SUBJECT: CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES IN THE US -- ELECTION OF GOVERNMENT OF/IN EXILE
Originator: CIA
Document date: 04/13/1965
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10180-10063..

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Till'erto Firero

Mistuntr/be, import Br., CD/00

2270

Caaota, 315

13 Aps 65

RETURNTO CIA

Background Use Only

• Do Not Reproduce

20/05

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Jahn sherwood

0102 is

Its 13 on your ald case on

FIlIbarto Ray.

HBR

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file

1A-294-65

7 April 1965

SUB SUT:

Cuban Sxile Activitjes in tbe US - Election of

Government 0f/1g 5811e

REF.

(of case taneous Contributione of Filberto Revero

following, and the enclosure, presumably are of

interest to John Sherwood, Wi DIVisIOn, et al.

?. The enclosure, for retention, 1s the edited results ot

evening and the early morning of 24-25

seeting was taped, transcribed and edited, all of which took much

nore time than had been anticipated; ergo, the delay.

3. In resume, enclosure reports the background of various

attempts, or opportunities missed,

to overthrow the Castro regime,

Rivero's opinions of why tbey failed, and his intention of

inftiating a final try.

On the basis of encouraging responses

to a couple of spot radio announcements in los Angeles and similar

experiences 1n Miani and New Yori, he has plans to poll all Cuban

exiles in Southern California. In a rather well thought out election

on Sunday, 25 Apr 65.

Qualffied voters will select some 20 or 50

anti-Castro Cubans from possibly 100 eligibles who, in essence,

will represent the Cubans in exile aud, when politic, & government

in exile.

The enclosure sets out the mechanics of the election,

anticipated activities

of the representatives in the US and in

Latin American countries, the formation

of Cuban-Latin brigades,

traintos facilities, and invasion preparations.

Since preparation of the above, Rivero advised on 7 Apr 65

that Prlo has proposed an alternate plan for elections on 2 May

or a group of 25 people to be chosen from a pre-selected 50.

will be 16 nominees of political or revolutionary background from

which eight will be elected; 10 frow the "new generation" - 5 will

be chosen; 3 from 6 industry-commerce nominees; and the same nurber

trou labor, the professions and the press.

The man with the greatest

nueber of votes will be the "Delegate" of the exiles, patterned

soberhat on Jose Martl's "delegate"

status prior to the Spanish

American War.

The reraining 24 will be his

EEd

Z/SR

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1A-294-65

7 April 1965

5. Rivero regards the above as one more Prio device to

assure himself effective control of the exile novement'!

operations, and the election a dishonest affair in tal

voters really have no choice.

6. Rivero, despite Prio's plans, 18 going ahead with his

own 25 April balloting.

He has since, with the help of forder

Cuban jurists, modified as follows the plan as presented in

enclosure.

8.

ach of the Caribbean Governuents willir

•assist in providing facilities (when the operati

•. If and when the exiles invaded Cuba, ti

unte and the Council would togetber oversee

forward 1t.

- end -

Encl: Transcription of Tape 'by F1l Rivero

- 2 -

i :.

A NYLY

'"""

...:

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• * +.

Enclosure to

1A-294-65

5 April 1505

1. For your isfursation, I an filiperto Rivero, I nu a citizen

of Cuba by birta; born 29 Aug

1913, and a permanent resident of the Us

Bince 1949. I as barried to an Americal, have an Aberican daughter, and

I've lived 1n Califorala practically since I arrived in the US, except

for tho or three short vialts to Cuba prior to 1959. At present I have

no political asiliations elther in: tea. or elsewhere, and l du not be long

. to any organtiations vhatsoever.

For a time, however, I was President of

the Cuban Catholic Center 1n Los Angeles, an archdiocesan organization

created to provide Cuban refugees vith a place to seet, and bely each

other find jobs, etc.

people like the Kivanis, Chambers of Commerce, etc., to try to explain

the Cuban situation.

on Station XWW, Pasadena, Sundays, 1900-1930. It's a sort of nevacast

of Latin America called "Nuestra Aberica al Dia", or "Our Aberica to

Date". In that progres I do a kind of resume of the important evento

PRESEN

About sour jears ago I started a lecture tour, prompted by

For the last tro yeare I have bad a radio progrea

of the week in latia America, concentrating on Cuba.

headlines much of the time, legitinately is important news and is the

source of Important nevs; also I'm extremely interested in the problems

of my country.

I should also say that I am a strong believer in the

American systen of sovernment and wish that uy little country could

have done as well, 1.e., had a two-party system with elections every

four years, after which they would bury the political hatchets and go

to work.

But it hasn't worked out like that.

sobe points of Aberican politics.

If I was a Republican I would be a

Liberal Republican; if I was a Democrat I would be a Conservative

Denocrat.

That's as close as I can describe my political thinking.

One final thing, I bave never been in jail and I've never been in

any trouble.

3. Now with that l1ttle background I should add that I have been

the only radio or TV voice in Los Angeles attempting to explain the ups

and downs of latin Arerican politics and this has given me a bit of

recognition. Also since October 1964 on Monday nights, from 2100 to

2400, I have had a program With a Mexican, Roberto Iglesias, who 18

an American citizen by convertience, in my opinion, that 1s, and not

by conviction, although we are friends. We started a program of

telephone conversations in which people would call and comment on

any subject on politics - national, local, or latin American -- as

they pleased.

Ints program, which 1s also on Kirl, has enjoyed a

t'antastic and unexpected success, and it brought me to some auditional

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suciosure to

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¿ April 1905

prominence in the latin community of los Angeles. I might say it

has also unde be a center of controveray. I've taken done strong

svipes at the Mexican Governuent because it did not go along with

the rest of America in breaking rolations with Castro. By the same

token, I have also taken some rather strong auipes at certain areas.

of the American Government for things done 1n Latin Averica tbat I

feel vere grave mistakes.

4. I consulted beforehand, bovever, vith a number or people

on a personal basis to know 1I I had the rigat to discuss American

politics, since I am not an American citizen. I vas told that this

Was a free country, and that as long as I dida't violate any lava

of the country I could speak on anything I pleased, and that it

would be judged is regard to good taste, or bad taste; but not that

I was doing anything illegal.

So, being respectful of American laws,

I've taken advantage of the fact that I live in a free country, one

I like very much, because I think I'm doing some good.

5.

with reference to the Mexican coumunity, In general, it'8 e

oatter of orienting a million and a hall people who were born witi

a hatred of the us.

Most of those that come here from Mexico have

been brought up with a deep-seated resentment against the Yankee.

Our program has shown thie to be tremendously strong and I make a

special effort to tell them that the cause of their woes 1s not the

Yankee; It's their own lack of education because their sovernment

for many years has kept them in a kind of an intellectual serfdou.

So, I'm not popular with many Mexicans, who accept whatever their

governmen: says 1s good for them.

I argue that you do not accept

the word of the governuent as the word of God; that you discusy

and argue with your guvernuent if you don't agree, and that 1s what

keeps the administration on 1ts toes.

This 10 not the way it works

1n Mexico which 18 not a democracy, but a kind of a civilian monarchy

In which the monarch or the king changes every six years, but the

monarchy reigas on, that 18, the Partido Revolucionairo Institucional,

the FRI. So much for Mexico.

Now, regarding Cuba.

The reason I wanted to have a chat with

you 18 because there 1s something imminent as far as Los Angeles 18

concerned, and due to our friendly relations I want to intorm you

beforehand so that you would know from me and not from the press.

I refer to the fact that we're trying to create what will amount to

a Cuban Government in exile.

This is aot news because it has been

going on fos about three or four months, but what is Important 19

that I have jumped the gun on the leaders in Miaul, and au scheduling

-2 .

TONY

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Enclosure to

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5 April 1995

an election vithout their particuln, approval, but vithout weir

specific disapproval efther. They have asked me to vait and talk

to Dr. Prio and the otber leadera in Niami vio are vorklag on this,

7. Firet, let's anover one question - why a government in exile?

Well, everything else seems to have failed. Since the Castro takeover.

in Cuba the first big thing I can remember vas the Bay of Ples, Hell,

that story in pretty vell know. The reasons why the Bay of Pigo

failed I think vere covered besutifully in an article by a Cuban

attorney entitled, "Decision for Disaster: At last The Truth About

'he Bay of Pig8, " in Resder's Disest for September 1964. Up to now.

this has been the most complete and factual article I have read on

the bay or Pigs.

I bave double-checked with many Cubans vho voro

Involved and they tell me this account 1s absolutely accurale, except

for one point.

It does not say why the Kennedy edministration cut

down the second and third vaves that vere origiually scheduled.

The

intorastion I beard from other sources is that there was a very heated

argument betveen Idlal Stevenson and President Kennedy.

Sterenson had

gone on record that the first ware of bombers that bit Cubs prior to

the invasion vere flown by defectors from the Cuban Air Force.

Apparently he did not know that this was part of the ovemll CIA

operation. When be learned of this, I'a told, he got very, very

upset, being a san of great pride, and that in his rather strong

argument uits President Kennedy about the point, he threatened to

neveal the whole piot in front of me world and resim as Ambassador

is the United liations is there were any more such bombings. I under-

stand President Kennedy feared a scandal, and gave the orders that

resulted in the Bay of Pigs disaster. 'I don't know if this 1s true

or not but I put it bere because 1t makes a lot of senoe and tenda

to relieve the Aberican Intelligence groups of the blame they're been

carrying on their shoulders since the Bay of Pigs Invasior, but that's

beside the point.

The next big woment of Cuban hope of liberation was the

many of us Cubans feel that the administration made another grave

uistake because rany very important people in the administiation

do not understand the rechanics of the Connunist mind. At the time

the so-ralled eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation came about

the Soviets provised to take the missiles out, and to permit some

international organization to inspect the ibland, etc.

the question is --uhy did the Averican Government retreat or lift

-3-

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Enclosure to

5 Apr1l 1965

the blockade when the soment of danger had already passedi

I under-

stand that many people in Hachington and the administration felt

that Khrushcher had behaved like a good boy, had promised he would

take his missiles out immediately, and disarntle theu, and that be

should not be pushed into a corner.

It was felt that if he vas pushed

into a corder, pussibly the Staliniat group in the USSR, prodded by

the Chlnese, would overthrow Khrushcher, and then the Us would have

to deal with a nuch rougher man and not good old Nikita who vasn't

too hard to get along with.

All he had doue vas point a rev atomic

In any event, ve Cubans felt that 18 the

blockade had been kept on for another few weeks, or until the inspec-

tion had been made, this vould have been ao brutally shamcfui to the

Castro regime that right then and there, chances were good for an^

Internas uprising while the United Nations or the OAS or the Red

Cross was there making 1ts inspection. At any rate, this vas a

fantastic upportunit; that maa minard is i'ernons unich perbaps

history say be able to take care of. So, that was second insug

that falled In the Cuben problem.

9.

also mention the disaster of Miro

Cardona and his group which failed in the opinion of «any people

because tiey vere practically appointed by the State Departuent.

At least, at that time,

the State Monortrent seemed to want some

left-wing, lesders to take over Cuba.

There 1s no doubt that Cardona

could be clesaltied as a socialist of sorts, or left-winger of sorts.

the disaster of cardona was a regult o1 the bay of Pigs situation and

was a very unpleasant thing.

I think personally that Cardom conducted

himself wong.

If be had been brought into President Kennedy's confi-

dence, he should have respected that confidence and made a discreet

exit, but not the big to-do he made which didn't accomplish anything

except to kill the hopes of other Cubans and to make President Kennedy

and Robert Kennedy very angry.

Anyway, Cardona's group had the original

sin of not being a legitimate Cuban organization. Moreover, there 10

another thing about his group which many Cubans have never forgiven --

that 18 tiat at the moment of the invasion they vere practically locked

They were supposed

to be allies but were kept prisoners. I suspect the truth of the

matter is that the Americans who were running the show feared these

Cubans vould talk too much and that their being put away for a few

hours vas just a roughshod way of protecting them against themselves.

But this left a bad taste because it proved that the eroup was nothing

but a puppet of the State Department, and Cubans proud of their

sovereigrus and their nationalian didn't like 1t at all.

!

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5 April 1955

10.

The next point on the things that have gone wrong in the

process of Cuban libertion 16 the fantestir "Operetta", and I egy

and his meanderingo around te caribbean.

In March 1964 and in Hiani in jacuary or February 1964 and I had

done a lot. of ralking, and interrovine, and investignting. When I

ing and 100n

returned to Los Anyeles, abos: April 19th, I yave a mecting of Cubans

a full report of my three-nont trip on the referendum preparationa

Going on

1n Miam1, and ay conversations in Washington With some Stare

Departinent people, with Cuban ex-azbassadora who still live in Washing-

con and a tremendous assortsent of personalities. During ay report,

•here in

Los Angeles, one of the Cuban

leaders asked me what I thought

about fay's pronise to be in Cuba, fighting by the 20th of May. I

told him uithout any hesitation (and I have a tape of that meeting)

that there was nothing to be concerced about or hoped for with Ray

because he was

going to be on sose convenient little island in the

Caribbean with a photographer and a fev friends and that would be the

end of his promise to invade Cuba.

But I was promptly abused by a

member of the Junta (JUPS) because be thought I was desccrating his

hero.

I told him I didn't have anything against Ray but that I had

enough incormation to warrant yi sajing that.

Of course, when this

actually happened just a fev veeis later when Ray was discovered on

Cay Anguila,

• British possessica, I was looked on with great respect

by the people at that meeting.

Ny reasoning that Ray was going to be

found on an 1sland was just ike result of putting a low bits of inforsa-

tion together and asking myself by Ray had made the rash promise in

1903 that he would be fighting In Cuba or be killed in the fighting.

This was because of his famous, or lofaduus, scheme known as the

Judas plan.

The Judas plan to

refrest you was one whereby the Averican

Governuent (when I say governbeat I van precisely Robert Kernedy and

perraps his brother) was to overicrov Castro just before the sictions

of 1954.

It came to be called ice Judas plan because actually it was

not meant to change the casic type of governaent, just to replace

Fidel Castro vito Manolo Ray. Those of' us who studied Ray wondered

how much difference there would be in the basic polltical philosophy

of Castro und Ray. I think thai ve can sa, without missing the mark

too far that Ray would find a lot of support for this kind of thinking

In some circles of the State Departoent and the Averican Governuent.

Then I had another reason to think that this Judas plan was real because

during my stay in Miaml I learsed tat severai top officials of the

first nine months of the Casiro goveroert, by then reluyees theaselves,

had been contacted by people connected in sout way with others suppoßed

These turmer officials

..

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5 April 100S

of the first year of the Castro governoent had been asked 1f tbey

would consider taking their old positions 1f and when tiere vas a

Cuban government that would de close to the original revolutionary

government - in other vords, Raj and his people. This vas before

the assassination ol President Kenredy. After tbe assassination,

which was in November 1903, I 138 In Florida and found that the rhole

Judas plan had disintegrated.

The main reason for it was to bare

sowething ready in case it was needed for a spectacular to give the

American people the feeling tbat 1ts governuent had finally liquidated

Fidel Castro and then would so out and re-elect the current adainistra-

tion.

This whole operation 1s very involved, vould require bours to

explain.

It was dubbed by sany the Judas plan because Judas was tbe

So, let's go on to the next polat.

11. Ray floundered and vas caught on Cay Asguila, in the Bacasas,

a British possession, and as ve all soow he vas fined for soDetaing

of other and let loose. Since that time we haven't heard much except

that he keeps going in and out of Puerto RIcO, Miami, etc., but he is

laying low.

As far as the Cubans are concerned, he's linished. Let

me say as a little sideline to the Ray situation: In s secret beeting

In Los Angeles, Jose Esterer, the JURE delegate, took an oath that Ray

was already in Cuba. Later, when Ray was discovered in Cay Anguils,

Estevez told his own executive group he had lied so that they vould

not lose their enthusiass. The people who had been with Ray in los

Angeles told Estevez that if lying was a way of life for JURs they

would back out, that they had left Cuba because Castro had lled to

them, and that they were not going to take any more lies fros any-

body.

This was the end of iRs and I have their document which 1s

extremely interesting, but this is unimportant rov.

12. Now, let's take a quick look at Manuel Artine. In ibe

opinion of 95% of the Cubans that consider themselves in the "koos",

Artime 18 & puppet, attacked to the strings of the CIA.

He's fed,

clothed and maneuvered by CIA io its wish and nothing else. mis is

& general consensus in all Cuban circles, so Artime 1s not ther

seriously.

Artime, however, is a very interesting person, be's

a good speaker, and nice-looking, but I consider his thirking very

much along the lines of Fascisa.,

Woen he travels he takes several

of his strong looking friends along, and when be speaks in public

places tbey

seem to watch the corners, and look very nasty with

their insigoias and all.

I had

the pleasure of asking Artime ben

he addressed the prestigious Association for the Econouic Reconstruc-

tion of Cuba in

being

used as a puppet for elesents

- 6.

:?.

-"-

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Enclosure to

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wanted so keep Cuba as a shouplace in America to prove to

the rest of

Amerist son bad Communism vas.

This vas one of the theorico maxing

the rounis in Washington, l.e., the horrible exasple. To uy surprise

and to bio, there vas tremendous applause. I've got that on tape too.

I assed Artime 11 he vas not a traitor to his country le told se

that a san who had been condemned to death and been in prison for

tho gears vas bard to deceive, which was not an ansver. But 1t

sousied very nice and I didn't insist.

Anyway, Artise at this time -

ve're islking now on March 24, 1965 -- I hear, has just completely

disssatled his operation. Since the unpleasantness in Costa RICa

which supposedly had to do with some contraband activities that

invoired the brother of President Orlich of Costa Rica himself,

Artise's group has been dismantled. Most of his people are sou in-

volied in another operation developing around Miani and sald to be

bached by the CIA or the Pentagon -I don't know uhich. When I

was in Miami in January and February 1965, I found that there were

tou sovups of Americans handling Cubans.

The CIA people who were

handling one kind of Cubans and then the Pentagon, apparently, vas

manessering another group.

I really don't know how wuch truth there

is to this.

I was told that the Pentagon people vere at odds vita

CIA and that they were going to try and get their own group of Cubans

jus: to sbow CIA hoy it should be done.

Artime's people bave gore

to s jroup supposedly handled either by the Pentagon or by CIA.

13.

There is another thing that I just found out in the last

weet.

post oi the people who were settine checks frou CiA through

Its dirferent devices had been f'ired and that there was a panic

arcual Miami. These people who had been living and bringing up

tbeir saullies with CIA checks were suddenly left. out in the cold.

I don't know hot much truth there 10 in this either.

I don't know

whs: Artive 18 doing now although I talked to a relative of one of

Artise's close associates who told me today that there is a very

large suve by the American Governuent inside of Cuba.

In other

words, tke ideas of invasions or bit and run, and all that seen to

be rasse. Now the big thing is the assassination of castro and the

instrrection Inside Cuba by people who are discontent, that 1s, the

Castro followers the ClA has been able to reach. I understand there

has been a tremendous abount of work done in the last two jears by

Aberican agencies, and tremendous files compiled of sho in Cuba could

de counted upon at certain times for certain things.

14. This is fine and dandy and who knows, maybe tomorrow we will

hest tint Castro has been assassinated and that the CIA plan has already

dose what it to expected to do.

I have only public information ard au

-7-

•!':

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Enciosure to

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5 19511 1905

not privy to any secrets either in the Aserican agencies or in tbe

Cuban higker echelons -- so, I don't kner, I just hear rubors.

15. The next thing that kind of blew the afr out of the Cuban

exiles vas the arrest of Henojo of the Alpha do, etc., group. Mesoyo,

in the opinion of cany Cubans, 18 a political gangster and s double-

dealer. He has the confidence only of his obn suall group of rollovera.

Menoyo, Iron what I have been told, jumped tbe gun on sometalag else

that was being prepared. His golng into Cuba vith tree ctber ven

sounds pretty stupid unless Menoyo suspecued or vas told that the big

inside push which 18 called la Onds Asericano, tbe Averican Wave,

vas iuninent, and he jumped the gun so that be could get lined up

before anybody else and take over the government. In my boak Menoyo

is not terribly important and does not cave much of a rolloriag. ¡e

has a few nice guys, but they're on the frlnge of being cracispots and

dreamers, not bad, but mixed up in their winds and hungry for pover.

They call themselves revolutionarles but instinctively fear anything

that bas a democratic process.

They want to take Cuba at the point

of a gun and keep it that waj. So Menoyo's capture l8 another blow

to the Cuban exiles.

Even 1i they didn': like bio, they said, "If

Menoyo opens up a beachbead in Cuba, 'Viva Menoyo'! we will so and

f1ght with bin!"

16.

So ve lave Menoyo in his peacerul prison in Havana and

go to the last and saddest of the Cuben disasters in the exile

movement - that is the complete l'lop of the RSCE, the Representa-

tion of Cuban Exiles. As you inos, I was deeply involved in the

foruation of this organization because I belleved 1t had a chance.

The quality of the sen behind this 1dea vere top people, bost of

whom I knew by first name, otbers I had grown up with.

The central

figure, Jose Bosch, head of the Bacardi Cospany, commanda respect

and is a patriot.

However, RidE disinteginted & couple of vecks

agо.

It might interest you to know that on 9 Jun 64, a few weeks

after the referendum was completed, l vrote a confidential, private

letter to Di. Ernesto Freyre, lito was one of the five sen appointed

by the comnittee and approved by a referendus of over 40 thousand

Cubans. I told Dr. Freyre, op old and personal friend, what, in sy

opinion, they should do to

nake RECS successful. I told big that the

first thing was to ignore washington compierely. I said, "I don't

have anything against the Americans - sue right now you bead an

organization that bas the approval of 90b or the Cuban exfles.

Use this moral support you have and try to create a real Cucan

outfit.

Ix you do, you'll get the backing of the Bacardi Cospany

million dollars, it ariered at the start.

Use 1t judiclously

8

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Enclosure to

1A-8: 91-65

5 April 1965

and create a strong, well-knit Cuban organization and don't ast

anything iros the Ascricans.

Ask the Cuban people for cuntribu-

tions; there are over a hundred thousand working in ibe Us. At

$5.00 a month, which they could easily pay, you vould have hall a

million dollars a sonth to vork with.

You can do a lot vito a hall

a million dollars a boath." But above all (I continue my letter

from memory), don't go to washington, just act as 11 toe US Govern-

ment did not exist.

If somebody comes to the office and vanta to

know what you're doing, treat them courteously and give them all the

Information they vant as far as the operation of the outfit. Ne are

I1ving in tbe US and I think that any American official 18 entitled

to know what is going on.

But as far as our own private plans for

the liberation of Cubis, they belong to the Curans at this tloe.

TheD,

I told Dr: Freyre, 18 you do this, you will then be sble to deal vith

the US Government on a completely different basis, not with your bat

in your hand. But if you have the solid backing of half a million

Cubans throughout the vorld you will command the respect not only

of the American Governient but also of the other countries of latin

America. I told hiu I thought the PECE should evolve into a govern-

ment in exile because that would be the logical thing, and the only

type of organizstion people would understand. What did they do?

They scooted down to latin America with no support except their

40 thousand votes, they talked to people in latin America. Every-

body promised they the sly but with one condition -- that Uncle Sam

approve.

Then they vent to Washington and found out that Uncic Sam

did not approve. After nine conths they blew up last seex and threw

in the towel.

Iwo delegates resigned and the other toree said that

they would do some housekeeping until they saw what happened.

Before leavinz the PECE 1n its peaceful grare I think I

should sention that I had gone all through the process of the

referendum itsel, and after the Race was formed I vas the delegate

in Los Angeles. After the referendum was completed I relped get fou

other delegetes so that we would have live delegates vr.ich 11ke the

delegations throushout their country, and in Mexico City, Caracas,

etc., duplicated the original group of five. In loveuber I resigned

because I could not set ansvers to a list of questions -- ansvers

for which I trought I vas justified in asking -- i.e., regarding its

finances, activities, successes, prospects, etc. That taies care of

So nov, we've reached the sorent of truch. Ali these things

have gone down the drain.

During my recent visi: to Miami there vas

one last hope shich seered still alive.

I uns told coveral times bi

hese people that twere is sobething very, very big being vorked out

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by the US agencies, that this rery, very b16 tallo 18 imminent,

that 1t 18 based exclusively on an irternal uprising and perhaps

wie possibillty of the assassinstion of Castro as a kickoft.

Two

dais aço I received a communicstion fron a person sho 18 close to

Us Government people in Misui, representatives of the State Depart-

ment, and also CIA people.

Fe said that we should be potient, that

the end is not far abay and test the so-called Onda Americara 18

going to solve the problem.

In other words, whatever organization

15 working on the Cuban probies spparently is on the verge of giving

the word to whomever 18 inside Cuba connected with this operation.

•I have little hope that this any be true. After five years, I have

no reason to bellere that circusstances at this tive are different

than two or three years 88o.

Us course, I have to recognize that

the Johnson administration is not the same as the Kennedy administra-

tion, as witness

the lack of cesitation in the Vietnam situation. It

nay interest you to know thas a group of Cubans frou REcä recently in

Washington vere told by imporssat people in no uncertsin teras that

the Cuban problem is certainly not top draver right now, but second,

third or fourth.

The top draver 18 Vietnam and that once Vietnam 18

solved one way or another, per-aps the Cuban situstion would be moved

up to the forefront, if no other area of the world flares up.

So, this is the sitistion that brings us right dom to

the point which I wanted to discuss with you in detail -- lie formation

of a Cuban Government in Exile as the only possible solution to nove

the Cuban situstion off dead center, whether the US Governsent 15

willing at this time to help or rot.

We feel that the creaston of a.

Cuban Government in Exile, if done

right and has the boral authority

and tke solid backing of the Cubin exiles, could possibly create a

situation where, without haviny to risk any American lives, the Cuban

problea and the Communist threat in Cuba could be eliainated without

danger of World Har III, or escalation, or anybody dropping ire fabous

bomb in New York or Washington.

I am going to tell you why a group

of people, including aysel, telleve very strongly that this govern-

ment in extle should be made as soon as possible, and an vell ag

possible. And the fact that if it vere a lait accompll it would

create some drastic changes in die chinking of the State Dejartment

regarding a Cuban Government in äxile.

20.. The beginning of the idea of a government in extle started

at an OAS meeting in lashington in July 1yó4 when Dr. Prio ard Dr.

Marquez Sterling capitalized on tieir personal, old friends:ipa

with the present Secretary o1 Suite of Brazil, Vasco Leltao Da Cunha,

and also the ex-dabassador of Argentina, Jullo Aboedo, to further

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these Ideas. Both the latter had been ambassadors to Cuba during

the rio regine and tbere vere strong tles between thea.

time of this conference in vuly 1964, apparently irlo convinced

Leitao and Amoedo lost the idea of a Cubun Government in Exilo

would be a solution to the Cuban problem. Brazil still had freab

in 1ts wind the horriule scare of going Communist, and Leftoo 18

strongly ants-Commist. He offered Prio a place to gativer in

Brazil for sost of the Cuban leadere (and he knew then all). The

11st of people to be invited to Brazil contained all the top leadora

In exile. I can give you their names but I think 1t vould be just

academic becuuse the yathering did not take place. This proposal

created tremendous excilement among the Cuban exiles and of course

Prio mentioned it as the basis for his enthusiasm in creating a

goverment in exile. Dr. Prio felt that if Brazil, Which 18 tbo

largest nation 11 Latin America, and the most popular with the UB,

especially nou that 1t has a friendly goverament, would recognize

the Cuban Government 1n Exile and give 1t a temporary bome there

that this would persuade the US to cooperate in some day or anothes.

The fact 18 that recently the Brazilian authorities turned down Dr.

Prio, much to his Borroi.

The information I have is that there vere

sobe very strong pressures exerted by the state departmeat on the

Brazilian Governuent against the idea of cooperating with Di. irio

or any of his friends,

in creating a Cuban Governuent in Exile.

Just a leu days ago in Miami, Mi, Leitso told Dr. Prio, and tals

is very rellable inside intoruation, that If he had gone ahead with

the original plans of inviting Prio and other Cubans to Brazil, he

might have lost his job.

21. Incidentally, yesterday I had a very interesting tidult

which I don't know 1s true or not.

Perhaps tovorrow it will be all

academic, but I was told that Prio and Leftao would have one last

secret meeting, in Houston, Texas, where Mrs. Lelto 18 raxing, sobe

kind of medical treatoent. So perhaps this is not cumpletely dead

vet or nayce Leltao bants

to appear as trying to 1n319t sobe bore -

I don't know, but it ia interesting.

22. Anyway, airer the Brazilian turn-down, the klani leadership

bas staggered.

No ose kney what to do next or whom to rali to.

Apparently the Coar leaders felt that unless they had une support

of a latin American country they would not be able to yo arcad vith

their government in calle idea.

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23.

As a result of sobering that happened sure recently, I

have real hopes.

In die issi sex days, perhaps you have heard,

sene bas an unbelierable plebiscite held in Miani first, then in

Los Angeles, and shea li Nes: York and Pucito Rico, in which people

vere just invited dj a comitire of vomen to coDe to certain places

and express theselles on a llitle card on viether they vanted a

sovernment in exile to de forded. Well, the reaction vas un-

believable. I dare out onio suo small announcesents on uy radio

program, and ve had aldost 5000 peoplé come to lullyvood and Vine

on a ratay, cold arternoon to deposit their llttle postcards saying

"He vant a goverinent in exile."

Miami had close to 50 thousand

do the same.

New York had over 50 thousand people. Puerto RIco

bad another 10 or 15 thousand.

In other vords, It was a spontaneous,

jegitimate reaction of the Cuten publie in favor of having sone kind

os an organization to represent them in their exile.

24.

As a result ol this informal plebiscite, we've resolved

In los Angeles to ignore the impasse that had come about in the

lesdership in Minal, to ignore tbe difficulties and complications

and all the things that people told us would be iupossible in

baring a government in exile vithout the support of the US, and go

ahead. And this is the main reason for my visit with you tonight.

The Idea, incidentally, or a fovernment in exile uay raise some

hackles

In the State Departent but from a purely legal point of

view, I feel, and i have no nesson to believe the contrary,

that the

Cubans 1n extie here are not violating any lan of the Us - federal,

state or local -- because what they are doing at this time 1s running

an clection to deterine abe opinion of 200 thousand-300 thousand

people as to whom they think soould take over the leadership of the

exiles.

Until such tine as those elected declare themselves a

government in exile toere would be no conflict vita Us laws.

Perhaps at that tina, once these people are elected and accept

tue election, they can then discuss this point with the State

Department. If the State Departoent tells them that if they declare

Lieuselves a governsent in exile that thej're going to ja1l, then

all they have to do 1s fiod our 1f Costa Rica will take thea, or El

salvador, or Brazil, or whatever. Of course, they and we know that

most of

these countries are strungly dependent upon liS aid and loans,

and so forts, for their operation and there 1s no doubt in my mind

trat 1t 1s 801ng to take a littie persuasion to get a latia American

country to defy che ls and fire thia government in exile a piece of

land and recugaition..

But there 1s un alternative which ve have

considered and this is that these nen who will be elected in this

process do not necessarlly have to declare tenselves a governaent

:.

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In exile. They could declare themselves, to be some kind of a

leadership junta, or a preparatory committee or vintever, to avola

any leyal problems with

the State Departuent of the US.

25. There has been • I belleve I mentioned It before -- a

tremendous amount of floundering by the leaders in Miani after tbe

Brazilian denial of a meeting place in Rio de Janeiro and a group

of us in California, and frankly I have been the prime instigator

1n this, have decided not to valt for the people in Miami, but to

go ahead and start an election in California to see hov it vorks

I con assure you that in the planning of thia whole election

there have been no participantà except a number of us Cubans all

of whom I think are in good faith and who may not be leaders but

are intelligent and well meaning.

So, we decided to start here

1n California where, incidentally, the passlons of politica are not

as vehement.

In Miami, the people are intensc in their political

passions and their brains are clouded.

For instance, about five

or six days ago, I called Dr. Eduardo Suarez Grivas, who is the

pover bebind Prio's political machinery.

All the meetings are held

In his bouse and he is the real brains of this whole thing.

can was a Cuban senator for some 18 years and one of the most active

1n passing good, progressive legislation. I consider hia one of the

most brilliant wen in the political strata of Miami.

for halt ar. hour on the phone, had to let hiu kno's what we were

planning and to ask him lt there was any posalbillty of our endanger-

1ny sowething that would be good for Cuba because, if so, ve wouldn't

Our objective is the liberation of Cuba, 1f our nove here

could possibly upset sowething else, le would refraln. le asted se

to walt a few days because something was going on but I learned from

ocher sources that the situation down there vas alsost chaotic so we're

goiny ahead.

26.

Now, what are we going to do?

Well, this is the story;

ve call it the California Plan.

We are going,

to hold an election

on April 25th -- that's about four weeks froa now roughly -- that

will give us plenty of tiue. The mechanics are these: He will

1nv1te every Cuban in the Los Angeles area to come to one of 15 to

25 predetermined polling places throughout the city and surrounding

areas where we know that there are a nunber of Cubans. We think

that we will be able to use the International Institute on Foyle

Bureet, the CYO building in bast los Angeles,

Including the Bleused Sacravent here 1n Hollywood, a number of

Masonic temples, the Knients of Columbus hall dountown at funnie

Bree and Ninth, and a number of business places. For Instance,

there are about five Cuban restaurants ve will turn into polline

places, a feu stores, shops, and gas stations oned and operated

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Dy Cubans, The polls vill be open fron 0900 to 1500, Sunday,

April 25th.

27. In each polling place there vill be a looselcar register

on uhich the person conisE in to vote will put his name, hio digsa-

ture, hio address e will accept Cuban passports, vuld or not,

telephore, and then his Identification, which

will be checked.

Immigration cards, and driver's licenses, plus whatever otber

We will meet

who have had electoral experience.

They will give us guidance on

hou to do this properly. .

After the person identifies binself and

registero ve will give hin a ballot to park in private. Either

from his nemory, or fros an information sheet avallable he will

vote for a president, a vice-president and for perhaps as Lev 88 15

or as many as 25 members of an advisory council. The number has

not yet been determined. The advisory council would have certain

veto povers over the President, as ve do not want another dictator.

There will be another ares on

the ballot for a regional representa-

tive of each sity that has nore than five thousand Cuban residents.

28. When the people bark their ballots and drop them into tbe

ballot box we will solicit whatever financial help they can afford

to defray this election expense, which u1ll approximate $2,000.

He will try as far as possible to have a former member of the Cuban

judiciary at each polling place, along with one or two members of the

2506th Brigade on guard.

he will try to get the cooperation of the

city in providing us vith police. At 1500 we will seal the ballot

boxes and try to have the city or some similar authority impound

thea so that they will be out of the hands of Cubans until they

are properly counted.

This may be a little shameful but we don't

want anyone in Miami or any place to say that these ebctions were

fraudulent because ve handled the ballots.

29.. To help keep the election clean we will stamp the hand

of the voter with a special ink of the type used at race tracks

and places of amusement.

This ink only shows when put under black

or ultraviolet light.

having ence cast a ballot, they will be unable

to vote again in any other place because they will be marked. That

is one way of keeping it clean.

Eligibles will include every Cuban over 18 or 21 -- we

have not decided the age yet.

We would like to keep as close as

possible to the age provided in the 1940 constitution of Cuba, se

wbatever

the constitution says, that's what we're going to abide by.

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31. To help people's memories we will provide with each ballot

a separate shect containing approximately 100 names with a brief

biography of each person, each of whoa has taken part in various

activities during the six years of exile. They will be frow every

side of the political fence.

If voters vant to have soncone who is

This is a free and in-

dependent popular expression or election, if you want to call it

Perhaps' in about a week or so ve will buy a full-page in

La Opinion (Spanish-language daily in Los Angeles) and explain

the wile procedure. Also, we're going to keep a barrage of radio

announcements going, explaining to the Cuban people the importance

of the election, giving out the names, doing everything possible to

32. Now, this is going to shock many people in New York and

Miams, but we want to shock them because they don't seen to be

doing anything at all. If, between now and the 25th of April,

they get their heads together and do sowething similar, fine.

All we want to do is get the ball rolling. Hopefully, they will

do something similar.

Incidentally, I should mention that we are going to try

exiles, and all the Central American republics.

We're going to try

to encourage elections simultaneously in each of these countries

and in every city of the US.

we will count the bailots that same day.

own elections in the western states on the 25th of April, then we

Will place the sealed ballot boxes in safe-keeping and wait until

che other cities have held their elections and then do the counting

he same day. Otherwise, we might destroy the whole election if we

indicated Celiornia's preferences.

34. Now, let's suppose that the elections have come off

beautifully throughout the whole world, with expressions from

200 to 300 trousand Cubans.

What happens next? Well, those who

ave been elected are going to have to act because they hav

eceived & mandate I am sure they will regard very carefully

I can tell you now that the people elected who do not accept

this mandate had better forget ahout going back to Cuba.

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5 1pr 11 1905

sext sore 10 Uila: Trese peuple are suing to have to decide how they're

going to operate,

and perhaps sei in touch with the US State Department

so determine what 1s and shat is not legal.

perhaps they may have to

Eu to a Central American country, perhapa to Panana, who knous? But

the sost important thing that I want you to know in that ve are going

to subalt to the government of exiies or in exile a master plan for the

liberation of Cuba.

• 35. This master plan 18 siaple and ve belleve strongly in 1t.

Tais government in exile or or exiles would have such tremendous

suthority with the backing of periaps 300 thousand Cubans What 1t

wuld be strong enouga to overcome the fears of the State Department.

We belleve that the American people vould endorse this exercise of

debocracy right in their own yard by people who want to liberate their

on country.

I think that the people of the Us, if properly informed,

would probably want their goverment to belp. I don't think that the

people of the Us would tolerate asy opposition from the State Depart-

Dent unless it could prove that this was bad for the US. Knowing the

influence of American public opinion, we feel that this step will

actually change the thinking of tie people in State who at this time

maj be opposed to this Idea.

36. Now, If we are able to aller the thinking of the State Depart-

ment so that

1t will not oppose wistever Latin American countries may

he disposed to help the exile movement, then we come to the final stage

or our thinking and our reason for creating this government of exiles

in exile. The final stage 1s sinply this. The government of exiles or

in exile, or at least 1ts President and 1ta equivalent of Secretary of

State, perhaps, should visit each. of the heads of government of the

¡'olloving republica: Guatemala, donduras, Nicaragus, El Salvador, Costa

Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, and the free

associated State of Puerto Rico.

The exile group should discuss with

tbe beads of these 10 Caritbean countries a plan for organizing in each

an arty or a brigade which hoperully would be composed of three elements:

Cubars, local citizenry and local cilitary men.

The Cubans of military age would come from all over to get

military training at bases provided in one of these 10 countries.

icink that the Cuban element would number approximately 50 thousand

Cusars of milftary age who would be distributed throughout these 10

Then we would lave the local citizenry, the youth of these

10 countries, who would like to participate in this Army of the Caribbean,

not to fight Castro for the sake of the Cubans, out for their own safety

and for treir own countries. Castro has proven himself a menace to the

interaal security of every country in the Caribbean

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most glaring example. The youngsiers in stese countries, vito a

senue of patriotisu and adventure, saü'd provide another 50 thousand

men to be trained with the cubans in mis rino of steel around the

Carlbbean, Tien, the nost laportes: pes of tais aruy of liberation.

in the Caribbean would be rolunteers to die regular army of eaca

of these countries provided me could rais things out with their own

governments so that they would not lose eiter their citizenship,

position or reputation by reason of rciunteering for this aruy of

38. Now come the big questions -- bo 1s going to pay for all

Who is soing to supply the amritiont

Or the military hard-

ware? Or the armada necessary for sa iarasion of Cuba by an army

that may have between 150 thousand asi all thousand men. le believe

that the Cuban Government of exiles or in exile can make arrangements

with each o: these countries to provide tases, military facilities,

raining areas, military advisors, fool, and housing for toat part

liberation force in that counter. If one or another country

is not financially able to do this I se sure tiat once the army

begins to form, the bases working and ste tralcing started, there

would be a nove throughout all of Aberica, sorth, central and south,

to raise funds for Cuba's liberation. I'a sure that millions would

be arallable.

39.

The next question is military tanivare. I'm afraid Uncle

Sam, directly or indirectly, is the suit source of supply toat ve

can look to.

He would like to keep uncie san out of any inter-

national involvement and let this be essertially a movement by

Latin Americans for latin American purpises.

Eowever,

there should

be nothing

to keep the US from suppljiro tiese legitimate govern-

ments with

whatever arms they request.

the later, in turn, could

make these arms available to the briggies being trained in each

country.

I believe

the US Government is as saxious to eradicate

Communism from America as 1t 1s fron Souiceast Asis, and certainly,

it can find

a way to supply hardware to scese 10 inter-American

armies within

completely normal inter-orerntent transactions.

There need be no direct contact betwees she US Government and the

Cuban exiles.

40. Once this army is trained there's always the possibility

Castro might be assassinated, or other Apricaa plans might be put

into eperation, or if the Cubans insice c. Cuba do 1t tnemselves,

well, then the

battle is won.

In thai baggy event, we will dis-

santle this operation and return to Cuis.

I don't honestly think that this aruy a liberation will ever have

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land in Cuba as an invading army. I believe that when this army

1s ready to pounce, the people around Castro will tell him they

don't think they should be there any longer.

Then we'll see

either Castro fly out of Cuba or have his lead blown off by bis

own men, nost of whom would rather be heroes of the revolution

and save what they can.

In my opinion, this would end the affair,

but 1f 1t doesn't, then the army of liberation will have to Invade

Cuba and go all-out.

this is the way I see it and this 1s about

the end of 1t.

I thin' I should point out at this stage that the elections

we are preparing are completely different frow the ones conducted

The RECE plan presented a package of five men to the

juban people on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and I think many peopl

resented this. There vere no alternatives. Ours in different. Our

15 & completely blank ballot.

The voter can choose anyone he wants,

even his mother-in-law. So I think the people will react favorably.

42.

I think before ending I would like you to hear the worde

of Dean Rusk when he spoke at a Los Angeles World Affairs Council

luncheon at the Beverly Hilton Hotel on Sept. 18, 1964. I asked

him from the floor 1f the State Department was grooming RECE fOr a

governsent in exile. At that time I really thought this was happen-

Ing since RECE people had been so secretive about their activities

In Washington. Rusk said,

"Well, I don't want to probe the future unduly

In this current situation but there are some tough

problems about s government in exile that we sbould

keep in mind.

considerable nuber of divergent groups, and my under-

standing 1s that they have not yet been able to come

together with the degree of solidarity that would

speak with authority on such a point. Then one must

bear in mind also the attitude of the people who

remain in Cuba and what their attitude toward such

leaders might be.

Nor what would be their role to

play in any luture development on the island. Third,

I would like to emphasize that it is of the greatest

importance to us to deal with the Cuban question on

as broad a hemispheric basic as possible.

We made

great strides in the last year or two in soving in

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that direction, I've already coubented on tsat

earlier today.

And there 10 considerable suspicion,

frankly, throughout latin America about things called

governbents in exile. Of course, far i'nos the Cuban

question, this idea appears to many of us to le an

instrubent which night lend itself to intimations

of other sorts and other places at other times.

And so there's cunsiderable sensitivity about

governments in exile in the hewisphere. I per-

sonally vould not think there would be great

advantage in our recogalzing & government in

exile if ve vere the only ones to do so."

*3. These are the words of Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,

regarding governments in exile in general and a Cuban goverament

In exile, in particular.

As we can see, the Secretary of State

does not express ideas that are contrary to those le have expressed

In this conversation we've had today with you, There are several

points in Dean Rusk's conversation that lead se to think that 1f

the Cuban government in exile 1s prepared in accordance with the

plan of elections ve have outlined earler, there is & very atrong

possibility that the State Department would change its present

attitude and not only accept the possibility of s government in

exile but even recognize it under the proper circusstances. If

seven, or eight, or 10 nations, in the Caribbean of Argentina

and Brazil decide to recognize

this governaent, there!s no reason

why the State Departuent could not change its present negative

attitude.

44. Naturally, there are many questions left unanswered in

this conversation but I would be very happy to answer any further

questions that you or the people that are associated with you may

have.

Before I finish I just wunt to express sy strong feelings

that the cause of the Cuban exiles and the security of the US are

parallel, although there might be some divergent points in procedure

of International consequences. But I am going ahead with this elec-

tion in California with the hope that it will help create & Cuban

government of exiles or in exile, whichever 1s the final wording,

and it will'be for the future security of this country, se well as

the liberation of Cuba.

With these words, I sould like to close .

this chat and thank you for your attertion.

Ci: 16 :

Do not fail to see para, 5 thru 8 of accoupanying demo. ]

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