## Page 1

157-10014-10227

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1991

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10227

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

07-M-132

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

DAWSON, R

DIEM

DATE: 06/00/1975

PAGES:

157

SUBJECTS:

CIA

COLBY, WILLIAM

VIETNAM

KENNEDY, JOHN

DIEM, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/05/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: CC Box 133

v9.1

HW 50955

DooId: 32423615

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Date :

08/08/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

*157-10014-10227

RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-132

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

: DAWSON, R.

TO

TITLE : DIEM

DATE: 06/00/75

PAGES : 157

SUBJECTS : VIETNAM

DIEM, ASSASSINATION

COLBY, WILLIAM

CIA

KENNEDY, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

: POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CC Box 133

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NH 50955 DocId: 32423615

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## Page 3

DIEM

AH 50955

DooId: 32423615 Page

---

## Page 4

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Nhut

Coloy

Hillsman

Kennedy, John F. Tung

McNamarra

Diem

Lodge

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

11 Sept 63

OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants

being

McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that

McNamarra pointed out that

Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon.

Mr. McCone commented

that he belleved that we should move cautiasly, that we should talk seriously to Diem

gand that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic

"view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach

*be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure.

The President asked whether we

had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared

by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies.

The President

asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper.

He also asked that a telegram be sent

to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some

real contact with Diem.

Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the

Presidenburcispuld be well informed of any steps taken in this contes raffsuch as the

instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22

DATE:

Dawson

FILE:

6/27/75

---

## Page 5

50955

Do

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDI, JOHN F.

KENNEDY, ROBERT F.

MC CONE, JOHN

DIEM

DATES:

5 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

01/2

Id

SECRET

: p:

OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when the telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent

Nto Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT

@KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA

should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE

"felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reser-

vations concering DIE and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we

could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My pre-

mcise words to the President, and

I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, 1f I

was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a

good pitcher or not.

By that I was saying that, If DIEM was removed we would have not one

coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and It might.

last several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of 5

pp. 62-32

DATE:

FILE:

R. DAWSON

29 June 1975

-----

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: more stability If DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him

and hope that some group of generals could run the country better."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

ATTR:

STAFF:

---

## Page 6

50955

D

Id

37

61

5

Pat

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MC CONE, JOHN

DIEM

DATES:

5 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM *

OCCURRENCE: On October 5, 1963, MC CONE sent, to some locations, including SAIGON the

following message: "Believe assassination discussions most careful handling.

In general

best line is no line so that it is clear that we are sticking to position of having no

responsibility for actions of any of various contending Vietnamese groups. We certainly can-

not be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the

other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might

receive even partial nowledge.

We certainly would not favor assassination of DIEM.

We be-

lieve in gaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes

of our position re others, re support of regime, etc.

Consequently, believe best approach

is hands off. However, we naturally interested

in intelligence on any such plan.- This mes-

sage has been cleared with State Department."

TOP

SOURCE:

Hearing held before Senate Select Conmittee Intelligence,

•June 6, 1975, McCone, p. 60.

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MINH, GENERAL

CONEIN

NGO DINH CAN

NGO DINH NHU

DATES:

October 3-4

1963

CATEGORIES:

TEME

TOP SECRET

that to a Mi explained to chat hey hai had, thine)

at MINH's headquarters.

there was going to be a coup d'etat, that they didn't want this to be an American sponsored

coup d'etat, they wanted to be assured of American backing, specifically in the part where

It comes to military and economic aid after the coup had been successful." p. 24 "What the.

GENERAL meant, he actually did not want U.S. participation in the coup d'etat. He did not

want the U.S. government to start the coup d'etat.

He also outlined three general ideas,

this was the first time that a leader had mentioned the possibility of assassination.

assassination was not of DIEM.

This was — if they could not do anything, it would be the

elimination of NGO DINH CAN, who was the war lord in central Vietnam and NGO DINH NHU. At

that time GENERAL MINH did say that one of the alternative means was to eliminate CAN and

NHU and keep DIEM." That was one of the altematives. p. 25

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

R. DAWSON

DATE:

---

## Page 7

NH

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

7

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CIA - Saigon Station

VIEINAMESE GENERALS

DATES:

31 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

FORE

OCCURRENCE:

In an August 31, 1963, CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0499), the following message appears:

"This particular coup Is finished....GENERALS did not feel ready and did not have sufficient

balance of forces....There is little doubt that GVN aware US role and may have considerable

detail....

" (15)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 15

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

28.6.75

---

## Page 8

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

50955

RICHARDSON

TAYLOR

DEPTRE 243

DEPTEL 256

LODGE

SPERA

DATES:

29 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEMY

MARKINS

CONEIN

TRUEHEART

Docid: 32123615

MINTI

KITOCCURRENCE:

Gen

Wi chief of

Stafi

CARD 1 of

SECR

On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology

o1 hugust 1903 coup activities as follows:

"At 0745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact

GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to

# GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WILTE HOUSE and com-

mentin? that second thoughts were beginning in Washington.

Faced with this information and

• given strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH

and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a

fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH.

"When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't.)

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., P. 12

STAFF:

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON

advised him of our meeting, with GENERAL WEEDE, Of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which

RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR

cable. LODGE was anpry and expressed the view

that RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying out a coup. RICHARDSON

expressed a firm dissenting opinion."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

nems

---

## Page 9

50955

/ONLITIES:

TAYLOR, Maxwell

DEPTEL 243

HARKINS, John

DATES:

28 AUp. 1963

DIEM

CATEGORIES:

DEFENSE DEPARIMENT Participation

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DooId:

OCCURRENCE:

The following telegram was sent from TAYLOR to HARKINS (JCS 3368-63) on August 28, 1963:

32423

"Important WHITE HOUSE meeting on subject scheduled for 1200 28 August EDT, your views

urgently needed on overall feasibility of operation contemplated....FYI State to Saigon

$ 243 was prepared without DOD or JCS participation. Authorities are now having second

thoughts."

P

SOURCE:

FILE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., P. 11

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

28.6.75

---

## Page 10

I DINUNS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, Henry Cabot

DIEM

DATES:

26 August 1963

a...

CATEGORIES:

DIEM Y

D

0Id:32123615

Page

10

OCCURRENCE:

On Aupust 26, 1963, AMBASSADOR LODGE presented his credentials to SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT

NGO DINH DIEM. (8)

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RICHARDSON, John

KHANH

LODGE, Henry Cabot

DEPTEL 243

DATES:

26 AUg. 1963

DIEM

CATEGORIES:

CONEIN, CIA officer in Saigon

KHIEM

SPERA.

BCCURRENdicer in Sairon

On Aupust 26, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0304),

"RICHARDSON reports that the AMBASSADOR decided that the American official hand should not

show in the operation.

It was apreed that CONEIN would see KHIEM and that SPERA would see

KHAN. CONEIN and SPERA were directed to convey the substance of DEPTEL 243, plus this

comment: 'We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state.

Entirely their own action, win or lose. '" (9)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 11

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RICHARDSON, John

DIEM

DATES:

25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

LODGE, Henry Cabot

C.IA

DIEM

TRUEHARI', William

HARKINS,

Gen. Paul D. (Cormander, MAC/V)

WEEDE, Gen.

MOP

OCCURRENCE:

CIA

On August 25, 1963, the following/cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296) had the message below:

"RICHARDSON reports the results of a conference among AMBASSADOR LODGE, DOM TRUEHART, GENERAL,

HARKINS, GENERAL WEEDE, and RICHARDSON. The group agreed that giving DIEM an option had no

chance of success. They accepted DEPIEL 243 (of 24 August) as a basic decision from Washingto:

and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions. RICHARDSON gives headquarters

his views on possible successor regimes." (7-8)

SOURCE:

FILE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 7-8

Part C

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

28.6.75

Pade

11

DocId: 32423615

NW 50955

---

## Page 12

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CATEGORIES:

HARRIMAN, Averell

HIESMAN, Roger

McCONE, John

MCNAMARA, Robert

RUSK, Dean

KENNEDY, John F.

TAYLOR, Maxwell

(Mil. ass't to

Pres.)

GILPATRIC, Roswell

DATES:

24-25 August

1,963

DIEM

L::

6020)

(CARD 1 of

OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains the following, description of the events of August 25,

1963, from a book by MARGUERIIE HIGGINS:

"The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek

tragedy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to saigon late in the evening of Aurust 24,

1963, a date made more significant because it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on

summer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.

"The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON.

It was drawn up at a meeting, called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER

HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task

force.

The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CIA DIRECIOR

JOHN MCCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (con't)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6

STAFF:

Dawson

PARTC

DATE:

28.6.75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

(cont)

HEIMS, Richard

DIEM

NHU

CATEGORIES:

Dien

Sett

(CARD

OCCURRENCE:

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball game in New York. PRESIDEN' KENNEDY

was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over

and the telegram long on its way.

• the cable proved historic. For the first time it rave the signal to

'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which

the generals had been talking for so many years.

.. the cable of lupust 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy

of one war at a time. It envisaged the generals' making war on their own government, and

with the implicit blessing of the United States.

"The substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)

DocId: 32423615

Page

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## Page 13

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Dien

(CARD 3 of 4)

OCCURRENCE:

io persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and

restore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law.

And if, as the cable antici-

sated, DIM would not do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIEINAMESE GENERALS

and tell them that the United States

would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.

• the controversial Aupust 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday

evening after being cryptically surmarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at

Iyannis Port.

"The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC • • had the cable describea

io him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC

says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't.)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Died

CARD HOLI

020hs1

OCCURRENCE:

important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not feel that he

ought to veto the telegram since . . . it had the 'approval of the PRESIDENT. '

"In McCONE's absence, the cable was described, again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS,

DEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel disposed to veto something approved by

he PRESIDENT. '" (5-6)

CARD 4 of 4

E

50955

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Page

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## Page 14

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)

NHU

DEEM

DEPIER 243

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

24 August 19631'

Drem

CARD

4221129

In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, the onlowing message annearedi

"The DEPARIMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation

In which power lies in NU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM

himself may have to go. The AMBASSADOR is authorized:

(1) to inform the GVN that actions

apainst BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that the US cannot

support a DIEM regime that includes the HU's and that 'we will give them direct support

in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism;' (3) to make statements

Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids."

"The telegram Includes the following statement: "The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should

urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

28.6.75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

HANG

Caid 2o8 20 0N

OCCURRENCE: (con't from card 1)

we might bring about DIFM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will under-

stand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this opera-

tion should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take

to achieve our objectives.'" (4-5)

CARD 2 of 2

50955

DocId: 32423615

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14

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## Page 15

PERSUNS/ENTTTIES:

Thich Tri Quang

Diem

DATES:

Aug. 21, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her

comand post than a holy place. It was the headquarters

xperiences, was more a political

from which the militant

Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political war against the Diem regime.

According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of

Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two

of us."

Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen

pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists. (Page 181)

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,

Harper and Rowe

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: July

3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL TON THAT DINH, MILITARY

GOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RD

21 August 1963,

DIEM

_CORPS

CONEIN

Louge, Henry C.

NGO DINH NHU

AMBASSADORD NOLTING

OCCURRLINCE: "On the night of the 2lst of August, GENERAL ION THAT DINH, as military gov-

emor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, has established a curfew. If I recall

Anybody seen afte

that time would be - shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that

time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard ot

NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon.

What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador

LODGE, was on his way to take over". p. 21

SECRET

STAFF:

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

R. DAWSON

DocId: 32423615

ag

---

## Page 16

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Milting, Ambassador

Aug. 21, 1963

Diem

Lodge, Ambassador

Di em

Thich Tri Quang

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins claims that "

...the raids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place

five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry

Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam." Higgins goes

on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this

time was because:

"It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no

intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many

consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem propaganda explosion,

Ambassador was

It would be lefteltent de vietnam United States if they took make when the new

For the same reason Steat

case was taken not

to inform the United States of the pagoda plans.

The yeason

ng was that Washington

could

be blamed for something about which-

knew

nothing." (page 183)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN, CIA officer (Saigon)

DON, General

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

8/21/63

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

SECUET

lan officer of the CIA

Saigon station and General DON, the latter asked for Usa, government

assurances of support assurances of support for moves against the DIEN

regime."

(3)

SOURCE:

1967 I.Q. Report, Part C, p 3.

STAFF:

RD

PTIR:

NG 50955 DocId: 32423615

Page 16

---

## Page 17

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GENERAL DON

AMBASSADOR NOLTING

CONEIN

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

July 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On July 4, 1963, CONEIN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps

at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public meeting and the hotel

was jammed packed. CONEIN states that: "It was at that time on the 4th of July that I

GENERAL DỒN tr

had the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when GENERAL DON tr

me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning.

ported

this fact, and I believe it was around the öth or 9th of July, that more indi-

cations...." p. 20.

NUr SECHE

STAFF:

DATE:

SOURCE:

R. DAWSON

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DALES:

CATEGORIES:

EN. DUONG VAN MINH

7/63.

EN. TRAN VAN DON

AJ. GEN.

LE VAN KIM

EN. TRAN THIEN KHTOM

TOP SEC

pete piece y

OCCURRENCE: The initial conscias dreise ünd

agreement amongste

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0002007 1200

58 0222

ast then icup

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failed. SOURCE:

Coccer: 1

sonaptrecons, one been resconozore cos 24460100 26720761231

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parmes cod fur dovelerios portsicad pleadeg.

Goasta!

247112

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Miese colo mos

2ud!

ao Chief of Statt to Goosed ittal Coring the ploties

the netual eou2.

STAPF:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one

page

i0.

PTIT:

DATS:

Dawson

6/30/75

50955

Doold: 32423615

Page

17

---

## Page 18

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

1/63

DIEM

GEN. MINH

NGO DINH NHU

OCCURRENCE:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SECKEN

the care was the declodon

1202.5034 60

3909

Pandidant Dion.

Tho majority ot

00130005p

Real, desired

President

2220

have

Mono.22%20

the politiest Socia

32 Sodth

Nebarn dad exde.

2B. C0 020 2606 004

Ago Dada

Cene

Chore

noone dissensione

Tho arcide gas that thoir douches

a2o0g 3x11

Ladene Ngo Dinh

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page ten.

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Diem

DATES:

10 July 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the situation in South Vietnam" the

following quotation appeared: '"if - as is likely - Diem fails to

carry out truly and promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists,

disorders will probably flare again and the chanus of coup or assassina-

tion attempts against him become even better... . We do not think . . .

the communists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some

combination of his non-communist opponents.

A non-Conmunist successor

regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but,

1967 T. Ronnnt nant a an 1-1

STAFF:

NH 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 18

---

## Page 19

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM

THICH TRI QUANG

DATES:

May 6, 1963

CAPEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any

religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic - having any precedence over the National

Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view.

Higgins does not doubt that the

Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made

possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti-

Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the

excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the National Vietnamese flag

on view being sometimes tattered

and torn and few in number. (91)

SOURCE:

1965

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, STAFF :

FILE:

Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

MADAME NHU

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their

antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be

Buddhists.

And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in.

light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish some mustard at

a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselve.

against the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas.

CONE.IN did not know whether or

not this became the principal reason for the United States

wanting to get rid of the regime.

pp. 42-44.

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

7070

50955

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## Page 20

PERSONS/ENTTTIES:

TRULILARI, WILLIAM

MECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA)

NOLTING, AMBASSADOR

DATES:

June 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

Caid If

OCCURRENCE: Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue

was to "urge Dien to repair all Buddhist grievances torthwith, to accept responsibility

for the May o killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting

Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Mediterranean vaction at the time.)

"According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from

Washington, 'direct, relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem

such as the United States

had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government...' In despair Trueheart

in June resorted to a fornal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures

(police eftort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), the United States would

later the drag cato son be Te soch action is arise a no tr

(continued next card)

SOURCE:

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper land a

Dawson,

R.

Row, 1965

DATE:

July 2, 1975

FILE:

--====

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

CARD TWO

Carl 2 g2

OCCURKENCE: (continuation)

the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the

encouraging the

Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics...

perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup'' (100)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

"Our Viet Nam Nightnare, Higgins, Harper and Row, STATH:

NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 20

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## Page 21

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

"Summer 1963"

DIEM

CATEGORIES:

CONEIN

NHU, NGO DINH

MADAME NHU

CAN, NGO DINH

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the attacks in May in Hue followed up by an attack in Augus

on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of the Buddhists

by making them become a political entity which they had never been before. CONEIN stated

that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAID and JASPAU, as well

as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power of the govern-

ment at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME NHU, the chief of

the womens' solidarity movement. DIEM was felt to be out of touch with reality and not get-

ting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp. 44-45

TIP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

July 1, 1975

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONE IN

DATES:

DIEM

"middle May

1963"

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said that the DIEM government started the Buddhist antagonism but

could not understand their doing so. He gave his personal opinion as that "they had a

chance to get out of it and get out of it very gracefully within the first two weeks after

the 8th of May incident in HUE by meeting the demands of paying off the families of those

people who were killed when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue.

If this would have

been done, I think that we would have been much better off.... This was a turning point of

the political situation....

pp. 41-42

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

50955

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## Page 22

PERSONG/ENTITIES:

DIEM

MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp.?)

DATES:

May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

"Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation

of the Hue affairs.

For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical conmission led by

Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a

man of integrity by the Americans.)" The commission also included the Surgeon General

of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance.

After extensive interrogation of

witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of the deaths on

"At the time, nonetheless, Dien's regime claimed that plastic agilis

caused the deaths was

widely ridiculed.

"Unfortunately, no American officials were witness"

he incidence.

The American con-

DATE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITTES:

THICH TRI QUANG

NGUTEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)

MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV, CHIEF).

DATES:

May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DI EM

OCCURRENCE:

AMA

SECRET

Nguyen Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang

Sy said that "While we

were inside, two loud explosions suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the

sounds of broken glass, gunshots,

and exploding hand grenades."

In the contusion Major

Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a

Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air.

Unfortunately this was the prearranged

splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably

made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla."

(95-96)

STAPP:

SOURCE

1965

Our Vict Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,

Daison, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

50955

DocId: 32423615

age

22

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## Page 23

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

THICH TRI QUANG

NGUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)

MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief)

DATES:

May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

According to Higgins on May 8, 1963 on the Buddhist birthday Thich Tri

Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government

speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags.

About 8 pm

Thich Tri

Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then

made the demand upon the director of the station to play.

He was refused. Thich Tri

Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would

not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would

fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy

then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd.

Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94)

SOURCE:

1965

Our Viet Nam Nightmare,

Higgins, Harper and Row, STAFF:

FILE:

Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Trich Tri Quang

Diem

DATES:

May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem y

OCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of

May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly

the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world.

alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant and his accomplices in a campaign

of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented

no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.

Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and

techniques of governing."

T STAFF.

50955

DocId: 32423615

page

23

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## Page 24

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Colby

1go, Dinh Can

10/65

Dienv

Conein

Ahme

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Colly explained that a couple of woeks before the assassination the thought

nf assassination vas not aimed at Dien but at Nhu and

hrothers who were considered the evil influence of tlie government.

Can, Dien's two

"I'lie

idea of removing tha from Vietnan was one that was discussed in great tetail

ind a great doal of pressure was put on Diem to

the country.

send his

brother out of

on out tetail

"At one point I made a suggestion that porhaps I could con-

rince him of the desirability of leaving the country for the benefit of

sis oun, of the country itself.

That I think is the separable

That I could so over and arque him into.(it)

thing from the actual decision to shoot Dien.

I think the decision to shoot Dien was a conscience decision taken by the

it letth fine

enerals which cane as a very new development during the coup, but let's face

"SOURCE: a rovcruncit."

is souctiin you lave to anticipate day tolca

Pages 35-34

STArY

an arortiron of

FILE:

Hearings, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Colly

Dawson

DATE:

7/1/75

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

11/2/63

Dien

111,

Nạo Dinh

Incin

nh

OCCURRENCE:

mein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassina-

on was there a discussion of the killing of Dien.

Further, there had never

en any discussion at any time about Diem himsell being killed by anybod.

1 fact, the generals and many people wanted Diem to be around but they could

it stand Nhu and dadane Nh, Diem's wife.

Page 64-66.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975

Dawson

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

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## Page 25

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COLBY,

WILLIAM

MINKI

GENERAL

NHUNG

CONEIN

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

I November 1963)

DIEM

CURRENCE: COLEX stated that "Apparentiy the decision by several of the generals, the

ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an

officer, a small armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the

He and his brother were put in an armored personnel carrier with an

they went

That officer, incidentally,

and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently when this junta of generals

was overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that occasion to shoot him."

po. 18-19.

SOURCE:

FILE:

Fearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19

STAFE: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTIPIES:

DATES:

May 7, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

THICH TRI QUANG

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached Hue on May T, 1903.

Vui Can Long, was ang any bedecked with lage the chanese Minister of tito the Bud-

dhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not be enforced.

of the monks were very pleased," said Minister Long.

exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the agrangement not to enforce

the regulation.

Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could

reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according

to Higgins was that Kuang sent a few monks around to tell the people to haul down the

flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers

actions.

'The monks were told to tell the population that this was being done as

sOURCE: result of Diems order to ban r buddhist flag

"(41-92) STAFF:

Our Viet Num Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,!

Dawson, R.

1965

FILE:

DATE: July 2, 1975

Docid: 32423615

Page

---

## Page 26

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

McCone

Diem

Nhu

Kahn

CATEGORIES:

DISM

OCCURRENCE:

In response to

Mr. Diem and is requestion as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate

that he did not think it was Mr. Diem

lind sentas te Diamo estated that "there was a prof osal, one

that suggestion, McCone testified

of a number of proposals, in connection with the diffiçult political situation that

xisted in South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination Mr. Nhu and General Kanh. ...

when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down"

(4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations. We

were really at war there.

My opposition was more on the basis of considered judgement

that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an alysis solve any

problem.". (5).

SOURCE: McCone, June 6, 1975

FILE:

STAFF: Gordon Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

NH 50955

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## Page 27

1960-62

HHT 50955

DooId: 32423615

Page

27

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## Page 28

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE

ALAN DULLES

DATES:

Mar 16, 1960

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

SPECIAL GROUP

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

on March 16, 1960 at the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans

to use the base radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listenine audience.

No expan theme sas

VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation In South Vietnam.. and

commented that this appears to be

a situation where S. F. training might be in order.

DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the

area to assess the situation on the spot." DULIES also discussed briefly "the possibility

of assisting the South Nietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin the north."

SOURCE:

FILE:

Minutes of Special Group Meet tr

5, March 16, 1960.

STAFF:

KELLEY

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lansdale

Dulles

Hare

Irwin

DATES:

May 12, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Diem

Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On May 12, 1960, the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation

from President Diem for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr. Hare said

"that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use General

Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments

could no doubt be made.

Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted

on to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated

to upset Diem."

1 0p

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting May 42 1960

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

NH

50955

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Page

28

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## Page 29

ORSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM

NGO DINH NHU

1962

DIEM

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENT

OF VIETNAM, COLBI,

HARKINS

HES IMOROLAND. GENERAL

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that:

"In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER"

THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAV to be responsible for liaison between CIA and thi

MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

The idea for this program was

that of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security withi

hamlets and

villages in order so the peopie could deny access of food and taxes to the

VIET CONG.

In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspic

of the MINISIRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including

small sections." p. 17. CONEIN.

"This was done with the permission of GENERAL HARKINS ar

it was known to GENERAL WESIMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein&

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JFK

Maxwell Taylor

STAFF:

DATE:

DATES:

27 Sept 62

R. DAWSON

30 June 1975

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Aug

MOONGOOSE"entec

Diem/v

OCCURRENCE:

laylor states that the Special Group and the Sepcial Group Augmented considered a proposal by

CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REnublic of Vietnam. This had

seen prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense.

laylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared.

It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support

if this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of

attle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be flown out

if Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese

vir Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists pilöts documented South Vietnam-

ise citizens.

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor'

Sept 27, 1962.

as-memorandum

005

PTL.F:

the President, dated

STAFF:

PGN

6/70/75

E

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## Page 30

PERSONS/ ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

February 1962

CATEGOKIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots,

re toss not the arr

was another attempted coup. At that time, in february, I was asked if I would go to the

political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the

military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM?

I was un-

able, at this time, to determine this fact.

There was an isolated dissidence within the

military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conetr

FILE:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

30 June 1975

HH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

30

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## Page 31

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

PATES:

February 1962

CATEGOKIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962,

two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air

Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM.

indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th

was another attempted coup.

At that time, in february, I was asked if I would go to the

different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to fina out what was to

politica, pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the

military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM?

I was un-

able, at this time, to determine this fact.

There was an isolated dissidence within the

military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962."

pp. 16-17.

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conetri

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

30 June 1975

N# 50955

DocId: 32423615

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## Page 32

1 9 63

177 50955

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32

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## Page 33

PERSONG/ENTITIES:

DATES:

1963

CATECORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

'Most manifestations of political oppostion," wrote Henderson,

"were

vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal.

Elections were

far fron free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime

bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could

be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting

Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's

people with the forms and substance of democracy, but... Diem had still to prove that his

professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to

disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165)

SOURCE:

Row, 1965

FILE:

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson, R.

July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NGO DINH CAN

MINISTER OF INTERIOR

CONCIN

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that :

"On May 7, 1963,..... "The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself &

his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam.

While

in Hue, it was on my aircraft that I

assigned to me for that day - while in Hue,

they had a very large meeting of different

milltary authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met w

the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some

decisions were made, of wnich I was not aware of (sic).

We returned quite late

the night

the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR told me it would be impossi:

I wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda.

I wanted to see burnt boats wit'

the candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there wa

an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists.

At that time, the Buddhists as an ent!

was not a political force and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Budd

came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening i

SOURCE: Vietnam." p. 19

STAPF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein,

R. DAWSON

50955

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## Page 34

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, Henry CABOT

CONEIN

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

DEIM V

OCCURRENCE: "

....I worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I re-

ceived my instructions from Ambassador LODGE.

They were cable instructions, he had a very

good habit of not reading something.

He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained to

you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know wi

was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instruc

tions, do you understand them?

Yes,

sir; allright, we'll carry them out."

pe 23 Instruc

TOP SECSI

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 20 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

1963

DIEM

CATEGORIES:

corin stated thef:

OCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any

resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: Tune an 1075

N# 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

34

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## Page 35

PERSONS/ENTTTIES:

Dawson

National Security Council

State Dept

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

1963

Dien

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

colby stated that the policy of the chain of command wanted i determination

whether it be by

the security Council or by other authority

is made to carry

out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council

to the ambassador.

"The anbassador is

the President's representative ind

has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an

importang question like this (the Diem coup) would be.

passed to the

ambassador

tohandle.

"Now, the other agencies in town would be inforned of tae policy

dircetive that we micht have additional comminication as to the details is

to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through

dircotive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and in-

mediately under the control of the ambassador."

Page s5.

SOURCE:

STAPF:

Hearings, SSGI, June 20, 1075, Colby

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75•

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Spccial forces

Colby

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

1963

Di cm

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that "the Special forces first arrived in Vietname working for

A in this country procram o. developine villages for their own defense

"hen it not to he as l remember 750 of them the question arose as to wiethei

they should be transferred out of CIA into military control, and this was

done during 1903; military took over responsibility for that program and

I will have sone more words to say about that at another time."

Page 20-20.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF

Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1075, Colby

Dakson

50955

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## Page 36

PERSONS/ENZITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY, MC GEORGE, TAYLOR, MAXWELL

BALL,

GEORGE

1963

DIEM

HORRESTAL, MICHAEL

HILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLTING

MC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERT

TO CrAPET

SEEURRESCROSHELT

COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference

room or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL,

FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. P. 70

COLBY also stated that

generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be

with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney

ave been lin the

sometime Match t

The chairman of the meetings downstairs which i

President never attended would have been Mr. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come so:

times, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs in

the Cabinet roon, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador NOLTING.

when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam took a very active role opposing action:

against President DIaM to the extent that he was invited to participate.

And his advice wi

not accepted. p. 73

SOURCE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

DATE:

1 July 1975

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

Sunmer and

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan.

There were several.

The problem that wa

facing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likely

were making assessments

chance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no chance of going back.

because there was going to be a coup.

The best thing to do was to monitor and keep the U.S.

government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and in

the future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this time, it was getting down

to the critical element. In October,..

the generals had to have assurances that I was speakin;

for the Ambassador.

Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was präcti-

cally impossible because of the security around the generals, who were

already suspect...."

p. 28

TOP SECKiN

NH

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

36

---

## Page 37

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

•Diem

DATES:

Summer 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

....Diem was not conforming to Western standards of democracy. And this

was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assump-

tion that Occidental

style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems.

It was an assumption with which Ngo Dinh Diem disagreed on both practical and philosophical

grounds."

SOURCE:

"Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins,

Harper & Row, 1965, D. 165

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

CATEGORIES:

Dawson

July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Thich Tri Quang

Summer, 1963

McNamara

Diem

D1em

OCCURRENCE: Card 1x

Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for concilia-

tion was based on the assumption that Thich Iri Quang's grievances concerning flags and

such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich

Tri Quang wanted was a pretext to see.

His objective was not a solution, but nonethe-

less than Diem's head.

"Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personally

shown immediate public concern for the victims of the lue tragedy.

order generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never

publicized. Perhaps he was too

So inwardly assured of his innocence was

Diem that he did not

toned neare ba pine rough her duble to eats de

Evould certain two

18511

19 -

ut sua sinsty would scarcely have appeased Thich Tri Quan

not Diens image

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,

ISTAFF:

Dawson

Harper and Rowe

1.10-1.1.

DATE: July 3, 1975

DocId: 32423615

Page

---

## Page 38

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

38

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---

## Page 39

PERSONS/ENCURTES:

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD:

DATES:

7/63

TOP

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SECRE

50.

•Danino.

comento of the freakûonuta? everd bad bosa. concacced

ami coene vero carly dodoccisas

sinains

che Agacias.

Corruer

10.3

nos coutacted stace reasor

Unais

2620019

The RAnger

10 219370071

tha

632 00X00 W85

No puro pro machi the coup plottora vira doe saceptica

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page ten.

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD:

5b

4200y

Pe pato de cood prottens.

Chic Marid

TRO 10

Yevanneso Epectal Faroes wich

Ato com aedo desning the necessaed. pedage muder dardar.

SOURCE :

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

STAFF :

Dawson

page 11.

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

50955

Doold: 32423615

Page

---

## Page 40

LENNDOLBALLALE2:

21102 :

7/63

204112:

OCCURRENCE:

DIEM

TOP SECE-

to escocö Coptala

20.222) 610.1415

0122ce:

ni the

laval, Torcos, lilled the Coperia sidor

LOUR'S .

Tais concly nosot the

t2D lAg 01

tas. p120,

3ad 102,8

cdo20 dicostly so

7130d. S02g

Reaga ba i

00220021034,

2nd do one larsa

Mata encoot the codo padretpala che the dercose 3002

to 12024.

"SOURCIE:

FILE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

Page 11.

STAFF

Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

OCCURKENCE:

DATES:

7/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECKEN

Pae Caigon Cureison Crcoge, ineladiog ensport trocpa

cuch os paratocostor, sigoci, espiaeore, sie, tere contactod

thaough tadtetcues conranders.

Vascuenose apecta? focaes,

14 Ats doblous zode as the enacutire azn of the secret

paver contacted bus neo allaya cousadered otra.

oreal do dedag conoletoly loynd to Precideas 0lgn.

SOURCE:

"Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

STAFH:

page 10-11.

Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/7

50955

DocId: 32423615

Pa

ge

---

## Page 41

FERDUNS/ENITTLES:

NGO DINH NHU

CONEIN

DATES:

July 11, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM V

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for ,

staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he knew of some coup planning going or

the generals. This scared the generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DINI

NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks."

some dissidence in the ranks. " 2. 20-21.

Map Ge

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE:

30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Krulik, Major General Victor H.

Kennedy, John F.

Mendenhall, Joseph, State

National Security Council

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Diem

8/63

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of

the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against the Viet

Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the

effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same

country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reac-

tion to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by go-.

ing to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and bat-

talion headquarters.

But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, 1.e.,

Hue In Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew during

Nam's chronically critical and bickering

that time, and ir was the slightly Effett, volital society what a the haven of viet

Intellectuals

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite

Harper and Rowe

STAFF: Dawson

DocId: 32423615

Page

---

## Page 42

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU, NGO DINH

CONEIN

DATES:

August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: The coup .... "aborted, because,

one, they did not have necessary forces.

I'm talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those

loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of the Rangers,

mangere best

presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the best

armed troops available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have

a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NH*

BONH VE

who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23

TOP SECRE

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES

COLBY

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 20 June 1975

DATES:

August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that:

"As part of the pressure on the governinent in the Augus:

period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and wit:

Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assisi

ance to the SPECIAL FORCES.

We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the

military who were involved in that, but CIA is an easy thing to turn off, turn on and off.

The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off. In a simple way, I think t:

has had a certain influence in what they did. I know it resulted in the transfer of sever:

units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them."

p. 78-79

SOURCE:

Hearines, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

1 July 1975

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

---

## Page 43

PALES:

CATEGORLES:

-MADAME NHU

ECONEIN

55

August 1963

DIEM V

OCCURRENCE:

CONEIN states that:

"Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the

"bonzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU

Sthat were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the popul

Etion."

615

Page 43

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 31 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM

DIEM

August 1963

COLBY, WILLIAM

NGO DINH NHU , CONE.IN

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM

and the government, particularly to remove NGO DINH NHU from the country, to bring about cer-

tain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the perfor-

mance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law

480 aid the suspension of the commodity import program. And also through various contacts

with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would stand aside if

the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that,

"Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor gov-

emment took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war.

and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so._

created by the generals naceiving thes kam on a crA or dae

This can only be read as

that there was no question

SOURCE: about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CI ufficer STAFE:

was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge and consent."

R. DAWSON

FILE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-11

DATE:

29 June 1975

---

## Page 44

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

50955

DIEM

COLBY, WILLIAM

August 1963

DIEM

NOLTING

LODGE, Henry Cabot

OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors

from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided

Buddists pagadas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddhist dissidence.

COLBY stated

that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying it in his mind

and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that

& country was faced with.

COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect

DIEM's image here in the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within the educa-

ted class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.

SOURCE:

TOP SEPRET

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 8-9

R. DAWSON

FILE:

DATE:

29 June 1975

-----

PERSONG/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Aug. 7, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

DIEM

NOLTING, AMBASSADOR

RICHARDSON, JOHN

OCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought

the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: "I do not think Ambassador

Nolting is plotting against me.

I do not think Richardson /of the CIAT is plotting

against me.

I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event

the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future.

And I

cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle.

for its very existence.

ca wood trop are t an aland

Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young

setierals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do

they have--of their own country, let alone the world?"

SOURCE:

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and

Dawson, R.

---

## Page 45

E PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

50955

DIEM

DREN, LODGE, AMBASSADOR

Aug. 7, 1963

Card 16z

DodId: 32423615

OCCURRENCE:

During an interview by lliggins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "

...Diem

sent an aide for document, which I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent con-

versation with an American official."

"Your ambassador, " Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my

posture of the liberal image

to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists

Page

and the political opposition...I cannot seem to convince the embassy that this is Viet

a bomb,

kills dozens of persons, including some American press? What would 'liberal

opinion' say of me then?

Would

they believe my government when it said that the Viet

Cong were responsible for the killings because only the Communists could profit from

SOURCE:

Öur Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, STAFF:

"1965

Dawson, R.

FILE:

DATE: July 2, 1975

----

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DI EM

Card 2f2

CARD TWO

OCCURRENCE:

(continuation)

such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the

Nast one but whom did the Americans blame? They blaned me the President of Viet

the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable nextatame? This is

not child's play; I am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when 1 try to protect the

people of this country--including the Americans--by good police work keeping control in

the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (167)e

SOURCE:

1965

STAFF:

* Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, !

Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

---

## Page 46

PERSONS/ENTITIES (Milting, Amb.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

5095

Affair, Saigon Embassy]

Hile nan, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State/

[rueheart, WIlliam] Mechlin, Director, USIA

8/14/63

Drem

§ Het Han

Card lof 2

ECARD 1 OCCURRENCE: Higgins points out that on August 14,

1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America

: 32423615

broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was "beginning to affect the war effort."

Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who

was at that time In conference with Trueheart and Mechlin.

"Our report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though,

of course, it could if riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting front-line

Page

troups."

"We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued,

"of the rumor that Bud-

dhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what

Hilsman based this statement on.

But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of

his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA." Mechlin suggested to Milting that

perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's commenda,

WHalsman was, after all,

Milting's boss." Higgins, returning to New

Tys thereafter, called Hilsman

(Continued on Card 2)

STAFF: Dawson

Harper and Rowe

FILE:

DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 2c8 e82

OCCURRENCE:

to find out what was the basis for his broadcast. Milsman conceded that in fact he had

based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches

out

of Saigon.

(page *8k 124-125).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

---

## Page 47

50955

DocId: 32123615

Page

FERSONS/ENTITILS:

Diem

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

14 August 1963

Diem v

OCCURRENCE:

TOP

630-10 181

In the lurrent, Intelligence Memorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Loup Rumors in

South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared:

• . : the coup reports

and rumors which have arisen

since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect

some serious coup plotting, we have no firm evidence of auvance planning

by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2) •

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

1967 I.G. Report, part C, p. 2

-age

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

RD

DATE:

6/28/75_---

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

8/21/63

Diem

Ball, Undersecretary of State

He Ims, Richard

colby, wm.

OCCURRENCE:

TOP

USELIT

On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupted"

Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial

Law.

At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants

from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it

was pointed out that on"notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division

that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was

pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."

SOURCE:

FILE:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C

Cage

STAFF:

DATE:

RD

6/28/75

---

## Page 48

19 50955D0011832423615 Paye 48

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

8/21/63

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

SECRET

Wadia

On 21 August 1963, the current intelligence

memorandum (OCI 2341/63) :

"Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" stated that "additional reports of plot-

shud on denge rous minent action, the Buddhist issue continues to make the

ting against the DIEM government have been received. While there is no

SOURCE:

FILE:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C,p. 3

Cage

STAFF:

DATE:

RD

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

21 August 1963

CONEIN

DINH

NGO DINH NHU, . GENERAL DON

VE TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: "During the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16

September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of

the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President

DIEM and counsellor NHU that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himsel!

NHU's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH

realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. The generals would recognize this fact

and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and

that, above all, should have been thanked by DIEM and HU for saving the government.

pp. 12-13

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975 , Exhibit I, Conein

DITT TA

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 49

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Diem

DATES:

August 21, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem

DocId: 32423615

age

OCCURRENCE:

toard 1y

Higgins characterizes the raids anxtakai on the Xalol and

August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy

toward Viet Nam. She states

that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration

that Diem had to be opposed.

raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an

Oriental Ian Fleming.

Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks "stormed" into

shortly after midnight. A

bells, a blood-curdling

scream shattered the spirits

serenity.

One eye witness professed to see

two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of

death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy.

"When the United Nations

"What the co ed at 3 month later, he conta the no evese fut ate e bad been buted !

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins

STAFF: Dawson

Harper and Rowe

- who had bee,

•ILE present duver gates teeta la Loi and to dod. bos

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

8/21/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

Diem

Ball, Undersecretary of State

Helms, Richard

Colby,

Win.

OCCURRENCE:

TOr

(EM

0 217

On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied

Buddhist pagodas throughout the country.

DIEM imposed nationwide martial

At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants

from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of far Eastern Division,

was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division

that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was

pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."

get to tee

" 1.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C

RD

FILE:

DATE:

Cage

6/28/75

-

-..

---

## Page 50

DocId: 32423615

Page

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

21 AUG. thru

Mike ini

16 SEPT.

OCCURRENCE:

TOM

SECRE

During the poriad betireen

1ogas6 God tho

Rising of martial law on 16 Septerber,

Rich cucually

roostdared aineal? the hero of Vastse

16 per fo

Genazal

Do CON De

SÖURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/15, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 12.

FILE:

STANT Dayson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSOES/ENETTIES:

GENERAL DINH

DATES:

11/1/63

21 AUG.

thru

16 SEPT.

'63

CAREDOLES:

OCCURRENGE:

TOP SECRET

Dinh's

Ee cuntons

0u?106

sols perdod '2s

tho 2o301a19.04 Co

423

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, S. S.C.I., 6/20/15, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 12.

STAFE: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

---

## Page 51

50955

Page

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

-.-*

HILLSMAN, Roger (Assistant

Secretary of State for Far

Eastern Affairs)

DATES:

CATEGORLES:

8/22/63

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334), the

following di

message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which has.

not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed

at all levels.

HilIsman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station

pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and

who real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtain-

ing US Bn objective.

Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially

assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary

drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency

planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Has. will comment and in

SOURCE:

STAFF:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C

FILE:

DATE:

Cage

RD

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HILISMAN, Roger (Assistant

Secretary of State for Far

Eastern Affairs)

CIA

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

8/22/63

Diem

CARD #2,

CARD 2012

TOP SECKLI

further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at

HilIsman's request." (3)

SOURCE:

FILE:

1967 I.G. Report, part C, p.3

Cage

STAFF:

DATE:

RD

6/28/75

---

## Page 52

AN 30955

ĐocId:32423615

Page

52

CIA

RICHARDSON, John (CIA station

chief in Saigon)

Saigon Embassy

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

DATUS:

8/22/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem v

UP

On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208) Chief of

Station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate

leadership:

". . . kecent events have made us feel that hope for civilian

government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic.

The solution

seems even more improbable than ever before. Would appear that we should

have either DIEM or military junta... . View time factor have not coordinated

this

ter."

message with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject mat-

(3-4)

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

1967 I.G. Report, part C, pp 3-4

Cage.

DATE:

RD

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HILLSMAN, ROGER

LODGE, HENRY CABOT

CONE.IN

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

22 or 23 August!

1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August.

When he arrived he found that Saigon was :

armed camp.

"During this period of these attacks on the pagodas, there had been many con-

tacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen to them talking about doing

thing about doing away with the existing regime, I had talked with different generals and

the one in August - I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 24th, we received a cable which i

Jater been known as the famous ROGER HILISMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead

that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22

STAFF:

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 53

E PERSONS/ENTITIES:

® CONEIN

DATES:

23 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEMV

55

securing "there was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occasio

Id: 32423615

I met with them, other people had also. We had met with colonels and junior officers.

we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August.

p. 22.

Page

OP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFE:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

30 June 1975

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretary

of State for Political Affairs)

HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans, (IA)

DATES:

8/24/63

Diem

of Defense)

On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS at

*2000k ad lit l

hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned

out to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to

HEIMS" query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained

an implicit pullout of American forces and support if the Nhus' were not

he Secretary of State the wish Me at Pence ared with Hyannisports) with

SOURCE:

FILE:

1967 I.G. Report, part C, p. Y

Cage

STAFF:

DATE:

RD

6/28/75

---

## Page 54

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

54

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HILSMAN, Roger (Ass't. Sec.State for

Far Fastern Aff -- FE)

LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)

DATES:

25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM +

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN tO LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels

(DIR 63854), there appeared the following messare:

"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is

dangerous but all apree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't

be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way."

SOURCE:

FILE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 5

PARIC

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

25 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

CIA

LODGE, Henry Cabot

DIEM V

TOD

SECDE

OCCURRENCE:

8 Batta

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following message appeared:

"FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared at highest

levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek

ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand it invites

LODGE final judgment. ... Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away

bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing.

suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same

time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we

probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least

interim period... . ."

SOURCE: 1.G. REPORI 1967, p. 7

STAFF: Dawson

---

## Page 55

EERSONS/ENTITIES:

CARDSON, Saigon Chief of Station

DATES:

25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM~

LAAH, General (SVN)

'ERA, CIA officer in Saigon

ACCURRENCE:

tủệ CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:

WEF OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH requested an irmediate meeting with

PERA tan officer of the CIA Sairon Station) •

At the meeting, KHANH requested assurances that

ne U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the DIEM

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7

PARTE

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ ENTITIES:

CIA

DATES:

26 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Staff Memorandum, No. 60-63, Internal ONE

working Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears:

"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment

If US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Conmunist

night not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better

shan the present regime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist

nationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of

ast years, months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we believe, Iles the only viable hope

or the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8

STAFF:

---

## Page 56

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

SEIMS, Richara

LODGE, Henry Cabot

DIEM

CARTER, Gen. Marshall KENNEDY, John F.

26 August 1963

ENHU

CTA

MEET, ADM. larry D. (CINOPAC)

DEPTEL 243

TOP SECREI

OCCURRENCE:

Don August 26, 1963, HELMS' record of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other

FIA participant was GENERAL MARSHALI CARTER, DDCI.

"The question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam

situation that it really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DIM himself.

*cipal points discussed were:

ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current

WS action in South Vietnam; the fact that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role

of the NU's; the meaning of the phrase 'give direct support to military commanders' in DEPTEL

243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend

failed. The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August 27 with participants to present

biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

- JOUND/LNTITIES:

CIA

RICHARDSON, John

CONEIN

SPERA

KHIEM

MINH

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

26 Aug. 1963

- KIACCURRENCE:

DIEM

In a CIA cable from Saigon on August 26, 1963 (SAIG 0330),

TOP SEGRET

"RICHARDSON reports the results of the CONEIN/SPERA approaches to the generals.

KIAN said he was not yet ready, and KHIEM said he would have to check with MINH."

In essence,

(9)

SOURCE:

FILE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, D. 9

STAFF: Dawson

---

## Page 57

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

57

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

KENNEDY, John F.

HELMS (DD/P)

COLBY, William

HARKINS (MAC/V)

CIA®

DEPTEL. 243

27 Aug. 1963

CARIER

LODGE, Henry Cabot

OCCURRENCE:

PRET

On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam.

The record was taken by

HELMS of by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:

"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and

asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judement of

LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup.

A cable

was

drafted asking if they still agreed with their concurrences to DEPTEL 243."' (9-10)

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 9-10

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

28.6.75

FILE:

DET TEL 243

DEPTEL 256

KENNEDY, John F.

UNTES:

27 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

LODIE, Henry Cabot

HARKINS, John (Commander, MAC/V)

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 256), on Aupust 27, 1963, the following message appeared:

"Examination of reports to date pives considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions.

Proceeding from the concept outlined in DEPTEL 243 as modified, now desire your prompt interim

appraisal of present prospects. . Highest authority asks whether you and HARKINS, in light

of developing situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by generals.

to pive you all possible support in best available course but not to insist on any decision

that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." (10)

SOURCE: : I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

---

## Page 58

CENSUNS/ENITTLES:

GEN. DINH

DATES:

31 August

11/1/63

6

CATEGORIES:

DIEMC-

GOUNSELLER NHU

DocId: 32423615

Page

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President

Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial

post for himself.

SOURCIE:

Hearings,

s.s.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

pages 12-13.

FILE:

.. UNS/ENTLYIES:

RICHARDSON, John

DATES:

28 Aug- 1963

STANY: Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEMV

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

1 August 28, 1963, RICHARDSON reports in a CIA cable from

Saigon" (SAIG 0363) that:

Situation here has reached point of no return....Unless the generals are neutralized before

ving able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that they have a good

ance to win....We all understand that the effort must succeed and that whatever needs to

done on our part must be done...." (10)

SOURCE:

'ILE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

---

## Page 59

EERSONS/ENTITIES:

UNSC EXECUTIVE CORMITTEE

BILMS, Richard

SHARKINS

CIA

KENNEDY, John I.

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

29 AUP. 1963

DIEM

ADET

ith a record taken by DD/P I XECUTOVE COMMITTE meetings on Vietnam on Aurust 29, 1963,

the consensus was that HARKINS should confirm to the generals that the approaches from CIA

were bona fide and represented the views of the US government. There was agreement that

better intormation was needed on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether

it was militarily feasible.

ERESIDENTIAL approval." (12)

A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for

(Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

RUSK, Dean

McNAMARA, Robert

TAYLOR, Maxwell

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY, MeGeorge

NSC Exec. Com.

LODGE, Henry Cabo

HARKINS, John

28 Aug. 1963

DIEM

(RO)

SHOREI

the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, MCNAMARA, TAYLOR, and McGEORGE

He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE, COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams

were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general message

from the DEPARIMENI to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS.

(This is reflected in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (11)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

---

## Page 60

JOINSON, Lyndon B.

HELMS

CARTER

COLBY

MCNAMARA

BUNDY

DATES:

30 ug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on VIetnam,

m./

and COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that:

Nº

with HELMS, CARTER,

"BuSk referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing

with or what they were planning. McNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether

tHe generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he had re-read the earlier traffic and noted

That they never said they did. GEN. CARTER said he believed that the general's coup was not

I§kely at this stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before

He attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY supgested we consider additional contingencies

@fore the GROUP and whether the assumption that NIU is impossible is well founded."

(13)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JOHNSON, Lyndon B.

COLBY

HARKINS

CARTER

HELMS

DATES:

31 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

RUSK

McNAMARA

LODGE

DIEM V

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects

that:

"RUSK suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us think of a coup

and what might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA suggested the first re-

quirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE and HARKINS. RUSK directed

that a telepram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we might ask the VN

to do."

DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS also participated.)

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, D. 14

STAFF: Dawson

---

## Page 61

EPERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARKINS

DATES:

31 Лид. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

reaM

OGE

LOCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

rAugust 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities, the

lowing report appears:

GENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to give KHIEM assurances of USG backing.

HEEM showed a reluctance to talk and suggested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KHIEM

aymented that MINil had called off the planning and was working on other methods which KHLEM

old not describe.

KHIEM further stated that the generals were not ready as they did not have

Bugh forces under their control. " HARKINS decided not to give KHIEM assurances which he had

een authorized to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS re-

orted."

(13)

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORI 1967, Part C., P. 13

STAFF :

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem

State Department

Defonse Department

OCCURRENCE:

HeCone

Colby stated that the "

•..In this situation we were having almost daily

nectinus with senior officials in the CIA,

State Department,

Defense He-

partment and so forth, in the basement of

the White llouse and there was

no question that this

was national policy and hammored out.

...at these

meetings, those were the meetings at which Mr. McCone and

I argued

very

strongly that we should not move against

the Diem coverment

we should

continue to work with it."

Page 36

TOO CADE

---

## Page 62

Page

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

CONEIN stated that; there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who

were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. The best way I

can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one genera!

would talk, walk. out of the room to go to the "john"

, two would tell you, don't trust that

one, and finally the one who had

out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he

would say, don't trust those two."

p. 31

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COLSY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Fall 1963

DIEM

LODGE, HENRY CABOT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OCCURRINCE: COLBY stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political

section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the proposition that the war coul'

not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in

his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, this which was the public

pressure on the policy levels of

our goverment in washington, and the United states,

think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUN

and by the people in the STAlE DEPARINENT."

p. 61

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 63

50

SPERSONS/ENTITIES:

COLBY

General HARKINS

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

PLODGE, H.C.

PNSC

stated

DOCCURRENCE: Mr. COLBY that :

"The Defense Department was almost totally in a position thi

Ethe wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well.

that this (DIEM's continuance in office) is an urban problem, urban political problem whici

should not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and

*General HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62

AP SECRE

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, COlby

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. Dawson

1 July 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU

LODGE, H.C•

COLBY

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious

attempt to persuade DiaM to leave office voluntarily that: "There had certainly been dis-

cussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, "there was almost no direct

contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact." P. 66

TOP SERPET

---

## Page 64

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

& COLBY

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM V

55

& SATE. DEPARIMENT

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by

¿the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARIMENI was "one

¿for President DIEM." D. 61

of distast

Page 64

TOP

669:05

DOLES

"SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

PILE:

STAPP:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

I July 1975

-------

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

COLBY

Fall 1963

DIEM

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

GENERAL KRULAK

MR. MENDELHAY

TOP SACRET

-OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that:

"The most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has

been described publicly a number times, was that at one time, particularly with the

frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two

strong positions, he sent

two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr.

Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about

live days to make an assessment on the spot and they came back to the camera room, and one

sat on one end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had bo

to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 30 military chiefs and all that sort of thin

and the war business (was, going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing

butt, ten

was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then

Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political

people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless be-

cause there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the genera:

feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them and

SOURCE: suv, Id you tusteiloes yo te the same country? Hord the

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, COLDY

answer is they did.

This, inkied et two ditteriet

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 65

LATES:

CATEGORIES:

ranh, Tonthat

194, Ngo Dinh

9/65

Mien

TOP SECRE

OCCURRENCE:

önein stated that Diem aud Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double

dent.

Dion or Nhu had planned to have a

Bravo I and

a Bravo TT that Diem

B Whit

would have their own coup and go down to Vongtau as if they were

reaping and there would irmediately be a counter-coup to bring Diem--all

Nstigated by Nhu back to pover by popular acclamation.

So on Novonber 1

ul pon. in the afternoon when troops were moving

it was assumed by Dien

Ed Whu that this was part of Diem's plan to have a counter-coup.

Page 66-08.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DINH

GENERAL DON

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

September 1963

DIEM

HUAN, Conmanding Officer, Military

OCCURRENE DON promised DIN that he would personnaly speak to the President on DINH'S

behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON,

would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. DINH believed that DON had his personal

interest at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his

government, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM

the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he tho-

ught was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to

lend sympathy to DINH.while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13

SOURCE:

TOP SECRETSA

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein

DATE:

Tina

2A 1075

---

## Page 66

50955

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL MINH

KHIEM

September 1963

DIEM

LODGE, MICAN CABOT

DON, GENERAL

CONEIN

OCCURRENCE: "During the month of September,.

there was still more talk of coups, and at thi

time, the month of September, I had been told by Ambassador LODGE that I was to

monitor co

planning only....That I was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messages to BIG MINH

on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one occasion.

I had met with GENERAL KHIEM and BIG MIN.

on another occasion. On several occasions, I had met with GENERAL DON and other military

leaders.".

• p. 23

Page

66

TOP SECIET

STAFF:

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

20 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITILS:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

RICHARDSON, John

DIEM

DIEMV

NHU

2 Sept. 1963

STA

COL. TUNG

OCCURRENCE:

TOD CLONEY

In a CIA cable from Salon (SATA 0523), See ele OR provides the following surmary:

"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIEM and the NU's are fully aware

that the usu encouraged the GunerAls to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of

this encouragement.

he judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could

go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with

COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a VN liaison vehicle through which to

conduct PM proprams, but noted that the AVN had offered no alternative. Unless we were willing,

to discontinue our IN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with

IUNG .

[NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs)

"The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting, and financing a couj:

and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIlM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widel;

the chicago tribune, Baltimore Sun,

and other prominent

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 67

ELERSONS/ENTITIES:

KINNEDY, John F.

HELMS

COLBY

RUSK

& OCCURRENCE:

lowing summary:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

NHU

BUNDY

* MADAME NIU

6 Sept. 1963

DIEM

NF

a PRESIDENIIAL meeting, on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the fol-

the necessity of advising LodGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NiV at this forth-

coming meeting, as one of LodE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.

expressed some doubt that NiU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK

cormented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT

replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16

STAFF:

Dawson

FILE

DATE:

28. 6.75

---

## Page 68

FUERSUNS/ENTITIES:

CATEGORIES:

ENNEDY, John E.

REMS

CLBY

USK

DI.EM

NHU

BUNDY

MADAME NIU

DATES:

6 Sept. 1963

DIEM

§OCCURRENCE:

tra PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the fol-

quing summary:

FOSK stressed the Immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIM.

BUNDY pointed out

He necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NIU at this forth-

ming, meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.

SK apreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing, MADAME NHU but

xpressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was.

amented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT

eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16

STAFF:

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Special Forces CIA payments

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CIA

8 Sept. 1963

tung, col.

DIEM

Bell, DAvid

OCCURRENCE:

TArt

On 8 September 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the

In prominent n

Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being

pald secretly by CIA.

This story was attributed to a highly reliable source in

Vashington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount of $3,000,000

annually, and of payment of$250,000 on 3 September. The story was datelined

in

Washington and in Manila.

David Bell warned in a television interview that the

U.S. Congress might cut back aid to Victnam unless the Diam government changed

its policy.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) , D. 17

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

---

## Page 69

50955

Page

KrulaK PERSONS/ENTITIES:

accrack, Victor Gen. Mendenhall,Jos. A.

DATES:

10 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

Counterinsurgency Specialists

UN Advisor

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Bureau rar tastern

DIEM

Rusk, Dean Sec. of State

MeGOne OCCURRENCE:

Affairs.

Kennedy, JbhaFe

Richardson, John

At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the

General Spolit

ack reported his finaings in Vletham..

His conclusions were that the

war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won

complete breakdown of the Siagon civilian government in the security situations in

the provinces had deteriorated.

The President asked where the two gentlemen had been

Insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August

that reversed the optimistic judgments In lay and June. Mr. McCone talked from a

personalufflegram which he had reselved Richardson reconending against any cut in ald.

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Diem

Richardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon

DIEM

10 Sept 1963

OCCURRENCE:

On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SAIG0760) to

Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers

will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do so)

unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there

Is breakdown of civil order or of governmental machinery, or unless war effort

begins to go backward seriously (despite danages suffered since 8 May and 21 August

an inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war

in military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should

suspend aid ".

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 70

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Kennedy, John F. President

CIA

DARES:

10 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 10 September 1963, In an interview by Huntley and Brinkley, the President denied

the charge that the CIA makes its own policy.

SOURCE:

FILE:

IQ Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

T STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITTES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Fundy,

Colby

ficCone

DIEM

McNamarra

10 Sept. 19631

Kernedy, President

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council executive neeting on Vietnam, with

Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record:

Bundy

stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to

control outgoing messages to Saigon. He emphasized the Importance of following the

President's guidance on this delicate problem, in spite of intensly differing views of

what should be done and how, the risk, minimun objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated

that his position was virovously against throwing out this government without seeing

an alterative and that none appeared to exist.

Mr. McCone commented that the problem

problem

was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one into power.

Bundy

summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations

as to mistakes and misdeeds of Dien but not be a position where we can not deal with

him further *

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 71

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Richardson, John

Seede, General

VIA Station Siagon

11 Sept 1963

DIEM

DorId

OCCURRENCE:

In a September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SAJG0797) Richardson

"eported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page sumary cable to answer

l cable fron the department requesting views.

The team was unable to agree even on the

Nirst three pages of the sunmary.

Weedzand Richardson dissented on the basis of the

Praft sumnary was too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country

On an inadequate basis of data. He said: "in some ways we seem to have reached the

point in the official American conmunity, where if you think we can win with the

overment, you are simply not running in the right airection with the majority. "Present

SOURCE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lodge

Nhu

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20

DATES:

STAFF

DATE:

Dawson

6/27/75

===

CATEGORIES:

McCone

Colby

Rusk

Bundy

11 Sept 1963

DEEM

OCCURRENCE: In a Septeiber 11, 1963

meeting of the National SEcurity Council

Executive Cormittee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with McCone also

being present for the CIA) the following appears:

"Rusk said he believed that we were

not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu. At the same

time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he saw no alternative. Rusk comnented

that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership and become the

real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotlating with Dien. Bundy

read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu.

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.

STAFF:

DATE: Dawson

---

## Page 72

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Sodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot

955

11 Sept 1963

DIEM

D

D

OCCURRENCE:

In a state telegram from Saigon (SAIG478) Lodge provided the following reflection on

the situation:

"My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that

It is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective

Sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing government and the installation

ff another; and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best brains of the

government to all the details, procedures and variants in connection with suspension

$pf ald."

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 21

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/21/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

McCone

Coloy

11i11sman

Kennedy, John F. Tung

McNamarra

Di.em

Lodge

DJEM

11 Sept 63

OCCURRINCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnan with the CIA participants

being

MeCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNemarra pointed out that

Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented

that he believed that we should move cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem

and that lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a nore realistic

view of the effects of suspending aid.

Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach

be trade to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure.

The President asked whether we

had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared

by Hillsnan). It was evident that the effects had not been studies.

The President

He also asked that a telegram be sent

to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some

real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the

Ma lucibu copula be well noned of ary steps taken ta this tontparench as the-

instanca intovine CTA nament to Col Tung last week.

---

## Page 73

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

& Shellman, Huntington

&'Iruehart, William, DCN

DATES:

13 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

& Lodge, Henry

• Cabot

Don, General

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon on 13 September 1963 (SAIG0890) Hungtington Shellman who

vIsited saigon reported his vlews of the situation In Vietnam Ine Ambassador 15

He Included as part of

his report the substance of a discussion with DON Truehart:

considering charging McVey with making the approach to SV military. He mentioned Gen.

Don, to attempt to stimulate early coup action with appropriate U.S. assurances. I

inquired had Ambassador made such a proposal to lashington and was told this was within

Lodge's authority.!"

73

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 22

STAFF:

DATE:

DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Halberstan, David

McCone, John, DCI

DATES:

15 Sept: 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEMA

OCCURRENCE:

On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence

Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members

of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their

chief close association with. Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence

gathering.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 74

5095

PERSONS/INTITIES:

Ta iberstian, David.

elecone, John, DCL

Bigon Station

DATES:

CATEGORTES:

15 Sept: 1963

DUEM

10COt

OCCURRENCE:

En 15 Septenber 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence

notta Toll encers

Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members

of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas.

They also feel their

Shief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence

Fathering.

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 23

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richardson, John

Diem

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

6/27/75

CATEGORIES:

DATES:

16 Sept 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to

Washington's requestfor his Judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain

ideas, as washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He

cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration

for as long

as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with

respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly

tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious

and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders

willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully

explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure

Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed.

These measures would be

more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

Nawson

---

## Page 75

50955

DocId: 32423615

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richardson, John

Diem

DATES:

16 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to

Washington's requestfor his judgnent on the desirability and feasibility of certain

Ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He

cabled:

"We must go on trying to win the war with current administration

as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with

respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly

tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious

and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnarese leaders

willing and able to do the job with necessary means.

(Agree we should carefully

explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure

Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed.

These, measures would be

more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

FILE:

Dawson

DATE:

6107/74

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Smith, David R.

CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963

Richardson, John

Sept 17, 1963

DIEM*

Lodge

Dunn, Mike

OCCURRENCE:

In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17) 1963,

0b161

he reported

"Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson

(Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one

occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave. Smith can run the stations for

a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?' "

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

---

## Page 76

50955

Page

76

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Smith, Davia R.

CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963

Richardson, John

Sept 17, 1963

DIEM

Lodge

Dunn, Mike

Saigon Station

OCCURRENCE

In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963,

he reported

"Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson

(Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was "to get rid of Richardson'. (On one

occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the

stations for

a temporary period while a new station chief Is being sent out here?'

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean

McCone, John

Sept 19, 1963

Lodge, Henry Cabot

Richardson, John

OCCURRENCE:

DIEM

S60H7

In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk

that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish

to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your

Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would

not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to

abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced

... We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead

us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a

replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may

occur even before you receive this letter.....

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 77

NTH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 77

PERSONS/ENTITLES:

Iodge, Henry Cabot

Kernedy, John F.

DATES:

Sept. 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SHORED

OCCURRENCE:

On Septenber 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stated to the President

that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the prosent government in

the imediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as

an interim measure pending such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for

substantative changes.

SOURCE:

T STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25

DATE:

FILE:

Dawson

6/25/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Lansdale, Major General

McCone, John

Rusk, Dean

Saigon STation

Sept 19, 1963

DIEM

Lodge, Henry Cabot

Richardson, John

OCCURRENCE:

In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk

that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish

to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your

Personnel, Including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would

not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to

abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced

We have no current Intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead

us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a

replacement regiine which would be better.

This is not however to say that a coup may

occur even before you receive this letter....."

•OURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 78

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 78

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCone

CIA Subcomnittee on House Armed Services

DATES:

CATEUUKIDS:

Sept. 23, 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On September 23, 1963, the icone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services.

He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of

ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then

current regime that was capable of running the government.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

•6/25/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU

DINH

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

October 1963

DIEM

COLONEL TUNC

CONEIN

OCCURRENCE: DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to President

DIEM.

He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times

brilliant mind, was used to the general's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convinced President

DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders to be

a counter-coup force. "DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne com-

panies on a bootless operation outside of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops

would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional

government. p. 13

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein

DATE:

---

## Page 79

HH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

79

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

October 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying orders from his am-

bassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were

planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught

with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic

and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his

objective the en-

couragement or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of dis-

couraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or

remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41

mp. 3 interest or

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DINH

MINH

DON

Early October

1963

DIEM

COLONEL CO, Dinh's Deputy

OCCURRLNOE when the ministertal post for DIl did not materialize by early october, the

coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime.

evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH dur-

ing the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromised

him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH If he showed any sign

of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a

day including CO, his deputy. p. 13

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 80

50

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

" CONEIN

- COLBY, WILLIAM

cI

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

October, 1963

DIEM

24

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONEIN) received a call on October 30

* (1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially

sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the de-

"cision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home

wat one point, etc."

age

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-12

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

29 June 1975

---

## Page 81

HH 50955

DolId: 32423615

Page

81

Y TI

PERSONS/ ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct. 2, 1963

Conein •

Gen. Don

Gen. Duong Van Minh

Gen. Ton That Dinh

Ngo Dinn Nhu

OCCURRENCE:

TOP

Conoin/Conomi Don nooting at haZarag with Me

toltorine sigcaticone pornia: (2)

Darms

ven

Rech desirod 2

3217460

(b) Genoral Don

Tha& Dian (CosmandinG General, 141

Corps)

1082120d

no had

been duped

by 08o4 Govera-

Ment

daring

his

canade

16.15.6a0g Gogotos 01

Saisco metroon. 21 Awgues end

Septeezes 1953;

(e) Comerals, Curlog

the Mould of Bepcender 1003,

sabottsed a request

So Prosidont Dida to accord

then socisions in

dixterent mindstrios voich

Lazy

222

1812.

Carpent. Dien

to honor;

toba tedd

that

SOURCE: Hearings, Ssui, 6/20/15, Conein, Exhibit One. p. Y

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SECD...

60L03

CONTINUED ON NEXT

CARD

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUED FROM LAST

TOP SECRET

the Genocal You boze 2 plan; (8)

pador to

Genera?

Dich'S erase conference of

0.13

cavition tod Gooseller

Ngo

pand Tan that the Aericans very coutacting

various

sadox to gusorzage

соло -

Dog co

ended oy Man 20d daowo 2

Isst

prepaces

graded fe

soup plotting;

SOURCE:

STAFF:

---

## Page 82

Г. 50955

DocId: 324236f5

Page 82

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMPASSADOR LODGE

CONFIN

GEN. DUONG VAN MINH

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

10/3/63

TOP

Aubaseodor forge Apacongt Conein's cooting aith

General Quong 173л

Minb

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, p.4.

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McNamarra

Lodge

McCone

Richardson

Smith

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct 3 - 4,1963

DIEM V

0910m

OCCURRENCE:

PIE

On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to MeCone stating that "I... agree with what

I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think

of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA

cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"....It is clear that

..departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...

". In a

comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-

quarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon

Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

---

## Page 83

& LODGE

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Dept, ofestate

CATEGORIES:

MCNAMARRA

DocId:324231

TAYLOR

5 Oct 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 5 October 1963 In a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534)1t was stated as a fourth

& GPN.

instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"toward

age

SOURCE:

RIIN

IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DARES:

CATEGORIES:

Nchanarra

Lodge

HicCone

Richardson

Sud.th

Oct 3 - 4,1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what

I understand MeNanarra said to you. The time has come for a new face,

but I also think

of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic Anerican..." On October 4

t, 1963 in a CIA

cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"

..it is clear that

Lodge wants a change in chief of station... departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours..."

In a

comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-

quarters request that he return to headquarters on IDY as soon as possible. Upon

Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

---

## Page 84

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 84

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LOIXIE

Dept. of State

MCNAMARRA

TAYLOR

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

5 Oct 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 5 October 1963 In a states cable to Saigon (DEPIEL534)it was stated as a fourth

instruction that the Arbassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"toward

GPN.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

LODGE, HENRY CABOI

WHTTEHOUSE

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

October 5,

1963

OCCURRENCE:

In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:

"...Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give

any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with

closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with

possible alternative leadership as it appears...."

-in-

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30

STAFF:

Dawson

---

## Page 85

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

LODGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

October 5,

1963

OCCURRENCE:

In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:

11

any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with

closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with

possible alternative leadership as it appears....

11

85

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30

TIIT.

STAFF:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Kennedy, John F.

Colby, William

Colmodity Tieport Program

McCone

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct. 5, 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 5 October there was a Presidential meeting on Vietnam.

The only CIA participant was

McCone. He provided the following record. The meeting was held to discuss matters that

became the subject of DEPTEL, 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the

opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with

the cormodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create

an econonic crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu Into a more

coperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning

of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at

large of a more serious nature.

It was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful

political movements had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined.

SOURCE:

Tr Rennot 1057 (CTA) D. 27

STAFF:

Dawton

---

## Page 86

50955

SMUTI, DAVID

CONCIN

DooId: 32423615

LODGE

MENH

PERSONS/ENITTIES:

Page

DATES:

Det 5, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DTEM

OCCURRENCE:

Tn a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1447) of 5 October 1963, DAVE SMITH, the Acting Chief

Station cabled thit he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Ambassador

LODGE and DOM TRUFMART. SMITH reported that he had recomended to Anbassador LODGE

that: "we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignation plot, since

the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or protracted struggle

which can rip the Army and the country asunder."

NOP CHer

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28

FILE:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Nhu, Ngo Dinh Conein

CAn, Ngo Dinh

Diem

Lodge

Oct 5, 1963

DIEM S

Minh, General

OCCURRENCE:

FOR CCCRET

On October 5, 1963 In a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG1445) it was stated that the

meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a

statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future.

He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances

that USG would not try to thwart his plans.

He outlined three possible plans for the

i ent to meet a assassinattonof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo

keeping President Diem in office; (b) encirelement of Saigon by various

military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units Involved in the

coup and loyalist military undts.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

---

## Page 87

EPERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BODGE, HENRY CABOT

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

KENNEDY, ROBERT F..

5 or 6 Oct.

1963

DIEM

DIEM, MC CONE, JOHN

SECRET

OCCURRENCE: MC CONE recalled a meeting with

President KENNEDY and Attorney General

ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about Uctober 5 or o, 1903.

'rather non-cormittal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said,

Sohn, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised

It the pusition you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it..."(T) This dis-

eussion had nothing to do with assassinations.

this was whether we should let the coup go

If use our influences not to.

Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of mes-

gages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways.

CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called - CABOT LODGE was called by DIEM's

Office and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do

it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup

was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy.!

11,.,

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 6, 1975, McCone, pp. 63-64

R. DAWSON

FILE:

DATE:

29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KAHN, CONEIN, LODGE, TRUHART, WM.

NGO DINH KAHN

DATES:

5-7 Oct. 1963

CATEGORIES:

SMITH, DAVID

COLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE, JOHN

•TOP SECRE

OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable from Saigon of 5 Octo-

ber 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assass-

ination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon, or a pro-

tracted struggle which could rip the army and the country asunder." And the response on

6 October 1963 which COLBY wrote for MC CONE as follows:

"MC CONE directs that you withdraw

recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassination plan under MC CONE instructions as we

cannot be in a position to actively condone such course of action thereby endangering our

our responsibility, therefore COLBY explained that this second message he drafted was to

eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY stated that the assassination of DIEM's

other brothers NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to continue. A reply was sent on October 7

from Saigon in response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was taken as directed, mean-

ing that the Ambassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 12-17

FILE:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

---

## Page 88

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

50955

DooId: 32423615

Page 88

MCCONE

LODGE

SMTIH

DATES:

Oct 6, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR73661of 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs

that you withdraw reconnendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan)

under MCCONe instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course

of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

'TRUEHART

LODGE

MCCONE

SMITH

Oct 7, 1963

STATE:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Salgon, the station in Saigon

responded (SAIG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DoiN

TRUEHART was also present when original recormendation was made, specific withdrawal

recommendation at one's restrucien as ate conveyed to TRUZHARI. Ambassador

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

---

## Page 89

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

89

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COLBY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY

JOHNSON

KTLPATRICK

MCCONE

10|8/63

DIEM

SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there

was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.s.

was maintaining

a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to the fact

that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCCONE also referred

to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that "for

Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent

a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running

counter to his policy."

The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of

station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)

SOURCE:

FILE:

Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct.17, 1963

STAFFI

DATE:

Kelley

6/28/75

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Tung, Col.

Smith, David

Oct 8, 1963

Phillips, Rusus, AID

Acting: Chief of Station

DIEM

Colby, William

Siagori after 10/5/63

Richardson, John "Jocko"Aid to Diem Regime!

OCCURRENCE:

2 DUOL 0

On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflects in a conment that the U.s.

government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had alraady been cut

quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby,

Jock Anderson and Dave Snith

told us that the public announcement of the aid reduction was a signal to the

general

and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that

the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but if so, that

intention did not find its way into the record.

The nearest thing to it is

in the

record of a presidential meeting of 10 september 1963.

The President asked

Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recemended and he suggested

"cutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much

enthusiasm as an Indication of virgouous of American position.

" In general,

ald cuts were discussed in terns of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in

his resuorce? ever planned, or hewever leokea-upon by the dos commiscation, it Is

clear that-

the Vietnamese considered the official confirmation of ald ballas a clear

token of their support of coup planning.

Dawson

BTIT

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 17-18

---

## Page 90

OCCURRENCE:

Page

90

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

RICHARDSON, JOHN

DATES:

Oct. 9, 1963

6/27/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM /

operating under - with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under

my instructions."

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, HENRY CABOT

COLBY, WILLIAM

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

Oct 9, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

(DIR74228)

a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and If

It appeared capable of Increasing effectiveness of military effort, Insuring popular

support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S."

The cable urges

that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that

MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional

that donal

general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been

cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."

SOURCE:

T STAFF:

---

## Page 91

NH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 91

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

RICHARDSON, JOHN

DATES:

Oct. 9, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that

the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who 1s a very dedicated public servant, has led to

surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has noi carried out independent

activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence

operating under - with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under

my Instructions."

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

STAFF:

DATE:

Darson

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.

MINH, GENERAL

DON,

GENERAL

DATES:

Oct 10, 1963

Oct. 9,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

COLBY, WILLIAM

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese

generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate

contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals Initiate contact, such contact

were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to

be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the

matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a

high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do

not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government

or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable

of Increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

DAWSON

---

## Page 92

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HENRY CABOT

COLBY, WILITAM

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

PARES:

Oct 9, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIUM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228)

• (DIRY4228)

which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"

... while we do not wish

to stinulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart

a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regune and if

it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular

support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S."

The cable urges

that the contact with MINH press for "detail infomation clearly indicating that

MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional

general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been

cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

Dawson

DATE:

FILE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.

MINH, GENERAL

DON, GENERAL

DATES:

Oct 10, 1903

Oct. 9,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

COLBY, WILLIAM

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnanese

generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate

contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact

In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to

be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the

matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a

high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do

not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government

or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, If it appeared capable

of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

STAFF:

DAWSON

---

## Page 93

FAROUND DIttIN

Oct. 10, '63

DIEMY

EIMBASSADOR LODGE

SEN. MINH

GEN. DON

OCCURRENCE:

Da: to commis

emposcador dodgo instruste

contact pith 0eoc2l.

Mand ox Cenaril

trop

one Canards indiato control. onsi

materia Kurd

cuthoriant;

the course if meatinas

02 00

200

Parate

aлcIRAлоое реке

2o be gives

that dad

06.71

not tume e change df gorecarzai or deny

coaconde or military

suedbsence to e low coctae it

Page 93

An opported capable of keezenging eifcesireness

of

10:21 C007

ectors.

assuring

popular gaptors

10

win

103 0a25?

220

Angsorog coslong colaticos wich the

Antos.

SOURCE:

Hearings,

page 5.

s.S.C.I.s

6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ODGE, HENRY CABOT

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

JINH, GENERAL

JON, GENERAL

DATES:

Oct 10,

1963

Oct. 9,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

COLBY, WILLIAM

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese

be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the

matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a

high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do

not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government

or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable

of Increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

TOP C00T

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

DAWSON

FILE:

DATE:

6/27/75

---

## Page 94

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Senate Foreign Relations Conmittee

MCCONE

DATES:

Oct 10,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that

"we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively

would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed

cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something

the sideltar, and the continists would come out the victor menely by sitting on

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Senate Foreign Relations Comnittee

MCCONE

DATES:

Oct 10,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Cormittee, it was noted that

"we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively

would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed

cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something

the sidells, and the Communists would come out the victor nezely by sitting on

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33

STAPF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

---

## Page 95

509

PERSONS/ENTITLES:

@CONCIN

GENERAL DON

EDIR/4228

PLODGE, MENRY CABOr

DARES:

CATEGORIES:

Det 23,1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

¿In a October 23, 1963 entry trio the Satgon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals

#Coup"

', it was noted that a meeting with

CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the

Generals had decided to try to stage.

a coup within a week following 26 October. CONETN

Dunder instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would scek

permission of the coup cormittice to give CON:IN their political plan for the Ambassador's

geyes unly.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lt. Col: PHAM NGOC THAO

I STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

6/27/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

Oct. 24, '63

TOD

Co%000! Chen Ngoc Coco me Dlamong c

cote achedalod zoe 1060 Muals;

the con

ja Neces

Dio 2002 Sted

that

She comp

Codes 10052d

would heye beguz as reported.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.Co1., June 20, 1915, Conein, Exhibit l

STAFF:

page 7.

MITTE

I DATE.

Dawson

---

## Page 96

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

509

GONEIN

AMBASSADOR LODGE

10/23/63

OCCURRENCE:

TOP

Page 96

Condia coked thy ths

12304328 A0d 306 250200 to A002282607

lodge at the

13 0c Sober

cecoption;

Don 8cor6ad

no aparoded to the

Ambrosstor since otter

were preseat; Coo 120a2560 a

cople seed pocatarton of che coup conaditre to

Ooa90a

their politioni plan for the Anbascide's

epoo dody and requestod a mering da doontown

Saison on 24 Pocohor.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/15, Conein, Exhibit One,

page

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NEIN

NERAL DON

R74228

DGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct 23,1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

a October 23, 1963 entry Into the Salgon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals

up", It was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the

nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week follwing 26 October. CONEIN

der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek

rmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's

es only.

SOURCE:

I STAFF:

---

## Page 97

PERSONS/ENTITLES:

DON

50

donein

DooId: 32423615

Page

97

Oct. 23, '63

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

SONEIN

3. HUAN

Goseca). Doa cocoesced 602015

Mendquaccone;

Gira

nỏ et 12ch

donava l

cilicens

1o assenor

tale

rivaniage of cho 26 Gesobor Mettonal Loy da coder

to stage

a conp machin a wook;

menbor of Censtal

5020101

20d Teokel

Sha% M d010

1728

CO 00082 00 02

ARGes 27

Corobes;

e the Azordeans

coa citas

the poteve

wood

asi pegnit

1102

Asd ordecad cive

Ste 211 70.

DivistonGg

wake freg

ecomentis

304800

122280

ine 0010e

to do oe circondad

Operestons otteide

Fodeon :

STAFF:

Dawson

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, p. b.

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct.

23, '63

OCCURRENCE:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TUP

SECRET

Don

6929222208

32 24110/

-У500:0 20 2129007 236082108

2500242--

1 2922822015-

236td00g

capore to vis

tho bace and improntog

one 150: Con contenned tae be had attenpton to

caztasà Concio succusa 10.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, p. b

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

---

## Page 98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

509

GrEN. MINH

BON

SEN. HARKINS

ZONEIN

:92423615

OCCURRENCE:

Page 98

DATES:

10/18/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

Conerzts 2ch ded don presos asedcopston

carod 1d General

n8 port Core

contioned Crescin.

SOURCE:

Hearings,

S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One

page

FILE:

1 STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTIT'TES:

DATES:

1171/63

0721.6

CATEGORIES:

SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Alon Do padado Generald:

vice teor Do Procedent Dion.

100 4006 Oror08 20 eo0200 7d4 deste moe medocoe de atra

1401Л16K 007 230927 A03 NG3C0e 237G2200: C0040.

Fritos

C.r9228 DoRe 60 LOoDe 200.00m1360 Grauna, 92920000 D/

Pr0s.200te

Sp0c1A: 2002002

bymy frem Borgon.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

pages 13-14.

FILE:

STAPP: Dawson

6/30/75

---

## Page 99

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

¿Conein

°Huan

"Gen. Harkins

sa

DATES:

Oct. 17,

*63

CATEGORIES

DIEM

Page 99

LO

ge

OCCURRENCE: Comain and Ruan hold abeting

sootlanad

t2e

TOP SECKED

sock that

contret

cad a Cossage tron

sae gameroir.

290026002

28

Detobes by Georrai

10.

one of the goperle

1132O

SUPPOSES

she Ariascoded and asi.

the saffor

wonsk for Cosciny 18 the Cabostador

condizas the's

Creta do specking with the Mabase dese contai

003y GoOSeng 0 004/090 802 did

SOURCE:

Hearings, s.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,

page so.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LAM NGOC HUAN

AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATES:

Oct. 16, '63

CATEGORIES

DIEM •

OCCURRENCE:

2 La

Mr, aa Ngoe Quon, Menager of Carayolio

Torer 4208 0182002 who

was petreed

dia

30001

2nd

to sts.-

1910

coug

Arowdued eo inchesy officer

phot

and statod to wis bying

after a social

Odens

2 militney octious daságasted by

Asbassador

do take pace do coofidontel ascucsods.

Ledge

OSSUGACY 6л23 611406606001 SUA61

gonovals and othor officers sto vanted

talk so

in grace Motora.

SOURCE: :

STAFF: Dawson

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Bxhibit One,

page 5.

---

## Page 100

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 100

E PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONEIN

ME NAMARA

12 October 1963

DIEM

NGU YEN QUANG

PHAM NGOC THAO*

OCCURRENCE: When CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p.

5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, 1.e.,

NGU YEN and THAO. But did not explain the reference to MC NAMARA. p. 29

TOP SECREN

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMBASSADOR LODGE

SECRETARY MACNAMARA

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

July 12.

1975

DATES:

Oct. 12, '63

CATEGORIES:

SECKED

Taron Canng Ngagon, Calot

of Operators.

Auner Cairesida

measud he

coutacter Dy

Maderont coup croupe duriab the wook o? 5-22

C/:22

63924

-SAC

CAN 422200. 0926 0-68040-0020202

Racectadaed no deli

97220.2 AboDay.

-2120862

221822844

vice Copiet

76070. 0602

Colonel miao olfared 102971

Ngwy 2a

do ai128 odocidod which group to cite burport.

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,

STAFF: Dawson

---

## Page 101

NW 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 101

→ PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DON

OCCURRENCE:

CON'T ON NEXT

CARD

7

SOURCE:

FILE:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct. 24, '63

DIEM

TOP SECRET

Cocode and Don inet aé 1030 201r7;

(a) con did not

Paccive petudestoo

so turn

45) Do2 had been

eationined to outline tre political chlaking of 4l9

coug comarittee • (1)

the baccending-goreenado i

gould be clottinn dad no mabor of the coup comittee

hold

a sailor position an the now gavornacad;

the men goveranont

wouldn

AS GOOR 46 possibles

tico won-coomondse politledl personers, boid

free

checkons, 200 Dottie operation of coursition

2011110a3

fox the Viet Cuag;

13) Late vitt do cougdote trooden o2

2971

sion 10d

STAFF:

Dawson

Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein,

Exhibit One, page 7.

DATE:

6/30/75

-

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct. 24, '63

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION OF

LAST CARD:

COVARD ON NEXT

SOURCE:

no Scroaktion 02 3 1002inction

ady

excod; (ed tho nor soveremand posie bo pco-doss

but noc a pore of She U9G;

(5) te now govemment.

world cary the vas egoanst

che fiel: Cous to

Sacdassta? concluston

wton veerera, 20x61011a213

2a2p; fc)

Don said

Cost conore mada

be 1a

alone contact visa coup

ecadqurvers to Losure :

cloga lice of concunscatie bedreca the cons

bertguantees end the Macaoeader;

(d) ton scated

x3a6 caco

the coug started.

1: 7001d

de: no good for

cho 0SS de citeupe So

SiOD

1t;

BoR 095 care

of coup posting on the port

0? 18.

Colouet Phan

in contact

STAFF

---

## Page 102

NW. 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

102

10112:

TOP SECP™

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS:

much taco, but 100 6005 dot love the recessary

Ê07aS 50

GAZIY Out 165 2191;

(5) the emoria'

Colp

comradeos bad come

the concioston

Momily had to be eitokbod Raon

one schotaled for 20 October.

SOURCE:

p. 7, conti

STAPF:

FILE:

DATE:

---

## Page 103

PERSONS/ENTTTIES:

DATES:

PON

ZONEIN

BEEN. HARKINS

DocId: 32423615

110/24/63

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: G6a0u27 0203

alas

cognaered

Conora

Ex bo at the

Loongs at Saigod Digore de 0626

General

1622 Coaoie Chat he bo6 sa02 Caoe.23

1.2

20 Pose do

2n6 Genot Macains

MONASOY 00036 06t C09024

CM2 22206 98

the

Coe dacorned Coaste Sent

Dit 23231 Gers

complete pad bcd bond checked and

Page 103

1b0ds60xg mi2i.1919 takes

1929

2004406%6 231

citized to doin tae cours

the 4207935

occue richie The tract wook 22d

12 00 0063

1a bee

61253 2

Zoe goghosted

& noeding

e consisbols orsice in doctoya

SAAgon,

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.U.T., June 20, 1915, Conein, Exhibit

STAFF

one

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

--------

---

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ODGE, HENRY CABOT

MARKINS

BUNDY, MC GEORGE

DATES:

October 24, 1963!

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

GENERAL DON

ZONEIN

ICCURRENCE: In a cable marked "eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October

34, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.s.

government and DIEM.

The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU

attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKIN:

can stand back from any non-essential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close control

over meetings between DON and CONEIN. " p. 33

TOP SECRET

OURCE:

tearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975. Conein

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 104

rENOUNS/ENTITIES:

CONE.IN

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY

JOHNSON

Oct. 24, 1963

@KILPATRICK

DIEM

SPECIAL GROUP

"MCCONE

- OCCURRENCE:

Son October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting "expressed his fear that

äthe top U.S, diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved

Fin conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN

wusefullness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult

"to deny." The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS emphasizing

a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment

Hof DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONEIN

meetings. The group agreed to firm up polley thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns

_to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken.

SOURCE:

Manutes of Spoolal Group Neting Oot, 24, 2961| 02

FILE:

STAFF

6/28/75

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTIFIES:

DATES:

ODGE

SUNDY

DON, GENERAL

ONETN

OCCURRENCE:

Oct. 24, 1963

DIEM

COD GODET

in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY: it was noted that: "CAS has

seen punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each

reeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance

xplicitly..."

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35

STAFF:

DAWSON

DATE:

6/27/75

-

---

## Page 105

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

105

PERSONS/ENTIYIES:

LODGE

HARKINS

BUNDY

CONSIN

NHƯ

DATES:

Oct 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DISM

OCCURRENCE:

In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following

message appears:

...there may be danger NIU attempting entrapment through DON's

approaches to CONEIN... feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back

from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over

meetings between DON and CONEIN."

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35

STAFF:

• DATE:

DAWSON

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BRENT

DATES:

24 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

CONEIN •

CRITIC

JGS headquarters

SECURRENCE: The IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at IGS headquarters 1s

well known in official circles.

On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: 'In

future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you

should slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.'

As a consequence, the firse cabled reports

from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at

headquarters."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

---

## Page 106

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGET

BEXECUTIVE DIRECIOR OF CIA

DATES:

Oct 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

GLODGE

RICHARDSON

DocTA

OCCURRENCE:

"On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and

KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by lODGE at

Shis initial meeting with LODGE. The menorandum for the record prepared by the Executive

@Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing

"with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the

whill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was

& caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government

officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its

Fom initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or

*Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were

erroneous.

He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had adone in Vietnam had

been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the

Ambassador

and had been sarried out with good judgment and with a high quality of

performs dRCEMANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting witheroie, LODGE hadnot

yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing.

i pat 936% 8A An yas at thts time.)

nich it nod in the aureau or the budget

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DON, GENERAL

HARKINS, GENERAL

CONEIN,

Oct. 24, 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals

, It is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October.

reported he had been Informed by Goastal HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart

any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were

available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting

DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON

to outline its substance, which he did.

SOURCE:

FILE

IG Report 1967 (CIA) ,p. 35

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

R12715

---

## Page 107

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

& LODGE

HARKINS®

BUNDY

Oct 24, 1963

Id: 3242361

CONEIN

NHU

DIEM Y

TO SECDET

OCCURRENCE:

In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following

& message appears:

...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's

approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back

meet a bete to an eat seems wise to matntain close control over

5

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) р. 35

STAFF:

DAWSON

DATE:

6/27/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGET

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CLA

LODGE

RICHARDSON

DATES:

Oct 24, 1963

OCCURRENCE:

On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and

KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at

his Initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive

Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing

with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military Its operation among the

hill tribes; e. ClA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was

caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained goverment

officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on Its

own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or

Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were

erroneous .

He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had done in Vietnam had

been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the

Ambassador

and bad been carried out with good Judgment and with a bigh quality of

performance CEANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting with rolE, LODGE hadnot

vet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing.

This took place a few days later.

nean it had in the Rimeals of the Budget !

---

## Page 108

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON, GENERAL.

HARKINS, GENERAL

CONCIN,

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct. 24, 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals

, it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON

reported he had been Informed by Coheral HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart

any coup plans.

DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were

available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November.

The second meeting

DON said the coup committee refused to

turn over the political plan but authorized DON

to outline its substance, which he did.

=.com

french

08

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

LODGE

BUNDY

DON, GENERAL

CONEIN

OCCURRENCE:

Oct. 24, 1963

DIEM

NOp SEANET

In a dIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has

been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each

meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance

explicitly..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35

STAFF:

DAWSON

---

## Page 109

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EMCCONE

KENNEDY, JOHN E.

Oct.25, 1963

DIEM

LODGE

ĐIEM

H

→ OCCURRENCE:

17093

in an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from

CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose

lof the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vletnam with respect to

coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our poliey in

Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government

prior to the return of LodGe for consultations.

MCCONE stated his views in detail.

gin sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and

"therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making

and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional

pertoastportical confusion, (1) civilians capabie of turning soup fenam coura not

important political Issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9)

we eitper,nave to work with bit and wu or we have to take aggresive,steps to remove them

and it Is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

MCCONE

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

LODGE

DIEM

Oct. 25, 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from

CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose

of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to

coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in

Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government

prior to the return of LODGE for consultations.

NICONE stated his views in detail.

In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and

therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making

and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional

manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak

leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during

period seRe ical confusion, ( civilians capable of tuning south is nam could not

be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss

inportant political Issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9)

we eithar have to work with Dill and Niu or we have to take aggresing steps to remove them

---

## Page 110

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON, GENERAL

LODGE, AMBASSADOR

ECONEIN

DATES:

Oct. 28, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEMY

OCCURRENCE:

She October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals

«Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador.

LODGE replied in the affirmative.' DON told the Ambassador that/ the U.S. government

should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coupd

The Ambassador agreed with DON.

110

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37

FILE:

I STAFF:

DATE:

DAWSON

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DON, GENERAL

LODGE, HENRY CABOT

CONEIN

28 October 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey

to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup and that CONEIN was to stay home and await fur-

ther orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE, who

was preparing to return home on the 3ist of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON

that LODGE not change his plans as it might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was

going on. p. 48.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

---

## Page 111

PERSONS/ENITY'TES:

STILWELL, GENERAL RICHARD

ECONEIN

GENERAL DON

ELODGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Latter part of

October 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated,

the people in Washington figured

Athat CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the

au.s. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Wash.

Tington made made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive militar

background should take over from him. When Washington then sent a message to Ambassador

LODGE and recormended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN's, GENERAL

#STILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't want

Enybody eise. pp. 31-32

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/KNITTTES:

SON, CHINERAL

CODGE, AMPASSADOR

CONKIN

DATES:

Oct. 28, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DID:M

OCCURRENCE:

the October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals

Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for

Oat renied in the artirrative. DoN told the Mbasador that the u!s! goverment?.

snould not interler with or try to stimulate a coup.

The Ambassador agreed with DON.

SOURCE:*

IG Report 1967 (CIA) D. 36-37

STAFF

DAWSON

---

## Page 112

SON, GENERAL

gONHIN

BUDGE, HENRY CABOT

CATEGORIES:

Oct 28, 1963

DIEM

DOc

OCCURRENCE:

En an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals

Coup" it is noted that: CONEIN met with Genral DON for the last time before the

coup was launched.

DON confirned he had talked with the Ambassador who had vouched

tor CONEIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final

Plans. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until 30 October -- until further

notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup

Legan,, but when pressed on his previous commitment to make them available, 40 hours

i advance, DON said that possiblythe hours would only be made available 4 hours in

advance.

DON said that nothing would be happening within the next 48 hours and that

if there was a good reason for the anbassador to change his planned 31 October departure,

the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his own decision.

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) P. 37

DAWSON

DATE:

6/27/75--

---

## Page 113

NH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 113

CONFIN

"PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DO CAO TRI

GEN. NGUYEN KHANH

GEN. DOIN

AMBAS. LODGE

OCCURRENue.

CON'T ON NEXT

CARD

SOURCE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

OCCURRENCE:

CON'T FROM LAST

CARD

SOURCE: P. 8, CON't.

DATES:

Oct. 28, '63

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECREE

23rm:8

Cocain and Genocod

Badgon

he and

Won

net 8t6 Crush's 01t100

14

4646 bouG.

008 501-

tolked to Achaosetor Lodge who

What the

600266/22151

to 2701d

Acordeans'

2070170501

in the

song and woorested

bias

07292

1,8. Doesne?

stop Mising

abous caly

goNe

226100d

(c)

do colonels tad

Don ons tafornod that

Astbaceodor codge was

deboodled to repact Saigon

32

cotoner;

Che

(0)

Data Taks

interested in

2x48ü

Vlad the Aotasendor Ladended

to

Oa202er,

orating

that ho

the Aabasendor

C2ang9

vchedule as.

cornge asset se

Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit

STAFF:

Dawson

page 8.

DATE:

6/30/75

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

• the Svl;

41)

con stated that he is

59 Octobor co docedians 1i20d olars

PiTu Generas Do Ceo 2e% 2od #gayza Koni;

Dozes sed Conna do consin at zone dona 80 Cotober

Made be Shor 10640e;

tao megaerdlos: Conaco? Ton Mos Cite parctedpation

Don Stated toat Dira tas not

020630406210G 20

te manadog oud that the cong

cord asbe copathizers dod dinoral Cler cousinuously

oreotado: and hed biscotiona to piloitate Dich

Chat an

12NS 10C

STAFF

---

## Page 114

NN 50955 DooId:32423615. Page

114

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE :

CONT. FROM LASI

CARD

aostacipathos in do sotot planaing os

the roats

62AL 7001A

PAX63629663

020 S042s

ecasad

tino

tho 112941383

corp contittoe de day oe

Tao 201201118

3a6-h31r 08

Airhorne

Ragade:

3244272026 02 2/021/2:23g

ei2 of the

Parco 11. ta

excoptiag

oi Colonal

3ch;: Ang

SavisionG.

D1732300g

siea0rt3

Division.

Connad Fest

cas coup bord

003.9101

SOURCE: p. 8, co.t.

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

---

## Page 115

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIFS:

inh

Thung,

CAPT

Concin

11/2/63

Dien

Chu, Neo Dinh

bam, Col

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Pam was returning with Dion and thu and an aide of Dion to the leadqurters

in an armored personnel carrier when linh in a

separate column in radio com-

miications with Lan's colunn

found out that Diem and Thu had been taken.

one in

states

that tinh with his arde,

crossed the colum, halted it and

mung stopped into

the armored car and

upon orders from Winh Thone Tilled

enem.

The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Headquarters

later on in the afternoon they were later removed from the General Staff

Headauarters to Clinique

St. Paul.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, HENRY CABOT

CONE.IN

DATES:

1 November 1963)

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

7/1/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were

communications between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact

with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was trans-

piring:

CONCIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera

did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units.

They d

not want any American participation within the coup. p. 50

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

I lone i cind an ins

107E

Pinatu

STAFF:

---

## Page 116

NW 50955

H

PERSORS/ 2209188:

THIEN KHIEM

VAN DON

VUUURRENCE:

DATES:

2400 hours

Nov. 1, '6

CATEPOKIES:

DIEM

Page

116

TOP SECRET

Cord 2r2c0 Mida 2o Ccting 0s

Binto Chos of Scars lo:

Don 8o dedinavely the Mo. 2 in

the corerale?

Palera

poisonog palatery sportelode plebaaya

nacdoted to coveral corgotcat colondie and asjors.

SOURCE:

FILE:

2227222

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, page 21.

DATES:

Nov. 1, '63)

2400 hours

STAFF

Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

as Prent done Maos Hope the oles has not been located, y

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I.,

6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, page 21.

FILE:

STAFF:

DARE:

Dawson

6/30/75

---

## Page 117

102VD2/B217080:

5095

& NHU

DocId: 32423615

Page 117

OCCORRENCIE:

DATES:

11/7/63

2140 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECKET

Prorpo Loding to the

place

anos sud cororing che foo to

Laguna

Cand dism

Man do

c2t in che loo ayaa.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, page 19.

FILE:

STANF

DATE:

Dawson

PRESONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

11/1/63

2400 hours

6/30/75.--

CATEGORIES:

DIEMU

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECKE

era chame di commons Credo corpeon coad toccag"!

2a00.

taua213 1002

044303 Card

0202 1ed

joinad

CuSCA. 6. 90816 GT030 D0TPO0CGRe

ro Carplag cato Choce 2x17009.

9060124209813

3he carte dite

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.l., 6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, page 21.

FTUE:

STAFF

Dawson

MAMD:

---

## Page 118

MINH

AMBASSADOR LODGE

1923

PERSORS/EXALTIES:

DARES:

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

11/1/63

1925 hours

DIEM I

TOP SECREN

dion andorand that Aubrasador Lodge ill receive wre

Sanchels

aSer

thre

coug to 0701.

SOURCE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIPS:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,

page 18.

SPARE: DAWSON

DATE: 6150|79

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

11/1/63

2140 hours

TOP

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SECHEI

Preside.ddad Ocard olongaco in tha Polecd condian: 1100400

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, Page

STAPF:

Dawson

NH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 118

---

## Page 119

NW

50

DooId: 32423615

Page

119

PERSONS/ENETTLEG:

vice President NGUYEN NGOC THO

CAPONTES:

DIEM.

OCCURRENCE:

SAGES:

11/1/63

1545

TOP SECRE

NHU

ca:k207 18 410

to taros dogs.

Vice Prosidest Agayod Agoe

tho mad tes

Ing dood ore cho onty ones dare for acrosser dox to nex

800.100816.

SOURCE:

Hearings,

S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 16.

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

FILE:

-.....

PERSONS/EN272TES:

DATTS:

11/1/63

16\15

CAN GORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

DIEM C

TOP SECKEL

------

279389622242856

S0922688

Trite: 2202111:

M6002103

We Coders

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Bxhibit one. | STAr:

---

## Page 120

PERSONS/ENTITTES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

11/1/63

DUONG VAN MINH

1545 houx

DALM

TRAN VAN MINH

TRAN THIEN KHIEM

TOP SEC

• node V07 de taber coup condoor? bages.

broadcast

tud coe tetey point lad beon browa,

she couteving gonerals are at

1GS:

M/Oenezat Doong

Prosident

Can Vas Miah, Dozenneus Seccartsy

Conceal, MiD.

C/Concret Fran

thica Andon, Chief of Scatf,

JeAnt Corstel Stort

B/ Guzer22 te Van

KEID

2goc

Inspector. 807f Deftense

Dy'Gaterzi. 2hen Xona Calea.

SOURCE! Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit I STAFF: Dawson

ETLE:

page 16.

_ 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DAPES:

CATEGORIES:

11/1/63

DIEM

GEN. NGUYEN KHANH

1545 hours

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECISI

che totioros ace claimed also to be screeting the cbeg:

Mosacion co coo Dot, Comeded, 136 0100104

Bior Mea. Ded My Who ander coup condest

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings,

s.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one

page 16.

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

HH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 120

---

## Page 121

MATED:

Nov. 1, '63

1330 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRINCE:

TOP SECRET

7303

Pardone pous into dorgon Ceon the direction of talea;

Indee Badebted to be foon Qunag Orang earning Condor

SOURCE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COL. Le QUANG TUNG

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 14.

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

11/1/63

1400 hours

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

Corone% Ro Goang Teg coptacon; dacohad to order

viettanore Ogectel Forces

to desse

as MO 820

nucholag at 20l2e0;

about 200 broses dhoured.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 14.

FILE:

STAYE: Diem

6/30/75

DATE:

WW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 121

---

## Page 122

DATES:

November 1, 1963

CATEGORIES:

COLBY

DIEM

LODGE, A.C.

OCCURRENCE: When DIEM called LODiE directly preceding his death, COLBY stales that the

message that he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was

going to require his officers to have filled their oaths of loyalty to the constitution,

the sons that he, as

Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position

President." p. 67

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

PILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

1 July 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DON, GENERAL,

STATION (SAICOK)

JGS headquarters

=====

DATES:

1 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On November 1, 1963, "CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the

command post throughout the struggle. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION

by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONEIN was told by GENERAL DON that DON had

tried unsuccessfully to reach CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that

CONEIN's telephone was out of order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line

open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate con-

tact with the coup principals, the STATION was able to report almost minute-by-minute progres:

of the coup."

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42

FILE:

TOP SPO

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

122

---

## Page 123

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONE.IN

COLBY, WILLIAM

DIEM

1 November

1963

DIEM•

MIHN, GENERAL

TOP SECRE

OCCURRENCE:

COLBY states that "When CONEIN was told by the generals, GENERAL MINA,

that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible

on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted.

that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance

to look at the bodies but turned it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assass-

ination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between Presi-

dent DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very

strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early

stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that

he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to

receive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten

out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city.

SOURCE: CONEIN was not in attendance.

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.

FILE:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

CRINIC

JGS headquarters

STATION

DATES:

1 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECTSCH

OCCURRENCE:

The IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at

JGS headquarters is well known in official circles"

, and bolsters

that notoriety by the

following statement:

'"The first cable (on the coup) was received at headquarters at 0117

hours,

(November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159.

At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the

STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the

STATION. Sometime during the

day of I November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters

cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in Its CRITIC

cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,

seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at

headquarters."

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

29 June 1975

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

123

---

## Page 124

CONEIN

VALEO:

1 November 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: when the generals took over the PII which controlled the communications,

left only the embassy lines open.

The telephone terminals had been taken out prior to the

coup and instead of leaving CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected

P. 51

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

COLBY, WILLIAM

Nhu

1 November 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "Ihe CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of Pres-

ident DIEM and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in

ihe United States goverment and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern.

In retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encoura

ing and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is

very clear that the United States through itsoverall policy was in support of that overthr

and, of course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent overthrow of a

re-

gime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we:

killed in the process."

pp. 19-20

480012

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, Do. 19-20

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

an

Then 1070

NH

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

124

---

## Page 125

PERSONS/ENETYTES:

GENERAL DINH

DADIES :

11/1/63

21.

AUG. thru

16 SEFT. '63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Dinh's

Malady Covarnor did not endeaz 1ku

colors curlos ces pared 29

cho population ci

01b05 029200xs.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S. S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 12.

FILE:

STARE: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

1 November 1903

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain .

shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a

certain time in order to alert American personnel who might be living around the area to

round the area to

watch out or stay under cover, because they would find 10s's in the center of the city.

There were no American casualities during this coup. The Vietnamese suffered about 100

dead.

p. 51-52

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

SOURCE:

R. DAWSON

NH

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 125

---

## Page 126

DATES:

CAXLEORIES:

11/1/63

DIEM+

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRE

Coup

the

balag Jamachod,

There pes 4 lode do the Grestcond prior to the actuai

Doctise of Els,

che Presidoot ordered

1156 Bonger Cattaitoe Go move tato 2a1g00 end

olock An

So curround the palace.

to take Gas

Sterls Dino.

This canoed stochor stunbilng

20:01103

colmares of the

22204707 25d

they vera complatoly boden by

botsoldon to virodres has mic.

to negociate mich the

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 1l.

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

FILE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DINH

COUNSELLER NHU

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

31 August. '63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

11/1/63

TOP SECRET

Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President

Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial

post for hinself.

-SOURCIE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

pages 12-13.

FILE:

STAKE: Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

HH 50955 DocId: 32423615

Page 126

---

## Page 127

GEN. MINH

CON'T. ON

NEXT CARD

CONT.

11/4/03

DIEMV

OCCUMKENCE

TOP

SECRET

ho method usad by the generais

Cos Closests

on dococal officers was 10

Colde buncheon

D3pos1-7

modians

the

encep dea of Conccal. Don Has Dick) and 222

com:220028 02

17118.

0300.0v217

"ous of these afficers bed agperred

Geared Stodd Dodomeators and Were 53400d folth

acceptina

1x Caseid

2 coccas

222k

2220WROed

Targe :

3 sectarn 02

146co2e Boated coned to sabnachine giao cone lace due eaod..

Seena Made Nobod don Chose oftAcon the dece madder

Do coup to otaod no.

to taid then tas? mnid he

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Dawson

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

pages 11-12.

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

12. 0 = 15-=1.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

1200

around Consent kia?t

TOP/SECRET

toadquadlong his rose not

to loave tha

comanoe. 20st.

tose who did nod joth the coup vore le

incodledogg placod rader acread pod pue under comed stazd, Once

RoL-cole brabers ind hoes coked moy? Coacut dinb onderod

1900: 0000del brovght to tae canadad post at vich cano he

tend the proclenarion and cbjectives of the cong plotters vaich

vas Decorded.

thon asted etch elficer nao nad agreed to

in the coup to spoot his nore taco the

sope

recotorio,

Sevarx?

cares Were made 2ron the orizlasz pod

rectorent pasis os the edty in pre-ranged

i ding pinces so

1226

In the ovont the coup tailed, no officor

cold clota sone he and not voluntarily participated in the

10 fit Cou

SOURCE: P. 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED

STAPF:

Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

127

---

## Page 128

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COI. KHANGV

DATES

CATEGORIES:

11/1/63

DIEM

TO

SECRET

OCCURRENCI:

Hasine

JaLa

OReO

she emp had startee,

S:

Colonal Khang ne the

Codone? Lan of the Civil. Guozd decided to

CON'T ON

NEXT CARD

code recorder varch

Colon28 Jam 2% M6e Clos rocordod Inetractions

undeo ocdeciog

Was t D0 1240r brcrecot to all cag

Rasolutionomy Comichae.

then to cooperate witt the Gederals'

It. Colonoi

Marine Brigade telephoned 21s 4a1t

thung, Coimander of

the

2A126

the cong

then partici

2a 2

3ad onderod shen to support the coop.

corsod of che Alx Vorce pas sivor to Colonol to khas Mai

vies Colonel Fion,

The Someand o2

the 7b Divasica 9A8 82701

ve coronal nerven Ves Co. Temporay command of the ly Cores

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

STAFF:

page 12.

FILE:

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

OCCURRENCE:

CONTENUATION FROM LAST CARD

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECKE

8b•

2s glynd Do Coloood 2u2 Wat None

Cornoad di (r0028 11.

Beiaon 220 0iocn to Genoral Ton Xiet Dini. Voder Scheral Dinh's

coonend were Saagos euppore troops, the faloe Borgedo,

ine Alaborne Brigade, 40 conse trem the Armor Concuod,

the 5th

supported by the Ale Force and sae

Thu Duc

Ordêcers Toaining Base undch joined the coup under tha

o? colonel Lar Son.

SOURCE:

Page 12, con't.

STARF

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

128

---

## Page 129

DINH

MINH

DON

PERSONS/ENTIDIRS:

DATES:

11/1/63

TOP

CATEGORIES:

SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

con Hus did nos

Cn0Eoo.ne 09 C2r07 0010000

Cazy bad Dian

codirety tainster acatasi

Cie C90002

toat.

' 702 cardes 01

auSsluge vi ch

Che

113

that

Ga20

ocapiouised him

elladaste

the gonzalo.

Danis

06 900600008 0y cocone Vas gargalilod

a day

10010630e 6929908 Con 4es dopuede

HOY 19 Corps Contander ded

costo sa coated to Brigadaor Conemas

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 13.

FILE:

STANE: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

N4 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 129

---

## Page 130

Nr/0008/1041100:

11/1

10/271

TOR

SECKET

In B01lac1 50 Che 10070

02432

244721

co10 9y

X0MC22 C0265 10621057 77 031169 9209 (92218

wales weat do Prosident

702 t00.

Trens 2000266 343%28 G8 13

30003

al destes and bulas aparece de cong ye s

Peroos atacadas Baleon tot colete da pasteled

to boone dogezodade ordena, 90900408 03

Caroneste

No tira

Ste

Social Poredo, avoy Craio Saigon.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.i., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

pages 13-14.

STAPE: Dawson

6/30/75

DATE:

u--...

PERSONS/ENTITTES:

DATES:

11/1763™

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

NGO DINH NHU

GEN. DON

GEN. DINH

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

dor a Prot

11100 Poe 20660d

0n0 ChAr 119:

dade pestos or saos: 0200 2602300d

1199 P8 180 2200

precis

2h: Geserota

R0n6 206 9970288. D6B 8602470 016/266 00

hia thot be

8. 2001 bexo

chave alt, phorid dovg boou Credked by Dien and

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, s.s.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 13.

STAFF:

Lawson

6130175

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 130

---

## Page 131

CEN. DON

CONEEN

AMBASSADOR LODGE

CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD

----

PERSONS/ENTITTES:

DATES:

CADEGORIES:

ACCURRENCE:

SOURCE:

FILE:

Nov. 1, '63

TOP SECRET

Cenava? Bob scabed to Conous thas Bou led tered to e

alort Occola pò 42e laccors cosidencs vince belere

2eon 20d

lo che andvorod. & laber choce devoazed

nei Comaiale telephone vos out ed nadar.

was 607d thet ho ms do leag a telephode Mie coan

to: deboscodoz hodge, Don Andocaed Coneia teut

Tung (ARVi Bpacind 2oceos Comeader

Exr Maca (Asafonce Conoscdery ena Colonet

Gzo Vos Vier (Conabodes of the Auboroe Brigodo) vend

namested; chot 0oioae), More 1goc Du (Copmadar ot

che 01v2% Guaed) 2ad h6. Colone? De Ngeren Konge

STAFF:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

Dawson

page a.

DATE:

6/30/75

99494224140443

DATES:

CATEGORTES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ONT FROM LASI CARD

OCCORRINCE:

zone.

Marade

Brigaded Bene indos Scard

andi dot yes declamod dod considered teatral.

Cornuel Pung; sas bromas da board acnsd guard a2d

tonced ai guapolné do codas o consattae botacen tia

Opecial Foroso, uni se adjacont

4ed 270

010/0005 01

che uch Bicision.

conde tAre hod bean

deciazod

Retweea Sanched Porcas

0nd 306,

thacty-117e

arabred

pezzonael

carriers

combat pers sturbed moving

Lowned Badgoe proper.

SOURCL: 42. 9, CoNt

STArT:

NN 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 131

---

## Page 132

NGÒ DINH NHU

GEN. DON

PERSONS/ENJUTIES:

COL. HUAN

DATES:

11/1/63

TOP

CATEGORIES:

SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CON*T ON NEXT CARD ALSO

Goa probleed

une 1ho y

behold 2d

Inter/or

Shake tus;

SoCioned Colonge,

no would ash took bioh be sendod the ulnistry

Don, todd ask for dte Ministay e2

Pasidan

to mi sego do govarnasad bos pace the proposal

22 anal 4 109

What de wordd bove bees dagossible des Dion or

Courtines were Liven.

that

Pecoldeot to.3d divo bam a manisserted

for the

deadlian!

Dad capped and tigh bed not record that be

though 6

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

STAPE: Dawson

page. 13.

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

DATES:

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD:

CARRIORTES:

SECRET

9b

208 208

General too dad echoe df0100n3s

chadia Colonel 093: Commander Otteer

te Killery

Madeny te Dated.

contacted

40 Send

Stille

Vish moo meature Job bis naisterdal

poste

SOURCE:

p., 13, Con't.

STAFF:

NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 132

---

## Page 133

EDNDUNS/ENITTLES:

Lansdale

DATES:

Afternon

11/1/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem

Colby

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRE

Colby stated that although he did not have the copy there

a telegram

a call made from Diem to lodge on the afternoon of the coup.

Dien said that he vas having trouble.

"...an effort was being made against

han by his fenerals, and that he believed

it essential to put this down.

He urged that

the U. S. consult General Lansdale and me (Colby) by name

because we understood something about

this situation.

afternoon of the coup.

The response,

I believe, Ambassador Lodge did

mention something about assistance in leaving the country.". Pages 19-50.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

DATE:

Dawson

7/1/75

NW 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 133

---

## Page 134

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,

DATES:

30 Oct. 1963

CATEGORIES:

SECRE

OCCURRENCE: On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the

same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063) : "

........do not think we have the

power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has made it clear many times that this is

a Vietnamese affair......I believe we should continue our present position of keeping

hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information.

CAS has

been anaylzing forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have

probably figured their chances pretty closely.......It does not seem sensible to have

the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of govern-

ment....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last

was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop It. HARKINS has read

SOURCE: this and does not concur."

STAFF: R. Dawson

CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39

DATE:

FILE:

29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander

CONEIN

DATES:

31 October 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEME

OCCURRENCE:

CONEIN stated that on or about October 3+,

landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 48

1963, FELT came to Vietnam and

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

Tore

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 134

---

## Page 135

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE

BUNDY

DATES:

30 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following

cable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred:

"Thanks for your sagacious instruction.

Will

carry out to best of my ability."

-.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

29 June 1975

----

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE

DATES:

30 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES

A DIEM:

BUNDY (?)

OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 79407) the following

quotation appeared: "....We do not accept as a basis for U.S, policy that we have no power

to delay or discourage coup....We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your

message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authorities

will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side....

" ( the IG Report here

states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House re-

peats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves."

The inference

can probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it

was indoubtedly emanating from the White House.)

SOURCE:

FILE:

CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

50955

DocId: 32123615

Page

135

---

## Page 136

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SMITH, DAVID

MCCONE

WARKINS, GEN-RAL

HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

TRUSTARD, WILLIAM COLBY

Nd l

KIEVNEDY, ROBERT

KENNIDY, JOIN F.

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY

In attendance.

The following record by HELMS

and COLBY shows that:

it was suggested

that in the Ambassador's absence, MARKINS, TRUELARI, and DAVID SMITH act as a

comnittee lo direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should

not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to

provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART

as well as carry out their instructions

in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not

clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching.

The Attorney General

felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence.

The DCI stated his view

that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might

only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

DATE:

FILE:

Dawson

6/27/75

HARKINS,

MINH

LODGE

BUNDY

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON

KENNEDY, JOIN F.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

Oct 30, 19632

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that

"...chanfes of action with or without our approval now so significant that we should

urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to

coup group can still have decisive effect on itsdecision. ...

We must have assurance

presently reveal plans to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some

contacts supervision and the event coup begins he becone head of country team..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 39

STAFF:

Dawson

NW 50955 DocId: 32423615

Page 136

---

## Page 137

LODGE, ALBASSADOR

DIEM

NHU

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of -

the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of Informing DIEM and NHU... Althoughthere

rave no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must

inticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE,

AMBASSADOR

DIEM

NHU

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct. 29, 1963

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of.

CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup:

"In sumary, It would appear

that a coup attempt by the ganerals group is irminent...and that no positiveaction by

the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of Informing DIEM and NHU... Althoughthere

have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must

anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FTT.E.

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 137

---

## Page 138

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DON

AMBASSADOR LODGE

CONEIN

DATES:

10/28/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

General Don approached

sobasaador Lodge at Dai:

27209r 3

of the 29920tere 08

President Dion the Anbacuador Longe Sow their

Losin

io Daigon end assed i1 Concin us sparing

for the Abaocolor; Abassador Lodge asplied 2a

nor datebford or too to atumiote & cons;

Axmanador eccadde the USG wated

No Dabelasses and

baconto dead toes:

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,

DATE:

FILE:

Dawson

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

SMITH, DAVID

MCCONE

HARKINS, GENERAL

HELMS

TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY

KENNEDY, ROBERT

Oct, 29, 1963

UP SECULI

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY

in attendance.

The following record by HELMS

and

COLBY shows that:

it was suggested

that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a

committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should

not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to

provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions

in the operations field. The President stated that If the forces in Saigon were not

clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching.

The Attorney General

felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence.

The DCI stated his view

that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might

only be solved by a second or third coup.

STAFF:

SOURCE:

HW 50955

DooId: 32423615

Page 138

---

## Page 139

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

GEN. DON

GEN. DO CAO TRI

NGUYEN KHANH

ECEN

OCCURRENCE:

SAN'T.

NEXT

CARD

5

Soverei doys. botore the coup tes

to inco placo, General

Don coccainsiod

the flead pies vith Genezada Do Cao fed and

N347 20

Cront and

wies the Commandiag O02cor of the Military.

Acadeny at Daiad.

2a0 signa3

soup pas baced on a

profions doccoe jasued by Presidant Olen which ecosed cast

aster 1 coumoos Shove could be no siosts cad Shere monid be

onzy a one-re Lanca ported.

By vadio mud celephones

the

2ot9 91% capats

2ed 205a68 Laotauctions to coup

ger disapan ts

3,305

2 Movenber worklas hones pould pogiz ex 1330.

Doyonser the dostractiong verg traile-

anay Toon Caigod,

1,0:8

Mues and 19

rich were to attack Seigon

SOURCE:

STARE:

Dawson

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 1l.

6/30/75

FILE:

OCCURRENCE:

DATE:

SECKE

6b

CONTINUATION OF LAST CARD, P. 11.

vence be sn posteton at 1030 hours.

Gae

vecetrad

its

insanesions to

nove

a$ 2330 Noure

actually

2c 1825 10728.

This MisS 095

one of was minor Ancidente

which norty doset

tho coug da 2h026 wie

fear shot this sould

bo dotected by duo dorees loyal to bion,

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

Burd

HH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 139

---

## Page 140

-* *PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

GERI. DUONG VAN MINH

GEN. TRAN VAN DON

DATES :

CATEGORIES:

Nov. 1, 1963

TRAD THIEN KHIEM

TRAN VAN MINH

icaurs

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Cocain vas podtactol ly Cogánio Boag

Conezr?

AMm: 80 2070

Poa ;

1738

2 6

1386 26023

Xea Cood

stas2HS

coaE Codein

10026909.

Comodiosely ai Consca? 90026 Xesa-

Saade tris

0765

20s

within precious

Gecrst

anraugenaate

CONTINUED ON NEXT

CARD

geas cioaed

for che nest maeiings C0029

anc Acpara A0o coA eA PrUG Oue

xastanobions 2nd 60a60d

• Unidoza

C÷ 8000 PruOIy QP2OCg 2002

to 006 cad De

chon dapariod,

Todle dotttag

?aktocd, tho doottof moge ddftoe bod bood

200 Nngs

NEXAG

aapoazodlet Conclarg

P2ccc2on

Tc2e 116 002-

11o X023age

tar& Oetosh

Anpadidboly to d0s

wts do prosdod

boadqcas t023.

Cie 0oco 406 22 20002245.

Srindbee

Bt2toi

Craot2

SOURCE:

9la/ted C1S

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

STAFF

Dawson

pages s4.

FILE:

OCCURRENCE:

DATE:

6/30/75

0/obu:2

CONT. FROM LAST

CARD

swsiane. s.

t-innet

Aaizon Via senlo des vaftg e prsacagid voice code

aod procodded 0o

tho

Wax Boon

at oob tondcaarters.

Arosont moxe Goxexels Cuong

Vao Banhir

tion Van ron,

Passt

202212. Onüen,

/22:97a

paded kaxa,

oa veo nach,

igapen Mgoc to,

Man man xeany te voa dadg

Tran

Matgat van ta:

Neayen dine Ngo:

Poan Ngoc Poit,

ve Man Ngatom; Colonazo Do Liau,

30S9y4к

1011028 2

Duong Tgoc Caa; 34J0r3 Le Ngugec

Johnaige Do KCooe Dindy

aad weidmucatted juaioz officers.

SOURCE: p. 9,

STAPF :

FILE:

DATE:

HH 50955 DocId:32423615

Page 140

---

## Page 141

PERSONS/ENTITUES:

TICE PRESIDENT THO

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

11/2/53

0310 hours

CATEGORIES

DIEM

TOP SECREI

C310

Vioo Aronddoae Tro &x dos

Palade 45 oedoe notvy extacis

SOURCE:

PILE:

teasinssg S.S.6I 228/20/75, Goneiile

Exhibit One,

Page

STARE:

Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

HW 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 141

---

## Page 142

MANUAL/UNILTLES:

DATES:

2 November 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM E

MINH

NHUNG

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that around 6:30 or 6:40 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked

to MINH for the first time.

DIEM asked MINH for full honors and MINH replied that he could

not guarantee full honors, if and during the time that Vietamese were still killing one

another. DIEM stated that he would order the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls

that this took place at about 7:50, November 2, 1963. CONEIN stated as follows: "At this

stage, there were four armored cars and 113's an escort of military police proceeded imme-

diately from the joint general staff headquarters toward GAI LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with

his aide, CAPTAIN HUNG got into a sedan and with MIS Corps, went out the back road from

the general staff headquarters toward the back of the golf course and took a different road

from the armored cars that went down Cong Le."

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTIRIES:

MINH •

DATES:

11/2/63

2420 hours

0020(0)

CATEGORIES:

DIEMY

0303

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECULI

19064210667 07277 945668 60 020 281009

Sant Na Orderod

cord dee godded to cokon de cog come.

e arcored Vehicles

2co 404060d 2ro6 Cho Creasey cool*

cr120y 4d doo: 202010r5 Dogleg Ve

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

FILE:

Exhibit One, page 23.

STAPF:

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 142

---

## Page 143

FEROUND/INILTIES:

Don, fieneral

Conein

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

DiemV

OCCURRENCE:

Concin stated at the tine they vere going to bring the pross in for the core-

mony on the capitulation of bich, Don said"

get the hell out ve are bringing

in the press"

Page 71.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, SSC Concin, June 20, 1075

STAFF:

DATE:

Dawson

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LAM, DUONG NGOC

NHU

XUAN

GENERAL MAI HUU

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Pover a 45638

U DIEM

Nacembers, 1463

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted,

off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted,

and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan. DIEM and NHi

were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the column LAM, who was a little

no and not go dan no at o

fat guy who wore a mustache and used to command the civil guard and not the individual who

later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical pro-

tection. p. 59-60

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

50955

DoeId: 32423615

Page

143

---

## Page 144

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Concin

Lodie,H.C.

11/2/63

Niem

ConciccuRaiN he kept contact with the junta "until the day that the i. S

officially recognized

the South Vietnamese government.

There were several

countrics

that recognized, and

I was acting as the liaison officer for the

ambassador to the junta during this period for approximately ten days or

two weeks.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

STAPF:

Hawson

FILE:

p. 61

DATE:

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Tuan

Whu

Conein

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Dien

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that another officer who had worked with Concin was apparently

executed

about that same time as Diem and Whu were.

Tuan had been head of

the Special Forces and had worked very closcly with Diem and Whu and Concin and

vas executed by the Gonerals that morning. Page 27-28.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

STAPF:

DATE:

Dawson

7/1/75

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

144

---

## Page 145

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Dicul

linh

ail,

Ngo Dinh

Tonein

OCCURRENCE:

Zonein explained that although it was baffling as to why niem left the palace

the church in Cholon, and although he did not know exactly how they

iot out the general assumption was

that there were secret tunnels in the Palace

hich was the former Governor General's Palace callod Gailong Palace.

tunnel took them under and through the palace and the half block to city Hall.

Page 63-64.

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

Dawson

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bang, Major

Minh

Phen, Ngoc

Concin

T'an

Nhu

DATES:

11/3./63

Dien

OCCURRENCE:

Bang was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had left.

Concin asked Bang(whom Concin had met in lanoi in 1945 what his orders were.

Bang stated the orders soing

unless we were tired upon and that they lad not been lound at that tune.

i trough the

through the palace was that we were not

in fire

The expectation was and everyhody assumed, that Minh and Thu were at the

palace.

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

Dawson

SOURCE Harmp, SSC1, Carain, 6/30/95

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 145

---

## Page 146

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CUN'T ON NEXT

CARD

I

DATES:

11/2/63

0310 hours

CAPEGORIES: 1C

DIEM V

OCCURKENCE A YI

noneral officers oncepò Gonerala 13. Vss Phona Cho,

Eugni: Van Caog Maud Quong loung.

LIST OF OFFICERS Colonels:

Loi Van Ebat

PARTICIPATING IN.

Do Maiz, Carol

o? iftiflecy Baoucate Sacrles

THE COUP:

Nguyen

Hus do

ignyen

Van. Chuan; J.4, JdS

CON'T on NEXT

CARD

Nguyen Suonge Chied of Statt tor Retorteg

Trag Viar Reyes

Dad Mul Nhen, CO, 2ot Eatartry Digloion

Dong Ngoe Dan, Director Cessnaß.

and Sers Deferee

Cor ge

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I.,

6/20/75, Conein,

STAFF: Dawson

Exhibit One, page 22.

FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

NGUYEN CAO KY

OCCURRENCE:

LAST CARD CONTIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN IHE COUP:

i. Colonels:

de daugoe hoog. Cometdor, Cardae

Brigade

Aid Tores

NgMyen Go 1yo

10k

CO, B00 Lazore Put

TOP SEA

STAFF

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

50955

DooId: 32423615

Page 146

---

## Page 147

DIEM

TOP SECREL

OCCURRENCE: LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:

CONTINUATION FROM

LASI CARD:

10c

Majors:

koe

Razy ore Petage Rene

SOURCES

FILE:

STAFE:

DATE:

HIT 50955

DocId:32423615

Page 147

---

## Page 148

PERSONS/KNEWTES:

NHU

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

CARIZONIES:

11/2/63

1330 hours

DIEM

TOP SECRET:

X002 M214622322 6a332b002 coraeaAc242068 Arom the Choloo

Made throughout ino cog. bused 21ade ros toon Cia

Long

Palace So Bad Coc not Coon Co Due to 12o Crodea Villa.

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,

Pages 24

25.

STAFF

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

DIEM

CATEGORIES:

DON, GENERAL

MINH, GENERAL

2 Nov 1963

DIEM Y

CONEIN

JGS headquarters

OCCURRENCE:

"According to one of CONEIN's reports, DIEM called GENERAL, DON at 0650 hours

2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally.

GENERAL MINH immediately ordered all

telephones removed from rooms in their JGS conmand post area. This cut off all communicatio:

with the outside except for radios under MINH's control.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

STAFE:

R. DAWSON

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 148

---

## Page 149

NHU

1180

PERSONS/ENTITDES:

24022:

Nov. 2,

1130 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

UCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Ii. Colcao?. Dron Wooo Dano 306d Cent ne aud ais foreos

2002 26X002 1acig

4542y

notaing houde to

scoto Don Bog Nad to the 395

20ce2 Seto corconder,

A aeron 200.a10d Choy

vere nos di the polaco nod lad

so the dos.

so to pand sy the 3go

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit one, page 24.

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITTES:

STARE:

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

... .

DATES:

11/2/63

1330 hours

CATEGORIES:

DI EM

IU

OCCURRENCE:

cidacty vose cougas

cCxr0h 32 1h0 2028, 180702,

capade: Do Dad, a aophos of Do Mau,

200015 фex800096 864

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page 25.

Dawson

FILE:

I DATE:

NH

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 149

---

## Page 150

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATES:

11/2/63

1000 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

"OCCURRENCE:

TOP SUCKIN

¿boscate Lodge doarad eargote to the Chancary.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I.,

6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, page

24.

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTRIES:

GEN. MAI HUU XUAN

NHU

STAFF

Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCIE:

DARES:

11/2/63

1130 hours

TOP SECKE U

10/0e20292 Bi Dm Kuna Ted the detall Which excated

Paung Hag ardest

in Caston.

Mean

corneren

19 the doe in teare codes.

Corse of denth as

Lois ting is proked.

SOURCE:

-----.

Hearings, S.S.C.lig

6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit one, page 24.

STArK. "Dawson"

DATE:

6/30/75

HH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

150

---

## Page 151

NHU

2,003

PERSONS/ENTITIRS:

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

11/2/63

1000 hours

DIEM

TOP SEGRE

Pica mad Aha ave oocciad de 305. Chas A3 nooontlzaad.

SOURCE:

FILE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 5/20/75, Conein

Exhibit One, page 24.

STAFE: Dawson

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

11/2/63

1000 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP

SEOKEI

mas do socontioned.

end Wins hore ascapod,

SOURCE: Hearings, 5.5.0.124-

6/20/75, Conein

Exhibit One, page

FILE:

STAFE:

PARE:

Dawson

6/30/75

HH

50955

DooId: 32423615

Page 151

---

## Page 152

MeRSCIS/ENTUPIES:

Vice President THO

CARMEOKIES:

11/2/63

0420 hours

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Viro Pesoadons Tao nos accopiod gondtion as foino Minaster.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

Exhibit One, page

23.

[SIANE:

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

PPASONS/ENº1T' 1125:

11/2/63

1000 hours

CAVIGORTES :

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Aporie tenda atre telre contamado.

SOURCK:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

T SPARE:

Danenn

NH

50955

DooId: 32423615

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## Page 153

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON

CONE.IN

DATES:

2 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to pay

the families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional

1,750,000 piasters.

One bundle of 250,000 plasters was overlooked and was found later in

CONEIN's safe. (The IG Report goes on to note as follows: "The passing of these funds 1s

obviously a very sensitive matter.")

TOP SEGLIG

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 40-41

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

NH 50955

DocId: 32423615

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## Page 154

1964

riori

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

154

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## Page 155

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KI LANH

MAJOR DANG SY

DATES:

Jan. 1964

CATEGORIES:

DI EM

OCCURRENCE:

At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime that

icceeded that of the

coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's prosecutor insisted that the

deaths had been caused-by American-supplied grenades af

use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the conviction by the military court was that the 8

deaths were caused by these concussion grenades. Wiggins argues in her book that this

conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessment of the MKIII grenade which found that

at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have suffi-

cient force to decapitato or mutilate persons, Let alone bring down the coil a los also

and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station.

states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter

one way or another. The trial was clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,!

1965

PILE:

Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

NW 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 155

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## Page 156

DATES:

Spring, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Thich Tri Quang

McNamara

Diem

D1em

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "Thich

Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the

greatest mistake we made was when we gave Thich Tri Quang

at the U. S.

Embassy."

(from September through November 1963) Page 103

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,

Harper and Rowe

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

IDATE:

July 3, 1975

HH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page

156

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## Page 157

Colby, Wn. E.

Breckinridge

OCCURRENCE:

Pearson, D.

3167

CATEGORIES:

Diem

IX - c - 2 -b

castro

response to a March 1967 Drew Pearson column to the effect that the agency

was involved with criminal syndicates to assassinate Castro. As a result

of discussions caused by the Pearson column, staff members in the I.G.'s

office were directed to put together reports on CIA involvement in the

assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and Diem (50).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75

FILE:

Cage

JFD

DATE: 6/28/75

NH

50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 157

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## Page 158

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

IG REPORT

CONEIN

SPERA

DON,

GENERAL

DIEM

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

31 May 1967

DIEM, V

OCCURRENCE: In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: "To recap:

(a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried

out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup gener-

als, but only as approved and under instructions.

. (c) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the

generals' command post throughout the fighting.

CONEIN furnished GENERAL DON about

$65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. (e) CIA hao

no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

29. June 1975

HM 50955

DocId: 32423615

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## Page 159

10010100114100 :

COLBY

DATES:

1975

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

0O 4A00T

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated in response to the difficulty for

the United States once it ha

sought to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the.

foreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various

tir

the degree: to wnich he is going to do one thing or the other.

The U.S. cannot control

it.

Ihe U. S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, pernaps influence him,

out the control, that is.... when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why ti

are limits to your degree of authority over them."

p. 76

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAPF:

DATE:

R. DAWSON

1 July 1975

NH 50955

DocId: 32423615

Page 159

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