CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CIA AND FBI
Originator: CIA
Document date: 08/09/1993
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1704-10331-10349

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JUN-26-1997 08:20

JFK TASK FORCE

202 324 3409

P.03/08

Mr. David G. Marwell

details the facts relating to records already processed under the Freedom of Information and

Privacy Acts (FOIPA) and the commitment of the FBI to provide the records to the public.

FBI CORE FILES AND ASSASSINATION RELATED FILES

Enclosure C contains the list of subjects and a summary of the files collected and

identified in 1992 as the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Assassination Core Files and Related Files as

prepared for Director Sessions statement The summary was presented to Congress as an

explanation of the pages processed under the FOIPA and available to the public in the FBIHQ's

FOIPA Reading Room. Research about how the universe of files known as "Core and Related,"

were grouped and titled did not produce a precise definition. A review of tickler notes related to

the FOIPA requests suggests that the group of files identified as "Core" was collected to respond

to FOIPA requests received in 1976 for files on the assassination. The group of files known as

"Related" seemed to have been established due to additional FOIPA requests and appeals for files

associated with the assassination. The John F. Kennedy Task Force (JFKTF) could not find any

documentation when the term of "Core and Related" was initiated.

FBI RECORDS SYSTEM

The FBI currently maintains seventeen record systems. The Privacy Act requires

that every type of record system used by a government agency be disclosed to the public. The

following is the list of records explained in the Federal Register (Enclosure D).

001. The National Crime Information Center (NCIC).

002. Central Records System (CRS).

003. The Bureau Mailing Lists.

004. Routine Correspondence Handled by Preprinted Form.

OOS. Routine Correspondence Prepared Without File

Yellow.

006. Electronic Surveillance Indices (ELSUR).

007. The FBI Automated Payroll System.

008. The Bureau Personnel Management System (BPMS).

009. The Fingerprint Identification Records System (FIRS).

010. Employee Travel Vouchers and Individual Earing Records.

011. Employee Health Records.

012. Time Utilization Record-Keeping System (TURK).

013.

Security Access Control System (SACS).

014.

FBI Alcoholism Program.

015.

National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC).

016.

FBI Counterdrug Information Indices System (CIIS).

017. National DNA Index System (NDIS).

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Mr. David G. Marwell

Ten of the above record systems do not concern the investigative ares. The five

record systems of an investigative nature, but not relevant to the assassination, are 001(NCIC),

009 (FIRS), 015 (NCAVC), 016 (CIS), and 017 (NDIS). Information from these records.

systems is retrievable through index searches of each respective system. The JFKTF did not

search the indices of these systems, since they were not applicable at the time of the assassination

or the related investigations. In addition, record systems 003 through OOS, 007, 008, and 010

through 014 were not relevant to the Act since they are internal FBI systems such as the payroll,

the handling of Bureau mail, health records, and other noninvestigative administrative matters

involving Bureau employees. The two systems of records relevant to the Act and searched by the

FBI were 002 Central Records' System (CRS) and 006 Electronic Surveillance Indices (ELSUR).

The following information will explain the FBI's system of recording, filing, and

retrieving documents at the FB.. The FBI's primary records repository is its CRy, which pras

automated beginning in 1978. The old manual card index of the CRS was maintained, since the

automation did not encompass all of the old records. The FBI maintains the CRS for its

investigative, personnel, applicant, administrative, and general files. Although the FBI has other

record systems as explained above, the CRS is the primary and most important system for

retrieving assassination related records. It consists of a numerical sequence index of subject

matter files and an alphabetical index to these files called the general index.

The FBI's filing system follows a numbering method used to show (1) tho

classication or type of investigativo violation or administrative area involved, (2) the individual

case file within the category, and (3) the serialization of individual documents commonly called.

pieces of mail, in the file. Once a violation defines the classification, then the case portion of the

file number is assigned by subject For instance, the number 91-200-20 on a piece of mail says it

is the 20th piece of mail in the 200th case file assigned to the bank robbery 91 classification.

This example would not be correct for the newest segment of files in the automated indices, the

Universal Case File (UCF) which was established in November 1991. However, the FEI's JEK

collection of ales aid documents known at this poiat do noi fall within the UCF system.

Each classification maintains a zero (0) and a double zero (00) file. The 0 and 00

files are "general files" and precede the first case file in each classification. The 0 file is used for

complaints and miscellaneous nonspecific data relating to the classification that does not warrant

establishing a separate case file. The 00 file is used for collecting, in one place, policies and

procedures that refer to the particular classification or violation category. The FBI files each

document concerning policy and procedure serially in the 00 file of the appropriate classification.

Therefore, every time a change in policy, procedure, instruction, or guideline occurs; it is

documented in this category, with tie information jeing placed in the 00 fis.

The FBI's indexing of the CRS general indices falls into two separate categories,

"Main" and "Cross" references. A Main index reference carries the name of an individual,

organization; activity, or the like which is the primary subject of the file maintained in the

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202 324 SAbY 1.15/108

Mr. David G. Marwell

system. All the documents created for a subject involving a particular violation will be filed in

that particular subject's main file. A Cross index reference contains only a mention or reference

to a particular individual, organization, activity, or the like found in the body of a document in a

file on another main subject. The case agent of records specialist indexes the cross reference, so

the information can be found later when it may be significant.

The FBI also maintains the ELSUR Index that contains the names of persons

whose voices have been monitored through an FBI microphone installation or a telephone

surveillance. This index consists of three categories of information: Principals (Targets) of an

electronic surveillance; Proprietary Interests; and Overhears. The FBI initiated the EL SUR index

at the recommendation of the Department of Justice. The index covers the electronic surveillance

sought by or conducted by the FBI since January 1, 1960. This index was automated in October

1991. Unlike the CRS, the FBI automated the entire indices, so only one search is necessary:

For the FBI to ensure that all the documents mandated by the Act were found, the

JFKTF requested those specifically trained in the record systems to conduct searches of both the

automated and manual CRS indices and the automated ELSUR index. The search included all

the core and related subjects as defined in Enclosure C. The searches were conducted at FBIHQ

and in the Field and Legat Offices. The FBI record specialists assigned to this task employed the

normal procedures for searching all the relevant indices to respond to the Act. Their appropriate

supervisors approved the work.

The House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA) was a Congressional

Committee established to review possible theories of the assassinations concerning President

John F. Kennedy and the Reverend Martin Luther King. The JFKTF identified the universe of

files known as the "HSCA Files" by reviewing the HSCA request letters, the FBI response letters,

administrative folders and copies of the files shown to the HSCA staff. The copies of the HSCA

files and folders were segregated at the end of the Committee's investigation due to an agreement

with the Committee. The JFKTF identified the HSCA Field Office ELSUR documents

concerning the requested subjects by using the same records previously mentioned.

Concerning the Board's requests involving "JUNE MAIL," "Do Not File"

memoranda, "informant files," "personnel files" and "COINTELPRO activities," the information

in those categories, if maintained as records, are indexed and filed in the CRS. Therefore, the

universe of assassination records searched for and collected would include any documents with

the above notations. At FBIHQ, sensitive records requiring restricted access are maintained in

the Special File Room (SFR) which is a repository for sensitive records. In the Field Offices the

sensitive documents are also maintained in special areas, such as the SAC's Safe. All

assassination related records that the FBI maintains in the secure areas are also retrievable

through the systems searched. The FBI used these systems to search all areas for indexed and

retrievable records.

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JUN-26-1997

08:22

JFK TASK FORCE

202 324 3409 P. 06/08

Mr. David G. Marwell

FBI RECORDS STORAGE FACILITIES

For storage of records outside FBI space, the FBI Headquarters uses two off-site

facilities. One location is Pickett Street in Alexandria, Virginia This facility contains most of

the FBI's closed files that were previously housed at FBIHQ at 10th and Pennsylvania Avenue,

Washington, D.C. The other off-site facility is in Boyers, Pennsylvania. This location houses…..

FBI Legat information. The Legat information at Boyers, is also on "Microfilm" at FBIHQ. The

only additional records maintained at the Boyer's location consist of National Lawyers Guild files

that are "Court Sealed" records. The Boyers, Pennsylvania records' storage area is rented by the

FBI from the National Underground Storage Company.

In addition, the field offices have three official off cite storage facilities. These

facilities are located at Butte, Montana; Pocatello, Idaho; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. All three

locations have archival disposition offices to decide the handling of closed files, but all decisions

are forwarded to FBIHQ's archival office for final approval. All FBI Field Offices and FBI

Legats send information requiring "record-keeping" to FBIHQ.

FBI RELEASES TO

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA)

Enclosure E depicts all releases made to NARA from the first release on

December 13, 1993, to the 16* release on December 20, 1996. A special note is made that the

total number of pages since 1992 has expanded from 236,000 pages to more than 666,000 pages

made available to the public. This includes the re-processing of all core and related files

according to the Act. The FBI has developed a plan with the Board's staff to streamline this

process. The change will cause an initial delay for the next release, but eventually the releases

will occur more often and with fewer postponements.

FBI RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS

Throughout the process of responding to the Board's specitic numbered requests

the JFKTF staff is in frequent contact with employees of the Board. The Board has also

requested information from our records concerning other areas that may have some relation to the

assassination. The memoranda from the Board to the FBI indicate that the FBI has addressed

both written and oral requests from the Board. Where there are no specific written responses

from the FBI to the Board, the FBI either handled these responses orally with members of the

staff of is in the process of responding. The JFKTF prepared an inventory of the requests and

status of responses and shared this information with the Board. However, the responses to the

numbered letter requests will be documented later.

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•.

- SECRET

fil

(amplete

From the Desk of Michele I. Platte

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

§Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO

¿ Lee E.

• Carle-y @ DO

(Michele 1. Platte

12/10/96 11:42:33

Trace Request: Mikhail Ivanovich Samarin

CL BY: 2151521}

CL REASON: 1.5(a)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: HUM 1-82

The Directorate of Operations surfaced no additional information to that already known to the: FBI.

Mikhail Ivanovich Samarin died (approximately) 06 June 1966.

Any questions concerning this request please call me on 43840. Thanks, Michele.

CC:

(Andrew J. Trusko'@ DO

Per phane all to FBI (DB.)

11 Dee 96 -

→N. OBjECTIoN

ReLeaSe

Bett

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

Andrew J. Trusko]@ DO

Fredrick C. Wickham

12/03/96 17:29:27

name trace

CL BY: 524343

CL REASON: 1.5(c)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: COV 1-82

I need a trace for the JFK folks of Mikhail Ivanovich Samarin. He was a Soviet defector borm in

Moscow Jan 21, 1908 and defected in 1948. Worked at Army Language Facility until 1951? The

request came from the FBI and they want to know if he is alive and if we care if his name is

released. I don't know what more we know about him if anything to answer the question. He did

become ill in 1951 and was put inot a sanitarium so I doubt he is alive but? If you find anything

pertinent you can send it to Eileen Wukitch and Lee Carle)if I'm not here tomorrow. Thanks.

CC:

Kenneth R. Johnson @ DO, Eileen M. Wukitch@ DO, Lee E. Carle-Y@DO

CONFIDENTIAL

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office of the Legal Attache

American

Embassy

Bern, Switzerland

Fax No. 41/31/357-73-68

(International)

031/357-73-68 (Domestic)

Telephone Number:

031/357-73-40

Page 1 of 2 pages

Date: 20 September 1995

TO:

FAX NUMBER:

ATTN :

FROM:

ORIGINATOR:

SUBJECT:

FBIHQ

001-202-324-2299

SC John Hartingh

LEGAL ATTACHE, BERN

Regina Superneau

JFK Assassination Review Board

OUR REF:

COMMENTS/MESSAGE: Here is a copy given to me by Polt of the

statement of the DOS's position which was presented to swiss

yesterday.

Let me know if you have any thoughts on this.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

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ASSASSINATION RECORDS

-- CONGRESS CREATED THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

AND THE PRESIDENT APPOINTED ITS MEMBERS IN RESPONSE TO

WIDESPREAD PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

- THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION ACT OF 1992

MANDATES THAT ALL GOVERNMENT RECORDS RELATED TO THE

ASSASSINATTON, TO THE GREATEST EATEN POSSIBLE, SHOULD BE

MADE AVAILABLE TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

-- WE SUPPORI THE BOARD AND ARE GIVING IT OUR FULL

COOPERATION IN ITS EFFORTS TO CARRY OUT. ITS MANDATE.

-- IN THIS SPIRIT, WE ASK YOUR COOPERATION IN MAKING ALL

RELEVANT DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

-- FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE, WE SEE NO REASON FOR THE

CONTINUED CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL THE BOARD HAS

REQUESTED.

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FBIMTG#1. TXT

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

Notes from meeting with FBI

2000

Assassination Review Board staffer for FBI - Phil Goldrick

Grant's Secure Fax:

202-324-3326

Grant wants copy of released 1967 IG Report for his reviwers

Names of FBI contact reviewers: Carl Valentine

Mike McCaffrey

Bob

Lill (?)

Dick Busching

Re issue with Board over protection of sources/informates:

"Protection forever"/not sure how board, with respond

Re privacy:

als

Board is supportive of protecting privacy of individu

not directly involved in assassination story (especially t

hose

whose roles were

incidential or circumstantial)

Re data base issues:

JFK

Does not currently have capability to search

database - will have once new hard drive installed;

Does not see an FOIA problem; reminded me that they are no

t

keeping their collection -- everything to NARA

Page

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Jerk P. HAs

FBI INFORMANT/CONFIDENTIALITY POSTPONEMENTS

CRUCINAL

INTRODUCTION

This document will address the postponement practices

of the FBI relating to informants and others with whom the FBI

has a confidential relationship (informant/confidentiality

postponements) in documents being transferred to the National

Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the "President

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992"

(the Act). To provide a basis for the formulation of these

practices, their description will be preceded by a discussion of

the classes of persons protected by an understanding of

confidentiality, as well as the development, operation,

protection, and investigative significance of such persons.

Other determinations underlying these practices will also be

addressed.

The information contained in this document is

not only on the experience of the FBI and law enforcement based

intelligence communities in general, but on the personal

investigative experiences of some of the contributors to it.

CLASSES OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The FBI maintains a confidential relationship with

several types of persons. They include:

1.

Criminal Informants who provide information

regarding criminal activity, including organized crime, white

collar crime, violent crime, drug trafficking, and, today,

domestic terrorism.: All such individuals are now

assigned

identifying symbol numbers (to be described hereafter) to protect

their identities in documents containing information they have

provided. However, before and at the time of the Assassination,

and for some years thereafter, the names of the persons under

development as informants (Potential Criminal Informants or PCIs)

were reflected in documents until their reliability could be

established and they were converted to Criminal Informant (CI)

status.

Upon conversion to CI status the informant was assigned

an identifying symbol number for protection.

There are a number of subgroups within the criminal

informant program.

While some CIs are considered general

criminal informants, others are categorized according to the

specialized area in which they provide information.

These would

include, for example, Organized Crime (OC) informants, who

provide information primarily regarding subjects involved in

organized crime. activity, and Top Echelon informants (TE), who

provide information regarding the highest levels of organized

crime.

From the time a person comes under development as an

informant

(in previous years as a PCI), he or she is made the

subject of an individual file.

This file contains information

CLA SPECIAL COLLECHUI

RELEASE IN FULL

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provided by the person, as well as administrative and background

data regarding the source.

2. National Security Informants who today provide

foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism

information, and, in years past, also included those informants

who provided information regarding domestic security/terrorism.

Such informants are now referred to as assets, but at the time of

the Assassination and for some years thereafter were labelled

Security Informants (SIs). Like criminal informants, assets. are

provided identifying symbol numbers for protection, as were SIs.

before them.

Persons under development as SIs were considered

Potential Security Informants (PSIs) and, as with PCIs, their

true identities were reflected in documents until they were

converted to symbol-number status.

assets.

The FBI operates various types of National security

They include:

Double Agents. A double agent is one who receives

assignments from, cooperates with, and/or performs tasks for a

foreign intelligence service on a clandestine basis but who, in

actuality, operates in this capacity under the control of the

U.S. Government.

Defector Sources.

A defector source is an individual

who possesses intelligence information of value and has either

openly or without announcement left the employment of his or her

country and is furnishing information to the U.S. Government.

Recruitments in Place (RIP). A RIP is an individual..

from a foreign country who covertly provides information of

intelligence value to the U.S. Government while outwardly

maintaining allegiance to his or her own government.

While under development as PSIs, SIs (like PCIs) were

made the subject of individual files which contain information

provided as well as administrative data and background

information.

Today, an

individual becomes the subject of a file

at the outset of his or her development as an asset.

.3. It should be noted that in recent years the FBI has

designated Cooperating Witnesses (CWs) as constituting another

class of source.

A CW is defined

as an individual whose

relationship with the Government is concealed until testimony is

required at trial and who, on a continuing basis and under the

direction of an Agent, contributes substantial operational

assistance. to the resolution and/or direction of a case through

active participation in the investigation.

CWs are unlike

informants, who gather intelligence and will not testify.

Although CWs are aware from the outset that it is likely that

they may be required to publicly admit their cooperation with law

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enforcement, the FBI has taken the position that, in the absence

of public testimony, the relationship with a W

is similar to the

relationship with any other source.

That is to say, if for any

reason the CW is never publicly exposed in trial, the

relationship remains confidential. In addition,

the

intelligence, as opposed to operational assistance, furnished by

a Cw also is protected, along with the confidential relationship

as it relates to such information.

4. Sources given expressed promises of confidentiality

in connection with the

information they provided in the course of

criminal, counterintelligence, and background investigations.

Oftentimes, when

associates or neighbors, as well as persons in

businesses, public utilities, government agencies, and elsewhere

are contacted in

Paont it ten sna be.

the course of an investigation, they agree to

provide information only if they are assured that theis

one cont dental o.

identities will be protected under a promise of confidentiality.

Where such a promise is given, documents containing such

information will contain the name of the person providing the

information as well as language specifically setting forth the

fact that confidentiality was

requested.

No file is opened on

such persons and no symbol numbers are assigned to protect their

identities.

Furthermore, unlike informants, little background

information other than an address or perhaps. the name of an

employer is set forth for these sources in FBI files.

5. Persons providing information requiring that

confidentiality be afforded its source.

In certain instances in

the past (to include the time of the Assassination), the FBI

received information from persons in financial institutions,

public utilities,

and other similar entities that would not have

been publicly available.

fact, today, a subpoena would be

required to obtain bank

records, telephone toll records, and

other like materials provided by such persons.

These persons

generally provided such information on a regular basis.

Regardless of the frequency with which they provided information,

they would have done so only with the understanding that they

were doing

so on a confidential basis, even where that

inderstandino is not specifically articulated in FBI documents

Additionally, much of the information necessary for the FBI to

successfully carry out its investigative function comes from

private citizens that

are either approached by the FBI for

questioning or who voluntarily come forward.

Before the passage

of provisions of the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act in the

mid-1970s allowing access to FBI investigative files, it can be

stated with

virtual certainty that no person providing such

information would have anticipated his or her cooperation ever

being made public.

In fact, prior to the passage of the Privacy

Act of 1974, all FBI investigative information,

including that

obtained from informants and sources, was confidential by

Department of Justice Order. After passage of the Privacy Act,

an expressed grant of confidentiality was required in order to

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to balance the risk of harm to the person or to the informant

program in these judgement calls. (see Tab 6)

5. The most difficult category of sources to deal with

is that of persons providing information to the FBI without a

specific request for confidentiality.

In the attempt to release

as much material as possible, the identities of most of these

sources were released, but, once again, the FBI has attempted to

balance the need to maximize released information with the

potential harm to the individual source. (see Tab 7)

6. The "Mosaic Theory" is of particular importance with

regard to the transfer of FBI files to NARA under the terms of

the Act. The FBI has maximized the release of information

maintained in the Assassination files in order to comply with

both the letter and the spirit of the Act, and this has resulted

in an unprecedented amount of informant information being made

available to the public. However, the FBI has postponed

•--

informant! symbol numbers wherever that informant is providing

positive information, under the terms of the Act which allow for

the postponement of the identity of informants. The release of

these symbol numbers, in combination with the information already

released, could very well lead to the identification of a number

ory we done to ent

of FBI informants.

The FBI is currently reviewing for transfer the

material which was provided to the HSCA in 1978.

With respect to

the HSCA files, the Task Force has been more protective of all

types of sources, but particularly organized crime and national

security informants,

due to the real danger of retaliation

against them, even

after these many years.

The informants

other sources utilized in these investigations were specifically

targeted against subjects of investigative interest, and it is

not readily apparent how they might figure in a conspiracy to

assassinate JFK.

Anticipating the opportunity to discuss these

concerns with the ARRB, the balancing test for the HSCA files, at

the present, has been necessarily weighted in favor of

postponement of any information which might tend to identify a

source.

red an arts les

Of course, if any information is located in these files

which bears, even indirectly, on the assassination, that

information will be considered under the most liberal light

possible.

BASIS FOR INFORMANT/CONFIDENTIALITY POSTPONEMENT PRACTICES

Again, the FBI has

attempted to postpone the release of

information only where there are compelling reasons to do so.

There are no more compelling reasons for postponement than those

underlying

the protection being given informants and others with

whom the FBI has confidential relationships.

The rationale for

postponement in this area is clear from the discussion of

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informants, assets, and other confidential sources set forth

above.

The privilege available to the government to withhold

the identity of persons who furnish information to officers

charged with law enforcement is well established in the law. The

rationale for the informant privilege has been explained as

follows:

[I]t has been the experience of law enforcement

officers that the prospective informer will usually

condition his cooperation on an assurance of anonymity,

fearing that if disclosure is made, physical harm or

other undesirable consequences may be visited upon him

or his family. By withholding the identity of the

informer, the government profits in that the continued

value of informants placed in strategic positions is

protected, and other persons are encouraged to ?

participate in the administration of justice.

United States v. Tucker,

380 F.2d 206, 213 (2d Cir. 1967); accord

In re United States,

565 F. 2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977).

cert. denied sub

nom, Bell v. Socialist workers Party, 436 U.S. 962 (1978)

To reduce the length of the body of this document,

further discussion of the privilege is not set forth here but is

contained in the appendices. (see Tab 8)

The FBI and the Department of Justice have gone to

great lengths in the past to protect the identity of informants.

Prosecutions have been dropped rather than divulge an informant

identity, a

• former Attorney General (Griffin Bell) risked being

held

in contempt of court rather than identify informants in a

civil suit, and the FBI has often had to weather the

protestations of other agencies which were given information

derived from

sources but which, despite their considerable

insistence, were not informed of the identity of these sources.

The FBI believes that its informant/confidentiality

practices are consistent with the postponement provisions of

Act.

The practice is clearly consistent with the language of

Section 6 (subsection 4) of the Act that permits the postponement

ot relationships currently requiring protection when public

disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public

interest. That is because unless a confidential relationship has

already been disclosed, and regardless of whether the source is

active or even still living,

the relationship must remain

confidential for the protection of the source and/or his or her

family, as well as to sustain the viability of the FBI's source

development efforts.

Again considering the balancing test under which an

agency must show that the need to protect certain information

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l.wt//w44011102d1"

through postponement outweighs the public interest in the

information proposed for postponement, 'the FBI believes there can

be little or no historical interest in the identity of someone

pro historices ve

who did not provide positive information, a situation that occurs

frequently in the "core" files. At the

same time, the damage to

individuals and the FBI's source development efforts resulting

from disclosure would be great.

Where there is positive information attributed to a

source whose identity is being postponed, the result of applying

the balancing test is virtually the same as that where the

contact was negative. The information provided by the source,

which is being disclosed, is of significantly greater public

interest than the source's identity, which is being postponed.

Disclosure of the source's identity accomplishes little in terms

of satisfying the public interest when compared, again to the

potential harm to the source and/or his or her.

the FBI's source development capabilities.

instances, the source of positive information is referred to not

by name, but by symbol number.

There would appear to be little

if any public interest in such an identifier except, perhaps, on

the part of persons attempting to apply the Mosaic approach

simply to determine the identities of informants or assets.

While the FBI does not directly rely on those grounds

for postponement centered on the unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy in regard to informant/confidentiality postponements,

such privacy concerns are also a part of the FBI's rationale

its informant/confidentiality practices. Exposing a source

and/or his or her family to any of the various forms of

retaliation that might result from a disclosure of the source's

identity would constitute, at the very least, an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.

CONCLUSION

Criminal informants and National Security informants

(assets) are, respectively,

absolutely indispensable resources in

the effort to maintain public safety and to protect the national

security.

It would not be possible to have effective law

enforcement without informants,

as well as ordinary citizens, who

are willing

to provide information on a confidential basis, nor

would it be possible to maintain the security of this nation

without the cooperation of assets and other sources.

In turn,

without the ability to honor the obligation to maintain the

confidentiality that is central to the relationship that must

exist with informants, assets, and other sources, there would be

a chilling effect that could irreparably debilitate efforts to

obtain the critical

assistance needed from such persons if law

enforcement and national security missions are to be effectively

carried out. Furthermore, the obligation to protect the

12

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## Page 16

13-00000

confidential relationship with informants and other sources is

one that must attach in perpetuity, not just because of the need

to protect the source and the source's family as promised, but so

that those that might serve as sources in the future are not

deterred from doing so because of a justifiable fear of

disclosure and the ensuing risk of harm to themselves and their

families.

Again, in its effort to maximize disclosure under the

Act, the FBI carefully examined every situation in which it

contemplated postponement of information and, more especially,

any type of information le.g. the identities of or information

tending to identify informants or other confidential sources)

that appears widely throughout the JFK documents.

In doing so,

the FBI made the inescapable determination that it must

absolutely protect the identities of informants and others with

whom a confidential relationship exists.

The FBI believes, that

doing so is consistent with the postponement provisions of the

1

3

---

## Page 17

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

May 14, 1993

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

336 AMES BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

ATTENTION: J. BARRY HARRELSON

DEAR BARRY:

ATTACHED ARE SEPARATE INVENTORY SHEETS REFLECTING

INCOMING AND OUTGOING CIA DOCUMENTS FOR EACH FILE THAT HAVE BEEN

INVENTORIED INTO OUR COMPUTER.

IF YOU NEED VERIFICATION OF ANY OF THE ENTRIES, LET ME

KNOW.

THANKS,

Lady

JUDY BOWEN

JFK TASK FORCE

ENCLOSURES

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

---

## Page 18

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(CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

5 May 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mrs. Margaret Cook

Team, Captain

Document Classification Unit

FOIA/Privacy Act Section

Federal Bureau of Investigation

-. FROM:

Mr. Barry Harrelson

Project Leader

Historical Review Group

History Staff

Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT:

Use of CIA Desigantor - "CLIP"

1.

This is in

response to your request for written

guidance concerning

the proper classificaton of the Agency's

designator -

"Clip."

We have reviewed this question with the the head of

the Directorate of Operations team working with this office

on the JFK collection.

The advice provided is that the

"Clip" may be treated as unclassified in all instances.

If you have any further questions in this regard;

please

call me.

Barry Harrelson

---

## Page 19

13-0,0000

Sile copy

SECRET

25 June 1993

JFK Assassination File Review

SUBJECT:

Review of FBI Materials

1.

Crypts to be coordinated with FBI:

FEDORA

SHAMROCK

VIADUCT

If during DO review or redaction review you find these

crypts _unredacted make a copy for Barry to coordinate with

Some numbers in the FBI 100 series (100-#####)

are

classified.

If a FBI 100 number is referenced

on a CIA

document it must be coordinated with the FBI. If there is

only the number (no substantive information)

give number,

or

a copy of the page the number is on, to Barry; the FBI does

not need the full document.

3. The Hede Messing-FBI issue (a Soviet defector in NY

Her

name and role in the story, and that we have information on

her, is releasable but not her relationship with the Agency.

When she is linked with the FBI continue to coorindate with

the FBI.

the first page of their documents for coordination is

When doing a final redaction of a JFK box,

box and folder # on copies and place in an envelope marked

FBI. and give to Barry.

Barry

CLONET:

---

## Page 20

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CLASSIFICATION: UNEAS

OFFICE OR TER LEGAL ATTACHE

ANKRICAN INBASSY

LONDON, ENGLAND

SECURR FAXS 171-629-8246

NON-SEOURB FAX:

171-499-7944

TRLEPHONS: 0171-408-8078

Date:

3/20/96

OINMEDIATE

X PRIORITY

O ROOTING

Number of paged Including thie page- 3

TO :

LEGAL COUNSEL (KENNEDY TASK-FORCE)

FAX NO:

202-324-5653

ATTN :

DEBBIE, BEATTY

FROM:

LEGAL, ATTACHE, LONDON ()

ORIGINATOR: JOHN E. QUIDO:

SUBJECT:

JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS

SPECIAL NOTES/ INSTRUCTIONS

File No:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: INCLAS

Approved:

Sent:

---

## Page 21

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UNCLAS

SECSTATE $3577

Ipnet 09:

INFO:

AMC

Laser2:

ACTION: DCMUNCL

INFO:

AMBUNCE: COPYUNZ

DISSEMINATION: AMB

CHARGE: STA

VZCZCTV0494100253

RR RUEHLO

DE RUEHC #3577 0751956

ZNR UUUUU 22H

R 151947Z MAR 96

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 8469

UNCLAS STATES 053577

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY KENNEDY.

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS:

AINF

SUBJECT: JOHN DE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS

COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

THE •ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

(THE "ACT") WAS SIGNED INTO LAW ON OCTOBER: 2641992-

THE ACT ESTABLISHED A PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING AND

SECURING ALL RECORDS RELATING TO THE ASSASSINATION OF

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. AND COLLECTING THEM IN THE

PRESIDENT: JOHN F..KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS

COLLECTION: AT THE NATIONAL, ARCHIVES: IN COLLEGE PARK;

MARYLAND. THE ACT ALSO ESTABLISHED THE ASSASSINATION

RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRE) TO COORDINATE AND OVERSEE

THE PROCESS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY

WITH THE ARRE TO ENSURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THESE

REQUIREMENTS, AND OVER A YEAR: AGO PRODUCED ITS

COLLECTION: FOR PUBLIC ACCESS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

2. THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER,

ONE PROVISION OF THE ACT

FOR WHICH THE SECRETARY MUST RELY ON YOUR OFFICES FOR

IMPLEMENTATION. THE ACT ENVISIONED AN APPROACH TO

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT'S FOR ANY: RECORDS THEY: MIGHT

MAINTAIN: SPECTRICALLY, SECTION 10(6) (2) OF THE ACI

STATES THAT IT IS THE "SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT THE:

SECRETARY OF STATE: SHOULD CONTACT. NY FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT THAT MAY HOLD INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE

ASSASSINATION AND SEEK DISCLOSURE OF SUCH

INFORMATION.

UNCLAS

SECSTATE 53577

---

## Page 22

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UNCLAS

SECSTATE 53577

3. IN ITS ICONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED SEARCH FOR

ASSASSINATION RECORDS.

THE ARRB WISHES TO DETERMINE

WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES IN GREAT BRITAIN MAINTAIN RECORDS THAT! ARE

RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

THE ARRE NOTES THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT

KENNEDY ATTRACTED. THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD, AND

THAT THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE

EVENT WOULD BE QPS INTEREST.

4. ACTION:: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH,

APPROPRIATE HMG OFFICIALS TO REQUEST COMPREHENSIVE

SEARCH OF UKG RECORDS THAT MAY RELATE TO THE

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

WITHOUT BEING. AWARE OF THE STRUCTURE AND

ORGANIZATION OF IPOTENTIALLY RELEVANT BRITISH FILES:

THE ARRB CANNOT PROVIDE SPECIETS/ GUIDANCE:ON: THE

APPROPRIATE, STRATEGY FOR ENSURING A COMPREHENSIVE

SEARCH.

THE ARRB TS WILLING TO PROVIDE ANY

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED. ANY"

SEARCH FOR RECORDS SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTS THAT IDENTIFY AMERICAN

REQUESTS TO GREAT BRITAIN FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE

ASSASSINATION AND THE BRITISH RESPONSES TO THOSE

REQUESTS.

(B) ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTS, STUDIES, INQUIRIES OR

INVESTIGATIONS BY GREAT BRITAIN (INCLUDING MI-5

AND

MI-6) OF THE ASSASSINATION.:

TARNOFF

#3577

NNNN

UNCLAS

SECSTATE 53577

---

## Page 23

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*JUN-26-1997

08:22

JFK TASK FORCE

202 324 3409Р.ORMO

Mr. David G. Marwell

The Board sent a letter dated January 22, 1997 documenting a meeting between

the FBI and the Board's staff. The letter verified additional important items of interest that the

FBI will address in the compliance statement. The FBI is responding to these issues and will

document the findings with the numbered letter request response.

FBI DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS

Concerning the FBI's destruction of records, the JFKTF compiled a listing of

destroyed material from the Field Office responses to the initial request (Enclosure F). Any

material destroyed followed the destruction policy of the FBI, which is explained as follows:

The Destruction of FBI files and records are governed by 44 U.S.C. Sections 3303

and 3303a; 36 CFR Part 1220, the General Records Schedule (GRS); and the FBI

Records Retention Plan and Disposition A Schedule (The Plan) developed by

NARA and the FBI, which the United States District Court approved, District of

Columbia, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1986. The actual reference material

pertinent to. "The Plan," is contained within two large loose-leaf notebooks, which

the Board's staff reviewed.

When the JFKTF originated in 1992, a database was established to inventory all

the material for future accountability. As the FBI collected the assassination-related records, the

JFKTF entered data concerning all the documents responsive to the Act in this database and later

entered the data into the mandated NARA "Identification Aids" program. To date, the JFKTE

has not found any documents missing from the original inventories.

FSI FILES ON LOCATE

Enclosure G is a list of all remaining files that are "On Locate." Certain files or

serials awaiting processing do remain "On Locate." FBI employees assigned to the Information

Resources Division, File Services Unit (FSU), are tasked with finding files that are "charged-out"

to other employees within the FBI Please be assured that the employees of the JEKTF, with

employees from the FSU, are diligently working together to find files that are "On Locate."

FBI RECORDS TO BE PROCESSED

Enclosure H is an updated list of all remaining subjects that are in various stages

of processing according to the Act. The enclosure explains the specific stage of processing for

each remaining subject

Concerning the Board's request that the Compliance Official (or Officials) be

made available for interviews, as the Compliance Official, I am the FBI's contact person for

6

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## Page 24

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JUN-26-1997 08:23

JFK TASK FORCE

202 324 3409

P. 08/08

Mr. David G. Marwell

scheduling the interviews. When the Board determines the time for interviewing, the request

should be forwarded to me and I will coordinate the arrangements for the FBI with the Board.

Sincerely yours,

Carol L. Keeley

Acting Unit Chief

Enclosures (8)

---

## Page 25

13-00000

protect the identity of sources used in background investigations

and civil cases.

However, implied source confidentiality is

still in effect in criminal cases.

INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBERS, ASSET CODE NAMES, AND THE MOSAIC THEORY

Symbol numbers and code names are used as substitutes

for the true identities of informants and assets and serve to

mask their identities in FBI documents. The use of these

substitutes limits the knowledge of the sources' true identities

to those who have a "need to know". Likewise, utilization of

symbol numbers and code names prevents a breach of security from

being more serious than it otherwise might be should an FBI

document fall into unauthorized hands.

It should be pointed out here that, even within ithe

FBI, an informant's/asset's identity, and information tending to

reveal the same, is restricted,

with their files maintained in a

separate and secure room, and with access to those files closely

monitored and limited only to those with

a legitimate "need to

know"

In a discussion of the importance of maintaining the

confidential relationship with informants, it should be pointed

out that the identity of an informant can be determined by

factors other than the release of the informant's name. Multiple

releases

of seemingly innocuous positive information attributable

to the same symbol source can,

in the aggregate, lead to the

identification of an informant.

This is known in the FBI as the

"Mosaic Theory" and it holds that the release of "singular

identifiers", such as symbol numbers, dates of contact, places of

contact, and

even small amounts of information, can be pieced

together to pinpoint the source of information.

THE RECRUITMENT AND OPERATION OF INFORMANTS AND OTHER SOURCES

The indispensability of criminal informants stems from

the fact that they save law enforcement inestimable amounts of

time and

resources and, more importantly, enable law enforcement

to do what otherwise could not be done.

and a not be done

They are often the only

means through which law enforcement agencies can identify, and

thereafter bring prosecutable cases against, the perpetrators of

virtually every type of crime.

activity is not readily apparent, as is generally the case with

organized crime and much white collar crime and large-scale

narcotics trafficking,

informants enable law enforcement to

detect and address activity of which it would otherwise be

unaware.

Informants are sometimes

honest, law-abiding citizens,

but often are intimately acquainted with, or a part of, the

4

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## Page 26

13-00000

criminal element.

Those involved with the criminal element may

have been involved in activities ranging from petty theft to the

most serious of violations, but it is their familiarity with

other criminals that positions them to be of such great value to

law enforcement. Informants, especially those with records of

serious criminal activity, must be very closely managed so that

everything possible is done to prevent them from engaging in

unauthorized criminal activities themselves while serving as

informants.

Informants can be motivated to provide information by a

number of factors, which might include one or more of the

following: civic duty or patriotism, revenge, fear of

prosecution, rapport with law enforcement officers, and/or money.

In every instance, however, the informant must have confidence in

the ability of the law enforcement officer and that officer's

agency to protect his or her identity at all costs, and in this

regard

to, be most judicious in the manner in which the

information provided is used and disseminated.

Some informants,

those principally motivated by money

or revenge, for example, might be easily developed. More often,

however,

an

informant is developed over a lengthy period of time.

The process begins by targeting someone for development based

on

the person's potential knowledge of, and/or interaction with,

particular criminals and criminal activity, as well as their

perceived susceptibility to development.

Having identified such

a person, a law enforcement officer might spend

months, and

particularly in the organized crime arena, sometimes years,

patiently pursuing various efforts to find the key to winning the

confidence of the target.

Once this confidence has been gained,

a flow of information can begin. Frequently limited at first,

this flow increases as trust in the relationship grows.

As mentioned previously, informants must be carefully

managed

and operated, not only to deter their involvement in

criminal activity, but to obtain the maximum benefit of their

information gathering capability. Additionally, careful

nanagement is required to guard against disclosure of their role,

either through injudicious actions on their part or through

mistakes in the use or dissemination of the information provided.

Great care must be taken, for example, to use an informant's

information in

search warrants and other affidavits, and to share

it where necessary with other agencies, in ways that do not lead

to the identification of the source.

Some informants may be in a position to provide

information on only one or two matters and are therefore operated

Pete one A at 10s not

Most informants, though, have

long-term relationships lasting not just years but sometimes

decades, all the while providing information that in most cases

law enforcement could not otherwise obtain. Even in

5

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## Page 27

13-00000

circumstances where an informant is knowledgeable only about a

single case, and operation ceases

after a short period of time,

that person might well be in a position to be reactivated as an

informant in future matters, sometimes in other parts of the

country, so long as the trust in his or her relationship with law

enforcement remains intact.

Whatever the length of time the informant is operated,

he or she runs a risk of retaliation if their cooperation is

discovered by the criminal targets on which information has been

provided. This risk is shared in many cases by the family of the

informant.

The degree of risk varies according to the nature of

the criminal activity and the criminals involved and, generally,

the higher the stakes, the greater the risk. Clearly, in the

case of organized crime and other violent criminal activities,

the possibility of death or serious harm is substantial if not

certain.

Indeed, there have been instances of retaliation

against informants, as well as those suspected of cooperating

with law enforcement (see Tabs 1&2). The fact that there have

not been more such incidents attests to the ability of the FBI to

maintain the confidentiality of informants during and after the

time that they are actually operated.

Protecting the identities of informants and their

information is also essential from the standpoint of preventing

criminals from learning how much law enforcement knows, or might

know,

about the extent of their activities.

Organized

crime

families are particularly interested in, and go to great lengths

to determine,

the extent to which they are penetrated, to include

knowing

the breadth of law enforcement coverage and the length of

time it has

existed.

National Security assets provide information in support

of FBI foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism

investigations.

Assets in counterintelligence investigations

often provide information regarding intelligence officers (IOs)

of hostile foreign intelligence services operating in the U.s.

An asset is most often a U.S. person who has some contact with

the IO, a fellow employee of

an IO, a social friend, or even

another IO whom the FBI has recruited to work on behalf of the

U.S. Government.

Assets in counterterrorism investigations are often

associated with the same international terrorism organization as

the subject of the FBI investigation.

These assets may also be

neighbors, co-workers or others in contact with the subject, or

persons to whom the subject has chosen to disclose his

activities.

6

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## Page 28

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In counterintelligence and counterterrorism

investigations, carefully developed and utilized

assets are often

the critical means of obtaining on a

recurrent basis

accurate

information regarding the subjects of FBI investigations.

These

assets may provide information on classified national security

information being sought or obtained by IOs of a hostile

intelligence service, or information regarding planned acts of

violence, fund-raising, or other activities of

investigative

interest conducted by international terrorists.

The recruitment and operation of National Security

assets is analogous in many ways to that of criminal informants.

Persons are targeted for development and are thereafter the

subjects of recruiting efforts that rely on motivation akin to

that used in the criminal field.

In the National Security arena,

however, recruitment and operation may be most similar in nature

to that of high-level organized crime informants, as the time

required for recruitment can be very lengthy,

the aversion to

recruitment great,

and the consequences of disclosure fatal.

Persons recruited

as assets may represent their own countries,

and have strong allegiances to both their country and its

ideology.

These are difficult factors to overcome, as is the

natural reluctance of these persons to undertake the grave risks

disclosure would pose for them and their families, who often

remain in their home countries.

The practices, and in some cases

the laws of the countries in which the FBI has a

counterintelligence and/or counterterrorism interest, can involve

the harshest of penalties for persons engaged in espionage

against them.

For evidence of the results of disclosure of an

asset's relationship with the FBI, one need look no further than

the recent investigation of former CIA employee Aldrich Ames, in

which a number of foreign nationals who had cooperated with u.s.

intelligence services are believed to have been executed by

Russian

authorities after Ames disclosed their identities to the

Russians.

Assets must be operated with the greatest of care

because hostile governments

are particularly vigilant where

penetration of their ranks

is concerned.

The smallest pieces of

information can enable other intelligence agencies or terrorist

organizations to determine where they have been penetrated and

the extent to which their operations have been compromised.

Similarly, these agencies can profit immensely in their efforts

to counter penetration by knowing the level at which that

penetration has occurred and/or the number of assets being

operated against them.

Assets

can be operated continuously or intermittently

for many years. Moreover,

the value of their information can

also extend for years when it serves

as the basis for, or is

critical to, a longstanding counterespionage or counterterrorism

operation.

7

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## Page 29

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While they are not recruited or operated like

informants and assets, persons who request confidentiality when

voluntarily reporting information to the FBI, or when responding

to requests for information during the course of investigations,

are also critical to the FBI's law enforcement and national

security missions. This is also true of persons who, often as

the result of painstakingly cultivated relationships, regularly

provide information that is not generally or readily

available to

the public.

Law enforcement and national security efforts would

both suffer immeasurably without the information that would be

unavailable unless these sources are secure in the knowledge that

they and their families are safe from any sort of retaliation

that might be directed against them. Absolute care has always

been taken to protect the identities of these invaluable sources,

and to ensure that the information they provide is not

nato sources,

disseminated in a way that would compromise their confidential

relationship with the FBI.

FBI INFORMANT POSTPONEMENT PRACTICES

The FBI has been interpreting the section of the Act

describing the bases for postponement of information from the JFK

files in a way that maximizes disclosure.

However, at the same

time, the FBI is assuming that the Act does not contemplate

disclosures that could cripple the efforts to maintain public

safety or protect national security.

This is particularly true

with regard to information contained in files that could result

in the identification of those persons with whom the FBI has

maintained a confidential relationship. In light of this, and

until guidance from the ARRB regarding these matters could be

sought, the FBI has postponed the release of such information.

"positive" and "negative" contacts with sources.

parlance, a "positive" contact is one in which the source

a sing es come

From time to time, references will be made to

In FBI

provides information that is even the slightest bit useful in

regard to an investigative matter. A "negative" contact is one

in

which the source can provide no useful information to the FBI

or knows nothing about a matter in which he or she is

specifically asked.

In the "core" Assassination files, which include those

files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, and the JFK

Assassination Investigation, the majority of informant and other

source

contacts were negative.

After the Assassination, all of

the FBI's almost sixty field divisions were instructed to contact

" all informants....(als well as other sources" to determine if

they could provide any information about the Assassination or

about such subjects as Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. In a

8

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## Page 30

13-00000

substantial majority of instances, the sources knew nothing about

the matter and the contacts were therefore reported

as negative.

There were some examples of positive contact, however, as where

persons

acquainted with Jack Ruby described his personality and

commented on his possible association with Oswald or members of

organized crime.

It should be noted that there is a substantial amount

of positive source information in the files that were provided to

the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) •

This

results from the fact that the HSCA collection includes

investigative files relating to a number of individuals

identified as organized crime figures or intelligence agents from

hostile countries.

Informants and others whose names or symbol

numbers

appear in these files were specifically targeted against

the subject and therefore furnished information that was nearly

always positive.

! In brief, the guidelines set out below were utilized by

the FBI with

respect to informant identities in the "Core" files:

1. All information received from informants or other

sources was released so long as the infci atior. was not so

singular as to clearly identify the source.

This has resulted in

the release of a very great percentage of the information

received from

such sources. Any information considered central

to the investigation of the assassination would have been

released even at the risk of exposure to the informant.

(see Tab 3)

2. Informant symbol numbers were released when no

positive information was attributed tö them and no

characterization (description) of the source was provided.

(see Tab 4)

3. The names of informants, as well as their

identifying symbol number and file number when those informants

are either providing positive information or are characterized,

have been postponed in accordance with Section 6, subsections 2

and 4 of the Act

The information provided was only postponed

when so singular that certain identification of the informant

would result from its release. (see Tab 5)

4. The identities of

those persons expressly requesting

confidentiality were, in general, protected and the information

that they provided was released.

In most cases, this information

might have been available from a number of sources

and

singularity was not a problem.

In some cases, the names of

persons giving information in the course of their jobs (j.e.

police officials

giving

arrest

records to the FBI), even if

requesting confidentiality, were released. The FBI has attemptec

9

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## Page 31

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CIA SPECIAL. COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

August 9, 1993

To: JFK Task Force

From: Barry Harrelson, CIA

Historical Records Group

Subject:

Referrals being made for the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act

CIA documents do not need to be referred to CIA if the only CIA

information deleted was the "Group 1" stamp and the

classification level stamps. Also, there is no need to refer the

CSCI document numbers since they are being released in the

records relating to the assassination.

---

## Page 32

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..JUN-26-1997 08:20

JFK TASK FORCE

202 324 3409 P. 01/08

FAX TRANSMISSION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

935 PENNSELVANLA AVENUE, NW

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

6202) 3249494

FAX: (202) 324-3408

To:

Fax #:

From:

Subject:

BARRY HARRELSON

Historical Review

CIA

(703) 613-3063

CAROL L. KEELEY

JFK Statement of Compliance

Date:

June 26, 1997

Pages:

8, including this cover sheet.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

COMMENTS:

Barry,

Attached is the FBI's initial statement of compliance. I

thought you might be interested in what the Board wanted from us.

I am not sending the enclosures, since there are too many pages

to tax.

If you are interested in seeing the enclosures, we can

make arrangements later.

The hardest work is yet to come, since we have received 43

additional written requests for other subjects (some very

voluminous). The statement for that will be more difficult.

If you have any questions or comments, please do not

hesitate to call.

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## Page 33

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.SS:

JUN-26-1997

08:20

JFK TASK FORCE

202 324 3409

P. 02/08

U.S. Departmeat of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

June 23, 1997

BY HAND

Mr. David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Boar

500 E Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Marwell:

This responds to your letter dated November 29, 1996, to address compliance

issues.

This letter is the FBI's Initial Statement of Compliance, The statement provides

information explaining the FBI's actions from the time Congress proposed the legislation until

the present. The following information documents for the Assassination Records Review Board

(the Board) the FBI's process of compliance.

This letter includes "Enclosures" to augment the explanations provided in the

letter. The enclosures are for reference and define the mechanics used by the FBI when Congress

signed "The President John F. Kennedy Records Collection Act of 1992" (the Act).

Enclosure A sets forth communications to all FBI Field and Legal Attache Offices

(Legat). The enclosed communications document that in January 1992, the FBI requested every

Field and Legat Office to search for assassination related records, so FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ)

could prepare for Congressional Hearings on the proposed Act. The Field and Legat Offices

reported the requested search information and later forwarded all identified assassination records

to FBIHQ.

Enclosure B is The Statement by former Director William S. Sessions, before the

Committee on Govemmental Affairs, United States Senate, May 12, 1992, on the Assassination

Materials Disclosure Act, Senate Joint Resolution 282. Former Director Sessions' statement

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