CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1104-10065-10086

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

• Do Not Reproduce

CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES

---

## Page 2

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CIA's Performance on the Inguiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha-

sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts

were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or

analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the

years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the

Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every

theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con-

clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is

evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the

intelligence agencies did - in the present instance, what was the

performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying

a patternof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case:

a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as

"D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and

saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose

of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both

by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans

instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to

have occurred.

This subject is treated in a confusing and in-

conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 3

14-00000

CONRIDENTIAL:

b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the

AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately.

The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during

the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in

order to support the SS view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D

of this report.

c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico

City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages, 60-

63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSE Report,

is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November

flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story

removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The

second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance

arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him

thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC

Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final

Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional

criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions.

To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth

and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both

on the part of CIA and the Warren Commission--consideration was given

to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

2

CONFIDENTIAY

---

## Page 4

14.00000

questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those

questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of

inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent

to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959.

These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The

first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in

October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from

which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA,

there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that

might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final

Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA

as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These

four general areas of inquiry are covered below.

I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962

14-Cn 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid,

Copenhagen) (ost), (telstnkt) Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. it noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to

the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his

employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested:

"any scrap information which bears on President's

assassination...."

3

COMPUTE!

31PJ

---

## Page 5

14-00000

CONFIDENTUL

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with

(Helsinky) and London providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British

journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959

there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living

in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern the factions by

official attitude of Govt to which they accredited." (Oslo

on the

same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's

travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by

a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various

reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife

from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the

United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

4

z/|v

CONFOSHAL

---

## Page 6

14-00000

HHU8N123

detailed results although there were some

• operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held

with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's

assassination of Presidant Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report,

in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the

investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will

not be detailed here.

II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get

visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive

attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to

Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern

felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit,

and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at

the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on

28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possibility

that other as yet unknown persons may have

been involved or even that other powers. may

have played a role.

consense

5

---

## Page 7

14-00000

CONFDENTIAL

• allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald takigg, money

ing Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive

sitention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter,

ind with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively

is have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the

time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations

was demonstrated

•to have been lying. After the allegations

¿y "g" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following

statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963:

"Pls continue to follow all leads and tips.

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as

follows:

"Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

propaganda about case.

el

On 17 Dacember 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stated as follows:

...Mexico City has been the only major

overseas reporter in the case.

While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

CONFIDENTIAL

he backsad date

---

## Page 8

14-00000

JUN NOT

• ...

life, we have not overlooked the really out-

standing performance of Mexico City's major

assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded. Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

[Department of Statel and [the FBI].

tries the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in

the quick clarification of the case, blanking

out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as

thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or

Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything,

events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as

counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans

and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more

simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with

speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press

in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations

inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit;

these are commented on at Tab G.

III. General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable

from Headquarters with the following statement:

CORROERTL

7

---

## Page 9

14-00000

~ CONFICENTIAL

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all

of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence

developments. Although we have no reason to

expect anything of a particular military nature,

all hands should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new President

takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other

than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to

field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be

stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and

this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi-

cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative.

It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has

been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant

or significant information on the subject it would have been reported

either in responses to the expression of general interest, or

spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly

involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

COMFIDENTIA

8

---

## Page 10

14.00000

incidentit

would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete

reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis

for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re-

quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to

produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect

at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued,

but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-

what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection

reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in

•the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above)

which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from

other stations:

"... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee

Oswald's life. . ."

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10

about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description

of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was

only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were

sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but

there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor-

mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently

was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As

stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

"Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct

an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was

limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

9

---

## Page 11

14-00000

requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity

in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case

officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic

activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station

as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be

extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the

United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of

page 58.

The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different

terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI

and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of

activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every

question that has been concerned since then.

IV "Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section

that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the

intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance

on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to

Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's

murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported

to be aboard those flights.

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana

flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico

City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this

time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on

10

CONFIORNTIAL

---

## Page 12

14-000

CONFIDENTIAL

22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headquarters. There was one (untlateral)CIA surveillance

team

that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

11.

......

TITANA PORTANT TERED CHEST TESTIMES 521499221L0 ZE

TAB

казать

---

## Page 13

14-

COMRISENTIAL

Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain,

at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record

of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori-

ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no

recorded response. The current review revealed additional information

from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion

of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final

Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City

times are used in the following discussion.

ГАВ

Records show that the flight arrived at the platform

at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed

few minutes earlier.

The departure of the aircraft was

2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation

in

The SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City

for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not

12

---

## Page 14

14-00000

•CONFIC _NTIAL

delayed five hours, as alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City

time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a

private flight with a secret passenger: This also contrasts

further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight.

which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded

substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it

allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of. the Cubana flight, it is

very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported

had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of

these sources and probabiy knew the above facts, feeling no need to

follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its

surmary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con-

siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to

the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the

assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the

§SC Final Report state that:

• • one source alleged that the Cuban-American

was 'involved' in the assassination."

CONFIDENTIAL

13

TAB

IAB

---

## Page 15

14:00000

CONFIDENIIAL

The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI "almost

immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi-

gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Conmission." Further

down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi-

gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual

travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious

travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had

contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC)

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi-

gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau

did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon-

sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report

contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the

results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the

FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting

about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will

be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement

at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who

saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana

on November 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'

..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-

up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

14

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 16

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban-

American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some

inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington

that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December

1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on

23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at

a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a

certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana

flight on night 27 November," a

This was followed by a dispatch the same

date, repeating the basic information in the cable,

and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding

Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana

are suspicious."

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in

history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who

was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as

possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report

of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI;

it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal

memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the

nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

15

CONPIDENTIAL

---

## Page 17

14-00900

CONFBENTH

to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way

into the more careful statements that usually characterize official

reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres-

stonistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic

activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing

the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the

context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled

that a source

alhad information on a man; the description seems to have the

same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the

report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement

that. he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he

entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final

Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts

that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and

times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico

City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his

passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued

in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa,

Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number

of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the

hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time,

when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could

not recall it.

COMFORCE A

16

---

## Page 18

14-00000

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the

record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre-

sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out

that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report

contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When

Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of

Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully

with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63."

It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of

entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained

today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to

highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how

it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information

on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access

to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became

available with such information he was queried and the results

were provided the authorities.

17

---