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104-10210-10009 Me 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIA, RESOLD DO CO: DEADORE DES IS

SiNCE COME. OH A65A9141100S CA 19015

- CONDENTS IN THE CASE

MISERIKOL

ATTS:

1CT. 1.2

• 1001:

I NY:- LIFE GEARINA IN SERUGITY CA PUERIES

CIA CI'S

PETUNIT

TORTURED BY:

COLT NOL

STONATON: OF

__NEVER ING OFFLOTA

19I24

TENA SLYL

Lind 1c

Sitt

ten Suste

Tania

Tmas Suite

CATS MAY BE COPIED OR BAOVED TROT THIS FILI.

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1 October lyis

CONCLUSICTS AND COMMENTS

IN THE CASE OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

;.

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1 Ociabor 1965

MEMORANDUV FOR: Dircatu: o: Sccurity

FROM

SULJECT

: Deputy Chill, Sccurity Rescuich Stull

: NOSENiO, Juily ivanovich

1.

In accordanco with 1'i0 raquusi of tho Deputy Director

of Central intelligeace, anachoù do a cuiraly with. corclusions

concoralna tha bora fides o! Yurig ivnovich dUSINio. Suc-

conclusiona aro coniairco ia liu surimary concerniag several

major areas which vero givin primazy cousiúeration in ine mafica

of tho boza dlios of Nostico.

2. Includid in thio cuntary are coismenis concerning

conclusions in thu pievicts burinary and an anoes contalrira is-

marko on throo separate subjucho reisica to tac NOSINKO caao.

3o In briof, dho conclusica di dio dummary le that NOSENkO

is tho porson ho claims so de, this he livia his cialracú postliors in

Bao isGE during 1953 - January lous, laur NOÜGHriO Was aot dis-

parched by the doh, and mat his previcuo lles dad exalucrationa

aro not actually oi material ciunticance at luis time.

BruCo L. Solio

Attachment:

Summary

BIS:ko

0001002

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i:.:

IABLE CE CONTENTS

I.

Introduction

Ii.

Summary oi Developmeris in NOSENKO Case Sirce

• 30.Ociober 1907

II, Aralyticai Comments Concerning ise Bona Fides of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO

A. IS NOSENKO Idericai to the Person Wrom He Clains

to be?

B. Is the Claimed 1G3 CaIce= ci NOSENKO Piausible?

C, Has NOSENKO Given at Acceptable Explaiaiion oi

His Motivaiion in Coniacting CLA in 1962 and Fo=

His Delection in 1904?

D. Is the Information Furnissed by NOSENKO to CLA

Concerning KGB Operators, Personalities, and

Organizatior. Reasorably Commensurate With Fis.

Ciaimed KG2 Carees?

E. Can the Iniormation Furrished by NOSENKO be

Considered ir. Too as Having Resulied in Maieria:

Damage to the KG3 arc/or Fias the iniormation

Furnisned by NOSENKO Been of Significant Bereiit

to Western Intelligerce?

F. Is There Eviderce of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"'

in Information Furrissed by NOSENKO Which Wow'd

•Warrant a Conclusica thai NOSENKO was Dispa-cred

by the KGB?

COUICC3

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G. is There Evidence di a Pollical or Any Oi e= Type

Objective Wricà Cold Jusilly a Dispich di NOSENKO

by ino ida Win Permission to Speak Freeij to Cia

Concerning His Knowiedge di te KGB and Without

NOSENKO Being Gives i Specific Vissior or Missions?

H. Is There Any Evidence Thai the Contacts oi NOSENKO ir

1902 0r in 1901 Wiir CIA Wuüe Known to tie KOB Prior

to His Jejuction or Thai NOSENKO Was Ever Briced

by the KOS Relaive to iis Behavior or KGB Objectives

During These Coniacis 0ª Air His Deiectica?

IV. Commenis Concerning Previous Conclusions in Rega-¿ to NOSENKO

A. NOSENKO Did Noi Serve in the Naval Rü in Any of ine

Capacities or ai the Placos añd Times He C'aimcd

.B. NOSENKO Did Not Erier the KGB in the Mannes or at ine

Time Hit Claimed

C. NOSENKO Did Not Surve in the American Embassy Scition

Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed

D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Serior

Case Otticer in, for Doputy Chief of, the Seventh.

Deparimeri American-British Commonweah Sectior

E. NOSENKO Was Neither Daputy Chiei of ine American Embassy

Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in ine Section

During the Period: 190: - 1902' (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Ciaims, Trai i= 1962 He was Chiei of the

American-British Cormonwealth Section ard Was

Thereafter a Deputy Chici of the Severth Department,

Aïe Noi Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB

Recruited No Americas Embassy Personrel Between

1953 and His Deiection in 1904

0001004

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-.

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V.

iten

index Á - Sinioncs di Soro: Oficiais Auout NOSEiXO

Annes 3 - Sum... Feo oi Cases Jo: Siamired in Text

Arnex C - Tre Cirzepanor Pupers

6001005

3

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'SECKLI

i De is:

I.

SECRET

G80R 1

Ercinted trash ast

19y7N2L.80

tectssancritan

0001006

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INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be

all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-

zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished

by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious

and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the

formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of

primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological

assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous

theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying

aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily

directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not

dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively

plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in

a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO

has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that

these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

SECRET

CLint t69 Eit

LÜU1067

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SECRET

but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational

or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of tbe phrase "bona

fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily

on whelter he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knovledge,

and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this

Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent

aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and

exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a

"uuna fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement

against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or

correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer.

For

purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas

considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to

whether this arbitrary siandard is a completely accurate standard, but it

is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other

sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader

to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers

appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami-

nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, " has been considered in

s1905.7739

SECRET.

60010C8

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CECKLI

¡da perparatlon of this summary. It will be commeniod on la part

and thie summary will include conclusions correlated with le seven

PILMETY COnCLUSIODS DAL LOItE On JAge 358 Of the BUOre suMIrary. •

Remaris concerniay certali sITore, Inconslatencies, omiasloas and

unsupparted corclusions in los pretloas summary la ragard lo specific

CAseS Of BUD-aIdas will be iscluded la chlo summary. Homerer, uhis

samaaty will not laclude a polni-by-potat comparison of all areas ol

agreement of disagrsement with irlormation contalaed in the provlous

A positira doctaton in sagard to NOSENKO basAd on all

availablo laformation should de mada la tha Inimediao future. Thoro

are tO taoma sOurces curreslly svellable to pronido sem positire:.

Indormation coscarnias NOSENKO and bla bona ildea. it la recogalsed

Rhas there do always a possibillly ln lsa fulare a sev anurce or sourcas

will be able to turnish additional iaforsation in regard to NOsENKO.

, However, this possibillty is exceediagly tenuous and ll la felt ibore

la cufflelens isformation avallablo on which to baso a conclustoa la

the NOSENKO matter.

3

SECREI

0001CCS

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SECRET

I. SEVARY OF DEVE DEMENIS IN NOSENTO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1.957

SECRET

tÃ0M 1

sectassication

C001010

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"?:

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to

NOSENIO but who has been aware of the NOSENIO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have

been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and caree:

of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been.

coverco during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the firet few

interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and

the interviewer bas noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect

of his life, career, or activities. On occasion MOSENKO has indicated a

reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously

considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance

was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

SECRET

Li)? 1

6001011

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Saurie!

tist

fad)

interviewer would not dispule or disparage his statements without adequate

reason, this reluciance on ihe pürt of NOSENKO, in the opinion oi the

interviewer, totai; disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six monthe,

MOSENKO materially assisted ine interviewer by preparing approximately

sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation ior de-

jection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB

organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example

of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included

remarie concerning approximately [B75 KGB officers, [O0)KGB agents,

35 GRu nificera, and odother Soviet nationals. The ae lista were alpina-

beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has

materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of iniormation

furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related

memoranda have been disseminaied to the FBI and the CI Stafi. Special

Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington

Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research

and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-

viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning

whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

6001612

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313R

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is addition, taras prolossionale linin lhe SE Diviston Lave

sortered the current information and anolacod in the retrloval of

PIOTIOSE LAÍOFINALIOn ETOM NOBENKO add collalion of cursent

laformalton usta previous laformatia. The lattar is a tremendous

task bacauso of tha volurs of material; de number ol lsdividual

cases i-mired; and the extensivo Infosmation in regard to KGB

persoaalltles, procedures, oxganizational structure and activities.

Tho 8B Dirieton elso prorided tha terrices of aa expert

tranelsios to translate the lapes of the 1965 interrogallon of NOBENKS

by PotE DERYABIN and one of the prevlovaly montioned threo pro-

fasolasala completed a new translation of the 1962 iacertlema with

NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certais otier particularly

pertineat pretloas thierviama of NOSENKO bare bees complosed by

the office of Security.

Approsimately 7000 pagas of transcripts and related matoria!

bave been compiled snd diasemiusted nisco late October 1967. Com-

meate concoraing the valua of the laformation contalaod in cho aboro

•rastesirl asa containod la asother section ol this summary. As of the

¡presest timo, a complato anslysis ls sot posalbla since a considerablo

portion al lhe malorizi has not been fully proceseed. In the proparation

of this summary all areas dl major signilicance bars been examiaed.

Jocaase ol tbe rolaminous information, all analysical and collation work

has not boes complatad; but li la sol considered that, based on all

0001013

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aratlabo laiormallos, the somaining work will materially alloci

tas conclusions drama la lila sunnary.

Tas polygraph latertler ad NOSINKO was inideied on

8 Hagues and concludod on 6 Augua: 1968. Approximataly sisty

rasadons of a periinosi sature vere includod la the polygrapa latar-

Mar. No problemo mero encouaiored durtag the polygrapa laterrlow

esd so additlonal senting ol NOSINKO la anticipated. Altacbod la si

copy ol the solt-oxplanatory report on lhe resulta of the polygrapa

Intarviona mits NOSENKO havo contined ainco tha polystapl

iarastler on a temporarily rodacod acilo in ordes to permit a tavier

ol previoso information and preparation o thie aumery. Thore 10 1i

DO CONDE LEBE LULUXO LIDTVIOMA MINA NOSENXO MUlI rETASI InfOrMALiOs

al inialligenco valuo, but information denaloped lua fiz tilll parrolt

a ductelos da tho caes of Yurty ivanovich NOSENK).

1.12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

0001014

4

SECALT

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TO

FROS

: Cricê, Security Researco Stari

: Interrogation Researca Division

SUBJECT : Yurt Ivanovich 105.2010

12 AUgUE: 1968

IRD $ 67-92

• Subject 16 a 40 year ola foruer KG3 Stalier wio deiected io tre

U.S. in i9ó4 ia Geseva.

DEKGROUED

сії:

"wir. Bruce lo Solie of the Security Rescarch Start has been de-

criciing ard interrogating Subject since October 1907 in order to

rosolve the issue wether Subject nas a dispaicied agent of the KOB.

die has conducted a vast arount of rescarch and checking with sources

¡ 1 ai effort to estaolisa the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose ci the poiygraph test was to deteruite:

1: Whether Suoject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;

2. Whether Suoject had Intentionaliy given Mr. Solle

Boy faisE inioration.

PROCEDURE

Subject las given a polygrapa examination on 2 August 1968 at

a safesite in the vicinity of washington, D.C. The examination vas

conducied in tre inziisa language.

Suoject's comprenension and the

ability to expreso himself in Engiisn was completely adequate for

purposes of poiygrash testing.

Suoject was completeig cooperative

in all respects.

Suoject displayea no evasiveness and appeareá to

be completely ¿raus tierever he was questioned or gave information

an a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the mericans, did you tell anyone else about your

Intentios to defect? No.

0001015

SECRET

• 450К9

Elsisle? 125 891

69T9T.010: 201

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NEURL!

120 614-

Page 2

Nie out int taco on the kus about your coatac" With

Merican Inteillgerce:

cre you given instructions by tre %0B to deù in costact witi

(merican Intelligence?

io.

ere you told üy the kus to defect in order to carry out a

Iteijigence mission? lio

Toe following reiovanù questions jere astoù during the secora test:

the UssR on the day of your acruction?

Here you acquainted vita CHaNePMOV? Xes.

Did you actually travel to Gortiy in joveroer 1963 to huat for

CITARSPAÑOV? YCE.

Are you dellocrately withholding fron us ary inioration about

the Ga recruitient of Aericars?

Does the XGB Lave MENKA and ¡aPTU. EO? Yes.

Were you the responsidie Case Officer for jona Abidian 1a 1960-613

Хеб.

so you iron the true tie di dunior or sisini? ¡o.

Dia jou ever save tucercüiosis? les.

The foilorinz reierant questions were asica on test three:

Dia you serve in Mary intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

Ma ivan in the iss durans the perdod 195? to 19598 Xero

To the best of your inorledge, were you in the Seventh

Department at thie time? Yes.

06

Dia you telephone tie GRU about Savinjat tals timer Yes.

• To the best of your inowledge, was POPOY compromised because

of the letter Vi, maters ualled?

Yes.

0001016

ZIBR

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$ :

Rude. 3

co the best of jour jacácigo, has manursial cinosei to the

103 because of the Insa curteiiinico on the Britica sibassyi

jes.

taù ther any misicadino immoration in tie sotes jou drougot

out fros the soviet ünicã? dio.

Dia jou Intertionally exauserate your personai association vito

Are you hiding any averse iniomation ajout your baciground? lio.

Subject's poiycrapa desi refiected no sigrificant responses indicative

of deceation regariing tre raiovant questions asicù.

so further polygraya

tests sere sizinistered on sis date occause the cramirer dia not want to

run tie rids of fatigue settirE 1a ard thus possibir clusing adrenalia

extaustion.

poivorapa testing was rasured on ú lugust 1963. Too foiiovins

relevant questions vere asica ca test iour:

Dia you join the XGB Iù iarch 1953? YcE.

Were you a KGB officer irca i953 to igú4? Yes..

"ere you a Deputy Chiel ci tre Seventh Depaicenti Yes.

were you only a Captal aù tris time? 'Yes.

¡ere you an officer 1n ise U.S, Eubassy Secuoa irón larca

1953 to way 19558

Ye6.

In 1958 and 1959 vere joù the Deputy Chici of the imerican-

Britisa-Candalan Sectick in the Severitn ispartuent?

Yes.

Fros january 1960 to vecesber 1951 vere jou the reputy to the

Chier of the first Section of the First Daparment?

Yes.

Frow January to July I9é2 were you the Cries of the First Section

of the Seventà Departzeao:

ere you an ordicer in the allou section, rarsu Department, ser

àt tne time oi the staringrad operatios against berson, Mule au

Etroudy Xes. :

06

06,06

0001017

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122 ÷ 67521

Page

: )

The jolioring reierant questions were asica on ter- sive:

sinco 1953 do jou suon of any other da recruit-cuis in tre

Merican abassy beadies indial and fluld ic.

Did the kua anor doout tie sotce you drous ..:

sio.

Have you told us the complete truth about your ius career? Yes.

Did you intentionally examerate your persoral Irvoivescht in

case6 in 1962 ani iJoy in anier to dicicaù us?

io.

Did you intentionally give us any fuico opcrationai

Infortation?

Dia GRIBMiOV offer you the position of Deputy Chies of the

First Department? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the

Chief of the First Departueat?

Yes.

in early 1960 dia GRIaliOV seli you tint your prizary respondibility

was to vori against Auericaa Code Cicris?

Yes.

Other than you rentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for

your defection? io.

Are you delloetely withroiding any inforation co any foreigera

recruitea oy the xuB? do.

The folioving reievaat questions were asied on test six:

Dia you enter tie kGa thiouza the luluence of Gezerai BOGDAN

KOBULOVE

Did you succeed BAKEVAIOV as Deputy Chier of the Zirst Section?

Yes.

Did GRYAZAOV succeed you as deputy Cilef of the ?irst Section?

Yes.

Were the CHERTPATOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB

knowleage?

No.

• .

: •

0001018

I BR

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=-

..

cist

ÜLÜRET

10: 61e.

Pia care au there any lodending infortuation 1a tie

Did you ever personaiig lect Gonzüri? so.

sas there a caule seão to coreva for yoü to assiGt intriv

In the BELITSKIY C66el

Yes.

06

Did you personaii, lase as approacn to Kursus at tie joacon

Літро? Yeє.

The, foiloring rejevant questione were asica on test seven:

Did you actually revlew the iOD i1le on Osirud? Yes.

DId LEE FARVEX OSWALD rECEIVE ANY XCA traiLOg Or AsBigTuente?

Were there any microphones instailed in the north ling of the

U.S. Rubassy 1n MOscOW?

Was the review of mierophone reports ore of your duties 12

1960-618 Yes.

Are you unthhoiding ory inioration knom to you concerning

¡GB nicrophones or ejectronde activity against the U.s.

Before your officiai transfer to the Seventh Departient ala

you renà the survelliance report on the visit of lordini

to PUsiti street? jes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of Sikov

1n 1962 1n Geneve?

Was the rari or lieutenant Colokei on your travel docent.

to GORiTY only a mistaie dy KiSiTOROV?

fes.

The following relevant questions were asied on test eight:

'While in tse V.S. Eroassy Section did you obtain a typewriter

for BOROni for the preparation of a letter to Eâvara zilis

SMINd? Yes.

.-

6001019

огрост.

1/BR

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variani:

20H672

2ag0 6

co aczeci to tie luericano? jo.

Suoject's polygrapa test oi ó luzust is'cerise recieored so:

Indicatione Di decepuros.

CONCHESTON

Baseà soiciy on the overall armiycis où Suuject's polygraph

testa, it la the opimion of the incroignca that ine Suoject ras

jen cubatantiaid truti in aurarilig ine rejevant queatione

aGiea.

6001020

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M/BR

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SECREI

II. AVALYTICAL COMVENES CONCERNENG THE EONA DIES

OF YURIY IVANOVOR NOSENKO

SECRET

EBUK I

Exches in atalie

577131416 29

freiassitreaties

: 6001021

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cwo--5g

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ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BOYA FIDES OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the irtroduction to this summary, information in

regard to Yuriy ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi-

trary but realistic list oí areas considered pertinent to the question of

whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB

knowledge; and whether his. 1962 and early 1964 contacts with represent -

atives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects

would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exag-

gerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a

"bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which

are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section

containing remaris in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. IS NOSENKO identical to the person winom he claime

to be?

B. . Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

SECRET

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read: altica igg

прит "на іні"

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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable expianation of

his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his

defection in 1964?

D.. Is ine information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA

concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-

zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB

career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con-

sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage

to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by

NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-

gence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in

information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant

a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective

which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB

with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his

knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given

a specific mission or missions?

2

SECRET

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- - teasi

SECKET.

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB

prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed

by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives

during these contacts or after his dejection?

L001024

= 3,

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IS JOSENKO IDENTICAL ED TEE PERSON

WHOM DE CLIENS TOBE?

• Баул 1￾

STRETABL ACA

reclassiflestion

0001025

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SECKe:

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person vinom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnised detailed information in regard

to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, assoc-

iates of his father and riother, and his own associates. The period

under consideration in this section is the period preceding his. entry

into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-

March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and

mother and his early. life, together with other information such as a

comparison

2 of photographs of Mostle and photograph of his father

and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 195ó with

Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich

•NOSENISO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-

building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisiactorily

supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern-

ing other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt

that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of

Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

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little or no value in assessing tie bona fides or non-bona fides oá

NOSENKO. An expose of his yourniul irdiscretions, of wnich te sas

admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENiO

was or was not dispatched b; lie KGB. Obtaining any collaterai first-

hand iniormation in regard to jOSENKO uciore 1945 would be of

negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from

Nikolay ARTAVONOV, a defector irom the Soviet Navy, concerning

the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory

school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad-

uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had

attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he shouid have

graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final

examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the institute

for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-

students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt inat he acrually

attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in

1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by

NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that

he had graduated from the Institute in 1949.. Actually this statement

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by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO

on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he

"completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO

has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to

1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in

1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation

caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950

instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has

characterized as hie "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt:

characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not

evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of

a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own

admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically

portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which

be had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during

March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been

seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of

3

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Stu....

time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is

considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub-

stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951

to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed

by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con-

cerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct

grammatical errors or speiling since to do so would be in conflict with

the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give

NOSENKO an opportunity to recuunt his life and activities to permit a re-

examination of the entire case.

The comprehension and fluency of

NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes

in October 1907 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interview's of and memoranda prepared by. NOSENKO since

• 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the

statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that

has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the

First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh

Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather

than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO

also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"

0001029

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(personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April

1955 rather than May - June 1955.

Since the unsatisfactory personnel

report was directly related to tir transier to the Seventh Department,

neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature.

An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between

errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by

NOSENKO.

Attachment:

31 Oct 67 Memo

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Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a hanüwritten memorandum

furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on

30 October 1967:

minion

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city

cle

Nicolaer, Ukraine.

•ic:

My family; the father - NOSENKO, ivan, b. 1902, was working

at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which

he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI),

D. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a

student.

In Sepiember 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but

studied a short period oi time because in October with the mother went

in Leningrad where the fatner was working at the shipbuilding plant,

"Sudemech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street

Nicoleki 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938:

at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St.. Canal of Griboedov,

154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

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devote

1938 1 studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living.

In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother

went to live in iVoscow in the end of this, year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here

I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941

I finished oth class and went with parents to rest to the souza (Sochi)

but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in

Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In

..Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChIZ, beirg there I tried to run to

the front with my playiellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned

home.. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in

July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special

school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class

in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This.

• school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achins' (Siberia) and I

did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the

"Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku,

where I was studying at the second course (9th class). in this school

I'twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon

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after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January

1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finisned

9th class and was accepted again in the military-ravy preparatory

school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in

Leningrad.

"it".

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km.

from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two

months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put

in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decider-not to return

in the school but to finish l0th class in Leningrad about what I have

written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such

my decision. With the help of the father's friende I quited with the school

and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January

1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWil finished and I

decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college

had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second

course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). in

Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmacher).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents

(St. Granovski, 3).

: Sk

• =3

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divide i

In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter

national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In july my father went in Germany with the group of engineers

and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant,

documents and a uniform):

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted.

with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine insulture. I

was in close sclilions with this girl, because of the pregnancy i married

her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and

we did not live together and we soon divorced.

In the end of 1946 I was

acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re-

ceived a flat in 1947 (St.. Mira - former Ist Uecyehckad, 162/174). In

• November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married

:;-her. The marriage was not successiul, I foundout about her close

relations with the brother, and the child-giri was born with patnological

changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her

and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working

the commission, which was deal ing with future works. of the students of

.,my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization

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and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry

of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the

help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the

intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my. future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a

group of faila I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950

I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951

and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (inteiligence of 7th

13

Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going

In to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately

after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. I the middle of May

I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I

finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health

I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of

¡ the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of

the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietak,

Kaliningrad'a district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a

/ rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service aiter finishing the

derains.002 0011025

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Becord course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also

the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence.

In September-October 1952 1 received a rank of licutenani.

In Soviete' the work was not interested and for me it was nothing

to do.

Besides this the climite was not good for my health and I decided

to change the job. With this

purpose before new year at the end of 1952

I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parente

at the evening farty at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I

did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a

former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I

was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me

on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing

more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the

head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN

about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium,

where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to

"Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There

•I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said

that he would settle my question concerning my job. After severa) days

in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to

0001036

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come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the re-

ception room of KOBULOV, but le was too busy and his assistant

SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of tie Chief of the Second Directory

SHUBNAKOV, who told me that thcre was signed an order and I was

accepted in the 1 department of 2 iuci direclory as a case officer.

SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of lie chief of l department GORBATENKO

(who was acting as the chiel of 1 Department because the chies of the

department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department

of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and

GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the l section of

the department. Then I with GORBATENXO went to the 1 department,

was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV

told ine that I will be working against the American correspondents,

showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were

working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV.

The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I

was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted

with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University,

and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents

at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

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St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I reccived a flat

at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracied a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice

of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors

asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an

operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given

me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once

more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a

letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The

plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNAKOV;

was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the

chief of the 2 directory, PEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's

organization also puniched me. I received a strict reprimand and waa

• freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member oi komsomol's orgarizationfrom. October 1943.

In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of'age) the komsomol

organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written

characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that

I did not appropriate to the l department 2 chief directory. In June-•

July. I'was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case

• 0001038

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livenes.

officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work agains:

tourista). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the

2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party,

soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a

senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In Auguet 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958.I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In

Ith department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to

work as a deputy chief of the l section in the l department 2 chief

directory (chief. of the l department, KLIPIN, Viad,, chief of the

1 section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana,

born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (hronchial

asthma) from 1957 and aimost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in

hospitale. In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of

living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB

in Ivov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow

I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of

2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia

0001039

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(counter-intelligence work among Soviet speciaiists in Ethiopia). The

chiei of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided

but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree.

The reasone were the case oi 1954 (illnes, and use of the passport for

"cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report

that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the l department till 1962. In January 1962

I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section

(work against tourite from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rani of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon 1

must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free

a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go

to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department

(the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working

till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school,

only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-

KGB at St. Kiselni.

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Stult:

Five times I was sent abroad: in 1957 I was in England with a

aport delegation; in 1958 was again in Engiand with a aport delegation;

in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation oi specialists of nickel industryi

in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to l department 2

directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzeriand - the conference of die-

armament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In

• 1953 with the wife I was resting in the luberculous sanatorium. In 1954.

I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage.,

In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia.

In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at

the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife

rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in

Kilovodek. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in

Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with ine wife in Sochi. In Juiy 1963

I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

C001C41:

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3. IS THE CLAIVED KUZ CARIER ÓE NOSENKO PIAUSI3=E?

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Easleiss tea aatreatis

dunabraciar &sa

-Leclassitraalian

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Sturina

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the

past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer

in the KGB. information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern-

ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so

extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed:

Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed

positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has

not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his

original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as

date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given

in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature,

as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day

of transfer irom one Department to another and not considered critical

or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false

information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

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his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary!

version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB

career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section,

First Department, SCD

. Late May 1955 - December 1959(1958 - December

1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh

Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of

• Section, First Section,: First Department,

SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section,

Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh

Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term. Deputy Chief is being used throughout this

summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief."

The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance,

including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used

2

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wavera

in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example,

a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad

may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the titie oi

First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief

of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all tne

Department sections.

The exception to the latter is when the Chief of

Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the

most imporiant section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only

over designated sections or organizational components. )

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO

has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates

his claimed positions in the KGB.. Detailed remarks on these topics are

contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO

was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department,

SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until

circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section,

First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information

with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department

in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-

ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available

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sure?

at this time. On the other hand, it is not Icasonable that NOSENKO

would lay claim to ine titie of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First

Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of

GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences

with officers ciosely associated with NOSENKO al that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD

or former oificers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with wnom

he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.

A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has

stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware

of certain activities inciuding Viadislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.

GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir

A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of

GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict.

with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and

talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description

of GOLITSY, of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls

rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any

reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such

an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this

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issue, it is eminently reasonable to conciude that the encounter took

place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is

no reason to attach sign. icance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed

pasition of Deputy Chiei, First Section, First Department, during 1960 -

1961 has had the most mer i in the controversy over his statements

relative to his KGB carcer. This particular aspect will be covered in.

detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy

over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB;

entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge

whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief oi the First Section in 1960 - 1961

on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First

Section was

commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief

in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Seciion in ine SCD,

• KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy

Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in

the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB

may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure

of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment

3

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divined.

as to whether NOSINKO held à certain claimed position on the basis

of a comparison of his activities and

responsibilities with that inherent

in a somewhat similar position in ClA.

One of the most important difierences between United Siates

agencies or organizations, inciuding CIA, and the bureaucratic structure

of, agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the

salary structure. Pay oi a KGB officer is based on military rani and

on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity

and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a

monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the

difference in montaly salary between a Captain and a major is twenty

rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and

a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles.

An increase in miitary

rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant

Colonel who is orly a Senior Case Officer receives less pay thas a major

who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain

from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various

claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold

the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual

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;.

supporting of refuting information, has necessarily been based to a

considerabie degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO.

Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resoiving the

• questions, out it is the only method possibie at this time.

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C. HAS JOSENKO GIVEN AN ICCERRIBLE EXPLAITON CE

LES MOTIVATION IN CONTECTENG CEL IN 1902

AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

0001650

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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his

motivation in contacting CL in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of

the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration

in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably

the most difficult in which to present a logical position with actual

support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although

motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation

problem is not a paramoun: factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or

is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in

1962 and defected in 1964 withöut KGB knowledgé and yet even at this late

date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature

which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.

Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit

unfavorable information weich-they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a reguest, furnished a.

handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of

which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct,

is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memo-

randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

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NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society

throughout their entire lives. The envirorment is an important factor

of influence in the lie of an individual and true disillusionment is at

best usually a gradual process in wbich many factors, some recognized

and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying

degrees.

NOSENO, until 1955 and possibiy until the deat of his father

in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy

parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains

employment.perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of

the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy

by Soviet standards but also held a higo government position. The

influence of his fatber and the name. of ais father undoubtedly was an

important is not the mosi important factor in NOSENKO even being

permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KG3 even though NOSENKO is

particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was

the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the

actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how

NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His

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periormance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that

be probably would have been summazily terminated if he had not been

the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

lí a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the

disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages

following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may

have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO

is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in

¡the USSR and bis behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time

after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and

the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through

influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation

in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money

and would sell "two

pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he

wanted to make a contaci with the Americans, that he vas not emotionally

ready to defect, but that de subconsciously believed that if he made a

contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could

„no longer retreat.

3

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NOSENKO nas stated that he gave considerabie thoug'at to the

best way to contact the Americans so that he wouid be believed and not

rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some.

information. NOSENKO staied that he thought if he approached the

Americans stating he was a "KGB counter intelligence officer who wanted

to give information, " he would not have been believed and would have

been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding

how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally

ecided to do it arough pal Ailusiom the CB considered a with

American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the

record.. NOSENXO did offer to sell "two pieces of information, " almost

immeciately gave more information, made no significant demande for

money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was

ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current

interviews stated, as be first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive

amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO

has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his

expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the

Americans.

.4

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NOSENKO has Distad that the sight before blo doparturo from

Gesara to tbo USSR ho gavo sorious thought to defection bus was sos

amotosally raspied to cofoct as tant tina. Following bla satura to lisa

Sortet Uston, NOSENKO, during a portod of timo, mado sla final

declalos to defect at tha fral opportanity, reallaing that it monas

leavlag blo vilio, callaras, and othor merabero al his far lly la eso

USSR.

Soo aspects of the notivattos of NOSENKO aro obscuro and

will probably so remata. I mould ba preferable ll an asses datallod

•chronalogy d! all the factore involvod could be prepared or 1f aren

corisia obvions inctors could be accuratoly dellnestad. These ara botie

Impossiblo as this lime and probably at any timo la che fucaro, What

ta. important ã1 this timo ta a docinion so to "hatbos the motivation al

NOSENKO was leood on personal restons tito no inplications of KGB

dispatch. It la considerod that the esplanation of NOSENKO concerning

blo motivation la acceptable and thai dia slatemast thal no one escopi

the Americana was awaro of hia contacto will the Amosleaza la 1962

0os bis intent to deface in 1964 lo supported by otizas informatos of a

calintarad sataro. (Seo Socton Ill, H.)

ALACATIDES:

Typed epy Memo from NOSENKO

5

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Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECI: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum

furnished by Subject on l November 1967, following a request on

31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to

the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an

understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of

the methods of the communiet regime, the knowledge.of.the real foreign

and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the right

ness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted

in a month or à year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I

think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's.

and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers

and periodice and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in

the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of

Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the

people of the Soviet Russia.

SECRET

GROUPT

•placed tres aricnalle

0001056

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When I worked Il years in MVD-KGB i understood and found,

out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime,

about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings,

about hundreds of thousande of the people of Russia who were (and

still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was

(and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was

several times abroad I have

seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in

reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying

at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping

me -- my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the

• Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real

show. I was thinking that they would not beiieve me otherwise. In

that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay.

abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even

when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that i did not want and could

not live more in the Soviet Russia.. In this period of time I have done

all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

G0U1/57

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vavooLi

It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult"

to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret:

10505

0001058

SFRACT:

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D. ' IS THE INFORVATICA PURMENZO BY JOSENKO TO CH

COICERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES.

AND ORGA VIZATION REASCYABLY COVMENSURATE

WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

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D.. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning

KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-

surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor -

mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,

and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with nis claimed

career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February

1964.

" In: reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given

to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each

department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with

consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception

or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically

be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no

accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-

mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is

actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events

or could be attributed to willful deception.

SECRET

Gaja 1

Escheted tas ataratie

#342,776.22,228.

rectasi: catas

GOU1CE0

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invest

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular

patterns or areas where jOSENKO has indicated he did not recali

specific maiters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas

have been noted.

NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory

as evidenced by the extensive information iurnished by NOSENKO purely

from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance

on the part of NOSENKO io discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has

known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topice of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB

officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career.

He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently

added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to

the volume and

scope of incormation furnished by NOSENKO. This in-

formation is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO

was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD,

during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Con-

sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in

evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his

indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during

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a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not

occupy the position which he claimed to have heid.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports

his claimed positions in the SCD. it has not been possible to substantially

confirm torough collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed

positions.

Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an

applicable.description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual

holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to bave held after 1958. It

is felt thero can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of

junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957.

As rogards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section,

Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO

held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal

judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in

as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in

regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual officês

he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four pri-

mary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -

1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers

3

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and other personnel, ard changes of personnel, as well as diagrams

of the oifices

of the Chiaf and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 -

1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENXO:

could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not

immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source

or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams

and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite

astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily

prepared the material in such detail. This sype of information is

peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another

defoctor and could, if not relatively correct, permit à rather positive con-

clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB

operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961,. and 1962 -

1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is

less.for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and, attitude

until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given

consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so

that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently

substantiated even though his actual job periormance undoubtedly

deserved a low rating.

C001963

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The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning

cases, KGE operations,

and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department

and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The

scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto

is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of

increased responsibilities.

His knowledge of the work of other departments

of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a

further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions

during this pericd of time.

5

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E. CAN THE INFOR VATION 2E3

SADS BY NCSENKO BE

CONSIDERED IN TOTO E FIVEG RESULTED

IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO TRE KOB AND/OR FAS

THE INFORVATION FURNISHED BY NOSINKO BEEN OF

SIGNIFICANT BENEFIE TO NESTERY INTELLENCE?

0001C65

SECRET

Excited tas swelle

8901378-188801

declara, Frisites

anor catas

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SECE

See DesertO te coasides

Westora cellizenca? Tre concasion in sagard io bui citas abora

of an incargible namize and in siscogico is accuraie ircasurement

NOSENKO as, as giariously indiccia, furnisivi Voimindas

irformation during curteri and previous mccaviewã, Anaccucato icta

o1 specific cases is ao: possibie at inis ime and wouié aubest ua cay

an interesting igure, me acica: signacance di Waicà woll do munginai.

Pricicady evesy interview wits NoSaNao, ovea an preset, caviais

iniormatus di councezintelligeace inceres: and la la expected ict ises,

producion cas consaue lur a corsicercoe period Gi tense. Tias Sauüle

I0- be consirued as an indication ina: disaAO is incessiorally wini-

colding irformation, jui ratati scai sinuation of bis memory carouga

normal questions ard discussions has bees asd can continue to be

productive.

SECRET

67584324

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-57t*

=

.=

Pratio

urcior lo Sorici accionais),

joweres, se ios iconici appicciniol: Esoformer or Currore Flasi

Caici Directoraie cilicers and diere is à considerabie exchange oi

dicers driveen ino ECD adá Sã5, inculion, nuncerous dicurs

oi she SCD ard oier Fiernai k03 orgarizasions travel abgoad witr

delegations, tourist groups, and as vistiors to varicas major excisitions

sucia as lorid's Fairã, i is imposaidie ai chis time to estimaie ino

auriaci o: 1G3 officers idertified by VOSENKO who have been ouisica

ine Soviet Bioe sinco nis iciaction 0r wiu wili be out sometime in die

iuture.

Tiere has dein verg lerie atompiu exploitation of iniorastios

¡urriscca"Sy NOSENO concerning Disco 103 oilicers ard, itereipre,

the possibie value oi inis iniormation io ürired Siutes intelligence

canoi de estimaica nor cantie acrontal camage to the XC3 de esti-

maied.

Disciosure di miormation curcerning ceriain XGB oficers would

be a necessary pari oi any distaica ci a iGS agent or cificer to ina

West either lor purposes of coriact with Western Intelligeace for a

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•sasure di te identidos dó approcracico 2, 29

DuuisC3 ofticoro and Sereral08 .

incred iGB agents coud soi in considurcá oi sugigible importance.

Obiaining specific iriornada la regará to NG2 Glicero di

KGB assots is imporiañi 10 Üriid Siuico irieiligence and a corsicer-

abie arnouri o manpower and rioney is speri on this activity. Even

acinowledging that it is muca mure curcuit dos CiA to obtai tais type

oi information aboui ise KGB, unici useruies in a closed sucicay, tran

it is for the iû3 to obtain the icorrij cá CLA empiojoes, l is bolevis

coübiu any reäder of this sumiraij volid consider that tie iconuri-

cucion o l2: 06o) clA empioreos are feve si dináreagen asseis co

the KGB wouid de aiy jess inar a very serios compronise di läiudtle

incormacion.

Prior to die aciection di NCUENAO, littie was losowa cá tie

organization of the SCD o ciner internal 1G3 organizations. Tre

incormation provided by lOSENXO concerning boin sas beer desiled

ard extensive. Thai this informacion is of vajue to the United Siates

Inteligence community is hardly subjeci io dispüie, althougà analysis

3

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•?".

can differ as to tre weiga wrich sacula be given io dir value oi this

sype of iniormation.

NOSENXO has furnished iniormation concerning SCD, XC3,

recruilmerts of nited Siates citizens ard ioreig. nationais covering

the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a

statement thai NOSENiO has furrishcó iniormaiion in regard to all

SCD recruitments, even oi Americans, äuring inis period. His irfo=-

mation based on personal knowlcuge is in gencral limited to ihe First

Department and Seventh Departmeni. He has fürrished information

concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some

FCD cases, but this information was in generai acquired incirectly

from social or business conversations with othe: KGB oificers.

NOSENKO has furnisned information in regard to a rumber of

cases which were previousy krown io United Staies intelligence. Wrile

the value of such information carnot be considered high, the additional

detaäs which NOSENKO has provided in a rumber of cases cannui be

dismissed as being of no value io Western Intelligerce, even ii ine

information cannot be regarded as damaging to ine KGB. Furthermore,

inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information

already known, there is so basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his

having provided such information.

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i.?.

-=.

Nosauro has furnisced iniormaion in regard to a nuribar oi

recruitmests by the KGB oi sor-Bioc railorals who were known by

Wesiern inielligence to be pro-Communisi or

even cornected with

Communist organizations.

Tre identification as a recruited XG3

agent of an indivicual previous-y knows io be pro-Communist is oi

considerable value io Western Irichligerce and may be considered to

have resulted in some damage io the 13B. Admittedly, the potential

to the KGB of an ageni who is known as pro-Communist is less than

that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Commurist"

or even "Communist" are noi syronymous with "recruited KGB agent."

' NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in

which there was some previous but limiied information. In a number

oi these instances the additional inormation from NOSENKO has per-

mitted identification of the individuais of irierest and the closing of an

"Unimown Subject" case. In such instarces the information from

NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since

the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not

have permitted ultimate identification of ice individual of interest.

This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage

to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

5

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NOSENKO ras furnished indiricon i regará 10 i innoc: cé

incividuals, bol American and nor-diue soreign, who were recruied

by the K0B aid concerning whoir Wester mieligence dad no siganicäno

incormation. li is recognized inni coriuia di these cases meruered ey

NOSENKO, particularly in the touriot caregory, wouid paüsnoyaiver

have actualy naterialized as producivi 103 agenis. Tais Coud be

¡or various reasons including later iciusui io cooperiio, ici giu-

graphical inaccessibility to ine KUB, oi sot being either i lie time

of SCD recruitment or later in a posicion io jurnish iniormation ci

interest to the KüB. in this regard, dûsENKO has sicied isi ai icasi

until 1962 there was a detrite tendency in the Seventh Deju ridess is

make a "recruitmen" as a statistic ¿or ine end-ci-year report ivia

though it was appareni the agent ai too timo lad no potentiai and isai

it was highly unlikely ¿here wouid do a porenziai in the furcie.

•NOSENKO ras furniched iniormation on or icads io à rumber oi

cases, primarily third nationais bu some Americar, in wrica de cas

been unable to furnisa suilicient deials io permit identification ai inis

time.

In certain instances it is boleved trat an identication wait be

possible aiter acditional rescarch and investigation, Until an icessi-

fication is made, the value of any particular lead to Wesier= intelli-

„gence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potezzial value

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cannot be igrored, às in exampiù cá inis caiegosy, NOSENãO as

furnished a lead, otill urder investonior, so an uniderided agert,

Frobabiy soi an American, wro in 1962 vãs is a position to remove

ine "NATO Emergeroy Codes, " dulver ine codes io ire d53 íci

phoiographing, and inen succesáuliy irjiace ine codes. Bicause it

•agent is as yer unidenified, his current access to iiormation alteciang

the security of ine Unites Stures curnoi di jauged.

In all, the informacon iron NOSENKO in the category a cases

where Western Irielligence die not previuisly kave signiticart iríor-

mation must be considered on bularce as laving resulied is maïeriai

damage to the KGB and o signilicant beneit to Western intelligence.

Quantiy alone of Ci or 2i inioiration érom a KÑZ dciecior is

noi a sincará on vnier to jlage dora dices. The question is wheike=

¿é amouai oi ris iniormaios is reusorabij commersuraio vita his

claimed jositions in tre KGB. Inis Güestion as regards lOSENKO

has been examineá, with aifirmative indings, in another section of

this paper:

A few examples from the asove cited caiegories oi iniormation

furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as

illustrations and are so. necessarily listed in order of importaace.

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.. avis

employee woo speni corsicciano rime lair cush is 1562 - 1963.

t:e Firat Section, First Departers, SCO, 16 562 asc Wis Zouriva

interviewed in 19ó4, FOW1ßo did ruincan in ico seen recinicé,

bus suspicion a for casuas area, escugo su incido coinco vicio

06

li inceci EO: ARowas recruded s, die 105, it la mousuione

1o determine cow much iioraiior wouid have bea Corpionisidoy

D6

Educa li wale in the üssil, nu cid tara coram access in die baied

Sicies Finbassy.

There is dune radar is succo dial i oRwas

recruited, it was se wro was responsion ini ino ecopianise di a

potentialy vailabie Soviei wain iá lini niori Cis Was atiorapriro io

establish cortaci using GOAadas intermediary.

NOSENXO in 1904 furnished biormation la regaro io à "ZHiR"

(apparentiy a KGB code same, aldough NOSENKO scougat ii was a true

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BArTO). Ho Identlilod "ZHARI" (phozelle) no an Americas codo clerk

to dalacted to the USSR la 1961, An Internal assumpilos mao mado

bacod on the orignal lead luernatos frOM NISENKO AL "EHARI"

Mao VIctor NOTTIs HAMILTON, ARE FCU:! MIlE! HINDALY, a former

NSA aroplayae muho delacrod to la USSR Is 1962, Rod the lafornialion

18021 NOSENIO mas nover disemlasted or Investigatod.

Prior to the surfectay al JobA DiaCoe SMITH by the Soviato

ls the Inil of 1967, Faaiet163 lalormatton concoraing KGB knowlodgo

of Arnerican codo clerke mas belaz lavendigalod; and Joha Discoe

SLUTH was a loading suspoct. After le ourfacing of SMITH by tho

Sortera, le became appareDi lar SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, Was

Adontical to "ZHARI." Intestigatlos diaciosod toas no defiallo lalorma.

Hes could be astabliased in ragard lo the actuel mbereaboute al SNATH

attor circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively atarad thas appropriaco

LanDarigation la 1964 al too "ZHARI" load would have lod to the Identi-

RCELOR O1 JODI DISCOS SUITH AS "ZHARI." HUMeTOr, Duch IROnUS-

cation would bavo been of considorabie interesi to tho Departinent ol

Sita and ClA, aad could rosy mall tara porratiod cortala action tilcà

moald bave al leasi lossened the propagasán ellact al ida surprtso

assouIcames: by tha Sardola la lhe fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, la Juse 1962, furalabad Information from walch

WIlLem VASSALL could be quickly Identlilod. GOLITSYN, la lato

1960 - carly 1961, bed furalabad Information coscarsing a Sortal pose-

station of is Artiles Goveramont on the barle rust the Britab

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Sorvicos had complled a llot si menty suspecis, including VASSALL.

• Even though lt may bo prezumed that lorestigation of the trenty suspecta

would ultimataly have resulled in a desertilaation Cal VASSALI, W20

riso agent on wizom GOLITSYN bad fursiabrd certain infornados, tre

¡afOsmation SOn NOSENKO In June 1962 resulted in la eatilor termal-

nation by to Arlilah Serrices of a adll valuable productive KGB agent.

Alibough not the CRAo of a KGB agent, le malter of this micro-

Mb.2208 la dae United Stales Embaddy abould also bo montioned.

GOLITSYN, following ble defecion in lecernber 1961, furnishod

certato iplormation in regard to mtcrophonos in the Unitad Stares

Embasay (Charcory). Since lo laci the inicrophones me s connected

to contral cables, locatlos of ona microphone would logicelly have lod

to tho 0xp0t07e of lie antlIa set of intesophonos. Homever, appro

priate action war not taion on this Information and the KGB would hare

bean awaro tart no action was lakes prios lo June 1862 when NOSENKO

LL NOSENKO lo e diapatched KGB Agent, l1 1s sut clost wisy lbe

ISGB world attract spacifle ailantion to a sysiem n1 microptones whicà

must faro etlll lad some value so ol june 1962. A precumpion may

Do Deado that 11 NOSENKO was a dispatchod agent, the KGB had, 13 ol

1962, as advancad sisten of montloring devices maica rendared to

abovo microphone Byalera obsolela. Howevos, no COnCIsCO evidenco

of such as adrasced system la avallable and ll abould be solod thai it

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giver a ical am idio à.

niel generas.

jéalu.de.

chain dais

:9u2.

interviews with YOSENKO rave ropesis in ipproximicly severtica

now Americar icads which are buino evarsince oy the 23i tickser-

views tave alsu resuited in more spicite inormation to ilord io in

¿cational devtiogieni di inse cases ay ine 23a

MOSE%RO ins provided lois io over lộo circ-cury iCB

agenis. Geogiomically incod icids ane wide in seoge, inciding

ruticadis di such courtroos is iconcsia, austria, Uruguay, do taéca

¡ingüom, France, West Gerinary, Biodun, Swedta, Australa, jir,

Vexico, jady, and a numicer dé circa cousiries.

incided in ire more insportant ol tuese ageni or octer leads

are leads to high ieveis of governmen: and inselligence to code clerks,

to access agents for America ia-geta, to actual or possible illegal

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invoscow, ircluding acinal dão cinicudia cocess inio coriain istiu==

Embussies joüi not the Ericia, ui imuricia Irribassica).

miorui ageris, nis iniorraión do soverui sung derivei durirg sis

¿rue mortas in Gerova ir isc2.

in is impossibie io sive in exaci eviinnica dé dio significance

có rio joreiga icads furnioned s; NOSaN:O. Thai thoyare of sigii-

Acari vaie io lesior, imedigeice and camaging 10 ine 103 is barcä;

subject io disquie, This evacaica mus: dù giver even inoüga inere

are rumerous foreiga itais vinich have noi deer adecuaie uspioied

at this time. '

•

As a final note, the implicó conciusion in tse previous summary

is accepted that the failure of NOSENiO i0 provide usabie positive

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. g

SECAL!

Insolligonco kalormation la sut a sigalficant factor la a datormlartisa

"of blo boss iscos, Tho qualificasion abosid, homores, be added lbat

de sa sat feit taas NOSINKO bas, so of Uhis timo, bear fully debrielod

1a nAsy useas al poslive istelligenco intereat.

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SECKEI

IS THERE EVIDEXCE 05 200 222282108 Ca "O92 C70K

NATORVATO: 307051003:355

•O "

-C

WOELD WARRANE A CONCLUSION FRAI NOSENEO

WAS DISPATCHES 3Y THE 3022

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SECRE:

F. Is there evidence of KGB decestion or "give away" in

incormation furnished by YOSENKO which wouid warrant a conclusion

that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KCB? The conclusion in this

summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGi. in

reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above que iion has

been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by

NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration

in arriving at a conclusior. that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by

the KGB. I NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have

surely been willing to sacrifice certain iniormation of value to the KGB

in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO

was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB

purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be

unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first

contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his benavior during thèse contacts is

particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would

have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications

of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

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i...

...

NOSENIO has staied that his original approach to "sell two

pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to

'be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact

with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the

time, and felt that if he merely stated that le was a "KGB counter-

intelligence officer who wanted to give information, " he very possibly

would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his

first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information"

and began to talk quiie freely on other matters.

IL NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962

contacts, would have been very carefully brieied and that his remarks

or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any

suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current

review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1902

indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and acial lies were quite

likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO

and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO

that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in

Geneva.

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...:

NOSENKO, during his five contacis in Geneva, made many

statements which in retrospect were impossibie,

and the investigation

of which could only have raised certain questions con arning NOSENKO.

The following is a list of the more obvious areas in wnich NOSENiO

made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with

Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the

recruitment jitch to James STORsEad (This was

a lie and an interview with ToRsaERcifuita display.

of photograpi would have disciosed at NOSENXO

did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment

approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and

LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(C) NOSENKO said he recruited [EUNT (Forace

LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSENKO never met

06

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...

(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact wita/Edmund 06

STEVENS iao, according to NOSENKO, har! been recruited

by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personaty met

(STEVENS and oniy bad seen rEVENionco at a distance.)

(e) NOSENXO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY"

in Moscow as 1949-1950. At ihe same time he furnished

information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to

Dayle Wallis SMIT*i) was in Moscow during a part of the time

that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigred to

MOscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actuaily in

Moscow 1952-1954.

(1) NOSENKO said be, GRIBANOV, and anoicer officer

met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since staied he did

not meet SMITH and loat his only role was obtaining a ioreign

typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMiTH

operation. )

(g) NOSENIO in a number of instances spoke in the

first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that, " in

reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now aùmits

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he was not involved but had some knowledge. (I

NOSENIO was under XGB control in 1962, both he

and the GB should have known that these indicated

exaggerations would eventually lead to a question

concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. )

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between

information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been

furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were

quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because

he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered

already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain

of the similarities ai the time could only be explained in lerms of

NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of

the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to

[Johan PREISFREUND] 06

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a

[military code clerk case (James STORSBERG) 08, 06

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a

trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name,

to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was

connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

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..-÷

Moscow, ur a recruitment of an American formerly

with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENXO

related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the

assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)

(a) Both furnished information in regard to

microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to

Edmund STEVENS and Ja Honey SHAPIRO.

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual

differénces in the amount of information furnished on any partic alar

topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in tais

summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest

is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases,

or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate

question concerning the bona fides oí NOSENKO.

The above area of concerr has been thoroughly examined and

it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information

on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or

greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence

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it...

that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during

current interviews

satisiaciorily sourced his intormation in almo st

every instance. In a few insiances he has said he dia not recall

how he learned of a particular pieci of information but these

apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are

considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between

information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and

information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have

been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States

Government was or is co-cerned related to certair activities centering

around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an

officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955

and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Tberefore,

the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases

or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN

furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not

unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN

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ires and was in coniaci wis dired cinioro di due Dirot Section ini

ConaStl das airbutod his icovicago l ciriano Casto Gr acuviales

ci ine Fiaso Deparimeno, SCD, primarij io nis associaios with

coriai cificers la the Dirsi Degiatria, Soi.

li is recogrized trai ibero nio cortain condicia la incorniarion

possibie io saibiacioräy corrono ieran miornaion lion Gorast

viis information iram MOSDNIO. Pics :ú2 - 103 di le previous

summaiy refer io iriormation from GOLES!) laica is cruinciorizid

as "iriormazion aboui ñ0B Operaiono aguirsi Immussy Code Cicrks à

19ó0 - 190i." The suicrences are io intormación iron COrärSyd inoci

or remaris by Geradiy ivarovica CRYAZiOV ard Valin Viriviürier

KOSO÷4POV di tue Firsi Section, Firsi Departnert, SCD, and ar

dificer oi the Seroni Sacron, Firsi Departmesi, SED.

NOSENTO ras siaied inui re vas Dazij Guiei oi ine Firsi

Seccoa, First Depurimeni, SCD, during 1960 - 1901, inai his poiriäj

responsibility was wori againsi coda cieris ai tre United Siates Embussy

in boscow, and that toth KOSOLAPOV ard GRIAZNOV were engaged ir.

the same work and inder his supervision. The siatement ly GOLTSYS

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W....

that NOSENXO was noi Depuy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has

been noted and commenica on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSY" has furnished certain iniormation wrich he re-

ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, couid

not be immediately correiated with information from NOSENKO, it was

previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part

of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility

that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain

instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now beer. possible to correlate irag-

mentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO,

making it evident that in these instances the differences could rot be

construed as in any way refiecting against NOSENKO. The four examples

cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible

correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this

time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnisned information which he

received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV

that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

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American iemale employee of the American Embassy

in Moscow inrough a male Soviei friend, but ihat ide

atrempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished iniormation

that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of

the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return

to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to

efiect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the

secretary, but did recall ¿hat it was a long and "German 08

sounding" name.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a

reczuitment aitempt againse Collette SCHWARZENBACi] 06

who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary"

referred to by COLITSYN. However SCHWARZENBACH

was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but

had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador

BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed

as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The

recruitment attempt agains: (SCHWARZENBÄCH, according to 06

NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First

Section, First Department, SCD.

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MCGREY

(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contairs iníor-

mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYANOV in

the spring of 1960 that GRYAZAuV had deveioped an operation

against an American Embassy miliary code cleri. in wnich the

iGi was "99 per cent sure" that the target wouid be recruited.

This is believed to undrubiedly be a reference to the case oi

Lames STORSBERojuio was acually ine subject of a recruir-

ment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that

GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from

GRYAZNOV. in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow

rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was

preparing ior his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This

theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous

summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January

1961 from Vladisiav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)

that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the

successíul recruitment of an American employee of the

Embarty. Johan PREsSPREuND|was used in the STORsBE al

operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also

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aware thai GOuTSYN had a conversation wii KOVSHUK about

06

PREISFREUNISinCe GOLITSYN wanted to use PREISFREUND

in Heisinki. NOSEYKO has siated he was not present during

the above conversation. It is very possibic that KOVSHUK

exaggeraied a liitle in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the

matter of why GOLTSYN could not use PREiSFREUNSas an

agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive inforination in regard

to the James STORERO case and with due consideration to

the accuracy and recoilection of GOLITSYN, there does not

appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of

NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report-

ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV

concerning what is considered to have been the James 06

STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by

NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG case. The

exact date of the recruitment aitempt against (STORSBERG

has not been positively established, but it is considered to

have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the

March-April 1961 period. The statement byfjames] 06

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STORSBERG) at it occurred in Ociober 1962 is com-

pieicly unaccepiable and is even contradicted by other

(c) Page ló3 of tie previous summary contains

irformation from GOLITSYN which he had received from

GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American

employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited

or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual

compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.

The previous summary also states that according to

GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in

various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just

become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing

iceoiogicai rather than biacimail recruitments. SHiELEPiN

aid not exclude future use of the phoiographs which the KGB

would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the

homosexual compromise of Robert BARRET wiLo was a

guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and

with whom "SHIMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

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agente of NOSENKO, became acguainted. Work against

the United States Exhibition was ine responsibility oi

the Nintn Depariment, SCD, but various Departmerts

were particip. ung under ine direction of the Ninth

Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeedca in

involving BARRET lin homosexual activities which were

photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,

although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB

was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a

general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment

of the United States Exhibition guides due to the pianned

visit of President EISENHOWER to the Sovict Union.

NOSENIO also stated that the compromising materiai

and information on BARRET T)was later given to the First

Department and that [ARRET I was recruited by the Second

Section, First Department when he returned with another

Exhibition in 1961, and thai he, NOSENKO, was not involved in

the recruitment operation. BARRETT, following his return

06

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to the United Staies in January 1902, confessed to the

FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of

compromising photographs which had been taken

during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this

time, it is possibie that the information furnished

by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV

actually refero to the/Robert BARRET Tease. Il ohould

be noted that robert BARRET )couid not actually be

charactcrized as an "American employee of the Embassy

in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor-

mation from GOLITSYN that in

the spring of 1960 when he

visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned

from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy

code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to fielsinki.

GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had

already furnished the KGB with some inforration, that he was

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considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if

..the transier of the code cierk materialized, GOLITSYN

might have the code cleris as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which ca:. be

correlated in any way with the above information from

GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN

resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation

which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is

considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer

to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in

Moscow during 1960 - 1961.. Ii is also possiole that the previous

remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who

might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks

in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information

obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in

November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information

from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

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considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if

the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN

might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be

correlated in any way with the above information from

GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN

resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation

which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is

considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer

to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in

Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous

remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who

might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarke

in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information

obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in

November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information

from NOSENIO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

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also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-19ó1 career

Of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinici

to accompany an American Embassy code cierk on the train to

Nioscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance

with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was

06

undoubtedly John GARLAND and the train manifest lists John GARLAND]

and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the

same train from Heisinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the

identity or John GARLAND but claimó no snowiedge os the above trip

of KOSOLAPOV to Feisinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically

charged with work against code clerks, showd have been aware of the

November 1960 trip of KOSOLA?OW to and from Helsinki. His laci of

knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities

such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be

interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispaiched by the KGB since, if

he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of

•KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the

*KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

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A theury which has previously been given consideration and

Warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched,

his mission was to confuse leads furnishea to American intelligence

and/or to denigrate the value of information fuznished by GOLITSYN.

In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during

current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way

be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does

not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,

when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO,

his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD, "

or "You's

should ask GOLITSYN about that. "

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of

NOSENKO wità CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by

the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing, oi certain

events should be noted.. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961.

NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland,

where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not

impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or

potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN,

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seleci NOSENKO as the individual wno would be dispatched io counter-

act the possible damage, and appropriately brief "OSENKO prior to

his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Thereíore, it NOSENKO

was dispatched by the KG3, it would appear that pians for this would

have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN

aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original

plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched,

it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENIO to

Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have

been dispatched to confuse and divert American intelligence and thus

'to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United

States Covernment, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should

and has been given full consideration, out it is not possible to factually

substantiate of refute this theory in the absence of specific information

that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should

be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from

NOSENKO is accepted, what eftect would or could it bave on the efforts

19

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of American counter-interigence to determine the identity of and

take appropriate action against KGB peretrations of the United

States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be

that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli-

gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-

sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.

In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there

were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy

expressed opinion of YOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary

and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred

of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements

are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time

there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the

expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any

particular knowledge of ECD activities. In addition, he does not claim

to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD.

As an.

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example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities

against members oi deiegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students,

ard individuals in the ÜSSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or

a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limised and at best

mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed krowledge of

activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,

nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh

Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain

notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number

o! Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code

name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an

opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department

and constitute the only inowledge NOSENKO had of these particuiar cases.

0001(99

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G. IS THERE EVIDENCE DE & POLITICAL OR ANY

OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WAICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCE

OF NOSENKO BY THE KOB WITH PERVISSION TO SPEAK

FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF TLE XGB

AND WITHOUE JOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC

VISSION OR VESSIONS?

0001.100

SECRET

CROSI

Exciates tos tritsatic

declass/fres. lon

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.ore

MACH CONVERGE D RENDECE G 8052020 80892 BORDARE GLE LEE

LO DEONE AURE BO GUA SORGE RECLE PORGERLO DI REE 303 426 NEA

2092070 CoRREren E 222016€ 226212 SE 2262227 E Faö Gwobe Ebosh-

wiia she sigle excepica démicá viiov, iuro is no evicinoo cáa

political or ciser syze dajecive wiica coula do considurud di suicicao.

importance by iso KGS io Wirrari ini Cosaica una XCE ubices Wiin

tao knowledge di NOSaNiC io spumi ireely with CLà Witioni ais bebng

diven a specific riesion of iriso dis s; ice X02.

in is accopiod in ino Soviet löndersare Woud üe anticciy cagnese

cá inesructing dao 403 in disputca a rice Glicer for permenent dosestion

io Unirà Sires aliaoricies vita no specido incalligence mission and ro

limitions on ino KGô inicurgerce iniormaton be raga caveal providirg

¿bai suca aci wouid, in sce carimuse oi sau leadersaio, re lu in a ret

polisical gain lor tue USSa. For such a possibilty io de seriousiy

entertained by ine Sovieis, bowevez, li svoüid nave io involve ar issue oi

major imporiance io ite Sovia: Icadership and presumabiy would hava to

0001101

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-

imoving me destrod cal ind daring every dote pauscotlaty

Oi success.

migan ince toe above requireminão do tau assassimila de frishco

Konzedy: the invoiseniori di jiù Fantaj Doraid in dou assassince.

and his associacon vich tae Sovior Jrion Given (a) specuratica

obtaining at tae ime jat there was Soviet involvemene in dee

assassination, joj e premise ¿cai in faci ¿nere Was to Sovie:

irvoivemeni, and (c) a hypochesis du. ice Soviet icadership was dcezly.

¿corcerned lest erroneous concisions de crawn Weice coulá irad to

irreversable actions, it is conceivable in de Sovic: leadersto migai

• have been prepared so take extreme sicos io convince nicol Sarus

autaorities of their non-involvemont in tra assassinazon. (Cat Jussuge

to toe Unitea Staies Governmer of ice aiegedly congies Savio: consuc.

file on OSWALD was, in itsei, an unprecedented aci.)

Tbe NOSENKO case warrants examination in se above regare ir.

lighi of the fact thai among the ircamation NOSENKO provicei was

"inside" KGB informazion on OSWALD: information waice purporady

0001162

2

539

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revealeà tao subsance dé dù corini di te diGa tiles or eStALo.

Tais inio-mañon Cled. j ludi: ind more Was no fiCz cecilisiig

continuing series o piuble.ns.

Epon examination, aowevez, JOSETãO does no- mee: ice

requiremen's pramised above lo- sericüs soviet considerazioa cá a irce

KGB defection.

The lolowing reusons ronder lais unacceptable:

a. The chronoiogy, in irsel, preseris virially impossibie

problemis for suca a faises, viz. NOSENKO's inisial aperoach to Cat

in Jure 1962, 17 montas prics io ide assassinacion of President Kerredy.

b. Vailo ine iréormativa iron JOSENXO on CSTALD is

interesting and pertinent,

it is mor, inicture,

scope, ard conteno,

sufficiently convincing fur United Si'es, aumorities io reaso-ady se

expecta to conclude ibai it represeniea trechivocal pIosi oi Sovies

son-involvement.

c. It is impiausible noù to assume tai dea Sovicas worid

assume thai United Siates autorines, in ary examinaños os ine

possibility of a Soviei (KGB) band in ihe assussinarion, wolá presume

3

G001103

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congüomenicon Waich lünd cicino iowledgcacilly by ary &ce

¿ción incivicials speciliació concernua vin miracos di taio dacaro.

Thi KGB carcer o N'OSENÃO Woüù nor permi dren soricus

considezaion diat l'OSENKO Coud citü ipicinij icon icoü inüo ini

anova very limited category.

It is accordingly conciuded ii saa jussicity di a porcicady

motivated iree dispaica can in due Cuse Ci NOSENO be sarisiacioriy

eliminated.

The possibility has aiso beca considoroi inui the KGB riza-

cave teorized thai by dispaiching an ageni, in this cuse an odice:,

wita curnerous leads to non-vuluzbie or non-curreni KGS agents ci

casas, the facilivies of me Unitea Staios inicüigence community word

be practically rautralized ior an extondod parioá oi time. This couid

ordy be based on an assumption thai zia Uniïed Siaies Inielligenca

community would involva a major portion di lis personnel and esioris

in te investigation and resciution oi cases viaica lad little o no curcent

or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be

arbitrarily eliminaied witcout iull consideration. I is noi believad ha-

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10521K0 in die absence ca any ivannico dat do sad day ico missioa

Di missions to initill coris via do isove Caregory, curticularly sinco in

ovizar assessment oi ilo incornamon ieads io me conclusica dear ¿ull

ixploimcion di his iniormacior wouid io quito damagery to see lice.

Consideration di mu zuove possinloy musi aiso include ci.

evaliaiion oi she deerun choci on to prospecis ci futuro recrulencais

by sce KG3 caused by legal acion tion agains: individuals exposed ay

incosmution from the dispurched agent us officer. Tre deterrent offuci

on oiters di ine convicion aid sentencing oi pursons vico kava commited

a crima or crimes has long dean a part cí the legal cory ci way persoas

woo commit à crime scoula be inprisoned or punished.

The deterreni effoci on otbars oi ice trials and corvictions oi

William VASSALi, RObEZ: LeE JOHNSON and James Allen VINTKEY-

BAUGh saould noi de underestimaiod,. The KGS aiso could rot save

known that incormation furnished by NOSENKO would not result in tac

triai and conviction oi cuur KGB agents of reczuitments concerning

whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

5.

0001105

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H.

IS THERE AVY EVE 2NOS OUT THE CONTACTS CE

NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 19: HITE CE WERE ENOWN TO TEE

KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR IHAT NOSENKO

WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RE-ITIVE TO FIS BEHAVIOR

OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING FRESE CONFECTS OR

AFTER HIS DEFECTiON?

0001106

SECRET C

tenapa des

Арізі тон3я

÷4=

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H. Is there any evidence that the contucts of NOSENKO in 1902

or in 1964 with CIA were known to the XGB prior to his defection or

that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior

or KGB objectives during these contacis or aiter his defection? The

conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his

defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in

:: previous sections. It is being treated bere as a separate area of interest

since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as

the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning

whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be

based on the full review of available incormation from NOSENKO,

collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the

individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of

each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacis of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962

and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

0001107

d: 1

¡Entistia lios arianatie

SECRET.

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Schie.

necessarily based in pari on a judgment as to whether any of his

activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion

that they were or could be in any part the result of XGB direction

or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent

behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion

was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB

control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962

. contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to

the KGB later and NOSZKO was doubled by the KGB.

It was con-

cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant

serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate

conclusion that the IGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in

KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free

to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,

during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his

personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be

kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

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u......

Viná Smils Eninssj ln juucoi ccnicdnnio ino Connco ilis Cãi cao

iãie diú ño= mion üo je cumiimá ind iouid nüi décognico any imorapiad

cormaói viddia due Sovicï Urion, MeSaãàO also duarioicà ztorraiion as

¿0 ráu ecason dor dio conccca inci nu iréorrainon étgaäclng änd coräes

Wiü Cià McComö écchiá m dio Üirinh Guido Smunssy Hn Didcdod Gna diê

dá-jers io dOSaNiO indij cornci dù Luempicù conaci Wim DOSaNKO

in ie üssii.

I is recogrizoù ini iù miovo mcicaiod concuon d dceadao

about his persomi security is nos suostntial ericence taú: NESZAKO

•was aot uréer 10B coriui, cowevas, it is evidezce iui NCSEiiO Wis

no: lã any way escouraging ciancessne coriact oi NOSINAC wisir ia

USSR; waich very ikely would inve beca an aim ci ze XG3 E X05230

was üdes XC3 control.

The maierial vaica NOSEN:O iurniscod io Cin in1901 suü Deer

careíuily reviewed to ¿ciermiro l tire is-any éviuence agt ie áCE

participated in any way in toz assorabling of this raicer unicüo coilaciion

of material. Nono oí the maïrial appisas to have duen di in ¿ccouniabio

type and, on ibe contrary, iù uppears iu: lOSaNio couid cave turniscid

all oi the matezial to CIA ard returred lo tae Sovict trion wizzout tze KG3

ever at a laier date becoming awure zut use maieriai was acially missing.

'The laiter staiement even includes io mavel docümert waica aumorized

the trip of NOSINKO io Gorkiy in December 1963.

00011C9

pintrc ds toe-ca fire:

laraa cac cotead cracded ito

3

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NOSENKO, tis partino documeni Was noi accounicoie in isco di las

only recejoaly io tuca li in ivaça coccessino cuidonasemone dos travol

¿spenses.

oi Lieliterai: Coionti.

NOSENSO bas compiorely retracial suo cicui iu divino sul ise

ranx of Lieuterant Coiurei, siaing zai Evir as a Digury Gicáviazini-

ment be was orly à Caridin aimouga be las entied to and especica io

receive ibe raris di Major in eugy llos, dûSINio cas sitocicãi

giving tim ise raris di iieuierari Colonel in die abori ¿coureni was

ERE eTIOI DE RASAPEROV, ie OSlicer un duty deie SCE on Surday, and

thãi practically all Depuiy Caleis di Degarmori in di SOD ind ai leüsi

the rank of Lieltenani Coionei.

The above expianation dy NOSENiO may wail de considezed sy

readers wita at leasi a degree o siepicisa. Ecwever, # OSENXO

was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem tai de could cave stes pro-

vided wita something à limle more substaniai iu document dis cinin ci

the rank of Lieuterant Colozci, in zadizion, it would seera ssai ice KGB

0001110

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cumu ive proviceá MCSDito vii cune sype di rocurioni Waica

Woid support ai susi che dimis ciamod pubitons in due SCD, ICe.

Bron ine Cherapinor Purers Lu ictin uny Way oppori tse Ciüro di

Dopicanoão, São, inição -iju, dui do moy dvia sappoco inu cinica

0001111

5

CE20-=

Legre.

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IV.

CONMENTS CONCERAINE PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

0001112

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'..+

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CONVENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examina-

tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Deíector" which contains seven (A - G)

primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Nävy Intelligence)

and KGB career of NOSENKO, These conclusions or findings are

independently treated in separate attachments.

With. the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are

i in direct conflict with the above conclusions

and are basically that at

:.. NOSENKO served. in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was.

a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964,

and held his claimed positions in the KGB during the March 1953 -

February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, toe term KGB is used to refer to the.

Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations.

unless otherwise indicated.

• Attachment:

Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination

of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector''

0001113

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combersciag a9s

decla: sireslies

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SEUME!

PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO

AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF

"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BOYA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation

Of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sectiona oi this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in

successively: senior positions of aunoriy from which he derived

extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB

operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period

1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive.

array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera-

..

tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive

evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including

intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's

claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a

senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensive positions, who

.!.

0001114

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enjoyed considerable autory and trust despite personal short-

comings, and whose acfection, 'ine greatest loss ever suffered

by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of em KGB Enta

• Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas-.

sinate bim."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's

biograpay relevant io his claimed KGB service with known

facto and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the

test to which his accounts were pul; whether his accounta are

internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether

he actually gained the information lie has from occupying the

KGB. positions he claims to have. held. In short, is he what he.

says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the ioilowing findings, arrived

at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU

in any of the capacities of at the places and times he

claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the

manner of at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American.

Embässy Section througaout the 1953-1955 period as

he claimed.

0001115

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"--?

liau....

D. During ine period 1955-1960, he was neither

a senior case oificer in, nor Deputy Chiei of, the Seventh

Department American-Brition Commonwealin Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the

American Embassy Section nor a senior oificer or

supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)

F. NOSENXO's claims, tnat in 1962 he was Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was

thereafter a Depudy Chief of the Seventh Department, are

not credible.

'" G. "NOSENKO has no valia claim to certainty

.. that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel

between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect io degree of probability

'or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence

in each instance. "

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence

Of NOSENKO bone fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts

of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make sis claims

as a whole unacceptabie. While truth and fact in this case freguently

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canrot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and

fact are not what NOSENKO reiates. By almosi any test, virtuaily

any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by iact or probability,

or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is

not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide deíector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide

defector, it is necessary to attempi to determine his true motives

for contacting American intelligence and for providing the iniormation

he has given. Here, it must be recognized that ine evidence, largely

consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal

conclusions. Neverheiess, the question cannot be ignored. The

character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that

some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,

and the necessity to ma'se decisions about NOSÉNKO's future all

require that at least a provisional judgment be made. "

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced ior NOSENKO's

misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing

as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he

suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has

greatly exaggerated his actual rani, status and access in the KGB, for

simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB

agent.

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divi

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed.

That

NOSENKO is not sinply a swindler woo falsely claims for personal

advaniage to have been a KG3 officer is evident, we believe, irom

the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations

which he has provided and which couid only derive from within the

KGB itself."

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and

psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the

possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product

of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewnat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB

officer who served in at least some of the components for some

or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag-

gerated his positions, rark and access to intormation, and

invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with

American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to

accommodate the fact thai several KGB officers have asserted

that NOSENKO did in fact nold senior positions in the KGB. Also,

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's

patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a

product of his own invention, since these were the subject of

comment.by.other.sources."

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"Because none of ine above explanations is consistent with

the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are

left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispaiched by the

KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies,

none of them renders it untenable. "

• •

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or

other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the

evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched

by the KGB, and believes that prudence reguires that he be

regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor -

mation should be assessed accordingly. "

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NOSENKO DID NOT SERVES THE NEVAL RÜ

IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES ANJ

JIVES HE CLAMED

0001120

SECRET L

C80.1

¿rchies tza atecatic

8379992488. 220

te212851757'168

we feate

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SECPET

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities

or at the places and times he claimed. (Previola conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard

to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed servicé of

NOSENKO in Navy Inteliigence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early

1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated

and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENXO prior to 1967 were complicated

by. NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation irom the Institute oi

International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to

admit that he had failed io graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class.

However, previous ejorts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962

statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted

significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his

"stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal

matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

SECRET

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iiv.....

1951 to early 1953 boin is the Far East and the Baltic area is fully

accepiabie. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all

of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval

RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pazes 49-59 and remarke will,

for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole

Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chiei,

Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic

or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify,

by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service,

but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits

to. Geneva. "

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily

prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number

of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was

not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval

RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by

NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by

Nosio regarding arosimarely 875 Ga officer, 20)/468 agesto,

35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.

?

SECRET

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It is interesting to note that the altached list contains the names

oi approximately 20 GRU oilicers whom NOSENKO relates to the cariy

1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews

and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelii-

gence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary anci other related pages question

whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence

and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a

copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by

NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy

Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was

...compieted by NOSENKO without any reierence material and a review of

his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic

area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled

that the former name of the place, an aimost deserted fisnermen's

village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO

for this place as having the mail address of Sovets' Primorskiy had

caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-

existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the

place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and

that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

3

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ki..

The previous summary diso stated that despite nis claimed

active commissioned service in the lavy, NOSENKO knew nothing of

Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, of organization of procedures. It

snowd be noted that there is a considerable difference between being

a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet

Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee

of the Office of Naval Inselligence and a line officer in the United States

Navy.

t. ...

Attachments:

List. of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO

• Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

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## Page 128

krenew Isonid - till hiss on lists a deputig of chicf of racy:

inter yease ther a chiif of mery utilegere lete he was a deputy of chief

of Hill (Sezer fuch and Joashatiny. Slewed he was as savy atf ache in the ust.

i bespelor - demejos, core clerk of the very intelligence if 7 fleet

in Soviit Fazhouts region in 1957-1752.

3. Coydasirskiy a deprig of chief of the mary intelligence of 7.

Fleet (on ageuts) in 1757-1957.

4. Bulakh - au officer of Me hen intelligence priut of intelligen

of He / Flet in Sovietsk Kaliningzad's distriet in 1352

s. Pickier = in 1350 a colorel, corled in the department if foreiza

at, ins of the sinistry of alefence.

6. Churil'skiy - cluel; in 1950- worked in the depsstment of

forcin, affains of the ininistrg of defence:

7. Percento Piton fier f mery intelligence point of intelligener if 4 Tbet

in Sovietsk, kaliningreds distiest.

8. Denisento - in 1962-1309 e mililary attache of strict enlissy in Bern.

1. Bolisharoo Juri- au officer f GAll (colonel), was in the USA,

works under cover of press-agency, Nocss

10. bulganin Ler 15,.

- in 1956= worked in gRH.

1. Soliyer - au officer if fU is sst. (or Ayerler.

-12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1150-1552 a chief if personnel department

if the nary intelligence.

tOU1125

13. Konorizuk - in h950 finished the instatute of international relations,

in 190 taken in the hasy intellizense med sent to work in Berlin (kenairs,

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## Page 129

17. Kipalkin- a geral, no 15405 res a diputgef ehif t mitiling.

diplimatic nondering. He hes tire sons: hipollen sergey- finishid this acartery

i, 14.50

, socks in GRu, woked an illaig and in Sure, his rife daughtte of

lieshal Tineshenko - Diza (puished the institute f foreigitraid; Lipilkuitia-

Ir - in 18405 sticed as a student in the less, also cooks in gal.

n. Kabaline Rudinin= injor, i senior fier if the may intret mee.

if 7 Fleet in 1350-52.

is. Khaberie - in 6950-52 a dipoly of clief of navy rotis ditschment

if the hay intelligener of 7 Firet.

17. Khaytor SS. -a depritig of chip (on information f mng inteli -

Jin of 7 Fit in 1980-52.

13. Kon'kor = a deprity of chef finey intellizense if 7 Flect in 195152

1s. Kezliskiy - in isso un officer (dipsstucut of foreign of fairs of the.

ministry of defense.

2. Orchior Geusadi - in 15t-5h un aninistutice ofiece of the way in -

eligenci of 7 Flut

22. Pegodin Boric a chuf of the seritzinte of hay intelligence of 7 Fet

in 1950-1952, theres a japane langeage.

23. Rezantser - a cemmander of nemy iste eigence print of the intelizane

if 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, kaliningrats distrat in 1152.

24. Shali - a general, in 1340$ roes a chief of the lilitary diplometicac-

i ding, later bes a chief of gRU.

15 Shapeshuiker Dyil -agees, sanks in gill; his fetter was mashese?

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## Page 130

2. Mel' nikor Sergey a clint of very untilligence of 7 Til in 190532.

dif. Nasugaladze - a yurt, nehif (ney lilizucent Bluch ses, 4055-52.

18. Sergeyit - an ingines feelized,

?, a senion offices of the naty

intelligence if 7 Fleet in lin-st (carlier hi sourked in Turkey).

51. Juslotich - in 6310-5e a cencedes of rougradio dotachnest of the

dis, from here inos recelliot:

iligence of the missisty of militang micy.

32. Pusilerskiy Yuri- works in ill, son of a unishal of listi.

34. Torontser duheil-asic.admiral, a fosues chif of hacy intiligani (5059)

35. Yersher - a officer of personil of the hacy intelligure 67 Tirt

In 1950-521

, knows a chinize Coguays.

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→ The the of literal, 195) sad ingand as coder about my t

in Sorist herfs, Primorskig district, where I have you,

big a tracin and arrived in thi place of mey agricitrecent éntle.

cind of liural (I recit from insern to khabarrash, alive

changsol a trusin to Konsoolsh-on eve then crossed the.

sies and frim station Pirast seit to Sort harb (station

ley dinins

Pay fosters y

sity Sorref

wishind Sakhalis.

The itellegese of 7 Theit in! locited in lay Posterny, here

rive also Political disctory of I Flirt, submarines and destroyers loses.

Thi healquestors of 7 int as leited in settlemerit Tilderket:

He connauder-in chief f7 Fleet inas aliral Bagher trait.:

i chief of staff - rice admint liesatines.

6001128

He chief of rey teligence of 7 Feet was ceptain f Lanch

1ke rider egg K, dis depts it of of ink Godson ki

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## Page 132

Purelento (a corsemissar).

I was working in the information deputaint: icia haCine,

§finow seze working in thir digertuent. Oller officies of the intelligence

Fisher, ca, tains Orechor, Modisuri, logodin, Bespetar anal 3-4 more.

"fisas. There sure alsó siergento an primitis.

In the end of April, 1152 I finn in Moserre stopping fes Al

degs in Khabarusk) for a lease.

chif alicestory. f

tini, Perano: biruse of illiass.

And I was aggrinited in the mary

in tige priest of nasy intolindi of ll Fleet in Soricts in

elis sefore a peninsula to Bulligst-formes Pillar), cohere 1

errised in August 1013. (Kaliningrades district fornic fussing.

Soviet is a little sity-villaje, a force gersus village of fish-

ernes, it seens had a nilse. Fishhausen.

ritie

Sritsk-a demolished Citte twin, here theri

bittalion).

Bias military determit Guilling

6001129

Bactiph,

Baltigst ins a base and healerters if 4 Fleet

---

## Page 133

and prisates.

hifore iny errind (2 degs) thes incy intilligenee pornt ses tüansfe

ed from east geniny in Sorist. Of in Yezmany the sock of Ths.

is it was sensated ill agint's sitsh, tund there 100s hather

tast -a primacation of agrit obscratin post in a euse of nost an

(5-4 pessous conk post). - an alsolelly ineskey behinees.

In the and of Levenliss took a leer asswing it will my illness,

fI having in mish a transferene, in anite plese.

In mislaf lilarch, 1s53 l biganti work in 2 chief directory ef lift

/ Are 11052

GOU1136

- SFARET

in mine!

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## Page 134

14.00000

B.

SECRET

NOSENKO D NOT SIZER THE KGB IN THE

MAN'ER OR AT TES ENS HE CLAIMED

SECRET

CaTFin 501

declassinsatioa

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SECRE:

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manrer or at the time

Claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard

I NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered

the then Second Chieí Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his

entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General

Bogdan Zakharovich KC3JLOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of

entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary

and will not be repcated here. His statements during current interviews

that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First

Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con-

sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed

was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when

he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in

1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

SECRET

0001132

Exciaied lisa autocatie

donagrasiag and

declassifleatica

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Suici

in 1964, NOSENKO had given tvo dates in 1952 as ais time of entry into

the KGB in an eifort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the

Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight io the statemente

Of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (VVD) under what

are

considered normal KGB procedures.

Proper allowances were not

given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister oi Shipbuilding,

and the influence.of General KOBULOV: An analyst can either accept or

reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through

-the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then

the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures

....should also be accepted.. A Communist society or a Soviet intelligence

organization is not and could not be immune to induence by a bigh official.

General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was. First Deputy io BERIYA,

the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summary raises several points concerning the

eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67

that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU,

he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at

the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro-

vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO

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-.....-

•was not sponsored by any person of influence as was ine case in 1953

with General KOBELOV who in mid-Murch 1953 was the First Deputy

to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB

defectors familiar with the standards in jorce at the time, no candidate

was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement

which it is doubtiul any lefector or series of defectors could fully

substantiate; namely, that it never happered. Until and unless it is

medically proven that NOSENKO did not bave tuberculosis, it is accepted

that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest.

place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that be was an officer in the KGB

after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly

have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously

had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who

had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks

and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and

therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning

these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at

this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB

(MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

3.

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Walad

NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his

processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was

a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.

This statement makes no allowance for the influence oi General

KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval

RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would

have had independent iniormation in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD

would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry

of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the iVVD undoubtedly also

had a dossier

un the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN

era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the

necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not

speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would

seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the

elimination of most if not all'of the necessity of complying with normal

procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews

stated that he com-

pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not

know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly

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eniered on duty or during his first year of KGB

service. While

NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the

time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second

Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the

First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN bas staied this reversal of

designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the

MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA

as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June

1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less

than a year. Yuriy RASIVOROV was recently queried concerning the

date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD. and SCD and places

it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that

• фро

the change occurred "soon aftei the advent of BERIYA as head of the

MVD in April 1953. " In the light of our inability to fix the eifective date

of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is

unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation

of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who

was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD.

NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, whick is

5

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-

in cortici with ise staierthis of DERYABIN, RASIVOROV and

GOLITSYN, all o whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for

the changes. As lor the issue of who was responsible ior toe reversal

of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. rowever,

the fact that be was a new junior officer and that this was a period of

upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in

this issue.

NOSENXO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing

the location of the Chiel Directorate of the Militia or the hisiory of the

KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that be had no

contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason

to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to

exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI

continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950'e), but care

should be used in stating wha: NOSENKO should know if he held a certain

position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own

memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at

any given period of time or when Agency components or relaied organizations

were organized of ceased to exist.

6

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The poini has also been made that any career of NOSENKO

in the KGB snowid have ended or he should have at least encountered

difficulty when his benefacior General KOBÜLOV, together with the

brother of General XOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in

early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he

encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection

was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an

official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO

would very possibly have encountered dilliculty; but, it should be noted

that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only

met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated

that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no

way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

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S. NOSENSO DIO NOT SERVE N' FIZ AVERICAN EVSASS:

SECTION THROUGHOUT THS.1953 - 1955 PERIOD

AS HE CLAIVED

6001139

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6.3998-81

S.3: 72188 821

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## Page 143

NOSENKO did rot serve in the American Embassy Section

throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The

conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First

Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-Varch

1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department,

SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO

during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an

officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that

both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he

was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to

admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during

this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal be-

havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the

Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

SECRET

0001140

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to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as io whether

he would be fired from the KGB or transierred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since

- his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 oy an official of the

KGB and his mother intercecied on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of

SCD. The result in 1955 was thai NOSENKO was transferred to the

Seventh Department ard not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remaia

in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and

was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This

is a valid question but a plausible explanasion is again the fact that he was

the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews ira:

following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon-

sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not

claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news-

paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers.

NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer, "

indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced

officer.. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period

: of time,: together. with-his knowledge of other KGB officers and his

0001141

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information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight

to accept the statement of NOSEKO that work against American cor-

respondents was his assignmeni irom mid-Varcia 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transier to ide Seventh Depart-

ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO ciaims and has claimed be was an

officer of the First Section with te responsibility of work against the

Military Attaches (Army) at the United Siaies Embassy in Moscow. It

is considered, based on his knowledge of she various Military Aitache

personnel and other collateral irformation furnished by NOSENXO, that

NOSENKO was an officer. of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late

May 1955. period of time, that his primary work was against members

of the Office oi the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work

undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the

Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least

certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the

First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances,

NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not

undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during

tois period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of

3

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the Military Aitache supporis the claira oi NOSENTO that he was an

officer of the Fir.i Section with the indicated assignment as related

by sin.

NOS2N%.0 has siaied that the work against the Military

Attacues was not primarily directed toward development oi recruitment

possibilities, but was direcied toward conirol of the Military Attaches

on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive

sives or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB

would appear io be compietely plausible and NOSENiO noted as

exceptionai in this regard toe recruitment attempt against Captain Waiter

MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches

to Sovieis in tao Unired Siaids in that period.

NOSENIO has been criticized because he did not know all the

deiails corcerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he

should have knovin il he had the specific responsibility for work against

the Military Araches during the indicated period of time, it is submiited

thai this may be evidence of his failure to satisiactorily fulfill his

Blist

0001143

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## Page 147

14-011100

acho miculedgi curcernino dis assignes argeis during approxim. iy

¿arch - Vay 1955. Trio, according io VOSINKO, was wher ân li-

saiciaciory "characicrization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, à

decision was beirg mace on nis case, and a period of time ir. ...äie

weri oni "big drunk" which curinated in is spending abrir 40 days

anue: justicai cara secause oi the possibility of recurrence cá his privis

mercüiosis.

Pages 81 - 87 oi the previous summary süggest trai dOStie

ial jui lumished suicient deialls abolimo aileged agent coove-s ui

ine ajudast se Vilitary Mitaches. It is considered tra: desert:

surrèsi durriews bas iurrishe adegua e accepiadia caiu, ascab

6001144

5

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## Page 148

The effectiveness or non-eifectivenesa of NOSENKO during his

assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March

1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the .

bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer

in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that iniormation

furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews

is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer

in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

C001145

6

SECRET

но..,'ча. піта

isis

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## Page 149

4-00000

0001146

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## Page 150

SECRET

D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1966. 2E WAS NEITHER A

SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN. NOR DEPUTY CHEAT OE.

THE SEVENTH DEPARTVENT ALDRICAN-BRITISH

COVMONWEALTH SECTION

0001147

SECRET

CRE:2 1

certonel intim

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## Page 151

SEC.JET

D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a

schior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief o1, the Seventh Department,

American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

•=-=

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The

current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh

Department, SCD, from late iVay 1955 to December 1959 and was

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Sevenin

Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive

information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department

during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject

of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in-

volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.

These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURG 06

In June 1956, contact with sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the

summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRISin 1958, the re-

cruitment of George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

0001148

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Excludid laa dularatio

5/8R

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•.

SE0.2:

Tiam Sundo, wia Jia June 1958, the series a Baria TALOT)

in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENSin July -

August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsere

FRIPPErJin 1959. The

foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO ciaims

personal invoivement, but is representative of casrs in which his alleged

participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who

was the KGB targel.

06, 06, 06

Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley iVILBY, and

David IAY LOR were British citizens and the other above-named indi-

viduals were United Stated| citizens. I'nis would acem to substantiate

the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an

officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-

wealth tourists in the USSR.

in addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about

an operation against Vartin

DRIALIA, an American sourist wno was in

the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955.

istla|has not been interviewed andavid not be interviewed, so at thie

time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement

or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the

individual involved.

...

ana cret

COC1149

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NOSENKO has furnished incormation on tre travel of certain

United States Government officiais, inciuding Congressional represent-

atives to ine ÜSSR in 1955 - 195ó; and the trip oi Supreme Couri Justice

William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when consivered with the previously

mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his

..imed service in the

Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth

tourists during the late Vay 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO nas stressed that when he transierred to the Seventh

Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent

network was not vailable for opcrations against American and British

tourists. This seems quite logical since the infix of tourists into the

USSR was ju t in,a jormative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in dctail about an agent network he de-

veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel

and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code

names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by

interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com-

promise operations.

I'ne previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150

in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Sevento Department service of

0001150

NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those flity

3

o.-eai in

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pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfiuous. Ii is

considered thât even in lie statemenis were accepted in soto, there

wouid stili noi be as adequaie basis jor a conclusion thai NOSENKO

was not an oilicer in ihe claimed positions in ine Sevenin Department

during she period of late Vay 1955 - Deceroes 1959. Nor is it con-

ceded that, i all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations oí various

areas of information were accepied without qualification, there is any

evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there

are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in ine

previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and wnich

are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 1,45 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENiO

was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-

intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign ageris

among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and expioitation

of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the

MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous

known (and presumably irknowr) successiul recruitments and recruit-

ment attempts. This activity has noi been limited to the Seventh Depart-

ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-

speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB galet-lelen

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considered with ine detaica irforniation NOSENKO has proviced on

Seventh Departinent persoirel, activities, procedures, and topice of

a similar nature is not considered to have any ioundation in íact.

Page 145 oi the above surmary lists eleven operations which

were Seventh Depariment Cases prior to 1900 and wnich were included

in the notes furnished to Cli in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations

were those againe Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSWAy, Join RUFE, 06, U6, 06,06, 06, 06, 06, 0k

Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK,

Ralph VATLAW, Varvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William 06, 06

TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above elevin cases

was that NOSENKO could not describe the irdividual operations other

than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details

as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart-

ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

The notes brought out by NOSENiO are considered in another

section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review

of all of the notes oi NOSENKO currently availabie indicates that his

statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes

are completely piausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished

by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi-

mately 150 cases or names mentioned in toe notes.

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......

During curren: inierviews, NOSENKO furnished specific

information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William

TA2AS4A, Bernard PaCHE Xichaei Michaei GiNSBUG and John Ruza, 06, 06, 06,06,06

It shouid aiso be noied that certain of the cases such, as Marvin KANTOR.

and am fRAska were carea in winich the tourist was siting

reiatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory

expianaiion oi how he jearneà oi the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in

discussing his duties as Depusy Cilief oi the American-British Common-

wealtn Section, aiso explained that il a tourist indicated that he intended

to visit relatives in the USS.:, the case automaticaily was assigned to a

group of officers in the Section who reported directiy to the Chief of

Section and were, not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has siated that he noted the names of three of the

individuals when retiring the files oi "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV, "

two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO

bas expiained that "SHIMELEY" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of

identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they

had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual

activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt

action was taken by the Seventh Department.

In some cases the individual

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was not considered a worinwhile target and in others the incormation

wàs just raintained for possible use at a later date if the individual

reiurned to ine USSR.

06

NOSENKO has aiso expiained how he learned of the Patrick

PRESSVANjand Gerald SEVERAcases; and, ine listing of the Soiia O6

SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in com-

plete error since page 427 oí the previous summary contains information

from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews

the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in

detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material

which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement

Oi NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the

Seventh Department or by ihe KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual.

An examination of the cited cases does not incicate that his participation

was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is

logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English

language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents

were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning

whether Gisella HARRIS jwas necessarily a Seventh Department case.

06

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106

Iris question seems quite superfitious sincelia. Juan in the USSR

on a tourisi visa ard "real" tourisis are tie responsility of the Sevenin

Department. Deparunental responsibility within ine SCD ior an indi-

vicual traveling in tie ÜSSR is decided on the basis oi how the individual

is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a dciegation,

as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a jormer diplomat

stationed in Moscow, as a dipiomat not previously stationed in Moscow;

as a member oi ine Cuitural Exchange program, as a student altending

a uriversity in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors

which afiect the determination of which Department or organizational

component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These

factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign

intelligence comections and whether the individual is a businessman.

In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the

responsibility oi the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the

ECD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at

least some of the substance of the information furnished by George

BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents

in the ÜSSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO

made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

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althouga he did then and still suspects thai William VASSAiL was the

source. The reierences dy NOSENKO to the KGB having such inior-

mation were noi developed in 19ú2 or later interrogations, and it was

not until current interviews thai it was establisned that NOSENZO had

actually seen excerpis o iniormation passe by George BLAKE.

According to NOSENKO, the incormation which was covious iy only

partial was furnished to the FCI by the SCD and couid oniy have come

from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CLA

acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists

by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the

Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his de-

fection in December 1961). it was noted ihat the summary contained

references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-

inielligence identified as Amirican agents and notea that NOSENKO

claimed he was Deputy Chief oi the American-British Commonwealth

Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified

no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later

is described as a claim by NOSENKO is reither an accurate reflection

o what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

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NOSENKO jas never claimed lu know all activities against

American traveiers in ine Soviet Union during

1958 - 1959. Múny

oi these iravelers wouid live been the responsibility of a section in

ine Sevenin Departireri, other than ine American-Britisn Common-

weaith Section, or anoiner Depariment in ihe SCD. NOSENKO was

quite aware that certain of the Americar iourists in 1958 - 1959 were

actig suspiciously irom a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the

Seventh Department had prepared and iurnished to the ECD in an effort

to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work againsi tourists

had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENIO stated he was not in

the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not

review the documeni lil after the defection of GOLITSYN and foliow -

ing advice from the ICD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the

document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN

has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained

aciditional information not in the document which he was aware had

been prepared by ine Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with

a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by

GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiguMSENKO

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• ::

ican "'surse" as inicop dio acio dudo inducia incir no insinceria

müa, persons travoling un irracion dé a Sovico organiamiion, dinácios

woüld not se mo responsionüy di ine Cuncisi Suction dé daü Serüzü

¡n regará io de 1955 - 1959 parica lo de accom y DeSBikO dis

¡i ine lae 1S50is. The previcas summasy ponited cüiisco, sinco

iné jüne igúi, i was impossible loz dira io save been a tourioû micos

"zue name in the USSR and, therefore, a mäget of the Sevenia Depart-

ment, as NOSENKO ciams. Almouga sevazal avenues ci bossiuiy

sultad lavestigation bave not yes bees dudy explorse, t00u1158

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isaüranco iui idis inomiay bill evcr du ixpliinedo àù mai

justifiacly cui de suiù ai iia prcouiummo is isat, oven i tse 5i0ry

OÍ NOSENÃO is inuocureti, moro is ño evádeniul reasca way suck

iraccuraci siouic uu ircespreiod as indicutávo di deceguios on daspaici.

or ica thai maitez as indicatvo zut ba Was no: Jogütj Circí ci iio

Americar-Briush Commonweatli Seczoa Gi me Sevenii Jugnrsmüri

ir 1958. - 1959; neishor woüid süca in inaccuraoy reñect on dis claimec

service in i902 - 19ó3 in ie Seveate Jiburimea:.

...:

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E. JOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN

EMBASSY SECTION YO: & SENIOR CERICER OR

SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE

PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic).

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Embass: Suckon Bore sarior Olieze do ersavisor in the Seerica

during ine bariod o: 1961 - 1962 stel irrevicas concision)

li is due conclusion of dis summiny in: NOSENiO beid ic

position di Deputy Chici, Firsi Secion fémerican Encassy Sectori,

SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The ciaim oí MOSENKO thai be deia de above position in i900

- 1961 has been ide mosi carica claimed zusicion 0. NOSaNO =0

satisfactorily resolve and accepi. Acceptance or ronacceptance 6i

his claim to have held shis particular posicion is a crisical facior ia

a decision as to whezer the remainder of his claimed XOB carea:

is valia, it is believea icasonible to presume inai li NOSENKO las

Deputy Chicé oi the Americar-Brisisa Commonwealia Seczion, Serenia

Deparimeni, prior io December 1959 in ice aosence of any indicazios

that he was demoted, se should have oten ai least a Deputy Chies vi

Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in she SCD, KG3, and througaout the IGB is important

from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige poini of view. I

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NOSENTO was day in to diro, succorno à Sonior Jaso Calicor in

180û-ig61, this wond rare sion a curoton in position wis resitart

¿oss u bum money and prestgr. ¿or dio rcasca ilone, ms fature co

have melá the postion di Deputy Caleria 19óû - 1901 Would caise con-

siderabie dovi as io wacirez de helms claimed posicion prior io idue,

as well as waether to ¿ciáis ciaimed positicas in :902 - 1933.

It is apparent thai the icovicago ci NOSENKO concerning au

aspects

of activisy in tic First Section, First Depurument, during iuû -

19ó1 is incompiete vira juáged by waai are considered the cormal

responsibilites of a Deguy Chiei in CIA: During curzeri inerviews,

an eifort was made to deiermine what the responsibilities di NCS ENiO

actually were in 1960 - 19ói and wrether dis statements in this area

were impossible or couid be accepteú as not regating his ciaim to have

• been Depuiy Chief, First Sectioz.

According to NOSENiO, in the carly 1960's there were only

approximately fifteen Depuiy Chieís ci Section in the entire SCD ard

'In certain departments rone o the sections had a Deputy Chiei of Section.

in accition, transier of a Deputy Caie di Section was ici aiways fcilowed

by a replacement in kird, according to NOSENO who stated that de was

not replaced by another Deputy Chief wrea de transferred to the First

-Section, First Departmen.

.

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Accorcio io Néezio, incio due due a joo descrizionior a

ceciced would ou his abbigied duies.

The previois sürrary del arianon to in apparerà corilici

between early siaremeris of NOSENKO inai ne replaced no cue laer ha

entezed on duty in ine Firsi Secrion, Firsa Deparmoni, incis susseguent

claim trat de repiaced Viñcall BAKiVAiOV as Deplay Caiei in taz Fiest

Sectior. Along wiih inis be rad first crociad KOVSHUK and varicas

ainer didicers in the Secion wich previous responsibility for cervaia

matters which were assigrea to him uson sis arrivai there, ther laiar

stated that BAKIVALOV had been respursibie for tese maners. The

previous summary roied thai interrogation rad rever resoived trese

contradictions.

In the light of the present cicarez picture oi the nature oi a

Deputy Chief of Section, the statements di NOSENXO On BAKFIVALOV

and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not

contradictory. There is no reason to cuestion that BAKFiVALOV, wiù

whom NOSENXO, incidertaliy, did rot overia), was a Deputy Chiti of

Section in the First Section before NOSE)XO, and that ke was respon-

sible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENXO. Ou the other

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T...

io ibè Tiroi Secion was do conceito in a mel arca di cinprasia joude

deris), mere como di course have beca no specito paciecesso: ior

the predecesoor di NoüaNiO ai ia imotae:

sensü de wes noi. -é

interpretador dé ine various siidaeao di OSINO da tais issue as

being in condici appears to de ine residi di comusicá dù seis juroy

ail concerned.

Accorcina io VOSENTO, at ini tisse os his iscasior to ind alist

Section, Firs: Desarmeni, in carly 1900, ne had rui seca ioid ará ior

a short period tereaiter was rui toid vhat his actuu: duries woid se.

KOVSHUS, Calei di ine First Section, warted io os = NOSENdO =0

supervise me work e ainst Service Ataches at the Uried Staico Ericassy.

JOSENKO lei trai me pioposed assignmen by KOVSHUR was iminded

to keep MOSaiXO acupied with nonproductive woin suce KG3 Fuicy

for work against ise Service Attaches was primariy ore of Costru: on

trips ard noi active work iowaras possible recrutmesi.

After a snuri period of time, NOSENiO was iiormed by

GRIBAVOV thai he, NOSENKO, had been tracierred io supervise se

work againsi code cieris (also code machine mechanios) ai tae taica

States Embassy GRISANOV defixed this work as being of the greatesi

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i.ci....-a

importace, and iie recrunnãù di couo ciccas as a priority airá ci

¿E AGB. KUYPiN, Woo Was Chie di dü Dirsi Dapartreni, laior aü-

peaicd the auove aiú e grodg coronang d NOSalKO, Ceradiyi.

CATAZNOV ard Vadini Va MUSÕRON was jurcd wi dCSENo

responsible for supervisión di tre wori. GRYAZNOV and KCSOLADoV

were not new KUB Glicers, dur indiciù were experienced officers

airough boi us Serior Case Ollicoro Were di lesser dari ian desaliso.

NOSENKO ¿oes not claim inai be cao io trais eiches ollice: or to misurely

scrutirize evazy action di proposed actior di GRyAZAOV and XOSO-iPOV.,

NOSENTO does claim re was responsibio ioi supervisión over ticin

work.

According to NOSENXO, GABANOV impiasized trai work

against code cieris was io be nis primary wori in ine First Seciio=

and that it wouid ta'e precedence over any oser activity. Other taz

work againsi code cieris, MOSENKO has generally defired his res=0=-

sibilities as foliows:

(a) Resporsibility for fie of (wozi agains:) John

ABIDiAN, Securiry Otticer at United Staies Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preiiminary review oi ze-

ports irom OTÜ ¡KOB ¡echnical unity oi "take" irom

microphones in ise United States Imbassy.

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(c) Responsibly dui mainicance di ine paysical

secürity ile on the Täici Sinius imbassy.

jc Acing in pace c: Viacisiar KOVSHUK, Caie,

First Section, wier SOVStud as abseni.

.As cãa be seen iron ine above, me rusponsibilies di NCSENKO,

by his definition, wrica are borne dui by opecilic iriormaior jucrissed

by NOSENKO, wouid noi coircide wiia da normal responsibutes dia

• Deputy Chief of Branch or Sectior in Cil, Án anaiysi Can Citier accepi

or reject the thcory that there is necessarily an eguation besween the

resporsibilities of a Degüy Chiei ir CiA nad the ñ5z, bui l ise analysi

accepis the treory, ne must offer some supporting evidence da inis poist.

Pages 15i - 261 cá the previcus summary contained commients

and conclusions and sub-conciusions in regard to the ciainco service

CÍ NOSENTO as Deputy Crieí of Firsi Saction, First Department, 1966 -

1961. The previous primary conclusior was that de was neider Deguy

Chieí of the First (American Smuassy' Section ror a suparvisor in shai

section. Ine conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief

and had supervisory resporsibilities for work against code cierks. The

; matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks

will be considered later. Comments will first be mace or the respon-

sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

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.. - .

Pages 205 - 222 cé il prurious summary coniain a derailed

cois for to previous conclusion in NOSENiO was not to kCE cuse

Oilicer joi jOin ABIDiAN, Daù Curicio Conclusion is incide lão ice

responsible case oilicer dui Abidial, initior di noi dis work against

ABiDiAN compared favorably with wrai is Considered to be the MiD oi

¡aresponsible Chi case oilcer is immaicrial, Waat is maïeria: is

whetser NOSINKO reasonabiy duttlica tie requirements of ice i03

for woris against the particuur targe, JOin ABIDIAN. I is leis inut

the answer to iris is thai NOSENKO did.

ACCOrding iO NOSENKO, ine word againsi AbleAN was in ihe

direction of determining if ABIDIAN would iead ine KGB to "anoices

POPOV, " and no consideration was given to active agent work against

ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO

appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge di ABIDiAN and ais

description of his work agains: ABIDIiN should be considered only

within that framework.

Admittediy NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount

of details regarding the background of ABIDIA, but on the other bard

if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the

KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAY woüld lead io "ancther POPOV, "

it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had

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Litle muieriai value lor me S0b, M: 200 hauarisco me 505 Grier

to the arrivãi di ABilid in ine üssà mi mondiali das consicurco io

de "Arrerican siélligence, "sño in ilciion ABiDiii, assumed de

Security Officer posito durmerij iud aj dussei in intésics,

who was inowa by the Xûs jo se Ci, lu rivesigaton üj the 505

was recessary to determine l ferDial was "american Ideigezee"

or тої.

Tre previous summary, juges 2i3 - 216, contains somegüite

specific siatemenis relative 1o Aliiil and à Soviai raid, a 103

operazional contaci according to NOSENXO, waich are errosecus.

This invalidates one oi ine bases ior ice previous concision taci

NOSENKO was noi tre responsicie case cálice: ior ABiDiN.

MOSENKO nad previolaij sidici iai in ciaca Gerober 196u sa

preparca an operaziona: piañ un abisini maica inciuded continion

of the placing of Vieica on the clotring ási eliects di ASIDiAN dy iis

maià vno is mertiosed above, Tasyana IZDOROV.Ci. Tue siatement

is made in the summary that this coud ro: be true because FEDOROVICH

did not wori part time for ABIDiA, until ai least Juy 1961. ABIDIAN

has recently been reinterviewed concerting the abové and the resulis

invalidate the previous conclusion tat FEDOROVICE could Ici rave

treated the clothing ana effecis o ABIDiAl with Meika prior to July 1961.

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AziDiAlias ton smird true do unzined in dioscow in March

relivian, à Departner di Staie imprajee, mis assuciamon connied

until she lei Moscow in mid-isol, 2212á53 inE Jasjani aRDOROViCE

as à maid and torougi mutual agreemen wit RaViVER, isDOROViC:

becare ino paricime maió ior Abiotal digining sometime in the ici

o: 1900. From that time on FEDOrOVIda, according io ABiDIAY, ic

unconsrolled access to as living quarters since ase sai à key to permi:

entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDiAN did soi mail any operation, itiers witzia the Sovie:

Ünion until after Varca 19ó1 and tereiore in view of de above, teera

is so reason io contradici ice staiement Di NOSENSO trai de inree mailed?

operational letters iriercepted by the KC3 and malied by ABiDIal aù

srowed evidence of Veila. it is interestng iu ade inãi NOSENKO in

Juse 1 9ó2 warned ClA about the KG3 use ci Veina for spoiting interra?

letter mailings by tased Siates Embassy persome:.

ABIDIAN, according to NOSEIKO, was ie subjeci of a 24-h0ü

surveillance with the Seventh Direcioraie assigring a specific survailarce

brigade to cover ABIDil. The actuai sürveillance of ABIDIAN was ice

¡ responsibility of the Seventa Directozaie waich submited reports to the

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First Secion, First Dujicacci.

OSINO, do ine cesponsibie case

any appropriaie guicance or direction to ine Sevenir Directorate, but.

under ine dus urganizaiion de wouid aui participate in ine surveiance

activities oi im: Severin Directoraie. NOSENKO saied trai rad sur-

veilance oï i mi iriormation discioscà any personal léninesses ci

ABIDIAN, L-KG3 Woud have attempied iu exqui dom. do geracia:

wea'nesses were disciosed, according io lOSalkO, and the parera

ol coverage to see li AbIlal wolid iead ice kus iu "another POPOV"

remained unchange.

Pages 210 - 212 of tie previous summary noies iãt NOSENKO

was linaware of countries visited by ABiDill during irips Outsice ine

USSR and that no effor: was made by NOSENKO inrouga de ECD to find

out such information. According to tae previcus summary, NCSINKO

stated that the FCD "wouid not accept"

such à request ior "operationai

action against an America diplomai coming izom. Voscow." The

surveillance which wouid have been required co the part of ise FCD

to achieve any sort of reasonabie coverage of ABDiAN abroad would

certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Furicer, NOSENKO

contends that the results which might reasonaby be expected wouid be

of little or no practical value to ine SCD..

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Pages 216 - 22i di do providis summary Coiicio à Summary

on ice mañer di ine Pushiúr Succi Gualico, Die WriCo juin ASTiAN

visiied on 30 Decerizer iso:, l sicuid de acred that a currero raview

oí ice 19ó4 = 19ó0 imerrogators o, NOSENKO do dis manor indicates

they were lubie io ciariy ine maica and diû much io coriuse it issic.

Current interviews, as icicaied isove, have Id dully resuived

the prosiems, düt rave assisiod in at lius: minimizing ine areas di

conflici or coniusion. It is appareni dai NOSINKO was noi in ice Firs:

• Secios, First Deparimer, lor any muierial period cá ime aiter

30 December 1961. I is also clear inut he either read the surveillasce

report on ine visit oí ABIDiN' i0 ine Pustixin Street ¿eacaros site 0=

was iuly bricied on ine details oi the visir. NOSENiO insisis thai he

rcad the surveillarce report ai the time or shortly aiter ine event.

There is no reason to question dis assertion that he read the repori

since his accurate knowiedge di the route di ABIDilY ard his actioas

in connection with the visit support this claim. Fowever, his consistent

inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relates to

his change of assigments raises a question regarding whea de actuaily

read the report.

NOSENKO claims trat the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushiin Street

deaddrop area ledto the KGB setting up a stationary surveilasce post

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...-.

near ine sie viici was mainamci lui inico moriio and inaile l'as

iniomed di i unily basio di do scuno di dis siaie due jaiways

rejative). Io lake ins siciemeri dieray Woüiù raida durier probier:

since, in addition io his iransíci irom die First Depurameni to ine

Seventh Department as oi cariy Jasüary iS62, NOSENiO viato

Geneva in mid-March 1962.

ii is conceivasie taãi, us he ainsia now maintino, de was kupt

acivised of developmanis or norceve'opmenis ioiowiny the visit oi

ABIDIAY to tie Pusanr, Strcut Julding by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chici

of Department in the Severin Directoraie vio had been iaca tu

1: NOSENKO since 1953, or Viadisiv KOVSaüK or GenraGiy GRYAZNOV,

Chief and Deputy Chies respectivaly of the First Section, First Depuri-

ment. Even so, however, his failure io call cür atiention io this malier

in Jüne 19ó2 would seem to require explanaior, especially in view oi

the fact that he did wain us about the danger oi operational lette: mail-

ings by ABIDIAN -- a warning wiich would appear clearly to have beer.

derived from KGB coverage di ¿ae activities oi ABIDiAN in the spring-

summer o 1961.

It is to be nosed that during the June 1962 meetings MOSENKO

was not specifically asked for ary additionai information regarding

any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDILN. Beyond

• 12

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¡is, NOSENIO nimodii pão sinidi in di did noi occur to dira to reli

us because ine siake oui suù long sinco beca dropped, i: mad revealed

suing suspicious on ibe duri dida-Dati Or inyone else, ard dictuscre

he sad regaried it as insignificant.

Tais is noi implausible. Lucier possibie explanacion, cowaves,

derived from ine aiready noied indubicy di NOSINXO to pia cowa à daco

jor the visit, is thai he icarned of due siationary surveillance post li=o-

of ine visit itsell after his mectings with us in june 1962, it should se

noied in this contex thai with the güstic exposure of die PENXOVSKIY

case in the fai of 1902, the Pishiin Sircci deucerop undoubtüdiy secare

the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That VOSENKO is at a minimum still corfused about the visi:

Di ABIDIAN io ise Pustixin Street deaddrop añd its consequences is ciear

from the record. While it is entirely possibie that NOSENKO us cor-

sciously exaggerated his involvemen: with the visit and its aftermais,

it is also possible that tne evident distortions of his accounts os the

afair derive from honest confusion.

Curresi interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inte=-

views leave so doubt trai NOSENXO was aware oi the visits of ABIDiLY

to she upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by

ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational

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crasinos waici subsianiale, iii riodo di indididdio à commesion

siop, a next-dour añi siop, ini é luca: zuat Office in ine aica Viere

inowa jo and considered suspicións dj ie KGB. Tie entrance in ire

art scop, according io lOSaNTO, vas sù sicarei as io be aniceci

place for picking up un piacag a conducoo, and a modio suiveirance

was piaced on tne ari scop ior à porici di time ¿cüowing die visi ci

ABIDIAV. Oificiai recoris contrm di visits ci ABiDiA) ai ¿ue time

and to the buildings described by NOSEAKO.

. Pages 21ó - 220 o ie previous summary contain no reference

to the specific statements of NOSINKO reiative to KGB interes: in the

...:'

visits.of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Sarcat area, it is also cicar

from a review o certain transcripts di previous interrogazioas tirai

no disferentiation was mace ourcerning sis siatements relative io ica

coverage of the activities oi ABiDIAN in ise upper Gury Sireci arca

circa March 1901 and his siaiements concerning his crowledge oi tre

:Pushkin Street deaddrop site aiter the visit oi ABDiA,l to tuai site

(30 December 1961).

It is impossibie ai this time to siaie thai a detailed debrielng

OS NOSENKO cOncErning ASIDiAN prior to hostile interrogation would

have permitted the clarificazion of ali issues including the above, büt

14

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int pomi viere compré carrca, dizoinés impossidie. dany évoii,

Sicion, Fisi Deparanim, oy 3i Decorabes isii aid riosi Cerichig indi

tuasícared dy eariy jamary igua, mo éuciici doSallo cas supcici

10 impuga lis claim to inving deen case cicce= lor ABDiN icor curly

properiy date the visit cABiDiAl io Pusaún Succi, as dido Way indicaüvé

• oi KGB dispaten. If dispatchea, VOSENXO presumady niciù cave sou ibe

Gate right.

In regará io (b), de responsi diy o NOSaNO iu pretiminary re-

view of reports fron OTü (Tecanical Ünit o' XiS; di "sake" irom micro-

phones in the ünited Staias Embassy, the previous conclusion was inui sis

ciaim that he personally reviewed ie KG3 ironitoring regoris was not

sustained.

it is not feli thai ice previous conciusion made suicient alow-

ance jor the explanados di NOSENiO d whai the respossibility actuaily

entailed. Iniormation irom micropiones in the United Siaies Embassy,

according io NOSENXO, was handied very specialiy. Talephone inter-

cepis were given io a designated oficer ior distribution to the appropriaje

case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even

0001175

withir. the First Section, were brougat daily to the Deputy Caiel or :

in his

absence to the Chiei and zen were distributed to the individual responsible

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case OliCCI, in lis way, accorting iu dobatio, no me beiow ise

¡unis di Depuiy Caici vas avaic di lie suici microphie "tie" from

the üried Siaies Enidassy do reccired oy lie section.

As regards purrica: type inurmacion, and accoadio to NOS2AXO

this was considered to mos: irportani ly die xC3 tri CTU, NOSENKO

had no responsibility ior zeview or unmare cissominarica di toe indu:-

mation io the Grief, SCo, ino Gaalexa:, Noi, or the Goatrai Committee

since this was the responsibly of a unit in ine difice disco Chiel, SED.

NOSENKO has aiso stated trui tre curput irom coriain of the

working microphones was "dying" and trut OTO in accision io having

recepiion difficuities was also having difficulty ostaining à sufficien:

number of gualified monitor-iransiators. As a result, aicording to

NOSENZO, OTU was noi providing complere verbatim trazscripts iron

most microphones, but actually was reporting orly those portions which

OTU considered pertirezi. Despite tre faci that full transcripis of ail

conversations in areas covered by active micropcores woüld have bees

of interest to responsibie officers of the First Section, OTU, according

tO NOSENKO, did noi provide full transcrists and when asked to provide

more gave the routive answer of, "we could do so ií we had more

personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at

OTU and could: not be furnished to the First Section.: An oificer of

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Firsi Secion COul isica iù i juinciná inpo buide ind to do io OTÜ

¡o dù 50 añd as à resiii lo was idio lurj ináreçuérij.

I is beloved it any presumguoi? tod d0D recoveres

manscried ai converantions even in me darieca areas disred by

NOSENIO as marug active micropacres de nui reasoradle or evea

realistic.. It is aiso unmenise io presuma inal any curversance Con-

ducted within reasorablo distance di in active microprone vias =0:

compromised to ise KGB. Ine later is a lacion io be coastuered in

any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis dur a presumpros

inat JOSENKO red to nave been aware oi isis or tais jusi secause some-

one dad à conversacion in ore of tre rooms in wiici deze was an acive

microphone and NOSENKO Las claimed lo reviewed due "iaxa" com

microphones in ire Ünited States Embassy.

It is apparent that chere are a number of imponderasie lactors

to be considered such as wether the conversation coil be picked sp

by the microphose, wrether ie monitor could recover

suicient portions

di the conversatios to understand the gist of what was being saic, and

even if he did, whether he wouid considez it oi suficieri imporiance o=

interest to include in his report in verbatim or in suramary form.

In regard to (c), the claim oi NOSENIO tha: be was responsible

for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,

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...

i: is noi considared thai jere do incline basis for Luéstiezing

wis Canor.

Tre previous swimary container a conclusion inci ine dicin

OÍ NOSENKO inai he was Custodian 0! it Embassy security ita was

an inverion. The casis iur luis conciucón was noi dien abeguaio ind

curreni inerviews Wis NOSENKO have duriar indicared iran his caim

as this poiri saouid be accepie¿.

• In regard to (a), the caim of NOSINO inut he acted in piace

of KOVSTR, ine Caial di Fira Section, wien KOVSHUK was absen,

it is considered irai lois clairo is accepidi providano d is tot con-

verted inio a presunpsion trai thereiore diSaNKO knew everyining

that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENiO ciaims that he was roi responsible for te direc:

supervision o approximately two-thiris i the officers in the First

Section. These officers normally repored dizectly to KOVSHUK ma

would only repori io NOSENKO Wies KOISHUK was ausent. As an

example of this, NOSEIXO has shown a laci of detacied kaowledge of

the work againat diplomatic personnel it ice Urited Siaies Eroassy.

He has stated he is süre he would have nowa of anything "importaai"

such as a recruitment or attempied recruiment, but he does so claim

to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

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Seccion, Mis recurión d: inimita di incividuals al die ünired

Siaies Brinosy in iSão - 196i én avis michi assigamento scurio

acegüaic.

démost agenis or operalive comacis wao were pari di de 8G3 rosvozk

among the indigerous exoployees cá the american imoussy, didioi

recognize treir photogrados, asi did 2ur give suilcieri cetails con-

cerning treir specific acüvities is considered to be an unwarranted

criticism. NOSENKO indicases toai ii genera: ine handling oi ageres

in the Firsi Sectior was the responsibilly di icivicua case oficers.

It is also apparent thai ¿se pailosoghy i te KOB was io maintain

a single hardler-agent relacionship as much as possible, and that respos-

sibility for an agent wouid nù be transforred merely bécause the agent

haú access to a target who was te responsibity of a case cálice: othe=

inan ine hancier oi ine ageni. Tris apparent mañosophy is oi particular

interest in connection with NOSJKO, wao evez though he was the case

oificer reaponsible for ABiDial and togetcer wish XOSOLAPOV ard

GRYAZNOV worked actively against code cierks, did sot have an agent

network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent ior reyort-

ing on or a specific activity against a particuiar target was normally

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nur in adequaie reason iú iransios responoiddlay ior ine agezi and it

appears tre KGB consiners inni ini concuation di an esicalsree

mcmies-ageni iciaronsing ino considernole ceri.

NOSeNo, as previousty indicaned,

has sited tact ke dad the

responsibility ior work aguinsi code cioris ai ine ünited Siaies Erabassy

curing 19ó0 - 1961. Excepi for ie period di time trai he ciaimo respon-

siblity for supervision di work against die Service Maches in Carly

19ó0, ne was, according io NOSENiO, responsibie lor supervision oi

the wori of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Curadiy i. CAYAZNOV, Viadimir

DEVKIN ard Yevgery GROMAKOVSKIY.

• GRYAZNOV ard KOSO-APOV worked oly "gainst code clerks

and therefore were supervised soicy by NOSENKO, whereas DIVikiN

• and GROMANOVSKIY, who nandied indigenous agents in American

House, came under the supervision oi NOSENKO ory in drose casas

where these agents were direcieù against code clerks.

It is quite ciear thai the inowledge ci NOSENKO concerning zaa

code cierks, code machine mechanies ard pouca clerks wao, according

tO NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was such

greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees

at the United States Embassy during this period excepi for AbIDiAN.

0001180

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The colowing comminio are Cuicorned wit several spacific

cases in which, according io disalro, ture was in approaca by tac

KGB, interestino miorriadio ivas Gerized, or in Waich ai least a

considerabie amouri di spectio wore vas carried

KOSORADOV and GRYAZNOV.

06

Tre irst case, Faies STORS323d is covereionseses lis -

177 di the previous summury, ince accionai corment is considezid

necessary on this case since there duca sui appear io de any adequie

reasou to question ine gererai siory di lûSENKO in regardio sio KOB

effort against SI025322G) 06

It is recogrized ard menioned eisewhere thai NOSENiO i 1902

exaggeraied his persoral invoivement intre case, particularly ir placing

himself as preseni witr GRBANOV wren ine recruitment plich was made

coSTORERO, NOSENTO Las eiracid sis particiar claims, but

there is no reason to doüsi trai he was engaged los approximaicy a year

in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessiul aggroaca

06

tO STORSBERG

An issue was previously made over the timirg di the approach.

1057O8 2a inco 5 0235 sac asce is as October 1962, XOSENSO

has indicated aboui June 1961, aid irformation from GOLITSYN, basec

on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the

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approach occurred ai ino "ead u ijcû."

NOSENÍO, auring currentierviews, has giver an accepicoie

¿ase the approaco so Stoassanal dur in l uncurred ariore ino

roach a tie Moscow aloo sofates sis islandi, 1952)

that the approach occurred in Ocicuor iloi, bui the mierrui evidence ia

his description di coïmiera: everis mañes it clear irat ine approaca lad

to have taien place co-siderably carlier.

Josepn VORONa anoiner code ciork at sue uried Siaies ambassy,

who will be the sübjeci of further discussion beiow, has jeen inierviewed

oa the basis of diatements bytons Endiavoid gas presearia

American House the night of the approach. Analysis of ire staiements

•[VORoR Eclearly indicales that the crests STORsEad describes

could not have taker, pace later than the period February io early May

1961.

The best estimaie possible ai this time is thai tre approach to

STORSBERG occurzed in Varch - April 1961

., which is cuite compatible

with the approximate daing of the approach by JOSENKO. In the face

o thia: approximation oi the date of the approaca to STORS82Rd it is

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beloved reasciadio io assure ta to remario di BoiStuk ia

reierring io à compromise priso di tie operanor rataor tona ine actuai

appicach, or was premairely clanning anticianice success.

Pages 178 - iSi di me prurious summary concain micinatica

¡a regard do de arter ace unection oration lastema lense

As cí tris time, it is consideriá inã mere are no discre-ancies cesween

record iniormation and inormation fion NOSENKO waick in any way

Öf NOSENKO as tre Sovidi who mace a fast appioacia to hira at tre ai=-

port,: but this does not provide a valid reason io disbelieve the stuiement

of NOSENDO that it was he who tried io tals 2545225 06

set iorth in the previous summary waich reguire specito comméri.

(a) The smiemen is made that to its vilicer

direcily connected with the case could rejard KEYSERS

as the replacement for STORSBERGl I laci, KaYSERS 06

actually was beisy trained bySTORs aclass substitute,

not a replacement, even trouga his primary assignment

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was no trol of a cour dirt Nigeläo is ductio

current micaviows redied cow du received te impressioa

irom ine Orü seporis di concürinticas Moric Up afire

micropione in ine dimir; sode rubm ai me United Siates

had been away iron code worn ior a consideradie period

•of time. In any eveni, die impression di NOSINO was

the particular work id Raisers, Ise coservations oi

poi been a code cieri lui, as nored, was being irained

by STORsEBa)so sai ne codid adi as a substinia. Ender

the circumstances, it is considered quite logical trat the

KOB would assure at ise sime sat selle

2aS was to be the

eventual replacem.ent 0157035322g

(b) The previous summary stared tha., "prior to bis

06.

depariure from Voscow, FaysaasJacinowieáged io sis

supervisors Colonel URAN is homosexual terlencies

and he admitted involvement in three homosexual ircidests,

all at the American House" (page 179).

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noi to aboravate tre possiny di a rasi accoy tina

wrile within the Sovie: trior. "

ic) On gage 250 oi ine previoud Summary, ice

statemeri is made thai, "In ino singie case i waich he

MOSENiO/ asserted that da Fe

did on iniurmation aro-

cured from microshones (KaYSE2S) ladure so repoxi

receipt of the dejeccion invication; he was in error."

Wille the official record shows thaiRSYSERS) 06

did indeed report receipi of the dejection inser io Coiuse: 06

that this occurred less thai one hour beiore KEYSERS dest

the Embassy for the airpoii.

NOSENKO has stated that in

the absence of information to the contrasy loom salesalaae

and telephone taps, the XG3 had concluded ta(KEYSERS)

had not reported receipt oi the defection leiter and there-

06

fore had decided to approach KEYSERS ai ise alsport. In

view of ise short time betwees KEYSERS report of receipt

06

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formation in line io cai dü inè iporiappicaco. Too

Piges 181 - iôs oi the previous summaiy contain máormarioa

i regard so Marrel Guru mio comes stolend

in ville arriveù in Moscow in Sepiember isti. GRYAZNOV was ice

Tae previous summary staias lagu 153) sar Zulus dussa

routine deariefing, confirmed ai Emuassy repori ¿nat in she summer oi

1902 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN, " Wio

visited the imerican House wiüa someone irom the United Azus Repubiic.

"LILLIA'" was interviewed by the American House manager ard sae

claimed to be from Vierna büt traveling with der employer, a Czeci.

Further iiquiry revealed that so austrian passport had been issued to.

"LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LiLLiAN"

replied thai she had forgoiten it, then leit, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that tie above ircident had bee=

described by NOSENXO but in connection with aitempis to entray josepa

VORONE) a 1960, 20t ZUJUS in 1962.

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Pago igé di di pácridia sumini; relaies informazior icoin

tivo termian Worda lio couid de used aguoi lie restianis di Americio

Ficüse. During curreni miciviolo, io mañica bas deca again cOverca

WiS NOSENÃO. ACCOrCaGiO NOSENIO, CAVAZIOV accuined for

these avo womez, ageris di the Berin KCS Resideriura, to visi Moscow

inder false cocumentarion, ono as à Wesi German und ihe Citi as an

Austrian, NOSENiO furier identised ise "Wesi German" agest,

"FANVA, " as raving the cover of a journalist, año siated de believed

(NozoNa ostimed ciai is carsy 1901 se had mei a Wasi Cormas sizi

at Americar Mouse ino claimed to be a journalist. The siaiements of

Voro afinertiare appear to suosiaiciale ine repori of iosaNsO.

Concerning the agent documerted as an Austrian, JOSENKO re-

ported that sue was gueried about ber passport at American House and

as a resuli the KGB returred her io East Germany withour further

attempts to use dei at American Fouse. NOSENKO places this incident

in tre same time period as the "FAVVA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He

bas never auzgested ay connecties wie ZU15, nor in tere roasoa

to assume tinas he could be reserring to the experience fUilsisince

this took place in the summer of 1962, aiter NOSENKO hac left the

American Embassy Seccos.

0001187

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•i was de corclusion di no prevos sutarery tiar iCSENZO

dib sci adow esolgi abous Zurus oi no incisiouri do dive exercisci

•leit ine Firsi Secion, Firsi Depuramust, at ine una di ilói di Waici

time any supervisory durcions di NOSENKO irmirated. Eures wao

did no: arrive in MoscoW inni Septerisir 1951, Iumained in Moscow

unti jacuary 19ó3.

Mosaiko could hardny be heid responsidie dor

lowing anything abra ZeliSater I Jaxary 1 562.

Pages ió5 - i09 di le gravious

sunimary coniain a bysopsis ci

previous informasion from NOSENNO in recard io paud JENya3

Basicaly, NOSENKO had reporied thai wnen de X05 learnad tai

Pani ENNER

,. sa0 was tougat to be a code ciera, was coming io

Moscow through Helsinki, à plan was made io sera Vadim V. KOSOLIPOV

so Heisinii to trave: on ine samo traia is alEs)to Voscono diciaio

agert di GRYAZVOV was to be piaced

os this tzain at Vyborg allor ibe

train emereá the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainied

Win eredas a pare al a iutare operation agaia ama in Mosco,

ard KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainied wid UEni33, 06

JOSENKO has stated that the operation was successiul, thai botk.

KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquainiance o JENNaR, 06

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me irip irom relairca to doscow.

approached da ine triéror, resinia dj avo young Russiano, "a suy

and a dri prodi, uiversi sudoss, " no sauce hopesos

Accordias 1o JENNER, wey boin said das shey migh suran

again by the same girl, tis time ai the licocow airpori viere de ico

gone on courier business. Trere was a scurt conversaiion and sae give

EsaR a phone number, insisting isas ic cimics, do womansiso

advised INVER roi to mention ie conversation to anyone. NOSENO

has stated that in an eiíort to forlow üs the titial train acquairiance,

the KGB har arranged for the demale agent io encousie: [anNEa:

the Moscow railroad staiion or airport when he weri alone to méei

couriers.

Insofar as is town, FlyEalias never bees showa a piotostala

•I XOSOLAPOV. Aitrough KOSOLADOY waS approximately 34 years oi

age in 1960, his phoiograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicaie that in

appearance he was much younger and inãi he coulà have passed as a

university student.

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destina story do regards Each see

mation raises dúricüires kere, icrevcr:

Finion irain marriesis

(31 March i960 train iom Findardio Moscow, añdirat be Vicior

KOLOSSOV ¡a rame NOSINTO insideratied as an allas used by

KOSOLAPOV) was on se 2 April 1960 irain id iloscow.

The above obvioüs discreparcy nas roi beca año cannur de clari-

dea withava able infornazion. NOSOLAPOV CLOSSOl; was elici

on the same irain aspielBajor de was aco. Irsia maricois indicase

¡hat KOSOLAPOV was noi. Neverincess, ine "boy añd giri, probaby

university siderts" wio, according io japa

siruci in a conve--

sation with him on the train wouid appear clearly io de puri di the

operationai eifort described by NOSINXO, particulaziy in view cá sce

Later approaci o this same girl so faiValai the airpori. Thereis

so reason io question that tris gizi was the female ager. of CRYAZNOV.

In view of the conflict between the train mankiest ard sia:ements by

NOSENKO, however, it is roi ciea, who the "boy studeni" was; whether

this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some

other person entirely.

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There is just no a salisiaciory answer dor te indicaied discrepuncy

beiween the irain rantiests and ine sireniro Of MOSBO dict

XOSOLAPOV añd JENNER were so tie sume train. liladeed KOSCuADoV

die so trave, wisiaNNa, as does asi establish aspira scie das

tai NOSENKO is wrong; ii is evidence diai to does not inow somering

ne, as ihe supervisur oi KOSOAPOV, sauüd rave mown accorcing to

ñis own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a sums bo

of previous irformation in

NOSINKO as à code cleri whom ine KCS was studying, but or who.

no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically

no detaiis in zejard to GARiAnsober can to centiy him as a coco.

clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered

reidies to the tria afGAR LAN rom irisinia io Moscow on ló overder

1900. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsicki KGB

Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American

coce clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow ard taat

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ino responsible São case dificez, JosCriPOV, vould se sera io Feisinki

ander auas io sirike up an acciininco wi ine coco cieri waiti iic

in residi ai that üme, mù ire desidency Fiocurecido dosompoY

à place in the comparimeri dé ine American on ine iraiirora Resirie

io Vascow.

The previous sunamary also siaicù COLiTSIN ind covisco trai

jater in acloinki he inquirea dí añoires SCa oficer "from iné Emoussy

Section" (Firsi Section, SCD) aboui de case or. waica ne cad acited

KOSOLAPOV. ACCOIdirEiO GOLITSYN, iNE DiCEE FEIUSGG tO CiSCUSS

ine case and he, GOLITSYN, concluced irom this reaction ihai it mus:

have resultea in a successiul recruitmeni.

Il has beca determined thai GOLITSY), in an imierview wiih tre

•$B1 os 20 March 1962, referred to the above "'SCD clices irom the

Embas sy Section" as (ínu) ZENKIN of the American Department.

GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsiuki under the alas

O SERGEIV (SERGEYEV), but was unabie to furnish à first name ard

patIonymic for SERGIYEV. GOLITSY) reierred to (inu) ZENil as

being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubi that the (iru) ZENKIN

referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual os the same last name

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........

concerning wadin NOSENiO us iurianco miormatica. doSENKO

ras icentfied Zadkal fricoe dri mine no does adi recall bui

pussibly is jurigi as in Gitica: di the Second Secio, First Degaria.

mei, SoD. According io MCalicO, une droug of ide Seccid Section

pots beiore ind aries igúù

- 1çúi was engaged in "oberive garais"

aguinói American Intelligence and dia: ZENKIN was a member oilis

grOup. NOSINKO das advised ini ZENial traveied abical in commectica

vita activities di ine Seconó Section, bur inui de had au specile icowiedge

regarding the actives of ZENKal on tiese trips. NOSENXO has iur-

nished some iragmeniary inormacion waica he learred in regara to

ZENKIN' and whes te fui name di SERGYEV (ZINKiN) iu wner with

his photograjia is obiained, this iragmentary information irom NCS INXO

may prove quiie useiul.

As regards ise KOSOLAPOV CARI INmates and she opirion

expressed by GOriTSYN based on die rejusal oi ZaNil to discuss the

case fEARLANS) inat is must hava resuired in a successiul recrument,

there appears to be an inadequate basis for lis presumption. According

TO NOSENKO, and tiere is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on tais

point, ZENKil was in tae Second Section, not the First Section, ir.

1960 - 1961. He was noi Chief oi the Section, but only à Senior Case

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..

Cicero Since XOSORAPOV Was indices of tro Firei Seccior ini

The Zimisi iraia manirèsi dé io dovenicer 1900 ior tie Frisiani

io MoscoW iraia lisis io CARLiN Jard Vilior SOLOSSOr jadias i

foiavirg die lead irom COLTSYN, derico naving mes amy Soviet wisa

tre paysicai description di KOSOLANOV os ine deisáridi-io-ivoscow

tris, and derieá ever veing approacied by Soviei Iniellagence, Laier

interviewa by the FBi and a poiygrapa interview dia not indicate thai ne

Lad ever, mei KOSOLAPOV, or thai ne cad ever knowirgiy beez coniacied

by ay foreigr inteliigerce agent.

It is accepied indi KOSOLAPOV wertirom Voscon io Reisici

in dovender ilóo, tai be ialied wiü GOLITSYN there, and that ae

was oz the same trais as GARLAND irom Helsinki io Voscow. it is

also accepted that NOSAVKO is unavare trai ROSOLAPOV made a iria

to Heisinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer ousside the ÜSSR 0r Bloc countries

reguires higk-level approval, accorciag to NOSaNXO. It does not

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....

dictii inni.

.......

maiter inat the icciviciua, imo previundãy craveica on a simiiar mussion,

caci irio musi nave spechao inoàtivés apacovar. The zed cape wireh

inus must inevicasij nave dcen invoived in preparuien iui süch i Iri?

furtser supporis iue assumpcion tiu AcoaaiO sowd nave jowa dbcui

the xosoiA 20r Ena R.

The posizion caken by NOSIyKO da inis puino is isai do accopis

the siatemeni by iue inierviowar thai kescuaper made suci airip,

but he says thai se, cNOSENKO, simaly does noi icow amychiro ascür

He adds oriy that had anyining sigulacant devesoped in toe siudy

o(5Ax2AN), no woilé dsvo joon áwaro o it.

rago i::

NOSENXO, as supervisor of the groua working agairst coce

clerks, should dave inown o any trie o KOSOLAPOV to Firiard i

1960 07 1961. NOSENKO himself was out oí Voscow on a trip iu Cuda

from 15 Noverber 1960 to circa !? December 1900. The possioiay

exists that tris could save accounted for his iaci ci inowicage oi tie

trip of KOSOiAPOV to Feisiaki ane returnto Voscow on ló loveriver

-1960. However, NOSENKO nas not attematea to use dis Cuban trip às

a possible explarazion ior noi mowing oi tze November KOSOLAPCV

trip.

ruitrinind cé

"..c.

As with ie JENVER-XOSOLAPOV case, it ia noi poggioie at

this time to resoive the discrepancies gertaining do the GARLAND}

XOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSZYXO denies any knoy'giffgs

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this operational activity oi KOSOLAPOV is arother apparent insince,

...as in ine ENVer case, of lis sci inowing somushing ie, by is awa

statemerts; should have knows.

"nit ruin. Viewed in the contexi of the toial richied." of NOSENKO ci

operazions against code cieries, rowever, titties the problems in ine

i. "

Fonza case nor those in the as a his ease, singly os combinia,

":..

:...in any'way represert conclusive ividerco imi NOSENKO was no super-

•ViSOr O KOSOLAPOV ur thai he was aoi responsible ior the code clerk

• operations describec-by NOSENKO. This siiement, rowever, was ro.

substartiated in the previous summary.

.:: • Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an accousi of

c..:..

KGB activity against code desi josepà veRonerom various sources.

• including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first merioned the case in 1962.

According to NOSENKO, the resporsible case officer for work

against|VORONE]was KOSOLAPOV. When i was learned that VORONa] 06

c..:and an Embassy colleague, a Marire guard by the name of BEGaS, were

planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the

i. ü: ÷ c-UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to

*r' "Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as VORONE)

F'and BR): The satent wäs for the agent, either on the train or atio-

• sequently in Warsaw,-to meet and compromise MORONE sexually. She

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successinly accompiisied mis, bui dui to ceriain probioms in 302-ÜB

Liaison relations, i vas not possibie ior she kãr to expicit this cirecty.

The previous summary staicó iái Wit, respeci to the semale

ÜB agent, there was persuasive evidence inal reither NOSZXO 20=

XOSOLAPOV payçi de sus in so MORONE ade describcd by

NOSENKO. Thai summary citeù the travel o: NOSINKO io Cuba and

trip to. Warsaw as evicence ci the impossioniy oi JOSaNKO arc

XOSOLAPOY being invoived personaly is sis pari ol de VORONa] 06

case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polisi female

...agent and made the arrangemerts to place "er on the train to Warsaw.

mown when KOSOLAPOV leit Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the

16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow.

NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 lovemioez 1960 fus Cuba. Tre

activities described by NOSENKO are therciore possibie wishin tae

known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role

in the MORONE]case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO,

placed the female agent on the trais. NOSENKO now clearly states that

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KOSOLAPOr wãs Lie Oüiy NOB officer in coraci with ire Pulse ageni.

NOSENDO previousig siaicá dai a 103 tocinician woo was où ine trui

from ivoscow to Warsaw =epo tea baciio NOSENKO ise day alter tha

train arrived in Warsaw.

saier NOSaNO said thai instead oi talking

to the technician personally, se may save read the report oi cae rechrician

aster he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENSO with. regard io tis reaier

are accordingly possible witin ice irown time irame. It is rot cor-

sidered that ine retractions NOS ENXO las made from his original

statements on this operation are oí suíficient significance to materially

discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains ine statement thai

MORONE) wich interviewed, denicd having been intimate with Svetlana

IVANOVA, à KGB agent employed at ine Americar House. NOSENKO

hãd stated thai IVANOVA wus instrucied io repori everything she saw

or heard concerning VoRoN aage 194). The summary, nowever,

cited a number a reporis tha: VORON iad been intimate with ivANova

and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employe at tse American

House, and commented thai VOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware

as the sexual involvement a W028.NE with "IVANOVa's friends."

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NOSANTO, during chicon iraviolis, bas indicaied alvareness

nished iniormation

Of a ceveianis cau ration againdi Marine stree

with IVANOVA, fe ios aiso siied in the bussicility was considerid

os using IVAYOVA againsi MORONao abilia compromising shotograpis.

This pian was seriously affecied wren it was learned froin the

militiaman/KGB guard at the United Siases Embassy dai iVANOVA,

been "in the city, " then returned io de "ici" of one of ice Varices

where the girls spori ine right. This apparently raced the relability

Of IVANOVA in question in the eyes oi ine First Secion.

According to the previous surinary, lOSENKO stated trai Pictio

CECCHI, Italian coois ai te American Embassy ard ageni oi KOSOLAPOV,

reported on Americans at the Embassy, bu NOSENO recalied coining

specific that CECCH had reported aboutOROva. The summary also

states that VORONEwas said by oiner American Sinbassy emplujees

to be a close friend as CaCCil and thai VORONE had admitted biacie

market money excharges with CECCHi.

During current interviews, NOSE\XO has stated that CECCHI

furnished "pieces" of informatios concerning MORONE but he, NOSENiO.

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MOSaiRO não iiso juicidi iii me 105 somcianes suspecied,

anú un occasion acinity decame avaro indi various agonis did rou

dudy report everyting di inierest iome K03. Tie KGB di ecursê

was aware thai CICCa: was involved in me bick market. rowevi:,

weeider he reporied to the KGB everying he dic and with whom is

'The commeni was made in ire previous suminary thai lOStio

was unaware tha MORONs mos some Soviet semaies in te spring oi

1961 at ine apartment o Saila: el SrAZLY, an Egyptian-national KOS

agent of the Sixth Deparimeni who was aiso reporting on Americans,

and was intimate with ore in this ajarrinent.

having mei some Soviet gizis a: the agariment o! Sarwat, but there is

so irdication thai he acimitted or thai asyone cise has reported that ie

was intimate with any oi them. The corcilsion of the previous sunriar;

in tais regard was basea on a misiciezpretatio.. Accordingly, since

there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident sook place

in tre Saiwai apartment, the story oi NOSENKO on this matter is co=-

sidered completely acceptable.

!

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...

A jew commonis are appropriate conceraing remarks in di

previous summary on pages 119 - 204. Comments were mice trere

concerrins Live code cleris, Marice ZWAG, Joàn TAYLOZ, razi 08, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

DAY, RObert DWELLY and JOseD: GAFZZI, ard alough it is aci

sper fically stated, ine suggestion is apparent thai the reporting ca

NOSETKO on these cases was considered eviacice tra. NOSENKO was

not supervisor oi all KGB operations aguins code clerko. The ¿ciow-

ing observations may assist in diacing these cases in their proper

perspective:

06

(a) Marice ZWAND - ZWANG was icestined by.

NOSENKO as à code cleak who was actively "worked ou"

duririg 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested

that the knowiedge of NOSINKO regarding KGB activity

against ZWA

ANG was iradequate. First, reporting of

06

NOSENKO on EVANO conjairca no reference to the

¿elationsis o IWAlia)wish his maid, whom jOSENKO

in anoiher case has identified as a KGB ageri. Althoug

[WANG denied sexual relations with his maid, ie did

aimit to some intimacies with her in her apartment.

During polygraph examination EWARE reacted when be

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--..--..A.

responded in ine regaivo io i Cücaior

juraiso can de jinisidly expiami of jany memory ca

his part oriailüre on ini juri di iie iraid io seguri deiais

oi tais rciationship to tre iCE.

nas invoived in tro currency operaions di Pieiro CICCEI.

(A jact inai previous sumiury impied ie sioüid save

krowa from 103 agent CaUCia, i From the record, now-

over, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG were rot

directy with CäCCril, but rather irrough oiner Eirbassy

employces, maxing it plausibio dia: CICChi was eliner

unaware os fie involvemet vi vaiajor, às jOSENiO

himseli biated he suspecied, CICCai did ioi report all

details of his currency operations io dis ic3 handier.

18) (John TAXIOR)- VOSENTO Cenied ExY102) 06

as fa State Department code cleriasd tar=ei oi KOSOLAPOV.

The KGB was aware of the irvoiveraes: of MAYLOR with

his Soviet maid, but no attempi was made to recruit TAYLOR

beicre his departure in early 1961 siace to do so might

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06

encorger to paro for i recrooment approac so rises

STORS3 ERG) woo dui deca ascer diveiopment ior almosi

a year und was corsièrced more vaiable.

Tàe impication di me previous summary ina:

the expiaracon givea dy NOSENiO was suiject to cuestion

failed io take into account ice fact thai alsough STORS3230) 06

was not approacied until aler the departure oilAY_03, 06

the mperation agairsi TO?SaFad]vas underway belore

[TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, is is

apparent that the KGB did noi abandon interest is FAXIO)00

since he was approached at a later date

outside the USSR

on the basis of his previous afíair with his maid in Moscow.

10 ERAS NOSE 0 identio and BATJas

La State Departmens codo cierliuho was ine target oá eilner

KOSOLAPOV OI GRYAZNOV. ACCOrGiNE tO NOSENIO,

nothing "interestig" was isarned abou DAl and no 096s-

ational measures were taken against DAT The previous

summary noted that in July 1961, DAY traveied to the

Caucasus with lis friend and iornez overt CIA employee, 08, 06

Agricultural Atiache G. Staniey BROWN!

It was also

stated that the tvo were under surveillance by five persons

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at all imes on did avove mad, taun indy dobod a "repitaran"

in tieir noie room ward mdy inexpectely returned, and

inat on inviner occusion in "antaclive and avalasia Suvier

female" was beloveù io inve suda jured in dacio train

comparinient.

According :o NOSENNO, surveilarce ard arj. Gicer

local coverage of añy erapioyee ai the nicá Siaies aricassy

who travels in the ÜSSR is the responsibilty oi tie lucai

KGB organization, not the SCD. li wouid appear inai ine

Locai orgarizasion was trying to do a thorouga joo as 5ar] 06

and BRot du it apparenty was hospiesive. i does

not seem justifiabie to expeci that NOSENiO scould tave

recalled a irip which produced no resulis.

(a) RODerE DWELL? - NOSENSO Lus reiated in cor.-

siderable detail the elioris of NOSENKO, GRYAZION aro

06

KOSOLAPOV to involve Roberi DWELL", a code ciersi

Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, inà homosertivi com-

promise operation. According to VOSENKO, a homosexial

agent of GAYAZNOY was of the apision fir 212) was a

homosexual.

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-....-.

Theroijäo zinoün is douür ihe siaicméni oi

JOSENKO concerano tüo diumio io cütermice Waen

BEG WiAETo/5w 05

i? was juiig "inio she eisy" (lioscov:)

so thai à horusexiai comprcmise siuation coud be

arranged.

Trere were no sjicito divelosmaenio irom

treir efforis, accordmo io losaião.

Dusala)iai caiejoricasy denied being a tomo-

sesual; YOSENKO has rot said io was, but oray thai ice

homosesual agesi Oi GRYAZ.NOV assessed 5u06

BuLY as

a homosexuál. There does Ici abgeai io de dny rcasor

io consicier ire siaiements dá NOSaNKO aboLi DWaLiY] 06

às refiecting aúversely on N@aNKo.

06

(e) Joseun CSErET) XOSENKO Las idorttied

Iosepi GAFZ EXjas a fCode cieril

The previous summary

noied that NOSENKO had siäsed ise KGB had tried to lüre

CCArTEYjinio dowatowa Voscow, using Sveilana IVAVOVA,

án agent of DEViKil' in the Americas House.

O6y way os commest, ihe pievious sunmary iiaicd

thad GAFTEYJarrived in Vicscow in Sepiember 1961 asd

tcar [red KADERA|had reporied ibai GAFZEY cad tolà him

he had been istimaie with a Russian girl at the AmgjE P2C5

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iron. Moscow in me summer di ¿jur ucuuse di drunken-

ress and during irervior caucinied being invimate

wich iVANOVA at ine American douse and at aer agart-

meri and trai she dad ciumed pregrancy.

As to whether ine abuve in'ormacon raises a

question concerning NOSENKO, the iciowing dacicas

should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO cas staied irai during the

latter part oi December 1çói de was part tirie

in the Firs: Department and past time in the

Seventh Deparimeri, and thai he reported full

time to the Seventh Department after New

Years Day 1902.

(2) In addition to the inormation previously

mantioned as inished in A rousing inter -

view, fArlY) alao stated thai he was first

intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December

1961 and was also intimate with he: later on three

occasions at her apartment. According to darrely

IVANOVA told sim of her pregnancy about 1 Vay

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19ó2, maica io approximuicy lour montas alie:

lOSENiO ano sinico in icansierced to the Severi

Depariner..

The matter di roviéw by NOSENKO cí OTU reporis iron micro-

paone coverage on me ricá Sicies Embasay cas previousy beer.

mentioned in this summarj. Pujes 22ó - 230 di sie previous surimary

contained a deiailed accouri di incorminion irom lOSINÄO on tie mater

oi microphones, couriermeasures taker. üy ire Americars in 196%, ard

damage estimates prepared by the Americáns. The previous conclusion

was that his iriormation did no susiain sis claim to have been Depuiy

Chief, First Section, ry his ciaim that he personally reviewed the KG3

microphone monitoring reporis. Comments have been made in this

summary in regara to inis previous conclusion.

A fei remario, it is believed, will issist in a fuller understari:--

of the micropione matier. In ine material brought out by NOSENKO i..

¡9ó4, there was a single sheet oi paper containing on ore side hand-

written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro--

phones (those which were being monitored) in the Urited States Embassy.

This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary ard need not be

repeated here. The acquisition of this list by JOSENKO was character-

ized in the previous suramary as singular and it was stated thai NOSENiO

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hus mever plausioly expacá de circumbiances waich piompied ais

reication di ine lis: until ison, vaca no produced it for Cià in Cezeva.

Juring curreni imerviews, ino maitei di tre above lisi ras deca

covered in considerably grenier deian wich NOSEN:O tar rod beer.

done beiore. Mis expianaiuo, cota di ina circumsinces waici ied to

his acquiring ine list as weü as of his stili bavirg i in nis possession

ai the time di nis deiection, is considered duusico, contrary io ine

judgmer: of the previous summury.

MOSENKO nas stated thai :.. 100 - 1961 Viadimir i. PEIROV,

Criei oi the Second Section, First Dupartmesi, destred some "soints"

for use against targets oi his section. VOSENXO uses the form "point"

not as meaning jusi a micropione, düi as reierring to an OTT sub-unit

wnich includes microphones as weli as the necessary moritors asó

transiaiors to cover the microphone ard translate ine "take." The

targeis di PETROV were primariy Americans ard, iberefore, inere

was a transcription-translation probiem.

According to NOSENKO, most oi the available "points" were

assigred to the First Sectior to cover microphones in tre. Urited States

Embassy. The Chies of the First Department, Viadimir A. KLYPIN,

held a meeting atended by KLYPIN, Chiei of the Firsi Section Viadislav

KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and VOSENKO, the purpose oi which

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...

1...

was io discuso the pussie; di corporaly ciscontinung cercis

Embussy "poiris" corolca sy die Firsi Section, ard vermining

PETROV :0 use inese "puris" agains: largeto of his sectió..

Accoring io dosadio, Darior brungat io ine meezing à lio:

oi rames di ceriain iasocis iù maica to wished io give iecimicai core=-

age. During ihe meeing ¡CUSaUR abourenly iooi a giece oi page:

waich PETROV had aná wroie di li a lisi ci active raicrupaones in. te

United States Embassy and residences. Whea the meting ended,

NOSENKO bad this pajer and re iook it back io his oílice.

Coniainea on the reverse side u die paper were ine foliowing

names in Russiar: LÜBI, !

The name A. 1, ViLLAYION uas listed sexi io the same of zu3a] 06

and the name of Y, E. CHERVETSEV was listed next to the sume oi

SVITH NOSENKO has expiained that LUBiN, SVinE, Wil BuRray 06,06,06

and Sipe BURT IN were amog the targets of PETROV; aNd MIKHAYZOV

and CHERVETSEV were ofiicers oi the Secoud Section.

NOSENKO siated he inew nothing more about ite écü: non-Sovie:

rames

excepi that tie; were targeis di PETROV. NOSINXO stated iat

he could noi be positive o the date oi the meeting otper tuar inat it

occurred while KLYPAl was Chiei of the First Deparimer. (Accordia

tO NOSENKO, KLYPil was succeeded by Sergey M. EDDOSEYEV as .

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a davis do mess defies a grate"

Wite be O6 de visit dire siderican

citizens nico nose la it EST elisa die 963 feet i tais trio.

mas stil not been icer ilied.

In view of ine above, in cas dion jussibie io deduce due cate

ci she meeting called by ¿uYPIN as circa dure isói.

According io NOSENIO, ise piece di paper described above

was placed b; NOSINO wish vicer soies ne dept beiween the pages.

o a bourd roiume waick NOSIO cails a "working copy." This,

according to JOSENKO, was an accouniable, regisiered aciebock

issued to all officers in maica indy were supposed to write ai ineir

quies, destroying any deser rotes.

According io NOSINKO, he, like many direr oilicers, did rot

compietely ioow regulations ard the indency was to ireguerily put

loose notes in ise noteboor so inái the noteboos oten acied as à file

racher than being useó in due way required by regulaticas. NOSENiO

has stated that wher he leit the First Section he iook various aotes

with him to the Severia Deparinert; these included notes he had drafted

coacerning ceriain First Sectiou activities ior use in brietng FEDOSEYEV

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. ......

VAC:FEDUSEYEY suéceidéù duiPãt, acáaoies dd mud prégarcd ioi

jccinres to ine Severii Direciurnic, Accorcangio NOSENäO, de did

noi irceniionuaj iase ino girccuinó jorèr permmagio micropiores;

ii was jusi in ine grong cincies io iuua aloiug viea de weri io de Siveri

Deparimeni.

In consideration di tre above expianation ay lOSENKO, in siicuió

be noied ihai ne aiso ürcügni wici timi. isús ris acies lui ire ürierino

• FIDOSIY IV ard cermin noses be.i.uily iui uoo preparió wicie

in the Firsi Section; C.go, iis ioies ii. m.icture io iie Severià

Direciorate in regaid 1o a "mass survrinice" ds tce imerican

Embassy.

By inciuding à section ípages 23ó - 239; on tre inowieáge of

VOSENXO of the KGB crypiologic attuci on ünired Siaies Embassy

commurications, the previous surmary imphes dai tcere is some

reason to question lis iniormaior on inis sübjeci.

NOSENXO jas asserted thai the KGB had aever sücceeded in

readirg enciphered communications oi the Service Aitaches; howevar,

he said that the Eignth Directoraie (the linii of the KOB responsible foï

communications irtercepi and cryptologic anaiysis) was reading some

United Staies Embassy traific. While it is opes io question to what

extent knowleage of successes of the Sighth Direciorate would be knows

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. .s, ae -aroih- no no u0n"

WAG"SEASAd"

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to aojore in ini Firsi Secrica ui ine Miro: Dopariment, Wierlo tao

scope pausidiy avalado io NOSENSO lims claired posicior, inero

is :Orcason io question mis siciérica.

inmo previcas summary legis 20ù - 240j, mit iadüres 0i

the excepcion di ABiDiAN, NOSENKO cues soi ciaim io huve véin tie

responsible case cilice: dur any di inù dsicá ciA Glacers. Accordina

io his claim, NOSENKO siodid have bees avaro indi Wiilam d. MOñILi

was CIA, büi he hasnever identified ViCasti as Cil. Surely XOVSzuK

¿rew VORELi VaS CLA Jui WiY MOSENXO is no: aware VORZLI was

CLA is toi krown, Ii has already been established, rowever, inai

NOSENXO, ao Deputy Chiei, was noi aware oi ali oi the activisies ci

KOVSHUK.

As regards some oi the oiner listed incividuais, ü iow remaris

are appropirate.

(a) NOSENKO has never indicaied any irowiedge

Paul GARBLER was CIA, ard je: GARBLER las süroly

¿nown to the FCD as a CIA empiojae besore going to

Moscow. It is presumed trat ine FCD furnished the SCD

at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was

"American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did rot

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arrive in Moscow anti doverber 19os, only a maori

beiGE NOSENKO init lie Firsi Secion for the Seventh

Deparineni.

(5) The previous summary stuied init according

tO NOSENXO dO NOB Lù 0i suspectad Eugere 03

VizONEY was à CLA Gilicer, yei de was a Cut ouicer.

0: iciensive KGB surveillance while ir Koscow irom

Ociover 1960 to September 1901. Ine "intensive XGB

surveiliance" is basea on statémenis o: VARONET)and

may possibiy be more a reflection of his persoral concern

over surveillance rather than what was actually haggening.

(a) Steve WASHENKOwas correcity idertillei by

NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was ClA and

identitica by NOSENKO as suspected oi being a Cid Office=

or cooptee.

ja) Lewis BOWDEN, who was no: CIA, was, according

tO NOSENKO, suspected oi being a CiA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, JI., has siated that

KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI

officer" in the Embassy. The Chereparov Papers indica:e

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that the KGS had rassons lo cuselder to activities of

BOV/DEN wilh suspicion.

¿6 10 a0t ballerod dat the ilacod tallures of NOSENKO so iderully

CIl officers are ol partieslas signifieance in establlehing that be was

o8 Was not Depoly Chias of the Firat Secion. There are too masy an-

known lacters nilch would need to be cousidered. Daspita out assump-

Mona sa to Whal the KGS knows, l8 l8 possible last (a) la KGB did 1oz

baow of the CIA alílllalton of these people, (b) the lalormation inowa

to the KGS TAs not avallaDle as lba f'irat Secilon, I1I8& Departnest.

loral, or (e) isformatios avallablo to the Chlat of the Firal Soction or

SO S EPEELLO COSA OÍÍICAT WAS Ol NO ONLILAL CODCOJA tO NOSENKO SId

maa sot made availablo to him. The last al thase possiblilitas lo

suggested in epite of clairas by NOSINKO tast be had to havo kroma

whataves was kaoss in the Section regarding CLA Identifications; a

propEnalty os tha part of NOSENKO to exaggerado the area of hia owi

kaomledgeability bso boen feen alpembero ta tito caso.

Pages 252 - 258 of sha pretious summasy contala a repost a

Cho 1960 ETip of NOSENKO lo Cilba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. Wita

sogard to the Cuba tiip, lero ls collateral evidence of 'ble staval ao

describad by NOSENKO, and there ls so substantive reaso to doubt

No account of bis activition on sala trip. The statament mao mado la

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-. .

the previcus summary thai do ravei di NOSENiO to Cuba in isio

camuged is claira iii he was sigurvising oberaiions againot sinbussy

code cieris ai die ime. To accipi ine validity di this judgment as to

say that no supervisor in ine SCO woriù be perminci to make a iris.

abroad unrelaied to his supervisory function, a judgment for vibich

there is no supporiing evicience.

As regards die irio d NOSENKO io Bugaria in 1901, iu= waick

thero is no collatera: iriormacios, to previous summary concludei

inat his accouni of the trip was urirue and argued thai such a trip to

Bulgaria, il it did take place, at a time when de claimed the operation

agains SToas eRa)was reaching a cilmas and his subordinates were

"apparenty planning to expioisKEYSERS" newly-discovered vuirerability,"

it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in lioscow was dis-

pensable. There was, however, so evidence that NOSENKO did not

travel to Bulgaria and only highly specuative reasoning as to way his

account oí the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the SToReRa case, while it cannoi ai present be proved

that the recruitment piich took place before NOSINKO leit for Bulgaria,

it cas be stated, da ine basis a zeporting iron ivoroN, that is had so

have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned fron Bulgaria.

Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning

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a NOSENXO in Moscow an iie mine iio pich was made, l would appear

indi NOSENÃO vas Cunjuravely irco io go to Bulgaria because inis

phase o ine STO?55 ERa opuralion rad been compicice.

i is clear that the approach to REysaas)ios place áder MosaNso

returned irom Bulgaria, and iurthermore inai the 1G3 probably did

sos becore aware wailial as fras a homosuxial indi tierciase

potentially vuinerable, until just beiore ire pitch was race.

In short, there is no reason to believe thai the accourts by

NOSENKO oi his trips io Cuba and to Bulgaria are roi essentially true,

or that if they are true they necessarily reject on his claim io having

been supervisor of code cleri operations.

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SECRET

E NOSENHO'S CLANS, PRAE EN 1063 LE WAS CHEES

OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND

WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH

DEPARTVENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

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F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section and was irereafter a

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Departmert, are not credible. (Previous

conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Cbief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from

January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was.a Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department thereafter.

NOSENKO bas stated that, although be was offered the position

of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg iM. CRIBANOV.

Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the

, Personnel Directorate, he declined ine profiered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaglovich

FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO

as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promoie Vladislav KOVSHUK,

then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

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willing to promoie NOSEVKO to the position of Chiei, First Section.

However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSiluK and NOSENKO

considered ihat under the circumstances it would be better for him to

return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to

FEDOSEY EV who wanted KOVSriüKas a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOS ENKO the

position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the

reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would

become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The

above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi-

cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to

GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career

Of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section,

and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-

ment. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, irom March to

June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-

tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January -

July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks

in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of

March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases

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are discussed in the previous summary; the cases of Wailace Everer 06; 06, 06,06

JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst

BRAUNS, Apparent conflicis between information from NOSENKO and

information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals

were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the

previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial

evidence that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed position of Chief oi the

First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That

there were KG& operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BlENSTOCK and 06, 06, 06, 06

BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four

individuals.

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are

warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial

discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and whai each individual

stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-

fication.

06

In the Wallace Everett JOHNSONcase, it was previously noted

ibarJOinson arzived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB

operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug-

gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend

encies al jOHNson were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary

to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during cur got in friews

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has stated that ine KGB learica of the homosexual tendencies di(jOHNsON)

"by chance" soon after his arrivai. "SHiVELEY" and "GRIGORIY, " two

homosexual agents o NOSEN"O, were at the time operating out of a room

at the detropol dote mierefOis on stayed. Iney medicinsolinere

and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regard to ine William Carroll JONES]case, NOSENKO during

current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation

againe Jol, incuding the woman incimila SUGAYEVA wio was recruited

as an agent to work against JONES|and was used in another case. The other

details furnished by NOSENXO concerning ine JONES case are compatibie

with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Severth Department.

In regaro to the fatalie BleNs Tociere, NOSENSO did not claira

- to hare been the responsible case officer but was abie to provide erough

specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when

she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the cetails con-

cerzing the aizis flock easi coud be explained by his elaim so have been

Chief of Section and not the case oificer directly invoived with the case.

In regard to the Horst BRAUNS/case, in the previous summary

the criticism was levied that oSaiko did not know why leats wigied

the USSR and was not able to identily any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS]

met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

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Bet time rimings

• - 8.

the Seventh Depariment was noi concerned with ioreigners visiting

relaiives in the ÜSSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENXO, accord-

ins to the previoia summary, was aware lar BRAinsivas a lormer

Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives

was information available to the KGB icrouga his visa application.

In regara to the staiement that the Seventh Depariment was not

concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet

expatriates, this is rot in agreement with current information from

NOSENIO, * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon-

sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility. of

another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were

involved. Howerer, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher

authority to anoider department or component, it was and remained the

responsibility of she Seventa Department. The laci that/BRAUNS,was a

former Soviet citizen could very wol bave made FAUNS or intoront to

the Second Section, First Deparimeni, of a direction in the Service of

the SCD. However, in the aosence of an actual reassignment by higher

authority, the case would remain toe responsibility of the Sevento Depart-

meat since BRAviSwas visiting the Soviet Vaions on a tourist visa. The

previous summary also indicated tha BRA Gris listed on big fisa appli-

cation ibat he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the

Seventh Depariment. The situation was not the same Q? &1793%.

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relátive or relatives in Leningrad. Alhough BRAUNS, when interviewed by

the FBI, mentioned a number of items o wnich the KGB was aware concern-

ing his background and occupation iron his visa application, there is no

specific reierence in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose

in visiting ice ÜSSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remaris by

NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that nis claimed role

in the case was not plausibic. There are several ayecific points made in

the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of

the case. Taere is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated

his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance

to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva

in 1962 and soi to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in

what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and inior-

mation from the aclual CIA record of the case. There are major differ-

ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved,

an effort has been made toward determining wether these apparent differ-

ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there

is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom

American Inielligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence

into meeting BELITSKIY insice ine USSR. The previous summary stated

that NOSENKO did not know when the BZLITSKI: operation started

(Brussels, Belgium, 1958), dic not know the rature of the British

involvement, did nit inow the operationai details and contact arrange-

ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, ard did not know BELITSKIY's pattern

of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness

that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use

BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-

ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in Loadon and still states that the

primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in

contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered

completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in

Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters bad been mailed to

BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY

had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time suíficient unresolved questions in the

BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis-

crepancies between the statements by NOSENXO on the BELITSKIY

case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO U001 224

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• .

the other band, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has

furnished the actial KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the

XGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relation-

ship of BELiTSiSIY wita CIA. There is a distinct possibility the

KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London

and BELITSKIY dia not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB

vis association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium.

As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in

1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some:

at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused

BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result

he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these

events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB

actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London

in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the

developments in his case prioz to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which

time be was in contact with a British citizen who was also

reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information

received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

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George BLAKE, (It seems highly likely the KGB would

ever have directed BELITSKlY to iurnish information which

may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could

have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was

employed from June

1959 to Augusi 1960 to come under

suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has staied thai BELITSKIY, aiter he went

to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA

rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known

whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and

that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American

Intelligence. (I the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the

KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of

the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELTSKIY

had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to

initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB

anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then

gave only a partial story oi what happened in London in 1961,

BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail-

ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had

a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore

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.... .

voüid poi rave idid dù äiCu iuv it acrinäy mubo Cointacs

wiir Americãn Iméligeico in ConoVä ci ig02, üni Vozy Wüü

could cuve ició me 1802 io buù soon à purticulas womui.

woom he had previoicy icowa, de was sure sie worked

10ï Ainerican mielliguéco ünd d was tarough tais woraur

Amorican inteligence bucurio iwere 3ZLITSICY was

Ceñevû.)

(6) BELIRSIDY EI02 lE Curova mgricù co m6ca

within ühe ESS2 an inüividual rupcosenang Cal.'Howeves,

bis agreemeri was. orly under cormia stpulaiei contatiors,

the most interesting of waicà was zuui ie incividual mus:

be ürwiting oi the true mature of ide reaviorskia of

BELITSKIY with CiA. in addicion, any imessage to

BELITSKIY or any indivicual who mei BELITSiLY must

maxe no seferonca to day proviois mediaz ol SELRSiEY

wita CiA.

The above conditions are quite explainabie if

BELITSKiY bad not been under XC3 Coztzol berveer 1953

aná 1961 and in 1961 gave tha KG3 oriy a partial siory ci

the 1961 events in London.

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As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a suíficient

number of unresoived questions in the BELITSKiY case so that discrep-

ancies between information f:om NOSENKO and the actual record in the

BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reilection against

NOSENKO, and there is a distinci possibility the KGB actually did not

know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noied on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA

was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also

noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB

..that CIA had warned BELITSKIY agairst SHULGINA." The previous

summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB

agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY. "

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by

NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY

against SHULGINA, " is a rcasonably accurate description of what actuay

happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELTSKIY in Geneva.

The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially

told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by

the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence

whie previously in Paris, France.

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it was

determined there was no collateral incormation which

would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis

and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaif

of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by

American Inteiligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to

BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and

report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGiA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with

the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV.

It was stated that ARTEVOV had been involved with a series of America.:

tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly

familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV

with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959.

The summary noted this

was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart-

ment. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV

was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO

was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO

has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,

First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi-

mately 1957.

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A closer examination of the cases described in the previous

summary as "CiA American tourist agents," reveals there is no con-

flict in the invoivement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement

by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart-

ment. As an example, one of the cases is ine case of Edivard MCGOWAN, 06

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was

originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter

by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the

First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only

became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases invoived the contact of ARTEMOV withla CIA

officer who waß under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,

and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individua, would under

no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of

the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was

even traveling under a diplomatic passport. it is, assumed the individual

was oi interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief

Directorate required or desired support from ine SCD, it would normally

request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely ur-

likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance

in a case involving an American diplomat.

0001230

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v..u..a.

Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis

for the previous conclusion thai the claim of NOSENKO that he was a

Deputy Chieí oí the Seventa Departnent from Juiy 1962 to January

1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuital is

not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadeçlate

information. During current interviaws, NOSENKO has furnished

details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position

which substantiate his claim, to having been a Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Depariment from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-

sion was based on inadequate iniormation is the matter of the written

notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964..

The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is

inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,

an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed expian-

ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed iníorma-

tion concerning ail aspects of his notes. This information supports his

claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes

collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,

First.Department, in 1960 - 1961.

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..-

-+..-1.

Primarily the notes of NOSENIO can be categorized as

follows:

• (a) Snori case summaries by the Chiefs of the

First Seciion, Second Section and Sixth Section, Sevents

Department. NOSENKO has stied that he was in 1902 -

1963 responsibie for supervision over these Sections and

that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chiei, SCD, who

supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all

recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to

NOSENKO, the order irom BOBKOV was to only retain the

files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of

other recruited ageris should be sent to the FCD or Archives.

NOSENiO has siatca that he in turn levied on the Chieis of

the tree Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex-

panded the request to include ail 1960 - 1962 cases, nor

excluding previous cases or cases which had already been

given to the FCD. The noies of NOSENKO included hand-

written reports from the Chie of Acting Chief of each Section

on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to

agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been trans-

ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO abou thejf0 U1232

15

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—-—

inclusion support his statement thai he had expanded

the original request irom BOBKOV so that he would have

some "pieces of irformation lo give CIA."

(b)

Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned

of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were

made from a review of a noteboois kept by the Chief, Severth

Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two

occasions.

Most of his notes were not detailed but were

sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later

date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before

his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate

prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and

the Seventn Department, 1962 - 1263.

(d) Drait report for the briefing of the new Chief, First

Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre-

pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,

including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the

Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium

of the KGB which was reviewing the activitieu of the Seventh

0001233

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443536 663

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Drpartment.

According to NOSENKO, the prepared

report was never syped as a formal document.

The view has been

set forin thai NOSENKO took undue risk in

carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination

of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in

collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the

possession of which might be incriminating or which il he had brought

out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-

siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with

little or no fear that a rearch of his effects in the KGB aiter his depart-

ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None

of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-

troyed by NOSENKo.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three. KGB

documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered

or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The drait report for the briefing of the Coliegium

which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually

a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of

submitting in handwriting as the others did.

0001234

17

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......

(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent.

NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file

kept by the Ch if which he reviewed and that he kept one.

Of interest is the iact that the copy was not à registered

documeni and did not contain the usual information as to

number oi copies typed.

6001235

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-....

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G.

LOSENKO FAS NO VEL CLINTO CERTAINTY TIRE

PERSONVEL BETWEEN 1953 AND ES DEFECTION IN LICE

0001236

SECRET

Excludes tra zinealis

P.7: Tida: a:1

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G. NOSENKO :as no valid claim to certainty that the KGB

recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his

defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in tais summary is that NOSENKO is of the

opinion that taere were no KGB recruitmenis of United States Embassy

personnel in Voscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception

Of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wailis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD] who actually

was aus) employee but did work part of she time in the Embagay.

The question bere is whether or not the expressed opinion of

NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion

can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB

recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The

only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be

accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that

a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any

way of the recruitment. This sould in no way be interpreted as a

suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased

observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to

accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSE NIl lild be

examined and can be cited as follows.

SECRET

Gaut 1

Excriles has sitaratic

ENDS MeNe9

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.......

(a) During Marcia 1953-jaie May 1955 NOSENKO

was a case officer in the Firsi Secion, First Department,

SCD. NOSENKO does noi claim that he would kave known

the detais concerning any recruitments (oteer than

"ANDREY") in this period, jut staies if there had been

be would have beard "sometaing."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO

was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department,

but continued to have contact with certain officers in the

First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the

opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United

States Embassy during this period he would have heard

"something" even though he would probably have learned

few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period

NOSENKO was Deputy Chiei of the First Section, First

Department,

and he has made the categorical statement

that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United

States Embassy personnel during this period of time.

He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments

during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during

1960-1961, have heard of learned some details of kg901239

case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

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NOSENIO since the Chief oi Section was Vladislav

KOVSHUK wno had been an officer of the First Depart-

meni since 1953, actually working in the First Section

excepi for tie periods of time that he was in the United

States to reactivaie "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a

period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First

Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the

Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain

contact with certain officers of the First Section, First

Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV,

who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First

Sectión, then became Chief of Section, and in the laiter

part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with

GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that

he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO

some information in regard to any successful recruitments

. of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed

out that he learned of the existence of the Fierbert HOWARD]

case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until

1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually

0001239

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Joarned of the samo when the Firet Sectlon, First

Departinent, needed the services of the Seventh

Department (Third Section) is obtaining a room in a

certain borel for the Sovlet girl friend of HOWARD

•In goneral the above constitutes the basio for the statod opinion

of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD]were the only

Ducconsul KGB recrultmento during 1953 - December 1963. It should

Do noted chai there are no olbar identified IGB recruitments during

this perlod of time which would specifically refute the opiaion of

NOSENKO. Howover, is vlew of the cilod actual baolo for the opinion

of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinios of NOSENKO as being an

honest opiaton should not be converted into a statement that it 16

absolute proof that another recrultment could not have occurred.

NOSENKO may be completely correct in bla opinion, but since

NOSENKO was only in the Firel Dopartment 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961

his optatos that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment

in 1953 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepied as intallible.

0001240

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V. 4N21

6001241

SECRET

Lair 1

-50-783 168

429-4911107759

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The previous summary contained an Arsex "A" ard an Ariex

"B" covering pages 31ó - 435. Limiied comments corcerring Annex

"A, "Statemeris o Soviei Officiais About NOSENXO, and Arnex "3, "

Summaries of Cases Noi Examined in Texi, are uttached. In addition,

there is an Arex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The

Chereparov Papers. "

Aitachments:

Annex B

Arcex C

SECRET

Gideo 1

663001683469

0001242

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ANVEX B - SEVIViARIES DE CASES NOT

EXA VINED IN TEXE

3

C001243

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Exc1966 1 8=2 2==3

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12.2Y 3

Pages 399 - 435 ji die jeerious summary contin surenaries

on the cases of lamesicars wão, accoring io inormision o

NOSENIO, were oi KGB interest, were agproached by die XC3, oi

were actually recruited by the NG3. I was stateá iba- tiesa cases

did noi clearly relate to the suciüc KCS positions iaid at particumi

¿mes by NOSENiO aad thus couid soi be usefully empioyed in exumining

his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of thesa cases has been expiored

in detail during ise current inierviews win NOSENIO, and it is now

possiole to establisi a certain reiationsig deveon these cases and

certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in ice KGB.

08

It is the conclusion o ihis summasy taat any group og)cases,

as well as all otier cases concerning wiica NOSENKO Las furnissed

information, must be fully considered, soi necassarily for iue importance

or unimportance of ine information, bui io determine how NOSE XO

claimed to have learned of ine case and wetaer his statements cos-

cerning each idertified case are supported by collateral informacion.

These factors are important in assessing the overall validity oi inior-

mation from NOSENKO as well as beisg supporting evlatroblattis

claimed positions in the KGB.

somales!

ST.PDET

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.........

C8

jo communi speculichi, o: casio di tie alcases would raguire

a very longly paper. Cutor interviews have coveloped perison

cases. Of even more signiticarce is the luci inai lOSE VO ias

08

lozicaliy sourced ris iiozation is all exces perhat fucicases.

The indicáied inability ol NOSENiO io corpicicly sourco ai 490i

the cases is not considered significant, particuurly since dis having

knowledge oi all ice cases is quito compricio with do claimed posiono

in the KGB, in addition, criticism of MOSaNO ior so: veing asie to

source all of his informaiion wouid be unicasonable sirce it makes

no allowance for normal lapses of mamory 0r iailure io racali some-

thing which was insigruicant a: tie simo i occurred.

Without ciring in detail añy oi the cases, do ways in winicia

NOSENKO learned oí a number of the cases are considered important

since there is a direct relationship io dis ciaimed positions in the ÄG3

during 1960 - January 1904, specuically the Dosicion Oi Daputy Criei,

First Section, First Department, 1960 - 19ó; Chies, First Section,

Seventh Departmeni, january - Juy 1962; ard as Deputy Chief, Sevansa

Department, July 1962 - Jaruary 1964. Certain examples of the abova

are as follows:

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(a) NOSENKO jerined di i minüer di tir Seveni

Deparimont cases whica ind occurred in 1900 -isól, as

weil as several 1950 - 1959 cases ivom adies prépared ly

tie Cuivi 0i Acino Caici ui ino Firsi Section, Secund

Section ind Sixil Section in 19ó3. Trese noies were Fie-

pared at the request oi NOSENKO vio as à Depay Chici,

Sevent Depariment, was responsidle loi supervision oi

these inree sections; aid the reçues was acilaily an ex-

pansion oi the original reçuest irom BOBKOV, Deput Chief

uf the SCD, for informacion on recruliments of iie Severin

Depariment. NOSENKO broughi wit him in 1904 tie nuies

preparei by the Chiei or Actirg Chiei of tre Firsi Section,

Second Section and Sist: Section and ais knowiedge of many.

of the cases which hãd occurred prior to 1962, partculary

1960 - 1901, was limited io information contained in tre

noies. From inese noies, NOSINKO rad prepared his re-

port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were net applicable

to the requesi.

(bi NOSENKO learned oi several 1962 - 1963 cases oi

the First Section, First Deparimen, fror. Germadiy I.

GRYAZNOV wno succeeded NOSENXO as Depuiy Chiei,

3.

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0001246

& anthouet. iStant tantriste

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.......

First Secion, Firsi Depainent. This inébirnice Was

furnisied i OSENÃO primarily because di bio icienuing

wish GRYAZNOV and adi as ine result di mural Oberancis.

was furnished addisonal details as a resui use jugues:

¡For the Severis Depuirmont to Isi Diasi Secion, 21r5:

Departmori, for assisiance or vice versa.

ment prior io 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in de Seventa

Departmeni. Ceriain oí the cases were cases in Waich the Firsü Secton,

First Departmeni, was invoived prior io i9óù or ilóû -ilói. The

knowledge of NOSENKO corcerning these tvo groups oi

cases does rot

materially suppor: his claimed positions in the Firsi Departueni and

Sevenih Departmeni, but does support ais claimeá assignment to sae

Sevenia Department prior so 1960 ard in 1962 - 1963, ani his ciaimed

assignment to the First Depariment in 1900 - 1961.

08

It is difficuii to specificaliy comment concerning faese El cases

since they do not iali irto one os two specific categories. Instead, iney

constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining aiter completion of

the detailed sections of the prèvious summary: Included are First

Department and Seventh Depariment cases covering a pariod o. approxi-

mately five and one-half years. It should be zoied, holtPeriat ibe

4

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expiration de NOSENiO concernino mis knowiedge ci coincases

is both plausible and comparioie wiin sis ciaimed positions in tae

First Deparonent und Sevent Departmeni during Iscû - January Sós.

0001248

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ANVEX E - TRE CARREPAYOV PAPERS

0001249

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6.87

Excitte: t.a cirall

8380:12195 C

820128-1149730

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S=0:E.

243 CH23324NOV PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous sundary contain a cuscription

oí the Cherepanov Pagers, ard now Alcisaiar Mioiayerica CHiZREPANOV

passed a package o documents io an American tourist in Moscow in early

November 1963. The conclusion, however, was thai tie assertions oi

NOSENIO with respeci to the CHERIPANOV Case were not material to

the claim of NOSENKO thai lie was Deploy Criei, Seventh Depärtmert,

in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers io the bona

fides of NOSENKO cannoi be ignored and must de given specitic consic-

eration. I CHEREPANOV was under KGB controi wich he passed ihe

papers to the American tourisi, or il the papers contain "deception

information, " the bona fides oi NOSENÃO are subjeci to very serious

question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was,

according to NOSENKO, an oificer in the First Section, First Depaïtment,

SECRET

0001250

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during isuo - mic-ilói wher ho was forcei into retirement our doe

KG3. During die above period o ime, NOSENiO ciaimo to save

been Depuig Chiel, Firsi Sucron, inconga ja does r0- Chrim is sive

cad a direct supervisory responsibil; our CHEREPANOV excozi

in ise absence of ine Caici di Socion, Vladisiar KOVSUK. NOSENiO

aiso clairs is dure participated in le bur ior CRenSPilOT

December 1963.

Consideration sas previously been given to tue incory dai dise

Cherepanov Papers were passea to americans by sai 103 tarouga

CHEREPANOV to SUppOrt ELe bOna LideS O NOSENKO, Tuis icosy

seems to have littie credibility since de papera Contain no iriormacios

which would even support ine claim oí JOSENKO dai be was in the

Firsi Section, First Depaïment, 1960 - ilói. The papers aiso contain

no incormation vaich would indicate theze was even a Deputy Caivi oi

the First Section during 1958, - 1960.

Statements by NOSENXO are empiatic that CHERERAYOV was

not under KGB control, thai se passed ie papers wuich it laver developed

be had taken from ice Firsi Section prior io dis retiremeni because de

was disgruniled with sis treaiment by toe KGB, and that the action by

CHEREPANOV caused consiernation in the KGB.

There is no coliateral evidence which contradicis any of

the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPAYOY. Further, sere is

0001251

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noiring in eliner ise iorm on suasince d the pagers Nicaprovides

a basis for suspicion as to their auerricity, inuicida, ine curm

and suasiance oí ine papers are in reczing win ice description sy

NOSENKO di Lie day-io-day Operacion o the Diesi Sucion, First

Departmeni.

During Curren: iriesviews, ie CREüEPANOY casuins jeen

covered in detail wits NOSENNO. Jae Chereparur Papers, Wack

were originally saown io MOSENiO i iós aer dis defactios, suva

aiso been covered in catali on à separate item-by-liom basis. dissouga

NOSENKO does noi ciaim to ture speciticaily seen any particuia, item

prior to 1964, his scaiemeris in regard to the vazious candwritings,

types of noies, and árai memoraria leave no douci isai NOSINiO

was very familiar wita personnel in sie Firsi Secion, Firsi Depart-

ment, ard with Firsi Deparimoni procedures.

Ceriain additional research as been conducied in regard io the

papers and a detailed analysis will de arepared at a laier daie. I

shouid de noted that a considerabie amouni of personal judgmen sas

been recessary in making an assessment oi ice Cuerabasov Pagazs

since there are no exemplars wisa vaich to compare any of the material.

However, based on iniormation developed thus fai, aud ¿here is 20

reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, iceze is

not an adequaie basis for an opinios toat CHEREPAYOV

was uader KG3

conirol, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive infgiUr"?S2"

3

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or inai the papers were orior tin ie colicction oi maïorial uy a

casgrunted employee waich he very cureully seleciod or accummaid,

the removal oi waich woula onij ive constitured i inirimal jisi to

CHEREPANOV.

The enüre Cherebanor Pipers save been covioved io determine

¡i aera is any iniormacion whicù coria de concuored "deceptive inor-

mation" eiter by direct siutemeri or implicasion.

Two possibie areas

have been noted ard given full consideratior. These areas are:

(a) There is no spocific irormation mut icere

were any recruiiments by se KGB O American per-

sonnel in the United Siates Embassy during 1958 - 15ú0,

nor is there any incormaion suggessing he KGB baù an

• American source or American agent in iie Emcassy

during thai perioa of tire.

¡i PetiS. POPOV, a GãU officer wao aud been

an extremely valuable is source from 1953 on, was,

according io the papers, exposed to the KGB in january

1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne

WINTERS, JE. VENTZAS WaS a CLA employee lisder

Department of State cover assigned io ibe Embassy in

Moscow. The letter, which was io POPOV, was obtained

by the KGB aiter mailing by WINTERS and was a dizeci

result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

0001253

SEPPOT

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in regara in lai, me papers dre ouly a raior minuse pari oi

the juia papers paro pud in tae Firsi Secion during i95ô - ISú0.

The lati di any inorinion in these pagers weico direcay or indirecay

indicares mai ine iOD ride a reczuitreni di un American in the

Inidass; or lud ai Americas source in die Embassy during lo l5ó -

196û period is ordy a madra los considerarion, It is not conciusive

prodi iái a recruimeni vas not made or that an American sourco

did noi exisi. Toe pagers do not cumicia à positive suiemoni on

eitker matter.

la regara io (a), tie quite specide iriormatior in the pagers

that Per S. POPOV was incovered by sie iGB as à rebuit oi XGB

surveillaace on George Payre WINTERS, Ji., wio mailed a letter to

POPOV in January 1959, this iriormasion should be considered as

possibiy information oí a deceptive nature unless an adequaie explaricion

can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalied to

Moscow irom Easi Germany in November 1958 ostensibly loi IDY.

The circumstances under waich ie was recalied and coliaterai inío=-

mation have given acequate grounds for a beliei tuai by Noveniber

1958 POPOV was suspecied by the KGB of cooperating with Western

Intelligence or that ie KGB may even have been sure POPOV bad

been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed tcat any lead to the KGB in regard to

POPOY or the fact that United Siaies Intelligence, more spe 000125-4

5

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CiA, had a source in ise GRü loud lave como irom an ageri or

source of ibe ECD, AGB, sui ice SCD. li can uiso da presumed irai

¿ source or agoni of ine FCD ii i pusicion io finisa a leuci io a

penciracion us to GRu by Mustern ineligence wouid be carvinily

proiccied even witn ine KGB. The possibil; oi coursa exists isat

a load ironi George BLARE, an ECD agori, resulied in io eposure

OÍ POPOV to the KGB, bui ii is noi esiblishod diat it did nor is tocra

any reasor to believe sae CD couid noi or dia not save anoicer igent

or agents who furnisced information iu the XG3 pertinent to develop-

ment of the case against POPOV.

The primary quesiion, however, as regards the Cherepanov

Papers is whether, even if it is presuned te KG3 obtained iniormation

from an FCD source or ageni waicia lcd io suspicion oi POPOV or

identification of POPOV, suis Wouid be incorputible with information

in the papers and could orij icaù to tie concision thai ide japers contain

"deceptive iniormation."

The conclusion in regard io the above is that te fuci the papers

attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KG3 to surveillance on WINTERS

when he mailed the leiter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible

with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained infor-

mation from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in

regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

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I incormiion was reccived iroin an important ECD agoni

such as George BLAKE or irougi anoiber vainidle ECD agent waica

¡ed to KGB suspicion vi POTOV piloi io his return to Moscow in

November 1958, it is sighly unlice; suca iniormation woud reccive

wide distribution within the KGo, cuber in lue FOD CE üa SCD. =

is also possibie ine limited giou, wishin die KO3 wio wouid de awara

_¿cat the KGB had receiveù iníoirmon leading io suspicion in POPOV

irom a valuable ageni would be very interesied in attributing the

exposure oi POPOV to the iortuiiis mailing of the letter to POPON

by WINTERS. The possibility scouid bo corsidered thai prior to ie

retrieval by the KGB of the letter io POPOV more was only a der i

suspicion of POPOV but thai the icitor compieiely soddited the case

against POPOV.

Consideration has been given io the possibilly dai CADaSPANOV

was under kGB conirol when de passed due pageis to die dinosicia

tonrist and that it was done by the iG3 with sae hope oi lvoiving 5zd

in a KGB-control'ea operation within the USSR. In that event, the

papers passed by CHEREPANOV would mos: likeiy be genuine since

this wouid have been the initial sap in what ine KGB doped would become

a successful operation.

The above theory has been rejected since there are a number

of factors which militate against i. These faciors incide the fac: that

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Tit.

...

Wich mown indice Gichard Ovind to Curiod access and tiere.

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INDEX

ABIDIAN, Jolin - IV, E, 5, 7-15,19, 20, 52

"ANDREY" (Dayle Vallis SMITII) - IV, G,1-4

ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - II, A, 2

ARTEMOY, Vladiriir Ivovich - IV, F, 6,12, 13

SAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV, E, 3, $

BALIDIS, Boris Andreyeviela - IV, T,2

BARRETT, Robert) - Iil, F, 14, 15

06 (BEGCS, Frank]-IV, E, 36,37

BEL:TSKIY, Boris - IV, F,6-12

BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - IV, B, 2,3,5-7

06 (BIENSTOGK, NataliE}- IV, F, 3, 4

06 BIRSE, Arthur)- IV, D, 1,2

BLAKE, George - IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9: V, C, 6,7

BO3KOV, Filip Derisovick - IV, F, 15,16; V, B, 3

BOHLEN, Ambassador - I, F, 10

BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53,54

06 (BRAUNS, Hoxsi]- IV, F, 3-6

06 (BROWN, G. Stanley - IV, E, 43

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BUGAYEVA, Luimila - IV, F, 4

06 (BURGL, Richard; iV, D.1

06 [BURTIN, Sipe]ý IV, E, 49,50

06 BURTIN, WiLT IV, E, 49,50

CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39,40,42

CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, =, 2, 16

CHEREPANOV, Aleksand= N. - Iu, F, 4; V, C, 1-4,6-8

CHERNEISEV, Y. 5. - IV, E, 49

CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - ill, B, 4

. 06 DAx, Frank -IV, F, 41,43

DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45

DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV, B, 5,6

DOUGLAS, William O. - IV,D, 3

06 DREW, George - IV, D, 1

06 DWELLY, RoberT]-IV, E, 41,44,45 '

FARVAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V, A, 1

FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV, E, 8,9

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey .V. - IV, E, 49-51; IV, F, 1

06 [risK, NormanJ-IV, D, 5

06 FRIPPEL, Arsene]- IV, D, 2

06 CAFFEY, Joseph} IV, E, 41, 45,46

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GARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 52

06 (GARCIA, Anthony Ag - IV, Z, 39

06. (GARLAND. John'} III, F. 17; iV, E, 31, 33-36

06 [CINSBURG, Michaell: IV, D.5,6

GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhayiovich - II, B, 3,4; II, E, 9-11; II, F, 5-13,15-19;

IV,B,5,6; IV,D,9,10; IV, E, 21,23,31-34;

V., A, 1

GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - I, F,3,4; IV, ó; IV,6; IV, E, 4,5,21; IV,F.1.2

"GRIGORIY" - III, F, 13; IV,D,3,6; IV,F,4

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - Ш, В, 4;. IV, Е, 20

GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - I, B, 4; III, F.8-13,15; IV, E, 5,12,19-21, 26-28.

30,43-45; IV.G,3; V,B.3,4

GUK, Yuriy I. - II, В, 4

HAMILTON, Victor Norris - Ji, E, 9.

(aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri)

"HANNA" - IV, E, 27

O6 GGARRIS, Cisella - IV. D.1,7,8

HORBALY, William - IV, E, 53

06 (HOWÄRD, Herberf), III, E,8; II, E, 20; IV,G. 1,3,4

IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39, 45, 46

06 [ENNER, Paul)- IV, E, 28-32, 35-36

JOHNSON, Robert Lee - III, E,8; UI, G,5

06 [JOHNSON, Wallace Everetl - IV, F, 3,4

06 [JONES, William Carroll - IV.5, 3,4

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06

KADERA, Tred} IV. E, 45

KANTOR, Marvia - IV, D, 5,6

06 (RARLOV, fEu - IV, D, 5

KASHPEROV, Vakhail - W, F, 4

KEMMER, Myra - IV,E, 9

: 06 [KEYSERS, James-IV, E,22-26,55,56

KLYPIN, Vladimir Aiekseyevich - IV, E, 5,48-51

KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV,B,1-4,7

KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30,34

(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - III, B, 4; ІШ, F, 8, 16, 17; IV, E,5,19-21,28-32.

34-39,42-44

KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1

KOVSHUK, Vladisläv M. - II,B, 4; Ш,F, 5,11,12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18,21,

23,49,52,53; IV, F,1,2; IV, G,3; V, C,2

KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12

KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - IV, B,5

•06 LANE, Allen IV, D.1:2

LANGELLE, Russell - III, F, 3; IV, E, 8

"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26

06. [LUBIN, GeorEE), IV. E, 49,50

06 [LUNT, Нотасе - I1, F,3

O6 (MAHONEY, Eugene - IV, E, 53

S6 MALIA, Vartin)-IV.D.2

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06•

MARK, David]j III, C, 4

EMARLAW, RalpEl- IV. D,5

06

IMERTENS,

Gerard - IV, D,2

MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, $9

MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - I1I, E, 8; Ш, G,5

MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52

• EMORONE, 'JoRepa) - 1V, E, 22, 27,36,37, 39,40,55

MULE, Walter (Capi.) - IV, C, 4

MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F, 13

06 PECHTER, Bernard ; IV, D, 5,6

PENKOVSKIY, Oieg Vasilyevich - IV, E, 13

PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - III, B, 4; IV, E, 48,49

POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/*-7

06 (PREISFREUND, Joha7) - III, E, 5. 11, 12

06 [PRESSMAN, Patrick]- iV, D, 5,7

"RÁKETA" - IV, C, 5

RASTVOROV, Yuriy : iV, B, 5,6

RHODES, Roy - Ш, F, 4

Od RUFE, Joan -IV, D, 5,6

06 SCHWARZENBACH, Collettel - II, F,10

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.: •

SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FVÜ - IV, E, 32,33

(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also

identical to Igor Aleksejevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV

and very possibly Igor a. SViRNOV.)

06 [SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry] -II, F, 6

D6. SHATYAUER, Sofial- IV, D, 5,7

SILAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40

SHELEPIN, Alekrandr Nikolayevich - W, F, 13

"SHIMELEV" - it, E, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

06 (SHUBIN, JORD- IV, D, 11

SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, 7, li, 12

SMITH, Dayle Wallis - L, F, 4, 20; IV, G, 1

SMITH, Edward Elis - ill, 5, 4

06 (SMITH, Joan Discoe - Ill, 5, 9: IV, Ei, 49, 50

STALIN - IV, B, 5

06 [STEVENS, Edmund!! II, E, 4,6

06 [STORSBERG, James) - ili, F, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 22-24, 26, 43, 55.56

06 [TARASKA, William]-IV, D, 5,6

06 TAYLOR, David] IV, D. 2

06 (IAYLOR, Joln J: IV, E, 42, 43

UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38

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06 (URBAN, (Culonel)- IV, E, 24,25

VASSALL, William - I, E, 9; II, G, 5; IV, D, 9

06 [WASHENKO, Steve) IV, E, 53

06 [WILBX, William Stanley}- IV,D,2

WINTERS, George Payre, Jr. - IV, E, 53; V, G,4-7

ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34

(Very possibly Igor Alexsejevica ZEVKIY, but is now considered also

identical to Igor Alekseyerich SERGEYEV, Igor Aleiseyevich SUKHOV

and very possibly Igor A. SVIRVOV.)

06 [(ZUJUS, Matthew)- IV, E, 26-28

06( ZWANO, Maurice)- IV, E, 40-42

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