INTERVIEW WITH JAMES J. ANGELTON
Originator: HSCA
Document date: 00/00/1978
Document type: AUDIOCASSETTE

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180-10147-10332

• 3=

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

Agency Information

10/19/20

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

HSCA

180-10110-10006

RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

014720

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

HSCA

FROM:

[Restricted]

TO :

TITLE :

[Restricted]

DATE: 10/05/1978

PAGES:

169

SUBJECTS :

CIA, ASSOCIATION WITH OSWALD

CIA, FILES

[Restricted]

MEXICO CITY

CIA, METHODOLOGY

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Includes notes about CIA documents on Oswald and two duplicates of testimony in next two

folders.Box 3.

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ANGLETON DEPOSITION

CIA DOCUMENTS

#1904

CUBAN CONNECTION (W/ BELIND

1934

CUBAN CONNECTION (WY BEUNN)

1963

TELEPMONE TRANSCRIPT 101,163 (OSUALD I KOSTIKON)

1999

COLERAN - SLAWSON MEMO ABOUT O, BENG OBSERVES IN

DEE DE SOU.!MILITARY ATTACHE IN MEXICO UTY

1977

TELEGRAM FROM MEXICO GESTION RE: PNOTOGRAPIC

COVERAGE

2008

1/31/64 RE: O'S CONTACT IN MEXICO CITI

177

DESCRIPTION OF AMERICAN MALE ENTERING SOU. EMB.

21033

1/23/64. BY DOULEY RE: REPRODUCINE MEMM PHOTO IN

WC. REPORT

179

HO RESPONSE TO MEXICO STATION 10/10/63 MY CORRECT

DEse UF o

2144

CABLE 12/20/63. B7 WHITTEN RE: WITNNOLOINE INO

ON ThE TAS

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#197

205

123/63 CABLE FROM MEXICO STATION TO N

CATION UNABLE tO COMPARE U'S vIL

1/23/63 CABLE FROM MEX CITY TO DIR: 5A74 O 'S

LAME PERSON WINO CALLEO SOU. GU PRIOR TO

10/1/63.

248

"/27/63 MEMO TO PAPICH: THAT THERE WAS CONTINOUS

PHOTO COVERDOE

1879

5/5/64 THAT O WAS IN CONTACT WI CALDERON,

PEREZ, RODRIGUEZ

1892

ALLEGATION THAT CALDERON WAS CONNECTED WU/ CA

1990

5/5/64 DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS FOR ANUE

1898

5/6/64 FOLION QUES FOR AMMUG

184.

5/8/64 SWENSON'S SUMMARM OF MEETING MY AMMUE

1929-30

TRANGITDEL OF AMMUG INFO TO MC

1937-33

ACTUAL INFO PROVIDED BY AMMUB: NO REE TO GUDERON

1907

5/14/64 BRIEF FOR PRESENTATION TO COMMISSION

1906

ANGLETON ON TRANSMITEAL OF INFO TO LUC

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1950-54

5/23/75

ISSUE OF CALDERON'S ROSSIBLE FOREKNONLESOE

1928

MATERIAL FROM MEXICO STATION SNOON TO LE

NO REF TO GALDERON

1977

CABLE: MANN WANTES CLOTRON ARRESTED

2089

CALDERON, ET AL: REQUEST THAT NO ACTION BE

JACEN WhO AGENCE CLEARANCE

2020

11/26/63 CABLE: D A ARNESTO RODRIGUEZ

1957-59

ELENA DE PAZ ALLEGATION

2055

(4/5/647 POSBISILITY OR KOB TRAINE SCHOOL IN

MINSK

796

10/31/59. SEATE DENT DUE DU O. ATTEMPTINO TO RE-

NOUNCE CITIZENSHIP

w.c.1917

NAVAL MESSAGE: THAt O. DEFERED tO FURNISH RUDAR.

SECRETS TO SOVIETS

943

OSWALO FILE CARDS.

2139

*

3/5/64 ANGLETON ON TRANGMITTAL DE MATERIALS TO LUC

2138

5/12/64 ANGLETON TO ROCCA

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SECRET

Stenographic Transcript Of

HEARINGS

Before The

SUBCOMMITTEE ON JOHN F. KENNEDY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ASSASSINATION OF JOHN E. KENNEDY

014720

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Washington.D.C.

October 5, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

Official Reposters

300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.

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WWEO6

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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House of Representatives

Select Committee on Assassinations

Subcommittee on John F. Kennedy

TESTIMONY OF:

Mr. James Angleton

Washington, D. C.

October 5,1978

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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

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U. S. House of Representatives,

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

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JAMES ANGLETON

called for examination by staff counsel for the Subcommittee,

pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on

Assassinations, House Office Building Annex II, Room 3369, .

Second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning|

at 10:00 o'clock a.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary

Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present

on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, Staff Counsel

SURELI BRADY, Staff Counsel

CHARLES BERK, Staff Counsel

MARGO JACKSON, Researcher

For the Deponent:

WALLACE DUNCAN and PHILIP I. CHABOT, JR.

of the firm of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg & Palmer, P.C.,

1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.., Washington, D.C. 20006

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PROCEEDINGS

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Miss Brady. Let the record reflect that present this

morning

for the deposition is the witness, Hames Angleton, who!

has been administered an oath by the reporter, Albert Joseph

LaFrance emplowered under the laws of the District of Columbia

to administer oaths.

Present for the deposition is Miss Surell Brady, counsel

for the Select Committee on Assassinations, Michael Goldsmith,

also counsel for the Select Committee on Assassinations,

and Margo Jackson, Research for the Select Committee on

Assassinations.

At this time, will counsel for Mr. Angleton identify

themselves?

Mr. Duncan. Wallace Duncan of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg

and Palmer, and Philip I. Chabot of the same firm.

Miss Brady. Let the record reflect that I have been

designated by the Select Committee on Assassinations of the

House of Representatives, pursuant to House

Resolution 222 and

Committee Rule 4to depose withnesses for the Committee.

Mr. Angleton, is this correct that you are appearing here.

voluntarily?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Miss Brady. You have been advised of your right to

counsel and have selected counsel of your choice, is that

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correct?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but I would like to explain later why

I chose counsel.

Miss Brady.

You may do so at this time, if you wish.

Mr. Angleton. I chose counsel simply because of the

surprise witness John Hart, that I was not notified in advance

of his appearance either by the Agency or by the Committee.

It seemed to me that lack of notification of a surprise witness

of this sort changed the whole context of what I regard this

inquiry to be. Therefore, having had the experience with the

Church Committee and not having had counsel in giving deposi-

tions and all of that and not having the right of discovery

during the course of the Church Committee hearings you might

say I learned a lesson.

Miss Brady. Your comments will be noted in the record.

Mr. Angleton, at this time, are you under any restriction

or privilege that would prevent you from answering all ques-

tions fully and accurately and without any intent to withhold

information?

Mr. Angleton. As far as I know, if I understand the

correspondence between the Chairman of the Committee and

Admiral Turner, CIA, there are no restrictions although the

cover letter signed by the Deputy Director Carlucci stated

if I had any question I was to refer them to Mr. Breckinridge.

Miss Brady.

Have you consulted with Mr. Breckinridge

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or the Agency about your appearance today?

Mr. Angleton. I consulted with him as to certain docu-

ments which I wish to see as it affected Mr. Hart,'s appearance.

That was the General Counsel's office through my attorneys.

Miss Brady. Have you also been provided with a copy of

the Committee's Rules and have you and your attorney had time

to peruse those rules?

Mr. Angleton. I haven't perursed them but I don't need

to. Iread them sometime ago. I have not really seen them for

the last month:

Mr. Duncan. His counsel are familiar with the rules.

Miss Brady.

Mr. Angleton, also the Committee Rules

provide that at the'end of the deposition the witness may be

furnished a copy of that transcript. As you are aware, much

of the information you will be dealing with this morning will

contain classified information to some extent. We are asking

if you will waive your right to have an actual copy of the

transcript but of course it will be available to you and your

attorneys at the Committee for your views.

Mr. Angleton. Can I reserve until we finish this session

as to whether I want a transcript or not?

Miss Brady. Certainly.

MI. Angleton. Since I don't know what we are going to go

into.

Miss Brady.

That is fine.

A22007

phone

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Mr. Angleton, first I would like to go into the background

of the Nosenko case.. Can

you tell me what position you held

with the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961?

Mr. Angleton.

I was Chief of Counterintelligence.

Miss Brady.

When did you first become involved in the

Nosenko case?

Mr. Angleton. I can't give you the exact dates but it

was when the first telegram arrived from Geneva that he had

contacted our people through an American diplomat.

Miss Brady.

Which individual in Geneva did Mr. Nosenko

first contact in 1962?

Mr. Angleton. It was David - the name will come back -

David somebody in the State Department who had previously been

stationed in Moscow.

Miss Brady. Do you know what the person's assignment

was?

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Mr. Angleton. He was a part of the American delegation.

You mean the person being the American diplomat? He was a

member of the American delegation to the UN Conference or

whatever it was.

Miss Brady. In Geneva?

Mr. Agleton. In Geneva.

Miss Brady. When did word of Nosenko's first contact

first reach the Counterintelligence Staff at Headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. Almost immediately.

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Miss Brady.

Through whom was that communication made?

MI. Angleton. Through the Agency.

Miss Brady.

Was that through a cable of what type of

communication.

Mr. Angleton. Telegram.

Miss Brady. Which division within the Agency was respon-

sible for the case at the time of the first contact?

Mx. Angleton. The Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. What was the role of the Counterintelligence

Staff?

Mr. Angleton. The Counterintelligence Staff is the

principal counterintelligence advisor to the Director.

Miss Brady. Was it normal for Counterintelligence to

handle defectors? Had they handled any defectors previously?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, we had handled a Hay Hannen, who

had been previously handled by others unsuccessfully and had

been turned over to Counterintelligence Staff and it was

through him that Colonel Abel was apprehended.

Miss Brady. Was it normal procedure then

for the defector

cases to initially go through the Soviet Division and only to

Counterintelligence if problems developed? Was that the

procedure?

Mr. Angleton. No, there is no proecedure. It is a ques-

tion of precisely how the

évents transpire. I can take up much

more in detail when we come to the person to whom Hart referred

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to as "X". But in short, we did not have jurisdiction over

Nosenko, then or any other time.

Miss Brady. What role were you playing? WEre you in a

consulting role at that time? How was information about the

case disseminated to you individually?

Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual in cases that dealt

with Soviet intelligence that copies of the telegram would be

sent to us automatically.

Miss Brady. What action was taken by the Agency after

Nosenko was first contacted?

Mr. Angleton. There was no action taken.

There was

great excitement. The first thing that one does in those

cases is to begin to run tracers against the registry and

files to see if there is any previous knowledge of the indi-

vidual.

Second was to consider the information which he submitted

in terms of file and tracers.

Miss Brady. What significant information was provided by

Nosenko at that time of the first contact?

Mr. Angleton. I have not seen those telegrams, I might

add, for several years but one of the more astonishing pieces

of information which he gave was to the effect that a Soviet

by the name of Belitsky, who was in contact with the Agency

was in fact a plant. He gave the name of our case officers

quite accurately who were handling Blitsky. He stated that

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Belitsky was an agent of the Department of Disinformation.

Miss Brady.

Within the KGB?

Mr. Angleton. Within the KGB.

Miss Brady. Was that the first allegation you had of a

serious Soviet penetration by the KGB?

Mr. Angleton. From whom? I am afraid I don't understand

your question.

Miss Brady. Was that the first information you had had

either through your own intelligence or through any other

Soviet defector of a possible serious Soviet penetration?

Mr. Angleton. We had had hundreds of them, allegations.

Miss Brady. How would you characterize this allegation

by Nosenko.

Was it more serious? Was it more substantive?

Mr. Angleton. The facts were, to explain this - it is

a complex case, as you will find out all of these cases are,

they cannot be simply explained in a few words - Belitsky

was a person connected with the media in the Soviet Union who

traveled extensively in the West and who had in fact attempted

in our view to be recruited by another allied intelligence

service. Eventually he fell into the hands of the CIA or the

Soviet Division who believed that they had made a firm recruit-

ment of this individual and therefore, for a great period of

time, I don't know how many years, they were in fact running

him as an agent.

He would travel to and from Moscow to the West. Therefore,

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from that point of view, to have it declared that their

case officers whose names were given accurately by Nosenko,

were in contact with a control agent of the KGB, particularly

the Department of Disinformation, they regarded that as an

enormous discovery. But when we got that trace and began to

analyze it we found the following:

Miss Brady. Excuse me.

When you say we are you refer-

ring to Counterintelligence?

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about Counterintelligence.

We found that the Foreign Service, whose favor Belitsky

had curried at one time, had put him under surveillance and

a number of other things while he was in their capitol. They

came to the conclusion that he was in fact what we would call

coat dragging, he was

trying to be recruited.

Therefore,

they wouldn't have anything to do with him on the grounds

that he was a suspected plant. So that was found in the files.

Second, we had information - I will put

it another way

- when we had "x" in a safe house there was some kind of

entry made into his personal papers and we found, not the

Counterintelligence but either the Office of Security or the

Soviet Division found, on some notes that he had made

apparently he was jotting down things to talk about -- and on

that he had the name Belitsky; in other words, the files showed

that had any analyst gone to Belitsky and so on that this was

not startling news becasue here was, number one, a Foreign

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service two or three years prior to that having given us a

full report on Belitsky as a suspected provocateur.

At the same time, we had in our possesion information

from

"X" that

Litsky was a plant.

Miss Brady. Based on that information, what conclusions

were you able to draw from Nosenko in terms of his giving this

information as a startling revelation?

MI. Angleton. We drew no conclusions. I gave you only

one piece of information that I can recall. It stands out

because he also gave, I believe, the alias of Belitsky.

Now, I would like to have seen the telegrams that came in at

that period because when he had met our people there, Bagley

and whoever it was, he had made the statement that he would

only give them three or four pieces of information in return

for about $200 or so, and that was a one time affair. That

was his original approach, and he needed that money in order

to make up for a deficit of what he had been using in drinking.

So, he gave other pieces of information, which may come

back to my memory, but at the moment, as I recall, they were

not the most startling in the world. Nevertheless, that is not

the basic point. The basic point was that the information

which I have just described on Belitsky would have made an

enormous impact on someone in Bagley's position if he was

unaware of the file checks.

Miss Brady. YOu

have mentioned

the testimony of John

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Hart.

I take it therefore you are familiar with the transcript

of that testimony?

MI. Angleton. I am indeed.

Miss Brady. Are you also familiar with Mr. Hart's alle-

gations or assertions that

at the time of Nosenko's first

interviews in Geneva, in an effort to sooth himself and calm

himself he had been drinking heavily and admitted later to :

case officers he was drunk in the earlier interigation?

Mr. Angleton. I am familiar with it and I regard it

as part and parcel of the Hart myth.

Miss Brady. What other information do you have on that

bearing on what the condition of Hart was at the time of the

first interviews?

Mr. Angleton. I happen to know that there was some

drinking being done. My own feeling is that the CIA people

were doing as much, if not more, drinking than Nosenko.

Miss Brady. Were there ever any reports, telegrams or

other type of information from those persons interviewing

him that he was in fact drunk.

MI. Angleton. There may have been some description,

oprational description, that he had been in some bars or

something of that sort. There may have been. You see, I have

to say to you that for many years, after I left the Agency, I

have not left Counterintelligence. So, I see my friends and

we still go over a lot of the same points and so on because we

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have this unhappy choice of leadership in the Counterintelli-

gence and in the Agency.

So that when I make some of these comments they are com-

ments that may not have been known to me at the time of my

activity but which I have learned subsequently.

Miss Brady. Is your lasting impression of Nosenko's first

contact that he was unstable or in any way unable to give

accurate information?

Mr. Angleton. If you have been 31 years in Counterintel-

ligence you don't draw any kind of inference at all. Conclu-

sions are the last thing you make based on a one time walk-in

who is only asking for $200.

There is a certain unreal air, to begin with, that a man

whose father was a Minister of the Soviet. Union, to whom they

had erected a statue as a hero of the soviet Union, would have

degenerated to the point that he would be willing to betray

his country for $200 in exchange for four pieces of informa-

tion.

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In other words, there is an unreal aspeet to that which

is illogical because he knows the trade, he could have asked

for several thousands of dollars for one piece of information,

if he liked to drink and have girlfriends and all that type

of thing, the thing simply doesn't jibe.

Miss Brady. What other factors about the circumstancas

of his contact would you say had an air of unreality?

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Mr. Angleton. Because he alleged to be from the Second

Chief Directorate and the primary concerns of the Second Chief

Directorate of the KGB are domestic, the same as the FBI.

Therefore, if he was going to be in Geneva it was illogical

up to a certain extent' because there is what is called the

"SK" or the security part of the First Chief Directorate, CIA

part, who would normally be occupying that position.

Miss Brady. At that time was Nosenko challenged or

questioned about any of these circumstances about his contact?

Mr. Angleton. I think in all honesty that Pete Bagley

was so taken up by the Belitsky and other leads, other

information imparted, that his basic concern was to break

down

this man or at least to induce this man to remain in contact

with a view to future recruitment; therefore not to get three

or four pieces of information but to get a lot of information

and to offer him all kinds of inducements so that there would

be a permanent relationship.

But in this sense it stood to mason that if a man was

prepared to sell himself for $300 or $200 or whatnot, that you

would have leverage over him in the ultimate if you desired

use such leverage, that he would have no options but to work

for you.

Miss Brady.

Was

Bagley the case officer assigned to

Nosenko at that time?

Mr. Angleton. He was stationed in Switzerland and he was

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a good Soviet expert.

Miss Brady. Within the Soviet Division?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether he depended directly

on them or whehher he dependhd on the Western European Divi-

sion, but he knew several languages and had studied in Geneva

and was a part of our mission.

Miss Brady. Was any of the information or lead provided

by Nosenko at that time given to another source to evaluate?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.

When Pete came

back, I permitted him to read hundreds and hundreds of pages

of transcript from "X".

Miss Brady. At this time could we identify "X" for the

record?

Mr Angleton. Anatole Golitzen. I can't give you dates.

or anything but he was absolutely shocked when he read this

information.

Miss Brady. What was the basis for his surprise or shock?

Mr. Angleton. Because he was unaware of it. Now, I

night add, we have one missing point here. Before he came

back I had

sent a long telegram, a questionnaire, to Geneva,

for which I drew heavily upon "X's" information, because, to

use a word I sort of invented in the business and I don't like

to have folks around know where it came from but I al-ays

believed in using "Iitmus paper", in other words, having a

fact not known, that the other side does not know we know.

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So that in the course of elicitation that thing is exposed

to an individual and he is unaware of the fact that we do know!

the whole story, say, on that particular matter.

Now, if he is in a position where he had had access and

knows that and withholds it from you, it is an indicator;

because, after all, a defection is a change of allegiance.

Further than that, a person who defects has to transfer his

sense of security and everyting to the other people. He has

to tell you about penetrations in your organization and all of

the troubles of your organization in his own defense because

he could be assassinated by somebody within your own organiza-

tion. Therefore, it is in his self interest to expose every-

thing.

So that this was a very long telegram, which I again have

not seen since practically that day, you might say, in which

I spent many hours pulling together those questions for them

to submit to Nosenko. To

this day I don't know whether those

questions were submitted. I can't recall them. I mean,

whether he left before they got the telegram of not, I don't

know.

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But I did not tell them that it came from "X", as I

recall.. It only simply stated as a follow-up in his position

as Second Chief Directorate "will you please take up

the following names" There was no explanation. "Will you

take this up.

Have you ever heard of this? Have you ever

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hard of that." And so on.

I can't recall, there may have been responses in all of

that. In my time frame it is all telescoped down to Pete's

return. So, to go back to your question as to whether this

was taken up with any other source, hte logical thought that

occurred to me was that since Golitzen was the first defector

who had ever given us in any department had the order of

battle of the Second Chief Directorate, that he would be the

logical man to turn to for evaluation.

This was put up to Mr. Helms and Mr. Helms -- the deci-

sion was that he would nev. er wish to disclose the name or

circimstances of the fact that we had been approached at that

given time and moment by this defector. So we resorted to

another device, and we took a page out of the chapter of the

operation in which for some months, if not years, a member of

the Eastern Bloc intelligence communicated to us through an

Embassy anonymously, and therefore we took the information,

basic information, thhat was given by Nosenko and we disguised

it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to us, and we

showed that anonymous letter to Golitzin, who read the infor-

mation and who stated this is disinformation, this is a provo-

cation.

Miss. Brady.

What was Golitzin's status with the Agency

at that time?

MI. Angleton. His status with the Agency was a defector

POET

Es since it a de

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who had supplied several thousands of pages of very hard core

information which had resulted in perhaps the most major

counterespionage cases in this country, I mean in the whole

Western world.

Miss Brady. At the time of Golitzin's defection, did he

give any indication of what he expected the KGB reaction to

be to his defection?

Mr. Angleton.

Exactly. He said that when he defected

- I mean at some given stage, and again I can't tell you the

exact dates on this -- let me put it this way: He defected

in Helsinki. We sent him on to Sweden and put him on an air-

plane with his wife and child with a view of a direct flight

to the United States. Either through bad

weather or for

reasons I do not know his plane

was diverted to Germany.

He

had warned our man in Helsinki that there was a penetration of

the Agency.

Miss Brady. Was he able to identify it any more than

that?

Mr. Angleton. No, he just said "you have to be very

careful how you treat my information because there is a pene-

tration."

Now, our station man in my view committed a terrible

error in giving a very brief, excitable summary of the infor-

mation disclosed by Golitzin which he was able to derive in

that short period of time. He included this allegation of

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penetration wheras anyone more mature would know that you do

not send that type of information through a cable where dozens

of copies are going to be made and disseminated to various

desks. It is the type of thing that you would have almost

traveled home with the agent and reported to the Director.

But that was not done and it was paragraph 7 in the cable that

had this statement that the source states we must be extremely

careful and he is fearful because there is a penetration in

the Agency.

So, that was ll that he told our man. He gave him a

warning in order for him to be careful and how he handled

whatever he did send back about him.

As I recall, Golitzin was supposed to have met a delega-

tion coming in from Moscow at the airport at the time we were

putting him on the plane and sending him on to Stockholm, so

we knew the alarm would

be immediate. So, when the plane

was diverted - and I might also add that I don't think his

wife and child had ever flown before or anything but they

terribly ill, and I don't think she knew anything about

the defection until about the last minute, and she had

relatives

behind in the Soviet Union, so there were a lot of

emotional problems - so when the plane was diverted to

Germany his suspicions were immediately that something was up

and therefore he began to fear for himself, because this was

not in accordance with the understanding. It was supposed to

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be a direct flight to the United States.

Therefore, when he arrived in Germany he did what he

would not have dore under other circumstance. He warned our

people in Germany that the agent to which he was referring

about the penetration had operated in Germany. Since the

person was a Russian speaker and of Russian origin, in fact

born in Russia, it would be logical that the Agency would put

him in contact or use as a handle that very man who could

assassinate him since he was one of the number one Russian

experts.

Not knowing this at all, he had all the suspicions in the

world of that diversion. So, it entailed his disclosing to us

or to the German station a great deal of information regarding

that agent.

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Miss Brady. Did he indentify the agent?

Mr. Angleton. Only by cryptonym.

Miss Brady®

What was the cryptonym.

Mr. Angleton. Sasha, S-a-s-h-a.

Miss Brady. Was the agency able through that cryptonym

to actually identify that person?

Mr. Angleton.

Eventually. I will go into that if you

would like.

Miss Brady. All right.

Mr. Angleton. First I want to get him back to the United!

Statea. He is stranded here in Germany.

So, he arrived with his family and was put up in a safe-

house.

In the meantime the very night that some of these

cables came in, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division was

Mr. Howard Osborn, later our Director of Security, and he came

rushing to my home with the telegram that had arrived at night,

as I recall, therefore he got in touch with me. We spent some!

time discussing it with a view of implications and all those

things you want to have in mind before the opening of business

next day.

I will now digress on Sasha. Under the charter or under

the regulations of the Agency all matters dealing with CIA

personnel are strictly jurisdictional matters of the Director

of security. In other words, the security investigations of

personnel, their security files as distinguished from personnel

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files, the polygraph, the investigations of applicants, the

periodic reexamination of personnel, the periodic repoly-

graphing of personnel, allegations regarding personnel,

employees, et cetera, are strictly within the sole jurisdic-

tion of the Director of Security. That also includes physical

installations and so on.

So that they would be obviously the first party to whom!

one would turn with an allegation regarding penetration and they

would have under all circumstances the right of direct contact.

with the source because they alone would ha ve the files from

which they could analyze gathered information for interroga-

tion and followup, et cetera, description or any small item of

information that might lead to identification.

Now Golitzen's story basically was this that he had

been on the Emigre Desk in the First Chief Directorate of

Soviet Intelligence and the file of this agent, Sasha, had

been transferred at a given time, I think it was 1951 or therer

abouts, had been transferred to the American Department and

that he had a chance to look at that file and they knew that

the individual's name ended in "insky" or something of that

sort, and that agent had come back into Russia at one stage

while in Germany to see his parents.

Miss Brady. What do you mean by coming back?

Mr. Angleton. That means that unbeknownst to anybody,

say, he might have walked down a street in Berlin, walked

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in a house, out the back entrance, changed clothes, identity,

disguise or what not, been put on a plane, flown there, and then

redeposited in west Berlin, and no one would ever have known

that he spent a week in Moscow. In other words, he had a cover

story that he was

on vacation or sick and so on. It means any

kind of covered travel, covert travel.

So that the

Security Office interrogated him at tre-

mendous length. We were privy to much of this information.

Therefore, it was the duty of the Security Office to delve

into all personnel files and all security files of all employees,

past and present, to try to come up with somebody who fit the

puzzle because there were enough indicators. They came: up

with the name of

an individual, and they were fairly certain

that

they had made an identification because he had asked them

"Give me all the names of the personnel whose names end in

'insky' and I will go through all those names and it may strike

me," because after all 10 years had passed since he had seen

that file. He had seen it illegally as it was transferred fron

one department to another. But this told us something. This

told us that if we had been really sharp that while the man

was on the Emigre Desk, his file was on the Emigre Desk, he

was an agent in the emigration movement, but when his file

was transferred to the American Desk, then it means that his

status must have changed, which in fact had happened. The

actual Sasha had worked as

a penetration agent of Russian

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emigre groups. During the course of that employment sought

out the CIA and gave the CIA information betraying the emigre

groups and built himself up with the CIA people in Germany to

a point where they recruited him as an agent.

So he ceased to be a man working on emigres and he was

transferred to the American Department. That coincides pre-

cisely with the career of Sash when he is finally identified.

But this terrible blunder was made that they omitted from this

list real Sasha.

Miss Brady. How was that possible?

Mr. Angleton. You would have to ask the Office of

Security.

So they go down there, and of all the names he says,

"This is the closest that I can come to it," and it so happened

that the person that he pointed out was a person who had been

OSS and who did have relatives in Russia and who had changed

his name but his original family name did end in "insky."

This

was true because among the information that "X" had given us,

he had taken

actual documents out of the embassy in Helsinki,

Soviet documents, we had a very sophisticated research and

development program of an electronic device by which we could

shoot a beam against a windowpane and turn the windowpane:

into a receiver so you could listen to conversations within

room.

There was a communication from Moscow to Helsinki

and it appeared to be a general communication to all stations

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and it stated "beware of this kind of CIA-FBI gadget."

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Then it went on even to describe that so many had been

ordered by the FBI and so man y by the CIA and so on and so on.

Now this was not the kind of thing that a desk officer

5

I mean this was not giving away anything other than it showed

that they knew in fact about one of the most secret things

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we had. So it did not lead you anywhere by having that docu-

ment. But the man who was wrongly suspected was the secretary

"of our technical production board of which I was the oldest

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member, who therefore sat in as the secretary in all our

meetings in which all the sophisticated research and develop-

ment was discussed. If you looked at it with this mistaken

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"insky" business, he conformed to a "y" with an individual

who could have supplied that basic information embodied in

i$

that document taken out by "x."

Miss Brady. How long from the time of the first "insky"

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information by Golitzen was it until you resolved which person

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I you were actually talking about?

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Mr. Angleton. It took a very long time because finally

they cameup with the "insky." We had some very curious things

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about the "insky.". Number one, he has been described and

downplayed by everybody as only being "a contract agent." If

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there is anything that has disgusted me throughout my career

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it has been from the time of the Colby period up to the present

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with a brief respite during the time of Director Burke, who

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I think was really putting the Agency, after all the travails

and so on, back on course.

I mean he had gained the respect

of foreign intelligence chiefs.

He had sensitivity to what

intelligence was about, the personnel. He was making strikes

trying to bring back some luster to CIA after the Church Com-

mittee. But nothing has disgusted me as it has from the colby

period all the way on through in what I regard as destroying

a profession.

This present director gives me no confidence whatsoever

both in terms of his firing of employees, the falsity of the

justification, putting out that they had to get rid of people

because we had overrecruited during Vietnam was the

official

statement, things of this sort. There is no truth to these

matters.

We did not recruit during Vietnam. Every component

of the Agency had to supply X percentage of their own personnel

to be directed to Vietnam. I had to give up & percentage of

my people for tours of duty. It was compulsory. So that

everyone went through this agony of taking people with families

and what not and deciding which man you were going to choose

to send to Vietnam.

And we had troubles, the Agency had troubles because you

had all kinds of hardship problems come up. You had all kinds

of things and at one

stage the idea was that if a person did

not go when he was told, that then he would be separated from

theAgency, and that was

regarded as too harsh and so on. It

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was a very dre-dful period. So that these so-called alle-

gations on the firing and so on are just simply not true.

While I am on the firings, I might also state that any

of us who regard ourselves as professionals knew many of the men

who were fired. But Turner didn't know any of them then.

Some

of the finest men were fired. This goes back because Colby

had salted the place with his personnel os that they remained

on a long time after his departure in very prominent positions

such as the head of the Clandestine Service, the Deputy Head

of the Clandestine Service, and so on and even into the Bush

period.

Hart was one of Colby's men from the Far East Division.

I was astonished to read the statement. that he was supposed

to be an expert because Hart's first job that I think he

ever had in the Agency was under me as a very junior employee

Italy.

Miss Brady. I know you want to go into some detail ---

Mr. Angleton. I am saying my strong views on the kinds

of distortions and self delusions that have gone on when it

came to the identification in fact of the true Sasha, of

trying to brush him off as a minor contract employee when in

fact in Germany he was in the most influential positions of

recruiting agents that we would sent into the Soviet Union.

In other words, we would sent 10 people from Berlin but all

of those people were identified by Sasha to the Soviets and

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all of them were put under control. So that the rot set in.

In other words; from a esponage point of view the moment

that the opposition knows one of your agents who is in contact

with another, and then unbeknownst, it is not long in a police

state before identification of the entire net is ascertained.

Being Russian, he worked in a very influential position in the

actual operations that had to do with penetration, I mean

with recruitment of Soviets for the purpose of espionage in the

Soviet Union.

Miss Brady. When roughly was Sasha identified as the per

son that Golitzen mentioned?

Mr. Angleton. I can't be precise on this but I would

say around: '53, '64. It became

more and more - we found,

for example, that shortly after Golitzen's telegram that was

given wide dissemination from Helsinki to the effect that there

was a penetration, we found a letter, which may have been pre

dated, of Sash writing a letter denouncing a member of the

Soviet Division as a Soviet agent, and this man's nickname

was Sasha.

Miss Brady. The man being denounced by Sasha had a:

nickname Sasha?

Mr. Angleton. His name was Alexander and the nickname

of Alexander is Sasha.

In all of his duties while he was in Germany Sasha's

superior was the man he denounced. He stated that if the

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Agency did not do anything about Sasha that he would go to the

Attorney General. It was not too long after that he resigned

from the Agency.

Miss Brady. Which, the superior or the -

Mr. Angleton. The real Sasha. In other words, the man

he was denounced, but in all of his dealings with him in Ger-

many as subordinate never referred to him as Sasha. he refer-

red to him as Alexander or by his last name.

so that is a very important point in terms of either, one,

the Soviets notifying him that in their damage report they

knew that Golitzen had seen the file on him, which was

entitled "Sasha," and the question then is, which we don't know

because he has never been broken, as to why it is that we have hi?

him denouncing a man whose nickname is Sash, known to everybody

as Sasha?

Miss Brady. Wws there ever any evidence that the superior

named Sasha had in fact been an agent of theSoviet?

MI. Angleton. No, but the sort of man that had been so

much dealing in this kind of affairs, knew so many Soviets and

was so exposed to to speak, and served in the field so long

in Germany and all that, that it was not beyond the realm of

imagination wen you had such an allegation, that one might

have been diverted to him, being tied up for months and

months believing that he was the person to whom Golitzen

was referring.

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Now let me explain to you that Golitzen stated what the

Soviet reaction to his defection would be because this is very

important to us to have a member of that organization describe

to us, what we had to watch out for, and therefore since he

knew the inner workings of the organization because he had

served at a time when other people had "defected," he had been

on the Far East Desk when a Soviet officer was going to defect

to the Briths and the British had a Soviet agent penetration

in their organization who informed the KGB and this was a man

who was going to defect in Japan and from KGB or "GRU, " it

may have been the military intelligence, he was going to defect

to the British.

The British official: in the field cabled London about

this would-be defector he was going to meet and all that and none

other than George Blake was the recipient of that telegram.

Hẹ

went to his Soviet control and the Soviets kidnapped this indi

vidual and brought him back to Russia and Golitzen was on the

Far East Desk handling that case. So we are dealing with an

expert therefore on what you do when you have defectors.

So, Golitzen told us that the first stage would be that

everything would be dropped to do a damage report, namely he

was 16 years in KGB, he had many jobs, it would be laborious,

they would have to go through all the materials that he could

possibly have had access to.

Now it is not as difficult for KGB to make a damage

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report as it would be in the United States Government.

Miss Brady. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton. Because the controls over information

and the controls on access and all of that are so rigorous

that if a man saw a file there have to be signatures, and time

out and time in, and so on and files do not float around and they

don't use Xerox machines, and I can go on and on.

Compartmentation is the key to their security. Therefore,

in making the damage report their first concern would be to pros

tect agents and to get at those matters where they knew that he

knew names of people where we could react immediately. They

would also know from the damage report there were things that

would take us a long time to arrive at. If you only have a

cryptonym and one or two events how are you going to make any

identification?

Do you see what I mean?

Whereas if you have the name, address and telephone

number of the agent, they can almost write him off as being

burned. So that would be number one. That would be the

damage report.

Then that damage report would go to two places. It would

go to the 13th Department, which would be the Department of

Execution or Wet Affairs, assassination, and it would go the

Department of Disinformation, the Department of Disinformation

being concerned with strategic deception --

Miss Brady. Excuse me, before Golitzen's defection had

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the Agency independently decided or learned that there was a

Department of Disinformation?

Was there corroboration of the

existence of that?

Mr. Angleton. We knew of Soviet deception for years but

we did not know the magnitude of its elevation to a Directorate

in May of 1959. In other words, from the beginning we knew

from the days of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin, Dzerzhinsky who was

the head of Cheka, we knew that deception played a most prom-

inent role in soviet covert activity. We knew that all through

the war. And we knew it through our double agent handling

and we knew it through literally thousands of cases. In

other words, no one can run a double agent, you don't run

double agents unless you also resort to deception, and

deception is integral to that because you are not going to

give away all your real stuff. You give away false stuff to

achieve your objectives.

When I come in to describing the background of Sasha,

then I think you will see more of what I mean by way of sophis

tication by the soviets and why this thing to try to shuffle

him off as a contract agent is ridiculous.

But going back to sasha again, we held many meetings

with the FBI on that since they were brought fully into it.

Since it was dealing with a Soviet agent in a sense they have

concurrent jurisdiction.

Miss Brady. Were they brought into it as soon

as the

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Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. What position did they take on the possible

penetration?

Mr: Angleton. For a long time they went into it. We

had many meetings. We had meetings with the Bureau, FBI, mem-

bers of the Counterintelligence and Security Office on this

-...

matter. We had to our satisfaction identified the real Sasha.

They sent us a letter in which they said that we were wrong

in our identification and therefore they proposed that we

send all our information to the Defense Department so that they

could look into it and see if the individual did not fit some-

body in Defense. That is a matter of record.

It shows exactly that the FBI at that time, for whatever

it was worth, that with all the same information, with all

those facts, et cetera, et cetera, they perceived that this was

not the right identification and the information should be

transferred to the Pentagon.

Miss Brady. Did Sasha touch any of their operations or

programs?

Mr: Angleton. Off the top of my head I can't say because

one would have to go over a damage report of the real Sasha,

jof all of the things that he would have had access to, of all

of his friends that would talk about their cases which would

impinge on the intelligence community.

Since he did not confess,

ran, as g

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the FBI in my view were not simply sophisticated enough to

handle the Sasha case.

They went over and interviewed him

directly. Then he went and disappeared. He was seen emerging

from the Soviet Embassy and then they challenged him, "Why were

you in the Soviet Embassy?" He said, "Well, you are asking

me all these personal details about my mother and father and

all this,

so I went in there to find out about them." But

later on, and this is very important, we had this agent Rgor,

who has been referred to in the press, who was responsible

for the Shadrin case, the kidnapping of the person in Vienna.

The Counterintelligence Staff took the firm position, unequiv

ocally, that Igor was a plant.

That was our 100 percent position. Both the FBI and the

Office of Security took opposite positions. They are the

ones who took Shadrin -- his real name was Artamanov, and took

him to Vienna where he was kidnapped. This is where you have

all the stories - I have newspaper clippings of the Nicholas

Horrocks' article which is the most detailed leak that I know

of in the government by way of accuracy and so forth. I

only ask why anyone would leak that because if he had been a

true agent of the Agency he was killed by that article.

It first appeared in Time Magazine. The New York Times

brought up this entire matter. It is very important because

Igor, to establish his bona fides told the FBI and the Office

of Security that Shadrin was their agent, that we must not do

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anything to hurt him because he was anidealist, not a

mercenary and he threatened us that if we did anything about

Sasha, the Central Committee had already approved a plan of

great retaliation, propagandawise and so on against the Agency

and the country.

Miss Brady. Was that the reason for the inaction in the

sasha case, that he was merely allowed to resign?

MI. Angleton. Oh, no. This is after he had already

resigned.

He went on to say that they had 29 volumes of Sasha's

reports to them while working for us and all this material

was the ammunition that would be used in the event that Sasha

was hurt.

Now, the reason I explain this to you is that having

represented for 31 years probably the most distinguished group

of loyal people that I have ever known and the most hard working

people, to have the Agency send as a representative of the

Agency an individual of Hart's character and inexpertise before

that Committee to take up a case of this magnitude and to listen

to the committee

people talk about the Chamber of Horros of

the Agency was redolent of the Church Committee, totally

adversary, reviving the past, and it raises very grave questions

about the integrity of your committee and it raises those

questions in a way that the American people have been horn-

swoggled.

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In other words, you can't set the clock back. you

have unleashed

something here that is going to go very far, one,

in destroying the climate of defection from the Soviet Union

of other

defectors who will have access to that testimony, who

are on the American Desk.

There was no pre-conference held in the Agency by

anyone bringing in epople who worked for 31 years in the

counterintelligence field. Mr. Hart never interviewed - he

interviewed me once and villated our agreement. I volunteered

to appear before him and I asked that there be a recording

machine and I asked that there be a transcript so that there

could

be an accurate record and I could go over the transcript.

I had one interview with Mr. Hart and I was never called again!

Miss Brady. MI. Angleton, I understand fully your position

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Mr. Angleton. But I want to be very clear on this because

I would not be going into any of these details necessarily with

you if it were not for the fact that Mr. Hart opened up a

great number of doors which you can't close.

Miss Brady. I agree fully with that. Within the scope

of the questions I want you to go into depth and explain it.

If we go off in this -

Mr. Angleton. I don't want anyone to read the transcript

and wonder why I am going into these details on Sasha, Colby,

the FBI and all these others matters with a committee investigating

DE SHE

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the assassination of JFK, when it is only relevant in terms of

the actions of your committee.

Miss Brady. I understand that.

Mr. Angleton. Therefore, we have to go in paralle. Since

the door is opened I find it my responsibility in terms of the

integrity of the counterintelligence and in terms of the

national interest that I close some of these doors and put it

into perspective one way or the other.

Miss Brady. So that context stays clear, too, if I can

continue to ask questions I think we will get out all the

information you want.

Mr.. Angleton. I am trying to make it coherent though in

terms that these sidetracks and diversions are also influenced

by the Hart testimony.

Miss Brady. That is fine.

Bringing us back to the Nosenko case, was the Sasha

allegation being investigated at the time of Nosenko's either

first contact or at the time of his actual defection?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. Did he give information on the allegation

possible penetration?

Mr. Angleton. Io my recollection his statement was that

they had never been successful in making recruitment.

Miss Brady. Was he interrogated specifically about the

Sasha allegation?

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MI.

Angleton. Let me point out here again by way of

explanation that the Counterintelligence Staff had no juris-

diction whatsoever over Nosenko. Nobody in the Counter-

intelligence Staff ever interviewed him or saw him. The

Counterintelligence Staff never signed up nor was every con

sulted on any of the administrative setups. We didn't know

anything about his salary and all that type of thing or the

projects and so on. So that when you are asking me this thing

it is all hearsay or things I can remember from reports that

were submitted to us by people in other components, so to

speak, who were dealing with hi-m. I am not saying for the

moment that we got all the reports and transcriptions and so

on. I am just simply stating that they got into another

Sasha which led to the identification of an army officer who

had been recruited in Germany, and he said that this was Sasha;

That was an operation continued by the Office of Security,

in the Bureau for a long period of time. I think it evaporated

in the end.. I can't remember any of the details. I can

remember that he stated how he was trying to recruit somebody

and how recruitment of Americans was impossible. I mean

page after page after page of their lack of successes on recruit-

ment of Americans.

Miss Brady. Was his information about a possible pene-

tration just of no substantive value or did it actually detract

from the information that Golitzen had given about sasha?

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Mr. Angleton. Totally detracted from what Golitzen had to

say. In fact, the two pieces of information cited by Hart,

one, about the foreign agent in the west, all of that had been

Golitzen. The microphone business

was all from Golitzen.

sent a memorandum to the State Department in June 1962 allerting

them to the microphone in the embassy.

Miss Brady. Was that based on information that Golitzen

had provided?

Mr. Angleton.. That is right. Also, if I recall correctly,

Nosenko said we were to look into one part of the embassy and

not in the other part. They were found where he said we were

not supposed to l00k.

Miss Brady. Was there any contact with Nosenko from the

time of his first contact in '62 ---

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady --- by the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady. Was that normal?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, because he said that he would not

report from the Soviet Union because of the total police control

and controls which they had in Russia. Therefore, he would

not risk his life in trying to communicate and we should not

try to communicate with him.

Miss Brady. Whom did he contact finally when he made the

actual defection in '64 and where did the contact take place?

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Mr. Angleton. He had some kind of contact of notifying our

people. I don't know the details of it. Immediately a member

of the Soviet Division or a person who was taking over the

Soviet Division and others went there and got him and brought

him to Germany.

Miss Brady. What reason did he give in 1964 for being

willing to defect when earlier he had only wanted money?

Mr. Angleton. I think he gave ideological reaons.

Miss Brady.: Were they accepted as credible at that time?

MI. Angleton. I can't really say. I will put it this way.

I can't really answer you honestly without telling you that

there was another case that occurred after he went and left

us.

Two American tourists were walking down

the street in

Moscow. A man came up and handed to them a batch of documents

This batch of documents was documents of the Second Chief

Directorate, files from the Second Chief Directorate, which

is there FBI, internal memoranda of their operations against

us.

It explained how we lost certain agents, Penkofsky, for

example.

The American Ambassador was not there.

The tourists

brought them to the Embassy. The Ambassador was not there

but the Charge d'affaires feared that this was a Soviet prov-

acotion and insisted that the documents be returned to the

Soviet Government, the Foreign Office.

We photographed the

documents before they were returned. Obviously the very

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giving back of those documents were permit the Soviet Govern-

ment to identify beyond a shadow of a doubt the individual

who gave those documents, whether he was genuine or not genuine.

The individual concerned was a man named Cherepanov and

Cherepanov was a man known previously to us in Yugoslavia

at the time when Philby was in the British intelligence and who

had offered his services to the British and to ourselves and was

regarded as a provocateur.

He returned to the Soviet Union. Knowing Philby, and I

know him very well personally, Philby had also given away to

the Soviets a very high grade defector in Turkey. A very high

grade defector named Volkov contacted the British authorities

and promised to give them the identities of X number of Ooviet

agents in the British Government in return for & number of

British pounds.

The telegram and communications of Volkov

came to Philby. He went to his Soviet control. Volkov was

kidnapped immediately by the Soviets. That was the end of

volkov.

so, we had a similar situation that when Cherepanov made

his overtures

to the British, Philby was in the sritish

Intelligence Service, he was a Soviet expert, and Cherepanov

ends up many, many, many years later being in the Second Chief

Directorate with alleged access to the most sensitive infor-

mation which is the internal documents and how they picked

up Penkovsky.

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Nosenko's story was that he personally engaged in the

search and running down of Cherepanov at the Turkish frontier

and that he had been captured and executed.

We began to get this same playback, through other sources,

of the Cherepanov story. An illegal, for example -- if you

know what an illegal is -- an illegal agent of the Soviets who

had been in touch with us for a long time made a trip back to

Moscow. He said that he went to the house of a General for

dinner and they were discussing the Cherepanov case and how

Cherepanov was tracked down at the border and arrested and exe-

cuted. Now it is inconceivable tht an illegal who is really at

the bottom of the totem pole in terms of the hierarchial

matters, would be dining with a Soviet general who would

reveal to him the Cherepanov case, because the world of the

Illegal is something so divorved from the internal parts of the

bureaucracy or headquarters, if you see what I mean, and yet

here all of thise confirmations of Nosenko started popping out

of the walls from all kinds of sources who are not in the

position to know.

This characterizes a great deal of things said by Nosenko

which were confirmed by Soviet agents of the FBI or CIA. The

orchestration began immediately. Were were inundated with

confirmations, even of stories which he later denied, even of

"stories which he later denied. In other words, where he said,

"I was wrong, there was no recall telegram," et cetera, et

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cetera, but the others had already said that he had been sent

a recall telegram.

Miss Brady. Were these confirmations of his story happening

between the time of his contact and his defection or later?

Mr. Angleton. Later after he defected.

Miss Brady. Were you able to get any other independent

information about Nosenko between 1962 and 1964 about who he was,

where he had served, what his background was?

Mr. Angleton. Obviously we knew a great deal about his

father. We have have had one or two sources.

I can't give

you the time spent, whether it was between defections or not

of people who go to school with him. We had a case in Turkey

that came up that some lady's husband had been in the same class

lor things of that sort.. I can't recall whether it was before

lor after the defection.

Miss Brady. I am going to need to take a short break if

I can for just a minute.

Mr. Angleton. Surely.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Miss grady. During the recess, Mr. Angleton, you referred

ito

an article you wanted to make part of the record. Will.

yOu

do

• so at this time.

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I had a telephone call yesterday from

friend who subscribes to the London Economist and who read

out

the following statement from the foreign news section, which

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is a special blue bulletin, dated 27 September 1978. The

subtitle is "Nosenko footnote."

Paragraph one.

"MI. James Angleton, the former Chief

of Counterintelligence, CIA, was due to testify for six hours

on 22 September to the House Subcommittee that is investigating

the Kennedy assassination. (See last weeks foreign report.)

"He pulled out for the time being on the grounds that,

(a)!,

he needed time to review the testimony of John Hart, who had

made damaging allegations about the handling of the suspected

defector Yuri Nosenko, and, (b), he wanted his lawyer upon

(sic) classified information."

I simply don't know how this was acquired.

I haven't

had time to try to analyze it in terms of dates and so on.

But

I had a telephone call frm the reporter from the wilmington

Delaware paper whose name is Joe Trento, who has written a

series of sensational réports about moles in the CIA, including

myself as a mole and others, and who purports to have agents

in the CIA and who purports that a former colleague of mine,

Cleveland Cram,

who I understand has been called back in service

to write the history of the counterintelligence, is actually

working on this question of moles. Treto also wrote an article

in "penthouse" together with a colleague named Roman for the

August issue which deals with KGB penetration through

the United

Nations. The article on the whole is totally apocryphal in

terms of allegations attributed to me, I mean statements

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attributed to me regarding that.

I was shown a draft of this article by one

WilLiam Cor-

son, a colonel, several weeks before its publication. william

Corson is a former Marine colonel who purporst to have excellent

contacts with the Senate and House intelligence people, including

Senators and including the Director of the CIA and others.

He

is listed as the Washington representative of Penthouse maga-

zine. He has also written a book, which is in the public

domain, on the Office of Strategic Services, OSS. He is

an

author of that book. I can't recall its title.

I received this telephone call at the Army-Navy Club

in which Trento stated

that the Agency had put my head in a

basket by producing John Hart and whether I had any comments

to make. I said no. Then he went on to make a statement that

Nosenko was going to sue the CIA, that he mentioned names, which

did not catch at all, the operation I think he mentioned was

Meadowlark and he insisted that he and Corson wanted to see me

immediately.

I told him that my lunch was getting cold and that I had

guests, et cetera, and "no, thank you." Now I don't know

whether he said anything or not but it has been my experience

that when he has called me to give me information, which is

his sole purpose, that he saja, "I have great admiration for

you and therefore I want to inform you of the following," and

he gives me a lot of things and whether I say "ho" or "hum)

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26.

He has a long quotation from me out of whole cloth, and

I only heard a fragment on ghe radio last night about the

Wilmington, Delaware newspaper, something of this sort and I

didn't hear it, I lost it. It must be on the Paisley case.

But

he alleges to have informants in the committee.

I will say that I have a tape recording of 20 or 30 min-

utes of Joe Trento, this man Roman, and the editor of Penthouse,

there way up in New York, and myself down below, denouncing

their going ahead with that article, since Corson had been

put on notice that this was all false, I mean that the whole

thing was full of fabrications. I think they are unaware of

the fact that I made that tape recording, I know they are

unware of it, in which they apologized to me and they offered

me all the space I want in any forthcoming issue, et cetera,

et cetera.

When I threatned that I would take legal action they

announced that three million copies had already gone through

the printers, et cetera. When I pointed out to them that it

creates a lie, in other words, that we must never lie regarding

KGB because it destroys the climate of defection, it means that

the Soviet on the American Desk who reads all of that then

says, "Well, they are just as bad as we are, so therefore

there is no inducement to come over," and it is a tremendous

disservice,

because they had such allegations as the fact that

Department Five staffs the United Nations. Well, Department Five

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is the new name that the Western Counterintelligence have

learned to be the old Department 13 of Assassinations and

Sabotage.

In other words, the whole thing is a complete hysterical

piece of spies in the United Nations. So you have the

editor of Penthouse pleading with me that he thought he was

doing me a great favor, that their whole purpose had been to

balance out all the adverse media business against CIA, by prin-

ting something against KGB and citing me as discovering agents

inside the Agency and all this kind of thing.

I only put this out because of Trento's call to me

regarding the Hart testimony and also the fact of what his

sources

stated and so on.

There is much more than I can recall because I was standing

up with waiters on both sides and a great deal of noise and

was extremely irritated by the abruptness with which he stated

that Corson

wanted to see me immediately, et cetera, et cetera.

He does mention real names of people within the CIA. In other

words, what I am saying is whether he had sources or not I

cannot say or whet her he is an innocent being manipulated by

dissident elements in the Agency and so on, or retirees, I

do not know.

I might add that Mr. Helms gets the brunt of this because

he has a vacation place there in Lewes, Delaware, and somebody

keeps calling him every time these Trento articles come out

3C

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in which he is mentioned as

a mole and investigations by the

Agency about that and so

on.

Miss Brady. Let us turn again to the Nosenko matter,

if we can. Are you able to describe or characterize the

Agency's attitude toward Nosenko when he actually defected in

1974?

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Mr. Angleton. Yes. I can't characterize it at that time.

I think it was regarded generally as a great coup.

Miss Brady. Did you share that view?

Mr. Angleton. I regarded it as a very interesting

development.

Miss Brady. Referring again to Hart's testimony, he

mentioned I believe that the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Branch

gave great weight and significance to the case whereas you just

felt either that it was not that significant or that there

were great doubts. Is that accurate?

Mr. Angleton. He quotes me as stating that when Bagley

came over that he had "a great efficiency" or words: to that

effect. Now my recollection is, and this is where I would

have to go back to the files, that I don't recall whether

Bagley came over after the first meeting with Nosenko -- I

think it was inthe first meeting with Nosenko that Bagley came

over. I would have to know which one it was, whether it was

the first meeting of the second meeting in which I displayed to

him, exhibited to him, the transcript of Colitzen. But when he

he intes

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read those he was thunderstruck. In other words,

what I am

trying to say is that I did not influence him one way or the

other. I just simply pointed out these are the things to

read.

He spent three days and nights in my office, outter

office, reading and taking notes of the interviews with

Golitzen that had taken place many, many months before.

I can tell you this, the moment that the news broadcast

carried the information that Nosenko had defected in Geneva

and that Tsarapsin, the head of the Soviet Delegation, had

denounced the Swiss Government for being in collusion with

terrorist powers and had kidnapped him and what not, that we

were, many of us, including foreigners, in conference with

Golitzen in another building.

Immediately that Golitzen heard of the defection of

Nosenko, he immediately said "that has to be the source of

that letter you showed me." It so happened that McCone, as

I recall, was in that building. It was not our normal building

in MeClean. It was a building that we had in town.: If I

recall correctly, he want-d to see Mr. MeCone immediately.

As I recall I took him into see MI. McCone. It was a building

where Mr. McCone would use those offices where he was going to!

to the white House back and forth, to the Secretary of State,

in town, and very few minutes from the White House, so that

he would use it every so often. Golitzen made the definite

statement that this was in fact the author of all of those

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items that he had seen before and that this was obviously a prov-

ocation.

Miss Brady. Was that the beginning of some of the charac-

terization of Golitzen as paranoid, to use MI. Hart's term?

Mr.. Angleton. I find that kinf of accusation the kind

that must have set off the greatest peals of glee in the KGB

of the many statements of his defection.

Miss Brady. To your knowledge had there been any diagnosis

of Golitzen as paranoid prior to that time?

Mr. Angleton. I imagine in the short time that you and

I have known one another that you could write a psychological

prfile of me and I could write one of you. I would say that

that is about the kind of imprecission or unprofessionalism of

writing a profile on Golitzen by a trained psychiatrist or

psychologist.

While we are on it, at some stage I could have gone

through this thing page by page, which I would like to do, and

just simply point out as one went along, but I will take itup

from there. Golitzen was a man who at a very early age had had

the opportunity, because of a study which he did in training

school together with his colleague, one named Kersheyev, had

written to the Central Committee, which was permissible in

the Soviet

system, a critique of Soviet espionage based on their

studies, and that critique went to the Central: Committee

and as a result of that, going through channels and it took.

HE G

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several

months, it arrived at the highest level, including

Stalin.

Out of the blue,

and

he was way down in the south of

Russia, he and his colleague were flown to Moscow and met with

Stalin.

Berea, and all the chiefs of intelligence, because

it had gone through those channels to Stalin and it pointed

out what the glaring errors were in the modus operandi against

the United States. So, it wasn't once but it was twice that

he saw those personalities..

second, his great quality was the analytical quality.

In

other words, where two separate components within the KGB

had different points of view he was brought in many times to do

the analytical side for the superiors in terms of the two points

of view.

His mind without question is one of the finest

analytical minds. He is not necessarily an operations officer.

but he is an analytical type and he is a historian by backgrourd.

I dare anyone to dispute a historical date or tilme, whether

it deals with Mamelukes or Byzantine of whatever it may be.

He is a true. Therefore he is very precise in terms of what

he states and he separates the fact from speculation and so on

So that I don't regard a man who comes from that system as being

paranoid who wishes to impart to the President of the United

States the strategic matters which he derived from documents

of the Soviet Government.

After all, he knew Stalin, he had access because the

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KGB is the underpinning of the regime. Unlike what happens

in the Western World you could take many of the senior people

in the CIA who do not have the slightest idea of what is going

on in the State Department or in the National Security Council

or in the President's mind. They would not have access to the

thinking or the policy in its formation, whereas

the KGB

is

the underpinning of the regime who supplies all the guards

to the Krelmin, who have the only intimate knowledge of who is

related to whom, which are the best kept secrets in the Soviet

Union, have access to the Central Committee and have access

strategy and to plans, because they are an integral part of

the policymaking.

In other words, Andropov, the Chairman of State Security,

is a member of the ruling class. He has been elevated as

with Brezhnev and with others so that it is a terrible mistake

which I think runs through all of Hart and : through all those

people who have really never dealt in Soviet matters either

historically or casewise. I can recall no achievement of

Hart's in his entire career that ever came to my attention of

any value whatsoever as a contribution to counterintelligence.

Miss Brady. At the time Golitzen was assisting in the

assessment of Nosenko was there any type of assessment in the

Agency about

Golitzen's value to the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Of course. When you say within the Agency

want to clarify again and take exception to some of the

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niceties of Hart'd delusions that he foisted on your committee.

He keeps talking about a small group in the CIA. He keeps

talking about the fact that he didn't know about certain things,

the thousands of us that didn't know, if one quotes on: of

his things, that were unaware of this of unaware of that or

unaware of the other. Therefore, he iputs it in a prejorative

sense, that there were very few people who knew.

Now. let us give consideration to the people who knew.

The Director knew. The Deputy Director knew. The head of

the Clandestine Services knew. The Deputy Director of Clan-

destine Services knew. His deputy knew. The Chief of the

Soviet Division and all of his selected people, the Chief of the

Counterintelligence and his selected

people, the Chief of the

Office of Security and his selected people, the FBI and their

selected people. So that it is not "some kind of cabal that

was jealous reasons of its own denying Hart an others"

"knowledge," because an intelligence service has only one

i defense against penetration and that is compartmentation. In

other words, it is because of compartmentation that we didn't

know thousands of things about the soviets.

But because Golitzen had made up his mind to defect many

years before he actually arrived, he was actually without our

knowing an agent in place trying to bring down their compart-

mentation, therefore he got himself into positions which per-

mitted him to break down their compartmentation into fields

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where they weren't realizing that he was doing this for the

purpose of acquiring vast knowledge in other fields which were

I not his duties, and amongst those was attending the higher

counterintelligence school where visiting KGB people would

come in to speak and talk about their operations.

Reading all of the KGB training books, knowing how those

training books were - for example, a case would be given there,

they would change the name of the locus of the operation, but

he wouldknow and find out the secret that if it was signed by

so and so, released by so and so, that that man was in the

Western European desk handling Scandinavian matters and there-

fore the case as described in the training school did not

occur in Turkey, as it was so stated in the training lectures,

but was handled in Scandinavia or in West Berlin, by knowing

who

the case officers,. et cetera, were who approved that being

submitted to the training school.

So that compartmentation was in the line of authority of

the Director. It was not something which the CIA staff imposed.

It was not something that people without authority imposed. It

was the approved handling of the Directorship and the leader-

ship of the Agency and it is based on the need to know prin-

ciple in which you do not bring people in who have nothing

to contribute to the case. It is not a matter of cocktail

talk or what not. It is compartmented and it is compartmented

hopefully in a way that if there is a leak at least you have a

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bigger list of people you know for your investigative leads.

In other words, if Golitzen gave a highly sensitive piece

of information and there was evidence that that information fell

in the hands of the opposition, then we would be in a position

to know that these are the X number of people alone who had

acess to that information as a basis for a leakage or whatever

it may be. So that I simply state that when I mentioned earlier

that Hart if a creature of the Colby regime I will go a step

further and state that in my dealings with Colby and the first

dealings when he took over as the Deputy Director of the Clan-

destine Service from Mr. Karamessines, who unfortunately

passed away a couple weeks ago and could have been very eloquent

on this subject, his statement was that we are now in a new

period in which you have to open the windows and let the fresh

air in.

Now that may be all right for a lunatic assylum or sana-

torium to have all that fresh air come in but in the intelli-

igence business it just does not work.

So that throughout Mr. Hart seems to be a person who seems

personally aggrieved that

he was unaware of all of

these things;

happening. But this was the real world. It is the real

world that we have been engaged in for 31 years with the Soviets.

It was not a world which we created. In other words, we had

the first major defector in the west who was Gouzenko who

took all the telegrams from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa

"Dii

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out with him when he defected, which lead to the huge atomic

espionage going on in Canada and the U.S. He was a code clerk

and he had that kind of access.

That was the number one magic

eye opener to Western counterintelligence in the largest sense

of the word.

The second major defector was Petrov who was Chief of the

KGB in Australia, and his wife who was a code clerk in the

KGB and who had been in many stations. He defected. to the

Australian security. He gave abundance of information.

So that, in other words, this is the world that spec-

¡alists in counterintelligence live in which is the factual

world of what they do. So we are not dealing with Nosenko as

some abnormality in the thing. It was simply a part of the

continuum which we had seen all the manifestations of during

World War II when we were in counterintelligence working

against the Germans. We began to bump into the soviets right

and left working against us.

In other words, we did not create a cold war or have a

paranoid attitude about the Soviets.

They taught us. In other

words, they did it by kidnapping people, by murdering people,

by shooting down our aircraft as they did over Yugosivaia and

not giving up the bodies until Truman gave them an ultimatum

and we had the l0th Mountain Division about ready to go in, which

probably would have been a good thing.

that is when they gave

up the bodies and the aircraft.

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In other words, what I am trying to say is that there is

an attitude in the Agency that there is no regime and there-

fore the past is the past and we will forget it and we will

start fresh again. But you can't undo all the cases of the con-

tinuum of penetration and of everything that has been going on!

from the days of Lenin. These cases keep going on.

I will give one example which Ithink is a very simply-

minded one but one that is true and which is illustrative of the

problem with Nosenko. Again it is illustrative of the Agency's

inability and the Directorship over there to understand what

intelligence and counterintelligence is all about.

Now during the war there emerged a General Turkul. General

Turkul had been a White Russian general who after the revolution

fled. He worked in many Balkan countries as a mercenary mil

itary man. I think among other things he helped restore King

70g to the throne in Bulgaria. He established a residence in

Istanbul and he became sort of a magnet for WhiteRussian or

anti-Soviets.

He was I believe in the cavalry and he was very

prominent and what not and he became quite a personality in his

own right. He made contact with the Fascists and with the

German general staff and gave such high grade information

regarding the Red Army that he was being paid fantastic sums

of money both by the Italians and the Germans for his intell-

igence. Now his cover story or legend - and keep in mind

I haven't been on this case for 25 years, so I am just reading

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the highlights of it -- his cover story or his legend was

that

he had a network of agents throughout the Red military, through-

out the Red Army, and that the Chieff of the Signal Corps of

the Red Army was his agent and that this network reported

through well-handled cells, well compartmented cells, up to

the Chief of the Signal Corps.

So that the head of the Signal Corps, who also ran the school

for training young wI operators - that means wireless telegraph

operators in morse code and transmissions for the armed forces

- would give them practice messages which they would transmit

say, from Archangel to the Crimea or what not, but that these

were actually encoded messages for which he had the code,

and

therefore he wouldn't go and explain anything further about all

this but the fact that he could have the most recent infor-

mation of troop movements, of internal things going on in the

Soviet Government and all the rest of it was because of this

fantastic network that he had and the fact that alone he had

the code and that he could receive this information by wir-eless,

et cetera, and that here all of these hundreds of students,

which is typical, and you have in cryptographic work what

are called practice messages.

They can be the same groups this way and a thousand

groups this way and a thousand backwards or they can be all

kinds of things that are gibberish, in other words. They are

also used to confuse anyone who is listening to those messages.

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But his statement was that these were actually the encoded

intelligence reports and the he therefore had the proper sig-

nals and he could intercept all this and he could decode it

and this was the intelligence.

Now he eventually ended up very highly favored by the

German intelligence and the German general staff during the

war.

He went to Germany. His information proved extremely

valuable to the Germans because Soviet divisions were destroyed

based on his information on troop movements and all of that.

Had the war gone on another three months or more, he would have

replaced, because what he had been doing was undermining General

Blassov who had a tremendous army of Russians working with

Hitler.

I am not going into speculation that if Hitler had

treated Blassov as an equal he could have been a major factor

in the Soviet campaigns if he didn't have his whole attitude

on race problems and so on.

But Blassov erepresented to the Soviet Government the most

dangerous single element since the revolution because Stalin

had made a decree that any captured Soviet officer or enlisted

man was a traitor. In other words, he put out that procla-

mation that anyone who was captured, who did not fight to the

death, was a traitor. So here you found brave men being

captured who were already traitors and Blassov who was an

anti-Bolshevik accumulated really the cream of the prisoners

CORT

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war and so on who wanted to fight against Russia and against

Bolshevism and they came from all over, the Georgians, from

all'

of the provinces.

So that western intelligence began to go int

the General Turkul case as to bona fides because there were inter

ceptions

of messages which are known as the MX-MORUT? which

were intercepted and they pertained to this whole overall oper

ation.

Now the question on bona fides of General Turkul was split

right down the center. It split the Allied intelligence service

in terms of whether he was bona fide or not bona fide.

We had his German case officer in the Abwehr. We had him

in Vienna in a high security prison and on a given day NKVĐ

officers who were part of the repatriation commission - that

was forceful repatriation of Russians back to Russia - came

over in American uniforms and raided that prison trying to

get the case officer and they were caught by a colleague of mine

in OSS in flagrante.

Now that only heightened the whole question of bona fides

on Turkul. It was not until 1967 or 1968 that my deputy Rocca

broke the case, the General Turkul case, through General

Orlov who was the most senior defector that there has ever been

from the NKVD or the OGP! or the KGB.

Miss Brady. When did Orlov come over?

Mr. Angleton. He came in 1934. He defected but he never

made his presence known until the death of Stalin in 1953.

SCOOTI

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wrote for nife Magazine a series of articles on the crimes of

Stalin. He wrote a letter to Stalin on his defection outlining

all of

Stalin's crimes

and stating that "if you bother me. or

my relatives or there is any sign of trying to touch me I will

publish your crimes."

He submitted in an attachment all of the

crimes and the Soviets never made any effort whatsoever to take

retribution against him.

He was the head of the NKVD in Spain during the Civil War.

When Stalin died the pact was over, the agreement was over,

and therefore Life magazine I believe paid him $40,000 for three

articles in which he spells out the crimes of Stalin which later

on are incorporated in Khrushchev's secret speech. General Orlov

is without question one of the most intelligent and most valued

men who had never been properly debriefed by the United States

Government.

Miss Brady.

What was his status in the United States?

Mr. Angleton. He had relatives and he just emerged and

then he was interviewed by the FBI without any human base being

created which you need with a defector and he broke off with

them.

They did not even tap the wealth of information which

was at his disposal. It happened in the Huntington case as

well. When you go

in and try - in other words, these men

don't regard themselves as agents of the country. In other

words, it is the same as Golitzen has stated on occasions that

"I have left them but whether I have joined you is another

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Miss Brady. W-s the Turkul case and the Nosenko case

the two most obvious cases that were split on the bona fides

issues?

Had other cases been significantly split within the

Agency than those two?

Mr. Angleton. In the Agency there were practically few

people who were involved in Turkul unless they were in OSS:

although later on we had people in Germany working still on

the Turkul case when we became CIA. The point I am trying to

say is that here you take all the years that Orlov told Rocca

you have to keep in mind this is going back and recreating

from the revolution all the way through NKVD, OGPU, all the

rest of it, building up machine computerized records of every

single Soviet case from the day of Lenin so that you would have

a data base where you understood comprehensively all of the

activities, organizations, changes in modus operandi and so on.

In the course of all of this he took up the Turkul matter

and Orlov read the critical fact which

was that a man by the

name of Katz Nelson who was under Dzerzhinsky around 1934 came

to Paris; I belteve it was Paris, and one of the purposes of

his trip was to meet with Turkul. Now Katz Nelson was the

Deputy Chief of the NKVD for the Ukraine, a personal friend

of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin. He was a cousin to Orlov and he

was the one who warned Orlov of the forthcoming purges and that

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he had better be careful of recall telegrams. There were

many attempts by, I think it was Jassov, head of the service,

to try to invite Orlov to come to Belgium and to go on to a

Soviet ship to have a conference on a very important matter,

et ceter, et cetera. He found in Spain a code clerk who was

loyal to him, told him there was another member in the mission

of the NKVD who was there unbeknownst to Orlov and probably for

purposes of assassinating him because of the fact that he had

put off any recall to Moscow.

His cousin was one of those executed in the 1937 purges.

So that the wealth of information is such that I can say,

and I understand the agreement that you have, if I understand

it correctly, with the Agency and the Chairman, that any

security oaths and what not are suspended for the purpose

of this.

Miss Brady • Yes.

Mr. Angleton. I just want to repeat it because I am

getting into fields that have never been gone into and which in

my own view are more properly the field of the Senate Intelli-

gence Committee rather than the Assassination Committee.

But

had anyone patiently worked with orlov, and I might add in

this respect that the Agency once contacted him and the

relationship fizzled out because of personalities, the soviet

Division tried to have a contact with him and it fizzled out.

It was only when Mr. Allen Dulles was writing his book on the

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craft of intelligence that I suggested to him that he pay a

_....

tribute to General Orlov's book which is one of the really great

books, and Mr. Dulles wrote and we helped him out a lot on

the book in different ways -- and MI. Dulles wrote a fine

tribute to General Orlov's book and so on.

One day Mr. Dulles called me to tell me that the Orlovs

were-in town and that General Orlov had called him to thank him

for the line tribute, that he had invited him to dinner.

Mr.

Dulles was no longer Director or anything. He asked me whether

I would come to the dinner. I said, "No, I am not the man

for that. I would like to send Rocca."

So that is how Rocca

met him and handled hilm up to his death. He recreated in

one country alone 34 Soviet cases.

bhat was a country that had

been overrun by the Germans, where the Germans had taken away

all the Soviet files so they didn't have any archives. He

recreated. 37 cases in that country.

In other words, the most important cases to them and so on.

The most important thing was that when he was in Spain he

knew that on Franco's staff - he himself was chief of NIVD,

with the Republicans fighting Franco, but he knew the senior

agent they had was on Franco's staff, that he was a young Brit-

ish reporter whose father was an Arabist and he knew his code

name, SINJAN, that was Philby, whose father was the famous sir.

John Philby, an Arabist. All of that was available in 1953.

I am simply trying to stress what it means that when someone

EGRe

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tries to take the Nosenko case and go and believe that they

are going to resolve it against a time factor, whether it be

the Warren Commission or whether it be the fact that the Direc-

tor wants it resolved or whether it is any other kind of arti-

ficial

constraints, it is out of kilter and not in step with

counterintelligence.

In other words, the philosophy of the counterintelligence

is not to have his hostile interrogation because hostile

interrogation gets one nowhere unless you have a superior

piece of intelligence unbeknownst to that individual.

Miss Brady.

Who made the decision to go to the hostile

Interrogation of Nosenko?

Mr. Angleton. The Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Were you consulted?

Mr. Angleton. No. In fact I think I was in Israel but

I am not certain.

Miss Brady. Which individual, the Chief of the soviet

Division?

MI. Angleton. I never reconstructed exactly who made

the decision.

Miss Brady. Do you know when the decision was made?

Mr. Angleton. I know it was after they thought they

had enough ammunition to break him.:

Miss Brady.

At that point, the so-called thousand page

report had already been issued, had it not? Prior to the

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refers to documents or codes and all of these things, they are

part of my life. It is the only life I have known because I

started off as a corporal in our organizationi, in the Army,

and I never went to an officers training school or anything

and I never asked for anything.

So, my commendations or rewards by foreing governments

or by my own government can be seen there. They are on the

record and I didn't write them.

so, the men I chose were

of like caliber,

"Rocca, Scotty Miler, and I can go through

a whole series of them, because experience taught me also how

to judge men.

For example, when we come to Peter Bagley,

who has been denigrated publicly through the auspices of your

committee with the help of Admiral Turner, Bagley was one

of the finest officers in the organization. Bagley didn't know

it but it had always been on my mind in evaluating a man that

he might well be one of my nominees for somebody who might

become the head of the Clandestine Service some day because

he

had certain qualities to him that I observed that were needed

for that type of

leadership.

First in intelligence, his schooling, his knowledge of

languages, his total dedication. He didn't have a penny to

his name. I mean he drove a car that I think was the oldest

car in the Agency. He had personal misfortunes, his son was

blinded in one eye and a number of other things. But at

the same time it was a part of his whole upbringing. Two

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decision to go to hostile interrogation had it been written?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. Let me dwell on the ques

tion of hostile interrogation so that we understand one

another.

I was many years in espionage and I think I can say in all

modesty I Ipobably recruited more agents than any person in

the CIA who would be known to you, by that I mean whose names

have ever come out. I recruited very high level people in

terms of access to codes and so on. I simply say that because

I was not just simply counterintelligence but I was also in

the espionage game for a long time before I became Chief of

Counterintelligence. I was Chief of Special Operations among

other things. The ultimate in our business is that espionage,

the ultimate of an espionage case is to get the codes of the

opposition. The ultimate in counterespionage is to protect

your own codes.

That. is the ultimate. There are all kinds of achievements

from recruiting a man all the way on up. But the heart of

everything is documentation. It is not just simply agent

reports. It is to be able to have the documents of the oppo

sition or to read their telegrams so that you know at the same

time they know,

so that you can make your own evaluation, not

based on what someone told you but on the actual documents.

So my statement to you is a world that I am very familiar

with, I mean in terms of when I am dealing with Golitzen he

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of his brothers were admirals of the fleet. One brother

was the senior admiral in London which controlled all the

fleet in the Atlantic and what not. The other brother was

an admiral, chief of the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy.

His uncle was Admiral Leavy. I don't have to describe

what that means when your uncle is Aamiral Leahy. So does

anyone believe that a man of Pete Bagley's qualities is the

same person described by Hart?

Miss Brady. I believe you are referring to a memo or so

called letter that Mr. Hart ascribed to Mr. Bagley?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. Did you have any knowledgeof such a letter

or memo?

Mr. Angleton.

Of course not. I never heard of any such

thing. But I know that a case officer who is working, I mean

who is really thinking through a problem, can go from the logical

¡¡to the reductio absurdum. In other words, if you follow me, if

you are told to think of everything that was the color blue

you could

start off with the blue of Pintorreto and start getting.

down into the fact that I

am going to sing the blues or some-

thing.

You go from those things that you would communicate to

somebody to those things which would be I mean in reductio

absurdum. The memo never went anywhere.

It was a personal paper of the man himself. All I am

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trying, to say is that Pete Bagley is the first man in the

world that knows that the Agency would never tolerate liqui-

dation.' He would never dare come into Helms and say that "We

have to liquidate the man."

The thing is so absurd that the very thought of it shows

the motivation of Hart to sensationalize and to put some

kind of onus on the past, because Hart is married to a young

lady, she is not

so young but she is a senior supergrade in

the Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Was she there at the time of the Nosenko

assessment?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but she was not in counterintelligence.

She was in estimates with Len McCoy: When Colby destroyed the

Counterintelligence, as far as I am concerned, Len MCCoy was

put into counterintelligence to take over from Rocca. He has

no qualifications for that job. Len McCoy and MI. Hart's wife!

were in the same group in the Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Were you ever party to conversations about what

is termed the embarrassing consequences of Mosenko's detention!

or possibly disposal even short of liquidation?

Mr. Angleton. I am personally aware of that because I

go;

back to what I have always felt about any of these people. I

am not opposed to taking in anyone, all defectors are welcome.

In other words, what I am trying to say is the more the merrier.

But you don't ever tell them that you disbelieve them. In

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other words, you elicit, you get their whole cover story from

A to 7. You put up all kinds of hypothetical things to them.

You feed them litmus and so on.

Miss Brady. What was your role in the counterintelligence

after the decision had been made to go to hostile interro

gation and he was actually incarcerated? What was the CIA

doing at that time?

Mr. Angleton.

We were following up traces. Let me put

it this way.

Much was made of the fact that out of X numbers

of days of incarceration he was only interrogated X number

of days. I worked it out that every three and a quarter days

he was seen.

Now let us logically look at it. The people

who would do the interrogation are people who also have other

responsibilities. They have In boxes and other cases that are

breaking.

That is number one.

Number two, they have to take the product of that interro-

gation back to headquarters from a distant location and do all

the research and analysis and traces and dossiers on what has

been provided during that day's interrogation.

I can assure you, having don this many times, myself, with

other defectors, having to travel to New York and spending

until four o'clock in the morning and getting two hours sleep

and getting the first plane

down and calling in people to get

traces run and go back that same afternoon, it is a little

gruelling when you

are also Chief of Counterintelligence

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handling hundreds of telegrams and new cases that come in.

I am certain that when I fugured that they saw hilm once every

three and a half days, that, without knowing this as a fact,

this would be the logical time factor of doing, one, your work

as Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division and whoever else he had

helping him, and doing the traces, preparing your questions

for the next encounter, et cetera.

So that I find nothing illogical in that.

I personally believe that the trouble with hostile

interrogation is that you can foresee that you are not going

to be successfull unless you have something so incriminating

that the man cannot deny it. In other words, if you photograph

him actually in the company of a known Soviet agent passing a

document or if you had a cipher break of a telegram which says,

•"Go and see Nosenko and tell him that we enjoyed his report.

on Bagley but try to find out about his brothers who are admirals,"

to give a fanciful thing, if you had such a thing of that sort

where it is incontrovertible evidence, then you could go to

hostile interrogation. I don't mean by hostile you could tell

him that he is a liar. Hostile interrogation to me would be

'to

show your card to the man, that you disbelieve him. Whereas

there is no reason to do that. In other words, you listen to

him. You thank him for his information but you have never let

him know that you disbelieve him until you have heard and

exhausted his entire story and that can take several months

Sabits

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to get all the details out. It is only after you analyze all

that that you see that you still don't have anything on which

you can break him. The fact that there was no telegram, the

fact that his rank might be wrong, or you can take all the

dozens, which I don't have at hand, dozens of contradictions,

my attitude was that these were fundamental contradictions

reinforced by the fact that other people under suspicion were

fortifying his testimony and that, most important, that Igor

when he came out confirmed that Sasha, Alexander, had submitted

enough reports within the Agency, 29 volumes, to be used by

the Central Committee against the United States, in a plan

approved by the Central Committee, if any harm came to him,

et cetera, et cetera, that he went to the soviet Embassy.

At the same time he confirms the bona fides of Nosenko

and goes into a long thing about how important Nosenko is,

he is more important than Golitzen and so on. Now we know

he is a fraud.

So then you take all the cases where that same earmarked

information of the lie is and you go through that to make the

idnetification of the other channels. When you begin to find

that an FBI source made the identical statement and so and

so made the identical statement and then you have Nosenko saying

"I lied, I didn't receive the telegram," and you look at these

other sources who said he received the telegram, et cetera,

et cetera, what does it raise in your mind except the classical

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thing, when you become involved in a double agent case you

are inviting for yourself a lot of trouble unless you have a

superior source. In other words, to run a double agent or pene

tration who is going to pass on information compells you to

-.-

exhaust a great deal of real information to build up his crea

ibility with the other side. You find yourself at time not

achieving your objective and therefore you have to throw more

good information after good information and still not achieve

your objective.

If the other side is astute enough, they can force you to

the wall in terms of having to give up stuff finally that you

can't give up and maintain the credibility of that agent. You

==

are on a train going to fast to jump off.

That is the reason I don't believe in hostile interro-

gation. In other words, I prefer the elicitation thing regard-

less of the time span, whether it be the Warren Commission or

whether it is the Director who has to have an answer right

away, et cetera.

I gave the Turkul case as one of the most obvious kinds of

cases, showing how long all Western counterintelligence

worked on Turkul: and how it eventually was resolved.

So that I canunderstand the Director who wants an answer,

who has to resolve it, who can't go any further with it. I

don't step away from Bagley and I don't step away from those

people. Xhey had the jurisdiction.

In their judgment they had!

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to make a decision, if you follow me. Therefore, when Helms was

confronted with that entire thing and the recommendations were

made and all that and he goes to Katzenbach and so on, I may

have known at the time or heard it of something but it was the

first time I knew that Dave Murphy had gone to see Katzenbach

and they had had such a meeting.

I did know Katzenbach very well before he became Attorney

General. So when I read or heard the testimony of Helsm I

was quite surprised about that meeting. My point is that I

can see that once they embarked on hostile interrogation it

would be very hard to get off that train because once you

starting telling a man you don't believe him, then he can shift

his story and you don't know what he would have told you had

you continued the elicitation. There were very many pieces of

litmus, as I call it, things which if he was bona fides in

the ultimate sense, in the sense of wanting to join our society

and protect our society, there are priorities of information

which he would have volunteered immediately as benefit to

the United States.

Miss Brady. I think you mentioned you wanted to break

at 12:30.

Is that correct?

Mr. Chabot. It might be a good time.

Miss Brady. Let us be back here at 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to

reconvene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.)

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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON RESUMED

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA conduct an investigation

into the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Angleton.

There was never any formal investigation

as such in the sense that there was never any thing like an

inspector general thing or task force.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you characterize the responsi-

bility of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the Warren Commis-

sion?

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Mr. Angleton. I think when the assassination occurred

- I will state the obvious, that no one in the history of

the Agency had even been confronted with the assassination of

a president. In other

words, practically anything that ever

happened in the Agency always had some precedent. In this

area, there was complete chaos, so to speak. So, the original

jurisdiction of course, devolved on the Bureau, the FBI.

When the Commission was set up I think it took it a long

time to get to focus. as such. In other words, I don't think

the community as a whole -- I mean Johnson in forming the

Commission, obviously there was advice from a lot of people -

my view is that he just simply hit on the Commission idea •

as spreading the responsibility

with some kind of blue ribbon

panel.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the purpose of the Commission

in general terms. My question though is now would you

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characterize the role of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the

warren Commission?

MI. Angleton. I think it went through a metamorphosis

in the beginning. You had the Director, who was a very close

social and personal friend of the President and therefore in

sense he wasn't just the Director of Central Intelligence,

he was also a very close personal friend. So that I think he

had broad views on it htat went beyond the Agency and I think

his Agency responsibilities.

I think that the metamorphosized into a thing where it

began to focus more on it

as an agency would facing any

problem. In the beginning you had the Director, you had

the Deputy Director, you had case officers, you had division

chiefs, all seeing the Warren Commission independently. You

had FBI liaisoning at many different levels.

We

had liaison

offices. That would be the normal way of approaching any

kind of business.

In a

sense, it took some time to get this thing to focus.

There was

some control of knowing what different elements

in

the Agencywere capable of doing or knew or whatnot.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long did it take to get focused so

there was an effective team of some kind at the Agency provid-

ing the Warren Commission on a regular basis with information?

Mr. Angleton. I can't give you a time factor. I know,

and this is only memory without having seen any papers, from

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my own memory I know I was raising certain questions of dupli-

cation and of the fact of trying to get all the papers pulled

together in one place.

In other words, if you got a call from

the Director you could not be really sure that you vere giving

a final answer. It did not necessarily mean that was the

answer.

Mr. Goldsmith. Eventually was the responsibility for

coordinating the Agency's work given to any particular unit

or component?

Mr. Angleton. We had what I called at that time, and

still refer to as the point of record. In other words, it

didn't have any command function but at least it was trying

get hold of all the telegrams, all of the memoranda of record,

all the agency participation, et cetera.

Mr. Goldsmith. By we are you referring to the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did this responsibility devolve upon

the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. Basically because you might say it was try-

ing to find someplace of common concern. We had research and

analysis. We were very strong on research and analysis in the

person of Rocca, the fact that he had some pretty good legmen

around him that could be diverted from what they were doing

to run errands and do work.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference to MI. Rocca.

Who

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within the CI Staff was primarily responsibile for coordinating

the effort to assist the Warren

• Commission?

MI. Angleton. He was the principal point.

Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibilities, if any, did you

have at

that time with regard to the work that was being

performed to assist the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I never saw anybody from the Warren Commi-

ssion. I am coming back to what you are saying. I preface

it by

saying that I never did meet anybody from the Warren

Commission to my knowledge, outside of Mr. Dulles and thät

was not in an official capacity. My basic thing was to read

over everything htat came across my desk but basically shoving

the responsibility on to Rocca to the point of the legwork

which meant that he didn't have to go through me to deal

_ with

other people in the Agency.

The normal course of events, if he was going to go, if the

Director called him or Deputy Director and so on, the channel

would normally be that he would be on the phone to me about it;

and we would confer. He was given a lot of latitude. But

have to explain something here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Angleton. Our main concern - when I say concern,

don't mean it in the sense of importance or anything, but at

that time we were in the middle of the day of the assassina-

tion, I can recall it very distinctly, there was a high

Da den

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representative of a foreign government who had arrived the day

before and had presented a letter of complaint to Mr. McCone

regarding an allegation as to one of his service's number two

man, a Soviet suspect.

So he had come with this letter from

the Chief of that service to register this complaint.

If I recall corectly, he had lunch with the Director

and then he was to meet with me and my Deputy. Now, this was

one of those ball-ups of an individual from that country, our

representative, who had been back and had been privately

briefed as to the security problems relating to that station

and to that country. Without authorization he disclosed to the

chief of that service the name of this individual who was in

fact this chief's deputy. So you can imagine the crisis that

devolved from this unauthorized leakage.

So this snowballed into quite a package, I might add,

and

it went on for I think about a year, with many visits from the

Intenal Security of that country to us during which all kinds

of cooperation was given, depositions, and all that, and in the

end they determined that -- I will put it this way, whatever

they determined they gave us no final report but the head of

that government appointed a special commission which got rid

of him, in short.

So that the day of the assassination this was one

of the

primary concerns of Counterintelligence. So it was running in

that office, I mean running in the conference room, running to;

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people, finally getting rid of the follow, staying on at night,

seeing what happened, et cetera, et cetera.

In the meantime, the Western Hemisphere Division was

involved, the Soviet Division was involved, the Deputy Director

was involved, et cetera.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that you were working in the

context of a crisis situation by virtue of the facts that you

made reference to. In light of that understanding, however,

my question is what responsibilities did you have with regard

to the work that the Agency was performing to assist the

Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I didn't have and specific responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. The CI Staff became a point of record?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were head of the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. But that does not follow in that strict

sense.

The Director could call or anyone could call Rocca

without reference to me. In other words, it was a very

special situation. He was doing a job of comnon concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. To what extent did you get involved in

the work of the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I got very much involved in the immediate

question, having been 31 years in the business and probably

as much knowledge as anybody about the Soviet assassinations,

assassinations as such by foreign services. My immediate

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concern was the question of Soviet intelligence, Soviet Bloc

intelligence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Rocca, as a matter of routine, pass

on to you information that he considered to be important?

Mi. Angleton. Yes. It was not just passing it on. If

he had a matter that he regarded as a development or something

that I had to know because of its relationship to whatever I

might be doing or anybody else in the Staff might be doing,

then he wouldn't hesitate after hours to get on the phone and

break in and so on, if there was such a type thing.

Our relationship was such that it was only 20 feet away

fromphis office to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he keep you apprised of the key

developments in the Kennedy case so far as the Agency was

concerned?

Mr. Angleton. There was an awful lot of activity going

on which I wouldn't say that we knew at the moment that it

was happening. In other words, there were a lot of people who

would be in the wi Division that might not know about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the CI Staff was a point of

record it does not necessarily follow that the CI Staff was

informed of all key developments that the Agency had become

aware of?

Mr. Angleton. I can't say that as a fact. I am simply

saying there were so many things going on that you couldn't

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be sure because, after all, unless somebody sent you something

how did you know

that activity of that particular thing was

going on? In other words, my memory is one that, unlike what

I said earlier where you have a task force or you have a

problem where there is no point of record but somebody who is

charged and where no action is taken without the clearance of

that individual, there wasn't that kind of situation.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Insofar as information was made available

to Mr. Rocca, did he actively keep you apprised of those facts:

that he considered to be important?

Mr. Angleton. I think so, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. From what you are saying I get the

impression generally htat the situation was not all that well

organized. Did Mr. Helms or anyone else issue an order indi-

cating that CI Staff was a point of record and that all perti

nent information for the Warren Commission or information

relevant to the investigation was to pass through the CI

Staff?

MI. Angleton. I think it was to be at least deposited

there.

There was an order of some sort, some kind of instruc-

tion, that made it clear that everything as to be pulled

together in the Counterintelligence Staff. That man was

Rocca.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Jack Whitten responsibile for coor-

dinating the aspects of the Agency work on the assassination?

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Mr. Angleton. J. C. King was the head of the WH Division

and Whitten was his right hand man handling all the Western

remisphere stuff;

Mr. Goldsmith. My question was probably more specifically

was Whitten given responsibility for coordinating the Agency's

initial efforts to support the FBI in attempting to investi-

gate the Kennedy assassination?

MI. Angleton. I can't remember exactly the terms of

reference of Whitten except that he was very prominent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever having any conflict

with Whitten concerning areas of responsibility with regard

to the Agency's effort to investigation the assassination?.

Mr. Angleton. Nothing that I can recall except that I

always felt unesay when anyone met with the FBI or anybody

else that we didn't either have a participant or somebody

present.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that?

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the regular counter-

intelligence liaison being centered in the Counterintelligence

Staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. If I understand you correct, what you

are saying is that the CI Staff essentially was responsible

for liaison witht with the FBI. For that reason, you would

have wanted to be kept informed?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. Simply that my experience

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with liaison is that when you speak with him voices to an

organization you are bound to have misunderstandings. In

other words, if you have people who have never dealt with the

FBI, there is a art of dealing with any interagency or

investigative group, you know -- but whitten was very promi-

nent because obviously the trip to Mexico and the telegrams

were coming in to SH Division as the action division.

Mr. Goldsmith. By Mexico you are referring to Oswald's

trip?

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Mr. Angleton. Yes. The cable when it comes in has in

the upper left hand corner a place where it says "action".

It will designate the component. Then it will have another

line which shows dissemination. So that action would be

WH Division unless it was the Deputy Director himself who

signed the cable in which case the action would be indicated

on that cable at the designated point. Dissemination showed

everybody else who had

a collateral interest of some sort.

All of a sudden you might see somebody on there that you

wondered why he was on it. Something like that might arounse

the question, why has the cable gone here, there and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals within the Agency to

your knowledge were responsibile for maintaining contact

with

the Warren Commission, communicating information to the

Warren Commission.

Mr. Angleton.

Just simply from my recollection, it would

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have been the Director, Mr. Helms, J. C. King, Whitten, Dave

Murphy, who was the Chief of the Soviet Division, Rocca, and

perhaps, but I am not certain, maybe one or two of his men.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any formal procedure established

for communicating information to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know that it was formal. It was

more on what the subject matter was.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, I take it that the CI Staff

per Helms order would have been informed of the information

that would have been available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. We tried to keep on top of it. I think

as time went on we got a little more of a grasp, I mean the

people who were involved, and also they began to call us in the

sense that we were passive, once we started getting all the

information and making sure that traces were run and all that,

it was in their interest to call us and ask questions.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you are referring to the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Angleton. Both the Warren Commission and any of the

other components in the Agency dealing with them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state in general terms

what areas the Agency attempted to give emphasis to in attempti

ing to support the Warren Commission? In otner words, were

there investigative hypotheses that were pursued?

Mr. Angleton. I think the fundamental one was the whole

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thing of trying to get some idea on Oswald and traces, hypo-

theses, on the question of whether there was any foreign

influence involved.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Which area of foreign influence received

emphasis?

Mr. Angleton. The Soviet would be one, and of course

Cuban.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you feel that you were given by your

superiors at the Agency all relevant information concerning

the

assassination which would have ensured that the Agency's

investigation and ultimately the Warren Commission's investi-

gation would be completely thorough?

Mr. Angleton. At

the time I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about today?

Mr. Angleton. After I left my job as Chief, Counter-

intelligence, but while they kept me on ice for the Church

Committee - let me put it that way, I had been working very

hard on that AP story that came out about Castro's warning

about attempted assassinations against him.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn of the anti-

castro assassination plots sponeored by the Agency?

MI. Angleton. I had wind of something from time to time

but never one I didn't stick my nose into in the sense that

I had been brought up in a world of compartmentation and I

tried to live up to that. I regarded it as a twoway street.

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But when someone has assigned things from the Directorate

it is not your job to try to break down that compartmentation.

I learned by pure accident that there had been a Mafia

contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you learn that?

MI. Angleton. I learned that, and I can't give you a

date but it is obviously in the record someplace, I learned

it because the FBI lisison fellow was at my house one evening

when the Bureau was frantically trying to get hold of him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when that was?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember thendate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it before or after the Warren

Commission work was completed?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was after the Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the FBI liaison?

Mr. Angleton. Sam Papich. According to the Bureau

procedures, he had left what his schedule would be and where

he would be at every moment. The call came in from the field

office, as I recall, and they stated that from surveillance

of Rosselli from CAlifornia, I think it was CAlifornia, he had

met an individual whose description was pricisely that of

Bill Harvey. They were a little upset.

I heard enough of it to tell Sam not to say anything

and

tell him he would call back or words to that effect. Then

he told me that they had said that Rosselli got off a plane

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by such an individual. They were baffled.

So I immediately called, I told sam, I said "look, this

thing, you have to keep in mind that the FBI had separate..;

liaison with the Cuban group because of the complications of

Miami and all that."

I said, "It is not my affair but don't start getting a

lot of explosions happening until we get this thing clarified

a bit."

Sam agreed. I think he told me he would be back at them

but not to get excited, or words to that effect.

I called Harvey's wife and asked here "Where is Bill?"

She said, "Duke Zeiberts."

"Will you get hold of him and tell him to call me

immediately, that there is a crisis?"

Bill called within a few seconds so to speak. I just

handed the phone, I said, "Bill, a Gernam somebody wants to

talk to you." So I gave him the telephone. I didn't listen

in on the conversation but I know that sam got the answers he

wanted and he called back the Burau and apparently had the

surveillance called off. This was around 10 o'clock, between

9 and. 10: 0'clock at right. Then he took it up with Bill the

next day.

I mean, from then on it left me and became a privileged

matter between him and the desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. I realize that I have asked this question

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one time. I would like to ask it again.

Mr. Angleton. I seem to be avoiding your cuestion.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, you have answered iny question.

You

have given me a lot of eatail about the circumstances surround+

ing your first learning of the anti-Castro assassination plot.

The question I want to ask again is, do you recall approxi-

mately when you learned this information?

MI. Angleton. No, I don't know the time. I was working

on a lot of that before I left the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state whether it was

before or after the Warren Commission had completed its work?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain it was well after the Warren

Commission had compited its work but I have no feeling for

dates.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is really the only relevant issue

so far as we are concerned.

Do you think that the work of the CI Staff in attempting

to facilitate the efforrs of the Warrent Commission

affected in any way by the failure of other CIA officials to

inform the CI Staff of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way, whether it would

have facilitated the Warren Commission I don't know. I think

the problem, I just told Miss Brady I was very unhappy not

to have been informed either by your Committee or the Agency

in advance that Hart was going to testify, ne put me at a

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terrible disadvantage in the sense that I would have been glued

to the radio to have heard him, therefore, I lost three or

four or five days and nights to dredge up that testimony with

a lot of calls coming in from a lot of concerned people.

Then, forewarned, I heard a lot of Helms testimony

except for interruptions.

This question keeps conding up,

whether it would have helped the Warren Commission. I would

answer in this fashion, that the counterintelligence concern

with the assassination could not keep pace with the life of

that Committee. In other words, the Committee's requirements

or demands, or whatever it may be, they had a life of their

own and they had deadlines to meet.

In other words, they were working at a faster pace than

we were in terms of our activities and they couldn't coincide.

In otherwords, for example, in private dicussions with Allen

Dulles I told him that personally I believed there should not

be a finality to the report. In other words, the door ought

to be left open. You don't have an assassin assassinate the

assassin so to speak, without all these terrible things going

to come out of the closet.

I didn't have

in mind at that time!

the Cubans, so to speak, so much as I did the whole question of

the Soviets, the Nosenko business, and many other things.

Mr. Goldsmith. I beliave that Mr. Helms in his public

testimony indicated that in retrospect he would have taken the :

information on the anti-Castro assassination plots and put them

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in a truck and driven to the steps of the Warren Commission and

simply delivered them there.

Mr. Angleton. I heard the statement.

MI. Goldsmith. That is the statement in substance.

DO

you think that the information should have been given to the

Warren Commission.

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I still haven't seen all

that information. Before leaving the Agency I can recall going

through a file and I found that there seemed to be a

- I won't

say disapprence but when I went to a certain individual and

said "Where is ther eport on Fitzgerald, et cetera, et cetera,

"In Paris?", whatever it was, that I could feel the door shut-

ting around me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any good reason for not

giving that information to the Warren Conmission?

Mr. Angleton. What puzzles me is whether even if they had

that, whether they would have seen its significance. In other

words, I even wonder whether people in the Agency understood

the significance of what that assassination business meant.

I think we would have seen it probably more sharply.

Mr. Goldsmith. By "we" you are referring to the CI

Staff?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I think we would nave seen it more

sharply because of the fact that we were more intensely

engaged in this whole Soviet Bloc assassination. We had more

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experience in terms of Department 13 and the whole history of

30 years of Soviet sabotage and assassinations. It was not

something to us that was a dream world. We knew of cases and

we knew of the modus operandi and so on.

Also, I never had much confidence in the Cuban operations,

whether it was run by Bissell or anybody else so far as

security went. I just didn't feel that you can run operations

of that sort, imigre groups and all the rest of it, and main-

tain security.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any positive indica-

tions that there were in fact security problems with regard to

these anti-Castro plots?

Mr. Angleton. I just happened to know a lot of the people

involved and I couldn't see it. You would hear too many

rumors. I don't like to make that statement and leave it

there. I went through the whole Bissell period of the Bay of

Pigs - not having been a part of it, in other words, I was

in the TB sanitarium and I got back -- while I was in the TB

sanitarium I heard a great deal about the Cuban operations from

people who were not even party to it.

• I had lunch with Bissell

and he asked me, I mean he:

raised the thing in some fashion, he invited me to lunch when

he got back. I asked him only one question. I said, "Do you

have any escape hatch?"

He took quite an officnse at that. He said, "What do you:

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"In case the thing falls flat on its face is there some-

one who goes to Castro and says 'you have won the battle.

What is your price?'"

In other words, have you planned for the failure as much

as planned for the successs?

We never met again until after

the Bay of Pigs. We never had one word exchanged.

So I say this only because I can't take an operation -

and then we had all this experience through the SS period, we

had it with the Polish imigraion, we had it with the failure

of the Albanian operations and everything else -- when you

start dealing with large masses of people and try to have

these fictional covers they simply don't hold up.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you think that the Cuban aspect of the

assassination was thoroughly and adequately investigated by the

Agency and by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No. I personally believe that the United

States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to

ever come to an adjudication. I don't think the capabilities

were there.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is regardless of whether or not the

anti-Castro plots would have been

made available to the Warren

Commission, you are saying regardless of that, our intelligence

agencies did not have the capability to investigate that

thoroughly.

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Mr. Angleton. Unless they had a code break or a defector

or something.

Let me take a case by say of example to show you what I

am trying to say. I think it was in 1962 or thereabouts we had

this young man from Hungary who was aviation internal security,

Hungarian Intelligence Security, Bela Lapusnyik, a very

important defector to the Austrians. whi knew of the internal

activities of AVH against embassies, recruitment of personnel

in embassies and their whole modus operandi, et cetera.

The Austrians were very reluctant to give us the custody

we wanted and yet as a service they didn't have the leads and

have the comprehensive knowledge of a VHO.. It was only

indirectly that we could pose questions to them and get

answers but the answers we were getting were enough to show the

tremendous importance of this individual.

Finally, with a lot of pressure it came to an agreement,

that on a Sunday they would have exhausted all international

interest in the man and he would be transported to the United

Stgtes. On the morning of his being transferred to us, even

though he was in a high security jail, with police and whatnot,

he was found dead. He was in his late 20's, in

perfect health.

Immediately it was declared that it was food poisoning.

It just didn't stack up that it would be food poisoning.

Now, we had had an allegation from reliable sources of

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penetration of the Austrian security service. It was a posi-

tive type of allegation from a high grade source. So Stein

Magsen sent all kinds of people down there. They printed

and everybody reprinted the fact that the official finding

was. food poisoning. Even the Vienna Institute of Forensic

riedicine, which is one of the most famous ones in the world;

supported the statement.

Some years later, we had another Hungarian defector.

The

Ioment he got off the plane I got hold of him. I met him out

in a safe house and one of the first things I hit him with was

about Lapusnyik. He gave the story that he nad access to that

file, that that file was in the custody of the Chief of

Ministry of the Interior and so on, and he explained in detail

that he had access ot it and they did not have the means of

conducting an assassination but the Czechs had the agent and

the Czechs were the ones who did the assassination. That was

on the eve of the man: coming to the United states.

I will say this.. He had only been skimed on the surface

in terms of the way he would have been, in the way of the

assets, and I mean recruitment, who the agents were in ::

embassies and

so on. That showed capability, it showed

flexibility, but it also showed collaboration among Bloc

services, the sharing:; of resources and cohesiveness of

action, and that is supported by many other cases, Rumanians,

Soviets and so on, all prove able cases, all cases which had

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prosecutions involved and

evidence certified.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, to what

extent did the Agency's concern for protecting sensitive

sources and methods have an

effect on the nature and quality

of the information that was made available to the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Angleton. By quality what do you mean?

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the information given to the Warren

Commission in sanitized form, for example?

Mr. Angleton. All I can say to that is that I hope so:

I don't know. I know that my view is that no piece of infor-

mation should go out of the Agency where if that document is

compromised it destroys: the source.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if in fact that was the

Agency's position that when information touching on sensitive

sources and methods was involved it would be sanitized at least

to those sensitive aspects and then given to the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. What I am trying to say is

that I can see the Chief of the Division or somebody if

he was talking to the counsel there and there wasn't any record

being made and so on, that he might feel that he ought to tell

him a little bit more to give him some sense of evaluatiing

that this is more important and this is important,

something

of that sort.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Overall, was there a concern about pro-

tecting sourceces and methods when giving information to the

Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that question because I

really don't know. I know that you had a lot of people dealing

with them. My personal view is that if we ever had information

that incontrovertibly showed that there had been a foreign

power that had assassinated the President, then that would

supersede all sources and methods.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go off the record for a moment.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr.

Dulles play any special role on

the Warren Commission so far as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. Angleton. Only by virtue of his having been the

Director.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he in any way represented

the interest of the Agency to the Warren Conmission?

MI. Angleton. I don't think that he had any understand-

ing with Mr. McCone at all. In fact, I

am quite confident he

would not have had an understanding. They were not on the

best of terms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge one

way of another about that?

Mr. Angleton. I personally had a relationship with him?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you have any personal knowledge

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concerning whether he represented the interest of the Agency

on the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. Explain that to me.

Mr. Goldsmith.

For example, there would have been areas

that the Warren Commission and the Agency lay have been some-

what at odds.

One area that comes to minu is in the Nosenko

area where the Agency may have had a preference for having the

Warren Commission not treat the Nosenko issue at all whereas

the Warren Commission may have wanted to deal with that issue

in some way. That would be a case where the Agency's interest

would be at stake.

My question is, do you know whether in a case of that kind

Mr. Dulles would have

made an effort to represent the Agency's

position to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't think so. I think that you

have to first keep in mind that Dulles was pretty much his own

man. He was an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell. He was

about as independent a man as I know when i came to questions

of his personal integrity. He wasn't a person who tried to

compromise a lot of things, if I can put it that way.

When it got down to something as

serious as going on the

Commission he did not give the President an answer right away.

In other words, he raised with the President, according to what

he told me, because he called me the very day he got back from

whereever he was up in New York and had received a call from

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the President, and he recounted to me the fact that he had

raised all these conflicts, possible conflicts, in the public

eye if he took that job.

We kicked that around as to the pros ana cons. I knew

he wanted the job. Like anyone in retirement this was a

challenge to him and so on. But I think by way of character

there would be no loyalties to the Agency or anybody else

superseding his mandate from the President.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me who you a document that corre

sponds with JFK Exhibit F-529 at the Committee's final hearings.

This document actually is one that we reviewed that was the

basis for the question that I just asked you. I would ask you

to skim two paragraphs. Read the third one and the fourth

a bit more carefully and then we will talk about it.

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that necessarily changes

anything that I said. What I am trying to say is that I am

certain if he believed that this was a proper course on it:

and the doubts on Nosenko were expressed, whether it was the

Bureau talking to him or anybody else talking to him, that he

would still be persuaded by the facts, not by the fact that

it was the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph there simply suggests

the possibility that Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent

the interest of the Agency and the Committee was concerned

with (a), whether that- was more than just a possibility,

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Mx. Angleton. I will say this. If there was anything in

that memorandum that he regarded as being detrimental to the

Commission's work, my view is that there would have been an

explosion and he would have exploded.

Mr. Goldsmith. By that you mean then that he would be

giving priority to the work of the Commission rather than to

the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. And I think in there he is giving priority

to the Commission. Wheaver briefing he received -- I was

unaware of the meeting that is being referred to here but I

am just saying that he was obviously persuaded, if there were

these doubts on the Nosenko thing, that this thing, the contro

versy as to bonifides, that it would -- I mean, it was one of

those kinds of things that would be detrimental to a finding

of the Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to have that marked as

Angleton Exhibit Number 1.

(The above referred to document was marked Angleton

Exhibit Number 1 and follows)

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Mr. Goldsmith. !

Do you know whether Mr. Dulles had any

special arrangement with Mr. Helms?

Mr. Angleton. No. I was never present with both of them

together. I don't know the content of any of their meetings

so far as I can recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role did the Mexico City station

have in the Agency's investigative effort?

Mr. Angleton. It had a very important role for two

reasons. One, Win Scott was the Chief of the Mission down

there, was perhaps one of the more capable officers we had.

He had been in the FBI. He was a very highly intelligent man.

He had assets, to wit, the overage, sources.

If you had to

grade stations across the board in terms of different kinds of

coverage or assets or agents or whatnot, I would give him a

very high batting average.

He was a real professional.

Further, he had an excellent relationship with the FBI

which had a huge station down there, and I would say a lesser

man would not have been on speaking terms with them because

they had once owned the Western Hemisphere in terms of juris-

diction and it was with some reluctance, so to speak, that they

transferred it to CIA. So he was highly regarded by the FBI

people. That was by force of his own personality.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico City Station had a major role?

MI. Angleton.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it one reason is because Oswald

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had visited Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you review the cable traffic that

flowed when the Mexico City station and headquarters after the

assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I saw a lot of jumbled messages. I saw

an

awful lot of massages that always seemed to be contentious

and that is the only way I can describe them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Contentious in what way?

Mr. Angleton. In the sense of headquarters saying cer-

tain things to Mexico and coming back and overlapping. I

never was able to sort out, I don't know that I saw all the

cables but there seemed to have been a lot of confusion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can summarize that

accurately. You saw a lot of cables. You did not see all

of them, is that correct?

MI. Angleton. I don't know if I saw all of them. There

was

no reason why I should see all of them because I think on

some occasions Win would telephone directly or the station

would telephone hin directly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Rocca have reviewed all the

cable and dispatch traffic between the Mexico City station and

headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. If they sent it to him, yes, if we were

on the dissemination.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I take it after MI. Helms' order that the

CI Staff would have been on the dissemination.

Mr. Angleton. We probably would have been. You see,

every station chief had the privilege of what is called "eyes

on cable" in different categories of dissemination that cable

people only follow what the code word is.

They don't know

about Mr. Helms' order in that sense.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that the cables were

contentious. Was there any conflict apparent in those cables

between Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. When I use the word contentious it may be

overdoing it but I can remember somebody saying, "have you

done this or that?" Or demanding that you send it up here

or something. I can't give you details. All I meant is that

Win was usually the tidiest of men. In other words, he always

had a big fat In box but he never left, regardless of an

appointment or anybody else, until he

finished his day's work.

He was a prodigious worker.

So, what I am trying to say is that having been down there

and seeing him function at one time when there was some pro-

blem with the Bureau and all that, i had the highest regard

for the way he ran his outfit.

Mr. Goldsmith. How common was it for Scott or anyone else

in the Mexico City station during the aftermath of the assassi

nation to communicate with headquarters personnel

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telephonically?

Mr. Angleton. It was very rare.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Did you ever communicate with them tele-

phonically relative to the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think so, no. I mean, I wouldn't

have the right to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any

surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against Soviet and

Cuban Embassies and Consulates?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was information regarding Oswald obtained

as a result of these operations?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what information was obtained?

Mr. Angleton. Unless I

saw the cables I could not tell

you precisely what was obtained. I know that there was infor-

mation about his going into the Soviet Embassy. In other

words, there was both telephonic and other surveillance of some

sort.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Photographic?

Mr. Angleton. Photographic surveillance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this information was

given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think the substance of everything was

given to the Warren Commission.

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MI. Goldsmith. I

Do you know whether the Warren Commission

was told about the specific surveillance operation?

Mr. Angleton. I don't really know whether they were in

the end. The reason I say that is because I can remember a

question about whether to black out the background behind

the face or soemthing so that it could not be identified in

terms of location.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is that you do not know

whether or not the Warren Commission was told specifically

about the surveillance operation?

Mr. Angleton. No. My feeling is that they must have

been told in the sense -- I mean, it stands to reason that they

would be pressuring, the attorneys would be pressuring, to know

more and more about the coverage and all that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have made reference now to a photo-

graph. Why don't we start examining some of the cable traffic

that is available to me. I am going to be making reference

to documents by their numbers. The numbers have been assigned

to the documents by the Agency. Essentially the Agency has

assigned the numbers for security purposes so that every docu

ment that is given to the Committee can be accounted for. For

convenience purposes I have taken those security numbers and

I use the for reference purposes in this deposition.

At this time we are going to refer to CIA document number

177, which is a cable dated 9 October 1963. The 177 appears

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at the bottom right. I would ask you to read that particular

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cable.

Now, the second paragraph of that cable makes reference

to photograph and it gives as description of someone. The

description, however, does not correspond to Lee Harvey Oswald!

Do you have any information concerning the descrepancy between

Oswald and the description given of him in that second para-

graph?

Mr. Angleton: No, it does not mean anything to me.:

Mr. Göldsmith: Was the Agency. ever able:to learn the

identity of the individual to whom reference is made in the

second paragraph?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission was

told about these photographs to which reference is made in

the the second paragraph?

Mr. Angleton. No. I mean, I don't know when.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you think that they were told about

the picture but you don't know when?

Mr. Angleton. I heard much about the picture but I still

don't have a coherent picture of the picture.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA Number 2139. This

is a memo dated 5 March 1964 for the attention of Richard

Helms.

Raymond Rocca is the author of the memo.

Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title?

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Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title?

MI. Goldsmith.

I don't know who gave it the title.

That

is a xerox copy of the document in the form that we found it

to be in the Oswald file..

Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference to -

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry.

Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference? Where is Rankin's!

letter which has been referred to?

Mr. Goldsmith. I will make that letter available to you.

Mr. Angleton. I can't get it in the context.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me as you this question which I do

not feel requires reference to that letter.

The second paragraph clearly makes reference to those

photographs?

Mr. Angleton. Let me finish this because I only got this

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Mr. Goldsmith.. I am only going to ask you a question

about the

second paragraph.

Mr. Angleton. It starts off here, paragraph two of the

letter, this says "this is in response to paragraph three of

this letter."

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

We will make the letter available

if you feel you have a need to see it.

Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the second paragraph of that memo

makes reference to the photographs that were the subject of

the controversy. According to the second paragraph there was

apparently an inclination on your part to "wait out the

Commission" with regard to its request for these photographs.

Mr. Angleton. Does it say that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read the relevant sentence to you.

Mr. Angleton. I don't read it that way. I don't see what

it means, wait out what? . I have to see what Rankin -

Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise it refers to "Jim would prefer

to wait out the matter covered in paragraph two of that letter

Mr. Angleton. Which I don't know anything about.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I will show you the

letter. Later on in the same paragraph it says "We have either

passed in substance to the Commission in response earlier

levies for the items referred to, reported leades. For example,

the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald."

I am asking you, in reference to these six photographs

which were not of Oswald, was there any inclination on your

part not to provide those materials to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I really can't answer you until I see what

paragraph two means. I don't even know whether paragraph two

refers to the photographs because here it says "We-have either

passed material in substance to the Commission", which I assume

is what I am referring to, in other words, what I am saying

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is that whatever I am objecting to seems to have already been

passed in substance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I won't quarrel with that. I won't

quarrel with you at all. It does say that it was passed in

substance. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to get the

Rankin letter for you to review and then we will come back

to this point later on.

Mr. Angleton. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with the

Embassies in Mexico City, was that contact considered to be

significant and important in any way by the mexico City .

station?

Mr. Angleton. I think all contacts were.

Mr. Goldsmith. All contacts with whom?

Mr. Angleton. Americans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Win Scott about

Oswald's trip to Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179 which is a

calbe dated 10 October 1963. It is three pages. Now, this

cable contains a correct description of Oswald in the first

paragraph. Do you know what the source of that correct

description would have been?

Mr. Angleton. It looks like it might have been Navy or

the Bureau.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Would that information have been obtained

from his 201 file, do you think?

Mr. Angleton. I would assume so.

Wait just one minute.

Let me see what the dissemination was on this.

This wasn't

to Egeter. She worked for me.

CIA liaison Roman in draft.

Does that mean that she was acting as Liaison? So they had

a role?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would they have had access to the 201

file?

MI. Angleton. Yes, but they would have access to the

201 file but the originator here is a fellow from WH Division,

Bustov.

Mr. Goldsmith. Charotte Bustoff?

Mr. Angleton. Charlotte.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know her?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph also makes reference

to Oswald by the name "Lee Henry Oswald"! That has become

somewhat subject of controversy by the Warren Commission

critics. Do you know how the Agency ever started to

refer to

Oswald by an incorreet middle name?

Mt. Angleton. I would like to -- when I look at this,

this is obviously a - the memo starts getting down here to

birth date and all that. It looks like passport information.

Therefore, I assume that is either State or Navy. I mean,

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somebody who had a record on him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The next paragraph makes reference to

background information concerning Oswald's defection. Would

that have escalated the significance of his contacts with the

Soviets in Mexico City, in your opinion?

Mr. Angleton. Let me see that again.. I think that would

be a solid trace. In other words, it would be from Scott's

point of view a matter of considerable interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton.

Because it does not read like a lot of

third hand information. It looks like it is pretty solid

information. It is not a lot of allegations and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Scott be concerned about the

fact that Oswald was a defector? I guess I am asking you to

state the obvious:

Mr. Angleton.

He had been in counterintelligence all his

life and he had handled an awful lot of soviet cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. The last sentence of pagraph five indi-

cates "Please keep headquarters advised of any further

contacts or positive identification of Oswald."

Assuming that the Mexico City station, prior to the

assassination, knew that Oswald had also contacted the Cuban

Embassy, should that information have been communicated to

headquarters and by using the words or the phrase "assuming

that Mexico City station knew"

, I mean actual knowledge, they

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had linked the contact of

an individual with the Cuban

Embassy, specifically Oswald, should that information have

been communicated to headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. You mean if they thought the same indi-

vidual hwere had been in touch with the Cubans?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Angleton. Sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. I note at the bottom left hand corner

of the document that Thomas

Karamessines was the releasing

officer. Why would someone as high up in DDO as Karamessines

have been the releasing officer for a cable of this kind?

Mr. Angleton. I think that the reason for that would be

that when you have more than one division involved plus a

staff and all that, he probably wanted to häve his finger on

it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What other division besides DDO was

involved here?

Mr. Angleton. SR Division. Since the fellow was from

Russia and all that Russian background it would be involvea.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have Western Hemisphere units con-

cerned and also Soviet Russian units concerned?

MI. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you know whether the Mexico City sta-

tion ever obtained a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Angleton. I would assume so but I don't know. . I

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assume they did when they talked about that previous informa-

tion you showed me. Wait a minute. Let me recapitulate:

"According to so and so American spoke broken Russian

and said his name was so and so." It was obviously a tape.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you know if there were any tape record-

ings of Oswald's voice in existence at the time of the assassi-

nation?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you

a letter dated

November 23, 1963 which I regret is not in very good form,

in other words, a poor xerox.

The letter is from Mr. Hoover

to the head of the Secret Service. I am only going to ask

you to read

one paragraph in it starting at the bottom of page

four, going on to page five. If you have difficulty reading

this, I will be glad to read it to you.

Mr. Angleton. This is from whom to whom?

Mr • Goldsmith.!

This is from Mr. Hoover to Mr. RowLey of

the Secret Service.

Mr. Angleton.. I can't read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read it then and I apologize for

the poor form.

"The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October

1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source has reported that an

idnvidual identified himself as Lee Oswald contacted the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City."

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Then it is sanitized. The next relevant sections are

as follows: Special agents of this Bureau who have conversed

with us from Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the

individual referred to above and have listened to a recording

of his voice.

These special agents are of the opinion htat

the above referred to individual was not lee Harvey Oswald."

In other words, the substance of this paragraph suggests

that there was a tape recording that was listened to after the

assassination by FBI agents. The recording purported

to

contain Oswald's voice but the agents were of the opinion that

it was not Oswald's voice.. Do you have any information con-

cerning this issue?

MI. Angleton. No. Does: that indicate whose tape it is?

Mr. Goldsmith. It does not. The inference is that it is

a CIA tape.

Frankly, this is a sanitized document.

Mr. Angleton. I wondered if the Bureau had a tape.

Mr. Goldsmith. The inference here is that at the time

the Bureau was in possession of the tape.

• Did the CIA's Mexico City station ever obtain a photograph

of Oswald as a result of its photo-surveillance operation

against the Soviet and Cuban Consulates?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they should have

obtained a photograph of Oswald in light of the scope of the

coverage?

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Mr. Angleton. I don't know how good the coverage was.

In other words, I don't know - in those days cameras were not

hwat they are today, I mean in germs of automated or the type

that takes one ver

minute. I don't know what it was set

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Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you have no pe-sonal know-

ledge of this?

Mr. Angleton. No. I don't know whether this is a movie

or still.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Win Scott

whom I take it you regarded as an extremely competent indi-

vidual?

Mr.. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Goldsmith. Was

Win Scott well known for maintaining

an extremely thorough record system?

Mr. Angleton. He was.

He was always fighting the

administration part of the Agency, who always wanted to reduce

the files or burn stuff and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. The administration people wanted to burn

files and he was inclined to keep them?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where his files are stored?

Mr. Angleton. He had a big office.

Mr. Goldmith. In Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did Win Scott also maintain materials in

alpersonal safe?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain that he aid.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that safe was?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know but I know it would certainly

be under his eye and it would be in his office, I would assume.

Mr. Goldsmith. After Win Scott's death did you ever visit

Mexico City for the purpose of removing materials from win

Scott's safe?.

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I visited there but not for the pur-

pose of removing stuff from the safe.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the visit?

Mr. Angleton. Well, number one, I was appointed as an

official by Dick to go down there to the funeral. Number two,

win was going to write a book, a manuscript. My purpose was

to go down and get all copies of the manuscript.

Since I was a close friend of his and I knew his wife and

all that, I combined both things and talked to her and. '

explained our position on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you able to obtain this manuscript?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review it at

all?

Mr. Angleton. I looked through it. He made more than

one draft.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the manu-

script, to give an account of his experience with the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Well, it was sort of a last will and

testament of an operator in which a lot of it was camoflaged

and romanticized into a story. It had a plot and all that.

Win had written under a pseudonym some seven stories of his

youth in Alabama which were sort of Mark Twainish. He had

it privately printed.

It was an extremely good book. I think that he was try-

ilg to write a mystery novel but at the same time he was mak-

ing a lot of observations about the world of espionage and

me in particular.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this particular manuscript ever

published?

Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it intended to be a fictional or

nonfictional account?

Mr. Angleton. Both. I mean, it was fictional but it

was recognizable. I mean, anyone who was in the business would

have recognized a great deal in it.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did the Agency know that Scott was

writing that manuscript?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that his wife, as

recall, his wife didn't know he was writing. I don't know

precisely how we found out, whether he told us or how it came

1

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to us. I knew at one time but it slips my mind precisely

how we knew.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you obtain any materials other than

this manuscript?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

I can't remember. I know

I got an awful lot of material which I turned over to the

Chief of Mission down there to dispatch back through the

pouch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long the manuscript

was? How many pages?

Mr. Angleton. It was sort of thickish, about that thick.

(Indicating). I can't tell how many drafts there were.

Apparently it was far from being finishea. It was well on -

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he ever discuss it with you?

MI:

Angleton. No.

MI. Goldsmith. Why don't we take a brief recess now or

perhaps Miss Brady will resume questions.

I will review some

materials that have been provided to me by the Agency. I might

add that so far as I am concerned, we are in pretty good shape

in terms of time.

Miss. Brady. Did you have any contact with Bernard

Barker, Howard Hunt or Eugenio Martinez during your CIA career?

Mr. Angleton. Who was the first one?

Miss Brady• Benard Barker.

Mr. Angleton. None of them.

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Miss Brady. At any time?

Mr. Angleton. No. I want to explain the Hunt business.

One of the things

that this Joe trento, the reporter, gave out

that he learned form this Committee, he put it that he learned

from the Committee that they had a memorandum between myself

and Dick Helms to the effect that I wrote a memo to Dick say

ing that Howard Hunt was in Dallas at the time of the assassi-

nation and I was suggesting or proposing a cover-up.

Miss Brady. To whom?

Mr. Angleton. To Helms. Now, when I was called before

the Watergate Committee I was challenged about soom such and

such in the Executive Office Building. I didn't even know

what they were talking about. I determined that that is where

all the Watergate people were hanging about, Hunt.

I kept getting all these threatening telephone calls from

Seymour Hirsch of the New York Times and all of that. I

couldn't honestly understand what they were talking about until

the whole Hunt thing hit the fan and they arrested Hunt and

so on:

Then a journalist came to me and tole me that there was

in inspector Bast, he called himself Inspector Bast, who is

supposed to be a well to do man, a lawyer of some sort, a

private investigator in McLean, and he had invited Colson to

his swimming pool and that he had a hidden microphone in the

shrubbery and that Colson told him that Angleton had recruited

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Hunt and was running Hunt in the White House as his agent and

that Hunt reported to Angleton daily.

Bast was reported to have this tape recording which he

made known to this journalist. The journalist was going to

print all of this.

Miss Brady. When

was this? During the Watergate period?

Mr. Angleton. Sometime maybe a little after or during.

So I

laughed at this fellow and told him, I said "That is just

about as crazy as anything I have ever hearü." I said, "If

you pursue that", I told him, "YOu will be exposed on this.

I never met Howard Hunt in my life."

He was arrested on a Firday

?. or Saturdy. The first work-

ing day I asked the Office of Security to supply me with eight

by ten photos of his security badges. In our organization

you go to hundreds of meetings without knowing all the people.

It is part of the compartmentation, if you would like. There-

fore, I had to be doubly sure because the newpaper picture of

Hunt was about this big and you couldn't get any features out

of it.

So, when they showed me the photographs, I had never

seen Hunt in my life.

The curious thing here, and I never explained it to the

press or anytobyd, is the fact that my Deputy's name is Jim

Hunt and I just let them go along, since they started the myth,

let them live with it. But Jim Hunt being retired and playing

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golf, I saw no reason to give an explanation and ruin the 19th

hole so to speak.

So, when Trento called me at the Army-navy Club, one of

the things he also said to me at that time was, "Has Hunt

been in touch with you?" Again he is on that same Colson-Bast,

et cetera, route as the others.

Miss Brady. So it is fair to say, apart from whatever

was made known publicly about the Watergate incident, you had

no independent knowledge of Hunt's activities with the Agency?

MI. Angleton. No. Later when he was picked up, yes, 'I

called for his file and read his file. I might also add that

I feel quite honestly that the man has suffered a great deal,

I mean a very great deal, the death of his wife and all the

things he went through and tragedies and trying to put his

life back to gether again with all these character assassins

still running after him. He paid his price. So I am a little

sympathetic with the fellow without even knowing him.

Miss Brady:: Was there ever really any Agency document

about Hunt's whereabouts on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Angleton. I don't remember any such thing. As I

said, Hung didn't mean a thing to me until after the Watergate.

Miss Brady. Do you have any knowledge of the pre-Bay of

Pigs operation called "Operation 40?"

Mr. Angleton. By that name? What is it about?

Miss Brady. Another one of the anti-Castro groups

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Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady. Targets and operations against Cuba, YOU

had no knowledge of that?

Mr. Angleton. I may have at some time or another but

you have to keep in mind that the Counterintelligence Staff

was not involved, that the Special Group on Cuba had its own

liaison with the FBI and their own counterintelligence.

In

other words, I loaned them or gave them one man in particular

whom I know who was fluent in Spanish, and he ceased to be a

member of my, I mean, he was taken off my rolls and trans-

ferred to them.

He was one of the principal counterintelligence people.

Then later on, when Harvey was running it, he had another one

of my men, but they were severed from the CI Staff and inte-

grated within that.

In other words, they allegedly had their own counter-

intelligence capability built into the Task Force.

Miss Brady. What is the extent, if we can call if, of

domestic counterintelligence in Miami and New Orleans during

the early sixties?

Mr. Angleton. Domestic counterintelligence in New Orleans:

and Miami?

Are you talking about the Domestic Branch? We

had what is called Domestic Operations which was on the overt

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Miss Brady. I am asking more in particular if there were

any covert activities that you were aware of?

Mr. Angleton. No. The only people who had that capa-

bility would be the Office of Security which had I think people

under cover.

Miss Brady. So if there were domestic operations you.

are saying the Office of Security would have been in charge of

them?

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Mr. Angleton. They would not have run operations there.

They had people under cover for investigative purposes,

personnel and security checks. I mean applicants, field

security checking.

Miss Brady. Was either Counterintelligence or the Office

of Security aware of Castro G-2 operatives in the Miamia area?

Have they been identified?

Mr. Angleton. What period are we talking about?

Miss Brady. The early sixties again.

MI. Angleton. That would have been the jurisdiction of

the code name J.M. WAVE outfit who had direct liaison with

the Miami field office of the FBI.

Miss Brady. Was J. M. WAVE a separate component or was

it run out of another office?

Mr. Angleton. I think J. M. WAVE was the code name on

communications for that entire task force based in Miami.

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Miss Brady. Did you at any time have any knowledge of

any contact by Oswald with the Cuban G-2 in either New

Orleans or Miami?

Mr. Angleton. None.

Miss Brady. Now you mentioned a Domestic Intelligence

Office, is that how you phrased it?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. It had different names. It was once

called "00". I can't remember what that means. Anyway, it

was a collection part of the Directorate of Intelligence,

which means that it was not a part of the Clandestine Services

but of the Deputy for Intelligence.

It was a domestic so that it did not work clandestinely.

Its offices were in the telephone directory of the major

cities where they were located and its basic thing was to

interview Americans who had been behind the Curtain. It was

a vacuum cleaner so to speak of every kind of human being they

had the manpower to interview, and they did some very good

work.

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Mr. Goldsmith. We were discussing the manuscript that you

obtained from Win. Scott's residence in Mexico City shortly

after his death. Do you recall whether winn Scott's pen

name was Ian Maxwell?

MI. Angleton. How do you spell the first name?

Mr. Goldsmith. I-a-n.

Mr. Angleton. I think it was, at least from the books

that he published.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you read through that manuscript

in its entirety?

Mr. Angleton. I read it in its entirety but my problem

is that there was more than one draft, but I read it pretty

thoroughly at one stage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall if it contained a chapter

wheih discussed lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't recall that. In fact I didn't

know there was a chapter on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you what we have obtained

from the Agency by virtue of a committee request

• for materials

that were obtained from Mr. Scott's safe or residence after

his death.

This

is a chapter from a manuscript.

It is fairly long.

Mr. Angleton. Is it a part of the book?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I only have one chapter here.

It

says Chapter 24 from a draft manuscript of "The Foul Foe," a

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book which purports to be an account of the writer's career

in intelligence. I have no way of knowing one way or another

whether this was included in the material that you actually

read.

But I would like to ask you to review those materials

now.

For the record the CIA number starts with 1l112364 and

it ends at 11112371. Please take five or ten minutes to read

through that.

MI. Angleton. This as far as I know I have never seen.

don't recall seeing this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that this was among the

materials that you obtained but simply that you did not review

it at that time?

Mr. Angleton. You see, the copies that I saw were before

the Xerox. They were what you call thermofaxes.

Has this been

" retyped from something?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is not the original or anything.

Maybe Mr. Berk can shed some light.

Mr. Berk. It was contained in the files. There were

other copies of this manuscript in somewhat edited versions.

This seems to be the final form.

Mr. Angleton. Were the documents in the files thermofaxed?

Mr. Berk. I am not versed in the distinction between

thermofax and Xerox.

Mr. Angleton. Thermofax is a special kind of paper, very

dark.

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Mr. Berk.

No, it was not thermofax.

Mr. Angleton. It is a heat treatment thing so that

unless you are using the original you have a very poor copy and

it is very hard to make a thermofax from a thermofax.

Mr. Berk. The paper itself is dark?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

I mean it is dark by having gone

through the heat process, you don't get a sharp black and white.

Mr. Berk. It did not seem to be that type.

MI. Angleton. I picked up an awful lot of materials there.

The thing comes back to me that I also arranged for the Chief

of Mission to be able to see Mrs. Scott after-ards and she said

she would cooperate a 100 hundred percent.

Mr. Goldsmith. This particular chapter I asked you to read

discusses Oswald's Mexico City trip; is that correct?

Mr. Angleton: This

is not the style of the manuscript.

Mr. Goldsmith. The manuscript you reviewed?

Mr. Angleton.

It is not in his style because. he was

| writing a more novel type of style.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that and I really don't

intend to dwell upon that manuscript since that is different

from what I have apparently shown you today.

Mr. Angleton. Although the title there must be the same

one that he had on the manuscript. Nould you read that title

again?

Mr. Duncan. "The Foul Foe."

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Mr. Angleton.

that rings a bell as being the title of

the book.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me tell you that the committee has

every intention of reviewing this in more detail. This was

just made available to us very recently. In any event the chapter

that you just read discusses Oswald's trip to Mexico City, is

that correct?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does it appear to you, based upon your

knowledge of the case, to be an accurate reflection of the

events that took place in Mexico City when Oswald visited there

in 1963?

Mr. Angleton. I can't say that. I necessarily have the same

picture from reading all that. My memory of headquarters, it

reads very much like Scott in terms of the actions that he

took and his feelings.

Mr. Goldsmith. This then does not strike you as a fictional

account?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Mrs.

Scott gave these materials

to

you to bring back to the Agency or for you to arrange for

the material to be sent back to the Agency did she in effect

make those materials a gift to the Agency? Was she giving

them all to the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. As I remember it there was no dispute.

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When I went down there, one, I did not know her moda.

In other words, win ha? retired and he was working I think for

some international investigative agency which had originally

been set up by a former employee named Al lmer who lived in

London and now lives in Geneva. I think win, who was a very

powerful man in Mexico, got a number of his Mexican friends

to invest in it and I think it failed, went bankrupt. So I

didn't know what the state of mind of the wife was going to be

in terms of certain bitterness.

that win did feel.

I went down there very open-minded as to what might hap-

pen. I was disturbed because, as I recall, we only had Xeroxes

of these thermofaxes and there was the whole question of being

able to get all the copies and all that type of thing and

whether he had sent them out to publishers and so on. So, I was

a little apprehensive about her greeting. When I went to see

her, her first words were "why did it take so long? So to

speak. When I took her in the side room and said "I had an

unpleasant task" -- I put it very clearly - "there are some

papers. If these are published this violates win's oath.

We

want to recover all of them," there was absolutely no oppo-

sition. She said, "You can have everything."

whoever was the

Chief of Mission was with me and so it was arranged that he

would followup and pick up all the stuff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Station Chief at that time a man

named John Horton?

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Mr. Angleton.

That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Are you familiar with the cryptonym

A.M. MUG?

Mr. Angleton. No, I mean not with that - A.M.?

Mr. Goldsmith. MUG, a Cuban defector.

Mr. Angleton. It does not mean anything in that way.

The "M" as I recall was Cuban, "A.M." or Cuban, operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember a Cuban defector in 1964

I providing information to the Agency about Oswald's contacts

with

CBI, Cuban Intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Coldsmith. Letus go back to this particular document

lat this point.

letter.

I call your attention to paragraph two of this

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to get the date.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is 5 March 1964 and that is 12 Feb-

ruary 1964.

MI. Angleton. Tom Karamessines' address was Acting Director

which meant that Dick Helms was away.

Mr. Goldsmith. To Odum of the Federal Bureau of Inves-

tigation.

"In order to complete the records of the commission

"regarding this matter the Commission would like to be informed

of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture

by your Agency and the identify of the individual shown if

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this information is currently available. Thank you for your

assistance."

Mr. Angleton.

Read that once more.

Mr. Goldsmith. "In order to complete the record of the

Commission regarding this matter the Commission would like

to be informed of the cirucmstances surrounding the obtaining

of this picture by your Agency and the identify of the individ

ual shown if this information is currently available."

Now I would refer to the second paragraph of Document

Number 2139 where you indicate that the Commission has received

the substance of their request but in effect I think you are

suggesting that the Agency wait out giving the Commission the

specifics.

Mr. Angleton. My only concern would have been the elaborate

surveillance and telephonic surveillance, letting that be

known.

I want to make one observation. People say, well, the

Soviets always know that you photograph them of they alwans

know that their lines are tapped.

There have been too many

times in history that an unknown, either an American Army

officer or somebody else that doesn't know, that makes the

slip. Xhose are all provable cases of where even though the

Soviets know -- J. can remember one case, an emergency situation

with one of our agents in Paris on the run, getting to Rome and

telephoning the embassy that he is in trouble, et cetera --

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even though they know they try to shut him up but it is too

late.

That type of thing.

Therefore with all the past experience the idea that even

though they knew that, this thing would get further, would

have complicated things

for the Mexican Government because

win's relationships with the Mexican Government were at

the

top, with the

President.

Therefore the repercussions

would

have been far more

than just simply losing. the operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the name Louisa Cal-

deron?

Mr. Angleton. I have heard but I can't place it?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Turning to a completely different area

at this time, on what basis would the CIA staff has occasion

to open a 201 file on an individual? I am referring now to

the time period 1959 to 1960.

Mr. Angleton. We opened up many files.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, what would the criteria have

been for opening a 201 file? I am speaking now with reference

specifically to the CIA staff?

Mr. Angleton. It would be anyone who was suspect or who had

contacts with the Soviets, I mean with the bloc or with an

espionage net, regardless of how

remote.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA document Number 796.

This is a Department of State telegram dated October 31, 1959.

Let me read it to you.

060NG

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Let me look at some of the addressees on

that.

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Mr. Goldsmith. CI is listed on the side.

I might add we

obtained it from the CI files. It reads, "Lee Harvey Oswala,

unmarried, age 20, passport issued September 19, 1959, i

appeared at the embassy today to renounce American citizenship.

Stated applied in Moscow for Soviet citizenship

• following entry

VJ.S.S.R. from Helsinki October 15. Mother's address and his

I last address. U.S., 4936 Commonwood Street, Et. Worth, Texas.

Says action contemplated last two years. Main reason 'I am

a Marxist.' Attitude arrogant, aggressive. Recently dis-

charged Marine Corps. Says has offered Soviet any information

he has acquired as an enlisted radar operator. In view

Petrulli case we propose delay executing renunciation until

Soviet action known and Department advises. Dispatch follows.

Press informed."

MI. Angleton. In view of what?

MI. Goldsmith. In view of Petrulli case.: My question

is whether the information contained in that telegram would

normally lead to the opening of

a 201 file?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it essentially because it suggests

that Oswald was a counterintelligence threat?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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Miss Brady. But ran no operations apart from these contacts?

Mr. Angleton. No.

The rule was that if they had likely

prospects of somebody going from any American company that

they might contact him to pick up something but they didn't have

a budget for payment.. Dhey didn't have the rites of security

oaths,

all of that. In other words, if it was

to become oper-

ational or sensitive in any way then they would have to pass

through the Clandestine Services who might or probably wouldn't

even consider it seriously.

Miss Brady. Returning again to the Soviet, do you know what

investigation w-s done to test Nosenko's allegations about

Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was

simply a question of interro-

gation and reinterrogation and how many files did he read and

trying to press him on detail, detail, detail, detail. I know

there were some conflicts because at one stage when the warren

Commission was going to ask the Soviet Government for, I mean

to request the soviet Government for information regarding

Oswald hen he stayed there, that we composed a very detailed

questionnaire that the State Department turned down on diplo

matic ground that it would disturb the water.

Miss Brady. A questionnaire for the Soviet Government?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. Then I know that we had question-

naires that we prepared for the Office of Security to use in

their polygraphing, which they did not use. In other words,

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there were a lot of things that in our view were testings and all

hat type of thing which were not employed.

Miss Brady. Did the CIA examine the documents turned over

by the Soviet Government about Oswald's stay in the Soviet Xnion?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. I know I saw them.

Miss Brady. Do you know whether any assessment was drawn

as

to whether or not they were authentic?

Mr. Angleton. I am just remembering my own reaction was

that it was a lot of puffery. It was just filling space with

stuff of no consequence.

Miss Brady. Were any of the people in the Agency who worked

in the area of foreign documents or Russian language asked to

make any intensive analysis of those documents?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain that that was done.

Miss

Brady. Do you believe that reports exist on that

kind of thing from those evaluations?

Mr. Angleton. There should be. Whether they went to the

Agency on that or whether the recipients, the warren Com-

mission how

they handled that I don't know. All I can say

is that if we had the originals it would be almost automatic for

that to go to what we call our "TSD" and have them examine

everything from the point of view of the typewriters and

SO

on, if there was on the surface something to be gained by it,

there were stamps or certifications or whatever. Also, just

from a technical point of view they would be interested in the

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I quality of paper because one of their jobs was to make paper 100k

like Russian paper.

Miss Brady. I know that many of the documents contain

names of Russian officials who either had occasion to see

Oswald or work with him. Would there have been traces of

followups on those individuals?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that.

That would be the

normal job for the Office of security - I am sorry, I will

correct that - for the soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Did the CIA have any independent knowledge of

the Minsk radio factory where Oswald worked?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Miss Brady. Was it normal for some type of evaluation

of installations like that in the Soviet bloc countries to be

maintained?

Mr. Angleton. I think that in those days any information

on any Soviet factory regardless would be maintained. that would

be again where the "00" or the Domestic Intelligence people

produce volumes of material on that because they would inter-

rogate so many American businessmen who had different kinds

of jobs and so on. It was really a very productive inexpensive

operation.

Miss Brady. What investigation to your knowledge was

conducted about Marina Oswald?

Mr. Angleton.. I think she was checked out against all the

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files and records and relatives or whatever she gave on her

application.

All that type of thing would be automatic.

Miss

Brady. Did we have some way of verifying or

checking if, for example, she gave the name of the uncle she

lived with? Did we have resources to do that?

Mr. Angleton. No. All I would say is that if somebody

found in the 00 or in the computers that some traveller had

lived in Minsk or had this or that, it is conceivable that there

might have been a request levied on 00 to see their contact.

Miss Brady. Given the lack of resources to go into those

kinds of areas about Marine Oswald, do you have any opinion

about how thorough that part of the Warren Commission's inves-

tigation was or are there still remaining questions as far as

you are concerned about Marina Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. My only concern I think is the concern of

everybody. It is the facility with which she was able to leave

the Soviet Union. I have known one case where a man, an American,

was recruited by the Soviet intelligence in order to get his

wife out, a prominent man. He lived and died before we dis-

covered that he was a Soviet agent.

Miss Brady. He did return to the United States with his

bride?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know - I think he got her out as

a result of making a deal.

Miss Brady. How close was that in time to Oswald's

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stay in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Angleton. It was a long time ago.

In other words,

this is the whole history of "oviet espionage making use of

hostages, people in the immediate family as a wya of control and

as a leverage over agents. In other words, agents who were

ideologically opposed to them, yet they operated very effec-

tively for them by virtue of hostages in the family, and even

some famous agents who did high grade work for KGB did it only!

by virtue of the hostage situation.

Miss Brady. Returning now to Golitzen, did you have any

knowledge during the initial briefing of Golitzen about a

story or allegation about him that the KGB had a plot in exis-

tence priot to the 1960 election to assassinate Nixon if he were

elected?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I heard this before. I

don't think that is the way, to my memory, the way he put it.

That is again the trouble I find with the Hart testimony,

the inaccuracies of making those kinds of statements, whether he

said this as a positive fact. What he did say was that

through the reorientation of the KGB as a part of the ...

de-Stalinization of the KGB, of bringing it in as an integral

part of the government, because

under Stalin the KGB had

deteriorated to an instrument of personal terror to preserve

Stalin's cult of personality, in other words, to advance Stalin

but not necessarily to advance the soviet or the communist

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Government as such across the board, that is the reason he had

chiefs and executed them, chiefs and executed them, and so on;

so part of the de-Stalinization was to raise the KGB -- and

it took several years, six years, before this was culminated

to where it was restored to the same role it had under Lenin,

namely as a integral part of Soviet policy and as a part of

a full-fledged member of the Voviet community, which by impli-

cation would mean that every action would have a political objec

tive and would therefore advance the cause of Communist strategy.

In describing all of that it got into the fact that even

foreign leaders who stood in the way would be executied. In

other words, Department 13's role was in effect to remove obsta-

cles in the West.

Miss Brady. So, your recollection of the story of the

allegation is that it was that general and not specifically

related to Nixon?

MI. Angleton. All I am syaing is that having talked thou-

sands and thousands of hours with him I don't remember his

saying that to me about Nixon. All I am trying to say is that

that would have rung a lot of bells. Maybe he did say it. If

he did I don't think he ver said it to me because you had to keep

in mind that when he first came to the United States he was in

the hands of the Soviet Division. Then there were a lot of

misunderstandings, and fauling out between the Divison and

Golitzen.

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Then he left the country and went abroad with his family

and broke the ties with the Soviet Division and then eventually!

there were negotiations by the foreigh country he was in and

it was finally negotiated that he would be prepared to come

back as long as the Counterintelligence took him over from

the Soviet Division. So he had tremendous numbers of sessions

with the Soviet Division before finally they deteriorated

totally.

In other words, there was a tremendous amount of material

which had accumulated, transcripts and all of that.

Miss Brady. So, the initial debriefings were conducted

by the Roviet Division?

Mr. Angleton. That is right, and also with the partici-

pation at times by my men, namely Burch O'Neill and I think

man called Jean Evans. In other words, these two men would

get into see him on special questions of a counterintelligence

nature, compartmented on certain agent cases and

so on.

Miss Brady. Why was a decision made ultimately to turn the

Nosenko

case over to the Office of s-curity and roughly when was

that decision made?

MI. Angleton. The Office of Security had a right to

defectors in terms of their own needs as being primarily respon-

sible for the personal security and physical security of instal-

lations.

So they had maintained with the Soviet Division very

close relationships in terms of daily visits back and forth on

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Nosenko. It became then a question that the person handling

that in the Soviet Division, Bruce Solie, gradually took the

position that Nosenko was bona

fide.

Miss Brady.

•Is it correct that that was after an early

assessment that he was not bona fide?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. I think the polygraphic

test

showed that he wasn't and so on. So that when the soviet

Division failed in breaking him through hostile interrogation,

and obviously his relationship with all those people had evap-

orated, it was not illogical to let -- I mean if you are

going to have sugar-vinegar -- the Office of Security pick it

up from there and sweeten the situation, particülarly because

they believed in him. Then they had

a keen interest in arriving

at all the information he could volunteer and being able to pre-:

sent cases to him and handle him.

So that is what took place. I didn't give you a date :

because I don't recall the date but it was in Hart's testimony.

I don't know whether that date is accurate.

Miss Brady. Is it fair to say at that point that the

Counterintelligence staff was of amind that he was not bona

fide?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way. To my knowledge I

never have ever stated, in other words, I never took the

position in extremis, a

flat statement. If I had had to give

it without any further -- I mean if I just had to stand still

and look at everything, I would have had to say that he was

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a dispatch agent. But again since I have a different philos-

ophy of modus operandi, which is to give rope and never informing

Nosenko that I doubted him, I would have continued to milk him

and milk him. I would never

have hired him as a consultant

to the Agency or FRI, giving counterintelligence lessons and

seeing people and personnel and having freedom of movement and

that type... of thing. You see, under the National Security Act

of 1974 you have the implementing directives of NSCIDs, National

Security Council Intelligence Directives which control and

govern the interagency relationships.

Under that there is a NSCID specifically on defectors.

For example, it advocates that you must preserve the climate

of

defection and so on. It goes on down and charges the

Central Intelligence Agency with the rehabilitation of defec-

tors.

Therefore, I would have rehabilitated him but without,

one, giving him any information, I would work him out of his own

material, not give him anything new, I mean anything that

wasn't worked out of his own material. I would continue to

test question him and financially look after him and all of

that, but with nothing to be gained by learning anything about;

the Agency.

Now in that same directive there are provisions made for

an inter-agency defector committee so that all components in the

government have a right to use that asset for their own purposes.

But the rehabilitation is strictly on the shoulders of the

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Director who also is empowered to do certain things with the

Attorney General in terms of the status, citizenshiy, and bills

in Congress and so on.

I will put it this way, the FBI was disseminating his

reports.. I have to backtrack on this. It is very difficult

to explain it. When McCone was before the hearings of the

Church Committee he made the statement in an interview with

Daniel Schorr that the material had not gone to the Warren

Commission, or words to that effect, because there were doubts

as to the bona fides of Nosenko. But that since then he had been

assured by the Agency or had been told by the Agency that the

bona fides had been established. When I heard this on television

immediately called the Agency and raised a serious question

on how they could make a statement that his bona fides had been

established.

There was a lot of waffling on this. They said that had been

accepted when security took over, or words to that effect.

So

I called Tom Karamessines. I said, "what is your understanding

of the status of the man Nosenko?" He said the man's bona

fides had not been established. So even in the FBI report

information disseminated by him was sourced as information from

a KGB, or whoever they might put down there, whose bona fides

had not been established.

So that this was a determination hurried up by colby and

company because they had another embarrassment on their hands.

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They had one journalist, TV commentator in Moscow, who had

been named Sam Jaffee whose uncle was the famous Hollywood actor,

he was a great character actor. Nosenko had accused him, had

made the statement that he was a Soviet agent while he was a TV

man in Moscow, and named his case

officer.

Jaffee got on

this business and couldn't get jobs and therefore challenged the

Agency as to whether he was bona fide or not. So, colby sent

him a letter stating that he wasn't a Pussian agent, et

cetera.

But the Bureau refused to give him such a letter. He is

still running around. He has been on the Tomorrow Show and

lot of other things. So he is still in the woodwork.

Miss Brady. The next area I would go into would be the

whole

initiation of the Hart report. I think at this point I am

going to defer again to Micky and then we can arrange our own

time.

is ends

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Mr. Angleton. Fine. Would you make a note there, that last

questionnaire, to go back gain, because I want to make it more

cogent than it remains at this moment.

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Miss Brady. What was the general purpose of the CI/SIG

unit within the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. The purpose of it basically was that the

Office of Security has jurisdiction, the Director of Security

has jurisdiction over the physical installations of the Agency

and has sole possession of security files and is responsible

for the security clearance of personnel. That is an exclusive

jurisdiction.

In any intelligence organization the most sensitive thing

is the security file, particularly the CIA. It is a very

thorough thing from birth plus everything that every hostile

neighbor might have to say about somebody.

Now, I set it up in 1954 for the purpose of, one, that

no one in the Counterintelligence, which is part of Clendes-

tine Services, would ever have access to anybody's security

file. I chose an individual who had been ex-FBI and who haâ

worked in the Office of Security as the man to run that com-

ponent. So that I never had access to the secuirty files nor

did anybody else.

But in the event that there was an allegation about an

employee, he could review with the Security üfficer the entire

file. But all that he would give to me or to any of my sub-

ordinates would be purely any relevant extract from that file

which pertained to the lead as a way of sanitizing, I mean of

keeping inviolable the security file. Now, that was one of

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their functions.

second, prior to this there was no place in the govern-

ment where you could find a list of defectors from the United

States. Normally that should have fallen on the FBI to keep

a list of all defectors and so on. So when I took over the

Counterintelligence, my whole thing first was to build up a

data base and all those gaps in government that one could

find where you should have counterintelligence coverage and

that was, for example, among other things, all the German

captured documents.

Miss Brady. Have you finished with your answer?

Mr. Angleton. No, I am just saying -- you were asking

for the functions of the SIG and I was trying to explain what

they are.

Miss Brady. Yes, I asked for the functions in general

terms and your answer was responsive.:

Mr. Angleton. It is not responsive because it had many

duties that had to do with other categories of sensitive cases

involving

Americans and

other things which were

not being

handled by anybody else or just falling between

stools

and

SO

on.

Miss Srady. Would the organizational charter of the

CI/SIG make reference to these various organizational

functions?

2=

Mr. Angleton. It would probably in fairly camouflaged

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terms, yes.

It was not a unit, however, whose duties were in

other words, explained to people. I mean, in training school

and so on it was very much fuzzed over if anyone was laying

out the CI Staff.

Miss Brady.

Can you state with certainty that one of

the essential functions of the CI/SIG unit was to maintain

a current list of American defectors to other countries?

Mr. Angleton. It would fall within that but there was

never, it was only until after the assassination that the

major effort was done to try to get all this. It was also

to do all the defectors from the Soviet Bloc which had never

been done.

Miss Brady. Prior to the assassination this was not one

of the general purposes of the CI/SIG unit?

MI. Angleton. I can't say that for a certainty. I can't

say it for a certainty because it had so many duties. This

time you are referring to -- to come back

to reality, the

heaviest burden on them was Mr. "X", Golitzin, because there

were bodies of sensitive intelligence that as far as I know

have never been disclosed running into thousands of pages of

hard documents relating to Soviet intelligence, and they were

also primarily responsible for that.

Miss Brady. Let me show you a number 708. This is an

opening reguest form. Byt that I mean it is a form to request

the opening of a 201 file. I ask you to review that particular

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Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. First, I would like to ask you the following

question. According to this document the file was opened

in December of 1960. Earlier I showed you a State Department

telegram reporting Oswald's intention to provide the Soviets

with military intelligence. That document was

dated October

31, 1959. It has been alleged by critics of the Warren

Commission that there is something unusual about the delayed

opening of the 201 file.

In your opinion, is there anything unusual about the

delayed opening of the 201 file?

MI. Angleton. That date again is what?

Mr. Goldsmith. October 31, 1959.

Mr. Angleton. What time was it received by Egeter?

Mr. Goldsmith. The earlier telegram is dated October 31,

1959. This is dated December 1960, more than a year later.

Is There anything unusual about that apparent delay in the

opening of the 201 file?

Mr. Angleton. Was she the only recipient of that tele-

23

23

gram?

Mr. Goldsmith. The telegram does not indicate who was the

recipient. In fact, I think it went to the security Office.

Mr. Angleton. Normally there is a cover sheet, a

registry.

When that telegram comes in - let me see that

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telegram again.

In other words, the procedure, when that telegram came

in from Moscow that would go to the Soviet Division who should

have the action on that telegram. It would have probably

gone to the Office of Security simply because of the relation-

ship between the Security Office --

Mr. Goldsmith In fact, this document was obtained from

the Security Office.

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to reconstruct what the

internal dissemination was. It might well have gone to liaison

of some sort. We had a lot of liaison.

But the action on

that telegram would have been the Soviet Division to open a

201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, my question is wny would it have

taken more than a year to open the file on Oswald. Is there

anything unusual in your view?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the circumstances. I don't

understand why it would take that long. In my view that

should have hit the Soviet Division pretty hard.

MIv. Goldsmith. Why would CI?SIG have responsibility for

opening the 201 file on Oswald at this time?

Mr. Angleton. That is what confuses me a bit, and I

am confused here because if there was anyone more meticulous

that I ever ran across it was Miss Egeter.

Mr: Goldsmith. Let me give you some background information.

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According to the record, in late October of late 1960 the

Agency received from the Department of State a list of

defectors.

I am referring now to CIA number A-21 and A-22.

A-22 has Oswald's name on it. You might want to read this

letter, A-21, skim it.

Mr. Angleton. I see that.

Mr: Goldsmith. Now, this information was all routed to

CI/SIG apparently but until today --

Mr. Angleton. Is there a routing slip?

Mr: Goldsmith. I am sorry, MI. Angleton. For that document

you are looking at right now, we don't have a routing slip.

I guess you will have to take my word for the record.

Mr. Angleton. All I am saing is that we had so many

difficulties with Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans that I

am amazed it actually came to us. .

Mr: iGoldsmith. According to the Agency's records, these

letters were routed to your office in 1960, late October

1960.

Approximately a month later the file was opened.

However, until you testified earlier, no one hac really

indicated to us that one

of the purposes of the CI/SIG was

to monitor defectors.

Mr. Angleton. It was to build up the most sensitive

cases on Americans. I have to explain two things hwere which

I don't think are clear and are the most sensitive of all

things. Number one, are the tarnscripts of thousands of pages

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of the Golitzin interrogations which included the interroga-

tions by fove to seven other services, Foreign Services, the

condition of their having access to him was that they give us

copies of all of their own interrogations. So we are running

into thousands of pages with only a few personnel, very few

personnel.

In addition to that, there were several thousand of the

most sensitive kinds of documents of Russian origian with

cryptonyms of agents in which part of their task with another

person was to try to make identifications of these people who

were Soviet agents both here and in Western Europe.

So that this was totally unknown, let us put it that

way, unless the people had special clearances. But the action

of anyone, whether he is a defector or not, goes with the

geographic area.

In other words, the person who is supposed

to open up a 201 file is supposed to be the person whose

geographic area it pertains to.

Mr". Goldsmith. SR, for example?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, the persons in Moscow.

They are the

ones who have assets. They have people in the Embassy: Ours

rode piggyback on everything else that everybody else was

doing. Also, if we had an intercept - can I go off the

record here --

Mr. Goldsmith. Sure. Off the recora.

(Off the record discussion)

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MI. Goldsmith. On the record.

By opening Oswald's 201 file and marking it restricted,

would that normally mean that if someone else in the Agency

requested access to the file, Miss Egeter or someone else

in the CI/SIG unit would be notified?

Mr. Angleton. It is not a question of marking it

restricted so much.

It is a question that if she entered,

without knowing any of the circumstances, if she opened up

201 file with her name and her extension and all of that,

it would be there so that anyone in registry could call to

her attention the fact that the Uganda Desk did or whatnot

was asking for the file or had submitted something.

Mr. Goldsmith.Would that be done as a matter of routine

or only if she marked the file as restricted?

Mr. Angleton. I can't really answer that question.

There

is a book about that thick on registry procedures. Sometimes

there is a notice in there, a piece of paper which says any

inquiry on this should be reported to so and so on extension

so and so. So the case officer can then call that person and

say "What is your interest in that case?" That is the only

means of making sure that someobyd who is sitting way up in

this section immediately is notified of some new information

that the case has been working on that no one was believed to

know about, that something has hit registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file always indicate the fact

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of an Agency relationship between an indivicual and the CIA

if in fact there was such a relationship?

Mr. Angleton. It could and many of them do. The general

rule is that the hard file, the file kept by the case officer,!

would be the file that would show any relationship to the

Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the soft file, is it not?

Mr. Angleton. No, the soft one is the 201, unless I am

getting my terminology confused.

Mr. Goldsmith. The hard copy would be the official Agency

copy whereas the soft copy would be the one maintained by the

case officer?

Mr. Angleton. Right. In other words, I kept thinking of

soft in terms of not as important. In any event, I always

thought the soft file was the one with a lot of material

missing. That is what I am trying to get.

Mr. Goldsmith. We need not spend much time on the distine-

tion between soft and harâ.

Let

us talk in terms of the one that the case officer

maintained and the one that is maintained in registry. The

one

that is maintined in registry, I take it, does not have all

the materials, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. Not where there is a special interest in

that person, I mean where it is still an active case or where

somebody has a particular interest.

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Mr. Goldsmith. That information would be in the file main-

tained by the case officer?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would someone actually get access to

the file maintained by the case officer?

Mr. Angleton. By registry telling him that "If you want

to know anything more you have to call so and so on extension

SO

and so," and there may be a legitimate interest and he

would permit him to read it. It might be a superior interest

and the file gets transferred to the next fellow.

MI: Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA 943. This is a xeroxed

copy of some index cards that were found in Uswald's 201 file.

I would like to reter you to the card on the top of the page

which is marked "Secret Eyes Only" and has Oswald's name on

it also. It makes reference to CI project/Ri. The date is

• November 1959. Do you know what that would be referring to?

Mr.

Angleton. These were in what?

MI. Goldsmith. Oswald's 201 file. The Committee is speci-

fically interested in whether Oswald was the subject of any

CI project. By that, was he actually a participant or was he

under surveillance by any CI project?

Mr. Angleton. I wouldhave to go back into all the symbols

that they used down there to understand "RE" unless it had

something to do with defectors.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a special project group in the

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CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. I think that was another name for SIG at

one time.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was Oswald ever the

subject of any CIA project?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Reuben Efron?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what responsibilities he had?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, mail intercept.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this card has the initials "RE" on it.

Is it possible that it is making reference to that individual?

Mr: Goldsmith.. It could be, it is probably a mail inter-

cept.

Mr.. Goldsmith. H. I. Lingual program?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. That explains a lot because he

probably passed that to Egeter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency ever had had

experience with case officers setting up ficticious 201's,

fake 201 files?

Mr. Angleton. When you say fake what do you mean?

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, in the case of a project file

you might set up a project file indicating that the project

was intended to serve one purpose when it was actually

intended to serve another, by way of example?

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Mir. Angleton. That is possible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any projects. where that

was done?

MI. Angleton. I can't off hand think of them but I know

there might be cases where the

sensitivity of the case was

so that you either would not open up a 201 file because the

very existence of the name of the person in the file would

disclose - say there was an illegal that had been identified

the very fact that you have a file with an illegal's name

has destroyed your case.

Mr. Goldsmith. So it was, I take it, then, accepted Agency

practice under certain circumstances to either not open a

file at all or if you were to open one, open it under some-

what misleading circumstances?

Mr. Angleton. I think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you familiar at all with LR RIFLE

program?

Mr. Angleton. Only from listening to testimony on the

radio.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any active involvement

with Mr. William Harvey in regard to that program?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Harold Swensson?

Mr. Angleton. I know who he is, Hal Swensson.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you consider him to be a reliable

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individual?

Mr. Angleton. He was down in the Argentine. I think he

may have been ex-FBI. I am not certain. He was a great

friend of Harvey's and well regarded. I never had any real

business with him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Ann Goodpastor?:

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were her responsibilities in the Mexico

City station?

Mr. Angleton. She was very close to win Scott, as I

recall, and to Bill Harvey. I mean, she knew a lot of the old

imers. I can't tell you exactly, but there was bound to be

someone very sensitive.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know if she in fact was Win Scott's

right hand person in Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that she is, I

personally have had very little dealings witn here but my men

had had a lot of dealings with her. She was always in on

very sensitive cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know David Phillips?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

What is your opinion of his reliability?

Mr. Angleton. I have always regarded him as a little

bit of a romantic. I think he is a very honest, straight-

forward fellow who is not really much of a professional. I

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think he is a very decent, upright, forthright person. But

I don't think any subtleties of the business ever penetrated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know an individual named Maurice

Bishop?

MI. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever heard reference to the term

"Black Tape 201 File?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Paul Harman?

Mr. Angleton. Very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you give us your opinion as to his

reliability?

Mr. Angleton. Very high. Paul is a person who fell on

bad times when he was running operations in the German Divi-

sion or something when I salvaged him.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did he work on your staff?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It seemed like eternally

but it wasn't. It was many years. I regara him as a very

unique individual.

Of course, Paul was trained by Rocca to begin with and

that is very important because he learned everything from

Rocca. He is the only man I ever knew in the Clendestine

Service who never failed you on tracking down something or

finding it; whether it is a system in the Library of Congress;

in other words, he made discoveries which had been there had

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the Agency ever known it was there for anyone if they had the

imagination, the drive, the total dedication htat he had.

Therefore, he made tremendous breakthroughs of bringing us

the efforts and labors of other people in government at no

cost.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he have a good memory?

Mr. Angleton. A tremendous memory.

Mr. Goldsmith. was he a record retrieval expert?

Mr. Angleton. He was. He was a birö cog.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Angleton, that just about exhausts my

questions. I would like to thank you very much for your

assistance today.

Mr. Angleton. Thank you.

Mr. Goldsmith. I also would like to add that normally when

the Committee takes a statement from a witness at a hearing,

at the conclusion of the hearing, the witness is given an

opportunity to make a statement. This is not a formal hearing

and the same procedure does not autimatically apply. However,

if you would like to take advantage of the opportunity to make

a five minute statement for the record, please feel free to

ão so.

Also he is coming back another day to finish my questions.

Mr. Angleton. I simply want to recapitulate this would

have been the end of my session had it not been for the

surprise witness, John Hart. I don't think I can let 31 years

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of my life go down the drain listening to Hart. So that

will be back when I have annotated what I regard to be one

of the worst torpedoes that the Director has launched into

the depths and has missed the target and it may make a U turn.

I use nautical terms because he has been launching a lot of

torpedoes in a very brief career.

So I will go on record with all my observations regarding

that and I want to point out first, so that you will under-

stand the depths of my feeling, that I was not notified by

the Committee and I was not notifed by the Agency that Mr.

Hart was going to appear and therefore I had a great deal of

personal troubles that came about as a result of that surprise

testimony which I had not heard. It involves the reputations

of a great number of men.

Number one, the CI Staff did not have any jurisdiction

cver Nosenko. The CI Staff was never involved in any of the

administrative details, payments or whatever. Contrary to

Hart's statement, I never saw the installation or visited the

installation with the Chief of the Soviet Division, which he

states as a categorical fact in his testimony.

I never was consulted regarding hostile interrogation,

to which I am very much opposed. I don't mean by that torture

or anything else. I mean alerting Nosenko that there are

suspicions regarding his testimony. That is totally contrary

to my philosophy of counterintelligence. So that it was a

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frolic of others.

But I do not stand aside from those others

because all those decisions went up through the channels of

command and were made and therefore I stand by what the

ultimate decisions were.

But he coalesced this into an accusation against the

Counterintelligence that has no foundation whatwoever.

He was

permitted to give that testimony in public and in that way he

has hurt a great number of people. I won't go into the big

impact it had on my personal family and friends. Therefore,

I want to be responsive to that.

My hope had always been with the Church Committee that

these matters would be pursued as they said they would be

pursued when they turned the files over to the Senate

Intelligence Committee. It was to be a continuity of these

matters that would be followed up. There has never been.

I might also add if the Admiral had any judgment in my

view, he would have called together people wo were familiar

with these cases, with Hart present, and he would have had a

normal discussion or conference with them and I don't think he

would have put Hart up there for testimony. Because I

question, one, Hart's qualifications, his first job having

been as a very junior subordinate under me in Italy. I know

his career. I have been on

all the senior promotion boards

from the very beginning and therefore, his file has crossed

my path many, many a time.

GA T

Hey Can

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He was a Colby man when he was put in. He was put in

by Colby's successors. He was brought in a case for which he

did not have the slightest qualifications or knowledge.

Therefore, those are my feelings about it. I never have

brought attorneys to this meeting or consulted about attorneys

in terms of my original meeting with Miss Brady until all

these doors were opened. Now, it is a question of who is

going to close those doors because there is also Mr. "X" who

resides in this country who listened to the stuff about his

psychiatric conditions and whatnot, his paranoid condition.

I think the Bureau showed great wisdom when they refused

to send somebody because these are all continuing cases. Just

gecause there is no directory, no chief counterintelligence

has changed, it has changed none of the basic counterintelli-

gence functions and the counterintelligence challenges that

exist today.

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They didn't show me the colby manuscript but they showed

it to everybody else before they cleared it. Had I seen

it

I would have given them information which Colby omitted from

his book and they would have seen that they could not clear

his book because it was a distortion of classified information.

So there is a whole series of things wnich I may find

necessary to take up with the President's Oversight Committee

before this is all over.

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I don't want to end by throwing an apple of discord but

I really do say that the judgment factors that have been

involved here are open to very serious question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much for your statement.

I am sure that Miss Brady will give you an opportunity to

communicate on the record your opinion on this matter.

Mr. Angleton. Thank you very much.

Whereupon, at 5145 p.m., the taking of the deposition

was

recessed; to be resumed at a time mutually agreed upon

between counsel.)

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have read the foregoing pages

1 through 155, inclusive, which

contain a correct transcript

of the answers made by me to the!

questions therein recorded.

Signature is subject to

corrections.

JO0 ITH STRETT,

5.W. KEPOREPS BUSDO, МАИНСТОк, D. С.

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(Deponent's signature

I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, Notary Public in and for the

District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I am notarizing

and witnessing the signature for the deposition of James

Angleton on this

_day of

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Notary Public in and for the

District of Columbia

My Commission expires

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Albert Joseph LaFeance, the officer before whom the

foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the

witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition

was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was

taken by me in shorthand to the best of my avility and there-

after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said

deposition is a true record of the testimony give by said

witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor

employed by any of the parties to the action in which this

deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative

or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties

thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the out-

come of the action.

300

ITU STREET.

5.U.

KEPORTIES

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District of Columbia

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November 14, 1980

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