REPORT ON DELIBERATIONS OF THE US ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (1953-1954)
Originator: JCS
From: DAVE
To: GENERAL TAYLOR
Document date: 06/20/1964
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date :

Page :

07/14/98

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JCS

202-10002-10125

TAYLOR PAPERS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS

FROM : DAVE

TO

GENERAL TAYLOR

TITLE: REPORT ON DELIBERATIONS OF THE US ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

(1953-1954)

DATE: 06/20/64

PAGES

:60

SUBJECTS: US POLICY - SOUTHEAST ASIA - 1953-54

US MILITARY ACTION - LAOS

US POLICY - SOUTHEAST ASIA - 1963, 1964

ASSASSINATION - DIEM AND NHU

HALBERSTAM, DAVID

SHEEHAN, NEIL

AMBASSADOR LODGE

DE GAULLE, CHARLES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER,

TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

.: 1C

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

03/04/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

: Taylor Papers, Box 12. Multiple memos and cables re:

U.s. policy in Southeast Asia in the 50's and 60's.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

STATE

DATE: MAR

2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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OF SECREI

EYES ONLY

R- 15594

0114402

SECRET EYES ONLY 141440Z

FM CIA

TO STATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK,

BALLy HELSMAN,

HUGHES

OSD LIES ONLY FOR MC NAMARA, GILPATRIC, TAYLOR, KURLAK, MR

WILLIAM BUNDY

WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR MC GEORGE BUNDY.

T S

ECRET EYES ONLY CITE CAS SAIGON 2441

FOR

STATE , DOD, SCS AND CLA

HONOLULU FOR CINCRAC AND CI

JOINT EMBASSY, MACV, CAS MESSAGE

REF: DEPTEL 570

1• THIS IS THE FIRST OF THREE MESSAGES IN RESPONSE TO

REFERENCE AND DEALS WITH IN-COUNTRY PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS.

2. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE TURNOVER

BY CAS TO MACU OF BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND MOUNTAIN SCOUT ASSETS.

THIS MESSAGE DEALS WITH THE REMAINING IN-COUNTRY PARAMILITARY

OP. ATIONS SPECIFIED IN DEPTEL 570. THESE ARE THE COMBAT INTELLI-

GENCE TEAM PROGRAM, THE CILIVIAN AIRBORNE RANGERS, AND THE

BRITISH/MALAYAN TEAM.

3. IT IS JOINTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THESE IN-COUNTRY PARA-

MILITARY ASSETS BE TURNED OVER TO MACV FOR SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE.

4. THE COMBAT INTELLIGENCE TEAM PROGRAM COMPRISES SOME

[A]

650 INDIVIDUALS OPERATING IN TEAMS OF APPROXIMATELY 18 MEN EACH.

IT PARALLELS IN EVERY WAY THE MOUNTAIN SCOUT PROGRAM, THE ASSETS

OF WHICH ARE NOW BEING ABSORBED INTO THE CIDG PROGRAM. HOWEVER,

IT OPERATES IN NON-MONTAGNARD AREAS AND IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF

ETHNIC VIETNAMESE. THIS PROGRAM ORIGINALLY CAME UNDER THE SUPPORT

OF CAS SINCE IT WAS BASED ON A STAY-BEHIND PROGRAM WHICH WAS

ACTIVATED WHEN THE NEEDS OF THE INSURGENCY SITUATION SO DICTATED.

THE ASSETS HAVE NOW BECOME OVERT. MACV HAS THE CAPABILITY TO

ABSORB THEM AS A PART OF THE CIDG STRIKE FORCES• THIS ACTION

WOULD ENHANCE U.S. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THESE ASSETS.

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THE CIVILIAN AIRBORNE RANGERS, COMPRISING THREE COMPANIES

OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEN EACH AND A REPLACEMENT COMPANY OF 92

MEN, WERE ORIGINALLY INTENDED AS STRIKE FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN

LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS SUPPORT OF SPEICAL INTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, THEY HAVE, IN THE PAST, PERFORMED

THESE MISSIONS TO A LIMITED DEGREE AND HAVE ALSO BEEN ATTACHED

TO REGULAR OPERATIONS WHEN DESIRABLE. VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES

ARE NOW UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND

MOST EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THESE FORCES IN CONJUNCTION

WITH OTHER OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL

CAMPAIGN PLAN. THEREFORE, THESE UNITS SHOULD BE INTEGRATED

WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES, THE GUIDANCE

AND SUPPORT OF WHICH IS ALREADY A MACV RESPONSIBILITY. MACV

WIFT SEEK TO REGULARIZE THESE GROUPS BY THEIR INDUCTION INTO

ARVN AND UTILIZATION ON OPERATIONS IN THE SAME FASHION AS OTHER

SPECIAL FORCES. THE UNITS ARE WELL TRAINED, FLEXIBLE, AND AGGRESSIVE.

6. THE BRITISH/MALAYAN TEAM COMPRISES SIX BRITISH OFFICERS

6a 1(C)

AND 14MALAYANS WHO HAVE HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

[F]

OPERATIONS AMONG MONTAGNARDS DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY.

BECAUSE OF THE UK'S POSITION AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION,

THE OVERT COMMITMENT OF THESE FORCES IS NOT DESIRABLE; HOWEVER,

THE BRITISH AND MALAYANS DID DESIRE TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO

THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG. THROUGH CAS AND THE GOOD OFFICES

OF USOM, THE BRITISH/MALAYAN TEAM, INTENDED TO CORRESPOND ROUGHLY

[F]

TO A UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES "A™ TEAM, WAS INTRODUCED IN

VIETNAM UNDER USOM COVER AS A MONTAGNARD RURAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR

GRO THE BRITISH/MALAYAN TEAM HAS TAKEN UP ITS POSITION ON

[F]

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

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PLATEAU G BUT SO FAR HAS NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS DUE TO

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE

DONE LITTLE TO ASSIST THE TEAM. BECAUSE OF THIS AND BECAUSE OF

THE CRISIS SITUATION IN MALAYA, THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS

TAKEN THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE MALAYANS FOR COMMITMENT IN

BORNEO. UNDER THE NEW SITUATION AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT, IT MAY

BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE MALAYAN GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS

DECISION, PROVIDED THERE IS SOME STRONG INDICATION OF INTEREST

IN THE TEAM ON THE PART OF THE NEW VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. THE

BRITISH AND MALAYANS HAVE AGREED TO DEFER WITHDRAWAL UNTIL SUCH

EXPRESSION CAN BE OBTAINED. IN THE EVENT OF A MALAYAN REVERSAL

OF THE DECISION, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FIELD OPERATIONS OF

THE ZEAM SHOULD BE HANDLED AS A SPECIAL FORCES "A" TEAM ENGAGED

IN A CIDG PROJECT AND, THEREFORE, UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF MACU. THEY

WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR USOM COVER. CAS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE

FOR INTER-GOVERNMENT LIAISON AND COORDINATION.

7• IF THESE TRANSFERS TO MACU ARE MADE, MACU WILL HAVE

UNIQUE SUPPORT AND CONTROL OF OVERT IN-COUNTRY PARAMILITARY ASSETS

AND WILL BE IN BETTER POSITION TO SYSTEMATIZE COMMAND AND SUPPORT

OF THESE IRREGULAR UNITS.

8. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT CAS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY FUNDS

AND MATERIAL TO MACV FOR THESE ACTIVITIES AT NOT LESS THAN THE

CURRENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT THROUGHOUT FY 64• FY 65 FUNDING WILL

BE HANDLED BY MACV, HOWEVER, CAS CHANNELS MAY BE UTILIZED FOR

THESE FUNDS IF SO AGREED BY DOD AND CAS HEADQUARTERS.

GP -

P SECRET

EYES ONLY

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6UXc(4

[F]

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY A JCS

RECORD NUMBER: 202-10002-10125

RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS

FROM : DAVE

TO : GENERAL TAYLOR

TITLE : REPORT ON DELIBERATIONS OF THE US ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

(1953-1954)

DATE: 06/20/1964

PAGES : 60

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

SUBJECTS : US POLICY - SOUTHEAST ASIA - 1953-54; US MILITARY

ACTION - LAOS; US POLICY - SOUTHEAST ASIA - 1963,

1964; ASSASSINATION - DIEM AND NHU; HALBERSTAM, DAVID;

SHEEHAN, NEIL; AMBASSADOR LODGE; DE GAULLE, CHARLES

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/01/1998

COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 12. Multiple memos and cables re:

U.S. policy in Southeast Asia in the 50's and 60's.

Audit history for this Record Identification Form.

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## Page 6

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, THE JOINT STAFF

WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

Pyou memory is as

in cliar as mine in The ViS.

proitims win respit to France

une Indo-Clien circa 1954,

2 Thick you will find thes

Dave.

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THE JOINT STAFF

Downgraten le conrEntAt

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

J-5 (PLANS AND POLICY) DIRECTORATE

DECLASSIF

DATE:

JUL 1 01997

J-5 M 622-64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject:

Report on Deliberations of the us on

Southeast Asia (1953-1954) (U)

1. The attached report is submitted in accordance with

your oral request of 1 June 1964 for a review of the US

position toward Indochina in 1953-1954.

2. A summary of the attached report is as follows:

a. The Us position during the period 1953-1954 with

respect to French Indochina was contained primarily in

N5C -24/2, approved 25 June 1952,

14 January 1954. In essence, NSC 124/2 called

and NSC 5405, approved

for:

(1) Assistance to Southeast Asia non-communist

countries.

(2) A warning to Communist China to stop aggressive

actions

but such warning was contingent upon French

and United Kingdom agreement to act militarily with

the US against Communist China if she did not heed the

warning.

Such action would involve US air and naval

forces with token allied support plus French and

indigenous ground forces.

(3) A Naval Blockade.

b. NSC 5405 reiterated the above and stated that the

loss of Indochina to communism would have "the most

serious repercussions on US and Free World interests

in Europe and elsewhere." It flatly opposed any idea

of accepting a cease-fire prior to opening negotiations

with the communists.

c. The US supported the French throughout the war

with military and economic assistance, as well as on

most political issues related to the war. Disagreements

centered around:

DES 29022

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

34014

20, 2.3

V NARA, Date

523,141

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Reyngratill to COMFIBENTIAL

(1) French lack of aggressiveness in prosecuting

the war:

(2) French (and UK) reluctance to join the US in

warning the Chinese communists that further aggression

would result in retaliation on Red China itself. (As

a result, such a warning was never given).

(3) US insistence on independence for the Associated

States (Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia) as a prerequisite

to furnishing troops, and French desire to hold on to

colonial possessions.

d. Areas in which State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

held divergent views

concerned paragraph 2.a. (2) above.

At state insistence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff softened

their position and decided to "take action against

Communist China in the event of further aggression."

There was also a difference of opinion between the

Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

the subject of what the US would do if France gave up

the struggle.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the

question resolved and the Secretary of Defense backed

by the National Security Council and the President

sidestepped the question.

e. Other factors influencing the resulting situation in

Indochina stemmed in part from:

(1) A deteriorating political situation in France.

(2) The fact that the American people and Congress

had not been prepared for unilateral American action

in Indochina.

I. The US noted (rather than signed) the Geneva

conference declaration, and presented a unilateral

statement to the last plenary session on 21 July 1954.

8. US Military assistance was halted when the decision

was made to divide Vietnam.

Materiel withdrawn from North

Vietnam was used as much as possible to equip the Associated

States forces.

Few US policies toward Southeast Asia have changed

since 1954. For example, air and naval action was advocated

in 1954 but the use of indigenous ground forces only was

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Downgraded to coN

contemplated. The statement made by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff that the loss of Indochina to communism would

have critical psychological, political and economic

consequences for the US, is still valid. Likewise the

question of whether or not to resort to nuclear weapons

in the event of large scale communist Chinese aggression

has never been completely resolved at governmental level.

Emuck

s. EMRICK

Major General, USAF

Director for Plans and Policy

PREPARED BY:

Colonel Harry Wilds, USAF

PESEA Branch,

Exts: 57043/73242

3

Downgraded to CONRDENTIAL

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a graded 10

MEDENTIAL

Dow

FUENTIA

REPORT ON DELIBERATIONS OF THE US ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (1953-1954)

.. The purpose of this paper is to review Us policies

with

respect to the Indochina situation during the period

1953-1954 to include areas in which the French Government

was supported by the Us and the views of the US Government

departments and agencies with respect to US policy.

During 1952 four Important trends developed in the

Indochinese war with respect to United States policy.

a. Washington was taking its place with Paris and Saigon

as a center of political and military strategic planning for

the war

b. The US Government was being drawn into closer coperation

with the British and French on the problems of the area.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, fearing that this tendency might

lead to a combined command of some sort, or to increased

American responsibility in the Indochinese conflict,

sometimes protested against it, though with little success.

c. The threat of Chinese communist intervention was

beginning to dwarf other factors in the Southeast Asia

picture, especially for the French, who seemed obsessed

with this danger.

d. France was beginning to crack under the triple burden

of the Indochinese war, Buropean rearmament, and the chronic

instability of its own

government

3. On 25 cune 1952, President Truman approved a comprehen-

sive US poliey* toward Indochina.

For the purpose of holding

the entire area this policy provided that, with respect to

Southeast Asia the United States should:

a. Continue programs of economic and technical assistance

designed to strengthen the indigenous non-communist govern-

ments of the area.

b. Seek agreement with other nations, including at least

France, the UK, Australia ard New Zealand, for a joint

warning to Communist China regarding the grave consequences

of Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia, the issuance

* NSO 124/2, 25 June 1952

To Downgraded to CONDENTIAL,

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of

such a warning to be contingent upon the prior agreements

of France and the Uk to participate in the following minimum

courses ol military action, either under the auspices of the

UN or in conjunction with France and the UK and any other

friendly governments:

(1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which

the US would provide such air and naval assistance as might

be practicable:

(2) Interdiction of Chinese communist communication lines

including those in China put avoiding targets near the USSR

boundaries.

(3) The US would provide the major forces for task

(2)

above, but would expect token forces from France

and the Uk and would expect France to carry the burden

of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States

(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), the ground forces for the

defense of Indochina.

c. Seek UK and French agreement in principle that a

naval blockade of Communist China should be included in

minimum courses of action set forth above.

d. Strengthen covert operations designed to assist in

the achievement of US objectives in Southeast East Asia.

e encourage the spirit of resiatance among the people

of boucheast Last Aeta to Communire Chinese aggression.

1• Make clear to the American people the importance

of Southeast Asia to the security of the uS.

g. Consider taking unilateral action in the event

concurence of the UK and France to expanded military

action against Connunist China is not obtained.

4. Following a Iripartite conference (UK, France, and the US)

the JCS took issue with the UK and French position which opposed

action against Colmunist China outside the area of aggression.

At State insistence the JOS softened their position and decided

to take action against Communist China in the event of further

Chinese aggression.*

* History of the Indochina Incident, Historical Section, JCS,

pages X 20-21

TOP SECReater de CONDIA

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MY SICKEL

DowngrauG to CONNENTAR O SECRET

5. The foregoing policy (NSC 124/2) was the most important develop-

ment in the US policy toward Indochina in 1952.

The Us continued to

keep responsibility for the war in the hands of the French, refused

to be drawninto a combined military command in southeast Asia

side-stepped any commitment to participate in a puroly local dorches

of Indochina. However, the US was backing the French position

in the UN and was expanding and publicizing its military aid

program for Indochina.

6. As the war progressed the US received more and more requests

for military assistance but the JCS found French plans deficient

in aggressive spirit.

After considerable prodding by the US,

the French "Navarre Plan" appeared to offer sufricient promise

of success to warrant increased American aid. The French

Government had indicated that such aid was the only alternative

to withdrawal from Indochina.

7. The JCS recognized two conditions under which French

witharawal might take place - intervention by the Chinese

communists or political deterioration within France.

Hopefully

the JCS considered that French withdrawal might not occur until

the expansion of native forces had reached an advanced state.

In that event the US might be able to forego the commitment of

ground troops and achieve results by providing air and naval

support or logistic support for the Vietnamese operation.

If Red Chinese aggression drove the French to withdraw there were

no feasible courses of military action that the us could take

in Indochina to prevent communist forces from overrunning the

Preventing the situation from reaching so serious

a state as this was a prime objective of American policy.

The

US Government had encountered continued French and British

reluctance to subscribe to a joint declaration advising Red China

that any further acts of aggression would call forth a united

retallacion that might not observe geographic limitations such

as those imposed on the Korean action.**

8. In issuing a unilateral US wrning*** against further

incursions in Southeast Asia Secretary of State Dulles suggested that

retallatory actions might not be limited to Indochina. the

JOS concluded that such action could not be so confined.

ICS 1992/137, 28 October 1952

Doc D-9 State Dept Press Release No. 160, 28 March 1953

*** Doc D-39 State Dept Press Release No. 469, 2 Sept 1953

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Downgianes su CUNNDENTIAL

9. In redrafting the 25 June 1952 statement of American

objectives and courses of action in Southeast Asia (NSC 124/2), the

Flanning board of the National Security Council in late 1953 made

an assesement of the probable consequences of a French dofeat in

Indochina. In June 1952 the Security Council had agreed that the

loss of any Southeast Asia country would probably lead to the rela-

tively swift realization of communiet domination over the whole area

But in November 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency would go no

further than to say:

"A Viet Minh victory in Indochina would re-

move a significant military barrier to a communist sweep through

Southeast Asia, expose the remaindor of that region to greatly

increased external communist pressures, and probably increase the

capabilitles of local communists..

"However the Deputy Director

for Intelligence of the Joint Staff registered a dissenting view:

"The establishment of communist control over Indochina by

military or other means would almost certainly result in the

communization of all of Southeast Aeia....

Accordingly,

the Planning Board's redraft contained the statement that the

loss of Indochina would have "the most serious repercussions

on US and Free World interests in Europe and elsewhere."

Drawing upon Korean experience, the Planning Board also

recommended that the US flatly oppose any idea of accepting

a cease-fire prior to opening negotiations because of the

probable result - irretrievable deterioration in the French

Union military position.**

10. Since the Board needed military advice the JCS directed

the Joint Strategic and Logisitics Plans Committees to review

an earlier study*** on the subject. As in the earlier study,

the committees assumed that:

The US could take over French responsibilities in an

orderly manner at the invitation of the Associated States.

11. The committee reaffirmed the conclusion that the

successful defense of Indochina was essential since loss of

the area would have critical psychological, political, and

economic consequences for the Us.****

The course of action

offering the US the greatest assurance of success was to

support and step-up the development of native troops and to

deploy American and Allied forces to Indochina for operations

that would have the objective of reducing communist elements

to scattered guerrilla bande.

12. The board foresaw that the threat of French withdrawal

might

take two forme.

There was, first, the possibility that

France might seek peace unless America offéred to participate

* SE-52, CIA Sp Est Probable Consequences in non-communist

Asia of Action Possible Developments in Indochina before

mid 1954, 10 Nov 1953

** NSC 5405, 10 Jan 1953

JCS 1992/227, 22 Jan 1953

****

JCS 1992/262, 24 Dec 1953

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in the war with military forces.

Should this contingency arise,

two choices would be open to the US:

Either the US Government

might do nothing to prevent the loss of Indochina or it might

provide the forces needed to keep France in the war.

The

second threat foreseen by the board was even more ominous:

The French Government might refuse to continue the struggle

even if the US did agree to commit troops.

Under these

circumstances again the US might write off Indochina.

On

the other hand, it could consider taking the course of action

that had just been evaluated ly the Joint Staff (para 11 above).

The board submitted this study for NSC consideration in

December 1953 as the Special Annex to NSC 177.

The JCS

agreed,* in general, with the board's position on 6 January 1954.

13. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee recognized that 1f

the French withdrew in spite of American intervention, the

worldwide situation might oblige the US to accept the loss

of Indochina.

Nevertheless, the US should be prepared to do

what it could to offset such a development.

Therefore, the

committee recommended that the Special Annex be revised to

reflect the following views:

"Should the French make an arbitrary decision to

withdraw from the conflict in Indochina despite all

offers of US assistance, the us should in any event,

and as a minimum urge the French to phase their wichdrawal

over a protracted period and to take all practicable

measures to prepare the indigenous forces better to assume

the responsibilities of their own defense. Additionally,

the US, preferably in conjunction with its Allies,

should provide such military assistarce to the indigenous

forces of Indochina as is determined to be advisable and

feasible in the light of conditions then prevailing;

respect to Southeast Asia and world-wide.**

JOS

1992/257,

4 Jan 1954

** JOS 1992/267, 4 Jan 1954

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14. Admiral Carney (CNO) suggested that if US forces were

to participate in the war, they should do su in sufficient

strength to insure an early and lasting military victory.

He also wished to strengthen the arguments in favor of the

most vigorous alternative course, supporting native troops

while deploying American and Allied forces for operations

which would reduce the communist to scattered guerrilla bands.*

15. At a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on

7 Jan 54, Admiral Radford indicated that the JCS had hastily

prepared some comments on the Special Annex to NSC 177.

However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roger M. Kyes

did not address himself to the principal problem at hand -

that of being prepared for a French request for intervention.

The Secretary of Defensé,

Charles E. Wilson, supported Mr. Kyas

and decided to request that the Special Annex be withdrawn from

further consideration. In addition, the Department of Defense

suggested to the Security Council that, in the future, requests

for military advice, such as that contained in the Special

Annex,

should be addressed to the Secretary of Defense, not to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

16, On 14 Jan 54, President Bisenhower approved the Planning

Board's policy statement toward Southeast Asia, NSC 177 which was

later airculated as NSC 5405 and bucame the charter for Us action

in the monthe to come, assuming the French fought on. However, the

Secretary of Defense and the council had sidestepped the

question raised by the JCS, of what the US would do if France

gave up the struggle.

17. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the continuing

deterioration of the French position, Vice President Nixon

took action of his own to test public epinion.

Asked what

the country should do if the French withdrew from Indochina,

Mr. Nixon replied:

" there was no reason why the French could not

stay on and win, but on the assumption they did withdraw -

an assumption he did not accept - Indochina would become

Conmunist in a month. The US as a leader of the free world

cannot afford further retreat in Asia. It was hoped that

the US would not have to send troops there, but if this

Government could not avoid it, the Administration must face

up to the situation and dispatch forces."***

* JCS 1992/268, 5 Jan 64

** AFPC Advice of Action, US Objectives and Courses of Action

with respect to SEA (NSC 177) 11 Jan 54.

***

-New York Times 4 May 1954 Page 4

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Public reaction was so unfavorable shot the Depurtment

of State took pains to point out that the Vice President had

been addressing himself to a hypothetical question.

18. With public opinion and the Congress obviously still

unready for unilateral American action and the British unwilling

to internationalize the war, the only course open to the

Administration was the use of moral suasion to keep the French

from selling out at Geneva.

19. Meanwhile a ceasefire was being discussed at Geneva.

In assessing the Indochinese situation, the JCS considered

that the US should adopt the following as its minimum position:

"The United States will not associate itself with any

French proposal directed toward cease-fire in advance of a

satisfactory political settlement.

The United States urges

the French Government to propose that negotiations for a

political settlement be initiated at once. During the

course of such negotiations,

French Union Forces should

continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all

means at their disposal in order to reinforce the French

negotiating position. In the meantime, as a means of

strengthening the French hand,

the United States will

intensify its efforts to organize and promptly activate a

Southeast Asian coalition for the purpose of preventing

further expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia.

If the French Government persists in its intention of

entering armistice negotiations or accedes to immediate

ceasefire negotiations, the United States will disassociate

itselr from such negotiations in order to maintain maximum

freedom of action in taking whatever measures may be

feasible for opposing extension of Communist control into

Southeast Asia"

20. The obvious answer to Geneva was American intervention,

but the French seened to dread the cure fully as much as the

complaint.

Twice during April the French Government had sought

American intervention to save Dien Bien Phu and both times had

been unwilling to pay the price of independence for the Allied

States. Mr. Dulles made this requirement clear when he stated:

remove any taint of colonialism in order to attract vital

Asian support and forestall opposition by other Asian and

Middle East countries"

. **

** 565 3002/308, 6 A 5(as a NAd 4074) yay 54

TOP.

7

raded to

CONNOENTIAL

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## Page 17

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

21. In late June the US and the UK received an aide

memoire from the French Government stating that French

authorities must face two sorts of difficulties: on the one

hand it would be most difficult to obtain concessions from

the Viet Minh in the north; and on the other hand the

negotiations risk causing, if the agreement is concluded,

dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose

citizens are serving at the present time under the orders of

the French command.*

22. The British and American Governments drafted an answer

to the alde-memoire in the hope of stiffening the French

position.

The two government's Informed the French that they

would be willing to respect an agreement that:

"I, preserves the integrity and independence of Laos

and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Vietminh forces

thererrom;

2. preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam,

and if possible an enclave in the Delta; in this connection

we would be unwilling to see the line of division of

responsibility drawn further south than a line running

generally west from Dong Hoi;

3. does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam

any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to

maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially

restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate

forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ

foreign advisers;

4. does not contain political provisions which would

risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;

5, does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate

unification of Vietnam by peaceful means;

6. provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under

international supervision, of those people desiring to be

moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and

7. provides effective machinery for international

supervision of the agreement.**

* Msg,

Dulles to Amb (Paris) 4852,

** Msg, Dulles to Amb (Paris) 4053,

28 June 1954

28 June 1954

TOP

SECRE

to COMTDENFAL

8

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Page 17

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## Page 18

TOP SEGR

DOY Downgraded to CORNS CRET

23. When the diplomats at Geneva formally agreed to

partition Vietnam, the Defense Department immediately

suspended all shioments of materiel to Indochina.

Between

1950 and the suspension date of July 1954 such assistance

had amounted to 2.7 billion dollars. Subsequently, the US

adopted an interim policy of sending to Indochina only items

directly alleviating suffering, preventing disease and assisting

in the evacuation of military forces and refugses.* It was

the US intention to use as much as possible of the materiel

rescued from northern Vietnam to help equip the native forces

of the Associated States.

This disposition of the equipment

was in line with the idea that the non-communist nations would

have to build up their own forces for internal security.

Thts

initial equiping of native forces

was the forerunner of the more

extensive MAP in effect in 1964.

24. In determining the degree to which the US might be willing

to be associated with an agreement which might be reached in

Geneva, the US issued a statement to the effect that it was not

prepared to join in the conference declaration.

Instead, the

following unilateral declaration** was presented by Under

Secretary Smith to the last plenary session of the conference

on 21 July:

"The Government of the United States being resolved to

devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in

Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva

on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the France-Laotian

Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of VietNam;

(b) The Royal Komer Army Command and the Command of the

Peoples Army of VietNam and of paragraphs 1 to 12

inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva

Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the

aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (1) it will refrain

from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in

accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United

Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain

in their international relations from the threat or use of

force; and (11) it would view any renewal of the aggression

in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern

* History of Indochina Incident, Historical Section,

JCS (Page 1, Summary of the Aid Program)

** US Declaration on Indochina, Under Secretary of State

21 July 54, State Dept. Bulletin VOL XXXI, No. 788 (2 Aug 54)

FOR SE

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TOP SECRET

Downgraded to COMFIDENTIAL

Down grater

TOP SECRET

and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning

free elections in Viet-Nam my government wishes to make clear

its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in

Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

In the case of nations now divided against their will,

we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free

elections supervised by the United Nations to Insure that

they are conducted fairly.'

With respect to the statement made by the representative of

the State of Viet-Nam, the United States te terates its

traditional position that peoples are entitlea to determine

their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement

which would hinder this.

Nothing in its declaration just

made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this

traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia,

Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part in full independence

and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and

will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own

future.

25. The US Government might have been able to stave off the

consequences of the Geneva Conference if, as the Joint Chiefs

of Staff were prepared to do, it had committed its own forces

to the struggle. But the National Security Council postponed

decision on this step in favor of an attempt to raise inter-

national support for united action. The National Security

Council never met the question squarely, and certainly the

American people and Congress had never

for fighting alone, or even with allies, in Indochina. The

principal shortcoming in the establishment of US policy regard-

ing Southeast Asia was the reluctance of Washington to face

squarely what action the US would take if the Chinese Communists

became involved in the conflict.

Then, as now, the use of

large contingents of US ground forces in Southeast Asia was

viewed unfavorably. At the same time, it was recognized that

air action with conventional weapons might not be adequate.

This poses the question which has not been faced squarely and

answered by all branches of the US Government concerned.

Would the US resort to nuclear weapons?

Downgrades

TOP. SECRET

VIAL

10

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## Page 20

REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

RETURN TO:

Office, Chairman, JCS

Room 2-E 865, The Pentagon

DOCUMENT NUMBER

J-5 M 622-64

SUBJECT

COPY NUMBER

Orig w/encl

Report on Deliberations of the US on Southeast Asia (1953-1954)

CONTROL NUMBER

1039

DATE RECEIVE

22 June 64

Downgrated"

to CONFIDENTIAI

DATE OF DOCUMENT

20 June 64

TO

The above described document has been received in this office.. Circulation of this document will be limited to

Individuals indicated below. The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record prior to dispatch to

another office, or other disposition. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

NAME

3

CHAIRMAN, JC3

EXECUTIVE

SPÉCIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)

MILITARY ASSISTANT (LAL)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN

of

065-4198

docamont consists

page, coy lol

L. copios, Sories 9

SD

FORM

NOY 88 349

E25624

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## Page 21

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SSO CABLE -- IMMEDIATE

FROM: General Maxwell D. Taylor, CJCS

TO:

Admiral Felt, CINCPAC

LIES ONL

28 May 1964

Copy to:

SecDef

Mr. Me Naughtor

General Harkins, COMUSMACV

- 2623

CITE JCS- 2624-64 EYES ONLY

DTG: 2815057 May 64

1. In addition to items for discussion at Honolulu conveyed by State

(state to Jaigon 2095)

to Ambassador Lodge, SecDef desires to have views of CINCPAC and

COMUSMACY on following questions:

Part I

a. What military actions might we consider to strengthen the

situation in Laos? What should be done about reequipping Kong Le's forces?

b. What military actions might be taken in ascending order of

gravity to impress Hanoi with our intention to strike NVN?

c. What are time factors and force movements involved in

achieving readiness for action against NVN?

d. What should be the purpose and pattern of the initial air strikes

against NVN?

e. What is your concept of the actions and reactions which may

arise from the progressive implementation of CINGPAC 37-64 and 32-64?

How may NVN and Communist China respond to our escalating pressures?

f If at some point Hanoi agrees to desist from further help to

VC and PL, how can we verify fulfillment? How long should we be prepared

to maintain our readiness posture while awaiting verification?

TOP SECRET

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EYES ONLY

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## Page 22

TO. SECRET

TOP SECRET

g. What help should be sought from SEATO nations in relation

to the situation (a) in Laos? (b) in SVN?

Part II

a. Reference CINGPAC 270805 Zulu. What is your view of

providing 4-man advisory teams at once for each district in the seven

selected provinces? (State-Saigon 2095); in all 239 districts? It is

assumed mission of teams would be to supervise unit training, operational

performance, and operational planning of the paramilitary units in the

district.

b. In addition to these district level advisory teams, in what

other ways could military personnel be used to advantage in forwarding the

pacification program in the seven selected provinces?

c. What are your views with regard to relocating the headquarters

of General Khanh and COMUSMACV?

d. What is the current status of the following projects:

(1) Proposed increase in regular and paramilitary forces

of GVN, including expansion of VNAF; reorganization of paramilitary forces;

increased compensation for GVN military forces.

(2) Formation of an intelligence net of US advisers reporting

on conditions in RVNAF.

(3) Development of a capability for offensive guerrilla operations.

TOR SECRE TOP SECRET

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Page 2 of 3 pages,

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## Page 23

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(4) Progress under decrees for national mobilization.

(5) Progress in detailing and carrying out operational plans

in implementation of clear-and-hold (oil-spot) operations.

2. Discussions are desired in groups of minimum size formed on

basis of need to participate.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32425003 Page 23

Page 3 of 3 pages.

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## Page 24

CJOS

14-1/2) DJS-I(16-3) SJCS-I(14

J3-11-y-5) SACSA 4(16-6/9) 55-1(1%-10,

NVCC/DDO-1(16-11) FIE-](K-12) jck

TGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INLICATE: L COLECT

Dil CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET

15187

ACTION:

Anembassy SAICON 21094

INDIALS

TROL TUE ACTING SECRETARY FOR TRE

AMBASSADOR.

ges

127 6.13 PMS!

14

20262

DXDIS

PASS HARKINS, WESTMORSLAND, ZORTIAN, HURT, AND

DE SILVA

I. You wilt have surmized from yesterday's celogram from

President and Secretary that we here are fully aware that gravest

decisions are in front of us and other governments about free

world's incerest in and cormitment to securicy of Southeast Asta.

Our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept

overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peiping Full and

frent discussion of these decisions with you is purpose of

Honolulu meeting Asksoessage

300200

303008

We are pleased you agreo with Suggestion that

MIES

meeting begin on monday

June 1, and Secretary is arranging his honeward schedule from

New Delhi on that basis.

President

Drafied bys

5/27/64

S: DEcai-S/VN: WhSullivan:mda

"Jearances:

S/S - Mi. Read

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved byi

The Acking Secretary

TOP

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

0402

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## Page 25

Page 2 of telegram to

SAIGON

TOP SECRET

President will continue in close consultation with congres-

sional leadership (he met with Democratic Leadership and Senate

Republicans yesterday) and will were

Sab-Kwish the Congress

associated wich him ou

3f steps which carry with them substancia?

acts and risks of escalation. As that point, there will be three

central questions:

(a) Is the security of Southeast Asia vical to the United

States and to the Free Worlde

(b) Are che additional steps necessary?

(c) Will the additional steps accomplish their mission of

stopping the intrusions of Hanoi and Peiping into the Souch?

Whether approached from (b) or (e)s above, it seems obvious

that we must do everyching in our power to oniffen and strengthen

the situation in South Viet Nam. We recognise that selftening and

strengthening measures will require lengthy preparations and we know

Chat the cime sequence of communist actions may force the calcical.

decisions before any such preparacory measures could achieve tangible

success.

So Nevercholeas, in onolulu,

inching We

would

JOR SECRET

DocId:32425003 Page 25

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## Page 26

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DocId: 32425003 Page 26

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## Page 27

Page 4 of telegram to

SAIGON

TOP SECRET

function to worl in the provincial administration, and insofar as it

is foasible, down Into the district level of administration. On the

millary side, it would mean the introduction of mobile training

Ceano dis

Day to

traing oclifen, and improve the status of the Vietnamese paramilitary

ond of dratzice operational

forces?

He voin corera scat have dready sent a message to

Cerocal Kazicins acking his views on this mobile training team concept.

Iliays ous proposal suggests that the propaganda and information

progrets in Chese selected provinces similarly be enhanced by the

signent of US civilian and military personnel to train, guide and

wort with Vietnamese counterparts in that field of action.

Ia order to test the utility of such a proposal, we would suggest

that seven provinces be chosen for this purpose. We would offer the

provinces of Long An, Dinh Tung, Kien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Ngiah,

which are five critical provinces in immediate' vicinity of Saigon.

Additionally, we would propose Quang Ngal, because it is a critical

[covince considerably removed from Saigon, and finally Phu Yen, because

it is a province in which significant pacification has already been

achieved.

It would

TOP SECRET

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## Page 28

Page 5 of telegram to.

SAIGON

TOP SECRET

It would be our concept that the US personnel assigned to these

actions would not RIT not appear directly in the chain of command,

either civilian or military. They would instead by listed as QUOTE:

US Assistents UNQUOTE to the Vietnamese officials. In practice,

however, we would expect them to carry a major share of che burden

of decision and action in these provinces and districts. Apart from

the milicary personnel assigned the mobile training teams, we do not

have precise estimates of the numbers that might be involved in this

assignment. However, we would expect a total (exclusive of traning

teams) in the neighborhood of 100 men. To the extent these men are

not available from civilian pool and to the extent that they can be

provided from military personnel in-country, such personnel might

be so assigned.

We realize this proposal might also require a close integration

of US and Vietnamese pacification activities in Saigon, We under-

scand chat some discussion has already been held concerning the

possible establishment of a joint US-Vietnamese Pacification Opera-

chon Center and Chat initial reactions are favorable.

III. In addition to chis radical proposal, ve also believe chat

you should be prepared to consult with us on the manner in which

the

TOP SECRET

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## Page 29

Page a of telegram to

SAIGON

TOP SECRET

the Honolulu talks can best be used to accomplish any of the other

stabilizing actions which you have been seeking to achieve over the

past few weeks. We continue gravely concerned about the differences

between Khanh and the Generals, the problem of 3ig Minh, and the

religious differences, both Catholic and Buddhist. (Deptel 2086)

IV. Finally, we wish to consult with you on the manner in

which we can make to eliminate the business as usual attitude in

your

Saigon. We share/yearview that the US community should set the

example and we feel that on your return from Honolulu you may wish

to insticute such specific measures as the elimination of cocktails

parties, black-tie dinners and other dispensable social customs. We

will also wish to examine the best means of reducing the problem of

dependents and otherwise clearing the decks for action in the

American community.

V. Before the Honolulu meeting certain diplomatic actions will

have been set in train and we will report further when we meet. Among

these will have been the consultation with the Canadians, on which I

think our views are very close and which I hope will result in the

eacly despatch of the new Canadian Commissioner to Saigon preferably

no later than next week.

II

TOP

SECRET

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## Page 30

Page 7 of telegram to_

SAIGON

TOP SECROT

I there are any other matters on which you feel you wish to

have to fully prepared before the Honolulu meeting, please advise

immedstely.

There may be such matters as the broadening or alternatively

nar-odes of the base for the Khanh Government, the introduction

01 0 nor notional efforts into Viet Nam, and the organization of che

United States Mission which you will want to raise with us collec-

tively or in more private discussions. We would naturally welcome

your viels on any of these matters.

VI. Additionally you should be aware that Graham Martin from

Chadbourn

proctole and Xaver geeZEK DCM/from Vientiane will participate

in the meeting. For your own team my suggestion would be that, in

dessicson to chose you have listed you might wish to bring Hurt of

Our end Zorthian of USIS,

You vill appreciate that until you receive further instructions

pothing concerning this proposed meeting should be said to Khanh or

ocho: Viecnamese officials. We wish to control from Washington the

manner in wich foreign officials are made aware of our planning for

this meeting.

BALL

TOP SECRET

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## Page 31

SECRET

R- 18895

0 2303902 75541

IM MARKING, SAIGON

TO. MACHANARA, 3LC DEF

TAFLOR, ACS

INTO TELT, CINCPAC

KEVLAS, OSD/SACSA

RECEIVED DIASO COMMCENTER 65/03392

EYES ONLY

NAG 1751

EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE FOR MAGNAMARA, TAYLOR, FELT, KRULAN

1. POSSIBLE PRES DIEM WILL NOST DINNER WHICH NILL BE BLACK TICS

ANY OTNER SOCKAL EVENTS, IF SCHEDULED, WILL BE KEPT INFORMAL.

• DUE CURRENT WEATHER

SUGGEST PARTY SRIME RAANCOATS.

J, RECUEST YOUR DESIRES CONCERNING PRESS REPS ACCOMPANILIG

PARTY ON FIELD VISITS, PRESS HAS INDICATED DESIRE TO ACCOMPANT

ALSO MEDIA REPS TO PRESS FOR INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEMS WITH MENSERS OF

PARTY• REQUEST GUIDANCE YOUR DESIRE TRIS REGARD,

A. COL BAKER MAÇU PIO) EXTENDS INVITATION TO BR SYLVESTER AS

BOUSE GUEST

S. MR BRENT SUSONS EXTENDS INVITATION TO OR BUNDY AS HOUSE GUESTS

SECRET

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## Page 32

SECRET

DIG:

030429z November 1963

FROM: HARKINS, COMUSMACV

TO::

TAYLOR, CJCS, WASHINGTON

INFO: FELT, CINCPAC

SECRET MAC 2081 EYES ONLY

E.ES ONLY

MAC 2081

1. Saigon is quiet and orderly and all evidence indicates revolutionary

committee has situation well in hand. Some troops still positioned

throughout city and police also in evidence. Martial Law continues with

curfew hours changed to 1900 to 0500.

2. With ref your JCS 4279 intend to press the new government for same

military improvements which we have been endorsing in the past,

specifically;

A. Direct chain of command.

B. Subordination of Prov Chief to Corps and Div Commanders in

military matters

C. Emphasis on training of units, including hamlet militia.

(and militia squad leaders).

D. Operational use of general reserve

E. Operational use of special forces under JCS and Corps commanders.

(now reported accomplished).

F. Better use of military engineers.

G. Better use of navy and civil guard boat companies in Delta.

H. Lifting of restrictions on aircraft armament.

I. Increased tempo of operations with emphasis on those types of

operations which augur success of desired objectives.

2081

SECRET

EYES ONLY

DocId: 32125003 Page 32

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## Page 33

2081

SECRET

EYES ONLY

J. Freeing of ARVN elements from static security missions and

reduction isolated outposts.

3. All of the above have previously been discussed with military

leaders who were responsive to the nead for such improvements and I

anticipate that they, functioning under the new government structure,

will be inclined to institute desired changes.

4. As concerns the effect of the change in administration on the

province chiefs I do not have at this time details on country-wide

reaction of these very important individuals. Am in the process of

assembling info on this point and will report in detail soonest. As

a general response to your query and based on info presently available.

A. As a general rule, with some exceptions, we have been

satisfied with current line up in so far as their military duties are

concerned.

B. Do not anticipate any wholesale shakeup of present incumbents.

C. Agree that it to our best interests to prevent removal of

effective or experienced chiefs, and to experience the minimum of changes.

D. Several Prov chiefs have to date declared their allegiance to

the new Government. Consolidated list being assembled and will be forwarded

ASAP:

E. Have received information of temporary replacement two (2) Prov

Chiefs in I Corps.

5. Senior advisor IV Corps advises that Gen Cao has been replaced as

CG IV Corps by Colonel Nhon who continues to function as CO 2lst Div.

SERDET

EYES ONLY

2

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## Page 34

SSO MACV

( no number )

875.

CRiTiC

02/0362 (?)

CRILIC - Secret

FROM: SSO MACV

2 November 1963

TO: Dir, NSA

A. Indicators of coup success

1. The initial objective of the coup group has been attained.

Open resistance to the coup forces has ceased leaving the military in

full control of the apparatus of government.

2. Deaths of President and Counsellor, protective custody of

Can, would appear remove only significant symbol around which suprorters

of former regime might rally

3. From all outward appearances there is strong public support of

the Armed Forces and the new government those forces have established.

The mood of the population is jubilant, by Vietnamese standards; rapport

between troops and people is excellent; everywhere, people are bringing

food to troops.

B. Status of public order

I. During morning hours there were numerous large, spontaneous

and enthusiastic demonstrations.

quieter, but the streets are crowded; this is, of course, Saturday

and a holiday to boot (Memorial Day for VN War Dead).

2. There has been some sacking and looting but, this far, it has

been highly selective. In addition to the palace, the targets have been

holdings of the Nhus (Times of Vietnam; Book Stores; Commercial concerns;

Hq: of Women's Solidarity League); residences of Minister Hien (Civic

Action), Luong (Interior) and Trinh (Education); and Home of Senior

Republican youth leader. In all actions, student groups have been in

vanguard.

3•

Few civil police in evidence, many having discarded uniforms

and jobs yesterday, those on duty are

making little or no effort to

influence crowds. Military have reacted quickly to the incipient danger

of crowds getting out of hand.

Military police and some line troops

are deployed at critical locations and handling situation in relaxed,

effective manner. Notably, Minh, Don, and Dinh have been personally

moving to reported trouble spots to supervise. Reconstitution of police

force is a first priority task of regime.

4. All public utilities continue in full operating condition.

5. Martial law in effect, country wide.

C. Personalities in new government

I. Following changes to initially reported lineup:

A. M/Gen Duong Van Minh is Chief, Joint General Staff.

B. M/Gen Tran Van Don is Minister of Nation Defense.

C. B/Gen Mai Huu Xuan is Director, National Police.

D. Do Khac Mai, promoted to Colonel, and named Commander, VINAF.

2.:

Promotions:

A. Ton That Dinh, III Corps Cndr and Minister of Interior

designate, promoted to Major General. He is currently responsible for

military security of Saigon-Cholon area again.

DocId:32425003 Page 34

SCT

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Page 2 CRITIC-Secret

FROM SSO MACV

TO: Dix, NSA

B=

2 November 1963

To Brig- Gen.

Do Mai, Chief MSS

Co, noW CG Ith DIV.

Thieu, now CG 5th Div.

3. B/G Nghiem, formerly I Corps Omdr, has assumed command of

VN Special Forces.

D. Threats to US Nationals

3. Condition yellow remains in effect, with intention to relax

to grey tomorrow.

E. VC Reaction to Coup

1. While it cannot be directly linked to exploitation of situation,

unusual pattern of VC attacks reported in Vinh Long. After daylight

this morning, VC aggregating 200, attacked 6 strategic hamlets. VC

described as clad in blue uniforms.

2:

33rd Ranger Bn has flushed estimated 300 VC in Ho Bo area,

Binh Duong Province.

3. No evidence any direct VC participation in minor disorders

(para B2 above,) in Saigon.

F. Effects of Saigon events on SVN forces and their operations against VC

1. Understandably, as the result of nationwide military interest

in coup developments combined with a national holiday, the tempo of

offensive operations slowed drastically today.

2. It recognized here that it will take several days to refocus

the attention of the new government on priority military tasks. The

attention of the entire higher command structure is now centered upon

the most pressing of all immediate problems: the establishment of viable

government.

There is also an impact upon field commanders, particularly

sector commanders who face, in varying degrees, personal and political

reorientation.

G. Steps being taken to form new goverment

I. Nothing substantial to report.

2. Coup leaders are making determined efforts to maintain order

and at the same time, transform popular exuberance into political support.

For example, Generals Minh and Don were reported as being well-received

this morning as they shook hands with, and moved freely among the people

of Saigon.

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## Page 36

TOP SECRET

DTG: 120945Z November 1963

Harlem

EYES ONLY

2168

FROM:

GENERAL HARKINS, SAIGON

TO:

GENERAL TAYLOR, CJCS, WASH D.C.

INFO: ADMIRAL FELT, CINCAC

AMB LODGE, SAIGON

TOP SECRET MAC 2168 EYES ONLY

1. Your attention invited to Neil Sheehan (UPI) story datelined

Saigon November 11.

2. Greater part of story is speculative in nature and not factual

with respect to specifics cited. While it portrays me personally,

my Command and the Defense Department in Washington in an unfavorable

light it is also detrimental to the US national interest and is

viewed with concern. This concern is over certain parts of story

which indicate without doubt that Sheehan has by some means obtained

information concerning the existence and content of most highly

classified and extremely sensitive messages. Such leaks can only

result in erosion of the best interest of the U.S.

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

Licomme distant do

DJ S

au chiefe

D'TG:

150425z November 1963

FROM:

HARKINS, SAIGON

TO:

TAYLOR, GICS

INFO: FELT, HAWAII

Sue Trite

MEG?

SECRET MAC 2197 EYES ONLY FOR TAYLOR EXCLUSIVE FOR FELT

In the military situation there has been little change from what

you and Secretary McNamara witnessed just over a month ago.

visited all Corps this week for a round-up before the Hawaii meeting.

The VC reaction to the coup though late in starting was violent

when it got going. There was no set pattern. It was something like

a blind dog in a meat shop - a bite here and a bite there.. The

incidents ran the gammet; attacks, harassments, propoganda, ambushes,

road cutting, assassinations, kidnapping, etc. All tolled they

exceeded the peak of any week since I have been here. The intensity

lasted for just about a week and have now dwindled to almost nothing.

To me the VC seemed to be celebrating the change in Government in

their diabolical manner. Taking advantage of the fact that government

forces for obvious reasons reached a near low as far as offensive

operations were concerned. The reason for the drop off in RVNAF

operations was the fact that heads were falling right and left and

everyone sat around waiting to see who was next. All new Province

Chiefs in the II Corps, three in the First, several in the III'd and

they are still making changes in the IV corps. There are new

Division Commanders in the lst, 22nd, 23rd, 7th, 9th, and 21st;

new Corps Commander in the IV Corps and a new CO of the VNAF.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

Captain Quyen CNO murdered; same for Colonel Tung (SF's). Changes

are still being made across the board in staffs, regiments and

districts. While waiting to see where the axe would fall, the units,

along with their Commanders, did a bit of celebrating, relaxed their

guard, and the VC walked in. As a comparison with the tremendous

upsurge of last week, only 27 incidents were reported for the 12th

and 13th and only six of these were armed attacks; one in the I

Corps, two in the II Corps, none in the III Corps, and three in IV

Corps. This was while the ARVN showed over five hundred initiated

actions for the same period, so things are getting back to normal,

however, it will be some time before the new Commanders, Province

and District Chiefs can digest all their problems and come up with

answers.

I discussed my visit to the Corps with Gen Don yesterday. I

told him many decisions must be made at his level so the people

in the field could get on with the war. He informed me they were

going to use the NCP as the basic plan and that he was going to

start visiting in the field ASAP. Incidentally, he is visiting the

7th Division and III Corps and intends to visit I and II Corps

next week. I sent Stillwell along with him today. I also gave

Gen Don a list of what I consider musts for getting on with the war.

I'm going to have lunch with him Monday and should be able to report

to you in Hawaii some of these actions he is taking. Regards.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

2

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## Page 39

TOP SECRET

DIG:

04174SZ November 1963

EYES ONLY

FROM:

HARKINS SAIGON

TO:

TAYLOR, JCS, WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET MAC 2097 EYES ONLY

RE YOUR JCS 4285

Plane with Nhu children aboard departed Saigon at 042020 local

repeat 042020 local. Destination Bangkok. Children accompanied by

Mx. Flott from Embassy plus nurse. One of children apparently not

too well. Onward passage from Bangkok not known here.

2097

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

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## Page 40

TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR

COUNTERINS URGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

LATES OS

THE JOINT STAFF

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF

DATE: JUL 1 01997

Sui Gi

Hugan

mor

23 March 1964

AomIM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

Lodge Proposal to the President Re-

garding Vietnam

1. In the Ambassador's message at Tab A he advances

the

thought that the Us must determine how to apply

its power in relatively limited doses as a warning to

the North Vietnamese.

He mentions in paragraph 9 that

some overt reconnaissance flights might be useful as

an initial step and recommends in paragraph ll that

an intensive study be made.

2. In the President's reply at Tab Bit is stated

that judgment is reserved for the present on overt

military action and that planning for action against

the north is on a contingency basis at the present.

3. In the Ambassador's résponse at Tab C he agrees

that

overt action should be held until Vietnam and US

covert steps have been tried and offers that it is not

premature to initiate this move as part of an essentially

diplomatic pressure move. In his paragraph 3 he men-

tions a report which is expected to propose additional

actions on a

"tit-for-tat"

basis which was referred

to in the President's message at Tab D, and which are

specifically in reference to renewal of

attacks on

Americans.

turn discussing the above with the Department of

State, representatives consider Mr. Lodge's message is

unclear to them, also.

They believe his message con-

cerning the report on the "tit-for-tat" methods will

bring clarification and intend to wait for Mr. Lodge's

report before taking further action.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 41

TOP SECRET

5. We believe that Mr. Lodge's reference to covert

actions refers to the operations included in 34-A,

but until there have been some successful military ac-

tions, it will be difficult to initiate the diplomatic

pressures which he refers to in his paragraph 2 of

Tab C and which is what he is recommending to the

President; 1.e., initiate diplomatic pressure based

upon successful

covert actions.

6. I recommend that we await the report from Mr.

Lodge conceming "tit-for-tat" methods prior to making

judgment on what Mr. Lodge is recommending to the

President.

Nart M. rigging

was informed 21hay

com

WALTER M. HIGGINS, JR.

USA

Deputy Special Assistant

TOP SECRET

2

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## Page 42

INCOLNG TELEGRAM Department of State

TOP SECRET

Control:

Recd:

S S

ges

14074

MARCH 19,

1964

3:04 AM

FROM:

SAIGON

ACTION, SECSTATE 1776 PRIORITY

DATE : MARCH 19, 3 PM

EXIS

FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE TO THE PRESIDENT

TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR 1454. 1 WILL CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM WITH

MAXIMUM ENERGY •

2. IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO COMMENT FURTHER ON TWO MATTERS:

FIRST, THE PROPOSAL TO PUT PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM, AS

REFERRED TO IN YOUR PARA FOUR, SUBPARAGRAPH THREE, SO THAT

THEY WILL CEASE THEIR AGGRESSION; AND, SECOND, THE IMACINATIVE

AND INTERESTING SUGGESTION, WHICH DESERVES CAREFUL ANALYSIS,

THAT I SEE GENERAL DE GAULLE•

3. AS REGARDS PRESSURE ON NVN, I SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING:

46 US PROBLEM IN ANY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY IS HOW TO APPLY

OU POWER. THE COMMUNISTS, CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL NOT USE

OUR MISSILES, ARE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE PEOPLE IN THE

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES RIGHT UNDER OUR NOSES. IT IS AS

THOUGH WE HAD A TREMENDOUS WARSHIP CAPABLE OF DOMINATING THE

SEAS, BUT WERE FACING A PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE OF THE DESERT.

IN SUCH A SITUATION OUR POWER SEEMS USELESS

5• LAST AUTUMN THE US DID FACE THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO APPLY

OUR POWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM. PRESIDENT KENNEDY, VERY PROPERLY

1 THOUGHT, WANTED TO BRING ABOUT SOME FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN

THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GVN. BUT WE SEEMED TO BE UP AGAINST A

BLANK WALL. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO WAY WE COULD USE OUR GREAT

POWER WHICH WOULD NOT EITHER DAMAGE THE WAR EFFORT OR BRING ON

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

TOP SECRET

_PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

CJCS-2 DJS-1 SJCS-1 SACSA-4

NMCC DUTY GEN/ ADM-1 FILE-1

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TOP SECRET

-2 - 1776, MARCH 19, 3 PM FROM SAIGON

AN ECONOMIC PANIC WITH WIDESPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT AND STARVATION.

6. YET, FINALLY, MUCH THOUGHT AND STUDY IN WASHINGTON AND

IN THE EMBASSY DISCOVERED WAYS TO APPLY US POWER. WE HAMMERED

AWAY AT ONE PLACE AND THEN AT ANOTHER AND, AFTER AWHILE,

THERE WAS A CRACK IN THE BLANK WALL.

THE BEGINNING OF A

CHANGE IN DIEMIS ATTITUDE WAS BECOMING APPARENT WHEN THE NOV. 1

COUP CAME. A DESCRIPTION OF THESE METHODS IS IN MY 949, NOV 6.

7 NOW WE FACE THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO APPLY OUR POWER TO NVN,

AND WE SEEM ALSO TO BE UP AGAINST A BLANK WALL. YET WE SEEM

TO BE QUITE SURE OF TWO THINGS: (A) ONE SINGLE SATURATION RAID

ON NVN COULD DESTROY THE FRUITS OF EIGHT YEARS' FIGHTING AGAINST

THE FRENCH AND OF TEN YEARS BACKBREAKING LABOR SINCE 1954: AND

B) WHILE THERE WOULD BE SOME SORT OF CHICOM REACTION, THE ABOVE

RAID WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BRING ON NUCLEAR WAR OR A REAL WORLD WAR.

8. IF NVN THOUGHT THAT THE US HAD THE WILL TO USE JUST WHAT WE

. HAVE OUT HERE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (THE TH FLEET, US AIR FORCE UNITS,

ETC.), THEY WOULD SEE THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD A VIET CONG VICTORY

IN SVN. THE PRICE WOULD BE TOO HIGH•

9• IHE PROBLEM IS HOW TO PERSUADE NVN, AND A COROLLARY IS HOW TO

APPLY OUR POWER IN RELATIVELY LIMITED DOSES SO AS TO GIVE THEM A

SAMPLE OF HOW REALLY DANGEROUS WE ARE. SOME OVERT RECONNAISSANCE

FLIGHTS MIGHT BE USEFUL AS AN INITIAL STEP.

110. WHAT WE CAN DO TO THEM SHOULD ALSO BE LINKED TO WHAT WE CAN

DO FOR THEM -- IN TERMS OF RICE AND REMOVING WHATEVER US PERSONNEL

WE INTEND TO REMOVE ANYWAY.

11. L 'RECOMMEND THAT THE SAME KIND OF INTENSIVE STUDY BE NOW:

GIVEN TO THE ABOVE IN WASHINGTON THAT WAS GIVEN LAST FALL TO APPLY-S

ING SANCTIONS TO DIEM. I AM CONFIDENT THAT GOOD RESULTS WOULD BE

OBTAINED AND THAT SOME THINGS WHICH LOOK PRETTY STRONG TODAY WOULD

START FALLING APART.

12. AS REGARDS

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

-3- 1776, MARCH 19, 3 PM FROM SAIGON

12. AS REGARDS DE GAULLE, I LOOK FORWARD TO CHANCE TO COMMENT,

WHICH YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR LAST PARAGRAPH, ON INSTRUCTIONS

TO AMBASSADOR BOHLEN. PARIS SEEMS HONESTLY TO BELIEVE THAT

1964 15 1954, WHICH LEADS THEM INTO STILL OTHER DANGEROUS

ERRORS.

13 AS REGARDS MY GOING TO PARIS TO EXPLAIN REALITIES TO THE

GENERAL, THE FOLLOWING CAN BE SAID IN FAVOR:

14. A LIFE-TIME OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE FRENCH, THE WARTIME

CONNECTION OF WHICH YOU SPOKE, AND MORE RECENT

CONTACTS IN

1960 AND IN 1961, AT WHICH TIME I LOCATED THE HEADQUARTERS

OF THE ATLANTIC INSTITUTE IN PARIS. ABOVE ALL, THE FACT THAT

I WOULD BE VISITING HIM AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BRING

ABOUT A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE, IF ANYTHING CAN.

15. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE IS THE REACTION IN THE GN. PROLONGED

REFLECTION CONVINCES ME THAT GVN, FROM GENERAL KHANH ON DOWN,

WOULD BE FILLED WITH APPREHENSION AND THAT, GIVEN THEIR MENTALITY,

NOTHING COULD CONVINCE THEM THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO PARIS TO SELL

THEM DOWN THE RIVER. AS US REPRESENTATIVE, I AM EXTREMELY

PROMINENT HERE, AND A TRIP BY ME TO PARIS TO SEE DE GAULLE,

AT THIS TIME, WOULD BE A BODY BLOW TO MORALE AND WOULD, WITH

ONE HAND, DESTROY WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO WITH THE PASSAGE

OF TIME.

GP-1•

LODGE

UMT

TOP SECRET

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## Page 45

ges

18

449

ITGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

CATE: DI COLLECT

ARGE TO

TOP SECRET

ACTION, Amembassy SAIGON

1484

Nox

Man 20

5

So PM '64

9-8

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. We have studied your 1776 and I am asking State to have

Bill Bundy make sure that you get our latest planning documents

on ways of applying pressure and power against the North. I

understand that some of this was discussed with you by McNamara,

mission in Saigon, but as plans are refined it would be helpful

to have your detailed comments.

As we agreed in our previous

messages to each other,

judgment 1s reserved for the present on

overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon

conversations of McNamara mission with General Khanh and you on

Judgment that novement against the North at the present would be

premature. We here share General Khanh's judgment that the

immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base.

For this reason our

planning for action against the North is on

a contingency basis at present,

and immediate problem in this

3/20TT stophic transmision and

st rec'd from White House: amp daification approved bye

THE SECRETARY

Cloaroncess

S/s - Me. Read

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

PROHIBITED UNLESS "OFFICIAL USE

ONLY" OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

I DS-322

CJCS-2 DJS-1 SJCS-1 SACSA-4

NMCC DUTY GEN/ADM-1 FILE-1

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Page_ 2 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGOS

TOP SECRET

area is to develop the strongest possible military and political

base for possible later action.

There is additional international

reason for avoiding immediate overt action in that we expect a showdow

between the Chinese and Soviet Commist parties soon and action against

tho North will be more practicable after than before a showdown. But

15 at any time you feel that more immediate action is urgent, I count

on you co let me know specifically the reasons for such action, together

with your recomendations for its size and shape.

2. On dealing with de Gaulle, I continue to think it may be

valuable for you to go to paris after Bohlen has made his first try.

(State is canding you draft instruction to Bohlen, which I have not yet

reviewed, for your comment.) It ought to be possible to explain in

Saigon that your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down

the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head, and on this

point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist

talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. I have made this point

myself to Mansfield and Lippmann and I expect to use evory public

opportunity to restate our position fimly. You may want to convey our

concern on this point to General Khanh and get his ideas on the best

possible joint program to stop such talk in Saigon, in Washington, and

TOP SECRET

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i Pago 3 of telestram to.

Amembassy SAIGON

TOP SECRET

abreast

In Paris. I imagine that you have kept General Khanh/agsass of

our efforts in Paris.

After we see the results of the Bohlen

approach you might wish to sound him out on Paris visit by you.

END

GP - 1

RUSK

TOP

SECRET

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## Page 48

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

TOP SECRET

CS

Action

SS

Info

Control:

Rec'd:

16669

MARCH 23g

1964

1:58 AM

FROM:

SAIGON

ACTION. SECSTATE 1803

13-6

DATE : MARCH 23, 1 PM

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE

YOUR 1484.

1 WILL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO COMMENT ON WHATEVER YOU SEND

ME REGARDING PRESSURE ON THE NORTH.

2. L CONTINUE TO AGREE THAT OVERT U. S. ACTION SHOULD BE

WITHHELD UNTIL AFTER VIET-NAM AND U.S. COVERT STEPS HAVE BEEN

IRIED -- AND TRIED AS PART OF AN ESSENTIALLY DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE

MOVE. I DO NOT RPT NOT THINK THAT SUCH A MOVE, INCLUDING THE

VIET-NAM AND U. S. COVERT ACTIVITIES INVOLVED, IS PREMATURE.

IF SUCH AN EFFORT COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT, IT WOULD

OVIOUSLY GREATLY DISCOURAGE THE VC AND HELP GENERAL KHANH

STRENGTHEN HIS SOUTHERN BASE. IN FACT IT MIGHT VERY MUCH

HASTEN THE END OF THE WAR HERE. I HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST

YOUR EXPECTATION OF A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND SOVIET

COMMUNIST PARTIES AND AGREE THAT THIS IS A MAJOR ELEMENT TO BE

CONSIDERED IN ANY SUCH DIPLOMATIC EFFORT.

Vo S. MISSION (COUNTRY TEAM) WILL HEAR A REPORT, PURSUANT

TO INSTRUCTION IN YOUR 1454, PARAGRAPH 4, SUBPARAGRAPH 4 ON

"TIT FOR TAT" METHODS AT THE REGULAR MEETING THIS WEEK.

4. AS REGARDS DE GAULLE, I WILL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO CARRY

OUT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, SHOULD YOU

DECIDE YOU WANT ME TO GO. I AM COMMENTING ON PROPOSED INSTRUCTION

TO AMBASSADOR

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

_PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

TOP SECRET

CJCS-2 DJS-1 SJCS-1 SACSA-4

NMCC (DUTY GEN/ADM)-1 FILE-I (10) cen

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TOP SECRET

-2 - 1803, MARCH 23, 1 PM FROM SAIGON

TO AMBASSADOR BOHLEN IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM. I LIKE YOUR

REASONING REGARDING KNOCKING DOWN THE IDEA OF NEUTRALISM AND

WILL DISCUSS WITH GENERAL KHANH.

GP - 10

LODGE

UMT

NOTE:

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:06 AM MARCH 23

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 4 AM MARCH 23

TOP SECRET

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## Page 50

CHAAGE 10

Orlain

5S

LM Department of State

TOP SECRET

fes

08

1454

ACTION:

Amembassy

EXDIS

SAIGON

PRIORITY

5 3

MAR 17 9 28 PM '

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT MAR 17 20

1. I have now personally reviewed your cables 1754

through 1757 and have considered them with Secretaries of

State and Defense. I am delighted to find that we have a

very high measure of agreement.

2. Your comments

on various sections of McNamara report

make good sense to all of us, and report has been revised to

meet most of your points. Revised version as approved today

in National Security Council follows by air.

3. We have also shortened and amended the White House

statement to reconcile it with your comments. Different

people seem to view the past differently, but there is no

point in letting such differences worry us as we go forward.

4. Specifically with respect to the comments in your

1757 your whole-hearted support of first eleven recommendations

covers our most important efforts which are still in South

The Secretary

S/S - Mr. XXXX Baldwin

DaText recd from White Houser rephie tranmision and

3/17/64: jmj

dassilication approved byr

Civincas

REPRODUCTIO::

COPY IS PROMIS

UNLESS "UNCLASS. ED".

00Y DS-322

TOP SECRET

CJCS-2 DJS-I SJCS-I SACSA-4

NYCO (DUTY GEN/ADM)-1 FILE-I (10) ceh

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Page 2 of telegram to-

Amembassy

TOP SECRET

SAIGON

Vietnam. On your additonal comments, I have reached the following

conclusions:

(1) I think additional actions against laos and Cambodia

should be intensively examined. We have agreed that cross-border

ground penetrations should be initiated into Laos

along any lines which can be worked out by khanh and Phoumi with

Souvanna's endorsement, and I will authorize low-level reconnaissance

there wherever the present high-level flights indicate that such

reconnaissance may be needed.

The questions of further U.S, participation and of ais end

ground strikes against laos raise tough diplomatic issues and

have asked Rusk and McNamara to concert a further recommead f100

My first thought is that it is important to seek support from

Souvanna Phouma and to build a stronger case before we take action

which might have only limited military effect and could trigger

wider Communist action in Laos.

On Cambodia we find ourselves hard put to keep abreast of the

rapid changes Sihanouk introduces

into the scene. Our impression

1s that bilateral GVN-RKG talks may now be in progress and State bas

sent you some thoughts on those prospects. Mowever, in the event

= furthor deterioration, I would expect to authorize hot pursuit.

TOP. SACRET

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ADIS

Page 3 of telegram to

Amembassy

BAIGON

TOP SHENGT

On ovart highe or low-level decondatosance over Norch Vietnam,

we are not coady to make a decision now. I have asked thas political

and diplomatic preparations be mde to lay a basis for such

reconnainance 1f it seems necessary or desirable after a few woeke.

fox military or political reacons, or both.

(2) As I read your coménts on John MeGone's points, the

min icens are thosediscussed above on laos and Cambodia. We agrec

that Mekong traffic 18 a trump curd,

and State has already sent you

e rosaage on thas question.

Me agree that large-scale Chinece Nationalist incursion vile

bo anothe, but high quality advisers are different matter and w

will send further thoughts on that.

(3) I have ordered & raview of your paper on locober 30.

My om inclination is to favor such predsures,

short of ourt atlater

action.

(4) Ilke you, I reserve judgont on such overt U,S. mensures

egainst Norch Vietnan, Question of direct retaliation for actedla

on Americans is nore complex. As I understand it from MoNoman

31946

these attacks are not an immediate present threat, but you are

Fincha

to prepare contingency recomendation for specifie tito for tat accim

in the event attacks on Americans are renewed.

TOP SECRET

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Page

-.of telegram to

Amembassy

MALGON

TOP SECRET

EXDIS

Your cable does not mention it, but Bob McNamara has reported

your concem about the effectivenes of owe representations to the

French. I have discussed this mirter wita Bohlen and we now plin that

he will rains these matters with General da Caulle personally whea

latter retums from Caribbean.

Department is drafting instructions and

will circulate them for your comet hefore they are final. Meanwhile

we may wish to consider whether at son point it would be fruitful for

you to go to Paris yourself to explain the realities of the situation

to the General. In the light of your matime connection with France;

possibility seems to me to have roal merit. CP-l.

END

RUSK

-DOP. SECRIST

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