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Date : 09/24/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10014

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY, BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB

FROM

: A.R. ASH

TO

THE FILE

TITLE

COVERT ACTION PANEL MEETING 6/5/64 (DISCUSSION WITH

SECRETARY;

SPECIAL GROUP, ET AL.)

DATE: 06/05/64

PAGES

6

SUBJECTS

COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE:

CLASSIFICATION

PAPER; TEXTUAL, DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

: 09/08/98-08/01/2024

COMMENTS

:Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967.

2025 Release under the President

John F. Kennedy Assassination

Becords Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10014

Box. 10

Covert Operations

1954-1967

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

206-10001-16017

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TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

Covert Action Panel Meeting 6/5/64

(Discussion With Secretary, Special Group, et al.)

On 6/5/64, at the Board's offices, Mr. Murphy held a meeting of the

Board's Covert Action Panel (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Langer) also attended

by General Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne; and A. R. Ash.

At the invitation of Chairman Murphy the meeting was joined by Mr. Peter

Jessup who since January 20, 1964, has been serving as Secretary of the

NSC 5412/2 Group.

Special

In answer to questions asked by Panel members, Mr. Jessup provided a

description of the Special Group and its activities, as follows:

The Special Group is chaired by Mr. McGeorge Bundy; Mr. Alexis Johnson

represents the State Department; Mr. Cyrus Vance represents the Secretary of

Defense; and Mr. McCone the CIA.

These Group members are back-stopped by

staffs in their respective agencies.

Meetings of the Special Group are held once each week. They are "action"

meetings not talk-fests, and the members have done their homework beforehand.

The Chairman of the JCS attends when the agenda includes subjects of particular

JCS interest (since January he has attended two meetings for discussion of Cuba

matters).

Most of the covert actions considered by the Special Group are CIA pro-

posals, although other members suggest actions (for example, State Department

brought up for discussion the matter of supplying arms in Tangayika).

The State

Department is considered to serve as the "conscience" of the Special Group in its

consideration of proposed covert actions. During the current year some 23 of

39 proposals were favorably considered by the Group.

About 50 per cent of the covert actions coming before the Special Group

are carried

out by the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of the JCS, in the

aerial reconnaissance field. Since January 1, the Group has approved actions

With respect to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Panama, Chile, Congo, Angola,

Tibet, Zanzibar, and China, among others. For example, the April 29, 1964,

meeting included discussions of the Chilean elections; Cuba; a JRC forecast of

peripheral missions; and reconnaissance coverage from India of a Chinese Communist

test range.

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TOR SECRET

( Minutes of Special Group

meetings are provided only to the members.

: (In answer to a specific question from Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jessup said that to

his knowledge there has been no systematic review by the Special Group con-

cerning the results of actions taken pursuant to previous. Group

approvals.

The Group follows the policy of referring to the President those pro-

posed

actions as to which Group members have differences of opinion regarding

the probability and acceptability of "noise levels" which would result from the

actions.

Since January, the subject of Cuba has been taken up with the President

with a view to obtaining guidance on the level of covert action activity desired

during this election year.

tri

Mr. Jessup concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the

meeting at this point.

Marting

Next, the Board Panel meeting was joined by Messrs. Dick Helms and

Cord Meyer of CIA.

Mr. Helms said that with regard to Cuba there has been an effective stand-

down

in externally-mounted sabotage operations since February. Policy approvals

have been given only to oddments of "passive sabotage", such as supplying agents

with incendiary pencils, etc.; a mattress factory. and a plastic works were burned

down; but CIA does not consider that such operations are enough and they are not

the whole program that CIA wants to conduct. The "Track II" paper in the State

Department calls for CIA support of Cuban exile group activity, but no CIA

diréction and control, and few results are possible from such an approach, with

Artime burning down a sugar mill, but Manolo Ray getting arrested by the British.

There have been acts of sabotage performed on tractors carried by vessels en route

to Cuba.

On the economic front, after Castro had put out false rumors of an

expected short sugar crop, in order to run up the world market price, the CIA

countered by assembling correct information which when published brought the

price down again.

With regard to Soviet personnel in Cuba, Mr. Helms estimated that there are

from 15,000 to 18,000 on the Island, although U. S. intelligence community

estimators place the figure at from 4,000 to 5,000.

Concerning Chile, Mr. Helms said that the coming Presidential elections

there on September 13 are viewed with serious concern.

The Socialists there are

more radical than the Communists,

and candidate Allende (backed by the FRAP

party) may have a strong chance of winning.

Moreover, the constitutional-minded

Chileans would accept a regularly-elected Communist as President and would not take

coup action to put him out of office.

Allende is being supported by the USSR at

the rate of about one-quarter million dollars a month, and his success at the polls

is important to the Soviets who can then point to the

election as an example of a

"peaceful" Communist victory.

CIA support of Chilean Christian Democrat candidate Frei included $750,000

in March; and on May 14, another $1.25 million was added following the urgings of

major business elements in Chile and the U. S. Some support is also being given

to anti-Communist candidate Edwards; to Protestants; and to poll-taking groups.

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-FOR SEGRET

Referring to Panama, Mr. Helms observed that CIA appeared for the moment to

have backed the right candidate -- Rebles.

With reference to Brazil, Mr. Helms said that the coup was Brazil -

inspired and spontaneous, not a U. S. operation.

He added that Brazil had

come close to being lost

to the Communists through subversion from the top

(Goulart).

Turning to the subject of Southeast Asia, Mr. Helms said that there have

been many lengthy discussions about South Vietnam and about getting the Viet

Cong out of that country.

This objective has been

talked to death, and all

possibilities considered; but no one seems to be preoccupied with

finding a way

to replace the political

fabric that was lost in South Vietnam when the Diem regime

was overthrown.

The present government is all a military show. Mr. Helms added

chat the Bhuddists are a political group but not cohesive. As for prospects of

effecting intelligence infiltration of North Vietnam, Mr. Helms said that CI

nad been trying, but the target country is small and there is not much intelli-

gence to obtain there. At present MACV is in charge of sabotage efforts against

'North Vietnam.

In Mr. Helms' opinion there is a clear need to create a new

political structure in South Vietnam or else there will be little use in

"striking against the North".

In Laos, Mr. Helms said, the Pathet Lao can take over at will. He noted

that the Meo's are still intact (only one battalion) and are being supplied

by CIA air drops (from Thailand) of weapons, food and medicines.

Mr. Cord Meyer referred to the crisis of the Adoula government in the

Congo.

There are 200 men in Brazzaville, with Chicom support, ready to

assassinate cabinet officers.

When the UN forces leave on June 30 the 30,000-man

Congolese National Army will have a big job to do. Mobutu and officers of the

Army are wary of providing much training down to the platoon level, because they

distrust these troops in arms.

Meanwhile, CIA has supplied the Army with 6

airplanes and pilots, and authority has now been received by CIA to dauble this

support.

Regarding Cyprus, Mr. Helms said that the Turks are threatening to go

onto the island with troops within 24 hours.

Messrs. Helms and Meyer left the Panel meeting at this point.

The Board Panel meeting was next joined by Mr. Alexis Johnson of the

State Department.

He filled the Panel members in on the latest Cyprus development

including the President's message to the head of the Turkish government; and

General Lemnitzer's trip to Turkey to point out the hazard to Turkey's NATO

relationships if Turkey moved Into Cyprus with troops.

Panel Chairman Murphy asked Mr. Johnson for any comments he might have

regarding State Department relationships with the Special Group, and with

the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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SUP SECRET

Mr. Johnson said that as State Department representative on the

Special Group he tries to do the difficult job of viewing the risks against

the gains involved in proposed covert actions.

Issues rarely arise in the

Special Group because problems are first staffed in the member agencies.

Get in our he totten t t never

In State Mr. Johnson is staffed by Mr. Scott of INR who maintains contacts

FBI having been recently regularized

as had been done earlier in the case of CIA. Mr. Scott consults Mr. Johnson

on all covert operationg and any issues, and also focuses on NRO matters

for Mr. Johnson.

In all, Mr. Johnson

feels that the Special Group system is satis-

He acknowledged, however, that the Special Group does not have a pro-

cedure for systematic look-back at the results, of programs previously approved.

From State's point of view, he could see the need for such a procedure, for he

never heare about projects once they are approxed -- unless something-goes

WrOng.

Mr. Johnson said that within State a quarterly review is made of

political action programs, and he sees a need for monitoring of programs in

the Special Group.

As for State's relations with the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, Mr. Johnson recalled that one problem arose with the Board's

November 22 report on the Dunlap

case, which caused him considerable concern

TO O

particularly the discussion language

supporting the Board's recommendations on

subjects involving State, CIA and FBI.: Mr. Johnson thought that he should

have been given an opportunity to comment to the Board concerning the FBI and

CIA complaints which were reflected in the recommendations.

Mr. Coyne then gave Mr. Johnson some of the background of one of the

Board's recommendations which involved State-CIA-FBI and which pertained to

development of such

sensitivity as to closely restrict the Board's disclosure

(Mr. Coyne took the initiative, after the Panel meeting, to suggest to

FBI that Mr. Johnson be briefed on this sensitive item,

in order that State

Department might be in a position to assist, and not unwittingly hinder,

related operations of FBI and CIA interest abroad. FBI did this soon afterward, and

Mr. Johnson expressed to Mr. Coyne his satisfaction at this handling of the

matter.)

Mr. Murphy next brought up the subject of the recently discovered audio

penetration. of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow.

USIB damage assessment contained State Department comments to the effect that

• bed Moe

Mr. Murphy noted that the preliminary

the compromise was not too serious, and he wondered if this accurately re-

flected the State Department view of the matter.

the audio penetration period the State Department sent many messages to our

Ambassador in Moscow,

telling him to make certain representations to the Soviets;

and in turn the Ambassador sent messages to Washington reporting on what he had

said to the Soviets and what they said to him; so, Mr. Johnson felt that no

damaging breach had occurred in this regard -- except for perhaps any Department

or Embassy analyses that might have appeared in messages Intercepted by the

Soviets..

Mr. Johnson added that our people at posts behind the Iron Curtain

assume that they are "bugged" and they behave accordingly; and Mr. Johnson

related to the Panel his own experience while serving at Prague where "he

dug out 35 mikes".

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TOP SECRET

Mr. Murphy raised with Mr. Johnson the question as to whether subordinates

should be allowed to make decisions such as the

cutting of the co-axial cables

discovered leading out of the Embassy In Moscow'-- Mr. Murphy pointing out that

such action appeared premature and prevented the technicians from making technical

examinations of value and importance.

Mr. Murphy also noted that subordinates

in State and CIA had

assumed responsibility for the decision that no attempt

would be made to exploit the devices found in Moscow.

Mr. Johnson was unaware

of policy direction regarding such matters, and Mr. Coyne made known to him

the provisions of NSC 5618 covering the subject.

With reference to North Vietnam, Mr. Johnson noted that the situation,

1s most discouraging insofar as covert infiltration actions are concerned.

He said that CIA had tried hard, and the activity has now been transferred

MACV In Saigon.

Mr. Johnson concluded his visit with the Board Panel and

departed the

meeting.

In executive session, Panel Chairman Murphy asked that the Board Staff'

Vietnam and Cuba, for later study by the Panel.

-tea of was set to sent yet to ever evyerar10 el rosa geraturn a lies

The Panel Meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

A. R. Ash

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