Agency: ROCKCOM
Originator: CIA
From: DCI
To: FITZGERALD, DESMOND
Document date: 4/12/63
Document type: MEMORANDUM

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System •

Identification Form

Date:

8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: ROCKCOM

RECORD NUMBER :

178-10003-10047

RECORD SERIES :

ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ASSASSINATION MATERIALS--MISC. ROCK/CIA (11)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

CIA

FROM: FITZGERALD, DESMOND

TO :

DCI

TITLE:

Released under the John F. Kennedy

issassination Records Collection

act of 1992 144 USC 2107 Notel•

Case#:NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

04/12/1963

4

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES

CIA

CUBAN EXILES

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/01/1995

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

v9.1

NW 53244

DocId: 32201568

80

Page 1

---

## Page 2

178-10003-10047

182:217212

28 A.:

773

THE WAR W

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelliganca

VIA .

"FORD

SUBJECTE

Deputy Director (Plaas)

Effects of the Curtailment of Exile

Flit and Rus Raids

1. This paper is for your inormation baly.

'¿. The decision of the Ü.S. Government to stop "hit-

andrun" raidd by the Cuban exile sroups will have a variety

of effecto depending upon from where one is viewing ta

decision.

3. From Ildel Castro's view it lo our belief that he

will haye mixed icelings. His first will be elation at our

having stopped the majority of these raids, but he will soon

recogaiso that me inow they have been Inore speciaculas than

damaging. Fidel will, we thir's, recognise that this order

will not stop a few datermined Cubans just as such zu

injunction did not deter him in his fight to oust Batiata. To a

degree Castro will view this order with apprenansion., He will

probably wonder what we plan instead. Casiro may well

miscalculate the effect of this order for he may bellave that

the basic rotivation and drive of the exiled Cuban is aciually

that of the U.S. and not ie Cuban hunself. Le may expect

to see the entiro exile effort against him collapse.

1. We believe the anti-Castro element Inaide Cuba

will be seriously disheartened. This U. 3, policy will be

Interpreted and loudly proclaimed ad a victory for Fidal, and

a furthor accommodation to the existence oi Fidel in Cuba.

Our cilort to rocruit or defect officiala of the Castro Covera-

meat should be expected to bacome even move difficult. A

THE GERALD

R. FORD LIBPARY

VAI

instedd

HH 53244

DocId: 32204568

Page 2

---

## Page 3

"BRAR

^.-.

GEORETI

few disillusioned individuals on tha inside who have long awaitsu

U.I, action may now ba convinced that it is not coming und

finally leave a regime they cardos tolerate.

5.

The effect on the exiles and their activities will be

varied. Basically, their motives are, first, copefully to

embroil the U.S. A, on their side, secondiy, to establisa their

owe personal reputation and laus aagure a sigziticant podition

in tha luture government, sad thirdly, an honest desize to

remove Castro and his govemmeni.

The order will cause

tha non activia type Cubaz exile wherever he is to conciude

thai the U.S. is unwilling to permit "ireelancing" Cuban

exiles to forco or creato U.S. policy in tha Caribozan by their

astiona..

Coupled with tais thought will go the conriction that

the U.S.'is convinced that these raids cannot bring Castro down

and short of a full, scale military invasion, Castro ja presently

innuaerable. This leads hin unisappily to the conclusion that

the U.S, haa no immediate, dramatic plan for tha restoracion

Df democracy to Cuca.

They will use the hard tors ico-

edstenca" jo describe our policy and some will call it

"appeasdment." viany Cubans vill conclud→ tbas the U.S. is

right and that they cannot do that which the U.G. judges cannot

be done.

Soma will at long last paci taeir baga and may leave

Miami for various destinations in tbe U.S. and iatin America,

or in just a few cases they may asi to go bos1e..

6. I'he "activist" Cuban exiles will probaily not ba

deteried by the order. They may even profit by the decree.

It will now ba 3 greater honor to engage in operationa against

Fidel. The double jeopardy arisiag from the threat of detention

by U.s. agents and the charça for martyidom at ibe hands of

Fidai will be an oven greater challenge. Actually the supply os

Iccruis for such hit and run raida ray run shallow but aot dry.

Anoider advantaga arisiag from tbe scrutiny of U. S. ageate will

be tise improvemeut in control and better clandestina security

practicas on to pait of tha exiles. But as the Ul. S. rastricts

and apprehendo tess men, confiscating gooils and funds, tor

loci of power will hava a terdency to move back to its traditional

conter:

the exiled-monied interests such at the Loaches, Erlos,

Batiatas, I must ba recogaized that cha clama down will dotor

-SECRET

23 OW

HH 53244

DocId: 32204568

Page 3

PHOTOCOPY

FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

---

## Page 4

07V83

THE WATE

raida sed diernate e "ade are" uperatos and many corbers,

but it must be especiod that occasional uncoordinated raida will

sllo through any cordon.

7. Politically tho exile most apt to proilt from thia

pronouncement will ba Manolo ñ4y of tha Revolutionary Junta

{Junta Rerolucionaria - JURE). It has long Been RAT's con-

tention that tae Cubans themselves laust, in the end, irre Cuba

and the decision to stoo exilo rajas may have tha immediate

cívet of firmly convinciag nany anti-Castro Cubana thai the

freedom of Cuba is aíter ail their problem.

•;

8. From ise stasapoist of our agents inside Cuda, to

boliave some will initially ba seriously diabeatened. They had

dreamed leat thame raids would increade, keep Fidel oif balanca,

encourage resiatance interzally, and eventually blon the spart

into a consagration desiroying Vidaliano, Sobezing as the

thought of zo immediao hely from tha outside mill be, is beliavo

our contisued contact and support of these men will prora to

them that they have not been forgoiten aad toat out datermination

to fres: Cuba has sut changed.

9. li in too soon actually to state definitivaly virat too

efferi of this policy will have on oil recruitmeat program.

Ihe Agency'o problem in noi the sumber of iscruits, but their

quality. The nemployed, poorly educaied, buniy are always

with us. Some of tas nory discerning type Cubans will avoid

Iccruitment as they are coavinced that a principal reason for

she U.S. action is so control who ligars Castro in order to assure!

who will succeed him; howerer, othere will desire to soris for so

regardless si this lactor. Tha preliminary reaction of our tAva

atation was to doubt that the ordar would have any effect on 0ur

recruitment afíorta

PHOTOCOPY

FROM '

•.-. 21122/2n

Desmond FitsCorald

Chief, Special Affairs Stall

Cc: DSCI

DDF

SECRETI

HH 53244

DocId: 32204568

Page 4

---

## Page 5

DDP/SAS: B. B, Cheever:el (3. April 1953)

Distribution:

1 - DAD/ CJ (NEZ. v/ebb)

1 - Signer

.

970839

LIBRAR

PHOTOCOP

WAITE HOUSE OFFICt

yo! le 10 05 3M. 85

8a23..

SEGRETT

PAS PAY

HH 53244

DocId: 32204568

Page

5

---