Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: NOTES

## Page 1

(180-10142-10064|

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

i pasy. At that

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ufforts. §HSCA Class, Depo of John Scelso, pin-

112 , Ever Session Tertimong of RichardHelns, 8/9/78,

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traffic ( code faceletition, telegram a

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was being dome are, the chole warld...

§HSCA Class. Depo of R. Pocca, 7/17/28, p9).

/...

142-10064

---

## Page 2

THIS COPY IS NOI

FOR RELEASE.

JFK Box 22

Folder 25

shift in a rares in ge

an errade tone.

L ExeC

p14, see also HS CA Class. Depo of JokinScelso,

5/16/78,7.1383

Rayrana Rocer expander on) els

reaming when he testified behe the

Committe that the shift in reaponable,

carded

wa partill are the satable?

o the Warren Commerin. I It SiA ClasS.

Depo of Raymond Rocca, Pp12-17), Rocea

addedto his reming:

it wor entrol appropriate in the

GPFLOOR please That he (Selad) wil

have that respinblet for the Agen

nostigatu?. But the minute

you had a Conism Det up

outade the live obveredy had to

(over

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

: Do Not Reproduce

---

## Page 3

because the spread invalid the, all

Co me utteds admiratitives

aimply a hybrid minor? Roccas

PIZ

---

## Page 4

Thes Committee has identif, ed two

isdesire

- 17-

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level

contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the

average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit

its information to the Warren Commission, after such in-

formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep.,

pp. 66-67) Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

at times

However,

curses,

concern for protecting i + 3

a the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused

the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty

relevant

in getting

information than when the protection of

such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin

expressed the opinion that the Agency's,

eftost

• to pro-

tect its sensitive sources and methods did

inteive

which

a effect «

• the quality of the information to

the Warren Commission and its staff

vere given access.

(Rankin at p. 23) Lin some instances

a resultuithe

made

the

As

e unilateral decisions

withholdfordmit

Agency

Fle-

accesstoC/A

mommaterialst

• the Commission. (Scerso dep.

p.158)

impreded the warren commission investi

Theise dare:

Two

is Commi

e in which

lon

of a

sources

methods we

dur-

the

đẹn Com

Ion

invest

on inva

nd

Im-

peded the warren Commiss

investigation to some degree:

wwthholdinginforimationsromthe..cor

en Conmission Sta

venta hire tothe photosurveillance and telephond surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexicot City Station

effectsofthe

2) As a related consideration, the controversy sur-

---

## Page 5

- 18-

rounding photograph now referred to as that

of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined a

herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of

sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was

evident from the

aception of the warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first

to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.

p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence re-

ports which derived from all our sources, in-

cluding technical sources, including the

tele-

phone intercept and the information gotten

from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for

example, which corresponded almost exactly

with the information from the telephone inter-

cepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the warren Conmission regarding Lee Harvey

'31 Janmemo

Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the informa-

tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was

based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification

of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The LA

policy +

limiting Warren Commission know-

ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early

as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from

CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the

Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

---

## Page 6

- 19 -

phone taps, in order to protect your contin-

uing ops .

Will rely instead on statements

of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet

Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID

(CIA cable DIR 97829 FOlA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20,

1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of

December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal

/Special Investigations Group-

of the CIA counterintelligence/staff wrote that he had

been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison men to the CIA,

that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren

Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup-

ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated

that some United States Agency was tapping telephones

in Mexico. Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could

Whie

supply the Warren Commission with source of the telephone

taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveil-

lance operations in Mexico City, see CIA S@CI-3/779/5101

O'Neal's memorandum

shows

• that he discussed this matter

with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms,

was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed

.to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the

Agency's desire to make available to the Com-

mission at least in this manner--via the FBI-

sensitive information which could relate to

telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File,

20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

---

## Page 7

- 22 -

was to bernaform thatwould

the form of this presentation a bare

has pro-

tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources

and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to

inform the Warren Commission, at least during

oftte@ommiss.con'suissitk,

the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo sur-

veillance operations in Mexico City,

Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these tele-

phone taps and surveillance was not only be-

cause it was sensitive from the Agency's

standpoint, but the telephone taps were run-

ning in conjunction with the Mexican authori-

ties and therefore, if this had become public

knowledge, it would

have caused very bad feel-

ings between Mexico and the United States,

and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session

hearing, pp.51-52,

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to

the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations

prior to the assassination. and

chan the pose assassination

period a

•).

Furthermon

as

of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information

made available by DCI McCone to National Security Councils

had beenmade

Director McGeorge Bundy,

aware that the CIA had tele-

phone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em-

bassy/Consulatesand that through these taps Oswald's pre-

sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been

corroborated. Luite Mi core ride to Me Georg Brend,

---

## Page 8

- 23 -

unwillingness

The CIA's

* to inform the Warren Commission

of the above-described surveillance operations

in the early stages

in-

vestigation

th

tHa

Is is a source

of concern to this committee.

It is indicative of an

Agony

preen desire skew ints fever the for id

Le ciA felt unconfortabli

substance

gene

ad information

* providedg

the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep.T. This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it,

even those whi

which might have meant exposing certain sensi-

-"?"

tive operations to the Commission.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA

provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that

chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visity during

September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963.: That memorandum

dig

that

= notmention.

Oswald's various conver-

sations

with the cuban and soubti Embassy/consulates had ::

been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore,

that

memorandum

d notention entere that the CIA

had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at•

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the

conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

firmas

Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and

transcribed.

---

## Page 9

r.t.......9.0.00..0.1.

- 24 -

On February li 1964 Helms appeared before the

Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran-

dum of January l , 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of

January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that

as ot

his writers.

*, the Warren Commission

had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance

operation or the production i.e., the tapes and trans-

cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb-

ruary 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communica-

tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in

of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated

by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com-

mission had been informed of the telephone surveillance

operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry

by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this

conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between

the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com-

mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headguar-

ters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various trans-

cripts resulting from the CIA's telephond surveillance

operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However,

Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available

to Commission representatives and was not able to state

under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren

Commission learned of these operations.

---

## Page 10

- 25 -

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's

inquiry of February 10.

The Agency response did indi-

cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was

also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did

not reveal the source of this information in its response

to the commissionor indicalo that it would be revealed

by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

v.

During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a

series of memoranda which among other

issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access

to the production material derived from the CIA telephonde

surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of

these memoranda tend to support the Committee's belief

that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman,

and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveil-

lance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman,

Salwson and willens met with win Scott, the CIA's Chief

Scott

of Station in Mexico City ne provided them with various

transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone

taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson

memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: -

Hometer, Brior to April. 9.

• it appears doubtful

that the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

---

## Page 11

- 26 -

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission

had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain

telephonde surveillance of

the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with

CIA representatives). Slawson's memoranaum reveals

the Warren Commission had learned that CIA lad In tos

possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

porticos-Armas

Thee conversations, requested by the Warren Commission

representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including

Richard Helms,

Mes concerned Silvia

Durha's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal

memo

Police (cite?).

Helms responded to the Com-

mission's request for access,

is that he would

attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives'

to review

this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not

reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the

Dorticos-Armas intercepts.". As detailed above, both the FBI

and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the

CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

(Cite)

One or the other could well have provided the war-

ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray-

mond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.

lends some support to the position that the Commission had

been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through

the CIA's initiative.

---

## Page 12

,,,,осей,,й, омо!!, .оілал,.алиіу.....

- 27-

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964

concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated

that the tentative conclusions concera

to Oswald's

Mexico trip,

that he had reached

were derived from CIA

memorandad of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964,

and in addition a Mexican federal police summary diatof

interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination

with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is

simply a summation of what the Mexican police

in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu-.

rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that salwson placed limited

reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there

is no indication that Salwson had been provided the Duran

telephond intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of

Slawson's comments conerning the Mejican police report,

it would appear that the Warren Commission as of March 25,

had been provided little substantive information pertaining

to Sylvia Duran.

insert p28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been

given access

to the Duran transcripts is further supported

by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite)

wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited

the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion

he

waste wer

as based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi-

mony before the Mexican police.

Ibis merrorandum bears

= nC

---

## Page 13

Insert

- 28 -

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran

transcripts. Furthermore,

Slawsor

had been given access

to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have

been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted

for this purpose. His analysis @bould have reflected

the lace of this ore alled ther by its cosrobaration or

criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

#Insortpag

the

Warren Co

March 25, 1964, the

the record instates that

its

Forts

restigalte

Oswal

activities

access to the Duran transcripts.

exico Citymad not been git

45 sdawson reverts

vihe Commission had been

forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make

susped ofa

reference to the surveillance operations, and a' summarya po-

lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for

over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera-

tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission

staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem-

ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to

the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention

of telephone taps, in order to protect your

continuing operations. Will rely instead

on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents

of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave

ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20,

1964 CIA p. 2144)

On Mar

27, 19648rawson

wrote that

deter-

mined that

had visite

the

aban Embassy

Three

---

## Page 14

- 29 -

times.

He stated that this conclusian was based upon his

review of silvia Duran's test

tony to

the Mexican

(Slawson megorandum, Marc

1964 CIA p. 1812) Howeyer,

Slawson

does not state

that his conclusions were also-drawn

from review of any

of the pr

station surveill ince opera

duction from the Mexico City

ions.

Shawson does

indicate,

Figuous regarding Oswald's

howeve

that his reasoning

visit to the Cuban embassy.

Logically, access to the

telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some

ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated

that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, re-

questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was

determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem-

ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate

stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as

Oswald

at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, o

the cit had twice

definitively established that Oswald had

visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific datesand exact timesof his presence

were

in the Cuban Embassy.

established as the result of the

telephonic surveillance.

Had this information been made

available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities

in Mexico City would have been more firmly established

than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

---

## Page 15

- 30 -

could have been made available to the Warren Commission

at its

nception but as. the record indicates they were

not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that

as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission

• had still not

been given access to the above-referenced

series of tele-

phone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman

and Slawson, they articulatedone question to the CIA and

two requests for information from the Agency (Ambassador

sMals ile mend April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Colemanand

1) What is the information source referred to in

the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended

to settle down in Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts

of the intercepts, translated if possible, in

refer

all cases where the

intercepts

Five to the

assassination or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see the intercept

in which the allegation that money was passed

at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

(ItemI)

The question

initially posed in the above-referenceo

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephon* intercept

of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April

3223). Necessarily, if Slawson

a Found.

22, 1964, CIA P.

necessary7.r9495

AMAN

othe source of the information, he had not beer

---

## Page 16

- 31

toy the cHAt

provided that source

whichi

one

The

tends to show

first Coleman-Slawson request

(Item Norbertwo I the aborts)

Athat

the commission

had

notbeen

given access,

concerning the

assassination

indicates the Seminist in d

Mycedart

englasti

287:9

(as

Is clear corro

Moreover

rated

toppal: 1 18 06-9-399

equest

interpretecte

mean

hat™

ểy had not been

given abcese.tt.any

subject

veriads.

The second request, fitem number three of the above

listing reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing

of monies Go discussed had not as of April 2 been provided

to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested

the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. Ot the March 12, 1964

meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-

presentatives. (Cite.)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated

their concern for receiving complete access. to all materials

relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire

investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is

a conclusion that he went there for the purpose

of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-

spiracies, etc. took place.

---

## Page 17

- 33 -

Upon the group's' arrival in Mexico City, they were met

by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State

Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of

the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission

representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the

group actual transcripts of the telephond surveillance

operations and English translations of the same. In addition,

he provided the group with reels of photographs for the

time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from

photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances

David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative

that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all

facts, including the sources of his information, and

that he understood that all three of us had been cleared

for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond

the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff

the information we obtained through him without first

clearing it with his superiors in Washington.

We

agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives

the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination..

Scott indicated that his staff a

immediately,

began to compile

dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22).

scott revealegthat

all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents

had immediately been put under surveillance following the

assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials,

particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the

Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded m

---

## Page 18

- 36

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

Thomas Karamesmes Ashant Ptito, regarding the

greshich

circumstances

§ this photograph by the

Central Intelligence Agency.

Rankin s

1eld

reques ted that

the Commission be

the identity of the individual

was

depicted in the photograph if that information ve available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,

Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret

since November 22, 1963

Service: that the CIA had disseminated several reports or

communications concerning the assassination to the Secret

Service sin

reports and other materials.

204t

RanKIn

requested copies of these

There matertaniachae

Three

cables truer

grig.nallgidenaif.co

which

concerned ten the photograph of the individual

Dig the 1991a CityStom as

Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.

Unha

91451

son, tamong the materials

bytrellA

disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26

dissemination (DIR85177), aeopy which was transmitted to

then deeret Servree. That cable concerned the Dort-Armas

conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic

surveillance operations in Mexico City'at the time of the

assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John

Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission

of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

'?.?

---

## Page 19

- 37-

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren

Commission all of our technical operations.

In other

words, we did not initially disclose to them that we

had photosurveillance because the November photo we had

(of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean

anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith:

...So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this

was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal

all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p.

150)

Rain Felorida 120, 19614.

intrawingin

reques fined

shish the Warren

Commission

access to

telephonic surveillance production' (as discussed in the

Similarlydiselaini

preceding section), the ma

• of the photosurveillance operations,

te the inad in Commitssion Man

Mate cause concern within

the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal

memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for

your determination. " Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to

respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding

CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23,

1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer

to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by

paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12

letter). If they come back on this point he feels

that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to

go over to show the Commission

the material rather than

pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these

items are of new substantive interest.

We have either

passed the material in substance to the Commission in

response to earlier levies on the items on the items

refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous sex

photographs which are not of Oswald..."

(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

---

## Page 20

- 43 -

VIII.

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's

assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named

"Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man

speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attach-

ment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's

Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap)

operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the

Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then

employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban

Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified

caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa

replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The callerwent on to tell Luisa that the person

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of

the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that

she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being

held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller

replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned

nothing else about the assassination that she had learned

about the assassination only a little while ago. The

unidentified caller commented:

---

## Page 21

- 44-

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been one of the

segregationists or against intergration

who

had killed Kennedy, then there was,

let's say, the possibility that a sort

of civil war would arise in the United

States; that contradictions would be

sharpened.. who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes

• three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, fo

fol

steer, in response to

a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on

a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the

only item in the intercept coverage of the

Cubans and Soviets after the assassination

that contains the suggestion of foreknow-

ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS,

23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com-

ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in-

deed indicate foreknowledge. of the assassination but may

also-

Y be interpreted without such

a sinister impli-

cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the

Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did

merit serious attention in the months following the assas-

sination.

However, Calderon's comments were not reported

to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

---

## Page 22

- 47 -

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in

Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying

Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed

to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15,

1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to

the CIA's

Mexico City Station and to the Chief of the CIA's

Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis-

patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data

on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon

was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Commercial

Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending

on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success,

to locate the report.

On

September 1, 1963, a dispatchwas sent

from

the Chief,

the Special Affairs

Staff to

the

Chief of

insert

the station

Mexico City

(Dispatch HMMW

11935).

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI

recorded, by

was

first reparted 10n

the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that

Joseph Langosen

time,

a, Chief of Counterintelligence for the

Special Affairs staff, repostetne results of his de-

briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum

stated that AMMUGhad no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items

of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

Serv

---

## Page 23

- 48 -

was.

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 Tet

asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence

services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Sensee

as recordet in

ty 5 momerenden that "prior to October

1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on

two or three occasions.

Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General

De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon,

Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

"(eite Mays men

Langosch

sarin thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise

relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to

this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch

duris January 1963

traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, date

for Cuba shortly after the assassination (ertemagimens)

On May 7, 1964, shame st

recorded additional informa-

tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's

possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran-

dum stated in part:

"a. Luisa Calderon, "since she returned to

Cuba, has been

paid a regular salary

by the DGI even

though she has not per-

formed any services.

Her home is in

the Vedado section where the rents are

high.

b: Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for

several years.

Before going to Mexico,

she worked in the Ministry of Exterior

Commerce in the department which was

known•as the "Empress Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General of the

Communist Youth in the department named

in the previous

sentence.

---

## Page 24

- 49-

On May 8 Danyone furthEr disclosed aMMic"s

S KnOW-

Ledge of the Oswald case. Sanesch

• paraphrased AMMUG's

knowledge of Calderon as

follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because

I learned about

17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to

Mexico, that she had been involved with an

American in Mexico.

The information to which

I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer...

I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange

that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from

the DGI althought she apparently did not do any

work for the Service. (The case officer) told

me that hers was a peculiar case and that he

himself believed that she had been recruited in

Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al-

though Manuel Pineiro,

the Head of the DGI, did

not agree.

As I recall, (the case officer) had

investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because,

during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had

intercepted a

letter to her by an American who

signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar.

As you know,

the pronunciation of

Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so

I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan-

dez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard"

or something different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love letter

but indicated that there was a clandestine-

professional relationship between the writer and

Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the

case officer) that after the interception of

the letter she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.

I do not know if this

could have been Oswäld...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

LANGOSCH

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information ma

had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP

in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis-

cuss

the AMMUG/1 sitaltion on a very restricted basis

with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at

the Agency of at the Commission headquarters. Until this

---

## Page 25

... ....'.

- 50 -

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ-

ing.

(11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments) .

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi-

tivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms'

communication was

a paraphrased accounting of s

Lamasch's

May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294) .

In that attachment the intelligence associations of

Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez are set

forth. However, that attachment hakes no reference what-

soever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested

accesti te

as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, mutanthet the

questions used in sagesch's interrogation of AMMUG. (DOOleY

memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18,

1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Counterintelligence Research

and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses

to the Warren Commission's officers for willen's review.

Willens saw &

yosh% May 5, memorandum. The only mention

of polderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of

Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about

six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early

in 1964.

However, willens was not shown the angos memoran-

dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more

detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

---

## Page 26

contimedafter p51

Calderon

veed a

bettertramition ento this section.

As discussed in an earlier section of this report,.

the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's

production from its telephonic surveillance operations

in Mexico City until an advanced stage in its investiga

tion. The record reflects that

Mssrs. Willens, Slawson,

and Coleman did not review the production until they

visited Mexico City on April

9, 1964. At that time, they

telephore

reviewed a number of Intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban

Embassies. These intercepts included one call to the

Soviet Embassy on September 27g believed to have been

- made by Oswaldy two calls made by Silvia Duran from the

Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from

give

dates

the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassya made by an uni-

dentified caller. (Cite Salwson memo of April 21, 1864.)

On September 28 the intercept operation recordeda

call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet

Consulate. (Cite.)

confusing

Kuniti

from

previos

parag:

On October I the intercept operation recorded two

calls made by a person later identified as Lee Harvey

Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.)

The Commission representatives were also supplied

with the CIA intercepts of

two conversations that

transpired between the Cuban President Dortic@Sand the

adpire Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations

Land for

It's very

what

paint is being , pages

made on

---

## Page 27

- 2 -

which

offered money while at the Cuban Embassyfand the general

state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22,

1964, pp. 45-46).

The committee's

$ review of CIA files «

E corro-

borateen ee slawson's monrantumne i telephone inter-

cepts provided to and reviewed by the

Commission.

-One

CIA document,

sugposting Saison's melerans

* entitled "Material

this

jach

exilica

expect

from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald

reader

File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This

document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls

nemember

it

made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These includedthree of the

comersations

£ September 27 listed above, one call of

September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of

7

echerat

• October.

dacument

While this does not correspond to the listing of

calls set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish

that no calls made en November 22, 1963 were shown to

i the mara station.

In addition, this document corroborates the showing

of the two Dorticas-Armas conversationSof November 26,

conversa

1964

the Warren Commission

The Committee has queried former Commission and CIA

representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript

of the Calderon conversation was ever shwon to the warren

---

## Page 28

- 5 -

Calderon

and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed F

• to

be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information

true

was not provided the Warren Commission either because

there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because

but

sound a

the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation

bit

were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been

stilted.

serious for It would demonstratedthat a CIA operative,

Try

well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed in-musdily.

formation prior to the assassination regarding Oswald

the

SerVICES

and/or his relationship to Cuban Intelligence,

and that

Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate

President Kennedy•

Regarding

m possible association with the CIA,

the com

mined catteranta file, Marina te Agen,

verlaur,

Files revealt no ostensible connection between Calderon an

the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact

between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A

September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the spe-

cial Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in

Reynosa, Texas, married to an American o1

1,

Mexican

descent.

If (CIA asset) can further

identify the sister, our domestic exploita-

tion section might be in a position to follow

up on this lead... Please levy the requirement

on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity.

(HMMW/ 1935, Sept.

1, 1963)

---

## Page 29

16-

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of

Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western

Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico,

reported that Luisa Calderon has

a sister

residing in Reynosa, Texas... Luisa may go

up to the border to visit her sister soon--

or her mother may make the trip--details

not clear. (HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidenced

an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her

family. Whether this interest took the form of a clan-

destine-agent relationship is

not revealed by Calderon's

201 file.

The Committee has queried the author of the above-

cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be con-

tacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section."

David Ronis, the dispateir's author, was a member

of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote

the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters

and was 40n responsible for recruitment and handling

of...

of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis,

when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of

his responsibility was to

scour the Western Hemisphere

division for operational leads related to the work of

the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally

would

send requests to CIA field

stations for information

offen

or leads on various persons.

A see he would receive no

What sampose is

served by

this sentence

---

## Page 30

- 7-

response to these requests.

It was Ronis' recollection

that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was

a task force within the Special Affairs Staff.

He also

stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division

might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sis-

ter.

Ronis told the Commitee that he had no recollection

of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intel-

ligence Service.

He did recall that he had recruited

women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did

not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban

Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis

stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon

was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August

31, 1978)

Various present and former CIA representatives

were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been asso-

ciated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one

recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August

ust

9, 2978, p. 136; ROcca, Dep. p.148, July 17, 1978: Sanges.

Interview of August_, Piccolo, Interview of_)

Thus, the Agency's file and the

and the testimony of former

•CIA employees are

between

and

reveal%no connection I Calderon es the

CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file

the most glaring mission beingtthe tama

ano Calderon's

hercryptic remarks following the assassination of President

Kennedy•

---

## Page 31

AFEMUG/ 1

no lawyerly

As cited with regard to Luisa Calderon, a defec-

tor from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the

CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's

contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector

was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-l defected from the DGI

on April 21, 1964 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. When

he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which

were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (OTTA IN 68894,

24 April 64) Following his defection, a CIA officer,

Joseph H. Langosch, went to Canada to meet A-1, debrief

him, and arrange for A-l's travel into the United States.

OSC

(See supra cite.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langresh's

debriefing of A-l were forwarded to the Chief of the CIA's

Special Affairs Staff from the Chief of Station in Ottawa,

Canada. Effective on May 1, A-l was under contract with

the CIA for operational purposes. (Contract Approving Of-

ficer memo, 6 May 64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was

convinced that A-I would be of great value to the Agency.

He stated:

There is no question in my mind that, AMMUG-1

*It is now known that A-l aid provide significant leads to

the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon.

It is further apparent

that little of this information was made available by the

CIA to the Warren Commission.

Therefore, the possibility

exists that A-l had provided other information to the CIA

that was relevant to the warren Commission's work but that which

was not properly reported to the Conmission.

---

## Page 32

-2 -

is a bona fide defector or that he has

furnished us with accurate and valuable

information concerning Cuban intelligence

operations, staffers, and

agents. (Langosch

memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the GI, A-1 from August of 1963

until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal

which

Section B (OTTA IN 68894 24 April 64)- This seetion

was responsibile for training agents for assignment in

Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained

handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal

Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April

64)

identifiedsortecha

A-1 knew who were the Cuban Intelligence officers

assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he untially

identified MEredo Mirabal, Manuel dega ant Rogelia Ródriguez

and the Comercial attache as DGI officers posted at the

Cuban Embaesy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described

A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence

people are.

One is _the Cuban Consul Alfredo

Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre.

That

is his title but he is actually the

intelligence chief, or at least he was until

the 16th of April at which time a replacement

was sent to Mexico to take over.

This fellow's

name is Manuel Vega.

The source says that the

Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia

or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intel-

ligence officer) and

another one is Rogelio.

(I might say that some of these names are familiar

to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debrief-

ing of A-1, 30 April 64)

---

## Page 33

_ 7 -

This

is a debriefing report of A-l entitled "The Oswald Case."

(Dispatch UFGW-5035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a

CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along

with eleven other A-l debriefing reports. (Cite supra.)

Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten ritation "SI." A CIA employee who has

worked extensively with the Agency files system tell a Committe

was thats/far

this notation t stand fee the CIA component Special In-

Hos

telligence. Other CIA representatives betieved the pota

CIA

tianta stand fort

the CIA component-social Intelligende.

been

Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a re-

aske

ference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In

a CIA memorandum dated

, it us stated

Quote Barbara's memo.

to

files

isoue?

The Agency has been unable to locate this document

and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the

substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-l's case officers regarding

about

additional information that A-l may have supplied regarding

Oswald.. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee

stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August

21, 1978) he did not have contact with the Warren Commission

and does not know what information derived from A-l's de-

briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission.

(Cite also

Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does

not

Internet

---

## Page 34

-8 -

A -1

recall thatfrid

memoranda atscussed

In a further effort to clarify the substance of informa-

tion that shite provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the

Give

fa legs committee has attempted to locate Anue. The CIA has also.

expun attempted to locate numut (give date of separation from CIA)

skeptial but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts.

A -1

re

At CIA

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information AMMUe may

stility. have supplied the CIA

about Oswal

* But on the basis of

CHA'S

the written fagera

the goney, except for the

t for the Caldero

welcHtt

episodel,

provided the Warren Commission with all

information

of investigative significance.$ff A broader question remains

however. The Agency,

as noted earlier, did not reveal to

the Warren Commission that A-l was present in the Washington,

D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the

Sivergdueconsiderat.on ta

Commission. Even considering the CIA's serious concern

for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was

not disclosed foreclosed the Warren Commission from exercising

a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1

sauce

as it concerned Oswald and

the Kennedy assassination.

On

Nose

this issue, as the written record tends to show,

unilaterally rejected thepassibilty.textrasati

the Agency

option.

It should not

have done so

The CIA die not fatt, in A-I's case, "the

enormous problems-estabfishing.boratidegs

- I see your last sentence

itata lit nosene

this.

ozoe

(gite Langosch's quote supora), his proven reliability and

confining

---

## Page 35

Thes Committee has identit, ex trust

areas of concern in whores generat

is desire

tis protectisensitivesources cam

astz.om

_ 17 -

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level

contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the

average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit

ambiguous

its information to the Warren Commission, after such in-

formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep.

petably

unnecency.

Alss, it

pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

However, *

at timess

concern for protecting its

• the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused

doen endar

Evatien

poseo

be cause,

if el took

the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty

relevant

CIA]

in getting

information than when the protection of

month

such sources and methods was not at issue.

J. Lee Rankin

to

processing.

effort

expressed the opinion that the Agency's

tect its sensitive sources and methods did

eve

which

Affect essen

the quality of the information to

-the

• Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) Lin

some instance

As a result the

dhe

Agency w

e unilateral decisions

le-

accesstoC/A

mmaterials tebe

• the Commission. (Scekso dep.

p.158)

ogme point, you should reen to testimony of cin

to a

request, th

ovie

week

transmittali

time

is

menningle.

TwO

on

of age

the

kẹn

Com

peded the warren Conmiss

sources

4B1On

invest

is committle in which the coun

nethods sie

sue dur- farm.

ion invol

IM-

investigation to some degree:

penalit the photosurveillance and telephone surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexicos City Station

effectsof the

As a related consideration, the controversy sur-

Get better phrasing Alre, this is wor

really

reparate area of concern.

---

## Page 36

- 18

Whe

rounding photograph now referred to as that

of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined the

herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of

sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was

evident from the

ception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first

to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.

p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence re-

ports which derived from all our sources, in-

cluding technical sources, including the tele-

.X

whet

phone intercept and the information gotten

from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for

example, which corresponded almost exactly

with the information from the telephone inter-

cepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the warren commanmen regarding Lee Harvey

Oswald's trip to Mexico City. {Cite.) Much of the informa-

tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was

based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification

of which had. been deleted completely from the report.

GIM

The

policy

limiting Warren Commission know-

ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early

as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from

CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the

Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

---

## Page 37

- 19 -

phone taps, in order to protect your contin-

uing ops

Will rely instead on statements

of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet

Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID

(CIA cable DIR 97829 FOLA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20,

1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of

December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal

/especial Investigations Group-

of the CIA Counterintelligence

Staff wrote that he had

been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison men to the CIA,

that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren

Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup-

ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

that had been

Decmeber 9, 1963rsubmitted to the Warren Conmission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated

that some United States Agency was tapping telephones

and

aked him

in Mexico, Papich queried O'Neat whether the FBI could

supply the Warren Commission with^source of the telephone

taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveil-

restructer

lance operations in Mexico City, see CIA S@CI-3/779/510)

this

O'Neal's memorandum

shown that he discussed this matter

sentence

with Scelso, who, in turn, after a discussion with Helms,

was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed

to the Warren Commission.

O'Neal wrote:

this

portion

fos

fence

not follow

swit

she

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the

Agency's desire to make available to the Com-

mission at least in this manner--via the FBI-

sensitive information which could relate to

telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File,

20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

issue.

---

## Page 38

appropriately

which world

- 22 -

was tober a form thatwould

the form of this presentation where

tect't

the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec. 63)

See aloo: Ayleton deps.

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during

the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo sur-

veillance operations in Mexico City! Ma

Helms testified:

unle

The reason for the sensitivity of these tele-

phone taps and surveillance was not only be-

cause it was sensitive from the Agency's

standpoint, but the telephone taps were run-

ning in conjunction with the Mexican authori-LT

ties and therefore, if this had become public

knowledge, it would have caused very bad feel-

ings between Mexico and the United States,

and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session

hearing, pp.51-52,

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to

the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations

Kule prior to the assassination eng

esignuring the post-assassination

+78518194184)

Furthermore

period

as

of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information

made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council3

had been made

Director McGeorge Bundy,

aware that the CIA had tele-

his

ants

p'""

phone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em-

bassy/Consulatesand that through these taps Oswald's pre-

sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been

corroborated.

Ecite Me Core Men to Me Georg, Bunity?

male..

pots paint.

---

## Page 39

- 23 -

unwillingness

The CIA'S

- to inform the Warren Conmission

of the above-described surveillance operations,

In the early stages

of this in-

vestigation

these

ALS

is-a-source

of concern to this committee.

It is indicative of antia

peerica desired skew nits favor the for and

deciA felt unconfortable

substance

information

a provideng

the

warren Commission. (See Scelso def. This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it,

even those which might have meant exposing certain sensi

tive operations to the commission. We'll have to give example.

ie. We was procading on

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA Compietily

mistake

provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that

assumptiser

chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visity during re ilto

in MC

September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

did

notention win

that

priso to

Oswald's various conver- Mc

sations with the Cuban and Sovlti Embassy/consulateshad =

trip

by

been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore,

WC

did

that memorandum

namention me

rosaur that the CIA

personned

had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban

April:

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at

e felicus

this was

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the

in. tire

conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

3130

Armas

Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and

mems.

transcribed.

---

## Page 40

- 24.-

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran-

dum of January Si , 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of

January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that

want as of his writirs..

*, the Warren Commission

had no substantive knowledge of the telephond surveillance

operation or the production i.e., the tapes and trans-

cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb-

ruary 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communica-

tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in

of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated

by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com-

mission had been informed of the telephong surveillance

operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry

by Rankin would not have been made. Good paiut.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this

conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between

the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com-

•.—.

mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar-

ters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various trans-

cripts resulting from the CIA's telephond surveillance

operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However,

Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available

to Commission representatives and was not able to state

under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren

firsts

Commission Tearned of these operations.

---

## Page 41

v.

Good

- 25 -

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's

inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi-

cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was

also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did

not revealithe source of this information in its response

this foun

to the Commissionfor indicate that it would be revealed

by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

Title?

- shouldut this be a subsection of the teleshow

During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other

issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access

to the production material derived from the CIA telephonde

surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of

these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief- Why?

Reaso

that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, should

and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveil-

lance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, whir

Salwson and Willens met with win scott, the CIA's Chief

print.

Scott

Station in Mexico City,we provided them with various

transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone

taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson

memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: —

rometer, Prior to Apail. 9

to it appears doubtful

that the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

---

## Page 42

- 26 -

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission

had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain

telephond surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with

CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals

sees the Warren Commission had learned that CIA tadTh tus

possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

Porticos-Armass

There conversations, requested by the Warren Commission

representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including

Richard Helms,

# concerned Silvia

Durha's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal

Police (cite?). emerue

Helms responded to the Com-

strailing

mission's request for access,

israsg that he would

attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives

to review

this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not

reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the

Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI

and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the

CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

Sue

One or the other could well have provided the War-

ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray-

mond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.

lends some support to the position that the Commission had

been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through

the CIA's initiative.

---

## Page 43

- 27-

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964

concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated

that the tentative conclusions Cancerous Oswald's

Mexico trip,

that he had reached

were derived from CIA

memorandad of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964,

and in addition a Mexican federal police summary sarof

interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination

with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is

simply a summation of what the Mexican police

learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia

Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate

in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu-

rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that salwson placed limited

reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there

is no indication that Salwson had been provided the Duran

telephonk intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of

Slawson's comments conerning the Meircan police report,

it would appear that the warren Commission as of March 25g

had been provided little substantive information pertaining

to Sylvia Duran.

Insert pz8

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been

given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported

by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite)

wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited

the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion

he ste we based upon an analysis of sylvia Duran's testi-

mony before the Mexican police.

Ibis memorandum benos

---

## Page 44

Insert

from

- 28 -

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran

transcripts. Furthermore,

Slawson

had been given access

to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have

been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted

for this purpose. His analysis dould have reflected

he tact ot this rerior

boreele fither by its corroboration o.

criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

AS

the

Warren

March 25, 1964, the record dahanstates that

its

orts to

#vestigaite

Oswal

activities

assess to the Duran transcripts.

Whe Commission had been clo

forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make

termidase

suspect

ofa

reference to the surveillance operations, and arsummarya po-

lice report. Thus, the Agency had been

successful for

over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera-

tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission

staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem-

ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to

the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention

of telephone taps, in order to protect your

continuing operations.

Will rely instead

on statements of Silvia Duran and

on contents

of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave

ODACID here.

(CIA cable,

DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20,

1964 CIA p. 2144)

On Mar

an 27, 1964 8rawson

wrote that

deter-

mined that

oswam

had visiter

the Cuban Embassy three

---

## Page 45

- 29 -

times.

He stated that this conclusion

Was based upon his

review of Silvia Duran's test.

mony to

the Mexican

- .

(Slawson menorandum, Marc

27 L

19646

CIA p. 1812)

Howeyer,

Slawson goes not state

a that his

conclusions

were alsge drawn

from review of any

f the production

from the Mexaco City

station sureillance operatiods

Lawson does

indicate,

however, that his feasoning

so regards swala's

visit to the cuban-Embassy.

•Logically, access to the

telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some

What

ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated

that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy@ re-

questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was late

Conversa

determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem-

y:16pm

ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate

subsquestly

stating that an American,

identified by ClA analysts as

was

tettnad twit?

Oswald

it the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ce

definitively established that Oswald had

visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific datesand exact times of his presence

toet

in the Cuban Embassy a established as the result of the.

telephonic surveillanee. Had this information been made

available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities

in Mexico City would have been more firmly established

than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

---

## Page 46

- 30 -

could have been made available to the warren Commission

at its minception. but as the record indicates they were

not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that

as of April 2, 1964 the Warren

Commission had still not

been given access to the above-referenced series of tele-

In

a memorandum of that date by Colemar

tand slawson, they articulatadone question to the CIA and

reference

two requests for information from the Agency• (Ambassador

Mann file memo

April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Colemanano

let slamson wore

1) What is the information source referred to in

vort

Lair

the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended

to settle down in Odessa;

this

For the fins!

intercepts.

2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts

of the intercepts, translated if possible, in

refer

all cases where the intercepts

Fire to the

assassination or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see the intercept

in which the allegation that money was passed

i.

at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

The question

Initially posed in the above-referenced

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephond intercept

of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April

Obvizus ye

1964, CIA p.

3223).

Necessarily, if Slawson a Found st

necessaratarguest

outhe source of the information, he had not been

Hard uny.

as yet

---

## Page 47

to the

riginal meterial

31

toy the CIA

provided that source which

one.

intro

The first Coleman-Slawson request

(Item Nutribertwo I the abstes)

tends to5hoc

sulthat

the commission

because

state

pie uine Given access,

concerning the assassination

(as

the

had

nitheen

to see intergents th

MeaT

chat

request

Ley Had not ween

miaks.

The (second request, Litem number three of the above

listingy reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing

of monies deS discussed had not as of April 2 been provided

to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested

the Dorticos-Armas transcripts._At the March 12, 1964

meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-

shand.nD

presentatives. (Cite.) to

exprome

on April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated

their concern for receiving complete access to all materials

relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:.

The most probable final result of the entire

investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is

a conclusion that he went there for the purpose

of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-

spiracies, etc. took place.

---

## Page 48

- 33 -

post

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met

by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State

Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of

the CIA.

That same day during a meeting. between the Commission

representatives and Win Scott, Scott made

available to the

group actual transcripts of the telephond surveillance

accompanied with

- you lawyery tyme lanquage

operations and English translations. Of the same, In addition,

he provided the group with reels of photographs for the

time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from

photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances

David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative

that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all

facts, including the sources of his information, and

that he understood that all three of us had been cleared

for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond

the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff

the information we obtained through him without first

clearing it with his superiors in Washington.

We

agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives

the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination,

Scott indicating that his stars aimediately

began to compile

dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22).

scott revealed läll known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents

Had immediately been put under surveillance following the

assassination.

Liaison was set up with Mexican officials,

particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the

Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded

---

## Page 49

- 34 -

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis-

closed immediately how incorrect our previous

information had been in Oswald's contacts with the

Soviet and Mexican Embassies.

Apparently the

distortions and omissions to which our information had

been subjected had entered some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott

was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We

had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the

embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how

badly distorted our information was we realized that

this would be useless.

Therefore, instead, we decided

to take as close note as possible from the original

source materials at some later time during our visit."

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did

following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealtexclusively

with the telephonic interceptspertaining orrespectively the

Duran and Oswald conversations Sorfle period Sept a 7-Out 1, 1963.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's

denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic

surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's

accurately rensoned

ability to draw conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico

City,

-table.

It meant that as

of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren

Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities

in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had

provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact

"on almost all the crucial points,

significantly more precise

could have been made

materials more available for analysis by the Commission.

---

## Page 50

VI.

The preceding sectio, 355 lated telep howitprato

veiline yet us co die no ten me leat

zuweillance.

Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission

with

vitally relevant information derived from certain

sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the

investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation

that might have been more seriously considered had this in

material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement.

-shortant cloracomesatio

be in this section?

Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by

FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no

physical resemblance to her son.

That photograph had been

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City

Station after Agency representatives had searched their files

in an effort to locate information on Oswald.

fr This photograph

was one in a series m

resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates

it

had been linked by the Mexico City Station

Prior to the

fr

assassination, lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn

affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the

photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4,

1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to

Oswala. {entecHatsaffiderstinWCR)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before

the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under

which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that

WIRI?

she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153)

---

## Page 51

- 36

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

to Thomas Karamesses Assestant Dipp

not,

regarding the

and

cxplanation

circumstances

my this photograph by the

toda

Central Intelligence Agency. Ranking

i-reques ted that

tota

the commission be

"the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph je that information wasavailable.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,.

Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret

the's could

ben lined into 1 se

Sentence.

Since November 22,1953

explicity le

Service: that,the CIA had disseminated several reports or

communications concerning the assassination to the Secret

Service sates

RanKlI

affece mankit request

requested copies of these

reports and other materials. Three Sif cables time

i simick

orig.nallgidentifiat

concerned mist the photograph of the individual

bythemesicoCitestat.onos

Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's

"what way

slown

i mother Lto

-the.

A:

icalinichuck

additioned

revent

Son, famong the materials

bytreciA

disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26

dissemination (DIR8517)), aeopyahich westrammitted to

ticos

theseretserree. That cable concerned the Dorkom-Armas

conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic

surveillance operations in Mexico Cityat the time of the

assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission

of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

---

## Page 52

- 37-

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren

Commission all of our technical operations.

In other

words, we did not initially disclose to them that we

had photosurveillance because the November photo we had

(of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean

anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the

• Warren

Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal

all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, B.

150)

Pang Felrdar 17,19617.

unknowingg

requestedl

in the Warren

Commission

Enerosheeanor access to

asourue of concern to the GlAt.

telephonic surveillance

production' (as discussed in the

similarlyaiselosure

unclean what is the

Youre d

preceding section), the me

• Of the photosurveillance operations,

to the Walten Commussion Man

a to cause concern within

the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal

memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for

your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to

respond directly to Rankin*s request of February 12 regarding

CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23,

1964.

Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer

to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by

}

paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12

letter). If they come back on this point he feels

that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to

go over to show the Commission

the material rather than

letter, y

pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these

items are of new substantive interest.

We have either

gassed the material in substance to the Commission in

this

with

photographs which are not of Oswald..."

ClArY Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

---

## Page 53

VIII.

- 43 -

This should be included in an

eculia section on the tops.

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's.

assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named

"Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man

speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attach-

ment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's

Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap)

operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the

Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then

employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban

Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified

caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa

replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The callerwent on to tell Luisa that the person

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of

the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that

she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being

held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller

replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned

nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned

about the assassination only a little while ago.

The

unidentified caller commented:

---

## Page 54

-44-

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been

one of the

segregationists or against intergration

who had killed Kennedy, then there was,

let's say, the possibility that a sort

of civil war would arise in the United

States; that contradictions would be

sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one,

two, three and now, that makes

three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, fo

fos

in response to

a 1975

Rockefeller Commission request for information on

a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the

only item in the intercept coverage of the

Cubans and

Soviets after the assassination

that contains the suggestion of foreknow-

ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS,

23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com-

ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in-

deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may

also-

y be interpreted without such

a sinister impli-

cation.

Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the

Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did

merit serious attention in the months following the assas-

sination. However, Calderon's

comments were not reported

to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

---

## Page 55

- 47 -

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in

Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying

Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed

to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15,

1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to

the CIA's Mexico City Seêtion and to the Chief of the CIA's

Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis-

patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data

on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon

was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial

office. The notation indicated that a report was pending

on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success,

to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from

the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of

indent

tke Station in Mexico City (Dispatch HMMW 11935) •

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI

was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that

time, Harold Swenson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the

Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his de-

briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum

states that AMMuG had no direct knowledge of lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items

of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

# This dispatch reported that:

Cover)

---

## Page 56

- 48-

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had

been

asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban

intelligence

services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson,

as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October

1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on

two or three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General

De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon,

Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

Swenson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise

relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to

this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch

traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, during.

Deafrike 1164

for Cuba.

On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional informa-

tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's

possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran-

dum stated in part:

"a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to

Cuba, has been paid a regular salary

by the DGI even

though she has not per-

formed any services.

Her home is in

the Vedado section where the rents are

high.

b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for

several years. Before going to Mexico,

she worked in the Ministry of Exterior

Commerce in the department which was

known as the "Empress Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General of the

Communist Youth in the department named

in the previous sentence.

???'

---

## Page 57

- 49 -

On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's know-

ledge of the Oswald case. Swenson paraphrased AMMUG'S

knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned about

17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to

Mexico, that she had been involved with an

American in Mexico. The information to which

I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer...

I had commented to (him)

that it seemed strange

that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from

the DGI althought she apparently did not do any

work for the Service.

(The case officer) told

me that hers was a peculiar case and that he

himself believed that she had been recruited in

Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al-

though Manuel Pineiro,

the Head of the DGI, did

not agree.

As I recall, (the case officer) had

investigated Luisa Calderon.

This was because,

during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had

intercepted a letter to her by an

American who

signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar.

As you know,

the pronunciation of

Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so

I am not sure of how

the name mentioned by Hernan-

dez should be spelled.

It could have been "Howard"

or something different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love letter

but indicated that there was a clandestine-

professional relationship between the writer and

I also understand

from (the

case officer) that after the interception of

the letter she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.

I do not know if this

could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson

had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP

in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis-

cuss the AMMUG/l sitaution on a very restricted basis

with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at

the Agency or at the Commission headquarters.

Until this

---

## Page 58

- 50 -

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ-

ing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi-

tivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms'

communication was a paraphrased accounting of Swenson's

May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294) .

In that attachment the intelligence associations of

Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez Sue set

forth. However, that attachment hakes no reference what-

soever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested

as a follow-up to

the May 15 memorandum, to look at the

questions used in Swenson's interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley

memo to Rocca, 19. June

1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18,

1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research

and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses

to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review.

Willens saw Swenson's May 5. memorandum. The only mention

of folderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of

Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about

six months in Mexico from

which she returned to Cuba early

in 1964.

However, Willens was not shown the Swenson memoran-

dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more

detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

---

## Page 59

á.;

weasif concern tawhickt

58-12

1 desim

les protest its sens utive sources an

pastes WheWarmer commissionvestig

aitz.com

- 17-

Mr.

Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level

contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the

average it took less than

ne week for the CIA to transmit

its information to the Warren Commission, after such in-

formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep.e.

tennes cing ties;

pp. 66-67)

(Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

stires

Megas, ie

the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused

Satisa

if eif iss

the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty

elevart

in getting

information than when the protection of

such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin

eftos to pro-

expressed the opinion that the Agency's

tect its sensitive sources.and methods did

which

effect

the quality of the information to

the Warren Commission and its staft

HSCA ClaSSIE,@ DEP.OR

vere given access.

time

atkin An.

P.23) 011

Agency

made

the

some instance,

As a result the

e unilateral decisions

accesstoC/A

#materials tate deta

p. 158)

It opire point, poe dionis

Two

-le-

the Commission. (Scekso dep. 5/16/78

Net tie testimony bad titt

saint

on

sources

Ion invest

the

en

Corni

peder

-the Warren Commissi

is Connizese in which th

ne thoas

Jouể

dur-

cion invo

1a

IM-

investigation to some degrèe:

1)

CommissiongT

perbaninithe photosurveillance and telephone surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexicoy City Station

".::

effects pufther

2) As a colated consideration need es

¡controversy surf reveal

get bette

pried nige

recente

instein.

---

## Page 60

13

- 18 -

originó

f

Founding photograph now referred to as that

of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined

herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of

sensitive technical operations,

as outlined above, was

evident from the s

"ception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first

to reveal all our technical operations." (seato ep.

But

p.158)

did

Scelso further testifiga that :

We were going to give them intelligence re-

ports which derived from all our sources, in-

cluding technical sources, including the tele-

phone intercept and the information gotten

from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for

example, which corresponded almost exactly

with the information from the telephone inter-

cepts. (Ext to seelsa quote, all of pr5)

Ibit

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey

swald's trip to Mexico City.

tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was

based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification

of which had been deleted completely from the report.

GIA

The

policy

limiting Warren Commission know-

ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early

as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from

CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the

Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

ankin fro

telms.

---

## Page 61

- 19 -

phone taps, in order to protect your contin-

uing ops .

Will rely instead on statements

of Silvia Duran and on contents of soviet

Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID

(CIA cable DIR 97829 FOlA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

CIATE FOLA DOC 1 496-154, 20 DeG 1963, DIRESTA)

428-757

1963 cable is also set fortin it a crA

The basic policy articulated in the December 20,

as it speu ficall concerned the CrA"S fthe tiBi

set forthin a CIA memorandum of

December JD, 1963.

§ in that men an in, are didea oneal, taco

/Special Investigations Group-

of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff wrote that he had

been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison man to the CIA,

that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren

Commission

for copies of the FBI's materials which sup-

ported of complimental thes

the FBI's five volume report o

Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated

that some United States Agency was tapping telephones

and asked hi, ton

in Mexico, Papich queried O'Neat whether the FBI could

Wilie

supply the Warren Commission with source of the telephone

taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveil-

Lance operations In Mexico City, see CIA S0CT-3/779/5101

O'Neal's memorandum

Shows

wow that he discussed this matter

with scelso, mipado, fifter a discussion with Helms,

was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed

,to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

"(si

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the

Agency's desire to make available to the Com-

mission at least in this manner--via the FBI-

sensitive intormation which could relate t

telephone taps (Birch @Neal,

- Memo for File

Subj: Lee Harvey asward)

20 Dee 636y Bire @'neal, in elsoftlilematerall

---

## Page 62

ine?

which would

- 22 -

stabernform thatwoüly

the form of this presentation

tect the

the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir: 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

Ibid.

IV. Telephone Taps and Pheto Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during

the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo sur-

veillance operations in Mexico City!

Helms-testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these tele-

phone taps and surveillance was not only be-

cause it was sensitive from the Agency's

standpoint, but the telephone taps were run-

ning in conjunction with the Mexican authoritY

tiesland therefore, if this had become public

knowledge, it would have caused very bad feel-

ings between Mexico and the

and that was the reason.

Tensee Session hates se

hearing, p9-51-521

12317:31

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to

the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations

prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination

798157100884164

Furthermona

7) .

as

of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information

made available by DCI McCone to National Security Councils

had been made

Director McGeorge Bundy, was aware that the CIA had tele-

phone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em-

bassy/Consulatesand that

through these taps Oswald's pre-

sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been

(/gP

15""

ati fixint

---

## Page 63

- 23 -

unwillingness

The CIA'S

- to inform the warren Commission

of the above-described surveillance operations,

in

the early stages

of this in-

vestigation

the

the

is-a source

of concern to this Committee.

It 1s indicative of an

MeciA felt unconfortabli

"gentseei information

the Warren Commission.

(see/scelso denT This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it.

even those tich night have meant exposing certain sensi-

tive operations to the connission. 'e'll have do joe sumpie.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA

Lenape arena

provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that

chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during i dio

September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

that

Oswald's various conver-

1-15

sations with the Cuban and Soveti Embassy/Consulatéshad *

L.wc.

been tapped and

subsequently transcribed. Furthermore,

did

that memorandum

rotention estate that the CIA

had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the

conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

3130

Armas

Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and

transcribed.

---

## Page 64

.... .....

- 24 -

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Connission lace above) and likely discussed the memoran-

dum of January 5l , 1964:

L'A PolA Doct 498-204,29 San 1965, 11<97829)

On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote Helms in regard to

the CIA memorandum of

EJFKE DOCNO.-

January 31.

A review of Rankin's letter indicates that.

at tarad as of e

his wastirse, the Warren Commission

had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance

operation or the production i.e., the tapes and trans-

cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb-

ruary 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communica-

tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in

Pottagraph of the January 31 memorandun) had been facilitated

by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com-

mission had been informed of the telephond surveillance

operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inguiry

by Rankin would not have been made. Syst

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this

conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between

the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com-

mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar-

ters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various trans-

cripts resulting from the CIA's telephond surveillance

Aset clasSiE ex dep. of Rasmand Rocca, 7/14/78,p89

operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.29) However,

Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available

to Commission representatives and was not able to state

under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren

first

commission learned of these operations. {Ibid?

---

## Page 65

ILA

Gout

- 25 -

On February 19, 1964 the

inquiry of February 10.

The Agency response did indi-

cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was

also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did

neither

with reveal"th

the source of this information in its response

this sourel

to the cormissionnor indicate that de would be revealed

by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). LIbid s

Mallor Commission knowledge of clAserenara

During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other

issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access

to the production material derived from the CIA telephonge

surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of

these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief-'jay?

that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, i li

and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveil-

lance materials until April 9, 1964. At that zine, coleman.

7

Saiwson and Willens met with win scott, the CIA's Chief

Scott

of Station in Mexico City,

we provided them with various

transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone

taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson

Memorandun of April 22, 1964, Subjact: Irip to Mexto Cite 5

Homer, Prior to April. 9 it appears doubtful

that the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

---

## Page 66

......... 1.......

- 26 -

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission

had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain

telephones surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with

CIA representatives). slawson's memorandumo events s

woes the Warren Commission had learned that CIA kites

possesssa transcripts of conversations between the Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

Porticos-Armas

There conversations, requested by the Warren Commission

representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including

Richard Helms,

Stan concerned Silvia

Duria's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal

starson memorandas ofApr, /22, 1964 Pp3,19,45-46>

Police

• (cite?). dpi:

 Helms responded to the Com-

mission's request for access,

stading

• that he would

attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives

to review de this material. (slawson memoi March 12, 1964)p 67

It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not

reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the

Dorticos-Armas intercepts.

•" As detailed above, both the FBI

and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the

CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

Su

citer

One or the other could well have provided the War-

ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray-….

mond Rodas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca đep.

lends some support to the position that the Commission had

been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through

the CIA's initiative.

---

## Page 67

- 27. -

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964

concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated

that the tentative conclusions? Concernu"t Oswald's

Mexico trip,

that he had reached

were derived from CIA

memorandas of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, Slandândum

a in addition a Mexican federal police summary a of paa64,

interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination

with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is

simply a summation of what the Mexican police

learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia

Duran, (sic an employee of the Cuban Consulate

in Mexico City, and

is therefore only as accu-

rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. LIbial

These comments indicate that Salson placed limited

reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there

is no indication that Salwson had been provided the Duran

telephonk intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of

Slawson's comments conerning the Mejican police report,

it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25,

had been provided little substantive information pertaining

to Sylvia Duran.

Insert pa8

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been

given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported

by reference to his memorandun offMarch 27, 1964

9969

L(Cite)

wherein he states his conclusion that paid pa had visited

the Cuban Embassy on three occasions.

conclusion

he

Westero based upon an analysis of sylvia Duran's testi-

mony before the Mexican police.

Ibis merocandus bears

---

## Page 68

Insert

from

- 28 -

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran

transcripts. Furthermore,

Slawson had been given access

to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have

been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted

for this purpose. His analysis bould have reflected

the fact of thielled ther by its corroboration or

criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

PEnsatpag

march 25, 1964, the record senstates that

the Warren

Co

sHan

its

Forts te

#vestigaite

Oswald

activities

a

dess to the Duran transcripts.

?

The Conmission had been

forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make

step

reference to the surveillance operations

isaab, Mexican Federal Pollend an summarya

Bie report.

Thus, the Agency had been successful for

over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera-

tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission

Irise.

staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem-

ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to

the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention

of telephone taps, in order to protect your

continuing operations. Will rely instead

on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents

of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave

-ODACID here.

(CIA GablE,

DÍR 90466, FOIA#420-757, Dec. 20,

1964 CIA p. 2144)

On Mar

mined that

uswate

27, 1964

Brawson

had visited

wrote that

deter-

the Caban Embassy

three

---

## Page 69

- 29 -

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his

review of Silvi

*a Duran's testamony to

the Mexican

(Slawson menorandum, Marc

1964

Slawson does not state

CIA p. d

12) Howeyer,

that his

conclusion

were alsogdrawn

from retiew of any of the pr

duction fy

om the Mexico City

station surveillance operations.

Sawson does indicate,

oratitie

however,

that

his reasoning

pandinn

mbiguous regardier swald's

visit to the Cubar Embassy.

VLogically, access to the ClA's

telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some

ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.{Slaws.n

memorandu,

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated

that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy re-

ind cuba

Embass.nsin

Eliversa

questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was lamed,

P=3

determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem-

i enjoins

ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate

subsequentl

stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as

was

LIbid, pus thecit had terre

Oswald

at the Cuban Embassy.'

Thus, aunts

definitively established that Oswald had

visited the Cuban. Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific datesand exact timesof his presence

were

in the Cuban Embassy re established as the result of the.

(Tbid)

telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made

available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities

in Mexico City would have been more firmly established

than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transaripts.

---

## Page 70

- 30 -

could have been made available to the Warren Commission

at ito sinception.but as the record taleates they were

not then made-avariable.

The record supports the Committee's finding that

as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not

been given access to the above-referenced series of tele-

uphond intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman

itin posed

and Slawson, they articulatedone question to the CIA and

two requests for information from the agency? (ambassador

Stunsorantleman

1) What is the information source referred to in

the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended

to settle down in Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts

of the intercepts, translated if possible, in

refer

all cases where the intercepts side to the

assassination or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see the intercept

in which the allegation that money was passed

the Cubai Embassy is discussed [Ibid)

The quet finaly posed in the above-referenced

memorandum of April 2 concerns

the CIA telephon* intercept

(Slawson nemo

of september 27, 1963 ak 20 a 9e7 p44

211, 1964, efA p. 3223).

if slawson Found-it

1e1s50r49069495

othe source of the information, he had not bee:

as yet

---

## Page 71

accesS,

provided

No the

origeral material

by Fre ciA

which

ne

(Item Number tes I the abo re-

listi.s

The

first Coleman Starson request

Pite

^7

astons

that

the amission

• had

notbeen

given access,

to intercepts i t

concerning the assassination

(as

indicates the Semiss lot not

baradate

aquantion

atanda

could wen

n00m0a/219

banaraw

breaker

theirs

request

Chapery

Hey nat not ween

given a

agat

erials.

1.sters

Lister

The: s

post,,

tem number three of the above

reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing

of monies deS discussed had not as of April 2 been provided

to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested

the Dorticos-Armas transcripts Of the March 12, 1964

meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-

stand aD

presentatives. (Cite) Nesters

-slawsonmemorandeem

Marh12,196

ibj: Conference teton Marchi

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated

1964}

their concern for receiving complete access to all materials

relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:-

The most probable final result of the entire

investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is

a conclusion that he went there for the purpose

of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-

spiracies, etc. took place.

---

## Page 72

- 33 -

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met

by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State

Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of

the CIA. SIb, App9-103

That same day during a meeting between the Commission

representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the

operation one 17 E the elepho ever ne

English translations. Of the same. In addition,

he provided the group with reels of photographs for the

time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from

photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances

David Slawson wrote:

"

...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative

that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all

facts, including the sources of his information, and

that he understood that all three of us had been cleared

for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond

the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff

the information we obtained through him without first

clearing it with his superiors in Washington.

agreed to this." (SIOn or 274-1909, p. 222

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives

the CIA's course, of action immediately following the assassination

Scott indicated that his staff a

Immediately began to compile

dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald ([s 22)

Etb, d8

scott revealed that

all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents

Had immediately been put under surveillance following the

assassination.

Lía

set up with Mexican

officials,

particularly Idi

Echerta

ria,

Acting

inisten

the

Mexidas cobernacion (a2244.

slawson then concluded

---

## Page 73

- 34 -

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis-

closed immediately how incorrect our previous

information had been in Oswald's contacts with

Soviet and Mexican Embassies.

Apparently the

distortions and omissions to which our information had

been subjected had entered some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott

was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We

had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the

embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how

badly distorted our information was we realized that

Therefore, instead, we decided

to take as close note as possible from the original

source materials at some later time during our visit."

pe berials at some

1[22/1,

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did

following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealtexclusively

with the telephonic interceptspertaininggerrespectively

denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic

surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's

accurately reasoned

ability to draw conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico

City,

It meant that as

of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren

Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities

in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had

provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact

"on almost all the crucial points"

significantly more precise

could have pees mane

materials me available for analysis by the Commission.) I bid

---

## Page 74

-d44-66994a95

- 35

Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission

with

vitally relevant information derived from certain

sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the

investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation

that might have been more seriously considered had this

material been expeditiously provided;

e.g., Cuban involvement

Mexico City Mystery Man

Feispered Agent Odum shower

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was chorn fe

EBT.

Specie

dum a photograph of a man bearing no

ENarcer Commission Report p-

physical resemblance to her sonto

Thed photograph had been

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City

Station after Agency representatives had searched their files

EGIA DOC DPPY- 1555, 25Ma

in an effort to locate information on Oswald.

This photographabe

was one in a series o

resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates l it

had been linked by the Mexico City Statior

prior to the

assassination

*OLee Harvey Oswal

Richard Helms, in a sworn

affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the

photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4,

1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to

Oswald.

Affidas t

of RichardHelms

p- 7

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before

the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under

5 Warren Commission Reporte-

which she was shown the photograph.

Mrs. Oswald testified that

SCRILY

she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby.

(p. 153)

---

## Page 75

- 36 -

wild an

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

Thomas Karamesties Assistant D.DP

to t

мінз, ова

at,

regarding the

bongresock

• circumstances

this photographby the

'Central Intelligence Agency.

told

the Commission be

Rankin

; reques ted that

the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph if that information v

ELetter f-J, Lee Ränkia, Feb .15, 1947,

JFk DoCH-

available.

Since Novembs 35, 1943

(Service: that the CIA had disseminated/several reports of

communications- concerning the assassination to the Secret

Service si

requested copies of these

"repo

see end other materials. Three

cables ottomer

esteror

which

griginally danti fired

sition the photographyof the individual

by the Merica city a sala she ubsequently shown to oswald's mother.

A:

sesson, famong the materials

bytreciA

disseminated to the secret $7, 2N. 196y November 26

CCIADOC PIR$5177

dissemination (AIRSTIN, arcopy at which vers trasmitted to

thence ret ferree. That cable concerned the Dors-Armas

conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic

surveillance operations in Mexico City'at the time of the

ada destite garan he circunstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission •

of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

---

## Page 76

r..........e...ww6100,46..

- 37-

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren

Commission all of our technical operations.

In other

words, we did not initially disclose to them that we

had photosurveillance because the November photo we had

(of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean

anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith:

...So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal

all our technical operations.

of John

31408

150)

By February 12, 1964.

marineh the Warren

vad

unknowing

pette: +5 706622

Commission

sourve of eccess tore claco

telephonic surveillance production' las discussed in the

sidering herists of

minite the idi

/ not the scounthe photosurveillance operations,

to the warren Commussion

Süm2-

to cause concern withi

the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal

memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for

your determination. " Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to

respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding

CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23,

1964.

Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer

to wait out the Commission

on the matter covered by

paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12

Пік рос

letter).

If they come back on this point he feels

that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to

90 over to show the Commission the material rather than

pass them to them in copy.

Incidentally, none of these

items are of new substantive interest.

We have either

passed the material in substance to the Commission in

response to earlier levies on the items anather items

photographs which are not of Oswald...

H(Roeca mEmo 3 March 64, FOIA 579-2501 d

---

## Page 77

.......'"I

п.вe. n.I

- 47-

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in

Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying

Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed

to be 1946516160 tease

no dategiver

HMMA21612 Calderon's presence in

Mexico City

was first reported by the CIA on July 15,

1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to

the CIA's Mexico City stôtion and to the Chief of the CIA's

CIA POL DISPATCH UFCA -10085

Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations).

That dis-1s5ue

patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data

on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon

was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial

office. The notation indicated that a report was pending

LIbid, ps of attachmet?

on Calderon.

The Agency has attempted, without success,

to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from

the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of

CIADEC

insert

te Station in Mexico City

(Dispatch HMMW 11935%, iSgot 1963 )

Tale calderon's aaesacion with the destin

recordeed

was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964.

Serenion,.

F01968-290 SMay196

Swenson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the

special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his der

briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum

stated that AMMUGhad no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items

of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

This

dispute

Reported that:

over

---

## Page 78

- 48

SIBIP

was

telligence Service officers

Specifically, AMMUG-1 had

been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence

services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-I tola Swenson,

osch

as-recordest in the May s-memorandum that "Prior to October

1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on

two or three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General

De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon,

Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez" SIBIP}

hangose

Swepson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise

relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to

indent

this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch

traffic which

tor cuba: to a per arrival an Magico and departure, duros

Largosd

On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional informa-

tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's

[CIA DOL F014 687-295, attach. 3, 7May)

possible contact with the DGI.

Paragraph 3 of this memoran-

dum stated in part:

"a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to

Cuba, has been paid a regular salary

by the DGI even

though she has not per-

formed any services.

Her home is in

the Vedado section where the rents are

high.

b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for

several years.

Before going to Mexico,

she worked in the Ministry of Exterior

Commerce in the department which was

known as the

"Empress Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General of the

Communist Youth in the department named

in the previous sentence. [I BIP?

---

## Page 79

- 49 -

hangosch

• On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's know-

[IBID, attach.5J

ledge of the Oswald case. Strenson paraphrased AMMUG'S

knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned about

17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to

Mexico, that she had been involved with an

American in Mexico.

The information to which

I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer...

I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange

that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from

the DGI althought she apparently did not do any

work for the Service. (The case officer) told

me that hers was a peculiar case and that he

himself believed that she had been recruited

in

Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al-

though Manuel Pineiro,

the Head of the DGI, did

not agree.

As I recall, (the case officer) had

investigated Luisa Calderon.

This was because,

during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had

intercepted a letter to her by an American who

signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something

As you know, the pronunciation of

Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so

I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan-

dez should be spelled.

It could have been "Howard"

or something different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love letter

but indicated that there was a clandestine-

professional relationship between the writer and

Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the

case officer) that after the interception of

the letter she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.

I do not know if this

could have been Oswald...( Ibid)

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson

§CIA DOC FOlA 687-295, Roccamemorandlem, 11 May 156

had elicited from AMMUG.

Rocca proposed that "the DDP

in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis-

cuss the AMMUG/] sitation on a very restricted basis

with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at

the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

---

## Page 80

- 50 -

akes place, it Is nos desirable to put anything in writ.

-Ibid.p.zs

ing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/1 attachments) .

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding .

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi-

ICIA DOC 5014697-294

Helms

tivity and operational significance.

Attached

to Helms''

nomoraades

15 Man146"

communication was a paraphrased accounting of insolis

May 5 memorandum. (ite hiS meno, May 15, 1961, FOIA 697-2917.

In that attachment the intelligence associations of

Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez are set

forth. However, that attachment Ales no reference what-

soever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested

as.e85$ns

as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to look at the

questions used in swengon's interrogation of AMMUGS Kaooies

-CIAVOCTOI

memo-fe Muca, 19 June 1964 FOES 729 2103. On June 18,

1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research

and Analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses

to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review.

Langosch'

Willens saw Swenson's May 5. memorandum. The only mention

of Cideron was as follows: "The precise relationship of

Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about

six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early

Langarch's

"however, willens was not shown the Swenson memoran-

dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more

detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

---