MCGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY
Originator: SSCIA
From: BARON, FREDERICK
To: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
Document date: 7/10/75
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10014-10095

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

6/29/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

SSCIA

157-10014-10095

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-01

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM: BARON, FREDERICK

TO: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR

TITLE: MCGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY

DATE: 07/10/1975

PAGES:

150

SUBJECTS :

BUNDY, MCGEORGE

TRUJILLO

CIA

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE :

REPORT

CLASSIFICATION:

Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

12/02/1999

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

CCBOX 454

v9.1

50955

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Date:

Page :

08/06/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10095

RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-01

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM : BARON, FREDERICK

TO : SCHWARZ,

FREDERICK A.0. JR.

TITLE : MCGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY

DATE : 07/10/75

PAGES : 150

SUBJECTS : BUNDY, MCGEORGE

CIA

TRUJILLO

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

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BUNDY

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TOP SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM:

DATE:

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, JI.

Frederick Baron

July 10, 1975

McGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY

McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs from January 20, 1961 until

1966.

TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961.

During

1961 in the Kennedy Administration much of the primary

responsibility for following Dominican Republic affairs

was delegated by BUNDY to RICHARD GOODWIN.

The following broad issues should be raised in the ques-

tioning of Mr. BUNDY in relation to the TRUJILLO assassi-

nation:

What construction was given by the CIA, State

Department,

and Special Group during the Kennedy

Administration to the January 12, 1961 decision

by the Special Group in the waning days of the

Eisenhower Administration to approve "limited

supplies of small arms and other material" to

Dominican dissidents.

Did this authorization

carry over?

Was it

stretched

to cover supplies

of potential assassination weapons?

- Did the reporting to the President and the NSC

staff from State and CIA provide adequate notice

of the propensities for assassination on the part

of Dominican dissident groups with whom the CIA

was in contact? (See Rusk memo of 2/15/61, Bissell

memo ot 2/17/61,

and CIA memo of 5/13/61).

Specifically, did Bissell's memo of February 17,

1961 adequately respond to your request for infor-

mation for "higher authority"?

NH 50059 DupId: 32123183 -Page a

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•-2=

Did the CIA send a cable to the Dominican

station on May 29, 1961

as an authentic state-

ment of a policy to dissociate from political

assassination?

was this an attempt to

create a written record favorable to the u.S..

which was contrary to previous policy?

BUNDY's testimony in relation to the TRUJILLO assassina-

tion should involve the following questions (see the

Tabs indicated, which are contained in the binder of

TRUJILLO materials) :

I. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES - 12 January 1961 (Tab J)

Special Group approved the supply of a limited number

of small arms and other material to dissidents in the

and over the sypply,

Dominican Republic.

2.

SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES - 14 February 1961 (Tab A,

BUNDY binder)

"Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for

higher authority on the subject of what plans can

be made for a successor government to Trujillo."

What precipitated this request?

3.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM DEAN RUSK -

15 February 1961 (Tab Q)

4.

BISSELL MEMORANDUM TO BUNDY: "BRIEFING PAPER ON THE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC"- 17 February 1961 (Tab R)

5.

CIA MEMORANDUM PREPARED AT REQUEST OF RICHARD GOODWIN:

"CIA COVERT ACTIVITIES, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC" =

I3 May 1961 (Tab 3C)

6.

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY FROM CHESTER BOWLES

ATTACHING DRAFT TELEGRAM - 26 May 1961 (Tab 3-F)

7. CIA CABLE DIRECTOR TO STATION - 29 May 1961 (Tab 3-G)

8. CIA CABLE DIRECTOR TO STATION - 31 May 1961 (Tab 3-I)

NH. 30$53

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TO:

FROM:

Fritz. Schwarz

Frederick Baron

DATE: July 10, 1975

McGEORGE BUNDY

Testimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION

1. TABS (pp. 48-54 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to

create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could

have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51) who asked him

to do this. Bissell does not recall any specific

conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are

names of the two

people from whom it /the request

for such a capability/ is most likely to come from."

2. TAB T (PP. 58-59 - - 6/9/75)

Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would

have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request

(58).

3. TAB U (pp. 80-83 - - 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that the "urgings"for an EXECUTIVE

ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly

luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and represen-

tatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE

(81-82) •

Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he

would

have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82).

"When I reported to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone

to BUNDY as well." (82).

4. TAB V (Pp. 16-19 - - 6/11/75)

IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY has

a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell

the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba.

HARVEY

says that Bissell instructed him to take over

EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate, and

thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO."

Bissell testified that he did not recall directing

the reactivation of the project but, he said,

think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY's responsibility

for Project

RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact."

(19) • Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact

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had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is

a fair inference that there would have been no reason

to maintain it /the contact unless there was some

possibility of reactivating that operation."

(19) •

5. TAB W (PP. 42-53 - - 6/11/75)

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind

that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and

possibly BUNDY." (46).

Bissell said he discussed

CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples

of assassination

targets. (50).

asked

a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he

recarled discussing the

assassination capability with

ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied:

"I am not sure

about BUNDY, but I think ROSTOW, yes, sir."

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INDEX TO EXHIBITS RELATING

TO TESTIMONY OF MCGEORGE BUNDY

TAB A

2/14/61

TAB B

10/5/61

10/6/61

11/30/61

1/19/62

3/5/62

3/5/62

TAB C

TAB D

3/16/62

3/13/62

ins...

TAB E

TAB F

TAB G

3/16/62

4/11/62

8/7/62

Minutes,

Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

NSAM No. 100

Minutes,

Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

Memorandum by_ JFK /cf. Tab 4,

Lansdale Book/

Memorandum

1 from Mc Manus

to

McCone Lcf. Tab 10, Lansdale

Book/

Minutes,

special Group (Augmented)

Icf. Tab

21, Lansdale Book/

Memorandum by General Taylor

Lef. Tab 22, Lansdale Book?

Memorandum by General Taylor

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

Memorandum by General Taylor

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Unsigned memorandum by William K.

Harvey

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- 2-

8/8/62

8/10/62

8/13/62

8/14/62

8/23/62

TAB H

8/27/62

TAB I

TAB. J

TAB K

TAB L

TAB M

10/16/62

10/17/62

1/4/63

1/22/63

4/3/63

TAB N

TAB O

4211/63

4/11/63

Unsigned memorandum from General

Lansdale

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

Memorandum from General Lansdale

see Tab D, Lansdale Book/

Memorandum from Harvey to DCI

Helms L5ee Tab F, Lansdale Book7

NSAM No. 181 from Bundy [see

Tab 41, Lansdale Book7.

Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Carter

to Bundy

Memorandum from Carter

Memorandum from Parrott

Memorandum from Bundy to JFK

Remarks of JFK to NSC Meeting

Memorandum for the Record, titled

"Meeting on Cuba"

Minutes, Special Group Meeting

Memorandum to Bundy from Gordon

Chase

i intima

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TAB 'P

TAB Q

4/18/63

4/22/63

TAB

R

TAB

4/23/63

4/29/63

TAB T

5/2/63

TAB U

5/13/63

TAB V

5/28/63

TAB W

TAB X

6/6/63

6/19/63

2-A

2-B

2-C

7/25/63

9/20/63

9/23/63

2-D

10/29/63

Minutes, Special Group Meeting

Summary Record of NSC Standing

Group Meeting No. 2/63 by

Bromley. Smith

Memorandum from Chase to Bundy

Memorandum by Bundy ré 4/30/63

Standing Group Meeting

Memorandum from Bundy to Members

of Standing Group

Draft Memorandum from CIA Office

of National Estimates

Memorandum from Bundy to Standing

Group Members

Minutes, Special Group Meeting

Memorandum from Parrott to Special

Group re "Sabotage Program Cuba"

Memorandum from Denney to Crimmins

Memorandum from Chase to Bundy

Memorandum from Bundy to Special

Group

Memorandum from Bundy to JFK

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2-E

2 - F

2 - G

2- I

10/29/63

10/30/63

6/10/64

6/22/64.

2-J

6/22/64

2- K

7/31/64

2-L

8/19/64

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Check-list for meeting by Bundy

Cable, Bundy to Lodge

Memorandum from Helms to McCone

Memorandum from Jessup re pre-

liminary meeting with Attorney

General 6/19/64

Memorandum for the Record, re

Minutes of the 303 Committee

Meeting, 6/18/64

Memorandun for the record re

Minutes of 303 Committee

Meeting, 7/30/64

Memorandum from McCone to Bundy

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Chronology and Issues for Testimony of MCGEORGE BUNDY

Biographical Background

1953-61

1961-63

1963-66

1966-

Present

Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvary University

special Assistant to President Johnsdy for National Security Affairs

President, Ford Foundation

Chronology of Events

' Summary Outline Re Castro

1. January 1961 - October 1961 -- Cuba Policy - Inauguration/Bay of Pigs to Mongoose

(NSAM 100 Plan re Removal of Castro)

2. November-January 1961 -- Conception and Approval of Mongoose

3. January - June 1962 -- Mongoose Phase One

4. June - December 1962 -- Mongoose Phase Two

(August 10, 1962 Meeting and possible Discussion of Castro Assassination)

5. January - November 1963 -- Post-Mongoose Policy

(Seeming pattern of discussion and papers on contingency of Castro death)

6. December 1963 - August 1964 -- Special Group Investigation of Mafia - Cuban Exile Castro

Assassination Plot.

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(McGeorge Bundy)

- 2 -

Jan. 9-10,

1961

Jan. 20, 1961

Jan. 27, 1961

April 17, 1961

May 16, 1961

Oct. 5, 1961

1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin

Bundy arrives in Washington (Source: Bundy Interview).

Bundy Appointment.

Kennedy Administration takes office. McGeorge

Bundy appointed Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs.

Bundy, Rostow and Bissell lunch at Hay Adams (Source: Bundy

Interview) Calendar note.

Bay of Pigs. Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs.

New U.S. Policy on Cuba.

President Kennedy approved actions taken

by the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to establish U.S. policy toward

Cuba. The NSC "agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at

the downfall of Castro and that since the measures agreed below

(CIA studies of weaknesses in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to

isolate Castro, improve relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not

likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at inter-

vals with a view to further action."

Source: Record of Actions by

NSC on May 5, 1961. (Tab B).

NSAM 100. Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum No. 100

to the Secretary of State/ull:

subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba.

The memorandum states in

"In confirmation of oral instructions

conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired

for the indicated contingency in Cuba."

There is no explanation 01

the nature of the "indicated contingency."

Source NSA!

No. 100, Oct. 5,

1961. (Tabc).

Issues and Questions

Was 'Executive Action" discussed?

Was Bissell instructed re

'Execu-

tive Action'?

Was this basic context for

later

U.S. Policy?

Was "indicated contingency" related

to ''Executive Action"?

Did JFK

authorize NSAM 100?

What was JFK

instruction re NSAM 100?

See next

entries below.

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(Mcueorge Bundy)

- 3 .

Oct. 5, 1961

Oct. 6, 1961

Nov. 30, 1961

Jan. 19, 1962

Taylor Instructions for Castro 'Removal" Contingence -- JFK interest

NOT to be Revealed.

On General Taylor's instructions, Parrott outlines

to Mr. Coerr of State a requirement for a "plan against the contingency

that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban

scene." Taylor tells Parrott not to indicate the President's interest

in the plan.

Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy not

present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in

progress in connection with Cuba -- the preparation of a contingency

plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban

scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations."

Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961. (See Lansdale, Tah 2).

President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. A memorandum from

President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone,

General Taylor, General Lansdale and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized

"the major decisions which have

Operation."

been made in regard to the Cuba

The memo stated:

"(1) We will use our available

assets

to go ahead gith the discussed project in order to help Cuba over-

throw the Conmunist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under

the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Opera-

It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular

organizations and departments of the Government."

Source: Memoran-

dum, November 30, 1961, (0069-70). (See Lansdale, Tab 4).

Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962

RFK Urges Action.

RFK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not present) that

solution of Cuban problem carries "the top priority in the U.S. Govern-

ment--all else is secondary--no time, money,

effort or manpower is to be

spared.

" Source: Memorandum, January 19, 1962, from MeManus to

McCone. (See Lansdale, Tab lo).

Issues and Questions

Was this the "indicated contingency"

in Bundy's NSAM 100 of October

1961?

5,

Is this plan the one referred to in

Bundy's NSAM 100?

Did it relate to a

U.S. assassination plan?

In a staff intervicw, Bundy recalls he

probably wrote this memo.

Memo shows

JFK approval for Mongoose.: What was

JFK relationship with Lansdale and JFK

interest in Mongoose?

Did RFK emphasis lead to assumption by

CIA a Castro assassination plot had

tacit authorization of higher authority?

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(McGeorge Bundy)

March 5, 1962

March 5, 1962

= 4

Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose®

General Taylor's memorandum pro-

poses Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following

assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target govern-

ment /Cuba? "the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources,

internal and external, but recognizes that final success will re-

quire decisive use

of U.S. military intervention.

đun by General Taylor, March 5, 1962, 00188. (See Lausdale, Toh 22).

Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines.

The Special Group (A)

including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines

for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information.

Source: Minutes of Special Group (Á) March 5, 1962, 00004. (See Lausdale, Tab 21):

Issues and Questions

If U.S. military intervention ruled

out, must assassination be considered

as only way to succeed?

Establishes Bundy was familiar with

Mongoose

guidelines.

March 16, 1962

President Receives Progress Briefing.

"In the presence of the

Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report

on Operation MONGOOSE.

The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were cir-

culated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a pro-

longed consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed,

General Lansdale and the Special Group

(Augmented) were given tacit

authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines."

The memo

is footnoted with the following item dated March 22,

1962:

'This

minute was

read to the Special Group. (Augmented) today.

The group was

unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise

was given by higher authority.

The members of the group asked that the

minute be amended to indicate that the group itselflhad decided to

proceed in accordance with the guidelines."'

Source: Memorandum,

March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008. (Tab E).

Why was it necessary to correct this

memorandum?

Is there a second level

of plausible denial, allowing

Special Group to deny a CIA action?

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Wrueurge bunuy)

=3=

April 11, 1962

August 7, 1962

August 8, 1962

August 10,1962

Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANSDALE gave progress re-

port.

RUSK and MCNAMARA suggested that the current target date for

bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed.

BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollabel action

internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be

embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S."

Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17. (Tal F).

Harvey submits Plan. In response to requests from the Special Group

(Augmented), for a paper on "stepped-up Course B" William K. Harvey

submits to General Lansdale a ten page plan of covert activities.

(Source: Unsigned memo of August 7, 1962 from William K. Harvey) (Tab 6).

Citing the 'major difference

from Phase I of Operation Mongoose" as "removing the restrictions

in the 14 March policy guidelines which keep our actions 'short of

reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target

area, '" General Lansdale sends the requested papers (from State?

"The major contribution is

(Source: Unsigned memo of August 3, 1962 from Gen.

Lansdale to SG(A) regarding stepped-up Course B). (See Lausdale, Taf 38).

Question of Assassination of Fidel Castro raised at SG(A) Meeting.

At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Mr. Risk's office,

at which, inter alia, Mr. McCone presented "an alternate plan (called...

the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General

Lansdale," "/E/he question of assassination particularly of Fidel

Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara.... It was the obvious con-

sensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow,

this is not a subjeft which has been made a matter of official record

Mr. Harvey? took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this

point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written

comments or study on this point.

for Deputy Director (Plans) from William K. Harvey, Chief, Task

Force W, subject: Operation Mongoose; Minutes of Meeting of Special

Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 10 August 1962, prepared by

Thomas 1. Parrott). (See Lausdele, Tab B, Lausdale Toh F).

Issues and Questions

Does advantage of having action

controlled counsel for consideration

of assassination rather than sabotage?

Why did Special Group (Augmented)

request a

stepped-up plan? Note Harvey

involvement.

(In his affidavit of April 25, 1975, pre-

pared

for the Rockefeller Commission,

MeGeorge Bundy states:

"I don't have any

recollection of where or how I heard about

the poisoning possibility....Now,

as to

neetings where such things might have

seen discussed

the only one I have any

recollection of

-- and it is a refreshed

recollection

-- I would not have known

about it a month ago -- is the one

which we discussed yesterday on August 10,

1962 and I do NOT have any recollection

of what

specifically was said in that

meeting.")

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(McGeorge Bundy)

Aug. 12, 1962

Aug. 14,1962

• 6 =

Lansdale's memo is amended, Four words, "Including liquidation of

Leaders,

" are excised.

General Lansdale distributes to Harvev (CIA); Hurwitch (State),

Harris (Defense); and Wilson (USIA) a memorandum subject Alternate

Course B.

The original memorandum contains the following language:

"Papers required from each of you for me Tuesday meeting:

'Mr. Harvey Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,

including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage,

limited

deception), and Paramilitary.

Also, any suggestions

for inclusion

in other sections of the paper."

When Harvey receives his copy, he calls Lansdale's office, points

out how inadvisable the subsequently deleted language is,

the memorandum is thereupon recalled and the complained-of

language deleted by General Lansdale.

(Source: Lansdale's Memo-

randum of August 13, 1902, to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris and Wilson,

Subject: Alternate Course B; Harvey's memorandum of August 14,

1962, supra. (See Lausdale, Tot D, Lausdale Tah F).

Harvey memorializes Discussion of Assassination of Castro.

Harvey writes for Helms,

then Deputy Director of Plans, a memoran-

dum "for your information." The memorandum records how the topic

of assassinations "particularly of Fidel Castro," arose and how

Harvey thereafter vigorously and quickly objected to Lansdale's

having circulated reference to it in his memo of the preceding

day, August 13, 1962. (See Lausdale, Tab F)

Paragraph 3 reads:

"The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,

was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the

Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10

August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in

answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub-

ject which has been made a matter of

official record.

careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point,

and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written

comments or study on this point.

(Sources: Lansdale's memo of Aug. 13, supra; Harvey's memo, Aug 14, supra)

Issues and Questions

Does Bundy recall this discussion? He

has said (at his interview with Commit-

tee staff on July 8, 1975) that he has

no recollection, refreshed, revived, or

independent of any such discussion by

McNamara.

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LINENSEE SWINESS

ug. 23, 1962

Issues and Questions

What prompted this NSAN?

Did NSAM 181

result from the August 10 meeting?

Aug. 27, 1962

Oct. 17, 1962

Bundy writes National Security Action Memorandum #181 (NSAM #181).

Bundy distributes a memorandum advising that the President

has directed the following action be undertaken:

"4. The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE

Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action:

General Taylor)

"8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvan-

tages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other

action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin

(Action: Department of State, in consultation with

Department of Defense)." (Source: NSAM, No. 181, from Mcfeorge

Bundy, August 23, 1962) (See Lausdale, Tot 41).

CIA Reports to Bundy on Progress in Complying with NSAM #181.

Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, responds to NSAM #181 and informs

Mr. Bundy that 'Mr. William K. Harvey, or in his absence, Mr. Bruce

B. Cheever' will be responsible for the line of activity projected

for Operation Mongoose (and Plan B plus) as noted in NSA™ #181.

(Source: Memo of August 27, 1962 from Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter,

Acting Director, Dul,

to McGeorge Bundy, Subject: CIA Action in

Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181) (Tob H).

Bundy discusses with the President, Gen. Carter's memo for the

Special Group Augmented of October 16, 1962.

After discussion with President Kennedy,

selected aspects of

Gen. Carter's memo, subject, Operation MONGOOSE sabotage proposals,

directed to the Special Group (Augmented) on Oct. 16, 1962, are approved.

(Sources: Memo of October 16, 1962, from Marshall Carter, Acting DCI

to Special Group (Augmented),

subject Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals;

Memorandum of October 17, 1962 from Thomas A. Parrott for the Special

Group (Augmented) subject: Memorandum for the Special Grpup (Augmented,

rom Gen. Carter, dated 16 October 1962) • (Tc I, Teb!

Note Harvey responsibility.

Were other unwritten or unrecorded

proposals discussed by Bundy to the

President?

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NH 50955 DocId: 32423483

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(McGeorge Bundy)

April 11,

1963°

April I1, 1963

- 9

The President summed up

the

meeting on Cuba by "directing the

following: (a) The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable

future strength should be completed as soon as possible.

(b) CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in

the field of sabotage during the next six months.

(c) A

meeting should be held

next week to review the proposed

sabotage program."

Source:

Memorandum, April 3, 1963,

"Meeting on Cuba," (02842-43). (Talm).

President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase

writes memorandum to Bundy proposing

enticing Castro over

to U. S. side. Chase states:

"I understand that, in

the

near future, the President will be looking at some more

violent solutions to the Cuban problem."

to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JFK Library file). Car andum

Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Security

Reasons•

On April 11, 1963,

the Special Group (Bundy present)

requested that comments by the Coordinator of Cuban affairs

dated April ll on three papers being considered at today's

meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons.

The meeting discussed the "entire question of sabotage" and

thus

the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage

operations./ /

The Special Group

engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the

entire question of sabotage...the group recognized

that a

searching examination must be undertaken...to determine whether

we wished to change the present policy...Mr. McCone expressed

great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with

sabotage operations...untsl an overall policy is made clear

and steps to be taken to

Issure the removal of Soviet troops

and on the problem of

It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should

nade to higher authority and a paper wount be prepared

out-

lining "a proposed broad program

examples of

specific operations, the scale of activity

and how such

activity would fit into overall policy.

Source:

Minutes

of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47) •(Tal 0).

Issues and Questions

What is meant by 'more

violent solutions'?

Why were documents destroy

Note unclear policy towars

Cuba.

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¡ Issues and Questions

April 18, 1963

April 23, 1963

April 23, 1963

Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage.

On April 18, 1963, the

Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of

Cuban

Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18.

The only reference to the

subject matters of these papers was:

"Mr. Fitzgerald pointed

out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action

Program" consists basically of sabotage and of harassment,

plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be

responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

"Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed

some doubts as to whether

we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until

we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward

Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a

half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether

"It would be possible

to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's

papers,

without a drastic change in U. S. policy."

Special group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). (TGEP).

Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re

"Short and Sweet" Action on Castro.

Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's

request, comments on papers for meeting:

"Assuming we are not

out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp,

1s there a

Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way

to get rid of him-a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky

approach, or a combination of both.../blockade would be too long;

thus/

speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate

"short and sweet" variety."

memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. (TaRR).!

RFK Proposes Study of U. S. Measures for Contingency of Castro

titled "A Sketch

of the Cuba

"elimination of the Castro

regime was a requirement" and a U. S. program should arm to

create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in

anti-Castro forces...

!

Does such "short and sweet

action" refer to assassi-

nation?

Does McNamara's hard view

reflect JFK policy?

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April 29, 1963

April 30,

1963

May 13, 1963

- 11 -

Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures

we would take following contingencies such as the death of

Castro", (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing

Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble

as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months."

(Source: Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record

ot NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JFK Library

f1le.) ( Tob Q) .

Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group mem-

bers,

Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the

possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider

political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are:

... (b) Possible death of Castro....

Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file. (TobS).

Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group

meeting results in assignment of "examination of the possible

developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene.

This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group

discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use

of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives,"

economie sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source:

memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK

Library file.) (Tol T).

Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA)

draft paper discusses "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S.

Actions in the Event of Castro's Death." Under a heading "The

U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than

natural causes, the U. S. would be widely charged with com-

plicity," even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft

Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963,

(JFK Library file) Tob 4.

Issues and Questions

Why interest in Castro

death?

Why interest in Castro

death?

Does "disappearance"

refer to Castro death?

Is Kent counseling against

assassination?

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(Mcleorge bundy)

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Issues and Questions

May 28, 1963

June 6, 1963

June 19, 1963

Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency.

Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28,

should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event

of Castro's death,"

and notes Sherman Kent will be present for

this purpose.

Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive

papers" dealing with "a list of possible actions under consid-

Peration at CIA" /not specified/ and Cuban oil supplies. Source:

Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK

Library File. (Tob V).

Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group

Note interest in talks with

discussed "various possibilities of establishing channels of com- Castro while also seeming

munication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this

interest in contingency of

is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro

his death.

should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone

emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely

secret...It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are

particularly unusual would be discussed with the special Group

in advance."

Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963 Tab-w)

JFK Approves External Sabotage Program.

A meeting was held with Did JFK decide against talks

"higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program

for "ex-

and in favor of harder sabo-

ternal sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding

tage approach?

that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was

to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy:

(a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facil1-

ties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and

manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to

"nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could

lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest.

Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963,

"Satotage Program Cuba"• (Tob X)

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(licGeorge Bundy)

September 209-

"1963

June 10, 1964

- 13 .

Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro

Suicide Preferable to Assassination.

At Bundy's request, Chase

summarizes State INR Paper entitled "Cuba: Possible Courses of

Action."

Chase's summary states: "

...The present importance

of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious opera-

tional target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's

martyrdom."

The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: "Assassina-

tion of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and

because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical

retribution.

It is preferable to discredit Castro...and drive

him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality," Source:

(1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK

Library File,

4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G.

Denney. Jr.. of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Af-

fairs: (Tab 2B, Jab 2A:

Issues and Questions

Why is it necessary to ex-

clude assassination if it is

not being considered?

Was

Dennev asked to consider

assassination?

Helms Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo

to the DCI, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans

of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders.

Agency officers told Cubans that U. S. would not condone the

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(McGeorge Bundy)

June 18,

1964

June 18, 1964

- 14 -

Issues and Questions

planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2,

1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which

was "still in the

embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro."

Businessman has

underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group

fered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to

use 5 men.

March 3, 1964 meeting In which Byron Cameron says he met an un-

identified group which would be willing to assassinate selected

Cuban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is

Interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto

Ghe Guevera."

"Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy."

Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans

of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders,

June 10, 1964 (03105-031110). (Tabi2G)

Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Note Bundy's view below

Special Group (303 Meeting)•

Peter Jessup, assistant to MI.

that U.S. must prevent such

Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mt. Bundy subject "303. Committee

Cuban review."

The memo stated

plots.

the meeting "might serve to give

us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might

serve to embarrass the U. S. A. In the next 120 days."

The memo

asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of

Frank Fiorini and persons of this ilk."

The memorandum con-

tinued: "We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform

Coup de Main operations for cash.

Who is keeping track of this?

Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all

impending adventures?"

A memorandum attached was described as:

"Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate

Selected Cuban Leaders, 10 June 1964."

Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban |

Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law

Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss

"problems

arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban

emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to as-

sassinate Castro and general unrest and instability on the is-

..."A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved

the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone

was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he

we shie

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(McGeorge Bundy)

June 19, 1964

July 30, 1964

August 19, 1964

- 15 -

Issues and Questions

would like to go into the matter further.

Others, including

Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice

and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly

the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention.

It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the

Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Source:

Minutes of 303 Connittee meeting, 18 June 1964. (TE I),

Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassina-

tion Report--Robert Kennedy told failure to prevent can be con-

What was RFK's action in

response.

strued as condoning.

On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with

Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303

Committee meeting of June 18.

"In regard to the memorandum to

the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile

groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro

regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the

United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot,

and failure to take preventive action could be construed as

condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially

a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General in-

dicated that the Department of Justice would look into the mat

ter."

Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by

Peter Jessup. (Tab 25)

Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot.

The 303/Special Group Committee

"agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald

meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier

report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate

Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a

matter of law enforcement."

Source: Memorandum for the record l

dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30,

1964. (Tab 2K)

Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-Mafia Did Bundy feel compelled to

Plot.

John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy

summarizing take any action?

the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to

assassinate government leaders.

The memorandum summarized seven

reports rendered by the FBI.

Three of the seven persons inter-

viewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of

these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to

the CIA..

Source:

Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy,

August 19, 1964. (Tab 2L)

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(McGeorge Bundy)

September 23, 1963

Oct 29, 1963

Oct 29, 1963

Oct 30, 1963

2022

-16--

SEPARATE DOCUMENTS

Bundy Warns Special Group on Security:

Bundy points

out to the Special Group that "unfortunately, the

maintenance of a high degree of security is

not a

simple matter in view of the numbers of people within

the government who have to know a little or much

about a U.S.-directed raid against Cuba."

(Source:

Memo, Sept 23, 1963, 3Bundy to Special Group. (Tetz)

Bundy informs JFK of need for White House information

on CIA communications.. Bundy asks the President to

order that the White House received one copy of all

important instructions from State and CIA to the field.

Bundy states trouble has arisen from'difference of

om differ

enthe field.

emphasis" in what we have

sent to the field.

(Source:

Memo Oct 29, 1963, Bundy

to JFK.) (Tab 2D)

Bundy on Lodge's movements. Bundy in a checklist

discusses consequence for plausible denial for Amb

Lodge's movements.

(Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, title Checklist.) (Tat ZE)

Bundy cables Lodge re Impending Coup:

Bundy cables

Lodge that "we cannot accept conslusion that we have

no power to delay or a coup."

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## Page 27

Memorandum

To: FAO Schwarz, Smothers

From: Robert Kelley

SHORT SUMMARY -- CUBA

McGEORGE BUNDY

McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs to President Kennedy throughout the Kennedy Administration.

Bundy chaired the Special Group until Maxwell Taylor took over that

function in mid-1961, and Bundy resumed chairmanship of the Special

Group after Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in late 1962.

Bundy and W. W. Rostow met Richard Bissell for lunch on

January 27, 1961, although Bundy recalls no discussion

of assassi-

nation or Executive Action capability at that meeting.. Bundy

attended the August 10, 1962 Mongoose meeting where a Castro assassi-

nation was reportedly suggested.

In October 1961, Bundy issued a National Security Action

Memorandum referring to an "indicated contingency" which appears

from other documents to have called for a plan in

the event of

Castro's removal. And in the Spring and Summer of 1963 Bundy and

the Special Group considered papers dealing with the contingency of

Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy's examination should encompass the following

questions and areas:

A. In meeting with'Richard Bissell in January 1961 was an

Executive Action capability or a Castro assassination plan dis-

cussed?

HH

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B. Was NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961 related to a Castro

assassination plot or capability?

C. Was the emphasis placed by President Kennedy or

Robert Kennedy on the Mongoose Program such that the CIA may

have assumed authorization, tacit or otherwise, for a Castro

assassination.

D. What accounts for the seeming pattern of interest in

the Spring and Summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's

death?

àc!

E. What were the Command and Control procedures for

authorization of covert actions in the Kennedy Administration?

F.

Was an

assassination of Castro ever considered by the

Kennedy Administration in the efforts to deal with the problem

of Cuba?

G. If an assassination was not considered or authorized,

what explanation is there

for the CIA Castro assassination

efforts during the Kennedy Administration?

ered cinema mutata au

NH 50955 DocId: 32423483. Page 28

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## Page 29

MEMORANDUM

TO

: Files

FROM : Bob Kelley

DATE : July 8, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH McGEORGE BUNDY

SUMMARY

On July 8, 1975, Mr. Bundy was interviewed at his office at the

Ford Foundation In New York by Frederick Baron, Bob Kelley, and John

Bayly of the Select Committee staff. The interview began at approxi-

mately 9:00 a.m. and continued virtually without interruption until

1:30 p.m. The Interview was conducted in three parts:

1. A review by Mr. Bundy of the principal documents in the attached

chronology.

2. Mr. Bundy was told of the chronology of events relating to the

Executive action and ZRIFFLE program, and was asked whether he

had any knowledge or recollection of these matters.

3. Mr. Bundy reviewed documents relating to the Trujillo matter, and

was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of that mat-

ter.

In summary, Mr. Bundy said: (1) He did not recall any of the docu-

ments listed on the attached chronology relating to Castro, and It was

his opinion, based on a reading of those documents at the interview,

that they did not reflect any consideration by the White House of Cabinet

level people in the Kennedy administration of a Castro assassination plan.

DEAD 2A8 202000 22006023

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Mr. Bundy stated further that those documents relating to the contin-

gency in the event of Castro's death and similar language did not re-

late to any Castro assassination plan, but rather to studies of what

might be the situation in Cuba should Castro die or leave office un

related to any U. S. effort; (2) With respect to the ZRIFFLE program,

Bundy stated that he was 'astonished" that this could have been going

on without the approval by the Special Group, that he knew of no au-

thorization for such program, and that he never knew of a case where

the Special Group process for authorizing covert actions was by-passed

by Allen Dulles or Bissell to reach the President through another route.

Mr. Bundy did state that he had a recollection of someone (he does not

know whom) Informing him of the "Executive action" capability, but it

was his understanding that this was only a study of possible assassina-

tion methods, and was not targeted against any particular individual

or country.

Set out below is a summary of Mr. Bundy's comments on the three

areas outlined above.

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE CASTRO ON ATTACHED CHRONOLOGY

NSAM 100 and related documents re "removal of Castro." Bundy had

no recollection at all of NSAM 100 and did not know what the words "in-

dicated contingency In Cuba" involved. When shown the Parrott memorandum

for the record, dated October 5, 1961, which states that Woodward was

asked by Parrott to prepare a contingency plan on General Tayler's in-

structions "against the contingency that Castro would in some way or

other be removed from the Cuban scene" and that General Tayler preferred

that "the President's Interest in this matter" not be told to Mr. Woodward,

INSA 100 Clearly reflects JFK's desires because Bundy would never write a

NSAM without his approval, Bundy said. However, Bundy emphasized that JFK

never asked him to look into or develop a plan for the assassination

, of Castro.

NH 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 30

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## Page 31

MI. Bundy still did not recall NSAM 100 or its subject. Similarly,

when shown the Special Group meeting minutes of October 6, 1961 where

Mr. Parrott told the Group that there was in preparation "a contingency

plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban

scene," Mr. Bundy's recollection was also not refreshed. Bundy stated

that his reading of these documents today makes him think that what was

desired

was only a plan of what might happen in a post-Castro Cuba, and

did not relate to any attempt by the United States to cause Castro's re-

moval. Bundy said he does not recall or know of any plan that Woodward

or any other agency might have developed as a result of NSAM 100. Bundy

suggested that General Taylor would be the best source for information

as to why the Presidential interest in this plan should have been con-

cealed from Mr. Woodward. Later in the interview, after reviewing for

Mr. Bundy the chronology relating to the ZRIFFLE program, and pointing

out that it was on November 15, 1961 that Bissell is alleged to have

instructed Harvey to arrange the assassination of Castro - some forty

days after NSAM 100 was Issued - Bundy stated there was no relationship

between NSAM 100 and the Bissell-Harvey orders of November 15.

President's memo, November 30, 1961, launching Mongoose. Bundy

had no recollection of this memo, although reading it today he thinks

he may have written it. Bundy noted that General Tayler ran the Special

Group 54/12 meetings from June 1961 through October 1962, and Bundy

merely attended to represent the Presidential interest.

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and Special Group approval,

March 5, 1962. Bundy noted that the Mongoose guidelines "recognized

that final success will require decisive U. S. military intervention."

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It was suggested to Mr. Bundy that if an invasion was recognized as a

requirement, yet was ruled out for political or diplomatic reasons,

and it was also recognized that sabotage could not accomplish the over

throw of the Cuban regime, policy makers might have taken up considera-

tion of a Castro assassination. Bundy said that today one could assume

that there were "two forks"; an invasion by U. S. forces, or a Castro

assassination, but Bundy emphasized that the thinking In the JFK admin

istration was focussed toward

an invasion by U. S. forces.

At other

points in the interview, Bundy emphasized that JFK policy makers never

considered the possibility of assassinating Castro. In positing the

"two forks," Bundy did not appear to mean that these two possibilities

were considered during the JFK years, but only that one might conceive

of the situation today in those terms.

JFK briefing on Mongoose March 16, 1962. Bundy explained, although

he had no recollection of this document, that this was the type of ef-

fort made to create plausible deniability." Thus, though the body of

the document states that the Special Group augmented was given "tacit

authorization to proceed" The footnote corrects that and states no

authorization was given by higher authority. Bundy said this reflected

an effort to protect the President from disclosure of covert actions

and was a usual practice. Bundy said that generally he would speak on

a one-to-one basis with President Kennedy and get a 'clear signal" from

him on a

covert action proposal. The understanding was that the paper

record would not reflect this signal. The President would give a clear

signal to the members of the Special Group in Informal conferences but

rarely at a formal group meeting. Bundy said we wanted the President

to hear what we were doing with respect to covert actions, and then we'd

continue doing It; but his approval would not be recorded.

NH 50955 DocId: 32123483 Page 32

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In response to a question, Bundy said that there was not another

level of plausible deniability between the Special Group and the CIA.

In other words, Bundy was asked whether with respect to assassinations,

a paper record might be created that showed

no approval by the Special

Group even though they may have given oral authorization for an assassina

tion, so that in later years, the chain of command would not rise above

the CIA. Bundy said that there was no such lower level of deniability,

"We would be explicit with the CIA either way on covert action approvals,

and such approvals would be reflected in the paper record."

August-October 1962; August 10, 1962, Meeting

Mr. Bundy was shown selected documents pertaining to meet-

ings of the Special Group Augmented and Operation Mongoose. All were

taken from the latter half of 1962 and principally from the months of

August, September and October: Although Mr. Bundy was able to identify

most of the documents as either his own or as those he received from others

he was unable to state that any of them revived his recollection of

any discussion or proposal

concerning assassinations. More directly,

Mr. Bundy stated that he had no recollection, revived, refreshed, or

independent, of any talk, proposal or discussion concerning assassina-

tions during any Special Group Augmented meeting he attended during

the months of August, September and October. Moreover, he has no recol-

lection of hearing any reference to assassination made by any one, either

seriously or jokingly, during that or any other period (Mr. Bundy con-

tested that he was at a meeting on October 16, 1962, chaired by the

Attorney General at which Operation Mongoose proposals were discussed.

Review of pertinent documentation indicates that there were two meet-

ings regarding Operation Mongoose on October 16, 1962. Mr. Bundy was

apparently in attendance at the first, held in the morning; he was

її "н

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## Page 34

-6-

evidently not in attendance at the second, held in the afternoon in

the Attorney General's office for operational representatives. Mr.

Helms' memo for files evidently records proceedings at the second meet-

ing.)

1963 Documents re Contingency of Castro's Death

Bundy explained that the January 4, 1963, memo from Bundy to the

President, although he did not have

a clear recollection of writing this

memo, reflected

the fact that Mongoose was not producing.

Bundy

said "RFK can huff and puff all he wanted to but Castro's house would

not come down." Bundy pointed out that the whole Cuban environment had

been transformed after the missile crisis. Kennedy was in a much stronger

political position but there were still Republican critics who wanted

continued strong action against Castro. The President recognized that

he could not satisfy these critics completely but nevertheless, felt im-

pelled to take some measures against Castro to show that he was aware of

the problem and trying to do something about it. Bundy showed us an

article from the New York Times by James Reston reflecting the President's

opinions to this affect.

Gordon Chase Memo to Bundy re'Violent Solutions"

Bundy said that Chase was his personal assistant with the special

responsibility for Cuban affairs. (Chase left the White House for the

Lindsey administration in New York City and is now at the Harvard Medical

School. Chase

did not have the type of position or responsibility on

Bundy's staff that would involve him in covert action approvals or in-

volvement in anything as serious as assassination discussion. Thus,

Chase's references to a "short and sweet" approach have to do with actions

«, д 70'і

at 2e3 9a:

''gira".

NH 50955 DocId: 32423483 Page 34

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## Page 35

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like sabotage, harassment or other covert actions far short of assassi-

nation.

Studies on Contingency of Castro's Death

The documents in the period April - September 1963 which discuss con-

tingencies after the death of Castro were simply the type of study often

commissioned on developments that might ensue after a foreign leader passes

away. They were not prepared in connection with any consideration or dis-

cussion of a Castro assassination. For example the papér by Sherman Kent

was "straight estimating" by CIA office of National Estimates. (It should

be noted that a Select Committee Staff member who was a very senior ONE

Officer believes that the Sherman Kent Paper was by no means a normal

estimate. His experience tells him that this was a very closely held paper

which would have been prepared by Kent personally at the request of the DCI

and not circulated within the ONE board for comments.) In response to a

question, Bundy could not recall why there was this seeming interest in

the spring and summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death.

Bundy said he tried to recall now whether there were reports of a decline

in Castro's health or some other event that might have prompted these

studies. He could not do so.

Documents on Non-Governmental Assassination Plot

Bundy conmented on the Helms' memo of June 10, 1964: "a disingeneous

memorandum given their earlier connection with the Cosa Nostra"'. However,

Bundy said he had no affirmative recollection of these documents at all.

He does not deny that he saw them but he simply has no recollection re-

freshed or otherwise.

Bundy does not recall what RFK's reaction was when

he was asked to hav e the Justice Department look into the plot as a matter

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of law enforcement, or any other out come with respect to the informa-

tion received by the Special Group.

After reviewing these documents referring to assassinations, Bundy

was asked if there might have been any connection between these documents

and the developments they reflect and the October 5, 1961, NASM which asked

for an indicated contingency, which, from subsequent documents, also seem

to deal with "a removal of Castro from the Cuban scene one way or another".

first

As he had done when documents were reviewed, Bundy again stated that JFK

"never asked me to look into an assassination of Castro." Nor was his re-

collection refreshed as to the 1961 documents--he simply does not recall

issuing NASM 100 or. any discussion at that time with JFK or anyone else

with respect to these documents.

Executive Action

Bundy recalls that he arrived in Washington around January 9 or 10.

He was an old friend of Bissell. Bissell had been his teacher in college

and he had worked with Bissell in the Marshall Plan and knew him at MIT

as well. His calendar book reflects the fact that he had lunch on January

27 at the Hay Adams with Bissell and Rostow. He does not recollect this

luncheon nor any discussion with Bissell about executive action capability.

He does recall that someone informed him that there was such a capability

but that no individual was targeted and no action would be taken without

authorization. He thought it was unlikely that his lunch with Bissell re-

lated to executive action, but he has no recollection at all of that lunch.

He said Bissell and he are frank and candid with each other when they speak

and there is no reason to think that Bissell interpreted any conversation

with Bundy as authorization to proceed with a Castro assassination plot.

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"No one but the President himself had authority to give such an order

in a valid way."

Bundy has no recollection of AMLASH. He does recall the reference

to "poison" but as something that would be on a larger scale than an in-

dividual assassination. For example, if such poison would be used it

would affect an entire restaurant and not be administered to a single

individual. Bundy had heared of the ball point syringe but does not re-

call it in the context of Cuba. Nor does he recall any reference to high

powered rifles.

Lansdale-RFK-JFK Relationship

Lansdale did have a direct personal relationship with RFK, but not to

JFK. Bundy pointed out, however, that there is a great difference between

"RFK beating up on people and saying 'go get poison'." It was in RFK's

character to press the bureacracy hard and want to "act agressively" against

enemies, but out of character to discuss poison or assassination. Any in-

structions that Bissell gave Harvey was a far cry from the "gung ho" sugges-

tions that Bobby usually made.

Mongoose and Assassinations. Bundy said he cannot say there was no

connection between the Mongoose three-man teams and any three-man teams

for assassinations. He does know that there was no 'witting authorization"

of three-man assassination teams.

He strongly disagrees with any suggestion

(by Helms) that the atmosphere of the Special Group Augmented made it accepta-

ble to plot Castro's assassination.

Special Group Approval and Assassination Plots. Bundy has no idea how

the reported mafia-CIA plot could have gone on without approval by the

Special Group. He is "astonished"' if it did so. He said he never knew of

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a case where the Special Group approval process was bypassed like men

like Allan Dulles or Bissell or where they took a back route to the

President around the Special Group. He said he would have to exclude

the period before the inauguration on January 20, 1961, because he was

not operating in the Special Group at that time.

Trujillo

Bundy had little to do with Dominican affairs. He did recall of

being told of the January 12, 1961, decision to support Dominican dissi-

dents and thought this was "o.k. if the dissidents succeed." He did not

believe that support amounted to support for an assassination. Goodwin

and Ralph Dungan would know about the Dominican Republic and Trujillo.

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NEUR

GRET - GIES CHLY

14 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 14 February 1961

PRESENT: Messis. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy,

Dulles, Gen. Cabell, Bissell

13.

General

Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the

benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions

taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list

of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which

it is planned to continue.

In the course of the discussion, the following points, among others,

were made:

V.

a. Dominican Republic - Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum

be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans

can be made for a successor government to Trujillo.

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V4. Congo

Mi. Bissell gave more details of the project designed to provide

support for pro-Western forces in the Congo, which had been introduced

at last Thursday's meeting. The Group had no objections.

V6. Vietnam Agent Drop

The proposal for this operation was approved, subject to the

stipulation that non-U.S. - preferably Chinese - crews be used.

MI. Bissell said that if all goes well we would plan to come

back to the Group for approval for certain "spoiling actions. " The

members felt that ClA should proceed on the assumption that a

comprehensive program would continue, and should therefore take

-steps to begin the six-week training cycle for the Vietnamese air

crews, which had been mentioned in the formal proposal.

C2.00

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NSC ACTIONS NOS. 2420-2425

COPY NO.

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38

RECORD OF ACTIONS

by the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

at its

FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

held on

May 5, 196).

(Approved by the President on May 16, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting.

The Acting Secretary of the

Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the

actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Educa-

ticn and welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency;

the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Dep

uty Under Secretary of State; Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant

to the Secretary of State; Stephen E

Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles;

the Special Counsel to the President;

the Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,

Special Assistant to the President; the

Assistant to the Special

Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President

for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the

Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the

Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended

the meeting.

ACTION

NUMBER

2420.

SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affalis to

prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15.

for discussion by the Council on May 19.

2421•

U. S. POLICY TCUARD KOREA

Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of

State for Far Eastern Affalrs should be established to

prepace and circulate a report on the subject by May 15

for discussion by the Council on May 19.

JUL

1415

JFKi

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ACTION

NURBER

2422.

JUL

AFR

14/S

SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2413-g; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated

May 4, 1961)

Agreed that U. S. polley toward Cuba should aim at

the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures

agreed below are not likely to achieve this end,

the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a

view to further action.

b. Agreed that the Unlied States should not undertake

military Intervention in Cuba now, but should do

nothing that would foreclose the possibility of

military intervention in the future.

S. Agreed that the United States should not impose a

naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba;

it was noted that neither cousse had the support of

the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

d. Noted the importance the President attaches to ob

taining tinely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban

military capabilities, especially the ennancement of

such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc nilitary assis-

tance, so that U. S. capabilitles for possible inter-

vention may be maintained at an acequate level.

= Noted the importance the President attaches to publi

cation in the Free World press of the terroristic

actions of the Castro regime, and to possible polit

ical action to end the current terror.

Noted the President's direction that the Central

Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should

make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and

vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control

in Cuba today.

Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council

shouid be improved and made more open, and while it

cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, sup-

port should be given to it insofar as it continues

to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

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ACTION

NUMBER

2422.

SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOVARD CUBA (Continued)

h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should

be orgarized in the United States, but that Cuban

nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S.

armed forces under plans to be developed by the Sec-

retary of Defense.

1.

Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visit-

ors' visas wiil be given refugee status and assisted,

under a program to be developed and direced by the

Secretary of Realth, Education and Welfare, in carry®

ing on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami

will be encouraged io locate in other areas.

Cuban

nationals entering the United States will be given

refugee status.

All refugees will be eligible to

apply for travel privileges, and it was understood

that they would also be eligible for citizenship.

Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on

Cuba.

The Secretary of State agreed to send to the

President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. em

bargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle

Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed,

it should be as conplete as possible, with certain

exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution

of druggs.

k.

Agreed that the United States should at once initiate

negotiation to enlarge, the willingness of other Amer

ican states to join in bilateral, multilateral and

OAS arrangements against Castro,

such as (1) breaking

diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling sub-

versive activities of Cuban egents; (3) preventing

arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic rela-

tions with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security

force; (6) Initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban

invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and

(7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of interna

*ional comnunisn by all nations of this hemisphere.

GECEIVED FROM

AFKL

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ACTION

NUMBER

24220

in.

2423.

MERRIVED FROM

1915

gFKX

S: BJF.CT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

la Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be

strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implemen-

cation of selected social development projects;

(2) acceleration of the implementation of other

Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional

reSOuICES for Latin Arerican economic and social des

velopment, including consideration of a supplemental

appropriation for development loans of the order of

$200-$400 million.

Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would ex-

pand its existing program in Latin America, but not

initiate electronic warfare against the Castro re-

gime; means of propaganda should be made avallable

to non-U. S. groups.

Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general

guidance to be prepared by the Departmeni of State,

would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America

with Latin American officers.

o. Agrecd that the Secretary of Scate should prepare a

report on a possible new juridical basis for effec-

tive anti-communist action.

2. Agreed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretary

of State for Latin American Affairs, che Task Force

on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of

Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel

to the President.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the 'lask Force on Cuba would prepare proutly

both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist in

tervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican

Republic.

Noted the President"g view that the United

States should not Inltiate the overthrow of Trajillo be

fore we knew what government would succeed him, and that

any action against Irujillo should be muitilateral.

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A. 1.

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ACE IONI

NMBER

2424.

2425.

SUBJECE

U. S.

POLICE TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Agreed that the Task Force on fuba would consider what

can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall

a communist take-over in that country.

U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit

and Dien that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.

b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told

that we are considering inclusion of U. S. truops

in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the

timing to be dependent on developments during or

after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference®

Noted that the Secretaries of State and DeSense would

be sending recommendations to the Presivent promptly

on U. So training troops in Viet Nam.

En FROM

JUL

1815

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Xit.

P

Y

PERUSE

WASHINGTON

October 5, 1961'

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 100

TO:

SUBJECT:

The Sccretary of State

Contingency Planning for Cuba

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant

Secrctary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated

contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

CC:

The Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Richard Goodwin

CC:

Mrs. Lincoln

Mr. Bundy's Files

MI. Bromley Smith

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HARUEY #2B

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on

Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,

Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale;

Mr. Kennedy; Mx. McCone and Mr. Harvey

The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the

changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were

proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under

date of 13 March.

Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some

of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be

contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need

to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and

to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under

the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific

proposals for approval tothe Special Group, which involve policy

considerations.

General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti-

tutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed.

sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were

The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

approved.

3.

dated i2 March

The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group

dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose,"

was then considered

and the following decisions made:

Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked

to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for

the proposed training.

They also undertook to reexamine the

feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to

authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under

the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any

major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval

by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be

made to the Group..

(This decision did not deal with the actual means

of supply, which is covered in < below.)

06006

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C.

Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The

Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re-

supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel

and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft.

This point will

be included in the Guidelines.

General Lansdale will arrange with

the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be

involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready

by next week. In the meantime preparations should be begun for the

selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries,

such a "sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to come up

within two weeks with

an estimate of their capability to provide

one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the Secre

tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available

within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be

established.

It was pointed out there are no PT boats available

and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired.

CIA will present

a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the

next few days.

4.

Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision

may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel.

He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming

that

such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be

permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should re-

flect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel,

bases

and equipment would be available but that the situation that

would

exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also

be studied immediately.

4.

At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale

undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of

destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered

to Cuba.

6.

The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east

of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer

that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the

risk is virtually non-existent.

It was agreed that the Group should give a status report

to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general

principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution

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16 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject:

Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE

with

the President

In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented)

the President was given a progress report on Operation

MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were

circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion.

After a prolonged consideration of the visibility,

noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and

the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit

uthorization to proced in accordance with the

guidelines.

M.D. I.

22 March 1962

This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today.

The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization,

either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority.

members of the Group asked

that the Group Itself had decided to proceed in accordance with

the Guidelines.

wisd

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HARVEY #3

11 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation

Mongoose, 11 April 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson and

Mr. Martin; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric,

General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. McCone,

Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey

Colonel Davies and Mr. Duval, of CIA, were also present.

General Lansdale gave a progress report.

Mi. McCone stated that there is little evidence from

photo reconnaissance of any significant increase in military support

facilities, over those that existed during the Batista regime.

therefore questioned whether current estimates of the size of the

Cuban military forces may not be somewhat exaggerated. In this

connection, attention was called to the sizeable list of bloc

materiel which has been provided to Cuba.

Mr. McNamara asked about cvidences of underground in-

stallations, pointing out that should these exist in any significant

numbers it would have a bearing on probable Cuban intentions and also

on the difficultics of armed invasion of the island. He added that

in any case, the difficulties can be expected to increase in the next

one to five years.

Mr. Harvey reported on the interrogation of recent

exfiltrees, with emphasis on their statements that some resistance

elements exist in seven

areas.

Answering Mr. Rusk's question, General Lemnitzer said that

the U.S. has the capability of blockading Cuba completely. He added

that the chiefs consider Cuba a threat to the U.S. and the Hemisphere

now and in the future.

The following

requests emerged from this discussion:

2.

Defense and CIA analysts should jointly consider

all available evidence, particularly photographic; bearing on

supporting military facilities, including any underground ones.

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b.

A study should be made of the time and resources

required to put a complete blockade into effect.

c.

CIA should compile the numbers of individuals

who are now traveling into Cuba from other countries in the

Hemisphere.

do

Defense/JCS should examine the possibility of

establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean, manned by personnel

from one or several countries; particular attention should be

given

to

the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely

U.S., in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt of

that country from Cuba.

3.

Mr. McCone said that the current schedule of covert actions

can be met, but he suggested that perhaps it should be speeded up even

though this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the U.S.

He added that the present restrictions on attribution present difficulties

with respect to training agents and to supply missions.

Mr.. McCone

also questioned whether complete success within the current covert

framework would lead

to the desired result.

Mr. Rusk urged that efforts' be continued to explore the

possibilities of defection or subversion of key individuals in the

Castro regime, and that efforts be made to induct Cuban exiles into

the U.S. armed

forces. (Mr. McNamara agreed that the latter could and

should

be done.)

In answer to the Secretary of State's question as to the

adequacy of existing policy approvals, General Lansdale said it would

be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than

restricting them to intelligence missions.

It was agreed that, within

the framework of present understandings, the numbers of personnel to

be infiltrated could be stepped up. In this connection, it was noted

however that it will be difficult if not impossible to maintain motiva-

tion and morale indefinitely, without at least the implied promise of

eventual action by the U.s.

The Secretary of State said that, at this time, he can see

no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified; on

the other hand this should not be taken as an excuse to cease activity

against the Castro regime. He, supportod by the Socrctary of Defense,

took the position that the U.S, should "play for the breaks," and

should take necessary steps so as to get into a position which would

afford

the U.S. a maximum number of choices of action. In this

connection, he and

Mr. McNamara suggested that the cuirent target

??D

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7 August 1962

COVERT

COVERT ACTIVITIES

William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose,

states:

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline. the action which would

be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement

course of action "b" in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special

Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is

contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62.

made:

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are

i .

i sugg ching aisints acting)

1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate

85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion

valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the

overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this

assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance

through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive

small-scale open resistance and through fortuituous circum-

stances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a

"time table" basis.

II. MISSION:

"Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other

pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt

U.S. military commitment'

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Ill.

TASKS:

A. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop.

active OAS and individual batin American country support for the

overthrow of Castro. ; .

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts,

leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban

political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban -

government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

5.

Induce the population to engage in militant mass action

such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and

sabotage.

ilet

B.

Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and

execution.

2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban

industries and public utilities with priority attention being given

to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities.

No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical

facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At

the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage

at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider

type teams using hit and run tactics.

3.

By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the

diversion of Cuban

resources from productive purposes.

4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread

minor acts of sabotage.

C.

Resistance:

1.

Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and

revolt in the general population.

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2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance

cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum

feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and

in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications

with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.

5.

Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics

support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and

run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia

posts, telephone centrals, etc.

7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban

people to resist Castro-Communism.

2.

and elsewhere.

Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere,

=. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with

particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

b. Activities of Cuban G-2

c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the

population. -

e. Militia morale.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the

"power centers" in the Cuban

government.

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IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop

and carry out the following program (which constitutes

a substantial expan-

sion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FI):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified

and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The follow -

ing types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans

in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and

maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more

critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals -

resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have -

potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly

in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA

problem.)

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban

population.

It will have to provide aggressive and provocative

propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage

in "high noise level"' types of propaganda operations calling for work

stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass

action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered

essential:

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba

located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in

operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy

approval to establish this is required.

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2.

A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and

appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching

operations.

3.

Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet

dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.

N°

4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio

transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval

is required.

5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine

broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations

infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers,

or couriers.

7.

Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional,

cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting

their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited.

Experience plus continually tightening security controls has

demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black

teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any

method yet been devised by which infiitrated "black teams" can be

effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the

PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting,

recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the

original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological

warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and

will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible

to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the rcquired tasks, the following program and

support is considered essential:

1.

Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of

approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral

caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and

run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen

these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when

an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either

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as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of

resistance.

These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run

commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training

would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible,

then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated

that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that

could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable

period. They should have a minimum of four-months training, for

which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are

required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban

• contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.

2.

Urban Resistance Cells - Two to five man teams equipped

with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major

Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented

team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence

on he completion of traito rue pouid se

intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting,

casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The

sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any

major uprising).

A third mission would be to establish small

caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. Y

It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could

be established.

At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to

enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting,

and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within

Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.

3.

Rural Resistance Cells - Three to five man teams equipped

with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas

to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented resistance

cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered

or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. :

These

resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until

called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that

twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces

lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%.

Selection and training of

the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but

they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.

4.

Guerrilla - Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T

•communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black,

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recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla

bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both

maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psy-

chological warfare program in support of this effort must be

aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the

guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups

of guerrillas can be activated.

It is not possible to predict

what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears

probable.

The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four

months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special

Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of

fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces - The recruitment and training of

Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed forces should be pressed to the but.

maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements

should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups

to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fighi" under responsible

exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant

internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel

should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups.

Additional Policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration - The increased Cuban defensive

capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program

requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration

tactics as required, including:

a.

capability.

Present and planned commercial/private maritime

b. Submarines and other naval craft.

c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews ard

aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

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V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

1.

Ground Support: Three separate training facilities

including all instruction and support.

a. Site A - commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive

basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.

Fifty men per course.

c. Site C - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis.

Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate

maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten

per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement

could be substantially higher.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba"

Naval surface craft support may be required at a

later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to

Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e.

Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes,

including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for

clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance,

and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3.

Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to

supplement U.S. contract crews,. provide crews and aircraft

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for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially

estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by

January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could sub-

stantially increase.

b. Support for CLA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to

provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized

support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide

communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing

program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare

operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage,

and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave trans mitter by

Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching •

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against

Cuban indus try and public utilities, i. e., refineries, power plants, trans-

portation, and communications.

F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams

being infiltrated.

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H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using

DOD instructors and support facilities.

I.

Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltra-

tion missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men

from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored

group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."

K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational

purposes.

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Opera-

tion Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 1963 - $40, 000, 000

Fiscal Year 1964 - $60, 000, 000 (exclusive of reimburse-

ment for DOD support which it is felt

should be on a non-reimbursable basis.)

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FIRE

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SENSITIVE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25. D. C.

•OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

isci

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT

: CIA Action in Response to National

Security Action Memorandum No. 181

JFKL

1. In response to National Security Action Memorandum

No. 181, the following CIA officers are designated as the respon-

sible officers for items in which action is assigned to CIA.

Item 2.

Mr. Seymour R. Bolten

Item 4. Mr. William K. Harvey

or in his absence, Mr. Bruce B. Cheever

Item 5.

Mr. Ray Cline

2. I have directed the following actions to be initiated:

A. The CIA/Cuban Task Force will follow up with

Pentagon representatives to determine the

Department of Defense attitude or action on

the Secretary of State's suggestion made at

the 23 August meeting regarding the removal

of restrictions on mounting operations out of

the Guantanamo Base.

B.

The Board of National Estimates will establish

a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of

the numbers and types of Communist Bloc

personnel entering Cuba, quantity and types

of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and

all construction, particularily missile sites.

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GROUP 1

Excluded fram automall:

done rating zad

ce dect

TS 173282

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C.

D.

E.

F.

The Board of National Estimates will prepare

an assessment of the physical and psychological

dangers to the United States and Latin America

of missile installations in Cuba.

CIA will institute immediately a daily publication

on Cuban developments to include current intelli..

gence reporting, substantiating evidence, estima-

tive assessments, and coverage of domestic and

foreign press. This publication will be distributed

to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Secretary

McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer,

Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, and the

Attorney General.

CIA will arrange intelligence collection overflights

of Cuba as frequently as the situation demands.

The CIA/Cuban Task Force is now working on a

plan of operations which will be supplementary

to the course of action already approved by the

Special Group (Augmented). This plan of opera-

tions will approximate the line of activity

projected for Operation MONGOOSE in Plan B

Plus.

Mai has. Carter

Marshall S.

Carte

Lt. General, USA

Acting Director

JFKL

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GROUP 1

Excluces from aulemalle

descrating and

declassific lion

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Operation MONGOOSE

17 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

SUBJECT:

Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from

General Carter,

dated 16 October 1962

As agreed at yesterday's meeting, Mr. Bundy discussed the

above-mentioned memorandum with higher authority today.

The decisions

are as follows:

1.

Paragraph d. of the subject memorandum is dis-

approved.

This disapproval extends to any activity intended to

capitalize on even the notional existence of materiel of the kind

described.

Paragraph b. is approved with the addition of the

words "Bloc or Cuban"

inserted before "shipping and port facilities."

3. Paragraph h. is approved with the addition of "Bloc"

before the words!

"oil tanker."

4. All other proposals are approved as listed.

Jalanatt

Thomas A. Parrott

Copies:

1 - Mr. Bundy

2. - Mr. Johnson

3

- Mr. Gilpatric yeatroys 114163-8614

4.-- Mr. McCone

5 - Mr. Kennedy

= General Taylor

7 - Chief of Operations- Cy destroy i talus hin

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JFK #1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject:

Further organization of the Government for dealing with Cuba

On your oral instructions conveyed by General Clifton, I have met .

with an interdepartmental group to try to work out an improved

arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action in 1963. The

time is ripe for such a reorganization, because we seem to be wind-

ing up the negotiations in New York, the prisoners are out, and there

is well nigh universal agreement that Mongoose, is at a dead end. The

people with whom I have been working are:

Vance, Yarmolinsky and

General Wheeler as delegates for McNamara and Gilpatric;

Nick

Katzenbach as a delegate of Bobby; Pat Carter from CLA; and

Alexis Johnson and Ed Martin from State Department.

The following paragraphs represent my personal sense of what we

have worked out together, and while there may be some small dif-

ferences of point of view or need for revision, I think they are ripe

for your consideration.

1. The first guiding principle is that final policy responsibility

should remain with you, working with the Executive Committee when

necessary. There is no point pretending that major Cuban policy

decisions can be made anywhere else than in the White House, and

your own executive role, supplemented by the Executive Committee

when there are major policy issues or interdepartmental difficulties,

is indispensable.

2. The more complicated matter is where to put day-to-day coordinat-

ing responsibility. After considerable discussion, the unanimous

consensus is that we should locate this responsibility in a Coordinator

of Cuban Affairs, working as a deputy to Ed Martin in the State

Department and acting as chairman of an interdepartmental group

on Cuba.

The Coordinator would be responsible to Dean Rusk and

Ed Martin for departmental business, and, under their guidance, to

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you and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination.

Nothing in his authority would supplant the responsibility of other

operating departments for management of their own assigned tasks,

or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed;

but it would be clear that you and the Executive Committee were

looking to the Coordinator and his interdepartmental committee for

effective execution of your policy decisions. In ordinary circum-

stances; the necessary coordination will be carried out effectively by

good will and good sense on all sides.

When there is an honest

difference that cannot be resolved it will,

of course, have to come

upstairs one way or another.

The key to this administrative organization is, of course, the indi-

vidual appointed as coordinator. The recommendation of the State

Department is that Sterling Cottrell should be given this job. He has

been doing a very solid and constructive job

as head of the Vietnamese

Task Force, and he is due for reassignment to Latin American Affairs,

which turn out to be his preferred professional field, both by ex-

perience and by interest.

He has the necessary professional seniority.

in the

Department, and high interdepartmental acceptance.

He has

worked well with the White House staff.

It this arrangement should be approved, the Cuban desk of the Depart-

ment would be absorbed in a new, higher level Office of Cuban

• Affairs under Cottrell, with Bob Hurwitch as his deputy. Hurwitch

has done a very able job within the Department, but he is a little

junior for a major job of interdepartmental coordination.

At the same

time, Cottrell would be expected to find and appoint a deputy co-

ordinator, to be based in Miami, to handle day-to-day relations with

Cuban refugees and with interested':

agencies of Government on the

spot.

Biil Orrick has been asked to expedite effective interdepart-

mental administrative support, as necessary, for both the Coordinator.

and the Miami office.

3. If a Coordinator for Cuban Affairs is established, then we think

the Mongoose office should be disbanded and responsibility for covert

operations should be a part of the work of the Coordinator and his

associates from other departments, reporting on covert activities to

the Special Group (5412) in the normal way

The Special Group

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would in turn be guided by broader policy as established by you through

the Executive Committee.

The covert aspects of our Cuban enterprise

are not the most important ones, at present, and they need to be

handled in the wider context of an open Cuban policy, centered in a.

visible office of Cuban Affairs. Such a change would liberate General

Lansdale for many other tasks in which his services are uniquely

valuable.

4. The problem of organization is of course less than half the battle:

what we really need is to sort out our policies toward Cuba. There

are a number of loose ends, large and

small, of which the following

are samples:

a. The shipping orders and the broader question of

economic pressure on Cuba are still unsettled., Executive Oiders

have been prepared along the lines of your press conference state-.

ment, but they are being held up, as I think Dean Rusk has explained

to you, pending discussion with OAS and other Allies.

The State

Department will take any public rap for this delay.

b..

The organization and handling of refugees needs restudy.

We need a much more open and continuous communication with

refugee leaders, and we need clarification of the opportunities to be

offered to Cuban volunteers, whether or not they are veterans of the

brigade. If we can manage it, we need to get a stronger process of

representation of free Cubans.

c. We should intensify our investigation of ways and means

of communicating with possibly dissident members of the Castro

regime, perhaps including even Fidel himself.

Donovan, for ex-

ample, has an invitation to be Castro's guest at the beach of Veradero,

and there is work to be done also in our relations with men like

Manolo Ray.

¿. The role of intelligence officers needs to be redefined.

The very large commitment of the CLA to Mongoose

activities should

be reexamined, and probably substantially reduced, and the role of

CIA as an apparent spokesman and agent of the United States Govern-

ment in Cuban affairs should probably be reduced still further --

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although this in no sense reflects on the Agency, which has been

trying to do what it was told to do.

e.

The political, psychological, and personal aspects

of the effort to isolate Castro's Cuba should be pursued intensively

in the OAS. We do not want Cuba to be a hemispheric training

ground for Communists, and we have not exhausted our weapons

here.

f. We need to keep up a continuous and high-level barrage

of public statements explicitly defending our rights of surveillance.

You said on television that the camera will be our best inspector

and this position should be energetically sustained.

g. The question of Pan American flights should be re-

viewed. My own view, which Ed Martin shares, is that it is probably

to our advantage to have such flights, and that Juan Trippe should

not be allowed to get away with poor-mouthing on the cost to Pan

American. Over the long run this franchise is of the highest im-

portance to Pan American, and nothing I have heard about their

marginal losses is very impressive.

5. It would help to have your general reaction to these matters by

Monday. If you approve, we could put the organization into effect

at once and have a preliminary discussion of the substantive issues

by Cottrell's people with the Executive Committee before the end

of next week.

me. B.

MCG. B.

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# 1:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council

Mecting of January 22, 1963

'[he President began his discussion of national security problems

by calling attention to the worldwide responsibilities of the United

States. While we fully recognize our rcsponsibilities, other states

are not carrying their fair share of the burden.

Cuba

The major lesson of the Cuban crisis, the President said, was the

paramount importance of timing. Both sides, the United States and

the USSR, need sufficient time to consider alternative courses of

Our objective was and is to protect our national interests

while trying to avoid a nuclear exchange which, if it happened, would

be a defeat for both sides. In handling crises, it is important that

the Russians have enough time to debate their action. If they are

forced to rcact in an hour or two, they may react in a spasm and

resort to nuclear wär.

We, too, looking back on the quarantine vs.

air strike decision, look several days to discuss and understand the

advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives. The reason for

building up NATO conventional forces is to gain greater control

over the timing of a showdown in Europe provoked by the Russians.

The President pointed out that we must always be in a position to

threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russian pressure against us

in Berlin. We must always be ready to move immediately against

Cuba in the event we decide such action would be a more effective

response to a Soviet initiative than a nuclear response. We can

use Cuba to limit Soviet actions in the way the Russians use Berlin

to limit our actions.

Western Europe

Turning to Europe, the President Iccalled that de Gaulle's current

policy is no different than that he has been advocating since 1958

when he first proposed to President Eisenhower a U.S. - U.K. - France

directorate giving France, in effect, a veto on our use of nuclear

weapons. The suggestion was turned down because it would have

broken up NATO. This Administration agrees it was a correct

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decision. .The turndown of de Gaulle's proposal was not, however, the

reason why he is behaving as he now is. Even if we had given France

nuclear weapons, de Gaulle would have tried to restore France to a

predominant position in Europe. For years, in speeches and in his

memoirs, de Gaulle has expressed his view that France must be a

dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal,

dependent on no one.

In analyzing de Gaulle!'s present actions, the President said de Gaulle

did not question our support of Europe.

The proof that he does not

fear we would desert him is the deployment of only a small number of

French troops opposite the Russians in Germany.

He relies on our

power to protect him while lie launches his policies based solely on

the self-interest of France. Having been turned down by the U.S. and

U.K. on the directorate, de Gaulle, turned to Germany.

This helps

to keep Germany from looking to the Russians. It does

threaten

NATO which de Gaulle strongly opposes.

As to the Common Market, the President said that if Great Britain

joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized. We favor the

U.K. joining even though it will cost the U.S. considerable trade.

If France keeps Britain out, this will be a setback for us but a more

severe setback for the U.K.

Our interest, the President continued, is to strengthen the NATO

multilateral force concept, even though de Gaulle is opposed, because

a multilateral force will increase our influence in Europe and provide

a way to guide NATO and keep it strong. We have to live with de Gaulle.

One way to respond is to strengthen NATO and push for a multilateral

nuclear force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the Six. We

should not be overly distressed because the problems caused by

de Gaulle are not crucial in the sense that our problems in Latin

America are.

U.S. Trade Negotiations

The President then summarized the guidelines for forthcoming trade

negotiations.

In the present situation, we must be very careful to

protect U.S. interests. Our balance of payments problem is serious,

it is not now under control, and it must be righted at the latest by the

end of 1964. If we do not do so, there will be pressure against the dollar

and Congress will be demanding reductions in our foreign programs.

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One effort we must make, the President continued, is to seek to

prevent European states from taking actions which make our balance

of payments problem worse. For example, we maintain large forces

in Germany. We must firmly oppose West Germany if it incrcases

its agricultural production to our detriment. We have not yet

reached the point of wheat against troops but we cannot continue to

pay for the military protection of Europe while the NA'TO states are not pay-

ing their fair share and living off the "fat of the land. " We have been

very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for our-

selves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not do anything for us

simply because we have in the

past helped them. No longer dependent

on the U.S. for economic assistance, the European states are less

subject to our influence.

If the French and other European powers

acquire a nuclear capability they would be in a position to be entirely

independent and we night be on the outside looking in. We must exploit

our military and political position to ensure that our economic interests.

are protected.

Attitude Toward Neutrals

Referring to criticism by those who say we are treating neutrals as:

favorably as allies, the President said he did not believe such criti-

cism was sound but we shouldn't be over-confident ourselves.

For

example, the Pakistanis oppose our giving military assistance to

the Indians. Despite the fact that the Pakistanis are our allies,

we must recognize the importance of India.. If the Indians joined

the Chinese, we would have no free South Asia. Our aim is to

make the sub-continent of Asia strong. Even under present

Indian leadership, we can work with India just as we must use our

ally Pakistan to achieve our aim of keeping the sub-continent out of

the Communist camp. We cannot permit all those who call themselves

neutrals to join the Communist bloc. Therefore, we must keep our

ties to Nasser and other neutralists even if we do not like many things

they do because, if we lose them, the balance of power could swing

against us.

Assistance to Foreign Countries

The President said he wanted to make clear that we are giving aid

to foreign countries in order to increase the security of the United

States - not primarily for humanitarian reasons. AID programs

should be tested against the contribution they make toward improving

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our national security. Recalling that the military could always get

Congress to appropriate funds for military assistance, the Presi

dent asked that Defense Department officials help sell Congress on

conomic assistance. Some Congressmen will try to cut the heart

out of the AID program. Should they succeed, we would be in real

danger. A major effort is required to prevent this. We must make

every effort to keep countries out of the Communist bloc. Once a

country is in, we know from experience that it is very difficult to

get it out. We cannot risk the possibility of four or five countries

suddenly turning Communist just because we did not give them

economic and military aid. An outside group is now reviewing the

existing AID program for the purpose of ensuring that our assistance

to foreign countries will best serve our own national interest.

Domestic Issues

In introducing his remarks on domestic issues, the President empha-

sized the major effort which has been made to hold down the budget.

deficit now estimated at about $12 billion. The current budget shows

increases only for defense, space and the fixed charge of interest on

the national debt.

Our cconomic growth rate over the past ten years, he continued, has

been too slow, particularly in view of the great increase in our

population.

We must avoid another recession which would endanger our gold

position and have a bad psychological effect on the American people.

In comparison with the Russians who are making a inajor effort to

improve their domestic economy, we must not give the impression.

of just drifting lest other states draw the conclusion that we cannot

deal with our domestic economic problems.

An unbalanced budget as such is not worrisome especially when we

realize that our present deficit is a reflection of the hot and cold

war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years.

The new

tax bill is very important in this respect because if it is passed by

the Congress we will be in

much better shape.

It is unnecessary to point out that all these matters, AID, defense,

economic growth and the tax program are all related. If we become

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weaker economically, our influence abroad will be reduced. If this

happens, the entire Free World position weakens.

It is basic to our

national security to have a strong domestic cconomy.

Defense Problems

Recalling recent decisions limiting or halting certain military pro-.

grams, c.g. the B-70, Skybolt, and Nike-Zeus, the President said

we are going forward with large defense and space programs.

If

the necessity develops, we will do even more, but there is a limit

to how much we can do.

One of our big tasks is to persuade our colleagues in Europe to in-

crease their defense forces. If we are to keep six divisions in

Europe, the European states must do more. Why should we have

in Europe supplies adequate to fight for ninety days when the

Puropean forces around our troops have only enough

supplies to

fight for two or three days? Our forces in Europe are further for-

ward than the troops of de Gaulle who, instead of committing his

divisions to NATO, is banking on us to defend him by maintaining

our present military position in Europe. While recognizing the

military interests of the Free World, we should consider very

hard the narrower interests of the United States.

Test Ban Negotiations

The President reviewed the background of the current negotiations

with the USSR on a test ban

treaty. Our primary purpose in trying

to get a treaty with Russia is to halt or delay the development of an

atomic capability by the Chinese Communists.

We will have a

difficult time protecting the free arcas of Asia if the Chinese get

nuclear weapons. A test ban including only the USSR, the British,

and the U.S. would not be very meaningful except in rogard to the

Chinese problem which the Russians are believed to be as concerned

about as we are. If we get a treaty we think we can live with, all of

us must support it in order to overcome Congressional opposition

which undoubtedly will develop.

Concluding his remarks, the President thanked the assembled officers

for their cooperation, commented on the harmonious relations which

exist among the Departments and Agencies, and expressed the hope

that during the coming year we could build on the solid foundation

which now exists.

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3 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Cuba

PRESENT:

The President, the Attorney General, Secretary Vance,

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Martin, Mr. Hurwitch,

Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Calefano

- The President asked Mr. FitzGerald whether the exile raids

accomplish anything worthwhile. The latter replied that he thought

they do not accomplish anything except perhaps to bolster morale

of the exiles; on the other hand the effect on people still in Cuba

can be counterproductive to some degree. The President said that

he does not object to these raids if they really strike worthwhile

targets rather than the "froth" which their acts to date have

represented.

Heradded that he had no objection to raids from the

sea unless they were directed at Soviet ships.

He also said we

cannot condone the holding of press conferences by the exiles after

such raids.

2. Mr. FitzGerald gave a summary of the results of agent

operations to date.

He noted that failures in black operations have

been due to weather, lack of reception, hostile activities in the area,

and mechanical fallures; only three failures have been due to refusal

of the agents to continue.

He emphasized the fact that the Cubans

are very good at counterinsurgency--that is putting down resistance

groups--but not very good at sophisticated counterintelligence

operations. He noted that there has been no particular trouble in

recruiting agents, but that it is not always possible to match the

qualifications and experience of these operatives with desired targets.

Mr. FitzGerald added that the classic Communist "block system" 1s

particularly effective In uncovering illegal residents.

3. The President asked whether sabotage operations are now

underway. Mrs. Bundy pointed out that they are not, because the

Special Group had decided--based to a considerable extent on the

difficulties encountered in mounting the mine operation--that such

activity is not worth the effort expanded on it, in relation to the

results that could be obtained in the intelligence field.

The latter

has been considered to have priority and to be more practicable. Mr.

Martin added that it had also been felt that sabotage by itself was

not particularly productive and that it should be done primarily in

conjunction with other activities.

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In answer to the President's question, a number of people

said that acts of sabotage might have some beneficial results from

the U. S. point. of view, both from the standpoint of the intrinsic

economic damage that might be done, and also for the psychological

effect of making it evident that internal resistance to Castro exists.

(In the latter connection, MI. FitzGerald made the point that recent

exfiltrees have said that there is now no organized resistance inside

Cuba.)

4.

In answer to the Attorney General's question, Mr. Fitzgerald

said that immediate plans are primarily based on obtaining fuller

Intelligence coverage of the island, with emphasis on filling in

• existing geographic gaps.

He said that perhaps the most important

question in this context is whether time is on our side or on Castro's,

and added that the Board of National Estimates 1s currently investi-

gating this question. Mr. FitzGerald added that in his opinion there

is no chance of a successful civilian uprising against Castro because

of the strength of Castro's security measures, but that we are hopeful

of accomplishing penetrations of the military establishment; on the

other hand, it is doubtful whether any such contacts would be willing

to communicate among themselves, for fear of provocation.

5. The Attorney General asked whether it might not be useful to

consider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men. Mr.

FitzGerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed it would

probably be impossible for them to survive for any length of time.

Mr. Bundy added that under these circumstances we would then have to

face the problem of whether the U. S. would actually back up these men.

The Attorney General urged, In any case, that CIA survey all possibilities

for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months, assuming that

the Agency could be given a free rein to proceed.

6. The President summed up the meeting by directing the following:

a. The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future

strength should be completed

as soon as possible.

b. CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished

In the field of sabotage during the next six months.

c. A meeting should be held next week to review the pro-

posed sabotage program..

(Signed) Thomas A. Parrott

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

CIA - 2 cys

State - 1 cy

Defense - 1 cy

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11 April 1963

MENORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

PRESENT:: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

DI. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley

were present for Items 1 - 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4.

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded

orally on the paper of 9 April, giving.

a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program,

and outlining proposals in this tield for the next month.

The Group

approved this projection. In response to a question about the status

of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch wich

him from time

to time, and chat any plan he has to offer for activicy

against Cuba will be sympachetically received, but that he has not to

date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 1l April,

on the three papers being considered at today's moeting were noted.

The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed

for security reasons.

With specific reference to the conment that a

proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on che carget date

of che 20ch ur 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date

had been set before the status of the dunovan negotiations was known.

He said that of course no activity of this kind would bo allowed to

• interfere with chose negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of

• sabotage. The Group agrced that che papers before it vore responsive

co requests which had been lovicó on CIA to come up vich general.ind

specifle propusals. On the other land, all members us the Group

recognized that a searching examination must be undertalien in the light

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of all pertinent factors, to determine

whecher we wish to change the

present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis

for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of che

prospects of

success, the extent of benefits to ho gained from

successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals,

etc.

Wich respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups,

1t was agreed that this sure of activity poses a Ical dilemna.

Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile

raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly

responsibility for such acts.

The U.S. is thus placed in the position

of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling, the exiles or

of beering the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of

procecding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an

over-all policy is made clear on steps to be talien to assure the re-

moval of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro.

He also com-

cented on the inoffectiveness of Cuban ayents and the fact that they

rould undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the

second point, but felt that these particular Cubans aro porhaps more

effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19ch of April, a pre-

sentation should be made to higher authority at which tie

all

responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their

views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program

for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of

the sale of activity which could reasonably be expected and

the

benefis from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by che use of

internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would

fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate wich State in che

prepuration of this paper.

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April. 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bundy

SUBJECT:

Cuba -- Policy

1. We are all concerned about solving our Cuba problem, but so far,

we have been looking seriously at only one side of the coin -- ways

to hurt Castro by varying degrees of overt and covert nastiness. We

have not yet looked seriously at the other side of the coin -- quietly

enticing Castro over to us.

2. If the sweet approach turned out to be feasible and, in turn,

successful, the benefits would be substantial. In the short run, we

would probably be able to ncutralize at Icast 2 of our main worries

about Castro -- the reintroduction of offensive missiles and Cuban

subversion. In the long run, we would be able to work on eliminating.

Castro at our leisure and from a good vantage point.

3. While the practical obstacles to this sort of approach may be

immense, they may not be insuperable. Two such obstacles are

the domestic political situation and Castro's reluctance to be enticed.

(a) Domestic Problem -- If the American people can be shown

that the offensive missile threat and the subversive threat

are under control, that the Russian presence in Cuba is

reduced and that Castro is much more a nationalist than

a Communist, the selling job necessary for a careful,

quiet policy turn-around may not be impossible.

(b) Castro's Reluctance to be Enticed -- This may be an casier

nut to crack now than it once would have bech. Castro may

have received, from our point of view, some very valuable

cducation over the past couple years. Hopefully, he has

Icarned that the Russians are not as tough and reliable as

he thought they were and that we are a lot tougher and nastier

than he thought we were;

also hopefully, he is scared.

13)

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Our present nasty policy is probably a necessary prelude to a sweet

approach. The more we can (1) scare Castro and (2) demonstrate to

him that the Bloc is either unwilling or unable to fill his security and

economic requirements, the more amenable Castro probably will be

to a new approach. In this regard, perhaps the worst thing we can

do is to let our nasty policy case off without a particular objective in

sight.

4. I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking

at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem. It might be

interesting if, at roughly the same time, he could have a look at a

feasibility study on a policy turn-around.

Do you think this timing for such a study is right? Or do you think it

is still premature?

Gordon Chase

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18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Mecting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mi. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

'Ilie Attorney General, General Taylor, Mi. Murrow, and

Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item 1.

1.

Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the

meeting

tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the

proposed sabotage actions for April will be canculled and two caching

operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The

Group approved this.

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative

decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability,

which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired

to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would tale

about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that in a

real crisis balloons could be uf consideraule valuc. Accordingly, it

was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the

idea that is a sicuation should arise in which balloons vould be use-

ful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying.

too much about attribution under those circumstances.

In commenting

on his opposition to the earlier proposicion, Mr. Murrow said that he

believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated

program.

The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Co-

ordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16ch, 17th, and 18th. It was

noted that there had not been time fur adequate staffing of these papers

and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully.

In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of

National Estimates

of CIA to review the papers, in light of cheir

estimacive .content.

It was thus agreed that the papers should be

staffed and sharpened up for presentation at nuxt weck's mecting.

Mr.

Johnson suggested that a possible fornat might be to produce one paper

which would be prefaced by the quidelines currently contained in the

Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a

surmary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various

types, and then reconmendations.

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Mr. Bundy and Mr. MeCond expressed some doubts is to whether le

aro in a posicion to decide major problons of this type mtil we

have a clearer picture of what che over all policy tovard Cuba is

likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy

pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of

these proposals would be considerably more chan it has been to date,

and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this.

Ile added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily

be bad, but it would cortainly be difierent from the low level

activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent,

it would be possible tu embark on the activities proposed in the

Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this

connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals

for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not

gencrate a high noise level.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a

"Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and

harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals ho

may be responsive to our advice but cortainly not to our command.

He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow fiom supporting

one group and

not ochers.

Mr. McCone said that if such groups become

active, it will be obvious that they have U.S, support because it is

well known that they do not have adequate assets now. lie and Mr..

Bundy agreed that, despite the face that some Central American govern

ments might be used as cutouts, the U.s. would be blamed for their

activities.and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on

such a course.

They felt additionally that we must be sure that such

a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives.

Mr. MeCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that

time is running in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald said that

some of these accivities are designed to slow down or

possible stop

the trend of events in his favor.

It was: noted that the program for shipping sabotage,

which has

already beun. approved, is in process of pussible implemencation. Ic

was. agreed that this process

should not be interrupted:

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TOP SECRET

Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 2/63,

April 23, 1963, 5:00 PM -- Cuba

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy

entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives."

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance,

it should consider whether the present policy we are following would

produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that

Castro's position over the short term wold improve if we took no

actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear

his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a reguire-

ment and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result

in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would

produce changes acceptable to us.

The program should aim at creat-

ing such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to

use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retalia-

tion by the USSR on the West.

MI. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that

Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from

now than it is

at present. He expressed his belief that present policy

would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could

provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban

economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agice with the views of the

Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of

existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate

that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to

shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit

full rations for Cuban militia.

Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting

Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance

Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved

that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example,

Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough

to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR and

not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind

of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not

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stay bought.

The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was

not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be.

induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies

such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.

b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in

eighteen months.

C. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist

Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba

from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was

a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against

Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always.•

be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba

and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major im-

portance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his vicw that we need promptly a state-

ment of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba

we could live with if it were no longer run by Castro or tied to. Moscow.

He said that American companies had written off their expropriated

sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would

own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared

in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist

Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR.: There

appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures

we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result

would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

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Ga.:

Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the moting

as

follows:

a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things

that we are not now doing.

b. Agree on military responses which we should make to con-

tingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.

c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.

d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.

e.' A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.

f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.

§. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to

the kind of a'regine we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith

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2

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April 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba -- Policy

I refer to your request that I look over the papers for the Standing Group

mecting and give you my comments.

1. The covering memorandum is very stimulating, hits the gut

issues and should provoke some much-needed thought and discussion on

Cuba policy.

2. Re "Possible New Initiatives" on page 3 -- The implication

of the three courses of action is that only Course a is likely to gain our

maximum objectives. While this is probably true, I'm not sure we can

rule out all possibilities quite yet. For example, Course c could con-

ceivably lead to the attainment of all possible U.S. objectives, including

the eventual overthrow of Castro.

I think the first order of business is to figure out exactly what we

want U.S. -Cuba relations to look like in X number of years. Assuming

we are not out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a

Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way of getting

rid of him -- a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or

a combination of both (e.g. a two-stage plan)? If, on the other hand,

there is a Castro we can live with, what are our terms of accommoda-

tion? Are we more likely to get these terms by a tough or a sweet

approach?

3. Re POL Blockade on page 3 -- Even assuming it would not

escalate into a shooting war, a POL blockade may not be a realistic

pressuring device.. It is my understanding that we would have to block-

ade for three to six months before Castro would really hurt. This means

we would be under terrific world (and probably domestic) pressure for an

awfully long time (e. g. newspapers depicting dying babies because the

power was cut off at the hospital). Generally speaking, any nasty actions

we contemplate should be of the "short and sweet" variety.

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4. The Standing Group may also wish to focus hard on some of

the policy approaches which we are now using and which we may want to

continue using in the future. For example, is economic isolation of

Cuba from the Free World likely to make Castro submit to our will? Or

is a rupture in the Bloc/Cuba tie more promising? Is it possible to use

both approaches at the same time? Or are we more likely to break the

Bloc/Cuba tie if we back off from our policy of isolating Cuba economically

from the Free World?

iC

Gordon Chase

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

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in

April 29, 1963

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF THE STANDING GROUP

TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 10:30 AM

I have not been able to make special assignments to individual

members of the group in this first weck, but I have had helpful dis-

cussions with several members, and I know that other members

have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do

tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major arcas of

interest, and to make proliminary decisions as to ways and means

of gotting forward with the necessary spare work.

1. The possible use of contingencies for the

he achievement of wider

political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind here are:

a. Interforence with overflights.

Possible death of Castro®

c.

The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner

of Hungary. - Cuban es Culomo.

Attributable interference by Castro in othey countries.

tal fam 2a.

e. Reintroduction of offensive weapons.

8 p.

2. Programs which might be initiated by the United States Government

with both immediate and long-run objectives: Examples which come

to mind are:

a. Gicater pressure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by hul?

trick to

additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to interrupt

all military traffic to Cuba.

• b.: Expanded conomic action, possibly including encourage-

ment of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than

anything attempted up until now. Within this category additional

possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it

it hoped that some may be offered.

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jonice of small-sale shirag are a lany perved.

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3.

The possible defection of Castro. This is a wholly separate

kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement

last wock that it was not very promising, but it has been properly

pointed out that it could be pursucd on a separate track while some

or all of the things proposed above were going on.

. t.

An information program for post-Castro Cuba. Therc was

general agreement last week that this also is a matter of high

inportance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions

in other categories.

Docinents which members may want to look at before the meeting

are attached:

Tab A:

Draft intelligence estimate of the situation in Cuba a

ycar from now.

Tab B:

The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet

military presence. This item is of considerable present

interest to higher authority.

It is

recognized that the diet here is relatively thin, but I think we

can uscfully spend one more meting making sure that we have the

elements of the problem in proper shape before we go into more

detailed work.

McGorge Bundy

attictritin

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it figist

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING GROUP

Tho following acsignmento have been made as a result of the discus-

siun in the Standing Groug ou Tuesday, April SOths

lo There will be an examinaton of the possible devclopmente

3n Cuba lt Castro were to disappear from the scene. This analysis

will be developed by Mi. Sherman Kent and will bo avallable for die-

cussion at the mecting of the Standing Group on May l4th.

2. There will be an analysia of the posnible use of contingenciea.

for the achievement of wides polltical objectives. This analysis will

be conducted under the direction of Ms. Alexis Johnson aud Mr. Paul

Nitze, and its first coults will be avallable for discussion at the

mecting of the Standing Group on May 14th. Thia first znalysis will

provide:

a. A úctailed examination of possible action in the event:

of Interference with surveillance; and b. a more general assessment

of possiblo use af other contingencies in Cuba or la the waters around

Cuba.

3. The Central Intelligonce Agency will preparo a general paper

on the possible forms of effective Interference with tho economic

Ille of Cuba by sabotage or other meane. In particular. CIA will

report on the oil problem in relation to Cuba. It is hoped that a

first report on this study may be arnilable next week for distribution.

4. The Department of State will examino the possible use of the

sugar market as a means of complicating the life of the Castro

regione:

It is hoped that this study will be avallable next week.

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The principal tople of dircuasion for the mecting of the

Standing Group on May 7th will ho the development of a U.s.

program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba, and tho initial:

lead la the discussion will be taken by Mr. Wilson for USLA..

Approprlata papers will be circulated before noon on Monday.

May orbeneditor

tale fontanned do Tantric. MeGeorge Bundy

;.

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CT!:

TS 1185620

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CFFICE OF NATIONAL, ESTIMATES

Fela

13 May 1963

DRAFT MENORANDUM

SURICT:

Developmonts in Cuba and Possible US Actions 1n

the Event of Castro's Death*

SUMMARY

We belleve the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother

Raul or some other figure in the regire would, with sovlet backing .

and help, take over control. However, there 1s a good chance that

a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a

struisle would spread, alther into a many-sided conflict or with

the Moscow-oriented Comnunists lined up on one side and those who

are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In nny ense

# Tits menorandun 1s a generni anlysis of the situation and

prospects for US action after Castro's death.

We have not soucht

to work out in detall latin Arerican, Western European, or other

third party renctions in the varlous contingencies adverted to in

our examination of the problem.

In paragraph 13 we consider very

goncrally the problem of Soviet reactions.

GROUP 1

Excluded froin autoratic

downgrading and

declassification

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the loyaltles of the nilitary commonders, now comitted to

Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly

Influence the outcone. Anti-roscow Cuban nationalists would

Icquire

extensive US help in order to win, and probably US

military Intervention.

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1OP

I.

CUEA WIINCUT CASTRO

Factor's In the Situation

The course of events in Cuba after Castro's death would

depend upon a wide range of variubles and unnams, rhich are .

unlikely to be male manifest until after the event. Yet we can

moke soile advance assessment of the importance of certain factors.

a. Me leadership. Castro's personal predoninance

has overshadored the rest of the Icadership. The two most

praillnent and poverful political Icaders under Fidel are his

brother Roul and Che Guevara. Raul 1s Deputy Picnier and the

designated successor. Furthernore he 1s Minister of the Aried

Torces ond Conmander in Chief. He has by far the best chance

of taking over after his brother's death, but he has a cold und

unattractive personality wiüh little of Iidel's appeal. to the

public. On the other hand, Che Guevura 1s a more colorfil figure,

a man of abillly and drive, and therefore a likely contender for

pover. If these two wore to cooperate, together with President

Do ticos they would have a good chance of consolidating control.

Anong the old line Comunists the position ind attitude of Carlos

Rafael. Rodriquez vould be the nost important, since he enjoys

2...

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some respect anoud the fidellstas aid has authority among the

Moscub-orlented Communists.

b.

Differences within the Regime. The top leadership

of the regime seams to live In more harmony than after the Escalante

uffair in the spriag of 1962 or

after the October 1952 crisis.

However, we bellove that there is still a basic cleavage between

the Fidelistas and the Moscor-orlented Corsunists and that it

night widen in situations of stress.

Co. The Nary and Socurliy Forces. The arned furces

and sceurity services have been molded Into Instruments highly

responsive to Fidel blinself. After his departure, both the army

ond the socurity forces are iliely to beccue niore important and

nore active ln polltics. Their allegiance 1n a power struggle

would depend to a rajor extent on the circunstances then current.

We have llitle trustworthy, Information on the majorlty of the

Individual milltary comanders, but we do know that popular

londers have been moved from post to post, presumably to prevent

their attaining too gicat power. A sizcable minority of

the top

military connanders are persuesively reported to be opposed to

the present close ties with the USSR; they have been restrained

so far by their personal loyalty to Fidel and by the regine's

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informant systen. A few commanders would probably lond

thenselves readily to support of another Moscow-orlented

leader; nost have demonsirated no political loyalty except

to Castro.

thus we would expect dissension within the armed

forces in the event of a strugale for poker. The loyalty of.

the conmanders rather than the attitude of the troops would

probably govern the behavior of the military forces in

such

a struggic.

d.

The Cliban Public.

The enthusiasm of a suistantial

portion of the population for the changes wrought by the Castro

rovolution, the departure or imprisouinent of many potential

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Icaders of opposition, the corerel possivity of the remainder of

the

pogulation, the weakness of the resistance, and the strength

of the security organisntions all crgue agrinst the likellhood of

a popular uprising after Castro's death.

e.

The Soviet Role. Castro's death would deprive the

Soviets of the only Communist lecder with Charisma in Latin Muerica

and at the same time rellove them of the difficulties of doing

business with a spiney independent character. Castro's successor

might be far easier for the Soviets to deel with, but is sure to

lack Castro's wide emotional appeal. Upon Castro's death the

Soviets would move rapialy to the support of Raul Castro or what-

ever other friendly contender for pover scened likely to win cut.

They would be able to offer signifi.cont help to their chosen

Instrunent, and such support might be decisive in my streble for

pover among the top leadership.

I. The US Rule. If Castro were to die by other than

natural causes the US would be widely charged with conplicity, even

though it is widely known that Castro has miny carmies.. US inter-

vention would be anticipated by many supporters and by many opponents

of the regine. In this

state of affairs, not only the nature but

also the tining of Us actions would have great inportance, and US

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10F

silence or Inaction rouid also have fas-icaching consequences.

These vill be dealt. with in nore deteil in the lollowing paragraphs.

Stages of the Cuban Reaction to Castro's Death

4. Il the US did nut Intervene imnedlately, Raul Castro or

one of the toy echelon of Casiro's follovers toula probably be cobe

to consolidate a working regime acceptable to the soviets. lorever,

we believe that there would be a substantial, though less then even

chance, of a struggle for bowei among the top lcaders. Such a

süruggle for pover right be insolved by the clergence of a single

leader, but there is a chance thut the conflict would usiniely

take on the characioristics of a civil var.

Initial Period of Solidarity. We believe that the

nast probable development after Castro's death would be a rallying

of a regime nround the designated successor, Raul Castro. The

amposition would teke heort, but would wait for a move from the US

end the Latin American opponchts ci the Castro regine before

carmitting Itself to nore than token efforts. Mter an initial

period of consolidation and solidarity the new leaders might 60 on

and control. On the other hand, It 1s equally Ilkely that a

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struggle for pure il3. devcion. Diving thia ezily phase te

belleve that presaure from the is would he wore likely to increase

the solidariiy of the regine thun promote a power stveste.

Seagule Cor loveco e sone Individual Or group

accided to contest Roules lendenhle, the cutcone would dobend upon

a nunber of factors, the nost imporcant of which would probably

be whether Raul had gained or rilienated the loyalty of the anued

forces. Ib ts nossibl? thalia is in the UbSk, the struncle lur

power could be confinca to the Innor circles and that a single

figure sould creniually gain control. In Cube, however, such a

struggle would be likely to break into the open, throwing up

several amoitious contenders for place and yower.

c.

Wdened Contlict. It Is also possible that s

suzuegle for pover would not end after the strongest of the 1n-

dividual Lenders had asserted himsole but that alliances rould

be formed and lines be drawn between the Fidelistas on the one

hand and the Moscow orlanted Cormunists on the other.

such a

split could extend into the Arry and security forces and dovelop

Into something like a civil war. Perhups even more likcly than

a tro sided civil vor would be a conflict in which many groups

6

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emerged, all striving fur dantnance,

forning alllances and

bacaling off into new splinter giouns and factions. In such &

altuntion the cagence of a 101-Coumunist Fidelista giCUp,

claining to be the rightful heirs of the origiual revalution,

would be a possibility, but unlikely without US support.

do Ultimate Resolution. Whatover the outcone of en

upheaval like that described above, certain elchents in the niesent

situation son certain to survive. the social and coonomic changes

brought about by Castro's revolution are unlikely io be reversed,

nether or noi Castro's ultinate successor be a Camuntst. Cuba

19 likely to be a socialist siate and probably to require for

sale time an authoritarion government. Whoever the lecder of Cuba

1s, he will probably be critically degendent upon the support of

armed forces.

II. US COURSES OF ACTION •

50

Ho Special US Initiatives. The posture of the US in the

Imnediate aftemath of Castro's death ill be of critical

importance. If the US took no position and no action alter

Castro's death the new regine would move rapidly to consolidate

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70

Its hold and the Illiclihred of an anti-Communist force cherging

vould be greatly reduced. If such an anti-Commuist croup dia

merge without the encomraganent or intervention of the US its

position might be less vulnerable to chaiges of being the.

ercature of the US. He think it much more likely, however, that

ony anti-Connist croup that emerged in Cuba would neid und

might openly seek assurcaces and help from the US. The most

LIkely circunstences foc such an upperl would be those in which

a nationalist group vas openly in conflict tith a Cammunist

directed end surpurtca group.

6.

us support for the "the Heirs" of the doth of July lovenent.

The energence of en effective anti-Cammmist force in Cuba vijl

depend primarily on Cubon Iniülalive and would probably require

the defection of laportant elements of the existing regime. With

noper timing, however, US encouragement wight stimulate such

development. Once the internal political forces in Cuba have pro-

duced a split betwcon the nationalists and the Moscor-oriented

Camunisto US instlatives would be of utmost importance. At the

right owent they night produce a merglig of nationalists tithin

the regime and those in opposition. This seans to us the combina-

tion most Ilkely to upset the forces seeking a Conmunist succescion.

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II Us offers ure to have an appeal to such a coclition they wust

make elcar the tillingness of the US to ccoperate with formos

menbers aud supporters of the Castro regime those ain 1s to

achieve Cuba's Independence of the Soviets and the Cornist Bloc.

It will also be recessay for the US to make & convincing

asselüion of lis readiness to accept most ai the social and

econanic changes instituted by the Castro regime.

To The probler of tining will, of course, be one of great

Imporiance. It seens likely that there rould be e yeriod duiing

which a public ennouncement of US willingness to support a

nationalist group would be disadvalageous. A too rapid announce-

went might serve to consolidate resistance to these people; a too

long delay could cause then to despair. Meanvile, it would be

essential to transit an offer of support clandestinely to the

right people at the earliest possible moment. One problem will be

the rclative timing of a US anouncoment und of activities designed

to preposition forces in anticipation of Iulfilling promises. It

11ll be extranely difficult to nove any US forces vithout publicity

by the Us press, but such prepositioning as can be carried out

inconspicucusly probably ought to take place as soon as a general

course of action has been decided unoul. A public statcnent of

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Us intentions should probably be made before nilitary preparations

dircated toward Cuba become widely known.

8. Once a nationilist group had emerged and entered into

conflict with the Moscow-oclented Connunists, the assistance which

it would require from the US would depend largely on circunstances.

It might be that arms and cmmunition delivered rapidly ond in such

a way as to ensure its victory volild be the only aid colled for.

It is possible that such a group would ask for US air support and

perhaps for Us ground forces as well in the early stages of contlict;

sooner or later it would alnost certainly require such support. In

a later stage 11 & US supported nationalist group had won dominance,

the US would face a new set of froblems. Almost my such group

would be likely to insist that no political or social changes nade

under Castro be reversed except at its own initiative. Compensation

for expropulated US property might be agreed to, but not at a

realistic figure. The US yould alnost certainly be obliged to

undertake an aid progran at least the rough equal of the present

Soviet program.

9. Action Through a government in Ex1le.. It 1s highly

unllkely that any Cuban exile group could effectively influence

the course of cents in Cuba

uiter Castro's death, with or without

Us support. Furthermore, the association of exiles with US

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Initlatives would probably reduce their chances of success.

It Is possible that certain groups in Cuba would prefer to

deal with the US through & Cuban government in exile, but we

think it unlikely.

10. Quarnntine:

and Rlackade. If in consonance wiüh

various policy pronouncements the US were to quarantine Soviet

attempts to reinforce its military and technical personnel 1n

Cuba and to Introduce additional armaments, the US-oriented

revolutionaries would probably be enspirited. If on the

other hand the US declared a blockade the reactions in Cuba

would be mixed: our friends would be greatly heartened to

realize that the US had Indicated its willingness to bring

down the Connunist regime In Cuba, even at the ris's of var with

the Soviet Union. The regime would be apprehensive. Unless the

blockade were swiftly challenged by the Soviets and the focus

of the confrontation drastically shifted, the chances of the

fall of the successor Cuban regime would rise.

11. Invasion. If the US declared Its readiness to support

the Cuban nationalists and true heirs of the Castro revolution

and 1l such a group emerged, the chances are at least even that

1t would require the intervention of US forces before It could

= 11.

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gain control of the isiana. Of the varlous guises under

which Invasion might be undertaken the least palainhle and

probably the least efiective would be that of a Cuban exile

force.

An undisguised US Invasion would cause political

problems inside

and outstde Cuba, but we do not belleve that

they would be unacceptable to the Cu

p7t1-Comnunist

moverent.

Huch would depend, of course, on the authenticity

of the Cuban novement.

12. Jolne Actlon by Hemisphere States. Joint OAS action

would be unlikely to have any great appeal to Cubans, even

the Cuban nationalists. However, steps to bring the OAS in

some way or another into any action contemplated by the US

night help avoid many diplomatic problems in latin America

and elsewhere.

13. Sovlet Reaction. Castio's departure from the scene

would not lessen the Soviet concern to preserve the Communist

base in Cuba. They would certainly try to Influence the

situation, particularly 1f a power strugule developed. For

a time they ould operate behind the scenes and publicly would

not have to go beyond reaffirmation of their vague commitments

to protect a Communist Cuba. Once the strugele reached open

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conflict, or 1f the US took strong action against the new

regime, the USSR would have no choice. They would have to

decide how far to go in support of & Communist faction.

What they would do outside Cuba is beyond the scope of this

paper, but within Cuba ve believe the Sovlets vould be

cautious about engaging in open conflict.

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EYES DALY

19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT:

Sabotage Program, Cuba

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority, on the

above subject.

Present were Mr. McNamara and General McKee; Mi.

Harriman; Mr. McCone

and Mr.

FitzGerald; and Mi. Bundy.

Mr. Harriman said that the Standing Group had approved the

proposed external sabotage program for Cuba and that the Secretary

of State had approved it in general terms, although not in detail.

He said it was State's understanding that the Special Group would

review the program regularly but that all concerned had agreed that'

once operations had begun, they should continue for a reasonable

length of time and not be subject to periodic stop-and-go orders.

A period of perhaps eighteen months was mentioned.

Mr. FitzGerald then gave the outlines of the proposed program.

It will be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy:

(a) electric power; (b) petrolcum refineries and storage facilities;

(c) railroad

and highway transportation; and (d) production and

manufacturing. (te pointed out that many targets in the last category

could be put out of operation by successful sabotage of power

facilities.)

The first operation is planned for mid-July.

Raids

will be conducted from outside Cuba, using Cuban agents under CIA

control. Missions will be staged from a U.S. key.

The point was raised that if any agents are captured they can

reveal their point of departure, and the question was asked whether

a British key could not be used instead. Mr. FitzGerald responded

that this would not help the situation because in any case the agents

would be in a position to tell a full story about U.S. involvement.

A question

was asked as to whether the Cubans could retaliate

in kind. The answer was that they would certainly have this capa-

bility but that they have not retaliated to date, in spite of a

number of publicized

exile raids.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that these operations will raise the

noise level considerably, in the same manner as the Alpha 66 raids

did.

(A comment was made that this is certainly true, and that it

02371

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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008007

will increase our domestic political problems, because the in-

creased publicity will inevitably lead to complaints that the U.S.

course of action is inadaquate.) Mr. Bundy added that the proposed

sabotage program interlocks with two other efforts along the same

lines.

One of these involves an autonomous operation which will be

based in Central America and which will not be operative until October

or November, and the other consists of continuing efforts to develop

internal resistance elements which could carry out sabotage. The •

purpose of all of this is to nourish a spirit of resistance and dis-

affection which could lead to significant defections and other by-

products of unrest.

Mr. McCone said that the military forces are a

particularly important target in this connection.

Mr. McCone also emphasized the fact that no single act of

sabotage, as proposed in this program, can be expected to have a

very significant effect on the Cuban economy, but what we are trying

for is the cunulative effect of a continuing series of operations.

The program was approved, with the understanding that operations.

would not begin until mid-July.

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

July 25, 1963

MAMORANDUM

TO

: CCA - Mr. Crimmins

FROM

: INR - George Co Denney, Jr. /C.d.'

SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action

This paper, prepared solely by a member of the INR Special

Studies Group who, among others from INR, has represented INk on

the Cuba Coordinating Comnittee, presents a concept and offers some

possible courses of action towards Cuba.

It is submitted for your

possible interest.

Summary and Recommendations

Rationale of Proposals

Revolutionary Nationalism Versus Communism

A. Exiles Stimulate Nationalist Altornative

B. Revolutionary Objectives

C.

Revolutionary Program

D. Exile Radio Activities

_Discrediting Castro in Latin America

Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule

Psychological Guidelines

-...

GROUP I

Excluded from

automatic

downgrading and

declassification

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Sumrary and Recommendations

US policy seeks to achieve an Independent, democratic, and socially

progressive Cuba and to erase the communist presence in Cuba which con-

stitutes a foreign imposition on the Cuban people and a threat to hemi-

spheric security.

The problem discussed in this paper is how to gain

these objectives without resort to invasion or attributable acts of

violence and violations of international law. To this end the paper

offers specific proposals and guidelines for: 1) discrediting Fidel

Castro and his communist regime in Latin America, 2) destroying his

image in Cuba, and 3) creating the necessary preconditions for nation

alist upheaval inside Cuba within two years.

Public expression of US policy should parallel the useful distinc-

tion made during the missile crisis when action vas directed not against

Castro but against the communist military threat chanating from Cuba.

It should now be aimed publicly not at getting rid of Castro - since

this only increases his popularity with the nationalistic Cuban

people - but at removing the threat posed by the coumunist presence

in Cuba. The public position should be: Castro is not a threat to us,

but a mere puppet who has violated Cuban liberty, dignity and vell-

being; the coumunist presence in Cuba, however, constitutes a totali-

tarian and subversive force in this hemisphere and therefore cmins

unacceptable.

In short, we suggest that the US government publicly disengage

from Castro while continuing indirect action against him in order to

overthrow his communist regime. Accordingly, the following action is

recommended:

a.

Indirectly cuide nationalist revolutionary exile groups

with reputations that remain untarnished (through non-

Identification with Batista, the Brigade, or US intcrests)

in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime from within,

under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement."

We propose that reputable exile lenders such as ranolo Ray

Ernesto Betancourtand Javier Pazos: 1) be informed by

Roirulo Botancourt that the US expects them to assume the

main leadership role in this endeavor without involving

the US; 2) be offered for their consideration the strategy,

Revolutionary ObJectives and Revolutionary Probram set

forth herein; 3) be encouraged to initiate a several-month

campaign of radio harassment as a prelude to foinenting

organized sabotage; subversion and guerrilla varfare against

the Castro regime; and 4) announce their Revolutionary

ProBram on July 26, 1963, seemingly, if not actually frora the

Cuban mainland.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28,

1963

TOP:

SECRET:

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM TO:

Members of The Standing Group.

The meeting this afternoon will be davoted to a number of

special problems on Cuba,

but I hope we may have a few minutes

sat the end'to take a reading on the general position as it appears

to be developing:

First, we will turn to

the problem of sugar as presented

in the papers of the Department of Agriculture. For this part

of the discussion, Under Secretary Sundquist will be present for

Secretary Freeman

?. We should briefly discuss a paper on possible U. S.

actions in the event of Castro's death.

For this part of the

discussion MI. Sherman Kent will be present.

3. There are to highly sensitive CIA papers which

Mr. McCone has requested that we hold for distribution at the

meeting.

They deal with a list of possible actions under con-

sideration at CLA and with the specific problem of Cuba's oil supplies.

40

Ipropose at the end to make a brief oral comment on the

results of our discussions thus far, as I understand them.

My own

preliminary conclusions are not optimistic,

but that is not an

excuse for avoiding the issue.

Hif Bin

McGeorge Bundy

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b. Reverse the present David-Goliath relationship with

Cuba by having a smaller and militarily helpless Central

American state, with a highly respected leader, engage

Castro in a propaganda struggle in order to distract

Castro and provoke him into threatening and unwise

countermoves. If successful this will serve several

purposes: 1) make an ordinary bully out of & heroically

posturing Castro, cause him to lose self-esteem, and

possibly involve. him in a chain reaction of mistakes,

2) increase Latin American concern over Cuban subversion

and promote ONS cooperation in defense of a small nation

(the US should be the last to interfere overtly), 3) pro-

vide the US with an excuse to take further action against

Cuba, should such escalation become desirable, and 4)

present Cuba-obsessed American public opinion with a new

outlook on a Castro cut down to smaller dimensions.

c. Coincidental with this baiting of Castro, and with-

out attribution to the US, mount a campaign to destroy

Castro's inage through ridicule.

Us strategy should be directed toward achieving the eventual down-

fall of the Castro/Communist regime as a result of internal stresses and

in response to forces largely, if not wholly, unattributable to the US.

Without fanfare and through the employment of overtly legal measures, and

without displaying undue concern about Cuban diplomatic relations and

marginal trade with such countries as Uruguay and Chile, the US should

continue to seek the economic and political isolation of Cuba from the

free world.

The Cuban regime contains the seeds of its own destruction. We

believe that progress in promoting its destruction can be made in such

a way as to incrense US prestige in Latin America and give Immodiate

impetus to the Alliance for Progress program.

Rationale of Proposals

The strategy proposed here is intended to supplement present measures

against Cuba, and to offer operational and psychological guidelines, at

the same time that it dovetails with recent policy on exile groups.

seeks to place the Cuban problem in perspective, subordinating it to

more vital national and hemispheric issues.

this strategy is based

on realistic assumptions and accurate analysis, It will serve as a public

relations guide for the emotionally charged Cuban problem both in the

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US and abroad. Although we cannot assume that the Castro regime can

be toppled by the proposed measures within twenty-four months, these

proposals Involve no US militarily commitment or financial cost, and

we recommend that they be implemented without delay.

The fact that the nationalist symbol personified by Castro is now

essential to communist success places the vulnerability of the Castro/

Communist regime in one person and makes him the logical operational

target.

However, the Indoctrination of Cuban youth is proceding apace,

and the loyalty of this group is being strengthened by the regime's

assignment of responsible roles to relatively young cadres.

Furthermore,

as communist indoctrination and totalitarian organizational techniques

become more effective, the communist apparatus will be able to function

perhaps even nore efficiently without Castro. His symbolic value in

Latin America, however, would continue to be a communist asset.

Although Castro is an unreliable ally who is actually neither

puppet nor neutralist, the Soviet Union is committed to supplying massive

aid to him.

Given the scope of this inveutent, there is smil chance

of negotiating the comminist presence (foreign and local) out of Cuba.

Activist Cubans Inside the island, who are capable of follienting an up-

heaval, VIew as the alternative to Communism not a democratic state

but either a repetition of Batista or an Ancrican occupation. Con-

sequently, many Cubans actually prefer Castro to foresceable governments.

They should be afforded a Cuban nationalist alternative. Morcover,

a purely Cuban solution to the Cuban problem has a great advantage

it avoids direct confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union.

If the Castro/Communist experiment will appear to have failed not

on Its own merits but as a result of obvious or inadequately disguised

Us intervention, or as a conscquence of the fraudulent invocation (in

Latin American eyes) of a unilateral and lopsided Monroe Doctrine, the

validity of Castro's revolutionary course might remain unquestioned.

This Castro/Communist experiment constitutes a genuine social revolution,

albelt a perverted one. If it is interrupted by the force of the world's

foremost "imperialist" and "capitalist" power in the absence of major

provocation, such action will discredit the US and tend to validate the

uncompleted experiment. Further Castro-type revolutions will then be

stimulated rather than discouraged, since it will appear to many that

social revolution (peaceful or otherwise) -- and not just communism --

has been outlawed by the US in this area.. It is not the winning of this

kind of battle but the manner in which it is won that will determine the

success or failure of US policy in the hemisphere.

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Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyr-

dom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical

retribution.

It 1s preferable to discredit Castro, destroy his self-

esteem, sabotage his revolution, force him to conclude that his situation

is hopeless and, as in the case of his political idol Eduardo Chibas,

in 1951, drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality.

While suicide is not expected, it is reasonable to anticipate that sus-

tained harassment and denigration of Castro plus frustration of communist

plans within Cuba will provoke turmoil and set the stage for the regime's

collapse.

The targets of pressure, influence, and support in Cuba are the

military, urban Jabo, (in particular pre-Castro trade union members),

student, burcaucratic, and other groups that are susceptible to disen-

chantinent with Castro. The Cuban masses are at least passively loyal to

Castro and not a irajor target. Action against Cuban and bloc ships even

within the Cuban three mile limit should be avoided, in order to deny the

Soviet Union an excuse for claiming attack in international waters, which

would allow them to use this issue to obscure Castro's reversals by con-

fusing Cuban and world opinion.

The greatest weapon against Communist subversion and recurrent dis

order in Latin America would be convincing evidence that the Alliance for

Progress is in forward motion and that the internal social reforms upon

which it is dependent are being carried out. US strategy must recognize

that such reforms are initiated in response to political pressure, which

can only be applied by an articulate electorate, literate and instructed

In democratic practices.. Perhaps the greatest stumbling block to effec-

tive implementation of the Alliance program is the Latin American feeling

that it is essentially a negative anti-Cuba policy. Unless the Alliance

for Progress 1s dissociated from our anti-Castro/Communist programs and

policy, Castro can successfully exploit this association to destroy the

hopes of Cuban and other Latin American idealists.

Us pressure tactics to obtain collective ONS measures against Castro's

regime often result in creating resentment against the US and sympathy for

Cuba. Legal victories of tactical value, unsupported by Latin American

public opinion, or supported by disreputable and transient regimes, should

not obscure continuing problems which may become a source of later political

defeats. Other OAS members should continue to be encouraged to accept

more responsibility for the Cuban problem, even to the extent of putting

forth solutions we may not favor.

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Possible OAS attempts, promoted by such countries as

Mexico and

Brazil, to reach an understanding with Castro can always be used to

publicize conditions within Cuba by posing such terms as: holding of

elections (a nudge to Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, and Guatemala), re-

leasing political prisoners, university autonomy, reintegration of exiles,

and Cuban cooperation against foreign subversion.

Revolutionary Nationalism versus Communism

A.

Exiles Stimulate Nationalist Alteinative

Reputable exile groups, such as are led by Manolo Ray, embody a

nationalist alternative to a Castro/Communist dominated Cuba, but they

must appear to operate without US support from Latin American bases.

Only by appealing to Cuban nationalism and by suppoiting the original

aios of the Cuban revolution can the exiles stimulate and promote action

which will retain the passivity of the masses, dampen the enthusiasm of

Cuban youth, gain the support of urban labor, weaken the loyalty of

cadre clements

-- who in vast majority are not now Communists - and

turn them against the communist regime.

At a carefully determined appropriate time, Sovict

installations on

the Cuban mainland should be attacked by exile and local guerrillas on a

large scale.

Severe reprisals against these Cuban action elements might

provide a lover for creating antagonism betwen the Soviets and the

Cuban people.

If properly exploited and publicized by non-US media, a

quiet rage could accumulate in the minds of at lcast some of the 300,000

Cubans under arms. Since the US will appear dissociated from this ac-

tivity and unable to control it, it will be justified in publicly ignoring

any Soviet or Castro complaints. Although there would be some risk of

escalation, we should be prepared to nect it in order to permit Cuban

patriots to evict the Communists from Cuba.

No public encouragement should be given the Cuban exiles beyond the

universally accepted acknowledgement that patriots have the right to

fight for the independence and freedom of their own countries. Repu-

table exile elements should obtain their moral and mterial support from

such countries as Venezuela and Costa Rica. Direct US assistance should

be avoided or channeled through the governments of the above-mentioned

countries.

Excessive US or even foreign assistance or involvement will

beeome known and thus tend to sap Cuban nationalist initiative, lessen

revolutionary motivation and appeal, and allow Castro convincingly to

blame the US.

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1.1.

Although exiles can be instrurental in establishing the precondi-

tions of successful

revolt, the main effort must come from within Cuba.

With proper guidance (from Betancourt, Orlich or Americans they trust)

reputable exiles can present an appealing program, create a mystique

and a provisional leadership symbol in imprisoned revolutionary hero

Major Huber Matos, and initlate the psychological and operational pro-

gram to discredit Castro and provoke internal revolt.

The uprisings in Poland and East Germany and the successful revolt

in llungary were crushed by the use or threat of use of nassive military

force: large Soviet armies were stationed on their territories. In con-

trast, the absence of an occupation army permitted Yugoslavia to exert

its independence. For the same rcason,

and also because of geographical

sparation, little Albanla not only maintains its independence fiom,but

also brazenly thunbs its nose at, Moscow. And, with a few hundred men

Castro overthrow a regime whose forces were equipped and trained by the

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that if the well-arned

Cubans should decide to revolt, the small number of Soviet troops there

would alnost certainly act wisely by remaining in their barracks.

Except for specific actions, outside inducements and pressures for

exile political unity only internationlize and thus neutralize their

most choesive element - nationalism.

for example, an exile covernment

would only be discredited as a US puppet and have no appeal within Cuba

at this time. Sinilarly, whenever an exile group is closely identified

with the US or its interests, Castro is able to rally Cuban nationalism

to his support. Center and left-of-center groups nced not be alienated,

but it is only the revolutionary exiles who can convey nationalist con-

viction to potential upheavalists in Cuba; this nationalist focus is a

tactical commnications device.

Some exile action groups are cooperating among themselves. In

exchange for supplies and by demonstrating more effective leadership,.

the more reputable ones could perform a coordinating function. For

action purposes these units should add to their own emblems that of the

"Authentic 26th of July Movement." The latter might infuriate Castro and

confuse his supporters. Formal political unity 1s largely irrelevant

and should not be pressed.

Mutuality of interest and proven trust remain the most effective

means of influenceng exile goups toward cooperative action. Any attempt

by a foreign power to control exile activities will carrupt and dis-

credit them or reveal that their integrity can be purchased. In Castro's

own words:

"Revolutions

are carried out on a basis of morality."

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As a reputable exile, Castro trained with his men in Mexico and

solicited funds in New York City. After he landed in Cuba and commenced

organized guerrilla activity, he expressed this view of the function of

non-combatant exiles:

Exiles should cooperate in the struggle, but 1t 1s

absurd for them to try to tell us from abroad what

peak ve should take, what sugar field we should burn,

what sabotage we should perform, or at what moment and.

in what circumstances and form we should unloose the

general strike. In addition to being absurd, it is

ridiculous. Help us from abroad by collecting money

among the exiles and the Cuban emigrants, by cam-

paigning for the cause of Cuba in the press and in

public opinion.

Denounce the crimes we are suffering

here, but do not pretend to direct from Miami the

revolution that is being waged in all of the cities

and country places of the island through fighting,

agitating, sabotaging and striking and thousands

of other

forms of revolutionary action, which have

been the war strategy of the 20th of July Movement.

Although Castro fought very few battles in the Sicrra Maestra, he

was able to broadcast fairly regularly to the Cuban people (reportedly

by tapes via Radio Caracas). His kind treatment of the local peasantry,

and their consequent passive adherence to his cause, plus the relative

indifference of the Cuban military forces sent against him (mostly in-

terested in plunder) were special circunstances which no guerrilla unit

can hope to duplicate within the present totalitarian socurity arrange-

nent.. While guerrilla activity in Cuba now usually has tragic results;

this action porhaps cannot and probably should not be discouraged. How-

ever, such action units require guidance and coordination of their losses

to be reduced and their effectiveness increased. This need could be

filled by revolutionary exile radio, which should promote not revolt,

but relatively less risky sabotage (spiking highways accommodating

Soviet trucks) and passive resistance. Discouraging revolt at this time

would give this radio an aura of visdom and authority and also suggest

it's certainty about the coming revolt and its timing: "Do not revolt

, has an

ominous ring.

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B. Revolutionary Objectives

Only by drawing to themselves the very powerful force of Cuban

nationalism can the reputable exiles undermine the present Cuban regive

and provoke a revolt or palace revolution against Castro. Towards this

end they must be able to:

1) convince the Cuban people that they are against any

foreign interference, US or Soviet;

2) convince the Cuban people that they are engaged in an

internal struggle, indifferent to whether or not this

is part of a global Cold War;

3) convey certainty of ultimate victory and demonstrate

willingness to sacrifice;

4) identify themselves with the original aims of the Cuban

revolution, the Constitution of 1940 as arrended in

the light of history since 1958, and the ideas of Harti;

5)

separate patriots from ambitious politicos, reduce dis-

sension among reputable exiles, encourage internal

leadership for an uprising and discourage future

caudillos like Castro, by publicly excluding them-

selves from public office for two years after

liberation;

6) announce the objectives of the revolution from the Cüban

mainland, make clear that a detailed program will not

be imposed but must be worked out with

the democratic

participation of the Cuban people, have it understood

that no one person nor any exile group can claim the

right to speak for all the Cuban people;

7) establish Free University of Havana facilities in a

Central American Republic to train exile students,

excluding partisan politics (as guests of a friendly

country) and political undesirables, partly as a lure

to defect Cuban youth through a superior educational

program, with Radio Education to be beamed at Cuba;

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a. 01

8)

make the Cuban hero Major Huber Matos an effective

revolutionary symbol and provisional leader

(the mystique of an unseen man leading a revolu

tion from a dungeon cell); initiate a student

sponsored "Save the Rosenbergs"-type campaign

(complete with riots and demonstrations), not

in the US but in Latin America, to "Free

Matos!"

and free the estimated forty to seventy-five

thousand political prisoners in Cuba (about

whom there has been astonishingly little concern)

and collect money to assist their families;

9) halt haphazard raids and attacks which might harm

innocent people (allowing Castro to speak of

dead women and children), concentrate on key

military (particularly forcign), Industrial and

communications installations, avoiding blood-

shed if posslble; gain the cooperation of other

exiles and insurgents by offering arms and equip-

ment in return for coordination and cooperation;

Revolutionary Program

The following are suggestions for a public program which the exiles

should announce on the Cuban mainland through radio and Icaflets under

the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement" and with Matos as

their provisional leader.

The feasibility and the details of this program

would of course have to be determined by the reputable exiles themselves;

whatever are its contents, its primary purpose is to appeal to the people

within Cuba. The principles to be enunciated would include:

1). Political freedom, civil liberties, rule of law and

respect for individual privacy; and social justice

along the lines of the 1940 Constitution. Imple-

mentation of the original aims of the 26th of July

Movement. All political, social and economic pro-

grams to be voted on freely by all the Cuban people.

2)

Exile leaders exclude themselves from accepting political

office (a Castro tactic). All office-holders will be

elected and for specific periods of time. No more

Caudillos like Batista or Castro. The OAS will be

asked to help provisional leaders to administer

until national and local clections are held twelve

months after liberation®

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3) Restore university autonomy and the free exchange of

ideas and scholars. Espousal of all political

ideas permitted, but Communist and Fascist politi-

cal parties forbidden for a period of five years.

Children will be taught the true Cuban Ideals, of

Martie

4) No labor without pay. Workers can form their own trade

unions and elect their own leaders without govern-

ment interference.

Sick leave and other benefits

to be restored. Peasants will be given the choice

of: a) owning their own land; b) finding employ-

rent on cooperatives; c) obtaining training and

work in urban areas.

5) Elimination of capital punishment, exclusion of re-

prisals against cadres. of the present regime;

those guilty of atrocities to be judged by an

inpartial jury under OAS supervision; preven-

tion of unnecessary killing of Cubans by Cubans;

transformation of the Isles of Pines into a

national park, and the prison into a technical

school for the young.

6) Reconmend a mixed type of economy: state, local,

cooperative and private enterprise. Decisions

will be made on the basis of experiment with ul-

timate decisions determined by referendum of the

Cuban people.

7) Property will not be restored to Batistianos and

Cormunists. Foreign owned properties will be com-

pensated on the basis

of 1958 tax assessed evalua-

tion over a period of fifteen years. Foreign

owned companies have the choice of this com-

pensation or restoration of 49% ownership plus 51%

compensated provided they are willing to assist

modernization and ahare management on all levels

with Cuban nationals.

8) Foreign investment will be carefully regulated along

the lines of the Mexican Revolution, with 51%

ownerships rule applicable to all enterprises.

For a period of at least two years Cuba will not

accept unilateral economic assistance from the

West or from the Communist bloc, but will seek

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aid and technical assistance from the inter-

national organizations such as the UN or the

OAS and from such countries

as Sweden and

Israel. (This might not be practical, but

should have public appeal.)

An outcry against revolutionary exile proposals for the

handling

of foreign property and investment by short-

sighted American business interests with assets in

Cuba will have the beneficial effect of increasing

the appeal and legitimacy of the exiles putting forth

this program.)

Anything less than a program of this kind will confirn Castro's

frequent and effective warning to the Cubans:

"They will take it away

from you."

This program should be accoptable to the 26th of July

leaders who refused to accept Castro's dictatorship and a Communist

society. It should also appeal to ranking Cuban nationalists who re-

mained in Cuba.

The importance of this leadership element was confirmed

recently by the British Ambassador to Cuba:

"He (Castro) desperately

needs his new friends, the 'old Communists'. He needs thier political

theory as a basis for his society...But he cannot afford to lose his old

strongly nationalistic 26th of July Movement comrades•

D. Exile Radio Activities

Exile broadcasts from Latin American countries or from international

vaters should attempt to transmit occasionally from the Cuban minland or

give the appearance of so doing, since it may be difficult to convey

revolutionary inspiration from abroad. Exile broadcasts can be justified

by recalling the totalitarian logic by which Castro demands non-intervention

In his affairs while he intervenes in the internal affairs of other nations.

Operational difficulties should be admitted to the Cuban people with the

explanation that mainland broadcasts will become more regular and frequent

when the Soviets leave with all their weapons.

Exile radio activity is essential for the following reasons and

purposes:

1) It can harass and ridicule Castro directly by interrupting

the transmission of his speeches:

"Fidel has no chin"

;

"Why did you kill Cienfuegos?"

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r.:

2) Keep alive hope and the original aims of the 20th of

July Movement, play its anthem (now forbidden), and

remind Cubans that they and the revolution have been

betrayed. Therefore, it can portray Castro as the

Counter-revolutionary.

3) Incite and teach no revolt but riskless sabotage and

passive resistance as the first stage of rebel

planning.

"Cuban food yes, Soviet sugar cane no!"

Guevara's guerrilla handbook can be used against

Guevara.

4) If Castro retaliates In a brutal manner against in-

surgents who have attacked Soviet installations, it

can help direct Cuban nationalism against the

"Soviet occupation force."

5) After engaging democratic Latin American students in a

"Free Matos!" campaign, it can raise this cry within

Cuba and create a rallying symbol in the person of

an authentic revolutionary hero, lodged in a prison

once occupied by Castro.

6) The Revolutionary Program should be announced fion the

Sierra Maestra (from the source of the struggle)

partly to infuriate Castro and in sentimental appeal

to the non-Communist revolutionaries still in Cuba;

"Unions for the workers, land for the peasants, Cuba

for the Cubans!"

The main appeal would be directed

at the urban classes.

• 7) It can repcat Castro's broken pronises regarding civil

liberties, free press, elections, land reform:

"Marti si, Communismo no."

8)

By broadcasting

accurate information nbout the out-

side world, it can remind Cubans of their isolation

and help cope with a problem described by Jaime

Benitez:

...for want. of adequate information from

the outside, divergences of opinion within the

country grow undernourished and eventually stifled..."

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rind

9)

10)

Radio Free Havana University can keep alive the ideals

of freedom and democracy through political education

programs:

"The autonomous university is the cradle

of liberty."

"this is the democratic creed that

Marti preached," etc.

It can emphasize that the Revolution is purely Cuban and

not exportable to other countries such as 'Brazil,

Chile or Mexico (for an interesting reaction).

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Discrediting Castro in Latin America

Fidel Castro regards himself as a transformer of history--a

Bolshevik Bolivar--and he sustains himself psychologically by the

exaggerated role he has been able to play in the Cold War and with-

in the communist bloc. His ability to manipulate mass emotions and

to maintain political momentum stems in large measure from the

heroic role he plays in a David-Goliath political setting: Thus as

long as Goliath (the US) continues to appear to be his main threat,

the longer he will be able to feed his own ego and maintain his

heroic roputation with Cubans and with important anti-Yankee ele-

ments in Latin America who already have deep-seated prejudices

against the US.

We propose that the president of a small Central American

republic be induced

to assume a David role in which he employs

ridicule and invective to make of Castro an enraged and impotent

Goliath, thereby substantially reducing Castro's prestige and con-

spiratorial effectiveness throughout Latin America.

For the sake of

illustration it will be assumed that the republic is Costa Rica, a

country dedicated to freedom and democracy. Costa Rica is half the

size of Cuba, has a population of only 1.2 million, and a per capita

annual GNP of over $400. (comparable to pre-Castro

Cuba).

Moreover,

Costa Rica possesses the unique advantage of a population which is

88% literate, and no army save a civil security force of some

2,700 men.

Costa Rican president Francisco Orlich is an educated and

forceful man who actively participated in fighting during the 1948

Costa Rican revolution and later helped repel an insurrectionary

raid from Nicaragua. He belongs to the Figures-led political group

in Costa Rica which has promoted democracy with such fervor abroad

that it has been accused internally of 'international adventurism."

As a consequence, if Orlich were to accept this proposed

role, he might be obliged to strengthen his political position with-

in Costa Rica.

By placing his own house in the best possible order,.

he would increase his effectiveness in this proposed role. If

Castro can be provoked into a public polemic with Orlich, Orlich

would be obliged to prove his consistency by expressing

some

criticism of other authoritarian states.

US effectiveness might

be equal to its ability to renin publicly aloof.

Orlich's opening maneuver would follow along these lines.

He

would present Costa Rica as a functioning democracy which is

achieving its social revolution in freedom--in contrast to Cuba.

That its aims are peaceful is attested by the fact that it has no

army. It is justifiably proud of having more teachers than police-

men. These and other real achievements should be made known to the

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Cuban people by radio broadcast. It should be easy to find other

excuses to provoke Castro and outside radio penetration, according

to the Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, provokes Castro's total rage.

Once Castro is provoked into responding to these measures,

Orlich would step up the power of his transmitter so that all

Cubans will come into range for clear reception. Although Orlich

would probably need little or no coaching in this role, the

following are examples of lines he might adopt:

1)

Politely request that 'brother' Fidel refrain from

interfering in the affairs of democratic sovereign states.

Invite the Cuban people to visit a land of freedom and

social justice--when they are again free to travel.

2)

Deny vehemently that he believes that Fidel is mad--as

is alleged by some medical authorities, admit the

possibility that he might, however, be a little sick

nentally and for this reason deserving of kindness and

understanding•

3)

Express

frequent praise for the Cuban people and its

noble traditions, make clear that disdain is only

directed at Castro and his fellow-puppet entourage.

4) Take advantage of Castro's vanity, accuse him of

sporting a beard simply because he has no chin.

proprietor Khrushchev needs no beard, dare his vassal

to be man enough to shave.

5)

Describe the free and happy people of Costa Rica, a land

without concentration camps, without political prisoners,

where citizens are not required to spy on each other,

where the dignity of privacy is respected. Explain that

he has come to office via a free election, other

political parties are allowed and dissenting views are,

in fact, encouraged.

6)

Invite unarmed Cuban observers to learn about democracy.

Remind Castro of his dealings with Trujillo.

7) Make no mention of the US or the Alliance for Frogress.

If Castro responds to this baiting, Orlich can defy him, emphasize

the absence of

a military establishment and declore that a free

people--even without any armaments--has nothing to fear from a

deranged and silly dictator. This should be sufficient to rally

other Latin American countries to Costa Rica's defende, and the

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Couran'

anticipated excesses of Castro's fury would do much to discredit

him in Latin America.

It is imperative that the "Colossus of the North" remove

itself from direct confrontation with a "small, defenseless

country."

Castro needs to be pitted against a competitor

on his

own level, one not vulnerable to charges of "imperialism, l

'dollar-diplomacy" and other shibboleths to which Latin Americans

instinctively respond.

Costa Rica or a similar country is

invulnerable to these

charges.

When the American public observes Castro responding to the

hounding of little Costa Rica, it will come to view the Cuban

problem with perspective and without hysteria or obsession.

In

turn, when Castro finds himself cut to size, his new perspective

might impel him into obsessive and hysterical behavior.

Assuming

a sympathetic attitude for a sick man on the part of the Cuban

people, they might decide to dispense with his services, without

violence.

This proposal is a further effort to discredit Castro, which

in conjunction with other efforts, might create internal stresses

leading to Castro's removal by Cubans.

At the least, it should

help to discredit him in Latin America, it might provoke him into

surfacing his aggressive intentions, and it might provide an excuse

for additional OAS measures against him.

Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule

The Cuban sense of humor is ideally suited to poking fun at

even the Maximum Leader. With a population of only six and a half

million, Cuba has 1,300,000 radio and 370,000 television receivers.

The media of television

and radio are therefore essential in

connecting Castro's psychological needs, his charismatic popu-

larity, and revolutionary control over the Cuban population with

his defiance of the US. This arrangement is vulnerable to broadcast

interference from outside Cuba, and it offers opportunities to

subject Castro to ridicule.

Castro's extreme sense of dignidad,

nowever, wide not permit him to find this amusing and the Cuban

reaction might have considerable impact on the less stable elements

of his personality.

As Latin America's most accomplished orator, Castro's broad-

cast exhibitions of sympathy for and identification with the under-

dog and the masses are so accomplished that they may be partly

genuine. They are the source of his strength and appeal. Paranoia,

however, is his most salient personality trait and to him this

affliction is a boon.

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It fits ideally the role he seeks to play.

Ile would create

enemies if they did not already exist and his defiance of these

enemies, which is frequently headlined in the press ("Castro Still

Defiant," 'Castro Shouts Defiance of JAS") impelled him to an

effort to defy Khrushchev.

This stance of apparent heroism has

been linked with Cuban nationalism.

Javier Pazos offers this

analysis:

"Fidel Castro...knows very well that the regime he has

established can only maintain itself in power by confronting the

Cuban people with an external menace.

Both the Communists and

Castro need to be in constant strife with the US in order to

survive."

The Canadian Ambassador to Cuba recently observed:

Castro keeps his revolution going, however, by playing

on and building up anti-US sentiment and the

Messianic cause of Latin American revolution.

These

themes are essential to his program. He always seens

to have to attack something.... What he really enjoys

is playing the role of a world figure... Invasion

scares... seem to strengthen rather than weaken him.

(On the other hand, when it is tactically to Castro's advantoge, he

could stress his role as a world leader by emphasizing coexistence.

Castro may decide that he has achieved minence on a par with

Khrushchev and Mao, and he might temporarily confine his activities

to maintaining his

position).

Cubans and other Latin Americans enjoy observing Castro

"In Castro!s complex personality, vanity looms so large that some

who have known him

intimately think it verges on pathological

narcissism."

In reality, Castro rules by television and public

appearance, simultaneously feeding his ego and retaining his popu-

larity. His own description of this therapy is: "ly modicine is

the people... I thrive on seeing and talking to the people."

Radio and television transmission could be carried out by

exiles using a well-known Cuban broadcaster, or someone with a

quick and acid wit,

either by adding to Castro's dialogue by

mimicking his voice (as the "Mininum Leader") or by speaking to

and commenting on his dialogue during a live transmission.

Radio interference will pose no problems.

Line of sight

sound transmission to television receivers would be complicated

since it would involve some risks to those operating nearby but

outside the three mile limit.

A transmitting balloon antenna,

for

example, would permit greater range but also be easier to locate

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and subject to weather conditions.

The US would not, of course,

be directly involved in this operation.

The minimal arrangement requires that the anti-Castro wit be

able to receive at least the sound of Castro's voice while trans

mitting his own voice to Castro's radio listeners with some

clarity and range. An example of how this might sound is con-

tained in an imaginary interference with a real speech delivered

by Castro at the Rene Fraga Moreno sports field in Mantanzas,

broadcast over Havana National Radio and Television Network

0221, GMI, 31 March 1963 (FBIS text).

mimicking Castro/

...This is something fundamental and of special

importance to the revolution. /which I have betrayed/

Human intelligence and human work is what creates and

produces. /not beards and cigars/ For that reason, in

the Oriente mountains, in the pre-vocational school,

/in Siberia/ there are at present ncarly 4,000 students,

in the schools /and prisons/ of Las Minas del Frio

(applause) who will be meeting gradually our

/Khrushchev's/ future needs, the plans for improving

our present teachers, who year by year are bettering

themselves to fulfill their sacred duty/ to Russia/

For that reason we should glance to the future,

because the future belongs completely to us. /Blas

Roca/ (at this point a monitoring technician hands

Castro a note explaining this interference.

Castro

shakes his fist in defiance as a voice says) / I am

the Gusano Maximo and I hate all Cubans!/

/dialogue with and comments on Castro/

The imperialists have tried to copy these tactics of

revolutionaries, /Fidel, you are lying!/ but the

nentality of a counterrevolutionary/ like brother

Raul/ will never be the mentality of a revolutionary/

come on, Fidel,

shave/ the mentality of the

counterrevolutionary will be crime,. terror, and one of

awaiting for the foreigner to come and invade. /what

nonsense/

And here in this province, /where

is your chin, Fidel?/

nurdered./ you did it, Fidel, you butcherl/ A family,

with two children, was shot to death;/ you communist

murderer/ and thus several crimes were committed/

you're lying again, you ape....

S

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 20, 1963

Ni.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

GE VERY

SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action

As you requested, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's "Cuba: Possible Courses

of Action" (attached). Essentially, the paper purports to show how we can achieve

a solution to the Cuban problem without resorting to invasion or attributable acts

of violence or violation of international law.

To this end the paper offers specific

guidelines for (I) discrediting Castro and his regime in Latin America, (2) de-

stroying Castro's image in Cuba, and (3) creating the necessary pre-conditions

for a Cuban upheaval within two years.

At the outset, the author gives the "rationale of proposals" which he describes

later in the paper.

First, the proposals will dovctail with present policies, put

the Cuban problem in a properly subordinate perspective and involve no U.S. mil-

itary or financial cost. U.S. public posture should be that Castro is not a threat

to us and that we are concerned not with him but with the Communist presence in

Cuba. Second, the prescit importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes

him the obvious opcrational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's

martyrdom. Third, there is little chance of negotiating the Soviet presence out of

Cuba.

Fourth, a purely Cuban solution is most desirable. It avoids a US-USSR

confrontation.

Also, it is important for our hemispheric policy that the Cuban/

Communist experiment appear to fail on its own merits; thus, we should disguise

any U.S. intervention. Fifth, our targets should be the military, urban labor,

students, and burcaucracy; the masses are not a good target.

We should leave

Cuban and Soviet shipping alone since such attacks will obscure Cuban reverses by

confusing Cuban and world opinion. Sixth, the Alliance for Progress must show

forward motion and should be dissociated from our anti-Castro/ Communist policies.

Seventh, we should encourage OAS members to accept more responsibility for the

Cuban problem. The author then goes on to describe his proposals under four

main headings.

1. Revolutionary Nationalism vs. Communism -- Reputable exile groups le. g.

Manolo Ray) can be instrumental in establishing pre-conditions for a successful

revolt, which must come from within. The U.S. should help only indirectly. Ap-

parent U.S. involvement will sap internal Cuban initiative, tend to discredit the in-

tegrity and appeal (to Cubans) of the revolution and allow Castro to convincingly

blame the U.S. Help should be channelled through such countries as Venezuela

and Costa Rica; the exiles, who should strenuously appeal to the powerful sources

of Cuban nationalism, should opcrate from Latin American bases.

STANT

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Some specific exile objectives are (L) to convince Cuban people that they are

against any foreign interference, and that, indifferent to the Cold War, they are

engaged in an internal struggle; (2) to convey certainty of victory and demonstrate

a willingness to sacrifice; (3) to attack and provoke attacks on Soviet installations

in the hope that reprisals will create Soviet/Cuban antagonisms. (The U.S. should

be dissociated from this but should be prepared to risk possible escalation. ); (1)

to separate patriots from ambitious politicos and to encourage internal leadership

for uprising; (5) to establish a Free University of Havana in Latin America which

will offer a better program (to be beamed at Cuba) and which will draw defecting

students.

The cxiles, under the banner of "The Authentic 26 of July Movement", with Major

Huber Matos as provisional leader (the mystic of the imprisoned leader), should

announce its program to Cuba. The program's principles would include (1) polit-

ical freedom, the rule of law, a return to the original aims of the revolution; (2)

free clections after 12 months, with exile leaders excluding selves from accepting

political office (a Castro tactic); (3) restoration of university autonomy; (1) trade

unions, no labor without pay and a better deal for the peasants; (5) no reprisals

and an end to capital punishment; (6) a mixed cconomy; (7) compensation for, but

regulation of foreign companies; (8) aid from UN or OAS but not from U.S. or

Soviets for two years; (9) no property or political office for Communists or fascists.

The exiles should broadcast to Cuba from Latin American countries,

international

waters, and occasionally from the Cuban mainland. Such broadcasts are essential

for the following reasons and purposes: (1) harass and ridicule Castro; (2) keep

hope alive and emphasize the original aims of the revolution; (3) play the July 26

anthem (now forbidden); (1) incite and teach no revolution, but riskless sabotage

and passive rcsistence; (5) direct the broadcasts against "Soviet occupation forces";

(6) stress "Free Matos" campaigns; (7) announce a revolutionary program fiom

Sierra Maestra; (8) repeat Castro's broken promises; (9) bring information from

the outside to remind Cubans of their isolation.

2. Discrediting Castro in Latin America -- The author notes that in his role of

David against Goliath, Castro prospers in the cyes of Cubans and many Latin

Americans who enjoy sceing Goliath's tail twisted. We should encourage a small

Central American country -- e. g. Costa Rica -- to take up the cudgels with Castro

and shower him with invective and ridicule. Hopefully, Castro will respond to the

bait. This will (1) provoke Castro into surfacing his aggressive intentions and

make an ordinary bully out of the heroically-posturing "Maximum Lcader"; (2) in-

crease Latin American concern over Cuban subversion and promote OAS cooperation

in defense of a small nation; (3) provide the U.S. with an excuse to take further

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action against Cuba should escalation be desirable; and (4) present American

public opinion with a new outlook on a Castro cut down to size.

Costa Rica deserves serious consideration for the purpose described above. It

is much smaller than Cuba (1. 2 million people), has the same per capita income

as pre-Castro Cuba, is 88% literate, has no army but a small security force of

2700 (''more teachers than police") and is a democracy achieving social revolution

in freedom. Orlich might be very willing to play the role.

13. Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule -- The author suggests that we take ad-

vantage of Cuba's good radio and T.V. facilities, the Cuban sense of humor and

Castro's paranoia and sense of dignity. We should arrange interferences in his

broadcasts -- e. g. mimicry, or biting comments (a little sick mentally, beard

covering weak chin) while he is speaking. Such tactics might amuse the Cuban

people, enrage Castro and help destroy his charismatic image. He should be

suceptible to this sort of thing.

1. Psychological Guidelines -- The author notes that Latin American support of

I.S. policy is often impeded by Yankee-phobia and offers these guidelines -- (1)

should not appear to be opposed to economic and social revolution; (2) we should

Ato ignore Castro taunts; (3) we should erase the Bay of Pigs image, a loser;

maintain flexibility we should keep U.S. policy statements to a minimum;

• (5) we

should encourage OAS initiative; (6) we should avoid direct attributable in-

volvement in Cuban situation.

5.

Commer

-- The author has been hampered by the fact that a lot is going. on in

U.S. Cuban aNairs that he doesn't know about. However, I agrce with Bromley

that there are some interesting ideas in the paper which are worth exploring. We

will do this at the hext Psychological Subcommittee meeting on Wednesday.

Gordon Chase

exil the there

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Without speculating on the long and short term repercussions

of such tactics, this affront to Castro's personal dignity might,

as a start, amuse the Cuban people, enrage Castro and help to

destroy his charismatic image.

Personal dignity is the touchstone

of the Latin American personality. Affronts to Castro's personal

vanity might make him wilder and more open to terror than existing

economic and political pressures.

Psychological Guidelines

Latin. American support of US policy towards Cuba is impeded by

Yankeephobia, historically justified or imagined fears of the

Colossus of the North, and the spectacle of direct US confrontation

with a small Caribbean country.

To many Latin Americans, the

Cuban regime is linked with a social and economic revolution.

Therefore, the US

seems to oppose a

social revolutionary trend and

is portrayed as a reactionary' country by the left. Within the

US, there is a

grave danger that public, press, and partisan

obsession with the Cuban problem will tend to force counter-

productive policy actions such as immediate responses to Castro's

charges or the issuance of overly precise and unnecessary policy

statements.

Such public attention only serves to nourish Castro's

ego, arouse Cuban nationalism to his support, and enhance his

stature elsewhere.

There is no reason for US officials and media to reply to

charges and taunts emanating from Castro's verbosity, and it

does not become a great nation to hasten to honor such provocation

with a reply.

Propaganda cannot be refuted immediately by truth,

nor can one debate with someone uninterested in facts.

The only

remedy is the steady flow of the truth, which in time builds up

the credibility of the medium employed and allows truth to be.

identified

as

such.

We must erase the Bay of Pigs image by not playing up the

Brigade or the individuals connected with it. If nothing succeds

like success, nothing fails like failure itself.

Except for special circumstances, additional statements of

US policy towards Cuba will tend to inhibit US freedom of action

by limiting alternatives, confining policy rigidly to a single

course, arousing more questions than are answered, or alerting

Castro to a possible policy change.

Moreover, Castro will use

the opportunity to claim that the US is again threatening the

Cuban people.

Both in the matter of pronouncements and with

respect to overt policies it is usually preferable to have the

initiative taken by one or more members of the oAS.

To do other-

wise confirms the Latin American conviction that the US is overly

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obsessed with Cuba, to the detriment of the Alliance for Progress.

Direct US involvement in anti-Castro information propaganda

campaigns creates,rather than destroys, sympathy for Castro in

Latin America. Therefore, as much as possible, unattributable

material and sources should be used. For the US publicly to

ignore Castro would be to deprive him of his largest audience,

and it might provoke him into attention-seeking behavior;

; which

in turn might have a sobering effect on Latin American oligarchs

who are resisting reforms. It is really by his own actions

(shooting of political prisoners, admission of Marxist ideological

motivation, and allowing the Soviet missile buildup) that Castro

has lost face in Cuba and elsewhere.. Rather than engage in a

continuing public polemic with Castro, thereby elevating him to our

level, the US and its media should keep public commentary on Cuba

to a minimum.

Should it become desirable or necessary for the US to comment

on the proposed Ixile Revolutionary Program, if it is announced, the

following guidelines are recommended:

1) The US is pleased to note that the formulators defer

to the Cuban people for ultimate approval of their

program.

The future of Cuba can only be decided by

the Cubans.

We applaud this democratic procedure.

2)

Every free man awaits the day when Cuba is no longer

a Soviet satellite. The Cuban Revolution, although

betrayed by a 'puppet," still lives.

Our sympathies

lie with the brave men

who risk and give their lives

to free their homeland.

3) It is understood that the Free World would come to

the assistance of a free Cuba. It is for the Cuban

people to make a determination on economic assistance

after. they have reviewed the economic mess left by

the Communists.

Since it is known that the US is always prepared to assist

noncommunist countries in difficulty, it might appear patronizing

and seem like bribery for the US to over-emphasize its capacity

to grant economic aid to a free Cuba. Mention of the Alliance for

Progress in this context will only exalt its negative (anti-Castro)

aspects.

SLUNLI

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THE WHITE HOUSE

• WASHINOTON

September 23, 1963

(4 coins

772°

SECRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba - Security Within

the Government

As you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two

'exile" raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now

available; it appears that our security, with respect to U. S.

participation in these operations, was excellent.

While there will always be public speculation as to the extent

of U. S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all

agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation,

and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a

high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the

numbers of people within the Government who have to know a

little or much about a U.S. -directed raid against Cuba.

For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial

and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over

20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August

raids while many other people were generally acquainted with

the U.S. involvement.

Among others, the Navy knew where the

attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS

knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD

people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids,

could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere;

and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told,

for their background, that the U. S. Government was aware oi

the raids.

I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons

we have learned from the August raids - one, that it is in the

nature of the problem that many people probably have to know

somethinglabout such raids; and two, that these paople apparently

Mol ÷ 1915

Aichives

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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September 23, 1963

can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view

of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when

substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems

essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance

of security to others who are privy to information about our

covert activities against Cuba.

May I ask that members of

the Special Group take such steps within their areas of

authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular

urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent

for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security

to all those with whom it has necessary business on these

matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security

set in these recent operations.

in fung can

McGeorge Bundy

SECRET - EYES ONLY

(page 2 of 2 pages)

"I FROM

JUl : 1915

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October 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Item for your 4 o'clock meeting this afternoon

I think it would be a wise precaution at the end of this meeting.

to ask that one copy of all important separate instructions

and reports made on any channel -- State, CIA, DOD, USIA,

and ICS -- be sent over here during this next period for your

• personal information.

My object here is to provide a check on the tone of voice on

policy-level messages in these tense periods. There is just

no doubt at all that a good deal of our trouble in the last

three months has come from differences of emphasis, at least,

in what we have said to the field.

It is pointlessly cumbersome

to inhibit the dispatch of business by requiring interdepartmental

clearance on everything, but the existence of a single information

copy of everything important for you over here will allow Mike

and me to call to your attention any serious divergencies.

In requesting such a single information copy, you would be

safe in saying that in no case would any, such copy be given

any additional circulation without direct notice from you to

the agency concerned.

I do not underestimate the sensitivity of this order. JOS, DOD,

and CIA particularly feel thai they have a right to communication

downward that is not monitored from above.

But your interest

is not served by the uncritical acceptance of that right.

McG. B.

JIl. $ 1915

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October 29, 1963 r

CHICK LIST FOR 4PM MEETING

(Not intended to be exhaustive)

1. Intelligence

A. Estimato of prospective balance of forcea, "'

B. Entimato of quality and quantity of militazy leadership

committedi

C. Summary of intelligence guestions on which it would be

pravitabie to ask lusther field assesument, e.g..

1. Can we inalat on independent process of

confirmation or croas-check?

2. Should we ask for a separate evaluation on

those guestions by Harkina?

2.. Lodgo's Movements

A. If we keep him in place, what are consequences for

1. Plausible denial:

2. Possible indeitnite delay in retura while nothing

happens;

3. Possible bad signal to Nhu or to coup group.

B. lí be seturna on schedule, who la in charge in Saigon,

and under what laatructions. (There should be a drait

inatruction to Truebart and Harkins on this point for the

# o'clock meeting.

LINEA FROM

JUL 0 1915

Archives

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"Contingency Planning

A. CINCPAC - Presumably Defence will draft instructione

for Felt which will preserve cover but move subatantial

forces to within easy range of Saigon.

B. Response to caup. Preaumably Harkina should be asked

for detalled plans on use and withholding of U. S. forces

so as sos to choose uy sides.

C. Ihere should be a political scenario of U. S. posture,

l.. while in a possibly prolonged atruggle)

2o il coup nucceedsf:..

3. I1 coup faila.

ROM

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VIA. CAS CHANNEL

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR: AMBASSADOR LODGE

illef

10/30/63

1.. Your 2063 shows important difference in our views and

we must repeat that we cannot accept conclusion that we have

no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12

you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail

you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe

that on this same basis you

should take action to persuade coup

leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment,

does not give a better-than-even prospect of quick success.

We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and

our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger

of appearing hostile to generals, but we do not share conclusion

implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure

justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention

should be that stated above.

2. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not a

better-than-even chance of quick success, you should communicate

this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist

at least until chances are better.

In such a communication

you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject

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any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because

of preference for present regime.

We recognize need to

bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt,

and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong

advice given as a friend and choice of sides by USG.

3. We continue to be deeply interested in up-toothe-minute

assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to

our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments

on this topic.

4 To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is

rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of

country team in all circumstances and our only instruction is

that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at

all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing

guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be

concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source

is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces

and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup,

Truehart will be chief of the country team, and our only modification

To existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish

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all instruction and debriefing of Conein to be conducted in

immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three

know what is said to Conein and what he reports at all stages.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that

emergency situation requires final local U. S. authority to be

vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions,

and that officer in our view is Harkins.

We do not repeat not

intend that this internal switch in final responsibility should be

publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in

basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 5.

Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested

in your paragraph 8.

5.

This paragraph contains our present standing instructions

for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct

intervention from either

side, and U.S. -controlled aircraft and

other resources will not be committed between the battle lines

or in support of either, side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may

in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,

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such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.

In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid

appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of

USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government

or instrument of coup.

• C. In the event of imminent of actual failure of coup,

U. S. authorities may offer asylum in their discretion to those

to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort.

d. But once a coup has begun, and within these

restrictions, it is not in the interest of the U. S. Government

that it should fail;

6. We have your message about return to Washington and

if announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be

kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if

possible you keep open the exact time of your departure.

We are

strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon

if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be

avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of

departure now.

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WASHINOTON, D.C. 20505

10 June 1964

MEYOPANDUM FUR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT •

Pians of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate

Selected Cuban Government. Leaders

The folloring report as compiled from informa-

tion obtained by ¿gency orficers zoom persons who vers

parties to the actiors described. agency officers mace

clear to each of the sources that the United States

Government would not, under any circumstances,

the pianned actsoes.

Presumablj the sources of the

in submitting this inforation: were notivates

in part oy the balien that by disclosing the information

they would obtain immunior against legal action should

they succeed in impienenting the plan.

A Cuban exile was approacred on 2 March 196: 5u

an acquaintance who visted to discuss a plan,

still in the enbryonic state,

•to assassinate Fidel Casure.

The acquaintance was described as a businessman and a

shipowner who owns at least one ship which sails under

the British 11a5,

and

mio aiso has a

legally sanctionid

interest in distributing and Placing

s10t machines 11

gambling houses.

The

invoirement o1

üre

accuaintancecn

the slot-machina business

orings the man

in contact vi.:

elements in the uncerroria,

minarily through his partrer

vno is a former police officer Ero= St. Louis

and througa

tie-in with elements of "Cosa dosura

The "Cosa Mostia" ciemanis are alleged to have numerous

contacts still available to them in Cuba, and they care

offered to assassinate Castro for S150,000: no acvaïCe

funds were recuested.

If the mission carnot ba accon-

plished, oe if the alaa

2a3N00030602,

to exceed 5i0. 000 vould be paid for the

travel and 11rirg

expenses of live men

invo-ved in the mission.

The Cusen

exile commented that he believec he had been

approaches

with this pian because of his family's wealth; de told

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his acquaintance that he was not interested and suggestso

that an approach might be made to someone who nas much norc

money.

Another Cuban exile reported that Byron Cameron,

owner and oberator of the My CayAd hope, whose address

is Caribe Tracing Co.,

with several Cuoan exiles on 3larch 1964.

utd., is. Lauderdalerrong the

Florida, met

persons attending the meting were Teoiiio Babun Franco,

co-owner of the Antiloan Nazira Shipping Corporation,

Miami, ard two of sarin's employees, Oscar fernandez

Viego and Eliseo Coroz Fernandez.

Babun and Cararon are

friendly shipping-business

competitors in the Caribber

During the course of conversation at this meeting,

Cancion mentioned that he was

in contact with an unidenti-

fied group mich would

se willing io assassinate selected

Cuban Officinis for cash; seacizically, the Carezon group

is interested in

assassinating ridel Castro, haul Cas-ro,

and Ernesto

"Che" Guevara.

After a prelininary discussion at the 3 larch

meeting, it

was thought that ine anount

01. 9150;000 10F

the assassination of tidel Castro, plus 55:000 epense

money, payable in advance, was too high, and Babun fett

situation was just another attemot to svindle

patriotic Cuban exiles.

inother resting was then neid

on 5 March and a counter-olfei of $100,000 vas made for

the assassination of Fidei Castro, elus $2,500 for ez-

senses, payaala in advance.

Cameron promised to check

with his contacts aiter returning iron a trip to the

Caribbean.

During a meeting on 15 March attended by Cameron

and Babun anc his associates, the following terms were

agreed upon for the assassination

oi the Cuban cificiais:

Fidei Castio, $100,000; Raul Castro, $20,000; Ernesto

"Che" Guevara, 520,000;

anu 52,500 for expenses, payable

in advance.

The tire init

zine arnansed mission

vould o3 50 days fron the date when Bauud courd voider,

to the satisiaction oi Cameron, that he sad $100,000 =t

his disposal for the payment.

The contraci for payment

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would se honored only upon the presentation of evidence

that the three Cuban officials died at the hands of the

• assassins connected with Cameron's contacts.

6.

In early April 195: Sliseo Gonez Fernandez met

with Jose

"Pepin"

Bosch.

sosch agreed to advance $100,000

and sabun and his associates vouid acvance 52, 500 for

expenses.

Julio 2ii0 Ciavarria, a wealthy. Cuban caile

in New York, susaquantly astesd to the terms, provided

that his come was not involes.

Accordingly,

Babun gave

Cameron $2,500 on 25 april.

Cameron then advised his

group,

and on 25 April me accosted that his group had

already calleà dis noa

in Cuss

and void hin to grocead

as planned and that "thoir other man"

would be hoading

for Cuba shortly.

The finzi comment was "re hope to

have some good news for you between

20 and 25 May."

Lobo Darned to air do tiani on 19 May to arrarge sor

the transfer of 5a00,000 to a saiety caposit box, tha

Keys to which are to be held jointly by Cameron and z

confidant of lobo.

7. The idesisties of the persons in the Cameron

grouy and now they plan to raoceed with this mission

are not known.

Subun's associcles ala reluctant

make any unnecessary queries secuuse they cave invested

52:500 and because Cameron nada it fairly Clear at the

was involved.

Cameron ie-

vealed during ine negotiations that his contact was a

police officer in the St.

Louis, Missouri, Vice Squac

who was about to retire and me has numerous concoctions

in the Marin.

Camoron inplied that "ina other man" in

question is in Sorin.

Caneron Knows that he couid be

indictos fon conspiracy and trat if there is any

treachery on sis pare,

Zasun and his associates rouid

not hesitate to sink his saig, the v card no.

In late liay 1964 a prominant Cuban saile tho

spoke with jose "Popin" Bosca reported that taofiio

Babun and Cliceo comer id

sinate Fidel Castro 10a the Dayaani of $150,000.

Bosch

claired that he had

committed minsoli to furnisa

$50,000 and that he vas hoping he could set the balance

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of the money from the United States Government or from

• other sources.

Bosch incicatea that he balioves that a

quick changa for the better in the Cuban Situation can

be brought about only by the physical elimination of

Fidel Castro and that his elimination is well worth

$150,000.

In pursuing his aturaots to raise an additional

$100, 000,

Bosch is

-ing to ask Julio Lobo to con-

tribute at least $50, 000.

Richard Relms

Deputy Director for Plans

06608

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• •CSDE-3/6G1, 653

Or13:

Tio Diroctor of Contral Intelligence

cc: Special Assistant to the President

for National Securii; rifairs

Assistant Secrciar;--Inte=-American Affairs

Department of Stato

The Director si Intelligence and Pesearch

Departmeni of Siate

Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs

Department of State

The Director, Deiense Intelligence Agency

The Attorney Genezzi

The Department of justice

The Director, federal Bureau of Investigation

Ihe Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Diracior for intelligence

98/29

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hal land

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::÷15:

::: = A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld

to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical

of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further.

Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on

notice

and should du everything in its power to asceitain promptly the veracity

of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that ivr..

Bundy

would call the matter to the Attorney. General's attention as a matter of law

enforcement.

112?

Peter Jessup

Distribution:

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Vance

Mr. McCone

09063

or SSORT

FIER PHY

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EYES ONLY.

31 July 1964

E.12

HEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

PRESENT:

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 30 July 1964 -

MI. Bundy, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Item l.

Colonel Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 3.

1.

Cuba

•The proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for

August 1964 were approved. Mr. FitzGerald then addressed himself

once more to the ever present problem of operations by autonomous

groups.

While under our cognizance, they are not controlled, he

said.

It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact Mr. Sam Papich of the

FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia over-

tones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to

handle as a matter of law enforcement.

=::...

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19 August 1964

E13

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The ilonorable McGeorge Bundly

Spocial Assistant to the President for

National Security Alíairs

SUBJECT:

Status of FBI Investigation re Plans

by Cuban Ladles to Ascassinate Cuban

Government Lcadors

?"—"

7=::

1.. This memorandum is for your information in responsc

to a 303 Commiltee guery of 30 July 1904 regarding the status of the

Federal Eurcau of Investigation's investigation of reported plans by

Cuban exiles to assassinate Cuban government leaders.

2. The following is a summary of the investigation to datc.

3. Subsequcht to CIA's dissemination of iniormation regarding

"Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Govermont

Leaders' (Icpart disseminateil by CIA to the 303 Committee and sclected

key officials as CSDD-3/661, 653 dated 10 June 1961), the Federal Dureau

I.c.

of Investigation has interviewed all of the people involved in the plot

except Byron Cameron. •Cameron is now in líchico on a business trip;

he may possibly return to Miami on 7 August at which time the FBI plans

to interviev: him regarding the plan. The FbI las not docided if it will

intervicw CLa's other source or if it will re-intervicw all of the people

involved in the plas.

I. Tho FBI, as a scoul of its invostigation, has disoominated

a total of seven (7) reports regarding this matter. A summary of these

roports follow:

a. Teofilo Dabun Solman spocifically denical to the FLI that he

had any Involvencht in, or knowlodge of, any plan to assassinato selected

Cuba government officials. Ile adinitted contact will Julio Lobo

Olavarria, but denied discussing the plan with hin and stated that

Eduardo Garcia Niolina was present during the mcuting with Lobo and

that Garcia could verify his statoments.

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b. Eduardo Garcia Molina advised the FEI that he knew

of the plan and that he was present when Babun discusscd il witi Lobo.

c. Julio Lobo Olavarria advined the FBI that Eabun had told

him of the plan and of Byron Cameron. Babun had asked him to con-

tribute funds for the plan and he tentatively agreed to furnish funds,

but later declined. Lobo also told the FEl that he had discussed the

plan with CLA.

d. Josc i. "Pepin" Bosch informed the FDI that he had

heard of the plan in general terms and that he had icported it to the

CLA. He denica that he had agrced to furnisi funds for the plan.

c. Ellaco Gomez Fernandez informed the FBI that he had no

knowledge. of the plan.

1. Coferino Oscar Fernandez Veiga informed the FBI that he

• had no knowledge of the plan.

8. Major John Doherty of the St. Louls, Missouri, City Police

Department advised the FBI that he is now in charge of the Field

Opcrations Division of the St. Louis Polica Departient and formerly

was connected with the Vice Squad of this department. Doherty stated

-

that he had no idca as to who would be involved with the lafia and who

would be in a position to participate in plans to carry out executions of

Cuban government oificials.

h. All other peoplo interviowed by the FBI denied Inowledge

of the plan.

JOIN A. McCONE

Director

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