OCI WEEKLY REVIEW
Originator: CIA
Document date: 11/29/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

104-10302-10007

ROUTING

NAME AND ADDRESS

TO:

1

2

3

4

ACTION

APPROVAL

COMMENT

CONCURRENCE

REMARKS:

DATE INITIALS

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

DIRECT REPLY

DISPATCH

FILE

INFORMATION

PREPARE REPLY

RECOMMENDATION

RETURN

SIGNATURE

CONTROL NO..

COPY

OF_

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to

those approved for the following specific activities:

TERNAL USE

SERIES "OL"

COPY DATE

$ 7 APR 1997

* THIS COPY MAY NOT BE FURTNER REPRODUCED

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

---

## Page 2

13-00000

TOP SECRET

29 November 1963

SC No. 00620/63

Copy, No.397

WEEKLY REVIEW

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

SERIES "AL"

COFY DATE 07 APR 1997

"THIS COY MAY NOT BE FURTNER DEFRODUCED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS

DOCUMENT

CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

51-228.70212

TOP SECRET

* GROUP 1' Excluded from automatic

downgrading and declassification

---

## Page 3

13-00000

This document contains classified information affecting the national

security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage

laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits

its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to

an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicia

to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any

foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated

and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

information; its security must be maintained in accordance with

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-

GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages

to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director

of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination

controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,

the document must be handled within the framework of

the limitation so imposed..

---

## Page 4

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

48

48

CONTENTS

(Information

as of 1200 EST, 27 November 1963)

CUBA

CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE

Fear that President Kennedy's assassination will

bring a more "aggressive" US policy was reflected

in a military alert which followed his death and

in speeches by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

THE COMMUNIST WORLD

SOVIET STANDDOWILON BERLIN AUTOBAIN BARASSMENI

The USSR's allure since the 4-5-November incident

to stop Allied convoys of nondismountable size and

its statements of 16 and 21 November suggest that

Moscow has decided to settle for a standoff in the

autobahn dispute at least for the present.

SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PATROLS

A recent 41-day voyage by an E-class submarine in

the northern Pacific, the first known out-of-area

mission by any of the USSR's nuclear units, may pre

sisage

their regular use on long-range patrols.

SOVIET THOUGHT ON ARMORED VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

Information compiled from classified Soviet docu

ments has provided a good picture of the thinking

among Soviet military leaders on development of

tanks and other armored vehicles. They appear to

be aiming toward two distinct tank types-a recon-

naissance and a main battle tank--to replace the

traditional light, medium, and heavy types.

(Pub-

lished separately as Special Report SC No. 00620/63A)

EASTERN EUROPE PREPARES FOR HARD WINTER

The regimes there-hope to prevent a recurrence of

the widespread discontent and the economic disloca-

tions which resulted from last year's severe winter

PELPING'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST ASIA

Their gradually Increasing trade in non-Communist

Asia provides foreign exchange the Chinese need to

buy grain.

Their aid activities in the area will

probably remain at a moderate level as long as the

grain imports continue.

page

1

2

5

29 Nov 63

5/N

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 1

---

## Page 5

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

7150

ASIA-AFRICA

98.

JAPANESE ELECTION, OUTCOME

The 7u1ing

Liberal Democratic Party's victory did

not significantly shift the balance between right

and left, although the moderate socialist party

scored significant gains at the expense of its

more extreme Saval

HIGH LEVEL OF VIET CONG ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Communist mrlitars action has become more erfective

and widespread in recent weeks, thereby increasing

pressure on South Vietnam's new rulers to produce

dramatic achievement.

AREA NOTE

On Laos

-

THE

TURKISH POLITICAL SITUATION

Turkey's military leaders who have retaried ulti-

mate authority since their takeover in 1960- must

soon decide wether to turn over over to a civil-

lan party they do not trust or try to maintain in

power the present group which not only lacks popu

lar support but shows no signs of being able to

generate it. Hitherto submerged currents of left-

list opinion may be coming to the surlace.

(Published

separately as Special Report SC No. 00620/63B)

Relatively moderate elements

In both the

Baghdad

and the Damascus regimes seem anxious to reach an

accommodation with their various internal factions

as well as between the two governments, but extrem

ist pressures are stil strong.

CONGOLSE EXPEL SOVET DIPLOMATS

Soviet representatives In Leopoldville had been"

Wassisting a radical exile group plotting against

Premier Adoula from neighboring Brazzaville.

MALAISE IN MALI

The government of

*President Modibo Kelta is faced

with mounting criticism from powerful local polit

1cal figures, dissidence among nomads, and a des-

perate foreign exchange shortage.

EUROPE

98

TEP DE

GAULLE - ERHARD TALKS

The

he 21-22 November talks seem to have established

a good working relationship between the two lead-

ders

and clarified certain aspects of French and

Hest German policies but produced few decisions.

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page

6

7

8

9

12

Page 11

---

## Page 6

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

EUROPE (continued)

WESTERN EUROPE'S STEEL PROBLEM

yA meeting next week of the Coal-Steel Community's

Council promises to have far-reaching implications

for the CSC's future as well as for the outcome of

international tariff negotiations in the spring.

ALYS ALDO MORO

In nearly five vears as party secretary, "Moro- has "

won the confidence of Italy's perennially divided

Christian Democrats but has only limited experience

in cabinet posts.

Personally retiring, he seems to

be undertaking the premiership with reluctance.

(Pub-

11shed separately_as Special Report SC No. 00620/63C)

AREA. NOTE

On Italy

Page

13

14

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

AREA NOTES

On Brazil and Venezuela

14,15

29 Nov

63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEN

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 111

---

## Page 7

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Cuba

CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE

Cuban leaders are appre-

hensive that President Kennedy's

assassination will result in a

nOre

"aggressive" US policy to-

ward Cuba.

Intercepted Cuban

military messages revealed that

certain units of the armed

forces were put on defensive

alert immediately after news of

the President's death reached

Cuba.

The alert was maintained

for about three days.

Fidel Castro's two-hour

speech on 23 November, which he

termed an "objective analysis"

of the implications of the

assassination,

warned Cubans

that the President's death was

"serious and bad news."

could, he

said, turn "a bad

situation" into a worse one.

He also asserted that President

Kennedy's alleged promise not

to invade Cuba had been strongly

attacked by those

"ultrareac

tionaries" in the United States

who now are

trying to create a

climate of "anti-Soviet and

anti-Cuban hysteria" designed

to pressure the new US Presi

dent toward a Cuban policy

"highly prejudicial to the in-

terests of peace and of man-

kind."

Castro stated that he hac

never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald

and insinuated that the Castro-

Communist affiliations of the

accused assassin were fabricated

by US "reactionaries" who, he

claimed

were the only people

who could benefit from the Presi-

dent's death.

In this connec-

tion he warned that a "sinister

maneuver" was under way, and

declared "we must be cautious

and vigilant and alert."

Che Guevara echoed these

warnings in a speech of 24

November, declaring that "the

years coming are going to be

as tough as, if not tougher

He expressed confi

dence in ultimate victory, not

only for Cuba but also for

"the peoples of Latin America."

Guevara stressed that the

revolutionary ferment in Latin

America is reaching a climar

and that the people there "are

going to conquer power in what-

ever manner necessary,

destroy-

ing whatever force that opposes

them." He pointed out that

Cuba's continuing "anti-imperi-

alist struggle" is closely

linked with the coming revolu

tion in the rest of Latin Amer-

ica.

"The fight of all peoples

is also our responsibility,"

he maintained,

sand it is part

29

Nov

63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 1

---

## Page 8

13-00000

* g

4

OP SECRET DINAR

The Communist World

SOVIET STANDOWN ON BERLIN AUTOBAHN HARASSMENT

Moscow apparently has de-

checking," whereas the US con-

cided to refrain from harass-

voy was detained until it agreed

ing Allied convoys on the Berlin

to "go through the same check."

autobahn, at least for the time

being.

On 21 November the USSR

The passage since the 4-5

replied to the Western notes of

November incident of five con

6 November which protested i'e

voys of a size which are non-

detention of the US convoy on

dismountable under Allied pro-

4-5 November.

The main purpose

cedures, the 16 November Soviet

of the reply was to restate for

statement on access procedures,

the public record the Soviet

and Moscow's 21 November note

claim that the June 1945 agree-

all suggest that Moscow has

ment between the Soviet and

decided to accept a standoff

Western commanders in Germany

in the autobahn dispute for the

gave the USSR the right to ex-

present.

The Soviet procedures

ercise "protection, maintenance

marked a clear retreat from

supervision, and control" on

earlier extreme demands that all

highways used by the Western

personnel in convoys of more

garrisons in Berlin.

than five vehicles are obliged

to dismount.

Although the Soviet

The Soviet note sought to

procedures are not identical to

strengthen this claim by stating

the Western "harmonized proce

that the "'harmonized procedures"

dures," the differences are not

conveyed by the Western powers

great

enough in themselves to

on 29 October "are in no degree

give rise to lurther incidents.

valid for Soviet military au

The Soviet rules seem to pro

thorities.". Moscow denied

vide Moscow with a practical

that American authorities have

working arrangement not incon

any right to establish the ob

sistent with normal Western

ligations and "manner of opera-

convoy practices.

tion" of Soviet checkpoint of-

ficials.

The note reflected Moscow's

sensitivity to the point made

in the Western notes contrast

ing the detention of the US

convoy with the normal process-

ing accorded closely similar

British and French convoys on

5 November which also refused

to dismount.

Moscow took ref-

uge in the pretense that

these latter convoys were not

challenged because they observed

existing procedures

and

"presented their personnel for

In light of the failure

to divide the Allies on the

access issue and the reper-

cussions of the Barghoorn case,

the Soviet leaders probably de

cided this was not an opportune

time to propose formal negoti-

ations.

Their efforts to es-

tablish an exclusive right to

control autobahn traffic, how

ever, suggest that the Russians

will

revive this issue whenever

theyfeel the situation is ripe

for another attempt to bring

the West into a new round of

Berlin negotiations. (SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 2

---

## Page 9

13-00000

CANARY

IS.

AZORES

SPITSBERGEN

•Petropavlovak

Kola.

Peninsula

U

S

S

R

Vladivariake

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

---

## Page 10

13-00000

- JP SECRET DINAR

The Communist World

SOVIET NUCT FAR SUBMARINE PATROLS

On about 16 November a

Soviet E-class nuclear-powered

submarine, equipped with cruise

missiles, completed a 41-day

patrol in the northern Pacific.

This voyage, the first known

out-of-area mission by any of

the USSR's nuclear missile sub-

marines, may presage their regu-

lar use

on patrols in the Atlan

tic and Pacific Oceans.

The first Soviet nuclear

submarine was probably completed

in 1958, and some 30 nuclear-

powered units have since been

placed in service. Until re-

cently, these seldon left home

waters, perhaps with good

reason.

There are numerous

reports of troubles with venti-

lation and propulsion systems.

Since June of this year,

however, there

have been several

longrange nuclear submarine op-

erations, culminating in the

Pacific cruise.

This suggests

that technical problems have

generally been ironed out and

that the submarines, or at least

some of them, now have become

fully operational.

These operations included

a five-week voyage by an E-class

submarine from Vladivostok to

Petropavlovsk in July and August,

which apparently simulated an out-

of-area cruise although the sub-

marine probably never left So-

viet waters. From late July to

early September an unusual de-

ployment of auxiliaries, includ

ing submarine support ships, to

an area near the Canary Islands

may have been in support of a

nuclear submarine mission into

the Atlantic.

There is also some

tenuous evidence that, during the

Same period, Northern

Fleet H-

class and N-Class nuclear subma

rines may have participated in

an interfleet exercise in the

Norwegian Sea and northeast At-

lantic.

In early September an N~

class torpedo-attack submarine

of the Northern Fleet left the

Kola Inlet, transited polar seas,

and arrived at Petropavlovsk

some 15 days later.

Another N

class submarine apparently carried

out a polar operation in late

September and early October which

may have included the circumnavi-

gation of the Spitsbergen Islands.

SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE

N-cia (Torpedo Attack)

focam (Ballistle Missile)

E-closs (Cruise Missile)

Totals

Norther Fleet

11

Pacifie Fleet

Totals

12

12°

$$1126 ₴

23

TOP SECRET

12

30

The only extended operations

by Soviet nuclear submarines

noted

earlier were four probable

under-ice cruises near Spits-

bergen and some N-class submarine

participation in the 1962 summer

interfleet exercise in the At-

lantic and Norwegian Sea. (TOP

SECRET DINAR)

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 3

---

## Page 11

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

The Communist World

EASTERN EUROPE PREPARES FOR HARD WINTER

Eastern Europe is making plans

to prevent a recurrence of the

widespread discontent and the se

rious dislocations in some sectors

of the economy which resulted from

last year's severe winter.

The

fuel, power, and construction in-

dustries and the railroads were

the hardest hit, and although a

repetition of last year's weather

conditions would be unusual, it

is primarily in these sectors that

preparations are being made. While

there are signs that the other

Communist regimes are making sim-

ilar plans, the most detailed in

formation is available on East

Germany's preparations.

The East German regime has

already warned that electric pro-

duction capacity again this winter

will be inadequate to meet demands

of all consumers.

The shortfall

results from growing industrial

use of electricity, delays in com-

pletion of new generating capacity,

and the low water level available

for power generation.

The regime

on 30 September published an ur-

gent appeal to save electricity.

It was followed a month later by

announcement of a

for "power thrift."

Throughout

industry power consumption norms

are being established. Production

during night shifts is being in-

creased to make more efficient use

of the hours when power consumption

is normally at a minimum.

In the coal industry, the East

Germans have made an exceptional

effort to increase production and

have succeeded in raising coal re-

serves in industry by 5 percent

since last autumn. Measures also

have been taken to prevent freezing

of coal loaded in open rail cars

and of rail switches at the mines,

which posed major problems last

winter.

The transport of coal

has been given priority over trans-

port of other items on the rail-

road.

East Germany is easing the

burdens on its railroads by con-

tinued transferal of short-distance

hauling from the railroads to

trucks.

New schedules for contin-

uous loading and unloading of

trains and trucks were instituted

on 1 October.

Production in high-fuel-con-

sumption industries such as steel

and ceramics reportedly will be

curtailed or halted as required.

About 60,000 workers would be af

fected by such drastic measures.

Czechoslovakia also has warned

that electric power output will be

insufficient to meet all needs this

winter, largely for the same rea-

sons as in East Germany..

The Czechs

began instituting measures to save

power as early as mid-August, and

preparations at power plants

WEre

to be completed by the end of

October.

Both Poland and Hungary appar-

ently are concerned with ensuring

adequate coal supplies for the do-

mestic market. The chief of Po-

land's coal exporting agency has

said that the country this year

will export to nonbloc countries

one million tons less than last

year. This move, along with greater

coal production, will increase sup-

plies for the domestic market.

Hungary has announced that coal

production will exceed the planned

level by one million tons as a re-

sult of overtime work, and that im-

ports of coal will be

1.2 million

tons above plan. (SECRET KIMBO NO

FOREIGN DISSEM)

VR

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 4

---

## Page 12

13-00000

THeone CIT

The Communist World

PEIPING 'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST ASIA

Communist China's economic

activities in the countries of

non-Communist Asia now are re-

covering from the setback they

suffered in 1960 following the

failure of the "leap forward."

Peiping's 1963 trade with

most of these countries appears

to be above last year's, so the

Chinese probably will earn more

from their Asian trade this

year than they have in the re-

cent past..

These earnings will

again be used chiefly to finance

imports of Western grain-which

presumably will

continue at

about last year's level.

China's net export earnings

from trade with Hong Kong,

its

largest

source of free world

currency, are up about 25 per-

cent over 1962 and are running

at an annual rate of about $250

mission.

China's favorable

trade balance with Malaysia may

reach about $80 million this

year

about 10 percent over the

level

achieved last year with

the members of the new federa-

tion.

Sino-Japanese trade is

currently at an annual rate of

slightly over $100 million up

from $84 million last year.

China's economic aid proj-

ects in the non-Communist

East have been implemented

slowly in the last few years.

Such activities are expected to

remain at a moderate level as

long as China's attention is

riveted on earning foreign ex-

change to buy grain.

The Chinese may, however,

be willing to provide additiona

economic assistance to Cambodia

which so far has utilized about

60 percent of a total of $50

million in Chinese grants.

Peiping responded favorably al-

though cautiously to overtures

from Prince Sihanouk after his

announcement of Cambodia's de-

cision to end the US aid progra

Earlier good-will gestures in-

cluded Liu Shao-chi's visit to

Cambodia last May, followed by

a trip to China by a Cambodian

bank delegation.

Recently

Chinese technicians arrived in

Cambodia to survey prospects for

construction of a glass factory

to be financed under a 1960 gran

A Chinese delegation this

month arrived in Djakarta to

discuss implementation of a $30-

million credit extended in 1961

for a textile plant. Peiping

recently agreed to provide Cey-

Ion with textile plants and

equipment under their $16-mil-

lion aid pact signed in 1957.

Peiping's largest single

economic aid pact an $84-11-

lion credit extended to Burma

in 1961--has been drawn down

by only about $2 million.

Burma, however, has recently

accepted a Chinese offer to

build two bridges in northern

burma, and there are indications

that formal approval of other

Chinese aid projects will be

forthcoming in the near future.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 5

---

## Page 13

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Asia-Africa

JAPANESE ELECTION OUTCOME

The Japanese general elec-

tion on 21 November was

charac-

terized by a paucity of real

issues and a low voter turnout.

It brought no significant shift

in the balance between the ruling

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

and the leftist opposition.

The LDP won 283 seats. and

is expected to pick up most of

the 12 conservative "independ-

ents." Adherence by all of these

nevertheless would leave the LDP

save cho Loio

still seven seats short of the

position it held after the 1960

elections.

On the left, the important

feature was the failure of the

Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to

gain, while the more moderate

Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

obtained six more seats than it

won in 1960.

The Japan Connu-

nist Party (JCP) now holds five

seats, a gain of two over its

1960

performance

The voter's support of the

LDP suggests that the electorate

is generally satisfied with con-

ditions and progress under the

Ikeda government.

The LDP's

victory falls short, however,

of assuring Ikeda a third term

as party president or of strength-

ening his position within the

party.

Intensification of

internal rivalries for position

within the party is certain

until precedences among the fac-

tion leaders can be hammered

out.

Actual damage to the

party and to Ikeda's position

nevertheless will probably be

offset by the fact that the lost

seats for the most part went

to the DSP, while the JSP, the

real enemy, was defeated.

A period of critical self

examination and possible changes

of leadership clearly are in

store for the JSP.

Its net

loss of one seat in the face

of gains by its DSP and CP

ravass may have seriously

damaged its carefully self-con

trived image as the leftist

"wave of the future," destined

to control the government by

1970.

Loss of extreme left

wing support to the JCP may be

attributed to the confrontation

of the JSP and JCP over the nu-

clear test ban treaty and to

the JCP's pro-Chinese stand.

The JSP's failure to reform

internally may have influenced

some voters to shift to the DSP.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLICENCE WEEKLY REVID™

Page 6

---

## Page 14

13-00000

¡NORTH

Muang

Nakhon Phanot

Muang

Sakon Natuken

Dong Mot

DEMARCATION LINE

Bo Ho Su

Quang Tel

As Division

Hue?

11:A!

THIES

I CORPS ZONE

O Da Nang (Tourane)

THAILAND

"Surin

tope

SUANG

NOAI

Kontum

22d Division

25th Division

Plaiter

FLEIKU

BINH

DINH

Du nion

Siere

PHERDON!

PHU?

I

ZONE

- DARLIC

"Ban Me Thuat

1 23d Division

H0A9S

-ina Trang

PBT* Special Zone

NG

Gia

Ngua vl:

Sth Division

PHNOM PENH

Do Duc

рл.оc

dunh

Prude Bori

DAn!

iHLiC

Loc :

ICYEV

Da Lat &

Phusc Vinh

7th Div

Ha Tien

LiE.

Duong C

•Truc Gia

- Bao Loc

Bi Linh

33d Special Zone

BINH

SINH

TLY

THUAN

Phari Tries

Gapttal Military Zone

alge ran

ophuo la 1Il CORPS ZONE

Vung Tau

-BIEN HOA

• Sprin Rame

NO P

Rach Glina

9th

sion

Pau Vint

EN HUA

COA DISH

SOUTH VIETNAM

MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE

BOUNDARIES

vi Thant

Khann?

SHIEST

Hung

NUTED

vinh Lo

Military Region boundary

GULF

OF

IV CORPS ZONE

• Division boundary

SIAM

HOUNWATY NITHNSENTATION

NOT NACENBANILT AUTHONTA FIVE

104

• Con Sere (Pauto Condore)

CON 30N

CON SOM

*Initials PBT (Phuoc Binh Thanh) derived

from names of provinces within the zone.

106

Province boundary

CONFIDENTIAL

my so 15 150 kimes

100 Miles

1i8

34325

31237-11-63

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

---

## Page 15

13-00000

OP SECRET DINAR

Asia-Africa

HIGH LEVEL CF VIET CONG ACTIVITY IN SCUTH VIETNAM

Cormunist military activity

in

South Vietnan has continued

at an unusually high tempo in the

three weeks since the coup

in

Saigon.

Despite some slackening

of the pace, the greater effec-

tiveness of the attacks and their

spread to new areas will increase

pressure on the country's new

military rulers to produce some

dramatic achievement to sustain

the psychological lift generated

by their takeover.

In the week ending 18

November, Viet Cong attacks

dropped to 14y trom the previous

week's all-time hich of 233, but

were still 50 percent above

the

average level set over the past

year.

A number of actions on

24 November emphasized the

boldness of the Viet Cong

offensive. A battalion-size

attack overran a Special Forces

training camp about 25 miles

north of Saigon, causing heavy

losses among both government

troops and US advisers.

Ground

fire damaged several government

aircraft operating in the south-

ernmost provinces.

Near the

Iaotian border in the central

highlands province of Kontum,

two strategic hamlets were

attacked.

In the delta, along the

area of the heaviest Communist

activity, a recent concentra

tion of attacks in Dinh Tuong

Province, just southwest of

Saigon, and to a lesser extent

in its

northern neighbors Long

An and Hau Nghia, has suggested

a possihle effort to secure a

corridor between the Communist

war zone adjacent to Cambodia

in Tay Ninh Province, and

strongholds farther south in

the delta.

The Kontum

attacks, however, suggest a

step-up

may now

be under way

in northern South Vietnam.

A heavy volume of communications

traffic was directed to this

general area by North Vietnam's

military high command from 15

November through at least 21

November.

South Vietnam's military

leaders are aware of the need

to move rapidly in pressing

the war against the Viet Cong®

They are continuing to try to

strengthen intelligence functions,

and reportedly plan to reshuffle

commanders in the I and II Corps

Zones in the north. They have

already named vigorous new

commanders in the III and IV

Corps Zones, but reportedly

have not yet succeeded in

getting ambitious General

Dinh, the new security minister,

to relinquish control of the

III Corps Zone, which surrounds

Saigon.

Dinh,

whose political

intentions remain a concern

of the junta, is also stating

that he hopes to keep the

strategic hamlet program under

his ministry.

Meanwhile, the generals

are getting little active help

from civilian politicians,

and remain under pressure

from

various urban groups to continue

weeding out the traces of the

Diem regime.

(TOP SECRET DINAR

NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

29 Nov 63

INV

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 7

---

## Page 16

13-00000

wang Prabang

• Mưoing Khao

Вал Ban +

Phou Khou

• Muong Kheung

Ban Song Hac

~ Lat Bauak

PLATEAU DU

Muong Soul

IN NINH

Nong Pet

Phou Keng ®

Kiang. Khay

AIN& Phong Savan

Lat Houang

Xieng Khouang

. Mong Het

NORTH

AMETNAM

Muong Kassy

Ban Ta Viang

Tha thor

Vang Vieng

Ban Namant

A

Ban Hin Heup

THAILAND

LAOS

frea

ci main

MEKONG

E5:1

THAILAND

VIENTIANE

Road

- Track or trail

Nong Khai

34324

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

---

## Page 17

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Asia Africa

AREA NOTE

Laos:

widening breach

wappears to be developing be-

tween the Souvanna government

in Laos and the Communist

Pathet Lao.

the Plaine des Jarres between

Kong Le, chief of Souvanna's

military forces, and Pathet Lao

commander Singkapo have been

jeopardized by an exchange of

allegations of bad faith.

particular attitudes and inten

tions of Premier Souvanna and

of the Pathet lao strategists

remain obscure.

Vang Vieng and its airfield

long held by the Pathet La

and also have pushed enemy ele

ments from Ban Namone,

farther

south on the main road. Al

though an earlier push by a

similar combination of govern

ment forces in the Plaine des

Jarres area did not attain comm

parable successes, the Pathet

Lao position at Xieng Khouang

town remains under heavy threat.

Communist reaction to these

developments thus far has been

limited to propaganda warnings.

In the military field, the

However, there are unconfirmed

initiative rests for the moment

reports of North Vietnamese

with the government. A well

troop reinforcements in the

coordinated clearing action

Plaine des Jarres, and irregu-

launched north of Vientiane on

larities noted since mid-Novem

2 November by forces under Kong

ber on the Hanoi-controlled

Le and rightist General Phoumi,

military net in Laos could in-

along with Meo guerrilla elements,

dicate a change in disposition

bas met with considerable success.

or strength of Communist forces

The government forces have secured

in Laos.

(TOP SECRET DINAR NO

FOREIGN DISSEM

SYRIAN AND IRAQI REGIMES TRYING TO STABILIZE

The stability of the re

gimes in Iraq and Syria is still

uncertain in the wake of the

army coup in Iraq.

This in turn

leaves unsettled the status of

future relationships between

these two countries as well as

between them and Egypt.

In Iraq, two ministers have

threatened to resign unless the

new government adopts a firm

stand regarding union with Egypt,

according to an intercepted

Egyptian message from Baghdad.

Also unhappy are a number of

non-Baathist army officers

who oppose the retention of

several Baathists in the cabi

net, and President Arif may

have some difficulty in holding

together the disparate army ele

ments who carried out the coup.

A meeting to elect a Nationa 1

Revolutionary Council on paper

the country's highest organ-

adjourned without reaching a

decision when disputes proved

insuperable.

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SFCRET DINAR

Page 8

---

## Page 18

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Asia-Africa

Statements by Iraqi regime

sposesmen, however, have con

tinued to

be conciliatory to

the Baath.

They have reiterated

that the coup was not directed

toward any party, and Premier

Tahir Yahya has said that the

new government will continue the

previous regine's policies.

In Syria, the Baathist

I'e-

split between moderates

who want to broaden the regime's

power base and a doctrinaire

faction that wishes to keep the

government under exclusively

Baathist control. The doctrin-

aire faction feels that several

statements made by Premier Hafiz

since he returned from Baghdad

Twhere he was caught at the out-

break of the coup) are concilia-

tory to non-Baathist elements

and reflect his personal opin-

ions rather than party decisions.

This dissension within the Baath

may affect the government's

ability to protect itself against

anti-Baath coup plotters who

have been heartened by events

in Iraq.

In an effort to moderate

the initially violent Syrian

reaction against the coup in

Baghdad, Hafiz had in fact en-

dorsed the Iraqi Army's move

against the national guard,

the

Iraqi Baath Party's paramili-

tary arm.

He also praised Presi-

dent Arif as a "brave Arab sol-

dier': and claimed that the coup

was staged by "Baathist ele-

ments."

The Iraqi regime for

its part has proclaimed that

military union with Syria re-

mains in force and that a new

conmander of the joint armies

will be announced shortly.

Syrian troops fighting in north-

ern Iraq will evidently remain

there, but a small Syrian unit

stationed near Baghdad is being

withdrawn.

The Syrians have also

agreed to expel Iragi Baathist

extremist Ali Saleh Saadi after

a message from Iraq protested

that his presence in Damascus

violated an agreement presum

ably made by the new Iragi

leaders with Hafiz and other

Syrian Baathists.

Saadi had

arrived in Syria unannounced

following a short exile in

Madrid.

While Cairo propaganda con-

tinues to call for a coup in

Syria similar to that in Iraq

the Egyptians appear to be grow

ing disillusioned over the

course of events in Iraq.

Inter-

cepted Egyptian messages from

Baghdad express considerable

concern with the inclusion of

Baathists in the new cabinet and

with the course President Arif

appears to be following.

messages complain that no pro-

Egyptian nationalist party is

represented in the cabinet and

that Arif is an opportunist.

The Egyptians in Baghdad have

advised Cairo radio to "expose"

Arif.

off

Cairo papers have backed

somewhat from their all-out

support of the Iraqi coup since

the announcement of the com

position of the new cabinet.

(TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN

DISSEM)

I/N

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SFCRET DINAR

Page 9

---

## Page 19

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Asia-Africa

CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET DIPLOMATS

Congolese Premier Adoula

last week declared all Soviet Ei

bassy personnel in Leopoldville

persona non grata.

Adoula's move

followed the arrest on 19 Novem

ber of two Soviet diplomats found

carrying documents showing the So

viets to be giving financial as-

sistance and encouragement to a

group of radical anti-Adoula

exiles across the Congo River in

Brazzaville. All of the Soviet

staff reportedly had departed by

23 November®.

The premier charged that the

captured documents proved "unques-

tionably" the collusion of the So-

viet Embassy with the leftist "con-

mittee of national liberation" in

Brazzaville.

He did not however,

break diplomatic relations with

the Soviet Union and has stated

that he will consider the appoint

ment of a new ambassador. Although

Moscow has bitterly protested the

expulsion of its officials, it has

indicated an intention to replace

them rather than retaliate against

the Congo.

No action has been taken

against the Leopoldville missions

of three other Soviet bloc coun

tries-Czechoslovakia, Poland, and

Bulgaria.

Adoula earlier planned

to expel

both the Soviet and Czech

missions, and for at least a month

the Congolese have been debating

some action to curb antigovernment

activitles by all the Soviet bloc

missions.

Soviet bloc representa-

tives have long been in contact

with dissident Congolese groups,

and their activity appears to re

flect routine clandestine contacts

and financial aid rather than So-

viet backing of any imminent coup

attempt.

The Congolese exiles in Braz

zaville consist of perhaps 50 anti

Adoula politicians and soldiers,

adherents of the imprisoned Antoine

Gizenga and the late Premier Patrice

Lumumba. They fled to Brazzaville

following Adoula's closing of parlia-

ment in late September.

Led by for-

mer Lumumbist Vice Premier Chris

tophe Gbenye, they have been able to

operate fairly freely in the Brazza

ville Congo's present confused at

mosphere under the shaky provisional

regime of Massamba-Debat.

They have

declared themselves a "committee of

national liberation" for the Leopold

ville Congo and are trying to convey

the impression that they constitute

a "government-in-exile."

The captured documents reveal

considerable infighting and confusion

on tactics within the group.

The

exiles nevertheless have been press-

ing for foreign support, arms, and

funds, are trying to establish an or-

ganization inside the Leopoldville

Congo, and hope to subvert its army.

They reportedly plan also to try to

assassinate leaders of its govern

ment.

Their successes and capabili-

ties presently seem limited, but

their activities may well lead to

further friction between the Leo-

poldville and Brazzaville regimes.

Katanga's ex-President Tshombé,

still in exile in Barcelona, has

again appealed to Adoula to permit

him to return soon to the Congo. The

Leopoldville

government apparently

still opposes Ishombé's return, and

his bid for a high government post

has been rejected.

Tshombé's recent promise to col-

laborate with the Leopoldville gov

ernment in the 1964 parliamentary

elections appears to be having some

appeal, however.

Tshombe says he

has decided to return soon, but has

indicated he will await assurances

for his personal safety from the

central government.

(SECRET NO

FOREIGN DISSEM

29 Nov 63

CURFENT INTELLIGENCE WEFKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 10

---

## Page 20

13-00000

MALI

ALGERIA

oKidal

MAURITANIA

Timbuktu

Gao

oKayes

BAMAKO

NIGER

NIAMEY

GUINEA

UPPER VOLTA

OUAGADOUGOU

TOGO,

GHANA

DAHOMEY

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

---

## Page 21

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Asia-Africa

MALAISE IN MALI

Mali's leftist government

is facing increasingly urgent

economic and political problems

at a time when President Modibo

Keita's efforts to mediate the

Moroccan Algerian dispute have

raised his standing to a new high

elsewhere in Africa. In the

face of mounting criticism from

politicians with strong local

power bases

and from young gov

ernment functionaries,

Keita

1s devoting major attention to

defending his party's hegemony.

He must also contend with dissi

dence among nomadic tribesmen

and with a desperate foreign ex-

change shortage.

The key problem probably

is that of foreign exchange.

The government brought most of

its troubles on itself a year

and a halt ago when,

of excessive Marzist-flavored

anticolonialism, it in effect

cut itself off from automatic

access to the French foreign

exchange reserves and set up a

Malian currency.

Since then a

steady adverse trade

balance

has cut into the country's own

meager reserves, and

by mid-

November they had fallen to an

estimated $1 million.

The gov-

ernment's budget deficit is

running about $14 million an

vally.

France reluctantly

bailed the Malians out once be

fore with a stopgap dole, but

it may be unwilling to do so

again.

The bloc has consistent

ly refused to extend budgetary

issistance, although it has pro

ridd development credits

amounting to $67.5 million.

Doctrinaire rigidity has

helped to make

ineffective the

government's efforts to alleviate

this situation.

Whereas Guinea's

Sekou Touré has recently retreated

from "African socialism' when

laced with an even worse situa

tion, Keita and his associates

have been reluctant

to curtail

the activities of such consistent.

money-losers as the state trading

company and the state airline.

This evidence of ineffective-

ness has brought to the surface

dissatisfaction among local pol-

iticians whom Keita has never

succeeded in bringing under

close control of his Soudanese

Union Party.

These local figures,

who generally occupy the conserv-

ative

end of the spectrum, seem

to control the National Assembly.

They also have at least some in-

fluential spokesmen both in the

party's political bureau and in

the executive branch of the gov

ernment, especially among elements

desiring a pragmatic approach to

Mali's problems.

at the same time, Keita

is faced with active

defiance

of the regime's authority on the

part of Tuareg nomads in the

country's northern deserts.

Half of the army reportedly

now is deployed in an effort,

so far unsuccessful, to halt

raids by these tribesmen. Keita

himself has spent most of this

month in outlying areas, trying

to re-establish party control

over potential and actual

centers of dissidence. (CON

FIDENTIAL)

---

## Page 22

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Europe

THE DE GAULLE - ERHARD TALKS

The 21-22 November talks

between Charles de Gaulle and

Ludwig Erhad seem to have estab-

lished a good working relation

ship and clarified aspects of

France's and West Germany's

national policies, but produced

few decisions.

De Gaulle reportedly en-

couraged Erhard to take some

initiative toward a politically

united Europe, and Erhard re-

sponded that he would give the

matter sympathetic consideration.

In his public statements, how-

ever, Erhard again made it plain

that he favored a Europe rooted

in an Atlantic community rather

than the French-led third force

which De Gaulle envisages.

German chancellor and

veteran French chief of state

"agreed to disagree."

De Gaulle

reportedly lectured

Erhard on the

Gaullist view that France cannot

depend on the US but rather needs

its own nuclear force, while

Irhard publicly reartirmed

Germany's trust in the protec

tive shield of US military power.

Neither leader disparaged the

other's position, however, and

De Gaulle is said to have assured

Erhard that France has no inten-

tion of forcing Bonn to choose

between Paris and Washington.

On the divisive and po

litically treacherous issue of

agricultural integration in the

Common Market, some slight

progress was made.

Neither

leader appeared prepared as

yet

to accept the Mansholt plan

whereby a single community

grain price would be set between

the high German level and the

lower French level, but, accord-

ing to a German observer, they

agreed that the proposal offered

a good working basis.

Implicit

l atmosphere was

the suggestion that De Gaulle

now is willing to discuss the

grain issue beyond the year-

end deadline he had previously

set for final agreement on

EEC agricultural policy.

It was agreed, moreover,

that EEC arrangements for beef,

dairy products, and rice-be

completed by the end of December.

In addition, the communiqué

issued

at the close of the

talks looked forward to the

successful conclusion of the

negotiations envisaged by the

US Trade Expansion Act.

Erhard and De Gaulle

throughout the talks apparently

maintained an air of cordiality,

but Erhard demonstrated that he

was neither so innately sympa

thetic to De Gaulle's views as

was Konrad Adenauer nor so

willing to play a secondary

role.

Thus Erhard may have

served notice that a somewhat

sterner era for Franco-German

relationships has arrived.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

0414

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

Page 12

TOP SECRET DINAR

---

## Page 23

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Europe

WESTERN EUROPE'S STEEL PROBLEM

The Council of the European

Coal-Steel Community (CSC) is

meeting on 2 December to deal

with the problems that afflict

the continental steel industry.

The session promises to have

far-reaching implications for

the CSC's future as well as for

the eventual outcome of inter-

national tariff negotiations

that are set for next spring.

The steel industry in the

Six now is running about 20

percent below capacity.

over, steel manufacturers have,

in recent months, suffered from

reductions in price that have

taken place both inside and out

side the community.

During the

past year, CSC officials have

advanced several possible solu

tions to the problem-including

the promotion of both official

or private agreements with for-

eign producers to limit their

exports--but none of these has

proved effective.

More recently, the CSC has

increasingly attracted to

the idea of raising tariffs,

but so far has not received

solid backing from the member

states for such a move.

The

Council has also been put on

notice by the US that a tariff

hike on an item so important

as steel would have grave polit

ical and psychological conse

quences on the forthcoming

tariff negotiations.

versed its position and now

will support a tariff rise

that was proposed by Bonn three

months ago.

If Paris and Bonn

see eye to eye on this, it is

probable that their tariffs will

go up to 9 percent-the pres-

ent level in Italy.

A restric-

tion on trade would primarily

affect Japan, Austria, and the

since the CSC already has

strict quotas on imports from

the bloc.

The political importance

of the steel tariff question

to the CSC has been generally

recognized in the community.

President Del Bo has intimated

to US officials that unless

the CSC can produce a Community-

wide solution to the challenge,

the CSC's very existence will

be threatened.

The CSC's failure to pro-

1/

However, pressure for a

steel tariff

hike or some oth

er restrictive action again

seems to be building up.

latest word Irom Paris,

example, indicates that the

French Government may have re-

the figh

Authority,

Its governing body"theory, more

has, in

power than its counterpart in

the Common Market.

But this

authority has sharply deteri-

orated because of its failure

to exercise its powers and the

anpointment of mediocre per-

sonnel to its staff.

This

deterioration began

1n 1958

when, under very smiliar cir-

cumstances, the High Authority

was unable

to produce a solution

to the then serious glut in

coal.

Should the member states

resort to urilateral solution

to the present problems in

steel,

there would be little

left of the CSC-the first and

nost supranational of the three

European communitles.

(CONFIDEN

TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEN)

---

## Page 24

13-00000

08

Z/R

TOP SECRET DINAR

AREA NOTES

Italy:

L Leaders of Italy's

four coalition parties reached

agreement over the week end on

the proposed program for a cen-

ter-left government and submitted

it to their parties' national

executive committees for approval.

Ratification by Pietro Nenni's

Italian Socialist Party is com

plicated by an intransigent group

of 10 of the 32 left-wingers

among the party's 87 parliamen-

tary deputies.

A party spokesman

told US Embassy officials that

Nenni was willing to risk a split

Europe

in the party to go along with

the accord.

Negotiations over appoint-

ments to the cabinet have pro-

ceeded with some degree of ur-

gency. There was general agree

ment that the Christian Democrats

would retain the defense porttolio,

as well as the Ministry of In-

terior, which controls the police.

The question of ex-Premier Amintore

Fanfani's participation has been

one stumbling block.

(CONFIDEN

TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Brazil d

Recently published

statements by President Goulart

have added to the widespread

un-

rest in Brazil and increased

speculation that he is planning

to establish an authoritarian

regime.

In an interview with

the Brazilian weekly Manchete,

published on 20 November, Gou-

lart declared that he had no

doubt Brazil's rampant infla-

tion will push the country "in-

evitably to bankruptcy" and a

"social disaster of catastrophic

proportions."

He emphasized his

lack of presidential powers to

solve the present crisis.

Goulart's words have aroused

sharp criticism from reponsible

political leaders and influential

newspapers.

Ranieri Mazzilli,

president

of the Chamber of Dep-

uties and next in line for the

presidency, expressed his sus-

picion of

Goulart's motives to

Ambassador Gordon and stated

Western Hemisphere

that Brazilian democracy is ex

periencing its "gravest testing

time" since

• the 1946 Constitution

was adopted. The US Army attaché

reports a growing concern among

army officers that Goulart may

attempt some extreme action during

the next few weeks.

The additional unrest

provoked by the President's

comments has encouraged re

newed plotting by rightist

elements, such as the Marshal

Odylio Denys group.

It has

also increased the chances of

an illegal action by the op-

position which Goulart could

use as a pretext to assume

greater powers.

In any event,

it is likely that political

tension will remain high for

the foreseeable future®

(SE

CRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK-

GROUND USE ONLY)

29 Nov 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEV

Page 14

---

## Page 25

13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

Western Hemisphere

AREA NOTE

Venezuela:/ Communist ter-

rorists can be expected to con-

tinue right up to election day

their campaign to sabotage the

voting in Venezuela on I Decem-

ber for a new president and

congress.

there is no reason.

moreover, to believe they will

turn from violence afterward.

is no question that the elections

will be held on schedule.

In

addition, the prospects are

that the

voters will turn out

in large numbers despite Com-

munist efforts to intimidate

them.

The proficiency of the gov-

ernment security forces has

been steadily improving, how

ever and more terrorists are

being arrested each day. The

Venezuelan armed forces

con

tinue to investigate reports

of clandestine landings of weap-

ons for terrorist forces,

as

well as airdrops of supplies in-

side Venezuela.

The air force

is laying plans

to intercept

future intruder flights.

With the security situation

reasonably well in hand, there

In any event, electioneer-

ing has continued

apace, and

most observers still consider

Raul Leoni, heading the Demo-

cratic Action party's ticket,

to be the likely winner by a

snall plurality.

The victor's biggest prob-

lem will be to pull together

an effective coalition govern-

ment.

Leoni lacks the personal

magnetism and political acumen

of incumbent President Betan

court.

Failure on Leoni's part

to convince the military of his

ability to handle the terrorist

problem could encourage plotting

for a coup d'etat.

(TOP SECRET

DINAR)

: 29 Nov

63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR

Page

15

---