Document date: 00/00/0000

## Page 1

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

GSA LEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W.

R. warhaffm

W.

Gregar Wolfss

SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J.

5. Adams

1 - Mr. J.

A. Mintz

1 - Mr. H.

N. Bassett

(Attn: J. A. Conley)

DATE: 12/8/75

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

J. G. Deegan

1 - Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

This informative memorandum is to record a matter

of particular interest which was discussed at a conference

12/3/75, attended by Deputy Associate Director J. B. Adams,

Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, and Supervisors D. Ryan

and S. F. Phillips of the Intelligence Division, with

Assistant Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh and

Criminal Division Attorneys Kevin Maroney and Phil White

in Thornburgh's office.;

JFK Law 10(a)1

Assoc. Dir. _

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp, Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

a Inspectic

Laboratory

Legal Coun. _

Plan. & Eval. -

Training -

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec 'y

100-106

UNREC COPY AND CO2Y OF ENCE FILED IN

- -----

---.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREM S

JNOLAGSIAIED

ATE 6/26/S0 BYP

JEK Law 10(a)1

Enclosures.

TST 10

BNEE-30

62-116395

HE DEC 19 1975

CONTINUED OVEr

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, JI.)

SFP :1hb|h99)

8 4 DEG 1 9 1975.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Ectot 1992/44 USC 2107 Motel. Case#: NW 69262 Date: 09.22-2022

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 1

---

## Page 2

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

62-116395

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a) (a)1

CONTINUED - OVER

-2 -

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 2

---

## Page 3

Memorandum to Mr.

W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

62-116395

JFK Law

10(a)1

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

For information and record purposes.

=3-

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 3

---

## Page 4

• ."

April 29, 1975

JFK Law 10 (a) 1

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EngLasus: (2-1163952-1200

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 4

---

## Page 5

JFK Law 10(a)1

JEK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a)1

JFK Law 10(a)1

-2 .

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 5

---

## Page 6

JFK Law 10(a)1

JFK Law 10(a)1

JFK Law

10 (a) 1

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a)1

-3 .

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 6

---

## Page 7

JFK Law 10(a)1

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a) 1

-4 .

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 7

---

## Page 8

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law 10(a) (a)1

JFK Law 10(a) (a)1

5.

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 8

JFK Law 10(a)1

---

## Page 9

JFK Law 10(a) (a)1

JFK Law 10(a) 1

JFK Law

10(a)1

• 6.

--

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 9

---

## Page 10

JFK Law 10(a) 1

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 10

---

## Page 11

1550C. A0 25

Dep. AD Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst..

Ext. Affairs _

Files & Com. _

Gen. Ins. -

Ident. _

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM

84 JAN 2 0 1976

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 11

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 = MI.

J.

A. Mintz

1 - MI. W.

R. Wannall

December 83, 1975

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

-Mr.

w. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my letter to you August 19, 1975,

which furnished a memorandum with enclosure concerning

interview by a representative of the sse of former FBl Special

Agent George C. Moore.

Enclosed is the original of another memorandum which

reports on another interview of Moore by SSC Staff Members.

A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to

Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE

62-116395

ATE 2-14-81- BYS

14D

PUD

1 • The Deputy Attorney General

Accention:

Michael E. Shaheen, JI.

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

11-6y-17

DEK.

1 - 67-

(Personnel file former SA George G. Moore)

SFP:mjgmy

(11)

wered

ST. 115,

REC.51

43145-395-12084

3

JAN 16 1976

nSC

3 Ta 1. 105C

"'Вї

33 1"12!

5 - los 6..:

6':

Sl=0

TELETYPE UNIT

tips

406 /

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 12

1 - MI. J. B. Adams

1 • Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

December 8, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENGE ACTIVITIES (SSG)

RE:

INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI

SPECIAL AGENT (SA) GEORGE G, MOORE

BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Reference

is made to the menorandun of this Bureau

dated August 19, 1975, which reported an interview on

July 28, 1975, of former FBI SA George C. Moore by an SSC

Staff Member.

Moore was again interviewed by SSC Staff Members

on November 3, 1975.

Prior to the interview recorded balow.

the FBI released Moore fron his confidentiality agreement

for the purpose of the interview confined to the subject of

COINTELERO.

prepared by Moore and voluntarily furnished to this Bureau.

"COINTELPRO (INTERVIEW OF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-1481

_BYSL

FORMER SA GEORGE, G. MOORE BY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF

MEMBERS, NOVEMBER 3, 1975)

"For identification purposes, this is a memorandm

prepared by George C. Moore, former Special Agent of the FBI

who served as Section Chief of IS-1 Section from October 1967

until his retirement on July 31, 1974. My address is 6715 N

27th St,

Arlington, VA.

22213, telephone number 533-8288.

Since the captioned interview concerned matters involving

Assoc. Dir. -

my activities while an FBI employee, I am furnishing this

Dep. AD Adm. -

nemorandm containing recalled pertinent aspects of the inter.

Dep.

AD Inv. _

view to FBI Headquarters entirely by my own volition.

Asse. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

1 - 67=

RIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

(Personnel file former SA George C. Moore)

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

exA.....

HEN

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

-1161395

ERIC SU

1200%0

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 12

---

## Page 13

S. Senate Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re:

interview of loner meet meet on

eorge c. Moore by sse start Member

"RE:

INTERVIEW OF FORMER

FBI SPECIAL, AGENT (SA)

GEORGE C. MOORE BY

J. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

STAFF MEMBERS, 11/3/75*

"At 2:00 p.m. November 3, 1975 I appeared at the

Dirksen Senate Office Building at the request of Staff Member

Barbara Banoff to be interviewed with regard to the FBI

COINTELPRO.

"The interview was conducted primarily by Banofi

assisted by Ms. Mary Debreo and joined later by staturember

Mark Gitenstein. The interview was recorded by a

reporter and I was advised of my rights and signed paper to

that effect.

approximately shish ligh are as to doerydew which lasted until

"The initial part covered my duties, experience and

general information about the Bureau's structure and chain of

command.

asked if I had been made Section Chief in 1967

by Mr. W. C. Sullivan because of my prior experience in counter-

intelligence in the foreign field. I replied that I felt quite

sure that counterintelligence experience had no part in my

selection but was due to recommendations of my superiors -

then Section Chief W. R. Wannall and Branch Chief D. E. Moore.**

"The early thrust of the interview dealt to a large

extent with the climate of the times in 1967-1968-69 at which

time the COINTELPRO was intensified against the black extremists.

Taget a Che and the at he on change the a an

was believed to have been effective in preventing additional

violence.**

- 2 -

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 13

---

## Page 14

U. S. Senate Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSG)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Special Agent (SA)

George C. Moore by SSC Staff Members

"Several documents were shown to me (memoranda which

initiated and intensified the program).

It is noted the Program

itself

against the Black Extrenists was initiated before I

became Section Chief.

I stated,

however, that I was fully

acquainted with the aims and goals and had actively participated

as Section Chief in implementing and in the administrative

supervision of same."

"A substantial amount of time was spent as to why

the 'civil rights organization'

Southern Christian Leadership

Conference (SCLC) headed by Dr. Martin Luther King was set

was sent to affet both initially and later when a communication

offices instructing that the program be intensi-

fied. I was able to furnish avery little information as to why

SCLC and King were targets in addition to the reasons stated

in the initial communication.

"The Staff Members Indicated that they were not

troubled by the COINTEL targets who were violent prone but were

concerned about DI. King and SCLC being made target."

"Another area of concern which involved rather a

substantial amount of questions concerned GOINTEL tactics

whereby allegations were sponsored by the fBl re certain targets

being intormants.

The Staff Members pointed out their concern

with this tactic as it could result in physical violence being

directed against that particular person as a resült of the FBI's

program.

I pointed out that I was not aware of any such violence

ever having occurred and I was asked whether this was just luck

or because of fact that much consideration was given to such

tactics before approval. I agreed that perhaps luck did play

a part but all COINTEL proposal received a great deal of consid-

eration and scrutiny by top officials before approval as we

wanted to be sure we did not cause violence on any person."

-3 -

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 14

---

## Page 15

U. S. Senate Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Special Agent (SA)

George C. Moore by SSC Staff Members

"I was asked if we ever discussed COINTEL at field

conferences and I advised that we usually discussed all key

programs Including COINTEL and exchanged ideas in that regard."'

"As a matter of interest, I was asked at the end of

the interview whether I had discussed the interview with

anyone prior to appearing. I stated that I had discussed it

with SA Paul Daly in order to get proper clearance from the

Bureau.

"I was then asked if I would be in touch with any

one at the FBI after the interview. I indicated that I would

be in touch with Daly whereupon the query was made as to

'why?'

I advised them that after having served for over 31 years in

the FBI I felt I had an obligation to advise the Bureau on a

voluntary basis of the result of any inquiry such as this one

which was concerning activities and matters of interest to the

FBI."

"Respectfully furnished

George C. Moore 11/6/75"

NOTE:

The statement of Moore, which was partially handprintec

and partially handwritten, was mailed to this Bureau and copied

Counsel to Mr. J.. B. Adams memorandum 10/22/75 "Senstudy 75."

- 4.

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 15

---

## Page 16

• TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO :

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available

for review but not transmitted,

so note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING &

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/8/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to

the White House

SSC

HSC

4.

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; five name or identification number of briefer.

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandun reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff

Members of former Special Agent George C. Moore

5.

IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number

if in response

wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena,

formal request, other.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

FORMATION Center

Codeword)

NA

U

7. KEY

Counterintelligence

Organization and staffing

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Interviewed regarding the bureau's Counterintelligence

progran during the 1967-69 years relating to Southern Christian

Leadership Conference and Black Estremists.

62-116395

FMK: fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS VELLOW

5. 71

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 16-751

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 16

---

## Page 17

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on

review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 66262 Docld:32195955 Page 17

---

## Page 18

J. Stanloy Pottinger

Assistant Attorney General

Civil Rights Division

Director, Fal

1

Mr.

N.

J.

P. Callahan

R.

B.

Adams

J.

Gallagher

MI.

W. R. Wannall

Decenber 8, 1073

Mr.

J. G. Deegan

-

Mr.

W.

0.

Cregar

-

Mr.

S. F.

Phillips

HARTIN LUTHER KING, SE.

-L INFORMATION CONTAINE

IEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE

DATE 1O K16O BY SAALMI4

Reference is made to your lottor datod December 1,

1975, in the above caption, your reference DJ 141-72-668.

This is to confirm a telephonse communication on

December 5, 1975, between ar. fobert A. Murphy of the Department

and Deputy Assoctate Director James D. Adams of this Bureau.

Adans sought claritying information concorning those portions

of the referonced lettor pertaining to "friends and associntes"

of king, particularly as mentioned in the sumarizing statement

(pago two, penultimate paragraph). It was agreed between

Murphy and Adams that initially, we will mako avnilable the

Piles relating to King, his innediate family and the Southern

Christian Loadership Conference (SCLC), as well as the file

concerning the fBle lovestigation of the assassination of

In so far ag "friends and associates" of King are

concerned, as the revier oi the above-described fijes by the

CIViL MIgATe bIVISzOR progresses, we mird also nake available

additional files relating to "Iriends nnd associates" as the

Civil Righte Division my designate and request same.

In the spirit of the completeness of your reviaw

which is so essential, we are also designating two additional

files fos innediate review as they contain nutorous reforences

to King, the SCLC and related metters.

It was fron these

two tiles that many communications have already been furnished

to the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence.

These two files aro entitled "Communist Influence in

Racial

antterg" and "Communist Party, USA - Negro Guestion."

In order to expedite your review, it 1s suggested

that you commenco with those files ne mintain at our Headquarters.

beanwhile, wo will solicit the necossaty inventories from our

field ofticos for your further consideration.

This antter has been designated within this bureau

as of the highest priority.

102-1163957

100-106670

1) - 62-116395

(SENSTUDY 75)

14 Ut6 1 8 19157)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED

46 DEC I: 1975

PITOETS

maternit

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 18

---

## Page 19

Department of Justice

THE DAY, DECEMBER L, 1915

E.D.T.

STATEMENT

OF

THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

TOS SURATE BETRET SMITE ON TINICE LETT S

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

10:00 A.M.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

62 187A

NOT RECORDED®

46 FEB 6 1976

5°

Фcо6

1976

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 19

62-11685

---

## Page 20

The Committee has asked me to talk with you

today about the future of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I thought it might be helpful if I outline quite briefly

some of the points I would like to make, some of the

problems I think ought to be considered, and some of the

steps we have taken.

The first point is that the statutory base

for the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully

satisfactory. The basic statutory provision is 28 USC

533 which provides that the Attorney General may appoint

officials "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the

United States; (2) to assist in the protection of the

President; and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding

official matters under the control of the Department of

Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by

the Attorney General." There are other statutes, such

as the Congressional Assassination, Kidnapping and Assault

Act, which vest in the Bureau special responsibilities to

investigate criminal violations.

In addition, there are

Executive orders and Presidential statements or directives

which place investigatory responsibilities upon the Bureau.

A number of questions

are often asked about this

statutory base. It has the virtue of simplicity, but the

Executive orders which deal

with government employee

investigations are complicated and confusing, and Presidential

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 20

---

## Page 21

-2-

memoranda or, perhaps, oral instructions from a President

may be difficult to collate. I think it is important,

in any case, to separate out the kinds of questions which

are asked about the Bureau's authority base. Some questions

are constitutional in nature, relating to the inherent power

of the President; others go to the interpretation of the

statutes and the relationship between the statutes and

Presidential directives; others go to the failure of the

statutes to define sufficiently the areas of the Bureau's

jurisdiction or to spell out sufficiently--and this is

partly constitutional--the means and methods which the Bureau

is permitted to use in carrying out its assigned tasks.

The second point, related to the first, is a

continuing discussion of the role of the Bureau in intelligence

investigations or domestic security investigations. The

argument is sometimes made that the Bureau's proper role,

at least in purely domestic matters, should be limited to

investigations of committed crimes. The basic statute for

the Bureau is broader than this, as have been Executive

orders and Presidential mandates to the Bureau. The basic

statute is broader, since it refers to investigations

regarding official matters under the control of the Department

of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed

by the Attorney General. A disparity is sometimes seen

among the different roles of the Bureau in crime detection,

in on-going domestic security matters, and in foreign

intelligence or foreign counterintelligence matters. In

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 21

---

## Page 22

- 3 -

recent days a statement by the then Attorney General Harlan

Fiske Stone, who reorganized the Bureau and chose J. Edgar

Hoover as its director, has been quoted as a relevant

warning.

Stone warned, "There is always

the possibility

that a secret police may become a menace to free government i

and free institutions, because it carries with it the

possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly

apprehended or understood .... It is important that its

activities be strictly limited to the performance of those

functions for which it was created and that its agents

themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach ....

The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political

or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only

with their conduct and then only with such conduct as is

forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police

system passes beyond these limits, it 'is dangerous to the

proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which

it should be our first concern to cherish."

I should like to suggest that Stone's warning always

must be considered relevant to the proper conduct of the

Bureau's duties, but it does not necessarily follow that

domestic security investigations are, therefore, outside

the Bureau's proper functions.

The detection of crime in

some areas requires preparation and at least some knowledge

of what is likely to be going on. What is at issue, I think,

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 22

---

## Page 23

4

is the proper scope, the means and methods used, the

attention

paid to conduct and not views, and the closeness of the

relationship of the conduct and that which is forbidden by

the laws of the United States.

Third, I realize that some proposals, since I

was asked about this when I last appeared before this

Committee, might separate out in some fashion domestic and

foreign intelligence functions from the FEI or from one

another within the FBI. This is, of course, an issue to

be looked at.

I assume it is recognized that there may

be some relationship between

that intelligence which is

domestic and that intelligence which is involved in foreign

counterintelligence work. One may lead to the other.

And there may be a relationship between foreign counter-

intelligence and foreign intelligence. If the work were

separated out into different agencies, I do not know if

the decision about when an investigation should pass

from one agency to another always could be made easily.

Moreover, even so, information presumably would pass from

one agency to the other. I know that one consideration

has been that it might be decided that information collected

by some permitted

means in intelligence investigations

under some circumstances should not be used in criminal

• prosecutions.

But if there is an exchange of information,

this must always be a consideration, whether there are

separate agencies or not, and the basic question then is one

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 23

---

## Page 24

— 5 -

of use and not organization. The more active concern,

I believe, is that there is a risk that conduct proper for

one area may be improper for another, and that the combination

can work a contamination. My view on this is that in any

case we must decide what conduct is appropriate and is

inappropriate for each of the areas, and we must take

steps to make sure that proper conduct is lived up to. My hope

is that the fact that the FBI has criminal investigative

responsibilities, which must be conducted within the confines

of constitutional protections strictly enforced by the courts,

gives

the organization an awareness of the interests of

individual liberties that might be missing in an agency

devoted solely to intelligence work. I know the argument

can be run the other way. I

believe the dangers are greater

if there is separation.

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 24

---

## Page 25

- 6 =

Fourth, there is a question as to the proper role of

the FBI in crime prevention and whether or not it should be

considered authorized to take steps under some circumstances

to reduce the likelihood that crimes will be committed

or that serious injury to persons or property will occur.

Preventive action has raised serious questions and these

must be dealt with.

I suppose an initial question is

whether it should be allowed at all. Yet I believe under

special circumstances and with proper controls most would

believe this to be a proper function.

Fifth, the problem of proper controls, supervision and

accountability is all-embracing. By statute the Federal

Bureau of Investigation is in the Department of Justice,

and also by statute the Attorney General is the head of the

Department of Justice. The history is mixed, of course, and

we all have a tendency to over-simplify, but it is a fair

statement that there have been times in the past when the

supervision by Attorneys General, granted that the Bureau must

have considerable autonomy, has been sporadic, practically

nonexistent, or ineffective. I hope that is not the case now.

The responsibility is a heavy one. But in any event the prob

lem of proper controls, supervision and accountability goes

beyond the Director of the Bureau and the Attorney General.

I have already mentioned that in my view the statutory base for

the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully satis-

factory. I think that better controls and performance can

be achieved through statutory means, executive orders, guide-

lines, and reporting to appropriate congressional committees.

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 25

---

## Page 26

-7 -

Sixth, before I come to a resume of some of the steps

which have been taken, let me say I know we all realize that

in the past there have been grave abuses. I am uncomfortable with

a kind of writing of history, however, which sees it only in terms

of the abuses and not in terms of past and present strength. It

is very difficult to be fair to the past in which many institutions

of government carried a share of responsibility. But more than

unfairness is involved. If we are not careful, we will turn to

solutions of the moment which a better reading of history might

indicate are not the best solutions. I know we must seize the

moment, if I may use such a phrase in this setting. I know also

that this Committee realizes that a very important agency with

dedicated, highly professional, greatly disciplined government

servants is involved. The importance is to the security and domestic

tranquility of the United States. Stone's warning was given in an

act of creation. He was proud of his creation. In spite of the

abuses, there is a proper place for pride. I take it our mutual

work should be to nurture that pride and the conditions which

justify it.

I turn now to a review of some of the steps which have been

taken or are in progress. We have tried most diligently, under safe-

guards to protect the privacy of individuals and with an awareness

of the unfairness of instant history, to give a great deal of informa-

tion to Congressional committees. Attorney General Saxbe made public

and Deputy Attorney General Silberman and Director Kelley testified

about the so-called COINTELPRO. When the FBI discovered evidence

of several more COINTELPRO projects after I

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 26

---

## Page 27

= 8

became Attorney General, these were revealed. One of my first

acts as Attorney General, my third week in office, was to testify

before a Congressional committee about possible incidents of

political misuse of the FBI by the White House in the past and

about the nature of FBI file-keeping systems, particularly the

files kept by Director Hoover in his office suite. Director Kelley

has spoken publicly and before congressional committees about incidents

in the past in which FBI agents engaged in break-ins to gather

or photograph physical evidence in intelligence investigations. On

a number of occasions, most recently in testimony before this

Committee, I have described the history of the use of electronic

surveillance by the FBI. We have welcomed such opportunities.

On February 26, 1975, I instructed Director Kelley to report to

me any requests made of the Bureau, or practices within the Bureau,

which he deems improper or which present the appearance of impropriety.

On February 28, 1975, Director Kelley ordered

FBI personnel to report

such requests or practices to him. In July, 1975, I reaffirmed my

February directive and also asked for a report of all sensitive

investigative practices. The Director promptly complied.

Director Kelley has regularly provided information on conduct

by Bureau agents and programs underway within the Bureau that

could raise questions. These matters have been

reviewed and

discussed within the Departnet so that

a consistent and appro-

priate policy can be Schieved. This is a continuing process.

I do not assert that we are aware of everything about the Bureau.

Nor do I suggest that we ought to know everything. Appropriate

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 27

---

## Page 28

- 9 -

communication, consultation and supervision at this level

have to be selective. I make this point, which I think may

sound disconcerting, not in any way to minimize the respon-

sibility of the Bureau to keep the Department informed nor

to minimize the Department's duty to find out. Rather

I want to be realistic about a learning and organization

problem which requires realism if it is to be understood

and perfected.

With respect to possible legislation, the Department

has in preparation various drafts of possible bills which may

be of assistance in the area of what is now warrantless

electronic surveillance. Although ebtaining a judicial warrant

does not automatically eradicate the possibility of abuse,

it is

perceived to be an important safeguard of individual

privacy interests, and we are exploring, as we said we would

do, various possibilities and alternatives.

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 28

---

## Page 29

- 10 -

Finally, a committee within the Department of Justice --

chaired by Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the

Office of Legal Counsel, and composed of representatives of my

office, the Criminal

and Civil Rights Divisions, the Office of

Policy and Planning, and the FBI -- has been working for eight

months reviewing FBI procedures in many areas and drafting guide-

lines to govern those procedures in the future. The Committee has

produced draft guidelines covering White House inquiries,

congressional and judicial staff appointment investigations,

unsolicited mail, and domestic security investigations. It is

currently at work on guidelines covering counterespionage investi-

gations and will later consider the use of informants, the employee

loyalty program, organized crime intelligence investigations,

criminal investigations, and other aspects of FBI practice.

The Committee's work has

been extensive and time-consuming. It

has involved not only questions of proper safeguards but also of

efficiency in the proper functioning of the Bureau. It has

been an effort to translate into words the complicated and

important mechanisms for controlling the FBI. I hope the

Committee's efforts

at articulation will be of use to this Com-

mittee and others as it considers drafting legislation.

You have received copies of the latest drafts of the

guidelines

that have been substantially completed by the Committee.

These guidelines do not yet represent Department policy. There

is disagreement within the Department on some aspects of these

guidelines. I have disagreed with the Committee recommendations

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 29

---

## Page 30

- 11 -

from time to time, and the FBI has raised substantial questions

about other recommendations--particularly with respect to the

treatment of unsolicited mail. Some of the proposals in the

guidelines could be promulgated as departmental regulations.

Congress may feel some ought to be enacted into statutory law.

Other provisions would require implementation by executive order.

I would be glad to discuss these draft guidelines with

you in detail in response to your questions, but a brief discussion

of the guidelines on domestic security may be useful at the outset.

The guidelines begin by attempting to impose some order

and definiteness to the domestic security field. To begin

with, these guidelines do not deal with FBI efforts to counter-

act the work of foreign intelligence services operating within

the United States.

Standards for determining when there is

foreign involvement sufficient to place a subject in the category

of foreign counterintelligence investigation are now being debated

within the guidelines committee. The domestic security guidelines

also are not meant to cover security or background investigations

of federal appointees or investigations of ordinary crimes. Under

the draft guidelines, domestic security investigations are only

to be authorized when there is a likelihood that the activities

of individuals or groups involve or will involve the use of force

or violence in violation of federal law. Domestic security inves-

tigations are to be limited to activities of individuals or groups

intended to accomplish one of five purposes: overthrowing the

government of the United States or of a State; interfering with

the activities within the United States of foreign governments

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 30

---

## Page 31

- 12 -

or their representatives; influencing government policies by inter-

fering by force or violence with government functions

or interstate

commerce; depriving individuals of their civil rights; and creating

domestic violence or rioting when such violence or rioting would

necessitate as a countermeasure the use of Federal armed forces.

There is also a provision for limited investigation when there is a

clear and immediate threat of domestic violence which is likely to

result in a request by a state for Federal armed assistance.

Currently there is no procedure requiring the review outside the

FBI of all domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI,

though the FBI has a long-standing policy of reporting its investi-

gative firdings to the Criminal Division. Under the draft guidelines

there would be a comprehensive program of reporting to the Attorney

General or his designee of all preliminary and full domestic intel-

ligence investigations. The Attorney General would be required under

the draft guidelines to put a stop to any full investigation whose:

justification did not meet an established standard. The standard!

would be that there must be specific and articulable facts giving reason

to believe that the individual or group under inves-

tigation is engaged in the activities I have just listed.

Another feature of the draft guidelines is to place

strict controls upon the use of any technique by the FBI which

goes beyond the gathering of information. COINTELPRO was the

name given the use of some such techniques. As I have said

before, some of the activities in COINTELPRO were outrageous

and the others were foolish. Nonetheless, there may be circum-

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 31

---

## Page 32

13-

stances involving an immediate risk to human life or to extraordin-

arily.

important government functions that could only be

countered by some sort of preventive action. The guidelines

require that any such preventive action proposal be submitted

to the Attorney General. He could authorize the preventive

action only when there is probable cause to believe that the

violence is imminent and when such measures are necessary to

minimize the danger to life or property. The preventive action

would in all cases have to be nonviolent. The Attorney General

would be required to report to Congress periodically and no less

often than once a year on the use of preventive action by the

• FBI.

I make no claim that during this rather difficult but

interesting and--I must trust--promising period

we have

achieved all that might have been possible. In many ways the

work has been disappointingly slow. But I do think we have

made advances in nurturing and helping to improve a structure

which will be supportive of the best efforts of the men and

women in the Department of Justice and in the Federal Bureau of

Investigation: No procedures are fail-safe against abuse.

The best protection remains the quality and professionalism of

the membersof the Bureau and of the Department.

DOJ-1975-12

NW 68262 Docld:32195955 Page 32

---