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157-10014-10178

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

SSCIA

157-10014-10178

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-83

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

DATE: 00/00/1975

PAGES:

161

SUBJECTS :

CASTRO, FIDEL

LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS : CC Box 73

V9.1

HH. 50935

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Date :

Page

08/07/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

157-10014-10178

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 07-M-83

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

÷00/00/75

PAGES

• 161

SUBJECTS : LUMUMBA, PATRICE,

ASSASSINATION

CIA

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULI

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CC Box

73

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED.

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

3 31/77

RC

INTERVIEW WITH:

Congo Chief of Station

REGARDING: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Reläted Events

in the Congo.

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 - 12:30-3:30 p.. =

Room 608, Carroll Arms

PRESENT: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE (s) :

EXECUTIVE SESSION:

_YES

X NO

12

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MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

Files

Frederick Baron

August 20, 1975

Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination

Plan and Related Events in the Congo

Staff Members Present:

Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson,

Frederick Baron

The following is a summary of the contents of an interview

conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961)

in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was

conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the

Carroll Arms Hotel.

At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to

take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter

as "COS".

COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS

COS said that he arrived in the Congo as Chief of Station in

early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before

he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either

Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Iweedy (Chief, Africa Division)

about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after

arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in

late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination

at those meetings, either.

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After his return to the Congo, probably in early September,

COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words,

"someone I would recognize would appear to give me instructions for

a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb

arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb

from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made

clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable.

Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this

meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early

September, 1960. COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal

biological agents had been developed for the assassination of

Lumumba.. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus

and

probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag.

But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived

shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber

gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment

for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances

were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else

that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of

the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were

approximately three different types of lethal substances provided

to him.

COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment

to him of the assassination of Lumumba. COS said that he was a

junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down"

the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never

18

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heard of anything like this," Cos's best recollection was that he

had the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb:

COS :

Gottlieb:

COS :

Gottlieb:

Where did this brilliant idea come from?

The top.

Who at the top?

The Director has instructions from President

Eisenhower.

COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the

interchange, although this was his best recollection. He said

Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to

remove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explained

the source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made it

clear that the President was the source. COS said it was possible

that Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that he

mentioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President."

In

response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import

of Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told him

something to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest

authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said that

Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place by

means of the biological agents he was supplying.

COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility

of assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassi-

nation. "They were serious about it... it was clear that the

policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said

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he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed

with the assassination operation.

COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connec-

tion with the Unitéd States if the biological agents were to be

employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for

use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved

forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said

that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the

assassination, Gottlieb

made it clear that "I was to do it or find

a way to do it."

COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would

lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long

period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what

the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his

bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there

were no customs checks in the Congo."

COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only

he had access.

He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime

later -- probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose

of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no

training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons.

COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him

that it left the traces of a normal disease.

COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the

poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't

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think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not

tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it.

COS said

that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance

for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and

the DCI, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment

of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a

double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and re-

questing confirmation. I then received a cable containing double-

talk confirmation, something like 'your assumption confirmed.'"

COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They

also said 'Director' and I sent my cables with a special slug. My.

cables were probably marked to 'Director" which is never actually

seen by the DCI. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables

on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said

that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo

Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was

not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy.

COS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields.

He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with

DI. Lester Houck because Houck was

removed as Branch Chief in early

fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance.

COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad

idea, both morally and practically." However, COS said that he

may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was

so taken aback at receiving the assignment. COS thought that he

told Gottlieb that he did not have a good means of access to Lumumba.

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COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with

Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the

context of his (COS's) feeling: "Thank God I never, had to use

it."

COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as

a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation.

Cos does not recall that anyone other than the President and the

DCI were indicated

,as the source of authority for the assassination

operation.

O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO

COS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in the

Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COS

said that O'Donnell "came to eliminate Lumumba." COS did not re-

call whether O'Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell.

COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he had

the impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of

Lumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was drag-

ging my feet and that I might be relieved."

COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting with

Sidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have a

specific recollection. COS said he would not dispute O 'Donnell's

testimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison virus

was in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded"

as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use.

But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included

as one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussed

6

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with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from "protective custody."

But he does not specifically remember this.

COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of

the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of

time drinking."

COS said that he was not aware of any action

O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of

Lumumba.

COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the

beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some

action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it."

COS said that he asked O'Donnell to clear with him any major

actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that

O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately

Christmas.

LUMUMBA'S ESCAPE

COS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was

a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do

with it, although they investigated the incident.

COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about

where Lumumba was and how he got out. But I did not get much good

information.

It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville.

The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on

this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the

Congolese."

COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect

that Lumumba might start an uprising against 'white devils.' But

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when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned

from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thys-

ville.

COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESSINES IN ROME

In November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome

to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Iweedy and Thomas Karamessines

(then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events

in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS

remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's

escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he does not recall

any specific discussion of assassination. He said, "Perhaps we

did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. I

had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination."

BRONSON TWEEDY

COS assumed that Iweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination

plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan

with Iweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in

possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson

Iweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank God nothing

was ever done.'"

Cos did not remember whether Iweedy came to the Congo before

Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have come later. COS

said, however, that if Iweedy had come earlier he probably would

have asked Iweedy about the assassination mission.

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COS INFORMS DCI SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that in response to Schlesinger's request for reports

on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him.

COS said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received

instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba. COS said that he did

not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger. COS said that Schlesinger

did not make a response to this information. COS was unaware of

any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger.

OTHERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY, BISSELL, and DULLES were

witting of the assassination plan. COS said that he did have

occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to time, but he does not

remember discussing assassination in any form with DULLES.

COS said, "I might have mentioned the assassination plan to

COLBY when he became Director." However, COS does not have any

specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY.

COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassina-

tion plan.

COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL

in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations.

COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with

ARNOLD SILVER.

PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN

COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William

Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE). COS said he never discussed

assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey.

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COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O'Donnell

may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said,

however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the

Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJWIN's activities.

WIROGUE

COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor why

or how he came to the Congo. When his recollection was refreshed

by seeing cable traffic, COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man

to handle. For a short time, WIROGUE became a major in the Congolese

Army. COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a sur-

veillance team. COS did not recall discussing WIROGUE with O'Donnell.

COS's only specific recollection is of being in WIROGUE's

apartment and discussing an assassination squad. COS does not

think that he mentioned the use of QWIN in connection with this

"execution squad." COS said that it was conceivable that he had

approached WIROGUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba.

But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE

did not know what he was doing. COS also said it was unlikely

that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE's approach to

QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related

to the actual assassination mission. Instead, it was merely

evidence that WIROGUE was out of control.

MOVING LUMUMBA TO KATANGA

COS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Lumumba

was being held there. COS was in contact with various Congolese

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officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to

fly to Thysville to put down the munity. COS attempted to con-

vince them not to go together. They did succeed in putting down

the mutiny.

COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga

until after it happened. COS said his discussions with Mobutu

about Mobutu's intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression

that Lumumba might be executed.

COS said that Jack Hasey was the Acting Base Chief in

Elizabethville, and was succeeded by David Whipple, who became

Base Chief in Katanga. COS also said that Ambassador Clare H.

Timberlake worked closely with COS, but they never discussed with

him the general question of assassination.

TESTIMONY UNDER ALIAS

At the outset of the interview, the Committee staff agreed

to honor COS's request to testify under alias. COS, who is still

in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal

danger there if he were linked to this story. He said, "They

might make me take the big high jump.

I've been on the 'zap list'

before."

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AFFIDAVIL

Dillon talent:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

INVENTORIED:

AN 3/31/77

_BC

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath

depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under

Secretary of State.

During approximately. 35-40 percent of

that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of

Secretary

Herter's absence from Washington.

secretary esthe shoe depart met under facetan of state,

had served as

Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee.

When

I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my

earlier responsibilities

for foreign economic policy.

Accord-

ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was

designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Robert

Murphy was

appointed

to this position and took over the State

Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of

State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com

mittee decisions:

On occasion I met with the

54/12 Committee

and participated

in its deliberations..

During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-

cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of

either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly

after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-

ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-

cussed.

During the discussion, which covered a great variety

of matters, my recollection is

that a question regarding the

possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was

briefly

raised.

The CIA representative indicated that the Agency

did not undertake this sort of operation.

This ended considera-

tion of this subject.

With this one exception I never heard any

discussion of assassination

attempts against anyone.

Dated this l day of May, 19.75.

exteen

Douglas Dillon

C.

Subscribed and

sworn to before me

this

_day Of May 1975,1

PROPERTY AF

THE WHITE HOW DES TICE

Notary Publi

District of Columbia

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-_ECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM:

RE:

DATE:

William G. Miller

Fritz Schwarz

Curt Smothers

Bill Bader

Burt Wides

Rhett Dawson

Frederick Baron

Douglas Dillon Interview

August 28, 1975

I spoke today by phone with Douglas Dillon, who was on vacation

in Maine, concerning a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the

Rockefeller Commission on May 21, 1975. The paragraph records Dillon's

recollection that

"On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly

after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-

ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-

cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of

matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possi-

bility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly

raised.

The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did

not undertake this sort of operation.

This ended consideration

of this subject.

With this one exception I never heard any

discussion of assassination attempts against anyone!:

I explored

the

subject of this meeting generally with Mr. Dillon on the

phone and set an appointment for him to review documents and testify on

Tuesday, September 2, at 3:00 p.m.. in Room G 308.

On the phone Dillon gave the following background information

on the meeting at the Pentagon:

1. This was not a small meeting; eight or ten people attended.

He did not think it was a meeting of a small body.

He said it was

not a Special Group meeting or NSC meeting.. But he was clear that

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2

wras a high-level meeting due to the participants.

2. He believes the participants included the Secretary of

==-mense because Dillon's recollection is firm on the fact that

—=-reeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

-ion did not remember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting,

- he said "top CIA people were present". Dillon said Richard

_=-sell was probably present. Dillon does not recall a man

named

sert Johnson, nor does he recall whether such a man was present

she neeting, but he said that we might be able to refresh his

= llection by giving him more backgreund on Robert Johnson.

did not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson's

=imony before the Committee; I simply asked if Jöhnson

sent at the meeting.)

3.

The mention of the subject of assassinating Lumumba was

== in the general context, Dillon said, of Lumunba's visit to

_United States, which had "convinced us that Lumumba was

• shopathic, not in a well-balanced mental state. After his

-it we wondered whether there was any way of changing the scenery

¿he Congo." Dillon said the subject was raised in the general

=_==-sext of "eliminating Lumumba"'

but the discussion did not

-coceed as far as mentioning means to be used.

4.

Dillon

said that the

response of the "CIA representative"

"not necessarily a moral objection

to assassination but was

→ in the

sense of indicating

that the CIA did not have that

— of capacity".

Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who

the remark.

6

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Now Joki: 1.24. 10029

1975 SEP 26

ГН

SELECT CO:

NEE

INFELLGENCE ACTIVI

• September 23, 1975.

Dear Mr. Dawson:

affidavit.

I enclose herewith Mr. Dillon's signed and notarized

Sincerely yours,

Lordy de Bard gane

Dorothy de Borchgrave

Mi. Rhett Dawson

Senate Select Committee

Room G-308

New Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 20510

or admen

6-416

Cook

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State of New York

county of llica Yorki

* This is cudexed almate

listo tres tie; the dece

Crampt be

SS:

Govind

C. Douglas Dillon, being duly sworn, deposes and

says: I have read the attached statement. consisting of

two pages prepared by Rhett Dawson, Counsel to the Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect

to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with

him on September 15, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify

this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

C.

Douglas Dillon

Sworn to before me

this

day of September, 1975.

Notary Public

CECILIA A. VERDON

Notary Public, State of Now York

No. 31-4095135

Qualified in New York County

Commission Expires March 30,

1977

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STATEMENTS BY C: DOUGLAS DILLON

TO RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975

I, C. Douglas Dillon, do wish to make the following

statement.

1. On September 15, 1975 I was shown by Rhett Dawson,

Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities, what he represented to

me to be

documents of the National Security Council of the below

dates:

Exhibit 1. Minutes of the 45lst Meeting

of the

National Security Council

held in the Cabinet Room of The White House

1960,

9: 00-11:00 a.m.

Exhibit 2.

Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting

of the National Security Council,

Thursday, July 21, 1960

Exhibit 3.

Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting

of the National Security Council,

Thursday, August 18, 1960

Exhibit 4.

Minutes of the 456th Meeting

of the

National Security Council

held in the Cabinet Room of The White !louse

Thursday A Sten on Aust 0, 190)

9: 00-11:00

Exhibit 5.

Minutes of the 458th Meeting

of the

National Security Council

held in the Cabinet Room of The White House

2: 30-4:30 P.M.

1960

Exhibit 6.

Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting

of the National Security Council,

Wednesday, September 21, 1960

17W7

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2. The documents shown to me do not in any way refresh my

recollection beyond the statements contained therein as to events related to the

Congo in the summer and early fall of 1960. I still do not have an independent

recollection of any specific conversation regarding the assassination of Patrice

Lumumba other than that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission

and in my testimony before the Select Committee on September 2.

3. I was informed by Mr. Dawson that Mr. Robert Johnson has testified

that he recollected a statement by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which

he construed as being an order for the assassination of Lumumba. After seeing

the documents listed above I am of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC

meeting of August 18, 1960 is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson. Although

the record shows that I was present at that meeting I have no personal recollection

of any such statement or order by the President.

4. I note that as to the Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting

of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above)

a page or pages immediately before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing

5. It is my understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be

appended to this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee.

Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975.

Rhett Dawson,

Counsel

Senate Select Committee to Study

Government Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities

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MEMORANDUM

To :

The Files

From:

Frederick D. Baron

INVENTORIED:

on 3/a/11

BY-

Date:

Re :

September 5, 1975

Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was

Deputy secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration

from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him

in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that

a phone conversation with Gates about the

Pentagon meeting

(at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi-

nating Lumumba)

Gates

named James Douglas as a person likely

to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he

never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba

raised

in his presence.

"I never heard speculation that it was even

on anyone's mina," he said.

Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon

in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where

the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas

says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but

he has no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some

regularity.

Frequently, however, these meetings were attended

by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-

national Security Affairs during that period.

Douglas said

that Irwin was

"more actively in contact with the State Depart-

ment and the CIA during this time."

(Irwin is now practicing

law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of

Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.

NH 50955. DocId: 32123566

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## Page 23

Memo to Files

September

5, 1975

Page Two

I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of

September

8, 1960. Douglas was in attendance at this

meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped

that CIA people were

"fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the

discussion to which it related.

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not

numbers are:

(312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

CC:

Rhett Dawson

Burt Wides

Fritz Schwarz

Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm

NH 50955 DocId: 32423566

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## Page 24

MEMORANDUM

To:

The Files

From: Frederick D. Baron

INVENTORIED:

ON 3/31/11

BY

BC

Date:

September 5, 1975

Re:

Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was

Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration

{rom early December 1959 untii January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him

in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that

in a phone conversation with Gates about the

Pentagon meeting

(at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi-

nating Lumumba) Gates

named

James

Douglas as a person likely

to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he

never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba

raised

in his presence.

"I never heard speculation that it was even

on anyone's mina," he

said.

Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon

in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where

the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas

says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but

he has no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some

regularity.

Frequently, however, these meetings were attended

by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-

national Security Affairs during that period.

Douglas said

that Irwin was

"more actively in contact with the State Depart-

ment and the CIA during this time."

(Irwin is now practicing

law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of

Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.

N 50953 Doeld: 32423566 Page 24

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## Page 25

Memo to Files

September 5, 1975

Page Two

I read to him a quote from the Special Group minutes of

September 8, 1960.

Douglas was in attendance at this

meeting. Mr. Gordon

Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped

that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the

discussion to which it related.

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not

be necessary to call him

to testify on the Lumumba matter.

1r. Douglas'

phone numbers are:

(617) 693-1353 (until September

29)

and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

CC :

Rhett Dawson

Burt Wides

Fritz Schwarz

Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm

50955 Do01d:32423566

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## Page 26

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO,

CHAIRMAN

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JF

WALTER DECIONDALE, MINN.

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

ROBERT MORGAN. NIC.

HAn MAN. 4019.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

NO HASMO GENG, MINORIT COUNSEL

IX-C-2-g-W(IRWIN)

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY: GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 86TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510

11 October 1975

KC

INVENTORIED:

3/31/77

Mr. John N. Irwin II

BY.

Patterson,

Belknap and Webb

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr: Irwin:

Thank you for sending the rewritten version of your affida-

vit. All of the changes you have made are perfectly satis-

factory and accurately reflect my understanding of the state-

ments you made on September 22.

I am enclosing the statement with my signature so that you

may proceed to sign and swear to it.

Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, it would be

appreciated if you will not retain a copy of the

affidavit. A

copy will remain on file at the Committee and accessible to you

at any time.

I look forward to receiving the sworn statement. Once

again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention

to this matter.

Sincerely,.

Fredrice Best

Frederick D. Baron

Special Assistant to the

Chief Counsel

1601.3

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STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN II

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower

Administration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs.

My current business

address is c/o Patterson, Balknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller

Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020.

1.. On September 22, 1975 in my office I reviewed with

Mr. Baron the following documents in an attempt to refresh

my recollection on discussions that took place at certain

governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of

the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and August

25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National

Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and

September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC

Meetings of July 15, 1960 and

September 7, 1960. These

documents indicate that I attended all of these meetings

except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, which Mr. Hadyn

Williams of ISA attended. I also reviewed the affidavit

of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter

alla, to

a meeting

at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection

by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no

direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize.

WW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 27

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## Page 28

2

I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan

connected

to the United States Government during the entire

course of my government service. I do not recall ever

hearing of the CIA adopting any assassination plan, nor do I

recall ever hearing the

President make a statement that

could be construed as an order for the assassination of

Patrice Lumumba.

3.' In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that

in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the

Record of the Special Group Meeting of August 25, 1960 is

sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a

discussion of assassination:

It was finally agreed that planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out "con-

sideration" of any particular kind of activity

which might contribute to getting rid of

Lumumba.

However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have

any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4. In answer to a question from MI. Baron I said that

in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the

Record of the NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960 is sufficiently

broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of

assassination:

NW 50955

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3

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power

in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba

was not yet disposed of and remained a

grave danger as long as he was not dis-

posed of.

However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I

have any direct recollection of the substance of that

meeting.

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me

on the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18, 1960, I

do not have any recollection of such a report, nor do I have

any other recollection of learning by another source of any

of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.

6. It is possible

that I was present at the meeting

at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. How-

ever, I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting;

nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where

the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.

7. In answer to a question from MI. Baron I said

that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director

of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassi-

nation operation without an express directive from the

President.

Prepared by me on this

gth

October

_day of

• 1975

Freich D. Baron

Frederick D. Baron

Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel

Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities

HH 50955 DooId: 32423566

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## Page 30

+8-8-2-9-400in

SEL COM

File:

September 23, 1975

Mr. John N. Irwin II

Patterson,

Bellknap & Webb

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I

prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions or correc

tlons in the statement. It would be appreciated it you

would matl a

sworn copy of your statement to me as soon

as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this natter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron

Special Assistant to the

Chief Counsel

Enclosure

FDB/ do

вес :

Fritz ScHwarz

5

NW 50955

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## Page 31

STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN II

TO FREDERICK. D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Admin-

istration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense. My

current business address is c/o Patterson, Bellknap. & Webb, 30

Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York.

1. On September 22, 1975 in my law office I reviewed the

following documents to refresh my recollection on discussions that

took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum For

the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and

August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National

Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and

September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings

of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. As indicated in these

documents, I attended all of these meetings except the NSC

meeting of August 18, 1960, where I was represented by Mr. Hadyn

Williams. I also reviewed the affidavit of C. Douglas Dillon

dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a meeting at the

Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2 .

Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by

reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct

recollection of the discussions which they memorialize. I do

not

recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to

the United States government during the entire course of my

4

NN 50955 DooId: 32423566

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## Page 32

.. - 2-

government

service. I do not recall whether I ever heard of the

CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I

ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed

as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

3. It is my opinion as a former member of the Special

Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25, 1960 that

the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad

enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

It was finally agreed that planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out "con-

sideration" of any particular kind of activity

which might contribute to getting rid of

Lumumba.

However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have

any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting..

4. It is my opinion as a frequent participant in NSC

meetings and as a participant in the meeting of September 21,

1960, that the following language from the Memorandum for the

Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power

in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was

not yet disposed of and remained a grave

danger as long as he was not disposed of.

However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have

any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the

substance of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have

NH 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 32

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## Page 33

- 3-

any recollection of such a report nor do I have any other recol-

lection of learning by another source of any of the substance

of the discussion at that meeting.

6. It is likely that I was present at the meeting at the

Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers..

However, I do

not remember if I was at this particular meeting; nor do I re-

member whether I was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where

the question of assassinating Patrice Lunumba was raised.

7. It is my general opinion that it would be improper for

the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination

operation without an

express directive from the President.

Prepared by me on this 22nd day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron,

Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel

Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities

AW 50955

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33

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## Page 34

State of New York

• County of

SS :

JOHN N. IRWIN II, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have read the attached statement consisting of three pages

prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select

Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him

on September 5, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-

ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

John N. Irwin II

Sworn to before me this

day of September, 1975.

Notary Public

NH 50955

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## Page 35

MEZ ORANDUL OF CONVERSATION

WITH ROBERT JORISON

SUEJICT:

ASSASSINATION OF LJMUMPA

PARTICIPANTS:

MR. JORISON AND MR. WILLIAM G. MILLER

DATE:

JUNE 10, 1975

Mr. Robert Johnson who is now at the Overseas Development Council

for the surier, telephone 234-8701, was

a member of the National Security

Council staff working on Asian affairs in the last two years of the

Eisenhower Administration and the first jear of the Kennedy Administration.

He said that on occasion, when people were on vacation, he was assigned

the task of taking notes at NSC neetings. In July or August of 1960,

Mr. Johnson had the tasks of note taking. After a revier of world evente,

by Director of CIA Dulles, which included a description of Mr. Innumba's

activities in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the meeting in

the full hearing of all those in attendance, and said sonething to the effect

that Luaumba should be eliminated. According to lir. Johnson, there was

a stunned silence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continued. He

said lie wrote the notes and that if they still exist, they are probably

In the Eisenhower Presidential papers. He said that notes generally in

presidential papers, official documents of the ISC, rerain with the NSC.

He said that the impression at the time vas one of great shock. He eaid

he had heard of nothing like that since.

He said &t was uncha racheristic

of Eisenhower to speak of anything of eubstance during ISC meetings,

reserving judguent to private meetings.

He does not renember exactly

who was at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulles, and possibly Janes Lay,

Gordon Gray and Robert adory.

50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 35

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## Page 36

- 2=

I asked if he would be willing to say this under sworn testimony.

He said that baving

gone this far he would, but he cautioned that 15

years had passed and he could not vouch for the exact wording, although

his menory of the impact of the neeting is firm.

Mr. Johnson called one how after the meeting saying that upon

reflection, he would prefer not to testify. 1l at all possible unless it

absolutely escential. He fears retribution, saying that such

testimonies in the past have blackballed people who were interested in

working for the government. Again, he cited people who had testified

for the rigat cause

such as the Dodd case. He said he would testity

if it were deemed to be absolutely necessary but he did cant to raise

this question.

50955

DooId: 32423566

Page

36

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## Page 37

IX-0-2-g-01

3-1

MEMORANDUM

TO :

From:

Date:

Re :

The Files

Frederick D. Baron

September 5, 1975

DN-

3/31/17

Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case.

I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon

to supplement the earlier interview (June 10, 1975) and

examination (June 18, 1975) that the Committee conducted

with him. At the beginning of the conversation I explained

there were a number of questions raised by his interview

and examination that needed to be answered on the record.

Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington

in the near future and because of the limited amount of addi-

tional information he was able to provide, we agreed that I

would memorialize the important points or

our interview in the

form of an affidavit to which Mr. Johnson would swear.

The following points are related as faithfully as

possible in the manner in which Mr. Johnson made them:

1. I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba

with lethal biological substances.

2.

To the best of my recollection, President Eisen-

hower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made

the statement relating to Lumumba about which I

have testified.

3.

After the meeting at which I heard the statement

by President Eisenhower which I described in my

testimony on June 18, 1975, I must have consulted

James Lay (Executive

Secretary of the NSC) for

advice on how to treat the President's statement

in my memorandum of the meeting.

Mr. Lay was

meticulous about including in the record

some

form

of reference to every major subject that was dis-

cussed at NSC meetings.

So we probably included

the President's statement in some form, but in

what form I do not know.

In general, these memo-

randa would be as complete as we could make them.

Nevertheless, on something as sensitive as this,

we may have decided to handle it with euphemism.

4 ..

The NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 is probably

not the meeting at which I heard the President's

NW 50955

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## Page 38

Memo for the Files

Page

two

September 5, 1975

statement in reference to Lumumba. Based on Mr.

Baron's representation that I am not listed (either

by name or position) among the participants in the

memorandum of record, I am convinced that I heard

the President's statement at a different meeting.

5. After hearing Mr. Baron read portions of the minutes

of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 to me, I

do have a recollection of some of the subject matter

This would not

be unusual, however, because as a member of the NSC

Planning Board I received a debriefing on the sub-

ject matter of each NSC meeting.

I do not, however,

have

a recollection of the statement by Mr. Dulles

as related in the minutes of the meeting:

"Lumumba

not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger

as long

as

he was

not disposed of."

50955

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## Page 39

IX-C-2-9-

WLAY)

INVENTORIED:

ON 3 31 71

STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1995

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley,

Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary,

of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board,

to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in

NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings

was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and

not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance

of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba

in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas-

sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a

remark at an NSC meeting that could have been

construed as an order

to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any

NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United

States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as

the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive

Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared

first draft of the official NSC minutes

subject to my review and

NH 50955. DocId: 32423566

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## Page 40

- 2-

revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC

meeting; it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC

minutes would record only the general subject discussed without

identifying the specially sensitive subject or

the discussion.

In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be

made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no

fixed procedure for

recording the discussions of these sensitive

matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance.

Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not

need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full

record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circu-

lated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members

for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and

decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved

by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these

extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly con-

trolled distribution.

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975:

Trederich D. Baron

Frederick D. Baron

Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel

Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect

to Intelligence Activities

10

1W 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page

40

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## Page 41

State of Virginia

county of foge

SS :

JAMES. LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I

have read the attached statement consisting of

two pages pre-

pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select

Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him

on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-

ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

fames Lau

James Lay,

Sworn to before me this - 26 th

day of September, 1975.

Herps

S. Lenit

Notary Public

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 2021277

NIN 50955

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9

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Ix-C-2-9-10c1a4)

SEL COM

File:

September 23, 1975

Mr. James Lay

Route 2, Box 273-A

Stanley, Virginia 22851

Dear Mr. Lay:

Enclosed please

find a copy of the statement I

prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions or correc-

tions in the statement.

It would be appreciated if you

would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon

as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron

Special Assistant to the

Chief Counsel

Enclosure

bec:

Rhett Dawson

Fritz Schwarz

FDB/ do

118 50955

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## Page 43

STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

throughout: 1960. My sunmer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley,

Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary

of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board,

to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in

NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings

was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and

not as a policymaker!. I cannot at this time recall the substance

of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba.

in NSC meetings during this period.

2.. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas-

sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a

remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order

to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any

NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United

States was engaged.

5.

• In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as

the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive

Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared

first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and

NN 50955

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Bi

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## Page 44

-2 -

revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6.. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC

meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC

minutes would record only the general subject discussed without

identifying: the specially sensitive subject or the discussion.

In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be

made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no

fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive

matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance.

Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not

need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full

record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circu-

lated by highly classified memorandum to each

of the NSC members

for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and

decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved

by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these

extremely sensitive matters were

circulated on a very strictly con-

trolled distribution.

Prepared

by me on this 8th day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron

Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel

Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect

to Intelligence Activities

NH 50955

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## Page 45

State of Virginia

County of

SS :

JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I

have read the attached

statement consisting of two pages pre-

pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select

Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him

on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-

ment which is

true and correct to my direct knowledge.

James Lay

Sworn to before me this

day of September,

1975.

Notary Public

NH 50955

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5

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## Page 46

Septencher 9,1975

Icar hur; Barair:

me afraid

datement today to giand

may that the speaker used,

an endasie

2 redraft in. which a hamet

sincerel

Jones D. Ear fe

DISTRIBTUION

original * attachments = F Baron

Key + attachments = Research Center

cy no atts # blue

cy no atts = clerk

NH 50955 DocId: 32123566 Page 46

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statementsky fames 5, Za

To Zrideiice D. Barau au Septetaher 8,1975

I was the Eucntue Secietai

the hational Sécuity Cauucisy of

sumnneeaddiess

tuanghaat 1860. 273 , saeley Vigue

Viguia

2285%

the Cauga Viu NSCmsetuigo duin

1960. hyy piucipalfuuction at NSC

2..

was auy dis cussion afassassinating

Lunnunda at au, NSC meetiugo,

President Eisenharee evee made a

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have been coustined as au order to

assassinate Lumunha,

4, I do nat recallect coletter

any reference was made at an

a tiest dialt

do notes in rise el test dict

approval.

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N'SC minutes,

?. after having. hu; Baron read too

September 21,1960, l still da no

recollect the substance of the

bis cuscion that took place at that

meeting Quatation)

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STATEMENT BY "ROBERT MARANA"

1O FREDERICK BARON ON NOVEMBER 14, 1975 VENTED

331/17

BC

SY

I am a current employee of the Central Intelligence

Agency. My current

address is c/o Review Staff, Central In-

telligence Agency, Langley, Virginia.

1. In 1960, I was employed by the CIA and one of my

responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as

the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under

the cryptonym "WIROGUE." I read most of the cable traffic re-

lating to WIROGUE until the point of the termination of his re-

lationship with the Agency.

2.. To the best of my knowledge, I participated in all

training that WIROGUE received in preparation for his assignment

to the Congo in 1960.

3. WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in

my presence. I am not aware that he was provided with any such

training.

4. I have no knowledge of any CIA plot to assassinate

Patrice Lumumba. I have no knowledge that WIROGUE was ever

connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba, nor have I heard

any hint or suggestion of such a connection.

5. I hereby affirm that "Robert Marana" is an alias which

is registered at the CIA along with my true identity. My true

signature is affixed to this affidavit. The Senate Select

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- 2 --

Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit from which

my true signature will be deleted.. This statement will remain

on file at the CIA and will be available for verification purposes

for not less than five years.

Filench D. Bacon

Frederick !:

saLon,

Special Assistant

co the Chief Counsel, senate select

Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence

Activities

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

INVENTORIED;

DN..

August * 29, 1975

3/31/71

BL

Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963

National Security Council Meeting

of the March

On this 13, 1963 meeting

I listened to a portion of the tape

• of the National Security

Council (President present).

I listened to it several

times in order to check it against the Library trans-

cript of

that meeting.

The relevant portion of the statement by John McCone

reads as

follows:

"With respect to Cuba, the thinking in the Agency is...

we have to first get rid of the Soviets

...troops, and

as stated ((several words garbled)) and use every resource we

have available--political, diplomatic, otherwise--to accom-

plish

that.

Once that is done, then we believe that the

monolithic structure of the Castro regime can be broken up.

Maybe we'll have to catalyze it a little bit.

But we think

that there are enough indicators of distress within the

military and within his political organization so that

once the Soviets are out

some. military coup can be..

will be brought about which will remove the Castro

government, and with a strong possibility of replacing

that government with a government more favorable to our

interests

in the Western Hemisphere.

Now, this is...

s a lot of ifs connected with that,

but it seems

to use, after having thought about this a good deal, that

some such action as that is a more probably course or

action that would be successful than to try to out..to

envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the

absence of the military...With the military and security

forces on behalf of Castro, they can very easily frustrate

and defeat any civilian uprising. I think, as time goes

on, that our principal problem is going to be dealing

with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America.

I think the problems of the Bay of Pigs and the october

incident and the missiles will disappear, and more anc

more attention is going to be brought on

the part of the

people on the Hill... is going to be...is how we're going

to dispose of this problem.

Then the President speaks.

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- ORIGINAL

TOP SECRET

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctions

The 3uitrù Stater Sruate R1018

INVENTORIEDE

IN 311/77

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With

• Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 2, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

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Testimony of:

C. Douglas Dillon

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Exhibits

Exhibit No. 1

Exhibit No. 2

Exhibit No. 3

Exhibit No. 4

Exhibit No. 5

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

-

Tuesday, September 2, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock

p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart

presiding.

Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson,

Professional Staff Members.

. Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the

record, please?

Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address

is Far Hills, New Jersey.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we

must go through with every witness.

I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have

the right to counsel here today?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware.

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TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLON

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Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering

questions at any point to seek advice of counsel?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me.

Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appearing here today

without counsel?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your

constitutional rights intact here before the Committee,

including your Fifth

Amentment rights?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that.

Mr. Baron.

Mr. Dillon, could you please give the

• Committee a general idea of your position in the Government

from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961?

Mr. Dillon. In late 1959

I was Under Secretary of State,

which was the number two position in the State Department.

And I continued in that position until 1961.

My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as

the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting

Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity

I had to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything

that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill

in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those

days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because

there were travels abroad, and various reasons. I think I

mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting

Secretary at least a third of the time during that period.

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My other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be

in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which

included economic areas of the State Department, and also

included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which

was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I

had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the

Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the legislation passed

each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a director

of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And

also

military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was

run through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State

Department official involved in that area.

So I had those two different functions. And for that

reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on

intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been

prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the

Under Secretary had always ahndled that. Mr. Herter, who was

my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before.

When I became Under Secretary I became so under a new law that

had been passed in 1953, at which time I was promoted to

Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the

number three job in the Department. That legislation provided

that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under

Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretary

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for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be

the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under

Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area,

which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under

Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under

Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities.

So the number three fellow was named Under Secretary for

Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr.

Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of

the Special Group.

Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not

handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it

was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got

above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political

Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important,

I was notified, because I had to know about them if an

emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town.

But

that was not my particular problem.

Mr. Barron.

so you would be kept notified of major

developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr.

Merchant?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments.

And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionally

on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealt

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with economic assistance to the various political groups in

different countries when they needed help.

Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings

regularly?

Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite

regularly whenever I was in town, eith in --

(Off the record discussion)

Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, do you swear that the testimony

you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Dillon. I do.

Senator Hart. Just for the record, you also understand

that all of the testimony you have given will be covered by

the oath?

Mr. Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your

constitutional rights?

Mr. Dillon. They have.

Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer?

(The witness' last ansver was read.)

Mr. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of

State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the

Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had

overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and

economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was

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important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at

National Security meetings. And they took place as you know,

at that time on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was

morning.

Mr. Baron. And where did they take place? " w:

Mr. Dillón. In the Capitol Room at the White House.

Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of

State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a

foreign leader or a foreign government?

Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would

assume that I would have been aware of them.

Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any

communications or orders running from the President to the

Director of Central Intelligence?

Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been given in my presence

and. I had heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of

them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State

Department to be aware of it, - and they usually did, there

was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special

Assistant and would keep everybody notified. But that won? n

wouldn't necessarily mean that we knew of every particular

thing.

Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major

CIA covert activities?

Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were all

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discussed at one time or another in the National Security

Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, because

the major activity that was just getting underway at that time

was

very much aware of the development of the capability to

move against Cuba.

MI. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of

that development?

Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was

the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban

exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were

rather general in nature, but öf which I was aware of in some

detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would

not be ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until

sometime next year. So if a decision was to be made to use il:

them, it would have come in the following Administration.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA

plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Dillon. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that

subject?

Mr. Dillon. None whatsoever.*

Mr. Baron. So although.you.were aware.ofuCIA.cövert/

activities against the Cuban regime, you were completely

unaware of any assassination effort against Castro?

t Mr. Dillon: The major activity was the building.up.of

this: capacity among the Cuban exiles, or supposed capacity,

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to invade Cuba and cause a change in regime.

Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the

Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of

Administrations you resigned from the State Department in

contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy

Administration as Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

I might as well explain that in some detail, because it

was an unusual situation.

That fall, I think it was in october, just prior to the

election in early October, due to some mishay in London, the

Bank of England failed to support the price of gold at a

given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an

aounce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation

in the financial markets over this, the first time that it

had happened since the thirties when the price had been set.

And there began to be an outflow of gold from the Us at the r

rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in

those days. And it was very disturbing.

That continued through the election. And if anything, it

intensified after the election.

During the election, of course, as a member of the

Republic Administration while the State Department was not

involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt

from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously a

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supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at

that time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after the

election, about three weeks after the election, I received a

telephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whom

I did not know. And he told me on the telephon that Senator

Kennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the Foreign

Relations Committee -- would like to come and see me that

night.

And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal,

I will go see him.

He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to

come to see you.

And I said, very good. I will be home all night.

So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he told

me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the

lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US and

the world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trusted

him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he

was going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anything

about finances.

And so what he wanted was to appoint someone whom he

thought would carry weight around the world, and yet who was

sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. And

he had read some speeches I had made at one time or another

in my economic capacity with the State Department which

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pretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite

contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue

where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our

growh. And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report

that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year

if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so

forth.

And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in

Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just

great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of

course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to

it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had been

released, he had been there and made:a speech and said some of

it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull

an dry as a result. It was written largely or suggested

largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the

Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find

anything wrong with that.

And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't

doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he

thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency

and all that.

Well, this came as a great surprise to me. I had made

all my plans to go back home.

To make a long story short, I talked to various people,

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including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury.

And he said I: should do this. And quite a few people did.

And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did

do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic

advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice

that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was

serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways. And one

commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that

it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a

very

easy thing for me to agree to.

And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of

the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at

which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December I

had a call from him when I got back that morning saying that

he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do

this if I would agree.

So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my

meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator

Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much. And I saw him.

And we talked about certain financial things that might be a

problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to

be.

And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise,

went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and took

me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before

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Dillon Exhibit 5 veptember 22, 2260

NENORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Discussion at the 460th Meeting

of the fiational security Council,

Wednesday, September 21, 1960

Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the

United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon);

the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of

Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the

Meeting and participating In the Council Actions below were the

Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget;

the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Connerce

(items f, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Derrett)

and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import

Bank of Washington (Items 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council on

Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting were

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intel-

ligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Secu-

rity Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant

Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Packard for the

Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency;

the White House Staff Secretery; the Assistant White House Staff

Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive

Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting

and the main points taken.

1.

WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM

(NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,

subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC

3011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August

29, and

September 19, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of

Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the leeting

and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President

said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospecto

for petroleun production in Libya.

He had been told that the

Libyan reserves exceeded even the

Sabara reserves. He asked

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untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was

announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary

of the Treasury.

That rather limited my capacity in the State Department.

But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things

up and make a proper turnover.

And then I resigned from the State Department in January

and continued that preparation for the new job.

And that is how that happened.

Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department - you

said

earlier to me on January 2nd or 3ra? i mid

:: Mr. DiIlon.: Or 4th or: 5th:, sometime in the first four.

or five or six days. And after: that one thing I ought to

make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in

the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I

think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles

had

probably dominated President Eisenhower in some aspects,

which I don't think was an accuare description of what

happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time.

So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he

put in some new people there.

And we came to be very close, and worked very well

together. And I had the greatest admiration for him.

He never at that time or later ever asked me anything about

my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy

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thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all.

Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan?

Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me.

And I think I might have been of some: help to him if he had,

because I had been aware of it right up through January, and in

particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at

the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the

use of our naval air if those people got in trouble. And I

don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy•

And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he

reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would

have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this

much about it.

Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did

you have contact with the CIA in any other, capacity on a

routine basis?

Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis.

Senator Hart.. Occasional basis?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back -

when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions,

for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department,

or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by

the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor,

he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that

capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear

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those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so

from time to time there were those moreorless informal

contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were

generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and

they needed something from the State Department:

Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of

questions by the staff on this sequence, but we may want to

get some questions on your experience during the US situation

on the Doctrine of "Plausible Deniability".

Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal

to say about.

Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.

Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your

affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you

joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for

advice on your State Department experience.

Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when

they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive

Committee.. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay

of pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me

better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he

called me in right at the beginning, and I had a very active

role in this period.

Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Admini-

stration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo

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affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as

itfell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this

was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of

my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me,

moreorless

as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury

should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the

Us effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was

going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And

so I did do thta. And that was the only foreign policy job

I did. And that was

economic in nature.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit

to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other

things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the

Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true

copy of your affidavit?

Mx. Dillon. It so appears.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have

affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of

1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington,

I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall

Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which

covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that

a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt

against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative

indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of

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operation.

This ended consideration of this subject. With

this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassina-

tion attempts

against anyone."

Do you recall this meeting now?

Mr. Dillon.

Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I

think probably should expand on that a little bit, because

in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be.

When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not

necessarily limited to -- or it might have been CIA personnel.

It also included encouraging one of the many factions that

might not like him there to take action on their own, with

CIA encouragement.

Senator Hart. What kind of encouragement, material

support, financial support?

Mr. Dillon. That, or moral support, if they did the US

would recognize them if they became the head, and would help

them.

Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can

recall of the passage o- weapons?

Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief,

very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that

time.

Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have

included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes.

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Mr. Baron. And it was a more general reference --

Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting some

where. In one of those other papers something was said about

getting rid of Lumumba. That was really moreorless the

objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but

just to get him out of the Congo and away.

Mr. Baron. Your clear impression that the suggestion

contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of

Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. As a possibility.

Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the

meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place?

Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense.

I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other

day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that

time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to

be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particular

meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took

place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there

or not.

It could be that he wasn't even there. But I think

it was in his own office that it took place.

Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought

he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling?

MI. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don't

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remember him being there or saying anything. All I remember

is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and

the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't

remember who they were - and the fact that the CIA people,

whoever: they were, were negative to any such action.

Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. I would

say

five or six, because I saw them

sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, of it

could have been seven or eight, no more.

Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so.

It was not a ruine

note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the

table with somebody as the Chairman.

Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words?

Mr. Dillon. It was aâ hoc.

Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the

nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent,

casual?

Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more orless silent, and

"there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral.

Senator Hart. There was no policy objection?

Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just

saying, no, it is not a possible thing.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather

than a-moral objection, as you have just said, it might have

been

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been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have the

capability to perform such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been just

something that they couldn't do, and therefore there is no

use talking about it.

Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meeting was probably

something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading role

in designing a policy for, right?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall the details of what was

ahppening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basic

recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty

difficult situation, with UN forces in there, and all sorts

of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper

mines were, and trying to get people out so they wouldn't get

killed.

There was always contingency planning, whether we

would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation

or something else. So it was a very mixed up and sort of a

hot situation at that time.

So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen would

be interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that he

personally had not given primary attention at any time to the

Congo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as I

mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those

meetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was at

that time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the Air

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Force, and maybe still was at that time.

Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurance to convene such

meetings at the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the

State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was

not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would

be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were

both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, we

would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible

would be this number three person in the State Department, he

would go to the Pentagon for many of the meetings, the

briefings and things like that which would be in the area of

the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal.

I wasn't there in my capacity.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in

attendance at this particular meeting?

Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with

the thing that I was talking with them about all the time, a

totally different subject, which was military aid. That could

well have been.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at

the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by name.

On the telephone you asked me about Bissell, whether he

might have been there. And

I answered, in all probability he

might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for

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many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that time

I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge

of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings:

there, or even at the White House. He was an advisor to Mr.

Dulles.

So I say that is very likely.

Mr. Baron.

By this sort of stuff would you mean covert

actions?

Mr. Dillon.

Covert actions or anything that was important

enough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA,

the President. He was a person there, one of the people that

was talked to about it. There were three people. There were

really at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that this was

a high level meeting -- a sufficiently high level meeting so

that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. He could have been.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would have

been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the

meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I imagine there must have been some represen-

tative of the military there. But I don't know who it would

have been. But there must have been someone else if the

Secretary of Defense was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn't

allow these things, he might have been there. That is just

supposition.

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Mr. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that

despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA

people were there, it was clear to you that some top level

CIA people were there?

Mr. Dillon.

Top enough, so that something like this could

be raised and moreorless dispösed of without even thinking

of it any further.

Senator Hart. Let me insert a question, if I might. This

is a philosophical question.

First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or

informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or

President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever

arise?

Mr. Dillon. As far as I

know, as I recall, in dealing

directly with either of them, no.

Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this

point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower,

and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think

the Committee would be interested in your view as to the

attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say,

the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?

Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult, thing to speculate

on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably

both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way,

most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence

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rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle.

That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few

cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy

of the Us, generally both of them were very much opposed to

it.

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Senator Hart. Off the record just a second.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the

Pentagon, I wonder if you could fill in

the nature of the

discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this

prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recally recall it, except that it

was bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and the

difficulty of working anything out with him, or the impossi-

bility of working anything out with him, and the exploration

of other possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particular

event which took place?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must have

taken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba's

visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was

that it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it was

impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government

as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time.

I don't think it would have possibly have occurred before he

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came.

We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to

better understanding with him.

Mr. Baron. Why did he strike you as being impossible to.

deal with in any way?

Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression

he made rather than the individual things he said. When he was

in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the

Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a mannter that seemed

almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in

the eye.

He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of

words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very

fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the

particular things that we wanted to discuss.

And it was just

like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he

was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only

characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational

being.

Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you

charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that

right?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you

and others at a high level in the State Department were,

extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position

in the Congo?

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112.

Mr. Dillon.

That is right.

MI. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the

prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting?

Mr. Dillon.

I don't. It very likely could have come from

somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from

the Defense Department in the international affairs areas,

someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the

State Department. There was probably someone there besides

myself. Because it wasn't usual to justibe alone talking

about this.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a

question or as a suggestion?

Mr. Dillon. No, as a question.

Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you

mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that

this was not within the capability of the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would

have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell,

but I think most likely Cabell.

Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met

with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960.

Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of

this conversation? It would be shortly after Lumumba's visit.

Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have

been it. And the record that you had must have been the

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record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to

earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were

supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his

visit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is why

they put this in. All I recall of the place and date is that

when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it must

have been

the

sunmer, July or August.

Mr. Baron.

Let me fill you in on a few other events that

were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this

refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that

might have existed at a meeting such as the one you attendec

in reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that on

the 12th of July the US had sent a carrier, the wasp, to the

Congo, although we had refrained from sending troops to the

Congo.

Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicated

that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do

everything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo.

Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year

contract with CINCO, a large American resources company.

But

that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the

Congo the following day, on the 26th of July -I am sorry, it

was disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the following

day. And it was in that setting that Lumumba then came to

Washington.

While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter

pledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was the

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Head of the CIMCO Company that had this huge contract in the

Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the

situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed

or not in the congo.

Do you recall any of that background? And does that

refresh your recollection about the urgency of the situation

at that time?

Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there

were - which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informall

conversations - that there were talks

at the time about the

possibility of using US military force in one way or another

-- I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits

right

in with that sort of general recollection, that it was

something that we were very worried about. And I don't

remember this particular contract with this company. In fact,

I don't think I have ever heard of CiMO.

Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of

the ordering of the lasp to the congo -- or to the shores of

Africa?

Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do

remember that there was consideration of the use of military

- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and

things of that nature, too, at that time.

Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe

CIMCO, C-I-M-C-0, stands for the Congo International Stoo

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Management Corporation, which

was a Us corporation. And they

had signed a resources development contract in the Congo.

Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just

formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds like.

Mr. Baron.

Do you recall a visit from Ambassador

Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the

Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the

Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No. But it think it would have been normal,

with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and

our concern about the situation,

for the Ambassador to come

back prior to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it,

to.

brief the Department on the latest developments there.

That

was sort of standard operating practice.

When the head of a

government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do

that.

Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA

Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to

Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for

his visit to report upon events in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't

remember that. But what I can say is that that would have

been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if

they hadn't.

Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have been

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getting at that time from the CIA Chief of Station and the US

Ambassador?

Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever

reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of

Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except

in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us.

Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador

from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of

Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the

Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to

reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced

by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he

certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was

so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an

individual. I don't recall any paticular urgins from the

Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural,

because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there,

and if he had been not warning against something, that would

have been very unusual.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and

the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and

the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there

not, to have a sense of

urgency about removing him?

Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I

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don't recall. But there were those problems down around the

copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there

of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at

that time.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything else about the language

that was used in raising the question of assassination at the

meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anything.

but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up

generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA.

Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question of

assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served

as sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to develop

the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed any

authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use

them. And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza-

tion by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I think

they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability

in this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concern

that everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they could

have done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that.

That is just developing their own internal capability, and

then they would have to come and get permission.

Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the

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development of a generalized assassination capability at the

CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without

specific authorization

from authority outside the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so.

Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at

the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in

itself have served as an

authorization for an actual assassi-

nation effort against Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action"

during your entire tenure in Government?

Mr. Dillon. No. The

• first time I ever heard it, I was

on the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Baron.

Were you aware that the CIA undertook a project

which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means

for carrying off an assassination if required?

Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't.

Mr. Baron.

And your first knowledge of any such project

was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

MI. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson,

who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and

serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert

Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so,

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because I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the

National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't

personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all.

Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson,

in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was

present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker,

at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated

to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of

Lumumba:

And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr.

Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted

explicityly,

and the meeting simply proceeded. He places

this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened

at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on

Septemb er 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting?

Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where

I recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba,

I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probably

present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time.

It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly

for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise

I would have been there. It could have been in view of this

feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not

impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace

and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself,

we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him.

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I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order

as Mr.

Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others

present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty

sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him,

shoot him or something - I just can't conceive of him

doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take

action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless

along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a

remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take

action right away on this?

Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this

was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it

wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it.

Mr. Baron. So although you have no recollection of being

present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you

would find his testimony at least plausible?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything

like this was not a direct order to have an assassination,

but let's take some action to get rid of Lumumba, get him

out of office.

Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicity authoriza-

tion?

Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what

they thought. And they could have well thought that. That

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is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it

is Lumumba or Castro. And you won't be able in the Castro

area, or particularly in this area, to run it down, because

the people aren't here anymore. But the person who really made

that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dawson.

I guess I was asking for your expert opinion

on the command and control structure as to what adequate,

implicit authorization would have been?

Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have been

quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization,

because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the

President directly in things of this nature. And he was

perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that

maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I

think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen

Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way the

system worked at that time?

Mr. Dillon. It was the way he worked; because he had a

very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting

too closely involved with anything that was unpleasant and

of this nature.

Mx. Baron. So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is

conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language

such as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into an

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authorization for an

assassination within the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with

Castro, when that came along the following year. That is

perfectly possible.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a i

series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those

refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward

the congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which

we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960.

(The above referred to document

was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2,

for identification.)

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MI. Baron. And this document refers to the election of

Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and

recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo

financially and "may have secured some influence with this

potentially useful individual."

Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think I ever did.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting

from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department

representative at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would

have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important

enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a signi-

ficant figure in Congo politics?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your

recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was

taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as

Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo.

Mr. Dillón. I didn't

realize that.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of

the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been

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notified by MI. Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired

at a Special Group meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job.

But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be

something that was of enough importance that it might be

something that I would have to act on or know about in my

capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying

financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate"

polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon.. Not in detail, but certainly the general

fact that we would be doing that, yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special

Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit

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Mr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to a

report by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the Special

Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrott

outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of

trade unions in the Congo and include the prospect that a

vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged.

Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraph

which describes the action of the Group as follows:

"The

Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in

order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate had

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether

the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.

Mr. Dulles replied that he had takent he comments referred

to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as

vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added

that he must necessarily put himself in a position of inter-

preting instructions of this kind within the bounds of

necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that :!

planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out

'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which

might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."

Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. But

you would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know who

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they referred to as his associate, that is the key point.

He

worked for the President.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony

from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes. for this meeting and

other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase

"Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring

euphemistically to the President.

Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed.

But

as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is

probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr.

Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously.

And then he talks about those as instructions and the same

thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to

the same meeting that your friend Mr. Johnson testified to,

which I presume took place before this. They are talking

about something that happened before this day, where he had

said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the

matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments

referred to seriously.

Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. Dulles had

heard comments by the President previous to this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Certainly.

Mr. Baron. Comments which called for "very straight-

forward action?"

Mr. Dillion. Yes, I think that is certainly what this

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320

said. So I think that whatever records there are of NSC

meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records

in detail. And that meeting - if you can find any meeting

that Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that

is probably the meeting.

Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language used

by the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated to

Mr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable

means of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the language

referred to here by Mr. Dulles?

MI. Dillon. It would sound so, seems

sO.

Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledge

of Special Group meetings

and the way the minutes were written

up, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism

for

assassination?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. It

would just mean strong action to do something to get rid of

Lumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. I

think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out

consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if

they were really going to mount something, they probably would

have come back to the Group. But they might not have. And

again, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he would

have gone back to the President and said, now, I have got the

capability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it

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next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have

done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or

get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to

something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident.

Allen Dulles' strong desire was to take the whole responsi-

bility for that, and resign, and be fired in disgrace,

publically, in order to protect the President. But the

President totally refused to accept any such way of handling

it.

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Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about the

character of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President?

MI. Dillon. Of both, yes.

Mr. Baron. That the President would be inerested in

taking responsibility for the orders that he had given?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

He was very strong that way. And Mr.

Dulles was so strong

in wanting to protect the President that

he was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace after

ten years or more of service to the Government, just to pro-

tect the President, although there was nothing that he had

responsibility for, primary responsibility.

Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetings

and minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "it

was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not

necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind

of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba"

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-- you would read that sentence to indicate that an assassina-

tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might

be used to get rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would.

Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles

might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group,

to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being

mounted?

Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted,

I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would

probably come back and say what we are doing.

Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to

the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character,

it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the

Special Group with such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely

that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the

President.

Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President?

Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think

he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite

different from the President,, all of the, in other words, as

expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and

do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to

protect the President as the public representative of the US

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from any bad publicity in connection with this or any other

similar thing.

Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meeting

you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to

proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba?

Mir. Dillon. No, I said that they would certainly have the

authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would

be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way

this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything

just on their own. I think they would have checked back at

least with the senior people in the State Department or the

Defense Department.

Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way that

it would be available to appear on the public record at any

time?

Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a call

from the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly the

Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection --

Mr. Dillon. - and Gordon Gray. I think they would have

kepi him notified, because

he was sort of central in this

thing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowing

about it.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection of

being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have

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been discussing before you saw the minutes today?

Mr. Dillon. No, I did

not.

Mr. Baron.

Let me show you now what we will marke as

Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September

8, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page

that refers to the Congo where Gordon Gray indicates that

"there is top level feeling that vigorous

action would not be

a mistake."

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Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recolleciton of

being made aware of this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I do not.

MI. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of

the policy at the highest levels of the American Government

toward Lumumba at this time?

Mr. Dillon.

It fits in? with what I understood was the

general policy that we were very concerned with.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in

early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was

a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power

which culminated in a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and

on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective

custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you

recall that chain of events?

Mr. Dillon. No. I knew that at some point there was a

change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this

time.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet

planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville?

Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it

does refresh my memory, because I do know -- I do remember

that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the

Soviets.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was the

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stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was

concern at higher levels in the State Department over the

connection between Lumumba and the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes

of the National Security Council meeting of September 21,

1960.

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MI •

Dillon. Yes, I seecnow that I attended this as Acting

Secretary of State, this particular meeting.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in

those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the

fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation in the part

of Lumumba, and

that there was some pressure being brought to

reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this

meeting. I don't recall the meeting itslef. But it fits

right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way

you looked at the Congo problems.

MI. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for

Lumumba.

Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's

desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate

representative of the Congo Government before the United

Nations?

Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to come

to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had

been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized

him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt.

I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized.

But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this

was a way of getting out.

And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big

complaint there.

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Mr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quote

Mr. Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African

Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation.

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the

moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a

grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."

Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall those particular remarks.

But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation,

"disposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it

would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was

neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure

he was done with.

Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the

means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable?

Mr. Dillon.

I guess the word "disposed" could mean that.

But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would

think once he was out of office, our concern would have been

deescaläted to some extent, it would have been more to find

some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of

getting him out, or locking him up, or anything.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of

the United Nations investigation of the circumstances

surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until

February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late

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September of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United

Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his

residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving,

but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops

who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his

residence.

Mx. Dillon.

I think I recall that now, because it is

rather unusual circumstances.

Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October

the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese Army,

who had come with an arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your

understanding that during this period of time, even after.

Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations,

he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force

in the Congo by the US?

Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at

all surprised if the then rulers or officials of the

Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned

about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a

crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started

to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably

would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes.

Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said

he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headguarters for

the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN

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custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army,

where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would

receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands

of the Congolese Army. Does

this mission of the CIA officer

seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time

toward Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so.

Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA

Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative

from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological

agents and the equipment with which to administer these

substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that

he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission.

which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you

ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. No, I never have.

Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with

the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those

special Group meetings?

Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one

document you have showed me --

Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Yes -- if assassination is a real possibility,

as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never

heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there was

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any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read

about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission :

with Castro, but not about this.

Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the

operational detail?

MX. DilIon.

Not in detail. But I am rather surprised

that it went this far and in my position I didn't know some-

thing about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight

that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of

State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it.

Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel

that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someone

in your position?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a

clearcut --

Mr. Baron.

- mandate to proceed with an assassination

operation?

Mx. Dillon. It is possible.

That is just supposition,

but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles'

decision.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the

CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the

coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government

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in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch

Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands

of the Congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson.

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of

questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I

would like to follow up on some of your statements about

Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I

think you made a very interesting and forthright observation,

that he was very interested in keeping the President protected

from things which may cause embarassment to him.

Mr. Dillon.

Not personally, but that he though would

cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just

the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just

because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,

it is not the nation. And the President is the nation.

SO

that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond rawal

personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should

not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the

basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that

that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known

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in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch

Lumumba fron UN protective custody and place him in the hands

of the congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of

questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I

would like to follow up on some of your statements about

Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I

think you made a very interesting and forthright observation,

that he was very interested in keeping the President protected

from things which may cause embarassment to him.

Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would

cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just

the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just

because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,

it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So

that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond

personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should

not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the

basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that

that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon.

I think that it was primarily -- I had known

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him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also

in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this

experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was

Acting Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of a

lot of that mix-up.

Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsible

individual in whom the President placed great trust?

Mr. Dillon. Very much

so, great trust.

Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President do

you believe that President Eisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles'

desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a great

embarrassment?

Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thing

made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles'

view, but it was also the view of the State Department that:

this was the correct procedure, that the President should take

whatever action was necessary either with Mr. Dulles or with

senior officials in the State Department, and blame them for

both, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing

happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that.

Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in

Turkey, and he made a special trip out to camp David to urge

this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibility

himself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for the

President taking responsibility, because I think he had a

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little different view of this. I think he had a view that

the press looked on the President as someone who was not in

full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought

this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for

the President. So we were thinking of it more from the

international aspect. We had the contrary feeling.

Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dulles

diminish significantly after the U-2 affair.

Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with the

U-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it

specifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it.

The only bolix that came was in the after events, where this

silly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guess

it was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around and

got lost, or something like that. And we really had a very

difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the

news came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. The

President had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards,

including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and

Colonel Goodpastor.

And he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and

gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed on

all the cover stories of anything of this nature. And I

went back to the State Department and was working diligently

on this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say.

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And the next thing we knew suddenly the President tola

Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the

State Department.

And the next thing we knew the statement came out from

the US from NASA which made no sense at all.

And of course what had happened was that lagerty -- that

had been the routine thing, and when it came up llagerty was

to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred,

had the cover story.

And Goodpastor - I never quite found out what happened

in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty

or lagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was

more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor

at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he

had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't

know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And

that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to

explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement

which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts.

And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet

announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew

that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it

followed electronically. And but it was because of this

White House bolix that htis had happened.

Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout

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Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a

mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he

felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President,

and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case

otherwise.

So this didn't change MI. Dulles at all, it made him even

stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew

the President was difficult to protect.

Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis

you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence

operations?

Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security

Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the

meeting would be called to order by the President, and then

he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing,

which was the first item of business in all those meetings.

Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to

tell the President enough where he would have some idea of

what was going on, but not tell him directly what was

happening?

Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence,

what other people were doing and what was happening. And it

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would only be exceptional when they would deal

with

what we

were doing ourselves.

Mr. Dawson.

Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles

wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how dia he

go about achieving that or gaining that approval?

Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard,

to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up

whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the

Secretary of Defense, or Acting Secretary Of Defense, and then

taken to the President and approved by him before the flight

could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor

rather than through Mr. Gray.

Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis?

Mr. Dillon. No, that was the procedure.

Mr. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly?

Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that

was the case with the U-2: After the U-2 crisis there weren't

any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end.

Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you

brought up which were required to be brought before the

Special Group --

Ms. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if

it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be

through the person who would know the most about it. And

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that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very close

to the President, although he was a relatively junior officer

at that time, he was a young colonel -- I think he may have

even been a major when he started there in the White House.

But he was

sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all

those relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State

Department. If you wanted to see the President on something

important, it was generally through General Goodpastor rather

than through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most of

the detailed mechanics of setting up meetings, and that sort

of thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to the

President. And that job was held by General Goodpastor.

Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President was

going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government,

in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the

National Security Council, were you privy to some of those

occurances?

Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one.

Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attempt

or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more

sinister than an assassination was brought up?

Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing a

capacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. And we have

the minutes on that.

That was considered a number of times

and reported a number of times.

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- Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, in

the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Govern-

ment of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes a

routine order goes out to estand down intelligence, to take

positiveactions in that area, are you aware of that standard

operating procedure?

Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your question

is there.

Mr. Dawson. After the U-? crisis did we for a period of

time stop agressive intelligence actions against the Soviet

Union?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural.

Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routine

matter?

Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously we

stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity

to shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again.

And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic

flights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept them

further away, or disconinued them for awhile.

Mr. Dawson. Are

you aware of a similar stand down order

having been issued after Lumumba was captured?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you

might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when

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this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that

correct?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, because August

was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the

summer, it was likely to be in August.

Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August

because of the miserable summers?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

And my family had a summer place where

I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get to.

I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of

times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting

and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of

Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it

coüld have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those

summers for a few days. And it could have been in August.

Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon

that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me

before we began this testimony today that from what you have

read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the

CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said,

in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination

attempt against Lumunba, might have been made simply because

the group was too large for such a discussion?

Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of

what I have learned since, and I have learned more today --

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but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro.

But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that

is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have

been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that

they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't

have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in

August.

Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the

creation?

Mr. Dillon.

The early stages, yes.

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely

appreciateive of your coming here today. This is obviously

a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have

been tremendously informative on it. So thank you very much.

Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details

of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have

really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively

unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help

I am glad to.

Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now.

I know that before we: started today Bill Miller, the Staff

Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would

be interested: in hearing you out at great length on policy

recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from

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your experience in the State Department and the Treasury

Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller

Commission.

But I wondered specifically, in reference to the

assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our

investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some

recommendations as soon as possible, do you have any specific

suggestions?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. I think that the record

has shown that this is the type of thing that the US

Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage

in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repitition

of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties,

which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like

that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its

being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think

even those who believed that such action was morally proper

and might have been in the best intersts of both the Us and

the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was

ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that

it does get traced back. So

I think that there will be a

general agreement among those who are the type of people who

would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be thought

of as Us policy.

Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you

would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool

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of foreign policy?

Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what

institutional changes are really necessary, but there should

be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever

name it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any

action by the CIA, whether it is assassination or military

action or anything else, in writing. I think that would be

fine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that the

President has to approve anything like that. I tend to agree

with Mr. Dulles that you should not get the President

personally involved in details of operations that might be

on the edge of what is right. I am not judging just about

assassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now is

that the President has to approve any covert operation. I

think that the result now will be that there wouldn't be

any. I think there may be times when we will need them, but

not violent ones.

I have in mind such things as financial

help and such things as that. But I don't think the President

ought personally to sign the checks.

Mr. Baron. Thank you again.

(hereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned,

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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AFFIDAVIT

Dillon Clear 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath

depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under

Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of

that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of

Secretary

Herter's absence from Washington.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State,

had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12

Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee.

When

I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my

earlier responsibilities

for foreign economic policy.

Accord-

ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was

designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert

Murphy was

appointed to this position

Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

the State

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of

State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com-

mittee

decisions.

On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee

and participated

in its deliberations.

During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-

cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of

either Generalissimo

Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly

after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-

ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-

cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety

of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the

possibility of

an assassination attempt against Lumumba was

briefly raised.

The CIA representative indicated that the Agency

did not undertake this sort of operation.

This ended considera-

tion of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any

discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

Dated this?/ day of May, 1975.

C.

subscrlbed and sworn to before me

this ay day of May 1975,

Not nut ta

District of Columbia

Douglas Dillon

THE WHITE HOW

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Dillon

30 June 1960

Chinita

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Déceting 3A Iune 1960

PRESENI: Messis. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen. Cabell

3. Congo

Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the elcction of Joseph Ileo

to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted

him financially.

He indicated that we in no way intend to clain full

• credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close

contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have

secured some influcnce with this potentially useful individual.

f7. Cuba

In an informal conversation after Gen. Cabell's departure,

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that the U.S. has taken publicly about

all that it can afford to take from the Castro government; that public

opinion both here and abroad is probably beginning to feel that there is

no limit as to how far this country can be pushed around; that this may

encourage other small countries to take a similar tack; and that the

longer we delay with effective economic and other action the harder we

may make it for ourselves.

Mr. Merchant and Mi. Irwin agreed, with the stipulation that

the United States should not take affirmative action until it is prepared

to follow through on a substantial scale.

1,

concer

-

3

Laboratt

is

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to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group

vicWs.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mi. Macy had raiscu a rclated

point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that

Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given

adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a

concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -

of a new Cuban government immediately after a successíul overturn

of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the

necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact

directed three wecks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

at anett

'HOMASA. PARROT'

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Know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,

particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration

of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had

pointed out that the frente is composed of poople who have broken

with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarily the situation with respect to the first

point, Mr.

Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with

Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail

all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to

understand how Macy could have received the impression that CLA

is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer

to MI. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -

and had developed at considerable longth - the thesis that our view

was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just

why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the

steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and

to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the

point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V

for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the

participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the

country.

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good

deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and

cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion

of certain ultra-conservative groups.

He said that the Frente bad

issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly

as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as

to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this

was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance

of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mi. Stans'

point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do

so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future

and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as

appropriate.

MI. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political

idcas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be

clearly established before the operation actually comes off. Hc

added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these

politically-screened individuals had issucd their general statement

of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD

together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

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V4. Cuba

' The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing

contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection

he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which

had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilitics

(after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

? He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of

approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer

to MI. Irvin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating

the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the

Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray

that he had discussed the Cuban project with MI. Macy and that as

a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two roservations that

he would like Gray to look into.

'One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his

discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest

withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any

effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mi. Gray had

answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mi. Dulles and

Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

3

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outstanding intelligence, ability or irive, but that he is obviously

well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other

individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church

hierarchy who could be useful.

MI. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black

Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this,

but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

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SPOT - BUS GAY Dillon Exhibit 3

25 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Spocial Group Mooting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later

described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in

mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:

operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;

the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of

no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged

leader oi certain independent labor groups. lie emphasized that the

latter had just come up and that we arc now in the process of assessing

the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much

in order.

Mi. Gray commented, however, that his associates had

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether

the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had

every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits

or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a

position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of

necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular

kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have

given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic

Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In

this connoction, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been

made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the

assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

PROPERTY ::

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V1. Dominican Republic

Mr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted to discuss

the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter

retire from oifice.

At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his

opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation

as to the efficacy or wisdom of such a letter. He said that it seemed

to him much more useful to make a personal approach, which not only

stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denied.

He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time

ago, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it

off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an

unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than

the previous individual.

Mr. Merchant said that he rcalized his own name had been

suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He

said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of

State to get out of office - either through the medium of a letter or

personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed

him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validily of Mr.

Gray's way comment that Mr. Merchant's ethics and his pragmatism

might be somowhat intertwined.

Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having aay U.S.

official sign such a letter. He thought that an unofficial letter might

be a different matter.

The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the

effort to get Mr. Pavley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor;

it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even,

but that no great harm could result.

15. Congo

There was

a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and

the possibilities of cffective action there.

Mr. Gray said that he

hoped that Agency people in the field are fully awareof the top-level

celing in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss.

Yapanitt

THOMAS A. PARROTT

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Mr. Dulles said he beliered a warrant had been Issued

arrest of Lumumba.

for there only man in the coe boate ta faire.

Aside from Lumumbr, Mobutu appears

to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A

recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles

then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with

funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu bad relieved our

messenger of the funds.

We cannot get funds to Mobutu because

he does not have complete control over his guards.

development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers,

most of whom are graduate students.

The old ministers have

been turned out of office and their offices have been taken

over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temp-

orary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered

a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had

been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced

out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after

departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know

whether they had moved on toward the USSR.

Mr. Gray asked

whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary

Dillon said the soviet press has not yet admitted that the

Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said

the Soviet diplo-

mats indicated to the press

before leaving that they would be

Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the soviets

had not given up In the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the

Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the soviet

markings which they painted over the congo markings on their

planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the

Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting

8 claritication of the situation. robutu appeared to be the

effective power in the congo for the moment but Lumunba was

not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as

he was

not disposed of.

Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in laos was still

confusing and that little progress had been made toward the

settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening

situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as

a result of the dispatch of laotian parachute troops to that

area.

The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao

and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem

of the conflicting governments in laos is no nearer a settle-

ment.

The King has requested that Goneral Ouane and General

Phouni call upon him. A skirmish between Phouni's forces and

Ventiane forces has been reported at Fak Sane, but Ilttle

bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Phoumi has adopted tactics

of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has

been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi

apparently intends to starve out the government.

Meanwalle,

15.

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kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested

departments and agencies to ensure that it serves

the purposes of retarding the growth of the war

potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its

unity.

"Noted that, with respect to paragraph. 11 of

NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials,

equipment, technology and services as can be unilater-

to achieve a sortitle adverse ingot sca

the nar potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but

also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially

with regara to technology and services.

Nole: the action in b above, as approved by the president,

subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.

5. SIGRIFICANT WORLD DEVELOFZIMITS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said he would first sumarize developnents in

the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts

to save Lunumbe.

An intercepted message between Egypt and Chana

indicates that Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to

concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to

bear

for the maintenance of Lumumba as Frime Minister. Mr.Dulles

remerked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had

been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the

Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopolaville Province.

Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that

a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic

representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The

UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with

the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to per-

suade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On Sep

tember 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no agreement

with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper

purporting to be an agreement with Kasavuba.

Secretary Dillon reported that Lumunba had requested a visa

for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to

the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Govern-

ment of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. How-

ever, i bunumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private

ba anard for ta to turnt in down Ma riote

added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lunumbe

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Dillon Ekihitt

8 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meating, & September 1960

PRESENT: Messis. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles

1. Supply Drop to Cuban Dissidents

Vi. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cubar

lissidents in the Escambray. After brief discussion, the Grou.

approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether

approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of

a similar nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The

Spooial Group agreed to this, with Mr. Dulles stating that the other

members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of

convening a meeting.

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VI. 8.7111 75

CUDA

3|31/27

FIDEL CASTRO INPERVIMIED BY DAGENG WHD7:7

Stockholm DAGENS MUFTER In SWedish 3 Jul 75 PD 1. 12 LD

(Mats Holmerg Interview with Cuban Prime Minister Castro: "'The Uniüed States Mo

Longer Vants To Assassinate Me'"]

(Excerpts]

Havann, 2 July--For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death

11st, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro looked remarkably unconcerned.

He sat on a sofa

In the Swedish Embassy a few hours before O10f Palme's departure from Cuba and when

he Has questioned, about the ClA's repeated

attempts to assassinate him, he raised

both hands to the ceiling in

a gesture of resignation:

"Good lord, " ha said.

"We have known all. that for a long time.

ridiculous," Fidel said, "to hear today of disclosures of new assassination

here in Cuba we already knew of them.

It seems a 11ttlc

plans when

"Yet what is now being disclosed in the United States I5 only a small part," he said.

"He could describe a dozen similar assassination plans and ve will also do so when

the U.S. Investigations are

over."

But he did not belleve that he ran the risk of being assasainated by the CIA any

longer.

"Is there are such plans today, we at least, do not knot of then," he sald. "I

believe that the United States

is no longer

so interested In assassinating me--and

I belleve that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or

Iater 1t must come to an agreement with us.

"But no one can be absolutely certain," he said.

Raised Eyebroas

sald while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some

cyebrows to be ralsed in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international

One of the key phrases

of 010r Palme's Latin American trip bas been "a new cconomie

world order."

a term which embraces small countrles' rights to control their

natural resources, and in both the oll pover, venezueln, and the potential oll power,

Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthuslasm.

When Fidel

Castro explained his

slepticiam

concernine tall of "a nor economie

world order" after dinner at the swedish Embassy, he did so in a violent attaci on

the world's

o1l-prolucing countries.

He belleved that

a new world order could

not be created by the introduction of new

privileges for a ner group of countries.

The Poor Are Affected

CEIVED FROM insurriciont: to demand that all

countries have control

over their

naterials," he sald, "¡ll privileges are created at anotherle expense, and today

JUL 14 19751t 10 n0t the Inductrialtzed countries which are affected by the oll countries!

profits but the poor countries which do not have oll.

CIA

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0?

JUL. 1A 1515

CHA

CUBA

"How can you conpare cocon and o11?" he asicadi.

mat benefit is it to countries like

Sr1 Ianla and Tanzania that all countries control their ran matcrials when all this

ncans to them is that they must pay more for both old and industrial 500ds?

"I an not speaking for myself," he explained.

"He receive o1l from the USSR on favorable

toras. But if the oil countries derand solidarity fon the Third World, they must

concern theuselves with the problems of the Third World. Micy are, as vel, reluctant

to do thís.

"Whare has the off revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question.

"It has been deposited in the econonies of the industrial world and has been used for

aras purchases.

The Industrialized countries will emerge fron the econonic crisis stronger

than

ever'.

It will be the developing countries which will be nffected."

They Do Not Dare

Pidel Cartro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish Journalists with an expression of

genuine alarin.

"Do you think I aa speaking too severely?" he asled vorrtedly.

"But you must under-

bind that someone must talk about this.

There 1s no one else who dares, since all

ara hoping for loans from the oli countries."

And he saxo those who sat next to him a conforting slay on the back.

In varions Iatin American countries latin America Is described

today as a changing

conclnent. and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olof Palme listened to the rovolutionary

and anti-impertalist diatribes which are increasingly:part of both these countries'

official language.

Fidel Castro did not appear especlally impressed by this change. lie did not mention

Mexioo and Venezuela at all when ha was asked about the prospects for social revolution

In South America--but he did mention the milltary governments of l'eru and Panana.

Better Than Nothing

"No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and ve aro watching the

progressive regines in Peru and Parama with great interest.

It is menningless to

discuss whether an armed struggle is necessary for revolution--all that can be aaid

13 that a revolution must be based on real

force, whether 1t be in Chile of Cuba. "

lio sm110d sadly wen asked for his opinion o1 the governments In Venezuela and lexico,

which,

by their own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long timo

before

ansiering,:

"It is better than nochins."

Someone asked 1f 1t 1s true that Cuba 15 recelving econonte ald from the USSR in

conflict with its own ideology and that it has Its "stomach in loscow and Its head in

Peking."

Fidel Castro was obviously upset by the question.

"It was not they who contrived the Cuban revolution," he said, "it was us. But the

USSR helped

us when no ont

olse would, and we cannot forget that.

We have not con-

monksed with elther the USSR or anyone else, and who else

could have helped us?

The United States?"

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THE EVENING STAR (Washington), Monday, S September 1963,

rour Star Edition, page B 4, Columns 4 - 5

"Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro"

by Daniel Harker, AP Staff Writer

.... Bitterly denouncing what he called recent u.s.

prompted raids on Cuban territory, MI. Castro said:

'We are prepared to fight them and answer

in kind.

U.S. leaders should think that if

they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate

Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be

safe.

'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate

and make promises which later it will not honor.

This has happened to promises made during the

October crisis.

They nave been broken as can

be seen with new attacks.

'But I warn this is leading to a very.

dangerous situation that could lead to a

worse crisis than October's..

(From

an impromptu interview given by Castro at a Brazilian

Embassy reception this week.]

RECEI

ROM

JUL 14 1975

GLA

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TIME-PICAYUNE, New Orleans, Monday, 9 September 1963, page 7,

columns -5 - 7

"Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba.

Imperiled by Aid to Rebels."

says U.S. Leaders

This item was introduced by an editor's note

referring to the fact that Castro had turned

up at a Brazilian Embassy reception Saturday

night (7 September) where he had submitted to

an impromptu interview:

Harker's account of

the interview reached New York Sunday after-

noon.

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro

said Saturday night: 'U.s. Leaders would be

in danger if they helped in any attempt to do

away with leaders of Cuba.'"

"Bitterly denouncing what he called

recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory,

Castro said:

'We are prepared to fight them

and answer in kind.. U.S. leaders should think

that if they are aiding terrorist plans to

eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will

not be safe.

... World affairs ... seemed to be

entering a more peaceful climate a few days

ago, but

now this trend has changed with

attacks."

"'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate

and make promises which later it will not honor.

This has happened to promises made during the

October crisis. They have been broken as can

be seen with new attacks.

'But I warn this is leading to a very

dangerous situation that could lead to a worse

crisis than October's....

RECEVED FROM

AUL 1 4 1975

GIA

41

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THE GIA IN QUB2:

CHRONOLOGICAL

SUMMARY

OF CUBAGE ALCEGATIONE

"Lo Crua" counterrevolutionary group, Tauler Sague:

"ganster,"

and Cubria Ramos were infiltratad through Funta Hicacos zone in

Province for a plot suadost Costro and other terrorism and sabotage.

and automatic pistols.

" High-powered rifles and large quantities

of annuntcion vere supplied by the CIA.

1961, Various counterrevolutionary groups were troined and armed by

the cin. and filtrated through the north of Havana, to assasstnate Castro

and support the Bay of Fige invaston.

sori Marin and four other

individuals were infiltrated to coordinate the accivittes of various

countorrevolucionary groups directed by the ciA inside

included automatic weapons, high-powered rifles with scopes, amnunition,

and explosives.

June, 1961, the "Frente Revolucionario Democratico" (FRD) met with individual

infiltrated into Cuba with instructions for a plot against Castro.

wich bazookas were placed in & garage at an intersection in Havana and

truck with grenades was ploced in sports city.

Plan was to ambush Castro

and other leaders.

Two participants - Guillermo Caula Ferrer and Higinto

when arrested that the CIA was in charge, and that contact

was maintained through Guantanamo and the Swiss Embassy.

In duly, 1961, after Bay of Pigs, CIA worked to consolidate counterrevolutionary

groups into the "Unidad Resistencla" (United Resistance) organization.

Pujals Mederos made an undercover visit to the United

States to meet with CIA

officers Jim Bender (or Boulding), Harold Bishop

and Carl Hitch.

There Mederos

was appointed head of clA operations in Cube in place

of the arrested Aldredo

Izaguirre.

Programs included

"selfaggression" against Guantantino

to justify

counter-attacks on other countries to provoke war

Guly 26, 1901, through the infiltration of CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero

Caro (Brand): Adolfo Mendoza (Raul) anú Jorge Garcia Rubio (Tony) and others,

che United Resistance group developed a piot against Castro during the

26th of July celebration In Criente Province.

(5)

(3)

July 26, 1961, the

same group planned another plot the same day against

rally at Revolution Squere.

Meetings were held at the

Guantanamo Naval

Base, where war material, including Targe quantities

of small arms, was

supplied by base commander Captain Car? E. Schenweias.

Also In July, 1961; Plotting against Castro was undertaken by representatives

of "30 de Noviembre,

"Movimento

Revolucionardo dal Pueblo,

Revolucionario Denocratico. "

The assassination attempt was to be carried

out near the home of Celia Sanchez Mandoley

in Vedado.

CIA instructions

came through contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel

Ray and Aureliano

Sanchez Arange, and through Adniral Burke and

CIA agents on Guantanano.

Weapons included explosives, mortars, high-powered rifles, and 30-calfber

machine guns.

September 13, 1961, the same groups listed In (6) above, in contact with the

"Movimiento

de Recuperacion Revolucionarta" (MiR), led by Juan Jose Martore

Silvä, made an attempt on the life of Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez when he

wäs returning from Matanzas to Havana.

They worked with a ClA agent in

and a counterrevolutionary band there.

Weapons included automatic

handguns: machine guns, and a nigh-powered rifle with telescopic site.

October 4, 1961, the MRR and "Il Frente del Escambray," under CIA direction,

agreed upon a plan for sabotage in Havana, timed to

coincide with the return

President Osvaldo Torrado

from Punta del Esta.

A bazooka was to ba

fired toward the President at the former prosidential

from & nearby

apartment building,

with the withdrawal

covered by launching grenades against

the public.

recovered included autometic rifles

and grenade launchers.

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2

(9)

In early ?962, with CIA Instructions through Guantanamo, Jorge Luis Cuervo

reorganized

groups into the

"Union de Untdades Revolucionarias"

(UDUR) •

A mecting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangements which

had béen made to receive equipment through Guantanamo.

CIA was pressing

both attempts against Castro and staged

acts of agression against Guantanamo.

Calvo outlined

-- & scheme to kill Foreign Minister Raul Roa, and

then attack other Cuban leaders who would attend the burial.

"The authors"

of the plan are listed as Cay Hernandez

and Cay Gispert and members of the

DRE organization headed by Julto Hernandez Rojo, listed

as a CIA agent

infiltrated into Cuba.

Weaponry included a double-barreled shotgun,

explosives, grenades, and demolition timing devices, one labeled "Block

Demolition, M5 Al."

In 1963 another

consolidation of groups was carried out with CIA direction from

abroad through agent Nino Diaz.

"Resistencia Civica

Anticonunista" (RCA), and it incorporated the "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional"

"Movintento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria" (MRR), and "Agrupacion

Montecristi," among others.

The overall objective, as

instructed by the CIA,

was to create the impression of a strong internal resistance to Castro,

inspire a decision for armed

intervention at the meeting of OAS presidents.

instructions came through. Guantanamo.

(10)

March 13, 1963, the RCA Inttiated a plan to

assasstnate Castro from a house

near the Untveristy of Havana, by firing a mortar.

People arrested included

Samuel Carballo Moreno, identified as a CIA agent.

Attacks were to be made

simultaneously on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and on

National Revolutionary Militia sites.

Bazookas, mortars and machine guns

were taken.

(11) April 7, 1963, the ReA developed a plan Involving sixteen men armed with

pistols and fragmentation grenades, who were to attack Castro at the Latin

Those arrested

were Enrique Rodriguez Valdes (known as

"Mulgado"), Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo, and Jorge Carlos

Espinosa Escarles.

(12) July 26, 1963, the RCA grouping planned to assassinate the Minister of the

Armed Forces, Raul Castro, at Revolution Square during the 25th of July

celebration.

Leading those groups Involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin

Hernandez.

(13) September 28, 1963, another group was formed through a relationship with

CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, who was a French citizen living in

Their plan was to dynamite sewage pipes under the presidential palace.

de Ure

confessed that he had been working for and giving information to the

CIA for a period of

two years.

(14) Maraster a a lad conscassirace Castro by Mario Salabairla Aguerrardo

who had contacts with the CIA through its agent Dr. Bernardo

Milanes Lopez, who sought support in Spoin from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch,

listed as friends of Salabarria.

The CIA gave Salabarria weapons and "great

sums of money" for a scheme which Involved Installingà 30 or 50 caliber

machine gun ti a vehicle and waiting for Castro to pass by.

(15) Mid-1964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of

part of the RCA block controlled by the

CIA.

The effort involved ClA agents Alberto and Ramon Grau Sterra, menbers

of a network headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who attempted

to poison Castro in 1965.

The mid-1964 plan called for throwing grenades

at Castro at the Latin American Stadium.

Nine men were involved.

September, 1964, members of "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN) and "Frente

Interna de Liberacion" (FIL), who had been

engaged in intelligence for the CIA,

began, under CIA instructions, to seek untfication.

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(16) One of the members of this

Monesto Cubillas Perez, told Angel Miguel

Arencibie

Rolando Baldos Ranzole and others of

a plot against Castro

to occur a:: 17

St. Vedado.

(17) In early 1905, counterrevolutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermin Conzalez

Carbalio and Giraïdo Reneïdo Diego Scienc

mo members of an RCA sub-group

known as

"Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional"

- were working on a plot against

Castro

in Santiego de 185 vegar,

This plan was dropped in favor or a plan

co hit Castro at the Latin Americon Stadium, with another group in a nearby

building set up to fire machine guns into the crowd

to create panic and

facilitate the escape.

(18) In June, 1955, there was an drrest of the group boaded by Ramon and Maria

Leopoldina

Grau Aisina (see (15) above): wilen was

part of the "Rescate"

"Movimianto Anticonmuniste Revolucionario"

(MAR" groups sponsored by the

Maria Leopoldina Grau had recoived CIA Instruccions

for petsoning

Castro at the Havana Libre Hotei.

Jesus Companioni Souza ano Santos de la

Caridad Perez Nunez, members of MAR: were to carry out

the poisoning.

this attempt falled, another 500 copsule bottle of poison was sent by Tony

Maria Alsina, also known 5s

"Politas" aiso recelved weapons with

silancers and special assassination projectiles from the ClA.

(19) in July of 1905, there was an arrest of a group which represented another

CIA attempt to

organize counterrevolutionarles, this time under the name

"Unidad Resistencia.

This group developed a plan to assassinate Castro

with a Thompson submachine gun at Vita Nouva's restaurant, firing also at

the Ministry of Interlor across the street to create confusion and permit the

escape. Equipment included weapons and communications gear.

(20) Also In 1965, there was an

arrest of former Cuban commander Rolando Cubela

Cubela was recruited during a trip to Madrid by ClA ägents Manuel

Artime, Jorge fobreno ("'The Magician"), Luis Enrique Trasancose and Carlos

The planning also involved an official at the Cuban Embassy in

Jose Luts Conzales Gallarreta, ard Alberto Blanco for "El Loco").

In Madrid, Artime promised boats, weapons and men for an invasion of Cuba

72 hours to support the assassination of

to Cuba, Cubela received from Gallarreto a rifle wich a telescopic site and

silencer.

(21) In mid-7965.

two groups with CIA coonections and

contacts in the United

"commandos L" and the "Movimiento 30

de Novembre,"

to infilerate Cube.

That effort was givon up, and instead they firad from

"scholarship zone"

in Miramar and at the Riveria Hotel, in

the direction of the presidential residence.

(22) In May, 1966, these same groups were infiltratod into the Monte Barreto

zone in Havana with the mission of assassinating Castro.

Armando Romero Martinez and Sandalio Merminio Diaz Garcle were killed:

António Cuesto Valie

..- head of

"Comandos i"

• and Eugenio Enrique Zaldivar

Cardenas were arrosted.

These men had been traine

in Puerto Rico by the

CIA,

some had been involyed in the bombardment of the

"Son Pascual,

a merchant

vessel

anchored

et the Carbarier Port in

has Villas Province.

(23) On March 17: 190/9

infiltrators from the United States - Felix

Asencio Crespo:

Wilfrede Martinez Diaz, and

Gustavo Araces Alvarez

arrested while attempting to

land by Cayo Fragoso.

Their planned activity

was to assassinate Castro end conduct systemacie sabotage to create the image

of a popular uprising,

to help counterrevolutionary groups in the United

These people had been trained by the CiA

States got official backingdos Minos Nuevos," "Comandos L," "Aipha-66," and

organizations.

They had automacie rifles, boats, plastic explosives,

and communications aquiprent.

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(24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile.

The main protagonist was Jesus Dominquez Benitez, known as "The Istander,"

who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions

inside the United States.

In 1970 he had participated in an unsuccessful

attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge

at Guantanamo, Where he was arrested for bond violation.

Nonetheless, he

was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban

counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed

in a television camera.

He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban

extles in that country. The plan was aborted.

Those involved in the plot

feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape.

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CLOSING STATENENT FROM CUBA DOCUMENT

consider that the analysis of the informations we offer,

known, and the onca that the American

authorities

posseas and have not been published, allows ug to affirm that

the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary

leaders,

especially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro

Ruz, has been

a reiterated policy of the United States through

its subver-

sive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries,

U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals,

the country as well as abroad, without taking

considera-

tion the victims that would result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the participants wich

a great number of

weapons,

explosives,

technical means of

transportation

and communication for the accomplishment

or their plans.

These

some of the connoted and proved facts of the

numerous subversive

activities that the CIA has carried out

aimed to

the

assassination of the leaders

of the Revolutionary

Government

of

Cuba.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTOY

EYES ONLY

November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba

1. Irefer to your interest in hearing more about the

Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment

of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at

bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of

Cuban machinery.

2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted

Ior a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5

would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald

is now conducting.

I have not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting.

(As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted

and were the

sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While. I do

not recognize the handwriting of the doodles on the attached

memo, they indicate that Item? was approved. My own

strong recollection of the fellow from the meeting was

, that Items l through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious

• problems concerned Items 6 and 7.

3. I assume that you still want to hear a status report on the

Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I

will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.

I think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop,

if indeed we do want to stop it.

In any event, you will be able

to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives

Chis status report.

Gordon Chase

A sin suite de come no OK

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY.

• Inden

R

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IOP SECRET

April 7, 1964

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

U.S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently

been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of

issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a

higher level.

The present covert program is designed in support of a general

policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro,

accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro

regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in

fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to

decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities

should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced,

or (d) abandoned.

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

antic intentio

1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex-

filtration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.

it elit Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro-

"Widt un yogram be continued.

Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of

active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the

regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be

continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

3. Cooperation with other agencies

in economic denial by selec-

tive economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban

economy.

Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be cor-

tinued:

4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential

dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.

Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-

tinued.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and

detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas

sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating

elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).

Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be

continued.

6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which

conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before

authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons.

Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom-

mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

7. ClA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban

exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will

begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.

Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended

that higher authority bear the arguments.

Copy

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TÖP SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4,

1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group

meeting this

afternoon

on Cuba.

1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely

because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one

for the usual reasons.

DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc-

tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff

will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that

could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East.

For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably

prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course

of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it

would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we

finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2.

Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange

to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this

one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch

Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal

with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be

turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should

dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange.

Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of

the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to

start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the

working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their

position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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Mr. Bundy

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 2-

March 4, 1965

attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-

promise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop

aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give

them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of

its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple

months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the

small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are:

(a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will

not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they

are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault.

We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have

liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that

$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having

Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble

between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might

be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man

wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the

job if it needs doing.

While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them

invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con-

traption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose

CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD

that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability

to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this

capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a

very short space of time.

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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liste

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Policy I'oward Cuba

In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that

he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Inter-

departmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate

interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the

In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square

"I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve

serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected

without very serious provocation - perhaps greater than that required

to justify invasion.

In addition, even if consistent with US values on

"just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under-

take such operations without having our role discovered and resulting

in serious international liabilities.

Finally, even if "Square Dance"

were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the

Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid

and control would be increased.

As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I

understand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend,

however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration

of "Square Dance" at this stage.

Then if the Coordinating Committee

and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals,

we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.

R.

C. BOWMAN

Lyndon

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

CODY

B. Johnson Library

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TOP SI SRET INFORMATIC

COVER SHEET

CONTROL MUMHER S

CFFICE OF THE DECRETARD OF DEFENSE

TOP SECRET INFORMATION

COVER SHEET

COPY NO.

DecORuRaCS 2304/274-1

The attached TOP SECRET information contains deto the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthor

ized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIDVAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, eus-

cory, and storake of

the attached information must be

exercised in accordance with

the

securaty regulations.

this cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have

read all or any pere of the document(s) iden-

erfled oy number above.

Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shall sign and fill in the information required

DATE

RECEIVED

REMARAS

indicate portione und all of documenty roadi

I REBorro

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Destruction of this

date of destruction

sheet is authorized one year from

of the document

attached hereto.

50 FCiM 194

PREVIOUS EDITIGNS OF THIS FORM ARE CBSOLETE.

("hen attachments. are

TOP SECRET INFORMATION

COVER SHEET

645393

Lyndon

Copy

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JOS 2304/244-1

30 October 1964

Pages 2 - 8, incl.

COP SECRET

COPY NO.

2

DISTRIBUTION G

REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

Reference: JCS 2304/244

DECISION

1. At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making

amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recon-

mendations in paragraph 12 of this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are

requested

to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised

white pages 3 and 5, incorporating the amendments, and to

destroy the superseded pages in accordance wich security

regulations.

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its

Appendices A, B, and C, was forwarded as JCSM-942-64,

dated 9 November 1954, to the Secretary

of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern or

üne Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10,

US Code 141 (c) applied and

were followed.

DISTRIBUTION:

• • $ 08095

ten. Wheeler (C,JCS,

Gen.

Johnson

(CSA)

Adm.

McDonald

(CNO)

Cen.

LeMay (CSAF

Gen.

Greene

CMC

Acha

Palmer

DC/S

Tata

0377

82aлc

Con

OPS)

Gen. Burchinal (D/JS).

Gen.

Adm. Davis (DD/JS)

Mannart (VD/JS) -n94200027

Adm. Mustin J-3)

Gen. Emrick (I-5)

Anthis

SACSANd

cons

0009/2304/944

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

SQUARE DANCE (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a memorandum* by. the Chier of Stail,

US Army, to consider

a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff

recommend to the President that the United States

1

2

covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.

3

4

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding**5

to a Presidential request for new Ideas relative to cuba,

6

stated that the President would be advised of any new and.

promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure

7

8

upon

the Cuban regime.

3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staf, US Army, sent

a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding. a

study on

the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime

by covertly

attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The Chief

of Staff, US Army, baconmended that the Joint Start

accomplish

inceragency coordination on the study proposals: and

that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it

by memorandum to the President, Informing him that the Joint

Chiefs

of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations

of the study and consider that the outline program therein

provides an adequate framework for the development of detailed

supporting programs and plans for participating agencies.

4. On 2 October 1954, the Operations Deputies considered

the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed

to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation

S

IC

11

12

13

14

15

• 16

17

18

19

20

21

of a report.

22

23

24

25

* Attachment to JCS 2304/244

** Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3

Lyndon

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

5-5 2304/244-1

3

Copy

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COP

SECRET

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5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were

presented

with

a briefing on the study and discussed some

of the issues of

the proposed actions.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Appendix A.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the

ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a

government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar

Industry is within existing or attainable capabilities

and

merits consideration by other appropriate governmental

agencies as

another option, in concert with

for causing

the collapse of the Castro

regime.

other actions,

9. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff recognize

that there are

possible political consequences which could result from

proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.

10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for

Cuban

Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-

agency coordination.

11. The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of

Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating

Committee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation

preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint

Chiefs of Stars:

2

3

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It Is recommended that:

a. The

memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its

Appendices A, B, and C, which reflects the above conclu-

sions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JCS 2304/244-1

4.

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

I4!

.15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

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b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the: commanders of

unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned

to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer

Captain J. O. Sherman, USN

J-5, Extension 78926

2

3

5

Copy

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TOP

SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respond-

ing to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to cuba,

stated that the President would be advised of any new and

promising courses of action which could possibly bring

pressure upon the Castro regime.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed

a review of a

study which examines world sugar economics and the vulner-

abilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an

outline program which would undermine Castro's economy,

deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political

instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's

sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the

world sugar market. Basically, the proposal

envisions

a

three- to six-year program, beginning

with a 30 per cent

reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by

introducing

aerially from off-shore, a sugar cane

plant

parasite, Bunga. Subsequently, the economic and political

disturbances

caused by this attack could be exacerbated

and

exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease

among draft animals; controlling rainfall by cloud seeding,

mining caneflelds, burning cane, and directing other acts

of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and

transportation

systems.

..GROUP. 1

EXCLUDED SERO

AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADIS PAND DECLASSIFICATIC

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

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6

Enclosure

TON

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TOP SECRET

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3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to belleve that the

ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a

government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

The concept of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert

means would furnish another option to the United States in

bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime.

4. Although the joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the

possible political consequences from proof of the us involve-

ment in such

program, they believe that

proposals related

the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market,

the stabilization of the free market,

and

the covert

intro

duction of Bunga

into Cuba, merit

serious consideration.

Other forms of

attack proposed in the study might be taken

subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political

turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A

hereto.

5. It Is recommended that the attached drafü memorandum

(Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs

for

appropriate Interagency coordination and conment

asa

basis for

consideration of further reconmendation by the

Joint Chiefs of Stafi.

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Enclosure

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(Revised by Decision - 9. Noveroer

1954)

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APPENDICES A, B, AND C

(6 pages)

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JCS 2304/244-1

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Appendicés A, B, and. C

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APPENDIX A

CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK

COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUCAR INDUSTRY

1. The uitimate success of the proposed program would

depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic

controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices.

It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual

production of sugar if

a subsequent rise in the price of

sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of

convertible currency

as it had before the program was

undertaken.

The arguments

and

rationale in favor of the

economic proposals in the study appear

to have validity.

However, world economics is a most complex subject

and

involves many

The important points on

variable factors.

economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate

agencies in the government having responsibility for such

matters.

2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline

program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this

would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or

that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United

States would be installed. Russia has too much at stake,

politically, to

allow an overthrow of

a communist regime

for economic reasons alone.

Success

of

the proposed

actions

would, however, create

serious difficulties

for the Castro

Government

and

would

be an additional

means

of exerting

pressure against that government.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

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3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by

the study. The approval for implementation of such

concept would introduce a new dimension into cold

war

methods and would require a major change in national

policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the

event of discovery. There is also an obvious political

risk associated with this proposal. Should any credible

evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political

loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart

from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence

of the United

States in international organizations such

as the United

Nations and the Organization of American

States would be impaired

seriously.

4. Nevertheless; it is the responsibility of the joint

Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the

President apprised of the capabilities of the military

establishment.

The subject study presents measures which

should be

considered, and if found to be acceptable after

coordination with appropriate government agencies it would

represent another option for positive actions against the

Castro

regime.

5. NSAM 213* dated 8 January 1963, established a

committee to coordinate the management of alí aspects

of US policy toward Cuba.

The President looks to the

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs

fos the effective coordination of the execution of policy

decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses

of action.

The subject study should be referred to this

committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to

reporting

to.

the President.

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

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26

27

28

29

30

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Appendix A

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6. The joint Chieis of Staff have a responsibility to

provide military advice to the Comronder in Chief and the

Secretary of Defense. It 1s appropriaie, therefore, that

a matter suor as the proposals under consideration, bo

sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation

that the stuay be forwarded

to the Interdepartmental

Coordinating Committee

for coordination and comment ad a

busis for considerstion of furthes recommendations by tho

joint Chiefs of Sisfi.

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

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Lyndon

3

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Appendix A

(Revised by Decision - 9 November 1954)

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APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR, INCERDEPARTMENTAL

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR

CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed

the President that they

would continue to review the problen

of putting

additional pressures on Castro and that

the

President would be advised

if any new and promising courses

of action were uncovered.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded

a study on

the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack-

ing the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world

sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry,

and proposes a phased interagency program which would:

a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by

approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1956

production level.

b. Expand

US

influence in the world sugar market

by assignment

of

quotas and other actions to insulate

the free

market from

the effects of Cuban sugar losses.

3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in

the study are within existing or attainable military capa-

bilities.

Several actions are proposed. Key among these

is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite

against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce

gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly

disavowing US involvement.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 '

11

12

13°

14

15

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20

21

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GROUP I

CODY

EXCLUDED

STiCH

AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

Lyndon Becoinsoncibrary

4

Appendix B

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4. Mindîul of the risks atbending such actions, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposols

of the stury

and

believe that

they offcs an option

for exerting new presaures

against Castro.

They believe that proposals related

to the

exponsion of US influenos over the world sugar maricet,. the

stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction

of sunga into Cuba, meriù serious consideration. Other forms

of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently

to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence.

5. The study is forwarded herewith with a request trat

the concept and actions proposed in the outline program of

the study be coordinated by your committee with other

govern

mental departments

and agencias. Upon completion of your

review

and coordination, it is further requested that

your

comments be made available to the Secrotary of Defense and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1

2

3

5

6.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

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(Revised ou Decisio

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APPENDIX C

Army Report on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

(See Attachment to JCS 2304/244,

beginning on page

6 of the white attachment)

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Appendix ¢

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5 November 1964

TOP

COPY NO.

DISTRIBUTION G

SECRET

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the :

HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1

A Report by the J-5

on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders are requested

to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the

superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

R. C. FORBES

J. E. MANSFIELD

Joint Secretariat

• UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment

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1x-c-2-h

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF

21 July

1975

INVENTORIED:

on 331122

EY-

SUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to

Covert Actions Against Cuba

FROM: Loch Johnson

Among the many

documents which I examined at the Johnson Library in

Texas this

past week is one that I find particularly alarming. I wish

Lo draw it to your attention.

The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of

Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert

action against Cuba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE.

On 21. March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for

new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new

promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be

brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright

new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached).

The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by intro

ducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called

Bunge.

The progran would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of antici-

pated

Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six

years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved.

"The

economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be

exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures

as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling

rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and direct-

ing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and

transportation systems" (6, emphasis added).

In sum, SQUARE DANCE

"would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about

the collapse of the Castro regime" (7).

the memo notes that

In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCe proposa imould introduce a new

the approval. for implementation of the program

dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in

national policy."

Indeed it would-or at. least one hopes we have not

used such methods before!

The proposal is nothing less thon a variant

of germ warfare which would have had serious consequences for the

civilian population.

At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE

concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially.

(The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC. staffer, to Bundy suggests

«overing son vet on by 3о

that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.)

To me, though,

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the mere writing of this kind of proposal is a reprehensible first step

toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief.

I find it even more

repugnant than contingency plans for assassination. These are not the

kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the white House from

the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of

what is

acceptable policy,

legally and morally.

As in the Huston Plan,

the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and un-

The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic

death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba.

The feeble efforts

of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by

comparison with this Army proposal for covert action.

I believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination

is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant

and animal life

through covert germ warfare. Somehow (probably through

hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the

point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy.

These limits may not be easy to define, but we must try.

Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for

Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference

is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive

Cuban imports (not food)." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC

staffer) indicates that this proposal received Presidential backing.

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ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: Castro

•Newspaper accounts report that prior to the

April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly

or thry Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and

Johnny Roselli in organizing assassination attempts against

Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or

about 3/13/61.

The first attempt used poison and it was

hoped that with Castro dead, the invasion planned and

executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success.

There were five more attempts

made on Castro's life after

3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of

1963.

Allegations (from Newspaper sources) :

1)

The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu

enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to

organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro.

Johnny Roselli headed several missions against

through

Castro from late March or April 1961 / late February or

March 1963.

3)

That REK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it.

es

4)

Roselll recèived poison capsul! from the CIA which

he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro

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before the Bay of Pigs.

to one of Castro's cooks.

One of the Cubans was

related

5)

The assassination was intended to take place before

invasion

the planned Bay of Pigs/in order to insure that CIA

operation's success.

6)

The CIA has extended services to Giancana which

included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas

apartment.

7)

Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA

agents William Harvey and James O'Connell.

8)

Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly

with Cuban Refugees:

1.

Rosell1

2.

Maheu

3. Hunt

4. Liddy

5. Glancana

6. James O'Connel

7.

Questions:

1)

2)

Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963?

Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals

to determine if there were any Castro intelligence

agent information?

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.. .

(3)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

10)

Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees

ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on

If so, how was the situation handled?

In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination

or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and

positive step towards the success of the invasion?

Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by

Cuban nationals?

Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters

made known to the agency by the cuban nationals in

advance?

Did the CIA clear such actions?

Was the CIA aware of Roselll's actions?

Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of

Johnny Roselli?

At any time has the CIA been associated with sam

Giancana?

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