TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975
Originator: SCIA
Document date: 1975-05-23 00:00:00
Document type: TESTIMONY

# DOCID-32112724

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER :

CHENEY

178-10004-10112

RECORD SERIES:

GENERAL SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: INTELLIGENCE-COLBY TESTIMONY/SSCIA 5/23/75

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SCIA

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975

DATE: 05/23/1975

PAGES:

118

SUBJECTS :

Best ava--able copy

HARVEY, WILLIAM

HUNT, E. HOWARD

KENNEDY, ROBERT

LANSDALE, EDWARD

LAS VEGAS

LAW ENFORCEMENT, WIRETAPPING

MAHEU, ROBERT

OPERATION MONGOOSE

ORGANIZED CRIME

ROSELLI, JOHN

WARREN COMMISSION, INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM

ZRRIFLE

[Restricted]

PROUTY, FLETCHER

GIANCANA, SAM

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

EDWARD, SHEFFIELD

DULLES, ALLEN

DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM.

CUBELA, ROLANDO

CUBAN EXILES

CONSPIRACY THEORIES, THREE TRAMPS

COLBY, WILLIAM E.

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

CIA

CHURCH COMMITTEE

BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT

BISSELL, RICHARD

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

AMLASH

v9.1

34

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

CHENEY

RECORD NUMBER:

178-10004-10112

RECORD SERIES:

GENERAL SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

INTELLIGENCE-COLBY TESTIMONY/SSCIA 5/23/75

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SCIA

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

05/23/1975

.118

FBI

TRAFFICANTE, SAM

STURGIS, FRANK

DOCUMENT TYPE:

TESTIMONY

CLASSIFICATION :

Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS:

IA; 1C

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

08/09/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

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TESTIMONY OF:

William E. Colby,

Director, CIA,

•-- accompanied by -

Scott S. Brechinriage, Jx.,

Deputy Inspector General,

Enno inoche,

Assistant to the Director,

Geoige L. Cary,

Legislative Counsel

NUMBER

Colby Bihibit Mos. 1, 2, and 3, cardboard-backed

photographs, deemed marked in

an off the record

discussion early in the transcript.

Colby No. 4

Colby No. 5

Colby No. 6

www.ashas..eci.au

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.?"?

TESTIMOY OF WILLINI E. COLBY,

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-

Friday, May 23, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Raspact to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Comnittee met, pursiant to notica at 9:15 o'clock

a.M., I11 RooM 107, The Capitol Building, Sanator Frank

Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Norgan, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and

Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, F.A.O.

Schwarz, III, Chief Counsal; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel;

Willian Bader, Professional Staff Mamber.

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JORD

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unadaman church. the nearing wall come to order.

Mr. Scott Breckinridgs is accompanying the Director this

morning and may be called upon from time to time to testily.

For that purpose, MI. Breckinridge, will you please stand

and be sworn?

Do you svear that all the testimony you may give in this

proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Breckinridge. I do.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questionin

this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Colby, did you have some things you

wanted to supply to the Committeé?

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MANNERED. LULISY, DIRECTOR, CIA,

ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR., DEPUTY

INSECTOR GEVERAL, ENTO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR, AHD GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the questions

that vere raised at the meeting the other day

and there are a

couple of clarifications I would like to make.

One, with' respect to the security investigations in the

United States. The question was asked whether we ever used

private investigators, and I said we normally used our own

investigators. We have some relationships with private

investigatory firns which provide cover for our investigators

and, secondly, we have a few firms which we own which are

proprietary if you will, whereby our investigators appear to

be private.

I said that in the past it is clear that on occasion we

did ask for private investigator firms to help us to some

degree.

It was usually the one that was giving us cover, and

for reasons of overload we asked them to have their own people

to do a few of the investigations.

My General Counsel

says that this is illegal. I have a

strong question about its propriety, if not logality, ard I

am undertaking to rcview this matter to see whether we can not

just eliminata that practice entirely, continuing the proprie-

tary and continuing the use of private investigators as covri

TORO

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But I did vant to clarily that. I think I mentioned it

last time that there have been occasions on which this was

done.

Chairman Church. Mr. Colby, would you in connection with

your review of this matter supply the Conmittee with the spe-

cifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged

private investigators to do Agency work?

Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. I

confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I

certainly will do my best.

• Chairman Church. Will you provide the committee with the

opinion of your Counsel with respect to the legality of such?

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairman Church.

such use of private

investigators?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Chairman Church.

And then I would ask the staff also

furnish the Committee with a brief on that question so that we

are-fully advised with respect to the law.

Mr. Colby. Right.

The second subject, lir. Chairman. Senator liondale askea

for our command and control regulations for the approval of

covert action projects. These were supplied to the staff on

the first of ilay and are available to the staff.

Thirdly, i was asked if it. Willian Harvey was removed

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from the Agency because of his involvement in the assassination.

plans 'against Prime Minister Castro.

The facts are-that in June 1963 he was assigned

as our

Chief

Station.

in Rome and in February of '67 he was ...

...=

reassigned to CIA Headquarters. He retired voluntarily under

our retirement system on 31 of December 1967.

If I may, there is a reason. why he was taken out and if I

could go off the record and mention that to the Comnittee. It

is a matter of his privacy.

Chairman Church. Very well, off the recora.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Colby.: Back on the record.

Senator Schweiker asked me whether Howard Hunt or James

Mccord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of

President Kennedy's assassination on 22nd of November '63.

• Howard Hunt fron. July '62 to August '64 was assigned as a

Section Chief in the Division of Plans Directorate, which is

now the Operations Directorate at CIA Headquarters, which had

no

responsibility whatsoever for Mexican operations.

Senator Schweiker. What were those dates again?

Mr. Colby. July '62 to August '61.

Senator Schweiker. Wasn't he at some point in lexico

City and in charge of that office?

Mr. Knoche. Way back in the '50's he served ir Mexico

City. Way back. He was not in charge.

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MI. LOINY.

ne was a case orlacet then.

Senator schuziker. So that is the pariod you are sayiny

he had no jurisciction in any way with Latin Arerica or Mexicor

Affairs.

Mr. Colby, No, he was in what we call, and we have since

changed the name, to Domestic Operations Division at that time,

our operations here in this country, and that is a whole

differcht subject I would have to explain some day.

Mr. McCord from June '62 to June '64 was assigned as

CIA Security Officer in therer

station at rankfor ta Germany

and he had no responsibilitics for Mexican operations at that

point.

Senator Morgan last time asked what infornation was given

to the Warren Commission concerning Agency assassination plans

concerning Castro, and I have been advised our records do not

indicate that the farren Commission was provided with informa-

tion on this subject.

Allen Dulles, of course, I would note, who was the CIA

Director until the fall of '61, was a member of the warren

Connission, but beyond thit fact I have nothing I could offer.

And then who made the decision not to provide it, if none

was given? Our records do not indicate that there was a CIA

decision on this matter not to tall the warren Commission.

I could add that I beliave the relationship with the

Warren Commission was handled by ore of our stafferobich

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I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation

system was such.

Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who

was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and

the Harren Commission?

lix. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.

Chairman Church. Where is it now?

Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year.

He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is

retired. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in

the washington area.

Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

Mr. Colby. Still vorking with us to help on the transi-

tion of the whole counter intelligence program.

Chairman Church. Why did he retire?

Mr. Colby.. That was the Angleton case, MI. Chairman, ané

the facts of that case were that I had had sone professional

differences in the organization with Mr. Angloton as to the

way the counterintelligerce business was run and the way the

Israeli account was handled. I belisved that it required a

higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the

Directorato and of the Agency. We had debated this on various

occasions in thr past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and

too: a numbar of functions chay from it. The liaison with l?

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endeavored to open un the Israeli account to a better rclation-

ship with our other dear Eastern activities. Me dabated this

over many months and on several occasions. Ne could never

really ayrea to it bacause he insisted on the importance of

retaining it where it was.

Mr. Angleton had donc a very good job of establishing that

liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeili who

were involved in it.

I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab

areas.

• Also, I believed that there vas a undue degree of compart-

mentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with

our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and i

set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December.

because there were some very substantial retirement benefits

that people would loose if they stayed after that point.

Then

unfortunately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd cane

to our attention before it was actually published, and so I

brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make tro

basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from

his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership

into the Head of the Countarintelligence Staff. I said I would

offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence

doctrine, he could stay wosting with us.

He did not have to

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RULELL.

at to wisha to retire the opportunity was thare. He

chose-to retire. I insisted that I talk to him before the

Seynour Hirs-article appeared.. I knew it was coning. I

didn't know what it was going to say. I wanted to make cicar

between him and me that the decision was based upon our long-

standing discussion of hoi to run that particular activity.

The question then cama up wno would be his succassor and

Mr. Rocca was his Deputy. There were two other officers who

were possibilities. One of the officers, Mr. Hood, had said

in early December that he planned to retire at the end of

December.

The other two, Mr. Rocca and Mir. Miler, were infornga

that they would

not ba the successor Chiaf of that staff.

They

ware offered a chance to stay on in their then current jobs.

They chose to retire. All four of them agreed to stay with

us on a consultant basis over

the next several months to hslp

us on the transition of new leadership into that job, and they

have done so.

Chairman Church. Well, without getting off the track,

just have one further question here in connection with r.

Anglaton himself.

Is it true that he is still being paid as a consultant?

Mr. Colby. I believe it has dropped off, ir. Chainian.

He did help us for three or four months but I believe that it

is terminated. It is about tine to terminate it, I know, ard

whether it is on this particular date has been teaminated.

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PAGE 1ó OmitTed

mis-Numbered is TRANSCRIBiNGS

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ve set ourselves about six month period wherr we would have

to -..

- Chairman Church. There is no, plan to retain him incefi-

nitely?

:.

Mr. Colby. Absolutely not. It was to help us get over

this transition and phase hin out.

Chairman Church. Very well.

Senator Mondale: I asked for vouchers on payments with

respect to assassinations?

Mr. COlby. I am looking for that. I don't have an answer

for you yot, Senator.

The request was also made whether we had any information

concerning plots to assassinate Chou En Lai. He have rrports

of two such examples, incidents, both conducted by the Chinese

Nationalists without our prior knowledge and without our

participation.

•One in Aptril 1955, an Air India aircraft crashed at

saa off Indochina after departing from Hong Kong. Several

Chinese communist dalegates for the Bandung Conferenca were

on board and it had been rumorsd that Chou En Lai rould he on

the aircrait.

On the lith of January 1956, the British Colonial Offica

in London issued an official statement reporting they had

evidence that the Chinese Nationalists had bribed a long kong

airport: employce to place a tina bomb on the airplana.

FORD

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wr

and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employea

had flcd to. Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incident

and frankly heard about it after it occurred.

In the. fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist Official

informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned to

assassinate Chou En lai during his visit to Cambodia in

Novenber '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of

the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to. Phnom Penh to supervise

the attempt. We learned of this after it had happened and ve

had nothing to do with

it.

We had a relationship with the Chinese Nationalists

intelligence servica over the years and, they clearly have dona

things without our knowledge or involvement, and in a number

of areas, but we have also worked together on some areas.

These are two that were separate.

Also I was asked to louk at the photographs of howard hurt

and Sturgis that appeared in Nawsweek some years ago. We

obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'cloc!..

We had not had it before.

We had a copy of the Newsweek

edition..

These are photographs of Hoard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and

1001. This is the only photograph we have of Mi. Sturgis.

It is taken out of the isusweck.

We have had no consuction with Mr. Sturgis and so we hare

DECROT

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are tauruggle du di is subject to the problems of it.

We had our photographic experts and analysts and so fortl:

100k at these two individuals here who were picked up. He

examined them in considerable detail, and talking about the

'61 hunt photograph, comparing it with this, and this is the

photograph, Newsween photograph. You will see thui there is a

lot of sortof fundamental differences in the kinds of

appearances they have, different characteristics of the

individuals.

:.

With respect to Sturgis, of course, we are not as confi-

dent because we don't have as good a base to work from in our

comparison but at the same time ie see differences there also.

Now, we further looked, had one of our disguise people --

we obviously have people who can disguise you -- the red vig

eipisode.. It wasn't red, they insist, it wasn't ill fitting.

That is the thing that shey got upsetabout. But thay say thai

it would not be feasible to have them actually in a disguise,

have these individuals-actually in this disguise, that it is

too-big a jump, it differs.

Senator luadleston. How about the size of the individual

are they pretty close?

Ix. Colby. These two are. la looks like a shorter man

from the surroundings.

And Hunt is about medium height, rathos

than this short.

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Mr. Knoche. Hunt is sive feet tan and a half ft

0e5.

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-....

a me way mel us analysis and they really

were able to do a pretty good job on lunt and, what they do is

identify certain key points, make measurements and put adjust-

ments, the same thing we do for the satellite photography in

terns of these measurements, and things like that, and compara

it in that sense, and their conclusion: is that clearly this is

not Hunt. They are absolutely confident that this photograph

is not. Hunt. They are less confident that it is not Sturgis

because of the base on which they are operating, but they think

it is not.

I point out that this analysis vas done overnight, about

3 o'clock in the morning.. This is Sturgis.

Mr. Schwarz. And to the right?

Mr. Colby. This is a rewspaper photograph of Hunt; a

recent one. These are sort of Agency photographs of him shen

he was an employee.

Senator Hart Of Colorado. Were those men ever identified

by the Dallas Police?

"Mr. Colby. They must have booked them or something if

they carried them in. I really don't know. If they took them

in I would assume they would have had to book them.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What are thess pictures on the

lovcr right and left?

Mr. Colby. These

are the blowups of the particular

photographs.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Not the one you had carlier?

Mx. Colby. They are different.

Senator Kart

Of Colorado. They are different angles?

Mr. Colby. This is reversed.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

They are different photographs?

Mr. Colby. It is reversed.

Senator llart Of'Colorado. No. They are not A and B ever

reversed.

Mr. Colby.. They can do that kird of a turn through the -

Senator Hart of Colorado. They can twist the photographs

aound?

Mr. Colby.. They can make it appear at a different angle.

Senator Hart of Colorado.. B at least is a totally dif-

feront pose. They turned his mouth down. His ayes are closed.

They have really done a job if they changed B to that lower

right.

Mr. ColDy. They can change then, honest.

Let ma get my brief on that and I will answer that

question.

They magnified them to the same scale using the eyes and

mouth. The contrast and texture differences were minimized,

continuous tone photographs amployed and angular compensations

were made to offset errors incident to the different heads.

They can nix them around in that kind of fashion.

Sonatcr Schueilar. Mara those nes detained?

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184290

If they tire

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detained maybe there are photographs from their detention.

Were these men arrasted?

MI. Colby. At the time we have had to work on this we have

just looked at the photographs.

Senator Schweiker. I assume that is where they are going

to ba detained.

Mr. Schwarz. Hasn't the

same analsysis done for the

Rockefeller Commission about two months ago? In other vords,

there has been an analysis at least once before last night,

hasn't there?

Mx.. Knoche. Not by us.

Mr. Colby. Perhaps by somzone else.

Chairman Church. Mr. Director, that is a different

photograph.

Mx. Colby. It does 100k like it.

I will answer that question next time I come up.

Chairman Church. All right. How can we follow up on the

identity of thase two people.

in connection with the Dallas

Police?' Would that be done through the FBI?

Mx. Colby. FBI. I could ask or you could ask, it might

be better if you ask.

Chairnan Church. Hell, I think ve should. I think these

should be markad as Conmittee Exhibits and staff should be

instructed to follow througl with the FBI to get what further

information there may be about the photographs and these two

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Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photogra,

supposed oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

MI. COlby, I don't have that with me. It is in the

Warren Commission published report. It is in there.

Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

ir. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in ordar to

conceal where it was taker but it was --

Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Cormission.

Just

one additional matter.

• Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to

you, ilI. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference

to the Israeli account and the special way that it haa been

handled under ir. Angleton. Before we finish our review with

you of covert operations we vould like to have a more detailsa

statement of that matter.

Mr. Colby. Right.

~ Chairman Church. And I think you should prepare to

discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask

you in connection with it.

I just wanted to give you notice.

Mi. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a

covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover

it.

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undeman nutch. all sagat. At some point ther in our

investigation?

Mr. Colby. Sure, no problem.

The only other one thirg I would like to suggest for the

record, It. Chairman, with respect to the discussion of the

attempts made against tir. Castro, in no way justifying them.

My position on this is quite clear. I do think it important

to put that exercise in the context of the times, which was

the times of the Bay of Pigs, which was a decision made by

the Government. The Cuban missile crisis, and following that,

a program approved by our normal covert action approval mecha-

nism to try to gencrate an overthrow of Mr. Castro from within

Cuba by assisting various groups to go in with sabatage and

by putting economic pressure on the country, and so forth.

That went on for a number of years after the 1961-62 episodes

and I think it does put a cover of policy attitude toward Cuba

and toward Mr. Castro that is an important factor in evaluat-

ing the thing, without in any way justifying the particular

attempts to assassinate him.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

But was there any evaluation

done at or about the time of that Cuban missile crisis?

Mr. Colby. There was an evaluation done after the Bay

of Pigs, a rather intensive Investigation Internal Security

Branch Review of the activity and ther the Cuban missile

crisis came along shortly thereafter before anything vory much

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got going. Thorsafter, however, a number or prograns vee

conducted, which I am sure the Committse might want a general

summary of. I am just giving you one sort of a paragraph

summary of it, which vere aimed at putting economic pressure

on Cuba in the hopes that this would put pressure against him

and lead to its disorder and problems there and, secondly, to

encouraga revolutions, sabotage and so forth, from within

Cuba through a variety of programs of propaganda, support of

exile movements, landing of teams on the coast, things of this

nature.

Chairman Church. The difficult with this is, as I see it

although, what you say is true, once an agency begins to engaga

in assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own

testimony shows it spread

at least as far as the Dominican

Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on

other matters such as Lnumba and Chile.

. So that I don't think this issue can be confined really

to the emergency that did in fact exist between the US and

Cuba and the seriousness of that emergency at the time.

Mr. Colby.

I agree with you, ir. Chairman. I am against

it and have bzen against it for a long time, but nonetheless

I think in fairness to the people involved at that period I

think it is important to give total context.

Chairman Church.

YES.

FORD

dit. Schwarz..

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to determine,

assuning internally the an might have co-template

additional efforts to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs,!

after the missile crisis, it would not have acted unless directi

by the very highest authority, would it?

Mr. Colby. That is not that clear, Senator Hart. I think

the evidence we have is that the then Director was not

of some of these activities and, therefore, one sould have a

very difficult

time saying that it was pursuant to a specific

authorization. It was consistent with an overall policy which

was the point I was saying, but nonetheless I think the spa-

cific action we cannot say was approved even within the Agarcy

at the Director level.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Is there any indication that

the Director, who did know of at least an earlier attempt --

is there any indication that following the Bay of Pigs, or

föllowing the missile crisis, he explicityly brought the sub-

ject up for review?

- Mr. Colby. There is one documentary evidence that Mr.

McCone dictated in 1967, I believe it was, in which he recourtad

being informed of a neating, of an inter-Agency meeting at

which the subject of assassination was raised, and he made a

particular point of indicating after the meeting -- he was

not at the meating; I believe, but he heard of the meeting and

ho made a particular poirt of saying he disapproved of this

"e..

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and did not agrea with it, to the other members.

Senator Hart of Michigan.: Who was at that mecting Mccone

heard about?

Mr. Colby.

That was the meeting we vere talking about at

the last session.

Mr. Schwarz. You brought up a new document which was Mr.

McCone's dictation of recollection of '67.

Mr. Colby. Yes; I think you have that.

Mr. Schwarz. That I have not seen. I know we do not

have that

Mr. Colby. I am sorry, I thought you did.

MI. Schwarz. Could that be supplied?

: Mr. Colby, No problems, yes. This is our document ano

Chairman Church. Will you supply the Committee with the

document?

-

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Excuse me, 'I beg your pardon. He states in '67, at one

of these meetings, about this time, I recall a suggestion made

being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime,.

including Castro. I took immodiate excaption to this suggestion

stating that the subject was completely out it bounds as far as

the US Government and CIA were concerned, The idea should not

be discussed nor should not be discussed nor should it apacar

in any papers.

=1

Senator Mondale. Hi. Colly, the other day when

you

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tostified there was a nomorandum that you gave us from I think

Mr. Osborn, which objected to a nemorandum by General Landsdalc

which roferred to assassinations of political leaders, in a

memorandum regarding Operation Morgoose, which was Cuba. And

it referred, to an attached nemorandum which I think you said

was the property of the f3I..

Mr. Colby. Of the National Security Council.

Senator Mondale.

NSC.

I gather you have a copy of that, but you don't feel

authorized to let us see it?

MI. Colby. I do have

copy of it. The understanding

we have had with the other

agencies is that each of us gives

our own material but we refer to the other agency for any

documents belonging to the other agency.

Chairman Church. Well, it is very difficult for the

Committee to operate that way. I thirk that since the Committa-

is entitled to this information, that when it is pertinent

and as we proceed in our hearings from ona subject to another,

we ought to be able to secure the information without having

to go back through executive channels.

Mr. Colby. May I undertake to get the permission to give

it to you? I will undertake to do this today.

Chairman Church. Any observations that the Comnittes

wishes to make on this kind of a problen?

It is the first cime it las come up.

AS FORD

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Senator llart of Colorado. Is this the understanding we

have had or rot?

Mr. Schwarz. It has been a total frustration to the staff

and I am very happy it has come up here because wa get chasta

around the corner by one agency to another. It is called the

"third agency rule." It was intended to have nothing to do

with congressional hearings. Obviously, it had to do with

declassification to the public, and it. has happened to completel

delay our ability to gat information because we go at one agency

and then they determine that it really isn't their document

or it mentioned sons other agency, and then we have to go to

the other •agency•

This is an example of how frustrating it is.

Senator Mondale. Have we tried to gat this document from

the NSA?

Mr. Colby, No; this particular document had just come up

on Wednesday --

Senator Schweiker. Does the counsel have any suggestiors

as to what he feals the Committee position should be in this

araa to enable him and staff to do an affective job?

Mr. Schwarz. I think the Committee's position ought to be

that pertinent information should ba produced by any agency

that possesses it, and if thay wish to inform anothor agency

that they are doing it, then that is their business. But I

think thuy should have to picduce it if thay possess

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Senator Bordale. Apparently this neiro fron

back to the meating about which osborre memorandum

and

the

Lansdal+

--

Mr. Colby. The series of two or three meetings at that

time, yes.

Senator Mondale. I think this is very imporiant becaus:

apparently this was a meeting at which Mosamara ard Rusk were

present, and apparently liccone was present, so we had all of

the top principals.

Mr. Colby. At least one of them.

Serator Mondale. And they discussed assassinations at

that meeting. Arid then Osborne came back with a meno which is

now part of the record.

Mr. Colby. I think it is Edwards in that case. Harvay,

excuse me.

Senator Mondale. Harvey.

Ha came back with a meno which

the Director supplied, objecting not to the assassination but

to putting it in writing.

Chairman Church. Of course what we don't know is whether

the assassination or subject of assassination that cane up at

this meeting was conjecture of whather it had to do with a

revelation of actual attempts that had involved the CIA or

that it had to do with an ongoing assassination effort by the

cI..

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Sanator Mondale. Yes.

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Chaixman Church. All

we know is the subject of assassina-

tions apparently came up in the course of the meeting.

Mr. Colby, Mr. Chairman, as one of the agercies involved,

if I could offer one explaration for the Third Agency Rule

even in this circumstance. And I am particularly interested in

this because somatimes our documents have material whose

sensitivity is not apparent on the face and we

assuma that this

will be handled ir certain compartmented channels, and if it

gets out of the compartment it might give problems that the

individual at the other end wasn't aware of. That is the

basis for the rule. The thought being go back and ask the

originator, and he has a feeling for that and could make the

particular case if somathing particularly sensitive is involved.

Chairman Church. I would suggest, Mr. Colby, without

binding the Committee to a pracedent, with respect to dealing

with the third Party Rule, that in this case you undertake

to sacure from the NSA --

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairnar. Church. -- its permission to turn this particular

document over to the Committes so it may be made a part of these

hearings.

Mr. Colby. I will endeavor to do that today, Mr. Chairman

Senator Morgan. I am going to irquire from Senator

Mondale what mamorandun were you reading about !clone and the

group being present?

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Senator Mondale. He have a manorandun, it is righi

from Mr. Harvey. Do I have the wrong one?

Yes, it is dated, I wili show it to you, in which he

objects to --

Chairman Church. What is the date of it?

Senator Mondale. 14 August 1962.

Senator Morgan. Do wa have that?

Mr. Schwarz. It was shown to us on Madnesday, marked

or deemed marked as part of the record, and raturned to the CIA

who roturned it to us today.

Mr. Colby. I have another copy of it.

Senator Mondale. It refers to a meeting in Mr. Rusk's

office at which prssumably. Mcvamara and Rusk, I gather from tha

later meno, and lecona ware present, ard it says this.

"I called Lansdale's office and ir. his absence pointea ai

to Frank Head the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this

type of comment in writing in a documant. The words he objected

to wers including liquidation of leaders. I advised him as

far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining

to this and would participate in no open meeting to discuss

it."

I read that to mean we will go ahead and do it but we don't

want anything in vriting and don't want to be in a meeting where

it is going so lund. That mares a lot of sense. No livirg

politicion wants to bi acsociated with an assassination, sver.

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il:

if he wants someone assassinated. I thirk that is common

schise.

That is why I thirk

these documents are so crucial.

Chairman Church. Of course they are crucial and wa must

have them.

The ambiguity, however, that we have yet to clear up is

in the third paragraph, Senator liondale, where the memorandum

reads the question of assassination, particularly of Fide!

Castro, was brought up by Sacretary McNamara at a meeting of

the special group augmanted in Secretary Rusk's offica in

August. It was the obvious consersus at that meeting, in

answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject

which has been made a matter-of official record, the subject

being the question of assassiration.

Now, that leaves us still without any documentary proof

that it was revealed at this meating that the CIA was in fact

engaged in an effort to assassinate.

Senator Mondale. Was Lansdale vorking for the CIA at

this tina?

Mr. Colby. Pardon?

Senator Mondale. Was General Lansdale working for the

CIA at this time?

Mr. Colby, General Lansdale was Assistant to the Secretary

of Defense, not CIA, at that time.

Serator Mondale. Had Lausdale been with the CIA?

Mr. Colby. He was with cIn in about 1952 to about

1355.

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more or less.

- Senator Mondale, During the Philippines.-.

No. COlbY. During the Philippinas and in Vistnam at that

time.

Then he left CIA. He was a regular Air Force officer

all this tinia but he was assigned to CIN for the time he was

in the Philippines and the time he was in Vietnan. He then

reverted to the Air Force and las an Assistant to the Secretaiy

of Defense until about 1964 or 1965. Then he went out to

Vietnam where he was an Assistant to the Ambassador, not

working for CIA. We were associated with him but he was not

a CIA officer at that time.

Senator Mondale. Do we know what his job at the Pentagor.

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was?

NI. Colby. It was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

I can't tell you exactly what the job was entitled but

he was active in

the Secratary of Defense's participation in

a variety, you might call it a 40 Committee type of operation.

I think ha probably was most cognizant of the various 10

Committee --

Senator Mondale. If he were involved with that, ha

would have close liaison with all manbers of the 10 connittee,

includirg the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir..

Chairnan Church. I vould like to call jour attention alco

to this suntence.

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I took careful notes on the conments at this meeting o:

this point and the spacial group augmented in not expecting

any written comnents of study on this point.

Thare, agair, the ambiguity.

It is within the range of the possible that one of the

ongoing efforts of the CIA was in fact raised and discussed.

It is also possible that the question of assassirating

Fidel Castro --

Senator liondale. Do we have those notes?

Chairman Church. I was going to ask that.

And that it was agreed that no study of review of this

should be'submitted as an abstract matter, should ba submitted

in written form.

So we are left without an answer to this question.

However, with raspact to the notes that ara referred to

hera, can you tell us whether thosa notes exist?

Mr. Colby. I dor't know of any, li. Chairman.

Chairman Church. He said he took careful notes.

•Mr. Colby. I don't know of any but I certainly will 1ook.

Mr. Brackinridge. When we reviewed this problem in 1967

тано

we found no such notes.

Senator Huddleston. Let me inject a thought or two alone

this line.

It sears to me like ma: of the things is are goirg

so determina us ve go iloil is as to what extent there was oi

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• 2.5

there is a standard operating procedure of your Agency an

effort not to make notes, an effort for certain individuals

not to have certain knowledge by design.

For instance, I was reading your menorardum here dated

I June 1973 in wich you are reporting on a meating that occurred

You make a point to say that you briefed someone orally. The

word "orally" is in there -- assuming that for the purpose

someone should know that you did not put anything in vriting

or you did not give him a writter. report.

You also say that I personally managed to avoid gaining

any krowledge of what precise actions ware taken.

I think a reasonable infarence there is that there is a

deliberate on your part hare -- and maybe this is standard

oparating procedure -- for you not to gat specific information

so that you always will be in the position of not krowing sona-

thing.

• Mr. Colby. I don't recogniza the raference. Certainly,

I think in past years there ware situations we did rot want

FO

to connit to writing.

There is a great deal of effort made by us to what wa

call compartment information so that. it is know only to certain

paople and not known to others. The compartment is still to

be open at the top, however.

There are things that I purposely try not to know. I don't

want to know the nane of an agent in the soviet Union.

I have

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absolutely no desire to learn his name because I don't need

to linow that information.

Senator Huddleston. ilere we are referring to action in

this case and not individuals.

Mr. Colby. I don't recognize that. I could perhaps put

it in context if I could

see the memorandum.

Mr. Schwarz. Perhaps we ought to mark that mamorandum.

Senator Huddleston.

Menorandum for it. William E. Colby:

I thought it was by kr. Colby.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry.

Senator Huddleston.

someone within the Agency apparently

is informing you about something and the subject is special

activitias. I don't see a name on it.

It has information in it about both the President and

Attorney General being involved in briefings.

Mr. Schwarz. I think for convenience of referenca ve

ought to mark it as an exhibit.

"Let's numbar as today's number, and wa have put in the

three charts so far, and wa will call this, which is the I

June 1973 menorandun for ir. William E. COlby, subjact special

activities, from stampad pages 09.157, 00158, and 00159, 0f

the so-called 694 pages.

The documunt above refaried to vas

marked Colby Exhibit :1o. 4.)

No. Colly. I recognize what that is, Senator fuddleston.

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The reason it was addressed to hilliam E. Coldy is we

were going through that period in the middle of 1973 where I

was technically, I guess, Diractor of Operations but had been

nominated to bacone Diractor. This was the kind of thing that

normally would be addressed to the Director but we had an

Acting Director, Ganeral Halters, but it was pretty clear I

was responsible for making the machinery run and we had a lot

of things around the Agency addressed to me and signed by me.

I believe this follows

a conversation I had with a Mr.

Walter Elder, who was an Assistant to Mr. John McCona -- he

was Executive Assistant when he was Director -- I think Mr.

Elder tola ma

that there were certain things that he krew of

in the background that related to this effort of identisying

various quastiorabla activities of the Agency, and I asked

him to go write them down so wa could get tham into the

Inspector General's raport.

Senator Huddlsston. The only question I raisa, I don't

want to gat off into the contents of a particular menorandum,

but the context with the area you were pursuing, just whether

or not stardard operating procadure would require at times

thare be a deliberate avoidance by certain peopla in the

Agency of facts ard whather or not there is a great body of

decisions that are made and implemented without anythirg writter

dor, so that trere loula never be any documantary evidence

TOMO

of it?

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Mr. Colby. Well, I think that you certainly can say that

there Is an avoidance by à lot of paople of learning things

that thoy are not authorized to kno:. I mean the more loyal

in a sense of our emuloyees, say that thay have authority to

know what it going on in, say, Cuba, they don't have a right

to know what is going on in, say, China, and they rather

carefully keep themsalves fron learning what is going on in

China. I think that is a pravalence.

I think the question you ars asking, however, is whether

we are trying to keep activities off of paper and it is pratty

clear that the assassination story was essentially kept off

the paper:

And I would think that is about the only one. No, the

drug thing. I assuna some of that was kept off of paper?

Mr. Breckinridga. Yas.

Mr. Colby. The lasson that I have frequently given to

my colleaguas in the bureaucracy is that however hard you try

to keep it off of paper, you will not succeed in a bureaucracy,

somebody will write it dowl and, therefore, it is a totally

feckless exercise to pretand that you can keep it sacret by

not writing it down. But the fact is there were situations

in which a conscious effort was made in the past to keep things

off the record.

Senator Huddlesion.. To sum up, you, as Director, with tha

excuption of individual names for which thare would be nora.

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particular value to you and no advantage to you knowing, except

for that you nake no deliberate effort not to krow about

oparations?

Mr. Colby. No. As a matter of fact, I take the opposite

position, Senator. I say that to my subordinates and have

reiterated a number of times, I cannot be subjected to surprise.

You have got to let me know the things I ought to know.

And

I have undertaken the same obligations to my oversight cormittaas

for example, that I am responsible getting to them before

they hear about it some place else.

Senator Huddleston. The other is in this inquiry. Can

the Conmittee expect that every effort will be made to supply

to us information about various things, evan though they may

not be written down?

Mr. Colby. You hava my commitment to that effect.

Senator Huddleston. Going further and looking through

the files for notes and documents?

Kr. Colby. It is my hope,

Serator, that I can help you

on this investigation rather than defending myself against you.

Senator Huddleston.

That is all.

Mr. Colby. That is what I would like to have the relation-

ship, that I am trying to help you do this investigation.

3,p5

Chairman Church. He want such a relationship and we

are tryirg to work it out.

Ho. Colly. I lnci you do. You hass said it a number

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tines and I agres with you.

Chairman Church.

Now, Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale.

The memorardum from John icCone that

we received this morning, dated 14 April, 1357, is addrussea

to the Director.

Was McCore an employee or related with the CIA at that

time?

Mr. Colby. No, he left in 1965.

Senator Mondale. So this was a memorandum from a person

no longer with the CIA, as former Director to the current

Director, which begins

"no memorardum can be located covering

the August, '62 meeting."

That is the one that earlier says the question of

assassination was discussed. However, it is highly probable

that one exists.

Now, I would like all documentation, records, and notes

that bear on the question of what McCone was raferring to,

bacause I gat the impression that the then Director, Mr. lielms

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Mondale.

-- was revieving the question of documantat

tions and records affacting that maating, or the question of

assassiration, and I think we nead to know what transpired,

what was happening then, what kind of responses ha received.

Mr. Colby. We vill cortainly give you that.

I can give

3.

you a basic explanation.

...

- ...

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This exercise stenmed from the revelation in Jack

Anderson's columns, I believe, of our relationship with the

Mafia figures at that time. This then generated the relast

to 11r. Breckinridge to do an Inspector Ganeral's report of

this whole subject, which he did, and which wa will cartainly

make avariable to this Committea.

In tha course of it, and with the publicity, tir. McCore,

who does maintain an occasional contact with the Agency, he

is a friend of it and an ex-Director -- I see him every now

and again and try to sort of keep him up with what is going

on in general terms without gatting into political or sensiziva

matters or anything -- but he doas maintain this contact and

I am sure that somebody made contact with him or he made contact

with the Agency about the Jack Anderson column, and that then

generated this particular memorandum.

Senator Mondala. And there was an Inspector General's

study dore at that time?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir; and you will get access to that.

Senator Mondale. Can we have documentation as to how

it was originated and the response to what was done?

Chairnan Church. Yes, we should have that information.

And I might say that you are aware, no doubt, that charges have

been mada that documants have been destroyed in the CIA which

may have been connacted with the goneral subject of cIA orò

involvamont in assassination efforts.

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Can you tell this Connittee whather, to your knowledge,

documents have been destroyad?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think we can talk in turms of what

wa

know is there.

On the Castro assassinatior, the involvement with the

Mafia, there vare a faw menoranda in the Office of Security,

and I think you have copias of those.

-.-....-

On the sacond phase of that, there are practically no

records at all and our investigation at that time las made

entirely on intarviews.

Based entirely on interviews, an attempt to reconstruct

that activity.

The final action which involved a Cuban by the name of

Cubella --

Mr. Colby. This ias tha Cuban major we discussed last

time.

• Mr. Breckinridge.

Started in the minds of the people

who jere involvad, was an attenpt to generate an internal

political action, revolt, and the records are very full because

there was ro attention on the part of the people who vere

involved at that time that that would be an assassination in

the sensa that the original work with the Mafia was

engaged in

and there is a full record. and that exists today.

In the case of the Donirican sapublic, this 3aveloped.

iats

3.

Let ma finish.

OP S300

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I will go back to the Cubella case.

In the instance of the Dominican Republic, the record

was vury full then and it is still very full today. I am

certain that record is completa.

Again, in the minds of the people who were involved, they

drew a line between the support they gave to the coup group

and conscious association with assassination as such. Those

records

are complate and those records were developed at the

time and thay were retained.. It was in the pariod of the

Mafia was involved where people lnew the purpose was assassina-

tior...

The records are practically non-axistent and I balieve

they never existed.

Harvey, who conducted the second phase of that, at the

time of our investigation had a handful of cryptic notes that

only he could intarpret. We couldn't interpret thein. And

it is my understanding that those notes no longer exist. They

were retained by him and he brought them in at the tima that

we were questioning him. He was then on sick leave prior to.

retiranant.

Those notes were totally unrevealing.

I think that those records are in the same state today

that they ware then.

There were none in the Castro affair except the restits

of our inventigation irvalving the Mafia.

-

The Culella cass is duil.. That case did progress to tha

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point that on the very day of President kennedy's assassination

a man was magting with Cubella in Paris, and in response to

Cubella's request offered him an assassination device that

at

the time of the investigation we undarstood he accepted but

I have sinca been told he did not accept. It was a ballpoint

pen converted into a syringe for injecting poison.

subsequantly, arms were harded to Cubella by a Cuban

refugee in Madrid, in the very early part of 1965, and two.

catches were put down by boats off Cuba for Cuballa. I think

he may have recovered one of those but not the other. The

racords on that are pretty complete.

so, generally speaking, on those things where the Agency

was involved, with the exception of the association with the

Mafia, where from the beginning the intent was assassination,

the records are complete, and I think that if paople 100k at

those they will find this is so.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the understanding that all racords dealing

with this subject, whather they are in Inspector Ganeral,

reports or underlying documents, would be producad for our

inspection?

FOR

Mr. Colby. Yes.

If I may ask only the Committee's consideration of the.

nornal treatment of compartmentation and some discussion of

possibly some individual names in it that va would hope that

ve might be able to handle very privately, or necessary, or eve:

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lave out.

But the normal procedures.

Chairman Church. Very well.

Now, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Scilvarz. Just to tidy up ons matter.

Lat me mark as Connittee Ixhibit 5 the John A. HicCom

to the Director memorandum of April 11, 1967. •

(The above mentioned docunent

was

marked as Colby Exhihit No. 5

for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Might I come down with you on this document

and ve will look at it togather?

Mr. Colby. •I have a copy.

'Mr. Schwarz. As of April, 1967, Me. licCone vas no longer

at the Agency, was he?

MI. Colby. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Was he then in his position with IT, or

did he have sone other position?

hit. Colby.

I really don't krow.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event he wasn't at the Agency?

Mr. Colby: That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. The thing that is curious about this memo-

23

randun, with respect to the state of the record, is paragraph

one, which reads as follows:

24

"Wo minorandun can be lusted covering the lugust 10, 13621

25

however, it is hignly probabl: that one sxists."

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How, Mr. liccone, was not in the Agency, is writing a

menprandun to th: Director, wo was ir the mgeucy, referrina

a search by or or bshalf of ir. Mccone.

Now, did MI. Mccone hays documents outside the Agercy,

or how do you explain?

Mr. Colby. I don't balieve he has any documents. I have

naver asked him. But I don't beliave he has ary documents

outside of the Agency.

Ir, inoche, Mr. McCone wrote me that manorandum while or

Agency premises.

It was durirg

a visit to the Agancy and he

had the benefit of his ex-stalf assistant, lir. Walter Elder,

helping him in doing a litila ressarch in this conraction.

Mr. Colby. All that says is that they hadn't located it

by then. I think we have located some since that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on a question of Sanator lar:

of Michigan, he asked you whether there had been evaluations

in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, ard then you

-

testified about valuations post-Bay of Pigs and rather continui

avaluations of the subject of Cuba: But I

take it those were

not evaluations or Is-evaluations of the subject of assassination

Mi. Colby. All I can say is I think that question is

a little obscure.

I know that after the bay of Pigs failure there was

21

i: vestigatina mats of th,ü:le episode, and in the course ca

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WARD & PAUL

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developed. And I an speaking at second hand here. Lui a progri

was developed of keeping some acoronic pressure on Cuba, and

that was a national policy, not just a CIA -- keeping an

-coronic pressure on Cuba and continuing to support tha

various elsments which might eventually lead to a change ir

tha Cuban govariment through sona overthrow of otherwise.

I think sone propoganda programs were kept up, some exila

activities were kept up, some training of teams to be infil-

trated into Cuba vare kapt up, some sabotage oparations vere

continued. ind those continued over the following saveral

months. .

Right after the 1963 missile crisis.--I cannot identify

right offhand here any particular review of that -- but I

know that that was a subject of 40 Comnittee consideration at

various times.

Whether that included assassination or not I cannot say.

My guess, as I say, is that if John McCone didn't know

about it, it was not covered in those discussions bacause it

would be very hard to cover them iithout his being involved.

Chairman Church. Are you taliing us that the much publi-

cized investigation of the CIA, which tool place following tha

Bay of Pigs fiasco, and as I renamber this review was ordered

by the President in order to datermina what had gone wrong ard

vily, and it was a matter of goat urgency and inportance io tli-

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government at that time -- are you telling us that in tho

course of that review the Agency's involvement in the assidsir.

tion efforts against Castro sevar came to light?

ir. Colby. I just don't know, !ir. Chairman. That is

the

ansver I have to give you. I do not know.

I believe the Inspector Genaral report after the Bay of

Pigs does not mention it, does it?

Mr. Breckinriage..

No.

Mr. Colby. The report of the Committas that looked into

it, General Taylor,

and the Attorney Gensral and sonebody else

there were three manbers of it -- maybe it. Dulles. I don't

believe that report

mentionad it.

Chairman Church. Do iva have a copy of the Taylor Riport?

MI. Colby. I think it has bean made available. Or is

thät a third agency problen?

Mr. Schwarz.

That is another frustration. That one has

bean denied to us or the theory that it is part of the kennedy

Library and, tharefore, we hava to go through arothar charnal

to get that.

Does the CIA have a copy of the Taylor Report?

Mr. Colby. I don't believe we do. I know we looked for

it a coupla of years ago and àt that time I vas told we dida't

have it.

I hate to say here mer ooth ta do not have one, but I

know I tried to get ahold of it and was tols

FOD SUC2G%

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ago thut we couldn't have on=.

But there are lots of dravers

in those safes in that building.

I ain not trying to evade the quastion. I am trying to

say I don't think we have one. It coula be.

He have a copy of our om Inspector General's report

at that time.

MI. Schwarz. Does that contain any mention of the

assassination

subject?

Mr. Colby. No, it does not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you find it puzzling that the cin doasn't

have a copy, of tha report designed to reviaw its activities

in the Bay of Pigs, a report that led to substantial Presidential

changes in the instructions with respact to your jurisdiction?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. I mean,

it is an important document --

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

• Mr. Schwarz. - relating to the CIA.

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. I wonder if l. McCone has a copy?

Mr. Colby. I would doubt it.

Senator Schwaiker. That is why he came in, becaue of that?

Mr. Colby. Roughly, yes.

Chairnar. Church. In the course of the investigation that

took place, this investiration that led to the Taylor Repait,

2.5

Chai toCk P.253

in the asterrath of the Bay of Pigs.:

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Were records kept, that is to say -

Mr'. Colby, Of contributions?

Chairman Church. lio. Did the investigation involve

written records? Did it involve testimony taken under oath

and transcribed? Is there raw matarial ralating to that

investigation to which this Committee could gair access?

Mr. Colby. I don't know the answer to the question, Mr.

Chairman. Maybe Mr. Breckinridge can help us.

Mr. Brackinriage. I am not familiar with that study.

I am familiar with the approach that was taken at the time

withir our organization when the Inspector General -- I vas

not involved in that study but I have heard it discussed

how they approached it.

Their understanding of the 3ay of Pigs problem was the

overall invasion plan and organization for that and concentrated

on that.

By way of explanation for the omission of reference to

the assassinations, so faw people knew about it, and I thin!:

it came to no one's attention - simply did not discover it

at that time. And it may not have been by way of explanation,

not a justification. It may not have been associated in the

minds of the people who did know about it with the inquiry

into the military operation.

is. Schwarz. ir. Bissel knew abont it and he was certaini:

the mair architect of the Bay of Pigs: right?

For disti

SORO

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Mr. Breckinridge. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Mir. Dulles, at least the records ve

put in on Wednesday, knew about it and he vas substentially

involved in the Bay of Pigs.

Those gentlemen surely would have

been questioned by General Taylor and Attorney General Kennedy

Is that fair?

Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume so.

Mr. Colby. Certainly, yes. But again, if the focus was

on the military operation, it might have been that that other

operation was not involved in it.

• Mr. Schwarz. The record further shows that on May 7, 1962,

a mesting was held with Attorney Ganeral Robert Kennady in

which the contemporaneous document describing that meetirg

indicates that he was not told that there was a continuirg

and ongoing operation, but rather was told of something whici

was not called an assassination but vas called a projec:

59

was told of something which was referred to ir the past tens=:

is that right?

Mr. Colby. It was in the past tense. Whether there wes

any other discussion in that meeting on this subject we just

don't krow.

Mr. Brechinridge. I think I can interpret vnat happener.

The people who brisfad Astorney General Kennedy are the

ores who knew about was we call the first phase of the operitic

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with the Hafia.

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Colonel Edwards, who was Director of Sacurity, under whoss

supervision the first portion of that activity was carried on,

had withdrawn from:it.

The Operation, whan it was reactivated later, was ruactivate

on a compartmented basis, and Colonel Ediards did not kro:

about it.

Mr. Schwarz.

Ever. though it contirued to involve the

Mafia until early. 1963?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct. Colonel Edwards no

longer knew what was going on. So when he briafed the Attorney

General ha did not know that this second operation, this

raactivation of

the operation that had fornarly run urder his

responsibility - he did not know that it was orgoing.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was rasponsible for the selection of

Colonel Edwards ard General Counsel Houston as being the

persons who would go to brief Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure I krow that.

_Mr. •Schwarz. It would have been soncore of higher

authority within the CIA; is that correct?

r. Breckinridge.

We have tried to determire.

MI. Houston, if I understand it, feels that he would not

have done this unless he thought the Director knew.

Mr. Schwäiz.

iner what?

Mr. Breckinridge.

Knew that he was goint to do this. Bus

25

ho did not talk to the Director about it.

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I gather thas it is not all that clear in Colonel Lawards'

either at this point in time.

Mr. Schiarz. So someone selected these persons to go

and brict Attorney General Kennedy, number one.

Number tvo, they did not know the plot for assassinition

Was

ongoing, although in fact it was?

Mr. Brackirriage. Correct.

kr. Schwarz.

Number three: therefore, Attorney General

Kennedy was given the impression that

whatever was goins on

was over; is that correct?

ar. Brackinridge.

I think that is correct as I Isconstruct

- .

it.

Mr. Schwarz.

Can we determine than who was responsible

for selecting those persons to brief Attorney General Kennedy,

instead of including in the group other persons who inew that

the Mafia part of the

assassination attempt was ongoing?

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't thirk that we can now.

-As I say, there is no written racora.

Mr. Schwarz. Who could it have been? ¡ho was in a

higher position of authority, in a position to maka a decision

as to who should brief Attorney General Kennedy?

• Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume that it. Bissal could

have.

Mr. Schware, Was hi still in the Agincy la May of 1962?

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ME. Biciriage. I ron's know. I thirt he may have

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loft by their.

_ May I reconstruct because nuch of my understanding is bassi

on my analysis of what happened and not on clear facts.

The FBI approached Colonel Edwards when their investigation

and incident in Las Vegas eventually produced his name, and

his conversations, I think, were with the Ganeral Counsal at

that time.. I cannot reconstruct beyond that so I really can't

give you ar answer to the specific questior. But the initiative

came fron the FBI. Colonel Edwards and MI. Houston discusss:

it. Ir. Houston, I have been told, balieves that the Diractor

must have known.

ir. Schwarz: which Director are we talking about?

Mr. Brackinridgs. Whoever the Director was at thai time?

Mr. Colby. By that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Of what agency?

Mx. Colby. CIA. That would have been Mccone.

Mr. Breckinridge. He operated on the assumption that ir.

Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

Mr. Breckinridge.

Knaw

that they were going to brief the

Attornsy General.

HI. Schwarz. About?

Hr. Breckinridge.

The record on this is very unsatisfactory

and I can't clarify it for you bacause we have been trying to

find out when fir. clons first learned of it after tha fact,

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as it was.

Whan people discussed this with ore another, what thay

conveyed to one another accurately as to what it was they were

discussing, tha record is simply nos clear and I don't think

that we can reconstruct that satisfactorily today.

Mr. Schwarz. Is ir. Edwards still aliva?,

Mr. Breckinridge. Yas, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. ir. Houston is still alive and is in Hashirg-

ton, D.C.?

HI. Breckinridge.

Nir. Schwarz.

Yes, sir..

Mr. Mccone is stiil aliva and is in --

Kr. Colby. California.

Mr. Schwarz. Was Mr. Helms the successor to Mr. Bissel?

Ni. Colby. Yes, sir.

rit. Schwarz.

Well, let's laava a place in tha record

Where wa will insart it was either Mr. McCone or Mr. Bissal

who had the job of Duputy Diractor 'for Plans in May, 1952.

Mr. Colby. It certainly wasn't tir. Mccone.

+

Mr. Schwarz.

Mo. Helms or it. Bissel?

Mr. Colby.

YeS.

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Chairman Church. You see, the state of the record

nOW

suggests a cover-up, another covar-up. It suggests that

those who were selected by the higher authority in CIA to

brief the Attorn-y General had linowledge limited to au attemo:

on the life of Castro that had been concluded.

It further suggests that they had no knowledge of contirairs

efforts then underway, even though presumably their superiors

did hava such knowledge. This leaves the Attorney General ir.

a position of being told about the past program ard nos bair

told about. the present program, and we know that he later said

to certair assistants of his that he had put a stop to

assassination attempts on Fidal Castro and hs may have been

left with the impression, as a result of this meeting, that

there were no further attempts. Hs may have said he wanted no

further attempts. We don't kron. But clearly ha was rot tola

that there were further attempts then underway.

• Senator Morgan. Ware ve told yasterday or the day befor=

Yesterdas, that he knew of the Cuban majors' oparation?

Mr. Schwarz. We were not told that.

Mr. Breckinridge. I canros clarify the question completely

but I can introduce a little bit more.

When the discussion occurred lr. Houston did go ard, tall

with General Carter, who was the the Daputy Director

No. Schwarz. Which discussio. are ve talkira about now?

Ho. Breckinrilga. The discussion about goiny to tha Attor:

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General.

To, go back, hor the question arose, and it goes far afield,

John Roselli,

who was the Chicago member of the Mafia wro

arranged the introduction of Giancanato the Cuban syndicate

head, through whom they initially tried to run this operation --

Giarcana had a personal love affair with a well know entertainer

who was then in Las Vegas, and she was suspected by him of then

having an affair with another well known entertainer.

Giancana went. to Robert laheu, through whom these introduc-

tions were first made --

Mr. Schwarz. Introduced to the Mafia personnel?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. Between CIA andtie Mafia.

Mr. Breckinridge. And asked Maheu toarrange to have the

room of the male entertainer in Las Vegas hugged. They hired

a private detective who ther did this. The roormate stumbled

on the equipment, the private detective was arrested, and the

FBI investigativa trail led from the private datective to Maheu

to Giancara and eventually to CIA. Giarcana had insisted that

Maheu help him because he had helped Maheu with the introduction:

to the head of the Cubar syndicate, and Maheu had then agreed

to get a private detective to do it.

so this arose in the contaxt of a domesticviolation of

wirstapping laws and the FBI was investigating it on that basis.

Because the trail led to riancana andleselli, mio warden

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third nember of the syndicate involved in this, both

if whom

werc high on the FBI list, as they progressed towards developing

a prosecution, they came to Colonel Ediards, the FBI did, and

said what is your position on this. The position of the agency

as stated by Colonel Edwards was we did not want them prosccuted

because it would expose what he understood to be this operation,

and I guess the time sequence gets a little fuzzy in my mina.

Mr.. Schwarz. Did he tell the Director of the FBI the

nature of

the operation, or simply he told him it would concern

some sensitive matter?

Mr. Breckinridge. He told him it was an intelligence

operation in country, and the Mafia was being used for that

purpose.

so in the discussions as it progressed, it dealt with

the wiretap prosecution. Colonel Edwards in discussing it

with us in 1967, according to our notes, said that they briefed

the Attorney General all the way, but at that time colonel

Eawards, I think by the time they did it, Colonel Edwards thought,

it was over. So the Attorney General and the FBI were not told

the complete story.

Mr. Schwarz.

They weren't told the most important part

of the story, and that was that it was continuing.

Mr. Breckinridge. They didn't know that, that is coricct.

Chairman Chuich. So you have here tho violations of law.

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Apart from what was told to the Attorney General, you have two

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violations of lair. Onc, the wiretap, it was an illegal operation

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We may have thrce. second, it is certainly an activ gy that

the basic law prohibited CIA from engaging in, domestic activity

MI. Colby.

CIA was not involved in the wiretap.

Chairman Church. As I understand it, the CIA was involved

because it engaged a private --

Mx. Breckinridge. I am sorry.

Chairman Church. Maybe I misunderstood.

Mr. Breckinridge. He didn't learn about this until after

the fBI found out about the Mafia involvement in that wiretap.

This was done by a private detective hired by a private businessma:

at the request of Giancana.

Mr. Schwarz. CIA agents had committed the crime, in this

case, but not on behalf of the CIA.

-

Mr. Breckinridge. No, по.

Mr. Schwarz. Isn't that accurate?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. I wouldn't call Giancana an agent, getting

back to our definitional problems.

Mr. Schwarz. CIA associates.

Mr. Colby. CIA instrument. We had a contact with Giancana,

obviously, and with Maheu. They decided on their own to do

this wiretapping, or bugging, or whatever it was, without our

prior knowledge.

They got caught. Then they said if this is

fully investigated and brought out, it will bring out the CIn

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collaboration on the other subject, and then decision wis mid.

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to go and brick the Attorney General to the degree briefed.

Chairman Church. After which the Justice Dopartment dropped

the case?

Mr. Colby.

It was dropped.

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Senator llart of Colorado. Was the CIA not concerned that.

Giancana indy have told somethin about this Cuba::

operation to

the femala entertainer who also may have told the male

entertainer?

1r. Brechinridge. No. If I understand what happened,

ard I am now describing what Mr. Maheu said, and I get this

from having Iead soma files at the Department of Justice

recantly -- when Mr. Maheu tried to explain to the FBI his

position and tried to provide a rational= for doing this, ha

said I thought thare was a leak in Chicago and I warted to have

the room of this entertainer bugged so I could find out if

Giancana had leaked.

The FBI gave this the kind of cradit I think it was entitled

to. They didn't pay much attention to it. This was something

he tried to develop to justify his involvement.

There is no indication that there were any leaks from

Chicago that we know of, something that he would know of, ard

there was no instruction on our part for him to do such a thirg,

and it was for another reason Giancana asked him to do it.

Serator Hart of Colorado. As far as you can tell from tha

record, the CIA was not concerned that Giancana and his female

friend, or her male friard, may have blovn the Cubar operation?

Mr. Brechintidge. No.

Senator last of Colorado. It was purely who was sleepira

FOND

with whon?

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Mr. Brechiaridge. I think that is still the case.!

I would like to add one further thing.. That prior to noiry

over to brici the Attorney General, the general couns:l did

go spear. to General Carter. General Carter said that he

undarstood --

Mr. Colby. General Carter was Deputy Director of the

Agency at that time.

MI. Breckinridge:

-- he understood the situation ard

in due time night brief the Director. He don't know that ha.

did brief the Director, who was than Mr. Accone. Our notes

written in 1907 say there is no indication that General Carter

was briefed or the full details of the assassination plot.

So while ha did approve their going and briefing the Attorrey

General about this associatior with the lafia, there is no

indication that he was told the full story then either.

Mr. Schwarz. Then in August of 1963, the document that

you providad for us last time, ir. lelms did know about the

ongoing operation; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think by then he knew that the

operation was going.

Mr. Schwarz. Ha sent to Director Mccone the menorardum

which had been prepared concsining the meeting with attorn=y

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Genaral dennedy, which indicated that the operation was comolitai.

so the inferenes from that paper record is that Me. "elms as

concadling affirmatively from the Director of Cantral Int:llica:

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in the same way as somebody had concealed from thy Attory

Gungral the fact that the plot vas ongoino.

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Is that a fair, characterization?

Mir. Colby. I don't know.

Mr. Brickinridge. Could I see the memo?

Chairman Church. The mano uses verbs in the past tease.

MI. Schwarz.

The cover

mamo

Exom Helms to McCore trans-

mittirg a copy of the memorardum concarning the lay, 1962

mating wish Astornay General Kennedy.

----

Mr. Breckinridge. May I say first I don't know. I

just call your attention to the third paragraph.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the memorandum from Director helms?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. He was then D.D.

¡I. Colby. The basic memorandum, of course, merely

referred to a sansitive CIA oparation and then ir Mr. Helms

in the paragraph says I assuma you are avara of the nature

of the operation discussed in the attachment.

Again, this was an attampt not to refer on paper to what

it was.

Ar. Schwarz. But the attachment refars to it in the

past tensa.

it. Colby. I agise.

Senator morgan. Who is this memorandum from?

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Mi. Colly. The minotarlin be are

discussing now of m

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ugust 1953 nas to the Direcoos fron Me. Helms. It attachei

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a copy of the briefing of the Attorney General in lay, 1962.

Stliator Morgan.

ist. rackinridge, the transcript of rever:

that you were reading from a

few moments ago, who prepared

that?

Mr.. Breckinridge.

This was prepared by another inspsctor

and me in 1967.

Sanator morgan. When you say there is no indication that

he knew, that is just an assumption on your part, that you

don't have any positive evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Serator. Morgan. The truth is you sort of suspect they

all knew what was going on. Don't you think that is true?

Mr. Breckinridge. No, not necessarily.

When we conducted our investigation we intervieved the

people directly involved in the operation, those that vere

available, ard trisd to reconstruct what happened with then.

• We intervived different people. I did not interview

ir. Bissal. I did intarview fir. Marvay.

He submitted this report to then-Director Helms, one copy

only. Wa did not interview him.

Where his name appeared

• the course of our inquiry ve

put it in our esport so that he would see how the record aposaro

to paople who approached it as we did.

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The extent of the bro late of chase different people is

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39 sisy to ruconstruc: dor

Exic. to assumi.

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I can't ansver your question.

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- Saintor Mortar. In other voids, is you didn't have

avidance that they did know, you just assumed that -- you

didn't assume that they didn't know, you just said there is

no evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge.

That is correct.

Senator Schweicker. Let me ask the question another way.

The documentation you collected and what you do have

positively, who was the highest ranking official, according

to your records, who knaw?

Chairman Church. According to the positive documents

that you have of knowledge.

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me say we did not have

documentation. It was based mostly on interviews, this

period involving the Mafia.

The highsst person that wa understood that knew during

the first phas= with Mr. Bissal. That we clearly did know

about it. There was discussion at one point in which ir.

Bissel, Colonal Edivards, the two of them, met with lit. Dulles

ard had a conversation in which I can bast say there was

doubletall as to what they were discussing.

It is open to questicr how clearly this vas stated

Mr. Dulles and whether or not lt. Dulles understood.

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At the time that ie toi; makind the inquiry it was our

opinion that lin. Dullis probaily tues, but I can't put it berr!

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that.

Senator Schweickar. He left the Agency in 1061, as I

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Iscall.

When was your investigation?

Mx. Breckirridge. Our investigation was ir 1957.

And our discussion wich Colonel Edwards, who described

this meeting when it occurred ir 1960, left us with the inpressic:

while they had met with iir. Dulles, that the corversation was

not in precis- terms.

As Colonel Savards said to us, va

didn't use any bad words, which meant they didn't use the

word "assassination," but they discussed an operation against

Castro in-such terms that he felt that they had conveyed the

message to Mr. Dulles. But there is room for doust.

Senator Schweicker. Once Mr. Dulles left the Agency, tino

then

became the highest rankira person to know, according

to your investigation?

• Mr. Breckinridge. If Me. Dulles did in fact urdsrstand,

he would be the highest person at this point.

Senator Schweicker. At this point. But he left the

Agency in 1061. Five years of assassination attempts went onio

after that.

You conducted an irvestigation in 1967. What did that

period show as to who was the highest ranking parson who knew?

Mr. Breckinridge.

1ri Mocone did not krow until much lat.=

until after it vas all over.

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My. Colby. He knew ir 1963.

- Mr. Breckinridga.. About a past avent.

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Mr. Colby. There was still activities going on:

ir. Breckinriage. That is right.

Chairman Church. Can wa get the answer first?

Mr. Brackinridge. Excuse me. I can't give you à more

precise answer bacause somstines the record that we were able

to reconstruct is' not precisa and in some instances not at all

clear. We were left with some uncertainty.

Senator Schweicker. Mouldn't that be the key issue of

your viole irvestigation, and you mean to say you can't tell

ine?

Mr. Breckinridge. Io, sir.

I,

Senator Schweicker. I am flabbergasted.

#r. Breckinridge. Let ma describe the investigation.

He were doing the irvestigation for tr. Helms as the Director.

Mr. Helms' involvement was sonething known to hin and we

submitted our description of what happened to him. He dia nos

interview him in the course of our investigation. He did not

interview ir. liccons: Ma did interview the ocher parties who

were available to us. But when we gave it to Mr. Melns she

assumption was

that he coild complate the gaos.

In this sense, ordinarini, when ia conduct an investigation

a ganeral investigation, we mula conclode with recomendations,

and in this instance we di? ". do recoastructad as tell as

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we could wiat happened. ind the report want ond copy orly to

Mr. Helms who held it.

"= had only one discussion. The

Inspector General then may have had others. We had only one

discussion with him, which was when we gave him the first

portion of the report, because we investigated thres different

assassination plans, as we described them then, and our discussio

with him had to do with the approach we had taken, and ve

said that we simply undertook to reconstruct what had happerea

as best we could reconstruct it:

So we were reporting to ir. Helms what wa had reconstructe

without having intervised him as such. It was in one copy

only, and quite frankly in 1367 we expected that it would

have no purpose other than to tell him what the situation was

for decisions as he felt appropriate.

Senator Mondale.

"low, you say it is z0= clear whether

Dulles knew, but yet there is a manoraudun from oshorn ta

the Executive Director dated 2/15/72, which states, I quote:

•"Individuals who were aware of this projset" --

That is the defia project --

"Were Messis. Dullas, Bissel, Colonel King, Colonel

Shefficla, Edwards, William Harvey, James P. O'Connall, and

attornays for Robert Maheu."

Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. Osborn is writing that or the basis

of his masrstanding of what Colonel Edwaras had to say.

Our discussions with Colonel lawards laft us with this meerari

not to t-0-00900

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Colonel Edwards believes that ir. Dulles understood the

conversation.

He also said that he engaged in doubletalk so

that there was room for misunderstanding.

Mr. Schwarz. I sho: you a documert stamped 0012, headed

John Roselli and ask you what it is.

Mr. Breckinridge: This is a mano prepared in the Office

of Sscurity describiny john Poselli, who is the first of the

manbers of the syndicate who was used to arrange the introductiol

to the head of the syrdicate in Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. And writter when?

Bs, Breckinridge.

I am not sure. I suspact it was writhe

in 1973 out I would have to check.

ir. Schwarz. Does it refer to a Castro assassination

attempt involvirg the lafia?

Mr. Breckinridge, Does the word "assassination" appear?

I think it rafers to the Malia.

Nir. Schwarz. Do you have any doubt, in fact, this is

referring to the assassination effort involving Maheu, Rosalli,

Trafficanta, in connection with Castro?

Hi. Breckinridge.

That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Ard does this document prepared by the

Office of Security state "the DCI was briefed ard gave his

approval"?

it. Breckinridge.

It does.

ir. Schwar?, And who was tha Cl in August, 1969?

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That was it. 'Dulles.

* Mr. Schwarz. Now, therafore, either Mr. Dulles did approval

which the document says, or somebody wrote a document in

connection wịth the investigation which irresporsibly says

Mr. Dullas

approved. Which is the case?

Mr. Breckiaridgs. I don't think that either is necessaril!

the

cas=.

The understanding of the Office of Security is that Mr.

Dulles doss know or did know. The question that was raised

in the course of our inquiry was that the nature of the maeting

as described to us raised a quastion of doubt. That le did

not resolve.

Chairman Church. I think if we accept your testinosy

that there was at least an element of doubt as to whether or

rot it. Dulles knew of the corruction batween the CIA and the

rafia, and its purpose, to assassinate lic. Castro, let's get

back to Senator Schweicker's questior. After lit. Dulles left

several more plots were

formed involving the CIA and having i?

to do with subsequent attempts on the life of Castro.

Now, what does your invastigation shoir and what can you

tell us with respect to the highest officials in the CIA,

following the departure of Me. Dulles, who may have had knowledgl

of these ongoing operations? :

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ir. Breckinridge. Wher. the operation was renewad I thin':

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it is clear that th= Diractor at that time did not know.

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Senator Schweickes. And

Who was tha Director at that

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time?

Chairman Church. Wher was the oparation renewed?

Mr. Breckinridge. The operation was actually reactivated

in April of 1962. It was plarned to be reactivated prior to

that but the employee who had responsibility for it did not

get free until april of '62 whan he actually reactivated it.

There is no indication that anyone above the level of Mi.

Bissal in 1961, at the time that this was discussed, ther:

is no

indication that aryone above his lavel knew that i=

was to be reactivated. This officer, ir. Harvey, then toos

it over and attenuted to run it again through the balance

of 1962, after April.

ir. Schwarz.

He did that at the irstruction of "r. "elms,

did he not?

nt. Breckinridge.

ar. helms became aware of this at i

later point.

"The confusion, as parhaps we discussed the other day, iic.

Helns signed off on a project that was originally initiated

by :1. Bissel called 2R Rifle, and 7R Rifle vas a projectikat

Mr. Bissal was quoted as saying was at the urgency of the

White House.

It was made no more specific than that.

don't know where in the lihite Mouse.

2R Rifle was described as

an executive action capabilisy,

a capability to gormit assassinations if someone called for

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- MI. Harvey was given the resporsibility of this by Mr.

Bissel ard originally it continued as a separate action from

the Castro operation, but it. Harvay was also given that

resporsibilizy, and for all intents and purposes they became

wedded.

Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Riale

as a project. ZR. Rifle had a dual purpose that has not been

,clarified by our inquiry. It aoparently was in fact used for

the stated purposes, as far as organizational activities went

along, which was to stealscodes, and ise. lalms, when ha

approved the project, authorized accounting on certification,

which meant that rather than the usual vouchers supporting

expenditures, that the officer involved vould simply certify

that the

money

had been spent and this would he acceoted.

It had à project, amount of some dollars, $7509 - 510,000 --

some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to irclua:

operating expenses.

so ir. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR Rifle

does not necessarily equate with the date when he became

familiar with the Castro operation.

Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle

mealis both, rifle files and used rifles?

Mr. Breckinridge.

It may mean either or both.

Mr. Colby.

It is supposed to disassociate but sometimes

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there is that kird of association.

• Hr. Breckinridge. I told you that I would look for wher

¡r. Helms' name first clearly appeared and I haven't don: that.

I was out of

town Yesterday.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have the mano of February 1962

when is. Helms,

according to Mr. Greer, Inspector General,

"authorized William Marvay by mamo to handle the project on

a special basis"?:

Ir. Brecki-ridge.

Do I have a copy of that manorandun?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Brechinriage. It is in the files and we can retrieve

Plans.

Chairman Church. Mr. Bissel was the Deputy Director of

Ths record would indicate that he knew of the re-

activation of the operation to assassinate Castro in April of

1962, and ir. Harvey, I take it, was assigned that duty?

Hit. Breckinridge.

If I may go back, it was in the fall

of 1FG1.

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was

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- MI. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It

in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment

by Mr. Bissel. I think Mr. Bissc: left in 1962. I am no: sure

of the dates,

So MI. Bissel would have known at that time.

But I am not sure after that.

Chairman Church. Helms succeeded Mr. Bissel as chief

of operations?

MI. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.

Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.

Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle

operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executi

capability -- whatever that ineans. Presumably that means a

capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized

by proper authority?

No. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.

Chairman Church. Is that your understanding?

air. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

•..

Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that

based upon what has been firealed through your interrogation?

Mr. Breckinridge. First, "let me go back and clarify, than

I will answer this question, it I may.

Mr. Helms approved ZP Rifle, which the record showshas the

responsibility of stealing codes, essentially.

My understanding, fron my interviews, is that R Rifle had

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also the responsibility for executive action capability. That

1s a difficult phrase.

The record does not show that Mr. Helms knew when he approved

the projest that it had this dual role. So from that poins of

view, I have a record that shows what the project was supposed

to have been as far as its open description, though classified,

and the result of our interviews with Mir. Harvey which tell the

other story about executive action capability. So it does not,

the record does not show that Mr. Helms at that time knew what

that was.

Chairman Church. If Harvey knew that it had this other

aspect, who would have told him to develop such a capability, i

it were not his superior?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a logical conclusion, bus

I was distinguishing what the record showed and what our intervies

developed.

Chairman Church. Didn't you ask Harvey in interviewing

him whether or not Helms had told him to develop this capability

as a part of the ZR Rifle?

Didn't. you ask him who told. him to develop this capability,

or did he do it on his own?

Mi. Breckinridga. Your question is a very proper one, ara

my difficulty is with the record which goes back to what Bissel

instructed Harvey to do.

MI. Schwarz. Bofore licims tool the job, Bissel told Harvey

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to take, charge of the Castro assassination project?

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- MI. Breckinridge. Bissel told Harvey to create the executi

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action capability.

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Mr. Schwarz. But he also told him to take charge of the

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Castro assassination project using the Mafia; isn't that

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correct?

MI. Breckinridge. Now, there is no record except the

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record that came from our interviews on this score. All I

am trying to do is draw the distinction between what the reccra

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shows and what our interviews: developed, and there are gaps

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Chairman Church. Your interviews show that Mr. Bissel, who

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preceded Helms, told Mr. Harvey to develop an executiva action

capability, which was a capability to assassinate if and wher

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ordered; right?

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Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

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Chairman Church. And your records show that Mr. Bissel

also Instructed Harvey to take over the Castro assassination

attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship

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between the CIA and the Mafia?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a correct assumption, -

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yes.

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Chairman Church. Now, when do your records show that llelins

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becare aware: of Harvey's whole assignment as given him by

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Bissel?

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Mr, Breckinridge. I don't have the accurate date. lie have

the 16 August 1963 memorandum, i promised Mr. Schwarz

that I

would try and find the date, and I was out of town yesterday

and simply didn't do it. But I have to go through the rucora

to find the earliest date that we have, and I simply have to go

into the record to dig this out.

Senator Schweiker.. Do your records show the date of when

the actual latest assassination attempt, was finished?

Mr. Schwarz. For Castro?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

When was that timeframe, roughly?

Mr. Breckinridge. You are talking about the Mafia connecti:

Senator Schweiker.

No; I am talking about when did 'ne

finally cease and desist in attempting to assassinate Castro,

from your records?

MI. Breckinridge. Let me, if I may, and I don't mean to

confuse the issue -- the Mafia connection from beginning to end

was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called

off finally in the Spring, perhaps february, of 1963..

Senator Hart of Michigan. What year?

Mr. Breckinridga. 1963.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Nafia part?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir. The Cuballa Association has a

different origin.

Chairman Church.

First, who called off the Mafia operatio:

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MI. Brechinridge. As near as I could tell, larvey.

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Chairman Church. Harvey?

Mr: Breckinridge. Harvey. Harvey decided that it could''t

succeed. Harvey was leaving the country for a foreign assignmon

and in conversation with roselli - Roselli was the man who was

in the Mafia through whon the Agency had continued to work --

and Roselli agreed that nothing was happening, nothing could

happen, and it should be called off. We don't have a record

that harvey went anywhere for approval. This doesn't mean that

he may not have discussed it, but I don't have the record of it.

So Harvey in his conversation with Roselli, terninated the

operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The memo which we saw at the

last session, which I don't know we officially have, 'ir. Colby

made it available to us -- was a wrap-up of the whole thing, or a

memo to the files, and I can't recall now who did it.

MI. Schwarz. That is the one referring to the meeting

with Robert Kennedy that we spent some time Icoking at.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That was the Sheffield-edwards

memo which say with the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion

operation, no further attempt was made with the ilafia. It ticd

it directly to the Bay of pigs.

Mr. Colby.. That was the first phase. There was a second

phase that followed with the Mafia.

Chairman Church, He now knoir from what you have said that

Harvey called off the ilafia connection, and we don't kroin whether

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that was done with the knowledge of authority of anyone more hi

placed in the CIn.

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know.

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Chuirman Church. All right, after Harvey left the country

who was then assigned

to undertake the subsequent efforts again

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the life of Castro?

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Mr. Breckinriage.

This brings us to Senator Schweiker's

question. A man by the name of Orlando Cubella, who had been

met in Mexico City by the Agency in 1961, who had been one of

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the leaders of the anti-Batista groups and held the rank of rajor

in the Cuban

army, that is the highest rank they have, Cuelia

was an M.D. and had been a youth leader and attended youth

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conferences around the worla, and was met first in Mexico City.

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and later he was met in Scandinavia on several occasions. And

the conversations during these various meetings had to 2o with

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Cubella's desire to have a change in Cuba, and the attempt on

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the Agency people who net with him to explore his ability to

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substitute a governrent as well as be able to overthrow thori

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existing government.

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These conversations

were very general, exploratory,

and

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non-productive.

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In one of the early meetings with Cubella, he taiked about

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climinating Castro, and the Agancy employee used the word

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assassination, which was

reported back as being an offensive

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word to Cubella, and instructions were issued that Cubella was

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not to be given a mission of elimination of Castro or anyone

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else.

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He was met in October of 1963, at which time he made the

proposai that he wished to have rapons with which to coltit

an assassination, and this proposal was rejected.

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He continued to speak in these terms, and finally, I cannot

give you the level of approval -- that might be at the level

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of Mr. Fitzgerald -- and I don't recall which job Mr. Fitzgerald

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had then, whether he headed the Cuban Task Force or whether he

had become i=

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MI. linoche. He replaced Harvey.

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Mr. Schwarz.' He did meet with this man and gave him a

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weapon or poison pen with which to kill Castro?

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Mr. Brechintidge. Fitzgerald did not give him the pen.

Mr. Schwarz. But discussed the subject?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I was considering the question of

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level of authorization, and I don't recall. I would assume

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Mr. Fitzgerald vas the highest level of authorization that If.

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know of.

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Chairman Church. And Fitzgerald's position at that

time?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I was questioning whether he had -- he

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had three jobs in fairly quick succession. Whether he replaced

liarvey as hoad of the Cuban Tast. Fozce, then he became Chief of

milk, the western lenisphere Division, and then he became for

a short time Deputy Director of Plans. But he died of a

heart

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attack.: I don't know whether he had at that time -- it wouid

be in October of 1963.

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Hs. colby.. I think at that time he was cither lead of tic

Cuban furse or Chief of the lesten Hemisphere Division.

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Chairman Church, Hill you get that for the record?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Breckinridge. The decision was taken to try and give

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Cubella some instrument. A ball point pen was designed that

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could be used as a syringe. Because Cubella was a doctor, the

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pen was given to him in Paris on the 22nd of November, 1963,

with the suggestion that he use it.

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Chaizman Church. By whom was the pen given?

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Mr. Breckinridge. It was given by a case officer of the

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Agency. In fact, Cubella refused to take it. When we irote oui

report, ve thought he accepted it, but I've sinca learned he

refused it. He said it was not practical.

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Because he was a doctor it was suggested that he could

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acquize the naterial to put in the pen, but he refused to accept

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Conversations continued, and finally the Agency arranged

to put down two caches at sea off the coast of Cuba, one of

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which had weapons in it, one of which had just general equipment.

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Senator Schweiker. Could cither of those involve the story

that appeared in the press under Colonel Prouty's statenent?

ir. Breckinridge. No, sir:

My MOM TEA TIME, REEN

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Senator Schweiker. Did that come later, Colonel Prouty?

Mr. Breckinridge, He still don't know what colonel Prout!'

statement refers to..

Hit. linoche.

Senator Schweiker. What?

Prouty's allegaiions go back to 1959.

Mr. Knoche.

1959, Late 1959 and early 1960.

Mr. Breckinridge. We arranged to have a Cuban refugee

leader meet Cubella in Spain, at which time he gave nim an

additional weapon. That would have been in February of 1964,

I think.

Chairman Church.

What kind of weapon was given to him?

Mr. Breckinridge. It is my recollection it was a rifle.

I am not sure of that.

Cubella continued to have conversations and meetings from

tine to time as he came out of Cuba, and finally in the middie

of 1965 the decision was taken to cut off contact with him

because there were serious questions about the security of his

organization.

lle was arrested, I think. I think I have gotten my dates

right. It is subject to correction. He was arrested in the

early part of 1966 and tried, made a confession, had a public

trial, which was reported in the press.

I wonder if I might check those dates?

Chairman Church. Surely.

While you check those dates, perhaps Mr.. Colby could

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explain how it was during this period that Cubella was able

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to return to Cuba and travel to Europe.

I assume he vas able to return to Cuba?

Mr. Colby, lie was a Cuban officer at that time, and

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apparently loyal to Castro. He would go out on various trips

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and things like that, and we would meet him there.

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Mr. Schwarz. He was the man who met with ir. Hunt in

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Madrid?

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MI. Colby. He met with a friend of Mr. Hunt. A Cuban exil

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met Cubella in Madrid. That is when the weapons were handed

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over.

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Mr. Schwarz. ' Was Mr. Hunt in Madrid at that time?

WAND & PAUL

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Mr. Colby. Yes.

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Mr. Breckinridge. No, because this man by the name of

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Artino, met Cubella in Madrid in December of 1961, and in

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February 1965 he made the delivery of the weapons. Hunt was

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not assigned there until the middle of 1965, after this was

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over.

He don't know where that story came from.

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Mr. Colby. Hunt and Artimo are very close, and he is the

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godfather of one of their children, and things like that.

He

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Imay have told him about it.

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Chairman Church. During this period you have described,

wien these various contacts, were made with Cuballa, who was

the highest officer within the CIA who had knowledge of these

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contacts and who authorized them to be made, as far as your

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investigation shows?

Mr: Breckinridge. I don't know the level at which the

contacts were known:

I would assume that the continuing contac

were known at a high level, but I have to assume that, and this

goes to a point when Senator Schweiker was asking the question

at the last time. This is the last instance that we know of

in which

assassination was involved.

Senator Schweiker. That is, both your records and your

interviews indicate that this was the last known activity,

according to your investigation?

MI. Breckinridge.

That was specifically related to

Castro:

Senator Schweiker. And that date was when?

Mr. Breckinridge.

vell, our contact with the Cubella group

was broken off in June of 1965.

Senator Schweiker.

June of when?

:

ME- Breckinridge.

1965.

I don't want to confuse you, but I would life to introduce

la

consideration that relates to this.

chairman Church. Before you do that, I have asked what

your investigation shows is the highest officer who knew and

under whose authority these continuing contacts were made, and

you said you assumed it must have been known to higher authority.

ax. Breckinridge. I said that about the contacts. sout

the contacts, I assumed this was known fairly high in the Agoney

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Chairman Church. The contacts and their purpose?

_MX: Breckinridge. This is a distinction I want to make.

The peopla who were involved, and this is difficult -

but their statenent of state of mind, and your interpietation,

may be different things. But the people who were involved

considered that the purpose of the association with Cubella was

he was a man

I who was high in the Castro government, he was a

man who represented a dissatisfied element, he had people who

agreed with him, and the hope was that this could be developed

into a group in Cuba that in some way could replace the govern-

ment..

The conversations with Cubella were really not productive,

and Cubella wanted demonstration of support, tangible support,

and the conversations progressed to the point that he wanted

equipment with which he could commit and assassination.

In the minds of the people who dealt with him, the question

of assassination was not uppermost, so much as it was to give

hin a material demonstration of support.

I don't mean to be trite, but the United States or the

Agency has in the past provided weapons of one kind or another

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¡to people, paramilitary. In the minds of these people, however

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credible to you this distinction is drawn, so assassination

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becare a consideration, but assassination had not been the

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objective:

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I am sorry, one more point.

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The point at which they bogan to providc weapons to him

should have required higher level approval. I don't know what

the level of approval was.

Mr. Schwarz. It should have under the normal procedures?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. At one point a meeting took place and an

agent of the CIA gave him a ballpoint pen that had been special:

designed to camouflage a syringe, and gave it to him with the

recommendation that it would be filled with poison and used to

kill Castro.

Are you saying that the agent may have done this without

the knowledge of the Director or the Deputy Director for Plans;

soreone high in the Agency? .

Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am saying there should have been

authorization. I don't know the level of that authorization. I

merely tried to draw a distinction because it is a question raisi

in my mind, it was raised by Senator Schweiker's question -- her

was the last attempt of assassination?

This developed to the point where assassination was

involved, and this was the last such interest that we know of.

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying after the incident that

Senator Church just asked you about, at that point the emphasis

shifted fron assassinating hin to replacing hin?

Is that what you are. trying to toll us, or did I misconstru

that, too?

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Mr. Breckinridge.

No; I am confusing the issue by trying

to describe the state of mind of the people who were involved i

the operation.

Chairman Church.

tell us that.

He don't even know who were involved.

Mr. Breckinridge. As far as I know, Mr. Fitzgerald would

be the highest level that I know was aware of this.

Chairman Church.

what was his position? We are back to

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that:

Mr. Colby. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

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Senator Morgan. Is he dead?

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- Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Breckinridge. The problem that you are having, mich

is one that we have, is raconstructing certain aspacts of this,

quite frankly, and we have attempted to reconstruct it by the

record, where the record supports it by interviews, where the

interviers can fill gaps, and it was of some interest to

try to get fron the people involved their rationale.

The

•rationale is difficult, complex, ard I have tried to corvey

that because it was brought to my mird by Senator Schweicker's

guestion.

Mx. Colby: 'If I could help interprat this from a cultural

patters.

I think: the poirt is that wa locatad this major, hel

looked like a very promisina contact withir cuba who coula

possibly replace castro.

or bring about his disposition, and so

forth, just r=move hin without ary spacifics.

In the course of the convarsations, the 1963 meating with

the ballpoint par toon place. 'e dor't have any clear recorá

as to who authorized that particular aspect of the relationshin

concerning the ballpoint pen. The fact that e then went on

with him until '64 and '65 with the offers of weapons fits

into the gencral support of that sffort ard doesn't racessarily

coircide with the daliberate attemots to assassinate him,

althougn it could, and our I-cords don't clearly indicate one

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way of the other on that.

- Chairman Church. A cache of weapons delivered on the

coast of Cuba hardly constitutes an arsenal by which it reaso..

could be assumed that the government can ba overthrown.

It

does, howaver, fit into a scheme of providing the major ardl

his conorts with a capability of assassirating the Cuban leader

ir. Colby. It also coincides with the possibility of

the first step toward additional arms.

I am not denying it, ir. Chairman. I am saying that the

records do='t clearly indicate it, and this gets back to Mr.

Schwarz's origiral quastion to me - car you define "assassica-

tior."?

I would esspactfully request that I don't get into that

because there is a question as to then you are supportig amed

action and when you are commitzing an assassination.

Chairman Church. All right. Durina this whole perica

we understand that she Director of the CIA, who was ile. licCore,

had said he had so noledge of these ongoing activities.

sir, colby. I would inagine that his testimony that he

did not know of an assassination vould be consistant with my

comment as to the weapons being given in support of armed actio:

but not the specific assassination plans. I don't kro that

but I an saying that is a possible explaration of the differenc:

between those stories.

Chairmar Church. Ma will hava to question NI. McCone mich

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more closely on that poirt.

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But you are unable now to tell us in connection with thess

later activities

whether or not there was specific knowledge

of their connaction with the assassiration purpose, above the

level of ar. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Brackinridge. At this moment I canrot.

Senator Morgan.

May I pursue a line of questions for just

a few minutes?

First of all, Mi. Schwarz, this document, Exhibit A, who

prepared it?

This is the origiral rough craft that was prepared only

-

by the typists?

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Ken Greer document.

r. Colby. Prepared by one of Mr. Brachinridge's

associates, ir. Kenneth Greer.

Senator Morgar.

What was the purpose of the preparation

of this document?

"Mr. Colby. It followed the

• 9eh of day, 1973 directive

by Mr. Schlesinger for a report on all questionable activitis.

These were gathered together by ir. Greer and the other members

of the Inspector General's office ard a summary of them vas

provided to me

to usa to brief the Chairman of the two committe:

Senator Morgan.. This was the best infornation that the

Agency vas able to obtain at the time?

Me. Colby,, That was the information availabla to the

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Inspector General at the time. I think I would say it vas abl.

I don't think ve instituted an aggressive, positive investigas.

ile rather collacted what ia had available.

Senator Morgan. Well, there have been assassinatior.

attempts or efforts on the part of the government. There's

no

question in my mind. The question I want to pursue is that

in the document marked here Exhibit A, project 79 Rifle, it

stated that early in the kennedy Administration, "the hite

House urged Richard Bissel to craate an executive actior.

capability."

That is a general standby capability to carry out

assassirations."

Now, that was the prinary purpose of aR Rifla: is that

your understandina?

is. Colby. It was one of the purposes of the zR Rifle

project.

Senator Morgan.

"the hite Mouss"?

And it was done at the instigation of

Mr. Colby. lie have ond record which states that fr

Bissel nade this statanent without further precision.

Senator Morgan.

And where is Mr. Sissal?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Bissal, I think, lives in Cornecticut ros.

Senator Morgan.

Now later on we find that this projact

continued on under a man by the rame of Bill llarvay, did it

not?

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Colby. Yes, sir.

- Senator Morgan.

And then on June 27, 1973, he vrota

a mamorandun to the Chief FI staff:

What does FI staff mean?

Mr. Colby. A foreign intelligerca staff.

Senator Morgan. Stating that the original justification

for employing l.J. Minn no longer existed ard raised the

question of his termination?

Mr. Colby. '53 was it?

• Senator Morgan. Jure of 1953. He was tarminated in

April of 1964?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Morgan.

now there is no doubt in your nird but

what this project was kaoin by the Director of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Approved by the Director. I don't think we

can say for sure.

Senator Horgan.

ir. Colby, isn't it a raaschable assumptic!

that"it a project of this magnitude was to carry out tha

assassination, it would not ba cisated without the abproval

of the Director of the CIA?

ix. Colby. It better not be created vithout my approval

now, I will guarantee you.

Senator Morgan. It certainly is not reasonable to assina

that even in 1961 it would have boer so created?

fir. Colby.

I would think that the general idea. whether

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the specific project or not but the general idea is so

significant, ard that is tha irdication that Mr. Dulles did

know of this act at the tine. Whether it was spacificalli

brought to the attention of his successor I could not acidally

testify ore way or the other.

Senator dorgan. HI. Colby, car. you make any more sansitiv:

a project at the CIA than one of assassination?

Mr. Colby, When tir. Schlesinger came ir. I made sure he

was aware of anything I knev.

Senator Morgan. And this being true, aren't you satisfied

in your own mird that all your directors were aware of this

project 2R Rifle until such time as it was tarminated?

MI. Colby. That is a conclusion, Senator.

give testimony on that.

I can't

Sarator Morgan. It is à conclusion, bat you are ar

expert.

ir. Colby.

Right.

-Senator Morgan. You are the Director of the CIA and toú

have had the experience and knowledge of the history of the

CIA.

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Let me ask you, based upon your history, the history and

th= knowledge of the CIA that you kno of, have as Director,

and you have gained as Directos, aren't you satisfied that

¿V=ry director knew of this project?

Mr. Colby. In the face of the statenent by 'ir. leCon

Tan CenT

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ha did not know of it, I find that statement disficult to

challenge.

I agras with you, he should have krows about it, but I

could not say for sure that statement is not accurate.

Senator Morgan. One final question. Mr. McCone left

the Agency when?

MI. Colby. In 1965.

Senator Morgar. I won't ask any other questions except

for the racord I coula like to say this so I car. remember ly

I was pursuing this later o.

I asked these questions ros to try to show the assassinati

plan, bacause I think that has already been established, and

if that is all we are after we can move on to something else.

But the thing that does concern me is that if this prin

continued on until and past the time that President karredy

was assassinated, then it raises a question in my mird as to

whether or noù Castro hinself may not well have known about it

and whither or not the President's assassination nay not have

been a part of a recrinisation plan and it may just opar the

door to whather or not later on we should decida to 100k irto

that.

That is the

Isasor. I have followed that line of quastions.

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Senator llart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection with

ZE Rifle, I think you testified or your associate said this was

a multi-purpose operation, including stealing codes, and the

development of the capability of what euphemistically is called

executive action.

In your professional judgment, and with your history of

your backyround in the Agency, does it make any sense to you that

a major operation; a major intelligence gathering operation of

the sort of stealing codes, which I assume means from other

governments, would be mounted under the direction of a man

about whom all I know is that it. Harvey has a background of

something like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the lovel,

I should say, of $7500 to $10,000?

Does it not suggest to you that stealing codes was in

fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassination

operation with unlimited, non-voucher financial capability?

Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.

In the first place, ir. Harvey had a very successful tour

in Sexilin where he ran the berlin tunnel operation, which was

one of our major successful intelligence operations.

Mr. Harvey was a very colorsul figure who had his lifestyle,

which is different than some others, but he had been very

effective at that, and very adventuresore in that category of

signals intelligence and a very "enturesome icca of tiat nature.

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lie was in the assignment of Chick of the FI Division staff.

That staff's major function is to conduct the signals intelligen

work which rust be done in the clandestine service.

It hindles our efforts today to penetrate into foreig.

code rooms abroad, and things of that nature, and it involves

the breaking into of safes and things, all that complicated

material.

Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability"

executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of

this material, that kind of a project. In other words, a

code-breaking, a stealing operation, obviously that is to be

kept very, very secret. If you get caught in it, it has all

¡sorts of very bad diplomatic implications, and so forth.

Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of

the work of that particular group.

You also are dealing with some very venturesome people

who are willing to cravl into somebody elsels code room and

take the chance of getting caught.

So, given you have a man who had some good technical

experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a

aprogram which is not too far off the requirements of high

compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and

therefore, for lit. Bissel to have selected llarvey to carry out

this project seems to me that it is compatible that he could

be running code-breaking projects, or code stealing projects,

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as well as this other activity.

Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second!

one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been

discussing. It was not to be put on the record although to be

done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me,

but to say that thewcode

stealing was only a cover I think is

"probably an unwarranted conclusion.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding

of $7,500 to $10,000?

Mr. Colby. That is not very much money jor that kind of

an operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Precisely. I think it is too

little.

Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is

largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own

staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't

think you can draw nuch conclusion from the actual number on

the figure, one way of the other.

This might not have been the only such project. You know,

an assassination project would cost you more money than that,

too.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Absolutely.

Nir. Colby. I find it hard to say that that is the only

amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation

where additional money would be put into either of those kinds

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of activities. I wouldn't get hung up on the bureaucritic

aspect d the number of dollars.

• senator Hart of Colorado. So Mr. Harvey, if the decision

were made to try to liquidate a foreign leader, and Mr. Paivey

found the instrumentality, the individual to do that, and that

required $100,000, all he had to do was come back in and say?

Mr. Colby. He could get it.

MI. Schwarz. I think we should have the record reflect

two things. The two gentlemen talking are not eyewitnesses to

what we have, been talking about.

second, and related to that, for us to pursue this mattes,

ve must have, and must have right away, the better evidence

which is in the possession of the CIA, which is at least the

Inspector General report of 1967; and more importantly than that?

the interview notes reflecting whatever interviews you had

with shonever you interviewed at that time or later.

Mr. Colby. These we will make available to you to the

extent we have them.

11r. Breckinridge. We rctained no notes.

we kept only the

one report that ie submitted to Mr. Helms at that time, the one

copy.

When he left the Agency he returned it to us.

Noir, the files on the cubella affair and the truji affair

exist, ind they are available.

Mr. Schwarz. Can we have it understood that, Mr.

Breckinridge, you will as

you did with the initial material..

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come down sometime early next week and we can go over it and

so forth?

. -

Mr. Colby, Suic. If we can just have the same sort of

normal ground rules about the papers.

Chairman Church. Sure. They always apply unless

--

Mr. Colby. I know.

Chairman Church. -- unless we say differently.

Mr. Schwarz. No, just following up one more thing on

Senator llart's question of some time ago.

fiould you determine with respect to five different periods

of time nether, first, there was any internal evaluation

within the Central Intelligence Agency as to whather or not

the assassination attempts should continue and, second, whether

there was any discussions with persons outside of the Central

Intelligence Agency as to whether of not the piot should continue

and the period of time would be the initial authorization, wich

was March 1960, after the Bay of Pigs, during the missile

crisis. And, parenthetically there, will you state whether it

was possible Castro might have been assassinated pursuant to

an ongoing plan during a period of time when the United States

and Russia were close to a nuclear confrontation. The next

case is John F.Kennedy's assassination:

Finally, at the tire of the break-off in June of 1965,.

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which I believe was Mr. Breckinridge's testimony, was anybody in

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higher authority told that the oporation had been broken off?

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Because that will bear upon whether anybody in higher authority

had authorized or requested the operation.

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Mr. Colby. Yes,

fine.

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Mr. Ichwarz. Can I pick up then on another subject rich

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ve just barely touched on last tine, Mr. Colby?

This is related to the question I asked you about the use

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of criminal elements.

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Senator Mathias. Before we leave this, I have one question.

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Chairman Church. Senator Mathias.

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Senator Mathias. In light of the fact this poison pan was

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actually proffered on the 22nd of November, 1963, is there a

scintilla of evidence -- and vas proffered to a Major in the

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Cuban Army on active duty -- is there a scintilla of evidence

14l that anyone in the Cuban

Government had any knovledge or suspicio:

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prior to that date that this was a project that was planned?

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Mr. Colby. There is certainly no evidence that anyone

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had that information with respect to the Cubella operation.

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Mr. Breckinridge.

NO.

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MI. Colby. The second phase of the Mafia operation nad been

wrapped up by then, I think.

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Mr. Breckinridge.

Yes.

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M. Colby. The individual in Cuba involved in it had

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take asylun, I think.

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Mr. Breckinridge,

rio, the sequenco is a little cifferent.

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Mr. Colby. A little later:

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Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. There vere people wio reportcilly

vere ant into Cuba, a team of three people -- and I said reporter

because we were working then through a Cuban exile leader.

They had the assignment of recruiting additional penple to

carry out such plans as might be developed. We never knew what

happened to those people - whether. they came back

-- only that

they were sent in.

But if you are looking for a possibility of knowledge of

an assassination plot, conceivably those three people could be

the source. of it, but not that the United States Government was

behind it. •

Senator Mathias. But it is conceivable that Castro and

his government could have come upon some evidence that some

plot was afoot?

MI. Colby.

He certainly could have cross allegations, and

you really must assume that various of the other kind, even

independent activities, or the first phase of the Mafia progran

could have produced allegations of attempts against him with

the conment that CIA or the United States was behind it. The

possibility of that kind of allegation is just almost infinite.

Serator Mathias. Particularly considering the nature of

the instruments that were being deployed?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir..

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Nr. Breckinridge. There is another consideration."

chairman church, You really haven't told us on the recor

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until just now, in response to Senator Mathias, just what the

second phase of the Mafia connection for assassination Castro

was.

We really haven't had the detail except as you gave it

to Senaio: Mathias.

I wonder if you could complete the record on this second

phase. Give us all the information that you know about that.

MI. Breckinridge., Before I do, one additional consideratio

The Cuban exile community in Miami was engaged in a great

deal of plotting of its own and a great deal of hyperbole, and

it is safe to assume that Castro also had reports of assassinati,

schenes or threats from that group. So there is one more source

to that sort of thing.

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Senator ilorgan. ¡here is Cubella nov? 'Is he still in

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prison?

Mr. Breckinridge. In jail on the Isle of Pines.

Sanator Morgan. Are we sure of that?

Mr. Breckinridge. I asked somebody the other day and they

said that is where they thin ha is.

Senator Morgan. I just wondered whose agent he really

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was.

ir. Colby.

He has been in jail for a long time if ne

was Castro's.

Senator Morgan. You testifiad he was abla to go in and

out of. Cuba fairly frequently.

'Mr. Colby. He was an associate of Castro's, there is

no question abous that, bui he had an independent relation

with us that finally got picked us. "I shiak thas is imporsant,

Nix. Chairman, that wa try to keep his rama out of any publisher

documants for that Isason.

There is no use getting him in

more trouble.

Senator Schweick=r. That is for surs.

Chairman Church. There is no argamant on that score.

Hould you please furnish us with all of the details as to

the second phasa of the lafia conraction?

mr. Breckinridge. He will give you nore accurate astail

when me give you the report, but I will ricise noir the best

that I can scall.

10RD

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Chairman Church.. Bafore you do, would you just explain

exactly what the r=lationship between CIA and Giancana and

Mahau was because that is not clear in my mird.

Would you develop for the conmittee that whole relationshine

Mr. Breckinridge. Robart Maheu usad to work for tbe

Fal and a resigned from the FBI and opened a private investiga-

tive firn here in Washington ar' CIA used him from time to

tina for certain kinds of support activities.

Chairman Church. What kind of support activities?

Mr. Breckinridge. On one

occasion he obtained a female

companion for an important foreign leader.

Chairnas Church, What other kird of support?

Mr. Breckinridge. In the early days -- and this becones

an.

embarrassment.

As nearly as I can recoastruct, the people

who knew him decided to put hin on a r=tainer in tha Office

of Sacurity, which they did for awhile, until he as so

successful he said he no longer nesded the retaines, which is

didn't do much to earz. He later got involved represanting

one of the Greek shipping interests and ma were given the

results of some of the information that he obtained from that

where there was a fight between liarchos and Drassis. le

think he may havs had some involvement in another foreigr

leader's companionship when he was in this country. I dor':

nave the details. I thini ve can probably raconstruce it for

you.

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Chairman Church. Can we have the file on him?

- ir. Breckinridg=. I think ve will provide ore on that.

We have one, yes.

Chairman. Church. Very well.

Mr. Breckinridge. When Maheu left Hashington and moved

out west, I think first to LOS Angeles, later to Las Vegas,

where he became associated with the Hughes organization, and

when the question arose about getting an irtroduction to the

Halia, because shay dia have gambling irterests in Cuba at

that time, the Office of Security, Colonel Edwards was asked

if he could establish a contact, and he went to Maneu, or

had someone go to Mahau, to see if Maheu could make such ar

introduction.

Maneu knew a man by the name of Johnry Rosalli, who

lival in Los Angeles, uno had this concassion for the icemaki:a

machines on the strip in Las Vegas, and he arranged, Rosalli

arrarged an introduction to -- the CIA actually arranged,

our sian didn't meet Giarcana, I don't balisve, arrarged an

introduction, but Giancana who in turn arranged an introáuctio.

to à mar. by the rama of Santos arafficanta.

Trafficante was the head of the Cuban gambling interests

and Castro had allowed them. First he had closed them, then

he reoperad than nopinn to attract tourists. And Traificante

travelled to and fron Cuba.

Giancana sarvad only as the introduction to trafficanta.

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This was all done through roselli.

• Our paople never -- they all dealt with Rosalli, who ir

turn deal with the othars.

Roselli

was in essency a cut-out or served as the middle

man: Roselli vas never paid for his services.

Giancana clearly knew eventually the government associatio:

Roselli came to know of it, though initially he was irtroduced

to tha CIA person.as a man who worked for Maheu on an assigment

by a private cliert.

so initially the cover story was Maheu's private client

who had an interest insid= Cuba. Giancana never really vas

irvolved subsequertly.

He dia arrange -- it vas Trafficante from than on -- and

Trafficante had a source inside Cuba who had an offica, had

a position ir the Office of the Prims Minister. Me as believ=s

10 have access to castro and a poison pill was ieveloped tha:

he was to insert into Castro's food. The pills vere sent in

to this man.

That we did not krow at the time was the man.

had lost his job and lost his access and the pills vere r=turned

sit. Colby. That is the firs: phase.

Senator Schweicker.

would you dats that?

ir. Breckinridge.

That would go into the early part of

1951, March-April, 1951.

vir. Schwarz.

The pills were given as part of the first

phase to à secord person in Cuba; is that correct?

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HI. Breckinridge. Just before the first phasa anded,

Roselli, through Trafficante, was introduced to anothar Cuban

exile leader in Miami by the

name of Anthony Varona. Again,

his name is a sensitive matter.

Varona was the leader of one of the groups that was being

supported by the CId as part of the preparation for the Bay

of Pigs.

Varona was unhappy wich his association, with the associatio

with the CIA. He felt he had rot been given enough morey.

Varona häd pisvious contact with the criniral element in Cuba

ard he was

approached by Roselli with Trafficante's introductio.

to take on this mission.

Roselli's story was that he represented some private cliens

wino had interest in Cuha. Th= Rosalli identity was aparan,

as was Trafficante's.

Varora said he kaew someone

who was in a restaurant that

Castio frequented and then the pills were transportei again.

"Pir. Schwarz.

Could you seat= for the recoid who mads tha

pills?

ir. Breckirriage.

The pills were made in what vas then

the Technical Services Division of the CIA.

ir. Schwarz.

Had they ever made such pills before?

Hr. Breckinridge. Hot that I know of.

ir. Schwarz. had they ever used Soculinum as a poisor. in

c-i:

and way batore?

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Mr. •Breckinridge. On ons previcus occasion Botulinum

had-beer considared for use or cigars that soneone had hoped

to get to Castro, and eventually that never got off the ground.

This was a scheme that was never approved and never want corvard

I know of that one instance ir which it was considered.

Botulinun was made into pills and these pills were taker.

again to Cuba. Castro stopped going to the restaurant vhere

this man was.

Th= Bay of pigs occurred and the operation

was called off.

When Harvey took over and then reactivated the second phass

in April, of 1962, they went back to Varona, and one of the

strange things is that Varora started off wish the repatition

of the original restaurant aporoach, which I think caused

some question as to the gap bususen what we were told and

what was happining.

Varoza after this didn't materializa. Varona then stated

that he had sant thres men into Cuba whose job vas to recrui

aciciicio.äl peopla for such plan as may develop. He later

planned to send in three nore people. He don't believe they

ever went.

The missile crisis intervened. There were a number

of dalays and we don't think they ever did go in.

The first three men, if in fact they did go in -- we

don't krow who they were, ive don't know what thay did, we

don't kaow nether they came out or not.

As a matter of interest, the man who was to go back --

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Chairman Church. It is possible they went in ard could

have been

• captured by Castro?

MI. Breckirriage. It is possible.

The question that Senator Mgan asted earlier, whus they

could have krown -- these man we don't balieve could hav= krow.

the actual backors of the oparatior, becaus= Varora was dealing

with a mamber of the syndicate with whom he had previous

connections.

The people who dealt with Varona felt that pos-lli

was discreet and careful.

But those men could have been captured. They could have

supplied tis interpretation that they might rot have trom.

nothing cams of the operation, it was called off, bus

essentially that is the first and secord phase.

Chairman Church. These three men were to be sent crom --

ir. Breckinridge. They vare cubar exiles.

Chairman Church. To be sent in fron the United States?

•Ar. Coloy. From ths Unized States.

_Chairman Church. And why is it you don't kno wether or

not they were sent?

Mr. Breckinridge. The guestion exists in my mird. I

an not sure it exists in other people's minds.

As I reviewed the record, when we gos the record back, ii:

preparation for these inquiries, I vas struch by the fact that

Varona had told us at the very end of the first phase thai

he was usiny this restaurant, and when a year later the place

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was reactivated, the same story was used and already had bear.

proven not to ba so.

Later he talked in general terms about the thrae men ard

I began to develop some resarvation ir my mird as to whatner

or not varona had in fact told us the truth.

That is purely spsculation or my part.

Mr. Colby: This is a problan we live vith in the irtellige

business. ¡Then you are not able to be in direct contact, for

good reasons you are subject to fabrication, particularly if

there is some money involvea.

Chairman Church. Did the CIA, in comection with phase

one of phase two, pay any of these agents for their services?

Mr. Breckinridge. In phase one I think we paid expanse

mon=y• In phase two we gave money to varona.

is. Schwarz. And to Roselli?

lir. Breckirriage. Me paid experse money for Roselli.

it. Schrarz. You paid hin moray to buy gurs?

"Mr. Breckinridge. I was going to tell the gun story.

Varora wanted money aul guns and sone of the squipment that

he specified could be obtained only from the United States

military. And the equipment that was acquired at that time

did not include that kind of cauipment. It included aquioment

that could be obtalued from other sources and excluded l.s.

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military equipment. It vas provided through the assistance

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of the Miami station. A U-llanl truck vas picked up aad daliv

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I know.

- Hr. Breckinridge.

The first man who had the job in the

Offica of the Prime'llinister, this man did get kickbacks from

the crininals. I think that must be the one you remember.

took I-fuge in the Venezuelan embassy ard stayed there until

1961. He finally was giver safe conduct to pass out. The

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Mexican embassy took over Eron Venazuela. Cuba broke diplonatic

relations. Ha continued to be a political rufugee in that

embassy until th= fall of 1964.

Chairmân Church.

in the plot?

Ir. Breckinridge.

What was Varona's motive for participating

Varone was one of the exile leaders

who wanted to overthrow Castro.

He wanted more firancing ther

he had. He would cooperate with anyone.

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MI. Schwarz.

I would like to pick up on the discussion

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we had.

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Chairman Church. Mi. Schwarz has five minutes more, and

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we will conclude, and I rould lisi. to ask the Committee eu stay

on for ten more minutes for an exécutive session.

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BI. Schwarz. In the discussion we had on the use of

criminal elements, ve have dealt with the Castro operation.

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In the midale of the book supplied to us by Mr. Breckinridge

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earlier this week, there is a discussion about the Lumumis

operation, and the Agent Q. J. Win.

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Now, is it a fact that l. J. Win was the agent, or asset,

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however you would refer to hin, who apparently was considered

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for the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which never tock place;

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Is that right?

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Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

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• Ms. Schwarz. Now, is it accurate that l. J. Win operatca

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in Europe trying to spot and

assess individuals whom the Agency

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I could use in safecracking operations?

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Mr. Colby. This is what is reported, and it is quite

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possible.

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HI. Breckinridge. The record indicates that.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it further so that one of the CIA

officers who first met l. J: Win in Luxembourg, was on a.

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trip overscas to find safecrackers and document suppliers?

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Mr. Colby. Yes, that is what it says.

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Mr. Schwarz. Now, just as a maiter of historical record,

is the OSS the predecessor of the CIA in some senso?

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MI. COLDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz.

Is it correct that "Lucky" Luciano was used

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to help the OSS in connection with operations in Italy during

the Second World liar?

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Mr. Colby. I don't know, but I have heard that story

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las well. It is an extensive story but I don't know the facts.

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Mr. Schwarz.

For the record, Mr. Luciano was a Mafia

figure who had been deported from the United States, or was in

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jail in the United States?

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Mr. Colby. Was in jail, I guess, and was later deported

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after the War.

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Mr. Schwarz.

Now, in connection with the instructions which

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you issued in 1973 concerning activities outside of the Charter

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of the CIA, you received, as we went through the other day, a

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report from the Inspector General leading up to that in lay of

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1973?

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Mr. Colby. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And was part of the report that the CIA

had itself conducted for local police departments in lashington,

Arlington, Fairfas: and Alevandria, during the perica 1968 and

1969, a

series of classes in items which included basics in

surveillance, photography, basic audio and countersabotage;

anci

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addition, this is what I particularly call your attention

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locks and picks and surreptitious entry?

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_ MI. COlby. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Schwarz. I am now reading from pages 225 and 226 of

the 694 lages, which I will mar!: 1s Exhibit io. 6.

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(The above-mentioned docurent was

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marked as Colby Exhibit to. 6

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for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz.

Is it the fact that, for example, between

October 7 and October 18, 1968, the CIA conducted a course for

the Hashington Police Department in the subject of surreptitious

entry?

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Mr. Colby. It was included in that, yes.

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Mr. Schwarz. What was the purpose of conducting such a

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course?

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Mr. Colby: lie had a relationship with various police

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departments around the country. They from time to time would

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unique to the CIA. There

are a number of things that we have

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to do in CIA which are quite frankly outside the norm of most

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other agencies of the Government.

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Chairman Church. Doesn't surreptitious entry refer to

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illegal entry?

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Mr. Colby. Going in secretly, that is what it means:

Entering secretly in some fashion of other, yes.

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Chairman Church. That is an illegal activity for local

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police, is it not?

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_ Mx. Colby. Presumably, yes.

Chairman Church.

Why is CIA conducting courses teaching

local police illegal activity, te, to conduct illogal opsations?

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Mr. Colby. I think at that time, ir. Chairman, that was

at the request of the police department of that area, that they

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were interested in this thing, and there is a defensive element

of it. In order to know how to protect against sorething, it

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is well to know how it is actually conducted.

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Chairman Church. Do you construe this activity to be

within the law, the basic statute which restricts your domestic

12 activities?

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Mr. Colby. I don't think it is a violation of the law,

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Mr. Chairman.

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I did give sore directive on that in 1973, that we not

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engage in this anynore, in conpliance with the spirit of the

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amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

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"Act, snich says that CIA will not provide support to the LEM

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in its assistance to local police departments. And as far as

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I was concerned, that is a policy that they don't want CIA in

touch with local police departrents.

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The fact of sharing our knowledge of techniques with a

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local police department does not in my mind get us into actually

conducting domestic police activity. There is a difference

there.

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Chairman Church. Yes. But apart from the technical

question of your jurisdiction, when you engage in teaching locai

police departments how to conduct break-ins, surreptitious

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break-ing, you are teaching them how to bicak the law.

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Mr. Colby. You are teaching them how the law is broken.

Chairman Church. That is right.

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Mr. Colby. Which can be useful to them in their knowledge

of how the law is broken, the techniques that are feasible.

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Chairman Church. Or can be useful to them in knowing how

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to break the law?

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Mr. Colby. It could. It is an item of information that

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• Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any situations where govern-

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engaged in break-ins within the United States?

Mr. Colby. I know of certain situations related to foreign!

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intelligence operations where access to appropriate targets has

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been obtained either through subterfuge of pretending to be a

workman or something of that nature, and I think in that history!

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there are some cases of actual break-ins.

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Now, I assure you, Mi. Chairman, we have been conducting

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break-ins abroad. There is no question about that. That is,

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Ive train our people to bo able to do that.

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Chairman Church. That is not the question I am raisirg

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with you.

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In

other words, these courses, it is my inpression, were.

generalized discussions of techniques. They vere not particulai

handholding on conducting a specific operation.

I think I am accurate in that

statenent.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, just a couple of quick questions.

First, with regard to the files, memoranda or diaries you

might have of former directors, are those still on Agenci

premises? Do you have those matters still there that were

left by former Directors?

Mr. Colby. Certain ones we do. I don't know of any that

we don't have.

As far as I am concerned, they are Agency property, and wien

I leave I am going to walk out without any paper.

Mr. Smothers. With respect then to the inguiries jou have

made with regard to information in the files on assassinations,

have these inquiries extended to an examination of those files

of former-Directors?

Nr. Breckinridge. In one or two instances on specific

points we have made irquiries. We have not gone through the

files in general for that purpose.

MI. Colby. We have gone through that collection I know of

Mr. Helms' files

I don't know of any specific set of files

called ir. McCone's files.

There is an executive registry where my correspondence is

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- Mr. Smothers. What I am searching for is the situation

where the generic classification of materials might soncho:

have not been complete enough for us to gat particular inuvledge!

and I was wondering prior to our nest meeting if a search

oriented with respect to the issue of knowledge might be a

fruitful exercise?

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Mr. Colby. Knowledge by previous diroctors of specifics

on this topic?

Mr. Smothers. Yes.

Mr. Colby. I think it is easy for Mr. Helms. I think

we have gone through his files. I don't know of any separate

set of files on Mr. Dulles or MI. McCone.

He will look.

, Senator Hondale. There is a reference to John Mccone's.

files in one of the menos that I looked at this morning.

Sx. Colby. I will check that, Senator.

Chairman Church. That is a good point, and I an glad you

have raised it.

I think we will conclude the hearing at this point with

the understanding, Mr. Colby, we will be back in touch with you.

Mr: colby. Surely.

Many times, I think, Mr. Chairnan.

Chairman Church. Yes.

I think that next week we will not have any formal meetings!

of the comittce, owing to the recess, but ve will then, I

think, we are going to have to go into tri-weckly meetings,

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beginning after the recess, so we can stop up the pace fut the

investigation.

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Senator Mondale. If they could get the Lansdale memo.

Mr. Colby. I will

do that tils afternoon.

I would like to add two things that have come to my attentio:

on the subject of assassinations, both of which are allegations,

both of which have been knocked down.

There was an allegation,

sore man has alleged that he was

working or conducting an assassination in Colonbia, and lie have

looked into the specifics of it, and there is absolutely nothing

to it. I thought I would mention it. I have the facts here

and will include them at sone time.

There is another allegation that one of our officers

had some knowledge of an attempt against Chou In-Lai, and he hasi

written me a note that points out that it is impossible for that'

to have happened because he wasn't in the place at the time.

Chairman Church. Since they are allegations into which

you bave inguired, I think you should make the papers available..

Mr. Colby. I will make sure the staff gets those. ~

• Chairman Church. Thank you very much. .

NI. inoche. Could I point out, I think we have the answer

to the photographs.

There were seven of these photographs taken at different

angles at the same time, but absolutely different tire intervals,

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duriny the tine that the police had these men in custody.

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Mc. Knoche. I am not sure. I am not certain for that

particular board that you were looking at.

with the blowup, they took this one of the seven photographs

which gives the best opportunity to look at the face.

MI. Colby. So they were separate photographs.

Chairman Church. Yes.

Mr. Knoche. I will be glad to leave that with you if you

would like to have it for your file.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock pim., the Committee

recessed subject to the

call of the Chair.)

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