop. AD AStr

Dap. 2017

Asst. Diry

Admin.

ГО

: MR. CALLARAN

DATE:

#

MDUS.

Gen. Iny. .

ATEL INPORIATION CONTAINIO

FROM : J. B. ADANIS

HERBIN IS UNCLASSITIEO

Inspection

DATE 11-7-00 BX SP 2 ALM 1/6

IntelliCe

Kim

Laboratory.

Plon. & Eval. -

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

Spoc, Inv..

Troining

Jenstudy -is

/Telephone Rm. -

iroctor Sad'y -

Wr. Keller asked that in connection with future testimony

we prepare two papers. One is to be a dissertation about our procedures

in opening and closing domestic security cases, including the application

of criteria for opening such cases and determining how long the cases

should remain in a pending status The second paper is to involve the

jurisdiction of the President to authorize unusual investigative techniques

in foreign intelligence investigations such as wiretaps, microphones

and surreptitious entries. This should include a definition of his

Constitutional powers and the derivative authority invested in the Attorney

General and the FBI.

Ill connection with these two papers, it is desired that there be

coordination between the Intelligence Division, Legal Counsel Division

and writers in the External Affairs Division, who should participate in the

basic research and discussions and prepare the final paper outlining the

research and analysis of the other two divisions.

Mr. Kelley's purpose is to have papers available on various topics

such as this which reduce technical dissertations to a style which can be

used for argumentative purposes in an easily understood form.

The types

of questions he receives generally do not require a highly technical response

but a concise presentation of the issues involved and the propriety of our

procedures.

69-1163%53

• ACTION:

NOT RECORDED 3

For information.

40ZAPRNZ 397575

JBA:ams!

(6)

1 - Mr. Jenkins

1 - Mr. Moore

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mc. Wannall

Or Hiddeck, even Lost

SW.s8dB8R 1o&d197589530 Page 10

DivE

A Devil

ORIGINAL

---

## Page 11

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962.E0ITION

3010106.

GSA Gail, RIG, N° 27

UNITED STATES C

VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-6-75

Assoc. Dir. -

Dap. AD Adni. -

Dap. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs.

Filos & Com..

Gon. Inv. -

Ident. -

WFROM : Legal Cöunsel

James

#mpRl6

AII, INFORRATION CONTAINLO

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIRIDO

DATE U-200 BEERACIN

Laboratory

SUBJECT HOUSÉ GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN

TuBlan. & Eval. -

*"Spoc. Inv.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE

Training.

THE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMNITTEE

Legal Coun.!

Telephone R!

HEARING,

MARCH 5, 1975

Diroctor Sec

• SeNAte

This Committee Which is chatred by Congresswoman Bella S.

Abzug (D-N. Y.) convened on March 5th to hear testimony from Director of

the CIA, William E. Colby. It was brought out at the hearing that the

¡Central Intelligence Agency had furnished information in their files pertaining

to Congresswoman Abzug the previous evening, March 4th, with the exception

of information which could not be disclosed without compromising a sensitive

source or intelligence gathering procedure. Director Colby also advised

Congresswoman Abzug in response to her inquiry that the source of some

fitems that she was in receipt of had been concealed because it was from

another agency. Colby did not disclose the identity of that agency.

111.110

Congresswoman Abzug asked Colby, and he agreed to

communicate with that agency and have them contact Congresswoman Abzug

concerning the aforementioned information. By way of background according

¡to a memorandum captioned "Bella S. Abzug (D-N. Y.)," dated 3-4-75, the

CIA asked for and received permission from this Bureau to release the PORTIAN OF

contents of unclassified reports furnished the CIA by the FBI and could be

furnished by the CIA to Congresswoman Abzug. From the remarks made

joy Director Coloy, it would appear that the topic or discussion between

Congresswoman Abzug and Director Colby pertained to these documents

and that we can expect some communication from the CIA in accordance

with Congresswoman Abzug's request.

REGIO 60 41225

296

During the question and answer portion of Director Colby's

testimony, Director Colby stated that the CIA would obtain information

pertaining to American citizens in only two instances in the future. (1) Infor -

mation developed incidental to their surveillance of a foreign target

ATTA DESTINATE

21

APR 3. 19

- Mr. Adams

1 - Mx. Wannall

I - Mr. Mintz

| PVD: disg (8)

51!

MAY 28 1975 Cmk

51975

-NW 08608-Đocld:32989530 Page 11

1 - Mr. McCreight

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Vir. Hotis

02-1/6395

NOT RECORDED

HAY 2.8 1975

LIGH

CONTINUED

rites

---

## Page 12

ina,

Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memo

Re: HOUSE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE

(2) Investigations conducted pursuant to FBI requests. He was asked

what the CIA's response would be to an improper request for investigation

concerning American citizens. He indicated that they would refuse such

a request and had done so in the past. The implication being from the

context of the question that the FBI had made an improper request of

the CIA.

In view of the wide scope of authority enjoyed by

Congresswoman Abzug's Committee and the realistic expectation the

FBI will have to testify before this Committee, it would be to our advantage

for the Intelligence Division, through liaison, with the Central Intelligence

Agency to obtain a transcript of this Committee hearing so that same

might be reviewed and possible questions contained therein concerning

FBI investigations be analyzed and responses prepared.

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division take action in line with the above.

2

NW. 88608-Docld:32989530 Page 12

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## Page 13

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

MDe 16

ALI INPORMATION CONTAINEL

TREES IS UNCLASSTFTA

113425100 FISPLALMHE

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

In Our Opinion

Assign Congress

To Hunt Bombers

See. Dir.

Asst. Diar

Adpin

Сокур.

ust

Ext

Sirs

Fil

Com.

Gen. Inv. =

Ident.

сореві

Intell

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec.

Jav.,-

Training"-

(Felontone Eim.

Director Sec'y

(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, eity and state.l!

Pg.

The Star Beacon

Ashtabula, Ohio

Here we go again.

The bombing of a State Departnent

restroom and followup phone call from,

someone calling itself the "Weather Un-

derground" is reminiscent of times past.

The bombers are apparently protest-

ing any economic aid to non-Communists

in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

There's a certain irony in the timing.

At the very moment the CIA and FBI are

being raked over the coals by self-right-

cous members of Congress, a radical

We wouldn't blame the FBI for turn-

ing the investigation of the latest bomb-

ing over to the congressional committee

investigating government surveillance.

Let the legislators handle it.

Some measure of watchfulness must

kie maintained over agencies like the

FBI and CLA. The repugnant aspect if

it all is congressmen leading the media

bandwagon to roast the agencies.

F32

0 MAR3 1 1975

MW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 13

Senster cy-73

Many of these congressmen and sen-

ators knew bloody well what these agen-

Lies were doing in years past, but never

raised a whisper, let alone a howl. Now!,

with home-grown terrorism seemingly —

behind us, the legislators play dumb

and feign shock or outrage over what

they call "disturbing revelations."

You can bet if a bomb went off in the

Senate or House chambers, Congress.

Iwould call out the FBI, CIA and any other

agency versed in intelligence gathering.

"ate:

1-30-75

What's more, the legislators would

dition:

Iwonder why the FBI and CIA couldn't

uthor:

immediately produce the 10 most likely

ditor:

itle:

Don Rowley

Miscellaneous

suspects.

"Where's your surveillance mechan-

ism," some senator would demand.

haracter: Public relation

What we have, folks, is Congress at

Issification:

Matters

its hypocritical worst.

sanitting Office: Clevelanc

L Being Investigated

CV

80-0

6211639517

NOT RECORDED

4O MAR 28 1975

---

## Page 14

5010-106

1962 EDITION

GSA "N.. REG.:50,27

UNITED STATES GO

ENMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AP Adm

1 - MT.

Carlahan

Asst. Di

1 - Mr. Adams

Comp. Syst. -

TO

: Mr. W. R. Wannal1

Ext. Affairs -

FROM

w. Austeregar

DATE: 3/21/75

1 - Each Assistant Director ton

1 - Mr. Cregar

Filos & Com. _

Gen. Inv..

intell.

egal Courk

I SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75:

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telophone Rm. -

This memorandum reports the results

of a meeting offactor socr

the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on

Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, (hereafter

referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the even-

ing of 3/20/75.

AIT. TITORHATION CONTAINER

DATE 9/26/0055P-2ALMtSTS.

DA

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In attendance were

Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Deputy AG Laurence

Silberman; Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John

Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, as well as officials from

Defense, Treasury and the Energy Research and Development

Administration (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission).

The meeting was called to have all agencies identify

(1) Types of information that could not be disclosed to Con-

gressional Committees, (2) Types of information the disclosure

of which was arguable, and (3) Types of information that could

be disclosed to Congressional Committees.

The FBI was asked to

lead off the presentation.

The Group was informed that we were

reluctant to discuss sensitive matters in such a large group

and we asked that the Group be reduced to a select few people

who would have to have knowledge of sensitive FBI operations.

After some discussion, the White House agreed this was a good

procedure and it now appears that Mr. Buchen of the White House,

one of his associates and probably Mr. Silberman will arrange

at some future date to discuss the sensitive type information

embraced in the above three questions.

No definite date was

set for this review and presumably either Mr. Clarke's office

or Mr. Silberman will be in contact with the Bureau regarding

this.

REC 2862-116395-

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by Mr.. Clarke

which attempts to outline a course the DCI can takeIn-coordinating

inquiries from the Senate and House Select Committees. Although

CA APR 9 1975

Enclosure

WOC:ebc."

(17)

APR 16 1075

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 14

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## Page 15

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

this paper was on the agenda for this meeting, it was never

discussed because of the length oi meeting,

concluding at

approximately 8:30 p.m.

Following the meeting, Assistant

Director Mintz and Mr. Cregar had a discussion with Mr. Wilderotter.

During this discussion Mr. Mintz pointed out to Mr. Wilderotter

that it was imperative that this Executive Committee clearly

define how responses to the Select Committees would be coordinated

with ther

All questions received by agencies of the Intelligence Community

from Select Committees would be furnished to Mr. Clarke.

matter of fact, Mr. Wilderotter advised a copy of the questions

received by the Department from the Senate Select Committee

requiring responses from the FBI had already been turned over to

Mr. Clarke by Mr. Wilderotter.

Upon receipt of a copy of such

questions, Mr. Clarke would review them and attempt to identify

which questions involve policy matters of interest

; to the White

House.

He would then inform all agencies involved in such a

response that such a question involved policy. Those agencies

would be obliged to discuss the response between themselves and.

arrive at a coordinated answer.

That answer would then be

furnished to Mr. Clarke who would in turn make a decision as to

whether it should go forward to the White House forresolution,

Answers to questions which did not involve policy matters would

also have to be furnished to Mr. Clarke to insure that there was

some coordinating mechanism in the Community and to insure that this

mechanism was in possession of all questions and all answers which

might be provided

the Select Committees.

Mr. Mintz made it quite clear to Mr. Wilderotter that

this was not the Bureau's understanding of how the coordination

process would work and was of the belief that no other agency

represented on the Executive Committee was aware of this procedure.

Mx. Wilderotter was asked to develop such a procedure for pre-

sentation to the Group to insure everybody was in agreement as to

how this process would work.

On the morning of 3/21/75, Mr. Clarke advised that

as a result of the meeting during the evening of 3/20/75 he was

completely confused and was at a loss as to how the coordination

process was going to work.

He advised Mr. Cregar that he would

CONTINUED - OVER

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 15

---

## Page 16

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

attempt to get some clarification and hopefully be in a

position to provide some information as to how the White House,

Mr. Silberman and Mr. Wilderotter wanted to proceed.

It is the opinion of both Mr. Mintz and Mr. Wannall

that the Bureau must immediately set up a Task Force to handle

the tremendous amount of information that will be required

from the FBI, including the coordination of our responses with

other agencies who might be involved in such an answer, as well

as to insure that both the Department of Justice and the White

House are fully informed.

We can anticipate very short deadlines

and requests for information that are not readily retrievable

from Bureau records without considerable research involving

several divisions in the Bureau.

ACTION:

That

wask force be immediately created within the

Bureau to facilitate the collation of information as well as

the coordination of such information responsive

•to the requests

we can anticipate receiving from Select Committees of the congress.

- Men be pere

70r.

Grenad

shape mean

such response.

y cach wiget

anagreemenhas

in terms af persunnel and collection and review

houserer, an

of information

and dacumenis;

in each otia

individual should be designatit

division as contacisto handle river at of

reguists of the division and to expuerte reprises

do 8988+34 1198.

from his divigion.

he briefed as to the roles of the

Soned.

and House Selet Comnittees irid tha

urge goof the rege development er, ol

services

that world assist in

Legar counsel will continue to jial witr

tri committes and help elsecre as necesuor yo

response time-

NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 16

-3-

gra

PLM

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an Eager

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

20 March 1975

This represents a working paper; It attempts

to outline a course the DCI can take in dealing

with the Senate /House Select Committees'

inquiries. The details herein have not yet

been discussed or coordinated with representa-

. tives of the Ad Hoc Group of USIB.

John

M. Clarke

AD/DCI/IC

9/26.700

ACTION

s",;

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A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORT

• In treating with Congressional inquiries, the Director of Central

Intelligence will provide leadership to the Intelligence Community.

The Associate Deputy to the DOI for the Intelligence Community,

supported by the Intelligence Community Staff, will provide the

principal staff direction and congressional liaison for the DCI in these

matters.

He will serve as a focal point for coordination among Community

entities and assure communication with the Executive Office as appropriate.

The IC Staff with the assistance of USIB. Agencies will pravide legal, .

security, substantive, and registry support structured so as to assure

"appropriate support to the DCI and the Intelligence Community. ' The •

AD/DCI/IC will chair an Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of USIB as a

principal mechanism for exchanging information and coordinating USIB

activities with respect to the inquiry where needed. The AD/DCI/IC and

the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group will establish periodic and special

time sensitive reporting to keep the DCI, the USIB principals, and involved

Executive Branch agencies advised on USIB Agencies' liaison relationships

with the Select Committees and on substantive exchanges in response to

Select Committee inquiries. Where usefnl, common standards and procedures

will be developed by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group.

B. COORDINATION

1. Physical security is proceeding well. The Chairman of the Security

Committee of USIB has been assigned as the principal Intelligence Community

officer on physical security und clearance matters.

Agreements have been

reached with the Senate Select Committee on physical security standards.

These standards have been provided to the House Select Committee Staff.

The Senate has arranged for central facilities which meet the physical

security standards and has appointed a full-time security officer who will

provide certification of personnel clearances. The House at the present

time is not planning central facilities and we understand will be dispersed

in at least three different locations.

Discussion of classified information will occur outside of the

security-approved Committee rooms and particularly in the offices of the

members of the Select Committee. • Agreement has been reached that the FBI

will approach the House and Senate Staff Directors and offer technical sweep

services for the Congressional offices involved.

id 0a02lni

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2. Personnel security investigations on Select Committee Staff are

under way by the FBI. It is understood that upon completion of Staff

investigations, the Select Committee Chairman will certify to the DCI

the Top Secret clearances of Committee Staff. The DCI, through his

Intelligence Community Staff, will pass along the certification to the

security elements of the respective agencies. Compartmented clearance

arrangements and certification also have been agreed with the Senate Select

Committee Staff. Similar arrangements have been discussed with the House

Seleci Committee Staff.

3. Secrecy agreements for the Senate Select Committee Staff employees

are being drafted and the AD/DCI/IC, supported by the CIA General Counsel

and the Associate Deputy Attorney General, will negotiate similar arrange-

ments with the House, The DCI policy is to insist upon secrecy agreements.

4. Arrangements will be established by the USIB Ad Hos Coordinating

Group for the recording of documents, testimony and transcripts, and for

procedures to protect sources and methods which may be contained in the

nutcrial flowing to the Salevi Curuittes frun all agencies. à cenirai

index service will be provided by the Intelligence Community Staff to serve

the DCI and USIB Agencies. The following describes the general content

of this central index.

a. All requests received by USIB Agencies from the Select

Committees.

b.. All other communications from Select Committees on subject v

of interest to more than one agency.

c. Reports and responses by other non-intelligence elements of the

Executive Branch (if desired by those elements).

d. Identification of document responses provided to the requests

and listing of subjects covered.

e.

Prepared

statements and transcripts of testimony made to.

Select Committees.

•f.

Selective material released or denied under the Freedom of

Information legislation which relates to subjects of interest to the

Select Committees:

2

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Under this concept, all USIB Agencies would have a reporting

responsibility to keep the central index current.

Procedures will be

developed. All agencies would retain responsibility for the physical

possession and accessibility of their documents. The third agency rule

will apply in providing documents to the Select Committees.

C. PROTECTION AND HANDLING OF MATERIALS

1. It is suggested that in general there are four levels of security

applied to documents supplied to the Committees.

a. The bulk of historical data, organizational directives, budgets,

cash flow, command and control procedures, etc. should be made available

.. to the Committees on request and transmitted by the agencies concerned

directly to the Select Committees. This material will be under the control

of the Select Committèes.. It should be properly classified as appropriate

to assure downgrading under the Freedom of Information Act is consistent

with the judgment of the originating agency.. The agencies will inform the

central registry of the IC Staff of such transmissions and provide a

description of the materials.

The record file will be maintained by the

originating agency so that it may be retrieved if necessary for use by

authorized persons.

b. A second level of material will involve more sensitive data where

sanitization or compartmented arrangements may be desired. Agencies will

be responsible for these determinations. The IC Staff and the USIB Security

Committee will develop general guidelines for application of sanitization

•procedures. Emphasis will be placed on protecting sources and methods

while providing meaningful response and documentation to the Select

Committees. The record copy of all such material will be available in the

originating agencies.

The existence of the original file and its sanitized

version and location will be recorded with the registry. Keys to sanitized

versions will be held by the agencies concerned

copa

c. A third type of material will be made available to Select

Committee members or staff at the originating agency or if desirable at

a central point to be determined. (Facilities for a central reading room

can be established by the IC Staff, if desired.) This material would be

provided in the presence of an authorized representative of the originating

valent eat as alt:

.3

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agency. These "fondling" files may have specific limiations placed upon

them by the agencies concerned. Where such search limitations are

determined, they should be consistent with the agreements cortained in the

DCI letter to Senator Church or with ground rules agreed among responsible

agencies or with the Select Committees. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

provides one forum for such determinations where interagency discussions

are useful.

A fourth type of material for numerous reasons will not be

available to Select Committee Staff in its raw form, e. g., memoranda to

_or from the President, especially sensitive matters where Executive Branch

prerogatives are involved. This material can be used to prepare briefs or

provide briefings to Select Cornmittee Staff or members bur specific

documentatious normally will not be provided.

If such briefs or briefings

do not satisfy the Select Committees, negotiations will be undertaken with

the Committees. The DCI should be kept adyised in all such instances.

Normally, if after negotiations there is provision of raw. data, such data

will be hand-carried to the Committees and read by the Committee or

strtimembora in the presence of an authorized representative of the

originating agency as in c. above. This shall be made a matter of record

by memorandum of the originating agency to the DCI and recorded in the

IC registry along with the ground rules negotiated with the committees

and the agencies in their negotiations.

These ground rules will normally

be an agenda item on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group agenda.

2. Testimony given in informal interview with Select Committee Staff

will be recorded normally in a memorandum of record and filed in the agency

concerned. Employees not wishing to report such testimony are free from

doing so. Notification will be given to the IC central index of the existence

of the file, its location and access rules. • To the degree possible, the

registry will cross-reference all materials provided the Committees and will

prepare current reports on such materials.

D. LEGAL SUPPORI AND QUALITY CONTROLS

1. The Intelligence Community Staff has several lawyers who will be

assigned to provide support to legal matters relating to this inquiry. The

leader of this group will be expected to have regular consultation with the

4

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General Counsels of all USIB Agencies and the Department of Justice,

the NSC, the OMB, and other Executive Branch elements involved in the

inquiry. Since the inquiry can résult in the introduction of legislation,

the IC Staff lawyers will also provide to the DCI appropriate legal briefs

for his use. The recording of these briefs will also be made by the.

central index. The lawyers will also assist the DCI and USIB in ensuring

that the Select Committees' procedures are developed in consideration

of the legal and constitutional position of the USIB agencies and employees

thereof.

2. We can anticipate the Select Committees will have 40-50 staff

personnel involved in the inquiries and that they will normally proceed

directly to the agencies concerned within their functional areas of interest.

Cross agency activity coordination and substantive comparisons will occur

within the Select Committees' siaffs.. It is in the interest of the USIB

Agencies to assure equally good coordination between and among the

members and Executive Branch elements as appropriate in the material

and testimony provided and that a general quality control of the product

is exercised. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group provides the forum for keeping

USIB Agencies informed on responses provided in the course of the inquiry

and avoiding surprise. Further, the IC Staff will establish a small quality

control and evaluative function and be alert to the indicators available as

the investigations proceed of potential actions or further inquiries that could

derive from materials or testimony provided by the various agencies.

3. There will be a range of "skeletons" and allegations which may

surface in the course of the inquiry. USIB Agencies will seek to assure that

all the facts are found and addressed so as to be responsive to the Select

Committee inquiry and in consideration of the Administration.

E. ALLEGATIONS AND PUBLICITY

1. The nature of the investigation will undoubtedly continue to afford

considerable public discourse. Many press allegations will cause further

inquiry. A system to check the veracity of such allegations should bẹ .

established by each SiB Agency.

The IC Staff will also undertake to

-

monitor press allegations and discuss them with the agencies involved

as appropriate.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 22

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2. Senator Church intends to provide the press with commentary on

selective testimony or facts pertaining to the inquiry. He has advised that

he will clear with the Director these releases, to avoid inadvertent disclosure

harmful to U.S. intelligence agencies. Review of such releases will be

undertaken by the IC Staff in concert with appropriate agencies.

• 3. In preparing statements or testimony to be given in open or closed

hearings, senior intelligence officials should avail themselves of all

previous related testimony or material furnished by other sources.

4. The DCI, through his IC Staff, will assure regular consultation with

Executive Branch agencies on press matters and take steps to fostér good

communication between USIB entities and political officials.

Notification of all inquiries from press officials to intelligence

agencies concemed should be provided to the IC Staff and a record of these

inquiries maintained in the central registry.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 23

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5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1982 EDITION

GSA GEN.

REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GG/ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.

Dept AD Adm.

1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan

Asst pir.:

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams

Admin. —

Comp. Syst..

TO

Mr. W.R. Wannallwe/r

Ext. Affairs —

DATE: March 27, 1975

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

FROM

1 - Hach Assistant Director u

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum is responsive to a request by the

Director, that is,

quick responses--why can't we get an agreement as to a

te are we got ane greement ur elves to dil

reasonable response time?"

Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated

3/21/75, captioned as

above,

described in considerable detail

problems concerned with coordinating responses to the Select

Committees of Congress.

One of the significant problems is

the very short deadlines we anticipate receiving from the

Select Committees.

Responsive to the Director's question, should we

get unreasonable deadlines from the Select Committees

requiring extensive file reviews, our legislative liaison

will personally contact Senator Church or Congressman Nedzi,

pointing out to

be completely responsive to their requests.

62-116395-6

ACTION:

REC-28

For the Director's

information.

APR 8 1975

WOC: bew

(17)

ALL TRIORH

EATOR CONTAINS

bow

34129/26106 SP2 ALM

PEM

BAAPE ::

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313 T0.70

NW 88608-Docld:32989530-Page 25 •-

62 341

-Descansa male...

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URECIOn

Trueral lurem of Innestigation

Muiteù States Ecuarturnt of Justier

Mashingtan, E. C.

August 24, 1936.

# moR 16

DECLASSIFIM BY SPEL AM ZIG

DI: 9 25/00

CONFIDE

PooSEYIuT

This norning, in accordance with the request of the President

conveyed to ue personally by him last Wednesday In New York City, I calleà

at the thite House at 9:15 and was with the President until 10:15.

He

was desirous of discussing the question of the suoversive

activities in the United States, particularly Fascism ard Communisi. He

had previously received the menorandun which I had prepared covering my

• conversation with General Snedley Butler and the effort of Father Coughlin

•In hava General Butler head an expedition to Mexico. I informei the Presidert

concerning certain recent developments in the Commnist activities in the

country, particularly the efforts of the Bridges orgsnization in Sen Fran-

cisco and their progressive control of the shipping on the Pacific Coast,

the Gulf Coast and their recent expansion to shipping operations on the

Atlantio-Coast. I told lin maù vuile heir contretut will expire on

Septenber 30, 1936, they are endeavoring to have it temporarily extended

until April 1, 1937, in order to conforn to the same date that the united

Mine Morkers' contract expires, which organization 1s headed by John L.

Lowls. I told him that the Bridges organization as practically controlled

by Connunists and that the Commnists had non decided to make very definita

plans to get control of the Lenis organization.

I called his attention to the activitiss of the Newspaper Guild

headed by Heywood Brows, hich has strong Commnistic leanings, and which

has been responsible for putting out of operation the Seattlo Post Intei-

ligencer. I told him that uy inforuation mas that the Communists had plarned

to get control of these three groups and by doing so they would be able at

any time to paralyze the country in that they could stop all shipping in

and out through the Bridges organization; stop the operation of industry

through the Mizing Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any newspapers

of the country tarough the Nenspaper Guild.

I also related to him the activities which have recently oc-

curred within Govermental service inspired by Commuists, particuiarly

in some of the Departuents and in the National Labor Relations Board.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 26

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CONFEDNETAI MORANDU

-2-

8-24-36

I likewise informed him that I had received information to the

effect that the Connunist Internationale in Moscow has recently issued in-

structions for all Communists in the United States to vote for President

Roosevelt for reelection and against Governor Landon because of the fact

that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare.

The President stated that he had been considerably concerned

about the movements of the Communists and of Fascism in the United States

and thai while the Secret Service of the Treaswry Department had assured

him that they had informants in every Communist group, he believed that

i that was true it was solely for the purpose of getting any infornation

upon plots upon his life, whereas what he was interested in was obtaining

a broad picture of the genaral movement and its activities as may affect the

econonic and political life of the country as a mole. I told him that there

is at the present time no governmental organization waich is getting any

so-called "general intelligence information" upon this subject.

He inquired

what suggestions i might ofter relative to this matter. I toiù hin inai

the appropciation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contains a provi

sion that it might investigate any matters referred to it by the Department

of State and that if the State Department should ask for us to conduct such

an investigation ve could do so under ou precent autority in the apar

priation aiready granted.

He stated that he is reluctant to have a lormal

request come through the State Department because of the nary leaks therein,

but that what he would do would be to puù a handritten memorandum of his

of State to request this information to be obtained by the Department of

Justice. He stated he would have the Secretary of State at the White House

tomorrow afternoon, and asked me to call at the White House at 1:45 p.n.

to see him, the President, and the Secretary of State, at which time the

matter could be further discussed and an oral request could be made or me

by the Secretary of State for investigation so as to avoid any possibility

of any leak.

He suggested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation

along similar lines which might be made by the military or Naval Intelligence

services.

He stated that the Secret Service was not being brought in on this

investigation as they should contine themselves strictly to the natuer or

protecting his life and the survey which he desired to have made was on a

much broader field.

John Edgar Hoover.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 27

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SIPECF.OR

Federal Auran of Instigation

Mnited Stater Department of Buntire

Mashingtan, 3. 0.

August 25, 1936.

9-25=

00

CONFIDANETAL MENORANDUM

Poday, in line with the request of the President, I called at the

White House at 1:45 p.m., and present at the conference were

the President,

the Secretary of Staue and myseli.

The President related to the Secretary of

State his concern relative to Cominist activities in this country, as well as

*Fascist activities. He stated that he was very desirous of having a survey

made of these conditions and inforned the Secretary of State that this survey

could be made by the Department of Justice if the Secretary of State requested

the Department to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation Act this

Bureau would have authority to make such investigation il asked to do so by

the Secretary of State.

The President poinied out that both of these nove-

ments were international in scope and thai Communisn particularly was directed

from Moscow, and that there had been certain indications that Oumansky, at

¿ached to the Russian Soviet Erbassy, was a leading figure in some of ühe

activities in this country, so consequently, it was a matter which feli witzr

the scope of foreign affairs over which the State Departnent would have a righ

to request an inquiry to be made.

the Secretary os State inquira if a regudst should he made is

writing.

the Presidant incicated that i should not me since he desired the

matter to be handled quite confidentially and that it woula be sufficient thai

ine President, the Secretary of State and I should be the ones aware of this

request.

The Secretary of State asked that the investigation be made and then

made several suggestions - one, relative to the making of a protest, either

formally or informally, to the Russian Government relative to its interference

with affairs in this country.

Discussion was also had as to the informtion

obtained indicating that the

Third Internationale had indicated preference fos

Roosevelt as against Landon.

It was the opinion of the President that some

statement shoula be made along this line by the Attorney General at an early

date.

The President asked that I speak to the Attorney General, upon his re-

turn to the city, about this matter, and he suggested to the Secretary of

State that he talk over the technique to be followed in this particular aspect,

with the Attorney leneral.

John Edgar Hoover.

X Zuluers activitien

He hand

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62-116395-477

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 29

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Office of the Attorney Erneral

Mashington, B. C.

Septemòer 14, 196*

MDR16

UNCHASSITIWD

2B SPĐ-A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Although the bulk of criminal offenses occurring

In the course of recent riots have been

local rather

than federal in nature: the question as

to whether

there was an organization which a, had made advancea

recally resolved by local authoritias.

In view of

• the

seriousness of the riot activity across the country:

It is most important that you use the maximum available

resources, investigative and intelligence,

to collect

and report all facts bearing upon the question as to

whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by

any group of whatever size: effectiveness or affiliation,

to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In this connection the following federal statutes

situation that develops:

12üle 18, USC, Section 2383, which proscribes

the inciting or engaging in any lever ion u.

insurrection against the authority of the

United States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2384, which proscribes

conspiring to overthrow or to destroy by force

the Government of the united States or to

oppose by force the authority thereof or by

• force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution

of any law of the United States.

NW 88608_Docld:32989530 Page 30

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Title 18, USC, Section 2385, which proscribes,

inter adla, advocacy of overthrowing the

Government of the United itates or the Govern-

ment of any state, territory, District or ,

possession thereof: or the Government of any

political

suodivision therein by force or

violence.

•Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388

Selective Service, 50 USC (App.) 462

Travel and Interstate. Transportation,

18 USC 1952 (Arson)

, '3:

18 USC 831-33 (Explosive)

Apart a a tend eficers and

Destruction Öf Government Property, 18 USC 1361 et al.

Federal Firearms Act, 15 USE 901-909

Crimes on Federal Reservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et al.

I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been

alert to this problem and is curcently submitting intelli-

gence reposts to us about riots and about the activity of

certain groups and individuals berore, auring and arter

a riot. Indeed, the President has said both publicly anc

privately that the FBi is conducting extensive and comprenen-

sive investigations of these matters.

There persists,

however, a widespread beller that

there is more organized activity in the riots than i€

presently know about.' We must recognize, I believe, that

this is a relatively new area of investigation and intelli-

gence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice.

We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility

of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a

violation of federal law, by a group of persons wao

the urban ghetto their base.of operation and whose

the a vase.

make

activities may not have been regularly monitored by

existing intelligence sources.:

In these circumstances, we must be certain that

every attemot is being made to get all information

bearing upon these problems; to take every step possiole

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 31

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to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or

activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.

As a part

of the broad investigation which must

necessarily be conducted, it is requested that a1l

available information be reported and analyzed regara-

= -ing each sniper caught in any riot or extremist

activity and regarding those arrested during the course

of a riot or significant racial disturbances who were

not, residents of the general area. -Moreover, sources

or Informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC

and other less publicized groups shoula be developed

and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these

groups and their relationship to other groups, and also

allegations of conspiratorial activity that come to our

attention from outside sources such as those reported

regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 28, 1967,

and those regarding the Detroit riot which were furnished

so the Department oy walter Sheridan of the Nationai

Broadcasting Company (summary of latter is attached).

msey

RAMSEY CLARK

Attorney General

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#mDR|6

AST YBLINDEZIALION CONTAINED

DIRECTIVE OF TIDE FRESIDENT OF TIC UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 15, 1953

"on September 6, 1939, January 8, 1913, and July 24,

1950, Iresidential Directives were Issued requesting aL enJO…Co

ment

orilcers, both federal and state, to report promptly sil

incormation relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities

and claied matters to the nearest fleld representative of the

rederal. Bureau of investigation.

I "he Federal Bureau of investigation 15 chargca wich

investigating all violations of the dionic Euerly Aci, 300140100

the illogal export or import of sissionablo maierial, the 1llegai

possession or

transportation of tissionable material and the

11j06a1 production,

transfe' or poscession ei may equalent. or

derico unlining rissionable muteraci or atonde oucrey as a militar

weapon. fissionable material means plutchium, uranium 135 O

other material which the Atomic Enesgy Commission hus astermined

to

be capable of reicasing substantini quantities. of encrey through

nucleni chain reaction.

ant requesting that ail enforcement:

oilicers: both federal and State, report all information telating

to violations of the Atonic Eneroy Act to the nearest 1i0la reper

sentative of the federal Bureau of Investigation.

"I suggest thai ali patriotic organizations and individusis

Iisewise report all ouch information to the lederal Bureau of

Is restigation In the same nanner."

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 33

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THE WHITE HOUSE

• WASHINGTON

July 211, 1950

Fir DR16

INSCRUTION CONCA TITER

WORDEN IS UECIASSIFIED

DUDE 925/00 VISP ZACMIFEE

INFORUATION RATATLIG TO DOLESTIC ESPIONAGE,

SABONAGE,

303758.57

ACTIV MI53 ARS RETURD

On Septerber 6, 1939 and Jenuary 8, 1913 a Presi

denttal Directive mas issued providing that the Federal Burezu

of Invostigation of the Departent of justico should take

charge of investigative mork in ratters relating to espionages

sabolage,

subyersive activities and related maters.

It tras

pointod out that the Investigaiions must ba conducted in a

couprchensive manner on a National basis and all Information

carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion.

the attention of cut Enfercement

officers, both Federal and stats, to the request that they re-

pore all Information in the above churerated flolds promptly.

to tho anorant Field Reprosöntatira of the Fodaral Dureal of .

Invastigaton, mach is charged with tie responsibility of

tho julcdiction of any other Federal ageney ilth responsibili

Eles in this ticla to the appropriate agency.

I suggest that all patrlotic organizations and

indivionals likorlso report all such iniornation relating to

ospionage, sabotage and subversivo activities to the Fodoral

Bureau of Investigation in this sane manner.

killin

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 34

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REPORT SECURITY MATTERS TO FBI

"On September 6,

1939,

I issued a di-

rective providing thai

the Federal Bureau

the Depatimeri of

Justice

nailers elating to espionage, sabotage and

violations

0 f

the neutrality

regulations,

poinzing out that the investigations must be

conducted in a comprehensive

national basis, and all information carejuily

sifted out and

correlated

in

order to avoid

confusion

and

irresponsibility.

I then

requested all police officers, sheriffs, and

other law enforcement oificers in the United

states, promptly to turn over to

the nearest

representative of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation any such information.

"I am again calling the attention of all

enforcement officers

to the reguest that they

roport all süch inévimaiive prompeiy co tne

nearest field representative

01

the

Rederal

Bureau of Investigation,

which is charged

with

the responsibility of correlaiing this

material

and

referring matters which

under the juri-diction of

any other federal

agency with responsibilities in this field

the appropriate agency.

"I suggest that all

tions and individuals likewise report all

such information relating to espionage and

related matters to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation

in the same manner.

"I am confident that all law enforcement

officers, who are now rendering such invalu-

able assistance tonard the success of the

internal

safety of our country will cooperate

in this

natier."

truthunderscoel

January 8, 2943

P: PET IS UNCERNS TERRO

19-25-00

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 35

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intendidato drea titan just aber de a cita tito

нематі!!!. 41 600.0

DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTENDER G, 1939

the Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct

the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of justive

to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espic

sabotage, and violutions of the neutrality r-gulations.

"This casi must bo conduccod da a compackoncire are

sirectave manner on a national basis, and ald Intormacion must be

carciully sifted out and correlated in ordor to uvora contusion enr

dreSponsibility.

Investigation any iniormation obtained by then relating to espiozages

counterespionuge, sabotage, subversive activities and violations os

the neutrality lavo."

# MDP 16

51/23/00 1 5P7 ALMILITE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

Page 36

---

## Page 37

1400

#mpel6

a-23:00

Strictly Co

Septenber 10, 1953.

sabis1

THANDS: P32

R. TITA

in talking with the Autorney Genoral today

concornino the radical situation,

I: informed

25a of the concerence thich I had sita use Presi::

donü on Sapüonber 1, 1020, at which time the

Croretory si State nes procont, and at vich

tino the socrotary of Sunte, at the Procident's

susacobion, raquested of ro,

the representative.

of the Departaont of Justice, to have investiga

tion zade of the subversive activitios in this

country, inchiding communise and fascion.

trinenitted this reuesi to the ationey General,

jand the attorney Goieral verbally directad no to:

proceed with this investigation and to coordinato,

as the Presideni suggested, information upon

these matters in the possession of thchilitar

cion,

the Stube Departmont.

is unc richority, upon trich to proceed in the

coaduct of this investisation, which should, of

(course, de lendled in a most discrect and con-

fidontial manner.

Very truly yours,

Jobn Edgar Hoover,

Dircator.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 37

---

## Page 38

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES

SINATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGICE ACTIVITTES

April 4,

• 1975

1 - Legal Counsel Division

1 - MC.

W. 0. Cregar

08

Reference is made to a letten

from the Senate

Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain

documents and other infornation

iron the rederal Bureau o'i

Investigation®

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes

an initial response to the various requests set forth in

referenced letter.

A copy of this memorandum is enclosed

for your records.

Processing of the additional requests

is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses

will be forthcoming.

Enclosures

(10)

EWL: jv1.

(5)

75477-7783

2/25/00

2 - ENCLOSURE

KE02S

/ I ST-112

JEE APR 8 1975

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -†

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection _

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plon. & Eval. _

pec. s

Legal Coun.

Director sedat

Fir AMAr ROS

NW 86600 Dold: 32989530

975

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 38

GPO 554-545

---

## Page 39

1 - Legal Counsel Division

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

#mDe16

9/25/00.

Z. ACM-756

April 4, 1975

UNDIED STATES SINATE SELECT COMMITTEE

/ STUDY, COVERNMEITAL ORURATIONS TITE

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Ieference is made to lotter dated March 19, 1975,

to the Attorney General fron the Chairman of captioned

Committeo, which enclosed certain requests for documents

and other

intornation from tho Federal Bureau of Investiga-

tion (reT).

Attached aro various documents which constitute an

initial and partial response to the Comnittco's request.

These docunents are doscribed as follows:

A memorandun from Attorney General Ramsey Clark

to FBI Diroctor J. Edgar Hoover, dated September 14, 1967.

2. Two FBI mamoranda recording instructions

received from President Fxanilin D. Roosevelt by FBI Director

Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities

and which indicate meetings between Fresident Roosevelt and

Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936.

3.

A momorandun from Director Hoover to FBI

Acsociate Director E. A, Tanm, dated September 10, 1936.

Запаху 8, 19435 5212231,

Prosidential directives dated September 6, 1939;

1950; and Besember 15, 1953.

The various other requests contained in the

Conmittee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention

and response will be forthcoming at the carliest possible

time.

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Enclosures

(8)

Ext. Affairs ..

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

1 - The Attorney General

Ident. _

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

EWL: jvI

(5)

Spoc. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM _

TELETYPE UNIT L

TO CORN

1=1:5.47

GPO 954-545

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 39

---

## Page 40

The Attorney Genoral

REC-46

Director, FBI

SENATE SELECT COMMITTED

1.51.

Marchl31, 1975

N.P, Callahan

J.B.* -Adans

1

- Mr. J.A. Mintz

1. - Mr.

W.R. Hannall

1 - HT. N.0. Cregar

Reference is sade to a telephone convorsation

botroen Associate Doputy Attorney Gonoral Janes A. Wilderottor

and Inspector John B. Hotis on Karch 25, 1975.

This vill confiru the authorization provided by

Xr. Rildorotter to Mr. Hotis with regard to pernitting CIA

to furnish a monorandun dated February 7, 1966, entitled

"CIA Operations in the United States," to the staff of the

Sonate Solect Committce.

It is our understanding that Mr. WilliamG. Millor,

stai tirocior, sonare select Comitcee, telephonically

contacted He.

donn clarke, associato deputy to the Dircetor

oi Contral Intelligence, and requeated a copy of the above-

described nenorandur.

I - The Doputy Attorney General

WOC: bCT

(9)

NOTE:

#IMPRIG

i.:1

9/25100 SP2 AntarE

menorandum W.O. Crogar to Mr. W.R. Hannall,

dated 3/24/75, captioned

| "Senstudy 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.

•Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv, aus

Asst. Dir.:

* Admin.

Camp. Syst.-

Ext. Affairs.

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. .

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

MAILED 6

311975

AR

-FBI

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 40

PIM

1

TELETYPE UNIT (

67094

---

## Page 41

OPTIONAL FOR•NO. 10

5010-106

AAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO

MENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM

DATE:

3/24/75

1 - Mr. Adams

- Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. —

Dap. AD Adm. -

Dop. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

-

Exi. Affairs -

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspoction -

Intell. -

laboratory

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

C7062712

ATTO

Spee. Inv. -

Training -

Telephono Rm. -

Director Soc'y -

This memorandum reports that on the morning of

3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating

Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community,

telephonically advised Section Chief William O. Cregar, the

Bureau's representative on this Group,

that the Senate Select

Committee (SSC) has requested a copy of the 2/7/66 FBI - CIA

Understanding, entitice "ClA operate ii in the United Siktas,"

We have previously received requests from the House

Appropriations Committee as well as the Rockefeller Commission

for copies of the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66.

Deputy AG Laurence Silberman authorized the

release of the FBI - CIA Understanding to the House Appropria-

tions Committee as welT as the Rockefeller Commission.

On the morning of 3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke telephonically

advised that CIA has received a request from the SSC to provide

the SSC with a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding. Inasmuch as

we have previously provided a copy of this Understanding to

another Congressional committee, it would appear that we have no

choice but to furnish a copy of

this Understanding to the SSC;

however, clearance should be obtained from Deputy AG Silberman.

Inasmuch as a timely response to the SSC is desired,

it would appear reasonable for the Legal Counsel Division to

telephonically inquire from Mr. Silberman whether he interposes

any objection to CIA furnishing a copy of the Understanding to

the SSC.

If oral authority is obtained, the Intelligence Division

will confirm such authority

from the deputy ad in writing.

PEG-46 602-116

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division IT Attempt

to obtain Mr. Silberman's authority for FBI to advise CIA that

this Bureau interposes no objection to CIA furnishing a copy of

the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66 to the SSC staff.

authority will be confirmed in writing if granted.

This

WOC: ebc

(5) 18

PLM

Sam 3 25/25 Are De A

172/-c1t1

Wass

grow

tended or eldere

eltel 2/7/lau7

55.0

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 41

---

## Page 42

NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

#mOR16

12049

20 March 1975

Assoc. Dir. =

Dep.-A. "Adm.

Dep.-A.D4Intel

Asst. Dir.

Adita. -

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. ..

Ident.

Inspection

Intenl.L

Laboratory

Plan & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

ROC

MAR 21 1975

XP

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation .

Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Thank you for forwarding me a copy of your letter to

Bill Cotter covering postal-related matters which might come

up in the Select Committees' review of U.S. intelligence. I

have passed this communication to John Clarke and can reaffirm

that John will be in touch with Bill as these matters evolve. I

want to assure that subjects dealing with any postal relationships

are properly coordinated.

I am furnishing Mr. Cotter with a copy of this letter.

Sincerely,

REC-19 EX-120

C 10-16 7== 45

Director

Đ

APR 1 1975

cc: Mr. Cotter

5

5-10..4

58 APR 8

1975)

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 42

---

## Page 43

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

49/25/00 SZAHG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BONRAUMEATIONS SECTION

MAR 2/1975

121505n

O SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVIFIESTYPE

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMA-

TION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN

OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD

SUTEL TO FBIQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION,

SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS

AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLI-

GENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT

ASSIGNED FULI-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPRO-

PRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intell.

Laboratory -

Pion. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

POo 8688 Docid:3

MAI

INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL

1 - Each Assistant Director

NOTE: By letter dated 3/19/75 Senator Frank Church,' Chairman of the

he camar at the Seato

Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Pespect To Intelli-

gence Activities, made an initial request for data concerning the FBI's legal

authority, jurisdictional agreements, organization and staffing policies and

procedures and studies and reports concerning internal security and counter-

intelligence activities. It is necessary to contact the feld OffigeSv a

specific intormation concerning the current agent stafi assigned to these

matters.

---

## Page 44

TELETYPE TO ALL SACS

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

Page 44

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## Page 45

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES G

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Mar. W. R. Wannal

FROM

: w. olC

regar

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 3/18/75

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Wannall

1

- Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.

Dap. Ap"Ach

Dap. AD IS

Asst. Dire

Admin..

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs _

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

Idont. -

Inspection

Laboratgiv

-ogal Coun

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Spoc! Inv. -

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting

of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of

the intelligence

Community, (hereafter referred to as the

Group), held on 3/14/75.

AISBYTOMLSI ITTACH

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made

up of representatives of agencies and departments having

membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future

testimony before various Congressional committees.

At a meeting of the Group on 3/14/75 the following

items were discussed:

Freedom of Information:

Mr. Clarke asked all agencies to report on the

volume of requests that are received under the Freedom of

Information Act.

The CIA representative pointed out that

as of 3/10/75 CIA had received 93 requests. Since 3/10/75

the requests are averaging approximately 50 per day. The

National Security Agency has received approximately 35 requests.

None of the other agencies reported any high volume of requests

and those requests that had been received did not impact on

the Intelligence Community

10

Security Arrangements:

REG382-116-595-4

CIA's Director of Security, Mr. Charles Kane, and

the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, Ma, Donäld E.-Mpore,

have met with Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Offider for the Senate

Select Committee (SSC), and are encouraged by the physical and

document security arrangements the SSC intends to employ. Attached

is a letter from Senator Church to Mr. Colby Expressing Senator

Church's appreciation for the help provided by Mr. Colby's staff

in developing security precautions.

Enclosures

WOC: ebc

(7)

ENCLOSURT

CONTINUED - OVERS

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 45

---

## Page 46

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

The FBI - CIA 1966 Understanding:

Mr. Clarke advised that the Rockefeller Commission

requested

a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding of 1966 and

inquired whether one could be made available to the Commission.

I advised Mr. Clarke that we had made the 1966 Understanding

available to Congressional committees and I saw no reason why

a copy of the Understanding could not be furnished to the

Rockefeller Commission but I would have to defer to deputy AG

Silberman (also in attendance). Mr. Silberman said by all means

we would have to respond to the Rockefeller Commission and he

authorized Clarke to furnish a copy of the Understanding to

the Rockefeller Commission.

Clearances for Staff Members of the SSC:

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter to the Staff

Director of the SSC from Mr. Clarke outlining procedures for

the certification of clearances granted to SSC staff members.

As an enclosure to this attachment is a suggested format which

the SSC could use in certifying that staff members who have

received a security iñvestigation by the FBI meet the require-

ments of Executive Order 10450 for access

tion up to and including "Top Secret." A second enclosure to

Clarke's letter to Miller contains a copy of Director of Central

Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 which sets up the Uniform

Personnel Security Ständards and Practices Governing Access to

Sensitive Compartmented Information.

Clearances for access to

compartmented information are the responsibility of CIA and

such

clearances will be issued to select members of the SSC on a

"need-to-know" basis.

Staff Members on Whom Substantial Derogatory Information is

Developed:

Mr. Clarke asked if I could describe for the Group

what procedures had been worked out with Senator Church when

information was developed of a significant derogatory nature

regarding potential staff employees. I advised the Group that

upon such a determination a Bureau official would bring the

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 46

---

## Page 47

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

written results of the investigation personally to the

attention of Senator Church or his Staff Director.

Follow-

ing that a copy of this investigation would be made available

to Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence and that

Senator Church or the Staff Director would welcome any comments

from Mr. Colby as to the security ramifications attendant to

the employment of this person.

Mr. Clarke agreed this was a

very desirable procedure and the Group fully endorsed this

arrangement.

Organization of the SSC:

Attached is Mr. Clarke's understanding of how the

ISSC will be organized. It is noted it will be broken down into

four Task Forces, each

with a Task Force Director, a lawyer or

lawyers assigned, each with several researchers.

As noted from

this enclosure,

Task Force three concerns domestic activities

including the FBI and those parts of the CIA that relate to

domestic matters. Army counterintelligence activities may also

come under the cognizance of this Task Force.

Staffing for Task

Force number three is still in process and no Task Force Director

has yet been appointed.

CIA Secrecy Agreement and Employee Bulletin:

Attached hereto is a letter to Senator Church from

Mr. Colby designed to relieve current CIA employees from any

obligation of secrecy. It is noted all CIA employees sign a

Secrecy Agreement as a

prerequisite to employment. Also attached

is a copy of an Employee Bulletin, dated 3/12/75, advising CIA

employees as to the procedures he

should follow if he is selected

to be interviewed by a member of the SSC or its staff.

It is to

be noted that both the Employee Bulletin and Colby's letter to

Senator Church were reviewed by the White House and the Department

of Justice.

CONTINUED - OVER

-3 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 47

---

## Page 48

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

CIA Requirements Received from the SSC:

Attached herewith is a letter from Senator Church

to Mr. Colby enclosing the initial request for CIA documents

for transmittal to the SSC.

According to Mr. Clarke, It is

his understanding that similar requests if not already received

are being prepared by the SSC for other members of the Group.

Executive Session:

At the conclusion of the formal meeting, Mr. Clarke

asked for an executive meeting to include the following persons:

Deputy AG Laurence Silberman,

Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter;

Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Mr. Chamberlain,

Inspector General, CIA; Mr. Thomas Latimer, Department of Defense

and myself.

According to Mr. Clarke the purpose of this meeting

was to develop strategy as to how the Group would respond to

the anticipated requests from the SSC. Both Mr. Buchen of

the White House and Mr. Silberman, acting in his capacity as the

President's Counsel

for Congressional Inquiries, insisted that

all requests as well as the responses to all

such requests be

coordinated through the above Group. Much discussion was had as

to how this could be accomplished.

No definitive decision was

arrived at.

However, it was agreed that the CIA would prepare

a paper outlining how they would respond to the questions that

they had already received, defining the level of response, the

area of coordination and identification of sensitive problems.

It was not quite clear to the Group as to exactly what form CIA's

what to

paper would take. It was proposed by Mr. Buchen and agreed that

the same Executive Group would meet at CIA Headquarters on 3/19/75

to review the paper developed by CIA.

In view of the various legal questions involved and

because of the direct involvement of Congressional committees,

the question of the Bureau's representation was discussed with

Mr. Adams.

It was agreed that in addition to Mr. Cregar, the

Bureau would be represented by Assistant Director Mintz.

This

(proposal was discussed with Mr. Clarke and he readily agreed that

certainly Mr. Mintz' presence would be a valuable asset to the Group.

CONTINUED - OVER

-4-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 48

---

## Page 49

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

As a result, Mr. Mintz and Mr. Cregar will attend the meeting

of the Group on Wednesday, 3/19/75, at CIA Headquarters, at

10:30 a.m.

Senator Towers had requested the Bureau to conduct

a counteraudio sweep of his personal office inasmuch as he

anticipated having sensitive conversations in his office: con-

cerning the business of the SSC.

Mr. Cregar was asked to raise

the question of a counteraudio sweep during the executive session

to get an expression from the Group as to whether counteraudio

sweeps should be done.

Both Mr. Silberman and Mr. Buchen felt

it was desirable to conduct such sweeps and strongly recommended

that they be done.

No commitment was made as to who would do

the sweeps at the

However, after consultation with Assistant

Directors Wannall and White, Mr. Adams and Mr. Callahan, it was

agreed that the Bureau should do the sweeps inasmuch as it was

a domestic matter.

Mr. White indicated that he did

have the

personnel and the equipment to conduct such sweeps. As a result

of that decision Mr. Clarke was telephonically advised that the

Bureau would conduct counteraudio sweeps of the personal offices

of both the Senate and House Select Committees providing such

was in accord with the desires of both Committees. Our Legisla-

tive Liaison is currently contacting both Senator Church and

Congressman Nedzi to confirm that both Committees desire this

counteraudio check.

It is to be noted

include the outer ofjices of the senators or Congressmen and will

so the notators ot

inot include the offices of the employees of both starts.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

gra

- 5 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 49

---

## Page 50

soutire. Registry

75-1266

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKI

2o, TENN.

BARRY GOLDWATER diRIZ.

WALTER D. HUNDAESTON, KY. CHARLES NOC, MATHIAS, JR., MD.

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

GARY HART, COLO.

¡VILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

¿nited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, SITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

75-103

Mr. William E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank

your for your letter of March Il, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin

you have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, in

order for the committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordance

with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation

will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all,

past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without

impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our

expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.

I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security

precautions. As you know, your

staff was very helpful to the Committee's

staff in designing those precautions.

The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will; under the direction

of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee

who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations

required to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.

It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee

and designated staff will have access to any and all information which

the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize,

however, that the committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such

as the identity of ClA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations

whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy.

In the event

that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters

we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss

jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed

should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific

areas.

ALm 7T6

NW 88608. Docld:32989530 Page 50

---

## Page 51

Mc. William Colby

Page Two

March 12, 1975

I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that

it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in

the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the

law.

Frank

/ Frank Church

Chairman

NW 88608. Docld:32989530 Page 51

---

## Page 52

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

13 March 1975

nAST

1241- 7-00.58

Mr. William G. Miller

Staff Director

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

United states senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Bill:

Following up on oùr brief discussion Tuesday on the clearances of

Committee Staff, I thought it might be helpful to outline a procedure

which you may consider reasonable to use.

As I understand your current ground rules, you are submitting your

staff applicants to the FBI for full field security investigation and on report

from the Bureau, under the authority of Senate Resolution 21, the Chairman .

and/ or the Committee will take action to grant or deny clearance.

The next step requires a notification to the Director of Central

Intelligence of the Chairman's decision and certification of the clearances

granted. I've attached a suggested format for this which you could use.

On receipt of the certification we will advise the USIB security elements

of the people so certified.

I also promised to go over with you the range of compartmented

clearances that exist and I am prepared to do that when we next get

together. You will recall these are the clearances for which you will

want to determine the "need-to-know'' for selected members of your

staff. We need to establish agreed procedures here as well. Access to

this information requires that an individual meet security standards set

forth in DCID 1/14, a copy of which is attached.

Classified by

006805

Exempt Irom General Declassication

Schodule of E.O. 11652, Exemption

Cutagary: 5B (1), (2), (3) or (4)

Declassified only on approval of tha

Director of Central Intelligence

• Nii:o.:.

SEOURITY INMORRATION

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 52

62116385543

ENCLOSURE

This downment may be

..!d!› Unclassified

CONFIDENTIAI

Tr:

in is detached.

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CONFIDENTIAL

I would like to suggest that you appoint a member of your staff - say,

Ben Marshall - as a focal point for handling compartmented information

access approvals and assign him the responsibility of insuring that these

security standards are met by persons selected to participate in this

sensitive area.

The CIA operates a Compartmented Information Branch as a service

of common concern to the intelligence community which records the names

of all individuals in the Government with access to compartmented information.

Your personnel would be similarly recorded which would considerably ease

the access certifications to all organizations for the duration of your inquiry.

As indicated, I am prepared to discuss this with you at any time.

Sincerelys

John M.

Таксо

Clarke

Associate Deputy to the DCI

for the Intelligence Community

Attachments:

1 - DCID 1/14

2. - Suggested Format

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 53

2

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAI

DCID No. 1/14

(New Series)

•02e2..0

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.1/14

#MARIG

ATS NEI INTORMANTON CONTAINED

ATLET-00 BY SEE ALMITTE

- NW. 88608-Docld:32989530 Page 54

::D.

MEIS TE

UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

GOVERNING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

F.:

(Effective 1' July -1968*)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 (New Series, revised 4 Marcy.

1964), paragrapb 2, subparagraph a. (5) and in order to ensure uniform

protection of sensitive compartmented information, the following per-

sonnel security standaras and practices are established for all United

States Goveriment civilian and military persornel, Government con

sultants, and employees-of-Government contractors. who-reguire access

to sensitive compartmented information or to information which reveals

the manner, methods and operational details by which sensitive com-

parimented information is collected. The standards and practices estab.

lished herein are to be considered minimal and the departments and

agencies may establish internally such additional security steps as may

be considered necessary and appropriate to ensure that eftective security

is maintained. "Access to sensitive compartmented information shall be

under the strictest application of the "reed-to-know" principle and in

full accordance with the existing authorities and regulations which

goverin access thereto.?.'S atonn: tar 985 1:

Purpose

11. The continued protection of sensitive compartmented information

within any one participating agency or among Government contractors

affects and is a matter of serious security concern to all participating

"agencies. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to-all-persons

under the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Executive Branch, without:

regard to civilian of military status, form of employment, ofcial rank

or position, or length of service. The establishment of uniform person-

nel security standards and practices as well as continuing security-pro.:

grams should enhance the security protection of such information and

at the same time facilitate the security certification process among

AT X035

'The term "Sensitive compartmented information" as used in this Directive is

intended to include all information and materials bearing special community

ontrols indicating restricted handling within present and future communit

intelligence collection programs and their end products for which communit.

systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The

terra does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section 11, Public Law 585,

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. '".?

•* This directive supersedes DCID 1/14, approved 23 June 1967.":

1

CONFIDENTIAI

ENCLOSURE

621163.

GROUP T

Excluded from automalic

downgrading and

declassifiestion

COPY

301

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## Page 55

The following Staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as

identified below by date and place of birth and' social security number

have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified

as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to

classified information up to and including Top Secret.

XX23MED 70440

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 55

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CONFIDENTIAL

Government departments and agencies when access to sensitive com-

partmented information is required.

2. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria con-

tained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to sensitive compart-

mented information shall not, solely for this reason, be considered in-

eligible for access to other classified information. However, individuals

whose access to sensitive compartmented information has been author.-

ized as an exception granted in accordarice with paragraph 5, shall not

solely for that reason be considered eligible for access to-other classified

information.

5,a-

Personnel Security Approval Criteria

0. =

3. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know

basis for access to sensitiye compartmented information are as follows:

a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discre-

tion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.

b. "Except where there is a compelling need and a determination

has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 5

below that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that under

the circumstances the security risk is negligible

(1) Both the individual and the members of his immediate family

shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes,..

"immediate family" is

deûnet as incuding the individuais spouse, parents, brothers, sisters

and children. As

7. her?

(2) The members of the individual's family and those persons to

whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be sub-

ject to physical, mental and other forms of duress by a foreign

power nor advocate the

use of force or violence to overthrow the

overnment of the united States nor the alteration of the form o

Government of the United States by unconstitutional mean:

33/

4. When there is compelling need to grant access to sensitive com-

partmented information prior to completion of the full prescribed in-

vestigation, such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall

be made at once, and shall include a personal interview by trained

security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible. Access in

such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the full prescribed investiga-

tion and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable

moment.

to art,

Exceptions

5. The exceptions to paragraph 3.b. (1) (2) above may be granted only

by the Senior Intelligence Oficer of the parent organization represented

on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), including military de-

partments, or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically

2

CONFIDENTIAL

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 56

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CONFIDENTIAL

delegated to the head oi an office or organization as set forth in inter-.

departmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be a common

sense determination based on all available information, and shall be

recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which

the individual has lived outside of the United. states for a substantial

period of his life; a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investiga

tion in terms of fulfllment of the minimur investigative requirements,

and: a judicious review of the information therein must be made before

an exception is considered. " is fa

Investigative: Reguirements i d

6. The investigation conducted on an individral onder consideration.

for access to sensitive compartierited infortnation shall be thorough and

shall be designed to develop information as to whether the individual

clearly meets the above Personnel Security Approval Criteria 299)

I EAT TIEN

ole investication shall be accompushed torough persona. interpiew.

by trained investigative personnel and shall establish armatively to the

adjudicating agency complete continuity. of identity to include birth,

residences, education, emloyments: and military service. Where the

circwostancesiof a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic

requirements set out below to ensure: that: those responsible for adju-

dicating accessieligibility have in their possession all the relevant facts

available.

-i8.- During the course of the investigation the individual shau furnisa

al signed personal' history statament and a certifcate of non-amliation

wita those organizations designated by the Atiomey General pursuant

to Executive Order 10450 Fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the

Federal Bureau of-Investigation shall be obtained. Photographs of the

individual siall also be obtained where additional corroboration of

identity is required.

.25L, 34

20088E 305000

g. The individual under investigation shall be given a personal inter-

rew tated security or counter eligence personnel whenever

s10. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:

ja. Verifcation of date and place of birth and citizenship of the

individual.

b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the. Federal Bureau

of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and other

national agencies as appropriate. An additional check of Immigra-

tion and Naturalization Service records shall be made if members of:

the individual's immediate family are other than United States citizens

• by birth. "gi

.: c. Local checks in all areas of the United States where the individual

has resided for at least six (6) months during the past fifteen years

3

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP T

Excluded from autoratic

downgrading and

declassification

COPY Nº 301

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 57

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• CONFIDENTIAL

or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Such period

of coverage shall include the following:

‹ (.) Check of police and cret records. Sher fartile ?

(?) Interviews with neighbors at present residence regardless of

duration and, to the extent considered to be productive and practical,

any other address at which the individual has resided.

-chrissa

d. Confrmation of all employment during the past fifteea years or

since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Personal inter-

views with supervisors and co-workers who had personal contact with

the individual shall be accomplished to the extent possible and prac-

e. Attendance at institutes of higher learning or at the most recently

attended secondary school shall be verifed in all instances: During

these inquiries collateral verification of prior educational records shall

be made and personal interviews with faculty members who had per-

sonal contact with the individual shall be accomplished to the extent

possible and practical. -

109. see good 94

r: I Review of appropriate military records. =

• "g. Interviews with a sufficient number of personal references given

by the individual and with a minimum of two other persons who can

furnish information on the basis of personal knowledge concerning

the individual's character, discretion and loyalty.

h. When employment, education or residence, except U.S.. Govern-

ment service, has occurred overseas during the past fiteen years, or

since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Passport

Ofce/Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and other

appropriate agencies. 'Efforts shall be made to develop informants

who knew the individual overseas in order to cover employment, edu-

cation or residence during this period.

"".

i. The spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family

shall be investigated to the extent necessary and appropriate to permit

affirmative determination by the adjudicating agency that the provi-

sions of paragraph 3, Personnel Security Approval Criteria, above, are

met. In all cases; the spouse shall be checked through the subversive

files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies,

as appropriate.

3253

Previous Investigation

i.....

....

11. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past

five rears which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it

may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided a review of the

personnel and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the

individual's security eligibility. Ii a previous investigation does not

substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five years

4

CONFIDENTIAL

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 58

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CONFIDENTIAL

(

old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that

necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in accordance with the

investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 4, above. Should new

information be developed during the current investigation which bears

unfavorably upon the individual's activities. covered by the previous

investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to

develop full details of this new information

Eyaluation

12. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on

an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be performed by analysts of

broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in security and

counterintelligence. When all other information developed on an in-

dividual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not

been met. will not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations

the protection of the national interest is paramount.. Any doubt con-

- cerning personnel having access to sensitive compartmented information

shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate deter-

mination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the

interests of national security shall be an over-all common sense deter-

mination based on all available information.

.:?.

Security Programs

13. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of

personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and

the investigative requirements established by this Directive, member

departments and agencies shall institute continuing Security Programs

for all individuals having access to compartmented information. In

addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to

create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape

notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's

"loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject to

undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable

personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive

compartmented work requiring access to sensitive compartmented infor-

mation and operations, the department, agency or Government program

to which he is assigned shall assume a continuing security and counter:

intelligence responsibility for that individual throughout the period of

his assignment.

14. The Security Programs shall include the following:

a. Security Education Programs to ensure that individuals who are

granted access to sensitive compartmented information are initially

and periodically thereafter indoctrinated as to its unique sensitivity

and that they understand their personal responsibility for its protec-

tion. These indoctrinations should be conducted by individuals having

5

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 7

Excluded from automatic

doungreding and

declassification

COPY

Nº 301

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 59

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CONFIDENTIAL

extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special

vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information

involved.

b. Security Supervisory Programs to ensure that supervisory per-

sonnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility. for main-

taining the security of sensitive information. Such programs shall

provide practical guidance as to indicators whick may signal matters

of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting pro-

cedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to

take. timely correcure action to sateguard the security of the Waite

states as well as to provide all necessary helpito the individual con-

cerned to neutralize his vulnerability.

c. Security Review. Programs to ensure that appropriate security.

authorities invariably:receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all

information bearing on the security posture of persons having access

- to sensitive information. Personnel history information shall be kept

current Security and related files shall be kept under continuing

review.a Departments and agencies shall develop security programs

under which at intervals no greater than 5 years, checks are made

: with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as all relevant police

and credit sources and, where feasible, each individual is given a per

sonal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel

15. Whenever indicated during the course of these Security Programs,

appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. ""In the.

absence of such indication the tempo of additional investigation shall be

tailored by the adjudicating agency to the circumstances surrounding

the individual under consideration as well as the breadth of knowledge

and degree of sensitivity involyed in his access. The investigation shall

be sufficient in scope to ensure that continued utilization of the individual

in activities requiring sensitive compartmented information is clearly

consistent with the interests of the national security.

12 PEeri

Effective: Date 3ị

16. This Directive declares the policy of USIB concerning Uniform

Personnel Security Standards and Practices for Access to Sensitive Com-

partmented Information. This policy shall become effective as soon as

practicable after approval of this Directive but in no case later than

I July 1968. Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and such

other references governing access to sensitive compartmented informa

tion as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

Richard Helms

• Director of Central Intelligence

~ These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investiga-

tion and Evaluation sections of DCID 6/3.

6

CONFIDENTIAL

_NW. 98608_Docld:32989530 Page 60

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This is a preliminary view and is provided

as

a report for information to the Ad Hoe Group.

STRACLA

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ALL FBIONFORMATION CORTAL:

FORMAN TO TATOES

111 200

Aim STE

The Organization of the Senate Select Committee - Rough Structure

The Committee will organize into four Task Forces - each with a Task

Force Director, each with a lawyer or lawyers assigned and each with

several researchers. Total professionals - 30/40.

Task Force One - Foreign Intelligence

This will deal with the CIA as a line Agency and with the institution of

the Director of Central Intelligence in his responsibility under NSCID #1.

USIB intelligence entities, i.e., State, Treasury, ARC and the military

establishments collecting, processing or producing foreign intelligence

will be reviewed in this context as well. CIA covert action is also covered here.

They plan to begin' with basic papers being prepared on USIB agencies

their missions, functions, organizations and general contribution so as to

provide the Committee with a "sound understanding on the role, nature,

performance and structure of intelligence looking toward legislation which

would address national intelligence needs, and provide adequate oversight

of national and defense intelligence entities and their relationships in

foreign policy generally!" William Bator is designated the Task Force

Director.

Task Force Two - Military Intelligence

This Task Force will deal with the organizational entities within the

Department of Defense collecting, processing, of producing intelligence

including the DIA, the Services Agencies, and the National Security Agency,

the NRO, and other collection entities such as AEDS, Attaches, etc. The

interrelationships between Task Force One and Task Force Two according

to the Staff Director will be accommodated by regular communication among

the Select Committee staff and be addressed by the Committee in the broader,

context of considering possible legislation for alternative structures. The

staffing for this Task Force is still in process and no Task Force Director

has yet been appointed.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 62

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Task Force Three - Domestic Activities

This Task Force will concern itself with intelligence organizations

engaged in domestic activities and including the FBi, those parts of the

CIA that relate to domestic matters, and possibly Army counterintelligence

activities. The staffing for this Task Force is still in process and se

Task Force Director has yet been appointed.

Task Force Four - Executive Branch Command and Control

This Task Force will be concerned with the tasking of the intelligence

community - its oversight, the use of intelligence, and the adequacy

thereof and mesh with the DCI's role as principal intelligence advisor to

the President.

It will treat with the National Security Council's activities,

functions, and

structure. It will address the variety of sub-committees

thereunder as well as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boar&

(PFIAB). David Aaron will be the Task Force Director. Note: Covert

Action direction and oversight is also included herein.

The Staff Director has indicated that the Committee is interested in dealing

with Agencies and documents therefrom in the most efficient fashion consistent

with security and economy of time.

He is not committed at this time to any

particular procedure. He has stated a desire to work selectively inside the

Agencies where access and screening of selective records could take place.

He wishes to avoid shipping in loads of data to the Committee.

NW 88608

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1975

210021502Am/ZE

The Honorable Frank Church

Chairman

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence

Activities

United States Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some

of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting.

At the outset, I should like to express my deep

personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of

you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your

sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our

Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the

Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review.

For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and

the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the

important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment,

a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only

necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its

responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in

the best interests of the intelligence community as well.

I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of

U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the

CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important

contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation

can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening

our democracy.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395711

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-2-

I am particularly appreciative of your recognition

that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence

activities must receive special consideration and treatment

by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we

discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive

sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign

intelligence services, the details of technical devices and

systems and o1 operational methods, the identitles of certain

of our employees

who could be targets of kidnapping or

assassination, the identities of American citizens and

organizations

who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and

some additional materials the public disclosure of which would

create serious foreign policy or national security problems,

should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from

that hot only to as

the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect

certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,

might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

Where these

kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appro-

priate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of

exposing such matters and at the

same time to satisfy the

Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our

activities.

As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence

Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff

interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this

might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to

protect the identity of particular employees whose physical

safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to

avoid such dangers.

I assume the Committee will make its own

arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no

longer have the authority to direct their cooperation.

However,

I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this

regard.

As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence

Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter

on duty.

This is a condition of employment, and it requires

that they keep forever secret all classified information gained

during the course of their employment.

The secrecy agreement

further requires that they may not disclose classified informa-

tion, either orally or by publication, without prior authoriza-

tion

• from the Director of Central Intelligence.

Under the

secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to

the protection of classified information continue after his

employment with the CIA has been terminated.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 65

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-3-

It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by

our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the

Select Committee.

To accomplish this, and in recognition

of the security protection contemplated by the select

Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise

protected

information to the Select Committee or its designated

staff members will constitute an authorized provision of infor-

mation within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This

letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any

Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to

the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters

which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement,

but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters

such as mentioned above.

is dieront

With respect to those particularly

sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously neces-

sary.

Accordingly, where

any matter included in these sensi

tive categories would be involved in responding to the Com-

mittee, the employee should express his concern and, if

possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without

exposing

such sensitive details.

If the Committee believes

that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary,

the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the

Agency.

I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any

time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine

together the appropriate course of action to be taken.

With the good faith evident in our discussions on these

matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to

discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources

and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same

time to provide the Select Committee with all the information

it needs to accomplish its task.

As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well

as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence

I have in-

structed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of coopera-

tion.

Sincerely,

w. E. Colby

Director

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 66

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## Page 67

AGENCYE

No. 442

EMPLOYEE

BULLETIN

AN TELINITORMANCON CORATNE

PAIN KOLA OLYAND

8242117-00-J9SF2 Am1724

12 March 1975

: 1

=

Senate Select Committee To Review

U.S. Intelligence Activities

Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the

Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls

for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort

and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against

CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact.

It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee

receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution

to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence

that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will pro-

duce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American

intelligence system.

It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal coop-

eration and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower,

the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the

CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and

for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design

procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern.

Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator

Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in

recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee,

I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information

to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute

authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy

Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special proce-

dures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly

sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensi-

tive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between

the Committee and the Agency.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 67

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## Page 68

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee

and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of

Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise

employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any

interview or other appearance.

When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed

by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel

will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal

liaison with the Committee and its Staff.

Mr. Clarke, in turn, will

notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the

work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee

to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security

guidance from an appropriate senior officer.

My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelli-

gence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative

changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and

contribution of U.S. intelligence programs.

1:

w. E. Colby

Director

Attachment: a/s

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

2

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 68

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## Page 69

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA!

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIF

• PHILIP A. CART, MICH.

WALTER F. MONDALE,

MINN." HARRY GOLDWA

7., TENN.

BARRY GOLDWAT

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.

ARIZ,

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Excoutive Registry

25-1215

nited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PUNSUANT TO J. RES, 21, PITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

75-104

"Д8К45L

RAMTO I LATINTLIN

SPE AIM)ETE

Mr. William E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

Enclosed is an initial request for documents approved

by the Committee at its meeting this afternoon.

Our respective staffs have discussed the request in its

draft form and I trust that they will continue to work together

in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is

necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

•

Sincerely,

rank

Charad

Frank Church

Chairman

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62116395-48

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ENGLUSURE

62-1163857

43

11323

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 70

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## Page 71

March 12, 1975

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

TO :

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence

FROM:

Agency

The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities

Guidelines

1. The attached request is not intended to call for a general file search

of the Agency.

Rather it is intended to call for various significant documents

available in the upper levels of the Agency. Without foreclosing any further

file review that may seem appropriate to agency personnel familiar with agency

files, we would suggest the following offices (current and past files) as likely

sources for initial review:

(i) The U.S. Intelligence Board staff and ICS

(11) Offices of the Director and the Deputy Director/CIA

(111) Offices of the General Counsel and Legislative Counsel/CIA

2. The requests are addressed to the Director, both in his capacity as

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence

and Chief Executive of the United States Intelligence Board.

3. Rather then waiting until all materials are available, it would be helpful

if any particular group is produced when ready.

4.

As previously discussed, please advise if there are categories of material

where it would be appropriate for Committee staff members to review called for .

material on the Agency premises in order to cull out the most pertinent materials.

5.

The request covers documents in the covered offices wherever originated

(including other departments or agencies). If any document referred to is believed

by the Agency to be in the possession only of another agency or department, advice

to that effect plus an indication that the Agency would not object to its being

made available to the Committee, would facilitate an expeditious inquiry.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 71

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## Page 72

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

I.

OUTSTANDING RE

ASTS

The Agency has agreed to provide the Committee with (1) charts indicating

the organizational history of the CIA; (2) identification of headquarters per-

sonnel; and (3) budgetary and cash flow information. The following is a further

elaboration of the kind of material in each of these categories which is necess-

ary for the Committee's basic understanding of the Agency:

Organization Charts and Personnel - The charts reflecting CIA organizational

history down to the Branch level should be accompanied by annotations or a nar-.

rative explaining when particular units were formed, merged, expanded or abolished.

The narrative should also indicate any changes in lines of authority, reporting

responsibilities,

and functions for each unit.

Changes in unit designation which

were not accompanied by substantive changes should be noted.

The charts should include the organization and staffing

arrangements of the USIB,

the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and its predecessors, and

the Forty Committee and its predecessors.

The identification of personnel should include all officials and supervisors down

to the Branch Chief and Deputy Branch Chief level, and to the executive assistants

for the directors or deputy directors of all Divisions, Offices and Staffs and

similar assistants for any officials above those levels.

B. Budget and Cash Flow - The budgetary Information should include both the budgets

proposed to OMB and the final budgets approved.

The cash flow data should include

the funds actually appropriated,. their location in the appropriations for other

Departments and agencies, and an indication of whether funds transferred from par-

ticular agencies are earmarked for particular uses within the CIA.

II: SPECIAL REPORTS OR STUDIES

The following are requested in their unexpurgated form (at the highest level

of classification; with all appendices, annexes and transmittal documents:

1.

2.

The Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report on' the Intelligence Community

1949 and 1955 Hoover Connissions,

Intelligence Task Force Reports

3. 1953 Historical Study of the Expenditure of Confidential Funds prepared

by the General Counsel's Office.

4. 1954 General Doolittle Report on the CIA

1960 Bureau of The Budget study of intelligence activities

1961 Taylor Report on covert action and the intelligence community

1962 Organizational study of the CIA initiated by John A. McCone

1964 Study by John Á. Bross, Frederick Nolting and Major General

John Reynolds

9. 1965 Study of CIA initiated by Admiral: Raborn

10.

1965 Study for the Director on CIA air propriataries

11.

1967 Internal CIA study for the Director on CIA activities at educational

facilities in the United States

12.

1967 Katzenbach Study (with John Gardner and Richard Helms) on CIA

domestic activity

13. 1967 Cunningham Study on the intelligence community

14.

1967 (or 1968) Eaton Committee Report for the DCI on NSA and the National.

Intelligence Resources Board Study for DCI on NSA

15% .

1967 (or 1968) report for DCI by the Senior Executive Group on the intelligence

community

16.

1970 Study under Admiral Wilfred McNeil on CIA Financial procedures

17°

1971 OMB study under James Schlesinger of the intelligence community

18.

Executive Order of November 5, 1971 restructuring the intelligence community

19.

1973 CIA internal review prepared for James Schlesinger on the CIA

20.

Additional studies specified in Appendix D of book furnished the

Committee staff on March 5, 1975

III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND OPERATING PROCEDURES

A.

Legal Authority

1.

All files dealing with the history of the 1949 CIA Act and the CIA sections

of the 1947 National Security Act.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 72

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## Page 73

B.

- 2-

2.

All agreements on jurisdiction or operational authority between the

CIA and other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

3. All legal opinions, memoranda or other materials analyzing the 1947

and 1949 Acts, Executive Orders or National Security Intelligence Directives

in regard to:

(a)

the authority of CIA to conduct covert actions

(b)

the authority of CIA to conduct particular categories of activity,

or specific activities, within the U.S., including without limitation:

the collection or maintenance of information or files on U.s.

the conduct of domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens or foreign

(iii)

nationals;

the organization and operation of proprietary organizations

(c)

the appropriate scope or application of the agreements requested in

#2 supra, including documents prepared in connection with their

negotiation

(d)

the applicability to CIA of restrictions placed by Congress on the use

•ôf funds included in appropriations from which CIA funds are transferred

(e)

the generation or use

of funds from any source other than appropriations

transferred to CIA, and the investment for profit of funds from any source:

. 4. All legal opinions, memoranda or other material analyzing the desirability

or effect of legislation proposed or considered to alter the authority of

the DCI or the

nature, structure or powers of the Agency in areas other than

employee compensation and benefits or headquarters construction.

include analyses of the CIA amendment to the 1974 Military Aid Act, whether

prepared before or after its adoption.

5. All Director Central Intelligence Directives ("DCIDS") • .

• '

Operating Procedures

An index of all major directives, guidelines, regulations, manuals or similar

materials which prescribe or explain authorization and reporting procedures

2. Directives, guidelines, manuals or similar materials describing the various

filing systems of the Agency

3. Specifically, all directives, guidelines, manuals or other materials prescribing

or explaining procedures to be followed

and the authorization and documentation

required in connection with covert operations, including without limitation:

field or headquarters initiation of proposals

(O) Elanning and modification of proposals

approval for commencement, continuation or renewal, and termination

field reports on the conduct or results of operations

(e)

evaluations following operations

The materials should indicate

the criteria which determine the level of

authorization required--Division Director, Deputy Director for Operations,

DCI or Forty Committee--for a particular operation. They should also indicate

the procedures and documentation involved in CIA inter-agency staff coordination

and CIA staffing for the review by the principals on the Forty Committee.

the extent the procedures described differ from those previously in effect,

furnish earlier directives, guidelines, manuals or similar material regarding

such previous procedures and provide a narrative description of how and when

(Request #3 is confined to procedures so that the Committee can subsequently

better understand CIA operations in the covert action area.)

Financial Procedures

In addtion to budgetary and cash flow figures, the Committee will need explanatory

information to understand the financial operations of CIA. This request consists

of all directives, guidelines, manuals and other materials governing or describing:

1. Procedures for preparing and discussing budgets with OMB, including ident-

fication of the documents involved in the process

2. The general procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing which

are used either within the CIA or in connection with Executive or Congressional

oversight

All special procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing in

regard to particular funds or types of activity,

e.g, proprietary organiza-

tions, currency transactions, or the discretionary fund of the Director.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 73

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## Page 74

D.

E.

IV.

-3-

4. All Bureau of the Budget and OMB examiners' reports on the Agency, and

all memoranda and reports provided by the Intelligence Community Staff

to OMB

All Annual Reports of the Inspector General and all Inspector General reports

for the past five years on all components

of the Agency.

The Agency's "Allegations and Responses" files

DIRECTOR COLBY'S JANUARY 15, 1975 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS

All materials reviewed or used by the Office of the Director in preparation for

Director Colby's testimony on January 15, 1975 before the senate Appropriations

Committee, including materials referred to in such testimony, (a representative

list öf which has been furnished to Central Intelligence Agency staff by the

Senate Select Committee staff) •

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 74

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## Page 75

'DIRECTOR COLBY'S PUBLIC SENATE TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

'Refereace is made to Director Colby's public testimony

January 15, 1975

before the Senate Appro

ations Conmittee, in which D

stor Colby identified

several documents basic

a an understanding of the Ageroy

is domestic operations.

The following requests are based on that testimony. Parenthetical page references

after each request indicate the page of Director Colby's testimony where the

the items requested were identified.

1 direct titted nettests into a site eaten Des soother

documents revising its authority or missions;

2. The directive or other documents in 1972 redesignating the Domestic Operations

Division the Foreign Resources Division; (p.13)

3. The directive or other documents defining the authority of the "cover and

commercial staff" and stating its missions (p.13)

4. The directive or other documents establishing on August 15, 1967, a unit within

the Counterintelligence Office "to look into the possibility of foreign links

to American dissident elements," or defining the units authority and stating.

5.

то вара 2 2 907

The August 29, 1967 letter from the Executive Director to the Kerner Commission;

The September 1, 1967 reply of the DCI to the Kerner Commission and all attachments

thereto; (p.19)

6.

the directive or other documents establishing CIA participation in "an interagency

program in support of the National Commission, among others." (p.20)

T. The document resulting from the DCI's review of the unit created on August 15,1967

in which he concluded it was proper, "while strictly observing statutory and de

facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvement;"

(p.20)

8.

The directive or documents governing EIA participation in the preparation of the

Ad Hoc Interagency Committee Plan ( the "Huston Plan"), and the directive or

documents governing CIA participation in the Interagency Evaluation Committee

when the Huston Plan was

abandonea. (p.20-21)

The document authorizing the operation in which. "the Agency recruited or inserted

about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles in order to establish

their credentials for operations abroad; (p.22)

10. The 1973 directive limiting the program described in request #9; (p.22)

11. The directive or other documents which in march 1974 terminated the program

described in request 79 (p. 22)

12, The directive or other documents authorizing the elimination from files of material

=

Americans generated from the program descscribed in request. #9; (p.23)

13. The directive or document authorizing the destruction in March 1974 of the IDIU

tape listing of 10,000 Americans received by CIA in May 1970; (D.23)

14. The directive orother documents authorizing the program to insert agents into

dissident organizations in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel,

and information.; if a new unit was established within the Office of Security

-..

to operate this program, the directive or other documents establishing the new unit,

definiting its authority or stating its missions. (p.23)

14. The directive or other documents terminating. the program described in request #14

(D.24):

15.. Indicate all lists "developed at various times in the past ... which do appear

questionable under CIA's

authority" (do not supply lists); (p.26)

16. All "current directives" prohibiting maintainance of the kinds of lists described

in request # 15; (p.26)

17. May 9, 1973 directive requesting employees to report questionable activity; all

written responses and all other documats reflecting oral responses to this; (p. 27)

13. The documents prepared for or constituting the

"internal review" which resulted

Ixom the responses described in Request # 17; (p. 27)

19. All documents containing "policy determinations and guidance that (Agency)

activities remain within proper Incrossed in August 1973; (p.27)

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 75

02146/395=

---

## Page 76

- 4 -

20.

The diregtive

other documents establishin

any mail inspection

programs with

the CIA or at its direction

Neen 1953 and February, 1973;(p.

21. The directive or other document terminating mail inspection programs in

February, 1973; (p-32)

22. The documents prepared for the review of CIA assistance to other federal, state

and local government components; all documents terminating or modifying

such

assistance as a result of that review; (p.33)

23. All directives subsequent to the directive of May 9, 1973 which similarly

requested employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and

all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives; (p.34)

24. All internal regulations, policy statements or similar documents pursuant to

the recommendations of the Katzenbacj task force in 1967. (p.35)

25. The Presidential Directive of October 9, 1974 regarding reorganization of the

intelligence conmunity.

NW 88608• Docld:32989530 Page 76

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## Page 77

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO

ERNMENT

Memorandum

sos. Sir.

* Dep. AD Adm.

Dop fil

AssI. D

Amin.

ViTo

Comp. Syst.

: Mr. Adams

DATE: 2-20-75

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

FimoRlo

ATh

Gen. Inv. -

FORMATION CAVIARD

Ident.

FROM : Legal Counsel

TRUIN 1S UNCLASSLLE

Inspection -

DATT 9/25/60 175P2 AM HIG

Intell. -

Laboratory -

SUBJECT

SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

Plan. & Eval..

Spec. Inv.

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

TALIBHETTEF

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y -

On 2-19-75 Inspector Bowers talked with William Miller,

Staff Director of captioned Committee. Miller was asked if the Committee

had established a possible timetable concerning hearings. He stated they

are "months" away from formal hearings but that they expect to begin taking

testimony in closed sessions to "build a record" in about two weeks.

Miller said these sessions will be conducted by a Member of the

Committee but will basically involve questioning of various agency officials,

not at the Director level, to provide basic information about the administrative

structure, legal basis, objectives and mission, and budget of the various

agencies in which the Committee will have an interest. Miller was requested

to give us specific notification as far in advance as possible concerning such

testimony sessions so that we would have sufficient time to prepare the necessary

material. Miller said this would be done.

Miller stated he would doubt that the Director would be needed

for any testimony for some time unless the Director wishes to be involved in

the early stages of providing basic information.

It seems apparent that the Committee still is uncertain of its

course of action. Miller commented that the Committee will probably follow

much the same procedure as used in the impeachment hearings where extensive

testimony was taken in closed sessions and used by the Members and staff to

prepare for the later public hearings.

It seems apparent that John Doar and his

staff who worked on the impeachment hearings will play a major role in the

Select Committee operations. Doar and a number of his former impeachment stati

members already are working with the Select CommiEre

roup.

ST-112

To date, we have received 13 requests from the Select

mmittee

for investigations of potential staff people in connection with the clearance

These

people by CIA following certification by the Committee.

These investigations are

being handled by the Special Investigative Division on a two-week deadline basis

RECOMMENDATION:

LES

For information,

1 - MI

Adams

1

1 -MR.

Cleveland! /

Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (8)

NW 88608 Docld 32989530 Page 77

---

## Page 78

4-528

/

62-116395-42x, .

CHANGED TO

62-116464-1

JUN 1 2 1975

Wmk/cg

#MDRIS

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 78

---

## Page 79

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

3010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir

Den.

Dep

Asst

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. _

¡Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/14/75

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

cent..

FROM

Legal counsel

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratary

SURECT SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

#MORIG

Plan. & Eval.

ON INTEILIGENCE

AIT, INTOR ATTON CONTATUE

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE

FITS 9-25 -00 FSP2 AnTHE

During a meeting attended by Section Chief Cregar, Intelligence

Division, on March 14, 1975, it was approved by the Deputy Attorney

General and Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, and concurred

in by William Colby, Director of CIA, that the Chairman of the two captionedy

committees should be approached and asked whether they would make

a Committee request for the offices of members to be examined for any

electronic surveillance devices. Offices occupied by staff members

116

would not be included in their proposed search.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Legal Analysis Office will contact Senator Church and

Congressman Nedzi to inquire if they, acting as Chairman of their

a search to be conducted. *

respective committees, would make comme request for such

steen mire

Ot to sent suit

grat

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. White

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Bowers

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Mintz

UNRECORDED

INCORDED COPY PISSES L

JAM:mfd

TEC-23

Pegal Can el

C2-tiz:322-11

MAR 21 Y975

56 MAR 3 1 1975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 79

Mi: 37 197

MA•

JUN 11 1975

LEGA

---

## Page 80

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

KLY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. RED. NO. *27

UNITED STATES

ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. Adams

DATE: 2-6-75

& FROM : Legal Counsel:

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATT, TNPORYNTICH CONTAINLE

D113125/00 BISEZALMETE

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. ADj Adm.

Dep. Agilnv.

Asst. Dfl.:

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affoirs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.

Téléphone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

Reference McDermott to Jenkins memorandum of 1-31-75

recommending contact with Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) concerning the

procedure for clearing staff personnel for captioned Committee.

Contact was made with the Senator's office on the morning of

2-6-75 to arrange an appointment. The Senator's secretary advised that his

schedule was so crowded that it would be impossible for him to discuss this

matter for several days. She said he requested that we discuss this situation with

William Miller, who the Senator intends to have head the Select Committee statf.

Miller was contacted on the morning of 2-6-75 by Inspector

Bowers, accompanied by Inspector Hotis. It was explained to him that the FBI

has no authority to issue clearances as such but that in conference with Central

Intelligence Agency officials it had been agreed that the FBI will investigate

prospective staff personnel, furnish results of the investigation to Senator Church/

as the Select Committee Chairman, and CIA will issue actual clearances based

on certification from Church. Miller agreed to this procedure. He was furnished

a small supply of SF 86, Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Position forms.

It was pointed out to him these forms should be filled out in complete detail and

furnished to us along with a current set of fingerprints. It was suggested the

applicants for these positions flingerprinted by the Capitol Police Department.

RECTI: 62-116395-407

Miller stated they would need results of these investigations as

soon as possible and after some discussion he agreed that a two week deadline

would be reasonable. It was suggested to him that in cases involving clerical-

type personnel that perhaps a longer deadline might be in order, and he said he

would keep this in mind. It was pointed out to Miller that results of the investigations

will be furnished to Senator Church personally. He also was advised that

representatives of various intelligence agencies currently are drawing up proposed

guidelines to suggest to the Committee for use in determining whether or not an

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Cleveland

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

10 MIAR Bowers

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. McDermott

DWB:kjs

(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

11-

58

NW 85608 Docld:32989530 Page 80

---

## Page 81

Legal Counsel to Mr.

Adams Memo

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

applicant qualifies for security clearance as well as proposed guidelines to

deal with the maintenance of classified material received by the Committee. He

was told someone will be in touch with Senator Church regarding this in the near

future.

Miller stated that the Committee is going to set up offices in the

auditorium of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the same space used by the

senate Watergate Committee. This space currently is being altered to meet

Committee requirements.

Miller stated that the Committee probably will bring on board as staff

personnel most of the "security team" used by the House Judiciary Committee

during the Impeachment hearings. He said this group has a proven track record

with respect to leaks of information since all leaks resulting from the impeachment

proceedings have been traced to Members following hearings rather than staff

personnel. This is the group headed by former Assistant Attorney General John

Doar, and Miller indicated Doar will play a major role on the Senate Select

Committee staff.

Miller will furnish Bowers the completed SF 86 forms and

fingerprint cards on proposed staff personnel as soon as possible and these will

be furnished directly to Assistant Director Cleveland for handling. This matter

already has been discussed with Mr. Cleveland.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

sire

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 81

---

## Page 82

• ÷*

OPTIONAL FOREI NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITYON

GSA, SEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES

ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. Jenkins

FROM : J. J. McDer

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DATE: 1-31-75

ALS INTORIA DELE

TION CONTAINEN

TZIN IS UNCIASSIFIEI

DATE 9/35/00 BS PJ AMITE

Assoc. Dir..

Dep. AD Adm.

Dap AD inv.&

/Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs.

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory _

Plan. & Eval. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rifie L

Diroctor Sec'yo

We have received the enclosed letter dated 1-29-75 from Senator

Frank Church (D-Idaho) writing in his capacity as the Chairman of the recently

established Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Senator states that to

carry out the task of the Committee, it will be necessary for the Members and

designated staff to have access to the most sensitive classified material. He

said the Committee is in the process of gathering a staff, adding that it is likely

many members of the staff will not have current security clearances. He stated

he would be most grateful if the FBI could expedite clearances on designated

staff so that work can proceed as expeditiously as possible. He points out the

standard clearance agreed upon during debate on the resolution creating the

Committee would be the equivalent of a "Q" clearance.

William E. Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, is

coordinating the compilation from various agencies of the intelligence community

suggested guidelines dealing with clearances and the handling of security information

to be presented for consideration to the Select Committee. FBI representatives

from the Intelligence Division have been participating in this matter.

REC-70 62-116385-31

This matter EXs aiscussed with Mr. Mintz and Mr. Adams, and

it was agreed that the Intelligence Division representative.

should explore with

CIA whether or not that agency would agree to issue clearances for the Select

Committee staff if the FBI handled the investigations. Section Chief William O.

Cregar took this matter up on the afternoon of 1-30-75 with John M. Clarke,

Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence. Cregar advised Clarke

had obtained Colby's agreement to the following procedure. The FBI will handle

investigations of potential staff members named by the Select Committee.

Results

of the investigations would be furnished to Church as Chairman of the Select 2 am.

Committee and the Committee would determine whether or not the indighat is

the necessary criteria for clearance. Following such certification by the

Committee, CIA would issue the appropriate clearance. A Sub Group-of-the

Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community

was to meet on 1-31-75 to draw up proposed guidelines to be presented to the

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Adams - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure

L, = Mr. Cleveland - Enclosure

DWB kis

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure tr

1 - Mr. McDermott - Enclosure!!

1 - Mr. Bowers - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

1*

NW 88608 Doc

'age 82

---

## Page 83

J. J. McDermott to Jenkins Memo

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Committee regarding the storage of information and the clearance of the staff.

This group consists of representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Atomic

Energy Commission. These guidelines, once approved by the Select Committee,

would be followed in determining whether or not potential staff members should

receive clearances.

Cregar said there is no objections to the FBI discussing the

foregoing procedure--FBI investigation, Select Committee certification, followed

by issuance of clearance by CIA with Senator Church. Senator Church will be

told at the same time that proposed guidelines regarding a clearance decision

will be presented to him as soon as they are compiled.

RECOMMENDATION:

procedure and work out with him appropriate arrangements for the referral

of potential staff members to us for investigation.

purt

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 83

---

## Page 84

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO

SHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD

CO-CHAIRMEN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON I1I, ILL.

MAN MILF FAST RESTAFF MEMBER

Assocu Dir:

Info

Dep. -A.D.-Arim

Dep.-A.D.

Asst. Dir

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

@nited States Senate

Ext, Affairs,

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES en. Inv

Files & gorld

AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 242, 83D CONGRESS)

Ident.

ROOM 252, RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

Anspection

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Intel

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

January 29, 1975

Spec. Iny. -

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Dinector Secy

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Justice

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Intelligen definiteni

The Senate, on January 27, created a Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect to All Intelligence Activities.

I am confident that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will make

every effort to assist the Select Committee in its work, and I look

forward to working together with you in completing this important task.

In order to carry out the necessary tasks mandated by the vote

of the Senate,

it will be necessary for Senators and designated staff

to have access to the most sensitive classified material. The Select

Committee is now in the process of bringing together a staff to assist

in carrying out its work.

In this regard, it is likely that many members

of the staff who will be hired will not have current security clearances.

On behalf of the Select Committee, I would be most grateful to

you if you could expedite, as a priority matter, clearances on designated

staff so that the work of the committee can proceed as expeditiously

as possible. In debate, prior to passage of S. Res. 21, the standard

¡applicable to a

"Q" clearance.

621-1163951

With kind regards,

MAR 2O 1975

Sincerely

70CC.i..I

FINDR16

AUL THFDRMATION CONTAINED

ERNE IN IS UNCLASSIFIND

DATE 9/25/00 IT SPA ALMITTE

wish

Frank Church

(D- IDAMS)

Pala natt to Gi bees

1-31-75 DWB/ke ja

SWAPR 1

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

1975 84

---

## Page 85

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN.

REG. MO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.

Comp. Syst. -

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/14/75

Ext. Affairs _

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

FROM

Legal Counself

Ident. -

Inspection.

Intell. —

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

Spoc. Inty. Al

Reference 1s made to memohandum Of M. O. Cregas

Legal Count

Telephone Rm. *1

Director Sec'y -

to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 3/10/75, captioned as above.

Page three of that memorandum referred to the CIA, as well

as the rest of the Intelligence Community, being concerned

over the request received for access to their files by Morton

Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). It was.

also noted that the Bureau had not received a request as of

not a that the busan

that time from Halperin under the FOIA.

The Department has now referred over to us today,

3/14/75, a request from Mr. Halperin to "inspect and, if I

choose, to copy files marked 'Official and Confidential' or

'OC' kept in the private office of J. Edgar Hoover."

This

request is being processed in the FOIA Unit.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Callahan

1

- Mr. Adams

1

. - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. Cregar

EXI10

JCF: TSy (17)

per

62:-11313-39

I MAR 21 1975

ANDR 16

AIT, INTORMATION CONTAINED

# RECY IS UNCLASSITLED

DA28 9. 25/00

2345P₴₴

10: or d

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 85

---

## Page 86

TO

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES G

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannall Whu

FROM

Cregar

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc, Dir..

De. 10 g0

Dop. AD

Asst. Dir

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.-

DATE: 3/7/75

1 - Mc. Adams

1

- Mc. Mintz

1

- Nr. Wannall

- Mr. Cregar

#M

AIT INPORMAFION SORRAIN

PISREIN IS UNCLASSIR!!

DATE 1L-6-0

k16

Legal Coun. -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. -

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y _

This memorandum reports the results of conversations

with Mr. Johm Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

reporting steps taken to insure to vettem

as the Group;

e that Mr. Willlam Cotter, Chief

Postal Inspector, Is invited to any

wherein the

question

discussions of the Groupx

of opening U. S. mail is addressed in

the context of Congressional hearings.

In a memorandum to Mr. Adams and Mr. Wannall, dated

3/4/75, Mr. Kelley reported the

results of his meeting with

Mr. Cotter on that date.

Cotter advised the Director that the

Postmaster General has become alarmed about the opening of mail

by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mr. Cotter asked the

Director if the FBI knew this was going on and did we actually

receive the benefits of it.

Mr. Kelley pointed out to Mr. Cotter

that the FBI knezXollOt and did get information on the procedure

from CIA.

REC-10 62111375=

During the course of their conversation, Mr. Kelley

told Mr. Cotter that he should be joined in the group of

investigative organizations headed by Mr. Colby, Director of

CIA, to consider actions in the Select Committee's probe.

Mr. Wannall was instructed to make. sure the Postal service is

included in the Group.

7 MAR 21 1975

On 3/6/75 Mr. William O. Cregar,

the Bureau's

representative on this

Group, discussed this matter wit

Mx. John Clarke. Mr. Clarke advised that inasmuch as member-

ship on the Group is

made up of United States Intelligence

Board (USIB) agencies and departments he felt most matters

discussed at future meetings of the Group would not be of interest

to the Postal Service and would be a waste of Mr. Cotter's time.

However, he assured Mr. Cregar that should a question involving

opening

of U. S. mails

be addressed by the Group or any questions

involving matters of interest to the Postmaster General, he

would see to it that Mr. Cotter or his designated representative

Enclosure - Sent 3-13-75

(5)

edm

CONTINUED - OVER.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 86

---

## Page 87

...=

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

was invited to the meeting. In addition, Mr. Clarke

indicated he would be in telephonic contact with Mr. Cotter

to arrange for any discussions Mr. Cotter might desire to

ACTION:

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, attached

is a letter to Mr. Cotter setting forth the arrangements

that have been made with Mr. Clarke regarding future atten-

dance of Postal Service representatives at meetings of the

A copy of this letter is being furnished to Mr. Colby

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 87

---

## Page 88

REC5710

March 13, 1975

BY LIAISON

-36

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

1

- Mir. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

•SP-

FEMDR 16

Honorable Millian 3. otter

Chief Postal Inspector

U. S. Postal Service

Vachington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

During our meeting in ny office on March 4,

1975, we discussed your participation in the group of

investigative organizations headed by kr. W111len

Colby, Director of Central Intelligence,

to consider

Community actions resulting fron Select Connittee

probes.

On

warch 6, 1915, hr. Vistian o. eregar, my

representative on this Group, discussed the matter vith

Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of

Intelligence for the Intelligence Concunity and

Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congres-

Mr. Clarke advised that membership on

this Group is made up of representatives from the u. s.

Intelligence Board agencies and departments and that the

major portion of infornation discussed at this Group

would not involve the Postal Service.

However, lir. Clarke

has assured Mr. Crogar that should any questions regarding

matters of interest to the Postmaster General be scheduled

for discussion before this Group, he would see to it that

your office is so advised in order that either you or

your designated representative can attend the neeting.

In

addition, Mr. Clarke indicated he would be in telephonic

"contact with you to arrange for any discussions you night

desire to have with him.

₩OC: ebc

(7)

om

0

SEE NOTE PAGE THO

"f:;

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD

Dep. ADA

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.=

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. --

Ident. -

is pection

Intell

Laboratory .

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv..

Training.

Legal Erun.

Telephono Ro

Director Se

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 88

TELETYPE UNIT [.J

1700051-04.

---

## Page 89

an' is tod

Honorable Hillian 5. Cotter

for his record sonding a copy of this dotter to ir. Colby

Sincerely yours,

Clarence 11. Belloy

Director

1 - Honorable William E. Colby

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C.

(BY LIAISON)

NOTE:

See memo W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

dated 3/7/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.

= 2 m

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 89

---

## Page 90

d.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

0-119

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. MINTZ AN

egislative Matters Section

FROM

R. J. GALLAGHER

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. —

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

-

DATE: 3/17/75

saltin

In reference to memorandum from Legal Counsel to

J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, SA Johnny L. Evans will be the

contact and coordinator for OPE in regard to the captioned matter.

Mr. Evans' extension is 2854.

OPE has no input into captioned matter at this time.

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

Diroctor Sec'y -

"ILE:DW

(6)

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Gallagher

1 - Mr. Matheson

1 - Mr. Colwell

1 - Mr. Evans

KMDR16

TORMATION CONTATHEN

DA 9-25-00 0:5P-2 ALM/116

9.110

RE610 67-116392--35

L1 MAR 21 1975

7 0 MAR 271975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 90

---

## Page 91

ORY ONAL FORM NO.1

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES

ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM

: Legal Counsel

DATE: 2-14-75

SUBJECT SENSTUDY - 1O

LETTER FROM SENATORS MANSFIELD AND SCOTT

RE DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS

JANUARY 27, 1975

Hate en

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. ADiAdm.

Dep. AD In

Asst. Dies

Admir

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv..

Training+

Lagel Count

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

In a letter to Mr. Kelley dated 1-27-75,

Senators Mike Mansfield (D - Mont.) and Hugh Scott (R - Pa.)

requested we not destroy any documents or files that may be of interest

to the Senate in the forthcoming hearings on intelligence activities.

A memorandum from H. R. Hauer to Mr. LaPrade dated

1-31-75 captioned "Destruction of Files and Records, Files and Com-

munications Division, " pointed out that our destruction program is governed

by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regulations of the rational Archives

SPIEL

and Records Service. Our current practice is to destroy files over

--

25 years old relating to subversive activities which are based on unsub-

stantiated allegations and have not resulted in prosecution. Criminal-

files over 10 years old are reduced to microfilm and the paper records

are destroyed. In addition, all duplicate copies of communications are

destroyed when they no longer serve a useful purpose. The Files and

Communications Division asked the Legal Counsel Division to determine

whether the Senators request applied to our current destruction program.

Mr. Callahan noted "Discus Tith sC staff.""

62116-395-341

On 2-10-75 Inspector J.

Hotis,

Legal Counsel Division,

met with William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence Advities, concerning this matter. Miller was told that ou

destruction program has been suspended until we can determine whether

any documents are involved that might be of interest to the Committegs 19r

Miller said he doubted that the Committee would inquire into intelligence;

matters that were over 25 years old but asked that we withhold destruction

of files until he consulted with Senator Church. He said he would contact

us later this week.

Enclosures (2) - sent

-2-19-75

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. McDermott

MAP 25 1975

- Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Ash

1 - Mr. Jenkins

1 - Mr. Wannall

aLIntz

1 - Mr. Bowers

57MAR 2

tarrington

1 - Mr. Hotis

NW 88608 Decld3558936 gee

(CONTINUED - OVER)

---

## Page 92

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams

Re: SENSTUDY

Letter from Senators Mansfield and Scott

Re Destruction of Records; 1-27-75

Attached are letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott

acknowledging their letter to the Director and advising them that we

have suspended our destruction program until the matter is clarified.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott

be sent.

pen

288

-2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 92

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## Page 93

:

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITIONI

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO

RNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/10/75

FROM

w. o. yetesar

FmoR) 6

SUBJECT;

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORHAZION CONTAINED

Mr. Adams

HEREIN IS UNGLASSIRIE

DATE 11 - 7-00 BX SP2ALME

Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

1 - Mr.

Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

Asst Pir.:

Adihin..

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv..

Idont..

Insposigh

Into las

Laboratory -

Legal Coun. -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv..

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Soc'y -

This

reports

information received telephonically

from Mr. Robert Gambino, Office of Security, CIA, on the

morning of 3/1/75.

According to Mr. Gambino, a CIA officer employed

by CIA's Office of Security, Mr.

Richard Kuh, has been

called to testify before

the Rockefeller Commission on 3/3/75.

The purpose of this testimony is to discuss CIA's recruitment

of approximately 10 dissidents.

The dissidents were to be

infiltrated into extremist

and revolutionary groups active in

area in 1967 in order that CIA could

obtain firsthand knowledge as to whether any of these extremist

or revolutionary groups were planning any physical damage

ox attack on CIA installations throughout the Washington, D. C.,

area.

In preparation for this testimony CIA was reviewing

all records in their Office of Security. In this connection

they came across a note from CIA Security Officer Paul Gaynor

reflecting a conversation he had with myself.

During that time

I had liaison responsibilities with CIA's Office of Security.

the note, signed by Paul Gaynor, read

as follows

"Discussed with

WiTTiam O: Cresar, FBI,.

4/4-6/67.

Says go ahead

after

conferring

1, Assistant Director, FBI.

"They never

WIth Mr. William Sullivalcopies of this note are being furnished

heard of this matter.'

to the Rockefeller Commission contemporaneous with Kuh's testimony.

I have reviewed all possible Bureau records in an

effort to locate any memoranda that might have been prepared.

I have found no such memoranda and am inclined to believe that

I did not make a record of my conversation with Mr. Gaynor in

view of the quotation, "They never heard of this matter."

33

• WOC :ebc

(6)

EX-112

CONTINUED

IS MAR 18 1975

1428808 6. 19785530 Page 93

---

## Page 94

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

Although I have no specific recollection of the

conversation with Mr. Gaynor, I do have some recoLlection

that such a conversation did

take place with him as well as

with Mr. Osborn, the Director of Security, CIA.

This is

somewhat reinforced by the fact that I can recall CIA and

Specifically Mr. Osborn was

concerned about the security of

CIA's installations. There was considerable campus unres

during this period of time. I can recall CIA recruiters

were attacked and beaten.

As a matter of fact, I am almost

sure that CIA's recruiters were forced off campus and did

potential employees' interviews in Federal buildings.

Recognizing that both Osborn, as the Director of Security, and

CIA generally were very security conscious, I can understand

and believe it was probably likely that the Office of Security,

CIA, began to plan the security and physical protection of

their offices throughout the u. s.

The fact is that

approximately one and one-half years after my reported con-

versation with Mr. Gaynor one of CIA's offices in Ann Arbor,

Michigan, was bombed, resulting in the now famous Keith

decision.

In the interim Martin Luther King was assassinated

4/4/68 and parts of the District were burned; Resurrection City

existed during May and June, 1968. All of these events remind

one of the situation that existed at that time and helps me at

least put into perspective why CIA's Office of Security was

"concerned about the security of their installations.

Although I cannot recall the specific conversation

with Mr. Gaynor, I did periodically speak to him during my

eight-year liaison assignment.

Had I received such a request

as reported on Mr. Gaynor's note, I would have discussed it with

the

Assistant Director at that time.

It is likely that

Mr. Sullivan who was then the

Assistant Director would have

reacted as reported in Gaynor's quotation. I say this because

if the facts are true, no operational activity to collect

intelligence was envisioned.

CIA merely proposed to place assets

in a position to know if any violent activity was planned against

CIA establishments and the Bureau was merely interposing no

objections to such activity on the part of CIA.

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 94

---

## Page 95

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

I have attempted to reconstruct the events in

my own mind as well as to view other activities that

transpired during the approximately eight years of my

liaison assignment. In all honesty I cannot recall any

case wherein I was requested or instructed to make an

arrangement with CIA without making a specific record of

it in Bureau files.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

good

whil

Ky

- 3

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 95

---

## Page 96

!

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO-ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:

Mr. J. B. Adams

How egal Counsel

SUBJECT:

SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DATE:

Assoc. Dir. #

op. ADlAdgi.

3/12/75

IS UNCLASSTPTAD

215925100 5P2 ALIS

Asst. D,)

Admir

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs _

Files & Com..

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory..

Plan. & Eval. _

• Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Co

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y -

On March 12, 1975, Associate Deputy Attorney General

Wilderotter advised me that he was just advised that the Senate

Committee staff has compiled a lengthy list of requests for documents

to be furnished by CIA to the Senate Committee. He said that the list

will be submitted to the Committee today for their approval in

requesting the material from CIA He described the list as unrealistic.

Mr. Wilderotter said that we may anticipate that the fBl will receive a

similar list requesting documents in great detail. He said that his

assignment in the Department at the present time is to assist in coordinating

the Department responses with the White House in regard to requests from

the Senate Committee and he requested me to advise him at once upon

receipt of such a request from the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That upon receipt of request from the Senate Committee,

as described above, Mr. Wilderotter be immediately informed.

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Moore

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Hotis

1- Mr. Mintz

REC 68

412,

62-114345-32

5I MAR 18 1975

JAM:mfd

(7)

227

70120 27 4775

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 96°

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## Page 97

ATT, THPORMATIOS COMPATIE

DA 1/25/00 35P 2 HEM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

EUGEN. RES. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

FROM

: Mr. WaR. Wannal

w.olyfegar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm

Dep. ApInv.L

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams

1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan

Admin

Comp! Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

DATE:

March 5, 1975.

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

1 - Each Assistant Director infu

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telophone Rm.

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting

of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of

the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the

Group) held on 2/27/75 at CIA Headquarters.

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made

up of representatives of agencies and departments having

membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board. Its purpose is

to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony

before various Congressional committees.

At the meeting of the Group on 2/27/75 several

items of interest were discussed, which items are set forth

hereinafter.

Mr. Colby, in his role as Director of Central

Intelligence, and Mr. Clarke met with Senator Frank Church

on the morning of 2/27/75.

Church advised that it is not

his intention to harass the intelligence community and he

hopes to reaffirm to both the Congress and the people of the

United States that there is a valid and critical need for

intelligence.

Church is concerned that no inadvertent dis-

He assured

se. Colly that he would continue to consEd Min 7 7170d5 - 3/

sensitive matters that come before the Committee

such inadvertencies.

Senator Church was appreciative of

the security guidelines furnished to him for the handling

of sensitive information and documents and assured Mr. Colby

that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) would abide by

these

guidelines,

With regard to the Secrecy Agreement, which

heretofor

Senator Church has been somewhat reluctant to haver 1& 1975

his stait personnel complete, it is now acceptable to the

Senator.

However, he does want to have

the Chief Counself

the SSC review the Secrecy Agreement and will probably propose

certain changes in its wording.

(A Secrecy Agreement was

developed by a subcommittee of

the Group in concert with the

Justice, Department.

Enclosures

-NOC:bcw (16)

CONTINUED - OVER

33), Page 97

---

## Page 98

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Senator Church stated that it was the Committee's

intention

to investigate all agencies' participation in

"covert

action" with primary emphasis on CIA activities overseas.

(Roughly interpreted, this could involve the Bureau's COINTEL

Program.) The SSC hopes to avoid any confrontation with any

members of the intelligence community over the release of

sensitive documents or testimony and it is Senator Church's

intention for him and Senator John G. Tower to consult with

both the President and the Vice President to resolve this

matter.

In this regard, Mr. Clarke advised members of the

Group that Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman has

been designated by the President to act as his counsel i

dealing with both the Senate.and the Fouse select cömmittees.

It is Mr. Clarkes

opinion that Mr. Silberman will act in this

capacity only as long as he remains Deputy Attorney General.

It isthe feeling of Senator Church at this time that

all staff employees of the SSC will be afforded "Q" clearances.

(issued by the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission.)

However, there is some question as to whether this in fact will

be true

and Clarke hopes to get further clarification on this

point.

Mr. Colby advised Senator Church that CIA requires

all employees to sign a CIA secrecy agreement.

It is

Mr. Colby's intention, as he did in the case of the Rockefeller

Commission, to issue an agency notice to all employees releasing

them from their obligation under the secrecy agreement in the

event an employee is called before the ssc. Additionally,

Mr. Colby intends to write a letter to the SSC advising it that

he

has so relieved CIA employees from this obligation, (Attached

is a draft copy of an Agency notice circulated within CIA. Also

attached is a copy of the letter Mr. Colby forwarded to the

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller advising the Rockefeller Commission

that he was relieving Agency employees from any obligation under

the secrecy agreement.)

Inasmuch as the Bureau requires all employees to

complete a secrecy agreement, the intelligence Division believes

that the Legal Counsel Division should review what action, 1f

any, the Bureau should take in anticipation of FBI personnel

With regard to deleting the names of Agents and

confidential sources from documents furnished to the sse,

senator Church agreed that this would be acceptable providing

he or members of his staff could consult with officials of the

submitting agency if it was deemed necessary that the names of

Agents or sources had to be revealed.

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 98

---

## Page 99

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

During the Colby/Church meeting, Church advised

(that he anticipates asking all agencies and departments of

the intelligence community for the following three items

down to a branch level, going back as far as 1947; 2) Copies

of all budgets since 1947; and 3) Documents reflecting all

With regard to items 2 and 3, Mr. Clarke indicated

that he will seek clarification with regard to budget and cash

flow submission and will hopefully have additional information

for members of the Group in the near future as to exactly what

the SSC desires.

During the course of the meeting of the Group,

Mr. Clarke advised that the Bureau should consider advising

Mr. Colby of any "bad apples" that are uncovered during the

Bureau's investigation of staff personnel.

This was not

intended to try to eliminate a candidate

as a staff employee

where there is some derogatory information but if the Bureau

develops very substantial information indicating the subject

is a definite security risk,

it is conceivable that Mr. Colby

could at least discuss that individual's possible employment

with Senator Church to prevent the Committee from hiring

anyone that could later prove embarrassing to the ssc.

Prior to the adjournment of the meeting of the

Group, Mr. Clarke queried all members as to what provisions

they have made for handling the onslaught of paper and

requests he anticipates all agencies will receive from the

SSC.

_ As an example, CIA has had to Xerox over 15,000 pages

of CIA documents in

the last

ten days in response

to requests

from the Rockefeller Commission. Clarke feels strongly that

each agency should develop a task force within their ranks

supplemented by stenographic personnel to prepare themselves

for what he believes will be very extensive requests from the

SSC with relatively short deadlines.

- 3 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 99

---

## Page 100

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

The matters of interest reported in this memorandum

were discussed at Mr. Callahan's conference on 3/3/75 and

are being addressed separately in accordance with decisions

made at that conference.

= 4 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 100

---

## Page 101

DRAFT

22 February 1975

CIA INTERNAL USE

ONLY

#MDRIG

OLI CONTARIND

L7TF

AGENCY NOTICE

As you are aware,. the President on 4 January 1975

established a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United

States to look into allegations that certain Agency activities

conducted within this country exceeded our charter and

statutory. authority.

Upon completion of its inquiry, the Commission will issue.

its findings and submit recommendations to the President and to

the Director of

Central Intelligence.

The President has

directed that the Agency extend support

and assistance to the Connission, and I have pledged my coopera-

tion to the Commission and its Staff.

I have also told the Commission that any current employee

of the Agency is available to the Commission and its Staff for

discussions..

The Agency and the Commission Staff have now developed

sufficient working experience so that we can désign additional

procedures to facilitate the Staff's work in examining topics

of concern.

All members of the Commission Staff have received security

clearances and have been given badges providing them with

:

access

to Agency offices in the Washington, D. C. area.

62-116595-31

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 101

---

## Page 102

The Commission Staff will, during their inquiries in CIA

Headquarters, Area Oftices, be given access to Agency files

related to the Commission's fields of responsibility.. The

use of specific sensitive data from these files in any

unclassified report by the Commission will be subject to

consultation between the Director and the Commission.

To facilitate interviews by the Commission Staff Officers

with CIA employees, I

have advised the Commission that employees

are authorized to furnish classified information with certain

exceptions.. My letter to the Vice President, the Chairman of

the Commission, is attached. It sets forth guidelines for the

furnishing of classified information.

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the com

mission and its Staff must at. the same time take account of the

rights of Agency employees. Like other citizens, they have the

right to remain silent. The Commission Staff will advise

employees of their rights at the beginning of any interview.or

other appearance.

My own belief, after careful review of all activities

question, is that legal action will not be taken against "

individuals. The final decision, however, must rest with the

Department of Justice and other legal authorities and risk of

such action is a judgment each employee must make for himself.

MS 88608

Noeld:32989530-Page 102

---

## Page 103

-3-

When a current Agency employee is asked to be interviewed

by a member of the Commission Staff, the Staff member should notify

Mr. E. H.. Knoche who is my assistant in charge,of liaison with

the Commission and its Staff.

My. Knoche, in turn, will advise the employee, tha

purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the vork of Staff members.

It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general

legal guidance it he wants it, and to obtain security guidance

from an appropriate senior officer.

Normally, we think an employee would advise his supervisor

or other Agency authorities on the nature of the interview. " It

should be understood, however, that this is not mandatory:

In arranging the interviews, I am acutely aware of the need

to avoid the appearance as well as the fact of collusion between

Agency and employee.

None ofus has any intention to fabricate

or mislead. I am convinced that being foxthconing,white per

aps

embarassing a ferdetalls, will on the woles vindicate the

Agency and its eminent service to our country.

In keeping with my long-standing policy, employees with

any knowledge of activities conducted within the United States,

now or in the past, which they believe to be of a questionable

nature can follow the customary practice within the Agency of

calling the matter to my attention or that of the inspector

General. This will ensure my ability to continue to be foxthcoming

with all those involved in external reviews of Agency activities.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 103

---

## Page 104

-4-

Employees should also feel free to bring any such matters

directly to the attention of the Commission of the Commission

Staff

outside of Agency channels if they so desire. . In doing

so, however, employees should bear in mind that the Commission's

field of interest is CIA activities within this country..

To contact the Commission, employees can call the Executive

Director, Mr. David. Belin on 456-7010.or the Counsel, Mr. Marvin

Gray, Jx., on 456-7014.

The mail address is:

Commission on CIA Activities

Within the United States

712 Jackson Place, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20500

Names of the members of the Commission Staff and their

badge numbers are attached.

W. E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

NW,88608 Docld:32989530 Page 104

---

## Page 105

COPY

#MORIS

ALL TBI LITOFARNMION CONTAINED

TEN IS UNCLES NUD

DAN 1-6-09 4S/2 ALm 71S

5 February 1975

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

Chairman, Commission on CIA Activities

Within the United States

712 Jackson Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Vice President:

As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence

Agency are required to sign secrecy agreements when they enter on

duty. This is a condition if employment, and it requires that they

keep forever secret all classified information gained during the

course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further re-

quires that they may not disclose classified information in inter-

views or by publication without prior authorization from the Director

of Central Intelligence. There is a provision in the secrecy agree-

ment that the conditions and obligations with respect to the protection

of classified information by the agreement continue after employment

with the Agency has been terminated.

As I have stated to the Commission, I will make available any

employee of this Agency to the Commission for staff interview and

for testimony before the Commission. This letter will serve as

authorization for any such employees or ex-employees to furnish

information as requested by the Commission or its staff on matters

that may be classified. As has been discussed with the Commission,

there are certain sensitive items which should receive special han-

dling. Such items include names of sources, specific details of

technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels

by the Agency, names of employees, names of persons who may be

targets of kidnapping or assassination by foreign intelligence organi-

zations, names of organizations cooperating with the Agency, and

detailed information which would pinpoint any of the above. Some

information might also conflict with a subject's right of privacy.

62-116395-31

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 105

COBV

---

## Page 106

Attachment to Agenc

Notice

karten dry fifir!

W.

BAKER, HAROLD A.

CARGILL, MASON

GELLHORN, ERNEST

• GRAY, MARVIN I., JR.

GREENE, RONALD J.

HARDY, TIMOTHY

MANFREDI, GEORGE

OLSEN, ROBERT

ROETHE, JAMES

SCHWARZER. WILLIAM'

WEIDNER, JAMES.

CLAPPER, PETER

* NW_88608 Docld:32989530 Page 106

A-6442

A-6428

A-6439

A-6429

A-6444

A-6435

A-6433

A-6432

A-6434

A-6427

A-4768

A-6447

A-6440

---

## Page 107

COPY

-2-

There is no purpose here to impede in any way the Commission's

investigation. Ibelieve, however, in most cases these specific

identifying names and details are not necessary for an understanding

of our activities. Where the Commission or the staff believes that

specific identification is necessary to the purpose of the testimony

or the staff interrogation, the matter will be discussed between the

Commission and the Agency, and I will be prepared to consult with

you and the Commission to determine the course of action to be taken.

Where in the judgment of the employee a specific identification is

especially sensitive as outlined in this paragraph, an identity number

will be assigned pending resolution of the matter between the Com-

mission and the Agency, and in the meantime the identity will not be

divulged by the

employee.

I appreciate the cooperation of the Commission and of Agency

employees in this regard.. I am still responsible under the statute

and as a professional for the protection of intelligence sources and

methods from unauthorized disclosure. In many situations the inad-

vertent disclosure of a name or identification could have serious

repercussions, including placing lives in jeopardy, and I cannot in

good conscience put such information at risk.

This arrangement of course does not affect the Commission's.

procedures for advising prospective witnesses of their rights, secur-

ing waivers, nor the employee's or ex-employee's right not to answer

certain questions if they are concerned that the answers might tend

to incriminate them.

Respectfully,

SIENED

...

W. E. Colby

Director

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 107

COPY

---

## Page 108

SA

ALm

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoe, Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

TO

Mr. W. R. Wannallukur

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 2/27/75

Asst. Dire

¡Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Iny. -

Ident. -

FROM

w. Oregar

1 - Mr.

Mintz

1

1

- MT. Bowers

- Mr. Wannall

1 - Mx. Cregar

Laboratory.

Plon. & Eval. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Spec. Inv._

Training-

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum recommends that we keep Mr. Colby

apprised, as the Director of central Intelligence, through the

Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry of any

proposed or completed FBI testimony before congressional com-alle

mittees when such FBI testimony impacts on other members of

AChy

the Intelligence Community, could result in other members of

the Intelligence Community

being called to testify, or any

questions are asked of the FBI which are of proprietary interest

to another agency or department of the Intelligence Community.

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

#MDR16

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry,

chaired by Mr. John Clarke,

Associate Deputy to the Director of

Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies

and departments having membership on the United States Intelli-

gence Board (USIB).

Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating

mechanism for future testimony before congressional hearings.'

At a meeting of the USIB on 2/26/75, Chairman Colby

commented on the effective manner in which the Ad Hoc Group

was functioning. However, he noted that it is imperative all

members of USIB

coordination to insure that the basic interests of the Intel-

ligence Community are served and that any testimony or documents

furnished congressional committees are factual and accurate.

He hoped that all members will be made aware of what other members

are testifying to before a congressional committee as well as the

identity of that congressional committee.

Mr. Colby noted that

it is highly likely that members of the Intelligence

Community

will be called before various congressional committees other

than the Senate and House Select

Committee?)

RECO

116325-

The Intelligence Division believés

this type of

coordination is vital to insure that one agency's testimony

is not in conflict with that of

another through misunderstanding

MAR 7 1975

CONTINUED® - OVER

62-116395

WOC: ebc

(7)

8 0 MAR 1 2 1975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 108

1X0:07 00201874

10.10 0302. 201Bin6i

HEGRET

---

## Page 109

(5)

Memo for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

or inadvertency. As an example of this coordination, Mr. Colby

has furnished the Bureau and other members of the Intelligence

Community the statement he plans to make as the lead-off witness

before the Senate Select Committee (SSC). This statement has

been reviewed by the Intelligence Division and a memorandum

has been prepared which notes that there is nothing objectionable

from the Bureau's standpoint in Colby's proposed statement.

A second point Colby made at the USIB meeting was his

desire that all members understand that no agency representative

should discuss with a congressional committee information or

techniques which are of proprietary interest to another agency

without prior consultation. This is certainly a valid request

and we should concur. As an example, the FBI would not want

the National Security Agency to discuss with a congressional

committee FBI support of National Security Agency's TELEX effort

without first clearing with us. Likewise, the Bureau representa-

tive should not discuss National Security

Agency's exploitation

of teletype traffic furnished to them by the FBI without prior

coordination with NSA. Recently a congressional committee asked

CIA for copies of any written agreements between FBI and CIA.

CIA felt they had no alternative but to provide the committee

with copies of the Bl - Co Understanding dated 2/7/66. However,

before doing so CÍA did obtain FBI approval:

ACTION:

If approved, through the Chairman of the Ad Hoc

Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry, representatives

of the Intelligence Division will keep Mr. Colby and the

Intelligence Community advised of any FBI testimony before

congressional committees wherein such testimony could impact

on other members of the Intelligence Community, could result

in other members of the Intelligence Community being called to

testify, or where questions are asked which are of proprietary

interest

to another member of the Community.

bernie.

3/6/75

wed 30/27/35

vica

guess

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

Page 109

- 2 -

---

## Page 110

O, MONAL PORA NO, 10

HAY 1PD2 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNTED STATES GO"

Memoran

5010-106

ERNMENT

1

1

- Mr

Adams

Vannali

Jep. AD Adm

TO

: Mr. W.R. Wannalluöut,ul

DATE:

3/4/75

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst._

Ext. Affairs -

Filos & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. _

Inspection yo

ntoll.

FROM : HI.A. Boynton, Jr.

1 = Mr. BOynton

1 - Mr. Schwartz

IS WECT: CENTRA INTERICINCE AGENCY (CIA) EMPLOYEE

SECRECY AGREEMENTS

Jerotis de

=75

Plon. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -17

Telephone Rm..

Directorsegy -

Concerning a news article appearing in the 2/28/752

edition of the Washington Post newspaper (copy attached)

entitled "Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge to Cooperate

With Senate Probe," the

Director noted "Can we determine what

#MORI 6

•II INTORMATION CONJAINEI

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIEIED

BES

DATEL

the agreement includes?"

On 3/4/75 Mx. Steve Kuhn, Office of Security, CIA,

advised that all CIA employees prior to commencing employ

ment with that Agency

are required to execute an "Entrance on

Duty Secrecy Agreement" and upon terminating their Agency

employment are requested to execute a "Termination Secrecy

Agreement" (copies of both attached). Briefly, these agree-

1

ments require that CIA employees keep torever secret all

classified information gained during the course of their

enployment.

Both

agreements further require that CIA employees

may not disclose classified information during intervievs

or by publication without prior authority Iron the director

of Central

Intelligence.

Both agreements

specifically set

forth that the employee has read the provisions of the

espionage laws (Sections

793, 794 and 798 of TItle 18, U.S.

Code, is aware thai unauthorized disclosure of classified

information relating to the nacional deiense coula lead to

prosecution and has revieved the provisions of the National

Security Act of 1947, which specifically charges the Director

vi

ORIGINAL FILED IN

of Central Intelligence with protecting intelligence sources

and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

In this connec

tion, the "Termination Secrecy Agreement" notes that the

employee has also read the provisions of Section 1001, Title 18,

U.S, Code, and is aware that making a false statement

"herein

or otherwise" may

be punished as

The

"Termination

Secrecy Agreement" consists of a

four-page form, pages

three and four of which are entitled "Excerpts From Title 18

United States Code"

gatlialind specifically sets forth the provision

Enclosures -

62-116395

&E MAR 1

$ 1375

CONTINUED • OVER.

scattes

BPM: tdp (5)

NOT RECORDED

46 MAR 13 1975

233

5 6 MAR 2 4 1975

_ NW-88608_Docld:32989530_Page 110

---

## Page 111

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall

RE:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) EMPLOYEE

SECRECY AGREEMENTS

of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 1001. Both Secrecy Agree-

ments also state that the

conditions and obligations with

respect to the protection of classified information con-

tinue after Agency employment has terminated.

The FBI, of course, utilizes Form FD-291 "Employ-

ment Agreement," which has been executed by all current

employees and must be signed by all new personnel entering

to cover the foregoing situation.

Asreement"' (copy attached) covers essentially the same

The "Employment

points noted in the attached CIA Secrecy Agreements.

While

we do not have an exit secrecy agreement signed by the

_terminating employee, form ID-193 "Report of Exit and

Separation" requires

(under Paragraph D, Page 2) that the

exiting employee be cautioned

regarding divulging con-

fidential information and reminded that such improper action

may violate Department of Justice regulations as well as

Federal statutes providing for substantial fines and lengthy

imprisonment or both.

ACTION:

Above for information.

BpM

what

2

..on

NW. 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 111

---

## Page 112

moe16

ALL IMPORTATION CO TAILIS

FEREIN IS UNGLAGSIVERA

DA1T11-6-00

March Sy 1075

MEMORANDUM TOE MIR. ADAIS

LAB. WANNALL

RE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Inculty Te Opening of 15atl-ay.te

Central Intelligence Agency

On March 4, 1975, William Cotter, Chief Postal Inspacior, came

to see me, He said the Postmaster Gencial has become alarmed about the

opening of mail by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for many years.

Mir. Cotter went to CiA and reccived a listig, by year, of tae acavity in

this regard. This lict furier stimulated the anim oi the rostmaster

General,

N.Y

Mx. Cotter advisod that hs had Inown of this project since the 1950s

when he was assigned to New York as an Inspector. He said that several of

the Postmaster Concrals were informed of the project and no proiest sas.

made. He said the gonoral feeling was that these ware possible enemice of the

nation and, therefore, the method was considered as necessary. The present

Postmastor General feels the procedure might be highly criticizod, und

MIr. Cotter came to me to get my assurance no such activity was now going

on. I informed him it is not.

Mr. Coiter further asited me if we know it was going on and did we

actually receive the benefits of it. I informod him we knew of it and did get

information on tho procedure from CIA.

I then told Mi. Cotter' I thought he should he joined in the group of

investigative organizations, headed by lix. Coloy, Director of CIA, to consider

our actions in the Salect Committee's probs, AIr. Cotter said they had been

:. Dir.

invited to the first meeting, but to none cinco.

• AD Adm. -

rap. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Assistant Diractor Wannall should chec's to male sure thoy are included

Admin.

and we should confirm to lir. Catter that his organization has been established

Ext afais as a participant.

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

REG-11

Gen. Inv. -

NE:1: 62-116315-29

Ident. -

Inspection.

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Evalk

MAR

poc. Inv.

SUNT FROM D. O

1.00 Kil

TINK

DARE 2/1125

BX

Very truly yours,

1375

Training

-egal Cour.

slephone Rm. -

Clarence M. Eelley

Dircetor

restor Soc'y

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT I

NW 88608CD02|d132389500) Page 112

---

## Page 113

OPTIOMAL FORM NO. iO

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

5010-106

NMENT

TO

FROM :J. H. Mortimer

INPORMATTON CONTAINa

HEREIN IS UXCLASSIFIED

53966 ete/4/am

DATE: February 27, 1975

SUBJECT

MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

DATE 51,00

115

TAMM

FROM JOHN EDGARYHOOVER

DATED SEPTEMBER

100

1936;

‹CONFIDENTIAL XMEMORANDUM BY CI

JOHN EDGARXHOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936=

le:

In r

it:

Ly"

P:

Sc,

T.

L3g

-Tair

Dity,

On

this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence

Division delivered the

above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory

with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in

the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction.

of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation

was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters

used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing

on the memoranda.

•..

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm

from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared

on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which

has been in use since 1930.

"Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25;

1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington

typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in.

use since October, 1935.

62-116375-

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

-

NOT RECORDED

MAY. 2

The result of this examination belforwarded to the

Intelligence Division

662-65757-18

]

• - Mr. Wannall

- Mr. Lacey

I feeli

Mr. White

Mr. Mortimer

1

- Mr. Oberg

WSO:ung

(6)

MAY 2

1975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 113

1314-1841

Original Filed

---

## Page 114

- 1.

OPTIONAl FORM NO, 10

5010-106

JAY 1902 EDITION

¡SA GEN. REG. NO. 2

UNITE STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. M. R. WannaIl What

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 2/14/75

Assoc. Dir.°

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

FROM

W. diVeregar

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mx. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Laboratory

-

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.-

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. _

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting

Director Sec'y -

Group) held on the morning of 2/14/75 at CIA Headquarters

The Group chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate

Deputy to the Director of Central

Intelligence, is made up

of representatives of agencies and departments

having member-

ship on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its

purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future

testimony before various congressional meetings.

At the meeting of the Group on 2/14/75 several items

of interest were discussed. They were:

#MDRIG

ATT INTORMATION CONTAINED

WHEN IS UACLASSIFIAD

M10:9/25/00 BYSP

A Secrecy Agreement (copy attached) was presented

to Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select

Committee (SSC), with therequest that all staff employees of

the Committee,

which may number as high as 40, be requested to sign.

Miller was rather cool to the suggestion and indicated that the

This

SSC and Senator Church would take it under advisement.

It is

to be noted that this draft of the Secrecy Agreement was prepared

by the Security Committee of USIB in concert with Mr. Kevin T.

Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal DiViSIOn,

Departmentso, Justice. Although, this was considered the tina!

aratt. of the,

Secrecy Agreement,

the Treasury representative on

the Group was hopeful additional language could be incorpörated

into the Agreement to cover other than classified information

such as the confidentiality of Internal Revenue returns.

(2) Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 2/4/75,

advised that Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central

Intelligence, had been instructed by the White House to identify

what information the Intelligence Community felt could not under

any circumstances be discussed with a congressional committee.

62-116395-2

Enclosures

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

WOC :ebc

O MAN U°

5

FEB 28 1975

CONTINUED -

OVER

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

Page 114

---

## Page 115

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE :

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Attached is a copy of the paper Colby provided to the White

House responsive to this request. It does encompass recom-

mendations of member agencies of

the Group including the FBI.

At a subsequent meeting Mr. Colby had with unidentified

persons at the White House, the above list was discussed. Colby

They were:

(A) to refuse

providing sensitive information to a congressional

committee and face the possibility of a contempt citation,

(B) have the President refuse to authorize the release of such

information, presumably through the exercise of Executive Privilege,

or (C) the President could call the majority and

minority leaders

of the congressional committee to the White House, furnish to them

the answer to the question with the added caveat that they were

the only persons being informed of the answers and, therefore,

would be personally accountable for any leak of information.

Representatives of the White House were not very enthusiastic to

the options put forth by Mr. Colby and indicated that they would

be calling a meeting at the White House of senior officials of

the Department of Defense, Justice Department, CIA and the FBI

to review what position the Intelligence Community should take

in responding to a request for extremely sensitive and highly

classified information.

(3)

Members of the Group were allowed to read an

internal memorandum from Mr. David W. Bellin, Executive Director

of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S. (The Rockefeller

Commission), to Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President.

This memorandum reports the results of a conversation between

Mr. Bellin and Mr. William Miller, Chief of Staff for the SSC.

The memorandum revealed that Miller believes that within two weeks

his staff will be in three-quarters gear. He plans to have a total

staff of about 40, 10 to 12 of whom will be lawyers.

The initial

work or the starI

will concentrate on a review of documents,

interviews, and what Miller called "depositions." Miller does not

plan to have any hearings of the SSC for several months and believes

the September deadline could not be met, rather that the investiga-

tion would take at least the rest of the year.

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 115

---

## Page 116

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Bellin's memorandum also noted that the thrust of

the SSC's investigation will include the whole range of

intelligence gathering agencies; will delve into the basic

matters of policy, including whether or not there is a need

for all of the agencies; what the results are; related public

policy matters, as well as rights of privacy.

Miller also advised Bellin that the SSC would operate

out of a room referred to as "the auditorium," which Miller

thought gave the best security. He said there would be rigid

standards imposed to seal off any leaks. These standards would

include having everything in a central filing area with a specific

check-out system permittedto particular people so that if leaks

occurred the source of such leaks could be readily ascertained.

Xeroxing would be severely limited. In response to a question

from Bellin to Miller as to why the Senate and House did not

create a joint Senate/House committee as opposed to individual

senate and House select committees, Miller advised that it was too

difficult to arrange because of matters of protocol.

It is noted that although a House Select Committee

is being formed with basically the same charter as the ssC, no

chairman of the House Select Committee has been designated

the Group estimates that it will be a month before the House

Select Committee can get started.

ACTION:

For information.

- 3 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 116

---

## Page 117

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1,

, in accepting employment

or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the

special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor-

mation from unauthorized disclosure.

I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth

below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with

the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United

States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter

referred to as the Select Committee.

It is my under standing that in the course of my employment

or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to

information from departments and agencies of the Government which

is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive

Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information

so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the

property of the United States of America and I further agree to

surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee

or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee,

any classified material which has come into my possession as a

result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if

information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or

reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified

information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my

employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior

written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or

their duly authorized representative.

#MDR16

ON COALID

ALm 177G

ARt 2222

:C.

5-00

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 117

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-11

---

## Page 118

B."

I hereby agree that any information learned during my

employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related

to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to

the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized

representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher,

editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said

material contains any classified information as defined in Executive

Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee,

President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has

the authority to make the final determination as to whether information

is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.

I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S. C. 793, 794,

798 and 952; and 50 U.S. C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive

Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor-

mation, and understand their meaning.

Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the

Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material.

I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agree-

ment could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.

I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed

on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this

agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ-

ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.

I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any

mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

Signature

Date

WITNESS:

Signature

Date

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 118

---

## Page 119

TRETSENSTIVA

CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER

THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION

I.

The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and

operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive

clandestine sources:

a. Agent or informant names or operational information

revealing them.

b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive

methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source

collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counter-

intelligence purposes.

~-The numbers, locations, times and other indications of

recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organiza

tions.

--Specific statements of the use of technical devices in

agent operations.

--The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness

against any given target organization or individual, or lack :

thereof.

--Names of selected agency and/ot ex-agency employees

if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility.

--Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would

be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

II.

Relationships with Other Intelligence Services

Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly

and neutral countries.

Classifies lay m

926047

Excaai liem panorel declassifiention seneáulo

cí E. O, 11552, calation eclegary:

angele

TAMON CONTAINED

Aeropy declariod on

"DATE MUCH MOLE TO DATER:NE

Alt, F5

FRESH

SETR

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 119

60701111

SENSITIVE

$ 45

---

## Page 120

b. Identifying collaborative operations betwéen the United States

,.intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison scivices

against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within

a jointly largetted third country.

c. The nature of support provided or arrangements with foreign

intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations.

d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service

under conditions of continued secrecy.

III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities

.a. Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material

b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations.

-

c. Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices

in the U.S. and abroad.

₫. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations

Je fucigunis ut fuicig iacillies 10. S. du curvauj.

e, Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and

unfriendly targets in the U.S. and abroad.

I. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance

arrangements with commercial U.S. and foreign companies (2) taps

(3) and from US installations abroad..

g- Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence

collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be

politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

h. Protective communications security measures.

i.

Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions

especially.critical to our work in ASW.

IV. Technical Intelligence

"ig.

a.. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high techuical.

vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

2

NW 38608 Docld:32989530 Page 120 SECRET/SENSITIVE

---

## Page 121

b.

Deta

of specific covert communications systems, including

secict writing,

special agent equipment, eic.

C.

Specific, identification of foreign technical collection installations

involving high political sensitivity in the host. country:

d.

Identification of technical counter-measures techniques.

€.

Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical

collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement.

Details of secure U.S. communications systems..

V. Other

a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass

the U.S. Government of frustrate the purpose of the operation.

b. Details or disclosure of monetary arcangements with U.s. and

foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence

operations.

c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms

established-with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes

names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged

customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.

d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies

in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large

foreign clienteles).

e. Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and

covere tax arrangements. -

I. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations

against foreign intelligence targets.

The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or

military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our

intelligence on military technologies of these nations.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 121

---

## Page 122

it. WoR. Wannall

N.O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

February 19, 1975

Der15

Menorandum W.0. Cregar to kr.

WeF.

IL INPORMATION CONTATUR

FOREIN IS UNCLASSIE IM

DATE 9/25/00 E SPLALING

Wannalt,

Inclusion as an unner in a series of annexes bir. Colby intends

to provide the Senate Select Connittee (SSC) on

the occasion

of his appearance as the lead off witness.

This nemorandun

was approved and the annex entitled "Origin and Disposition

01 the Huston Plan" was furnished to Wi. Colby for his use.

In anticipation that i. Kelley

will appear before

the

many se

the annes entitled "Origin and Disposition

of the Huston Plan" is being furnished to the Legal Counsel

Division for inclusion in the briefing book being prepared

the Director relative to his anticipated appeazance before the

SiSCo.

ACTION:

The attached copy of the FBI paper entitled "origin

and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furaished to the Legal

Counsel Division for their use in connection with the preparation

of a briofing book for the Director's anticipated appearance

berore the sSC.

Enclosure

hiro

Mint?

"aRo

Wannall

H.O. Cregar

WOe :bcw (4)

Original cannot ta located

and is not on record

When

mairal is received in firean's

First i 161

* thor

15-2-3-7

ST 112

REC862-116395771

18 MAY 27 1975

272459752

---

## Page 123

5010-106

TO

OPTIONAL FORM MO, 10

HAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN.

REG. NO, 27

* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W.R. WannalI Wi

Assoc. Dir.

1 - Mr. Adams

1

- Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

DATE:

2/12/75

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD In

Assi. DN

idmin.

omp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. -

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr.

1 - Mr. Boynton

1 - Mr. Schwartz

spestAi

tellin

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Training l

Legal Coun.,

Telephone Rm.

Pursuant to request of Mr. Adams, Liaison Officer

Director Setty

L.F. Schwartz contacted Mr. John Clark of the Intelligence

Community Staff on 2/11/75 with regard to suggested security

procedures for the handling of classified information by

the Select Committee.

Mr. Clark advised that on 2/10/75 he had met

personally with Mr. William miller who has been designated

to head the Select Committee Staff. He stated that he dis-

cussed with Mr. Miller the proposed guidelines for security

and the proposed secrecy agreement for staff members and

furnished Miller with copies of both these items. Mr. Clark

stated that Miller was generally receptive to the proposed

guidelines and felt that they would be acceptable subject

to the approval of Senator Church. Mr. Miller was decidedly

cool concerning the idea of stall members sigmna.

a secrecy

agreement but indicated that a final decision regarding this

would be made by Senator Church...

Mr. Clark stated that he raised two specific questions

which Mr. Colby considers most important with regard to any

presentation made to the Select Committee. He advised Miller

that the Intelligence Community would desire to not identify

specific agents or the details

was agreeable to this and foresaw no problem with the Select

Committee accepting this proposal. Secondly, Mr. Clark

advised Mr. Miller that Mr. Colby, speaking for the Intelli-

gence Community, was opposed to having any dealings with staff

members of the various Senators and Representatives other

than those assigned to work directly under Mr. Miller as part

of the Select Committee Staff.

Mr. Miller stated that this

was also acceptable to him and he assured Mr. Clark that all

of his staff members would be subject to an FBI background

investigation and the issuance ida

oI a security clearance by.

CIA.

62-116395

LFS: tdp (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-2601

5

FL8 24 1975

MIT INTORMATTON CONTAINCS

D138 9/25/00 EX SEE ALMITE

NW

88608.

MAR 3

1875!

Docld:32989530 Page 123

---

## Page 124

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

During the conversation with Mr. Clark he advised

further that it is not the intention of Mr. Colby to use

as any part of the CIA's defense for alleged domestic

activities the allegation that such activities were under-

taken because the FBI had failed or was unwilling to carry

out its responsibilities in the domestic area.

Mr. Clark

noted that he is aware that there have been references to

such a claim in the newspapers but he assured SA Schwartz

that Mr. Colby does not support this position in any way.

Mr. Clark volunteered to arrange a personal meeting between

Mr. Colby and an appropriate FBI official to discuss this

point, if the Bureau so desired.

ACTION:

For information.

Norteed unles

change,

god

goon

Grah

!

!

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 124

---

## Page 125

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1902. EDITION

• GS GEN. MEG. NO. 27

UNITEY STATES

GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. "un

Dep. AD Adm.

1 - Mr. Adams

Dep. "ADylnv.

Asst. Dif.:

1 - Mr. Mintz

Admin

Comp. Syst.-

TO

Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/18/75

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

en. Iny. —

FROM

w. oPeregar

1 - "Mr. Wannall

dent. _

1 - Mr. Cregar

зів

SUBJECT

SENSTUDY 75

HERBIL IS UNCLASSIZIE

DATE 4-6-00 BY 5P2Am /70€

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. _

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum reports that on 2/14/75 Mr. John

Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on

Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, tele-

phonically advised Section Chief, W. O. Cregar, the Bureau's

representative on this Group, that Mr. Samuel R. Preston,

Senior Staff Member of the House Appropriations Committee,

requested that CIA provide the House Appropriations Committee

With any written agreements between CIA änd the FBI.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives-of

agencies and departments having membership on the U. S. Intelli

gence Board. Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism

for future

testimony before various congressional committees.

On the late afternoon of 2/14/75, Mr. John Clarke,

telephonically advised Mr. Cregar that he had received a

telephone call from Mr. Samuel R. Preston.

The purpose of the

agreements that existed between

the CIA and the FBI.

Clarke advised the only written agreement

2/7/66 (copy attached).

he could identify existing between the FBI and CIA was one dated

Clarke stated thatsinasmuch as he had gotten this

specific request from Mr. Preston he felt CIA had no alternative

but to provide a copy of the Agreement to him.

However, Clarke

wanted to be sure the FBI concurred

Adams telephonically

contacted Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman and explained

the problem to him.

Mr. Silberman authorized the release of a

copy of the FBI - CIA Agreement to Mr. Preston.

On the afternoon

of 2/14/75 Mr. Cregar advised Mr. Clarke that the FBI interposed

no objection to the release of a copy of the 1966 Agreement to

Mr. Preston.

Enclosures - Sent 2-20-75

62-116395

B FEB 25 1975

WOC:ebc (5)

58 MAR 419756

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 125

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER.

---

## Page 126

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Attached is a memorandum to the Attorney General

with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General confirming

the conversation between Mr. Adams and Mr. Silberman on the

afternoon of 2/14/75.

ACTION:

That the memorandum to the Attorney General be

sent.

gma

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 126

---

## Page 127

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer 10

File No.

17-6-00

CLASSIED BY SP 2 ALMI2

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XJ

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

ASSIF

ALI, INFORMAT

UNGL

HEREIN IS

SHOWH

THERE

(1)

CIA will not initiate an investigation of any

foreign official in the United States without the concurrence

and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term

"investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or

procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances

or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information

concerning an individual's activities or background;

"investigation" does not include the acceptance or the

development of information through social contacts or contacts

normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover

functions. (5)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of

the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign

official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States.

The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action

does not conflict with any operation, current or planned,

including active investigation of the FBI. (5)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned

meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or

communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to

the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials

and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social

development. (S)

(1) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic

American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited

abroad who come to the United States will be identified

tO

the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on

the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent

arrives

in the United States for a visit or for an

SECRET

NW 88608 Dold: 32989530 Page 127

GROUP

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and

deplationation 62-116345-27

---

## Page 128

• SECRE1

Central Intelligence Agency

Operations in the United States

(s)

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies

will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the

United States. It is recognized that each case will have:

its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will

be positive intelligence interest as weighed against

internal security factors.

cIa will continue its

contractual relationship for the purpose of handling

the training, the procurement of positive foreign

intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to

the agent, and the preparation of the, agent for his

next assignment abroad. (S).

• (6)

In those cases where CIA will be handling its

agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security

or counterintelligence requirements ana wili provide the

FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence

or internal security matters, including the scope and

nature of the agent's access to information and the

identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly

in the communist-bloc field.

In such cases where CIA

servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security

interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent.

-NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 128

- 2 - SECRET

---

## Page 129

CODE

TELETYPE

ILIMEDIATE

1-29-75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 2 9 1975

...

i-m!

8

IN CIVIL DISCOVERY

----

1 195

FILE PROCESSED

FOR RELEASE

TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS

FFOM DIRECTOR FBI

DESTRUCTION OF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND

STUDY OF GOVERNIZENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPCT TO INTELLI

GENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED

THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION

OF CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF PERVIT DISPOSAL QE

ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON

SUEJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT

OF THIS COMMUNICATION, FECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD

IN AFRYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PRIVOUS LE

62-111315

APPROVED BY STATUTE OR Li GULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON FECEIPT.

- 192 • FEB 28 1975

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (sent direct)

1 - Mr. Callahan (sent direct)

1 - Mr. Jenkins (sent direct)

1 - Mr. Adams (sent direct)

1 - Each Assistant Director (sent direct)

(19)

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intoll. -

Laboratory

i:::light

Plan. & Eval. =

Spoc. Inv. -

Training -

BITHLEV

regal Cour. -

5197016) 023 PE

elephone Rm. y

iroctor Sec'y

MAIL ROOM I

TELETYPE UNIT

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 129

NOTE: Reference letter to the Director dated 1-27-75 from Hugh Scott,

Republican Leader, and Mike Mansfield,,

Majority Leader, United

States Senate.:

goon

424381

---

## Page 130

k-101

REC-23/.

25

Honorable Hugh Scott

United States Senate

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

UACLASSIFIED

BY SPY ELL

Washington, D. C. 20510

1

*Mr. Callahan

1

. = "Mr. Adams

1 ~ Mr. Jenkins

I - Mr. McDermott

Ecbruary 19, 1075

1 - Mr. Ash

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Bowers

1 - Mr. Hotis

Dear Senator Ecott:

We have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with

enclosure, from you and Senator Mile Mansfield which requests that

we not destroy or othervise dispose of any records or documents

relating to a forthcoming Jenate investigation of intelligence activities.

HEREIN IS

7/2

Cur procedures regarding the destruction of documents

in our files are govezned by the zederal lecords Act of 1059 and regu-

lations of the Naticnal Archives and Recorda Service. It is our current

DATE

policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to sub-

versive activities which were based on unsubstantiated allegations and

did, not result in prosecutive action. In addition, all criminal files over

ten years old are recaced to ricrctilm and the original recorus are

nast

MAILED 6

FEB 191975

destroyed. We also destroy the cuplicate copies of all documents when

thece copies no longer serve a useful purpose.

-FBI

Upon receipt of your letter, we immediately suspended

our deatruction program and are attempting to determine whether any

documents are involved that might relate to matters set out in section 2

of Senate Resolution 21. Tie also contacted William G. aller, Litant

Director, Senate Select Committea on Intelligence Activities, who

adviced us that he will consult with Zenator Church and advice us

accordingly.

You may be ascured that we are taking every possible

Assoc. Did measure to preserve those records or documents relating to intelligence

Dep. AD Inv. - activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It is certainly our

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

intention to cooperate fully vith the Select Committee in this very

Comp. Syst._

important inquiry.

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. ...

Gen. Inv. -

Sincerely yours,

Ident.

inspection.

Intell. -

FEE 27 1975

Laboratory _

''''tis

Clarence

Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Training t

-egal count

YES ANAR O

1975

*MAIL ROOM

NW 88608 Docld: 32989530

(See NOTE next page)

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 130

---

## Page 131

Honorable Hugh Scott

United States Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75

captioned 'SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mansfield and Hugh Scott

re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75, " JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield

nor Senator Scott is on the Bureau*s mailing list.

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 131

---

## Page 132

OPFIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1862 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

anil sucha litter

TO

Mr. LaPrade

* .:

FROM

H. R. Hauer

SUBJECT:

DESTRUCTION OF FILES AND RECORDS

FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

Ext.

Fle Com.

Gen. Inv..

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv..

Trainingt

Legal Coun.

Telephone Ri.

Leader Hugh su it, ana letter to the Director dated 1-2-1, sequested the bureau!

not to/destroy, remove from our possession or control, or otherwise dispose or

permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on

subject's under investigation proposed by Senate. Accordingly, Files and

Communications Division is hölding in abeyance any destruction program previously.

approved by statute or regulation and has issued instructions to all field offices

and Legats to do likewise until clarification of above request is received.

Recommend

Office of Legal Counsel prepare letter to Senators Mansfield and Scott asking clarifi-

cation of their request and whether or not it includes existing destruction procedures

previously approved by the Archivist of the United States.

Regulations of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS), General

Services Administration, which are based on Title 44, Chapter 33, Sections 3301

and 3302, U.S. Code, govern the type of material which we must maintain.

NARS,

regulations also govern what material may be destroyed. Record material is

described as including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documen-

tary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received

by an agency of the U.S. Government under Federal law or in connection with the

transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that;

agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies,

decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or

because of the information value of data contained therein." Our destruction pro-

grams are conducted in compliance with NARS regulations to conserve space and

manpower. In those instances where we have more than one copy of a communication,

it is our policy to file only the original of the communication and to destroy any

copies when they no longer serve

sa useful purpose. Examples to ow:

REC-23

02+1163

25

-111T

nix.

21. FEB 28 1975

SPUELW

FEE

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Jenkins

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Ash

AX.

PFS:bpr

(8)

NW 8660d Docld:329893304

Tire

age 132

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 133

Memo Hauer to LaPrade

Re: Destruction of Files and Records

Files and Communications Division

Identification Division has purge-type projects in both the criminal and

civil fingerprint files involving the destruction of certain fingerprint cards and

related name index cards, primarily duplicate-type cards on persons considered

inactive because of age.

Insofar as destruction of material by Files and Communications Division

is concerned, files, index cards, and related material over 2o years old maintained

at FBI Headquarters pertaining to unfounded allegations of subversive activities, .

membership in subversive organizations, subversive sympathies and tendencies on

the part of individuals and organizations are approved for destruction by NARS when

investigations revealed allegations predicated upon rumor, nebulous complaints and

nonspecific allegations from which no prosecutive action occurred. Archival

authority has been obtained to destroy FBI Headquarters files in connection with

Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles cases, Selective Service Act

cases, Destruction o1 Aircrait or Motor Vehicles cases (provided no prosecution

results from the inquiries conducted and the case had been closed ten years);.

and Archival authority has been obtained for destruction of

files at FBI Headquarters in unknown subject cases in which there was no criminal

prosecution (no time limit set regarding the destruction of unknown subject cases).

In addition to the above authority for the outright destruction of FBI

Headquarters records, Archival authority has also been obtained to microfilm any

closed criminal file:

after the case has been

closed for ten or more years. Thereafter, the paper records may be destroyed.

We currently have on hand 38, 601 index cards to be destroyed which pertain to

paper record material which has been destroyed previously under NARS regulations

and authority.

In addition, personnel files concerning employees who have been separated

more than one year are reviewed and temporary records contained therein which no

longer serve a useful purpose are purged and only those permanent records as

described in the Federal Personnel Manual are retained in the official personnel

folder.

Also files, index cards and related material, over 15 years old, maintained

at FBI Headquarters relating to laboratory examinations requested by various local,

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 133

---

## Page 134

Memo Hauer to LaPrade

Re: Destruction of Files and Records.

Files and Communications Division

state and Federal law enforcement organizations in cases other than FBI cases

wherein positive identification was not effected are also purged. These files

no longer possess sufficient reference or evidentiary value to merit retention.

Administrative and noninvestigative records maintained in the various

field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are purged also. This material

is retained in the field offices until necessary action has been taken or it has served

its purpose.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Office of Legal Counsel prepare an appropriate reply to Senators

Mansfield and Scott to determine if their request not to destroy records and

documents was intended to include the destruction programs enumerated above.

670s

ditt

Discuse with

gon out goo

-3 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 134

---

## Page 135

2205 205PEG-11

-/1!

Honorable Mike Mansfield

United States Senato

Washington, D. C. 20510

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Jenkins

1 - Mr. McDermon

Uruary 19, 1375

1 - Mr. Ash

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Bowers

1 - Mr. Hotis

Dear Senator Mansfield:

We have received the letter of January 27, 1075, with

•CLASSIHED

enclosure, froin you and Senator lugh Scott which requests that vc not

destroy or othervice dispose of any records or dccuments relating to a

forthcoming Denate invectigation of intelligence activities.

Cur procedures regarding the destruction of documents

in our files are governed by the Federal Records Act of 1050 and regu-

lationo of the Maticnal Archives and Records fervice. It is our eurrcht

C.

policy to destroy all recordo over twenty-five years old pertaining to sub-

ALL

HERER.

verpive activitics which were based on unsubstantiated allegations and

DATE

did not recult in presecutive actioil. In addition, all criminal files over

ten years old are reduced to microfilm and the original rccords are

destroyed. Te also destroy the duplicate copies of all documents when

thece copies no longer serve a ucciul purpose.

MAILED 6

3 9 1975

Upon reccipt of your letter, ve immeziately cuorcades

@ cur destruction program and are attempting to determine victhor any

locuments are involved that might relate to matters set cut in cecilon

of Senate Recolution 21. We also contacies William &. Miller, stair

Lin

Director, Senato Belect Committee on Intelligence Activities, tho

adviced us that he mill consult with Senator Church and auvise us

accordingly.

HDED

3

You may be assured that we are taling every pascivic

_meacure to preserve those records or documents relating to intelligence

Dep. AD i activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It is certainly our

Asst. Dir.:

intention to cooperate fully with tie Select Committce in this very

Admin. -

Comp, Sys. iraportant inquiry.

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Sincerely yours,

Gen. Inv. -

loent.c

Inspection -

Intell. —

Laboratory -

Plan. & Evali_

Training 1

C. M. Kelley,

, Churence It. Eclley

Director

Lego! Cou

(See NOTE next page)

Tie le pl

NW

age 135 TELETYPE UNIT L

GRO 9544-545

---

## Page 136

Honorable Mike Mansfield

United States Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75

captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott

re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75, " JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield

nor Senator Scott is on the Bureau*s mailing list.

-2 =

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 136

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## Page 137

KEIKE MANSFIELD

MONTANA

Anited States Senate

Office of the Majority Header

Washington, EI

2151n

January 27, 1975

ATS INPORATON DOE LENED

WENTY IS UNCLASSITLED

DATE 9/25/00 BLSP2 PCHETG

Honorable Clarence M. Kelley

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Director:

O Senting-

15%

As you may be aware, the senäte is to conduct

an investigation and study of

government operations with

respect to intelligence activities.

The scope of the

investigation is set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which

has been enclosed for your information.

We are writing to request that you not destroy,

remove from your possession or control, or otherwise

dispose or permit the disposal of any

records or documents

which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation,

including but not limited to all records or documents pertain-

ing in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21

Sincerely yours,

Hah Seatt

HUGH SCOTT, REPUBLICAN LEADER

Enclosure

MIKE MANSFIELD, MAJORITY

D

N

MOME

sentered Seatta mantic

Lated

2019/75

Z ENCLOSURE

EX-105

Read to strain by phone lo tom 1/28/75

until further noties, Tank

and regressed no destruation of any Built.

REG-11

62-11-54=24

2

MAR 4 1975

MAR

n 1975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 137

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## Page 138

• OFFICE OrDiRECTOR Lee me

FEDERAL BUREAU:OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPÄRTMENT OF JUSTICEDA

MR. CALLAHAN -

MR. JENKINS -

ADAMS -

MR. ASH -

MR. BASSETT -

MR. CLEVELAND

MR. DECKER -

MR. GALLAGHER

MR. GEBHARDT -

MR. JAMIESON -

MR. LA PRADE

MR. MC DERM'

MR. MINTZ.

MR. WALSH

MR. WANNALL

MR. WHITE -

MR. COLEMAN -

MR. REED -

TELE. ROOM _

MRS. METCALF-

Regarde agains.

AIL TNFORMATION CONTAIWE

INTEIN IS UNCLASSITIED

DASS 9/25/00 BYSP-2 ALM/11G

ENCLOSURE

62-116385-24

NW 8860a Docld:32989530 Page 138

---

## Page 139

IMDR16

AIT IINVORHATTON CONTAINER

FOR LIN IS UNCLASSIFIE

Calendar No. 2

IST SESSION

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21, 1975

Mr. PAstore submitted the following resolution; which was ordered to be placed

on the calendar (under general orders)

RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an in-

vestigation and study with respect to intelligence activities

carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

1

Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate

2 to conduct an investigation and study of governmental oper-

3

ations with respect to intelligence activities and of the

extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical ac-

5

tivities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal.

6 Government of by any persons, acting individually or in

combination with others, with respect to any intelligence.

activity carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Govern-

9 ment; be it further

10

Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a select

REG 11/: - 11:56:24

E:1509

NW 866087

Docld:32989530-Rage 139

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## Page 140

2

1

committee of the Senate which may be called, for con-

2 venience of expression, the Select Committee To Study

3 Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac-

4 tivities to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if

any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were

6 engaged in by any agency or by any persons, acting either

" individually or in combination with others, in carrying out

8 any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf

9 of any agency of the Federal Government.

10

(b) The select committee created by this resolution

1l shall consist of eleven members of the Senate, six to be

12 appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority

13 members of the Senate upon the rocommendation of the

14 majority leader of the Senate, and five minority members of

15 the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate

16 upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the

17 Senate. For the purposes of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the

18 Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a

19 member, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee

20 shall not be taken into account.

21

(c) The majority members of the committee shall select

22 a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice

23 chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures

24 to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside

25

over meetings of the select committee during the absence

ww.88608 Stocld:32989530 Barge 11400)

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## Page 141

- 5a

3

of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities

as may be assigned to him by the select committee or the

chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select com-

4 mittee shall not affect the authority of the remaining mem-

5 bers to execute the functions of the

select committee and

; shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments

7

to it are made.

8

(d) A majority of the members of the select committee

9 shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but

10 the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum

11 for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.

12

Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed

13 to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the in-

14 vestigations and

study specified in subsection (a) of the

15 first section. Without abridging in any way the authority

16 conferred upon the select committee by the preceding

17 sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs

18 the select committee to make a complete investigation and

19

study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons

20 or groups of persons or organizations of any kind which

21 have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to

22 the following matters or questions:

23

(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has

24

conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation in

25

the United States.

---

## Page 142

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or coun-

terintelligence operations against United States citizens

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other

Federal agency.

(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Hus-

ton Plan to apply United States intelligence agency

capabilities against individuals or organizations within

the United States.

(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other

Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies coordi-

nate their respective activities, any agreements which

govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack

of coordination has contributed to activities or actions

which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con-

trary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic

intelligence or counterintelligence activities

and the

operation of any other activities within the United States

by the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to the leg-

islative charter of that Agency and the intent of the

Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation by the

Dizector of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to

protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 142-

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## Page 143

5

1

the provision in section 102 (d) (3) of the National

2

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3) ) that

3

"... that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law

4

enforcement powers, or internal security functions.."

5

(7) Nature and extent of executive branch over-

6

sight of all United States intelligence activities.

(8) The need for specific legislative authority to

8

govern the operations of any intelligence agencies of

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

18

the Federal Government now existing without that

explicit statutory authority, including but not limited to,

11 agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and

the National Security Agency.

The nature and extent to which Federal agencies

cooperate and exchange intelligence information and

the adequacy of any regulations or statutes

which

govern such cooperation and exchange of intelligence

17 information.

(9) The extent to which United States intelligence

19. •

20

agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, or

regulations either published or secret and the extent

21

22

23

24

to which those Executive orders, rules, or regulations

interpret, expand, or are in conflict with specific legis-

lative authority.

(10) The violation or suspected violation of any

S. Res. 21-2

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 143

---

## Page 144

Eir.

6

1': : State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or

¡by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency

"з' "

of the Federal Government including but not limited

to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eaves-

dropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, or

6

the monitoring of the United States mail.

(11) The need for improved, strengthened, or con-

8

solidated oversight of United States intelligence ac-

• .9

tivities by the Congress.

(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the

•1l

United States are inadequate, either in their provisions

12

or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of

13

American citizens, to improve executive and legislative

14

control of intelligence and related activities, and to re-

15:

solve uncertainties as to

the authority of United States

•16: intelligence and related agencies.

17

(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of

18

expenditure and effort in the collection and processing

19

of intelligence information by United States agencies.

20

(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert

2:1

intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.

*22

(15) Such other related matters as

the committee

23

deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibilities

24

under section (a)

25

SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make

EWW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 144

---

## Page 145

7.

I the investigation and study authorized and directed by this

2 resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee

3 as an'agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the com-

4 pensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical,

5 and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate,

6 but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules;

" (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions,

recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold

9 hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive docu-

10 mentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and

11 questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to

12 require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses

13 of any persons who the select committee believes have

I knowledge or information concerning any of the matters

15 or questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5)

16 to require by subpena or order any department, agency,

I7 officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United

18 States Government, or any private person, firm, or corpora-

19 tion, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence

20 in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled

21 checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers,

22 physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials re-

23 lating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to

24 investigate and study which they or any of them may have

25 in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to the

NW-88608_Docld:32989530_ Page 145

---

## Page 146

8

1

Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect

2 to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer ques-

3

tions or give testimony in his character as a witiess during

4 his appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure

5 or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch

6 of the United States Government of any person, firm, or

corporation to produce before the committee any books,

8

checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications,

9

document,

financial records, papers, physical evidence,

10 records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any

11

subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testi-

12 mony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any

13

other country; (8) to procure. the temporary or intermit-

14 tent services of individual consultants, or organizations there-

15 of, in the same manner and under the same conditions as

16 a standing committee of the Senate may procure such serv-

17 ices under section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganiza-

18 tion Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable basis, with

1o the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Adminis-

20 tration, the services of personnel of any such department

21 or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or other-

22 wise with the prior consent of the chairman of any sub-

23 committee of any committee of the Senate the facilities oi

24 services of any members of the staffs of such other Senate

25 committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate com-

INNwi88608 Docld:32989530_Page 145

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## Page 147

1 mittees whenerer the select committee or its chairman deems

2 th't such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the

3 select committee to make the investigation and study anthor-

A ized ind directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct

5

access through the agency of any members of the select

6 committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants

y designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority

8 member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis,

9 or document or papers, relating to any of the matters or

10 questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate

Il and study in the custody or under the control of any depart-

12 ment, agency, officer, or employee of the ezecutive branch

13 of the United States Government, including any department,

14 agency, officer, or employee of the United States Govern-

15 ment having the power under the laws of the United States

16 to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute

17 persons charged with crimes against the United States and

18 any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United

19 States Government having the authority to conduct intelli-

20 gence or surveillance within or outside the United States,

21 without regard to the jurisdiction of authority of any other

22 Senate committee, which will aid the select committee to

23 prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized

24 and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the

25 extent it determines necessary oi appropriate any moneys

MNN 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 147

---

## Page 148

10

made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties

2 and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution

3 and to make the investigation and study it is authorized by

A this resolution to make.

5

(b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee

6 acting through the chairman or any other member designated

" by him, and may be served by any person designated by

8

such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders

of the United States. The chairman of the select committee,

10 or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to admin-

11 ister oaths to any witnesses appearing before the committee.

12

(c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation

13

and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the

14

select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers

15 conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of.

16

title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress

17 regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses.

18

SEc. 4. The select committee shall have authority to

19

recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the

20

amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces-

21

sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national secu-

22 rity, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United

23

States and to protect the rights of United States citizens

24

with regard to those activities.

25

Sec. 5. The select committee shall make a final report

---

## Page 149

11

I of the results of the investigation and study conducted by

2 it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and

3 its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it

4 deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest

5 practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975. The

6 select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim

I reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its

8 final report, the select committee shall have three calendar

9 months to close its affairs,

and on the expiration of such

10 three calendar months shall cease to exist.

11

Sec. 6. The expenses of the select committee through

12 September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed

13 $750,000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be

14

available for the procurement of the services of individual

15 consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be

16 paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers

17 approved by the chairman of the select committee.

NW-88608_Docld:32989530-Page-149-

---

## Page 150

Calendar No. 2

DA CONCES S. RES. 21

IST SESSION

RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee of the Senate to

conduct an investigation and study with re-

spect to intelligence activities carried out by

or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. PASTORE

JANUARY 21, 1975

Ordered to be placed on the calendar (under general

orders)

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 150

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## Page 151

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

1 - Nr. N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 2/11/75

FROM

:W.

di) Cregar

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. _

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. —

Ident.

1 - Mr. ", R. Wannall

1 - Nr. A. B. Fulton

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

Spec. Inv. -

Training —

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled

"The Role of Counterintelligence" be furnished to Mr. Colby (

as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion

as an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends to provide

de V

the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his

appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the

responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating

Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives of

#EMORIS

ALI INFORMATION CONTAINE

HEREIN IS UNCLASSININ

DAIEL/6/00 BYSP

agencies and departments having membership on the U.S.

Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as

coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various

Congressional committees.

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by the

Intelligence Division entitled "The Role of Counterintelligence."

It is a basic paper and describes what counterintelligence means

from an intelligence community viewpoint. It incorporates a

considerable amount of input from the CIA, as well as from the

Intelligence Division of the FBI.. The paper has been circulated

as a drait to representatives of ClA, DIA, Army, Navy, AIr FOrCE

and NsA, All have concurred in its content and have recommended

it be furnished to Mr. Colby for use as an

annex in connection

with his forthcoming appearance before the SSC.

ACTION:

8X-117

REC38 62-116545-23

If approved, the paper entitled "The Role of

Counterintelligence" will be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use

as an annex, to his prepared statement before the SSC.

waitin

'Enclosures

(2)

WOC: aIn fis

(7)

EEA TEN 1975

2 TENGLOSURE

god

NỮ B8 GỪ cld: Ởcld:3289530

Page 151)

---

## Page 152

SECRET

:.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP PALAN LIG

on 1116/00.

THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence is an integral part of our

national defense. By definition and by its very nature

counterintelligence is a defensive posture to the extent

that it reacts primarily to intelligence initiatives of

hostile intelligence services. As any good defense,

however, it cannot be static or passive. It is based

upon knowledge of this country's adversaries; it seeks

out and engages hostile agents and the intelligence

services that employ them.

The national counterintelli-

gence defense, in other words, requires both sound preven-

tive measures

and an energetic and sustained counterattack.

The purpose of defensive and

aggressive counter-

intelligence is to ensure that adversaries who do not want

to risk open confrontation cannot attain the same objectives

through stealth. In more concrete terms, the purpose of

counterintelligence is to identify and neutralize spies

à nu

their masters who serve our opponents.

Spycatching, by itself, is not enough, because

spies are replaceable. American

counterintelligence must

also know who sent the spies and who supported and directed

their work in this country and

in friendly nations. And

beyond identifying these agent handlers--the officers of

the KGB and other such clandestine communist organizations-

our counterintelligence must know how these people are moti-

vated, recruited, trained, structured, rewarded, and

punished.

We need to know how they communicate

with each

other--from New York or Washington, for example, to Moscow

or Prague. In short, we need to know everything we can

find out about them,

as individuals and as organizations.

And finally, what we know must be shared appropriately with

other services equally concerned.

This need is even more acute today than in the

1950s and 1960s.

We know from hard experience that the

clandestine communist services always increase the range

and the intensity of their operations during periods of

Western relaxation, when the openness and multiplicity of

exchanges provide favorable conditions and opportunities

for launching intelligence operations against our country.

62-116395-23

storer

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 152

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## Page 153

SECRET

The growth in communist-bloc intelligence

representation over the past several years, not only in

the United States but also throughout the rest of the

world, is statistically and operationally demonstrable.

For convenient reference there is attached to this paper

a fact sheet documenting this growth based on information

recorded by the CIA and FBI. In considering the number

of communist-bloc nationals posted to official establish-

ments outside their countries, it is important to recognize

that a substantial proportion

of these are intelligence

officers.

These officers have a primary mission to conduct

intelligence operations and official duties involved in

their cover positions, if required at all, are secondary

and serve mainly

to legitimize their cover.

In the Soviet

case,

it is an estimate accepted by the United States .

intelligence community that at least 40 per

cent of the

officials are intelligence officers. Indeed, some defector

sources have estimated that 70 per cent to 80 per cent of

Soviet officials have some intelligence connection,

although this figure includes officials who act only in a

minimal support capacity and only occasionally.

The most effective way to achieve the counter-

intelligence purpose is to recruit personnel from hostile

secret services.

It is also the hardest of counterintelli-

gence tasks, a goal usually requiring years of close study

and meticulous planning.

Even if the effort succeeds, we

cannot accept at face value what the penetration source

tells us. His reports must be most carefully crosschecked

against everything known. from all other sources.

Otherwise

we may be duped by an adversary who uses "our" agent to

tell us what he wants us to hear.

It there is no penetration of the adversary, or

none. at the level of seniority, all the other sources

(hostile agents whom we have detected and "doubled," inter-

cepted communications, defectors, etc.) become all the more

important.

If counterintelligence is to identify and then

contain or control secret action directed against the

United States, it must be closely coordinated. The adver-

sary services do not run uncoordinated, haphazard operations

sEcReT

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 153

---

## Page 154

SEU

RE1

against us. All their major programs of espionage, counter-

espionage.

subversion, sabotage, deception, and disinforma-

cion are intertwined.

For example, a computer program

designed to keep track of CIA personnel at home and abroad

was planned in the soviet Union, is maintained in

Czechoslovakia, and draws upon information from bast

Germany, Hungary, and elsewhere.

Another example:

informa-

tion from multiple defector sources indicates that the

Cuban security service, the DGI, since 1968-69, has agreed

to operate against the

United States and American intelli-

gence in areas where the Soviets are at an operational

disadvantage.

A second reason why United States counterintelli

gence must be coordinated is the need for effective liaison

with counterintelligence services abroad.

No one Western

service can cope by itself with the worldwide, centrally

directed, attack of the Soviets, the bloc (including the

Cubans), and the whole array of

Communist Party auxiliaries.

A counterintelligence defense which stops at a border is

no defense at ail.

The work within our borders is equally essential.

to our safety.

Because the United States continues to be

the main site of hostile clandestine operations, it is

also the main site of

American counterintelligence.

Both forms of counterintelligence--the security

'of our own operations and the penetration of operations

against us--have to be sustained if the Director of Central

Intelligence is to be able to protect United States intelli-

gence methods and sources, as required by law.

Counterintelligence has three values which flow

from its functions.

The value of its security function is

that it prevents our adversaries from gaining information

that the United States Government does not want to make

public. Counterintelligence cannot perform this security

role by rote and routines. And it cannot depend entirely

upon guards, safes, and other passive measures.

It must be

active to prevent the subversion of those people to whom

SEORET

- 3-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 154

---

## Page 155

SE

R.

ET

the United States Government has entrusted its classified

information. Some of these persons are members in American

intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.1

It must also prevent leakage of sensitive

United States information from foreign services to whom

American secrets are necessarily confided as a matter of

common concern but which in turn have been penetrated by

enemy agents.

The value of what might be called an anticipatory

defense is not always evident because when it succeeds,

nothing happens. It is like preventive medicine.

Its

value becomes dramatically clear only when it fails.

The second value of counterintelligence is that

It provides information about hostile clandestine intentions

and capabilities.

This information is the more valuable if

our adversaries

do not know that we have it.

Finally, the thira value of counterintelligence is

the large amount of straight intelligence obtained as a by-

product by counterintelligence agents in the normal course

of their business.

ISome specific and subsequently publicized examples of

Soviet success in the

recruitment of American officials, in

most cases exposed and frustrated by the FBI, are: Nelson

Whelan (1963),

Robert Johnson

(1965), Herbert Boeckenhaupt (1966), and

Ulysis Harris (1967)..

There may be cited here some of the completed counter-

intelligence cases which resulted in the identification and

suppression of high-level Soviet penetrations of Western

intelligence services and which were directly attributable

to CIA counterintelligence work:

Heinz Felfe (West Germany - 1961), Harold Adrian Russell

("Kim") Philby (UK - 1963),

GIorglo Rinald Ghistleri Italy, Spain - 1967), Yuriy

Loginov (South Africa - 1967), Nahit Imre (Turkey - 1968),

and Francis Roussilhe (France - 1969).

SECRET

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SE

RET

All United States governmental components have

some individual internal responsibility. for the security

of personnel, records,

and physical facilities.

Aside

from these basic security functions, the overall counter-

intelligence role in the United States Government is shared

by several specific intelligence agencies.

The conduct of

counterintelligence overseas is one of CIA's original

functions flowing from the National Security Act of 1947,

as amended, and specifically spelled out and developed in

a series of

National Security Council Intelligence Directives.

The FBI has the general responsibility for conduct of

counterintelligence operations within the United States

based on statutory responsibilities (enforcement of espionage,

sabotage, neutrality, registration acts, and related matters)

as well as a series of Presidential Directives and Attorney

General orders.

Success of United States counterintelligence is

proportionate to the extent to which it exists as

an

integrated, unified concept with fullest coordination among

the separate agencies. It did not exist as such until

World War II; and only small progress was made after that

war, despite the National Security Act of 1947.

An

integrated system first began to take shape in 1958, when

the National Security Council moved directly into the

Intelligence and counterintelligence directives

which established the basic ground rules were formulated

and placed in effect. . As a result the United States has a

set

of counterintelligence concepts and precepts that

organize our experience and hold us together.

Throughout

the recent years interagency coordination and cooperation

have become a working reality, becoming more and more

effective as the level of coordination continues to rise.

The effectiveness of counterintelligence also

requires recognition of its separateness as a function. In

CIA and elsewhere, before the mid-1950s, counterintelligence

was often identified only with

security

and the ad hoc

exchange of limited

amounts

of information in liaison.

was sometimes regarded as an adjunct to other specialities,

S

RET

• 5 -

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## Page 157

SEC

usually espionage.

This subordination degraded the function

to its lowest level, to such necessary but elementary work

as nametracing and

operational bookkeeping. But these

are only the elementary building blocks of

the masonry of

counterintelligence. If it is restricted to nothing more

than that, American

counterintelligence will inevitably

degenerate to parochialism and departmentalism. It will

not be responsive to a

central and vital philosophy. It

will tend to yield the initiative to the adversary and to

the writing of damage reports after 'we have been hurt

instead of seeking the adversary out and engaging him

before he can hurt us.

In summary, the value of counterintelligence as

an integral part of national defense requires a

continuity

of doctrine, an organization of experience,

and

must be

sustained by a full-time, experienced cadre of specialists

with continuing emphasis on interagency understanding and

coordination.

...

SECRET

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## Page 158

SECRET

FACT SHEET

COMMUNIST-BLOC INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATION

There are presently 667 intelligence and security

services operating throughout the world.

The 13 countries comprising the Soviet Union and

other communist states, including Cuba, operate 52 services

of domestic and foreign intelligence and security. Some

23 of these work outside their own frontiers.

The principal

service in action throughout the world against the

United States and Americans--which our highest grade

documentary sources confirm are termed "The Main Enemy"

(Glavny Vrag)--is the Soviet State Security Service (KGB),

together with Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, headed

by a senior KGB officer.

Soviet intelligence representation in the Free

World has been massively increasing for at least the

past

iộ years, as the following data show:

Year

Persons

1959

1966

1971

January, 1974

1, 500

2,490

2,106.

3, 100 (est.) :

The Central Committee of the Communist Party-of-

the Soviet Union and the Soviet intelligence services also

of espionage and subversion abroad. During the period

1969-73, Soviet funding of non-bloc communist parties showed

actual and estimated annual costs to be almost $17 million.

But we do not have the quality of sources that would guarantee

this as anything but a minimal figure.

The scope of the clandestine attack upon the

United States is suggested by the number of identifiable

recruitment approaches made to Americans by Soviet, bloc,

Cuban, and Chinese services during the 9 years from 1965

SECRET

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42-116395-43

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## Page 159

through 1973, which totals 742. This averages out to

82 per year,

or better than

one recruitment attempt per

week.

These are the things we know. Our primary concerns

now are those recruitment approaches that have been

successful and where there has been no volunteering of

information.

Communist-bloc officials assigned to

legal establishments in the United States

Date

9/61

• 9/71

1/75

Soviets

-

333

707

1, 078

Other

285

459

1,015

Total

518

1, 166

2,093

Soviet Commercial Groups

' Individuals

Soviet Special Exchange

GrOUpS

Individuals

Visits by Soviet Ships

Crew members

Temporary visitors

1972

81

•641

-330--

1,944

26

1,300

1973

370

1,299

429

2,024

267

13,000.

1974

466

-1,500

- 486

2,683

219

Not available

V

SECRET

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## Page 160

**.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAKE 962 EDITIONY

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Assoc. Dir

Dop. AD

TO

:

Mr.

J. B. Adams

DATE: February 7, 1975

Admin.

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affoirs -

... Files & Com. -

FROM :

W. R. Wannal

9/25/00

CURSARD BIE

DESACSIFY ON: 25X

ImpR 16

= Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT:

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

Spec. Inv. -

Training _

Legal Coun. -

This communication is Secret - Sensitive since the

Telophone Rm. -

information herein and in the attachments has been so classi-

Director Sec'y

fied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (S)

on 2/6/75 the writer was furnished the attached material

by Mr. William E./Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, during

a meeting in his office

which was also attended by Lt. General

Lew Allen, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA)&.:

General Allen was provided copies of the same material. It includes

a three-page statement containing a listing of categories of activities

of subject matters that require stringent protection during testimony

before the captioned Committee by any members of the U.S. Intelligence

Community.

The FBI had input in connection with the compilation of

this information and the material we furnished has been included. (S)

Also among the material is a copy of a statement which

Mr. Colby is hopeful of securing permission to present at the very

beginning of the Select Committee hearings in order that he can

emphasize the importance of and need for intelligence operations ji

its processes, the processes for collection of intelligence, how

they are controlled and overseen, why there is an overriding need

for secrecy in certain areas and what Congress can do to enhance

U.S. intelligence collections. (5)

The third paper lists eleven papers which Mr. Colby intends

to turn over to the Committee whether or not he is permitted to

make his opening statement.

These papers supplement his statement

and have been the subject of previous memoranda.

The FBI has

prepared the last two papers listed and is coordinating with all

other interested Intelligence Community members to assure that all

of the papers

will be in such form as not to conflict with Bureau

interests. (S

REC3862-116375-22

LOmnad

Among the highlights are the following: (S)

He points out (page 2) that it is important thät Eur 29106h1i-

gence activities be viewed in proper perspective and that the few (5)

Enclosures

WRY: 1m. Callahan (with enclosures)

- Mr.

1: Means with enclosure

MIntz

ME: Wannati (with enclosures?

84 MAR 3

1975

SECRET - SANSITIVE

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## Page 161

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

instances of failure or error that may have occurred in the past

" be understood in context.

He states we cannot operate effectively

without more precise provisions in the law to protect our secrets. (5)

Referring on page 5 specifically to the FBI, he notes that

intelligence collection on a worldwide basis contributes to our

internal security.

The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our

society and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There

are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence

operatives in this country seeking information about the United

States and its plans and their efforts must be met by an intensive

counterintelligence effort. He states "Within the United States,

this is

the function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the foreign agent

before

he arrives in America or to learn of the plans of foreign

groups to try to subvert our institutions.

danger has been added a new threat of international terrorism.

CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic intelligence activities have

collaborated to frustrate several plans to bring to America and its

citizens the kind of hijacking and indiscriminate

that characterize too many axeas of the world." (sterrorist bombings

Beginning at page 7, Mr. Colby undertakes to explain the

processes of collecting intelligence and on page 10 briefly goes

into the roles of the various intelligence components and the

legislative bases for their activities.

For example, he states

the intelligence roles of the other members of the Intelligence

Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and in part from separate

legislation, such as that charging the FBI with responsibility for

internal security, which I consider a correct statement. (S,

On page 11, he notes that all intelligence elements operate

within legal authority and are given further direction by the

National Security Council, but (page 13) "each of us in the Intelli-

gence Community takes full personal responsibility for the actions

recommended or taken in conformance with such general guidance and

policy. " (S)

He explains the role of the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board (PFIAB) whose "members are an impressive group of

responsible Americans who report their independent views of the

accomplishments and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community direstly

to the president. "(5)

Following this, he notes that in addition to responding to

various Congressional committees, the National Security Council and

the PFIAB, all of which exercise

oversight-type functions, the (5)

- 2-

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SECRET - SENS REVE

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## Page 162

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

intelligence agencies are exposed to audit-type functions exercised

by the Office of Management and Budget, internal audit systems, the

General Accounting Office, and the Director of Central Intelligence. S)

On page 14, after referring to the manner in which the

Intelligence Community functions through a series of committees

and boards, Mr. Colby states that the work of such committees and

boards is limited to foreign intelligence,"as internal security

falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI participates

in the Intelligence Community effort, however, so that any contribu-

tions that foreign intelligence might make to internal security can

be properly handled. " (s)

On page 17, Mr. Colby expresses confidence that the American

people not only support but insist upon an effective intelligence

apparatus to protect their security and intelligence..

Thereafter,

referring to Congress, on page 17, he states "Just tell us in the

intelligence business what the Nation wants and does not want, and

we will do our best to satisfy it.

But also give us a way openly

to change these rules when the Nation expects them to be changed."

He then calls upon Congress to organize itself to protect the

necessary secrecy of our intelligence operations while exercising

A review of Mr. Colby's proposed statement has revealed

no information which I feel would be objectionable from the Bureau's

standpoint.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

He you

_3-

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## Page 163

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER

THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTICTION

I.

The names of agents, informants,

covert liaison contacts and

operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive

clandestine sources

a. Agent or informant names or operational information

revealing them.

b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive

methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source

collection (2) employed by the FBI fox internal security and counter-

intelligence purposes.

-- The numbers, locations, times and other indications of

recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organiza-

tions.

-Specific statements of the use of technical devices in

agent operations.

• The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness

against any given target organization or individual, or lack

thereof.

--Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency employees

if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility.

--Foreign ox US sources, official or otherwise, who would

be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

II. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services

a. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly

and neutral countries.

FnDe16

ALI, TBI VPORMATION CONTAITED

HERBIN IS DINCLABSUYKDD

U-6-00 ENSE LALM ETE

Classified by - 056077

Exempt from general raciessilestion senatulo

ci E. O.

11652, carration cologary:

53 (01, (3) 15) er to tarala son or moral

DATE TACHOOLE TO DETERIANS

JOLOSURE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

62-116395-22

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## Page 164

b.

Identifying collaborative operations between the

United States

intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services

against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within

a jointly targetted third country.

c. The nature of support provided or arrangements with foreign

intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations.

d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service

under conditions of continued secrecy.

III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities

.a. Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material.

b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations.

c. Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices

in the U.S. and abroad.

d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations

üi fustigners or loreign facilities (U.S. and abroad:).

e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and

unfriendly targets in the U.S. and abroad.

f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (I) assistance

arrangements with commercial U.S. and foreign companies (2) taps

(3) and from US installations abroad.

politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

h. Protective communications security measures.

i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions

especially critical to our work in ASW.

IV. Technical Intelligence

a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical

vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

2

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SECRET SENSITIVE

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## Page 165

SEEKENSSNSIIVE

b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including

secret writing, special agent equipment, etc.

C.

Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations

involving high political sensitivity in the host country:

d.

Identification of technical counter-measures techniques.

e. Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical

collection a foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement.

f. Details of secure U.S. communications systems.

V. Other

a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass

the U.S. Government of frustrate the purpose of the operation.

b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and

foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence

operations.

ç. Specific information on special relationships with private firms

established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes

names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged

customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.

d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies

in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large

foreign clienteles).

e. Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and

covert tax arrangements.

f. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations

against foreign intelligence targets.

The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or

military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our

intelligence on military technologies of these nations.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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## Page 166

• Mx. Chairman and Members of the Committee

This Committee's inquiry and its conclusions and recom-

mendations can open a new era in American intelligence and

even in the intelligence profession worldwide. Historically,

the intelligence activities of a state have been considered

an essential function, but one conducted outside normal Gov-

ernment processes.

Indeed, one foreign official recently

expressed some surprise to me that our intelligence rests

upon legislation enacted by the Congress and is subject to

oversight and annual appropriation by the Congress. He com-

mented that he naû

aiways considered it a matter private to

the Executive. This Committee's charter demonstrates the

contrary in America.

America has made many innovations in the intelligence

,process, and I believe we have brought ours to the highest

peak of efficiency of any intelligence service in the world.

Oux Government's policies can now be based on factual in-

formation and demonstrable analysis rather than on hunches,

circumstantial evidence, and overly qualified judgments

that alone were available a

few years ago.

With

the assistance of my Intelligence Community col-

leagues, I hope to give this Committee the broadest possible

look at these intelligence efforts of the United States.

FFMORIG

ALA, BI INFOPMNHON CONTAINID

FUREN IS UNCLASSTYIED

DATE 11-6-00.55 SP2 ALM/ITE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 166

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## Page 167

I will also offer ideas for improvements that could help us

do our job better.

It is important that our intelligence activities be

viewed in proper perspective and that the few instances of

failure or error that may have occurred in the past be

understood in context.

We will welcome clear statements of the authority and

mission assigned to American intelligence. I believe the

public, including those engaged in the intelligence profession,

are entitled to and are prepared to accept clarifications

and

new definitions.

The Congress and the American people

do not expect intelligence to be carried on in the shadows

of euphemism and ambiguity. Nor can we operate effectively

without more precise provisions in the law to protect our

secrets. I believe oux nation is ready to accept the nec-

essity of reasonable secrecy in our intelligence operations

in the same way it accepts the need for secrecy in diplomatic

negotiations, in development of war plans, or in protecting

newspaper sources.

I. The Importance of Intelligence

Mr. Chairman, American intelligence helps protect our

country, it helps maintain peace in the world, and it helps

our Government make better decisions affecting the welfare

of every one of our citizens. It is not only responsible

-2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 167

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## Page 168

!

:

for warning us of imminent attack by a hostile power, these

days it must also look into the future and warn of the research

and development of new weapons systems which, unless countered

or negotiated away, would affect the security of our citizens

ten years hence.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the contribution of

intelligence to our security occurred in 1962 in the Cuban

Missile Crisis. But this story began long before in the

secret development of the U-2 aircraft to give us access to

areas where we had always been blinded. Its flight over

Cuba on October 14, 1962, provided the first certain evidence

the deployment of offensive missiles there, but intelligence

during

that crisis involved far more than the U-2. Through

the entire apparatus of intelligence, a close watch was main-

tained over all the ways in which our national security might

have been jeopardized, and it was precisely this centralized

analysis of thousands of individual bits of information that

provided our Government with reasoned

assessments and

estimates during the critical days of October 1962.

These

assessments drew on all types

. technical, diplomatic, and

military intelligence,

and they were substantially assisted

by the contribution made by at least one foreign agent who

paid for his commitment with his life.

- 3-

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## Page 169

He issue da it then in act

Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community has not been idle

since the development of the U-2, and the improvements that

have been made have

added a new dimension to the importance

of intelligence today--its contribution to the maintenance

of peace in the world.

As I believe is well known, the breakthrough in the strategic

Arms Limitations negotiations followed the development of our

ability to monitor whether or not the other side is complying

with the agreements made. To do so with respect to closed and

suspicious societies, intelligence has had to invest hundreds

of millions of dollars and heavy doses of imagination and

technical genius.

We have not yet convinced all the nations that might

pose a threat to us that our system of openness is the best

fox them as well as for us, so we must depend upon our intel-

ligence to give us the means

with which to negotiate with

• them and, at least, to limit, if not eliminate, the risks we

both run in today's world.

The peace-keeping role of intelligence goes beyond strategic

arms .

There are a number of situations in which our knowledge

of some local situation around the world was better than that

of the participants. By bringing this knowledge to both sides,

or to the one about to make a mistaken military move, intel-

ligence has

several times

assisted in defusing a potential

-4-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 169

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## Page 170

annies tastie beat

crisis

and thus disproving

our own predictions. This is a

contribution of which we are proud, for our purpose is not

merely to record facts pertaining to foreign situations

but to help maintain security and peace as well.

Intelligence likewise contributes to our internal secu-

rity.

The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our society

and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There

are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence

operatives in this country seeking information about the

United States and its plans, and their efforts must be met by

in intonsive countorintalligence effort. Within the Unitau

States, this is the function of the Federal Bureau of Invest-

igation. Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the

foreign agent before he arrives in America or to learn of

the plans of foreign groups to try to subvert our institutions.

To this traditional danger has been added a new threat

of international terrorism. CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic

intelligence activities have collaborated to frustrate several

plans to bring to America and its citizens the kind of hijack-

ing and indiscriminate terrorist bombings that characterize

too many areas of the world. Intelligence has also contributed

to the identification of international narcotics traffickers,

reducing the threat this pernicious activity poses to the

health of our citizens.

- 5-

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## Page 171

Major political and economic decisions are regularly made

by our covernment and by our Congress with assistance from our

intelligence.

These decisions range from the appropriate level

of our defense buâget to economic and

monetary policy. In the

past several years the Intelligence Community--CIA, and parts

of State, and Treasury in particular--has paid considerable

attention to international economics and related political

issues. The interdependence of the world with respect to energy,

food, raw. materials, and service industries is increasing at

a very rapid rate. The accompanying shifts in economic power

and control can require future adjustments of grave importance

to our country.

American intelligence keeps watch on such

foreign activities. Stated another way, it is becoming as

important to our national security to watch the machinations

of foreign cartel arrangements as to follow Soviet or Chinese

missile development. Intelligence is critical to our coun-

• try's economic negotiations and we are contributing materially.

Mr. Chairman, I indicated at the outset the importance

of this Committee's getting a full appreciation for the con-

tribution intelligence is making, to our country. But foremost

in this process is the Intelligence Community's reputation for

objectivity in our intelligence assessments. We do not claim

that intelligence

analysis provides a scientific procedure for

reaching decisions.

We do feel it provides an essential

=6==

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## Page 172

• mechanism for giving visibility to the issues for the policy-

maker. Our job is to provide an independent and objective

analysis based upon a wide range of confidential sources and

technical inputs. The organization of the Intelligence Com-

munity is designed to provide this independence and objectivity.

II.

The American Intelligence Process

Mr. Chairman, I would like to cover briefly the American

intelligence process, as I believe it is grossly misunderstood

by many quarters

who associate it almost exclusively with the

spectacular images of James Bond, Mata Hari, or even Maxwell

Smart.

americen intelligence is first and foremost an intel-

lectual exercise that encompasses the following steps:

1. The collection and assembly of raw informa-

tion from all sources available to the U.S. Govern-

ment, ranging from overt news dispatches to data

from the most secret technical devices or agents;

2. The assessment of the validity of the raw

information;

3. The analysis of the information and the

development of objective conclusions and judg-

ments; and

4. The presentation of the findings to policy

makers in a cleax, succinct, and timely fashion.

-7-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 172

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## Page 173

The collection process involves acquiring open informa-

tion wherever this is possible. This information largely comes

from abroad but also here in the United States from knowledge-

able citizens and Government officers whose missions are well

understood and accepted in international life, such as Foreign

Service Officers, Defense, Treasury, and even Commercial and

Agricultural Attaches. To this is added the information col-

lected by technical means. Today these give us access to

areas

never before seen. Electronic marvels identify details

we never hoped to know, and computers select and store masses

of detail

never before manageable. These ways to collect are

supplemented by clandestine collection for those matters and

in those societies

where open or technical collection cannot

provide the secret war plans, the research idea before it is

visible, or a perception of authoritarian political dynamics.

After the material is collected, it must be processed

or analyzed. Again the electronic and computer worlds have

added new dimensions to our potential to extract valuable

information from hitherto incomprehensible indicators, al-

though, alas, the computer has also increased the incompre-

hensibility of some of the systems we try to identify.

=8-

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## Page 174

The analytical process is the smallest of our categories

of expenditure, but upon the integrity, the objectivity, and

the

expertise of this body of men and women rests the real

fruit of the whole process--reasoned assessments of develop-

ments abroad today and in the future.

An essential element of the process is the presentation

of intelligence to those who make the decisions for our nation.

In our society this is not restricted to the Executive but also

includes the Congress and the public. As a consequence, intel-

ligence has endeavored to bring its product to the Congress and

even to the public through unclassified publications where

possible, through classified testimony in executive session that

is later reviewed

so we can release all information that does not

reveal our sources and methods, and through informal discussion

with journalists and the academic community where conclusions

can be debated but sources omitted.

In addition, the Department of Defense has regularly made

available the results of the intelligence process, the best

example perhaps being the way we followed in the news media

the development and testing of the generation of Soviet missiles

now being deployed. When such material is consciously released,

it can be done in a form that

allows the Congress and the public

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 174

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## Page 175

to benefit from the conclusions and assessments involved but

still protects the sources and methods by which we reach them.

Unfortunately, their revelation by individuals without author-

ization can result in the exposure of the source or technique

by which we learn the information..

Mr. Chairman, the National Security Act of 1947 was the

foundation stone for this American intelligence process. At

that time, intelligence was deemed by our country to be a mat-

ter which

should be protected from public exposure. Thus,

the specifics of the intelligence process and its authorities

were deliberately expressed in general language and left by

that statute to be specified in classified directives by the

National

Security Council. The CIA Act of 1949 further rec-

ognized the importance of this secrecy to intelligence and

specifically exempted the CIA from the publication of the

'organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries,

Or

number.s

of personnel employed by the Agency.

The intelligence roles of the other members of the

Intelligence Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and

in part from separate legislation,

such as that charging the

FBI

with responsibility for internal security, the AEC, now

ERDA; with its security authorities, and other laws such as

Public Law 86-36, which provides the National Security

Agency the authority to function without disclosing

-10-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 175

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## Page 176

information that would endanger its cryptologic functions. All

intelligence elements operate within legal authority. All are

given further direction by the National Security Council.

Those Acts, however, were not the end of Congress' role

with respect to intelligence. Intelligence operates on an-

nual appropriations, it reports to a variety of Congressional

committees, and the. Director and Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence are appointed with the advice and consent of the

Senate after hearings which, in the cases of General Walters

and me, included open sessions.

Congress long ago made special arrangements to handle

oversight and appropriations for intelligence. The consistent

position of the Executive Branch in this regard has been that

it would respond

to any way in which the congress organized.

itself to conduct this oversight and appropriations process.

To this, as indicated earlier, I add my own concern that this

• process be conducted

in a manner that preserves the

secrecy

upon which intelligence must rest.

In tune with the times, we have in more recent years,

and not just in my Directorship, become increasingly re-

*>.

sponsive to Congress both in executive session and in open

session.

For example, in 1974, I appeared before thirteen

committees or subcommittees on twenty-five occasions.

-11-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 176

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## Page 177

• These were supplemented by informal responses or briefings to

interested members on a frequent basis. The result has been

greater exposure of the substance of our intelligence process

to assist Congress in its decisionmaking, as well as a

few.

untoward exposures of our sources and methods. I hope that

this Committee sets out clearer arrangements with both houses

so that we can make available the substance of our intelligence

to assist in your decisionmaking while protecting the intel-

ligence sources

and methods.

The Executive Branch directs

and supervises the intel-

ligence apparatus to insure that mur intelligenre agencies

work together for the common goal without duplication or

bureaucratic conflict. At the head of the structure is, of

course, the National Security Council, pursuant to statute.

The Council itself has issued general directives to the Intelli-

gence Community, and the subcommittees established under the

Council give more frequent guidance and direction to our effort.

Certain subcommittees focus on current crises and call for in-

telligence coverage thereof, certain work on longer term problems

that require intelligence analysis, and certain review the

work of the Intelligence Community in specified fields. I

will not get into the bureaucratic detail necessary to clarify

this at this session, although I certainly expect to do so in

• -12-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 177

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## Page 178

the future..

I would like, however, to state my belief that

the Intelligence Community receives appropriate general guid-

ance

and direction from the National Security Council and its

committees. However, the Intelligence Community itself is

responsible for recommending actions needed or for recommend-

ing

the best way to accomplish the general goals set out by

policy leaders. Thus, general policy direction stems From

the National Security Council, but each of us in the Intelli-

gence Community takes full personal responsibility for the

actions

recommended or taken in conformance with such general

guidance and policy.

An independent review of the effectiveness of our intel-

ligence effort is conducted by the President's Foreign Intel-

ligence Advisory Board. This Board over the years has had

an important role in stimulating and supporting improvements

in our intelligence machinery. Its members are an impressive

group of responsible Americans who report their independent

views of the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the Intel-

ligence Community directly to the President.

Also in the Executive. Branch, the Office of Management

and Budget conducts through a compartmented unit the same type

of budget review of the work of the Intelligence Community as

it does of any department.

-13-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 178

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## Page 179

The Intelligence Community is also subject to intensive

audit, both internally within the departments and agencies

involved, and to the extent feasible by the General Accounting

office,

Even in those areas exempted by law from GAO review,

our internal procedures follow the same standards and practices

of audit and accounting that apply to the other components of the

Government.

Lastly, consistent with the policy outlined in Section

102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of

Central Intelligence has been charged by the President with

providing overall leadership to the Intelliyence Community.

He has been directed to review all expenditures for foreign

intelligence within the Government and make an annual recom-

mendation to the President as to the appropriate level thereof.

This charge requires him to insure that the intelligence ac-

tivities of the various departments and agencies give us the

best intelligence product at the least cost.

The Intelligence Community functions through a series of

committees and boards that bring the different agencies to-

gether. I have submitted añ™

annex to this presentation out-

lining these relationships. The work of these committees and

boards is limited to foreign intelligence, as internal

secu-

rity falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI

-14-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 179

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## Page 180

participates in the Intelligence Community effort, however,

so that any contributions that foreign intelligence might

make to internal

security can be properly handled. I will

not take your time here to describe all of these bureaucratic

arrangements, but I would like to stress the scope and com-

plexity of the Community so that its individual elements

be understood.

The collection of raw information consumes the highest

percentage of the resources devoted to intelligence. Large

sums are required for the complex technical systems I mentioned

earlier. In addition, the very substantial increases in mili-

tary and civilian personnel costs over recent years have put

a large burden on our intelligence budget despite reductions in

personnel. In conformity with the Senate's vote on June 4th,

1974, I do not propose to discuss these figures publicly, but

I do believe that you will be impressed with the way the In-

• telligence Community has increased its productivity over the

years and also reduced its size and focused its effort in

order to adjust to inflation.

III. The Needs of Intelligence

.">

Mr. Chairman, in recognition of the fundamental purpose

of this Select Committee, I indicated early in my statement

that I wanted to outline for you some of the ways in which our

-15-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 180

---

## Page 181

:

• Intelligence Community might be improved so as to open a new

era in American intelligence. In this context, I believe this

Committee may want to focus particularly on the role and pro-

cedures of intelligence in the future as well as in the past.

First, Mr. Chairman, I believe it essential to clarify

for the Congress and the people of America, as well as the

personnel in our Intelligence Community, the authorities, the

limitations, and the mission of American intelligence. When

President Eisenhower assumed full responsibility for sending

a U-2 over the Soviet Union, and President Kennedy for the Bay

of Pigs, they

repudiated in the name of the American people

the old concept of intelligence being disowned. I am confident

that our people not only support but insist upon an effective

intelligence apparatus to protect their security and welfare.

I believe, however, that they want the role of intelligence

clearly spelled out, they want controls adequate to pre-

vent abuse, and they also want necessary secrecy protected.

In my confirmation hearing, I suggested the word "foreign"

be inserted each time the word "intelligence" appears in the

charter

the CIA, to make,crystal clear its proper function

and to end any possible "gray area" in its authority. Legisla-

tion was introduced in the last Congress that would do this

and would also clarify the proper role of the Agency within

the United States. I welcome such clarification of our authority

-16-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 181

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## Page 182

ima.

and any limitation on our activities desired by the people

of this country. Just tell us in the intelligence business

what the nation wants and does not want, and we will do our

best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly to change

these rules when the nation expects them to be changed.

With respect to oversight of our activities, Mr. Chairman,

I have described the current procedures. I believe they are

sufficient on the Executive side, and I reiterate that the

oxganization of the Congress to carry out its responsibilities

is not a matter for my determination or recommendation. I do

honestly request and trust, however, that the Congress will

organize itself to protect the necessary secrecy of our

intelligence operations while exercising its responsibilities

for oversight.

Lastly, I most earnestly request of the Congress some

improvement in our ability to protect the secrets necessary

to effective intelligence operations. The spectacle that we

are presenting to the world of being unable to prevent ex-

employees from revealing their knowledge of intimate relations

with individuals and frienaly

intelligence services who put

their trust in us is raising a substantial question as to

our ability to obtain information from such sources in the

future. The revelation of our

• activities from a series of

leaks of supposedly secret testimony makes it impossible to

-17-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 182

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## Page 183

===^

contemplate the initiation of sensitive operations today

under procedures that require their exposure to a large num-

ber of reviewing bodies. The issue of whether we should

again adopt Secretary Stimson's view that "gentlemen do not

read each other's mail" land that we live in a world of

gentlemen) should be faced squarely and openly by the Con-

gress and not through irresponsible individual exposures.

IV. Cooperation with the Committee

Mr. Chairman, I assure you, as I did on the telephone

when you were named, of my most sincere intention to cooperate

with you and this Committee in its work. I look forward to

your, as well as our, contribution of ideas to the shaping of

the new era that American intelligence can have if we do our

work well. By my presence here I indicate my intention to be

as open and public as I can be during your proceedings. There

will be, however, many matters which, I am sure you will agree,

can only be handled effectively in executive session. For this

purpose, your staffs have been given appropriate clearances by

the committee, and I urge that you take steps to insure not

only that they will abide by the Committee's sules but also that

you have the legal ability similar to the one we use for our

employees to require any later exposure of such matters to occur

only after you have had a chance to review whether they may

improperly reveal sensitive information.

-18-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 183

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## Page 184

There are some matters, Mr. Chairman, which I am required

under the statute and as a professional to protect against any

chance of exposure.

The names of our agents, the names of many

patriotic Americans who have worked with us, and the specifics

of a number of our costly and delicate technical systems are

so important, Mr. Chairman, that I believe an additional level

of secrecy is necessary to protect them. The lives of

individuals are at stake, and we cannot put them to risk.

There are also cases where the reputations and future prospects

of a number of patriotic Americans who have helped or con-

tributed to our

intelligence process could be jeopardized if

their associations are revealed openly and then twisted in

the press through misunderstanding or by hostile opponents.

American intelligence cannot hope to have any future if it

repudiates the understanding of confidentiality upon which

cooperation was extended to it. There are also a range of

specific methods for gathering information which needs to be

secret. Hundreds of millions of dollars in complex technical

equipment can be made worthless if the access it provides to

foreign secrets is exposed.

.. »

An exposure is a one-time sensation, and American in-

telligence today is suffering internally and abroad from a

series of exposures and sensational exaggerations which have

-19--

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 184

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## Page 185

:_

raised questions among many of our foreign individual and of-

ficial sources, and also among our personnel. Whether the

Intelligence Community can continue its contribution to our

nation's security and welfare and the maintenance of peace in

the world will depend on our ability to conduct this review

without further exposures. Thus, I do not propose to provide

these details, but if oné becomes of particular importance

to the work of the Committee, I will certainly consult with

you and the ranking minority member to determine the best

course of action. I stress this, Mr. Chairman, as we have

but one chance to avoid unwarranted disclosures which can ruin

-the lives or the futures of people and institutions which

put their trust in our nation through its intelligence

service. I believe that you and the Committee will want to

fulfill that trust, and that this Committee's inquiry can be

comprehensive and searching without violating it.

Mx. Chairman, I have not discussed the newspaper al-

legations that led to this Committee's formation.

• I have

reported fully on this to the President, to the President's

Commission, and to the Senate Appropriations and Armed

Services Committees. I am

submitting for the record of this

Committee my remarks there

and am, of course, prepared to

expand on them. I believe it only appropriate here to deny

-20-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 185

---a

transa

---

## Page 186

flatly, as I have already, that CIA conducted a "massive

illegal domestic intelligence operation."

I have also submitted for the record a number of annexes

to this statement, mostly in classified form, in order to set

out fur the use of the Committee and its staff some further

detail about our intelligence apparatus and its work. I am,

of course, available for further questioning here today and

to cover classfied questions in Executive Session when this

may prove

to be necessary. I hope that out of the Committee's

work will come a better public understanding of the role

and functioning of American intelligence today and that the

Committee's

recommendations for improvements in our authority,

procedures, and protection may indeed be looked back on in the

future as the initiation of a new era in American intelligence.

We in American intelligence are proud to be of service

to our country, and we firmly believe that the personnel of

American intelligence, and my predecessors in this post, have

served their country well over the years.

We

are equally con-

vinced that our intelligence profession

will

serve the country

well in the new era of

Amexican intelligence being launched by

this Committee.

Thank you.

-21-

:

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 186

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## Page 187

SEGRET

LIST OF ANNEXES

A.

The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence

B..

The Intelligence Process

Drafter

CIA

DIA

C.

Mission and Functions Statements for all

Elements of the Intelligence Community

D.

Intelligence Community Oversight and DCI Role

DCI/IC

DCI/IC

Description of Intelligence Community Resources

and Canahilities

DCI/IC

•I =

G.

A Description of the Committees of the USIB and IRAC

DCI/IC

Intelligence and the Law: Description of Suggested

Changes Now Before the Congress

CIA/JUSTICE/

DCI/IC

H.

A Listing of External Reviews of Intelligence Community

Agencies

J.

K.

The Role of Security in CIA and the Intelligence

Community

The Nature and Purpose of Counterintelligence

DCI/IC

CIA

FBI/CIA

The Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan

(Will also cover Intelligence Evaluation Committee

and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Unit)

AM DR16

ALI, FBI INFORMATICH CON

62-116395-

2

costed by sweet

FIBRIHET IS UNCLASSIE BEL

Brenny from

DATH 1-0.00 BY

•, clausion colegory:

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 187

930

59 61.

1e: di (cale dis or mara)

P; adosited on

D.78

FBI/Justice Dept.

---

## Page 188

6

1975

MAILED 2

The Actorney Concral

"Tobruary 20, 1070

Director, IDI

BERAT OOT COUNTIET

• 1 - Mr. Adams

сТ:, т.

1::925/0015P2AmEIG-1 - Mr. Mintz

. - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

Rotoronco is naco to a tolophono convercation

boincon Doputy Attornoy Conaral Inuronce Bilborman and

Ja, damos Adass, lopaty Associato Direckoi, IDI, CD

Tobruary Z4, 1070.

This vill contira the authorisation providod by

Ns. Silboroan to Mr. Adana with zonard to pornitting CIA

to turnish a nozoranoun dated February 7, 1000, catitlee

"Contral Intelligence broney Sporations in the

United States,"

to It'. Camuel D, Preston, Icnicy Staff Neater, House Appro-

priations Cornittee.

for your intornation, attacked is a

copy or thin acmorandura.

It lo our uncorstanding thot il'. Preston sclo-

phonically contacted Mr. John Clarlie, Associate Teputy to

the Dircetor of Central Intelligence,

and regacated all

pritton agicemento botueen the 23I and CIA le turniched lia

Lor the uce of the llcuse Appropitationa Committeo.

Caclocure

02-120305

REC.59

1 - The Poputy Attornoy Conoral (Enclosure) ' 1:1

HOC: ebc

(8) ric

NOTE :

DO FEB 21 1975

Assoc, Dir.

Dep. AD Adm...

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. Wannall, dated

Do 10/ 2/18/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by HOC:ebc.

Comp.Syst.com

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

-ALE

Intell. .

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval...

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Cour. -

Telephone Rm.

TELETYPE UNIT

NW 88608 Doeld:32989530 Page 188

---

## Page 189

+312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail

2/7/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

AZE INFORMOR CONTAITO

ON THIS

HEREIN IS UNOLASSIFIEO

Form

DATE 9/25/00 BYSP 2 ALTIFTO

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject

JUNE MAIL

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

Removed By

File Number

F7 9 MAR 3 1975

62-116395-20

Permanent Serial Charge Out

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 189

---

## Page 190

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

HAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Alsoc. Dir.

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan

Dep. AD Adm.

1

- Mr. Adams

Asst. Djf.:

1 - Mr. Bassett

Admir

Comp. Syst. _

TO

DATE: 2/7/75

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

FROM

w. o. Noregar

1 - Mr. Mintz

Ident.

. - Mr. Wannall

1-

insisten.

Mx. Fulton

Laboratory.

FUsE: BENSTUDY 75,

1 - Mr. Cregar

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Dead it

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

2/6/75, recommended that Section Chief William O. Cregar,

emo net that set

Memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett, dated

the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, be

to protect the integrity of classified documents which will af

authorized to concur in recommendations dealing with proposal /d

necessarily be provided to the Select Committee of the Senate;

(SCS) during forthcoming hearings.

Referenced

memorandum

was approved subject to a recommended change by Inspector J.E.

Herington, Legal Counsel Division.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional

Review of the Intelligence Community met on the morning of

2/7/75, at which time the above-described Paper was considered.

The change of language offered by Inspector Herington was

submitted to the Group for consideration and was adopted.

No

substantive changes in the Paper were made and the over-all

Paper was approved.

These security proposals will now be discussed with

Senator Church and his staff by Mr. Colby's staff in an effort

to insure proper protection of. classified documents that might

be presented during forthcoming SCS testimony.

ACTION:

62-116395

WOC: ebc

(8) be

For information and record purposes.

REG-59 62-116395-19

SHIE

FEB 19 1975

+12525553 EASIN

ATL. INFOR

P:ROUT IS UNCLASGIETEO

DATE 9/25/00 3x SP2 ALMIG

5-liti:

R668 19159530 Page 190

---

## Page 191

LOTIONAL FORM NO. 1O

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSS GEN. REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO

IRNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. J.B. Adams

DATE: 1-24-75

SUBJECT:

Legal Counsel

git

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FBI, OVERSIGHT

Admin.

Comp.!

yst..

Exi. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Pion. & Eval. -

Director Sec'y

On 1-23-75 Tom Hart, Professional Staff Member,

Senate Judiciary Committee, advised Inspector John B. Hotis

that the creation in the Senate of a Select Committee on Intelligence

Operations raises serious questions about the future of the FBI

Oversight Subcommittee. The Select Committee will make a final

report to the Senate in September, together with recommendations

as to any new legislation that might be necessary. It is possible that

a new committee dealing solely with the intelligence community may

be created or that recommendations will be made that there be stronger.

oversight by the parent committee.

FMDR16

ALE ITFERUAZION GONZAIBLE

HERELL IS UECLASSIETE

Hart said that he is troubled over the mounting pressures in

the Congress to reduce the power and effectiveness of the Bureau.

He feels that is what is behind the "phony stories" that have suddenly

Ybeen circulating about Bureau files on Congressmen. Even some of

the "right wing Republicans, " he said, are attempting to capitalize on

the controversy, hoping thereby to take some of the criticism away

from former President Nixon.

michel

REC 68 62-115645-179

He said thai some of the younger Senators are attempting to

take over the oversight responsibilities on the grounds that Senators

Eastland and McClellan have been overly protective of the Bureau.

It is important, therefore, that the Oversight Subcommittee show some

immediate activity. As soon as the confirmation hearings on Attorney

General Designate Levi are completed, Hart will go to the Rules

Committee to get budget approval for the Oversighi Subcommittee.

1 - Mr. Adams

1. - Vir. Wannall

2 - M.c. Mintz

1 - Congressional Services Unit

1 - Mr. Reed

1 - Mr. Hotis

62-116395

ENE

NOT RECORDED

46 FEB 218 1975

-

SAN 33/1973

THIS SISTER CREa

1215395

51FEB281975 45

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Class.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 191

ORICIT

AL FILED IN

---

## Page 192

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams

Re: Senate Subcommittee on FBI Oversight

Professor John Ellif and two interns have been preparing materials

for the committee regarding the foreign counterintelligence functions

of the Bureau and it is expected that hearings will be scheduled in

mid-February.

Hart added that he does not know who the new members of

the Oversight Subcommittee will be at this time. It could include

Senators Tunney, Hart, or Kennedy. This determination will be made

later this month.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

side

- 2

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 192

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## Page 193

J. B. ADAMS

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Senstuty 75

2/12/75

TO MR. KELLEY:

The original, after being approvy

Mr. Callahan and me, was furnished to Mr

for his use as an annex to his prepared stat

before the Senate Committee.

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AprAdm.

Dep.

AD

Asst. Dir

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

ntew

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec: Inv.

Training

Legal Coun. —

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y

J. B. ADAMS

goo

JBA:ams

REC-59

+112

42-116395-18

FEB 20 1975

#MDR 16

ATL INTORMATION CONTAINED

TARTLE IS UNCLASSITIED,

DAN 9/25/00

NW 88608

Docld:32989530

Page 193

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## Page 194

Assóc. Dir. i

J. B. ADAMS

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Dep. ALl

Adm.

Dep. ADEL

Asst. Diy

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

2/12/75

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Escristie. le

Gen. Inv. -

75

Ident.

TO MR. KELLEY:

Inspectig

Intelly

Laboratory

Attached is a memorandum re

Plan. & Eval. -

approval of an annex to be furnished to M

Spec. Inv.

entitled Origin and Disposition of the Hu

Training.

Also enclosed is a proposed anne

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

•Intelligence Evaluation Committee prepa

Director Sec'y _

Department since the Committee was a D

function. Both were prepared from existing records,

do not involve any policy statement and, accordingly,

upon approval by Mr. Callahan and myself were

transmitted to Mr. Colby.

EX-112]

JAS. B. ADAMS

REC-5962 - 116395-17

FEB 20 1975

JBA:ams

FEMDR 16

ATE INFORMATION CONTAINER

HARKIN IS UNCIASSIFIED

DANE 9/25/00 BY SPRACHE

Oh

SiML38608 3 6192589530 Page 194

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## Page 195

MET. INFOTIA FION CONTAINE ON THIS

ENVELOpE

MERCIN SO UNCIASSITIED

Da159-23-00 BXSP-2 ALmIt

CONTENTS ENGLOSED

COUHEN REViEWED

11517

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 195

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ENVELOPE

EMPTY

Official DocLab Instruction(s) - Revised 10-Apr-2014

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 196

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January 27, 1975

Zonorable John 06, Pastore

United States

senate

Mashinator, D. C.

20510

Dear Senator Pastore:

I have had an opportunity to roac the remarlis you

made «January 21st on the Senate Elcor when you presented a

rosolution to establish i solect conmittee to conduct a study

of governrantal operatione vich respoci to intellitones

activities.

I want you to hnow of ny sincere appreciation for

your very generous commonto concerniny le and i am pleased y

your insistence on a completely fair and objective investigation.

I velcone the opportunity to appear before the dartinguished

members of the Senate to dincuss all matters of interost to tho

committed.

"á.36

9/25/00 SPRAINING

sincerely yours,

Clarence

Clarence Il. Kelley

Director

EX-110

l - Boston Enclosure

1 - Congressional Services Office - Enclosure

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

ACRESUNDE

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. ~

MILES 6

Ident. _

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

-Fal

Spec. Inv. -

Training

DESCRIFER MAN POOF

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 197

RECS !

116312216

22 JAN 29 1975

Hyew

TELETYPE UNIT LU

GPO 954-545

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S 524

NGRESSIONAL RECORD - SE

SENATE FESOLUCION B1--R

25 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, ser

WON BELATIG TO INVENSICA-

Ice di a senator as a membor, chairman, or

TION AND STUDE 'OR COVERIT

vica chairman o tho select committee shall

MENTAL

ORBRAIIONS

WIJH

• 30t ba taken into account

{c) The majority membors of the commit-

WISECT TO ITTEULICENOE AC

tee shall seicat & chairmon and the minor-

TIVINES -PLACED UNDER "RES-

Ity membars

shall celech &

vico chairman

OLUTIONS AND MOTIONS OVER,

sad the coromitted shall adopt rules and pro-

UNDER THE RULE"

cedures to govern its procedings, The vico

MI. MANSFIELD" Mr.

charman shall preside over meetings of the

President,: I

select committee during the sbrance of the

yield to the distingulshed Senator from

chairman, and dlscharge such other respon-

Rhode Island.

albilities as may be assigned to him by the

Mr. PASTORE, Mr. Prealdent, I send

selecti-committes.or

the chalrasn.

to the dest & resolution and ask for its

Vacan-

cien. in the membership of the select com-

immediate consideration.

mittee shall not affect the authority of the

The

TICE PRESUENT,. Is there ob.

remaining members to execute tho functions

jectior?

of the solect.committee and shall be Ailled 122

Vr, RUGH SCOTT, Mr President,

toe samo manner as origiaal appointments to

It are made.

reserving the rigat to doject; I under.

(d). A majority of the members of the se-

Stand that this is the resolution having

"Lect committee

shall constltute & quorum

to do with tus CrA.

for the transaction of business, but the ser

ViT WANSELELD. With tho Intelligence

leot committee may afix, & lesser number as

community.

& quorum for the purpose of taking testi-

Mr. FOCEL SCOTT. With the intelli-

mony or depositions.

SES. 2

Tae select committee is author-

gencé conemunity.

ized and directed to do everything necessary

MY. MANSITED, I do not think we

or appropriate to make the investigations

*Shoula emonasize the CIA too much, 'be-

and study specified in subsection (a) of the

cause it, is she intelligence community. I

first section,

Without saridging in any way

"Raink that should be understood.

the authorlty

conferred upon the select

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will

committee

by

the preceding

sentence,

tho

report tbe resolution

Senate further expressiy authorizes and-di-

rects the select committee to mako & com-

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Fasolyer,

plete investigation and study of the activi-

to establish a select committeo

ties of any agency or of any and all persons

of tho Senate to conduct on investigation and

pr groups of persons or organizations of any

study ot

governmental oporations with te

kind which have any tendency to reveal the

spect to intalligence settvittes

full facts with respect to the following mat

Mr. MANSTIALD addressed the Chair.

ters of questions:

NIr; HUGE

SCOTT. Mr. Fresident,

(1)

Whether

the Central Intelligence

have reserved sha right to obiect.

Agency has conducted an illegal domestio

intelligence operation in the United States.

VT. MANSFIELD. VT, Fresident, I ask

=(2) the conduct, of domestic intelligence

unanimous consent, so that it will be fully

0F

counter intelligence

operations

against

understood, that the resoltition be read in

U.S, citizens by the 'Federal Bureau' of Ja-

vestigation or any other Federal agency.

VIT. PASTORE. That is right.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will

report the resolution in full.

The legisterive clerk read as follows:

S. Res. 23

Resolaed, To establish e teléca committee

of the Senato-to conduct en investigation

and study of gorernmental operations

with

respect to Intelligence ectivities and of the

extent. 15 any,

to which illegel, improper, or

unethiest activitles were engaged in by any

agenoy of tho Federal Government of by. any

persons, acting individually or lu, combina-

tox, with others, wiba respect to any intelli

sence activity, catrled out. by or on behalt

of the Federal Government.

Resolved, Chat (n) there in hereby estab.

Ished # salect committes

tha Senato

which met ho called, for convenienco of ex-

pression,: the,

Solect Committee

ta

study

Governmental. Operations With Respect to

Intelligence

Activittes to

'conduct

an in-

vestigation sad stude of the extent, 1i any.

to waich illegas, improper, or uneunical activ

Ittes were

engaged 10, by any agency or by

any persons.

sobing

either individually

or

in compination with others, in carrying out

any intelligence or survelllanco actlyities by

ot on bebait: 0f ang agency of the Federal

Government,

(b). Tho select committes created by this

resolution shall consist of sloven Members

of the senate, nis to be appointed by

the

President of the Senate from the majority

Members of the Senate upon tho recom-

mendation ot tho Majority Leader os the Sen-

ate, and this Ininority Methbens of the Sen-

ato to be appolateà by tho Fresident of tho

Senate upon the recommendation of the l-

nority Lender of tho Senate,

For

the purpases of paragraph 6 of Rule

SENDAIS

(3) The origin and dispositton of tho-so

balled "Huston Plan" to epply United States

intelligence

agency capabilities agalnst in-

dividuals or oganizations within the United

States.

(*) The extent to which the Fcderal Bu-

reau of Investigation,

the Central Intelli

gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce-

ment

or

intelligence

agencies

coordinate

their respective

activities,

any agreemonta

which govern that coordination, and the ex-

tent to which, & lack of coordination has

contributed to activities or

actions which.

are illegal, improper,

melicient.

unethical,

or contrary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of

domestic

intelligence

or

counter-totelli

gence activities and the operation of any

other activities within the

United States by

the Central Intelligenco Agency conforms to

the legislative

charter of that agency and

the intent of the Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation

by the Director of Central Intelligence of the

responsibility to protect intelligence sources

and methods as it relates to the provision in

section 102(d) (3)

of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)) that that"...

that the agency shell have no police, subpens,

low enforcement powers, or internal securlty

functions.

(7) Nature and extent of executive branch

oversight of all United States intelligenco

activittes.

(8)

The need for specific legislative au-

thority to govern the operations of any in-

telligence agencles of the Federal Govern-

ment now existing.

Witnout

that explicit

stetutory authority, including but not lim

ited to agencles such as the

Defense Intel-

ligence

Agency and the National Securlty

Agency:

The nature and extent to which Federal

NW 88608 Docld:32989530. Page 198

45923/08

ENCLOSURE

anuary 11, 1975

agencies

cooporats and esebango intelli-

genco intoration nad the macguasy of, sny

regulations or atatated which norer-rach

cooperation and richnago of intolligence in-

formetlon.

(D) The extent to taich United States In-

telligence agences vic goverzed by executive

orders, rules, or regulations either published

or secret and tho oxtent ts minion thoso ex-

ecutive orders, rules, or regulationn intor-

pret, expand or ara in condies with specifo

legislative authority,

(10) The violation of suspected Molation

of any State of Federal statuto by any in-

telligence agency or by any person by or on

behalf of any intelligence agency ot the Fed-

eral Government including but not limited

to surreptitious entrlos, curveillance,

taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of tho

United

States mail,

or the monitoting of

the United States mall.

(22) The deed for improved, strengthened,

or consolidsted oversight of United States

Intelligencs activities by the Congress.

(12) Whether any of tho esisting laws ot

the United States rio Inadequata,

oither In

their provisions or manner of ontorcement,

to sateguard the rights of American citizens,

to improve executive and legislative control

or intelligenes and reinted activities, end to

resolvo uncertainties as to the authority of

United States intelligenco and rolated agon-

cles.

(13) Whether there is unnecessary dupli-

cation of expenditure and ellort in the col-

lection sad processing of intelligence infor

mation by United States agchcles.

{14) Tho extont and necesalty of overt and

covert intelligence detivities in the United

States and abroad.

(15) Such other tolnted matters as the

committee deems necessary in order to carry

out Its responsibilitles under section (a).

SEC, 3(a). To enable the select committeo

to make the investigation and study author-

ized and directed by this resolution, the Sen-

ato hereby empowers the select committee

as an agency of the senato (1) to employ and

fix the compensation of such clerical, inves-

tigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants

as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it

may not exceed the normal Sonato salary

schedules;

(2) to sit and act at any time or

ploce during sessions, recesses, and adjouri-

ment periods of the Senato; (3) to hold hear-

ings for taking testimony on oath or to re-

ceive documentary or physical evidonco relat

Ing to the matters and questions it is author-

ized to investigato or study: (1) to require by

subpene or otherwine the attendanco as wit

nesses di any persons who the select commit

tee belleves have knowledgo or inforrantion

concerning ony of the matters or questions it

ts authorized to investigate and study; (5)

to require by subpena of order any depart

ment, agency, ofcer, or cmployed of the ex

ecutive branch of the united States Govern

ment, or any private person, frm, or corpora-

ton, to produce for its consideration or for

use as evidence in its investigation and study

any books, checks, canceled

checks, corre-

spondence, communications, document, pa-

pers, physical evidence, records, recordings,

tapes, or materials relating to any of the mat-

ters or questions it is authorized to inves-

tigate and study which they or any of them

may have in their custody or under their con-

trol;' (G) to make to the Senato say recom-

mendations it deems appropriate in respect to

the wilful latlure or refusal of any person

to answer questions or give testimony in his

character as a witness during his eppearence

before it, or in respect to the willful failure

or refusal of any officer or employee of the

executive branch of the United states Gov-

ernment or any person, frm, or corporation

to produce before the committee any books,

checks,

canceled

checka,

correspondence,

communications, document, finencial records,

papers, physies evidence, recoras, recordings,

tapes, or materials in obedienco to any sub-

GaWs

-0/1

---

## Page 199

Jamary: 01, 1975

NGRESSIONAI RECORD - SI

S 525

pona or endor; (7í ta too degos

legislation it deema necessary or desirable

other testinear on asta cogmbero

sin tho

the sonato at the earliest practicable date,

united states ri in any other countur; (8) to

but no later than September 1,

1975. The

procure tus temporam on inramnittent seri

select committee may also submit to the Sen-

loes di indiansl consultants, or organiza-

ate such interim reports as it considers 8p

ttons titerest, in the remo manner and wader

propriate. After submision, of its final re-

the same canditiong as a struding committea

port, the salect committee shall have three

of the senato may precure cuch services un-

calendar montha to close its affairs,

and on

der section 202(1) of tino Logislativa Reorga-

tho expiration of such three calendar months

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-

jection, it is so ordered.

MT.

PASTORA. MT. President, I do

want-to say, while the resolution is be-

fore the Senate, that there is no inten-

tion here to conduct a wich hunt there

is no, one in the Senate who has more

nization, Act of 1240: 197 ta use on a reim-

chall cease to exist.

bursable bacte, with the prior consent of tho

SEC. 6.

The expenses of the select com-

a civilian intelli-

¡Conamittee on Bules and Administration, tho

raittee

through September 1,

1975,

under

inteiligence

services of personnel of any such department

this resolution saall not exceed $750,000 of

agency, and an fust in order to guar

ox agenez; (1a) to use on a reimbursable basts

which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be

antee

the security and the surviva

or otherwise with the prior consent of the

avallable for the procurement of the services

ot this Breat Republid. But in recent

chairman of any aubcommittee of ing com

of individual consultants or organizations

weeks and in recent months there have

mittee of the Senate the facilities or services

thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the

been charges and counter charges spelled

of any members of the statis of such othor

contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers

Senete sosamittees or any subcommittees of

out on the front page of every newspaper

epproved.by the chairman of the select

such other Enante committees thenever the

committee.

in this country.

The matter has been

select committes or its chairman deems that

discussed over. television and radio. The

such action is necessary or appropriate to en.

The VICH PRESIDENT. Is there ob-

people of America are confused. They are

able the colect committes to make the inves-

jection to the resolution?

asking themselves,

"What is actually

tigotion ond

study outinorized and directed

MI. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, re-

nappening to these organizations which

by tata segolation: (11) ta have direct secess

serving the right to object,

I do so in

thinugh the ageney ot try members of the

are essential for the security and the sur-

order, first, to make the point that what

relect commuttoo de pay of its investigatory

vival of our great Nation?"

sI legal resiadante

we are really trying to do here is agree on

designated by it or its

In order to clear tho air, in order to

a time to vote on

this resolution if we

charman or the renking minority member to

cleanse whatever abuses there have been

any dets, evidence, intorration, report, mi-

can. It may be necessary to object for-

in the past, so that we can put these

alysis, or document or paners relating to any

mally to get the matter on the calendar.

of the nantters or quentions which it is au-

•If so, I will be prepared to object for that

agencies on the right track, so that we

can recite, once and for all, the proper

thorized set directed to Investigate and study

In the cartony or under the cotrol of any

purpose.

parameters within which they can func-

I am not objecting to the early con-

department, agency, officer, or employee of

tion, I am afraid we will do Irreparable

sideration of the resolution. The distin-

tho executiva, bremen of too: United States.

harm to the security and the survival of

Gorernment inoluding.

depertment,

guished majority leader and I have dis-

the country unless we do this.

agency, prices; or emplarea of tho United

cussed the possibility of an early vote. I

It was for that reason, Mt. President,

States Gorument horar the power under

personally am in accord with that.

that I introduced this resolution before

tho laws so the trited states to lovestivate

I should like to ask one question for

the Democratic conference. I made it

any alleged criminal sotivittes or to prose-

the henefit of the legislative history: It

plain at the line that in my judement

cuta persone carred with comes agairat too

iin my understanding that it would be

United. States and any department, agonsy.

there

are no three frenter Amarans

the intention of the majority that the

oficer, or employes of the United States Gov.

Than Colby. Helms,

and Keller. Iknow

vice chairman of the committee will be

ernment having the guthorty to conduct In-

telligenge or sureillancs, within or putside

& member of the minority party.

all unree, have worked with all three,

andhave found

them to be distin-

the Dulted States, withouh regard to the fur-

ME. PASTORE. That is correct, and

isdiction or authority of any other Senate

it is so specified in the resolution.

guished gentlemen who are patriotic and

love this country as much as anv othes

committee, which will nid the select commit-

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I yield to the dis-

sirercans, maurud any doubt at all.

tea to prepare for or conduco the investiga-

tinguished Senator from Texas, if I may,

tion and nhucy authorized and directed by

But there has been abuse. They have

who may also wish to reserve the right

been infiuenced in making their judg-

this resolutton; and (12) to expend to the

to object. :

extent, it tatermines pecessary ou appropriato .;

ments, and these influences, I am afraid;

any moneys made aralleble to it by the sen-.

Mr. TOWER. I have nothing to add

have come from on high, may times right

to what the distinguished Senator from

ato to periorm the dutles ond. exercise the

out.of the Oval Room of the White

poweta conferred upon it by this resolution

Pennsylvanta has said, except to express

House, and sometimes from some under-

and to make the investigation and study it

the hope that when the objection is

lings at the White House.

is authorized by this recolusion to meke.

formally raised, we can consent to get

We had the instance before our com-

(a) Stopenas 10ay bo lesued by the select

• the resolution on the calendar as soon as

mittee where Ehrlichman called up the

committes coting through the chairman.or

possible; Monday, if possible.

Deputy Director of the CIA and instruct-

any other romber destinated by him, nad

Mr. HUGE SCOTT. For the purpose

mey he cerved by sit person designated by

ed him to give disguise paraphernalia to

such choirman or other member anywhere

of achieving that, I can object now.

Mr. Hunt. The question is, Under whose

within the borders of the United States. The

I object.

authority? Who was Fhrlichman? Was it

chairman be the select committee,

or any

"The VICE PRESIDENT. The objection

within the purview of the statute? Was it

other tombar thereot, is hereby authorized

is neard.

The resolution will go over.

in conformity with the charter that es

• to administer osths to ing witnesses appeai

under the rule.

tablished the CIA?

ing befers tha comtoittes,

Mr. MANSFIFLD, Mr. President, I. ask

These are questions that have to be

: 10) 70 prepating doz or conducting the in-

vestigation

god atudy anthorized,

and

di-

unanimous consent that notwithstand-

resolved, because we want the CIA to

•Ing the objection, the resolution be placed

be responsive to the President of the

tected by this resolution, the select coma

• on the calendar at this time to save the

mittee 82311, be, empowerod to' exercise tho

United States directly, and not indirect-

powers conraried woon

committees of the

time of the Senate. I do so because it. is

ly. We want him to be responsible to the

Senate by section 5002 of title 18 of the

not anticipated at the moment that we

Congress that is responsible, in turn, to

United Strass Code or any other Act of Con-

will be in tomorrow, and perhaps not

the people of this country. It is for that

gress regulating the gronting of immunity

on Thursday. We will be in Friday. It is

reason' that this investigation is being

for that reason that I make this unani-

conducted and this resolution is before

• SEc. t 2e, select committea. shall have

mous-consent request.

this body.

Buttorior in recommend the enactment of

MI. HUGH SCOTT. I have no objec-

It was

atgued by the distinguished

any now legislation or the amendment of

any enoug statute, which it considers nec-

tion.

Senator from Mississippi that this falls

The VICE. PRESIDENT. Without ob-

"essary or desirable to strengthen or clarify

within the purview and the jurisdiction

jection, it is so ordered. The resolution

of his own Armed Services Committee.

the nationni security, Intelligence, or surveil-

lance activittes of the United States and to..

* is placed on the calendar.

As a matter of fact, when we talk about

protect the rights of United States citizens

Mir, MANSFIELD. I have notifled Sen-

jurisdiction, we also have the Foreign

• with regerd to those actlvittes.

ators STENNIS and MCCLELLAN of what

Relations Committee, we have the Ap-

BEG. a. The select conomittee shall make a

was going to happen today and have also

propriations Committee, and 'I do not

final raport of the results of the investigation

discussed the inatter with the distin-

think we are ever going to get around

and study concucted by it pursuant to this,

guished Republican leader and the rank-.

discussing the question of jurisdiction

resolution, togother with ita findings and its

ing member of the Armed Services Com-

unless we get it into a select committee.

recommendations

09 to

new congressions)

mittee, Mr. TowER,

It we get it into the Appropriations Com-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 199

---

## Page 200

$ 52

NGRESSIONAL RECORD-

mitte or tho Arided Services.

Rinit-

committee of the senate to conduct an

see, I ma atraid wa are ming back again

investigation and

to the castion of centority, the seniority

draw particular attention to these words,

complex tat has disturbed so many

"of Governnent operations with respect

people.

to intelligence activities."

I pim hot osciast putting senior Mem-

I want to find out from the author of

bers on

"ais select committtee, but we

have &

wa hove a reservoir of

have nor vettled their minas or prei

waited Marinates exas way or the otter.

manny, Thoust cav, iroin my own con-

those particular words to include covert

actions as tell as literal intelligence-

gathering activities, including the full

range of Central Intelligence Agency

operations, propaganda, subversion,

stabilization, operation

A, e mitary inrelence, and of the

companies, and counterintelligence. The

inquiry would thus include, for example,

unas tie 25t, un my humble, activities like the secret war in Laos,

Operation Phoenix, and destabilization

han cranence Leuszt think he is & line

of the Government of Chile.

Americen, and 2 dote te is an excelert

The VICE FRESIDINI. The 10 min-

police outer no quests engit stave

utes.of the Senator from Montana has

no 162 a min him.

and funda-

Have no lout to hina with

anybody, except tras we went the right

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that I may proceed

for an additional 10 minutes, and yield

We are not foing to sanduct a witch

that additional time to the distinguished

hund in dais case. We are not out to get

Senater from Rhode Island.

Herone ment, not, te ace trying to do

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-

1s to sorte, zumerica.

jection, it is so ordered.

diety, went in an open society, sometimes

Mr. PASTORE. The answer is "Yes." If

we lave to have 2 secret organization.

they fall within the purview of any of

The big question is, in whom are they

the activitles of these agencies; and

responsisin? Who not 2s into Cambodia?

whether these actions are performed

Who got as into Lass? Who got us into

domestically or abroad, the resolution is

the Boy pi Pies? Who got us into Chile?

very specific in that respect. The answer

Who got us in all over the world, and

under whose authority, and why was not

the Congwis toid?

Here We are; we possed the war rowers

bill in order to restrict the power to de-

+ GIaTE

rint and require that Congress be

consulied, and we find now they can do

*It' surreptitiously through the CIA or

trirongh same other agency of Goverh-

ment. Xin's is all wong, Mr. President,

and it should he rectited. I hope that

the majority leader pod the mincrity

leader will pick out competent personnel

of whom we have enough here in the

Senate,

and that they

will conduct a

Mr. RENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

I believe this is again referred to in sub-

section 2(14) of the resolution, where it

concludes with reference to

and necessity of covert intelligence ac-

tivities in the United States and abroad.

Mu. PASTORE. That is correct.

RENNEDY. I bring this up be-

cause ore might later argue that the

resolution does not cover some of the ac-

tivities the CIA has been involved in be-

cause they are not literally intelligence

activities," and therefore that they are

not subject to the scope of the resolution.

hearing, that toey will protect the secrect

of the Cia, the FBI, and the military in

MI. KENNEDY: But quite clearly, as

telligence, and that they will not spread

it

out.

I have listened to the Senator here on

nublicly and thus injure

the floor and also to his explanation in

Nation.

the caucus,

the scope of the resolution

I think we have that competence. T

covers all of these matters I have just

think we have the responsibility to do

referred to, and they would be so

that. And after all, the Armed services

cluded in the inquiry authorized by the

Committee, the Appropriations Commit-

tee, and the Foreign Relations Commit. Mr. PASTORE. That is correct;

and

tee pro not so sanctified that they are

the majority leader will address himself

the only ones who can do it..

to that point; that this is not to be con-

The ont thing I and soying is, let us

strued in any limited way, that it has to

spread this out, wet us widen our scope,.

be given a broad interpretation, and that

and let as pick out men who will devote

interpretation will be the interpretation

themselves to this tasi, who are not al-

of the committee itself, and

ready. too much involved with other re-

sponsibilities in the Senate, and can get

on add do this lob that needs to be done.

and report, back to the people.

VI. KANNEDY. Nr. President, will the

Senator Field?

MI. PASTORE, I yield.

VIL.

KENNEDY, I wonder if I could

direct the Senator's attention to certain*

provisions of the resolution, and ask his

interpretation of such provisions.

• Mr. PASTORE, The Senator may..

KENNEDY.

clause;

The

first resolve

reters to establishing &

"select

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President will

the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator

from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER.

Armed Services Committee, as I do, I

can understand the

and the

interest of other Members of this body

over reports emanating from the New

York Times and other newspapers in the

country relative to the activities, or at

- least charged activities, of the CIA.

Jonuary 27, 1975

that such & resolution

would be introduced, and I am vers glad

that it has been introduced, and particu-

my friend,

the Senator

from Rhode Island, seems to be heading

the point that I am trying to

eet to is, serplan on the Area services

Committee, there are many times.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. Fresident, may we

have order so that those wao wish to

can give attention to the debate?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Order.

Mr. GOLDWATER. There are many

times, Mr. President, when we are con-

fronted with testimony that we do not

want to hear. It is of such a highly classi-

fled nature, I do not think, frankly, any-

one outside of the intelligence commu-

nity should hear it.

Now, it is my hope and prayer that

during the course of this investigation,

first that a proper committee be selected.

We do not want to have anyone running

for President on this committee, or any

other office. We want to have people who

are going to be objective and hew to the

Mr. PASTORE. That is correct.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Now intelligence

is not something that we gather on

Americans. It is something we gather on

an enemy. Intelligence is & worldwide

operation and, I must say, we have al-

ready lost from the CIA probably the

world's finest intelligence oficer, because

he was not going to put up with what he

thought he would be subjected to in

Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator from

Arizona admit that part of that has al-

ready been accomplished by the stories

that have appeared?

MT. GOLDWATER. I am sorry about

Mr. PASTORE. Absolutely.

Mr. GOLDWATER. What I want to

see prevented is a further diminution of

the intelligence forces we have had.

I. never worked too closely with intelli-

gence but I have worked close enough

to know, though, people in these jobs

and in this field are very dificult to come

by, they are very sensitive to exposure,

and are very sensitive to having their

discussions brought out in

So I would hope, when the majority

leader and minority leader get together

to select this committee, that they select

a committee that will weigh alt of the

facts and be particularly careful about

what is allowed to leak, because the War

tergate leaked like an old sieve, and we

sure do not want that to happen in an

area as sensitive as intelligence.

I might say that we have gone through

a lot of criticism or we have suffered

through a lot of criticism in this country

in the last several years, criticism of the

military. Who is responsible for the mili-

tary to go to Vietnam? It was not the

Pentagon; it was the President of the

United States who was the only man who

could do it.

Who is responsible for the CIA, FBI,

and DIA and others getting into fields

I have & feeling they did not want to

Get into? The Fresident of the United

States. Now should we go that high?

KWV 88608• Docld:32989530. Page 200

---

## Page 201

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG."NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM

W.

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr.

N. P. Callahan

1 - Mx.

J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

DATE:

2/10/75

I - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dirg —

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

As5t. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

le Inspection

Laboratory _

Plan. & Eval. _

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled

"Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished

Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs

Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC)

on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The

FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by

the Ad Hoc Coordinating

Group on Congressional Review of the

Intelligence Community.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

of the Intelligence Community is chaired by Mr. John Clarke,

Associate Deputy to the DCI.

It is made up of representatives

of agencies and departments having membership on the U.s.

Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a

coordinating mechanism for future testimony before

various

Congressional committees.

There are enclosed two papers which will be used as

annexs.

The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division,

is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan."

Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking

the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby.

The second

paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was

prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the

Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process.

The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed

chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition.

It is completely footnoted to documents which have been pre-

viously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These

documents appear in published form in the document entitled

"Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of

o resent 303.

Ninety-third Congress,

Second Session Pursuant

The paper was reviewed by those members o

62-116325 CONTINGED - OVER

Enclosures (2)

WOC: ain lie

(7)

REC-18

#MOR 16

he cont 973

9/23/00

in I2: 70 1975

5

989530 Page 201

---

## Page 202

Memorandum to Mr. W.

R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy 75

Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan.

No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and

it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for

use as an annex.

The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation

Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided

to the FBI for our review and concurrence.

paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition

of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to

various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as

attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

paper.

This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and

it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to

Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement.

ACTION:

для.

15

vill

1. If approved, the paper entitled "Origin and

Disposition of the Huston Plan" will be furnished to Mr. Colby.

2. MI. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney

General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI concurs

In the paper entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committeer for

use as an annex by Mr. Colby.

goa

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 202

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## Page 203

GSA UIN

UNI'L

ATES GOVERNMENT

orandum

TO

Mr. H. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

- NI•J.

B. Adams

I - Mr. J. A. Miniz

DATE: 2/10/75

1. - Mi. W. R. Wannall

FROM W. O.)Cregar

- Mx. A.

B. Fulton

I - Mr. W.

0. Cregar

ALI IPODUATION BETA MORI6

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

HEREIN IS UNCLASSINITO

PATE I 6100 BY SPANIZ

This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled

"Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished

Nx. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs

Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC)

on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The

FBI

was given the responsibility for preparing

this paper by

the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the

Intelligence Community.

Assoc. Dise and

Den. AD Ai-,-

Der. AD tir. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -e

Ext. Affo'is an.

Files & 6o5. .

Gon, lar.

Ident. -

inspection

Intell. --

Laboraiory

Plan, & Exei.

Spec. ins.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Di actor Sec'y --

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

ul tho Inbchligtuce Community is chaincd by Mr. John Clarte,

Associate Deputy to the DOI.

It is made up of representatives

of agencies and departments having membership on the Us.

Intelligence

Board

coordinating

(USIB).

Its purpose is to serve as

a

mechanism for future testimony before various

Congressional committees.

There are enclosed two papers which will be used as

annexs.

The

first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division,

is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan."

Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking

the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby.

paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was

prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the

Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process.

The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed

chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition.

It is completely footnoted to documents which have been pre-

viously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These

documents

appear in published form in the document

entitled

"Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, house oi

Representatives

Ninety-third Congress

to H. Res. 803."

The paper was reviewe, Second Session Pursuant

by those members of

Enclosures (2)

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC: dIn':

(7)

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 203

---

## Page 204

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy 75

Ad hoc group who participated in the development of the plan.

No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and

it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for

use as an annex.

The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation

Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided

to the FBI for our review and concurrence.

Here again this

paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition

of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

It is footnoted to

various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as

attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and

it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to

Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement.

ACTION:

1.

It approved, the

paper entitled "Origin and

Disposition of the Huston Plan' will be furnished to Mr. Colby..

21.

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney

General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI concurs

in the paper entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee for

use as an annex by Mr. Colby.

WRU

---

## Page 205

SEC

#mDR)6 11-6-00

CLASSIFIED BY SP.2 ALmIETE.

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

ORIGIN AND DISPOSITION

OF THE

HUSTON PLAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINM

HEREIN IS UNOLASSIFIAD BEGUY*

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated 6/20/69 Tom Charles Huston, Staff

Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Director, FBI,

stating that the President had directed that a report on foreign

communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the

United States be prepared for his study. According to the

Huston

letter; the President specifically requested that the

report draw upon all the sources available to the intelligence

community, that it be as detailed as possible, and

that the word "support" should be liberally construed

to include all activities by foreign communists designed to

encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the

United States.

The letter stated that on the basis of

earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited

aspect of the problem, it was apparent "present" intelligence

collection capabilities in the area were inadequate. Huston

stated the President wanted to know what resources were currently

targeted toward monitoring foreign communist support of

revolutionary youth activities in the United States, how

effective they were, what gaps existed in our (U.S.) intelligence

because of either inadequate resources or low priority of

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 205

SECRET

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## Page 206

SECRET

attention and what steps could be taken, if the president

directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these

activities.

The request was also sent to CIA, NSA and DIA

sceking contributions relating to this same problem.

Pursuant to the request, the FBI and CIA submitted available

information on the matter. These responses were handled

unilaterally and without coordination between CIA and FBI.

On 6/5/70 Director Hoover met with President Nixon

at which meeting the President appointed him as chairman

of a

special intelligence committee to coordinate a more effective

intelligence-gathering function. I He also instructed that

the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (ClA), National Secusiiy

Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were to

coordinate their efforts to insure that comprehensive informa-

tion would be obtained for the President's use which would

provide him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new left

and subversive groups in directing dissident activities in

the United States. Present at this meeting were CIA Director

Richard Helms; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V.

Bennett, DIA; Mr. Tom Charles. Huston, White House Staff Assistant;

"Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of

Representatives A Resolution Authorizing and Directing the

Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant

to H. Res. 803,

Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient

Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise its

Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President

of the United States of America," Book VII, Part 1, Pg. 375.

- 2 -

SECRET

-NW-88608-Doeld:32989530-Page-206m

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## Page 207

ident

Assistant to the President H. R. Halgeman; Assistant to the

President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman and Robert H.

Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and

Welfare.

An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee on

Intelligence (AD HOC) was held in Mr. Hoover's office on

6/8/70. This meeting was attended by Mr. Helms, Vice: Admiral

Gayler, General. Bennett

and Mr. Huston, Mr. Hoover

emphasized the President's keen interest in the problem of

intelligence collection and outlined the general objectives to

which the Committee was to address itself. He instructed

that

a working subcommittce be established composed of

repcesentatives of all the member agencies which subcommittee

was to be headed by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan.

The first meeting of the working subcommittee was

held on 6/9/70. At this meeting Mr. Huston presented

the subcommittee with an outline which he stated the President

desired the subcommittee to follow in preparing its report.

The outline addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures

and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The following

from the outline is quoted:

"PURPOSE:

(A)

(B)

(C)

To define and assess the existing internal

security threat.

To evaluate the collection procedures and

techniques presently employed and to assess

their effectiveness.

To identify gaps in our present collection efforts.

and recormend steps to close these gaps.

-

3

-proper

Ten a.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 207

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## Page 208

(D)

(E)

(E)

te

To review current procedures for inter-

community coordination and cooperation and

to recommend steps to improve these procedures.

To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence

data and to recommend procedures to increase

both its timeliness and usefulness.

To assess the priorities presently attached

to domestic intelligence collection efforts and

to recommend new priorities where appropriate.

PROCEDURES:

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

Although the sub-committee will be officially

constituted within the framework of USIB, it

will in fact be an independent, ad hoc, inter-

agency working group with a limited mandate.

Operational details will be the responsibility

of the chairman.

However, the scope and

direction of the review will be determined by

the white House member.

The sub-committee will submit its reports to the

White House and not to USIB. Report will be

due by July 1, 1970.

To insure that the President has all the options

available for consideration,

the Wh member may

direct detailed interrogatories to individual

agencies in order to ascertain facts relevant

to polle

to policy evaluation by the President.

Information resulting from such interrogatories

will, if the contributing agency requests, be

treated on a confidential basis and not be

considered by the sub-committtee as a whole.

OBJECTIVES:

(A)

(B)

(C)

Maximum coordination and cooperation within the

intelligence community. The sub-committee

may wish to consider the creation of a permanent

Domestic Intelligence Operations

Board, or

some other appropriate mechanism to insure

community-wide evaluation of intelligence data.

Higher priority by all intelligence agencies

on internal security collection efforts.

Maximum use of all special investigative

techniques, including increased agent and

informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.

-4-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 208

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## Page 209

:.

:.

time in the wet i rests

SECRET

(D)

Clarification of NSA's role in targeting

against conmunication traffic involving

revolutionary leaders and organizations. (5)

(E)

Maximum coverage of the overseas activitics

of revolutionary leaders and of foreign surport

of U.S. revolutionary activities.

(E)

Maximum coverage of campus and student-related

activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.

(G)

More detailed information about the sources and

extent of financial support of revolutionary

organizations.

(H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence

role of the Armed Services.

• (I) Development of procedures for translating

analyzed intelligence information into a fourat

useful for policy formulation."

At a meeting of the working subcommittee held on

6/23/70 a consensus was reached on a final draft of the Rupuct

to be issued by the Interagency Cömmittee. This Report, which

was captioned "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence

(AD HOC), "2 dated June, 1970, and numbering 43 pages was

signed and approved by the heads of each member agency at a

final

meeting of the Committee held in Mr. Hoover's office on

6/25/70.3

The Report footnoted several objections by the FBI

to certain options contained in the Committee's Report. 4

These

objections are enumerated in a latter portion of this paper.

ZIbia., pp.

384-431.

3Ibid., pg. 383.

4Ibid., pg. 433.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 209

-

5-

SECRE I

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## Page 210

-..

SECRET

A copy of the "Special Report" was delivered to Mr. Huston at

the White House on 6/26/70. The "Special Report" was divided

into three main sections: Part One, a summarized estimate of

the internal security threat; Part Iwo, a summary of various

operational limitations on certain intelligence collection

techniques with cited advantages of maintaining such restrictions

as well as the advantages of relaxing them; and Part Three,

an evaluation of interagency cooperation with suggested

measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence

collection.

During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent

the

"Special

Report" to H. R. Haldeman with a memorandum

entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection.

In his memorandum Huston recommended that the President,

from among the options discussed by the "Special Report,"

select;

in

most areas discussed, the options relaxing the

restraints on intelligence collection. 5

On 7/14/70 Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston

stating the President had approved Huston's recommendations

for relaxing restraints on intelligence collection and

requested a formal decision memorandum be prepared.

In a memorandum dated 7/23/70 addressed to the AD HOC

Committee agencies with copies for the President and Mr. Haldeman,

Mr. Huston advised that the President had carefully studied

5Ibia., pg.

437.

EIbia., pg.

445.

7Ibid., pp.

450, 451.

6

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 210

SECRET

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## Page 211

ume

SEGMEI

the "Special Report" and had made certain decisions with

respect to issues raised therein. The President's decisions

called for a relaxation of certain existing restraints on

intelligence coverage including the following: NSCID-6 was

to be interpreted to permit NSA to program for coverage the

communications of United States citizens using international

(S)

facilities;

the intelligence community was directed to intensify

electronic surveillance coverage of individuals and groups in

the United States who pose a threat to the internal security;

restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be removed and

restrictions on covert mail coverage relaxed to permit its use

on select targets of priority intelligence; restraints on the

use of surreptitious entry were to be removed on certain high-

priority targets; the coverage of violence-prone campus and

student-related groups was to be increased; CIA coverage of

american students traveling of living abroad was to be inereased,!

(5)

the restrictions on the use of military undercover agents

were to be retained; each member agency was to submit a

detailed estimate of manpower and monetary needs required to

implement the decisions; and a committee consisting of the

directors of representative agencies or appropriate alternates

was to be constituted effective 8/1/70 to provide

evaluation of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic

domestic intelligence estimates, carry out other objectives

specified in the Report and perform such other duties as

the President should from time to time assign. The Director

SECRET

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 211

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## Page 212

SECRET

of the FBI was appointed to serve as chairman of this committee.

An attachment to the memorandum from Mr. Huston captioned

"Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group

on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth

specific composition, operations and duties of this new committee.

On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston the Director,

FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney General dated 7/27/70

pointing out FBI objections to certain of the decisions reported

in the Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation of

electronic surveillance policy, the implementation of covert mail

coverage, the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious

entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic. materials, the removal

of controls and restrictions relating to the coverage of

violence-prone campus and student-related groups and the

establishment of a permanent Interagency Committee on Domestic

Intelligence. The Director stated that in the "Special Report"

he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects of the

Report and requested of the Attorney General a prompt

expression of his views concerning the matter. He noted that

no action to implement the instructions contained in Mr. Huston's

letter would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney General.

No further action to implement the Huston letter

subsequent to the 7/27/70 letter to the Attorney General was

instituted by the intelligence community. There is no indication

that the Attorney General ever responded to this communication.

& Ibid., pg. 456.

- 8 - SECRET

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 212

-+19947

---

## Page 213

SECRET

On or about 7/27/70 each recipient agency of the

7/23/70 memorandum recei yed a

telephone call from the

White House instructing that the memorandum be returned.

SECRET

1. N: 82513. Pocid 32899539 Page 213

---

## Page 214

!

#MDR6

ALZ, YOI INFORILATION CONTAINES

INTELLIGENCE LVALUATION CONMITTEE

ACM

Introduction

Since its existence was first revealed publicly during

HUFLAT IS UNOLASS

3-00 BESE

the height of the Senate Walergate Committee investigation in

1973, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (TEC) has been the

object of suspicion and misunderstanding. Unfortunately

associated by some politicians and representatives of the

media with such things as political spying, illegal electronic

surveillance and surreptitious entry, it was nothing more than

an effort by the Exccutive Branch to better coordinate and

disseminate intelligence information received by various in-

telligence and investigative agencies in the Federal Government.

While the fact of its existence was kept secret, which may have

contributed to the misunderstanding of its purpose and function,

the IEC was not an operational entity. That is, it did not

conduct its own investigations as did the FBI and other agencies.

Nor did it engage in surreptitious entries, wiretapping or

other similar activity. It merely received data collected

by the agencies represented on the Committee and put this

information into one comprehonsive report or estimate for

dissemination to interested agencies and individuals within the

Executive Branch. The Committee was staffed by career personnel

L NW 88608≤Hoeld32989530-Page-214-

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## Page 215

2 -

and it existed for approximately 18 months.

oxigin

In November, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell

met with John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for

Domestic Affairs; Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General;

jorris Leonard, Administrator of the Law Enforcoment Assistance

Administration (LEXA) ; Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney

General, Internal Security Division; and a consultant from

the State of Washington, former State Judge Morell Sharp, to

discuss the need for an inter-departmental unit capable of

obtaining and evaluating intelligence infornation from all the

rescurces of the Federal Goverment relating to the membership,

status and activities of militant terrorist groups operating

within the United States. The meeting took place on November 10.

1970 in Mr. Mitchell's office and, according to a memorandum

dated November 12, prepared by MI. Mardian, past attempts to

elicit such cooperation from interested depariments and

agencies of the Executive Branch had been unsuccessful. It

was decided that Judge Sharp, John Dean, then Counsel to the

President, and Mr. Mardian were to contact the heads of

various agencies and explain the wishes of the President and

seek

their advice and cooperation.

(See Attachment

1) .

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 215

---

## Page 216

- 3 --

According to à memorandun dated December 17, 1970,

from

Mi. Mardian to the Attorney General, a second meeting of the

Intelligence Evaluation Commitcee took place at 9:00 a.m. in

the Executive Offic, Building, and was attended by Mr. Mardian,

Judge Sharp, Mr. Dain, Egil Krogh (Deputy Counsel to the

presidont), copert crochkle (Ajsistant Secretary Of Defense),

James Angleton (Contral Intelligence Agency), Thomas Kelly

(Secret Service), Beacon Bustham (National Security Agency) ,

George Moose (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and John

Doherty (Departmeni of Justice). It was agreed at that

meeting that on or "cfore Jaruary 6, 1971 the agencies repre-

sented would furnish infornution relating to "organizational

targets and intelligence targots." Judge Sharp was to be

available on a full-iine consulting basis beginning January 11,

1971, and the Committee was to have its next meeting on

January 11 at 9:00 a.m. (Sea

• Attachment 2) •

Judge Sharp actendeù

three meetings of the IC during

its initial stages of development. He did not attend the

fousth scheduled mosting on january 25, 1971, at which time

Mr. Mardian explainod his absence by stating there had been

several inquiries by the former Judge's acquaintances

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 216

---

## Page 217

4

in Congress which caused the Attorney General and the White

House to be concerned that it would be difficult to maintain

appropriate security regarding the Committee's work with

Judge Sharp as its head. Mardian stated that at a meeting at

the White House on January 21, it was decided that Judge

Sharp would

be removed from the Committee and assigned other

consultane duties with the Justice Department.

Subsequent memoranda revealed that certain individuals

were designated by their respective agencies as representatives

on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, and by February 10,

1971 a document outlining the authority, mission, membership,

staff, procedures and functions and office space and facilities

drafted and presented to each of the member-representatives.

Functions and Purpose

According to the February 10, memorandum, the purpose of.

the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was to provide intelli-

gence estimates to the respective Government departments and

agencies on a need-to-know basis, in order to effectively

evaluate and anticipate problems

for appropriate response to

civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, the Committee

was to have access to all pertinent intelligence in the

possession of the United States Government. The membership

NW 88608_ Docld:32989530 Page 217

Tea"+: +9953444480144009

---

## Page 218

5

WAS

to consist of representatives

from the Department of

Defense,

Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and National

Security Agency and "when necessary, representatives of other

departments and agencies designated by the Committee." I/

The Committee was to be supported by a permanent staff

consisting of representatives from member departments and

agencies and headed by an Executive Director appointed by 'the

Committee.

The staff was to perform certain functions which

included: (1) when requested by the Committee, agency repre-

sentatives would furnish to the staff all pertinent information

relevant

to the stated request of the Committee; (2) prepare

estimates; (3) report information gaps; (4) recommend subjects

for intelligence estimates; (5) prepare relevant studies and

reports; and (6) provide for the secrecy of the information

received and the protection of all, sources of the information.

The Department of Justice provided necessary office space,

supplies and incidental administrative support. (See

Attachment 3) .

1/ In his report of January 15, 1975 to the Senate Appropri-

ations Committee, Director of Central Intelligence willian

E. Colby stated that the State Department was represented

on the IEC. It was not. However, at some time after its

formation, the Treasury Department appointed a representative

to the Committee.

NW. 88608-Dockd: 32989530 Page 218. 35

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## Page 219

6

-

Mr. Hoover initially declined a request from Mr.

Mardian to provide staff support, but on May 17, 1971, the

Attorney General requested that the fBI provide two agents

and one secretary for the permanent working staff of IIC:

hoover acceded to this request.

Meetings and Reports

John Doherty of the Department of Justice was named as

the first Executive Director of the Intelligence Evaluation

Committee and

with the approval of the Assistant Attorney

General, Internal Security Division, Jales McGrath, a staff

attorney, was assigned as his assistant. Subsequently. Bernara

Wells, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi

gation replaced Mr. Doherty, who retired from government service,

as Executive Director in September, 1971. Weekly meetings were

held with representatives of the various agencies and procedures

for agency contribution to IEC estimates or reports were

adopted. (See Attachment 4) •

The first estimate or report prepared and disseminated

by the IC was designated E-1 dated February 18, 1971 entitled

"April-May Demonstrations" dealing with the potential for

violence during

the anti-war demonstrations in washington and

other parts of the country planned for April-May 1971. During

the period February 18, 1971 to April 30, 1973, the Committee

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 219

---

## Page 220

- 7

produced and disseminated 31 estimates or reports dealing with

such subjects as anti-war demonstrations, potential for vio-

lence in major cities, black power organizations, Arab

terrorist groups, prison riots, and related topics.

There is

attached a complete list of all of the estimates or reports

produced and disseminated by the IC during its

existence.

(See Attachment 5). The estimates were disseminated to the

Counsel to the President; Director, Central Intelligence;

Director, National Security Agency; Director, Secret Service;

DineLiui, Ecöcial Bureau of Invostigation; Dircotor, Cificc of

Low Enforcement,

Treasury Department; the Assistant Attorney

General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice;

and the Defense Intelligence Agency. No estimates were

produced after April 30, 1973. A communication to all .

interested

agencies dated June 11, 1973 pointed out that

inasmuch as the end of the war in Vietnam had resulted in the .

termination of demonstrations

which carried a potential for

violence, there was no longer any useful function to be served

by the IC and that, effective immediately, the IEC would no

longer be in existence.

During July, 1971, Mr. Mardian, at a meeting of the

IEC, stated that President Nixon had requested a

• report regara-

ing the handling of classified information, which was prompted

/ NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 220

---

## Page 221

- 8

ans'

by the Pentagon Papers case. Shortly thereafter, the IBC,

staff was advised that White House Staff Member Gordon Liddy

had been appointed to work with the Ic regarding its study of

the handling of classified information and by November, 1971.

the IC completed and disseminated a special report entitled

"The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information."

Relationship of the IEC to the "Huston Plan"

In June 1970, J. Edgar Hoover met with President Nixon,

at which time Mr. Hoover was appointed chairman of a special

committee to coordinate more effectively the intelligence-

gathering efforts of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA. The head

of each of these agencies was present at a June 5, 1970 meet-

ing with the President, which included White House Staff

Assistant Tom C. Huston. Subsequently, a working subcommittee

headed by Assistant Director William C. Sullivan of the FBI

was formed, and it held a series of meetings beyinning June 9,

1970. A final meeting held in late June

1970, a

"Special

Report" was filed and approved by the head of each member

agency.

The "Special Report"

• which was

submitted by Mr. Hoover

to the President, was divided into

three

sections:

a surmaty

of the internal security threat;

summarized limitations on

---

## Page 222

-9 -

certain intelligence collection techniques; and, a brief

evaluation

. of interagency cooperation, with suggested measures

to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collec-

zion.

Mr. Hoover objected to certain options

for relaxation

of restraints on intelligence gathering. Although President

Nixon at first approved the relaxation of certain restraints,

this approval was rescinded about five days later.

Inquiries by Various Committees of

Congress and Other Entities Into

the Operations of the IEC

since

its üisclosure, the IC las been the target of

a number of investigations and

inquiries, none of which has

revealed any illegality or impropriety. The Senate Select

Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Senate Water-

gate Committee) interviewed former IEC personnel. in 1973, and

• member of the Committee staff was offered access to all IEC

reports and documents. The final report of the Watergate

Committee published in June 1974 makes no reference to any

improper or illegal activity by the ILC, but devoted a section

to the Huston

Plan.

(See Attachment 6)

The House Judiciary Committee Investigating the Impeach-

ment of Richard Nixon (Rodino Committee) did not see fit to

conduct any investigation of the IEC, and onc may conclude that

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 222

---

## Page 223

.. 10 -

it developed no information which would require scrutiny.

The

Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Ervin Committee),

after submitting voluminous questionnaires to the Department of

Justice beginning in August, 1973 regarding the activities of

the former Internal Security Division, was given complete

information and access to all documents relating to the IEC

and, to date, has reported no finding of impropriety or

illegality.

The Watergate Special Prosecution Force has been given

complete access to the documents and iccorde of the committeo

and it has conducted interviews of former Committee repre-

sentatives

and staff with no report to the Attorney General

Of any improper conduct. Moreover, the IC will continue to

be a target of inquiry by the recently formed Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence

Activities (Church Committee).

In his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee,

former Counsel to the President, John

Dean,

testified that

"I am unaware of the IC ever having engaged in any illicit

activities or assignments." See,

Hearings Before the Select

Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United

States Senate, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., at 916 (1973).

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 223

---

## Page 224

Attachment I

'orm DJ-19

Ed. 1-26-65

UNITED STATES GOVERYMENT

Memorandum

TO

The sitorney General

DEPARTMEYI OF JUSTICE,

SECRET

-

DATE: 11/12/70

FROM

Robert C. Mardian

Assistant Attorney General

Internal Security Division

SUBJECT:

DOMESTIC INTELLICENCE UNIT

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth

the tentative conclusions reaches in the discussion in

your office on November 10, 1970, which was attended by

yourself, John Ehrlichman, the Daputy Attorney General,

Jerris Leonard, Justice Morell Swarp, and Robert Mardian.

1. That these ves a rod tot in intor acpastmental

unit capable of obtaining and clueting intelligence

• information from all the rasour-na of the federal government,

relating to membershio, status and anticipated activities

- of militant terrorist groups operating within the United

States.

2. That previous atterpts to alicit the

cooperation of the Departnents and Agencios possessing this

information havebeén unsuccessful for numesous reasons and

that the most recent attempt failed largery because of the

lack of confidence by the Departnents and Agencies in the

White House representative responsible fox contacting ten.

-

3. That Justice Sharp, John Dean, anā Robert

Mardian be appointed

as an ad hoc committze

to contact the

heads of the affected Departments and Agencies and explair

the wishes of the President in this regard, and to seek

theis advice and enlist their cooperation in this effort.

That such contacts would only be made after the heads o

the

affected Agencies were advised by the white House of the

appointment and purposes of the ad hoc committee.

Cc - Deputy AG

John Dean

Jerris Leonard

SECRET

NW 88608-Doeld:32989530 Page 224-2

---

## Page 225

SECRET

- 2 m

4. That the Inter-Departmental Information

Unit (IDIU) of the Deyariment of Justice would be used as

a cover for the proposed domostic intelligence unit.

5. That Justice. Sharp would meet with Jim

Devine of the IDIU for the purpose of informing himself

as to the character of the IDIU operation and developing

with Devine a strategy for the use of the IDIU as the

operating entity for the proposed domestic intelligence unit.

Justice Sharp, Dean, and Mardian met on Wednesday:

November 11, and reviewed the history of the government's

attempt to create a dorestic intelligence unit, including

the efforts of the Ad Hoc Intor-Agency Committee (under the

Chairmanship of Dicentor Huuw.) that racontly mage a study

of the domestic int iligense gathering piocess and proposed

- steps that could be tasen to improve that process.

It was generally agreed that, initially, the

proposed domestic intelligence unit shouid limit itself to

obtaining and evaluating the available intelligence information

from the existing sources of the government and developing

a more sophisticated method of collating, and evaluating such

information.

If you approve the foregoing and will advise us that

preliminary contact has been made with the heads of the

affectea Agencies, we will proceed in accordance with your

instructions.

SECBET

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 225

---

## Page 226

-26-61

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

The Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SECRET - EYES OATY

FROM : Robert C. Mardian

Reun

Assistant Attorney General

Internal Security Division

• SUBJECT: Intelligence

Evaluation Committee Meeting

DATE: December 17, 1970

OFFICE OF

RECEIVED

TH.!

DE6 1 7 1970

SITORNEY GENERA

The second meeting of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee took

place at the hour of 9 AM in the conference Room of the Vice

President, Executive

Office Building, on Wednesday, December 16,

1970. Attending were Justice Morell Sharpe, Egil Krogh, John

Dean, Robert Froehlke (DOD), James Angleton (CIA), Thomas Kelly

(Secret Service), Benson Buffham (NSA) , George Moore (FBI), John

Doherty (Techniral Advisor to the Chairman), and myself.

Assistant Secretary Froehlke explained that he had been requestea

by Secretary Laird to attend the preliminary meetings and that

after he had had an opportunity to brief the designee (probably

preliminary to Secretary Laird's making any designation. This

i agreed to do.

I opened the meeting by briefly outlining the conclusions reached

at our first meeting for the benefit of those who were not present.

We then discussed how best to approach a solution to the problem

and it was unanimously agreed as follows:

That on or before January 6, 1971, the operative agencies

represented would furnish to me under appropriate security

measures: (1) organizational targets and (2) intelli-

gence targets (such as the extent and nature of foreign

influence on our organization targets and the extent and

nature of the financing of our organization targets).

Inspector Moore disclosed that the FBI had compiled a calendar

of demonstrations and events planned by certain of the target

organizations. He agreed to furnish a copy of the calendar to

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-NW-88608-Docld:32989530 Page 226.

+2-4720-79.71

---

## Page 227

SECRET

-2-

me and it was agreed that I would circulate the calendar (much

of which is public knowledge) under appropriate security measures

to ascertain whether or not the other agencios represented were

aware of any further planned demonstrations.

We informed

the Committee that sufficient space for the evaluation

comnittee had been provided in FOB #7 and that Justice Sharpe would

be available on a full-time consulting basis starting on January 11,

1971.

The Committee agreed to have its next meeting on Monday, January 11

at 9 AM, at which time I will have engrossed the submissions of

each of the member agencies and further that at the next meeting

we would attempt to establish priorities with respect to our

intelligence targets.

The meeting adjourned at 11:35 AM.

--

cc: The Honorable John Ehrlichman

The Honorable Robert Haldeman

SECRET

NW 85608 Docld:32989530 Page 227

---

## Page 228

5781 19-150

58. 4126-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: See Addressees Below

DR

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DATE:February 10, 1971

FROM : Robert C. Mardiant

Assistant Attorney General

Internal Security Division

SUBJECT:

Intelligence Evaluation Committee

I.a.

II.

III.

IV.

AUTHORITY:

Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances.

MISSION:

To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible

Covernment departments and agencies on a need-to-know

basis in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate

problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders.

In carrying out this mission, the Committee shall have

access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession

of the United States Government.

MEMBERSHIP:

Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives

of the following departments and agencies: Department of

Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence

Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service:

National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representa-

tives of other departments or agencies designated by the

Committee.

STAFE:

The Conmittee will be supported by a permanent intelligence

estimation staff* consisting of representatives from member

* The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not provids

personnel for this start.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 228

---

## Page 229

DRAF

V.

VI.

SECRET - EYES ONLE

∞2-

departments and agencies and headed by an executive

director appointed by the Committee.

PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS:

The permanent staff will perform the following functions:

I. When requested by the Committee, the Departments

Or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee

staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated

request, of the Committee.

Such requests for intelligence

data shall first be approved by the Cormittee. The.

Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate

requests for information from member agencies subject to

review and approval by the committee.

2. Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by

the Committee.

3. Report information gaps to the Committee as such

gaps are identified.

= *

A. Recommend to the Committee no less often than

monthly subjects for intelligence, estimation.

5. Prepare other relevant studies and reports as

directed by the Committee.

6. Provide for the

security of information received

and the protection of all sources of information:

OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES:

The Department of Justice shall provide necessary office

space, supplies, and incidental administrative support.

• SECRET

EYES ONLY

AV 88608_Docld: 32989530 Page 229

---

## Page 230

• i

SECRET - EXES ONLY

-3=

ADDRESSEES:

Inspecto: George C. Moore

Mr. Benso:: Buffnam

Mc. Thomes J. Kelley

Colonel Joan W. Downey

Mr. Richard Ober

...

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 230

---

## Page 231

litter 1:979

SECRET

PROCEDURES FOR THE AGENCIES CONTRIBUTION TO IEC ESTIMATES

l. The INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC) has been

charged with the responsibility of providing intelligence

estimates to designated Government departments by effectively

evaluating and anticipating problems of civil disorder.

To evaluate a potential problem it will be necessary for

IEC to request each assisting agency to prepare an

intelligence analysis.

The analysis, in the form of

evaluated contributions, will be forwarded to the Executive

Director of IEC.

These contributions, pursuant to requirements

set forth by Ic, will become the basis for the IC's

intelligenco estimate of potential problems of civil disoraei.

2.

The IEC does not desire to receive a voluminous collection

of intelligence data from the member agencies.

The

contribution should be an evaluation of the particular

situation based on the data which that agency has in its

possession. The IC Staff may issue GUIDELINES, to assist the

five agencies in the preparation of their intelligence con-

tribution. Additionally, such GUIDELINES will be of

assistance to IEC in identifying intelligence "gaps" and

the basis for making supplemental requests to the individual

agency for further intelligence information.

3.

The following format will be generally used by the IC

evaluation staff in the preparation of intelligence estimates.

It would be of great assistance if the participating agencies

would follow the same format when submitting the completed

contribution.

FORMAT

1.

2.

3.

4.

The Problem

Summary

Conclusions/Comment

Background

Discussion

NW 88608-Docld:32989530 Page 231-

+29-74494445

GROUP I

---

## Page 232

E- 1

E-2

E-3

E-4

E-5

E-6

E-7

E-8

E-9

E-10

E-11

E-12

E-13

E-14

E-15

April-may Demonstrations

Likelihood of New Momentum on the Antiwar

Activities and Forces in View of the Laos

and Cambodian Situation

Likelihood of Kidnapping of any High U.S.

Government Official in the Immediate Future by

Political Terrorists

Calendar of Significant Antiwar Events

An Assessment of the Antiwar Movement in the u.s.

An Estimate of JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDI)

Planned Activities During Demonstrations

Scheduled

for Lafayette Park on March 21, 1971

• The Potential for Violence in the Major Cities

During Summer 1971

Proposed Demonstrations in Washington, D. C.

(for twin week periods, beginning v/April 23 - May 5)

The Effect of the Death of Francois Duvalier on

the Internal Security of the U.S.

Plans of the PCPJ and NPAC, and any other organi-

zations to Demonstrate at Military Bases on

May 16, 1971

Likelihood of Demonstrations by the PCPJ or any

other organization at the NATO Conference on

Cities, to be held at Indianapolis, Indiana, on

• May 26 - 31, 1971

Intelligence Calendar of Significant Events (Monthly)

The Planned Disruption at The White House on

June 12, 1971

Antiwar Conferences, June-July 1971, and Their

Effect on the Future Activities of the Antiwar

Community

Interrelationship of Black Power Organizations

Within the western Hemisphere

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 232

---

## Page 233

E-16

E-17

E-18

E-19

E-20

E-21

E-22

E-23

E-24.

E-25

E-26

E-27

E-28

E-29

E-30

E-31

•.

. *

Interrelationship of Arab Terrorist Groups and

U. S. Black Militants

Jewish Defense League; An Assessment

October-November Antiwar Offensive

Prison Riots

An Assessment of the Communications and Communi-

cations Security Capabilities of Violence-Prone

Groups Within the United States

Unauthorized Disclosures

Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican

National Convention, San Diego, California

Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic

National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida

Demonstration and Racial Disturbance Study

Phone Phreaking

Militant Left's Involvement in the Labor Movement

African Liberation Day

Intelligence Requirements List

Protest Demonstrations During Presidential

Inaugururation Ceremonies

• Foreign Students - Terrorists

Events and Personalities Attractive to

Terrorist Attack

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 233

---

## Page 234

Attachment 6

1. THE HUSION PLANT

The earliest evidence that this concept of presidential power existed

is found in a 19TU top secret document entitled "Operational Restruints

on intelligenco Collection,

"to and the various memorandums from

Tom Charles Fluston to H. R. Haldeman which ere first revcaled by

John Dean. In preparation for his testimony before the select Corn-

mittee, Dean placed these papers, some of which bore the highest se-

curity cla sineation, in the custody of Chiet Judge John Strick of the

U.S. District Court for the Dierrict of Columbia. This stop was taken

by Deen, on the adrice of counsel, to aroid riolation of any tresidouvui

directive of Federal lass prohibiting release of Goveimm-nt docu-

Inents affecting national security. liter due consideration, Judge Si-

rica released one copy i th se papers to the Department of Juice and

one copy to the Select Committee, pursuant to its motion.

(United

States v. John Doe, et al., Alise, No. TT-T8, JLay It, 1978)

The committee, with the aid of various intelligence agencies, re-

mered these documents. While the committee sealed a few cros there-

in, which could involve national security considerations, it concluded

that these papers, for the most part, dealt primary with domesuc

iftairs and were unrelated to national security matters.1s The papers

is Sanitized by the committee, were entere.. into the committee's recor

during Dean's testimony. 1a

These papers and the Fresident's own statement of slay 22, 1973,

disclose that the President approved the use of illegal wiretapping, il

legal break-ins and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence pur-

poses. The resident was tully advised of the illegality of these intel

ligence-gathering techniques prior to approving them. In the top secret

document entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection,"

the recommendation for surreptitious entries (break-ins) contalned

the following statement under the heading "Rationale":

•Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts to

burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great em-

barrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most trutiul

1 Eshibit 35. 3 Fesringa 1062, 1319

27 Extibits 36-10, 42. 3

FIcaringa 1062, 1321-33, 1338.

133 Heurings 1000.

1062.

10 Exalbits 35mf1, 3 Hearings 1062, 1319-37.

NW 88608_Docd:32989530° Page 234

---

## Page 235

tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be

obtained in any other fashion.

On July 1t 1070, Flaldeman sent a top secret memorandum to

Huston, notifying him of the President's approval of the use of bur-

illegal wiretaps and illegal mail coters for domestic intelli-

gence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated :

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the

review, have been approred by the President. Ile does not

norever, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page -

of your memorandum remiting implementation. He mould

profor Chat the Cheng Canaly Do Mut Gung 1161101 ON The 193i6

ot this approval. The formal dividi momorancium should,

of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which

to carry it out

:..** [emphasis added]

It appears that the nest day. July 1ã. 1970, Huston prepared a desi-

sion memorandum, based on the residents approvai, for castribution

to the Federal intelligence agencies involved in the plan-the 1 B1, the

Cid, the National security Agency and the Defense Intelligence

Agency 2 In his alay 22, 1073, publie statement, the President reported

that the decision memorindum was circulated to the agencies involsed

on July 23, 1970. Fosterer, the decision remorandum is dated July 15,

1970, indicating that is was forwarded to the agencies on that day or

shortly thorcatter.

Huston's recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar Hoover,

Director of the IBI.2 Hoover had served as the chairman of a group

comprised of the heads of the Federal intelligence agencies formed to

study the problems of intelligence-gatherig and cooperation among

the various intelligence agencies? In his pablic statement of May 22.

1973, President iTison stated:

After reconsideration, however; prompted by the opposi-

tion of Director Iloorei, the agencies were notifud a days

later, on July 23, that the approval had been rescinded.

Haldeman's testimony is to the sume effect. * Dean, hoseter, testified

that he was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan * and

there appurently is no written record of a recision on July 28 or any

decision memorandum of July 15, 1970. Jr. Hoover did present strong

Fluston was concerned that Hoover's objections would interfere with

the plan's implementation. On ugust 5, 1070. 8 days after the Presi-

dent states he ordered recision, Fluston sent Haldeman a lengthy top

secret memorandum on the subject, "Domestic Intelligence,

strongy atracked Hoover's objections and made a number of recom-

mendutions concerning a forthcoming meeting regarding the plan

so Fishlblt 35. 3 Herrings 1321.

* Estloit 30.

3 Fcerings 1324.

= Neve Fork Limes, Jube T, 1373. p. 36.

# We Sort Times, Juce T, 1973.

13 Hearings D16.

eS Appendis Of Leral Documents at p. 628.

= 7 Mcaricos 2872.

7 3 Fearines 1006.

* 3 Hearings 916; 1 Hearings 1603.

NW 88608-Docld:32989530 Page 235

among Haldeman. the An

the fact that the plan d

the following langu.

At some point. i

has become to.

mental to our de:

important to me:

knows that the fra

and Hoover has Bor

nets his mar, 1: 20

the Presidunt. Fea

agains hun. I.

stand ihy the aG i

Bong to and he T

reverse a Presidiane

people worked treir

merits, was a first-ra:

It should be noted ta::

DId, CIl and the miti:

recommendations.

ITo clays later, on tre

memorandom to Fir

Attorney General ard :

that the Director (Ilou.

and that all intelle:

once." 32 FInston nood :

coast to vacation for s

the problems surrou

be into the ner schos!

Later, on Septemniv

claims the plan was its

to the Attorney Getera

our domestic interlipons.

added] This memorar.?

Inter-agency Domest

sart of the Huston pian.:

observed that Hoovr wis

unit and that it was ing

Far from indicating i....

mendation to remore res

been withdrawn, Dean, ir

General:

I believe tre agree.

any blanket ra: cor.

priate procedure sto:

we need, based on c

2 Exhiblt 87, 3 Recrimes 1021:

1o Exhible 37.3 Hearin-a 1

& Exbibit 33, 3 fearings dash.

* Ibid.

---

## Page 236

Ine

•5

among Flaldeman, the Attorney General and Hoover?" Inlicatito of

the fact that the plan was still quite alire, but imperiled by Floorer, is

the following language in this memorandun:

At some point, Floover has to be toid iho is President. He

has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is retri-

mental to our domestic intelligence oparations... It is

important to remember that the entire intelligence community

Inows that the President made a positive decision to go abead

and Hoover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he

gets his way, it is going to look like he is more powerful than

the President. Fle had his say in the footnotes and RA decided

against him.

Thar shouid close the mother son I can't undor-

stand why the tr is a party in reopening it. all of us are

going to look damned silly in the eyes nf Helms. Gayler,

Bennett, and the militars chiefs it Iloover can unilaterally

reverse & fresiciential decision based on a report that many

people worked their asses off to prepere and which, on the

merits, was a first-rate, objectire job. 30

It should be noted that this memorandum indicates that the ISA,

DIA, CIa and the military serrices basically supported the Huston

recommendations.

Two days later, on August 7, 1970, Huston sent a brief, confidential

memorandum to

Ilaldeman

wong that, Talemen!

"most ith the

Attorney General and secure his support for the Fresident's decision,

that the Director (FIcover) be inforned that the decision will stand,

and that all intellgence agencies are to proeced to implement them at

onee." 31 Fluston noted that: "DIr. floorer has departed for the test

coast to vacation for 3 weeks. If you wait until mis return to clear up

the probiems surrounding our do nestic intelligence operations, we will

be into the new school year without any preparations.

Later, on September 18, 1970 (almost 2 inonths after the President

claims the plan was rescinded), Dean sent a top secret memorandum

to the Attorner General suggesting certain procedures to "commence

our domestic inteligence operation as quickly as possible." [emphasis

added] This memoranduni specifically called for the creation of an

Inter-agency Domestic Intelligence Unit which had been an integra

part of the Huston plan. Dean's memorandum to the Attorney (eneral

observed that Floover was strongly opposed to the creation of such :

unit and that it vas important "to bring the FBI fully on board.'

Far from indicating thut the President's approral of Huston's recom-

mendation to remove restraints on illegal intelligence-gathering had

been trithdrawn, Dean, in his memorandum, suggested to the attorney

General:

I believe tre agreed that it would be inappropriate to have

any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appro-

priate procedure rould be to decide on the type of intelligence

we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of

* Exhiblt 37, & Hearing3 1325-29.

= Exhible 37. 3 Hearing: 1326.

3 Exhilbit 33. 3 Hearinys 1330.

2z Ibid.

NW 83608 Docld:32989530 Page 236

---

## Page 237

6

this nii, and theu proceed to remove the restraits as neces-

sary in cotain such intelligences: [emphasis added]

Dean's monorandam indicated that the creation of the Inter-gency

Domest: latelligence Chit would an forsard and provide recom-

mendati er ior the chrosing of a nic director to serve as a richchard

man tortor tomer General and for the selection of representatives

from the racious intelligence agencies who would serte on it. Dean

closed? memorandur with the sugrestion that the Attorney Ger-

oral call scale meetinos to monitor problems as they emerged and to

make erotain that we are moving this program into inplementarion as

quickla as possible." = [emphasis added Recognizing that Hoover

atm. Dud solded a note to the betton of his domacts

to join you in & ineering with Floover he will be happy to do so." as

Hoere hoover. never did come completely "on board" and the

plun tur an Inter-goney Domestic Intelligence Unit was never im-

plementel. a clue to the fate of the kluston plan is provided by the

edited un whenticated "Submission of Recorded Presidential Con-

versation to the Judlery Committee of the House of Representatires

by Piesranst Richard Acon", on april 30, l9rt, where the tollowing

passagertrears:

• ishat Bill Sallivan's resire in life is, is to set up a

ince systom, a White Flouse

.. la:dy ip me dofteint. He says me hare nerer been

becance Maover lost his guts several years ago. l

on manll he and for Huston worked on it. Tom Husto

had your instructions to go out and do it and the whole thing

jus crambled

Dean inded that the plan for the creation of an Intergency

welligence Cut was the product of Thite Flouse fear of

demo stations and discht. Faldeman denied that such an atmos-

phere of feir emister in the l'hite lIonse as In his statement before the

committe" HIndeman save as the reason for Thite Flouse. interest in

improting mielligend-gathering operations the "critical proportions"

of the d nestio security problem in 1970 as illustrated by

"a trave of

bombings: and explosions, rioting and violence, demonstrations, arson,

gun bati and other disruptive activities across the country- on col-

fere cumouses primarily--but also in other areas." so On this issue,

Chrlichman's testimony corroborates Fiaideman's."

The Tin-ton recommendations themselves refer to "a major threat

to the internal securicy"s and express the belief that "the potential for

even greater violence is present and we have a positive obligation to

take swig step within our power to prevent it

... for surely drastic

violence and disorder threaten the very fabric of our society." 42

39 Ex!

41, 8 Refringe 1387.

36 Fis!:

43, 3 Mccrings 1337

3: 1G:

= Iniled Piusidentlal Conversations, pp. *23-5.

8

Touri

6: 51t.

1101233 2511.

68 Jicari: 78 2512-13.

4 Dollult 55. 3 Hearings 1313.

• Exhiult S7, 3 Icerinys 1627-25.

• draper, piere i's no

NW 85608 Docld:32989530. Page 237

The committee ncas

Clellan's Permanen: 5:

Committee on Covera

1070, indicures that.

were signiticant incic.ses

Government facilities

against lan euforce.nen

Dean testified. homer:

not only toward vio

strations and dissent. is

Plunde

stretchest out in fr

me to his ofe

the sign in the par

mon had to comtei. i

---

## Page 238

7

The commitice notes that the evidence presented to Senator AIc-

Cellan's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Sonate

Committee on Gorernment Operations, in hearings beginning in July

1970, inclicates that, in tha several years preceding the hearigs, there

were signticant increases in illegal acts of rolence directed against

Goreminent facilities and a disturbing number of such acts directed

against lus enforcement officials.i3

Dean tastihed, howerer, that the White Flouse concern was dirceted

not only toward violent demonstrations, but also to peaceful demon-

strations and dissent. is an illustration hostid:

firing the lace winter of 1071

... the President•

happened to look out of the windows of the residence of the

White clouse and saw a lone man writh a large 10-to0t sign

stretchen out in tront of Latayette Park. JIr. Iligby called

me to his oftice to tell mo of the F'resident's displeasure with

the sign in the park and told me that Jr. Faldeman said the

sign had to come down. When I came out of AIr. Higby's oftico,

I ran into air. Dwight Chaym who said that he sas going to

get some "thugs" in remove that man from Latayette Park

to sail it would take him a few hours to get them, but they

conid do the job."

NW 88608. Dosld:32989530 Page 238 :

---

## Page 239

:

FROM

SUBJECT:

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. BASSETT AN

F. B. GRIFFITH7

r.;

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD-Ad

Dep. 'ADIlfv

Asst. Dir.

Admin..

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

DATE:

2/6/75

FFMDR16

ALT. INTORMATION COMTATNFE

REN IS INSTEIO

it 9125100FSPZALMITG

'lan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. —

Training.

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm..

Director Sec'y -

SENSTUDY 75 is the code word for a new control file for all communications

xelating to the Senate Select Committee (SC) to conduct investigation and study of

conventional operations with respect to intelligence activities.

Pursuant to recommendation in memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall

dated 1/27/75 regarding the SSC, I attended a meeting of the Ad Hoc Security Group

of the U. S. Intelligénce Board (USIB) Security Committee at CIA Headquarters on

2/5/75. Security representatives'from DIA, NSA and CIA were present at this meet-

ing which was concerned with proposals to protect the integrity of classified documents

which will necessarily be provided the SSC during its investigation. Results are set

forth below.

Attached are copies of: (1) proposed agreements the Director, ot Central

Intelligence (DCI) will be asked to obtain from the SSC; (2), guides for protection

of elassifed information and of documents furnished the SSC; and (3) proposed.

secrecy agreement to be executed by SC staff members and employees.

. These

items were discussed paragraph by paragraph and revisions agreed upon were

penciled in. These revised drafts will be discussed at a meeting on 2/7/75 of

the Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Investigations to be attended by

Section Chief W. O. Cregar. At this time a final version will be approved for

presentment to the DCI.

The registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy referred to on

page 2 of the guides was described as a facility geared to handle and account

for classified documents to the satisfaction of the intelligence community. It

is guarded and has a suitable al

m system. BEC-18 /

•/11.

14

The guides include the possibility that agencies presenting testimony may

conduct their own security sweeps of the hearing room; calls for a system of

document control as well as control from reproduction and distruction of classified

material. Consideration of secure transcription procedures is requested with the

Enclosures (3)

1 - Messrs Callaha

n; Adams,

, "Mintz,

Wannall, Cregar

FIVE-WiG

FBG:njw

84 REB 2 4 197.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 239

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 240

Memorandum for Mr. Bassett

Re: SENSTUDY 75

possibility that each agency could provide such service. It might be necessary,

however, to provide escort service in the event outside transcribers are utilized.

This would entail security of carbons, waste and notes and return of the transcribed

testimony to the Committee upon completion. It was also suggested that a security

officer be appointed by the SSC who would be a central contact for representatives

of agencies falling within the purview of the SSC investigation. Attached material

was reviewed by Legal Counsel Division by Inspector J. E. Herington who concurred

with the exception of item number 4 of the proposed guidelines dealing with counter-

measures of inspections to preclude, ". . . surreptitious use of transmitters and/or

unauthorized recording devices similar to the device located in the Rayburn House

Office Building on 12 February 1973." He noted this wording could be construed

as placing a limitation on what type of device could be prohibited and suggested

revising the above phraseology by placing a period after "recording devices" and

then stating, "It is noted such a device was located in the . . ."

OBSERVATIONS:

At this time it is unknown if the above-mentioned material will be accepted

by the SSC or whether the committee will draw up its own procedures. In any

event, the material to be presented will at least serve as a means of calling the

Senators' attention to the many faceted program involved in the protection of

classified information. It is felt concurrence with the attached material with the

suggested observation of the Legal Counsel Division be accepted is to our best

interest.

ACTION:

It is recommended Section Chief W. O. Cregar offer the revision referred

to above at the meeting on 2/7/75 and be authorized to offer FBl concurrence with

In this material.

Liste

gna

1pfl

1-10

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 240

---

## Page 241

AGREEMENIS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH

CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES

!

1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with

the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other

Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:

(a) Departments and agencies shall have the right

to request that testimony be given only in executive session,

that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and

that certain testimony be heard only by members and in

some cases inly by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review

and.comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony

prior to any publication of it.

(c) The "Third-Agency Rule" is binding upon members

of the United States intelligence community and may require

witnesses representing one member of the intelligence

community. to decline to testify concerning matters within

the proprietary purview of another community member.

. Z.

It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement

with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies

#MDRIG

ACE. YOND CRUNCIONS COMRADE

BIRCE WORCES

N599/25/005RE AmITTE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 241

62-111-385-17

---

## Page 242

furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from

those document, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel

as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy

may be jeopardized by disclosure. This would include names of

sources or specific information on highly technical devices and

operations in keeping with the DCI's responsibilities to protect

sources and methods.

3, 11919у ТАД ДЕЛ АТЕМру ТО- SECURE Ал.

AGREEMENT WITH THE CHDREN OF THE

SELECT COMMITIEES THAT THEY ENTERTIIN

AND CONSIDER

SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND

GUIDEUNES WItICS WILL BE PROVIDED,

2

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 242

---

## Page 243

GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECI COMMITTEES

1. Personnel Security Clearances

(a) Background Investigation

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that

no staff member is to be given access to any classified material,

testimony or information received or generated by the committees

without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field

investigation.

• (b) Secrecy Agreement

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a

signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to

the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:

1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations

is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;

2) Recognizing US Government property rights to

classified information;

3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence

of classified information.

4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules

and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the

FFMDR)6

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 243

62-114375-14

:

---

## Page 244

i.

signer to administrative and/or legal action under

appropriate statutes;

5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the

agreement.

?. Physical and Document Security

The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the

secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be

preserved. These rules be made known to the individuals and

agencies who will be called upon to

present testimony or materials.

Among these should be rules on physical security and document

security.

(a) Physical Security

It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following

rules related to physical security:

in safes

1) All classified material will be storedfor safé-

keeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with

the regulations of this registry for classified material.

2) Material should be stored in safes wher not in use:

2

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 244

---

## Page 245

15.=

:

BY

T60T1-11STRC5.ORS

TWENTY FOUR HOUR

SUPPLEMEUTEN

ALARMS

THE STORAGE

28)/ Guard protection/should be required onthis area.

34) Areas selected for use in closed session should

be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.

48) Agencies presenting testimony should be permitted

to conduct or arrange with the Sergeant-at-Arms to conduct

audio countermeasures inspections to preclude the possibility

of surreptitious use of transmitters and/or unauthorized

recording devices similar to the device located in the

Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973,

5f) At. the end of each

session of the Select Committees,

the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff

officer who will secure any misplaced classified material

or waste.

67) Areas should be designated in which classified

material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure

against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should

not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience

except when necessary for the work of the committees and

should not be transported overnight to the office or residence

of personnel of the committees.

3

NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 245

---

## Page 246

(b) Document Security

1) Committees should select and identify a single

location/and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow-

ledgement of receipt of classified materials provideds to

the committees.

2) A system of document control should be established

to permit control of classified documents to provide for

accountability of'do euments furnished the committee.

3) Duplication of documents should be controlled sa

requirs

as to permart a record of the document reproduced, the

number of copies reproduced, and the custodian or

receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents.

should be subject to the same controls as the original.

4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for.

the destruction of classified waste.

5) Transcripts.

The committees should give

consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate

security in the transcription of testimony by committee

transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each.

agency presenting testimony with this responsibility.

In

some, if not all cases, this might include escort of

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 246

AxIe

---

## Page 247

materials to the place of transcription, the securing of

carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed

testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance

with committee rules.

6) At the conclusion of the committees' investigations.

classified material should be reviewed for the poscibility of

isposition been to contributors.

s, of material submitte

by them

3. Security Officer

It would be desirable if the committees appointed one member

of its staff as a security officer with the responsibility of discharging

the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point

of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the

committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules

required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact

to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee.

5

NW 88608 Dold: 32989530 Page 247

-_ -

---

## Page 248

SECRECY AGREEMENT

I,

_ in accepting employment

or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmenta]

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the

special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified

information from unauthorized disclosure.

I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth

below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with

the Select Committee to Stüdy Governmental Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United

States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, herein after

referred to as the Select Committee.

It is my understanding that in the course of my employment

or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to

information from departments and agencies of the Government which

is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive

Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information

so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the

property of the United States of America and I further agree to

surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or

#MORIG

19/2/0e HAZ'ALMITE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 248

12-116575-14

---

## Page 249

his designees or upon my separation from the Select Committee,

any classified material which has come into my possession as a

result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

I hereby agree that I will never divulge, publish or reveal

by word,

writing, conduct, ineluding interviews for radio and

television-boardeasts or otherwise any classified information which

has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assign-

ment with the Select Committee, without prior written consent of the

Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized

representative.

I hereby agree that any information learned during ty

employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is

related to intelligence and prepared for publications by me will be

submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their

duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing.

to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of deter-

mining whether said material contains any classified information as

defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the

Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized

2

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 249

---

## Page 250

representative has the authority to make the final determination

as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted

from the material submitted.

have been informed of the provisions of

I am acquainted with the relevant portions of (Insert relevant

codes and sections

as considered appropriate by the Department of

Justice) and understand their meaning.

Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as

the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified

of

material. I understand that any breach on any part of the obligations

in this agreement could subject me to legal andfaministrative action.

I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed

on me with respect to the protection of classified information by

this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during

my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship

has terminated.

I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any

mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

WITNESS:

Signature

DATE

Signature

NW 88608 Docld:32989530aRage 250

---.

---

## Page 251

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962-EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

N

• TO

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

Adams

1 - Mx. N.P. Callahan

DATE: 1/27/75

"Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. —

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

FROM

: W. 10%

Cregar

1 - Mr. Bassett

1 - Mx. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

G

"L'aboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.

SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

Training -

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. +

Director Sec'y

Memorandum W. O. Cregar

to W. R. Wannall, dated

1/24/75, entitled 'United States Intelligence Board

Meeting of 1/24/75," recommended that Section Chief William/o.

Cregar's name be provided to the Deputy Director of the

Intelligence Community Staff as a point of contact within the

FBI to coordinate matters dealing with the 'Senate Select

Committee (SSC). The mandate of the SSC is to examine the

extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the U.S.

and abroad..

On the morning of 1/27/75 Mr. John Clarke, Deputy

Director of the Intelligence Community Staff, advised that

Mr. Colby believes it is

necessary for security representatives

of FBI, CIA and National Security Agency (NSA), to meetin

order to develop recommendations for the SSC as to how documents

and testimony furnished to the SSC will be protected against

unauthorized disclosure, In this regard, Mr. Donald E. Moore,

former Inspector in the

Intelligence Division and currently

Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, will function as the

USIB representative to this group.

OBSERVATIONS:

REC-111

42-46325=

According to the Senate Resolution dated 1/21/75

relating to the investigation and study of cavenmontut opera-

tions with respect to intelligence activities,

the SSC is going

to involve all agencies of the Intelligence Community.

In

anticipation that Bureau representatives will be called to testify

and asked to supply some extremely sensitive documents regarding

our investigative activity in the U.S, it is believed essential

that we have an input into how such documents and testimony are

going to be hanäled by staff personnel of the Committee.

Unless

we participate in developing security standards, we may find that

sensitive documents and testimony that we are called to provide

to the Committee cannot be adequately protected from public

scrutiny.

WOC: ebc

(6)

#M DR 16

ATE INFORMATION COUTATED

EREIN IS UNCLASSIFICD

DATE 9/23/0057 SP JALi

5-C

CONTINUED - OVER

XEnE

NW S808FБ8iâ:32383530 Page 251

1975

---

## Page 252

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

ACTION:

If approved, Bureau Supervisor Fred B. Griffith,

Document Classification and Security Coordinator,

designated as the Bureau representative to meet with the

Chairman of the USIB Committee and representatives of NSA

and CIA.

Arrangements with U sis, usA,

ClA are appropriate as recommended.

here; however contacts with the

Semate committee + staff shold be

made by liaison established with

Congress, Cooperation of Intelligare

Div. and Legal Counsel would

serve best. Jam

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 252

---

## Page 253

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOW:RNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannallwate

FROM

w. olveregar

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE

BOARD (USIB)

MEETING OF 1/24/75

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Mintz

DATE: 1/24/75

I - Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir.

Dap. AD

Dep. A,

Asst. Dif

Admini

Comp. 'Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com._

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

1 - Mr. Leavitt

1

- Mr. Mack

1 - Mr. Boynton

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

1 - Mr. Cregar

*MDR16

AXI. INTORMATION CONTAINED

Training -

BEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIAD

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. —

DATE 925/00 BY SPE ARTIC Director Soc'y-

At a meeting of the USIB this morning Chairman

Colby spoke briefly about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

procedures for testifying before the Blue Ribbon Commission

BRC) Investigating ClA as well as anticipated problems tha

night arise regarding future testimony at the Senate Selec

Committee (SSC) whose membership has not yet been announced.

According to Colby, the mandate of the SSC is to examine the

extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the

U. S. and abroad.

Colby advised that the Ssc would involve

all member agencies and departments of the intelligence

community and for that reason he believed the members of the

intelligence community should stay in close communication.

As a result of the above, Colby has selected

Mr. John Clarke, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community

Staff, to act as a coordinator for the intelligence community

to insure close coordination.

He requested that all agencies

and departments represented on USIß designate one individual

in their agency as Clarkes point of contact to insure the

close coordination Colby

feels will be necessary during future

appearances before the ssc.

The Intelligence Division believes

this is a desirable procedure and recommends that Section Chief

William O. Cregar who is the Bureau's alternate member on USIB

be designated as the Bureau representative to maintain liaison

with Mr. Clarke.

REC 111)

In addition, Colby advised that in his opening

Ka 2n his 03125-12

statement before the

SSC he intends to make a strong pitch

for the intelligence community. He proposes to show the value

and importance intelligence has played in the past as well as

the luture;:he expects to outline for the ssc how the intelli

gence business is run and organized. In addition, he proposes

in his opening statement to make an appeal for legislation to

shore up the protection of sources and methods against planned

and calculated leaks of classified information.:

File

WOC: ebe

(9).

62-116395

42 FEB 5 1975

CONTTNUED

3417

NW 88609 0082089587age 253

3208

FEr 1R 1975

'au"

139

---

## Page 254

:

va

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE

BOARD (USIB)

MEETING OF 1/24/75

Colby advised that any examples member agencies

or departments could provide CIA wherein the acquisition of

intelligence proved useful to the development of U. s.

policies or programs would certainly be appreciated. Colby

stated that

in this regard Mr. John Clarke as the over-all

coordinator would be in touch with the designated representa-

tives of USIB departments or agencies to further clarify this

point.

With regard to the BRC chaired by Vice President

Rockefeller, Colby advised that CIA has already obtained an

agreement from that Commission that any documents furnished

to the Commission by CIA would have the names of CIA employees

and/or CIA sources deleted from the document. The purpose of

this deletion was to avoid such names from appearing in press

releases.

Colby also hopes to obtain the same agreement from

the SSC.

The Intelligence Division believes that the Bureau

should also attempt to obtain such an agreement from the

BRC and the SSC if at some time FBI representatives are called

to testify or are called to produce FBI documents.

This matter

has been discussed with the Office of Legal Counsel and it

concurs in this recommendation.

ACTION:

If approved, Section Chief William O. Cregar's

name will

be provided to Mr. Clarke as his point of contact

within the FBI

(2) Should Bureau representatives be called to testify

before the BRC or the SSC an agreement be obtained to delete any

names of FBI employees and/or sources with the understanding that

the identities could be made available to either the Commission or

Committee if either felt such names were absolutely necessary.

dill

- 2 -

goo

gine

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 254

---

## Page 255

The Doputy Atcorney Cercral

Dirsctor, ESI

MALID CILCH REQUESIS HEDE BI

D.S. EUMATON LORAND L. BANGE, JA. I

FOR IURL SILICE SOURIO COLLITTLE 1O

LUVISSIONER INTELLIGENOR NECESS

1-24-75

1 - Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB

- Mr. Adams, 5744 JB

H

- Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB

- Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB

- Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB

1

- Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH

1 - Mr. Hetherington

On Januazy 23, 1975, U.S. Schavor howard li. Pales, 3r

roguestsi nave checks of FuI files be made

ENCI FILED

Comicico to Invescigato Intelligence Agencios.

In responso to Senator Baker's rcques, attachei

are four letterhad senoranua portaining to Ronald Davii

wahan, Arcaur Eoggess Calakouor, Jr., Hovari Lcibengood

and jichael J. Madigon for transvictal to the roguesting

Carmistos.

116-4

Enclosures (4)

D

0311300

-Б3l

1ml62 62 11432119

REC-111* 15 HAN 28 1975

-=

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection.

Intell. .

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.-

Training -

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Soc'y-d 13

MATE ROONE

NW 88608 Dodid 32989530

DTP: ysO

(10)

NOTE:

See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75

captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority

Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence

Agencies, Name Check Request."

~ ENCLOSURE

9/25/00.

SPS ALMAG

197F

17625 ETYPE UNIT

---

## Page 256

- Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB

1 - Mr. Adams, 5744 JB

1 - Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB

1 - Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB

1 - Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB

1 - Mr.

Gebhardt,

5012 JEH

Tantury

Heth sington

ARIUDE DOOGESS CULAROUSE, JR.

Born;

July 4, 1943

Athens, Kennesseo

The central files of the Federal Bureau of

invescigation and the records of the IBI IdentiFication

Division contain no information identifiable with captioned

individual.

# MDE 16

29/23/00 SP2 AMITTE

Original and 1 - Deputy Attorney General

DTP: ysd (10)

Assoc. Dir..

Dap. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75

Asst. Dir.:

captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.) , Minority

Admin.

Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence

Comp. Syst.-m

Ext. Affairs -

Agencies, Name Check Request."

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident..

Inspoction _

Intell..

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

02-116381-11

Tolephone Rm. - " MÀTL ROOM E?

TELETYPE UNIT L

NW 860 Dold:32989530 Page 256

ENCLOSURE

---

## Page 257

1

- Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB

- Mr. Adams, 5744 JB

1

- Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB

1

- Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB

- Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB

1 - Mr. Gebhardt,

5012 JEH

ITamMEry Hethersington

EOTARD LUIDINCOOD

Born: December 29, 1942

South Dent, Indiana

Ilie contrul filco of tho Ectoral Bureau of

investigation and the recordo of the FBI Identification

Diviszon contain no infornacion identifiable with captioned

individual,

9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/175

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Original and 1 - Deputy Attorney General

DTP : YSC

NOTE:

See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75

captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority

Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence

Agencies, Name Check Request."

DTF

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

MAIL ROOM [

Did 8860 Docld:32989530 Page 257

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE?

---

## Page 258

5010-106

HAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

'Ássoc. Dir.

TO

FROM

Mr. W. R. Wannallwar

w.1o! Peresar

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

DATE: 2/4/75

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Fulton

1 - Mx. Cregar

Asst. w

Adman.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. —

Ident. -

pecti

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

SENSTUDY 75 is the code word of a new control

file for all communications regarding matters relating to

the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) to conduct an

investigation and study of governmental operations with respect

to intelligence activities.

on 2/4/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc

Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry, advised that

vr. Colby has been instructed to have four items prepared for

the President's consideration by 2/5/75. They areas follows:

(1) an outline as to what Colby plans to say as lead-off

hat colby.

witness before the SCS, (2) two lists identifying what informa-

tion the Intelligence Community feels under no circumstances

could be discussed with the SCS as well as what information

188 tour

could be discussed with the SCS under controlled conditions,

(3) a set of suggested talking points the President should

discuss with the Senate leadership regarding procedures for

the proposed hearings, and (4) a list of annexes that Colby

plans to provide the Chairmanship of the SCS on the occasion of

his initial appearance.

With the Director's approval we have provided Colby

with our suggestions relative to items 2 and 3.

to item 4 we are preparing two annexes which will be furnished

to the Director for his approval prior to furnishing them to

Colby.

REC-1111 62-116-375

Mr. Clarke was asked whether the four items to be

furnished to the President would also be provided to the Bureau.

Clarke assured us that it was his intention to recommend to

Colby that material covering items 1, 2, 3 and 4 mo-luchighed to

the FBI as well as other members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

for Congressional Inquiry and he felt confident thategolay would

Iso order.

62-116395

WOC: ebc

(7) cle

ATTON CONTAINER

AIT. INFOR

HEREIN IS UNCTACSIFT

DITX 9/25/00 :SP 2 ALm /36

CONTINUED - OVER

344

NW 88608 2 66E62980130 Page 258

---

## Page 259

=. a

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Upon receipt of this information from Mr. Clarke

it will be submitted to the Director with comments where

appropriate for his information.

ACTION:

For information.

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

Page 259

---

## Page 260

-...

(CI-2)

62-116395

1 - Mr.

N.

P. Callahan

1

- Mr.

1

- Mr.

5.

B. Adams

J.

A.

- Mr.

Min'tz

1

- Mr.

W.

R.

Wannal]

W. A. Branigan

February 3, 1975

1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar

AEC-114

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AIT INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

#MDRI6

INTELLIGEICE ICTIVITIES

ALT XNFORNITION GOUTALLED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSISTEY

-The following are deemed to be ratters so essential

to the security and survival of the nation that they never

should be discussed outside the intelligence comunity, and

even within the intelligence community, they should be

discussed only on a strict need-to-snow basis:

The nanes and other identifying characteristics of

sensitive sources.

Details which vould pernit opposition ascessnent

of the totality of our effectiveness in the tields of

internal security and icreign counterintelligence, including:

The numbers, locations, tires, and

affiliations of recruitnents-in-place of personnel

within target organizations.

ntellionS cate sub on 2 scaly sophisticated

The total extent of our investigative

effectiveness against any civen target organization

ca individual, or the lack thereot.

Intelligence inforration furnished in confidence

by friendly foreign agencies, the disclosure of which could

Assoc. Dir. -

jeopardize operations of those agencies.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Ds DIv. - ORIGINAL, AND ONE FURNISHED DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISONT

Comp. Syst. _ JPT: HFC : bib • "

Ext. Affairs _

(9)

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

NOTE:

Inspection -

Intell.

Laboratory

memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr.

R. Wannall

Plan. & Eval. -

captioned

"seloat Connittee of the Senate"

,,2/3/75, prepared

Spec. Inv. — by WOC:ebc/ber.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

RiW*&8608- Do

TELETYPE UNIT

Page

GPO 954-545

---

## Page 261

1 - Mr.

N.

Callahan

1

. - fir.

1

1 - Mr.

1 - Mr.

J. B. Adams

J.

A.

Hintz

R. Wannall

A. Branigan

W. 0. Cregar

REC-111

Febcuary o, 1075

SENATE STLECT COMATIDE

TO CONCUCT AN INVESIIGATION AID STUDY OF

GOVERIMENTAZ OPPRATIONS VIJI RESPECT TO

INVTPLLIGENCE ACCIVITIES

Concorn for the security and curvival of the nation

dictates that discussion of details of highly- sophicticated

intelligence-gathering techniques and nethods omployed by the

FBI be hold only under controlled conditions, such as in

Baccutivo Sossion before only Senator's serving as noners

of the Committee. This includes not only those techniques

and wethods usad in furtherance of Fil responsibilitiod, but

anso those uittized in support oi missions ot otter nenJore

the United Statos Intolligence community.

62-116395

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

HEC: JP'T: dshich

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

data 75 Cottoned "Select Committee of the Senate,"

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv..

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

MAIL ROOM LO

TELETYPE UNIT

AW 88608

N 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 26

FMDR16

SMART N COOL INS

125/00 SPERMITE

GPO 954

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## Page 262

TO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT •

Memorandum

:

Mr. WoR. WannallWRuffeL

FROM

1 - Mc. Callahan •

1 - Mc.

Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

DATE: 2/3/75

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Fulton

1 - Mc. Cregar

SUBJECT:

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident..

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training.

Legal Coun.

Telophono Rm. -

Director Soc'y _

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

This memorandum recommends that we provide at

Mr. Colby's request two lists:

(1) information which the

FBI

feels under no circumstances could be discussed with

the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) and (2) items of

information which could be discussed with the SCS under

controlled conditions.

On the afternoon of 2/1/75, Mr. John Clarke, in

his role as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for

Congressional Inquiry, telephonically advised the Bureau's

representative on this Group that a meeting was held at

the White House on the morning of 2/1/75.

Participants were

the secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelli-

gence and Dr. Henry Kissinger in his role as advisor to the

President on national security affairs.

Dr. Kissinger

requested Mr. Colby to prepare two lists for the President's

DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 FLR

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

AST AMORIN COBRA ISU

consideration.

The purpose of these lists was to provide

the President with information necessary for him to make a

judgment as to whether certain information should be with-

held

from the SCS on the basis of executive privilege.

As a result of the White House meeting, Mr. Clarke

requested

the Bureau prepare by the close of business, 2/3/75,

two lists: (1) that information proprietary to the FBI which

under no circumstances could be discussed with the SCS and as

a result would require the denial of such presentation by virtue

of executive privilege and (2) a list of information proprietary

to the FBI which could be discussed with the SCS under controlled

conditions (presumably this means discussed in Executive Session

limited to members of the SCS).

Attached herewith are the

REC-11T

two

Its requested 6315-1

Mr. Clarke, which will be furnished to Mr. Colby by our liaison

representative with CIA.

FEB 5-1975,

ACTION:

It approved, the attached two lists will be deliverg

SWORD

62-116395

Enclosures

WOC: ebc/bew

bow

(7)

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 262

---

## Page 263

OFFICE OF THE

• DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

January 30, 1975

NOTE TO: William V. Cleveland

Special Investigative Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM:

James A. wilderotter vr

Associate Deputy Att

ney General

Scrater te, 75)

-Please handle per our telephone conversation.

Thanks.

IMDXI6

Attachment

delivere

15

9/35100.

62-11372-8

15 FEB 11 1975

ENCLOSURE

REC-110

file

53F18, 519/5,

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 263

---

## Page 264

OFTIONAL FEEdINO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA§PMR (11 CFJR) 101-11.8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: The Deputy Attorney General

DATE:

1-24-75

: Director, FBI

SUBJECT: NAME CHECK REQUESTS. MADE BY

U.S. SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.,

FOR THE SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO

INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.,

requested name checks of FBI files be made on four

individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate

Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.

In response to Senator Baker's request, attached

are four letterhead memoranda pertaining to Ronald David

CMahan, Arthur Boggess Culahouse, Jr., Howard Leibengoo

and Michael J. Madigan for transmittal to the requestin

Committee.

Enclosures (4)

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFZED

DATE 9/25/00 BISPFALM 1F6

FBI-35

65-11638578

ENCLOSURE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 7age 26 Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 265

äina

The Deputy Attorney Gencral

1-21-75

Director, FBI

NAME CHECK REQUESTS NADE BY

J-S. SENATOR HOWARD I. BARER, JR-,

FOR THE SELECI SENATE COICITREE TO

INVESTICARE INTCILICINCE AGENCIEG

On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard E. Bakor, JI.:

requested name checks of FBI files be made on four

individuals who are to be staft members of the Select Senato

Comittee to Investigatc Intelligence Agencies.

In rasponse to Senator Baler's request, attachod

are four letterhead nemoranda pertaining to Ronald David

richahan, Archur Boggess Culahouse, JI, Howard Lozbengood

and Michael J. Madigan for transmittal io the rcquesting

Committee.

Enclosures

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 265

---

## Page 266

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. J.B. Adams

DATE:

2-4-75

FROM

: Legal Counsel

SUBJECT:

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

Intuiti

CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR

11:30 A.M., FEBRUARY 6, 1975

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident..

Inspection -

Intell..

Laboratory

Plan. & Eva

Spec. Inv..

Training

Legal Coun!

Telephondhr

Director See

4

At 2:50 p.m., 2-3-75, Bill Miller, Counsel, Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence Activities, advised Inspector John B. Hotis

that Senator Frank Church (D - Idaho), Chairman

that tike to Frank Church. Keley at his earmest conveniemmittee,

The meeting is an informal one and no other members of

the Committee will be present. The purpose is merely to get acquainted

and discuss in general terms what the Committee hopes to accomplish.

Senator Church also wants to assure Mr. Kelley that it is not his intention

to undermine public confidence in the intelligence agencies of the United

States. But the Committee wants to ascertain whether these agencies

are being run with integrity and in a manner which is consistent with

national goals.

The only time this week which is mutually convenient to

Mr. Kelley and Senator Church is Thursday, 2-6-75, at 11:30 a.m.

This has been verified by Mrs. Metcalf and approved by the Director.

Mr. Adams will accompany the Director to this meeting. Mr. Miller

has been advised and he will inform us

the meeting.

Mit the precise location of

CH 45

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

REC-111

62-116375-7

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. McDermott

1 - Mrs. Metcalf

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Telephone Room

1 - Mr. Hotis

#M.DR 16

BH:mbkgh

AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED,

L(8X

HEREIN IS UNCIASSIFIED

NW 88608 fgoElB2982619/Page 266

DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/7161

HE FEB Y 1975

---

## Page 267

AT FIT NO. 10

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannall Wawful

1 - Mr.

Callahan

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

DATE: 2/3/75

FROM

: W.

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr.

Fulton

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

- Assoc. Dir.

Dep. Ap Adm.

Dep. AD

Asst. Dir.

Admin..

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

insigion

Laboratory -

Plon. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

raining

No day coon.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y_

This memorandum recommends that Mr. Colby, in

his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, be furnished

two write-ups for inclusion as annexes in a briefing book he

plans to provide the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) on

the occasion of his appearance as the lead-off witness before

маісіт

this Committee.

The write-ups are: (1) the role of counter-

intelligence and (2) the origin and disposition of the "Huston

Plan."

A previous memorandum was approved that Section Chief

William O. Cregar be designated as the point of contact within

the FBI to coordinate matters dealing with future testimony.

before the SCS.

Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the

Director of Central Intelligence, has been designated as the

coordinator for the Intelligence Community. The points of

contact under Mr. Clarke's auspices have been given the tiule

Ma hoc coorainating Group for Congressional Inquiry.

on 1/31/75 Clarke held a second meeting of this Group

wherein he reiterated that it was Mr. Colby's intention to make

a very strong plea for the Intelligence Community as the lead-

off witness.

In addition, Mr. Colby plans to provide to the

SCS a series of annexes, some of which will be classified, which

will address some of the issues to be looked into by the scs.

Those issues have been generally identified in Senate Résolution

Number 21, dated 1/21/75.

Representatives at Mr. Clarke's

meeting were asked to prepare certain of these annexes.

The

FBI was requested to prepare the annex on the role of counter

intelligence as well, as the

of the "Huston Plan."

REC-11 pn the origin and disposition

62-1163956

The Intelligence Division in responding to the request

from Clarke's Group will prepare these two write-ups ItS

anticipated that there will be no problems in connection with

the write-up on counterintelligence and this is goine forward.

62-116395

AT.L, INTORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

WOC:ebc (7)

DATE 9/25/00 BY 5P2 ALM /76

CONTINUED - OVER.

53 FEB . 31975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 267

---

## Page 268

I

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

62-116395

With regard to the origin and disposition of the "Huston Plan,"

we anticipate having an initial paper ready for discussion

actively involved in the development of the Plan.

Department's participation is necessary inasmuch as the Intel-

ligence Evaluation Committee (IEC), chaired by the Department,

evolved from one of the recommendations set out in the "Huston

Plan." Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General,

member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional

Inquiry and is preparing an input to the "uston Plan" annex,

lot the naut will desoribe the origin, function and disposition

Prior to releasing these two annexes for Mr. Colby's

luse, they will be submitted to the Director for his approval.

ACTION:

For information.

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 268

---

## Page 269

The,

At tiss:

REC-111

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr. J.

B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

12-111÷

1 - Mr. W. An grangán 979

Branigan

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SENATE SELECT COLMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AIT INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF

GOVERIVIENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

With regard to legislation proposed by the FBI,

a letter was sent to the Office of Legislative Affairs,

Department ôf Justice, on August 29, 1974, strongly

reconnending that consideration be given to a legislative

proposal that would authorize the Government to conduct

court-approved electronic surveillances in domestic security

This recommendation was based on the Supreme Court

decision which held that electronic surveillances conducted

solely within the discretion of the Esecutive violated the

warrant requirement of the Iourth Anendent and our opinion

that the current standards imposed by Title III of the

Omnibus Crine Control and Safe Streets Act of 1970 would be

AEM/ITE

SP2

ineffective techniques in donestic intelligence investigations.

In another legislative bill pending in the United States

Senate, Senate Bill S3001, although the FBI was not the

sponsor of the bill it has a particular intcrest in its

passage both for internal security and foreign counterintel

ligence considerations.

This bill would nale it a Federal

offense to obtain; produce, sell or utilize false docunentation.

of possible interest, in recognition o1 questions

Which have been voiced as to the jurisdiction and authority

of the FBI to conduct donestic intelligence investigations

and in order to cover any possible gap between statutory

authority and Ixecutive authority necessary to protect the

this Bureau submitted to the Attorney

Gencral in August, 1973, a proposal for an Executive Order

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.-w

HFC: JPT:dnt/jIb!'

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Ext. Affairs -

(9)

Files & Com.

Classified by 68755PY

Gen. Inv. -

Isenpt fron gus, categories 2 and s

Ident. -

Date of Declassilication Indelinite

Inspection ...

Intell. -

Laboratory.

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

WEH

Training -

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm-s

C. MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

GRO 954-546

(Docld:329896301 Pade 269

---

## Page 270

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF

GOVERNVENTAL OPMIATIONE VITIL BESDECI TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

to establish both authoritative and definitive guidelines

for the FBI in this area.

The proposed order took cognizance

of the constitutional responsibility ot the resident to

deiend the Constitution and the Government, ot continuing

threats to conestio tranguility and the seneral velfare;

of existing stacutes relating to national secuity and

public safety; and of the President's need for intelligence

Infornation.

The proposed Executive Order Included an

order by the

Iresident that "The Attorney General prepare

and issue guldeltnes, conforming to the principles of the

Constitution and the

B111 of Fights, and outlining the

necessary direction, cooroination,

and suldance of invostigations

to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides

on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to

the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and

other such sotivity affecting the national security, comestic

tranquility, and general volfore of the United states."

NOTE:

See memorandum I. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall

• 1/28/75, prepared by WOC/ebo, captioned as above.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 270

---

## Page 271

ELChEd

1

1

1

1

1

Mx .

N.

1!!1

Hx .

J.

Mx.

hr.

P. Callahan

B. Adams

A. Mintz

R. Tannall

W.

A. Branigan

- Mx. W. 0. Cregar

REC-11V

1/'.3

Januany 22, 1970

CLUNES DLCICT COLUTIZTIZ

IO CONDUCZ AIT JIVEGTEGATION ANO STUDX 07

116/00 #MDR16

GOVLIILIDNINE OFCINTIONE TADI BUSSECH TU

INIOZLIGUICS ACIIVIZIDO

CLASSIFIED BY SP 2ALM/11G

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XJ6

Tho Ilt hao tho erclusive rooponolbility foc

protcotion of the lntornol scoucity of the Unlted Statos.

ALL INFORMITION CONDAT ASE

HERZIN IS EHSTAGSIFIIO

UrE wpus

PEERE SHOWN

As rogords doroisa counicrintotligraco nccivitios in the

Unltod dtatoo, the IDI, as 1 nonbor os to United statod

intollzgonco comunity,

cotoching onl noutralining hoctilo intolligonce aotivivico,

bIt i0 1 producoz of BOSitivC intolligenco inormation oi

valuc to the Unidod Juotes Govosncont.

Tno FBI's Toroien countorintolligence oporations

noù only thmrt tho cilozto of hocüilo intclligonco ccrvicea

bui contribute to cno ovorall inoviecge anu czacotiyonoso oi

the Unitod Ciatco intolligoncs couzunity.

than 110 Dovloi-bloc indolligones ofdtcoro nnd/oz aconto

have boon ronovod fron thoir ozticial positions vithin tho

Unstod Statos or oscluded fron ontry or rccntry into tho

Unitod Statos no 2 rcould oi FBI Invostigativo cizorio.

Cono notororthy cananloo of thc IDl's contrêbution in thâo

arca dad of tho üypos o2 hoatile actvity mhich challongo our

intolligonoe corzunity {ollow:

In 1902 the ibl mo sucoosasul in ecrainaring en

opcration taich vas bozun ia 1030 von tho covioü intcllironeo

corvicos attoaptod to Covolop an agoni o2 inaluonco in icorican

20l2s2eo.

A Loviot intollironco officor caployod au thc

Unitod Mationo Coczoinzzan cultivated a How Yort lnw seuconi

and ovontually otferod to iinanco thig individunl'a canpaiga

ao a candicado for tho lon fori Stato Aoccrüly.

Assoc. Dir. _

torminatod thio opozacion by omposing it and tho bovzot

Dep. AD Adm. -

copartod tnc Unitod Btates and pill not bo poraiüiod to

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

POCUIR.

Admin, _

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Evol. -

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO DIRECIOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

DecIaT

HFC: JPT: dsh fr-

(9)

TIT

Clacsiz2o

by GSZa

Laoons

177

GON,

Entegorico A and z

Dato of Lokl:

noitiCCciOn

indostinitio

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

iest

Spec. Inv.-

Training —

Legal Coun..

Telephone Rm.-

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM L

TELETYPE UNIT L

HFC

IPT

GPO 954-545

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 271

---

## Page 272

DECKLT

SLAVIN DUELCE COLLILTILE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGAZION AND CTUDY OZ

GOVIRNHLITIAL GEURACIONE NITTI EGGPICT 1O

INTLLLIGLACI ACTIVITINS

In July, 1000, e Cooch intelligonoo officor

nosinod to the Cacch Inlassy in Vashington, D. C., was

declarod porson non gratn folloving on Ill oporation wich

balked his plons to place an olcotronic listoning dovico

in e Copartuont as Stato offico. (S)

In 1307 a Soviot-bloc diplont defected to tho

United States.

The history of Soviet-bloo espionage is

colored with tho offorts of their services to prevent

ccicctions and take roprisals against those wa throw

oid the communist yoke. In 1969 tho IDI dotectod & plot

by hostile intolligonce against tho aforemontioned coacetor

who was residing in the United States.

The FBI deternined

that tho hostile service had recruited two individuals

during visits by then to their foreign honelnud and assignod

then to locate and photograph the defector.

The innigrants

confessed their assignonts against the dcioctor and a ster

warning was issuod by the Departaont of Stato to the offonding

nation that such incidonto would not ho tolerated in the future. (s)

On Tobruary 7, 1070, a Coviot national enployca at

the United Intions Secrotariat vas arrestod on espionago

charges in Seattle, Vashington. Ho hou been dispatched to

the Unitoú statos undorcover ns? translator ai tho

Unitod Nations, but his primary joh was to collect classified

docuncnts nbout Unitod States wostern ali dofense fros an

agcat the soviets believod thoy had doveloped, but who actually

was a double ngent untor Fit control. The complaint agalast

this soviot was dismissod with the provision that ho capart

tho United statos by Fobruary 17, 1970, (S)

ITa, another soviet national tho

vas dispatchod to tha United Statco undor tho covor of translaton

at tho United rations, vas arrested outside of a restaurant on

Long Inland in tho procoss of receiving clasalfiod documonti

pertaining to a jot ligitor airpinne boing built for the

Unitod States Navy, Again, an fBI doublo agent was involvod. (5)

DUCILE

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 272

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## Page 273

SONATI LALICE COLITADD

TO CONDUCE AN INVIOLIGIPION AND TUDE OS

INIJLLAGEICE ACTIVITILO

On July 21, 1073, a Coviot diplount assignod to

Coviot unbassy in fachington, D. C., to cotinod in

Yori: Cliy in tho prococo of nooting with a nombor of

Unlted Sintos nilitary. The United Statoo military man

tos erroptorl on charges of copionage and unon cotabliching

the inct thot ho hod diploatic inunity, the doviot tog

permittod to deport the United Statos on August 15, 1975.

By this arrest the rot proventod the troneniscion to tho

Soviet Govorment of ovor 1, 000 olncaiiiod docmonts

volguing noorly d0 poundo and encosmaocing intorntion

troa tho ontiro Unitod Staton intollaroned consunity. (5)

Luzing 1073 throe highly explosive dovioos voro

Jocnted in tho vicinity of threo lemoli-connectod busineco

cotablichacnts in How Yori: City. The caplosivo dovicos

fortuntoly toiled to cotonato, thus paving noscibly

hundices or lives.

Wat Invostigation icontitiod an Irani

12020nal who had entered the Unitod States on a visitor'o

vior during tho carly part os 1973 es the individual who planded

chope dovicos.

It mo lator dovoloped that tho Ircas national

vas i known wonber of the clock soptenbor Organiention, wnich

is the socrei tortorici ving of Al Inth. To Iraqi national

we indictod in tastera District don torl on try 17, 1973,

ono coun, and in couthern Dictrict rey fork on lay 21, 1973,

on tvo counto of violations of ittle 10, coction 01d1. (S)

Industrial copionago by hostile intolligonce corvicoo,

vich caucos a drain of valuahle tochnolosy frog the

Unitod Stadcs, is of inorcasing concom to the United Statou

1noclLicenco community. In Auguet, 1973,

2 Sovlot-3102

chouderial roprosontativo, to had untorod tho United Ctates

ostensibly for connorcial

purposes just a sew cage hocore,

was arzoctod by Put Agents Zollowing on aticopt to atcal a

ecorce closs process iron the ford Locos Company.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 273

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## Page 274

d. 300

SECRET

SLRATE SELECT COMMETITE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF

GOVENILICNTAL ODIRATIONS WITH NESPECE TO

INTOLLICENCE ACTIVIIIES

Another example of investigations donling with

communist officials permanently assignod to the Unitod States

was tho attenpt by anothor Soviet diplonut curing 1972 to

penotrato the securo voico communications syston of tho

Prosidential comand plano, as well as the secure voice

communications system betven Tho White Ilouse and

Number 10 Dorning Stzeet.

bacause of til countorintertgence oitorts. S

An attenpt of the Sovlots to panotrato United Statos

policy inking and legislativo organs cano to the attention

of tho FBi during the lattor part of 1073 won a soviet

intolligenco officer contacted an aid to a United statos

logislator.

During this same poriod tha Ili Icarnod that

an individual connected with the Communist Party of the

United Statos lad been encouraged to move to the

Vashington, D, C., area to ether all availablo informtion

concerning

this sino legisintor. Coincidontal with this

display of interest in the particular logislator, it vas

learned that the wife of another Soviot intelligonce oflicer

attenpted to gathor all information availablo concorning this

logislator through the New York Times Information Bank.

NOTE:

See nomorandum W. 0, Cregar to lix. W. R. Wannall,

dated 1/28/75, captioned as above, prepared by WOC:elc.

rootle sterlos dare told tittie?

arused tas she Doorers that the Sere or dee duie, i...

him,

hut those wore are ree:

a this meterial rederates

CLORET

- 4 so

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 274

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## Page 275

1 = Mr.

N. P. Callahan

1 = Mr.

J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

- Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

January

W. 184-Gregar

111-5::.5

SENATE SELECT COMMITICE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGITION AND STUDY OF

GOVERNIENTAL, OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Inasmuch as the captioned Cormittee, to bo referred

to hereinatter as the see, will, of necessity, be concerned

in part with highly cencielve infornation relacins to

national security, this bureau suggests that agreenent of

the SSC be sought for the adoption of the following security

measures and procedures, both in the interests of nationzl

security and of protection of privacy of individuals:

In the resolution establishing the SSC it vas

established that no employce of the SaC or person perforning

tasks for the SSC on a contractual banis should be given

acceps to classified material unless appropriately cleared for

access to such naterial by the SSc.

It was indicated that

the type of clearance would be connensurate with the type

of intornation to be rade available to such persons under

conditions agreed upon by the ssc.

In this regard it would

be desirable for the ose to stipulate that no staii rember

nho is to be given access to any raterial, testicony, or

inforration received or scherated by the

connittee other than

that which is, in essence, public in ortation be granted cuci

access without prior receipt of a security clearance based on

a full field investigation.

Consideration nighi alco be givon

The SSC should adopt rules to insure that the

Assoc. Dir. -

secrecy of any sensitive information received ci generatca

Dep. AD Adm. -

by it be preserved and that these rules be nade lncan to the

Dep. AD in. - individuals and agencies who will be called upon to presens

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

testinony ci materials.

Comp. Syst.=

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen.Inv.-

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHID TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA,

Ident. _

_BY LIAISON

Inspection -

Intell. -

TO DRONG

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

(9)

Spec. Inv.-

925/00.

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

Training _

Legal Cour. _

Telephone Rm. -

MAIL ROOM

NW 88668 Docld:32989530

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fire

GPO 954-545

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FINATE SILICT COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTICITICN AND STUDY OF

GOVIEN ENIAL COIRATIONS VITA RESPICT TO

INTALLICAICE ACTIVIIEDO

It should be stipulated that those agoncies which

nil1 precont documents to tho committee be authorized to

excice from those documents, prior to their presentation, the

names of thoir personnel no well as those of any othor

Individunls whose safety or individual privacy richt bo

jeopardized by unauthorived disclosure of their identities.

It should be stipulated that, so has been custoney

in other Congressional proceedings regarding consitive mtters,

witnesses shall have the right to request that testimony be

cáven in executivo secaion,

that in sone inatances tectimony

be "oft the record," and that certain testinony be heard only

by members or the ese.

It should further be stipulated that witnesses ba

afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/ar

correct the record of thoir testinony prtos to any publiestion

01 1%.

It should be understood by the committee that the

"Third Agency Rule," binding upon members of the United States

intertigence community, may obiige a witness representing

another community member.

It is the intention of this Bureau to cooperate

culuy with the ise. It will be requested that in attempting

to satisfy recuirenents of the sSc we be efforded aulficient

time to research these requirenents in order to incure that

our answers will be totally responsive and accurate.

Provision should be made for the safecuarding of

Information and docuentary materials recolved or generated

by the fee, consistent with

their substance, and, at the

conclusion of the Committee's investigation and study, for

scoure disposition ot such recoras, including return to

contributors of materials submitted by thon.

A NW 88608 Dold:32989530 Page 276

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## Page 277

= .

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

'ee memorandum W. Q. Cregar to Ar. W. F.. Wannall

/28/75, prepared by NOC/ebo, captioned as above

.. -

- 3 a

NW 88608 Docld:32989530

Page 277

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## Page 278

!;

6^

VREC-111

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

115=5

January 29, 1975

1 = Mr: W: O. Brenigan

W. O. Cregar

SENATE SELECT COMMITTIE

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF

GOVERNHENTAL OPERATIONS MITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

There have been public charges that the FBI has

operated for 50 years vithout oversight or any external

controls. This is not accurate. In the Congress, several

bodies have had jurisdiction over matters affecting FEI

prograus and activities.

These include the Appropriations

Connittees of both Houses, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee

on Constitutional Rights and on Administrative Practice and

Procedure,

a special Senate Foreign Relations Subconnittee

on Surveillances, the louse Judiciary Connittce, the former

Ilouse Conmittee on Internal Security, the Coverment Operations

Cormittees of both the llouse and Senate and the senate sub

cormittee on IDI Oversight.

During 1972 the President's Foreign Intelligence

HAVISOLY sOard, With the lul. cooperation of the ibt,

cOnt

ducted detailed and extensive examination of the IDI's activities

as a member of the United States intelligence conmunity.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972

created a Cormission on the Organization of the Governuent for

the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

That cormittee made inguiries

of members of the intelligence cormunity regarding the role

of intelligence as it affects the conduct of our foreign policy.

In its research the comittee looked into certain pertinent

IBI activities and had contact with IBI representatives both

in the United States and abroad.

Ey direction of Chairnan Peter Rodino and the House

Assoc. Dir. -

of Representatives' Judiciary Committee, the General Accounting

Dep. AD Adm. -

Office (GAO) is currently reviewing the domestic intelligence

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

operations of the IBI, concentrating on policies, prograns,

Admin.

procedures and case nanagenent.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. w..

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA,

Gen. Inv. -

BY LIAISON

Ident. -

Inspection -

IMDR 16

Intell. -

Laboratory

SPT 1b fel

SPAAM 7IE SEE NOTE PAGE THO

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. -

Training

1/4s/0a

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

TS 88608-Doc:329893%6-Page IP-ETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-545

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## Page 279

=

SENATE SELECT COMITTEN

TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND ETUDY OF

GOVERNMINTAL OPERATIONE WITH RISPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIIS

GAO's audit is covering llendquarters and ton

of the IBI'S field offices where a representative number

of the Bureau's domestic investigations ara conducted.

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

1/28/75, captioned as above, prepared by WOC:ebc.

!

IN 33608 Dadd: 32939530 Page 279

_--

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## Page 280

TO

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM

. NO. 10

AAY 1962 BELON

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. _

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

Callahan

- Mr.

Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz

DATE: 1/28/75

Dep. AD Adm. _

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

regar

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

ATY THRCZVATTON COY

Ident.

Ingesties

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv..

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

D:0S 9/25/00 FISPLALMTTEST

Training -

. Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Diroctor Sec'y -

CoNcent

maliffere

= GoveRnmentat

INtell

This

memorandum recommends that the original

and one copy of four memoranda (copies attached) be furnished

to Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, for

his consideration at

the time of his forthcoming appearance af

before the Select Committee of the Senate.

1975

ONLOS

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated

1/27/75, captioned as

above, advised that Mr. Colby anticipates

being called as the first witness before the Select Committee

of

the Senate responsible for examining the extent of overt

and covert intelligence activities in the U. S. and abroad.

In connection with this appearance, Colby has indicated that

ne intends to make a very strong pitch ior the Intelligence

Community and has asked all agencies and departments of the

U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) to provide him with memoranda

on the following four subjects: (1) examples of how the FBI

in its counterintelligence role has materially benefited the

U. S. Government, (2) ground rules that the FBI believes should

Ibe discussed with the Committee in order to insure that innocent

(persons are not maligned and sources and methods of investigation

are protected,

and (3) a chronology of independent boards or

commissions which have examined the efficacy and authority of

the FBl, and (4) any pending or proposed legislation involving

internal security matters submitted by\the FBI.

Attached

are copies of four memoranda prepared by

the Intelligence Division which we propose te deliver to

Mn. Colby efore the else on banes

1/29/75

7 she

ACTION:

62-116380

SIMME

If approved, the original and one copy of each of the

Four memoranda will be delivered to Mr.

Colby's office

afternoon of 1/29/75,

by liaison. REC-11.

427220320-5

Enclosures

WOC: ebc

(6)

desperich

NW as6n& Dackd:32989530 Page 280

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## Page 281

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1982 EDITION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.

TO

Nc. W. R. WannallupunL

-

Nx .

N.

P.

Callahan

NK .

J.

B. Adams

Mr. T.

J. Jenkins

Each

Assistant Director

DATE:

2/3/75

Asst Dir.:

min.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext, Affairs -

last & Com. !

ien. Inv. _

Ident.

1 - Each Section Chief, INTD

FROM

: W.

SUBJECI: SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT

AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OE

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS HITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE

ACTIVITIES

Side Schit Canittie

PURPOSE:

9

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This recommends code word IS ENSTUDY 75 be adopted

as title of new control file for communications regarding

subject.

; On 1/21/75 the U. S. Senate reported Senate

Resolution 21 to establish captioned committee.

Committee will look into operations of members of the

U. S. intelligence community including the FBI. The Committeer

is being chaired by Senator

Frank Church of Idaho. We have

already received and responded to requests from the Ad Hoc

Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry for information

to be used by Mc. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence,

in preparing for his anticipated initial appearance before the

committee.

The Ad Hoc Group is composed of representatives of

U.S. Intelligence Board member agencies and departments to

deal with. "SENSTUDY 75."

For administrative convenience,

as well as economy,

it is suggested that copies of all communications and material

dealing with the activities of the committee be placed in a

new control file, 62-116395, and that the code word "SENSTUDY 75"

be adopted as a brief title

for internal communications

relating to this matter.

FBIHQ indices contain no references

to that code word.

62-116395

MCT-1M

REC 111 62-116375-

JPT:bkbutt

CH 42

(24)

AZE FOR 6 COATHER

TENDIN IS UNALASSIN

1439/25/00 BISREALM /116

NW 886083065830989530

9530° Page 281

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## Page 282

1

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senate Select Committee To Conduct An Investigation

And Study of Governmental Operations With Respect

To Intelligence Activities

ACTION:

With your approval, the Files and Communications

Division will establish file 62-116395 under the caption

"SENSTUDY 75" as a repository for communications dealing with

this matter.

goa

ghe

oly

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 282

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## Page 283

• y

POZICE GENES CO TO CORATO

1

James 8o, 1075

Mr. Callahan

-

Mr.

Adams

Fir.

hinez

Wannall

• - Mr. Cregar

Ca January 23,

1079, Depolutics 21 corbitered

2 Coloot Cosalitoo cl to Sonato lo Coccust cy jercaulga

clan und doray at governated opcratice vich reczoct ia l

Occeral Indolliconso cad Clairez of Sto United Guzico

Intolligerce Looni (URD), les cavinod fare Lo antielpasco

coins callod

concutie. of sho rosato.

Zn Jdo 020a157 20208i0 26

achars ot tho intollicens Gornity highlighding Demy o1

Ito onescondary ecatalibations.

he noticion, to Caret

to Dhow thai tro Comináty has ovcr to gozoo loca cubicat

do corudlay by torozasad conlociora ced incidi

In furiterance of a coordinated cilori to ¿naise

MAILED 6

1975

JAM ::0

aro portrayod in a boot faroraule Jigut 12. Folly Ins

reguanted painto of cantact to cotabliciod in each ESID

cocooy dr coperteat. 1. dom Di, Clario, Roccolato Loguiz

to Sto Dizzator 02 Goateal Intelligenco for See Intollicalco

Corma030y, 191E. Colby'D porcoral ropesantosite to irjure

• proper coordanarca cisco.

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. =

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.-

Inspoction

Intell. co

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval...

Spec. Inv..

Training -

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm..

Diroctor Sec'y..

NW 86

Fa caticipatina toû tro ancollageo Prolnation

Cenaibico ratien moy chaired by tha Poraricone no dearico

Lo the cobjeet of

In in conisci

with your citico.

REG 1167-1062 -14327-

(9)

GH 42

etie

• FEB $ 1973

SEE

NOTE PAE TO M

ENCLOSURE

1'1.

set.

MAIL ROOM I

8r Doold: 32989530 Page 283

TELETYPE UNIT |

00/5t76

ConnoRada Nota

1011049

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## Page 284

The Attorney General

Attachod is a list of those individuals

representing the USID who have been desirnated as points

of contact in thoir respective agencies or departments

for Mr. Clarke.

Enclosure

I - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure

NOTE :

Memorandum W. 0. Cregar to W. R. Wannall,

dated

1/27/75, captioned "Select Committee of the Senate," recom-

mended

that Section Chief William O. Cregar's name be provided

Mr. Clarke as the Bureau's point of contact.

The Intelligence

Division is currently preparing memoranda for Mr. Colby's

consideration in anticipation of his appearance before the

Senate Select Committee.

Such memoranda, of course, will be

furnished to the Director for his approval prior to

being

furnished to Mr. Colby.

→ 2-

NW 38608 Dold: 2989530 Page 284

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## Page 285

Dr. John M. Clarke

Mr. William McAfee

Mr. Benson K. Buffham

Mr. Kenneth Geisen

Mr. J. Foster Collins

Mr. Merrill I. Kelly

Captain Donald S. Jones

-Colonel Jerry D: Alderson

Mr. William O. Cregar

DI. Charles Cook

Mt. Hank Knoche

Mx. John Warner

Mi. George Cary

Mrs. Patricia Taylor

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 285

IC Staff

State

NSA

DIA

Treasury

Army

Navy

Air Force

FBI

SAFSS

CIA

CIA

CIA

IC Staff

,143ext5477

101ext21504

(9)688-7222

"Ilext75101

184ext2421

11ext78419

-llext53737

1lext50006

175ext4612

: 1lext78531

143ext4086

143ext611l

143ext6121

143ext4401

A CLOSURE

5-116575

3

- Arm 116

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## Page 286

1 * Mr. McDermott

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Congressional Services

Januory 24, 1075

1 - Mr. Cleveland

• Adm.

D Inv. Jus

t..

The Deputy Attorney Goneral

Director, BI

SENATOR HOLARD E. BAIGE, JE.

MINORITY MOLICER

SELECT SINATE COMMITTER TO

FIVESTIGATE DIT OLLIGANCH AGENCIS

NARE CRCCI REGUEST

ANANT 19350794.

#MDR 16

O SOILINES

",".

***

9125/00 SPLANTE

This is to confiria a convercation betteen you and Depaty

Associate Director Adams on January 23, 1075, herein you authorized

the FBI to honor name check requests on stalf employees received

from the Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.

You were advised that we presently have a request in this connection

from Senator Horard I. Eaker, Jr., for name checks on four potential.

stat employees.

Senator Baker had also indicated to the FEl that he had no

idea as to tho would have the responsibility of conducting the background

investigations which must be conducted, and this is to confirm your

approval that ve contact Director William f. Colby of the Central

Intelligence Agency regarding their desires in this matter since they

normally handle background cheers of stait employees of committees

receiving sensitive information concerning Central Intelligence Agency

and the FBI normally handles such background investigations on staff

employees of committees receiving sensitive FEI information. Following

discussions with Mir. Colby, contact will be had with the Chairman of the

Select Senate Cormittee in order to ascertain which agency should conjuct

ta required background entratioas.

REC-111

i LED SOR

12-114373

5: 2

JBA:ams

(2)

JAN 2 4 1975

E1 d4734-7976

FBI

ction -

Laboratory -1

Plan. & Evalin

Spoc. Inv. -e

graining B FLe

agal Coun. _

alephone Rm. -

KIW 3860a

TAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNT

ocld:32989530

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## Page 287

OPTIONAL FORMHO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN.

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: MR. JENKINS

DATE:

1-23-75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

ta. Dép. AD Inv. 1

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst..

Exty Affairs i

is a some it

FROM : I. J. MC DERMOM

SUBJECT: SENATOR

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. (R-Tenn.)

MINORITY MEMBER

J SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

NAME CHECK REQUEST

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plon. & Eval.

2Spde. Inv. 1

Training

Legal Coun..

Telephone Rm..

Quinn in my office this morning to advise that he had been

contacted by Senator Baker requesting name checks on three

individuals who are to be staff members of captioned committee.

In this regard, Baker indicated that he anticipated that the

committee would request full field investigations on all staff

members of this committee.

Baker advised that the three names he provided will

be among

the ten staffers that the minority representation on

the committee will have. The three are as follows:

RONALD DAVID MC MAHAN

11716

DOB: 6-22-38, Knoxville, Tennessee

SSN

#408-58-9952

Residence:

1904 Whipping Post Way, Vienna, Virginia

ARTHUR BOGGESS-CULAHOUSE, JR.

DOB: 7-4-48,

Athens, Tennessee.

SSN #415-78=7202

Residence: 1015 E Street, S

S. F.'_W

_Washington, D. C.

HOWARD LEIBENGOOD

DOB: 12-29-42,

South Bend, Indiana

SSN #307-44=9707

Residence:

6304 Wildwood Valley Drive,

"Brentwood, Tennessee

Formerly a staff member of the Select Committee

to Investigate

Campaign Activities

Baker stated tha

buza appreciate the restles

of these name checks as sooHasspossible since it is anticipted

that the select panel will be receiving materials on or about

Tuesday of next week (1-28-75).

&I JAN 31 1975

GTe : crt|v(6)

1 - мы!

McDermott

1 - Mr.

Gebhardt

1 - Congressional Services Office

140

NW.88608> 5ocil:32989538

Page 287

(OVER.

---

## Page 288

Memorandum to Mr. Jenkins

Re:

SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

Baker indicated to Taylor that he has no idea as to

who will have the responsibility of conducting the background

investigations but he would hope that the staff members would

have "Q" clearances or the type of clearances afforded Atomic

Energy Commission.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be approved and referred to the

General Investigative Division for appropriate action in line

with Senator Baker's request.

Дужа

4 tom

ADDENDUM:

G. T. QUINN/cIt

1-23-75

SA Taylor called back at 2:00 p.m. and requested

that the following individual also be subjected to a name

check for Senator Baker:

MICHAEL J. MADIGAN

DOB: 4-18-43, Washington, D. C.

SSN #042-34-3797

Residence:

256 School Street, Acton, Massachusetts

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 288

---

## Page 289

qun

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

TUFORIATION CONTAINES

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

ON IS UNCLASSIFIER

5XSP2

:9-25.00

* No domestic spies?

Allegations and disclosures about CIA and

NeBI surveillance of Americans within U.S. bor-

ders have been interpreted by some as a type of,

domestic spying that could have a chilling effect

on the exercise of political expression. One

response has been that all domestic intelligence

operations should be eliminated. Recent events

show this, would be a non solution, a patent

overreaction.

Most public opinion and most judicial opin-

ion, we suspect, would not consider it an inva;

sion of constitutional nights of privacy i the FBI

infiltrated or otherwise kept an eye on activities

"Of the Weathermen. That organization not long

ago expressed itselt by taking credit for a bomb

explosion in the State Department and for plac-

ing, another explosive device

at the Armed

Forces Induction Center in Oakland, Calif.

Should members of Fuerzas Armadas

de

Liberacion Nacional. (FALN), the Puerto Rican:

nationalist group that claimed responsibility for

the lan 24 bombing - three men killed; many

injured. — at New York's historic Fraunces Tay-

ern's annex, be exempted from monitoring by

federal police because the act was supposedly

politically inspired? By some remotelogic, FAUN

believes thät bombing Wall Street restaurants

will bring independence to Puerto Riço.

the question answers itselt, society nas. the

right and the obligation to protect itself. These:

were acts of terrorism, whether or not motivat-

ed by political aims: impering innocent people

to enforce points of view that have been repu-

diated by a free open political process is black

mail; And blackmail cannot become integral to

any long sustainable political system.

The Weathermen and FAiN, as well as any

other organization that indicates it

extra-legal methods to voice dissent, should not

pe treed trom fear of domestic spying,

The answer is not to eliminate all domestic

political surveillance, Is to set the conditions,

and they should be rigid, under which domestic

spying: will be tolerated and under which abuse

by: federal agents of such ipirequenty grante

authority will'be: met with stern penalties

0'

Senstride

$6 MAR 3 1 1975

REC-6

FEX-Lb6

Dep.-A.D, Tuy t

Asst, Dixi.

Admin.

Ext

Files &

Com.

Gen Inv. -

Ident.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone km. --

Director Sec'y

(Indicate page, name of

Editione

city and state.)

THE ORECONIAN

A2 PORTLAND, OREGON

274-25-

Date:

2-14-75

Edition:

Author:

Editor: J. Richard Nokes

Title:

CIA; FBI

EDITORIAL

Character:

Classification:

Submitting Office:

_ Being Investigated

Portland

162-

1639%

NOT RECORDED

4O WAR 2 1975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 289

---

## Page 290

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

1155

(Mount Clipping in Space. Below)

*M DR/6

ALL INTORMATION CONTAINEI

HEREIN IS UNCLASSITEED

DATE 9/25/00 BISP ALMAS

Senate And The ClA

The special committee the U.S, Senate is

Many congressmen are indignant about

forming to look into charges of illegal suying

this. But they should restrain their outrage,

Ion Americans by the CTA, the FBI Or other N For unlike the CIA, the FBI does have the

agencies cán do a lot of good or harm.

duty of conducting domestic investigations

If the committee conducts a sober and re:

and there are times when members of Cou

sponsible inquiry it can determineif the CIA gress are proper objects of FBI interest.

did in fact overstep the law against domestic

Every so often, for example; a congress

espionage and what corrective measures, if

man turns out to be a crook. And in, such in-

aily, are needed.

stances the laws he violates are usually fed

If, however, the committee conducts a

epal ones.

..li

Watergate-style probe, complete with televised:

So the FBI, as the federal government's in-

hearings and sensationalized leaks, it can se-

vestigatory agency, should not be parred from

verely damage the nation's foreign policy and

keeping, records on any suspects, even if they:

intelligence capability.

happen to be congressmen.

*

Incidentally, by voting in caucus 45-7. to es-

Some people; of course, react with knee.

tablish: the special committee, Senate Demo:

Jerk fashion any time they hear of the FBI

crats delivered a rebuff, which seems to be

keeping files on anybody. They immediately

unjustified, to President Ford and the com-

begin screaming about "police state" tactics:

mission headed by Vice President Nelson

Well; no American citizen in his right mind

Rockefeller which Mr. Ford pamed to inyes

should. defend

police-state actions by any

tigate the CIA.

agency.

The Democrats Implicitly stated by their

vote that they did not trust the Rockefeller

But agencies like the FBI and the CIA are-

commission to perform an objective inquiry.

essential, considering the kind of world we

That amounts to prejudicial prejudgement.

live in. So we dare not emasculate them to

The Rocketeller panel should be given a

the point where they won't be able to perform

chance to do its job: Then if it does come up

their necessary functions.

with a whitewash, the criticism would be in

order.

*

Meanwhile; the investigation into illegal

spying widened atter the FBI confirmed its

files.contain.some informatton.on.thexpersonal

behavior of some congressmen. Included are

* references to their loyalty, character or reps

(Sensturdy -76

utation;

Assoc. Dir.

• Dep.-A.D.-Adm.-

Dep.-A.D.-InT.-

Asst Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst.

Ext.

Affairs

Files' & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan.

& Eval. -

Spec. Int.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephong Km

Director Sorry il

(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, city and atato.)

24 The Pittsburgh Presi

Pittsburgh, Pa.

eun'

58 MAR : 819757

Letter to Trion

13117j= DLD: mmer:

Date:

1/23/75

Edition: Final

Author:

Editor:

Title:

JOHN TROAN

MISC INFO

Character:

80-861

Classification:

Submitting Olice: Pittsburgh

Being Investigated

62-

16395-1

NOT RECORDED

46

MAR 28 1975

G..

-NW 88608_Docld:32989530_Page 290

---

## Page 291

FBI Chief Looked for

Skeletons in Closets

of Famous

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.~A.D.-Adm.

Dop.•A.D.-Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intelle

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

WASHINGTON. The files

went to the Ovar otfice under

Hoover's

penchant for fer

example,

Johnson. Te

JJ. Edgar Hoover'S familiar 3

reting out the skeltons, in the

quested Cumpete bureau ins

closets of the tamous was as

you might be inter-

lested. in knowing"

well known outside the agency

vestigations

both,

Sen:

(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, city and state.)

Spira Agnew, after he became

within,

The absence

And what: they contained was

vice-president-elect in 1968.

protest against it until now ins

always interesting

the least.

= to say

(dicates.

thàt the threat thàt!

Johnson 'justified the Gold.

those: files might be bared

water request one ex-BI:offis

From one of the most profi-

may well have been the major

cial reported, by pointing out.

icient"

information-gathering

source of Hoover's power.

that Goldwater was a reserve!

"I" can't really say "how

general, in the Air

6B

DETROIT FREE PRESS

DETROIT,

MICHIGAN

machines an

existence

the

major

(FBI

Edgar Hoover com

Force and "had more secrets,

much of the information ever

piled: explicit tales of human.

was

used,' said one former

than

we do' at the

White

weakness in high places; b

high-ranking

House:"

FIMORIS

bureau official

licit sex,

drunkeness,

homos

"But I.

am

convinced that

In 1964 Johnson sent an-ene

sexuality, marital problems.

many a politician shied away:

tire team of agents headed by

ATT. INFORMATTON CONTAINED

If any president who re

from

controntations. with the

DeLoach to the Atlantic City

PUREIN IS UNCLASSIF

ceived such information from

director • because he did not

Democratic convention to.do a

know

Hoover and all are said to)

what

Hoover

thim."

had: on

little spying orcfriends.of Rob

D/T3925/00 BKSP FALm 2

ert F.."

Kennedy,

whom hệi

have " ever rebuked. him for

feared might be plotting tol

his efforts, it rémained.as.se-

THE

COMING

congres:

itake

the nomination away

cret as

the contents of the

sional investigations may not

from him.

memos themselves. ost were

verify the existence or secret,

And a decade before, it was

dutifuly grateful

The official bureau position is

Hooyer's FBL, that supplied»

Sunstude

"Old FBI hands say Hogyer)

that the marination is storeds

Joseph" McCarthy with

began compums Miformation

fin bits

and pieces and wast

much of the ammunition in his,

on public figures, including

only

pulled," together

when'

now discredited pursuitof.al

néeded:

congressmen.very.early in his

Leged communists.

30-year reign:

But there are witnesses who?

More than one president,

can swear that such dossiers:

FBI officials agree, used the

By. the early. 1950s field

existed;

perhaps: in Hooyer's

agency to gather information

Date:

agents: were under a standing

personal files which have ei

on personal enemies, including

1/30/75

Edition:

directive to forward biograph-

ther been destroyed or rea

elected officials.

information

on; newly.

moved from the bureau. And;

Roosevelt,

Instance

Author:

elected; congressmen or execis

they were readily, accessible

for

Moosed the FBI on toes of his

tive

Editor:

branch

appointees

to

to presidents.

lend-lease: program,

Johnson

JOSEPH H. STROUD

Washington: for the .benent.of

frequently passed information

Title:

bureau officials, who had to

"I have

personally. carried

deal with them,

files. to the White House doz-

along. to allies on Capitol Hill

ens of times and delivered:

As far as it is known, there

them: to: a secretary," said a

No one stas tops: 22-116355-14

ponent by casually droppinga

nèver. were

any specific or former FBI-White House fai

juicy tidbit of gossip from his.

ders, official or unofficial, for

son during the Johnson admin:

FBI file.,

FIOT RECORDED

rEBI agents to solicit intorma-

fistration:'

"That

was the

Although never documented,

tion of an intimate personal

president could trithfully say.

it was widely believed

nature:

he.had.never.talked'to the FBI

Washington:

" that

Johnson

on a particular matter

amused himself with bedside:

Subtling dice:

+-Being Invesfigatea

DETROIT

* But one

former

assistant.

IF BT

directoi

recalled

ret

reading of what I. Edgar was

cently:

"It was' understood i

WHILE THE ultimate abuse

finding out about others.

that. Hoover was interested' in

flof the FBI occurred' under Ri-

House Speaker Carl Albert,

such, material.

Some agents!

chard Nixon, most present and

who like everyone else heard

who might come-across.a little

tormer FBI offcials say Pres

rumors that the FBI had a

ident Lyndon B. Johnson, who

"thick file on his personal life,

nad a private telephone line toy wrote Hoover and. asked. him

the home of assistant director

about it, Hoover responded

Cartha

D.

DeLoach, did not.

equivocally that no such file

File

hesitate to use Hoover's bu

vor and deliberately wenholt reau for poinarpurposes:

existed:

a hermor cy 4975

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 291

---

## Page 292

The existence of such files

was

lease until 173, ater to:

yer's death, wher the Senate:

was considering the appoint-

ment of L, Patrick Gray as his

Then acting director, Gray

told the Senate Judiciary Com

mittee he bad-seen files sa hot

he lens thou yet destroy,

to some subjects

Saying he would like to burn

The Name at Are Nay Fi

say over the documents.

NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 292

---