R-379
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
To: CONEIN, LUCIEN
Document date: 06/20/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

Date : 08/06/95

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER: 157-10014-10094

RECORDS

SERIES: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 13-H-03

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

CONEIN, LUCIEN

TO

TITLE : R-379

DATE : 06/20/75

PAGES

: 87

SUBJECTS : CONEIN, LUCIEN

VIETNAM

DIEM, NGO DINH

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

: POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/22/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 4

Released under the John F. kennedy

[R] - ITEM

IS

RESTRICTED

53244

DocId: 32423482

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27i.11.

Yol. 1 Or 5

Ohe Anitro Statra Grnate

LATIONAT

:Unäuthorized Disc

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to Criuinal' Sänctiöns

1379.

Report of P'roceedingo

•NVENTARLD:

=/29/27

BC

Senato

• Saleat

Operations

Hearing held before

uttoo to study conoramental

espoot to Intolligonoe detivitios

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

RELLAS OF AS DOCUMENT,

Friday, June 20, 1975

Washington, D. C

(Stenutype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET. S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 644-6000

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TOT" SECRET

CONIENIS

TESTIMONY OF

Lucien Conein

PAGF.

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EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

Conein NO.

1

FOR IDENTIFICATION

26

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AHWARD: ant

Frano (Arda 202) 341

EXECUTIVE SESSION

2

Friday, June 20, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

8

Governmental Motivitles,

Washington, D. C.

9

10

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 o'clock

11

пp.m., in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator John Tower presiding.

1::

Present:

Sanators Hart of Michigan, Hluddleston, Mondale,

1: Morgan, tower (presiding), Mathias, Baker and schreiker.

14 1

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

14.

lin. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

!r. "Counsel; and Frederick Baron, Charlas Kirbow, Burton Wides,

1. Michael J. Madigan, William Bader, David Maron and Patrick

?: Shea, Professional Staff Members.

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110 Peral Straos. 8.l, M.100sa9,101, D2.20001

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AHHARD : ant

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PROCEEDINGS

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(2:15 p.m.)

3

Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

4

Beford we proceed to hear the witness, I think we should

5

have a report from the team that went down to the White House

6

this morning to examina some documents, and I believe thay

7

will report to us and have a racommendation on how the committee:

8

should agree to handle this material, and shall I call on --

Sanator Mondals. Howard has the notes.

10

Sonator Tower. I call on Senator Baker.

1]

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, Rill Radar has the notes.

Senator Mondale. Well then, call on ma. I can read them.

13

Serator Tower. Mr. Bador?

14

MI. Bader. Thank

you, Senator.

14;

The documents that wa reviewed briufly at the white louse

16

situation room were four different catagorius.

In the first category, there were copies of the so-caller

"Mongoose files. These files contain minutes of the Special

1'1

Group Augmented and copies of the rest of the Mongoose files,

arranged in chronological ordur. And these holdings are from

2!

¡the files of the Fxecutive Secretary of the an Committee and

2r.

¡include the files of the Chairman and the Executive Secretary

of the special Group Mugmented.

Also these trust files are turned over to the Chairman by

¡General Lansdale after the group ceased functioning, that is.

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tha Mongoose group. As I looked at tham, thore were about a

2

hundred documents in this first group.

The second group of documents are CIA's Mongoose files,

4

which we have already seen. There are aoma six files, and I

5

assume these are the same files, and wo have seen tham. But of

6

icourse, we didn't have a chance to go through them with any

¡care.

8

The third group of files were the Rockefeller Commission

9 papers and files on assassination, and that Includes the summary

In lof facts, the investigation of plans for the assassination of

1: "Castro and perhaps more than Castro, the other assassinations,

1^ Trujillo as well.

1÷

MI. Madigan. Lumumba's in there and also a refarence to

14 Sukarno.

15 :

MI. Bakur. That is a some in or 90 page document which, as.

1i •I say, is a summary of facts, and this was prepared by David

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• Balin.

1;:

Senator Baker. It might be important to note here, Mr.

Chainnan, that the whitd llouse indicated to us that that summary

%.

was not a Rockefeller Commisgion document and did not nacesgarilv

::.

reprasant the

position of the Rockefeller Commission as such.

That is the way I interpret their language.

I get tho impression that this may havy been a summary that

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was not accepted for conclusion in the report, therafore there

a: 'may ba some conflict.

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Senator Morgan. It was preparad by whom?

Senator Baker. Belin, the Exacutiva Director.

Mr. Badar: The last category, tha fourth category, are

some Spaciál Group minutas, that is, a filo, it is a tiny file,

really, of assassinations and allegations, and thase minutes

ware cullad from Special Group mestings and they are highly

seluctive in the sense that they are documents as thay could

find them in their search that relatad only to Cuba and 1t 19

clear that there is a great deal more to come in this category

of the spocial Group minutes. It was just on Cuba. Thare was

nothing on the other assassinatiors.

Senator Schweiker. You mean more that you have not seen

1 lyot?

14

MI. Bader. More that they have not put together as yet,

I: jor at least they have not made available to us, and those were

If.

lithe four categories.

It is a little hard to judge just how much work it will

take to go through them. It is,

I would say, somewhere around

•:: 490 to 500

pages, perhaps.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would ask Fritz and Bill

i: to monitor what I'm about to say next to make sure that I reflect

2 "it accurately.

There is a general uneasiness at the white House about

letting us have these documents unrestricted, although pretty

2!

¡clearly thoy are committed to let us have tham, under some

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circumstance.

2

It 1s also clear to ma that some documents have not yet

buen located and supplied to us and that parts of some documents

have been deleted. I think we probablv can get that deleted

5

information before very long.

6

The suggostion was made that wa ask the White House to

>ibring those documents up here by their own personnel on Monday

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"so that we could use them to examine witnesses. If they care

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¡to keep someone here to retain technical possession of the

Is "documents, to take them back with them at the close of that day

"or any day on which we use them, they might do that, and that

1:

I: sooner or later we would have to find a way to utilize those

documents, meaning to put certain documents in the record

I: or to read them into the record or to supply copies.

Rod Hill seemed to think well of that idea. I told him

Ir: ahat I would suggest it to sunator Tower and to the rest of

I the Committee, and hopefully Senator Tower of Senator Church

would be back in touch with the White Housé to see if we can

1÷

:: negotiate an agreument along those linos. I think we can. i

think the hite House will agree to that arrangement.

Senator Monlalé. There are two points I would like to

i make.

2:

2:

2:

2:

Senator

Tower. Fritz?

Sanator Mondals. I think Hills was saying, from some of

the documentation we looked at it was clear that we may not yet.

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havo all of the documants that wa ought to look at, and I think

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they are looking for more documents. Things we read rafarred

to things that were not there. So I don't think we can be

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satisfied yet. that the full record 19 available for perusal.

The second thing is, in our quick look lt is vary apparent

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that we must have the documentation. I saw some which would

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have been very important in our questioning McCone, which may

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have helped him remember things. It was vary contral to it.

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I think wa wasted a couple of hours when it could have been

10

I dons very quickly with one or two documents.

1:

I saw, there wore saveral other documents that inmediatoly

struck me as being essantial to our work. I don't think we saw

anything that was revolutionary of that filled in a lot of the

1:: Cantral gaps.

Senator Tower. You didn't sue anything that was sensitiva

It, I to the extont that it might reflect on a foreign goverment.

1;. or somathing like that?

Senator Mondale. There might be stuff in there, honostly,

1÷

I don't know. But just looking at our work --

Senator Tower.

What you're saying, Fritz, is you don't

::.

think we need all of it, that we could select out some of it.

His that it?

Senator Mondale.

What I am saying is I think there is

2:

Inore available somewhere than we saw, and they said they are

25

"still looking. Hills said he wasn't satisfied that it was all

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there yet, and secondly, wa've got to havo it.

2

Senator Tower. Right.

Senator Mondale. And we nood it for cross-axamination and

we need it --

5

Senator Tower. Wall, the question 1s, do you nood avery-

thing that you looked at today, or do you think --

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Senator Mondale. I don't know. Some of the stuff wa

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already have.

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Mr. Bador. Some, we already have.

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Senator Mondale. So we don't need that.

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Senator Tower.

YaS.

Senator Mondale. The other material, it struck me that

1: II don't see what we have to lose by having most of it. I think

li ¡most of it is historical.

Senator Baker. I think we ought to have all of it, John.

1, The essence of the suggustion I tried to make was that we have

1: iphysically present in this room all of it, and then we can decide

Is how wa use it and what parts of it.

1:!

Senator Huddlaston. Und quastion on the documents.

Is that just the material that the Rockefeller commission

2: has had?

2: 1

Senator Baker. No, the Rockofoller Commission apparently

2:

has not had these NSC minutes.

2÷

Senator Mondale. They did not have the NSC minutes.

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Mr. Schwarz. They asked for them and we were told about

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tan days ago that the Whito House rofusod to give 1t to the

Rockafollar Commission for some reason.

Sanator Baker. Tha's right.

Senator Mondalo. The interouting,thing; anong other things,

it tello you exactly who was dt all'of: thasa inscings.

Senator Bakar. That's ramarkable, thore's no doubt about

who was there and in most cases who said what.

Senator Mondale. The heat was on, there's no doubt about

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6

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li that.

1:

Sunator Towar. YOU'Vd heard Sanator Bakar's proposal.

: "Is it the sense of the cormitted that we should adopt that

::procedure for now, at least, for -- let's say, what is it,

2: Monday that we want them up here?

14

Mr. Schwarz. Bundy is coming at 2:n0 o'clock on Monday

land wa've set an opportunity to meet with him and go over and

:: refresh his recollection and so forth. Are we entitled to have

"them for that purpose as well as the actual use of them at the

÷ hearing?

Senator Baker. My understanding is that thare is to be no

... restriction on our use of them.

Senator Mondale, We not only need then, but we noed tham

i: in a way that they're useful to us on cross-examination. Now, as

2: I understand it, the staff will be down there this afternoon an!

i; maybe into tomorrow and the next day, for that mattar.

Senator Tower.

So the staff can sift through some of this?

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Mr. Schwarz. And digest it, and ao forth.

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Senator Mondale, And we should ask that the materials

that are appropriate or rolevant to the next witnoss be avail-

¡¡ able to us and that staff have them organized in ordar:..:

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! to help us.

6

Senator Baker. Thoro is a point there l'd like to vary on a

•#little.

I don't want to give the White House an opportunity to pick

9

jout of that stuff what thay're going to send up here. I would

In Hika our request to be to send all of 1t, and then for us to

1: i'decido here, with the Whles House concurrance, on how we use it.

;:'¡that 1s, do we road it. into the rocoral, do we photocopy it, or

1: do they

supply us a copy of it.

Lot us make the esgance of it that they send it here.

Senator Tower. The proposition by Senator Baker is that

Iwe ask them to bring the documents here, allow the bearer to

16

17

be present while the documents are being used, so they maintain

technical possession and take them back to the White House after

we have used them in our session or subsequent sessions.

¿ "Then we can determine at a later time what final disposition wa

make.

24.

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Is that correct, Howard?

Senator Baker. That's correct.

Senator Towar. I was not able to get Senator Church. "e

is off in the wilds of Idaho.

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Mr. Schwarz. I talked with him last night, and this 18

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quite consistant with our conversation.

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Senator Tower. I think this will be agreeable with him.

but I told his secretary that 1f, for any reason, after he gets

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¡in touch with his office he does find it objoctionable that I

6

Iwould reopen the mattar in a subseguent meeting.

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8

Sanator Mondale. Just one question.

There would not be a white House staff person here durina

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1:

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someone's testimony?

Mr. Schwarz. They'd sit outside the door.

Senator Mondale. I don't think he should be here as a

1ri monitor.

1: :

Senator Baker. I think that's a point we'll have to make

i; clear. I agree with you, Fritz, he ought to be physically

i present, like guarding the door that we don't run off with it,

:: but not here.

Senator Tower. And we would undertake that we're not going

" to xerox them of anythig while he's sittina out there.

Is that agrued on by everybody? Is thare any objection to

i ¡that?

:.:

E:

2:

Then that is the way we will procaed.

Senator Baker.

Mike Madinan makes a point that's well

taken. It was Mike's understanding that Hill's was telling us

there were certain other documents that he had already identifi.l

but had not yet reviewed and we ought to make sure that we ret

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all of those as well.

Senator Tower. I think the problem down there 18 they do

not have enough staff to got all of this stuff together, is that

"it?

4

Senator Baker. I think the problem is they do not want to

6

¡bo taken by surprise.

7

Senator Huddleston. They want to seo it all first.

Senator Tower. They want to see it bafore it comes to us?

-==-===

Senator Baker. I don't blame them.

1c

Senator Tower. I understand MI. Kissinger has some interest

in seeing them.

Sunator Mondale. I think that's why they don't have enough

1: (staff.

14

Senator Tower. Okay.

Is there anything else of a housekeepina nature to come

l up?

Senator Baker. I might say to the Cormittee, MI. Chairman.

that you conducted a most intriguing interview with Mr. Angletor.

Yosterday.

Senator Tower, We did. In effect, we took a deposition

from him in my office yesterday, and I think it was very

*Hillumirating, to say the least.

Serator Morgan. He looks the part.

Senator Baker, lle sure does.

Senator Tower. So I would suggest to the Committea

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time.

the reading of that deposition. I think it would be worth your

Senator Bakar and Sanator Mathias wore thore also.

All right.

5

Mt. Kirbow?

6

MI. Kirbow. Mt. Chalrman, I think it would bo heloful to

7

the members if they know that when Mr. Coreln is testifying trat,

¡he has before him what ho refers to as an afteraction isport.

9

in which both he and the station Chief before Mr. ISmsel Mr. 06

1:

:Richardson, John Richardson, compiled immediately after the coup

:: ¡took place in Saigon.

He is going to limit his testimony principally, since he

:: has no personal knowledge of the washington scene, to paintin

for the committee, if you will, a picture of the events that

transpired from early May of 1963 on through the time of the

coup, and he will then be prepared to answer any questions.

much as we did with Mr. Colby this morning.

Senator Tower. He wants to proceed in narrativo.form?•

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

:

Senator Tower. All right, we will proceed with Mr. Condin.

(Whergupon, at 2:27 o'clock p.m., the witness entered the

hearira room.)

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Sanator Tower. Mr. Conein, thank you for coming today.

We will be questioning you under oath today, so if you would

raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear that the testimony

¡you are about to give before this committee is the

truth, the

5

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so halp you god?

6

MI. Consin. I do, sir:

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8

9

Senator Towar, Counsel will advise you on your rights.

Mr. Kirbow. Please bo seatad.

MI. Schwarz. MI. Conaln, just a couplo of procedural

10

"matters.

1:

You are aware that you have the right to counsel?

1:

Mr. Conein. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop and

i; obtain counsel in the middle of these proceedings you have

I'" that right as well?

MI. Conain.

Yes.

1:.

Mr. Schwarz..A..! of course you have all your constitutional

s rights including your rights under the flith Amendment, you

:: understand that?

Mr. Kirbow will question you.

Senator Tower.

Mr. Kirbow?

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TESTIMONY OF LUCIEN E. CONEIN

2

Mr. Risbow.

Mr. Conein, for the record would you plaase

state your full name, your current address, and present

occupation?

5

Mr. Conein. My name is Lucien E. Condin, C-o-n-a-1-n.

6

I live at 1111 Ingleside -- 1-n-g-1-0-s-1-d-e -- Avenue,

9

Mclean, Virginia.

I am employed by the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement

Admintatration.

Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.

?:

Mr. Conein, would you

be good anough to give the committee

i: a brief synopsis of your background from the time you first

!:bocame angaged in any government work, either military or

?; Civilian?

•Mr. Conein. I enlisted in the Army in 1941, Septemher of

1: 1941, and in 1943 I graduated from OCS in Fort Benning, Georaia.

At that time, I had been asked to volunteer for the office

:.' of Strategic Services, which I did, and was sent to England for

:: further training in the Special Operations Exacutive, which was

¿al: organization affiliated with the OSS under Britieh Command. .

I was parachuted behind the lines in France in 1944. In

December, 1914 I returned to the United States and I was sent

for training preparatory to going to the China, Burma, India

theatre which I did in 1945.

In March of 1945, the French garrison in French Indochira

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had been attackod by the Japaneso and I was asked to parachute

into the area to recuperato elaments of the French forces, to

consolidate them, retrain then, go back into Indochina and to

form a base for operations in the northern part of Indochina.

5

This I did and later on 1 was in Hanoi with the Viet Minh

6

|took over in 1945, and I stayed until 1946 when I came back to

?

8

I the United States and then I was sent to the su mission, which

jwas the predecessor of the CIM, to Germany and I served in the

Assu, the CIG and the CIA.

10

I left Germany in 1953, still in the military, whore I

11 : became a desk chief at CIA, and in 1954 I was asked by Mr. llelms

1: 1E I would go back to Vietnam, which I dia, under the command of

1: than-Colonel Edward G. Lansiale and I was assigned to North

1, Vietnam.

16°

I stayed there until the Viet Minh took over in October of

If 1954. I then went to Haiphong, and in 1955 I came to Saigon.

1: and at that time, the operation was to establish a viable

1: government in Vletnam, the government of go Dien Diem.

I remained until 1956 and in 1956 I agked to be relieved

from the CIA so I could return to the military service. I harl

i..

been up to that time, approximately 13 years as a military man

with oss, SSU, CIG and CIA.

::.

I laft and I joined the Special Forces in the Army and I

2; served from '56 to '59. In 1959 I was assigned to the Assistant

¿: Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S. Army and was sent to

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" Iran where I served for two years.

2

I ratirad from the military in 1961 and roturned to the

iCIn. I was sent to Vietnam in 1961 and I remained in Vietnam

until August of 1967.

5

I laft the CIA in 1968, July the 15th, retired from the

o icIA and military. I went in private business for a couple of

? years and in 1971 I worked as a consultant for the unite House

8

¡for approximately four months, four or fivo months.

I then was a consultant to the Bureau of Narcotica and

1: "Dangarous Drugs of the Department of Justice and I joined the

DEA in 1973 and I am presently working for the DEA.

MI. Kirbow. Directina your attention than to that period

:: 'after you returned to Vietnam after 1961 to tha period bezinning

i: in carly 1963, would you relate to the Committee your experiences

i"in connection with the build-up and the eventual General's

coup and the downfall of the Diam government?

Mr. Condin. Yes, sir.

In February of 1962, two Air Force pilots, Vietnamese Air

:: Force pilots, attacked the Presidential Palace of Ngo Dien Mien.

This was not the first indication that there was something

wrong, because if you will recall in November of 1960 there was

another attampted coup.

At that time, in Februarv, I was asked if I would go to the

different military leaders which I knew and had known in the

i'past to find out what was the political pressure, what was the

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temperature, was there coally some diesidence within the military

ranks, was thare really a basis for an uprising against Ngo Dion

Diam.

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I was unable at that time to determine this fact. There

5

iwas isolated dissidenco within the milltary structure. This was

6 Iraported in Fabruary or March in 1962.

8

In the meantime, Mr. Colby had assigned me to work with the!

¡Ministar of the Interior of the Government of Vietnam, and I

9

was responsible to be the liaison betwear the CIA and the

¡Ministry of the Interior on a program, on a project, which was

1: #called Strategie Hamlet Program.

::: This was an idea forwarded by Ngo Dion Nhu, the President's

1 brother and counsallor, to ustablish security within the

i÷ hanlets and the villages where people lived so that they could

" deny access of food, taxes and what have you to the Vietcong.

1..

In this position I was able to travel quite extensively

• 1ї. because I was under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior

" and indirectly I worked for the President's brother who was in

1:

charge of the program and by travelling I was abla to qo to

every province, I was able to talk to unit commanders down to

:.

and including small sections. Some of thesa people I had liroi:

for many years; some of them I had known back aven in World ler

II. Some of them ware in powerful positions, and I was abie.

;; talk to them on a persor to person basis, not as a government

official.

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1

I did wear a uniform though I was out of the Army when I

2

Iwas in that position because those military commanders who knew

4

5

Ime always assumed that I was in the Army and that I was still in:

¡the Army. Therafore, lt was much easier for me to travel in

juniform and special arrangaments were made for me to carry an

6

idantification card as being an active duty military officer.

This was dono with the parmission of General Harkins, and

8

i,It was also known to General Westmoreland when General Wast-

9

"moreland took over.

In that period, I would say that the country team was

I: "attempting to get organized so thay could show that they were

speaking with ond head under Ambassador Nolting, and we had

1÷ "a committae which the military and also " agencies, includina

the CIA, were members, and it was called the Truebart Committee

I Where we jointly made plans to help out the governmant of

16 "Viotnam in different prograns, whether they be military programs

!:TOr USAID type prograns, self-help programs, also prograns of

which to arm the villagars so they could protect themselves.

We didn't arm tham with modern weapons, we gave them

shotgums, .12 gauge shotguns. There were very vow modern

€.:

weapons available for that type of activity.

At the same time, we ware interested in the

Montagnard

Program and I did work with the Montagnaids "- those are the

24 hill tribes in central Vietnam.

20

We did arm certain elements of the Montagnards, and we dil

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keep them up and organize them in paramilitary forces, and these

forces were eventually turned over completaly to the u.s.

Army.

About - well, I can say definitely on 7 of May, 1963,

5

the Minister of Interior, myself and his entourage flew to

6

Hue in cantral Vietnam. While in Hue, It was on my aircraft that

¡I had assigned to me for that day -- while in Hue, they had a

8

very large meeting of different military authorities and at that.

9

time I did not realize what was going on.

10

They had met with the President's brother, Ngo Dien Can.

i: who was considered the war lord,' in a way, and some decisions

i: "were made, of which I was not aware of, va returnel quite late

"the right of the ith; though. I wanted to stay, the Ministry

1÷

the Interior told me it would ba impossibla. I wanted to see

the celebration of the birthday of Buddha. I wanted to see

16

¡the boats with the candles lit going down the perfumed river,

¡but it was not to ba.

17

The next day there was an attack by the military forces or

the Buddhists. Up to that time, the Buddhists, as an entity.

iwas not a political force and never thourht of being, and wher

f:.

the attack on the Buddhists came about, this was, in my estima-

tion, one of the turning points in what was happening in Vistrr.

8r.

It could have been salvaged, but this -- arain, I had

talked later with the Minister of the Interior and I had talle:

24

with Ngo Dien Nhu on several occasions when they were trying =

25

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1

lappaase the situation: They were trying to meat some demands

2

"of the Buddhist leaders. This, unfortunately, did not come

about.

I did not travel too much during the latter part of May

5

jor June, and it was quite evident at that time, to me and to

6 lother people who were there that there was a strong anti-American

8

jfeeling, and also a restriction put on by the government of

¡Vietnam about people associatiny with Americans.

9

The only time that it broke down was on the 4th of July of

1: 1963 whan the Ambassador Nolting threw a party for the Indepen-

1: donce Day and it seened like every military leader and political

1: personality was attending American parties that day.

1:

I received a message to meet with General Don, . who

": was Commander of ICORPS at that time, and it was in a public

i: place, it was in the Caravalle Hotel downstairs where they had

i sort of a big dining room, a nightclub, and I was present with

÷ General Don and his entourage and everybody from the Diem

:.government was in the same place. The place was jam packer.

It was at that time on the ith of July that I had the

: first indication that something serious was being contemplater?

:.

when General Son told me that if the Buddhist situation does

4:

:..

not got sattled that the military are planning. I reported

this fact, and I believe it was around the fth or 9th of

Tuly,

that more indications -- on the llth of July, Ngo Dien Nhu

¿: called the Generals together for a staff meeting at the General

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Staff Headquartars and shocked them by telling them that ha

¡know of some coup planning going on:by the Caserals.

This scared the Gonerals and other officars,

needless to

•say, that Ngo Dien Nhu would be completely aware that thore.

5 iwas some dissidence in the tanks.

6

Nothing happened much before the 20th or 21st of August

7

¡O9 1963. At that time --I have to go back a littlo bit.

8

We had had bonzes burning themsalves, and we had had local

9 pregs releasas mado by Madam Nhu that somotimas were not too

Ii "well received by tho Americans and also antagonized the

• 1: population.

On the night of the 21st of August, General Ton That Dinh,

1: as Military Governor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps,

l÷ had established a curfew. If I racall correctly, the curfew

i:, was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody

I: seen after that time would be seen -- after that would be shot.

1: And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that

:÷ time, later on proving to be elements of the Special Forces,

which was the praetorian quard of Nao Dien Nhu and the police

2 dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in saigon.

Now what was very bad about this, Ambassador Nolting had

already bean rellaved and Ambassador Lodge was on his way to

:: take over. And Ambassador Lorige arrived on the 22nd or 23rd

i; of August. I am

not sure exactly of the date.

2:

And he found that Saigon was an armed camp.

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Now, during this poriod of those attacks on the pagodas.

2

there had been many contacts made by a lot of people to anybody

who would listan to them talking about doing something about

¡doing away with the existing regine, I had talked with tha

5

6

¡diffarent generals and on the one time in August -- I don't

recall if it was the 23rd or 24th --we recolved a cable which

7

has later been known as the famous Roger Hillsman cable, which

8

9

¡practically gave us the go ahead that this type of thing could

not continue.

10

Talking of type of thing, we're talking about the present

regime continuing as it was.

•::.

Thare was a lot of

talk of coups. We had not with

1: "Generals on different occasions. I had met with them, other

!; people had also.

We had met with colonels and junior officers.

¡And we anticipated that there would be some type of action taker.

Is "in the latter part of August.

If you will recall, or those of you who don't know, it

aborted at that time. It aborted because, one, they did not

have necessary forces, I am talking about the coup plotters,

*did not have the necessary forces to comhat those loyal to the

Diem government, namely elements of the marines, elements of

Ew: the Rangers, the Presidential Guard, and other units, and

;.:

especially the Special Forces, which were the best-armed troops

' available.

25

Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was payin:

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loff or was paying to have a coup. This was a very shrowd and

2

calculating movo on any man on tha quality of Ngo Dien Nhu

¡who was a shrewd politician and also a master of psychological

warfare.

5

During the month of September, there was still more talk

6

"of coups and at that time, the month of Saptember, I had been

7

I told by Ambassador Lodge that. I was to monitor coup planning

8

lonly. I was not told to -- that I was to convey any messages.

9

¿I had conveyed messagas to Big Minh on two occasions, General

•Khiem --K-h-i-e-m -- on one occasion:

I had met Genoral

1:

Khiem and Big Minh on another occasion.

On several occasions I had met General Don and other

1: military leaders.

In Saptembar, the latter part of Saptember, thars had heen

i some loassessment of what had been going on.

I will say this, that I worked for Ambasgador Lodge. I

i: raportad to Ambassador Lodge and I received my instructions

:: from Ambassador Lodge. If they ware cabled instructions, he had

'a very good habit of not reading something. Ily would fold a

piece of paper and what pertained to you for instructions he

i: would let you read that, and that alore so that you didn't

i know who was sending it of where it came from.' He just read

that, and he said those are the instructions, do you understand

is them? Yes, sir; all right, go carry them out.

In October -- I'm running over these things in a hurry

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In October, tha first part of Octobar, I think Octobar the

34d or 4th, I was askad to contact Big Minh. I was by mysalf

and I contacted Big Minh at his hoadquartera.

5

6

At that time, Big Minh axplained to mo that they had had,

Ithat thare was going to be a coup d'otat, that they didn't want

ithis to be an American sponsored coup d'etat, thay wanted to be

assured of American backing, specifically in the part where it

8

9

"comes to military and economic ald after the coup had been

successful.

10

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I Interrupt for just

1: a sacond?

Senator Towar. Senator

Baker.

Senator Baker. It's a terribly fine point, and I don't

¿¡ mean to be critical, but could you elaborate a little bit on

what you understood him to mean when he said he did not want

::it to be an Amarican-sponsored coup d'etat, but he wanted

:: assurances in advance of American economic and military support

:.after a successful coup d'etat.

Could you tell me how you make that distinction a little

¿ clearer?

:..

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

2:

I had specific instructions from the Ambassador, and all

.. the instructions I received, Senator, before any meetina, I

; was told exactly what I would say, and if I recall at that.

time, I was told to go ahead to the meeting, and I have it here

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In the paper -- and I hate to rifla through papar, but I could

answer it if I could just --

5

Now, what the General meant, he did not want actual u.s.

participation in the coup d'atat. He did not want the u.s.

government to start the coup d'atat. le also outlined three

6

genaral ideas, this was the first time that a leader had

7

mantioned the possibility of assassination. This assassination

8

was not of dien. This was -- if they could not do anything, 1t

9

would do the alimination of Ngo Dien Can who was the was lord

1a lin contral Vietnam and Ngo Dion Nhu.

i:: At that time, General Minh did say that one of the altar-

:: native means was to eliminate Can and Nhu and keep Diem. That

ir iwas one of the alternatives.

l÷.

Senator Baker. Did they ask you for any support in

1 eliminating either of these people?

1€

Mr. Conein. No, sir. I had never, and even right up

"to the very end, I had never been asked for any resources

::whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any Individua.

Senator Tower. This was developed in some considerable

detail by MI. Colby this morning and you might be interester.

i: in reading the transcript.

"I. Kirbow. I think, having interrupted you, appropriate:.

:: MI. Condin, could I ask you too, you have placed, or penner!

¿i a paper, made à chronology of all of the evants immediatel:

2:.

preceeding and after the coup d'etat.

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25

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir.

2

MI. Kirbow, Do you have a copy of that thare befora you?

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir.

4°

Mr. Kirbow. And you have looked at the original, which

5

I hold here?

6

Mi, Conein. Yas, I havo it hare.

7

MI. Kirbow. This has bean marked, Mr. Chairman, as

Conein Exhibit No. 1 and I ask at this time that the entiro

9

document, as bast evidence of what transpired at the time, be

10, placed in the record for future use by the Committee.

11

Senator Tower. Without objection.

12

(The document referred to was

marked as Conein Exhibit No. 1

for identification.)

14

35!

16

17

3:1

20:

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]

MI. Kirbow.

Pleasa go ahoad, Mr. Conain, with your

2

summary.

3

Mr. Conein. To answer your question on this, I have the

document. This is my after action report that I wrote after

the coup d'otat.

6

In this, it says:

"Big Minh did not expect U.S. government

7

support for himself or his colleagues for a coup d'etat but did

8

noed U.S, government assurances that U.s. government would not

9

10

"attampt to thwart his plans. Minh stated the nead for continu-

ation of American military and aconomic ald at the present

11

lovel.

12

"Minh outlined thrae plans under consideration by the ren-

1: "erals:

to assassinate Ngo Dian Nhu and Ngo Dien Can and to

1, koop President Diem In office. Two, have the military units

go into dissidenoe against the overnment of vietnam, encircle

1, and isolate Saigon. Three, direct military action against the

military units in Saigon."

Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.

1÷

Would you go ahead with your summary, please?

MI. Conein. Under instructions of the Ambassador, I

accelerated my contacts in monitoring Hue and reported back

i..

2:

"all times exactly what the conversations were.

Sometimes I had

as many as two or three meetings. Primarily my meetings were

with General Don, who was the organizer in his position of

!getting the commanders of different military units committed

'2?

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1

to

the coup.

2

You must understand also, gentlamen, that there were not

one coup plan. There were several. The problem that was facing

ithe people who were making assessments of this was which one

5

Thad tha most likely chance of succeeding? We were at the point

6

7

"of no return. There was no chance of pulling back, because

Ithore was going to be a coup. The best thing to do was to

8

¡monitor and keep the U.S. government advised of who the principal

9

"players were and what their Intentions were then and in the

1 future.

1: It was an impossible situation, and also during this time

1: when it was getting

down to thu critical element in October, they

li had to have assurances, the Generals had to have assurances,

1; that I was speaking for the Ambassador, Several attempts were

¿i made to get these assurances, and it was

practically impossible

Iê "because of security around the Generals, who were already

1: suspect, it was almost impossible for anybody to approach them

1: at a reception, although they had intended to do this.

So it was arranged that the Ambassador did give the

proper assurances that I was spealing for him and that I was

acting upon his orders.

Mr. Kirbow. Now that was done about the 17th of October?

Mr. Conein. The 17th, 20th -- it was in the middle of

i October it was

assured that I was speaking for them, for the

i: Ambassador, and that I was carrying out his instructions.

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Mr. Kirbow. Could I call your attantion to an entry in

2

that document that we discussed of 12 October where you ar

on page 5 and ask you to alaborato for the Committed about

4

this referance to Secretary McNamara?

5

MI. Conein. Yos.

6

Here it says that: ' "Captain Nguyen Quang Nguyen, Chief

7

"of Operations, Armor Command, stated he was contacted by two

different coup groups during the week of 5-12 October; the sacond

9

aoup: group was headed by Lt. Colonel Pham. Ngoc Thao" --

"Pham Ngo Thao was an officer, extremely capable, extremaly

In brilliant. Unfortunately, ho was killed lator, about a year.

i land a half after the cous.

He was working with the Chief of

1: ¡the Secret Police, DI. TraD Khiem Tuyen, T.u-y-e-п. Dr.

Is truven was the head of the President Diem's Secret Police, the

?:, ¿civilian part of the Secret Police, and had bees

so since

1955, but right at the time of the coup

d'etat, Ngo Diem Nhu

became.highly suspicioug.of. him and had appointed him as

Consul General in Cairo and therefore DI. Tuyen's group, it

was also an important group, was left over to Colonel Tau,

and Colonel Tau was trying to hold together a group of dissidert

individuals who ware also making their plans based upon the

2, :direction of DI. Tuyen who unfortunately never got to cairo.

but he did get as far as long rong and stayed thary.

So there were different elements contacting the same

Igroup.

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It was absolutely necessary in the coup that the Armor vas

2

tin. It was necessary that the Airborno was in. It was

necessary that the proper military units, It was also nocessary

that the Alr Force was in.

5 :

Now, the opposition forces were the Practorian Guards,

6 ¡¡the Special forces, and the Palace Guards, vory well-equipped

> jand axtremely well-armed and they were in Saigon. This

¡Was the danger, because to make a confrontation directly in

9

that city would have blown the hell out of the city the way.

1.

these people shoot, I'm sorry to say. You have to have a truck

of ammunition for each rifle that they shoot.

::

Mx. Kirbow.

During this period of october or about that.

!:

time, were you awale of the requests that were being madle on

:: the Ambassador and the Chief of Station to attempt to obtain

detailed plans of the coup from --

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kirbow. Were you instructed to take care of that?

MI. Conein. Yes, gir.

The request that had been madle -- I assumed, I learned

latar on, I learned later on that they were being made by

washington, I learned that they were made by washington --

₴:

:..

was

to have complete detail of the military plan, the politica:

plan and their ideas for the future.

44

When I was talking at meatings -- row, I didn't go to

• meetings like here, gentlemen; I had to sneak around and meet

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1

in a dentist's office and aven had to have some work dona on

2

my teeth so that they could san that I had reason -- I mean,

that's an example. I had to sneak around, as I had a very high

"profile in Vietnam, sort of cover my tracks of why I was meating.

5

and talking to these different individuals.

6

And I was told to try to procure these plans.

I was

7.

6

9

#promised these plans, and they had a coup committee, and I

learned afterwards, I didn't know it at the time, that thare

was already dissidence within the coup group, the people who

Ii "were going to pull the coup, and one General didn't like the

?: other General. The best way I can descrihe it, if you had

i*: three Vietnamese Generals sitting and talking to you, one

1: General would wall: out of the room to go to the john, two of

i than would tell you, don't trust that one and finally the one

who would outwait the other two and there would be one left,

and he would say, don't trust those two.

so it was a very

:: difficult situation, gentlemen. It was not one of these thiras

that you think

just ran along very smoothly.

It looks good ir a report, but the frustrations of tryin'.

to get the man to give you the things that he had promised

:..

you, to try to deal with different personalities through ont

2:

man or two men, to got, was practically impossible.

In the latter part of October, as I say, I think that the

people back here in washington fiqured out that I was being

set up for a patsy and thare was a possihility that it would be

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highly ambarrassing for the United States government in caso

that it was found out that I had been set up as a patsy. They

made a recommendation that somebody more senior to me and with

¡extensive military backgrounds should take over from me.

Sanator Baker.

well, Mr. Chairman, why -- maybe this was

covered earlier --. but why did you say you were being set

up?

c:

Phana (Aras 202) 344-6000

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8

Mr. Conein. No, somabody back here.

Senator Schweiker. Why?

10

Mr. Conein. Why? Because they couldn't understand why

1: |I was gotting all of the Information. Obviously, If I'm gettina

in this information of when we're going to plan and what is goina

1: to happen, what units are going to be, obviously somebody is

1: setting me up for a patsy and would blame the United States

"government.

1€

Senator Baker. Who made that determination?

Mr. Conein. The people back here thought I was being set

I:: up for a patsy, so they sent a message to the Ambassador and

1? recommended that a very capable officer and a personal friend

= Of mine, General Dick Stillwell, would take over instead of

2: me. But wher. this was brought up to General Don and the coup

24 members, they said, no, we trust Conein, we don't want anybot!

2

else.

So I continued.

24

There was a plan to transfer me at the last moment. I wish

25

they had. I wouldn't be here today, there would be somebody

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1

Senator Baker. I have a cable to saigon from MoGeorge

Bundy to Lodge, I guass 1t is 24 October. It says: "Eyes

5

5

only to Lodge and llarkins from Bundy. There may be danger.

"Nhu attempting entrapment through don's approaches to Corein.

¡Feel quito strongly that Lodge and Harking can stand back from

6

any nonossential involvament. It seans wise to maintain close

7

control over meetings betwean Don and Conein."

Is that the message that activated the disangagement?

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Was the other telenram we heard this

11

morning related to this at. all, or was that a different time

sequence, whereby we were warned that we wanted to have nothin

1: " to do with

anything that smacked of assassination?

1.:

Mr. Schwarz. That is right in the same time period.

15"

Senator Schweiker. Was that part of the patsy concern?

16

Mr. Conein. Oh, you're talking about that, on the 5th of

1' ¡October, sir, or on the 4th. There is one thing that you

misunderstand. There might be a twenty-four hour difference

1?

because we cross the international dateline, so I might say

" the 3ed and it would be the sth.

€ :

Senator Schweiker.

How does that wire fit into what we

are talking about?

Mr. Conein.

All right, on the 5th of october meetin

• 2; between myself and Gertral 31g Minh, Duong Van Minh, at his

headquarters, at this point, Minh stated, and I read this over,

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2

and outlined thres plans under consideration by the Generals

to assassinate Ngo Dien Nhu and Ngo Dian Can and to keep

President Dien in office.

6

7

8

When I reported this to the Ambassador, we had at that

itime an'Acting Chief of station by the name of Davaka smely

Jon his own, talked to the Ambassador and made a reference that

iwe should not -- I didn't know this, but that we should not

'eliminate the possibility of the assassination of Ngo Dien Can

Her

9

and Ngo Dien Nhu, that this might preclude bloodshed in Saigor.

1i

He was, 1f I recall proporly, quito severely reprimanded

1: "by then-Director John Mecone.

1:

Senator Schweiker. Well, McCone wired --

Senator Tower. That is what triggered the Colby wire back

!; thare, or McCone, which Colby actually sent.

MI. Schwarz. Are you testifying now from your ravlew of

the documents, or from what you knew at the time?

1:

MI. Conein.. I am testifying from a review of my after

?:action report:

Mr. Schwarz. But your after action report does not mention

the McCone cable.

Mr. Contin. Mo. In my after action reoort there were a

lot of thinas left out. It would have to be a book, sir.

i.:

Mr. Schwarz. At the time, did you know of the McCone

¿; Cable?

2:

Mr. Conein. I did not know, sir.

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MI. Schwarz. The substance of it was not transmitted to

2

you either?

MI. Conein. No, sir.

MI. Schwarz. So to make that perfectly clear on the

/record -

6

Sanator Schwalker. The substance of it was not?

7

Mr. Conein. The substance of my stating the options, that

8

I knew.

9

10

Mr. Schwarz. You knew that had boon communicated to us?

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir.

=-:

Senator Schweiker. But you did not know what option had

1: ' beon eliminated?

....

Mx. Conain. No, sir.

1:

Mr. Schwarz. You were not told?

Senator Schweiker. And yet you werd the key guy in the

1r. " coup?

1:"

•Mr. Conein. I was not told at that point. I was told

later on about assassinations. I can't recall if it was around!

the 20th of october of when.

Mr. Schwarz. You were told by whom?

Senator Schweiker. What by whom?

Ir. Conein. By Ambassador Lodge that we would not tolerate

or would not condone any assassination:.

Senator Schweiker.

Was that within the same timeframe?

2-;

21.

Mr. Contin. That was within a two-week timeframe, yes, sir.

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Senator Schweiker. And they were your instructions than?

2

Mr. Conain. They were my instructions then, sir.

5

Mr. Schwarz. How did he convey that to you? did he do it

¡by showing you a cable, or orally, or what fashion?

5

Mr. Conein. No, he told this to me on a subsequent meetina

6

that I had with the Generals, sir.

7

Mr. Schwarz. Did he instruct you to tell the Generals

8

that the United States opposed assassination?

9

MI. Condin. Yes, sir.

10

Senator Schweiker. And did you?

11

12 H

Mr. Conein. / Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. And what was their reaction to that?

18

Mr. Condin. The Inaction was just, okay.

14

We're not talking now about a businesslike way of doing

15

things. All right, you don't want it like that? Well, we'll

1€

"do it our own way anyway. They didn't say that, you know.

Senator Schweiker. That's what you got?

12;

Mr. Coneir. They conveyed it, all right, you don't like it,

I. -we wor't talk about it anynore.

Mr. Schwarz.

Does your after action report say that you

passer that message on to Big Minh?

2: 1

Mr. Conein. I don't recall -- no, it doesn't. I think

21

that -- all right, the report -- I did not pass it to Bia Minh.

I passed it to Don.

23

Mr. Schwarz. Does your after action report say that?

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• MI. Conein. No, it doas not.

Mr. Schwarz. Does your action report describe the meeting

which you had with don in which you say that you did. pass it

to him?

5

Ms. Conein. It describes a meeting which I had with Don

6 which I bellave was on the 21th in which thie was brought up.

7

¡It was in the airport at 8:00 o'clock in the morning which

8

i confirmed that General Harkins had been informed -- had told

¡General Don or told the Generals, I don't know which one he

I thad told, that they would not support the coup and bon told

ime that all plans were complete and had been checked and

rachecked, and it was at this point that. I said, you know, they

don't go for this knocking off.

MI. Schwarz. Well, the action report has about twenty-five

"lines on that meeting?

Mt. Conein. No, sir, it has about fiftean.

Mr. Schwarz.

Page 7, arg we looking at the same --

Mr. Conein. We are looking now at page 6. It was at

that point.

Now the second meeting of that day was when I was pressing

General Don, I was more interested in the political plans thar.

I was of the actual goings on. This was a request that had

::

been levied on me by washington, and what I wanted to do mors

than anything else is git bafore it happened what thair politica!

:: plans were.

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Mr. Kirbow. MI. Conein, is there any doubt in your mind

2

that you in some way, conveyed to alther Don or Big Minh the

Ambassador's position regarding assassination?

MI. Consin. Oh, I conveyed it to don that they didn't go

5

jfor it. That is all.

6

Mr. Schwarz. Why didn't you put that in the action report

7

Iwhich you made up in 1963?

8

Mr. Conein. I never thought I'd come up here, sir, I'll

"tell you truthfully. I never thought I'd come up here and be

15

asked that specific question, so there are some things left

jout of my after action report, such as when we drank beer

in ¡together or something like that. I left a few thinas out.

But this -- I never thought I would he here answering that

specific question. If I had known that then, I assure you it

i: would have been in there in capital letters.

Senator Baker.

Mr. Chairman, can I ask one general ques-

"tion?

Senator Tower. Senator Baker.

Senator Baker. I apologize, I am sure that this must

i ¡have been covered in previous testimony, but Mr. Conein, what

:: did you conceive your job to be in Vietnam at this, time?

Mr. Conein. My job was to convey the orders from my

Ambassador and the instructions from my Ambassador to the

people who were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals

2:

who were planning the coup, to get as much information so that

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our government would not be caught with their pants down.

2

Senator Baker. Did you, in fact, agree not to thrart

the coup and in fact to supply economic and military assistance

I'if the coup succeeded?

5

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, I did.

6

Senator Huddleston. May I expand on that just a moment?

7

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston?

8

9

Senator Huddlaston. Did you conceive your objective to

¡be to encourage or promote the coup?

10

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

1:

Senator Baker. Did you conceive it to be to promote a

coup but to preserve deniability?

Mr. Conein.

No, sir. I did not see that I was to promote

14

a coup. The coup was going to happen.

Senator Huddleston. You were just an observer?

1€

Mr. Conein.

I was an observer and I was a liaison between

i: my government and the people who were plotting the coup.

Senator Mondale. Did you discuss the possibility of

i: discouraging the coup?

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

i:.

Senator Mondale. Why?

Mr. Conein. Because in the monitoring of an incident,

::if you start in a negative.--I did not, for example, encourase

them nor did I discourage them in the sense of answering

your question, sir. But I did not go in and say, oh, I think

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this is bad, oh, I think this is awful on everything that they

₴

said, bacause I would than be cut off and be blindod.

Senator Mondale. I understand that, but when you mot with

"them as you did --

5

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

6

Senator Mondale. -- when you assured them that were there

?

a coup they would be assured of support, ware you not in fact

& lencouraging the coup even though you say you were neutral, but

9

Iff you do It, these things will happen?

1'.

• Senator Schwalker. Senator Mondale, you missed -- there

::

was a wire this morning clearly establishing the State nepart.-

::ment passed on instructions to go ahead and have a coup, and

i that was the order of the day.

Senator Tower. I think to clarify this --

Senator Mondale. Is that the Hillsman --

Sanator Schweiker. The Hyannis Port wire.

Senator Mondale. ' May I look at that wire?

Senator Schweiker. Just

show it to senator Mondale, that's

all.

Senator Tower. What was brought out this morning was that

the CIA an'l DOD took an official position in opposition to

topple Diem, but the State Department took a contrary view that.

jiem had to go and their function in carrying out national

:; policy was to inform than.

f.:

Incidentally, we had lifted pi 480,

tho

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commarcial import program to show our displaasure at the Diem

govarnment. What they were doing was tolling the plotters that

if they were successful that this would be restored.

Is this essentially corroct, Mr. Contin?

5

Mr. Consin. Yes, sir.

6

?

Sir; when I did receive the information on the 24th or 26th,

I forget the date, August, which was the famous Hillsman

¡cablo, I conveyed the pointe of that message to the coup

9

plotters. I did not take those back at all during any time.

Senator Huddleston. One other question that Mr. Colby

i: "answered this morning, but I'd like your opinion, if there hat

2:" been no Interest in the United States in deposing niem, would

there have been a coup?

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir.

senator lluddleston. You think they were going ahead?

Mr. Conein. I think there would have been, sir. The

"catalyst that started that was what happened between the

Buddhists --

Sarator Schweiker. Who started the Buddhist thing?

Which --

:.

1r. Conein. The Diem government.

Senator schweiker. And why, knowing what you assessed,.

i: which was they were a reutral element. and all of a sudden

:: they're antagonistic politically, why did they do it?

• Hr. Conein. This I never could understand. I was up there

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the day before. Now you're asking for my opinion.

2

My opinion was that they had a chance to get out of it

and got out of it very gracefully within the flist two weeks

after the 8th of May incident in Hua by mooting the demands of

5

paying off the families of those people who were killed when

6

the military attacked the pagodas in Hue. If this would have

7:" been done, I think that we would have been much better off.

8

9

Again, this is my personal opinion.

Senator Schwelker. If I can interrupt for one more

10

minute --

11

Senator Huddlaston. Go right ahead.

1:

1÷:

Senator Schweiker. You said that you thought this was a

In Ikey, did I understand, sort of the turning point of the war?

Mr. Conein. No, sir. This was the turning point of the

1: ¡political situation, sir.

16

Senator Schweiker. I see.

Mr. Conein. Not the war.

Senator Schweiker. But it could have subsequently affected

1:

the outcome of the war by messing up the stability of the

political establishment, is that right?

Mr.

Conein. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you.

2:

Senator Huddleston. You mentioned that Madam Nhu had been

making some inflamatory

statements that were unsettling to the

2:

lipeople. "ere you referring to the people of Vietnam or the

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poopla of tho Unitad States?

2

I recall some very anti-Buddhist stataments that she was

5

making, something to the effect, why not let them burn

thamselves up, or whatever?

Mr. Conein. Yes.

6

Sanator Huddlaston. Very unsympathetic.

7

Mr. Consin. Very unsympathatic. This upsets -- the reasons

being, tha Buddhists are not --

9

Senator Huddleston. Are you referring to the Viotnamese

10 l people?

=..

i:

Mr. Conein. I am referrina to the Vietnamese people.

1: The people thamselves, they claim to be 80 percent Buddhist.

What happened, people who had never gone to a pagoda after

:; she started making statements to thy effect that she'd like to

1:.

furnish sone mustard at a bonzes barbecue, or something to

¿that effect, this made poopla want to identify themselvas

i agairst the regime and so they would go.

Senator Huddleston. And this was the principal reason that

!: the United States felt that they had to get rid of the regime,

¿ or one of the reasons?

::

Mr. Conein. Oh, I don't know what we were thinking back.

er there. I was out there. But it was an intolerable situation

2: Where you had a President who had a Catholic regime and I

*i happen to be Catholic myself, sir, but who were being oppressive

against another religious group in the middle of a war.

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2

Sanator Huddleston. And you think that was the catalyst

that got the coup started?

;

Mr. Conein. This was the action I think was the catalyst

that brought down the Diem regime.

5

Mr. Kirbow. MI. Conaln, was it the general opinion anona

you and your associates in the Agency and the State Department

7

officials there, the country taam, so to speak, that the true

powar in the government at that time was the brother and his

9

¡wife or the two brothers and not Dien?

10

Mr. Conein. Well, yes, sir. What had happened was, 1t

i: was becoming obvious to those people who were keeping abreast

"of the situation, not only within the State Department, but

"also within USAID and JUSPOW and other govarnment entities

I; "out there that Diem had been out of touch with reality and was

lnot getting the true facts, that everything was being channeler

16

li through his brothar Nhu. The control of the Republican

1: Youths, which was based on the Hitlerian Youths, with nice

•blue uniforms, Madam Nhu was the Chief of the Womar.'s Solidarity

Movement, they had the Fenale Republican Youths, they controlled

the civil quards, they controlled the praetorian quards, the

2: Special forces, they controlled a vast Secret Police mechanism

? and all of this, including the police, was all under one man's

contrcl: This was Ngo Dian Nhu.

In central Vietnam, Ngo Dien Can, the brother of Ngo Dier:

26

Dien, was the actual war lord and nothing happened up there

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without his personal approval.

2

So what you had, you had a Catholle ragime superimposed

3

fand running all of the political, sconomic and military entities

"In the nation and then suppressing what, quote/unquote, was

5

considered the majority religious group in the country.

6

Senator Schwelker. The Buddhists?

7

Mr. Conein. The Buddhists.

8

Senator Tower. Weren't the Buddhists themselves fraction-

9

20 !

alized?

Mr. Conein.

Sir?

Senator Tower. Weren't thare two or three different

:: principal sects

of the Buddhists?

Mr. Corein.

Oh, there were many principal sects

i; Buddhists. There were three of four different sects, of

of the

:: course.

Senator Tower. Was this just one sect they were dealing

:" with, or all of them?

Mr. Conein. Once this happened that thare was an attack

..Or the pagodas in llue and followad up by an attack in August.

:. on the pagodas in saigon, this consolidated all the factions

i.

of the Buddhists, so they bacame a political entity which they

had never been before.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, we have a vote in progress.

Senator Mondale. Can I ask one question?

Your background ir. Vietnam went back many years. You knew:

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many of thase later loaders, Generals, you were working with

¡much earlier in their careers.

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir.

5

Sanator Mondale. And you spoke Vietnamese?

Mr. Conein.

I spoke 1t very badly, but I spoke it. I

6

apoke Franch fluently.

Senator Mondale. But you were picked, I gather, for this

"liaison work because of this unique, longstanding personal

relationship with these people.

MI. Conein. I assume so. I hope things work that way,

1: "Senator.

Senator Mondale. Mall, that was the Idea, and then you

met with them frequently?

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

=:.

Senator Mondale. And during those occasions when they

were discussing their feelinas about Diem and those around him

and the need for change, the coup and so on, did they bring

:: up assassinations as a possibility?

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

Senator Mondale. They never did that?

Mr. Conein. The only time that assassination was brought.

i up was at the meeting I had with big Minh as one of the optiors

that he was considering, in October of 1963.

Senator Mondale. Has that the one where he was considerina

Whu and someone else?

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MT. Conein.

Yau.: i.

Senator Mondala, But not Diem?

MI. Conein. Not Diam, yos, sir.

Senator Mondale. But they nover once suggested: assassina-

tion of Diem while you ware there?

MI. Conain. No, s1r, not at that time.

Senator Tower.

Gentlemen, why don't we suspend and all go

vote and come back?

(A brief recess

нa8

taken

at 3:26

p.m.)

10)

2 3

..2.::*.

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Sanator Tower. Let ma suggast to the Committos that we

2

allow Mr. Conein to proceed with his summary and then, before

we ask questions, becauso I think some of the questions might

"bo in that summary and it might allow us to get through our

5

!business in a little more orderly fashion.

6

So if you would proceed, Mr. Conein.

7

MI. Conein. Thank you, sir.

8

In the latter part of October, specifically the 28th of

9

Octobar, I was-informed by Ganeral Don to convey to the

¡Ambassador, Ambassador Lodga, that they were ready to have a

1:

"coup and that one, that I was to stay homy and await further

: orders, that the coup would be accomplished before the 2nd

13 jof November. -

At that time, Ambassador Lodge was preparina to raturn

1:

ito the United States for consultation with the President of

the United States. Ambassador Lodge made that known to me that

he was coming back to the United States.

Genaral Don reguested that I convey to the Ambassador that

...

he do not change his plans to leave on the 3lst of October to

come back for consultation to the United States because if he

: did change his plans that this might ba a signal to the President

i i and whu that something was going on.

...

I don't know why, but the plans were changed and Admiral

:: Felt, CINCPAC Commander, came to Vietnam and landed

and had an

"Intarview with the President that morning, the day that the coup

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was going, or coming off.

2

The coup started I balleve here on the 31st. It was the

¡lst of November in Saigon. At approximately noon on the

5

•Ist of November, I received an emissary telling me that I am to

move. I was changing into uniform when the second emissary came

fand said that I was to proceed immediately per praviously

:7

arranged plans to the Joint General Staff Headquarters.

8

I had at that time a military jeep, a Vietnamase driver,

9

¡two radio sets, a bag, an extra-large briofcase, and I was

10 armed with a .38 revolver. This was for my own personal

i: protection because it was a short-nosed revolver, and you

:: couldn't hit anything further than two feet away from you.

My driver, who was a Vietnamese serguant who had been

:¡ detailed to ma by the military, was armed with a .15.

We proceeded from my residence and about 1:00 o'clock in

1? the afternoon and on the way to -- or the moment I got the

:: signal that the coup was on, I got onto my radio sets and

:: alerted the Embassy through a voice code which I had and another

:: voice code which had been prearranged, to lat them know I was

safe.

i..

I proceeded to the Gereral Staff Headquarters, and there

is was firiny going on betwean the Special Forces unit that was

:: right next to the General Staff Heedquarters and some of the

i: elements, the troop elements, at the General Staff Headquarters.

I arrived at the General Staff Headquarters approximatel:

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3:30 1r. the afternoon. The coup was than on.

At tha General Staff Headquarters thore was Genaral Big

3

Minh, General Little Minh, General Don, General Khiem, General

Le Van

Kim, Colonel 'Iam. -- well, a lot of military officers.

5

Most of them were of the General Staff and no unit commanders

6

themsalveg.

?

Upon arrival I was with the Generals and they told

I Blg Minh told no that they only had a couple of officers that

9

li they were in doubt of who had not comnittad themsalves yet, bu

10

that it was in progress. They started the attack and it kept.

:: ¡on going about 1ipn o'clock in the afternoon -- 1 have it here

:: in my notes, but I'm trying to recall it without referrina to

::my notes -- our first call came in, maybe 1:00 or 4:00 o'cloct.

I In the aftersoon, when they called Prasident Dien and e

asked

hin to surrender and if he would surrender that they would give

Is him sanctuary and allow him to escape from the country.

This was refused.

About the same time or a little afterwards, there was the

:: communications between Ambassador Lodge and President niem. I

was in both radio and telephonic contact with the Embassy

and

?.:

keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what

2: Was transpiring. I was to convey, one of the first messages I

was to convey was that they did not want any U.s, military

24

officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They did

2F.

not want any American participation within the coup.

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They automatically closed down the airport as they always

2

¡do in a coup and procaeded to attack the Contral Police

• Illeadquarters, take ovar the radio station, and get into the

i PTT which controlled the communications.

5

This was very unfortunate, because when they did this --

6

prior to the coup they had taken out the, i don't know, the

? ¡talephone terminals and in the process, instead of leaving my

& telephona into my home open they had disconnected it. They

would only leave the Embassy lines open so thorefore I was not

warned until practically the last minute to proceed. They had

:: been trying to get ahold of me since about an hour before they

¿: finally got in contact with me.

And the coup, different units or differant elaments, had

committed themselves and had progressed. Wa were not sure till

:: about 1:00 o'clock the following morning that the coup had

:: been successful. At that time, it became quite obvious. There

:: had boen three or four communieations between PItsident Dian,

:" Nao Dien Whu, with the General Officers, each time Diem refused

:: to speak to Big Minh.

And on several occasions I woul? warn the Embassy that

certair. shellings were going to take place, or bombings by

i: aircraft was going to take place at a certain time, to alert.

:: American personnel who might be living arourd the area to wate':

out or stay under cover because thay were firing 195's in the

:: center of the city.

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We had no American casualty, wounded of killed, during this

2

coup. I am talking from the imerican side, now. The Vietnamese

suffered about 100 dead.

5

At about 6:00 o'clock the following morning -- this 1s the

Ipart where it gets to the point where what we are discuasing 1s

most important -- about 6:00 o'clock in the morning just as dawn

?..

was coming up, all of the officars that were in the coup and soma

hangers on who, I don't know how they got there, thay were all

9

standing out, including myself, wa were standing out on the patio

10

of the Joint Genaral Staff Headquarters. At that tima, there

i: Thad bean some discussion going on among the Generals and

Colonels who wore there about what they were going to do now.

I only heard of one officer who was quite adamant about

1: the elimination of President Diem at that time. This officer.

1! who is now dead, a General by the name of Le, L-e, who was a

In former Chief of Police under Diem in 1955 or '56. He was for

j: the killing of Diem.

At about 6:40 or 6:30 or 6:40, a telephone call came in

1: from Diem. We still assumed that Diem was at Gailong Palace ..

G-a-i-l-o-n-g. And it was at this point that Diem talked to

Big Minh for the sirst time.

He asked

for full honors if -- he wanted to capitulate,

::but he wanted to have

full honors. Big Minh renliod to the

President that he could not quarantee full honors, if and

aurirn the time that Vietnamese wars still killing one another.

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Diem, something to the affect, said that he would order

2

3

¡Coase fire at the Palaca. My recollection is it was about 10

¡minutas to 7:00, mayba 10 minutas to 8:00. Now i had been up

4

all night long, I had been working with this for a long time,

5

6

7

iso I can't say the time exactly, but it was around that time.

There was a cease fire and the people quit flring. At this

istage, there were four armored cars and 113's ar escort of

military police proceeded immediately from the Joint Caneral

9

Staff Headquarters toward Gailong Palace. Big Minh, with his

1. "alde, Captain Nhung, got into a sedan and with MIS Corps want

out the hack road from the General Staff lleadruarters toward

: the back of the golf coursd and took a different road from the

armored cars that went down Cong le.

The armored column

was commanded by a lainr. Bang --B-a-r.-

9-- who had been a former Province Chief at Da Lac Province.

Thoy proceeded to the Palace and they started searchina

the place. About on hour later -- and this is the part that is

important -- when Big Minh left, General Dor. and General Khiem

.. and Le Van Kim were still at the General Staff Headquarters: s4

was I. At this point, they procedded to take the pictures or

Dien down, cover the statue that was

out ir front of the Generl

::.

Staff Headquarters and they took all telephone lines out anil i

2:

roverted to radio communication, and

I would like to put one

:.

thing into place. Between the telephone call at 5:10 or 6:2n

in the morning and the second telenhone call which came at li

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minutes to 7:00 from Dlan, I was asked by Big Minh and Don to

2

get an aircraft. I callad the Embassy -- I still had telephone

communication -- I called the Embassy and I spoke to Mr. favE 06

laininwho was then Acting Chief of Station and who had been up

5

all night also. And I told them that it looked like Diem and

6

Nhu ware going to surrender and that I nooded an alrcraft.

7

I was reminded that the United States government had no

8

¡intention of immediately recognizing the new regime, or the

!! junta; secondly, that President Dian would ba taken to the

1.. I first country that offered him asvlum; thirdly, that they did

not want the aircraft to land in a country other than the

:: country that was going to give asvlum. For axample, and I am

! just setting this as an example, asgume that France was the

:: first courtry to grant President Dism asylum. They did not war.!

'an aireraft that would have to land, say ir. Delhi, or Carachi

¿i or Teiran or anyplace olse where Dlem would get out and start.

forming a government in exila.

Senator Baker.

Was there any airplane that would fly that

' far?

:::

z:.

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. We had C-13n's.

They could not

fly that far. We had KC-135's, and I was told that they cou!!

not get ar aircraft for twenty-four hours, therefore it was un.

aid the utarest KC-135 was in Guam, and they could not net ar

aircraft for twenty-four hours.

I informed both General yinh and General non that I coul?

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not get an aircraft for twanty-four hours, and -- so when Big

2

Minh had gone, General Don was proparing for the reception of

3

the President and his brother. We startad -- I wasn't doing it.:

Ibut wa got troops in and we claanad up the whole area, policed

5

¡lit out and brought in a large table with green felt on it and

6

they were preparing to call in the Press so that they would have

coverage of Diem rasigning.

8

Vice President Tho --T-h-o -- was to be the new Premier

9

of the government and he was to accept the resignation and hu

10

would then bacome the head of the government.

i:

The thing, the most important fact that they were afraid

It:

"of was that they would not be accepted to other novernments,

not be recognized, so they wanted a legal trangition.

14. Also, they prepared to house both Diem and Nhu in the general

Staff Headquarters under proper security. That was the way it

was at the time I departed, when they said - General Don told

1' Ime they were bringing in the Press and I saw movie cameras an!

everything coming in, and I said this is the time for me torme:

. out, and I went home.

I jot home, by then my telephone was re-established and :

got à telephone call, come to the Embassy. I want to the

i: Einbassy and I was

informed that i had to find

Dien. I was tirut

2:

and fed up and ? said, who gave those orders.

They let me krok

that those orders same fron the President of the United States.

21.

So I went back out to the General Staff Headquarters,

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gotting there about 10:15, 10:30 in the morning. In the meantime.

2

they had moved the group from the General Staff Headquarters to

¡the office upstairs and the Officer's Club at the General Staff

÷

Haadquarters which was right off of the entrance to the Ganeral

¡Staff Headquartars.

6

Tho Ministers of the former government were all, excapt

one, present and had turned over to the junta, and they were ir.

8

the process of being talked to and the questioning them and what

have you. I walked in and I saw General Big Minh --I saw all

"the Gororals, averybody olse, but I saw General Big Minh's ald,

:: because General Big Minh and Le Van Kim ware talking to Minis-

::tars, to former Ministers of the government.

I told the aide that I wanted to talk to sia Minh and he

.; said, what it is about, and I said I wanted to know where Dimm

::WaS. Big Minh came over and I explained to him that it was

Ir important to the United States government to know the location

... of President Diet. Big Minh told me they committed suicide.

I looked at him, and I sain, where.

He said

they were ir

.. the Catholic Church at. Cho Long, and they conmitted suicide.

I think I lost my cool at that point, becausa I think !

colü big inh, look, you're a Buddhist, I'm a Catholic. If :?=

committad suicide at that church ard the priest holds Mass

tonight, that story won't hold water. I said, where are the::

He said they are at the central Staff Headquarters, behir:

' the General Staff Headquarters, did I want to see them. Ar.!:

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said no. He said, why not? And I said, wall, if by chance one

2

of e million of the poople believo you that they committed

3

suicide in Church and I see that. they have not committed suicide:

5

and I know differently, then if it ever leaks out, I am in

¡trouble. I refused to be a witness to it.

6

They had been killed.

7

I roturned to the Embassy and so reported and a message

8

¡was sunt back to washington innediately that they were dead,

9

1c !

"that they were at the Ganeral Staff Headquarters.

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, Mr. Conein. Did you report that

they had committed suicide as they had told you at the Embassy

i: or did you report what you actually knew?

MI. Conein. I reported axactly vas I said, that 'I was

told that they committed suicide but I refused to witness how

it thoy had died, bacause I didn't want to get mysalf involved

1. In their death, period.

Serator Baker.

Mr. Chairman, I'm not quita sure how vou

can confirm or deny how they could have committod suicide in

:: the church if their bories were at the General Staff llead-

¿ quarters?

:.:

Mr. Conein. Well according to the original story that te:

gave out that they both comnitted suicide in the church --

Senator Baker. How could you have told or not tol by

1oohing at the bodies? What difference would it have made?

2:

Mr. Conein. I know the Vietnamese well enough, Senator,

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that thay loave a lot of marks on peopla.

Sanator Baker. So you don't have any doubt in your mind?

Mr. Conein. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. Kirbow. Did you latar ses the pictures of the body?.

5

!

MI. Conein. I saw the pictures in, I think, a few days

6

aftarwards. I saw the pictures of it and then there were the

7

¡Picturas of it being handed around.

₴

Senator Mondale. Did they tell you that they had taken

i polson?

li

Mr. Consin. Well, no, they just told me that they had

i:' committed suicide. I didn't want to delve into it.

Mr. Kirbow. Hould you tell the committee the nature of the

apparont deaths from the photographs?

Mr. Conein. Oh, yas. Diem had been shot and he had a

bloody face and his head was turned over to one side and it was

obvious that his hards had been tied behind his back.

Ngo Diam Whu had multiple wounds and' also vou could tell

that he had been stabbad many times, besides being shot.

You

i could tell, and by the running of the blood.

Mr. Kirbow. Did you later determine in some manner to your

:.

own knowledge how the deaths actually' occurrud?

MI. Contin. Yus, sir.

Mr. Kirbow. Would you tell the Committee?

Mr. Conein. This is something I swore I would never tel!.

It appeared, first of all, when Diem and Nhu were going tr

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make confessions at the church, they were using a telephone line

2

which they could contact, through the Palace switchboard, so it

would appear that thay were still in the Palace and someone, I

¡don't know who, reported where they were.

5

Senator Tower. So they were actually in the church at

6

! Cho Long?

Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, they were in the church. As you

1go In -- you don't know it, but Ngo Dien Nhu was a chain smoker:

9

"continuously smoking, and he was out in the yard, the little

1.?

courtyard they have around the church, and he was walking around

land hs and his brother were walking back and forth, thay had

=: one aide with them.

Mr. Schwarz. Not in custody of the rienerals?

:: ' Mr. Conein. Not in touch with the Generals, but someboly

reported it.

First of all, you must understand -- now this is specula-

tion on my part now; I'm not saying how it happenad, because

"don't know how this part happened in fact, but they had so man:

: pictures of Diem hung up on public buildings and in every offie:

•and his picture was all over, like Ho Chi Minh's picture was

all over saigon now, it was all over, so therefore, he was ve::

wall krown, plus people had

seen him, they krow him, so it was:.':

very difficult for anybody to spot him and make

a report.

General Mai Huu juan and then-Colonel, later General,

Duong Ngoc Lam took ofs with armored cars and want to the chur::

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There is a little bit of diffarance of opinion as to exactly

what happered, as exactly what happened at the church.

Mai lluu Xuan reported to the Prasident, saluted and told

"him to det into the armored

car.

Ngo Dien Nhl protested and

jasked for a sedan, and this led to an arqumant. Anyway, they

Ivere shoved into the armored car and were told by the commander

I jof the column, who was colonel lam, that they had to uso the

a ¡armored car for their physical protection.

9

Senator Tower. Was that Colonel Lam, was he later ICORPS

/conmander ?

Mr. Conein. No, sir, this was a difforant Lam.

duang

::. Ngoc Lam was a fat little quy who wore a moustache who urod

:. to command tha civil quarr, later becane a ceneral, yes, sir,

:; but he was not the ICORPS commander. He's also dead now.

Anyway, they were coming back with the column, who were

:: in radio communications with Big Minh

and his entourage and

when they found out, when Big Minh found out that they were

:.prisonurs, he gave an order tu his aide, Captain Nhung, and

:. Captain hung killed then, in the armored car.

The bodias were

taken directly to the General Staf! Headquarters and later on

in the afturnoon they were remover from tha fengral Staff

Headquarters to Clinique St. Paul.

Senator Tower. Were they killed right after they were put

into the armored car?

Mr. Conein. No, they were killed on the way back, when

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Big Minh's group, with his aldo, crossed the column, halted it,

2

and Captain Nhung stupped into it and killed them.

Now other people who were in the armored car, I assume -- I

4

5

do not know who did the stabbina wounds or anything else. I do

know the two ware killed by Captain Nhung.

6

7

8

9

We knew this within a matter of hours, exactly what

happened, and I soported it and it was reported back here at

¡Haadquartars exactly what happened.

That is the story, sir.

10

Sanator lluddleston. Do you know that Big Minh gave the

1: order that they be killed?

i:.

I. Conein. I have it on very good authority of very

1: nany people that Big Minh gave the order, not only of -- one

1: thing I can say, Senator, is that I kept contact with the jurta

1:' until the day that the United States officially recognized the

Ir: South Vietnamese government. There were several countries that

1: recognized, and I was acting as the liaison officer for the

I Ambassador to the junta during this period of approximately ten

1: days or two weeks.

Senator Huddleston. Is it true that Bin Minh and the

:: Generals had made a definite appointment with the Generals to

2:: come to the Palace, at which time President Diam would surrer.-

i: der?

€:

Mr. Conein. No, they didn't make a definite appointmer".

Senator Huddleston. They didn't go to the Palace expect i:.

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'to find'hin?

2

MI• Conain. Yas, Big Minh went by himsalf. He had Phen

Ngoc Tau who knew the Palace the best, Major Bang --B-a-n-g--

"Who was in the armored column. I can say that about an hour

5

after they left, Major Bang came back and I asked Major Bang,

6

jwhom I had known up in Hanol back in 1945, I asked him, I said,

what were your ordars? And he said, the orders going through

the Palace was that we were not to fire unless we were fired

9

lupon. And I said, wall, did you find tham? And he said, no

I two didn't find than yet. Thay had not known at that time where

1:

!they ware.

Senator liuddleston. They expected him to be at the Palace?

1:.

?:.1

Mr. Conein: They expectad him to be at the Palace. Fver!-

1; body assumed, including myself, that thay vere at the Palace.

Senator Huddleston. Is it your judgment that at that tim

•..*.

that they had expected to take them peacefully?

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

Sanator Huddleston. And to send them out of the courtrv?

Mr. Conein. What was going to transpire was that they were

goira to take them peacefully. Dig Mirh himself, as the leed."

of the junta, was to tale escort them bac! to the Genaral

Staff Headgurters where they

would have the green table

2:

President Diem was to sign over power to the Vice President.

:; They were going to be held until I could det the aircraft, ant

• then they were going to be flown out of the country, because

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immediately after the signing that Diem would got through the

2

caramony of turning over the powars to the Vico Presidant, Tho,

he would ask for asylum and this would be broadcast.

Senator Huddleston. Then what reason do you belleve that

5

6

7

¡Diem laft the Palace? Was it to go to the church, or was he

really attempting to slip --

•MI. Conein.

No, sir, we didn't find this out until

aftarwards, because it was very baffling. I don't know how

9

they got out. Everybody talked about secret tunnels; thare

10

were sacret tunnels. There was a passage, because the Gallong

i! :Palaco -- now you have to understand that

the Doc Lap Palace,

i: D-o-c L-a-p, was the Presidantial Palace hefore the now one was

1: ' made, that belorged to tho Emperor Bao Dal. The administrative

i; the French Governor General's palace was in failong Palace.

:: When the Palace was bomberl in February of '67 by the two

:: Vistnamese Air Force pilots, they moved out of that Palace ara

i: took over the Gailong Palace.

The Gailong

Palace was right behind the Saigon City Hall.

::which was then, when it was constructad, was run by the French.

: Well, between the covernor seneral's Palace, which was the

i. Gailong Palace, ard the City Hall was about a half a block.

¿: What they had was a passage underneath, just like you have here,

i: so that servants won't have to go out in the

hot noonday sun

i, and get a paper signed, they could go underneath.

2:

ind what-Presidant Diam and Nhu and his aide did was to no

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idown through that, walk out in front of the Clty Hall, got Into

2

an automobile and drove on up to Mal Tuyen's house in Choldlon.

Senator lluddlaston. What I'm trying to datermine was what

thair motive was? Ware they in fact trying to evade being

5

apprehanded, or were they going to church?

..

Mr. Conein. Sit, there are a lot of things sot- in this report

jone of them is the Operation Bravo, and I hate to get into this

& jithing, Bravo I and Travo II.

9

Senator lluddleston. All I want to know is were they trying

1: lto avoid --

Mr. Consin. No, sir, because first of all, they thought.

is when the coup started, that it was their coup.

ARI

Senator Huddleston. Well, according to other

c.. : i; irformation -

i:.

Senator Schweiker. Wait a minute. You lost me.

Senator Huddleston. According to other information --

•Mr. Conain. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. -- they had made ar arrangement with

:: Big Mish that they would be at the Palace at a certain time.

ard that big Minh should come and take them and that they woul.!

i peacefully surrender and that they would be given passage out

:: of the country.

Now as I understand it, Bia Minh and the column that vou

i; talk about, the armored cars, went to the Palace with that

assumption they ware going to be there.

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Mr. Consin. Yos, sir

Senator Huddleston. When they arrived, they were not

there.

Mr. Conein. That's right, sir.

5

Senator lluddlaston. They did not know whare they were?

6

7

9

l'i

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

Senator Huddleston.

The conclusion I draw is that this

was a breach of faith, and that it angerod the Gonerals, and

because of that, when they did find them, they killed them.

Now is that accurate or not?

::

Mr. Conein. That is a very accurate way of descrihina it.

:: the reason being

is that, if I can make a personal observation.

Big yinh is a very proud mar. and those of you who have been

t.o

!; Southeast Asia know that face is vary important, and at the

in last moment when he lost face, when he was going up there in al1

if of his splendor with a sedan and everything else to receive

them, this probably was one of the thirds that ticked him off ant

.:he gave the order.

Senator Huddleston. Is it your opinion that if they har

carried out the pre-arranged plar and had surrendered that the

scrrario would have been much as you !lescrihed?

That they woe!!

2: have har the Press Conference?

i.:

"Ir. Conein. It they had carried it out and if sin Mirh

; would have found then there would have been too many people

2.:

present at the Palace for them to even attempt --

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Senator Huddleston. That thay would probably bo aliva

...e.

today?

Mr. Conein. They would probably be alive today. I might

also add that three days aftarwards I was instrumental in getting

5

"Ngo Dion Nhu's children out of the country.

6

Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you want to proced?

7

Senator Hart of Michigan. I think that clarifias 1t.

8

Sonator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman?

9

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker?

1÷

Senator Hart: Well, let me ask, the understanding that

i: at no point in the climactic days so far as you krew, was ther

any discussion of killing Diem?

Mr. Conein. No, sir, there had never been any discussion

1: of any time about Diem himself beiny killed by anybody. I will

make ole statement that many people -- and I'm talking about the

¿: General andother people -- wanted Diem to be around.

They could

i7 not stand Nhu and Madam Nhu. This was an opinion of the people.

The Generals themselves wanted legal turnover of the

1: government. They wanted international reconnition of their

coup. They did want that.

:..

Senator Tower.

Serator Schweiker?

Senator Schweiker, You made a point I didn't understan:!.

You sald that it was Dien's own coun that he thouaht was

¿; unfollina?

Nr. Conuin. Yus, bacausa I -- I actually lato to get in thi.

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bocauso It 18 in this roport hare.. It 1s a very complicater

thing and you have to understand the davious mind of an Oriental:

3

and I'll tell you what, I spent many years out there and I still

5

don't understand it, but I can understand why they do certain

things, but don't ask me why.

In August of 1963, General Ton ThatDinh. had been Military

Governor, had been appointed Military Governor of Saigon and

8

Commandar of the Third Corps. General Dinh was tharofore in

9

power and working for Ngo Dion Nhu and Ngo Dien Dien directly

I in sugust of 1963.

. When the military curfew and Military Governor of

Saigon's povers were taken away on the lith of September of

1963, Tor. That Dinh considured himself the hero of saigon.

112

li, saved the Diem ragime in August.

He also, during that time, had made plans to have what ne

1r.

call Bravo I and Bravo

Il that Diem -- or Nhu -- would have his

1' I own coup, Dien and Nhu would go down to Vung Tau as if ther

!^:

were escaping and there would be immediataly a courtercoup put

on by -- all instigated by Nhu -- a countercoup put on by Dien

at the same time and briny back whu and Diem by popular

acclimation.

so, in the beginning of the coup, Ton that sinh, who vis:;

tr.

sometime erratic -- or, he's still alive; I don't want to sa

he's erratic -- or sometimes a little funny, very devious, he

had convinced Ngo Dion Nhu that he was goina to go throun!::

...

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this plan. So they assumad, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon

2

when troops were moving and everything alse that it was their

coup. This was Ton That Dinh's plan..

What they didn't know was Ton That Dinh was the military

5

ilcommandor of Saigon for the coup.

6

Senator Schweiker.

Double agent, as we say.

7

Mr. Conein. Well, he was triple about that time.

8

Senator Morgan. Where is he now?

9

Mr. Consin. Sir?

10

Senator Morgan. Where is he now?

Mr. Conein. I don't know. I do not know if he escaper

in "this last thing or not. I don't know if he got out. He was a

1: "Senator.

!÷

1: i

Senator Huddlaston. That explains it.

Senator Schweiker. That's why he was a triple agent.

Mr. Conain. He was a Senator, ar. alected Senator of the

1: Vietnamese and he was the military chairman of the Senate

:: Military Affairs Committee In Vietnam.

Serator Mondale. You had a substartial amount of money ii.

piasters in your private safe which you were asked to hring

:..

with you to the Joint General Staff Headquartars, right?

ilr. Coreir. I had, and I don't recall exactly the amourt

i:

of money. There is someplace somewhere an accounting of the

noney and also the sigrature of General son who received some

of this money. I don't recall -- and I'm telling you

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truthfully, I don't rocall if I had 3 1/2 million or 5 million

2

piastars. I said I brought a little brown bagi it was one of

these diplomatic sort

of courier bags and it was stuffed with

money.

5

I had made some certain contingency plans for my own

o l protection because it becane obvious to me that If anything

"happened that my family might suffer, and also that 1f tho

¡Diam government found out that. I was Involved in a conspiracy,

9

If we may call it that, that I probably would have a very

I ! efficient Vietcong Incident -- In other words, I would be

1:

blown up or assassinated of something like that and It would he

::blaned on the Victcorg for doing that.

Therefore, I took certain precautions.

I had nade arrangements to have one FA Special Forces

tean available upon signal to protact my house when the coun

¿¿'came off. I had also made arrangements to have a military jess

: with proper type of communications equipmant so that I would.

..nc matter what happened, I would always be in communication.

I also --

Senator Mondale. Was your family with you in saigon?

Mo. Consin. Yes. I had just had a daughter born three

2:

months before, and one of the things I wanted was, they could

::

kill me but I didn't want my family to pay for what I did.

¿: Therefore, I had one completa FA team of the Fifth Special Toroes

¿: at my house durira the coup.

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76

I had made a contingancy plan for funds. Now the amount

2

#of funds -- like I tall you, I don't rocall exactly how much,

3

it was 3 1/2 or 5 million piasters.

Senator Baker. How much

is that in dollars?

6

Mr. Conein. About $70,000. Now this is roughly, I'm

figuring it up now In my head, I'm not a mathomatician. And

7

It took this money and put it in the bag, the brown bag, the

8

reason being that for the first twenty-four hours there were

9 itwo things that ware vitally important. There were cartain

In units that would be diverted at the last moment. These units

1: ¡were going to be put irto a situation they did not know of, so

!: therefort they did not have the rice and the bread. That was

i: the most important thing, rice and bread.

1 :

The second thing was that we did not want, under any

1: circumstances, of any personality who would be shot of killed

during the coup that there wasn't a gesture made to pay off the

11 family immediately. This is something that you gentlamen

1:: probably don't know, but there are no insurances in Vlotnam in

i. the proper sense that. we know of, so there's always, whan some:

¿: body is killed, there is a sun of money given.

i:

The other thing was, we had to have volunteer medical

facilities available in addition to the military facilities.

i: He wanted to be sure that there vere certain medical facilities

so that we coull take care of our own wounded.

21.

Well, those things have to be prepared, gentlemen, and heig

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1

wasn't a lot of money

-. It was a lot of money in plastars.

2

All of these monies have been accounted for, they were

accounted for by me, thay were signed for by the General, and --

"for each payment. Now, I do not know where those recaipts are.

5

Senator Mondale, Could I? I'm not getting at -- there's

ino implication, I hope, about the management of money. I'm just

patrying to find out what the monay was for.

8

MI. Conein. It was to pay for food --

ттe..

Senator Mondale. In other words, you have something like

1: 11570,000 in piastars, give of take whatever the arithmetie, and!

:: "how long had you had that monty?

::.

ir. Corein. I ha? hal that money since approimately, l

would say around the lith of Octobar. I had that in a safe i:

:; my house.

Senator Mondala. And did that money come to you through

:: the CIA?

HI. Conein. I requested it from the Finance office, yus,

:.sir.

:..

i::

Senator Mondals. He provided you the money, you brought

it out and kopt it in your hore and then when was the

fist ca!!

for the money?

Was that the dav --

Mr. Conein. I took it with me.

Senator Mondale. You had it in your home?

*Ir. Congin. Yes, I had it in my home, and when I changed

into uniform to qo out to General Staff --

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Senator Mondale. But they asked you to bring money at

?.

that time, did they?

Mr. Conein. I had made arrangements that I would bring a

¡cartain sum of contingency funds.

5

Senator Mondale. With Guneral Don?

6

Mr. Conein. With Ganeral Don.

7

Senator Mondale. He asked you to bring the money, didn't

he?

Did I understand you to say bring as much money as you

could lay your hands on?

i::

Mr. Conein. No, not as much money as I could. •If it were

::that, I would have taken a b-bag full. But the thing of it was,

:: it was only

for a small sum of money, a contingency fund for

!: a twenty-four hour or thirty-six hour period, which I did not

:: know at that time.

Senator Mondale, What did you understand that money to !!

i • for? For what purposes?

Mr. Conein. The money was to pay for those units who, at

the last noment, when their officers would give the order to

.: march, who had no time to get thair food, to draw the supplies.

Senator Mondale. Anything elsa?

Mr. Consin.

To pay for medical --

:::

Senator Mondale. Expenses.

:..

Mr. Conein. -- expenses.

i 4,

Senator "Ion.lald.

All right.

2!

Anything else?

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MI. Consin.

To pay the death benefits for any person,

2

you know, killed.

Senator Mondale. Did he tell you that's what he wanted it

4

¡for, or did you know that that is what it was for?

5

6 !

Mr. Conein.

I knew that's what it was for.

Senator Tower. I would lika to bring up at this point,

¿ ¡Plector Colby has testified about this.

Mr. Schwarz.

Not in the same detail.

Senator Tower. Not in the same detail.

Senator Mondale. Well, I'm sorry. I was not here this

i: morning.

Senator Tower. That's all right.

1:.

Senator Mondale.

So in that sense, we ware bringing,

!: through you, assets which they would use to help carry out arri

1: pay the costs of the coup.

Mr. Coneir. Yes, sir.

Sanator Mondale.

All right.

Now, was there any discussion about whether it was risky

for you to be parsonally present at the JGS or anywhere else

with these Generals at of near the time of the coup?

Did you have any discussions about that?

Mr. Conein. There were several discussions about my

personal security prior to the coup. There were also discussio..:

with no because I was worried about my family in case --

Senator Mondale. Wall, it was clear that this was ver!

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#risky for you, but apart from that, was there any question about

whether your presence as an American officer would link us, if

Iknown, to the coup?

MI. Condin. No, sir.

5

Sanator Mondale. Because I think you mentioned you got

6 out of it fast when you saw newsman.

7

MI. Conein. Yes, sir, I was scared.

Sanator Mondale. You didn't want to be seen there:

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

In Senator sondale. You didn't want to be seen there, because

:: you didn't want our association, whatevur it might be, with this

:: group kuoun to the public?

Mr. Conein. I did not want --

Senator Mondale. Is that correct? That's in here?

Mr. Schwarz.

Yes.

Senator Tower.

You were ordered in and ordered out, weren't

" you?

MI. Consin. Yes, sir.

Senator Mondale.

well, you left yourself?

Mr. Consin. I left myself.

Senator Mondale. "ithout any orders.

Mr. Conein. At the moment I saw that they were aoing to

:.:

bring the Press in, for the capitulation of President Diem, wis

at the time that they told me to get the hell out, General Don

i said, net the hell out, we're bringing in the Press.

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Senator Mondale. So were thare discussions about the

2

wisdom of having you there at all at any time; or did they need

la llaison?

5

Mr. Concin. No, air, It wasn't a question of a discussior.

Iin the sense that you're talking about, sonator. You must

?

9

1C

1:

Junderstand the rolationahlp. I was part and parcel of the whole

¡conspiracy, so if something went wrong, they would go down the

drain with me. We were all going down the drain together.

Senator Tower. Can we suspend at this point?

Let us go vote.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Towsr. Phil, I balieve you had the floor when we

i suspendad.

Senator lart of Michigan. I have no questions.

Senator Tower. All right.

1i.

1€

Fritz?

1:

Mr. Schwarz.

To go back to the telephone conversation. about

1e the airplano.

13

Mr. Contin. Yes, sir.

2:

it. Schwarz. After you obtained the word that you couldn't

i: get a plane for twenty-four hours, was that word passed on to

2r Mr. 1go Dien Diem?

ils. Corein. No, sir.

24

This was a telephone conversation; because President Dien

21 had talked to Big Minh and to General Don and it was the first

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1

time during the whole coup that the President had had a chance to

2

Italk to Big Minh. Up to that point, ha refused at all points to

talk to Big Minh.

4

Mr. Schwarz. And in any event, you are quite sure that

5

ithe word about the plane being available but not being available

for twenty-four hours didn't get to MI. Dien?

7

Mr. Consin.

I am positive, because the reason being it was;

8

after the conversation with President Diam that both Generalg.

9

Don and Big Minh came to me and asked me about gatting an air-

Is "plane to get them out. It was after they had hung up, and this

:: "was when I called the Embassy and spoke to Mr.

ament 06

Mr. Schwarz. And he gave you theis three raasons, or three

.:!comments, about the airplane? He gave you those right over the

phone, or did he call you back?

MI. Conein. Yes, sir, right over the phone and I trans-

if "mitted that message back and I don't recall if Big Mirh had

walked out but I know that General Don had been told by me

i: exactly that it would taka twenty-four hours.

Senator Tower.

Senator Mondale had the floor wher we

¡ suspended.

Senator Mondale. Just ore question.

How did you arrive at the figure of money that you had ir

your possession with your local office there? How was that figure

24

¡determined, was it just a ballpark anount?

25

Mr. Conein. The amount of money?

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Sanator Mondale. Yes.

2

Mr. Conein. That was all that would fit in this brlofcase.

and I wasn't going to haul two briofcases.

Senator Mondale.

No, what did you - go to the Director

5

and say, I'd like this much?

6

MI. Conein. No, sir, I had asked for a certain sun but i

I could not put It all In thie brlotcase. This la why I cannot

¡answer you really, if I spent 3 1/2 or 5 1/2.

I do know that when I went back to check my safe, one of

===

the packagus of 250,000 plastors had fallen over the back end

i: of the little guide rall, you know, that keeps the safo drawers

1: ard one of those packages had fallen back and I remember tatina

"'that and I said, look, l've got some left, and I turned it bac!

l' in and got a receipt for it.

So this is why I cannot tell you

axactly the amount. They know, and I would say roughly it's ir

ié the 570,000 figure.

Senator Mondale. Thank you.

Senator Morgan. I have just one question.

Senator Tower. I beliave Mr. Colby testified this mornir.

:.

it was 5 million piasters.

ils. Conein. Yes, sir, but I didr't spend it all.

Senator Toror. Senator Morgan?

Senator Morgan. I just have one question, Mr. Conein.

Do you have any reasor. to balieve that thare was any undu

delay on the part of the Embassy in makina a plane available?

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MI. Conein. No, sir, the lact being that an alrcraft of

2

that size, it would take -- becausa it would have to come from

3

Guam, sir, then the pilots would have to brief and all the thing

4

on how to go. Now you must understand aldo that the airport was

5

6

iclosed down at that time. No aircraft were coming in or leaving

without special permission.

1.7

Sanator Morgan. Would it hava come to Tan Son Nhat?

8

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

9

Senator Morgan. Now did I understand you to tell Senator

10

Intondalu that General Minh never knew that it would take twenty-

1?

four hours?

Mr. Consin. I don't know whether he knew it of not. y

1: 5ãy that I know that I told this to Guneral Don. I can't recall.

1: This was all - everything is ovor with, you know?

Senator Morgan. But the main thing in my mind, in your

16 opinion there was no undue delay in making the plan avallable?

11: MI. Conein. No, sir.

Senator Morgan.

Well that was the question that was in

1: my mind.

Senator Tower. I think we were all a little confounded by

2:

that this morning, but I think the explanation of that is that

is the airplane had to fly directly to the country of assylum and

:: couldn't stop anyplace alse. That would require longrange

:; aircraft like the KC-135. You couldn't make it in a c-17.

' :

Sanator Morgar. Which would not normally be available or

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Taiwan?

2

Mr. Conoin.. No, alr, 1t was not avallablo outsido of

3

„Guam or Hawaii at that time, sir. Later on they were available

4

in Subick Bay and Clark Field.

5

Sanator Tower.

Senator Baker?

6

Senator Baker. Thank you..

7

Who laid on that requirament that it be a nonstop fliaht

& jito the country of asylum?

9 !

MI. Condin. This I do not know, if it was the Ambassador

2o l'or if this was just an assumption of the people who knew the

1: Ambassador's thinking. This I do not know, sir. I do not know

1: if it came from the White House of the State Dopartment. I do

1: 1ot know.

1÷

Senator Baker.

Do we know from other material?

16

1r. Monday.

Mr. Kirbow. We assume that MoGeorge fundy might know or:

1:

MI. Schwarz. We don't know.

06 Did you have an assumption from the conversation with ir.

CEnsed that he was prepared for your question?

I mean, he came

back with an answer that had three rather complicated points.

i:

MI. Conein. Yes, sir. I assumed that the moment that i

i would get the go ahead from the junta that they wanted the

aircraft that I would levy the requirement. and the Embassy

Atl

24

•the military werr prepared to levy the requirament immediatel'.

2:

Mr. Schwarz.

No, but did you assume from your conversati:.

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with Mr. amiahl that he was prepared for your question in light of|

the complex answer that he came back with?

3

MI. Conein. Sir, I don't know. I would assume that he had

5

6

been

prepared and obviously if he was prepared that well that

somebody must have talked to him. I waBn't there. I was at

the othar place..

7

Mr. Schwarz. Just to make sure the rocord is clear on it,

8

"but for those rules laid down in the talephone conversation,

thare were airplanes that the United Statos had control over

10

"which could have been used?

11

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

If -- for example, sir, let me point out one thina, that

I lilf it had been Philippines Islands that qranted asylum first

14 that we would then not have had to use a C-135, we could have

15

jused General Harking' C-130 which was a convertad VIP plane.

16

But at that time and under those circunstances there was

1'

Ino way of knowing which country -- assume that it was Japan,

1e

we did not want the airplane to land in Taiwan.

•Mr. Schwarz. But that. was a matter of choice?

21

Mr. Contin. A matter of choice.

2

Senator Baker. What do you myan, "we didn't?".

2r.

Mr. Conein. He -- according to my instructions, were that

2:

the airplane was not to make a stop.

24

Senator Baker. What do you mean, "we"? You said

25

Hyou didn't know who laid on that requirement. Was that your

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wish?

Mr. Conein.

I say we don't know.

I'm talking now, we

the United States government, I'm assuming, because the gentleman

Lhas asked me a question and I assume that he had talked to

5

! the Ambassador.

6

Sanator Baker.

Any further questions, any members of the

7

Committet?

8

I reckon that's it.

Mr. Consin. Thank you vary much, sir.

15

¡testimony.

Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Conein. We appreciate your

Wa will ask you back to discuss the matter that Senator

is Baker brought up.

Mr. Conein. At your convenience, sir.

(The questions by Senator Baker follows:)

. ?

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Sanator Tower. Lat's go back on the record.

Senator Baker. MI. Conlen, whilo we're walting. for the

other Committee members to raturn, I have a few questions on

5

other matters and wa can arrange the transcript so that it

6

will not intorrupt the flow of your othor tastimony, if that's

7

all right with you, Mr. Chairman.

8

Senator Tower. All right.

9

Senator Baker. Are you acquainted with a man named 1. J.

20 | Woolston-Smith?

1:!

Mr. Condin. M. J. Hoolston? No, sir.

Senator Baker. 1 private investigator in Yew York City?

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

1÷

Senator Baker. Do you have any information about the

i Involvement of the CIA, the DEA of its predecessor -- what was

¿the predecessor?

Mr. Corein. BNDD.

Senator Baker. -- in any domestic assassination?

MI. Conein. No, sir.

Senator Baker. Do you have any knowledge of any assassina-

=.

tions or any attempted assassinations of persons related to

.!International drug

traffic by persons connected or affiliated

with the CIA or the DEA?

ilI. Conein.

No, sir.

24

Senator Baker.

Nont at all?

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Mr. Conein. No, sir.

2

Senator Baker. Do you have any knowlodge of any CIA

involvement in any drug traffic for profit in Vietnam?

4

MI. Consin. No, sir, I do not.

5

Sanator Baker. lave you ever been involved in or had any

6 , knowlodge of the purchase or the manufacturer or sale of

? jassassination devices to or by a Federal government agency?

8

Mr. Conein. Sir, I think you are referring to somathing

9

that was asked by Senator Weicker one time when I was looking

I'"'at Title III equipment, which is bugging equipment for the

1: Drug Enforcement Administration.. I was shown some, without

.: solicitation, I was shown some devices, that were booby-trap

1: type devices.

I would like to make it a part of the record

in that the Secret Service has boen completely Informed of this

i: and also the

Alcohol, Tobacco and Plrearm, know of these

16 devices.

i.

And I also furnished a complets brochure of all the

:: description of these assassination type devices to the Secret

•1: Service.

Sanator Baker. lave you got a copy of that brochure?

2:

Mr. Conein.

No, sir, I do not.

2:.

Senator Morgan.

Senator Baker, would you yield on that?

Senator Baker. Yes.

2÷

Senator Morgan. Would you

repedt that name again? I'm

sorry, when you say non-related, I started reading the paper.

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Would you give me that namo again?

Sanator Bakur. The name?

Senator Morgan. Yes, sir.

Senator Baker. Mr. A. J. Woolston-smith.

Sanator Morgan. Was that somewhere around Alexandria

C.

mone (Aras 202) 344-4000

6

hare?

7

Senator Baker. Well, he's been haro, and he's bean in

8

9

New York City, ha's beon in St. Louls, and I understand at one

time he had an office on the last Coast.

10

Senator Morgan. Would you add to that the name Paris.

11

Theodore, with regards to any kind of assassination devices?

15

MI. Conein. No, sit.

MI. Schwarz. Who did show you the assassination devices?

14

Mr. Conein. This was, I think, Senator Weicker asked ma

specifically in January, I don't recall the date, that he had

ip: a report that I had seen assassination devices. I had testified

I: personally to the senator with an attorney present, and while

Is there I told him that there was another one of my staff members

1 .

had been present and had sean tha same devices and he called

for. the staff mamber who verifiad everything that I had said,

and

I did not open my mouth during the questioning of this

is " other member of my staff.

?.:

Mr. Schwarz. Who showad you the assassination devices.

24

Mr. Conein. Sir?

2:.

MI. Schwarz. Who showed you the assassination devices?

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for

Sanator Tower.

momant?

Could we suspend thia line of questioning

3

4

5

6

pr.

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1

Sanator Towar. Off the record.

(Discussion off the rocord.)

Senator Baker. I will refrain from asking the question,

Ibut I wish the next time that mo ask. Ma, Coroin :......

5

to come back here and bring with him the paraphonalia, the

devices, and any brochures that he has.

Senator Tower. Do you have any of tha devices?

8

Mr. Conein. No, sir.

Senator Tower. Do you have the brochure?

10

MI. Conein. Yes, sir, I have a copy of the brochure that

1n l1 furnished the Secret Service.

12

Senator Baker.

I might ask this one thing, or mentior.

I'"this one thing, rather. You might be prepared to describe to

14

us how you came to have the brochure, particularly with reference

is ito whether you solicited it of were solicited and whether this

It was the only one that you over had, and similar material.

1ї.

MI. Conein. Yes, sir.

Senator Tower. Mrything further?

All right.

2:

24

25

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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

÷ 87

Senator, Tovar:

111.90.0h0.has.anything to.bring up-at

this.tinal:tha Committad:issadjournod until Monday aftarnoon at

2:00 o'clock.

(Wharaupon, at 5:04 o'clock p.M., the hearing in the

above-ontitled matter was racassed, to raconvene at 2:00 o'clock

p.m., Monday, June 23, 1975).

16

1

.8

19

20

21

22

24

25

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idealerant it

MISTORE OF TUM VIBACLAROR MENELLO C3JP

0l 1.12 Mianher 1204

=:

1. 1212/02010:

Without analyalug the variour co? plots advancod to

CAS muor to üle a lay las luo saclarat.

1x c20 le statad

at thn nutset that sibsequert do this grent, the couchoula

Buddhiat cainis presented both a springboard und " coalescent

facto: rarlously used by both long-stunding aod new critlea

galace coup to divect alllary action for

of tag ronine.

Through easly july, the various piots ot

a beans aara could not ha seriously judged nith tho

exceptton ni the 3 duly ludication toat Geeral Man Vai zon.

then Gaininuian of the Army,

in Consort Mala 1ll blit a ton o1

the geraral silicors, had pleas fai the crerthroe on the

goveracus to include tho duoral of dha mcide lio fundly

t=on suvei.

ceneral Don no veli as several chel sonaral

officero had sor a fertod oi a jour or acta regiciered diz-

satisination over vanlous inlicioo add iraderacters of tha

iut at to

diel thero anor such planniag in

depth to warrant serious considoration si the proimbtlly of

The B july ssport,

hoover, rainloxeed by statonasts

tron 110u5 military scureas, Includiagn 5 july toport tron

Gendill le vian ligaled that a coup would duon occur: murrantec

close ind carazul erasinatioe of the latant mud aillity of a

como:naclon oi tho general citicera to colis uctior: agalost

t20 145100.

Pornys the host cigatilent. and tithout a

dcubi nost adverse factor nilliusing agrinst o uilitary

to ocoit 1n die pre-21 August purica

was the confrontetion

the reneuri oificene which in

ratrospect must be sard as en insplreà puner move to clearly

lIdicute tha segine's avareness of cose plotting. to lasua

o cler mining against cecion, oni sost initani. to codiuse

aad divide tao general officein.

the nost enrious dudguent to anence ircn this period

wie strong auerladich

that lgo Dlik ilou as dotstag

soug agingi Fresiions Dier,

Talo was cute wriantly

she coaten? nd tild

eulogies preparo. for tbo

no cat time: cowaver:

21626. 50a22-

Lilch dorived only area reposted rogurts to cia tuneral

CLA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDOR

RELEABE OF THIS DOCUMENT

car 7/15/98

COpy

207935

daMagradiat and

drelasaircailas

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## Page 92

..

Repubar

ag tench lovereat to euphort tiG audancIes 01 gover

Ls scenarios.

223 diest chanter of the Budcist erlals culmianting

tho ractoracion of martial law on 22 August i052, Hiovided

owns gog upon wilch various protonalovul disslienta could

bang linde vocalisation of dissidance, cryntallized latent

and cunnisced maoy at the urolessione? illitsty tlet cho ror

neutai: tbo tilsi Cong could nod ba ton 11 tha solitIcal

pituntina maro alloned to deteriosato.

Tha coup d'atit plotting botreen 15 aal &l. August

1963 11 cocospact 20p0ar3 292 conanhat Guagerts nara by

the gonoral odilonna to tale action agains iho Dica Ragino.

¡a coalists of chis coup phot polato up sarrel smsong for

1i0 inliura to vasesinlizo, the nosi signlticant oi muich are

contact und iconlodge anons, the frericau

crumully as too scoliteratod zad muss be considerad ay

Eave; náveronly aáfected the securicy of the upericion;

(b) di grave Dolat, there uccurrell a fabricated or

actual lets

so the CVi waich resulcod in 1001) press attacks

mains cho md turelga adventurors;

(e) do no tiny die the coup piancere control

suillela% trado strengta so parate rapid id silicizut

tartare: 0l the palace of other sey 1n5t2iln+1006; t10

scIces a1labis to tha cop principals unre coapletely

outclilsied by shose sorces ander the couriol of the GIN with

120 030÷229

Penlization of a blood hats 11 precio:iate

2at101 er2 danaches;

it no tina did the coup principals indicata an

ai polisical straiegy raguired to do aos then

viinato tno lociubents lu the ralace:

Although there

appeari to De 5009 r3c0gnlti0n

02 the dablink 1114y 03

c1u11la- policions parclotpacing in causerer soreraneut

trea tols te3 sanitied whan doneral inoc. Van Hinh

Ma Coulod after tao colo

indae.on ol i aold 2111ance sacreue a purely tiltical

is potsend other this i contioration si utoc

Cong 108/-

407935

---

## Page 93

20g 06 the GA.

xas jirlod betveen 2 Septonoey. ti ilest svort

uncidità

"D' ilipt",

204 1 Movcr.b:2

mua me mendlicaady caraciertzed by te Inlleilea:

Was Dien Rogine muroued a rolley of leasching

for altrinailva to lisS ald and s bult-tiglioniar sa 1tg own

mha Diem Regina at no tius clitoug this period

donatritad oves the sost suparflcial avarclays oi the

prolum'sy di disalzacilon and dlasidence muung the articulate

ced oplion-joriag segreata of tua urban mopulatica;

(a) che isE puranoi a policy of graduatoi prossuras

1n tor sanadndo sron culoninled do forco the Dien lingino ta

0ltect innic sodoins nocesshly for tho sucrasiul condict

•l tuo : ir aguinsà the Wlat Cong and 1o Min popula: suppost

1ao tho Il arited by Dien;

Ile ascariniion of tha coadllet tetreen tha

Dur and ian Glil by the continuen publle antlunmarory statananis

on Macino ago Daca Nba, Lotil chils Bie mas Li SoLti V10tz2a

mú diag dai vialt to Dalaiade, Rome:

Parte end he Uaitol

inaag siatenerts asin g0ll Icolayed in the vercscuir

Вай Inte 11011 02905;

The beightentus hostlla sorld opinior. lannod by

Ma 1ntarcatlonel pieno;

=)

Tho inatility or failure (tho forner 13 most

1baly) di Prosddend bian and Coucgalica khu tc co:tralise or

mialante the disaldent genial officess.

(i) me datarioracion of tie econonic st:ollity o?

w: m1th.n epitonicod sy the tinctuatiez judle ci

23 currency:

thigan po

10 ilnch miating: Choo la pricas oi com: congunoi

te calira doccaso di inconta, arci dappendoc

3: 1012

Ire the rallint.

(1) continuró solinolallors in Bocchéit bordee.

In suanai7: the deinlorating polltord rid econcuir

Copy 19_0:1 207935

2022

---

## Page 94

(

ridi aroracad she generals visa tho clildeld 1iay ronulrad

to contato trote plauning for a coup d'arat,

ile ibjactiva

siley led :yric abendonad cut had nesely chiraitor.

1. S002E02 SOURS ESTONE US 3 02033:

2 Deriver

Conols/General Don mooting sit Nhaler ag with the

tolloring sigrificant points: (al Cindant Caons Van

Mini duntiod a pilvaco converaatled with Convio;

(b) Genoral Don

"That Dinn (Coumaudiis Gonerai, III

Corps) reallied ho had baen duped by Dien Govera-

ment during his tenure na Military tavernor of

Salyod Manour. 11 Angua and 26 Septemoer 1953;

(e) dennals, curing tha month of sayiender 1983,

anpattion a raquast to prasiont. Lid to accord

theu poultions in dittorent iniatrios thich tbey

did not expert Dion io honor; (d) fon staton thai

the Geutrala 10w hava A alro; (a) prior to

Genoal Dint's pruss concernco of 10 August, an

naiduashided Vlatnaarge civillan isid Counsellor

Ngo Minit Man that the merlelig de contacting

carloua Floccanesa 1u dada: to g0c0 iag0 2 coug -

lica vas salim by Mou and scord a dist prepared

buy dili

naning Auericao: engaged lu coup ploiting;

donaton sauo vas nos on the list.

3 geister

libasearlor Lodge roscovad Concin's rating with

Geay2a1 Duody Van M10b

Condle cad Gonaral Duong Vnu Mted Det at Le Van

Duyer Lundquancers: (a) Genural Mini. roquested to

inoy liod position with rospout to & chauga in the

GVil In taa near zuture; b) Winh dic dot expect

Te sumort dor binsalt or his codlingues lar o

col? metai, liut did need U05 assircrcus that liso

would not attoont to ibrart bis plens;

stated need s

conciauation of Anorican nilitar:

ud econonle and as the present luvr1;

taren sions unise russidoriion by

assussiarre des Din Mou aid

aid to boss isastrend slan in ofiles;

unlo to into caocidence agtirsi

enginnie and doorate carso; (3) diract

milay cotlon agalast lont aility 1n1t3 in

(e) lilna expressel come doubts as is ila

mace sole pliged by General ireo

sagios that :

coar lot

---

## Page 95

unls;

duply

ie biirino:

18 d0t:i.r

13 Cotaii :1

1: 00ce.91

llnea mrogad a dousla

voie dutirk che luguat 1983

CE, tho gencralu hat to act

m'ucly comune aaty celenniai,

c.i.pny cihuan6ot wong ve diled in ner irala wrlip

1iin Mlishe d0 tere chocláve

wanld lhad üs

M:9:9020;

(8) manu naned Corectlo tra: Van Dos,

Camd third Kbiocy ürog Tar. Hllch.

in':asiadoi lodze lestmety Cis ist do Initlain

concaot. u1th Gonoral ninh or Cenural lon, but is

w: Crudiala luttiete contuct. muei contacts '7re

rutbot1.o1; in the cource of reotlars ulth lui oi

1anb, anuurances vore 10 03 &lren tual tho Uoù

1i.11 nol tavarà a chanre of fcleraneni or deay

160i0u1: ue ahittary analutane io 110n xoglae 11

ii 3p060r01 cabebie of iccrunalng elfectivenag3 of

minltaly elfor, assurluny populir aacpoct to g1n

Bis maa, dad ahprorlus lohllug colaticns niin tue

dn?ted states.

Mimtain Mguyon Guang Nzuyen. Catel si Oporatlaais,

Annor Comzand, Giatud De cns conisciri by tuo

Midleusad coup aroupe durlag cat rocl o? -32

S a

EUbaSSaGOT 1OdG2 BUS C2oTetR2K Cramnl da bad

2ladsad maneti when Cayinin Mayca •B3 cor-

ssonriteri;

it, Colonel thao citnec niley; Nguyra

1o silil dndeeldad waich troug do val: support.

JI, Lan lizoc ilin, lsnagor of Carrsolio Jotel and

forner nva cliduer sho mas rntiroo dia to sug

sisiûge ei invalvenent in Hojaubar 19:n coun plot.

iporniched an ranngsy officer aiter a social ayon:

a=l starac no mla tijiog io eitabiisn coctant uliu

= nilitnsy octioes destgouted by Arbasoador Lodke

is tade bart lù caulccontiel t-ucuistone.

HH NAS GOOCOHGÜTHIA SOLI VASTSE

jauorals and otber pificers tto ranêal to taik to

3u Neracel Dobtuary cadzeer duolle tat eiltdützon

Ciaain aatl Maan Held moating Cuodne ralch Tuor

tud t9u d regedge tron tro gtir 18111.

rocreit:!

t in tivon

n8 coiomer ti, Caandi Miraidd

tiionuskast Gitgs;

CHO 01 1i3 1:19.:6111

pocstt tie trilrerdortd 18..

xd0r

wohet dor Cotrie; 1: 10a .rpsuizoo: 11442123

¿aneis lo geriins ulet tne

207935

5021 19201L.

=

---

## Page 96

C.

U

16101r

23

E: 8l: 1''

-?..

Le atould le preparad don e fuire desilig ontaida

18. 19; 601

1211 in General

doatiint as worl

1217 00n901l5;

trough

Ankaascie

talian wath axl

pacarais: none tantlorad coseen.

Cacarl Fan rogostod Conoin to meat lan et di

Maglarioos; lich stated tho amoral cialcers

mo cowuittue bad docided to dutonat co Lata

novantage of this 20 sciobor lational lay la order

¿o Fungia a coup michán a nool; a manber of Genural

thu's sialf. Colonel Mguyen ioriong, hud leaiad to

U.ü, nuthoolties thai i coio ines io orsur on Di

miout el decobor: tuond' oncoures o tho Amaricana

Aud rmelità dise paiane and as a denult Prosidant

M..o.n

ilid

iscry

11200

1::0.10d

eioneia an toa salgui uraa ior ino coup,

estendid operailano untside Frigon; Dou

To tnoir tia: 313werG

Basale.

vinte tor chare no anasa or novecenni eccelle

minity enort. assurter populas lesport to vis

i30;

noialig, tel. ilons sith

Con confiziad that 2o 1ad urienptal to

couiasi Conela chronca Mr.

1a1a; Corsia iolios way t!:3

radenis bad so: Dpdsen to imbassacor iodgo at the

Li detoher recentio; Con staiad tius decurity would

25t

perud. 20 aurorah to tha ubreglion

sincy otuar

michers of the ile vere progent; len ricolaed in

canu cuor peralsadon di tio coup conclitea to give

Crania

nein polatical plar for the abagoador's

aud requasted a aeeting in ioratorn

Saigon on

21 Desoner.

Granrai Doo's aide monested Coneta ti leat the

Fonts de

304g0d 20830xk

Ce0.2041

jord Condis

Poco'sta mad retori!

tar 1.2r

2X 7123500 20200 8

Male bone condiain ded ind bund toreted and

103 :122215.12;

tha 1207935

:: 100/

---

## Page 97

13 theos::

1a1"d.

scout wither the dent waits and is so ca03

Caled

perheated a rootilg

CH*

e/0n1u5 at a duniloto's uilice in countovo

Gagen.

A report was rectived at anproilnatoly 1230 Loura

the lic, Coloael Plan Ngoc

lean nas picuning a

Caip scheduled Or TaCO hours; the coup fadied to

Sater, Theo winditud thist:

the coug

walad hive begun in depsited.

Conoin and Don net a: 1330 hou:s; (a) Don did sot

revelva paraission iron the cure conuittee to turn

2n00 the 2011i1eal phan; fo) Dou had bean

althorizid do outling te poli:loal chinsing of the

are connantee • (1) the succeudlar covernment

muid is cluilin and no mentor of tho coup conaittse

wald mold a safee josttion in the cor government;

(ul tba say goreramelt souli. ds soon "3 posalble,

Lice ech-earmonto political pilsoners. hoid frae

eluctiona, and cornis operatlon of caprettion

yatation).

partles cacept for the Vict Cung;

1) ibare vill Do couglare froston of :elig1oa id

ne torontion o2 dinacizarcion choan iotard any

cored; (4) the mom Goverumond Waild be Dro-ios:

bad a0t a pawe ci the USG; (5) the not govercoat

sariy the mur agzhost the figt. Cong i0 a

siccessia conclusion ali Western, particuiarly

USE, 202p; (c)

Con bald that Consin wolld be in

close coctact tith coup headgarters to laburg 1

cluna line of concunication bocreen the cous

heniquarters and the hacassador;

(d) isa stated

tils caco the coup started; li nould di no good for

tao tiso to ziteupt in stop 1i; (e) LO!. was ausro

o? cour giottini on the par: od It. Colonel Phan

(1) the coug committee wis in contact

vich Tino, but theo doos not lave the recesaary

once in carry mut his glaz;

(E) ibo tanerala'

colip conmitter had codo to

the conclusion that

tur enidro igo semily had to

in elleinred aron tha

Ja Sonto Vlotia; (D) .l nom m32622kg

uni schuduled ari 20 ctondi.

Ceneral bon coniaond abcasador Lodg: no Dail:

Airpare on deo deccauca

oi ino departare oi

Prurn to daigon and asked

il Corean wis apacklag

Ion ino Anbasonica; Aebaggaior Lodge 1c1lted

22207935

cop 1 or

Wrong!

---

## Page 98

.C.

23 Got: *

mithmmaoloe; 001 gold cao sacchion la 196 chould

to atlatiniar. ciug;

ta 102 miln montrellites und

150 conde and chroni an adoor.

Concio and Caneral

Man site

lu dovadorn Sargoil

i2. Con cca-

farned that he aud tolled to fringsador Lodoe who

inr.d

"oicien for Corati:

ib) loit mated that the

enomittea lions to mood diaricane'

2190XV4671:2

in the cong aid talitied thai oiher

alous say cong action;

c) Don sily liforned thal

Monasador nege mao cchedules to depart 5a1&0n

Cil

(d) lon ins intergsted in

112

244ce chas tag Anbagsidor datindad to depart

C:!

ike Ambustador

Tu1A

uot conage dis acucuuls is i carage might is

(i) Con studen inat to ms

laving on 10 Cotosas in soortland tland plans

т.Lі11

46) 200

! roys..

*!'

1:217

regarlag Coneral Ton Tra: tidic

Por Sinted toa: Dira vas not

mechoing in the manding cod car the cong

assaditoe aycatuizers ind Galoral Cian continuously

excimmoon and had instructions to alistrate Dion

1.7

It:

chowed say gigas

o acronlshit the coup;

(1)

letough canticing that it 2as not

articipating in the catal planatig of the andts

chat

would participica la the coug, arabad that

"101

10 meetings of the coup countie lie knew ut

133

20110912g.an1ts:

one-halt of the airborne

ringine:

¿andtaldo25 of Marines, a1i of the dir

20123

much the exceptloo of Coronal Huych Huu 91en,

machrs Sch, Tok. and 01ai Davisiona. halt of

Bord Division,

ind elenants of is Did Diyiglou.

43)

the Comand Fos: for tas soup voric ba Jolat

man B7a1t Headguarters.

Cocain 113

contacteddy cataly loa, aide de Caes

Sit:

2t

that Corela

:;.18.

Midd idle.

Finite

til?'s

Cretat"

not within

wait seat busiciles

10e8chi30

nan gated

out

10.6!:1

-97935

---

## Page 99

Mille goctite

Hats

manista:

tha doctiot rione Cit co loo boon ta:c

2.9:

ampanon at coceind tono titi cen-

transion of

the message that Ciont: i; to greeeed

inmatoly to Jas beaducarterg.

de manther sentenl

12.21.

cha cora was tu progress.

Can..inl :29020d 018

Salgon

Roon al job Sardcuarters.

were Gorertis blong

van hand. tiar You Dos,

10.111

Has Chlou.

Ding thien kalin, han Van Mich,

1f:y 311

lud atak, he van dil, Tran Tu

r.ad.

guran van La: Aquyeu Glac Mio. Tria Ngoc Tra,

Le izu traem; colonalo lo lau, deuina suony,

mong lgou lia; salors lo liguyer lhuis, do susc 1a1.

nod untazasiriad junior officava.

1. Horatái

Cannili mou siated to donein tnso bon hid tried to

reildance giuca befoie

Acon iaA do Cio 2201010d.

delas chees ravenied

caù canala'o colepnoce vas out o? dider.

Mul 60id that le vius in lees a lelo mone llae coan

to ratasaudos Lodge; inn Arcated Conota Acat

Colonois lo Guang 'Mas CARVi Sorcla: Forus Comaador)

Bia Mian Maurdoneo comoardoe: and Colonel

la0 Vea Vion (Concuadas of the claboras Baigado) Mere

arcosen: that Colonel. Muows geo Lin (Comandar ot

tha Clyl: Chard) 27d lic. Coinuel En ilgaren Kaldy

(concander of the larine Brigain) veis iodor guerd

una not yei dechared and congiaa.ed cubral.

Cañonel

Tuns mas broucht so uncir arad quard and

icaced ai suupoist to ordar & chusalira batraen tu

Grecial

Forces mles adjacout io dos bardquarters

And 479

Diaicons of the oro mlvision.

saco tha

corna tire hod been daclared destesa Sexcial Forco3

and Jos,

tharty-i1ve araoced B2r50n.J01

Ionder mith iroopa la conbai pers

teward dalyou propei.

iTI. 226: 0002.

_28 9202 276282048:

that the tattla? coracious

Maret dJily 114e.

noorted ese the creante ttased do

---

## Page 100

- 1!..

-.

r.

C.

C.

1au3ull or van illush too been the retratable

C.):

16:1?::4

My Drinerrala tood the otist:

2an07l Minnis Captey

suilitary offlcars and nat crima.ders.

probably the vost catalllacke rt tha

. .

Var labore resconailue for zitiala, neitoualist

1cin

ruden Theme colo mos to lusts licencry ordaes

to mit 20 Madel af Stall to doneral iilne

datin the ploctiot

anil

t.a3

ctual coys.

Other genoial officers such is Do Cao 1T1

and wher m thai tece Iniormod ox the coup plarcing bui did sot

•cline: Marcleanore 17 acy of tha actual dizerine.

Ton tip: innil; Coamnding Sheral of 11I Costs, Mas bundled

cableing Conferently teal any othel ofelori.

Cranians Were colinetod by Coadcal Dou alrictly do waro

cine:!:i to inpuor as the Jalai Peroral staff thon their

siltal situation incalitod or casa vistiiog. Sol.

M: ain doctors ill: aflaccod tina coup io; lba drilsion to

nisatner tooD finaldent liar.

inabulo; Geneis? dina, Costuca Procldcot clan do lava honorablo

remierer 1ron ina yodlalell some in Saach Vleine and exliv.

2o to car toad dou and kno binn cai. there Lis reit dassensicu.

1re ailinide ves toes their dondto, alcug tina lutionz Nge Dish

Generai Hugan Van Cao, CouchalE Genert or IV Corps,

vas nars tudio into the conflicure oi the coup attacipals.

preterred to nort mich Chionot Bu? sun ihoa,

Chorard: c2 the 815r Civision.

with tha tin Divinies and tha

Sch Divinlon, too conspirators darlt with coulsentl comandory

and biraind the divasion comsuseis.

Thie inctle applied a1:0

to thy turns Srigade and the Altorna Brilala 2ud, to a 108301

akrant: in the arnos Concaba.

The daleon Carilsee treans. inchiding support troops

such as puer ternatter,

siopal, cucinears. ctt.,

wens contactod

adiatrinal contancis.

ViCiones? Sionta? Forcey;

1120111i-a:

ma nave contacied but irs ail aya

coushaerod by it.a

x000922

сiн2i і

^a•i

diese itera

coopleidly loyid to Proctions dies.

ul the Freakienttel Grind had been contrated

mainy the Chabilag.

The 1a!:1:

icuticted stare

trenee Mulls 4a2.osigar. 10

Sacre 1à corun cod divastons.

11.e 1i::

1o be loych to tat wule.

To day drine

Jud 06rrme nich the coup ploitar viid tea escagdicu

07935

---

## Page 101

-7.1-

• ....

Terrie: : 204-12010190it, 281;

tol? 12.

AIS MiRACEY 1750.0K

the recessary

she carlone, n lagor tankly illian

(storesic), Who

hild

eu: i losin to escort Captalo do Tao Glyun,

connanding

DIcient the Murl Porcas, Lilled the Capilla prior to 1200

"ais noirl; unaer the tarlag of the 11131.

fortubadody,

lic:

Ms MOVED Crieddly to 21e 1111211y

tilties.

Savoral days before the coup vis

ins taçe placo, General

Don cost subcoil the lanar bion with Senarals Du dad tri nad

15ue dani and moo da Coraudias O!lcer of lie l1l1taoy

dodell t Baint.

aro signal du start tat soup and based on a

Dreiluis decide 1sousi jy Presidant Dles which sinter that

aiter 1' overder thore mould be no stouta tud there would be

Daiy a 2.9-h0re lunch pe:101.

1y 2nd10 and rolsphone,

cos0 urb cupain bai ssued instructions to coup carcistpants

i orecher orking bones could bagin ze 1330.

SArtH 48 07B0 40473 1 107051 413

sus?lilate teas so

dide ine dorces waded very to attack Saigor

de 10 position at 1020 tours.

Ona unit ci tre Pth Divislon

tro lustrnetlons to more at 1330 hours in: accually

Doved ri 1315 Loura.

'Tals aico ves one of too minor incideats

rairly upset

tha cuug is tierg tag 1aa6 that tols rould

bo dateciod dy tia coroes loyal co Disa.

to tie aresidant prior to the actual

coup dole lausched.

Lechuss of this,

the Prasidlant ordered

tha 415t legal Fattalion to move Into Saigon and so tako tha

PIT and io surrona die palaea.

Fola cased another stumbling

olock la the guaerals' pian.

They vore cocpiacaly isisen by

susprine by tale manenver and had to regoctat mita roa

conaara di the battalion to windray als unas.

2ba metron used by the keueraid to neutaslize opposi

ornadiul olficers tos to hold n

the bairon troutuito the

"on that olai:) and til

con:12 1954 of

inco angry duo ai chece affleans

rad appeared

60:1 1V0RL

207935

---

## Page 102

C

- 1.5.

•, Emeral blint

circt::: lie poverinali, by inice.

4 th1: 41:4

Panion immed with sub-nichine gunt chi tito the rall.

mated for chose officers to tend dis tre to go

COlD

to sidod up.

In told than tao, vould ba

simo is mort aiound Conoral Stalf beadquartera lult naro not

to letre the comand jost.

Thuss who cid ooi join the

coup vere

ulet arrent ard put tries towed guard: Once

ord.olcd

mordal brought to the comand post nù latch timo to

raild !!; graclaaation and objoctives ci the cony glottars tbich

was recridea.

He thon asked ouca caficer phu hid greed to

participatu in tha coup to suans 1iis naas 1030 :ho tape

Sevaral trong wers nade aren

ta. oriclu.l and

distalineer: lo difforent rarts of the city in we-irraned

Diana tilley so that 1n

the evant the coup intiod, no officer

could sinlu that he bud noi voluntailly participated in the

riclip.

unco the coup had started

Late made and Colonei Lan of the Caul. Guard decided to

JC1

Colonai Lom at thee tlue recordad Instructions

cic li:. incorder raich waB to in latri brendonat to all Clvil

Cuinü titta ordering

taint Trigade Telepacned his uali com:andars not then partici-

3712

Coloral Kiinag of tha

them to cooporats witt the Geseralg'.

It, Colonel ichang, Coumandor of tha

slins in the coup and ordered then to support the coup.

l'aa couraad of the Alr Force mu given to coloul to Mac lat

vica colonol H1en.

Tho connaad of the 7th Divisica sea givea

to coiu:al Figuyen Vas Co.

Tempornry Conauna of the IV Caips

W23 Biu0a to Colonel Bul Huu Nhon.

Cornand of Scope 1n

Salgor :16 siven to Canerul Toy Tiet Dish.

Under General Dina's

0501a?. coland vere saigon support troups, the sarine Brigado,

¿no Alisorne Ertgade.

40, tanks iron

the Airios Coirand, the Sth

and Tih Olvisiona:

sipported by the Al's Forca and tau

Thu Duc

Clicen's training Base which joined tüe coup under the

conser! al Colonal Lan Son.

sortin:

I particularly impertant.

me backgacuod to Gengial Dinh'e Jolndra tho coun

During da period bawwasn

M1 404412 And

thy lifting of martial lay on 16

Begienies, Genaral

Mian prually

considered blossi?

the hero of Visten und

the

that di ide

ilan legina.

cods boriu! as

111dr Goverhor dld not codear hiu in

the paglaton or 149

Plah, on approntrtoly 31 degist, lad tie

000y 210: 1

TOP E

207935

---

## Page 103

C.

L..

: i.::

; i+

?::

-13--

And 1e21234.8

•2% 202

Time thuld carotlon

1a3 i6aup6 Diato Cabar

...

"ji.

137i mod Ceneral Dou 36.20. 0100110 ce

aù.t? in colling bin chac in tass dead boso

ali, should hove leed trunked

by Died and

Don blared o tre tood this

•!:.

Er. prelimel

:..1:

ld meatsunily spois io

tan: he vodad aal: than Dloh ba concod ino Miniacry

tand: 100 206re 10.

Don, Would asir lux die Minisiry oi

11:0r.j1

ta dacc..

j.u

way that do would auve been incorpiola Ex Dien ar

roset.

Istlines more bien.

Dinit us mriwad that

moraldoes

2a.01.2::

isaa

ifter tha

milaad and thin to not recited this ha thouzat

itchellit

faintel on.

mey de Caine, caldened de lord gurnaly de dia.

Taer this did not

ze iy

tany la:

IE 13

ros grosacuts durias the seriad of messlys vt ta

Peneral

1id tou

tonal bith had feld car ted capronised hin

use bie Crossa end. 1à 200a5a217: 10 eltzialio

:: in

THe Sit

[inl

sincera yin barvatibed did &n Lours a day

co. cis degusy, een 2y corga dontander and

r.erly

writes

i..1

origadder cateral.

Canzin. Miah's desire to

12e30

i Fresideut

ji:.

ricana dua dethal buy in gie anuais of the cous.

Sus 29:d10 and

a thus prallanat nind my used 60 the generala

10920481.1

In diat Oneral Cich conctacut Pr211400% Dien that Lo,

105 ales Colonel us buses ig

14CE6 3

Ulaà 21zo

8÷112..

Paiges in

if :

11ar there ixcoug work:

arrant

choke dad tr indeed.

Bacurlüy 1n

Ciao? 02 11111 ida

300y 80i

207935

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## Page 104

'.-

r.

C

an?d-

Mit to trunidlent Dien.

TceSH tE!0.k

1.49130 ci 12

coHê 84 Corohe: 2au baill B0 ü Bieduee Mi Namnig 723. do5a

iiross murcracnlax dadgon don rimler and Goanttledl tü: ecd:.

Greral Miale to dumle angiopllat Gruero, Egrimrod ioi ilo

?.s1094:r

qwue uaits cavorolo to tho cougianoy io die

Ortesiisg

o" Snigon aad also io novo ua1tia, sucù 43 tee

Sgecial Forcas,

away frot Saigon. i

oy tha manguvers cieacrtand abouo.

tb= 10rera1?

sho n0si

favorablo pojolbie Lalsa00 07 107025 1c Ciis:

iiavor aud

curing the tsest. botr, arscrod the

1ensi possiile 1o3a of 1110 anorg tho ciridion pozalatton.

2 F0/3020r

1500 Pre- Pe ta0oon seuda datofnne

indinaiad to be:

1545 CáS ardlalod that coon in pictross.

zoiledas hardora cenodas natt tinentry os ineartor

2i09: Xe.srl

Diruoto:ato Conaral. Of Muticaa" Follc: E9

Ministry oi Matlonal Dalmaio

dltany Eecurlty Serrice lil (haecked)

PalACi gurrovndad.

Isoridential Gaald burwacks ec Te:

Taut Monlaverdl entarsd; sucuagtently curvuederzi sta

henry ligatla5.

Migktiag 10 Viatnonose Epocirl Fercas arcs at Tan Soa Shu:

Ainorl uilts noving througi suigon.

1400

Colorid Lo quang 10n5 cuptucad; dlutctai

tr cild =r

lrG NSgeO Oe Baga0A 1Uz0008 eGelXT,914

ihring trucss

Pinai:ag sü enlaeai aboue 000 toniii dturaind.

35 sa 1ea1 1009 povirg onaall the dlites,

".. R%: 1

207935

---

## Page 105

-15..

?.:

last naili

i:..

cio taleir

2o:0har Duong dece ton. Clrl: Ceili Gorgoater

Dion too Clag Tilai, Seputy Chiod Ol Stars, 1TSP, snight

beatably on due morning 03 1 NoCi.

r.

jill guaranton safe Morraine to

Bien nud dih.: otherytse,

mo macro mail ba attacked tr 1500 loria by cha d1i

The dal A1101,

furianii:

ligayer Diab Then, Eccradaty of Otate ac tbe

Densidee:

1GUYen LUOUS. M0N10÷0T 07 212020

Look hoe Chard, Ministor

lucinal Econsty.

mai corsial 100 tard Diuh das the ley: unes ba goreed

muel narsunde: are noid cocard to la lalgon Rivai

imprei by caval presomaai. ,

1506

Ma Regrads ul tropes Qui crossor dies lui bridge by

1aieun rudioed I 20d il Coros and the 115l Diulsion tart o

L::0 132 3040

ardenoted

in basion bit that all toa 10-

uglate bava baon arrestad.

1EY H72: 469237

Leuluding 21t01.

aaniy died

10: 81031-

-07935

---

## Page 106

-.

r:

=

• 1830

•-13-

Pra-resteen

el.1uan goliticloos ad 20s vlth cereml:

uáll hos 101n ciual corudaanent.

1o niarr (10 5611

rei wrveanent thich niouin bo enbaillairs

T de Litro Monouae? Miri

Mina Preasdeat

mintytn Haoc

tho ind isi

tha only ones

thun aar golectad ded tre ner

£09J.nu21t.

Redie, VriH 10 uüer coup contro:: usged hoodenot tetrig

bud:ae .olay

poind liad boon ilavs.

*he tollowing gederuls fre nt 1G6:

si/Geuerai Tuong Van Munh, Militar, ndvisos to

the Fiosideut

si/Goarrul Cran Van Mish, Permandot Suesataly

Canaral; bnle.

t/Cenccal Tran Ibien Jilen, Chief n? Etais.

Joint renoral Stuft.

B/Ceau212 Le Van Ilu, ID

D/Gearnl Hguven Ngoc Le. Inupsuior. Eel. Betouse

CorpE/alus:

DjGeriral Then duan Caleu.

me folinring nno clulned slso to do suauertlns tha coug:

nGegeral uguysn Shann, Conmnalinz Coceras: 11

CoxKS

liGaaorai lu dno Drit, Coimaros, 15t Lilrinkton

Blan Hsd aid zy tho nnder couy soutrel.

trs zai.ce

itha. Trang:

111 sutss.

LCCEl C0002111413 41J 1299187913

waored venlele has guen tatred sn trono n2

the c1sgors.

Pol c loie stonsweetig tlaeo:

Dtrialon,

1rr..hon.

Coloncl Nguyen Van Clls:

Myat&n:

Colonal Ced Lnh Doi.

M1rsdo?

Colccal Ia Cualg

E'ed! 154:0100.

Cilonol Mguyan

" 2::.

sin Mariidon (Dinh 1us

ieglitr.at?

Mareco torge taly aoparaidag Ey obackri

tarul:

207935

. I

---

## Page 107

.

r.

C.

1iag

1350

1550

1700

1715

1723

17-15

1750

190)

101J

1515

Mind too date Ah

# 2416.3

Garaged 61i0: 20621141

As coral dt kit Pcalle

1 0o!?? Cii.

nores Curander Dion cla and mate; up tore iris

olinoa.od.

Minà told au ¿bat la te and bled dil cot restau ino sur

1350 bonza, the palace scule is jocol.

Radio sagon Missary Povolutionary Could!: 6Ocne Lalia 192

thing meet the Governreas.

aid's

1910)

iolinn de ito

Get 35126850h0220: 18s 03th

Tha vonne ol ta Flatauregy amed Turned met all the 212

Pay west mia to join de Burzzor de 28d3i

31,a.30

irong Var. Mind

as nonnese the doctory oi

he goneranand landed at lan sa it.

3-23

wooled Bulgon sad moped did triot: t191114.

GaLe?3: 11r9 GO 17106 T0 8103

wer militar tid

Ti 10Fpe.

scott? cue carth till da 207935

11.::1.

---

## Page 108

.

C.

-2.3-

117.5

1055r: 1:è 221000.

1000

1$45

Leave artiLery:

12920 in Daian tren, Balgon; birbiiy

sargested on 238 beadqurters.

Frestretlel Cuned copleulated; coup torson Javing 1a

palace libin sana iron JeS tad

Troogs are nuvlug on the baleco sad empeci io tue

pogãs50ion by 1000 Lours, bui Gro propared for coulter

1h9 gendrule Loga 10r Say 1060 160n i do

United Stades and other mastera porats.

to so cirpiete citu.n a veek.

When te cous la completed.

presunally on the n1ght vi lovenber l, Gorecals oili cone

to tia !i.s.

1356

2900

Dien conal to caultulate and cha solace 1111 53 1195066.

Coard Cong IN,

exclial aid greclalra? the carole do.

250 sturenon ilbaracoa Dy cony fo.cs. and intel ds J.9;

hOAlRY 010-C010 031C256-2101.

Four 1011 s1@.33.005

neuriti: the vicinity of the relace.

1915

1923

Aloo isorned that tabassador judge ll succive the

1945 MR 159015:

Loatlets crockaining the at goreranent dad

signed hy derami tinh ida clocrabater; urry

and bacolo seen to be tracy: pulice hercuanzters

nod province chie: resideace and under a:11ta::

control.

Sua can DaBand the factolty en the las find de

Curity ileclared to be midectro 2066 10183.

Pittant.

4003

Can9:11!

012311770

1 21710 2

$11.l065

Allo Malt.

8, 407935

---

## Page 109

.-1.51-

2ac02r007a0195 dst deGe%

Three cora 24r:1

Mded

2103

8199

1CE0 T1UMЛ 1X5

loading In Delace 001 Sier Boronal

223'

troops t approninetely battalton stairats cerlag la

fillets

Has ne 10st 21018 diao Nisa Ca:

tomed lan thut sis

palaus.

B/Genazul guger. Van Cao, Comsadlaz real: IV Cares:

inay has joined the coup.

Cecorate bonedule a press conteroes dr 0006 houng t

B inyenies.

2140

Yor courselor tea brome to cal reminer feitor.

tos Coiseller Hill,

atlitar Falloc ere rounding un clollion political Inoders

for deafereide.

is choin ior president 18 àe 1o otill alita.

st 195.

le allowed in

spell In subordinate contaders ula solegacee.

annunce thelr durport of the couo.

nina who oold vian would he murad to reachale to: tigh:

against tha vieu Coog and Hla Tojolly io thu timo Kiglu

could roù ba held agnost h1a.

Tronge loving

lastro

tu tre palaco aunt aud cureting the 3io :

Dien its

iT.u

do

ro, attends do trage 11i01d:

a Meren tundal Unát 1a the don duai.

mahoot Hammitte

18.798996

---

## Page 110

=

c.

-20-

cotaton st taio colur, but Minh erovadlar.

1o 5t 4e12201e ceonctoe 3y towa, adelaon dey dela:

uall ta truacei.

1111

613272422022C5 379 53 009 22600002

..: illr:31

tovard tia palica.

41.15

Mrd; fireMseat SG2M00r

T:is at: 8019

POIcaS.

22co dpprocdaete3, 1.000 teoops ara noring tonsed tho palnen.

PnaailH 17d ilus: Lewa1c Qu10%.

Physteal sacuedog : Cii's

resldaca 10 Aia

213 120tras31.

joatis!

truciloads 0f

rOW0G MOG 2001 CO 1110kK.

Sinbris are sapwy.

2155

jachtho.el intacidon 1y depicued drnn the dus toor d tay

palses.

3/Cenerai Do Cuo Trú, Camandee, 1 C07S, PUblicly 11002.0015

shpconi of thn cong.

Tadoaseian Consul Cena.nl inlcous Mohhzeuder Lolge tuat ti

Mlnister o? Buolic Morisg, Nyusen Ina 01a1, nougar 1ay1in 41

tao boon ol Chis Indonas1aa Corsul Gsaarul,

3210

AnoroI1:adoLT 17 th0k3 aan 100 tr0000 100 novlag O.l: 2i0.

iho malico uacucdo to aagago ¿,con cmo torce trorpa.

2250

2319

Demolltion mgecinlists aud conp tauks 22a uirered io sei

chargas to

blos up tha paidos.

Tim icianory raitallons and laltaes drlla1o, arrorud

poraonl ChTiucs. C1ol0 19 24.290 1e9 Hy 290

:a do!9

üho mai.on tctauii udi comad of te, codonet Tlek.

3400

Tho q0. 011ng 16010C0r3 Baw9 10513eed Mo tur dote: Coeam2

31122:

Ma19n Dien Chuaa, Saurotnay oo 31046

M=enldeney a0d Baartg M1al6ter

Daáeaise.

Diguyac Luong. 11n15420 D8 11alic3

Jaalit die Qurn1:

Aud BaEn 14eid

1rishal t::6:y

207935

./.

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## Page 111

C

to :

1e trio die cordided by

joinen Cood on Dazier Cartle?.

maneral are confideat bi vierosy errot for Le laa Ki,

cenlion mich c1v1li0n c0l.tic.ras

ir are hurting

i me dualion pracleination but "ith arpid turnover 1o

lin in preparing a proclilation for broadcast.

nand, 112h to deilbitely In Control, 201-1501V98 dJ1

The venezals axe trying to coniict ulaister ca

es trenddone dugou agoc mo ai80 hoart deen located.

yan Thien Mian do actlug as Mink's Cals: oi Start 1o:

comatons: bat toon dea bon 1a definitoi rie No. € 12

Camel Chinu in mandating Generiti

when and do colicong alictre rperatlors ciosary,

circus bu saveral condetunt caconds and cajors.

→ talker

Anominador itates that Minisines Thuan, Luoig.

..a chand moon couscted d0 to dus by terraoser Li

•1 cad40 repend lach the coup coccus.

::cod their locatio, buc inta they adgo: be needed 1oa

stubating on to noralod or 1 lovenors.

subsequeatly

cuted chat my bad checked du nicey mats ilalater Quasy

1ae5 Mar; Cousit Cannonl daborts that tribes see deployed turo.igk-

and the city.

Dlonia anther's here is guarday by

colons pun beguins pulses and caciscied by barber

So a sand catal

Jaw.

11: 23 Oterla3

sit in

"01.

ti!

Clote Mill

ne matering inn

asident.

ha

1636decd 16

not to at prostdoud cataccore.

licean che is named

2oe prlai

207935.

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## Page 112

-222.0

cheess dul Prosecutlon

Time KInister • Mayr Myes 19 1201 1702 1 166100.0.

Money Podne Mineatara .. Can

Mintstor of laformation - 2/GrilAl Criu Da 134 (201;

Manector co rencholoclans Miriara)

Lanetor nd Youth and littlera).

alicantee learns

sra11 Van Gilsh

H'n1stai or l'ortign Affaira •Üi Van liu

Minigter dor lublic losso - Tea I0 quins face

Agricultural kadorn?.

rcases not selected.

Ngunar Ngee the dus cuntactod 16s una is au's.

C3.10 Vico Grandasto Tho at exis

Palace 15 22303 heary attacis

L1a: of offleers lavolved 10 the wan:

111 general Dificers raceut Ganerala 57: lay Phana Cou .

Laynil Y2:1

Car, tand fang loing.

colonelg: Lau Vaa Ebri

Do 1an, Chicl of Milliary docuill Barrter

Ngolyen

Han Co

Agayen vin Cruan. J. AGE

• Ng-yen suong, Chias of Stutt for infartro

Trad Yiss Muses

Ba! Muu thon: CO; 2i1 Guinitry Dlulsier

Diractor Carenl

Cuard and Beid Batened Corge

it. Colonels: le igurer 50a05. Corardar terine

Atr Lores

Vicinimasa file lor:

207935

112

---

## Page 113

A2u; ian C..1E

...IS:

2alg

Mila was ordaid

lo crored vehluärs

ie paleon

*÷Aakan 8x 22y

masay toof.

maidiors mauling to Pasteur lorid

71 Prosiddd the los accaptad posttloi as itine liaisior.

2its.09at Disa culled Gianeral Don at Jet alth currender

Ho rail chat ba and la mnt only alte conduct to

tron there to ai rasgaelileil

The man sadlaran are not it tax jalaco.

Get ill Mind aucaghed President Dian's pürer.

lein: 88 11 3102a6d.

ou doross have comrad the salice. Prlnr4331 1185t103

c1332

itia chels.

Man o boiloy sord the brosidentlal Curre ine ofber units

0E111208

ten coup Macas 10 tea. clay

mill ps isinstat+l 10

"Hind

Ming called Do: with on vifar to zuccerder unccaditionally;

isa ba kao oradend de brasidential Guard lio cease

Tha Mauserls mall procaod to tha palace to gloi: up Dier aa

mn tou encord thea do ces; ta9y wall sendese breterenco is

To destinailon Jud Boes approval Of the count! Canagancee.

Poina HAndote: 2h0 has 262% GUS 10r h1s 205110020 And 111l

tie ricrulo:.

oralay 1:

121013 12003 di Ene Deleou 56ad0i1.

111: 00 21a2.

Falaca

i::

2: HG @0t6id8l

5007.29.L01.L

207935

---

## Page 114

C.

-2÷-

1:3 1.101÷00 d. 1010 Bluo Ootlealol Larrel 60 d 100

C :108226S7028d22896

mes dirlented!

Saed Md

toral gars oithont fes:.

T cuad slal hamoat ssdocg te glds dotion

13sü Üd910

Vial mau, Lesrooal dolreg Director Muyen

nnd Ci0 midector trayon mn . all as vet

nc:: ded!.

eral fai lau wid a5 appoalied mlinctos Gen2rad o

riorad tolrcis

1d bode232005t268016162

Tháe li ucconflazed.

l.g tne

íecarie mundd dulu Bale couetluer.

¡taeno.coo, Louge moeced endouse in the Chuocury.

"i:: criipo du esclared

25 conglotod aad uccaseiul.

iuiu t 1und Wha ae dataauted in be daiá.

laidle cunour.ce

ci.i, ihey corotimni mmicida iy

1r: 10.0d 40

Len: 1d.

Iedgou.

Bulics ara

110: L:. Culenai. Thon lgoc Fiao suld chat be auel his forces

•iecud daa long icincg suring the aorly nooiug bours to

11.0tt Dloa aod Miu io

tha Jos aftor thoir su :rendar.

".nicn rousaled they vong not ot toe palace ind had noi

ic--n mhera durdny tha

Tuao doporian bics to the dob.

Viilag du datgon pad Cablon konm to de naad sy tha Ngo

Frr liy warn saarched.

Mimsral Med Mal Xuan lad the derall Wnich Zicatad Diem

Áod Meu aru vihlo oa Plung lung arreet in Cadlon.

Tnnunel to taa d0e aita thair toul.es.

uiga ot deuth at

iriis cling

is neraecon.

teCl Aruyen

1500 1100, S0nCinl A381a1024 B0 B/le0ecal MguyeN

1311 V.2

itid'sti

Hem K Maeaes.

0a13ud

Ee dart wiswed tha

He a1l

3.1: *i-3.;

cleax tiai

nitrhoaddtsd, losarnly"

tiri' ; ilreciion.

ci dcioont panr oudde, diad agooed that bierd aad Nhu 101.iri

leolodidtliaed crlbpog19 Conmudeltills ¿iDn

yl....:

1r0.2hou6 1: 201.01000 11003 26a 1201 6. 101%

00.1 181/051

ma0at

BENETIVE

207935

---

## Page 115

1C0

2000

-25-

Palane do Wu lue aud even Cle sue do la Cholar -111à.

panca: pled no other dieteers need cere diet

07. 0 miurs on i lorenber by

Benerars: Shey leit the

tunnel anthe ot: to?

it.

to con thinn Chicano Cetoolie Church in Colos

Miard thoy

1002 F

iser more discoveredid taurturol

Bidios ang nt J0S,

orderl nare caught and adiled by minis carsonne at:

church in chu diaa, Clotos.

Cin trend int

Cancain: Is lad, a nophas of lo Mau, arS Ci:el.

Aro or on to order nonet entral tid.

Croad satirind at in not an Fus.

calebr.timm on

3 Normabor mith Che fraille

of finig :i3lilsnce.

A variptyo: factors paritiod the cur princians co

micemurl and relacively blao.l.aes coup d atre. tra

most sigaliliar: or abich are as sellers:

1: B0ng 1r1:1015

" Then bad hacm 1or nany varis

w91oer was colstered by accreditation grea ch cy 1..591492

Lenge and berarid daking.

It albrade duce the galevancos and a901ra:0ra

imperede

sonine: aid ascuronoos andoutally halaud in

:: 1400

the crun ard corosion of ite dauict:

nsge:t3, She

SOlE

was an all-liatronase ndirl.

sida caled ta tan

:::81.1

¿07935

---

## Page 116

.?:.

0nh Jhelor 1164913

saniolas

id sotalet

117:2+

:::::

is 1121.1ary crucition of lue cous ari the

N266 2609X 45671

109101F:

Mastroaciel Guard Parracke.

fan Dotitlest Aspects o1

sorin do have cuam TiBs voll t0ioir4d

+.

nichose misse isable of holding togatuer tia cirpiiata eleconte

•I was trolutioney Cornittes dod Lue cartleta 10l.0u1ng.

tado, iowater. o rotoent leades, partleriarly da

• 201:Cod Me DiS 509020l Chard 09p003540 18 c0s.ro

/aara d 101010.105.

re possibly did adi duali metrectate the

r02y/ R00S_/

207335

---