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157-10014-10067)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date : 08/06/95

Page

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10014-10067

RECORDS SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 09-H-08

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

SSCIA

TWEEDY, BRONSON

TITLE :

DATE: 09/09/75

PAGES

:76

SUBJECTS

: CONGO

ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS: 1A

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 09/25/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NN 50955

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TION

ubject

vol 1.or

to: C

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held belore

Senate Salect Comnittee to study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Cade

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

Washingtoni, D.C."...

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF.

Bronson Tweedy

EXHIBITS

NUMBER

Tweedy Exhibit No. 1

Tweedy Exhibit No. 2

Tweedy Exhibit No. 3

Tweady Exhibit No. 4

Tweedy Exhlbit No. 5

Iweedy Exhibit No. 6

Tweedy Exhibit No.7

(The above exhibits were retained by counsel.)

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

-. =

United States Senate,

Select Committes to Study Governmental

operations with respect to

Intelligence Activities.

Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m.,

In Room 443, Russoll Office Building, Senator Walter F.

Mondale presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale (presiding) .

Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron,

Also present:

Professional Staff Members.

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Senator Mondale. Do you awear the testimony you are

about to give will he the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

but the truth, so help you God?

MI. Tweedy. I do.

MI.Baron. Mr. Tweody, are you aware that you have

the right to counsel here today?

Mr. Tweedy.

I am.

Mr. Baron.

And are you appearing voluntarily here

today without counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

(At this point, the hearing was removed to room 608,

Carroll Arms Hlotel.)

Mir. Baron.

Are you also aware that all of your

constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, Includ-

ing your Fifth Amendment rights?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr.. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have

the right to cease answering questions

at any time

and

consult with

an attorney?

Ur. Tweedy, Yes, I gather thit was implicit in whos

you

said in the senator's office.

Мт. Вагоп.

It was.

¡low, that we are no longer

in the Senator's

presence

I would like to make it clear on you that you are under no

obligation to continue testifying, although the Committec

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would obviously appreclate it if you would.

Are you willing to do so?

Mr. Tweedy.

I have no intention of not cooperating.

Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify

to the truth as best you can?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.

MI. Baron.

Perhaps we should begin by putting on the

record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading

to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of

the African Division.

TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Me. Tweedly.

I come aborad the Agency in the first o:

May, 1347 and after training was sent to switzerland.

returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs

in what was karin

as the Central European Division, I quess, and went through

a number of different assignments at that time, until say?

15-14

0f 1953 when I went out as Chief of station to Vernadostria

I was there until the middle of 195g and returned very

15+1

briefly to the sentes, went to tondo as Deputy chief of

Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in the

middle of 1958 and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in

15-1

Conlon, early in October 1959, and I took over the

African Division I should think somewhere around between the

15ch and 18th of lovember 1959.

That brings me up to date.

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Mr. Baron. And how long did you sorve as Chie fof

the African Division?

MI. Tweedy, Until september of '63.

MI. Baron. In that pogition did you consult frequent

with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?

- MI. Tweedy.

Well, as I was explaining to you as we

were strolling around, the aimple answer to that is yes.

These consultations would take many, many different forms.

On the Congo, for example, the State Napartment

obviously was just

as involved as praculeally the rest of the

U.s. Government and they

had a Congolear: task force.

would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would

attend their meetings.

They took place almost daily,

sometimes I guess even

more than once daily.

MI. Baron. During what period of time?

Mr. Tweedy.

oh, boid, from the time the congo thin;

really hotted up, and I am talking

then varticularly

under thin

Kennedy Administration, when Mionnon Williams organized the

tast. force and Wayne Fredericks was

his deputy; thosc meer-

ings were State's

meetings, they weren't CiA mortings, thri

weren's nectings primarily to discuss the CiA policy, but

No had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the

policy was.

Mr. Baron. If we could focus our attention on the

period hotween the indopondence of the Congo in June of '60

and the announg prop stickEt" Luminba in february of '1.

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Mr. Tweedy.

Whe that the month of his death?

Mr. Baron.

The month the death was announced.

As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his

death and the probable cause of his death. AS far as the U.".

Investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps

January 18, 1961.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

MI. Baron.

What was the nature of your contact with

the State Department during that period of time?

MI. Tweedy, My recollection of thin

is far less

Congo and far more gencral, is I was mentoning to you as

we strolled, and

particularly my talks with Jim Penfield, tr.

whom Joe Satterswate was

dedicated.

Toe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for

African Mifairs, and

Penfield and

were colleagues in Vienn

together. He had the minister.

But we did a great deal c

talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was

forming a division both at home and

abroad and i had a lot

32

of things to negotiate with him fabone heate

BENCE LOT

attentiand he naturally had his vich's on a lot of the thin:.

we wanted to do, and ve spent a great deal of time arguin

these things out, making arrancements

ind so. on and so

fore!:.

To be frant with you, I have far loss recollection at'

intinato policy talks on places like thr Congo with

that

particular group than 1 did after 19-what, the beginning o!

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the Kennedy Adminiatration.

Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration

that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were,

scared Ups.

MI. Twcedy. Nil that happened then, absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Do'you remember discussions with Livingstone

Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminia-

trations?

No. Tweedly.

I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific

discussions with him I really do not rrenll, no.

Later on

"remenber having a couple of

mertings along

with Mr. Rusk.

Ar. Haron.

Did any of those meetings conomen

Lumunhd?

Mr.. Twoudy.

No, Mr. Rushi, I thini: they exclunivaly

concerned Portuguese Africa.

Hir. Baron. Do you rencaber having any mectings alone

with lerter, Secretary llerter, about Lumumba?

sir. Thecdy. I an not sure I have had a menting with tir.

lorder.

ir. baron.

Did you have my meetings with decretar!

opter or Douglas Dillon or

livinastone torchant?

tr. Proorly.

never not Mi. Dillon.

Ar. Baron. About Congolese affairs?

Ar, nwoody. lever not tir. Dillon and i do not recall

arring mot with livingstone kerchant on the Condo. I may

have done so but 1 really don't recall, l had vory littlo

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professional contact with MI. Merchant. I knew him mostly

alightly socially.

MI. BaIon. When you met regularly with Mi. Satterawate

or MI. Penfield did you discugs Lumumba with them?

ME. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the

sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-

tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo

was heading. I did this with, you know, alnost all of the

African situations, Individual African country situations.

We would spend a great deal of time, their pointa of

view, our point of view, cu: perspective, their perspective,

but never as an action matter that I can recall.

Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba

ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?

Mr. Tweedy. Never.

MI. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period

between Congolese independence and the announced death of

Lumumba w1th people at the NSC level or people in the white

House?

MI. Tweedy.

I don't recall so at all. For example, i!

President Eisenhower had an African representative the same

way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he

was.

President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes

me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador

and one that I saw most of foi a considerable period of

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time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the school of

2

Advanced Studies in Princeton.

Mr. Baron.

During the Eisenhower Administration did

4

you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster

with saference to Congolese affairs.

You are shaking your head and we have to put it on

6

the rocord.

MI. Tweady, I am alsmot convinced that the answer 1s

8

no. I am just thinking, I know Gordon Gray quite well. I

9

don't recall evor having policy discussions with him at all,

10

nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.

1.

MI. Baron, You mentioned to me earlier that you had

1: ÷ attended only two National Security Council meetings In your

memory and that those two meeting were both long aftor the

death of Lumumba, is that correct?

1:.

MI. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have been

because this was well into the kennedy Administration.

wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.

Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John

McCone at CIA?

MI. Tweedy.

Yes, that is without question. And

McBundy was at the meetings.

Yes, it must have been

well after the death of lumumba, maybe even the following

year.

Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower

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Administration when eventa in Congo wore heatingup, after

Congolese Independence, what was the goneral atmosphere in

the State Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba,

the general attitude toward Lumumba?

MI. Ireedy. Well, I think you would have to start by

saying what was the general assessment of the situation in

the congo. Lunumba was really sort of the last thing you

came down to.

The worry in WAshington about the situation in the

Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression

In Africa that thretened to go up in amore, up because the

Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because

it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that

those African countries in their early yoars were at least

vulnerable to.

The only trouble with the congo was if it

happened there the side effects would have been infinitely

greater than, of course, if it had happened

anywhere else.

Mr. Baron.

What would

those side effects have been?

Mr. Tweedy.

All one culd do was assess those, but it

would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring

country by which great store was set by the west wag Nigeria

and if the game infection crossed

that border one was afraid

that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there

was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it

really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.

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This was the concein.

2

Mr. Baron. Wero these political side effects only

that were being taken into account or vere thera also

fears for American business interests in the Congo that

5

were part of the side effects?

MI. Tweedy, Insolar as my assesamenta were concerned,

: =:

and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall

8

9

with the State Department, American business was juat not a

great factor.

1C

If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of

1:

course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to

succood resulting in tha grans anvolvanant of both the u.No anl

the U.S. In the congo altair, the lear there was that 11 you

put together the Congo without Katanga It was like construct-

ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.

Mr. Baron.

That is because

Kutanga is the home of

most of the natural resources that are

In the Congo.

Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that

country going.

Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-

:.

siderations in back of that but these vere political

i.:

economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is

whatlas going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-

i.:

far as I recall.

24

Мг. Вагоп.

so the primary concern was for political

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stability in Africa.

MI. Tweody, Yes, political stability in Africa.

In

a quick phrase you put your foot right on that.

Mr. Dawson.

During the summer of 1960 you mentioned

earlier that in the time frame you did not think the

Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with

you but -

Mr. Tweedy.

I don't mean to say this was nothing that

anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern.

Mr. Dawson. But there was significant soviet interest

In infiltrating and taking advantago of the situation in the

Congo?

MI. Tweedy, I think it would be much more accurate

to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to soviet

intentiona with respect to Africa, which I suspect in those

¿days like a great many other things about African culture

round the globe were ill informed at that point, and un-

doubtedly secking their own polcies in Africa just the way this

country was. It was obviously a worry.

МІ. вагоп. .

Was it also our assumption if the Soviets

moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?

MI. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have been

little doubt in our

minds that that would have been the case.

MI. Baron, And is it also true that the general perception

at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba

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posed the threat in the congo beyond the mere threat of

political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets

or his willingness to accept aid from the Sovlets?

Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese mora binding but I

don't think we had any Information indicating there was

any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it

was potentlally there.

Mr. Baron. And that potential -

MI. Tweedy. Thia increased one's nervousneas about the

situation.

Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of che African

Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive

orders?

Mr. Tweedy, Well, the normal chain of command was

through DDD, Dick Rissell and --

MI. Baron. Hould you meet regularly with Richard

Bissell during this period of time?

Mr. Tweedy.

Regularly would be a big word.

Not

necessarily that often.

We might talk on the phone. To

say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It

would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but

Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the

congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook

any major operatlon.

MI. Tweedy.

Hell, depending on what you mean by

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major operation. Major operation per so, if you are not

talking about juat intelligenco operations, call for in-

structions and formalization elther inside the Agency or out-

side.

Мг. Ватол. .

So any major covert action would be

formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the :

DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels

than that.

Mr. Tweody.

I suppose the DCI, 1f Bissell felt that

was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the

DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-

tions i would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from

conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and

funnelled down to me.

I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-

ceived instructions.

MI. Baron. So if you received an instruction from

Richard Hissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that

instruction on the asgumption

it was fully authorized above

the level of DDP?

MI. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the

basis that he was authorized to give me instructions

and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered

to tell me to do.

I couldn't run his affnirg for him to that extent, but

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by and large I recton the Agency worked and that was the way

It was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to

say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to

Allen Dulles firat I would think is nonsense.

MI, Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question

Bissell about the source of authority for some covert: action

he was asking you to undertake?

MI. Tweedy.

I would have never hesitated to do if

I felt that lt was necessary to do so.

I can't recall having done so.

He and I used to have

aisagreements philosophically on operations. We were very

good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him

i when I thought he didn't make any sense but --

MI. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical

difference, or is it describable?

MI. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. I think Dick was

by and large inclined to feel that almost anything

was

possible, you know, in the clandestine service, if they put

their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.

Mr. Dawson.

Thank you.

• Mr. Baron.

Did you ever discuss the question of

assassinating bumumba with Richard Bissell?

MI. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing

came up in the flist instance.

I can't remember how it came

up except undoubtedly we had a conversation,

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MI. Baron. Do you recall when it came up?

Mr. Tweady,

No, I don't. It obviously must have

come up, i assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no

way of putting a date to it.

MI. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or

perhaps I should backtrack firgt and ask whether this was one

7

discussion or a series of discussions?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have diacussed it more than

once.

I chink it came up in the sense that Dick would have

2: |

said we probably better be thinking about whether it might

:: !:

ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which

" case we presumably should be in position to assess whether wr

:: could do it or not successfully.

Mr. Baron.

Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Mit. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him

in any other

sense but a planning exercise, but a planning

exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed

to do anything of this kind. "We were

instructed to agk whether

such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of

:

Station be thinking along those lines as well.

Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move

ahead at least as far as developing the capability to

:..

carry of an assassination if an order should be alven?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for

doing that.

:.:

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Mr. Dawson.

I know that you have indicated you

won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation

with Bissell

or conversations with Blssell, but maybe ve can

naTIOw it down a littlo bit.

Would you assume that it would be after the proclama-

tion of the Congolese Independence on June 30, 1960?

Mr. Tweedy, Oh, yes.

Mr. Dawson. Hould you assume it would be before

Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on

September15, 19607

MI. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. I

didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.

Mr. Baron.

so then it would

be sometime during the

summer or early fall of '60?

MI. Tweedy, What happened to Lunumba after that?

MI. Baron.

He was in protective custody at the United

Nations force from mid-September until late November and

it was in late November that he left to. go traveling

towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops

at that point in very early December and from early December

until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in

prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was

flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death

was announced shortly thereafter.

MI. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it

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was somotine after Septamber 15th. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. When you say "after" -.

MI. Tweedy,

After you put September 15 the day ho

came under. The only

thing is I have no recollection that

it would have happened as early as, say, darly August or

early September.

MI, Baron. It was In August or carly September that

Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?

MI. Tweedy.

Yes.

Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a struggle for power

botween Lumumba and Kasavubu going on.

MI. Dawson.

I guess. the crucial question.

Mr. Tweedy, You

have really got me at this point.

Mr. Dawson. It would be whether of not you would have

considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.

If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think

any more precision in the date would necessarily be productive.

MI. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would

be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have

a plan when he was in nobody's custody.

Mr. Baron. That would have been before --

MI. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense

to me, September, because -

Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.

In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that

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want back

and forth batween headquarters and the Congo after

he was In U.N, custody to see 1f that rofreshes your recollec-

tion about the general attitude with rogard to Lumumba at

that time.

MI. Tweedy. Yes.

MI. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would

only make sense to you that --

MI. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me

but --

Mr. Daron, -- that this initial conalderation of the

feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bigsell

and yourself?

MI. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have

been during the period!

when

he was in effect in power. I

should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.

Mr. Baron.

Did you have any discussion with Bissell

where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina-

tion of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of

possibility to

an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking

stepa to carry out.

Mr. Tweedy.

I cannot recall a conversation with

Bissoll where in effect he said, lat's move from A to B or c

to D or something like this. I do not rocall that. My

recollection of the whole interval when this was under con-

sideration was that

it was a planning interval and at no point

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can I racall that I aven felt it was imninent that somebody

would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was

go-able. or anything really very close to it. It was

always my assumption that at the time anything like this should

occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the

problem at probably a very conaiderable policy level within

the Agency at which somebody would have said something

more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call

or Biasell would ask me to come down to his office and say

go to it.

Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would

merely implement plan so-and-so.

We never got that

fat.

Mr. Baron.

You didn't have any action plane for

assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware

Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever

got anywhere.

Мг. Baron.

What kind of planning was done?

Mr, Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one

asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of

accers onr might cher have

lied to lumumba

sor whatever purpose.

It was this kind of thing, as best i recollect.

MI. Baron. Did you send cables raiging the question of

gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating

him?

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MI. Tweedy, I auspect that was the flost cable that

ever went out.

In other words, the flat cable that ever

want out to Larry Hedgman.

He must have realized, he would

have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were:

running even though it was purely a contihgency.

Мг, ВагОЛ.

I am sorry. I don't think I understood

that.

You say the first cable that went out.

MI. Tweedy.

9

That was the firat way that Hedgman vas

!:

ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in

= li washington, was via our cable. I am aure he wasn't back in

1::.

the States over anything of this kind.

Mí. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?

1÷

MI. Tweedy, I think I remember that much more distinet-

11.

Iy than anyching I remember in the last lew minutes that it

1 4

was a cable which asked him to be thinking of that.

Mr. Baron.

That was pursuant to your conversation

:"With ME. Bissell?

MI. Tweedy. That was.

:.

MI. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell

send that cable.

::'

Mr. Tweedy, It probably would have been a cable I

wouldhave written and probably released by him.

Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?

Mr. Tweedy.

God knows, I don't.

F. :.

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MI. Baron. "OF the effect of the language in the cable?

MI. Tweedy, The effect of the language in the cable

would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.

Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?

MI. Tweedy. It would have been the eventuality that we

might wish to get Ild of Mr. Lumumba personally.

MI. Dawson. Is that language you think might have

been used of that 18 how you think it might have been done?

MI. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the

cable.

MI. Baron.. Did you send a number of auch cables to

the Chief of Station?

MI. Tweedy, I Imagine there weres few over a period

of time. It was not an intensive correspondence as I

remember it.

Mr. Baron,

It wouldn't be thenormal practice to

have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject.

would it?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever

had

one but I have had very sensitive subjects, operationally

sensitive hubjecta that I have dealt with in

extensive

cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this

nature whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. . Were these cables from headquarters to

cho Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially

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restricted channel?

MI. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sant in

various types of restricted channela I am sure you aware.

Mi. Baron.

This channel even more tightly held and

closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that rould

flow to the Chief of Station?

MI. Tweedy. That would be a very fali statement,

5

6

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yes.

14

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MI. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-

structions to destroy it after reading 1t?

Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.

MI. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this

such an instruction would have been given?

MI. Tweedy. It would Ically be up to the Chief of

Station, I think.

It would be up to the Chief of Station

what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he

needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in

the future.

But, he was perfectly capable of keeping a file

which would be accessable only to him and the station and

if he was sure of his own

security within the station I don'

• think this would have been a problem for him, but to answer your

question I don't know what ledgman himself did.

MI. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from

Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?

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Mr. Twoody.. It was a serfous anster. I can't do

better than that.

It was a serlous ansver. It wasn't argu-

mentative, I quass it started to diacuss, not the pros and

cons of policy, at least I don't recall it did, but what it

¿was that ha might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply

to an inatruction from headquarters.

MI. Baron.

Did he mention any specific means that

he had of gaining access to Lumumba?

Mr. Twoody.

I don't recall now. I don't recall. I

think he sald it was certainly not beyond the question that

moans could either be developed or might arise but I certainly

do not socall that he came up with any very specific ideas in

the fliat Instance. On that I am afrald 1 am terribly hedgy.

Мг. Baron.

At the time that you were requesting the

Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access

to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this

access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of

personal access that would be needed?

MI. Tweedy, I am sure that must have been covered

at some point, i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.

MI. Baron. Hould this be access to shoot him or would

this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

Mr. Tweedy, I suppose all those types of things might

have been considered.

Mi. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of -

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finding a way to sneak inaldo the U.N. guard to simply

2

snatch Lumumba from custody, this was cloarly access to assassin-

ate him, 1a that correct?

MI. Tweedy. That would cortainly be my recollection.

5

Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even

7

considered, at least i don't remember 1t.

Мг. Вагол.

In your discussiona with Richard Bissell

9

about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to

you that he had had similar discusedone with Justin o 'popal?

Mr. Tweedy, I was reminded of Justin O'Donnell's

•: i role in all chla, As you may recall, when I talked to you

* :

and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I hod forgotten

1" that gustino Donnell played any sole whatsoever and now

is that it has been brought to my recollection i recall it.

i": I recall it almost in detail.

I remember being told that he had expressed

reservations

or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I

think my response to you was if he säid that I would believe

him but I didn't recall it.

:

;:

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bigsell ever indicate to you

that he had asted Jústin o'Donneil to go to the congo to

assassinate Lumumba?

MI. Tweedy, well, he must have indeed have told me

that he was going to ask.

¿O'nonnellato go to the congo to

examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever

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25

saying, I am going to send O'Donnellito the Congo to knock

off Lumumba, not in those words.

Mr. Baron. When you say examine the thing on the ground

you mean he would send O'Donnell to the Congo to take a

firat-hand look at the means?

MI. Tweedy. Yes, conceivably I suppose this all

might have resulted in a climax there but at loaat my recollec-

tion certainly was never that he told me that I am sending

¿ Donnell, to the congo to knock off Lumumbe in those worde

but that he, I am sure the philosophy was that if anything

was done you would want to keep it as separate from the

station as possible and thus a man from the outaide.

It was Bissell's idea that Quonnell might be the man.

Mr. Baron. The man from outside?

MI. Tweedy. Outside the station.

Mr. Baron.

The CIA station in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Right.

Mr. Baron. That such a man would be necessary to

carry out an asgasgination operation if one were to be mounted?

MI. Tweedy.

That if one was mounted it would

obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would

protect the security of the station or involvement of the

station.

That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.

Mr. Baron. But it is your Iccollection that

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was sent to the Congo to assess tho possibility for

assassinating Lunumba rather than to mount some sort of kid-

napping plan to draw tumumba out from the U.N. guard and put

him in tho handa of Congolese authoritias?

Mr. Tweedy. That is certainly my recollection but i

would not want to put too high a value on it. I

just don't recall kidnapping as a factor da all.

MI. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that

lethal blological agents had been developed in the CIA

laboratories tor possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum-

ba?

Or they were avallable for such usa?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD

probably had the capability or had the agent or whatever lá

was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I

heard that, yes.

Мг. Вагоn..

Hould this have boen under (staney Gottlié»'s

auspices or direction in TSD?

Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would

have been. I don't recall.

Has he? I think he was.

мЕ. Вагоп. .

Did

Richard Bissell ever indicate to you

-Iu=

"r,

directly that/sidney Gottlichlwas involved in developing

poisons that might be used for assassination?

Mr. Iweedy. I don't recall that at all..

MI. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about

the feasibility of an

assassination operation, did poisons

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1

come up as one means that was being considered and which

the Chief of Station should explore?

Mr. Tweedy.

I am sure it must have.

After all,

there are not many ways of doing it.

Shoot a man, poison

him, of course you could, 'I suppose, stab him or something

6

like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency

7

plan which I assume has the beat posalbility of protecting the

Involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it

9

in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right

11:

word, as posaible, I think poison would then stand high on the

1:

• list of possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make &

i: response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex-

ploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible

:: use of polsoning -- purpose of poisoniny him.

MI. Tweedy, I am sure he must have done that. I:.

!"'don't recall specifically, but that effect 1s what he was

!. charged to do in the first instance, examine the possibilicies.

I would be very surprised if lledgman didn't come back

and in affect comment on this but the nature of his comment:

::

I really don't recall.

:.

Mr. Dawson.

When you and Bissell had your conversa-

::

tions, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he

::.

mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest

;:÷

authority to undertake.to

assassinate lumumba?

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MI. Tweedy.

I don't recall that, no. I guess I was

under

2

the impression when he talked to me that --I don't know

whether this to fair or not - I honestly don't know what

my impression was at the time whether this was something that

Biasell had in effect aucked out of his own thumb as a

6

contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and

because it was contingency planning I don't think at thas

stage I was particularly concerned.

But to answer the

question I just don't know.

9

Mr. Dawson. You stated earlier you knew Gordon

Gray very well.

MI. Tweedy.

I didn't say that. I have known Gordon

1!.

Gray for better

since than I did then.. I knew Gordon Gray

very Brightly indeed then, and I am not sure I over had a --

while he was in office -- that I ever had a personal conversa

tion with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the

President's Board.

MI. Dawson.

That answers my question.

Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation

to you one way of the other as to whether he had approval fron

any nuthority higher than DDP for this consideration of

assassinating Lumumba?

MI. Tweedy. No, I do not recall

30.

::

Mr. baron.

Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you

that he was directly in contact with the Chlef of Station in

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Leopoldville or that he had means of dealing directly with

the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through

you?

MI. Tweedy, He alwaya said that any DDP, of course,

that has the capabillty, and right, it was never my impression

that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he

did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay 1t, he

certainly had the right and capability to go into it.

MI. Dawson, Can wo go into how the right was able to be

exercised?

MI. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He

could establish his own channel to Leopolduille with his own

set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division.

He has the right to do that.

Mr. Baron.

It would not be improper for a DDP to send

a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another

country?

MI. Iweedy. I wouldn't comment on the approprlateness.

He obvlously had the authority. My relationahipa with

Bissell were such that I do not belleve it.

I never had the impression that he ever had any inten-

tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.

MI. Dawson.

Who else other than the DDP or DCI

would have such authority?

Mr. Tweedy.

I don't know.

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Mr. Baron, Hould the Preaident?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would probably have to come

to the Agency to find out how to do it. I Imagine the Presi

dent could send apersonal representative, I am damn sure he

would: have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there.

He would make a muck of it if he did.

Mi. Baron.

Did you learn at any point that lethal bio-

logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chlet

of Station in Congo?

Mr. Twaedy. This was mentioned when I talked to you and

MI. Wides and my

answer was that I don't recall it, but that

It was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.

Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent?

MI. Tweedy.

They could have been sent one or two ways,

they would have been sent through the pouch with the whole

thing wrapped in ard addressed in such

manner that it would be

opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out

by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way de could be

done.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger

from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide

the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry

out the assassination of Lumumba, li possible, and also pro-

vide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination.

namely, poisonsand medical equipment for administering them?

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MI. Tready. No, I do not.

MI, Baron.

Let mo represent to you that we have

testimony from the Chief of Station in

the congo at that

point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that

a messenger would arrive in the Congo and would be

someone that he would recognize and this messangar would give

him instructions that he was to carry out.

Did you ever know of such a cable being sent to the

Congo?

ARO

FAUL

seen. U 6

-9003

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Ms. Tweedy.

I should be very surprised if I didn't,

but I certainly have no recollection of it-whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. And the Chief of station further testified

that shortly after receiving such a cable he received a visit

from

stoney Couchich who arrived in

Leopoldville and

made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of

chrider.

Station said that he immedlately recognized forciseblas an

officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this

cable referred to.

Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had metings

with

Poreocentch in his apartment in Leopoldville where

Got lian gave him instructions that he said came from the

headquarterg

to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and

dote lich

also, according to the Chief of Station, gave

him lethal biological substances and medical equipment wich

which to administer them.

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Here you aware of that chain of events?

MI. Tweedy.

That sounds far more definitive than any-

thing I have any recollection of at all.

If I understand what you said was,

Gottileb rould have

left Instructions with the Chief of Station which would have

empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their

converaations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any

further recourse or reference to headquarters?

Mr. Baron. That 15

MI. Twaedy. If that is the case I don't belleve it.

Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the

testimony that

the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious

to carry out an assassination mission. He didn't think it was

practical or wise and he probably would have gone back

to headquarters to congult with them if he thought he

was in a position to move immediately to carry out the asgass-

Ination plan, but it was his opinion that the polloy decision

had been made and that he had authority to move ahead

although he doubted

MI. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go

anywhere near

that far.

MI. Dawson. He checked that authority by immediately

cabling back to headquarters saying, this guy has made himself

available to me as well as he has delivered something and

has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority

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in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got

another cable back through the specially alugged cable saying

yes, what he told you is correct.

Mr. Tweedy, I don't recall that, which surprises

me, bocause once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't

have been privy to those.

MI. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson

outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it

were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, 1! it had

said aimply I have seen your messenger and received instruc-

tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them ous,

would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had

seen such a cable?

Mr. Tweedy.

I can't be at all sure it will refresh

my recollection but if you and ledgman say that such a cable

was sent, I am not going to gaingay it.

MI. Baron. Would that be the manner in which

confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?

MI. Iweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be-

fore or gince but it sounds highly reasonable to me.

This

1s the way, this would be

the way I should have thought any

two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when

each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking

about and, of course, you don't have to use unnecessary words

but beyond the likellhood of this I can't say that in what

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Mr. Dawson.

This leaves us with one or two alter

natives, either the Chief of Station who has appeared and

testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly

reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling

us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were: not

privy to what was going on.

MI. Treedy. Of I Ilterally don't recall it. Thie 1s my

problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things

Mr. Dawson, It is 15 years ago.

Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this. I

had to be reminded of so many things about the things that

I socall the most vividly about all my African experiences

were basically the things I was baBically concerned with all

the time which was putting this division together and the .

rest of it.

when it comes to operational detail I start getting

fuzzy and

you would have thought with something like thinking

about MI. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to

bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this

wasn't the case.

I spent days in a row not even giving lumumba ono

single bloody thought. This is my problem.

MI. Dawson,

Let's try to jog your memory on this.

Do you recall any time during that perlod of any dig-

cussiong of the use of

Do collian whatsoever as a courter?

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Mr, Iready. No.

Mr. Dawson. All right.

Mr. Tweedy. But 1f he went as a courier, I will bet

I knew it, but I don't recall it.

Mr. Baron.

Having heard this story, would it be your

assumption it is more likely to be true than not?

MI. Tweedy. Well, I put it purely this way.

MI. Baron. I am asking you for your expert opinion

here as someone experienced.

Mr. Trecdy.

Expert opinion.

Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible dor

promoting this Chief of Station or at least appoliting him

Chief of Station, I assune?

Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His

appointent was already in the works when I came aboard and

I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which,

1f I remember correctly, wag in Brussels and he

came to lon-

don to discuss an operational matter with me which had

nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good

discussion. It was only, I think, when I yot back to

headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division

that

I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station

in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no

exception whatsoever, but as a number of aggignments may be

made before I came thay had to be they couldn't wait for me

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to get tha word.

ME. Dawson.

Have you ever had any occasion to doubt

his veracity or integrity?

Mr. Tweedy. I have not.

I think when I say yes to your banic question, it would

be that I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his

integrity.

МІ, BaIOn.

we don't question it.

MI. Tweedy. All of thia happoned pratty much the way

you gave it to me.

Mr. Baron. That would be your --

MI. Tweady.

The sspect of it I find very difficult to

believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of

these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very

difficult to -- I do not recall and I find

difficult to believe

and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was,

reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as

hell would

have referred again to headquarters

before he did

1t.

Мт. Вагоп.

Why did you find it difficult to believe

such an instruction would have been given?

Mr. Tweedy.

That way I would have said in such a

matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a.

last

word up to the last minute.

81116-118

Not one of these things that

Gattlebruns off to the

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Congo and by the time he has found ledgman, givon his inatruc-

tlong and all of which could have been four or five or six

days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it

even then set about his leisure to do lt or without further

reference to headquartera that is not the way my organization

has ever run operations.

310:116

Mr. Baron, Was It likely at all thatic Gotches

would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the

congo to doliver them to the Chief of station?

Mr. Tweedy. I should have sald quite impossible.

Mr. Baron.

Without an

instruction from the DDP at

least?

Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible.

Mr. Baron. Would Dr: fattlig have proceeded to the

1:? Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the

DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?

:.

:::

24

25

Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid I don't quite understand.

MI. Baron. If the DCI had given iD

instruction to go to the congo and deliver poisons to the

Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting

with

the DDP?

MI. Tweedy. I suppose so.

But I don't believe 1t.

I don't believe it ever happened.

To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a

personal private instruction from the DCI, and was instructed

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to proceed without rafarence to anybody else he would pre-

sumably go ahead and do so.

Мг. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this

assassination of Lumumba had been discussed, this was not such

a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum-

vented?

Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the

person with whom the division first discussed the matter an-

tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen

Dulles. I am aure when I say I am sure I assumo Biggell dis-

cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter

which was between the DCl's office and the Leopoldville

station insofar as I was awarc, and to this day I don't

believe it ever was.

Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about

earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together,

it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl-

edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that

time that the testimony, the basic testimony we have received

Gabroare

about poisons being delivered to the congo by Pr. Gottilebywit!

instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba.

1f possible, would be true testimony?

MI. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr.

Baron, is to say I see not the klightest reagon and do not

belleve that you would have been lied to on this point.

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But, there in nothing in my experiance with the Agency

2

which would really bear on that point whatsoever.

MI. Baron.

Did you travel to the Congo shortly

before the independence of the Congo was declared?

Mr. Tweedy.

That was my firet visit to the Congo as I

6

recall, it was two weeks before independence. I made a

long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in

7

a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flow from Samburo, I

guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville

9

and that is theflat time I over saw leopoldville.

10

MI. DAWBON.

Do you know whether MI. Hedgman was

1:

there at that time?

Mr. Tweedy.

Mr. Hedgman

I am almost sure was

1:

not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I

:..• can't remember his name.

MI. Baron.

And you left the Congo before

!:

independence was declared.

MI. Twecdy.

Yes, I was only there for, I suppose I

was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to

:::

end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventully

I had to go up to the Ivory coase to settle an unexpected

• problem.

2.1.

Mr. Baron.

for the record would you agree with me

that independence was declared about June 30, 1960?

MI. Tweedy, Yes.

:.

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Mr. Baron.

Did you make another tilp during which

you visited the Congo at some point beforo the death of

Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy.

Yes, well, it 1s this one that I regurgi-

tated finally which must have been

aS

near a8

the early

part of December and which had startod with a visit to Rome

In the latter part of November, followed by a tilp to Nairobi

followed by a brief visit to south Africa, then

I think Congo.

then brlefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.

MI. Baron.

And this meeting in November '60 in

Rome was a moeting of Aftican --

Mr. Tweedy.

South - Northern African Station

chiets.

fake Noghral and these would have been chiefs of stations of

anas. Algeria, RA

1,1,41

And the Congo?

Mr. Baron.

Mr. Tweedy. No.

MI. Baron.

So the Congo Chief of Station would not

normally have been --

Mr. Twcedy. If he came up he must have come up to see

Bisscll.

Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell was

traveling with you on

this -

Mr. Tweedy. No.

MI. Baron. - tour to Rome and Nairobi?

Mr. Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose

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1

of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of

?.

our new Chiefs of Stationa in Africa and rather than make a trip

around Africa, which he hardly id time, he used a device

which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at

5

a central point to which these people could have ready access

6

and, therefore, it was casy for people on the north Mediter-

Ianean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to

6

Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station

9

Chiefs to proceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there.

i..

each one two or three days, i suppose.

Mr. Baron.

Did the Chief of Station in the Congo

:: attend the meeting in Rome?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not.

In other words,

if he saw Bissell he would havn merely come to Rome and have

seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in

fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a

man

who didn't,

belong in the North African meetings and merely

raised

the question whether lledgman was there.

Mr. Baron.

What region in the CIn organization char:

would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?

Mr. Tweedy.

We change around there. We had in

:.:

: 1

those days, we had the North African branch, we had the

east Nrigan branch, we had a,

Southen African branch, which

included

souch AFrico Rhodesia, probably (ortunuche African

maybe the Congo in those days.

Later on the Congo was sort

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of sul Goneris but in that eaily time I suspect it

fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutoly sure.

It might havo fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.

He always had achrenchanett Africa, angelthespecking,

6

7

===

9

10

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Mr. Baron. We have receivod testimony from the Chief

of station in the Congo at that point that he did come to

Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he belives that he also

met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines'

house.

Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mi. Karamessines.

It

would only be because Mr. Karamessinco was host

as Chief of

Station in Rome.

But I am sure he was not discussing any

policy problems with MI. Karamessincs who had absolutely no

jurisdiction over them in those days whatsoever.

MI. Baron, That was his testimony, but it was incidental,

but if, as he has testified, that he met with MI. Bissell and

yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?

Mr. Tweedy, Absolutely not.

Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intenaity of

activity in the congo at this point and the intensity of

concern over that activity?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming

more

and

more of a commitment of both the U.s. Government and

thus the agency.

I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this

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was the main Isason that I am sure I went to the Congo

at that point was the fact that 1t obviously was going to become

a major personnel drain, 1f you like, on the Division

and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the

fleld, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.

MI. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about

this moeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and

yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you

were together?

MI. Tweedy.

I can only assume that some of the things

that we discussed by cable traffic were diacussed.

The other thing I am

sure must have been discussed was

what I would call the general

assessment of the Congolese

situation and what the station might be required to do, thus

the soit of support headquarters was going to have

to give

the Station.

Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination

of Lumumba or the prospect of --

Mx. Tweedy. I would he immensely surprised if it

wasn't discussed but I don't recall in what context it was

discussed.

In fact, I don't believe it wasn't discussed.

It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at leagt

assume it was, at that point.

MI. Baron.

The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con-

tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that

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Lumumba was actually dead?

MI. Tweedy, I don't recall. You probably are much more

knowledgcable on that than 1 am. I don't recall when in

effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a

factor. I just don't remember.

Mr. Baron.

But, just now you were assuming that that

would have the case?

MI. Tweedy. If 1t was still on, it was atill on

the agonda, Inevitably we must have discused 1t. If 1t was

off the agenda then no, but I honestly don'e remember.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable tinffic

between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a

series of cables

that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed

into U.N. custody, then continues after he wag placed in U.N.

custody.

In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the

attitude at the Agency toward bumumba after he was in U.N.

custody --

Mr. Ticedy, Okay.

Mr. Baron, -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy

Exhibit 1 1s dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to che

Director.

(The document referred

to was

marked Treedy Exhibit No. 1 for

identification.)

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Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cablos were addressed.

I see he sent ono spocifically to dcI.

Mx. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the racord.)

Mr. Baron. Onthe record.

Let's turn back now.

I believo while we were off the record and axamining this

cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that

this cable was not sent from

Leopoldville to the Director but

10

Iather it was sent from headquarters to Icopoldville, 1s

::: that correct?

Mr. Tweedy.

Correct.

Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation

i: "Allen H. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was

:: a personal message signed off by the DCl himself to the Chief

is of station.

Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have

drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.

Mr. Baron.

And let me direct your attention to

the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is

the clear-cut conclusion that if lll continues to hold high

office the inevitable result will at best he chaos and at

?:

worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the congo with

disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for

the interests of the Free World generally.

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Consequently we conclude that his removal muat be an

urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditi.

this should be a high priority of our covert action.

Now, do you belleve that LLl refera to Lumumba?

MI. Tweedy. I do.

MI. Baron. And why would three L's have been used in

the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

MI. Baron, Would that be a standard way of making sure

that at least one of the l's was clear in transmissioni

Mr. Tweedy, I honestly don'e know.

Now, that isn't the normal way to do it at all. l

honestly don't know how. His namo was Patrice.

MI. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion tha:

LLL does refer to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.

Me. Baron. Does this sccord with your general sense

of the policy toward lumumba at that time at the Agency and ::

State Department?

Mr. Tweedy. It accords much more with my recollect!.

of our attitude toward the potonlially disastrous situati:.

the congo than it does on he personally, but he obvious!:

was always in the background.

Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his

removal must be an urgent and prime objectiva and that under

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existing conditions this should be a high priority of out

covert action, close quotes, - in that consistent with the

polley towards Lumumba as you recall it?

In other words, that Lumumba'a removal was a primo objec-

tiva of the covert actiona of the Agency.

MI. Troody, He would have givan our aya teeth to have

Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would

agree with that.

September 16, 1960.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated

i :

(The document referrod to was

marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2

for Identification. )

2.:

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MI. Baron.

This containa referancos to the faet that

"the station wa flooded with reports te outcony Mobutu coup".

And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N.

troops had interferred with Congolose troopa and prevented

them from arresting Lumumba.

Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters

from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective

custody from the United Nationa and two days after the lobutu

coup where Mobutu took over the government.

In the cable as it has been sandelzad by the Agency

it now reads:

"Station advised two moderate Congolose politician

try work with key Congolese contact in elfort eliminate

Lumumba, Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity

to organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him

from scene soonest*.

WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point,

as far as you understood it, that the fact that bumumba

was in U.N, protective custody did not eliminate him as a

threat in the Congo?

MI. Tweedy, I don't really recall but I think the

chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody

might very well result in his early release or his ability sui:

to control matters. I should think that is very probable.

Ms. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be

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this fear of counterattack organired by bumumba while he was

protected by the U.N. =

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is probably true.

MI. Baron. As Exhiblt 3 let's turn to a cablo dated

Septeraber 20, 1960, which 18 sent - off the record.

(The document referred to was

marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for

identification.)

(Discussion off the racord.)

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MI. Baron. Back on the record.

Although the top of this cable does not indicate where

the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the

cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking

at the designations that this cable must have been sent from

Leopoldville to headguarters, in that correct, Mr. Treedy?

Mr. Treedy. That ie correct.

Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to paragraph

7 which aaya:

"Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba

reconcilation. Kanavubu denies Bolikango failed deny

possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly

as vice Premier. Believe some aubstance to rumor but will

do best prevent 1f Lumumba allowed even minor role he most ap:

come out on top".

Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station

in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned

that lumumba should not be allowed even a minor role in the

government of the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy, That is what it says.

Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated

January 19, 1961.

(The document referred to was

marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4

for identification.

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Mi. Baron. Thie was sent from the Congo to --

Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville info

headquartera, information headquarters.

Mr. Baron. So that headquarter. would have received

a copy of this cable

sent by the base chiat in Elliabethville

to the Station Chief in Leopoldville?

Mr. Tweedy. Right.

Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of thia cable says:

"Thanks for ratrice. If we had known he was coming

wo would have baked a anake".

Do you have an independent recollection of this

cable?

MI. Iwcedy, Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason

of that phrase, which is another way of saying, a lighthearted

way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived

in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.

MI. Baron, • So this cable does not indicate that there

was any connection between the CIA and. Lumumba'a eventual death.

the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?

Mr. Tweedy, Will you say that again? I am not quite

sure I understood that.

MI. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that

the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba's

death at the point when it occurred?

In other words, that they were connected to the people

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who caused his death?

Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the

question.

This moans that Lumumba arrived under the Congo-

lese auspices in Rutanga and that Elizabothville, the bage di

Elizabethville didn't know he was coning, our base, didn't

know very much, didn't presumably know very much about what

occurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.

Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.

On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Mutanga?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And later United Nationa Investigationg co..

cluded that. 1t was the 17ch or perhapa the 18ch chat Lumumbo

was actually killed in Kucanga.

I was asking you before whether this cable would indi

cate that the United States would have been involved in

bringing about the death of Lumumba?

Mx. tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in-

dicates that this part of the Agency, 1.0., Elizabethuille

had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate

except these few phrases that he put down here and would imp:

although it certainly doesn't say yo, that he was adding a

little information to what was perhaps an anormously ignoran:

Leopoldville which, of course,

is the fact of the matter.

We didn't know how all this was occurring and wore not able

to follow the event except after the event.

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Mr. Baron.

Was the CIA connected in any way to the

events that immodiately led to Lumumba's death?

Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly

Lumumba from hia previous place of imprisonment in tysville

out to lutanga where the authorities vere known to be so

hostile to him that he would probably neat his death there?

Mr. Tweedy, The fate of Lumumba in the end vas purely

an African event.

Mr. Baron, At what point did you laarn of Lumumba's

death?

Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the

world did. No one had a beat on this.

MI. Baron. You had so advanced warning that Mobutu in-

tended to fly Lumunba to Katanga?

MI. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am aure the cable

traffic would reflect it if I had.

MI. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was

sent from Europe, where he had been recruited by nola 2S

to the Congo in the fall of 19607

MI. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of chis when I talked

to you and Mi. lides a couple or so montha ago.

MI. Baron.

This would be an asset who went by the

cryptonym of QJHIN.

MI. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym

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I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number

of cryptonyme when reminded of them.

MI. Baron. Aside fron the cryptonym, do you recall US

there was an asset who had been recrulted bysshold alliter in

Europe and who was sent to the congo to parform some mission

in November and December of 19607

Mr. Tweody, I was generally reminded of it by that

conversation with you and Mr. Hides but I will confess that

my recollection doesn't go any further than that.

But unlike some of the things I have been reminded

of, I think recalled that asset of smola füsal had been

involved. That is just as about as deop as my recollection

goes.

MI. Baron, Let me see if I can rafresh your recollection.

first, by relating to you the testimony of surento Domel

who said that he did make use of QWIN in the Congo as

a kind of "alter ego" of hia, a general operative of his.

Does that remind you at all of the nature of the

mission that OJWIN had in the Congo?

• Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.

MI. Baron.

Have you heard the phrase executive ac-

tion?

Mr. Tweedy, In the newspapers.

MI. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you

never heard the phrase oxecutivo action diacuased as part of

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a CIA program or plan.

ME. Tweedy. No, Only in bureaucratic Washington

terma of executive action.

Мг. Вагол.

Meaning adminiatrative action?

Ms. Twoody. Yes.

Ms. Baron. Here you aware of any project at CIA to

develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of

a foreign leader, l1 required?

Me. Tweedy, Will you repeat that?

Mr. Baron.

Here you aware that the CIA had a project

which operated under the cryptonym ERRIFLE to develop the nea::

pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin-

ations if required?

Mr. Tweedy, You mean just generically?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

MI. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had

with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating

Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the

Agency about assassination capabilities?

Mr. Tweedy.

Never.

MI. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connacted with

the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of

assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in

Congo?

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Mr. Twuedy. The only other person who vas avare of it

van my deputy.

No. Baron. That would be?

Mr, Tweedy, Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that

велше.

MI. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that

plan or consideration?

Mr. Tweedy. No, just he was in matters of this kind he

would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that 18

all.

MI. Baron. Do you know Willlam Harvey?

Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't

seen him in a long while.

Mr. Baron. And were you awace that William Harvey

was in contact with mold slicento develop the standby

capability for carrying out assassinations?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know anything about it whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William

Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.

Мг. Вагол.

Let me show you a document now that we will

Mark Fxhibit 5.

(The document referred to was

marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for

identification.)

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ME. Baron,

This 1s a dispatch from the Chief of

KUTUBE/D, Which I believe 18 -

MI, Treedy. That is Staff D.

Мг. Ваго. In: the Foreign Intelligence Divialon, is

that correct?

Mr. Treedy. Yes.

12-10

Mr. Baron. Meitten to the Chief of station in skat

and Chief of Station in Luxenburg through Chief AF and

Chief ME.

Division?

Would Chiet AF have been yourself, Chief of the African

Mr. Tweody. What is the date?

Мг. ВЛОП.

The date 1s November 2, 1960.

Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.

Mr. Baron.

And William Harvey would hve been Chief o

. KU2D?

MI. Iweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was

Chief of Staff D, In which case he could have, that 19

what he would have been then..

Mr. Baron.

Mx. Tweedy, while we have been off the

record you have had a chance to revlew this document and

tell me some things about it

I would like to repeat on the

record.

Flest of all, on this copy of the document chere is

typed the words Danuel M. Pressland, under the space for

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officer's aignature, and you salê to ma a moment ago that

you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonymo

of Hillian Harvey, is that right?

MI. Tweedy.

Yes.

MI. Baron. And you were just pointing to .=

MI. Tweedy, Chief of ID.

You told me he was Chief

of ID at the time. He cartainly was Chief of ID. You told

no he was Chial of ID than, I put those two together

and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was

Harvey, I can't swear to it, but I am virtually sure.

Mr. Baron.

And do you have any independent recollec-

tion of the subject matter that la discussed in this document?

MI. Treedy.

None at all. It doesn't ring a bell

at all.

Mr. Baron. Even after revlewing the document

do you have any recollection of what OWIN's mission in the

Congo would be, would have been?

Mr. Tweedy.

NO.

Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo -

MI. Tweedy, You told me he was going out there to

work with O'Donnell and whon o'Donnell went out there I

guess he was going to look into a number of things for

headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.

When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't

recollect by any emeans what the full auspices of O'Donnell's

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vialt to the Congo were and you unid that MI. AHIN

was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going

to wosk for him and act as his general assistant.

Mr. Baron. That was the way Mr. ÖlDonnell described

1t, although in this lengthy mano which apparently precedes

the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there de no mention ofcMr.

CorDonnell.

MI. Tweody.

This I don't think

necessarily has anything

to do with(O'DonnElTy » minaton whatsoever. Thia, I think, in

generic mission, seems to indicate that he is going to

muck around with Coreicans. I don't recall Corsicans, I

know

dubonnell in the Congo at all.

Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been

written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the

Chief of the African Division?

Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote

the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather

from thia - you see there is also a reference here. I don't

know what the reference 1a about. But I gather that Dakar is

brought into this activity because they wanted to act in a

support capacity to this

headquarters activity.

Me. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission

in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con-

cerned

with?

MI. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.

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Mr. Baron. Mould it have been proper for the Chief of

Staff D to arrango an operation in the Congo directly without

going through

the African Division although keeeping the

African Chief informed?

MI. Tweedy.

Well, the two are mutually exclusive.

You can't have one without the othar. To anner your first

question, it would be guite improper and wouldn't have occurred

that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station

without the African Division being informed. This, however,

makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African

Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terma of

headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been

sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate

this with the Division and if the Division had perceived

any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it .

before the dispatch went out.

Also I noticed Dakar is also Invited to find problems

with this, st it did, and say so..:..

Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would

Staff D have been carrying out in Miriça at this time?

Mr. Tweedy. Hell, you know what the role of

Staff D was.

Мг. Вагоп.

This would be obtaining codes by surrepti-

tious entry.

Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals

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intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.

MI. Baron. Hould it be surprising to you that QJHIN might.

have been used in some manner in connection with an assassina-

tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised

by Nilliam Harvey without your knowledge?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and

would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn't occur.

Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a

moment ago that you thought thin might indicate that OWIN

was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activitios.

MI. Tweedy.

Well, you mentloned IRRIFLE, which frankly

I hadn't heard before.

This sounda as if he was going to

have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those

two together but I know nothing about it at all.

Mr. Baron, The dispatch says, "In view of the extrene

sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform

his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do."

Do you have any knowledge of what it was preciaely that

OJHIN was asked to do?

MI. Tweedy. I do not.

MI. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:

"The operation we have in mind is too sensitive

to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets

must be conducted with truly" . which is underscored --

"minimum risk".

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What would these assets have been used for, what was

the search for assets all about?

MI. Tweedy. I junt do not know.

MI. Baron. Let'a turn now to a document ..that we will

mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which l9 a meno

for the FN Divialon from Willlam R. Harvey, Chief of FI

Division D.

In thie memo I will direct your attention to the

sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told

to TA/A all OUWIN expenses to headquarters since QWIN was

' being used for TI/D purposes."

Do you know what FID purposes OJHIN was being used

":

:! for?

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MI. Tweedy. I don't know.

MI. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:

"OJHIN was sent on this trip for a specifically senai-

tive operational purpose which has been completed".

were you informed by Willian Harvey that QJWIN's

mission was completed?

MI. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall

any aspect of the mission or its completion.

Mr. Baron.

Okay.

Did you know of an assot of the Chief of Station in the

Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after re-

ceiving plastic surgery

so that he wouldn't be recognized by

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hia follow Europeans who might be traveling through the

Congo7

63

MI. Tweedy, I do recollect that and you brought 1t

to my attention, when you

and Mr. Widos and I discussed this

s: a couple of monthe ago. I do remember the cryptonym and

6

7

9

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remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as

a sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought

1f we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be helpful

and he was recruited on that rather goneral basis, and when you

discuased with me a later alarming axchange of cables which

indicated that he landed running and made some rather irrespon-

sible remarks and we commented on them to the station.

My best recollection is that In the long haul he stayed

on in the Congo and I think became, I belleve he became a

somewhat useful intelligence source, but lledgman would

have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember

quite well his dispatch. He had been

seen.by two or three

members of my Division, Including my deputy. I don't

recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo.

If I did I just don't remember. But I remember he was assesser.

as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on

a general purpose mission.

MI. Baron. So, he would be viewed

as one of the major

aggets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?

Mr. Tweedy, How major I don't know.

He was

an

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asset. Only time would have told hor major it rould have

been. Ho was thought qualified to perform one of a variety

of things in the Congo by Hedgman.

Mr. Baron. Would one of those things for which he was

qualified have been an assassination mission against Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. An I told you previoualy, told you and Mr.

Wides previoualy, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was

basically dispatched, asseased and dealt with by the balance

of the Division, not by me personally, Glenn Fielde person-

ally, and he was in elfect a station au set mounted by the

Division.

The Division knew nothing about the balance of this

thing.

MI, Baron. You are saying that Division porsonnel out-

side of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known --

Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.

MI. Baron. - would not have known that the assassina-

tion of Lumumba was being considered? ...

. .

MI. Tweedy, Considered at all, that is correct.

Mr. Baron. And -=

Mr. Tweedy. If they did learn of it I never knew

that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it

through me or Fields.

Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and

training of this asset to other people in the Division than

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yourself and Fielda would indicate to you that he wasn'e

being considered at that point for an assassination mission?

Mr. Iweedy, I will put it differently, As far as

I know he was never considered for an assaasination mission

at all.

He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds

of daring in the PM "lold and began to talk rather lusty when

he arrived, but I think he was soon put straighe.

Mr. Baron. PM 18 paramilitary oporations?

MI. Tweedy.

Yes.

МІ. Вагол.

Let me show you a document we will mark

Exhibit 7, dated Decembor 17, 1960, which Is a cable to

the headquarters, marked to Director froreopoldville dealina

with WIROGUE on an approach. he made to agent OJWIN.

(The document referred to was

marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7

for identification.)

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Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that.

This la the one we dis-

cussed two months ago and this happens all the time.

MI. Baron.

We are referring specifically to WIN's

report that "HIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to par-

ticipate in intel net and be member".--I am sorry - "member

€ ¡ 'execution squad'".

Mr. Tweedy, Yes; I remember all of this as a result

of your having previoualy brought it to my attention and I

recall 1t, It was a typical example of an agont or asset

: full of plas and vinegar exceeding his brinf and he was

certainly put back on the track very early on.

But in this business do not confusr execution aquad

with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumbo or any-

thing else. It had nothing to do with that.

MI. Baron.

You are saying even

though you would

assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to

the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination

coming to the Congo was true, the approach that NIROGUE made

to QJWIN was probably not a part of that mission.

Mr. Tweedy.

it was quite specifically not a part of

that mission. There was a chapter of accidents. You have

;.:

sech it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be-

fore, two people who are periphically involved

in the same

:

thing

and run into each.'er and one smells something on the

other.

1::

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MI. Baron.

Again, why are you no sure that this would

not have been connected in any way to the assassination

misalon?

Mr. Tweedy.

I thought I made that clear because

this man want out up to a point through what I would call

¿ . the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving

training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing

to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been

handled that way.

Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr.

ledgman, after he got to the congo, that he was to underrate

recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination

mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. It is purcly a speculative question.

He

could have been but Hedgman would also have been required

and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him.

That was

not the purpoge for his being

sent.

The purpose for

which he was sent out was unspecific at

the time, generally

in the PM field.

Mr. Baron. Did this icport cocate a flay at headquarters

at the time when the

cable

was

sent?

MI. Tweedy. No, not at all.

:.

MI. Baron.

It would have heen considered a tairly

usual

Mr. Tweedy, It is not.

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Мг. Вагол.

-- example of free wheeling by an operativa?

Mr. Tweedy. It is the sort of thing that can happen.

What you want to do 18 put a stop to it.

But no great problem.

The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.

Mr: Baron.

Have you aver discussed eventa in the Congo

with Sidney Gottlleb?

::.

Mr. Tweedy: -

Have I ever discussed events in the

Congo with Sidney Gottlies?

I can only assume I must have seen

Starduring this

period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussións.

In fact, if there had been any discussions with sidney forg

• Affabion the Congo it would have been at that time.

Mr. Baron.

Why would that be so?

Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney

GottFief would have had

no interest in the Congo.

МІ. Вагол.

So you'mean if there had been any dis-

cussions between yourself and Sid

nay Cole b

it probably

would have --

MI. Tweedy.

It would have surrounded these events.

Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological sub-

stances

in his laboratory?

MI. Tweedy, Yes, air. Not necessarily that, because

I think that would have been Cüdney cattleb" business as to

what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest pre-

sumably would have been was there anything

in his inventory

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that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.

Mt. Baron.

You might have had at least an exploratory

conversation with him on that subject?

MI. Iweody. I would bo surprisad 1í. I didn't.

Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then i

tollored it up, something like that. I would suapect thet

probably the firat conversation would undoubtely have been

hold botween Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottileb but this lo mercly

what I would suspect was the way it occurred.

I don't say that that la che way it occurred.

But

other than that no conversation with stancy colécE on ene con-

go at all.

Mr. Baron.

I am at the end of my questions on specific

tacts concerning the congo during this period of time leadina

up to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow

subject of our inquiry right now, and firat of all I want

to say that I appreciate tremendously and know that the

Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony

here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one

narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and un-

pleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.

I wonder if you have any facts that you would like to .ui!

to the record that you think are necessary to put our dis

cussion today into context?

MI. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about

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my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo --

let's leave the balance of Afilca out -- and U.N. and U.S.

involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen

an element of the Agency ao totally Involved in a matter which

clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking

"about Lumumba, I am talking about the congo.

Mr. Baron.

There was an extreme sense of urgency at

that time?

Mr. Tweedy.

Not only an extrone sense of urgency. +

the U.S. was supporting the U.l., the Agency was supporting

the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the

Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately

with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostl:

State, the White House.

I must say the Executive Department

was very much working as a team during these days. AGain for-

get Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And

I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off in-

to left field or that I didn't know

the way

the white House wis

thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking

ahout thinas, and the National Security was thinking about

things, and i have no reason to beliuve they ever felt that tre:

didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. It was an exti

ordinarily close thim.

I remember Mennen Willians tryiny in form a

Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I was

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given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one,

which would he a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather

typical of the way the government worked on this thing and i

personally felt excellent advised that the U.s, was absolutely

right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been

& total disaster 1f Kutanga had been allowed to succeed,

and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that 1e

Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty

well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it

• chance to move the way it has.

There are going to be ups and downs with the chings

but that is the way it is. I feel very stronaly about it.

Does that somewhat answer your queation.

does that help?

Mr. Baron. I simply wanted to give you a chance.

Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very atrongly and no other assign-

ment that. I have ever had was this kind of government team

and cooperation ever really required because we weren't

engaged of I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.

MI. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you ir..

talking about one that was

primarily put together to carry

out the paramilitary activicies in the Congo in the

latter part of the 60's, '02, '63.

Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what-

ever activity the Unitel States Government felt it needed

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to be engagod in in the Congo, This Included such things as

purely policy questions of what the Ambaseddor to the U.N.

might say to the Secretary General of tho U.N.or what che

President might want to say conceivably I suppose to the

Chief of the Belgium state on such matters. Everything

====

certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be

Involved In. It was the whole policy ball of wax with res-

pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which

• the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.

MI. Baron. Did this high dogroc of organization and

i intenalty of concern begin sometime after the death of rumunlu

or had it gotten rolling?

Mr. Tweedy. I think

Mr. Baron.

After the Congolese independence?

Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly

!'.

• seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating

" Congo that started in the earliest days of independence

and continued and, of course, when

the Tachombe-kutanga

thing became a fact of life, which

is basically why the U.f.

was

there, then, of course, that was it.

In other words, I would say chat u.s. involvement, l.s.

: :

concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could rea!

them in the

press just continued and continued, hut one thin:

perfoctly clear, was that the lies, was quite determined

to see thin thing through. Nothing had been clearer than

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the way President Kennedy presided over those two meotinga.

He was annoyed by the Congo and Irritated by it and he was

worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but

he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he

was continually goosing his staff to do just that, but

in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by

ourselves. It couldn't have been clearar.

MI. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the

Committee in interested in your wisdom on policy-making and

analyala in the intelligence community venerally and there may

be other members of the committee staff that would like to call

upon you to testify on other subincts because of your long

experience in Agency activities.

But I want to thank you now for your complete coopera-

tion and the tremendous

amount of information that you have

provided

on this one subject that has been very helpful?

MI. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can agsure you an!'-

thing I can do to help the committee

in

other

areas I

will be glad to do it and if I don't think I can help be-

cause I don't think I know enough about the subject I will jus:

say so, murioo: am not afraid to jut :, tho bits in.

Mi. Baron.

As far as your two bits goes, we would

be interested

in your two bits worth an policy recommendatio::

in general, institutional, critique or suggestiong for change

or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make.

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and we will take that up at some point in the future. But

you have obvioualy had a good deal of experiance at the policy:

level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that.

That 18 all, thank you.

Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.

(Whereupon, at j:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)

6

MAND A PALE

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