PRELIMINARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 02/20/1976
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10014-10141]

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

717/2015

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER:

157-10014-10141

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-46

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

SSCIA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT

KENNEDY

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS:

02/20/1976

117

SSCSGO, REPORT

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE:

REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

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Date : 08/07/95

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER: 157-10014-10141

RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-46

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

TITLE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE : 02/20/76

PAGES

: 117

SUBJECTS

SSCSGO, REPORT

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

:REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

: POSTPONED

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

353

IN FULL

(R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Box 353

110010

Cy 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM

TO

:Senator Schweiker and Senator Hart (Colorado)

FROM : Select Committee Staff

DATE

:February 20, 1976

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report of Investigation into the Assassination

of President Kennedy

The purpose of this

report is to provide you with a comprehensive

summary of the significant evidence developed in the course of this in-

vestigation, together with the staff's analysis of that evidence. Since

the staff desired to

give you the opportunity to begin reviewing

this

report, certain sections are not yet in this booklet. For example, re-

ports on various

allegations of CIA connections with persons involved

in the Garrison investigation are not finished.

Likewise, 'the report

on the FBI's role in the investigation is incomplete, but

should be

ready on Monday.

This booklet is

a narrative of the evidence we have developed. It

is divided into sections, marked by Tabs, in accordance with the attach-

ed Table of Contents.

There are only three copies of this booklet and

each has been registered with the Committee's document custodian be-

cause of the extremely sensitive material contained in it.

In addition to this report, the staff has prepared three booklets

of documents

generated by its investigation.

These are maintained in

only one copy.

Two booklets -- one for FBI

and one

for CIA -- contain

the documents

designated in this report as TAB

We did not feel it

was necessary for you to examine these documents since they are summarized

in the narrative portion of this report; however, the booklets of docu-

-ments are available at your request.

The fourth booklet contains a copy of all requests to the agencies,

together with their responses.

It serves

record of the course

and

nature of the investigation.

It, too, is available at your request.

finally, you should be aware of the fact that the staft investiga-

tion is continuing.

Several very significant requests have not yet

been

met by the agencies.

However, rather than delay this report by

the staff will supplement this report if

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TOF

ET

PRELIMINARY REPORT:

INVESTIGATION OF ASSASSINATION

OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Table of Contents

TAB

B

C.

D

E

E-1

E-2

F

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Introduction

General Summaries: Review of Classified Agency

and Warren Commission Materials

FBI and CIA Files on Oswald Before the Assassination;

Availability of Oswald's FBI File to the Warren

Commission

FBI's Handling of the Oswald Security Case

The Assassination Investigation: Preliminary

Discussion

CIA's Role in the Investigation

FBI's Role in the Investigation

Miscellaneous Allegations:

-- Connection between Oswald and United States

Intelligence

-- Oswald's Alleged FBI Informant Status

-- Alleged November 17, 1963 FBI Teletype Warning

of President's Assassination

- Alleged Threat of J.P. Milteer to Assassinate

the President

-- Allegations Regarding Windshield in Presidential

Limousine

-- Alleged Threatening Note that Oswald Delivered

FBI Office, Dallas, Two Weeks Before the

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Investigative Areas Not Covered

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INTRODUCTION

Although a good deal of the evidentiary record compiled to

date is well known to you by virtue of your extensive participa-

tion in the interviews and executive session testimony, the staff

has admittedly been somewhat derelict in providing the detailed

information developed pursuant to our review of classified

Agency materials. In partial justification, we wanted to first

ourselves wade through the factual morass that has engulfed the

Warren Commission's report over the

past twelve years.. The instant

report treats in summary fashion all aspects of the investigatory

course pursued by the subcommittee staff over the past three

months and sets forth the findings, albeit tentative, that can be

drawn from the evidence reviewed.

Since early June, Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing devoted a con-

siderable amount of time to Warren Commission-related matters.

Paul Wallach began work in this area in late October; Jim Johnston

and Tom Dawson (part-time) began in late November. The subcommittee's

staff -- which has functioned as an autonomous unit within the

- Committee -- has never been more than two counsel -- Jim and Paul --

and three members of the research staff.

By early November, it became apparent that we had to restructure

and restrict our inquiry to allow for limitations of (1) time; (2)

staff, and; (3) investigative expertise. The factual complexity

of the issues involved precluded our undertaking anything resem-

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bling a thorough review of the Commission's findings and con-

clusions; a process

that would require us to construct and sub-

stitute findings and conclusions where we found the Commission's

deficient.*

Indeed, we estimate that just to review and cate-

gorize the relevant Agency materials would take us from six

months to a year.

The Warren Commission relied almost entirely upon the intell-

igence community, and, in particular, the FBI, as the provider

of facts upon which the Commission based its finding and con-

clusions. The Select Committee's "intelligence expertise" com-

bined with its established access to Agency personnel and materials

suggested a preliminary inquiry designed to determine (1) whether

evidence was not provided to the Commission, and; (2) whether the

intelligence Agency's assassination investigation was deficient

-- an inquiry well within the letter and spirit of S. Res. 21.

In mid-November, we sought and received your approval to

conduct such an inquiry. However, it soon became apparent that

-our limited resources precluded even a preliminary examination

of all possible substantive areas in which disclosure or investi-

gative deficiencies might have occurred. Our knowledge of certain

* It is, in any event, doubtful whether, under s. Res. Z1, we

would have the authority to conduct a "full-scale"

review of the

Warren Commission's findings and conclusions, even if we had the

resources to do it.

.at

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intelligence Agency attitudes - such as the demonstrated re-

luctance

to disclose information obtained from sensitive operations,

informants, sources, or techniques (whether legal or illegal) -

suggested

certain areas where deficiencies were more likely to

have

occurred.

It is to these areas, and to the areas identified

by allegations publicly advanced over the past twelve years, that

the staff has directed its efforts.

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I. GENERAL SUMMARIES: REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED AGENCY AND WARREN

COMMISSION MATERIALS

(A) FBI

• The FBI has an extensive and efficient data retrieval system.

Each filed document is indexed and serialized. An abstract of

every document is prepared and filed separately by author and

subject.

The system ensures that it is virtually impossible to

destroy the record of a document's existence once that document

has been filed. However, the Cormittee is not itself allowed to use

this data retrieval system; we have been required to

make requests

to the FBI and rely upon a good faith compliance. Thus, gaining

access to FBI materials has always been for the Committee a tedious

and time consuming project. It became even more difficult after the

Committee announced an expiration date of February 29, 1976.

Unlike the CIA, the Bureau refused to make their Oswald and

assassination investigation files available en toto for our review.

This necessitated a

series of lengthy Committee document requests.

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One

copy of each of these requests has been included in the

separate book forwarded herewith for your review.

In addition to the standard FBI multilayered screening and

approval process

for Committee document requests (which informs

the Bureau as to the areas into which we are inquiring), the

latest "procedural technique" adopted by the Bureau is worth

mentioning: viz., the Bureau's refusal to even begin gathering

documents pursuant, to our requests until they receive a copy of

our request from the Justice Department. This would not be

especially noteworthy, except for the Bureau's earlier suggestion

that we copy them on all of our requests to expedite the process,

and their subsequent failure to inform the Committee's Justice

liaison -- who under the established procedure correctly saw no

reason to forward our requests to the Bureau with all deliberate

speed -- of the changed procedure.

Eventually, documents have come forth from the Bureau for our

review. We have been able to somewhat expedite our review by

- initially examining abstracts of correspondence and memoranda rather

than the documents themselves, and, subsequently, selecting certain

materials to be reviewed in their entirety. However, even the use

of abstracts has not allowed us to even familiarize ourselves with

FBI materials in other than the few areas to which we decided to

direct our attention. Our inability to review even the relevant

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FBI documentary record in its entirety should be factored into

our conclusions and recommendations.

(B) CIA

At the inception of our inquiry the CIA gave us access

to

the voluminous Oswald "201" file -- which the Agency represented

as

including all CIA materials on the assassination "investigation."

Based upon the Agency's demonstrated reluctance to provide the

Committee with any materials in other areas, its response here

was

unique. However, certain types of documents relevant to the

assassination -- such as internal memoranda pertaining to the

Warren Commission or memoranda prepared by either Mr. McCone or

Mr. Helms -- are not in these files. Our review of the file also

revealed the absence of any 1963 or 1964 memorandums that even

touched on the CIA's Castro assassination attempts or the activities

of anti-Castro groups.

The sheer size of the files precluded our adequately reviewing

all materials contained therein. Jim Johnston's memorandum of

- January 5, 1976, discusses those areas in which we concentrated

our CIA document review in November and December. Our more recent

efforts are summarized below. Once the staff familiarized itself

with the available materials, it then began seeking out files

that

had not been provided. The first such files pertained to the 1967

Garrison investigation.

We also sought to review-- and were only

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allowed access after an unexplained lengthy delay -- the AMLASH

file, and we are,

at present, attempting to gain access to files

containing relevant memoranda of Mr. McCone; - files reviewed

by the staff of the Rockefeller Commission, which noted certain

memoranda were "missing" or "destroyed."

(C) SECRET SERVICE

The Secret Service -- unlike the CIA and the FBI -- is

not an intelligence agency. It is charged with protecting certain

government officials; (most notably, the President), visiting

dignitaries and Presidential candidates. The Service's pro-

tective research files contain information only on persons who

are presently regarded as potential threats to the safety of the

protected individuals. Thus, with the exception of the limited

number of documents pertaining to that Agency's limited partici-

pation in the

assassination investigation, there is literally

nothing of interest to us in its files.

We have completed our review of what the Secret Service has

- assured us were all the materials they have pertaining to the

assassination, the subsequent investigation, and the Warren

Commission. Aside from reports dealing with Presidential protection

and the actions of individual agents in Dallas on November 22,

1963, these materials have primarily served to supplement FBI

reports. They do, additionally, reflect the Service's limited

role in the assassination investigation and reveal specific in-

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stances where the Service's investigation was turned off at the

Bureau's request.*

It is worth briefly noting that the Secret Service did not

have certain documents one would expect them to have. For ex-

ample, there were neither materials pertaining to Warren Commission

proceedings as such, nor memoranda reflecting internal meetings

or discussions relating to Warren Commission testimony by Secret

Service personnel. Additionally, although FBI documents make

reference to Warren Commission related meetings attended by

Secret Service representatives, the Service's files contain no

documents which even refer to these meetings. It is also sur-

prising that there is no formal report of the Service's forty-

five minute interview of Marina Oswald on November 23, 1963 --

the first post assassination interview of Marina by any Federal

agency.

The "absence" of materials is not, in itself, sufficient to

give rise to the inference that documents were destroyed or not

provided to the Conmittee. It is of concern, however, and we

have requested a written response from the Service assuring us that

the materials we have seen are all they ever had, along with the

* As you are aware, President Johnson, on November 25, 1963,

directed the Bureau to conduct the investigation of the

assassination.

ist

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names of the persons within the Service upon whose statements this

assurance is based.

Immigration and Naturalization Service.

We have completed our review of I & NS generated materials on

Lee and Marina Oswald. Invoking the third agency rules, I & NS

refused to allow us to examine FBI documents. However, they did

provide us with

a listing of these FBI materials, a list which

appeared to include certain pre assassination Oswald documents we

had not as yet seen. Subsequent review at the Bureau revealed that

the listed FBI documents were merely the field reports that had

been fully incorporated in the investigative reports that had been

made available to us.

NSA and the Military Intelligence Agencies.

Jim Johnston's memorandum of January 6, 1976, details our

review of the military intelligence and NSA materials through

December 1975. That memorandum concluded further investigation of

military intelligence did not seem productive.

NSA maintains that it has no materials pertaining to Oswald,

the assassination, or the cast of characters (American, Soviet,

and Cuban) that we have identified during our inquiry aside from

the few relatively unimportant documents for which they originally

provided us with a copy. NSA has further informed us that it, un-

like all other intelligence agencies, has no existing file on

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Oswald or the assassination.

The staff interviewed Di. Tordella, who was Deputy Director

of NSA in 1963.

He stated NSA had no significant information

relating to the assassination. Mr. Angleton confirmed Dr. Tordella's

statements,

so the staff decided further investigation of NSA would

not be productive.

State Department

We have reviewed selected materials in State Department files

pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. Most of these

documents in State's files were generated elsewhere. The State

Department generated materials relate to: (1) Oswald's applications

for passports; (2) Oswald's defection to and return from the Soviet

Union; and (3) Marina Oswald's admission to the United States.

There are significant questions raised by the State Department's

handling of the Oswalds. For example, with a "stop" on Lee's pass-

port file after his defection, Department procedures should have

precluded the automatic reissuance of the passport Oswald subse-

•quently sought for his September 1963 trip to Mexico City. Other

questions surround State's decision to allow the Oswalds to return

from the Soviet Union (and even finance the trip) after Oswald's

announced defection. However, unless we can find the fingerprints

of the intelligence community on State's decisional processes these

interesting questions relate solely to internal State Department

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procedures. Our investigation has not uncovered any evidence

which suggests

that

Oswald

received preferential treatment or

that there was any impropriety in the handling of his case. In-

deed, the classified documents reveal that Oswald applied to

return during a period in which the Department was attempting to

foster good relations with the Soviet Union.

Warren

Commission

An understanding of the information that was made available

to the Commission is a prerequisite to

any determination that

evidence was withheld. Although our limited resources precluded

a review of Commission materials in their entirety, we have

attempted to identify what materials were provided to the Commission

in certain areas, and to review completely the materials so iden-

tified. We have also reviewed regardless of subject area, the

ninety classified numbered Commission documents and the ninety-

five classified unnumbered Commission documents presently stored

at the National Archives.

Of the ninety numbered Commission documents, nineteen are CIA

generated, sixty-three are the FBI's and eight are the Department

of State's. The CIA generated documents include a chronology of

Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, miscellaneous information re-

lating to Oswald's activities in Mexico City, personal background

information on George DeMohrenschildt and information pertaining

to Soviet and Cuban intelligence agency activities. The FBI

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materials include personal background information on Michael and

Ruth Paine and Mark Lane,

investigative reports on Oswald's visit

to Mexico City, and

extensive background information on Cuban

groups.

The Department of State documents include reports on

alleged

assassination attempts of world leaders and cable traffic

from the American Embassies in Moscow and Mexico City.

The thirty-three unnumbered documents classified by the CIA

and the Warren Commission are either letters and memoranda between

the CIA or internal Warren Commission memoranda containing national

security information.

More specifically, these documents contain

records of conversations between Warren Commission staffers and

CIA personnel about administrative and substantive issues; memo-

randa of the Commission about CIA information on Oswald's stay

in the Soviet Union and his trip to Mexico City; information per-

taining to the Soviet defector, Nossenko; draft reports of the

Warren Commission on the possibility of a foreign conspiracy; a

memorandum by Warren Commission staffers on their visit to Mexico

City; and, letters to the Soviet and Cuban Governments asking for

information on Oswald. Included in the thirty-nine classified

unnumbered FBI documents

are investigative reports from Mexico

and personal information concerning Mark Lane and Marina Oswald.

The twenty-three classified unnumbered Department of State docu-

ments include correspondence between the Warren Commission and the

Department of State concerning Oswald's defection to the Soviet

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Union and his return to the United States, and the Department's

requests to the

Soviet and Cuban Governments for materials relating

to Oswald.

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THE BUREAU'S PRE-ASSASSINATION OSWALD FILE

A. Oswald's Defection

The Bureau opened a file [Bufile No. 105-82555] on Lee

Harvey Oswald on October 31, 1959, some three weeks subsequent

to his

departure for the Soviet Union. Apparently the opening

was based upon a Washington news ticker advising that Oswald

was in Moscow, that he had applied to renounce his American

citizenship and become a Soviet (citizen for "purely political

reasons,"

and that "he would never

return to the United States

for any reason." Subsequently, the Bureau received a copy of a

State Department telegram and a copy of an Oswald note which con-

firmed the news ticker and additionally noted that ex-Marine

Oswald "has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as

an enlisted radar operator."

The Bureau then proceeded to review Oswald's record at U.S.

Marine Corps headquarters. These records revealed that Oswald

had entered the Marine Corps on October 24, 1956, to serve three

-years. While in the service, Oswald attended the Aviation Fund-

amental School and completed the Aircraft and Control and Warning

Operators' Course. However, there was no record of a security

clearance. The Bureau's stated conclusion was that:

Since subject's defection is known to Department of the Navy, and

subject apparently has no knowledge of any strategic inform-

ation which would be of benefit to the Soviets, it does not appear

that any action is warranted by the Bureau in this matter.

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It is recommended, however, that this memo be referred to the

Identification Division so subject's service fingerprints can

be placed in the criminal files

and that a stop be placed

against the prints to prevent subject's entering the U.S. under

any name.

Espionage Section should be advised it subject again

enters the U.S.

On May 12, 1960, SA John Fain interviewed Oswald's mother in

Dallas, Texas. She had recently received a letter addressed to

Lee from the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland, indicating

that Lee was expected at the college on April 20, 1960. Mrs.

Oswald furnished SA Fain with a photograph of Lee and informed

him that her son had taken his birth certificate with him. By

memorandum, dated June 3, 1960, the Bureau expressed to the State

Department its concern over the possibility that an imposter could

be using Oswald's birth certificate, and requested all State

in-

formation on Oswald.

Inquiries by the FBI's Paris Legal Attache revealed that

Oswald had by letter, dated March 19, 1959, written the college

announcing his intention to begin studies there in the fall of

1959, and that Oswald had paid the $25 deposit. However, there

was no record of Oswald ever having attended the school.

On May 9, 1961, the Bureau's review of State's passport

files on Oswald revealed that:

(a) On 2/13/61,

the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. received an undated

letter

from Oswald postmarked Minsk 2/5/61, indicating that he

wished

to return to the U.S. if legal proceedings were not brought

against him.

Oswald explained that he could not leave Minsk with-

out permission and therefore was writing instead of visiting.

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(b) On 3/20/01, the embassy received

a second Oswald letter

postmarked Minsk, 3/5/61. Oswald requested a questionaire again

explaining that he could not come to Minsk.

A subsequent review of State's files on 8/22/61, indicated that:

(a) by letter, dated May, 1961, Oswald advised Embassy that he

had no intention of returning unless guarantee of no prosecution.

He also advised that he had married a Russian girl, and that he

wanted to return with her.

(b) On 7/8/61, Oswald appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow

with respect to his desire to return now.

(c) On 7/10/61, Oswald executed an application for passport

renewal at the American Embassy.

(d) By memorandum dated 8/18/61, the State Department authorized

the American Embassy in Moscow to renew Oswald's passport for direct

travel to the U.S.

Additional Bureau review of State's passport files on 1/29/62,

revealed that:

(1) By letter to Embassy, dated 7/15/61, Oswald advised that he

was continuing his efforts to obtain exit visas for his wife and

himself.

(2) By letter, dated 8/8/61, Oswald inquired if it would be per-

nissible for him to travel through Poland by train after leaving

Minsk, pointing out that he could not afford to fly from Moscow

but that the cough

to New York City.

- (3) By letter dated 10/4/61, Oswald asked Embassy to assist him

in obtaining exit visas from Soviet authorities.

(4) By letter, dated 1/5/62, Oswald informed Embassy that he

expected to receive exit visas within forty five days. (NOTE:

Embassy had been

notified by Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

that visas granted).

B. Oswald's Return to the United States

By airtel, on May 31, 1962, the Bureau instructed its

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Dallas Field office that they should interview Oswald upon his

return and specifically attempt to ascertain whether he was

recruited by Soviet Intelligence, whether he made any deals

with the Soviets in order to obtain permission to return to the

United States, and exactly what information he furnished to

the Soviets.

The headquarters supervisor noted that if any

doubt existed as to Oswald's truthfulness, the agent should

"consider reguesting his consent to a polygraph examination

and thereafter obtain bureau authority for such an examination."

On June 22, 1962, INS confirmed that Oswald's family returned

to the United States via Hoboken, New Jersey, on June 13, 1962,

and that INS Inspector Frederick Wiedershiem interviewed Oswald

at that time. Wiedershiem advised the Bureau that Oswald had been

employed as a mechanic in Russia, had threatened to renounce his

United States citizenship, but never carried through with the

threat

and had never voted in Russia.

On June 26, 1962, SA John Fain interviewed Oswald in Fort

Worth, Texas.

Fain reported that Oswald was "very difficult to

interview," "cold and arrogant," and "on the whole was generally

uncooperative." Indeed, Fain was also aware that Oswald had .

blatently lied to him as follows:

(a) Oswald denied ever having stated that he was going to renounce

his American citizenship and apply for Soviet citizenship;

(b) Oswald denied having taken his birth certificate with him;

(c) Oswald denied ever mentioning that he would reveal radar

secrets to the Soviets.

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asked Oswald whether or not he would be willing to submit to

a polygraph examination

as to answers given by him during

the interview.

Oswald refused, and subsequently also refused

Fain's request to take a polygraph as to "his negative answers

to the questsions as to whether or not he had been services

or furnished any information to the Soviets or whether he had

made any deals with the Soviets in order to obtain permission

to return to the United States." • Fain indicated on the memorandum

that Oswald would be reinterviewed.

A memorandum, dated July 25, 1962, prepared by a Dallas

Supervisor, reveals that under the SOBIR program a file had been

opened by the Dallas office on Marina Oswald. The Supervisor

opened the case on a pending inactive status -- with suggested

review in six months -- for the following reasons:

"The

case on LEE HARVEY OSWALD is in pending status

and he is

to be reinterviewed.. It is not believed any

active investigation of his wife or interview of her under

the OSBIR program is logical or advisable at this time.

It

is felt that her activities can be sufficiently followed

at this time in connection with the case on her husband.

It is noted there are no subversive references on any

member of the husband's family, and, under present

circumstances, she will be closely and intimately associated

with them.

Oswald was, in fact, reinterviewed by Agent Fain on

August 1b, 1962. Oswald then told Fain that he had recently

advised the Soviet Embassy of his wife's current address, as

1..

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required by Soviet law.

Oswald again lied to Fain, and was this

time only a bit less arrogant and uncooperative. By report,

dated August 30, 1962, SA Fain closed the Oswald case.

.. c.

The Continued Investigation - Dallas

On September 28, 1962, the FBI's New York field office

learned that Oswald had subscribed to "The Worker" an East

Coast communist newspaper. Agent James P. Hosty had been assigned

the pending inactive Marina Oswald case on October 23, 1962, some

five months prior to its status review. On March 3, 1963,

Hosty ascertained through a a review of IN&S records that

Marina was living at an Elsbeth Street address in the Oak

Cliff section of Dallas. On March 11, 1963, Hosty was

informed by the Oswalds' landlady that she had evicted them on

March 3, 1963, for fighting, and his drinking. Hosty was able

to determine from postal authorities that the Oswald's had

moved to Neely Street; he verified this address by checking

the names on the mailbox. Hosty subsequently reviewed the

file on Lee Harvey Oswald and - after noting that Oswald had

subscribed to the Daily Worker --

requested, on March 25,

1963, that the Bureau reopen the case.

Hosty also requested

and received permission to interview Oswald's wife.

Lee

Oswald's case was reopened on March

26, 1963.

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On April 21, 1963, a confidential informant advised the

Dallas office that Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for

Cuba Committee in New York City, at which time he advised that

he passed out pamphlets for the FPCC with a plackard around

his neck reading, "Hands Off Cuba, Viva Fidel." Subsequent

investigation, on May 27, 1963, revealed, however, that the

Oswalds had moved from their last known Dallas address, and

had given no forwarding address from that residence to the

Post Office.

D. Continued Investigation - New Orleans

By letter, dated July 17, 1963, the FBI's New Orleans

field office informed the Dallas office that they had received

information that the Oswald's were living in New Orleans.

This information was apparently provided by the New York

Office and gleaned from a mail cover on the FPCC. At Dallas'

request, the New Orleans office, on August 13, 1963, verified

the Oswald's presence in that city. On September 10, 1963,

the office of origin for both Lee's and Marina's cases were

- changed from Dallas to New Orleans.

In the interim, Oswald had been arrested in New Orleans

and charged with "disturbing thepeace by creating a scene."

More specifically, while distributing FPCC literature, on

August 9, 1963, Oswald had been involved in a "fight" with

three anti-Castro Cubans. On the morning of Saturday, August 10th,

Oswald asked to see a Bureau agent, and he was interviewed in

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jail, at length, by SA Quigley. It is interesting to note that

Oswald also repeatedly lied to this FBI agent, including a

statement that he met and married his wife in Fort Worth, Texas.

On August 22, 1963, the New Orleans office was provided with

a copy of the transcript of an August 21 broadcast of a radio

program called "Conversation Carte Blanche" in which Oswald

had participated. During the program, Oswald stated that the

FPCC was not Communist-controlled and that he is a Marxist.

On August 30, 1963, Station Manager Bill Stucky told SA Kaack

(Oswald's case agent in New Orleans) that after the broadcast,

Oswald told him that "the Russians had 'gone soft' on

Communism, and that Cuba is the only real revolutionary

country in the world today."

On August 23, 1963, the New Orleans Office received a

headquarters airtel instructing that office to:

"ascertain

facts concerning subject' distribution of above-mentioned

pamphlet including nature of pamphlet following which contact

should be made with established sources familiar with Cuban

activities in the New Orleans area to determine whether

subject involved in activities inimical to the internal

security of the U.S. Submit results in letterhead memorandum

form suitable for dissemination with appropriate recommendation

as to further action."

On September 24, 1963, the New Orleans SAC informed the

Bureau that: "Investigation of Oswald is contiuing,. and

a report containing the results thereof will be furnished to

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:

the Bureau together with the recommendation of the New Orleans

office concerning further action concerning Oswald."

The subsequent New Orleans' investigation of Oswald is set

forth in SA Kaack's October 31, 1963 investigative report

encompassing the period July 23, 1963, through October 10, 1963.

The report recounts Oswald's FPCC activities, his arrest and

subsequent interview, his letters to the FPCC, and The Worker

in New York, and that four low level Cuban informants advised

they had no information pertaining to Oswald and that the

Oswald's had moved from New Orleans on or about September 25,1963.

The Oswald's landlord had told the agents that the "same

Russian speaking woman that had brought Marina to New Orleans

had picked up Marina and her child in a station wagon with

Texas license plates. Leads were sent out to Fort Worth (to

attempt to identify the woman and locate Marina), to Dallas

(to attempt to identify the woman and conduct neightborhood

investigation at the Oswald's last known residence), and to Mälvin,

Arkansas (to interview Lee's brother to see if he had any informa-

tion on the Oswald's whereabouts). Additionally, it was stated

that New Orleans would "continue its efforts to locate subjects."

On October 10, 1963, Bureau headquarters through CIA

liaison was provided with a copy of an Agency cable which stated

that "Lee Henry Oswald" had been in contact with the Soviet

Embassy in Mexico City. Further details of Oswald's contact;

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including his meeting

with vice counsel Kostikov, were provided

in an October 19, 1963, cablegram from the Bureau's Legal

Attache in Mexico City to Bureau headquarters. Legat also then

advised that it was attempting to establish Oswald's entry

into Mexico and

his current whereabouts. Copies of these

communications were sent to the New Orleans office which

eventually forwarded copies on to the Dallas office.

On October 18, 1963, SA Hosty -- following up on the

New Orleans office's request to locate Oswald - reviewed

files at IN&S. Although SA Hosty was not able to find a

new address for the Oswalds, he did learn from an IN&S agent

of the CIA communication indicating that Oswald had contacted

the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

On October 22, 1963, the Bureau cabled the Mexico City

Legat that certain background information on Oswald was

simultaneously being sent to Legat by pouch. Headquarters

also advised that "Lee Henry Oswald" was apparently identical

with "Lee Harvey Oswald"

On October 25, 1963, the New Orleans office learned that

Oswald had left

a forwarding address in New Orleans on

September 26, 1963, showing his new address to be 2515 West

5th Street, Irving, Texas. It asked the Dallas office to

verify that this was Oswald's residence.

E. Continued Investigation: Dallas

On October 30, 1963, SA Hosty, through a neighborhood

pretext interview learned that Marina Oswald was living at

the 5th Street address with a Mrs. Michael R. Paine. Hösty

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also learned that although Oswald had visited his family at

the Paine residence, he was not living there. He so informed

the New Orleans office on October 31, 1963, noting that

efforts to locate Oswald should be continued.

Hosty then reviewed Bureau indices and checked with the

Paine's employers to

"ensure that there were no subversive

references." On November 1, 1963, he proceeded to the Paine

residence to interview Mrs. Paine. Although Mrs. Paine

claimed she did not know Oswald's home address, she did

know he was employed at the Texas School Book depository

in Dallas.

Toward the end of the interview Mrs. Oswald entered

the room; however, Hosty, reported that he merely exchanged

greetings with her. Hosty left his name and office telephone

number with Mrs. Paine, requesting that she contact him if

she learned of Oswald's

address.

On November 2, 1963, Hosty by telephone verified Oswald's

employment at the Book depository. The other field offices

were so notifed

and instructed to discontinue efforts to locate

Oswald. However, Hosty was not able to verify Oswald's residence;

the Book Depository had it listed as the Paine's address. He

returned to the Paine address again on November 5, 1963. Although

Oswald had visited his family again on November 2, Mrs. Paine

could provide nothing further as to an address; however, she

did say that Oswald was "an illogical person and an admitted

Trotyskite Comnunist."

vas

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By memorandum dated November 15, 1963, the office of

origin for the Oswald cases was changed back to Dallas.

On November 19, 1963, the Washington Field Office informed

FBI headquarters that Oswald:

has recently been in contact with Consular Office, Soviet Embassy,

Washington, D.C., at which time he related he

had

recently met

with Comrade KOSTIN,

Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. At

this time OSWALD indicated to Soviet Embassy that he was

unable

to remain in Mexico because of Mexican visa restruction of 15

days and

that he could not request a new visa unless he used

his real

name.

According to informant, OSWALD had originally intended to

visit Soviet Embassy in Havana, Cuba, where he could have had

time to complete his business but could not reach Cuba.

The informant stated that OSWALD is married to MARINA

NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, a Soviet citizen, and has a new daughter,

AUDREY MARINA OSWALD, born 10/20/63,. Dallas, Texas.

OSWALD'S

address is known to informant as Box 6225, Dallas, Texas.

This information was received in Dallas on November 22, 1963.

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CIA's Pre-Assassination Files on Oswald

CIA's information on Oswald was not collected in one office or

file prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Instead, in-

formation was located in the Western Hemisphere Division, the Coun-

terintelligence Division, in CIA's "201" file on Oswald, and in other

offices.

The CIA's 201 files are computer-indexed files on individuals

about whom the CIA has received information. Documents in Oswald's

201 file, therefore, are merely those received by CIA and retrievable

through a computerized name check.

On November 22, 1963, Oswald's 201 file contained five documents :

an ONI memorandum of May 1, 1962, advising CIA of Oswald's request to

have his undesirable discharge changed; the State Department's Foreign

Service dispatches of May 26, 1961, and October 12, 1961, discussing

Oswald's citizenship and passport status; and FBI investigative xe-

ports by Special Agent John Fain, dated July 3, 1961, summarizing in-

terviews of Oswald's mother and brother, and August 30, 1962, summariz-

-ing the second FBI interview of Oswald after his return from the Soviet

Union.

Two other FBI reports on Oswald were not in the 201 file. One

was an FBI report by Fain dated May 12, 1960, which, according to Mr.

Elder's January 23, 1976, letter to the Select Committee, was filed in

another filed unrelated to the Oswald 201. The second was an FBI re-

port by Special Agent Milton Kaack of October 31, 1963, giving infor-

mation on Oswald's background, his arrest in New Orleans, and his move

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from New Orleans. As discussed in detail infra, the Kaack report

was first routed to the Counterintelligence section of the Special

Affairs Staff, then to the Counterintelligence Division in November

1963.

Five messages related to Oswald's visit to Mexico City in Sept-

ember and October 1963 were in the Western Hemisphere Division files on

November 22, 1963. The information contained in these

messages had

not, as of that date, been incorporated in Oswald's 201 file.

CIA's mail intercept program intercepted one letter which Oswald

had written while in Russia. That letter had not been put in his 201

file.

)

Finally, a message from CIA's WAVE station in Miami indicates

that its sources had limited information on Oswald prior to the as-

sassination. This information and its significance is discussed in-

fra.

CIA recently informed the Select Committee that this informa-

tion probably did not come from files held at the WAVE station, but

from files of Cuban exile groups connected with CIA. Technically,

- therefore, this information was not in CIA's files on Oswald prior

to the assassination.

'st:

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Discussion: Availability of Pre-Assassination FBI

Oswald Documents to the Warren Commission

By letter, dated May 4, 1964, J. Edgar Hoover listed and

summarily described for the Warren Commission each of the

sixty-nine items that made up the Bureau's headquarters file

on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. Although

certain summaries in the letter are misleading, we have not

found any indication that there were other than these sixty

nine documents in the headquarters FBI Oswald file.

Nor have we

found any indication that there were other than the usual

underlying reports in the FBI field office files. Still

outstanding, however, is our request for materials in Oswald's

Washington, D.C. field office file at any time on or before

November 22, 1963.

The staff believes that a review of this

file will allow for the resolution of certain outstanding

questions pertaining to the interception of Oswald's letters

to the Soviet Embassy.

Although only portions of the sixty-nine documents were

received by the Warren Commission, they were offered the opportunity

to review all of

them.* As the testimony set forth below reveals,

on May 6, 1964, Assistant Director Alan Belmont brought the head-

quarters file with him andoffered it to the Commissioners for

their review:

Mr. Stern: Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identifi-

cation Commission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the

Commission, please?

(The document referred to was marked Commission

Exhibit No. 834 for identification.)

Asuming that Mr. Belmont was accurate in his. reprentation

that the file contained the complete set of documents

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MR. BELMONT. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed

to the Cormission which sets forth in summary the contents of the

headquarters file on Oswald prior to the assassination.

MR. STERN.

Do you have that file with you?

MR. BELMDNT. Yes, sir.

MR. STERN.

Would you explain generally to the Conmission what

materials there are in that file that for security reasons you

would prefer not to disclose?

MR. BEIMONI. The file contains the identity of some of our

informants in subversive movements.

It contains information as

to some of the investigative techniques whereby we were able to

receive some of the information which has been made available to

the Cormission.

MR. STERN. I think that is enough, MI. Belmont, on that.

MR. MCCLOY. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did

you?

MR.

BELMONT. No.

THE CHAIRMAN. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the

other members of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning

that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that

you have just spoken of.

MR. BELMONT.

I would like to make it clear, Me. Chairman, that-

I think that is very kind of you--I would like to make it clear

that Mr. Hoover has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help

to the Cormission, and to make any information abailable that

will be helpful to the Conmission. I think your observation is very

much worthwhile.

MR. STERN.

Mr.

Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this

letter of May 4 wich summarizes each document in the file?

MR. BELMONT.

Yes, sir.

MR. STERN. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of

each piece of information in the file?

MR. BELMONT.

Yes, sir.

MR. STERN.

The file is available to the Camission?

MR. BELMONT.

Yes, sir.

MR.

STERN.

MR.

If they want to look at any item in it?

BELMONT. Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. The file does not include that security matter that

you mentioned, or does it?

MR. BELMONT.

This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all

information in it.

THE CHAIRMAN.

With all information in it?

MR. BELMONT. Yes, sir; this is the actual file.

THE CHAIRMAN. I see.

MR. RANKIN.

Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a

reasonable time in case any of the Commissioners desire to examine

it personally?

MR. BELMONT.

Yes, sir.

MR.

RANKIN.

We will return it.

THE CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions.

If we

want to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought

to make

It known here while the witness is here. I personally don't

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care to have this information that involves our security unless

it is necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession

where it could be assumed that I had gotten that information and

used it, so I would rather,

I would rather myself confine our

questions to this file to the testimony of Mr. Belmont.

Then

if we want it, if we want any of those things, it then

becomes a

matter to discuss here in the open, and not just in privacy.

THE CHAIRMAN.

I think that would be better.

I think, Mr. Rankin,

your purpose is entirely laudable here, but I think we do have to use

some discretion in the matter, and you say that you want it so we can

say we have seen everything.

Well, the same people who would demand

that they be entitled to see it, and if it is security matters we

can't let them see it. It has to go back to the FBI without their

scrutiny.

So unless, I would say, unless there is something that we think

here is vital to this situation, that it isn't necessary for us to see

the whole file, particularly (p. 13) in view of the fact that we

have practifally--we have all the reports, he says we have all the

reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old

straw to go over it and over it again.

MR. MCCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in

here from the Embassy?

MR. BELMONT.

You are looking at--

MR. MCCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that?

We don't have these in our files, for example.

MR. BELMONT.

This is subsequent to the assassination. You see

your area of interest at this point is information, all information

we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file

the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination,

MR. MCCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should

examine that file.

I can't come to any other conclusion after reading

it all, becuase I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and

what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that

is narrative, which I think would be relevant.

Certainly, I don't

believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing

a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of.

We are just as interested in protecting the security of your

investigative processes as you are...

But I don't think that when it

is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material

that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to

examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we

ought not to have somebody go through it.

MR. DULLES.

I agree with you but I think we could save time if we

checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about

half of that file probably.

MR. MCCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about

half of it.

THE CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's

see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

MR. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the

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tile then until we can give you the information.

THE CHAIRMAN.

That is right. is

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DISCUSSION: THE BUREAU'S HANDLING OF OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION CASE

A. Oswald's Defection.

After the State Department informed the Bureau of Oswald's

defection and announcement to State officials that he intended

to provide "radar secrets" to the Soviets, the Bureau opened a

"Security case" with Oswald as the subject. The FBI then verified

through inquiries with the Department of the Navy that Oswald did

not have knowledge of strategic information that would benefit

the Soviets. The conclusion was that, although no further action

on the case was warranted, a stop should be placed against the

prints to prevent Oswald from entering the United States under

any name.

Some six months later the Bureau Interviewed Oswald's mother

at her request. They were informed that Oswald had taken his

birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union; by memorandum

disseminated to, inter alia, State (but not CIA), the Bureau ex-

pressed concern that an imposter might attempt to return to the

United States using Oswald's identity.*

B. Oswald's Return to the United States.

Despite the Bureau's expressed concern, when Oswald returned

to the United States on June 13, 1963, he was interviewed at the

dock by IN&S Inspector Frederick Weidersheim. The Bureau did not

interview Oswald until some three weeks subsequent to his return.

*The FBI's own field offices were not provided with a copy of

this memorandum.

The Dallas agents have testified that they never

considered the imposter possibility.

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There is no indication that Weidersheim attempted to verify

whether an imposter had assumed Oswald's identity. Nor did the

Department of State follow its own internal procedures: viz.,

embassy officials handed Oswald his passport some five days prior

to his scheduled departure from the Soviet Union, and there was

no look out card placed in Oswald's file.*

On June 26, 1962, SA Fain interviewed Oswald in Fort Worth,

Texas. According to Fain, Oswald was cold, arrogant and difficult

to interview. With copies of State Department documents in hand,

Fain must have been aware that Oswald was repeatedly lying.

Indeed, Fain asked Oswald to take a polygraph test; he refused,

even to his negative answers on deals or relationships with Soviet

intelligence** Fain also reported that Oswald denied that he had

ever been a member of the Communist Party in the United States,

or that he went to the Soviet Union because "of a lack of sympathy

for the institutions of the United States."

A second interview some four weeks later on August 30, 1962,

• went much the same

way. Despite Oswald's attitude and demonstrable

lies, Agent Fain closed the Oswald security case on August 20, 1962;

it was not to be reopened again until March 26, 1963.

The only additional investigation of Oswald conducted by the

Bureau at any time prior to March 26, 1963, were the reviews of

the Oswald file at the Department of State, inquiring of two low-

level Communist Party informants whether they knew of Oswald (with

*

Issues relating to the Department of State's handling of Oswald's

return are treated in Appendix XV of the Commission's Report.

* The Warren Commission was apparently not provided with the

• administrative cover

pages of Fain's report

Oswald'

which

s..refusal to be polygraphed.

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negative responses) and interviewing three of Oswald's relatives.

No neighborhood or employment sources were checked or developed,

Marina was not interviewed, none of the Bureau's established

legitimate techniques to determine with whom a subject was in

contact -- such as mail covers -- were employed or their use even

suggested.

Indeed, the Bureau's failure to interview Marina is surprising.

The documentary record reflects that Marina's case was opened in

a pending inactive status; i.e., although the file was not tech-

nically closed, nothing would be done in the case for six months.

She had originally been considered for the Bureau's SOBIR (Soviet

Block Immigrant Repatriation) program, which we have been informed

involved the Bureau's desire to interview and more closely monitor

the activities of Soviet immigrants who meet certain criteria that

suggest possible intelligence connections. However, the field

Supervisor concluded on July 25, 1962, that consideration of

Marina for the SOBIR program would be postponed for six months in

- that her activities could be sufficiently monitored in connection

with the subversive case on Lee Oswald. As previously noted, the

case on Lee Oswald was closed on August 30, 1962.

With respect to Oswald's marriage to Marina, and her return

to the United States, the Commission stated:

Oswald's marriage to Marina Prusakova on April

30, 1961, 1s Itself a fact meriting consideration.

A foreigner living in Russia cannot marry without

the permission of the Soviet Government.

It seems

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unlikely that the Soviet authorities would

have permitted Oswald to marry and to take

his wife with him to the United States if they

were contemplating using him alone as an agent.

The fact that he had a Russian wife would be

Likely,

in their view, to cinrease any surveil-

lance under which he would be kept by American

security agencies, would make him even more

conspicuous to his neighbors as "an ex-Russian,"

and would decrease his mobility. A wife's

presence in the United States would also consti-

tute a continuing risk of

disclosure.

On the

other hand, Marina Oswald's lack of English

training and her complete ignorance of the United

States and its customs would scarcely recommend

"agent team"

agent Someto besent es ahe he men states

on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise.

In contradistinction, a retired Bureau Soviet Section Supervisor

told us that of greatest concern to him in the Oswald case was

the fact that the Soviets had allowed Marina to return to the

United States with Oswald. He felt that if they desired to "tap

Oswald on the shoulder and make use of him at some future date,

Marina's presence would give them a great deal of leverage."

However, it should be emphasized that the Supervisor is not aware

of any evidence which suggests that the Soviets in fact used or

attempted to contact Oswald.

It is surprising that Oswald was not debriefed despite two

years in the Soviet Union, and more particularly, in Minsk, a city on

which the intelligence agencies have told us that they had less

information than they would have liked to have had.* Indeed, it

was the dearth of positive intelligence on Minsk which led the CIA

officer on the Soviet desk to suggest, in 1961, that Oswald be" de-

* The documentary material does not provide an explanation for

the intelligence community's failure to debrief Oswald.

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briefed upon his return. It is also interesting to note that

the CIA attempted in part to justify certain of their counter-

intelligence operations - such as the mail opening program

on the basis of the valuable general, positive intelligence

provided on the Soviet Union. We also know that the CIA still

openly interviews American citizens upon their return from the

Soviet Union.

C. The Continued Investigation - Dallas.

On September 28, 1962, the New York field office learned,

through a mail cover -- and, subsequently informed Dallas -- that

Oswald subscribed to "The Worker," which periodical in Bureau

parlance is referred to as "an East Coast Communist newspaper."

Oswald's subscription to this newspaper would seem to contradict

his statements to SA Fain that he was disenchanted with the Soviet

Union and not out of sympathy with U.S. institutions. The fact

of Oswald's subscription was simply noted in his security file;

FBI headquarters was not informed of the subscription until Sep-

tember 10, 1963, and then only afterilt had requested information

on Oswald from the Dallas office. Assistant Director Gale of the

Inspection Division, in his December 10, 1963, highly-critical

report on the Bureau's handling of the pre-assassination Oswald

case noted: "In light of Oswald's defection, the case should have

been reopened at the first indication of Communist sympathy or

activity."*

*None of the Bureau's internal stinging criticism of their agents

handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case ever reached the

Warren Commission.

See discussion

supra

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In October of 1962, SA Hosty had been assigned the Marina

Oswald security case, which remained at that time in pending

inactive status.

The case was reviewed by Hosty for the first

time in March of 1963. Hosty then located Marina Oswald, but

did not interview her as a potential SOBIR subject because of

her alleged marital difficulties. Hosty did, however, review

the Dallas Office's security file on Lee Oswald and, on the basis

of Oswald's contacts with "The Worker," opened that case on

March 26, 1963.

With respect to Hosty's stated reason for not interviewing

Marina -- i.e., that he had developed information that Oswald

had been drinking to excess, and beating his wife, and wanted to

allow a "cooling off" period -- Mr. Hoover noted in December of

1963 that this was "certainly an asinine excuse" and "I just

don't understand such soicitude." Inspector Gale in the above-

noted memorandum informed Mr. Tolson that "this entire facet of

the investigation was mishandled. Mrs. Oswald definitively

should have been interviewed and the best time to get information

from her would be after she was beaten up by her husband." The

Director added the following notation to Gale's conclusion: "This

certainly makes sense."

On April 21, 1963, the New York field office obtained a copy

of an Oswald letter to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee ("FPCC").

This is the first indication in Bureau files that Oswald had a

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260084

relationship with this pro-Castro organization. Oswald therein

advised that he had passed out FPCC literature in Dallas with a

placard around his neck reading "Hand Off Cuba - Viva Fidel."

This information was not reported to Dallas until June 27, 1963,

and not reported to headquarters until September 10, 1963.

Once again, Oswald's activities contradict his "non-Communist"

interview statements.

On May 27, 1963, when Hosty finally returned to the Oswald's

Neely Street residence to interview Marina, he was informed that

the Oswald's had moved from the Dallas area without leaving a

forwarding address. Pursuant to leads sent out by the Dallas

office seeking information on the Oswald's whereabouts, the New

Orleans office Informed Dallas on July 17, 1963, that the Oswald's

were living in that city. The Bureau had apparently first

learned of Oswald's presence in New Orleans from a letter he had

written to "The Worker" on June 26, 1975. Oswald claimed in the

letter to be a long-time subscriber and stated that he was

forming an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans. He enclosed honorary

membership cards for "those fighters for peace," Mr. Gus Hall

(General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA) and Benjamin

Davis (National Secretary of the Communist Party, USA). On

September 10, 1963, New Orleans became the office of origin for

both Lee and Marina's cases. SA Kaack was then assigned both

cases.

TOP

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D. The Continued Investigation - New Orleans.

In the interim, Oswald had on August 9, 1963, been arrested

in New Orleans in connection with his FPCC activities and

charged with "disturbing the peace by creating a scene." On

the morning of Saturday, August 10th, Oswald asked to see a

Bureau agent, and he was interviewed at length by SA Quigley.

It is interesting to note that Oswald also repeatedly lied to

this FBI agent. For example, he told Agent Quigley that he had

met and married his wife in Fort Worth, Texas. Although Quigley

and Bureau reports maintain that he "only passed the information

on to SA Kaack' (and that he was not aware of these lies as he

had not read the previous reports), Bureau records establish

that Quigley had been handling the leads on the Oswald case prior

to the formal assignment to Kaack on September 10, 1963; in this

capacity he should have been aware of Oswald's background

The New Orleans office learned on August 22, 1963, that

Oswald participated in a radio program in his capacity as the

- Secretary of the New Orleans FPCC Chapter, and stated, inter alia,

that he was a Marxist and that "Cuba is the only real revolutionary

country in the world today." On August 23, 1963, the New Orlean's

office was instructed by headquarters "to submit results of their

Oswald investigation to the Bureau." On September 24, 1963, the

New Orleans office advised the Bureau that the investigation was

continuing and that a report setting forth the investigative

TOP SECRET

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findings would be furnished. Agent Kaack's investigative report

was subsequently sent to the Bureau on October 31, 1963; it did

not contain any significant information that was not already in

Oswald's headquarters file.

Some time between September 25 and October 2, 1963, agents

of the New Orleans office attempted to ascertain Oswald's residence

and place of employment. They then learned that the Oswalds had

left New Orleans. Leads to locate Oswald were sent to Dallas,

Forth Worth and Malvern, Arkansas.

It was not until October 22, 1963 -- some twelve days sub-

sequent to the date on which Bureau headquarters was first infor-

med of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City --

that information pertaining to Oswald's Mexico City trip was

provided to the New Orleans office. Coincidentally, Hosty in

Dallas had by chance ascertained similar information from the

I&NS Inspector, and Hosty's report was also received in New

Orleans on October 22, 1963. Thus, despite the fact that both

- field offices were aware by October 22, 1963, of Oswald's contact

with the Soviet Embassy, there is absolutely no evidence that either

of these field offices intensified their "efforts" to locate Oswald.

Most surprising, however, is that the "Soviet experts" at FBI

headquarters did not intensify their efforts in the Oswald case

after being informed that Oswald had met with Vice Consul Kostikov

at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Not only were these experts

TOP SECRET

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more familiar with Soviet activities in general; they knew that

Kostikov was KGB, and had reason to believe he was an agent

within the KGB's Department 13 (Assassination-Sabotage).

They were also aware that American citizen contacts with the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were extremely rare. Ironicly, the

teletypes informing the Bureau of Oswald's Mexico City activities

were sitting on a pile of documents on the headquarter's super-

• visor's desk awaiting initial action on November 22, 1963. That

'portion of Inspector Gale's memorandum of December 10, 1963,

which discusses these teletypes reads as follows:

The SOG (Seat of Government) supervisor failed

to take any action on the teletypes, stating

it did not appear to him any action was warranted.

Inspector (i.e. Gale) feels

the field

should have been instructed to intensify Inves-

tigation

... and Oswald placed on Security

Index.

TOP SEGREI

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E. Continued Investigation: Dallas

On October 26, 1963, the New Orleans field office advised the

Dallas office that the Oswald's had left a forwarding address in

Irving, Texas. Dallas was asked to verify the new residence.

On October 30, 1963, Hosty established that although Marina and

the baby were living in Irving with the Paine family, Lee was

not living there. On November 1, 1963, Hosty went to the Paine

residence for the stated purpose of interviewing Mrs. Paine to

"find out where Oswald was residing." Mrs. Paine told Hosty that

she did not know where Oswald lived; however, she did advise

Hosty that Oswald was employed at the Texas Book Depository.

Toward the end of the interview Marina Oswald came into the room.

According to Hosty, she expressed fear of the FBI. Hosty claims

that his two or three minute conversation with her (with Ruth

Paine translating) was cordial, as he attempted to waylay her

fears.

On November 2, 1963, Hosty claims to have, by telephone,

• verified Oswald's employment at the Book Depository. However,

Oswald's employment records listed the Paine house as his re-

sidence. Hosty recontacted Mrs. Paine again, but she was still

unable to provide any further information as to Oswald's

residence address.

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At this point, Hosty held the investigation in abeyance and

no further investigation was undertaken until the assassination.

Hosty explained that he held the investigation in abeyance to

"be sure that he was in possession of all information from New

Orleans."

Hosty also gave this explanation to Inspector Gale,

who noted in his memorandum to Mr. Tolson:

Inspector definitely does not agree.

New Orleans submitted sixteen page report,

10/31/63, and only leads outstanding

in

New Orleans were to ascertain Oswald's

whereabouts.

No indication New Orleans

had any further data

• Even if New

Orleans had not

reported all information

in their possession, Dallas should have

intensifled investigation in light of

Oswald's contact with Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City and not held investigation in

abeyance.

TOP SHINEI

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Katie

THE ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION

Preliminary Discussion:

Not only were many Americans, immediately after the assass-

ination, for the first time questioning the myth of the intelli-

gence agencies infallability; many were also openly skeptical of

the FBI's stated findings that Oswald was the assassin and that

he acted alone..

Congress and the President were well aware that the public

could only

be assuaged by

what they believed was a thorough and

independent investigation of the assassination. Two resolutions

were submitted in Congress calling for congressional investigations

into the circumstances surrounding the assassination. The State

of Texas set up a Commission for the same purpose. President

Johnson, in establishing the Warren Commission by executive order on

November 29, 1963, preempted the field.

The President's publicly stated reason for establishing the

Commission was to "ensure a thorough and independent investigation

of the circumstances surrounding the assassination." In that the

only investigations of the assassination on record were the invest-

igations that had been conducted by the Dallas Police Department

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation -- and taking into account

the public criticism and skepticism directed at these two agencies --

it can be inferred from President Johnson's public statements that

the Commission's investigation was to be independent from the

Bureau's. Indeed, the Commission's report noted: "Because of the

TOO 901

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TOR SEG

numerous rumors and theories the public interest in insuring the

the

truth could not be met merely by adopting the reports or the

analysis of Federal or state agencies."

When it began work in earnest in mid-December, the Commission

was supplied with a tremendous number of reports from various

Federal and state agencies. By far the greatest number of reports

emanated from the FBI; of particular importance was the five

volume, December 9, 1963, Report summarizing the Bureau's immediate

post assassination investigation. Subsequently, the Commission

requested

and received the field investigation reports upon which

the December 9, 1963, report had been based. The Commission stated

in its report:

As these investigative reports were

received, the staff began analyzing and

summarizing them. The members of the legal

staff

divided into teams, proceeded to

organize the facts revealed by these in-

vestigations, determine the issues, sort

out the unresolved problems, and recommend

additional investigation by

the Commission

After reviewing the accumulating ma-

terials, the Commission directed numerous

additional requests to Federal and State

agencies.

(Report, P. xii)

The Commission's Report also states:

Because of the diligence, cooperation, and

facilities of Federal investigative agencies,

it was unnecessary for the Commission to em-

ploy investigators, other than the members of

the Commission's legal staff. (Report, p. xiii)

TOMP

PEOPAT

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With only isolated minor exceptions, the entire body of

factual material from

which the Commission drew its findings was

supplied by the intelligence community, and, primarily, the FBI.

Even when material was provided by an agency other than the FBI,

however, the record reflects that the agency usually first checked

with the Bureau before supplying information to the Commission.

Moreover, FBI memoranda indicate that CIA and Secret Service

personnel received Director Hoover's Commission testimony prior

to the testimony of their respective agency head, for the stated

purpose of "ensuring that there were no conflicts in testimony."

Thus, by its own admission, the Commission was dependent

upon the intelligence agencies for the facts. As a second step,

• the Commission and its staff did analyze the material and fre-

quently requested follow up agency investigations. However, if

the Commission did not initially receive any evidence on a parti-

cular point, the second step would obviously not be reached, and

the Commission's findings and conclusions would necessarily be

drawn without the benefit of any information on the omitted point.

There are a variety of reasons that can explain why a parti-

cular piece of evidence was not produced for the Warren Commission.

It might not in the first instance have been available to the

intelligence agencies, or although available not uncovered because

of an inadequate investigation. It is also possible that the

... also led

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WAR ORDET

evidence was known to certain persons within the agencies but be-

cause of compartmentation not available to the liaisons and never

provided to the Commission. Another possibility is that evidence

was purposefully withheld from the Commission. The next two sections

analyze those aspects fo the CIA's and FBI's respective assass-

ination investigations which the staff has had the opportunity

to

review.

Subsequent sections of the report discuss the staff's

review of specific instances where it has been alleged that evidence

was withheld from the Commission.

NO CROOST

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THE CIA'S ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION

1.

The Effect of Assassination Plots Against Castro on the Warren

Commission Investigation

The possibility that CIA had engaged in plots to assassinate

foreign leaders was

first acknowledged publicly in the course of

the Rockefeller Commission's investigation and was confirmed by

the Senate Select Conmittee's investigation and report.

The Rockefeller Commission investigated both CIA assassination

plots and their connection with the Warren Commission investigation.

David Belin, a staff attorney for the Warren Commission and Chief

Counsel for the Rockefeller Commission, wrote:

At no time did the CIA disclose to the Warren

Commission any facts which pertained to alleged

assassination plans to kill Fidel Castro; (Memor-

andum from David Belin to the Rockefeller Commission,

May 20, 1975, p. 1 (TAB A ))

Belin concluded: [T]he CIA withheld from the Warren

Commission information which might have been relevant

• in light of the allegations of conspiratorial

contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban

government. (Ibid., p. 18.)

Mr. Belin also discussed this matter with Raymond Rocca, Chief,

Research and Analysis, Counterintelligence Division, CIA in 1964;

who was the "point of record" & between the CIA and the Warren

Commission. Mr. Rocca, like Mr. Belin, prepared a memorandum stating

he was unaware of the plots until 1975 and expressing concern about

the Warren Commission's findings in light of this new information.

Mr. Belin also contacted former Warren Commission staff counsel,

Burt Griffin, to get his views on this matter. Mr. Griffin responded

* Testimony of James Angleton, February 5, 1976.

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by letter (TAB B) wherein he wrote he was not told of assassi-

nation plots against Castro. He also expressed his feelings that

assassination plots against Castro might have a significant effect

on the Warren Commission findings.

After the Select Committee concluded that one plot, possibly

involving the assassination of Castro, was underway in the Fall of

1963 and that the plot involved the passing of a poison pen to a

Cuban agent on the very day of President Kennedy's assassination

we began an investigation to resolve: (1) whether anyone with the

Warren Commission knew of the plots; (2) whether the CIA intention-

ally withheld information about the plots from the Commission or

from other Government officials; and (3) whether there is probable

cause to believe the existence of such assassination plots affects

the findings of the Warren Commission.

a. Background of Assassination Plots: Covert Actions Against Cuba

Fidel Castro's forces took over the government of Cuba on Jan-

uary 1, 1959. Although initially advocating reform through socialism,

Castro soon openly advocated Communism and aligned himself with the

Soviet Bloc. The United States was properly concerned with Castro's

change in direction, not merely because a Soviet aligned regime in

Cuba posed a threat to U.S. security, but also because Castro seemed

bent on exporting communist revolution throughout Latin America.

As a result, the United States embarked on a policy looking to

the ouster of Castro and his Communist regime. Implementation of

this policy concerned all appropriate government agencies -- the

Departments of State, Justice, and Defense included. The CIA was

given principal responsibility for implementation of the policy

through covert action.

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We have made no attempt to detail the CIA's covert operations

against Cuba except as necessary to provide a background for the

CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Our review indicates

that by the end of 1964, CIA covert operations against the Castro

regime totalled $106 million. Peak spending of $44 million was

in 1961 with most of the money going to support the Bay of Pigs

invasion.

Spending in 1962, 1963, and 1964 averaged only $20

million. (TAB C › *

The nature of the covert operations ran the gamut of the tech-

niques CIA had available: propaganda, coastal raids, agent net-

works,

sabotage of facilities, defection of Cuban officials,

outright invasion in the case of the Bay of Pigs, and coup planning

and assassination. In addition to these operations directly con-

trolled by CIA, there were various operations run by Cuban exiles.

Two major exile groups, referred to by the CIA as "autonomous

operations," were assisted by CIA and were controlled as best as

could be by CIA.

The CIA therefore had files on many of those involved with the

twc autonomous groups. As will be discussed infra, this meant that

even though many members were living in the United States and ostensi-

bly, within the jurisdiction of the FBI, not the CIA, the CIA could

have assisted Warren Commission investigators in understanding Oswald's

Cuban connections.

We do not think that the Warren Commission knew

* Expenditures for paramilitary operations generally totalled an

estimated $9 million in 1964, $5 million of which was for support

of

autonomous Cuban

groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.

(TAB

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TOP SECTI

Thus, the Warren Commission's investigation of the assassination

of President Kennedy was conducted against a background of CIA's

covert operations against Cuba. Knowledge of these operations was

relevant both to the Commission's conclusions about foreign con-

spiracies and to its investigation of Oswald's connections to pro-

Castro and anti-Castro organizations. We found no evidence that

the Warren Commission was given access to information about Cuban

operations of that the CIA independently investigated these matters.

b: Nexus Between CIA's Assassination Plots and a Foreign Conspiracy

[The following discussion of foreign conspiracy should be

considered of the highest sensitivity. There is no direct evidence

of such a conspiracy. But there is sufficient circumstantial

evidence to suggest that one existed, and was not thoroughly investi-

gated.

Without question, any public indication that the Select Commit-

tee is investigating a foreign conspiracy would be enormously ex-

plosive.

A disclosure would have substantial impact on current

foreign policy vis-a-vis the countries under question. While any

direct evidence of a foreign conspiracy might ultimately warrant

public disclosure, certainly the evidence so far developed does

not!]

*

Information in JMWAVE files on the Cuban Student Directorate

that "AMHINT 53

reports AMSPELL delegate had radio debate with Lee

H. Oswald of Fair Play for Cuba Committee sometime in August of

1963 . .

: According AMSPELL files Oswald former U.S. marine who

had travelled Moscow 59 at which time renounced American citizenship

and turned passport over to American consulate.

Allegedly lived in

home Sov foreign minister for two months.

(Cable from JMWAVE

Station to Headquarters, November 22, 1963. (TAB * )

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_In its public report, the Warren Commission concluded there

was no evidence of any conspiracy involving Oswald:

Based upon the investigation reviewed in this chapter,

the Commission concluded that there is no credible

evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was part of a con-

spiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Examination

of the tacts of the assassination itself

revealed no

indication that Oswald was aided in the planning or

execution of his scheme. ..The Commission discovered

no evidence that the Soviet Union or Cuba were in-

volved in the assassination of President Kennedy. WR 374-

In a

confidential staff memorandum prepared only a month. hefore

the report went to print, Commission staff member, Burt W. Griffin,

argued against the then proposed version of the public report on

foreign conspiracy. He argued:

Much of the "disproving evidence" which is

amassed in connection with the [foreign gov-

ernmentall conspiracies has little probative

(Memorandum From Burt Griffin

to Howard Willens, August 20, 1964, p. 1.)

He also noted that the report's conclusions were in reality based

only on the findings: (1) no foreign government had a motive;

(2) there was no evidence Oswald was a foreign agent; and (3) Oswald

would have been the worst possible agent for the job.

The public report's conclusion against any conspiracy stands

in sharp contrast to the staff's classified conclusions. In its

one hundred eleven page Top Secret report on foreign conspiracy,

the staff stated it did not believe the Soviet Union was behind the

assassination but it did not reach the same conclusion with regard

to Cuba.

For example, in discussing Oswald's actions it wrote:

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do the other heed a de can umstances a characte

propagandizer,

or even an assassin, for the Cuban Government.

Our investigation supports this conclusion about Cuban involve-

ment. However,

we do not rule out Soviet involvement and CIA

counterintelligence personnel interviewed strongly doubt the Cubans

could have carried off an assassination of President Kennedy without

the knowledge, and possible assistance, of the KGB.

c. The AMLASH Operation and Castro's Knowledge of It

Without doubt, Fidel Castro had good reason to fear U.S. policy

under President Kennedy. Kennedy had permitted the abortive Bay

of Pigs invasion and had threatened nuclear war over Soviet place-

ment of nuclear weapons in Cuba. His administration constantly

focused on the ouster of the Castro regime.

On the other hand, Castro on the surface seemed to have little

to gain from the death of Kennedy since he would be succeeded by

Johnson who, Castro could have assumed, would carry on the same

policies. Castro certainly noticed no difference between Kennedy's

policies and those which might be adopted by Senator Goldwater, his

likely opponent in the 1964 election. For example, in a report of

an impromptu interview on September 7, 1963, AP correspondert

Daniel Harker reported:

Castro then launched into a discussion of the U.s.

political scene saying he expects no change in Washington's

foreign policy even if there is a change in administra-

tions

after the 1964 presidential elections.

"I am sure

it will be a fight between (President) Kennedy and

*

Sanitized Copy of Warren Commission Staff Memorandum on Foreign

Conspiracy obtained from Archives, P. 6.

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(Sen. Barry) Goldwater (R Ariz.).

and

crooked

politicians,'

Castro

said.

Both are chea

(TAB E

In any event, speculation as to Castro's motives requires

consideration of the specific actions the Kennedy administration

taking in the Fall of 1963. Of prime importance to Castro, may

have been belief or actual knowledge that CIA was then attempting

to assassinate him as part of a coup by the non-Communist officials

in the Castro regime.

After the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, CIA's covert

operations, then

designated as Project Mongoose, were halted on

October 30, 1962. Castro seemed to be aware of this decision in

his November 1963 interview with the reporter Jean Daniel. (TABF )

On the other hand, raids by Cuban exile groups could not be

so easily controlled. However, after exile raiding boats fired on

a Russian ship off the coast of Cuba in Spring 1963, the FBI,

reportedly acting on Robert Kennedy's orders, started a crack-down

on the U.S. based operations of the exile groups. Mechanisms were

devised, however, to avoid FBI crack-down on the CIA operations.

In June 1963, a decision was reached to step up various covert

operations against Cuba, including sabotage operations designed

to encourage dissident groups inside Cuba,

to worsen economic

conditions in the country, and to cause Cubans to doubt the ability

of the Castro regime to defend the country. (TAB G )

Perhaps this decision prompted CIA to renew contact in June with

a high level Cuban official, code-named AMLASH, who previously had

indicated interest in assassinating Castro and in toppling

* Landsdale memorandum for kecord, 10/30/62.

**

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12

the regime.

In late August 1963, AMLASH travelled to Brazil with a group of

Cuban officials and athletes. Upon arrival there, he notified a

contact he had with CIA.

From September 5 through 8, he met with

his contact and CIA case officers in Brazil... Although CIA's interest

in AMLASH may have been to gain intelligence and to cultivate him

as an asset for covert operations, the case officers learned that

AMLASH himself was interested primarily in attempting an "inside

job" against Castro.

After making his proposal, AMLASH left Brazil

indicating he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. A message from

CIA headquarters analyzes the contact by suggesting AMLASH did not

seem interested in routine intelligence missions and should be dir-

ected toward recruiting cohorts for sabotage and "more serious matters

on an orderly basis."

The case officer testified he was aware of

this analysis.**

• There is no hard evidence that Castro was aware of these meetings

with CIA, but there is

reason to believe he was.

Shortly after the meeting, CIA received information from another

source in Cuba to the effect that AMLASH was part of a group of anti-

communist Cuban officials of which Castro was aware. The case officer

could not recall receiving this information, but he knew that AMLASH

had been rather openly anticommunist in 1961 and 1962.

More importantly, on September 7, 1973, Castro gave an impromp-

tu interview with AP reporter Daniel Harker and warned against

The following facts are detailed in the Staff Summary of CIA's

AMIASH file. (TAB H

*

AMLASH

case officer was interviewed on February 11, 1976.

His

disagreements with the chain of events.

drawn

From

the

file

are noted.

1**:

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the U.S. "aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders." Castro

chose a reception at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana as the occasion

for his tirade. (TAB E ) The connection between Castro's warn-

ing and the AMLASH meeting may only be coincidental.* Never-

theless, AMASH had proposed a terrorist plan to eliminate Cuban

leaders; and, according to an informal briefing by a current CIA i

analyst of Cuban affairs, Castro is known to resort to subtle

nuances, such as the choice of the Brazilian Embassy, to put his

statements in context.

Similarly Mr. Rocca has concluded: "There can be no question

from the facts surrounding the Castro appearance, which had not been

expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event

represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the

record in the United States." (Memorandum for DC/OPS, May 23, 1975).

According to Harker, Castro went on to say the "United States

leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away

with leaders of Cuba... . We are prepared to fight them and

answer in kind. United States leaders should think that if they

are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they

themselves will not be safe."

Castro also talked about what he termed "recent U.S.-prompted

raids on Cuban territory" and "piratical attacks" by the United

States against the Cuban people. Indeed the CIA had conducted

raids on Cuban coastal targets in August. In addition an air raid

by an exile group, not related to CIA, in the same time period was

The case officer was not aware of this warning at the time. He

conceded it may be a

fair

statement of the nature of the AMLASH opera-

tion.

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11

noted in a report of September 4, to be of much concern in Cuba.

( TAB

"I)

Obviously, we cannot be certain about Castro's awareness of the

AMLASH meeting. His statements refer to raids, which were much talked

about according to the September 4 report. Yet objectively those

raids cannot be considered "plans to eliminate Cuban leaders."

AMLASH's proposal was. The raids would not objectively call for

Castro to threaten the safety of American leaders aiding the plans.

AMLASH's proposal might. In any event, Castro comments at that

interview clearly suggest he held Kennedy responsible for whatever

he was concerned about.

In the ensuing two months, CIA involvement in AMLASH's plot

grew deeper. In early October the case officer told AMLASH that his

proposal had U.S. support at the highest levels* and found AMLASH

greatly relieved and ready to return to Cuba to undertake the

"big job." Later in the month AMLASH demanded to meet with Robert

Kennedy to obtain his personal assurance that the United States

supported his plan -- a coup, the first step of which was

probably the assassination of Castro.**

CIA did not arrange a meeting

with Robert Kennedy, but instead

sent Desmond Fitzgerald, head of the Special Affairs Staff (the

office responsible for all covert operations against Cuba), to meet

* He testified he meant the highest levels of CIA.

** The case officer repeatedly refused to characterize the AMLASH oper-

ation as an assassination plot.

However, he testified that AMLASH was

proposing a coup which included Castro's

assassination as the first step.

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with AMLASH as the personal representative of Robert Kennedy. On

October 29, Fitzgerald told AMLASH a successful coup would receive

U.S. support.

AMLASH seemed satisifed with this show of high level U.S. support

for his plans, but still expressed concern that the U.S. was not

furnishing him the necessary equipment, e.g., explosives and rifles

with telescopic sights.*

On November 20, a CIA case officer tele-

phoned AMLASH to arrange a meeting for November 22, saying he did

not know if it would be interesting, but it would be the meeting

AMLASH requested. The case officer hesitated in stating that AMLASH

would have understood this message as positive evidence CIA was going

to meet his request. At this meeting AMLASH was shown a poison pen

device, given assurances that the requested equipment would be sup-

plied him in Cuba, and shown a copy of President Kennedy's speech of

November 18 in Miami.** The case officer told AMLASH that Fitzgerald

had helped write the speech, which included the following passages:

It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has

stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed

over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban

nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. *** This, and

this alone divides us.

. As long as this is true nothing

is possible.

Without it everything is possible. ***

Once this barrier is removed we will be ready

and

anxious to work with the Cuban people . . .

***

*

The case officer said he also asked for a device to protect him-

self in close quarters. The poison pen device was developed to satis-

fy this request.

** The case officer does not think he showed AMLASH the speech, but

instead alluded to it.

He testified that the quoted portion, especial-

ly the statement "Once this barrier is removed," probably was pointed

out to AMLASH as an indication of Kennedy's support.

He testified that

Fitzgerald had authorized him to make these representations to

AMLASH.

He did not know what authority Fitzgerald had or what the President or

anyone above Fitzgerald had been told about the AMLASH operation.

*** Washington Post, November 19, 1963, P.

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Certainly this left little doubt in AMASH's mind that U.S. policy

was fully in support of his proposal to do away with Castro and to

lead a coup. * The contact report prepared on November 25 makes no men-

tion of the poison pen or assassination. The case officer thought

Fitzgerald had told him to make no mention of it. However, a March

19, 1965, document in AMLASH's file states: ~

22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. *** [the case officer

assured subject (AMLASH] that this Agency would give

him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer,

all the money he wanted).

The situation changed when Mr.

***

and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover

that President Kennedy had been assassinated.

Because

of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was de

cided that this Agency could have no part in the assassi-

nation of

a government leader (including Castro) and

it would not aid

subject in his attempt.

This included

the following.

"We would not furnish the silencer,

scope,

nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore,

we would not lift a finger to help

Cuba should he assassinate Castro.

subject escape from

The case officer took exception to the statements of fact contained

in this document. First, he pointed out Fitzgerald was not at the meet-

ing, but was instead in Washington. After repeated questions, he final-

ly denied he had given AMLASH the assurance of "all the money he wanted. "

He testified AMIASH never asked for money. He and Fitzgerald did, how-

ever, assure AMLASH of all the support he needed; and money could be

considered part of that support.

The case officer said he and Fitzgerald never discussed a connec-

tion between the AMLASH operation and the assassination of President

Kennedy. Therefore, he thought the document's statement that plans

The case officer testified that he himself thought this speech was

"signal" to dissident groups within Cuba.

NH 50955

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changed because of Kennedy's assassination does not accurately de-

scribe the situation. He further said that there was no assurance

to aid AMLASH's escape. The case officer felt the document was a

summary drawn from the AMLASH file, attributing statements made to

AMLASH in November 1964 to decisions in 1963.

There is no way to reconcile this document with the case officer's

testimony. No other document indicates Fitzgerald was at the Novem-

ber 22 meeting with AMLASH. No other document, except a missing cable

of November 23, allegedly instructing the case officer to break con-

tact with AMLASH, suggests plans changed because of the assassination.

No other document so directly refers to the AMLASH operation as an as-

sassination plot. No other documents mention escape plans or money.

If the case officer is correct in his testimony, the quoted portions

of this 1965 document were cut out of whole cloth. And, if he is cor-

rect, many at the Agency, who had later responsibility for at least

a portion of the operation, were acting on very erroneous information.

Two other events occurring in the October-November 1963 time

period deserve mention in this discussion of U.S. -Cuban relations.

The first is that talks between the Cuban delegate to the UN, La

Chuga, and a U.S. delegate, William Atwood, were proposed by the

Cubans on

September 5.

After discussions about the location for such

TOP SECRET

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talks and Atwood's expressions of U.S. interest, La Chuga told

Atwood on October 28 that "Havana didn't see exactly how a talk

would be useful now, but he would be glad to maintain continuous

contact." On November 29, La Chuga again inquired of Atwood about

U.S. interest in talks. (TAB K )

Secondly, the French reporter, Jean Daniel, had a brief inter-

view with President Kennedy on October 24 before setting off on an

assignment in Cuba. At that meeting, the President expressed his

feeling that Castro had betrayed the revolution. (TAB L)

Daniel travelled to Cuba but got no hint of a similar meeting

with Castro. Then on November 19, the day after the President's

speech in Miami, Castro contacted Daniel and spent six hours talking

to him about U.S. /Cuban

relations. (TAB M) Daniel again

met Castro on November 22, spending most of the day with him.

Daniel's report of this meeting "When Castro heard the News"

describes Castro's reaction to word of the assassination. Sig-

nificantly, after word of Johnson's succession to the Presidency

reached Castro, he asked: "What authority does he exercise over

the CIA?" (TABA ›

There is little doubt that Castro was well aware of the U.S.

program of covert operations against Cuba. In public speeches,

he repeatedly attacked CIA operations, although he rarely dis-

tinguished between CIA operations and those of exile groups operating

on their own.

President Kennedy's speech of November 18 would

have reinforced his belief that the U.S. was committed to his overthrow.

We have attempted to determine whether Castro knew about the

AMLASH operation specifically either because AMLASH himself was

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double agent* or because Cuban/Soviet penetration of the CIA's

Cuban operations would have given him such information.

Our brief investigation has not yielded a definitive answer.

However, the following facts included in TAB M, indicate Castro

could have known of the operation. First, Castro's statement on

September 7 that "events of the last few days" indicate the U.S.

was possibly aiding terrorist groups' plans to eliminate the leaders

of the revolution is an accurate description of the CIA meetings

with AMLASH on September 5-8. Second, the CIA received a report

that Castro was

aware that AMLASH was part of an anti-communist group

of Cuban

leaders. Third, CIA received information that employees

of the Cuban Embassy in Paris suspected AMLASH was there on some

Top Secret business. Fourth, CIA learned that Cuban Embassy employees

in Paris were angered by statements by AMLASH and others denigrating

the revolution during the time he was there meeting with CIA case

officers.** Five, CIA discovered at least one of their meetings with

AMLASH was under surveillance by French intelligence and CIA had

to explain its actions to the French. Six, a CIA proposal in 1965

indicated AMLASH might be a double agent and suggested CIA inform

the Cubans that he had received money from CIA; however the

proposal apparently was not implemented. (TABO) Seven, the CIA

received various reports that its operations were penetrated. One

Cuban defector named a low level CIA agent who had been working for

The case officer dismissed this possibility because AMLASH was tried,

convicted, and sentenced to the Isle of Pines for a later plot. AMLASH

made no mention of the 1963 plot during his trial.

**

The case officer testified that AMLASH may have expressed to his

friends his opposition to Castro and admitted such conversations might

have been overheard by others

who would not have been receptive to such

comments.

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the Cubans since 1961 and indicated there was a very highly placed

Cuban intelligence agent in CIA's covert operations against Cuba.

Thus, it is possible that Castro knew that CIA was meeting with

AMLASH and that he knew generally that AMLASH was dissatisfied with

the regime. There is no doubt that Castro also knew that AMLASH

had assassinated a Batista official in 1956 (TAB P ) so he i

could surmise the threat posed by CIA's meeting with AMLASH.

d. Should CIA Have Disclosed the AMLASH Operation to the Warren

Commission?

Knowledge of covert operations generally must be distinguished

from knowledge of specific operations. The members and staff of

the Warren Commission knew Kennedy's policy toward Cuba and knew

CIA was

involved.

Allen Dulles, for example was completely familiar

with operations conducted until his departure from the Agency in

November 1961. He could also have assumed that those operations

continued.

The more difficult question is who knew of the assassination

attempts against Castro and who knew of the details of the AMLASH

operation.

Again Dulles probably knew CIA had engaged in past attempts to

kill Castro. There is no reason to believe he knew of the AMLASH

operation.

The Select Committee's report on assassination concluded that

Mr. Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, was informed about the AMLASH

operations and approved Fitzgerald's being introduced to AMLASH as a

representative of the Attorney General. Mr. McCone denied knowing of

the AMLASH operation. We have found no evidence to indicate that

ties At pe

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anyone with the Warren Commission was told of AMLASH; and we have

Mr. Belin's, Mr. Griffin's and CIA's statements that the Warren

Commission was not informed.

From the facts described previously, the AMLASH operation seems

extremely relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's

• :

assassination. Not only did the operation contemplate the assassina-

tion of Castro with rifles with telescopic sights, but it involved

telling AMLASH that Robert Kennedy approved the scheme and calling

his attention to the President's speech on November 18. Moreover,

key meetings were held during the Fall of 1963, with the final

meeting taking place at the very moment of the assassination.

Despite this, neither Mr. Helms, nor the case officer who net

with AMLASH thought any relationship existed. Both seemed to :

suggest there was no reason for informing the Warren Commission about

the operation - the thought never crossed their minds.

The testimony of Mr. Helms and the case officer notwithstanding,

we find it incredible that those at CIA knowledgeable of the opera-

tion did not at least suspect there might be a relationship. Further-

more, we find evidence that affirmative actions may have been taken

to prevent those investigating the assassination from learning of

the AMLASH operation.

For example, CIA files on AMLASH contain only the briefest report

of the November 22 meeting with AMLASH. The case officer identified

the document in the file as the report he prepared, but he could not

explain why the type of the third page is dramatically lighter than

The case officer testified there was "no link" in his mind between

the two events and no discussions of such a link.

21

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tigating the assassination, but only to note the unresolved leads.

"Furthermore, the Warren Commission staff travelled to Mexico

City and was given

access to files there and at Headquarters. We

have not attempted the difficult and tedious job of determining

precisely what documents the staff actually read or what documents

it had access to.

We have summaries of the documents reviewed in

Mexico City and from these summaries it seems the staff did not re-

view many of the Station's files; but we cannot be certain that

..-.

the summaries are accurate.

In any event, our review of CIA files on Mexico City yields a

different picture of Oswald's visit there than that painted in

the public version of the Warren Report. Moreover, these documents

disclose unusual activity by both the Soviets and Cubans in Mexico

City, which may or may not relate to the assassination,

but are,

in the least, coincidental with it. Our findings follow.

Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy on September 27, sometime

between 10:00 a.m. and 4:05 p.m. A caller to the Soviet Embassy at

10:30 that morning asked for a visa to Odessa. It is unlikely that

the caller was Oswald because the caller spoke Spanish, because

the call was placed so soon after his arrival, and because Odessa

is a resort town in Russia and not a likely destination for Oswald.

Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate in the afternoon asking for

a visa and indicating he had previously been to the Soviet consulate.

He dealt with a Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate named Sylvia

* We do know that the files we have reviewed may contain docu-

ments not seen by the Warren Commission

staff.

i Oswald studied spanish, but was not known to speak it.

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30

Duran. She called the Soviets at 4:05 p.m. in an attempt to de-

termine whether they had granted a visa and learned they had not.

She told Oswald he could not get a visa to Cuba for travel on to

Russia unless he had the Russian visa first. This is substantiated

by the documents

furnished by the Cuban government.

The next morning Oswald apparently visited the Soviet Consulate

again and then went to the Cuban consulate. At 11:31 a.m. he called

the Soviet Consulate from the Cuban Consulate and told them that

he had just been there. He continued saying the Soviets wanted his

"address" which the Cubans had. The Russian with whom he talked told

him to come back and give them the address.

There is no explanation for why Oswald had to get his address

from the Cubans, nor is it known whether he was referring to his

address in the United States or in Mexiço City. Relevant to the

latter hypothesis, is Sylvia Duran's reported statement in 1967 that

she had sexual relations with Oswald. She denied this in 1963

when interrogated by Mexican authorities.

Either on this day or the previous day, Oswald allegedygot

into an argument with the Cuban consul, Asque. This fact was initially

brought out in the interrogation of Duran by Mexican authorities

immediately after the assassination. It was substantiated by Oswald's

letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington of November 9, 1963,

in which he complains about the attitude of Asque. (TABU ›

However, in mid-1964, a sensitive source reported that Oswald had

also told Asque that he intended to shoot Kennedy. An article in

the National Inquirer and the Mexican, newspaper, Novedades, reports

an interview by a British journalist, Comer Clark, in 1967 with

Castro in which Castroy

"satdeoswald

tora. Asque that he planned to

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13..: .

shoot Kennedy. * (TAB V *)

Oswald may

have met with the Soviet Consul, Yatskov,

while in Mexico City.

Oswald may also have met Vice-Consul

Kostikov; Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy refers

to a dis-

cussion with "Comrade Kostin." Oswald easily could have been

confused or could have forgotten Yatskov's name, so there seems

to be no significance in the fact he met Yatskov.

Nothing is known about Oswald's activities on September 29 or 30 --

although his visa application furnished by the Cubans indicates

he wanted to travel to Cuba on September 30. The Cuban documents

show his application was not approved until October 27 and then

only on the condition that he have a Soviet visa.

On October 1, Oswald telephoned the Soviet Embassy and Consul-

ate about his visa application. He was told there was no further

**

information but a telegram had been sent to Washington.

CIA documents indicate the October 1 call was a long

distance telephone call. One witness, familiar with Mexico City,

indicated that calls from suburban sections of the city could be

***

long distance.

CIA developed no further information in Mexico City about

Oswald until the assassination. But only twenty minutes after

NH 50955

* The Warren Commission Report tends to suggest Oswald did not

contemplate assassination until a mid-November slight by Marina.

** The Soviet Ambassador. in Washington turned over to the State

Department all files in the Washington Embassy and Consulate:

There

is no telegram or other message from Mexico City.

***

Testimony of David Phillips, February,

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the shooting in Dallas the CIA intercepted a telephone call be-

tween Mirabil (Asque's replacement as Cuban consul) and Kostikov.

Their conversation is unusual and perhaps was prompted by word of

the assassination.

The Jean Daniel report of "When Castro heard

the News" indicates Castro received word less than half an hour

after the shooting.

Various Cuban and Communist Bloc personnel in Mexico City

reportedly said something to the effect that they knew "almost

before Kennedy." (IAB i) This possibly means word of Oswald's

threat against Kennedy, expressed to Asque, had spread throughout

the Communist Bloc establishment in Mexico City before the assassination.

After the assassination CIA received a report from a source,

later determined to be

prone to exaggeration, that a reporter in

Mexico said the Cubans had met Oswald at a restaurant on the out-

skirts of the city during his visit. The Mexican reporter denied

the story to FBI investigators. Employees of the restaurant were

interviewed and, after being shown pictures of Oswald and various

Cuban officials, stated they could not recall seeing them at the

restaurant. (TAB X >

The Mexican authority's arrest of Duran was strongly protested

by the Cubans. Even if Cuba had no involvement with Oswald, the

Cubans would be concerned about U.S. suspicions. In any event,

the Cuban Ambassador met with Duran and reviewed what she had told

NW 50955

*

Whether this phone call was made after both were aware of the

assassination is not clear.

U.S. personnel in Mexico City indicate

they did not learn of the assassination for nearly an hour after it

occurred. The Piwire carried Merriman Smith's report of the shooting

within four minutes and his report "Kennedy seriously wounded per-

haps

seriously perhaps fatally by

assassin's bullet"

a few minutes

later.

(LABY)

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the Mexicans. He then summarized what she told him in a report he

pouched

to President Dorticos of Cuba. On November 26, Dorticos

called the Ambassador two different times in order to clarify the

report.

In both conversations, Dorticos repeatedly asked the Am-

bassador whether Duran had said anything about giving money to

Oswald.

Assured that she hadn't, Dorticos concluded the second phone

call by asking whether it was safe to act on the information he had.

(TAB: 2)

Shortly after the assassination, CIA learned of unusual activi-

ty on flights to Cuba. First, it was reported that a flight from

Mexico City to Cuba on November 22 was delayed some five hours in

order to take on an unidentified passenger who boarded the aircraft

without passing through customs. No further information was ever

received by CIA and no further investigation of the information was

ever conducted. (TAB PA)

Second, an American of Cuban birth named Gilberto Lopez

was

reported to have travelled from Tampa to Texas where he crossed

into Mexico on November 23. On November 25, he arrived in Mexico

City and departed on a late evening flight to Havana on November 27.

He was the only passenger on the Cubana airlines flight which had

a crew of nine.

Information available to CIA also indicated that Soviet couriers

were engaged in "unusual" travel between New York, Mexico City, and

Havana both before and immediately after the assassination. (TAB

Again, CIA drew no conclusion about this unusual activity.

4020229

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3.

Major Deficiencies in CIA's Investigation

a. Nossenko.

In repeated testimony before the Select Committee, Mr. James

Angleton, who was head of CIA counterintelligence for 20 years,

emphasized the strange case of the defector Nossenko as. a basis for

his concern about Warren Commission findings. Nossenko, a high level

KGB officer, defected to the U.S. in early 1964. Among other things,

he told a story of KGB's belief that Oswald was unstable and of

KGB's resultant disinterest in Oswald. Nossenko claimed to have

reviewed the complete KGB dossier on Oswald shortly before his

defection and assured interrogators that KGB had no connection with

Oswald.

Mr. Angleton testified that neither he nor other CIA personnel

responsible for Nossenko's interrogation believed him to be telling

the truth -- in Mr. Angleton's parlance, Nossenko lacked bona fides.

Current CIA counterintelligence officials, who strongly disagree

with Mr. Angleton's

policies generally, now assert that Nossenko

is bona fides. The limited material the Select Committee staff has

been able to digest tends to support Mr. Angleton's view. However,

MH 50955

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in the least we have a difference in opinion between the counter-

intelligence experts as to the reliability of Nossenko's story.

If Nossenko is not bona fides

but is instead a plant, then

there is a very troubling question as to why he defected and as

to why his story exonerates the KGB. Perhaps his defection was

designed to give CIA incorrect information on many aspects of the

KGB's operation - in which case his story about Oswald could still

be true. However, there seem to be inconsistencies between his

knowledge of the Oswald case and the known informatiön- about Oswald.

For example, he claimed to have reviewed the entire KGB file on

Oswald. Yet he had no knowledge of Oswald's visit

to Mexico City

other than the bare fact that he went there. He did not tell

interrogators, what surely must have been in Oswald's file, that

Oswald met Yatskov and Kostikov -- both KGB agents. In any event,

the Nossenko defection remains as mysterious now as it was in 1964.

b. Pursuit of the Cuban Connection

With substantial evidence pointing to Cuban involvement. in the

assassination, CIA would logically have been expected to use its

resources to conduct a vigorous investigation of that connection.

Just the opposite happened. There is also the possibility that a

vigorous investigation was not urged by higher levels.

The Mexico City Station informed Headquarters immediately after

the assassination that the Mexican government, like CIA, knew that

Oswald had met with Sylvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate. It

* This is the same deficiency in the documents furnished by

the Soviet Ambassador.

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1, 6.

further cabled that the authorities planned to arrest and inter-

rogate Duran. Upon learning this Mr. Karamessines, then assistant to

DDP Helms, ordered Mr. Whiten of the Mexican desk of the Western

Hemisphere Division to telephone the Chief of Station on an

open line to call off the arrest. The telephoned order was too late

for Duran had already been arrested. However, Whiten apparently

did not agree with the order and wrote a memorandum for record

stating that he carried out the order despite his personal objection

to it. (TAB )

Later that day, a

message authorized by Karamessines cautions

Mexico Station about the interrogation of Duran because it could

jeopardize U.S. freedom on the whole question of Cuban responsibility:

We have not as yet deposed Mr. Karamessines or Mr. Whiten about

this

order, but Mr. Angleton testified he was unaware of it and cannot

understand why it was issued.

More importantly, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Thomas Mann,

apparently was at this time extremely interested in investigating

the role of the Cubans. CIA cables from Mexico reveal he was ex-

erting pressure on CIA, FBI and State Department personnel to investi-

gate the Cuban connection. He proposed that Mexican authorities arrest

Maria Louisa Calderon and the Cuban Consul Mirabil. The Chief of

Station cabled headquarters about this pressure and warned of

the "flap potential" of the Ambassador's continuing along his line

of investigation.

The Chief of Station is now dead so he cannot

explain the meaning of his cable. Clark Anderson, the FBI

representative in Mexico City who sat in on meetings with the Am-

bassador and Chief of Station testified that he was not aware of

NN 50955

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N SEGME

any CIA reluctance to pursue Cuban involvement; and, he expressed

surprise that the Chief of Station sent such a message to Head-

quarters.

Indeed very little is known about the actions of the Cuban

diplomatic/intelligence personnel in Mexico City either before

or after the assassination. Mr. Phillips, charged with responsi-

bility for Cuban affairs in Mexico City, testified that CIA had

"total coverage" of the Cuban diplomatic establishment. Yet

asked to explain CIA's failure to have telephone intercepts from

the Cuban consulate of the conversations intercepted at the Soviet

Embassy, he suggested only that CIA probably had decided not to

monitor the Cuban ¡consulate's phones.

Moreover, unlike the Soviet KGB personnel, Cuban intelligence

officers were not put under CIA surveillance. Maria Louisa Calderon,

who was alleged to have been in contact with Oswald, moved her

residence on the afternoon of the assassination and moved into

the Cuban Embassy after the arrest of Duran. She returned to Cuba

on December 13.

Furthermore, CIA undertook a major review of its Cuban policy

immediately after the assassination. In early December, Head-

quarters first approved and then called off various operations

against Cuba by its WAVE station in Florida. WAVE complained about

the confusing orders, but Headquarters assured WAVE that everything

depended upon the high level review of Cuban/Caribbean policy.

Indeed White House documents of January , 1964, note that

previous orders were issued delineating the types of operations that

could be conducted pending final decision by the President as to

future Cuban policy. (TAB

NW 50955

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Throughout January, February, and March, review at the White

House level continued. Notes of discussions at these meetings

are quite detailed, but the AMLASH operation was never mentioned by

name, nor so far as we can determine, by even a general description.

There is no reference in these notes to the events of the Fall of

1963, although almost every other CIA operation is detailed.

In November 1964, AMLASH was again in contact with CIA through

an intermediary and the White House staff was duly informed of this.

However, the staff was only told that AMLASH had been working for

CIA since 1961 and had provided valuable information.

The

staff

was not told that CIA had met AMLASH in connection with

a coup or

assassination attempt.

29

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34

TOP SECRET

*с.

SAS Information on Cuban Groups

As mentioned previously, CIA was engaged in a variety of covert

operations against Cuba. At Headquarters, the Special Affairs Staff

was

responsible for Cuba. The WAVE station in Florida actually car-

ried out the operations. So far as we have been able to determine,

WAVE had two major ties to the Cuban exile community. First, it em-

ployed exiles in CIA-controlled operations against Cuba. -

Cuban exiles

were used as members of agent teams landed in Cuba and as the crews

of boats

and aircraft supporting operations. Necessarily, WAVE per-

sonnel were actively recruiting Cuban exiles for these operations and

probably had a great deal of information about Cuban exile groups.

Second, WAVE apparently had responsibility for liaison contact

with the two "autonomous

groups" -- one headed by Ray and the other

by Artime.

Both of these groups had extensive contacts in the Cuban

exile community.

Despite WAVE's potential for assisting in the investigation of

the assassination -- especially regarding Oswald's connection with

Cuban exiles -- WAVE was not directed to give such assistance.

Although the Warren Commission requested FBI to furnish what in-

formation it held on various Cuban groups, it made no similar request

of CIA. We have not been able to learn why the Commission did not make

such a request -- particularly significant in view of the fact that

FBI's response noted CIA might have an operational interest in Cuban

groups. In any event, a large and possibly fruitful area of investiga-

tion, the CIA's ties to Cuban groups, was not investigated by the War-

ren Commission or the CIA.

Лії":

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N 020

tatctdian

ire-

*

MAe eCePE

15 k30 6

NH 50955

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"d.

Gilberto Policarpo Lopez

As mentioned previously, CIA learned that Lopez crossed the border

from Texas into Mexico on November 23. CIA knew that the border had

been closed by Mexican authorities immediately after the assassination

and reopened on November 23, so such a crossing was itself cause for

investigation. Lopez arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed

in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a late

evening Cubana airlines flight to Havana, using a Cuban "courtesy visa"

and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on that flight,

which had a crew of nine.

In February 1964, CIA received a report that a source alleged Lopez

had received his permit to enter Mexico on November 20 in Tampa, Florida.

The same source, apparently an informant for Mexican police, also said

Lopez was somehow "involved in the assassination." There is no indica-

tion that CIA followed-up on this report.

The FBI did investigate Lopez after receiving CIA's report of his

unusual travel. The FBI's investigation terminated after publication

of the Warren Report, because Lopez was then in Cuban and so outside

the FBI's jurisdiction.

The FBI's reports on Lopez are confusing and very inadequate, but

they are the only information we have on him. The following informa-

tion is taken from those reports.

Lopez applied for a U.S. passport at the U.S. Consul Office in

Havana on June 2, 1960. He presented proof that his mother was an

NW 50955 DocId: 32423529 Page 82

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American citizen although she moved to Cuba with her parents when she

was eight months old.

She married Lopez' father, a Cuban national,

in 1939.. Lopez was born in 1940. His mother, in documents submitted

with Lopez' application, indicated she planned to remain in Cuba.

On

July 5, 1960, the U.S. Passport Office authorized the Embassy in Cuba

to

issue Lopez a passport, but limited its validity to January 25, 1963,

• the date he would become 23 years old.

Lopez requested Cuban authorities to permit him to return to Cuba

on May 15, 1962. Lopez' cousin said Lopez had spent several weeks in

Cuba and we assume this was after May 15, 1962.

In August 1962, Lopez married an American woman, ll years his

elder, named Blanche Andrea Leon. They lived in Key West until June

1963, when they moved to Tampa.

In August 1963, his wife moved back to Key West because of marital

problems with Lopez. His wife and others characterized Lopez as pro-

Castro.

Lopez allegedly told FBI's sources that he had originally left

Cuba to evade military service, but Selective Service records disclosed

that Lopez registered for the draft on July 29, 1960, at Key West. He

was classified 4-F on February 23, 1962, because of a language barrier

and because he had a physician's letter stating Lopez had gran mal

epilepsy. Nevertheless, some sources told FBI that Lopez had returned

to Cuba in 1963 because he feared being drafted. Others attributed his

return to his worry about his parents or about his own health.

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VOr

"It was also reported to FBI that Lopez had a brother in the Cuban

military who was studying in the Soviet Union.

On November 17, 1963, according to several sources, Lopez was at

a get-together at the home of Mary Quist, a member of the Tampa Chapter

of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where color slides of Cuba were

shown.

[Ilhere was some talk about Gilberto Lopez having been at

the Quist residence for some time waiting for a telephone

call from Cuba which was very important.

It was understood

that it all

depended on his

getting the

for him to leave the United

States.

"go ahead order"

He indicated he had

been refused travel back to his native Cuba. . . . (TAB *

On November 20, 1963, Lopez obtained a Mexican tourist card at

the Honorary Consulate of Mexico in Tampa. He crossed the border into

Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on November 23. Apparently because Lopez was

not listed as the driver of any vehicle crossing the border that day,

FBI concluded he crossed in a privately owned automobile owned by an-

other person.

On December 10, 1963, at the regular monthly meeting of the Tampa

FPCC, a Mrs. Christina Amor told the group that she had telephoned Cuba

at 5:00 a.m. and learned Lopez had arrived there safely via Texas and

Mexico. On January 16, 1964, Mrs. Amor reportedly said Lopez had bor-

rowed $190 prior to his leaving for Mexico.

On September 3, 1964, Agapito Gonzalez told FBI that he was ac-

quainted with Lopez. According to Gonzalez, Lopez borrowed $150 for

his travel from Isabel Lopez but repaid only $25. Another

source

re-

ported that as of September 1964, Lopez was not working in Cuba and

* President Kennedy made several public appearances in Tampa on Novem-

ber 18.

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spent a great deal of time playing dominoes.

The preceding was the extent of the FBI's and CIA's investigation.

So far as we can determine, neither FBI nor CIA told the Warren Commis-

sion about Lopez. In responding to the Commission's request for infor-

mation on the Miami chapter of FPCC, FBI mentioned the Tampa chapter

had 16 members in 1961 and was active in May 1963. The FBI response

does not mention Lopez or the November and December 1963-meetings.

Moreover, a possible connection between Oswald and the Tampa chap-

ter of FPCC was already indicated. Oswald applied to V. I. Lee, na-

tional president of the FPCC, for a charter for a New Orleans chapter.

Lee wrote Oswald on May 29, 1963, suggesting Oswald get in touch with

the Tampa chapter, which V. I. Lee had personally organized. Thus,

the suspicious travel of Lopez coupled with the possibility that Os-

wald had contacted the Tampa chapter certainly should have prompted

more thorough investigation than FBI conducted and should have been

volunteered to the Warren Commission, regardless of its failure to re-

quest the information.

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4.

Findings and Conclusions

From the foregoing discussion, we make these findings. The War-

ren Commission was not aware of the full extent of CIA's covert opera-

tions against Cuba, especially the AMLASH operation, which might have

greatly affected its investigation into Oswald's Cuban connections.

The Nossenko matter was not resolved satisfactorily by the time the

Warren Commission went out of existence and it remains unresolved.

The CIA's investigation of Oswald's connections with Cuba was, in hind-

sight, far from adequate. CIA may have possessed relevant information

about Oswald and his contacts with Cuban exiles, but CIA apparently

neither informed the Warren Commission of this fact nor conducted an

independent investigation. Finally, CIA's and FBI's investigation of

the substantial and significant information they developed about Gil-

berto Lopez and their failure to pass any of this information to the

Warren Commission constitutes a major flaw in the Warren Commission's

investigation.

We conclude from our preliminary investigation that these defi

ciencies in CIA's investigation of the assassination cast doubt as to

the adequacy of the Warren Commission's Report. They also increase

the probability that a more thorough investigation would conclude that

Oswald acted in concert with others.

Furthermore, we conclude that the deficiencies we have noted in

the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination raise

substantial questions about the adequacy of its counterintelligence

capability. CIA's apparent inability to collect relevant information

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from-sensitive sources and its failure to follow what seem to be sub-

stantial leads have not been adequately explained and CIA's compart-

mentation either prevented its own investigators from having access

to all relevant evidence of permitted some at CIA to withhold such

evidence.

We also conclude that the system for exchanging counterintelli-

gence information between agencies and confusion of responsibility

among the agencies caused substantial problems in investigating the

assassination.

Finally, it should be noted that we are not oblivious to the pos-

sibility that high-level Government officials may have been informed

of relevant evidence, even though it was not provided to the Warren

Commission. For example, although we have no evidence that such of-

ficials were aware of the AMLASH operation or the evidence pointing

to possible Cuban involvement, a major review of Cuban policy was ini-

tiated immediately after the assassination, and previous indications

of support for AMLASH's proposals were withdrawn after the assassina-

tion.

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Dinited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 11, ITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510

3/16/25

secteran

E-2

fee

R2660

------

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Were there Connections between Oswald and U.S. Intelligence

*The Warren Commission investigated the charge that Oswald

had in some way been an agent for the U.S. Government and concluded:

Thus,

close scrutiny of the records of the Federal

agencies involved and the testimony of the responsible

officials of the U.S. Governemnt establish

that there

was absolutely no type of informant or undercover Ie-

lationship between an agency of the U.S. Government

and Lee Harvey Oswald at any time. (WR 327)

Nevertheless, Warren Commission critics have continuously

asserted such a relationship existed. For example, it-has been

claimed that Oswald was an agent for military intelligence and

defected to the Soviet Union at its instigation; that Oswald was

likewise an agent for CIA; and that he was an agent for or an

informant of FBI. Such allegations often cite the rather unusual

circumstances of his defection to Russia, his ease in returning to the

United States, and the apparent lack of interest in him by U.S.

intelligence prior to the assassination.

Indeed we agree these were unusual circumstances and we found

no satisfactory explanation for them. For example, despite evidence

that the Navy, FBI and State Department were extremely interested

in and did determine the precise date and place Oswald would return

to the United States he was not interviewed by FBI until three

weeks after his return.

We have received testimony from a former CIA employee, Mr.

Deneselya, claiming to have read a CIA report of a debriefing of

a re-defector, who had been in Minsk and who was either a corporal or

captain in the military. We reviewed the cases of other re-defectors

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noting many were debriefed by CIA as well as FBI. And, CIA docu-

ments disclose that at least some at CIA had prior to Oswald's

return proposed he be debriefed.

Because of CIA's interest in re-defectors and because of the.

testimony indicating a possible debriefing of Oswald, we conclude

that

some CIA debriefing of Oswald after his return would be expected.

Nevertheless, we have been unable to locate any evidence of a CIA

debriefing. The Oswald file at CIA contains no record of any contact,

the records of the Domestic Contacts Division (the CIA Division

Deneselya alleged to be the originator of the report he saw)

- denies

having any record of a debriefing. At our request, CIA

reviewed its data base on Minsk and stated it could locate no

information which it could attribute to Oswald.*

While the fact that Oswald was not debriefed by CIA after his

return can be construed to suggest he was an agent of U.S. intelli-

gence -- and so not debriefed - we found no evidence to contradict

the Warren Commission's finding that he was not an agent. There is

nothing in any of CIA's files we reviewed to suggest Oswald was

employed by CIA. Moreover, present CIA officials state they have

found nothing, after an extensive search, to indicate he was so

* One CIA employee did recall reading a debriefing of Oswald.

He thought he saw it after the assassination.

He was shown copies

of the three known FBI debriefings of Oswald but could not positively

he indicated one report

Identify any as the report he salassuming dIA's denial of such a

might have been the one he saw.

debrieting is correct, the only explanation for his recollection is

that he saw some version of information on Oswald, such as his diary,

no information on soa

which CIA acquired after the assassination. (TAB

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employed. One official observed it is unlikely that anyone

currently with CIA is aware of such a relationship with Oswald in light

of CIA's attempts to uncover all past questionable activity.*

Furthermore, from the time of Oswald's defection to Russia in

1959 until after the assassination, procedures required CIA be

informed of the names of all agents used by any U.S. intelligence

agency. This procedure obviously was necessary in order to avoid

two agencies using the same individual. For example, Army intelli-

gence was required to clear with CIA the name of any agent it intended

to use. CIA is not aware of any agency's circumvention of this

pIo-

cedure. So, the fact that the CIA has no record of Oswald being

an agent of U.S. intelligence substantiates the denials by other

intelligence agencies that they used him. (TAB

Thus, with one qualification we conclude Oswald was not em-

ployed by CIA or any other U.S. intelligence agency at any time

for any reason. We feel it necessary to qualify this conclusion

because as will be discussed in more detail, infra, the extreme

compartmentation of information within CIA makes it possible for

CIA to employ agents without centralized clearance and without

records retrievable by anyone other than knowledgeable CIA employees.

While we have no reason to believe this possibility is a real one,

we cannot discount it. Indeed CIA's compartmentation permits only

* Similar questions were posed by the Rockefeller Commission.

CIA's answer was the same.

(TAB

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the Director to have access to all information about all Agency

relationships with agents. (IAB

> However, Director McCone

in 1964 denied, under oath, that Oswald was in any way connected

with CIA. (TAB

) He remains the only person qualified to make

such a flat statement: and we have no reason to doubt its truth.

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Discussion: Alleged Oswald FBI Connections

A.

The 1964 Allegation.

On Wednesday, January 22, 1964, J.W. Rankin received a call

from the then Attorney General of Texas, Waggoner Carr. Mr.

Carr stated that he had received on a confidential basis an

allegation to the effect that Oswald was an undercover agent for

the FBI since September of 1962 and that he had been paid $200

a month from an account designated as No. 179. Carr indicated

that this allegation was in the hands of the press and defense

counsel for Ruby and suggested that his information came ultimately

from District Attorney Henry Wade, although he stated that he had

not discussed this matter with Wade.

Rankin immediately informed the Chief Justice of these

allegations and a meeting of the Commission was called for

5:30 p.m. on Wednesday, January 22, 1964. Rankin then laid out

the allegations for the attending members. In response to

Senator Cooper's query as to how the Commission could test "this

kind of thing," Rankin responded:

It is going to be very difficult for us to

be able to establish the facts in it.

I am

confident that the FBI would never admit it,

and I presume their records will never show

it.

Rankin later in the meeting informed the Committee:

Secondly, there is this matter too that is a

consideration, that is somewhat an issue in

this case, and I suppose you are all aware of it.

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That is that the FBI is very explicit that Oswald

is the assassin or was the assassin, and they are

very explicit that there was no conspiracy, and

they are also saying in the same place that they

are continuing their investigation.

Now in my

experience of almost nine years, in the first

place it is hard to get them to say when you

think you have got a

case tight enough to convict

somebody, that that is the person that committed

the crime.

In my experience with the FBI they

don't do

that. They claim that they don't evalu-

it is uniform prior experience that they

don't do that. Secondly they have not run out

all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia and so

forth which they could probably . .:

It is.

not our business, it is the very . . . .

On Friday, January 24, 1964, Rankin and Chief Justice

Warren met at Commission headquarters with Attorney General

Carr, District Attorney Wade, Assistant District Attorney Alexander,

Mr. Jaworski

and Dean Storey. They were informed that the sources

for the Oswald informant allegations were several reporters,

including Houston Post reporter Hudkins.

On Friday evening, January 24, 1964, Rankin was informed

that the Secret Service had interviewed Allen Swett, Chief of

the Sheriff's Office in Dalles, regarding the Oswald informant

allegations.

Swett stated that he received the allegation from

Alexander.

He also mentioned Houston Post reporter Hudkins

a source of the information.

All of the above was presented to the full Commission on

Monday, January 27, 1964. The transcript reflects the concern

of the Commission members with this allegation, and more

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specifically their desire to not offend Mr. Hoover and avoid the

appearance of accusing the FBI. Various possible approaches

to "running down" the allegations were discussed. It was decided

that Rankin would inform Hoover directly of these allegations,

and allow the FBI the opportunity to refute the allegations.

On February 6, 1964 Mr. Hoover submitted an affidavit wherein

he categorically stated that Oswald was never an informant of

the FBI. On February 12, 1964 the Director forwarded to the Com-

mission nine additional affidavits

"executed by Bureau personnel

of this Bureau who, because of their assignments, would have been

responsible for or cognizant of any attempt to develop Lee Harvey

Oswald as an informant of the FBI."**

An undated Rankin memorandum states that on or about

January 23, 1963 he came across a Secret Service Agent Bertram's

report reflecting a 12/10/63 interview of Hudkins. Significantly,

the report contains information on Jack Ruby; there is no refer-

ence to Hudkins having made any "Oswald informant allegations."

However, Bertram reinterviewed Hudkins on December 17, 1963, and

he then advised that Allen Swett mentioned "that is was his opinion

that Oswald was being paid $200 a month by the FBI as an inform-

ant in connection with subversive investigations, and was assigned

the number 172.

* Special Agents Shanklin, Clark, Hosty, Carter, Brown,

Howe, Maynor, Quigley and Lynn.. Also submitted was an affidavit

of retired S.A. John Fain.

Kartas

1549

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int

"By letter dated February 11, 1964 Director Hoover informed

the Warren Commission as to the Bureau's interview with Hudkins.

Hudkins told the FBI that a government official (not a federal

official in Dallas) had told him that Oswald was on the payroll

of either the FBI or CIA with voucher number 179 and that he

had received no less than $150 a month and no more than $225

a month." Hudkins further stated that Philadelphia Inquirer

reporter Joseph Golden had also mentioned to him that Oswald was

an FBI informant, but with a voucher number different from 179.

(The FBI report on their interview with Golden states that Golden

declined to identify his source beyond stating that he "had

obtained the information from a law enforcement officer in Dallas."

Not surprisingly, Hudkins' version of the

events differed from

that set forth in the FBI report and is succintly set forth below.

Hudkins testified that on or about January 3, 1964, he

visited Allan Sweatt at the Dallas sheriff's office and was

told told that FBI agent Vicent Drain -- who was then with the

Chief Criminal Deputy - had been trying to find him. Hudkins

met with Drain and another FBI agent (name unknown), and told

them in no uncertain terms that No. 5-172 was made up (i.e..

it never existed). Hudkins explained that Hugh Aynesworth and

William Alexander, and he had "made up" the informant story

during their three-way telephone conversation in early December

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as a means of determining whether any of their telephones were

being

tapped.

According to Hudkins, within thirty minutes of

this conversation an FBI

agent from the Houston office (name

unknown) dropped by his office and asked whether he had heard

anything about Oswald having a payroll number. Hudkins further

testified that similar occurrences took place at both Alexander's

and Aynesworth's offices. Hudkins stated that he could not

understand "why the Bureau let the Warren Commission go through

all that crap about Oswald being an FBI informant:"

Following up on the new version of Hudkins' allegations,

the staff spoke with

Messrs. Alexander and Aynesworth who both

unequivocally deny Hudkins' version of the phone call and

alleged subsequent FBI agent visits to their respective offices.

In

response to a document request, the Bureau assured us that

they have no materials indicating that Huakins was interviewed

and/or contacted by the FBI prior to February 8, 1964. The

staff concluded that there was no basis for any further inves-

tigation of Hudkins' specific allegations.

pia Big

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_ B. MORE RECENT ALLEGATIONS: STAFF REVIEW

On January 22, 1964, the allegation that Oswald was an

FBI informant was brought to the Commissioner's attention by

Texas officials.

The manner in which the allegation came to the

Commissioner's attention and the Commissioner's subsequent in-

quiries are treated in detail in the preceding section. J. Edgar

Hoover and John McCone each presented the Commission with an

affidavit, wherein they unequivocally denied that Oswald was ever,

at any time, in any way, shape or form, associated with or em-

ployed by their respective agency. Similar affidavits of S. A.s

Shanklin, Clark, Hosty, Carter, Brown, Howe, Maynor, Fain, Quigley,

and Lynn were also

submitted to the Commission.

More recently, in sworn Committee testimony, S.A.s Hosty and

DeBrueys denied any Bureau relationship with Oswald. Although the

staff is not permitted to physically review raw FBI files, in

response to explicit Committee requests the Bureau has informed us

that they have no documents indicating that Oswald was ever a

Bureau "source, informant, agent or asset."

A recently reviewed March 1964 FBI memorandum recounts a

conversation in which White House aide Walter Jenkins advised

Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach that an FBI agent, transferred to

Dallas from New Orleans in January 1964, had told a close personal

friend that Oswald had been an FBI informant. The documents re-

viewed by the staff did not indicate what, if any, inquiries the

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Bureau made as a result of this allegation. By letter, dated

February 12, 1976, we requested delivery of all such materials

from the Bureau. .

On January 17, 1976, we interviewed a former FBI agent whose

assignment to the Bureau's Kansas City auto-theft squad overlapped

with Hosty's for some three months in late 1964 and early 1965.

This ex-agent is positive that Hosty told him that both Hosty and

the Dallas Agent who had handled the Oswald case prior to Hosty

[i.e., John Fain] had attempted to develop Oswald as a potential

security informant ("PSI"). More specifically, the agent quoted

Hosty as stating:

Hosty told us that [Fain] had had no

contact with Oswald, and that one of the

last acts

the older

agent did betore he re-

tired was to deactivate the Oswald file as

a PSI.

When Hosty came into his new job

in DalS PSI. Hosty conmented that.

he decided to reopen the Oswald

Of his effort to reopen the Oswald as part

matter,

he left notes at oswald's apartment, recall

him to get in touch with the FBI.

hosty commenting that although he had listed

Oswald as a PSI, he had not had any contact

with him.

The agent also supplied us with the names of certain other agents

in the squad to whom he believes

Hosty also made these statements.

In a recent staff interview, one of these agents denied these

accusations; however, he is, by his own admission, a close friend

of Hosty's. The sworn testimony of another named agent will be

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taken on February 17, 1976.

There are numerous facts in the record which raise the

issue of Hosty's real relationship with Oswald. We know that

approximately two weeks before the assassination, Oswald left a

note for Hosty at the FBI's Dallas Field Office, asking him to

stop bothering his wife.

(See discussion, infra, at

Marina was interviewed by Hosty four days after the assassination.

She refused to answer his questions and accused Hosty of having

harassed her in his previous interviews; her undisguised hostility

and anger toward Hosty on that occasion, like that of Oswald him-

self when Hosty appeared at the interrogation session right after his

arrest, is surprising if Hosty only visited the Paine home twice

and these visits were as innocuous as he, Marina and Ruth Paine

all testified. Indeed, the documents reveal that not even J. Edgar

Hoover

could understand why Hosty visited the Paine house a second

time on November 5, 1963, to again ask for Oswald's home address,

when he had learned five days earlier that Oswald worked at the

Book Depository. You are aware that Hosty's name, office address,

and office telephone, and automobile license plate numbers were in

Oswald's notebook. *

*

You are also aware of the explanations offered by Hosty and

Marina for the Hosty information being in Oswald's notebook.

Interest-

ingly enough, the Bureau initially failed to inform the Commission

of

these entries; an omission subsequently explained in the affidavit

›f SA Gemberling. The staff has not reexamined the circumstances

surrounding that incident.

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-The staff has reviewed documents and received testimony re-

flecting the intense pressure on agents to develop informants.

The emphasis was first on quantity, second on quality. Agents

have also told us that contrary to established procedures many

agents would not report initial contacts and/or attempts to

develop an informant; even if they did report it, however, 1963

FBI procedures initially required only the permission of the

Special Agent in Charge. Thus, between the time of the decision

to develop a

person as a PSI and the initial contact, there would

be no documentary record on the person at headquarters; there would

only be a single sheet of paper in the field offices' 134 file

that would not be cross referenced into any other file (such as

the Security File the Dallas office had on Oswald).

Finally, William Walter -- the ex-FBI file clerk who claims

to have seen a November 17, 1963, teletype which stated that a

revolutionary group might attempt to assassinate President Kennedy

in Dallas (see discussion, infra, at

) -- also claims to have

seen an informant file on Oswald in the New Orleans field office.

However, as noted above, both SAs Kaack and DeBrueys have told

us that Oswald was not an informant of the Bureau in New Orleans;

similar statements were made by SAC Maynor and SA Quigley in

affidavits

submitted to the Warren Commission. Recently, Walter

himself admitted to the staff that the file he thought was an in-

formant file might well have been Oswald's security file.

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ALLEGATION: THAT A NOVEMBER 17,

1963,

BUREAU TELETYPE ADVISED OF

THREAT THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD BE ASSASSINATED IN DALLAS

- A. The Bureau's Documentary Record

WilliamS. Walter, a former security clerk in the, New

Orleans FBI Office told Mark Lane, in early January of 1968,

that on the morning of November 17, 1963, while on duty, he

received a teletype message which was directed to all southern

field offices of the FBI. The message reportedly stated that

a "militant revolutionary group may attempt to assassinate

Fresident Kennedy on proposed trip to Dallas, November 22, 1963."

Walter claimed that he had called the SAC and informed him of the

message. Lane publicly revealed this information later in

January, 1968, during an appearance on the Johnny Carson tele-

vision show.

On February 1, 1968, Walter denied to the FBI that he had

ever received or saw such a teletype or message. However, on

March 9, 1968, Walter's attorney contacted the U.S. Attorney's

Office in New Orleans, to determine if Walter would be in violation

of Federal law if he testified before a State grand jury and

divulged information gained during his employment with the FBI.

Subsequently, on March 15, 1968, the attorney and Walter advised

that he had received such a teletype as described above, while

working the midnight to 8

a.m. shift on November 17, 1963. He

said he "probably" notified SAC Harry G. Maynor of receipt of the

teletype, since that was routine procedure. Walter said he did

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not have a copy of the teletype, he did not give a copy to Lane,

and he did not know who would have a copy.

The Bureau reinterviewed Walter again on March 26, 1968.

He insisted that he did receive such a teletype, and that there

were other clerical employees of the New Orleans Office who knew

of it, but he refused to identify any of them.

SAC Harry G. Maynor denied any knowledge of such a teletype,

as did all special agents and clerical personnel in New Orleans,

in March 1968, who were there in November 1963. A summary of the

Bureau's search of its 1968 headquarters records revealed that no such

communication between November 1 through November 22, 1963, was

found. Similarly, all southern FBI field offices responded

negatively to a Bureau search slip.

On May 8, 1968, the Bureau learned from one of Garrison's

investigators that Walter had told Garrison that he had a copy of

the teletype. The Bureau immediately reinterviewed Walter. He

denied having a copy of the teletype.

The Bureau and the Department of Justice concluded that the

Walter's teletype allegation was false. However, the Department's

recommendation that Walter be prosecuted for supplying false in-

formation to a Government official was, for a reason. not reflected

in the documentary record, never followed up.

The investigation of the alleged teletype remained dormant

until September 9, 1975, when Tom Johnson, Publisher, Dallas Times

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Herald, related to Director Kelley and Assistant to the Director

Adams, an allegation he recently received, which allegation, in

essence, restated Walter's claim. Although Johnson refused to

identify his

source, the Bureau assumed "it could only" be Walter."

(Coincidently, Johnson was the newsman who had initially contacted

the Bureau on the destruction of the Oswald note.)

On September 17, 1975, Johnson orally furnished the Dallas

field office with what he had been informed was the wording and

format of the November 17, 1963, teletype. [A copy of this alleged

teletype is attached at Tab c.] The conclusion reached by the

FBI's Communications Section was that numerous inconsistencies in

the teletype (i.e., deviations from the Bureau's standard format

and normal practices "indicated that it was contrived or recon-

structed from memory." However, the Communications' analysts did

note two caveats: (1) that the errors might be attributable to the

dictation, and; (2) it is "not inconceivable that a series of co-

incidences could have resulted in a message similar to that pre-

sented." The Bureau interviewed all living personnel - agents

and clerical -- who were in the New Orleans office in November, 1963.

All denied knowledge of the teletype. The Bureau also interviewed

the headquarters' communications clerk, whose initials allegedly

appeared on the teletype; he, unequivocally, under oath, denied

sending it. The Bureau's stated investigative conclusion

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was that no such teletype had been sent.

On September 22, 1975, Johnson told Adams that his source

(assumed by the Bureau to be Walter) was extremely concerned over

possible prosecutive action in the event he made available an

actual copy of the teletype. Adams requested and received

authorization to inform Walter that he would be granted immunity

for "purloining, possessing, or not previously making available

this alleged stolen

document." Adams immediately informed Johnson,

and a conference call was arranged between Johnson, Walter, and

Adams. Adams' memorandum reflects that even after the offer of

immunity, Walter denied having the teletype. Adams noted, "He's

playing games with us."

B.

Discussion

No information was ever made available to the Warren

Commission which indicated that the Bureau had received information

that an attempt on the President's life would be made by any group

or person, in Dallas, Texas. If the alleged November 17, 1963,

teletype had, in fact, been sent, it is perfectly clear that

the information which prompted the teletype's dispatch had been

withheld from the Commission.

Walter told us that he did receive such a teletype and

definitively informed SAC Maynor of this fact. He identified

certain other New Orleans' ex-FBI clerical personnel whom he knew

had seen this teletype.

However, both the Bureau and Robert Fink

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of the House Government Operations Subcommittee had interviewed

these clerical personnel and been informed that they had neither

seen nor heard about the alleged teletype. Indeed, they were

among

the New Orleans' FBI personnel that had made such denials

in sworn affidavits furnished to the Bureau during the course of

its internal investigation.

Although the copy of the alleged teletype that the Bureau's

Communications Section had critically reviewed had not been

supplied by Walter, and Walter's stated version of the teletype

appears to eliminate the discrepancies in format noted by the

Bureau, Walter admitted that his experience in handling teletypes

would allow him to fabricate a perfect one if he desired to do so.

Conclusion:

The staff did not conduct an independent investigation of the

Walter allegation. Each of the Bureau's New Orleans's personnel

who were in a position where they were likely to have been made

aware of the teletype have denied any knowledge of it under oath.

Similar denials have been made by headquarter's personnel.

The Bureau's investigation of the teletype allegation appears

to have been exhaustive; the staff has uncovered no evidence which

suggests that the Bureau's investigative findings and conclusions

are impeachable.

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at.

Allegation: That the FBI and/or the Secret Service

Withheld Information Relating to J, A. Milteer's

Threat to Assassinate President Kennedy.

The documentary record available to the Committee reveals

that National States

Rights Party member J. A. Milteer asserted

during a November 9, 1963 conversation that President Kennedy

would be assassinated by someone using a high-powered rifle

from the window of a tall building, that Jack Brown of Chat-

tanooga, Tennessee, was a man who might do the job and "that

afterward officers would leave no stone unturned trying to

find the killer, they will pick up someone within hours after-

ward just to throw the public off." This conversation was

Iecorded by Miami Police Department informant William Somerset,

and verbatim transcripts were disseminated to the Secret Service

and the FBI on November 11, 1963. However, the reports provided

the Warren Commission neither recounted that the threat had

been recorded nor the specifics of the threat. Thus, the

Commission had no reason to distinguish this threat from the

hundreds of unsubstantiated allegations that poured into the

Bureau subsequent to the assassination.

On November 26, 1963, Sommerset provided additional infor-

mation on Milteer, the reliability of which was established by

the tapes of a November 23, 1963 conversation. On that date,

Milteer was in the Union Train Station, Jacksonville, Florida,

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where he stated that he was jubilant over the death of

President Kennedy, that he had stopped in Dallas on an auto-

mobile trip through southern cities, and that everything had

run true to

form.

Milteer further stated that:

I guess you thought I was kidding you when I

said he would be killed from a window with a

high-powered rifle.

On December 1, 1963, two FBI agents interviewed Milteer

in Quitman, Georgia. According to their report:

Milteer emphatically denied ever making threats

to assassinate President Kennedy of partici-

pating in such threats.

He stated he has never

heard anyone make such

threats. He also denied

ever having visited Dallas, Texas.

The Bureau documents we reviewed - which documents we

were told represented all FBI materials gathered on Milteer

during the course of the assassination investigation -- revealed

that on the basis of Milteer's

statements to the agents, and

information indicating that Milteer was in Quitman, Georgia

on November 22, 1963, the Bureau conducted no further investi-

gation of Milteer or his known associates, one of whom was Don

Burros [whose name was found in Oswald's notebook].

The Secret Service response to the November 9, 1963,

Milteer threat is also instructive. By letter, dated January

9, 1976, the staff posed to the Secret Service certain questions

relating to Milteer and the President's November 1963 Miami and

Dallas trips. In summary, the Service acknowledged receipt of

a transcript of the tape, and the fact that further investigation

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of certain named persons associated with right wing groups

had been predicated upon receipt of the "Milteer information."

They assert that this investigation established that none of

these persons were in the Miami area on November 18, 1963.

Interestingly enough, the Secret Service response to the

question of whether Milteer's threat was considered in connec

tion with the President's visit to Dallas on November 22, 1963,

was not that they conducted a similar investigation in Dallas

but that:

In the absence of any information from the FBI

to indicate any of the Milteer connected indivi-

luals were coming to, or were present in, Dallas,

this particular case

was not considered critical.

This response is surprising in that there is no record that

the FBI was monitoring the activities of any of the named

persons on anything approaching a

daily basis or that -- with

the exception of Milteer himself -- the Bureau had information

Indicating that any of these persons constituted a threat to

the safety of the President, a prerequisite at that time to

the dissemination of FBI information to the Secret Service.*

TOP SECRET

* The record does establish that the name of one known member

of a right wing group in the Dallas area was provided to the

Secret service by the FBI.

However, he was not one of the

"Milteer connected" individuals.

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Allegation Re: Windshield of the Presidential Limousine

The staff's initial review of Warren Commission materials

raised the issue of whether the front windshield sent to the

FBI laboratory for examination (and later admitted into evidence

by the Warren Commission) was the same windshield as the one on:

the limousine at the time it was returned from Dallas to Washington

on the evening of the assassination.

The Presidential limousine was flown from Dallas to Washington

and driven to the White House garage late in the evening of November

22, 1963. Secret Service Agent Charles E. Taylor had been assigned

responsibility for the security of the limousine upon its arrival

at Andrews Air Force Base; he rode in the front passenger seat

while the car was driven to the White House garage. Taylor observed

the three and one-half hour examination of the limousine conducted

by five FBI experts between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m. on November 23, 1963.

His report, dated November 27, 1963, contains the following

language:

Of particular note was the small hole just left

of center in the windshield from which what

appeared to be bullet fragments were removed.*

Secret Service Agents Davis and Eies were also present for the FBI

examination; their respective reports stated that they noticed the

damage to the front windshield when the car arrived at the White

House garage, that both of them ran their hands over the outside

of the windshield and found it to be smooth and unbroken, and that

*

The windshield represented to be the one removed from the

Presidential limousine is

Archives.

internal

defect

just left of center; there is no hole.

tar

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damage to the windshield was entirely to the inside surface.*

On November 26, 1963 the windshield was removed from the

limousine and stored at the White House garage. In March 1964,

at the request of the Warren Commission, the Secret Service

delivered the windshield to the Bureau. The windshield was sub-

sequently examined at the FBI laboratory; this examination

and the prior examination of the limousine were the subjects of

FBI lab inspector Robert A. Frazier's testimony before the Warren -

Commission, (Vol. V, p. 69). In response to a question posed by

Commission counsel Arlen Specter, Mr. Frazier stated "I prepared

the formal report of the entire examination of the limousine."

(Vol. V, p. 69) A Life Magazine article in the November 25, 1966

issue quotes Specter as stating:

One of the most impressive pieces of evidence,

says Specter,

is the FBI report on an examination

of the limousine.

It concludes that no part of

the car's interior was struck by a whole bullet.

Despite a specific Commission request on March 18, 1964 for "the

report on the examination conducted by the FBI on the President's

automobile on November 23, 1963," the staff has not been able to

locate any such report in the Warren Commission files. Indeed,

the FBI recently informed this Comittee that they could not find

any report reflecting the examination; they were able to locate

four pages of the examiner's handwritten notes** Neither Agent

Frazier nor any other Bureau employee has been able to examine

FBI photographs of the windshield allegedly taken during

course of this examination of the limousine do not establish

one way or the other whether there was a hole in the windshield.

** These handwritten notes mention an internal defect in the

windshield just left of center.

Lead tracings were removed from

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The staff interviewed Secret Service Agent Taylor on

December 10

, 1975.

On that occasion Taylor was positive that

there had been a hole through the windshield. He stated that a

pin could definitely be inserted through this hole from one side

of the windshield to the other. However, the staff was not con-

vinced that Taylor had actually had the opportunity to examine

what he believed to be a hole. With Committee staff present,

Taylor recently examined the windshield at the Archives. He

stated that the windshield was as he had seen it in 1963; i.e.

contrary to his report, there was an internal defect and not

a penetration. The staff subsequently prepared an affidavit

and forwarded it to the Secret Service for Mr. Taylor's review

and signature.

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ALLEGATION: OSWALD DELIVERED A NOTE TO THE BUREAU'S DALLAS FIELD.

OFFICE SOME TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION

On or about July 2, 1975, Thomas Johnson,.

of the Dallas Times

Herald, advised recently retired Dallas SAC Gordon Shanklin that

an individual, whose identity he could not reveal, had told him

that Oswald had visited the FBI

office in Dallas sometime prior

to the assassination; that Oswald left a note -- allegedly threat-

ening in nature -- for the Agent who had been handling the Bureau's

investigation of Oswald; and that neither Oswald's visit nor the

-

note. was reported prior to or following the assassination of

President Kennedy. Shanklin advised that Johnson should contact

the Bureau directly, and suggested Assistant to the Director

James Adams.

On July 7, 1975, Johnson met in Washington, DC, with Adams

and Director Kelley repeating the aforementioned allegations. The

Attorney General was advised of the allegations on July 8, 1975,

and informed that the Bureau intended to conduct an inquiry re-

garding them.

On July 8, 1975, a conference was held in Director Kelley's

office. In attendance, in addition to Mr. Adams, were Gordon

Shanklin (former SAC Dallas), * Theodore Gunderson (SAC Dallas) ,

* In that Shanklin had recently retired from the Bureau and

the alleged destruction of the note involved the field office

of which he had been in charge, his attendance at the meeting

is

surprising.

tri

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S.A. William Nettles (who has assigned to him the assassination

case), and Harold Bassett (Assistant Director in Charge of the

Inspection Division).

The handling of the investigation was dis-

cussed,

and Bassett was

assigned personal responsibility for

handling it.

The Bureau's initial file review did not develop any informa-

tion indicating that Oswald had ever visited the Dallas Office of

the FBI or that he had left a note. Initial interviews of per-

sonnel assigned, in 1963, to the Dallas field office did establish

that:

...-

(1) Lee Harvey Oswald did, in fact, visit the office

some two or three weeks prior to the assassination;

(2) That Oswald asked to see S. A. James Hosty, and

upon being informed that he was not in, left a note

for Hosty;

(3) That the note was destroyed after assassination.

However, the FBI's investigation failed to establish:

(1) whether the note was threatening in nature;

(2)

at whose instruction the note was destroyed;

(3)

the motives behind the note's destruction.

As to the wording of the note, accounts vary. The receptionist

recalled that the note read as follows:

"Let this be a warning.

will blow up the FBI and the Dallas Police Department if you don't

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liam Nazad a lies

stop. bothering my wife. Signed - Lee Harvey Oswald."

Hosty recalled its wording as, "If you have anything you

want to learn about me, come talk to me directly. If you don't

cease bothering my wife, I will take appropriate action and

report this to proper authorities."

Hosty's supervisor -- Kenneth Howe -- who claimed to have

seen the note, said that he seemed to recall it contained some

kind of threat but could not remember specifics.

Aside from these three persons - the receptionist, Agent

Hosty, and Agent Howe - no one else who was interviewed by the

Bureau admitted having seen the note. Some indicated they under-

stood that the note contained a threat; however, this was hearsay

knowledge, having come primarily from conversations they had had

with the receptionist.

In attempting to determine what action was taken regarding

the note, the FBI learned that Hosty had placed the note in his

workbox -- where it remained until the day of the assassination.

Hosty participated in an interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police

Department on the day of the assassination and returned to the

Field Office about an hour later, at which time he was called into

Shanklin's office. Howe was in the office along with Shanklin,

one of them displayed the threatening note and asked Hosty to ex-

plain its contents.

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Ciscudi

- By Hosty's account, he told them he had interviewed Marina

Oswald and Mrs. Paine on November 1, 1963; and that when he parti-

cipated in the interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police Department,

Oswald, upon learning his name, commented that he was the one who

was talking to and bothering his wife - that if the Agent wanted

to know

something about Oswald he should have come and talked to

Oswald himself.

At this point, Hosty claims that Shanklin ordered him to

prepare a memorandum setting forth the information regarding the

note and his interview with Marina Oswald and Mrs. Paine. He

stated that he did prepare such a memorandum, three or four pages

in length, and delivered it to the Shanklin on the evening of

November 22, 1963.

The secretary to whom Hosty claims to have dictated this

memorandum was interviewed by the Bureau. She said she had no

recollection of the memorandum.

Agent Howe said that it was he who found the note in Hosty's

workbox very soon after the assassination of President Kennedy.

He stated that he took the note

to Shanklin's office, but had no

recollection where the note may have gone of who may have had it

thereafter. He has no knowledge of the disposition of the note.

According to Hosty, approximately two hours after Oswald had

been pronounced dead on November 24, Howe told him that Shanklin

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wanted to see them. Hosty claims that upon arriving in Shanklin's

office, he was instructed by Shanklin to destroy both the note and

the November 22 memorandum regarding it. Hosty states that he com-

plied with these instructions by flushing them down the toilet.

Shanklin denies having any knowledge of Oswald's visit to

the Dallas Office or of Oswald's leaving a note there. He main-

tains that he did not issue any orders to destroy the note. In

fact, he claims that he had no knowledge of this entire matter

until July 1975.*

The personnel who were assigned to the Dallas Office in Nov-

ember 1963, and who have admitted personal knowledge of the Oswald

visit and note, have denied having any knowledge that the facts of

this matter were brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters.

However, William Sullivan, who was an Assistant Director at

the time of the assassination, has stated that he discussed the

Oswald case many times with Shanklin, and that Shanklin mentioned

on one occasion that "he had an internal problem involving one of

his Agents who had received a threatening message from Oswald be-

cause the Agent was investigating Oswald." Sullivan recalls that

Shanklin seemed disinclined to discuss the matter other than to say

Ural Horton -- a recently retired Special Agent -- in an

affidavit submitted to the Bureau, swore that he mentioned the

note and the destruction to Shanklin in August 1974.

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he was handling it as a personnel problem with Assistant to the

Director, John P. Mohr. Mohr has denied under oath any knowledge

of the note or the destruction. Similarly, all other living

Bureau officials in the chain of command of the two investigative

Divisions which supervised the Kennedy assassination case, each

furnished the Bureau with sworn statements denying any knowledge

of this matter.

Neither staff review of Bureau documents nor interviews of

Messrs. Hosty and Shanklin has clarified any of the above noted

factual discrepancies. It is obviously important that we determine

to our own satisfaction whether or not the existence and destruction

of the Oswald note were known to persons at Bureau headquarters,

as Bill Sullivan alleges. However, in that the Bureau has ad-

mitted receipt and destruction of the note, resolution of this

secondary issue is not directly relevant to the primary focus

of our inquiry. If time allows, the staff intends to take the

necessary investigative steps.

a card nice or la case ti

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Identification of Areas Not Investigated

Our conclusions and recommendations are necessarily affect-

ed by the limited scope of our investigation. As noted in the

introductory paragraphs, our investigation principally focused

on two questions:

(1) whether the intelligence agencies pro-

vided the Warren Commission all available evidence, and

(2)

whether the assassination investigation was adeguate.

The Select Committee made no attempt to investigate any

of the following: (1) the physical evidence, such as weapons,

trajectories, location of wounds, photographic evidence, autopsy

data, the Zapruder film, etc.; (2) suspicions that Jack Ruby

was part of a conspiracy to silence Oswald and Ruby's connec-

tions to various groups; (3) suspicions that Oswald was part

of a conspiracy involving organized crime; or (4) suspicions

that right-wing or white hate groups were involved in the assas-

sination.

The

Select Committee is aware that such areas of investi-

gation might be fruitful; however, a conscious decision was

made not to overextend its authority or the limited time and

resources it had for the purpose of looking into these areas.

Thus, except to the extent that the intelligence agencies pos-

sessed relevant information in these areas and withheld it from

the Warren Commission, the Select Committee has not considered

these matters.

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