CIA'S PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

4-00000

104-10103-10009

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

CIA's Performance On The Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, emphasizing

the Consister

things that if tests should have been done but which it assertghere

not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis

that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. As

a practical consideration, it is unlikely that every theoretical question

that can be conceived can be answered conclusively; there simply may

be no evidence at all, or if there is evidence somewhere, it may not

be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did, with

the SSC Final Report portraying what seems to be a pattern of neglect

or avoidance, which we believe is inconsistent with reason and the

record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case. It refers to an allegation by a person identified

as "D" (pages 28-30, 47-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw

Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose of assassinating

President Kennedy; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by .

determining that Oswald was in New Orleans instead of Mexico City at

the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. Nevertheless,.

this subject is treated in a confused and inconclusive manner in the

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 2

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SSC Final Report. Great emphasis is placed on the AMLASH operation,

and its not being reported to the Warren Commission, inaccurately

attributing to it characteristics and therefore significance that it did

not have; this is treated in some detail at Tab A of this report. Space

is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana, on

22 November and 27 November, respectively, failures by CIA and the FBI

being charged. In fact, the first of the flights is inaccurately

described, the correct story removing the basis for the inferences

developed by the SSC version, In the second instance the subject in

question was the subject of a detailed inquiry as is discussed at Tab

of this report. These examples create some problems, for the

reliability of the SSC Final Report unavoidably becomes the subject.

of basic reservations in the face of such errors. How to respond

to treatments that seem contrary to the facts and that are used as

an additional

a basis for serious criticisms presentsa problem?

In essence, it is

necessary to review the record to the extent possible, and report the

findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964 on the

part of CIA; even in terms of the more limited perceptions of the time,

it was decided to consider what courses of action CIA might have taken

to throw some light on the questions as were understood at the time,

as well as considering those questions that have been developed in the

years following. What would be the areas of inquiry?

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice sub-

sequent to his return to private life from the Marine Corps. The

- 2 -

CONFDENTIAL

---

## Page 3

4-00000

first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union

in 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from

which he returned in early October 1963. In addition to these two

areas of obvious inquiry, there is the problem of general intelli-

gence collection that might in some way produce information on the

subject. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations opera-

tions being conducted by CIA as part of a general U.S. program against

the Castro regime. These four general areas of inquiry are covered.

below.

Travel To And From The USSR 1959-1962 .

On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent. to Paris, Rome, Madrid,

- 14-6

Copenhagen, Oslob Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps 11 September 1959 and his travel

to the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as .

to his employment and marriage while in Russia. Information was

• requested on:

"any scrap information which bears on

President's assassination . .

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with

Helsinki and London providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. London reported that a British journalist

claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was

a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living in

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

4/BR

---

## Page 4

14-00000

CONAIDENTIAL

luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'."

Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of president Kennedy although

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from Cuba. to "govern their actions

by official attitude of Gove to which they, accredited." Costol on

the same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about

Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on

2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The

Hague. Various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald

and his wife from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands en

route to United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

detailed results although there were some technical operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with

the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance. Book V of the SaC Final Report, in not criticizing tin

agency's perfrance in this aspect of the investigation scems to have

accented it as ade uate

_4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

I/BR

---

## Page 5

4-00000

CONHDENTIAL

delete

stater'a...

Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October: 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get a

visa for travel to the Soviet Union, transiting Cuba, has received

extensive attention. The details concerning the knowledge about

Oswald is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab_. The

concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of

Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies,

was obvious at the time. The following statement is in a cable to

Mexico City on 28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possi.-

bility that other.as yet unknown persons

may have been involved or even that other

powers may have played a role. Please

continue all your coverage of Soviet and

Cuban installations and your liaison with

Mexicans."

The allegations made by "p" about having seen Oswald taking money from

Cubans received intensive attention from CIA and the FBI, working

closely on the matter, and with the Mexican authorities. Giris was

demonstrated conclusively to have been a false allegation.

After the

allegations by "D" had been proven false, Headquarters made the follow-

ing statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963:

"Pls continue to follow all leads and tips.

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

- 5 -

CONTIDENTAL

---

## Page 6

4-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as

follows:

"Pls continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel

in India had letters sent to ODYOKE readers

demanding full investigation of case."

On 17 December. 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stating as follows:

". . : Mexico City has been the only major

overseas reporter in the case. While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee OSWALD's

life, we have not overlooked the really out-

standing performance of Mexico City's major

assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded. Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

ODACID, and ODENVY.

"Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors

in the quick clarification of the case, blank-

ing out the really ominous spectre of foreign

backing."

- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAI

---

## Page 7

14-00000

CONFIOENIAL

Essentially, the/trip of Oswald to Mexico City was investigated

as thoroughly as possible without producing any evidence there of Soviet

or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If

anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being

seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both

Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this possible analysis as a

proper view, but simply. note that if it means anything it tends to

counter speculation to the contrary..

General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable

(D1R 84608)

from Headquarters with the following statement:

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires

all of us to look sharp for any unusal

intelligence developments. Although we

have no reason to expect anything of a

particular military nature, all hands

should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new

President takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. In this case, without

any leaks, the requirements had to be general. General reporting

can be stimulated by general requests if there is something to report.

Beyond this, in any event, in the world of intelligence,

reporting

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the

- 7-

COMTIDBITIAL

rades said

---

## Page 8

this will be rewritten to

taken into account the recently

discovered fact thut WAVE did issue

collection requirements to those

agents insice Cuba, hoever linited

the resources or access. Furthei,

hovever "passive" the posture in

the U.sio, out of inference to the

the fact of actual requiradent

to Cuban agents should be covered.

Fill sturbitts is going to help

develop this point.

---

## Page 9

14-00000

significance of important information and will report in on their

own initiative. It must be considered significant, in the light of

these considerations, that there has been massive silence on the

subject over the years.

Were there relevant or significant information

on the subject it would have been reported either in responsep to the

expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information

was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared the knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly

involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

" would be nothing to report in the first place. In either event,

insistence that CIA produce something that proves or disproves the

conspiracy theory flies in the face of a view that absence of reporting

means that no collection requirements were issued.

The general collection requirements were addressed to stations

with Cuban assets. The Miami Station did query its assets, but as

was stated by the Chief of the Miami Station, in his testimony

before the Committee, we had no real sources inside Cuba that could

be expected to help on this (page 58), much less "an extensive intelli-

gence network in Cuba" (as stated at page 10 of the SSC Final Report)

that could be expected to have special access to such information.

His characterization of acting in a "passive way" was seized on in the

SSC Final Report, without

its qualifying comments. In fact Cuban

sources were made aware of interests in information.

-8-

COME DeSTI

битт

+ 2031-56674208

---

## Page 10

4-00000

GUNTIUENHAL

While the SSC Final Report undertakes to paint this in different

terms, it is very difficult to conceive, even today, what could have

been done in this respect that was not done.

CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of various operations against Cuba

and the Castro regime that should have been reported to the Warren

Commission as part of the subject matter that it consciously took

into consideration.

To demonstrate its case the SSC Final Report discusses Operation

AMLASH extensively. Because of the extensive treatment given that

activity in the SSC Final Report, we have addressed it in detail

in one of the other annexes of this report (Tab A). We feel that

the SSC Final Report did not analyze that activity carefully and as

a result misunderstood it, and that much of its presentation is

therefore badly flawed. That will not be treated in detail again

here.

The discussion at Tab A does refer to other known operational

activities

against Cuba, and the remarkable tensions between the Cuban

and U.S. governments. The following discussion addresses what has

been done recently in CIA to review all other Cuban operations to see

what they may reveal relating to the Kennedy assassination.

In 1964 the people responsible for the various operations were

still assigned to the general field of Cuban operations. They knew

what was in them, and what was not. Today, persons unfamiliar with

the files have gone through them in detail to determine if there was

anything in them relevant to the Kennedy assassination.

- 9 -

COURIDENTIAL

---

## Page 11

4-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

This search of old operational files necessarily meant that not

only the obvious would be picked out, but that hypothetical tests

must be applied to information and that tenuous possibilities would

be treated as real for the purpose of the review. Findings might well

be of a nature that would not be acceptable under normal professional

standards. Nevertheless, to ensure thoroughness, even the most

far-out

possibility was to be scrutinized, with the thinnest leads being

offered up for consideration. The fact that they are recorded does not

mean that they are accepted as real, but simply that they were noted

in the course of the special research that was undertaken. Ordinarily

these items might not be dignified by even taking them past the first

phase of hypothetical consideration. There always are reservations

about advancing unfounded theory beyond this first step; nowadays

this is an additional

consideration simply because once they find their

way into print they may find their way into the public domain without

the profound reservations that may be held about them. The talent of

the press for extravagant extrapolation and selective reporting almost

of findings

certainly seems to risk a reckless and irresponsible presentation/to

the public, once separated from the special circumstances that

produced them. Nevertheless, they are duly recorded here.

The relevance of the J We following tenuous summaries is based

on an hypothesis that has attracted some current acceptance, but

but that is seriously flawed in itself. This is the hypothesis that

actions of the U.S. Government were so provocative to Castro that he

- 10. -

- CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 12

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

retaliated by ordering the assassination of president Kennedy. There

has never been a secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Adminis-

tration and the Castro regime. The SSC Final Report notes this (pages

2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American policy and practice

must have appeared threatening to the Castro regime, and most certainly

the 556 in its Farinal Pegeant

Was Fans cent ael provo derbes on the basts of this hypothesis,

activitres

The SSC Final Report feels these should have been reported to the Warren

Commission. The approach in the SSC Final Report was to select separate

elements of the overall program directed against the Castro regime which

might, of themselves, have been especially provocative to the Cubans

had they learned of them. This selection of separate activities, seeing

in them especially provocative characteristics, hypothesizing a possi-

bility that they might have become known to the Castro regime, and

then pointing to an ultimate conclusion of responsibility, presents

a series of discrete progressions that must be viewed at each step: the

selection must be well founded (the SSC dismissed out of hand the

relevance of the operation against Castro

that involved the criminal

underworld, while the AMLASH operation failes to support the thesis);

the provocative characteristics must be well founded (the treatment of

the AMLASH operation does this unsuccessfully); the possibility that

the Castro regime learned of the activity in its essential characteristics

this is not done, either inconclusively demonstrating its security

weakness or even that the SSC really appreciated the nature of the

operatiory; and then there would have to be some serious consideration

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

---

## Page 13

14-00000

CONFIDENIAL

of how Castro would have reacted, given all the questions that would

have been presented to him in taking the action suggested by the SSC

Final Report.

It obviously was on the basis of the well known generally low

state of relations between the U.S. and Cuba that the possibility of

Cuban involvement with Oswald was considered at the beginning of the

investigation. The Warren Commission obviously did not elect to inquire

about the separate pieces of the entire Kennedy anti-Castro program,

but relied primarily--as still seems appropriate today--on extensive

and detailed reconstruction of Oswald's history to ascertain where he

had been, what he had done, the identity of his associates, etc. This

was supported by more general information requirements levied among

Cuban sources who might know or learn something, as well as sources in

other parts of the world, especially in Europe.

Today in 1977

it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything

that did and did not happen in 1964, although when specific issues are

raised they can be checked. For instance, there were many individuals

assigned to various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar

with those activities, and with their strengths and weaknesses. Had

they known of any aspects of their operations that might have born

on the assassination of President Kennedy, it is certain that Should.

have been reported, as in fact were a number of separate items of

information:

That sources did not report more meaningful information

is an

indication of what was known then to those actually involved and

what could be learned.

- 11 a -

CONFIDENTIAL'

---

## Page 14

14-00000

CONFIDENANI

Today, the knowledge of the persons directly involved in the

various operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's death

cannot be recaptured in the form it existed then. Those persons are

scattered, their memories are not as detailed or accurate as they then

were, and some are dead. The SSC--in its attempt to capture elements

of the past--led some employees into expressing opinions on subject

matter they did not know about in 1964, phrased to be responsive to

representations of SSC staff members that were inaccurate; this

illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving the question today

on a responsible basis.

In the face of the hypothesis advanced by the SSC Final Report,

with its interpretations based on imprecise presentations of events

and a generally captious character of its arguments,

fit has been felt

necessary to review in great detail all records of Cuban operations

conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1960-64. The organi-

zation of the review is described at Tab _ It was not easy to

predict the form that information turned up by this inquiry might take,

and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the

provocation concept was kept in mind.. In the months that it took to .

complete this extensive review, it is significant to observe that only

two areas of specific operational activity were found that might meet

some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or that in any

way might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy. To report

this conclusion to the research is not to set aside the original general

question facing the Warren Commission, that led to the initial concern

- 11 b-

3 5o

GUARDLAD

---

## Page 15

14-00000

CONFIDE:

N71A

over whether there might be Cuban or Soviet connections behind Oswald,

arising from the state of relations between Cuba and the U.S. That

such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but

that the records for that period disclose no such leads today, and

that the appropriate sources were queried at the time of the investi-

gation, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The two areas of operational activity noted above can be described

briefly as follows:

Operations directed against the Cuban leadership.

Operations involving the criminal underworld.

- 17 C -

CONFIDENTAL'

---

## Page 16

14-00000

Jt.I,

I have experimented with the thre questions

ruised: Sturgis, AtTriNk and the objective o spli ting

the regime, to see what wa night enl un saying. However,

that vie più in here depends on hoi your paper progresses.

Pleas, destroy previous drafts.

SDB

---