PAPER: INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS WITH THE LBJ WHITE HOUSE
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: OCI/CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Phe -

butt

18 3л

FORM NO.

• AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101

WHICH MAY BE USED.

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pens

The Johnson Era

16553

For most employees of the Federal government, work

continues unchanged when a new President moves into the

White House. Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the

Labor-Management Services Administration, or the Commodity

Exchange Authority all go about their jobs in their ac-

customed ways, though changes of administration policy can

ultimately have an effect. Even the pattern of most intel-

ligence work--collection and the production of finished

intelligence for a considerable number of officials--remains

undisturbed. But for those who are turning out intelligence

specifically for the President, everything is apt to change

as soon as a new Chief Executive takes over. Ilow wide-

ranging will the new President's interest in

• foreign

countries and in international relations be?

Hew much

appetite will he have for intelligence?' Will large and

frequent servings be in order, or modest portions only as

absolutely required? Will he want merely facts, or facts

plus interpretation and analysis?

Separated or homogenized?

Is he willing to read a regular intelligence document, or

does he prefer to be briefed?

In each of the previous

administrations, OCT had

established

a satisfactor channel directly to the President.

Horever, de system had never cartie: ever

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to the next. Fisenhover did not want the personal wee! ly

briefing frcm the Director that Trunan had received; the

rely on the

General preierred to marminim sharonso weekly

meetings

of the liational security Council. Kennedy did

not like to use the NSC with any regularity. Instead he

found just what he wanted in the personal, daily intelligence

Checklist devised for him five months after he entered office.

The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that

OCI and the Director naturally hoped to continue it with

Lyndon Johnson, especially as it became apparent that

Johnson, like his predecessor, was not going to have regular

NSC meetings.

Eventually OCI succeeded, but after many

months of frustration. It was only when he had a firm hold

of his administration and when certain foreign situations

forced themselves upon his attention that President Johnson

discovered the usefulness of a daily current intelligence

document.

For a few days after the assassination of President

Kennedy, R. J. Smith took the Checklist to DCI. McCone at

East Building at 8:30 a.m. The Director then held a staff

meeting, after which R. J. Smith personally tool the

Checklist to Bromley Smith and Cen. Clifton in the white

House. The briefing of President Johnson from the Checklist,

however, was done by McCone, who saw the President daily for

about three weeks after the assassination.

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Although OCI had provided more detail and background

information than usual in its first intelligence hooks for

President Johnson, McCone on 24 November passed the word

through DDI Cline that there should he more but shorter

items.

McCone said the Fresident expected that topics

appearing in the Checklist would be followed up in later

issues; therefore, OCI should make even negative reports.

En that day, cline said that the checklist should cover

rilitary activity in south Vietnam, the fighting in Laos,

Soviet ICBM developments, and problems in the Berlin air

corridors and venezuela.

On 5 December, the President held a meeting of the NSC

to which the chairmen and te

minority Leaderof the leading

Congressional committees were invited. Most of the guests

had to be hurriedly briefed on COMINT. Clinton R. Conger,

Chief of OCI's Presentations Branch and the office's briefing

drafter, put together the intelligence presentation on the

Soviet military position, which was presented by DCI McCone.

Conger was present at the briefing to handle the charts on '

the easel. Before the meeting started, the President gave

a nod and in came his photographer, Okimoto. He began

shooting pictures left and right. McCone was aghast, finally

looking around at Conger, who had managed to turn over a

map of the Soviet ICEM sites before the first picture was

taken. A week later there was similar NSC meeting on China.

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Johnson did not have a large number of NSC meetinas, but

when he did they normally began with an intelligence

briefing, usually prepared by Conger on the basis of

materials frcm OCI, OSR, and OER, as appropriate. 47/

Around the middle of December, when McCone stopped

seeing the President daily, the white House staff tried to get

the President to read the Checklist. They were largely

unsuccessful, although McGeorge Bundy was able to do some

oral briefing, Checklist in hand. On 16 December, Gen.

Clifton told OCI's John Heidemann, "If we

can't penetrate

this sort of wall today or tomorrow, we'll just have to try

something else." (ccasionally things went well. On the

18th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed to get

the President to read "the books"--probably two or three

issues.

At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas

ranch and shortly after Christmas had Chancellor Erhard as

a visitor for several days. The PICI, was cabled to the ranch

each day. The report was limited to notes covering important

developments and any information that might be useful in the

talks with Erhard. The President returned to Washington or.

5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been at

the ranch, told lleidemann that he had been able to get the

Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard

had gone.

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on 8 January, however, Clifton was having difficulties

again--the President had not read the intelligence document

since leaving Texas. Clifton thought there would be a little

let-up in the press of business after that day's ftate of

the Union speech. He asked Philip Kennedy for a special

report, briefly treating important and still-current

problems that were covered in the books the President hadn't

read. Clifton thought, in fact, that it would be good to

try the system of giving the President a summary of signi-

ficant intelligence twice a week.

OCI quickly put together an experimental President's

Intelligence Review, covering the period 4-9 January. This

was taken by Richard Lehman, Assistant for Special Frojects,

to Gen. Clifton on 9 January. Clifton thought the Review

was the best solution to the problem of the President's

intelligence reading. He and Bundy were agreed that the

President would not accept a daily intelligence briefing.

The President had instructed Clifton that the DCI was to

see him whenever he wished but that otherwise the President

relied on Bundy and Clifton to stay on top of the intelligence.

Because the President was likely to ask them with no warning

for the latest word, the daily Checklist had to continue.

Clifton suggested that the Checklist periodically include a

special blue- or green-bordered page containing an operational

4?

report.

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The next morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report

that the shite louse was very pleased with the Review, and

wanted it continued. It had been tried on the President at

breakfast and it had "worked like a charm."

3/

Because the President was not reading the Checklist

every day, DCI. McCone wanted it sent to a few more high-

level officials beyond the small circle of, readers in

Kennedy's time--the Secretaries of State and Defense,

McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs. Therefore he obtained permission in

February to extend the dissemination to four additional

top officials in the State Department, two more in Defense,

one on the Joint Chiefs staff, plus the Secretary of the

Treasury and the Attorney-General.

Besides doing the semi-weekly Review and the PICL,

OCI was writing memoranda in response to requests from the

White House staff, and DCI McCone was briefing the President

from time to time. The Checklist writers still took the

publication to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton each morning"

and received their comments, plus occasional playback from

the President. When unusually interesting items in the PICL

caught his eye, Clifton would make a point of bringing them

to the President's attention. Ön 21 January, for example,

he was taken with an item featuring quotable statements by

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Khrushchev. (For exarple, the soviet chairman had been

bragging about new rockets, but said, "All the same, you

cannot put a rocket into soup.") A few days later, when it

looked as though war would break out on Cyprus at any time

despite a strong US mediation effort, Clifton instructed

OcI to keep the White House "up to the minute" on develop-

ments. "Hours will make the difference," he said.

Gen. Clifton told James Hanrahan on 28 January that

he had talked with the President about the Intelligence

Review and Mr. Johnson had said

it was just fine. He found

it a very valuable supplement to his occasional briefings

from the DCI and he wanted it continued without change.

On 25 March the President's plans to spend a weekend

in Texas prompted Gen. Clifton to comment that Mr. Johnson

read his intelligence while at the ranch; he was often up and

asking for it by 8:15 a.m. But it was hard to catch him in

Washington. '

The next day Clifton said that it was not

necessary for the OCI representatives to meet him at 9:30

a.M., the book did not move upstairs that fast. He asked

that the meetings take place at 10 in the future.

Early in 1964, the President drew his aides Bill Moyers

and Jack Valenti into the intelligence picture.

He wanted

one of them present when he read the Review at breakfast

and he was reported occasionally as discussing Checklist

items with them. Although the PICL writers continued to

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meet and tall: with Bromicy Smith and Gen. Clifton, it

began to look as though Movers and valenti were taking the

documents to the President.

James C. Graham, Acting AD/CI, took up with DDI Ray

Cline the possibility of inviting Moyers to CIA headquarters

for lunch and a briefing.

Cline first wanted

to discuss

• the

White House problem with McCone, and asked Grahan for a little

menorarcum on how things were going. "g/ OCI drew up a state-

ment for Cline

making the principal points that it had no way

of knowing whether it was meeting the President's needs be-

cause it had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation

under Kennedy. The

reason for this was that OCI's contacts

at the White House did not deal directly with the President

on intelligence matters. OCI hoped to be able to establish

close links to the President's immediate staff. "2&/

Things remained in a confused state for the next few

months, with only occasional indications that OCI's presi-

dential publications had hit the mark. Clifton commented

in May that the Review was the best means of reaching the

President, although he said the PICL registered at times

when Valenti was interested in an item. There were days

when the President read and initialed both the Review and

the PICI.. One day when the PICL was heavy on the side of

bad news, Clifton said, "It's no wonder the President doesn't

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want to read this stuff--it annoys you." From mid-year on,

Mr. Johnson made frequent campaign trips around the country.

clifton, who was usually with him, said he had more luck

getting the President to read his intelligence or the return

flights than on the way out,

when Mr. Johnson

was studving

his speeches.

As the election neared, Secretary of State Fusk expressed

some concern to McCone about the security of the Checklist

and seemed to prefer that dissemination be limited to the

President, Secretary of Defense McNamara and himself. McCone

passed the word down and also conveyed his feeling that the

President should read the Checklist daily, or have it read

to him, and should not depend on the semi-weekly Review.

7/

AD/CI R. J. Smith responded in a memorandum of 5 November

1964. He believed that the Agency would have a graceful way

of cropping some of the Checklist readers if the publication

were to undergo a transformation in which it would acquire a

new name, a new cover, and a new format. It would become

President Ichnson's publication, specifically designed to

meet his needs. To increase the chances of its being read

by the Chief Executive, it would he produced to conform to the

President's working habits and would be delivered in late

afternoon. Smith noted that the Peview, which Mr. Johnson

"usually reads," was timed for his evening perusal. smith

i c,

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also noted the importance of finding a way to establish

direct contact with the President so that oCI could get

feedback and thus avoid writing in a vacuum. "e/

The PDB Appears

Smith's proposal for a new publication vas accepted

and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was

dated 30 November 1964 and the next day the first

issue of the

President's Daily Prief (PDB) was delivered to the White llouse.

In substance it resembled the PICL, but it had a fresh appear-

ance--chiefly because it was printed on legal-sized paper--

and it came cut late in the afternoon instead of early in

the morning.

Jack Valenti sent this first issue back to

McGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, liked it,

and wanted it continued. Dissemination was cut back, so that

the only persons receiving the PDB outside the White House

were the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, the Secretary

of Defense, the Deputy Secretary and one Assistant Secretary,

the Treasury Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and

Gen. Carroll, the head of DIA.

The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December

the DCI ordered that a summary of OCI's Current Intelligence

Weekly Review be included with each Friday's PDB. The summary,

titled Highlights of the Week, lasted only until 26 February

1965, having failed to arouse presidential interest.

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In the ersuing wecks and months, OCI was naturally

watching for indications of the success or failure of the

restyled daily for the Fresident. On 13 January, PDB writer

Thomas Patton noted that Bronley Smith vrote "The President"

in the upper right corner of Copy No. 1. Patton asked whether

Smith would like OCI to type this on. No, said Smith, putting

it on in long-hand gave it a human touch.

On 18 January, the Prief went from a legal-sized to a

letter-sized document as a result of discussions between

MeGeorge Pundy and Ray Cline. Bromley Smith said he liked

the new format and he thought the South Vietnam item was

"exactly right."

He reported very briefly and generally

that Saigon had

a new cahinet. The President, Smith said,

was not interested in the names of generals and ministers

and didn't follow such details.

Further experiments in page size

followed a talk McCone

had with the President, but nothing came of them. There was

even a sarple Brief that the President could put in his pocket,

though the thought of having sensitive material handled this

way made Bromley Smith groan.

In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the Vietnam

situation report, which OCI had begun sending to the White

House daily at 8 a.m., was

proving to be very useful; it was

going up to the President every morning.

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It should not be imagined that the PDE writers always

transacted their business with Fromley Smith in trancuillity.

Occasionally there was a certain amount of conmotion around

Smith's office because of people coming and going to different

meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door,

explaining that

Bundy night be able to work this way with all the

Indians charging in all the time, but I can't,

especially since I was here till after 11 last

night waiting for the President to leave.

The Impact of Santo Domingo

On 24 April 1965 events took place that had the effect

of improving the standing of OCI publications in the white

House. On that day an uprising began against the provisional

government of the Dominican Republic. The US fear that

Communists might seize control of the country led to the

prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo.. By coincidence,

the day they landed--28 April--was also the day that Admiral

William Paborn was sworn in as DCI, succeeding John McCone.

President Johnson could hardly get enough intelligence on

the Dominican situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined

to provide the best service possible. The day after he took

office, the Admiral ordered the establishment of a CIA task

force on the Dominican Republic under E. Drexel Godfrey,

• chief of OCI's Western Area. As directed, it provided

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"complete and around-the-clock CIA intelligence support to

the white House." Its first task each day was to brief Paborn

to put him in readiness to deal with calls from the white House.

Periodically throughout the day and night it issued round-

up situation reports, and when necessary, spot renorts of

particular developments. All these reports vere teletyoed

to the White House. They were read by Mr. Johnson, who was

now described by Promley Smith as a President "who eats up

information." OCI, of course, continued to put out its

regular publications. It was during the Dominican crisis that

word was received that the President's Daily Erief had taken

firm root in the White House. Fill Moyers said on 21 May

that the President read it "avidly. " 9/

The increased tempo of intelligence service to the

Chief Executive prompted further consideration of the proper

way to get material to him. DDCI Richard Helms and DDI Ray

Cline agreed that the NSC Staff. (McCeorge Rundy, Bromley Smith,

and the White House Situation Room) should be the place of

entry for intelligence for the President, although information

copies could be sent to Moyers and Valenti. Helms and Cline

said that a "greased channel" through Bundy should be established

for the PDB and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure

the President sees.

i/ AD/CI" Jack smith commented on 20

May that a "greased channel" already appeared to exist for

the PDB.

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The hectic atmosphere in the spring of 1965, with the

Dominican situation coming on top of

growing difficulties

in Vietnam, caused the men in the white House to ask more of

intelligence and to react to it more sharply. Eromley

Smith said the President has a "very short reaction fuse."

He wanted to hear firstfrom official sources and not fron

the press about major developments, so rapid dissemination

was essential. Smith also warned that OCI would soon be

asked to report on every coup and to cover all present and

potential trouble spots with high precision. He said that

in the future, OCI's reports would not say that the Valencia

regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is going to be overthrown

by a coup on the umpteenth July by & in Toonerville." Since

this would be asking the impossible in most cases, Richard

Lehman, OCI's Assistant

for special Frojects, went to see

Bill Moyers. He explained that OCI could write 50 pages

of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance

against

any possible contingency, but that the office did not

believe this would really serve the President. Lehman said

OCI tried to be highly selective in warning of coups and the

like. Moyers expressed understanding of DCI's difficulties,

and the fire died down. Ta/

This episode had an amusing

sequel about eight months later when Bromley Smith pondered

the series of army coups in the republics of West Africa.

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He said he dian't think the President wanted or needed to be

informed in advance of every threatened coup. "otherwise,"

he said, "you could fill the book with that sort of thing."

The system for supplying current intelligence to

President Johnson was now working better than previously.

To be sure, OCI did not benefit from the steady presidential

playback it had enjoyed under John lennedy. On the other

hand, OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading

the IDE regularly, and the writers on the PDB team received

useful suggestions, criticisms, and reactions--usually from

Bromley Smith--when they delivered the publication each day.

One day in June 1965 the first paragraph of the lead

item in the PDE said "Accumulating information suggests that

Hanoi is bringing North Vietnam to a state of semi-motilization."

The second paragraph explained that Hanoi's action was

Far

short of classic mobilization for offensive operations; (CI

considered the move defensive and was therefore inclined to

discount the view of one British expert who thought a large-

scale attack would soon be made across the 17th parallel.

President Johnson and Gen. Clifton at the time were at the

IBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDE received a phone

call from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen. Clifton had

called from the ranch. He had been shaken by the first

sentence of the vietnamese item and was concerned about the

whole piece. The President

was out on the lake and was not

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expected back for several hours. Clifton at first felt he

should summon the President to shore. Smith discussed the

matter with the PDB writer, Thomas Patton, and there was

further conversation with Clifton, who decided simply to add

the word "but" after the first sentence and continue.

with

the somewhat reassuring second sentence. The case was a

vivid

illustration of the potentiality of the PDB for causing

excitement in the white House entourage.

Foreign developrents often provoked spirited reactions:

from Bromley Smith, but it was not often that he expressed

SORPRISE IN SHE NATURE Of the inTEllIGENCE he WAS reADiNG,

substamed aparto die such vecasion, however, came when the

PEE RAN AN IteM About dessersian bituer Rumania) aid the

soviet union. (r intercept revealed that edusesculanc

Maure had compaired to Enelepin]that the DESP acts o..

the international scene without

consulting its allies, just

as in Stalin's time. The Rumanians/cited the 1962 missile

adventure in Cuba and Soviet positions on disarmament.

(Shelepinagreed that more coordination was needed. smith was

particularly interested in this item and remarked to PDB

writer Archer C. Bush that it was "fantastic" that this

kind of information could be obtained.

OCI produced many memoranda upon request by White House

personnel, who were often directly conveying

the President's

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wishes... For a considerable period of time, both the Kennedy

and Johnson administrations had been

trying to find a means

by which the supposed desire of some West European countries

to share in the ownership and control of nuclear weapons

could be satisfied. The scheme that finally came to have

official backing was

the proposed multilateral nuclear force

(MLF) of surface vessels with jointly owned nuclear weapons.

The ships were to be manned by mixed crews of personnel from

most NATO countries. Washington officialdom was sharply

divided over this proposal and the pro- and anti-MLF forces

steadily bombarded the White House with their arguments.

Towards the end of 1965, the white House asked DCI for an

"objective" report on the status and implications of the

plan. The President's advisers

sent the word that they

were "ecstatic" over the memorandum drafted by Joe L. Zaring.

Soon afterwards, President Johnson dropped the MLF idea as

politically unfeasible and militarily unnecessary.

Eromley Smith now and then modified or rewrote PDB

items when he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarm"

the President. In December 1965, for example, President

Johnson ordered a halt in the bombing of Vietnam in the hope

of getting negotiations started.

A. PDB item reported that

Hanoi had broadcast a tough restatement of its position;

making no reference to the pause in air strikes.

Smith,

afraid that this would be taken as a rebuff to the President's

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efforts, reworked the text to avoid this internretation since

the broadcast did not constitute a fully official government

statement.

Quite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad

news from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in April 1966 that

"the political situation appears to be rapidly worsening" in

South Vietnam, and

averred that ky might soon have to take

drastic measures to restore authority or make major concessions

to the Buddhists, Smith remarked that the article was pessi-

mistic and that he had later information.

It was, of course,

one of the perils of the PDB operation that the White House

sometines had fresher reports from the field. Smith handed

John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to formulate

a new constitution and that the State Department looked upon

this as hopeful. Heidemann agreed that OCI had written in

ignorance of this information, but added that offhand he

would not be optimistic.

A few days later Smith read in the PDB that "There was

no real improvement in the situation today..." and said

"You're going to break the President's heart; he thinks

things are much better today."

When he finished the whole

disheartening report, he tossed the book in the air, whistled,

and said, "We'll have fun tonight. But that's no reason for

not writing it as you see it."

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Smith had cause for unhappiness

again when the PDE had

to report that a Pakistan official felt that his country was

drifting apart from the US and would probably establish closer

relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told PDB writer

Allen Valpey that this article was a "shocker" and that

Walt Rostow would be disturbed by it. (Rostow had replaced

McGeorge Bundy in April 1966.)

Although John McCone had not taken up a White House

suggestion that the President's daily give occasional coverage

to CIA activities, Admiral Raborn as DCI did adopt this

practice. Bromley Smith reacted negatively to these reports,

however, apparently believing that President Johnson did not

like them. He particularly objected

in 1966 to a PDB Annex

explaining enthusiastically how. CIA used a portable ultra-

violet light device in Vietnam to detect guerrillas who had

recently handled weapons before mingling with innocent

villagers. Smith did not want the Agency to "advertise"

in the PDB. He believed that if the President should he

informed of some CIA activities, the DCI should send him a

memorandum.

Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some

ideas about the PDB and would like to get together with all

the writers. By this time R. J. Smith was DDI, E. Drexel

Godfrey was D/OCI and Richard Lehman was DD/OCI. Bromley

Smith met with them and the PDE writers in the Langley,

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building on 3 August. He prefaced his remarks by expressing

his satisfaction with the way the President was being served;

he had no criticisns. He explained, however, that while

the President "tolerates" anonymous documents, he is much

more responsive to a personalized paper.. He wondered whether

the Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, now DCI. Then it

would become a personal link between the President and the

Director. In regard to content, Smith said the PDB did rot

have to alert the President to impending crises over which

he would have no control. Rather, Smith thought the PDB

could be most

useful by rendering pithy judgments on situations

with which the President is or will be faced. Smith said these

judgments would be accepted; OCI did not have to support them

with argumentation or evidence. Smith emphasized that the

Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should

read presidential speeches. He thought the President was

kept adequately informed of Vietnamese military developments

by other means; the PDB should carry more Vietnamese political

and economic items. Smith urged that the Brief increase its

coverage of lurope and said that Panama was another subject

high on the priority list.

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Helms did not take up the idea of personally signing

the PDB, but OCI promptly set about adopting

Smith's suggestions

as to content. Smith soon commented that he noticed the

change.

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m....raw.

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The DDI Operations Center, under the executive direction

of the D/OCI, has

superseded the Hatch office in 1965 and

played its role in supplying current intelligence to the

White House. Whenever any information of great importance

came in at night, the Senior Duty Officer would have the

White House Situation Room informed immediately. On most

of these occasions the SDO and the Watch Officers were

aware that the President was personally taking an interest

in the developments. Sometimes the initial report opened

up a sequence that involved many incomina messages, calls.

to and from the White House, and hours of intensive work.

A classic example occurred when King Constantine made his

abortive attempt to overthrow the Greek junta in December

1967. The Operations Center got

the word about 3 a.m. that

Constantine planned to move within the next five hours.

Neil Huntley, the SDo, alerted DCI lielms, who

told Huntley

to call walt Rostow at his home, brief him, and carry out

any instructions of Rostow's. Rostow asked that the White

House Situation Room be informed that he was on his way in

and would wake the President when he got there.

Meanwhile,

Rostow wanted copies of the relevant cables sent to the

White House by LDX. About 7 a.m. Postow called the

Operations Center to say

that he had not received any

follow-up reporting from the Embassy or CIA station in

Athens. He asked Huntley to telephone the station and find

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out what was going on. COMMO then set un a telecon with the

chief of station. Huntley went down to COMMO, kept the red-

line to, the Operations Center open, and the cenior Watch

Officer in turn keptthe secure line to the white House open.

After the chief of station gave an undated situation report,

Rostow fed questions to him and received answers via the

Senior Watch Officer, Huntley, and the communicator.

The Final Arrangement

A major alteration in the PDE system occurred at the

end of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was

that President Johnson decided that he would rather get the

Brief in the morning than in the evening. This change in

delivery time, however, forced other changes. The President

wanted the Frief at 6:30 a.m., just before he began reading

the newspapers. This meant that OCI's closing time on the

book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to be written in

full knowledge of what was in the morning press. As E.

Drexel Godfrey commented, the schedule put "the highest

premium on making the publication up to the ninute."

15/

Because the Brief now had to be delivered to the White

House Situation Room by 6 a.m.,

there was

no longer a member

of the President's staff up and available to receive the

book and comment on it. This meant that there was no point

MAD GENDIT

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in having the PlE writers make the trip to the white House.

From this time on; the PDE was delivered by couriers.

TO

make up for the loss of the morning conversations with

Eromley Smith, an OCI staff member would visit him occa-

sionally to check on how things were going, and there was

also communication by phone.

Shortly after the changeover to the new schedule for the

PDE, Bromley smith, commenting on the President's reaction,

said emphatically that "we are much more certain now that

he's reading it." He also made a point he was to make several

times subsequently, which was that he disapproved of annexes

to the Brief. He was afraid that if the brief were burdened

with an annex, the President would put it aside for later

reading--and then not get back to it. In smith's view, the

PDB should be of a length which the President could whip

through quickly. It would be better, he insisted, if annex-

type reports were sent down separately. Smith thought it was

an excellent idea for the Brief to summarize the conclusions

of "important" national estimates. It/

Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then

about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB.

He

admitted

that it was hard to know where to draw the line,

but he did not like "hopping mad," ror, on another occasion,

MAD CERDEM

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did he care for a description of India as an "unwilling

bride." As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should

avoid seeming frivolous or light-hearted.

At the President's request, OCI on 7 September 1967

began to attach to the Brief a Special Report on Morth

Vietnam that dealt mainly with the effects of the war.

The only copy to go outside of the Agency was addressed:

"For Bromley Smith - Eyes Only for the President." Beginning

with the issue of 6 October, this Special Report carried a

new section on North Vietnamese treatment of political

attitudes toward the war, expressed in statements and

demonstrations.

In November DCI Helms talked with Drexel Codfrey and

Richard Lehman about the PDB.

The Director expressed great

satisfaction with both the Brief and the Special Report.

He said the latter was "really hitting the mark." He urged

that OCI try harder to come up with items on the personali-

ties of men familiar to the President, who lelms said, thinks

in terms of personalities.

Helms also asked that the PDE

give more attention to coming visits of world VIPs to

Washington and to each other.

No major changes in the PDE were made during President

Johnson's time after the introduction of the Special Report

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on North Vietnam.. To all appearances, the Brief had evolved

into a document satisfactory to the President, and it kept . :

serving its purpose throughout the rest of the administration.

All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar

with a photograph of President and Lady Bird Johnson sitting

in the White House in dressing gowns. Mrs. Johnson is

holding their first grandson, while the President is looking

at the President's Daily Brief. This homey picture epitomizes

the position OCI hoped the Brief occupied in the White House.

And perhaps it did.

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