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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

00/P22-130-32

7/27/62-

Exacutive Ragistry

102-5263

25 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 20 July 1962, the Director and the Deputy Diroctor (Plans)

not with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, Willian Lunger, and

J. Patrick Coyne to discuss certain aspects of the Agency's Political

Action Programs. The Director sat with the Panel fron 10:30 't1l noon,

the Deputy Director (Plans) was present from 10:30 to 12:30 and from

2:00 to 3:30.

2. The Director opened the discussion with a historical description

of the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the

fight against Cormnisi. He described in detail the procedures now in

effect whereby Political Action Projects are originated, staffed out,

and cleared with appropriate elements of Government. He pointed out

that each project must have his approval prior to lts circulation to

the members of the Special Croup. At this point, be digressed to Inform

the Panel that reconnaissance overflights are now approved by the

Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this

same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser de-

gree. He terninated this part of the discussion by stating that in

his opinion "all covert action prograns are now handled in an orderly,

correct marner".

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1998

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3. The Director then described in some detail Agency covert

fInancial support in the recent feruelections, the last Creek elections,

and to Ematal eleotion, He also deteribed our actrities i don-

nection with the Italian political parties. Following this, he covered

our plans for the upcoming Brazilian elections. He touched on ou

thoughts with rogerd to the political eltuation in fritish Gulang

4o At this juncture, the Director discussed Agency labor opera-

tions. He read to the eroup a short paper wilch outlined our support

to anti-Communist labor unions in/Erance) and Italy) our work trough

the ICFTY, and our relatlonships with American /labor and the assistance

(aited States undona have given us.

So Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by

DI. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current statue

of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for

Cultural Freedon and the International Conission of Jurists. He

touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the

services of Mr. Ilvingston Merchant to bead 1t.

6. In the time remaining to him, the Director went over with the

Panel country by country an extended list of political parties and

leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not

have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Plans)

finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon

session.

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•3.

To Also in the afternoon, the Deputy Director (Plans) read to

the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose which the Director had used

earlier in the day for briefing the President. This paper was used

on the Instruction of the Director: The Panel asked questions about

Agency activity Involving Cuba, all of wiloh were answered with the

exception of one having to do with the role of the Attorney General.

This query was raised by Mr. Gray who recognized and gracefully ac

cepted the fact that he was not answered directly.

8. Before the afternoon session adjourned, the Panel raised the

question of the total dollar anout of funds expended annually for

covert astion. The Deputy Director (Plans) showed then a chart com

piled by DDP-PS, dated i April 1962. Thie chart gives the precise

dollar amounts expended annually. These figures vary frOll the Congres-

sional ones since the support slice is not inoluded.

Richard Helms

Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Original

- The Director"

1 ce

Exec. Director

1

- C/CA-IO

1 ce

- DD/P

79T

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2: 5?67

62-8090

2 November 1962

MUYORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

I. On 1 November, the Depaty Director (Plans) met with

Messrs. Robert Murphy, Jordan Gray, and J. Patrick Goyne to present

a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since

the ore held on 20 July 1962. The meeting lasted Drom 2:30 to 4:45.

2. There was little discussion on Cuba. In response to

Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good Intelligence job bad

been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by

the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having pre-

pared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured MT. Coyne would be sub-

mitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to re-

view it.

3. The fra lan progeran, program, was covered die considerablo

deta11. Pointa covered were: (2) the reason for the program, (b) the

marner in which candidates were chosen, (e) the amount of money 1n-

volved, (d) the methods of funding, and (e) the coordination of State

and the Agency on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of

the factual elements, there was considerable discussion of the politi-

cal situation in Brast]) and the direction in which that doverment

seemed to be tending.

I/mc

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4. CIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival tas

the next item presented. A full report was given which followed care-

fully the post-morten written by the dA Staff.

5. As for El activities 1a the reminder of Latila Amertes,, to

following countries were covered: Dominican Republic, Chile, Peru

patiouls refarance to the sensitivity of the (is-) cooperation an

tho latter.

6. In Southeast Asia, an up-to-date repart as presented on

operations in Inos, South Vietran, and North Vietnan. Problems in

connection with forth Vietzanase operations were specifically Ident1-

fied.

7. on the sino tadan conito, tibe panel was made anare of

pending and current requeste from the Indian GIE/ for asslatance 1a

the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also

Identifled. In response to a query from fr. Murphy, I said tbat I

did not see any requirement at this time for an increase of our perma-

nant establishment in/India, expressing the opinion that any trainers

and parantlitary experts which we night send could be covered for us

by the (Indians

8. In Burope, lA prograns in the folloring areas were up-

dated delta, Pranco and Italy, Epin Etan and sire?

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Mr. Murphy seemed particularly interested in the level of activity

in Italy and our efforts to cut it back.

9. At one point in the briefing, I spolse of the change in

status of the African-American Institute and told of our negotiations

with the Ford Foundation on the Congress for Caltural Freedon. I

6

mentioned the Department of State teto on passing funde to Holden

Roberto, There was some discussion of the lemen and associated

problens. Here, I simply gave an Intelligence briefing on the lemen

and the effects of the revolution thare on Saudi Arabia and the

Bxitish position in the Aden Protectorate.

Richard Helms

Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Original - Director, CIA

1 ce - Exec: Director"

Chief, CA

DD/P

"Poles

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UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

*SE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

Office of the DD/P

Rm. 3-C-34- Hdqrs.

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

2 - NOV 1962

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show trom whor

• whom.: Drom a line across column after each comment.)

EXECUTiVE DiRECTOR

3.

4.

DDCI

Ex. DIss for files

LiBK

6.

7.

8.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14:

15.

DEC So 610 USEDIIONOUS

EDITIONS.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961: 0 - 593646

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CD/P 5219711

Executiva Registry

17 April 1963

633249

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. OR 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Measts. Robert

Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to briel them on major

covert actioa developments since their previous briefing on

2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.

2. Al MI. Murphy's sequest, I began with a description of our

electoral operations as

particularly concerned wilh the situation in Brazil] and both be and

Ms. Gray found it difficalt to understand why the State Department

continued to provide large-scale economic assiatance whea Goular!/

had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow

travelers both within the goverament and the labor movement. They

were Interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the

military leaders who are opposed to Goulart, and they seemed to feel

that a mllitary coup at, aqme polit might be preferable to allowing a

country (28 lasge and pówerful as Brazil to driít iato the hande of the

oppositios. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had

expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the

resalts. They did sor question either the need for intervention or

the size of our effort; although la the Chlleag case Mr. Murphy wanted

to be sure that we had evidence that the funde passed through [tallaa) &

hands aciually reached the Chilea? Christian Democrats.

3. MI. Murphy then raised the Argentine/problem and said

that he had been intormed in New York that the State Department was

putting considerable presaure on the Argentine regime to persaade it

to hold the alactions scheduled for June 1963. He questioned the

wisdom of this presaure, pointing out that there was a real danger

at the Peronistas returning to power is the elections more held. He

asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was atill

considerable doubt whether the elections would actually taice place.

10ж

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I added that the more responsible milltary were trying to work out with

§ the Guido /government and the non-Peronist political partles a formula

which would prevent the (Peronista)from making large gains on the

national level.

4. On the subject of flaitl, Mr. Murphy felt that in ao small a

country action should be possible to remove (Duvalier )ind wondered

why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no palicy

approval lor such action but thai we were active in lubatalying and

making contact with opposition elements both within Halti and in exile.

I described some of the difficultles, such al/Duvalier'" contral of

the arons in the palace and bis widespread penetration of opposition

plottlag that had just resulted la the rolliag up of a coup attempt by

Hallan/army ollicore.

5. MI. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report

of out recent decision to allow Radio Ilbasty to broadcast in Russian

to the Sovlet troops in Cube, He was heartily in favor of sach action

but wondered how me were able to obtain approval of it when the

Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear

to be provocative to the Sovlots. I informed him thathere had, in fact,

boen some delay la obtainiag the approval.

6. Both the gentlemen askod for detailed information on the

structure and workings of the Latin American Palloy Committue (LAPC)

and asked whether we felt this committee in asy way hampered or

interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that

both Chiel, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC

operases and baliaved it to be highly aseful.

7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast

Asia, particularly the measure to atrengthen the barder palico in the

(porth of Indlad I tald them that Nehru)was aware of these actlone and

they wanted to be certain Mr. Bowles was clearly inatructed prlor to

ala departure as ambassador.

8. Both men objecied to press reports that cortain Adminiatration

alficials believed the Sovies to be exerting a helpiul and restraining

intluence in laos. I had to agros with them that it was hard to malatain

such a view la the face of the lacreasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao,

and I described the exiating palicy limita on our relations with Phouri 6

and Kong Le, 1 then described the presont stato os the Soviat-Chinese

6

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split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbato these tensions.

MI. Murpay asked for specific information on the extent of trade, i1

any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the out-

standing Chinesa debt to the Soviets, I agreed to provide this via

MI. Coyno. MI. Gray asked about sno depth and axtent of our

Intelligence from Peklag and the China mainland, and was critical of

the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists, I said

that intelligence operations is China were not my field but that I would

make sure that a report on this did get to them.

9. I went on to dascribe the cultural ferment within Rusaia and

recent action Khrushcher had taken to disciplino the dissidont wilters

and artists. They were very much interested in the actions weiked

saken to exploit this situation and particulasly interested la the current

¡saue of Encounter and la the account therein of the Khrushcher tirado

at the recent art exhibition.

10. On Cuba 1 explained that I was not in a position to brles

them in depta and any questions in this field would be handled by the

DirectOI oI DDP. I did, however, briof them on the Kralal Committee

and the recest meetinga in Managua regarding measures that could be

raken to limit the export of subverslan from Cuba, (I have set to

them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandun on the present scope of tae

Cuban subveraive training effort.)

1d.

I described the covert support to the Italian) political parties

for the forthcomlag parliamentary election as approved by the Special

Group. MI. Murphy had not previoualy known of the decision to lend

some selective support to the Nenni autonomistaland described this

decialos wita some surprise 'as quite a awitch." 8

12. Finally, gwhen informed of the policy limitations on ou:

relations with the Angolan Nationallats/and) Holden Roberto, MI. Murphy

expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and

seemed to feel that the beat course to follow was to asslat the (Portuguese)

Coverument in its attempts to control the situation. Ho said that he had

met recently for the irst time with aberto Holdenia New York last

week and was not impressed by the man.

3

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13. The meeting was throughout a cordlal one and I detected

no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert

action progsam.

CORD MEYER, JR.

Chief

Covert Action Stall

Distribution:

Orig. - Director, CLA

1 - Exoc. Director

1 - DDP

1 - C/CA

Ea° MA 1o O1 El R9A

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UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

"CE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE:

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

C/ CA

NO.

DATE :

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

1.

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

L8K

to whom.

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

ExeC. Director

2.

PELAB

12.

13:

14.

15.

FORM

1DEC So O1U USEDRTONOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1981: 0- 993644

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23 April 1963

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(CLASSIFICATION)

D.CI

lopy!

23

(8X84242-6

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99

BYEMAN?

Save cy a

f ther

loce

ement te

chao. Enright

on Taug1964

8/19/98

asassination

Record

Michtle

WARNING

This document contoins information offecting the national security of the United States within the mean.

ing of the espionage lows U: S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmis.

sion or the revelation of its contents in ony monner to on unouthorized person, as well as its use in ony

manner prejudicial to the sofety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of ony foreign govern.

ment te the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U.S, personnel especiolly indoc.

trinoted and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be

meintoined in recordance with regulations pertoining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

CORONA.

99

..[TACKLE]

ICLASSIFICATIONI

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TGP SECRET

24 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,

1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963

Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace,

Gen. Doolittle, MI. Gray, DI. Langer, Dr. Land;

Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash;

From CIA: MI. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald,

Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick

1. When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing

the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to

the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released.

Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told

that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for com-

mercial interests, and that their fictitious names la d apparently held up

during interrogation.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the

22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure

the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in

exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the

release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of

sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina

with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with

deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons

was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the

release involved any other commitments.

Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making

these releases.. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles,

and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford

asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew

of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make

a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention

of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did

return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't

really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro

apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with

GROUP 7

10P SUr

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canneradin and

de: casticaten

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the United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fidel

didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U.S.

because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching every-

thing he did. Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that

the President, the Alterury Gentral and the DCI be advised of his attitude.

Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McCone

said he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was

any indication given that CIA was being consulted of advised. Dr. Killian

then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McCone

said there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to that

briefing.

2.

MI. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was

in effect and working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the

complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC

was developing well. The Special Group has expanded its review of counter-

insurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant

of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting,

we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish

one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum.

Mr. McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries.

He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the

15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves

in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense

was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone

said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordina-

tion. He said that he and Mr. McNamara had postponed the reorganization

of USIB. It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point

of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time.

8716

Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA End TACKLE flights over

China produced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not.

set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He

advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet

Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board.. The last CORONA

flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these

installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged

from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that

18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned

similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18

launching pads, or a total of about 450. Mr. McCone advised that at this time

we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities.

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The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction

time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150

launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate.

Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone

replied, "Only one. "

4. DI. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and

he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget

that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and

said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave

with the Board. This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an

extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964,

with two in September. If trouble develops with the "J" configuratign, "M"

can be continued once a month until March. The next LANYARD shot is

scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first

99 {GAMBIT/shot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month

through all of 1964. Mr. McCone noted that if there were future failures,

there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between

shots.

tight at Mach. Sand then would be pushed up to it tell ored and animoe

General Doolittle noted that the next. 6 increase presented very serious

engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood

but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status.

6. MI. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a

judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory

photography in the area of resolution. He noted that he felt we were dealing

too much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the beat

possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite

photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying

the Soviet Union.[He stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see

DI. Edward Purcell in an effort to persuade him to chair a panel which

would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Govern-

ment. He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when

satellite photography would reach the desired resolution. MI. McCone

advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of

this committee which he would submit to the President's Board. He noted

that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of

reconnaissance, including the best read-out, but that he wanted this com-

mittee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing

it under his personal direction. He noted that he had the enthusiastic support

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of DOD in doing this.

said he would like the support of the President's

Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership,

including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the

committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Board

had apparently felt in a previous matter.)

DI. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future poten-

tiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the

terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel

should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the

U.S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mi. Clifford

asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No. "

Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and

Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted

that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and

Mr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not full

out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted.

Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he

thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone

said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was

concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted

that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what

resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the

engineering of missiles.

Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he

thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five

who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was

not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask

DI. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land replied that he might be able to do it.

7.

Mr. Pace asked whether there had been one or two U-2 flights over

China.

Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had

98

produced some interesting results.

gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those

These included progress on a possible t7

of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was

not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not

produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it

could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another

area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised

that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese

nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed

out the paucity of the information available. However, they had put together

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98 24

a whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that

the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field

and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported

that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at

this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive over-

flights. Di. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12

over China, and Mr. McCone said that he didn't and, furthermore, that he

personally didn't see any problem in using it over the USSR.

8.

Mr. McCone advised that he had taken some additional steps to

pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established

a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise

at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence

analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its

removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that

area. He said further that ISD was directly linked to the operational aspects

of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted

that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General

Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He

said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board

and read to the Board the membership.

TIP

SCRE

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9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that

he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results

of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the

four principal targets were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when

weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet

military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in

a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days. Mr. McCone

then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April

1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy.

The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive

to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally

carried on railroad flatcars. Mr. McCone stated that an examination of the

photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace

of the convoy. Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have

provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he

planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information.

10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on

operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated

the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents

and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal

teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday,

and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage

in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were

looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly

military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting

intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose

at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was

desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempt-

ing to develop a large scale dangerous activity.

Vir. FitzGerald pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installation:

vere mainly diplomatic installations and that some 14 Cuban diplomats were

our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba,

and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted

10 to Mexico City by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there

were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium 24.

speed transmitter that was quite small, the size of about two cigarette cartons]

and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds. He said that there was a

smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development.

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Dr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others.

Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents

except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply com-

promise the instrument.

Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting,

and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1, 040 reports looked impressive, but it

vas quite true that this was not a true indication, zule said that some of the

reporting was very good, and there were two (Cuban ambassadors/on th

payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone

in what Castro was thinking. Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's

immediate entourage penetrated, and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked

for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out

that the 665 reports from resident agents were primarily on military targets,

and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supple-

ment to overhead reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal

team was two men and Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes". Mi. Murphy asked

whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and

equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford

noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were

back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the

casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts "Legal Resident

Agents in Cuba" and "Illegal Agent Development".

(At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came

in. )

Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of

policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a

it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month.

Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba.

Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered

throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-

wide resistance networks last summer.

He then produced the chart entitled

"Ilegal Infiltration -- Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this.

Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and

Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations

and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted

"subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire

and throwing it across high tension lines.

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NO SHARE

11. The Board then turned to Mr. Cottrell and asked him to describe

the work of his group. Mr. Cottrell said the President had become con-

cerned there were so many government agencies dealing with so many

Cuban groups, and he had set up the group under Mr. Cottrell to coordinate

all of this activity. He said that his immediate group consisted of a repre-

sentative of Defense and CIA, and there were additional committees or

groups reporting to them. He outlined the general policy guidance under

which they were operating and under questioning from Mr. Murphy stoutly

denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature, and it was

directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba. It was

further explained that CIA's activities were coordinated through this group.

12. DI. Killian then asked Bruce Clarke to give a brief report on the

situation in Cuba, and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the

present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures

were arrived at. At 12:00 this session was recessed to permit the presenta-

tion by DIA.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Executive Director

cy

+ - 001

#2 - BDCI

# 3-

EX DiR

#h of - ER

TA?

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Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963:

1. Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba.

2. Coordination on NRO agreement - "in effect and working well".

3. Report on photographic results of Corona End Tackle flights over

China? mentioned there would be one more Ox flight at Mach. 572H

and then be pushed to full speed and altitude.

4. Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel.

5. Discussion of U-2 flights over Chinaland results.

6. Establishment of R&D board to pull together the Agency's scientific

and technical assets:

7. Discussion of Cuba; DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights

to provide more information.

8. FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba.

9. Cottrell described the work of his group.

10. Bruce Blark gave report on the situation in Cuba.

T02

SECRET

[BYRMAN]

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SECRET

Gan admised 10/20.-

22 april 1963.

LOTT

20 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Me: Kirkpatric LBK

DCI does not want to meet the Board with Cottrell

and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy

to many operational matters.

Your suggestions seemed agree-

able to Mr. McCone.

wilder

W. Elder

55:

RET

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SEGNET

22 April 1963

SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 10.15 A.M., 23 APRIL

11:15

A. M.

I

IlI

Coordination.

a. NRO Agreement--currently in effect.

b. NPIC--agreement with DIA is fairly well solidified

with not too many differences in opinion.

c. Counterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goes

to the Special Group now in effect.

d. Current Intelligence Reporting--now in negotiation

stage with DIA.

e. Clandestine Intelligence Collection--close coordination

between CIA and DIA now in effect.

99

Recent CORONA Coverage plus Recent TACKLE Flights

bededecle fights +01 1965-1967

Progress on

RETEXCART.

a. Establishment of the Purcell Panel.

Iv

Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CIA.

a. Report of the Roddis Panel on Chinese nuclear energy

capabilities.

b. The CIA Research and Development Review Board.

10/ Palery

leslie

SEGRET

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Handle via

BYEMAN

Control

System

17 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECI: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board, Tuesday, 23 April 1963

1. The President's Board has asked that you meet with them on

the 23rd from 10:15 to 11:15. They have suggested that the later half

of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence

on Cuba and have suggested that Mr. Cottrell attend for that period.

2. Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and proce-

dures will have been settled prior to the 23rd, I would suggest that you

may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including

their recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest C-

and I.J99 flights.

Toma Katie

Kirkpatrick

Executive Director

Cc:. DDCI

99

Handle via BrEMAN)

Controk

ystem

SENt

rit

BYE

23

4241-631

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163-2540/1

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director LAK

Reference the attached memorandum from the Director,

I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board

on Tuesday, 23 April, and would appreciate very much your

informing Pat Coyne accordingly. I hope that you will be able

to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures.

If not,

I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate repre-

sentative. If you can find out in advance from Mr. Coyne just

what the Board may want, it would be most helpful. In the

meantime, please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing

memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time!!!

Marshall 3?

Carter

Lieutenant General, USA

Deputy Director

Attachment:

Memo to IDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 (ER 63-2540)

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att

1 - DDCI w/ cy att

1 - ER w/cy att

1052042

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Executive Registry

2 - 2540

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

In discussions with Dr. Killian, he mentioned

that his Board were meeting for one day. He had

been advised that I would be in Europe at that time.

The meeting date is April 23rd. Dr. Killian specifi-

cally requested that you be available for an hour or

so on that date, and I said I would convey this request

to you.

W% s

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(CLASSIFICATION)

B4є 375

Capt

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99

BYEMAN]

8/1998

attor

Assp.

Rod.

Mickle

WARNING

This document contoins information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean-

ing of the espionage lows U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794.

The law prohibits its transmis

sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unouthorized person, as well as its use in any

manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of ony foreign govern-

ment to the detriment of the United Stotes, It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc-

trinated and outhorized to receive information in the designated control channels, Its security must be

maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

(CLASSIFICATION)

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## Page 30

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI

ITION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

INITIALS

1 DCI

Noted

DCI

EvEe DiR

Approud with

3

3 minor changes as

4

noted.

5

ACTION

APPROVAL

COMMENT

CONCURRENCE

Remarks:

DIRECT REPLY

DISPATCH

FILE

INFORMATION

PREPARE REPLY

RECOMMENDATION

RETURN

I SIGNATURE

Distribution to other than DDCI and

yourself awaits your approval.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

Executive Director

DATE

31 Dec 62

UNCLASSIFIED

F09M, N0. 237 Use previous editions

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(40)

# U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981 0- 587282

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28 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a.m.

Specific

Subject

: Discussion of Cuba

1. At 0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the

Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great

amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly

on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the

changes which had been sent to them this morning. The Director

commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he still did

not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important indicators.

Mr. McCone then said that there were one of two other subjects that

he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report.

These are covered in separate memoranda.

2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked

Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report.

The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had

no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his

personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that these

were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the

Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and MI. Coyne

(BYE 37559-627

Home

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+.=

2.

noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McCone

went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt

of his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis.

Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendous

interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should

have copies of them. Mr. McCone replied that he realized this and would

supply copies.

3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian

asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group

had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the

detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose.

Mr. McCone replied no, in fact the Special Group had assisted. He noted

the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the

Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering

through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country

activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and

that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December

of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no

Miami set up. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General

and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why opera-

tions against. Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological

reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been

investigations and there was general discouragement. DI. Killian said

T83 279957

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## Page 33

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wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general

euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great

danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many

other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully

in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that

word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance

over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States.

This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznethov and by Thompson

to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly

two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons fore-

stall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low

level flights. He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical

situation.

4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any probibitions on intelligence

collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a

more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was

important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelli-

gence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said

he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly

this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they

would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would

want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of

operations. This would involve a control of Castro and while they

might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the

907 9E20ET

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capability to do so. Mi. McCone said he was inclined to believe that the

second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort

should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.

5. MI. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort

to penetrate the Cuban government. The DCI said yes, that every effort

should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure

and that more and more agents should be put it. He noted that only this

week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy

asked how many there were in a tam and the Director replied three to tive,

6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts

to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned

the British, Canadiang, Erench? Germans and one or two Latin countries.

He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced

by discussions with Donovan and Nolang. We already know that Castro

had a fight with Che Guevarfa. Castro also spent three hours with the

captain of the African Pilot) and the captain had indicated that he wanted

to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone

said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the

first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities.

He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time

to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concen-

trated on intelligence collection.

TE? SEONET

4.

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5.

7. Mr. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo.

The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo.

He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we

got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian

said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or

not.

8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba

now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present,

but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to

fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this

gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked

out to about once a week. He noed that some areas such as harbors were

covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of

priorities for aerial reconnaissance.

9. Mi. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the

use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for

operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study.

10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during

NO

September and said that apparently effort was made to penetrate critical

areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using

Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a

from

Guantanana

series of agent infiltrations in August, but that this was not approved.

Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these

operations.

TOP 979287

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....

- ..

6.

11. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different

than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The

Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case.

Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his

opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless

of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if (Guantanamo was used for

SIGINT purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and

referred to Mir. Kirkpatrick who read from he ISA memorandum/on

their expanding activities in june, noting the additional positiona

activated in June and the fact that there some floating positions established

near Santiago de Cuba.

12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between

Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first

phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence

potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties.

He mentioned that there were 100, 000 informers organized on a block and

community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled

ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said

the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four

different levels of activity. "A" was the most violent, directed toward

precipitating a revolution. "B" involved extensive sabotage. " B plus"

was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more

activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem

SB00ET

3/к

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7.

is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CLA in the

position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy

would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10,

when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had

discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian

asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he

wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to

Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know.

13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the

accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered

whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates.

Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance

where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the September photography

of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we

know it was for developing missilesites, but the photography could be

interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes.

14. DI. Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear

implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better

camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography,

might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a

different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of

coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were .

reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor

and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin

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## Page 38

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allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might

not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed

and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said

obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the

Soviet Union.

15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact

that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from

a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that

this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this

was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was

putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that

he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and

might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense

budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should

have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. MI. McCone

said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the

reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know.

DI. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an

erroneous impression; e. g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone

acknowledged that this was a danger. DI. Killian asked whether

Congress the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this

danger.

Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also

stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute

dependence on photography.

10P 322227

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16. Mi. Pace commented that since November there had been

72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of time there

had been no U -2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more

important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in

our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse

than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence

on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so

that low level reconnaissance was needed.

The Director said this

wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed

to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were

needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked

if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on

Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted

the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had

moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have dis-

covered the missiles.

17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said

that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive

research program on sensors tò break through camouflage]

18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in

the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He

noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban

TOP

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Substitite language

"technical details"

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10.

crisis.

Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the

State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2

and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitu-

lation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might

interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from

thowe.ver,

covering China North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that,

na second

U-2 had been sent to Formosa and that the wraps had been taken off

Far Eastern reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was

an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone

calls.

19. DI. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the

report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone

replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had

concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as

presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters,

there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.

20. This session was completed at 10:40.

chan

Tymas Kristichh

Krkpatric

Executive Director

LBK:rm

Orig - DCI

cy 2 - DDCI

cy 3 - DD/P

cy 4 - DD/R

cy 5 - DD/I

cy 6 - IG

EPFIAS

coring lite

3hmc

---