COMMENTS ON HSCA INTERIM DRAFTS.
Originator: CIA
From: S. D. BRECKINRIDGE
To: WILLIAM STURBITTS
Document date: 01/29/1979
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 238 OUr

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENTS ON HSCA REPORTS RECEIVED 26 JANUARY 1979

This new package consists of two drafts, one is a 14 page

draft concerning a Cuban-American, followed by footnotes. The

other is a discussion of whether Oswald had any CIA or other

connections; the pagination of this draft was uncertain and I

re-numbered the pages, totalling 108 in all. (U)

I. Cuban-American

This draft shows the HSCA attempt to sanitize. They have

designated LITEMPO/4 to be deleted.

They have proposed to delete the

word "City" in order to

change

"Mexico City Station" into a more

general "Mexico Station." The Warren Commission report, I think,

makes some reference to it so we may have a problem on how to handle

These references recur on pages 3-5.

References to the Monterray

Base, also to be deleted, appear on pages 5 and 6.

The name of the

subject of the report. Lopez, appears on every page of this section

from page 2 on. We should consider whether we object to this. (C)

While LITEMPO/4 is indicated for deletion, LIFIRE is not (see

pages 2, 3, and 4). Does this make any difference or should we request

the same treatment as given LITEMPO? (C)

Does the references on page 4 to a "photograph of Lopez" really

compromise anything?

There are further references on page 4. More

specific references on page 3 are marked for deletion. (C)

What is the reference on page 6 to "LAM/FI?" (U).

On page 7 there is talk about FBI information on Lopez. While

we haven't a direct interest in FBI material, this does relate to the

subject which takes us back to the original question of whether we

object giving the name of Lopez. (C)

On page 10 CIA's not giving the Warren Commission information on

Lopez is described as

"egregious."

While we think the report that first

seemed to give him significance is a very poor report, the HSCA view is

that we should have passed it on anyway.

We can say that CIA did what

intelligence agencies always do, evaluate the report and not disseminate

it if it doesn't have merit, but I don't think that argument would go

very Tar. I am inclined to not take exception to the HSCA description

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here. We passed it on to the FBI, and we may request that recognition

be given to that fact. (C)

On page 11, the HSCA draft says that the 1977 Task Force Report

"attempted to refute several 'inaccuracies' in the Senate report," on.

Lopez.

We are entitled to say that rather than refuting the Senate

report, we were pointing out the flaws. in. the information on which the

Senate report was based, which raised the question as to its credibility.

That might provide us the opportunity, without contesting the other

statements in the HSCA draft, to point out the inaccuracies, and how

intelligence agencies must and do evaluate the quality of information

received.

(C)

The statement on page 11 that the 1977 Task Force report was

"apparently the only follow-up...after the Senate report appeared" is:

partly correct. We did report to the FBI which obviously conducted a

further investigation.

The HSCA problem is that it never understood

the responsibilities between the investigating bodies. (U)

The last sentence in the ending of page 12 should be rephrased.

The badly flawed Monterrey report obviously did not jibe with earlier

information, which means that the statement by the DCOS to the effect

that it did was, on the face of it, incorrect.

More than discounting

what was said, we are simply pointing out that it did not make sense. (C)

At the bottom of page 12 and on over to page 13, it is correct to

say that the Task Force report did say that CIA did nothing further

about Lopez, although it did debrief a refugee. It had no further

capability on its own. It obviously did report to the Bureau, which was

responsible for the investigation, which carried it on. Obviously the

Bureau did a rather complete job. (C)

The last sentence on page 14 may be "plausible" to the HSCA, but

there is no appareni evidence to support that view.

CIA's action was based

on its correct evaluation of the unreliability of the report. It

nevertheless did refer it to the FBI. It is my recollection

that the

Schweiker report noted that the FBI completed its investigation only

after the Warren Commission. We possibly would take some exception

to this last paragraph on page 14. (U)

II. The Oswald-Agent Question

Reference is made on page 2 to "Oswald's alleged association with

CIA." I guess anyone can make any kind of allegation and it will be

dealt with seriously by the kind of people the Committee hires. By phrasing

it this way they reveal something of themselves. I suggest that we leave it

the way it is without comment. (U)

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The statement is made that the HSCA did an "intensive

file review...which included...the CIA's 124 volume Oswald file."

As stated; that assertion is false. It is Goldsmith's claim

by looking at the FOIA material, he has reviewed our files; in fact

he has not. We should say so.

At the bottom of page 4, the draft states "nor was there always

an independent means of verification that all materials requested by

the Agency were, in fact, provided." Having made this gratuitous

statement, the Cormittee is entitled to be told that they did not

take the steps necessary to make that statement.

There are large

quantities of materials assembled for their review that still

remain unread. They have been told this enough times to have no

misunderstanding; if they leave this statement in their report, it says

something about the integrity of their writing. (U)

I do feel inclined to respond to their statement in the paragraph

starting on page 5.

The way they arranged to overcome our "institutional

obstacles" -- Committee euphenism for security considerations -- was to

obligate themselves to observe security. These "institutional

obstacles" are a matter of law, and all they had to do to get access

was to accept the same responsibility that we observe. This phrasing

is a piece of congressional CYA, and we are correct in making an

appropriate comment. (U)

Starting at page l1 the Committee recites what Wilcott said, but

then doesn't address all of those statements in the discussion that

follows.

For instance, Wilcott claims that he "himself had unknowingly

disbursed payments for

Oswald's project." The Committee could point

out how difficult that would have been if he was not on the scene

until long after Oswald had left. It says something about the witness. (U)

moad lette En says

It is interesting that the Committee, despite its tendency to state

the questions it has about CIA witnesses, suppresses all comment about

the dubious quality of Wilcott's testimony. (U)

On page 17 the statement about why the Oswald file "was purportedly

must be rounded out a little bit.

Yes, he did meet the test of

being a potential Cl threat, so a file could have been opened on him.

The Committee also knows, which it points out itself later, that the

clerical Judgment of the moment was probably the deciding factor. (U)

On page 19 it is correct to say that someone could have opened the file

on Oswald in 1959, but any comprehensive discussion would make it

clear in the same point that it didn't necessarily. follow that one should

do so. (U)

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Page 21. The last sentence in the paragraph ending five lines

from the bottom.

This makes the same point which page 2000584 on another

draft does.

Does this draft supercede that earlier draft? (U)

Page 23. In having reviewed earlier the considerations that go

The information is in the system whether there is a separate 201 file.

Isn't the file something of a management or clerical convenience? (U)

computer symbol

on page 26 "AG. HSCA draft wrestles with the problem of the

The recollection of a person 15 years after the

fact appears to receive a little bit more credence than the Agency

records.

It also takes two pages of writing to discuss it.

When the

symbol was instituted isn't the issue; it is the meaning of the symbol

which counts, which refers to a defector, which Oswald was.

The

discussion is left up in the air, which possibly reflects the effect

of the theory they had that "AG"

had that

meant agent. The breathless way the

Committee investigators tried to develop this provided some of the

more cynical humor we had the opportunity to engage in until they

finally asked us what "AG" meant. (U)

Page 32. Is the paragraph in the middle of the page accurate?

Is that what CIA said?

Page 34. The Committee spends a lot of time playing with the thought

of dual and hidden files.

It really hangs all of these on what Bill Harvey

thought about when he was first trying to figure out how to do ZRRIFLE.

Yes, almost anything is possible, but the investigators were told enough

times that no second system could be designed without someone having to

know. In any event,

it is certain that the confused statement at the top

of page 34 referring to "operational detail indicative of an Agency (sic)

relationship with the CIA" is merely a reflection of the state of mind of

the author.

(U)

Page 44. This is Egerter's name. (C)

Page 60. Do we object to making it public that Mrs. McMillan was

denied a security clearance? (C)

Page 66. What is the story on Snyder's serving as a spotter? Didn't

we provide an explanation about why the Snyder file had been red-flagged?

Is it merely that they don't like it? (C)

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Page 74-77. J. Walton Moore was discussed several times. (C)

Page 78-82. Do we have a problem with the use of Gaudet's name

in the discussion of him? More specifically, have we reservations about

publishing the evaluation of our relationship with Gaudet, as shown. on

page 80? (C)

Page 86-88. This deals again with Oswald's visa in Helsinki.

Does it replace an earlier draft?

In any event, would we object to a

discussion of the Soviet Consul Golub and the references to "CIA dispatches

from Helsinki?" (C)

Page 90. The discussion of CIA cable traffic lets one infer that it

was from Mexico City.

However, it doesn't say so

in so many words.

Consider whether we can live with this.

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OLC RECORD COPY

HSCA

OLC 79-0113/7

29 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

William Sturbitts, LA/DDO

Dick Rininger, OGC

Ray Reardon,

Russell Holmes

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

SUBJECT

: Comments on HSCA Interim Drafts

The Committee may be looking to us soon for comments on these

preliminary drafts.

The next time we see them, it will be on the

five-day countdown, with security being the primary problem.

feeling is that we

ought not to take substantive issue in the final

exchange except on very important points. We should save our

amunition for any security issues that require special consideration.

Therefore, we have to make our points on these current replies. I

would like to get these replies back to HSCA very soon in so we are

a little ahead of the game instead of behind it.

Could you meet with

me at 1300 hours, Thursday, I February, in the Conference Room in

6D-5317?

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment

21168

DERIVATIVE CL BY 13196

SERIVED FROM 313

CONFIDENTIAL

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