Originator: OSD
From: LANSDALE, ED
Document date: 02/20/1962
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 08/11/93

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD

FROM : LANSDALE, ED

TO :

TITLE :

: 02/20/62

: 26

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

CUBA

"THE CUBA PROJECT"

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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SENSITIVE

Program Review

by Brig. Gen. Lansdale

TOP SECRET

TOR SEGRET

20 February 1962

THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum

of 30 November 1961, the United States will help the people of Cuba over-

throw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new govern-

ment with which the United States can live in peace.

The Situation.

We still know too little about the real situation inside

Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However,

some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is

an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist

controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repres-

sive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in

Castro's economic.dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted

in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which males a

resistance program a distinct and present possibility.

Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are

losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside

interest.soon.

They need something they can join with the hope of starting

to work surely towards overthrowing the regime.

Since late November, we

have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S.

government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets

required for success in our task.

The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62) promises

to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due

recognition of the sparsity of hard facts.

The needs of the Cuba project,

as it

goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence

collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance.

These

will be prepared on a periodic basis.

Premise of Action.

Americans once ran a

successful revolution. It

was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong

political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported

our cause. Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must

now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty.

On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to

Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to provide

a realistic assessment and preparation of 5.S. capabilities. The Attorney

General and the Special Group were apprised of this action.

The answers

received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course

of action.

The answers also revealed that the course of action must con-

tain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present opera-

tional estimates and intelligence. Actually, it represents the maximum

target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible.

aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962. It is a

Excluded from

utomatic regrading:

•D Dir 5200,10

es not apply.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

This document contains

Copy No.

of / 2

_Pgs

copies

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TOP STARET

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

series of target actions and dates, not a rigid time-table. The target dates

are timed as follows:

Phase I, Action, March 1962. Start moving in.

Phase II, Build-up, April-July 1962. Activating the necessary opera-

tions inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political,

econonic, and military-type support from outside Cuba.

Phase III, Readiness, I August 1962, check for final policy decision.

Phase IV, Resistance, August-September 1962, move into guerrilla

operations.

Phase V, Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and

overthrow of the Communist regime.

Phase VI, Final, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new

government.

Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of

the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside

help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt

and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility

is a must for success.

Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the

Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy

matters are involved.

Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached

operational plans, which cover:

A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba

B. Political Support Plan

C. Economic Support Plan

D. Psychological Support Plan

E. Military Support Plan

F. Sabotage Support Plan

G. Intelligence Support Plan

Early Policy Decisions.

The operational plan for clandestine U.S.

support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist

regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision,

still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in

winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are

achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will

the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The

contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed, and

recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared

by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. An early decision is required.

prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program.

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SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

2

TOP SEGRET

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Distribution:

Copy No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

.9.

10.

11.-12.

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TOF SECRET

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

The President

The Attorney General

General Taylor

The Secretary of State

(through Deputy Under Secretary Johnson)

The Secretary of Defense

(through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)

The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

The Director, U. S. Information Agency

(through Deputy Director Wilson)

State (Mr. Goodwin)

Defense (Brig. Gen. Craig)

CIA (Mr. Harvey)

Chief of Operations (Brig. Gen. Lansdale)

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

3

KOF SECRET

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TOP

SECRET

OPERATION IN CUBA

MARCH

Establish three "pathfinder" agent

operations in key areas selected

by CIA.

OPERATION IN CUBA

APRIL.

Establish up to five more agent

operations in key areas selected

by CIA.

BASIC ACTION PLAN

INSIDE CUBA

PHASE I

(March, 1962)

PURPOSE

Explore operational conditions and re-

quirements. Report on potential and

active resistance elements and situation

for exploitation by resistance teams. Lay

groundwork for bringing in additional

agents and teams as conditions warrant.

PHASE II

(April-July 1962)

PURPOSE

Report on resistance potential and lay

groundwork for additional agent opera-

tions.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

Agent operations must stay alive, make

useful contacts and communicate securely

with CIA. Risk to the personnel is sub-

stantial due to lack of intelligence, but

mission is essential to planning and

operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

These additional teams should provide cur -

rent reporting on major Cuban areas, so

broad political action program can be

planned.

Risk to teams will continue high,

but mission is essential.

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SECRET

OPERATION IN CUB A

APRIL (cont. )

"Voice" of Cuban movement goes

on the air.

MAY

?

Re-supply agent operations

as

necessary.

BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE II (cont.)...

PURPOSE

Establishes vital psychological assur-

ance to people that a movement exists

to overthrow the regime.

Deliver supplies to

satisfy needs

developed by agent operations, if

valid.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

Preferably, the "voice" should be

from mobile transmitter inside Cuba.

Broadcasts can be brief ones at first:

identifying music, slogan, and short

News to include reports on

"resistance" acts, taking credit for

all sabotage. As daily broadcasts

are established, "criminals against

people" should be named and promised

swift justice, two names per broadcast.

If operational judgment dictates, trans-

mitter can be aboard submarine for

early broadcasts, as a strictly tempor-

ary measure.

It is vital to take risks

by having it inside Cuba; a second

transmitter and crew should be moved

in if the first is lost.

The agents will have to prove to local

partisans that outside support is a

reality.

Thus, as arms, ammunition,

and equipment, etc., are needed to

equip resistance groups, we must be

able to respond effectively to these needs.

Maritime and, as feasible, air re-supply

will be used.

This capability will have

to expaná as resistance is developed.

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OPERATION IN CUBA

By June establish 12 more agent

operations in key areas selected

by CIA.

JUNE

By June, introduce three resistance

teams in areas under initial "path-

finder" surveillance, if situation is

favorable.

Establish bases for

guerrilla

operations.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE II (cont.)

PURPOSE

Mission is the same as for previous

"pathfinder" operations.

This will test acceptance and use of

the more highly trained teams that

must guide development of the popular

revolution within Cuba. This also

will check emphasis and timing of

program from viewpoint of Cuban

situation.

To have focal points, with some viability

to stockpile for defensive needs and for

future attack operations.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

These will be the last agent operations

infiltrated into key areas from the out-

side.

Further expansion by "pathfinders,"

after these teams are in, can be done

from groups inside. It is likely that

some of these last "pathfinders" will be

replacing casualties.

Very minor resistance actions by im-

portant population elements such as

labor must be tried and groundwork

laid for broader anti-regime program

leading toward firm uprising program.

Realism of political platform can be

tested.

These bases are to be selected after on-.

the-ground surveys by the teams inside

Cuba.

Some may exist already.

These

will also be logistical bases, for caches

and stockpiling of arms and equipment

to be used by the resistance.

The p.a.

teams will need not only supplies for

active resistance, but also should be

able to provide some welfare aid (such

as to families of resistance members,

families affected by plants shut-down by

sabotage, etc.

U

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CRET

JUNE (cont)

g.

OPERATION IN CUBA

Establish clandestine leadership

head juarters with means to com-

municate with all resistance

elements.

Collection and use of psychological

action material.

JULY

By July establish up to 5 more

resistance teams in areas prepared

by "pathfinder"' operations, as

operationally feasible.

Basic organization of underground

in vicinity of airfields and communi-

cation centers.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE II (cont. )

PURPOSE.

Organize internal direction and con-

trol of the popular movement.

To provide documentary and photo-

graphic evidence of tyranny of regime

to awaken world opinion and fan fire

of revolt inside Cuba, for use by sup-

port operations and by resistance teams

inside.

Mission is the same as for the first

resistance teams (A Il e above).

To prepare the means for sabotage

against military aircraft and key

communication links of the regime's

security forces.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

Leadership will have been emerging and

this is about the earliest date possible

to establish a clandestine headquarters.

It should be of a bare, field type, in the

securest area possible. This can be-

come the meaningful source of political-

psychological actions, to develop Cuban

will to resist and fight.

The resistance teams will use this material

with timeliness inside and get it back out-

side so that it can be exploited fully in Latin

America and elsewhere, building official

and public opinion in support of the inside.

operation.

Experience of first resistance

teams must

be considered in preparing these additional

teams for operations. Security of person-

nel is very important at this point, as the

operation expands.

This requires ground surveys, selection

of sites for caching of sabotage supplies,

and recruitment of local underground, in-

cluding members of military and communi-

cations employees.

Popular support must

be prepared by resistance teams.

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yes it

OPERATION IN CUBA

JULY (cont.)

Expand infiltration points along

coasts.

Low-key resistance sabotage, as

a continuing and expanding program..

BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE II (cont.)

PURPOSE

To obtain maximum security for

stepped-up infiltration.

To demonstrate public disaffection

with the regime and give examples

which will prompt similar actions

by many others.

To build attitude

and morale of the Cuban people to

become activists for their cause

against the Communist dictators.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

Original "rat-lines" need to be expanded

into a functioning "underground railway"

to pass more infiltrees into interior.

Means of quick alerts to danger, delaying

defenses, multiple routes, coastal watchers

and receiver's need to be organized and

activated.

Actions under resistance team guidance

can include:

- "Runs"on State food and clothing stores

and ransack where possible (prompting

similar acts by those who want to get

enough to eat and wear).

- Sugar in gas tanks of public buses and

local official cars and trucks.

- Ice-picking tires.

- Removing receivers from telephones.

- Harassing telephone calls to officials.

- Throwing stones with threatening notes

into homes of officials.

- Disrupting rail switches and

sand in

gear boxes of trains.

- Swiping spark plugs and distributors

from vehicles.

- Housewives complaints on shortages of

food, medicine, doctors, etc.

- Public contempt campaign against Cubans

in regime's puppet organizations, includ-

ing effigy burning.

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SECRET

OPERATION IN CUBA

AUGUST

m. Final check on resistance elements,

in Cuba.

AUGUST

n. Symbolic work slow-down.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE III

(1 August 1962)

PURPOSE

To have a final look at the situation

and at the means in place before

giving the signal to initiate actions

leading to full-scale revolt.

PHASE IV

(August - September 1962)

To give workers a feeling of parti-

cipating in the popular movement,

without immediate reprisal.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE.

CONSIDERATIONS

This is a last-minute pause, to be cer-

, tain that the resistance has a possible

organization in key places which will

act when needed, that the significant

portion of the Cuban people are in

sympathy with the aims of the move-

ment and will join in when given the

chance, and that the movement will be

able to gain an area of Cuba as its own

against the regime's military forces,

as a minimum

12 August is the anniversary of the ovei-

throw of dictator Machado.

The resist-

should link the Castro-Communists

with Machado and call on workers to lose

one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug.

to commemorate the overthrow of one

dictator. Workers should be asked to

give either one-hour by slow-down or

one act of sabotage.

The "Voice" of the

movement should thank them the

day for their splendid response (to shame

those who didn't participate by making

them feel alone).

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CINE

OPERATION IN CUBA

AUGUST (cont.)

0.

Symkolic signs painted on walls:

"Machado One"

p.

By August, have actions to

penetrate and subvert the regime.

q. Cuban paramilitary teams infiltrated

to bases in the hills.

I. Guerrilla bands activated in key areas.

LUI DIUREL DILNILLY M

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE IV (cont.)

PURPOSE

To commemorate the downfall of

one remembered dictator and give

a symbolic pace to the resistance.

To weaken and frustrate organized

actions against the popular move -

ment..

To provide a trained guerrilla cadre

upon which to form guerrilla units.

To build a military striking force for

the popular movement inside Cuba.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

Timed with the symbolic work slow -

down (A IV n above). Spaced a few

days apart, the signs should have lines

added to them to read:

"Machado One

Batista Two

Castro Three."

These are actions on officials of the

regime, including the military and the

Some should be defected in

Others should be defected and

helped to escape to the outside world

to tell the inside story of the regime's

tyranny, to evoke world sympathy with

the freedom fighters.

The paramilitary teams must be capable

of initiating minor harassment and

reprisal

actions, as well as organizing and training

guerrilla units. Popular support is

essential.

Recruits will be coming in after the sym-

bolic harassment and reprisal actions.

They will be screened, organized, and

trained for guerrilla action. The regime's

security forces can be expected to be very

active.

Anti-tank. and anti-aircraft tactics

are necessary.. Increased popular support

is a must in this phase.

Resises

D

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7301

ET

OPERATION IN CUBA

SEPTEMBER

S.

Commence expanding underground

to every locality in Cuba.

Step-up of guerrilla actions.

U. Activate larger-scale "black" opera-

tions on bureaucracy, as penetration

assets permit.

Start entry of volunteer "freedom

fighters" from Latin America and

elsewhere.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE IV (cont.)

PURPOSE

To have a truly revolutionary organi-

zation throughout Cuba.

To season the guerrilla forces with

larger scale raids.

To overburden the regime's adminis-

trative machinery by false orders,

increase the amount of paper work

by adding new forms, issue regulations

to discredit superiors, and sew sus-

picion and friction between bureaus.

To let the Cuban people know that

they are not alone in their struggle

against tyranny, by the physical

presence of foreign "freedom fighters."

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

The guerrillas are the open arm, but the

popular movement must have mass sup-

port, which requires intelligence collec-

tion and clandestine activists in cities

and towns throughout.

They will surface

when the revolt needs open support.

'Actions will be to seize police files, kid-

nap officials as hostages, capture local

militia arms stores, increase road

ambushes, and destroy fuel supplies and

transport by raid actions.

This will require intensive preparation,

including defection in place of some per-

sonnel, intimate knowledge of current

procedures within bureaus, and means

of producing material which can pass as

official.

A "Marti Battalion" might be formed for

foreign volunteers.

Recruits from Latin

America, from refugee groups (such as

Hungarians, Poles, etc.), and Americans,

need a controlled means of entering the

good fight.

Some veterans of the Huk

campaign could be a gesture and a practical

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OPERATION IN CUBA

SEPTEMBER (cont.)

w.

Attack on the cadre of the regime,

including key leaders.

Operations liberating political

prisoners held by regime, if

possible.

y.

Start blocking

assistance from the

Communist Bloc.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE IV (cont.)

PURPOSE

To express popular anger against the

regime's tyranny and to give harsh

reality to the listing of "criminals

against the people."

To liberate prisoners for impact upon

popular support of guerrillas and

general resistance program.

To shut off Bloc assistance to

the island of Cuba by all possible

means from the inside.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

This should be a "special target" opera-

tions. CIA defector operations are vital

here. Gangster elements might provide

the best recruitment potential for actions

against police-G2 officials. Bloc tech-

nicians should be added to the list of

targets.

CW agents should be fully

considered.

This requires a physical survey to obtain

precise information on feasibility of brib-

ing guards, breaking way open to release

prisoners, encourage prisoners to have

hope that tyranny of regime will be over-

thrown, etc. From these hard facts,

decisions can be made on which prison or

prisons should be targets for liberation

actions.

Bold operations are called for;

the psychological impact will be very high.

While appealing to the free people of the

world to help shut off Communist ship-

ments of arms being used to kill the Cuban

people, the resistance must act on its own

inside Cuba - striking against ships deliver-

ing Bloc supplies, denying harbors by

mining, sabotaging transport aircraft,

destroying B loc supplies in warehouses,

and acting against Bloc technicians.

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SECRE

OPERATION IN CUBA

SEPTEMBER (cont.)

z.

Commence active sabotage of

military aircraft, ground trans-

port and communications.

OCTOBER

General strike by the Cuban

workers.

b. Anti-regime demonstrations.

c. Declaration of the revolt.

A, BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE IV (cont. )

PURPOSE

To hamper the ability of the regime's

security forces to strike at the resist-

ance movement as it emerges into

more open guerrilla bands.

PHASE V

(FIRST TWO WEEKS, OCTOBER 1962)

To make public the popular support of

the militant revolt, signifying the pass-

ing from underground to open rebellion.

Same purpose as noted above. (A V a) for

the general strike.

To initiate the hour of decision by

calling on all Cubans for open support.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

More sophisticated sabotage devices,

contaminants, etc., should be in target

area by this time.

Strike must tie-up transportation and

communications.

The resistance teams

must have set the readiness of the workers

for this defiance of the regime. Arms

must be available.

Military cells will

be activated. Funds will be needed to

help the workers hold on and to bait

defections

of groups.

The resistance teams must have set the

readiness of all population elements (youth,

farmers, Church, etc.) to openly defy

the regime.

Arms must be available,

including anti-tank weapons. Military

cells will be activated.

Since the aims of the liberation will have

been publicized previously, this is the

"go" signal.

All Cubans and the world

need to hear it.

1

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SECRET

OPERATION IN CUBA

OCTOBER (cont.)

d. Open revolt by the Cuban people.

e.

Return of Cuban refugees who are

qualified and want to help liberate

their homeland.

Establish a new Cuban government,

which can be recognized by the U.S.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE V (cont.)

PURPOSE

To overthrow the Communist regime.

To start a more open movement back

to Cuba of those Cuban refugees who

are able and willing to risk their lives

in overthrowing the Communist regime.

PHASE VI

(DURING OCTOBER 1962)

To give legality to the moral right of

the Cuban revolt.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

This is the combat phase, fighting to

take and hold ground.

' Cuban refugee organizations will be

tested with a "put up or shut up" pro-

position. Those who have ability to

contribute to the popular movement

inside Cuba should be given a chance

to go home and act. Their screening

and infiltration will have to be con-

trolled.

It must be a joining-in, not

a taking-over of the inside movement.

When the popular movement is holding

meaningful territory in Cuba, it should

form a provisional government.

should permit open Latin American and

U.S. help, if requested and necessary.

A military government situation will

exist for the initial period and we must

insist upon realism in this interim

period preceding reasonable civilian

control.

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SECRET

6.

ACTIVITY

Use U.s. diplomats and staffs in

official and other contacts.

Activate Latin American leaders,

government and public.

Activate labor leadership in other

countries, especially Latin Ameri-

can area.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN.

(cont.)

PURPOSE

To influence attitude of political

leaders favorably for the Cuban

people and hostile to Communist

dictatorship.

To influence key

staffers of foreign leaders along

same line and, as appropriate,

influence leaders in intellectual

and major population groups.

CONSIDERATIONS

Personal influence upon foreign officials is vital

to build sympathy and support for Cuban revolution

against Castro regime.

Can lead to independent

actions by other nations to build the case for the

Cuban people.. Latin American nations are most

important, but NATO also important. Official

attitude of Spanish government can be key to

operational values in homeland ties to Spanish

colony in Cuba. (State responsibility, with sup-

port by others as required.)

Timely and sirong publir, statements will be en-

couraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin,

other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets.

(State responsibility, with support by CIA and

USIA.)

Commit national prestige and

power of Latin political, intellec-

tual, labor, youth, religious,

military leaders to cause of Cuban

people against Communist regime.

For own public impact, international

support, and morale of resistance

within Cuba.

To lead major population groups in

opinion formulation and in actions

impressing upon political leadership

a demand for support of the Cuban

people against their dictator regime.

To counter and steal the Communist

maneuver using labor to defend the

Cuban grab and launch other take -

overs.

To employ any contacts with

working class in Cuba as a means to

help generate the resistance and revolt.

Contacts under CLA will be put to this vital task.

Crash enlistment of additional assets is

required,

along with reorientation of existing long-range

uses.

Labor contacts must polarize other dynamic

elements such as farmers and students. Labor

leaders can piay key role in impeding supplies and

communications Communists in Cuba must have.

(CIA responsibility, with support by others as

required.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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ACTIVITY

1. Use OAS and its organs.

2.

Use United Nations members and

U. N. organs.

3..

Use US officials and news releases

at Washington level.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To reaffirm strong official condemna-

tion of Communist rule in Cuba.

To

influence Latin American and world

opinion against Communist grab of

Cuba and favorably toward Cubans

recapturing their freedom.

To enlist world opinion for plight of

Cuban people under domination of a

foreign sponsored government. Build

hostility to Communist regime and a

favorable attitude to people's revolt.

Develop basis for outside support of

Cuban people.

Indicate policy and commit prestige

of U.S. government to appropriate

support of the Cuban people vs. Com-

munist dictatorship.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

OAS members must be firm and open about

this being a regional concern.

OAS must

build support for the cause of the Cuban

people against the Communist regime, by

statements and reports about the police

• state methods and foreign domination in

Cuba.

This will require official and per-

sonal diplomacy with a real sense of mis-

sion, and must be an effort by Latin Ameri-

can as well as U.S. officials.

(State

responsibility, with CIA and USIA support.)

Statements of world leaders for humanity

and justice can come from speeches and

comments about misery of Cubans under

Communist political-economic program.

Plight of trade unionism, religion, health,

education all fall within UN interest. Phoney

Communist maneuvers about persecution of

Castro regime can open way for a challenge

to a UN inquiry team from OAS states re the

true status of popular support within Cuba.

A challenge to hold free elections under UN

monitor could be timely and place Cuban

Communists on the defensive. A UN "aid

for Cuban poverty and health" would be

sound move to highlight situation. (State

responsibility.)

Top officials of Executive and Legislative

branches can keep pressure upon Castro

regime directly by timely statements. This

also supports similar attitude by leaders of

other nations and helps spirit of Cubans.

Development of sympathy leading to favorable

opinion about outside support for Cuban people

is a goal. (State has responsibility to lead in

this very important line.)

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SECRET

7.

ACTIVITY

Use exile Cuban labor leaders.

8.

Use exile groups under Cuban

Revolutionary Council.

9..

Use exiles as touring teams for

political action in Latin America.

10. Special news coverage for Latin

America, to generate political

action.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

(cont.)

PURPOSE

To help develop labor assets and

actions in Latin America and to

assist main operation by communi-

cations and infiltration of personnel

inside Cuba.

To maintain a significant symbol of

special groupings for contacts with -

in Cuba and impact upon Latin Ameri-

can public opinion.

To give personal witness against the

Communist regime and ask support

for the people recapturing their

freedom.

To arouse public and official sym -

pathy for the suppressed Cuban

people and to sharpen appreciation

of the Communist threat to other

Latin American countries.

Will

provide leads for popular actions

such as public pressure through

petitions to local political and pub-

lic leaders.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA contacts with trade union leadership in

Latin America will help exile Cubans join in.

Special groupings such as students, youth,

professions, women are under the CRC and

must be used with care and avoid political

imprint of CRC to maximum.

Teams of students, lawyers, ex-Castro

associates can tell impressive story that is

newsworthy.

Cooperative news media will be

employed. by

Bi-weekly news guidance is scheduled

for all CIA stations in the area, providing

current material about Communist mistreat-

ment of the workers, students, and Church

within Cuba.

Economic ills and public re-

sistance will be fully played. Special publica-

tions, such as hand-outs, pamphlets,

groups..

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TOP

SECRET

ACTIVITY

11. Radio programs for Cuban

political activation.

12. By October, official U.S.

and Latin American policy

support.

B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

(cont.)

PURPOSE

To inform and keep basic

interests within the Cuban

population.

To provide a positive basis for

more open support of the people's

revolution, possibly a foundation

for military assistance upon

request of recognized new.

government.

CONSIDERATIONS

Religious programs, interviews with exile

workers, students, fishermen, families

to help keep Cubans in touch with the way

of life they must recapture from the Com-

CIA capability for daily and

special broadcasts exists, noting Swan

Island station, and arrangements with

private stations in Miami, New Orleans,

and some 75 small outlets in the Caribbean

area. (Use of printed materials for dis-

semination inside Cuba is possible through

mails and drops, but hazard to receiver too

great prior to climax. ) (CIA and USIA

!

The policy line for recognition of a revolu-

tionary government is involved directly at

this point.

CRET

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## Page 20

2.

3.

5.

6.

ACTIVITY

Persuade: QAS, NATO and countries

¡riendly to freedom to desist from

trading with the Communist dictator-

-ship in Havana.

Stop trans-shipment of U.S. items to

Cuba, especially via Mexico and

Canada.

A "positive list" for Latin America

subject to licensing procedures for

other parts of the Free World.

Harassment of shipping destined for

or arriving from Cuba.

Obtain cooperation of National Foreign

Trade Council in delaying or refusing

charters to vessels calling at Cuban

ports, by mid-March.

Introduce counterfeit currency into

Cuba, if feasible.

Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of

U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the

National Association of Manufacturers

to influence U.S. firms having sub-

sidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit

of.U.S. economic boycott of Cuban

regime.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To build anti-regime feelings among

Cuban people, by economic squeeze.

To reduce supply of items and parts

critical to the Cuban regime's

economic program.

To reduce supply of special interest

items.

To delay and reduce supplies Cuban

regime needs in economy.

To reduce supplies the Cuban regime

must have to keep economy going.

To disrupt Cuban economy.

To harass Cuban economy.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

The regime may be weakened as the Cuban

dollar market is depleted through loss of credit

line. Requires full cooperation of allies and

friends. (State responsibility with CIA and

Commerce.)

Target is Cuban sugar economy, power petroleum,

communications, transport. (State responsibility

/ with CIA, Commerce, Justice.)

(Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA

participating.)

Union leadership can help in this.

Security or

administrative reasons can be used for actions

if a reason is required. (Responsibility of CIA

with State, Commerce, Defense, Justice, Labor

and Treasury participating.)

(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA

participating.)

(Responsibility of CIA with Treasury and Justice

participating.)

(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CLA

participating.)

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ACTIVITY

By June, rumor campaign against

Cuban items in free world market.

C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN

(cont.)

PURPOSE

To discourage sales of Cuban produce

and to further deplete Cuba's dollar

market.

CONSIDERATIONS

Tropicals, tobacco, and sugar could be tar-

geted.

(Responsibility of CIA with State and

USIA participating.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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## Page 22

3.

ACTIVITY

Create atmosphere of a "crusade"

for human liberty"

Ready broadcast means for "Voice"

of inside Cuban movement, to com-

mence broadcasting in April.

In March, commence visits of

prominent U.S. and Latin American

personalities to Cuban refugee camps

in Florida.

Publicity for selected defectors

from Castro team.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To set the deeply-moving tone and

motivating force for the liberation

of Cuba.

To ensure maximum effectiveness

of broadcasts.

To demonstrate concern for plight

of refugees, particularly parent-

less children.

To demonstrate Cuban regime's

failure to live up to promises of

original 26th of July movement.

CONSIDERATIONS

All media.

This means maximum use of

spiritual appeal (such as the prayer for Cuba

by Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuine

Cuban revolutionary background), recapturing

the ideal of Marti by taking use of his memory

away from the Communists (even to issue of

commemorative U.S. stamp), and popularizing

songs by commercial recordings. (USIA and

CIA responsibility.)

These broadcasts entail considerable work and

risk to mount. They have to pay-off every second

while on the air. They need identifying music

(by guerrilla instruments such as guitar or

harmonica), identifying slogan, and a format

worth risk to the listener inside Cuba. If opera-

tionally required, initial broadcasts can be taped

and transmitted by submarine. As soon as feasible,

portable transmitter(s) must be established inside

Cuba. (CIA responsibility, with support by

Defense and USIA as required.)

Mrs. Kennedy would be especially effective in

visiting children refugees. (One camp near Miami

has about. 1, 000 children who came out without

their parents.) Her impact upon Latin Ameri-

cans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela

and Colombia suggests this. (USIA responsibility.)

Feature

stories, documentaries, etc. (USIA

responsibility, with help of ClA, Justice, and

State.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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## Page 23

6.

ACTIVITY

Publication of weekly reports

with hurian-interest stories about

Cuban refugees, starting in March.

Activate bi-partisan group to pro-

vide medical supplies to Cuba, by

September.

Dramatize individual stories of Cuban

refugees representative of major

population groups: workers, youth,

farmers, fishermen, women, church.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN

(cont.)

PURPOSE

To illuminate intolerable conditions

in Cuba and the plight of the Cubans

who remain inside.

CCNSIDERATIONS

This should include supporting reports giving

statistics on the numbers of refugees who have

fled, and keep Fleeing, to the U.S., Jamaica,

Venezuela, Mexico, and Spain.

(USIA respon-

sibility, with support of others as required.)

To dramatize plight of the Cuban

people and the failure of the Com-

munist regime to care for the people.

To publicize that ordinary citizens,

not just the rich, have fled tyranny.

Documentaries, etc., of these refugees now at

work in the l'. S. (not just in refugee centers),

awaiting the day they can return to strike a blow

for liberty. (USIA responsibility.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Deserty:

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2.

3.

5.

6.

7.

ACTIVITY

Provide logistic, personnel

and training support.

Induce actions against Cuba

through bilateral and multi-

lateral military organizations,

to include personal contacts.

Prepare to increase military

activity in the Caribbean area.

Prepare to intrude Cuban sea

or air space.

Prepare to harass Cuban civil

aviation and surface shipping.

Prepare to protect elements of

the resistance movement.

Prepare to intrude or jam Cuban

communications.

IVE MINILL

Ea... MILITARY SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To insure optimum implementation of

the basic plan.

To enlist support of military elements

of the Free World for the resistance

movement, to encourage opposition to

the Cuban regime and actions against

that regime.

To deceive Cuban government or to

divert attention, to provide psycho-

logical support for the resistance,

to frustrate the Cuban regime, and

to demonstrate U.S. determination

to other states.

To divert attention of the Cuban

regime, and to help impede trans-

port of supplies the regime needs.

To delay, confuse, or deter Cuban

transportation and communication.

To insure success of resistance

at critical juncture.

To confuse and block Cuban com-

munications.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

The basic plan requires complete and efficient

support of the military, to include the use of

facilities and military cover. (Defense

responsibility.?

Make full use of the Inter-American Defense

Board, the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Com-

mission, the Joint Brazil-U.S, Defense Com-

mission, and the Permanent Joint Board for

the Defense, Canada-U.S. Additionally, use

should be made of extra-hemispheric military

organizations.

(Defense responsibility, with

State support.)

Increases in flights or naval shipping, moves

of dependents, reinforcement or increased

supply will improve readiness posture in the

area. (Defense responsibility.)

Unattributable. (Defense responsibility with

CIA support.)

Unattributable. (Defense responsibility with

CIA support.)

Air cover or escort and sea

and air rescue

operations.

(Defense responsibility with CIA

(Defense responsibility -- CIA and USIA support.)

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2.

3.

ACTIVITY

Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel

to Soviets.

Sabotage fuel supply.

Sabotage communications.

Sabotage power supply.

E. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder

Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports.

To cripple transportation.

To dramatize and encourage the

spirit of resistance.

To increase strain on regime and

bring daily business to a standstill,

by dramatic action all people will

note.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

This can be an early sabotage action on the

Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based

outside Cuba.

Destruction of transformers,

coolant pumps and towers seems more

feasible than blocking the channel. Effect

can be supported later by denial of Canadian

spare parts.

Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil

additive is expected on locomotives in June -

July. Much more can be done with fuel

contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel

Crews aboard Western tankers offer

real opportunity for more vigorous program.

Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based

outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio

transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S.

broadcasts).

Attacks mounted only when

operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave

net should be dealt with when there are suf

ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide

with a critical need, in August-September.

This should be a concerted attack,

as feasible

in July-August on power plants at Havana,

Santiago, Cinfuegas,

Vicente, Santa Clara, -

Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type

requiring detailed planning and special equip-

ment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba.

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ACTIVITY

Special Operations Room fully.

activated, by 1 March 1962

2. Caribbean Admission Center,

Opa -Locka, Florida, fully

activated by 15 March 1962.

SE

ET

Develop additional Interrogation

centers in other areas, during

March 1962.

Expand special intelligence and

other sensitive intelligence cover-

age, as required.

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

To provide the Chief of Operations and

the project team with current intelligence

and daily developments.. To provide top

U.S. officials with status briefings, as

useful.

To collect intelligence required for the

operations, to identify and'earmark

assets as refugees arrive, and to pro-

vide security against Communist agent

operations.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmos-

phere, at differont levels than now seem

possible in the cortinental U.S., to spot

additional assets for the operation, and

to provide security against Communist

agent operations.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

A maximum security room for this project

will be maintained in the inner JCS

security

area of the Pentagon. (Defense responsi-

bility, with support by CIA and others as

required.)

This operation, in response to early recom

mendation as essential by the Chief of Opera-

tions, is moving at utmost speed to become

fully active by 15 March, with a new building

completed and occupied, and with a stafi of

42 at work.

The staff is now being increased

in phases, as quickly as personnel are train-

ed, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA

responsibility, with support y Defense,

Justice, State, USIA.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, as

first priority, CIA must survey means and

methods for activating other intericgation

centers where useful.

Puerto Rico, Spain,

and Venezuela should be included in this

survey. The new centers should be activated

as quickly as feasible. (CIA responsibility,

with support by Defense and others as

necessary.)

(Defense responsibility, in collaboration with

CIA.)

--5203

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5.

?..

ACTIVITY

Develop intelligence potential of

Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

Develop the means of the Inter-

American Defense Board to pro-

vide substantive intelligence on

Cuban activities.

Periodic intelligence estimates, as

required by progress of operations.

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN.

(cont.)

PURPOSE

To exploit the intelligence possibilities

of former residents of Cuba (including

U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

To add to the increased U.S. intelligence

coverage on Cuba and to strengthen the

concern of Latin American states for

security.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current

estimates can be considered at national

policy levels.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C.,

and other U.S. cities which are "little

Cubas." Family, Church, and business

interests provoke unusual personal ties

inside Cuba for some of these residents;

a real potential exists for collection of

intelligence not otherwise available.

(Justice/FBI responsibility, with support

from CIA and others as required.)

by others as required.)

As the operations develop, there will be

both increased intelligence collection and

a need for as current an Intelligence Esti-

mate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.

It is likely that a more informal method of

producing an Intelligence Estimate for use

at the national level (than now governing the

issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed.

(CIA responsibility, with support of others

as required.)

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