## Page 1

157-10002-10152

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/05/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

.: 157-10002-10152

RECORDS SERIES :

INTERVIEW SUMMARY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE :

INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH

DATE : 05/29/75

PAGES : 21

SUBJECTS :

PAPICH

FBI

CIA

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

CUBA

CASTRO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 256

Folder 4

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NH 50955

DocId: 32281992

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARI

INTERVIEW WITH:

REGARDING:

Sam Papich

SECRET

AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

JATE-TIME-LOCATION: MaY 29, 1975; 9 a.m.; Carroll Arms

PRESENT: morning: John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly

afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly

MAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

TOP

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(s) :

FBI ut

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 5/5/94 83

A RELEASE iN FULL

RELEASE IN PART

TOTAL DENIAL

Mean.

EXECUTIVE SESSION:

_YES

197/18

CLASSIFIED BY: 5116 SuS ude

REASON:

1.5

DECLASSIFY OIL X

(JFP)

asined

ERMBIGAT

(OFK)

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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Papich began with a brief summary of his experi-

ence

in the FBI.

During World War II and there-

after he ran certain operations in Latin America.

In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations

in Brazil

against the Communist Party of Brazil

and bloc intelligence agents.

In 1952 he became

FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating

and planning, including the development of sources.

He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover.

Papich presented the following overview of the

issues.

He has a high respect and regard for the

Soviet

intelligence service, its efficiency, and

effectiveness.

He must be shown that their

philosophy has changed

since 1970.

The

of the U. S. intelligence community reg

KGB and GRU is very limited.

In 195

nole,

the U. S. intelligence community

had

be-

lieved

was good information

00

ructure.

This had to be readily rev

new

defectors

and new operations

succeede

owing that the

premises were

false.

Papie

"they've taken

us to the cleaners in the last

few years". There

is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in

United States.

The old view was that illegals

would aim at middle-class government and business

It has been discovered that they take

jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment

background.

There is no knowledge of Soviet

objectives.

Illegals may do nothing for years so

they can be tapped for the future.

There may be

500, or 5,000 of them.

were sent in as

early as the 20's and 30's. They are the Rudolph

Abel-type. His network was never identified.

Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U.S.

results in identifying Soviet operations in

United States.

Papich

stated that he played a controversial

"devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the

He did not confer with Attorney General

Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell's

attention.

Papich assumes Helms wanted Mitchell

to get a review of the history of FBI-CIA relations.

Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without

checking with other FBI officials.

Ma90950710179

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REVIEWED BY FBIJFK TASK FORCE

15/94

RELEASE IN FULL

RELEASE IN PART (See taks

TOTAL DENIAL

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To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is

necessary

to go back to World War II, according

to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into

the foreign intelligence field in

world war II.

Overnight the FBI had to generate the capability

to move into Latin America against the German

espionage operation which included business covers,

radio networks, and influence in Latin American

The FBI had no precedent or guidance.

Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegg conferred with

the British in London for assistance.

FBI agents

went into Latin America first under business covers,

then in the embassies, which was thin cover.

The

legal attaches established official liaison

wi

local authorities.

The FBI's role was

counterintelligence but some positive in

was

gathered about the stability of

FBI agents learned on the job.

headquarters was ridiculous until

from

-periences

were reported back.

The OSS ran operations

and Asia as well

as Latin America.

Donova

ran undercover

operations in the United

States.

See the book

by Donald Downs.

OSS had a very close relation-

ship with MI 5 and MI 6.

The British also ran

operations in the United States in 1939-41. No

one knows how many.

They saw the FBI as neophytes

knowing little about the business.

The British

developed closer relations to OSS than to FBI.

At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but

Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in

the united states, for example, the OSS bugging

of the spanish subassy. Other

Latin America.

The friction between Hoover and

8 From (5)

IB (FB1)

Donovan is important background for Hoover's view

of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regard-

less of their background if he thought they had

use of Communists

out of Hoover,

as did OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation

with the NKVD.

Hoover would never work with

Communists.

Hoover saw CIA roots in OSS. Papich

Hoover would never buy.

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In 1943-45, the government began looking toward

a worldwide intelligence system.

The alternatives

were the military, OSS, State, and FBI.

allegedly assured

Hoover that he would be respon-

for setting up the post-war system.

saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted

this job.

The Latin American operation was

successful but Hoover never understood or had

feel for the problems.

He felt insecure.

He never

traveled outside the U.S., and only saw things

from washington, D. C.

President Truman, Hoover did not have a

"warm" relationship with the President.

When the

Central Intelligence

group was formed and

the 1947

Act drafted, Hoover's attitute was mistrust and

lack of confidence in the group creating CIA.

were a different type of people,

Law-

oriented.

Ivy League students

of fore

did not speak Hoover's language.

Papich states It was a "bl

ins Hoover

did

not get the job. Hoover.

omfortable" when

confronted

with

worldwiden

He did not under

stand relationships and opelations abroad.

In the

U. S., for instance, if Hoover had

a problem with

a police chief, he just cut off relations.

He

A foreign

intelligence service cannot operate like

a domestic

intelligence agency.

In 1952, when Papich became

FBI-CIA liaison, rela-

tionships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle

was CIA director.

There were many flaps

between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psycho-

logical warfare, especially regarding the funding

parties.

parties. At the time of the 1947 Act,

and political

niques of "covert action" were the subject of

tremendously heated battles between CIA and State.

There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence

In the field of political and psychological warfare

operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped

people.

The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional

agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a

SEGREA

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MISECRET

possible assignment, the newsman would contact

the FBI to ask what

was going on, this

would go

to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA

director.

But Beedle Smith was tough. Communi-

cation between the FBI and CIA was almost non-

existent by 1952.

Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is

so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels,

exchanging ideas

for operations.

He would push

CIA ideas in the FBI.

Flaps would come up.

would stamp them out and say "get on with the job".

The FBI was easier to control since it was cent

tralized.

Papich's relations with Hoover wo

go up and down.

He frequently asked to

field - and sometimes Hoover consider

him there.

But by the 1950's, most

foreign intelligence talent had di

36d.

No formal consideration was

within

the FBI

to limiting its role to la

cement.

Tolson

probably thought it should

Hoover never

expressed a desire to give

his intelligence

job.

Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's

reasons for doing what he did.

He had his own

conversations and contacts in the White House,

Congress, and his personal sources.

He knew

he was doing and had

"a nose and ear for the

what

political climate in Washington". This was true

for

"risky" operations.

Papich believes it would be disastrous to give

both foreign and

domestic intelligence duties to

a CIA. While there would be advantages in

coordinating fragmented sources,

it is a risk to

liberty, like a national police.

apich ald not recall any significant plan to

morove coordination in 1058 when FBI joined USIB.

FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group.

The CIA would suggest joint field operations but

Hoover would rarely buy it.

This was like his

reluctance to join any operation with any other

agencies.

He thought the FBI should always have

control, a commanding role.

For example, Allan

IB (F81)

SECRET

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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were in the Secretariat: Dulles stressed that

He knew soviet agents and other countries" agents(s)

UN. "The EBI "religiously observed" the ban on

there vas little doverage or penetration it

operating in the u.N. c

when Hoover and Dulles met:

Compoune Papich was present (S)

When Hoover objected

to the plan, Dulles dropped it.

Another example:

Angelton might be disturbed

about our lacki

information about KGB operations out of the embassy:

He would discuss with Papich

how to penetrate the

KGB.

Friction

would develop in "the gray area" of posi-

tive intelligence.

For example, a top foreign

Official came to the United States for medical

treatment.

The CIA knew he was coming to the U.S.

and wanted to know his relationship with Communists

and

wanted intelligence

on the instability in the

country.

The CIA wants him surveilled to find out

his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or

bug.

The FBI would not do this

since he was not

an intelligence agent and not within FBI jurisdi

tion.

The clA would be upset.

cases like this, one involving la Bollviar

Over the years,

Papich sold Hoover on

but it was always a gray area.

loordina-

tion never worked with the FBI

In summary, the sources of.

(1) the OSS experience

(2)

warfare by CIA, and

(3) the CIA

intelligence gathering in the U.S.

#friction were

cal and psychological

desire for positive

There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to

develop "friendgh in the U.s.

Papich

more than three to six instances of disagreement.

The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization

for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because

it moved on its own.

The CIA Office of Security

advised Papich that they had a relationship with

-the National Student Association. This never gave

the FBI a problem.

The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI prob-

lems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down

the drain when contacts through student groups were

curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts

PIE SECRET

(FBI)

( FBI)

(FBI

1B

(ES) (FBI)

(CIA)

per

CIA

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had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence

community could have dealt with the New Left

later.

The CIA would have had assets to assess

the issues.

Such questions involved New Left

travels overseas and relationships with foreign

agents.

The FBl and ClA dia discuss developing a cover

in the U.S. to get into China. Travelers gained S

very little.

The immediate

problem was the pro-

posal for a joint approach.

When Papich was there,

it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did

set up cover in the U.S.,

the FBI provided no

support.

However, if the CIA desired to use a

company

it would ask for a check of FBI files.

Papich 1s not aware of any political organiza

created by the CIA, although it may have

in the 50's or 60's.

There was discussi

FBI about creating its own group aimed

and discussion of whether or not to

know about it.

There had to be coo

CIA.

Papich does not know if pl

organizations were implemented

*PIA

3(5)

atton with

arroreate

he decision would

have been at Hoover's level

FBI informant travel oversea

was

limited mainly

to CPUSA members.

The FBI woald not tell CIA

about informant trips to Moscow or Paris before-

hand.

The reason was that the CIA would have

notified its field agencies that the informant's

life should be protected.

Instead, the FBI informed

the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.

The FBI llaison section was made up of six or seven

agents.

Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA.

Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security

Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and

the Office of Security. Papich and Creager backed

each other up in their respective areas.

There

were several liaison agents at the Pentagon.

The

liaison at State was Oren Bartlett.

The other

liaison agents were not so deeply involved in in-

telligence operations as

was Papich.

FBI liaison

at NSA was Bi12

Masonnell, although rapich was also

involved with

iNSA

(FRI) IB

верим

Revred,

(F81)

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Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies,

Hoover was "goddamned careful"

He was sensitive

to any

"risks" and thus any request for FBI support

had to be established firmly.

Hoover never

responded "let them do it" within the United

States. Hoover did

not give other agencies any

blessing or approval for questionable domestic

(i) (c)

activities such

as the case of the Bottvian officialS

mentioned above.

SE, 1O NO 13

percIA)

In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich stimulated

the United States,

The CIA wanted to

foreign officials in the United States before

officials went home.

in these e

its sources to recruit

the

These officials

Here not

spies,

therefore, when the CIA aske

BI to

recruit them, Hoover said no.

Th

had its

ups and downs, depending on

the

Some-

times Papich did convince Hoo

the CIA

recruit a foreign official

S.

1B (581)

Hoover treated State De

requests dif-

ferently than CIA req

ince

he considered

them

to be requests

secretary abstate

rather than the DC

onougs or taps. 8u

Hoover was back-stor

becaus

the issue wen

to the Attorney

eral

IfENSA asked for help

tin getting codes, Hoover sometimes refused.

Не

based his evaluation

feasibility of the

(S)

(4A)

operation.

Neither NSA

nor

state had their ownS

capabilities and there Was no formal discussion

of their developing 1t.

Papich stressed that

Hoover treated State, CIA, andus leach differently. (S) (44)

There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA

recruited without clearing with the FBI. The CIA

asked for FBI wiretags no more than five or six

(Syu)

times. Papich was asked by FBI officials whether

the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly

for wretap authority.

Papich says this may have

(Sy)

happened, but not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys

General would have stuck their neck out. It was a

possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where

the relationshp was unusually close.

Papich says

CIA wiretapping. could only have happened once or

(ш)

twice since the FBI would have detected it most of

the time. If it was done it would be through CIA

(FBI)

reques

NGA (FBI)

farew

I (FBI)

68 (FBI)

IB (FBI)

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Office of Security, although that office had an

Allan Dulles

would not have condoned it since he had great

respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same

is true

of McCone and Helms.

Papich also con-

cedes the possibility of entries by the CIA,

citing the independent operation conducted regard-

ing the Bol vien or alai? Hoover opposed goingS

to CIA Or INSA for technical support in a jointS!

surveillance operation.

The fBI would on

For equipments for its own operations

Regarding the memorandum of understar

CIA and FBL, the

general problem

Loping

Sources in the United States

amo

gn officials;

as many as 12,000 of them a year

ned to the

United States.

CIA tried to

s source in

the 50's.

FBI involvement

off and on" and

some thought a new FBI

would be needed

for it.

The FBI as cons

did not have

trained personnel or carab.

Wity to develop foreign

targets.

the clA had this capability.

Papich

proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the

United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest

in a target,

the purposes of the contact, and any

results. If the FBI had no interest in the target,

that 1s, an interest in a KGB contact for example,

it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that

CIA furnish it any information relevant to its

needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left

was handled separately from the memorandum of under-

standing procedures).

Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division

before Sullivan.

capable administrator, he

operated behind

scene, stayed out of politics,

had good rapport with agents, and was able to

handle Hoover.

retired, the FBI "lost

a rudder".

This was a crucial point

In FBI history,

with Hoover getting old.

Belmont stressed to his

subordinates the need to develop a strong case for

any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case

ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and

Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter-

intelligence operations

against the KGB.

(le)

in CA)

IB(ES1)

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Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in

the 50's the CIA's general attitude was

not to

Investigate or surveld Americans overseas.

FBI-

CIA communications rarely involved U.S. citizen

argets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent.

In the 1900's, Papich recalls two early incidents

of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas.

One

was the Republic of New Africa, a black group

with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals

note by biliff - the individual was Robert

Williams?). The second

was stokely Carmichaer, who

traveled around the world.

The FBI asked the CIA

for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas

but there were no results since the CIA had no

capability.

In retrospect, Papich thinks his

importance was exaggerated.

Papich does not recall any case or interest of the

CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests

on the CIA regarding Dr. King.

rapich recalls

the FBI thought a black Communist Party mere

contacts with King.

The assumption wa

Athe

CPUSA was supported and financed

offet Union.

influenced the FBI's view

Problem.

There was no way the CIA

abroad since

the CIA had no penetra

he Communist Party

in Russia.

The CIA had

on the CPUSA links

to the Soviet Union.

put little or no effort

abroad into developing information on this. It

was not a cla priority.

CIA was satisfied

with FBI

coverage of the Communist Party.

If the KGB was

using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would

uncover 1t.

The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA

activities. Regarding CrUSA, FBI determined that

there was

Soviet financial support into the 1960's.

The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the

CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA

links to the Soviet Union.

There were no leads for

he clA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc.

If a Communist Party member

went to nome or London,

FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave

it low priority and produced little.

This led to

FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through

its legal attaches, who would

contact foreign

security services.

Normally, the CIA was informed

but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI

called it "an internal security" matter. Papich

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stresses that this is a problem.

What is the dif-

ference between

"internal

security"

and "counter-

intelligence" and "positive intelligence"?

FBI

would use these distinctions

as an excuse

not to

notify. CIA.

Regarding the legal attaches

de Janerio after World War

Ii.

Papich was in Rio

• FBI had moved

out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to

have someone there anyway.

rapich stayed a year

wanted out since he aisliked doing

only

liaison work with local police and CIA.

The legal

attaches were never operations and dealt with

foreign security police and

criminal police.

major exception was texteo

acquiescence, the FBI

as operators: in ct (Syu)

age was through sources going back f

and

may still exist. The target

and

CPUSA officials

and

ing fugitives. The

minals

apprehend

rover the

soviets.

1S)

There were six or sever legal attache offices

from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970.

Papich

feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should

be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their

assets and

sources do not duplicate the CIA. A

FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence

community through his liaison with local police.

overagen the counterintelligence field of a

Soviet officon should be by the CIA. Coverage of S

a CPUSA member should be joint FBI-CIA. There

never has been such coordination.

The

legal

attache should be involved in operations through

his liaison contacts.

Papich gave the following example:

the French DST have good liaison for counterintel-

Tigence coverage.

If a jointiCA-French coverage/

target is coming to the U..

the FBI Tegal

attache should be Involvedtin France to prepare (S

Ior the transfer of coverage to FBI in the U.S.

Papich sees the implications of this for the need

to have a single counterintelligence agency.

would be

advantages of centralization, communication,

and security.

1D (FBI)

1B (FBI)

1B (FBI)

(CA)

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When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence

service for

coverage

of

an FBI target, it asks for

any information rather than specifying the data.

This is because foreign services may be penetrated

by the KGB.

Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft

in France or the "17 wiretaps"

Regarding "leak" cases, over the years bagh

Eisenhower and Kennedy,

the

White

Housers

through the root: noover

ate

these investigations

ned a source

would be a top offic

nothis would be done.

For example, under

Kennedy the FBI did

identify a top source

• leaks, gave

the informa-

tion to Kennedy, and

nothing was done.

The secu

rity committee was created to deal with leaks.

Each agency would handle its own, although the

President

could still order the

FBI to enter the

case.

Papich did not recall anything about Anna

Chennault, but he did recall that during the

Korean War there was a request of a top American

citizen regarding those negotiations.

Papich

says he talked them out of it.

Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens,

Papich recalls beginning to request CIA

coverage

of New Left travel abroad about 1967.

He does not

as 1965, at the

time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on

antiwar protests.

Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request

to CIA nor did he know

when Ober's unit was set up.

He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his

unit but he did know

of its existence after it was

established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular

group leaders.

The Bureau wanted to know if there

was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders.

These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not

know CIA project codewords). There was no CIA

capability to cover antiwar

Moscows The CIA's attitude toward this new issue

Contad this new taus u

was similar to the old assumptions about the CPUSA.

AB (FBI)

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The accepted view

at CIA was that it was

impor-

tant to determine if there was foreign support

sabotage training.

After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts

on this topic developed rapidly. There were few

really valuable ClA results nor was much obtained

through the FBl, the legal attaches, or informants

going abroad.

Papich referred to the climate of press commentary,

assassinations,

allegations of sabotage plans,

bombings.

There was

"a potential for panic within

the intelligence community" since no one had the

coverage they thought they needed. Travel of U.s.

antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed impor-

tant, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals

found not to be important.

Therefore, time was

spent on targets who should not have been targets

but this was a new task.

Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought

New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich

never thought the CPUSA responsible for development

of the New Left or SDS.

CPUSA did try to use the

New Left.

Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled

CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had

been proved wrong.

In World war II days, yes,

the soviets used

CrUSA lor recruitment.

late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their

policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose.

was never convinced of this change.

Papich

recognized

the possibility that there might be a

reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but

Papich's top concern has always been KGB penetra-

tion of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question

of how good

the double agents are.

Regarding the theory of KGB aims) for using U.S.

dissidents, the main problem was

lack of knowledge.

In the 40's and 50's, the FBI vas confident of its

knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to

influence U.S. politics, but in the late 50's

the Bureau's coverage of

groups was tremendously

The FBI recognized this.

The CIA stressed

it also for three reasons:

(1) the increase in FBI

requests for CIA information, la: the white House

requests, and (3) CIA officials own concern about

inadequate coverage.

The concision was that

intelligence regarding people ino went abroad

inadequate.

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Papich had no personal involvement with White

House requests.

There was discussion both in

the

FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage

and development of sources. For example, does

CIA

nave anybody who can have an entree into SDS?

The Katzenbach report had limited the CIA to

foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited

broad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this.

out also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP.

Papich believes anything Ober said and did

reflected CIA policy from the top.

The operation

grew like Topsy.

CIA compartmented it very

tightly and Ober was very security conscio

the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned

by the

assassinations, riots, and

put on the pressure to

find out

me

ind it.

He pressed Papich to pressur

Regarding assassinatio

van

was

convinced

and Belmont

W

ultimately

nced that Oswald

acted alone.

No

one

aswered the question

of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union.

Did he

get any guidance?

Why did they permit him to

leave? Papich had frequent discussions with

Dulles and the CIA

regarding the Warren Commission

although he thinks

the formal FBI liaison was Jim

Malloy.

The question as to whether Oswald was a

U. S. intelligence asset never arose.

Critics at

the time said the FBI should have surveilled

Oswald.

Papich recalls discussions of a plan to

have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such

plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was

not worth the risk.

He does not know whether the

CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not llkely

to use "nuts".

Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was

not the reason for his retirement.

Instead, there

were problems with Hoover on operations and

policy

decisions.

Papich was taking an aggressive stand

on coverage of soviet.

Regarding McCone's proposal on expanded FBI cover-

age of soviets, Papich

stated that others in the

CLA intruenced McCone to press for more coverage.

(S)

McCone was aggressive.

Papich pushed 1t too.

This was the time of the cuban missile crisis.

1B (FBI) :

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Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues

but proposals for major

new operations went to

PFIAB

for support.

answer on the proposal was

negative.

proposal

involved more extensive and sophisticated elec-

tronic surveillance.

This was at the time of dis-

covery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in

Moscow, as well as an

increase in the numbere

KGB attempts to recruit U.S. citizens

He

does not think COINTELPRO was develop

alternative to this.

Hoover's rejection of McCon

an did influence

CIA attitudes toward the

A

saw the FBI as

not being "a clandestine

CIA's view was

that FBI had to reject CIA

proposals

as illegal.

When Papich lectured to CIA

recruits he attempted

to orient CIA to the FBI's limits.

On the other

hand, FBI did

not understand CIA functions abroad.

Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed

that he clashed with Hoover

every year and that

their relationship had declined steadily after

1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil.

In December '69, he decided to retire the follow-

ing. spring.

February 1970, while winding up

business, the Riha

incident arose.

Professor Riha disappeared from the university.

there was faculty and press interest in Boulder,

Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI.

But FBI opened no case or investigation.

In March

of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado

came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in

Boulder to inquire about the disappearance.

CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office.

FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and dis-

covered that marital problems had led to the dis-

appearance. CIA man told the university president

what he learned from "reliable government sources".

The president told the press.

attorney called the president and asked his source.

The president went back to his CIA source.

source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in

Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC.

The CIA

suggested that he and the SAC go to the

aistrict attorney to say that the original source

was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and

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wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent

who gave the information.

The CIA officer

refused and there was a

bitter clash.

(Things

like this had happened in the past.

FBI field

agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always

told them to get on with the job. The SAC sent

a teletype to Hoover.

Hoover said to Papich, go

to Helms

and get the

Helms

identity of the FBI sourge.

called in the CIA man, who refused tes

identify him.

Helms sent Hoover a lette

this and said he was "taking the nec

trative action"

• Hoover noted one!

ng

inis-

"dis-

continue liaison with CIA".

Papich then wrote

a lon

01

resignation to

Hoover instead of his

brief resignation

note.

He strongly app

Hoover to reconsider

and

keep communications

open.

He also raised

serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions.

Hoover was not happy.

Papich says there had been

dozens of incidents

like this before.

He did not

confer

with anyone in the FBI about his letter.

W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring

things up.

(Papich says if it is OK with the FBI

it's OK with him for the Committee to get the

letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover.

The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)

Regarding the 1966 cutbacks,

Papich thinks it

started with the Long Committee hearings on the

After the Kennedy

Administration, and especially under Attorney

General Clark, there were cutbacks inkelectronia

coverages This dat nicoly attested CIA interest

in the coverage of Boviets. ch: would prod the

i on the covorare of ombassies.

ICIA Technical

Seryices Division only loaned quipment to FBIS

lie doos recall & lour-month jolnt experimental

Lost of eguipment in the weishington aren.

(S)

w. C. Sullivan

saw Angleton and CIA directors at

USIB meetings.

Papich would discuss FBI-CIA

problems with Sullivan.

Papich

stressed the need

for milorophone coverage.

"This was "a red Plag"

to loover, Tho obstacle, was that lentry

Operations

were

needed and

be detected.

1B

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Regarding the CIA

and

ocal police, the only thing

Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relation-

ship with New York City police.

The purpose was

not operations, but protection of CIA New York

facilities.

He was also aware of relationships

between Washington, D. C.

and suburban police for

protection of CIA

facilities and personnel.

knew that some CIA employees joined questionable

groups and that the CIA was concerned about its

personnel associating with radicals and protesters.

The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in

1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six

sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in

protest groups.

The information provided to the

FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap".

Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA

He is not aware of any CIA activity re-

garding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware

of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose

of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations.

CIA should have relied

on FBI.

B1ll Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office

of security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memo-

randa to the FBI Intelligence Division on all trans-

actions with CIA. Creager

kept Papich advised,

especially of the potential for flaps and for

successiul operations.

Papich believes Office of

Security was restricted both in number of personnel

and by CIA rules.

It could claim a need to protect

its own facilities and personnel but it didn't

have significant capability.

If 1t did, it would

have been detected by the FBI.

Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich

recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President

and the National Security Council. Johnson may

have asked the FBI for help.

An FBI agent from

the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly

from Mexico City,

sent to the Dominican

Republic.

This was done with CIA approval and the

joint effort was successful.

There were no flaps.

The FBI agent had sources all over Central America

going back to World War 11.

Other FBI activities

in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in

Havana before Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan.

In all these areas the FBI's

capability was based

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on personas relationships going back to World

War Il.

In the late 1960's, the FBI went into

El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste

of FBI manpower.

Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps

with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to

recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the

exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would

get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA

cover companies screening exiles.

The FBI investi

gated one cover company until it discovered the

CIA cover.

CIA tried to recruit FBI sources with-

out checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must

have" used agents to

cover local Miami Cubans.

when to an intereste ra somed of test

investigating.

There would be general protests

o ClA to stay out of counterintelligence.

Some

problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent

in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with

(1)(A)

NOW

43

CIA

(CIA)

(1) -B)

NöV 13

CI*

Fitzgerald.

Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans

in New York, Papich said the policy was no

counterintelligence by CIA.

He has no recollection

of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal

activities, but Papich admits he would have learned

only if there was a flap.

Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich

formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relation-

ships.

The problem, as noted

earlier, was CIA

desire to Interview foreign officials in the U.S

tor at.the U. N. Hoover finally, reluctantly,

agreed to the 1966 understanding.

Papich warned

CIA that if there were continuing flaps,

would withdraw his agreement and

"It would be my

butt".

There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where

Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit

and failed to advise FBI.

If CIA was interested

in a Soviet bloc intelligence

service recruitment,

FBI said no.

If either Domestic Operations Division

or the counterintelligence staff was interested in

any Soviet in the U.S.,

they

touched base with FBI.

But they felt that if FBI had

allowed them to

recruit they could have succeeded.

(CIA)

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

70

POCATE

Regarding postal intercept, CIA came up with the

proposition, said they had

entree, and desired 1t

for positive

intelligence. CIA did all the work.

The focus was air mail to and from Russia. CIA

gave FBI the products where FBI had "stops

on

persons of interest and also where other informa-

tion might be of interest to FBI. It provided

some leads to intelligence agents.

Papich recalls

a briel mail intercept in the early 1950's on the

West Coast regarding China.

a new postmaster arrived.

"It was stopped arter (S

Papich stated that the

New York operation was of greater benefit to the

ma for positive intelligence regarding the sover

Union.

Papich recalls meetings with CIA and!

The leonin the name treaten lend (S)

monitoring.

The Fbi would get leads for suspects.

In CIA: Division D. were the COMINT people.

recalls no other areas for dring in the U.

B.aaten (S)

Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would

get positive intelligence reports, for example,

on an allen coming to the United States. The FBI

was interested in his training in Russia as a

possible source regarding Soviet intelligence

activities.

The CIA Domestic Contact Service would

provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field

on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups.

got the information from faculty and students regard-

ing future riots.

The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities

were set by the intelligence community, for

example, gather whatever they can about missiles.

would not task DCS.

If DCS went Into opera-

tions, I'Bl itself was upset. But DCS had good

officers who would note potential for counter-

intelligence use.

There was no Increase in DCS

traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.

The creation of DCS in 1947 worrled Hoover, who

feared an internal security role.

It was

set up

by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact

between FBI and the DCS at the fleid level.

procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview

Page L8 of 21

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IB

(FBI)

(CIA

(CIA)

CIA)

"CIA

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an alien, a form was submitted by FBI.

reta then

got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so

it could protect any operation.

Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence

agencies,

if the FBI discovers any it evaluates

the potential for a double agent or the possibility

of recruitment.

FBI usually goes to the agency and

tells them the situation to prevent access to

sensitive information.

Also, the agency can give

FBl assistance.

The CIA Office of Security is

"paranoid" on this subject.

It is very concerned

if there is a report on a CIA employee associating

with bloc nationals.

Before telling the FBI, it

would do as much as it could on its own so there

would be something to discuss. In one case the

CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy,

predicated on its analysts' conclusions from a

photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of

this alone.

There were other cases where FBI and

CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It

depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier"

than FBI.

If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own

employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was

true for physical surveillance of its own employees.

If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell,

but it never came to

FBl attention and there was

no policy discussion of the subject.

If the CIA

wanted to do something with its own assets with

Attorney General or White House approval, it would

not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with

FBI 1f it saw a risk that FBl would discover.

Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen.

Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned

to Moscow is useful to the rub.

A newman who may

have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a

target in

the U. S.

Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity

"tainting" a criminal case.

CIA would make sources

available for criminal prosecutions.

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Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls

proposals for developing cover in the U.S. for

Ober advised Papich of the develop-

ment of sources in the U.S. to cover overseas

targets. Papich would write a memo on the situa-

tion and provide any relevant FBI information.

also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA

Papich stresses

that FBI

sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working

through CIA but never got very far.

Papich gives

the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and

reported back through CIA.

Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather

information on policy guidance,

funding, and train-

ing of U. S. dissidents overseas.

There was a large

volume of

communication covering

names like

Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.

FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investiga-

tion regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must

recognize the

evidentiary rules. If there were

prosecutions (very few), it was

never necessary to

disclose CIA data.

position to testify. Papich does not recall ask-

ing CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might

have originated with electronic surveillance over-

seas.

If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic

matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew

about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief.

Papich would insist on identification of the

sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI

did get access to sources, sometimes working through

a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.

I B (FBI)

was not implemented before he left in 1970. It

could have been explored in the FBl Intelligence

Division but they would have come to Papich if

CIA was needed.

Papich discussed with Far East

Division in CIA.

Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer

to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the

entire

intelligence community, including the white

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INTERVIEN AND MEDINING SUMMARY

House,

to acquire, Soviet

cable trasere

was fortreal estate and equipment The FBI

line money (S)

would

run the operation to providel bloc trarrio produet

Papich was not directly involved, but he

heard of it.

Papich, recalls discussion with Technical Services

Division regarding secret inks out he recalls no

(S)

Instance where TSD provided documents to FBI and

he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of

CIA alias documentation or other document forging.

If this had been done, it would have had to go

through Papich.

Papich knew nothing about Vesco.

Papich recalls a code

on ober memos tossibleste purpose was so S

designation possibly I

that when

information came back to CIA from FBI

it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter-

intelligence staff had an office to log communica-

The determination as to what FBI informa-

tion would go to Ober was first based on Ober's

request for specifics and second based on FBI

criteria which considered whether there would be

any possible CIA results.

FBI

would alert Ober

regarding an individual and ask for any informa-

tion generally about his overseas activity.

Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and enter-

ing operations in the 1960's.

regarding CA security research stall, rapich

recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-

intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-

type" operation, doing research on penetration of

the CIA.

It also analyzed and evaluated the

exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might

have been Communists or have had World War II

Communist contacts.

For example, in Germany until

the mid-50's, CIA

was vulnerable

to recruitment

by Communist

intelligence.

CIA brought in brilliant

minds who might still have strong Identification

with their home countries in eastern and middle

Europe.

Papich and Creager felt that "the guts of

Flatson" was with DDP on counterintelligen brice

on their internal security problems.

of Security there was a small number of investiga-

tions overlapping FBI.

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(CIA)

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