## Page 1

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

44 THRU 5thNB 474

475

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

28296 Date: 2025

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 1

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## Page 2

QI STATS LAY DEPARTI

1208 Mies sullds

Baltimore 2, Marytond

Julý 16, 7952

Federal

of. Investigation

int of tuatio

pont 011108. 305 2015

Gentlemen i

inclosing for jow lniformintion .copy 01

lotter datod June 8, 7950 thou tha Incistrial Imployuent

Review sonna to 22. sumoys alo gopy pi ma, sunoge:

Presidont of univeraitsot: layland

I knon that.

lottor.

ti you haro any rurther Lilantion regarding

surnay 1 +1146007a1717 approalato

17.02. • I 811. 8180.

Intorastod to no, somathing more alaut the: Inirst rial

employmeat Torion oma, aspselally thether or not jour.

radords are availablo to it and too liportanos:01. 1te

findings

ranking you for your kindness and pooperation.

Vory truly yours,

speclal saintant Attorney Gonerri.

030gt

moon CAST 41-1

INW 88296 Docld:32989624. Page 2

---

## Page 3

62-116395

Mintz

(1

- MT..

W.

JaB.

HotEs

R. Wannall

- Mr.

W.

. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

July 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMIITEE

2O STODY GOVERNHENIAL OPERAFEONS

WITH RESPECT TO IVIELLIGINCE ACTIVINIES

(Sse)

RE:

FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERIAINING TO

THE FBI AND DEPARTIENT OF JUSTICE

#MORIG

POLIGIES AND PROCEDURES

AUT INFORMATTON CONTAINED

HERDIN IS UNCLASSTTISD

DATE 1/23/00 38 5P 2ALTHIS

Reference is made to sse letter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendices, requesting certain documents

other information Exon the FBI.

Item number 1. b., Of Paxt I, Appendix B of refer-

enced communication requested Conmittee, staff access to all

indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated

by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the

present.

Actached to this menorandun is a list of al1

recrievable prograns, projects, surveys and procedures

employed in connection with comestic intelligence operations

of the FBI which may be of interest to you.

There were a

numoer of other prograns; projects; surveys and procequres

employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence

opcrations of the FBI which are not included.

In the event

you desire information concerning these latter items, which

inexude extremely sensitive maccets, we would be pleased to

discuss them with BSC Staff Mémbere at FBI Headquarters,

Enclosure

Dir. - 1 - The Attorney General

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

TEB: lek/1hblhb ORIGINAL. AND ONE COPY TO AG

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.-

ident. -

Inspection -

Intell.

Loboratory

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

wah

Plan, & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

TELETYPE UNIT E

Per

ENGLOSURE,

+2-111585-442X

G70 954-545

Mw wsz90, Docld:32989624 Page 3

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## Page 4

1/2100

#NAL

016

CLASSIFTED BYSPOALM

DEGLASSIFY ON: 25X.1,6

PRO

ED

CLASSiFiCATION.

I HAVE MOST FiLES AT

MIDESK ON THESE

CODENAMES / CODEWORDS

FOR RESEARCH NEEDS.

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

• Policies and Procedures

1IX: INFORAATION CONTAINS

FRETEN IS UNALASSITEE

STATURIG MOMS NUTHA

NOTE:

TOP SECRET

The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List

(PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPI, infra,

were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of

available INTD inspection reports and files.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPI

1. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries - Developing

positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the

United. States from non-Soviet-bloc countries.

International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside

the Soviet-bloc - Centralized compilation of potentially danger-

ous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State

Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift

diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.

Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International.

Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks

conducted by various members of U.S. intelligence community

based on information provided to such

intelligence organizations

by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.

4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel) . U

5. [Alem - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States. (s)

6. Anagram - Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in (s)

the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials:

(Mr. Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi

tive information such as that regarding Anagram and electronic

surveillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given

to Senators Church and Tower) •

SECRET

-2 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 4

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## Page 5

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED:

SECRET

7.

Banpop - Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer

of funds through Swiss banks.

8 Chinese Aliens Entering the United States - Identification

of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with

intelligence assignments.

Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United states

Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese

background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be

targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC)

personnel and establishments in the ü.s. and Canada,

10.

Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -

Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with

intelligence assignments.

11..

Chinese University and Graduate School Index list of

Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or

graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are

* the china

considered potential candidates for development as U.S.

assets.

12.

Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed against

foxeign intelligence officers..(5)

ItIVE FiLE: 65-73750

13. (Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the

United States from Europe through Canadad (S)

14.

efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country.

Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart (U)

DRC

mINS

15.

Forest - Screening of récords of foreign students at New York

University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover

Soviet illegals. (S

TOP SECRET

- 3-

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 5

---

## Page 6

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED:

SECRET

16.

Proho - [Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised

or recruited by soviet intelligences(s) File 105-140972

17.

Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents

with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments - Investigations

conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established

criteria.

18 .

Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries - Interviews of selected

U. S, tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc

intelligence. U

Orkid - Technical penetration of Soviet establishments in th‹

united states. (5

FILE 105-189368

20.€

Cloverleaf - Technical penetration of new Soviet residential

complex, Riverdale, New York City.(S)

FiLE 165-231856

21.

22.

Sam Survey - Screening öf mail to selected European cities: U

Gus Survey - Screening of mail originating in New York,

New York, destined for specific postal zones.

23.

Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets -

Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence

and counterintelligence purposes.

24. Rega - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.

as aliens during certain years. (5) 65-73094

25. ¿Secomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include

development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico. (5) FicE 105-148076

LOP SECRET

- 4-

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

NN 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 6

---

## Page 7

DEU POLTEY MEMO

STATES MENTION OF

NAME ITSELF iS

NOTCLASSIFIED

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

26.

27.

28.

32.

33..

34.

35.

→?

NOTE CONTINUED:

SECRET

Sobir - Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and

répatriates in an attempt to identify those previously

recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence. (S

Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet

illegals who have applied for documentation as U.S.

residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide

cover identity. FiLE 65-66114

Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible

infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow

to the United States.

Walklok - Screening of requests for birth certificates under

an established criteria to identify such requests which

may have originated with soviet intelligence](s) FiLe 65-95130

Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone

and microphone installations functioning at certain times. U

(Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying

Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP

equipment. (5)

Cuban Refugee - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents

who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee

channels. (5)

Deseco - Development of selected contacts to be directed

against Soviet-bloc officials. U

East-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards

regarding admission to the U.s. of Soviet and satellite

nationals. U

I Coverage - Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission

to the United Nations. U

TOP

SECRET

- 5 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6

KN 98296 Docld:32989624_ Page 7

---

## Page 8

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED:

SECRET

36 ÷

Chiprop - Sereening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong

and the Peoplé's Republic of China (PRC) . U

37.

Chiclet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong

and the

PRC. U

(Alchemy - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic

revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at

uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States. (5)

(Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected

foreign countries

claiming

• U.S. citizenship--to identify

Soviet illegals (s)

Fi1865-72903

40.

Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political

intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the

information of the White House. U fiLt 64-41404 56

REF

41. (Oarbit - Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by u.s.

military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S.

Military bases--to uncover possible soviet agents. (S) FiLE

65-75385

Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly

resided in a specific foreign country and whose present

whereabouts are unknown](S) 511865-75008

Crascifiod by 6283 XCDS I and 3, Indefinite.

IS SECRET

- 6 -

EWW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 8,

---

## Page 9

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Commu, ity Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/25/75

* DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY |

OTHER

For Review

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

Issc

HSC

4.

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive

data for documents; five name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier

subject)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number

wise

state

verbal

request

of (name),

initiative, subpoena,

afive, supposed ferned request, other.

6. CHAORMATION SO DES

TS or

SSC request 5/14/75, Part I, Appendix B, Item lb

U

the pheropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words

not listed are

Information Handling

Intelligence Collection

Operating Procedures

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Access to all available indices and control files

regarding all programs operated by the Intelligence Division

from 1960 to present.

#MOR 16

AT.I, INFORXATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNGLASSIFIED

D/25 10/2/00 BYSP2ALM 11G

62-116395

AJD: 1hb

(4)

379 | 16-75)

NW 88296 Docld: 32989624 Page 9

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TRET AS YE

CLASSIEY AS A

62-115395- 442X

---

## Page 10

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type, or print clearly. in inker

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8.: SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and

showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or

evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted.

Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions in review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or tormer employee,

etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

i..

....

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 10

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## Page 11

5010-106

ONSIONALIFORM, NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NQ, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/25/75

1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar

FROM

W. O. Gregar WoEsn

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dop. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

15 pestil

ntal!!

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. _

Spoc. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

i (Director Sec'y —

This memorandum records for the record my efforts

do met ye and Deuty see a To tense 5625775 0 eleg

secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 6/25/75!

On the late afternoon of 7/24/75, Mr. Benson

Buffham, Deputy Director, National Security Agency (NSA),

made available to Liaison Agent Brian Murphy a copy of a

"Top Secret" memorandum dated 4/20/71, written by Louis W.

Tordella, who was the then Deputy Director of NSA. This

Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shamrock, copy of which

is attached, makes reference to a file entitled Shamrock

avaifable in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for

Intelligence, United States Army.

Pursuant to your instructions on the evening of

7/24/75, I personally contacted Mr. Latimer at approximately

8:00 a.m., 7/25/75. In my conversation with Mr. Latimer, I

noted that it was imperative that I see him as soon as

possible regarding the contents of the Shamrock file.

Mr. Latimer was informed that the Bureau was attempting to

establish the line of authority relative to the Bureau's

procurement of foreign government's cable traffic sent

through international cable companies in the United States.

indicared that he hác mc va a

from Mr. Buffham on the late afternoon of 7/24/75 and was

aware of the Bureau's interest in reviewing certain memoranda

in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer indicated that this was

a matter of interest to the General Counself the Department

of Defense and that he would have to consult with them.

Enclosure

S JIL 31.1975

62-116395

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHEO

WOC: 1hb 1hb

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

- ENCLOSURE

• 4 JUL 3 1 19/

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 11

---

## Page 12

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

62-116395

He advised me he would have somebody from the General Counsel's

office, Department of Defense, promptly contact me regarding

a review of this file by FBI personnel.

Not hearing from Mr. Latimer by the late morning

of 7/25/75, I telephonically contacted his office. He was

not available and I asked his secretary to have him return

my call. Shortly before noon, Mr. Latimer returned my call

and explained that he had discussed my request with

Mr. "Marty" Hoffman (phonetic) of the Department of Defense.

It was Latimer's understanding that Mr. Hoffman had gone to

the White House to discuss my request with Mr. Philip Buchen,

Counsel to the President. Latimer promised that he would

telephonically recontact me as soon as he could establish

contact with Hoffman.

I again reiterated to Latimer that it

was imperative the Bureau have access to the Shamrock file

in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to

its contents hoping to clearly demonstrate that both the

then Attorney General Thomas Clark and, in fact, President

Truman himself were aware of certain information contained

in the Shamrock file.

Mr. Latimer said he understood clearly

what was at issue here and that he would get back to me as

soon as possible.

At 1:50 p.m., 7/25/75, I again called Mr. Latimer's

office and his secretary informed me that Mr. Latimer had

stepped out of his office and that she would give him a

message to call me as soon as he returned. As of 4:00 p.M.,

7/25/75, I had not received a return call from Mr. Latimer.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

soft

- 2 -

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 12

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## Page 13

* SECRE

SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION LIMITED

20 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: SHAMROCK

Dorongraded to Su

+2945780

Mr. Buffham and I had an opportunity this morning to read

the SHAMROCK file in ACSI. Major General Joe! McChristian gave

us permission to view it but

, once we had read it, after careful con-

sideration he decided that he would not teel free to give NSA either

the file or a duplicate copy without personal permission from SecDef

inasmuch as SecDef had entrusted the file to ACSI in 1949. All of

us agreed that an approach to the Secretary would be unnecessary

and perhaps would generate too many questions. He did agree

after sealing the file again to limit access to the Secretary of Defense

on demand, the Director or the Deputy Director, NSA, on demand,

the o hide envelse.

and the Chief of the SSO, ACSI. This trowed le noted on

The file contained memoranda for record, one prepared after

a meeting in Forrestal's office attended by senior officials from ITT,

Western Union, and RCA plus Marks Leva (then Defense General

Counsel), Secretary Forrestal, and a representative from the Attorney

General's office. Colonel Carter Clark from ACSI, who was present,

prepared this memorandum. A subsequent meeting was held in Secre-

tary Louis Johnson's office attended by representatives. of the same

three companies and I believe the Attorney General himself. In Mr.

• Johnson's own handwriting is a note to the effect that he showed the

memorandum for record to President Truman and a note that TCC, ap-

parently Attorney General Thomas Clark, either was present or had

also discussed the matter with the President. Both memoranda indi-

cated that the companies were informed that the work they were doing

was of very great importance to the U.S. and every effort would be

made to protect knowledge of its existence as well as to protect the

companies in the event of exposure.

The material is filed under TS Control No. 516652-3-5 in the

SSO ACSI files.

hori Wordella

6

LOUIS W. TORDELLA

2-116395-441 Deputy Director

KR SE

989624-Page 13

---

## Page 14

-ON 0061001*

5010-106

TO

: MR. W. R

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MANNALI,

Assoc. Dir. -

1 - Mr.

J.

Cochran, Jr.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dop. AD Inv. -

1 - Mr.

R. J. Gallagher

Asst. Dir.:

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

Admin..

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs

DATE: July 24, 1975

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

Ident.

FROM

W. LUOREGAR

1 - Mr.

A. B. Fulton

Inspection -

Intell. -

1 - Mr.

J. G. Deegan

Laboratory -

1 - Mr.

R.

L. Shackelford

Legal Coun. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1

- Mx.

F.

S. Putman

Plan. & Eval. _

Spec. Inv. -

1 - Mr.

J. W. Redfield

Training

1 - Mr. T. J. MCNiff

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y -

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised

you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) 190 pages e extracted from a 693-page document prepared by

CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities

may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities

cited in this document include references to Bureau perations of

an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate

Select Committee has had access to this document.

that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to

the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section

believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for

the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an

10123221080

110/00 ISPLALM/FE

assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation

is involved.

This is to advise that the following pages from the docu-

ment were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of

the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose

of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:

General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151,

155, 156,

158-161,

1763 and 354

181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and

Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182,

202, 221,

222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248

WEre

furnished for information purposes as these

pages contained information concerning

techniques used and/or developed by CIA

which may be of interest).

Intelligence Division

REC-88.

Section CI-1

12116375-441

Pages 23,

295, 329, 242, 815, a 1

29, 70,

72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142,

628•

3 JUL 31 1975

62-116395

TJM: ekw (12)

(Ku)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 3 1 1975

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 14

---

## Page 15

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Section CI-2

Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3

282, 290, 292,

368, 371,

pa5, 26, 595, 36-319, 964, 335, 538 10 3470, 6-933,

Section IS-1

Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS-2

Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,

330, and 482.

Section IS-3

Pages 521 and 549

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to

above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the

Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

ACTION:

None.

You will be advised of results of above requested

assessment.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the

information contained therein should be closely

guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know

basis.

NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 15

---

## Page 16

see it! Lilo ONLT

ROJECT HOGKINGBIRD

Project Mockingbirt, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted

between 12 March 1963 and

15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-

based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles

based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency

and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's

office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections

were established with the assistance of a telephone company official

'who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.

Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.

John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted

the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),

the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert Mclamara), and the Director of

the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to

Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and

• research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency

officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director

of Central Intelligence (General MarshallS. Carter), the Inspector

General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence

Houston).

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-

tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources

of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they

received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators

and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,

of whom 11 were identified; lo government employees, including a staff

member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an

Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number

of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span

of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through

these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official

data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen

for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines

were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project Mockimguird, those materials related

to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access

os two office of Security professio 2181/6 345-475000222

ENCLOSURE

SECRET EYES ONLY

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 16

WARNING NOT.CS

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENGE SCURCES

---

## Page 17

SEGRET

EVES ONLY

SUBJECT:

Soviet Defector

• A Soviet defector,

defected to a representative of this Agency in

1964. The responsibility for

his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of

the Clandestine

Service and he was brought to this country

After initial interrogation by

representatives of the SR Division,

he was moved to a safe-

house in

Maryland,

Where he

wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced

that he was

a dispatched

agent but even after a long

period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their

contention and he was confined at ISOLATION in an effort

to convince him to "confess."

This Office together with the Office of General

Counsel

became increasingly concerned with the illegality

of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under

these conditions for such a long period of time.

Strong

representations were made to the

Director (MI.

Helms)-by

this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the

Legislative

Liaison Counsel, and

on 27 October 196., the

responsibility for his

further handling was transferred

to the Office of Security under the direction of the Députy

Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

The Soviet defector

• was moved to a comfortable safehouse in

the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,

sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr.

Bruce Solle, or more than a year.

It soon became apparent

was bona fide and he was moved to

more confortable surroundings with consideraase treedom

of independent movement and has continued to cooperate

fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this

Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

E2 IMPDET

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valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever

and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were

explored.and. have resulted in the arrest and prosecution

of Soviet

recruited agents

-in several

countries throughout the world. He currently is living

under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife

and remarried

an. American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,

and appreciative of the treatment

accorded him and states

"while I regret my

years of incarceration, I have

no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

•

000242-

2

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I. SURVEILLANCES

• A. SIESTA

During the periods 1-20 February, 14 April- May,

and 9-20 August 1911, a surveillance was conducted of

Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employec, and

orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom

Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-

tionally involved.

Surveillance was predicated upon

information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from

employees information in Information Processing Division

files, and that employees were visiting a photographic

studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and lunez in

Fairfax

City, Virginia. In addition

to physical surveillance,

one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio vas

made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez

was aborted because of a door lock problem.

B. PARAGON

Pursuant to a

request from the CI Staff, approved

by the DCI, surveillances

were conducted of

Iden 69

and her associates at various times from May to September

1971.

Iden 69

, an acknowledged Latin American revolu-

tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and

had given information regarding a plot to assassinate

or kidnap Vice President-Agnow and the DEf.

Surveil-

lances included coverage of

the activities of Iden 69

during two visits to the United States, technical cover-

age of debriefings of her by H Division representatives

in New lork City, and surveillance, including mail cover-

age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of

the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in

New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals

included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C. CELOTEXT

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-

ducted of

Iden 180

of the

Washington Post during

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SECHET

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the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971

and on 3 January 1972.

In addition to physical sur-

veillance,

an observation post was maintained in the

Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-

tained of the building housing his office.

The sur-

veillance was designed

to determine Iden 180 sources

of classified information of interest to the Agency

which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. MUDHEN

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con-

ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg

Joseph Spear,

from 15 February

In addition to

the

physical surveillance,

an observation post was main-

tained in the Statler

Hilton Hotel directly opposite

Anderson's office.

The purpose of this surveillance

was to attempt to

determine Anderson's sources for

highly classified Agency information appearing in his

syndicated columns.

E. BUTANE-

At the direction of the DCI

conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March Was

20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was

to determine his activities

and contacts both with

Agency employees and

other individuals in regard to

his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-

posing Agency operations.

II. POLICE SUPPORT

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,

the Intelligence

Division of the Metropolitan Police

Department

was provided a communications system to

monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the

• Washington area. This system consisted of a radio

receiver and an

Headquarters and

several automobiles from an Agency

mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as well as:a

representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropalitan

Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that

the communications over this system were monitored at

the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of

possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-

stallations.

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B.

During the period from 1968 to 1973, several

items of positive audio equipment consisting pri-

marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone

dial

recorders were loaned to the metropolitan

Police Department, Fairiax-County,-virginia, Police

Department, Montgomery Gounty, Maryland, Police

Department, New York-City Police Department, and the

San Francisco, California, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

A. SRPOINTER-

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-

cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail

and, at various times, other selective

mail at Kennedy

Alrport in New York city. Inis operation included not

only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-

tious opening and photographing of

selected items of

mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-

nal security interest which

was disseminated to the

•Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This program is

nOw

in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether

the operation will be continued or abolished.

B. AELADLE

For several years the Office of Security has pro-

vided support to

•a Russian defector of

interest to the CI Staff.

This support has consisted

of numerous things, including documentation for a change

of identity

on three occasions.

.......

C.

REDFACE I

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious

entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-

pied by a former defector working under contract for

the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and

3

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SECKEl

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sonic alarm

system, entering a vault, and entering

a safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera-

tion was to determine whether the individual had

any unauthorized classified information in his

possession.

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director approved

a request

from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security

clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished

through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of

Security

operating in

Falls Church, Virginia. Support

includes covert recruitment,

investigation, polygraph,

medical clearance, and training.

It has been divided

into three phases:

(1) A CI operation to place indi-

viduals

in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal

activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment

of Chinese or

spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)

Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BADD

but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is

only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.

In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and

other

employee benefits

to come from CIA on a reim-.

bursable basis.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

As a result of a request from the Department of

on a 24-hour basis

to twe sons, Qf a foreign leader who are attending school

in the United States:

This support includes

the financing of the protection and the detail to the

Department of State of six armed Agents of this office

who are documented as State Department Office of Security

employees.

F. MERRIMAG

From February 1967 to November 1971,

an

Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled

several Agents for the purpose

of covertly monitoring

4

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dissident groups in the Washington area considered

to be potential threats to Agency personnel and

One of these Agents so, successfully

Penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned

over to the FBI for handling.

In addition, during

this period, the Office of Security field

offices

were

tasked

with collecting available intelligence

on dissident groups.

All such information was in-

cluded in a periodic report distributed

to appro-

priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside

Government agencies.

B F. ANTLERS

Several months ago,

at the request of CI Staff,

and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this

office arranged to move a sensitive defector

out of

a European country via conmercial transportation and

gain entry into the United States

without leaving

any trace of his true identity...

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 23

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i !

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11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECI: General: Office of Security Survey

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence

of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in

• RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security

questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a

dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of

three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current

interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this

informant is

a female who was employed in RID for a number of years

until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation

of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does

not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at

the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by

reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance

with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also

being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have

an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also sub-

sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among

clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these

employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID

employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the

Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this

capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially

those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought

to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

00053

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5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,

. but it is inconclusive.

He is known to have been a member of anti-

Castro organizations

this country. There are al

reports that

his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time.

Intre are other

episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part

with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

:6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant

in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the

principal informant.

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed

interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds.

for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such

•file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence

that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent

contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On

one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions

from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no

knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been

levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of

• the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees

except social contacts.

8.

The Office of Security has been running this operation for

over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-

gence nature.

CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which

was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-

sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security.

As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions

it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security

has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-

promising the operation.

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied

with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures

to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed, the course of watch-

ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that

would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge

of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current

Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

- 2-

00063

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to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made

any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he

• continues to see them

ocially. Thus, there is slir

reason to believe

that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.

It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact

with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might

alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly

since a plausible reason ior transier would be difficult to develop

for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could

move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the

security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign

nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's

operation.

1l. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.

The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing

information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further

delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban

has current productive penctrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage

to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from

continuing this CI effort.

John On Lassrence

3

00061

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AL MISTRATVE RIZZLE USE JNLY

9 May 1973

MENOR INDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

SUBJECT

, Press Allegations re Use of Agency

Polygraph

• 1.

:This memorandum is for your information only

and confirns a report I made to you by telephone earlier

today.

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on

American proposals rclative

to the SALT talks in The New

York Times over the by-line of Iden 181.

It was

devastatingly accurate

and contained direct quotes from

a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had

sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, a

few days earlier.

The President

was alleged

to be furious with this unauthorized dis-

closure of classified information and directed a sweeping

investigation within the United States Government to

determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation

was conducted under the direction of Ni. Egil Krogh and •

Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John

Ehrlichman,

Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

•3.

On the basis of investigations conducted by

State Security and Defense officials, four individuals -

one individual in the Department of Defense and three

• individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--

were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted

me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph

the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation would be asked

to polygraph the one suspect

in the Department of Defense.

1287

ADMINISTRATIVZ-INTERNAL USE ONLY

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4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time

in matters involving the national security the Agency had •

detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of state

security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for

his use

In polygraphing state department employees who

were recipients of allegations concerning their lojalty.

I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's

approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-

ation was their total responsiblity.

I further informed

him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-

tain his request and that even

then it would require the

• specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to

obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with

Mr. Gentile.

5.

Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile

and inquired as

to whether the arrangements had been made.

Mr. Gentile indicated they had and

suggested that the same

polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.

Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an

excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials

to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph

examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182

of the Department of Defense and Iden 183

Iden 184

• and

Iden 185

• of

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph

examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the

results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature

to Mi. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering

memorandum is attached.

7. : Iden 186

a staff writer for The

Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971

stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged

at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation had

polygraphed State Department employees

suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in

July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

2

ADMINISTRATRIZ INTERNAL USE ONLY

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Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a

letter to The hashinaten Post and said that the polygraph

examinations had been concuited by another agency. Specu-

ation centerea around the agency, but after a day or so,

press speculation in this resard died aray.

8.

Iden 186

apparently has never been satisfied

and has been pressing dr. Charles Bray, state bepartment

spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement.

Nir.

Bray learned today that Iden 186

plans to use a press

conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this atternoon to press

this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by

Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible

he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State

Department Security officials utilizing an operator and

a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose.

I

do not

Know winether or not the fact that the government-iide

investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to

but I suspect that it is and that this is the

reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David

Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an

internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the

White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was

Alans Colare

Director of Security

Attachment

ADMINSTRATINE DA LAMAL USE ONLY

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ine 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Items in John Clarke Memorandum

to the Director of Central Intelligence,

dated 9 May 1973

1.

Two items in the attached memorandum had not

previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CLA funds

and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-

vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use

against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised

that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA

being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of

buying an apartment building.

There was also

Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other

ClA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with

some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the

surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem

here was in the use of funds, not in the operation.

He thought

the only source of additional information on this subject was

MI. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help

State Department defer Presidential representational expenses

of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia. "

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested

by State Department was $3, 000, 000 but that the Director would

not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in

those instances where some operational activity was involved or

could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalaction influence

activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

CLASSIFIID R: ..

WarM 66X4 26861

00070

§ 55616 D. 1: 96 i:

initial cabli decadencise posi

-===

SEATE

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fund's used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply

additional detai

He said Senator Russell đ,

Repre-

sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but

asked not to be briefed in detail.

glass Rilent

Inspector

Attáchmen t

00071

SECRET-EYES ONLY

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9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the

Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions

at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment

should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point

raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill

Colby is fully conversant are:

-- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.

WHIBRINEY and WHIMUT-UAL investments and

accumulation of Government capital.

Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S.

real estate for FBI and provision of technical

equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against

a common target in the U.S.

- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer

Presidential representational expenses Of L. B.J GuI

trip to SEA.

- DCI

tave

john M. Clarke

00073

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SEGRET

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ne 1973

HEMCHANDUM FOR: Inspector General

• SUEJECT

: Items in John Clare l'emorandum

to the Director di Central Litelligence,

datad 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not

previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CLA funds

and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-

vision of tochnical equipments by NSA (MHDQZEN) fOr USO

against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mir. Clarke, he advised

that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedior CIA

being given to the l'Dl in cashiers checks for the purpose of

buying an apartment building

-.

There was also

Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other

CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to N'SA who, with

some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the

surveillance.

air. Clarke said he thought the only problem

hero was in the use of funds, rot in the operation. He thought

tho only source of auditional information on this subject was

Mí. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help

State Department defer Presidential representational expenses

of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested

by State Department was $3, 000,000 but that the Director would

not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in

those instances where some operational activity was involved or

could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politica/action influence

activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

CLASSITEED DY -

SEEDSE

00073

253 022Y

...

....

cis?

¿ralissimo die roses dier 3l doriti

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

• FBI referred to in para 1 1s not shown

In other documents in the Agency. It

has been ket very close with ir. Yale,

Mr. Magnusson, and possibly tr. Colby.

All files have been purged.

00075

(DATET

FORK

NO.

1 auG se 101

REPLACES FORM 10-101

WHICH

MAY BE USED.

•

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07 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM

: Director of Finance

SUBJECT

•: Special Other Government Agency Activities

I.

Project WHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director-

• Comptroller,

acting for the Director, authorized the Director

of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 lovember 1971 to obligate

$2,700,000

for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to

disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be

determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by

the Chief, CI Staff, DDP.

This authorization was reaffirmed

by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still

active.

2. LFMEDLEY - Rental of office space in New York City

for National security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,

Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,

Deputy Director for Plans.

3.

Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable and non-

reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of

Justice, Defense Agencies, etc.,

based on signed

memoranda

between

the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

Project THOFOLD. - Reimbursement from

• Bureau of

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by

a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the

Executive Director-Comptroller

authorized a payment of

$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated

sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the

Deputy Director for Plans.

E2 IMPDET

CL

BY: 006567

SENSITIVE INTOLEGERER : SURCES

AND METHOSS WAVOLVED

_ NW 88296_Docld:32989624 Page 35

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• 15r0

MEMORANDUA FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT

'Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to

provide information on situations or associations that

might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies

Background:

For many years the Centrai intelligence Agency nas

detailed employees to the immediate office of the white House

per se and to components associated intimately with the inrediate

office of the President such

as the Council on International

Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board.

have furnished

secretarios, clerical

employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable

and non-reimbursable basis.

the present time, we

have no

clericals or professionals

assigned to the immediate White

House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their

Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.

I might point out that we had

detailed to the White House as

late as

the

fall of 1970 couriers,

telephone operators,

laborer

assigned to the grounds and a graphics

man who

designed

invitations

for State dinners.

By October of 1970, more funds

were apparently

available to run the White House and most of

our detailees were hired

as bona fide White House employees.

CiA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with

detailees.

Levies have

been made by this Administration and

others on

Defense and State and other Government entities

whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present

time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven

clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists

detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College

security officers detailed to the Department of State to

and

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CI By 003955

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•protect foreign vis

Ators. Recently, John Ha

was detailed

to the Secretary of

he Treasury along with

ar other Agency

employees.

people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

cole have even stan

in rare. instances, detailed our

•3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -

Discussion: Details to disC, the inite House, isa and the

National Har College are probably quite deforsible. On the other

hand, there may be those who would question igency employees

currently workirg at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

and Mr.

Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his

secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made

a trip with him to Moscow).

She is still with him in his

present assignment but we expect that she will redort to NSc for

a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112

DY Thin

served for

years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for

AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during

that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability

retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire

automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or

other Government

agency has been carefully considered and

approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were

involved.

4. Project THOFOLD: I believe the support we are

providing to Project IrOFOLD is an activity that should be .

reported under your guidelines.

Since this is an extremely

sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on

it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5.

Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more

general sense, Contract Personnci Division prepares and executes

contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out

domestic activities. He also process Staff Agents who are

domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided

certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangemerts with American Firms: In the interest of

reporting

"too nuch,

," I would remind you that Contract Personnel

Division writes "agreements" with

comestically based American

firms to provide cover for Agency

assets.

The actual assign-

ments are

overseas.

The arrangements, however, are backstopped,

in the main, in the United States.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

00100

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## Page 38

7.

Contractua

RelationshiD - USJPRS:

he Agency

organization,

USJPRE,

has a contractual association with

approximately 1,500 independent

contractors and 45 contract

employees.

These individuals are unwitting of the fact that

they

• really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic

activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research

Service) is a part of FBIS.

They perform a translation service

of unclassified documents for the Government.

The independent

contractors work in their cun homes and are

as the need arises.

given

assignments

The contract employees

are

"integrated"

into the bureau of Standards

and are located in Washington, D. C.

They are paid and administered by the Bureau.

CIA reimburses

the Bureau.

Their basic contracts of employment are prepared

in Contract Personnel Division.

8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of

External Enployment Assistance iranch's action on a request

from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or

resigning from the Agency:

Sometine

in the spring of 1972, Iden 38

uf EEAB

received a call from lioward Hunt who

asked iden 38 1f he had a

• retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks.

Iden 38

sent him

a resume on

Thomas Anato who retired

31 July 1971: Iden 39

did not document his EEAB record

to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who

also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between

March and May 1972.

All of the above information was reported to the Office

of Security on 4 October 1972

following the FBI's contact with

the Agency regarding Howard Funt.

9.

Resume Sent to NcCord: Ross Lambert, a contract

employee uno retired in septenber 1971, was a client of the

External Enployment Assistance Branch in his search for à job

after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was

James McCord's

security business.

EEAB sent a resume to

McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from

Chicago. (He had a job

there with the Halifax Security Co.,

a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had

3

CONFIDENTIAL

00107

- NW-88296-Đocld:32989624 Page 38

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## Page 39

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from

the D.C. area.) He

aid he had been visited

• a Special

Agent of the FBI wh

told Lambert that his rewime had been

found among McCord's papers.

The. Agent wanted to know if

Lambert had

hon the resume got to decond. Kennedy of Of and iden29

any connection with McCord. Lambert explained

After the Agent left him,

Lambert telephoned EEAB.

OS were notified immediately.

Han 3. Tuh

Harry B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

00108

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## Page 40

4 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

SUBJECT

: Deputy Director for Management and Services

: Sensitive Activities Performed by the

Office of Logistics

1.

This memorandun contains information for the Director

of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given

by the Deputy Director for Management and services on

• 7 May

that

Office Directors report on activities, either under their

cognizance of otherwise known to them, the

nature of which

could possibly need

explanation or justification when viered

within the statutory responsibility and authority of the

• Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the

Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein

reported, except

two, the actions undertaken

Tiere at

the re-

quest of

another Agency component.

He have prepared à brief

description of each

action involved and then have included the

name of the sponsoring component.

The substantive reason for

the requests for action by

this

Office will have to be deter-

mined by inquiry to

the designated sponsoring component.

3.

Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the

initiative of this

Office are as follows:

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-

relate to pohe

cated to the acquisition of firearms, annunition, and

related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,

Maryland.

It was organized in 1969. This proprictary

is operated

in order to give the Agency a capability to

obtain such materiel without associating the procurement

action with the United States Government.

It is legally

necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the

State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in

Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland

State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

WANtING NOTICE

SENSINE WHOLES

CE SUURCES

AND 19ir308

118039

-NW-88296-Doeld:32989624 Page 40

EYES ONLY

SECRET 043-2758

00120

... ....

Z WisEr CL D: 001777

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SUBJECT: Sensitive

Logistics

-tivities Performed by ti. Office of

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's

association with this

proprietary and have assisted us in

obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a

Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary

throush an arrangerent with the pureau of licono they: too,

of the Department of the Treasury.

have been

briefed on the Agency's association with this

proprietary.

b. Under Title 18, Chaptes 2512 of the U. S. Code

(1908), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is

prohibited except to federal agencies, and state

and local

law enforcement agencies.

In essence, this law makes it

almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence

equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship

to the United States Government is made. In order for the

Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any

Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the

Procurement Division. has

relied

on an established working

relationship with a U.S. firm.

This firm, a prominent

supplier located in.

Maryland, deals in

a wide

range of law enforcerent, police supplies, and equipment.

The Covert. Frocurement Staff has. had a relationship

ene staff

withan officer

•. in the firm

for over

15 years.

allos us to place orders

The officer

agreed to

through his

corporation

to rajor

suppliers of this

equipment with

a billing to an Agency national

proprietary. There is an understanding

that. if any inquiry

is raised

by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would

immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff

who would, through appropilate liaison channels, contact

the Department of

Justice, identify the Agency's interest

rosponsibilitiaon lo September 1971, there was an inquicy

procurement action, and clear

about the proprietary

fron_an FBI agent making a routine

investigation of the officer's

books.

Through Office of

Security liaison wich the Department of Justice and the FBI,

the agent was informed that

is an Agency

notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry

and, since that time, there has been no further

inquiry.

• Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit

requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment.

The

majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-

gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various

foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

EYES

SECRET:

0011

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SUBJECT: Sensitive

Logistics

-tivities Performed by ti. Office of

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveil-

lance equipment unless it has

been approved oy the CI

Staff of the DD/O.

4: Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the

following items are pertinent:

a.

In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then

Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend

meeting in his office,

also attended by Mr. William Colby.

Colonel White explained that the Technical Services

Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance

to the FBI for a sensitive project

Colonel White did not dis-

close

the purpose of the assistance being provided by ISD

but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual

matters.

Since the Office of Logistics has

no intormation

concerning the mission or purpose of

Project

sub-.

stantive

questions concerning

the subject should be

addressed

• to TSD.

Other procurement actions accomplished

for the FbLare reported belni.

Specific mention is made,

however,

of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-

proximately s1 million, and

the complex technical equip-

• ment that

has

been

Involved in the undertaking.

b.

The Procurement Division, OL, currently has tic

requisitions in hand fron TSD which would involve reim-

bursable

sales

tO

the

FBI. One such requisition

in the

amount of $56,900 is for

cameras.

The

two Kestinghouse television

second requisition in the amount of $11,200

EITE

is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by

Bausch and Lomb.

No action is being taken on either of

these requirements pending further instructions which

will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management

and Services.

c.

over the years, this Agency has often supported

other Government agencies from a contractuai or materiel

standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved

supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency

would either enter into "acconmodation procurements"'

for

the requesting agency of support the requesting agency by

the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are

legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This

Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-

vide a service for, another Government agency when such

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00313

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 42

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## Page 43

TILU VI:LT

SUBJECT: Sensitive rctivities Perforned by the Office of

Logistics

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for

one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities

readily available from another. A typical example of this

procedure is

purchasing photointerpretation

gear for tis

Defense Intelligence Agency element located

at NPIC. In

connection with the current reporting recuirement, however,

I have had

our records researched for the past 2 years and

Attachnent I reflects those transactions which appear to be

relevant to the subject of this menoranaum.

d.

In connection with the disclosures during the sum-

mer of 1971 that

the

Rand Corporation was not properly

sareguarding classifled documents, this Office undertook

two acts. I directed the Securitudeficer from our: West

Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87

-.

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy

himself that classified material furnished them by the

Agency was

both properly sateguarded and accounted for.

His report was artirmative.

On 23 August 1971, the senior

Security. Officer assigned

to this Office forwarded a

letter to

the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming

the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified

information furnished then by the Agency. Of residual

interest in this

matter, there is summarized

the contents

of a memorandun of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-

Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly

disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation

but that instructions had been issued

to cease

• distribution of classified reports.

While no

other direct dissemination went to

Rand, other

USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing

"many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as au-

thorized under USIB regulations.

The memoran-

dum also states that Rand personnel had

requested searches and document retrieval from

the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of

Security, there are three

relevant items:

a.

The Printing Services Division, OL,'

was requested

by the Office of Security to print a book written by

Hany, Harphy, Office of Security.

The book was pre-

pared by ty Muryly under a Brookings Institution Federal

EYES OMLY

SECRE!

00113

_NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 43

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## Page 44

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of

Logistics

Executive Fellowship. - The book is entitled "Where's

What -- Sources of Infornation for Federal Investigators."

It is

a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-

formation that may be useful to an investigator. The

book's first printing of 300 copies las made in June 1967.

Due to

demand, a second printing of 600 copies las made

an spute to the deed see on central

attribution

Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution

Federal

Executive Fellorship.

The book is classified Confidential,

and it is our understanding that the distribution ras made

to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government.

A copy

of MI. Murphy's book can be made available for review if

desired.

sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAt) requested

that the Agency give consiceration to our publishing, at

LEAA expense,

an unclassified version of this volume.

It

was the intent of LEiA to make broad-scale distribution

to Police Departments throughout the country.

The Director

of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly

determined

that the Lead request should not be honored be-

cause the Agency should not put itself in the position of

publishing law enforcement material for general and un-

classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of oux print-

ing facilities.

b.. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security re-

quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor

vehicles for use in connection with a special support

operation which would last approximately 5 months.

The

Director of security informed me, in his requesting memo-

randum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has

been undertaken at

the specific instruction of the Director

•and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has

requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of

materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by

them to local Police Departments. In certain cases

soMe

of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in

other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made

by funds furnished by the Office of Security.

A complete

listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

0013-3

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 44

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## Page 45

SUBJECT: Sensitive sctivities Performed by the Office of

•Logistics

..

In connection with the responsibility held by this

Office

to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all

Agency operating

components, the following information is.

relevant.

A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which

is Iden 88

was made available to General Cushman's

office on 25 July 1971.

The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970

as a replacement

for a terminated OL standby safe site

and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-

plement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use.

The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older

high-rise

building along Iden 89.

The nominal

lessee is

Iden 90

a security-cleared

attorney with offices located at Iden 91

• The cover story utilized is that

Iden 90,. • rents the

meetings

apartment for business conferences,

overnight stays by his staff

The original lease term

was for a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,

with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby

safe site,

the apartment has

been used by various

Agency

components

to meet their short-term or crash requirements.

Control of the standby safe site and its

security is the

responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of

each user,

component, and date of use; however, no record

is made of those persons being met at the site

nor for what

purpose the site Is being used (meetings, training, etc.) •

Such information is maintained by the operating component

requesting the safe site.

Records maintained by this

Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made

available to General Cushman's office on 25 July 1971 in

answer to a telephonic request.

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance

nor responsibility,

that an apartment was rented

in Miami

Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National

Convention, 10-14 July 1972,

and the Republican diational

Convention,

21-24 August 1972.

The apartment was used as

a meeting plâce tor otticers of the Miami Station who were

in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

6

EYES CNLY

SECRET

00115

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 45

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## Page 46

SUBJECT:

Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of

Logistics

assistance in connection with the political conventions

that were being held.

WH Division is the cognizant

operating

component or this matter.

The above recitation of facts represents, to the best

of my knowledge and

memory, those

matters which appear to be

relevant to subject

tasking given by the Director.

John F. Blake

Jirector or LogistIc.

2 Aits

CC:

DD/M&S

-NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 46

EYES, ONCE

SECRET !

003.15

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## Page 47

Requesting

Office

OS

TSD

OS

Date of

Request

3/23/72

5/16/72

3/23/72

OS

OS

OS

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

WAWKS NOTICE

•3/23/72

3/23/72

3/23/72

11/16/72

4/17/72

11/18/71

4/19/72

12/ 7/72

10/13/72

3/26/71

4/20/73

ULUTLE

EYES ONLY

Item

Telephone Analyzer

Transmitters, Radio Beacon

Telephone Analyzer

Telephone Analyzers

Telephone Analyzers

Telephone Analyzers

Camera Sets

Camera Sets

Actuators, Recorders

Tessina Cameras

Camera, Video

Tube,

Image,

Burn-Resistance,

Equivalent

of W

L 30691

Tubes, Image, W I 30691

Cameras, Television

EYES ONLY

WHORET .

Quantity

8.

13

10

2

20

.10

50

3

• 1

2

2

Unit Cost

1,350

313

1,350

1,400

1,350

1,375

656

700

488

700

• 18,045

4,639

4,60%

18,300

Receiving

U.S. Depart

ment or Agen

BNDD

BNDD

* Comme House

Agenan

Air Force

Stato

ALC

FBI

FBI

FBI

BNDD

FBI

• FBI

FBI

FBI

Лro.T no. 001777)

---

## Page 48

Requesting

Office

TSD

TSD

TSD

TSD

ISD

TSD

TSD

OL

OS

OL

TSD

Date of.

Request

12/14/72

10/20/72

10/13/72

5/26/71

4/22/71

4/22/71

4/22/71

2/25/71

1/30/71

8/12/70

1/10/73

ISD

ISD

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 48

6/28/72

7/20/71

EYES ONLY

Item

Transmitters, Radio

Actuators, Recorder

Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,

Equivalent of W L 30691

Tube, Image, W L 30691

Transmitters'

Module, Plug-In

Power Supply - UWP-39A

Telephone Analyzers

Telephone Analyzers

Cable, Special-Purpose

Electrical

Ink, Special Formula

Ink, Special Formula

quantity

Unit Cost

3

313

591

1

.4,639

2

3

1

2

22

5,000 ft.

1 10t

1.10t

4,639

1,372

1,247

568

1, 350

1,350

1, 825

3,700

728

Receiving

U.S. Depart-

ment or Agenc

BNDD

FBI

FBI

FBI

FBI

FBI

FBI

Treasuxy

Treasury

.42 White House

Communication

Agency

Immigration a

Naturalizatio

Service

Immigration "

Naturalizatio

Service

U.S. forcitry

Transmitter, Radio Beacon

EYES ONLY

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## Page 49

WITLY

OJCS-594=73

11 NAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH

SUBJECT

: Deputy Director for Management and Services

: Activities which might be considered sensitive

issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of

Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which

might be considered sensitive issues.

Most Sensitive Projects

OJCS

Project Officer

Project

Organization, &

Identification

I elephone

-

OJCS

Reason for

Listing

SANCA

ORDSTAT

Richard Ober

CI Staff

Red 1465

Iden 48

OS

Red 9298

John Hutchings

ORD

3061

Nature

of

Project

A special pro-

ject initiated

by DCI

Machine

index to

security files

Information

storage & re-

trieval of drug

related data

fORD's project

•OFTEN)

Type of

data being

collected.

Type of

data in

index.

Type of

data in

files.

Sensitive Projects

DRUGGS

Iden 18

OMS

7792

Computer file

of drug data.

" :

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Type of

data in

file.

00335

2

LIMPOET CL 5N035490;

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 49

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## Page 50

• Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS

Project Officer

Project

Organization, &

Identificat

Telephone

Nature

of

Proi

OJCS.

Reason for

Listing

PROFILES

John Winnie

TSD

362-1922

(sterile)

Statistical

analysis of

psychological

data.

Source of

data. Con-

tractors are

involved

with project.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

THIAQ

Robert Hahn •

SB

Red 1185/

1251

Pattern

analysis of

surveillance

data from

foreign liaison

sèrvice

Nature of

data. Tech-

niques of

system dis-

cussed with

F'BI.

SPIDER

George

Swegman

OS

5071

Data on

radio frequen-

cies used for

support of Im

Place-Monitor-

ing-System, a

system to identify

unauthorized

transmitters.

Project

originated by

James McCord.

DAVREC

Iden 48

OS

Red 9298

File of auto-

mobile license

numbers.

Nature of

data.

APREGIN

Walter-

Kawalski

CI Staff

Red 9338

File of Agency Nature of

applicants who

data.

were not

hired.

2.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00130

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 50

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## Page 51

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

OJCS

Project Officer

Nature

OJCS

Project

Organization, &

of

Reason for

Identificatio!

Telephone

Projec

Listing

Iden 187

ISD/DDO

Red 1442

Cooperative

program with

Iden 188

Association

with the

named

organization.

in

name grouping

techniques.

Co. Deghe Clines

JOHN D. LAMS

Director of Joint Computer Support

3

EYES ONLY

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SL 03289/73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),

Office of Communications, Operational

Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit,

which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact

with the Miani bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police

and the Miami

Beach Police.

The

staff provided support

to these activities in monitoring, identification and

DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by

area.

Arrangements for this support were made

through the DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/

DDO, requested that the Special

Programs Division initiate

a hearability survey of certain ht long-distance connercial

telephone

circuits between the U.S. and South America.

The circuits

carried drug related long-distance calls of

interest to the BiDD and other U.S. agencies.

Because of

the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,

the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station

at Iden 92

Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-

cepted.

15 January 1973, formal lSA tasking of the

intercept was instituted.

On 30 January 1973, all coverage

was terminated by Division D because of possible legal

complications.

3.

The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special

¿lectronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal

technical liaison with operating components of the FBI

for a number of yeais.

Initial contacts and arrangements

for support of specific activities have been made by the

Division D/DDO..

Support has been provided in the form of

Downsided to suit

Quite electives

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 52

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061947

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMNT. CHANNELS

00140

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## Page 53

DON SECRET

S, 03289/73

8 May 1973

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical

assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipnori.

In the past several years,

support has been rendered to

sensitive FBI projects leMan, UNtON and HUGrAtEL.

Support

has been and is presently being given to FBi projects ORKID

and ReSE.

These projects are described in the attached

sealed

envelope.

4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HF / DF

system vas jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and

OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.

A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the

tests because of similarity to the actual target site and

environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on

the roof of the hotei

being used as

the rcceiving/DF site.

A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the

roof.

A team member

in effect told him that the

group

was an advance security segment for the Denocratic National

convention. No turther questions were asked; the tests

vere completed and the cauionent was returned to the

Washington area.

signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Prograns Division, OC

Att.

TOP SEGRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT GHANNELS

00141

Downgradel to studedoss

---

## Page 54

SENSITIVE

9

1973

MOHARK-

Electronic survey of

Iden 63.

This operation was terminated approximately th

months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for

two days.

JNION.

- Inen 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by

the Iden 94. Embassy on their diplomatic communi-

cation link.

SPD/SEO, support terminated two

years ago.

ORKID

-

Electronic surveillance of Iden 64

Washington, D.C.

SPD/SEO involvad only In planning

at this time, (attendance at two meetings).

-ROSE

Electronic surveillance of Iden 62

electroric search of the Iden 62

SPD/CHT personnel performed an

_..area and SPD/SEO

personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording

of the spectrum covering .1-to.6 Giz during the

period 16 to 20 April 1973.

Plans call for contin-

ued support by SPD in the future as requested.

•WUGRAVEL - Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk.

SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in

use of device

and

stood by in Iden 97,

Washington, D.C., to back up case ofíicer li needed.

The operation

took place in July 1972.

..

HANDLE FIA BEJINT CANNELS

TAP SIGNET

SENSITIVE

00142

NW 8290306c1:32989624 Page 54

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## Page 55

1237551,4

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to

Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes

in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

: D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,

Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or

Indirect Involvement

1. The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval

by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K

for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mi. Colby

asked that DDO records be checked.

2. DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a

•project called Iden 99.

This is a joint operation with the Iden 100

service for the collection oi ELINT intelligence. The activity is

handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.

3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to Cl on

13 January 1972.: It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that

the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,ic., $30 to 32K

and not to two separate allocations.

00125

NW- 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 55

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## Page 56

2581

May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUEJECT:

Deputy Director fur Manageinent and Services

Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect

Involverent

1. This memorandum responds to the Directur's request for

a report of any involverent in uny capacity since l January 1969

• suith Messrs. Hunt, AcCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

• 2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddly or Young.

3. My McCord contuct was indirect and occurred sometime

during the late 1950's when I Was Director, Oilice of Coniputer

Services. I opposed plans íor Technical Division, Office oi

Security (under dir. McCord) lo acquire a separate computer for

Iden 101.

Ted Mines of DD/SaT (then ORD)

was the computer individual working with ID and, I think, would

have details.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his

request, first through Ori2, that CIA fund soreign travel on bchale

of the Cubinct Comittee on International Harcotics Control. Indi-

vidual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency

focal points tierc Iden 32 and Iden 3;

I ünderstand

Iden 3 has forvarded relevant documentation. Copies of

memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached

also.

5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to

all OPPB employecs. One oificer who was attending a funcial will

not be available until tomorrow.

OlbBP:CVE=1822,X::4509653719713)

JODIESB ElUE CUIÀ E!IS

(1:881-390152265

DIRTIEROI:

/s/ Charles A. Brigos

Charles A. Briggs

Director of Planning,

Programming, ind budgeting

Attachment

As stated

00119

SECRET

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 56

---

## Page 57

hrent

23 day 19:3

4 Feb 72

Call from Jin Taylor, OMB ie "Bud" Krogh and His deputy,

Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plun foreign

travol in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was

alerting us to their intention to ask us for.

íunds for the

travel.

7 Feb 72

Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips ior 3 individuals--

all in FY 7?.

Cost probably Sick. Winnick ready fu maic

first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. E:Dir said Ok re Tehran

visit.

--

7 Feb 72

See attached memn from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and

follow on muros irom Seymou! Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Coloy

(2 Aug 72).

12(7) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/

Minnick attendance at a Latin American Iden 102

conference on narcotics. He also.

said Jeif Shepherd.

White House, was laying un atras

with iden 32 for

himseli, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.

23 Jun 72

Iden 3

commented on Krogh/Minnick interest

in getting CA activities, including large-scale Pif,

on narcotics front. Iden 3

pushing small-scale PP.

6 Jul 72

Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-lurley filu.

We will send.*

2. Aug 72

Iden 3 called rc Colby letter (attached). Said travel

orders ready; need money this. Fil (No record in my

notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint

recollection of its being to Mexico City).. San Hines

and, Iden 73.

contacted by Iden 3.

1 Nov 72

Related? Iden 3

call. Again noses are cryptic:

WH/GAO-Grace !Iden 32): Survey BIDD problers/

Mexico."

• *

00150

— NW -Docld:32989624 Page 57

SECRET

---

## Page 58

On Mr. Colby's copy only:

13 Jan 72

20 Jan 72

ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive

CS project - no details.

Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

SECRFT

0015%

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 58

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## Page 59

19 Jul

972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jac! Bauman

1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I

dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida.

Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due

• to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for

about 20 years prior to his retirement.

2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had

been interviewed three of four times by the FBI in connection with

the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed,

and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard

Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security

Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in

January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt

who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack

furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.

Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt

that his heart condition would not allow him to become intolved in

such activity.

3. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt

they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time

they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program

and a need for a good security system both before and during the

National Convention. Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that

the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security

programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even.

though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a

problem.

00153

2:g0ae 3i 0576-16

EMENT FD.4 E3RE58L 293L00983

M. D. 116:2. 669067 CH334:

00/202MAL

BIES DA?

•Pa!

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 59

---

## Page 60

4. When Jack declined, he indicated th

Mr. Hunt asked

for any other rec

mendations he might have.

iccording to Jack

he told Mi. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the

Agency, but he did furnish the name of

INEN-lus who might be

possibly ready to retire from the Agency.

5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau

obtained his name due to the resume he furnished MIr. Hunt. He

said that the Bugeau had talked to him on three or four occasions

and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning

his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about

Mr. NicCord, Jack

said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any

knowledge of Mi. McCord's technical capability.

• 6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch

with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of

the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-

sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being

removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as

originally reported.

7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr.

Bauman, and I really did noi get involved in any discussion on the

matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name

connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation

took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion

relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record

and for information of the Director of Security.

Charle

ircken.

W. Kane

SONFIDENTAL •

EYES ONLY

00153

NW 88296 - Docld:32989624 Page 60

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## Page 61

DD/M&S 73-1809

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT

•: Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central

Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained hercin is of such

significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with

the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of

such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the

proper format to do so.

2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the

Watergate and related matters was through Vir. Jack Bauman a former

Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In

December 1971 ivir. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he

wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's

home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a

former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call.

I had only met Hunt once about 10 ycars before but I agreed to relay the message.

I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his

home phone and requested he call Mir. Bauman. Mi. Hunt thanked me for

relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of

little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the

Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate

situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from

Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the

Record prepared by. Iden 17

? as a result of our conversation.

3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida

and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in

a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the

FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

00255

SENSITE E

2

011018

- IMPDET CL BY...

~NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 61

---

## Page 62

(2)

with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported

this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for

the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the

memorandum is attached.

4. Other than knowing VIr. McCord through his employment with

the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor

have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related

matters now receiving attention in the press.

Charles w. Kane

Special Assistant to the

Deputy Director

for Management and Services

Atts

EISS C.V SECRET,

00155

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 62

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## Page 63

17 July 197

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

• SUBJECT: Charles W.. Kane

Iden 108

1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-

tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects

worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests

of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the

subjects.

2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on

the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.

Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement

and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

3. When Agent Parham was again contacied and advised

of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that

the Bureau does not wish to interview them.

• 4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108

the same fashion as Mr. True was previously intervieved.

in

5. I called Mir. Kane both at his office and his residence •

' and leained that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.

I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him o the inquiry.

: 6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to

how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen

Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was

the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

Greate

7121

00160

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 63

---

## Page 64

by the fact that Mr

sane accompanied a technic

sweep team

to, the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around

Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman

who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked

• Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him.. Mr. Kane obtained

Mr. Hunt's telephone number trough telephone information channels

whereupon he passed the number on to vir. Bauman.

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman

has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the

current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may

have obtained his name from him.

signed Iden 17

Deputy Director of Security

00161

-NW-88296--Docld:32989624 Page 64

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## Page 65

SECRET/SENSITIVE

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:*

Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT:

Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved

in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data

of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists,

etc.

b. Fl Staff and Office of Medical Services program

for recording data on foreign and U'.S. physicians from American

Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern

listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from

New York State and Chicago at the DCl's request (Admiral Rayborn) on

data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified) .

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with

possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&I/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103

for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction

System."

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project

which involved the collection

of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms

terminated this program last Fall.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

00163

—NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 65

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## Page 66

CONFIDO.ITIAL I-Z

ay. 1973

HE ORANDLA FOR THE RECORD

SUMBCT: Research Project on Rokert Vesco

1. On 15 October 1972 Messrs. Freckinridge and Feintrelran,

in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the

Atlantic/Pacific Division of tre Office of Economic reports. One

project cated was a cuery tro the cirector, apparentl: at the re-

quest of secretary Shulte, to the effect, "that do ve know about

Vesco," the man then running IOS.

Two of Dril's analists wore arsigned

to tre projoct and, working through tre vomestic contact vervice,

spent a day going over tro files of the securities and Exchange

Conmission. There apparently was some contact also with zur vivision

of the beputy jirectorate for slans and with ühe Office of Current

Intelligence.

2. Tie information atove is based on rough notes and obviously

25 sketchy. lt is cited no: not to suggest any wiongaoing cut cecause

of the current outlicity accuit vesco und the procccility of continuing

prokes into the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Freckinridge

Ho Henry Heintüelman

00173

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 66

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## Page 67

22 Maj

973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Bill--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0013/68,

Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one

with the chapter on radical students in America (pages

25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,

and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the

other version without the references to the American

scene was disseminated to twenty people outsice the

Agency. This document without the material on the

Us was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent

to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more

abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General

in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969),

No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).

3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look

(12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign

Dissem (Copy 98).

Please note that these are our record copies and should

• be returned.

#

7.

-

4/10/13

1. 5.%%

Attachments

Edward W. Proctor

Deputy Director for Intelligence

00171

2.

013329

SECRET /SENSITIVE

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 67

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## Page 68

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 68

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## Page 69

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

': Deputy Director for Intelligence

: Activities Possibly Outside CIA's

Legislative Charter

1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to

report any activitics which might be considered outside CIA's.

Icgislative charter.

All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate

have reviewed the past and present activities of their components.

I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any

activitics related to cithcr the Watergate affair or the break into

the offices of Ellsbcig's psychiatrist. Although contacts with

three of the people allegecily implicated in these incidents were

reporied, these contacts were on matters other than the two

impropci activities:

Hunt:

Col. White, Richard Lchman, and I talked

to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation

of a recommendation in support of the Agency's

nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National

Civil Service League Award.

Mitchell:

While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,

an OCI officer was assigned the task of

providing him with daily briefings on

foreign developments.

RECI

on 3/11900: 9803200/gel:

001.83

per Gins FK)

disririd il

UI3329-

c: :. :

Ma HisTor

(9S03 Riffel 3/1(94 JFK)

NW-88296-Docld:32989624 Page 69

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 70

Young

Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS

• had frequent contacts with Young during the

summer of 1972 in connection with Executive

Order 11652 and the implementing NSC

directive. This involved visits by Young

to CIA to discuss information storage and

retrieval and several meetings of an inter-

agency group dealing with the implementation

" of the Executive Order and directive.

"-3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported

..domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.

Ther responses are attached. Most of these activitics are clearly

-within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be

.,virmed as borderline.

- DCS collects information on foreign students studying

in the US.

• DCS collects information on physicians practicing in

the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign

nationals).

DCS accepts information on possible foreign

involvement in US dissident groups and on the

narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal

with. the FBI and BNDD directly.

DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of

US citizens to cooperate with CIA.

DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,

was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas

calls.

.?.

Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods.

NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery

from NASA programs to identify photography

too "sensitive" for public release.

-2-

• 00182

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 70

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## Page 71

•CIN LITTLE UNEVITI

NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special

purposes such as natural catastruphics and civil

disturbances.

OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence

memoranda on possible foreign connections with

the US anti-war movement and world-wide student

dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of

the White House.

CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining

the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to

the Soviet, and occasionally other forcign, embassies

to acquire positive foreign intelligence.

- FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work

diroctly for another agency, c.g., to the FlI to

translate Arabic in Washington.

- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports

covered by copyright. These are circulated within

the Government and stampod "Official Use Only"

This has gone on for three docades without problems.

FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio

broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens

such as those by US POls in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,

and Ramsey Clarke.

FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service •

under Department of Commerce cover since 1957.

JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of

unclassified publications in foreign languages

and contracts with private individuals to do this

work. Most of these individuals are not witting.

of the CIA-JPRS relationship.

EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 71

-3-

CIA INTERIAL USE ONLY

0038º

---

## Page 72

SÈCRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

•7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Centrál Intelligence:

VIA

: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: Director of Current Intelligence

: Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism

in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on

black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean

and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states.

Iwo DDI. memoranda were produced on the subject:

"Black

Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969),

and "Black

Radicalisn in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970).

In each a single paragraph was devoica to ties with the

Us black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned

visits of

Stokely Carmichael and other US black pover

activists to the Caribbean and othor overt contacts.

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was

asked to

write a memorandum with special attention to links be-

tween black

radicalism

in the Caribbean and advocates

black power in the us.

The record is not clear where

this request originatca, but it came through channels

from

the DCI.

The paper was to be treated

as especially

sensitive and was to include material provided by the

Spacial Operations group of the CI Staff.

The CI Staff

material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful

evidence of important links between militant blacks in

the US and the Caribbean.

This, in fact, was one of

the conclusions of the paper.

The memorandum was produced

in typescript form and given

• to the DCI.

SECRET.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Chaired 15-6125=53.7

Per drien Care381.

131/01681: 101163 166C 6ö 19.0=21

3M83625

00183

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 72

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## Page 73

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

3.

For several months in the first half of 1968

the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda

on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad auring a period

when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection

is that the memoranda were

for internal CIA use only,

although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Richard Lchman.

Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

00183

NW 88296 Docld: 32989624 Page 73

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## Page 74

CS 20003

7 May 1973

MENORANDUN FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT:

DOS Domestic Activity

:

To the best of my knowledge, DOS has not engaged in any

activity outside

the CIA charter or that could be construed as

illugal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f

(i) of providing operational support within the US to all

elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, ars

perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis-

interpreted. For example:

1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain

foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and

officials.

2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection

of foreign student lists from certain niversities.

3. Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens

to dotermine their suitability and willingness to

cooperate with the Agency.

4.

Introduce cooperative US busincssmen and academicians

• to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA

credentials.

5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement.

or penetration

of Us dissident groups, but only in a

passive manner and only when the source has refused

to pass the information directly to the FBI.

6.

collect information on the narcotics trade, but again

only in a passive manner when the source has refused to

pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.

0038"

12 MPET CL 7Y.001176

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 74

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## Page 75

88a0 ice

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

I. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or

master keys for foreign hotels.

8.

Collect medical information from cooperative contacts

on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment

or examinations in the US.

9.

Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing

in the US who have studied

abroad.

Although nost were

foreign nationals, some were US.

The taped information

Included school, present business address, date of birth,

and specialty.

10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas

telephone calls between persons in the US and persons

overscas and telophone calls between two forcign points

routed through US switchboards.

This activity lasted

for approximately six months but has ceased.

11.

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods.

•.

=

JAMES R. MURPHY

Domestic Contact Service

00185

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 75-

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## Page 76

SECRET

EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM

:. Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Activity Related to Domestic Events

I. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then

Spocial Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of

worldwide student dissidence. Conironted by timult at

campuses like Columbia ond mindful of the violence

accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University

and elsethere, Rostow sought io learn whether youthful.

dissidence was

interconnected: spawned by the

same causes;

financed and honce manipulated by forces or influences

hostil to the interests of the Us and its allies; or likely

to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.

2. The paper was prepared by paul Corscadden of OCI

with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs.

D/OCI, and Corscaddon met with Rostow to elicit the reasons

mc iết 209

The DDI,

for his or the presidcht's concerns and to agree on the

sources

etc.

to be examined, the research methods to be followed,

3.

Written during the summer of 1968, the most

sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections.

The first was

a philosophical treatment of student unrest,

its motivation, histor; and tactics.

This section drew

heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students

for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups.

In a sense,

the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page)

typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same

author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in

December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)

Corres ty C25829--

SECRET

EYES ONLY

: >.

.'..1.

:1996191

cople go and necine all aird

00133

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## Page 77

SECRET

EXES ONLY

1. Because of the paucity of information on foreign

student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which

then monopolized the field of student action here and

abroad.

A second section comprised 19 country chapters--

ranging from Argentina to yugoslavia--and stood by itself

as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the

full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-

wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be

in the Johnson Libraiy.

6. Following the paper's favorable reception by

the president and Mr. Rostow,

the DCI briefed the NSC

on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently

was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in

September 1968 and then updated and issued again in

: March 1969 and August 1970.

--

Richard Lehman

Director of Current

• Intelligence

SECRET

EYES ONLY

00131

_ NW-88296_Bocid:32989624_Page 7I

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## Page 78

YUP SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM

: Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT

:Activity Related to Domestic Events :

In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation

of several short intelligence memoranca dealing with the

foreign connections of US organizations and activists in-

volved in the anti-var movement. The main purpose of

these reports, prepared at the request of the linite House,

was to determine whether any links

existed between inter-

national Communist elements or foreign governments and the

American

peace movement.

The conclusion reached was that

there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-

war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of

direction or formal coordination.

2.

In October 1967 President Johnson expressed

interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-

departmental survey.

In response to his personal request

to the DCI, Mir. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect what-

ever information was available through our own sources

and

through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which

was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the

President.

3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations

to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this

subject. • Altholgh agent reports on Comnunist front opera-

tions overseas were

some value, the primary source of

information on the activities of US activists--and that was

quite limited--was

sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,

which had

l been similarly tasked by the white llouse.

IPP SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

0d. 6108 06 00039)

....

wild least adi di tients

• Downgraded to secut

quel's to dealers

-NW-88296-Doeld:32989624-Page 78

00383

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## Page 79

P SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

li:"'A druft memorandum was jointly prepared by

OCI 'ar:i

CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI.

He passed

this tirescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the

Presidnt personally. The White House copy is now in

the fi:us of President Johnson's

papers at the library

in Austin.

Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and

toinezued te the White House on ¿i December and 17°

Jilue. • 195E.

According to our best recollection, no

furthe

Finished intelligence reports on intcrnational

conneciims.of the peace movement were produçed.

Richard Lehman

Director of Current Intelligence

DOR SECRET UMBRA

EYES ONLY

0019-7

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 79

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## Page 80

7 May 1973

MEMORANDU: FOR:

SUBJECT:

0/DDI

Involvement In Domestic Affairs

1:

This memorandun responds to the DdI's

request for a

listing of any questionable

involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe

that CRS is doing anything that a

reasonable

man could construe as improper.

2.

CRS

does,

of course, have several programs

to acquire still pictures, novies, videotapes

and books either privately, secretly or without

acknowledgoment that CIA is the actual end user.

CRS is regularly involved with Custons in looking

at the content of film cans addressed to the

Russian Inbassy in Hashington.

Customs occasionally

also provides

access to other.

filn from denied

areas.

It may be addressed to privatc citizens

or organizations or other embassies.

These efforts

are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign

information.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on u.s.

citizens or organizations.

The biographic file-

building criteria specifically excludes U.S.

nationals unless the person has become of

major importance in the political life of a foreign

country that the file is essential.

(To my knowledge,

only 2 persons

so qualify. One is

the wife of

the opposition leader of Guyana. and the other

is Hope Lang.

Our Cuban files probably include

some persons who are now U.s. citizens but we

have no way to separate

them; we have files on

U.S. defectors to. Cuba.)

00137

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 80

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## Page 81

SEU..2d

SUBJECI: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

4. The CIA Library has several informal

snag

files intended to aid the librarians in

answering the kinds of questions that they know

they will get on a continuing basis. An

appointments file is a collation of clippings

on appointed federal officials: who holds what

job when and what is his backgrourd? The extremist

files are a collection of folders on a variety

of organizations and a few people with intricate

organizational links.

Any

sort of extremism

is grist for these particular files.

Anda

few

persons, c.g., Rip

Brown and Blurlage Cleaver,

have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of

clippings from public media.

These files are

unclassifica and consist nostly of clippings

from the public press:

U.s., forcign, underground,

scholarly.

5.

I am not aware of any other kind of

involvement in domestic activities that is not

related to development of techniques or logistics

or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

Hi::

/

H. C. EISENBRISS

Director, Central Reference Service

-2-

SECRET

0n383

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## Page 82

May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:' DDI

SUBJECT

: Sensitive Activities

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg

and Watergate cases.

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From

time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of

Conmunications conponents for special operations (usually abroad) involving

close-support SIGINI work or translation of audio take. On one occasion

recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several

FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for tha FBI on a short-

term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg

of the DJO CI Staff.

He said the project was very highly classified and

that FBIS participation

was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS

participation nos. approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with

the ADDI.. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help

in the handling and rcsettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of

an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcrive

recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another

Chinese linguist on two occasions to

assist in the U.S. military training

of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-

missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes

some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libei,

and privacy of international connunications. Press services controlled

by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without

specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC'S MCNA,

are monitored by FRIS and the material is disseminated

without restric-

tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the

Office of General Counsel.

However, we also monitor some in-house,

correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private

point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of

material nonitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official

Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor

from other press agencies which arc protected by international copyright,

e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (NENA), and the

Iragi Nes Agency (INA) • This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

00202

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 82

SECRET

+ J.

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## Page 83

SBONET

cal

agency material for nearly three decades without problens.

Recently,

however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use

Only"

caveat will not bar such raterial fron the general public under

the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into

alternative neasures, among which arc: (1) the purchase of news services

with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of

those itons vital to the government's business which we nust continue

to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against

the risk of present procedures.

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often

involves statements or spaeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio

facilities. Examples are statements nade or allegedly made by Anerican

POll's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam.

At the rcquest of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the

approval of

the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-

mitted transcripts of such broadcasts

Department of Justice as

part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such

cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,

presumably because of the possivility they might be required as witnesses.

(In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employce was directed to appear as

an expert witness in

the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged

with aiding the enemy in a broadcast fron Hanoi.) FBIS views all. this

with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts

is incidental and

rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered

policemen raintaining surveillance of

traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations

is under Depariment of Commerce cover.

The Joint Publications Rescarch

Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which

great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could

be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United

States on a piece rate basis.

Contractors are not witting of their CIA

employment. This use of cover is an anonaly in FBIS and contains some

risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public

knowledge.

The surfacing of JIRS was given study in 1969, but after

consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive

Director-Comptroller

level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently

taking a sccond 100k.

Bit usele

• H. KNOCHE

Director

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 83

-2-

SECRET

STRETRA

00203

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## Page 84

"SECRET

=

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT

: ISD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires

that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and

other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for

Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this

support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal

Burcau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department

of State, Unitod States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency

for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these

services have included training and materials, and in a few in-

stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,

secret writing and related communications, personal protection,

disguise,

concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-

tion, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are

received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director

' or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved

is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the

Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for

coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.

Approval within ISD by the Chief of Operations or Development

and Engineering and the Chief of ISD or his Deputy also is re-

quired.

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to

the organizations named in Paragraph two.

SECRET

'É2 IMPDET

CL BY 059098

00215

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 84

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## Page 85

TOLUITA

- 2=

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods.

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,

whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires

approval of non-TSD offices.

Support to the military for instance

would be validated by FI Staff/ Departmental Coordination Group

It Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for

coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated

with DDO/NARCOG.

Requests for documentation of Immigration

and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs

Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must

be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has

been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support

until the documentation has been returned to ISD. If the material

is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded

of the outstanding documentation.

Attachment

Distribution:

0 & 1 - Addressee, w/att

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 85

like tit

Sidney Cottlieb

Chief

Technical Services Division

SECRET

00216

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## Page 86

ATTAC

MENT

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,

flaps and seals, counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses

have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department

of Defense and certain elements. of the Special Forces. All requests

are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at

Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn

these elements furnished ISD with exemplars of foreign identities

documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing

systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected

audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type

cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau

in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive forcign

targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for

overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,

SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel

responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.

All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG foI coordination

with area divisions and for action by ISD if appropriate.

Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his

designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in

developing tamperproof alien registration cards, 'special

fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests

are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within ISD if

technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper -

ational.

SECRET

00217

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 86

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## Page 87

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United

States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring

and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been

supplied the State Department.

In addition analyses and

exposure of black letter operations against the United States

abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded

to ISD for further coordination within the Division. The

Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,

forcign visas and in ito past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected

personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has

been furnished foreign postal information and has been the

recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent

ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with

the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD

with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities

for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have

an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert

a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secrct Service

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential

campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID

photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval

for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for

Operations.

In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical

Investigation Course (Counter TerrOI) at Los Fresnos Border

Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Iexas. Instructors are under

Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation

is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are

given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

- 2 -

11592

i=..

00213

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 87

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## Page 88

request of CI/ PG..

Trainees represent internal security or

national police from all countries participating in AID Police

assistance programs.

White House

Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great

Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy

Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfas and

Alexandria

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes

reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,

locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry

were given to selected members from the above mentioned

cities.

Overall training was approved by the Director of

Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for

each course from the Director of Security.

i :

SECRET

00210

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 88

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## Page 89

SE ENTY

Dete

T11L

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJÉCT: (Oplicnal)

FROM:

Sidney Gottlieb

Chief, TSD

203 South Building

TO: (Officer designalion, room number, and

building)

-

EXTENSION

x-2831

DATE

OFFICER:

INITIAL

NO.

DATE

8 May 1973

CONMENTS (Numbes each comment lo show iron uh=-

to whom.

Dran o line across columa afies esen commess.;

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

DDS&T

Attached herewith are additions:

explanations of ISD support io

other U.S. Government agencies,

2.

3.

5:

6

7.

8.

.

10.

SEAST-DIS C2Y

11.

12.

13.

14.

03220

15.

FORM

SERENIOUS

IN 88296 Bocla: 2489624 PadE gE

CONFIDENTIAL

USE ONLY

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## Page 90

ATTACHMENT

• FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over

the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has

been fully briefed on ISD audio techniques and equipment. The

following are situations where ISI equipment and guidance were

involved in operations:

(A) Identity 59

- Four masked transmitters were

installed.

Two have failed and two remain workable.

(B) Identity 60

- A TSD built masked transmitter

was. installed to collect emanations from a crypto-

graphic machine. The system continues to function

when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C)

Identity 61

- Two transmitters have been

installed and are operating. One is specifically

designed to collect the sounds of typowriting, the

other is a

straight audio transmitter to colluct con-

versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening

post.

A third system

is not oper-

ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape

made from

this room

was made by the National

Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62

sultation covering

- ISD furnished equipment and con-

Identity 62.

First masked switched trans-

mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor

ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters

and microwave transmitters were installed in the

permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-

tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install-

ation is not fully operational because the full comple-

ment of personnel have not yet arrived.

SECRET

00223

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 90

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## Page 91

(EL Iden

- This is an

operation with

additional

participation by National Security Agency. It is

designed in anticipation of the

Identity 64

in Washington. The listening post was

obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms

for procuring the property. New systems are

being designed and produced by using ISD's covert

contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.

(F) Identity 65

- Ten masked audio devices pur-

chased from TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install-

ed in November and December 1971, the remaining

equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests

made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI

listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that

the target equipment no longer functioned and was

believed discovered by the occupants.

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute

an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and

audio surveillance operations which might not be

known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a

relatively unsophisticated device was used against

a domestic target.

00222

SECRET

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 91

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## Page 92

SECRET

-

TSD/ SDB. Memo #138-73

8 May 1973

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 92

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Executive Officer

Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB

provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for

selected members of the washington metropolitan area police

departments.

The training was given at the Fairfax County

police pistol and rifle range.

Authorization for the train-

ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the

auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of

the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff

and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-

zation to police officers of several domestic police

departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection

rechnique and Trace Metals Detection Technique.

These tech-

niques had been declassified and are currently available to

the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center

publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities

in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-

cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate

covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City

police department, Dade County (niami) Florida Dept. and the

Los Angeles Police Dept.

Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi-

cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference

in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA.

When the

recent letter

bomb menace

began in September 1972, our liaison

with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in-

formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the

Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

CF56RET

/s /

.?

- Identity 120

C/ISD/OPS/: =

00223

E2| IMPDET/CL BY OGISE

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## Page 93

.:

Did wiliat

L13-23÷2

ORD-2328-73

• 9 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and

Technology

SUBJECT

: Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-

Foreign Intelligence Activities

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined

with respect to all ORD services or dealings with

other agencies on donestic, non-foreign matters.

In

addition, this

report covers all our activities

with

the rescarch and development of intelligence

equipment for foreign use which has been tested in

the United States

and might have collected domestic

information.

Again, each member of ORD available

today was asked either directly or through his super-

visor to provide the above requestod information,

whether he was directly involved or not.

have

used

all diligence to search our records available

to us during this time period to ensure this is a

complete and factual list.

ung s довл

Director of Research & Development

Attachments:

1 - Contacts with Other

Government Agencies

2 - Domestic Tests

CUSSE

=C..

357323

i =323

vi)

SEORET

00223

NW 88296 Docld:32989624-Page 93

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## Page 94

CONTACTS WITH

TER U.S. GOVERIMENT AGENCIES WHICH

COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED

TECHNOLUGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

ORD represents

DD/S&T on the RED Sub-Committee

of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics

Control that is concorned with

research support of

the narcotics control problem.

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST)

(Cianci/LS)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and

physical security information was exchanged with

them.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and

equipment for navigation and

tracking was discussed with

BNDD.

(Mx. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Van Dewerker/TA)

(Noe/TA)

Technical information was exchanged relating

to the development of simple, portable sensor systems

for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and

narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and

MI. Bill Butler, BNDD

(Parker/DSP)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their

intelligibility: The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Scott/An)

:

00223

9.0047

•will.

ATTACHMENTI

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 94

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## Page 95

SEGRET

SUBJECT: Con

ts With Other U.S. Gove

ment Agencies

Which

Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed

Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972

to receive proposals from derospace,

Inc.,

concerning

a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) •

Identity 125 /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed

for the detection of narcotics for application in

Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of

the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST)

(Terek/LS)

(MI. Stan Sobel, BNDD)

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with

the

intclligence community regarding technical surveillance

countermeasurs and physical security.

This exchange

of information, reports, and

equipment has been con-

ducted under the auspices of USIß TSCC and involves

State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and

Navy•

(Noe/TA)

(Noyes/PD)

State Department

• Two contracts for development of countermeasures

techniques were funded

jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA)

2

: 1:

00233

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 95

SEGRET

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## Page 96

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Some of the MEC Laboratorics, e.g., Savannah

River Laboratory, are supported by CIA

to develop

radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques

devices.

These Laboratories have used sampling

techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear

plant releases.

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC)

(Walker/DSP)

AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger)

were X-rayed.

The operation

occurred one

evening and was an attempt

to resolve some

anomalies created by the use of the non-lincar junction

detector.

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC)

(Noyes/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)

Reports and information about the ORD-developed

*Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System

were made available to Department of Justice Would

August 1972.

If they developed the system,

be used for civilian croid and riot control.

(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA)

Identity 125 /LS)

• Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical

security information were

exchanged with LEAA.

(Noe/TA)

3

SECRET

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 96

00232

---

## Page 97

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Treasury

Di. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department

to assist in formulating their RED program and organization

in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug

enforcement administration.

The request for his services

was made by Identity 3,

the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-

nator.

Identity 3

discussed the request and cleared the

detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating

to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions

over

the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mx. Martin Pera, Customs)

(Lawrence/DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

• About live years ago, assistance was requested in

"domestic search of "moonshine" stills

using CIA infrared

scanners. This was turned down.

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret

Service regarding

navigation and

tracking techniques

and equipnent.

(Van Dewerker/ TA)

4

00732

_ NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 97

---

## Page 98

Wasnat

SUBJECT:

Cont

its With Other U.S. Gove

ment Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

The

results of our rcsearch work in the detection

of metals

(NOLIR) were

reported to FAA for possible use

in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

•National Institute of Health (NIH)

At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician

to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser

Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This worl was

done in cooperation with NIll.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH)

Identity 125 /LS)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order

to structure ORD's Bly/Ch research programs to support

ACDA needs

Identity 125 /LS)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of

radio nuclides in the environnent was exchanged with

them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)

(Walker/DSP)

5

00233

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 98

SOONET

---

## Page 99

8.8.21

SUBJECT:

Contäcts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

EPA (cont'd)

Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning

equipment

to detect underground fires in a sanitary land

fill have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA)

(Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement

techniques germane to removing distortions from some

photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request

for spocific support in processing the imagery was turned

down.

(Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service

FBT

• U.S. Customs

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies

*in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been

in the field of audio surveillance countermcasures, anti-

hijacking, or drugs.

Mr. Robert Burnell, SS)

(Noyes/PD)

Mi. Thomas Allen, FBI)

(Mr: Martin Pera, Customs)

• NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER.

= $0

•develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne

multispectral sensors for earth resources

assessments.

Mr. William Ruble, USDA)

(Galinaitis/IPA)

NI. Loonaid Jaffo, NASA)

(General Snart)

6

0023-7

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 99

---

## Page 100

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association

would be SECRET)

The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-

mental program to aid in

estimating the Soviet wheat

crop.

A part of the information would be obtained from

a satellite launched for other announced programs.

Ground-

truth data will be collected on North American crops.

(Briglia, PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics

and Dangerous Drugs

CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre

plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington •

state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium

poppies.

(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA)

(Mr. Fred Garficld

, BNDD)

(Lawrence/DSP)

(Cianci/LS)

Army, Office of Provost Marshail Coneral

We have exchanged technical surveillance countri-

measures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

U.S. Army

•Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,

Toelle Ordnance DepoE

IS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,

storage and production facilities in the U.s.

¡ Identity 125 LS!

00235

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 100

7

SCARET

---

## Page 101

SUBJECT:

Contacts With Other U.S. Goverhment Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

Problems

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

LS/ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing

an IR remote detecior of Cl aerosols.

Identity 125 / LS)

U.S. Navy

BSD/ORD turned over about eight trained dolphins

to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued

our dolphin program.

(Lynch/LS)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago, CIA infrarod equipment was

made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a

means

for night seaich of life boats.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG)

(Lawrence/DSP)

Identity 174

Sheriff's Office

ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.

Polygraph security findings were compared with the

Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff)

Identity 125 /LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-

ment methods in 1967-68.

• (Sheriff)

Identity 125 /LS)

8

'SECTET

00235

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 101

---

## Page 102

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.

Problems

Chief, San Francisco Police

For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of

a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate

Chinese

social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief)

Identity 125/LS)

9

'SECRET

00233

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 102

---

## Page 103

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR

AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1.: As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the

research and development of equipment and

techniques

for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we

conduct experiments and tests in the United States.

Clearly, the design and development of our intelli-

gence equipments can be done more cconomically and

more securely in this country. Although most of

the tests of our RaD equipments are performed in

closed laboratories or in secure arcas simulating

the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-

ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2.

A revicw of the surveillance equipment or

techniques which have at some time or other been

exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a., Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser

probe developed by ORD was tested by ISD in

San Francisco under very closely controlled

conditions.

The ORD Project Officer witnessed

portions of the test. Recordings that were

made of laser probe

output were carefully

controllcd as classified

matcrial and it is

believed that the taves have long since been

destroyed. (lood/TA)

bi Microwave Intercept System - About

1968, this system was esed in a light air-

craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station

in Identity 127:, California. This system 15

designed to permit intercopt of microwave

telephone communication channels of systems

such

Identity 130

works equally well against the Bell Telephone

generically the same.

intercepts were

carefully controlled and were destroyed several

years ago.

CanarT

ATTACHMENT 2

00230

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 103

---

## Page 104

SUBJECT: - Development Efforts

Domestic Tests for Agency Research and

• C.

Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-

tive of this current program is to develop a

means to utilize toreign telephone systems as

a communication link without the knowledge of

the host system.

in order to carry out this

objective, it is necessary to learn the com-

plete

supervisory signalling and

sequencing

control system hierarchy tor the various foreign

telephone

systens.

Many of these are patterned

after the U

intercept equipment in the United States is

planned.

The data to be collccted would

be

merely the signal tones from which supervisory

codes

can be extracted. Message content is

of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-

seas

testing

is planned

at a subscquent date.

To date, some domestic testing of this concept

has been

carried out at the contractor's plant.

No recordings have been nade of such data.

Ex-

tremely brief tests exorcising U.S. and forcign

telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-

nalling have been carried out to verify initial

concepts.

The duration of testing was less

than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of

enginecring development tests of special sensors

within

the United States include infrared

and

high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR

(FLIR) flights, laser scannors, industrial efflu-

ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-

tometer surveys for metal

In all these cases, the data output of such

testing has becn used for engineering develop-

ment and the content has

been

restricted to

dissemination to those in Government involved

with the engineering design.

2

SECRET

00220

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 104

---

## Page 105

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Res

Devo

pment Efforts

ach and

e.

Remote Physiological Measurements -

An ORD-developca cryogenic magnetometer is

being tested at a contractor's site for use

as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph).

Some test subjects are witting, but most tests

are on naive subjects (they do not know they

are being tested). The magnetometer is com-

pletely harmless to the subject and the test

results

are closely hela.

Personality Structure of Defectors

Study - ORD undertook to actermine the per-

sonality structure of defectors during the

perzod 1900-09. lne work primarily involved

an analysis of the open litcrature on knowr

defectors.

Án

ancillary effort was concerned

with a study of the phonomenon of defection

itself, i.e., Icaving

one religion for another,

or changing

another.

one set of political beliefs for

The work was

conducted at Stanford

University. Identity 125 /LS)

Trained Birds - Birds have been trained

and tested in the United States to carry small

intelligence collecting packages such as audio

surveillance devices,

small cameras,

and cur-

rent measuring devices. Any data collected

from unwitting domestic sources would have been

used only for engineering purposes and

then

destroyed.

h. Connunications Link Loading Study - In

the period from 1970 through 1972 various means

were used to check out an intercept system designed

care aisy controle

communications links.

microwave communications were recorded and passed

through the intercept system under test to prove

quality of performance.

All intercept material

connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks

of the time of intercept and the material was never

checked

for substantive content. NSA participated

and controlled most elcments of the U.S. material.

3

SECHET

00240

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 105

---

## Page 106

SB032T

ORD-2274-73

• 7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director for Science and

Technology

SUBJECT

: Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign

Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief

or his representative was instructed to query all of

his people and report back by this afternoon whether

or not they had provided any services or dealt with

any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.

The attached list is an inventory of all items we

were able to uncover.

If additional information on

any of these topics is desired, we can provide either

a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

• Attachment:

As stated

_ NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 106.

harles

McGinnis

Scientific Advisor

to

Director of Research & Development

CLASSIER EY -

322323

^.""

SCHEST::

CARCIT

art cheater:

--*>

and tas it

Imposit to Deteners

0024=

---

## Page 107

-

Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be

politically sensitive.

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be

politically sensitive.

Narcotics--our foreign activities are.well known

in DDS&T.

A negative report from the Support Staff.

ORD'S NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about

three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge..

Robert Scott - Perforned intelligibility enhancement

of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stophan - At the request of FBI, we described

Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing

distortions

tiom some photography they had on an

alleged bank robber.

Request toi specitic support

in processing the imagery was turned down.

SECRET

00242

NW 88296 Docld;32989624 Page 107

---

## Page 108

7 May 19:

C. V. NOYES

My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance

with domestic operations has been in the field of audio sur-

veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-

fically, I participated in ISCC and RED Subcommittee meetings

which included technology exchanges and some equipment ex-

changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.

• I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman

• of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard

Cowan of AEC Security. The operation

occurred one evening

(date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies

created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Mi. Robert Burnett, Secret Service

Mr: Martin Pera, U. S. Customs.

Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA

Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI

Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF

Major John Langager, ONI/USN

Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

SECRET

00213

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 108

---

## Page 109

Thomas P. woe

5/7/73

1. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.

regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and

physical security. This is an exchange of information and

reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the

USIB Technical Surveillance

Countermeasures Community.

State

Navy

Air Force

US Secret Service

Army

NSA

DIA

FBI

2.. Joint funding of two contracts with State Depart-

ment (TRN/LLL).

Two electret microphones were furnished

to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of

one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD

contract (Bureau of Standards) •

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information

collection or exchange only.

ARPA

LEAA/Dept. of Justice

DNA/DOD

Office Telecommunications Policy

Office of Army/Provost Marshal General

Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon

Air Force/Office of the Inspector General

Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

00241

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 109

---

## Page 110

-

7 May 1973

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOVESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

2. BNDA (Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive

proposals from Identity 135,

concerning a Radar People Detector

developed for ORD. Time:

Fall of 1972. Action was ayproved by

D/ORD.

2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the

Navy. Time: December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System.

Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LaAA

in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for

civilian crowd and riot control.

012.48

SECRET

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 110

---

## Page 111

build Curricul

29 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management

Committee

SUBJECT

: Reported Identity 61

• Burglary

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the

reported break-in of Identity 61.

An investigative report

by an officer of the Exccutive Protective Service states that the

offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio

operation conducted against Identity 61

by the FBI, at the

Agency's behest and with its technical support.

This presents a

related question that should be noted. James McCord's' testimony

indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity

61.

He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping

that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge

the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield,

says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure"

they "were subjects of national security wirctaps."

3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone lap on the

Identity 75

, r'un by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes Mic Cord

knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation

against Identity 61

', and assumed that it was also a telephone

tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping

that both his lelephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and

that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped

because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive

operations. At this point, given the publicity of the

Iden 61 break-in,

and the testimony of NIcCord and Caulfield, the current investigations

may lead to exposure of the operations.

5)x9

1. 19,

Iliam

V.

Broe

Inspector General

CI.

00352

-..

Attachment:

As Stated Above

Sal: C.

sü....

His li

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 111

---

## Page 112

• 24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Reported Burglary of the Identity 61 •

1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61

. 13-14

May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive

Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a

number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent

fingerprints, but no identitication was made. The FBI, which states

that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-

mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61

registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expiessed,

Identity 61

making it clear that they suspected something other than

ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.

There had been an carlier intelligence opcration against the Identity 61

which is described below.

2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency. proposed to the FBI the instal-

lation of technical coverage of Identity 61

The opportunily

for such an installation came about when a domestic assel of Foreign

Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid

for a contract to renovate

Identity 61

Upon securing the

contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate

or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed

to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic

support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community

was cited.

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned

down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms

sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI

turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and

national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April

the Attorncy-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington

Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00352

a-p.--i..

SB22

Senates eng

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 112

---

## Page 113

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the

technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered,

installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency.

personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of

equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-

nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions

of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did

they enter. Identity 61.

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 • be

stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover

advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and

might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°

was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the

best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972

when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage.

The

request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76

delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on

nationalization of foreign holdings,

While the FBI was still

in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of

State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible

coverage of Identity 61

and on 22 December 1972 coverage

was partially reinstituted with full coverage in effect by 26 December

1972.

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against

the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was

not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the EBI

tó discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised

that microphone surveillance of Iden 61

was discontinued.

plue Richarde

Richard.

STC*S7

00353

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 113

---

## Page 114

This

et sit

into

files

110..00

Addendum

who owned the

ferred to in JCRichards' 24

n.v 73 memo to IG,

I. The Foreign hedgraph

Identity 61

Resaraces Division asset/vas

Break-in

Identity 77

Identity 78

• The Agency had initially agreed

to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The final

amount of remuneration turned out to be $4, 828.53. Another ER

asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79

plumber and

elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.

2. ISD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening

post were: Identity 80, Identity 30

of TSD and Haroid Loith of Division D.

..?]

and Identity 45

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 114

---

## Page 115

Go TASTIA

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

Information has been

reccived from WH Division

which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61

on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76

Desk

of WH Division has

no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that

time.

2. I discussed the Iden 76

matter with Iden 66

of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised

that the FBI did

have coverage of Identity 61,

the Agency sup-

ported this operation.

He indicated

that this was identified

as Operation WUDCOR and he would be able to provide additional

details on this if Mi. Colby icquests it.

/s/ Identity 10

Acting Executive Officer

GeFOSITAL

• E2

IMPDET

CL BY 008246 00311

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 115

---

## Page 116

DD.02222402

& MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

REFDRENCE:

Deputy Director for Operations

Il Couments on Jack Anderson Column

Jack Anderson's Wishington Bierry-0o-

Round Column of 3 March 1573:

"Chilean

Break-ins Ratlest adorgate"

I. VII Division has reviowel the refereneed column

(copy attached) by Jack inderson ind finds that it con-

tains no new infornation. Io

the best knowicage ot

the

DIViSIOn, there is no soundatzon to the aliegation that

2. Howard Hunt was enzoged on bearif of ift in arcaking

into Chilean diplonatie installations in Washington aừd

New YorK.

23.

Any connection between ITT and those break-ins

is purely conjectural and the collon takes care to

point this out.

¡tive,

3. Haxold tendils, lIT lain taerioon represente

ins told us that he bad no relationshin with

Hunt on this or any Ift aaitor. la had anticipate

ramon

that Anderson night inpig such

a rcincionshig in

his

Ycoluan and had assured us that this vas soù true.

/s/ Identity 81

Chief

Hestern Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As Biated

ESCUSSI

Pn32 90

AlamED man per peo

GmB 3/3/95

(9803 RAs/gol 3/17/99 TX)

193 217067

ICA BY 031224

00373

LIS MENSE

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 116

---

## Page 117

USSS-EPS FORR 101

6/70

EXCUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

INCIDENT REFORT

LOATION

(NATION)

ISTREET

DORESSi

I. SIFIAL (CASE) HUNGER

24-72-323

13.4=.9

5:23-72:05-25-721 in=

5, AATURE OF INCIDENT

Chile

G. REPORTED BY:

1735 liassachusetts Avenue'll

7. ADDRESS

Burglary it

Hernan Havarro

10. OFFICE ASSIGHED

Sergeant Stevens E. Eutler

- Scracant Riley l. Richardson

14.X1TNESS

DATE

B. ..OME FriDiE

327-7223

9. OFFICEF.

1705 Hanlet Street,

Sprirafield, Vee

12. HOUR

13. DAY OF VILEX

785-2746

05-75-72

15. AOGRESS

11330 hrs.

() (™)

N/A

• W/h

18. WITNESS

19. ADDRESS

16.

NONE?

1:/A

12. 086191/1

20. ACHE ;

N/A

N/A

1/s

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT IBRIEFLY DESCRIDE INCIDENT, CONTIQUE AGO LE ITEMS AS MECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)

At approximatoly 1320 hours, Monday, May 23, 2072, Farcion Missions DividiCa=

Control Contex is edised bill P.Ph30, thate bangler had takon nlace at te

Chancery of Chilne 1735 l'ossaciasetes Avarue, lte, sonatino betueen lon haura on

Friday, Hey 23, 1972, and on 0355 hours this aste.

Sergeant Bilazi Pichardion ard lba nadaisi gned tere dispatchod at apprainel

2335 hours in Cruiser t 23.

The undersicned as advised by tr. Hernan (nT) Unrro, Leninistrative Coursion

of the Tabassy of Crile, that the Chancerr of Chile vas enterca ond all vor ofei=

were ransactica. it this tare the metros of enter on itses talion as unsicin.

Ir. Navarro acrises that no vil contict the Foreion Yissions Division atch Coze

Then detemiiation a timing articlas is rada. (continuca)

23. PHOTOS

O YES

FS:

jam

LAST

NAME

LUSE EPS FORM 102 • SUPPLEMELT FOO ADGITIOHAL DETAILSI

24, SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTEO PERSONS. IDENTIFY SY FAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY HUMGER, DOS,

EYES, ETC.

FIPST

MIOcLE.

NOURESS

RACE

SEX

HEIGHT

WEIGHT

HAIR

EYES

DATE OF BIRTH

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

NATIGHAL.:"

LAST KAME

FIRST

MIDDLE

ACOPESS

12)

TRACE

SEX

KEIGHT

ViEIGHT

HAIR

EYES

DATE OF SIRTH

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

HATICAL:::

25. ARREST PO

26. ARREST NO.

27. ARREST OFFICER (NAME ANO GADGE DO.

28. DATE GF DREEST

23.10.:

30. INCIDENT STATUS

2. 35 OPEN

B. I CLOSEO

UNFOUNDED

0.0

CLEARED aY AIRE!"

Sergeant Sistens f. Mitter

33. STATE DEPI. OFFICIAL NOTIFIEG

N/A

32. APPROVINE OFFICIAL (SIGNINÃE)

05-25-72

initivit

DATE

1S.A

1500 hrs.

Cantain Pete N. lantres

PATE:

34. USSS-ID CASE DU.

HOUR:

N/n

LEE-

00.376

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 117

---

## Page 118

INGENT REPORT - SUPPLEN

1. SERIAL !CASES %.

Fú-72.-323

2. RATURE OF INEIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPORTCO 8Y:

Hernan ORT levarro

AODITIOTAL DETAILS OF INCIOENT:

4. ADORESS :

221-

?l?.

17605 Marlet Street, Springfielde Val

3 0.59.

105-17u

The folloring were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge j 14i,

MP.D.C.,3D, and Ofticer liichael S. Kurailla, Badge $ 3770, 1. PoD.G., 3D, aIsO MaP.I."

Print Cruiser # 735.

1.150

S/A Michael F. Kurphy,, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS, IDENTIFY 8Y NANE, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMGER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

LAST RAME I

FIRST I

_ MIDDLEY

ADORESS:

(1):

RACEI

SEX

•HEIGHT!

WEIGHT!

HAIR !

EYES!

• DATE OF BIRTHI

• SOCIAL SECURITY NO.,

• LAST NAME

FIRST

MIDDLEY

ADORESS

(2) :

RACE|

SEX. I

HEIGHT!

K'EIGHT |

KAIR |

•_EYES

• DATE OF BIRTH!

•SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

S. ARREST POI

10. ARREST NO.!

!1- ARREST OFFICER LAME & 8Л9GE NO!

.....

.12.DATE

14. CUSPENT CASE DISPOSTION!

MISPERI

16. FIAL CASE DISPOSITION!

15. USSS-10 CASE NO.

CRUSTOUNDED!

D. SCLEARED BY ARREST!

11/1

OPFE

00372

18. DAIE|

this

Sergcant Stevens &. Butler

NW-88296-Doeld:32989624-Page-1-18-

05-15-72

13. APPROVED IS:INATURE & TITLES

Vernmanti

Captain Pete li. Kanthos

N/A

NATIOSAiN:

NATIOKAi:

13.4229

20. 51:3

05-2:

---

## Page 119

2. P'ATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary II

3.

REPOPTED BY:

4. ADDRESS

321-7227'

Hewan ART Navarce

T. ADDITICIAL DETAILS OF LACIDENT:.

7605 Hamlet Street, Springliold, Va

At approximately 1600 hours, Juesday, May 16, 1972, Mir. Havarro contacted Officer

Marian Poran-Goncalez as 1310 I. Strcet, lil. and stated the folloring üems rissic:

(4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanjo Há/s Portable Radio, tro (2) Panasonio AVE Rasi

and one (1) lestinghouse ah/rh/sa Radio. Also taken ras

ore (2) Braun Elcotric Shaver;

one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an uninom number of books.

jam

B. SUSPECT-ÀID/OR ARRESTEN PERSO!iS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, MODRESS, SEX, RACE, SECIAL SECURITY NUMDER, DOO, EYES, ETC.

N/1

LiT NAME I

• FIRST!

- MICOLES

ACORESS ;

• 11):

RACE I

SEX

WEIGHT!

HAIR!

EYES

• DATE OF BIRTH!

• LAST ARME!

FIRST!

MIDDLE|

ACORESS

12):

RACE!

.SLx.1

HEIGHT!

W'EIGHT

HAIR!

•_EYES!

• DATE CE BIRTH!

S. ARREST PDI

10. ARREST HO.!

!1O ARREST DEFICER LEAME & BAGGE DO!

14. CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION I

CDUNFOUNDED|

D. DICLEAREO BY ARRESTI

16. EIMAL CASE DISPOSITION!

OPEN

18. DATE!

• SOCIAL SECURITY NO.,

NATIGHALI

•SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

• NATIONAL:T:

....

. 17. DATE

13.4909

15. USSS-ID CASE NO.

N/A

00378

20.01:

sergeant sterens k. butier

05-15-72

Captain Pete. N. Yanthos

05-27

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 119

---

## Page 120

¡ PERSON! GA PROPER

14. EX. COPIES

15. DiST.

16. BEAT

.3D

17.88.1.

18. COS PLANANT'S OCCUPÁTION LÜD HRS

N/A

19. DESCRIBE LOCATID OR IYPE OF PIZiLISE

ChILE EMbASSY

20. VEMICLE USED - TAS LO. MISD STATE

21. YEAR

MODEL

COLOR(S)

Embrissy oF crike

3. STREET ADURESS

173614155, Aue

'OYEC

5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR SUTGOL ATIER

N.UJ.

G

N/A

7.

SEX

RACE

COS

R.

CRIME

BUrG. 4:

9. LOCATION OF CRIME (KáresS)

1736 MASS, AUE NIll',

11. MEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OF MENS USED

1248-42

4. HOME PriO..E

N/ A

6. BUS, FliONE

785-1744

ON OWNER R - REFORTING PERSON

CODE: C-

12. METHOD USED

10. DATE, E:Y5

зой і б!

PHOTOS

• YES

Dio.

FS:

13, CLASSIF CATEG

22. HAVE (Last, First, Misdie)

"NAVEBO, HERNAN

UNK

CODE| RES. ADDRESS

R

7405 HamletsT.

VA

HOttE PHOKE

32/-717.1

755-17.

24.

25.

IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY MUTAGER

PERRESTED CIVE SATEST ROLESAR AND CHARGE sat Centen in are Vicol, Eyes, Hit, Giothin Esco

cêmit description il aisesiad)

(1)

N/i

(2)

26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATIO: ON BODY

27. HOSPITALIZED - SINERE?

jo

01041

OFELEA

28. TRAMSPORTED EY

29. TREATED SY

30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN

UN%

33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY

INSIde EMDrISSY

31. LOSS VALLE

CRISE ENTRY!

TIE TRO ROAD MCLUSE

NARRATIVE:

LINED FOCVE.

(2) BRIEFLY DESCRISE DECIDENT ANO ACTION TRaiN.

PROPERLY MORE DISPOSITS DE DESCRITE AD FROSTY HAVOLD. US.

PORTIFHORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED SY VICTI

R-I ReporTs BeTiceN Telaurs af 1COS, 5-15-72 And 0855,

5-15-72 The Embissy of chike wis entered And shL The

Euhh Report To Fohhou hsTer,

CAU 244 SETtiLLON SCeNE

POiNT CRU 735 oN SCeNe

OFF L eITZ OF EP.S, NOTiFiEd sTiSSO ArSe

T. T. NU!SER

DATE & TIME THIS REPORT

9391

5-15-72

5500

37- DilE/TiE TIPE liO.

39. REFOSTRIG OFFICEE GATE & PROGERS. 140. STATUS iCEFi Ge)

4I. UHNTIREFERRED 10

1S.KIrcles 50 5710

KOPER OCLOSIO

O SUSPENCED

43. SECOND GETICER UNIT & FIDGE RiO.

15, REVICHER

3,L. DUNNING

NW 8620 Dold 32539624 Page 120 METEN ITS PURE DESERTENT NASUReTAN TRE

33. REPROUTE

42. UCR

00379

---

## Page 121

OGC 73-0930

.25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61

Break In on 15 May 1972

1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,

General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he

had any information as to criminal prosecution of porsons involved

in a break in at Identity 61

• in Washington, D.C. on

15 May 1972, Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but

suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and

the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive

Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mi. Gentile and he identi-

fied to State Department cables relative to the incident; one from

the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated

15 May 1972, Subjoct: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest

of the Iden 76 Covernment presented to the American Embassy,

and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 0S4655, dated

15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of

investigation and suggested that I get a copy fror the Secret Service.

I then callad Mr. Iom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison

man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent

Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received

a telephone call from Mi. James Robinson relative to my inquiry

about prosecution. Mi. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington

Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 218-424 filed with the 3rd

District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61

between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

00389

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 121

---

## Page 122

Reported loss at tha

ime consisted of four am/fr

adios

and one electric razor. The police investigation identified

some latent fingerprints bui no identification of those prints

was made. Since the reported loss was under $5, 000 and there

was. no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did

not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported

that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

Kik Dream

POHN K. GREATE

Assistant General Counsel

• cc: Legislative Counsel

• Inspector General

OGC:JKG:cav

Orig - Subject: Watergate Case

1 - JKG Signer

1 - Chrono

-2-

00385

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 122

---

## Page 123

02227719949994

EXS 0337

1. June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT:

Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have

searched

my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples

of activitics which to hostile observors or to somconc

without complete knowlcage and with a spocial kind of

motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities

exceeding CIA's charter.

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,

DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert

F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the tolephones of columnists

Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify

their sources for classified

information which was appeal-

ing in their columns.

Because the primary source appeared

to be in

the Department of

Defense, MeConc oidered me

personally to brief Gencral Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,

orally, which

I did. I understand nore

complete information

on this operation is available from the Director of security.

I, personally, managed to avoid

gaining any knowledge of

whät precise

actions

were taken, what information was gained,

what was done with it, and when the opcration was terminated.

3. As a rosult of a devcloping relationship with

IDEN-122

and

thelDEN-123rcpresentative in Washington,

also as

a result of certain information convejed by

IDEN-124

, James Angleton, with the approval of

Dick Helms, agreed to mount a

counterespionage operation

against the

IDEN-95

Washington. This involved

breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

2

MUST CHAOOTZES!

RES G21

00458

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 123

---

## Page 124

++57499179979997

EVES OWN

2

the

IDEN-126

On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and

Helms briefed

Secretary of State Rusk generally.on the

operation without going into operational details: Later

on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.

Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and

on 15 April 1963: DCI McCone met with President Kennedy

alone and briefed the President on the dotails of this

new phase of the operation.

On the same day, the Attorney

General was briefed and he

agiced that he would not

mention it to the FBI unless the FBI therselves raised

it with him. On 3 February 1961, DCI NcCone met alone

with President Lyndon B. Johnson

and briefed him on the

opcration.

On 1 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.

On 6 February 1964 in a

briefing

of Secretary of State

Rusk on the results

of the opcration, Rusk expressed

rescrvations about the propricty of such an operation.

He rnised this same concern in subsequent conversations

with McCone on 17 April 1961. 28 May 1961: and 14 June

1961. On 12 September 1961 Rusk continued to express

grave leservations and repeatedly suggested that the

IDEN-i3 be informed dirocrly that we know about their

espionage operations

in the

United States and ask them

to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1961 Rusk expressed

these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and

President Join F.. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara

was also

present, and there is no record

that he had

previously been made aware of this operation.

• 4.

Although certain activities never got beyond

the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples

of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.

One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice

i are on patron.

crops in both Cuba

and North Vietnam.

A second involved

a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nucleai instal-

lations.

Outside the United States Government, General

Eisenhower was briefed on such planning.

A third, which

assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by

Angleton and Helms for a greatly

increased intelligence

collection effort against foreign installations in this

country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

# +993785-90-1751

-NW-88296_Docld:32989624 Page 124

BEC ONY

00453

---

## Page 125

3

-

exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the

Soviet intelligence service.

The reasons are still unclear

to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the

effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and

indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase

the Agency representation in the

Moscow Embassy, and

generally to use Gb-type tactics, also extensively and

indiscriminately.

This led to a heated exchange between

DCI McCone and Mir. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting

taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.

It is clear that the IBI was opposed to any such proposal

then, as now, and the plan never went forward..

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in

charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office

learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured

the cooperation of several

prominent US business firms

in denying

economic items to Cuba.

There was no question

but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-

ledge of this operation had to be rather widespicad.

6. On 17 April 1961. Mi. Robert B. Anderson came

to DCJ. McConc

on behalf of Ancrican business interests,

offering to inscrt some $300,000 to try to secure a

favorable result in the clections in Panama.

after

this

approach.

Shortly

IDEN'-128

IDEN-129

made a similar proposal to icCone in connection

with elections in Chile.

On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of

the 303 Connittce, it was decided that the offers of

American business

could not be accepted, it being neither

secure way not an honorable way of doing such business.

This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent

ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that cCone has

forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of

refusing

to accopt such collaboration between the Agency's operations

and private business.

7.

At the direction of Attorney General Robert

Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,

Nccone injocted the Agency, and

particularly

IDEN- 36

BIts E.

00450

NW.88296_Docld:32989624 Page 125

---

## Page 126

CHES CALY

4

into the US labor situation, and particularly to try

to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and

Walter Reuther. IDEN-36

stcered a very skillful

course in this connection, but the Agency could be

vulnerable to charges that we went behind leany's back,

or were somehow consorting with Reuther against leany's

wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency

funds which I know to be controversial. One was the

expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing

the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners.

Details of

this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mire

Miskovsky

IDEN-131

, and Jares Smith.

Second,

as you well know, when Lou

Concin received

his sumnons

to report to the Joint Gencral Staff Headquarters on

1 Novenber

1963 a large amount of

cash went with him.

My impression is that the accounting for this and its

use has never

been very frank or complete.

Third, at

one of

the

carly Special Group nectings attended by

McConc he tool strong exception to proposals to spond

Agency funds to improve the

economic viability of liest

Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His

gencral position was that such exponditures were not

within the Agency's charter, and that he would

allow

such spending only on the direct personal

request of

the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or

the White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I

remember the Agency's being

severely criticized by the

House Appropriations Subcommitice for having spent $3,000

for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors

to secure the

release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that

any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried

about the fact that conversations within the offices

and

over the telephones were transcribed.

During McCone's

002779209997797939

......

00453

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 126

---

## Page 127

ETS CXY

5

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,

his inner office, his dining room, his office in East

Building, and his study at his icsidence on white Raven

Street.

I do not know who would be willing to raise such

an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to

spread, and certainly

the Agency is vulnerable on this

score.

I1. Also under the heading of old business, I

well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by carl

Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a

contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the soviet

Union.

Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, thore was

a disposition in Washington to reexaminc the

Bay of Pigs,

and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard

officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced

with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was

a special

arrangement with the Office of Communications

wherchy the

Director's office gained access to non-CI.

traffic.

This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after

Admiral

Rayborn became DCI.

He had visited the Signal

Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy

in the Dominican Republic for Undei Secretary Gorge Ball,

Eyes Only.

He roturned to his office and proccoded to

discuss this telegram with George Ball who vas naturally

quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as

to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.

Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent

several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and

I well know,

operated on a very

lofty plane,

and I think certain of

his activities could be misunderstood: One example was

his decision in July of 1961 to have Aristotle Onassis and

Maria Callas

flown from Rome

to. Athens

on Air Force KC 135.

Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the

attention of the local press and in

due course sir. John

00462

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 127

---

## Page 128

13,1

Histlit

. i :

-

ENTS ONLY

6

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for

Washington,

came to see me to ask about the propriety

of this action.

14. The use of

IDEN-132

aircraft

has been remarkably secure, but DCI IcCone himself

foigot about the cover arrangement and became quite

exercised whon he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the

San Francisco airport for the Republican Sational Con-

vention in 1961 aboard the

IDEN-133

with

the highly visible tail number IDEN-134. This

was, 1

explained

to him carefully, a perfectly logitimate

charter, but he didn't like it.

15.

McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen

in Washington.

In fact; they gave him a gift and a

luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps

indicative of the press's relations with him. However,

in the case of the Ross

and lise book, The Invisiblc

Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher

and tie authors to change things.

They did not change

a comma, and

I I doubt that this old saw willever sing

again.

Finally, and this will reflect my Middle

Western Protestant upbringing, icCone's dealings with

the Vatican, including lope John XXIII

and Pope Paul

VI,

would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a

sinking feeling that discipline has broken down,

and

that

allegations from any quarter which cast these things in

• the wrong light would receive great publicity and

attention,

and no amount of denial would

ever set the record

straight.

If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further

• details, I am of course at your disposal,

but I would point

"4+13-91+08419499

00303

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 128

---

## Page 129

PIES CACY

7

out that I was very much in the position of the

enlisted

man who knew that the commissioned officers

were aware of these activities

and better able to

judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-

pretation.

Welder

WALTER ELDER

EB C7

00453

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 129

---

## Page 130

SECRET SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program

which has as its fundamental

objective the long term manipu-

lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division

difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various

parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are

often exposed to and directed against American radical, loftist,

and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftring,

radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset

might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the

Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for

some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his

Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-

rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each

case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is

kept. informed on a regular basis.

SECRET SENSITIVE

E2 INPDET

CL BY 061090

00483

-NW 88296_Docid:32989624_Page 130

---

## Page 131

Thad

a-no

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy

in 1971 and 1972

1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76

Embassy in

Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of

this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used

Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed

operationally by the FBI, was initiated only aftor then-

Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-

Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-

continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 whon it

appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before

Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and

identify this operation as CIA instigated.

2.: The operation consisted of the following three

technical devices:

ar An AC-powered, masked transmitter and

two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy.

-Chief of Mission.

.b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the

office of the Ambassador's secretary which was

SENDET

00468

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Rage-131

---

## Page 132

-

-2-

designed to pick up high quality audio of typing

in the office. It was hoped to break these audio

signals into clear text using advanced computer

techniques developed by. Division D. No useful

product, however, was ever obtained.:

c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter

and switch concealed in the

door of the

Embassy, which would supply crytographic information

for NSA. (Produced excellent quality signals

until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of

battery failure.)

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of

the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited

value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations

of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because

of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission

arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level

talks. with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt

- renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the

_two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December

-

1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting

00453

c.

SECRET

-11

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 132

---

## Page 133

-3-

DirectorL. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request

was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of

this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing

to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the

mounting disclosures

about CIA involvement inDEN-76 This

was especially so because of our

reservations about maintaining

proper security for the listening post which, as with other

operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

-

.

-

-

00420

SECRET

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 133

---

## Page 134

SECRET

e.

Alias Social Sccurity Cards. 171 backstopped

accounts have been established for contract personnel

whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed

but who are entitled to social security coverage.

Following expiration of the contractual relationship,

at an appropliate time the alias and true name accounts

are merged permiiting the individual to icceive com

plete benctits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

I. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 51 Social Security

dividual tax accounts have been established with IRS

on an unwitting basis in 11 cities in the United States.

§. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities

(13 corporations; 6i sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers

and 61 telephone answcling scivice addresses are nain-

tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

h. Alins Signatorics on Dank Accounts.

24 aliases

for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notion-

al company bank accounts arc in use by 9 officcis and l

propiietary-hirc as tollows:

CCS/lIas - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8

proprietary entities and 1

notional conpany.

CCS/NY PIC: - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13

proplictary entitics.

CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprictary-hire (1 alias)

on 3 proprietary entities.

CCS/AD PIC* - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2

proprietary entities.

*Proprietary Management Company

-3-

00510

__NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 134

---

## Page 135

.,i.:

-

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise

of normal

commercial annuities.

Backstopping for

this arrangoment is provided through CCS-procured

bank accounts and Post office boxes. 19 retirecs

are currently being handled.

k.

Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Yon-

official Covor Tersonnel.

DivIdonas (Interest) carned

on Croalt Union accounts by individuals under cover

are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based

on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenus Code Section

6041.

Individuals under cover may borl'ow money fron the

Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however,

the mortgage is recorded in the name of a clared

lawyer and not the actual lencior (Credit Union).

Paragraph 1. deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

-5-

00513

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 135

---

## Page 136

SECRET,

CORPORATE COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the

placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover

of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This

process involves

the selection of companies; research on

their locations and key personncl; clearances; contacts

with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency;

arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the

companies, including letters of understanding; funaing of

salaries, allovances and expenses; and, continuous monitor

ing of each integratca case throughout

the course of the

cover use.

The ovcrall objcctive is to match the individual

being placed, the company,

and

the location, in a mannci

that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and pio-:

tection of the company integrity.

2.

Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover

is provided by 110 companies; 179 integices are located in

17 forcign countrics and 12 are located in the United States.

To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel aic ic-

searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companios

at any givon time.

3.

To minimize the adverse consequences to a

cooperating

company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in

the event of exposure of an individual

under cover, it has

been established policy that no more than two individuals

would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present

time this ratio is confined to ayproximaiely 25% of the total

number of companies now being used and efforts are under~

way

•to effect further reductions toward the goal of one

individual per company.

4.

In addition to the primary corporate cover function

described in paragraph. above, Cos maintains continuing

contact with

two U.s. car rental firns and two U.s. credit

card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit

cards in alias for operational use in the United States and

abroad by Agency personnel. 12 such caids are now being

used by 31 individuals.

----

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 136

SECRET

00524

---

## Page 137

SEGRET:

-

DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-

stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-

vide cover for Agency personnel in the Unitcd States

and abroad and to provide an attributable source 102

Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-

ment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilitics

comprise 13 corporations providing personal status cover,

payrolling and tax attribution sources, and othei miscel.-

Janeous support such as title to property, funding, etc.;

61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational

cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207

non-icgistered companics providing support for high risk

operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate rein

bursements, and

proprictary funding.

2.

224 Agcncy personnel engaged

in opcrational

activitics are payrolled by the facilitics, an essential

procedure permiiting the reporting of Agency salarios with-

out docunenting the Agency as the source.

3. The facilities provide a capability for passing

Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide

companies on a continuing basis.

225 bank accounts

located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide

the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

005.2

SECRET

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 137

---

## Page 138

SECRET

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

1.

Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic

proprietary management companies which provide funding and

operational

support for 19 Agency entities, including 13

controlled and directed by CCS.

2.

The thice proprictary management companies

are

staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the

commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going

operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of

entities supporting operations, and provide cover and

funding channols for opcrational activitics as required.

Most importantly, professional services are furhished in

a manner rosponsive to required security standards and

at a cost considerably less than would be charged by

bona fide management firms.

3.

The 13 proprietary entitics directed by CCS pio-

vide cover for ton individuals in the United States and

three orciseas.

Operationally, the companies provide

commercial funding channels

on

a world-wide basis and

serve as corporate ouncis of equipment, inventory and

aircraft and

as

for outstanding

notes and loans in ordor to conceal U.S. Government

affiliation or intcresi.

00526

SECRET,

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 138

---

## Page 139

S20R37

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Items for Possible Use in Briefing

the DCI

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to

identify to you for possible briefing of the

Director activities which in

certain contexts could

be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

2.

At the request of the Director of Security,

approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January

safesite number 583 was made available to the

U.S. Marshal's

•Service for use as a secure residence

by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was

under thrcat of assassination by organized criminal

elements.

SB Division over the past three months has

interviewed four graduate students as prospective

candidates for assignments under American business

cover in the USSR.

They were encouraged to locate

cover jobs on their own.

4.

For approximately two years the SB Division

has had the cooperation of the Commander of the

Morals Division of the Distriüt of Columbia Police

Department in training officers scheduled for

assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to

conduct themselves it placed under arrest.

The

arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

5.

Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven

FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in

response to requests from the FBI. We have shared

with them through lcctures and discussions lessons

we have learned which are relevant to their counter-

espionage responsibilities.

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 059952

00502

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 139

---

## Page 140

- 2 -

6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational

experience we have invited three FBI officers to be

students in

our Sovict Operatios Course from 14 to 25

May 1973.

7.• A Soviet defector

was

confined at a CIA

facility from April 1964 to

Septenber 1967 while efforts were being made to

establish

whether he was

a bona fide defector.

Although his present attitude toward the Agency is

quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the

press could cause undesirable publicity if it were

to uncover the story.

David H. Blee

Chicf

Soviet Bloc Division

MORET

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 140

---

## Page 141

MEMOR.. DUM FOR: MI. Colby

Attached is the material we requested of Dick

Ober:

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for

Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the

Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for

Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the

Democratic National Convention

•C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to

Secret Service for Democratic and Republican

Conventions

00545

FORM NO.

1 AUG SA

101

REPLACES FOIN 10-101

WHICH MAY DE USEO:

(47)

- NW-88296-Đocld:32989624-Page-141-

---

## Page 142

SENDL

COMET L SECR

OAFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

NAR

AND ADDRESS

DATE

Inspector General

ITIALS

TO

1

2

3

5

6

ACTION

220PQY

CUiTHENT

CONCURRENCE

WEST EARLI

GiSPATCH

FILE

INFORATIOK

RESORM

SIGRATURE

Remarks:

Mi. Broe:

Dick Ober has been advised thai this package

is being sent to you. since knowledge of the

existence of this Committee has been strictly

unopened. Although it has an ER number on it,

it has not been sent through that oifice -- I gave

then only the day, subject, and originator.

Cominic

00527

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FRON: BALE. AUDRESS AND PHONE NO.

O/ES/MC/Barbara Pindar

ET CONFIDENTIT

FORM NO. 237

1-67

Use previous contions

DATE

h5 May 73

SECITT

(40)

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 142

---

## Page 143

ROUTING AND RECCAD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Opioral)

FROM:

Richard Ober

TO: /Officer designarion, room number, ord

building)

1.

2.

IDEN-73

0/PC1

ide Gilly

-

DATE

EXTENSION

1465

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

NO.

DATE

14 May 1973

CMMENTS (uniber each comment lo shon in m-=

o whom. Drow a lina across column citer each conner

RECEIVED

12l2

Attached are:

3.

4.

Committee per your rou

of this morning.

2. Copies of memoranda con-:

соглівд «досу бирот? са

Secret service (7 Joril and

23 June 1972).

6.

7.

8

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

s.

EYES OXI.Y

00548

610 Laara's

NW 88296 Docld:32989624

G6C.5T

Page 143

1 was ?:

---

## Page 144

5856884897

14 MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce

fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,

including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism

and terrorisn.

"lembership: Department of Justice (Chair-

man); Federal

Bureau

of Investigation; Department of

Delense; secret service; national security agency; Central

Intelligence gency; and as necessary representatives of

other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-

pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive

Director John Dougherty and

later Bernard Wells supplied

by Department of Justice with title of Special Issistant

to the

Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney

Gencral for Internal Security Robert Sardian and later

Willian Olson. Is has received renurements directly

that and deline nic to scras so to hat he the

White liouse.

existence of this Conmittee be kept secret. Wareness

of its existence within this Agency has been linited to

, C/CT and four oifiers or this office.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on forcign

aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or at-

tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign

intelligence provided by FBI and USA.

The Chief of the

Special

Opciations

Group serves

as the Agency

representa-

Bive on the Intelligence Fvaluation Committee

Staff and

as the alternate to the Agency representative on the

Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure

of Classified Information,

november 1971.

This study

•was initiaied in July 1971 by the White House as a con-

sequence of the President's concern about the release

of the Pentagon Papers by Danicl Ellsberg.

Both Robert

Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially Involved in tasking

the les to produce this evaluation.

Drafting done by IES

•Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-

pation was editorial review.

00549

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 144

SENSITIVE

SERRAT

---

## Page 145

EWS C17

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August

1972): At the request

of the White llouse, a series of

estimates

was prepared by the IES on

"Potential Dis-

ruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention,

Miami Beach, Florida."

The Agency provided from

February through August 1972 periodic contributions for

these estimates concerning foreign support for activi-

ties planned

to disrupt or harass the Republican

National Convention (copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July

1972):

At the request of the White House, a

series of

estimates was prepared by the IlS on "Potential Disrup-

tions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami

The Agency provided between March and

July 1973 contributions on forcign support for activi-

ties planned to disrupt or harass

the Democratic

National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

EYES CRY

SENSITIVE

00550

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 145

---

## Page 146

CONONOLLED DSOLA

83 FEB 1S72

SUBJECT:

Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only linited indications thus far of

foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of

activities designed

to disrupt or harass the National

Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23

August 1972.

2.

Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled

World Assembly for Peace and Indeyendence of the Peoples of

Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles,

attempted

unsuccesstully to include a call for international

demonstrations to take place at the time

of the Republican

National Convention. A representative of the San Diego

• Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action

groups targetting on

Republican Convention, requested

the Anerican Delegations' Stecring Committee at the World

Assembly to include

a specific call for international

support o1 activitzes against the Republican convention

in their proposal to the

Action Commission of the horld

Assembly.

This

request, however, was dropped as

t00

divisive by the Steering Connittce, despite initial indica-

tions

that the proposal would be taken to the floor

of

the Assembly.

3.

John LENNON, a British

subject, has provided

financial support to

Project "YES"

, which in

turn paid

the travel expenses to the world Assembly of

. a representa-

tive of leading antivar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' repre-

sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations

for disruptive actions

at the San Diego Convention.)

Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNOli-supported pro-

ject,

the Election Year

Strategy Information Conter (EYSIC),

of which Ronnie DAVIS is a key leader, which was

direct New Left protest activities at

set up to

the Republican

National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS'

representative

to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of

the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;

it is not known if the Republican National Convention

discussed.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 146

COXTROLLED DESIA

00558

---

## Page 147

I FOMENT DIESEART GOGE ROMOND

CONTAGUZD DISSEM

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its

harassment of the Republican convention.

Republing

A working draft

plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a

special television network to broadcast video-taped messages

sTom other countries, including coverage of sympathetic

denonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public

address systens of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese

In Paris and from the Connunist Chinese and others at the

United Nations.

00553

GOSSROWED D'SSEM

NW 18296 Docld:32989624 Page 147.

---

## Page 148

CONTHOLLED DISSED

81 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications. remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts

to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed

to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican

-Party in San Diego, 21-23 August

1972.

The concept of coordinated

international support for domestic activities in the United

States was generally endorsed at the recent world Assembly for

Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the

Conference issued no spocific call

for international support of

disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Sovict-controlled World Assembly for Peace and

Independence of

the Peoples of Indochina, held In Versailles

arom 10-1s February 1972, there las mention of Ancrican plans

for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic

National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the

Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted

by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination

for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-

national support to six wecks of domestic antivar actions and

demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with

the statement:

"This

campaign will lead up

to the Democratic

Party. Convention at Miami

on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the

Peacc"and Independence of the Indochinese People" of

13 February

1972; drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against

the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various

even the

soldiers.

The Assembly

calls for support to these progressive and

the United States, and

asks

the

governments antiwar forces in

to grant asylum

to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.

All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently

hein

to inpose on

the U.S. Governnent the restoration of peacc

and independence and

• freedom

in Victnan, Laos, and Canbndía."

---

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 148

COMMOLEN DISSEN

HO FORCICH CISSOMMO DESSER HOROAD

00552

---

## Page 149

1U TonLiur b:

CONINOSLED DIESEN

DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the

domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-

vention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a

"large exposition in

the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,

displays will portray the struggles

Plans for activities at

Expose

72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special

television network to broadcast video-taped messages from

other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demon-

strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address

systems of live telephone calls.from

the Vietnanese in Paris

and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

In addition, the SDCC has

suggested that,

in order to "outflank

NIXON domestically and internationally

international opposition

can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries

and liberation movements to carly their flags in SDCC demon-

strations."

00555

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 149

---

## Page 150

GOA:

ROLA

• 2.4 AP.R. 1972

Foreign Su

or Harass

it for Activities Plann

to Disrupt

the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There is little new evidence of foreign plans

or efforts

to inspire, support, or take

advantage of actions designed

to

disrupt or

harass the Republican National Convention in San

Diego,

21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic

society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning

actions

at the

Republican Convention, has

adopted a proposal

to cooperate with Mexican workers and

students in a demonstra-

tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention.

The San Diego

Convention Coûlition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting

on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity froi

the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indica-

tion of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact

will be required for the SDCC to implement its

carlier-rchorted

plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the

Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in

Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts,

held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic

Socioty (SDS) adopted a proposal

to hold demonstrations at

the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National

Convention. The proposal included

a call for SDS io coopernte

with Mexican workers

and students in an action to occur during

a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be

entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given thcir endorsement to

the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC)

in the form of a

letter from the Vietnam Committce for Solidarity with the

American People (VCSHAP), a quasi official organ of the

North Vietnamese Government.

The letter, which has been

circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,

expresses "great delight" with the formation of the

and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant soil-

darity and friendship."

write often and "send us materials you have, "that the

The VCSWAP requests

SDCC

CONTROLED BESIM-

00556

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 150

---

## Page 151

3 F.&3EN

& 3 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or liarass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications rerain limited of foreign plans or attempts

to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designea

to disrupt or harass the Rapublican National Convention in

mritami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedisn

Committee for Vietnam, ino 1s also a member of the secre-

tariat of the Stocknolm Conference on Vietnam, has stated

that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in

the-Swedish Committee's work.

The British-based Interna-

tional Confederation for Disarmament and

Peace (ICDP) has

distributed a

"Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities

In the United

states against the war based on a submission

by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned

in connection with

the Republican Convention.

DEVELOTTE:TS:

•I. mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee

for V: inam, who is also an influential and well-informed

staff : inber of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference

on Vicinam, stated in a private discussion ci the Swedisn

Committee's unusually heavy

work load that "things will be

hectic

right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and

-Peace, a british-based antiwar organization and one of the

more prominent member organizations

of the Stockhoim Con-

ference, has attached a

• "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the

April-bay 1972 issue of its regular international publica-

tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished

: by the

People's coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and

Included the following entry:

August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.

Demonstrations organized by the San

Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,

San Diego, Ca. 92103.

00552

o4010000998

NW 88296 Docld:32989624•Page 151

1'9

---

## Page 152

GONINGLIES

DISSEN

The ICDP Connentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations

In support of some of the dates listed but does not specificall:

call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

00553

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 152

BIA

CONTOS 2ED B:332.1

pr1=

---

## Page 153

2½ JUN 1972.

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in

Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of

interest by a menber of the North Vietnamese Delegation to

the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antivar

oiganizations in the United States for demonstrations in

connection with the political conventions of both major

• parties.

DEVELOPMESTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese

Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to

contact hin again when the visitor returned from an imminent

trip to the United States.

The North Vietnameso official

gave

the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's

Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and

the National

Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to

inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-

tions during the coming summer.

The North Vietnamese

official stated that he was

especially interested

• in plans

for actions in connection with the Democratic and

Republican

National Conventions.

00559

NO FOREIGN BISSEN/HO DISSEM AGROAD

GOATULLED BISSEM

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 153

---

## Page 154

Gontrolied Bissem

28 JUN 1912

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial

foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-

tage of

activitles designed to disrupt or harass the National

. Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24

August 1972.

00503

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abread

_ Controlled Dissem

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 154

Estate:

---

## Page 155

CONTROUX33

D339S

26 JUL 1972

Forcign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

OI Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,

support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-

Iupt oI

harass the

Republican rational Convention in miami,

FlorIda, 21-24 August 1912,

consist of the following:

leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice

(PCPJ) has stated

that demonstrations will

be organized to

take place at United States and allied military installa-

tions abroad during the period immediately before and during

The PCPJ leader also stated that

the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will

participate in activities in connection with the Convention.

Anti-lar Union (Ail), a domestic organization wnich has

seen active in planning demonstrations in connection with the

Republican National Convention,

has

sent a delegation to

Paris, France, to mect with officials of the Democratic Repub-

dic of Victnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-

ment of South Vietnan (PRG) .

No information is presently

available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican

Convention have been discussed at these mectings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an carly July 1972 meeting with prominent members of

forcign antivar organizations, a representative of the People's

Coalition foi Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-

tant position within that organization, discussed

the plans

of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign

in the United States.

The PCPJ representative stated that

during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against

Bombing" would be

waged in U.S. cities involved in the manu-

facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam,

and

that similar actions will be organized

at United States and

allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-

tive further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

0055°

NSIVE EATELLIGACE SOURCES

CONTRONED DIESEM

RW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 155 7 Я.КО ГОЕ С3 ГВТР1 1230:П

850115%

(3) er (:)cil: r=: ur :.

Impossible to deterni::

---

## Page 156

GUANTOLEO DESEN

of the bombing in

ietnam are being organi:

by the "Repub-

lican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on

21 August 1972.

In an apparent reference to the 21 August

actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the

Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of

the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.

(Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of

Stockholn Conference representatives to travel to the United

States during the

Republican

National Convention; nor do we

have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm

Conference representatives to participate in activities con-

nected with

the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Union (ANU), a domestic group engaged

in

organizing counter-activities

at the Republican National Con-

vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists

to paris, France, to meet with officials of the Denocratic

Republic of dorth Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolu-

itionary Governnent of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party

has already met with DRV and PRG representatives

to discuss

the agenda for meetings with the full diU delegation. Although

no infornation is presently available indicating

that actions

at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-

uled to be discussed at mectings between the At delcgation

and the DRY/PRG officials, it is Inown that menbors of the NU

advance party have astied for advice from the PRG officials

regarding the stance

the Ail should take on certain questions

relating

to the presidential elections. It is also known

that

the

DRV officials

have questioned

the ANU advance party

about the political mood in the United States.

One of the

AlU delegation members has

stated that upon their return to

the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members

will spoak at rallies, over the radio, and on tolevision,

to "educate the American people about the consequences of

voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat

Nixon."

The delegation member added that the demonstrations

•at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."

CORRELLED DISSENS

KO FERDICH DISSOLARO DISSEM ABROAD

00583

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 156

---

## Page 157

LUNA

Lidean

2 AUG 1972

Foreign Support för Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to

inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designca to disrupt or

harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August

1972. Although mectings have becn held recently in Paris, France, between

Amcrican antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic

of North Victriam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of

South Victnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the

DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the

American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National

Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire

American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials;

at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private

exchanges. A sccond group of activists, considered more important than

the first delegation, is scheculed to travel to Paris on or about 1 august 1972

for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American

delagation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary

Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to dis-

cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-

ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar

movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-

lican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen

Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions

of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."

TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven

Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part,

refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon-

strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

00583

CLASSINTO CY

EXIET FROM GOTRAL DECRIGUITICA:

C2NDR2:03

WARMIG NONCE

SENSITIVS INFELD BEL SOURCES

NV 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 157

impossible to determine

---

## Page 158

Пі!!!"

COMMOLSO DISSIM

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,

the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.

Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by

the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there

Is no information available concerning the substance of these private

exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with

the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972

for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second

group is scheduled to be led by Rennic DAVIS, founcier and leader of the

AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for

discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from

his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at

both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's

chief target would be the Republican Convention.

..

0058

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 15gn rn

CONTROLILED ESSEN

---

## Page 159

Gunmunni Diaden

9 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans

or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed

to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party

in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00505

CLASSIFIED EY

WARNING NOTICE

ÜG SOURCES

NW 88296c Docld:32989624 Page 159

13 f.323

5 ass Pas

impossible to determin

---

## Page 160

COMROLLES BASEN

16 AUG 1372

Foreign Support for Activities Plarned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of

foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take

advantage of activities desigred to disrupt or harass

the National Convention of the Republican Party in

Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00585

WEING MIKE

SEPSITIVE DATELLIGE REE LAMINCES

NW 88296 1D@did132989624 Page 1600 FOREIEN DISSEUNO DISSON ARCAD

852:62

Inpossible to doic

Qualies or oo lie, insert éile ne e

---

## Page 161

• COROLNO

0 € MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUBMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus. far of toreign

extorts to insplre, support or take advantage oi

activities

lesigned to disrupt or harass the National Convention of

the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept

of coordinated

international support for domestic activities

in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent

World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples

of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific

call for international support of disruptive actions at the

American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At- the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace

and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in

Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of

American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican

and Democratic lational

resolution from

Conventions.

The final draft

the conference's "Action Commission" con-

tains an appendix submitted

by Ancrican delegates whose

goal was to socure global coordination for domestic actions

in the United States.

It calls for international support

to six wecks of domestic antivar

actions and

demonstrations,

From 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-

ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party

•Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

Party Convention in. San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly

for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"

of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Conmission"

states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest

against the

war is voiced more and more strongly,

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 161 •

HE 73 22283.

NO FERRICH BETARD 05237 497319

00508

---

## Page 162

To ThaT cr

GOATROSI

ID DOSEN:

under. Various forms, such as draft

evasions,

desertions, resistance, demonstrations which

now affect even the soldiers.

The Assembly

calls for support to these progressive and

antiwar forces in the United States, and asks

the governments to grant asylum to deserters

and to support their right to repatriation.

All together, the peoples of the world will

•efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-

ment the restoration of peace, independence

and freedon in Vietnan',

"Laos and Cambodia."

..'

00569

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 162.

---

## Page 163

CORACATED

1:1

09 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,

support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt

or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13

July 1972, are linited to a reiteration by a member of the

Secrctariat of the Stockholm Corference on Vietnam of a

statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace

and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina.

The Assembly's

pronounccment generally endorsed the concept of internationai

support to a

campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities

in the

United States Icading up to the Denocratic and Republican

Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-

ruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In early April 1972 an

influential and well-informed

staff wonber of the Stockholm Conference on

Vietnam discussed,

in private, the international anti-Vietnam lar activities

conducted

on 1, 15, and 22 April.

The Stockholm Conference

member

stated

that

these actions were part of an international

campaign in support of domestic American

antiwar efforts

during

the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate

at the clection conventions in July and August."

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the

Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was

a major organizer, had carlier enunciated a similar statement

in an appendix to

the final draft resolution of the Assembly's

•"Action Commission." The appendix called for international

support to six weeks of domestic antivar actions

and denon-

strations, from I April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with

•the statement:

"This campaign will lead up

to the Democratic

Party Convention at Miami

on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

COME LEO DROS

NO FORECH DISCHATO 05628 202310

00570

NW-88296-Docld:32989624_ Page 163

---

## Page 164

lid luilt

CONTRGLLES DISSEM

2.3 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

-ar Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUNMARY:

Indications remain linited of foreign plans or attempts

to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in

Miani, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

A member of the Swedish

Connittee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the secre-

tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has

stated

that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in

the Swedish Committee's work.

The British-based Interna-

tional Confederation for Disarmament

and Peace (ICDP) has

distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities

in the United States against the war based on a submission

by the

Peoples' Coalition

for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned in connection with

the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee

for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed

staff wember of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference

on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish

Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be

hectic right until the elections in the U.s."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and

Peace, a British-based antivar organization and onc of the

more prominent member organizations of

the Stockholm Con-

ference, has attached a

"Spring Offensive Calendar" to the

April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publica-

tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been

furnished

by the People's Coalition

for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and

included the following entry:

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.

Demonstrations organised by

Florida

People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,

Florida 33012.

00572

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 164.

---

## Page 165

TO TUNETUTE DrUSE

CONTROLD DESON

The ICDP conmentary on the PCPJ calendar uiges demonstrations

in support of some of the dates listed but does not specificall:

•call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

00572

NW 88296. Docld:32989624_ Page 165_

11100140

---

## Page 166

CONTROLLED-BISSEN

7. JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

•or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt or harass

the Democratic National Convention in

Miami, Florida, 1D-13 July 1972, is an expression of interast

the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris

Peace Talks in the plans of the major antivar organizations

in the United States for demonstrations in connection with

the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-

gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact

him again when the visitor returned from an inninent trip

to the United States.

The

North Vietnamese official

gave

the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's

Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the

National

Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and astied the visitor to

Inquire at their offices regarding

their plans for demon-

stratIons duiing the coming summer.

The North Vietnamese

•official stated that he was

especially interested in plans

for actions

in connection with the Democratic and

National

Conventions.

00573

CONTROLEO DIESEN

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 166

---

## Page 167

10:1F

21 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activitics Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans

or cíforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to

disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,

Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 167

CONTOLLED DESAI

0.01

00571

---

## Page 168

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 168

00575

---

## Page 169

230E

1972

MESORANDUS FOR: Excutive Direcior/ Comptroller

VIA

: Acting Deputy Direcior for Plans

SUBJECT

:

Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service

(USSS) For National Ferocratic (a0-14 July

2972) anü ational

republican (21-24 August

2972) Conventions

1. This monorandus is for the information of the Exccutive

Discotor/Coaptroller.

2e Auchorization for CIA support to tho U.S. Secrot Service

for tha Derocratic and Renablican

tational Conventions is con-

tained in

a monorandua of 7 loril 1272 Eron Chief, CI Staff to

the iCI inich was concurred in ly tic ADD? and approved by tre

DCI on 10 April 1072 (copy attachio).

3. On 13 Anil 1972 the COs, Mi/lland nor with the liari

USSS representatlie

and it. astrovito of usss tradguarters io

discuss

preliminary planina for station tilliaai sunpoit to tis

USSS prior to and

marina

subject coreriions.

:?n?

1i Antil 1472

tho c/mycos and ccirish act with ir. tastrovito at Headrearicrs

to inpleont the archaninary planniny apreca upon in

tinni

ard

¿o deternine the caront of licaúquarters

-support required by the

UsSS.

4.

The basic arcenent rutually concurred in by the liSss

and licadquartcrs rcpresentatives proviced that:

Ma. Station Will:ilaul lould conduct nase traces. on

all Cubans of interest to ine U55S,

• b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on

all other forciin born persons of intcrest to the uses.

c. ClA mould been the usss informed of aay arents

in the Caribhean

and latin

Aacricon arcas that would

have any bearin? on the Usss procctive rission during

the contention periods.

This Hould include briefinas

on Cups

and Culan policies toward tie initor

states. and

on activitics of cuban intelliconce operations which

could affect the security of the conventions.

00578

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 169

---

## Page 170

de Coverago of Latin Ancrican exile

FrouDs in the

Unized States

would be the responsinility of the FRI

since CIA lad

coased tie extonsive coverage fornerly

cargeiod against these groups since it as now considered

an internal socurity function.

S.

On 27 April 1072 a aceting vas hold at a buffor office

of Station it/liani

with the iSSS Chief of Comunica-

tions, station persoanci and a iloadquarters representative.

It

was agrced that name traces tould no laudied by lioni socurity

fichd office courier fros the LeSS connifer office until the SSS

ostablished cosmunications linis fron their command post

in

convention center, at which tine trace recuests would be sont

from the command post to U5ss heracuarters

und sclayed to CIs

Headquarters: Cuban nane traces are relayed to station mi/iami

by the Signal Center and non-Curan traces are conjucted by 1i:/C0s.

Replies to USSS Icquests on non-cuians are coordinatod sith

ci/so.

Station Milliami has arranded the rental of a safeicuse

about five minutes iron convention couter which till provide a

secute and noorby neceira site

108 1555 278

rency perscuined.

This saichouse

will do aruilable

just prior to anủ

during both

CONVEnTIONS.

tradguarters officer will TaY to iori srior to

the contentions

and

Icanir until

the conventions aujour to

assist thic Station in providing tle suprort doscried in paragrapi

four above.

7. Station Wlari is in dally contact mich the isss in

Niani, utilizingbulfer office as a necting site tien necessary. The

Location of Station

ia5 not been rcrcalra to

the isSS. • (Station

is located sone distance fros buffer office.)

Auditionally, the inni Security Liclú office maintains noral

liaison with she Local USSS diani unit.

8. The Station understands that no porsonnel i1ll be nroscht

at the convention hall, that

they will not provide any equipmort

unique to the igency, not will it provide the use of any

oticr

facilities other than tne sulehouse described in paragraph sia.

SESTET

00574

NW 8629b Docld:32989624 Page 170-

---

## Page 171

May 1973

SUBJECI: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

.

-You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,

I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.

•These funds may still be possibly held in a special

account for that use. This is one of the areas where

TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would

have the details as this was handled through the Executive.

Director's office and of course Angleton would have

additional information.

Signed

I-BN-1::

Chief

Missions and Programs

; Staff

67

E2 INPDET CL BY 357737

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00583

port

NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 171

---

## Page 172

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

:

Areas of Possible Embarrassment

to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John

Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to

the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was

non-spocific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with

the possible adverse publicily thai might develop regarding the

President's nephew, who was employed by IOs.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the

Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director

Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,

General Cushman (sce attached telephone conversation).

Note that Ehilichian is mentioned, and

c.

John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels

were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by

the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since

it gives the flavor of White House concern.

It took several days to

uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-

ment of the Picsident's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.

• The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were

coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-.

ject died down and we did not pursue it further.

" 4. Please return the attachments when they have served your

purpose.

i :

SECUET

EZ IMPDET CL BY 05451 ?

• \

00583

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 172

---

## Page 173

Viti

5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation

Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober.

The original

meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House

and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then

Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian

and then

later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mi.

Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always

possible that he might draw in the Agency. •

6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency

representative, I had allended various inter-agency mectings pre-

sided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms

that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-

perience.

Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split

between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis

one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly

passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission.

This

was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from

the Bureau.

pertinen

{James Angleton

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

SECRET

00584

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 173

---

## Page 174

MENOPANDU: FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

: Counter Intolligence Staff,

Police Group Activities

CEN-168

of the Deputy Director for operations tor activities

and

prograas involving assistance to foroin molicelsacurity

forces for the nurose

of exploitin: such activities and

prograns for intelligence nurvoses.

2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Pu:lic

Safeli

Hency for interational carcion ent (129/1)

and its

training facility, the International lolice leadery

(IP:) •

CIpe also administers

and smorvises Project

IDEN-I71

and its training pronrictory facility WEN-172

in audition, cI/po coordinates

a joint MelATO Tecinical

services Division, Contral Intelligence pency creter

Technical Investizations Course.

CI/PG provides guldance

and counsel to the ira?

nivisions in natters portainins

to police security functions

ana activities. Spocitic

details of those functions are as follows:

LIAISO WITH OPS/ID

CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a

daily basis and consists principally of:

A. exchange of infornation on IPA participants, some

of won later attend lDEN-172 courses

and who

are

of interest to Agency components,

B arranging for inclusion of lgency sponsored partici-

pants

in IPA/O"S/AlT

training prograns,

C.

arrangiar for It/eps/In tricfinas

and tours

foreimn police/security renresentatives

sponsore!

by ClA Area Divisions,

00593

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 174

---

## Page 175

-2

D. obtaining hiogranhic and

assessment data.on

IPA/OPS/AID trainces,.

Fo providing general information pertaining to

activities, equip-

operating conponents,

F. coordinating the agency's participation in the

Tecinical Investigations course desiined to

faniliarizo the trainces vith the tochnique

required to pronerly investirate terrorist

activitios wherein explosives have been utilized,

G. obtaining Ol'S/AlD cover for CIA personol to serve

abroad. At one time as rany as

50 CIA erployees

were covered in Latin Anerica, the Far Last

and

Africa. Tiis

total las

been reduced durin the

past several years to in serving in thailand,

1l. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID

sponsored narticizants.

PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPPIRTARY IOEN-172- 4ra111 runetion of :

IDEN-172 Training Academy is

sells pairs.

a cornercial interprise.

It was

incomorated under the laus of the State of caryinni gi

in 1753 and conducts its business

in the District of

colond1e. lt is engaged principally in trainins foreign

consuni

nolice/security nersonnel under an overt contract wit

SETTI:

and

salling police/security equipment to forcion

police/security personnel and organizations.IDEN-172 also

provides soccial

training prograns

and bricfings to

forein police/security versonncl of interest

to Agency

operating divisions. It provides biogranhic and assessnent

data

01l

trainces to

country dosts. RecentlyIDEN-172 has

acquired the capability of providing training to foreign

police/security personnel in VIP protective scurity

for Chiefs

of State.

* CIA porsonnel under this cover will not he replaced as

süch

and all will be phased out by June 1974.

00538

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 175

SOONET

---

## Page 176

-3 -

CO.TIEXT

• CI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison

with any lar entorcorent organization, local or tedcral,

at home or abroad.

Then

the necd arises, such contact is

sometimes

made on

our behalf by OPS/AID or DEN-172without

divulging agency interest.

OPS/AID has such contacts

at iome

and

airoad hecause of the

nature of its activitics

(training of forcin noiice security personnel at none

21 d

abroad), and its Pulic safoty nrograns around tc

world. IEN-172 has such contacts at hore - local and

federal lovel - hecause its personnel are personall!

acquainted with law enforcemont officors throughout the

United States. "ohhers of the DEN-172 staff (not identified)

as Cl! lave appeared

federal

institutions as

Secret Service, and the

U.S. Treasury Inforcement Division.

3. In addition to the liaison "entioned in tie

previous pararraon, tic

frency maintains liuison in varying

degrees with foreign police/security organizations through

its

field stations.

Tho

existenco

and

extent thercof,

hoverer, is a decision to so nado by tie irca civision,

and is not the rosponsibility of CI/P6.

4. The CI! station as a member of the Country Tean in

Monteriaco, Uruguay, may have had

sore contact with an

in riperienced

11h0 as

murdered to the thanatos.

Danitrione,

and respected law enforcenent officer, vas

a bona fide nis/ln ofticer assigned to the an mission

in Uruguay, and was nover a Cll employee or agent.

for ten are

ine lc ton

Chief,

Counter

Intelligence Staff

00593

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 176

CERST

---

## Page 177

SENSITIVE

s. cetizlies

=

SUBJECT: The NHCHAOS Program

The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program

I for

clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign

efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic

U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,

North Vietnam,

the Soviet Union, North Korea and the

Arab fedayeen.

2. - The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-

ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection

purposes. Agency efforts arc foreign. Foreign-oriented

activity in the United States has been of tio types:

a .

Selected FBI domestic

sources who travel

abroad in connection with their extremist activity

and/or affiliations

make

contact with hostilc

foreign powers or with forcign cxtremist groups

have

been briefed

and debricfed by caiquartois

officers.

The

bricting has

included appropriate

operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing

extremist creden-

tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and

dispatched abroad for PCS

assignnchts as contract

the F5i"

primarily sources offered

for

such use by

ilhen

abroad

they collect information re-

sponsive to MICHAOS program requirements,

as well

as other Agency icquirements.

They are

thus

used

prinarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Com-

munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-

ground and their particular access permits.

It

should be noted that the

UPTROIKI aspect of the

MPLODESTAR project of the

East Asia Division is

similar to the MICHAOS PROGRAi.

3. As indicated earlier, MCHAOS is a foreign pro-

gram, conducted overseas, except for the lunited activity

described above. The program is and has been managed so

as to achieve the maximum

feasible utilization of exist-

ing resources of the Operations Dircctorate.

No assets

starten

SENSITRE BRIARER SOURCES

AMB TAMMAND

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 177

00.502

-LISPOET CL DY0C12

SENSITIVE

SECRET

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## Page 178

NOTINNI

SENSITIVE

have been recuited and run exclusively for the MICHAOS

program.

Instead, emphasis has

been placed on the exploi-

tation of new and

old agency assets who have a by-product

capability or a concurrent capability for provision of

information responsive to the program's requirements.

This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-

tion requirements

and operational guidance.

This collec-

tion program is viewed as an

integral part of the

recruit-

ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam

Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet BloC Division opera-

tions and Korean Branch operations.

Agents who have an

American "Movement" background or who have known connec-

tions with the

American

agents to obtain biographic and personality

data, to dis-

cern possible vulncrabilities and susccutibilitics, and

to develop operationally exploitable relationships with

recruitment targets of the abore programs.

These assets

are of interest

to our

targets because of their connec-

tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."

Over

the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been

approximately to important areas of

operational interest

which at the present time have

been reduced to about ton:

Paris, Stockholm,

Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,

Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The MCHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-

tions,

two of which have

been implemented to cover

tar-

gets

of special interest.

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive

foreign operation.

!

Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive

Agency foreign operation.

i i

NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 178

SENSITIVE

SECRET

00593

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## Page 179

SENSITIVE

5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the

program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted

in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and

who appear to have extremist connections, interests

sackground are reported upon. Other individuals are re-

ported upon in response to

ments received from the FBI because such individuals are

the tone the sand at are -

of activo investigatory security interost to the FBI.

All cable and dispatch traffic related to the

MHCHAOS program is

sent via

restricted channels.

It is

not processed by either the Cable Sccretariat or the In-

tormation Services Division.

The control and retriev-

ability of infornation obtained, including information

received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-

cial Opcrations Group.

7.

Information responsive to specific FBI require-

ments is disseminated to the fBl via spocial controlled

dissemination channels, 1.e., by restricted handling cablo

cratiic or via special pouch

pouch na

memoranda.

and specially numbered blind

8. Information of particular significance, when col-

lected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over

the signature of the Director of Contral Intelligence to

the White liouse (Di. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as

to the Attorney General, the Sccrotary of State and the

Director of the FBI.

SENSITIVE

SECRET

00593

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 179

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## Page 180

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-

FR 73-183

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Foreign Resources Division Operational

Activities with Possible Flap Potential

FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May

1973, same subject

1.

The

answers

to your questions are as follows:

a.

Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer:

Yes, we recruit Americans to be

used as academic support assots and access agents.

These Americans are used for spotting and assess-

ment purposes only and do not perform any rccruit-

ments.

Paragraph 1. b. and l. c. are deleted

because they contain sensitive agency

operational methods and techniques.

SECRET/SEASITIVE

EZ IMPDET

CLBY: 057223

00613

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 180

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## Page 181

Silva

12/

d. Question: What is the arrangement re. recruiting

out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?

Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically

requires approval by the. ADDO or DDO for any

recruitment attempt made in the United States

against an American member of the academic

community or a foreign target attending an American

academic institution. This regulation is presently in

the process of revision in thai this approval authority

for academic recruitments in the United States is to

be delcgated to Chief, FR. The approval authority

for recruitment attempts against American students

outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief

of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions

at the present time are those precluding iccruitment

attempts against foreign students here in the United States

on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockcfeller or Fulbright.

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

- signed, IDEN-173

Acting Chief

Foreign Resources Division

00612

2/20037V8

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 181

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## Page 182

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FR 73-180

-

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Foreign Resources Division Operational

Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational

activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk

that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency.

We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with

our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under

the circumstances. There aïe cortain rather unusual activities in which

FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some-

what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed

these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

a. The New York Base provides a fairly considerable

amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the

Chinesc.

This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines

and MI.

Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other

than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base

personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of

money that has been expended in support of these efforts.

b. A CIA Officer

is to be assigned to FR Division. The

CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas

under deep

cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. This is the cor-

poration thai employed E. Howard Hunt. In discussions between

NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer

would

be pulled out

and reassigned in the United States.

FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.

E2 IMPDET

CL BY: 057223

006.1:1

SLORETSUNSITIVE

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 182

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## Page 183

SECRET/SENSITI

12!

We have concluded that the best solution is to have this

officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least

a year, working towards an advanced degree until there

has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan

to make no operational use of tie CIA Officer waïsoever,

during the period of time that he is attending the university.

Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the .

situation and decide the nesi course of action at that time.

Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the

existence of an audio opcration done by the FBI but with close

TSD support in San Francisco. This operation is directed

against IDEN-62.

I understand the operation has

been exceptionally well done.

However, the responsibility

for this activity has come from Chief, ISD in conjunction .

with SB Division.

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations

in the

IDEN-61

by the FBI. The equipment was pro-

duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no

CIA personnel have entered the premises. The operation was

deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however,

are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause

some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is

unlikely the finger would point to CIA.

00615

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 183

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## Page 184

SÊCRET

VIII. Coordination

A.

Internal

In developing its cadre of general support assets

and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact

with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for

Intelligence, using their assets wherever and

whenever

possible to support FR's operational activities.

To a

more linited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts with Office

of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives,

pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers

and using their entre to specific individuals who can

provide access to targets of operational interest.

B.

External

FR officers

in the field maintain coordination with

their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation

with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving

Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are

of occasional help in operations involving other nationals.

The local

field offices of the FBI are made aware of the

presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have

on

occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was.

some flap potential.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent

recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between

the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.

The Bases

also have contact with local Immigration

and Naturalization

Service offices although these contacts

are less frequent and less important than the contacts

with "the FBI offices.

SECRET

0003

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 184

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## Page 185

1 - Mr. Wannall (detached)

July 16, 1975

1 - Mr.

Mintz (detached)

1 - Ir. Hotis (detached)

SENATOR GARY W. HART 1 - Mx. Daly (detached)

1 - Mr. Cregar (detached)

1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)

Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney

General dated may 28, 1975, and signedby Senator Trapl

Church and Senator John C. Tower.

A review of the central files of the FBI revealed

that a file pertaining to your application for employnent

with the Department of Justice and a file which lists you as

the victin in a case involving the Congrossional Assassination

Statute are maintained by this Bureau.

Inclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the

Departmental Applicant file.

Certain data in this file is

exempt from public disclosure pursuant to the provisions of

Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) (2), (b) (5), and

(b) (7) (C) and (D). As I am sure you are aware,

these exemptions

allow cor the withholding of intormation related solely to the

internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; inter-

agency or intra-agency documents not available through discovery

proceedings during litigation; information which would constitute

an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of another

individual; and information which would disclose the identity

of a confidential source.

The other file pertains to an invostigation concerning

a threat against your life.

Although your name is carried in

the title throughout the file as the "victin," only a minimal

amount of information refers to you.

The file indicates that

the Denver Police Department received information that a

particular individual

was in Denver to kill you if you were

elected as United States Senator from Colorado on November 5,

1974; that the polls indicated you would be elected; that you

and your Denver Office were aware of this threat; that the

Denver Police Department afforded protection for you until you

departed Denver the morning of Novenber 6, 1974, for vacation

in Mexico; and that an Agent of this Bureau attempted to see

you to display a phocograph of the suspect, but was advised

by your assistant that the Denver Police Department had

I - The Atiorney Coneral

2 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attn :

Susan M. Hauser

Attn:

K. William O'Connor

(1,- Bufile 62-116395

/)

NOT RECORDED

SEE NOTE ON PAGE FWii to 10/6

jav:caj (14)

AT MOONATON

ORIGINAL FLEA

NIV 88246 Docld:32989624 Page 185

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## Page 186

Senator Gary W. Hart

displayed the photograph to you and you did not recognize the

suspect. For your intormation this is no longer an active

investigation as the unknown subject was not identified and

the original allegation was not corroborated.

Other than the

reasonably segregable portion of the references to you as set

forth above, this file is exempt from disclosure under the

provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5,

United States Code, Section 552 (b) (2) , (b) (5) and (3) (7) (C)

and (D) .

Also, our records contain two documents fron the

United States Department of Justice concerning you which have

been referred to the Attorney General.

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered,

it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the

Attorney General.

Enclosures (12)

7/16/75, captioned,

Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,

Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence Activities."

DRW :mlh.

Senator Hart is subject of favorable Department

Applicant file 77-93050.

He is the victim of a civil rights

case under the "Congressional Assassination Statute,"

Bufile 44-62521. Airtel from Denver dated 3/3/75, sets forth

info that Carbon County, Wyoming is in the process of filing

First Degree Murder charges against Thomas Eugene Creech

(Suspect of Bufile 44-62521) in connection with the murder

oI RidgLey stewart Mckenzie. Ascertained 6/11/75 from

Supervisor John Brockton, Denver, case closed or reasons

cited in instant letter.

The 58 pages being furnished to

Senator Hart are located in Bufile 77-93050.

- 2-

NIM 88296_ Docld:32989624 Page 186

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## Page 187

a es00 span 216

CECROS CV.

July 16, 1975

1 - lix, Wannall (detached)

1 - ME. Mintz (detached)

. - IIr. lotis (detached)

1

. - Mx. Daly (detached)

1

Nix. Cregar (dotached)

1 - HI. Farrington (detached)

SENATOR WALTER I. MONDALE

Reference is pade to the letter to the Attorney Cenoral

signed by Senator Izank Church and Senator John Tower dated

Ma 28, 1975.

A revies of the central files of the FBI revealed

the following rocordo portaining to you.

It is noted that you

have not boon the subject of an I'BI investigation; hovover, a

correspondence file pertaining to you has bech maintained since 1961+

Also, our recosus contain three investigative files

in which you are shown to have been the victim of an attemptcd

extortion.

Copies of excised documents from two of these files

arc enclosed.

The third file, comprisod of one hundred and eighty

three documents, includes six extortion lettors which you or

one of your ascistants furnishca tha IlI. in this regaro, your

office was adviced of the final disposition of this matter by

the FBI on February 10, 1971,

Although some of the documonts fron

this file aro subjcat to disclosuro, they are not being included

since you would be avare of the contents of thie data.

Additional inforation concerning you which is

containod in our contral records is exempt from disclosuro as

provicod by title 5,

• United States Code, Section 552 (b) (1),

(b) (2), (b) (b) (b) (G) , (b) (7) (C) and (D) • thesc exemptions

protect, respectively

mattors that are specifically authorized

under criteria established by an Executive Ordor to be kept

secres in the interest of national defense or foreion polloy;

information relating to the internal personnel, rulos/and

practices of this Bureau; inter-agency or intra-agages

memorandums or letters which would not be available

discovery proceedings during litigation; informacies ilk ay 1976

personnel file the disclosure of which would constitute a

clearly unvarranted invasion of porsonal privacy; Information

the disclosure of which would constituto an unwarranted invasion

of privacy of third parties; and the identity of and information

furnished by sources

pursuant to an assurance of confidentiality.

- The Attorney General

General

Attn: 1K. William O*Connor

/ Bufile 62-116395

Lam: dal (14) CONTINUED OVER

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 187

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## Page 188

Sextator Walter F. Mondale

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered,

it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney

Goneral.

Our records also revoaled à classified document from

the Depariment of state pertaining to you. We have referred

this documont to then with the request that they cormunicate

Enclosures (39)

NOTE:

See Director, FBI, to tho Attorney General memorandum

dated 7/16/75, captioned, "REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN TBI

FILES EX SENATORS GARY HART, WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, CHARLES

CC MATHTAS, WALEER E, LONDALE AND ROBERT MORGAN, MEMBERS OF*

THE U. S. SENATE SELECI COMMIITEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. "

Senator Mondale is the subject of Bufile 94-60489 and

is shown as a victim in Bufiles 9-44386; 9-52508; 9-54750

The original of excised documents released to the senator

in Bufiles 1-11800-3;5; 9-52508-1;2; 9-54750- 1;2;3; 61-3176-

4490; 62-89475-592; 62-100230-1; 92-0-3355; 94-60189-1;334;

5;6:7:8:9;10;11;12;13;14,15;16;17;19;20;21;22;100-435179-421

100-454565-463; 405-25263-1047: 1246x; 1413; 105-74565-2757(5)

157-4-33-A-Washington Post and Fines Herald

5-24-617157-7-6-43-25.

See memorandum Mr.

Mclarnott to Ix. Hannall dated 6/3/75,

and 6/19/75 regarding classified material pertaining to senator

Mondale exempted from disclosure.

Also sec ir. MoDermott to

Mx. Wannall memorandun dated 6/16/75 captioned

l "Congressman

Donald W. Riegle" regarding classification review of Bufile

0705-229897.

Serials 81_p.6; 114; 117 P. 2167 113; 140 ep 248;

143 Of Bufile 105-229897 refer to Senator Mondale.

By letter dated 5/14/75, CIA furnished 23 FBI documento

concerning Senator Mondale which they had surfaced in a review

of their files in connection with a FOIA request from Senator

Mondala to Mr. Colby, Director of CIA. SA I. II. Bresson

advised CIA by telephone of our pending request for information.

By letter dated 7/14/75 to Department of State reference

105-188989-8 was referred to then for action.

=2.0

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 188

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## Page 189

9170W

Per

Mr.

Farrington (detached)

1

-

Mx..

Wannall (detached)

Mr.. Mintz (detached)

1

-

Mr. Hotis (detached)

1 - Mr. Daly (detached)

Säly. 16, 1975

1 - Mr. Cregar (detached)

Sir.stricke

SE

HATOR ROBERT HORGAN

saferende lo nado to the letter to the

AttOrNey

teneral datad say 28, 1975, algned by

Sanators Frant Church and John G. Icar.

A review of the contral files of the IDI

revealad the folloning racords pertaining to you

unich ma are authorirad to ralease.

OEROY IALOTEALION

concerung you to axeapt, fror disclosure pursuant

to Title 5, United States Codo, seation 552 (b) (2),

and (b) (7) (C) and (D).

Thass axemptions allon the

withholding of natorial uniah talatas solely to the

intornal personnal rules and practices of an agenoy:

arampts 1n101mat10a the disclosure of which would

•constitute an unvarranted invasion of porsonal privacy

of talra parties; and axempts information which vonta

discloss the identity of a confidential source, and.

InformAtIon furnished undor circusatances of

confidentiality.

staor documenta in duI central recards

• raveal that shilo ln the officlal capaaitses of

Attorney General fox Morth Carolina and Judge 10x

Harnatt County, "oxEs Carolina, you vera one of tho

subjeots in thres Clull Rights Invastigationa

conducted in 1958, 1971, and 1973-

Hou saxe advinod

of the 1958 and 1973 investigations.

1ze 1971

Investigation vas rafarzad to the crlainal Division.

Departuant of Justice, for adjudication.

The oniy..

other rafaxencos concarniny you portain to a

6iv11 nights compluint in 1974, an extortion lotter

raceivad by you in 1970 throatoning covarnor Robert

soott, and inforsation regarding your realination

iron the difica os the Attorney General ol

Horth carolina to run for the united states Sanate:

1 • The Attorney General

2 - The Daputy Attorney General

Susan No Hauser

Attn: R. W1111an O'Connor

1 - Bufile 62-116395

Saw mlh (14)

Miltonis

1976

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 189 •

62-11639

NOT RECORDE

46 імАії 19 1976

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ід:

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## Page 190

Sonator Fabert sargan

If you wish to have any of the matorial

reconsidered it sould be apprupriata to discusa bla

matter vita the Attornay denaral.

Enctanures (13).

NOTE:

See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter

dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in

FBI files by Senators Gary' Hart, Walter D. Huddleston,

Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F

Mondale and Robert

Morgan, Members of the U. 'S. Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence Activities."

DRw:mlh-

Morgan is subject of Bufiles 44-13052, 44-50587,

44-57418 and 94-68460. He is also mentioned in eleven

other files.

These files contain no derogatory information;

and our relations with the

Senator have been cordial.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 190

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## Page 191

July 10, 1975

1 - Mix. Hannall (Detached)

fund food fond

. - Mx. Nintz (Decached)

. - NI. Lotis (Detachod)

. - Ix. Daly (Detachoü)

I - Ir. Crogar (Detached)

SELATOR UNIRER D. HCDDLESEON 1 - VI. Farrington

О

(Detached.)

Rofcronce is nade to the lotter to the

attorney General datod May 28, 1975, signed by Fenators

Frani: Church and John F. Lower.

A revior of the central files of the FBI

revcaled the enclosed Iccords pertaining to you.

Those

postions which have been doletna and the

renaindor of the

files are overne fron disclosure purcuant to the provisions

of the Frocio: of Incornation doi, Title 5, Unicor States

Code, foction 552 (1) (2) , (0) (5), and (b) (7) (C), (D) ano (F) .

#MORIG

МОЗМ

100

INDEN 390

DA22 L4

subsection (b) (2) ester pts docurents which relate

solely to the

Internal Illes anc

practices of our agency.

Subsection (b) (5) exenpts inter-agency and intra-agency

retoranda the disclosure of which vould have a dotrimental

offeat upon the developent of rolloy, quicance and aoini

strative dircotion.

Subsoccions (5) (7) (C), (D) and (E)

allow withholding infomation the disclosure of thich

vould constitute an unterranted invasion of perconal

privacy of those individuals interviced or rontioned

during the courso of an investigation; roveal the identity

of and infornation furnished by confidential sources; and

üivulge investigative tochniques and procedurco.

If you wish to have any of the ratorial

reconsiderod, it vould bo appropriato to discus. this

ratter wich the Nctorney Ceneral.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The attorney Gencral

2 - The Deputy Attorney Cenerol

Attention: I. William O'Connor

Attention: Juson 11. Hauser

6a-111.595-

NOT RECORDED

Bufile 62-116395

46 MAR 19 1976

see note bage 2.

BI MAR 78)

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 191

ORIGINAL SUED AL

---

## Page 192

Senator Walter D. Huddleston

NOTE: See Director, FPI, to the Attorney General memorandum

dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI Files

By Senators Cary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,

Walter F. liondale and

Robert Morgan, Members

of the U. S. Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRWinlh.

Senator Huddleston is identical with subject of

Bufiles 166-5980, 94-67291, and 94-1-676-300. Huddleston

was contacted by Bureau liaison to offer any assistance

to the newly elected Senator, which is standard. Bureau policy.

Huddleston's Ixecutive Assistant called the Congressional

Service Office on 1/9/75, and requested a speaker from the

FBI to address the Kentucky Chamber of Commorce Convention.

speaker granted.

Huddleston was alleged to have taken a

bilbe of

$15,000 while he was a State Senator in Kentucky.

Several persons approached him to find out if they could

establish a bank charter. His supposed reply was that this

could be acconplished for a certain amount of money.

bank charter was eventually established and one of the

individuals who originally approached him, hand-carried the

$15,000 in cash to him at his office.

On 9/5/73, the

Department advised the FBI that it desired no more invest-

igation in this case at that time.

Senator Huddleston was

never interviewed regarding this matter. Excised documents

taken fron 94-67291-3,2,1; 34-1-676-300; and 166-5980-9,7,5,1,

and 1.

KNA 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 192

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## Page 193

ALI INFORMATION CONTAIZe

FERTIN IS UNALASSITE HIS

KENNE SHONE SIRN54

Mr.

Wannall (detached)

- Mr. Mintz (detached)

1

-. Mr.

Hotis (detached)

- Mr. Daly (detached)

1

- Mr. Cregar (detached)

. - Mr. Farrington (detached)

July 16, 1975

AmDR 16 11/21/00

CLASSINED BY SPRA

DEGLASSIFY ON: 25X

Senateli

JEUTATOR CHARLES NEC. PATHJAS, IR.

A revies of the central files of the PI has been

conducted to locate records pertaining to you in accordance

with the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 1975,

aigned by senators Frank Church and John G. ToMer.

Enclosed is one copy sach of 52 documents fron our

f1108.. The delations shich have been nado vere based on the

Freedon of InfoxIAtiOn Act.

Additional information concerning you which is

contained in our central Iecords lE AxeNpt fICH disOlOsUre as

provided by fitle 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) (1).

(b) (2). 16) 65)- (59 17) () and (5) (7) (D) .

These exerptiona

allow withholding. of infornation classifled pursuant to

recutive order, inforuation related solely to the interna

rules and practices of this agency, Inforation vithin the

category of Intra-agency manoranca not avallable through

Ciscovery proceedings during litigations Infornation the

Asclosure of which could constitute an unvarranted invasion

of the personal privacy.of a third party; and the identity

of and Information furalahed by Inaluiduals under circum

stances of confidentlality.

Also, our records cantain tro doctmants fron the

United States Departnent of Justice concerning you which have

boon referred to the Attorney General.

If you wish to have any of the natarial reconsidered

It would bo appropilate to discuss this matter with the Attorney

GeREIaI

ERClOSUTES (52)

I - Attorney General

2 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: Susan M. Hauser

Attention: R. W111lam O'Connor

Bufile 62-116395

62-116375

NOT RECORDED

40 MAR 19 1976

hann: rar

(14)

61 MAR 2 3 1976

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 193

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## Page 194

Wala.

(G)

SENATOR CHARLES MC CURDY MATHIAS

NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney Ceneral letter

dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI

Files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles

McCurdy Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members

of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,"

DRW:mlh.

Mathias is the subject of the following Bufiles:

9-45767

"Victim, Extortion"

(3 serials); 9-47912

"Victim,

Extortion" (4 serials); 94-49643 "Victim, Extortion-Racial

Matters" (5 serials); 9-5343? "Victin, Excortion" (3 serials);

56-5105 "Possible Violation of Title 18, USC 602 and 603,

Election Laws" (3 serials); 89-2560 "Possible Victim, Congres-

sional Assassination" (5 serials); and 94-54474 "R-Maryland"

(13 serials).

He is

being furnished excised copies of the

following references:

9-53432; 9-45767; 9-47912; 56-5105;

94-54474;

62-96529-268; 5-0-1861; 7-16021-6; 47-52807-2;

62-116270-7; 65-74060-765; 91-1-32555-148; 174-3-6723; 94-

37990-101; 100-443916-278; 89-2560; 64-29833-345-188; 65-

740G0-589, 1168, and 1276. U. S. Secret Service documents

are being

given per Robert Goit on 6/26/75, with "No objection

From USSS," 9/49543-1 and 4. I. Miller, CIA Legal Office,

contacted SA D. R. Willians 7/15/75 concerning FBI LHMS

(dated 12/13/67 re Kerekes, "IS-HU"; 2/6/69 re Bubnov,

"IS-R";

2/18/70

re Soviet Diplomatic accivities, "IS-R"; 4/17/70

re Romanian Diplomatic Activities in the United Scates, "IS-

Romania"; and 6/8/72 re Peoples Republic of China Mission)

maintained in their files, they are in general terms referring

to documents in CIA response to Senator lathias.

He was

advised our review will cover these documents.

Mathias is also

700-575-6-51, (-05-1884219.6 55-36333-120, 135-22980--577 (S)

ер.136, 105-10828-1970, 89-2560, 65-74060-1205 p.49, and

95-45505-24. Justice Department documents contained in 56-

5105-1 and 62-115695-4 are being referred.

Per addendum to

memo from Mr. McDernoti to Mr. Wannall dated 6/19/75

the (5) (1) exemption is

being utilized.

-2-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 194

---

## Page 195

TO

FROM :

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

JULIE

1373 EDITION

DESA FPMR 141 CPRI 101-11.8

• UNITED STATES GOVERDMENT

Memorandum

Deputy Attorney General

William O'Connor

Director Kelley®

Douglas Marvin

Senated, $75

• disoc. Dir. -

- 819

DATE: July 16, 1975

WsP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINID

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 102/00

with the Sente select commoted procedure for dealing

11:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 17.

considered. go

review of Materil

Attachment

Döp. AD.

Dop. AD ing

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. ¿

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

Laborato

egal d

Plan. & Elal.

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Telophone Rm. -

Director Sec'y-

+6216-395-424

AUG 5 1975

63-116395

I ENGLOSURE

= 1000

IXeroy made and given to Mr 99-755

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1517-75 edm

NW 88296- Docld:32989624 Page 195

---

## Page 196

PROPOSED PROCEDURE

FMDR16

AZZ ERRORIA ON CONTANA

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFTED

PATT 112|00 BYSP-2 ALMI11E.

(1)

The Committee will request those documents to which it

wishes

access.

(2) The Department will furnish access to those matters

requested to:

(a)

the members of the Committee where it is deter-

(b)

mined by the Attorney General that the matters

are peculiarly sensitive;

in all other cases, the appropriately cleared

staff will have access

to the materials.

(3).

The Committee staff

shall select those documents which

it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and

necessary for the examination of witnesses or the

(4)

(5)

establishment of certain facts during the course of

the inquiry.

These documents may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171

of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as

deemed appropriate by the staff.

The notes will be left in the secure room of the Hoover

Building during the study.

(6) Upon completion of the study, the staff can prepare a

summary of the information which it considers appropriate

for Committee use.'

(7)

The summary will be checked with senior Bureau executives

to ensure the protection of national security matters,

confidential

sources of information and interests of

-474

MMY 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 196

---

## Page 197

-2-

individuals in privacy. Thereafter, the summary may

be removed

to the Committee's office and all the

staff notes will be destroyed. The original documents

may be referred to as extensively as necessary to

check the summary.

(8) The Committee staff shall designate those documents that

it wishes to make copies of for transfer to the

Committee's offices. Before the copies of the docu-

ments are taken to the Committee's offices, appropri-

ate excisions of the documents will be made. If an •

agreement cannot be reached at the staff level with

respect to the appropriate

excisions, the matter shall

be taken to the Attorney General and the Committee.

---

## Page 198

TO

JEROM

SUBJECT

:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. CALLAHAN

DATE:

J.

ADAMS

дла

REQUEST BY VARIOUS SENATORS ON

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW

THEIR FBI FILES

7/24/75

Туі)

yalt

Assoc. Dir. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Sybs._

com. *

At Com. T

Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell. _

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Tolon

Rm. _

Director Sec'y -

At the meeting between Mr. Kelley and the Attorney

General, along with their respective staffs on 7/21/75, the Attorney

General determined that there should be broad disclosure of material

in the files of those Senators on the Senate Select Committee requesting

access to same and that in the main the Bureau should only restrict

access to revelation of live informants or information which would

reveal the identity of live informants. In addition, he indicated that

in his review of the file on Senator Hart he noted certain derogatory

information on relatives which he felt Senator Hart should not see.

AlSO, there may be criminal investigations against one of the Senators

of such a nature that revelation should be restricted.

It was agreed that Deputy Assistant Attorney General

O'Connor and I should review the files in order to determine problem

areas and Mr. O'Connor would consult vite hase Tylor as sea

413

Files have been reviewed and there is general agreement

that almost all of the information can be revealed with certain limited

excisions taking care of problem areas. Mr. O'Connor advised On

7/24/75 that he has been in touch with the Committee and they will make

arrangements to come to my office and review their fifes Alemy presence

along with Mr. O'Connor. Senator Goldwater has added his name to the

list and Mr. McDermott has been advised in order to insure all pertinent

material is accumulated.

1/5

ACTION:

Sett

None. Information only.

noc

1 - Mr. McDermott

FMDR16

ATT. TTORHATION CONTAINED

5/0/2/0015 SP 2A4M/776

• 4 AUG 5 1975

VW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 191

---

## Page 199

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. CALLAHAN

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

FROM

SUBJECT

:

SENSTUDY 75

10/23/00.

7/29/75

SPaMM/ITE

After

In compliance with instructions of Mr. J. B. Adams

as relayed through SA S. F. Phillips, there are attached hereto

Field Inspector's Manual #763 and Headquarters Inspector's Manual

are currently charged to sente Be Cet Com and shoT be ee manual

from his property record.

RE COMMENDATIONS:

Division to tea ores the manuals be not se to ete meigen

representatives.

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gon. Inv.

Ident.

WRe apoction

siboratory

/ Legal Coun. _

Plan, & Eval. —

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Telophone Rm. -

Director Sec'y _

Del. to

2. That it also be routed to the Administrative Division

for semoval of the manuals trom sa Gret a proberty peon 422

Enclosures

9 AUG 5 1915

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

FBG:wM]

(6)

PaM

680116391

¿TE INVOPIATION CONTAURE

1975 песизв

NW 88296 Boeld: 32989624 Page 199

---

## Page 200

gB..

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2675

28 July 1975

recd from Cia 1/315-

=75.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating

. Group

SUBJECT

: Select Committee Requests

Attached for your information are four requests, two of

which are levied on the Central Intelligence Agency, one on

the Department of Defense and one on the Internal Revenue Servicer

The Central Intelligence Agency requests are dated July 22 and 25.

The request to the Department of Defense is July 22, and the

Internal Revenue Service request is dated July 9.

P

62-111-395-

471

Harriet Theret o AUG 55 1975

Harriett D. Mowitt

Executive Secretary

Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

on Congressional Review

Attachments:

a/s

thest as oreginal

#MORIG

PECCCONZARTED

112t0°

SEZAm46 62-116595

84 AUG 5 1975

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Pagé 200

---

## Page 201

'OTIS &. PIKE

FIRST DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTER:

LYMYS AND MEANS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Clashington, 2.C. 20515

2128 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.G. 20515

AREA CODE 202

§ TELEPHONE: 225-3826

MRS. BETTY ORR

OFFICE MANAGER

DISTRICT OFFICE:

209 WEST MAIN STREET

RIVERHEAD, NET YORK 11901

TELEPHONE: 727-2332

July 22,

1975

#m DR 16

Mr. William E. Colby

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

10123/0.

Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby: •

As Chairman of the House Select Committee on

Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Cormittee

be furnished with copies of all documents and materials

provided to the Senate Select Committee to study Govern-

mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

I would like to make a priority request for

all documents and materials related to budgetary authority

and procedures, all budget information for the past 15

years, and any General Counsel's opinions of the authority,

mandate, or charter of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Until such time as the materials can be delivered to the

Committee, I request that arrangements be made for the

Committee staff to review them at the Agency.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much

appreciated.

Sincerely,

This i

Otis G.

Pike

Chairman

62-110395

NNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 201

ENCLOSURE

411

---

## Page 202

PHANE CALINCH, PONIO, CHAIRAIN "

"R'IN D, TOWER, TEXAS, VICÉ CHASIMMAN

TEMS. MONOALE, SINN.

TER D, AUDIOLESTON, KY.

# 6688424081. Ps.C.

1X1918, COLD.

DIANAY COLUIVATIN, AMIT.

CHAMLES SIGG, 81N711A5, 3182 MU.

• PALESAM GO MILLER, STAFF IMECTOR

DCI/0/5-8663

Asite notates Berate

SELECT COMMITTLETO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(FURSUINT TO S,HES, 21, 917H CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 25, 1975

Mr. Fres

ripn. Belter

Laves -

REVIEW STAFF

75-2027

Mx. Walter Elder

Central Intelligence Agency

Langley, Virginia

Dear Walt:

This is to confirm our telephone conversation of July 25, 1975;

in which I conveyed to you the requests of the Senate Select Committee

for full and complete information on the folloving topics:

: 1.

...

Any financing by CIA, direct or indirect, of U.S.-.

owned, including proprietaries, domestic or foreign

media; including but not limited to books, articles,

publishing houses, ilms, IV programs, scholarly

Journals, magazines and news services.

.2..: Full and complete information, direct or indirect

•CIA use of United States citizens who are news

paper me, journalists, movie, tV or any other

persons connected with the nedia in any way.

3..

Full and complete information on the direct or in-

direct involvement of the CIA with U.S. citizens who

were connected directly with religious groups, including

churches and missionaries, with activities or relation-

ships in foreign countries.

With kind regards,

# mpR 16

SPZALMHATE

Sincerely,

Bell.

William G. Miller

42-16395-471

• ENCLOSURE

NM: 88296.

Doi

---

## Page 203

HEY YOKK

WIRHITTEKE

AYS AND MEANS

Congress of tie United States

House of Repeesentatives

Clashington, A.C. 20515

WAOMINATON. D.C.

2051J

TELETHONE: 228-3026

MAB. BETTY O11R

OFFICE MAILDIN

DISTRICT OFFICTI

209 WEST MAIN STHEET

FIVERHEÄD, NEW YOuR 11001

TELETIONEs 727-8.332

DC1/1075-3-658

July 22, 1975

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger

Secretary of Defense

The Pentagon

Washington, D. C.

10123/00

"SPU ALMIE

Dear Mr. Schlesinger:

As Chairman of the House Select Committee on

Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee

with copies of all documents and materials

provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-

mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities;

Security Agency, the Defense

Intelligence Agency, and Armed Services intelligence

components.

I would like to make a priority request for all

documents and materials related to budgetary authority and

procedures for the past 15 years, and any General Counsel's

opinions of the authorities, mandates, or charters of the

National

Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence. Agency,

or Armed Services intelligence components. Until such time

as these materials can be delivered to the Committee, I

request that arrangements he made for members of the Com-

mittee staff to review them at the respective agencies.

appreciated.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much

Sincercly,

Otis

bite

Pike

Chairman

10968

62-116385-471

ENCLOSURE

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 203.

---

## Page 204

aski

FHIRIN A. MAMT, МІСН.

SALTERY, MONDALE, MIHY.

SYALTEND, MIDDLESTON, KY.

HOMER: H'ONGAN, N.C.

HOWAND I. UAKER, SR., TE

NAHHY COLOMATER, AMIZ.

CHARLAS МС С. МАТНІЛУ, З

MICHANO S. OCHWINCH, YA

MILLIAM O, MILLER, ETAFE DIRECTOR

БАГОЇНІСК А. О. SCH, ІН., СНІСМ COUNSEL

CURTIS A, EMOTHERS, MINOMNITY COUNSEL

#MDRIG

10/23/00

SP-LAIM|ITG

Writes Biates Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY, GOVEKNMENTAL OVERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. MES, 21, 86TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 9, 1975

DCI/IC 75-2608

an as tel

Mx: Thomas V. Glynn

Assistant to the Commissioner

Internal Revenue Service

Washington, D.C. 20224

Dear Tom:

19%5

We would appreciate your advising the Select

committee of the following regarding possible. IRs

participation in or furnishing information to the Intelli-

gence Evaluation Committee:

1) whether the IRS had a

was such

information, if any, IRS furnished to IEC. We request

that the IRs identify for inspection and copying by the

Select Committee staff all documents relating to or

constituting information furnished by IRs either

directly to IIC or furnished to persons in the Treasury

Department of elsewhere which was ultimately provided to

• IEC.

The Committee has reason to believe that at a

March 26, 1971, meeting of the IC, Mr. Eugene I. Rossides,

then Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury,

Enforcement and Operations Division, was introduced to the

IC as the person responsible for, inter alia, intelligence

gathering by IRS, and that he would be called upon to make

contributions from that source to the Committee's work.

come forward with all

o got us at pacion a the not the te to 5

KINGLOSURE,

bi2 1163-75-411

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 204

---

## Page 205

Mr. Thomas V. Glynn

•Page two

July 9, 1975

Mr. Arthur Jefferson of the Select Committee

staff is the individual primarily concerned with the

investigation of IIC and will be in touch with you soon

xegarding the development of the requested information.

Sincerely

Arthur

w. Harrigan, Jr.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 205

---

## Page 206

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Adams-Encs.

1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.

1 - Mr. Cregar-Encs.

1 - Mr.

Wannall-Encs.

July 21, 1975

1 - Mr. Hotis-Encs.

1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVEENMENTAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

**X.

EmpR16

.. 1012/00

SPZALMIZTE

During the executive sescion of captioned Committee

on July 16, 1975, members of that Committee requested that they be

furnished answers to the following questions:

(1) How are files established on Congressmen?

(2) How long are such files maintained?

(3) Who has access to the Congressional files and

"official and confidential files!!?

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to the above-

mentioned questions. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for

your records.

delivered

Enclosures (2)

02-11

-170

Cesame

62-116395

9 AUG 5 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: I. William O'Connor

Assoc. Dir..

Special Counsel for

Dep. AD Adm. -

Intelligence Coordination

Dep. AD Inv. _

ttee 7/24/75

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

NOTE: The attachment to the enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled!

Comp. Syst. — "FBI Information-Gathering Practices with Respect to Members of Congress"

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com,

was prepared in conjunction with the appearance of the Attorney General and

Gen. Inv..

Ident.

the Director before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights

Inspection

*Nof the House Judiciary Committee. This statement is responsive to questions

Intell.

Laboratory=

(1) and (2). Question (3) was answered in coordination with Files and Communi-

Plon. & Eval. -

cations Division.

spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

"VD: aKkg (10)

1184113

TELETYPE UNIT

0 954-546

NW 88296_Docld:32989624 Page 206

---

## Page 207

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

Juty 21, 1075

1 - Mr. Daly

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COLMITTEL

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OFITATIONS

WITE SUSPACT TO IFALLICENCE ACTIVITIES (55C)

During the agpearance before the SSC on Lday 10, 1975,

the following questions were asked by members of that Subcommittee:

(1) How are files established on Congressmen't

(2) How long are such files maintained?

(3) Tiho has access to the Congrossional files and

"official and confidential files!!?

Attached is a responce to questions one and two and,

in part, question three. With regard to that portion of question three

concerning aceces to the official and confidential files, be adviced that

these files are maintained in the Special File Room of the Federal Dureai

of investigation, Fileo and Communications Division. Aceces to these

files is strictly limited and thoce only having a necessity for access may

revior these files. A log is maintained as to who has aecess to the

official and confidontial files.

Inclosire

62-116395

1 - The Attorney General

IMDRIE

MH.0744491.

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. _

Dep. AD Inv. -

isst. Dir.

Admin. -

Comp. Syst..

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. ..

Ident..

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

disi

- PVD: dkg (9)

Plan. & Eval. _

Spoc. Inv..

Training

Logal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAlL ROOM

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 207

TELETYPE UNIT E

for

gril

GPO 954-345

---

## Page 208

FBI INFORMATION-GATHERING PRACTICES

WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

There is a total of more than 6,500,000 files at

FBI Headquarters.

Most of these contain information gathered

during investigation of matters--including some 100 types of

criminal, security, and applicant-employee cases--assigned to

the FBI by laws of Congress, directives of the President, and

orders of the Attorney General.

" the Attorney benera:

The remainder of these more than 6,500,000 files

include:

(1) Personnel files regarding FBI applicants.and

employees;

(2)

General files regarding FBI contacts and

dealings with a variety of individuals and

organizations concerning matters that do

not require of involve FBI investigation; and

: (3)

Administrative-type files, such as those of a

policy nature, those containing statistical

reports, those detailing FBI cooperative

services, and the like.

An unknown, but extremely small, percentage of

these more than 6,500,000 FBI files contain information

regarding present or former Congressmen ana Senators which

mays have been accumulated prior to, during, or after their

tenure in Congress.

WHAT FBI FILES CONTAIN ON CONGRESSMEN:

FBI Files contain substantially the same types of

information regarding Senators and Congressmen as is contained

in them about other citizens.

Basically this information falls

into the following categories:

Violations of Law

(1)

Allegations that Congressmen or Senators have

violated Federal. laws within the FBI's jurisdiction.

"TOREIN IS UNCHAGSIFTED

10/2/00 BYSP-LAIMETE

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 208

ENCLOSURE

62-116375

410

---

## Page 209

The FBI investigates such allegations whether they

relate to Members of Congress or any other person.

The

results of these investigations are furnished to United States

Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department

of Justice. The investigation may establish (a) that the

Congressnan or Senator has, in fact, violated a Federal law,

(b) that a Federal law has been violated, but that the involve-

ment of the Congressman or Senator in that violation cannot be

established, (c)

that a Federal law has been violated, but

that the Congressman or Senator clearly had no involvement

in its violation, or (d) that no violation of Federal law

was

committed.

Included among such allegations involving Congress-

men and Senators have been the following types of violations

within the FBI's jurisdiction: Bank Fraud and Embezzlement;

Conflict of Interest; Conspicacy to Obstruct Justice; Election

Laws; Fraud Against the Government; and Interstate Transporta-

tion

in Aid of Racketeering.

(2) Violations of Federal laws within the FBI's

jurisdiction involving Congressmen and Senators as victims.

The results of FBI investigations of such violations

are furnished to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecu-

tive officials of the Department of Justice.

the original complaint in these cases

In many instances,

is received from the law-

maker-victim himself; however, if the information originates

elsewhere, the FBI promptly notifies the Congressman or. Senator

involved of the threat which has been made.

In addition; other

law enforcement agencies which have a legitimate interest in

these cases are notified of the threat.

Violations of the Congressional Assassination, Kid-

naping and Assault Statute, Bomb Threats, and Extortion

are

among the crimes within the

FBI's jurisdiction which have

involved lawmakers as victims.

(3) Allegations that members of the staffs of

Congressmen or Senators have violated Federal laws within the

FBI'S

jurisdiction, or that these staff members have been

victims of such violations.

The FBI investigates such allegations and furnishes

the results to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecutive

officials of the Department of Justice. Where appropriate, the

Congressman or Senator involved is also advised of the investi-

gation.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 209

12:

---

## Page 210

Congressmen and Senators may be interviewed by the

FBI in these cases involving Congressional aides--just as they

may be interviewed in connection with other types of FBI

investigations--and both the fact of, and the results of,

such interviews are noted in the file reflecting the FBI

investigation.

(4) Allegations that Senators or Congressmen have

violated laws within the jurisdiction of other investigative

agencies.

These allegations are brought to the attention of

the agency concerned--Federal, state, or local. Such allega-

tions are not investigated by the FBI. However, the coopera-

tive services of the FBI Laboratory, Identification Division,

and National Crime Information Center are available to other

law enforcement agencies in the investigation of these, as

well as other, crimes.

Applicant Investigations

(5)

Present and former Congressmen and Senators

often are considered for positions in the Executive or

Judicial Branches of the Federal Government which require

that the FBI conduct a thorough background investigation

of them.

Dependent, upon the nature of the position involved,

the results of these investigations are furnished to the White

House, the Department of Justice, and/or other appropriate

Government agencies.

• (6) Congressmen and Senators often are interviewed

in the course of applicant-type investigations regarding

other persons who are being considered for Executive or

Judicial positions--as well as during applicant-type investi-

gations conducted by the FBI (at the request of the Committee

chairman involved) concerning staff members of a limited

number of House and Senate Committees. Both the fact of, and

the results of, the interview of the Congressman or Senator

are noted in the file reflecting the FBI's investigation.

Security Cases

(7) Either prior to, during, or subsequent to their

tenure in Congress, there may be files pertaining to security-

type matters which

relate to members of the House and Senate,

or Congressmen may be identified in FBI files as actual or

intended victims of acts by subjects of security-type cases.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 210

*5/p474=

---

## Page 211

The Statutes covering such matters are Title 18, Section 2383

'(Rebellion and Insurrection), Title 18, Section 2384

(Seditious

Conspiracy), and Title 18, Section 2385 (Smith Act -

Advocating overthrow of Government by force) .

Oral or Written Contact

(8) An unknown number of FBI files contain copies

of correspondence between the FBI and Congressmen and Senators

concerning a wide variety of matters which include bills

pending in, or passed by, Congress; personnel matters; the

Bureau's cooperative services; and

FBI policies, procedures,

and investigations. Many of these letters from Congressmen

anã Senators have been prompted by inquiries which these

lawmakers have received from constituents or other interested

citizens.

The FBI's files also contain memoranda regarding

telephone calls and personal contacts the FBI has had with

Congressmen and Senators regarding the above-cited variety

of matters.

Miscellaneous Information About Congressmen

(9) An unknown number of FBI files contain informa-

tion reflecting

favorably or unfavorably upon the character,

integrity, and loyalty of Senators and Congressmen--which

information does not require investigative action at the time

received on the part of the FBI or other law enforcement

• agencies. It consists of:

(a) Information contained in unsolicited letters

received by the FBI from persons and organi-

zations representing a variety of backgrounds,

viewpoints, and walks of life.

(b)

Information volunteered orally to FBI Agents by

the same broad range of individuals and organi.-

zations as cited directly above.

(c)

Newspaper Clippings, as well as data from

magazines and

other

news dissemination media.

(d)

Miscellaneous information received from FBI COn-

fidential informants and/or other sensitive sources.

- 4-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 211

---

## Page 212

Fingerprints of Congressmen

(10 )

The files of the Identification Division

contain the fingerprints of an unknown number of Senators

and Congressmen.

Some of these relate to their having been

arrested for violations of Federal, state, or local laws.

Others are noncriminal in origin and largely pertain to

their having served in the Asmed Forces or having been appli-

cants for various positions.

These fingerprint cards have

been submitted to

the FBI by Federal agencies, as well as by

local, county, and state criminal justice agencies, throughout

the United States.

Fingerprint records are maintained by the FBI's

Identification Division, and they are kept entirely separate

and apart from all other files and records of the FBI.

HOW INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN REACHES FBI FILES:

There are two basic types of information regarding

Congressmen and

• Senators in FBI files:

(1) Information which the FBI has solicited during

investigations involving the Congressman or Senator as either

a subject or a victim.

This includes information of

pertinence to the case which the lawmaker himself has

furnished to the FBI.

(2) Unsolicited Information.

there are many sources of the unsolicited information

that is included in FBI files:

(a)

It is volunteered by citizens who are being

interviewed during investigations of matters

having no relationship to any of our Nation's

Lawmakers.

(b)

It is volunteered in communications sent to the

FBI by individuals and organizations.

(c) It is included in news articles and

other reports

publicly disseminated by our Nation's news media

which come to the FBI's attention.

(d)

It is received from FBI confidential informants

and, very infrequently, from telephone taps not

directed at a Congressman which have been

installed with authority of a Federal Court

and/or authority of the Attorney General.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 212

-"I"

---

## Page 213

(e) In the case of information contained on finger-

print cards, it is sent to the FBI's Identifica-

tion Division by authorized contributors,

including criminal justice agencies throughout

the United States.

HOW AND WHERE INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN IS MAINTAINED:

Information regarding Congressmen ana Senators is

included in the official FBI files--totaling more than

6,500, 000 in number--that are maintained by the Files and

Communications Division on an upper floor of the J. Edgar

Hoover FBI Building.

The area where these files are maintained is staffed

and supervised 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assure

continuous security.

General Index

The essential key to the effective use of these FBI

files is the Bureau's General Index which consists of 58

million index cards and which is located on a different floor

from the files themselves in the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.

To determine what files (if any at all) contain information

regarding an individual Senator or Congressman, it is

necessary to search the name of that lawmaker in the General

Index.

The General Index is staffed and supervised 24 hours

a day, 7 days a week, to assure continuous security.

Rules Governing Use of Files

These official FBI files are available only to FBI

personnel--and they are available on a "need-to-know" basis

only.

The Files and Communications Division maintains a

record of files that have been charged out by Headquarters

personnel.

Such files must be returned to the Files and

Communications Division as

soon as possible; and during the

period that a file is charged out, it cannot be left even

momentarily in an unlocked room.

If retained overnight,

the file must be kept in a

• locked cabinet inside a locked

room.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 213

---

## Page 214

The charge-out record is temporary in nature and

is destroyed five days after the file has been returned to

the Files

and Communications Division.

WHY THE FBI RETAINS INFORMATION REGARDING CONGRESSMEN:

The information regarding Congressmen and Senators

that is maintained in FBI files can be divided into three

major categories:

(1) The results of investigations (criminal-,

security, and applicant-type) involving a Congressman or

Senator as a subject or victim;

(2) Information regarding a Congressman or Senator--

in addition to that gathered during investigation(s) of the

lawmaker involved--which the FBI has disseminated to other

Federal agencies (such as to the Internal Revenue Service if, for

example, the information involves a tax-related matter) and/or to

state and local law enforcement agencies (such as the police

department covering the lawmaker's home community if, for example,

the information involves an alleged threat against the lawmaker's

house or other property; and

(3) Other information that. the FBi receives from,

or receives about,

a Congressman or Senator that is included

in the FBI's files--without having been either investigated

or disseminated by the FBI.

The reasons this information is retained in FBI

files can be explained in legal and administrative terms,

as well as in practical terms.

Legal and Administrative Reasons

All investigative files and other records of the

FBI involving Congressmen.or Senators are within a class

of records which-under the FBI Records Retention Plan

developed in 1969 by the National Archives and Records

Service of the General Services

Administrationare con-

sidered of enduring archival value to ensure their preser-

vation.

This FBI Records Retention Plan was prepared under

the authority contained in the Federal Records Act of 1950,

which is contained in Title 44 of the United States Code.

- 7-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 214

---

## Page 215

Included among the FBI records to be retained

under the Records Retention Plan formulated by the National

Archives and Kecords Service are those which would have

historical value and would document policies, procedures,

functions, legislative and budget matters, and the like--

and reports of investigations of both civil and criminal

activities, including "crimes involving, and other records,

concerning, the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the

United States, members of and delegates elected to the

Congresses of

the United States, cabinet heads, judges and

other officials appointed by the President."

In "'stablishing the FBI Records Retention Plan,

the National Archives and Records Service noted, "Ordinarily

the records of a Federal agency that are worthy of permanent

retention amount to a cather small percentage of the total

volume of records generated.

Many of the records produced

by the Federal. Bureau of Investigation, however, relate to

a number of controversial if not important aspects of the

history of the United States, particularly to the role of

the Federal Government in its relation to its citizens.

To be sure,

many years will pass before these records can

be made available to the public for historical and other

sérious research. Nevertheless, the archival value of these

recoras will nut decrease nor will interest in them dissipate."

In addition, the FBI is also required by the

Federal Recorus Act to make records containing adequate and

proper documentation of its administration and operations

which, among lither things, are designed to furnish informa-

tion necessary to protect the legal and financial interest

of the Governient and of persons directly affected by FBI

activities.

Practlval Reasons for Retaining Information

Logic, reason, and lessons learned from more than

six decades o! law enforcement experience dictate that the

FBI should maintain records of investigations it has conducted

(category #1 cited at the top of page 7) and records of

information it has disseminated to other agencies (category #2

on page 7) .

Such records enable the FBI to answer questions or

challenges (incluäing those arising in judicial or administra-

tive proceedins) involving investigations FBI Agents have

conducted and,r information the FBI has disseminated io other

n8 c

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 215

---

## Page 216

1

agencies.

Such records also enable the FBI to furnish additional

copies of investigative reports or other information that has

been disseminated-should additional copies be needed by the

original recipients or by other official agencies.

Furthermore,

the information contained in these files often proves of

assistance in future investigations.

Less obvious may be the reasons why the FBI retains

the third category of information about Congressmen and

Senators (data that has neither been investigated nor

disseminated by the FBI) cited on page 7.

If such information is of an administrative nature--

that is, if the information indicates the lawmaker is interested

in a specific FBI investigation, a specific area of the FBI'S

jurisdiction, or specific FBI policies, practices and procedures-

it is filed for:

(1) the information and advice of FBI employees in

connection with future contacts or correspondence with that

Congressman or Senator;

(2) consideration of FBI personnel in connection

with possible future changes in FBI policies, practices, and

procedures.

If the information is of a personal nature--that is,

if it reflects upon the loyalty, character, or integrity of a

lawmaker--it is included in FBI files for the following reasons:

(1) The information may prove of value when

present or former Congressman of Senator is considered for

a position in the Executive or Judicial Branch of Government

which requires that the FBI conduct a backgrouna investiga-

irog that the ive

tion of him.

(2) The information could prove of value in

solving future crimes committed against the Congressman or

Senator-or against members of that lawmaker's family.

(A person who berates and defames a lawmaker would be a

logical suspect if that Lawmaker-or another Congressman

or Senator whose views coincide with his--becomes the

target of actual or threatened violence.)

(3) The information could aid the FBI in solving

crimes committed against other persons. (For example, the

handwriting, typewriting, stationery, and/or distinctive

- 9 -

NW.88296 Docld:32989624 Page 216

---

## Page 217

phraseology in a letter defaming a Congressman could assist

the FBI in linking the writer of that letter to a subsequent

ext meier note congrest-en bomb threat that, does not involve

(4) The information frequently provides valuable.

insight into the character, stability, and reliability of

the person who has furnished it to the FBI. Thereby, it is

of value and assistance to the FBI in future contacts

with,

contacts by, or inquiries regarding, this individual.

(5) The information provides a useful administra-

tive check on the performance of FBI field offices--

particularly with regard to the important consideration of

whether they are being fully responsive to the public needs.

Supervisory personnel regularly review complaints or

allegations received from the public to insure that the

appropriate action was taken--if, in fact, action was called

for.

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO DESTROY FILE INFORMATION:

Barring a new law of Congress and/or receipt of a

revised FBI Records

Retention Plan from the National Archives

and Records Service, the FBI cannot unilaterally undertake

the destruction of information regarding Congressmen and

Senators in its files.

- 10_

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 217

---

## Page 218

--

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Senate Select Committee

J.S. Senate select Committee

Be to stdy -overnmenta

Caption bf Document: Operations With Respect to Intelligence

Activities. Concerning 3 questions asked by that

Subcommittee.

Originating Office:

faulvalal,

_ Date: _

J/2y125

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDRIG

ALL INPORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

BATE 10/2/00 BYSP 2 ALRISTE

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 218

ENCLOSURE 62-116-395-419

---

## Page 219

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

2.

DATE PROVIDED

review but

I DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW |

TESTIMONY |

JOTHER

7/21/75

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; five name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandun ond enclesure

request,

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

done a fanter

SSC oral request on 7/16/75

7. Ked under sent fo

the phasopriate key words from the list provided separately: if key words not listed are

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse side before completing

this item)

FBI inforuation gathering practices with respect

to members of Congress

62-116395

EMK: Emk

(4)

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ATT TITOR

Tier.

077. 10/2 100

SPRALM/TE

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAI, COMMUNITY INDEX

TREAT AS VELLOM

379 | (6-75)

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 219

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE,

Tr 42-116375--470

---

## Page 220

165-10498

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing.

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

" Ce

NW 88296* Docld:32989624 Page 220

---

## Page 221

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• WASHINGTON, D. C.. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2613

29 July 1975

recd drom dia

/ ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating

•Group

SUBJECT

Security Clearances

mDie

ATT THE FO

MATION CONTAINE

BANIS UHOLASSRETED

TAL 22-00 BYSPSALM HE

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified

by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the

requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified

information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these

individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of

DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

•Howiet Mowitt

John.M. Clarke

Associate Deputy to the DCI

for the Intelligence Community,

1469

• Attachment

-

REC 88

U2-116345

treat as areginal

9 AUG 5 1975

62-116395

8 4 AUG 5 1975

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 221

---

## Page 222

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

29. JUL 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security

investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as

meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name

Aaron, David

ler, William

Bayly, John

Banoff, Barbara

Barkey, Howard

Baron, Frederick

Benz, Charity I.

Betts, Richard K.

Birdsell, Wayne

Bloomfield, Susan

Bouschard, Samuel

Brissett, Belva

Brooks, Nancy

'Brown, C. Harold

Erown, Maxine

Compartmented

Clearance

Designated Briefed

(SI, TK, B)

B 4/15

B:4/17

• NW 88296 :Docld:32989624 Page 222

*.

*

Date and

Place of Birth

B 5/19

B • 6/.26

B 6/2.

฿ 5/19

• B 5/23

B 7/1

B 7/14

฿ 6/10

B 6/10

B 5/23

•B. 6/26

8-21-38

:9-8-31

1-26-44

12-20-45

1-26-17.

12-2-47

7-23-46

8-15-47

5-2-06

12-23-51

3-12-24

6-23-41

2-14-40

6-6-38

8-8-28

Il1.

NJ..

DC

Cal.:

Mo.

Conn.:

NY

Pa.

DC

Ohio

Maine

Ok.

Ky

• Ohio

Ida.:

Social

Security No.

550-44-7971;

545-30-3377

578÷60-2305

561-68-9123.

490-01-6758

494-54-5241

053-38-7410

016-38-2619

578-03-1841

256-92-0341

007-18-3292

440-44-6374

313-38-6773

278-34-3428

568-40-3123

TE Badge

1116

NIN

IMDE16

ON CONT

ALMi

ENCLOSURE

---

## Page 223

Name

Bushong, David

Carpenter, Margaret.

Carter, Barry

iesnick, Barbara

Culbreth, Elizabeth

Davis,: Lynn

Dawson, Thomas.

Dawson, Rhett

DéMarco, James.

Dennin, Joseph Fráncis

DeOreó, Mary

enova, Joseph E.

Dick, James :

Dillon; Molly

Doolittle, Patricia.:

Dwyer, Daniel

-Elliff, John

Epstein, Michael Taylor

NWEE26 DOCaß32989624, Page 223

Compartmented

Clearance

Designated Briefed

(SI, TK, B)

Date and.

Place of Birth

*

*

*

*

B 71/4

B. 5/19

8-10-47

8-27-44

B 4/24

•12-14-42

B 7:/14•

4-18-46

B 7/2

6-23-42

B 4/17(Port) - 9-6-43

B.6/26

9÷9÷52

12-9-43

B. 5/19

B 6/26.

3-12-43

:B.6/23

6-9-43

:B 6/26

6-13-47

• B 6/26

2-22-45

B 6/26.

7-25-47

B 6/10

4-16-51

8-12-43

.B 7/14

8-24-52

B. 5/23

6-30-41

B. 6/26

3-10-37

:8-30-46

Ohio

Cal.

Cal,

WI

NC

Fl.

L Minn.

Ili.

W.Va.

NY

Ohio

Del.

Mass.

Va.

NC

Ma:

DC.

Mass.

DC

Social.

Security No.

289-40-1203

555-62-6129)

•567-56-8854

39.0-46-2235:

240-64-9040.

042-36-9155

471-60-1688

351-34-4329

286-36-9097

567-62-5353

287-42-6258

222-28-5430

029-36-6745

150-38-4588

213-42-6360

023-44-8792

•345-34-2468

026-28-6318

215-46-2988

29: JUL 1975

TF Badge

---

## Page 224

Name

Fenn, Peter

Ford, Harold

Gitenstein, Mark Henry

Grant,

Bruce

reissing, Edward

•Harrigan, Arthur

Hatry, Audrey Helen

Inderfurth, Mark K.

Iverson, Portia •

Jefferson, Arthur M.

Johnson, Dórothy

Johnson, Loch

calekas, Anne

Kayden, Jeffrey

Kelley, Robert

Kieves, Lawrence

Kirbow, Charles

Kirchheimer, Joseph

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 224

Compartmented

Clearance

Designated

Briefed

(SI, TK, B)

•B 4/24

B 6/26

*

is.

*

*

*

*

• B. 5/28

B 7/2

•B :7/14

B 5/19

B 5/19

B: 4/29

B 7/14

B 6/26

B 4/29

B 5/28

B 7/14

B 5/19

1....

B 5/19

•B 4/24

Date and

Place of Birth

12-12-47•

3-23-21

3÷7-46

6-16-16.

11-27-50

3-16-44

6-10-23

9-29÷46

10-22-50

3-16-44

6-8-25

2-21-42

11-6-46

3-22-51

10-29-40

1-4÷48

10-2-22

6-3-17

Ma:

•Cal.

•Ala.

Neb.

Germany

NY

•Md..

NC

W. Va.

N.Y

Or.

N. Zealand

Ma.

NY

Ipd.

• NY

Ga.

29 JUL 1975

Social

Security No.

213-50-1123

550-16-4630:

420-60-8767

507-20-1311°

296-50-4113

141-34-1031

•216-14-8691

245-74-5617.

233-84-0847

141-34-1031

+540-20-6413

566-62-04781

023-36-4329

065-40-7277

559-54-1348

068-38-6464

252-12-5112

359-03-7843

TE Badge.

TE Badge.

---

## Page 225

Name

Koppal, Diane

LaVoy, Diane

Liebengood, Howard

Lombard, Charles

• Lynch, Mary

MacDonald, Naldeen

Madigan, Michael James

* Marshall, Benjamin

Marshall, Burke

Mascioli, Cynthia

Mason, Judy

Maxwell, Elliot Everett

Mayo, Betty

Mecham, Martha Evans:

Miller, William G.

Monaco, Patricia

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 225

Compartmented

Clearance

Designated

Briefed

(SI, TK, B)

B 6/26

B 6/10

B:4/24

*

*

:, B 4/15

B 4/17

B 6/26

B 6/10

• B 4/15

B 6/26

B. 5/23

: B 4/15

• B 5/23

Date and

Place of Birth

•6-24-48

11-10-48

12-29-42

6=2-30

:3-16-26

÷10-19-51

4-18-43

•5-4-19

• 10 - 1-2.2

1-4-51

1-6-46

7-24-46

12-13-22

2-11-40

-8-15-31

NC

Venezuela

. In.

France

W. Va..

• Brazil

DC.

NE

NJ

NY

DC

NY

Ohio

Cal.

NY

•10-17-35

NJ:.

Social

Security No.

219-48-0018

165-40-3119

307-44-9707

578-44-9471

250-38-1344

225-78-8708

042-34-3797

485-28-4503

1577-44-5241

112-44-7636

578-60-7280

133-34-4225

277-14-4062

528-48-6848

109-26-4349

157-26-8100:

•29 JUL 1975

Badge

TF Badge

TE Badge

---

## Page 226

Name

Moore; Janet

Murphy; Michael

laherty; James Daniel

.Orloff, Jan

•Owens, :Drena

Peterson, John F.

Pitts, 'Susan

, Postal, Andrew

Pyle, Christopher

Quanbeck, Elton

Ralston, Theodore

Rhea,

Gordon

dard, Eric

Ricks, Walter®

Romberg, Alan

Rowe, James

Schneider, Ruth

Schwarz, Frederick 'A. O. III

Seidel, Lester

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 226:

• Compartmented

Clearance

Designated Briefed

(SI, TK; B)

*

i*

*.

.

$::

*.

B 5/23

• B•4/1'5

"B 6/26

•• B 6/2

B.6/26

B 6/10

B 7/23

B 6/26

B 5/19

B 7/23

•B 6/26

B 7/10

B 6/26

B 4/22

B 5/19

^. B: 5/23

B.4/15

iB 6/26

Date and

Place of Birth

4-9-43

:10-13-54

i.11-4-42

11-14-47

12-8-42

; 6-15-41

10-24-53

:5-11-48

•11-24-39

•5-15-26

8-25-48

3-10-45

•12-27-49

12-27-46

12-1-38

:6-6-51

"10-31-14

4-20-35

: 7-17-44

Iowa

Tex.

Ill.

Cal.

NC

•. Cal.

Canada

NY

Mass.

N. Dak.

Wash.

Va.

NY

: Ga:

NY

DC

Conn.

NY

•DC

Social

Security No.

484-52-9820

231-86-8829

239-62-8495

558-74-8394

242-68-3271

565-56-7707

020-40-7638

128-40-4695

019-30-9898

- 501-14-4534

538-48-4673

412-74-7901

128-40-7430

244-74-4304

107-30-8583

579-62-6719

"008-32-0180

084-30-2047

216-38-5204

29. JUL 1975

Badge

---

## Page 227

Name

Shea, Patrick

Shelburn, Frank

th

,. Elizabeth

Smith, John Li

Smith, Stephanie

Smothers, Curtis

Snider, Lewis Brittle

Talley, Martha

Thoben, Florence

homas, Robert.

Towell, Mary

Treverton, Gregory:

Trueheart, William

Turner, James

Ischirgi, James:

Vance, James

Wallach,. Paul

Ward, Fred

NW 88296: Docld:32989624 Page 227

Compartmented

Clearance

Designated Briefed

(SI; TK, B)

B 4/15.

B. 5/19

B 6/26

B 5/16

B 4/24

B 6/26

*.

*

B 6/10

B 612

:B.6/2

B 7/14

•B 6/26

B. 7/23

3.6/26

Date and.

Place of Birth

2-28-18

5-30-13

6-21-49

•3-3-39

3-23-54

8-26-43

•1-12-45

9-7-50

•6-2÷10

12-16-25•

4-25-44

1-21-47.

12-18-18

6-29-53

2-23-25

4-6-36

5-24-4.7

11-20-40

Utah

Va.

NY

Ky.

Ohio

Md.

NC.

NC

Ind.

: Md.

Terin.

Colo.

Va.

Cal.

Wyo.

Ohio

NY

• DO

Social

Security No.

528-64-1965

338-24-6934

076-42-0199

400-52-5800

282-58-6476

220-38-9869

246-72-0956

245-88-1368

4-313-12-1857

219-14-5186

566-64-7628

524-62-2459

225-20-6411

215-64-7255

520-16-7290

078-28-3950

149-36-2999

225-50-9983

•29 JUL 1975

Badge

---

## Page 228

Name

White, William

Wides, Burton. Victor

Wiik, Carol Ann

Wilson,. Otis

Zimmerman, Peter Brown

Zimmerman, Phebe

Compartmented

Clearance

Designated Briefed

(SI, TK, B)

B 7/10

B 4/17

• B 5/23

B-6/10

already briefed

Date and

Place of Birth

8-8-39

6-14-41

NJ

4-21-51":

" Mass,

5-16-20

• Va.

3-26-46.:

I11.

12-1-50

Ohio

Social

Security No.

168-30-9147

139-30-1936

017-40-7170

557-14-5461*

227-60-1093

271-54-17243

29 JUL 1975

:TF' Badge

.NW

Doeld

989624 - Page

---

## Page 229

TO

:

FROM :

SUBJECT.

Lotto

Gregatolannelinens

-

1/v5

125

7/24/21

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

JULY 1973 EDITION

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Clarence M. Kelley, Director

DATE:

July 16, 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Edward H. Levi

Attorney General n

United States

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The United States Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Acti-

vities (the "Church Committee") has recently requested

certain information regarding the functions of the Attorney

General with respect to the supervision of and policy-mouldy

for internal

security and intelligence activities.

appreciate it if you would prepare by July 25, 1975_the full-

est possible response to the following questions:

1. What standards and procedures has the

Attorney General adopted for the collec-

tion, analysis,

use,

and dissemination of

organized crime intelligence?

2.

To what extent have communications between

the White House and the FBI or other agencies

under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General

bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent

should such communications

be channeled through

the Attorney General?

I'a

1975

30

9:30 am 7/15/255

Sidlege fred la

y00$7/23/1504datsz/25

7)15/58

42-116385-468

670116395

SA NUL 17 1975

antant maines senses

Malia

FIVE

84

1975

5010-110

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 229

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 230

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 807 AI: CODED

MH 2,01075

10:16 PM NITE JUY 30, 1975 SOLSTYPE

TO :

DIRECTOR

(62-116395)

FFMDE16

AX TAT DRMANTON CONTATEM

_FROM:

ATLANTA

(62-2854)

SENSTUDY • 75

•BUDED: JULY JLLY 1975.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, JULY 25, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST SET FORTH, EXTENSIVE FILE REVIEW

AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WILL ENTAIL TIME WHICH

WILL NOT ALLOW AILANIA TO MEET THE JULY 31, 1975, DEADLINE.

ATLANTA ANTICIPATES RECOVERY AND XEROXING OF MATERIAL

REQUESTED AND SUBMISSION OF AIRTEL TRANSMITTING SAME BY THE -

GOSE OF BUSINESS, JULY 31, 1975, WHICH SHOULD REACH ITE

BUREAU BY ALGUST 2, 1975.

END

FLS HOLD FOR ONE MORE

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm. .

Dep.-A.D.-Inv,

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syrt.

Ext. Affirs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

inspection

Lonfal.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Lev. -

Training

Legal coun

Telephore Be c

REG 88

10467

62-116315

9 AUL: 5 1975

62-116595-

Lu Best G, 5ld: 3969624 Page 230

---

## Page 231

AMUINICSTIONS SELTION

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

NR 004 SF CODE

Almin.

Crip. Syst.

1246 PM. URGENT 7/14/75 MCC

Ext. Affairs

Filer & Com.

Gwa. Inv..

TO

DIRECTOR

Ident.

Ia intion

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

4P

Int."!

ATTN

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - ME. MOO GREGAR

Lalancory

Ples. & Eval.

Spos. Inv.

Tr. ing

UNITED STATES SELECI COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATION phone

WITH RESPECT IO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IS EXAMINING MEASURES

Director Sec'y

DIRECTED AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) IN THE LATE

1960S AND EARLY 1970S IN SAN FRANCISCO - OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES

AND SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, BY THE PEELD OFFICES OF THE PER"

RE BUREAU NITEL JULY 9, 1975.

Sursti!,

FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL LOCAL POLICE DEPARFMENTS AND

PERSONNEL CONTACTED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION RELATIVE TO

THIS COINTELPRO:

IN NOVEMBER 1968, UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO

POLICE DEPARTMENT WERE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO GIVE WILFRED

5.

AT

HOLIDAY, ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN CRUTCH, SPECIAL PRIVILEGES

CITY PRISON. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER DECEMBER 2, 1968,

D-

ENTITLED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALISF - HATE

GROUP, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (BLACK PANIHER PARTY), BUFILE 100-448006.

,EX-106

CAH75-6203

REC-23

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/2/1/83 BY5P2 TAP/RBE

621ir5is=461

OXUAATISAUSY SUNNIES

& JUL 21 1975

NW 88296

1975

Docld:32989624 Page 231

---

## Page 232

PAGE TWO

SF 62-6887

IN JANUARY 1969, UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS, BERKELEY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, WERE ADVISED THAT RICHARD AND SAM NAPIER WERE

MEMBERS OF THE BPP. THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE

BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENI AFTER AN ARMORED CAR WAS HELD UP AND

A GUARD MURDERED AND THE GETAWAY CAR WAS FOUND TO BE REGISTERED

TO RICHARD NAPIER. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU

JANUARY 13, 1969, ENTITLED "COINTELPRO, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE

GROUPS (BLACK PANTHER PARTY) •

IN EARLY 1969, AN UNKNOWN OFFICER, SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,. AT OAKLAND, WAS ADVISED OF THE USE

BY A FILM COMPANY (MGM) OF BLACK PANTHERS AS "PROPS" IN THEIR

FILMING OF BERKELEY RIOT SCENES. THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE IN TURN

FURNISHED THIS INFORMATION TO THE BERKELEY PRESS. SEE SAN

FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU MARCH 1D, 1969, ENTITLED

"COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUP,

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE, BLACK PANTHER PARTY. "

IN APRIL 1969, INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE BPP WAS

PLANNING A MEETING BETWEEN SOME OF THEIR LEADERS AND SOME OF THE

PEOPLE WHO HAD LEFT THE PARTY IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEN BACK

TOGETHER, THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO RICHARD WAGNER,

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 232

---

## Page 233

PAGE THREE

SF 62-6887

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, ON APRIL 18, 1969, WHO, IN TURN,

APPARENTLY FED THE INFORMATION TO THE BLACK PANTHER RENEGADES

WHO CONSTRUED THIS APPARENTLY AS A "SET UP" AND DID NOT ATTEND.

THIS INCIDENT IS RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO SERIAL 157-601-201.

ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1969, SERGEANT STAN WHITE, OAKLAND POLICE

DEPARTMENT, INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WAS ADVISED THAT INFORMATION

HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THOMAS JOLLY, A BPP MEMBER, WAS PLANNING

TO CONTACT PROBATION OFFICER IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TO

REPRESENT HIMSELF AS THE UNCLE OF BELVA NEWSON, ANOTHER BPP

MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED. JOLLY, WHO IS NOT NEWSON'S UNCLE,

PLANNED TO ARRANGE FOR HER RELEASE TO THEM. THIS MATTER IS

RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO FILE 157-681-356.

SAN FRANCISCO FILE DOES NOT REFLECT MEDIA PERSONNEL

WERE CONTACTED IN RELÁTION TO THIS PROGRAM.

!!

SA RAYMOND

N

BYERS, LAST KNOWN BY SAN FRANCISCO TO BE

ASSISTANT LEGAI, TOŸKYO, WAS NAMED COORDINATOR OF THE COINTELPRO -

BPP ON APRIL 3, 1968.

THE CASE WAS REASSIGNED APRIL 18, 1968,

TO FORMER SA VILLIAM

COHENDET WHO PRESENTLY RESIDES AT 1557 BALBOA

WAY, BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 9401D. THIS MATTER WAS REASSIGNED

TO SA LEO SO BRENNELSEN MAY 16, 1969. THE MATTER WAS CLOSED ON

MAY 1, 19710

PLS MAKE READ-LAST PARAGRAPH-2ND-LINE 3RD WORD READ TOKYO-REPT TOKYO

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 233

---

## Page 234

:

PAGE FOUR

SF 62-6887

THIS MATTER WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA ALBERT P

CLARK

FROM APRIL 3, 1968 TO MAY 9, 1970. CLARK PRESENTLY RESIDES

66 ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94939. COINTELPRO - BPP

WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA DAVID EA

TODD FROM FEBRUARY 9, 1970

TO MAY 1, 1971, TODD RESIDES AI Z0 COZZOLINO DRIVE, MILLBRATE;

CALIFORNIA 94030.

END

LER FAUTAX WAIT A MINUTE ON 3RD-PAGE-2, 0XX-2, 2ND-TOL

LASI-LINE-LASIZIA

-WORD READ-MELBRAE REPT MILLBRAE

-"

NW 86296 Docld:32989624 Page 234

---

## Page 235

NR018 BS CODED

8:03PM NITEL JULY 24, 1975

Manda

JU. 1315

0P 3909

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.A.D.-Inx

Asst. Dif.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

REC-5Z

10:

DIRECTOR

62-116395

FROM:

BOSTON

66-4177

ATTN& INTD, (SA N. O. GREGAR)

SENSTUDY, 1975.

ON JULY 24, 1975, JOHN E. KEHOE, JR., (FORMER SA) IS

10.00

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,

ADVISED THAT ON JULY 23, 1975, HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE

CALL FROM PAUL WALLACH, WHO STATED HE WAS

A STAFF MEMBER

112"

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Ru. -

Director Sec'y

A MR 6

SR,

ACTIVITIES. WALLACH GAVE HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER AS

202-224-170D. WALLACH ASKED KEHOE IF HE WAS A FORMER SPECIAL

AGENT OF FBI AND KEHOE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. WALLACH

THEN INQUIRED WHETHER KEHOE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER COVERT INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING ACTIVITTES IN NEW YORK CITY IN THERES 5 62-1165954655

REHOE TOLD WALLACH THAT HE HAD BEENA

AN SA ASSIGNED TO

THE

NEW YORK OFFICE IN 1946 AND 1947• WALLACH STATED

YOU DIDN'T GO BACK THERE TO DO SOME JOB DURING THE 68°S

did. 1975

DID YOU?" KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE. WALLACH THEN

NSA

MAALERO

1975

AUE dO 197

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 235

PCHA/ NSG: UNIT

---

## Page 236

PAGE TWO

BS 66-4177

ASKED IF KEHOE KNEW OF ANY OTHER SA'S NAMED KEHOE WHO

WERE ASSIGNED TO NEW YORK OFFICE DURING THE 1960°S AND

WHO WERE NOW RETIRED. KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE,

AT WHICH TIME WALLACH CONCLUDED THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.

• THE ABOVE IS FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ.

END

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 236

---

## Page 237

TO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

3010-108

MAY 7902 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr,

W. R. Wannall

FROM

1 - Mr.

N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr.

J.

B. Adams

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE:

7/11/75

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

J. G. Deegan

1

Mr.

R.

L shackeliora

Mr. W. 0. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.-

Dap. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv..

Ident.

SUBJEC

& Eval. -

SENSTUDY '75

Spec. Invo.

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Soc'y -

This memorandum recommends that the Director raise the

question of privacy and source protection with Senators of the

Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his anticipated

meeting in Executive Session with the SSC tentatively scheduled

for the week of 7/14/75.

By letter dated 7/9/75, Senators Frank Church and

John Tower of SSC requested the Attorney General and the

Director to appear before the Committee in Executive Session

during the week of 7/14/75.

The purpose of this meeting is

to

discuss the matter of concern to Mr. Kelley and steps which

might be taken to expedite the response to requests for documents!

expedite the

essential to the Committee inquiry.

The Senstudy staff of the Intelligence Division is

preparing for the Director's use copies of each of the written

requests received from SSC annotated with the dates of our

response to each request; the date it was delivered to the

Department; and the date it was delivered to the SSC staff.

There remains, however, a serious problem precipitated

by three recent written

requests

of the SSC dated 6/30/75 (received

by the Bureau on 7/7/75); 7/1/75 (received by the Bureau on

7/8/75); and 7/8/75 (received by the FBI on 7/9/75). All three

of these requests appear, in part,

to disregard the privacy of

certain individuals or requests

the identity of sources

cooperating with the FBI.

ba 11199.

464

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

rathere

WOC: emg/dsh

(9)

FFMDR 16

ATE INTOR ATTAN CONTAIND

R307 IS DOLLEG TIED

DATE 1012/00 BY SPL AMITE

NWS 825046 5d 32975621 Page 237

---

## Page 238

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY ' 75

In this regard, in an exchange of letters dated

3/11 and 12/75,

William Colby in his role as the Director

of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Church stating.

that "I am particularly appreciative of your recognition

that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities

must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select

Committee in the course of your work.

As we discussed, such

matters as the identities oi our sensitive sources. . . •

should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from

the risk of exposure. We should

also work

together to protect

certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,

might impair the privacy rights

of the individuals."

By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church stated as

follows, "It is the Committee's understanding that the members

of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any

or all information which the Committee deems necessary for its

inquiry.

We recognize, however,

that the Committee inquiry

may touch on sensitive

areas,

such as the identities of CIA

personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose

disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the

event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive

areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting

of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggested

quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee

decide it requires more information in these specific areas."

The 6/30/75 SSC letter requests among other things,

a list of all police departments and personnel contacted

relative to a particular COINTELPRO operation; a list of all

media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and

the media affiliation.

The 7/1/75 SSC letter requests a list of all persons

contacted in relation to four persons who were subjects of

CONTINUED - OVER

-2 -

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 238

---

## Page 239

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY '75

COINTELPRO operations.

This same letter also notes that one

Morris Starsky, one of the four persons referred to above,

was made known

to the FBI during a conference on 6/12/75, as

a person who would be the subject of a case study by the SSc.

This is not so. Inquiry was made of those Bureau supervisors

who attended the conference and a review of the memorandum

written following the conference was made. Neither the

memorandum nor the recollection of Bureau

supervisors attending

the conferencé indicates the name Morris Starsky was mentioned

by SSC staff personnel.

The 7/8/75 SSC letter requests among other things:

(1) all memoranda and other materials which relate to a meeting

between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph,

Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer and Jack

Greenberg on

11/19/64; (2) a copy of a November, 1964, telegram

from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to Director Hoover and all

notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the

disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt

of, said telegram; (3) all memoranda and other materials which

relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on

2/9/65; (4) all other materials which relate to the transfer of

former Special Agent Robert C. Nichols to the Oklahoma Office of

the t'Bt in June, 1969; (5) all forms and attachments including

forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide For Investigative

Personnel," from 1959 until retirement for former Special

Agents Robert C. Nichols and Alan Sentinella.

OBSERVATION:

It would appear the above cited requests do, in fact,

violate the privacy of individuals and possibly place in jeopardy

the identity of persons who cooperated with the FBI. Consistent

with the agreement in the exchange of letters between Colby and

Church dated 3/11 and 12/75, it is believed the Director should

raise these questions with the sue and attempt to get reliel

from the requirement of revealing the names of FBI sources or

violating the privacy of individuals.

Certainly the request for

information on former Special Agents Nichols and Sentinella goes

to the heart of the privacy issue and appears to be a blatant

disregard for their privacy.

ACTION CONTINUED - OVER

-3 -

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 239

---

## Page 240

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY '75

ACTION:

It approved, the attached letter to the Attorney

General will be sent advising him of the Director's intention

to raise these issues with the SSC on the occasion of his

appearance with the Attorney General during the week of

7/14/75.

nặt reut

Discussed

- 4-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 240

---

## Page 241

WE CANAL DOM NO. 10

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: The Attorney General

DATE:

July 15, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church

and John Tower requested our appearance

in Executive Session

before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of

concern

to me and steps which might be taken to expedite

responses to requests for documents essential to the

Committee's inquiry.

It is my intention to/raise the question of privacy

as well as the protection of sources at this forthcoming

meeting. In the most recent requests of the Senate Select

Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are

in the possession of Mr. O'Connor,

the Committee appears to

disregard the rights of

certain individuals' privacy, going

so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings

of certain former Special/Agents of the FBI.

It is my intention to request the Committee to

relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the

privacy rights. ot individuals or placing in jeopardy

the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau.

I - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. William O'Connor

Special Counsel for

Not seat

Intelligence Coordination

AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSTFIED

DATS 10/2/00 BYSR 2 AL-M HEC

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 88296-Bocld:32989624 Page 241

---

## Page 242

#MDR16

29121

The Attorney General

1 - Mc. N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr. J.

B. Adams

2

* - Mr.

J. A. Mintz July 15,

1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

- Mr. J. G. Deegan

1

- Hr. h.

Lo Shackelford

1 - Mr.

W. O. Gregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Dy letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church

and john lower requested our appearance in Executive session

before the Senate Select Cormittee to discuss natters of

concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite

responses

to requests for documents essential to the

Committee's inquiry.

It is my intention to raise the question of privacy

as well as the protection of sources at this forthcoming

meeting.

In the most recent requests of the Senate Select

Conmittee dated June 30 and July 3, 1975, copies of which are

in the possession of Mr. O'Connor,

disregard the rights of certain individuals' privacy, going

so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings

of certain former special Agents of the FBi.

It is my intention to request the Committee to

relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the

privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy

I - The Deputy Attorney General

Special Counsel foi

Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. _

Dop. AD Inv. _

sst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

pec. Inv. -

Training -

gal Coun. _

lephone Rm. -

actor Soc'y -

MAIL ROOM L

TELETYPE UNIT

MW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 242

VOC: emg/dst jsk

(12)

NOTE:

to Mr.

dated 7/11/75, captioned

See W. O. Cred *SENSTUDY

8:15, " prepared loy

Wannall memorandun

WOe:eng/dsh.

wol

GPO 954-545

---

## Page 243

4312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

:

Date of Mail

6/14/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

LI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HIS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/2/00 BYSF2 ALM ITE

Subject

JUNE MAIL

SENSTUDY 75

Removed By

File Number

7 9 AUG 41975

62-116395-463

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOS/ FBI

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 243

---

## Page 244

GET MOES SECTION

308 3009

TER TYPE

Assac Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adi

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Initell.

Laboratoly

Pln. & Eval.

Training --..

Legal CoUR, a w.

Telephone Rza. --

Director Sec'y

vinn

Grife

44557

NR 801

S* CODE

10:56 AM URGENT 6/16/75 MCC

TO

DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN VRANCISCO (62-6887)

ATTN

CREGAR, INTD

SENSTUDY 75.

RE SACRAMENTO TELETYPE INSTANT DATE.

REVIEW OF SAN FRANCISCO ELSUR INDIGES

SHOWS NO OVERHEARS

ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

END

VLJ FBIHQ CLR

62-111313

-is

TA N4-29 1975

Livorei

120018

N & A Scid 19789624 Page 241

---

## Page 245

NR 015 WE CODED

SAO PM NITEL JUNE 16, 1975 WWG

/TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

* FROM:

SAC, WFO (62-10744) (P)

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Svst.

-

Ext. Affairs

Files & Cum.

Gen. Inv. -

Idoint

Inspection

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Cour.

Telephone Ra.

shes

Director See'T

ATTENTION

INID.

W. 0. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY

75)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JUNE 13, 1975.

BASED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE

WFO IS UNABLE IO LOCATE ANY INFORMATION REGARDING ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHERAKING, JR. DURING PERIOD

INDICATED IN REFERENCED • COMMUNICATION.

END.

Gio

62-119375-461

AÚG A 1975

#mOR16

1012/00

8 4 AUG 4 1975

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 245

---

## Page 246

....i

NO MERCAMONG SECTION

AWW 2 0175

Assoe. Dir.

Dep.-AD.-A OIL

Dep.-A.D.-InTen

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairg

Files & Com.

Gen. InV. --

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratly

Plan.

& Eval.

Spec. Inv. -...

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone fin.

Director Sec y

10:3D AM URGENT 6/16/75 VLS

TO

DIRECTOR (52-116395)

SAR

FRANCISCO

FROM

SAGRAMENTO (62-489)

ATTN: INTD.

(W. 0 • CREGAR)

SENSTUDY 75.

412372H

"RE BUREAU TEL TO DETROIT, JUNE 13, 1975.

REVIEW OF SACRAMENTO INDICES REFLECIS NO INFO RE ELECTROMIC

SURVEILLANCE, APRIL 23-24, 1964, SENATOR HOTEL, SACRAMENTO, CALIF

SACRAMENTO DIVISION ESTABLISHED 1967.

FOR INFO SAN FRANCISCO, RETEL STATED IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST, FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE

ATTW: INTD - W. O. CREGAR:

ELECTROWIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT INDICATE OVER-

HEARS ON KHOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, AR.

FOR ABOVE DATE AND LOCATION.

SAN FRANCISCO REVIEW ELSURE INDICES AND FURNISH FBIHQ FIRST DATE

KING OVERHEARD ON ABOVE TECHNICAL INSTALLATION. IF HE WAS NOT

460

HEARD, SO ADVISE.

REC23 62-143%3

END

• JUL-B'O 1975

VLJ FEIHQ CLR

Mad. V,MORN:719

1012/00 SP2 ALM/HG

84 AUG 4

1975

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 246

---

## Page 247

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail

6/16/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

THiS

IT INFORMATION CONTAINED FORM

F-IS UNCIASSIFIED

DATE 1012/ 00 BSSP2 ALMIKE

Subject

JUNE MAIL

SENSTUDY 75

Removed By

File Number

7 9 AUG

62-116395-459

4 1975

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/ FBI

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 247

---

## Page 248

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

* "AY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

DATE:

July 21, 1975

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv..

Ident. -

ispection

ntell. let

Laboratory

Spec. Inv..

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

FROM :

R. J. McCaftay

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Attorney General's letter,

July 16, 1975, captioned as above, requesting intormation

relating

• to the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination

of organized crime intelligence.

On June 25, 1974, the Director testified before

of the Senate Judiciary.

Committee that the Bureau has "no statutory authority to

collect intelligence per se" but that it operates under the

general umbrella of 28 U.S.C. 533 (3), which authorizes the

Attorney General to appoint

officials

"to conduct...investiga

tions regarding official matters...as may be directed by the

Attorney General." A listing of

any directives issued by

the Department or the Attorney General with respect to organized

crime should be available in the office of the Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

With respect to the FBI, all our investigations in

the organized crime field are aimed at one ultimate objective:

prosecution.

458

hoodlums

During the course of our

and the various criminal syndicates operating through-

out the United States, we naturally acquire considerable data

regarding

the structure of the organized underworld, the

identities of its principal leaders, the extent of its in-

its primary sources of income, its payoffs to corrupt

officials, and the operations of its vast communteations networks.

9 AUG A 1515

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

1 - Mr. Cleveland

1 - Mr. McCarthy

1 - Mr. McHale

JEM: bkh

(6) 555

FMDR/6

MIT, INFOPMATION CONTAINID

12: 10/3100

5 UNCLATEUVIED

BYSP 2 AL MI7TE

SI PAlia

1975

SWe821G Docld:32989624 Page 248

---

## Page 249

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland

Re:

United States Senate Select Committee

To Study Governmental Operations With

Respect to Intelligence Activities

Most of this information is obtained from paid

informants, from other law enforcement officers, from aler

citizens, and from court-approved electronic surveillances

installed under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus

•Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

None of it, however, is intelligence for intelligence's

sake. The experience of the FBI over the years has shown that

criminal syndicates exist for the sole purpose of conducting

illegal operations and that anyone belonging to them may

reasonably be presumed to be engaged in one or more of these

activities. Therefore, our investigations of the organized

underworld

are not aimed at developing general nonspecific

data but at establishing which criminal violations its members

are engaged in and then proving these violations in a court

of law.

Obviously, not every case opened, every lead followed,

or every bit of information received is going to wind up in

Federal court.

On the contrary, much of this material relates

to offenses outside the investigative jurisdiction of the

FBI.

When such is the case, we immediately disseminate the

informatión to the appropriate Federal, state, or local agency.

As a result, information uncovered by the FBI during the past

five years

alone has enabled the recipient agencies to make

1151, 000, 000,000 organized crime arrests; confiscate over

worth of illicit drugs and narcotics, $9,000,000

worth of

cash, property, weapons, and wagering paraphernalia,

and: $6,000,000 worth of counterfeit bills; and assess tax

liens against $19,000,000 worth of property arising out of

Federal gambling

cases.

In addition, a considerable portion of the organized

crime intelligence information developed by the FBI is for-

warded to the various Federal Strike Forces coordinating

racket investigations throughout the country and to the

Criminal Division of the Department, which has entered this

information in its computerized data bank called "Racketéer

Profile."

-2-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 249

---

## Page 250

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland

Re:

United States Senate Select Committee

To Study Governmental Operations With

Respect to Intelligence Activities

RECOMMENDATION:

That, upon approval, this memorandum be routed to

supervisor S. I. Phillips, of the Intelligence Division

who is coordinating the Bureau's reply to the Attorne

General's inquiry.

SFP

-phM

-uuc

JEM

per

-3-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 250

---

## Page 251

4312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail

7/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#MDR 16

ON THiS

ALI INFORMATION CONTAINED FORM

MS IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10 3100 BX SPLAmITE:

Subject

JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By

File Number

7 9 AUG

4 1975

62-116395-457

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOS/ FBI

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 251

---

## Page 252

TES

FMDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN

TEREIN IS UNGLASSIKIN

DATRIO/OO

BYSPER ALI

PLAINTEXT

TELETYPE

URGENT

SAC, LOUSVILLE

TO:

FROM:

RECTOR, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Mintz

1- Mr. Wana ON UNICATIONS SETTON

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

SEP, 2. 51975

TELETYPE

175 0u Jk

RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALI, TO LOUISVILLE, 9/24/75.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE STANLEY S. CZARNECKI OF THE

LOUISVILLE OFFICE BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW CON-

CERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OE THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF

KEY ACTIVISTS - NEW LEFT. THIS WILI BE A STAFF INTERVIEW

CONDUCTED BY STAFF MEMBER JOHN SMITH. SMITH REQUESTED

THAT THE INTERVIEW TAKE PLACE IN LOUSVILLE ON FRIDAY,

9/28/75, IF POSSIBLE.

SAC CZARNECKI SHOULD TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT LEGAL,

APPROPRIATE BRIEFING TRON THE INTELLIGENCE DIE OUT 2. 1975

Personnel File - Stanley S. Czarnecki

NOTE: John Smith, Senate Select Committee staff member, requested the

interview of SAC Czarnecki concerning the Bureau's investigation of Key

Activists - New Left. This communication will serve as approval for the

waiver of the existingémployee agreement signed by SAC Czarnecki.

Referenced telephone call alerted SAC Czarnecki.

356 SY

Til in

PVDikis

(9)

Assoc. Dir.

Dap. AD.Adma

Dep. AD In

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs -

Filos & Com. -

Gon. Ins. -

Ident..

Inspection.

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Teleph

Director, See'

NIM 88296 pocla

дом I

TELETYPE UNIT

989624 Page 252

pur

---

## Page 253

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM

: Legal Counsel

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

E: 7-24-75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD

Dep.

Asst. D

Admiri

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Laborator Fl

-egal Cout

Plan, & Era): =

Spec. Inv. _

Training -

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y.

(

#mOR/6

ITA, INTOR LATTON CONTAINIO

PEPSIN IS UNCLASSITIUD

DANS 10/2/00

_BYSP-ZALMITE

Pursuant to a request from SA Thomas J. McNiff

SA Daly of this Division contacted Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special

Counsel for Intelligence Coordination for the Department, on 7-22-75

concerning the current policy regarding excisions which may properly

be made on documents being furnished to the Senate Select Committee

for their review in Bureau space and the policy concerning notes being

taken during the Committee staffers review of such materials.

Shaheen stated that there is no agreement currently in

operation concerning excisions, however, he telt that excisions should

be properly restricted to the protection of sources, sensitive techniques

or methods concerning sensitive ongoing operations. He noted that this -

is in general conformity with the proposed agreement concerning this matter

which was being reviewed at the White House. Regarding the question

raised concerning the taking of notes, Shaheen indicated that the proposed

new agreement allowed for the taking of notes on these documents which

notes may be taken to the Senate Select Committee offices. In fact,

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, K. William O'Connor, who

was present during this discussion pointed out it was the intent of the

aforementioned proposed agreement that "screened documents" may be

removed by the Committee staff members to the Senate Select Committee

offices. With this in mind, Shaheen stated we should allow the statt

members to take notes and remove same to their lettes 6-44325-456

SA McNiff was orally advised of the results of thisua

# 1975.

conversation.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

pum

NW 8826 G PagE P3agE253 Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5-Im

---

## Page 254

TO

5010-106

ÃY 1962 EDITIOI

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Wol. Hannallul

SECRET

: J.W.

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford

DATE: July 29, 1975

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W.A. Braniga

1 - Mr. J.W. Redfiel

1 - Mr. J.F.. McGuire

Assoc. Dir.

Dap. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Laboratory -

Legal Coun. _

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

PURPOSE:

To comment on items extracted from a 693-page

document prepared by CIA citing certain instances wherein ANY

CIA believes its activities may have exceeded its legal

mandate.

BACKGROUND:

Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. WoR. Wannall, dated

7/24/75, captioned as

above, described the

above-mentioned

CIA document and requested a review of certain items

mentioned therein in order to fully identify the subject

matter thereof and to assess whether same may involve any'

compromise of FBI counterintelligence operations.

CIA item captioned "Antlers," relates thet CIA

arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European

country by commercial transportation and gained entry into

the U.S. without leaving any trace of the defector's true

identity.

FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information

concerning the word "Antlers," in the context described by

CIA.

More than likely, "Antlers" is a CIA in-house code word

used for the handling

of a valuable and sensitive defector

source.

While we have no information relative to "Antlers,"

it is noted that we do have access currently to two CIA

defector sources respectively code named TORTIS and TUMBLE,

both of whom were Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) officers

whose whereabouts have been carefully concealed as both of

these defectors are targets of the RIS. Specifically, the RIS

has indicated a desire to kidnap and/or kill the two defectors

mentioned herein.

It is possible the CIA item referred to as

"Antlers" may relate to either TORTIS or TUMBLE. It is firmly

believed that public disclosure of the cIa item

beyond that described in the attachment to W.O! Cregarts

i not to Vol man 123, 455

memorandum of 7/24/75, could adversely affect the safety

and"

security of TORTIS or TUMBLE, if in fac" REC-ö8

defector described in the CIA item.

either one@isAUced 1975

62-116395

SECRET

JFM: bcw

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by 2721

(7)

Exempt Irom GDs, Categories 2,

3 and 4

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Civil số280 4ocit07g089624 Page 254

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

---

## Page 255

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr.

RE:

SENSTUDY

75

62-116395

W.R. Wannall

CIA item described as Project WESTPOINTER apparently

involved the examination of mail to the U.S. from Mainland

China during certain specific months of 1969, 1970 and 1971.

ClA indicated that Project WESTPOINTER was similar to Project

SRPOINTER.

EbIHE COMVENT: Our files contain no information

concerning Project WESTPOINTER.

Memorandum from Acting

Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated 4/1/75,

captioned "Jane Fonda v. I.

Patrick Gray, et al.; Civil Action

No. 73-2442-MML (C.D. Cal.)," describes a CIA covert operation

known as SRPOINTER which involved examination of mail to and

from the Soviet Union which was discontinued in 2/73.

Apparently, CIA had examined certain mail addressed to Jane

Fonda in connection with its SPOINTER activity.

While we

were not aware of CIA's Project WESTPOINTER, it is noted that

this Bureau did periodically examine mail coming from the

People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong to the U.s.

and mail from the U.S. to the PRC and Hong Kong during the

period 1956-1966.

This activity, which was permanently dis-

continued 1/24/66, was carried under the code names CHIPROP

and CHICLET.

Public disclosure of the CIA item referred to

above as project WastPOINter might lead to a more detailed

public examination of this Bureau's periodic control of mail

in the CHIPROP and CHICLET operations.

ACTION:

For information in connection with Senstudy 75.

Frim

SECREI

-2 -

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 255

---

## Page 256

I lik

DCI/IC-75-0126

23 July 1975

Need from cis 1/26135

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Members of the USIB Ad Hoc

Coordinating Group

SUBJECT:

Key Words for Central Indexing

Senately -75

Future key wording of information furnished to.the

Community Central Index should include names of Agencies.

These will be helpful in identifying information in the

material which relates to another Agency's activities.

Haut Thawer

Harriett Mowitt

Executive Secretary

USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

REC-88

62-116395-454

#mDR16

N 88256 6 Cid: 3275624 Page 256

---

## Page 257

KV.

1

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J.

B. Adams

1 - MT:.: H. N. Bassett

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1

- Mr.

J. B. Hotis)

July 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mc. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

0

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECI CONMITTEE

INTILLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

AMDRIG

LUL TION CONTAINES

L6010530/00

10/2/005 SP- 2ALM

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated

May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting

.

certain documents and other information fron the FBI.

=.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to

SSC is the original of a memorandun which responds in part

to one of the requests contained in above SSC letter.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for

your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. William O'Gonnor

REC-88

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

112-1118%9

453.

9 AUG + 19/

JPT: 1hb /hb

(11)

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. _

ENCLOSURE

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspecti

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

MAZE ROOM Y

TELETYPE UNIT L

ỨG 4/d: 32989624 Page 257

per

jPT

GPO: 1975

---

## Page 258

*

62-116395

1 - Mc.

B. Adams

1 - Mc. H. N. Bassett

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Ms. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

July 22, 1975

1 - Mc. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mc. J. P. Thomas

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTLE TO

STUDY GOVERNMEITTAL OPERATIONS TITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSG)

RE: FURTIER DOCUNENTS PERTAINING

TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

#MDRIG

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

ATT. TOTY

Reference is made to letter, with attached

appendices, dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General

from the Chairman of captioned Comnittee, requesting certain

documents and other information from the

Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI).

Appendix B, Item I, lumber 5 of referenced

appendices requested this Bureau to provide Commitice Scafe

access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for

the past ten years with respect to the following EDI field

offices: F'ew York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Los Angeles;

San Diego; Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffalo;

Atlanta; and Columbia, South. Carolina; Number 6 requested

this Bureau to provide the annual inspection reports and

related surveys for the past ten years pertaining to che FBI

Intelligence Division.

Assoc. Dir.._

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

At a conference held on May 30, 1975, betreen

Asst. Dir.:

Messrs. John I. Siliff and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate

Admin. ...

Comp. Syst. =

Select Committee; Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department

Ext. Affairs ..

Files & Com. -

of Justice; and Messrs. Hilliam 0. Gregar and Elmer 17.

Gen. Inv. -

Larson of the FBI, it was agreed, in response to above request,

Ident..

Inspection -

that this Bureau would make available to appropriate personnel

Intell.

of the SSC State, for review at FBIM, copies of the reports

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. - JPT : 1hb

Spec. Inv. _

Training -

(10)

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y -

• MAIL ROOM L

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 258

TELETYPE UNIT O

ENCLOSURE, / 2

-GPO 454-546

---

## Page 259

RS: Further Documents Pertaining to

the ISt and Department of Justice

Policies and Irocedures

of the tro inspections condueted of the Domestie Intelligence

Division, FBI Headquarters, curing 1971, and of the

inspection of the San Francisco Field Office of the FBI

during October, 1970.

Pertinent documents, believed responsive to above

agrement, are now ready for review at FBI Headquarters by

appropriate personnel of the SSG Staff. You will note that

portions of the San Francisco inspection report which relate

solely to investigations of criminal matters, with no

security ramifications, have been eliminated from the report.

Should the SSC deem such material pertinent to its mandate,

horever, ic can be made available for review by the SSC Staff,

upon tritten request.

1 - The Attorney General

- 2 -

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 259

---

## Page 260

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

P. 5. Senate select committeet, study Covernm Oper-

Caption of Document: ations. Re: Further Documents Pertain-

'ing to the FBI and Dept. of Justice. Policies and Pro-

cedures. 5-14-75 request Appendix B, Item I, #5.

Originating Office:

Delivered by:

Faults

_Date: 7/24/25-

Received by:

Bartor De

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

FEMDRIG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HERZIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 101210O BX SPEALMilETE

ENCLOSURE

62116585=

453

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 260

---

## Page 261

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBE

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document was made available

for

review but not transmitted, so

note.)

X DOCUMENT |

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

JOTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/22/75

FOR REVION

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check

appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; five name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Menoranduma

• IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

ise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.

INFORMATION (enter

Codewosa TS or

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appondix B, Iter 1, #5

U

?. KEy "unde fentor te pasopriate key words from the list provided separately:

if key words not listed are

Operating procedures

TIMOR 16

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Made available to appropriete personnel of the SSC

Stuff, for ravier at FELIA, copies of tie reporte of

the two inspections conducted of the Donastic Intelligence

Divicion, FBI Readquarters, during 1971, and of the

Inspection de the Son Francisco Fleld Office of the FBI

during Detober, 1970

62-116395

FMK: Emk

(4)

379 | 16-751

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 261

ORIGINAL. VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COSMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 woefs

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 624116395=453

---

## Page 262

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and

showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or tormer employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

i al ta it

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 262

---

## Page 263

Assoc. Dir.

WRO06 SE CODED

4350 PM NITEL 71.21/75 SLA

FEDERAL I"CA

•AVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIENS SECTION

NUL:: 107.

TELET/PE

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

TO

DIRECTOR (62-116395)

aspectior

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

FROM

SEATTLE

(66-2894)

Spec. Inv.

Tr. ining

SENSTUDY

Legal Coun. .

| Telephone Rm.

-RE BUREAU NITEL, JULY IT, 1975.

FORMER EMPLOYEE,

TROY V. SHEETS NO LORE MARTASS NES DOES E

AT MARYSUILLE, WASHINGTON. HE HAS PURCHASED AN AIRSTREAM TRAILER

AND ON JUNE 10, 1975, HE AND HIS WIFE LEFT THE AREA FOR AN

EXTENDED FOUR-MONTHS CROSSCOUNTRY TRIP. PRIOR TO LEAVING, SHEETS

ADVISED SRA JOHN E. CONNOR, EVERETT, WASHINGTON, THAT HE WOULD BE

TRAVELING CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL MID-OCTOBER, 1975, WHEN HE WOULD RETURN

TO THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. CURRENT LOCATION OF SHEETS IS

UNKNOWN.

SHEEIS IS BELIEVED TO STILL HAVE A MARRIED STEPDAUGHTER, NAME

UNKNOWN; IN THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. SHE MAY HAVE AN

I INERARY FOR SHEETS THAT COULD. LOCATE HIM FOR A POSSIBLE INTERVIEW.

IF BUREAU DESIRES HER CONTACTED, A REVIEW OF PERSONNEL FILE OF

SHEETS AT HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE HER NAME AND ADDRESS.

END

REC: 8&

350483

(le)

11452

FBIHQ

42-116-39>

8.

JUL 909975

COPy

RETAINED

PERSORNEL

NSY

(SHEETS)

AGE, INTOR:

#MDR16

SETON CONCITED

HOREN"

DAn 10200

SPa ALM|1T6

NW 68296 Gold: 82789624 Page 263

---

## Page 264

oin

1..

COPY RETAINED IN

RECORDS

PERSONNEL

CODE

TELETYPE

TO SACS LOS ANGELES

SAN DIEGO

SAN FRANCISCO :

FROLS DIRECIOR, FBI (62-116395)

BEASTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

NITEL

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz.

JULN 30, 1975

(1 - Mr. Hotis)

(1

- Mr. Daly)

1 - lix.

W. Walsh

- Mr.

$ 7. Wanal

1 - Mr.

W.

0. Cregar

1 - MX.

S.

F. Phillips

REBUTEL LAY 2, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HEUBER LESTER SEIDEL

HAS FURNISHED THE FOLLOWIIG TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEVS

IN YOUR OFFICE: SAN DIEGO 7-30-75 SAS EARL M. PETERSER,

LAVRENCE F. WIRICK; LOS ANGELES 8-5-75 WALLACE E. WARD, RICHARD

A. BLOESER, 8-7-75 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHANDT; SAI

FRANCISCO 8-11-75 LEO S. BRENNEISEN, 8/11-12/75 SAC CARLES W.

BATES. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW IS TO BE COINIELPRO AND BUREAU

INVESTIGATION OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. ADDITIONALLY SAC

DATES VILL BE INTERVIEWED CONCERITING KNOHLEDGE OF "HOUSTON PLAN"

1500

5D,

ido, 5: 440

Kleph.

BY SSC STAFF MEMBER LOCII JOHNSON.

I HAVE WAIVED YOUR EMPLOYLIENI AGREEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF

THESE INTERVIEWS. EACH SHOULD NOTE THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO

COUNSEL; HOWEVER, TIE FBI IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE PRIVATE COUNSEL.

Assoc. Dir. -

JERE ARE CATAXI PRIVILBCED AREAS COZCERNLIG WITCH SAS NOU 451

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. —

PVD/SFP:migrys

-(10)

AUG 4 1975

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -_

Ident.

Inspection

ELDERAL BURLAU DE INVESTIGATION

Intell.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

JUL 301975

W'i,

Training -

Legal Coun. _

143p J12

Telephone Rm. -

Director

Sec"y

TEAROOM F

• TELETYPE UNIT

pur

PWS88296

focid. 2989624 Page 264

---

## Page 265

PAGE TWO

62-116395

NOT BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. AREAS CONCERN INFORMATION

WHICH MIGHT DIVULGE IDENTITIES OF FBI SOURCES; INFORMATION

RELATING TO SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; INFORMATION WHICH

MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING FBI INVESTIGATIONS; AND INFORMA-

TION WHICH ORIGINATED WITH OTHER AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

SAN FRANCISCO NOTE RELEASE ALSO APPLIES TO FORMER SAS

ALBERT P. CLARK AND WILLIAN A. COLENDIT WIO, ALONG WITH OTHER

EX-SAS ON WEST COAST, MAY ALSO BE INTERVIEWED, CLARK AND COHENDET

HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED FOREGOING ADVICE REGARDING PRIVATE COUNSEL

AND PRIVILEGED AREAS AND HAVE ASKED FOR CONSULTATION ASSISTANCE

VIICA CUREAU IS APPROVING AS BELOW.

NORMALLY, FBIEQ WOULD SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ON-THE

SCENE FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER, DISTANCE AND TIME

SCOPE MAKES THIS NOT FEASIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE.

THE RANKING FBI OFFICIAL IN FACHI OFFICE WILL SERVE FOR

CONSULTATION PURPOSES. IN HIS ABSENCE, AN SAC IN LOS ANGELES OR

ASAC IN SAN DIEGO AND SAN FRANCISCO MAY SO SERVE. PURPOSE OF

CONSULTANT, WHO WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT INTERVIEW BUT AVAILABLE

NEARBY, WILL BE TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT PERSON BEING

-2 -

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 265

---

## Page 266

PAGE THREE

62-116395

INTERVIEWED IS ASKED QUESTIONS IN ONE OF THE PRIVILEGED AREAS

OR QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIED PARAMETERS OF THE INTERVIEW

(COINTELPRO/BLACK PANTHER PARTY). SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE WHICH

CONSUITANT REPRESENIATIVE CANNOT FANDLE, SUGGEST IMMEDIATE

TELEPHONE CALL TO LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.

SHOULD ADDITIONAL FORMER SAS CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE,

COORDINATE WITE THEL WAIVER FROM EMPLOYHENT AGREEMENT THROUGH

LEGAL COUNSEL, DIVISION AND FURNISH CONSULTATION SERVICES AS

REQUESTED.

NOTE THAN RANKING OFFICIAL SERVING IN CONSULTANT

POSITION DOES NOT REPRESENT THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE AS PRIVATE

COUNSEL.

NOTE:

The referenced 5/2/75 teletype apprised all offices of

our cooperation with the SSC and furnished general background re

Because of time element

we are telephoning necessary instructions to that office.

previously by teletype 7/9/75 advised current and former

employees

on Hest Coast of SSC's intentions regarding these interviews.

also previously released sAe Bates Ior purpose of interview re

Cointelpro/BPP and

• are now extending release to incude interview

"Houston Plan," as requested by SSC Staff Member Johnson 7/25/75.

Former SAs Clark and Cohendet previously given necessary

advice by Legal Counsel Division as indicated above and offer

made for consultation services which they requested.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 266

3

-

---

## Page 267

TO

FROM

:

:

SUBJECT:

•TIONAL FORM NO.:

LY 1962 EDITIO

GSA FPAR 641 CFR 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. CALLAHAN

H. N. BASSETT

SENSTUDY 75

DATE:

6/9/75

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs _

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

dent

gn

*Eval.

Spec. Inv. _

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Director See'y -

In response to a Senate Select Committee request for

gui de lines utilized by the Inspection Division, memorandum

H. N. Bassett to W. R. Wannall dated 6/2/75, captioned as above,

noted there would be no objection to a review of the Handbooks

for Headquarters and field office inspections by Committee Staff

members provided the review was conducted in FBI space with an

Inspection Division representative present.

On 7/8/75 Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Select Committee Staff

reviewed the FBIHQ Inspection Manual in the presence of SA

Fred B. Griffith. Mr. Gitenstein was specifically advised these

Manuals are used solely as guidelines for the Inspection Staff and

are not binding on anyone but staff members. They cannot be used

to document any deficiencies noted during an inspection. He was told

such action would have to be based on applicable provisions in either

the Manual of Instructions or the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

TTG

1: 10/2/00 BYSP ZALM

During the review it was noted Mr. Gitenstein made notes regarding

the following Sections:

1. Section 2 (Recording the Inspection Findings), pages 5 and 6

which deal with the assembly and distribution of inspection reports and

work papers.

2. Section 4 (Specific Division Operations), pages 4 and 5 which are

concerned with surveys and audits.

02

11L-

3. Section 8 (Inspector's Summaries), pages 1, 2 and 4 which deal

with the summary for the Director, the letter to the Division*Head, from

the Director and personnel write-ups.

Mr. Gitenstein stated he would return at a later date to review in 97

field manual.

ACTION: None. .

• for information.

1 - Messrs. Adams, Wannall, Cregar

fF Bia7vmj

NW 38235-Docld?)2989624 Buye U5y Sawings Bonds Regularly on

thể

Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 268

9/ Y8W#

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFAN 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

'O

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-7-75

FROM

: Legal/Counsel

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. fir..

Dep. AD Adr

Dep. /ADin

Asst Dil

Admin.

Comp. §yst. _

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

I inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

land& Eval

"Spec. Inv.

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Soc'y -

26/W702-d518

TETEISSTTONN ST 115.

By memorandum, 6-18-75, you were advised the

Department was considering preparing summaries of existing summaries

of tho so-called "Kissinger 17" wiretaps to be furnished the senate lolly

Select Committee (SSC). The Department was awaiting our approval..

of this mode of response to the Committee. The referenced memorandum

recommended we advise the Department that we agreed on the preparation Do

of the summaries with the provision that we be allowed to review same

prior to the Department seeking Court approval for making them available

to the Senate Select Committee. This recommendation was approved.

Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination in the Department, inquired of Special Agent Paul V. Daly

as to when the aforementioned summaries would be completed. He was

informed it was the Bureau's understanding the Department would prepare

the summaries. Mr. Shaheen, after consulting with K. William O'Connor,

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated it was the Department's

desire that the Bureau prepare the summaries. He advised the Departmental

attorneys concerned with the litigation arising from these wiretaps will

review the summaries and seek Court approval prior to furnishing to the

Committee.

REC2 62-11/3%5

449

RECOMMENDATION:

1* JUL 18 1975

Intelligence Division with the assistance of Legal Counsel

prepare the necessary summaries for forwarding to the Committee.

1 - Mr. Wannall

frie

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Hotis

pur

1 - Mr. Peterson

1 - Mr. Daly

PVD Kis (8)

NW 88296o Decld: 32989624 Page 268

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---

## Page 269

CODE

CABLEGRAM

I-Legal Counsel Office

(Attn: Mr. Daly)

1-Foreign Liaison -

1-Mr. Cregar

1-Mr. Helgeson

URGENT

9

7/28/75

SP-2 ALM/LTG

#MDR/6

10/2/00

TO LEGAT LONDON

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

MARK GITENSTEIN, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING PRO-

CEDURES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, HAS ADVISED THAT

THE COMMITTEE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HOW OTHER

COUNTRIES HANDLE THEIR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS;

THAT IS, THOSE INVESTIGATIONS ANALOGOUS TO OUR EXTREM-

IST AND SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS. GITENSTEIN IS LEAVING

FOR LONDON AUGUST SIX NEXT AND HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO

MEET WITH APPROPRIATE BRITISH OFFICIALS ANY TIME AUGUST

ELEVEN OR TWELVE NEXT FOR A GENERAL BRIEFING IF THIS IS

POSSIBLE. HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO LEGAT SITTING IN ON SUCH

BRIEFING.

GITENSTEIN'S REQUEST HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH JOHN (5)

HEH:enm

(6)

Assoc. Dir. _

Dop. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec, Inv. -

Training

Telophone Rm.

MAYE, ROOM L

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 269

VENERAL BUREAU ON INVESTIGATION

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 2 9 1975

REG-36

+2-114-375-448

VIES

ZEX-106)

TELETYI

160 2 31 191

jeM

fisc

---

## Page 270

CABLEGRAM TO LONDON

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

(PARKER, COUNSELOR, MI-5, WASHINGTON, WHO SUGGESTS

YOU CONTACT MI-5 LIAISON TO DETERMINE HOW THIS SHOULD

BE HANDLED. BUREAU SUGGESTS THAT IN ADDITION YOU.

CONTACT SCOTLAND YARD IF YOU FEEL IT APPROPRIATE. J (5)

HANDLE AND SUCAB ARRANGEMENTS, ATTENTION:

HELGESON, INTD.

NOTE: Gitenstein made the above oral request to Inspector

Helgeson during a meeting 7/25/75. This is being

coordinated with Supervisor Paul Daly with the Office

of Legal Counsel.

2-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 270

---

## Page 271

TO

FROM

SUBJECT.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFR 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. J. B. Adams

Legal Counself

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ACCESS TO WITNESSES I

DATE: 7/18/75

ssoc. Di

Dep. AD A

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Filos & Com. -

Gon. Inv..

Ident. _

Inspection.

Legal Colle

Plan. & Eval. Le

Spoc. Inv..

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Diroctor Sec'y -

#MORIS

ANLY

ALT, INTORRATTON CONDIT

PRUT IS LAOLANTED

DA 23/0/2/00 3xSR3

At 11:40 a.m. on July 18, 1975, K. William O'Connor,

Special Counsel in the Deputy Attorney General's Office, telephonically

advised me that his negotiations with the Committee concerning more

restrictive limitations on Committee access to witnesses were not

successful. He said that the Department has determined that the

procedure in effect previously whereby the FBI Director would receive

a request for the availability of FBI personnel for interview and would

determine whether such personnel should be released from applicable

secrecy agreements would be reinstituted.

I asked Mr. O'Connor whether this meant that the Department

no longer regarded all requests for interview of present or former employees

as "demand" situations requiring the specific authorization of the Department

as if a subpoena had been issued. Mr. O'Connor said that the Department

would not consider such requests in that manner and that the FBI should

make all determinations necessary for the appearance of witnesses for

interview.

REC-36

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-106

62116375

For information.

We will continue to discuss requests for

interview with individuals named by the Committee in their requests,

and authorize waivers of the secrecy agreements of a case-by-case

basis.

NE JUL 31 1975

446

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Mr. Mintz

MAS

pen

JAM:mfd

LEGALV

(5)

NW 88296oDocld:32989624

1330

5 1AUG04 1975

Buy

ÜS. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Page 271

---

## Page 272

god.

50514

10.241-80

'ad

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com..

Gen, Inv..

Ident.

Inspection.

intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

CODE

TELETYPE

1 - Mr. Mintz

1

- Mr.

Wannall

- Mr. W.O. Cregar

(Attn: S.F. Phillips)

NITEL

1

Mr.

1

Deegan

- Mr. Nugent

JULY 25, 1975

TO SAC, ATLANTA

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

(SENSTUDY 175,)BUDED: 7/51/75.

i'MICATIONS

SECTIDI!

SUL 25/075

TELATURE

FBIHQ IS PRESENTLY COMPILING PERTINENT DOCUMENTS PERTAIN-I

ING TO CAPTIONED MATTER AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH.

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC).

INCLUDED IN THE SSC'S REQUEST IS ONE CONCERNING ALL MEMO-,

RANDA AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS INDICATING OR REFLECTING THE

INCEPTION OF (A) ALL HEADQUARTERS FILES AND (B) ALL ATLANTA

DIVISION FILES CONCERNING MARTIN LUTHER KING AND ORGANIZATIONAL

FILE CAPTIONED "COMINFIL OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP-

CONFERENCE, " (SCLC), TOGETHER WITH THE BASIS AND AUTHORITY

OPENING SUCH FILES.

SSC STAFF PERSONNEL HAVE ADVISED THE ABOVE REQUEST REFERS

NOT ONLY TO COMMUNICATIONS WHICH INITIATED ACTIVE INVESTIGA-

TION OF KING AND THE SCLC, BUT SHOULD INCLUDE SUCH LIEVE

WHETHER THEY BE OFFICE MEMOF

JA OR OTHER VAT RATS 1H5

111:37.

PEN: adn/tap/

(9)

ST-103

0 JUL 29 1975

100-106670

(KING)

FEDERAL DOCH AS

SLEAT OSCIC

COMMUNICATIOI

SECTION

TEL

FIVPE

IL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

189624 Page 272

18HN68/6810

обля

pus

GO 954-545

W

---

## Page 273

PAGE TWO

NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS) WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING

THESE FILES PRIOR TO THE TIME ACTIVE INVESTIGATION VAS

INITIATED.

ATLANTA DIVISION PROMPTLY REVIEW ABOVE MATTERS AND

FURNISH FBIHQ WITH THREE CLEAR XEROXES OF ITEMS WHICH ARE

RESPONSIVE TO THE SSC'S REQUESI. THESE ITEMS SHOULD BE

XEROXED AS THEY APPEAR IN YOUR FILES. ANY EXCISIONS OF

DATA APPEARING THEREIN WILL BE HANDLED BY FBIHQ PRIOR TO

THE TIME THESE MATERIALS ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SSC.

IT WILI, NOT BE NECESSARY TO FURNISH HEADQUARTERS WITH

COPIES OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO INSTITUTING ACTIVE

INVESTIGATION IN THESE CASES WHICH EMANATED FROM FBIHQ.

WHERE SUCH IS THE CASE A SIMPLE STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT

SHOULD BE MADE AND THE DATE AND CAPTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS

CONMUNICATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY COVER AIRTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION

BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS 7/31/75.

NOTE:

Teletype being directed to the AT Division to obtain

information which is responsive to a request by the Senate

Bureau deadline deemed necessary in view

of request by this Committee.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 273

---

## Page 274

OPTIONAL FORM NON, 10

HAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAR 641 CFR 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GO

VERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. /J. B. Adams

FROM

: Legal Counsel

SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir..

Dop. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD inv. -

Asgi. 'Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

DATE: 7-18-75

Filos & Com. _

Hates-Jitt

Gen. Inv. -

Ident..

Inspection

Found

¿lan. & Eval..

Spec. Inv..

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

S/JOW#

repo sard

OSISSS7I0N SINCE

Attached is a memorandum from K. William O'Connor,

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice,

dated 7-18-75 requesting our observations concerning the type of access

certain Members of the Senate Select Committee would have to FBI

files concerning those Senators. This memorandum was received at

11:14 a.m., 7-18-75, and we were requested to furnish our response

no later than 1 p.m. on 7-18-75.

After consultation with Assistant Directors-Deputy

Associate Directors Adams and Jenkins, Mr. O'Connor was telephonically

advised by SA Paul V. Daly that it was this Bureau's position that

Option 3 with certain modifications would be this Bureau's choice.

Option 3, with modifications would read, "The file is assembled and the

Senator given access to it, with certain portions or papers withheld

and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the

documents."

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-21

For information.

12 46775-444

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Adams - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Mintz- Enclosure

1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Farrington - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Hotis - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Daly - Enclosure

SI-103

JUL 31 1975

75/1/js3

PVD:kjs (9)

N

84

1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 88236-Docld:32989624 Page 274

---

## Page 275

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 1 8 1975

TO: See Distribution

#MBRIG

ARE TRI CARRADION CORMATED

2 0053 SPL ALM 7T

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained

by the FBl

Certain members of the Senate Select Conmittee have requested

access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the

subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you

know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Cormittee, access to

the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be

had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.

The Attomey General has considered several options, and has

asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has

aSked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m.,

this afternoon so that he may promptly consider them. The options

considered are not exclusive.

If you have any suggestions other

than the options indicated, please attach it to your response.

Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice,

by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.

OPTIONS

Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and

delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal inves.-

tigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the senator under

controlled circumstances at the Depariment of Justice.

Approved

Disapproved

Comment:

+7114-345-4441:45 KWillann

o cimnaadraed

ENCLOSURE

SHOUTIN

NW/88296 Docld:32989624 Page 275

---

## Page 276

====

=

- 2-

Option 2: Same as Option I, except that a xerox of the documents as

excised is delivered to the Senator.

Approved

Disapproved

Conment:

options:

Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it,

with certain papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of

the reasons for withholding of the documents.

Approved

_ Disapproved

Comment:

portions or

Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file

without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Depariment

of Justice.

Approved

Disapproved

Corment:

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General

Solicitor General

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Thomburg, Criminal Division

Mr'. Pottinger, CRD

Mir. Scalia, OLC

Mr, Uhlmann, OLA

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 276

---

## Page 277

SAT IN FORENO. 10

GSA EPAIR (41 CFRI 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G

RNMENT

Memorandum

TỐ

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/27/75

FROM : Legal Counsel Mu

SUBJECT:

Hayes

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD'

Asst, Dir

Admin. _

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection

aboratory

Roganc don

Plan & Eval

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telophone Rm. -

Director Sec'y_

AT TIPOD TO CONEAUL EMDR 16

ArE 10/2/00 B&SP- 2ALMIEG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALLEGATION BY JOHN/EN MFF CONCERNING

INTERFERENCE WITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

At 5:14 p.m., on 6/27/75, K. William O'Connor, Special

Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, advised me that he had received

a call from John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee complaining of

what he described as an attempt to interferewith the Committee's investi-

gation by supplying information to the press that the Committee had been

furnished material which it had declined to use or to inquire into because

of its sensitive nature. O'Connor said that Elliff claimed that a journalist

who is friendly with the Committee had advised the Committee that he had

information from a Justice Department official that the Committee had been

furnished information originating in the FBI that Communist funds were

used to finance Martin Luther King; that King had been related to the CP, USA,

and that the Senate Select Committee had treated this matter as a "hot potato"

and that the information also indicated that "King laughed all the way to the

bank."

O'Connor said that Elliff protested the apparent disclosures

by the Justice Department bo the press and claimed that it appeared an

effort was being made to interferewith the Committee's work. O'Connor

told Elliff he had no knowledge of anyone in the Justice Department furnishing

any such information to the press and further, he told him that he did not

believe that information concerning CP funding of King had been furnished

to the Committee.

ST-101

REC=18

62.116515-

O'Connor said that he did not believe that the fBi had furnished

such information to the news media but he wanted us to«be aware of Elliff's

complaint. O'Connor said that it is possible that during interviews conducted

by staff of the Committee, they have received statements indicating that

Communist funds were used by King, but he does not believe that any docu-

mentation of that has been furnished to the Committee as yet.

RECOMMENDATION:

I - Mr. Moore

For information.

LEERL

SEL

- Mr. Daly

- Mr.

NW 88206-Doeld:529896247

SEE ADDENDUM, PAGE 2.

Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 278

ADDENDUM

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SFP:lhb

7/2/75

INTD has received no report. or has any information

concerning the alleged leak referred to in this memorandum.

Concerning t= the allegation in this memorandum

that information originated with the FBI that communist

funds were used to finance Martin Luther King, Jr., and that

King had been "related" to the CPUSA, the following is noted.

We have never had any information that communist tunds,

literally, were used to finance King. We did have reliable

reports that King was helped in a financial way, particularly

as to advice regarding fund raising, by a close advisor,

Stanley David Levison, who was a secret member of the CPUSA.

However, none of our reports are known to have claimed that

"communist funds" were financing King. King was never known

to have been a member of the CPUSA. It is true that he had

a number of close associates such as Levison who at the time

were either current or past CPUSA members.

INID is unable to pinpoint the report that "King

laughed all the way to the bank."

did feen

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## Page 279

2 - MI.

A. Mintz

11%

Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

July 25,

1975

The Attorney Ceneral

Diredtor, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COLLITTEE

ON INTEITICENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By Letter dated May 14, 1975, With attached appendices,

the SSC requested cortain dociments and other infornation

from the FBI.

Inclosed for your approval and forvarding to the

Cormittee is the original of a memorandum with an

enclosure which is in response to one of the Committee's

requescs.

A copy of this memorandum with its enclosure io

being fumished for your records.

Enclosuras (4)

SI, 112,

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

REC-65

Attention:

I. Willian O'Connor

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

4427

TEB: lek/Inb|hb

(9)

#MDR16

1OR0O SPiRALMING

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp.Syst._

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

• ENCLOSURE

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Diroctor See

MAIL ROOM LYI

NiN 8026 6 19789624 Page 279)

TELETYPE UNIT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

G00 91 546

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## Page 280

62-116395

2 - MI.

J

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

I - MC.

W. R. Wannall

- Hr.

1

w. 0. Cregar

- Mx. T. E. Burns

July 25, 1975

UNITED STATUS SENATA SELECT CONTIIDE

ZO STUDY GOVERNUMITAI OPERAZIONS

WINI RESPECT TO INIELLIGINCE ACIIVITIES (SSC)

RS: FUNTIER DOCUNENTS PERIZINING DO

THE FBI MID DEPARIZENE OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDUNSS

#MOR)6

= 10103/00

Reference is made to SSC letter dated lay 14, 1975,

wich attached appendicas, requesting certain documents

other infosuation fron the EBI,

and

Item number 1. b, Of Part I, Appendix D of refer-

enced communication requested Conmittee Staff access to all

indices and control files pertaining to

all prograns operated

by the Intelligence Division For 1960 to the present.

Attached to this nenorandum is a list of all

retrievable prograns, projects, surveys and proccdures

employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations

of the FBI which may be of interest to you.

There wexe a

numer of other prograns, projects, surveys and procedures

employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence

opcrations of the ilI which are not included.

In the evont

you cesire intoration concerning these latter items, which

incinic extremcly sensitive matters, we would be picased

Üiscuss then with SSC Staff Henbors at FDI Headquarters*

Enclosure

Assoc. Dir.

1 - The Attorney General

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

TEB: lek/1hb |hb

Comp. Syst. -

(8)

Exte Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. inv. --

Ident..

Inspection.

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec.Inv.c

Training -

Legal Coun. _

elephone Rm. -

¡rector Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

MMM 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 280

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE

pain

44"

GPO 954-546

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## Page 281

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policios and Procedures

NOTE:

TÓP SECRET

The Programs, Projeccs, Surveys and Procedures List

(PPSPI), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPI, infra,

were generated by SA Thomas I. Burns, Jr. from a review of

available INID inspection reports and files.

COUNTERINIELLICENCE PESPL

1. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries - Developing

positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the

United States from non-soviet-bloc countries.

2.

International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside

the Sovict-bloc - Centralized compilation of potentially danger-

ous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the J. S. State

Department could initiace steps to deport or to lift

diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.

3.

Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International

Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks

conducied by various members of U. S. intelligence community

-based on information provided to such intelligence organizations

by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.

1. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel) .

5. Alem - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.

6.

Anagram - Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in

che United states for procurement oi cryptographic materials.

Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-

information such as that regarding Anagram and electronic

eillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given

anators Church and Tower) •

SECRET

- 2 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

MMY 8b296 Docld:32989624

Page 281

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## Page 282

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED:

7.

Banpop - Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer

of funds through Swiss banks.

8. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States - Identification

of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with

intelligence assignments.

9.

Chinese Cormunist Contacts with Scientists in the United States -

Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese

background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be

targoted against Pcople's Republic of China (PRC)

personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.

10.

Chinese

Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -

Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.s. with

intelligence assignments.

11. Chinese University and Graduate School Index - List of

Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or

graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are

considered potential candidates for development as U.S.

assets.

12.

Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed against

foreign intelligence officers.

13.

Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in tle

United States from Europe through Canada.

14. Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart

efforts

of Chinese intelligence in this country.

15.

Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York

University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover

Soviet illegals.

TAP

SECRET

- 3-

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

KHA x6 loall: 32989624 Page 282

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## Page 283

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

-

NOTE CONTINUED:

TOP SECRET

16.

Proho - Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised

or recruited by Soviet intelligence.

17. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents

with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments - Investigations

conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established

criteria.

18.

Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries - Interviews of selected

U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc

intelligence.

19. Orkid - Technical penetration of Soviet establishments in the

United States.

20. Cloverleat - Technical penetration of new Soviet residential

complex, Riverdale, New York City.

21. Sam Survey - Screening of mail to selected European cities.

22.

Survey - screening of mail originating in New York,

New York, destined for specific postal zones.

23.

Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets -

Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence

and counterintelligence purposes.

24.

Rega - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.s.

as aliens during certain years.

25. Secomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include

development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico.

- 4 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

NW 48296 Rocld 32989624 Page 283

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## Page 284

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED:

TOP SECRET

26.

Sobir - Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and

repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously

recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence.

27.

Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet

illegals who have applied for documentation as U.s.

residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide

cover identity.

28.

Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible

infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow

to the United States.

29. Walklok - Screening of requests for birth certificates under

an established criteria to identify such requests which

may have originated with Soviet intelligence.

30.

Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone

and microphone installations functioning at certain times.

31. Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying

Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP

equipment.

32.

Cuban Refugee - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents

who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee

channels.

33. Deseco - Development of selected contacts to be directed

against Soviet-bloc officials.

34. East-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards

regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite

nationals.

35.

Z Coverage - Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission

to the United Nations.

IgO sECReT

- 5 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6

MMY 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 284

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## Page 285

„ts'

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED:

IOP SECRET

36.

Chiprop - Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong

and the People's Republic of China (PRC) .

37. Chiclet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong

and the PRC.

Alchemy - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic

revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at

uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States.

39.

Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected

foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify

Soviet illegals.

40.

Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political

intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the

41. Oarbit - Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.s.

military personnel in the vicinity of selected u.s.

Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents.

42.

Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly

resided in a specific foreign country and whose present

whereabouts are unknown.

Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, 2 and 3, Indefinite.

DOP SECRET

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MW. 88296_ Docld:32989624 Page 285

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## Page 286

PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, SURVEYS, and PROCEDURES

1. Adninistrative Indez (Adex) - List of individuals who posed.

a realistic direct, and current danger to the national

security of the United States.

2. Agitator Index - List of individuals who have demonstrated

by their actions that they have a propensity for fomenting

racial discord.

3.

American Repatriate - Specific procedure to be followed

concoming United States (U...) citizens who wore issued

Swiss protection passports to return to the U.5. from

4.

5.

Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File - Covers

black extremists who have propensity for violence or who could

be considered logical suspects in various crimes in which

Bureau might have an interest.

Black Student Groups on College Campuses - Discreet preliminary

inquiries, limited to established sources, on black student

organizations and their leaders.

6.

Bocov - Communist coverage along the Mexican border.

7. Characterization - Descriptive statements concerning

certain organizations which have been subject to

investigation.

8.

Cointelpro - Counterintelligence programs directed against

domestic subversive activities.

9.

10.

11.

Cormunist Influence in Racial Matters - Periodio reports

relative to communist influence in racial matters.

Computerized Telephone Number File - Computerized programing

of telephone numbers utilized by extremists and

revolutionaries and other individuals suspected oi

involvement in interstate gambling activities.

12.

Emorgency Detention - Provided for apprehension and detention

of persons considered potentially injurious to the national

defense and public safety of the U.s. in time of national

emergency.

ATE INPNOMATION CONTAINLO

627 19166 330733

1C: 10261003Y SP2ALM/ 7TG

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NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 286

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13.

Excremist Infornant - Development of sources to provide

intelligence and evidentiary information concerning extremist

individuals and organizations.

14.

Chetto Informant - Davalopmont of individuals living or working

in Chocco orcas who can furnish information with particular

emphasis on sicuations which may create civil unreat.

Intensification of Investigation of catherman and Other

Sinilar Terrorisi Groups - Use Of full resources of FBI and

uso of innovative methods to achieve a more comprchensive

coverage of such groups.

16, Roy Accivist - Invascigation of individual who vore crtrenaly

active and vocal in their stacohonts denouncing the u.S.

and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of

unlawíul and disruptive acts.

17, Key Extremist - Provided intensified coverage of selected.

oxtremists who were known to be active and who had

previously evidenced the potential for fomenting violence

ox revolutionary accivitico.

18.

Location of Non-Fugitive Weatherman Membors - Intonsified

efforts to locate non-fugitive Weatherman members.

19 -

New Left Extremist - False Identity - Attorpt to provido

effective dissemination of voluminous data concerning

falso idontities used by Weatherman porsonnel and other

Now Loit extrchists.

20.

New Taft lovemani - Financos - Periodic inforation made

available to the USdi and the Whitc House regarding income

source of various rovolucionary groups.

21.

Now Left ilovement - Publications - Coverage of Publications being

circulated by New ieft Movement.

22.

Pocential for Racial. Violonce - Survey of localities having

potential for racial violenco based on curteni social conditions.

23. Potential for Violence and Civil Unrest - Periodic assessment

of potential for violence and civil unrest throughout the

U.S. with emphasis on situacions involving racial factors,

24.

Prisacts - Extremist, revolutionary, terrorist, and

subversive accivities in penal institutions.

-2 -

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 287

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## Page 288

25.

Prosab - Protection of Strategio Air Command and inter-

continental ballistic missile bases of the U.s. Air Force.

26.

Rovolutionary Activities - Violence - Periodic reports

appraising potential dangerousness of the various

revolutionary groups.

27.

Sccurity Index - Lint of individuals who were believed to be

dangerous to the internal security of the U.S. during

times of encrgency.

28.

Security Informant - Development of sources io provide intelli-

gonce and evidentiary information concerning security matters.

Security of Spocial Agent Personnel - Communication to all offices

daced septenser 11, 1973, alercing field to intormation that

revolutionary and extroniat activists and organizations have

Instituted a program of collecting intelligence data against law

enforcement poraonnal and agencies.

It dircoted tield to

adviso FBI Headquartors it information developed that such organ-

izations and individuals are actively ongaged in confrontation

and harassment of fDI personnel.

30.

Spectar - (Special Target for Informant Development) -

Development of quality informants to penetrate revolutionary

underground.

31.

Index Program on Aninistrative Indez Subjects -

Placing Alex Category 1 individuals in the "stop index"

operated by the Computer Systers Division in order to promptly

decermine inquiries roceived from local police concerning such

subjects.

32. Underground Newspapers - Collection of copies of various

revolutionary newspapers.

33.

Venceremos Brigade - Individuals subjected to background

investigation with view toward docemining possible Adex

inclusion and onalysis to determine whether or not subject

could bo targeted against hostile intelligonce agencies.

34.

Weatherman Fugitive

(Weatherfug) Investigations - Ifforts to

locace Weatherfugs.

35. Weatherman Automobile Hot Sheet - Compilation of Weatherman

vehicles for use by surveillance personnel.

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