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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Sper sap

7ele

26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECOR D

SUBJECT: Notes on Special Group Meeting, 26 March 1963

Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Comparative result of high-

level versus low-level photography were demonstrated by Mr. Lundahl.

After considerable discussion, it was decided that the matter would be

held in abeyance for a week pending further developments on the Donovan

matter. In general, Gilpatric's attitude was against low-level on the basis

of Defense intelligence needs, but would agree if State felt periodic low-

levels would establish "right of access". Johnson expressed general

objection at this time. McCone expressed two prevailing viewpoints within

CIA, but recommended proceeding with low-level. Bundy agreed to put ..

the matter to higher authority for final decision. McCone suggested he

was willing to accept responsibility for further delay.

Action:

Matter to be reconsidered each week./

2.

Reconnaissance of Indonesia. State, Defense, and Bundy all

opposed overflying Indonesia. McCone recommended we support the

British effort and it was agreed that the matter would be put to higher

authority for decision. ]

98

Monthly Report of NRO was reviewed. McCone reported in detail

on the failure of recent CORONA shots; specifically referred to failures

of January, February, and March, and the fact that November and

December were not usually productive of good photography. He advised

Special Group that new estimates of Soviet capability could not be made

until the Fall, rather than in June and July as is customary. He advised

that the next flight was scheduled for Saturday, 30th of March, and it

will be a standard CORONA. Gilpatric reported that adequate emergency

back-up arrangements were being made, and delays of a type occurring

in the last 90 days would not be recurring.

McCone reported the difficulties incurred with the U-2 generators

and brushes and the fact that this had caused a standdown of flights in the

Far East, but not in Cuba. Condition was reported as having been cor-

rected and the North Korean, North China flight is on a weather alert.)

3/mc

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4.

The two papers from ine Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

on sabotage operations and additional covert programs were

returned for consideration by the Cuban Affairs Committee.

was noted that the Cottrell Committee had not acted on these papers.

The procedure adopted was for Cottrell Committee action and

recommendations in much the same way that we now get Ambassador

endorsement of covert activities elsewhere. There was a general

concensus that actions against Cuba shipping would not be final

although it would be an irritant, since plan called for damaging and

making ships inoperative rather than destroying them. Several

details of the additional Covert Action Program were discussed.

The paper is to be revised and reviewed by the Cottrell Group.

5. [Col. Steakley feported on the results of several recent

Elint missions, and Elint destroyer operations in the Far East and

Elint operation into the Baltic. Dr. Scoville reported on the

Chasse operation.

6. Question was raised as to the results from overflights over

Laos.

Action:

I would like a thorough briefing on this as I have

heard nothing on this.

7. It was reported that SAC seriously questioned CIA's con-

clusion that the SA-3 sites in Russia are low-level intercept

ground-to-air missile sites. Apparently SAC has prepared a report

on this. Gilpatric noted the March 18th CIA memorandum reaffirming

our conclusions.

Action:

DD/I must pursue this matter and explore with

SAC their reasons for questioning our conclusions. Thi

s the second time in weeks that these conclusions have bee

questioned.

Ad vise me.]

JAM/ji

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26 April 1963

MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) meeting, 25 April 1963

Attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone

1.

CIA weekly report on our activities was reviewed without

comment.

No requests were made.

No actions are needed.

2.

[Extensive discuasions of DCI'e recommendations for low-

level reconnaissance of Cuba. Gilpatric raleed the question of political

ConsequenCeS.

Johnson responded that Mr. Hughes had submitted a

paper to him indicating the Soviets would take a harder line under these

provocations. He reported that Thompson appeared to feel that low -

levels would be used as a basis to halt withdrawal and possibly intensify

the situation in Laos and elsewhere and that our interests would be

adversely affected. I took the position that intelligence requirements

were such that low-levels must be dontinued. It was agreed to go to

higher authority with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

present. Arrangements were made for a meeting about 6:30, 25 April.)

3.

MI. FitzGerald presented the proposed new covert policy

toward Cuba, reviewing the situation and specific operations in con-

siderable detail. The Group were Impressed with the planning. They

were not prepared to act, and suggested the matter be discussed with

higher authority, and also that action be withheld until the Standing

Group had further deliberated on the question.

1. [Covers action in the Conge was decuared. Bronsen Iweady

reported briefly. The CIA proposal was approved.

The proposed feint operations of GROSBEAK were discussed

in some detail. Colonel Steakley suggested this operation might prejudice

their ELINT operations. However, it was agreed that the exercise would

be undertaken during the May dark-of-the-moon perlod and the results

reported back to the Special Group prior to reaching a decision for reaching

approval of continuing operations. Jorgenson was instructed accordingly.

ACTION: CIA is authorized to undertake this operation:

it should be watched carefully, reported accurately and

fully, and brought before the Special Group at the time

we're

considering the : June operations,]

3/mc

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6.

[The status report on the Italian elections was briefly

discussed.

Approval was expressed on the manner in which this

had been handled. Apparently, the political observers on Nir.

Bundy's atalf views coincided with those reported by the Rome

Station.

[Mc Cone reported on the proposed plan for the April 30-

May l meeting on British Guiana. Mi. Bundy and MI. Johnson

expressed the view that it was important that the strike be continued.

They were concerned that it might be settled prior to May 30 and

CIA was instructed to look Into this and jointly with MIGtake such

action as might be indicated as desirable to ensure the continuation

of the strike. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that the $10, 000 a day

figure la the ClA paper would be cheap if a continuation of the strike

for a protracted period would ensure the fall of Jagan and the destruc-

Hon of ble political support.

ACTION; McCone should discuse with Helms and,

if desirable, to arrange for a discuasion with Fulton

by Cline or by McCone in Paris over this coming

weekend.

JAM/bd (tape)

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. .

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 1963

1.

[Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed.

The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two

flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the

NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit.

If, on the other hand, the four India - Communist China border flights

were not executed at this time, then CIA was authorized to fly three

flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired

by both Sarit and COMOR.]

2.

Status of negotiations for India - Communist China recon-

naissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be

pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville

reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either

India or Thailand until about the 20th of April.

3.

Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration

operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved.

The

proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general

program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported

by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the

direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority

to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was de-

tailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected

on a series of operations which were within our capability. I took the

position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally,

however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program

until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets

from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this

was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series

of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared

to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of

Zoe

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which would permanently impair the facilities under attack nor would

they seriously impair Castro's economic or military posture and, hence,

serve no useful purpose. Furthermore, I estimated that under the laws

of averages, a number of the teams would be rolled up and they would

as they had in the past attribute the whole thing to the U.S. Government

and the CIA. Since we had stood down the ALPHA 66 and others, more or

less disenfranchised ourselves from the Cuban colony in Miami as a result

of the Miro Cardona incident, we would have no plausible denial and in fact

would find ourselves in a rather difficult position. It was agreed this matter

should be further studied and reported on next Thursday, and possibly

discussed with higher authority on Friday. An important part of this

issue is the SNIE now under preparation which has to do with the future

of Castro.

4.

ACTION: I should discuss this subject with

General Carter and some of the

Senior Staff on Friday morning to

prepare an agreed CIA position

and also to schedule the completion

of the SNIE.

North Vietnam monthly report was accepted.

Johnson was asked to go back to Ambassador Unger with an insistent

message that Phoumi support Kong Le with money now in which came

from the United States. However, if this appeal failed, the support

recommended in the paper should be given for a limited period of time./

6.

The covert annex to the Bolivian internal defense plan was

remanded because the Special Group (CI) had remanded the basic internal

defense plan. However, there was no objection expressed to the annex

but it must not be construed that the Special Group approved any subjects

covered in the annex.

7.

[The Colombian internal defense plan was not considered.

8.

(Colonel Steakley submitted a report on inadvertent over-

flights by reconnaissance since 1 January 1961. This report was noted.

DCI raised the question as to why he had not been informed. Apparently

this was an oversight as written procedures had been established by

Colonel Steakley for prompt informing of all members of Special Group

when instances of this type occurred. Apparently, Alexis Johnson was/

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98

informed by Colonel Steakley's office and he was under the impression

that I was informed. However, he was on leave and therefore did not

know that I had not been informed.

British Guiana situation was opened up for discussion and

placed on the agenda for next week. Alexis Johnson reported on

Mr. Burdette's position, substantially parallelling Helms', with the

effect that he was disappointed in the British position, that he felt time

had run in favor of Jagan, and they would like an appeal made to

Macmillan. Bundy took exception. McCone stated that CIA felt much

as Johnson reported and furthermore objected to the British plan to

involve CIA in its own political actions which would be attributable

both whether they succeeded or failed.

It was agreed to place subject

on agenda for next week. 7

ACTION: Subject should be carefully reviewed by staff.

JAM:bd

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tastest

1 .-

24 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group 5412 Meeting - 23 May 1963

1. [After general discussion the North Viet Nam paper as presented

by Colby was approved with the exception of Item b. State took the position

that work with isolated ethnic groups in North Viet Nam should not be

undertaken unless specifically approved by the Department. Defense raised

the question of more extensive operations than anticipated by CIA and

indicated that the JCS had developed a plan which would be submitted to

the Secretary of Defense and then to the Special Group. I raised the

question as to whether the General Harkins command working with the

South Viet Nam army could conduct truly covert operations north of the

17th parallel, pointing out that if such actions were attributed to either

• the United States or the South Viet Namese, then the North Viet Namese

with their substantial military organizations could retaliate against the

South Viet Nam with punishing consequences. The JCS plan was not

formally presented. No actions were taken seikber although it is expected

that it will be presented in the near future.

ACTION: General Carter has had this matter under

consideration with Admiral Riley. We

should receive and study the JCS plan

immediately upon its approval.

2. Defense indicated that the Army have developed plans for large-

scale operations against Cuba involving sabotage. No presentation was made

however the Special Group was advised that such a plan would be forthcoming.

3. [Plan for disposing of the 14, 000 sacks of sugar in Puerto Rico was

discussed. I explained the actions being taken by DDP under FitzGerald's

direction and indicated the sugar would probably be sold by the Soviets to a

New York sugar broker who would in turn sell it to a non-U.S. port.

The

800 bags in question would be disposed of./

4. I reported the current status of British Guiana as outlined in the

attached paper.

ACTION: Mr. Bundy asked that Mr. Helms follow

British Guiana closely and keep in close

communication with me and with him.J

50-43-331-11

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98

5. The probable position of the Nenni Socialists at their July

Congress was discussed.

ACTION: CIA was requested to explore the possibility

of political action at this time designed to

influence a favorable decision by the Congress

concerning the Party's support of NATO and

the West as contrasted with the taking of a

neutral position. As an alternate possibility,

it was suggested that the Party might be

influenced to refrain from making support

of NATO an issue on which the Government

might be brought down. Such a course would

make it possible for the Christian Democratic

Party to conduct its support of NATO even

though the CD are closely associated with the

Nenni Socialists.

McCone stated that Mr. Karamessines

would report on this matter at the earliest

possible time.]

6. Liter a brief discussion on conditions in Haiti, Mr. Bundy

stated that NSAM

would be issued and would impose on CIA

certain responsibilities for covert action among exile groups.

ACTION: CIA should immediately study the prospect of

creating an exile group around dependable

leadership, prepare a plan, estimate of cost,

and a forecast of success of intervention in

Haiti and make specific recommendations on

course of action if one is indicated. Care should

be taken not to initiate action until policy has

been agreed upon at appropriate levels of

Government and of higher authority. Under no

circumstances should a course of action by

tied to a particular date or be otherwise 7

inflexible.

7. After a brief discussion of the overflight problem in India, Special

Group urged that CIA seek an appointment with Amb. Bowles prior to his

departure in order to acquaint him with the background of thi

aistory of the attitude of the Indiana, the current status andiother dimensions

of the problem so that he will be fully informed upon his arrival in New Delhi

and will not necessarily be prejudiced by the views of Amb. Gailbraith.7

JAM/ mib

3 жс

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SECRET CARD GALY

27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - 27 June 1963

98

1. [In connection with the scheduled monthly overflights,

Johnson brought up the question of overflights on Laos and North

Viet Nam, stating that he understood the COMOR requirements for

Laos had been completely filled and nothing was left over, but there

was a requirement for one flight on North Viet Nam. McCone answered

he was not sure but would check up. It was agreed that any unfilled

requirements on Laos would be taken care of.

2. [Reference use al ChiNats in N rth Viet Nam, this is O. K..

providing the use is part of a South China mission which then passes

over North Viet Nam, because weather conditions permit, and then

exits.. State would not agree to a straight North VietNam-La os

flight flown by ChiNat pilots because of the political implications if

anything happened.

3. Ethe program for Labor Training in Spain was O. k.7

was approved. McCone brought up the question of extensive coastal

defenses being built up by the Cubans as evidenced by the arrival of

new PT boats and advised the Group that we must plan contingent

methods for evading such coastal defenses. Also McCone stated

that he had asked for a review of all reports for the last 90 days

because of his continuing concern over the large number of

unexplained reports we are getting on Cuba which indicates some

ominous situation might be developing.

JAM/ mfb

3/mc

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DCI

CLASSIFICATION)

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99

BYEMAN

......

.....

WARNING

This document contoins information affecting the national security of the United Stotes within the mean.

ing of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The low prohrbits its trensmis-

sion or the revelation of its contents in ony monner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in ony

manner prejudicial to the sofety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern-

ment to the detriment of the United States, It is to be seen only by U.S, personnel especially indoc-

trinoted and outhorized to receive information in the designated control chonnels. Its security must be

maintained in occordance with regulations pertoining to the designoted controls.

This document contains information

referring to Projects:

...

ICLASSIFICATIONI

Imc

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: *

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group (5412) - 8 August 1963

Present were: McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson,

General Carter and Paul Eckel

98

1. Reconnaissance Requirements for Current Contingency in

the Far East

The requirements for overflights were approved subject

to the following:

For the Sino-Indian border when a base becomes

available. Bundy wanted to know if we were ready for a high-level

approach to Nehru. I asked him to hold off until we had taken a better

reading and our team had returned. As to the Mainland of China,

to include Manchuria, Bundy did not want to go near the Soviet border

and felt that 10 or 15 miles was entirely too close. He had no objec-

tion to anywhere over the Mainland of China providing we kept well

clear of the Soviet border. I told him that if we did this we would

not be meeting the requirement to keep track of anything occurring on

the Sino-Soviet conflict along the border and the general consensus

was that we could do without this type of reconnaissance rather than

run the risk of an incident. The Group established a "bank of two"

missions for operations against Laos, north of the 17th parallel, and

against North Vietnam. There appeared to be no problem about

replenishing the bank when it was drawn down. The mission against

Laos

south of the 17th parallel was approved.

The mission for cover-

ing North Korea was approved as a high priority requirement subject

only to the return of Secretary Rusk.

2. Cuban Operations of August

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Special Group along the lines

of his briefing notes (SAS 63-481 of 7 August). Everything was

approved except that State had an opportunity to reclama the sabotage

operations if they felt the need--Johnson said he would know definitely

by Sunday (presumably thinking that Rusk may have had some private

conversations with Khrushchev that could indicate the need for soft

pedaling actions in Cuba).

(BYE-4284-63)

Утк

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..

...

3. [The covert action project for Bolivia was approved.

4. Matt Baird put on a fine brieting on CIA counterinsurgency

training.

Bundy indicated he would reassure the Attorney General

and I do not think we will have any further problem as to outside

inspections or overseeing of our training program.]

5. There was no discussion of the minutes or next week's

agenda.

98,

6. I reported on the high-level coverage of Cuba in accordance

with the Keber memorandum, and I also gave them a briefing of our

U-2 carrier operations to include the pornographic pictures.

M. S. c.'

3/к

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STORET

19 891 1353

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group 18 July 1963

PRESENT:

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. John A. McCone

Mr. Roswell Gilpatric

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Thomas A. Parrott

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald

1.

The undersigned was present at this meeting

only for the brief item on Cuba which involved the

final decision whether or not to postpone the two

external sabotage operations planned for 26 July.

Mr. Bundy referred to the fact that the Agency repre-

sentatives had previously stated that they would

prefer, in terms of the morale of the case officers and

agents,

to have a decision to postpone made at the

earliest possible moment rather than to have such a

decision reached at the last minute. Mr. Bundy stated

that in light of this he felt it reasonably certain

that Higher Authority would consider that negotiations

in Moscow were proceeding in a sufficiently favorable

manner to warrant a postponenent decision at this time.

Mr. Bundy said that if the undersigned did not hear

from him during the course of the day Higher Authority's

decision to postpone could be assumed. MI. Bundy

further said that it was only fair to warn that there

might be a resumption of Moscow negotiations at a later

date - perhaps August -- and that these resumed nego-

tiations might in turn call for postponements.

did not call and the operations have been postponed

approximately the 15th of August.)

Gincur T

Exclude aslunatic

3.7đ

SEGRET

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SEEDET

2

On the morning of the 19th of July the under-

signed called Mr. Bundy and confirmed this fact an

said that a field message now indicated the possibilit

of an internal sabotage operation to take place on the

Mr. Bundy said that such an operation would be

perfectly acceptable and that the only bar was or

'across water" operations.

Mr. Bundy also added that

Higher Authority asked him to convey to us the fact that

in reaching the decision to postpone,

among the Agency case officers and therefore had con-

siderable difficulty in reaching the decision..

Mr. Bundy

authorized the undersigned to quote Higher Authority

accordingly to any staif personnel concerned and to ad

that Higher Authority retains his enthusiasn

and interest

in the program.

Chief,

Special Affairs Staff

CEOMET

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SECRET

!!"

3 0 AUG 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group 29 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

General Marshall Carter

Mr. Roswell Gilpatric

Mr. U.

Alexis Johnson

Mr. Thomas A. Parrott

Mr. Bruce B. Cheever

1. Mr. Johnson opened the discussion of the paper

Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups" (i.e., Support

to Commandos L) by commenting that he was under the

impression that Mr. McCone had indicated at the last

Special Group Meeting that he would look into the

proposal further and that Mr. Johnson wondered what his

views now were.

2. Mr. Cheever was not able to express Mr. McCone's

personal views on this matter, but pointed out in general

terms the reasons why we considered the proposal desirable

as a supplement to the already approved program. Further

discussion centered on the question of the use of

British territory and the possibility of attribution of

the raids to the United States. No mention whatsoever

was made regarding the question of attacking Cuban ships.

After an inconclusive discussion, Mr. Johnson reiterated

his desire to hear Mr. McCone's personal views on the

proposal.

Mr. McBundy concurred and the question remains

open until the next Special Group Meeting.

3. Mr. Cheever has the distinct impression that

not "front-run" the proposal. Mr. Bundy appears open-

minded on the matter.

CROUPT

Excluder from automatic!

danger ag and

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.....

SECRET

- 2 -

Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the operation

to remove and destroy the "Streatham Hill" contaminated

The briefing covered the chronological details

trom initiation of negotiations for purchase until

completion of the dumping of the sugar at sea.

Identities

of the various brokers, cover companies, etc. were not

asked for nor revealed.

The Group expressed its

(Mr. Parrott had

satisfaction with the operatio"that Mr. Bundy did not

previously advised Mr. Cheever

desire a paper on this matter.)

5.

The after-action report on the Casilda/Santa

Lucia operations was briefly discussed. Mr. Johnson

questioned the motives for the amount of material

abandoned on the scene.

Mr. Cheever commented that

while it was unfortunate that the material had been

it was explainable in terms of the reaction of

soldiers under fire and especially those in their first

fire fight.

The Guatemala press release on "Commando

Mambises" was favorably commented on by Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Bundy asked about the comment in the after-action

report that "One cannot predict what Castro's ultimate

reaction or reprisal will be."

Mr. Cheever stated some

of the people who closely study Castro believed that he

would be personally furious over the attacks and that

one could expect more reaction than had appeared to date.

In response to Mr. Bundy?s question whether there would

be additional operations of this type next month,

Mr. Cheever advised that several were in the planning

Cover de long Elon ston

stage,

but that until he talked to our people coming up

from Miami this weekend, he could not be certain but

that he doubted

we would ask to mount any the next

moon period.

Mr. Cheever mentioned the cancellation

of the scheduled South Coast Caching operation due to

the Cuban alert, the execution of the three members of

the

DOGGO team,

and the probable doubling of the ATHENA

team.

MT. Bundy asked if the Attorney General had been

briefed on Casilda/Santa Lucia.

When advised to the

contrary, he asked that this be done when the Attorney

General returns to Washington next week (week of

3 September).

Queen

BRUCE B. CHEEVER

Acting Chief

Special Affairs Staff

SEGRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1963

SECRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba - Security Within

the Government

As you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two

"exile" raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now

available, it appears that our security, with respect to U. S.

participation in these operations, was excellent.

While there will always be public speculation as to the extent

of U. S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all

agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation,

and no direct knowledge.

Unfortunately, the maintenance of a

high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the

numbers of people within the Government who have to know a

little or much about a U.S. -directed raid against Cuba.

ot po be within to

For example, without counting ClA personnel and secretarial

and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over

20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August

raids while many other people were generally acquainted with

the U. S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the

attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS

knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD

people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids,

could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere;

and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told,

for their background, that the U. S. Government was aware of

the raids.

I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons

we have learned from the August raids -- one, that it is in the

nature of the problem that many people probably have to know

something about such raids; and two, that these people apparently

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

September 23, 1963

can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view

of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when

substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems

essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance

of security to others who are privy to information about our

covert activities against Cuba.

May I ask that members of

the Special Group take such steps within their areas of

authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular

urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent

for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security

to all those with whom it has necessary business on these

matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security

set in these recent operations.

Infer id

McGeorge Bundy

SECRET - EYES ONLY

(page 2 of 2 pages)

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