Originator: WH
From: INDERFURTH, RICK
To: DODSON, CHRISTINE
Document date: 05/31/1977
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

181-10002-10296

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

5/12/202

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

NARA

181-10002-10296

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER FILES

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

WH

INDERFURTH, RICK

DODSON, CHRISTINE

DATE: 05/31/1977

PAGES:

143

• SUBJECTS :

REVIEW OF KENNEDY ASSASSINATION MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION:

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

Secret

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

Redact

04/26/2018

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Ip. memo re attached file "Office, OTS, [John Kennedy Assassination, 5/77].

v9.1

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## Page 2

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1977

FOR:

FROM:

CHRISTINE DODSON

RICK INDERFUR TH

Christine, one of John Matheny's onerous

• tasks was to review material on the

¡assassination of John Kennedy.

Attached,

is a file John gave me before he left for

the VP's staff. Please see that lt is filed

appropriately and retrievable if needed.

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## Page 3

COPY

Morgan - Roselli - Maheu - Garrison

March in Las Vegas

Morgan and Jack Anderson

1) Prior to Aug '60

2) Aug '60 to Apr '61 (Bay of Pigs)

3) Apr '61 to late '61

4) Late '61 to late '62 (Cuban Missile Crisis)

5) Late '62 into mid '63

wia appi ai.

Roselli op started in Sept '60

(Maheu to Roselli to Giancana)

AG briefed 7 May '62

Taylor became Chairman

of JCS on 9 Aug '62

Rusk, McNamara. Taylor, Bundy.

Goodwin. Gilpatric. Lansdale. Murrow. McCone

COPY

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## Page 4

SECRET -EYES DALY

23 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

This report was prepared at the request of the Director of

Central Intelligence.

He assigned the task to the Inspector

General on 23 March 1967. The report was delivered to the Director,

personally, in installments, beginning on 24 April 1967. The

Director returned this copy to the Inspector General on 22 May 1967

with instructions that the Inspector General:

Retain It in personal, EYES ONLY safekeeping

Destroy the one burn copy retained temporarily by the

Inspector General

Destroy all notes and other source materials originated

by those participating in the writing of the report

The one stayback burn copy, all notes, and all other derived

source materials were destroyed

on 23 May 1967.

This ribbon copy is the only text of the report now in existence,

either in whole or in part. Its text has been read only by:

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence

J. S. Earman, Inspector General

K. L. Greer,

Inspector (one of the authors)

S. D. Breckinridge, Inspector (one of the authors)

All typing of drafts and of final text was done by the authors.

Filed with the report are:

Office of Security file used as source material

Memorandums concerning William Harvey

Drew Pearson columns

Garmen

Earmal

Inspector General

SECRET-EYES ONLY

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OUTLINE

C.

Introductory Section

Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960

Aerosol Attack on Radio Station

Contaminated Cigars

Depilatory

The Gambling Syndicate Operation

Phase 1 (August 1960 - May 1961)

Phase 2 (Late 1961 - June 1963)

The Wiretapping Incident

The Phyllis McGuire/Attorney General Phase (Late 1961 - May 1962)

The Long Committee Phase (May - July 1966)

Schemes in Early 1963

Skin Diving Suit

Sea Shell

Project AMIASH - Rolando Cubela (March 1961 - March 1966)

- Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Government Meetings

Special Group (Augmented) Meeting of 10 August 1962

Special Group Meeting of 30 July 1964

The Ramifications of the Gambling Syndicate Operation

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## Page 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introductory Section

Scarcity of documentary evidence

Relationship of assassination planning to govemment policy

Risk of assassination when a government is overthrown •

Resort to synecdoche

Published intelligence on the possibility of Castro's demise

Accuracy of the story Drew Pearson has

Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960

Aerosol Attack on Radio Station

Contaminated Cigars

Depilatory ......••

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1 •

Genesis of the plot . ...

First contact with Maheu

O'Connell named as case officer

First meeting with Rosell1

Briefing of Dulles and Cabell

First meeting between Maheu and Giancana

True identities of Giancana and Trafficante become known

Role of Trafficante

Early planning on the means of assassination

Gunn's Involvement with lethal cigars

Treichler's preparation of lethal cigars

Delivery of the cigars to 'Gunn

Roosevelt learns of the plot

Possible ways of packaging the poison

Decision to package the poison in pill form

Juan Orta is identifled as the syndicate's man in Cuba

Gunn tests the pills on guinea pigs .....

Sequence preceding passing the pills to O'Connell

• O'Connell receives the pills and passes them to Roselli

Harvey is briefed on the operation

Trafficante receives the pills and gives them to Orta

Identification of Orta

The Orta channel collapses ..

Varona is brought into the operation

Edward K. Moss

... ...

Roselli associates O'Connell with CIA

Funds are approved for passing to Varona

Money and lethal pills are passed to Varona

Varona's restaurant contact in Cuba

Edwards calls off the operation •

Disposition of the pills

List of those witting of the operation

9

10

11

13

14

14

15

16

16

17

18

19

19

20

21

21

22

3

3

24

25

25

26

27

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Page

C

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2 •

Why Harvey was briefed on Phase 1

Harvey put in charge of the Executive Action Capability

Harvey briefs Helms on the Executive Action Capability.

QWIN- planned assassination of Lumumba

Approval of Project ZRRIFLE

Bissell puts Harvey in charge of the Castro operation

Harvey is told he will head the Cuba task force

Harvey's first meeting with Edwards on the Castro operation

Termination of @WIN. . ..

-..

Harvey briefs Helms on the Castro operation

• Differing views on the turnover to Harvey .

Harvey's first meeting with Roselli in New York Clty

Roselli and O'Connell go to Miami.

Harvey leaves for Miami with lethal pills

Roselll is already in touch with Varona.

Harvey takes over "a going operation"

Changes in gangster personnel participating

Maceo enters the operation

Harvey supplies weapons and equipment to Varona

Roselli reports that the pills are in Cuba

Varona sends a three-man team to Cuba

Varona plans to send three militia men to Cuba

Harvey and Roselli agree to terminate the operation

Roselli comes to Washington to meet Harvey

Harvey's meeting with Roselll observed by the FBI

List of persons witting of this phase of the operation

The Wiretapping Incident ..

Giancana suspects Phyllis McGuire and Dan Rowan

Giancana asks Maheu to bug Rowan's room

Likely date of the bugging incident •

Maheu asks Edward Du Bois to do the job

Du Bois assigns Balletti and Harrison to the job.

Wiretap made instead of microphone plant

Balletti is caught and phones Maheu for help.

Maheu refers the FBI to CIA

Shef Edwards meets with an FBI representative

Edwards intervenes with Sam Papich on Maheu's behalf

Houston intervenes with the Justice Department.

Houston briefs General Carter

Edwards and Houston brief the Attorney General.

Edwards sends a memorandum record of the meeting to Kennedy

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2 is already under way .

Helms is briefed on the meeting with the Attorney General

Edwards

warns Harvey to clear with the DCI. .

Kennedy's request on 4 March 67 for a copy of the briefing memo

37

37

38

38

38

39

39

40

41

41

41

43

45

46

47

47

48

48

49

50

51

51

52

53

54

55

57

57

57

58

58

58

59

59

59

60

61

61

62

628

63

64

65

65

66

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Page

The Wiretapping Incident (continued)

Chicago Sun-Times story of 16 Aug 63 re Giancana & CIA.

Chicago Daily News story of 20 Aug 63 re Giancana & CIA

Helms sends McCone a copy of the Kennedy briefing memorandum.

Rumors now connect CIA & gangsters in plot to kill Castro

The Long Committee. . ..

Former Maheu employee called to testify

The Onassis-Niarchos fight over oil shipping rights

Maheu is hired by Niarchos and is supported by CIA

CIA Intervenes on Niarchos ' behalf. . . .

The Long Cormittee plans to resurrect the Onassis wiretap

CIA Intervenes with the Long Committee on Maheu's behalf.

Maheu applies pressure on CIA to avoid publicity

Maheu indicates he may brief his attorney . ..

Schemes in Early 1963. . . ..

Skin Diving Suit. . . ...

Gift from Donovan to Castro

The suit is bought and made

ready

The plan is overtaken by events

Ilst of persons witting. •

Booby-trapped Sea Shell

Books on Mollusca are bought

The plan proves to be impracticable

Names of those witting .

Project AMLASH - Rolando Cubela.

Stewart's meeting with Cubela in Mexico City (Mar 61)

Cubela's role in the Cuban revolution

Cubela reported disaffected . . .

Mexico City meeting inconclusive

Cubela and Juan Orta want to exfiltrate (Mar 61).

Cubela asks for meeting in Paris (Aug 61)

Cubela plans to attend Helsinki Youth Festival.

Meetings in Helsinki (Aug 62)

Meetings in Stockholm . .

Cubela objects to the word "assassinate"

Paris meetings (Aug 62); S/W & demolition training.

Meetings in Porto Alegre (Sept 63)

Paris meetings (Oct 63); Cubela wants assurance

FitzGerald meets with Cubela in Paris (Oct 63)

Differing versions of what FitzGerald told Cubela

1 U.S.Govt

67

69

69

70

71

71

71

72

72

72

73

73

74

75

75

75

75

76

77

TT

77

78

78

78

79

79

80

81

83

84

85

85

86

87

88

90

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Page

Project AMLASH - Rolando Cubela (continued)

Cuba cache approved for Cubela. ..

The Black Leaf 40 scheme is discussed

Gunn converts a ballpoint pen into a hypodermic syringe

Sanchez gives to Cubela in Paris while Kennedy 1s shot

Cubela asks for high-powered rifle with telescopic sight.

Those witting of the Black Leaf 40 episode

Cubela cache put down (without rifles) (Mar 64)

Cubela requests a silencer for a FAL rifle

SAS requests ISD to produce FAl silencer on crash basis

Second Cubela cache put down (with FAL rIfles) (June 64,

Artime meets Cubela intermediary. . .•

• Artime agrees to meet with Cubela personally

Sanchez meets Cubela in Paris (Dec 64). • .

Explanation of how Artime and Cubela were put together

Artime and Cubela meet in Madrid (Dec 64) . .

Artime agrees to furnish silencer

Artime gives Cubela silencer and other special gear

Second name-line between Cubela and gambling syndicate operation

Headquarters terminates all contacts with Cubela group.

Cubela and others arrested; plead guilty (Mar 66)

The charges . . . .....

Castro asks for leniency

Testimony about the silencer.

Cubela expects to be executed

Cubela sentenced to 25 years' imprisorment.

No mention made of Cubela's pre-Nov 64 dealings with CIA

91

92

93

93a

93a

94

96

97

97

97

98

99

• 100

100

101

102

103

104

104

107

108

109

109

110

110

111

Memo to Secretary of State (Rusk), Subject: CIA Involve

ment in Cuban Counter-revolutionary Activities

Arrest of Rolando CUBELA Secades and Rarnon Tomas

GUIN Diaz, dated 7 March 1966 (added after completior

of report)

. .....

132

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25 April 1967

MEMORANDUM

This reconstruction of Agency Involvement in plans to

assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because

of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or

attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept

of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written

records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main

events or were put on paper from memory years afterward.* William

Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his activities during the

years in question, and they are our best source of dates. Dr.

Edward Gunn, of the Office of Medical Services, has a record of

whom he met and when and cryptic references to the subjects discussed.

Ray Treichler, of TSD, has a record of two or three dates that are

pertinent. Gunn and Treichler were involved in only the technical

aspects of operational planning, and their participations were short-

lived. Although fragmentary, their records are a help in establishing

critical time frames. Operational files are useful in some instances,

because they give dates of meetings, the substances of which may be

Inferred from collateral information.

For the most part, though, we have had to rely on information

given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time.

Their recollections of

dates are particularly hazy, and some of them

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are no longer able to keep the details of one plan separate from those

of another. We Interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely

to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. Dulles and General

Cabell. A complete list is attached at Tab A. We did not go on

fishing expeditions among the mere possibles. To have done so would

have risked making witting a number of employees who were previously

unwitting and, in our estimate, would have added Iittle to the details

available from those directly involved. There are Inconsistencles

among the varlous accounts, but most of them can be resolved by

collating the information furnished by all of the identifiable

participants. in a particular plan and by then checking it against

specific dates that can be fixed with fair certainty. We believe

that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking

associated with it 1s reasonably sound. If there are significant

Inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to occur in faulty

ordering of the sequence of

events. People still remember much of

what happened, but they can no longer recall precisely when.

It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor

with which schemes were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro

personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts

to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases

in Agency assassination planning, although the transitions from one

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to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection

of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime.

a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schemes

prior to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were

aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by Influencing

his behaviour or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that were hatched

In late 1960 and early 1961 were aggressively pursued and were

viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one

aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime

that culminated in the Bay of Pigs.

c. April 1961 to late 1961: A major scheme that was

begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and

remained dormant for several months, as did most other Agency

operational activity related to Cuba.

d. Late 1962 to Late 2962: That particular scheme vas

reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the

era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense admini-

stration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and his

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuban missile

crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the

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C

aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived in

April 1962 was finally terminated in early 1963. Two other

plots were originated in 1963, but both were impracticable

and nothing ever came of them.

We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency

Kennedy

•officers felt themselves subject to the/administration's severe

pressures to do something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless

and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in

that light.

Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so

obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We belleve,

though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the

dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him

personally rather than to the government as a body, will not

necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This point was

stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft

paper of October 1961, which was Initiated in response to General

Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the

position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would

offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Conmunist

and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically

relevant to our investigation, 1s that bringing about the downfall of

a government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from

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positions of power, and there 1s always the risk that the partici-

pants will resort to assassination. Such removale from pover go the

house azrest•f-&-MOssade¢© †he*fl‡ght Of-a-Batist&-shoulđ Tơt

cause one to overlock the killings of a Diem or of & Trujillo by

forces encouraged but not-controlled by the U.s. Government.

There is a third point, which was not directly made by any of

those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the interviews

and from review of files. The point is that of frequent resort to

synecdoche-- the mention of a part when the whole 1s to be understood,

or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such

as "aisposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, llteral

sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in

the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime.

Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing some-

thing about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically

In mind 1s killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may

not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said

what they actually meant, they should not be surprised If their oral

shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.

The suggestion was made to us that operations aimed at the

assassination of Castro may have been generated in an atmosphere of

stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's

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demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would

follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1960 through

1966, Including National Intelligence Estimates, Special National

Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Memorandums, and Memorandums

for the Director. The NIE's on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba"

•for 1960, 1963, and 1964 have brief paragraphs on Ilkely successor

governments if Castro were to depart the scene. We also find similar

short references in a SNIE of March 1960 and in an Intelligence

Memorandum of May 1965. In each case the treatment is no more nor

less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such

as these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the

operators were unduly Influenced by the content of intelligence

publications.

Drew Pearson's column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA

plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson also has

Information, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a

meeting at the State Department at which assassination of Castro

was discussed and that a team actually landed in Cuba with pills to

be used in an assassination attempt. There is basis In fact for each

of those three reports.

a. A CIA officer passed an assassination weapon to an

Agency Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 November 1963.

The weapon

was a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe.

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The CIA officer suggested that the Cuban asset load the syringe

with Black Leaf 40. The evidence Indicates that the meeting

was under way at the very moment President Kennedy was shot.

b. There was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

• In Secretary Rusk's conference room on 10 August 1962 at which

Secretary McNamara broached the subject of liquidation of

Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Project MONGOOSE

action memorandu prepared by Edward Lansdale. At another

Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there was discussion of

a recently-disseminated Clandestine Services Information report

on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused

the exile's request for funds and had no involvement in the plot.

c. CIA twice (Irst in early 1961 and again in early 1962)

supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working

In behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1961

plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished in

April 1962 were passed by the gambling syndicate representative

to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who in turn had them sent to

Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that

a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the

operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would

make an attempt on Castro's life--perhaps using the pills.

-7=

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This report describes these and other episodes in detail; puts them

Into perspective; and reveals, that while the events described by

Drew Pearson did occur and are subject to being patched together

as though one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative

relationship among them is unfounded.

8

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Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960

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Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960

March to August 1960

We find evidence of at least three, and perhaps four, schemes

that were under consideration well before the Bay of Pigs, but we

can fix the time frame only speculatively. Those who have some

knowledge of the episodes guessed at dates ranging from 1959 through

1961. The March-to-August span we have fixed may be too narrow, but

it best fits the limited evidence we have.

a. None of those we interviewed who was first assigned to

the Cuba task force after the Bay of Pigs knows of any of these

scheme s•

b. J. D. (Jake) Esterline, who was head of the Cuba task

force in pre-Bay of Pigs days, 1s probably the most reliable

witness on general timing. He may not have been privy to the .

precise details of any of the plans, but he seems at least to

have known of all of them. He is no longer able to keep the

details of one plan separate from those of another, but each of the

facets he recalls fits somewhere Into one of the schemes.

Hence,

we conclude that all of these schemes were under consideration

while Esterline had direct responsibility for Cuba operations.

c. Esterline himself furnishes the best clue as to the

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possible time span. He thinks it unlikely that any planning

of this

sort would have progressed to the point of consideration

of means until after U.S. policy concerning Cuba was decided

upon about March 1960. By about the end of the third quarter

of 1960, the total energies of the task force were concentrated

on the main-thrust effort, and there would have been no interest

In nor time for pursuing such wills-o'-the-wisp as these.

We are unable to establish even a tentative sequence among the schemes;

they may, in fact, have been under consideration simultaneously. We

find no evidence that any of these schemes was approved at any

level higher than division, if that. We think It most likely that

no higher-level approvals were sought, because none of the schemes

progressed to the point where approval to launch would have been

needed.

Aerosol Attack on Radio Station

Ray Treichler, of TSD, remembers discussion of a scheme to

contaminate the air of the radio studio where Castro broadcast bis

speeches with an aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions

similar to those of lysergic acid (LSD). Nothing came of the idea.

Treichler said he had discouraged the scheme, because the chemical

could not be relied upon to be effective. Henry Bortner, also of ISD,

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recalls experimentation with psychic energizers but cannot relate it

to Castro as a target. We found no one else who remembered anything

of this plot, with the possible exception of Jake Esterline who

may have it confused with other schemes.

Contaminated Cigars

Jake Esterline claims to have had in his possession in pre-Bay

of Pigs days a box of cigars that had been treated with some sort

of chemical. In our first Interview with him, bis recollection was

that the chemical was intended to produce temporary personality

disorientation. The thought was to somehow contrive to have Castro

smoke one before making a speech and then to make a public spectacle

of himself. Esterline distinctly recalls having had the cigars in

his personal safe until he left wH/4 and that they definitely were

Intended for Castro. He does not remember how they came into his

possession, but be thinks they must have been prepared by Ray Treichler.

In a second interview with Esterline, we mentioned that we had learned

since first speaking with him of a scheme to cause Castro's beard to

fall out. He then said that his cigars might have been associated

with that plan. Esterline finally said that, although it was

evident that he no longer remembered the intended effect of the

cigars, he was positive they were not lethal. The cigars were never

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used, according to Esterline, because Wah could not figure out how

to deliver them without danger of blowback on the Agency. He says

he destroyed them before leaving WHj4 in June 1961.

Sidney Gottlieb, of ISD, claims to remember distinctly a plot

Involving cigars.

To emphasize the clarity of his memory, he named

the officer, then assigned to WH/CA, who approached him with the

scheme. Although there may well have been such a plot, the officer

Gottlieb named was then assigned in India and has never worked in

WH Division nor had anything to do with Cuba operations. Gottlieb

remembers the scheme as being one that was talked about frequently

but not widely and as being concerned with killing, not merely with

Influencing behaviour. As far as Gottlieb knows, this idea never

got beyond the talking stage. TSD may have gone ahead and prepared

the cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that he did not get

the DD/P's (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release them, as would

have been done if the operation had gone that far. We are unable to

discover whether Esterline and Gottlieb

are speaking of a single

cigar episode or of two unrelated schemes. We found no one else with

firm recollections of lethal cigars being considered prior to August

1960.

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Depilatory

Ray Treichler recalls a scheme involving thallium salts, a

chenical used by women as a depilatory--the thought being to destroy

Castro's Image as "The Beard" by causing the beard to fall out.

The chemical may be administered either orally or by absorption

through the skin. The right dosage causes depilation; too much

produces paralysis. Treichler believes that the idea originated in

connection with a trip Castro was to have made outside of Cuba. The

idea was to dust thallium powder into Castro's shoes when they were

put out at night to be shined. The scheme progressed as far as

procuring the chemical and testing 1t on animals. Treichler's

recollection is that Castro did not make the intended trip, and

the scheme fell through. Henry Bortner remembers consideration

being given to use of thalliun salts (perhaps against Castro) and

something having to do with boots or shoes. Treichler does not

remember with whom he dealt on this plot. We found no one else

with firm knowledge of 1t.

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Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1

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Gambling Syndicate

The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had

Its Inception in August 1960. It Involved the use of members of

the criminal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. The operation

had two phases: the first ran from August 1960 unt1l late April

or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Bay of Pigs;

the second ran from April 1962 until February 1963 and was merely

& revival of the first phase which had been inactive since about

May 1961.

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1

August 1960

Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield

Edwards, Director of Security, 1f Edwards could establish contact

with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The

objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although Edwards

claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his

conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated

with J.C. King, then Chief of Wi Division, although king now

recalls having had only limited knowledge of such a plan and at a

much later date--about mid-1962.

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Edwards consulted Robert A. Maheu, a private investigator who

had done sensitive work for the Agency, to see if Maheu had any

underworld contacts. Maheu was once a special agent of the FBI.

He opened a private office in Washington in 1956. The late Robert

Cunningham, of the Office of Security (and also a former Special

Agent with the FBI), knew Maheu and knew that his business was having

& shaky start financially. Cunningham arranged to subsidize Maheu

to the extent of $500 per month. Within six months Maheu was doing

so well financially that he suggested that the retainer be discontinued.

Over the years he has been intimately Involved in providing support

for some of the Agency's more sensitive operations. He has since

moved bis personal headguarters to Los Angeles but retains a

Washington office. A more detailed account of Maheu's background

appears in a separate section of this report.

(Comment: Although we see nothing sinister in 1t, we are

struck by the fact that so many of the persons whose names appear

In this account once worked for the FBI. We have already named

Cunningham and Maheu. Later to appear are William Harvey, James

O'Connell, and Edward Morgan.)

Maheu acknowledged that he had a contact who might furnish

access to the criminal underworld, but Maheu was most reluctant to

allow himself to be involved in such an assignment. He agreed to

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participate only after being pressed by Edwards to do so. Maheu

Identified his contact as one Johnny Rosell1, who lived in Los

Angeles and had the concession for the ice-making machines on "the

strip" in Las Vegas and whom Maheu understood to be a member of the

syndicate. Maheu was known to Roselll as a man who had a number of

large business organizations as clients. Edwards and Maheu agreed

that Maheu would approach Roselll as the representative of business-

men with interests In Cuba who saw the elimination of Castro as the

essential first step to the recovery of their investments. Maheu

was authorized to tell Roselll that his "clients" were willing to

pay $150,000 for Castro's removal.

September 1960

Shef Edwards named as his case officer for the operation

James P. O'Connell (a forner Special Agent of the FBI), then Chief,

Operational Support Division, Office of Security. O'Connell and

Maheu met Roselli In New York City on 14 September 1960 where Maheu

made the pitch. Roselli Initially was also reluctant to become

Involved, but finally agreed to introduce Maheu to "Sam Gold" who

either had or could arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba

who might handle the job. Roselli said he had no interest in being

paid for his participation and believed that "Gold" would feel the

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same way. A memorandum for the record prepared by. Sheffield Edwards

on 14 May 1962 states:

"No monies were ever paid to Roselli and

Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods

that he was in Miami."

(Giancana is "Gold.")

O'Connell was Introduced (in true name) to Roselli as an employee

of Maheu, the explanation being that O'Connell would handle the

case for Maheu, because Maheu was too busy to work on it full time

himself. No one else in the Office of Security was made witting of

the operation at this time. Edwards himself did not meet Roselli

until the summer of 1962.

At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edwards

told Bissell that he had a friend, a private Investigator, who had

a contact who in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate

elements in Cuba could be reached. These syndicate elements in

Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter

part of September 1960, Edwards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only

ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.S.

gangster elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was not informed

of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that time.

With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Allen Dulles)

and the DDCI (General Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving

members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards

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deliberately avoided the use of any "bad words." The descriptive term

used was "an Intelligence operation." Edwards is quite sure that the

DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he

was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being "from A to

B to C." As he then envisioned It, "A" was Maheu, "3" was Rosell1,

'and "C" was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles

merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly,

there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no

formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval

to use his own judgment. Bissell committed $150, 000 for the support

of the operation.

(Comment: In the light of this description of the briefing,

It 1s appropriate to conjecture as to just what the Director did

approve. It 1s safe to conclude, given the men participating

and the general subject of the meeting, that there was little

Ilkelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were

deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was never.

stated in unmistakable language. It 1s also reasonable to

conclude that the pointed avoidance of "bad words" emphasized

to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.

During the week of 25 September 1960, O'Connell and Maheu went to

Miami where Rosell1 introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold" at a meeting

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In the Fontainbleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man, whom he

Identified only as "Joe," who would serve as courier to Cuba and

make arrangements there. Maheu pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell

from a distance, but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe."

He did, however, learn their true identities. An Office of Security

memorandur to the DDCI of 24 June 1966 places the time as "several

weeks later." O'Connell is now uncertain as to whether it was on this

first visit to Miami or on a subsequent one that he and Maheu learned

the true identities of the two men. Maheu and O'Connell were staying

at separate hotels. Maheu phoned O'Connell one Sunday morning and

called his attention to the Parade supplement in one of that morning's

Miami newspapers. It carried an article on the Cosa Nostra, with

pictures of prominent members.

The man Maheu and O'Connell knew as

"Sam Gold"

appeared as Mon Salvatore (Sam) Giancana, a Chicago-based

gangster. "Joe, the courier" (who was never identified to either

Maheu or O'Connell in any other way) turned out to be Santos Trafficante,

the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba.

At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba,

and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on

syndicate business. (The casinos were closed and gambling was banned

effective Y January 1959. On 13 January 1959, Castro announced that

the casinos would be permitted to reopen for tourists and foreigners

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but that Cubans would be barred. The cabinet on 17 February 1959

authorized reopening the casinos for the tourist trade. Time magazine

for 2 March 1959 announced that the casinos had been reopened the

previous week. The New York Times Issue of 30 September 1961

announced that the last of the casinos still running had been closed.)

•Trafficante was to make the arrangements with one of his contacts

Inside Cuba on one of his trips to Havana.

Fall and Early Winter 1960

Very early in the operation, well before the first contact with

Rosell, the machinery for readying the means of assassination was

set in motion. The sequence of events 1s not clear, but it 1s

apparent that a number of methods were considered. Preparation of

some materials went ahead without express approval.

(Comment: It should be noted that ISD maintains a stock

of equipment and materials for operational use. When queries are

made of TSD technicians about materials or devices that are not.

stock items, It is not unusual for the technicians to go

ahead with the preparation of the materials or devices against

the event that there is a

formal request for them. Because of

this, undue significance should not be attached to advance

preparations for this operation. It should also be noted that

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It was not unusual at the time in question for the Chief of TSD

to be by-passed in operations involving his people. While

Cornelius Roosevelt, then Chief of TSD, has the clear Impression

that all requests were levied through him, instances were cited

In the course of this inquiry where such was not the case. The

practices and procedures in existence at the time may account,

at least in part, for the differing recollections of what did and

what did not happen and for the differing degrees of significance

given developments in the minds of the participants.)

Dr. Edward Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical

Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960 he received a box of

Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal material. He understood them

to be Fidel's favorite brand, and he thinks they were given to him by

Shef Edwards.

Edwards does not recall the

Incident. Guan has a

notation that he contacted Ray Treichler, of TSD, on 6 September 1960.

Treichler remembers experimenting with some cigars and then treating

& full box. He cannot now recall whether he was initially given two

boxes, experimenting with one and then treating the other; or whether

he bought a box for experimentation, after which he treated the box

supplied him by Gunn. He does not, in fact, remember Gunn as the

supplier of any cigars. He is positive, though, that he did contaminate

a full box of fifty cigars with botulinum toxin, a virulent poison that

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produces a fatal illness some hours after it is ingested. Treichler

distinctly remembers the flaps-and-seals job he had to do on the box

and on each of the wrapped cigars, both to get at the cigars and to

erase evidence of tampering. He kept one of the experimental cigars

and still has it. He retested it during our inquiry and found that

'the toxin still retained 94% of 1ts original effectiveness. The

cigars were so heavily contaminated that merely putting one in the

mouth would do the job; the intended victim would not actually have

to smoke it.

Gunn's notes show

that he reported the cigars as being ready

for delivery on T October 1960. Treichler's notes do not show actual

delivery until 13 February 1961. They do not indicate to whom

delivery was made. Gunn states that he took the cigars, at some

unspecifled time, and kept them in his personal safe. He remembers

destroying them within a month of Shef Edwards retirement In June 1963.

(Comment: Others recall the cigar scheme, but only as an

Idea that was considered and then discarded. Roosevelt, Chief

of TSD at the time, and O'Connell, the case officer, recall the

cigar scheme, but feel that It was never considered seriously.

To Gunn and Treichler, who gave it a good deal of time but did

not participate in the broader operational discussions, the cigars

loom as important.)

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Edwards recalls approaching Roosevelt after Bissell had already

spoken to Roosevelt on the subject; Roosevelt recalls speaking to

Edwards after Bissell discussed It with Edwards. Bissell does not

recall specific conversations with either of them on the technical

aspects of the problem, but he belleves that he must have "closed the

'loop" by talks with both Edwards and Roosevelt. Roosevelt recalls

his first meeting with Edwards as being in Edwards' office. Edwards

remembers asking to be introduced to a chemist. He is sure that he

did not name the target to Roosevelt, but Roosevelt says he knew it

was Castro. Roosevelt believes that he would have put Edwards In

touch with Henry Bortner, then chief of TSD's Chemical Division, but

Bortner has no recollection of such work at that time. Bortner

recalls other operations at other times, but not this one. Roosevelt

did say that, if he turned 1t over to Bortner, Bortner could have

assigned 1t to Ray Treichler.

Roosevelt remembers that four possible approaches were considered:

(1) something highly toxic, such as

shellfish poison to be administered

with a pin (which Roosevelt said was what was supplied to Gary Powers);

(2) bacterial material in liquid form; (3) bacterial treatment of a

cigarette or cigar; and (4) a handkerchief treated with bacteria.

The decision, to the best of his recollection, was that bacteria in

liquid form was the best means. Bissell recalls the same decision,

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tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee,

or boutllon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well

suited.

January - February 1961

Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most

desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in

the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.. Treichler

remembers meeting with Edwards and O'Connell in Edwards' office to

discuss the requirement. The

specifications were that the poison be

stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not Immediately acting,

and with a firmly predictable end result.: Botulin comes nearest to

meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either

liquid or solid form. Treichler states that the pill form was

chosen because of ease and safety of handling.

(Comment: The gangsters may have had some Influence on the

choice of a means of assassination. O'Connell says that in his

very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely,

Maheu's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible

ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first

thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which

Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the

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use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do

the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be

negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill

that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Irafficante

("Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban

official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that

would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters

named their man inside as Juan Orta who was then Office Chief

and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister (Castro).

The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to

receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost

that source of income, and needed the money.)

When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of

water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even

disintegrate, let alone dissolve. Treichler took them back and made

up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards

at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He

called on Dr. Gunn to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave

Gunn money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Gunn has a record of a

conversation with Treichler on 6 February 1961. It may have related to

the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that

Gunn tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.

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Treichler states that tests of botulin on guinea pigs are not valid,

because guines pigs have a high resistance to this particular toxin.

Treichler himself tested the pills on monkeys and found they did the

job expected of them.

We cannot reconstruct with certainty the seguence of events

'between readying the pills and putting them Into the hands of Roselli.

Edwards has the impression that he had a favorable report from Dr.

Gunn on the guinea pig test. Gunn probably reported only that the

pills were effective, and Edwards assumed the report was based on the

results of tests on guinea pigs. Dr. Gunn has a clear recollection,

without a date, of being present at a meeting in which Roosevelt

demonstrated a pencil designed as a concealment device for delivering

the pills. Roosevelt also recalls such a meeting, also without a

date. Gunns' notes record that his last action on the operation came

on 10 February 1961 when he put Gottlieb in touch with Edwards.

Gottlleb has no recollection of being Involved, an impression that 1s

supported by Bissell who states that Gottlieb's assignments were of a

aifferent nature. O'Connell, who eventually recelved the pills,

recalls that he dealt with Treichler. Treichler has no record of

delivering pills at this time, but he does not ordinarily keep detailed

records of such things.

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In any event, O'Connell did receive the pills, and he believes

there were six of them. He recalls giving three to Roselli. Presumably

the other three were used in testing for solubility and effectiveness.

The dates on which O'Connell received the pills and subsequently

passed them to Roselll cannot be established. It would have been

'sometime after Gunn's notation of 10 February 1961.

Gunn also has a record of being approached about the undertaking

by William K. Harvey (former special agent of the FBI) In February

In connection with a sensitive project Harvey was working on for

Bissell. According to Guan's notes, he briefed Harvey on the operation,

and Harvey Instructed him to discuss techniques, but not targets,

with Gottlieb. Gunn's notation on this point is not in accord with

the recollection of any of the others involved. We are unable to

clarify It; the note may have been in another context. O'Connell

states that J. C. King was also briefed at this time, although King

denies learning of the operation until much later.

Late February - March 1961

Rosell passed the pills to Trafficante. Roselli reported to

O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba. Orta

is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before

returning them. According to the gangsters, Orta got cold feet.

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(Comment: Orta lost his position in the Prime Minister's

Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was

still going on in Miami and in Washington. He took refuge in

the Venezuelan Embassy on 11 April 1961 and became the responsi-

bility of the Mexican Embassy when Venezuela broke relations

with Cuba in November 1961. Castro refused to give him a safe

conduct pass until October 1964 when he was allowed to leave for

Mexico City. He arrived in Miami In early February 1965.

(It appears that Edwards and O'Connell did not know at the

time of Orta's fall from favor. They have made no reference

to it--ascribing Orta's failure to cold feet. It would seem,

though, that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his

access to Castro. They described him as a man who had once had

a position

that allowed him a rake-off on gambling profits, a

position that he had since lost. The only job with which we can

associate Orta that might have allowed him a rake-off was the

one he held in the Prime Minister's Office, which he lost on

26 January 1961. It seems likely that, while the Agency thought

the gangsters had a man in Cuba with easy access to Castro, what

they actually had was a man disgruntled at having lost access.)

The previously-mentioned 24 June 1966 summary of the operation

prepared by the Office of Security states that when Orta asked out

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of the assignment he suggested another candidate who made several

attempts without success. Neither Edwards nor O'Connell know the

identity of Orta's replacement nor any additional details of the

reported further attempts.

March - April 1961

Following the collapse of the Orta channel, Roselli told

O'Connell that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile

movement who might do the job. He identified him as Tony Varona

(DI. Manuel Antonio de VARONA y Loredo). Varona was the head of the

Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported by the Agency as

part of the larger Cuban operation. O'Connell understood that Varona

was dissatisfied with the nature and the extent of this support and

that JMWAVE suspected that Varona was not keeping his bargain with the

Agency.

(Comment: Reports from the FBI suggest how Trafficante may

have known of Varona. On 21 December 1960 the Bureau forwarded

to the Agency a memorandum reporting that efforts were being

made by U.S. racketeers to finance anti-Castro activities in

hopes of securing the gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies

In Cuba in the event Castro was overthrown. A later report of

18 January 1961 associates Varona with those schemes. Varona

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had hired Edward K. Moss, a Washington public relations

counselor, as a fund raiser and public relations advisor.

The Bureau report alleged that Moss' mistress was one Julia

Cellini, whose brothers represented two of the largest gambling

casinos in Cuba. The Cellini brothers were believed to be in

touch with Varona through Moss and were reported to have offered

Varona large sums of money for his operations against Castro,

with the understanding that they would receive privlleged

treatment "in the Cuba of the future." Attempts to verify these

reports were unsuccessful.

(There is a record of CIA interest in MOss, but there is

no indication that the Agency had any involvement with him

In connection with Cuba. He was granted Covert Security

Clearances in March 1959 for use by NE Division in his (then)

role as consultant to the Indian Embassy and again in November

1962 for use by CA Staff under Project ZRMAJOR, a program for

the exploitation of political consultants. In early 1965 Moss

became of interest to the House Foreign Affairs Committee because

of his record of having represented various foreign governments.

A memorandum prepared by CA Staff In March 1965 states that the

records do not show any use made of Moss by either NE Division

or by CA Staff. The CSA of T November 1962 specifles that the

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approval became invalid if Moss were not used within six

months of the date of the approval.)

Trafficante approached Varona and told him that he had clients

who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money

. for the job. Varona 1s reported to have been very receptive, since

It would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms, and

communications eguipment.

(Connent: By this time Roselli had become certain that

O'Connell was an Agency employee, not a subordinate of Maheu.

He told O'Connell that he was sure that O'Connell was "a

government man - CIA" but that O'Connell should not conf1rm

this to him. Roselli said

that as a loyal American he would

do whatever he could and would never divulge the operation.)

Roselli was to deliver money to Varona for expenses. O'Connell

now recalls the amount as $50,000. Edwards, who was away at the time,

recalls it as $25,000. Since Edwards was absent, O'Connell had to

get approval from Edwards' deputy, Robert Bannerman, who until then

had been unwitting of the operation. O'Connell told Bannerman that

the operation was known to and approved by Edwards. Bannerman authorized

passing the money and now recalls the amount as being on the order of

$20,000 to $25,000. An Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI,

-. ~

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dated 24 June 1966, sets the amount as $10,000 1n cash and $1, 000

worth of communications equipment. Jake Esterline, who signed the

vouchers for the funds, recalls the amounts as being those stated

in the Office of Security memorandum.

(Conment: As a sidelight, Esterline says that, when be

learned of the intended use of Varona, steps were taken to

cancel the plan. Varona was one of the five key figures in the

Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in support of the

approaching Bay of Plgs operation. If steps were in fact taken

to end Varona's participation in the syndicate plan, they were

Ineffective. It 1s clear that he continued as an integral part

of the syndicate scheme.)

When the money was ready, O'Connell took the pills from his safe

and delivered them and the money to Rosell. Rosell gave the pills

and the money to Varona, whom Rosell dealt with under pseudonym.

Ilttle is known of the delivery channels beyond Varona. Varona was

believed to have an asset Inside Cuba In a position to slip a pill

to Castro. Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in

a restaurant frequented by Castro and who was to receive the pills and

put them into Castro's food or drink. Edwards believes that the

scheme failed because Castro ceased to visit that particular restaurant.

8 ..

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April - May 1961

Soon after the Bay of Pigs, Edwards sent word to Roselli

through O'Connell that the operation was off--even if something

happened there would be no payoff. Edwards is sure there was a

complete standdown after that; the operation was dead and remained so

unt1l April 1962. He clearly relates the origins of the operation to

the upcoming Bay of Pigs Invasion, and 1ts termination to the Bay

of Pigs failure. O'Connell agrees that the operation was called off

after the Bay of Pigs but that the termination was not firm and final.

He belleves that there was something going on between April 1961 and

April 1962, but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill

Harvey that when the operation was revived In April 1962, Harvey took

over a "going operation."

(Comment: As distinguished from Edwards and O'Connell,

both Bissell and Esterline place the termination date of the

assassination operation as being about six months before the

Bay of Pigs...

Esterline gives as his reason for so believing the

fact that the decision bad been made to go ahead with a massive,

major operation instead of an individually-targeted one such as

this. Whatever the intention in this respect, if the decision to

terminate was actually made, the decision was not communicated

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effectively. It is clear that this plan to assassinate Castro

continued In train until sometime after the Bay of Pigs.)

O'Connell believes that he must have recovered the pills, but

he has no specific recollection of having done so. He thinks that

Instead of returning them to TSD he probably would have destroyed

them, most likely by flushing them down a toilet. Treichler has no

record of the pills having been returned to him, but he says he is

quite sure that they were.

In a memorandum of 14 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards stated that

knowledge of this particular operation was limited to six persons.

In the course of this investigation, we have identified the following

persons who knew In Late 1960 or early 1961 of this specific plan

to assassinate Castro:

1. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence

2. General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

3. Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans

4. Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security

5.

James O'Connell, Office of Security, the case officer

6. J. D. Esterline, Chief, WE/4

7• Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD

8. Ray Treichler, Chemical Division, ISD

9. Edward Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services

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10. William Harvey, Chief, FI/D

11. Sidney Gottlieb, Special Assistant to the DD/P (Gottlieb's

name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he

denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)

12. Robert Bannerman, Deputy Director of Security

13. J.C. King, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of

the operation at the time.

The following persons outside the government are known to be

witting of the operation and elther know or strongly suspect the

Agency's connection with It:

I. Robert Maheu, a private Investigator

2. John Roselll, the Agency's principal contact with the

gambling syndicate

3. Sam Giancana, an important figure in the syndicate

4. Santos Trafficante, the courier and man inside Cuba

These additional people were aware of the operation, but their

knowledge of CIA's connection with it can only be speculated:

1. Juan Orta, the man originally selected to poison Castro

2. Antonio Varona, a Cuban exile leader

3. The son-in-law of Varona, who is known to have been Involved

with him closely during this tine. (The Varona 201 file makes

no reference to Varona having a son-in-law, but he identified

this close associate as such.

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The Agency's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, and Attorney

General Robert Kennedy learned the full details of the operation in

May 1962. We do not know the particulars of the report Drew Pearson

now has, but it may include many of the details of this operation.

If 1t does, then the circle of those now knowledgeable would be

widened to include:

1. Edward P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington attorney

2. Columnist Drew Pearson and probably his partner,

Jack Anderson

3. Chief Justice Earl Warren

4. James Rowley, chief of the Secret Service

5. Pat Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB

6. Attorney General Ramsey Clark

7. Various members of the FBI

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Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2

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Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2

William Harvey, Chief of FI/D, was briefed in February 1961

(by authority of Richard Bissell) on phase one of the gambling

syndicate operation. That briefing was in connection with a sensitive

• operation that Bissell had assigned to Harvey. Harvey describes 1t

thus: Early in the Kennedy administration, Bissell called him in to

discuss what Harvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; 1.e.,

& general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required.

Harvey's notes quote Bissell as saying, "The White House has twice

urged me to create such a capability." Bissell recalls discussing

the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He

mentioned the Edwards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro

In that context, but he now thinks that the operation was over by

then and that reference to 1t was in terms of a past operation as a

case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be

briefed by Edwards. Harvey's fixing of the date as February was only

after review of events both preceding the briefing and following it.

He says now that 1t might have been/early as late January or as late

as March 1961.

After some discussion of the problems involved in developing an

Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the

effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects

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of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since

Silver was already cut In, Harvey used him in developing the

Executive Action Capability, although never with respect to Castro.

We did not question Gottlieb on his knowledge of the progran for

creating an Executive Action Capability, but Harvey's mention of him

'In this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey

Instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating

the discussion with the Castro operation.

Harvey states that after the decision was made to go ahead with

the creating of an Executive Action Capability, and while he was

still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms

fully on the general concept but without mention of the then ongoing

plan to assassinate Castro.

The Executive Action program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its

principal asset was an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier

by Arnold Silver for use in a special operation in the Congo f

rancosination of Patrice-Lummba, to be run by Justin O'Donnell.

(O'Donnell made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in

an assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which Bissell

granted.) The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in

May. 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February

1962. The new DD/P (Helms) on that date authorized Harvey, by

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memorandun, to handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for

expenditures was to be by general category and on Harvey's certifi-

cation. The Initial approval was for $14,700, consisting of $7,200

for QWIN's annual salary and $7,500 for operational expenses.

Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly

to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers).

It continued on a course separate from the Edwards/gambling syndicate

operation against Castro until 15 November 1961. Harvey has a note

that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of the

ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. Harvey says that Bissell Instructed him to

take over Edwards' contact with the criminal syndicate and thereafter

to run the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that, as a completely

unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he

was told by Helms that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's

• Cuba task force.

Late 1961 - Early 1962

Harvey recalls that he was very busy with a number of things in

the period that followed the discussion with Bissell that led to his

taking over Edwards' Castro operation. He was turning over his

responsibilities in FI/D. He was working with NSA on the Martin/

Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and

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was engaged in daily meetings concerning them. He attended a station

chiefs' conference in Panama in late January and early February.

February - March 1962

Harvey recalls a first meeting with Edwards in February 1962

on the subject of the Castro operation. He also recalls working

out the details of the takeover during March.

(Corment: After Harvey took over the Castro operation he

ran it as one aspect of ZRRIFLE; however, he personally handled

the Castro operation and did not use any of the assets being

developed in ZRRIFLE. He says that he soon came to think of the

Castro operation and ZRRIFLE as being synonymous. The over-all

Executive Action program came to be treated in his mind as being

synonymous with @WIN, the agent working on the over-all program.

He says that when he wrote of ZRRIFLE/@WIN the reference was to

Executive Action Capability; when he used the cryptonym ZRRIFLE

alone, he was referring to Castro. He said that his correspondence

would disclose this distinction. We reviewed the correspondence

and found it for the most part unrevealing.

(After Harvey left Task Force W and was winding up his

headquarters responsibilities in preparation for assignment to

Rome, he wrote a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, dated 27 June

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1963, stating that the original justification for employing

QWIN no longer existed and raising the question of @WIN's

termination.

The records (OLIA-1974, 24 April 1964) show that

QWIN was terminated by the Luxembourg Station on 21 April

1964. There is no Indication in the flle that the Executive

Action Capability of ZRRIFLE/@WIN was ever used.)

April 1962

Edwards recalls Harvey contacting him In April and asking to be

put In touch with Roselli. Edwards says that he verifled Helms'

approval and then made the arrangements. Harvey states that he briefed

HeIms before his Mrst meeting with Roselll, explatning its purpose,

and that he also reported to Helms the results of his meeting with

Roselli. Harvey states that thereafter he regularly briefed Helms

on the status of the Castro operation.

(Comment: Edwards statement that he "verified Helms'

approval" is the earliest indication we have that Mr. Helms had

been made witting of the gambling syndicate operation against

Castro. Harvey added that, when he briefed Helms on Roselli,

he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the Director.)

Edwards, Harvey, and O'Connell have differing recollections.of

the specifics of the turnover from Edwards/O'Connell to Harvey. Not

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all of the differences can be resolved--not even by follow up

Interviews in which the Information furnished by each was checked

with each of the other two. There is no disagreement on the fact

of the turnover nor on when it took place. The recollections vary

decidedly, though, on the status of the operation at the time of 1ts

•transfer to Harvey and on just how clean the break was between phase

one under Edwards and phase two under Harvey.

a. Edwards believes that the operation was called off

completely after the Bay of Pigs and that there was no further

operational activity In connection with 1t until Harvey met

Rosell1 and reactivated the operation in April 1962. O'Connell

Introduced Harvey to Roselli, and Edwards had nothing further to

do with the operation--with the exception of a meeting with

Attorney General Robert Kennedy In connection with the Phyllis

McGuire wiretapping Incident. (The wiretapping Incident 1s

described in a separate section of this report.) Edwards'

records show that on 14 May 1962 Harvey called Edwards "and

indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of

Rosell1 for the future."

b. Harvey's recollection of the turnover tends to support

Edwards' summary, but he claims that he took over "a going

operation." Some support for this claim is found in his description

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of just how it was planned to get the poison into Castro's food

by employing someone with access to a restaurant frequented by

Castro. The mechanics were identical with those described by

Edwards and as reported in our earlier account of phase one of

the operation.

c. O'Connell's account of his own role in the operation

in the early weeks following Harvey's supposed takeover makes It

evident that there was not a clean break between the Office of

Security's responsibility and that of Harvey. Further, O'Connell

now belleves that there must have been "something going on"

between April 1961 (after the Bay Of Pigs) and April 1962, but

he claims to be unable to remember any of the particulars.

There are other disagreements among the three on facts. They are

reviewed here, not because they alter the essential fact of the

turnover or of Harvey's sole responsibility for the operation after

a certain point in time, but because they suggest that persons who

were supposedly unwitting of events after

the turnover were in fact

witting, because they were not effectively cut off at the instant of

turnover.

Harvey's notes show that he and O'Connell went to New York City

to meet Roselli on the 8th and 9th of April 1962. O'Connell recalls

It as being early in April and that the introduction was made on a

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Sunday, which would make It the 8th. Harvey says that only he and

O'Connell net with Rosell; O'Connell says that Maheu was also

present at the meeting. Both are positive of the accuracy of their

recollections, and each gives reasons for his confidence in his

clarity of recall. The significance, for purposes of this inquiry,

is whether Maheu did or did not know that the operation continued

under Harvey.

a. Harvey 1s certain that he would have remembered 1t 1f

Maheu were present. He and Maheu were in the same FBI training

class at Quantico in 1940. He does not remember having seen

Maheu since he, Harvey, came with the Agency In 1947, although he

acknowledges that he may have seen him once or twice socially.

He is sure he has not seen Maheu since 1952 when Harvey was

assigned to Berlin.

b. O'Connell who set up the meeting, is just as positive

that Maheu was there. He describes a series of events that

reassure. him of the accuracy of his memory. The four of them

traveled separately to New York. They met at the Savoy Plaza

Hotel (Savoy Hilton?) where all four stayed. After discussions,

Maheu suggested dinner at the Elk Room, a fashionable restaurant

in a nearby hotel. O'Connell says that Maheu picked up the tab.

They finished dinner about 9:30 or 10:00 p.I. Roselli wanted to

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buy the group a nightcap, but since it was Sunday night nearly

all of the bars were closed. They walked around the neighbor-

hood looking for an open bar and finally wound up at the

Copacabana. They were refused admittance to the bar because of

a rule restricting admission to couples, so they sat at a table

where they could watch the floor show. Roselli found himself

facing a table at "ringside" at which Phyllis McGuire was sitting

with Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace for the opening night of

singer Rosemary Clooney. To avoid Fhyllis MeGuire's seeing him,

Rosellf got his companions to change their seating arrangement

so that his back was turned to Miss McGuire. Maheu was an

Integral part of all this. (Rosell's reason for not wanting

Phyllis McGuire to see him with his companions will become

evident from her role in the wiretapping incident, which is

described in a separate section of this report.)

The two differing recollections cannot be reconciled. As a point of

Interest, Edwards stated that when be briefed Harvey on the operation

he deliberately omitted reference to Maheu In order to screen Maheu

Off from Harvey's takeover of the operation.

The next significant point of difference has to do with what

happened after the New York meeting. O'Connell told us that he and

Roselli left New York for Miami the next day (presumably 10 April)

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and remained there until Harvey arrived. Harvey, on the other hand,

recalls a meeting with O'Connell and Roselli in Washington on 14 April.

O'Connell, at first, did not recall the Washington meeting, but,

when given Harvey's chronology, he said he did recall returning to

Washington to meet Harvey for some purpose but that the details are

vague in his mind. Harvey at first thought that the 14 April meeting

In Washington was O'Connell's last contact with Roselli during this

second phase of the gambling syndicate operation. O'Connell told us

that Roselli was apprehensive over the new arrangement (and of Harvey

personally) and asked O'Connell to remain on for a time, which O'Connell

agreed to do. When told that O'Connellwas sure that he had continued

on in the operation for some two or three weeks after Harvey's take -

over, Harvey agreed that this was correct. O'Connell's carryover was

for purposes of continuity. We cannot be sure of the date O'Connell

was finally eliminated from the operation. He was in Miami with

Roselli and Harvey perhaps

as late as 27 April. His role in the

operation had definitely ended by June 1962 when he was assigned PCS

to Okinawa.

Harvey recalls leaving Washington for Miami by automobile on

19 April. He thought that he took delivery of the pills from Dr. Gunn

before leaving. Gunn has no record of any such deliveryat that time;

his last record concerning pills is dated February 1961. Ray Treichler

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does have a notation of delivering four pills (one capsule and three

tablets) to "J.0." on 18 April 1962. Treichler reads this as being

Jim O'Connell. When told of this, Harvey agreed that It was probably

correct. O'Connell also feels that he must have been in Washington

for the pill dellvery.

Harvey says that he arrived in Miami on 21 April 1962 and found

Roselll already in touch with Tony Varona, the Cuban exile leader who

had participated in phase one. It is at this point that the final

difference in recollections occurs. Harvey described the manner in

which the lethal material was to be Introduced into Castro's food,

Involving an asset of Varpna's who had access to someone in a

restaurant frequented by Castro. We told Harvey that Edwards had

described precisely the same plan. When we asked Harvey how Edwards

could have known of the mechanics if there had been no activity in the

operation for a year, and if Harvey was starting again fron scratch,

Harvey replied that he took over a going operation--one that was

already "in train." Edwards denies that this is so. O'Connell says

that Harvey is the one who is right. The operation was going on when

Harvey took 1t over, although O'Connell does not remember when Varona

was reactivated or what had been done with him in the meantime.

Along with the change In Agency leadership of the operation,

which saw Harvey replacing Edwards/O'Connell, there also were changes

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In the original cast of hoodlum players. Harvey specified that

Giancans was not to be brought in on the reactivation of the operation,

and he believes that Rosell honored the request. Roselli once

reported to Harvey that Giancana had asked 1f anything was going on,

and when Rosellt sald that nothing was happening, Glancana said,

'"Too bad." Additionally, Santos Trafficante ("'Joe, the courler" from

the earlier phase) was no longer involved. With the closing of the

last casino in Havana In September 1961, Trafficante presumably no

longer had access. Roselli now had a man known to Harvey as Maceo,

who also used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy.

(Comment: Harvey is unable further to identify Maceo; he

describes him as "a Cuban who spoke Italian." One of Varona's

associates in the Cuban exile conmunity was named Antonio MACEO

Mackle, but it seems unlikely that he was the Maceo of this

operation. He was prominent enough in the exile community to

have been known to Harvey. Further, It seems clear that Maceo

was "Roselli's man." This second phase appears to lack the

overwhelming, high-level gangster flavor that characterized the

fIrst phase. Roselli remained as a prominent figure in the

operation, but working directly with the Cuban exile community

and directly on behalf of CIA. Roselli was essential to the

second phase as a contact with Varona, who presumably still

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believed he was being supported by U.s. businessmen with

financial stakes in Cuba. Roselli needed Giancana and Trafficante

in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba.

He did not need them in the second phase, because he had Varona.

However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take

the precaution of Informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he

was working in a territory considered to be the private domain

of someone else in the syndicate.)

When the pills were given to Varona through Roselll, Varona

requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the

operation. Roselll passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the

help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMAVE Station, procured

explosives, detonators, twenty •30 caliber rifles, twenty .45 caliber

hand guns, two radios, and one boat radar. Harvey says that the

"shopping list" Included some items that could be obtained only from

the U.S. Goverment. Harvey omitted those 1tems, because Rosell,

posing as a representative of private business interests, would not.

have had access to such equipment. The cost of the arms and equipment,

about $5,000, was I/A'el to headquarters.

Harvey and Shackley rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name,

loaded It with the arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot

of a drive-in restaurant. The keys were then given to Roselli for

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delivery elther to Macéo, to Varona, or to Varona's son-in-law.

Evidently Harvey and Roselli had not yet come to trust each other.

Perbaps fearing a double-cross, each set about independently to

assure himself that the equipment reached the proper hands. After

parking the truck, Harvey and Shackley kept the parking lot under

surveillance until the pass was completed. Roselll, accompanied by

O'Connell, did the same. Nether pair knew that the other was

watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away. It

was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the seat as

prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says

that Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what

purpose. Shackley was merely called upon to furnish support for a

beadquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded.

May 1962

Harvey and Rosell1 arranged a system of telephone communication

by which farvey was kept posted on any developments. Harvey, using a

pay phone, could call Roselll at the Friars Club in Los Angeles at 1600

hours, Los Angeles time. Rosell1 could phone Harvey at Harvey's home

In the evening. Roselll reported that the pills were in Cuba and at

the restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

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June 1962

Rosell reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched

a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is

pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific

-plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be

used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented

Itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt--

perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned their names or anything

else about theil.

From the sequence of the reports, It would seem that

the pills were sent in ahead of the three-man tean, but this is not now

ascertainable.

September 1962

Harvey saw Rosell1 In Miami on 7 and on 1l September. Varona

was reported as then ready to send in another team of three men. They

were supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's

body guard. During this perlod the "medicine" was reported as still

In place and the three men of the first team safe.

September 1962 - January 1963

Although Harvey received several reports that the militia men were

poised to take off, presumably from somewhere in the Florida keys,

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they did not actually leave. Flrst, "conditions Inside" were given

as the reason for delay; then the October missile crisis threw plans

awry. Harvey was in Miami between 22 December and 6 January. He saw

both Rosell and Maceo several times during that period. He made a

payment of $2,700 to Rosell for passing to Varona for the expenses of

•the three militia men. Harvey and Roselli had telephone discussions

of the operation between 11 and 16 January. Harvey says that Roselli

wasn't kidding himself. He agreed with Harvey that nothing was

happening and that there was not much chance that anything would

happen in the future. As far as Harvey knows, the three militia

men never did leave for Cuba. He knows nothing of what may have

happened to the three reported to have been sent to Cuba.

February 1963

Harvey was in Miami 11-14 February.. He had no contacts with any

of the principals, but he left word for Maceo that there was nothing

new and that it now looked as If It were all over. (Just how Harvey

left this word for Maceo is not clear.)

Harvey left Miami on 15 February to meet with Rosellf in Los

Angeles. They agreed at the Los Angeles meeting that the operation

would be closed off, but that 1t would be unwise to attempt a precipitate

break between Roselli and Varona. Roselli agreed that he would continue

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to see Varons, gradually reducing the frequency of contact until there

was none.

April - May 1963

Harvey says that he received two telephone calls from Roselli

'during this period. Harvey decided that it would be best to bave one

last meeting with Roselli before he left for his assignment in Rome.

He states that he reported this decision to Mr. Helms who gave his

approval.

June 1963

Rosell1 came to Washington to neet with Harvey sometime about the

middle of June. Harvey met him at Dulles airport. Harvey remembers

having suggested to Rosell that he bring only carry-on luggage so

there would be no delay at the airport awaiting baggage. Harvey had by

then closed his own home in preparation for leaving the country and

was Ilving In the house of a neighbor who was out of town. Roselll

stayed with Harvey as a houseguest in the neighbor's home. That

evening Rosell1, Harvey, and Mrs. Harvey went out for dinner. While

dining, Harvey received a phone call from Sam Papich who wanted to know

If Harvey knew the identity of his dinner guest. Harvey said that he did.

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It subsequently developed that the FBI had Roselli under intensive

surveillance at the time, and Harvey speculates that he was picked up

as he left the airport parking lot and was identifled through his auto

license number. Harvey met Papich for breakfast the next morning and

explained that he was terminating an operational association with

'Rose1l1. Papich reminded Harvey of the FBI rule requiring FBI personnel

to report any known contacts between former FBI employees and criminal

elements. Papich said that he would have to report to J. Edgar Hoover

that Harvey had been seen with Rosell1. Harvey said he understood

Papich's situation

and did not object to such a report being made.

Harvey said that he asked Papich to inform him in advance if 1t appeared

that Hoover might call Mr. McCone--Harvey's point being that he felt

that McCone should be briefed before receiving a call from Hoover.

Papich agreed to do so. Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of

the incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief

Mcdone unless a call from Hoover was to be expected.

Tals was Harvey's last face-to-face meeting with Rosell1,

although he has heard from him since then. The later links between

Harvey and Roselli are described in a separate section of this report.

The list of persons witting of the second phase of the operation

differs from those who knew of the first phase.

Those we have identified

are:

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1. Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans

2. William Harvey, Chief, Task Force W

3°

James O'Connell, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey

took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and

equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments

after May 1962.)

4.

Sheffleld Edwards, Director of Securty (He knows of the fact

of the turnover to Harvey, but states he knows nothing of

developments thereafter.)

5. J.C. King, Chief, Wi Division (He stated in our interview

with him that he knew that Harvey was having meetings with

members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)

6.. Bruce Cheever, Harvey's deputy in 1962 (Cheever knows that

Harvey was meeting with gangsters in Reno (sic) in the winter

of 1962.)

7.

Ted Shackley, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted Harvey In the

delivery of arms and equipment to Varona in April 1962,

but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients

nor the purpose for which the material was to be used.

8. Ray Treichler, ISD (Treichler's participation was limited

to furnishing the pills to O'Connell on 18 April 1962.)

•9. Antonio Varona, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was

not aware of government sponsorsbip.)

10-

11.

Varona's son-in-law (He too was presumably was not aware of

the goverment's role.)

Maceo, Rosell's "man" (Maceo probably knew there was a

government connection, but may not have identified CIA as

the agency.)

We can only conjecture as to who else may have known at least that

the operation was continuing and perhaps some of the details. Sam

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Giancana was supposedly cut out of the second phase, but we cannot

be sure that Roselll did not keep him informed. The same may be said

of Santos Trafficante. Harvey is sure that Maheu was not involved in

Harvey's introduction to Roselli, but O'Connell 1s equally positive

that Maheu participated. The story that Drew Pearson told the

President, and which is known in other Government circles, sounds

suspiciously like this second phase of the operation. If that 1s so,

then It is likely that the operation has leaked--perhaps through

these channels:

Roselli to Maheu

Maheu to Edward P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington lawyer

Morgan to Drew Pearson

Pearson to Chief Justice Warren and to the President

Warren to Rowley, chief of the Secret Service

Rowley to Pat Coyne and to the FBI

The FBI to Attorney General Clark

We have a more detailed treatment in a separate section of this report

of the channels through which the story may have passed.

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The Wiretapping Incident

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Late 1961 - Early 1962

Well after the Pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the gambling syndicate

operation to assassinate Castro, and only indirectly related to 1t,

a development in the private life of Sam Glancana led to an Incident

that made the FBI aware of the Agency's relationship with the syndicate

and required the briefing of the Attorney General on the details

of the assassination plan.

Phyllls McGuire, of the singing McGuire sisters, was and 1s

openly known to be Giancana's mistress. Glancana suspected her of

having an affair with Dan Rowan, of the Rowan and Martin comedy team.

Both Rowan and Miss McGuire were then entertaining in Las Vegas, and

Giancana asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's roam. Maheu did not want

to do the job and declined on the grounds that he wasn't equipped for

that sort of work. Glancana made a claim for a return favor: he

had worked on the Castro assassination operation for Maheu, and

Maheu was indebted to him. Giancana said that if Maheu wouldn't

take on the job, be, Glancana, would go to las Vegas and do 1t

himself. Maheu agreed to arrange to have the room bugged.

(Corment: The exact date of this is uncertain. An August

1963 1tem on Giancana in the Chicago Sun-Times refers to the

Incident, without mention of wiretapping, and sets the year as

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1961. There 1s nothing in Agency flles that pinpoints the date,

and the memories of those we interviewed who know of the Incident

are hazy. Edwards and O'Connell did not learn of the incident

until after it had happened. Edwards can place it only as being

after the Bay of Pigs. O'Connell at first thought that lt was

In early 1962. When shown the newspaper account, O'Connell said

that if the news story was correct, it would have had to have been

very late in 1961. An Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI,

of 24 June 1966, states that 1t was "at the height of the project

negotiations." This is confusing, rather than clarifying, because

the operation was supposedly at dead standstill in late 1961

and very early 1962. Clearly the incident occurred before 7

February 1962, because It was on that date that the Director of

Security told the FBI that CIA would object to prosecution.

Presumably the FBI's case was already complete by then.)

Maheu arranged to have Giancana's request handled by Edward I.

Du Bois, a private Investigator in Miami. Du Bois assigned two men

to the job: Arthur J. Balletti and J. W. Harrison.

(Comment: The September 1966 classified telephone directory

for the Greater Miami Area lists Edward L. Du Bois under

"Detective Agencies." There is an advertisement on the page

for "Arthur J. Balletti Investigations" which lists as one of

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his specialties the obtaining of photographic and electronic

evidence.)

O'Connell recalls that, instead of planting a microphone 1n Rowan's

room, the investigator tapped the telephone, which would not have

revealed the sort of Intimacies that Glancana expected to discover.

When Rowan left the room to do a show, Balletti also left his room

to see the act, leaving his equipment out in full sight and running.

It was found by a maid, and the local sheriff's office was called.

Balletti was arrested. Harrison was not picked up. Agency personnel

have no further information about Harrison. The FBI Identified him

only as being "supplied by Maheu."

Balletti first tried to telephone Du Bols for help but coula

not reach him. He then called Maheu, in the presence of the sheriff's

officers. O'Connell says that Maheu was able to fix the matter with

local Las Vegas authorities, perhaps with belp from Roselli. However,

Balletti's call to Maheu caused the case to reach the FBI. The

Bureau decided to press for prosecution under the wiretapping statute.

When Maheu was approached by the FBI, he referred them to the CIA

Director of Security, Sheffield Edwards.

(Comment: Edwards states that he had told Maheu, who had

to work closely with the thugs, that if he got into a bind with

the FBI, he could tell the Bureau that he was working on an

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intelligence operation being handled by Edwards. Maheu,

according to Edwards, told the Bureau that he had not personally

done the wiretapping, but that it grew out of an operation he was

working on with Edwards. Maheu presumably did not mention the

ultimate objective of the "Intelligence operation" involving the

gambling syndicate. The Bureau, In a memorandum from J. Edgar

Hoover to the DCI, dated 23 March 1962, stated that: "Maheu claimed

that he ordered coverage of Rowan In behalf of CIA's efforts to

obtain Intelligence information in Cuba through the hoodlum

element, Including Sam Giancana, which had interests there. Maheu

said he was put in contact with Glancans in connection with these

Intelligence activities through John Rosell1, a Los Angeles

hoodlum. Maheu authorized wiring of Rowan's room and discussed

this matter with John Rosell1.")

March 1962

The 23 March memorandum from the Bureau takes the form of a

letter of confirmation of a 7 February meeting between an unnamed

representative of the FBI and Shef Edwards. The memorandum quotes

Edwards as having made the following points: Maheu was involved in a

sensitive operation with the Agency; the Agency would object to any

prosecution that would necessitate use of CIA personnel or information;

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and Introduction of evidence concerning CIA operations would embarrass

the Government. This is also essentially as stated to us by Edwards

In revlewing the incident during

; the course of this investigation.

The 23 March memorandum stated that the Criminal Division of the

Department of Justice requested that CIA advise specifically if 1t

objected to Initiation of criminal prosecution against Balletti,

Maheu, and Harrison. On 28 or 29 March, Edwards met with the Bureau

liaison officer, Sam Papich, and told him that any prosecution would

endanger sensitive sources and methods used in a duly authorized

project and would not be in the national interest. Papich accepted

Edwards' oral statement as the reply requested and said that he would

report to proper authorities in the Bureau. Edwards made a record

of the meeting In a memorandum of 4 April 1962.

Edwards informed us during our inquiry that at the time of the

bugging Incident and the flap that ensued those (Dulles and Bissell)

who had given the initial approval of the plan to assassinate Castro

through the gambling syndicate were gone. As no one else in authority

(Including Mr. Helms) had been cut in on the operation, Edwards dealt

with Papich without reference to anyone else in the Agency.

April 1962

In early April Papich Informed Edwards that Herbert J. Miller,

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Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the

Department of Justice, wanted to discuss the case. Edwards then

brought in Lawrence Houston, General Counsel, and asked Houston to

call on Miller and tell him that the bugging Incident in Las Vegas

was related to an intelligence operation and that the Agency did not

think 1t wise at that time to surface its connection with Roselli.

Houston net with Miller on 16 April and told him of the Agency's

Involvement, without revealing any details of the assassination

operation. Houston's memorandum of the meeting, dated 26 April, quotes

Miller as saying that he foresaw no major difficulty in stopping

prosecution, but that he might mention the problem to the Attorney

General. Houston's memorandum notes that Miller raised a question

about the possibillty of our involvement in this particular case,

the las Vegas wiretap, standing in the way of prosecution of other

actions, particularly against Giancana.

Houston's 26 April memorandum states that on 20 April there was a

second meeting with Justice--with Miller's first assistant, Mr. Foley.

At that meeting Houston told Foley that the Agency's request not to

prosecute was limited to this specific bugging incident, was based on

security grounds, and that security considerations would not be a bar

to prosecution on other matters. As it was possible that the Attorney

General might be told about this and might then call the DCI, Houston

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briefed the DDCI, General Carter, who said he understood the situation

and in due time might brief the Director, Mr. McCone. It 1s not known

whether General Carter did or did not brief Mr. McCone. There is no

indication that General Carter was further briefed on the full details

of the assassination plot against Castro.

May 1962

The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA's operational

Involvement with gangster elements, because he requested a briefing

on the details. On 7 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston

wet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and, as Edwards puts 1t,

"briefed him all the May." Houston says that after the briefing

Kennedy "thought about the problem quite seriously.". The Attorney

General said that he could see the problem and that he could not proceed

against those involved in the wiretapping case. He spoke quite

firmly, saying in effect, "I trust that 1f you ever try to do business

with organized crime again--with gangsters--you will let the Attorney

General know before you do it." Houston quotes Edwards as replying that

this was a reasonable request. Edwards says that among the points

covered was that of Roselli's motivation. The Attorney General had

thought that Roselli was doing the job (the attempt at assassination

of Castro) for money. Edwards corrected that impression; he was not.

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Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney

General the latter asked for a memorandum record of the meeting.

Edwards believes that the request was made later and by telephone.

A memorandum was prepared and was signed by Edwards. Both Edwards and

Houston recall having had a hand in writing 1t. A transmittal buck-

'slip from Houston to Kennedy notes that the request was made on

I1 May, which suggests that Edwards is correct in his belief that the

request was made by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney

General. The memorandum is dated 14 May 1962. It was typed in two

copies only, with the original being sent to Attorney General Kennedy

and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It was

typed by Edwards' secretary, Sarah Hall. It does not state the

purpose of the operation on which Kennedy was briefed, but it does

make it clear that the operation was against Castro and 1ts true

purpose may be inferred from the memorandum.

Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and

the forwarding of a memorandum of record was carried out without

briefing the Director (John McCone), the DDCI (General Carter), or the

DD/P (Richard Helms). He felt that, since they had not been privy to

the operation when it was under way, they should be protected from

Involvement in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston had

briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter involving the

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Department of Justice, but Houston had not given the DDCI the specifies.

He feels it would have been normal for him to have briefed the DCI

In view of the Attorney General's Interest, but he also feels quite

sure that/would have remembered doing it and he does not. He

suggested that Edwards' deliberate avoidance of such briefings may

have led him also to avoid making any briefings. He recalls no

disagreements with Edwards on this point and concludes that he must

have accepted Edwards' decision not to brief.

Houston and Edwards briefed Robert Kennedy on a CIA operation

embracing gangster elements, which presumably was terminated following

the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kennedy stated his view, reportedly quite

strongly, that the Attorney General should be told in advance of any

future CIA intentions to work with or through U.S. gangster elements.

From reports of the briefing, it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy

believed he had such a commitment from Agency representatives.

In fact, however, at the time of the 7 May 1962 briefing of the

Attorney General on "Gambling Syndicate - Phase One," Phase Two under

William Harvey was already well under way. Harvey had been introduced

to Roselli on 8 April and Varona or his men had received the lethal

pills, the arms, and related support equiment in late April. The

Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation

had already been reactivated, nor, as far as we know, was he ever told

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C

that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements.

When the Attorney General was briefed on 7 May, Edwards knew

that Harvey had been Introduced to Roselli. He must also have known

that his subordinate, James O'Connell, was in Miami and roughly for

what purpose (although Edwards does not now recall this). The

gambling syndicate operation had been taken from him, and, in

retrospect, he probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General

on only that aspect of the operation for which he had been responsible

and of which he had direct, personal knowledge.

Harvey states that on 14 May he briefed Mr. Helms on the meeting

with the Attorney General, as told to him by Edwards. Harvey, too,

advised against briefing Mi. McCone and General Carter and states

that Helms concurred in this.

On that same date, 14 May, Edwards

prepared a memorandum for the record stating that on that day Harvey

had told him that any plans for future use of Roselli were dropped.

Edwards' memorandum states that he "cautioned him (Harvey) that I

(Edwards) felt that any future projects. of this nature should have the

tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." Edwards

Informed us that he has no specific recollection of having told

Harvey of Kennedy's warning that the Attorney General should be told

In advance of any future CIA use of gangsters.

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Although the Attorney General on 7 May 1962 was given a full and

frank account of the Agency's relations with Maheu, Roselll, and

Glancana in the Castro operation, including the wiretapping flap,

it appears that the FBI was not given anything like the same detail.

The Bureau quite properly was not told about the assassination

operation, and it seems that 1t also was not told how the private

Ilfe of Giancana came to Involve the Agency In the Las Vegas wire-

tapping incident. Edwards states that to have briefed the Bureau on

the assassination operation would have put 1t in an Impossible bind,

since both Roselli and Glancana were high on the Bureau's "list."

The briefing of Attorney General Kennedy was absolutely restricted

to him, and we can only speculate that the confidence was observed.

(Comment: Senator Robert Kennedy's secretary, who was

also his secretary when be was Attorney General, phoned the

Director's office on 4 March 1967 and asked for a copy of the

Edwards' memorandum on the 7 May 1962 meeting with Kennedy when

he was Attorney General, at which time he was briefed on the

Castro assassination operation. Kennedy knew of the Drew Pearson

article of 7 March 1967 and wanted to check his recollection of

what he had been told by Edwards and Houston on 7 May 1962. The

Attorney General's copy of the memorandum for the record of that

briefing is in the archives of the Attorney General's office.

Mr. Helms subsequently had lunch with Senator Kennedy. He took a

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copy of the memorandum with him and allowed Kennedy to read 1t.

He did not leave a copy with Kennedy.)

If the information given the Bureau is as limited as the records

and our information indicate, then the Bureau has not been informed,

as the Attorney General was, that the Agency was first unwitting and

then a reluctant accessory after the fact. It would be surprising,

though, if the Bureau does not now know the whole story of the las

Vegas bugging incident. Whether the Bureau may now think that CIA was

less than candid about the bugging incident (as distinguished from the

sensitive assassination operation) is a question for speculation.

August 1963

What is available to the press is undoubtedly available to the

Bureau. In fact, some indication of the extent of the Bureau's

knowledge 1s found in a feature story in the Chicago Sun-Times of

16 August 1963, With a Washington date line, under the banner lead:

• "CIA SOUGHT GIANCANA HELP FOR CUBA SPYING"

The article cites "Justice Department sources' as expressing the belief

that Giancana never did any spying at all for the CIA. He merely

pretended to go along with the CIA:

"In the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put him

behind bars might be slowed - or at least affected - by his

ruse of co-operation with another government agency."

The story places the period of the relationship from 1959 to:

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"some time in 1960, long before the abortive rebel

Invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961."

The newspaper then gives the following version of the bugging incident:

"An equally bizarre episode months later gave the

Justice Department its first clue to Glancana's

negotiations with the CIA.

"The figures in this incident were a male night-

club entertainer and Giancans's girl friend,

Phyllis McGuire, one of the singing McGuire

sisters.

"At the time, in Giancana's opinion, the entertainer

was overly attentive to Miss McGuire.

"At Las Vegas, Nev., In 1961, sheriff's police

seized & prowler in the entertainer's hotel suite.

For hours, the intruder refused to identify himself

or say he was rifling the entertainer's rooms.

"Persistent questioning by sheriff's deputies,

according to federal authorities, led to an

admission by the prowler that he was on the

payroll of a private detective agency in Florida.

"Florida authorities sought an explanation of the

Incident from the operator of the detective agency.

At first, the operator refused to discuss the

matter.

Finally, however, he told investigators

to get in touch with the CIA.

"The inquiry then shifted from Florida to Washington

and revealed Giancana's negotiations with CIA,

It was disclosed.

"Government sources reported Thursday that the

private investigator's mission in the Las Vegas

suite of the entertainer was another riddle of the

Glancana caper with the CIA. Neither CIA nor the

florida detective Agency ever has offered an

explanation of what the investigator was doing in

the Hotel suite, the sources said."

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• Four days later, on 20 August 1963, the Chicago Dally News

reported further on the subject under the following headline:

"THE TRUTH ABOUT COSA NOSTRA CHIEF AND THE CIA"

The story cited an incident in which Giancana literally bumped into

an FBI agent who was tailing him. Giancana was reported to have said,

"Why don't you fellows leave me alone? I'm one of you!" Giancana

is represented in the newspaper account as having been approached by--

but not as having made any arrangements with--CIA. The story also

mentions the las Vegas Incident, but in terms of someone, possibly

CIA, ransacking a room occupied by one of Glancana's henchmen who

bad just returned from Cuba.

On 16 August 1963 the DD/P (Helms) sent a memorandum to the

DCI (McCone) forwarding a copy of the 14 May 1962 memorandum for the

record sent to Attorney General Kennedy following the 7 May 1962

briefing of Kennedy on the gambling syndicate operation - phase one.

The coincidence of dates strongly suggests that the Director's

Interest resulted from the Chicago newspaper story of 16 August.

. In his transmittal memorandum to the DCI, Mr. Helms wrote that:

• . . I was vaguely aware of the existence of such

a memorandum the memorandum for the record of the 7 May 1962

briefing of Robert Kennedy/ since I was informed that it had

been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel

Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in

May of last year.

•I assume you are aware of the

nature of the operation discussed in the attachment."

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This 1s the earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone's

being aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using

members of the gambling syndicate.

Drew Pearson has access to these newspaper stories, and they

are available to any number of sources who might wish to collect

such information. The rumors of CIA's alliance with gangsters are

not new; what is new 1s that the runors now connect CIA and the

gangsters in a plot to assassinate Castro. It may be assumed that

the Attorney General (Clark) knows that the rumors of the relation-

ship, as such, are true because of the records of the FBI on the las.

Vegas wiretapping Incident. As of this writing, he does not

necessarily know more - -subject

to what he may have learned as a

result.of the FBI Interview of Edward P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington

attorney. A clue as to how much the Attorney General may know 1s

found in his statement that Maheu is the closest thing to a link

between CIA and Giancana.

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!

May - July 1966

The Long Committee

The Agency's previous Interventions on Maheu's behalf are

-reviewed here, because of the increasingly Important role of Maheu

In the scenario. The last of these interventions occurred during

the period May - June 1966. At that time a Senate Comnittee headed

by Senator Long of Missouri was investigating Invasions of privacy

and planned to call Maheu to testify. We learned Indirectly of the

Committee's intention to call him. A man who was employed by Maheu

In 1954-55 was informed that he would be called to testify about his

activities during that period. He was an employee of ADD in 1966.

The Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice learned

that he was to be called as a witness and informed CIA's General

Counsel.

In the 1954-55 time period Maheu was hired by the Greek sbipping

magnate, Niarchos, to belp in a financial tussle Niarchos was having

with another Greek shipping figure, Onassis, who had managed to

negotiate a pact with King Saud under which Onassis would control

90% of all Saudi Arabian o11 shipments. British, American, and German

shipping interests opposed Onassis' near monopoly, and the US and UK

governments supported Niarchos in his fight to have the agreement

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cancelled. Maheu is believed to have worked at top levels in both

the British and American governments, reportedly meeting at least once

with Vice President Nixon. Maheu's operations were financed by

Narchos,

but CIA became involved in supporting them by request of

the Department of State. Agency communications and pouch facilities

were made available to Maheu, and he was given help in developing

a black propaganda campaign against Onassis. Niarchos, with Maheu's

help, won his scrap with Onassis.

A variety of litigation arose from the contest. In one law suit

for libel before the New York Supreme Court in early 1956 (Onassis vs.

Catapodis), Niarchos was examined by attorneys for Catapodis. When

questions were asked about certain affidavits In issue (which had been

passed through the CIA pouch system), Narchos, as a witness, was

advised by his attorneys not to testify on the grounds of Government

privilege. CIA inevitably became involved. The General Counsel

prepared a statement for the U.S. District Attorney In New York

(to be retained by the 00/C office there) stating the Agency's interest.

As a consequence, CIA was identified as being a party to the Niarchos/

Onassis squabble. Although that was In 1956, the Agency's Inter-

vention is presumably still a matter of record.

The Long Committee planned to resurrect the old Onassis/Niarchos

light, because It had involved an invasion of privacy. Apparently

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one of the things Maheu did was to hire someone to run a technical

surveillance on Onassis' offices, and this became known. Maheu's

more recent involvement in the Las Vegas wiretapping incident also

seemed certain to receive extensive attention by the Long Committee.

The Long Committee presumably would have been interested only in

Maheu's connection with the wiretappings that grew out of the Onassis/

Niarchos affair and the gambling syndicate operation against Castro.

The Agency decided that 1t would not be in its Interest to allow

Maheu to testify on the bugging incidents because of the risk that

his testimony could not be confined just to wiretapping. Further,

Maheu has been used over the years in a number of sensitive CIA

operations. There was a risk that a general inquiry might open up

other sensitive issues. A number of meetings were held with

Edward P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington attorney, and with a close legal

associate of senator long, a St. Louls attorney named Morris Shenker.

Finally, In direct meetings with Senator Long, our General Counsel

- was able to have Maheu excused from testifying before the Long

Committee.

While negotiations were under way to have Maheu excused from

testifying, Maheu became quite alarmed over the risk of adverse publicity,

which might jeopardize his business with very important clients. He was

especially worried over his Howard Hughes account. He applied pressure

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....

on the Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might

expose his past sensitive work for CIA. Maheu's background and past

associations with CIA are the subject of another section of this

report.

James O'Connell states that at one point in the negotiations with

'the Long Committee Maheu Indicated that he might brief his attorney,

Edward P. Morgan, fully about his past activities so that Morgan would

be able to decide how best to represent him. Whether he did or not,

and, 1f so, what he told him, is not known. We have a discussion of

the possible implications of this in a later section of this report.

a. Maheu may very well have told Morgan the details of

the plan to assassinate Castro using members of the gambling.

syndicate, and

b. Maheu has now, on three separate occasions, seen CIA

intervene in official proceedings--once for Niarchos and twice

for Mabeu.

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Schemes In Early 1963

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Schemes in Early 1963

Skin Diving Suit

At about the time of the Donovan-Castro negotiations for the

release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners a plan was devised to have

Donovan present a contaminated skin diving suit to Castro as a gift.

•Castro was known to be a skin diving enthusiast. We cannot put a

precise date on this scheme. Desmond FitzGerald told us of 1t as if

it had originated after he took over the Cuba task force in January

1963. Samuel Halpern said that 1t began under William Harvey and

that he, Halpern, briefed FitzGerald on 1t. Harvey states positively

that he never heard of 1t.

According to Sidney Gottlieb, this scheme progressed to the

point of actually buying a diving suit and readying it for delivery.

The technique Involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus

that would produce a disabling

and chronic skin disease (Madura foot)

and contaminating the breathing apparatus with tubercle bacilli.

Gottlieb does not remember what came of the scheme or what happened

to the scuba suit. Sam Halpern, who was in on the scheme, at first

said the plan was dropped because it was obviously impracticable.

He later recalled that the plan was abandoned because it was overtaken

by events:

Donovan had already given Castro a skin diving suit on his

own initiative. The scheme may have been mentioned to Mike Miskovsky,

who worked with Donova, but FitzGerald has no recollection that 1t was.

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Halpern says that he mentioned the plan to George McManus, then

& special assistant to the DD/P (Helms). McManus later told Halpern

that he had mentioned the scheme to Mr. Helms. Those who were involved

In the plot or who were identified to us by the participants as being

witting are the following:

Richard Helms

William Harvey (denies any knowledge)

Desmond FitzGerald

Samuel Halpern

George McManus

Sidney Gottlieb

Ray Treichler

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Booby-trapped Sea Shell

Some time in 1963, date uncertain but probably early in the

year, Desmond FitzGerald, then Chief, SAS, originated a scheme for

doing away with Castro by means of an explosives-rigged sea shell.

The idea was to take an unusually spectacular sea shell that would

'be certain to catch Castro's eye, load 1t with an explosive triggered

to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where

Castro often went skin diving.

Des bought two books on Caribbean Mollusca. The scheme was soon

found to be impracticable. None of the shells that might conceivably

be found in the Caribbean area was both spectacular enough to be sure

of attracting attention and large enough to hold the needed volume

of explosive. The midget submarine that would have had to be used

In emplacement of the shell has too short an operating range for such

an operation.

FitzGerald states that he, Sam Halpern, and Bruce Cheever had

several sessions at which they explored this possibility, but that no

one else was ever brought in on the talks. Haldern believes that he

had conversations with ISD on feasibility and using a hypothetical

case.

He does not remember with whom he may have spoken. We are

unable to identify any others who knew of the scheme at the time 1t

was being considered.

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• weGarer iee depeee talleoea.

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Tab A

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Files were furnished for review by the Director of Security,

the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative

Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. King, former

Chief of WH Division. Biographic files and intelligence publications

were furnished by the Director of Central Reference. He was not made

witting of the reason for our interest in them, and those who

assembled them for him were not told for whom they were intended.

We called back four officers for interviews: Richard Bissell,

Sheffield Edwards from retirement, William Harvey from sick leave,

and Nestor Sanchez from his post in Caracas.

Otherwise, our interviews

were confined to officers assigned to the headquarters installation.

We opened each interview by referring to the Drew Fearson column of

7 March 1967, citing that as the reason for our interest in learning

of plots to assassinate Castro. We told those interviewed that we

were on a fact-finding mission on behalf of the Director, and that

this was not the usual sort of Inspector General investigation. We

asked each to name any others who were likely to have knowledge of

such plots.

We cautioned each not to discuss the subject of the

Interview with anyone else--even others whom we might interview.

This is a complete list of those interviewed:

Desmond FitzGerald

Samuel Halpern

Bruce Cheever

J. C. King

Alfonso Rodriguez

J. D. Esterline

Edward Gunn

Howard Osborn

James O'Connell

Sidney Gottlieb

Sheffield Edwards.

Richard Bissell

Lawrence Houston

Ray Treichler

John Warner

Nestor Sanchez

William Harvey

Cornelius Roosevelt

Robert Bannerman

Henry Bortner

Richard Ober

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Project AMLASH - Rolando Cubela

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on his views on the Cuban situation. Cubela had been attending the

leftist-sponsored Latin American Conference on National Sovereignty,

Emancipation and Peace held in Mexico City from 5 to 8 March.

Cubela was noncommittal. The meeting was arranged by Carlos

Tepedino (AMWHIP-1), a long-time friend of Cubela. Cubela knew

Stewart casually from Havana where Stewart was once assigned and where

a similar meeting had once been set up but had fallen through.

(Comment: Rolando CUBELA Secades was the second-ranking

leader of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) 13 de Marso, which

was an elite group of leftist student activists founded in 1956

to organize violence to overthrow the Batista regime. Cubela

was belleved to have been one of the participants in the

assassination in 1956 of It. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, then

the head of Batista's military intelligence service. The DR

members considered themselves quite apart from the Fidelista

26th of July Movement, despite the fact that they had reluctantly

signed a unity pact. In the final days of the revolution the DR

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to Che Guevara but eventually (and reluctantly) turned over to

Fidel Castro. Cubela was a major in the Cuban army, the highest

Cuban military rank.

(A CS Information Report with a date of information of

March 1959 reported that: "Prior to his appointment to the

post of Cuban Military Attache to Spain and his subsequent

departure for Madrid on 27 March 1959, Rolando Cubela frankly

expressed to Prime Minister Fidel Castro his dissatisfaction

over the present situation in Cuba. Cubela. . . privately

told intimates that he was so disgusted with Castro that 1f he,

Cubela, did not get out of the country soon, he would kill

Castro himsele."

(Although the March 1961 meeting between Stewart and Cubela

1n Mexico City was Inconslusive, it led to other meetings out of

which grew Project AMIASH. Cubela (AMIASH-1) repeatedly insisted

that the essential first step In overthrowing the regime was the

elimination of Castro himself, which Cubela claimed he was

prepared to accomplish. He repeatedly requested that we furnish

him the special equipment or material needed to do the job.

Those

Immediately concerned with the running of the operation now

recall it as one in which the Agency was interested primarily in

keeping Cubela active in the MHAPRON program directed against

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..

Cuban military leaders, while resisting his pleas for technical

assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project

files and the Information furnished us by Nestor Sanchez,

Cubela's case officer, do not wholly support those recollections.

The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's

plottings.)

28 March 1961

An asset of the Miami Station reported that Rolando Cubela and

Juan Orta wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. (Juan Orta

was the gangsters' "man Inside Cuba" with access to Castro in the

lethal pill operation we have called Gambling Syndicate - Phase One.)

Headquarters expressed Interest In exfiltrating Orta and Cubela.

The exfiltration attempt was called offas a result of a report that

the Cuban police were aware of Cubela's desire to defect and of his

departure plans.

(Comment: This is one of three name-links we found in the

AMLASH file between Rolando Cubela and persons Involved in the

gambling syndicate episodes. The other two links are even more

nebulous than this. If Cubela was in fact one of the gangsters'

assets Inside Cuba, that fact was unknown to either the CIA

officers running the gangster episodes or to those handling Cubela.)

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14 August 1961

Carlos Tepedino reported that Rolando Cubela was planning

to attend the French National Student Union Cultural Festival

later in the month. Cubela sent a message to Tepedino saying that

he wanted to talk with a "friend of Stewart's" in Paris if possible.

The message presumably was passed through Cubela's girl friend,

an airline stewardess. The Paris Station was given approval to

approach Cubela, but there is no indication in the file that he

was actually contacted.

15 June 1962

The JMWAVE Station cabled that a station asset (AMCONCERT-1)

was told by Lucia ECHEVARRIA Bianci that Cubela had left Cuba for

Helsinki on 10 June 1962. He was traveling on a Czech airline,

by way of Prague, to Helsinkl where he planned to attend the World

Youth Festival. Lucia's mother and father had arrived in Miami

on 9 June and had been seen off at the alport by Cubela when they

left Cuba. Lucia's mother told Lucia that Cubela wanted to defect

and to enter the U.S. Cubela said that on his return from Helsinki

he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet his old friend,

Carlos Tepedino.

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37 June 1962

The FBI forwarded to CIA a report of a meeting with an FBI

Informant in Miami on 1l June. The informant reported that Cubela

was attending the Youth Festival in Helsinki in July-August 1962

•and wanted to defect. In a detailed transmittal memorandum, the

FBI Identified Its Informant as Carlos Tepedino, whom the FBI knew to

be a long-time contact of CIA. Tepedino offered his services to the

FBI to assist in the defection of Cubela. He told the Bureau of

Stewart's meeting with Cubela In Mexico CIty In March 1961. The

Bureau stated in Its memorandum to us that it had told Tepedino

that his offer would be forwarded to the proper U.S. agency. The

Bureau also stated that 1t was Informing Its Paris representative

to refer Tepedino to CIA if Tepedino should contact the Paris Legal

8 July 1962

The JMWAVE Station reported the substance of a telephone

conversation between Tepedino and a station officer, which was

arranged by AMCONCERT-1. Tepedino identified the original source

of his information on Cubela's desire to defect as being the Echavarrias,

from whom the JMWAVE Station had received its report. Tepedino said

he had approached the FBI in Miami because of dissatisfaction with the

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way CIA had handled Cubela's "planned defection" In Paris In August

1961. Tepedino agreed to meet with a CIA officer and contact

arrangements were made.

13 and 14 July 1962

William Wainwright, from headquarters, met with Tepedino in

New York City on 13 and 14 July 1962. Tepedino agreed to meet

Wainwright in Helsinkt, and to travel anywhere else necessary, to aid

In an attempt to defect Cubela. Tepedino, who is a successful

Cuban exile jeweller in New York CIty, refused an offer to pay his

full expenses. He did accept reimbursement for airline tickets and

hotel expenses. He was not offered a salary or bonus.

30 July - 6 August 1962

Tepedino arrived in Helsinkl on 30 July. Wainwright was already

there. Cubela was found, and the first of a series of meetings with

him was held on 1 August. The original objective of defecting Cubela

was quickly changed to one of recruiting him in place. These are

excerpts from Wainwright's contact report of the first meeting with

Cubela:

!

He said he was considering not going back to Cuba, but after

talking to Tepedino, he felt that if he could do something

really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, be meo

he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there.

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He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small

undertaking, but that if he could be given a really large part

to play, he would use himself and several others in Cuba whom

he could rely upon.

He said he had plans to blow up an oll refinery, as he felt that

the continuing existence of a semblance of normal functioning in

Cuba depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum, supplies of

which, as we know, are at a critical stage today.

He also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriguez (a top-

ranking Castro subordinate) and the Soviet Ambassador, and also

to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary.

While we were making no committments or plans, we pointed out to

Cubela that schemes like he envisicned certainly had their place,

but that a lot of coordination, planning, Information-collection,

etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and

success of such plans.

Cubela stated many times during the course of this and subsequent

meetings that he was only interested in involving himself in a

plan of significant action, and which was truly designed to

achieve rapidly his desire

to help Cuba.

1 - 9 August 1962

Because of the security hazard in too frequent meetings in

Helsinki, where Cubela was surrounded by his associates in the Cuban

delegation, It was agreed that further meetings would be held in

Stockholm and in Copenhagen. Cubela agreed to meet with a Spanish.

speaking case officer in Paris later in the month. Nothing significant

came out of the meetings in Stockho]m, ? - 9 August, except Cubela's

revelation that he had told four of his Cuban associates of his meetings

In Helsinki with Tepedino.

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10 - 11 August 1962

Walnwright, Tepedino, and Cubela met in Copenhagen for further

meetings. Wainwright wrote in his contact report:

•at one time when we Wainwright always wrote of himself

as 'we' were discussing the various aspects

of Cubela's future

It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice

of the word used to describe it.

'Eliminate was acceptable.'"

(Comment: It is worth noting here that Tepedino, & Cuban

Jeweller In New York, was present at

a series of meetings at

which the assassination of Castro was discussed between Cubela

and Wainwright, whom Tepedino knew to be a CIA officer.)

14 - 23 August 1962

Cubela, Tepedino, and Wainwright met In Paris and were joined

by Earle Williamson, a Spanish-speaking case officer from Madrid.

Cubela was given SW training and was issued appropriate S/W supplies.

He was taken to the south of France on 20 August for a demolition

demonstration. Williamson planned to polygraph Cubela and asked

for a polygraph operator to be sent to Paris. Cubela indignantly

refused to be polygraphed. Williamson cabled on 17 August:

"Have no intention give Cubela physical elimination mission

as requirement but recognize this something he could or

mIght try to carry out on his own Initiative."

Headquarters replied by cable on 18 August:

"Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cubela."

29 August 1962

Cubela left Prague by air for Havana.

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5 - 8 September 1963

Cubela attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil,

as a representative of the Cuban government. He was met there by

Wainwright and Tepedino. Also participating was Nestor Sanchez, a

Spanish-speaking case officer from headquarters, who thereafter acted

as case officer for Cubela.

Cubela claimed that he had written two S/w messages. (Only one

had been received.) He said he was reluctant to use S/w because

he feared the efficiency of the Cuban postal censorship.

Cubela discussed a group of Cuban military officers known to

him, and possible ways of approaching them. The problem was, be

explained, that although many of them were anti-Communist, they were

elther loyal to Fidel or were so afraid of him that they were

reluctant to discuss any conspiracies for fear they might be

provocations. Cubela said that he thought highly of Ramon GUIN Diaz

(AMTRUNK-10) who was hiding Miguel DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14). Diaz

had been sent to Cuba by CIA to recruit Guin in place, and had done so.

Cubela said he planned to use Guin but was concerned about Guin's

"nervous condition" and the fact that he drank heavily. Cubela was

told to assist Guin in Guin's intelligence assignments, but not to

help Guin leave Cuba--as Cubela proposed.

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14 September 1963

From Porto Alegre, Cubela flew to Paris, arrlving on 14 September.

He was there ostensibly to attend the Alliance Francaise, but actually

to take an extended vacation--of which he planned to inform Fidel

after the fact.

16 September 1963

Cubela (in Paris) wrote to Tepedino (in New York): "I don't

Intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again," which you

should tell them, "so they don't make the trip. I want to get away

from politics completely •

3 October 1963

Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings with Cubela. (The

record does not reveal why Sanchez went to Paris In the face of Cubela's

stated

wish not to see him. The letter may have been written during

a spell of temporary depression. Station officers were already in

contact with Cubela when Sanchez arrived.) Also participating in the

meetings were John (Red) Stent and Richard Long. At the time of these

meetings it was discovered that the French were unilaterally keeping

Cubela under surveillance. CIA informed the French that our contacts

with Cubela were for the purpose of defecting him.

11 October 1963

Sanchez cabled that Cubela was insistent upon meeting with a

senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurances

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of U.S. moral support for any activity Cubela under took in Cuba.

Sanchez said that the answer Cubela received might be crucial to

CIA's relationship with Cubela. Sanchez recommended that "highest

and profound consideration be given as feeling drawn by all who in

contact Cubela is that he determined attempt op against Castro with

or without U.S. support."

13 October 1963

The Paris Station cabled: "Sanchez ETA LOND 13 Oct. Pending change

after 12 Oct meet Sanchez plans return Egs after LOND stop in order discuss

details operation before entering final round discussions with AMLASH."

17 October 1963

Red Stent cabled the results

of a meeting with Cubela and

Tepedino. Cubela, in a private conversation with Stent, reiterated

his desire to speak with a high-levelU.S. Government official. Stent

said that basically Cubela wanted assurances that the U.S. Government

would support him if his enterprise were successiul.

29 October 1963

Desmond FItzGerald, then Chief, SAS, who was going to Paris on

other business, arranged to meet with Cubela to give him the assurances

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he sought. The contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the

AMIASH file, has this to say on cover:

FitzGerald will represent self as personal representative of

Robert F. Kennedy who traveled Paris for specific purpose

meeting Cubela and giving him assurances of full U.S. support

If there is change of the present government in Cuba.

According to FitzGerald, he discussed the planned meeting with the

DD/P (Helms) who decided It was not necessary to seek approval from

Robert Kennedy for FitzGerald to speak in his name.

The meeting was held in Red Stent's house in Paris on 29

October 1963. FItzGerald used the alias James Clark. Nestor

Sanchez acted as interpreter. Red Stent was not present during the

meeting. Sanchez on 13 November 1963 wrote a memorandum for the

record of the meeting. It reads, in part:

prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist

Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban

leadership and assumes sufficient control to invite the United

States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was

emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after

a real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position

to request U.S. (probably under CAS auspices) recognition an

support.

It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared t

commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such ai

uprising can be extinguished in a matter of hours if the present

government is still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup

perioa, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be

turned back but will support the necessary economic and

political reforms which will benefit the mass of the Cuban

people.

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(Comment: Those involved now recall the purpose of the

meeting as being something quite different from that appearing

in written records prepared at about the time of the meeting.

FItzGerald recalls that Cubela spoke repeatedly of the need for an

assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered

rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could

be used to kill Castro from a distance. FitzGerald wanted no

part of such a scheme and told Sandez to tell Cubela that the

U.S. simply does not do such things. When he was told this,

Cubela said he wanted confirmation from a senior U.S. official,

not a member of CIA. FitzGerald says that when he met with

Cubela In Paris he told Cubela that the U.S. Government would

have no part of an attempt on Castro's life. Sam Halpern, who

was not present at FitzGerald's meeting with Cubela but who was

thoroughly familiar with all that was going on, has a recollection

1dentical with that of FltzGerala.)

Be that as it may, the written record tells a somewhat different

story. In Sandez' memorandum of the meeting with Cubela he wrote

that:

Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the

FitzGerald meeting. After the meeting Cubela stated that

he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired

to know what technical support we could provide him.

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14 November 1963

Wainwright met with Tepedino in New York City on 14 November.

Wainwright's contact report reveals Cubela's reaction (as told to

Tepedino) to his meeting with FitzGerald.

The visit with FitzGerald, who acted in the capacity of a

representative of high levels of the Government concerned with

the Cuban problem satisfied Cubela as far as policy was

concerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact that he still

was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan

as he saw it. Tepedino said that Cubela dwelt constantly on

this point.

He could not understand why he was denied certain

small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to

the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.s. Government

gave much equipment and money to exile groups for thei

Ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets.

According to Tepedino, Cubela feels strongly on this point,

and 1f he does not get advice and materials from a U.S.

Government technician, he will probably become fed-up

again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date.

19 November 1963

Memorandum for the record prepared by Nestor Sanchez: "C/SAS

(FItzGerald) approved telling Cubela he would be given a cache

Inside Cuba. Cache could, 1f he requested it, Include . . . high

power rifles w/scopes . . . . . C/SAS requested written reports on

AMLASH operation be kept to a minimun. "

20 November 1963

Thus far, this account of the Cubela project has been based almost

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wholly on documents found in the project file. Beginning here is an

account of an episode in the Cubela operation on which there 1s no

documentary evidence. Dr. Gunn has a record of nine contacts and

their dates;

otherwise, this sumnary is drawn from the recollections

of those involved.

Sanchez says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with

'Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own llfe 1n exchange

for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced

rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards.

Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was), he

was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the

job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in

the try.

Samuel Halpern and

Nestor Sanchez approached Dr. Gunn for

assistance. Although none of the participants specifically so stated,

It may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination

of a sort that Cubela might reasonably have been expected to have

devised himself. What they settled upon was Black Leaf 40, a common,

easly obtainable insecticide containing about vo/icotine sulphate.

Nicotine is a deadly poison that may be administered orally, by injection,

or by absorption through the skin. It Is likely that there also were

discussions of means of administering the poison, because Gunn was ready

to move when asked.

The plan reached the action stage when Halpern and Sanchez contacted

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Gunn again on the morning of 20 November 1963 and told him that the

device for administering the poison (a ballpoint pen rigged as a

hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for Sanchez to catch a

plane at noon the next day. Gunn says that he went Immediately to

the FI/D workshop and spent the rest of the day and most of that

night fabricating the device. Those in FI/D who worked with him

knew what he was trying to make but not for whom it was intended.

Eventually, after seven or eight failures, he succeeded in converting

& Paper-Mate pen into a hypodermic syringe that worked. He said that

the needle was so fine that the victim would hardly feel It when 1t

was Inserted--he compared it with the scratch from a shirt with

too much starch. He delivered the workable device to Sanchez the

following morning and retained two of the later prototypes. He states

that they are

still in his safe. He does not know what happened to

the device he gave Sanchez; he does not remember its having been

returned to him. He believes he was told that Cubela refused to

accept the device. He says he would not now be able to differentiate

the final pen from the earlier prototypes that are in his safe.

22 November 1963

Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris on the morning of 22 November

and met with Cubela late that afternoon. Sanchez states that he

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showed the pen/syringe to Cubela and explained how it worked. He is not

sure, but he believes that Cubela accepted the device but said that he

would not take it to Cuba with him. Sanchez distinctly recalls that

Cubela didn't think much of the device. Cubela said that, as a doctor,

he knew all about Black Leaf 40 and that we surely could come up

with something more sophisticated than that. It should be noted that

Gunn and Sanchez agree that the syringe was not loaded. Cubela was

expected to supply his own poison; we merely suggested Black Leaf 40

as an effective poison for use in the syringe.

Sanchez wrote a contact report of the meeting. It makes no

mention of a pen or of poison. The following is a summary of the

contact report. Cubela said that he was returning to Cuba fully

determined to pursue his plans to initiate a coup against Castro.

Sanchez reiterated the assurances given Cubela by FitzGerald of full

U.S. support if a real coup against the Castro regime were successful.

Cubela asked for the following items to be included in a cache Inside

Cuba: 20 hand grenades, two high-powered rifles with telescopic

sights, and approximately 20 pounds of C-4 explosive and related

equipment. Cubela suggested the best place for the cache was on

the finca (farm) managed by his friend, Guin (AMTRUNK/10). Since he

was returning to Cuba by way of Prague, he did not want to carry S/W

or any other incriminating materials with him. As they were coming

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out of the meeting, Sanchez and Cubela were Informed that President

Kennedy had been assassinated. Cubela was visibly moved over the

news. He asked, "Why do such things happen to good people?" The

contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the

Sanchez-Cubela meeting, but It 1s IIkely that at the very moment

President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban

agent 1n Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against

Castro. Sanchez states that be received an OPIM cable from FItzGerald

that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was

off. We do not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. There 18

a record in the file that Sanchez was due to arrive back in

Washington at 1810 hours, 23 November.

The AMIASH project was probably about as widely known within

the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature.

However, we can identify only four people who know of the just-

described episode involving a hypodermic syringe and Black Leaf 40.

Sanchez knew all of the story, Halpern knew nost of It, and Gunn knew

much of 1t. FitzGerald did not mention this aspect of the Cubela

operation when he first briefed us on it. When we went back to

him later with specific questions, he said he remembered something

about Black Leaf 40, but nothing whatever about a device for

administering it. Gunn said he had the impression that FitzGerald

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knew about the operation "but didn't want to know." Sanchez says

that FItzGerald knew that he and Halpern were seeing Gunn. Halpern

agrees, but adds that FitzGerald did not know the specifics of the

fabricating of an assassination device.

* # #**

Beginning here, the narrative is again drawn fron records in

the Project AMIASH files.

1 December 1963

FBIS reported that Cubela returned to Cuba from Prague.

19 February 1964

The JMWAVE Station reported by cable that two separate,

Identical caches would be emplaced in support of Project AMLASH

during March. One would be put down in Pinar del Rio on Operation

ZORRO. The other would be taken by the AMTRUNKs to the AMTRUNK

Infiltration area. Each cache would contain, among other things,

two.

• FAL 7.62 automatic rifles.

6 March 1964

Cable from the JMWAVE Station: "Unless headquarters has overriding

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reason unknown WAVE for Including FALs In cache to be carried by

AMIRUNKs, wish stress following point in WAVE's decision to eliminate

FALS: FALs require 7 by 9 by 50 inch oblong cache container which

is difficult to handle in the Intermediate craft."

•I March 1964

Headquarters replied that:

"Reason for desiring Include FALs Is

that this is the main 1tem requested by AMLASH-1."

13 March 1964

The JMWAVE Station cabled: "Since cannot break down FALs to fit

available cache container shorter than 50 inches, will omit FALS

from AMLASH cache."

17 - 21 March 1964

The AMIASE cache was put down on Operation AMTRUNK VIII.

24 April 1964

Headquarters cabled the Paris Station that Carlos Tepedino had

been briefed to meet Carlos Jorge ROBRENO Mariquez, "who has an

Important message from Cubela."

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..

-

3 May 1964

The Paris Station reported that the message Robreno had from

Cubela was that Cubela wanted a silencer for the Belgian FAI

submachine gun soonest.

•5. May 1964

SAS requested ISD to produce FAI silencers on a crash basis.

There are several later documents in the file describing ISD's

efforts to silence a FAl and to modify Its sights for firing under

poor lighting conditions. TSD eventually came up with a silencer

and modifled ammunition that fairly effectively silenced muzzle

blast and eliminated sonic boom by reducing muzzle velocity.

9 - 11 June 1964

Operation ZORRO put down an AMLASH cache on the north coast of

Pinar del Rio containing, among other things, "two each FAL automatic

rIfles with five magazines per weapon." No mention 1s made of

silencers. From ISD's reports on development of a silencer, one was

not yet ready at the time the cache was prepared.

1 August 1964

The JMWAVE Station reported receipt of an S/W message from

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AMIRUNK-10 dated 18 July. It stated that the AMIASH cache put

down in the AMIRUNK infiltration area had been located and that

steps were being taken to recover its contents. The message said that

it was hoped the cache contained "two high-powered rifles with

silencers," because AMTRUNK-10 was not yet certain that he could

recover the cache put down in Pinar del Rio by Operation ZORRO.

30 August 1964

Manuel Artime received Information through Madrid that a group

of dissident members of the Castro regime desired to establish

direct contact with Artine. On 7 October 1964, an Artime associate

went to France for a meeting with an intermediary from the dissident

group. The intermediary was named as Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

12 November 1964

FBIS report: "A delegation of the University Student Fedration

of Cuba arrived in Prague on Il November to participate in the meeting

of the Executive Council of the International Student Union to be

held from 14 to 17 November. The delegation is made up of . . .

Ma.j. Rolando Cubela, who will attend the event as a special guest

of the IUS."

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13 November 1964

Contact report of a meeting in Washington with Artime: "Artime

agreed to talk to AMIASH-1 if it turns out that he is the contact man

for the internal dissident group. Artime thinks that If AMLASH-1 is

-the chief of the dissident group we can all forget about the

operation."

35 November 1964

The Paris Station reported Cubela's

arrival in Paris.

4 December 1964

Nestor Sanchez prepared a memorandum request for $6,500 as an

extraordinary budget expenditure for the travel of Artime for

maintaining contact with the internal dissident group's representatives

In Europe during November and December 1964. There is no direct

Indication in the file that the request was approved, but indirect

evidence Indicates that It was. Artime dia travel to Europe and

maintained the contacts.

6 - 7 December 1964

Sanchez met Cubela in Paris. This is a summary of the details

reported by Sanchez: Cubela, although unhappy because he was unable

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to carry out his plans during the past year, continued to feel that

his solution to the Cuban problem was the only one feasible and that

he had to continue trying. Cubela was told that the U.S. Government

could not and would not in any way become involved or provide

assistance in the task he had planned for himself. Cubela appeared

to understand our position and said that if he needed help he would

look elsewhere.

10 December 1964

Memorandum prepared by Sanchez and left with Robert Owen, of the

Paris Station, as background on the then current status of the AMLASH

operation--excerpts:

"Artime does not know and we do not plan to tell him that we

are in direct contact with Cubela, nor does Cubela know and we

do not desire he know that we are in direct contact with Artime.

"Cubela was told and fully understands that U.S. Government

cannot become involved to any degree in the 'first step' of his

plan. If he needs support, he realizes that be will have to

get 1t elsewhere. FYI: This is where Artime could fit ir

nicely in giving any support Cubela would request."

(Comment: Sanchez explained to us that what had happened

was that SAS contrived

to put Artime and Cubela together in such

a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered

by CIA. The thought was that Artime needed a man inside and

Cubela wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish

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to him directly. By putting the two together, Artime might get

his man Inside and Cubela might get his silenced weapon--fron

Artime. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon

for Artime to give to Cubela, and did not do so.)

17 December 1964

Headquarters cable to Paris: "When Bob Owen contacts Cubela to

debrief him, . . . please confirm statement by Cubela to Sanchez that

only money and a few commo items were retrieved by the fishermen.

Cubela and AMTRUNK-10 unhappy that fishermen had not recovered more

from the cache, but it was not possible for Cubela and AMTRUNK-10

to go to the site of the cache personally. (Cubela had told Sanchez

that AMTRUNK-10 had used some "fishermen" to recover the cache and

that not all of it was recovered. This was the cache put down in the

AMTRUNK Infiltration area, which did not include the FAL rifles.)

27 December 1964

Artime and Cubela met for the first time--in Madrid.

30 December 1964

Artime and Cubela met for a second time in Madrid on 30 December.

Artime reported the results in a meeting with Nestor Sanchez in

Florida on 3 January 1965. Cubela told Artime that he had requested

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a silencer for a FAL Iifle frOM the Americans, which they had not been

able to provide. Artime agreed to furnish either a silencer for a

FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer. II Artime obtained a

silencer for a FAL, Cubela would personally carry It back to Cuba

with him. Il Artime had to settle for some other type of silenced

•rifle, he would cache 1t In Cuba for Cubela.

28 January 1965

Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings with Cubela.

2 February 1965

Sanchez cabled fron Paris: "Cubela and Tepedino returned Paris

31 January. Met 1 February. Cubela states full agreement reached

with Artime and he well satisfied with arrangements which he outlined

for our information (along same lines as reported by Artime). . .

Artime providing package in Madrid which Cubela plans carry back in

personal luggage."

Sanchez cabled from Paris:

"As of November 1964 when Cubela departed

Cuba neither be nor AMTRUNK-10 had received any part of the Matanzas

cache. AMTRUNK-10 told him fishermen recovered money and parts of

communications gear but that money was no good since it was in a series

out of circulation."

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Il February 1965

Madrid Station cabled: "From Cubela on 10 February: On 10 or

Il February Cubela is to receive one pistol with silencer and one

Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from Artime's secretary. Both weapons

'come from U.S. and now in Madrid." (This is in conflict with the

earlier report that Artime would cache a rifle and silencer if that

were all he could find. We are unable to resolve the conflict.)

12 February 1965

The Panama City Station cabled: "Artime reported on final meeting

with Cubela: Artime had three packages of special Items made up by

his technical people and delivered to Cubela in Madrid. Cubela

seemed satisfied."

4 Marched 1965

Carlos Tepedino reported receiving a telephone call from a

friend in Havana who had seen Cubela back In Havana the previous day.

15 March 1965

The Madrid Station cabled that one Rafael GARCIA-BANGO Dirube

had arrived in Madrid from Cuba on 15 March and had been introduced

to a

station officer. Garcia-Bango claimed to be in contact with a

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, group of Cuban military leaders who were planning to eliminate Castro

and take over the government. It quickly became clear that he was

referring to Cubela. Garcia-Bango said that he had always been

publicly Identified as a close friend of Cubela, whom he last saw

In Havana on 9 March. Garcia-Bango said that he had been the lawyer

for the Capri Hotel In Havana. He was jailed for 75 days in July

1962 for defending Santos Trafficante, a U.S. citizen and ex-manager

of the capri gambling casino who was kicked out of Cuba.

(Comment: This is another name-link between Cubela and

the gambling syndicate plots reported upon earlier in this

report. Irafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards'

Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in

Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all,

Trafficante was the man who brought Varona into the operation late

In Phase One, and Varona was one of the main players during Phase

Tro. The three-man team that was sent In/Varona was reported

on 21 June 1962 to be in place in Cuba.)

June 1965

Headquarters decided to terminate all contacts with key members

of the Cubela group. It had become increasingly apparent that the

circle of Cubans who knew of Cubela's plans and of CIA's association

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with them was ever-widening. The last straw came in early June 1965.

Note: There is a discrepancy in dates. The memorandum prepared at

the time lists dates of 2, 3, and 4 May. From other evidence in the

file, It 1s apparent that the month was June--not May.) One Victor

ESPINOSA Hernandez, & former IM trainee who was terminated as a

malcontent on 20 March 1961, contacted an I&NS agent on 2 June 1965

with a story that Espinosa thought affected U.S. security. I&NS

heard him out and then sent him to the FBI. The FBI listened to the

story on 3 June and then sent him to CIA. A CIA officer Interviewed

him on 4 June. Espinosa said that in May he had received a letter

from a friend in Paris urging him to meet in Paris with a friend of

Cubela. Espinosa went to Paris and met with Alberto Blanco, one

of Cubela's closest associates in the supposed plan to assassinate

Castro. Blanco claimed to have a message from Cubela, which Cubela

wanted Espinosa to deliver to CIA. The message was that Cubela and the

others with him were In a position to kill Castro and others in the

regime, but they needed some help and to know whether the CIA and the

U.S. Government were with them and willing to support them. If the

answer were affirmative, Cubela would send out details on what he

needed. From his story it was obvious that Espinosa knew the full

details of the Cubela operation.

(Comment: There is no indication in the file that CIA ever

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lound out the sort of "help" Cubela thought he needed. At a

meeting 1n Paris on 1 February 1965 he asked for $10,000 "to

organize the internal group." CIA refused to give him the money

and suggested be try to get it from Artime. Cubela was quite

upset over the turn down. A few days later, in Madrid, he

approached a Cuban asset of the Madrid Station, claiming he

was stranded in Madrid with no money. Headquarters approved

a "personal loan" of $200. On 16 February 1965, Cubela asked

Sanchez for $1,000, which headquarters approved giving him.

In a later meeting with Carlos Tepedino in New York City,

Tepedino said that he had given Cubela $7,000.)

On 23 June 1965 headquarters sent a cable to the stations

concerned directing termination of contact with members of the

Cubela group. It read, in part:

• • convincing proof that entire AMLASH grOUI

insecure

and that further contact with key members of grout

constitutes menace to CIA operations against Cuba as well as

to the security of CIA staff personnel in Western Europe.

"Under the circumstances headquarters desires that contact

with key members of the group be eliminated as rapidly as

possible, and that assets who may be in contact with individual

members of the group or peripherally involved in AMLASH

conspiracy be warned of danger implicit in these associations

and directed to eliminate contacts ASAP."

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• I March 1966

Reuters reported from Havana that the Cuban security police

had arrested two military officers for alleged counterrevolutionary

activities involving the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. They were

•Identified as Maj. Rolando Cubela and Maj. Ramon Guin.

I March 1966

FBIS quoting Havana Domestic Service: "The trial of the

accused Rolando Cubela, Ramon Guin, and others who are linked to

the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, was begun in the revolutionary

court of Havana district In La Cabana today at 1500 hours."

8 March 1966

Excerpts from first day's trial proceedings as reported by

the Havana Domestic Service and copied by FBIS:

Former Majors Rolando Cubela and Ramon Guin as well as

others who are under indictment have confessed their guilt.

The defendants are being tried for crimes against the integrity

and stability of the nation by having planned the assassination

of Maj. Fidel Castro.

The defendants are Rolando Cubela Secades, Ramon Guin Diaz,

Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta, Alberto Blanco Romariz, and

Juan Alsina Navarro, all of whom confessed their guilt in the

Imputed facts of the case. Also appearing in the trial were

Guillermo Cunill Alvarez and Angel Herrero Veliz.

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The accused Jose Luis Gonzales Gallarreta, who worked as a

diplomatic attache in the Cuban Emgassy in Spain, betrayed his

country for 100,000 dollars given him by CIA agents whom he

contacted only a month after his arrival in Spain. (He) met

with an official of the aforementioned organization of

International subversion named James Noel who covered his

activities by appearing as an official of the U.S. Embassy in

Spain. Noel demanded that biographic information and

Information about the Cuban diplomatic mission be furnished him

under this arrangement.

Cubela during his stay In Europe makes three trips to Spain,

on 26 December 1964, and on 6 and 20 February 1965. The

revolutionary ringleader Artime goes to Madrid at the beginning

of February 1965. A meeting is held between Cubela and Artime

In which they agree on the final plan.

This plan would begin with a personal attack aimed at

Maj. Fidel Castro Ruz.

This criminal act would be followed

by an armed invasion of the country 48 hours later by U.S.

troops. The attack against Comrade Fidel Castro would be made

using a 7.62 mm. FAL rifle that Cubela owned.

This weapon

would be fitted with a powerful 4x40 telescopic sight and a

silencer.

Artime sent Gallego to the United States to get the

telescopic sight and the silencer. Once obtained, this

equipment was delivered to Blanco Romariz. He in turn delivered

1t to Gonzalez Gallarreta who then delivered it to Cubela the

day before he left Madrid.

In order to insure the successpf his plans, Cubela meets

with defendant Guin. Guin had been recruited since September

1963 as a spy for the Yankee CIA. This recruiting was done by

CIA agent Miguel Diaz who infiltrated Cuba in order to recruit

him, and did so.

Seized in Cubela's residence was a Tasco brand telescopic

sight with accessories, the fAl rifle, large quantities of weapons

and ammunition for them, fragmentation and incendiary grenades,

and other military equipment and materiel.

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The punishment to which the defendants are subject and which

this prosecution wishes imposed is as follows:

For Rolando

Cubela Secades, Rmon Guin Diaz, Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta,

and Alberto Blanco Romariz--the death penalty by firing squad.

For Juan Alsina Navarro, Guillermo Cunill Alvarez, and Angel

Herrero Veliz--30 years imprisonment plus corresponding

additional penalties.

9 March 1966

FBIS report from Havana Domestic Service: "Prime Minister Fidel

Castro has sent a letter to the prosecutor in the case . . . against

Majors Rolando Cubela, Ramon Gulz, and other defendants. In it, the

Prime Minister says that it must be recognized from all this, a bitter

but useful lesson may be drawn, adding, 'I suggest that the court

not ask the death sentence for any of the accused."

10 March 1966

FBIS report of testimony given in court on 8 March:

Question: Do you recall when the silencer broke?

Cubela: The silencer? Actually, the silencer did not break.

The silencer actually did not break.

Question: Where is the silencer?

Cubela: I threw the silencer away because it was burning my hands.

Prosecutor: Have you spoken with Comrade Fidel Castro recently?

Cubela: Yes®

Prosecutor: Can you tell the court when you spoke with Comrade Fidel?

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Cubela: I believe It was in January, let me see, In January,

In January.

Prosecutor: In January! Do you recall the conversation you had

with Comrade Fidel, and did Comrade Fidel offer to help you?

Cubela: Comrade Fidel opened the doors, opened the doors to

me. He gave me, he gave me to understand that he knew what I

was doing but I did not have enough courage to tell him.

*****

Defense Attorney: Cubela Secades, what, In your view, is the

punishment merited by conduct of this nature?

Cubela: The worst!

Question: What do you mean by "the worst?"

Cubela: The wall.

Question: What do you mean by "the wall?"

Cubela: Deserved execution by a firing squad.

11 March 1966

FBIS report quoting Havana Domestic Service of 10 March:

Revolutionary Court No. 1, which has tried case 108 in crimes

against the integrity and security of the nation, has pronounced

sentences on the accused Rolando Cubela Secades, Ramon Guin Diaz,

and others.

According to the sentences, Rolando Cubela and Ramon Guin were

sentenced to 25 years imprisonment; Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta

and Alberto Blanco Romariz, 20 years; and Juan Hilario Alsina

Navarro, 10 years.

Guillermo Cunil Alvarez and Angel Herrero Veliz were absolved of

guilt. They were released provided they are not liable to any

other charges.

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(Comment: It is worth noting that none of Cubela's dealings

with CIA from March 1961 until November 1964 were mentioned in the

trial proceedings. The first association of Cubela with CIA

was in connection with bis trip to Europe in late 1964 and

early 1965 during which he had his meetings with Artime. The

trial evidence was confined to Cubela's counterrevolutionary

activities growing out of those meetings with Artime in

December 1964 and February 1965. None of his many direct

contacts with CIA officers, some of whom he knew by true name,

were mentioned. There 1s not even a hint of the ballpoint pen/

hypodermic/Black Leaf 40 episode. The Cuban authorities may

have gotten that Information from him and decided not to

Introduce it In evidence, but we can think of no convincing

reason why they would have withheld it. The closest we can come

to a decent reason, and it 1s pure conjecture, 1s this: Castro

may have thought it politically imprudent to allow the execution

of someone so close to his inner circle, who had merely plotted.

without acting. If the full details of Cubela's Involvement

with CIA had come out in court, Castro might have had little

excuse for asking for leniency.)

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DIscussion of Assassination at High-Level Goverment Meetings

Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level

meeting at the Department of State at which plans for the assassina-

tion of Castro were discussed. We find record of two high-level,

Interagency meetings at which assassination of Castro was raised. The

first (and probably the one to which Pearson refers) was at the

Department of State on 10 August 1962. It was a meeting of the

Special Group (Augmented). The second meeting we have identified

was held on 30 July 1964. It was a meeting of the 303 Committee

and probably was held in the White House Situation Room. The two

meetings are described separately below.

10 August 1962

The Special Group (Augmented) met at the Department of State,

either in Secretary Rusk's office or in his conference rOOm. The

following are recorded as being present:

State

White House

Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin,

Richard Goodwin, Robert Hurwitch

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (Bill Harvey's

notes record that Robert Kennedy was absent

and that Bundy had his proxy.)

Defense

Robert McNamara, Roswell Gilpatric, Lyman

Lemnitzer, Edward Lansdale

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CIA

USIA

Secretary

John McCone, William Harvey

Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson

Thomas Parrott

Tom Parrott's minutes of the meeting make no mention of the

subject of assassination. Both McCone and Harvey recall that

McNamara raised the subject. Harvey's notes taken at the meeting

show that it was also mentioned by Murrow, but the nature of the

comments was not recorded. Mr. McCone states, in a memorandum of

I4 April 1967, that he recalls meetings on 8 or 9 August In the

JCS Operations Room in the Pentagon and on 10 August 1962 1n

Secretary Rusk's conference room. At one of these meetings (and

McCone now recalls it as being at the JCS) the suggestion was made

that top people in the Cuban regime, Including Castro, be liquidated.

(Comment: As 1t will later be seen, Mr. McCone's recollection

1s probably faulty. It Is quite clear that assassination came

up for discussion at the 10 August meeting at State.)

Mr. McCone says that he took immediate exception to the discussion

and promptly after the meeting called on Secretary McNamara personally

to emphasize his position. According to McCone, McNamara "beartily

agreed." McCone states in his memorandum that at no time aid the

suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented)

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or by any individual responsible for policy. McCone adds that through

the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose

of Castro," "remove Castro," and "mock off Castro," etc., but that

these phrases were always construed to mean the overthrowing of the

communist government In Cuba. Harvey recalls that, when McCone

told him of the McCone-McNamara conversation, McCone said that 1f he,

McCone, were to be involved in such & thing he would be excommunicated.

Following the 10 August meeting, and without reference to the

reported exchange between McCone and McNamara, Lansdale addressed

a memorandum on 13 August to William Harvey (CIA), Robert Hurwitch

(State), General Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA). The

memorandum assigned responsibility for drafting papers on various

subjects related to the Cuban operation. Harvey's assignment

Included: "Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, portion

excised from the CIA file copy ).

On I4 August, Harvey submitted a memorandum to the DD/P (Helms)

reporting the Lansdale communication and what Harvey had done about

It. Harvey's memorandum to the DD/P states that the excised portion

had consisted of the phrase: "including elimination of leaders".

Harvey wrote that he had phoned Lansdale's office and had spoken with

Frank Hand In Lansdale's absence. Harvey said he had protested the

use of the phrase and had proposed that steps be taken to have 1t

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excised from all copies. This was agreed to. Harvey deleted the

phrase from his own copy and assumes that instructions were given

to other recipients to do the same. Harvey told us that Lansdale

repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassination of Castro

with Harvey over the next several weeks. Harvey says that he always

avoided such discussions. Harvey estimates that five persons in

Lansdale's office were generally aware of the sensitive details of

Project MONGOOSE and of Lansdale's interest in assassination as an

aspect of it.

30 July 1964

The 303 Committee met In regular session, probably in the Situation

Room of the White House. (Desmond FitzGerald recalls that such

meetings were generally held there.) The following are recorded as

being present:

McGeorge Bundy, Cyrus Vance, John McCone, Thomas Hughes

Desmond FitzGerald for the discussion on Cuba

Col. Ralph Steakley was present for another Item on the

agency, but it is not shown if he was present when the

Cuba item was discussed.

Peter Jessup as secretary

The minutes of the meeting record this in the context of the discussion

of Cuba:

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"It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact Mr. Sam

rapich of the Fil in regard to the earlier report of an

alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and

which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of

law enforcement."

The reference 1s clearly to a 10 June 190 memorandun Information

• report from the DD/P to the Director. The following additional

"elite" dissemination was made of it:

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Attorney General

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

the report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro

that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be

Involved in the scheme. The asking price for doing the job was

$150,000, with a guarantee of $10,000 for expenses. A wealthy Cuban

exile, Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Fresident of Bacardi Run International,

was reported ready to contribute $50,000. Bosch approached the Chief

of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested that the U.S. Government also

contribute funds.

The suggestion was rejected out of hand. The record

Indicates that CIA's only Involvement In the plot was to report

Information of its existence. The last record we find of the Incident

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.1s a memorandum from the DCI (McCone) to Bundy, dated 19 August 1964,

reporting the results of FBI Interviews with the alleged participants.

Obviously, nothing came of the plot.

(Comment: It may be only coincidence, but we are struck

by the point that this group of plotters, allegedly Including

gangster elements, offered to assassinate Castro for $150, 000,

which 1s precisely the sum that CIA offered to pay in an

earlier plot that very definitely Involved gangster elements.

It could be the same group of gangsters, or it could be that

the criminal underworld knows the "going price.")

As we have said earlier, 1f Drew Pearson has firm Information on

a high-level meeting at which assassination of Castro was discussed,

It is likely that the reference would be to the 10 August 1962 meeting

of the Special Group (Augmented). The 30 July 1964 303 Committee

Meeting is described only because its reference to assassination of

Castro might be distorted to assume some of the characteristics of

the Pearson story.

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The Possible RAM fIcAtions of the Gambling Syndicate Operation

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Published Details

The CIA hatched a plot to knock off Castro.

Robert Kennedy may have approved an

assassination plot.

Underworld figures were actually recruited

to carry out the plot.

Three hired assassins were caught in Havana

where a lone survivor 1s. still supposed

to be languishing in prison.

IS

Rissue

THE DREW PEARSON STORY

The Facts As We Know Them

True.

Not true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phase

One after it was over. He was not briefed on Phase Iwo.

True.

Rosell1 Informed Harvey on 21 June 1962, presumably

on the basis of Information from Varona, that a team

of three men was inside Cuba. We do not know their

1dentities nor what may have happened to them. We have

no proof that they were actually dispatched.

of the announced captures and executions during this

period fits this team.

This reportedly has come out in the Garrison Investi

gations. It also was stated by Castillo In the

Philippines under direct interrogation.

We have no

Independent confirmation of any sort. (Note that

Garrison met with Rosell1 1n Las Vegas 12 March 1967.)

Castro learned enough at least to believe the

CIA was seeking to kill him. He is reported

to have cooked up a counterplot against

President Kennedy.

Unpublished Details

Pills were sent to Cuba for use in the

assassination.

There was a meeting at the Department of State

at which the assassination of Castro was

discussed.

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True. At least we were told by Roselli that the pills

were sent in during Phase One and again in Phase Two.

True. The subject was raised at a meeting at State on

10 August 1962, but 1t 1s unrelated to any actual

attempts at assassination.

It did result in a MONGOOSE

action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action

for planning liquidation of leaders. The offending

phrase was later excised from copies forwarded to CIA,

State, Defense, and USIA, but the damage may already

have been done.

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C

The Possible Ramifications of the Gambling Syndicate Operation

The earlier sections of this report describe all of the CIA

schemes aimed at the assassination of Castro that we have been able

to discover. The accounts of the two phases of the gambling

syndicate operation are factual to the extent that they are based

on what those interviewed recall or believe the facts to have been.

It 1s evident that some of those facts have leaked, are being talked

about, or are being peddled. On the opposite page 1s a list of the

main details of the story Drew Pearson has, as they are known to us,

together with a brief comment on the apparent accuracy of each.

There 1s support in fact for most of the details in Pearson's story.

He has a garbled account of the role played by Robert Kennedy, and

he errs in telling the story as 1f all of the details are part of

a single story, which they are not. For the most part, though,

his facts are straight and he has the truly important aspects of

the gambling syndicate operation.

Until James O'Connell returned on 2 May from his meetings in

Las Vegas, we were faced with the difficulty of being unable to

estimate the dimensions of the problem facing the Agency unless we

could discover what has been leaked, by whom, to whom, and for what

purpose. None of those things could be deduced with confidence from

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C

the Information then available to us. O'Connell, who has already

reported to you orally and will be submitting his written report

directly to you, is able to shed some light on the likely sources

of Pearson's Information. He has also briefed us on his conversations

with Mabeu. These are the key points:

• =

a. Maheu did brief his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, on

Maheu's participation in Phase One.

b. Maheu knew nothing of Phase Two while it was under way

and has never heard of it from Roselli.

c. Morgan and Rosell were acquainted, independently of

Maheu, well before Maheu became Involved with Rosell1 in the

gambling syndicate operation. Roselli was steered to Morgan by

H. M. Greenspun, editor and publisher of the Las Vegas Sun.

d. Maheu suspects that Roselli is a client of Morgan's.

e. Roselli is drinking heavily. Morgan has been in Las

Vegas once or twice recently, was drinking too much, and was

"Indiscreet."

f. Jim GarTISOn, Edward Morgan, and Rosell1 were all in

Ias Vegas at the same time this past March. Garrison was in •

touch with Roselli; so was Morgan. It is our impression that

Greenspun was also involved in the conversations. We do not know

the date, but it might be noted that one of Pearson's columns

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-

Lethal Pills

Briefing of Kennedy Three-Man Team

State Dept. Meeting

Harvey

Rosell1

Maheu

O'Connell

Edwards

Houston

Varona

Varona 's

son-in-law

Maceo

Giancana

Trafficante

Orta

Harvey

Rosel11

Maheu

O'Connell

Edwards

Houston

Harvey

Rose111

Harvey

Varona

Varona ' s

son-in-law

Maceo

*It 1s quite possible that the fact of Robert Kennedy's having been

briefed, and perhaps the substance of the briefing, is more widely

known to government officials than this list would indicate. We

know that Mr. McCone on 16 August 1963 asked for and received a

copy of the memorandum record of the briefing. Others in Justice

and the FBI besides Kennedy may know of the memorandum and of Its

contents.

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appeared on 7 March.

g. According to Maheu, Morgan and Jack Anderson, Drew

Pearson's associate, are very close.

This seems clearly to point the finger at Roselli as the ultimate

source of the Information on the gambling syndicate plot and to

confiru Morgan as Pearson's source.

We can test the accuracy of this assumption against analysis we

had done earlier in an effort to identify the likely source of

Pearson's story. On the opposite page is a listing of persons

defInitely known to be witting of certain key facts now in Pearson's

possession. The list Includes CIA officers who knew more than one

of the key facts, plus all known outsiders. These were our

conclusions:

a. Il Drew Pearson has a single source, and 1f Pearson's

Immediate source is the ultimate source of the leak, and 1f

compartmentation was not violated, then Bill Harvey emerges

as the likely candidate. He was the only person we found in

the course of this inquiry who knew all four of the key facts

at the time the Pearson columns appeared. We preferred not to

think that Bill Harvey was the culprit. We could find no

persuasive reason why he would wish to leak the story

deliberately, and we doubted that he would be so indiscreet as

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to leak 1t accidentally. Further, If he were the source, we

could expect Pearson's story to be completely accurate, because

Harvey knew the truth.

b. If we ruled out Harvey as the source, then it appeared

that there must be at least two ultimate sources of leaks. The

State Department meeting was not known to any of the other

participants in the operation--assuming that Harvey did not

mention it to any of them. Therefore, it is quite possible

that the leak on the State Department meeting has come from

someone who has no direct knowledge of the gambling syndicate

operation but does know of the meeting.

c. From the standpoint of who-knew-what, the next most

Iikely source of the original leak 1s John Rosell1. He 15, in

fact, the only person with direct and continuous participation

throughout both phases of the gambling syndicate operation. He

Introduced Maheu to Sam Giancana as the first step in getting

the operation under way, and he was the one who made the final

break with Varona when the operation was abandoned. He knows

everything that went on with the gangsters, with Orta, and with

Varona between those dates. He and Robert Maheu are the only

non-CIA participants with immediate knowledge of the Robert

Kennedy aspect. Shef Edwards had lunch with Roselli and Maheu

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In Los Angeles In the sumer of 1962. Edwards says that Rosell1

knew Edwards' true name and his position in the Agency. Edwards

said he took the occasion to express his personal appreciation

to Rose1l1, and told Roselll that he, Edwards, had personally

told Attorney General Kennedy of what Rosell had tried to do

in the national interest. We know that Kennedy was merely

briefed on the operation--and only on Phase One at that--but

Rosell may have inferred that Kennedy had an active role in

the operation.

d. We did not know what Robert Maheu knew of the

operation firsthand, because we had conflicting Information on

precisely when he was cut off from direct participation. He

has direct knowledge of the first phase, but probably little

If any of the second phase (from which Pearson's story seems

to come). If Maheu knows of the second phase, he could have

learned of it only from Roselli.

e. Maceo, about whom we know very little, was "Roselll's

man" in the second phase.

He presumably knows of the pills

and of the three-man team, but the other details he could have

•known only from Roselli.

I. Varona's knowledge and that of his son-in-law would be

limited to the pills and the team, but they should know considerably

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more of the specifies; such as, who received the pills, the

composition of the team, and the eventual fate of the team.

g. Giancana and Trafficante were presumably cut out of

Phase Two. They could have learned of it only from Roselli.

About all that emerged from this review of "who had direct knowledge

'of what" was support for the hypothesis that Drew Pearson's story

probably 1s drawn from more than one informant: one on the State

Department meeting and another (or others) on the gambling syndicate

operation. We also postulated that Roselli Is the most likely

ultimate source of Pearson's story. This line of reasoning and the

information O'Connell got fron Maheu are consistent.

Our

supposition until now was that the immediate and the

ultlmate sources, 1l different people, were leaking or peddling the

story with ulterior motives in mind. What those ulterior motives

might be were difficult to fathom--for these reasons:

a. If protection was what the source was seeking, be

could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach

to CIA for help.

b. Maheu was the only known link associating Morgan with

the syndicate plot, and Maheu stands only to lose by having his

role become common knowledge.

c. Those who know Morgan, Maheu, and Roselli thought 1t

!

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quite out of character for any of the three to be spreading

the story dellberately for a private purpose.

In learning of the Rosell1-Morgan link, we are relleved of the

need for speculation as to how the story has gotten out. It 1s

quite likely that Rosell 1s the source, Morgan the channel, and

Anderson and Pearson the recipients. We may also be relieved of

the need for speculation as to why the story is being told. The

• Inference to be drawn from O'Connell's discoveries In Las Vegas 1s

that Rosell1 1s drinking too much and talking and that Morgan is also

drinking and talking to a newspaperman friend.

Put in 1ts best light--that there 1s no ulterlor motive in

spreading the story--it is questionable whether we are any better off

now than we were before; our position may be even worse than we had

suspected.

a-We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched

together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His

ultimate source, Roselli, knows more about certain details of

the gambling syndicate operation than we do, and he evidently

has talked. Trying now to hush up further leaks might do more

harm than good; the story is already out and probably in

considerable detail.

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b. The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas In March

Is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that

Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in

retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know

that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that

there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears

that Garrison may also know this.

The publicity on this subject has probably not yet run its

course •

8. Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two

of his best goodies: the story of the pills and the fact of

the State Department meeting.

b. Garrison has not yet revealed his full case. When he

does, we should expect to find CIA prominently displayed.

c. The Philippine National Bureau of Investigation has a

Puerto Rican in custody who claims he participated in a Castro-

inspired assassination plot in Dallas. He also claims that

Castro made a speech in July 1962 threatening to try to

assassinate Kennedy in retaliation for two Kennedy attempts

on Castro's life. (We have found no record nor recollection of

Castro having made such a speech.) The Puerto Rican is in the

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Philippines Illegally and probably will be deported to the U.S.

We may expect the FBI to take him over and wring him dry.

We face the likelihood that things will get worse before they begin

to get better. In the following paragraphs we explore some of the

ramifications and discuss what might be done about them.

should we try to silence those who are talking or might later talk?

It appears to us that this tactic offers little chance of

success. For one thing, the story is already out and probably in

about as full detail as it ever will be. The only participant on

whom we have any real leverage 1s Maheu, and he has already done all

of the talking he 1s likely to do (to his lawyer, Morgan). We have no

hold on any of the others who might furnish confirmation for Roselll's

story.

+

a. Varona 1s almost certainly not a friend of the Agency.

Varona

As the Bay of Pigs operation developed, /was one of the most

critical of the lack of Cuban control of the operation and of

the people involved in it. He was bitter over termination of

Agency support of his exile group (and the consequent loss

of

his own income). The last we kaow of him he was in New York

living a hand-to-mouth existence as a part-time auto salesman.

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b. Rosell, Giancana, and Trafficante have fallen on

"evil" days. Giancana is reported (in a Chicago newspaper of

recent date) to have been deposed as the Mafia head in Chicago

and was rumored to be hiding in Mexico. Maheu reports that

Trafficante 1s in jail In Tampa. Roselli is persona non grata

• In Las Vegas, being required to register with the police any

time he Is in town. None of them would have compunctions about

dragging in his CIA connection when he was being pushed by law

enforcement authorities. Giancana has already done it when the

FBI was crowding him in 1963. Roselll appears to be doing it in

his conversations with Morgan and Garrison.

(Comment: The cover story used with Rosell1, Giancana,

Trafficante, Varona, and presumably with Orta was that the

sponsors were U.S. businessmen with interests in Cuba. Roselli

soon concluded that CIA was the true sponsor and so told

O'Connell. In Roselli's subsequent dealings with Harvey and

Edwards be came to know this for sure. Giancana named CIA

In 1963. We must assume that the others, with the possible

exception of Orta and perhaps Varona, are equally sure that CIA

was the true sponsor.)

c. Morgan may always retire behind the screen of an attorney-

client relationsbip, as he reportedly did when the FBI approached

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(3)

him on the Pearson story.

d. Pearson, Anderson, and Greenspun (In Las Vegas) are

newspapermen with a newsworthy story. Pearson has already

published much of 1t.

e. Maheu does have good reason for not wanting the story

aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose

his lucrative client, Howard Hughes. There might be some value

to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach

Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion.

What do other components of Government know about this operation?

Former Attorney General Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by

Houston and Edwards on 7 May 1962. A memorandum confirming the

oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May 1962. The memorandum

does not use the word "assassinate," but there 1s l1ttle room for

misinterpretation of what was meant. Presumably the original of that

memorandum is still in the files of the Justice Department. It should

be noted that the briefing of Kennedy was restricted to Phase One

of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier. Phase Two

was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy was

not told of it.

As far as we know, the FBI has not been told the sensitive

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operational details, but it would be naive to assume that they have

not by now put two and two together and come out with the right.

answer. They know of CIA's Involvement with Roselli and Giancana

as a result of the las Vegas wiretapping incident. From the Chicago

newspaper stories of August 1963, and from Giancana's own statement,

It appears that they know this related to Cuba. When Roselli's

story reached them (Roselli to Morgan to Pearson to Warren to Rowley

to the FBI), all of the pieces should have fallen Into place. They

should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of

Castro and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation.

There is some support for this thesis in the conversation I had

with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967 when I told him of the expected meeting

between Rosell1 and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Giancana

have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation." He said that

be doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either

Rosell1 or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your

people."

Can we plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to

assassinate Castro?

No, we cannot. We are reasonably confident that there is nothing

In writing outside of the Government that would confirm Pearson's

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story of the gambling syndicate operation, but there are plenty of

non-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation.

a. Maheu can confirm that Shef Edwards told Roselli

that Edwards had told the Attorney General of Rosell's

activities on behalf of the Government.

b. Varona and Varona's son-in-law can confirm the pill and

three-man team elements of the story.

c. Orta can confirm the pill element of Phase One.

d. If an independent Investigation were to be ordered,

the investigators could learn everything that we have learned.

Such an Investigation probably would uncover details unknown to

us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants.

Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?

Not in this case. While It is true that Phase Two was carried

out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy administration pressure to

do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase.

Phase One was Initiated in August 1960 under the Elsenhower

administration. Phase Two is associated in Harvey's mind with the

Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was developed in

response to White House urgings. Again, Phase One had been started

and abandoned months before the Executive Action Capability appeared

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on the scene.

When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1962, he

strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check with the Attorney

General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal

elements. This was not done with respect to Phase IWo, which was

already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed. The

Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, Includes

one detail that is found only in Phase Two: the three-man team.

What measures might be taken to lessen the damage?

We see little to be gained from personal approaches now to

Maheu, Morgan, or Rosell. Maheu has much to lose and might be able

to prevail upon Morgan and Roselli not to spread the story further.

It is questionable whether any such urging would be effective with

Rosell1, because Roselll stands only to gain from having the story

of his CIA connection known and accepted. We cannot now suppress

the story, because it is already out and may boil up afresh from the

Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and

urge discretion upon him, and if this became known, It would merely

lend credence to a tale that now sounds somewhat Improbable.

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16-1011.

T53: 6-0.963

830027

• 7 MAN 1033

MENORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Dean Rusk

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

: CIA Iovolvement in Cuban Counter -

revolutionary activities--Arrest of

Rolando CUDILA Secades and

Rarion Tomas GUIN Diaz

1. With reference to the Habana Prenza Latina news zelease

of 5 March 1966, alleging CIA involvemicut with Rolanco CUBELA

Secades and Raron Tomas CUIN Diaz in counterrevolutionary

activities, the following outlines the Agency's contact with these two

persOnS®

2. GUIN was recruiicd by a ClA agent in August 1953 inside

Cuba as a Principal Ageat to recruit high-level military leaders.

He bas had no contact with ClA staff personnel.

3. CUBELA, the more important of the two men, has been

in contact with this Agency during the period 1961-1965. The last

Agency contact with CUSSIA was in Icbruary 1965. Fic has had

direct contace with several Agency officials and, in addition, is

known to have been in contact with Cuban exiles, including Manuel

ARTIME. CIA's contact and relationship with both CUBBLA and GUIN

was for the express purpose of using ther to collect intelligence on

military activities and objectives in Cuba. The Agency was not

involved with either of these two men in a plot to assassinate ridel

Castro, as claiied in the Prensa Latire news release, nor did it

ever

encourage either d these two persons to atterapt such an act.

4o 115. James Noel, mentioned in the press release, is a

CIA afficial stationed in the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, Spain, and was

in contact with both Odon Alvarez de la CAlíPA and Jose Luis

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• 2-

GONZALÜL Gallarretta, as noted in the press release. The

purpose of this contact was limited specifically to obtaining

intelligence information. There is no truth to the allegation that

CIA paid $100, 000 or any other siceable sura of money to either

of these individuals.

5. The Agency has also had limited direci and indirect

contact with Jorge ROBRENO, Alberto BLANCO Ramirez, and

Carlos TIPLDINO, noted in the press release. Again, these

contacts were restricted to obtaining intelligence.

Is/ Richard Folas

Richard Helms

Deputy tirector

Signature Recommended:

s/ Thanas M. KaramEssines ? - MAR 1956

A Deputy Director for Plans

(.

SECRET

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