MINUTES OF MTG. OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON OPERATION MONGOOSE
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: WH
From: THE RECORD
To: PARROTT, THOMAS
Document date: 9/6/62
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 09/30/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10102

RECORDS SERIES :

MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Released under the John

Assassination Recorda

collection Act of 1992

(44 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 53244 Date:

06-13-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : WH

FROM : PARROTT, THOMAS

TO : THE RECORD

TITLE :

MINUTES OF MTG. OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON OPERATION MONGOOSE

DATE : 09/06/62

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CUBA

CASTRO

LANSDALE

BUNDY, MCGEORGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : S

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 245

Folder 12

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f.

General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all

Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed

to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to

be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected

overnight.

h.

General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22

(submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude

in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the

other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-

measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look

at other possibilities in some detail.

i.

General Carter felt that a determination should be made as

to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions.

He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27

will not in themselves be especially effective in precking the Cuban

economy.

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my 9711791959119f

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4.

The Group then turned to a discussion of numberf32 (agricultural"

sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any

such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-

thing going wrong, Paperetlarly if there were obvious attribution to

"the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to

accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in

the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop

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fat lures by the

introductton of-biological agents-which-would appear

[to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about

any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result?

of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must

avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless!

they could be completely covered up.

.. a tar?

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5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which

could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can

be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination

to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

6.

It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of

Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7.

The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8.

It was suggested, that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked

into further.

9.

General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how

• much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,

within broad policy lines.

The Chairman indicated that it would not be

a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great

degree.

HH 53244

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum

of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.

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