COMMITTEE REPORT: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 00/00/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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(157-10014-10138

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

717/2015

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10138

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-43

Document Information

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TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

COMMITTEE REPORT: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE ASSASSINATION OF

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

00/00/1975

170

SSCSGO, REPORT

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE :

REPORT

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Date : 08/07/95

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10138

RECORDS SERIES

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 07-M-43 A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : COMMITTEE REPORT: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE : 00/00/75

PAGES

: 170

SUBJECTS

: SSCSGO,: REPORT

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

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COMMITTEE DRAFT:

"THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY"

R2787

Cy!83

CreCy

Table of Contents

II.

III.

IV.

Introduction

Interest of Intelligence Community in Oswald Prior

to the Assassination

The CIA's Role in the Investigation and the FBI's

Assassination Investigation

The 1967 Investigation of Allegations of Castro's

Connection with the Assassination

V. Discussion

VI. Appendixes

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v HOP ONG

INTRODUCTION

Legally, the assassination of President Kennedy and the

subsequent murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspected assassin, was

within the jursidiction of authorities of the State of Texas.

But many Americans were questioning how a President could be

assassinated despite the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus. Many

were also openly skeptical of the FBI's stated findings that Oswald

was the assassin and that he acted alone.

Congress and the President felt that public concern could

only be assuaged by what they believed was a thorough and independent

investigation of the assassination. Two resolutions were submitted

in Congress. calling for congressional investigations into the

circumstances surrounding the assassination: The State of Texas

set up a Commission for the same purpose. President Johnson, in

establishing the Warren Commission by executive order on

November 29, 1963, preempted the field.

The President's publicly stated reason for establishing the

Commission was to "ensure a thorough and independent investigation

of the circumstances

surrounding the assassination." In that the

only investigations of the assassination on record were the invest-

igations that had been conducted by the Dallas Police Department

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation - and taking into account

the public criticism and skepticism directed at these two agencies

it can be inferred from President Johnson's public statements that

the Commission's investigation was to be independent from the

WH 50955urBagI4;3212IFRFeeBayeHe Commission's report noted: "Because of the

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numerous rumors and theories the public interest in insuring the

truth could not be met merely by adopting the reports or the

analysis of Federal or state agencies."

When it began work in earnest in mid-December, the Commission

was supplied with a tremendous number of reports from various

Federal and state agencies. By far the greatest number of reports

emanated from the FBI; of particular importance was the five

volume, December 9, 1963, Report summarizing the Bureau's immediate

Post

assassination investigation. Subsequently, the Commission

requested and received the field investigation reports upon which

the December 9, 1963, report had been based. The Commission stated

in its report:

As these investigative reports were

received, the staff began analyzing and

summarizing them. The members of the legal

staff, divided into teams, proceeded to

organize the facts revealed by these In-

vestigations, determine the issues, sort

out the unresolved problems, and recommend

additional investigation by the Commission

After reviewing

the accumulating ma-

• terials, the. Commission directed

numerous

•additional requests to Federal and State

agencies.

(Report, p. xii)

The Commission's Report also states:

Because of the diligence, cooperation, and

facilities of Federal investigative agencies,

It was unnecessary

for the Commission to em-

ploy investigators, other than

the members of

the Commission's legal staff.

(Report, P. Xii1)

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100

With only isolated minor exceptions, the entire body of

factual material from which the Commission drew its findings was

supplied by the intelligence community, and, primarily, the FBI.

Even when material was provided by an agency other than the FBI,

however, the record reflects that the agency usually first checked

with the Bureau before supplying information to the Commission.

Moreover, FBI memoranda indicate that CIA and Secret Service

personnel reviewed Director Hoover's Commission testimony prior

to the testimony of their respective agency head, for the stated

purpose of "ensuring that there were no conflicts in testimony."

Thus, by its own admission, the Commission was dependent

upon the intelligence agencies for the facts. As a second step,

the

Commission and its staff did analyze the material and fre-

quently requested follow up agency investigations. However, if

the Commission did not initially receive any evidence on a parti-

cular point, the second step would obviously not be reached, and

the Commission's findings and conclusions would necessarily be

drawn without the benefit of any information on the omitted point.

The Select Committee's investigation of alleged assassination

attempts against foreign leaders raised questions as to possible

connections these plots and the assassination of President

Kennedy and as to whether information about these plots was

provided

the Warren Commission. Thus, in accordance with its

mandate to review

the performance of the intelligence agencies,

the Select Committee established a subcommittee of two Senators

to investigate the role of thoseragencies in events leading-up

• to the assassination of the President:

and in the ensuing investigation.

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Given the tremendous volume of

material alby the intelli-

gence agencies relating to the assassination, the subcommittee, with

limited staff and time, could obviously not attempt to duplicate

the work of the Warren Commission.

Instead building on the other work of the Select Committee and

utilizing its access to the agencies and its expertise in their

function, the subcommittee examined how those agencies reacted

to the Warren Commission's investigationn

sub

It must be remembered that the purpose of thenfommittee's

inquiry was to allow for an evaluation of the performance of

the intelligence agencies (both prior and subsequent to the

assassination) and the process by which information was

provided

to the Warren Commission. Although the Committe

seek

to uncover elidence that wait

refate the Warren

die not recty

Commission's

finding»

anyevidene ich relates to

shese findings and

42є поє

made available to the quumission is discussed i

his report.

It should also be remembered that all of our intelligence

agencies were operating under tremendous pressures after the

assassination. Literally thousands of persons contacted the CIA and

FBI within days of the assassination, offering information which

they believed to relate to the assassination. Much of the informa-

tion so provided was irrelevant or of doubtful reliability. The

agencies tile conderer a given lead or adequately investigate

a lead/under these circumstances, is in most instanced reler standabate.

The Mommittee is not now attempting to look back with twelve years

of hindsight and criticize these agencies. Nor is our discussion

of the assassination investigation

Pintended to minimize the agencies'

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extensive assassination investigation.

The following report of the subcommittee details the

evidence developed by the subcommittee's review of intelligence

agencies in connection with the assassination of President

Kennedy.

It

seems

clear that a

satisfactory explanation of the

assassination may never be possible. Doubts will probably

continue; and all questions can never be answered.

The subcommitt euphie dri

i can evidence to contradiet the

navit.

findingo of the watren Connission that aswald acted thome in

COMES

нажу

as873s

Prestdent. It did obtain, evidence which tends

corded enformation ss the en commission reachel:

1937 336796657

the subcommittee's recommendation that this evidence

impeaching the process of the investigation, should be further

explored. For, if the intelligence agencies cannot be relied

upon to investigate fully and to report candidly to a specially

constituted body like the Warren Commission, then there is

doubt as to whether these agencies can ever be relied upon to

investigate their own operations and their own performance in

critical situations. Moreover, if the agencies withheld infor-

mation from the Warren Commission, or if their investigation of

the assassination was deficient, the Warren Cormission may have

been precluded from determining the true circumstances surrounding

the

assassination of President John

F. Kennedy.

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•II. Interest of Intelligence Community in Oswald Prior to Assassination

A. Summary of Oswald's Activities of Interest to Intelligence

Community Generally

While the Select Committee's investigation focused on the

CIA and FBI because these two agencies were most involved in the

assassination investigation, many other intelligence agencies had

been involved in investigating Oswald's activities prior to the

assassination.

In September 1959, Oswald received an early, hardship

discharge from the Marine Corps, claiming he needed to support his

mother, but instead he left for Europe shortly after being dis-

charged. On October 1959, he showed up in Moscow. After a reported

suicide attempt, he went to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow seeking

to renounce his U.S. citizenship. He also informed Embassy officials

that he planned to disclose to the Soviets certain classified

information he had on

Marine Corps radar equipment.

Upon learning this, the Office of Naval Intelligence reviewed

Oswald's access to classified information and determined that any

disclosure he might make would do little harm.

confirmed by the Marines after the assassinat

ion and by the CIA, which

determined that although swadd was stattoned at a U-tasin

Japan, he did pot havenacess to any classified information about

thet 2. Oswald's half brother, John Pic, who was a sergeant in

the Air Force, then became alarmed by Oswald's defection and

submitted voluntarily to a background investigation by Air Force

intelligence. By March 1960, the military concluded that there was

little cause for concern about Oswald's defection, although the

Marine Corps decided in August of

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discharge to an undesirable discharge

becauseu

e.t

estion.

Relévant: documents on Oswald were circulated throughout*

intelligence community, so that by. late 1960, the Department of

Defense, CIA, State Department, FBI, and I&NS all had intelligence

files on Oswald.

Oswald spent two and one half years in the Soviet Union work-

ing in a television and radio parts factory in Minsk. In 1961, he

met Marina and married her. They had one child born in the Soviet

Union, and a second child born in the United States about a month

before the assassination.

Oswald wrote his relatives while in the Soviet Union and

these relatives passed some of this information on to the intelli-

gence agencies.

Oswald also wrote the State Department and the

Marine Corps on several matters and this correspondence was duly

included in intelligence files. CIA's mail intercept program

also acquired correspondence. Information obtained from this.

correspondence was given to the FBI after the assassination.

By early 1962, it was learned that Oswald planned to return

to the U.S. wich his wife and daughter. ONI, FBI, I&NS, and State

Department were all involved in determining when he would return.

Oswald, in fact, returned by ship, landing in New York on June 6,

1962. There he was interviewed briefly by an I&NS agent. Oswald

and his family then proceeded to Fort Worth, where he was inter-

viewed by the FBI in late June and again in August. Neither ONI's

nor CIA's files indicate their contact with Oswald after his return.'

These two agencies claim FBI was the appropriate,agency.for any

as discusted in Appendix

-, the committee rescived

of stinozz to 2/A did debriet, Oswald at his return.

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- 3-

such contact.

• As discussed infra, FBI

and

rA investigated certain oI

Oswald's activities in 1963.

Other intelligence agencies got

copies of CLA's and FBI's reports, but, vill the exception of

ONI's receipt of correspondence pelated to Gomald attempt to

get his undesirable discharge fron

me Gonna get goide

these other agencies developed

70

er to 1963

were not dicectly investigating

oswald's

activities in 1963 preerti

initiating unnation. "

* As discussedi in appendion)

agencies other than CIA D and FBI developed

information on seweld during 1963. 574

example, ONI's files contain his corespondence

oras in 1963 relating to

Oswald's atters! te got his undesireble

lischarge set aside; o

renuved his perspirit in 1963.

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Milar

from New Orleans: As discussed in detail infra, the Kaack report

was first routed to the Counterintelligence section of the Special

Affairs

Staff, then to the Counterintelligence Division in November

1963.

Five messages related to Oswald's visit to Mexico City in Sept-

ember and October 1963 were in the Western Hemisphere Division files

November 22, 1963. The information contained in these messages had

not, as of

that date, been incorporated in Oswald's 201 file.

CIA's mail intercept program intercepted one letter which Oswald

had written while in Russia. That letter had not been put in his 201

file.

om/

Finally, a message from CIA'S WAVE station in Miami indicates

that its sources had limited information on Oswald prior to the as-

sassination. This information and its significance is discussed in-

fra. CIA recently informed the Select Committee that this informa-

tion probably did not come from files held at the WAVE station, but

from files of Cuban exile groups connected with CIA. Technically,

therefore, this information was not in CIA's files on Oswald prior

to the assassination.

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• FBIS

THE BUREAU'S PRE-ASSASSINATION OSWALD FILE

94/02

A. Oswald's Defection

The Bureau opened a file on Lee Harvey Oswald on October

31, 1959, some four weeks subsequent to his departure for the

Soviet Union. The opening was apparently based upon receipt of a UPI

news ticker advising that Oswald was in Moscow, that he had applied

to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen

for "purely political reasons," and that "he would never return to

the United States for any reason." On November 3, 1959, the Bureau

received a copy of an internal State Department telegram which

I confimed the news ticker and additionally noted that ex-Marine

Oswald "has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as

an

enlisted radar operator. "

On November 2, 1959, the Bureau determined through liaison

with the Navy Department that although the Office of Naval Intelligence

("ONI) did not have any record of Oswald, the United States Marine

Corps did have a record (Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H.

Belmont, 11/4/59). These records revealed that Oswald had entered

the Marine Corps on October 24, 1956, to serve three years.

While in the service, Oswald attended the Aviation Fundamental

School and completed the Aircraft and Control and Warning, Operators'

Course. However, there was no record of a security clearance.

The

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1800 /

Bureau's stated conclusion was that:

Since subject's defection is known to Department

of the Navy, and since subject apparently has

no knowledge of any strategic information which

would be of benefit to the Soviets, it does not

appear that any action is warranted by the Bureau

in. this matter.

It is recommended,

however, that

this memo be referred to the Identification

Division so subject's service fingerprints can be

placed in the criminal files and that a stop be

placed against the prints to prevent subject's

entering the U.S. under any name.

Espionage

Section should be advised if

subject again enters

11/4/59 32) Memorandum From W.A. Branigan to A.H. Belmont,

On April 28, 1960, Special Agent (SA") John Fain

interviewed

Oswald's mother, Mrs. Marquerite Oswald, in Dallas,

Texas. She had recently received a letter addressed to Lee

from the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland, indicating that

Lee was expected at the college on April 20, 1960. Mrs. Oswald

furnished S. A. Fain

with a photograph of lee and informed him

that her son had taken his birth certificate with him (Report

from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/12/60). By

memorandum dated June 3, 1960, the Bureau expressed to the State

Department its concern over the possibility that an imposter

could be using Oswald's birth certificate, and requested all State

Department information on Oswald.

Inquiries by the FBI's Paris Legal Attache ("Legat!") revealed

that Oswald had by letter, dated March 19, 1959, written the collere

announcing his intention to begin studies there in the fall of 1959.

and that

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Oswald had paid the $25 deposit.

However,

burnete was no record of

Oswald ever having attended the School. (Memorandum from Legat,

Paris to Director, FBI, 10/12/60)

On May 9, 1961, the Bureau's review of the State Department

passport files on Oswald revealed that:

(a) On 2/13/61, the U.S: Embassy in Moscow

received an undated letter from Oswald post-

marked Minsk 2/5/61, indicating that he wished

i• return to the U.S. if legal proceedings were

Oswald explained that

he could not leave Minsk without permission and

therefore was writing instead of visiting.

(b) On 3/20/61, the.

embassy received a second

Oswald letter postmarked Minsk, 3/5/61: Oswald

requested a questionaire again explaining that

he could not come to Minsk. (Memorandum from SAC,

Washington Field Uffice to Director, FBI, 5/23/61.)

On January 11, 1951, the Bureau was informed by ONI

(District Intelligence Office, 8th Naval District, Hew Orleans,

Louisiana) that Oswald had been given an undesirable discharge

from the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve on August 17, 1960. (Report

from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/3/61). According

to the Special Agent in Dallas assigned to the Oswald case, the

subsequent background investigation of Oswald - as discussed in

the 7/3/01 investigative report -- was "predicated" upon the

information received from Naval Intelligence. (Report from Dallas

Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/3/61.)

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....:

"...it..

A subsequent FBI review of the State Department's Oswald file on

8/22/61, indicated that:

(a) by letter, dated May 1961, Oswald advised

Embassy that he had no intention of returning

unless guarantee of no prosecution.

He also

advised that he had married a Russian girl, and

that he wanted to return with her.

(b) On 7/8/61, Oswald appeared at the American

Embassy in Moscow with respect to his desire to

return

now.

(c). On 7/10/61, Oswald executed an application

for passport renewal

at the. American Embassy.

(d) By memorandum dated 8/18/61, the State De-

partment authorized the American

Embassy in

Moscow

to renew Oswald's passport for direct travel to

the U.S. (Memorandum from SAC, Washington Field Office

to Director, FBI, 9/1/61)

Based upon Oswald's stated intention to return to the United States

and the renewal of his passport for direct travel, the FBI decided

to interview Oswald's mother, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, to determine

(1) "if subject (Oswald) has returned to the U.S.," and (2) "if

subject has not returned to U.S., contact should be maintained with

Mrs. Oswald to determine subject's expected arrival in U.S." (Memo-

randum from SAC, WFO, to Director, FBI, 9/1/61; Memorandum from

SAC, Dallas to Director, FBI, 9/29/61) On October 13, 1961, a

special agent in the FBI Dallas field office learned during an

interview of Mrs. Marguerite Oswald that Lee had not returned to

the United States and that she had no idea when they might come

or when they would be allowed to come. (Memorandum from SAC,

Dallas to Director, FBI, 11/20/61)

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The "final FBI review of the State Department Oswald file on 1/29/62,

revealed that:

(1). By letter to Embassy, dated 7/15/61, Oswald

advised that he was continuing his efforts to

obtain exit visas for his wife and himself.

(2): By letter, dated 8/8/61, Oswald inquired

if it would be permissible for him to travel

through foland by train after leaving. Minsk,

pointing out that he could not afford to fly

from Moscow to New York City.

(3) By letter dated 10/4/61, Oswald asked

Embassy to assist him in obtaining exit visas

from Soviet authorities.

(4). By letter, dated 1/5/62, Oswald informed

Embassy that he expected to receive exit visas

within forty five days.

(NOTE: Embassy had

been notified by Soviet Ministry of Foreign

Affairs that visas granted). (Memorandum from SAC,"

Washington, DC field office, to Director, FBI,

2/19/62)

On May 17, 1962, the State Department informed the Bureau that :

It has been determined that Oswald, the ex-Marine

is still an American citizen; both he and his Soviet

wife now have exit permits, and the Department has

given approval for

their travel with their infant

child to the U.S.A.

• There is a problem with his

wife, however,

in that SOV in the Department is

trying to get

a waiver of 243 G, which requires

that Oswald's wife pick up her visa

for entry into

the U.S.A. in Western Europe.

As soon as this

question has been settled

travel

they will be free to

• (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC,

Dallas;

5/31/62)

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- B. Oswald's Return to the United States

On May 31, 1962, an FBI headquarters supervisor instructed

the Dallas Field office that Oswald should be interviewed upon his

return and that the interviewing agents attempt to ascertain

whether he was

recruited by. Soviet Intelligence, whether he made

any deals with the Soviets in order to obtain permission to return

to the United States, and exactly what information he furnished

to the Soviets.. The supervisor noted that if any doubt existed

as to Oswald's truthfulness, the agents should "consider requesting

his consent to a polygraph examination and thereafter obtain Bureau

authority for such an

examination." (Memorandum from Director: FRI,

to SAC, Dallas, 5/31/62)

On June 12, 1962, the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(ISNS"') informed the Bureau's New York field office that the Oswald's

were listed on the advance manifest of the "SS Maasdam," Holland-

American Lines, which vessel was scheduled to dock at approximately

11:00 a.m., on June 13, 1962. (Memorandum from SAC, New York to

Director, FBI, 6/12/62) On June 14, 1962, FBI Headquarters

advised the New York field office that the Dallas field office had

been instructed to interview Oswald upon his return; the New York

field office was directed to contact ISNS to verify Oswald's arrival

and to determine his destination in the United States. (Memo-

randum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 6/14/62)

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"On June 22, 1962, I&NS confirmed that Oswald's family returned

to the United States via Hoboken, New Jersey, on June 13, 1962, and

that I&NS Inspector Frederick J. Wiedersheim interviewed Oswald at

that time. Wiedersheim orally advised a Bureau agent that Oswald

stated he had been employed as a mechanic in Russia, had threatened

to renounce his United States citizenship, but never carried through

with the threat

and had never voted in Russia. The Oswald's destin-

ation of Fort Worth, Texas, was also verified. (Memorandum from

SAC, New York, to Director, FBI, 6/26/62)

On June 26, 1962, SA'

s John Fain and B: Tom Carter interviewed

Lee Harvey Oswald in Fort Worth, Texas. Fain reported that Oswald

was "very difficult to interview,". "cold and arrogant," and "on

the whole was generally uncooperative.". Oswald specifically denied

that he had ever denounced his U.S. citizenship, offered military

secrets to the Russians, or applied for Soviet citizenship. Addi-

tionally, Fain asked Oswald whether or not he would be willing to

submit to a polygraph examination as to answers given by him during

the interview. Oswald refused, and subsequently, also refused

Fain's request to take a polygraph as to "his negative answers to

the questions as to whether or not he had been providing services

of furnished any information to the Soviets or whether he had made

any deals with the Soviets in order to obtain permission to return

to the United States."

Fain indicated in his report that Oswald

3/24/16 changes incorp.

in riginal to this paze.

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business. ' (Report from Dallas Field Office tol TBIlleadquarters,

8/23/62) By report, dated August 30, 1962, SA Fain closed the

Oswald case. i

C. The Continued Investigation - Dallas

On September 23, 1962, the FBI's ew York field office

learned that Oswald had subscribed to "The Worker, which Bureau

reports describe as "an East Coast communist newspaper." (Memo-

randum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 3/25/63): SA James P.

Hosty had been assigned the pending inactive Marina Oswald case on

October 23, 1962, some five months prior to its scheduled status

review.. On March 3, 1963, Hosty ascertained through a review of

IsiS records that Marina was living, at an Elsbeth Street address

in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas. On March 11, 1963, Hosty was

inforned by the Oswalds' landlady that she haú evicted them on

March 3, 1963, for fighting, and his drinking. Hosty was able to

determine that the Oswald's had moved to Neely Street; he verified

this address by checking the names on the mailbox. (Memorandum from

SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 3/25/63) Hosty subsequently reviewed

the file on Lee Harvey Oswald

and

-- after noting that Oswald had

subscribed to the Vaily Worker - requested, on March 25, 1963, that

the Bureau reopen the case. Hosty also requested and received

permission to interview Oswald's wife. Lee Oswald's case was reopened

on March 31, 1963. (Hosty, 12/13/75, D. 119)

*

*

the case because "There didn't seem to be any evidence that

ho fowalt had a potential for violance of mathing tike that

5757642 0s wald had become employe, was with smart

ioniafä potential fr vialence.

Mine-ll si bit. 425-

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• On April 21, 1963, a confidential informant advised the

Dallas office that Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for

Cuba Committee in New York City, at. which time Oswald was quoted

stating that he had passed out pamphlets for the Fair Play for

Cuba Cormittee ("FPCC") with a placard around his neck reading,

"Hands Off Cuba, Viva Fidel." (Report from Dallas Field Office to

FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Subsequent investigation, on May 27, 1963,.

revealed, however, that the Oswalds had moved from their last known

Dallas address, and had left no forwarding address from that

residence.

D. Continued Investigation - New Orleans

By letter, dated July 17, 1963, the FBI's New Orleans

field office informed the Dallas office that it had received

information that the Oswalds were living in New Orleans. This

information was apparently provided by the FBI's New York field

office. At Dallas' request, the New Orleans office, on August 13,

163, verified the Oswalds' presence in that city. (Memorandum

from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 8/23/63) On September 10, 1963,

the office of origin (i.e., office of principal responsibility) for

both Lee's and Marina's cases was changed from Dallas to New Orleans:

(Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 9/10/63).

In the interim, Oswald had been arrested in New Orleans and

charged with "disturbing the peace by creating a scene." More

specifically, while distributing FPCC Literature, on August 9, 1963,

NH 509553

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2/

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Oswald had been involved in "fight" with three

ago Cubans.

On the morning of Saturday, August 10th, Oswald asked to see a Bureau

agent, and he was interviewed in jail, at length, by. SA John L.

Quigley. (Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters,

8/15/63)

On August 22, 1963, the New Orleans office was provided with a

copy of the transcript of an August 21 broadcast of a radio program

called "Conversation Carte Blanche" in which Oswald had participated.

• During the program, Oswald stated that the FPCC was not Communist-

enta

controlled and that he is a Marxist. On August 30, 1963, a local V

radio station manager told SA Milton R. Kaack (Oswald's case agent

in New Orleans) that after the broadcast, Oswald told him that "the

Russians had "gone soft' on communism, and that Cuba is the only

real revolutionary country in the world today." (Report from New

Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63)

On August 23, 1963, the New Orleans office received a head-

quarters air telegram instructing that office to:

ascertain facts concerning subject' distri-

bution of above-mentioned pamphlet including

nature of pamphlet following which contact

should be made with established sources

familiar with Cuban activities in the

New Orleans area to determine whether

subject involved in activities inimical

to the internal security of the U.S. Submit

results in letterhead memorandum form

suitable for dissemination with appropriate

recommendation as to further action. (Memo-

randum from Director to SAC, New Orleans;

8/21/63)

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 22

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## Page 23

22

H6 14020L

The-October 31, 1963, report of SA Milton Kaack reveals that Bureau

agents in New Orleans contacted two confidential informants

-- one

familiar with Cuban activities, the other "with some phases" of

Communist Party activities in the New Orleans area -- who advised

that they had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald.

On September 24, 1963, the New Orleans field office informed

the Bureau that: "Investigation of Oswald is continuing, and a

report containing the results thereof will be furnished to the.

Bureau together with the reconmendation of the New Orleans office

concerning further action concerning Oswald." (Memorandum from

SAÇ, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 9/24/63) The subsequent New Orleans

"investigation" of Oswald is set forth in SA Kaack's October 31, 1963,

investigative report encompassing the period July 23, 1963, through

October 10, 1963. The report recounts Oswald's FPCC activities, his

arrest and subsequent interview, his letters to the FPCC and The

Worker, and that the Oswalds had moved from New Orleans on or about

September 25, 1963.

The Oswalds' landlord in New Orleans had told the FBI agents

that the

"same Russian speaking woman that had brought Marina to New

Orleans had picked up Marina and her child in a station wagon with

Texas

license plates." Leads were sent out to Forth Worth (to attempt

to identify the woman and locate Marina), to Dallas (to attempt to

identify the woman and conduct neighborhood investigation at the

Oswald's last known residence), and to Malvern, Arkansas (to inter-

MH 50955

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## Page 24

23

TOP

view Lee's brother to see

if he had any information on the Oswald's

whereabouts).

Additionally, it was stated that New Orleans would

"continue its efforts to locate subjects."

(Report from New Orleans

Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63)

On October 10, 1963, Bureau headquarters through CIA liaison

was provided with a copy of an Agency cable which stated that "Lee

Henry Oswald" had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City on September 28, 1963. Further details of Oswald's contact,.

including an apparent meeting with Soviet counsel Kostikov, were

provided in an October 18, 1963, cablegram from the Bureau's Legal

Attache ('Legat'"] in Mexico City to Bureau headquarters. That Legat

also then advised headnuarters that it was attempting to establish

Oswald's entry into Mexico and his current whereabouts: A copy of

each of these communications was sent to the Hew Orleans field office

which eventually forwarded two

copies on to the Dallas office.

(liemorandum from SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI, 10/24/63)

On October 18, 1903, SA Hosty -- Following up on the New Orleans

field office's request to locate Oswald -- reviewed files at I&NS.

Although Hosty was not able to find a new address for the Oswalds, he

did. learn from an I&NS agent of the CIA communication indicating that

Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (Memorandum

from SAC, Dallas, to. Director, FBI, 10/22/63)

On October 22, 1963, the Bureau cabled certain general back-

ground information to the Mexico City Legat, and noted that addi-

NN 50955

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## Page 25

34

TOP

tional information on Oswald was simultaneously being

sent by mail.

Headquarters also advised that "Lee Henry Oswald" was apparently

identical with "Lee Harvey Oswald." (Memorandum from. Director,

FBI, to. Legat, Mexico City, 10/22/63)

On October 25, 1963, the New Orleans office learned that Oswald

had left a forwarding address in New Orleans on September 26, 1963,

showing his new address to be 2515 West Sth Street, Irving, Texas.

It asked the Dallas office to verify that this was Oswald's resi-

dence. (Memorandum from SAC, New Orleans, to Director, FBI, 10/25/63.)

E. Continued Investigation: Dallas

On October 30, 1963, SA Hosty, through a neighborhood

pretext interview learned that Marina Oswald was living at the Fifth

Street address with a Mrs. Michael R. Paine. SA Hosty also learned

that although Oswald had visited his family at the Paine residence,

he was not living there. He so informed the New Orleans office on

October 31, 1963, noting that efforts to locate Oswald should be

continued. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 10/30/63)

SA Hosty then reviewed Bureau indices and checked with the

Paine's employers to "ensure that there were no subversive refer-

ences." On November 1, 1963, he proceeded to the Paine residence

to interview Mrs. Paine. Although Mrs. Paine claimed she did not

know Oswald'

s home address, she informed Hosty that Oswald was

employed at the Texas School Book depository in Dallas. (Memorandum

from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 11/14/63) Toward the end of the

•і в ..

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 25

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## Page 26

25.

interview Mrs. Oswald entered the room; however, Hosty reported

that he merely exchanged greetings with her. Hosty left his name and

office telephone number with Mrs. Paine, requesting that she contact

him if she learned of Oswald's address. (Memorandum from SA Hosty

to SAC, Dallas, 11/24/63)

On November 2, 1963, Hosty by telephone verified Oswald's

employment at the Book Depository. The other field offices were

notified and instructed to discontinue

efforts to locate Oswald.

However, Hosty was not able to verify Oswald's residence; the Book

Depository had it listed as the Paine's address. He returned

to the Paine address again on November 5, 1963. Although Oswald

had visited his family again on November 2, Mrs. Paine could pro-

vide nothing further as to an address; however, she did say that

Oswald was "an illogical person and an admitted Irotskyite Communist."

(Memorandum from SA Hosty to SAÇ Dallas, to Director, FBI; 11/27/63)

By memorandum dated November 9, 1963, and November 15, 1963,

Jene office of origin for Both lee and Marina Oswald's cases was

changed back to Dallas from New Orleans. (Memorandum from SAC,

New Orleans to Director, FBI, 11/15/63, 11/18/63)

On November 19, 1963, the Washington field office informed

FBI headquarters that Oswald:

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 26

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## Page 27

Z4.

has recently been in contacti

Office, Soviet

with Consular l

Embassy, Washington, DC, at

which time he related he had recently met

with Comrade KOSTIN, Soviet Embassy, Mexico

City, Mexico.

At this time OSWALD indicated

to Soviet Embassy that he was unable to

remain in Mexico because of Mexican visa.

restriction of 15 days and that he could not

request a new visa unless. he used his real

name.

According to informant, OSWALD had orig-

inally intended to visit Soviet Embassy in

Havana, Cuba, where he could have had

time

to complete his business but could not reach

Cuba.

The informant stated that OSWALD is.

married to MARINA NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, a Soviet

citizen, and has a new daughter, AUDREY MARINA

OSWALD, born 10/20/63, Dallas, Texas. OSWALD's

address

is known to

Dallas, Texas:

informant

as Box 6225,

This information was reœived in Dallas on November 22, 1963. (Memo-

randum from SAC, Washington, DC field office, to Director, FBI,

11/19/63)

F. Availability of Pre-Assassination FBI Oswald Documents

to the Warren Commission

By letter, dated May 4, 1964, J. Edgar Hoover listed

and summarily described for the Warren Commission each of the sixty-

nine items that made up the Bureau'

§ headquarters file on lee

Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. Although certain of the

summaries in the letter contain misleading descriptions of the

underlying

documents, the Committee has not in its review

HH 50955

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## Page 28

27

214

of FBI materials seen other than these sixty-nine documents in

the headquarters FBI Oswald file.* Nor has the Committee found any

indication that there were other than the usual underlying, reports

in the FBI Dallas, New Orleans, and Washington, DC field office.

files, the contents of which are accurately reflected in the head-

quarters materials.**

By letter dated October 31, 1975, the Committee requested

access to

"all

materials pertainins, to Lee Harvey Oswald that were

in FBI headquarters files at any time on or before November 22,

1963."

In what we were informed

a complete response, the

Bureau produced

for the

Committee the

sixty-nine documents summarily

described in Mr. Hoover's letter of May 4, 1964.

It should again be

emphasized, however, that the Committee

has not had access to FBI

files.

Under the Committee's agreement with the Department of

Justice, the Committee by letter requests either

"access to" or

"delivery of". FBI materials.

Upon receint of a Committee document

request, the FBI reviews its files

and

produces those documents it

believes responsive

to the request.

Un 314/44Assistant FBI Director Alan H. Belmont offered

the entire Bureau headquarterd's file on Lee Harvey Oswald to the

Commissioners for their review. See testimony of Alan H. Belmont,

HH

50955 Sticks see te. Belmont estimon, Warren

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## Page 29

28

TOP SECKEN

DISCUSSION:

THE BUREAU'S HANDLING OF OSWALD

PRE-ASSASSINATION CASE

A. . Oswald's Defection

Upon learning on October 31, 1959 of Lee Harvey

Oswald's defection

and announcement to State Department offi-

cials in the Soviet Union that he intended to provide "radar

secrets" to the Soviets, the Bureau opened a "security case"

with Oswald as the subject. (Memorandum from W. A. Brannigan

i to A. H. Belmont, 11/4/69) The FBI then verified through inquir-

ies with the Department of the Navy that Oswald did not have

knowledge of strategic information that would benefit the Soviets.

The Bureau's stated conclusion was that, although no further

action on the case was warranted, a stop should be placed against

Oswald's fingerprints to prevent him from entering the United

States under any name. (Memorandum from W. A. Brannigan, 11/4/59)

Some six months later the Bureau interviewed Oswald's

mother. They were informed that Oswald had taken his birth

certificate with him to the Soviet Union; by memorandum dis-

seminated to the State Department, the Bureau expressed con-

cern that an imposter might attempt to return to the United

States using Oswald's identity. (Report from Dallas Field

Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/12/60).

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 29

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## Page 30

29

28

B. Oswald's Return to the United States

Despite the Bureau's expressed concern that an imposter

might attempt to return to the United States using Oswald's

identity, the FBI did not interview Oswald until some thiee

weeks subsequent to his return to the United States on June 13,

1962.. Oswald was interviewed at the dock by I&NS Inspector

Frederick Weidersheim: (Memorandum from SAC, New York to

Director, FBI, 6/26/62) There is no indication that either

Inspector Weidersheim, or the FBI agents assigned to the Dallas

field office who

interviewed Oswald were

ever alerted to the

possibility that an imposter might attempt to assume Oswald's

identity. Indeed, SA James P. Hosty, JI. testified that he had

neither seen a copy of the memorandum which raised the imposter

possibility, nor attempted to determine whether someone had in

fact assumed Oswald's identity. (Hosty, 12/12/75, P. 75)

On June 26, 1962, SA's John John W. Fain and B. Tom Carter

interviewed Oswald in Fort Worth, Texas. According to SA

Fain's report, Oswald was cold, arrogant, and difficult to inter-

view.

With copies of State Department documents in hand, Fain

aware that despite Oswald's denials he had stated

to State

'Department officials at the American Embassy in Moscow that he

HH 50955

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30

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## Page 31

TOP

(1) was going to renounce his American citizenship,

for Soviet citizenship, and (3) reveal radar secrets to the Soviets.*

Indeed, SA Fain asked Oswald to take a polygraph test; Oswald

refused. to be polygraphed, even as to his negative answers on

deals or relationships with Soviet intelligence. (Report from

Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/10/62.)**

SA Fain also reported that Oswald denied that he had ever been

a member of the Communist Party in, the United States, or that

he went to the Soviet Union because "of a lack of sympathy for

the institutions of the United States." (Report from Dallas Field

Office

to FBI Headquarters, 7/10/62)

A second interview some three weeks later on August 16, 1962,

went much the same way. Despite Oswald's attitude and demon-

strable lies, SA Fain closed the Oswald security case on August 20,

1962; it was

not to be reopened until March 26, 1963. Hosty,

12/13/75, p. 119)

The only additional investigation of Oswald conducted by

the Bureau at any time prior to March 26, 1963, were the reviews

of the Oswald file at the Department of State, inquiring of two

low-level Dallas Communist Party informants whether they knew

of Oswald (with negative responses) and interviewing three of

* Wazzen commission testimony of so ten fatn,

- She Fain testing, Wann lepat,

5/5/642.

** The Warren Commission apparently was not

10. 418

poovided with the

administrative cover pages of SA Fain's report which discussed,

inter alia, Oswald's refusals to be polygraphed.

Fain did not

crepancies in Oswald's statements, and-Fain's reaction to them.

See Flin testimon

WH 50955 Daka: 32823526 Page 31 Warrin Kofit

Vo. 4.

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## Page 32

31

ka400al5

Oswald's relatives.

Despite the extensive use of sources and

techniques to develop background information on subjects of

security cases, no neighborhood or employment sources were

checked or developed in Oswald's case, Marina was not inter-

viewed, and none of the Bureau's established techniques to

determine with whom a person

was in contact -- such as the mail

cover - were employed or their use even suggested.*

The Bureau's failure to interview Marina prior to the

assassination is surprising. The documentary record reflects

that Marina's case was opened in a pending inactive status, i.e.,

although the file was not technically closed, nothing was to

be done in the case for six months. Marina Oswald had oririnally

been considered for a Bureau, program which monitored the

activities of Soviet immigrants and

repatriates who met

criteria which suggested that they might have

intelligence ties. However the Dallas field office

supervisor concluded on July 25, 1962, that consideration of Marina for

because.

this program would be postponed for six months in that her activities

could be sufficiently monitored in connection with the subversive

case on Lee Oswald. As previously noted, the case on Lee

Oswald was closed on August 20, 1962. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas

to Director, FBI, 8/25/63)

* The Committee is neither suggesting that these techniques

should have been employed nor that their use would have been pro-

per.

It is merely noting that its review of other FBI security

files reflects that such sources and techniques were extensively

used in cases similar to Oswald's.

NW 50955 DocId: 32423526 Page 32

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## Page 33

A

I superine also testya in response to nate

Schmitin's quests-couns

Junter Schericher, o buard on

your kindwe and your rip cent, you

suy its not only very uNusual, bour

it is The expept

- exapron to the

policies operane ar one une 10

at him come our with his wife...

That was any exceptanal, and while

we could not understand why, we were

thraking in tems Mut This Viggests

something, that he nught have

ven dicwit, and that she was.

Sint =54l1 that she was

21s0-101..

nigent, on that she was

-. And 112. 23/15/761p263. -

NH 50955 ĐocId:32/23526 - Fage

33

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## Page 34

3zm

NH 50955

JUN SCORI

- With respect to Oswald's marriage to Marina, and her

return to the United States, the Commission stated:

Oswald's marriage to Marina Prusakova on

April 30, 1961,

consideration.

is itself a fact meriting

• A foreigner living in Russia

cannot marry without the permission of the

Soviet Government.

It seems unlikely. that.

the Soviet authorities would have permitted

Oswald to marry and to take his wife with

him to the United States if they were con-

et they to cond

templating using him alone as an agent.: The

"act that he had

a Russian wife would be likely,

in their view, to increase any surveillance

under which he would be kept by American secur-

ity agencies, would make him even more conspic-

uous to his neighbors as

"an ex-Russian"

• and

would decrease his mobility. A wife's pre-

sence in the United States would also constitute

a continuing risk of disclosure.

On the other

hand,

Marina

Oswald's lack of English training

her complete ignorance of the United States

and its customs would scarcely recommend her to

the Soviet authorities as one member of an

"agent team"

to be. sent to the United States

on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise.

(Warren Commioston Report, p. 274.)

In contradistinction, a retired Bureau Soviet Section Supervisor

told the Conmittee that of greatest concern to him in the Oswald

case was the fact that the Soviets had allowed Marina to return

to the United States with Oswald. He felt that if they desired

to "tap Oswald on the shoulder and make use of him at some

future date, Marina's presence would give them a great deal of

leverage."

• (Staff interview with former FBI Headquarters Super-

visor, 1/76/765'However, it should be emphasized that the

Supervisor is not

aware of any evidence which suggests that the

Soviets in fact used or attempted to contact Oswald..

tray, 3/5/76, p.21)

DoçId: 32423526

Page.

3=.

"The Russians hught

Are to purse explaids.

Russea and

in Tring"

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## Page 35

C. The Continued Investigation

- ballas

33

On September 28, 1962, the lew York field office learned --

and subsequently informed Dallas -- that Oswald subscribed to

The Worker.

Oswald's

subscription to this newspaper

":

contradicted his interview statements that he was

"disenchanted with the Soviet Union" and "not out of sympathy

with U. S' institutions." (Report from Dallas Field Office to

FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63)* The fact of Oswald's subscription

was simply noted in his security file; FBI headquarters was not

informed of the subscription until September 10, 1963, and then

only after it had requested information on Oswald from the Dallas

office. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI. Headquarters,, 9/10/63)

Assistant FBI Director Gale of the Inspection Division, in

his December 10, 1963, highly critical report on the Bureau's

handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case noted: "In light

of Oswald's defection, the case should have been reopened at

the first

indication of Communist sympathy or activity."

(Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63)**

In October of 1962; SA Hosty had been assigned the Marina

Oswald security case, which remained at that time in a pending

inactive status. The case was reviewed by Hosty for the

first time in March of 1963, at which time he located Marina

Oswald, but did not interview her because of her alleged

marital difficulties: (Hosty, 12/75/75, P.11S Hosty did,

7.71%

* SA James P. Hosty, JI. recommended on March 25, 1963 that the

Oswald case be reopened solely on the basis of this contradiction*

Testimony of SA Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 118.

** Mr. Hoover noted on November 29, 1963 that, "In Oswald's case

there was no indication of repentence but only one of openly avowed

hostility,. and contacts with subversive clements." (Memorandum From

V. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 11/29/63.) None of the Bureau's

internal criticism of the handling of the

pre-assassination Oswald

case ever reached the Warren Commission:

See discussion, supra, et

Section

HH

50955 DocId:32423526 Page 35

• is hera

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## Page 36

34

A WINE

however, review the Dallas Office's security file on Lee

Oswald and, on the basis of Oswald's subscription to The Worker,

requested. (and subsequently received), approval to open the case

on March 26, 1963. (Hosty, 12/12/75, p. 111 ›

With respect to losty's stated reason for not interviewing

Marina -- i.e., in that he had developed information that Oswald

had been drinking to excess and beating his wife, the relevant

FBI manual provision required that he allow a "cooling off" period --

MI. Hoover commented on the December 10, 1963 Gale memorandum that

"this was certainly an asinine excuse"' and "I just don't understand

such solicitude." Inspector Gale had written that

this entire facet of the investigation was

mishandled. " Mrs. Oswald definitely should

have been interviewed

and. the best time to

get information from her would be after she

was beaten up by her husband.*

The Director added the following notation next to Gale's conclusion:

"This certainly makes sense." (Memorandum from J. H. Gale to

Tolson, 12/10/63)

On April 21, 1963, the New York 'field office was informed

that Oswald had written a letter to the FPCC. This is the first

indication in Bureau files that Oswald had a relationship with

this pro-Castro organization. (Report from Dallas Field Office

to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Oswald then wrote that he had

passed out FPCC literature in Dallas with a placard around his

neck reading "Hand[s] Off Cuba - Viva Fidel." This information

-

HW 50955

In that the Committee has verified

that such

a manual provision

was in effect, it would appear that Hosty's decision to allow

"a

cooling off"

period prior to interviewing Marina was entirely in

Scara: 3268526

with

FBI regulations.

The

arguments do not provide an

explanacion

why

Fagather Hoover or Gale required this provisionin

---

## Page 37

35

03 Bra

U lies

was-not reported to Dallas until June 27,

1963

(Memorandum

from J. H. Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63) and not reported to head-

quarters until September 10, 1963. (Report from Dallas Field

Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Once again, Oswald's

activities appear to contradict his interview statements.

On May 27, 1Y63, Hosty returned to the Oswald's Neely

Street residence to interview Marina, and was intormed

that the Oswalds had moved fromthe Dallas area without leaving

a forwarding address. Pursuant to leads sent out by the Dallas

office seeking information on the Oswalds' whereabouts, the

New Orleans office informed Dallas

on July 17, 1963, that the

Oswalds were living in that city. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas

to Director, FBI, to SAC, New Orleans, 8/23/63) The Bureau

apparently learned of Oswald's presence in New Orleans from a

letter he had written to The Worker on June 26, 1963. Oswald

claimed in the letter to be a long-time subscriber and stated

that he was forming an. FPCC chapter in New Orleans. He enclosed

honorary membership cards for "those fighters for peace." Mr.

Gus Hall (General: Secretary of the Communist Party, USA) and

Benjamin Davis

(National Secretary of the Community Party, USA).

(Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters,

10/31/63) On September 10, 1963, New Orleans became the office

of origin for Lee and Marina's cases. (Memorandum from SAC,

Dallas, to Director, FBI, 9/10/63)

7*!.

HH 50955

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37

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## Page 38

3L

TOP SLONET

D. The Continued Investigation - New Orleans

In the interim, Oswald had on August 9; 1963, been arrested

in New Orleans in

connection with his FPCC activities and

charged with "disturbing the peace by creating a scene." On

the morning

of Saturday, August 10, Oswald asked to see a

Bureau agent, and he was interviewed at length by SA Quigley.

Oswald also repeatedly lied to this FBI agent. For example, he

told. Quigley that he had met and married his wife in Fort Worth,

Texas. (Report from New. Orleans Field Office to FBI leadquarters,

8/15/63)

The New Orleans office

learned on August 22, 1963, that

Oswald participated in a radio program in his capacity as the

secretary of the New Orleans FPCC chapter, and stated, among other

things, that he was

a Marxist and that "Cuba is the only real

revolutionary country in the world today." (Report from New

Orleans Field Office to FBI lieadquarters, 10/31/63, p. 11)

On August 23, 1963, the New Orleans office was instructed by head-

quarters to "submit results of their Oswald investigation to the

Bureau." (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, New Orleans,

8/23/63) On September 24, 1963, the New Orleans office advised

the Bureau that the investigation was continuing and that a

report setting forth the investigative findings would be furn-

ished (Memorandum from SAC, New Orleans, to FBI Headquarters,

9/24/63) Agent Kaack's investigative report was subsequently

NH 50955

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## Page 39

sent to thé Bureäu on October 31, 1963; it did not contain ulles

any significant information that was not already in Oswald's

headquarters file. The report reveals that only two informants

in the New Orleans area

-- one familiar with Cuban activity --

were asked about Oswald. Neither informant had heard of him.

(Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters,

10/31/63)

On or about. October 2, 1963, agents of the New Orleans

office attempted to ascertain Oswald's residence and place of

employment. They learned that the Oswalds had left New Orleans.

Leads to locate Lee Harvey Oswald were sent to Dallas, Fort

Worth, and Malvern, Arkansas. (Report from New Orleans Field

Office to FBI Headquarters; 10/31/63)

The evidence indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico

City from September 27, 1963, through October 4, 1963. On

October 10, 1963, Bureau headquarters through CIA liaison was

provided with a copy of an Agency cable which stated that "Lee

Henry Oswald" had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City on September 28, 1963. (CIA Cable from Mexico City

Station to Directox, FBI, 10/10/63; Memorandum from LEGAT Mexico

City to Director, FBI, 10/18/63)

• It was not until October 22, 1963 -- some twelve days

subsequent to the date on which Bureau headquarters was first

informed of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

WH 50955 DocId:32423526 Page 39

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## Page 40

38

:V02 Eaten 13

City -- that information pertaining to Oswald's Mexico City

trip was provided to the New Orleans Office. (Memorandum from

Director, FBI, to Legat, Mexico, 10/22/63) Coincidentally,

SA Hosty in Dallas had by chance

ascertained similar informa-

tion from the local I&NS office, and the

xeport in which Hosty

detailed this information was received in New Orleans on October

22, 1963. Thus, despite the fact that both the Dallas and

New Orleans field offices were aware on October 22, 1963 of

Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, there

is not evidence that either of these field offices intensified

their "efforts" to locate and interview Oswald. Möst surprising,

however; is that the "Soviet experts" at FBI headquarters did

not intensify their efforts in the Oswald case after being

informed that Oswald had met with Vice Consul Kostikov at the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (Memorandum from Legat, Mexico

City to Director, FBI, 10/18/63) Not only were these experts

more familiar with Soviet activities in general; they knew that

Kostikov was KGB, and had reason to believe he was an agent

within the KGB's Department 13, which Department carries öut

assassination and sabotage.* They vere alsö aware that Américan

citizen contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Mèxico City were

extremely rare. (Testimony of Clark Anderson, 2/4/76) Ironically,

the teletypes informing the Bureau of Oswald's Mexico City

activities were sitting on a pile of documents on a headquarters

* Al1 of this Information was made available • the Warren Commission.

‹CIA letter to Commission of 1/22/64.)

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TOP

supervisor's desk awaiting initial action

That portion of Inspector Gale'

s memorandum of December 10,

1953, which discusses these teletypes reads as follows:

The SOG (Seat of Government) superviso! failed

to take any action on the teletypes; stating

it did not appear to him any action was warranted.

Inspector (i.e., Gale) feels

.. the field

should have been instructed to intensify investi-

gation

• and Oswald placed on Security Index.

(Memorandum from J. H: Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63)

÷ 1963

E.

Continued Investigation - Dallas

On October 26, 1963, the New Orleans field office advised

the Dallas office that the Oswalds

had left a forwarding addiess

in Irving. l'exas. Dallas was asked to verify the new residence.

(Memorandu from SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI; and SAC,

Dallas, 10/25/63) On October 30; 1963, SA Hosty established

that although Marina and the baby were living in irving with

the Paine

family, Lee was not living there. On November 1; 1963;

hosty went to the Paine residence for the stated purpose of

interviewing Mrs. Paine to "find out where Oswald was residing."*

Mrs: Patne informed Hosty that she did not know where Oswald lived;.

however, she did state that Oswald was employed at the Texas

Book Depository. Toward the erd of the interview Marina Oswald

came into the room. According to losty, she expressed fear.

of the FBI; his two or three minute conversation with her (with

Ruth Paine translating) was cordial, and an attempt to mayiry

her fears. Cilosty, 12/12175, p.54

* It should be noter that under the FBI manual provisions then in

effect, any

contact such as Oswald's

wiLh the

Soviet Embassy in

Mexico

City

required that immediate investigative action at tlie

appropriate

field office.

However,

these provisions also preciuded

interviewing Oscald, without the express, uritten

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## Page 42

40

10T

4/600005N

After the assassination, the Dallas office explained to Bureau.

headquarters that the investigation had been held in abeyance

to "be sure that it was in possession of all information from

New Orleans."

Inspector Gale commented on thir explanation

in his December 10, 1963 memorandum:

Inspector definitely does not agree.

New Orleans

submitted sixteen-page report, 10/31/63, and

ascertain outsts wherea New orleanindicatio

No indication

New Orleans had any further data

• Even if

New Orleans had

not reported all information in

their possession; Dallas should have intensified

investigation in light of Oswald's contact with

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and not held invest-

igation in abeyánce. (Memorandum from

J. H: Gale

to Tolson, 12/10/63)

HH

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C. The crA's Role in the Inverted steady

1. Nature of CIA's Investigation

Except for the requests from the Warren Commission; CIA

received no written instructions to conduct an investigation. Unlike

FBI; CIA was not directed by the President to undertake an active in-

vestigation; President Johnson only instructed Diréctor McCone to

make CIA lesources available to FBI ir order to assist FBI's

1

investigation.

Nevertheless; as news of the assassination spread on

November 22, CIA stations began reporting to CIA Headquarters any

information they received

that appeared to have even the remotest

connection to the assassiration. Of course, information from Mexico

City wäs of paramount importance to CIA Hadquarters since the

station there had reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Consulate

only two months earlier. Headquarters analyzed these reports and

for several weeks after the assassination closely followed the

situation in Mexico City, ordering the station to investigate various

allegations and to follow certain leads.

After the Warren. Commission was estäblished and after it

was clear FBI had principal responsibility for investigating the

assassination, CIA's work gradually shifted from the kind of active

investigation it had been conducting in Mexico City to one of

restonding

to requests

from, or passing along information to, the

Warren Commission or the FBI.

Effect of Assassination Plots Against Castro on the Warren

Conmission Investigation

The possibility that CIA had engaged in plots to assassinate

.. :.

HIH

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43

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42

foreign leaders

was first acknowledged publicly in the course of

the Rockefeller Commission's investigation and was confirmed by

the Senate Select Committee's investigation and report.

The Rockefeller Commission investigated both CIA assassination

plots and their connection with the Warren Commission investigation.

David Belin, a staff attorney for the Warren Commission and Chief

Coursel for the Rockefeller Commission, wrote:

At no time did the CIA disclose to the Warret

Commission any facts which pertained to alleged

warrend

assassination plans to kill Fidel Castro; (Memor-

ändum from David Belin to the Rockefëller Commission;

Ma 20, 1975, p. 1)

[Ilhe CIA withheld from the Warren Commission

information which might have been televant

in light of the allegations of conspiratorial

contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban

government.

Mr. Belin also discussed this matter with Raymond Rocca;

Chief, Research and Analysis, Counterintelligence Division, CIA,

who was

the. "point of record" between the CIA and the Warren

Commission. Mr. Rocca, like Mr. Belin, prepared a menorandum

stating he was unaware of the plots until 1975 and expressing concern

about the Warren Cormission's findings in light of this new informa-

tion

Mr. Beliri also contacted former

Warren Commission staff

counsel, Burt Griffin, to get his views on this matter. Mr Gritfin

responded by letter wherein he expressed his feelings that

assassination plots against Castro

might have a significant effect

on the Warren Commission findings.

NW 50955

Mr. Rankin,

General Counsel. of the Warren Commission, also

advised the Committee he was not

aware of the CIA's

assassination

•plots until 1975

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43

Moreover; the Select Committeelhas previously condiuded

that one plot, possibly involving the assassination:

öf Castre

as

underway in the Fall of 1963 and that the plot involved the passing

of a poison pen to a Cuban agent on the very day of President Kennedy's

assassination. Because of the chronological relationship of this

plot to the assassination of President Kennedy, the Select Committee

investigated whether there were other connections between the plot and

President Kennedy's assassination.

a. Background of Assassination Plots: Covert Actions Against

Cuba

Fidel Castro's forces took över the government of Cuba

on January 1, 1959. Although initially advocating reform through

socialism, Castro soon openly advocated communism and aligned himself

with the Soviet Bloc. The United States was properly concerned with

Castro's change in direction, not merely because a foviet aligned

regime in Cuba posed a threat to U.S. security, but also because

Castro seemed bent on exporting communist revolution throughout Latin

Ametica.

As a result; the United States embarked on a policy

looking to the ouster of Castro and his comminist regime. Implémenta-

tion of this policy concerned all appropriate government agencies

the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense included. The CIA was

given principal responsibility for implementation of the policy through

covert action.

The nature of the covert operations ran the gamit of the

techniques CIA had available: propaganda, coastal raids, agent net-

MH 50955

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"CRET

works, sabotage of frcilities, defection of Cuban officials, out-

right invasion in: the case of the Bay of Pigs, and coup planning and

assassination. In addition to these operations directly controlled

by CIA, there were various operations run by Cuban exiles.

Two major exile groups, referred to by the CIA as

"autonomous operations," were assisted by CIA and were controlled as

well as could be by CIA. The CIA therefore had files on many of

those invoived with the two autonomous groups. As will be discussed

infra, this meant that even though many members were living in the

United States and ostensibly within the jurisdiction of the FBI, not the

CIA, the CIA could have assisted Warren Commission investigatorn in

understanding Oswald's Cubar connections.

Thus, the Warren Commission's investigation of the

assassination of President Kennedy was conducted against a background

of CIA's covert operations against Cuba. Knowledge of these operations

was relevant both to the Commission's conclusions about föreign con-

spiracies and to its investigation of Oswald's connections to pro-

Castro arid anti-Castro organizations

•b. The AMLASH Operation and Castro's Knowledgé of It

Without doubt; Fidel Castro had good reason to fear ü.s.

policy under President Kennedy: Kennedy had permitted the abortive. Bay

of Pigs invasion and had threatened nucleat war over Soviet placement

of nuclear weapons in Cuba. His administration constantly focused on

the custer of the Castro regime.

On the other hand, Castro seemed to have little to gain

From the death of Kennedy since le would be succeeded by Johnson cho.

Castro could have assumed, would carry on the same policies. Castro

1122:

NW 50955 DocId: 32423526 Page 46

PIT.

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4

certainly noticed no difference between Kennedy's policies

TOP SECRET

those which might be adopted by Senator Goldwater, his likely opponent

in the 1964 election. For example, in a repoit of an impromptu interview

ón September 7, 1963, AP correspondent Daniel Harker reported:

Castro then launched into a discussion of the U.S:.

political scene saying he expects no change in

Washington's foreign policy even if there is a

change in administrations after the 1964 presidential

elections.

'I am sure it will be a fight between

(President) Kennedy and (Sen: Barry) Goldwater

(R Ariz.) :

Both are cheap and crooked politicians,'

Castro said. _3/

In any event, speculation as to Castro's motives

requires consideration of the specific actions the Kennedy administra-

tion was taking in the Fall of 1963: Of prime importance to Castro,

may have been belief or actual knowledge that CIA was then attempting

to assassinate him as

part of a coup.

After the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, CIA's

covert operations, then designated as Project Mongoose, were halted

on Octobér 30, 1962.

Castro seened to be aware of this decision in

his November 1963 interview with the reporter Jean Daniel.

Ön the other hand; raids by Cuban exile groups could not be

so easily controlled. However, after exile raiding boats fired on

a Russiän ship off the coast of Cuba in Spring 1963, the FBI,

reportedly acting on Robert Kehnedy's orders, started ä crack-down

on the U:S. based operations of the exile groups: Mechanisms were

devised; however, to avoid FBI crack-down on the CIA operations.

In June 1963; a decision

was reached to step up various

covert operations

against Cuba, including sabotogs operations designed

to encourage dissident groups inside Cuba, to worsen economic condi-

tions in the country, and to cause Cubans to doubt the ability of the

HW 50955 DocId:32423526 Page 47

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## Page 48

44

TOP

Castro regime to defend the country.

Perhaps this decision prompted CIA to renew contact with

a highly placed Cuban, code-named AMLASH, who previously had

indicated interest in assassinating Castro and in toppling the

regime.

In late August 1963, AMLASH was in Brazil and there met with

CIA case officers. Although before this meeting CiA's interest in

AMLASH nay have been to gain intelligence and to cultivate him as an

asset for covert operations, the case officers learned that AMLÄSIl

himself was interested primarily in attempting an "inside job" against

Caströ and was awaiting a U.S. Plan of action. A message fröm CIA

Headquarters analyzed the contact by suggesting AMASH did not

seem intèrested in routine intelligence missions and should be dir-

ected toward recruiting cohorts

for sabotage and "more serious

matters on an orderly basis.": The case officer testified he was

aware of this analysis.

There is no direct évidence that Castro was aware of

these meetings with CIA; but there is reason to believe he was:

Shortly after the meeting, CIA received information

from another

source to the effect that Castro was äware of AMLASH's

general sentiments.

The case officer could not recall receiving this

information, but he knew that AMASH had been rather openly anti-

communist:

More importantly, on September 7, 1973, Castro gave an

impromptu three hour interview with AP reporter Daniel Harker and

warned against the U.S. "aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban

..

HH 50955

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4.7

leaders." Castro chose a reception at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana

as the occasion for his tirade.

The connection betweer Castro's.

warning and the AMLASH meeting

may, only be coincidental. Nevertheless,

AMLASIl häd proposed a terrorist plan to eliminate Cuban leaders;

and, according to an informal briefing by a current CIA analyst of

Cuban affairs, Castro is prone to resort to subtle nuances, such

as the choice of the Brazilian Embassy, to put his statements in

context.

Similarly. Mt. Rocca has concluded: "There can be no

question from the facts surrounding the Castro appearance, which

had not been expected, and his agreement to the intetview. that this

event represented a more-than-ordinary ättempt to gét a message ón'

the record in the United States." (Memorandum for DC/OPS, May 23;

1975.)

According to Harker, Castro went on to say the "United

States leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to

do away with leaders of Cuba... We afe prepared to fight them and

ariswer in kind: United States leaders should think that if they

are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they

themselves will not be safe."

Castro also talked about what he termed recent u.s.-

prompted raids on Cuban territöry" and "piratical attacks" by the

United States against the Cuban people.

Indeed the CIA had conducted

raids on Cuban coastal

targets in August. In addition an sir raid

The case officer was not aware of this warring

at the time.

He

Jule tra

AMLASH opera-

seemis i

NN 50955

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49

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TOr Saonch

an exile group, not related to CIA, in the same time period was

noted in a report of September 4. to be of much conern in Cuba:"

Such raids, however, would not seem to justify Castro's

threat: Objectively the raids cannot be considered "plans to eliminate

Cuban leaders." AMLASH's proposal was. The räids would not

objectively. call for Castro to threaten the safety of American leaders

aiding the plans. AMLASH's proposal might:

In any event, Castro

comments at that interview clearly suggest he held Kennedy responsible

for whatever he was concerned about.

In the ensuing two months; CIA involvement in AMLASH's

plöt grew deeper. In early Octöber the case officer told AMLAS! that

his proposal had U.S. support at the highest levels

and found AMLASH

greatly relieved and ready to return to Cuba to undertake the

"big job." Later in the month AMLASH demanded to meet with Robert

Kennedy: to obtain his personal assurance that the United States

supported his plan - a coup, the first step of which was probably

the assassination of Castro.

CIA did not arrange a meeting with Robert Kennedy, but

instead sent Desmond Fitzgerald, head of the Special Affairs Staff

(the office responsible for all covert operations against Cuba), to meet

with

AMLASH as the personal représentätive of Robert Kennedy. On

October 29; Fitzgerald told AMASll a successful coup would receive

U.s. support.

48

AMLASH seemed satisfied with this show of high level

He testified he meant the highest levels of CIA.

The case officer repeatedly refused to characterize the AMLASH

operation as an assassination plot. However, he testified that AMLASH

proposing a coup which

in luded Castro's assassination as the first

NH 50955

§ G8Eid:32423526 Page 50

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## Page 51

19:

support for his plans, but

that the

U.S. was not furnishing him the necessary equipment,

e.g.,

ex-

plosives and rifles with telescopic sights.

On November 20;

à CIÀ case officer telephoned AMLASH to arrange a meeting for

November 22, saying he did not know if it would be interesting; but

it would be the meeting AMLASH requested. The case officer hesitated

in stating that AMLASH would have understood this message as positive

evidence CIA was going to meet his request for equipment.

At the November 22 meeting AMLASH was shown a poison peri

device; given assurances that the requested equipment would be sup

plied him in Cuba, and shown a copy of President Kennedy's speech of

November 18 in Miami.

The case öfficer told AMLASH that Fitz-

gerald had helped write the speech. Certainly these actions left

little döubt in AMLASH's mind that U.S. policy was fully in support

of his proposal to do away with Castro and to foment a coup.

The contact report prepared on November 25 makes no

mention of the poison pen of assassination. The case officet thought

Fitzgerald had töld him to make no mention of it: However, a March

19; 1965, documert in AMIASH's file states:

The

case officer said he also asked for a device to protect

himself in close quarters. The poison pen device was déveloped to

satisy this request.

**

The

case officer does not think he showed AMLASH the speech

but instead alluded to it.

He testified that Fitzgerald had authorized

him to make

He did not know

what authority sezgerald had or what the Presided not noe above.

Fitzgerald had been told about the AMLASH operation. .

HW 50955

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50

22 Nov.

63 Mr. Fitzgeral and Mr.

*** [the case

assured subject [AMLASH] that this Agency wouid give

nim everything he needed (te escopic sight, silencer,

The situation changed when

Mr.

*** and Mr.

Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover

that President Kennedy had been assassinated.

Because

of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was

de-

cided that this. Agency could have no part in the assassi-

nation of a government leader (including Castro) and

it would not aid subject in his attempt.

This included

the following.

"We would

the silencer, nor

scope, nor any money for direct assassination;

furthermore, we would not lift a

Finger to help subjèct

escape from

Cuba should he assassinate

Castro.

The case officer took exception to the statements of

fact contained in this document. First, he pointed out Fitzgerald

was not at the November 22 meeting, but wäs instead in washington.

After repeated questions, he finally denied he had given AMLASH the

assurance of "all the money he wanted:" He testified AMLASH never

asked for money. He and Fitzgerald had, however, assured. AMLASH

of all the support he needed; and money could be considered part

of that support.

The case officer said he and Fitzgerald never discussed

a connection between. the AMLASH operation and the assassination of

President Kennedy. Therefore, he thought the documerit's statement

that plans changed because of Kennedy's assassination does not

accurately describe the situation. He further said that there was

no assurance to aid AMLASH's escape. The case officer felt the

document ias

summary drawn from the AMLASH file; attributing

statements made to AMLÄSH much later to decisions in 1963.

There is no way to reconcile this document with the case

officer's testimony. Fitzgerald apparently was not at the November

22 meeting with AMLASH. No other document; except

a missing cable

NW 50955

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51

of November 23, allegedly instructing the case

et

Atak

contact with AMLASH, suggests

plans changed because of the assassina-

tion..

No other document so directly refers to the AMLASH operation

as an assassination plot. No other documents mention escape plans

or money. If the case officer is correct in his testimony, the

quoted portions of this 1965 document were cut out of whole cloth.

Arid; if he is correct, many at the Agency, who had later responsi-

bility for at least a portion of the operation, were acting on very

erroneous information if they relied on this document.

Two other events occurring in the October-November 1963

time period deserve mention in this discussion of U.S.-Cuban

relations. The first is that talks between the Cuban delegate to

the UN, La Chuga, and a U.S. delegate, William Atwood, were proposed

by the Cubans on September 5. After discussions about the location for

such talks and Atwood's expressions of U.S. interest, La Chuga told

Atwood. ön October 28 that "Havana didn't see exactly how a talk

would be useful now; but he would be glad to maintain continuous

contact:" On November 29, La Chuga again' inquired of Atwood about

U.S: interest in talks.

Secondly, the French reporter, Jean Daniel, had a brief

interview with President Kennedy on October 24 before setting off on

an assignment in Cuba. At that meeting, the President expressed his

feeling that Castro had betrayed the revolution.

Daniel travelled to Cuba but got no hint of a similar

meeting with Castro.

Then on November 19, the day after the Fresi-

dent's spéech in Miami, Castro contacted Daniel and spent six hours

MH 50955

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52

talking to him about U.S./Cuban relations:

Daniel again met

Castro on November 22, spending most of the day wi

Kim. ADaniel's

report of this meeting "When Castro heard the News" describes

Castro's reaction to word of the assassination. Significantly:

after word of Johnson's succession to the Presidency reached Castro,

he asked: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?"

Of course Castro was well aware of the U.S. program

of covert operations against Cuba: In public speeches; he repeatedly

attacked CIA operations; although he rarely distinguished betreen

CIA operations and those of exile groups operating on their own:

President Kennedy's speech of November 18 would häve reinforced

his belief that the U.S. was committed to his overthrow.

The Select Committee attempted to determine whether Castro

had

actual knowledge of the AMLASH operation either because AMLASH

himself was

a double agent or because Cuban/Soviet penetration of

the CIA's Cuban operations would have given him such information.

This brief investigation has not yielded a definitive

answer. However, the following facts indicate Castro could have

known of the operation. First; Castro's statement on September 7

that "events of the last few days" indicate the U.S. was possibly

aiding terrorist groups'

plans to eliminate the leaders of the

revolution is an accurate description of the CIA meetings with

ÄMLÄSH. Second, the CIA received a report that Castro was

aware

Of AMLASH's general sentiments.

Third, CIA received information that

employees of a Cuban Embassy suspected AMLASH was on some Top Secret

business. Fourth. CIA learned that Cuban Embassy employees were

angered by statements by AMLASH and others denigrating the revolution

NW 50955 DocId: 32423526 Page 54

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53

duritig the time he was

meeting with .CIA case offlcers

CIA discovered at least one of its meetings with AMLASH was under

surveillance by another intelligence service and CIA had to explain

its actions to that service. Sixth, as late as 1965/CIA analyst

wrote speculating AMLASH might be a double agent and suggesting

CIA compromise him; however the proposal apparently was not implemented:

Seventh, the CIA received repeated reports thät its Cuban operations

were penetrated. For example one Cuban defector named a low level

CIA agent who had been working for the Cubans for a long time and

indicated there was a very highly placed Cuban intelligence agent in

CIA's covert operations against Cuba. Finally, CIA's contact with

AMLASH was terminated in 1965 for reasons of security.

Thus; it is possible that Castro knew that CIA tas

meeting with AMLASH and knew generally that AMLASH was dissatisfied

with the regime. He could surmise the threat posed by ClA's meeting

with AMLASH.

•c..

Should CIA Have Disclosed the AMLASH Operation to the Warren

Commission?

The case officer testified that AMLASH may have expressed to

his

friends his opposition

to Castro and admitted such conversations

have been overheard by others

who

might

would not have been receptive to.

such comments.

HH 50955

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55

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54

Knowledge of

covert eperations generally must

be dis-

tinguished from knowledge of specific operations. The members and

staff of the Warren Commission knew Kenredy's policy toward Cuba

and knew CIA was involved. Allen Dulles; a member of the Warren

Commission and former DCI, was completely familiar with operations

conducted until his departure from the CIA in November 1961. He

could have assumed that those operations continued.

The more difficult question is who knew of assassination

attempts against Castro and who knew of details of the AMLASH

operation.

John McCone, then DOT, had been briefed about previous

assassination plots but denied knowledge of the AMLASH opetation.

Allen Dulles probably knew CIA had engaged in past attempts to kill

Castro but there is no reason to believe he krew of the AMLASH

operation.

McCone testified he "had not related" assassination plots

against. Castro involving the Mafia with Kennedy's assassination.

McCone

further testified that Allen Dulles

was in a position to

orief the Warren Commission generally on

"any activities

in the

CIA" that might have been relevant to the investigation.

Allen Dulles, my predecessor, was a member of the

Warren Commission, and it seemed only natural

that if there were

activities in the CIA

that preceeded my taking office, which might

•have

in some way been responsible for this tragedy

that

Allen Dulles would have surfaced it with

the

Warren Commission, which he apparently. did not.

de.

Johu MeCone Testimony, 10/9/75, P. 13.

145.

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55

1si 14t t6

• The Select Committee's

interim Report "Alleged Assassination

Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" discusses at length who knew of

CIA's assassination plots against Castro. So far as has been

determined knowledge of plots involving the Mafia were known by

a number of government officials outside CIA. For example, Hoover

prepared a memorandum dated May 10, 1962, in which he recounted a

private meeting he had with Attorney General Kennedy that day.

Hoover noted:

Maheu had been hired by CIA to approach Gian-

canna with a proposition of paying $150,000

to hire some gunman to go into Cuba and kill

Castro.

He. further stated that CIA admitted

having

assisted Maheu in making the bugging

•of Las Vegas.

A copy of this memorandum was disseminated to Messis. Tolson,

Belmont, Evans, Sullivan, and DeLoach. Although these senior

Bureau officials were in various capacities involved in the assass-

ination investigation, the Committee has uncovered no evidence that

the Warren Commission was ever informed of these plots. There is no

indication in the documentary record made available to the Committee

which even suggests that any Bureau official considered these plots

in connection with the assassination. Indeed, FBI documents do

not again reference these plots until February 1967.

However, there is no evidence that the AMLASH operation --

far more relevant to the Kennedy assassination than these earlier

plots because it was underway in Fall 1963 -- was known outside CIA.

NH 50955

* Similarly, CIA and FBI materials reviewed by the Committee do

not reflect that the Bureau ever inquired during the course of the

assassination investigation as to the details of the agencies' Castro

assassination plots or, more

specifically, whether such plots were

8Be4ael0naz irauhe fall of 1963.

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## Page 58

÷56

Mr. Angleton testified he often met informally with Mr. Dulles

during the Warren Commission's investigation. He' and Dulles dist

"I think t readet an heck anderin. a mean.

1975. heard it it tend that towe don it se the fellow

Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans

and CIA

san eating.

liason with the Warren Commission, was informed about the AMLASH

operation and approved Fitzgerald's being introduced to AMLASH as

a representative of the Attorney General. Helms was questioned why

he did not inform the Warren Commission of assassination plots

Buil

(including both the attempts involving the Mafia and the AMLASH

operation) since he had knowledge of both operations.

Chairman.

Since you had knowledge of the CIA involvement

in these assassination plots against Castro, and knew it

at the time . .

would have thought

that ought

to have been

related to the Commission, because it does

bear on motives, whatever else.

Mr. Helms.

• Mr. Allen Dulles was a member of the

Warren Commission.

And the first

assassination plot

happened during his time as director.

What he said

to the Warren Commission about this

.. I don't know.

But at least he was sitting right there in (the Commis-

sion's) deliberations and knew about this, and I am sure

that the same thought that occurred to you must have occur-

red to him. *x/

The "thought.. . that must have occurred to (Dulles)" in

Helm's opinion would only have related to those assassination plans

against Castro before 1961. Dulles did not know that in the Fall 1963

CIA offered AMLASH rifles with telescopic sights, told AMLASH that

Robert Kennedy approved the scheme, and called his attention to one

of President Kennedy's speeches as an indication of Kennedy's

approval of AMLASH's proposal to eliminate Castro. Dulles did not

know of key meetings with AMLASH held during the Fall of 1963, with the

final meeting taking place at the very moment of the assassination.

Helms also argued he did not think the AMLASH operation

* James drator's Testerious, 216176 p. 3%.

HH 50955

*BoCIR1C12382GleFage Sestimony, 7/18/75, PP: 36-37.

I never de

diáss

that:

nail ints the beenies

---

## Page 59

57

was relevant to Kennedy's assassination.

Questioned why he did not think it important to give

material about assassination plots to the Warren Commission, Helms

indicated the Commission could have relied on public knowledge that

the United States wanted "to get rid of Castro."

I don't recall that I was either instructed

or it occurred

to me to cover with the Warren

Commission the precise details of the Agency's

operations not because I made a significant

iudgment not to do this, but .

• my recollec

tion at the

time was

that it was public knowledge that

the United States was trying to get rid of Castro. #

Helms'

assumption that early covert actions against Cuba

which included

assassination attempts "must have occurred to

(Dulles)" is paradoxical to Helms' inability to recollect whether a

1963 plot which he authorized and which had a least chronological

relevance to Kennedy's assassination "occurred" to him. When

questioned why, in both positions of liaison with the Warren

Commission and DDP, Helms did not inform the Warren Commission,

Helms narrowly defined his position with the Warren Commission.

Sen: Morgan.

just an employee of the CIA.

the 194. you were no the top

echelon, the management level were you not?

Helms.

Yes, I was Senator Morgan.

Sen. Morgan.

... you had been part of an assassination

plot against Castro?

Helms.

I was aware that there had been efforts made to

get rid of him by these means.

Sen. Morgan.

you were charged with furnishing the

Warren Commission information from the CIA, information

that you thought was relevant?

Helms.

No sir, I was instructed to reply to inquiries from

the Warren Commission for information from the Agency. I

HH 50955

DeIdRIZRAY HElif testimony, 6/13/75, p. 82.

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## Page 60

58

LUr

was not asked to initiate any particular thing.

Sen. Morgan.

in other words (if) you weren't

asked for it, you didn't give it.

Helms. That's right, sir.

Both Helms and the case officer who met AMLASH have

testified that no relationship existed between the AMLASH operation

and the Kennedy assassination. Both seemed to suggest there was

no reason for informing the Warren Commission about the operations

-- the thought never crossed their minds. Helms testified as follows:

Q. Now, after President Kennedy was assassinated in

November 1963, and after it became known to you that

the individual, Lee Harvey Oswald, was believed very

broadly to have done the shooting, that Oswald had had some

activity in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee

-. •

did you hold any conversations with anybody about the

possibility that the assassination of President Kennedy

was a retaliation by. Oswald against the activity, the talks

and plans to assassinate Castro?

A.

No. I don't recall discussing that with anybody. I

don't recall the thought ever having occurred to me at the

time.

The first time I ever heard such theory as that

enunciated was in a very peculiar way by President Johnson . . .

Q. I am not asking you about a story, Ambassador.

I

am asking you whether or not there was a relationship

between Oswald's contacts with the Cubans and his support

for the Castro government, his attempts in September

1963 to get a passport to

Cuba, to travel to Cuba, his

attempts to penetrate anti-Castro groups. Did the connec

tion ever enter your mind?

A. I don't recall its having done so.

Richard Helms Testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75,

pp. 389-391.

The AMLASH case officer testified that there was no

discussion between him and Mr. Fitzgerald (his immediate superior)

about any link between the AMLASH operation and Kennedy's assassination;

AMLASH Case Officer Testimony, 2/11/76, PP.

59-60

NW 50955 DocId: 32423526 Page 60

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## Page 61

59

Met

however, he also testified he assumed that after the November 22

meeting with AMLASH the "whole Cuban operation was going to be

reassessed after what happened to President Kennedy."

Questioned if he ever made any link in his own mind

between the AMLASH operation and the Kennedy assassination, the AMLASH

case officer replied "none whatsoever" and suggested "that all the

public theories" have distortedthe context of the 1963 AMLASH

operation.

The Case Officer insisted the AMLASH operation was

not an assassination plot and therefore there would be no reason

to make any connections:

I have to preface what I have to say by saying

that (the AMLASH operation) was not an assassina-

tion plot; so there would be no reason why we

would be

connecting Kennedy's assassination with

this assassination plot.

(AMLASH operation) was

not an assassination plot, it was not conceived as

an assassination plot

• so there was really

in the context of

the time the fact that this was

not an assassination plot conceived as an assassination

plot, there was really no reason to connect this one

particular operation with the tragedy of President

Kennedy.

* AMLASH Case Officer Testimony, 2/11/76, p. 76.

**AMLASH Case Officer Testimony,

2/11/76, p. 87. With

regard to his

it is interesting to note the

he now know that Oswald was pro-Castro.

HH 50955

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## Page 62

LD.

The testimony of Mr. Helms and helle or can u

standing, it does not seem credible that those at CIA knowledgeable

of the operation did not at least suspect there might be a relation-

ship.

Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that affirmative

actions may have been

taken to prevent those

investigating the

assassination from learning of the AMLASH operation.

For example, CIA files on AMLASH contain only the

briefest report of the November 22 meeting with AMLASH. The case

officer identified the document in the file as the report he prepared,

but he could not explain why the type of the third page is dramatically

lighter than that

on the first. two pages. He explained its failure

to mention the poison pen device by saying Fitzgerald probably

ordered him to avoid mention of it in the report. Indeed, although

the case officer's testimonyestablished the facts about the device, no

existing document at CIA except for the 1967 I.G. Report, mentions it.

Moreover, there is the documentary evidence, contradicted by

the case officer's testimony, that CIA terminated the AMLASH operation

specifically because of the Kennedy assassination. The 1967 I.G. Report

and the case officer's testimony before the Select Committee point

to the existence of a cable from CIA Headquarters to the case officer

on the morning of November 23, ordering the case officer to break off

contact with AMLASH and return to Headquarters. Neither the staff

of the Committee nor the staff of the I.G. in 1967 could locate this

cable. The contents of such a cable might support the previously

referenced 1965 summary

of the AMLASH operation, which states the

AMLASH "situation changed" when it was learned the President had been

assassinated.

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 62

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## Page 63

61

13385

Furthermore, the organization of CIA's investigation of the

assassination

and its work with the Warren Commission precluded dis-

closure of the AMLASH operation. The case officer testified he knew

of no CIA investigation of a connection between the AMLASH operation

and the assassination.

The AMLASH operation was the responsibility of the Special

Aftairs Staff headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. Although Mi. Fitz-

• gerald was nominally within the

Western Hemisphere Division of the

DDP and so answered to the head of that Division, J. C. King,

Mr. Fitzgerald often worked directly with Mr. Helms especially on

sensitive projects. For example, minutes of White House meetings

in 1964 on Cuban operations show Mr. Fitzgerald's presence but not

Mr. King's.

Evidence available to the Select Committee is conflicting as

to what Mr. King knew of the Cuban operations and assassination plots.

The case officer did not know if Mr. King knew; but it seems fair to

assume. that Mr. King did not know of the AMLASH operation. For example,

in a February 4, 1964 memorandum to AMLASH's case officer, King

itemized intelligence requirements for AMLASH. This at least suggests

that King was unaware of the September 1963 decision not to use

AMLASH for intelligence and suggests he was unaware of the AMLASH

operation. The case officer did not feel such a conclusion can be

reached merely from the memorandum, but he did not recall receiving it.

In any event the staff of SAS apparently was not put in direct

contact with the Warren Commission. Mr. Angleton testified that "point

of record" for the Warren

Commission's contact with CIA was Mr.

HH 50955

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## Page 64

b2

Raymond Rocca of Angleton's staff. Rocca described himself as

chief_of research for matters of interest to the Warren Commission

30 900

primarily Oswald's defection to Russia.

Rocca had a staff of three

who assisted him in research. One conducted research on the Soviet

services. • Another followed all FBI developments forwarded to CIA.

And another handled Oswald's relationship to the DeMohrenschildts (a

HH 50955

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64

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## Page 65

63

HH 50955

092. 9006

couple close to Oswald who were part of the Russian community

in

Dalla's)

and he followed overt references to Oswald and the Soviet

services.

Rocca said the Mexico City aspects of the investigation were

handled by Mr. King and his desk chief, Mr. Jack Whitten, the latter

usually reporting directly to Mr. Helms. Helms

, according to Rocca,

was

the major liaison with the Warren Commission

and conducted any

negotiation with Dulles or Rankin.

Consequently, SAS was not involved in the day-to-day work on

the assassination although, according to Angleton, it might respond

to requests from Helms or Rocca. Thus, except for Helms, CIA

personnel knowledgeable of the AMLASH operation were not in direct

contact with the Warren Commission.

However, SAS, it would seem, was the most logical office to

be working on the case in view of the fact that Oswald's activities

since at least August 1963 had revolved around Cuba. For instance,

he headed a one-man Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans.

The FBI report of this sent to CIA was routed first to SAS, Counterin-

telligence on November 15, 1963. Oswald attempted to join, and then

argued with, members of an anti-Castro group. The CIA received a

message about this on

November 22, 1963, through SAS from the WAVE

station in Miami. CIA's response to the staff request for WAVE's files

on Oswald was that there are none.

Indeed, the whole question of Cuban intelligence's role in the

assassination could only have been analyzed by SAS's counterintelli-

gence division -- a self-contained counterintelligence operation that

was not under Mr. Angleton, CIA Chief of Counterintelligence.

Whether intentional or not, CIA's exclusion of SAS from day-to-

DooId: 32423526

Page 65

cantart

mith

Harren Commiccino anuld coon ta hanf maine

---

## Page 66

6.4:

significance, for it denied the Warren Commission ready access to

the CIA division with the most direct knowledge of both pro-Castro and

—^*7

anti-Castro activities, of the activity of Cuban intelligence, and

of CIA's work with a high-level Cuban who planned to assassinate Castro.

Finally, on a document which apparently is a biography of AMLASH

and which mentions his contact with CIA is written, "Dec 1963, Not to

leave this officer per [the case officer's] orders." All documents

in this file are filed chronologically and this document appears with

others bearing a December 1963 date. It probably was the top document

in the AMLASH file in December 1963.

The case officer testified that he did not recall giving such an

order and he did not think such an order unusual. He testified that

Fitzgerald indicated the AMLASH operation was very sensitive. Never-

theless, he conceded

that a request for the file would, by virtue.of

this

order, require that he be consulted before the file could be given

out. It certainly seems possible that the order was given because

Rocca and others investigating the assassination were requesting

• SAS

files.

Indeed, CIA personnel working on the investigation of Kennedy's

assassination were almost immediately concerned with the connection be-

tween Oswald and KGB and other Soviet personnel in Mexico City. On

November 24, Mexico City station cabled all known contacts of certain

Soviet personnel there. Among those contacts mentioned in the cable

was AMLASH. Since all

such names were presumably traced through CIA

files, it seems likely that CIA personnel investigating the assassina-

tion would have requested all files on AMLASH.

NH 509553

Doeld: 32423526

Page

66

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## Page 67

65

of course

, there are no documents indicating such a request was made

or indicating the AMLASH file was turned over to CIA investigators.

However, fron the handwriting on the top document in the AMLASH file,

one may infer that the investigators did not receive his file.

3. Mexico City Investigation

On September 25, 1963, Oswald left New Orleans by bus and

travelled

to Mexico City, arriving there at 10:00 a.m. on Friday

September 27. He left Mexico City on the morning of October 2

and travelled by bus to Dallas area, where he lived until the

assassination.

After the assassination, intensive investigation by the FBI

and by Mexican authorities produced little information about

Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. The investigation

determined the bus he took, the passengers on the buses (whom the

FBI interviewed), his arrival and departure times, and the hotel

he stayed in. One person interviewed by the FBI recalled seeing

Oswald

at

the hotel when he left for Dallas and another saw

him

eating

50955

DocId: 32423526

Page

67

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## Page 68

lunch

at a restaurant near the hotel. Otherwise, all information

about Oswald's activities in Mexico City has come from the CIA

and from documents furnished by the Cuban government to the Warren

Commission.

Thus, although Oswald spent about five and a half

days in Mexico City, CIA was the principal

source of information

about his

activities there.

On the surface, the information only indicated Oswald was

in

Mexico City. to obtain a visa to Russia with a stop-over in Cuba --

travel requiring he obtain the approval of both governments.

It was this information which brought Oswald to CIA attention

before the assassination.

On October 8, 1963, the Mexico Station relying on this information

reported to headquarters that Lee Oswald had been in contact with

the Soviet consulate.

Later in October, CIA Headquarters passed this information

with some background material from its files to the Navy, State

Department and FBI; and the Mexico Station made a similar distribu-

tion, including the background information it received from Head-

quarters,

to liaison contacts in Mexico City. Passing this informa-

tion to these three agencies ended CIA's responsibility in the matter.

Since Oswald was

an American citizen and since FBI was the responsible

* Documents furnished by the Soviets do not accord with this

information from CIA. Infra.

HH 50955 DocId:32423526

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## Page 69

67

Let lies te

agency, there seemed to be nothing further CiA could do.

The CIA did obtain photographs of an American-looking male, in

Mexico City at the time Oswald was there. The station reported his

description to Headquarters, and asked for a photograph of Oswald

to compare with the photograph of this man. After the assassination,

the Station sent the photograph to Dallas and simultaneously

realized from television pictures, the individual was not Oswald.

CIA to this day maintains it does not know who this unidentified

individual is.

In any event, after the assassination CIA concentrated most of

its efforts on Soviet Embassy personnel in Mexico City who may have

contacted Oswald and on other alleged contacts of Oswald there.

The great mass of material the CIA holds on the assassination

has precluded exhaustive analysis of the thoroughness of its

investigation in Mexico City. The Select Committee staff, operating on

the assumption that information received by CIA immediately after the

assassination, probably the most reliable, analyzed this information

closely. The staff attempted to determine what, if anything, was done

to pursue the leads contained in this information.

It must be remembered that both CIA Headquarters and the station

in Mexico City were operating under tremendous pressures after the

assassination and were receiving a great deal of irrelevant informa-

take 10n. I Faste to fotton a given Lead is understandable This

discussion

is net intended to minim tA's impressive work in inves-

chese conditions Protos

made it deficiet

to

sort out and pursue freen all major lands

Conferee of envestigatin response

Secuter

F07

---

## Page 70

6%

tigating the assassination, but only to note the unresolved leads.

Furthermore, the Warren Commission staff travelled to Mexico

City and was given access to files there and at Headquarters. The Committe.

staff did not attempt the difficult and

tedious job of determining

precisely what documents

the Commission staff actually read of what

documents

it had access to.

There are summaries of the documents

the Warren Commission staff reveiwed in Mexico City and from these

summaries it seems the staff did not review many of the Station's

files; but these summaries are not necessarily accurate or complete.

In any event, the Select Committee's review of CIA files on

Mexico City yields a different picture of Oswald's visit there than

that painted in the public version of the Warren Report. Moreover,

these documents disclose unusual activity by both the Soviets and

Cubans in Mexico City, which may or may not relate to the assassina-

tion, but are, in the least, coincidental with it.

Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy on September 27, sometime

after arriving in the city.

He visited the Cuban Consulate in the afternoon asking for a

visa and indicating he had previously been to the Soviet consulate.

He dealt with a Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate named Sylvia

Duran.

She attempted to determine whether the Soviets had granted

a visa and learned they had not. She told Oswald he could not get

a visa to Cuba for travel on to Russia unless he had the Russian visa

first.

This is substantiated by the documents furnished by the Cuban

We do know that the files we have reviewed may contain docu-

ments not

seen by the Warren Commission

staff.

NW 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 70

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## Page 71

government.

The next morning Oswald apparently visited the Soviet Consulate

again

and then went to the Cuban Consulate. He had to return to the

Soviet Consulate later in the day to give the Soviets his "address"

which the Cubans

had.

There is no explanation for why Oswald had to get his address

from the Cubans, nor is it known whetebr it was his address in the

United States or in Mexico City.

However,. in 1967 Sylvia Duran

reportedly said

1 that

she had sexual

relations with Oswald. She denied this in 1963 when interrogated

by Mexican authorities.

Either on this day or the previous day, Oswald allegedly got

into an argument with the Cuban consul, Asque. This fact was initially

brought out in the interrogation

of Duran by Mexican authorities

immediately after the assassination. It was substantiated by Oswald's

letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington of November 9, 1963,

in which he complainecabout the attitude of Asque. However, in mid-

1964, it was reported that Oswald had also told Asque that he

intended to shoot Kennedy. A 1967 article in the National Inquirer

• and the Mexican newspaper, Novedades, reports an interview by a

British journalist, Comer Clark, with Castro in which Castro said

Oswald told Asque that he planned to shoot Kennedy.

Oswald may have met with the Soviet Consul and KGB agent, Yatskov,

while in Mexico City. Oswald may also have met Vice-Consul and KGB

agent Kostikov; Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy refers to a

The Warren Commission Report tends to suggest Oswald did not

contemplate assassination until a mid-November slight by Marina.

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 71

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## Page 72

70

discussion with "Comrade 'Kostin." Oswald easily could have been

confused or could have forgotten Yatskov's name, so there seems to

be no significance in the fact he met Yatskov. Kostikov is believed

to have

been in the KGB's 13th

Department, specializing in sabotage

and assassination. However, Kostikov, as part of his "cover" was

responsible for issuing visas and CIA developed no evidence that

Oswald's contact with Kostikov was other than for the purpose of

obtaining a visa.

Nothing is known about Oswald's activities on September 29•

or 30 -- although his visa application furnished by the Cubans in-

dicates he wanted to travel to Cuba on September 30: The Cuban

documents show his application was not approved until October 27 and

then only on the condition that he have a Soviet visa.

On October 1, Oswald again contacted the Soviet Consulate

about approval of his visa application. He was told there was no

further information but a telegram had been sent to Washington.

CIA developed no further information in Mexico City, about Oswald

until the assassination. But shortly after the shooting in Dallas

the CIA learned

at least one Cuban and one Communist Bloc official

in Mexico City reportedly said something to the effect that they knew

"almost before Kennedy." This possibly means word of Oswald's

threat against Kennedy, expressed to Asque, had spread throughout

the Communist Bloc establishment in Mexico City before the assassina-

tion.

After the assassination CIA received a report from a source,

later determined to be prone to exaggeration, that a reporter in

NH

50955

The Soviet Ambassador in

Washington turned over to the State

Fare fein the washington embassy and Consulate. There

telegram

other message from Mexico City.

---

## Page 73

71•

Mexico 'said the Cubans had met Oswald at a restaurant on the out-

skirts of the city during

his visit. The Mexican reporter denied

the story to FBI investigators. Employees of the restaurant were

interviewed and,

after being shown pictures of Oswald and various

• Cuban officials,

stated they could not recall seeing them at the

restaurant.

The day after the assassination Mexican authorities arrested

Sylvia Duran, the person Oswald contacted at the Cuban Consulate.

Her arrest was strongly protested by the Cubans. Even if Cuba had

no involvement with Oswald, the Cubans would be concerned about

J.S. suspicions. In any event, the Cuban Ambassador met with

Duran and

reviewed what she had told the Mexicans. He then summarized

what

she told him in a report he sent to üuba. Despite this report

the Cubans remained concerned about allegations Duran might tell something

about "money" and Oswald. Only after the Cubans were sure that she

hadn't, did they decide it was safe to act on the information they

had.

Shortly after the assassination, CIA learned of unusual activi-

ty on flights to Cuba. First, it was reported that a Cubana airline

flight from Mexico City to Cuba in late afternoon on November 22 was

delayed some five hours in order to take on an unidentified passenger

who arrived in a small aircraft and who boarded the Cubana flight without

passing through customs. No further information was ever received by

CIA and there is no evidence that any further investigation was ever

made.

Second, an American of Cuban birth (referred to herein as the

Cuban-American) was reported to have travelled from Tampa to Texas

where he crossed into Mexico on November 23. On November 25, he arrived

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 73

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## Page 74

Hur

72

in Mexico City and departed on a late evening flight to Havana

on November 27. He was the only passenger on the Cubana airlines

flight

which had a crew of nine.

Information available to CIA also indicated that Soviet couriers

were engaged in "unusual"' travel between New York, Mexico City, and

Havana both before and immediately after the assassination.

CIA drew

no conclusion about this

unusual activity.

3. Major Deficiencies in CIA's Investigation

a. Nossenko.

In repeated testimony before the Select Committee, Mr. James

Angleton, who was head of CIA counterintelligence for 20 years,

emphasized the strange case of the defector Nossenko as a basis for

his concern about Warren Commission findings. Nossenko, a high level

KGB officer, defected to the U.S. in early 1964. Among other things,

he told a story of KGB's belief that Oswald was unstable and of KGB's

resultant disinterest in Oswald during his stay in Russia. Nossenko

claimed to have reviewed the complete KGB dossier on Oswald shortly . .

before his defection and assured interrogators that KGB had no connec-

tion with Oswald.

Mr. Angleton testified that neither he nor other CIA personnel

responsible for Nossenko's interrogation believed him to be telling

the truth -- in Mr. Angleton's parlance, Nossenko lacked bona fides.

Current CIA counterintelligence officials, who strongly disagree

with Mr. Angleton's policies generally, now assert that Nossenko

is bona fides.

HH 50955

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## Page 75

Ihus there is a difference in opinion between the counterintelligence

experts as to the reliability of Nossenko's story.

If Nossenko is not bona fides but is instead a plant, then there

is a very troubling question as to why he defected and as to why

his

story exonerates the KGB from a role in the assassination.

Per-

haps his defection was designed to give CIA incorrect

information on

many aspects of the

KGB's operation -- in which case his story about Oswald could still

be true.

However, there seem to be inconsistencies between his

knowledge of the Oswald case and the known information about Oswald.

For example, he claimed to have reviewed the entire KGB file on

Oswald,

yet he had no knowledge of Oswald's visit to Mexico City

other than the bare fact that he went there. He did not tell

interrogators; what surely must have been in Oswald's file, that

Oswald met Yatskov and Kostikov -- both KGB agents. In any event,

the Nossenko defection remains as mysterious now as it was in 1964.

b. Pursuit of the Cuban Connection

With substantial evidence pointing to Cuban involvement. in the

assassination, CIA would logically have been expected to use its

resources to conduct a vigorous investigation of that connection.

at did not happen.

The Mexico City Station

informed Headquarters

immediately after

the assassination that the Mexican government, like CIA, knew that

Oswald had met with Sylvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate. It

* This is the same deficiency in the documents furnished by

the Soviet Ambassador.

NW 50955 DocId: 32423526 Page 75

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## Page 76

74.

:.

further

cabled that the Mexican authorities planned to arrest and inter-

rogate Duran: Upon learning this Mr. Karamessines, then assistant to

DDP Helms, ordered Mr. Whitten of the Mexican desk of the Western

Hemisphere Division to telephone the Chief of Station on an open

line to call off the arrest. The telephoned order was too late

for Duran had already been arrested. However, Whitten did not agree

with the order and wrote a memorandum for record stating that he .

carried out the order despite his personal objection to it.

Later that day, a message from Headquarters cautioned Mexico

City Station about the interrogation of

Duran because "it could

jeopardize U.S. freedom on the whole question of Cuban responsibility."

Neither Mr. Karamessines nor Mr. Whitten have been questioned about

this order, but Mr. Angleton testified he was unaware of-it and cannot

understand why it was issued.

More importantly, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Thomas Mann,

apparently was at this time extremely interested in investigating

the role of the Cubans. CIA cables from Mexico reveal he was

exerting pressure on CIA, FBI and State Department personnel to

investigate the Cuban connection.

He proposed that

Mexican authorities

arrest Maria Louisa Caleron, a Cuban consulate employee, and the

Cuban Consul Mirabil. The Chief of Station cabled headquarters about

this pressure and warned of the "flap potential" of the Ambassador's

continuing along his line of investigation. The Chief of Station is

now dead so he cannot explain the meaning of his cable. The FBI

representative in Mexico City who sat in on meetings with the Am-

bassador and Chief of Station testified that he was not aware of

HM 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 76

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## Page 77

75

any CIA reluctance to pursue Cuban involvement; land, he expressed

surprise that the Chief of Station sent such a message to Head-

quarters.

Moreover, Director McCone's calendar reveals he met with

Ambassador Mann and Mr. King on December 13, 1963 in Washington.

The Select Committee

has not yet been able to obtain records of this

meeting.

Indeed very little is known about the actions of the Cuban

diplomatic/intelligence personnel in Mexico City either before or

after the assassination:

Unlike the Soviet KGB personnel, Cuban intelligence officers were

not closely watched by CIA. Maria Louisa Calderon, who was alleged

to have been in contact with Oswald, moved her residence on the

afternoon of the assassination and moved into the Cuban Embassy after

the arrest of Duran. She

returned to Cuba on December 13.

Furthermore, CIA undertook a major review of its Cuban policy

immediately after the assassination. In early December, Head-

quarters

first approved and then called off several operations

against Cuba. CIA's Florida station ("WAVE") complained about

the

confusing orders, but Headquarters assured WAVE that everything

depended upon the high

level review of Cuban/Caribbean policy.

Indeed White House documents of January 1964, note that orders

had been issued in early December 1963 delineating the types of

operations that could be conducted pending final decision by the

President as to future Cuban policy. CIA has not yet given the staff

access to its files on this review process.

Throughout January, February, and March, review at the White

House level continued. Notes of discussions at these meetings are

quite detailed, but the AMLASH operation was never mentioned by

H₩ 50955 DoOId:32423526 Page 77

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## Page 78

name, nor so far as we can determine, by even a general description.

There, is no reference in these notes to the events of the Fall of

1963, although almost every other CIA operation is detailed.

In November 1964, AMLASH was again in contact with CIA through

an intermediary and the White House staff was duly informed of this.

However, the staff was only told that AMLASH had been working for

CIA since 1961 and had provided valuable information. The staff

was not told that CIA had met AMLASH in connection with a coup or

assassination attempt.

Memoranda for Record prepared by Director McCone of his

meetings with President Johnson from November 22, 1963 through

January 31, 1964, were reviewed by the staff of the Select Committee.

There is no mention in those memoranda of the AMLASH operation or

the possibility that CIA plots against Castro prompted him to re-

taliate.

In 1967, Mr. Helms orally briefed President Johnson on the CIA

I.G. report on assassination.. Helms' handwritten notes prepared for

the briefing do not refer to any activity after mid-1963 although

the I.G.'s report detailed the AMLASH operation is an assassination

• plot. As previously mentioned, Mr. Helms has testified he

did

not regard the AMLASH operation generally as

an assassination plot.

NH 50955

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c. - Special Affairs Staff Information on Cuban Groups

As mentioned previously, CIA was engaged in a variety of covert

operations against Cuba. At Headquarters, the Special Affairs Staff

was. responsible for Cuba. The WAVE station in Florida actually car-

ried out the operations. WAVE had at least two major ties to the

Cuban exile community: First, it employed exiles in CIA-controlled

operations against Cuba. Cuban exiles were used as members of agent

teams landed in Cuba and as the crews of boats and aircraft supporting

operations. Necessarily, WAVE personnel were actively recruiting

Cuban exiles for these operations and probably had a great deal of

information about Cuban exile groups.

Second, WAVE apparently had responsibility for liaison contact

with the two "autonomous groups." Both of these groups had extensive

contacts in the Cuban exile community.

Despite WAVE's potential for assisting in the investigation of

the assassination - especially regarding Oswald's connection with

Cuban exiles and allegations he was seen in the company of Mexicans

or Cubans -- WAVE was not directed to give such assistance.

Although the Warren Commission requested FBI to furnish what in-

formation it held

on various

•Cuban groups, it made no similar request

of CIA. The Select Committee has not been able to learn why the

Commission did not make such a request -- particularly significant

in view of the fact that FBI's response noted CIA might have an

operational interest in Cuban groups. In any event, a large and possibly

fruitful area of investigation, the CIA's ties to Cuban groups, was

not investigated by the Warren Commission or the CIA.

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d. The Cuban-American

As mentioned previously, CIA learned that the Cuban-American

crossed the border from Texas into Mexico on November 23. CIA knew

that the border had been closed by Mexican authorities immediately

after the assassination and reopened on November 23, so such a

crossing was itself cause for investigation. The Cuban-American •

arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the

evening of November 27, when he departed on a late evening Cubana

airlines flight to Havana, using a Cuban "courtesy visa" and an

expired U:S. passport. He was the only passenger on that flight, which

had a crew of nine.

In March 1964, CIA received a report that a source alleged the

Cuban-American had received his permit to enter Mexico on November 20

in Tampa, Florida. The same source also said the Cuban-American was

somehow "involved in the assassination." There is no indication

that CIA followed-up on this report.

The FBI did investigate this individual after receiving CIA's

report of his unusual travel. The FBI's investigation terminated

after publication of the Warren Report, because the Cuban-American

was then in Cuba and

so outside the FBI's jursidiction.

The FBI's reports on the Cuban-American are confusing and

Incumplete but

they are the only available information about him.

following information is taken from those reports.

The Cuban-American applied for a U.S. passport at the U.S. Consul

Office in Havana on June 2, 1960. He presented proof that his mother

was an American citizen although she moved to Cuba with her parents

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79

when she was eight months old.

She married the Cuban American's

father, a Cuban national in 1939 and the Cuban-American was born

in 1940. His mother, in documents submitted with his application

for passport indicated she planned to remain in Cuba. On July 13,

1960, the Cuban-American was issued a passport, but it was only valid

until January 25, 1963, the date he would become 23 years old.

The Cuban-American requested Cuban authorities to permit him to

return to Cuba on May 15, 1962. The Cuban-American's cousin said the

Cuban-American had spent several weeks in Cuba and apparently he did

travel there sometime after May 15, 1962.

In August 1962, the Cuban-American married an American woman,

11 years his elder. They lived in Key West until June 1963, when

they moved to Tampa.

In August 1963, his wife moved back to Key West because of marital

problems. His wife and others characterized the Cuban-American as

pro-Castro.

The Cuban-American allegedly told FBI's sources that he had origin-

ally left Cuba to evade philitary service, but Selective Service

4. 5.

records disclosed that he registered for thedraft on July 29, 1960,

at Key West - shortly after his arrival in the U.S. He was

classified 4-F on February 23, 1962, because of a language barrier

and because he had a physician's letter stating he had grand mal

epilepsy.

Nevertheless,

some sources told FBI that the Cuban-

American had returned to Cuba in 1963 because he feared being drafted.

Others attributed his return to his worry about his parents or about

his own health.

NW 50955

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80

It was also reported to FBI that the Cuban-American had

a brother

in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union.

On November 17, 1963, according to several sources, the Cuban-

American was at a get-together at the home of a

member of the Tampa

Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where color slides

of Cuba were shown..

(There was some talk about |the Cuban-American) having

at the residence for some time waiting for a tele-

phone call from Cuba which was very important.

It was

understood that it all depended on his getting the "go

ahead order" for him to leave the United States.

indicated he had been refused

travel back to his native

Cuba . . . ..

*/

On November 20, 1963, the Cuban-American obtained a Mexican tourist

card at the Honorary Consulate of Mexico in Tampa. He crossed the

border into Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on November 23. Apparently

because the Cuban-American was not listed as the driver of any

vehicle crossing the border that day, FBI concluded he crossed in

a privately owned automobile owned by another person.

On December 10, 1963, at the regular monthly meeting of the Tampa

FPCC, a woman told the group that she had telephoned Cuba at 5:00 a.m.

and learned the Cuban-American had arrived there safely via Texas and

Mexico. On January 16, 1964,

the same woman reportedly said he had

borrowed $190 prior to his leaving for Mexico.

On September 3, 1964, a source who told FBI that he was acquainted

with the Cuban-American said he borrowed $150 for his travel but

repaid only $25. Another source reported that as of September 1964, the

Cuban-American was not working in Cuba but spent a great deal of time

playing dominoes.

*

President Kennedy made several public appearances in Tampa

on

WW 50955N0Veh 7242{526 Page 82

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## Page 83

The preceding was the extent of the FBI's and CIA's investi-

gation.

So far as we can determine, neither FBI nor CIA told the

Warren Commission about the Cuban-American's strange travel. Warren

Commission files contain an excerpt of the FBI's check on

the Cuban-American at the Passport Office, but nothing else. In

responding to the Commission's request for information on the Miami

chapter of FPCC, FBI mentioned the Tampa chapter had 16 members in

1961

and was active in May 1963. The FBI response did not mention

the Cuban-American or the November and December 1963 meetings.

Moreover, a possible connection between Oswald and the Tampa

chapter of FPCC was already indicated. Oswald applied to V. T. Lee,

national president of the FPCC, for a charter for a New Orleans

chapter. Lee wrote Oswald on May 29, 1963, suggesting Oswald get

in touch with the Tampa chapter, which V. T. Lee had personally

organized. Thus, the suspicious travel of this individual coupled

with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely

investigation than FBl conducted and the results should have been

volunteered to the Warren Commission, regardless of its failure to

request the information.

HH 50955

* A CIA employee did chick. the U.S. Passport shit's felt is

the endividical in sandy dicene, 963, allen to tie in t

called a requent for a check, An May, 1464, a defector from,"

intelligence was asked if he knew anything about the

individual and he responded in the negative.

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82

THE FBI'S ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION

Preliminary Discussion

The FBI's investigation of the assassination was a massive

effort.

Literally thousands of leads were followed by hundreds

of agents, many of whom during the days immediately following

the

assassination worked round the clock. The investigative

files total over five hundred and ninety volumes of materials.

Although the Committee reviewed FBI materials in areas

where allegations of disclosure or investigative difficiencies

had been advanced, existing limitations of personnel and time

precluded &

emmittee review of the Bureau's entire investigative

effort. Rather, than randomly selecting for examination a

limited number of other substantive investigative areas, the

Committee directed the staff

to review documents and examine

Bureau employees to determine whether there were any limitations

placed on the assassination investigation, or whether the

Bureau withheld evidence from the Warren Commission. The

Connittee began this aspect of its investigation with the

impression - subsequently confirmed -- that the Warren

Commission had not been informed of the CIA's attempts on

Fidel

Castro's life. Whether knowledge of these attempts,

or existing Bureau activities, or the Bureau's relationship

with the Commission, is likely to have affected the process

by which information flowed from the Bureau to the Commission

or the Bureau's assassination investigation, is discussed in

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53.

in next three

sub-sections of this chapter.

The remaining

sub-sections consider certain aspect of the Bureau's investigative

efforts in Dallas, Mexico City,

and New Orleans

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85

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84

70/

Fraters too bed

(a) The internally admitted investigative deficiencies in

the Bureau's handling of the pre-assassination Oswald

case

Immediately after the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover

instructed that a complete analysis be made of "any investi-

gative deficiencies in the Oswald case." By memorandum dated

December 10, 1963, Assistant Director J. H. Gale (Inspection

Division) reported that there were a number of investigative

and reporting delinquencies in the handling of the Oswald case

as follows:

Oswald should have been on the Security

Index; his wife should have been interviewed

before the assassination, and investigation

intensified --. not held in abeyance . after

Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

In the paragraph immediately preceding the section of the

report which sets forth Mr. Gale's recommendations for disci-

plinary actions, he observes:

Concerning the administrative action recom

mended hereinafter, there is the possibility

that the Presidential Commission investigating

instant matter will subpoena the investigating

Agents.

If this occurs, the possibility then

exists that the Agents may be questioned con-

cerning whether administrative action had been

taken against them.

However, it is felt these

possibilities are sufficiently remote that the

recommended action

should go forward at this

time.

It appears unlikely at this time that

the Commission's subpoenas would go down to the

Agent level.

to which Mr. Hoover noted: "In any event such gross incompe-

tency cannot be overlooked nor administrative action postponed."

NW 50955

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The following addendum to Mr. Gale's report was written

by Assistant Director Cartha D. DeLoach:

I recommend that the suggested disciplinary

action be held in abeyance until the findings

of the Presidential Commission have been made

public.

Ihis action is recommended inasmuch as

any

"leak" to the general public, or particularly

to the communications media, concerning the FBI.

taking disciplinary action against its personnel

with

respect to captioned matter would be

assumed

as a direct admission that we are responsible for

negligence which might have resulted in the

assassination of the President.

At the present

time there are so many. wild rumors, gossip, ano

speculation that even

the slishtest hint to out-

concerning disciplinary action of this

nature would result in considerable adverse re-

action against the FBI.

I do not believe that

our personnel will be

subpoenaed.

Justice Warren has indicated he plans to issue

There is, however,

the possibility

• that the public will learn of disciplinary action

being taken against

our personnel and, therefore,

start a bad,

unjustifiable reaction,

immediately below which Mr. Hoover noted: "I do not concur."

On December 20, 1963, 17 Bureau employees (5 field investigative.

agents, 1 field supervisor, 3 special agents in charge, 4 headquarters

supervisors, 2 headquarters section chiefs, 1 inspector, and 1 assis-

tant director) were disciplined (i.e., censured and/or placed on pro-

bation) for "shortcomings in connection with the investigation of Os-

wald prior to the assassination." Although the transferring

of

some of these agents was discussed at that time, certain

transfers were held in abeyance until the issuance of the warren

Commission's report on September 24, 1964.*

Jini. Gole Is C. TOlson, 9/30/64.

...

N# 50955

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One of the investigative shortcomings identified by

Assistant Director Gale was the failure to include Oswald's

name on the Security Index.* Indeed, of the seventeen agents,

supervisors, and senior officials who were disciplined, not a

single one believed that Oswald met the criteria for the Secu

+ Th

rity Index. In this regard Assistant Director Alan Belmont

noted in an addendum to Mr. Gale's. 12/10/63 memorandum that:

It is significant to note that all of the

supervisors and officials who came into con-

tact with this case at the seat of government,

as well as agents in the field, are unanimous

in the opinion that Oswald did

not meet

the

criteria for the Security Index.

- If this is

so, it would appear that the criteria are not

sufficiently specific to include a case such

as Oswald's

and, rather than take the posi-

tion that all of these employees were mis

taken in their judgment, the criteria should

be changed.

This has now been recommended

by Assistant Director Gale.

Mr. Hoover made the following handwritten notations next to

Mr. Belmont's addendum: "They were worse than mistaken";

"Certainly no one in full possession of all his faculties can

claim Oswald didn't fall within this criteria."

* The Security Index and the criteria pursuant to which

names are selected for inclusion are discussed in detail on

pages 195-199 of Tab D Of the Committee's Domestic Report.

With respect to the Oswald case, however, it is important to

understand that under the procedures then in effect, the inclu-

sion of Oswald on Security Index would not have resulted in

the dissemination of Oswald's name to the Secret Service.

NW 50955

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5?

n On September 24, 1964 -- the same day the Warren Commis-

sion's report was officially released -- Assistant Director

William C. Sullivan wrote:

In answer to the question

as to why bee

Harvey Oswald was not on the Security Index,

based on the facts concerning Oswald which

were available prior to his assassination of

the President, it was the judgment of the

agents handling the case in Dallas and New

Orleans. The Dallas field supervisor and

the SAC in New Orleans as well as supervisors

at the Seat of Goverment that such facts dia

not warrant the inclusion of Oswald in the

Security Index.

The matter has, of course,

been re-examined in the Bureau

and Mr. Gale

by memorandum 12/10/63 expressed the opinion

that Oswald should have been placed on

the

Security Index prior to 11/22/63.

The

Director concurred with MI. Gale's opinion

and administrative action has been taken.*

Mr. Hoover's handwritten notations on the above-quoted Sullivan

memorandum were with respect to the Bureau personnel who failed

to include Oswald on the Security Index, "They could not have

been more stupid," and with respect to administrative action,

"And now that the Bureau has been debunked publicly I intend

to take additional administrative action."

Special Agent Hosty testified before

the Warren Commission

on May *

, 1964. He had previously requested to talk to

Mr. Hoover, and he learned from Assistant Director Alan Belmont

on the morning of May b, 1964, that he would be allowed to see

the Director later that day. According to SA Hosty, the

*Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 9/29/64.

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## Page 90

109

saying,

100 fu crit

Director could not have been more pleasant; sA Hosty testified

Yurt he tried no est

that here sat one negative ford, and the Director told-me

that I fare nothing to worry about.

Indeed, this is exactly

what SA Hosty recounted to SAe Gordon Shanklin upon his return

to Dallas. ** Mr. Hoover's version of the meeting differs con

siderably from S# Hosty's. According to the Director:

[Il discussed with him the situation

which had developed in Dallas . . . and

of embarrassment which had been caused. ***

On September 28, 1964 -- some four days after the issuance of

the Commission's report -- eight of the Bureau employees against

whom disciplinary action had been taken in December of 1963

were again censured and/or put on probation land some this time

transferred) for reasons identical to those that led to action

being

taken against them in December 1963. In addition to the

above eight, three other employees who had not been disciplined

as a result of the Oswald case in December 1963 were disciplined

as follows:

• 1) A Special Agent in Dallas was censured

and placed on probation for failing to

properly handle and supervise this matter:

2)

An inspector at FBI HQ was censured for

not exercising suflicient

imagination and

Foresight to initlate action to have Security

Index material disseminated to Secret Service;

3)

An Assistant to the Director at FBI HQ

was censured for his overall responsibility

in this entire matter.

* *

Testimony of J. Gordon Shanklin, December 20, 1975,p.

Frosty, 12/5/75, p-71.

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## Page 91

Phila

In a memorandum disseminated to senior bureau officials on

October 12, 1964, Mr. Hoover noted:

There is no question in my mind but that we

alled in carrying through some of the most

¡alient aspects of

the Oswald investigation.

It ought to be a lesson to all, but I doubt

if some

even realize it now.

J. Edgar Hoover did not believe that the fact of discipli-

nary action would ever become known outside the Bureau. It did

not until October 1975. Neither the testimony of FBI personnel

nor the materials made available to the Commission suggest

the

slightest investigative deficiency in the Bureau's

pre-assassina-

tion Oswald case. Indeed, the record gives

just the opposite impres-

sion. However, the documentary record made available to the Committee

reveals that Bureau

officials were continually concerned with the

possibility. that the FBI might be regarded as "responsible for

negligence that resulted in the assassination of President Kenneedy

because of pre-assassination investigative deficiencies in the

Oswald case."*

Asocurt* Memorandum from Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont to

Assistant touthe Director Clyde Tolson, 10/1/64.

Cf. Discus-

sion, infra, subsection (b).

HH 50955

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Tie too lo

(b) "The Bureau's perception of the Warren Commission

as

an adversary.

Not only was the Bureau subjected to its first major public

criticism in years for its handling of the pre assassination case;

a majority of Americans were skeptical of the Bureau's stated in-

vestigative findings that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted

alone. The Warren Commission itself noted in its report that:

"Because of the numerous rumors and theories, the public interest

in insuring the truth was ascertained could not be met by merely

(1)

adopting the reports on the analysis of Federal or state agencies."

Assuming, arguendo, that the Warren Commission reported either

that the Bureau's handling of the pre assassination Oswald case

was deficient in some manner, the FBI would have been open to em-

barrassment and criticism and charged with responsibility for the

assassination. Given this possibility and J. Edgar Hoover's known

hostility and established reactions to either criticism or embarr-

assment (be it personal or of the Bureau), it is not at all sur-

prising that from its inception Mr. Hoover, and therefore the Bureau,

perceived the Commission as an adversary.

J. Edgar Hoover had, by November 23, 1963, informed President

Johnson of the Bureau's preliminary investigative findings: v1z.;

that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone.

In a

HH 50955

(1) Warren Commission Report, p. X.

(2) It should

• also be notel Thest

By letter to the Warren Commission dated December 9, 1963, Deputy

Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach recommended that the

Commission

make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report .

clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and

that Oswald was a loner. DeLoach had apparently learned of Katzenbach's

letter from a Commission member. Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to

Dóc M: 35423526-2483 92

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## Page 93

November 9, 1963, menorandum, Ni. Hoover recounts a telephone col

versation he had that day with President Johnson:

The President called and asked if I am

familiar with

the proposed group they are

trying

to get to study my report - two from the

House, two from the Senate, two from the courts,

and a

couple of outsiders.

I replied that I

had not heard of that but had

seen reports from

the Senate Investigating Committee.

The President stated he wanted to get by

just with my file and my report.

I told him

I thought it would be very bad to have a rash

of investigations.

He then indicated the only

way to stop it is to appoint a high level comm-

Ittee to evaluate my report and tell the House

and Senate not to go ahead with the investi-

gation.

I stated that would be a three-ring

circus.

***

I advised the President that we hope to

have the investigation wrapped up today but

probably won't have it before the first of the

week as an angle in Mexico is giving trouble -

the matter of

Oswald's getting $6,500 from the

Cuban Embassy

and coming back to this country

with it; that we are not able to prove that

fact; that we have information he was there on

September 18 and we are able to prove he was

in New Orleans on that date; that a story came

in changing the date to September 28

was in Mexico on the 28th.

date 28 heptember & story ne

I related that the

police have again arrested Duran

a member of

the Cuban. Embassy; that they will hold her two

or three days; will confront her with the orig-

inal informant and will also try a lie detector

test on her.

* **

The President then indicated our conclusions

are: he is the one who did it;..

whether he

was connected with the Cuban operation with

HIH

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92

money we are trying to nail down. I told

him that is what we are trying to nail

down; that we have copies of the corres-

pondence;

that none of the letters dealt

with any indication of violence or assassi-

nation; that they were dealing with a visa

to go back to Russia.

On November 29, 1963, President Johnson issued the executive

order establishing the Presidential commission. Bureau documents

reflect that each time Hoover received word that a particular person

was being considered for the Commission or its staff, he asked to

be informed as to "what the Bureau had" on the individual. Although

derogatory information pertaining to members and staff was brought

to Mr. Hoover's attention, the Bureau has informed the Committee

staff that there is no documentary evidence which indicates that

.(3)

such information was ever disseminated

sive the cameras

was in seasie.

On December 10, 1963, Hoover informed Assistant Directoe Alan

Belmont that he would be "personally responsible for reviewing every

piece of paper that went to the Warren Commission." Hoover also

designated Inspector James Malley -- who had previously cosupervised

the field investigation in Dallas along with SAE Shanklin -- as the

Bureau liaison with the Warren Commission. In a memorandum re-

counting the December 10 meeting during which Malley was briefed

(3)

The Committee and

the Bureau defined their terms, such that

"dissemination" includes informing

the person himself of the derog-

atory information.

Additionally,

in

order to

ensure the protection

of individual privacy, the Committee directed

the staff not to

request access to any derogatory information.

HW 50955

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## Page 95

as to his new assignment, the Director wrote,

I told Mr. Malley that I wanted him to

establish the closest and most amiable

working relationship with Mr. Rankin.

I told

him that I had personally known Mr. Rankin

quite well since he had

served as Solicitor

General under Attorneys General Brownell and

Rogers.

I also alerted Mr. Malley that there were

indications that the Chief Justice,

the Presidential Commission, was endeavoring

to find fault with the FBI and certain inform-

ation had been leaked by the Chief Justice to

Drew Pearson

which

was critical of the FBI's

functioning in Dallas prior to the assassina-

tion.

I told Me. Malley and Mr. Belmont that the

Chief Justice has now demanded all of the so-

called

of

"raw" reports upon which the FBI report

the assassination was predicated,

and in

doing so the Chief Justice had characterized

the FBI report as being in "skeleton form.

I stated the Chief Justice had further added

in his statement to the press:

"In order to

evaluate it we have to see the materials on which

the report was prepared. "

statement by the Chief

tirely unwarranted and could certainly have been

phrased better so as not to leave the impression;

at least by inuendo, that the FBI had not done

a thorough job.:

On January 28, 1964, Lee Rankin met with Hoover at the Commiss-

ion's direction to discuss the allegation that Oswald was. an FBI

informant. According to a Hoover memorandum of January 31, 1964:

Rankin stated that the Commission was

concerned as to how this matter could be re-

solved, and it was for this reason that they

asked him to see me.

He stated that the

Commission did not desire to initiate an

in-

vestigation on the outside.

• as it might

appear the Commission was investigating the FBI.

NW 50955

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94

I told Mr. Rankin that Lee Harvey Oswald was

never at any time a confidential informant,

under-

cover agent,. or even a source of information for

the FBI, and I would like to see that clearly

stated on the record of the commission and I

would be willing to so state under oath.

I commented to him that I had not appreciated

what I interpreted as carping criticism by the

Chief Justice when he referred to the Bureau's

report originally furnished to the Commission as

being a "'skeleton report.'

Throughout the Warren Commission's existence, Mr. Hoover was

kept informed on a daily basis by Alan Belmont as to (1) the internal

Commission meetings and decisions; (2) the areas in which the Commiss-

ion was requesting information or further FBI investigation, and (3)

the materials which the Bureau intended to provide to the Commission.

On various occasions, Mr. Hoover learned that the Commission members

and/or staff members had

stated that they were impressed with the

testimony of Bureau personnel and the investigation conducted by the

Bureau.

His handwritten notation on an April 4, 1964, memorandum

succinctly states his usual response to such complimentary remarks:

• place no credence in any complimentary

remarks made by Warren nor

the Commission.

They were looking for FBI "gaps" and having

found none yet they try to get sympathy.

In his April 3, 1964 memorandum to William Sullivan, William Branigan

MH 50955

(4) See, e.g., memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to J. Mohr, 12/12/63;

memorandum from

A.

Rosen to A. Belmont, 4/4/644

(5) See, e.g., memorandum Erom A. Rosen to A. Belmont, 4/4/64.

/BI docents alde rescel Ma digitor of CIA passel information

le received ab, to lin inner enwortigation to la FBI.

Mr. Argitten alse tilet the Bureau CIt's planned response te the

DCId: 3242352

ours, about a commition Orated had will CIA.

... ar)

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## Page 97

wrote

While complimenting the Bureau for its

cooperation, the President's Commission, by

letter dated 3-26-64, forwarded what purports

to be 30 questions (by actual count there are

52 as some of the enumerated questions have

more than one part)

to which they request a

reasoned

response in reasonable detail and

with such substantiating materials as seem

appropriate.

The questions are those of a cross-examin-

ing attorney and it is evident that this is a

cross-examination of the FBI or a part of it

in the case of the assassination of President

Kennedy.

Mr. Hoover noted on the memorandum, "Their so-called compliments of

the Bureau's work are empty and have no sincerity."

Similarly, upon being informed that the Commission intended. to

send two of its staff members to Mexico City, the Director "expressed

concern as to how lawyers on the Commission could spot gaps in our

investigation.

(6)

As is more fully discussed in subsection (c), supra, Special

Agent Hosty met with Hoover the day after Hosty's Warren Commission

testimony. On that occasion, Mr. Hoover mentioned that "the Warren

Commission would exonerate the FBI completely" and that indications

were

that "the Commission would vote five to two in the Bureau's

favor.

(6)

(7) Testimony of SA James P. Hosty, JI., 12/5/75, p: 68.

HH 50955 DocId:32423526 Page 97

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## Page 98

«The Commission did not "exonerate the FBI completely" and,

in fact, criticized

certain aspects of the FBI's handling of the

Oswald pre assassination case and the Bureau's failure to inform

the Secret Service of Oswald's presence in Dallas, Texas. For

example, the Commission concluded that the "FBI took an unduly

restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence

(8)

work, prior to the assassination.

(8)

Warren Commission Report, P.

443,

NW 50955 DocId: 32423526 Page 98

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## Page 99

(c) - The Bureau's Reaction to the Warren Commission Report

Upon receipt on September 25, 1964, of a copy ofache Warren

Commission's Report, the Director noted: "I want this carefully

reviewed as it pertains to FBI shortcomings by Gale. Chapter 8

tears us to pieces." On September 29, 1964, Mr. Hoover, after

reading a Washington Post article captioned "Praise is Voiced for

Staff Engaged on Warren Report," directed that the Bureau's files on

the 84 staff members listed in the article "be checked." By memo-

randum dated October. 2, 1964, the Director was informed that

"Bureau files contain derogatory information concerning the following

(1)

individuals and their relatives. "

On September 30, 1964, Assistant Director Gale pre-

SONAL DIY

sented Assistant to the Director Clyde Tolson with a memorandum that

reviewed the Commission Report "as it pertained to FBI shortcomings."

(1) On November 8, 1966, memoranda were furnished to Marvin Watson,

Special Assistant to President Johnson, at his request, setting forth

background information -- including derogatory materials - on seven

private citizens who wrote unfavorable articles concerning the Warren

Commission findings.

A. February 3, 1975, FBI memorandum which dis-

cusses

these

memoranda and their dissemination in 1966 to the White

House recounts:

No information was developed or furnished to

the White House concerning immoral conduct on

the part of the

seven above listed critics of

the Warren Commission with the exception of the

information furnished regarding

[identity of individual deleted for reasons of

privacy. 1

NH

50955

DocId:32423526 Page 99

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## Page 100

The memorandum is captioned "Shortcomings in handling of Lee Harvey

Oswald matter

by FBI personnel." Gale wrote:

The Commission has now set forth in a very. •

damning manner

some of the same glaring weak-

nesses for which we previously disciplined our

personnel such

as lack of vigorous investigation

after we had established that Oswald

visited

the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

Gale notes instances where the testimony of FBI agents makes the

Bureau look ridiculous

and taints its public image." These instances

include, inter alia, the following:

One agent testified that conditions in the

Dallas police station at the time of detention

and interrogation of Oswald were not "too much

unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, may-

be like Yankee Stadium during the World Series

Sames."

It is questionable whether the agent

should have described conditions in such an ed-

itorializing

and flamboyant manner but rather

should have indicated conditions were crowded.

More importantly, Gale's memorandum reveals a dichotomy between the

Bureau's "public position" and what Bureau officials regarded

as the

truth:

The Commission report indicates that we did not

have a stop on Oswald's passport with the De-

partment of State and did not know Oswald applied

for a passport in June 1963, to travel to Western

European countries, Soviet Union, Finland and

This is another specific example of how

case was improperly investigated

personnel are responsible for this example as

were previously criticized for not using appro-

priate techniques and making a more vigorous and

thorough investigation, to determine with whom

Oswald in contact or whether he had intelligence

=-------, on.

NH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 100

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## Page 101

TOO PRORET

assignment.

The Bureau by letter to the

Commission indicated that the facts did not

warrant Placing a stop on the passport as

investigation disclosed no. evidence that

Oswald was acting under the instructions or

on behalf of any foreign Government or In.

strumentality thereot

Inspector feels TE

was proper at that time to take this

"public"

posztion.

However

it is felt that with

Oswald's background we should have had a stop

n his passport, particularly since we di

ot know definitely whether or not he had an

intelligence assignments at that time.

[emphasis added.

Not surprisingly, Gale states in the "observations" section of this

memorandum :

We previously took administrative action

against those responsible for the investiga-

tive shortcomings in this case some of which

were brought out by the Commission.

felt that it

is appropriate at this time to

consider further, administrative action against

those

primarily culpable for the derelictions

in this case which have now had the effect

of publicly embarrassing the Bureau. lemphasis

added.]

After reviewing the aforementioned Gale memorandum, Assistant

Director Alan Belmont forwarded a one page memorandum to Clyde Tolson

on October 1, 1964. Belmont argued that

I think we are making a tactical error by

taking this

disciplinary action in this

case at this time.

Warren Commission

report has just been released. It contains

criticism of the FBI.

We are currently taking

aggressive steps to challenge the findings of

the Warren

Commission insotar as they pertain

to the FBI. (2) It is most important, there-

(2) These "aggressive steps" are discussed in an October 6, 1964,

memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, discussed, infra.

NH 50955 DooId: 32423526

Page 101

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## Page 102

By late datin

On Deptha 4, 1964 in

Binds safed the white bise and the

Acting Alterey Are That the come s

spat is tussly accuate in so far as its

Yentmint of the. IBS is concised". An an

to clyde tonor,

Octavia 1,1944 Menninene

desses consides wine a copy ties little

whole de vent to the wane Commentie.

Bumant wrote:

Or is nold that this Water a

are Went the Come

in that we charge tent in the

transcess approval, ti

AH 50955

DooId:32423526

Page 102

extram sing to is.

mind, If we wered a copy of

---

## Page 103

This latin to to the commission

"nere, it wile parteil male te

with pinie to gins with a afwit

aire.

• ***

I suggest are may wandt

camaron.

10/1/04 Al Midee, ihn Wile

We might is wale ery

down and diet anyoony

noR riticals,

NH 50955

Doeld: 32423526

Page

103

---

## Page 104

100

fore, that we do not provide a foothold

for our critics or the general public to

serve upon

to say in effect,

'See, the

Commission

is right, Mr. Hoover has taken

strong action against personnel involved

a in error, and thus.

in this case and thus admits that the bureau

Mr. Hoover disagreed with Belmont's observations, writing:

We were wrong.

The administrative action

approved by me will stand. I do not intend

to paliate actions which have resulted in

forever destroying the Bureau as the top

level investigative organization (3)

(nolst-Astuched -)

Bureau records reflect that on or about October 1, 1964, a

senior Bureau official instructed Inspector James Malley (who had

handled the Bureau's liaison with the Committee) to telephonically

contact Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin and inform him that

"he did the Bureau a great disservice and had out-McCarthyed

McCarthy." A memorandum dated October 2, 1964, reflects that this

request was dutifully carried out.

On October 6, 1964, Assistant Director Cartha D. DeLoach for-

warded to Assistant Director John Mohr a memorandum captioned

"Criticism of the FBI Following the Assassination of the President."

DeLoach wrote:

The criticism concerning the FBI and its

role in

events surrounding the assassination

of President Kennedy raises three questions

(3)

Mr. Tolson also disagreed with Mr. Belmont.

In

an addendum to the Gale memorandum Tolson wrote: "Most of

the administrative directions with respect to the Security

Index, the prompt submission of reports, etc., and not the

Oswald

case per se."

(4) This monorandum does not identif the Bureau official

ming could not Recall lik

who instructed Inspector Malley to make the phone call. aim

SEN

(578ff Interse, 3/20/76J,

WH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 104

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## Page 105

61

*FORET

which merit consideration at this time.

(1)

What is the public image of

the FBI at the present time?

certainly, it cannot be denied that the

public image of the FBI has been affected

in certain

areas by the criticism made of

the Bureau and its role in the events taking

place prior to the assassination of the

President.

It is believed this situation

reached one stage during the days immediately

following this event

and was climaxed by Dallas

Chief of Police Curry's statements which left

the, implication this

Bureau was seriously dere-

lict in discharging its responsibilities as an

intelligence agency.

The second stage, the most acute,

followed

the issuance of the Warren Report.

While there is admittedly no absolute way

to assess

a public image, it is believed the

image of the FBI improved

steadily since the

week following the assassination, and it im-

proved immeasurably up until

release of

the Warren Report. At the time we suffered

a rough

setback.

Following the release of the

Director's testimony, we have been well on the

road back to good prestige.

There is every

indication this improvement will continue if

we follow our current program regarding this

situation.

(2) What has been done to counteract this

criticism of the FBI?

Immediately following the assassination, we

undertook a program designed to eliminate the

nisunderstanding as to the statutory respon-

sibilities of the Secret Service and the FBI

which existed among the un the meus media, radio

appropriate medium such

scripts, FBI

tours, correspondence, speeches and

police training was used to clear the air con-

cerning

our responsibility.

NW 50955

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## Page 106

102

For the more educated group, those who.

were not necessarily biased, and who were

aware of the statutory authority of the FBI

we furnished full explanations for our actions

prior to the

assassination with respect to Lee

Harvey Oswald.

This was designed to convince

them that this Bureau did not fail to properly

evaluate the information available on Oswald

prIor to November LL, 1963, and that, in light

• of the facts available and the authority granted

within which to act, we were not derelict in

disseminating pertinent information to proper

authorities.

(3). What should be our future course in

this matter?

The liberal press, with the exception of

and its friends will

new to time tened eatends l place

he iss on the defensive; however, it is not

felt we should engage in

any prolonged debate

with them.

By keeping the argument going,

ve are diverting public attention from Secret

Service and the State Department and their

culpability.

* **

The Director has said that "nothing is more

devastating to

a smear than an offensive of

real outstanding accomplishments."

Our attention

and energies should be directed toward this end

in the coming months.

At the bottom of the last page of this DeLoach memorandum, Mr.

Hoover made the following handwritten notation:

The FBI will never live down this smear which

could have been so easily avoided if there had

been proper supervision and initiative.

N# 50955

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## Page 107

103

ISSUES RAISED BY CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE FBI'S

ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION IN THREE CITIES

MEXICO CITY

The information developed by the Bureau's investigation in

Mexico is discussed in detail in part two of the preceding sec-

tion

"The CIA's Role in the Investigation." The fol-

lowing section discusses certain facts which taken together

give rise to the, issue of the adequacy of the supervision and

scope of the investigation in Mexico.

A. Issues as to Adequacy of Supervision of Investigation

Prior to November 22; 1963, all the information which the

Bureau had on Oswald's trip to Mexico (September 27 through October 3:

generated by the CIA station in Mexico City

On October: 13, 1963

the EBI's Legat in Mexico City, Clarl Anderson, informed head-

quarters that his office would "attempt to establish Oswald's

whereabouts and date of entry into Mexico." A subsequent November 22,

1963, Legat airtel to headquarters states:

Investigation Mexico has failed to determine aus

information concerning subject's entry into or

departure trom Mexico City.

Last know intorma-

tion CIA advised

subject in contact with Soviet

and 10/1/63.

Mexico City to Headquartors, 10/18/63)

NH 50955

Doold: 32123526

Page 107

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## Page 108

0ET

weas

Anneson van the highent cantter trend cricint in tied

city.

The Pureau's assassination investigation there vas under

his direction.

Andercon armitted that wile conducting

the

investiantion. he was

mroceeding under the "inpression" that

rawald was the accassin and that he rated alone. He further

stater:

1.06

Our investigation was dedicated or

directed toward establishing Oswald's

activities in Mexico and looking to-

ward trying to establish whether he had

been accompanied by anyone while he was

in Mexico.

**

He

succintly summarized the results of his investigation as follows:

We were able to get him in, get him

out where he itayed

I don't recall

that

we were able to

establish where he was

eiery

day

in Mexico. ***

The Bureau's intelligence, nebror, in Maried war miring.

It was almost entirely dependent on liaison mith CIA and the

tonican

government for intelliaonoe. In thie sonant, the torti-

"ony of Clarl: Andorson is instructive:

0: D10

the Bureau hare any nourcas in the

Cuban aron in Mexioo City?

A.

To the best of my recollection the

Burnau did not.

0: I am trying to understand wbat the

Buccan in Mexico City could have don to

track dow whether or not there were any

connectiond betrech Oatld ond the Cubang

1nd the soviets.

Couldn't that have hac

nore of a mattor for de CTA?

* Clack Andersen testimony, 344/7r pi23

** Clack Andorson beskinon?: 2/9/16, 1. 22.

**: Clark Anderson testacony, 204/70, P. 22.

NH 50955 DooId: 32423526

Page 108

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## Page 109

105%

A: It

would have been.

Q: Do you recall conducting an investigation

for that prupose?

We were limited. The Bureau

have been dependent on the CIA to help us

- would

*

Q:

Were you able to identify any contacts

that Oswald may have had in Mexico or Mexico

City?

A: To the best of my recollection, we were

noc.

Q: Do you know whether or not the CIA was

conducting an

investigation in Mexico City

of the assassination?

A: I don't know. I would assume from the

recollection of conversations with [Mexico

City GIA Station Chiefl that they were aleft

for any information they might get.

Indeed; in a memorandum dated January

4, 1964; Mr. Hoover

informed certain senior Bureau officials that he was "not at

all impressed with the thoroughness of the investigations nos

the supervision of the investigation."

Upon subsequently

being informed of the impending Mexico City trip of Warren

Commission staff members, Hoover is noted by a subordinate to

Indeed, Mr. Anderson testified that he did not ever know

who within the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic establishments was;

or was suspected of being either KGB or DGI.

* Clark Anderson Testimony, 2/4/76, pp. 25-26. Our review

indicates that the minimal active assassination investigation

undeitaken by the CIA was gradually phased out as FBI agents

and the Mexican authorities began

their investigation in early

December 1963.

..

NH 50955

DocId:32423526

Page 109

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## Page 110

106

Not did

• ...

Have

"expressed concern as to how lawyers on the Commission

could spot gaps in our investigation."

Responsibility for the investigation in Mexico City was

corifused: Both the State Department and the FBI had claim to

supervising it.

One of the major areas of investigation soon after Kennedy's

assassination

was

an

allegation of a Nicaraguan named Gilberto

Alvarado Ugarte. Alvarado walked into the American Enbassy in

Mexico City on November 25, 1963, and alleged that he had been at

the Cuban Consulate on September 18, 1963 and had observed Oswald

receive $6,500 from a consulate employee. Alvarado eventually

admitted that he had fabricated the allegation: The Warren

Comnission reveived Alvarado's original claim and concluded it was

false since overwhelming evidence indicated Oswald was in New

Orleans on September 18, 1963.

Cable traffic discussing investigative responses of the Legat

office, CIA Station and Ambassador Mann to the Alvarado allegation

indicate problems of coordination and raise questions of the adequacy

surrounding the investigation of the assassination especially in

the area of possible Cuban involvement.

When

the American

Embassy heard Alvarado's allegation, Ambassador Mann requested

that a Bureau tepresentative

"some down fron Washington to

Mexico City.". CIA cables reflect Mann's belief that he was not

being fully informed on all developments in the FBI's investi-

*

**

NW 50955 DocId:32423526. Page 110

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## Page 111

107

gation in the United States.

Mann sas also concerned about

gravity of Alvarado's allegation and requested that the investiga-

tión of Alvarado's claim be given the highest priority. J. Edgar

Hoover shared Mann's concern over the Alvarado allegation noting.

Ambassador Manu may be one of the pseudo-

investigators, a Sherlock Holmes;

but he

has made a lot of statements which, if true,

throw an

entirely different light on the

whole picture. *

In apparent response to Hoover's stated concern; and the

Ambassador'

s request Assistant Director William C. Suilivan,

Domestic Intelligence Division, instructed Supervisor Lawrence

Keenan to proceed to Mexico City where he was to "direct and

coordinate" the investigation. However, in a memorandum to Alan

Belmont dated November 27, 1963, Sullivan wrote:

Supervisor Lawrence Keenan, in complying

with the Director's request, has been

selected

to go to Mexico to direct and

coordinate our entire investigation there

and to pursue it vigorously until the de-

sired results are obtained.

Mr. Keenan's presence in Mexico City was short lived. He

arrived on November 27, and returned to FBI headquarters on December

1, 1963. A Sullivan to Belmont memorandüm of 12/3/63 reflects

that once Alvarado admitted he had fabricated his story, the

Ambassador "advised that it was no longer necessary for Keenan

to stay." Sullivan's previous statement that Keenan was selected

to go to Mexico

to direct and

coordinate the entire investigation

*

FBI Memorandum, November 27, 1963.

** Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 11/27/63.

NN 50955

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## Page 112

188

there and pursue it vigorously until the desired results are

obtained,"

cannot be reconciled unless the thorough investigation

and desired results were the "breaking" of Alvarado.

Indeed, CIA documents reflect that Agency's confusion as to

the role Keenan was to play. On November 26, 1953, the Mexico

City station cabled Helms:

BeLIeve iBI in Mexico, as does station, has

all information needed to investigate Mexican

aspects

leads on cases.

In my opinion; it

is

desirable that FBI send officer to Mexico to

satisfy Ambassador, unless Mr. (Alexis) Johnson

can convince Ambassador that chief FBI Mexico

will receive and make availablè to him all inform-

ation of interest to Ambassador concerning U.S.

angles of these cases.

On Novenher 27:

Helms cabled back to the station:

Mr. Johnson has informed me that Mr. Katzen-

bach spoke with Chief, FBI who contended that

Mexi FBI office possessed all relevant informa-

tion and that he was not ept disposed to send

FBI officer to Mexi.

Would you please let us know a) whether FBI

Mexi does in

fact have necessary information,

b) is 1t desirable in your opinion that FBI

do send

agent to Mexi?

However, on November 28, Headquarters cabled:

Note FBI man Larry Keenan now in Mexi was sent

especially to follow up leads on entire assassina-

tion.

Pls cooperate with him fully.

On November 27, 1963, Ambassador Mann showed Clark Anderson

two

State Department cables in which Alexis Johnson is quoted as

stating, "FBi is considered to be in full charge of investigation

*

Clark Anderson testified that he was never informed that

Keenan was being sent down to direct the investigation.

(Anderson

testimony, 2/3/76. p. 27

Keenan told the staff that it was

his

understanding

that he had been

sent to Mexico City to direct the

entire investigation.

NW 50955

booId: 32423526

Page 112

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## Page 113

104

9P237

C: 00:

and CIA and State have made it

clear that we expect FBI to call

the shots."

In a cablegram dated November 28, 1963, Keenan

"strongly recommended that Johnson be

immediately contacted and

that he be

straightened out," adding that he "unequivocally

advised

! Mann that FBI was not directing investigations here."

Keenan also stated in the cablegram "Anderson and I following

most closely and will assume no initiative from which it may be

.**

construed FBI is calling shots here.

A subsequent memorandum

• reflects that Assistant Secretary Mann was

"formally advised

that the FBI was not in charge of the investigarion

According to Anderson, the FRI's amostigation vas

"independent" and "overt" from the Buread, and, as stated pre-

riously,"+atthe investigation was"dedicated or directed toward

establishing Oswald's activities in Mexico and looking toward

trying to establish whether he had been accompanied by anyone

else when he was in Mexico. " *A*

Б.

Issues as to the FBI's Pursuit Of the Cuban Connection

in Mexico City

¡s discussed infra CIA's investigation of possible Cuban

* themesendin.

prive W. Bravengen yo W.Sucldon, 1/29/03.

jarme W. Prossegne I W. Juleira, 1/29113

***

The Bureau's stoted position ras that the State Department

CIA have jurisdiction in dealing

foreign governments and

in getting investigative results and

intelligence coverage abroad;

that while we are cooperating fully with State and CIA in Mexico,

the responsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA.

Memorandum from Courtney Evans to A. Belmont, 11/27/63.

HH

50955 B66

Docta: 53445836: Pade is p. 22

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## Page 114

10:

comections to the assassinatior

d tod linoug ters.

F!:1

docunents

also jeveal a reluctance to follon leads

in the

ciibah

ane a li

By cablegram, dated November 23, 1963,, Jegat införmed head-

quärters that:

Ambassador Mann is greatly concerned that Cubans

behind subject's assassination of President. He

feels that both we and CIA doing

everything.possi-

ble there to establish or refute

Cuban connection.

In a subsequent cablegram sent on November

.24, 1963, Anderson

stated:

Ankarcador here foole Cordese muct too

sophisticated to participate in direction

o.f

aecassination of tresident by sulject,

bul thnks Cubans

natan e i nont

stupid cnough to nave

carticipoted in such diroction even tc

extont of hiring nuhject.

tf this should

be case, it would appear

likely that the

contract ronld have beon ade

muth surgjeit

in U.G. and purpose cf his brip to dezico

N05

to set nn get aray toube.

kareau nay

desite to give consideration to polling all

Cuhan sources in U.S. in effost to confimy

rfute this theory.

There ie ne indication that the Emoau over attarated to confirm

or rofute thie theory. Tndee?

:o Pureou supgrrleor'e handuritten

notation on the cablecram gtates:

"Not desirabte. would serve

to ptomota cunora."

Hr. Helmg" sentiments coincide? with this Buseay saper-

visor's. In his Hovemher 23, 1962 ookte to te Merico City

atation chief, lielme seated:

toe pancraate dn cat ene ciee dlae per.

Statoj that Anbassador ta cuching tos case

too hard .

and

that te could wtt creake

Clan with Cohans micl could hace' erriaye

repetcussions.

B tere hay 87, 9°93, dyeee sank. 9y S22g mrgeme, ig

Duroos boodeoartore de chicb te dtdr that a tenes delopor lud

llwl l Mel W Grel Glalleeel, theed Maroyldold beul Cict:

HH 50955 DooId:32423526 Page 114

---

## Page 115

At one point in the lengtly release he

was

quoted

as saying that they do not have the

slightest doubt that assassination of

President Kennedy and

subsequent elimina-

tion of his assassin is work of Communist

direction.

To back up this statement he

alleged that Fidel Castro in his speech

made at the Brazilian Embassy in Havanna

September 7, 1963, accused CIA and President

Kennedy of planning attempt against Castro

and that Castro stated

'Let Kennedy and his

brother Robert take care of themselves since

chech to can bee he vi death of an

attempt

On Hovenber 27, 1963; Anderson egain cabled Puroan Mean-

waiters, this tine inforing that:

Neither Legat nor ClA office here has been

able to identify unknown

subject who visited

Cuban and Soviet Embassies here and who at

first was

thought to be identical

with subject

because of timing of visits.

It should

be noted that CIA states

have additional in

formation,

indicating this person visited

Cuban Embassy October 14 last,

a number of

days after

Oswald's

departure from Mexico

City.

This would make it appear unlikely

that

UNSUB

had

any connection with Oswald.

Decenber 3, 1963, Anderson informed headquarters of the

following information:

Reliable source today furnished inform-

ation which may have bearing on instant

case.

(the Noventee 2e ast, year citizen maitered

Mexico at Nuevo Laredo.

Although means of

travel not known the Cuban-American appar-

He was only

passenger aboard Cubana Flignt 465 which depait-

ed Mexico City for Havane on November 27 last.

NH 50955

DocId: 32123526

Page 115

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## Page 116

1z

In view of travel of (the Cuban-American]

during significant period of time and fact

he was only passenger or Cubana flight going

to Havana it is requested that Washington

Field Office check passport records to obtain

full background information

and photographs

of the Cuban-American, and that investigation

be conducted

to fully identity and establish

connections.

Subsequent CIA and FBl investigation of the activities

of this Cuban - Amorican are discussed, infrit, Section C.

HH

50955

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## Page 117

113

NEW ORLEANS

The Committee has not been able to fully review the Bureau

investigative efforts in New Orleans: However, our preliminary

examination has revealed certain facts which sive rise to the

issue of the adequacy of the investloation conducted in that

city, and

sugrest the need for more detoiled review.

The Harren

Commission's leport contes that Usuald mored fran

Dallas to New Orleans on April 24, 1963; and surpests the

Following as reasons for the move:

When Ruth Paine visited the Oswald's at

their

apartment.on April 24, she vas

SUI-

prised to learn that Oswald was packed and

ready to leave for New Orleans by bus.

He explained that he had been unable to

find employment

in or around Dallas, and

that Marina had

surrested that he go

New Orleans since he had been born there.

Marina

has

testified that the real reason

behind her suggestion was that she wanted

him to get out of

tom because.of

the

Walker

incident.*

There is no indication in FBI documents or the Commission'

record that Oswald was in New Orleans on any eccaston

between

October 1959 and April 24: 1963. However, an Imigration and

Naturalization Service Inspector testified before the Committee

that he is absolutely certain that he intervened Lee Harver

Oswald In a New Orleans jail cell sometime shortly before lis

1pr1l 10. 1963, transfer out of dew Orleans * Althourt the

Warren Commission Report, p. 725.

Dewald's only known attempt:

to find employment in Dallas during

the perio! botween his April 6.

1963 discharre and his April 24, 1953 move to How Orleans tes 5

single visit

to the Texas Ennloymont Cormission on Arril 2. 1963.

** Testinony of I&llS Inspector,

12/11/75

, п.20 .

The Inspector does not

recall whether on this occasion ha

to the colice

response en & routine call, or whether he learned that fatall was

NW 50955 Docdlal2420526oPage alzalien durine

mutine visit "o

the

station (Dal).

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## Page 118

114

inspector is not now certain whather Oswald was "using that par-

ticular name at that time," he is certain that Onwald was "claim-

ing to be a Cuban alien" and that he "interviewed Oswald to verify

or disprove this status."*

The inspector neither recalls what

Oswald said nor what language or languages he conversed in. He

does not recall anything unusual about Oswald's dress or demeanor,

and believes that he quickly ascertained that Oswald was not a

Cuban alien, at which time he would have left Oswald in his jail celi.

Senator Schweiker: Well; what if the person is

claiming to be a foreigner and he isn't. How have

you run that down?

Inspector: Well, I have never

run into a case where

a guy claimed to

be a foreigner and he wás

a United

States citizen, where he didn't treak individually,

because when the Immigration Service comes into play

and you advise them, if you are in the United States

illegally and you're subject to deportation, and these

kinds of things.

Senator Schweiker:

So in all probability, something

like that would have happened in Oswald's incident?

**

Inspector: I am sure:

Although the inspector did state that based upon his experi-

ence it was most unusual for an American citizen to assert that

he was an alien, he noted that visits to jail colls to verify an

individual's citizenship status were frequent and routine, and

reports were not filed unless it was determined that the individual

was illegally in the inited States.

15*6

Inspector, 12/11/75, 1.21

Oswald told the arresting New

Orleans police officers on August 3, 1953 that he wes

Caban born.

** tospector, 12/11/75, p.28

IGNS headquarters offisials informed the Committee that the

IENS had no documentary record of the interview: noting that inter-

vicus of this nature were generally not written up.

NH 50955 DooId: 32423526

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## Page 119

1/

on January i, 1976, the commited staff telephonleally.con-

tacted the New: Orleans Police Department and requested that they

review their Oswald arrest records to see if he had been arrested

other than on August 9, 1963. On January I, the staff was informed

that there was no record of another Oswald arrest, and that the

New Orleans Police Department, in fact, had no information on

Oswald prior to August 9, 1963:

Oswald distributed FPCC handbills in the vicinity of the

U.S.S. Wasp on June 16, 1963, and, subsequently, in dowritown New

Orleans, on August 9 (on which occasion he was arrested), and

August 16. Or August 17, he appeated briefly on a radio program;

and on August 21 he participated in a radio debate about Cuba:

The Bureau was unable to idencily any persons li the New

Orleans area whom Oswald may have been in contact in connection

with his pro-Castro activities. Indeed, the Commissien's con-

clusion was that "Oswald's EPCC activities may be viewed as a

very shrewd political operation in which one man single-handedly

created

publicity for his cause. """*

-* The police official told the staff that procedures

in 1963

would have renuired documentation of an arrest; unless

someone

was in on

drunk charge.

Although the I&NS inspector does not

know the charge Oswald was booked on, he testified that he would

not have interviewed Oswald it he was drunk insacta, p35

) .

Special Agent Hosty testified that Investigation after the assassi-

nation established that Oswald neither smoked nor dranl: (Hary, 14/1/75).

**

Harren Commission Peport, P. 407

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IIC

During a staff intervier on December 1, 1975, a New Orleans

resident familiar with the Cuban community in that city, un-

equivocally asserted that in the suner of 1963 Oswald associated

with various Federal agents in New Orleans. le specifically

identified an inspector who was then with the ISNS Border Patrol

Station in New Orleans and an inspector who was then with the

United States Customs Service. Although this I&NS inspector sub-

sequently testified that he had neithei met nor spoken with Oswald,

he recalled that he "may" have seen Oswald on one occasion passing

out handbills near Jackson Square in New Orleans. The inspector

also informed the Committee that ISMS in 1963 had some resporsi-

bility for surveilling certain Cuban groups in New Coleans,

Although the inspector could not recall the dates these gurveillances

were in effect, he believes they had been requested by the Depart-

ment of Justice.

The former Customs inspector had not heard of

Lee Harvey Oswald (under that name or any of his known aliases)

prior to November 22, 1963.

Meither of the IsNS iuspectone who appeared before the

Conmittee had been questioned during the assassination investi-

gation: the inspectors do not believe that any lenS New Orleans

personnel. were questioned.

The ISNS inspector identified was not the iuspector who had

interviered Oswald in a New Orleans jai! cell prior to April 10, 1.963.

** ISNS Inspector, 12/9/75, p.

Weither I50S nor the Depart-

ment of Justi:e

have records

of any such surveillancr

sk:: The other IcbS personnel interviezed by the committee staff

were also not contacted by the carrer Cartirrin.

NH 50955 DooId: 32423526

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117

Although the name

-..

la Tulane University

professor] does not appear in the Warren Coumisston Report,

materials available at the Archives refleci that the Commission

was provided with certain FBI reports containing information on

the

professor developed during the assassination investigation.

A brief review of the Bureau's handling of allegations of an

alleged Oswald acquaintanceshit with the professor 1s instructive.

in that the Committee finds it exemplary of the FBI's Investiga-

tion of persons with whom Oswald was suspected of having beer in

contact.

On November 27, 1963, the New Orleans FBI field office learned

that sometime in late 1962 some FPCC literature had been found in

the street in the 1200 or 1300 block of Pine Street, Mer Orleans,

near the residences of two Tulane University pinfessors, one of

mom was the professor referenced above.

The teletype from the

FRI's New Orleans field office; pursuant to which this information

was disseminated to headquatters, noted "investigation being con-

ducted to determine any possible asseciation with Oswald.

On November 30, 1963, New Orleans Police Captain Jämes Arnold

informed

SA John Quigley that this professor "had been mentioned

as being possibly affiliated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

The Tulane University prifiers's

There was also

separate allegation that FPCC literature was

observed

in keronar+

car an early 1963,22

Teletype from SAC, New Orleans to Virector, FBI and SAC, Dallas,

11/27/63

*1: Report of SA John I. Dudgley. 11/30/63.

NH 50955 DoeId: 32423526

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118

25

Arnold -- who was present for the August 9 interview of Oswald

recalled that Oswald mentioned during the intervlew that some of

the meetings of the FPCC had been held on Fine Street. According

to SA Quigley's report on the Arnold Interview:

Arnold asked Oswald if [the professor] was

a

member of the FPCC.

Oswald did not give a

verbal answer to this question, but Captain

Arnold said he gathered from the expressions

appearing on Oswald's face, and from the words

he uttered at that time,

which he could

recall at this time, that Oswald knew or was

acquainted with [the professor). He said he

attempted to pursue this turther,

but Oswald

refused

to admit any knowledre of (the pro.

fessorl

home.

*

or ever having been at [the professor's!

On November 29, SA. Milton Kaack Interviewed It. Fráncis Martello

öf the New Orleans Police Department, who along with Captain Arnold

was present at the August 9 arrest interview of Oswald. According

to Kaack's report, Martello stated:

When questioned by Martello about, Fair Play

for Cuba Conmittee, Oswald said that

some

of the meetings of

the FPCC were held on

Pine St. in New Orleans, refusing to give

specific location. Martello recalled that :

Fair Play For Cuba Conmittee literature had

been

found in the past in the one thousand

block of Pine

St., which is close to the

residence of the professor:

Martello further

recalled that lthe professor! wag revorted

to be

a member of the New Orleans Council For Peace-

cul Alternatives, which was a 'ban the bomb"

eroup established in New Otleans and which

Report of SA Quigley, 11/30/63

HIH

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19

had conducted two or three demorstrations

here.

Martello asked

Oswald if he knew

(the: professorl or if he had held FPOC

meetings in (the professor'sl home.

Oswald

evaded the question and

appeared to Martello

to have a nervous reaction.

Martello ad-

vised during interview he

asked Oswald if

he knew lanother Tulane University professor.

Oswald refused to answer this question.

• 42

On December 2, 1963, John Rice, Chief of the New Orleans

Secret Service office, spoke with assistant special agent in

charge, Sylvester, of the New Orleans FBI field office.

** Rice

then related that Charles Steele -- the person photographed with

Oswald passing out literature in front of the international Trade

Mart Building -- recalled Oswald having told him that someone at

Tulane University had given him this literature. Rice also re-

counted a Secret Service interview with Dean Andrews, in which

Andrews recalled Oswald having stated that he vas "getting $25 a

day to do this (i.e., pass out FPCC literaturel." According to

a subsequent December 6, 1963 report, on Decerber 3; 1963, the

FBI requested that the Secret Service not interview |the protessor]. ***

However, lthe professorl had already been interviewed by the

FBI on Decembér 2, 1963. According to the two-page FRT teletype

---

Teletype from SAC,

New Orleans to Director, FBT, SAC'

s Dallas

and san francisco, 11/30/63.

*it*

Secret Service memorandum prepared by J. Rice, 12/6/63.

Secret Service menorandum

prepared by J. Rice, 12/6/63.

NT 50955 DooId: 32423526

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120

recounting the

interview, [the professor) "could not recall ever

having known Oswald." He stated that "he never new of the l/d

existence of

a FPCC chapter in New Orleans and never had any

connection in any way with any so-called left wing organizations. "*

This cursory intervièw apparently satisfied the FBI that

the professor had not had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald.

The documents

made

available to the Committee fall to reflect

that any of the professor's friends or Pine Street neighbors were

ever

interviewed by the FBI. Nor do these documents provide any

explanation for this apparent investigative

oversight.

Teletype from

SAC, San Francisco to Director, "BI

Dallas and New Orleans, 12/2/63.

SAC's

NH 50955

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## Page 125

141

Dallas:

November 22 and 23

The rBI neither participated in the advance planning for

the President's Dallas viedt nor Presidential socurity for the

trip itself. Bureau agents assigned to the ballas field office

in November 1963 have told us that the secret Service did not

advise that office of the President's trip: they leatned of the

imbonding visit through newspaper accounts:

Moreover, an off-

duty agent ras instructed hy his Supervisor not to attend the

scheduled Movenber 22, 1963, Presidential luncheon because "the

fBT and Secret Service were having some difficulties over juris

dictional lines. 2/

In that the assagsination of the Dresidert was not then a

Federal orime, the Dollas agents functioned merely no observers.

For orample, SA Rohert Parkett vas present it the Dallas theatre

when pallas police officere tool: Devald into custody.

Barrett

is abrolutely positive that the Theatre'e house lights wore off

3/

the ontire time oswald was in the theatre:

The police and

patrons who testified before the Marren Conmission swore that

the lights were on.

1/ Barrett was not asked to testify lefore

the commission.

5/

1/.

See

e.g.. testimonv of SA James Hostv, .1r., 12/5175.

?/

Testinony of for Special agent.

3/ Tentinony of Si Robert Parrott: 1117/75, p.54

4/

Darren Coriasion Eatinor cr

:. N Hobonal: 1,3/5/64

and

this

Print: 412164.

5/

Barrett, 12 / 17/75, p:92.

NH 50955

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## Page 126

122

49: 293

Tomediately upon being taler into custody

by the Dallas

_police, Oswald vas transported to the office of Captain J: Will

Fritz.

Special Agent James Boolhout--who was then serving as

FDT. Liaison with the local police-cas present when Ostal? was

brought iri. Upon learning that Oscald war a suspect in the

assassination, losty immediately inforned SAC Shanklin that

the Biteau had a security File on Darala.g

Hosty spent the

next few hours in shanklin's office, assisting in the relating

of all Oswald data to Belmont.

Belmont subrequently instructed sic chantiin to direct

¡losty to procee:

to the police

station and "participate in

thie interrogation of oswain. "B

loch arriving at the station,

Kosty ran into Dallas police licutenant daci: nevill, whe later

minted liosty ho thon stating that "the Fel knew Ostald was

caparle of assassinating the President..9/

the mention of

Mosty's name

as he entered Captain Frite's office provoked

Oswald; he attempted to jump out of the chair to which he was

handouffed and screamed, "you're the quy who's been sothering

my wife.

410/

sithough the questioning of Covald vas condicted exclusively

by local police officials, lost did diggest certain duections

6/ Hostr, 12/13/75, D.108

I Hosty, 12/13/75, 1. 108

T0574

3/ Strandin

11320pl!7.

9/

Menorandin, Jack evill;

to Captain W. i. Cangaray, 11/23/631

Festimony of at. Jack: Dorill Wefora

Harren Cormission; 5/13/64,

25.

10/ Hosty: 12/5/75, 3.26.

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123

to cartain reit Interestingly enolah, shon Kosty snugested.

that Fritz ask Oswald about Mexico City, Oscald

interjected,

screaming "How do you know about that?", before Fritz was

able to ask the question. id

devald subsequently denied ever

having been to Mexico City. lovever, he did aûmit to having

been in Tijuana.

12/

The interrogation was interrupted at epproximately 1:30 p.m.,

when Onvald was called in for y lineup. losty was then informed

by SA Bookhout that he was

not to mention oswald's levico City

visit to anyone.. Hosty later learned that these orders had cone

From hearguaiters.

13/ Although he was

never hold the reason for

the ordei!

he helioves that it was intended to protect tie sen-

sitive CIA methods which had veritied covaid's presence in that

11/

city.

It was apparently durino this same

'hreak" for the

Lineup that secret service duent Willian Pattatson recalle losty

inforning him that "Oswald had been in contact with to linown

subversivee too weoks before the assassination. 15/

Within minutes

after recoi: ing the aforementioned instruc-

tions throngh Agent Boolhout, losty received a dall from the

11/ Hosty, 12/5/75, D. 26.

12/ Hosty, 12/5/75, p. 35. It is not clear whether nawald's

response indicated a

recent trio to Tiluana.

13/ Hosty, 12/5/75, 00. 40-41.

11/ Hostv, 12/5175, D. 32.

15/ Testimony of Willian Patterson, 11/5/75.

p.20. Although the

Fattersor memorandun of bocenbor 12, 1963, which Eccounts Horty's

otatonent, was apparently nade available

to

the

Corouscion,

Patterson was net pertioned ky the Comission.

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124

rield office directing him to copert to phonitinget.

16/

It ie on this occasion that chantin confronted losty with the

nöte Oswald had left at the ballas field office 1'

The cir-

cumatancer surrounding the doubmotion of tie note are discussed,

inFection

= supra.

President Johnson called fir. Hoover at 1:00 p.m. on November

21, 1963. According to Hoover, "the President was greatly dis-

turbed about this incident lthe murder of Oswaldl and decreed

that the FeT conduct whatever investigntion possible into this

matter :..

• tithoul: regard foi trendcalities: "10/

There was an early morning meeting of all agents of the

Dallar field office on November 28, 1063.

Ld: When asked by the

staff wither any linitatione vore placed upon

the investiga

tion; one of the agents who attended this rooting initially

téstified as Eollows:

The morning after the assassination Mr. Shanklin

called all of the agents together in a conference and

did relate to us that Washington; was the term he used,

is quite anxious that we do not make any inflanmatory

statements or ask any questions of delve too much into

the Soviet aspect of this case

that we are to soft-

peddle that

and not to bring this up too much.

Ii renponse to Genator Gary Hart's question as to mother this

meant that leade relating to international consptracias vere not

16/ Hosty, 12/19/75, D. 144 :

17/ Hosty, 12/13/75, D.144

reader.

13/ *Memorandum frem Director,

19/ Hosty, 12/4/75, 0.

: 11/24/53.

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125

to le pursued, the nuent deranda ty lind of had debat in

pression." However, this agent later told the Committee:

I.

want to emphasize that I did not mean that

we din not

investigate Oswald's posnible Soviet

involvement, just

that

• this laspect of thel

investigation was

tightly controlled by PET head-

quarters.

Although sac chanklin recalln the early moming neeting on

Noverter 23, 1063, he denied eval loving made the statement.

attributed to him hy the agent: Mditionally, of the ethor agents

who vore present at the meeting who vore interviewed by Committee

staff,

none recall such an instruction

being conveyer be chantin

on anyone. else.

NH 50955

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Page

129

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## Page 130

14L

THE RECEIPT AND DESTRUCTION OF THE NOTE WHICH OSWALD PERSONALLY

DELIVERED TO THE FBI'S DALLAS FIELD OFFICE

(1)

Prelininary Discussion

On or about July 2, 1975, Thomas Johnson, of the Dallas

Times Herald, advised recently retired Dallas SAC Gordon Shauklin

that

an individual, whose identity he would not reveal, had told

him that Oswald had visited the FBI office in Dallas

sometime

prior to the assassination; that Oswald left a note - allegedly

threatening in nature -- for the Agent who had been handling

the Bureau's investigation of Oswald; and that neither Oswald's

visit nor the note was reported prior: to or following the arsassina-

tion of President Kennedy. Shanklin suggested that Johnson should

contact Deputy Associate Director James Adams.

On July 7, 1975, Johnson met in Washington, D. C.. with

Adams and Director Kelley repeating the aforementioned allega-

tions: The Attorney General was advised of the allegations on

July 3; 1975, and inforned that the Bureau intended to conduct

an inquiry regarding them.

Ori July 8, 1975, a conference was held in Director Kelley's

office. In attendance, in addition to Mr. Adams, were Gordon

Shanklin (former SAC Dallas),

1/ Theodore Gunderson (SAC Dallas) ;

the headquarters agent presently

assigned to the assassina-

tion case, and Harold Bassett (Assistant Director in Charge of

1/ In that Shanklin had recently retired Erom the. Bureru and

the alleged destruction of the note involved the field gifice of

hich he had been in charge.

NN 50955 Dorddta24g3i25 sBaper ising.

the endance as subs duarters

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## Page 131

- 2 ..

127

"...

the Inspection Division). The

handling of the investigation

was discussed,

and

Bassett was

assigned personal responsibility

for directing it.

The Bureau's initial file review did not develop any inform-

ation indicating that Oswald had ever visited the Dallas Office

of the FBI or that he had left a note. Interviews of personnel

assigned; in 1963, to the Dallas field office did establish that:

(1) Lee Harvey Oswald did; in fact, visit the office

some two or three weeks prior to the assassination;

(2) That Oswald asked to see SA James Hosty; and upon

being informed that he was not in. left a hote för Hosty;

(3) That the note was destroyed after the assassination.

However, as to certain of the most basic facts, the evidence

developed by the Bureau contains sharp conflicts. The fBI's

investigation failed to establish:

(1) whether the note was threatening in nature;

(2) at whose instruction the note was destroyed.

Each of these questions raises important issues. If the note was

threatening in nature, then the FBI would have been on notice

that Oswald was capable of violence. If the orders to destroy

the note emanated from FBI headquarters, the inference that

there might have been orders

to destroy other pieces of evidence

is stronger than if the note had been simply destroyed Ecr

entirely personal reasons by agents in lie Dallie field office.

NH 50955 Doold: 32423526

Page 131

TOP SEGUE

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## Page 132

128

- 3.

TOP SEGUL

4.3

However, neither the review of the Bureau's investigative file,

nor the sworn testimony of Bureau personnel alleged to have know-

ledge of the delivery of the note and its subsequent destruction

has allowed the,Committee to resolve any of the above noted factual

discrepancies. The Committee has also not received a satisfac-

tory explanation as to the reasons why the existence of the

note was not discussed internally in the Bureau, or at the

Dallas field office during the assassination investigation.

Rather than'

attempting to draw conclusions from an eviden-

tiary record replete with factual discrepancies, the Conmittee

decided that it would make the entire record available to the

public for its review. Section (A), infra, summarizes this

record,

highlightirig those areas where discrepancies exist. The materials

relating to the investigation in this area will be made available

under separate cover.

2

(a)

The wording of the note

Approximately one week or ten days prior to November

22, 1963; Oswald appeared at the reception desk in the Dallas

field office and asked to see Hosty. After being informed that

Hosty was not in, Oswald left an envelope with a note inside.

On the envelope appeared the name SA losty. The envelope was

not sealed and the note was partially sticking out.

The recep-

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## Page 133

129

-41...

Lionist read the note and according

to her recollection it

read as

follows:

Let this be a warning; I will blow up the

FBI and the Dallas Police Department if you

don't stop

bothering my wite.

Signed

-- Lee Harvey

Oswald

Sonetime later in the day the receptionist persorially gave the

note to Hosty. 4/

Hosty recalled the note's wording as:

If you have anything you want to

learn about me.

come talk to me directly.

If you don't cease

bothering my wife, I will take appropriäte action

and report this to proper authorities. 5/

Hosty's supervisor - Kenneth Howe -- who claimed to have

seen the note, said

that he seemed to recall it contained some

kind of threat but could not remember specifies. 61

Aside from these three persons -- the receptionist, Agent

Hosty, and

Agent Howe - no one else who was interviewed by the

Bureau

admitted having seen the note. Some indicated they under-

stood that the note contained a threat; however, this was bear-

say knowledge, having come primarily from conveisations they had

had with the receptionist.

4/

Afsidavit of receptionist, 7/15/75.

Affidavit of James

Hosty, Jr.,

7717/75; testimony

of

Janes

P. Hosty, Jr.. 12/13/75, p.

6/ Affidavit of Kenneth C. Howe, 7/21/15

TOP

HH

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- 5

Hosty had placed the note in his workbox -- where it

remained until the day of the assassination.?!

Hosty partic-

ipated in an interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police Department

on the day of the assassination and returned to the Field Office

about an hour later, at which time

he

was called into Shanklin's

office. Howe was in the office along with Shanklin; one of them

displayed the threatening note and asked Hosty to explain its

8/

contents.

By Hosty's account, he told thein he had intervieved Marina

Oswald and Mrs. Paine on November 1: 1963; and that when he parti-

cipated in the interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police Depart-

ment, Oswald, upon learning his name, commented that he was the

?! Hosty initially stated that he did not recall any signature

on the note

and in

fact thought it was from the

subject of a

case

he had handled who

had made a complaint alleging his civil

rights had been violated

and upon his interview of this individ-

ual's wife she furnished a different version of the allegations,

completely wiping out the civil rights complaint. (Hosty affidavit,

7/17/75)

Subsequently, after being informed by Bureau officials

that he had interviewed the above referenced subject in June,

1963, hatE stated to his neidavit of SentenCe seems

the interview took place

in June,

inconceivable that I would think

that this

was from

rights subject.

8/

Antidavit of James I

Hosty, Jr., 7/17/75; testimony of

James

P. Hosty, Jr., 12/13/75.

NH 50955

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## Page 135

13/

- 6 --

one who was talking to and bothering his wife -- that if the

Agent wanted to know something about Oswald he should have

come and talked to Oswald himself.

At this point, Hosty claims that Shanklin ordered him to

prepare a memorandum

setting forth the information regarding

the note and his interview with Marina Oswald and Mrs. Paine.

He stated that he did prepare such a memorandum, three or four

pages in length; and delivered it to

Shanklin on the even

ing of November 22, 1963.101

Agent Howe said that it was he who found the note in Hosty's

workbox very soon after the assassination

of President Kennedy.

He stated that he took the note to Shanklin's office, but had

no recollection where the note may have gone of who may have

had it thereafter. He has no knowledge of the disposition of

11/

the note.

According to Hosty, approximately two hours after Oswald had

been pronounced dead on November 24, Howe told him that Shanklin

wanted to see them. Hosty claims that upon arriving in

Shanklin's office, he was instructed by Shanklin to destroy both

the note and the November. 22 memorandum regarding it. Hosty

states that he complied with these instructions by flushing them

12/

domi the toilet.

9/

Hosty Affidavit, 9/22/75; Hosty: 12/13/75, P.

10% Mosty Affidavit, 9/22/75; Hosty, 12/13/75. p.

11/ Howe Affidavit,

714/75; Agent Howe actually suhmitted thiee

affidavits; the quoted statements are as he corrected them.

12/ Hosty Affidavit; 9/22/75; Hosty Testimony, 12/13/75; Deputy

Associate FBI Director James B. Adams while testifying on October

footnote continued.

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## Page 136

152

- 7-

Shanklin denies having any knowledge of Oswald's visit to

the Dallas Office or of Oswald's leaving a rote there. He main-

tains that he did not issue any orders to destroy the note. In

fact, he claims that he had no knowledge of this entire matter

until July 1975.13/

?::.

The personnel who were

assigned to the Dallas Office in

November 1963, and who have admitted personal knowledge of the

Oswald visit and note, all have denied having any knowledge that

the facts of this matter were brought to the attention of FBI

Headquarters.

Hownver, William Sullivan, who was an Assistant Director at

the time of the assassination, has stated that he discussed the

Oswald case many times with Shanklin, and that Sharklin men-

" itioned on one occasion that "he had an internal

problem involv-

ing one of his Agents who had received a threatening message

from Oswald because the Agent was investigating Osxald." Sulli-

van recalls that Shanklin seemed disinclined to discuss the

matter other than to say he was handling it as a personnel problem

footnote continued . .

21, 1975, before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights

the House Committee on the Judiciary, stated that the agent

who destroyed the note did so

to "avoid

embarrassment to the Bureau."

However, there is no testimony in the record which supports such a

claim.

13/ Affidavit of J. Gordon Sharklin; 9/24/75 Testinons of J

Gordon

Shanklin, 12/19/85.

Ural Horton, a receutly retired Special agent,

in an

affidavit submitted to the Bureau, swore that he mentioned

the note and the destruction to Shanklin

while driving with him in

a car in August of 1974.

TOP

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..8.

133:

with Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr.

14/ Mohr has

denied under oath any knowledge of the note or the destruction. 15/

Similarly, all other living Bureau officials in the chain of

command of the two investigative Divisions which supervised

the Kennedy assassination case, each furnished the Bureau with

Sworn

statements denying any knowledge of this matter.

14/ Affidavit of William C. Sullivan, 9/16/75.

15/

Affidavit of John P. Mohr, 9/12/75.

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1341

t.V.

THE 1967 INVESTICATIONNOS ALLECANIONS DE CASTROS CONNECNION

WITH THE ASSASSINATIONN

but Aboue January 231967 Draw Wearson met When ontar Justice

warren At ender elme pearsoa advised chau a lawyer

ved Morgan

наш алелене мо литьтеа нім некат воыву кеннеау наа огданееа

group that vene to duba to kill castro, chac all were killed or 2m

prisoned except one person who escaped that freubsequently, Castro

HH

50955 : Poeta

1525

Page

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## Page 139

1350

degled to uttitze the ane procedure to kill preoldent kennedy ey

and that ne htred osvald to do the dou/l

Pear con wanted neint

chief dustice to see Ed Morgan however he declined

the ontess

Nuus elice informed Pearson thau le would be hecessacy tot him conse

pass ento Information on and Pearson inferred that he would prefer

1(8)3

that the Setvice

land not the Br be norteted

On January 31, 1967Ndames Ju Rawley Diredtory US gsecret

servicen met with the chiet juseice, and was antormed of the

allegations that had been passed on by Rowley. Actording lo

Rowley i

The way bet the chier duselael approachen

it was that herbald ne thoughe chis. wal. der toug

enough and so forth, but he wanted to get ut

8ft hid hands me felts that: herhad to that

i had to be tola to somebodyi

and that; the

Warren Commise tont was SiMloned, and he wanted

the thihg pursuediTsupposes by. ourselves.or

the FBI: (9)

Ar angements Were made by vames di rowley DiPector United:

States secret servicer withbrew Pearson to have Morgan Comer do

to an interview conducted by Committee startion Pepzunty 25,

edward, Pierpont morgaheadmitted. that he had passed tiBinform

i on onto hire pone retard

Drew Pearsons

but specterdaily dented

ever being intormed (or telling Pearson) that oswald hae been hates

to do,

the Jobr"

(8)

eventspare detailed

Hoover;

2/15/070 MoRowdy contend memorandun from moley o

the detailg get tbrch

thereth

i we testimony before thencommittee. on ma13, 1976 a

Secret Service has

inforned the Committee that they do not havene

copy 8# the 2/13/67 Rowley memb

restimony of dameste

RowLey -2/1373650: ALA R6918

also 9

* Festifled that the chief Justice:

whethe

Fethis.

the

First time he had heard chat

Ens paited Stater covernment had

plotted to assassthate castro: (p.116)i

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## Page 140

TOP

see him on rebruary 8,

1967

Subsequently% on rebruary 1o

1967г1

Mr Rowley spoke with the chief Justicer introning him that mel here

Pearson nor Morgan had called and that the infotmation would benite

(9) 1

reported to the Bureau

This information was reported by Rowley to the sureau in eve

latter dated rebruary 13119670

the Bureauld reply, dated february

151 1962, states!

In connection with the allegation that

Castro conspiracy was involvea in the

Vestigation

Fidel Castro or officials ofuthe Cuban gov

ernment were, involved with uee Harvey Oswald

in the assassination of Prestaent Kennedy

This Buteau, 10 not conducting any, uhe

vestigation regarding this matteri

However

should Mer PeatsonMr, Motgan

Morgans

source af 1Atormauion Care, 08. Volunteer anyo

intornation to this Bureau, it would be

acceptedia

Thereafter considerasion eatra/a

given:

to whethet any additional investigas

t1on 719

Warranted»

166en 26 D8B6adK

вар ади 432 907 59448412037.282

Pearson or Morgan was

to meet

him for the purpose.

15st

SuTTi haa not heard

025-550

memorandumt com

uhders bahdutie

thätreither

quary 81

9

670:62

contact

Fanöthan data

Rowley

decided to forward the informa

Hay:

Mrebruary 101

1967 - anathe

iti

8

H

6. the FBI

20

Although AsE l6tant FBI, Director

Deboache informed marvin mat

oh

March 71 1967 thae Rowley haa

made several

attempts, to conta

Morgany but Morgan refused to keep

Delbach to Tolsoh,

3717/67) nether

appoihtments.membrahdum

from

Rowley Hot Morgan recalled ahy

Sugh attempter

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## Page 141

TOP SECRET

1937

In a memorandum from Assistant Directol Alex Roben to dartha,

Deboach& dated February 15,

09,967.24

the seated purpose. owntan

was to advise beloach of the action taken in response tora letter

dated 2/13/67 from James unRowley Rosen wrote:

Consideration wassgiven

to furnishing this

information to the white Houser but

since

this matter does. not concern

pertinent to che present Administratlony no

letter is being sente

However on March 17, 1967mbeloach regelved a telephone, a11 trom

Prestdentlal Assistant Marvin Watson, Who heormed Belonah ende

he Prenident mad Kotruated that the rur interview Morgan concerning

ans knowledge he might have regarding the asassinaston sharrestaentr

Kenhedy.

wat son stated that This request stemmed trom at

the searet: Servicêt

Accoraing to his memorandum 62 March 17, 1967

Deloach then toid Fearsons

that Drew Pearson, had gone, eonsee chief Fustuden

Warren and häd told.him that Edward PMorgar

(10)

Memoranauk From Beloach. t6.t81don1/3/17/671

Memo ah dum, son. Decaden, to jolson;

3/17/671

noted that

FBI

documents

percathing to behoach s

discuss Pon with

Watson,

and che subsequent bl

interview

Morgan were delivered

to the conniotee: by the ron on MarchalOy

1976: (56me six weeky after

they had initially been requested i thereby preclually adequate some

evaluation of the documents

TOP

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## Page 142

113%

had a rather bizarre stbry todel

the assassination Pearson asked the chist

Justice to see Morgani

the ohlet Justices

a old made let tents sue

Morgan Lefused to keep the appointments

I told watson thaty under the circum-

statices it!

Cappeared/.that Morgänadrd.not

want to be intervleved, and even it he was

interviewed he would probably not /aivulge

the identity of hig: soutces who apparently

but that the president

terview in guestion

I toid Watson that

under the circumstancest we, had ho altere

hative buba to make, chas attempehowever

i hoped he. and herpresident realized that

this might be putting the fBI into

a situa

tron with Distride Attorney 0arris86 who

was nothing nore than a pubilerty Seeker

(12)

Morgan was interviewed by the ret on maten 20, 1967

In:

vor 1ng, che attorney altent privilege, Motgan retused do identity

the persons who turnished him chus: Intormation

He seated thatse

these clients were used by a united states Government agency to

Bibe the dos des nation de cadet castror and that pastro Tearisa,

of che plot andischereactar dispatened teams be asbassing tom:

the united states for the burpose of do seatles oblint

Kenhedy Morsan added that His eltened were aware orche daenesty

of come de these individusion and he understood that two such ins

(12) Mamotandum from Ai. Rosen to DeLoach: 3/22/673

TOP

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## Page 143

135

(13)

diviquais lived in New Jersey:

A feport summartling the

Bureau's thter yew with Morgan was sent to the white Houser thei

L(14)

Attornay General and the Seoret services

There is no indication inithe documentary record made available

to the Committee that the Bureau evet pursued the Morgen allege

ations.

Although the Selectecommittee has hot been able to establton

that residen tonnson quented ciA aboue Morgah Dstory, Te Motes

tha then birector Helms on March 23 ordered ciA nopeded caneral

to AnVestugate Ana capore 8A BiAs acsassinanion plots against Castro

The 1982 to di Repore veterances not only Drew Pedesons dewspaper

artiolas but arco the facevor Morgans contadas wich warrent Rowley

and the tet.

So it maybe inferred that the Report was Prepatedry

difectly 1a. response. co

Preoldential, conceuh, aboul the Morgan allega-

By Apart 24 the terbegan Submiduing portions

-ot Its report

to Direator Helms. Sometime between then and May 22, the Director

net and solated president bohnson on thectic rindingsie Ale

then soned previously% a one page note in pirecto Helmed handozious

apparencry preparea tar usan ortering the president, only referendes

covert actions against Cuba through mia: 19631

Director Helms was not asked whether he baleted the Presidents

about thệ taft 1963 AMtASH operation, But he bestltted that he did

(13) FBI memorandum: 3/21/69

Ls belter fear di waste over to the libe done Da

HY 50955 DoeTd:32423526 Page 143:

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## Page 144

not briet the President about later dealings wich ANACH, because

R61H5.018 hour

regard Arrastasan.abbage tracion about chestion

Reportinhowever dia creat the AMiASH 6perations in 1960-andy 19640

poseis aimed at assassinating castro. Moreover lene Reporu also

Indteated that Morgan's aliends may have, had khowledge of thee

AMASH Operacion

TOP SECRET

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## Page 145

141

v. " DISCUSSION

TOP SECRET

It is hoped that the preceding report sufficiently conveys

the preliminary nature of the subcommittee's investigation and

the fact the subcommittee has not been able to develop a complete

evidentiary record in the time available to it. Where conflicting

evidence was received, the subcommittee has attempted to set forth

both sides in its report so that the evidence may speak for itself:

Resources did not permit the subcommittee to hear from every witness

whose name arose during the investigation. In certain cases, time

constraints

necessitated that testinory be taken prior to the receipt

of all relevant agency materials.

The subcommittee believes that the preliminary nature of its

inquiry precludes the issuance of findings arid conclusions.

However, the subcommittee also believes that disclosure of the

evidence developed to date is necessary. Thus, this discussion

is meant merely to highlight those questions which have arisen during

the course of the investigation for which the subcommittee has not

received an adequate answer.

It is apparent that the Warren Commission's findings were

affected, at least in tone if not in substance, by the FBI's

fear the Commission vould criticize its performance prior to the

assassination. For example, the Bureau by letter to the Commission

indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on Oswald's

passport with the Department of State since its investigation had

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142

1 min

disclosed

no evidence that Oswald

ing under the instructions

or at the behalf

of any foreign government. Yet internal FBI

memoranda reveal that this was only a "public posture," that

FBI concluded Oswald's background should have caused FBI to request

a stop on his passport, and that disciplinary action was taken

against the agents responsible for this "investigative deficiency."

The Bureau assured the Commission that it had

no reason to

believe Oswald was a threat to the President; yet some twô weeks

prior to the assassination Oswald delivered a note; claimed by some

FBI employees to be threatening in tone, to the FBI's Dallas field

office: The FBi also knew some five weeks before the assassination

that Oswald had been in contact with an alleged KGB sabotage änd

assassination case officer in Mexico City; yet it did not know what

Oswald discussed with them, and did not vigorously push its local

agents. to interview Oswald about the meetings. For these failures,

the Bureau also censured certain of its supervisory personnel.

The fact that the Bureau had determined that there were

serious investigative failures in connection with its pre-assassina-

tion Oswald case, was never disclosed to the Warren Commission.

Indeed the documentary record reflects it was the Bureau's "public

position" that this case was "properly handled."

It is also clear that knowledge of CIA assassination plots

generally, and of CIA's AMLASH operation in particular: would

have

focused a great deal of Conmission attention on Oswald's

Cuban connections.

Indeed Commission documents reveal its concern

with the subject of political assacsination generally: in its

ENS DE

r=7

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## Page 147

TOP SECRE

requests about assassination attempts against De Gaulle, Sukarno

and other foreign leaders.

Moreover, CIA provided the Commission, and the subcommittee,

with detailed accounts of KGB'

$ Department 13 -- a department

specializing in sabotage and assassination. Knowledgeable CIA

personnel told the subcommittee that they had "second-hand"

information that this Department had hatched plots to assassinate

foreign leaders in the early 1950s, including a plan to kil!

President-elect Eisenhower during a visit to Korea. However, these

CIA analysts also

noted the primary mission of the 13th Department

had changed in the late 1950s to one of preparation for sabotage

in the event of war. They could not subscribe to any theory that

the 13th Department was given a mission of assassinating President

Kennedy.

They were also asked to analyze Oswald's apparent contact

with the Soviet Vice-Consul Kostikov, an alleged 13th Department

case officer, during Oswald's trip to Mexico City. The analysts

testified that Oswald's contact with Kostikov and Oswald's sub-

sequent actions did not conform to the known operating methods of

the 13th Department. Their informed opinion was the same as that

reached by CIA analysts in 1964 -- Oswald was not given a mission

by the KGB to assassinate President Kennedy.

Nevertheless,

even the limited amount of evidence the sub

committee has uncovered in the Cuban area raises the issue of

whether the evidence excluded from the Coumission's review would

have affected its findings that Oswald acted alone. Only days

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14:4

after the CIA met with AMLASH in Brazil and learned of his plan

to enlist U.S. support to topple the Castro regime and to "eliminate"

Castro, Castro met with a U.S. reporter at the Brazilian Embassy

in Havana for three hours, talked of U.S. leaders supporting

terrorists plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and threatened

retaliation. He warned the stiuation could lead to a crisis

worse than the missile crisis of October 1962. Despite this

warning, CIA continued to plot with AMLASH.. Indeed AMASH asked

for and received the assurance of a senior CIA official that

Fresident Kennedy®

was fully in support of his intended action.

AMLASH was not given the final

assurances he requested -- a

poison pen device and the promise of a weapons drop (inclüding

rifles with telescopic sights) -- until the very day of the

assassination. However, two days

before then, he was telephoned

and told that there would be a meeting on November 22 and that

it was the meeting he requested.

Whether Castro know or suspected AMLASH was working with CIA

has not been determined. Castro's hastily arranged meeting with

Jean Daniel, the French reporter, on November 19 to discuss

President Kennedy and his

policies may have been a product of his

alarm over

Kennedy's strongly anti-Castro speech on November 19 in

Miami. Castro's decision to spend the day with Mr. Daniel on

November 22, especially in view of Daniel's great difficulty in

getting any interview with Castro cannot be explained. Even Daniel,

not privy to the details of CIA plots against Castro, realized the

significance of Castro's question about Lyndon Johnson: "What

authority does he exercise over the CIA?:

120:

1 = 0

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TOP SECRET

Moreover, the CIA uncovered but did not pursue tantalizing

leads which suggested the possibility of Cuban involvement or prior

knowledge in the assassination. It learned that a Cubana Airlines

flight to Cuba on the afternoon of the assassination had been

delayed five hours

awaiting an unidentified passenger who arrived

in a light plane, bypassed customs, and rode in the cockpit of

the Cubana aircraft.

It learned that a Cuban-American had left Tampa, where Fresi-

dent Kennedy had made public appearances only four days before the

assassination, travelled to Mexico on the day after the assassina-

tion, and flew to Cuba as the only passenger on a late evening

flight on

November 27 using an expired passport. CIA later re-

ceived an allegation that this individual was "involved" in the

assassination.

FBI's investigation of this same Cuban-American was also far

from adequate. It was terminated without any conclusion because

the Cuban-American had returned to Cuba. There is no evidence

that the significant FBI reports pertaining to the Cuban-American

which pre-dated the Commission's termination, were provided the

Warren Commission.

The Warren Commission was not given the details of CIA's covert

actions against Cuba.

The Commission may not have realized that

CIA's Cuban operations were specially compartmented within CIA

under the Special Affairs Staff and that it bad not been in contact

with any members of this section.

TOP SERPeT

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## Page 150

IUP SECKEN

While the Warren Commission may have believed that CIA counter-

intelligence experts on the Soviet services were the most logical

ones

to deal with the assassination investigation. CIA had. only

seven days before the assassination, routed FBI's

report of Oswald's

activities in New Orleans to SAS's counterintelligence staff before

it was sent to Soviet counterintelligence personnel.

SAS also directed the activities of the CIA's WAVE station

146

in Florida which had the closest and most extensive contacts

with the Cuba exile community. Although CIA headquarters received

some information by WAVE evidencing Oswald contacts with residents

of this Cuban exile community, about Oswald there is no record

of CIA having ever directed WAVE to obtain further information

about Oswald or about various Cubans whose names arose in the course

of the Warren Commission investigation. Indeed, the FBI wrote

the

Commission noting that CIA had an operational interest in some

Cuban groups the Commission had inquired about, but the Commission

did not pursue the implicit suggestion that CIA be asked to provide

information on these groups. Although the FBI interviewed some Cuban

exiles connected with CIA operations, neither these irdividuals

nor CIA volunteered information about their CIA connections.

Of course,

a complete disclosure

of CIA operations to the Warren

Commission was not called for. The Warren Commission might reasonably

have assume CIA would make its own investigation of such operations

and report to the Commission only whatever information the CIA felt

significant. Yet there is no evidence that ClA made such an

investigation of its AMLASH operation, although it did review all

its Cuban/Caribbean operations in early December 1963.

Finally, the subcommittee questions the

FBI's

and CIA's

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## Page 151

147

150ats

reaction to allegations advanced by M:.

tha

hnedy

assassination may have been instigated by Castro in retaliation for

CIA plots. The documents reflect that the FPI reluctantly inter-

viewed Morgan only after being ordered to do so by the President.

It reported what he said to the President, but did not further

investigate his charges.

The day after the

President received the report of FBI's

interview of Morgan, Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General

to investigate and report on CIA's assassination plots against

Castro. Although

the I.G. Report characterized the AMLASH opera-

tion as an

assassination plot and although the

Report speculates

Morgan could have obtained information about the ANLASH operation,

Director Helms apparently did not mention the operation when he

briefed the President about the I.G. 's Report.

The subcommittee believes that even the linited amount of

evidence developed

pursuant to its preliminary investigation is of

sufficient substance and relevancy Ebelse ter the

adequacy of the process through which the Commission arrived

at its

porecas

conclusions. The subcommittee can

setbatonte what

evidence a more

extensive investigation would disclose. he sub

пентинии

committee again emphasizes that itsainvestigation has uncovered no

conchsue

airect

evidence that the assassination of President Kennedy

was

the

result of a conspiracy.

Therefore. the

subcommittee recommends the full Committee consider

the evidence developed with a view to a Commitree reconnendation

that the investigation initiated by the subcommittee be continued

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148

TOP

in a manner deemed appropriate by the full Committee

until

satisfactory answers

the questions raised can be obtained.

Dudha L

SECRET

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152

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life,

Appendix.

REVLEW OF CEASSIFTED AGENCY AND WARREN COMMISSION MATERIALS

(A)

FBI

The FBI has an extensive and efficient data retrieval

system

Each filed document is indexed and serialized. An abstract

of

every document is prepared and filed separately by author and

subject. The system ensures that it is virtually impossible to

destroy the

record of a document's existence once that document has

been filed. However, the Committee is not itself allowed to se

this data retrieval system; it has been required to make requests

to the FBI and rely upon a good faith compliance. Thus, gaining

access to FBI materials was a tedious and time consuming project.

Unlike the CIA, the Bureai did not make its Oswald and

assassination investigation files available en toto for revier. This

necessitated a series of lengthy Committee document requests.

*

The Conmittee is aware that the Bureau had a "Do Not File"

procedure, pursuant to which certain documents are

initially filed

in other than the usual file encer gaically destroyed. Mamorandun

than we do not tie. a

Although it would appear

procedure auld have been Limited to requests

for authorization for illegal'

acess: such as break-ins, the committee

has not been able to

establish whether this or a similar procedure

was

employed in connection with mategials relating to Osrald or the

assassination.

TOP SECRET

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..n. 4 to tie.

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15°

-

The Bureau reviewed its files

and produced

documents responsive

to

the request.

In those areas where general document requests would

have

required an inordinate review of Bureau documents, the Committee

virtually requested access to abstracts of the documents.

After

reviewing the abstracts, the Committee

selected certain authorizing

documents to be reviewed in their entirety, and such documents

were requested by the Committee and produced by the FBI. However,

even the use of abstracts has

not allowed the staff to familiarize

itself with FBI materials in other than the few areas to which it

decided to direct attention.

This inability to review even

the

relevant FBI documentary record in its entirety should be considered

in evaluating the staff's conclusions and recommendations.

HIH

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151

TOp 9p22E

(B) CIA

The CIA granted the staff free access to three major

files related to the assassination of President Kennedy: the

Agency's "201 file" on Oswald; the files of the Mexico City

Station on Oswald and the assassination investigation; a file of

materials CIA developed because of the Garrison

investigation.

Shortly after the assassination Mr: Rocca of the CIA's

Counterintelligence staff was designated the "point of record" for

then existing CIA's work on the assassination investigation.

Rocca

attempted to collect all their existing documents en Oswald and

the assassination and he had those documents, or copies, put into

Oswald's '201 file.' Rocca also attemoted to out into the

the "201 file" all later

documents received or generated

by CIA.. Thus the "201 file" on Oswald now has approimately 56 file

folders containing the CIA's pre-assassination documents on Oswald,

documents generated during the life of the Warrer Commission. and

miscellaneous documents (including books and articles) collected

by the Agency over the past twelve and one half years relating

to

the

assassination.

The Mexico

City station maintained a smiliar file on

Oswald until 1967 when

all its holdings were transferred to CIA

headquarters.

The Mexico City Station files fill sir large file

Folders.

Since New Orleans District Attorney Carrison made many

allegations relating

to,CIA in the course of his investigation.

the Cla Office of Security opened a File on the Garrison investiga-

cior.

That file contains, for the most part, books and erticles

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MOP

152

18ua 88

NH 50955 DooId: 32423526

Page 156

about the Garrison

investigation

and internal CIA nemcranda

analyzing allegations about CIA.

The sheer size of these files precluded detailed examina-

tion and analysis of each document. The Select Committee

staff

concentrated on documents received or prepared in the first

few

weeks after

the assassination, although it reviewed all documents

prepared during

the course of the Warren Comnission investigation.

In addition to these files. the Select Conmittee requested

access to a number of other. CIA files, such as those on AMbASH,

those containing Director McCone's memoranda of conversations with

President Johnson, and those on certain individuals whose namen

arose in the course of the Select Committee's investigation.

(C) NSA and the Military Intelligence Agencies

Assassination files of the military intelligence agencies -

Navy, Army, and Air Force intelligence -- are conciderable. For

the most part, they are merely duplicate copies of material other

agencies prepared and turned over to the Warren Commission. All

three agenices have, with one exception, furnished the staff with

all preassassination documents on Oswald. The Office of Naval.

Intelligence (ONI) invoked the third agency rule and did not give

the staff a copy of any pre-assassination document in its file

which was originated by a third agency but did furnish a lint of

all third-agency documents it acquired between May 1962 and

December 1963. All three agencies save the staff access to all

their files on Oswald or the assassination.

The Warren Commission had full access to files of the

TOP SECRET

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## Page 157

1.53

I0F SKUNS

military intelligence agencies.

The tiles or onl

the nilitary

agency with principal interest in Oswald. were reviewed in their

entirety immediately after the assassination by senior. State and

Defense Department officials.

NSA maintains it has no materials pertaining to Oswald, the

assassination, or the cast of characters (American. Soviet, and Cuban)

that were identified by Committee document requests, aside from

few relatively unimportant documents it furnished. NSA has stated

that it, unlike the other

intelligence agencies, has no existing file

on Oswald or the assassination.

The staff interviewed Dr. Tordella, who was Deputy Director of

NSA in 1963. He stated NSA developed no significant information

relating to the assassination. This statement was confirmed by Mr.

Angleton of CIA.

(D) SECRET SERVICE

The Secret Service • Unlike the CIA and the FBI .. is

not an

intelligence agency. It is charged with protecting certain

government officials; (most notably, the President), visiting

dignitaries and Presidential candidates. The Service's protective

research

files

contain information only on persons who are

presently regarded as potential threats to the safety of the pro-

tected individuals. Thus, with the exception of the limited number

of documents pertaining to that Agency's limited participation in

the

assassination investigation. there is little relevant material in

Secret Service

files.

The staff reviewed what the Secret Service represented as

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## Page 158

154

all

materials pertaining to the

assassination, the subsequent

investigation, and the Warren Conmission. Aside from reports dealing

with

Presidential protection and the actions of individual agents in

Dallas on November 22, 1963, these materials primarily supplement FBI

reports. They do, additionally, reflect the Service's limited

role in the assassination investigation and reveal specific instances

where the Service's

investigation was terminated at the Bureau's

request.

It is worth briefly noting that the Secret Service did not

have certain documents one would expect them to have.

For example,

there were neither materials pertaining to Warren Commission

proceedings as

such, nor memoranda reflecting internal meetings or

discussions relating to Warren Commission testimony by Secret Service

personnel. Additionally, although FBI documents make reference to

Warren Commission related meetings attended by Secret Service

representatives, the Service's files contain no documents which even

refer to these meetings. It is also surprising that there is no

formal report of the Service's forty-five minute interview of Marina

Oswald on November 23, 1963 … the first post assassination interview

of Marina by any Federal agency.

The "absence" of materials is not, in itself, sufficient. to

give rise to the inference that documents were not provided to the

Conmittee. It is of concern, however: and the staff requested a

written response from the Service assuring it that the naterials the

staff reviewed are all they ever had.

*

President Johnson, on Novenber 25,

1963

conduct the investigation of

the assassination.

directed the Bureau to

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TOP

(E)

Immigration and Naturalization

Service.

The staff reviewed all documents at I & NS on Lee and Marina

Oswald. Invoking the third agency rule, I

& NS refused to allow the

staff to examine FBI documents. However, it did provide a listing

of these FBI materials.

(F)

State Department

The staff reviewed selected materials in State Department

files

pertaining to. Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. Most of

these documents in State's files were generated elsewhere. The State

Department generated materials relating to: (1) Oswald's applica-

tions for passports: (2) Oswald's defection to and return from the

Soviet Union; and (3) Marina Oswald's admission to the United States.

There are significant questions raised by the State

Department's handling of the Oswalds. For example, with a "stop"

on Lee's passport file after his defection, Depariment procedures

should have precluded the automatic reissuance of the passport Oswald

obtained in July 1963. Other questions surround State's decision

to allow the Oswalds to return from the Soviet Union fand even finance

the trip) after Oswald's

announced defection. However, the Comnittee

did not pursue these questions;

since all this information was available

to the Warren Commission.

(G) Warren Commission

An understanding of the information that was made available

to the Commission is

a prerequisite to any determination that

evidence was withheld. Although limited resources precluded a

review of Conmission materials in their entirety: the staff attempted

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15C

to identify what materials were provided to the Commission in

certain areas, and to review completely the materials so identified.

It also reviewed regardless of subject area, the ninety classified

numbered Commission documents and the ninety-five classified

unnumbered Commiesion documents presently stored at the National

Archives.

Of the ninety numbered Commission documents

nineteen are CIA

generated, sixty-three are the FBI's and eight are the Department

of State's. The CIA generated documents include a chronology of

Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, miscellaneous information re-

lating to Oswald's activities in Mexico City, personal background

information on George DeMohrenschildt and information pertaining

Eo Soviet and Cuban intelligence agency activities. The FBI

materials include personal background information on Michael and

Ruth Paine and Mark Lane, investigative reports on Oswald's visit

to lexico City, and extensive background information on Cuban

groups. The Department of State documents include reports ou

alleged assassination attempts of would leaders and cable traffic

from the American Embassies in Moscow and Mexico City.

The thirty-three unnumbered documents classified by the CiA

and the Warren Commission are either letters and memoranda to

the CIA or internal Warren Commission memoranda conteining national.

security information.

More specifically, these documents contain

records of conversations between Warren Commission staffers and

CIA personnel about administrative and substantive issues; memo-

randa of the Commission about ClA infoonation on Oswald's stay

in the Soviet Union and his trip to dories Ciry: information por

taining to the Soviet defeg

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TOY

SLUNCH

Warren Commission on the possibility of a foreign conspiracy; a

memörandum by Warren Commission staffers on their visit to Mexico

City; and. letters to the Soviet and Cuban Governments asking for

information on Oswald. Included in tlie thirty-nine classified

unnumbered FBI documents

are investigative reports from Mexico

and

personal information concerning Mark Lane and Marina Oswald.

The

twenty-three classified unnumbered Department of State doc!-

ments

include corespondence between the Warren Commission and the

Department of Stake concerning Oswald's defection to the Soviet

Union

and his return to the United States, and the Department's

requests to the Soviet and Cuban Governments for materials relating

to

Oswald.

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Appendix B

Were There Connections Between Oswald and U.S. Intelligence

I. Agencies Other Than the FBI

The Warren Commission investigated the charge that Oswald

had in some way been an agent for the U.S. Government and concluded:

close scrutiny of the records of the Federal

agencies involved and the testimony of the responsible

officials of the U.S. Government establish that there

was absolutely no type of informant or undercover re-

lationship between an agency of the U.S. Government

and Lee Harvey Oswald at any time. (WR 327)

Nevertheless, Warren Commission critics have continuously

asserted such a relationship existed. For example, it has been

claimed that Oswald

was an agent for military intelligence and

defected to the Soviet Union at its instigation; or that Oswald

was likewise an agent for CIA. Such allegations often cite the

rather unusual circumstances of his defection to Russia, his

ease in returning to the United States, and the apparent lack

of interest in him by U.S. intelligence prior to the assassination.

Indeed these were unusual circumstances and there is no

satisfactory explanation for them. For example, despite evidence

that the Navy, FBI and State Department were extremely interested

in and did determine the precise date and place Oswald would return

to the United States he was not interviewed by FBI until three

weeks after his return,

and even then was not questioned in detail

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as to his

activities in the Soviet Union.

The subcommittee received testimony from a former CIA employee

claiming to have read a CIA report of a debriefing of a re-defector

who had been in Minsk and who was either a corporal or captain

in the Marines.

The subcommittee reviewed the cases of other re-

defectors noting many were debriefed by CIA as well as FBI. And,

CIA documents disclose that at least some at CIA had, prior to

Oswald's return, proposed he be debriefed.

Because of CIA's interest in re-defectors and because of the

testimony indicating a possible debriefing of Oswald, some CIA

debriefing of Oswald after his return would be expected. Neverthe-

less, the subcommittee has not been able to locate evidence of a

CIA debriefing. The Oswald file at CIA contains no record of any

contact; the records

of the Domestic Contacts Division (the CIA

Division which the former CIA employee alleged to be the originator

of the report he saw) denies having any record of a debriefing. At

the subcommittee's request, CIA reviewed its data

base on Minsk

and stated

it could locate no information which it could attribute

to Oswald.

The limitations and restrictions under which the subcommittee

has operated has not allowed it to definitively resolve the question

One CIA employee did recall reading a report about Oswald's

stay in Minsk.

He thought he saw it after the assassination.

was

shown copies of the three known FBI reports summarizing its

interviews of Oswald but could not positively identify any as

the report he saw; however, he indicated one report might have been

the one he saw.

Assuming

CIA's denial of such a debriefing is correct,

the only explanation for his recollection is that he saw some version

of information on Oswald, such as his diary, which CIA acquired

after the assassination.!

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166

of whether Uswald was in any capacity employed by U.S. intelli-

gence.

The extreme compartmentation of information within CIA

makes it possible for CIA to employ agents without centralized

clearance and without records retrievable by anyone other than

knowledgeable CIA employees. Indeed CIA's compartmentation permits

only the Director to have access to all information about all

Agency relationships with agents. However, Director McCone in

1964 denied, under oath, that Oswald was in any way connected with

CIA.

He remains the only person qualified to make such a flat

statement:

And there is nothing in any of the CIA's files the subcommittee

staff reviewed which suggests Oswald was employed by CIA. More-

over, present CIA officials state they have found nothing, after

an extensive search to indicate he was so employed.

Furthermore, from the time of Oswald's defection to Russia in

1959 until after the assassination, procedures required CIA be

informed of the names of all agents used by any U.S. intelligence

agency. This procedure obviously was necessary in order to avoid

two agencies using the same individual. For example, Army intelli-

gence was required to clear with CIA the name of any agent it

intended to use.

CIA is not aware of any agency's circumvention of

this procedure. So, if Oswald were employed for foreign

intelligence

purposes by an agency other than CIA, there should be a record of

such employment at CIA. CIA has informed the subcommittee that

it has

no such record.

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Discussion: Alleged Oswald FBI Connections

A. The 1964 Allegation.

On Wednesday, January 22, 1964, J.W. Rankin received a

call fxom the then Attorney General of Texas, Waggoner Cart.

Mr. Carr stated that he had recieved on a confidential basis

an allegation to the effect that Oswald was an undercover agent

for the FBI since September 1962 and that he had been paid

$200 a month from an account designated as No. 179. Carr

indicated that this allegation was in the hands of the press and

defense counsel for Ruby and suggested that his information

came ultimately from District Attorney Henry Wade, although he

stated that he had not discussed this matter with Wade.

Rankin immediately informed the Chief Justice of these

allegations and

a meeting of the Commission was called for

5:30, Wednesday, January 22, 1964. Rankin then laid out the

allegations

for the attending members. In response to Senator

Cooper's query as to how the Commission could test "this kind

of thing," Rankin responded:

It is going to be very difficult for us to

be able to establish

the facts in it.

am

confident that the FBI would never admit it, and

• I presume their records will never

show

it.

Executive Session-1/22/64, President's Commission on the

Assassination.of President Kennedy,-.p.-1.

Memorandum for the files from J. Lee Rankin,

undated.

S100

• ":.

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On Thursday; January 23, 1964, J. Lee Rankin reviewed

- -

a Secret Service Report which summarized an interview of

Houston Post reporter Alonso

Hudkins. Hudkins had told

the interviewing Secret Service agents on December 17, 1963

that Allan Sweatt

of the Sheriff's Office had an "opinion"

that Oswald was being paid $200 a month by the FBI. Hudkins

also told the Secret Service that Oswald's alleged informant

number was "S172".

On Friday, January 24, 1964, Rankin and Chief Justice

Warren met at Commission headquarters with Texas Attorney

General Carr, Dallas District Attorney Wade, Assistant District

Attorney Alexander, Leon Jaworski and Dean Storey. They were

informed that the sources for the Oswald informant allegations

***

were several reporters, including Hudkins.

On Friday evening, January 24, 1964, Rankin was informed

that the Secret Service had also interviewed Allen Sweatt regarding

the Oswald informant allegations. Sweatt stated that he received

the allegation from Alexander. He also mentioned Houston Post

**3%

reporter Hudkins as a source of the information.

All of the above was presented to the full Commission on

Monday, January 27, 1964. The transcript reflects the concern

of the Commission members with this allegation, and their

desire to avoid offending Hoover and the appearance of accusing

*

Memorandum for the files from J. Lee Rankin, undated.

U.S. Secret Service Investigative Report, 1/3/64.

***

Op. cit., p. 4.

****

Op. cit., p. 5

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the FBI. Various possible approaches for "running down"

the allegations were discussed.

It was decided that Rankin

would inform Hoover directly of these allegations, and allow

the FBI the opportunity to refute the allegations.

Rankin discussed Hudkin's allegation that Oswald was

an FBI informant with James Malley,

FBI liaison to the Warren

Commission, on February 7, 1964.

Hudkins was interviewed

by FBI agents on February 8, 1964. He stated that a government

official (not a federal official in Dallas) had told him that

Executive Session, 1/27/64, President's Commission on the

Assassination of President Kennedy.

Hoover submitted to the

Commission an affidavit which he swore

That he has caused a search to be made of the records

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States

Department of Justice, by employees of

the said Federal

Bureau

of Investigation and that said search discloses

that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the

FBI, was never assigned a symbol number in that capacity

was never paid any amount of money by the FBI in any

regard.

(Hoover affidavit, 2/6/64, attached to letter

from Hoover to Rankin, 2/6/64)

The Bureau additional forward nine affidavits (of

Special Agents Clark

• Hosty, Carter, Bronw, Howe, Maynor,

Quigley, Lynn and retired Special Agent Fain):

who because of their assignments, would have been

responsible

for or cognizant of any attempt to

develop Lee Harvey Oswald as an informant of the

FBI.

(Letter from Hoover to Rankin, 2/12/64.)

**

Letter from Hoover to Rankin, 2/11/64.

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Oswald was on the payroll of either the FBI or CIA with voucher

number 179 and that he had received no less than $150 a month

and no more than $225 a month." Hudkins further stated that

Philadelphia Inguirer reporter

Joseph Golden had also mentioned

to him that Oswald was an FBI informant, but with a voucher

number different from 179.

In testimony to the Committee, Hudkins detailed his oletimony

in the allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant, which differs

significantly from

the information he supplied Federal agencies

in 1963 and 1964:

Hudkins testified that on or about

January 3, 1964 he visited Allan Sweatt at the Sherriff's office

in Dallas and was told that an FBI agent (who was still in the

building) had been trying to locate him. Hudkins met with

two FBI agents, immediately thereafter, and told him that

"S172"' had been. fabricated. Hudkins testified that he, Hugh

Aynesworth and William Alexander "made-up" the informant story

during a three way conference call in early December as a

means of determining whether any of their telephones were

being tapped. According to Hudkins, within thirty minutes of

this conversation an FBI agent from the Houston office (whom

*

When contacted by the FBI, Golden declined to identify.

his source beyond stating that he "had obtained the information

from a law enforcement officer in Dallas." (Letter from Hoover

to Rankin, 2/11/64.)

Alonzo Hudkins testimony, 11/20/75-9

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Hudkins could not identify) dropped by his office and asked

whether he had heard anything about Oswald having a payroll

number. Hudkins expressed puzzlement over the controversy

that has developed from the "made-up ren

number for Oswald and

stated that he could not understand "why (the Bureau) let

the warren) Commission go through all that crap about Oswald

being an FBI informanti (liu denotestimo , 11/20/75, pri)

B. MORE RECENT ALLEGATIONS

On January 22, 1964, the allegation that Oswald was an

FBI informant was brought to the attention of the Commission

by Texas officials. John McCone swore that Oswald "was not

an agent, employee, or informant of the CIA . . .* Hoover

swore that "a search (of FBI records). . . discloses that

Oswald was never an informant of the FBI . . ."**Similar

affidavits of Special Agents Shanklin, Clark, Hosty, Carter,

Brown, Howe, Manor, Fain, Quigley, and Lynn were also submitted

to the Commission.***

More

recently, in

sworn Committee testimony Special Agents

Hosty and DeBrueys unequivocally denied any Bureau relation-

ship with Oswald. Although the staff is not permitted to physically

review raw FBI files, in response lo specific monieter

requests the Bureau has informed us

that they have no

*John McCone affidavit, 5/18/64.

**Hoover affidavit, 2/6/64, attached to Letter from Hoover to

to Rankin, 2/6/64

***Letter from Hoover to

parkin, 2/12/64-

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documents indicating that Oswald was ever a Bureau "source,

informant, agent or asset."

On April 29, 1964 Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to

President Johnson, informed Assistant FBI Director Cartha

DeLoach that a close personal friend

had spoken with an

FBI agent that had assisted in the investigation of the

Oswald case and that the agent had stated that Oswald was

definitely an FBI informant and that Bureau files in Washington

was definitely prove this fact. Jenkins added that the agent

had also told his friend that he had been transferred from

New Orleans to Dallas as a result of getting into difficulty

with a woman in the French Quarter. At the close of the

memorandum pursuant to which DeLoach recounted Jenkins

statements for Associate Director John Mohr, DeLoach recommends:

*Cite

**Jenkins declined to divulge his friend's identity to

the FBI.. In that the Committee did not receive the FBI reports

which discuss this matter until March 3, 1976, the staff attempting

to contact Jenkins for the first tiem

on March 4, learned

from his attorney that he was under a "doctor's care" and

his health precluded the Committee's directly contacting him.

The attorney agreed to supply the Committee with a doctor's

statement verifying the above, and further agreed that Mr.

Jenkins would answer written interrogatories from the Committee.

***Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to J. Mohr, 4/30/64.

According to DeLoach, Jenkins stated that "there was no

question in his mind regarding the falsity "of this allegation,

and Jenkins had previously informed his friend that" this was

an old rumor . :

completely false. and that the FBI had branded it as being

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Despite the fact that this matter has been

tied down as being false, it is considered desirable

to review

personnel files of agents in Dulles to

ind out if any of the Agents have been trans-

ferred there from New Orleans there yo such isciplinary

problem as desribed above.

Agent

he should be interviewed regarding this

matter.

The subsequent review of Dallas field office personnel

files revealed that one agent had been transferred from New

Orleans in May, 1958, following misconduct while attending a

night club in the New Orleans French Quarter, and a second

agent was similarly transferred in May 1960 following an

allegation involving himself and a female FBI employee.

These agents were personally interview by the Special Agent

in Charge of the Dallas field office, J. Gordon Shanklin

and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge Kyle Clark.

They categorically denied ever telling anyone outside the

Bureau the reason for their transfer and they similarly

denied telling anyone that Oswald was an FBI informant.

On May 6. 1964 DeLoach orally informed Jenkins of the

Bureau's investigative findings, noting that the Bureau would

not pursue this matter further unless Jenkins subsequently

chose to reveal his friend's identity.

On January 17, 1976, the Committee staff interviewed

a former FBI agent who had been assigned to the Bureau's Kansas

* Memorandum from W. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan, 5/5/64.

**

Memorandum from W. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan, 5/5/64.

***

Memorandum from C. D. Deloach to JhaAs, 516/64.

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City field office when Hosty was transferred there from Dallas

in September, 1964. This ex-agent is positive that Hosty told

him that both Hosty and the Dallas agent who had handled the

Oswald case prior to Hosty [i.e.,. John Fain] had attempted to

develop Oswald as a potential security informant ("'PSI"). More

specifically, the

agent quoted Hosty as stating:

that Oswald had been a PSI (Potential Security Informant)

for an older agent who reitred just before Hosty moved

had had no contact with Oswald, and that one of the last acts

* in pan come gith.

Hosty told us that his older agent

the older agent did before he reitred was to deactivate

the Oswald file as a PSI. Hosty commented

that as

part of his effort to reopen the Oswald matter, he left

notes at Oswalds'

apartment, urging him to get in touch

with the FBI. I recall Hosty commenting that although

he had listed Oswald as a PSI, he had not had any

contact with him.*

This former agent also advised that Hosty made similar

remarks to certain other FBI agents then stationed in Kansas

City. The Committee has talked to two agents; neither one

recalls Hosty ever stating that Oswald was a PSI.

*Affidavit of former FBI

agent, 1/30/76.

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