CIA COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT PAPER ON THE 'EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUA-SPONSORED ASSASSINTION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST CASTRO.
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, S.D. (CIA)
To: BLAKEY, G. ROBERT (HSCA DIRECTOR)
Document date: 03/15/1979
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10067-10 134,

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Office of Legislative Counsel

FIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OLC -79-0113/L

15 March 1979

Mir. G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel and Director

Select Comnittee on Assassinations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Bob:

Herewith are comments on the draft paper on "Evolution and

Implications of

the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies

Against Castro."

First, it is noted that no footnotes are attached, so we are

unable to comment on the kind of modifications that have been

required for security reasons in earlier instances.

Next, as we are nearing the end of this phase of things, it

is noted

that we have seen no graphics, and therefore assume that

there will be none of interest or relevance to CIA.

As a preliminary observation - to avoid the endless listing of

instances of recurring citation in the draft - the names of

Jares O'Connell, Tony Varona, and Juan Orta, should be deleted or

replaced wherever they occur.

Substitutes will be suggested where

they first appear. Cubela, of course, should be referred to as

Page 1.

First paragraph. I would like to raise a personal

question on the presentation in this paragraph.

These are my

views, to you; not necessarily shared by my colleagues. There

is as much, if not more, simplistic rhetoric here as there is

mature moral principle,

and you may wish to modify the language.

First, it is not clear whether the draft states categorical

opposition to all assassinations, whatever and wherever, or whether

it is directed only to those considered by CIA — however

ineffective the plans.

Hurder is reprehensible, and contrary to the principles of

civilized society (alchough lawyers make a variety of technical

distinctions between different kinds of homicide). However,

wastern culture has a parellel, if necessarily subordinate, line

of philosophy on the subject of tyrannicide.

writings of church

philosophers, as well as other reputable thinkers, recognize the

principle, given special considerations. These writers fail to

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provide a set of standards or rules for how the principle is to

be applied should the question present itself.

This uncertainty.

aids to the complexity of the question, introducing subjective

tests of perception and degree, aspects of life that make life

uncomfortable already for those tidy minds that feel compelled to

deal with everything in blacks and whites.

Let ira pose the problem thus. Had anyone foreseen the extremes

of Hitler, a truly danonic man, would there have been a basis for

seriously considering his assassination? Had he been murdered, at

least six million Jews would have survived, not to mention the many

Sho can confidently

balance the scales on that question, between the rights of humanity,

in the larger sense, and the life of Hitler? I recall the reports of

an atteipt on Hitler's life during World War II, and the general

approbation of American society for the heroes that tried and failed.

It really isn't all that simple, at least not as stated in your draft

introduction.

Obviously it is too complex a subject for a full and considered

discussion here, and my comment is intended only to suggest that

you may wish

to review the presentation on hon the Cormittee finally

speaks on this.

I personally happen to feel that the perceived desirability of

giving the Cuban people a nore enlightened government - shared by

the overwhelming majority of Americans at the time - was unlikely

to have been served by Castro's death.

Quite frankly, I have

similar doubts on the others considered as possible targets for

elimination in the 1950s and 1960s.

And that is why I asked ny first

question about whether your draft categorically includes all political

assassinations, regardless of whatever and wherever, or if it is

directed at those considered during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

My point is that the HSCA craft is subject to imorovement on this

point.:

Page 3.

Insert the word "late" before the date 1960, sixth line

from the bottom.

Page 3. Last sentence should read: "CIA records indicate that

the operation was inactive from April 1961 until April 1962."

Page 4, Delete "Jares 'Big Jim' O'Connell" and replace with the

"Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch." There-

after, he can be identified as "the Oparations Support Chief" or

"Support Chief."

Page 6. Change last sentence to commence as

follows:

1967 IGP noted that....

"The

Page 7.

End of the first complete paragraph. Substitute word

"operation" for the word "plots".

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Page 11.. Fifth line fron botton. Insert word "unsuccessfully"

after "Harvey subsequently attempted...."

Page 12. Iwelfth line from bottom, Insert year "1967" before.

the name of Ed Morgan.

Second sentence should be rephrased as follows:

"This

regori detailed the accounts of various CIA plans and operations

against Castro...

Page 15.

It should be erphasized that CIA's concern was, narrowly,

protection of intelligence sources and rethods.

Page 16. Delete that portion of the last sentence of the first

paragraph that reads as follows:

"...on-going plots against the revo

lutionary government in Cuba and its....

=

The main thrust of the SSC

report had to do with plotting against Castro and this tends to shift the

emphasis to a broader range than the SSC report really supports.

Page 17. Second sentence, first complete paragraph. While it is

correct. to summarize the SSC report as stated, the SSC report is

incorrect, and we should so note.

Page 17. Last paragraph. There was no "ripple effect".. Nobody

paid any attention to the SSC report after the first few days. It was

quite sore time afterwards, on a time-available basis that the CIA Task

Force took up the problem.

the SSC report in the usual sense of the word so much as it was intended

to research the general problem. We did not know what we would find.

1 any a it not roman a void that.

In any event, it was not intended to "answer"

Page 18.

The subparagraph (1), second line. The word "as"

should be replaced by "on."

Page 18. Fifth to the last line. TER for IGR.

Page 19. Fifth line. "Operative" for "operation".

Page 21. Next to last line. TER for IGR.

Page 23. Top paragraph. The reason there was no contact with AMLASH

for the year preceding, from 1962 to 1963, was that he was in Cuba.

Page 23. Third line after indented quotation. It was not a question

of a "connitment" to bring about change, but the "problem" in doing so.

Suggest change accordingly.

Page 23.

Next to last line right in micale paragcaph. CIA did not

say that any dispute was

in the eyes of the SSC only.

Page 24. Second parayraph, first line. Substitute "cabled" for

"called".

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ADE TAL

Page 24. FitzGerald is spelled with capital "G".

Page 24.

Second paragraph, ninth line. Substitute TER for CIA.

The HSCA draft is imprecise in this treatrent.

The task force

report gave a rather detailed recitation of what ALASH was told as the

basis for its vier.

While Book V of the SSC reported ANLASH's reaction as

uncertain, the Task Force report made it clear that his reaction as to

what he was told was exactly the same as the CIA record of what he was

told.

Page 24. Second sentence, first full paragraph. Substitute the

following:

"In October 1963 Desmond FitzGerald met AMLASH/1 outside the

United States."

Page 26. Fourth line in the quotation at the top of the page.

Substitute the word "reinforce" for the word "re-inform".

Pages 30-32. The following names (in case any of those mentioned

elsewhere

are overlooked here) should be removed or replaced with

appropriate descriptions:

Varona

(#3), Duque (#16), Alonso (#17), O'Connell (#27),

Orta (#31) •

Page 34. Remove the "s" from the CIA Inspector General Reports.

Page 35. The record is clearly documented in detail as to what

the AMLASH operation was.

the authors may not wish to choose

between the record, and what the SSC has said about it (erroneously).

As for Langosch, he was not in charge of the component that was

responsible for CIA operations against Cuba, as the sentence structure

makes it appear. In fact he was neither responsible for nor familiar

with the nature of the association with AMLASH, except peripherally. His

views on the security aspects of the case, because of AMLASH/l's parsonality,

are very different from what he knew about the actual nature of what was

and was not going on.

Langosch's lack of familiarity with the details of the operation is

quickly apparent it one takes the time to review what he has said on the

subject, and how it ratches the facts. We have already contented else-

where how his coments to you about use of the polygraph betray his

unfamiliarity with the case.

The followiny is also relevant:

In his testiony before the SSC in 1975, he stated

• that FitzGerald's meeting with AMLASH/1 had to do with Castro's

assassination. Had he read the payers preceding the meeting,

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with the specific limitations decided upon, and the report of

the actual meeting (with the basic rebuff given by Fitzgerald, so

far as support was concerned), followed by subseguent reports shoving

that ANI.ASH/1 had understood that he had been denied support,

Langosch could have spoken differently than he did. As it is; he

spoke in erxor, if quoted correctly in your draft.

Also, when testifying before the SSC in 1975, Langosch

was unable to recall the time frame of developirents

in the AMLASH

operation, a factor that is critical and central to any analysis

and evaluation of what the operation was during the life of President

Kennedy. this is directly relevant to your charter and the issue of

the morent. The CIA Task Forca Report documented this in detail.

And in 1975, when Langosen testified before the SSC, he was

revealed as somewhat vague as to characterization of the AMLASH

operation.

In this respect, his testimony seems to have undergone a

significant metamorphosis in terms of firm recollection.

It might be instructive to review Book V of the SSC Final Report at

page 75.

One would think that the man's

credibility would be tested

somewhere along the way, by at least quasi-legal standards:

Langosch was not knowledgeable on the AMASH operation

at the time it was going on.. He admittedly did not know the

time frame.

His testimony on key details has been demonstrated

to be inaccurate.

2. Langosch's testimony has evolved with the passage of

As a witness, what he says does not warrant the emphasis

given by your draft.

Page 36. Instead of describing Pollock as "from the CIA" he should

be referred to as "a former CIA employee."

Page 37. First line. The word "object" should be "objective."

Page 37. Second line. The word "Cuba" should be "AMLASH/1".

Page 46. The draft's assertion that O'Connell and Maheu are

lying about

identification of the syndicate people with whom they were

dealing; this is unsupported by the evidence.

is somewhat longer than the association of the FiSCA

investigators with it, and the only thing they add to it is this

unfounded subjective judgnent. I vias one of the two CIA officers who

debriefed O'Connell on his part in the operation, when another inspector

and I did the original. 1967 IG report on assassinations.

At that time

O'Connell was forthright and did not dissemble, although he experienced

difficulty in recalling sone details.

5.;

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C08A1

At the tire of the 1967 interviews, O'Connell related the discovery

of the actual identity of the parsons with whom they were dealing prisarily

as an interesting development in the unfolding events of the Operation.

He related his role in a factual manner; he had been given an assignant

and carried it.out.

He related it without explanation a apology.

If ha

was presssed by HSCA investigators he may have been asked questions that

posed the various considerations in terms of rationale, etc., but that was

not his presentation when he was speaking inside the Agency

in 1967 -

then under strict terns of security - when he originally recorded hinself

on the matter. He is not a philosocher, and I doubt that he would have

volunteered much on this score. Quite frankly, my impression from 1967

(and I interviewed him again in 1975) was that he was inpressed by the

high-level attention the syndicate gave the matter, rather than being

embarrassed by it.

It is more accurate to see him viewing it as a sign

of the serious attention given by the syndicate, possibly reinforcing

the chances of achieving the objective. O'Connell knew from the beginning

that he was dealing with the syndicate, and that there had to be high-level

approval was a foregone conclusion.

No real thought had been given as to

what sort of person would be assigned to the job, and whomever

there was little that could be done about it if the operation was to

proceed. The interpretation of O'Connell's thought processes are far

fetched.

Page 48. O'Connell's name appears several times in the preceding

pages, but it appears here with Edwards.

We might suggest that the word

"they" be substituted. All the other places it can be "Operations

Page 57. Second sentence in last paragraph.

Request deletion of

entire sentence.

It reveals the CIA relations with the Cuban exile

organizations, which we wish to protect. The deletion does not impair

the basic story.

to be substituted to sentence starting there line. Propose following

"Moss had previous CIA associations. He also was supposedly

acting as conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini brothers

with the understanding that this group would receive privileged

treatirent in the Cuba of the future."

Page 68-71. I recall the introduction to the HSCA draft report

that it would not imougn the reputation of innocent by-standers.

identities of Dan Rowan and Phyllis McGuire fall into this categosy.

simple and correct story is that Giancana

felt that he was being cuckolded

by Rowan and took advantage, in his jealousy,

of his new and novel

relationship with CIA. O'Connell should not have gone

along with him, but

he did, unfortunately.

With the advantage of 20-20 hincsight it nay

look easy today to have turned it aside then. Remenber, then

CONIDINTIAL

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O'Connell first told the story in sone detail (with some error in dates),.

inside the Agency for the record (1957), he told it in just those terns.

He had no reason then to conceal concern, if any, and current speculation

really doesn't alter the basic facts of that simple story. There really

at that time about Giancana leaking

Suggest we remove all references that identify Rovan and

ricGuire and clean up the presentation to fit the facts.

Page 74. Second line TER for CIA.

A little confusion in the seguence of events catween

Phase I and Phase II. when the first access to Castro failea, and

a viable new one did not develop, Roselli went to the Cuban exile

That contact and the apparent uncertainties that it

offered is what was terminated at the end of phase I. That is where

it started when it was reactivated in April 1962 for Phase II.

Page 77. There are many operations in the Clandestine world in which

the instruments of action are not known in detail to the case officer.

In the Phase II operation, Roselli served as cut-out between CIs and the

Cuban exile leader.

In a sense, the Cuban ran his own net and did not

reveal the identities of his people or any specific plans.

absence of direct access to the target his operatives had

to go in and

develop a way in which to carry out their mission. Had it succeeded, it

would have been possible to reconstruct events

after the fact in the

absence of ultimate action it may seem uncertain to sone individuals

unfamiliar with the tenuous nature of some clandestine action. The real

question today, in my mind, is whether the Cuban exile leader really

dispatched "teams" with the mission they were supposed to have.

It may seem extraordinary to the investigators that CIA

operated as

First, as mentioned above, there are a number of

uncertainties in the world of clandestine operations. There are numerous

instances in which individuals throughout an operational chain are unknow

to CIA. In this particular case, dealing with representatives of the

underworld, labored under certain practical inhibitions about how far he

could press individuals using their resources to carry out a mutual

objective.

Page 88.

"top line. Delete "station personnel in Madria."

Page 89.

Third line. Delete "to fladria.".

Page 89.

Second paragraph, second lina. Delete "in dadria."

Page 89.

Next last line. Delete "to flacria."

• Page 90. Seventh line.

Substitute "CIX" for Padria Station.

Page 90.

Iwelfth line.

Substitute "abroad" for "to Spain."

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Page 90. Sixteenth line. Delete "in Madria."

Page 32.

Suggest. retain the designation of "A" for Victor Spirosa

Hernandez, rather than using his full nare.

Page 93. Top paragraph.

We cannot contribute positively to the

question of a real link between the syndicate and "A". Homevar, the SSC

final report, Book V, at pages 78, 79, and 105 seens to make it clear

that what "A" knew acout AMLASH post-dated the 1963 period.

We are now going forced draft to comment on the long and unexpected

Nosenko araft.. I hope to have it to you Monday afternoon.

Sincerely,

S. D. Breckinriäge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

Distribution:

orig - Nase

- Jack Sullivan, OS

1 - Dick Rininger,

OGC

1 - Bill Sturbitts, LA/DDO

-•Russ Holmes

-OLC/Subj

1 - OLC/Chrono

OLC/SDB/ksn (15 Mar 79)

8

00 6 390

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