## Page 1

1104-10337-1000

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1 Central Intellge nis Agerky

.!:

:??:

Mastungion. D C 20505

April 1992

The Honorable John Conyers, JI.

Chairman

Committee on Government Operations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has

asked me to respond to your letter of

April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA

holdings of records related to the assassination of

President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records

relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,

although

many of these records were originated by the FBI or

by investigating committees of the Congress.

We believe that

a significant portion of our records could be released if h.J.

Resolution 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence

Agency is currently embarking on its own review of

assassination records.

I would expect that this review will

result in the public release of a significant body of

information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of

CIA records pertaining to the assassination,

I am enclosing

the answers to the specific questions you raised in your

letter.

!

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Director of Congressional

Affairs

Enclosure

---

## Page 2

13-00000

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination

OCA/ LEG/DMPearline: rw

23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)

(OCA

1123-92/1)

(OCA

1123-92/2)

Original - Addressee (w/enclos)

1

- DCI

1

- DDCI

1

- ExDir

1

1

- D/OCA (w/enclos)

1

- DMPearline Signer

(w/enclos)

1 - OCA/LEG Subject File

(w/enclos)

1

- OCA Record (w/enclos)

• 1

- D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)

---

## Page 3

13-00000

OCA 1123-92

110.

...

no.

desire»

:61.ue.

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by

or developed on behalf of the House

Select Committee on

Assassinations?

If so, how many pages of such records does

the Agency have in its

possession?

What is the nature of

these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by

or developed on behalf of the House select Committee on

Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000

pages of such records

which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald

file (originally collected in response to the Warren

Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records

collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA.

Although these records cover a wide varlety of topics, they

principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro,

Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's

activities in Mexico City and New Orleans.

The vast majority

of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to

specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA.

They

also include a large number of name traces requested by the

HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison

investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies

of FBI reports relating to Oswald.

Because the HSCA wag also

investigating the assassination of DI. Martin Luther Ring,

JI., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the

civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to

the HSCA that may be considered

relevant to the assassination

of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and

the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission

and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above).

• CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document

bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency

were asked to explore newly advanced theories the search for

documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the

review of thousands of additional documents.

To conduct any

further search, CIA would require specific guidelines

describing the kinds of records sought.

Did any of the records described in questions

1 and 2

originate with the FBI?

If so, approximately how many?

about

30

We believe that between 40 percent and-50-percent of the

records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the

FBI.

1

---

## Page 4

13-00000

г.

50234067

763)

• 6io

le,

4. Did any of these records originate with any other

Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please

describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the

assassination of JFK, probably less than 5% originated with

the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization

Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%.

are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for

release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many

of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the

assassination of Jik, representing 1,969 documents, under the

FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination

records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many

records would be released under the standards contained in

House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents

that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because

consideration for protection of classified information and

other sensitive categories of information would be required on

a document by document basis.

We would review our holdings

carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information 18

released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect

intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of

individuals involved.

2

---

## Page 5

13-00000

INTELLIGENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DCI History Staff

316 Ames Building

Washington, D.C.

20505

Phone (703) 351-2621

TRANSMITTED DATE: 4/21/92

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

PAGES TRANSMITTED.

(cover sheet included)

IRANSMIITER TQ:

NAME:

ORGANIZATION:

BLDG, ROOM

TELE/EXT:

SUBJECT:

TRANSMIITED FROM:

NAME:

BLDG, ROOM:

TELE/EXT:

JOHN PEREIRA

176160

(FAX 574 3208)

OCA LEVIERE (W/EMEL) # INEMEMO (U/O ATT.)

'# CAMS DRAGT MOU WITH STATE

KEN MCDONALD

316 AMES

301471

(FAX (522928U)

MESSAGE:

John = The OcA letter (which Doved Pronesse

seut us yesterdes) bus nup our gestes changes

on it. I thank (sent your an earher

draft of on proposed access memo of mud-

standin, with stat, to wach the Wilcox

mens refers.

Ken

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 6

13-00000

Central Inteligenes agency

Warrion a 630505

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Chairman

Committee on Government Operations

United States House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

DEax MI. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of

6 April requesting

certain information regarding CIA holdings

of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

we do have a significant number of records relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of

these records were originated by the fBI or by investigating

committees of the Congress.

We believe that a significant

portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolutin

454 л

were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence

Agency is currently embarking on its own review of

assassination records.

I would expect that this review will

result in the public release of a significant body of

information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of

IA records pertaining to the assassination,

letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

---

## Page 7

13-00000

• . .

1.. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by

or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on

Assassinations?

If so, how many pages of

such records does

the Agency have in its possession?

What is the nature of

these records?

Xes, the CIA retained possession of recotds requested by

or developed on behalf of the House select Committee on

of such records

(originally collected in response to the warren comnission's

include

Inquiry, then added to) as well as recorda collected in

microdilm

IeSpOnse to specific requests from the House select Committee

on AEsassinationa, Although these recorda cover a wide

variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations

againat Cuba and Castro, bee harvey Oswald's sojourn in the

USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans.

They also include a large number of names trades requested by

the isCA staff, as. well as materials relating to the carrison

Investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies

of FBI repoIts relating to oswald.

Because the HSCA waS a180

investigating the assassination of DI. Martin Luther flag,

JI.: there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the

sivil rights novement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to

the House Assassinations Comnittee that may be considered

relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so,

please describe such records and the approximate number of

pages.

The CIA responded to requeats fron the warren Commission

and the House Select Connittee on Abdassinationa

(approximately 300, 000 pages, see above).

The CIA has sever,

however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every

conceivable angle or theory relating to the assaasination of

"testaent vons f. kennedy.

To conduct any surther search, o

would require specifia guidelines of the kinds, of records

Bought.

Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2

originate with the federal Bureau of Investigation? If so.

approximately how many?

We belleve that between 40% and 50% of the records

described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Pederal

Bureau of Investigation.

1.

---

## Page 8

13-00000

• to

4.. Did any of these records originate with any other

Federal, foreign, state, or local agency?.. If so, please

describe which agencies

and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's Jfk assassination recorde.

probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department

and the Immigration and Naturalization service.

Another small

number of records, also less than 5%, are original HsCA

records stating Committee requests to cIa.

CIA has released 7,432 pages of JFK assassination

records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of

Information Act.

There

1a no documentation of how many JEK

assassinatIon recoIde CIA has reviewed under polA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many

records would he released under the standards containod in

House Joint

Resolution 454?

It la very difficult to estimate the number of documents

that would be released if the Joint resolution passed. Wa

would revlew our holdings carefully to ensure that the naximun

amount of infornation is released, consistent with the scI's

responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2

---

## Page 9

13-00000

ferdarte

i. i

20 ДРР 1992

ER 92-25.16

/AAREN E RUOMLA MITY HAMPENIR

¿QHA SETHQUA CALiP QANI

OMARO WRIER, AP2NS DIREET

tanited States Senate

COMMITTEE OR

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIR:

WASHINGTON, DE 20610-6250

April 14, 1992

The Honorable Robert M. Gates

Director

central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO COISCT ON TO

DECUACOISC

20R

GALE

DEdI DidACtOI GAtESE

I am please to learn that you will be testifying before

May 12,

the Committee on Governmental Affalse on TuesdaY'held in RooM

1992. The hearing will bogin at 9800 a.m.. and be

342 of the Dirksen Senate Juilding. The subject of the hearing

will be the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992."

The legislation proposes to create an independent review board

to govern and coordinate the release of goverrment information

relevant to the assassination of former President John E.

Kennedy. As required by Committee rules, please have 100

copies of your written testimony delivered to the Coumittee by

close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written

testimony may be

as long as you wiah, please plan to limit

your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.

Your testimony Will be extremely helpful to the Committee

and to the congress as it considers this important

legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the

legislation you daaire, particularly how it relates to the

records and resources of your agency, the Committee would

appreciate learning your views on saveral specific subjects:

what are the rossons which the Central Intelligence

Agency has records related to the assassination of

President Kennedy?

What have the methods been to date for the identification

no detination of central interrudence agency recoras de

naterial related to the assassination of President

Kennedy?

What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to

assess the scope of relevant documents outside of

materials requested by earlier investigativa or ocher

official committees or commissions, or through the

Freedom of Information Act?

What is the volume of material which you might recommend

be released to the public without concein for further

postponement?

---

## Page 10

13-00000

?.5

- 5c

The Honorable Robe. -M. rates

Page

2

Would you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies,

whenever possible, to self-certity materials which may

celeased without agency objectioni

what recommendations can you make with regard to the need

for interagency working groups to identify third-agency

records in agancy files, to avoid dupiication, and to

assist in the efficient

In the artictant,

disclosure of information to the

What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns

chat you have with regard to the review and release of

3ssa881nat10n matariali

Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look

forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that

any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your

staff has alroady been very helpful to the Committee in 1ts

preparation for the hearing. They may also contaot dI. Leasard

weasa, Starg Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at

202-224-4751.

JHG/ 5k

---

## Page 11

13-00000

HEARING

before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

S.J. Res. 282:

THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

ruesday, May 12, 1991

9:00 a.m.

Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

* * **

Panel 1:

RELEASE OR GI INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable David L. Boren

United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Louis Stokes

United States Representative (D-OH)

* * **

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * **

--•------

Panel 3:

James Lesar

President

assassination Archives, nd Research Center

Professor Ernest May

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis

Department of History

Marquette University

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * **

---

## Page 12

13-00000

HEARING

before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

S.J. Res. 282:

THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

ruesday, May 12, 1997

9:00 a.m.

Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

* * * *

:

Panel 1:

The Honorable David L. Boren

United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter

United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes

United States Representative (D-OH)

* * * *

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates--

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

• The Honorable Williams Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * **

RELEASE OF CA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOLUWENT

Panel 3:

James Lesar

President

Assassination Archives and Research Center

Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis

Department of History

Marquette University

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* *

:

---

## Page 13

13-00000

1.

P.2

4/22/92

CA SPECIAL CZECHIONS

RELEAZ DOLL

2000.

OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JEK RESOLUTION

Agresment with Principles of Legislation.

1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as

is consistent with protection of intelligence

sources and methods.

Established own declassification program.

Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.

Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable

mechanism to declassify documents.

$. ' Describe Nature and Amount of Records.

1. Reasons for having records.

2.

Volume of existing material and who it belongs

to.

3. How we have identified material related to jFK

assassination.

.C. How Much Material Can be Relealad?

1.

Give estimate of amount of material to be

released under CIA program or resolution.

2. Describe material that could not be disclosed.

a. Example of Intelligence Sources and

Methods that would require withholding.

b. Example of material the release of which

would invade privacy.

3. Desctibe resources-imanpower and funds-- to

achieve results.

D. Concerns with Resolutions.

1.

Address only Intelligence Community Concerne.

Will defer to Dou on Constitutional objections.

---

## Page 14

13-00000

ArK <L

APR 22

14.÷3

'52 03:47

P.3

2.

CIA or other agencies that originate documents

should conduct initial review of material to

determine whether it can be released. Material.

withheld from public release could then be made

available to Review Board.

3. Agencies that originate information should be

allowed to review it for release even if that

intonation is contained in a document prepared bs

another agency or congress.

to arise with disclosure of third agency

documents. .

4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board

for additional material that has a reasonable

relationship to the assassination.

Would hope that the Board will consult with

DCI before uning subpoena power to compel

production of material that involves sensitive

intelligence sources and methods.

5, Exemptions need to be clarified so as to

ensure that deliberative process information and

identities of covert employees are protected.

E.' Conclusions Pledge to cooperate with whatever

mechanism is established to declasaify material.

Hope that

this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK

assassination.

---

## Page 15

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

OCA 2034-92

1 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on

H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public

hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure

Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation

and National Security Subcommittee.

Majority

Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority

Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority

Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton

and minority members

member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing.

Committee's

Press release, which criticizes the government

and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents "at

a snail's pace"

, and witness statements are attached.

The hearing was well attended by the public and

attracted much media

coverage.

Eight witnesses testified in

four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by

Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select committee

on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton

testified first.

The congressmen were followed by the movie

"JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by

Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and

James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee.

session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris,

Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the

ACLU; DI. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History,

Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the

City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea,

American National Government Specialist at the Congressional

Research Service.

3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks

that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch

and thus would hold another hearing session.

He noted that

"after much negotiation," the Director of Central

Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May.

He further

noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the

Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice

Department were still ongoing.

Conyers was criticized of

the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 16

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

."

Subject:

House Government Operations Committee Hearing on

H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing

numerous

"legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he

characterized as not reflecting a real willingness

to work

together to release the documents to the American people.

4.

The general tone of the session was strongly in

favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority

of the material.

Most witnesses conceded that there might

be some materials that required postponement of disclosure,

but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even

Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman

Shays that he

(Shays) found it hard to imagine what national

security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years,

conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone

thought 98 percent of the material could be released.

Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church

Committee counsel, suggested that most national security

information should be released under the resolution, but

that privacy interests posed greater concerns.

Congressman Hamilton

warned that the Congress

should be

careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up

the bill," which is why he said that review by an

independent board

I was so important.

5.

Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the

hearing.

Several congressman and witnesses credited his

movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today."

Chairman Conyers appeared

particularly impressed

with Stone,

describing his

testimony in exchanges with later witnesses

as "persuasive" and "compelling."

A few potentially tough

questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize

Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did

he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government

as part of his

research process?

However, there was no

aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers.

Discerning

observers

may have picked up on the fact that Stone's

"research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived

conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had

talked to President

Ford, a member of the Warren Commission

and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone

answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as

a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)

6.

The murder

conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more

that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence

agencies."

Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.

2

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 17

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject:

House Government Operations Committee Hearing on

H.J. Res.

454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence.

and also said that a closer look should be taken at an

operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale.

He also

posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact,

spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told

Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the

Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone

theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not

directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see

a that me header

Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change

embarking upon several courses that disturbed that

"Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam.

In

response to a later question about various theories, Stone

called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you

know,

the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible

deniability" and that it was important to look behind the

Mafia at "who pulls the strings."

7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include

that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly

the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying" to

the Warren Commission.

The particular example offered had

to do with "AMLASH."

This individual came up in connection

with traces the Agency apparently conducted

for the Warren

Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH

in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not

make this fact known to the Warren Commission.

The

witnesses characterized this as pertinent

information CIA

consciously withheld from the Warren Commission.

Also, when

the final panel engaged in a broader discussion

of

government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the

ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Forcé report as an

example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure" as the mechanism

to "vindicate t public's right to know." (On 18 March

Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force

report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government.

Secrecy After the Cold War.")

8.

A major recurring theme was concern that, despite

the need to make the documents publicly available, the

Administration would not support the resolution and it could

be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the

resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House

would pass a resolution to release its own recoras.

(Such

an action would be problematic for the Administration,

because much Executive branch information is contained in

House

records,

and the House also probably considers

documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its

3

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 18

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

subject:

House Government Operations Committee Hearing on

H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to

avoid a constitutional confrontation with the

Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to

help work around problems were made.

For example, the ACLU

suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the

established in connection with the State

Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the

United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical

staff is familiar.

This body was established by a provision

included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

9.

In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much

detail on provisions of the resolution.

Much time was spent

on general propositions like the fact that the documents

ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core

issues raised by H.R. 454.

Jit up

Victoria L. Pepper

Assistant General Counsel

Office of Congressional Affairs

4

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 19

13-00000

PART

ADDED

LATER

CIA SPECIESCRET LECTIONS

ANue 4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALDURE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

Pages

Date

Description.

4

1

4

5

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

7

2

2

2

1

1

2

1

7

9

2

3

4

1

1

...- 14

1

1

6 Mar 64

30 Jan 76

Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA

CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15

Jan 75 on deleting #s.

6 Mar 64

6 Mar 64

6 Mar 64

31 Oct 59

DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.

helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.

Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.

•State Cable from Moscow to SecState.

Redacted copy of same.

2

2

9

1 Nov 59

& 4 Nov

Nov 59

NOv 59

Press clipping

Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query

Pron Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept

*State Cable, Moscow to SecState

Redacted copy of same

9 Nov 59

-State Cable, Tokyo to SecState

Redacted copy of same

16 NOV 59*

26 NOV

59"

Press clipping

Press clipping

25 May

60

Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms

12

May

60

Attachment to above

12 MaY

60

FBI report, fr Dallas

25 Oct

60State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors

Redacted copy of same

3 Nov 60 --DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)

Redacted copy of same

18 Nov 60_Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany

draft reply to Cumming

undated

~-Handwritten descrip of letter cited above

21 Nov 60--Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US

defectors

Declassified version of Oswald info from ff

List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter

18 Nov

60

21 Nov 60

9 Dec 60

Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell

Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above

2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald

201.

>Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

26 May 61'

→2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship.

and passport (signed Rusk)

26 Jan 61 State MemCon re Oswald

Redacted copy of same

13 Jul 61

Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several

FBI reports, much of which is illegible

28 Sep 61

Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion

in Oswald 201

13 Oct 617 Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering

copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow

7 Dec 61

Form fI INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info

on Oswald

SECRET

---

## Page 20

13-00000

1

5

9

2

7

3

3

2

20

20

14

ADDES

LATER

14

3 Mar 62

26 Apr 62

7 Sep 62

10 Sep 63

24 Sep 63

10 Sep 63

8 Nov 63

7 NOv 63

25 Oct 63

31 Jan 64

SECRET

Note saying Navy message of this date is

missing

1 from CD 692 sent from Archives

Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus

Navy, USMC, and press items

Hoover to Helms, plus report fI SAC/Dallas

Redacted pages

FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas

FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans

FBI field report on Oswald. from Dallas

(apparently different from above)

Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans

report

Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on

Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff

FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material

above

Report, not really contemprary with this file,

"Information Developed by CIA on

• the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..,"

28 Sep--3 Oct 63

Redacted copy of same

---

## Page 21

13-00000

OCA 2050-92

6 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR IS Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT:

JFK Testimony

1.

Attached is a copy of your opening statement for

the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs

Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are

commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines

require us to súbmit the testimony in advance to OMB for

Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your

opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI.

As you

know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel

presentation before the Committee.

2. Please let me know whether you have any objections

to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI.

Committee has requested that an advance copy of your

statement be provided to them by 8 May.

Stanley M.

Moskowitz

Attachment:

as stated

---

## Page 22

13-00000

Draft 5/6/92

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

200O

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

12 MAY 1992

---

## Page 23

13-00000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide

my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination

Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of

documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John

F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on

this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement

with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts

should be made to declassify and make available to the public as

quickly as possible government documents relating to the

assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and

giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public

access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that

outs

still linger even 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe

that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that the CIA had

participated in the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I

recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents

of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the

establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible

for declassifying as many historical documents as possible

consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

do lie!

---

## Page 24

13-00000

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the

Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for

declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national •

intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are

10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-

year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the

Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records

focusing on particular events of historical importance, including

the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review

Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of

declassifying the records. As we speal this Group has already

begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of

Cas me

President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of

fine somed

(dea o)

these records, which includes all CIA documents on Lee Harvey

#>

Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and

Is it

limite

transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

anh, to

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy

cited

assassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of

page eleasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently

Leat's nor approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical

Review Program which

se a presumption in favor of

Ken said

declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in

making these documents available to the public, and I have

several "easy"

there tan instructed the Historical Review Group to dp so.

2

interest pr

waitin

clat

---

## Page 25

13-00000

clea

What's

this

mean?

брес от

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in

reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to

place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents

related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of

approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes

copier and originak@ Warran Commission and the

64 boxes or'information provided to the House Select Committee

on Assassination) ketween 1977 and 1979, and over 17 boxes of fu

naterial on Lee Harvey Oswald, accumulate

afte

how de

president Kennedys aranimationi

ft frst blush, you might think that this is an enormous

amount of material for the CIA to have on the assassination. It is

important to recognize, however, thaT Virtually all of these, are

Kend

document.

essentially "secondary" documents solute ternate

assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the

In came to CiA pra

other

Warren Commission or the House Select Committee Fe investigations

| Assassinations. There were some documents that did exist/betpre

the assassination, but they were only brought together in response

to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that

illustrates this very point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination

this

dent LA held only a small filey, Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted

of 37 documents (less than 150 pages) Jet whieh 28 documents

""1"

ably

consisted of material originated by the State Department, the

Were

Navy, the EBI, and newspaper clippings. I have brought along a

copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that

you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have

I-CZA

Chead pages,

3

---

## Page 26

13-00000

What's that mean? Sounds like a dodge.

already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this files

und utahign dethren to the National Archives: The records in this

file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and

his activities iu the U.S: after his return in 1961. By contrast, it

accumulate

was oly after the assassination that CIA Colleetel-all the rest of

the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages in total.M~

Beclock.

om where

Lshould emphasize that much of the material held by CIA

originated from other agencies or departments. For example, in

the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of

the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated

trom the State Department or elsewhere

Warran Commissin

Hey staff is still going the

through the material compiled at the request of the House Select

other part Committee on Assassinations, whick includes 63 boxes of paper.

records and one box that contains 7 reels of microfilm c

{However we estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records,

% originated from the FBI, pind a smaller ment

& Vaniety

ofitter

pumber of records, less Han + %, originated from the State-

Agent

24%,

other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of

CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review

A preliminary frey of these files has provided us some

indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a

wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities

concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet

4

underway

---

## Page 27

13-00000

Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and

New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces.

on Assassinarous

requested by the start of the House select Committee, as well as

material relating to the Garrison investigation, Cuban exile

activities leopies of FBI reports about Oswaly, and ever

information about Watergates

The CLA cannot Simply at declassify if release me og

documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act

(which protects the names of American citizens against

unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by

the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that

many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA.

However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the

sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the

process of declassification. H

I will as

pole set,

Nole i expect a large amount of material can be it ha

дря

dessert declassified under our program, there still will be information that

011

this

Soyuestent

cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including

i?. privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and

methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of

material. During the investigation by the House Select

Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and

a nunha

personnel files were requested of Ageaty employees. These files

contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical

evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

declassify

5

---

## Page 28

13-00000

15, in

correct

hey? Although largely irrelevant to the question of who killed President

Kennedy,

these and other personal documents ultimately ended up

in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that

the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information

outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping

this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with

documents containing derogatory information on particular

individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor.

Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided

us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We

would not disclose this information ia breach of such a promise.

Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the

Agency will be willing to make redactions, substitute generic

formation or summarize leinformation ia order to ensure that

the maximum amount of information is released while still

protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual

The effort required to declassify the documents related t

the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.

However, it is an important program, and I am personally

committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing

resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the

Foo stet.

allocation of ts full-time positions to expand the History Staff,

and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the

review the JFK documents and other documents of historical

interest.

---

## Page 29

13-00000

intent to get there pans tutor declassified and releed, and

White we are in compete agreement on the need to

declassify documents-related to the assassination.of President

Kennedy, I do have certain technical reservations about the

mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this

same

a result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns;

I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional

problems posed by the joint resolution.

inagaina

beginne

resense o

Committees

Neguet, I

Cite

My primary concern with the joint resolution, as currently

drafted, is that it directs the Executive Director of the

Assassination Materials Review Board to make the initial

*determination as to whether, marenals related to tae assassination

held by all Exceutive Branch agencies, including CIA, can be

released to the public, Testing this review authority, in an outside

body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect

intelligence sources and methods. [u addition, I am coucerned

that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a

Review Board that has no articuld expertise in matillgene

classifieation determinations and is unfamiliar with the

assassination material is bound to result in delays in releasing the

material. It will also result in a duplication of effort since

originating agencies will have to review the decision of the

Executive Director to release particular documents.

I share your belief that the review of documents be done in

an expeditious and efficient manner. To that and, I propose that

the initial review of assassination materials be made by the

---

## Page 30

13-00000

originating agencies and completed within a reasonable period of

time.

AsI have indicated, the CIA has already begun this process.

Documents that an agency determines cannot be released to the

publiC would the be reviewed by members of the Review Board,

who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an

agency and the Review Board over the release of a document

could then be resolved by the President or his designee. This

arrangement would ensure that the initial review of documents is

accomplished quickly by individuals who are in place and have

the necessary substantive experience to declassify documents

while at the same time providing an independent review of all

decisions pade to withhold information.

It pusemally frould expelit

dad?

would he onl

in so verific

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains ao

provision requiring security clearances or secure document

handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

As Director of Central Inteltigence, I have an obligation to protect

intelligence sources and methods, and to uphold that obligation I

could not make classified information available to the Boarduntil

it took the necessary steps to safeguard at jaformation

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not

provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release

of CIA information contained in documents originated by

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,

documents originated by these entities can be released directly by

the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

8

---

## Page 31

13-00000

Board without any review by the President or other Executive

Branch agencies. Osce again, this provision conflicts with my

statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods; that duty

should not be delegated to an outside body. I believe that the

joint resolution should provide that an agency that originated

information found in another's document should have the

opportunity to review the information and raise necessary

objections prior to its release to the public. Au interagency

working group should be established to coordinate the review and

release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion!

Fourth, the joint resolution defines "assassinátion material"

broadly to include any records that relate "in any manner or

degree to the assassination." I believe we have already identified

these documents as a result of previous inquiries from

investigative bodies, such as the Warren Commission and House

Select Committee on Assassmations. These investigations were

thorough, and any additional requests for information should bear

some reasonable relationship to the JFK assassination. Perhaps a

panel of distinguished historians could be formed to provide

advice to the Review Board as to what, if any, additional material

should be reviewed.

Time, the joint resolution from ily a 30-day period for

agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive

Director to release informations Thi? may not provide sufficient

time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large

---

## Page 32

13-00000

volumes of material at one time. If the initial review o

documents is done by the Executive Director, the joint resolution

should be amended to provide that an agency may request a

reasonable extension of time to determine whether documents

may be released

finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the

tou

grounds for postponement of public release of a document, mathes

problem

Got be adequate to protect Agency interests in certain respects.

For example, there is no provision for postponing release of

belien

documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative

process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.

solved

While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and

are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly

related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under

.

the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. I

also believe that "intelligence agent" under section 6iL)(A of the

joint resolution should be defined to include covert employees of

an intelligence agency, or former employees who retired

undercover from an intelligence agency.

While I believe that the joint resolution carbe improved, I

want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the ClA will cooperate

'with whatever reasonable mechanism is established to declassify

the assassination material. As Director of Central latelligence and

as Bobert Gates private citizen, I am committed to making this

process work. It is my hope that the declassification of this

with any to mechanis established by the congress and the

---

## Page 33

13-00000

6 May 1992

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM: Neal wolin,

Re:

JEK Testimony

SA/DCI

questir

2) Check why

*OCA

ahead

handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'.

en cares are nine

A briefing book with

Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday.

As Stan's cover note

suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the

Executive; OCA'S preference is to send it out tomorrow.

Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony

commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seg.) is too long

and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay

in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you

should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme

clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that

will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality)

that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectivas relating

to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will

continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of

material consistent with your statutory obligations.

In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your

"statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more

than a couple of times.

Moreover, I think the paragraph on the

definition of "assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary

and potentially counterproductive.

One of the impetuses for the

JEK resolution,

after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that

previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph

feeds right into that criticism.

Some of the other "technical"

criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make

(especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but

might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee

or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving

the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material

declassification to death.

Nere

Neal

---

## Page 34

13-00000

OCA 2149-92

19 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Director. Center for the Study of

Intelligence

Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC

David M. Pearline

Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA

Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony

1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's

15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials

Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which

CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of

the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.

2. The following specific questions require follow-up

action:

a.

How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we

may never know about? (p. 5)

b.

Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months

after his defection?

(p. 5)

c.

Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)

d

Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was

thought to be him, was

that an error?

Or was there

something involved in that you can shed some light on?

(p. 5)

e. [What consisted of new information lin the Oswald

filel

that the public had not already had in its published

files

somewhere? (p. 14)

f. (Wlould the establishment of such a panel of

outside experts (by DCI, to review redactions in the absence

of legislation] . . .violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)

3.

I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate

components, will take the lead on all questions except for

the last.

augun take the le

I understand OGC will take the lead on the

Privacy Act question.

(Note: OGC advises that the issue of

why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his

defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations

volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate

your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the

record.

David M. Pearline

Attachment

---

## Page 35

13-00000

Draft: 14 May 1992

CIA SPECT.

RELEASE DEADLE

2000

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND

NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

15 MAY 1992

---

## Page 36

13-00000

CIA SPECIA/ OH ROTTONS

RELEASE MOUL

2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide

my views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination

Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of

documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John

F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on

this important matter, just as I did before your Senate

counterparts last Tuesday.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement

with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts

should be made to declassify and make available to the public as

quickly as possible government documents relating to the

assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and

giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public

access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that

still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe

that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had

anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I

recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents

of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the

establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible

for declassifying as many historical documents as possible

---

## Page 37

13-00000

consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the

Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for

declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national

intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are

10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of

30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the

Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records

focusing on particular events of historical importance, including

the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review

Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of

declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting

for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents

belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,

already has begun its review of the documents related to the

assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that

the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on

Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been

declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the

National Archives for release to the public. This is, I

acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest

of my commitment immediately to begin review for

declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the

reviewers are going through a substantial number of, documents,

and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

2

FinsT

were

feeler

sco:

---

## Page 38

13-00000

,.l..................

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy

assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as

possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification

guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically

direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can

be very forward leaning in making these documents available to

the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to

take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making

publicly available these new guidelines for historical review

and declassification.

In connection with these historical review guidelines, I

have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency

procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I

have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal

FOLA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have

described for historical declassification. Although the task

force will have to explore the difference between current

documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-

old documents that are placed into the historical review

program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much

more positive attitude toward declassification and release of

Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in

reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to

---

## Page 39

13-00000

place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents

related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of

chart

approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes

64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the

Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on

Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald

accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are

dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is

uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized-all of which makes the

review process more difficult. The material contains everything

from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane

news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files

before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA

received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as

well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA

prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I

should emphasize that these records were assembled into the

present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from

the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on

Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination

CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted

of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which

---

## Page 40

13-00000

originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and

newspaper clippings. (Although I reported slightly smaller

numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed

these exact numbers.) Only 11 of these documents originated

within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed

before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender

it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified

the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and

provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file

dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his

activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after

the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on

Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CLA received from

other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination

Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize

that this is but the first installment-an example of our

intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have

will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transief they

declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed,

rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been

concluded.

The committee has asked about documents in our possession

generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

5

---

## Page 41

13-00000

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,

in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the

documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated

with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going

through the material compiled at the request of the Warren

Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,

which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that

contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap

material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within

the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with

a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private

organizations, and foreign and American press.

Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination

materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community

agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which

I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement

records. The National Security Agency and the State

Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report,

after a preliminary search, that they have identified a

relatively small amount of material responsive to previous

inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee,

and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The

Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence

until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date,

and it anticipates that any holdings'it might have would be

6

---

## Page 42

13-00000

minimal because its mission at the time.of the Kennedy

assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents

from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection

of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to

review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for

declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these

files has provided us some indications of what they contain.

Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they

principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro,

Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent

activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a

large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House

Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating

to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally

because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names

of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the

sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents

belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already

taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other

agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If

necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of

7

---

## Page 43

13-00000

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the

results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be

declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be

information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of

reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of

intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give

examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the

House Select:Committee on Assassinations, I understand that

security and personnel files were requested on a number of

Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or

performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks

on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of

who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal

documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of

documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of

disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest

of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing

derogatory information on particular individuals where the

information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain

names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on

a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names

in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such

information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and

summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum

8

---

## Page 44

13-00000

amount of information is released while still protecting the

identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the

President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence

and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any

information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel

of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps

including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever

documents wé have redacted or kept classified. They would then

issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to

the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.

However, it is an important program, and I am personally

committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing

resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the

allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff

and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK

documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent

to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what

remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is

against this background that, in response to the committee's

request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism

established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I

---

## Page 45

13-00000

.....:?:...

...'. 1..9.0.9.001.112129

:.

intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will

defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems

posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to

whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released

to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility

to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no

provision requiring security clearances or secure document

handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not

provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release

of CIA information contained in documents originated by

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,

documents originated by these entities can be released directly by

the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

Board without any review by the President or other Executive

Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for

agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive

Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for

meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of

material at one time.

---

## Page 46

13-00000

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which

outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a

document, makes no provision for postponing release of

documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative

process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.

While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and,

in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information

directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be

unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they

might be needed.

These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in

ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing

on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation,

CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the

relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate

fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the

President to declassify all of this material.

---

## Page 47

13-00000

Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.. -

Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law

Committee on the Judiciary.

U.S. House of Representatives

20 Mays!922.15

_COTIONS

RELEASE IN FOLL

2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide

our views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination

Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of

documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John

F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on

this important matter.

Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on

this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with

the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be

made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as

possible government documents relating to the assassination of

John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving

journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to

governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger

over 28 years after the assassination. Further, we believe that

maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had

anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

---

## Page 48

13-00000

-—--

••••*•

---

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the

Director recognized the need for greater public access to CIA

documents of historical importance. Two months ago, he

announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be

responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as

possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the

Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for

declassification documents-30-years old or older,-and national-

intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are

10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of

30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff

in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA

records focusing on particular events of historical importance,

including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical

Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose

of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not

waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying

documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group

already has begun its review of the documents related to the

assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these

records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald

prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite

minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for

release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have,

2

---

## Page 49

13-00000

....-

-

but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin

review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I

speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of

documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released

shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy

assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as

possible. In fact, the Director recently approved-new CIA - -

declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program

which specifically direct a presumption in favor of

declassification. The Director believes that we can be very

forward leaning in making these documents available to the

public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take

this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly

available these new guidelines for historical review and

declassification.

In connection with these historical review guidelines, the

Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency

procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The

mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA

procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described

for historical declassification. Although the task force will have

to explore the difference between current documents that often are

requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed

into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the

3

---

## Page 50

13-00000

--

FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward

declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in

reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to

place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents

related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of

approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes

64 boxes of copies and originals of information-provided-to the--

Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on

Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald

accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that

is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of

which makes the review process more difficult. The material

contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources

to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files

before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA

received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as

well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA

prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I

should emphasize that these records were assembled into the

present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from

the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on

Assassinations.

4

---

## Page 51

13-00000

Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a

small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents

(amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI,

State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of

these documents originated within CIA. As I have already noted,

we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite

minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives.

The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet

Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By

contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated

the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of

which CIA received from other agencies after November 22,

1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination

Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize

that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all

the material that we will review-an example of our intentions.

All of the assassination-related documents we have will be

reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified

documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than

waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.

We have been asked about documents in our possession

generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,

5

---

## Page 52

13-00000

11420010161006194 141

in the 17 boxes of Oswald records; approximately 40% of the

documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated

with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going

through the material compiled at the request of the Warren

Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,

which includes 63.boxes.of-paper records.and one box. that-

contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap

material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within

the 63-boxes of paper records,-appreximately 27% originated with

a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private

organizations, and foreign and American press.

We have also been asked about assassination materials that

may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI

will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both

intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security

Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have

identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to

previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church

Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into

existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to

date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be

minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy

assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

---

## Page 53

13-00000

:

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents

from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection

of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to

review, and, as I said earlier, this review for declassification is

now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided

us some indications of what they contain. Although the records

cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA

activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the

Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City

and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name

traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on

Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison

investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CLA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally

because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names

of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the

sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents

belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already

taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other

agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If

necessary, in the absence of legislation, we will ask the House of

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the

results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

We hope to work with you, Mr. Chairman, to remove any

obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.

7

-

---

## Page 54

13-00000

•.

While we expect that a large amount of material can be

declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be

information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of

reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of

intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give

examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the

House Select-Committee on Assassinations, I understand that

security and personnel files were requested on a number of

Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or

performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks

on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of

who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal

documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of

documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of

disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest

of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing

derogatory information on particular individuals where the

information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain

names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on

a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names

in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such

information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and

summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum

amount of information is released while still protecting the

identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

---

## Page 55

13-00000

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the

President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence

and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any

information relevant to the assassination, the Director has stated

that he would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from

outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former

jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept

classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on

their findings.

-

The effort required to declassify the documents related to

the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.

However, it is an important program, and both the Director and I

are personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of

diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, the

Director has allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the History

Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the

JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent

-to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what

remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is

against this background that, in response to the committee's

request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism

established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. 1

intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will

9

---

## Page 56

13-00000

defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems

posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to

whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released

to the public is inconsistent with the Director's statutory

responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, we are concerned that the joint resolution contains

no provision requiring security clearances or secure document

handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not

provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release

of CIA information contained in documents originated by

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,

documents originated by these entities can be released directly by

the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

Board without any review by the President or other Executive

Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for

agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive

Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for

meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of

material at one time.

10

--

---

## Page 57

13-00000

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which

outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a

document, makes no provision for postponing release of

documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative

process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.

While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and,

in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information

directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be

unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they

might be needed

These are technical problems that we believe can be solved

in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents

bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation,

CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the

relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate

fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the

President to declassify all of this material.

11

---

## Page 58

13-00000

;:.

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington DC 20505

OCA 2157-92

22 May 1992

The Honorable John Glenn

Chairman

Committee on, Governmental Affairs -

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman: -

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I

made when

I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on

the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to

approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was

declassified and released to the public.

A subsequent count

by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total

of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages.

I gave the correct

numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee

on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee

on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by

Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had

had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or

GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I

answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and

the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State

Department might have requested those files, but I was not

certain.

At the time, I believed that that was an accurate

answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January

1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal

service (MBRF)

for any information related to the Kennedy

assassination.

The Russians advised us, after reviewing

their file holdings

on Oswald, that they had nothing that

would add to our knowledge or

to the 22 November 1991 ABC

television special on this issue, which they termed

"detailed and objective."

CL BY (2196777)

DECL

OADR

DRV FM LIA 3-87

-

---

## Page 59

13-00000

i :

SECKE

The Honorable John Glenn

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain

access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the

this topic must remain classified.

Agency has had direct contacts with for the purpose of

Russian service on

correcting the public record, I suggest the following

unclassified statement:

In response to a request from the US embassy in

Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file

holdings"on Oswald.

They have advised us that

they had nothing that would add to our knowledge

the 22 November 1991 ABC television special

objectives sue, which they termed "detailed and

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the

Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful.

A similar letter is being sent to Ranking Minority

Member Roth.

Sincerely,

outmates

Robert M. Get

• Director of Central Intelligence

CC:

Senator Cohen

Senator Boren

Senator Murkowski

---

## Page 60

13-00000

SECRET.

Central intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C20SOS

OCA 2157-92/1

22 May 1992

The Honorable William V. Roth, JI.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Roth:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I

made when I testified before the Comnittee last Tuesday on

the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to

approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was

declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count

by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total

I gave the correct

numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee

on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee

on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by

Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had

had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or

GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination.

answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and

the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State

Department might have requested those files, but I was not

certain.

At the time, I believed that that was an accurate

answer.

I have since discovered, however, that in January

1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal

service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy

assassination.

The Russians advised us, after reviewing

their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that

would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC

television special on this issue, which they termed

"detailed and objective."

CL BY

2196777}

DECL

OADR

DRV FM LIA 3-87

---

## Page 61

13-00000

SEGRAT

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain

access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the

Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service or

this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of

correcting the public record, I

In response to a request from the US. embassy ir

Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file

holdings on Oswald.

They have advised us that

they had nothing that would add to our knowledge

or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special

objectivessue, which they termed "detailed and

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the

Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful.

A similar

letter is being sent to Chairman Glenn.

Sincerely,

tonetmates

Robert M. Gates

Director of Central Intelligence

CC:

Senator Cohen

Senator Boren

Senator Murkowski

---

## Page 62

13-00000

SESRET

The Honorable John Glenn

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

SUBJECT:

Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee

on Governmental Affairs

OCA/ LEG/ SMDunne: me/37916

Distribution:

Original

- Addressees

1 - DCI

1

- PDCI

- ExDir

1

- DDO

1

-

D/OCA

1

D/CSI

C/DCI History Staff

1

ER

1

• OCA Records

1

Leg

Subj File

1

SMD Signer File

1

- SMD Soft File

(21 May 1992)

OCA 2157-92

3

---

## Page 63

13-00000.

Se nator

John Glenn

- News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Jack Sparks

(202) 224-5635

May 12, 1992

Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751

Statement of Senator John Glenn

Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

Hearing on

S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"

May 12, 1992

The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the

"Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The

legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator

Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.

The legislation would require the government to release

records to the American public which are "relevant to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would

establish an independent review board within 90 days of

enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to

release the records to the public through the National Archives

and the Government Printing Office.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing

documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold

documents

to prove to the Review Board and the American people

why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.

It is also important to stress that the legislation does

not authorize, any official investigation of the assassination.

Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American

public may be given the most complete access to review relevant

records, and make their own observations and assessments. The

Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to

this purpose.

This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and

distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official

explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a

climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs,

and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the

only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel

distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and

remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's

assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next

generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the

---

## Page 64

13-00000

assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly

improved by the release of these records.

Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first

required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive

Branch national security information. Declassification schedules

remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the

requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this

same

practice. It is likely that more government documents related to

the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past

12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also

fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of

Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions,

have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by

the FBI.

The public interest in the history of the assassination

of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted

bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports,

films,

or television programs were produced on the subject between the

years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250

holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports,

allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as

Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently

located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were

identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas

police officers who were not previously interviewed by

government

investigators.

The speculation about the assassination of President

Kennedy may be more cruel than the truth itself. It is arguable

whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the

speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made

available wilt answer many questions and provide many history

lessons.

I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the

process for review and release of the records is fair and

appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a

minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that

it will

recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I

hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of

assassination related records that will be efficient and

effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will

address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.

The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for

working quickly to propose an independent and accountable

mechanism to release

records related to the assassination.

However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.

I believe that the major issues include:

_2-

---

## Page 65

13-00000

First, how will agencies

and others who hold records

define the universe of "relevant" Kennedy assassination

materials? It is

important to be able to go beyond the

frame of

reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees,

but the question must be asked: Where will the search for

documents end?

Second, the definition and search for "relevant

assassination

material" also

raises important questions of human

resources

and costs to organize and make material available to

the Review Board. How much will this cost?

Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review

and release of records in an independent, accountable, and

credible manner. The tension

between management and public

confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may

be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes

necessary?

Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name

of openness in government,

also exempts

the Review Board from

the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information

Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?

Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of

disclosure.

strongly believe that the government should

practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are

demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is

important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages

of material will be released, the bill contains national

security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and

administrative records relating to past official inquiries.

I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress,

which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the

passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the

bill, before releasing

documents.

It is my intention to move

legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but

regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created

in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin

its work.

We will hear today how ready key agencies

congressional officials are to release their records. If even

some of the material can go out the door without further

adjustments, then let's give the public access now.

The review

board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the

opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly

thereafter.

Today we are fortunate to have several experts and

authorities

to discuss these issues. These include the authors

of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

- 3 -

---

## Page 66

13-00000

Investigation. We

are grateful to have our other witnesses as

well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the

Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work

represents

the track record on public access to Kennedy

assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He

will speak to the nature and limitations of current access

arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century

historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and

Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each

possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of

the intelligence and federal law enforcement communities. We

welcome all of you to the Committee.

4

---

## Page 67

13-00000

= 1H16 have ang oral comment, DRAFT

If you

Vicki teno

→, " The are to call

Dave

6/5/92

SUGGESTED AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED IN REPORT LANGUAGE

(IF NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION)

1.

Initial Reyiew of assassination materials.

It

should be made clear that section 5 of H.J.Res. 454, which

requires that records not provided to the Archivist for

within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude

agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as

much information available as possible before the Review

Board conducts its review of assassination materials.

Suggested clarifying report language:

The Coumittee notes that some agencies, such as the

Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to

review and release assassination materials.

Section

5(a) (2), which requires that all records of an official.

investigation for which an agency is custodian be made

available to the Review Board within 60 days of

enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to

preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they

have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives

for public release wherever possible. In, fact the

committee encourages such reviews to

continue inasmuch

as they can provide tor more expeditious release of

assassination materials to the public.

2.

"Third agency rule" adhered to in review of

documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily

provide that the agency or department that originated the

information will have any input into a decision to disclose

the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision

after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:

the committee understands that existing regulation

within the Executive Branch require that clasgifie

information originated in one agency may not be

disseminated outside another agency to which it has

been made available without the consent of the

originating agency.

The Committee expects that

agencies that are custodians of records will follow

this practice before providing information to the

Archivist under section 5(a) (1) for public release

pursuant to section 4.

Section 5(a) (2) requires agencies that are custodians

records available to the Review Board. The Board will

then make a determination of whether the material

qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth

---

## Page 68

13-00000

DRAET

in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records

and the originating body of the record of its

determination.

The Committee expects that the Review

Board also will consult with the agency or department

that originated the information in reaching its

determination as to whether

public disclosure of the

material must be postponed to ensure that it is

apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that

information.

For example, the Review Board should

consult with the relevant

Executive Branch agency that

provided information incorporated into a congressional

document before making a decision to release that

before maki

document and shall inform the originating agency of a

decision to release that information.

3. Identities of covert. employees qualify for

postponement.

"Intelligence agent" is something of a term

of art that. left undefined, might not be construed to

protect information that would reveal the identity of covert

employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested

clarifying report language:

The term "intelligence agent" as used in section

7(a) (1) (A)

is intended to permit postponement of

release of information that would reveal the identity

of a domestic or foreign intelligence or

counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign

liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States

intelligence organization, where the identity of any of

these currently requires protection.

4. Board access to "any record" of an Executive

In addition to adding language to section 10(1) (1)

to clarify that requests for additional records must be made

by the Review Board itselt, report language snouta make

clear that the Committee does not intend the Board's

discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report

language:

Section 10(1) (1) provides that the Review Board may

request "any record" from an Executive agency.

The

Committee intends to give the Review Board wide

latitude to determine what additional records may be

held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination

of President Kennedy.

Rather than the Committee

attempting to define what records should be requested,

the Committee believes that this judgment is best left

to the Board, which will develop expertise in

assassination-related issues and documents as its work

---

## Page 69

13-00000

DRAEX

proceeds.

However, the Committee does not intend to

vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to

request any and all records of agencies without regard

to their relationship to the assassination.

Comnittee expects that the Board will request only

documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to

the assassination,

the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of

sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or

methods is to be avoided.

---

## Page 70

13-00000

SECRET

HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION

10 April 1996

1.

Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered

- Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working

files

- Third Agency documents:

FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries

2.

Pages released

(227,000)

- Percentage of pages redacted; 70 %

3. Process of declassification

- Former senior officers in HRG review

- Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)

Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection

Act, 1992

- Records related to the assassination or investigation

into the assassination

- Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of

records

-- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be pre-

sented to the Board

E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring

protection

- Source or method currently utilized

- Foreign government relationship cur-

rently requiring protection

Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there

is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement

- Board then has to justify on the record each redaction

with which it agrees

- Once

a determination is made, Board must publish it in

Federal Register within 14 days

---

## Page 71

13-00000

- Options available:

substitute language e.g.

"Northern

European station"

- Also, summary of a record

- Board has access to every document in full

6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:

- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of

information that is 30 years old with damage to current

intelligence operations

- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki (

- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover

- Liaison, joint operations in Mexico

- Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger', Jeff Smith, Central

Cover, DO desk officers, others

- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover,

ability to conduct operations

7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree

with Board's determination

- President has sole authority to require postponement of

a record or information

--President required to advise the Board within 30 days

of the Board's determination

-- This is published in the Federal Register

8. Current appeal (now resolved)

- Issues: identification of Agency asset

liaison relationship

identification of station

- Potential appeal: Tokyo station

Additional requests of Board to

review other records e.g.,

history of Mexico City

station, Intelligence Community Staff

records

---

## Page 72

13-00000

CSI 1997-552

10 December 1997

NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study

of Intelligence

Deputy Director

Office

of Congressional Affairs

FROM:

John Pereira

Chief,

Historical Review Group

SUBJECT:

JFK/Possible Letter from

Congressman Burton to EXDIR

Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told

HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a

letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA

will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of

assassination-related records.

Burton chairs the Government

Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the

JFK Board.

Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton's staff

last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may

not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the

review of documents by 1. September 1998.

Gunn showed the

staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board

and the EXDIR on the same issue.

According to the staffers,

Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the

assassination records.

The staffers gave Gunn the

impression that Burton's strong interest will prompt him to

write to the Agency.

During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with hin

the Agency's clear commitment to declassifying all

assassination records.

We also explained that we have

shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and

will shift more it necessary, even at the cost of slowing

down or stopping other declassification efforts.

The Perina

John

• Pereira

I killen

1- Fast Hiccham

12/10

/ cerculated-JFK

ADMINISTRATIVE=

INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 73

13-00000

uuv..

12/19/97 FRI 09:17 FAX 202 724 0457

ALTUKM

10: 2022261274

ARRB

JAT. LUNDS

LA MARMAND

ECTICUT

на

MORANA

HORIDA

Оню

AMFORO, SOUTH CAROLINA

MANIPULAE

HI JERBEY

BER, LANCAS

ROS PORTMAN, ONTO

DEC 17'97

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

2157 FAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20516-8113

(2053, 826-2062

December 16, 1997

0002

17:24 N0.003 P. 07

NEATEN MATU CANTONEN

DON MAE, WEST VIRORKA

1A, NEW YORA

EDOU

HEN TUPI

METIVANLA

BARY A CONDIT CALI

01.11

CAPO

ONEY, MEDY TORE

THON

ACCOMEN

ELE

DIST

VEGNORTON

TTAH, MNNETIVARRA

ELLIAM E. OUHMINOS, MARTIANO

DENNIS KU

DO A, BLAGOJEVICH, LINON

DANNY A DAVIS, RUMORS

ОННГ. ТЕННЕ, МАПАЛОНИВЕТТЕ

BERMANO CARDERS, VERMONT

MDEPENOEAT

The Honorable Goorge J. Tenet

Director of Contral Intelligence

Central Intelligenco Agency

SIA HAS NO OBJECTION 1O

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Direclor Tenct:

As Chairman of the Committoc on Govemment Reform and Ovansight, I have a groat interest in

ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee,

completes its work by its scheduled tormination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this ycar I introduced

H.R. 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended the authorization of the keviow Board for one additional

ycar, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Reviow Board was included

in President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 budget, and received biparisan support in Congress.

During consideration of H.R. 1553, I stated my firm intention for this to be the final exlension of

authorization for the Koview Board, Accordingly, I believe that it is of ulmost importanco that all leecral

agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order

that documents may bo procossed and transferred to the National Archiycs, in compliance with the President

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).

The Review Board has advised me that while it perceives that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

generally has boon cooperative and he piul, the Board novertholess believes that the CLA is not transferring

records to tho Board it a paoe consistent with the neod to complete the work on limc. The Board similarly

has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious mannor, il is prepared to use its

legal powers to order a transfor of records to the Board which would then vole to open the records without

benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it docs nol wish to take this slep, but

that it is fully preparod to do so if necessary to complete its work by its September 30, 1998, termination

I urgo you to tako all appropriate steps to ensure that the CIA promptly fulfils its obligations under

the law by expeditiously revicwing and transferring the relevant records to the Review Board.

15309445

cerely,

Dan Burton

Chairman

DB:jes

---

## Page 74

13-00000

Lal

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OCA 97-1969

8 January 1998

• •

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FOLL

2000

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman

Committee on Government Reform

and Oversight

House of Representatives

washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which.

you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence

Agency's (CIA) processing of records related to President

John F. Kennedy's assassination.

You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board's

concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace

sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure

you, as I did to the Review Board's Executive Director in

the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is

vember 44. 2992 Tetter

committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory

deadline of September 30,

1998 for reviewing all of the

Agency's assassination-related materials.

As the Review

Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board

and its staff in this effort.

We share the Review Board's goal of declassifying

and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent

possible.

As you are aware, it is

important that there be

a proper review of all the records

so that still sensitive

information that might warrant continued protection can be

identified to the Board.

For the past several years a team

of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task

of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we

shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to

accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt

transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National

Archives.

---

## Page 75

13-00000

The Honorable Dan Burton

I understand the importance that the Congress and the

President have placed

on disclosing to the American people

all available information about the assassination.

To this

end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material

and are working diligently to complete our review of the

remaining records.

If you or your staff require any further information or

would like a briefing on our declassification program, please

have your staff contact Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional

Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

Enclosure

---

## Page 76

13-00000

.ttwqrt.ar...r101161.01

ewe ml deeedesaioe

The Honorable Dan Burton

DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan: dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 INTERIM)

OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)

Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)

Distribution:

Original - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC

1 - EXDIR/CIA (Follow-up to SCI-97-536)

1

- DCI

1

- DDCI

1

- ER (ACTION ITEM:

ER 97-5851)

1

- DCI/OGC

1

- DCI/CSI

- DDO

1

- DO/IMS

- DA/OIM

- DA/OIM/IRG

- DA/MS

- D/OCA

- AO/OCA

1

- OCA Records (ACTION ITEM:

A/97-05697)

1 - JPMeehan Chrono

3

---

## Page 77

13-00000

CIA SEECE CARRERONS

RELEASE BAREL

2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide

my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination

Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of

documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John

F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on

this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement

with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts

should be made to declassify and make available to the public as

quickly as possible government documents relating to the

assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and

giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public

access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that

still linger over 28 years after the assassinatión. Further, I believe

that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had

anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I

recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents

of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the

establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible

for declassifying as many historical documents as possible

consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

---

## Page 78

13-00000

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the

Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for

declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national

intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are

10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of

30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the

Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records

focusing on particular events of historical importance, including

the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review

Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of

declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting

for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents

belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,

already has begun its review of the documents related to the

assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that

the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on

Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has*been

declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred

to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I

acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest

of my commitment to begin review for declassification

immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the

reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents,

and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

2

---

## Page 79

13-00000

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy

assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many

documents as possible. In façt, I recently approved new CIA

declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program

which specifically direct a presumption in favor of

declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in

making these documents available to the public, and I have

instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to

make

pallic

heart.

to day the

guidelitor

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in

reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to

place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents

related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of

approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes

64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the

Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on

Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald

accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing

with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and

is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process

more difficult. The material contains everything from the most

sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news

clippings.

3

---

## Page 80

13-00000

These records include documents that CIA had in its files

before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA

received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as

well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA

prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I

should emphasize that these records were assembled into the

present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from

the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on

Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination

CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted

of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which

originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and

newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the

CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed

before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender

it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified

the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and

we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in

this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959

and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only

after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the

material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA

received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

---

## Page 81

13-00000

You have asked about documents in our possession

generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,

in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the

documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated

from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going

through the material compiled at the request of the Warren

Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,

which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that

contains % reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap

material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within

the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the

documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government

agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from

other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of

CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review

and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for

declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these

files has provided us some indications of what they contain.

Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they

principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro,

Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent

activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a

large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House

5

---

## Page 82

13-00000

Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating

to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally

because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names

of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the

sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents

belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already

taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with

other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If

necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to

release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered

documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be

declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be

information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of

reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of

intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give

examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the

House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that

security and personnel files were requested on a number of

Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports

(performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks

on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of

who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal

6

---

## Page 83

13-00000

documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of

documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of

disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest

of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing

derogatory information on particular individuals where the

information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain

names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on

a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names

in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such

information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and

summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum

amount of information is released while still protecting the

identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the

President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence

and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any

information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of

distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine

pretty

foreman

whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They

destinguered

would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to

the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.

However, it is an important program, and I am personally

committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing

---

## Page 84

13-00000

resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the

allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff

and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK

documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent

to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what

remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is

against this background that, in response to this Committee's

Few.

request, I cite our technical reservations about the mechanism

established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I

intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will

defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems

posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to

whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released

to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to

protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no

provision requiring security clearances or secure document

handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not

provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release

of CIA information contained in documents originated by

8

---

## Page 85

13-00000

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,

documents originated by these entities can be released directly by

the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

Board without any review by the President or other Executive

Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for

agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive

Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for

meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of

material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which

outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a

document, makes no provision for postponing release of

documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative

process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.

While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and

are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly

related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under

the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

the

These are,technical problems that I believe can be solved in

ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing

on the assassination of President Kennedy.

---

## Page 86

13-00000

But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation,

CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the

relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate

with any mechanism established by the Congress and the

President to declassify all of this material.

adled commant on person nection at the tine.

seen party is a mill every we she

10

---

## Page 87

13-00000

PART

ADDED

LATER

CIA SPECI

BeRt? LECTIONS

REM

ALUAL 4 MaY 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALDY

PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

Pages Date

Description.

4

6 Mar 64

30 Jan 76

Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA

CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15

1

4

5

Jan 75 on deleting #s.

1

6 Mar 64

6 Mar 64

6 Mar 64

31 Oct 59

1

NOV

59

2

& 4

NOV

2

NOv

59

9 NOV

59

DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.

Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.

Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.

State Cable from Moscow to SecState.

Redacted copy of same.

Press clipping

Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query

Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept

-state Cable, Moscow to secstate

Redacted copy of same

9 Nov

59

-State Cable, Tokyo to SecState

Redacted copy of same

16 Nov 59

Press clipping

HHANNAHH

26 Nov 59°

Press clipping

25

May 60

Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms

12

May 60

Attachment to above

12 MaY

60

FBI report, fr Dallas

25 Oct 60 State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors

Redacted copy of same

3 Nov 60 - - DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)

Redacted copy of same

18 Nov 60 Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany

draft reply to Cumming

undated - -Handwritten descrip of letter cited above

2

21 Nov 60--Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US

"

defectors

Declassified version of Oswald info from ff

List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter

9

2

18 NOv 60

21 NOV 60

9. Dec 60

Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell

Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above

2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald

3

4

1

201.

>Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

32 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

*DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship.

1

1

14

and passport (signed Rusk)

26 Jan 61 State MemCon re Oswald

Redacted copy of same

13 Jul 61

Cover letter to Helms fI Hoover, plus several

FBI reports, much of which is illegible

1

4

1

28 Sep 61

7 Dec 61

Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion

in Oswald 201

13 Oct 61→ Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering

copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow

Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info

on Oswald

SECRET

---

## Page 88

13-00000

5

9

2

3

3

2

20

20

14

ADDED

LATER

14

3 Mar 62

26 Apr 62

7 Sep 62

10 Sep 63

24 Sep

• 63.

10 Sep 63

8 Nov 63

7 Nov 63

25 Oct 63

31 Jan 64

SECRET

Note saying Navy message of this date is

missing from CD 692 sent from Archives

Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus

Navy, USMC, and

press items

Hoover to helms, plus report fr sac/dallas

Redacted pages

; from above

FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas

FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans

FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas

(apparently different from above)

Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans

report

Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on

Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff

FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material

Report, not really contemprary with this file,

entitled:

"Information Developed by CIA on

the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..,"

28 Sep--3 Oct 63

Redacted copy of same

---

## Page 89

1,3-00000

- Theoharis -- Appendix A

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

June 14, 1966

MR. TOLSON:

Mr. Dolson

• Tolson >

Mr. Mohr -

Mr. Wick.

Mr. Casper.

Mr. Callahan.

Mr. Conrad

Mr. Fell.

Mr. Gale!

Mr. Rosen -

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Tavel -

Mr. Trotter

Tele. Room

Miss Holmes

Miss Gandy

(D) (6)

• *

Justtee Totas returned my call of midday,

6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him

about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation

of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss

the venkins conse, ence with him on severaoytried, asd her seen

boyfriend, and other items which

Mr. Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he

wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.

Fe.

...

jr.

The Black case was then brought up and he was told that

although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this

matter. Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss

this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time.

He then asked me to have breakdast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.

Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast,

we

preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat

of the problem. I gave him a complete rundown on the exchange of corres-

of atten bach the vaste tracties in attempting to detend sobby lege stically

I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned

to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the

Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would

throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to

the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed.

Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a

continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course

out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to

Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent,

had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if

facts, as possessed by the FBI concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping

were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely

destroy Kennedy.

CDD:amr

(2)

CONTINUED..... OVER

---

## Page 90

13-00000

Memorandum to Vr. Tolson

Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after

solicitor General Thurgood Marshall had Ineptly and inadequately presenter

the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Cour

had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas

and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting.

At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand

the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a

tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic

devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception

of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower

court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his

own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of

the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude

towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed

around" regardless of the politics involved.

Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine

how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in

their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the

Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memo-

randa taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum

which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind

but what the FBi acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the

specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully

recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI gave him in

answer to the questions posed by the Supreme Court.

After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought

(the best thing to do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the

President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As

an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the

exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney

General. I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect

the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice

replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want

I to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the supreme Court.

He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect

the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and

Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the

(President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that

CONTINUED..... OVER

---

## Page 91

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order

for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would

listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the

Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would

'be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.

le stated the next problem would be to find this particula

nan. He said he had in mind somebody like"Ken Royall former Secretar

of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally

had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better

judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone

like RosS' Malone, 'former President of the American Bar Association, would

be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable

relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was

an immediate past President of the American Bar Association, from the State

of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated

this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that

Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning

crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak.

Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.

Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action

immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, florida, today; however,

he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would

discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told

him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an

answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter

of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be

gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two weeks. He stated

he thought this could be done.

Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another

/ subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in

the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would

be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I

knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with

the Foffa case. I replied in the aftirmative, stating that Kennedy on one

occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone

on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken

despite the fact that the FBl had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas repliec

that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstance.

CONTINUED. .... OVER

-3 .

---

## Page 92

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

IThe would sit with the rest of the supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would

make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the

Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the

Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the

other Justices.

Justice Fortas next, inquired if I had known a former Bureau

employee by the name of Courtney

Evans. I told him that I did know Evans.

"He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we

were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely

concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett

Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his

"ace in the hole." I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me

to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had

previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans

had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and

that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of

preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that

Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly, indicated,

"Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we

had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information

from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that

Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard.

The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy

knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans

had replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically

'could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone

il coverage.

Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans' background.

I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further

mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at

the urging of Kennedy, Justice Fortas replied that this was the worst news he

had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to

sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely

be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme

Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of

such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.

CONTINUED..... OVER

- 4 -

---

## Page 93

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At this point, I told Justice Fortas of, the memoranda in which

the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished

the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the

following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White

House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnell had immediately advised Bobby

Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to

us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical

/ or Kennedy.

Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed

(down by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He

stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI

would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice

Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model

agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he

wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and

stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of

confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing

Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain

exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraign-

ment of subjects, confessions, etc.

He stated that Marshall therefore, as a

result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to

the Supreme Court.

alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.

He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no

Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning

Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very

despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man, " he nevertheless

could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt

Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down

into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey

Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not

there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the.

Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one

who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr.

The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.

• CONTINUED..... OVER

- 5 -

---

## Page 94

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated

once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator."

He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding

this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in

touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be

protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director

and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a

position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the

President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of

electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the

advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities

both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern

had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political

field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he

recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the

usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result

of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact

that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director,,

Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION:

(1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin

Watson today of the background and current employment of

Courtney Evans.

(2) Il the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that

the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best.

man to serve as an "arbitrator."

or Eltoover)

---

## Page 95

13-00000

8-750 (Rer. 12-11-88)

CIA HAS NO OBJEU...

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

x00000x

xxx000x

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

28 Pagels) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following

statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material

available for release to you.

Section 552

Section S52a

O (6)(1)

(b) (2)

• (b)(3)

• (b)(4)

• (b)(5)

I (b)(6)

• (6)(7)(4)

(b)(7)(B)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(D).

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(F)

(b)(8)

(b)(9)

-=""

[(i)(2)

0(x)(1)

0 (k)(2)

• (k)(3)

(K:)(4)

(K)(5)

• (%)(6)

(k)(7)

• Information pertained only to a third parsy with no reference to you or the subject of your

request.

• Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred

to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be

advised by the Fil as to the releasability of this information following our consultation

with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):

• For your information:

I The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

65 - 6165 - 25,26

x0000xx

XXXXXXX

x00xxxx

x3000OOXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X DELETED PAGE(S)

• NO DUPLICATION FEE.

FOR THIS PAG

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXXXX

YBI/DOJ

---

## Page 96

13-00000

P. Had 1 1333

Theoharis -- Appendix C

SECURITY IT KAY 1 - SEPRET

Mares 16, 1953

PERSONAL AND CCYPISANTIAL

PYARANDOK POR TUE INTORKEY SET RAL

In connestion vith a possible unsuthorizod

lank of offiolal Govorazant information, It 18 belloved

desirablo to Instituto a tachaical surveillanco of

I therefore recomend that you grant authority

to placo a tochnical surrolllance on the rasidends of

prunovald, Apartuent 6258, The jostobostos, 4000

catbodrel Avamo, Ho "., isshington, a. C..

taloppono:

koodley 7-5700,

or any othor rasidencs or orrica spada

ubich he sight occupy in the futuro.

Raspectrully,

John Edgar Zooros

[irector

RECORDED 91 A-19?

HAR 18 1953

}.

This menorandum 1s being submittod in accordance with the

Attoroy General's suggestion. st

• (EH4/rb)

10°%

JECURITY IN?CRATICK

Ha!:

---

## Page 97

13-00000

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOYERNMENT

Mr. Tolson V.

DATZ, April 28, 1953

FROM.

L. B. Nichola

ALL INTORMATION CONTAINCO

V

TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD

KEAN COMMITTEE

Табу мо

Tele.

I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Keas

Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that

on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session,

son tea

L'obin then outlined the following particulars:

Tobin

stated he had ascertained this was probably

679

This was the point which Tobin

stated caused him the most concern because there was such & reference in

the réport of Special Agent

dated at Now York on July 20, b7C

1951, in the investigation on

3.

Tobin outlined this was

b7C

Tobin stated. that Grunewald had the habit of passing

lout ties at Christmas and that as late as 1951 Grunewald had sent ties to.

the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hotd. I told Tobin if he was inferring

that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuale they might have

Kurnihed him the information, that he ougbe to be pretty cautioue because l's

I knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place

the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long

period of time; tho Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director

has not appreciated the manner in which Gunewald has thrown the Director's

RFCORDED . 58

cc :

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Rosen

INDrYEN - 58

- 65-6165-147

1159

---

## Page 98

13-00000

same around and I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever

seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the filo on

With seforence to Ms. Tolsos, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson

one of the most conscientious individuale in Washington and that

Icertainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly,

all he had to do was look at the record so far an Hottel was concerned;

that a few yeare ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to .

Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District

Committee.

Tobin was making quite & point about how Grunewald

could have gotten the information.

I told Tobin categorically I had

reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I

was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from. the

Bureau.

I further told him that with reference to the information on

Grunewald was a fairly good investicator and it would have been

simple matter for him to find out

with reference to the information on

that

- told him it was my

understanding

what thin itsel was a matier or public

record; that one of the first things an investigatos would do in the investi-

gation of,& lawyer would be to check on his admissión to the Bar an

with the tirievance Committee; that anybody could have gotten this.

Furthet. I inquised whether he had any information to the effect that

assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated

TGrunewald/stated/

assisted him. I told him

undoubtedly

personally; that

was in the Department for many

aw hitarer sod no doubt had let is the Debat toM. Terked whether

¡he had any information indicating

Mas close to Melnerney.

=2-

bic

---

## Page 99

13-00000

The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily

concerned about

I told him the investigative reporte on

ment to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951;

Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies mere gives to

G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a

summary of our files on february 28th; that a gummasy memo was

furnished the AG under date of February 29th on

and

He then inquired as to why Go? would want the normation.

I told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the

адвтеї:

I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald

made his investigation. He stated it was shortly after the time when the

committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in

November or December, 1951.

I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired

regarding

and

stating he had heard there were a

couple of Communists on the staff and' that the evidence was supposed to

be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case

and it would'appear that the newspaper source was merely calling ue to

let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously wo

furnishild. no information; that there was some indication from the source

that

had been helping Grunewald and"

might be in contact

with Melnerney.

I told him he was at liberty to

do so.

I told him I would check for the reason why G-? wanted

the information and let him know, which in being done.

bxe

- 3 -

---

## Page 100

13-00000

= =-

ay conversation with tobin, he aduided that there bas

inforsation

the senate sintlar to that furnished by Grunesald.

I oaked him where in the Senate and he noid it came out of Senator

Косатталʼя оддісе.

Inasauch od

the fine romaittee had told the senator about

Think de right be set the beat his go auber or

to conidentially inguire as to whether she recalled what member of

the Conaittee Jurnished then this information.

I,

of course, see no point in talking to

any surther about this natter.

6xc 670

---

## Page 101

13-00000

cc Hr. Ladd

fir. Rosen

Mr. kalley.

Fr. Pennington

The attorcoy General

мат 130,1953

22157 TIR PERSONAL AND CONTIONIAL

Dirostor, FBI

HENRY WILLIAND

GRUNNALD

INFORILTION CONCERAIG

Grunevald was

rollability on

rollowing tarorsation concerning beasy ittle al

brainod oy a contidential source of now

May 110 1953.

proud.

1931.

MANIO I!

FLac

11 1953

EXED

RECORat:

7 162.

1-

---

## Page 102

13-00000

The ittornoy donoral

Complete details consemini the Inturaution doveloped

1a connection with the racuust o1 Deputy Attorag, General Rogers

will, of course, de furnished to hiin upon iis completius

vi tae

Investiguilun oi thess matters.

NOTE:

This is a condensed vorsion of information received from

the washington Field Office which has beon set forth

in as readable

form as possible for the infornation of the Attorney Ceneral.

It is to be noted an attempt has been made to furnish tie attorney

Gensral with only pertinont information which appears would be of

Interest to aim.

• 2.

---

## Page 103

13-00000

Theoharis -- Apendix B

6x

61D

runerald was not Erastrorthy, posserred a bad raprtetion and had boon sadlot el

Los TOlAtION Os tho MALIOnel PrOHIbITION dEL, ANDOREA DA tAs DOt CONVIET

(6) Bureau 111 65-6165 reflects tbat at the request of it. Stephen

T. ¿ATlY, SACTOLATY to the Pposidoat, the Barara condected en Imestigation La:

61c

61D

oIsoct that Graser

siyo and thate

81000 f05 Sanator JyA. It mas allaged that Brushtald had Intlanted tals nobey

Cane frOn SeGrOLATY Of DAT, HarTy I, Moodrlaf, and that the sanay mas pale In

67D

La the DaRroy DollelE, Mesolagton, D. G. (1)

(1) 65-61653

87.2755287

---

## Page 104

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated

once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator."

He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding

this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in .

touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBl's interest should be

protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director

and the fil and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a

position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the

President had Issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of

electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the

advantage of such dèvices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities

ooth in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concer

had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the politica

field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he

recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the

usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result

of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact

that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director,,

Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION:

(1) Pursuant to the Director's Instructions I will advise Marvin

Watson today of the background and current employment of

Courtney Evans.

(2) Il the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that

the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best

man to serve/as an "arbitrator. "

---

## Page 105

13-00000

JOHN EDDAR HOOVER

REDETAS TALL

seen of truestigation

Mashington, 2.8.

„Nit 23, 1949

- 511115

•MEMORANDUM FOR TIE DIRECTOR

Asth further reference to Henry Wise GruseweLd,

In whar we are presently interested, I an attaching a memorandu

Кот у'то Сагзоть что.

63

BEIR

Sor your armorali thare is attacked bereto & lotter

for the ittorney veneralls signetaro, to the secratery of the

Treasu

f'ansorth

1-11-40

SMIT.

•: 5

65 6125--25

41491

---

## Page 106

13-00000

=67D

per

• (7) Burera I1lo 65-6265 alio sellaste that 11 HAY, 1941, tho 20121ta5y

Intalligadoo servion adrisad the Burana that InPoratlos bad bean secaired by

one of 1ta Intormato that Grunnald uns the paroll men for Dores agorts 1n

tho United States and tus ales contest men for tarlous Marlors paros and sub

vorsive organisations. saberquently, the surenz ascertained that the inforean

of the illitery Intalligenos service vasI

• and 1t nao

felt that the lilitary Intelligence sarato man serely renurrocting old 10

Soration In fion at the last that the Bureau had provonaly Investigatad the

Bazo allogations made bul

•Horeros, on kay 23, 1941, a tochnical nun

Talllance of Grasanald us nethorised and fras sune d, 1941 through lugust 1,

1912, such parvellieses yes salrtained on his epartment in the tiestohestes

Aptirtmants, Jo defialtal In ornation nas davolopod, indloating that Granarald

had Molated any specifie faderal statute. (2)

: (8) Bureau file b5-01ós serlects that on Septesber 15, 1942, the Omaha

affice of the Bureau roseived a complalat Iron the Moltar Intelligance sarrie

that Henry tallan arunenald had, on the previous arezing, fiver 2110.00 in

currency to too Any polvatos attached to Headminen satenth Seriice Command

were driniding at a bar in

the fontenelle Hotel In Daahs. The two stivates were then engaged In studyng

110

Intalligence work, and. boopalag misplalous al Grunenal d's apparent Laserosity

sit.; his soner, reported the satter to the Omaha Off1o0. They Indicated that

and approximately

816,000 in her perso.

улів додеу нав дової

Via liah die openod her purso in order

to furaish currency to brusonald to pass out to the arond.

Grunnild as setóstionad by too Agento of the conta offico on

Soptember 15, 1942, ragarding the asttes and he foentified binself as being

connected ad th the illon property Cuntodlan's OStieO In Dashlagton, D.G., by

edibiting travel authority 55a, signed by Jones E. Larther, of the 1l1oa

Property Custodies OPPoo 10 instilagtos, D. C. Grunerald aleload to recalte

189000 por year an каяту Son the Л Р СоЛІД!» DIfjoe. He admitted

"parsing out soney prontacuouely la the bar and statad that be fld sot slah the .

inatter reported to his supertore in fiashington although be jas adlling to

'Turnish Infornation about sho inaldent oonti dostlay:ta

Ro stated

(1) 6561658

(2) 65-5165-228 65-6165 Sub 1, 805121 1 50 222

52:

---

## Page 107

13-00000

• .

Sorlal Ramaral Charse Our

Nor: +404. 101651138

Subject HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD

-, which was

returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General

authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveillance, has

been permanently removed for retention in the l

datea 1=13-23. Men 62-115

See 62-115687-

for details and where maintained.

Removed By_

343

_Date 1/21/74

Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124

ALL DEERAGON CONTANED

WERE IS ECLASSIRIED

12-27-39

sp.s.i.c.t

---

## Page 108

13-00000

T7

Office Memoranalme ONTAS BEATES

-10

droctor, Joderel Drenati af Invertigatles f95

роі. 13

торат дугов алг

ao0sdes0s sita pallay.

RECORDED : 23

#888

AUG &Y FRO

50 MA TE

6332165-141

TAR 23 85S

---

## Page 109

13-00000

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

I4 May 1992

Note For: David Pearline, OCA

Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination

Documents

(Dave Gries suggests additional Is and As along the following

lines)

Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the Nationa

rchives earlier this week were said to have been in th

Archives previously.

Is this correct?

Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by

other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies

had previously released.

'here appears to be little information of interest in the

swald file that wa:

released. Is this true?

Yes this

essentially accurate. But the objective

in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faiti

commitment to release as many documents related to the

assassination

as possible, and as expeditiously as possible

John Pereira

* 76160)

OFFICIAL USE

ONLY

---

## Page 110

13-00000

rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-M

a0639

11:22 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-MULTITAKES

THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

-----

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL

SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act

of 1992

Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates

Location: Rayburn Building, Room 2154

Time: 10 a.m.

MaY 15, 1992

you.

If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For

service problems inside the

District of Columbia, call 202-898-

8355; outside D.C.; call 1-800-537-9755.

*****

*****

This transcript is provided by News Transcripts, Inc. If "-

questions of content arise, call 682-9050

*****

ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution 454,-

the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992.

I very much

appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just

as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.

I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely

the same as the one I did earlier.

Let me just say, as I have

said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to

underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to

declassify and make available to the public as quickly as

possible government documents relating to the assassination of

President Kennedy.

Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will

discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his

murder.

I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to

accelerate the declassification of historical materials,

creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified,

or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old,

and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.

I've asked them to take as

their first priority the

review for declassification a review of the documents relating

to the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have

proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.

And I've indicated earlier this week, we've

declassified the first

set of these records, the pre-

assassination Oswald file.

And these have now been transferred

to the National Archives for release.

---

## Page 111

13-00000

It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to

do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to

declassify these documents and to get them before the public as

quickly as possible.

I've also made publicly available this week the

agency's new guidelines for historical review and

declassification.

In connection with these guidelines I have recently

commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the

Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to

ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the

approach that I've described for historical declassification.

Although the task force will have to explore the

difference between current documents and those that are often

historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA

and the release of government or CIA records.

The chart that I've brought along with me describes

he nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 tc

300,000 pages of material.

further detail on that.

As I indicated, only about 11 of the pre-assassination

documents belong to CIA, and

we have released those, and as I

did earlier in the week,

brought along that file simply to show

how thin it was before that time.

It was only after the assassination that CIA

accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on

Oswald alone.

There has been some comment on the pre-assassination

Oswald file, and how little it contained.

I want to reemphasize

nat this pre-assassination material is but the tirst

-----

nstallment-of all the material we will review: merelv ar

earnest of our intentions.

All of the

assassination-related documents we have

will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the

declassified documents to the archives as they are completed

without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination

materials that may be held

by other intelligence community

agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which

I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.

The National Security Agency and the State

Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a

preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small

amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the

Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select

Committee on Assassinations.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come

into existence until 1961, has

identified no assassination

material to date,

and it anticipates that any holdings it might

have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the

assassination

focused

on foreign military order of battle.

I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA

cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of

limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans

against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many

documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and

2

---

## Page 112

13-00000

the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other

than CIA.

However, we've

already taken steps to lift the

sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin

the process of declassification.

As I indicated earlier in the week, if necessary, and

- in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of

Representatives for-a resolution permitting CIA to release the

results.

of the declassification effort on the seguestered

documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman,

to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the

sequestered documents.

I also have indicated in my statement for the record

that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be

released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns,

or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.

And let me again-take

a moment to give an example of

this type of material.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and

personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files

contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical

evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Although irrelevant to the question of who killed

President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately

ended up in the sequestered collection of documents.

I do not

believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this

information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the

individuals in keeping it confidential.

Similar privacy concerns

exist with documents

containing derogatory information on particular individuals,

where the information is based on gossip or rumor.

Our files also contain the names of individuals who

provided us intelligence information on a promise of

confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach

of such a promise.

where

we cannot disclosure such information to the

public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the

information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of

information is released while still protecting the identity of

an agent, or the privacy of an individual.

As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week,

if legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the

president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence

and to, provide reassurance that CIA has not held back

panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government,

perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents

we have redacted or kept classified.

And they would then issue an unclassified report on

their findings.

I believe that these

actions attest to the seriousness

of our intent to get these documents declassified and released,

and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental

review.

It is against this background'

that I cite our few

technical reservations about the mechanism established by the

joint

resolution to achieve this result.

3

---

## Page 113

13-00000

First, vesting in a body outside--in an outside body

the determination whether CIA materials related to the

assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with

my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources

and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution

contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure

document handling by the assassination materials review board or

its staff.

Third, I'm concerned that the joint resolution does

not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the

release of CIA information contained in documents. originated by.

the Congress or the Warren Commission:

Under the joint resolution documents originated by

these entities can be released directly. by the executive

director of the assassination materials review board, without

any review by the president or the executive branch.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day

period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the

executive director to release information may not provide

sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be

a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution,

which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release

of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of

documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative

process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information.

While such privileges could be waived in the public interest,

and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual

information directly relating to the assassination, they would

be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they

might be needed.

These are technical problems, and I believe they can

be. solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents

bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy•

But again,

whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is

proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant

documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate

fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the

president to declassify this material.

That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr.

Chairman.

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report

Assassinations/hearing

May 15, 1992

MORE

-

LLLEnglish

4

---

## Page 114

13-00000

rtit-rw: TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS- 1

a0829

13:50 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS- 1STADD

THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL

SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure

Act

of 1992

Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates

May 15, 1992

(First Add). -

*****

* * * Mr. Chairman.

REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much,

Mr. Gates.

We appreciate your statement.

And I only have a

couple of observations.

Putting

them altogether, I'm interested in how much

material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about?

why the Lee Oswald file was opened at the CIA 14 months after

his defection.

Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that

picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an

error? Or was there something involved in that that you can

shed some light on?

GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing appallingly.

ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answers to any of those

questions.

But I will take them for the record and respond

quickly to the committee. •

REP. 'CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.

We're here against the background of history and the

fact that this is the murder of the century.

A president of the

United States, sitting president.

And I thought it was

exemplary of the ClA--I never thought l'd be saying this this

morning, either--to find out that you had permitted your

representatives to discuss the subject matter with various think

tanks around the city, one of which was included was the

Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.

And I was told

that there was a very candid exchange

about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting.

Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with

them.

And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the

times.

I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd

say what I am saying today.. But one of

the parts of that

discussion

was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has

been parading around the country saying that you will not meet

with him.

And as a conciliatory member of this Congress, could I

facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the

confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he

5

...

Q's

---

## Page 115

13-00000

has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on

this subject?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a

self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all.

think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing

documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing.

think that the ageney has in many ways set a standard in terms

of its willingness to release these documents, and our

determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.

Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in

the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen

it--are offensive to the agency, and tö the American government,

and to a number of people who were in office at that time from

the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on

down.

It is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose

would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.

REP. CONYERS: Can you tell me about the sympathy and

understanding that you may have for the American people's

confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey

Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?

well, my view, and it's a very personal view.

Mr. Chairman, is that--and

I have never made a study of the

assassination; I have not read the many books that have been

written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of

the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people

of a single individual, a single irrational individual,

committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is -

enormously difficult to--for them to accept at face value.

controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more

than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies and

so on in that respect.

And by the same token, and with all due respect to his

memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy

about the assassination of President McKinley.

to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences

that has contributed to this.

concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept

it at face value but rather than particularly young people who

may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may

not read what historians have to say that is critical about the

movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire

in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must

have been some sort of conspiracy.

And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I

had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States

Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see

the money, and they came back and the reaction was not that they

and the reaction vas not.

accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their

government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was

that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it

was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the

---

## Page 116

13-00000

suspicions that had been created.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. Mr. Schiff.

REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for

appearing personally here.

I know that you have a heavy

schedule, and I'm sure all- the members-of the committee do

appreciate that.

I

have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of

observations on your statement.

The first is.

I do not know

personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at

the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of

President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.

I do know this, though. I do know that it's because

of his movie that members of

the Congress of the United States

are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the

CIA.

And I'm quite-positive that his movie has caused all of

that to happen today, and I personally give him the credit for

that.

Second of all, I note your observation that there is

not a lingering conspiracy

theory involving the assassination of

President McKinley.

To your knowledge, anywhere in the

government, your agency or elsewhere,

are there any documents or

information which for any reason are

not being released with

respect to the assassination of President McKinley?

GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct

knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated

CIA's formation by 47

years, I imagine not.

REP. SCHIFF:

well, you see, I think that's the

central point here, is that there is--I'm

not sure we'll ever

resolve all the questions about the assassination of President

Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved all the

questions about the assassination of President Lincoln.

On

national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes

Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave. reasons for

that.

But the difference between the assassination of

President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our

country's history is, this is the one

and •for whatever circumstances

still holds information nich it considers to be confidential.

And that's the root of this controversy now, and

that's the root of this hearing, I think.

And I made a note of items

that you as director of the

CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality

today.

And I made notes of three. If there were more, I

apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the

procedures, which you made observations about,

and which I think

beanch. find the conmittee willing to discuss with the executive

But three classifications of records. The first is

personnel records involving, I gather, government agents,

perhaps CIA agents, fitness

reports and credit reports, first of

all.

Second of all, the privacy issue because government

-

---

## Page 117

13-00000

files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can

be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the

files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've

nade a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular

informant.

Before I ask you about "those three, can I just ask.

are there any other areas of documents that you as_ director of

_ - the CIA believe should not be released in terms of a generic

category like these?

GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of

sources also the protection of intelligence methods.

think you've captured it.

REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these

briefly.

On protection of personnel records, why would those

have gotten--I understand what you're talking about.

I think we

all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own

agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would

those records have gotten into the assassination records on

President Kennedy?

Why are they mixed in there, do you know?

GATES:

I don't really know, Mr. Schiff.

I think, as

I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a

great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is

kept, and

as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this

part of it: These files contain everything from the most

mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified,

or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.

And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also

indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through

these documents-is that they are not indexed; they are not

catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.

So when I started asking some months ago what was in

the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some

time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of what

kinds of records were in there.

But I assume that these kinds of things were just

swept up with

a lot of other material.

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report

Assassinations/hearing (first

add)

May 15, 1992

MORE

LLLEnglish

---

## Page 118

13-00000

Itt-rw

a0831

13:52

05-15

TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS- 2

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-2NDADD

THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL

SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act

of 199,2

Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates

May 15, 1992

(Second Add)

*****

--

* x x other material.

categories, and that is, where the government has given a

promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that.

Can't the information be released without revealing the

informant? Because I think it's the information that is desirec

here, not necessarily the- identity of who provided it.

GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should

be the case in almost every instance.

REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence

methods, I understand that there's a national security point.

there.

But we are also talking about 30 years ago,

approximately.

do year at a fun to ago get ten mete a one aged an

security risk today if revealed?

GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method

is no longer in use, then I think it no longer--and there's

little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to

I think here again, though, that the focus should be

on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather

than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.

i ca ton or he sout

The only reason I would seek to protect them is in

those instances in which those techniques are still being used,

or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.

With respect to sources, I think that we have a much

longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm

prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that

would be

established, or in the absence of legislation, through

an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence

business review

any of that material that we had held back to

see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.

REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director

9

---

## Page 119

13-00000

Gates,

released?

is that everything that can be released should be

GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.

REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.

Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff.

The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.

REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr.

Chairman.

nd thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcomin

na positive testimony before this committee. _I think that it

is important to emphasize that we share an-interest in

disclosing all of the information related to the substance of

this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct

its business.

And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says

that disclosure to the general public of assassination material

or particular information in assassination material may be

postponed if its release would--and there's a whole List--but

among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is

currently utilized

or reasonably expected to be utilized by the

United States government is involved.

And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us,

and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are

contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records

as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those

safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods

would be revealed or compromise by the information which 1s

released?

GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for

the protection of sources and methods and that allow us

ultimately the president to have the final say would provide

adequate safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for

intelligence-related information then are sufficient?

GATES: Yes, sir. I've'indicated in my testimony we

would ask the Congress to

consider I think two additional

categories of information.

I mentioned executive privilege, or

deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.

Again, we think that there would be very little

intormation that would be withheld under those circumstances,

but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.

The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up

on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate

legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert

employees of U.s. intelligence agencies.

REP. THORNTON:

I appreciate those suggestions.

But

in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the

general outline contained in this resolution would not damage

any current CIA operations; is that correct?

10

---

## Page 120

13-00000

GATES: No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.

REP. THORNTON:

of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel Castro in

the late '50s and early. /60s? -

GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation

Mongoose, AMLash (phonetic), and so on,

are included in the

documents that will be reviewed in the--

REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question

as to whether those files would be included in the material.

GATES: Yes, sir.

REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your

- testimony. Like you I have not seen the movie, and that is not

the basis of my concern.

The basis of my concern is to make

sure that all of the information that is in government

possession relating to this assassination be released. Because

in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences

drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the

Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy,

that there were allusions to the possibility of an external

conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled

by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of

that time.

Would you agree with that, sir?

GATES: I agree with that totally, Mr. Thornton.

REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance

of my time.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thornton.

The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.

REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr.

Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that

you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to

release important documents that will contribute to the better

understanding of the public at large as to what exactly

happened.

I also agree with my colleagues that while the

conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's

movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your

perhaps totally

agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed

attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day.

And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the

chair of this committee

asked you to direct your attention to

the content of that movie, because what we need now is an

informed basis upon which

to look at it.

I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my

colleagues.

And there are a number of very troublesome

questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to

71

---

## Page 121

13-00000

evaluate it, as most of the people in the country.

And

therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely

important.

Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that

you indicate that some of

the documents which are relevant to

this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in

fact documents which belong to other agencies.

——-Would-you-comment on that and clarify that particular

statement in your testimony?

GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post

assassination investigations,

shared

among the agencies.

a great deal of information was

For example, in the 17 boxes of

Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those

documents originated with

the FBI, and were simply made

available for information to CIA.

About 20 percent originated with the State Department

or other agencies

ner the throne tele too lation to

leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We

cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same

practice with us.

REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are

considering now make it possible for your agency, as the

custodian of records that you have been given by other agencies,

be included in your own disclosure?

Can we make that possible?

GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that,

Mrs. Mink. I think that it would simply require those other

agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of

reviewing for declassification the documents that they

originated.-.

We don't hold the record copies of those documents. We

simply have copies of them.

REP. MINK

Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for

disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials

in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they

were documents that your agency had been provided by other

governmental agencies?

GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my

all--belong to other agencies

had all already been declassified. That's correct.

REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with

reference to Oswald now in the public domain?

GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.

REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other

agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are

part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not

necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now

available public documents?

12

---

## Page 122

13-00000

GATES :

don't know whether that's the case or not.

Only the documents that we had from them have been released as

part of the file we released. They may have other documents

pre-November 22na, 1963 that

we didn't have.

REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald

everything that you had in your possession, regardless of

whether it belonged to other agencies, because you found them to

be declassified, have all been released?

GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.

REP. MINK: Now, there is a Washington Post article of

May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been

disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing

that your understanding also of the documents that you

released

to the archives?

GATES: As I indicated earlier, I am certainly no

student of this material. I do not know the answer to that

question.

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report

Assassinations/hearing (second add)

May 15, 1992

MORE

LLLEnglish

13

---

## Page 123

13-00000

rtt-rw

•TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-3

a0835

13:54

05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS- 3RDADD

THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

.—..

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL

SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act

of 1992

Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates

May 15, 1992

(Third

Add)

*****

x x x that question.

REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your

agency have an answer to that question?

GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been

released, so would have represented new information.

REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new

items that had not been released previously?

GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the

director of our center for the study of intelligence.

DAVID GREASE (director, center for the study of

intelligence);

Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been

previously released. About half of those that are--originated

at the CIA.

Among the documents of other agencies that were in our

files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be

verified, that almost all of them, if not all of them, had been

previously released.

REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that

the public had not already had in its'published files somewhere?

GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond

to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you

precisely which documents were new.

I do know that the new ones are not of much

consequence. They do not contain any information that is

particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the

hearing what those are.

REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had

been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October

315t, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did

not open a

file until 14 months alter?

GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.

14

?Q.

A.

---

## Page 124

13-00000

Mink.

REP. MINK:

There was no policy in effect in 1959 with

reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the

Soviet Union?

GATES: I just don't know.

REP. MINK:

Has there been any inquiry made within the

agency to determine that i4-month lapse?

GATES: I don't believe so.

naya do do gated to information the one peo, an ene

REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this

conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the

materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did

not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals,

as the article says, that the materials turned over had been

altered, revised, in some

way by the CIA before they were

released to the archives. Is that a true statement?

GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were

altered or revised.

Our effort was

• to furnish the file that we

had.

That file contained copies of original documents.

Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we

had.

what might be characterized as alterations by some by

us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates

has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I

can assure you, nothing of any conseguence.

These are Privacy Act considerations and things of

that nature.

REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your

testimony you indicated

that you did not support vesting in an

outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related

to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree

to that would be inconsistent with your statutory

responsibility.

I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in

this bill which call

for such

vesting in an outside body?

GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions

that provide that the president can have the final say, normally

I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting

sources and methods.

But it seems to me that, given the unique

circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part

of the bill that

we could find a way to work around.

REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in

your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and

didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished

Americans from outside the government to do the exact same

function for your agency?

15

---

## Page 125

13-00000

GATES: No, ma'am, what I would appoint that panel to

1o is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to

examine

all

of the documents that we decided could not be

declassified, and then provide a report to the American people

on whether of not any of those redactions or those withheld

documents had

a bearing on the assassination.

They would not make the decision to declassify.

REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a

panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition

violate the Privacy Act?

to have--I would have to have our attorneys look at it.

La have to have know the answer to that. I would have A.

REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONXERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've

touched on some very important areas:

There are just two related considerations that I'd

like to bring to your attention, Director Gates.

One is in the

Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a

discretionary matter with the agency,

and we would like you to

review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of

previously released requests.

It's a technical point, but I

bring it to your attention for your future consideration.

And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and

AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you

will elevate those as high up on your agenda for reconsideration

HRG

Note

for release as soon as appropriate.

There are a number of

members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter

to your attention as well. .....

GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of

the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us

today.

GATES: Thank you, sir.

END GATES TESTIMONY

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report

Assassinations/hearing (third and final

May 15, 1992

add)

REUTER

LLLEnglish

16

---

## Page 126

13-00000

1 ut30/98

FKI 11:OO FAA CUL

1<4

U4ur

АЛЛ2

SSINATION

ASSA

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

VIEW

BOAR

January 30, 1998

CIA HAS NO ORJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

iN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

2185 Rayburn House Office Building

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman: •

This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board's sixth monthly progress report,

as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R.

1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until

September 30, 1998.

At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately

3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly

5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meeting. In

addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military

records regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-63. Additional military records

related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960's will be ready for public release in

the coming months.

The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January

meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total

of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions

with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to

increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has

advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe

should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are

conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the

review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests

for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities

have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff - Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOA: Thomas E. Samoluk

---

## Page 127

13-00000

The Honorable Dan Burton

January 30, 1998

Page 2

willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a

significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA

bodes well for the completion of these requests in a timely manner.

Since our December report, the Board's FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000

pages of records from the FBI's HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of

individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of

President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have

advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is

completed in a timely manner.

As I reported in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to

which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to

complete their work in a timely manner. In particular, recent meetings and

communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide

reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.

I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board's

federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final

compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be

completed and appropriately documented by early March. The Joints Chiefs of Staff

has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its

compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has

submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its

obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal

agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is

proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.

Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the

support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do

not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or

questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.

incerely,

T. Jeremy Gunni

Executive Director

---

## Page 128

13-00000

LUE

14:OD

tAA

ZUZ Y24

0457

AKKB

@ 002

T. Jeremy Gunn

Executive Director and General Counsel

Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Statement for

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

Hearing on S. 712

AS OFECTION TO

DECLAIR

March 25, 1998

AINFORMATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee - I appreciate the opportunity to

testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the

declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although I serve as the

Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, I wish to emphasize

that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an

individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal

agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim,

Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor

Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people

unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a

century. The Review Board's official positions on matters related to declassilication will

be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.

I applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee to

reduce goverment secrecy. One of the tragic consequences of goverment secrecy

has been the widely held bellef that the government has known much more about the

assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination

records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any

harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help

alleviate the suspicion of goverment - some of it being justifiable suspicion - that has

festered since the assassination of President Kennedy.

Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, 1 will

focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial

classification.

". Background

Although the word "unique" is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and

accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an

effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of

President Kennedy, In accordance with the declassification standards articulated in

1992, 46 UtS. P 210 Pub. F02-528 ( amended in Act, Col ovie Board

---

## Page 129

13-00000

Uner

ANND

# 003

- 2 -

has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments,

including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice,

as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and

the National Security Council.

Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in

full, or to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of

their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies' evidence, the Review Board

deliberates and makes "formal determinations" as to whether the records should be

opened. The Board's determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening

records. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its

sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one

agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals uitimately involved

approximately 90 records and four different issües.) After extensive briefings had been

submitted to the President - with each side arguing why the records should or should

not be released - the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the

Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal

determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have

been released in accordance with Board decisions. It has now been almost two years

since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board's work has

been a success. Although I do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for

future goverment-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable

lessons that may.be of use to you as you consider S. 712.

Il. The "Four Noble Truths" of Declassification

In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on

the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish

bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the

significant institutional impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to

change the secrecy system should take into account what I will call the "Four Noble

Truths" of declassification:

first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final

decision maker on declassification;

second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed,

and skeptical;

third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be interal

institutional incentives to declassity information; and

fourth, the key to successful declassification is not the articulation of the

---

## Page 130

13-00000

dina

LUG IL4 UADI

ARRB

i.....

@ 010

List of Exhibits

Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn

Exhibit A.

Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.

This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of

typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts

appear in the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is

the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of

the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be

released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.

Exhibit B.

Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960.

Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - Internal Security.

This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained

foreign govemment information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document

was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was

re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of

the Department of State, approached the Swiss Goverment and requested that it

consent to the release of the information. In December-1995, the document was

released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.

Exhibit C.

Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31,

1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.

The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military

contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-

page document formerly classified Top Secret Sensitive. The document was excluded

from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was

systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This

document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session

in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the

National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Exhibit D.

(a) Vietnam January-August 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3.

pp. 265-270.

(b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on

• Vietnam, May 6, Honolulu, Honolulu, Hawaii

---

## Page 131

13-00000

SAA LUZ 124 0457

ARRB

@ 011

2

In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the

eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honciuts, Hawai. Part (a) of this

exhibit includes all of the material that had been publicy released on the conference

prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign Relations of the

United States) and part (b) includes the title pages of the ful 213-page Record (of the)

Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiets of Staff Official File that

has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been

excluded from automatic regrading and declassification and could presumably have

remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was

systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989, and the cassacation of Top Secret was

continued. The document was opened in full at an ARAB declassification session in

July 1997.

Exhibit E.

Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to

Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.

The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance.

This document Is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963,

a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's anival in the Mexican capital. The attached

form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 and postponed in its entirety.

It was opened in full in 1995 after a Board vote..

Exhibit F.

NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.

The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document. •

discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. & was originally unavailable to the public

in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification This document was

released with sanitizations by Board vote.

Exhiblt G.

Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, June 15, 1964. Subject:

Assassination of Castro.

This document from the files of the National Securty Councill was originally classified

"Secret" and was exempted from declassification in 1976. The NSC agreed to release

it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1998.

---

## Page 132

13-00000

ANNO

4004

• 3-

categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of

such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the

party that seeks to exempt information from release.

Because these four points are Inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in

reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this

testimony.

During the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials

from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the

release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression

that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, consclentious, competent, and

hardworking. (| also have had the general impression that they have sought to be

cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to

comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated,

institutional reluctance to release intormation - particularly on the part of those

institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and

preserving secrets.

In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their

reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example,

Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed justification

for [an initial classification] decision." Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review,

agencies would "certifty] to the President at the end of such 30-year perlod that

continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the

national security of the United States...." (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who

are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such

justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to...

articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand

scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding

information did not withstand scrutiny.

Illustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November

27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed

text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts

appear in what is called the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators.

"GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in

the first line of the second paragraph of text. The ClA originally advised that GPFLOOR

could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the

cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why

GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand

their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was

simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being

offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that

---

## Page 133

13-00000

unil

AKKB

C005

- 4.

covered other topics. Finally, an official said: "I don't see why it can't be released. This

is an issue for COMMO [COMMO is the Communications Office.) Someone ask

COMMO whether it cares." COMMO was subsequently asked - and it had no objection

to the release. I now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency

habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant

questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.

Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service,

the Board identified for the Secret Service a record it intended to open in full and the

agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been

published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency

continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document

would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently

voted to open the record.

Illustration 3. In several FBI documents that were subject to appeal to the

President, the FBi argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not

previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J.

Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence

of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.

Illustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily

redacted but provocative. document-pertaining to an FBI *Internal Security" Inquiry into

Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the Information,

arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign govemment and that the goverment

had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the

Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Goverment and requested that

it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal

Police provided to the FBI to track down Oswald. The Swiss govemment agreed and

the record is now open in full.

Illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret

documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C

contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been "excluded

from automatic downgrading and declassification." The Review Board staff arranged

meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of

this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being

completely closed to completely open.

Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on

Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the

conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign

---

## Page 134

13-00000

АККУ

@ 006

- 5 .

Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page Record

(of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official

File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum

had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could

presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the

document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of

Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at a declassification

session in July 1997.

Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to

release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational

report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's

arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The

Review Board voted to open the record in its entirety.

Illustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in

releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA's

intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It

was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from

declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released.

Illustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a National Security Council document....

that pertains to an alleged plot to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally

classified "Secret" and was desmed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC

agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board.

I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect

information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a

fittie prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a

cooperative spirit to declassity secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK

Act, agencies have little internal or extemal incentive to take an energetic approach to

declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a

fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is

absolutely necessary. Agencies have the hatural disinclination to release information

that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and

declassitication is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important

and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: once agencies

come to the understanding that they must declassily records and that there is a

presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith

with the requirements established by Congress.

---

## Page 135

13-00000

00164/50

IUE 11:30 HAS 202 724 0457

ARRB

CLMC-416111104495.4.

@ 007

- 6 -

Ill. The Mechanics of Declassification

Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of

information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records

through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides

valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I

would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of

declassification.

First, the "referral process" is one of the most significant, goverment-wide

bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release

information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the

record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is

a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among

agencies, it becomes a costly and time consuming obstacle to declassification. Very

frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.

The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the

referral process: (a) establishing joint-dectassification sessions where several agencies

convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified

records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them

declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencios notice that.unless records-were reviewed

by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the

benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the

declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the

independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.

The ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification

sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral

process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional

inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly.

*Surprisingly, agencies typically assumed that another agency would not release

information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the

suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other

agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1

above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the

need to keep records closed.

Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to

"direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . , additional

information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason

to belleve is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities...." JFK Act, §

7()(1)(C)ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the

basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate,

---

## Page 136

13-00000

AKKD

@ 008

-7-

and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an

agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain

the information it needs to accomplish its work.

Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification.

process is the final transter of records from the declassitying agency to the National

Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have

the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is

complete, the final step of making records avallable to the public is taken.

• Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, It is a necessary

prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board,

as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

(ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It

is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the

initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons leared by the Review

Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.

When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to

set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions,

require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified

records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success.

I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK

Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence,

consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and

accountable to the people who have paid for it.

• IV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective

With regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that

have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:

First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in

the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be

genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should

be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies,

but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.

Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable

timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral

review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its

own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent

agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that

---

## Page 137

13-00000

ANNO

2 009

-8=

is essential for completing its work.

Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain

point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to

articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would

be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification

for an initial period (e.g., between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the

presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.

Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere: "detalled

justifications" (see, e.g., S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify

records. The written explanations must be more than "justifications," they must be able

to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of

the writing.

Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the

National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to

agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.

Finally, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that

presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in

passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the

"sources and methods" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a

multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would

be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.

****

I would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of

the American people to better understand how their govemment functions. I would be

pleased to answer your questions.

---

## Page 138

13-00000

STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL

DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

before the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

iN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing

the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying

national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order

12958, entitled "Classified National Security Information." This Order took effect on

October 14, 1995, only two .and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of

implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.

*The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide

implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security

Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO is also

responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978,

ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In

addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance

from the National Security Council.

Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison

with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews

their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions;

(5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security

classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about

the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency

Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and

(8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.

.-.

---

## Page 139

13-00000

лі

On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our

Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of

pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the

interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the

information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens.

Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:

• In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more

than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.

• Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since

1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.

• Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the

Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National

Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.

The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel

representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more:..

2

---

## Page 140

13-00000

than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency

decisions to keep those same documents classified.

• Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have

decreased to historic lows.

• Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information

are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been

routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased

threat to our national security.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that the

United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner,

timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its

records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after

conversation that I have had over the years with foreign govemment officials, and with

foreign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressed

great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws,

and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its

emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.

3

---

## Page 141

13-00000

These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our

security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For

example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major

classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of

implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and

resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To

be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are

unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can

achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be

noteworthy.

I recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. |

will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and

differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the

system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious

objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the

President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification

programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference

traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.

4

---

## Page 142

13-00000

However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these

concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The

Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the

Administration to support S. 712.

5

---

## Page 143

13-00000

Beard of Sponsors

(pe rial List)

• Sidney Altman

Bruce Ames

* Philip W. Anderson

• Kenneth J. Arrow

* Julius Axelrod

• David Baltimore

• Baruj Benacerraf

• Hans A. Bethe

• J. Michael Bishop

• Konrad Bloch

* Nicolaas Bloembergen

* Norman E. Borlaug

• Owen Chamberlain

Abram Chayes

• Stanley Cohen

• Loon N. Cooper

• E. J. Corey

Paul B. Comely

* Johann Deisenhofer

* Renato Dulbecco

John T. Edsall

Paul R. Ehrlich

* Gertrude B. Elion

George Field

Jerome D. Frank

* Jerome I. Friedman

* D. Carleton Gajdusek

John Kenneth Galbraith

• Walter Gilbert

Edward L. Ginzion

• Donald Glaser

* Sheldon L. Glashów

Marvin L. Goldberger

• Joseph L. Goldstein

* Roger C.L. Guillemin

* Herbert A. Hauptman

* Dudley R. Herschbach

Frank von Hippel

- Roald Hoffmann

John P. Holdren

* David H. Hubel

* Jerome Karle

Nathan Keyfitz

• H. Gobind Khorana

* Arthur Komberg

• Edwin G. Krebs

* Willis E. Lamb, Jr.

* Loon Loderman

• Wassily W. Leontief

* William N. Lipscomb

Jessica T. Mathews

Matthew S. Meselson

Neal E. Miller

* Franco Modigliani •

Philip Morrison

Stephen S. Morse

* Joseph E. Murray

* Daniel Nathans

* Marshall Nirenberg

* Douglas D. Osheroff

• Amo A. Penzias

* Martin L. Perl

Gerard Piel

Paul Portney

Mark Ptashne

George Rathjens

*Frederick Reines

*Burton Richte

• Richard J. Roberts

Vernon Ruttan

Jeffrey Sachs

* Arthur Schawlou

J. Rober Schrieffe

*Glenn T. Seaborg

• Phillip A. Sharp

* Herbert A. Simon

* Richard E. Smalley

Neil Smelser

•Jack Steinberger

* Henry Taube

* James Tobin

* Charles H. Townes

Robert A. Weinberg

Victor F. Weisskopf

*Torsien N. Wiesel

C.S. Wu

Herberl F. York

* Nobel laureates

F.A.S.

Carl Kaysen

Chairman

Robert M. Adams

Vice-Chairmun

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

30 Massach D.C. one. N..

E-Mail fas@fas.org

Neb http://www.fas.org

Phone (202) 546-3300

Facsimile (202) 675-1010

Ann Druyan

Secrelary

Charles C. Price

Treasurer

eremy J. Ston

Presiden

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA iNFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

Statement

of

Steven Aftergood

Director, Project on Government Secrecy

Federation of American Scientists

before the

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Hearing on

S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act

March 25, 1998

Eric Hall Arnelt

Rosemary Chalk

Steve Fetter

National Council Members

* Val L. Fitch

Monton H. Hilperin

Linda Gottfredson

Daniel Kammen

David Hatemeister

Priscilla J. McMillan

ex officio: *Robert 1. Solen: Andrew Sessler

Anhur H. Rosenfeld

Rubert Sacelow

Bums H. Wesron

---

## Page 144

13-00000

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee or the

subject of government secrecy.

I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda

because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on

information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits

on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with

their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable.

At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in

certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military

technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.

A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a

responsible and appropriate balance between the imperatives of open, accountable

government and the requirements of national security secrecy.

Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of

cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that

improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often

failing to protect genuine secrets.

My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new

balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information

policy that better serves the national interest.

In the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy

policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning

the Government Secrecy Act.

BACKGROUND

I would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation

for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.

Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.

One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to

those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as

well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.

Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996

consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that "the government

---

## Page 145

13-00000

protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET."'

In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the

province of "special interest" groups; it is shared throughout the general public.

Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of "public interest."

Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and

again around specific issues- the JFK assassination, POW/MiAs in Southeast Asia,

UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.

2.

Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.

Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive,

they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true

that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no

longer warrants protection.

This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals

to declassify records are frequently overturned- within the executive branch itself- by

the Interagency Sécurity Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals

from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by

President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her

Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense,

CIA, NSC and the National Archives:

We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70

documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify

more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant

segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, in

each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its

highest level of appeal....

'Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor "a high level of

secrecy" for technology with military applications. "Public Attitudes Towards Security

and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996" by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion

Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security

Research Center, November 1996. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.html>.

Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification

Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel,

March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.html>.

2

-

---

## Page 146

13-00000

The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even

within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that

classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankléss

job the best they can.

The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all

bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed,

"The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as

much as possible, and for as long as possible."" If they go unchecked, agencies will

hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.

Fortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable

problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record

of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or

eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by "outsiders" who share

the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian

tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.

Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security

wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should

inform Congressional action in this area.

3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.

The Justice Department "strongly opposes a statutory framework for the

safeguarding of national security information," arguing in effect not only that the

President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has

exclusive authority to do so."

The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response

from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its

own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case.

Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy

("Commission Report"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in

searchable "html" format at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.

"Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required

standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would

limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees

fit." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of

1997, September 15, 1997.

3

---

## Page 147

13-00000

There is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation

to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage.

the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of

the Congressional Research Service has pointed out:

Pursuant to its constitutional authority "To make Rules for the Government and

Regulation of the land and naval forces" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well

as the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress

has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the

government and the armed services....

These clauses would appear to empower

Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that

prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.

The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly

recognized by the Supreme Court. Prier to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of

Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had

not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or

procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted,

the Court also found that:

Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new

procedures or it could have established its own procedures- subject only to

whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such

congressional ordering.®

And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on

numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic

Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President)

assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting

intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring

§Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for

Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 48ff.

6410 U.S: at 83 (1973). See. Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for

National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994,

page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that "the

only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order

disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret."

4

---

## Page 148

13-00000

disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records,

Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's .

Foreign Relations of the United States series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has

granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.'

Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before

Congress, including: S: 1220, "The Human Rights Information Act"; S. 1232, a bill to

declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg®; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War

Crimes Disclosure Act."' Each of these bills was introduced because the public had

no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch

classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to

be taken at face value, all of these bills- as well as the Freedom of Information Act

itself- would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely

unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose.

In short, while the executive branch is entitled to advise Congress to stay out of

national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national

interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.

4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.

A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself.

In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what

needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.

In particular; the Committee should recognize the changes that were

inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already

produced some impressive results.

Most important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification

provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable

25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented

surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone."

*See Senate Resolution 400, section 8.

8<http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1220.html>.

9<http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.html>.

10 http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>.

11996 ISOO Report to the President <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.html›.

5

---

## Page 149

13-00000

So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum.

It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and "first, do no harm."

Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is

positive in current policy- and then building on it.

THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997

The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which

are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and

Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations-- a "balancing

test and a National Declassification Center- are also the ones that have elicited the

strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of

these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.

1. The balancing test and judicial review.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or "balance" the

potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification

and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt

about the need to 'classify the information, it shall not be classified.

From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government

information, this is the Act's single most important provision.

In the abstract, the idea of "balancing" is unexceptionable and is almost built into

the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing

test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a "significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b)

for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter

Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].)

This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its

balancing requirement per se, but because it would allow judicial review of agency

balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would

presume to "second guess" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to

classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.

This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt.

Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments

to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether

information had been "properly" classified. 12 Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto

and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized.

*See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.

6

---

## Page 150

13-00000

To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as

useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the

courts are not sufficiently diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions. 13

The CIA has warned of "costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of

DCI/CIA judgments." This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge

would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld.

But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are in need of the checks and

balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation

of "sources and methods." Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:

the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to

automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm

analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of

information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be

protected thus appears at times to have been applied not in a thoughtful way but

almost by rote."

Federal court judges will never reject a "thoughtful" or even a merely plausible

argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the

possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible "rote" classification.

Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not

been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOlA, and there is no

reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted

with a balancing test.

I would add that any suggestions of a "flood" of lawsuits resulting from this

provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOlA requester, there are huge.

"barriers to entry" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive,

and pro bono assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national

importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed

hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOlA only once.

The absence of effective "checks and balances" on executive branch

classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary

classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most

13" National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for

Effective Judicial Enforcement," Boston College Law Review 25: 611-643 (1984).

'*Commission Report, Chapter Ill, page 70, emphasis added.

7

---

## Page 151

13-00000

appropriate solution.

2. A National Declassification Center

The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented

quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight,

which the Secrecy Commission described as "the critical missing link.*16

As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous

bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or

no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be

assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:

The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all

agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and

compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.

The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of

all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the

efficiency of the declassification process.

Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many

of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight

Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the

intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally

demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not.

But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its

nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a

message throughout the executive branch that "we're not going to take secrecy

oversight seriously."

15 The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the

mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in

Security Classification of Information, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information,

Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077N2, April

1993, Chaps. 5; 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for

weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process- such as "beyond a

reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "preponderance of the

evidence" - could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).

16 Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.

8

---

## Page 152

13-00000

The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already

operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming

years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,

When I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a

considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes- and the

caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which

also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing

demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and

declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP's staffing

structure may very well prove too much to bear."7

Therefore, one straightforward "fix" that Congress might consider, at least in the

interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these

two organizations so as to help fill in the "missing link" of executive branch oversight.

But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to

establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been

clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:

Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization,

independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency

inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also

possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies....

Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a

budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying

agencies.

3. What About the "Other" Classification System?

If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory

secrecy system- we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national

security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.

The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a

significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo

separate declassification reviews under each system.

"Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.

18Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.

9

---

## Page 153

13-00000

Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the

Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the .

difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the

Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Mis. Mazer,

information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated

as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public

domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy

declassification review. Moreover, there appears to be no system in place to get

this information declassified, even though the Departments involved- Energy,

Defense, and State- acknowledge that it is innocuous. 19

The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a

significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act's' goal of "a more stable and

cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and

procedures."

Therefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of

consolidating both classification systems into one.

CONCLUSION

Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still

face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day.

Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.

It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by

the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have

confidence in the traditional American mechanism of "checks and balances."

By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long

been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will

advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more

efficiently protecting genuine national security information.

19Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.

10

---

## Page 154

13-00000

05/08/87

final

FRI 12:15 FAX 202 724 0457

ARRB

Page 1

THIS SEARCH

Nast fit

PraT sit

Hit ulat

THIS DOCUMENT

Portara

Back

Bast sections

Doc Contenta

THIS CR ISSUE

Next Document

Frey Document

Da11y Diseas

Extena Contesta

GO TO

New Search

Hele

OR ISBURE bY DAtA

Congressional Record entry 1 of 100

H.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

(Page: E876]

MA HAS NO ONELTON 10A

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA iNFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

HON. DAN BURTON

in the House of Representatives

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997

• Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992-Public Law 102-526--to provide 1

additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. This legislation

would extend the Review Board's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to

September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased

that the Honorable Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government

Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable Louis Stokes, who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired

the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of

H.R. 1553.

• The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy

assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to

review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI,

the Secret Service, the CLA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church

Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held

assassination records, and records have also been in the possession of certain State and local

authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of

records compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the

public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information

available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the

Kennedy assassination, and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992

law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made

public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this

information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to

Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.

• As a result of the Review Board's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national

archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that

---

## Page 155

13-00000

CO/UY/YI FKA 12: 10 FAA ZUZ 124 UADI

AKKB

• Page 2

collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over

the United States. The Review Board was in the news last month when it voted to make public the

Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination.

• The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a

3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately,

there were lengthy delays in the appointment of Board members, and as a consequence the Review

Board was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress

restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996.

The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until

September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than

anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the

Review Board's authorization.

• I support the Assassination Records Review Board's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization

so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very

trongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearl

tended to be temporary in nature. The Review Board has informed me that it is confident that it wi

be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional

year, until September 30, 1998.

THIS SEARCH

Next Hit

ProT Eit

BlE Indet

TETS DOCUMENT

FormaId

Back

Bast Sectiona

Doc contenta

THIS OR IsSUE

Next Degument

REcy Dogment

Da11y Direst

Extena. contenta

co to

Ner Bearch

Hema Page

Hole

OR InqueR by Date

---

## Page 156

13-00000

en".

DETA

RELEASE OF CA RESORMATION

# THIS DOCUMEN?

TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

on

S.J. Res. 282

"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MAY 12, 1992

---

## Page 157

13-00000

• '.

I an a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing

in U.s. intelligence and surveillarce policy, and have published extensively

on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(F3I)o As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and

nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, sernower, Kennedy, and

Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.

I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination

Materialo Disclosuro Act of 1992, and the question 1t raises: Should Congress

create a special Rovlew Board and authorize 1t to release or postpone the

release of relevant Goverment records?

There aro precedents for legislating procedures governing the release

of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1960, as amended

in 197-, maniating the rejease of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding

agency recoras.. The congressional response to the so-cailed Nixon-jampson

agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President

Idchard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the recoris

pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called

Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded tris agreement, created the 3rownell

Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential

records were public records, and not a president's personal property,

Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition

and release of all presidential records.

As in the case of the Nixon presidential recoras, there exists

widespread public suspicion :bout the Goverment's disposition oi ine

Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federai

officials (1) have not made available all Goverrment assassination

records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassisation

Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FCIA

In order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively

addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed

Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and

I1 necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the

criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing

justilication exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.

There is reason to believe that all relevant Goverment records

pertainag to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot

be precisoly identified by persons outside the executive branci:. It might

not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names

and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committoo, Warren

Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the

---

## Page 158

13-00000

-2-

recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their

most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to

limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding

in 1975 to the Church Connittee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing

program, CIA officials acvised that the relevant program file had been

destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having

discovered among the Agency's financial recorde extant documents which

provided additional information about the scope of this program. During

the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times!

distinguished between official and informal recorde while NSC official

Oliver-North admitted to having employed a "do sot log" procedure to ensure

that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed

in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central

records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series

of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not

serialized or :lled in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive

information could be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the

Bureau. Trese included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting

and authorizing "black bag jobs;" blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative"

matters in which case, mea

was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not

sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from

"sources illegal in nature" or from "most secretive" sources such as

"Griersors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such

officials and their attitudo;" and administrative pages/cover letters

for reporting "facts and Information " which could "cause embarrassment

to the Bureau, if distribut d." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos

were to be maintained in "office files" of senior FBI officials (and were

to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under

lock and key" 1I FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FPT

headquarters, while administrative page/cover letters were to be detached

whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any

agency outside the Bureau."

SoJ. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all

relevant Kennady eg8as.:nation rocords and how and where they might have

been filod. Erecutive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review

Board "all assisBination materials" even 11 "uncertain 11 a record 18

assassination material" and the Executive Diroctor 18 authorized to

"Inquire as to the erdstence of further records" and then recommend that

the Review Board "subpoena such records in the event of desial." Properly

placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination

materials on agency officials who are most knowledgable about their agency'a

recoras practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Exocutivo Director

and stall to identily additional records loarned througa a close reading

of croBe references in the "available" documents.

Section 6, moreorer, addressos the companion obstacle to full disclosure,

the discretion wich the FOlA allows loderal agony officials to withhold

categories of information when releasing FOIA-roquested documents. Particularly

---

## Page 159

13-00000,

-3-

during the 1980s agency officials bave withheld information clearly

relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to

Individuals identifled directly or'indirectly with the Kennedy assassination.

Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notably

President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation os 1984

totally exespting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legalation

of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the eástence of FBI

Intormant I1les, Soction 6 doretalls FOlA's exemptive proviatoss but,

at the sano timo, Introduces a stricter sos-disclosura standard to roquiro

rolease unloss "the threat to the military defonse, intolligence operations

or conduct of foreiga relations of tho Undtod States posed by its disclosuro

is of such gravity that 1t outreighs any public intoreat 1n 1to diaclosure."

My akoptician about agency practices in withholding documents, noreover,

1s basod on my experiences as a froquent user of the FOIA. I recogaize

that this is sot the proper form for retlowing how fedoral agoncies have

processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on

whether the FOlA, and 1ts provisione accepting agency discretion, can bo

expected to ensure full and raasonable disclosure.

In 1980, I liled an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential

File of former FBI Director J. Fagar Hoover and in 1983 received approdmately

to appeal these withholdings,

2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this

time I offered a detailed foldur by folder challenge, arguing that much

of the withhelu information was already in the public domain and further

that since the former FbI director had maintained in his office derogatory

1nformati. a on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent

personallüles the question of what use had been made of this information

required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in

1989 the FbI released approximately 15,000 pages including information

formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases.

The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents

This example, becauso the Fil had evaluated the sane document three

timos, offers insighte into the cilteria euployed to deny the release

of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this

---

## Page 160

13-00000

-4-

decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's "clear and convincing"

standard. For, my original 1900 request and receipt in 1983 of the

heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World

Report which devoted its "1984" issue of December 1983 to summarizing

the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened

public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989,

1f not 1985, FBI officials were no longer williug to risk FOIA litigation

challenging

their claimed interpretation of the FOlA's exemptive provisions.

My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a

FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first diclosed by the

House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI

wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders,

notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a

"contract" out on John Kennedy? Did ril officials purposefully withhold

this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in

1963 and ther from the Warren Commissior in 1964? The ansvers to these

questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as well

as other FBI memos recording hon the FBI dealt with these transcripts.

My experience involving hoi the FbI has processed my requests for other

FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be

si redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one

of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the

considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which

distinguish our approach from those of journalists, corgressional staff,

and lawyers.

Ihis case of FBI Wiretapping involved Henry Grunewald, a Washington,

D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance executive

Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressmen, former New Dealer Thomas

Corcoran, and rashington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly

1n Grunewald', activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover'& offisted

file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of

Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these

two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods

and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript-

particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in

former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office i1le

that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration,

became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during, the

early 1940s. The ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941

wiretap had been known of authorized by the Attorney General or the Waite

House. Accordingly, I filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters

files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Rooserelt

Administration'e Interest in Grunewald's activities 1n 1940 but (see Appendix

B): either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departmentse

failure to have processed as yet documents which they originated the

---

## Page 161

13-00000

5

wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.

The heavily redacted Granewald filee further disclosed that Grunewald

became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House

committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that

centered on Grunevald's aotivities, among others. Thin inquiry prored

embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans

during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigas. In 1953, the

now Republican-controlled House rovisited this isnue. Particularly interested

1n Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the

Justice Departuest. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however,

proclude answerg to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional

Inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownoll had requested and authorized

this wirotap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee

Included Information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a

sunnary of one FBI report to the Attorney Geseral, based on this wiretap.

The released transcripts of this 1953 wiretap, in contrast to those released

to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were heavily redacted--the FBI

withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted contersations

of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the reloased transcripte

virtually Incomprehensible and of

minimal research value.)

I have gone into detail on the Fortas adi Gruzovald mattere as I

think thoy offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an

Issue central to these hoarings. It has been my experience that the

"culture" of the intelligence agencios encourages agency officials to

Interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that nore suidor

agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those

Instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny.

The Review Board procedure promotes this nooded accountai .lity. At the

same time, the Bo:rd's independence can undercut public suspicions that

claimed national security or privacy justifications aro a mask to preclude

full disclosure. Surely sow, thirty years after President Kennedy's

assassination and with the and of the Cold War, we should be able to

assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither

secreted nor withhold for bureaucratic reasons.

While I do:st that the rlease of the Kenned assassination records

w1ll conclusively resolve the question "who Ialled Kennedy," I am convinced

that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that

rocords documenting a goverment conspiracy are being purposefully withheld.

Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other

significant research interests of the scholarly community. Lot me conclude

by brlefly list some of these son-assassination-rolated questions: (1) the

Liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the

assassination; (2) the liaison relatlonship betwoon the FBI and the Secret

---

## Page 162

13-00000

-6-

Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement

of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politica of presiciential commissions

(the purpose for creation, the level'of agency cooperation, and the

responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public

to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent

disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee

activist) in contrast to the Intensity of FBI Interest in nore respectable

rational leaders (Meanor Rosevelt,. Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest

femingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationshipe

with and uses of infomants and sources recruited to provide foreiga

Intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities"

information.

---

## Page 163

13.00000,

CIA HAS NO CBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

ORS!

M10P0/100201

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID I. BOREN

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

May 12, 1992

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the

opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you

Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials

Disclosure Act of 1992.

The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a

comprehensive process

ultimately leading to the release of all

materials held by the United States Government regarding the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis

Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select

Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation

in the House of Representatives.

I am particularly pleased, Mr.

Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this

legislation.

We have had at least four substantial federal government

investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first

conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson

in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA

-1-

---

## Page 164

13-00000

Activities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by

the Senate Select Committee-to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and

1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots

against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation

of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.

Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren

Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation,

produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy

assassination.. In addition, literally hundreds of books and

articles have been written on the subject.

Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.

The recent release of the controversial film "JFK" has raised

them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the

assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by

our Government. Even prior to the release of "JFK," in fact,

there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as

concerned legislators to open these files for public review.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain.

Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that

would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous

investigations or not.

- 2-

---

## Page 165

13-00000,

But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to

the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and

journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate

conclusions.

•As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should

make available its records after the passage of a reasonable

amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be

compromised. The American people have a right to assure

themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the

historical record of our government. The timely release of all

documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that

even the most secret programs of our government will be operated

in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence

operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is

recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the

lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.

This is not to say that all of the files should simply be

pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto

Pennsylvania Avenue

for general

• consumption. Careful review is

required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental

fairness. Even

after almost thirty years, there remain

governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests.

that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the

way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be

especially compelling.

- 3-

---

## Page 166

13-00000

What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-

wide review of the Kennedy

assassination records conducted under

the auspices of an impartial, independent board.

• It may be useful to state precisely what these records are.

First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA,

Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch

agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They

also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller

commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee

on Assassinations.

Many of these records are now stored under

seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency

files.

The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President

Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the

Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be

other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential

libraries. These presidential library records are administered by

the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be

subject to this Joint Resolution.

I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of

these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the

custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of

the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a

single small room at the National Archives. There is a

rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive,

-4-

---

## Page 167

13-00000

and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has

examined some of these files, and we believe the process of

separating out J.f.k. assassination materials -- once that term is

more

precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not

prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The kennedy

assassination investigation was only a small component of the

Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned

only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the

assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President

Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact

copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the

Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both

inside and

outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those

interviews, among other materials originated by the Church

committee,

are an important part of the j.f.k. files.

Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination

have previously been released by the

Archives and as

aresult of

Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains

shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the

internal files generated by. the warren Commission are still

sealed.

Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and

CIA files

remain sealed.

Many pages of documents that have been

released have been so extensively redacted that their

informational value

is minimal. The extensive files of the House

Assassinations Committee,

some 848 boxes of materials on both the

Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the

- 5-

---

## Page 168

13-00000

year 2029.

To date, these records have been withheld from the public due

to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations

and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of

confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the

privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some

validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with

the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to

full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records,

not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the

need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government..

We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not

information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed

new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic

crime of this century.

The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the

continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also

create a process by which many records could be promptly released.

Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it

must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure.

The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a

strong presumption in favor of disclosure.

In addition, to address the, problem of heavily redacted and

therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a

- 6-

---

## Page 169

13-00000

page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that

covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials.

Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit

introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of

classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for

creation of such

summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so

that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy

assassination from a document even where references to private

matters or crucial national security secrets would render the

document itself mostly unreleasable at present.

In all cases, the Joint Resolution reguires that the

presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released

unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing

release is essential to a vital interest.

Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the

Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.

The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the

Assassination Material Review

Board. The members of this Review.

Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of

government who have had no prior involvement with previous

inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board,

aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central

role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board

would be required to complete

its work within two years of its

-7-

---

## Page 170

13-00000

first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be

completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed

expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.

We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint

the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at

other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me

give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the

allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived

conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to

appoint the Board did not seem appropriate.

We settled instead on

the special three-judge federal court division that appoints

independent counsels for criminal investigations.

The Justice-Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to

Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach

to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition,

some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make

appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very

small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this

assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would

raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical

ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should

rest with an impartial source without no interest or

stake in the

outcome.

I believe a strong argument can be made that the

appointment process is constitutional under the principles

enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654

-8-

---

## Page 171

13-00000

(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to

appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch

misconduct.

If the Committee nevertheless

concludes that this approach is

undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration,

conceding that both are also susceptible to possible

constitutional objection. The first would be for the President

and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given

number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and

responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not

make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since

they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay

the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach

suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used

last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on

Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department,

namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria,

i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the

members coming from lists submitted by designated professional

associations.

Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is

constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first

step in the process would be to make available to the Executive

Director all Government assassination materials. Where the

Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to

- 9-

.

---

## Page 172

13-00000

submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to

question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review

Board to obtain any additional records.

The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review

Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the

Government, would undertake the initial screening of these

records.

If the Executive Director concluded that a particular

record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically

be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the

Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility

for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this

manner,

many

records could be promptly released without formal

Review Board deliberations.

If the Executive Director determined that a particular record

was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or

that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she

would automatically be required to refer that

decision to the

Review Board.

The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer

particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further

investigation, to the Review Board.

In deciding on appeals and referrals from the Executive

Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct

-10-

---

## Page 173

13-00000

hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.

The Review Board would have final say as to the release or

non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive

branch materials, the President would have the authority to

supersede the Board's determination and postpone release.

But

each time the President did so, he would be required to explain

his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress.

Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of

records would also have to be explained to the public and

Congress.

Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain

permanently sealed. The Review

Board, before finishing its work,

would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time

or a specified occurrence following which the item could be

released.

The files would then be transferred to the Archives,

where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider

them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.

Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would

be available in the Archives for public review and copying.

Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch

agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers

under the law to release a partiçular record even if the Joint

Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of

-11-

---

## Page 174

13-00000

the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to

request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.

MI. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the

matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be

accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by

the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all

the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents.

In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent

information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy

being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so,

will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.

Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been

received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting

the need for change.

With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must

say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take

what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many

of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the

flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal

cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious

concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to

reassert familiar claims of Executive

privilege and all of the

other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of

government information.

- 12-

---

## Page 175

13-00000

The whole point of this legislation was to create new

criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information

hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old

procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not

produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence

of the American people.

It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy

interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the

Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man"

defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with

solving the problem.

I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the

Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the

Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its

own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any

congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me as

preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is

ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If

Congress wants to release information it has developed, the

President should not be able to stand in the way.

Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive

branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public

expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and

-13-

---

## Page 176

13-00000

telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.

Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised

by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in

touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the

Committee.

1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the

boundaries

of "assassination material." The Joint Resolution

defines "assassination material" as "a record that relates in any

manner or degree to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy..." But given the wide range of theories that have

developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types

of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination.

What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized

crime should be covered? This matter requires careful

consideration.

The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the

definition of "assassination material," apparently to only those

records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I

am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is

widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to

the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid

records that might shed light on activities linked to such an

alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the

public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of

-14-

---

## Page 177

13-00000

inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the

operations of our government

and our foreign policy in the early

1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that

the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release

of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where

records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch

materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full

review is probably appropriate.

I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the

Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise

parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the

Review Board to do so promptly after it is established.

Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the

various records agencies and committees as to what documents

should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.

2: As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn

noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or

committee control over release of a record it originated even if

that record contained information obtained from another agency or

committee.

I agree that this provision should be changed to give

agencies authority over release of their own information.

However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may

not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a

lengthy congressional report, may contain both information

-15-

---

## Page 178

13-00000

developed by the body that created the record and information

originated by a- recutive

agency. Instead of letting either of

these two "orig

¿ing bodies" have veto power over the release of

an entire document, we should work out language that give an

agency or committee control over release of that portion of a

document for which it was responsible even if other information in

the document was originated elsewhere.

3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the

Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself

subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and

to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and

the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased

government openness should not itself establish an exception from

general standärds for accountability.' I still strongly believe,

however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive

court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves

either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under

the Freedom of Information Act.

4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear

that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only

over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.

5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that

the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are

released instead of actual records or information: "Any such

-16 -

---

## Page 179

13-00000

summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when

released to the public."

6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to

recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component

of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian

of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint

Resolution.

I thank

the

Committee

views on this measure.

for this

opportunity to

express my

•17-

---

## Page 180

13-00000

statement for the Senate Committee on Governuent Affairs,

May 12, 1992

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

Ernest R. May

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

iN THIS DOCUMENT...

It is an honor to be invited to testily on this bill. .

I an a professor of history. at Harvard University, where I

teach both in the history department. and in the John I- Ken-

nedy School of Govertment. While I have done research an

the history of intelligence agencies and have served in

Washington frow time to time as a consultant, I do not speak

as an expert on the matter before the committee. My coI

wents are merely those of a historian looking at legislation

designed to unearth historical source material.

The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts

about President Kemedy's murder. The Warren Commission had

• the same aim. Its make up was supposed to reassure the puo:

lic. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost

within months, books challenging its findings hit best-

seller lists.

.. Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes

whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of

these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not

new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this par

ticular set. of theories has found new life.. Two books of

this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992,

and Oliver stone's film, "JFK," became a box office hit.

---

## Page 181

13-00000

i+w.0=

.....

dins ild on.

2

The bill now under consideration vould open records 50

that the public can be reassured that these theories are

fantasies.

The stated aim is to "contribute to the trust of

the people in their governuent."

To achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five.

person Review Boata. Is Ieassurance against a cover-up in

behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Colum-

bia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the

Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too

partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice War-

ren.)

The bill says that members of the Board are to be dis-

tinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that

they not be currently in goverment employ and that they

never have been Involved In any investigation of the Kennedy

murder.

The Board and its Executive Director would have wide

powers. They would look at all materials relating to the

• murder.

If they suspect any agency of withholding material,

they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives

the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take

testimory under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, aná to

punish defiance.

→ •:

---

## Page 182

13-00000

LÜ/UO18Z

..

11:10

o1T 462 1872

hi See GUY

MUDG

3

The Board's decisions are to be final unless the Presi-

dent himself intervenes to insist that some piece of in-

formation not be released. The bill giving the Board its

powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial

decision ...,

or common law doctrine" that might be in con-

flict.

My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I

question whether any legislation can achieve all that this

D1ll seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-

appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities and

powers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected,

with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.

The first cautionaly point concerns the aim of clearing

doubts about the Kennedy murdet. Evan if every bit of

relevant docimentation becomes public, it will not yield a

story that all americans will accept. Why, should it?

Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl

Harbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven.

one of the latest has winston Churchill as the villain!

Despite more than a century of research, new theories

still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth

k1l1 Iincoln. The chances are that the sane will always be

true for Oswald and Kennedy. " Alter another decade or 50,

---

## Page 183

13-00000

however, Kennedy's murder will probably become, Like Iin-

coln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at

large.

Ihe chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by

the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not

be released. Mis bill itself speaks of protecting socret

agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also

of privacy rights.. CIA and FBI reports and National

security Agency Intercepts contain much material that, by

these criteria, would have to remain secret.

In fact, still nore material may be kept from the pub-

Iic. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of

living persons. If the Review. Board yields to human feel-

ings, it way extend protection to families and friends.

Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording

old accusations against sone Cuban-American. Even if the

person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could

suffer should the accusations become public. If the review

Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and

false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?

Also, it has to be assumed that some files will turn

out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review

Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to

---

## Page 184

13-00000

5

leave some matarial under wraps but that other material was

simply nissing. Would spinners of conspiracy theaties take

the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of col-

luding in concealment of "snoking guns"?

The Review Board would meanwhile be undar pressure not

to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit

release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and

docudrana producers would hammer at it. So would scholars,

including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy

murder. So would others with axes to grina.

Some material sought might have only a remote rela-

tionship to the murder. The clamor would be no less fero-

cious. How mich of the central files. of the FBI and CIA

would have to be opened, for example,. to persuade disciples

of Mark North of Mark lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI

nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot?

The Review Board, would surely be urged to pursue data

on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Ob

vious items would include not only IBI files but also tax

returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation it, in

fairness, the. Review Board also sought data on financial

transactions by individuals associated with Vice President

Lynãon Johnson!

---

## Page 185

13-00000

di:dy

501T 483 1972

EEN SCH GOT

1008

6

I forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not

dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of

the more adventurous theorizing.

I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is

managed as this-bill proposes, one of two results will fol-

IOW:

If the Review Board Yields to outside prassures, it

will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and

possibly harmful information will be made public. Alterna-

tively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will

define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it'

reveals. It will then 'be accused of a "whitewash." The

latter result could make matters worse rather than better.

• .

Suspicion could be fed, not allayed. :

There may, however, be better means of doing what needs

doing. The current bill vould have the Review Board and its

Executive Director examine all materials to be released.

They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed materi-

al; and they would have effective responsibility for decid-

ing what would and would not be released.

An alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders

of records to identify and locate materials that, in the

language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or de

---

## Page 186

13-00000

7

gree" to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction

would apply to all congressional committees and all execu-

tive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Ser-

vice, and the National Archives. The bill could direct

these record-holders to make the materials public. It coulá

specify that the only materials to be held back would be

those itemized in the current bill - agents, intalligence

sources and nethods, etc.

Where legislative writ does not ru or is disputable, a

:

statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks

such cooperation fral state anà local agencies and foreign

governments. À statute thät sought to avoid constitutional

disputes could ask the same of the President regarding

records of the White House and Executive Office.

Ibis alternative bill could require or equest public

reports describing materials withheld from release — their

characteristics and quartities, the general reasons for non-

disclosure, and plans for eventual release.

A Review Board could be created with a limited - and

more workable - mandate.

Its first duty could be to review record-holders'

guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency-

Procedures for searching National security Agency files of

---

## Page 187

13-00000

comminications intercepts might not be the same as those for

searching the much less voluminous filer of CIA stations and

headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to

ensure comparative unifornity in the diligence of searches.

The Board could try also to ensure comparative

•uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It

might urge, for exemple, that the intelligence sources and

methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in cur-

rent use, not just to any eyer used.

The Board's second duty could be to scan materials that

record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board

might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it coula

ask that the agency or connittee think again. If dif-

ferences continued, the Board could appeal to the President

or, Ior congressional docunents, to the president of the

Senate of the speaker of the House.

• In a final public report, the Board coula describe any

still unresolved differences. While the description would

be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known.

The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate

the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions.

Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively

traditional methods. Noninations could be asked of the

---

## Page 188

13-00000

American Bar Association, the Amaricas Historical Associa-

tion, the American Political Science Association, or kindred

bodies.. Appointments could be made by the president, wita

advice and consent of the senate.

orless the quantity of material. tithheld proved to be

much larger than I vould expect, the Review Boara could be

kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff.

I believe that this alternative statute would ac-

complish all that can be accomplished: It would leave the

onus for release or nor-release of records on those already

familiar with these records. Committees of Congrass would

make rules for their files.. The President, the heads of de-

partments; the Directors of Central Intelligence and the

FBI, and the Archivist of the united states would make rules

for theirs.

This alternative statute vould limit the powers and

responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially

vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the

assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of

sritariz for disclosure and nor-disclosure.

since the invitation to testify included questions

reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to

respond to that concerning general declassification

---

## Page 189

13-00000

10

• policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be

applled much more widely. A statute could declare that all

government records more than tairty years old vould become

public unless the originating agency showed specific cause

for continued non-disclosure. À Board or Commission ap.

pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the

Senate could have authority to review all such naterials and

to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates

practioe in the united Kingdom.

In conclusion, I repeat a warning against expecting any

legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to

the trast of the paople in their goverment." Inventors of

conspiracy theories will always be more ingenious than as-

semblers of evidence.. The immediate result of releasing

records vill be, noreover, to provide grist for the

theorists' mills. Even if everything were released tomor

row, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort

the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy

builders would be picking out those bits and pices of evi-

dence that suited them. In the long mun, release of docu

ments will get us closer to truth; but, as keynes observed,

that long run prabably stretches beyond any of out

Isfetimes.

---

## Page 190

13-00000

.."

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIE CARON AND/OR 166

RELEASE OF CIA NIFORMATION

NIHIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LESAR

PRESIDENT

ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER

ON

S.J. RES. 282

"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992"

BEFORE

THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

May 12, 1992

---

## Page 191

13-00000

2

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you

on the legislation to require the government to release its records

pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I

appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center

("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-

profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates

information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC

is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am

an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation,

and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past

twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and

researchers who have litigated

their Freedom of Information

Act

requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President

Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.

I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have

also read the letter which you received from the Department of

Justice. I have heard that the Administration may seek to achieve

its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards

for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive

order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only

thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in

legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone

executive order

which goes unchallenged by Congress. Legislation

is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records

---

## Page 192

13-00000

-

3

on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is

accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice

Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would

duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal of full disclosure

which occurred when

the Reagan Administration successfully

sabotaged the

1974 amendments to Exemption 1 by drastically

altering the standards for classifying information in the interests

of national security.

The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to

Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to

alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive

order on national security classification. If you support release

of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice

Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to

three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially

liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.

A few illustrations from my practice will show the

inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues

to those who attempt to use it to obtain information about the

Kennedy assassination. These examples

reveal a pattern of delay,

costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government.

Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of

information, with little significant information being released.

= . ...

Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission

critic, made a

simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the

results of the spectrographic. tests which had been conducted on

---

## Page 193

13-00000

4

bullets), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck

by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied

access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought

suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court,

relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not

in the national interest to release the results of these scientific

tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but

the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred

to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized

Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA

"forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the

Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase

in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But

the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a

rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing

en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt

from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent

so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it

specifically overturned the Weisberg case, reqyiring that the FBI

and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly

exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.

In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again

brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this

time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same

evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years

and involved three trips to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately,

---

## Page 194

13-00000

5

Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests,

including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then

claimed were missing or destroyed.

Other records were never

located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request,

the legal battles lasted fourteen years.

Case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release

all of the records it had made available to the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester

brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were

approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request.

I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four

threshold issues raised by the Government. Had my client lost any

one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to

release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.

By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents.

Although the CIA told the court that it had assigned seven people

to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly

slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA

several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had

no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus,

he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some

of the subjects discussed in the report of the House Select

Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although

the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-

half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of

the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold

---

## Page 195

13-00000

virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and

most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that

previously had been released, or documents that were heavily

redacted.

Case 3: In 1976, DI. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA

documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made

its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of

the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969

investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District

Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that shaw, David Ferrie and

others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly told

Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only

be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in

six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed, Hoch received

such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-

year period.. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch

retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed,

evidence was developed which indicated that all the CIA had done

over the previous six years was to number the documents. It had

numbered several

documents one month, a few more another month, a

couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a

veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a

hundred documents that month.

A few months after Hoch filed his complaint in district court

the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a

considerable volume

of materials; mostly on grounds of national

---

## Page 196

13-00000

7

security

or because disclosure allegedly would identify

intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all

of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11-page

memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety

under Exemption

5's deliberative process privilege. The judge

ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things

got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his

order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit

obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety

under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and

intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act

on the motion

for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a

new revelation: the

eleven-page memo, which dealt with the

CIA/Mafia plots to. kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters

exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly

in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.

Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI

records on the assassination of DI. Martin Luther King, JI. J.

Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this

request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg

submitted a new request for King assassination records. He

specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After

he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene

photographs. This

statement was false.

Ultimately, the FBI

released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.

During the same

case, Weisberg picked up indications that an

---

## Page 197

13-00000

8

FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King

assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of

documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The

FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it

claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of

resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler

exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When

finally located, most of the file had been gutted.

Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted

15 years.

He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same

suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth

of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

These stories that I have related are unusual only because the

requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most

requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their

FOIA reguests:

against these agencies. You might be tempted to

conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working

just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely

damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA

operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which

applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of

decisions in the Supreme Court and the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded

the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.

Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the

public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions

---

## Page 198

13-00000

9

which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you

must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies,

including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the

State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the

National Security Agency.

I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation

will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the

Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at

least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to

this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any

"smoking gun," which will "solve the case." Rather, this

legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people

have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make

of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and.

understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the

resolution of

any controversies which beset this subject remains

to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The

American people want to know the details of their history, however

painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.

The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses.

I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint

resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes.

To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a

definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the

Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release

of information.. The standards' for postponement are critical

---

## Page 199

13-00000

10

because they determine the amount of material which may be

withheld.

Before discussing

the limitations on the term "assassination

material" as related to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records

• on the

assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther

King, JI. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA")

conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination

and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy.

Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy

and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged

assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the

importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a

movie has been made about them, there is no justification for

excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.

The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the

subject of profound controversy.

Recently, a group of

distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los

Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los

Angeles Police Department engaged in "willful and corrupt

misconduct"

in

its investigation of Senator Kennedy's

assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted

more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los

Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges

that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material

evidentiary leads, cannot account for important missing evidence,

---

## Page 200

13-00000

11

engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a

thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal

agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's

assassination should also be included in this legislation.

The term "assassination material" is broadly defined, but it

falls short of ensuring that scholars will have

all of the

documents which they need in order to properly study the subject.

It should include policy documents which provide the context of

decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on

the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all

documents

obtained or created by any previous official

investigation. It should include materials on those persons who

have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal

or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new

avenues

of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should

be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials

reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its

investigations. Finally, it should also include information

records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant

to the study of the assassination.

The current provision

defining assassination materials

contains

an

exemption for

"personnel

matters

or other

administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren

Commission,

or any entity within

the Executive Branch of

Government." I strongly oppose

this exclusion. The Warren

Commission records on this subject have been publicly available

---

## Page 201

13-00000

12

through the National Archives for many years and should not now be

made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees is a

perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some

secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In

particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with

the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert

Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has

published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is

quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath,

others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have

been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their

information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an

additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any

secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or

executive branch commission or committee.

This provision would also be used to prohibit release of

information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House

Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the

Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer

assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts

in the

Washington

Post,

this officer, Regis T. Blahut,

surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of

President Kennedy's

assassination, including autopsy photos, X-

rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet".

that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally.

According to the Post,

Blahut was given several polygraph

---

## Page 202

13-00000

13

examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one

source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered

him to do it,

and he is said to have flunked that question too.

Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully

available to the public.

A second problem with this legislation is that is proposes to

exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous

involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. " I believe this is too

broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official"

investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics

might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to

be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent

materials if the panel does not include experienced and

knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.

A third and critically important area that needs refinement

is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly

significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term

"intelligence source" and the term "intelligence method."

Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be

withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined

to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been

the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official

acknowledgement, .and

sources who

are

willing to

have their

identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected

to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are

---

## Page 203

13-00000

14

disclosed.

Similar restrictions must be put on the term

"confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it

must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded

methods, methods which are known to the public or methods which may

be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known

to other hostile intelligence services.

New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If

this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air,

it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance

to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best of

reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to

increase.

I ask that additional comments be placed in the record.

---

## Page 204

13-00000

1

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

on S. J. Res. 282

Sec. 3.

Definitions

(2)

"Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may

fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to

properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present

definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which

have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or

Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may

not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not

have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the

definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement.

: It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material"

includes any material which any member of the Assassination

Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release

under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOJA"), can plausibly

contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its

investigations.

The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The

first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to

personnel

matters

or other

administrative

affairs of

congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity

within the Executive Branch

'Of" the Government. ... «

This

---

## Page 205

13-00000

2

language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining

to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with

autopsy materials

pertaining to the

Kennedy assassination.

The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated

by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that

the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to

the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy

materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The

remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created

right of legal action by family members rather than denial or

public access.

Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board

(b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished

and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently

employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall

have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry

relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to

serve as members of the Review Board."

Query:

Is this language designed to exclude private

citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official

investigations of President Kennedy's

assassinations? Or only

those

persons

who participated in official investigations or

inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult

to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about

Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by

the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to

---

## Page 206

13-00000

3

the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure

outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on

the Review

Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that

all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the

objective of restoring trust in government.

A committee of

distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not

likely to inspire trust.

Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure

Subsection I states that disclosure may be postponed if its

release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset."

This must be qualified. It should only apply to living,

covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public

domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence

agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be

disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by

clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can

reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its

release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which

is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by

the United States Government. • . ."

This provision

also must be modified. The first problem is

that there is no limiting definition of "intelligence source of

method. " Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such

"intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement

---

## Page 207

13-00000

4

agencies, etc., as well as the personnel affiliated with them.

Research in a public library

' is an "intelligence method," and it,

too, is no doubt currently utilized.

A fortiori would this

definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the

Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to

living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably

be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the

source.

Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not

cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or

foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity

of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have becone

known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency

thereof, it should be released.

"Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it

applies only, to methods that are unknown to the public or to

foreign intelligence agencies.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its

release would (C) reveal "any other matter currently relating to

the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign

relations of the United States; and the threat to the military

defense or conduct of foreign relations of the Unites States posed

by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public

interest in its disclosure.

The chief problem with this provision is that there is no

standard for what constitutes

a "public interest" of sufficient

---

## Page 208

13-00000

5

moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general

interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which

may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the

substantive content of the material at issue be shown?

Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living

person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that

invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public

interest in its disclosure."

This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies

"whether the person is identified in the material or not." This

phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this

provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption

6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual

production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content

needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept.

One

limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a

theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to

intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely

to have profound adverse impact on an individual.

Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its

release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation

of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent

and a witness or a foreign government. . . ."

This provision needs to be amended to include only those

promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign

government--made in writing.. Among the reasons for this are the

----

---

## Page 209

13-00000

6

fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to

have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means

to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency

wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality

frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own

desire for secrecy.

This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it

does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information

provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be

some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made

with a foreign government.

And

perhaps there should be a

requirement that the foreign government officially object to each

such disclosure in writing.

Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or

in the legislative history, that it is not a "substantial and

unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose

information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness

can be concealed. •

Section 8.

Determinations by the Review Board

Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a

record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be

postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review."

Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than

litigation under the FOIA.

Subsection (h) (2) provides that the President may certify that

material

"qualifies

for postponement of disclosure pursuant to

---

## Page 210

13-00000.

7

section 6, in which case release of the material shall be

postponed, and this decision shall

not be subject to judicial

review."

There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the

President.

Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion

of the President's term which remains.

Section 11.

Rules of Construction

Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution

shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any

Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial

review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.

One problem here is that transferring all agency records to

the Review Board may mean that they are no longer "agency records"

within the meaning of the FOIA. "

A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR

from FOIA coverage.

This sets a bad precedent and sets up

circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding

mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.

A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA

action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the

standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials

Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOIA.

Additional Notes

It may be a

good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller

Commission as subject to the Act.

---

## Page 211

13-00000

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

Judge John R. Tunheim

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

Chairman

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

Assassination Records Review Board THIS DOCUMENT

Prepared Testimony In Support of

H.R. 1553,

To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board

until September 30, 1998.

Before the

National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee,

House Government Reform and Oversight Committee

June 4, 1997

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the

opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support

of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final

year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of

President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time

will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical

FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the

Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much

information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing

H.R. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These

Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we

as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history,

and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to

express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It

provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date

and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity.

Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have

had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff,

Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College

of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr.

William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections,

Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in

---

## Page 212

13-00000

Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this

important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the

American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee

and answer any of your questions.

I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have

hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G. Marwell, a professional historian who

gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents

with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the

Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who

have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and

administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with

seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted

us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of

Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local

governments that were not previously available to the American public I believe that

we assembled exactly the type of professional and diversified staff that Congress

envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.

Il. Accomplishments to Date

As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (FK Act) as an independent

Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the

assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee

played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation

designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records

related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering

suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and

efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.

The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret

records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to

the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the

National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in

our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK

Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by

researchers from all over the United States.

By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed

nearly all of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30

different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the

2

---

## Page 213

13-00000

important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records

held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted

information will have been made public by the Review Board.

I. Release of Government Records Related to the Assassination

Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight

for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has

made public. They include:

*

Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of

President Kennedy that made up the CIA's Oswald File and detail the agency's

investigative activities following the assassination;

*

Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select

Committee on Assassinations, chaired by-Congressman Stokes, including the ar broisee

controversial Staff Report on Oswald's trip to Mexico City; di: i e Mexico City

*

Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that

document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the

Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and

* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.

The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most

graphically demonstrated by showing you the "before" and "after" versions of one of

the pre-assassiration FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has

released to the public. Prior to the Review Board's review, this FBI document OFK

Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to

the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only

information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, "October 12, 1960,"

that it was to the "Director, FBI," from "Legat, Paris" (the FBI representative in Paris),

that the subject was "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security," and that it had to do with

a "Paris letter 9/27/60." The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version

of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and

researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the

provocative subject title.

The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this

document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the

assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the

White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss

3

---

## Page 214

13-00000

government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum

shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald

and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the

public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state,

the document could have meant anything that a researcher's imagination and

speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.

IV. Identification and Location of Additional Assassination Records

One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of

the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records that are relevant to the

assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the

process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have

already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of

requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline,

much remains to be done before it can be confident that it has completed this «aunt. tuss

responsibility.

inconcibility.

I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional

assassination records. Some examples:

Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to

identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any

homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence.

As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as

possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved

in President Kennedy's autopsy, as well as other individuals who had

knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.

*

Identification and Location"of Additional FBI Records and Information. The

Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination

records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has

assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested

files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely,

cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested

information.

Identification and Location of Additional CIA Records and Information. The

Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional

information and records. The Review Board expects that these requests will be

promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.

4

---

## Page 215

13-00000

Identification and Location of Additional Secret Service Records and

Information. Time consuming and careful review of Secret Service activities by

the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional records and

information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant

assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board's first eight

requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than

1,500 pages of material

Identification and Location. of Additional Military Records and Information. The

Department of Defense (including its many components and the military

services) (collectively "DOD"), identified few assassination records on its own

initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review

Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located,

DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.

Additional work would be required in our last year to ensure that all par to ensure that

assassination records in the military archives have been made a part of the JFKen MiO= : "*:

Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage

for accomplishing this task.

V. Release of Private and Local Records

In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government's vast files, and

consistent with the Board's mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as

complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant

assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and local

governments, including:

*

The original personal papers of Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin

that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;

Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison's

investigation of the assassination;

The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work

as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969

against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans,

ncluding records on District Attorney Garrison's investigation and prosecution

f Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures

---

## Page 216

13-00000

*

Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never

seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and

Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission

attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney

Frank Ragano, as well as others.

I am also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the

original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the

only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw

was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney

Garrison's investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this

particular chapter of the assassination story.

All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future

generations of Americans. Once these records are processed and described by the is i did

National Archives, they will be available for research....

VI. The Need For Additional Time

Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have

outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original

three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:

*

First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take

three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the

time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no

way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would

encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we

have taken in fulfilling our mandate.

*

Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was

signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies

initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed

under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed

to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board

was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact,

many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking

their compliance.

Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in

which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board

6

---

## Page 217

13-00000

could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire

new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at

the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable for the

storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not

begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.

We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome

these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the

review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do

not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job

we began, and with one additional year we can.

VII. The Job Ahead

The additional year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by

completing several major areas of our work. Please be assured that these are Aertea sher Unece a

identifiable projects that are critical to ensuring that the JFK Collection is as complete as "ention is e.

possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we

have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year

on the following:

*

CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the

Oswald "201 file," the file created and maintained by the CIA or Oswald and the

assassination. The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the

agency's "Sequestered Collection," the large collection of files that was

assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select

Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970's.

These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the

course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally

consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of

microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly

described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of

great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others

cannot be identified.

EBI Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two

general categories. The first is the "Core and Related Files," consisting of nearly

600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into

the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant

collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers to as its

"HSCA records," is a large collection of records that were identified as being of

interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the

7

---

## Page 218

13-00000

CIA's Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately

280,000 pages ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.

The Records of Some Federal Agencies and Congressional Committees.

Additional time will allow the Board to finish its work with several agencies,

including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional

Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee.

*

Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's

search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, anc

ocal governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of thes

records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.

*

Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a

compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with

the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the

American public that the goals of the JPK Act have been accomplished to the been accomplis

greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act

were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the

U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the

assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies' statements of compliance will

be included in the Review Board's final report to the Congress. The one-year

extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully

documented in the final report.

It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board

believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important

records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as

part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board's

work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an

additional year.

VIl. An Approach to the Review of the Remaining CIA and FBI Records

It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The

review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task.

However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the

stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to

briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set

a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.

8

---

## Page 219

13-00000

Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues

raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far

beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, required a time-

consuming early phase.

At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample

opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to

standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised

in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar

with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. In a

progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed

postponements can be released through a "consent" process. In this consent process,

the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be

approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the

release of the information.

In our review of the FBI's'"Core and Related Files" and the CIA's "Oswald 201 File,"

the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every

requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result

from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?

In considering our review of the CIA and FBI "Sequestered Collections," the Board

recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into

account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only

in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in

its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to

determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the

Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized

that some categories of records did not require the intensive word-by-word review that

had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board's

attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996

Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board

meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the

assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or "NBR"). Applying these

new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant

remaining records in order of priority.

These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff

time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents that have a

remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are

identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word.

These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true

9

---

## Page 220

13-00000

assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK

Collection at the National Archives.

The fruit of our labor from the first three years would be realized in our last year, one

in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially

most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. I am happy

to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work

with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our

task can be completed.

IX. Conclusion

In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the

Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary

commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may have a self-

preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to assure you in the clearest and "Or y"

most unambiguous manner that our recommerdation is motivated strictly by our desire for e

to complete the job. My colleagues and I were appointed as private citizens and have

many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the

additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our

task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.

1 me year exen ton or the eview yard wade, as s Admited a to 19 9u Pudive of the

amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our

final report.

Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the

widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of

President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and

e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from

all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of

varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22,

1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on the

assassination.

I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up in a letter we

received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional

historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private

citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:

"In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect

10

---

## Page 221

13-00000

upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be

closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JFK assassination."

These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why we

hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.

The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating

uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the

assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a

premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts

within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information

that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation

about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate

closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in

the future at even greater cost. The additional year that we recommend will allow for

a confident conclusion of this important task, ton of this riportant louis.

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the

Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to

discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would

be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for

me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional

information that may be required. Thank you.

11

---

## Page 222

13-00000

titi

Copyright 1997 Federal Information Systems Corporation

Federal News Service

SECTION: IN THE NEWS

LENGTH: 12335 words

JUNE 4, 1997, WEDNESDAY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR A

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

iN THIS DOCUMENT

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY,

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND

OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION

CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL)

2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC

BODY:

REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and

Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very

important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman

Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority

member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today,

also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records

compiled by official investigations still had been not made public. Congress

decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the

records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October

26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John

F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to

complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board

members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the

Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September

30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the

statute to continue operating for one additional year.

The review process has proved to be more complex and time- consuming than

---

## Page 223

13-00000

anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely

continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman

Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the

board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the

public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total

accountability to the people of this country.

At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.

Barrett.

REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to

welcome

my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this

subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this

area.

Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President

Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor

or the bombing or Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the

---

## Page 224

13-00000

PAGE 17

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by

establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access

to government information. That legislation was necessary because

administration after administration had failed to release documents. That

should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages

that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are

here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of

making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming

than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication

of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting

with our government to allow public access to government documents.

Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public

access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after

administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton

for his efforts to declassify documents, but we need to do much more.

I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every

agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished.

It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the

government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to

mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and

suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in

that process, but there is much more work to be done.

Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement?

If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who

served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976

to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill

And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in

this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.

REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr.

Turner, Mr. La Tourette.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I

may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20

years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to

complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of

President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our

---

## Page 225

13-00000

investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final

report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the

Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In

addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two

days of public policy hearings.

Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released

everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other

records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives

rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records

routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee

relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to

the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about

these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released,

would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government

agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.

---

## Page 226

13-00000

PAGE 18

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie

contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death

of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with

thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these

sealed files.

As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it

important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless

accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the

assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation

to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in

keeping with the memory of this great president.

Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL

102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review

Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make

available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was

our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every

agency, every court record, anywhere they existed - that those records be

released to the American people.

Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus

an additional year, at the board's discretion.

We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel

was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by

the Congress - a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we

were very fortunate to have persons such as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff,

Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding

executive director, David Marwell.

Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 previously secret

government documents.

They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee

to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive

amount of work in which they have been involved.

They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their

work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of

documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from

which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work

in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people,

that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about

---

## Page 227

13-00000

the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage

of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the

original co-sponsors.

I'd be pleased to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman - or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate

the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually,

three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly

REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just

yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize hov

nuch they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this on

additional year that they will complete the work.

REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals

of your original legislation in 1992?

REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

---

## Page 228

13-00000

PAGE 19

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review

board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.

REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that - in projecting the fact that they

can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say

to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.

REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment you,

Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and

hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future

that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served?

Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?

REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress

passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed

that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination

of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless

rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort.

And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and

permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it

allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the

assassination of our president.

However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things.

For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had

not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the

umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to

bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the

president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately

after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the

witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were

materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before

we went out of existence.

And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has

ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus

far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to

that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.

---

## Page 229

13-00000

REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.

The gentleman from Ohio.

REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I

want to

thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on

1553, and give praise to the co- sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman,

and also to Congressman Stokes.

The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that

I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have,

and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland,

here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on

Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would

venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the

things that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and

this country.

Just as an example, the other day I found out - and I don't know if you're a

---

## Page 230

13-00000

PAGE 20

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes - well,

you re lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer.

I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry

versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I

didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that,

and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his

expertise with the country.

Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony,

and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked

about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public

polls. And you still run into people - as I'm sure - I still run into people

that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in

Dallas.

And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the

legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the

review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the

documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these

documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security

that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait

34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some

of those rumors?

REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks.

But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not —

when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done

because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House

rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it

completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had

not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30

to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we

conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King

Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that

one also.

But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat

there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought

things to the head.

REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the

Issassination Records Collection Act - obviously, now we collect record

lifferently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. D

you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy - God

forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should

---

## Page 231

13-00000

another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the

model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date

of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?

REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons.

Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and

that will help us, I think, tremendously.

But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this sort

and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in

their testimony - for instance, there's a very interesting document that they

will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and

the name of a country - everything was redacted. And under their work, that

whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.

What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really

has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind

of rumors and myths that grow up around it.

---

## Page 232

13-00000

PAGE 21

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future -

which all of us hope would never occur — that our agencies will realize that

this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and

suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct

this type of thing.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise -

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. LATOURETTE: - and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you.

And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.

KET. JIM TURNER (D-IX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years

of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of

service and your contributions to this body.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for

the years of service you've provided not only on this issue, but on many other

issues to which you've contributed.

And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it

is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.

Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the

chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of

the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives.

We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson

Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High

School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.

And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here

to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time.

So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and - (witnesses are sworn in). Thank

you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.

JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and

---

## Page 233

13-00000

just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today.

I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in

favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman

Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort

to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President

Kennedy.

The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by

Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly

complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American

public. I'a like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and

Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the

subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing

this hearing today and assisting in this effort.

One of the other members of the review board is present with us today - I'd

like to introduce her — Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct

---

## Page 234

13-00000

PAGE 22

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row

directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review

board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional

and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.

The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995,

pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted

specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the

National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee

shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages' worth of material.

I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the

review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his

testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version,

the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You

probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the

FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is

indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee

Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27- 60.

And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly,

a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President

Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest

among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The

speculation that individuals had about this was great.

Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially

ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president.

Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact

Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met

personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his

assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.

And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the

National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was

the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in

Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the

investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was,

indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his

interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of

work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information

that has long been redacted from the public.

The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the

records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core

collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have

---

## Page 235

13-00000

been released.

The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant

assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens

and local governments. Just a couple of examples:

The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission,

have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all

of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released.

And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just

acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual

prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the

assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this

story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and

will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very

interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March 1st,

1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.

---

## Page 236

13-00000

PAGE 23

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three

years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're

confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the

records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and

at the FBI - records sequestered by the House Select Committee on

Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you

and the members have.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the

testimony.

MR. TUNHEIM: Very well.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?

STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives

and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief

of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and

Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify

today on behalf - for the National Archives in support of HR 1553.

I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, I am charged with

implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's

liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding

that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be

brief in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office

of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that

office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives.

Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with

working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK

Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.

When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my

staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to

provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and

use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies

involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of

assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals.

The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship

through the three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that

this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review

board.

NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's

authorization.

---

## Page 237

13-00000

The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work

in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the

assassination of President Kennedy.

I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts

to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records

Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately

3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These

lumbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation o

he entire federal government as well as private donors in this important tasl

or the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to mj

estimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major group:

of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI

records.

Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance

---

## Page 238

13-00000

• PAGE 24

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the

records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of

relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by

private entities are also available in the collection.

This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the

ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even

individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their

own personal computer through the Internet.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence

• the value of this collection. Keference requ

are value o collection, detence requests have risen in 1ums. revery

ve have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over s

ercent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on ou

computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the

assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has

been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.

Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great

progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in

the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity

and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size,

quality or public demand witnessed today.

However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this

important work can be completed.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any

questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Holland?

MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.

Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author

named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was

Lincoln Murdered?" Eisenschimi claimed one of the most important events in

American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered

the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his

secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's

program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.

When pressed, Otto EisenschimI openly admitted that he had no evidence to

support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record

that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long

line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.

---

## Page 239

13-00000

Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by

the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will

probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when

President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come

to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least,

they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and

thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto

Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now.

I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for

another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt

end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made;

in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of

Il, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the

ederal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the

balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board

---

## Page 240

13-00000

PAGE 25

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren

Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that

I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the

commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and / or ridiculed entity

ever created by the federal government.

These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very

traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books

nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal

government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries,

compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance,

simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most

elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and

manage to do the right thing.

Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a

very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the

intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be

termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources.

The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the

assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic.

Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of

information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint

of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government

knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret

for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official

conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept

secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources

and methods.

With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the

wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and

thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CLA and

other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from

overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a

link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.

The last area in which the review board has made a - perhaps its greatest

contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance

between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially

since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the

interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board

decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to

pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here

---

## Page 241

13-00000

before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods.

While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this

particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved

somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's

assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be

released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the

government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during

the Cold War.

Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts

in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board,

serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a

better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no

better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism

exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

---

## Page 242

13-00000

PAGE 26

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.

And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from

Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an

attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into

politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know

the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this

afternoon.

You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and

have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to

your testimony.

BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the

record and I will briefly summarize.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the

record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.

My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located

in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of

Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education.

My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history,

American government, and international relations.

And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the

honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief

remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only

as a citizen, but as an educator.

In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a

project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project

culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half

of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren

Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say

obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite

intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end

of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the

subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to

Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional

research.

From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the

JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from

---

## Page 243

13-00000

PAGE 27

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to

conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work,

it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the

speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a

cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged.

What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made

public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the

information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the

United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The

review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens

telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists,

in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the

government.

In his recent book, "The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John

Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception

of events that is crucial."

Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of

President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving

individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our

young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do

we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be

assembled?

It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the

opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of

information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions

of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have

opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in

some small way - or maybe in some large way - to at least provide them with

more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK

assassination means.

We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56

students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been

affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.

The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the

public and students can relate. It touches people.

As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have

a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project.

Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering

500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with

information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call

---

## Page 244

13-00000

from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School

received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.

The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what

Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the

assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national

interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the

opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more

reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination.

I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the

task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a

professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by

this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not

---

## Page 245

13-00000

Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth

scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its

work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and

truly educational opportunity.

I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have

studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside

normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring

break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with

government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for

students.

In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as

the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an

excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively

involved in learning.

Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still

---

## Page 246

13-00000

PAGE 28

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

and could not be fully appreciated.

An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly

supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and

mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a

couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different

context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a

difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President

Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when?

After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do

less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most

important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we

are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the

accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford

to miss.

In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said,

we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History

can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.

Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective

of our students' interest in this event, I have my honors government classes

perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year - they

could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked

with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in

support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the

Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review

board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the

documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the

extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the

gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can

make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the

record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some

materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any

information in here that you find particularly interesting?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just

gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our

---

## Page 247

13-00000

staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation

n there and its a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhap.

unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibl

been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he

played in the trial.

We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his

reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the

prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever

in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted

him.

REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this

issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to

get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was

so difficult to get this information?

MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where

---

## Page 248

13-00000

PAGE 29

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold

assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill

that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be.

Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take

from people, so we have to find where they are.

Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to

the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We

received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw,

and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged

them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was

developed.

REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose

now and which just have to wait?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of

all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has

governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a

standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record

or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the

material.

The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as

disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether

hat person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly

Joes it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally

known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there

personal privacy considerations that are involved.

I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of

information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the

process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of

policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own

review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now

we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board

made on earlier records.

REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do

you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the

American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to

Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President

Lincoln's assassination.

Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?

---

## Page 249

13-00000

MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record.

The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or

not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the

dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established

the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information

redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes

a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some

continuing national security concern.

So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but

a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the

collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how

many more records need to be reviewed?

MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of

material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located

---

## Page 250

13-00000

PAGE 30

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the

Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to

destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs.

Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the

Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records

to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up

the records they've located.

So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going

to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the

collection before this process is finished.

REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?

MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million

pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating

about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know

there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come

to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive

work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection

again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and

years ahead.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the

movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone

ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board.

He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially,

encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our

public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the

board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.

REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin

reviewing the CIA and FBI records?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the

very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really

significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of

those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a

million pages of records.

What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered

collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the

House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away

from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select

Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are

---

## Page 251

13-00000

highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are

about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm.

In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of

records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next

year, if we get the extension.

REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you

think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?

MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work.

Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure

that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which

sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next

We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving

quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to be a

temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long

---

## Page 252

13-00000

PAGE 31

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

time. We need to get the information to the American public.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing

students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how

important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that

folks like yourself can have the availability for students?

MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only

teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future

generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review

board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and

they pay their own way and they do their own research on their on time. But it

has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the

assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for

the government.

I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to

be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research

opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to

work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that

opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk,

nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to

Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had

the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.

It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any

classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and

will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to

look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as

much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as

ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university,

students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American

citizens.

I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping

bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that

exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would

think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your

legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that

your learned demeanor was that of a --

REP. HASTERT: Not at all.

---

## Page 253

13-00000

REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the

story of Otto Eisenschimi because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a

book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary

Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm

glad you brought that up.

Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking

to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held

up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in

Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always

wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view

that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this

document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal

police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some

Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part

of a conspiracy.

---

## Page 254

13-00000

PAGE 32

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other

people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall

emester of you and didn't show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at a

he question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FB

originally appealed the decision to not-or to withdraw the redaction of this

particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that

you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and

the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.

Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of

cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be

appropriately publicly released?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer — the question is, no, we're not

receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are

committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process

going for one additional year.

The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a

good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their

work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of

those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with

the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite

well.

The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed

the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal

police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no.

Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was

all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it

takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important

materials.

REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes

expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board -- should

another review board setting be required in the future to review another

situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in

terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need

to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic

marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be

instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the

release of documents in the future?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through

this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency,

to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process

---

## Page 255

13-00000

at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed.

There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this

information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time

simply to trust the American people with access to important information about

their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this

process. It's a process that, while time consuming, has worked very well for

this set of records.

REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review

board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left

behind for future such endeavors?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have - virtually all of our work has

been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've

approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make

recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas

if the Congress so wishes.

:

---

## Page 256

13-00000

PAGE 33

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine

work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP.: Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was

listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland;

were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the

assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before

this commission existed, before these documents came out?

MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they

regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By

historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written

about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to

possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be — and, you know,

credible is in the eye of the beholder.

But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you

have to - it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the

Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did.

Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation

of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about

- to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and

disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to

Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that

going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be

inserted into historical context. That's probably been the element that's been

missing all this time.

REP.: So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out

of pulp - pop culture - pulp culture was a bad choice of words - pop culture

and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can

now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not

necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that

we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the

interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than

any questions they had remaining about the assassination.

MR. HOLLAND: I think - my own particular view is that besides, you know, being

an investigation of three crimes - the murder of President Kennedy, the assault

on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder

of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view

the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding

mandate.

But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with

---

## Page 257

13-00000

entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to

behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great - and the FBI had

not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time.

And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it

posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right

conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.

REP.: One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point.

In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think,

can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and

how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many

agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's

still some — can we accelerate the process?

What have we learned from this as to - obviously this is one that particularly

anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary

assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do

---

## Page 258

13-00000

PAGE 34

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so,

presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone

movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.

MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years

old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the

assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who

said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the

FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to

release any of that information.

I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these

agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public

can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for

secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen

approach of the past.

REP. : We first learned - I was elected in '94, and our first experience in

this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some

information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that

nitial investigation.

nigoing debate with the administ ation right now, because it gets far beyond th

And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out

that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations.

That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this

will have silenced most critics?

MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps

provoke others.

We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There

were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in

time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we

should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is

no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I

think that will be a very significant development.

Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for

historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their

determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing.

We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But

there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found.

REP.: I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with

acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what

you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the

---

## Page 259

13-00000

status of that?

MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board

designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt

that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK

Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the

National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this

collection.

Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month

period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address

this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make

those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it

by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of

evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So,

therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to

the American public.

---

## Page 260

13-00000

PAGE 35

Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that

film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But

we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review

this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP. : Do you have

any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for —

REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one

more question, if I may.

Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and

FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be,

it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in

obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal

government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would

impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by

this legislation?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone

is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the

records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the

process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about

and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time.

It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the

point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've

been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning

process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no

impediments among any of the agency partners that we're dealing with to

completing the review of the records on a timely basis.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.

REP.: I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For

procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing - the hearing is adjourned --

and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record

Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open

If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to th‹

consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of

the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any

point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing

none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in

favor say "Aye."

MEMBERS: Aye.

REP.: Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes

fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full

---

## Page 261

13-00000

committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye.

REP.: Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill

moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the

subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work

~END~

---