STATEMENT CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT BOLIVIA IN 1967 AND ROLE IN THE CAPTURE OF ERNESTO 'CHE' GUEVARA DE LA SERNA.
Originator: CIA
From: LA/EICO
To: DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL
Document date: 06/03/1975
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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* 2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEGRET

INSPECTOR CENERAL

75-2011

3 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT:

Statement by Benton H. Mizones concerning

his assignment Bolivia in 1967 and his role

in the capture of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA

de la Serna

REFERENCE:

Memo dated 29 May 1975

1. The undersigned met with Benton H. Mizones his

contract

employee, on 2 and 3 June to obtain his story about

assignment to Bolivia in 1967. This query is based upon ref

interview,

during which Mizores mentioned that he had re-

transmitted an order from Colonel Joaquin Zenteno Anaya,.

Commander of the 8th Division of the Bolivian Army, to a

Bolivian sergeant; which resulted 'in the execution of Ernesto

"Che" GUEVARA de la Serna, Cuban leader of the guerrillas then

operating in Bolivia.

2.

Mizones said that his assignment came about after an

interview held in Miami in June or July of 1967,

he was a case officer

at which time

working for the Miami office. He had

been selected for the job interview because of his para-

military training and experience.

He was asked if he vould

agree to

serve with Gustavo Virolbos a fellow Cuban. He

accepted. He was told that he was to go to Bolivia with

Villolbo where they would be engaged in training intelligence

teams for the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Eighth Division of

the Bolivian Army.

He was also told that he and Viliolbo

would be assigned to the 2nd Ranger Battalion as advisors

and would be based in the town of Esperanza.

While in Miami,

he and ViMolbo were given briefings about the political and

guerrilla situation in Bolivia, and he was given a refresher

course in communications.

Mizones and Villolbo were told

that there were strong indications that Guevara was leading

the guerrillas.

Among the instructions given them was a clear

one that in the event that the Bolivian Army captured Guevara,

they should do everything possible "to keep him alive."

• 3.

They were introduced to their future case officer.

in Washington, who was to be in liaison with the Bolivian

forces in Santa Cruz.

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4.

Prior to their departure, both Mizones and Villolbo

HOLE

issued falsa U.S. re-entry permits in the names of

Felix

Ranos and Eduardo Gonzalez, respectively: . These were

received in New York City just prior to their departure on

July for La Paz on a Braniff Airline flight.

Theii case

officer had preceded them and met them on 31 July at 7. a.m.

at the la Paz airport.

Mizones believes that Bolivian visas

were stamped in their re-entry permits.

The case officer and another American took them to

neet resident Barrientos, to whom they were introduced as

experts on guerrilla warfare.

He issued each a personal card

in which were handwritten his instructions to all civilian

and military officials that they be given full support.

ten that morning, they met General Ovando, Commander-in-Chief

of the Bolivian Armed Forces.

(It wasn't until about a month

later that Mizones met (the COS in Santa Cruz.) While in

Larkaz, no new instructions were issued to them about their

mission.

After about a week there,

they were flown to Santa

•Cruz de la Sierra for a few days and introduced to Colonel

Joaquin Zenteno Anaya, Commander of the Eighth Division.

Zenteno arranged for Captain "Poppie" Shelton, the American

officer in charge of the military mission training the 2nd

Ranger Battalion, to come to Santa Cruz to meet Mizones and

Vil lobo.

They were also introduced to Major, Arnaldo Saucedo,

G-2 of the Eighth Division..

After 3 or 4 days in Santa Cruz,

Mizones. and Milkolbo went to La Esperanza, where they were

quartered at the Bolivian officers!

compound.

In La Esperanza

they met Major Ayiroa, the Commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion,

and: Captain Gari Prado.

Prior to their departure from La Paz, Mizones and

Vittolbo were issued Bolivian uniforms and credentials as

captains in the Bolivian Army. Nevertheless, they did not

receive Bolivian Army insignia. Later, Mizones was given by

Major Saucedo a Bolivian tri-color cap-insignia which he wore

(escarapela). Mizones and Villolbo, were issued Smith and Wessor

louble-action automatic pistols.

During their activities as

structors and advisors they assumed the role of Bolivian

although they were known as foreign advisors to a

(Mizones said that he learned later

he and Villolbo from becoming involved in the anti-guerrilla

activities in the field.)

7. Despite their apparent status as Bolivian officers,

Mizones said that they never were given orders by higher-

ranking Bolivian officers (One exception to this rule was the

order which Colonel Zenteno issued

Guevara's exccution, if Mizones story is to be believed.)

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8.

Mizones was assigned to Santa Cruz and Villolbo was

assigned to La Esperanza, where the latter conducted most of

the intelligence training.

As time went by, Mizones' own

duties gravitated to becoming basically those of an advisor.

He said

that his case officer was aware of and approved of this

development.

Among the things which Mizones and Willorbo;

attempted to accomplish was the preservation of the lives of

captured guerrillas, for the collection of intelligence about

the gee said the saved the late sa cose castillo Chavez,

as well as for humanitarian reasons.

traveling for that purpose to Vallegrande from Santa Cruz,

where he spoke briefly to Castillo at the Nuestra Senora de

- me a lie on tag on sace on one a Bore outed.

take his side.

The prisoner was flown to Vallegrande where

Mizones covered all medical costs and carried out a two-week

interrogation.

The resulting twenty-page interrogation report

provided the Bolivians with a complete concept of the

•guerrilla's strategy, which turned out to be the key to

Guevara's capture,

according to Mizones.

This report was

attributed by the Bolivians to be from their own people.

This important development was followed by an

encounter in late September between a unit led by a Lt. Galindo

and the remnants of the guerrillas.. During this action, a Cuban

lieutenant named Miguel; the Bolivian Coco Peredo; and a

Bolivian physician named Jose Gutierrez Ardaya were killed.

Mizones travelled by jeep to Pucara, where the bodies were

located, and through

the information he had learned from

Castillo, he was able to establish that the men were from

Guevara's

forward element.

Upon his return to santa Cruz,

Mizones advised Colonel Zenteno. that the 2nd Ranger Battallion

should be immediately deployed, with the remaining

two weeks

of their training cancelled.

Zenteno accepted this advice

and the Rangers were moved to Pucara,

and the Headquarters of

the Eighth Division were moved to Vallegrande. Mizones

continued in-his advisory role, suggesting 'areas for troop

deployment as well as the deployment of the intelligence

teams:

In the ith of October, contact was established wit

Guevara's remaining forces.

At this. time Mizones was. 11

Vallegrande and Villolbo in Esperanza.) On the 8th, Major

Saucedo reported over the radio that "the chief" had been

captured.

Mizones then fler over the area

in a PT-6 carrying

with him a PRC-10 radio with which he was able to communicate

with the Bolivian forces.

He then confirmed that Guevara was

"the chief" who had been captured.

He returned to allegrande

where he told Col. Zenteno that Guevara had been wounded and

captured.

SEGRET

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10.

That day Major Selich was sent to Higueras to

interrogate the guerrilla prisoners and assembled the

captured

documents. Since Colonel Zenteno was planning to fly

by helicopter to Higueras on the 9th, Mizones asked him on

the evening of the 8th if he could accompany him to interrogate

Guevara.

Zenteno consulted his staff and agreed.

helicopter had room only for a pilot and two passengers.)

Mizones prepared a 100-word message to the La-Paz Statione

in code reporting Guevara's capture and asking that an Embassy

representative be sent to the area to prevail upon the

Bolivians to spare Guevara's life, since he did not believe

that he could succeed in doing so.

This message was prepared

for the scheduled 10 a.m. transmission of 9 October, and

was not transmitted to the relay point in Asuncion, Paraguay,

until about 10:30 a.n., after Mizones arrived in Higueras

and set up his radio transmitter an RS-48.

out by helicopter

• and arrived in Higueras at about 7:40 a..

Mizones accompanied

Zenteno and Major Ayiroa when they visited Guevara in the

school room which was his improvised jail.

Guevara would

not answer Zenteno when spoken to.. He was bound, hand and foot,

and had a leg wound.

Mizones and Major Selich then reviewed the captured

documents and Mizones obtained permission from Selich to

photograph all the papers,

including Guevara's diary, and also

Selich's permission to retain the

original accommodation

addresses found.

While Zenteno and all the other Bolivian officers

(with the exception of a Lieutenant Perez) were outside of

the village attending to other military affairs, Mizones

remained in Higueras as the highest ranking "Bolivian officer".

In this capacity he answered a call received on the military

field telephone and answered as Captain Ramos

He was given

the code numbers 500 and 600 as orders which were to be

implemented by command of "higher authorities".. He said that

the connection was not clear and he could not recognize the

voice but it could have been

that of Major Saucedo.

case, Mizones said that since it was a

line only available

to the military he was confident that it was order re-

transmitted through military channels.

He said that he knew

that 500 referred to Guevara, 600 to the word execute and

700 to the preservation of Guevarra's life.

These simple

codes had been identified to him previously.

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14. Upon Zenteno's return, Mizones told him of the

message and Zenteno took it as an authentic order and made

no effort to have it confirmed.

Mizones asked if Guevara's

life could be preserved since he had these instructions.

Zenteno replied that his own position would be placed in

jeopardy if he did not comply.

Mizones asked him to make

(Mizones believes that Zenteno had

already resigned himself to the inevitability of Guevara's

Zenteno. said that he was in sympathy with Mizones'

wish but that it was not in his power to reverse the order.

that he was well aware of the treatment which

out to Cubans and

told him to execute Guevara

in any manuer which he might choose.

Zenteno

that he

had to leave for Vallegrande at 10:00 a.m. and would send

a helicopter back to pick up Guevara's'body" at 2 p.m., and

"as a friend"

, asked that the body be ready.

Mizones

reiterated his

request that the order be appealed and

Zenteno

agreed to make the attempt, and said he would advise if he

were successful.

Failing a counter-manding of the order and as the

"Bolivian officer"

left in Higueras, Mizones said he

was left with the implementation of the execution.

Zenteno left,

Mizones was

able to talk to Guevara, who

identified Mizones either as a Puerto Rican or a

working for U.S.

intelligence.

He said he made this judgment

on the basis of the questions asked and on Mizones

accent.

While Mizones was with Guevara, shots were fired in adjoining

rooms and Mizones later determined that these involved the

execution of two other prisoners.

Recognizing these shots

for what they were,

nevertheless,

Guevara blanched

Mizones confirmed that

he too would be executed; although

later composing himself.

After leaving Guevara, Mizones told a sergeant of

the order to execute Guevara and entrusted the mission to him.

He was told to fire below

the head.

The order was given to

the sergeant at 1:00 p.m. and Mizones heard the shots fired

at Guevara at 1:20 p.m.

At 2:00 p.m., the helicopter returned

to Higueras.

Guevara's

A Father Shiller performed the last rites and

remains were

strapped to one of the helicopter's

skids and

Mizones accompanied them to Vallegrande, where

they landed at 2:30

quickly

in the crow p-n.

Mizones said that he lost himself

gathered at the airport, but that

Villolbo took charge

the remains and was photographed.

Mizones said that the title of the photograph, which appearec

in the press, gave an incorrect identification of Villolbo

the name Mizones used, Bamos.

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17.

Mizones said he reported the executions to Major

Saucedo

and

the .Chief of Operations,

a Major Gutierrez,

and then was taken back to identify the bodies of the thrce

executed guerrillas.

They then drove to Santa Cruz with the

documents,

films and equipment and then flew to La Paz,

Where Mizones

contacted his case officer.

He was taken to

a home where the DCOS and other Americans were briefed by

him.

Everything which he had been able

to retain was turned

in then to be carried by a special courier to Washington.

Mizones

then flew back to Santa Cruz where a C-130 ordered

by General Porter, CINCSOUTH,

was

to pick him and Villolbo

up for a flight to the Canal

Zone.

This plane arrived with

flat tire on the l0th or lith.

The U.S. Mission aircraft,

a C- 54,

was then flown to Santa

Cruz and he

and Villolbo

were flown back to La Paz.

After overnighting there, another

C-130 carried them to Panama where Mizones was asked

to

relate his story to General Porter.

After 2 weeks in Panama,

Mizones and Villolbo were documented as GS-l6s so that they

could board a over-booked military flight to Charlotte,

South Carolina.

After their arrival there,

they journeyed

to Miami, where Mizones briefed General Cushman.

(Mizones

believes

that in both high-level briefings he mentioned his

own personal role in the execution of Guevara.)

Charles B.

Dickens

LA/EICO

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