Originator: OSD
Document date: 8/7/62
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date

Page

:

08/28/98

1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD

• NUMBER

: 202-10001-10167

RECORDS

• SERIES

FOIA SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 168

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

: 08/07/62

PAGES

: 10

SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.

EXEMPT PER E.O: 13526*

SEC 3.3(b) 54x5

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR

2016

IS RE-REVIEW DATE 3/DEL2437

OKAY TO RELEASE AS REACTED: C/CIA CENCURENCE

[R]. - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DocId: 32424898

Page 1

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TOP SECRET

2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and

appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching

operations.

3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet

dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.

4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio

transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval

is required.

5.

Continuation and, expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine

broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations

infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers,

or couriers.

7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional,

cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting

their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited.

Experience plus continually tightening security controls has

demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black

teams"' in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any

method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be

effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the

PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting,

recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the

original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological

warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and

will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible

to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and

support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of

approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral

caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and

run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen

these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when

an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32421898 Page 2

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## Page 3

TOP SECRET

recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla

bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both

maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psy-

chological warfare program in support of this effort must be

aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the

guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups

of guerrillas can be activated.

It is not possible to predict

what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears

probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four

months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special

Forces instructors.

The trainees could be handled in groups of

fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces - The recruitment and training of

Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the

maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements

should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups

to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fight"-under responsible

exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant

internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel

should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups.

Additional Policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration - The increased Cuban defensive

capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program

requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/ exfiltration

tactics as required, including:

a.

Present and planned commercial/private maritime

capability.

D. Submarines and other naval crait

c.

aircraft.

Aerial overflight with contractor USAF crewe and

Additional policy approval is required.

7

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

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TOP SECRET

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

1.

Ground Support: Three separate training facilities

including all instruction and support.

a. Site A - commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive

basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.

Fifty men per course.

c. Site C - Special Forces type training.

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.

Fifty men per course.

2.

Naval Support:

a.

Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions.

Estimate

maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten

per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement

could be substantially higher.

Submarine radio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba"

Naval surface craft support may be required at a

later date but cannot be predicted now.

d.

Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to

Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes,

including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for

clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance,

and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to

supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

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## Page 5

TOP SECRET

for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially

estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by

January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could sub-

stantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to

provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized

support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide

communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing

program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare

operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage,

and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave trans mitter by

Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching •

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against

Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, trans-

portation, and communications.

5. Authority to use U.S. Nary submarinea dor infiltration/exileration

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams

being infiltrated.

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

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## Page 6

TOP SECRET

Xcesen

H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using

DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltra-

tion missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAE crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men

from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored

group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."

K. (Authority to utilize

Guantanamo Naval Base for operational

purposes.

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Opera-

tion Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 1963 - $40, 000, 000

Fiscal Year 1964 - $60, 000, 000 (exclusive of reimburse -

ment for DOD support which it is felt

should be on a non-reimbursable basis.)

10

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32424898

Page

6

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## Page 7

TOP SECRET

2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and

appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching

operations.

3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet

dropping operationg using U.S. and other contract crews.

4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio

transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms.

Policy approval

is required.

5.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations

infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers,

or couriers.

7.

Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional,

cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting

their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited.

Experience plus continually tightening security controls has

demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black

teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any

method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be

effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the

PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting,

recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the

original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological

warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and

will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible

to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and

support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of

approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral

caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and

run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen

these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when

an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32424898 Page 7

---

## Page 8

TOP SECRET

recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run"' guerrilla

bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both

maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psy-

chological warfare program in support of this effort must be

aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the

guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups

of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict

what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears

probable.

The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four

months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special

Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of

fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces - The recruitment and training of

Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the

maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements

should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals of groups

to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fight"' under responsible

exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant

internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel

should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups.

Additional Policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration - The increased Cuban defensive

capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program

requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration

tactics as required, including:

a.

capability

Present and planned commercial/private maritime

Aerial overflight| with contrac

aircraft:

Additional policy approval is required.

7

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32424898

Page 8

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## Page 9

..

TOP SECRET

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities

including all instruction and support.

a. Site A - commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive

basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.

Fifty men per course.

c.

Site C- Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.

Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a.

Estimate

maximun five per month first three months increasing to ten

per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement

could be substantially higher.

b.

later date but cannot be predicted now.

Naval surface craft support may be required at a

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to

Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to

supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32424898 Page 9

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## Page 10

TOP SECRET

for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially

estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by

January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could sub-

stantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to

provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized

support in connection with the (IA maritime program, and to provide

communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing

program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare

operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage,

and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave trans mitter by

Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching •

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against

Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, trans-

portation, and communications.

I.. Authority to usel

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams

being infiltrated.

9

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32121898 Page 10

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## Page 11

TOP SECRET

H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using

DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltra-

tion missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men

from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored

group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."

Authority to utilize.

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Opera-

tion Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 1963

- $40, 000, 000

Fiscal Year 1964 - $60, 000, 000 (exclusive of reimburse -

ment for DOD support which it is felt

should be on a non-reimbursable basis.)

10

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId:32424898

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