Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10083

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

1.

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10083

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

..

ORIGINATOR : DOS

FROM : Task Force Viet

TO :

TITLE : Status Report on the Instructions

DATE : 12/1/1961

PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS:

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Vietnam Memos and Reports,

12/1/61-12/2/61. Box 2

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Prepared by:

Task Force Viet-Nam

Department of State

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Tuit

December 1, 1961

STATUS REPORT

on the

INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR NOLTING

(Deptel 619 of November 15)

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17/1.

1476

File

5

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SECRET

December 1, 1961

STATUS. REPORT

For ease in reading we are not repeating the points in Deptel 619

underlined in the last report. However, the following paragraphs are

responsive.

has appointment with Diem at 3:30 p.m.

aid or "capitalist imperialism": (Saigon's 731 and 736)

3. Embassy Saigon reports problems with UK Mission.

Contrary US-UK

agreements on procedure, Thompson submitted plan to Dien without prior

consultation with US, without real effort determine thrust our counter

Insurgency plans, and without limiting it to intelligence and civil aspects.

Substantively, Thompson Plan (which Thuan said Diem accepted) strikes blow at

us efforts get Dien delegate authority to Field Command which by-passed in

Thompson command scheme and gives priority to Delta when MAAG would like

emphasize area north of Saigon. Dien's acceptance Thompson recoimendations

may also be prompted by attitude toward current Us proposals. (Saigon's 737)

4.

Dien expressed his frustration with the new Us proposals to CAS on

Novenber 27g

Compared Taylor Mission to Marshall China Mission; reiterated

View that good people hard to find to whom authority can be delegated;

deplored fanfare of Staley program and failure aid to naterialize; said

difficulties with Cabinet which would have resulted had he shown them the

new US proposals; expressed frustration at dealing with US press representa-

tives.

However, he going ahead with extra financial expenditures, and would

establish provincial councils. (IDCS 3/L94,L03)

After many Indian delaying ploys, Canadians succeeded getting Indian

agreement refer GVN letters on subversion to ICC legal cornittee with time

Limit.: (Saigon's 732)

The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Keith Holyoake,

im announcing

a gift of over 3 10,000 of tents, blankets,_canned meat and-soap to-South

Viet-Nam, said: "The future of South Viet-Nam and its brave people is of

deep/

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i.:

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- 205

deep concern to New Zealand. Anything we can do to help them, not only in

their present plight but also in pressing on with econonic development and.

raising their living standards, is in our own interests as well as theirs."

7. The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. R. G. Menzies, has informed

the Secretary that "I have put under immediate study your proposals for

action to help South Viet-Nam counter Viet-Cong insurgency.

In general,

they seem admrably adapted to meeting a very difficult situation. . I am

also having examined the possibility of Australia increasing its assistance

to Viet-Nam and hope to be able to make a decision on this after the

elections next month."

8. Vieving with "profound concern the deteriorating situation" in SVN

Foreign Secretary Serrano of the Philippines reportedly said, " we are

still studying in what form and manner the Fhilippines could chip in. For

the monent ve are not thinking of military or economic matters. There is

the possibility of sending nurses and doctors….." The Embassy reports that

despite apparently lack of immediate response to US course of action in

SVN,

Serrano appeared pleased at Ambassador Fickerson's outline of us

decisions.

WHITE PAPER " Printed and is being pouched today to all interested

posts with Instructions to embargo release pending further instruction.

Balance of scenario depends upon Dien response to Nolting.

10. A status report of military actions is attached.

11. A status report of intelligence actions is attached.

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