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1704-10308-0062 * 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

TO

Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

POSED

c5.0

PROCESSING

ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED

HEADQUARTERS DESK

AN UNE 102ANG

PLISHEL

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBIE Operational/TYPIC/AMLEQ

Unsuccessful Exfiltration Attempt by M/V ADA

ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

9-12 May 1964

References:

A.

BARR-1606,

dated

13 May

B.

BARR-1607,

dated

13

May

C.

WAVE-6458

dated

13

D.

WAVE-6433

dated

E.

WAVE-6463

13

May

MaY

dated

13

May

F.

BARR-1612,

dated

14

G.

May

BARR-1614,

dated

14

H.

BARR-1619

May

I.

UFGA-15986,

dated

15

20

May

dated

May

1964

1964

1964

1964

1964

1964

1964

1964

1964

dated

i WA- 130, dated 24 May 1061

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated,

and kept under control,

the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist

him in obtaining asylum for his wife and family in a third country

diplomatic installation in Cuba.

Since the failure of the last

asylum attempt for Mrs. AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in refer-

ence I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum

without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what

Ittle optimism ho had remaining for a safe method of bringing his

wife and children out of Cuba.

After the failure of the asylum

attempt in March 1964, Mrs. AMLEO-3 again renewed her attackupon

AMLEO-3 by phone and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means

at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him

that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration

mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get her

or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children.

Up until

recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings

of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime

assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration,

equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission

successfully.

Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discon-

tinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

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GROUP 1

Excluded ticin antamal:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

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19-6-75/3

1934

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exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he

would prefer to terminate his relationship

with KUBARK so that he can

out such exfiltration attempts on his own in a completely

independent manner.

Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress

reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts in-

side Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of

AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts.

As a result

AMLEO-3 has borrowed money from AMSHED-] and family relatives in the

attempting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in

debt to these individuals to the tune of $4-55,000.00.

On 5 May 1964,

MLEO-3 informed his C/O,that he had recently heard from his wife vi:

he (Japanese diplomatic Courier channel) and in her letter she ha

from inside the Island the weekend of I0 May 1964

the C/O to alert QKMAGNET to this attempt

and said that he expected

to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964.

Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the

lowing morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O

and gave him the following information:

"The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night

of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11

adults and children.

They plan to depart from Playa

de Guanabo,

between Havana and Matanzas, during the

night of 11 May 1964 and expect

to arrive in Key West,

Florida sometime on 12 May 1964."

AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group

planned to use,

follow, etc VEDDER and Leon C. FLUTEO, during a routine operational

to Bruce P.

meeting, that he had sponsored and masterminded the aborted exfiltratio

operation, and that the operation had been mounted from the U.S.,

not from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to the c/O.

On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an

explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation. AMLEO-3

claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his

part to KUBARK,-since KUBARK had refused to continue its effert ta

rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would

continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK

help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his

attempts to do so.

AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V

ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following

individuals in the operation.

A. Maxto DOMIS, probably identical with Mario RENIS-

Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly

resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came

to the U.S. from Cuba

in August 1962

departing from Guanabo by small

boat with five other Cuban refugees.

AMLEO=3 claims he used this

individual as his principal organizer in the expedition,

had agreed to go into Cuba acting as a guide and leader of the group.

REMIS had previously resided in an area

close to AMLEO-3's home in

Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go to A-3's home and bring his family

REMIS did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last

individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos.

Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/v

ADA, and brought the

boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963

Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed

RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay,

and supplied him

with a recent photograph of Mrs. AMLEO-3 and her

wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the

childre"back of the

and AMLEO-3

photograph'and also listed his home address without revealing (he says.

TORM

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the true name of his wife.

(This photograph was brought back by

RODRIGUEZ and returned to

AMLEO-3).

RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed

to lead the infiltration mission,

and personally contact AMLEO-3's

family and the family of Jesus. GÓMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and

take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring

out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring

out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not

supposed to exceed 15 persons.

Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa,

AMBIG-4 were recruited by RODRIGUEZ, for the mission,

AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the

mission, nor were

they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission.

was to bring out his father, mother,

sister, younger brother, and his

and LOPEZ's fiancees;

BLANCO his wife

and daughter; RODRIGUEZ,

his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ

AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4

was a KUBARK asset,.

and AMLEO-3 has never indicated in any way that he

knew AMBIG-4 was

Since the boat in question,

was not equipped with a radio set,

desired for use as a radio operator by

AMBIG-4

AMLEO-3 inforned the C/O that he had previously warned his

some that something as to happen lo weekend of to on time and that

be coming to see her with bona fides from him.

AMLEO-3 also was

instructed to supply

this contact man with all the

pesos she had at her disposal, since

the infiltrees reportedly were

able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them.

abort of the mission, Mrs. AMLEO-3 has

talked to A-3 by phone at least

reportedly not under control or surveillance by the Cuban Intelligence

services.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ADA •

4 May

- 8. May 1964

During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities

were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group

in a local Army/Navy store.

They were also equipped with two

Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic .38 Cal

pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition

for the four weapons.

weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only.

Talbo, key gest, Mortwas located at Sunset Harbor Maxina, Stock

9 May 1964

West, Fla for

Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIB-4,

The M/V ADA was enroute

to Cuba during the remainder

of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual

reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964

The infiltration crew

arrived in Cuba at a point approxi-

mately A mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours:

There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high

They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent

at the base of the reefs.

In broad daylight, all four went ashore and

walked across the highway 'Via Blanca'.

There were several empty

trenches between the highway and the coast line,

but the group

detect no vigilance in the area. ' LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes

do meet RODRIGUEZ!

while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to

contact.

(in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one

Paulo MARTINEZ as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo.

AMLABEL-1 states he

asked the name of this contact several times, but

each time LOPEZ

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maintained that he did not know.

AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the

C/o who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group.

LOPEZ

may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or else fabri-

cated a name.)

LOPEZ. began to count cars to while away the time.

During

the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks

approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of

One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites,

who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same

LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy

RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ

RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to

get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and

BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are located.

RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the

information in para 8 is the

AMLEO? the AMLEQ-3 version of this perlod, again acquired

•3 reported the following activity:

Upon his return to

the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ SAW LOPEZ and told him to wait

and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly

to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GoC.

4-3 would not

say how these contacts were carried out, but due to the time lactor

it -is assumed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims

the contacts were as follows:

1 high level civilian official of the GOC, with the

rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS,

who is willing to collaborate

with the Rebel Army in exile,

and willing to furnish their infiltrated

agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces

Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their

missions.

B. Some unnamed high level Cuban military officers.

some type of strong, action that would prove

stated that he would be more than willing to coriab-

-tE Vith KUBARK In lurthering contact with these unnamed Individuals

if KUBARK would support him in a future exfiltration te rescue his

family from Cuba.

AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information

relative to these supposed inside contacts of his.

AMLEO-3 states

that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964,

and then he and LOPEZ boarded the

boat and went out to sea for the

night.

A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local

Iisherman dropped by

to look at the boat while it remained at the reefs

and nothing was done

to insure the cooperation of the fishermen

did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing

on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964

After putting out to sea,.

RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during

and awoke the next morning,

11 May, at about 1130 hours.to

find themselves directly across from

the city of Matanzas.

returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours.

(LOPEZ said the

would only do about 4 to 6 knots).

They took the boat back close to

the original landing place,

waited to see some light signals indi-

cating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to

go in anyway and investigate.

When approximately_20-yards-off shore,

they were fired-upon-by-automatic weapons and-a spotlight came on

searching for them.

The boat party was not hit by the fire and re-

treated to the-open sea.

5-60

(40)

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The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three

miles down the coast from Guanabo,

and they attempted to land on the

beach again.

Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided not to

attempt a landing and instead anchorod the boat beyond the surf line

(about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach.

RoDriGUEz went inland and caughta bus to Guanabo, and they went back

to the safehouse of Paulo MARTINEZD6 At the safehouse he found the

pickup team of BLANCQ and AMBIG-4,

and some 28 people whom they had

acquired as passengers.

These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO

and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable

to locate the homes of Jesus GOMEZ_Calzadilla and AMLEO-3 and therefore

had not been able to contact these families.

They then returned the

bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3

and GOMEZ.

(AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that

AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after

seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to

tried to find his home nor that of GOMEZ.)

RODRIGUEZ,

AMBIG-4,

BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo,

arranged recognition signals.

RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat;

leaving AMBIG-S and BLANCO to convoy t

the passengers in three cars to

the exfiltration point.

RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about

30 minutes after the appointedhur of 2300,

and halted the boat about

meters offshore.

They saw a light on top of the reef at which

point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal,

When asked about the recognition signals,

LOPEZ stated that he

know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights

and an exchange of names.

He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all

these details).

They brought the boat right up to the reef at which

point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directi

of the highway.

(AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get

women and children down these steep cliffs.

LQPEZ replied that the

difficulties-involved had not occurred to them.

By the same token,

they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families.)

RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the

protection against the rifle fire.

LOPEZ states that RODRIGUE!

was hit as he jumped overboard.

RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of

his shoulder wound.

On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time

had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore.

decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the

LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard.

then claims that the rifle

(FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward

land rather than out to sea toward their boat. LOPEZ states that

diversion was the only thing which saved them.

LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding

north when he

saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle

in front of his boat.

LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on the

deck) of this new development.

Even though bleeding and barely con-

scious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas

LOPEZ said he could.

RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward

Matanzas hugging the coastline.

The patrol craft (or fishing boats)

since extinguished their lights.

LOPEZ followed his advice and

several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol

RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until

straighten out and follow that course to Key

tanks had been pierced by

the barrage,

and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West.

last remaining water tank was also shot up.

They arrived at approxi-

mately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West,

Fla. on 12 May 1964.

Upon arrival in Key West, Fla,

RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized

and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his

right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated

He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right

not punctured,

but there was some blood between his lung and

the pleura and the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

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of 13 May 1964.

RODRIGUEZ has since been

moved to Miami,

and is

now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida.

dition is now satisfactory.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

After the abortive exfiltration attempt by the M/V ADA,

various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls

and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various

individuals.

The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cabl

and debriefings of Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ

National Police in Havana who had received

of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the

a telegram from his daughte

Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964.

(She was supposed to have col

out with BLANCO and AMBIG-1 In the exfiltration).

The telegram stated

we are well, love to all,

••AN

(40)

On 14 May 1964

AMSWIRL-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE

Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had

received three telegrams from Cuba:

the first on 10 May stated

"Armando arrived all is well" ; the second on 11 May stated,

"Armando

departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's

cable no

good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando

BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informec

14 year old son of

(see para 3 A above) had

called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him

he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while

trying to leave cuba,

and that the police

had let the children free,

but continued to hold the adults under arrest.

Reportedly only

one car had. been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people

in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being

As of 23_ May 1964

no other information has been reported te KUBARK

on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG 4, Or the passengers who were at the

exfiltration point.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA

As noted in paragraph 8 of refarence J,

various operational

inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the

exfiltration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba.

WAVE is of the opinion

that some-of these inconsistencies can be attributed to genuine con-

fusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ

Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO

and AMBIG-4

again after their infiltration inland), and the withhelding of facts

by AMLEO-3 who considers this activity_was his-own personal büsiness:

and had nöthing to do with KUBARK.

Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is

probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infil-

tration,

but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate

him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and

KUBARK does not

consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation

of him at this time.

It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withhold

information he considers privileged,

and it has been noted that

AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the

expedition, Marie REMIS, has

been visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla.

Since the two infiltrees,

BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under

or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to

AMLEO-3 's family etc., will ever be completely clarified.'

As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J,

AMLEO-3 continues

to look for methods whereby

he may exfiltrate his

from Cuba,

and has reached the point where he is

no longer rational in his

reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family. AMLEO-3 is

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dotinitoly actiny out of dosporation,

and although he does not desire

to burn all hig KUBARK bridgog behind

he feels that he must since

KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under

WAVE's position on the

matter has been fully stated in

paragraph 9 of reference J.

On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to con-

tact AMSWIRL-1 and Inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him

Insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry

out further

rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Cin chari

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