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124-10168-10040)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI

RECORD NUMBER: 124-10168-10040

RECORD _SERIES: HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116391-41X

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM: PAPICH, SAM

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1970

PAGES: 85

SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE:

ORIGINAL

CLASSIFICATION:

REVIEW DATE:

STATUS

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

Secret

11/03/1998

Redact

NEw

CLASSIFICATION:

UPDATE DATE:

02/12/2001

COMMENTS:

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(A)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES

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10)

siller

use it o

DENTED SENTES CONEROTENT

Memorandum pr.

Pr.or

Rickefeller

Release was made to

commissien

The Director

3/16/81

CLASS. & EXT.

REASON-PCIM IT,

4.2

Sa. San lapich

DATE OF REVIEW

3/13/40

7074773,330

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

CIA INTO ON pO 2IE22

RELATTONS WITH CIA

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFLED

only was Deckissed per

EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN

JohN E. BacoN 8/27/80

OTHERWISE

Reference is mace to my lettors dated

March 5, 1970. In My lettur od larch 5, 1970, 1 stel a and

is important

to emphasiro that the Bureau can

also produce

an citensive list oi justified gricvancos.

It is my under-

standing thas tie Circator desirod that this list be icentiriod.

Encloood hererth is a inct of approxinntoly 75 iters. u

This list should not be considered absolutoly complete.

Propaintion vas prodicatod on my personal recollection and a

LOVior Of bureau rocorda.

To nate this list nore conploto and

specilically reciate would nocessitate the review of thousands

of lilos. Tho enclosca list can be supportod by Burcau records.

1116!

also must be kont in mind in councution with our craluntion

of the alleged CiA grievances whici: I picrinusly listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but

If the Director fools that our Duenu vorli can bonefit by i

personal discusion between the Director and nycli, I an

ravailabao until april s, 1070. I plan to leave the area.

immediately therentior for an extended period.

AC: JOK:

REC- ST

NOPe

62-80750-473

RED-ATTE DISASTE to

80 APR-1 10%6

For information.

Enclosure

CIA HAS NO OBJECTIONITO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDER

1

- M. Deloach

RELEASE OF CIA INFORM

1

Mi. Sullivan

NIHIS DOCUMENT

1

- ir. Prpich

SJP:*

(4)

RPV8/98

Charitiodby T2

Exempt from

Date of Decisitication

121-11-75

finite

1143A120DICA

Classified bal

Declassity on:

OADR

UFK

668.5L0/GCL

219198

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

AS BRACKETEO R6. 3

20 March 1970

MAR 20 1970

KP 1/8/98

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C.

FRE INFO

5668 Suo/Gee

Dear Mr. Hoover:

4{6)

(JFK) 2/9/98 4/2798

We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence

collection engendered by your letter of ll March 1970. We warmly

welcome periodic rcexamination by our two agencies of the implemen..

ration di tne isóó agreemen aud to micron i positire inceiligence

which you proposed.

I concur also with your comments that there is

a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and

counterintelligence coliection.

To be most effective, I agree that it

is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a

continuing analysis o1 clandestine collection activity.

The product is

of growing importance to the national security and to the United States

Intelligence Community.

Therefore we endorse your proposal for a

reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be

conducted.

With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to

the then Director, Vice Admiral William E. Raborn, Jr., the compe-

Itent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an

effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no

major problems have been encountered since its adoption.

I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar

importance to the national security, which warrant periodic recxamina-

•tion since they have a direst bearing on domestic clandestine collection

of positive intelligence.

REC 8

MAY 6 1970

SECRET

GriBSP 1

Exclace: trom cutomatic?

Cannera. in? and

declassilicalien

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• ...

As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe

that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:

• (1)" Audio coverage. Audio coverage provides timely

intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials for

policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance

necessary for the improvement of operational and collec-

tion activity here and abroad.

Audio coverage is unique

production because it is readily subject to local cross-

checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and

costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on

targets which affect directly the national interests.

For several years your Bureau had been recep-

tive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable

coverage.

The quality of your production proved that

jour Buicau alono possessco capabilitico and cxporionas

which cannot be duplicated by any other U.s. agency.

On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio

coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to

positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connec-

tions.

(I refer to the case of d

1) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the

Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney

General for approval.

It is suggested that the question of audio coverage

beireopened between representatives of your Bureau and

this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observa

tions on this subject.

I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive

type of collection should be implemented under rigid and

stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to

maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting

the coverage and for the exploitation of the product. (An

excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective

and secure production of SCOPE. )(S)

2

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(2) Mail Covérage." Another much needed intelli-

gence tool is mail coverage.. Its importance has been

proven in the past.

I have the impression that it has

been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen-

tatives should confer and examine together whether this

assel might be deployed against communications of the

oviet Bloc

Wei, ew taft, and identiried foreign agents.

(3)

CIA Technical Services. A significant expendi-

ture of this Agency's money and personnel has been com-

milied to resparch and development for the improvement

of technical aids.

This Agency has provided your Bureau

with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and

has offered you at cost or giatis our most sophisticated

equipment.

Although we will continue these services, we would welcome

S(S)

any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the

technical field including proposals how these assets' can be

better employed. Your comments will be particularly

appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing

lOpcration

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and

Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive

foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your

main internal security and counterintelligence responsibili-

ties,

I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a dis-

advantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting

processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence.

At our 1966 conference, we offered to institute positive intel-

ligence training courses, including reports writing and

*This section describes sorenses

for

technial intelligences collection.

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analysis,.

for FBI personnel. In soliciting your views on

the desirability. of this type of training, I wish to reiterate

our willingness to provide such instruction.

It would be

designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community

in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting

List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services.

• Given the

growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile

intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI

experts in this field meet as required at our respective

Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices,

in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus

operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of

opposition services.

I know that you will agree with me

that no opportunities for improvement should be over-

looked which might haln on negate the efforts of hostile

services who are charged with undermining the security

of the United States. These sessions should also provide

an opportunity to explore and devise new means to pene-

trate and neutralize these inimical forces.

(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our coopera-.

tion and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defec-

tors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual

effort.

I believe that there is room for substantial improve-

ment in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation

of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these

sensitive sources.

I would invite your thoughts on how we

may better coordinate requirements for these sources and

establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive

intelligence production before it is given general dissemina-

tion within the Government.

Our review would suggest that

there are good reasons for consultation to explore the

development of higher quality live sources, for example

Code cierks. Ts,

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(7) Live Sources in the Non-Bloc Area.. Sources

such as code clerksand diplomats are a fertile field for

procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the

activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern

countries which are expanding their subversive and

terrorist activities, even to the United States. I do not.

feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited

the full potential of this field, and would urge that this

subject be explored by our respective representatives.

(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already

a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limi-

tations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether

both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable

developments.

The increasingly close connection between

these forces in the United States and hostile elements

abroad has been well established by both of our agencies.

(I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how

we can besi emplor mure wisely oui linited tranpovci,

knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings,

hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforce -

ment officers, is international in scope.

(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal

Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts

in this area but there may be room for improving the quality

of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection.

Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic

re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies

to make mutually-agreed adjustments.

Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal

judgment in affairs bearing on the national security.

I know that your

experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our

country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the

foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item

which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.

Faithfully yours,

Richard Helms

Director

SEGRET

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CASES AND/E: SITUATIONS

INVOLVING CON LICTS WITH THE

CENTRAL IXPOGLIGEICE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) NOCASE (TUY RORIS MORROS CASE)

This vos a sensitive Sovict-espionage case

which originated in 1945 and terminated for the most

(part in 1957. The case hird many wide foreign ramifi-

cations and historically has been, and undoubtedly

will be, one of the most important and involved cases

of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We

did not dissominate any intormation of signilicance

' in this case until 1954. On various occasions when

the Linison agent has become involved in heated argu-

ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise

this case as an outsionding example of FBI failure to

cooperate with the Afoncy.

The position taken by CIA

that it shouid have been auvised regurding the

Soviet opcrational activity in foreign countries,

claining that

the Agency rould have had the opportunit;

to develop more intornation of significance, identify

Soviet ag

Its, and possibly preparo conditions for

, recrutner or dubling of Soviet operatives.

We did

not dissominate our reports to CIA because of the

extreme sensitl.ity of the case. Ve actually did not

permit Cil to handle any investications relating to

Ithe HOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA conplained that it certainly had

every right to have raccived the information earlier

because nany aspecto of the liCCASE portained to CIA

employces and operations.

had been greatly handichpped in effectively carrying out

the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the

Agency at the same tine that the case vas publicized.

The drency argucd that the failure of the Bureau to

coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case

permitted i french t

permitted the french, rather than the U.S., to play a

I dominating role in Europe.

PER MANGOLD RELEASE /CLA.

88-1826)

5668 solace

(0)(6)

(57K) 2/9498 442/98

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How

nuch

information CIA has developed over

the years

concerning out operational activity in

Mexico City is ualknown.

however, we should bearin

mind that former Special Agent George Munto

many of our operations

in Mexico, including key intor-

mants, and subsequently began performing services for

CIA after he left the Burenu.

We also should not

forget that Americans operating in Latin American

countries for one agency are hoavily exposed to the

resourcea o anather U. se intelligence or investigative

agency.

This Agent Inows from personal

experience that

operating in these areas constitutes a "very small vorld"

and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CiA has no. raised the point for

several years, the prevailing attitude mas, and probably

still exists,

that the fBI

did not play it square with

STA in the Abel

ago by not maring contain that the

Agency mes given the proper recognition foi its contri

¡butions.

CIA fcols that in the first place,

there would

not have been any U.S. access or availability to the

source in this cuse, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA tool:

the full responsibility for noving

Hayhanen from France

Ito the U. S. in 1957.

Cia clains it took the risk and

responsibility of doing this after the Burcau declired

to become involved in any operation designed to transport

Hayhanen to the U. S.

It should be noted that Hayhanen

was an alcoholic and

thet his first contacts with CIA

In Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental

istability.

After Hayhonen arrived in the U. S., ve

arlanged access to him for a period, the pulpose of

which was to obtain a conplete story of his intelli-

gence activitics in the U. S. and we were particularly

interested in identifying all of his associates, es-

pecially the man

who later was identified as Rudolph

Abel.

After a short handling period in the U. S., ve

dropped Hayhanen because he became a problen.

It was

an extremoly critical situation because we had not yet

identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility

Hor the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but ne

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countries with

far batter. inpressions than in the

past.

In addition, we have learned nore about these

countries, their scryices, and

their security chiels

by spending & fow minutas

with thom.

Heedless

to say,

this

kind oi trectment has

aldo imensurably helped

our Legal Attacles.

INTEREST IN SOVICT ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

In 1965,

the Dutch Internal Security Services)

had been engaged in Soviet-espionage

activity.

inquiry at the

with the Dutchfureau.

At that time, our relations

id been practically nonchistent because

the ButchShed failed to honestly

(Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile - 100-11116)

(8) COLONEL JOY GROMBACK (FAT O'RIDE)

Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S.

Arny officer who, during World War Il, established

private intelligence network, operating throughout the

world but prinarily in Lurope.

His sources included

any number of buropean exiles

who came to the U.S.

While he was in businoss, he was financed by the State

Jeparthent

then the Department of the arny, and in the

later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA.

Grombach

established contact with the bureau through one of

his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called

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on

us and furnished information which Gronbach felt

was of intorest

i:.o

This discomination through

Pat O'Brien continued during the period of Grombach's

relationship with CIA. We never intormed CIA that we

were roceivang such intornation which aiso vas ot

interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach

had given the same data to CiA but we do not know.

CIA

and Grombach cloched and the reiationship vas severed

in an atmosphore of severe bitüorness,

succossfully penetrated the latter's organization and

allegedly had icontified many of

the souice?.

CIA

hinted to the Linison ligent that it had become aware

of the relationship between Gronbach's organization

and the bureau.

How much CId roally learned about

this relationship is not known but is its penetrations

were significant,

the Agency may have developed evidence

to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld infor-

nation

fron Cia.

partrouisely when ve vore receiving

the data

fyom an

organication tich was financed by

the 1g0sor

(Eud110 - 02-77906)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE

ORCAIIZAXION OF THE

EXECUTIVE PRANCIL DE TIP GOVENIENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1951)

In October, 1054, & tosk force of the captioned

Comission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under

the leadershipo General Wark W. Clarli.

In January, 1955,

we were advised by a representative of

the task force

that Sonator Joseph loCarthy had furnished the group a

list of CIl employces who were considered subversive.

CIA becane cognizant of this development and there was

talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished

the names to the Senator.

When the liaison agent was

informally approached on this, he

flatly told the Agency

to officinlly submit its charges.

The Agency never did.

What information CiA may have had on this matter as it

pertained to the Bureau is not Inown.

It is possible that

the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge

that we maintained liaison with the Semtor's Committee.

(Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-30750)

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•(10) INTORNAL. SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950°5,

we gave our Legal Attaches

nunerous icads atoming fron internal security cases in

the U.s.

In many instances we did not see fit to

notify CIA although

the agency always maintoined that

you could not soparate "intornal Security" fron "counter-

intelligence," namely a lead in fronce pertaining to &

communiss inntte U.S, mrranted adristug olay 2t not,

at least asling the agoney to handle the lend.

In the

Inst sevoral veers, it is not believed that there is

any basis for compinint since ve have regulerly been

notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases vo travel

abroad.

In the Logal attache is investigating, CiA is

notified in order to avoid duplicate efto.ts.

There

have been exceptions mere we have taken the position

that CIA should not be notified because if the sensitivity

of the matter.

How many such exceptions are known to

Cia cannot be established trom our tiles:

shouid wour in mind that mei cur boach artoches taves

tigate, they contact many of the sone foreion officials

normally contacted by CiA. How many of these foreign

officials are CIA intormantegor on the Agency paysoll,

is unknown.

(11) BURRAU OPARATIONS IN CUBA

that country. During the period we operated these

we did not coordinate our operations yith

incoral did not advice the Acency that ve had such

CIA.

sources however, in 1900, after Castro

came on the

scene,.

it became infeasible to handle certain informants

in a secure nanner dis.

approval was granted to turn certain

informants over to

What these informants may have

subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is

unknown.

This iten is boing cited in the event CIA had

evidence to catablish that we hod been operation. in

сира ала пас до

coorcinated with the Agency pursuant

to DireCtIveS.

Memorandum Donahoe to Beimont, February

5,

1960, re: "Partido Socialiata Popular," 64-200-210, 2377

and lemorandun Frohbose to

Belnont

(Narcisco Tauler encrictoing)

134-5639,-1)(6)

February 3, 1960, re:

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(S)

(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1059

In 1959 the u.s. Ambassador in "Brazil accused

our Legal Attache of cosogin, in uncoordinated coveri

intelligence

activity

"of a nature mhich I bolieve

excreds his terns of r'oferenco."

The Anbassodor lurther

indicated that CIA was uncony over the Loral Attaches

activities and

the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador

that the Legal steacho had dissoninated information from

a souxce who was a

fabricator or a provocator.

situation arose as

i result of the legal attache:

peration of an informant in Erazils) Some of the

information that he received from

the informant vas

of a derogatory

nature and relatod to a Brazilian

was being

touted as & Fresidential candidate.

CIA

astred for the idontity of the informant and ve told

the agency that the person could not be identified

because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed.

This case is being cited becuuse

_CIA may have evidence

That ve noc been operationai in ruza Shed not coordi-

nated purcuant to Dircotives, and that the matter was

further occravated because of the alleged unreliability

of the inforbation.

Memorandum Roach to Belront,

May 2, 19530

"gillian I. Friedman, Legal Attache,

Rio de Janeiro," 07-429340) and (Hemorandum Roach to

Belront, nex

1959

re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities -

Frazie,

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

In dune, 1957, ou Phochix Office presented a

problem concerning the Buroau's handling of informants

on the Mexican border.

These infornants were opcrating

inside Mexico.

The problen was predicated or situations

which might arise as the resulü of CIA's endeavors to

develop informants who already were being handled by the

Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could

come in coninet with such sources and could make approaches

for r'ecruitment. It was recommended and approved that

in order to protect our coverage in the border aren, a

valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would

continue

to be utilized even it he were contaced by CIA.

Our policy vas

that we would not identify our sources to

the Ageicy.

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Now much crA learned about our border coverage

is not known

Again,

polated out that former

Burenu Agent George Munzo Say have been Inowledreable.

As indicated,

he later bogan: porforming services 1or

If CIA

learned that we were opereting infornants

• in toxico, it couls use such intoration as additional

evidence of Bureau inilure to cooperate and coordinate

with the

Agency pursuant to Directives.

(Memorandum

Roach to Belmont, dune 14, 105%, re"Communist Coverage

ДлОUБ,СОС-9х4000 30х905, 591942945

39240 deta

1-2-.3

100-35601512389

(14) CAMPORT CASE 7E)

captioned

shnute be infamed eoncerning thestnuble Arent's

to Svitzerland Sit is recommended and approved thet we

not suvice CiA.

What is important

haye is that CIA established

contact withyour double agent

one point. The Ageney

may have had further contact

Wthout our knowledge.

The

Agenog may. have also picked up the contact with the Soviet S

in Switzerland. Sthe cose is being highlighted since we

the possibility that the agency hag

to demonstra

¿that we vere operntional In Puropos evidence

did not coordinate with the Agency.

(lemorandum Breniran

to Belmont, june 10, 1957, re; @CARPORT, " 10526453-1825)]S)

(15) CIA REQUESTO FOR L REAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On Septenber 25, 1958, CIA inquired if l. C.

Sullivan could give & lecture on the communist movenent

in the U.S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the

lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts

of the Government.

The Dircetor made the notation "We

cannot make Sullivan avnilable to this outfit." The

Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

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to cooperate.on.a

nost inportant subject of interoet

to both agencies.

(Memorandun Sullivan to Betnont,

October

• 1, 1955, r0: "Request jor Lecture on Counica

by CIA, ")

(10) Cres Or

On July

9,

1956, en official of the State

Deportment contidentialty savised the Bureau that a

CIA employee in Moscow, had been

involved in an attair

According

to oui source,

allegedly had furnished information

to the f viet

We checked with the State Department

and CIA und we confirnod that

i had bech involved in

an aflair and that he had been recalled.

CIA end State Deportment, there vas no indication that

a hed been involved in any espionge aguinst the

U,S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau

to identity its source and then changed ito mind.

Whether CIA has documonted this as an instance there

the Bureau sciled to cooperate by not volunteering the

source is a natter of conjecture but, it is a cose that

should be kept in nind.

(Burile -

(17) THIE

OPERATION

In April, 1963, we becare involved with CIA in

that Agencyis efforts to

COLLACE SENSITIVe 1NICrMaL10

relating to french covernment

Intentions to conduc

espionage arainst the U.

9

CiA had access to a sensitive

1865, CIA inforned us that our Legal Attache in Carlasta

locally contactca Cla concerning this natter.

CIA Mend-

quarters was highly disturbed because its office infariss)

had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency

wanted

to be inforned rogarding the nature and the extent of our

dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache.

We

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ned that the Logal Attachehad made inquiries in

our a response to folds wuch had beion tent iren Eurer

Headquarters.

This matter is being highlighted beccuse

it nas a vitally inportant oporation to CIA and the agency

had received indications that intornation had been leaked

to French auchoritios.Ste huve no evidence or reason tó

that the Legal Attache Office ever involved iczeli

in any such leal.

however,

ve should not, under any cir

cumstances,

alacgunt the fact that Clothes penetrared

sand has hed access

to sensitive, information

Parisal The Wrenchynave always

had an outstanding cap.

of tapping phones and installing microphones in

Paris. Sisuch coverage on U,s. officials. including their

residences, Should never be excluded. The information ve

had conveyed to our vo

el attache possibly may have beer

acquired by the french through clandestine coverage.

CIA

possibly could charge us with nandling their sensitive

information in an incooure unnner by trangnitting it to

purif thou conferring with the agancy.

In connection with

alleged French esotonage

activity in the Jo

Se, CIA has never been satistied with

the efforts made by the Bureau.

The Agency possibly couid

taire the position that no looked lightiy it the allogations

and did not purque a ma

er which,

in their eyes.

merited

a more aggressive approuch. (Bufile -

or some time. Cia has held to

a position that

the trench Intelligence

Service (SDICE)Is penetrated i

the Soviets Is the Agency has pointed out that if the French (;

are collectino sensitive infoination in the U.s., the

product is ending up infloscowS/In January,

reviered the status of ou investigation of Grench Intel-

ligence activities in the U.s.

The Director commented

"I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the port

of CIA which has been played as a sucker by

I would waste no more time on it at least until a1l CIA

restrictions are

by not manitan enovod." ClA did imose restriciiens

us to pursue certain loads because it

feared that its sensitive source woul, be jeopardized.

(Bufile -

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from CIA.

We did not obtain clearance from ClA fOr

the inclusion ofthis intoration in our monograph.

Clearance approval vas not obtained because of the

ursency of pre

cin was irritated bechuse

Le coas dared a coen a distinct violation on the

third agency rule. The hgency "never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORLANTS IN GUATEMALAIS)

In 1966;

,and 1967, ve were operating informants...

in Guatenala]SAt the inception of our operational ac-

CIA was not intormed.

• In one case, we finally

were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA

whereby the Burenu vould be pernitted to run the informant

in (Guatemain K)in the second instance, we established an

HE COLIN CON

infornation collected fion the informant.

Theao two cases

had all the makings oi a condict.

Can was under one

definite impression that ve had boen running these

normants before we had finally coordinate with them

tie true that fthe CIA Chief in (Guatenala Was muel

incensed but no Issue vas made at CIA Headquarters and

theratter was put to rest.

CIA may nave developed concrete evidence that

we were operating in Guatemala bearing in mind that in

a placo such is Guatomala City shit would not be difficult

spot an ISt. Agent in

ontact with Cuatemalans GOur potential vulnerability 1

nat we were operatint in Guatenala Pithou

coordineting

with Cia.

(22)

The information emanating from the caption 1

sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA

and other agencies for several years.

The sensitive

suurce has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips

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(25) ESTACLISEUENT OF BURSAU LIAISON WITH

QUECT MERMAL SECUREY SB077C4 1030

In danuary

traveled to Holland for the purpose

1960, out Legal Attache, Bonn,

been handled through CIASmile indicated that before there

was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for

CiA and rBi to come to come

form of an agreement.

Alleo

Dulles subsequently exprossed disappointment in that his

Agency had not been contected by the Bureau prior to

exploring the liaison arrangenent.

We eventually conferred

with CiA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all

parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite this as in instance where

we failed to coordinato with the Agency in line with

National. Security Council Mirectives

Memorandum Prohhore

to Belmont, larch s, 1060, re:

"Legal Attacie

Operations

Norway, lonmark, Sweden, and the liotherlande," 66-18973-123)

In the latter part of 1059 we gave considoration to

establishing a Legal Attache in Copennagen,. Denmark:.

The

purpose of the assignuent was to follow Bureau leads in

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland.

We did not inform

CIA of our intentions.

(lenorandun Frohbose to Belnont,

January 14,

1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations, The

Netherlands, " 66-18973-113)

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTORINTALLIGENCE

INVORLATION TO FOREION SERVICES - 1962

By letter dated Novenuer 7, 1962, CIA raised

questions concerning the propriety of Burcau dissemination

of counterintelligence information io foreign intelligence

services.

CIA, at that time, had particular reference to

cion which our lord hitache had transmitted to the

Green Intelligance Service concerning ob opcrations. CIA

took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with

CIA PrIOT

to such dissemination.

The particular data

had emanated fron one of qui consitive me

sens sources

8. Ve rosn ided to CIA by stating that the

inforaation was the product of an internal, security

operation and did not rciate to any operational activity

abroad.

CiA again surrendered.

The Agency could argue

that it was rosponsible for toiloving soviet matter.

vith the Green Intelligone Service and that ve had

obligation of coordinating with the Agency.

(Memorandun

Bronigen to Sullivan, Hovenber 9, 1962, re:

(27) "THIS INVISIOLS GOVERNHENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY

DAVIL WISE AND THOLAS ROSS

In August, 1963, we received information indi

cating that Vise and Ross were in the process of gathering

material for a book pertaining to activitics of U.s.

intelligenon actinttioe:

Bott

Roan and Wise contorted

the Bureau.

It was reconnonded that linison orally advise

that those two individuals vere

preparing a book con

cerning U. 5, intelligenco agencies. Thi Director noted

"I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was avare of the contact

with the Bureau.

Wise and Ross subsequently published the

book which contained extremely derogatory information

concerning CIA.

(Memorandun Jones to Deloach, re: "David

Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross 0f

the "Chicago Sun Tines")

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITISS - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would

give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward

developing coverage in Africa.

CiA was looking tor the

services of any Negro informant who might be available.

The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in

the

Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as

an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau

would recstablish technical

surveillance coverage on

who CIA felt was a key figure in tho

"oy serent 1ie ancelligence cata to the

• Intelligence service ole declined to reinstitute

the: coverage..Ci considered the matter important becnuse:

of its relationship to the ideast crisis. 1e)

On October 21, 1969, we toid CIA that future

requests from Cla for technical surveillance.covorage

should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the

Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official conmeni or

protest but it has considered the aforc-nentioned action

by the. Burenu as unfriendly and uncooperative.

The Agency

has looked to the Buranu

as the logical point of contact

and

as the only organization having the resources and capabilities

of adequately detormining if such coverage is even feasible.

(se)

The Liaison Agent recalls fragnents of oth:

situations or conflicts which occured over the years und

which resulted in

1 the voicingot CIA displeasure or criticism.

The Agont cannot recall the nunes of the cases which is

necessary to acquire the required data.

There was one

instance corly in the 1950's which involved information

received fron a source of unknown reliability charging

Alien Dulles with having been a communic and a spy while

in EUrOpe.

We disseninated the information to several

agencies. Dulles esploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when

CIA, alleged that its source o1 informant was compromised by

Bureau revelation of CIA infornation during the course of

interviews conducted by us.

Techuically, this would be a

violation of the third agency rule and,

if CIA had hard

core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly it an

important informant was lost. CIA never nade any official

issue or protest.

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LIST OF SUARU CRIMICES

1.

ATTICS CAINST BURPAU (HEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - [951)

Although Agent Papich did not berin handling Linicon

with Ca: until 1052, it is inportani to reicr to highly signi-

ficini differonoes with CIA wich culminated in a serious

conflict in the foil of 1901.

and Paris reported thai ClA representatives vere attocking the

Burcal, were endeavoring to piace us in an uniavornble light,

were questioning our juricdiction, and vere maiing disparaging

remarks concerning the Burcau.

some of this was sunned up by

characicrising it as covert hostility within Cid, stenming

largoly from disgruntled jorner enployees of the fBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Bedull Snith, then

Director of CIA, asked to

meet with the Diroctor and other

Bureau represontatives for the purpose of discussing the

existing difierences.

General Smith denied that there was any

court hostilito arcinst the Bureau and mintained that there

was & gene a)

fealing of respect for us.

there ind been isulated instances of friction for which Ci

. must

accept its share of rosponsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other

Burenu officinis did meet with Ceneral Snith, at which tinc

guidelines wore set forth for maintaining future relations

between tho tro agencies.

I was not able to find a monorancin

of second coving this meeting. (taste

2. PROSPLYNING ON EUSZIU PERSONAL BY CIA

The Archt clearly recalls that early in the 1950's

tie encountered difficultion with CiA because the Agency allegedly

was recruiting bureau cnployed personnel. We vigorously pio-

the Agency advised that it would follow

a policy of not having'any contact with a Bureau employee until

the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period

of at least thirty anys.

The Agent could not locate the badl

ground of this matter in the filos revieved by him. It is pos-

sible that the pertinent information lies in the porsonnel file

of some fornci Bureau Agent.

KP 48198

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''PY 5668 Scoloc

TORODO A

(JAR) 246198412/98

Q(6)

62-88750-4784

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7. CAGE OF POLISE CESMEN - DETECTORS - 1954

*w"By Totter dated october 13, losa;

a very stron

letter

'Defector Commadlee at CRA:

or peotest von sent to generated ioutar rado scrorence to

Botts of the Intergency

political asylum which vas

being considered for coxtin Polish

who had been seized by the Chinese Natsonalist Government.

General Dotte dissominated a memorandum indicating that members

of the Committed had agreed that in view of commitments made

by the Unitod States and Chinose ofticials, that failure to

arrange re-entry for

tie Polish seamen would have an adverse

effect on the over-all United States Defector Program.

Ve

emphasized to General Botts

that this metter had never been

officially

presented before the Defector Committee. He ras

inforned that his action vas not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8.

CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIINS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION

VITI ALLEY DULLES DEPOSUBER 27. 195

1955

On september 27, 1955, the Linicou

Agent met with

Allen Dulles, at which tive the CIA Dircetor's attention was

referrod to a matter wich had not yet developed into

& serious

situation but it not properly followed could lead to conflicts

between the two agencios.

Dulles was referred to the contacts

of aliens in the Unitod

states made by CIA personnel without

first obtaining the necessary clearance fron the bureau.

The

recuirement for such clerance was clear-cut and purcuant to an

establiched esteement. (62-30750; menorandun Roach to Belmont

September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In Hovember, 1955, an incident arose

when Cis approaches

a. National loademy sraduate

to utilize his corviceskin Guaterala.

This approach was marie while the graduate ras attenaine National-

Academy classes.

A protest vas made to ley CIA officials for

not having advised us prior to

establishing contact with the

Academy graquate. (Re:

10.

In December, 1955, we received information 1 dienting

that ciA was in contoct with on indivicual whon the Bureau was

developing for utilization in i double agent operation.

We

Icarned that CIA representatives had established contact with

a and had given hin some advice and guidance without

first chocking with the burcau. We protested to CIA.

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that he had been advised by & CIA official

that the Thi

*would be furhishtng operational nuidence to. him. We had never w

become involred

In My

such

arrangenent.

and we

later determined

thata.Clrorficlnl/hod.coon.ah.orvor.an. noting. the 2bavp

described miscopresentation.

protoatod the CrA

officia

handling of this mattor. (Re:

4)

15.

On July 20,

1353,

date mined

hat one wa

had been in contact

with the Caes

Military Attaches

Washington, D. C:

We further ascertained

that

TAS

CIA employee. We were inforned by CIA

on

July 21,

1950,

that

the agency has no inforwuson concerning tastes reported

the Caochoos We later intorviewed

it was indicated thet

2. CA

indicat concern hid in tant had on a corict ni

Attache

¿We protested

and CIA submitted a

retter of apolony

(Momorsmum Belmont to Boaronon July 21, 1066

62223

16.

In July,

1056, a statement was made by a state

Department official.

the effect that a CIA

employee allegedly

had

advised that the subject, do soviet agenty as beins per-

mitted to onter the United States so that his activities

could be covered

and so

that the

Bureau would be in a position

to pronote a defection.

the bureau was not in possession ot

any

information indicating that ve had sanctioned the entry

of

the subject for the purpose described above.

she State

Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA

employee involved; inquiry a: CIA woe negative.

We were not

in a position to identify the CIA employee without conduccing

up with the identity. lie:

17.

By letter dated November 8, 1955,

we strongly pro-

tested to CIA bockuse represontatives of that Agency had inter

viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining

Clcarance fron the Bureau.

It should be noted that there was

a well-established af cement whereby it was incumbent upon

CIA to first check with the bureau beiore intervieving

any

alien in the United States. (letter to CIA November 8, 1956,

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18.

Dianes ras a tormer student it colunth University

with when we had been in contact because oi ha

association

with a Bovie"

sansinned to the Unitsy nations@in Decenber

1959 г.

an unidenti

ividual

• letter

that the

cine in the well tie dece

indicating

interested in cooporating with the United States.

When (Lennon]s)

returned to the United States, we permitied CIA to interview

the subject because of the Agency's forei

ests.

He subsenuently interviered @emeneat wich take inter

Incorned us that he had been chutioned by cid not to fuinsch

pertine. t incorntion to the Bureau.

scatchour Was mode. Me: Darrell Patricl: Ilemmer)S)

10.

CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCEANING A HIGH-SPEED CAMORA-

1957

The Sen Francisco Office furnished information

indicating

thot CIA had requested a

pertaining

to a high-speed conore manufactured by

the company.

The mutter was revioned because we wanted to be certain that

CiA was not invading our jurisdiction.

We did not develop

evidence that cra hed overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director

did

make & noticion,

"O.Ko, but it does seen to me

we give CIA

& pictly wide authority

to explore such a field. H"

(Menorandun

Belmont to Boardhan April 10, 195%, 'Flow of

Intelligence Information to soviets and Satellites through

So-Called Channels"')

20 €

On Hay 23, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repre

sentatives in the field had interviered the captioned ta

alien who had amced to cooperate with the Agency aiter he

2101057. 6

returnea to ba

CIA conducted this interview without

first obtaining cionrance from, the Bureau.

Such clearance was

necessary pursuant to an esinblished

protest was made to the Agency. (Re:

agrecment.

• A vicorous

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21..

CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR

REPRESENTATIVOS - 1957

COLOMBIAN INTRILIGENCE SERVICE

SIn July, 1957, ClA requested a tour for several:

[Colombian officiots vio

were coming to this country under ClA

ciA was toid that no tours vould de riven to th

Coloubians Sbecause in the past a Colombian embassador ha

grossly insulted the Bureau aiter we had arrested the

ambassado:'s chauffour on White Slave Traffic Act charge.

If Ne so desired, ve could give consideration to

accusing CIA of trying to

impose upon us individuals whon ve

considered undecicable in light of the foregging.

(Memorantum duly 15, 1057, Mooch to Belmont "Representatives

of Colombian Intelligence

Service

- Request for Bureau 'Pour

by CIA")

22..

REQUEST FOR SECURINY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS • NEW YORK CITY • 1957

(и)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was con-

tacted by

the local Cid representative who desired to be in

formed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the

prenises of the councid on coreiga herations which were located

ACIOGS

the street from & byilding occupied by thersoviet

United Nations Delegation The CIA representative indicate

that his visit to our office vas pursuant to instructions

recerved Iron aLden Dulles who.

Arlegedy vas concerned 200ul

the possibility of the Soviets

stablishing covernge of

conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council.

It should be noted that the Council included as members many

well known porsonalities, including officials of the United

States Government.

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles vas informed

on Movenber 18, 1957, that

we did

not like

by CIA in

that

such

the agproach used

a sensitive matter had been taken up at

the field level rather

than through Bureau Headquarters.

(Menorancum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council

on Foreign Relations")

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23.

1957:

we received information

from

indicating

thata Polish scientist then visiting in

the united (S

States might defect.

We followed develonnents through &

and ve. kept Cis advised.. The Agoncy was fully avare of the

situation and particularly lnow

that ve were

in contact with

He subsoquently received information indicating that

orployees estaolined contact with

(S

proporly coordinating

that the action

taken by

a Burecu operation. (re:

A protest was made to CIA for not

their interests

with us,

bearing in

possibly could

have

icopardized

24.

By letter dated February 10, 1953, we directed a

that agency with interviewing the

2 Romanian alien, without first obtaining the nec

cesary clearance mom the

Eurect. Be:

25.

ALICED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYED

On April 23,

1058, we received information indicating

that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being

with the FBl when she tricd to arrange an intorview with

, an official of the international Association

of

Machinisis ti Washington, D. C.

gave a signod statement

in which he clained that

had received a phone call from a

Miss

(asses who

said she wus with

the

POle

Upon checking with

CIA,

we vere inforned that Miss

Mas denied that she had made

such

ropresentatich. Gemorandum

Mosch to Belmont April 25,

1958, "Unknown Subject; A

26.

By letter dated liny 12, 1958, the Bureau protested

to CIA for interviowing an alien

in the Detroit arca without

first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.

Such clearance

was necossar

pursuant to established agrecment.

(Re:

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30 .

GENERAL RGINIARD GOGLEN

The 10r21

attacis, Monu, advised by lecier caree

June

1953:

he had been invited to visit veneral

Gehlen

Ane houd of the best Goran intelligonce service slenird

becane

and

informed our legal

Attache that is was not desired that the

Legat vicit with Gonlen.Sour logot was instructed by the Bureau

to accept the invitation

regardLess

of the CiA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as

being

uncooperative. (Monorandun Roach to Belnont June 17;

1953, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTONESE IN CHINESET AT TINSCS

In June, 1958, we rada:d

the question concerning

CIA's failure to achere

• to an arrooment relating to CIA's

recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United states for over

(S)

the arreement.. CIA was

not to approach any Chinese alien without firet chocking vith

(S)

us.

A situation developed in Illinois indicating thet CIA

allegedly hod become intercoted in recruiting an alien and

even took some action without tinst checking with us.

We

expressed our disappioval in a letter to ClA June 12, 1958

(emoweneum Belnont to Boarduan June 9, 1953, "Recruitment (S)

of Chinese Aliens in the United Statos for Overseas

Intelligence Operations)

32..

CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Toryo, obtained a copy of a meo

randun sent to an oitician in our embassy in toryo by f

Chief of the CIA office in Japan. In his cornunication

belittled the value of "insters

Dacoity as an anticonnuriet

(S

weapon in foreign countries.

He clained that the book nertined

only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a

He statod

that t a author of

tlie book was not an intellectual but rather

1959,

"Masters of

Deceit.")

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33

CIA DEVELOPHENT OF INDONIOIAN GOVERNT SOURCES IN

THE UNIND SLA2Z&.

In May, 1053, CIA. furnished idontifving and back

ground date concerning three

individuals

E2, 0nd

all entoyees of the

Indonesian

Lovernment and assigned to the United States.

Am heroen developed as a source of information by CIA

Cane

to Ct in Washington, D. C.

and volunicored his services.

renas hnd been developed as

a source by CiA and

had

been furnishing

some intormation

to

the Agency. In & letter datod june

24,

1953, we told CIA

that in the case oi Else, ve felt

that the

Agency should

have notified us at an eczlica date in order that ve could

have considcred caploitacion for internes security purg

JOS

at the outset. (e: Indonesiannetivities - 100-2547491 S

34.

(MICHAE, COLDENESKI, A

AKA DE. HEINRICH SCHUTZE

The subdoes,

2. 102nse n03602 C6 the 00112

I21021280n0e

Service, defectod to

the united neares and furnishes

extremely

valuable information.

The beginnings of this case include

Internation raising questione concerning CIA

cooperetion.

In June, 1953, we developed.

indicating

that CIA May, have opened a letter in

Switzerland Which had

been natessed to the Director by an

identified hinselt as Di. Heinzich Schutees, The wrifer

further

indicated that he might be connected with the Polish Sntelligence

Service.

The letter addressed to the Director had been placed

in turn, had ended up

in ine office of

che United States Ambassador in FritzeriandSWe subsequentl;

recelved i copy of the pesticular comunication from Cia,

and the contents were such at that tine that no action wus

required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars. lending

to the alleged oponing of the lettor which had been addressed

to the Director.

CIA clained that it had not opened the

the matter to CiA.

tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA

in Europe.

nat actually happened at the Unired States Oubassy

s somathins le ay never inow. (richal Goleniencki - 65-651927 5

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35

By letter dated Junc

26

regarding Chl's-alleged.interview o

22063

....

we yoiced our concer

Annesa alien whom: CIA.

was concidoring for overseas recruitment.

CIs denied that an

approach of. the alien had.boon, moder Our investiotion contra

dicted tho

statonents

emanating ironiCA.

(Resa

Bureaü file E

36.

COPRONIST OF TRY TOUTCA SURVILICE COMINAGE] (S)

On

July 18, 1065, CIA requested the Burenu for

permission

obtained

to play a recordias of a telephone cos ations,

the Bureau to kind Mussein of Jordan

On JuDe 5, 1053,

we had obtrinod the contents of

Rousan os the Jordanian Embassy and

The convorsation

strongly

closely with ths

ryptian.

Micated that X"

the sayptied meeting

information

evolutionary

indichting

plot,

do he do one in chove

objective of which was to ovorthrow

Rousan

returned to Jordan

and was imprisoned by

King

1145s01!

3aG20

upon

information made available through Cia.

denicd

any

implication in any revolutionary activity

and

he was strongly supported

tain

top officials in the

Jordanian

Government.

1010 CIA

not he was on the

spot and

that

he

noeded

Proof Of Rousan':

Poneniratoria:

activity.

CIA

acked

if we would permit

to

played

to the

Kin!

) stressing

that this was the only way

King

Hussien

could

be convinced

On

July 18,

CiA official vas advised that

the Bureau posit

yely

of the recordingS) lie maintained

permission,

be seriously imperile

our other coverage of a sensitive nature could

On July

• 35.

1958,

Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau

would roconsider

position in view of the critical situation

in the Middle Eastio) Pursuant to instructions, ClA vas then

tole that in view

of the position in which the Bureau had been

placed, we acceded to Dulles'

request.

CIA was further told

that we were seriously considering the termination of all of

our tochnical surveilances

did not intend to be

placed in such a position in the inture.

on July 22:

1058, Dulles told

the Liaison Agent

that he was vory much disturbed over the Director's reaction

He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to

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in we head at tones none to was deliste

nting wether or not the Eccordin

reconmended.

that the

Liaison

Agent

pur de of entert to me Gutrun

they, the matt

the matter for the

ised liy CIA.

The Directon's notation was,

Sat is in

the-fire now

1t.1 noelcos

in unste. any more tine on it.

We will

any cotails

in Fearson's column.

The strong ponition ve toot in

resisting

tho

dissemination of such sensitive inforation to a

government

Wan fully 3ugta2109e

Monoranown roach. to Belmont

dated July

re "CIA Nequest for Permission to Play

37.

CIA AILEORD PANTICIPATION IN MEXICAN COVERMENT

DEPORTION Or AMERICAY COMMUNISTS

In 1250, CIA officially informed us that

it was

engaged in. a program designed

to diarupt overall communist

activity in loxico.

He became concerned because this program

1125

to involve dopartation of undosirables, including

American

communists residing in Vexico.

The

implomentation of

such

progran could

nave

renuice in do cellen or Anericon comminisis

to the

United States.

CIA denied that it was engaged in any

operation

Specifically designed to cust Anerican communists.

In September, 1055; we were informed that the Mexican Government

hac

enbaried on a

strong anticommunist program and certain

americ ins wore ordered

deported.

We checked with CIA and the

Agency's

chie?

involvod

in Moxico City clained that his Agency was not

(u)

The Liaison Agent subsoquently was informed on a

strictly confidential basis that

the Anorican Anbassador had

been in contact with certain Mexican citicials concerning

possible anticommunict activities.

The Ambassador had concultod

with the locnl CIA chief and had asked for a list of Anericans

who could be considered as beins deportable.

The CIA officor

reportedly furnished a

list of approxinately 40 names.

(melo -

randum Roach to Belmont, Soptenber 17,

1058,

"iegal Attache,

Office, Mexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CIA)

4)

38.

We expressed our displensure to CIA il

i September,

1958

tho

because of that Agency

United

States of

seen the das here in none-

tion with an exchange

progran.

The Romanian indicated to an

erican friend that he wie interested in staring in the thes

States,- but was

not roady for actual defection because of

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to notify the Barenu

lotter dated Septembor 16,

1950, was

also: cont.10.

and he was told that the burcau wis

disappointed

in.hin because he

had failed to make any objection

to the article and had not aleited us concerning the impending

attack against

the Bureau.

August.

(Memorandun Frohbose to belmont,

27, 1959,

"Allen Dulles:

America's Clobal Sherlock,

Mogazine,

September, 1959'; and Memorandum Prohbose to

Selmont, September 4, 1959,

"Allen Dulles")

45

ACTIVITIES OF CONCACTS DIVISION OF CIA = 1959

•(U)

"e received information in september, 1959,

that.

the Contacts

Division of CIA had bold interviews

with anerican

dealt with meetings between

the businessnen and visiting BovietallicA reportedly was inter-

the Bureau:

our interest in the Soviet. By loiteiS

doted September 29,

1059, we voiced our

objection to the manner

in which CIA had

ancied this.

(Re

Burenu

file

40.

APPEAR NCE

OF

COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE

HOUSE CONTENTE ON MANURICAN ACCIVIETOS (ICUA) - 1959

on november G,

1959,

information was received

indicating that HOUA was

interosted in obtaining Colonel Frantiser

Tisier',

a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee.

HICUA

advisod us that it had contacted

the State Department who, in

turn, had conferred with Cil.

Allen Dulles allegedly informed

#CUn that Tisler was agreeable to appenring before the Committee

and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security

instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority -

to make a defector available to a congressional committee without

first chocking with other interested agencies.

The birector was

informed

that CIA did not have such authority

because a Nicional

Security Council directive made it

very clear that this could not

ve done without procossing the maiter through the Inter-Agency

Defoctor Conmittee. In this particular case the aforementioned

Committce had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA

official, had made certain phone calls.

A Bureau representative

WaS

contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we

had not formulated a position.

Allen Dulles alicgedly contacted

the chairman of the Connittee

and was told that the Committee

had no cojection do mating Tislor availablo.

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On November 13, 1050, CiA repronentatives were

inforned that.wo. wore opposed

do making the defector availabig

to lICUA..

on that same date we were told that CIA

was informing

Houst was reversing its position and that

apon icconsideration

it did not foel that Tisler could be

made available.

By memorandum dotcd November 14, 1959, the dovelop-

monis in this miter vore reviewed and

it was recommended that

at the next intor-agency Defector Committee nocting we strongl:

protest CIA's

dereliction in the handling of the HUA request.

(Burent file 106-50008)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960

of Reicco

company, Carache, venezuela

normed the Bureau that he recently

Nowheld

& conversation with

Enbassy in Caracas.

is a dia un on at cal to the cention

to complinentary statemente made by mamm

concerning the Director

and the fBi.

sintcd that the Dircetor should have retired

fivE yoat's

ago foi

thc

good of

all concerned.

A protest was made

to Allen Dulleg

Ape:1 20, 1060.

(diomorandum Frohbose to Belmont,

Аркав 22, 1000,

18.

CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING

R32D

CHINA • 29C0

Position

In February, 1960,

Cranes

for the Richardson Foundntion, volunteered intomation

concerning

statchonts

a top

CiA official.

allegedly advocated iccognition oi Red

China.

matter was called to the attontion of Allen

Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed

the Liaison Ant

that he had conducted an inquiry, had revieved a tape recording

talli,

and was satisfied thre f

had not made thu

statement attributed lo him.

The above is being cited in the event we desir l

dispute the

position

taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly

established

mes had made such

a statement, we could"

the information to suppori a position that ve would have

warranted in being most circumspect with CIA.

(Memorandum

Ironbose to Beinont, April 21, 1900,

19.

ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S.

PROMISUS ARRORD BY CTA

A State Department representative inforned Mir mitch

that a microphone had been tound

the u.s. Imbassy,

Mosion

11t7:

that it had boen planted

by CIA; and that Allen Dulles altonly

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had maintained that ar cla tas to operate effectively, it hind

to know what was goind on in Us. establishuants,. The implieation

WilS

leït that Cia vas coyering activities of other U.s. agencios

through

technient inetallatiörs."

Inquiries developed infoin-

tion indicating

Cr had installed

a microphone

in the Unbassy

in 1952 at the. regucst o1

c. Suato Dupartmout official.

The O1fice

•of-scewrity in State Depastment we contacted in an citort: to

this down in a nore seccific vonner.

We were told by State

that their recorde did not contrin any intoration concoming

the microphone.

 Gibscquently,

aletter was transmitted. to alt. Legal

Attaches instructing

them to be on the alert for technical

installations which my affect Burenu operntions.

(Menorancum

L'Allior to Belmont, May 2, 1000,

"Installation of Microphones

on U.a, Premices Abrond by CIA")

50.

raveceived informati

ndicating that the subjuet

formers Cuban hintelligence

agent

subject or & Bureau

investigation,

had plannedto detect

new fork City. Xe

sauce the sabject

in ordei

to orient hin so that

maximon propaganda effect would be derived

throw emer parters

• Ve vere told that the CIA lopre

And been instructed by his hordquarter:

to tell the subject that

ne would not

be mosecuted by the les.

Government.

complained to CJA

Gulessing thit

the Agency

had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity.

(enorendum tAllick to Belmont, September 30, 1000,

(и)

51.

MiGg

CIA

employce, obcazned a

position as a socretar

the Difice off they

to the United Antions.

prior to rcceiving this job,

TA chocked

with the Bureau.

The

naison arent subscquently learned that

had informed the

that she was leaving her job

The

Sho

3 inquired if she could recommend somebody else.

save them the name of another CIA enployec, Miss

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was

out of line by not first chcching with the Bureau defore recon-

mending fo

that the Burcan was intererted

in developing intelligence intormation which night be useful.

to the U.S. Goveranont; and tiat,

in this instance, CIA vas

obstructing operatione by not appropriately coordinating with

the Bureau.

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:52

CIA USD OF DUREAU INFORMATION IN

A U-S. INRELLISIELOE BOARD DOCUMENE

..*..

On March. 20, 1001, the Linason Anent contacted

Allen Dulles concerning Cid's lailure to obtain. Bureau clearance.

for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Boafd document.

No. known unnage bod been dobey. but

the dsent screesod the sensa-

tivity oc

the Buroti indormation..

Dulles requested one of his

subordinates to establiah a procedure

to prevent a recurrence

ої

such errors. Memorandum D'Ailier to Belmont, Mich 30, 1961,

53.

"SPY IN FID U.S.": BOOK AUE RED BY PANEL MONAT

in july,

1961, our Chicago Office received

galley

proots of the book

"Spy in the U.s.,

"written by Pawel Monat.

A revich of these proofs disclosed several references which

portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable

Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing

he might perior, the matter was discussed with cia.

It

turned out that CIA had not boen following the preparation ot

the book.

We were told that stops would be taken to protect

Purpon interont: The publishors had indicated to CiA that they

would cooperate on changes.

Although some changes were made,

the books still came out

information which was not

entirely favorable to

the Bureal.

(Pavel Monat, Burcau

file

105-40510,

, 4)

54. CONFLICT, WITH LEGAL ATTACHE

MEXICO CITY

3961

1 Cetober 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, Alexico City3

received infornation indicating that the brech Enbassy&in chat

и)

4)

city

Intelligence.

The Legal Attache was told by thelocal CIA ofiicetg/u)

that the Agency was not involved.

On October 12, 161, the

sane CIA ollier changed las position and admittod that ClA had

ho those

been involved to a cortain extent.

The Liaison Agont objected

to those tactics.

It was important to hin to know the facts

so he could be guided

accordantry.

(demorandungh' Allie: to

sullivan,

October 18

1961, Czechoslovalian DifTomatio

Activities texico'2

55. CIA TECINICAL SUR LILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STARES - 1021

When he defected in December, 1561,

furnished

in metion

concoming alleged penetration of

American

intelligonce. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within

Agency succestod that a CIA intelligence officer,

was a logieal suspoct.

Ve conferrod with CIA and on February 5,

1962, we advised the Agency that ve would tale over the investi

gation.

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instructions vi sont to the field and we then learned in

Now. York City that ClA

allegedy planned to make a recruitnent

approach.

The matter

was

taken up with CIA headquarters and

a protest ms made becauso of the vide

discrepancy in the

roports we

received

on CIA

intentions.

Gonorandun brennan

to

Sullivan, April, 18, 1066,

(u.)

6'7.

PASSING OL GURDAU

DOCURNES TO

SUNATOR NOSHAT C

DIRD BY CIA EXPIOZIS - 1006

in septender,

1.966,

we developed information indicating

that copies

0f. FBI docunoots had been passed to Senator Byrd by

•CIA.

The mattor was discused with the Director of CIA and the

Agoney subsequently conducied an

investication and establiched

that one of its enployees.

who was

subject ot the mtorial in question.

eat had a responsibility of handling seno chech requests fo:

CiA and, in this

connectaon, was in coutact with our Nano Chock

Section.

He admitted that be institutod a nume chock on an

"off

the cuff basis" for anotor Cia employee named

It 1e my corollontion that one er bott: CIA employees

were subscquently

sivod

asisod to resign.

(Memorandom

Brennan

Sullivon

Soptenber 21,

1906,

"Leak of ISI

Documents

Concerning

to Genator Robert C. Byrd")

68.

ALLEGED COMPOUTER OF BURNAL DOURLE AGENT J(*)U1

In Warch, 106%, we protested to CIA

in

With a matter relatina

to our mutual

interest

ounects

& chonis

connected with

Jersey

We were utilizing

ee Chemist

ardouble agent

211

an operation

directed against the Sovietst

*CIA

1a0 established

a relation

ship with the

side poison to!

tho

parpose of roguiring

intelligence relating to the field of mas

Ous* Newark *

Chemis

Tir'm

14077291161

discussing

Homerandm

the matter with the president of the

Sullivan to Deloach, March 15,

1967,

69.

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where

the Agency allegedly had failod to roport to us concerning a

communication which & Cuban exile, residing in the United States:

had receired fron the Cuban Intelligence Scivice.

the particular

communication had instructod

the exile to initiate proparations

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