Document date: 00/00/0000

## Page 1

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

267 THRe 268

268X1

269

269X1 THRIe 275

277 THRu 280

282 THRU 288

290 THRU 293

-

295 THRU 299

Teleased under the John F. Kenned

issassination Records Collection Ac

of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).

ase#NW 65360 Date: 11-17-2022.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 1

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## Page 2

..

G2-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B, Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

I - Mr. W. O. Cregar

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELICT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: SUPERSEDED SECTIONS OF THE

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Reterence is made to the sst memorandur, with

attached appendices,

dated April 30, 1915, requesting

certain documents and other information fron the fBI.

Part one of referenced memorandun requested this

Bureau to make available for review various superseded

sections of the Manual of Instructions (MOL).

Appeadix A

attached to referenced memorandum set forth the sections

requested for review.

Nr. Mark Citenstein, SSC Stair

Member, has advised FBI Special Agent Paul Y. Daly that

revisions to the Mol should cover the period

January 1,

1960, to the present.

These superseded sections are non ready for

review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared

personnel of the SSC Staff. It should be noted that for tho

period January 1, 1960, to

the present, there were no

revisions of MOI Sections 95 and 97.

I - The Attorney General

KAM:sdjs sdj's

(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

AIL INFORMATION CONTAIED

MORN

Assoc. Dir. _

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst._

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. inv. -

Training.

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

INW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 2

PeM

TELETYPE UNIT L

62-116-75-29911

"CLOSURE

KAAM

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 3

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

()

UNITED STATES SENATE SEI ECT COMMITTED

ON INTELLIGINCE ACTIVITIES (3CC)

2 - MX. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R.

Wannall

June 17,

1975

I - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. R, A. Mendenhall

Reference is nado to a memorandun from the SSC

dated April 30, 1975, with attachod appondicos A thru C

requesting certain documents and athor information from

the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC

is the original of a menorandum which responds to one of the

requests contained in above SSC memorandum.

A copy of the memorandun is being furnished for

your records.

Enclosures (2)

==

62-116395

: 1 - the Baputy Attornoy Genoral

Accention: I. Hillian O'Connor

Special Counsel for

Intelligonce Coordinatzon

REC- 102

12-114575-299

(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINER

MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. _

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv..

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Pion. & Evol, -

Spoc. Inv. c

Training

Legal Coun. -

Telophone Rm. -

Nong ROOM L

NW 65360

"Docld32989609 Page 3

TELETYPE UNIT I

PLM

W. OC@R6G1R-4063844

---

## Page 4

Re: Superseded Sections of the

Manual of Instructions

NOTE:

Pursuant to a prior SSC request, we furnished them

107 and 130,

Listed below are the Intelligence Division

representatives and the MOI sections reviewed for this

project:

Section 36-Espionage

Section 31-Registration Act

Section S6-Sabotage

Section 87-Investigations of

Subversive Organizations and

James W. Johnson

Dennis R. Dickson

Louis J. Brune

William N. Preusse

Thomas J. McNiff

CI-1

CI-3

IS-2

15-2

IS-2

Individuals

Section 88-Sedition

George J. Lex

Section 105-Internal Security-

James #. Johnson

Nationalistic Tendency

Howard W. Dare, Jr.

Dennis R. Dickson

Section 107-Internal Security

Edward P. Grigalus

Informants and Confidential

James W. Johnson

Sources; and Foreign Counter- Howard W. Dare, Ji.

intelligence Assets

Dennis R. Dickson

Section 122-Extremist Matters

Robert D. Shea

and Civil Unrest

Section 130-Extremist Informans Robert D. Shea

IS-2

CI-1

CI-2

CI-3

IS-2

CI-1

CI-2

CI-3

IS-1

IS-I

and Sources

As previously noted, there were no MOI revisions

during the period of interest to Section 95-Treason and

Section 97-Voorhis Act.

The revisions.of the MOI requested by SSC consists

of approximately 2,200 pages and is approximately g" in

height.

Due to the bulkiness of these revisions, they are

not being attached to this memorandum.

- 2-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 4

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## Page 5

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ES LHM

Senate select committee.

Report dated 6/17/75

Re: Superseded

Caption of Document: Sections of the Manual of Instructnsi

Part I SSC memorandum 4/30/75.

FBI

Originating Offic

Delivered br

Re sived by:

" Title: -

1' raylor, Date: (0/20/75

3i/M

face Wavease

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

MDR-16

05390 Docki AMBig Pages

---

## Page 6

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

for review

transmitted, so note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

C. Benz, Office Manager

SSC

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents;

five name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions

5. IN A SPoNs orbal requese and lame, merative, suppose e formal request, other-

subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part I.

". Key order fente for e pharopriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

ALL INFORMATION CONTALTED

Operating Procedures

SURELY IS UNCLANSIELZI

DATE 10-25-2000 BX Sp2/4M/Bing

8. SUMMARY (see reverse

side before completing this item)

At the request of SSC, specified superseded sections of

this Bureau's Manual of Instructions, covering the period 1/1/60

to the present, have been made avallable at FBIHQ for review by

SSC Members.

62-116395

TJM:1hb

(4)

379| (6-75)

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 6

TREAT AS YELLOW

weig

5-I1*

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 7

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions. (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes

to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original

abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 7

---

## Page 8

".."

2 - Min

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr.

1-

Mr.

W. R. Wannall

w. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

June 17, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELTIGENCE ACIIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter, and appendices thereto,

from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents

and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is an original of a memorandum which is responsive

to their request.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your

records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. William O'Connor

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

RDS: imn imm

REG- 102

€33

Beig

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN

DATE NEERA

62.116315-298.

•lL 2 1975

NANT GE

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

inspection.

intell..

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

pir

5- Tril

85689 Mage 8

TELETYPE UNIT E

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 9

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. i. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

w. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

June 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECE COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNINNTAI OPERAFIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLICINCE ACTIVIRIES

RI: REQUESE PERTAININIG TO BLECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to SSC letter to the Attorney Goneral,

with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain

documents and other infoznation from the FBI.

BLeCtIonIo SurveILLance y

following request:

Item 13.

"All July and August nemoranda from Former

Special Agont (SA) Leo I. Clari: to the Assistant Spocial Agent

in Charge (ASAC) or the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the

Tewark, low Jersey, Office of the federal Bureau of Invostigation

(FBI) , captioned 'Protection of the President - Uhite House

Inguiry.""

In regard to the aforementioned, a thorough review of

the filos

of the Newari Office of the FBI.

did not zeveal the

existence of a file bearing the caption, "Protection of the

President - Thito House Inquizy."

However, this rovien did

disclose the existence of a file bearing the caption, "protcation

of the Presideni."

A thorough revion of this file failed to

uncover any memoranda emanating fron

former SA Leo I. Clark at

any time.

In addition, a thorough revich ot other files main

Assoc. Dira tained at the levari: Offico believed relovant to the subject

Dep. AD In. - matter of this inquiry, did not reveal any nenoranda, letters

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. _

ox othor type communications prepared by former SA Glark.

Comp. Syst. -

Exi. Affairs —

A thorough review of pertinent FBIHQ files discloses

Files a com. - no memoranda emanating fron former SA Clark regarding this...

Ident..

ratter.

Inspection =

Intell..

Laboratory -

1 - The Attorney General

Plan. $ Eval. -

1Nil

Spec. Iny. — RDS : jmn

Training.

Legal Coun. _

(8)

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

KNV 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 9

117. 110211

LENCLOSURE

SEE

NOTE PAGE 2

79%

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 10

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

NOTE:

Telephonic instructions were issued to the Newark

Office to respond to Item 15, in SSC letter 5/14/75. By airtel

dated 5/30/75 and teletype dated 6/5/75, Newark advised that

their review regarding Item 15 was negative.

Material reviewed

at FBIHQ included, the "Disruption of Democratic National

Convention; Information Concerning" file; records of the

Inspection Division regarding the "Special Squad, Atlantic City,

New Jersey, National Convention, August 22-28, 1964," personnel

files of former Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant

Director W. C. Sullivan, former SA's Leo I. Clark

and Frederick

Baumgaraner.

Above material did not make reference to or con-

tain any memoranda prepared by SA Clark regarding the Democratic

National Convention held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, from

8/22-28/64. File review conducted by SA Robert D. Shea.

= 2=

INS. 55360 Docit: 329896091

Page 10

---

## Page 11

---

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Senate Select Committee

P'LTR

Й 5-8-

SEC to stay Gou be rations 17/7 espect*

Caption of Document: to Intelligence Activities. Re:

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

3:10

Date: 40/20/75

PM

Reheived by:

Refurn this receipt to the Intelligence Division,

, FBI.

ALL DORIS NION CONTAINER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 11

---

## Page 12

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

PROVIDED (check appropriate

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

review but

not transmitted, so

note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY X OTHER

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

C. BINZ, Office Manager

SSC

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive

data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. I sponsor alist date on it mia, spoon to gal request, other-

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix D, Item 15.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

dren as Centen

"'I"

7. Key words font fore possesiate key words from the list provided separately; If key words not listed are

Surveillance

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

SSC requested all July and August, 1964, memoranda captioned

"Protection of the Fresident - White House Inquiry," prepared by

a former Special Agent of our Philadelphia Office.

Search of

Bureau records failed to uncover the existence of any such

documents.

ALL INFORVATION CONTAINED /

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

TJM:1hb

(4)

379| (6-75)

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 12

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 13

INSTRUCTIONS

...

Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated..

SPECIFIC. ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship tò Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. It actual document or transcript

is provided: that fact should be noted and no summary is required: Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 13

---

## Page 14

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SETATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

I - Mr. D. W. Moore -*

2 - Mr. J.

A. Minuz

(Ms. J. B. Hotis)

June 17, 1975

1 - fir. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. I. Moore

ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE AS S5 PALAD

Inclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is the original of a menorandum and enclosures which

serve as a response to one of the SSc requests.

There does not appear to be any relation between the

elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division and the mandate

of the Committee contained in Senate Resolution 21.

You may

approving the forwarding of the enclosed documents to the

Committee.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being

lurnished for your records.

Enclosures

(20)

62-116395

R8E6. 202 = - 1151-292

I = The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. Milian 0' Connor

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

3 HIll 2 1975

f. Dir.

1. AD Adm. -RIM :mam

p. AD Inv. -

' Dir.:

(10)38.

min. a

imp. Syst.

fiLM

%. Affairs

Bs & Com. -

h. Inv. -

/ A ENGLOSURE

pection

fell.

-aboratory

Yan. & Eval. -

sc. inv..

ning

Coun.

one Rm.

Ww. D 3M119750m

Docld:32989609 Page 14

PuM

1,.

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 15

62-116395

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(Mx. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. I. Moore

DHIALD DIATES SETING DELESE COMITTEE (803)

TO GIUDE GOVER INTAL OFFRAIONS

VITH RECFICE TO INTEILIGEICO ACZITILIDS

RIE: TORCHLE DOCULIETIC PLEZAINING TO TED

FEI TD DIPIRZLINZ OF JUSTICE

ORGARIZATION, STRUCTURE, LD JURISDICETOU

Roloronce is enúo to SeC letter dated Lay 14,

1975, v1th attachod aprondicos, requecting contain

documents and other information Iron the FBI.

Furquant to your request in Appendia B, Forü II,

Iten nurber 15, for all cococanda and othor matoriule

peLating to

• Che OL1nzR2010n O1 the LUI LEING HOCOLAS

Division in lato 1972 or carly 1973, chelosed are coples

of nino ISI costnicationo.

Inclosuras (9)

I - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

BREIN IS UNCLASSIFY

ATE 10252000 BY SMALL

MDR16

RIM:mam

(9) 0507

NOTE:

The material furnished contains available information

with reference to the change in name and later elimination of

the Crime Records Division during the period 10/16/72 to 1/3/73.

This matter has been coordinated with Mr. David Divan of the

External Affairs Division.

An extensive search by the Files and

Dep. AD Adm. _Communications Division has failed to locate the 10/4/72 memorandum

or referenced in M. A. Jones to ir. Bishop memorandam, Ine letter to

_the I. M. Walters memorandum to Mr. Felt, 12/14/72.

Comp. Syst. -MiT. Fletcher Thompson mentioned in the second recommendation,

Files a com page 3, of the 10/16/72 Jones to Bishop memorandum is a letter of

Gon. Iv. appreciation for the suggestion with reference to the change in

-name of the Crime Records Division.

Laborotory

Plon. & Eval.

Spoe. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

Director See'y —

MAIL ROOM L

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 15

I'has document is prepared in response to prince and is not for dussema

10!

nation outside your Committee.

Its use i: lori? to official proceedings b?

your committee and the content may nut be cisclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI

TENGLOSUAE -211

---

## Page 16

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

addressee:

Senate Select Committee

XI LHM Memo Report dated 6/17/75

Caption of Socument Study Govt Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities. Re;

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept.

of Justice; Organization, Structure,

and

Jurisdi etion.

De'ivered by:

lar pay bot 1. our 6/23/15

Ster 15

Rebeived by:

Offine Damage

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ATE 11-25-

MOR-1

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 16

---

## Page 17

TO :

ji:.

FROM

SL'BJECT:

NO. 10

010-106

ON

'A tra

«KE, HO, 17

UNITED STA*

GO

RNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. •Bishop

DATE: 10-16-72

'.:

M.

A,' Jones

¡SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE

...:

/CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

i lorraine a dorite a spade tell decelle: ages gracion!

indicated that

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was

has suggested

a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office

f public Information of some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that

suggestion

was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop)

have had with members of your staff concerning a possible

name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that •

he "can think of many reasons for changing the name.

What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"

With the formation of the Computer Systems nivision

and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and

the work of the Uniform.Crime Reporting Section, including

the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal

Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems,

the title "Crime Records,"

as

shas indicated,

is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this

Division is concerned.

"Office of Public Information," which was

suggested by

would inaccurately reflect

the activities and responsibilities of this Division

and could result in confusion with the Office of Public

Information in the Department of Justice. This, of

• course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

"AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED

THREE

MDR-16.

I'nes document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation oussias wour committee..

Ils me si lmotea to official proceedings br

your Committee aid the content, may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel unthout the express approval of the FBl.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 17

---

## Page 18

• inn...

M..

RE:

..

Jones to Mr.. Bishop Memo

SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

......

, It is noted that this Division, which is presently

comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondence

and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting

extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention,...

..""

and other related matters in the law enforcement field.

This Division is involved' in the review and préparation

of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction

and operations received from law enforcement, other Government

agencies, and the general public in those instances where

the Bureau has a responsibility to, disseminate such information.

The FBI taw Enforcemen't Bulletin,

which is the

official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed

by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the

instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law

enforcement profession and the general public. This Division

is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities

for Government officials, law enforcement authorities,

and the general public; directs the program of distributing

informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives

interests in the utilization of radio, television, and

publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsi

bilities in the law

enforcement field by acquainting the

public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of,

a number of research and reference files which are maintained

in a current status and which are essential to the Division

in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

Further,

this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-

'Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television

series, both of which involve research for their sustenance

and success.

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing,

that this Division is not completely absorbed in research

to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 .

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 18

---

## Page 19

trolled tea deline did

M.

RE :

A.

•**:

Jones to Mr.

Bishop Memo

SUGGESTED NAME, CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is

felt, than any other title suggested...It is noted the.cro.a.nt

more likely alternatives discussed were

"Research and

Information Division" and "Research and. Correspondence.

Division "tien

we can det oared tendered pricitedee

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the

Crime. Records Division to Crime Research Division

fated dogs! is

.:?.

""".

780010/28

09:021

2.

That in line with the foregoing, the attached

letter to

be approved and sent.

10/230

+08:075

--

3

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 19

---

## Page 20

OFFICE OF TIK DIRLOTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

"?..

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

• WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

(Typed October 27, 1972)

PERSONAT ATTENTION

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: NAME CHANGE OF CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

TO CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

In view of the transfer of the record functions

of the Crime Records Division to the Computer Systems

Division, I have approved changing the name of the Crime

Records Division to the Crime Research Division effective

immediately.

The Section formerly known as the Crime

Research Section has been renamed Research and Service

section. Manual changes are forthanming.

I. Patrick Gray, III

Acting. Director

'ALL INFORMATION CONTAINZO

DARE T 36300 shm/B

ThDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

NW 65360 Döcld:32989609 Page 20

---

## Page 21

FROM

SUBJECT:

UPTIONA FORe, NO. 19

3010-108

MAT 1962 EDITION

GSA GIN. PIG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum.

THE ACTING DIRICTOR

W. M.'FELT

DATE: 121-1-72

REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION.

1o46a:

" Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is

being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special

assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

.....

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of

a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This

is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the

officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the

ramifications of major cases.

Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field back-

ground, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited

to handle this assignment.

I he has time. Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop

• meaningful practieal cases which will enable new agents to meet present-

day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities

to be used by Mir. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report

to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.

1/

is being diverted from his current

inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate

survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the

transfer of its functions to other divisions.or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

'ALL, INFORMATION CONTATNED

DATE 10-26-70

"This dome is proared in respose to wor renest and is not for aisseme

nation rigi."

one cannot n

les use di lanted to officirl proceedings ou

you Countee c• the cunt:, may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person.

nel without

NW 65360 Docld: 32989609 Paget the Gress approval of the TEl.

---

## Page 22

UNITED STATES GOVRAVENT

• Memorand

TO

MR. FELT

DATE:

12/6/72

FROM

• I. M. WALTERSY

SUBJECT:

SUPÉRVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1)-

MOR16

PURPOSE: : To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer

, of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based

on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together

with appropriate personnel as follows:

•OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other

nows modia formerly handled by Assistant Director Pishop, his front office Agent

personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).

Functions and Related Responsibilties:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressionai

telephone,calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public

and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

europe dee carde dies destinercens caressroad,

repair gain oiciniciant

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning

press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commenta:

liaison with the White Flouse and Department press offices; review of editorials

and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News

Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding

press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible

future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches -

to FBIH@ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Revieiv material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical

IT's ist is timited to

your Committee and the curient may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

. CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 22

---

## Page 23

ITANT

wupervisory Reorgan,

*Personnel; Crime R

tion of Functions and

arch Division

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison

maiters..

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume/review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the coriespondence./ Formerly handled by

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director

and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions, and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions;

-file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background

of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and

requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on •

local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with

correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news

media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government

representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requesis for

publications.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. these functions formen y

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

-2, -

CONTINUED - OVER .

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 23

---

## Page 24

¿ for Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Person

Crime Research Division

introde die i coet

stire

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special

interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the

public through movies; television and other news.media; and specialized.research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau Oficials, research for speeches and policy statements

of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

• Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other

Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone

directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and

other officials based on review of current periodi cals, police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance.

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of ?

lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination-

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue

of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and

correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance •

Oi a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;

custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together

with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-

quotes of Director in news

media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizution:

-3-

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 24

---

## Page 25

¿mo for Mr. Felt

ne: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division.ae1

11108:

Research and coordination & materials in connection with speeches, by-

line articies and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation

of memoranda concerning.books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request

FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material.

presented in the FBI'S Annual Reports outlines and research for speech data

requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materiats.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders.

parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics

concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureaujuvenile

project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors

to the Eureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-.

town nevspapers as recruitment aids.

These functions formeil y handled among

the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour

Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the -job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitor's and sccurity of all tow areas;

prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

publication in their home-town newspapers.

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360. Docld:32989609 Page 25

---

## Page 26

sior Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorgamzation of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division,

Recommended Agent Transfer:

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on naiviquals requesting special

the Director: compilation of data and preparation of background

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative

memoranda pertainag to organizations asking for data./ These functions formerly

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit, (In past years these functions were

performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent. Transfer:

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugitives maintenance of special indices concerr.

distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with

je suns mahing telephonic i porsonal calls to FBIHO concerning matters within the

jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly

handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with

in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested •

that clerical functions and personnel noy simply move with the Agent desks and

units tö which they are attached. Questions of space also have not been covered

and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel

suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico

(e.g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Iraining :

Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and

Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should -

remain at Headquarters. Accordingly

formerly in the

Front Oilice of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training

Dirision in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator

of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico.

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and

relocation of units

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page functions to Quantico demand greater study and inas much

---

## Page 27

"fior Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these

matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated

in consultation with Administrative Division.

It is the purpose of this memorandum

to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in

order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and

supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research

Division.

in coin as iri?"

td,'

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

222200 OF M

and nice don eins t

ivantico lineaten tho Lilve

he duite enferent the redlin

ment of feverined the comester

- fatime 2

(FoReGOING typed oN followis pAGe)

chun i ain Been this to Cigarin

chante chin gas

NW/ 65360-Đocld:32989609 Page 27

---

## Page 28

i lisaus

ADDENDUM OF V. M. FELT

12-6-72

WMF:cert

" This appears logical and feasible. I snags develop we can y

readjust. I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain

under'

should be reassigned to the Iraining

Divisions I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico,

however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material

at fleadquarters and occasional contacts with the public.

Furthermore, there

is no availabla space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly,

I recommend that the FBIHQ Library. ke moved into the Library. Building ai .

Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIH@ the telephone directories and

encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The

space into which the FBiHa Library was to have been moved in the Sth and D

Suilding can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence

Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and

that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by saparate

memoranda.

- 6

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 28

---

## Page 29

UNITED STATES GON

Memorando

MENT

'MR. FELT

DATE: December 14,1972 .

•:

FRON

I. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

.

per prior approval of Mr. Gray

Effective immediately /ail unctions and personnel formerly assigned

to the Crime Pesenrch Division are reassigned as indicated oelow. Recipient

Inspectors, section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of

assignment.

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical

personne: unlized in banding these assignments arc to transfer with listed agenis

in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTINC DIRECTOR

:

-

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press ard

other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research

Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated

as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by

ATI INFORMATIÖN CONTAININ-

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison: Congressional correspondence; Congressional

telephone cails; progress ci legisiation oi interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and ali public

and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record

Press, radio, television and motion sicture contacts: field matters concer:

press, ra lio and televisich; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a com-

mentator;lason with the White House and Department press oiices; review of

editorials and articles: review of magazines, newspaper cliupings and Washington.

News service ticker items; news releases and press inquiics; SAC calls regarcing

press

releases;

press contact prograri, coordinate press matters of possible

future use from FEIriQ Divisics.

This document is prepared in response to you request and is not for dissemi

nation outside wi!?..

Ch tO Offen: 2300002199

NW 65360 Docid: 329896204 liggerpress uproval of the FBI.

usclose to muuthorted person

3024)

---

## Page 30

• Memo for Mi. Felt

• Re? Reorganization of

Review statements and speeches by Director. or matters affecting major

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches:

to FBIQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critica

of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

special photograplis in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran Liaison

matters

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled b:

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director

and Natica) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions an Related Responsibililies:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field

divisions; lile reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent

background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply tu

inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government

representatives o local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field

offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public

relations: general news media; requests and inquiries irom law eniorcement

officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail;

and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorney's Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legi

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

-2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 30

---

## Page 31

Memo for Mr. Felt

Rei, Reorganization of

TRAINING DIVISION.

G.t610.i"

2 C429922:222122224

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest

in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and juisdiction to law enforcement and the

public through movics, television and other néws media; and specialized research

and prepazation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements

of the Direcior and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

... ~ Reference service to FBI officials, employees, andathorities from ther

Government agencies and individuals authorized: maintenance of out-of-town telepac

directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director anni

other officiais based on review of current periodicals: police journals and scientifis

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and geration of a

lending library to Bureau employees.

Lelaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and disseminatio

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LES); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue

of the Lab; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparation of interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices;

and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

" •

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FEI and maintena

of a running bries on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of malters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Burcau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies

custody and maintenance of the general and oificial Eureau photograph file together

with indices: writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

-3 -

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 31

---

## Page 32

Memo for sIr. Felt

Re: Reorganization of

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution. of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis -

quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and autha ized individuals and

organizations.

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-

line articles and featue stories made or published by the Director, preparation

of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement: review and analysis oi magazin:

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request

• FBi review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material

presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research ior speech data

requested by Bureau oificials; maintenance of indices on research materials,

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance o

of reierence files pertiner:

to FBl jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex oifenders, '

parole and prchation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics !

concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile

project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings, and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitor.

to the Bureau. Preparation oi data on Bureau employèes for: publication in home-

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y handled among

the Fugitive Fublicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit,

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autogra

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the -job

training and supervision of tow leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or .

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to lay enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statstics of visitors and security of all tour areas;

prepare data o: background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

publication in their home-town newspapers.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 32

-

1

---

## Page 33

Memo for Mi. Felt

- Re: Reorganization of

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special

lours or mectings with the Director; compilation of iuta and preparation of backgrou

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informati

memoranda pertaining to organizations. asking for data. These functions formerly.

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit,

ANZSPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISIONA

jri..

8,157

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Toy Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices

concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct

interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning

matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI Oi ci interest to the Beau. These

functions were fornierly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment

oi space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.

2.

That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and

responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with

any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational

charts.

3.

That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 33

-5-

---

## Page 34

::airtel."

it sold?

12/0

December 15, 1972

1'0: SAC, Albany

From: For the Acting Director, FBI w

W. Mark Felt

Acting Associate Director

SUPERVISORY REORCANIZATION OF

und thad angel, softines

ALL INFORMATION CONTATIO

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

DATE I LEAST LAMER

CORIVE RESEARCH DIVISION I

MDR-16

For information of all offices, the functions and personnel formerly

assigned to the Crime Research Division have been realigned at FBId.

Mr. Gray has assumed supervision of contacts with the Congress,

press and other news media.

Remaining functions of the Crime Research Division have been

reorganized and assigned as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and

the FBi and preparation of replies to correspondence.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

•...

Formal liaisch with the American Bar Association and other legal_

oxgantation

TRAINING DIVISION

Operation and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and

dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest

2 - All Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

Its use is limited to official proceedings br

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 34

6:048

---

## Page 35

Airtel to Aibany

Supervisory Reorganization oi

Functions and Personnel;

Crime Research Division

In law enforcement and the crime problem, coordination and complation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement

and the public through movies

, television and other news mecia; and specialized

research and preparation of material in "connection with memoranda requested

by the Director and cher Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy

statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning

the FBI,

•÷

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs

with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

White House name checks and appropriate correspondence; compilation

of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours

os meetings with the Direcior; compilaliou i vaia and prepuration di baciground

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of

informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available

media; prepare narrative and illustrative cata for Top Ten Fugitive Program,

research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugiaves.

Above furnished for guidance in routing communications to FBIQ.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 35

---

## Page 36

MAY IPAZ ADITION

OSA GIN. 21G. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO VER

Memorandum

MENT

MR. FELT

DATE:

12/18/72

FROM :N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the

reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research

Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The

purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned

to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes .

in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise

of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related

responsibilities reassigned to the respective Uttice or Division. Aii ciericai

personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted

for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if'

there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical

personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative

or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under

the respective Office or Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINIO

MDR16

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former

Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results

furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can

be adjusted.

This document is preparce lu response lo lur crust ad is not for dissemi-

nation outside you don'"":

sor Committee ant the cont

mi to oficial proceedogs by

nel ivithout the capross appidad if tu.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 36

---

## Page 37

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPIONAL PORM NO. 10

3010-106

MAT 1987

SITIO!!

UNITED STATES GO

RNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Felt®

T. J. Jenkins

c4C23c4C0 2002

DATE: December 21, 1972

2AN3А:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

C08 309109

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

finest will yee

1357221

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt,

dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and

personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200

corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINIO

DATE,

MDR-16

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the

library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books

and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI

Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters.

-=*-

from the survey, it was determined these books can be, maintained lu two room.

presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surpris spade.

• In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members.

These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege

of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposin

that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the

books at the end of that period to Quantico.

This document is minared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outsile you Coinmilice.

Its ase is limila to official proceedings by

your Committce and the content may nut be disclosed to unuuthorized persön

pel without the express approval af the FBl.

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 37.

---

## Page 38

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr.

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

From the survey, I believe that the two library technicians, who äre

presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and

telephone directories and that when

returns to work a decision can be

made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico,

it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books,

lending library, and out-of-toby telephone directories be transferred to the Academy

at Quantico.

*

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending

library,over the next six-month period.

(3) That

be transferred to Quantico

as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.

• (4) That

. --

transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

be

•-4°

1.

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that

* be reassigned.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 38

=2.

---

## Page 39

ovine ordered crisee cocond dod Cup potence

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins.to Mr. Felt

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division SK

i did racere trait

44: (6) That the two library technicians;

be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories

remaining at FBI Headquarters.

Despite is?.

(7) It above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will

handle.

-

12/2.7

1:188

3-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page 39-

---

## Page 40

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

@SA GEH.

81c. Ho. 27

UNITED STATES GO

Memoranaum

MENT

Mr. Felt

I.. J. Jepkins

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

EUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION.

:1.0..

H4010edo"

DATE:

January. 3, 1973"

Reference is made to the memorandum bf.Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt.

dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assignes

to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly

the Research and Service Section.

As you know,

, has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs

Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters

into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Sectio.

This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that te

Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal

tiài

ie fueues livacy Juil, whal is ivii vi i here ài abi readqualiens, ve meg=-

with the Research Unit leaving three units from the lormer Research and Service

Section; namely, the Research Unit;

Special Productions Unit and Publications

Unit.

.

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggesticas.

Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrear:

Division and he is agreeable.

This would mean an addition to his division of one

Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Trainin=

Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed

at FBI. Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I

believe that current Section Chief

is capable of handling this

assignment as Section Chief, particularly if?

is retained as

Number One Man of the Section.

has served as Number One Man in the

former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIEND

DATE 10-26-2000 BX JINAUm/

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation ulside pom Commitles.

Its use is limited to official proceedings bu

your committee and the convent may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the capross approral of the kEl.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Pàge 40.

---

## Page 41

22/256 206g Bear 240255

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crimè Research Division

.....

mecharaching.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime

Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of

the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and

Research Section.

..

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals

And chiet Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the

Administrative Division.

2 9. . . . .o..

Division be retirea as Section Chief. OF

• current Section Chief in the Training

THE NEVATEN

wait

BLESIANTE

be retired as Number One Man of

(4) That

-----

this new Section in the Training Division,

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Pagé 41

---

## Page 42

Prasadios:

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

1-4-73

"іл.:"

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed

new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. "I think

this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has

agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section.

I recommend approval with this modification.

Approard

-=

3

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 42

---

## Page 43

OPTIONAL ADAM NO, 10

OSA ÚEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum.

' . . ..

TO

: Mr. Felt '

DATE: January 3, 1973 *

FROM : T. J.

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

EUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to the memorandum bf.Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt,

dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned

to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly

the Research and Service Section. As you know, the Section Chief of that Section,

Milton A. Jones, has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs

Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters

into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section.

This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the

Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal

tie fueues Libraiy Unli, wial is left vi it here al FEi Headqualiero, ve merge

with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service

Section; namely, the Research Unit;

Special Productions Unit and Publications

Unit.

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions,

Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative

Division and he is agreeable.

This would mean an addition to his division of one

Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training

Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed

at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I

believe that current Section Chief, T. J. Brownfield, is capable of handling this

assignment as Section Chief, particularly if Mr. Lawrence J. Heim is retained as

Number One Man of the Section. Mr. Heim has served as Number One Man in the

former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DARE SELAM

. This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committée.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

NW 65360 Docid:32989609 Page 43

nel without the express angrat of !'

---

## Page 44

othe Chide Dry.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

**...

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime

Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of

the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and

Research Section.

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals

And Chiet cive Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the

Administrative Division.

--aid.

Ze That SA T. J. Brownfield current Section Chief in the Training

Division be retenred as Section Chief. Of HIS NINETA

• =

i will.

"7'

DAISIENTA

(4) That SA Lawrence J. Heim be retained as Number One Man of

this new Section in the Training Division,

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 44

---

## Page 45

Creepcard

2020644

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

1-4-73

174:.24:01

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed -

new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. I think te

this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has

agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section.

I recommend approval with this modification.

Approvid.

NW 65360 Döcld:32989609 Page 45

3

---

## Page 46

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

". Hor review but not trapsmitted, so note.)

If a document was made available

for review but not

$ DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate

term;

add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

C. Benz, Office Manager

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number

interviewee, testifier and subject)

of briefer..

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. Wise spoNs erbal redate and iame, mber afive, suppose to formal request, other-

subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part II, Item 15.

7. Key "onde fant rote pppropriato koy words from the list provided separately; if key words not listad aro

Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse side before completing this item)

At the request of the SSC, documents relating to the

elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972

were furnished to the SSC for review.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

MDR16

TREAT AS YELLOM

62-116395

TJM:1hb

(4)

379| (6-751

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 46

5.JM

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. 255

7-2-25

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 47

- INSTRUCTIONS.

• Type or print clearly in ink.

' • Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC. ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 63060 Docld:32989609 Page 41

---

## Page 48

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

:

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-108

MAY 19D2 iSITION

OSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum.

Mr. Felt®

T. J. Jenkins

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISIONS

DATE: December 21, 1972

AT FORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSENHD

DATE /N-242001

MDR14

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt,

dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and

personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200

corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

Inspector Bernand M. Suttler, GS-16

Lilorarian lona triswann, Gs-y/

Accistant Librarian Eleanor In Donich, GS-€

Secretary Connie:Hutchison, GS-4 (position is GS-5)

3 Librarian Technicians

Alica Brand, GS-4 (on extended leave without pay - due to illness)

Patricia, auber, GS-3 (GS-4 position)

m-tilanueva, GS-4

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the

library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books.

and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI

Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters.

from the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms

presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space."

In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members.

These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege

of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposin

that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the

books at the end of that period to Quantico.

I'has document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclased to unauthorized person.

nel without the express approval of the EBl.

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Döcld:32989609 Page 48

---

## Page 49

328

dater.:

Memorandum T.J. Jenkins to Mr reit Came techee

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

From the survey; I believe that the two library technicians, who are.

presently assigned to the rare

can handle the remainig reterence books and

telephone directories and that when Miss Brand returns to work a decision can be

made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico,

it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books,

lending library, and out-of-tols telephone directories be transferred to the Academy

at Quantico.

- -

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending

library over the next six-month period.

-..

(3) That Inspector Bernard M. Suttler be transferred to Quantico

as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy. ,

(4) That Miss Iona G. Swann and Miss Eleanor I. Benish be

transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

it not

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that Miss Connie

Hutchison be reassigned.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 49

---

## Page 50

.!!"

Memorandụm T. J. Jenkins to Mr:

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

Felt

...i,ш....

-df/ry.ri(6) That the two library technicians, Patricia Lauber and Ester.

Villanueva, be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories

remaining at FBI Headquarters.

handle.

(7) If above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will

i see milde

Approved. C

Tiển

130/37

1:18P

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 50

3

---

## Page 51

TO

TA• SONAL KIX

NO. 10

2010-106

.ON

"EG, NO. 37

UNITED STA"

GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mc. Bishop

M.

A. ' Jones

DATE: 10-16-72

FROM

sure, di's

SUBJECT:

For Mes

SUGGESTED NAME. CHANGE

CRIME RECORDS DIVISION t

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was

indicated that Fletcher D. Thompson, SAC, Omaha, has suggested

a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office

of Public Information of some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that Mr. Thompson's suggestion

was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop)

have had with members of your staff concerning a possible

name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that .

he "can think of many reasons for changing the name.

What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"

With the formation of the Computer Systems Division

the

Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems,

the title "Crime Records," as Mr. Thompson has indicated,

is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this

Division is concerned.

"Office of Public Information," which was

suggested by Mr. Thompson, would inaccurately reflect

the activities and responsibilities of this Division

and could result in confusion with the Office of Public

Information in the Department of Justice.

This, of

course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

=

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

FURBIN IS UNGLASSIFIE

ATE 1156-2000 BY CHAUN/

MORt

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings oy

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

NW 65360 Döcld:32989609 Page 51

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

---

## Page 52

M

A

RE':"

Jones

to Mr.

Bishop.

Memo

SUGGESTED' NAME CHANGE;

MeRRIME RECORDS DIVISION I SEE:

:.."

It is noted that this Division, which is presently

comprised Of the Crime Research, Section, and the Correspondencerns

and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting:

extensive research pertaining

to crime, crime prevention,

and other related matters in the law enforcement field.

This Division is involved in the review and preparation

of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction

and operations received from law enforcement, other Government

agencies, and the general public in those instances where

the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.

"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,

which is the

official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed

by crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the

instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law

enforcement profession and the general public. This Division

is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities

for Government officials, law enforcement authorities,

and the general public; directs the program of distributing

informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives

to various media for the purpose of effecting

, and apprenersion of these criminais with the neiy vi cilizen

cooperation;and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's

interests in the utilization of radio, television, and

publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsi

bilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the

public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of

a number of research and reference files which are maintained

in a current status and which are essential to the Division

in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-

Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television

series, both of which involve research for their sustenance

and success.

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing,

that this Division is not completely absorbed in research

to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 52

---

## Page 53

M. A. Jones to Mr.

Bishop Memo

RE: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is

felt;.than.any other title.suggested::It/is.noted..thehxrv04cs

more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and

Information Division"

and "Research and, Correspondence.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Crime Records Division to!Crime Research Division.

1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the

Opioned:

0. 10022

'фoіd...:

2.

That in line with the foregoing, the attached

letter to Mr. Thompson be approved and sent.

10/3.32

-..-

3

1

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page 53

---

## Page 54

TO

OPTIONAL FORe, NO. 10

5010-106

21AY 1902 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

THE ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM

: W. M. FELT

DATE: 12-1-72 :

.. "*119

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is

being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special

assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of

a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This

is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the

officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the

ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field back-

ground, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited

to handle this assignment.

,! I he has time. Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop

• meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-

day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities

to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report

to Mir. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.

Inspector Wilburn-K.KDeBruler is being diverted from his current

inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate

survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the

transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For intormation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

BRHIN LUNCH

MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee., Its use is limited to official precedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person:

nel without

NW 65360 Docld:3298960 without the express approval of the FBI.

---

## Page 55

nOSR cited

87°0.110. 29

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

120243/1330

'TO

MR. FELT

DATE: December 14, 1972

3206

FRON"

I.. M. WALTERS

auton tot.

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

"ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

DAN: 10 3 59502Am/

MDR16

per prior approval of Mr. Gray

Effective immeciately ail functions and personnel formerly assigned

to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated öelow. Recipient

Inspectois, Section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of

assignnient.

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical

personnel utilized in handling these assignments are to transfer with listed Agents

in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

Inspactors Janes F. Bland, David W. Bowers, Jack I. Herington and

SA Harold 2. Leinbaugh.

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and

other news media formerly handled in the Front Oifice of the Crime Research

Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated

as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by Inspectors Jack t.

Heringtowand David W. Bowers...wi

Functions and Related Resyonsibilities:

Congressional liaison: Congressional correspondence; Congressional

telephone cails; progress of legisiation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resoluticas introduced into both Houses of Congress and ali public

and private laws enacted. and review and analysis of the Congressional Record

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts: field matters concern

press, radio and teievision; correspondence relating to an editorial oi to a com-

mentator; la son with the White House and Depariment press ottices; review of

editorials nnd articles review of magazines, newspaper clivings and washington:

News service acker rems news releases and press inquries; sAc calls regarcang

press releases, press contact promar

coordinate bress matters of possible as

future use irom FBIAQ Divisions.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

you commutee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthomsed person

NW 65360 Dold:32989603uhge the express approval of the FBI .

---

## Page 56

• " Memo for Mr. Felt

• • Re: Reorganization of

Review statements and speeches by Director of matters affecting major:

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment.of speeches

to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critica!

of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

special photographs in Pirector's Office; American, Legion and veteran Liaisons

matters.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 02

Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One

Man), Ralph IV. Engelmeier, Marion S. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg:

Robert C. Dean and Richard I. White.

To assune review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspóndence. Formerly handled by

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance io Director

and Natica) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions an Related Responsibililies:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field

divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent

background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to

inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government

representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field

offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public

relations: general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement

*-

officials: Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail;

and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

SA James C. Farrington,

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Associatich, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legai

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 56

---

## Page 57

Memo for Mr. Felt

Re: Reorganization of

ded TRAINING DIVISION ride re

4200206022

Section Chief Milton Ä.: Jones, Inspectors Bernard Suttler and :

George T. QuilD; and SAs Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell, Edward H.

Gooderham, David L. Divan; Carl'J. Hall, Louis S: Lear, Donald GHaninng;

Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C.

Stukenbroeker.cc.rmfs

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

..and.dissemination ofpamphlets.reprints.and.related.material.of.special.interest...

in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and juisdiction to law enforcement and the

public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements

of the Director and analysis of articles and statemeits made concerning the FBI."

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

.... - Reference service to FBI officials, employees, andathorities from ther.

Government agencies and individuals authorized: maintenance oi out-of -town telepho:

directories covering United States; preparation of memprandia for Director and

other officiais based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and geration of a

lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement of crime for each issue

of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparatien of interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices;

and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenar

of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Direcior and Bureau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies.

custody and maintenance of the general and oificial Bureau photograph file together

with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBl fugitives and

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 57

---

## Page 58

- Memo for Mr. Felt

Re: Reorganization.of

matters of fBi jurisdiction; distribution of Unuorm Crime neports Bulletn

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reférence file on mis-?

quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly revfew of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and autha ized individuals and

organizations.

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-

line articles and featue stories made or published by the Duector, preparation

of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request

FBi review for accuracy; compilation of data and'narrative form of materiar

presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data

requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex oifenders,

parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and stalistics /

concerning f'Bl speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile

project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

SA William H. Stapleton.

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tow's conducted for visitors

to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y handled among

the Fugitive Fublicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograp

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the -job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statstics of visitors and security of all tour areas;

prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

publication in their home-town newspapers.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

SAs Edward J. Kilday, Ill, and Anthony Edward Schiappa

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 58

- 4=

CONTINITA - DIFT

---

## Page 59

Memo for Mr. Felt

Re: Reorganization of

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special

tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of lata and preparation of backgroun

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informatit

memoranda.pertaining.to organizations asking for data.. These functions.formerly

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit.

22040544:

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION 2194X

Litera

wist reti

SA Thomas B. Coll

Prates?

To assune overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

avzilable media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Iop Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning.fugitives: maintenance of special.indices.

concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduci

interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIQ concerning

matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI Oi of interest to the Bureau. These

functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment

of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.

2, That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and

responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with

any needed realigument of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational

charts.

3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

-5-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 59

---

## Page 60

OPTIONAL TORM NO, 10

ALAY 10D2 BOITION

5010-106

OSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO VIK

*MENT

Memorandum

TO

MR. FELT

DATE:

12/18/72

FROM

iN. P. CALLAHAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

MOR 16

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the

reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research

Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The

purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned

to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes

in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise

of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related

responsibilities reassigned to the respective Vitice or Division. Ail clerical

personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted

for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if'

there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical

personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative

or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under

the respective Office or Division.

Inspector James F. Bland, Office of the Acting Director

Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt, Office of the Acting

Associate Director

SA James C. Farrington, Office of Legal Counsel

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Training Division

SA William H. Stapleton, Administrative Division

SA Edward J. Kilday III, General Investigative Division

SA Thomas B: Coll, Special Investigative Division

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former

Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results

furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can

be adjusted.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 60

---

## Page 61

Her 1902 tolrion

MigGSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVEKNMENT

Memoranaum

TO

VR. FELT

DATE:

12/6/72

FROM : I. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED

: AAS2-14

PURPOSE:

To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer

of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based

on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together

With appropriate personnel as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other

news modia formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishon, his front office Agent

personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).

Functions and Related Responsibilies:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional

telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public

and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning

press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentato

liaison with the White Flouse and Department press offices; review of editorials

and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News

Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding

press releases: press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible

future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

.....

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major.

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches -

to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, tirst-name salutation mail, matters critical

(hus document

nation outside your Committee. Its use is timited to offocat proceedings or

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 61

---

## Page 62

•jur Mix. Felt

supervisory Reorgan

tion of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison

matters.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Inspectors James F. Bland, David W. Bowers and JackE. Herington.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume/review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director

and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions;

-file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background

of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and

requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on

local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with

correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news

media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government

representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requesis for

publications.

--

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Section Chief Gorda E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One

- Man), Ralph W. Engelmeier, MarionS. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg,

Robert C. Dean and Richard E. White.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formed y

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

.. SA James C. Farrington..

-2-

CONTINUED - OVER

NW- 65360-Docld:32989609 Page 62

---

## Page 63

u for Mr. Felt

-: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;

i Crime Research Division a

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special

interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the:

public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau Officials, research for speeches and policy statements"

of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI,

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

: Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other

Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone

*directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and

other officials based on review of current periodi cals, police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance•

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of ?

lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue

of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and

correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBl and maintenance

of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;

custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together

with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on inis -

quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations

_ NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 63

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 64

-

mo for Mr. Felt

Re:

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division

Research"and coordination & materials in connection with speeches, by.-:

line articies and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation

of memoranda concerning. books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request.

FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative.form of material....

presented in the FBI'S Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data

requested by Bureau ofticials, maintenance of Midices on research mätertais or!

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,

parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision-and statistics

concerning, FBI Speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile

project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors Bernard M. Suttler and George T.

Quinn and SAs Harold P. Leinbaugh, Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell,

Edward H. Gooderham; David I. Divan, Carl J. Hall, Lous S. Lear, Donald G.

Hanning, Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C.

Stukonor cokor.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision forspecial visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors

to the Eureau / Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions former y handled among

the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit; Research Unit and Tour

Unit,

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas;

prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

• publication in their home-town newspapers.

-4

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 64

---

## Page 65

jfor Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and

Personnel, Crime Research Division

Recommended Agent Transfer: •

SA William H. Stapleton

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assüme White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special.

tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative.

memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were

performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent Transfer:

arisin

SAs Edward J. Kilday, III, and Anthony Edward Schiappa

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerni

distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with

pisons inaking tolophonic or personal calls to FBIH® concerning matters within the

jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly

handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SA Thomas B. Coll

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with

in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested

that clerical functions and personnel noy simply move with the Agent desks and

units to which they are attached. Questions of space alsö häve not been covered

and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel

suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico

(e. g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training

Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and

Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should -

remain at Headquarters. Accordingly, SA Harold P. Leinbaugh, formerly in the

Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training

Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coar dinator

of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico.

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and

Nw 6560 Boc:3898360*S aged functions to Quantico demand greater study and inns much

---

## Page 66

dior Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;

Crime Research DiviSion:

as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these

matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated

in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum

to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in

order to provide for immediate routing. Of mail and upper level *eview,and

supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research

Division.

Sons Read gara,

•is do a trigger and..

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

appined wept the st Fein hugh

with remain with fanti office 70

Bland i Mering in, 1577

it aper main in plo

Assarium del0.n..Füls

The 019999931

teres and benne

fu the Bench i berrie find s

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•cle do feeding

with the parentic."

inferee do ten confich the relie didn

did la Bill finis

in do ge no Badilero come les cereal condi in freed a beatly incealer

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NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 66

---

## Page 67

to coate desose?

AAP9-4.408

977429056

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

12-6-72

WMF:cri

?,This appears logical and feasible, I snags develop we can

readjust..

I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain

under Section Chief Milton A. Jones, should be reassigned to the Training"

Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico,

however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material

at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public.. Furthermore, there

is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly,

I recommend that the FBIHQ Library be moved into the Library. Building at

Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIH. the telephone directories and

encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The

space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D

Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence

Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and

that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate

memoranda.

- 8 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 67

---

## Page 68

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

1 - Mc. W. R. Wannall

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Actorney General

Director, FBI

J. S. SETATE SELICI COLITTLE IO

STUDY GOVERNLIENTAL OPERATIOUS WITH

RESPECT TO IITELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

6076

Inclosed for your infornation is the original

of a merorandun concerning an interview by a Staff Member

of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent

Ernest Il. Belter. A copy of the nemorandun is also enclosed

for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate

Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Actention: K. William O'Connor REC- 102

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

13.111:1:-2960

1 - 67-

(Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

salacon re

SFP: 1hb /hb

(11)

Namelodi

L8/T5KJ

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst._

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. .

Laboratory _

Plan. & Eval. _

TELETYPE UNIT

@ 853601 Dbcld:2989609 Page 68

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 69

62-116395

1 - Ms. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

1 - Mc. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 17, 1975

U. S. SELATE SOLECT CORMITTEE JO

STUDY COVERNIISTDAL OFRRATIONS WITHI

RESPICE TO INTILZIGEICE ACCIVIIIES (SSG)

RE: INTERVIEO DE RETIRCO FBI

21070-81

spassmin

6026

Sot out belor Is infornation voluntarily fumiched

by Iz. Boltor to the FBI, on June 11, 1975. Bolter servod

in the IDI as on SA fron July 19, 1943, uncil his retirerent

on January 29, 1973.

Ch June 10, 1975, Eeltor tas contacted by SSC

Scaft kenber Michael.

Epstein who requested to intcruici

Belter at the SSC office.

On June 11, 1975, Bolter vas advised

by Ipstein that tha interview would concern hartin Luchor

vould cake place at 3:00 p.i. that day, June 11, 1975.

Balice vas inickvionad by Epsicin in SS0 quaricro

during the period of approvinately 3:00 p.ul. to 3:40 p.D. on

June 11, 1975. The intervict was not under oath and tas not

pursuant to a subpoena. The dotailo of the intervier are

sot out bolot, noi necessarily in chronological order.

Belter was asted and furnished the period of time

Dep. ADd he had served in the lashingion Fiold Office (UPO) of the FBI

and the date of his retirenant.

He ras asked and furnished

Admin. -

Comp.Syst.com

Informacion as to his dubios in ITO at the time he sctired

Ext. Affairs

-and what they vere in 1964. lle informed lipstein that he tas

Gen. In -the Supervisor of a Squad which handled cloctronic surveillances,

Ident.

Inspection -

- including both nicrophone and telephone survillances.

Then

Intell..

Laboratory

(Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)

Plan. I Eval. 1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

Spec. Inv._

Training -

Inb

Legal Coun..

_SFP: 1hb

(10)

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

TELETYPE UNIT

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 69

-11

SEE NOTE PAGE

•111:375

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 70

•

...

SEATE SELECT COLMITTED ON INTELLIGINCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: IUTIERVIRIT OF RETIRED FBI SA EY SSC

he was asked how many men vorked under him on his Squad, he

told Epstein that he desired to consuli with the rBI

ropresentative tho had accompanied him to the interviow bur

uho tas not present during the accual intervier, that

representative remaining in an outer lobby of the SSC quarters.

Belter requested this consultation privilege as he belleved

the question vas outside the indicated scope of the intervion.

Ipstein Indicated he was vithcraving the question, thus

eliminating the necessity for the consultation.

Belter was questioned and furnished infornation

concerning the organization of VTO, from the Special Agenc

in Charge down to the squad level. Belter indicated that

there nerc several squads handling criminal cases, some

handling applicant-type investigations, and other squads

handling security vork. He indicated that the security squads

vere under a security coordinator, Iudvig ll. R. Oberndors,

now deceased.

Epstein advised Belter that the SSC Staff had

read Belter's deposition in the Halperin case. (Morion H.

Halperin; et al, vs. Henry A. kissinger, et al, Unitec states

District Court, District of Columbia Civil Action I'ile

Fumber 1187-73.) On the basis of the deposicion, Ipstein

Indicated he was familiar with the adminiscrative procedure

for instituting telephone surveillances and asked Belter

about the aaministracive procedures for instituting microphone

survelllances. It vas Belter's roply that the acministrative

*e proc arol

procedures vere essentially the same for both types of

surveillances.

Epstein then had Belter recite the procedure fron

shen an SA vould request fron FBI Headquarters by form letter

authocity for installing a microphone surveillance. Belter

told how the Headquarters vould first authorize the ficld to

-2 =

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 70

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## Page 71

SENATE SELICI COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

conduct a feasibility survey, results of which would be

furnished Headquarters. Thereafter, if the installation was

feasible and justified, Headquarters would authorize by

correspondence the installation. Epstein asked whether the

authorizing comunication from Headquarters would mention

that the Attorney Ganeral (AG) had authorized the surveillance.

Belter told Epstein that in recent years he belleved that the

Bureau communication authorizing a survelllance would indicate

that the At authorization had been obtained; but Belter could

not recall whether of not this indication was shown during

1964. Belter also told Epstein that at one time he thought

that former FBI Director Hoover did not need to have Af approval

in advance for a specific microphone surveillance. Epstein

indicated he was already aware of this.

Epstein then inquired concerning a microphone

surveillance which the FBI had installed at the Willard Hotel

in Hashington, D. C., concerning King. Belter was unable

to pinpoint when this occurred and told Epstein that he,

Belter, was bypassed in practically all netters relating to

this surveillance. The entire matter was handled by security

Coordinator Oberndorf and Belter never saw any of the correspond-

ence relating thereto, Belter was only asked to furnish some

support personnel from his squad for the purpose of monitoring

the survelllance. In response to further specifie questions,

Belter advised Epstein that he did not see any correspondence,

logs, tapes, or any other material relating to this surveillance.

Epstein inquired about the procedureof an Inspector

checking on such a surveillance at the time of a perfodie

Inspection of WFO. He asked if the Inspector would examine

the required correspondence relating to all microphone

surveillances the office had conducted. Belter repiled that

an Inspector would look over matters of this nature but that

• 3 .

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 71

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## Page 72

SENATE SELICT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

In the case of the King microphone surveillance, as with

certain other extremly sensitive ones, Oberndorf would have

possession of the correspondence and Belter would be unaware

of any examination of such correspondence by an Inspector.

Belter explained that this was part of the security precautions

taken in highly sensitive matters which vere restricted

within WO to a nesd-to-know basis.

Epstein inquired as to wether Belter knew of any

other ulcrophone surveillance on king in the Washington, D. C.,

ares at any time and Belter replled that he did not know of

any. Belter was asked if he was anare of any Interest or

participation by the Washington, D. C., Police Department in

the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and he

responied that he was not aware of same.

Epstein inguired as to the actual installation of

the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and wanted

to know who performed the installation. It was Balter's

recollection that the installation ves made by SA Wilfred

BergeIon, probably assisted by SA William D. Campbell. Epstein

volunteered the name of SA Richard Suter and this refreshed

Belter'y recollection to the extent that Belter indicated that

Suter also probably assisted. On Epstein's Inquiry as to the

whereabouts of these three individuals, Belter advised that

Bergeron is retlred, residing in Bethesda, Maryland; Campbell

1s assigned at FBI Headquarters; and Suter is assigned to the

Houston Field Office.

Epstein inquired whether Bergeron mentioned King's

name when Bergeron asked for assistance of support persornel

for monitoring purposes and Belter replled that King's name

was mentioned.

At the close of the interview, Epstein renarked that,

"We may be in touch with you again."

- 44 =

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 72

---

## Page 73

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

NOTE:

Prior to Belter's interview, he contacted FBIHQ

to alert us and ask for assistance in the form of an SA for

possible consultation purposes. Belter had been previously

that higher e contacted bye, ss and to ure tel tsalst

him on his roquest.

Belter was therefore appropriately

briefed by Assistant Director Mintz; as well as Supervisor

S. F. Phillips of INID who accompanied Belter to the intervier.

Debriefing of Belter as reported herein was by Phillips.

-

5

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page 73

---

## Page 74

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

DOCUMENT

BRIEFINGS% INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to

the White House

HSC

1. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents;

interviewee, testifier and subject

give name or identification number

of briefer,

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by an SSC Staff

Member of retired FBI Special Agent Ernest H. Belter

RESPONSE TO (list

late and item number if in response to formal request, other

state verbal request

f (name), initiative, subpoena, etc..

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

NA

U

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

upderline

Intelligence collection

Surveillance

Intelligence activities, domestic

Organization and staffing

8.

SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing

this item)

Interview covered following topics:

Administrative procedures of FBI regarding electronic surveillance.

ARE INPORMATION CONTAINED

SFP.1hb

(4)

379 | 16-751

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 74

FREAT MO YELLOM

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 75

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change 'indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

• e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

• is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

peers a

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 75 .

---

## Page 76

The Attornoy General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVICIES

(SSC)

2 - IIr. J. A. Hintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Vannall

1 - lix. H. N. Bassett

Junc 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jx.

1 - hr. W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached

appondices, the SSC requested certain infornation and

documents iron the reI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to

the Comnitico is the original of a monorandun containing

a response to one of the Connittee's requests.

A copy of this nonorandun is being furnished

for your records.

FALL WFORMATION CONTAINED

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

MDR-16

I - The Deputy Attorney Genoral

Attention: X. Willian O'Connor

special Counsel 10k

Intelligence Coordination

!!

(11)

REG- 102

62-116315-295

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm..

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin,

Comp. Syst. un-

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gon. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval.

Spoc. Ing.

Training

ENGLOSURE

4

Telephone Rm..

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

TELETYPE UNIT L

0W/65360L Docid 32989609 Page 76

JoL 2 1975

gma

PLM

680 951-794

---

## Page 77

.

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Hr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett

1 - Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY COVENAMENTAL, OPERATIONS WITH

BESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE:

FURTHER DOCUMENTE PERTAINING TO THE

IBI AND DEPARTHENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

lierence 1s nade to 83C lotter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and

other Intormation from the fBl.

Purquant to your roquest in Appendix B, Part I,

Iton 1, for guldellnes unod by the FBI Inspection Division

for inspocting flold offices and far Inspecting DiViSiONs

of the FBI, ve currently have such naterial avallablo lar

revioN at FBl Headquarters by appropriatoly cloarad personnel

of the Committee.

I - The Attorney General

'ALI EPORMATION CONTAINSO

(10) 1B

NOTE:

See H. N. Bassett memorandum to Mr. Wannall June 2,

1975, captioned

"Senstudy 75," wherein the Inspection Division

advised it has no objection to a review of the field and

headquarters inspection manuals by members of the Committee

staff provided the review is conducted in FBI space with an

Inspection Division representative present.

When SSC review

is requested, we will have the Inspection Division representative

make the manuals available.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir.

DeD. AD Adm...

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin,

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Sper. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM L

TELETYPE UNIT

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 77

ENCLOSURE

295

10 971.749

---

## Page 78

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(SSC)

HOTE CONTINUED:

The FBIIQ and field inspection manuals were reviewed

by Special Agent (SA) Thomas E. Burns, Jr. Determination to

furnish questionable field inspection manual sections concerning

PROSAB (Section 4 J 2.), AFSAM (Section 5 L 10.) and BUPLANS

(Section 5 P.) was coordinated with IS - 2 (SA Edward P. Grigalus)

IS - 3 (SẠ Russell II. Horner) of the Intelligence Division

and the Laboratory Division, Cryptanalysis Unit (P. I. Paddock),

and it was ascertained there is no objection to a Committee

of these sections.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 78

---

## Page 79

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Committee

OLTR

R LHM

→ Memo

1 Report dated _ 6-12-75

Caption of Document:

Senate Select Committee:

Re:

Policies

and Procedures

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

TATT, INFORMATION CONTAINED

AT 03.-544-3459/244m/Bp

MDR-T6

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 79

---

## Page 80

....

TE:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/12/75

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

FOR REVIEW

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

Sherry Towell, Assistant Office Manager

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents;

give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. Is sPore or also date and amo, marafito, supposefo pal roquest, other-

6. CLASSIFICÁTION OF

INFORMATION (enter

Codeword TS or

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part I, Item 7.

7. KEed oRder fint rothe phasipriate key words from the list provided separately: if key words not listed are

Operating Procedures

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse

side pefore completing this item)

At the request of SSC, material containing the guidelines

used by the FBI Inspection Division for Inspecting various aspects

of the Bureau's operations has been made avallable at FBINO for

review by SSC members.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 10-2520

MOZARAT

woe

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

TJM:1hb

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. <ES 7-2-25

CLASSIFY AS

APPROPRIATE

379| (6-75)

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 80

---

## Page 81

INSTRUCTIONS

--

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Connunity

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, •

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

ÑW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 81

---

## Page 82

tige wit

FEDERAL BUNGAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN UMp.

N B99 IP CODE

ПЕВЕТУРЕ

5:30 PM NITEL JUNE 30, 1975 JMM

TOS

DIRECTOR: (62-116395)

FROM;

TAMPA (105-1 1121)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU NITEL JUNE: 28, 1975.

JAMES E. MC MAHON, 3119 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33.618,

AND DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, GENERAL, TELEPHONE COMPANY, JAMPA,

LORIDA, WAS CÓNTACTED ON JUNE 3D, 1975, AND ADVISED OF THE:

CNT ENTS OF REFERENCED BUREAU NITEL. MR. MC MAHON ADVISED

THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HE

AVOULD IIMEDSATELY NOTIFY THE SAC OF THE TAMPA OFFICE AND

VILL CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO ASSIST HIM AS TO

-HIS OBLIGATIONS

ÀS TO CONFIDENT IAL ITY OF FERNISHING INFORMATION

ACQUIRED AS AN FBI EMMOYEE.

END

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -..

Ident.

Inspection

sIntell.

Labnratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. --

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y

AIL INFORIATION CONTAINSO

MOR16

REC-102b2 -116-385-293

JOL T 1975

1.

5

1975

i N 8s36d' bold:32989609 Page 82

---

## Page 83

ERAL BUNEAU OF INVESTIGATION

AMUNICATIONS SECTION

WAROGS CE PLAIN

16515PM NITEL

G/30/75 EMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO (62-6211)

TELETYPE

SENSTUDY • 75.

AssoC.

Dir.-

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv._

Asst. Dir.:

Armin.

Comp. Syst.

Dat. Affairs

Fils & Com.

Gen. Inv. - !

Ident.

Inspection Vers

Intell.

Lairratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. ...

1Lr.142g

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Dirertor Secy

ATT INFORMATION CONTAININ

MDR16

REBUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

SA JOHN R. BASSEIT, CHICAGO DIVISION, HAS BEEN ADVISED

OE CONTENTS OF RESUSEL; NOWEVER, IT IS POLNIED OUT IO THE

PUREAU THAI SA BASSIST HAS BEEN DISPAICHED 80 PINE

FRIDGE, SOUTH DAKOTA, TO ASSISI IN BUREAU SPECIAL RESUURS.

ETHIS TIME, CHICAGO HAS NO IDEA WHEN SA BASSETT MAY

RETURN.

"36

a Ca

ABOVE FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU IN EVENT THEY MAY

DESIRE IO ADVISE SENATE SELECI COMMITIEE OF SA BASSEIT°S

PRESENT UNAVAILABILITY.

REG- 102

02-111-395-992

END

3 JUL 2 1975

HOLD

CC: 67-

Plish

84 JUL 2

1975

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 83

---

## Page 84

Mr. OPTIONI

_LORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MI. W. R. Wannallwau

FROM :

DATE:

6/24/75

ORIGINAL, ONLY

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD.

Dep. ADjin

Isst. Dt

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv..

Ident..

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv..

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

PURPOSE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTANED

UNCLASSINED

HEREN

DATE

To advise that CIA has agreed to have Bureau

representatives review 693 page CIA document containing

information relating to joint ventures; involving CIA and

other members of the intelligence community in sensitive

matters, and decision of CIA to furnish FBI with copies

of any document contained therein having a bearing on

FBI activities

DETAILS:

My memorandum to you captioned as above dated

6/20/75, advised that a representative of the Intelligence.

Community Staff on that date, at FBI Headquarters, briefed

appropriate Intelligence Division personnel of the contents

of a 693 page document prepared by CIA which contains

numerous memoranda relating to a wide variety of operations

in which CIA, to some degree, had contact or cooperated.

with other members of the intelligence community in sensitive

matters. You were advised that members of the Senate

Select Committee have already had access to, if not actual

possession of, this document, and that a number of the operations

wild

involving this Bureau. J

REG- 102

IIn order to enable this Bureau tope in a position

to knowledgeably and accurately reply to SSC inquiries and

to fully identify operations listed in the document of

interest to this Bureau, contact was initiated with John Clarke,

Associate Deputy to Director of Central Intelligence for the

Intelligence Community, for; the purpose of obtaining a copy

of this document. On 6/23/75, Mr. Clarke advised that CIA

Director William Colby authorized the reviewing of this

62-116395

..

CONTINUED - OVER

1975M: adn

MW 5366 cld: 32989609 Page 84

---

## Page 85

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS FURNISHED

TO SSC

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 85

---

## Page 86

Du..

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: SENSTUDY

62-116395

693 page document by Bureau representatives and this Bureau's

obtaining a copy of any memorandum contained therein having

a bearing on FBI activities.,

As the above authorization appears to be responsive to

this Bureau's need for reviewing the document for intormation

having a bearing on this Bureau's operations, arrangements

have been effected for Mrs. Harriett Mowitt, Executive Secretary,

Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of Intelligence

Community, to bring this 693 page document to FBI Headquarters

on 6/25/75 for review by selected personnel of the Intelligence

in battys to reneg

Division.

Copies will be obtained of any memorandum contained

therein believed to have a bearing on any, 'phase of this Bureau's

activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

Upon completion of above review you will be advised

of pertinent information obtained, accompanied by recommendations

as to additional action believed necessary in this matter.

wher

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 86

2

---

## Page 87

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Statf

•DCI/IC-75-0679)

18 JUN 1981

w, sets.

I5-

MEMORANDUM FOR:

USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT

Organization for Liaison with Select Committees

The attached CIA Employee Bulletin lays out the DCI's

organization for dealing with the Senate and House Select

Committees. It is provided to you for information.

John Me tarde

Acting Deputy to the DCI

for-the Intelligence Community

Attachment:

as stated

Ho

/. JENCLOSURE -

ALL ELI IIFORMATION CONTAIVID

MDRI

REC- 102

62116395-290

• 3 JUL 2 1975

1975

NOV 85360 ocld: 32989609 Page 87

file

62-116395

---

## Page 88

AGENCYE

EMPLOYEE

BULLETIN

No. 452

10 June 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. E. H. Knoche has been named the focal point within

the Agency for liaison with the Senate and House Select

Committees investigating intelligence activities. Mr. John

Clarke will continue in his capacity as focal point for the

Intelligence Community on that same subject. Any Agency

employee contacted directly by a Select Committee staff

member should refer the caller to the Select Committee Review

Staff under Mr. Knoche, on X4086.

I RATION CONTAINED

DISTRIBUTION:

All Employees

11'=85-29.0

-NGLOSURE

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 88.

---

## Page 89

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 2 R 1919

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adiu

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y

NRODI AL

CODE

3:47 PM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 L W.

footed

TO DIRECTOR: (62-1 16395)

BROM ALBANY

(62-2368)

SENST IDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAI

DATE

miR-16

RE BUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 28, 1975, FORMER SA HENRY G. ROUSE, JR., MAS

DONT ACTED BY ASAP JOHN J. HINCHOLIFFE AND ADVISED CONTENIS

RE BUTEL. ROWSE STATED THAT SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY SCC, ME

WILL CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION. ROME CIRRENTLY

RESIDING C/D P.O. BOX 65, SHELDON, VT., 95483, TELEPHONE NO •

do

LRF FIKQ CLR

3

JUL 1 1975

84 JUL 1

1975

MW 55360 Docid:32989609. Page 89

---

## Page 90

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SUN 2 9 1975

TELETYPE &

ABSOC. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext.

• Affairs

Files & Com

Ten. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y

NRO02 AT CODED

7:44 PM NITEL

JUNE 29,

1975 ILL

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA

SENSTUDY • 75

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES JUNE 28, 1975.

FORMER SA MARION CHEEK CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE

29, 1975, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCIIONS IN RE TEL.

END

ALL INPORIATION CONTADIN

HARKIN IS U

DATEL/A

Son Snumily

MDR-16

TOW FBIHQ CLR

REC- 102

62116395287

3 JUL 1 1975

84 JUL 1

1975

NW 65360; Docld:32989609 Page 90

---

## Page 91

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 2.819/5

TELETYPE

10: 40

AM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 PG

TOS DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

-FROM: ATLANTA

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, JUNE 28, 1975.

ALL CURRENT AND FORMER AGENTS WITHIN ATLANTA DIVISION

CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE 28, 1975, WITH EXCEPTION OF

FORMER SA MARION CHEEK AND ADVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

INSTRUCTIONS, RE TEL.

FORMER SA CHEEK CURRENTLY BOATING ON SUWANEE RIVER IN

REMOTE AREA, FLORIDA, AND NO POTENTIAL FOR LOCATING UNTIL

EVENING OF JUNE 29, 1975, NEXT. CHEEK WILL BE CONTACTED BY

SAC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, JUNE 29, 1975, AND BUREAU IMMEDIATELY

ADVISED OF CONTACT.

END

LRF FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adia.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairg

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

18Dec

tell WeATh

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rol. -

Director See'y

Wite

the

REG 102

62-116395-2880

3 JUL 1 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINER

FRETA IS UNCLASSIFTAD

- JUL 1

1975

65360 Docld:32989609 Page 91

---

## Page 92

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, DIC. 20530

1875

TUSSMATT

I CONTAM

N IS VIVC

2057

MDR-HO

TO:

Antonin Scalia

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

Douglas R. Marvin

Special Assistant to the

Attorney General

ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINHO

HEREIN IS

LANSINE

QBYSPLACNM

MUING

0-

FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

. 6

Deputy Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

Senatuly 175>

SUBJECT:

Senate Select Connittee Request: Appendix D, Item 17 -

Joseph Kraft

The SSC's request of Item 17, Appendix, D, seeks "All memo-

randa and other materials reflecting written on oral authorization

and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Directo

• of

the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft''.

By letter of May 2, 1975, to Kraft's attorney, Lloyd Cutler,

the Attorney General gave,

inter alia, the following assurances:

"Pending further Departmental action relating to the policies

which will govern records of the type involved in Mr. Kraft's

case, all documents, recordings, or other records of any type in

the Department's custody or control which constitute, surmarize,

r describe the contents of the overhearings obtained as the resul

f any electronic surveillance directed against Mr. Kraft an

members of his family will be placed under seal"'

o He say it no no. C. 1060 - 294 0 5 95-285

well, by Cutler in telephone conversations with me on June 12, and

June 16, 1975 (the second call came after Cutler had conferred with

Kraft) that the material sought by the Senate Select Committee is

distinct from that protected by seal and that, therefore, the

requested material be found, reviewed and forwarded to the SC.

(Cutler advised that the Ervin Committee was given same).

3 JUL 1 1975

May I have your views on this matter?

11639}

5-aut

Полін ки

85360 Docld: 32989609 page 92

haul diliner from tgt. 5gg 6/21/15, 9m

---

## Page 93

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 19

3010-106

MAY 1982 EDITION

¡OSA GEN, PIG, IÚ. 37

UNITED STATES GU

ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr

FROM

S.

J. Papich

EK Act 5 (9) (2) 1D)

-SECRE

DATE: February 13,

1970

ALI. INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNGLASSIFIED EXCEPT

SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

WASHE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

_CIA,

curnished the folloning

Liaison Agent On 2/10/70.JC)

[CIA has

the

will be restricted

this operation is to

The primary objective of

CIA hoves thail

It this develops, CIA will then proceed

CLASSIFIED BY SPrACm/Ba

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

MOR-16

From then on CIA

In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will

furnish

The Agent also asked

We should have such data

so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the

event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest

in the captioned group.

We, of course, will

also be interested

in international ramifications which could have a bearing on.

the activities of left ling activity in this country.

The Agent

also asked for the names of til

officials which will be: relates

to the Union for Revolution.

At this stage there do's not appear to be any conditions

or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our

operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately

informed.

CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming

to our attention concerning the erganization.

CIA further requests

that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that

information be handled on

a need-to-know basis.l

20116

305

228

CONTENUED • OVEI

Exempt

CDS, Category Stay

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 14

agesidcation Indefinite

'ENCLOSURE

---

## Page 94

15-4

-SECRET

•Memorandun to Mr. D. J: Brennan, Jr.

RE:

UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the

attention of the Internal Security Section and the

Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will {ollow

in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to

above and will again reiterals that we be turnishea copies

of connunications transnitted to the mailing addresses. IS

ціаной ці пінки"

Hansa hows, attire

SECREE

2

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 94

---

## Page 95

OFTIONAL TORM NO. 10

3010-106

Hr19719449N

• GSA GEN, REG, SU. 21

UNITED STATES C

ERNMENT

Memorandum

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

TO

: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr

-

DATE: February 13, 1970

FROM

S.

J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIM IS URCLESSIFIED EXCEPT

SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Idadson Agoni on 2/10/10:J CTA, Burnished the following to the

< CIA has

will be restricted

this operation is to

The primary objective of

CIA hopes that

If this develops, CIA will then proceed

'CLASSIFIED BY SPEAm BI

From then on CIA

DECLASS SNON: 25% 1

Lin response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA Will

furnish

7 The Agent also asked

JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

We should have such data

so that we can take the

necessary investigative action in the

event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest

in the captioned group.

We, of course, will also be interested

in international ramifications which could have a bearing on.

the activities of leit ling activity in this countrys

The Agent

also asked for the names of the officials which will be related

to the Union for Revolution, y

Lat this stage there do ¿ not appear to he any conditions

or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our

operations or jurisdiction.providing that CIA keeps us adequately

informed.

CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming

to our attention concerning the organization.

CIA further requests

that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureay and that

this information be handled on a need-to-know basis.

Classified

10283

""(6)*

Exempt trom CDS, Category a

Date of Declassification Indefinite

GOry SEGRET CONTINUED - OVER

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 95

---

## Page 96

Memorandum to Mr. D. J: Brennan, Jr.

UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ACTION:

The above information is being airected to the

attention of the Internal Security Section and the

Nationalities Intelligence Section.

Liaison will follow

in order to obtain samples of

the propaganda referred to

above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies

of conmunications transmitted to

the mailing addresses. (S

:

BEORET

2

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 96

- _

__.

---

## Page 97

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Committee

O'LTR

[XI LHM

• Memo

• Report dated —

_6/11/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Other

C'aption of Document:

Specific FBI Practices and Procedure

Item #24, Part III, Appendix C

FBI

Originating Office:

Delivered by:

Received by:

Dall TElep

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

Date: -

6/13/25-

05400178

---

## Page 98

• oconser

des

"12:30

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 98

---

## Page 99

...

Att INFORMATION CONTATNEO

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 99

ENCLOSURE

62416395-284

---

## Page 100

OTE:

CLASSIFY AS

APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

ATTN: Central Index

(ran Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information hall coyselect Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document was made available

for review

but not transmitted,

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/11/75

& DOCUMENT!

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term;

add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

ALL INFORMATICN CONTAINED

MIRED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. •

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION

(provide descriptive data for documents;

give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

5.

RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-

wise state verbal request of (name),

initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix 6, Part III, Item 24.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

11g"

7. KEY

WORDS (enter

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

used underline

emphasis)

1.15-2801

COVERT ACTIVITIES 5)

LASSIFIED BY SPZAM/Bm

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/

MDR-16

8.

SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing

this item)

With agreement of CIA, SSC was furnished with copy of

documents maintained by the Bureau relating to establishment by

CIA in this country of a "notional" Marxist-leninist organization.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE IL 1- LOLA SPEARS

hote: Original

Dest dacion to Contral Comminuty Indey

in sonnection sit festasy 15,

TJM: 1hb

(4)

62-116395

379| (6-751

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 100

Siut

IS VELLOW

5-11il

SECRET

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ERCLUSINC

4211163581

1284

---

## Page 101

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HS) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee,

etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 101

---

## Page 102

2 =

fud pont

Ex

(1

190а

1i5.

W

Bo

= If. Hlo

Ao Mintz

J B. Hotis)

R

Tannall

Cragar

taluar

do base 41

1975

152s61i313

Tho Attorocy Genoral

Dirootor, FBI

UNITED STATEB SLNATS SILECT

ON INZAELIGENCE ACTIVITIIS

ITIEE

Lefarnare is aade

:10 BONOTANGNS ITOR LUUR35

Seloet Connlttas,

dated May 14, 1975, and appendiees

Ehoroto, roluentiad cartasu

docknente and othor inforna-

iron the FaI.

Attachod lox yous spproual and faruardias to tae

Cosnittoe in tte origisal af a sunorintus ant nn sscloaure

valen is responnive to ono ol tho comoisten's i

F193e6*

delrenis

SINE DEUTIUOL J04 YOIY 70,046

Bacleseros (4)

62-116995

1 n The l'aptty attornay seneral

Attentzon:

W11lzan €'Connor

Epscial cousnot 10r

Vp. V.g

Intalligenco Coordination

645095B

War.ddelivercat

REC- 102

в 0. 05 р

PU iRyy

com

guppt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIUAI

MORl

42-116345-284

M : 1 10

Wirtin

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm, _

Dap. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. .

Ext. Affairs ....

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Labaratory

Plan. & Eval

Spec. fov.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

pur

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHER

ocld

TELETYPE UNIT

age 102

GPO 954-546

---

## Page 103

88-128395

8 - НГ.

SECRET

1

1

1

Mr.

НГ.

4E.

B.

A. Hintz

Ит.

J. B. Hotla)

R. Wannall

0. СТеда

Palmer

DaIO, JI.

JuDo 11, 1975

WHITED STATXS SENATE SELECT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

COMKITTIE TO STUDY COVINHMENTALIS?

NEW IS UACLASSIFIED EXCEPT

OPEBATIONS TITH RIBPECT TO

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INTILLIGXNCE ACTIVITIES

HI: OTHEA SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICAS AND PROGRANS

Botoranco ls sado to mastasdun fron captionad

1215-2000

CLASSIFIED BY

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

althis the valted statos.

LIa responso to Iton nuRber 34, PArt III, AppendiI 6,

asclosed

for tha Comaitton 10 a capy of a nonorandas irom

1970, captioned "Hates POT Renolution,

Information Iron CIA ANTIAINy of the establlabsent of a

"Bottonal" Narxlat-1on1a1at ar89n1ze110n by the cid.

Althonga tha FAl d18, ds sorod 18 other responsos to the

omatttoo, eatablinà and direct auch sotional organizatione.

no Inforantion has born doralopod indienting the FBI

connulten 01th ClA Yu

TAGIONUTO

1 - The Attorady Gonoral

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. ...

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst, Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

SECRET

SER NOTE PAGE 2

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

inspection

HWD: prd

(9)

pid

ClANS11le by !

Exompt Iron GBS,

Intell.

Loboratory

bare or be en rose at de

Plon. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

Tratning

Legal Coun.

SEGRET 62116383-284

Telephone Rm. -

PW 63360 Doc A2989609 Page TELETYPE UNT E

MENCLOSURE

(610 954-546

---

## Page 104

SECRET

The Attornoy Genoral

NOTE:

LSee sonoranduM W. O. Crogar to kr. M. B. Hanuall,

dated 6/6/75, ubich advised of CIA's clearanco

to formerd

menorandue datod 2/13/70 to the Connittoo.

In onclosure

datod 3/13/70, the nane of the CIA Agent who furnished

the infornation has boon excised per CIA's roquest.

Hemarandus dated 3/23/70 and captioned "Unton for

Rovolution, " mentionod 11 V. O. Cregar senorandul to

ir. No E. Wannall, dated 6/6/75 1a not belag lorvarded to

he Cormittoo 51nc0 1t 18 not responalvo to the comittee'l

spootfic roguest.

that menorandun deals with an evaluatio

Ol CIA's notIonal operation by this Bureal. 18)

[Innetta "Seorots, 11 accordanco with CIl's

c2asa11tcátion of Ila inforation por Mr. Valt Elder, CXA.8)

-SECRET

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 104

---

## Page 105

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDTION

GSA FPAIR (11 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM

: Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

=,

*.

DATE:

6-9-75

De: A0 t

Isst. D

Admin

Comp/syst.

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Eval

Spec. Inv.

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y —

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINID

TERHEN

IS UNCLASSIETEHO

PATE.

-26/187,

UR-16

fi -

By memorandum dated 6-4-75 you were advised that

captioned Committee was preparing what they termed case studies on

COINTELPROS in four separate areas. The areas defined were Black

Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of

J

Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the

Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was

killed during a police raid in Chicago, Ilinois).

Mr. Lester B. Seidel advised SA Paul V. Daly 6-9-75'

that in addition to the aforementioned areas he also wanted to include the

Muhammad Kenyatta case in Philadelphia.

As an observation, two of the

areas cited by Mr. Seidel are areas where the Bureau currently is façing

lawsuits, namely,

the Hampton and Kenyatta cases, and a third area is

one which we could well be involved in a lawsuit, that being the Starsky

case. Mr. Seidel indicated the Bureau can expect correspondence from

the Committee concerning these matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC- 102

42-111375-283

For information.

pus

TISH/00D

DRen

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Inspector J. T. Kelly

PVD:kjs (8)

84 JUAN

1975

NW 65300. Jocld:32989609 Bay FS. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 106

CODE

ТЕДЕТУРЕ

URGENT

6-9-75

1 - Mr. Wannall

то

8AC SAN FRANCISCO

Attn: Cregar

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

(62-116395) - 2822 - Mr. Minte

- Mr. Hotis

SENSTUDY 75 REC- 102

1 - Mr. Daly

THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT PURSUANT TO REQUEST FROM THE

SENATE SEZACI (CAMITIFE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) I HAVI

LIASED YOU NIND FORMER SA DAVID I. TOLD FROM APPLICABLE

INFORMATION CONTAINE

EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGNIIMENTA FOR THE PURPOSE OF A STATE INTERVIEW

ASSIFIAD

BY SEC CONCERNING COINTELPRO AND THE INVESTIGATION AT

BY

JIAN FRANCISCO OF THE BPP. LISTER B. SEIDEL, STAFF MEMBER OF 8SC

UNCL

UNILL TRIVEL TO SAN FRANCISCO TO CONDUCI THE INTERVIENS IN

CAPPROXIMATELY THO HEEKS.

ALL

HEREIN

DATE

AN AGENT NILL BE AVAILABLE DURINE INTERVIEW TO ASSIST IN

MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO MIETHER OR NOI A PARTICULAR

QUESTION SHOULD BE RESPONDED TO, THIS AGENT IS NOT TO BE

COMSITERED PRIVATE COUNSEL AND WILL NOT BE PRESENT DURING INTER-

VIIW.

Assoc, Dir..

Dap. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst...

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon, & Eval.

Spec. Inv. .

Training

YOU, AN ASAC, OR SENIOR NUPERVIBOR CONTACI FORMER SA DAVID

E. TODD TO ADVISE HIM OF THE WAIVAR OF THE APPLICABLE SECRECY

AGRETMENT AND DETERIE NETHER HE IS LABIROUS OF HAVING AN

PVD: eek

(7) FEDERAL :BUREAU, OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN O 9 1975

Trive se

1975

TELETYPE UNIT

ww.csacu Docld:32989609 Page 106

iBtj

1500

4013

JEK

10) 954-546

---

## Page 107

i. B.

PAGE TWO 62-116395

AGENT AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEN. FOR YOUR BACHGROUAD INFOFMATION

TODD HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION CONCERNING THIS INTERVIEW AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED

CONCERNING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, ETC.

SUTEL RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH TODD. YOU SHOULD CONTACT

LEGAL COUNSEL, DIVISION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING

YOUR INTERVIEW.

NOTE:

BY memo 6-2-75 captioned as above it was recommended

and approved that sAc Charles W. Bates, former SA David E. Todd,

and Assistrat Director Robert E. Gebhardt be released from

applicatle secrecy agreements for purposes of interview by sSc.

We are soperately advising Assistant Director Robert E. Gebbardt

of thia decision.

- 2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 107

---

## Page 108

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

"GSA FPAIR 141 CFRI 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dire

Dog Aptin.

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-2-75

FROM

Legal Counsel

(SUBJECT; SENSTUDY 75

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

inspection

Intell.

Laboratory,

Legal Coun.

Plan, & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that

Lester B. Seidell, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, has

informed us that the Committee intends to interview former SA David E.

Todd, SAC Charles W. Bates, and ASsistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt

and to request that the aforementioned employees be released from existing

employment and/or secrecy agreement for purposes of a staff interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAT

SPLAT

On the evening of 5-29-75, Lester B. Seidell telephonically

advised SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that in accordance with the

"guidelines" existing between the Committee and the various intelligence

agencies under review, he was giving notice that he as a representative

of the Committee was going to San Francisco in approximately two to three

weeks, and it was his intention to interview SAC Charles W. Bates, former

SA David E. Todd, and former Assistant to the Director Alan H. Belmont.

He also requested Assistant Director Gebhardt be made available for staff

DATE

interview in Washington, D. C. He asked that the Bureau take the necessary

steps to release the Agents from any existing employment or secrecy

agreements. For the purposes of this interview, he stated he would inquire?

of each of the interviewees as to their knowledge and participation in counter-

intelligence activities directed against the Black Panther Party. With regards

to this discussion, he specifically mentioned a Bureau airtel to San Francisco

dated 5-11-70, titled "Counterintelligence and Special Operations (Research

Section). " He stated this document was one of the documents released by

the court in the suit by newscaster Carl Stern. He was asked as to whether

6/9/75

he could deline more precisely the areas to be covered in the interviews and

stated he could not inasmuch as he did not low the farloys aspects

counterintelligence program against the Black Panther Party in the San Francisco

area. Additionally, he advised he was making a request for documents'5

JUL 1 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - MI» Hotis

1 - Mr. Cleveland

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Personnel File, SAC Charles W. Bates

1 - Personnel File, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt

1 - Personnel File, former SA David E. Todd

12)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.s. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 65360ioDocld:32989609 Page 108

---

## Page 109

Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams

Re: SENSTUDY 75

in writing, which would coincide with the aforementioned topic of interview.

He described these interviews as being "abuse" interviews which according

to the Committee's understanding precludes the presence of an agency

representative during interview. However, an Agent may be available for

consultation purposes.

Mr. Seidell was advised by SA Daly that former Assistant

to the Director Belmont was in poor health and that before attempting interview

of Mr. Belmont, he should ascertain his current physical condition. Mr. Seidell

requested SA Daly determine Mr. Belmont's physical condition. Assistant

Director Cleveland advised SA Daly on 5-30-75 that Mr. Belmont was very

seriously ill and was suffering from the Shy Drager Syndrome. This informa-

tion was brought to the attention of John Elliff, Task Force Director on

Domestic Intelligence Activities of captioned Committee, and Elliff expressed

dismay that Seidell had made an inquiry concerning the interview of Belmont.

Elliff requested that we not take any action concerning Seidell's request as

ito Belmont at this time.

Former SA David E. Todd had previously contacted this

Division and as set forth in memorandum dated 5-16-75 from Legal Counsel

to J. B. Adams, he was advised of his rights, the existence of an employment

secrecy agreement signed by him, of the provisions of Attorney General

Order 501-73, and to his right to a private attorney. He was also advised

that an Agent would be made available for consultation during the interview

if he so desired. Mr. Todd did not indicate at this point whether he was

desirous of having a Bureau representative available for consultation during

interview. Todd, according to Seidell, stated he would not consider to be

interviewed in the absence of a release of a secrecy agreement by the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SA David E. Todd, Assistant Director

Robert E. Gebhardt, and SAC Charles W. Bates be released from their

employment and secrecy agreementsfor purposes of a staff interview concerning

our Cointelpro activities against the Black Panther Party.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONTINUED - OVER

-2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 109

---

## Page 110

Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memorandum

Re: SENSTUDY 75

(2) If approved, the employees and former employee will

be advised and briefed generally concerning the making available of a

Bureau representative for consulation during such an interview and

679175

other pertinent matters to be considered during interview.

DUD

TBHPOD

Go unio

per

gra

-3-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 110

---

## Page 111

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSAIGEN. REG.

10. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SEC,

ET

2

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

1

1

/ FROM

W.

O. Noregar

1

- Nr.

J. B. Adams

- Mr.

(1

J. A. Mintz

- J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 6/17/75

- Mr.

W. R. Wannall

H. E. Helgeson

- Mc .

W.

0. Cregar

- Mk: J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD

Dep. AD

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

SUBJECT: SENS TUDY 75

Labpratory —

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This is to record meeting of Task Force (TF)

leaders with Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel

to the

President, at the Executive Office Building on 6/13/75.

Aforementioned meeting was called and chaired by

Nr. Wilderotter, and

was attended by representatives of The

White House, Justice, Defense, FBI, CIA, and State.

Project

Manager W. O. Cregar

and Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Section CI-2,

INTD, represented the FBI.

Mr. Wilderotter reported that the Senate Select

Committee (SSC) has agreed to specifically identify a limited

number of "abuse areas" which it will investigate from top to

bottom.

"Notices"

should be issued to agencies very shortly

defining certain terms and specifying the SSC targets. If

these areas can be fully investigated, with assistance of the

intelligence community,

the SSC agrees to not extend its inquiries

beyond the specified areas. If the SSC does so limit its

inquiries, this will be

to

150T

community

in that it will minimize the SSC's straying into

A8 CEL

91-2

various

nonper tinent matters; the TFs can present the intelli-

gence community's side on the topics examined; the Trs should

be able to expedite the Committee's inquiries and thereby limit

the duration of the SSC investigation.

DECLAS

The FBI has responsibility for the TEs on "Political

Abuses," TF leader Insp. H. E. Helgeson, and

| "Use of Notional

Organizations," TE leader Supv. J. P. Thomas. We cannot fully

address either topic until receiving the SSC

notices defining

the extent of the proposed inquiries.

contrary to the initial concept of the Trs, they will

not prepare comprehensive papers regarding their topics, but ir

some areas it may be advantageous for a TF to prepare an

"opening statement" type paper for the sSc.

Enclosure

REC-100

•62-11632

-24%

CONTINUEL

OVER

62-116395

SECA

ET

2569565592

JPT: bkb6Kb

Classified

6875 JPT

87. JUN 271912

- Ey

(8)

Exempt from

Category Number

Date of Declassification Indefinite

NO 633661M tid: tid:3%989609 Page 111

---

## Page 112

i ..

SHORT

Memorandum to

Mr.

Re:

SENSTUDY

75

62-116395

W. R. Wannall

The purpose of the TE and functions of the TE

leaders were discussed. Briefly, each TF leader is to become

a substantive expert on the particular topic assigned to him

(e.g. political abuses), locate all documents, identify

potential witnesses, develop strategy for presenting subject

matter to the SSC and work to minimize any delays which might

be caused by the Third Agency Rule. TF leaders will not

themselves be witnesses unless their activities other than as

TF leaders are subjects of testimony. TF leaders will, in

consultation with legal counsel, define terms pertinent to

their topics.

will outline directly to the SSC staff,

insofar as the SSC is receptive, the scope and direction of

pertinent inquiry, who is and is not competent to testify,

what documents are available, and what areas may or may not be

pertinent to the Committee's

interests.

Tr leaders will prepare

themselves to be able to answer any inquiries from the

White House on their topics.

Although TF leaders must know

the location of all documents pertinent, the documents them-

selves will be made available to the SSC by the agency having

custody of same and each agency may negotiate with the SSC

regarding access by the Committee to material on a case by

case basis.

The agencies will, of course, coordinate first

with their

own legal counsel and then with the White House

before releasing documents.

On sensitive matters, such as notional organizations

or proprietary organizations,

the SSC has agreed that it will

not be necessary for agencies to furnish the names of U.s.

citizens and companies who have cooperated with the U. S. unless

those persons or companies have received notoriety (e.g.

Hughes

Tool Company, Sam Giancana). It is reportedly understood that

agencies must protect their ongoing operations.

Agencies are

free to attempt to negotiate with the SSC regarding the extent

and form of their responses.

Attached is a copy of an intelligence community staff

memorandum 6/10/75 showing the TF assignments and, in the left

margin notes as to the agencies expected to have input into

each subject.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

SECKET

- 2 -

pur

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 112

---

## Page 113

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. G. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DC1/IC-75-0119

0 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT

Memorandum dated 6 June 1975 re

Task Force Assignments

1.

This memorandum is a follow-on to subject memorandum

and in addition to completing the principal officer assignments also

lists task force members assigned by other agencies:

Subject

Principal

Agency

Principal

Officer.

Task Force

Assignments

•CIA

State

DOD

Assassinations

White House

Mr. Wilderotter

IDS 145-7094

James Gardner,

State Dept.

•IDS 101-29034

CIA

Army

Drug Abuse

(Testing of. drugs)

CIA

Sayre Stevens

IDS 143-4303

* Malcolm Lawrence

State Dept.

IDS 101-2869,4

FBI;CIA

W. House Political Abuses

DofJ:

: (1:964)

FBI

ALL

Domestic

Surveillance

(iñcl. 27

taps,

Hus ton| Plan, etc.!

Justice

Hunter Helgeson

John Thomao

234-4609

ID5 175-4881

Green voo

John Martir

HDS 187-4555

Charles Kane

CIA

IDS 143-6777

ALE FBI IFORMATON CONTAINED

•SIRINT IS UNCLASHLAIED

Verne Si. Mars

State Dept.

IDS 101-29448

62110385-200

• ENGLOSURE

CLASSITED DY _00 6805

EXCRIPT FROM GENERAL DECLISCIFICATION

SCHTCULA OFF. O. B1ES RYSMOMON CATLEORY:

§ 50(1, O. li) or (1) (riral; one or more)

NW 65360

Docld:32989609- Päge 113

(unlese imponsible, insert dule or event)

---

## Page 114

SECRET

Subject

•

Principal

Agency

Principal

Officer

Task Force

Assignments

FBI

Electronic

CIA (Clarkesurveillance

DOD

• and Warrantless

Wiretap

Justice

George Calhoun

IDS 187-4401

William Jones

State Dept.

IDS 101-20370

...

FBI

CIA, DOD

Use of Notional

Organizations

FBI

•1941

FBI

; CIA

Use of Proprietary

Organizations

CIA

John Thomas

344-4609

IDS: 1.7Ve

• 4609

GREEN Y503

Exich •Isenstead

Green $140

Lee Peters

State Dept..

IDS 101-29403

FBI.

CIA

DOD

Mail Cover and

Intercept

Justice

Phil White

IDS 187-4674

Ernest Ts, ferdamas

CiA

IDS: 143-6348

(to be

defined

by SSC)

Watch List

DÖD

Benson Buffham

NSA

688-7222

DOD:

Army

Surveillance

DOD

Di. David Cooke

695-4436

The following officers from the Department of State have been

named to assist in the CIA preparation of comprehensive papers on the

following geographic and subject areas:

Greece

James Gardner

105, 101-29034

Dominican Republic

James Gardner

IDS 101-29034

James Henderson

Last Asia Bureau

The Congo

Bayard King

IDS 101-21504

Indonesia

Patricia Barnett

IDS 101-22369

2

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 114 -

---

## Page 115

SECRET

Katzenbach Report

Emerson Brown

-- IDS 101-21504

--.

3. The proposed DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House

Select Committee on Intelligence is in final coordination and is expected

to be available for Community review shortly. Following this,

Mi. Wilderotter will meet with the General Counsels to review and

coordinate on the final language.

Haut Theret

Harriett Mowitt

Executive Secretary

USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

CC:

Mr. Buchen

Mi. Fills

Distribution:

1 - Mi. Wilderotier

1 - Mr..

Latimer

1

- MI.

Hyland

1. - Mr.

Morell

'= Mr. O'Connor

- Mx. Cregard

• MI.

Knoche

1 - Mr.. Clarke

- NW 65360-Docld:32989609 Page 115

---

## Page 116

43 ? (Rev. 101173)

Date of Mail

6/12/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

MDR-16

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject

JUNE MAIL SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Removed By

File Number

7 9 JUN 2 7 1975

62-116395-279

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/ FBI

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 116

---

## Page 117

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

1 - Mr. McDermott-EnC. Asst. Dir.:

1 - Mr. Wannall-Enc.

Comp. Syst.

1 - Mr. Mintz -Enc

Ext. Affairs

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-11-75

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

1 - Mr. Cregar-Enc.

Ident.

FROM

: Iegal Counsel

1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.

Inspection

Intell.

1 - Mr. Daly-Enc.

Laboratory

Legal Coun..

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telephone Rm. _

On 6-10-75, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for

Diroctor Soc'y -

Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, furnished

Inspector John B. Hotis a copy of a letter from Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho)

to the Attorney General dated 5-28-75, requesting any files or documents

in the Department or the FBI concerning five members of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence Activities. The files requested pertain to Senators

Gary Hart (D-Colo.), Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), Charles McC. Mathias

(R-Md.), Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), and Robert Morgan (D-N.C.).

Senator Church emphasized that the request is made pursuant to Senate

Resolution 21, which established the Select Committee and not under the

Freedom of Information Act (FOLA) •

Mr. O'Connor also provided a draft of a proposed response

to the Senator's letter by the Attorney General. General Levi pledges

ALL INFORMATION CONTATED

cooperation in this matter and suggests that the scope of the request should

be clarified. He also states that while the request is not made under FOIA,

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

exemptions in the Act indicate the kind of concerns the Committee might

want the Department to bring to its attention before disclosure is made.

"The implication is that certain information in the files, particularly materials

which would violate individual privacy may be withheld."

It should also be noted that the Attorney General intends to

advise Senator Church that he is preparing the necessary materials and

DATE

asks for early discussions to determine how best to proceed. Accordingly,

it is felt that we should promptly review any files that might exist concerning

each of the above-named Senators and be prepared to furnish appropriate

information to the Attorney General upon request.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-115

REC-49

46st_115225-2784

5 MAR 12 1376

That the FOIA Section, Files and Communications Division,

institute an immediate review of Bureau files for any doeuments-er other

records concerning each of the above-named Senators.

3 ENCLOSURSI

1/75/75 DRW: MLH

Enclosure

JBh: dkg (8)

32985609

Buy YS. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 118

Estria d

ACREY

•FRANK' CHURCH, IDAHO, & JAIRA

JOHN G. IOWERP TEXAS, VICE CHAI

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

WALTER*F. MONDALE, MINN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.

WALTEP D. HUDDLESTON, KY.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

ROBETE. MORGAN, N.C.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

GARY HARTE COLO:

WILLIAM GAMILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

FREDERICK A. ONSCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

CURTIS R. 'SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL,

RECEIVEU

© 371.: 753

JUN

15%.

KNOC

15

1*01

United States Benate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 21, 84TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May

20,-1975''

150

JUN 5 197}

ON CONTAINED

24CM

C..S8

CENTURAT

The Honorable Edward H. Levi

The Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, we write to

request the delivery forthwith to the members whose names are listed

in the attachment hereto of any files on them or documents concern-

ing then that are in the possession, custody or control of the

Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This request is made pursuant to the mandate of the senate,

contained in S. Res. 21.

That Resolution requires us to investigate

"conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence opera-

tions against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation or any other Federal agency"

One means of accomplishing this objective is to review the

material, if any, which the Department of Justice has gathered on

members of the United States Senate.

This request is made pursuant to the Committee's mandate and

not under the Freedom of Information Act. The exemptions to that

Act are designed to allow federal agencies and departments the

degree of confidentiality necessary to conduct the ongoing activities

of the Executive Branch, not to prevent a duly constituted Congres-

sional Committee from understanding the nature, legality, and

propriety of some of those activities. Whether as a matter of agree-

ment between the Committee and the Department some material that may

be in any such files should be withheld depends upon an analysis of

the weight of the particular reason put forward for the proposed

withholding balanced against the committee's need to exercise its t DI

mandate.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Obviously, material received by the members

of

the select

ATI IVFORMATTON CONTAINED

DATE 11-20

SPRACH

mo

JUN 6 1975

+116-3955106X

ENCLOSUREN

R.A.0.

TRICE OF LEGATE

INW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 118

---

## Page 119

2

Committee would be handled in a secure manner, consistent with the

Rules of Procedure of the Committee and other

arrangements for the

special handling of particularly sensitive material.

We look forward to receiving the material responsive to this

request as soon as possible.

Here Can

Gh tower

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 119

---

## Page 120

Select Committee Members Requesting Files

Senator Gary Hart

Senator Walter D. Huddleston

Senator Charles McC. Mathias

Senator, Walter F. Mondale

Senator Robert Morgan

ALE, FBI TANORIZANTORI CONTARUND

62-111-395-0781

ENCLOSURE

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 120

---

## Page 121

John AitanfarFBI!

Dear

CONTAINED

HHO

ALI.

FOREHET

D428 2

I have just today received your letter dated May 28.

It apparently reached the Department of Justice on June 8.

It requests "the delivery forthwith to the members whose

names are listed in the attachment hereto of any files on

them or documents concerning them that are in the possession,

custody, or control of the Department of Justice, including

the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

The Department wants to cooperate with you on this

matter. But I think we first ought to clarify the

scope

of your reguest. I assume, for example, that your request

is not intended to encompass

copies of all letters between

the members and the Department. I would suggest that we can

reach ap understanding on issues of this kind by consulta-

tions between us.

, Your letter says that "whether as a matter of agree-

ment between the Committee and the Department some material

that may be in any such files should be withheld depends upon

an analysis of the weight of the particular reason put forward

for the proposed withholding balanced against the Committee's

need to exercise its mandate. "

I take that to mean you would like us to go over the

files and to raise with the Committee such problems with dis-

closure as may or may not exist. I realize this request is

274)

ALL AFORTAIION CONTAINE

HERHIN IS UNCLIESLETHO

209 ВУ БрАСті

TOR:

62-1163751

ENCLOSUREN

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 121

---

## Page 122

-2-

not made under the Freedom of Information Act, but as we

review the material in the file, exemptions in the act

indicate, I think, the kind of concerns the Committee might

want the Department to bring to its attention before dis-

closure is made. For example, if material in a file would

violate the privacy of an individual other than the member

if it were revealed, would the Committee insist that such

material be revealed?

we are beginning naprepare the material so that

no time will be wasted; but I would like discussions to

begin quickly so that we can agree on how to proceed.

That

done, I would think that we could deliver the documents that

you have requested.

Aw 55360 Bocid: 2333609 Fage 122

---

## Page 123

TO

FROM

EPTIONAL. FOÍA, NO. 10

181M 144

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

W. to Wannatulas

W.

egar

SUBJECT:

AELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

LEGISLATION

1-

1

Mx.

J.

B. Adams

Mr.

J.

A.

Mintz

(1 - Mx.

J. B. Hotis)

DATE:

6/11/75

1

- Mx.

Mr.

R. E. Gebhardt

Nr.

W.

R. Wannall

W.

0. Cregar

-

Mr.

R.

- Mr.

1

- Mx.

B.

H.

Horner

F.

Murphy

Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection.

Intoll.

Laboratory -

Legal Coun!

Pion. & Eval. '

Spoc. Inv..

Training -

,Telephone Rm. -

2 biractor Soc'y -

Attached is a copy of a memorandum dated 5/27/75,

Which was furnished by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

arepare at the care a tutti gene avery tast had been to

The memorandum analyzes current pending legislation

(S. 743, H. R. 141 and H. R. 214) all of which would repeal

•the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

passed, such legislation could seriously affect the Bureau

and other agencies of the intelligence community.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached memorandum should be forwarded to the Legal

Analysis Unit of the Office of Legal Counsel for its use in

any analysis that it may be making of the legislation

described above.

1 0405-7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINIC

ATE

INDA

6'

Enclosure

LES:mig my

(10)

M8 636UN it: 39759609 Page 123

;"..

REC-100

62-11633955

218

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

N7. JUN 27 1975

---

## Page 124

27 May 1975

At her

6/10/7V-1ES

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Electronic Surveillance Legislation

1. Over a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress to date

aimed at restricting electronic surveillance conducted on national security

grounds. Although impelled by concern for the Fourth Amendment rights of

American citizens, the major bills in this area (S. 743, H.R. 141, H.R. 214)

are characterized by a heavy-handed approach which poses a serious threat

to the exploitation of foreign SIGINT sources, both within the United States

and overseas. (Signals intelligence subsumes communications intelligence

and electronic intelligence.)

2. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C.

2510, et seg.) established certain procedures which require the Government

to obtain a court order issued on probable cause prior to conducting wire or

oral communication interception in the investigation of certain offenses.. In

section 2511(3) of that Act, Congress specifically disavows any limitation on

the constitutional powers of the President in national security matters and

recognizes that the President has inherent constitutional authority to engage

in certain foreign intelligence activities:

(n)othing contained in this chapter or in

section 605 of the Communications Act of

1934 shall limit the constitutional power of

the President ... to obtain foreign intelli-

gence information deemed essential to the

security of the United States, or to protect

national security information against foreign

intelligence activities. (emphasis added)

The emphasized language implicitly recognizes that foreign intelligence

surveillances may be distinguished from national security surveillances

aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminal conspiracies and activity.

3. In reliance on these Presidential powers and congressional

recognition thereof, foreign intelligence signal and communication interceptions

may be conducted within the United States without judicial warrant.

ALL FBI INTORVINIOA CONIALNED

FORTELET IS ONOLASSSIUD

6.2-1160395

ENCLOSURE

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 124

---

## Page 125

SECRET

4. Sentiment that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) (quoted above).

are incompatible with Fourth Amendment rights has spawned a Senate bill and

over a dozen House bills (some of these identical) aimed at closing what the

sponsors view as "the national security loophole" in current surveillance laws.

A distinctive approach to national security surveillance is taking shape which

would prohibit the use of warrantless surveillance for any reason whatsoever,

treating national security surveillance under a single rubric, without distin-

guishing between gathering foreign intelligence on the one hand, and national

security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminality,

on the other.

(a) S. 743 by Senators Nelson and Kennedy would amend

18 U.S.C. 2510, et seg., as follows: First, repeal 18 U.S.C.

2511(3) thereby withdrawing whatever congressional recognition

that section gave the foreign intelligence surveillance powers of

the President. Second, prohibit intercepting the communications

of an American citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence

until a prior judicial warrant is obtained issued on probable cause

that a specific crime, e.g., espionage, has been or is about to be

committed. Third, prohibit intercepting the communication of a

foreign power or its agent until a prior judicial warrant is obtained

by establishing probable cause (a) that such interception is

necessary to protect the national defense (note narrower standard

than national security); (b) that the interception will be consistent

with the international obligations of the United States; and (c) that

the target is a foreign power or foreign agent. (A foreign agent is

defined as any person, not an American citizen or alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence, whose activities are intended

to serve the interests of a foreign power and to undermine the

national defense. Each application for such an interception would

be made to the D. C. Federal District Court on personal and written

authorization of the President and would provide detailed informa-

tion on the target, the purposes and justification of the interception.)

Upon court approval, only the FBI would be authorized to intercept

the communication. Fourth, require that every American citizen

targetted be informed of the specifics of the surveillance within a

month of the last authorized interception. (This disclosure could

be postponed if the Government satisfies the court that the target

is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or that disclosure

would endanger national security interests. A foreign power or

its agent need not be informed of interceptions.) Fifth, require the

Attorney General to report to the Congress, at least quarterly, the

details of each interception undertaken on national security

grounds, to be filed with the Senate Foreign Relations and

Judiciary Committees and the House International Relations and

Judiciary Committees.

NW 65360- Docld:32989609 Page 125

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## Page 126

(b) H. R. 141 by Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of

the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the

Administration of Justice, which has legislative jurisdiction for

surveillance, is similar to the above bill. It would repeal

18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and amend Title 18 to permit communications

interception in national security cases only under court order

issued on probable cause that an individual has committed one of

several enumerated offenses or is engaged in activities intended to

serve the interests of a foreign principal and to undermine the

national security. (From the language of the bill, it could be

argued that the foreign agent's activities would have to constitute

a criminal offense before a warrant could be issued.) The bill

"does not mention the communications of a foreign power.

Each application for an interception would have to be authorized

by the Attorney General and made to a Federal judge of com-

petent jurisdiction. The targetted individual would be informed

of the surveillance within ninety days. The President, Attorney

General, and all Government agencies would be required to

supply Congress, through the Senate Judiciary and Foreign

Relations Committees and the House Judiciary and International

Relations Committees, any information regarding any interception

applied for .

•(c) H. R. 214 by Mr. Mosher and seven identical bills

co-sponsored by over 70 Congressmen from both parties, would

prohibit any interception of communications, surreptitious entry,

mail-opening, or the procuring and inspection of records of

telephone, bank, credit, medical, or other business or private

transactions of any individual without court order issued on

probable cause that a crime has been committed. Like S. 743

and H. R. 141, reviewed above, H.R. 214 would repeal 18 U.S.C.

2511(3). Unlike the above bills, H.R. 214 does not provide for non-

law enforcement surveillance. It would also strike out pro-

visions for summary procedures for intercepting communications

during emergencies and would require that detailed information

on each application for a communication interception be reported

to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

5. Intelligence Community Interests: These bills, through

imposing judiciary administration over all surveillance, would impair existing

responsibility to conduct electronic surveillance in gathering foreign positive

intelligence, which now reaches wholly domestic communications, those both

transmitted and received within the United States; wholly foreign communications,

those both transmitted and received abroad; and transnational communications,

international communications received in or transmitted from the United States.

3

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 126

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## Page 127

Linsen

-SEORET

SIGINT provides a broad range of foreign intelligence ranging from early

warning indicators to the most mundane information.

The importance of any

single intercept or series of interceptions cannot be anticipated in advance;

therefore, the probable cause standard and the proposed requirements of

"particularity" are inappropriate in connection with this method of foreign intelli-

gence collection. (Furthermore, the House bills would impair existing responsibility

for using other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign subjects within the

United States, e. g., medicepts, photo surveillance, etc.)

6.

Effect on Intelligence Community Interests: The bills reviewed above

would severely restrict domestic communications interception for foreign intelligence

gathering purposes; raise serious questions respecting authority to intercept

transnational communications; and would even raise questions concerning the

foreign intelligence community's authority to conduct electronic surveillance abroad

free from judicial intrusion or other conditions. (Moreover, the House bills

would restrict the use of other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign

targets within the United States.)

(a) Domestic Electronic Surveillance: An operation

mounted against a foreign target within the United States to

gather foreign positive intelligence would apparently not meet the

court test unless the specific message targetted involved an anti-

cipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense.

S. 743 explicitly confers interception authority to the FBI alone.

It also explicitly raises the issue of the consistency of surveillance

with international obligations, e.g, the Vienna Convention, and

thus challenges the position taken by the State Department that no

current international obligation precludes targetting foreign

facilities within the United States.

(b) Transnational Electronic Surveillance: Proposed

legislation would apparently subject the interception of trans-

national communications from a situs within the United States to

the probable cause standard. It could also provide grounds for

arguing that interceptions of transnational communications from

facilities outside the United States would be subject to the same

standard.

(c) Foreign Electronic Surveillance: The bills

reviewed above are broadly written and the prohibitions are not

expressly limited to the territory of the United States. While the

reach of this legislation should be subject to the built-in limitation

that the authority of a federal court to issue warrants is confined

to its territorial limits, repeal of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and the

articulation of probable cause standards for foreign intelligence

gathering activities could have a grave impact on overseas

intelligence collection by bringing into play a body of exclusionary

rule case law (developed in ruling on the admissability in a

Federal criminal trial of evidence obtained overseas by electronic

surveillance). Suffice it, here, to say that this could result in

4

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 127

SEGNET

---

## Page 128

subjecting overseas foreign intelligence surveillance to the proposed

probable cause standards as a test of the "reasonableness" required

by Fourth Amendment protections. Moreover, this legislation could

raise complex questions in situations where an element of the inter-

ception process falls within the jurisdiction of the federal court, e.g.,

the physical presence of the surveillance device. Even if these bills

would not directly affect authority to conduct foreign electronic

surveillance, they could ultimately weaken it by raising the

opportunity to argue that this authority rests only on three

bases--assertion of inherent Presidential intelligence-gathering

powers, congressional recognition and judicial acceptance. Repeal

of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) may be viewed as weakening the argument that

Congress has recognized foreign intelligence gathering authority

inherent in the President and delegated to his Executive branch agents.

• 7. Summary:

--Proposed legislation would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and would

impose judicial administration of a "probable cause" standard over foreign intelli-

gence electronic surveillance. At the very least, this would restrict communications

interceptions against foreign targets within the United States to situations

involving an anticipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense.

Also, this would probably subject the interception of transnational communica-

tions, from either an overseas or domestic situs, to the same judicial standards.

Finally, this would raise difficult questions concerning the ability of CIA, NSA,

and the service cryptologic agencies to conduct electronic surveillance overseas

against foreign targets without conforming to the standards of Fourth Amendment

"reasonableness" articulated in this legislation. In sum, enactment of proposed

legislation would severely restrict the collection and processing of foreign •

SIGINT and would seriously impair the production of all-source intelligence.

--By repealing 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and by introjecting the judiciary

into the field of foreign intelligence gathering, proposed legislation raises a

constitutional challenge insofar as it purports to withdraw sanction of and

place limitations on the President's inherent power to conduct foreign

surveillance. This infringement could undermine the Executive sources of

authority upon which the intelligence community depends. To be sure, the

proposed requirement of prior judicial authorization of foreign intelligence

surveillances is altogether impractical. But the fundamental constitutional

objection is that it purports to share Executive authority with judicial officers

having no expertise in or responsibility for national security or foreign

affairs.

The necessity of a foreign intelligence surveillance is simply

inappropriate for judicial resolution. It is a matter committed to the Executive

branch by the Constitution and an area for which there are no judicially

manageable standards. An arrangement by which federal judges decide

what foreign intelligence the President may have in his conduct of foreign

5

NW 65360 Docld:32989609- Page 128

ULET

---

## Page 129

SEGRET

relations is incompatible with the Chief Executive's inherent foreign

intelligence gathering powers. Since this Presidential authority is

constitutional in nature and stems from a fundamental separation of

governmental powers, a Congressional attempt to require its sharing

with the judiciary would certainly lead to protracted constitutional

litigation. Moreover, Congress implicitly authorized the use of elec-

tronic surveillance in foreign intelligence activities and this legislation

would circumscribe the very functions which Congress intended the

Agency to perform.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 129

---

## Page 130

• →

3 - Mr.

• A. Mintz

(Mr.

J. B. Hotis)

(Mr. P. V. Daly)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

• June A, 1975

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT-COMKITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

:

Assoc. Dir. --

Dep. AD Admie.

Dep. AD inte

Asst. DiE

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. _

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. *

Training-

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Reference is made to my letter dated May 6, 1975,

enclosing a memorandum, same date, which proposed that an

FBI position paper dated July 31;

1972, be withheld from the

Senate Select Commiitee on the basis that it was considered

to be an internal deliberative document.

Reference is also made to a conversation May 28,

1975, between Deputy

• Assistant Attorney General K. William

O'Connor and Special Agent Paul V. Daly during which

Mr. O'Connor advised that it was the Department of Justice

decision to make the July 31, 1972, position paper available

to the Senate Select Committee. In view of this decision,

we will make this docunent available for review at FBI

FELT

Headquarters.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is the original of a memorandum advising the Cormittee

of the availability of the duly se, 19te, position paper.

copy of this memorandum is enclosed for

your records.

Enclosures - 2

}*

LITTON CATTA ' CONTAINID

62-116395

My R16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. Willian O'Connor

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

EWL: ekw/1hb/hb

REC-100

62-116395-277

(10)

NOTE PAGE 2-

fi 314/25 T3A6

gra

37, XIN 271975

WOr

298960g

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The Attorney General

NOTE:

By memorandum 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the

position paper in question

was

an internal deliberative document

which was the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI

authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied

in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the AG dated

8/7/73.

on this basis, we felt it was

inappropriate that

the requested position

paper be made available to the SSC.

In conversation between Deputy Assistant Attorney

General O'Connor and SA Daly, referred to above, O'Connor

indicated that it was the decision oi the Department to make

this paper available to the SSC. Since we have already expressed

our position concerning the paper to the AG, it does not appear

that there would be any purpose served disputing his decision.

However, since it is an internal deliberative document, it is

felt that the paper should be made available for review rather

given outright to the sse.

Also, ve are setting a

condition that no notes be taken during the initial review,

subject to negotiation of further requests by the Committee.

- 2 т

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62-11G395

3. - Мт.

Mintz

(Mr.

J. B. Hotis)

Mr.

P. V. Daly)

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mx.

W. O. Cregar

1 - Mc. E. W. Larson

June 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNHENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIEG

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

"ALL INFORMATION CONTAITIN

Peference is made ta lotter doted March 19, 137T

to tho Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned

Cormittce, which enclosed certain requests for documents and

other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (IBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was

made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to

(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intel-

ligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence

activities.

Material responsive to this request vas deliverod

to the Committee during April, 1975.

Since the receipt of the above mentioned material,

the Conmittee has indicated a specific intercst in a position

paper datod July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of MBI

Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Bonestic

Intelligence Investigations."

This paper has been located and

wil1 be available for review at FBI Headqucrters by Mr. John

II1111 and/or lix. Maris Gitonstein of the Committee starf.

our position is that the duty st, 1572, paper is an

witch

internal deliberative docuent the contents of which were

refined in a formal statenent on IBI authority

to conduct

internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum fron

the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1073.

A copy of this latter document has been made available to tho

Assoc. Dir.

Committee.

Under these circumstances, ve vould request that

Dep. AD

the July 31, 1972, document be

revieved in this context end

Dep. AD

Asst. Dir.:

that no notes be taken during this initial reviow.

Should this

Admin.

arrangenent be unsatisfactory to the Committee, upon complation

Comp. Syst.-

of the initial review ve vill certainly considor any furthor

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. --

request for the document in a paraphrase form

acceptable to

Gen. inv. -

the Committee.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell. .

- The Attorney General

Laboratory

Plan, & Eval ' EWL: ekw/1hbh

Training -

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

NW 65360

MAIL ROOM CAN "TELETYPE UNIT [

Docld:32989609 Page 132

762-116395-

GPO 954-546

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## Page 133

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 6/41

OLTR

XI LHM

• Memo

Senate Select Committee to Study

5/30/75

Caption of Document: Govt. Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities. Re: Legal

Authorities

Originating Office:

FBI

Delivered by:

6/55/25-

Received by:

LAO Schwartz

Title:

Return this receipt to the litelligence Division, FBI

ALT INFORMATION CONTATTELI

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFLED

MDR-T4

NW 65360 Docld:32939609 Page 133

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## Page 134

•)

POSITION PAPER

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION

AND RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORNATICN CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFDED

DATE 1142080 BY SALAMED

MIR16

Thomas J. Smith

Chief,

Research

Section

Domestic Intelligence Division

July 31, 1972

W 65360 Dgcld:32989609 Page 134

62-116795-217

ERCLOSURE

sense!.

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## Page 135

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background.

Authority Derived Presidential Directives

•

Authority

Conveyed Even

Before 1939 Directives.

•

Presidential Directives Subsequent to 1939.

Implementation of 1939 Directive... : :•:

Expansion of Authority Contained

In 1939 Directive.

Directives Supplemented or Superseded by Statutes

Validity of the Smith

Act

Directives

Versus Legislative Enactment

Investigations Under Statutory Authority.

Preventive

Investigations

Intelligence Investigations

• '

•

•.

Executive Order 10450

•

Statutory Authority and

President's

Constitutional Power.

Special White House Request

.. ...

Need for Current Executive Order.

Development of Investigative Policies

Preventive Investigations

Intelligence Investigations and Civii

...

Liberty

Interpretation of Authority by Substantive Sections

Extremist Intelligence Section

Views.

Nationalities Intelligence Section Views.

Internal Security Section Views •

Revolutionary Activities Section Views.

Official Recognition of Intelligence Investigation.

Former Study of FBI's

Investigative Responsibilities. •

Recent Executive Intent

Conclusions

•

•

..

•

Recommendations

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 135

1

2

20

22

23

24

26

28

28

28

30

32

34

37

37

39

40

42

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## Page 136

SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY,

JURISDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

BACKGROUND

Over the past several months there have been

an increasing

number of public statements made

various quarters questioning

or contesting

authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct

domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where

there is no clear-cut legislative

authority apparent.

One of the

most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by

Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton

University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public

Justice.

Professor Elliff addressed himself to the matter of

FBI authority derived

legislative enactments

as opposed to

that derived from

Presidential directives.

He went into some

detail in connection

with the Presidential directive issued by

President Roosevelt in September, 1939, which was

subsequently

reiterated on three occasions.

questioned whether Roosevelt

was even aware that he was shifting FBI authority from congressional

enactment to

Presidential directive when he issued the September,

directive since he probably assumed he had granted such

authority in 1936 when he requested intelligence investigations

of fifth columnists.

accused the FBI of magnifying the

September, 1939, directive

into a definitive order.

Over a long period of time Senator Sam J. Ervin has been

probing into the nature and extent of FBI gathering and retention

of domestic intelligence information.

April, 1971,

Senator Ervin made

a request of the Department of Justice to

furnish detailed information concerning the Department's (the FBI's)

policy and practice on investigating and reporting the political

beliefs and activities of persons not under investigation for

violating the laws.

Of particular interest was specific infor-

mation on the constitutional authority and power exercised by the

Executive Branch to conduct such investigations.

Subsequently, Senator Ervin

announced that he intended to

propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any

person without his consent, unless the Government has reason to

believe that person has

committed a crime or is about to commit

a crime.

Other Congressmen have either introduced or announced

plans to introduce legislation or resolutions calling for special

activities, particularly

in the area of domestic intelligence

operations.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 136

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## Page 137

Based on these developments it became apparent that

an in-depth study was in order to clarify any misconceptions

which might have grown up concerning the scope of FBI intelligence

authority, particularly where it concerns

domestic organizations and/or individuals.

A detailed and

exhaustive study has now been completed, and

the following is

the result of that study.

AUTHORITY DERIVED PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES

In the testimony of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover

before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 2, 1972,

under the subject of justifications

on page 2 the statement is

made that "The FBI's responsibilities in the domestic intelligence

are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential

directives and instructions of the Attorney General. They include

investigative jurisdiction over matters

relating to

espionage,

counterespionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, and

related internal

security functions.

Subjects of investigation

include the activities of the Communist Party, USA,

communist

front groups and other totalitarian

organizations, including

individuals or groups who are alleged either to seek

overthrow

of the Government of the United States by force or violence or to

conspire against the rights of citizens."

Similar language has

appeared

in Mr. Hoover's testimony in prior years.

assumed that the Presidential directives referred

to in Mr. Hoover's testimony are (1) Directive dated

September 6,

1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and

December 15,

1953; (2) Executive Order 10450

dated April 27, 1953

(and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Oxder 11605

dated July 2, 1971).

It is believed that there is a misconception concerning

the extent of jurisdiction or authority which was conveyed to

the FBI by the Presidential directive dated September 6, 1939.

All of the succeeding directives appear to be hinged on

the one

issued in September, 1939.

Therefore, the language of that first

directive becomes a

very important issue. Perhaps even more

important are the circumstances leading up to the issuance of

that directive and the intent of the President at the time

it was issued.

Prior to the issuance of the September, 1939, directive

President Roosevelt issued a statement or confidential

directive

to the heads of the

various Government Departments on June 26,

1939, which stated,

"It is my desire that the investigation of

espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled

and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the

War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the

Navy Dopartment. The Directors of these three

agencies

function

as a committee to coordinate their activities."

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NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 137

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## Page 138

"No investigations should be conducted by any investi

gative agency of the Government into matters involving actually

or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage,

except by the three agencies mentioned above."

"I

shall be glad if you will instruct

the heads of all

other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer

immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation any data, information or material that may come to

their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,

counterespionage, or sabotage."

It is to be noted that in this statement or directive

the language, with the exception of the word "counterespionage"

deals with

matters coming cleaxly within legislative enactments.

The September, 1939, directive stated, "The Attorney

General has been requested by

me to instruct the Federal Bureau

of Investigation of the Department of Justice to

take charge of

investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,

and violations of the neutrality regulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and

effective manner on

a national basis, and all information must be

carefully sifted

out

and correlated in order to avoid confusion

and irresponsiblity.

"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs,

and all other law

enforcement officers in the United

States

promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating

to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities

and violations of the neutrality laws."

In this document it is particularly important to note

that the language says the FBI is

to

"take charge of investiga-

tions" and not

"assume jurisdiction" or "have

authority to

investigate" matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and

violations of the neutrality regulations.

The statutory authority

to investigate

the enumerated crimes was

already present, but

directive fixed responsibility for the FBI to conduct the

investigations.

In other words, this directive conveyed no

authority not already possessed

by the FBI by legislative

enactment

but merely established

that no

other investigative agency should

handle the matters.

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NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 138

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## Page 139

The last paragraph of this particular directive, which

was

actually a request of all local law

enforcement agencies,

used the words "counterespionage" and "subversive activities."

However, the context of the statement appears to merely be

designed to broadly define activities which

might touch

on the

national security so that all such matters, irrespective of the

legal definition or name, would be turned over to the FBI.

A logical conclusion, based purely on examination of

the language used in the September, 1939,

directive, is. that

the directive merely put

everyone

on notice that the FBI had the

responsibility to investigate the statutory crimes named; that

it provided no so-called

"constitutional" or "executive

authority" for the FBI to investigate matters not covered by

legislative enactment. This is not to say that the President

has

no such constitutional authority (he has), but only that it

was not exercised here.

As a matter of particular interest, Professor Elliff,

in questioning whether President Roosevelt was aware. that he

shifting FBI authority from Congressional enactment to

Presidential directive since he assumed that he had

granted such

authority in 1936, was at least half correct. While no shift

of authority appears to have occurred as a result of the 1939

diroctive,

we have historical evidence to show that the President

instructed the FBI

to conduct subversive intelligence-type

investigations of radicals in 1935.

In this regard, there appears

to be little doubt that Roosevelt conveyed some degree of

Executive authority to the FBI.

AUTHORITY CONVEYED EVEN BEFORE 1939 DIRECTIVES

Confidential memoranda written by Mr. Hoover in August

and September, 1936,

clearly reveal that President Roosevelt was

very concerned about the subversive activities of fascists

communists in the United States

and discussed the matter with

Mr. Hoover during personal meetings.

These memoranda indicate

that President Roosevelt was obviously cognizant of the lack of

statutory authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations

of fascism

and communism.

Yet, the President desired the FBI to

conduct such investigations.

Mr. Hoover pointed out that the

FBI appropriation contained a provision for the FBI to conduct

investigations if such

matters were referred to it by the

Department of State.

The President was hesitant of having a

formal request come through State Department, however, because

of the many leaks in

State Department.

-4-

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However,

during a meeting between the President,

Mr. Hoover and the Secretary of State on August 25, 1936,

the

Secretary of State did ask the FBI to conduct investigations of

"Fascist and Communist activities, under the provisions of the

Appropriations Act. In the discussion preceding the request,

however, it must be noted that the President stressed the fact that

and communism were international in scope, and that

communism in particular was directed from

Moscow; that this

matter which fell within the scope of foreign affairs over which

the State Department would have a right to request an inquiry to

be made.

According to the information presently available,

President Roosevelt agreed to place a handwritten memorandum of

his own in the White House safe, concerning the request of the

State Department for investigations of fascism

President

asked Mr. Hoover to speak to the Attorney General

che matter

and that the Secretary of State also discuss the

technique to be followed with the Attorney General.

recorded that he did inform the Attorney General on September 10,

1936, of a

conference he had with the President on September 1, 1936,

at which time the Secretary of State was

present, and

at which

time

the Secretary of State - at the President' suggestion - requested

of Mr. Hoover to have investigations made of the subversive

activities in this country: including communism and fascism.

The Attorney General verbally directed Mr. Hoover to proceed with

the investigations and to coordinate these matters in the

possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval

Intelligence Division, and the State Department.

Mr. Hoover

considered this the authority upon which to proceed.

The circumstances

surrounding the manner in which the

President had the State Department request investigation very

likely explains why the September,

1939, directive did not

contain

any language relating to subversive activities.

President Roosevelt

was fully

aware that the FBI was already conducting confidential

• investigations of the activities of fascists and communists who

xepresetned a threat to the national security at that time.

was obviously a private and understandable confidential agreement

between all interested parties, including the other Federal

investigative agencies who had an interest.

There was no need

to mention subversive activities in the first part of the directive

since the pertinent Federal agencies were already on notice and

local agencies would turn over

all matters relating to the

national security.

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Based on the foregoing, reliance on the September, 1939,

directive or even the carlier confidential arrangement worked

out by the President, whether considered a Presidential directive,

Presidential mandate,

other manifestation of Executive

power, for current investigative authority appears to be unwise.

Placing the 1939 directive and the earlier arrangement in

proper perspective is very important.

Both were laid in

a period

when the world was on the brink of World War II.

The concern for

national

security was

related to two international movements. There

were no laws, such as

the Smith Act of 1940 or the Internal

Security Act of 1950. Although there were undoubtedly some purely

American

groups which received no direction or control from abroad,

there

was no national

costrn for indigenous anarchists or other

groups desiring to overthrow the Government.

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES SUBSEQUENT TO 1939

As mentioned previously, the directive dated

September 6, 1939, was reiterated

dated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953.

The directive dated January, 1943, signed by President Roosevelt,

to be alone no line roosevost,

was

simply a reaffirmation of the

earlier 1939 directive and

was broadened only to the extent that it called on all patriotic

organizations and individuals as well as local law enforcement

officers to report information to the FBI. The July, 1950,

directive,

signed by President Truman, contained the

"subversive activities and related matters," which on the

surface would indicate that President

Truman intended to broaden

the scope..of authority it might convey to the FBI.

However,

closer examination reveals that the Truman. directive actually

misquoted the earlier two directives of President Roosevelt and

included the phrase

"subversive activities and related matters"

which did not appear in the Roosevelt directives.

Since no information is available concerning Executive

intent behind the issuance of the 1950 directive, it cannot be

determined whether President Truman was aware of the possible

additional authority he might have conveyed to the FBI

result of changing

the language of the two prior directives to

include the phrase "subversive activities and related matters."

The fact of the matter is, the United States was at the

engaged in the "police action" in Korea and there was

unquestionably a great deal of domestic subversive activity

at the time, most of which could be traced to the Communist Party.

We do know

that President Truman signed the 1950 directive

on the advice of the National Security Council.

There is one document available which tends to reveal

the concern President Truman

had

relative to increased subversive

activity involving domestic cases.

In a letter dated July 17,

1946, the Attorney General said he felt that in the troubled

period

in international affairs, accompanied by an

increase in

-6 -

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## Page 142

subversive

activity at home, it was imperative to use special

investigative measures (wire taps) in domestic cases. Mr. Truman

concurred with the Attorney General and authorized the special

investigative measures.

There is one important point, however, which bears on

any feelings President Truman might have had on

the issue of

domestic subversive activity.

When the Congress passed the

Internal Security Act of 1950, consisting of two subchapters,

Truman vetoed the bill, citing as a reason that Title II of

the Bill - The Emergency Detention Act - constituted a threat

to the democratic process.

In "The American Constitution

Its Origins and Development" by Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A.

Harison,

declared that President Truman roundly

condemned the Internal Security Act

as grossly unconstitutional.

They said that his veto message called the registration provisions

of the law

greatest danger to freedom of press, speech

assembly since

the Sedition Act of 1798."

A drastic new sedition

statute, derived from the earlier Mundt-Nixon bill which was

up in the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1948, was

incorporated in the Internal Security Act.

Mr. Truman thought

the phrase prohibiting a person to "substantially contribute"

to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship so vague as

to cast grave doubts upon whether it met the standards of

accuracy

necessary for due process in criminal statutes.

These authors

did not even touch on the emergency detention subchapter of the

The political climate at

the time, however, in spite of

President Truman's censure and veto, was

such that the Internal

Security Act was passed

over the veto and became law.

While the

directive of President Truman incorrectly

stated "On September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943,

Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge

of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,

subversive activities and related matters.," the directive issued

by President Bisenhower on December 15, 1953, said nothing about

the FBI being responsible for such matters.

Rather, the 1953

directive began by stating,

"On September 6, 1939, January 8,

1943, and July 24, 1950,

Presidential Directives

requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State,

to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage,

subversive

activities,

and related matters

representative of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation."

This language can, of course, be interpreted to mean

that the FBI is responsible

for investigating these matters

otherwise the directive would not have noted that enforcement

officers were requested to furnish all information to the FBI.

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The 1953 directive actually did not reiterate either of the

three previous directives

except for the language quoted above.

Instead, it cited the FBI's responsibility to investigate all

violations of the Atomic Energy Act

requested all patriotic

organizations and individuals as well as all enforcement officers

to report violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest

representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF 1939 DIRECTIVE

All of the foregoing documents have obviously been

subject to various interpretations.

However the language might

be interpreted, the September, 1939, directive, was implemented by

the FBI and Congress was made fully aware of the extent of

investigative activity the FBI was conducting as a result of the

directive. In Mr. Hoover's testimony on November 30, 1939, in

connection with an

emergency supplemental appropriations bill,

he said,

"In September,

1939, we found it necessary to organize

a General Intelligence

Division in Washington. The establishment

of this division was

made necessary by the President's proclama-

tion directing that all complaints of violations of the national

defense statutes and proclamations be reported to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

division now has compiled extensive

indices of individuals,

groups, and organizations engaged in

subversive

activities, in espionage activities, or any activities

that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the

United States.

"The indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically

but also geographically, so that at any time, should we enter

into the conflict abroad, we would be able to go into any of

these communities and identify individuals and

groups who might

be a source of

grave danger to the security of the country."

During the same testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any

of the funds being requested in the emergency supplemental

appropriation yould be spent for any of the purposes for which

funds were denied at the previous session.

Mr. Hoover replied

they would not; that the entire sum would

be spent for intelli-

gence work.

Subsequently, in June, 1940, Mr. Hoover again testified

before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations.

time he

referred to his appearance before the committee the previous

wherein he testified that authority had been requested to set up

a separate division with the

FBI to handle national defense

matters under an

assistant director. Mr Hoover offered a chart

showing the organizational structure of five divisions of the

Bureau, one of which he referred to as the National Defense

Division.

He said that this Division would handle and direct all

investigations dealing with espionage, sabotage, national defense

matters, and violations of neutrality

statutues.

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## Page 144

Mr.. Hoover testified that in line with the President's

order of the previous September (September 6, 1939) there had

been close coordination of all the intelligence services. He

pointed out that the President, on September 6, directed

to coordinate the functions on

national defense matters in

intelligence work.

Mr. Hoover also related that he wanted to

refer to a

general intelligence index which he had mentioned in

previous hearings.

He said that thai index included the names

of persons who might become potential enemies to our national

security,

such as

known espionage agents,

known sabotuers,

leading members of the Communist Party,

and the bund.

explained that this index had been compiled very carefully, and

confined solely to persons engaged in activities detrimental

to the United States.

on February 19, 1941, when Mr. Hoover appeared

before Congress in connection with a deficiency appropriations

bill for 1941, he went into some detail concerning the activities

of the FBI prior to the then national emergency.

In response to

a question concerning this, Mr. Hoover replied

that prior to the

emergency our activities

covered

genexally the investigation of

all Federal statutes except counterfeiting, narcotics, income

tax, and postal violations.

jurisdiction, he said, included

kidnaping, extortion, bank robbery, white slavery, motor vehicle

theft, impersonation of Government officers, frauds against the

Government, antitrust investigations, etc.

Mr. Hoover then incorporated into the record a list of

major crime laws passed between 1934 and 1941, showing the

legislative jurisdiction

of the FBI during the period.

exception of nine of these laws, all dealt with criminal-type

violations of law.

The exceptions

included a prohibition on

exportation of arms

and ammunition to Spain during the civil

war; the prohibition of making photographs, sketches or maps of

vital military and naval defense installations; the Hatch Act,

which among other things related to employment of individuals by

the Government who were members of political parties advocating

the overthrow of the Government; amendment of the act requiring

registration of agents of foreign principals; the Neutrality Act

amendment of the Espionage Act; the Smith Act of 1940;

act requiring registration of certain organizations (Voorhis Act);

amendment to the Sabotage Act.. There was a special note

listed under the amendment of the act requiring registration of

agents of foreign principals.

This called attention to the Presidential

dixective dated September 6, 1939.

From this structure inference

can be drawn that the directive was related to this amendment.

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## Page 145

EXPANSION OF AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN 1939 DIRECTIVE

Further in his testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any other

agencies of the Government were covering the same work that

emergency employees

of the FBI were covering.

He replied that

he would like to leave the committee a publication listing the

statutes, proclamations and Executive Orders pertaining to

national defense matters.

Ho then stated that the President in

1939 directed that all inves! ations dealing with espionage,

sabotage, subversive activit.

and national defense

activities,

would be handled by the FBI ..ept those arising within the

Army or Navy.

He went on to say that other governmental agencies

were instructed under this Executive order to report to the FBI

any information showing any violation dealing with national

defense matters.

No Executive Order could be located which

contains

language used by Mr. Hoover in this instance.

He might havä. che

been referring to either the directive or statement made by

•President Roosevelt in June, 1939, or the directive dated

September 6, 1939. However, the above-quoted language is much

broader than used

In either

of these documents.

In considering the

full impact of the June and September,

1939, Presidential directives,

and how they subsequently influenced

FBI Jurisaiction and responsibility, it must be borne in mind

the Nation was at the very brink of World War 11.

Roosevelt issued

a proclamation on September 8, 1939,

declaring

that state of national emergency existed in connection with the

observance, safeguarding, and

enforcement of neutrality,

strengthening of the national defense within the limits

of peace-

time authorizations. An Executive Order (No.8233) dated September 5,

1939, prescribed regulations

governing the enforcement of the

neutrality of the United States.

The War Department, Navy Department,

Treasury and Commerce Departments, and the Governor of the Panama

Canal were assigned certain enforcement duties.

The Justice

Department (FBI) was given responsibility of enforcement of the

neutrality of the United States not especially designated to other

departments, independent offices and establishments of the

United States Government, and prosecution of violations of the

neutrality of the U.S.

Unquestionably in time of national

emergency the broadest

possible interpretation was being applied to

every statute, resolu-

proclamation, Executive order, Presidential directive or other

order or mandate in the interest of the preservation of peace,

the national

defense and general welfare of the

Undoubtedly

there are many other documents recording Executive intention,

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Executive instructions concerning broad, sweeping authority for the

FBI, which cannot now be found for one reason or another. Certainly

there is indication that at least President Roosevelt had more than

one conversation with Mr. Hoover concerning the necessity for the

•FBI to conduct investigations beyond the statutory authority it

normally used.

DIRECTIVES SUPPLEMENTED OR SUPERSEDED BY STATUTES

Eventually, however, there were legislative enactments

which broadened the

scope of our statutory authority, increased

our legal jurisdiction and added to our investigative responsi-

bility.

Following the September, 1939, directive, which has

been used as a source of FBI authority to conduct certain types

of domestic intelligence investigations, the Smith Act of 1940

became law.

Several successful prosecutions resulted from the

Smith Act,

although some parts of it were invalidated by the

Supreme Court.

The revised statute (Title 18, U.S.C. 2385) remains

on the books and is enforceable.

Legal Counsel's Office analyzed Title 18, USC 2385,

in June, 1972. It was noted that this statute contains the

substance of the original Smith Act.

The House of Representatives

Committee on Judiciary, Report No. 1869, 74th Congress,

First Session, made clear the purpose of the original legislation:

reported bill is based on the natural right of

self-preservation inherent in every government.

authorizes

It simply

exercise of the power of the

government to defend

itself against those who

•seek by force

and violence to destroy

clarification of the legislative objective was

made by Representative John W. McCormack, who said,

"And by

the way, this bill is not alone aimed at

communists; this bill

is aimed at anyone who

advocates the overthrow of government

by violence and force."

VALIDITY OF THE SMITH ACT

The Supreme Court held in 1951 that teaching the

doctrine of forcible overthrow of the United States Government

was a violation of the Smith Act where there was a clear and

present danger that a substantial public evil would result.

The Court further held

that the Act did not violate the First

Amendment.

Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion,

used language which must be considered at this time to be

significant in deciding whether the Government may in

fact conduct preventive-type investigations in the interest

of self preservation.

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Justice Vinson wrote, "The rule we deduce from these

cases (a series of earlier Supreme Court decisions - namely the

'question in

every case is whether words used are used in such

circunstances and are of such nature as to create a clear

present danger that they will bring about the substantive

evils that Congress

a right to prevent.') is that where

añ offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress

terms,

a conviction relying upon speech

or press

as evidence

of violation may be

sustained only when the speech or publication

created a 'clear and present danger' of attempting or accom-

plishing the prohibited crime."

"obvious ye

in this case, applying this rule, the court said,

"Obviously, these words cannot mean that before the Government

may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed,

the plans have been laid, and the signal is awaited--we must,

therefore,

reject the contention that success or probability

of success

is the criterion."

In addition to the Smith Act of 1940, Congress also

passed legislation which

further increased

authority of

the FBI to

deal with subversive activities.

The Voorhis Act

(superseded in 1948 along with original Smith Act) which is

Title 18,. USC 2386, provided for registration of organizations

subjeci to

foreign control which

engage in political activity

among other things. The Internal Security Act of 1950 was

passed over the

veto of President Truman and provided not only

a prohibition of conspiracies or attempts to establish a

totalitarian dictatorship and a long list of measures having

to do with Communist organizations

(Control of Subversive

Activities) but also for the

emergency detention of suspected

security risks.

Further, in 1954, Congress enacted the Communist

Control Act to

provide additional investigative

authority in

dealing with the communist threat to national security,

DIRECTIVES VERSUS LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT

These legislative enactments were unquestionably

designed to give the FBI a cloak of statutory authority to

investigate not only the communists, which were a grave concern

to President Roosevelt when he requested investigations of

communism by the FBI in 1936, but

also any other group which

activity aimed at

overthrow of the Government by

force or violence.

And, whereas President Roosevelt relied

on the element of

foreign relations

and the international

character of the fascist and

communist movements

to have

State Deparment make a request for FBI investigation, the

statutes referred to above do not require a dependence on

foreign elements, notwithstanding the

congressional finding

of necessity in connection with the Internal Security Act of

1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954.

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The question to be resolved, then, is divided into

several interrelated parts. First, if the Presidential

directives described heretofore are actually valid. Secondly,

assuming that the directives are

completely valid, why have

they been cited as one of the bases of FBI investigative

authority? Thirdly, if, as it appears from the foregoing, the

directives are valid, but do not

convey the investigative

authority we have heretofore contended, what effect will this

have on our past and future domestic intelligence investigative

activity?

Insofar as the validity of the Presidential directives

Is concerned, there can be no question but that each directive

was issued completely in

accord with the president's executive

The evidence shows that the first directive in September,:

1939, was not only implemented with the knowledge of Congress,

but by appropriating money to the FBI for its implementation

Congress in effect

gave the directive the full force of law.

None of the directives from September, 1939, to the one issued

by President Eisenhower

in 1953 have been secret.

of fact, all were directed to the public at large,

asking

support of local law enforcement officials and patriotic

organizations.

Numerous times the directives have been cited

in FBI appropriations testimony.

The second part of the question becomes more difficult

to answer.

Over the years, whenever it has been necessary and

describe our investigative authority, and this has

been a requirement in justifying our annual budget, we have used

what we have considered

all of the different bases

for such

authority,

Although it now seems obvious that the September,

1939, and July, 1943, directives did not actually order the FBI

charge of any investigations not actually covered by

statute, i.e.,

espionage, sabotage, and neutrality laws, it did

law enforcement

officers to turn over to the nearest

representative of the FBI all information relating to subversive

activities and

counterespionage as well as the three statutory

crimes listed.

It is apparent that the language here was intended

as a catch-all so that law enforcement officers would turn over

information of any sort whatsoever if it might affect the

national security.

In analyzing the language used in that first directive

of September, 1939, everything must be put into its proper

perspective.

In 1939 the Nation had been conditioned to a state

of near-war. From. January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler became

Chancellor of Germany, through the nonagression pact between

Germany and the Soviet Union in August, 1939, the specter of war

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hung over America.

Anti-German, anti-Italian and anti-soviet

sentiment swept over the country. People began to look for spies

under their beds.

It became very necessary to direct the

Nation's energies in that regard into a single channel.

We could

not have every police officer, sheriff and special deputy sheriff

in the country running around investigating spies. By the same

token, it was very necessary for the Government's resources to be

directed towards identification and neutralization of very real

espionage rings and potential saboteurs.

The June, 1939, directive

assured that the FBI would take charge of domestic internal

security instead of several

agencies working at cross purposes.

The September, 1939, directive placed local law enforcement on

notice and simultaneously provided for information of possible

value to be funneled to the FBI which was responsible for the

coordination and investigation.

The

september,

1939, directive, although not conveying

any investigative authority to the FBI, did result in an

additional workload for the FBI by virtue of the fact that local

police and other Federal agencies were referring matters to the

FBI for investigative

attention

which were not previously

called

to our attention.

While some of the matters could be logically

fit into

one of

the statutory crimes of espionage, sabotage or

neutrality regulations, others could not be since

the original

information was often nonspecific or so nebulous that it could

be categorized only after some

inquiry was made locally.

We were also faced with the reality of war and the

fact that Germany, Italy, Japan and

the Soviet Union had

apparatuses directed against the United States.

espionage

While we might

not ordinarily institute an investigation before the commission

of a crime,

the case of a bank robbery, motor vehicle

theft, etc., the crimes of espionage and sabotage relate to the

national security.

It would have not only been folly, it would

have been insane to wait until we had evidence of the commission

of crimes of espionage or sabotage.

Rather than wait until

a complaint alleging the commission of one of these crimes

we went out and conducted intelligence-type investigations to

determine if there were espionage rings operating or if there

were persons conspiring to sabotage the national

defense.

So the

September, 1939, directive did affect our investigative operations.

Not by giving us some new investigative authority, but by assigning

us the responsibility of coordinating all investigative activity

in this regard. We were, of course,

already in the intelligence

gathering business as a

result of the confidential arrangement

agreed upon in August and September, 1936, among

President Roosevelt, Director Hoover, and

the Secretary of State.

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Fox these reasons, it can be seen why the FBI used the

September, 1939, directive as one of the bases

for its investi-

gative authority. The unfortunate thing is that the 1939 directive

was never really updated, in spite of the reiterations of 1943,

1950, and 1953.

really never broadened to incorporate the

Executive request made in 1936, and to reflect the Executive

intent that became so obvious in the succeeding years up to this

very time.

It

would be very difficult to convince

someone

examining

our legal

authority for conducting intelligence-type

investigations that we derive

any authority, particularly

reiterating it.

What we have, it appears, is

a hold-over

perpetuation of a concept of

authority (or better, responsibility)

which had some basis in 1939, and perhaps even through

Korean War years, but which has long since ceased to have any

bearing on FBI investigative operations.

This leads us to the third part of the question and

that is what effect the lack of authority derived from the

directives will have on past and future domestic intelligence

investigations.

supervisors

Although there is division of opinion by some

and officials in the Domestic Intelligence Division as

to how much investigative activity has in the past and will in

the future depend on the nebulous authority of the directives

in question, examination of all the evidence leads to the

conclusion that in the past our investigations have to some

degree depended, not on the language of

any of the directives,

but rathers

the Executive request of President Roosevelt in

1936 andon basic authority derived from

the many statutes

relating to the national security, both before and after the

issuance of all the directives in question.

INVESTIGATIONS UNDER STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Argument has been advanced by some in the Domestic

Intelligence Division that it will be impossible to carry out

our internal security responsibilities of conducting purely

intelligence-type investigations using statutory authority only;

that the only way we have been able to do this in the past was

from the authority contained in one or more of the directives

in question.

If this were true, i.e, that we have conducted

some investigative activity solely on

the basis of the directives,

the FBI would be in for

a rough time if the efforts on the part

of several congressional figures to look into

our operations

The fact of the matter is, we have had

ample authority to do just what we have done without the

directives. Administratively perhaps, we could have been more

precise in advertising our investigative jurisdiction and

authority. And unquestionably, we could have been more careful

in writing reports and other

records of our investigative activity

to show that our investigations were predicated on information

indicating violation or possible violation of statutes.

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This brings

up another point mentioned by

Professor Elliff in his study.

Elliff related that

FBI had a policy from Mr. Hoover's appointment as Director

until 1936 of "closed

end" investigations, but that this policy

gave way to intelligence coverage involving continuing investiga-

cive activity within a broad range of delegated authority. By

"closed end" investigations, Elliff means

that a crime was

committed, a prosecutive opinion was received, an investigation

was conducted, a prosecutive opinion was sought and the case

was either prosecuted or closed for want of prosecution.

the other hand, an intelligence-type investigation would involve

continuing investigation without any thought of closing the

case by virtue of prosecution or inability to prosecute.

a case involving a purely criminal act, it can be seen that

a "closed end" investigation is possible.

But in the fast-moving

world of today, with its organized crime problem tied into space-

age concepts

even in purely. criminal cases, the "closed end"

investigation is often far from a reality.

PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

In analyzing. the concept of "closed end" investigations

versus continuing intelligence-type investigations, several

factors must be considered, especially where the national security

is involved. Ordinary criminal acts such as the bank robbery,

burglary, fraud, etc., can in no way be compared to crimes

involving the national

security.

Usually we would

occasion to conduct investigation prior to the commission of any

of the above-named crimes.

But, a crime against national security

is an entirely different

matter.

No one but a

• fool or one

dedicated to the destruction of democracy would advocate that the

Government take no action to prevent a crime which could destroy

the Government.'

In other words, it would be an unusual case to

conduct a "closed end" investigation of an attempt to overthrow

the Government by force

and violence.

It would appear that the

FBI would have a constitutional obligation to conduct the

necessary preventive investigation (intelligence?) to insure that

an attempt to overthrow the Government does not occur.

Taking into consideration

that any court in the land

would take judicial notice that the Soviet Union

and its satellites

are engaged in espionage directed against the United States and

that it employs intelligence-gathering techniques against us, it

logically follows that the

same courts would take judicial notice

that the United States Government would have to employ counter-

espionage and counterintelligence methods to combat this threat.

It is believed that the same can,be said for other situations

the facts

are such to lead any prudent and cautious individual to

believe that a threat exists to commit sabotage; to incite to

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"I""

insurrection or rebellion; to engage in seditious conspiracy; or

to plot the overthrow

the Government.

Under such circumstances

it would seem that the FBI not only has the duty to conduct

investigations to prevent the crimes, but has the obligation to

do whatever is

necessary within the

law to neutralize such

threats.

It is true that this type of investigation might be

contrary to the established concept of investigating only after

there is evidence of crime.

It is also true that such investi-

gations might take place

a long period of time without any

indication or prospect of presecution.

However, as pointed out

by Legal Counsel in his memorandum dated 7/14/72 on

Wiretapping,

that "Running through the whole (decision) is a golden thread

philosophy that when the functions essential to the preservation

of a nation itself are at stake, the nation has the power to take

the action reasonably necessary

to protect itself."

While this

comment had to do with a particular court decision not related

to the national secuirty, it is

very apropos.

It would be

unrealistic to contend that the FBI could only investigate

crimes

or potential crimes affecting the national security

after

the crime has been committed. How ludicrous this would be.

Right on point in this regard is another part of the

majority opinion upholding the Smith Act convictions in 1951.

Chief Justice Vinson wrote, "Likewise we are in accord with...

the trial court's finding that the requisite danger

existed. The

mere fact that from the period of 1945 to 1948 petitioners'

activities did not result in the

attempt to overthrow the

Government by force and violence is, of course, no answer to the

fact that there was a

group that was ready to make the attempt.

The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy,

with rigidly disciplined members subject to call

when the leaders,

these petitioners, felt the time had come for action, coupled with

the inflammable nature of the world conditions, similar uprisings in

other countries,

and the touch-and-go nature of our relations

countries with whom

the petitioners were in the very least

ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were

justified on this score.

"And this analysis disposes

of the contention that

conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from advocacy itself,

cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it comprises only

the preparation.

It is the existence of the conspiracy which

creates the danger. (Emphasis mine) If the ingredients of the

reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until

the catalyst is added."

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Some might say, "this is all very well and good where

prosecutive action is used or intended, but what of the cases

where the only purpose of the investigation is to produce

intelligence information, with no hope or intent of prosecutive

There are unquestionably situations where prosecution

would be impossible, but it is doubtful if any situation could be

conjured up involving the national security where the elements

of

one

or more

statutes would be present to lend statutory authority?

to an investigation or reason for investigation.

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Recently, in connection with a lawsuit filed by the

Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee because of investigation

by the FBI relative to

a huge demonstration in Washington, D. C.,

the Department of Justice cited Title 28, USC 533, as the

lawful

authority of the FBI

to conduct the investigations in question.

The investigation at issue had to do with contacting various

transportation facilities

an effort to determine the nature

and size of groups traveling to Washington for the demonstration.

In a sense,

this was purely intelligence-type investigation.

statute cited was nothing more than the statute enabling the

Attorney General to direct the FBI to conduct investigations.

This

same statute

has been cited

for other types of

investigations

where the Department of Justice has requested the

FBI to conduct investigations where we might not have

seen or understood the

clearly

underlying authority or reason. It can be

seen, however,

that under the statutory authority granted to the

President in Title 10, USC 331-333, to call up troops to assist

local

governments to put down

an insurrection or restore order,

the Attorney General would be within his statutory authority as

the President's Chief Legal Advisor to ask the FBI to provide all

possible intormation which might assist the President in making a

determination under Title 10. Thus, the FBI would conduct an

intelligence-type investigation under the statutory and constitu-

tional authority

flowing

from

the President, through the

Attorney General to the FBI.

In this case

we might not immedi-

ately see the potential

for prosecutive action, although with the

statutes covering antiriot and

civil disorder we would

no doubt

be alert for indications that riots

or disorders would occur

and that evidence could be collected which would support prosecu

tion.

Here; we would be conducting investigation before

violation takes place, not only for the intelligence data needed

by the President, but to determine if a Federal violation of law

might also occur.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

What other authority is also available to the FBI? We

sometimes lump Presidential directives and

Executive orders into

one category as if they were the same. This is a common practice,

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even on the Executive level. The Executive orders are

numbered,

whereas the directives usually are not.

From information

available it appears that Presidential directives and Executive

orders carry equal weight.

They take on the force of law if

acknowledged by resolution of Congress and are published in the

Federal Register.

All this leads up to a very significant

document which over the years has provided substantial investi-

gative authority to the FBI.

It is commonly known

Order 10450, although it has been

revised and will be known

Executive Order 11605 if it is ever implemented. Executive

Order 10450 is captioned as

"Security Requirements for Government

Employment" and, as the name implies, is related to employment

by the Government of individuals who might constitute a national

security risk.

This Executive order grew out of Executive

Order

9835, dated March 21, 1947, which provided for an

investigative procedure affecting persons entering competitive

civil service.

The order established

a Loyalty Review Board

and procedures for handling of cases where loyalty of an

employee was questioned.

Executive Order 9835

followed the

establishment of the President's temporary commission on loyalty

Executive Order 9086, dated November 25, 1946. Executive

Order 10450, dated April 27, 1953, superseded

and revoked

Executive Order 9835.

The important thing about these two Executive orders is

that the Attorney General was

required to furnish the Loyalty

Review Board current information concerning the subversive nature

of foreign or domestic organizations, including totalitarian

groups.

Thus, the FBI, acting under

lawful authority of the

Attorney General, was bound to conduct the necessary investiga-

to enable the Attorney General to fulfill his responsibility

to the Loyalty Review

Executive Order 10450, in

revoking

Executive Order 9835, also disbanded the Loyalty Review

and provided that the Attorney General would furnish the same

information regarding subversive organizations to the head of

each department and

requested to render to the heads. Attorney General was also

of departments and agencies

advice

as may be requisite to enable them

to establish and

maintain an appropriate employee-security program.

Under Executive Orders 9835 and 10450. the

Attorney General had the responsibility to designate

organizations as totalitarian,

commission

adopted

fascist, communist or subversive,

apolicy.

of advocating or

approving the

of acts of force or violence to deny others their

rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking

to alter the form of government of the United States by uncon-

stitutional means. Under provisions of Executive Order 11605,

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dated July 2, 1971, the Attorney General still has the

responsi-

bility of furnishing names of organizations, to the heads of

departments and agencies.

However, instead of the organizations

being designated by the Attorney General, the new Executive

Order provides that the Subversive Activities Control Board

shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct hearings

to make the same determination formerly made

by the

Attorney General.

The new Executive Order also sets up

a much

broader criteria

for establishing the subversive nature

organizations.

Unfortunately, the Subversive Activities Control

Board, which

was initially established under the Internal Security

Act of 1950, is under attack from Congress.

Congress refused

to provide

any funds for the Subversive Activities Control Board

after July 1, 1972. There has been indication that Congress may

also take steps to

repeal the remnants of the Internal Security

Act of 1950.

Should this happen, we would lose a broad base of

current authority for conducting many of our security-type

investigations.

Executive Order 11605 has not actually been

implemented; therefore,

we are bound to the provisions of

Executive Order 10450.

Basically, however, the responsibility

under 10450 (or even 11605 if it is ever implemented) falls on

the Attorney General,

and for this reason the Department of Justice

should now

provide guidance as to what investigations are required

to fulfill the Attorney General's obligations under

the existing Exeuctive order.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

What other investigative authority or jurisdiction do

we have?

Attached to this study is a collection of statutes

documents which

grant investigative authority for conducting the

various types of investigations falling with the primary super-

vision of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Included in this

collection of laws are statutes such as civil rights statutes,

which are the basic responsibility of the General Investigative

Division, but which nevertheless convey statutory authority in

investigating totalitarian organizations

and other hate-type

groups. Civil rights statutes might also

likely be involved in other situations where

organized

groups

act in such a manner as to deny other persons their constitutional

rights.

The fraud statutes are included since many groups

engage

in

activities which are covered in one way or another

by such statutes.

There are, of course, the basic statutes such

as

espionage, sabotage, treason and foreign agents registration

act.

But there are statutes, such as inciting to

and others which cover an extremely broad spectrum of subversive

activity.

But isn't there some additional authority under the

constitutional power of the President to protect the national

security?

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It was under just such constitutional powers that

President

Roosevelt requested the FBI to investigate the fascist

and communist movement.

And, of course, it was under just such

constitutional powers that the President authorized the

Attorney General to approve without a warrant electronic sur-

veillances on both domestic and foreign organizations engaged

in activity detrimental

to the national security.

However, the

Supreme Court has considerably narrowed the President's consti-

tutional authority as

a result of the keith case.

essence,

the court stated

that insofar as domestic organizations are

concerned, the

not have the power

to abrogate

the First

and Fourth Amendments.

In other words, the President

cannot order an act (investigation) which would interfere with

abridge the

First Amendment rights to assemble or redress

grievances, or

to enjoy freedom of speech, or the Fourth Amend-

ment rights requiring the issuance of search warrant in connec-

tion with the seizure of evidence.

The courts have considerably broadened their inter-

pretation of both the First and Fourth Amendments.

libertarians have proclaimed that any activity on the part of the

Government which might have a "chilling effect" on an individual's

legitimate right to dissent constitutes

a violation of First

Amendment rights.

In some cases

the courts have adopted this

the same token,

Fourth Amendment rights have been

broadened to include overhearings of conversation,

and the issue

of invasion of privacy is being raised more and more.

factors being considered there are, however, numerous

situations bearing on the national security where

the President

unquestionably has

the constitutional authority to have the

FBI obtain information which will enable him to fulfill his

broad responsibilities under the Constituion. With the exception

of the recent Keith

decision, the courts have declined to define

or circumscribe the President's constitutional power.

Ordinarily, when we speak of the constitutional

power of the President we think in terms of a specific order

such as a directive or Executive order or some other tangible

evidence.

However, over the years, beginning with the years

preceding World War II, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover established

rapport with the President which resulted in the President

making requests of the FBI under his inherent Executive authority.

The request made by President Roosevelt in 1936 as described

herein is an excellent example of a long series of Presidential

requests extending through a long line of Presidents and at least

until Mr. Hoover's death.

Presidents from Roosevelt to Nixon

confided in Mr. Hoover and sought his advice and product of

FBI investigative skill, particularly in matters affecting the

national security. One very excellent example of the confidence

the President has

had in the FBI is the confidential Presidential

?

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dixective of 1941

instructing that the FBI set up a Special

Intelligence Service covering the Western

Hemisphere to handle

and coordinate all intelligence work within the

hemisphere.

There are

many other

examples, but a more recent one

fact

that President Nixon, in spite of responsibility assigned to

CIA, asked that the FBI establish Legal Attaches in several

countries where there had been a dearth of good intelligence

information.

SPECIAL WHITE HOUSE REQUESTS

Over a period of years

the President came to rely on the

FBI to provide first-hand intelligence information concerning

both domestic and foreign

situations bearing on policy affecting

the national security.

As a result of numerous conferences in

which the various Presidents outlined to Mr. Hoover their needs

for information which

would assist him and his staff in

policy decisions, Mr. Hoover instructed that important developments

concerning the national defense or which might otherwise be of

value to the White House should be

reported

directly to the

President or one of his high-level

staff members.

instances the same information was made available to the Attorney

simultaneously.

Over the years it became a common practice

House staff members to

telephone requests for information

or investigations to Mr. Hoover's office or the office of one of

his officials.

requests were usually considered as being

within the constitutional Executive power, and

most part

such requests were completely legitimate and well within the

recognized scope of the FBI investigative authority.

Occasionally, however, requests

were made - and

complied

with - which in retrospect appear to have been beyond any recognized

Executive

authority.

An example is

a telephone request to furnish

all available information to the

White House concerning a forth-

coming Earth Day rally in 1970.

The rally, which was sponsored by

groups concerned with pollution and ecology, attracted the

attention of a few subversive elements, but

appeared to be very

much under the control of the sponsors. Senator Edmund S. Muskie

spoke at the rally in Washington, D. C., and Rennie Davis, an

antiwar activist with a subversive

background, appeared on the

same platform with Senator Muskie.

A few minor disturbances

erupted in some areas, but overall the Earth Day rallies were •

peaceful and

attained their general objective, the calling of

attention to

environmental problems.

Muskie, who learned

that the FBI covered the rally in Washington, was incensed that

FBI was involved.

We had a poor defense

and in this case, at

least, it is doubtful that there

was any legitimate Executive

authority to have the FBI involved. In any event

that such requests should flow through channels, including tappear

Department of Justice where possible, to assure

that unreasonable

and improper requests are made for investigative activity.

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It is quite understandable that various staff members

at the White House

have assignments or projects to prepare

reports on a wide variety of matters relating to the welfare

of the country. It is also quite understandable that such

individuals would turn to the FBI to develop information through

investigative activity or from its

files.

However, the fact that

the FBI has specific responsibilities and jurisdiction under

the law may not be known to these staff members and in their

ignorance of the situation they could

ask us to engage in activity

beyond the scope of oux investigative authority.

Over a long period of time the FBI has disseminated

information directly to the White House as it was developed

when the information had a bearing on national defense or possible

foreign policy planning.

The White House has come to expect this

kind of rapid. dissemination.

Much of the information disseminated

has been of specific interest to the National Security Council

of which the President, Vice President and high level members

of

his staff

are members.

Even though CIA has the basic responsibility

under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate all

intelligence data relating to national defense, the nature of

rapid changing situations makes it impractical

to disseminate all

important intelligence information to the National Security

Council via CIA channels.

It is not believed

that the White House

• would

sit

still for the FBI cutting off dissemination on nationai

security information.

NEED FOR CURRENT EXECUTIVE ORDER

Dissemination, however, is but the product of investi-

gative activity.

The question, then, is not to whom we should

or should

not disseminate, but

rather

when and when not should

President does have broad constitutional powers which he can

exercise in the interest of national security, how

can such

power be conveyed to the FBI to cover possible

gaps in our

statutory authority? It is not believed that individual requests,

particularly from lower level White House

staff members, actually

convey any power of inherent Executive authority, unless

requests may have originated from the President himself.

What appears to be sorely needed, then, is

a clear-cut memorandum

of understanding - possibly in the form of

a comprehensive

Executive order or Presidential directive - outlining areas of

investigative activity required and the investigative product

needed by the Executive to fulfill his national security

responsibilities.

i i

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DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE POLICIES

By examining our investigative policies and procedures

over the years it can readily be seen that procedures

out of necessity, such as those developing out of the perited

preceding World War II, in time come to be

accepted as gospel

both within and outside the FBI.

The intelligence-type investi-

gations

originally ordered because of circumstances existing in

1936 and even before, continued after World War II, and in reality

became necessary again during the Korean War period. And although

actual basis of authority in 1949

and 1950 was

as in 1936, we evidently considered it the same and obviously the

Department of Justice and White House did also. Even though the

Congress provided legislative authority to investigate subversive

acts, it appears that we did not feel that the type of investi-

gations necessary could be conducted except under an authority

which did not require collection and preservation of evidence with

a view of eventual prosecution, but rather to gather information

only for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of

subversive activity.

This is not to imply that the statutes were not used.

On the contrary,

the statutes were used

and' a large number of

top level Communist Party functionaries were convicted under the

Act, but we still conducted investigations based on what

we considered to be authority under constitutional power of the

President - investigations which Professor Elliff has called

continuing investigative activity within a broad range of delegated

authority.

While this study has not gone into the procedures

and policies developed by the FBI in connection with investiga-

tions relating to our Emergency Detention Program, various

documents were examined and it is known that this program preceded

the Emergency Detention Act, which was

a part of the Internal

Security Act of 1950.

great deal of investigative activity,

dating back to the 1930's, was conducted concerning the Security

Index, an integral part of the Emergency Detention Program. las a

matter of interest, the Emergency Detention Program, which was

a program devised

to insure that individuals constituting a

threat to national security would be arrested and detained in the

event of a national emergency.

The Department

at one point felt

that the constitutionality of

such a program was highly question-

However, the program was implemented and was in existence

at the time the Internal Security Act of 1950 was passed.

And most curiously of all is the fact that even

after

the Internal Security Act of 1950 became law, providing a legal

basis for the program in existence, it was not until the 1960's

that our Emergency Detention Program was switched over from an

emergency plan

under Presidential powers to the authority

vested by statute. Of course, the part of the Internal Security Act

7

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authorizing emergency apprehension and detention was repealed

in October, 1971.

Under the Emergency Detention Program, while

it existed, a great deal

of continuing investigative. activity

was

conducted concerning thousands of individuals who were

believed to represent a threat to the national security in time

of national emergency. Some

of our investigative practices today

are based on criteria authority growing out of the original

Emergency Detention Program.

Now this is

not to say that the FBI is in a position of

having to defend its investigative policies or practices.

has been but a single thread of continuity running through our

investigative practices and procedures over the years it is that

the individual's constitutional rights are paramount; that nothing

is so important as a citizen's rights under the law.

Legal

Counsel

pointed out an

extremely important point last year

at the

time of the Princeton Conference where

a group of FBI critics

gathered to expose the FBI's

faults.

He noted that for years

preceding the Miranda decision and the Escobedo decision the FBI

been warning persons of their rights prior to taking any kind

of statement.

Every Special Agent knows that the first and

perhaps most

important

element in preparing for a prosecution is

preserve the individual's rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

The

FBI has legally conducied investigations of individuals

and organizations whose philosophies include the overthrow or

destruction of the United States Government by force or violence.

Whether conducted under a Presidential order or statutory

authority any such investigations

were absolutely necessary and

continue to be so.

For administrative reasons documents reporting

results of investigations often have not always clearly shown the

authority, statutory

or otherwise.

A caption has usually been

used for routing and supervisory purposes which is not clearly

indicative of

the nature or purpose of the investigative activity.

Such captions might well be confusing to one not connected with

the FBI and they might well lead to the conclusion that investi-

gation was not based on any legal authority.

For example, the

"Security Matter - Miscellaneous" or "Internal Security

Revolutionary Activity" means little to someone outside the FBI.

To those in the Domestic Intelligence Divison such designations

identify the type of case and supervising unit at Headquarters.

In other words, there has been nothing wrong with the

conduct of

our investigations.. Only those deserving of investi-

gation under statutory provisions

have been investigated.

While

we would have been more precise to predicate our investigations on

a specific authority, whether

statutory or Executive order (10450),

we have not engaged in extra-legal investigative activity

simply because we

failed to cite any specific authority to

conduct the investigation in such

a way as to make it a "closed

end" investigation such as Professor Elliff described.

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PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

While there has been

some disagreement by one or two

supervisory personnel in Domestic Intelligence Division as to

how long an investigation may be carried on under statutory

authority or whether a "preventive" investigation

can be carried

on under that authority, it is my own contention that intelligence-

type investigations can

be carried out under statutory authority;

that there is no constraint imposed by law governing the length

of time in which

an investigation can be conducted.

There are

many reasons why continuing investigative activity would be

necessary,

even when a statutory violation is involved. In most

cases involving the national security a conspiracy of some sort

is involved.

Conspiracies frequently go on for years. When

the preservation of the Government is involved, who is to say that

we either prove a conspiracy within a specific

period of time or

stop investigating.

conspiracy is evident or not, the FBI would

an investigation of any type unless information was first

received that a violation of Federal law was involved or that the

national security was threatened. This is how our so-called

intelligence-type investigations

are usually started.

A citizen,

an informant, or a law enforcement officer furnishes information that

there is a group in existence which includes in its philosophy an

advocacy of overthrow or destruction of the Government of the

United States by force or violence. It would appear to be entirely

logical that under at least three separate.

Federal statutes a

violation would occur if this group did attempt to overthrow the

Government. And the Supreme Court has said that the Government

and that proof that success or probability of success must be shown.

While the examples cited hereafter might not be good legai

analogy, there does not seem to be any reason why the preservation

of our Government warrants any less consideration under the law.

The courts have upheld cases,

such

as have been developed in the

Washington, D. C., metropolitan

area, where a nearby jurisdiction,

which

prohibits importation of liquor from Washington, sets up

a

surveillance near the larger purveyors of liquor.

When

a car

bearing Virginia or Maryland license plates is observed to be

loading up

what is obvioulsy more liquor than

can be imported

states, a surveillance is instituted and when the person

the state line he

is arrested

charged with

violation of state liquor laws.

it can be argued that such is

possible only because of the broad police powers delegated to

states by the Constitution.

Perhaps.

But under

the same

Constitution it would appear that

somewhere there is a rationale

that if a statute exists prohibiting the overthrow or destruction

of our

Government, the Government

same degree

of power to see that persons do not overthrow

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But the same problem exists in

many areas covered by

Federal statute.

In the narcotics field tremendous intelligence

programs

are in

existence to stop the spiraling increase in drug

addiction and traffic in narcotics by organized crime.

Even

broader intelligence programs are being planned.

It is true that

violations are

occurring.

And some arrests

being made as the

result of excellent police work following the violations.

the Government is also concerned with preventing drugs from even

getting into the United States,

and from preventing any that do

get here from being sold to our children.

So, we are conducting

preventive investigations in the narcotics field. We are conducting

intelligence-type investigations.

Certainly prosecutions will

be sought wherever possible, but we are conducting

the same type

of investigations in the narcotics area as we are in the field of

national

security.

We are doing what has to be done, and the

are the basis of what has to be done.

In the field of organized crime we know that the Mafia

and the Cosa Nostra have spread like a cancerous

very economy of the Nation.

i the a open cathy hoto

growth into the

are violations of

law.

Statutes of some sort are usually involved. Many of the

statutes involved are outside the primary investigative jurisdiction

of the FBI.

What has to be done?

The individuals controlling

the organizations of crime syndicates must be identified and the

nature of their activity analyzed to see what - if any - Federai,

or even local,

crimes are being committed.

In other words, we

know that syndicated criminals

are engaged in crime, yet we do

not know exactly what crimes.

We are therefore conducting

intelligence-type investigations to first identify the criminal

and then identify the crime.

I fail to see why there isn't a

parallel between intelligence-type investigations conducted to

prevent criminal depredations on the public at large and the same

kind of investigations to protect the Nation from the nihilists,

anarchists, terrorists, revolutionaries and other subversives.

While drawing a parallel between criminal investigations

and national security investigations, there is no intent here to

show that both

types of investigative

activity can be or should be

conducted alike.

The two types of activity are as diametrically

opposed as the two poles of the earth. One is concerned with the

individuals and organizations which are involved purely for

financial

The other is concerned with

the individuals and

organizations which are involved purely for ideological and

philosophical reasons.

There is

a vast difference between

Intelligence-type investigations are necessary in the

field of narcotics and other

areas of organized crime and they

are conducted without the need

for any inherent Executive power

being conveyed.

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origin to the common-law concept of a sovereign's rights to

protect itself to the 1939 et sea, directives and Executive

Oxders 9835 and 10450. Included in this group were (1) National

Association of Black Students

(NABS) which originally had as its

stated purpose to. serve as an information center and communications

network. for blacks on college campuses. This was in 1969.

There was an enormous amount of violence and upheaval on college

campuses at that time.

Damage and injuries from arson, sabotage

and malicious vandalism grew into the millions.

instances black students were in the center of the activity.

NABS was considered a potential source of danger during any

strife, particularly since the national coordinator of the

Gwendolyn Marie Patton, had been a member of an extremist

group cited as an

extremist group by the House Committee on

Un-American Activities.

The Black Panther Party and other

revolutionary-type organizations attempted to organize and

penetrate black student groups such

(2) The Center for Black Education (CBE) came under

investigation when its founder was determined to be a former member

of the Black Panther Party and described as one of the leading black

militants in San Francisco prior to his move to Washington, D. C.

CBE has been publicly described as an educational institution

designed to train technicians who will work to liberate the

African people and develop the African world. The CBE has as its

"the independence of the African People." Members have

engaged in firearms training.

The Drum and Spear Bookstore (DSB) in

Washington, D. C., opened in 1968 and was publicly described as

a retail bookstore having the largest collection of books about

AIrIca, Asia, and the Negro in America. It also had protest

literature

and books concerning the socio-economic conditions in

the U. S.

It was determined through investigation that the

bookstore was apparently not being used as a front for underground

or. subversive activity and investigation was closed.

(4) The Congress of African Peoples (CAP) was formed in

It initially advocated the unification of all blacks, the

complete rejection of the

"white imperialist, capitalist system,"

establishment of a black nation, the

formation of a National

African Party and ultimately a World African Party under the

revolutionary ideology of Pan-Africanism.

During a CAP conference in July, 1971, CAP leaders

vociferously

advocated the need to engage in disruptions

means of ending "acts detrimental to blacks," the formation

of a paramilitary "defense unit," and the establishment of

communication

black revolutionary movements

abroad. The CAP has established

communication links with the

Chinese communist diplomatic establishment in Canada.

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND CIVIL LIBERTY

One of the biggest distinctions between the criminal

and security-type investigations is the fact that national

security investigations, which involved the ideological factor,

are almost without exception concerned

with the concept of

political ideology.

No matter how radical the political ideology

might be, it is nevertheless considered by the people involved

and often by many intellectual idealists - as a right guaranteed

the Constitution.

As a result of a great deal of liberal

thinking on the part of the civil libertarians and groups such as

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), there is a much

and cry when

intelligence-type investigations

surfaced

and it developed that the purpose of the investigation

had something to do with an individual's so-called political

beliefs. The potential problem

for the FBI in conducting purely

intelligence-type investigations: even when based on statutes,

the investigation broaches or gets real close to rights

protected under the First and Fourth Amendments.

As pointed out before, however, the Supreme Court has

emphatically stated that the President has no constitutional

power to abridge these two Amendments. Therefore, no Executive

no matter how broadly worded to

convey investigative

authority for intelligence- type investigations, could

enable the

FBI to avoid the same pitfalls regarding areas of activity

covered by the First and Fourth Amendments.

Therefore, even though

a definitive Executive order would be desirable from the stand-

point of fixing our responsibilities and bridging any gaps between

statute and Executive necessity, the FBI would still be in a little

better position than it is at the present time under purely

statutory authority.

INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORITY BY SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS

At this point it appears appropriate to introduce comments

offered by

representatives of the various substantive Sections of

the Domestic Intelligence Division

as to their interpretation of

Executive power

flowing from the 1939 et sea, directives and

the types of investigative matters that possibly cannot be conducted

solely under statutory authority.

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS

The Extremist Intelligence Section

described

four

investigative matters

where it appears that investigation, at

least initially, would not or could not have been grounded in

specific Federal statutes, but where the FBI nevertheless was in

a sense fulfilling intelligence responsibility tracing its

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COMMENT - REBUTTAL

It is believed that in at least three of the above-

described situations the FBI would have been able to

conduct

investigatons based on statutes relating

to advocacy of over-

throw of the Government, seditious conspiracy, inciting to

insurrection or rebellion, civil disorders,

antiriot,

neutrality laws

(foreign relations) and perhaps sabotage. The

questionable case, the Drum and Spear Bookstore, would have

probably been brought adequately to our attention from various

public sources or through our informant coverage of overall

matters affecting the national security.

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS

The Nationalities Intelligence Section listed four

situations

wherein,

generally speaking, much of the FBI's

investigative activity has not been based on statutory authority,

but has been designed to develop intelligence data regarding

individuals

organizations which have

established themselves

a potential threat to the security and safety of the

United States Government or its citizens. Listed are the following:

The Jewish Defense League (JDL). Although involved

in terror-type bombings covered by statute, FBI investigation of

IDL is also developing information regarding future plans

activities, particularly violent acts against Soviet diplomats

diplomatic establishments and pro-soviet groups and indivi-

In the case of JDL, Department of State has a specific

from the standpoint of U.S. relations with other

countries.

Certain of our intelligence-type investigations of

JDL are aimed at satisfying State Department requirements.

Al

Fat ah

and

Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine are two organizations that are well known for violence

potential.

In light of statements and

actions of members

leaders,

it is obvious that the FBI should conduct intelligence

investigations when these organizations are active in the U.s.

(3)

Revolutionary Union

and Venceremos Organization are

. groups which adhere to

a pro-Chinese communist political

philosophy and pledge overt action through use of weapons to

bring about revolution in this country.

With this in mind, we

have undertaken intelligence-type investigations to identify

those involved who may be responsible for carrying out violence

directed

against the U. S. Government or the citizens of this

country.

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(4)

Puerto Rican independence groups, specifically those

who seek to bring about independent status for Puerto Rico by

of force and

violence, are the subject of intelligence-

type investigations.

No groups

seeking independence of Puerto Rico

by lawful means are investigated. The violence-prone groups have

committed

acts ranging from attempted assassination of the President,

accompanied by murder, to acts of terrorism involving bombing,

arson, and shootings.

Much of the violence-prone groups ' activity.

is planned in communist Cuba.

Many of the leaders of the violent

pro-independence groups are

communists or followers of Leninist-

Marxist philosophy.

Nationalities Intelligence Section is of the opinion that

the aims and activities of the above-mentioned groups and similar

organizations border on

statutory violations; that while we do not

on statutory

prohibitions for authority to investigate them,

it must be recognized that the reason investigations

are initiated

approaches the elements

involved in conspiracy violations.

Nationalities Intelligence Section opines that if we must 100k

authority for this kind of investigation,

it appears we must rely on the Executive order (directive?) dated

September 6, 1939,

and subsequent reaffirmations of that order,

noting that

the 1939 directive and later supporting directives

were published at a time

when this country was involved in armed

hostilities abroad.

Nationalities Intelligence Section observed that it

appears necessary

at this

time to seek

a properly worded Executive

order which clearly sets

forth the desires of the President in

his capacity as the chief administrator of our country.

Such an

order should carefully distinguish between acts which

are clearly

opposed to the constitutional basis under which we operate and

which, no matter how unpopular, are nothing more than an

expression of ideas.

Finally, Nationalities Intelligence suggests

guidelines from the Attorney General

should be

issued, based on the

Executive order or directive.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

While I agree completely with the suggestion that a

detailed Presidential order

is needed, along with guildelines

issued by the Attorney General, I disagree that we cannot investigate

the violence-prone Puerto Ricans and the Revolutionary Union and its

spin-off, the Venceremos Organization, under existing

statutes.

also that all we need to cover

the JDL and the Arab terrorists

like a blanket is a request from the Secretary of State to the

Attorney General

under the statutory authority relating to

foreign relations which has previously been

described herein

and in

accordance with Title 28, USC 533, set forth in the

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exhibit accompanying this study.

Some

additional authority is

also present, at least for the time being, in Executive Order

10450 (based on Executive Order 9835). Additionally, there is

authority: particularly with respect to JDL, under statute

having to do with assaulting foreign diplomats.

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION VIEWS

The Internal Security Section pointed out that the

security investigations supervised within that Section are

conducted within the purview of authority set out in original

position paper of the Domestic Intelligence Divison dated

May 19, 1972, entitled "Investigations of Subversion," which

have been discussed during meeting of the Bureau's

Executive Staff with Mr. Gray at Quantico the last week of May.

The position paper was

abandoned by Mr. Miller in favor of

different position, the essence of which has been expressed

in this study.

authority referred to by Internal Security Section

essentially is based

on both statutory and Presidential documents,

including the 1939, et sea,

directives.

Internal Security pointed

out that it should be stated at the outset that while FBI

investigations conducted

with specific reference to a statute

will develop some intelligence it is not possible to base all FBI

activities in

the collection of intelligence on statutory

authority alone.

Internal Security further points out that it is

true that the initial Presidential directive(s) of 1939 picked

up the term "subversive activities" as incidental to their

primary thrust, but that it is just as true that President Truman's

directive of July 24, 1950, however intentional or

unintentional it may have been specifically stated, said that the

FBI had charge of investigative work in matters relating to

espionage, sabotage, subversive

activities and related matters.

Internal Security feels that whether or not the initial Presidential

directives fully embraced the concept of subversive activities

would appear irrelevant after such a definitive order signed

by Truman. Internal Security Section is of the

opinion that whether

it spelled out beforehand is unimportant because obviously

Truman's order of July 24, 1950,

made our investigative interest

in subversive activities valid at that time.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

Without going

into detailed rebuttal here, the Truman

directive is discussed in detail heretofore, it must be reiterated

that Truman's directive contained

a misstatement of fact concerning

the previous directives, and I feel that under the magnification

of a critical analysis

of the Truman directive, particularly by

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individuals unsympathetic to the FBI, we cannot glibly state

that whatever the intention or unintention may have been, Truman

signed the order and therefore it made everything fine.

VIEWS CONTINUED

The Internal Security Section believes that reliance on

statutory authority alone for the collection of intelligence

would severely limit the scope of FBI activities to the detriment

of our national security.

They feel that a statutory basis must

impose reasonable and definable limits and for the most part

investigations conducted with regard to statute are "closed

Internal Security points out that we investigate violations

or allegations of violations; that we do not investigate indefinitely

on the supposition or speculation that by "fishing" we may

find somebody who violates a Federal law. Internal Security notes

that such a concept is repugnant to the democratic process and

clearly indicates a police state mentality.

They go on to point

out that on the other hand it is

also clear that there are

areas - particularly where the integrity of the Government

stake -- where we must

conduct intelligence-type investigations

to detect conspiracies and actual

attempts which go to the very

heart of the Government's existence.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

Here,

again, I must interject with

a point of rebuttal.

As pointed out

before, I feel that investigation under statutory

or other legal authority does not require the so-called "closed

end" type of investigation in every

But the most important

point I want to bring out is that I

cannot see the logic of saying

that investigations based on the possibility of violations to

destroy the Government (intelligence investigations actually)

are repugnant to the democratic process when performed under

statutes forbidding such activity and are indicative of a police

state mentality, whereas there is nothing repugnant, nothing

wrong with conduct the same type of investigations

under some

nonspecific Presidential power to protect the integrity of

the Government. I personally, as

a citizen, would rather

have a system wherein I could not be investigated unless there

was some indication that I was planning to violate the law,

or had already done so. As a law-abiding citizen I have no

fear of intelligence-type investigations aimed at discovering

plots to violate the law.

I would have fear of

system which permitted intelligence investigations based

someone's - anyone's; Presidential or otherwise - interpretation

of what an individual may say, do or think. The law is a

guideline and states clearly what I may do or not do.

Vague interpretations subject to the caprices of undisciplined

politicians

could result in a virtual police state if the law is

not the basis of our investigative activity.

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VIEWS CONTINUED

Internal Security Section recognizes that our investi-

gations are conducted under both

the authority conferred under

Executive orders (10450) and statutes and notes that

as

practical matter the statutory provisions cited as a basis for

intelligence-type investigative authority must bear a reasonable

relationship to the activity investigated and must be brought to

a logical conclusion within a reasonable period of time. They.

also point out that it would be extremely difficult to justify

continued investigative interest in a mere member of the communist

Party on the basis of the Smith

Act or the Internal Security Act

of 1950.

It is further pointed out that this points up again

the necessity

for reliance not only on statutory authority but

for the broader. intelligence-type authority conferred by

Presidentail directives and Executive orders.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION VIEWS

The Revolutionary Activities Section furnished several

specific examples of work of that Section which does not fall

within the purview of existing Federal statutes. Included in

those examples are the following:

(1) Students for a Democratic Society/Worker

Student Alliance (SDS/WSA) is the largest faction of SDS

in existence at the present time. It has

an estimated

membership of 750 members. This

group is

described as

a revolu-

tionary, predominantly campus-based organization dominated and

controlled by the communist Progressive Labor Party.

The group

has engaged in recent widespread anti-Government demonstrations

throughout the country which have led to numerous arrests,

property damage, and

injuries to law enforcement officers.

purpose of our

investigation of SDS/WSA is to obtain intelligence

data in order to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength,

dangerousness,

and activities of the organization and to keep

the Department. of Justice and other interested agencies advised.

Revolutionary Activities Section states that authority

for investigation of SDS/WSA is

based on Executive Order 10450,

but that additional authority is derived from Presidential

directives dating from September 6, 1939, 28 Code of Federal

Regulations

0.85 (d) cites FBI authority

to carry out Presidential

directives.

They also note that

"inherent" responsibility of the

President derived from the Constitution to "insure domestic

tranquility," (Preamble) to "take care that the

faithfully

executed,"

(Article II, Section 3) and to protect the states

against invasion and domestic violence (Article IV, Section 4)

provide power to the President.

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(2) The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is the inter-

national Trotskyist movement founded in the 1920's when Leon Trotsky

lost out in a power struggle to Joseph Stalin for control of the

international

communist movement. The basic philosophy of the SW

is that only violent revolution

destroy capitalism; that

all political groups other than their own are counterrevolutionary

and must be destroyed. We rely on Executive Order 10450 for

investigative authority.

(3) The Venceremos Brigade consists of a loosely knit

group of over 1500 individuals who have travelled to Cuba in

separate contingents since November, 1969.

Positive information

has been developed that the organization is being used by

various hostile intelligence services for spotting purposes

and recruitment of intelligence agents and support personnel.

group is under investigation because it appears to be under

control and domination of a hostile power.

Revolutionary Activities Section states that Presidential

directives (supposedly the 1939,

et seq directives) have given

the FBI responsibility to investigate matters relating to the

internal security of the country.

They point out that after the

first contingent returned to the U.S. in February, 1970, the

White House (nonspecific) instructed

the Director

to conduct an

intensive investigation of the

group to determine the extent of

indoctrination afforded these individuals while in Cuba and to

assess their potential dangerousness to the country. In addition,

the Department of Justice has requested information to support

indicia that members of various

contingents have been trained

espionage and intelligence agents for the Cubans and North Koreans

and may be operating as such in the u.s.

(4) Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) is a revo-

luationary antiwar group currently of major concern in view of

its potential for violence.

The organization is made up of many

Vietnam war veterans who have advanced training in explosives and

weapons and many have records of narcotics use.

One VVAW

no plosives and

national coordinator stockpiled arms and ammunition and advocated

"political elimination squads."

Revolutionary Activities Section

relies on the Presidential directives (1939 et seq) and Executive

a basis for investigation in the absence of

specific statutory authority.

(5) Weatherman is the name adopted by a group which is

a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization dedicated to the

of the Government through force and violence. A number

of Weatherman leaders are current Bureau fugitives in connection

with violations of Federal antiriot laws, Bombing and Gun Law

statutes, as well as the

Fugitive Felon Act.

Revolutionary

Activities Section cites as specific authority for investigation

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of the Weatherman organization that Presidential directives have

instructed the FBI to take charge of investigative work

relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities and that

Executive Order 10450

provides additional

authority.

(6) Unaffiliated individuals who are a part of the New

Left Movement.

Revolutionary Activities Section notes that

although the New Left Movement has no definable ideology of its

own, it does have strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist

anarchist overtones.

In some instances there are individuals

without any organizational affiliation who by their revolutionary

activities and statements, establishing a rejection of law and

order, reveal the individual to be a potential threat to the

security of the U.s.

individuals do, in fact, engage in

violence or unlawful

activities and their potential dangerousness

to the internal security is clearly demonstrated by their state-

ments, conduct

and actions. According to Revolutionary Activities

Section, specific authority to conduct our investigations of

unaffiliated individuals is derived

from Presidential directives

of September 6, 1939, through December 15, 1953.

This Section states that in all these examples there is

a likelihood that evidence may be developed at

some future date

that activities of these organizations and individuals constitute

violations of specific statutes.

It is further stated that our

authority to conduct investigations in these cases cannot be

based on the speculation that evidence of some violation might be

developed; however, until such time as we obtain a substantial

allegation that

a violation has occurred, we must base our

"intelligence" investigations on the Presidential directives and

Executive orders issued by the President delineating our

responsibility in regard to national security.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

At the risk of being monotonous, there appears to be

ample indication here that a great deal of statutory authority

Is present, but not being cited.

The Smith Act of 1940 and

statutes

dealing with the national

security provide the basis for

investigating all of these

groups.

The espionage statutes

serve as basis for investigating the Venceremos

Brigade.

Certainly

the authority conveyed by Executive Order 10450 is

not questioned.

And in the case of the Weatherman group, the Fugitive Felon

gives us a tremendous latitude for conducting all the intelligence

investigation we may need in

an effort to locate the Weatherman

fugitives.

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OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Although the cold facts indicate that the Presidential

directives dating back to 1939 do not convey any authority to

the FBI which

it did not have

already by legislative enactment,

it is obvious

that intelligence-type investigations are necessary

in the protection of the national security.

Various documents

emphasize the necessity for developing intelligence data.

example,

the report of the National Advisory-Commission on Civil

Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) emphasized that law enforcement

organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence

for planning purposes and that law enforcement. should "gather,

evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as

as actual civil disorders. "

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest

(1970) took special

note of the need for intelligence in

effective

law enforcement.

The Commission stated in its report, "It is

an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men

and women

who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and

sometimes

to maim and kill."

The report concluded that the

best, and sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart

or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

A memorandum for the Director of the FBI from Attorney

General Ramsey Clark, dated September 14, 1967, stated that "In

view of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country,

it is most important

that you use the maximum available resources,

investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts

bearing on the question

as to whether there has been or is a

scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness,

ox affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot

activity."

The memorandum went on to state that "In this connection

the following federal statutes could be applicable depending, of

course, upon the factual situation that develops." Ten Federal

statutes were then listed and

it is particularly significant to

note that the Attorney General was instructing that the FBI

collect intelligence information - not on some specific allegation

that a crime had been committed, but to determine whether there

has been or is a scheme or conspiracy. In other words, the FBI

was instructed by the Attorney General to conduct intelligence

investigations

to determine if any

of the ten Federal laws might have

been violated in connection

with riot activity.

FORMER STUDY OF FBI'S INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

In an exhaustive study of the "role of the FBI in

Clandestine Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States, "

conducted and reported in a document dated April 29, 1966, by.

a committee more commonly referred to as the "Papich

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## Page 173

considerable information was brought out concerning

the FBI's

investigative authority.

Of great interest is the impact the

National Security Act of 1947 had on the gathering of intelligence

in the United States.

This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401

et seq, established the National Security Council (NSC) and under

it the Centeral Intelligence Agency (CIA). The legislative

history of the Act notes the concern Congress had that CIA could

develop into a gestapo if permitted to become operational in the

James Forestal, then Secretary of the Navy, testified in

a hearing before the

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive

Departments, that "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency

limited

definitely to purposes outside of this country, except

collation of information gathered by other government agencies."

He went on to say, "Regarding domestic operations, the

Federal Bureau

of Investigation is working at all times

collaboration with General Vandenberg (then head of CIA).

relies upon them for domestic activities."

The Papich Committee

study noted that there is tacit

acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)

of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers

information affecting the national security:

"That upon the written

request of the Director

of the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central

Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and

dissemination as

essential to the national security."

The Papich Committee report reveals that there is ample

indication that Congress

was

aware of FBI intelligence functions,

particularly with respect to

foreign intelligence activity in

the U.S.

The Executive

Branch was obviously depending on the FBI

to provide intelligence data which CIA, by law,

could

not collect

in the U.S. A task force headed by General Mark Clark in 1955

took notice of the fact that the FBI dealt in security intelligence.

The task force

report cited the fact that the FBI was one of

four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(LIC),

created by the National Secuirty Council, approved by the President,

March 23, 1949, to coordinate "the investigation of all domestic

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related

matters affecting internal security."

It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb

responsibilities of its member agencies

but made mandatory

action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete

investigative coverage in compliance with

the needs of the IIC,

which had full responsiblity for coordination of the investigation

of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, etc.,

affecting

internal security.

The task force mentioned above, in commenting on the role

of the FBI, noted "The Federal Bureau of

Investigation, however,

is the recognized center of the domestic

aspect of internal

security including counterintelligence within the United States

arid. its possessions. "

It is to be noted that this task force

took

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## Page 174

cognizance of the fact that President Roosevelt as far back as

1939 had directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic

used in the task force report.

In any event,

we know this is a

very broad

interpretation of the 1939 directive.)

RECENT EXECUTIVE INTENT

Even more recently the White House exhibited its own under-

standing of the intelligence role and functions delegated to the

Attorney General and the FBI.

By confidential memorandum from

the White House to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and

Commerce; the Attorney General; Director of CIA; Military Represen-

tative of the President; Administrator, Federal

Aviation Agency;

and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,

dated June 9, 1962

(National Security Action Memorandum 161), President Kennedy

stated that he would look to the Attorney

General to take the

initiative in the Government in insuring the development of plans,

programs, and action proposals to protect the internal security

of the United States.

memorandum directed that the two

interdepartmental committees concerned with internal security --

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Chaired by J. Edgar

and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

(Chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice) which

had been under the supervision

of the National Security Council,

be transferred to the supervision of the Attorney General.

One of the greatest problems in conducting

a study of this

type is the location of pertinent documents and material which

bear on the issues.

We have located

copies of the documents

related primarily to the heart of this issue, our basic authority

in the national security field - namely, the Presidential directives

and Executive orders

which we have cited in addition to statutes

as being our sources of authority - but there may be other very

pertinent documents bearing on the Executive intent to have the

FBI conduct intelligence-type investigations.

A good example

is evidence used by the

Papich Committee, but not found during

this study, which shows

that President Roosevelt called a

White House conference on May 9, 1954, attended by the Attorney

General, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of

FBI, and

Chief of the U. S. Secret Service to deal

with the problem

growth of fascist organizations in the United States.

The con-

ference agreed that there should be an invesiigation of

groups and their activities for intelligence purposes.

the only Federal law believed applicable at the time was the

Immigration Law, the President decided that the Commissioner of

Immigration and

Naturalization Service should confer with the

Chief of Secret

Service and the Director of FBI to work out

details of the investigation.

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## Page 175

Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to

conduct an intensive

investigation of the Nazi movement.

evidently, was the

This,

first general intelligence investigation made

by the Government into fascist activities in this country.

note that this general intelligence investigation was based in

law, namely the Immigration Law:

We have here an

example of

the exercise

of inherent Executive power tempered by the fact

that the Presidential desire for intelligence investigations would

be implemented because there was a statute covering the situation.

Basically, the same

applies

to the 1936 arrangement between the

President, the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of State.

The law permitting the Secretary of State to request the Attorney

General to investigate certain matters was the legal basis for

the subsequent FBI investigations.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary

and conclusion, it is believed that the facts

clearly show that while there

labyrinth of conflicting infor-

and opinions concerning the FBI's authority to conduct

intelligence-type investigations in the national security

field,

there are a few basic points requiring

clarification.

is believed that we must first sweep away the myth that the FBI

now has any investigative authority based on the Presidential

directives dating from 1939, and that any investigative

responsibility we derived from those directives is so outdated as

to be very questionable if not entirely void.

This is, of course,

taking into consideration the national situation at the time the

directives were individually issued.

Secondly, it is believed thai the FBI does have a valid

reason to conduct intelligence-type investigations based on

the fact that there are laws prohibiting all the various types

subversion truly affecting the national security and that the

Government has the right to protect itself from destruction by

conducting whatever preventive or intelligence-type investigations

are necessary to see that individuals and organizations

do not do those things, in violation of the law, which could

threaten the national

security.

Preventive or intelligence-type

investigations would include the use of confidential informants

and sources of information, the calling on law enforcement officers

and patriotic citizens

organizations to furnish all infórmation

concerning subversion to the FBI, the collection

intelligence data from publications and other public source

material, including congressional hearings, and the full scale

investigation of allegations received from all sources.

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## Page 176

Our intelligence-type investigations, however, should

meticulously adhere to guidelines which would

clearly prohibit

any intrusion or abridgement of an individual's rights guaranteed

under the Constitution, particularly the First, Fourth and Fifth

Amendments.

To assure

that the proper guidelines are drawn we

should request the Department of Justice to issue them and then

afford the closest possible supervision of investigation, both

in the field and

at Headquarters to see that our intelligence

investigations are kept within these guidelines.

The voicing

of this need does not indict our existing guidelines or careful

supervision, but merely recommends that our responsibilities be

described and, where necessary, circumscribed by the Attorney General

whose duty under the law is to

supervise our activity.

It appears that the most effective means of laying to

rest the persistent complaints of various

critics that the FBI

engages in political surveillance (investigations) in violation of

First and Fourth

Amendment rights is to have definitive legislative

enactment carefully state what the FBI must do to protect the

national security.

Such could be resolution or statute, but should

cover in complete

detail what acts should be investigated by the

FBI, and, in particular, that the FBI must conduct preventive or

intelligence-type investigations to protect the national security.

Under the political climate existing in the country today,

however, the

passage of either a

resolution of the

type needed is very remote.

Because of the misconceptions and

misapprehensions surrounding investigations relating to subversion,

atmosphere of suspicion in congressional circles that

would likely stifle any

attempt to formulate any such legislation

at this time.

We should, however, recommend to the Department chat

consideration be

given immediately to sponsoring some comprehensive

legislative enactment along the lines needed.

In the meantime, for the benefit of the FBI, the

Department of Justice and the rest of the Executive Branch of

Government, including

staff at the White House, it appears

that the next best thing

is to have a comprehensive Executive

order issued, under the inherent Executive power, outlining

exactly what

responsibilities the FBI has in the protection

of the national security and in furnishing the Prèsident

the data he needs to fulfill his responsibilities under"

Constitution.

To be effective such Executive order would have to

clearly define the FBI's intelligence collection responsibilities

and would necessarily have to contain language which

would

satisfy the courts that First and Fourth Amendment rights are

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## Page 177

not being abrogated in any manner.

Language in such an order

would ideally follow the basic language and purposes of Executive

Order 11605, since this deals with virtually every type of

subversive activity confronting the country today.

It is finally concluded that this study has shown that

the FBI has in the past conducied no intelligence-type investigations

which were not permissible under the law, particularly under the

concept that intelligence-type or preventive-type investigations

are lawful when the product

and purpose of the investigation

is to prevent a violation of a statute.

It is believed, however,

that every area of our national security investigations should

be reviewed for the purpose of determining what additional

constitutional safeguards should be considered. This

is particularly

true in light of the fact that much of our investigative

activity

in the past was

geared to the Emergency Detention Act, which was

repealed in October, 1971.

We should make absolutely

certain,

for

example, that the procedures adopted in setting up our

Administrative Index, following repeal of the Emergency Detention

Act,

are

not being used to circumvent the repeal of the

Emergency Detention Act. In this regard, it is to be noted that

a detailed study of the Administrative Index has been underway

and is almost complete as of this date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

That upon

completion of a final draft of the study

dealing with this matter, a

letter to the Department be prepared

containing the essence of this study, pointing out our findings

and requesting (a) The Department's opinion concerning our findings,

particularly directives discussed herein; (b) The Department's

opinion concerning

the legality of intelligence-type or preventive-

type investigations based on existing statutes; (c) Requesting the

Department to issue comprehensive investigative guidelines for

future investigations of the intelligence or preventive type;

(d). Requesting

the Department to sponsor comprehensive legislation

spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of

intelligence information relating to the

national security; and

(e) Requesting the Department to seek a comprehensive Executive

order which would cover

any possible gaps between statutory authority

and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

That a penetrative study be completed at the

earliest possible date concerning all

our current national

security investigative guidelines to insure that every possible

safeguard is in effect to protect the individual's rights

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## Page 178

kis""

protected by the constitution; that the current

study of

procedures

relating to

Administrative Index

specifically

determine if any procedures are in effect which could be interpreted

as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.

THOMAS J. SMITH

CHIEF, RESEARCH SECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

-

43

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## Page 179

NOTE:

ONS ON REVERSE

ETING.

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

HOW PROVIDED (check

for review

appropriate

term.

If a document was made available

but not transmitted, so note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING.

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

JOTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/4/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check

appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

*

ssC

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION

(provide descriptive data for documents; dive name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum advising SSC that a document it desires is available

for review only at FBI Headquarters.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in

response to formal request, other-

wise state

verbal

request

of (name), initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 3/19/75; Part I, Legal Authorities.

U

1. KEY WORDS (enter

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

ised underline

for emphasis)

Authorities - legal

ALI, INFORMATTON CONTATIO

ntelligence activities, GOMeStIC DArEN-

FIREN A SO SISTAN

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this

item)

Memorandun advises that in response to SSC request for an FBI

position paper dated 7/31/72, discussing the "Scope of FB

Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelli-

gence Investigations,' the paper is being made avallable for

review only at FBI Headquarters and with further condition that

no notes be taken during this initial review.

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:1hb

(4)

62-116395

379| (6-751

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 179

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-2475<85

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 180

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy.of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required.

Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

1 ....

i 4350 Frurl 2337605 Page 180

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## Page 181

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO

RNMENT

Memorandum

MR. WANNALI WiNK

DATE:

6/2/75

Assoc. Dir.-

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dop. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dis.

Comp. Syst..

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com..

FROM

I. N. BASSETT HiD

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

Laboratory -

Legal Coun. w

Plan. & Eval..

Spec. Inv..

Training

Telephone Rm. -

irector See'y -

In response to the Church Committee's request for Inspection Division

guidelines used for inspecting field offices and divisions (item #7, Appendix B

of Senator Church's letter to the Attorney General da ed 5/14/75), this Division

has no objection to a review of the field and headquarters inspection manuals by

Members of Committee Staff, provided the review is conducted in FBI space

with an Inspection Division representative present.

1 - Mr. Wannall (Mr. Cregar)

1 - Bufile 62-116395

poor

FBG:wmi

(4)

:

ALI, INFORMATION COT FAIV

HEREIN IS UNC

DATE 10-7-7000 BY GRUMmA

mostle

REC-100

62-116385

47. JUN 27 1975

275

84 JUN 2 7 1975

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 181

RISTIET

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## Page 182

OPTIONAL FORMINIO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITIÓN

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

FRO

1. - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

1

- Mr. J.

B. Adams

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

DATE: 5/29/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1

- Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT

Assoc.

Dop.

AD

•Dap. AD

Ass4. Dir.: 1

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident..

Laboratory

Legal Coun. -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sac'y -

SENSTUDY 75

provided Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff for review of

This memorandum recommends that Bureau space be

Bureau material and interviews of Bureau employees.

SSC Staff is in a phase of its inquiry concerning

Bureau operations which includes (1) review of considerable

FBI material (sections of manuals, Iorms,

SAC memoranda, etc.

(2) interviews of Bureau employees; and (3) briefing o1

Staff

members by Bureau officials and supervisors.

For many very

sound reasons it would be to the Bureau's distinct

advantage

to provide limited, but suitable space within the J. Edgar

Hoover Building to

the SSC Staff.

Because we have been able

to obtain the Staff's agreement

to review much of our material

at FBIHQ, rather than its insistence on turning the material

over to the Staff, we are in a position of insuring the

security of our material by maintaining it in our space at all

times.

Also, by having the SSC Staff conduct its review of

the material

in our space, we can have personnel readily

available to answer their inquiries, thus precluding the

necessity for preparing otherwise needless correspondence and

eliminating the necessity for having our personnel present

throughout their reviews if they took place elsewhere.

Further, from a psychological standpoint, it is to our

advantage that our employees be interviewed in our space rather

than in SSC offices.

Finally, space made available to SSC

Stait will also provide a desirable site for the various brielings

our people are giving to them.

It should be noted that the

providing of the space which this memorandum recommends is

Similar to what we have already done for the General Accounting

Office in connection with its audit of our operations 25=0

62-116395

REC-100

6.2-116

27

HE JUN 24 1975

(7)

ALL INFORMATION CO: "" INI

CONTINUED

DATED. 1: 00 pm/30

MDR-16

Bwk6d360 B071d2989609 Page 182

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## Page 183

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy 75

62-116395

Stomale

6/20175

Space required should be sufficient to accommodate

three desks and three chairs plus two or three file cabinets;

and including the necessary desks, chairs and cabinets.

¡ Space should approximate that currently used to accommodate

Section Chief's offices in the INID.

Because the SSC Staff has already commenced some of

its review of Bureau material and has already engaged in some

briefings, it is essential that urgent attention be given this

request.

INTD has already surveyed its space and would be

unable to accommodate the need involved.

ACTION:

Upon approval, Administrative Division will

immediately take necessary steps to provide for the necessary

space and equipment described above.

locatio

woel

We have initiated space

surey to see if there a ste

spacefat all

up for this pusosie.

-2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 183

---

## Page 184

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

X" 1902 EDIÇO1

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. -

_1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

Jep. AD Adr

Dop. AD Invi

LV0603 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Asst. Dirat

Admin.

(1-J.B.Hotis)

Comp. syst. -

TO

:MR. W. R. WANNALI

DATE:

May 27, 1975

Ext. Affairs_

Files & Com. -

(1-Mr.P.V.Daly)

Gon. Inv. -

EBOR

: MR. W.

o!

PEREGAR

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Ident.

ins pegio

Intelf.

" I ORMATION CONTAND 1 - Mr. I. W. Leavitt.

Laboratory -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

IS UNCLACOIRED EXCEP - Mr. W. A. Branigar

Plan. & Eval. -

- SHOWN OTHERWISE.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting*

Telephone Rm. -

Diloctor Sechy

between Mr. John Elliff, Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff,

who is in charge of the

task force looking into the FBI, and

Messrs. Wannall, Leavitt, Branigan, and Cregar. Purpose of the Ü

meeting was to acquaint Elliff with the work of the Counterintelli-

gence Branch in

the Intelligence Division.

House Select Committee (HSC)

Elliff advised that the SSC is concerned with how the

HSC plans to conduct its probe of the intelligence community.

He anticipates HSC may hold hearings very shortly and possibly

LASSIFIED BOND

WECLASSIFY ON: 25X

of intelligence community documents the SSC has been furnished.

Department of Justice

• According to Elliff, Kevin I. Maroney, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, has agreed to allow Staff

Members of the SSC to review the Department's file on the

Intelligence Evaluation Committee (this was a Committee chaired

by the Department and evalved from one of the recommendations set

out.in the "Hpuston Plan." During its existence the Bureau had

several representatives assigned to the IEC).

Mr. Maroney has also advised the SSC Staff that in the

1966-67 period the Department of Justice did an extensive

study

on the legal authority for the conductof electronic surveillances.

Elliff was quite pleased that the Justice Department planned to make

this study

available for review by Staff Members of the SSC in the

Department's Building and expressed the hope that the Bureau would

also see fit to allow Staff Members to review research and studies

the: Bureau might have conducted in the area of sensitive investi-

gative techniques.

REG-I00 62-116-395-2

62-116395

WOC: ekw

*5/22/75

CONTINUED

17 JUN

27 1974

NOW 653601 2 7 1975

Docld:32989609 Page 184

---

## Page 185

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall DE

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Sensitive Investigative Techniques

Mr. Elliff felt that much could be accomplished in

responding to the SSC request of 5/14/75 if the Bureau could

pull together the basic FBI documents delineating our legal

authority to engage in the following investigative techniques.

(1) Electronic surveillances, including consensual

electronic surveillances; (2) all forms of mail surveillances

Including covers and openings; (3) physical surveillances

including Special Agent (SA) infiltration of target groups;

photography and remote viewing and sensing devices (laser

beams); (4) surreptitious entries; (5) incommunicado interroga-

tions; and (6) bank credit, and other personal information.

It was Elliff's opinion that if the Committee could

be allowed to review the legal authority for such surveillances

along with the documents showing how the decision-making process

worked in instituting, approving and discontinuing such operations,

much of the misunderstandings some members of the Committee have

would be clarified. Elliff also felt a detailed briefing of the

Committee with whatever limitations the Bureau desired to place

on the number and level of those to be briefed would be extremely

helpful in assisting the Committee in developing some authority

for the FBI to legally engage in such sensitive activities in

the future.

Three Top Priority Items of the SSC

Elliff advised that in his judgment the three top

jurisdictional authority in the security and counterintelligence

field. (2) Provide the Bureau with some authoritative basis,

either statutory of otherwise, to engage in certain counter-

intelligence activities, l.e., surreptitious entry, electronic

surveillances, incommunicado interviews, in national security

cases when the

need for such activity has been clearly established.

(3) To improve the coordination between the FBI and the rest

of the intelligence community.

- 2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 185

---

## Page 186

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. WannalidEvillE

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Elliff was questioned about the reason for the

third priority. He responded by noting that one President

(Nixon) had stated that in 1970 there was a breakdown in the

relations between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence

community. Elliff was informed that this was not so, that the

discontinuance of a formal liaison relationship with Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and subsequently the rest of the

intelligence community in 1970 did not mean that there was a

breakdown in coordination. Elliff asked why the Bureau dis-

continued a formal liaison relationship with CIA in early 1970.

We briefly reviewed for Elliff the Thomas Riha case pointing

out that Mr. Kelley had personally caused a review of that

case in an effort to determine whether it, in fact, was the

reason for the discontinuance of our liaison relationship with

the CIA. Elliff was informed that this was the case.

addition, we discussed with Elliff the 1966 understanding

between CIA and the FBI and made it quite clear to him that

we felt the relationship with not only CIA but the entire

intelligence community was excellent.

Other Matters of Interest

During the course of the briefing, Elliff was shown

charts depicting the inordinate increase of Sino-Soviet bloc

official presence in the U. S. from 1959 through January, 1975,

the growth of the presence of foreign hostile intelligence

officials in the U. S. during this same period compared with

the static number of SAs we had working against this threat

during this same period. Elliff was concerned over the fact

that the presence of Sino-Soviet bloc officials as well as the

intelligence officers increased substantially while the number

of SAs dedicated to counterintelligence investigations remained

static. He wondered why this was so. Elliff was advised that

lit was a question of manpower and priorities.

He was told that

during the 1959-1975 period there was a considerable demand for

the usecof SA personnel in the fields of organized crime, civil

fights,&ghetto riots. In addition, during that period of time

additional investigative responsibilities were placed upon the

EBI by virtue of new legislation.

- 3 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 186

---

## Page 187

D1SW81t3

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Elliff was also interested in knowing whether our

legal attaches were operational in the counterintelligence field.

He was advised they were not.

made available to the FBI their latest technical developments.

he ret their

Elliff also asked whether CIA

He was advised that we believed they did.

Finally, Elliff desired to know whether the FBI had

received any documents

JFK Act 5 (9) (2)(D)

wherein|l

JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

Iftle was advised that this

would have to be researched and that we would be in touch with

him on this particular subject.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) We have already begun to examine the material asked

for regarding the FBI's legal authority and implication of

sensitive investigative techniques. Once examined and analyzed,

(2) We are pulling together the documents regarding

JFK Act 5

(9) (2) (D)

Kind with approval will suggest

Elliff submit his specific request in writing. through the AG.

alvised

Dals, 16175

SECRET

- 4•-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 187

---

## Page 188

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

• MAY 1902 PEDITION

5010-106

G$A GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr.

W. R. Wannall

FROM

2 - Mx. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

DATE: June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1

- Mx. W. O. Cregar

- Mr. J. W. Dalsea

- Mr. T.

Assoc. Dire

Dep. ARrA

Dep. APKInv

Asst. Dif.:

Adminy

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv

Iden

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

SUBJECT

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y —

Reference is made to memorandum from Office of

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated June 10, 1975, captioned

as above, (copy attached) wherein it was recommended and approved

that representatives of the Intelligence Division meet with.

Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination, Office of

the Deputy Attorney General, for the

purpose of briefing him concerning the contents of a Bureau letter

to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President at

the White House, dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic

Coverage Placed

at the Request

of the White House."

By way of background, the Senate Select Committee (SSC)

has requested certain documents and information relating to the

so-called "Kissinger 17."

Some of this information has already

been prepared and furnished to O'Connor with the caveats that the

Government has not publicly admitted to 15 of the coverages involved

and some material relating to the remaining

two has been impounded

by court order due to pending civil suits.

The decision was leIt

to the Department as to whether or not material prepared in resporse

Ito SSC requests should be made available to that Committee:

Mr. O'Connor on June 9, 1975, requested of Assistant Director:

John Mintz a briefing as to the contents of the above July 23, 1944,

letter which he believed summarized information avajlable to the

Bureau concerning the 17 wire taps. •

On June 17, 1975, Special Agents John W. Dalseg and

Thomas J. McNiff met

with Mr. William O'Connor and the latter's

assistant, Michael T.

Shaheen, in the office of Mr. O'Connor. Afte

a briefing on the contents of the July 43, 1974,

letter Mr. O'Coffor

concluded that information contained

in that letter and its

enclosures is too sketchy to enable a knowledgeable determination

to whether or not requested material should be released

to SSC. Mr. O'Connor stated he believed such a determination could

only be made after a review of the entire file relating to the

Enclosure

REG- 102

62-116385-27

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 65-75085

ALL INFORMATION CONTAS EI

17 JUN 26 1975

ADDENDUM PAGE 3

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Cempt 87,082

*AIINST

(8)

N65360 2 6 1975

DATE_

Jocld:32989609 Page 18

5/10/82 BYssseflende

---

## Page 189

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senate Select Committee

62-116395

"Kissinger 17" and he stated his office would, in the near future,

prepare a letter to the Director similarly requesting that

Mr. Shaheen or some other designated representative of his staff

be granted authority to review the Bureau file concerning the

matter in question.

OBSERVATIONS:

During the above conversation Mr. O'Connor appeared to

be primarily interested in the completeness of the Bureau file with

regard to matters relating to the "Kissinger 17" and to what degree

information in this file had been made public. It was explained to

Mr. O'Connor, who appeared knowledgeable concerning the history of

these documents, that this file contains all communications known

to be in existence concerning the "Kissinger I7," but no one can

state with certainty, due to the manner in which this material was

handled at the specific request of the White House, that the file

contains

all communications prepared in this matter.

With regard

to publicity afforded these documents, Mr. O'Connor

stated he is

familiar with the documents which had

been made available to the

Department for referral to various Committees and he is familiar

with excised versions of these documents which had been

published

by these Committees.

He indicated that the Department's present

problem is that no record has

been located in the Department to

date as to just which material or in what form such material

furnished by the Bureau to the Department was subsequently turned

lover to the Committees by the Department. O'Connor stated it

could be embarrassing at this time to make available to the SSC

material which had not previously been made available to the

Congressional Committees and equally embarrassing to withhold

from the SSC material which was previously furnished Congressional

Committees.

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

at goo

sail

-2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 189

---

## Page 190

ADDENDUM:

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

TJM: 1hb

6/19/75

In anticipation of Department's request cited in

instant memorandum to review Bureau files concerning the so-called

"Kissinger 17'' Special Agent (SA) Robert F. Peterson, Office of

Legal Counsel, on 6/18/75 contacted Department Attorney Edward

Christenbury: who is handling the Halperin Civil Suit, to

determine if the United States District Court's (USDC) impoundment

would prevent this Bureau making available this file to

representatives of the Department. Christenbury, late 618/75,

advised SA Peterson that he, Christenbury, had contacted plaintiff's

(Halperin) attorney, who advised he had no objection to this

file being made available to a Department representative for

review.

Christenbury then attempted to contact USDC Judge

John Lewis Smith, who issued the impoundment order in this matter.

Christenbury spoke to Judge Smith's law clerk, who advised that

in view of the position taken by plaintiff's attorney, he did .

not believe that Judge Smith would interpose any objection to

the Department's anticipated request. The law clerk stated,

however,

that he would contact Judge Smith at the earliest

opportunity to obtain a ruling and would advise Christenbury of

the results.

You will be advised of the results when received.

Hip ToM G

you for

get

gon

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 190

---

## Page 191

OPTIONAL FORM NO: 10

MAY 1262 EDIRIDA

OSA IPMA (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM

: Legal

Counsel 1'

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically.

advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning

certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the

White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that

he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the

Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information

available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps.

„Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter

in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a ietter

dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams:

Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum

was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned

"Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which

advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy

Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams

at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved

in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Mr. Mintz

JAVI:mtm

Aszet- Dir.

2555. Dir.:

Admira

Comp- SYST.

Ext- Affairs

Files & Car.

Eter. Inv.

Tient. -

Lizaratary

Lagal Cour. -

Flar. 3 Erci...

Saac. Inv. _

Training

Tempione RiT. -

Dinactor Sac'y -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

MEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED CAmp # 87,082

DATE

5/10/82 BY 28585p/e/m

6z

116375

ENCLOSURE

5:272

phillip's

NW 694601 Docld:32989609 Page, 191 inor Bond Poull on the Pavoll Soninos Plam

---

## Page 192

LITO

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORA NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (11 CFA) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. J. B. Adams

Legal Counsell

SENSTUDY

• 75

DATE:

6-18-75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. Ap Admi

Dep. Ab thut

Asst. Diff:

Admin. Y

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com. -

Gon. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Iny.—

Fraining

Telephone Rm. _

Director Soc'y -

By memo dated 6-10-75, you were advised that

K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination in the Department, requested he be allowed to

review a summary prepared concerning the so called "Kissinger.

17" wiretaps since the Senate Select Committe had included a

mite had notese.

request for information concerning them in their letter of

May 14, 1975. Mr. O'Connor and his Deputy, Michael Shaheen,

reviewed the summaries.

At Mr. O'Connor's request, a conference was held

with Messrs O'Connor and Shaheen and SA Robert Peterson,

SA Paul V. Daly, Inspector John B. Hotis, and Assistant

Director John A. Mintz, present to discuss the SSC request for

documents concerning the "Kissinger 17" wiretaps and his concern

that the furnishing of such documents might adversely impact

on existing litigation involving the Bureau, and may subject the

Most of the documents in question

are also under a protective order of the Court in the Halperin

Case and therefore, a release must be orchestrated with the

Court.

Mr. O'Connor suggested that a summary of existing

summaries of these wiretaps be prepared by the Department and

with the acquiescence of the Court which issued the protective

order be made available for review by the Committee in the

1 - Mr. Wannall

(Attn: Mr. Cregar)

1 - Mr. Mintz

1

- Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

REG. 102

(6)

MIL INFORMATION CONTAINES

AT 106-200 LAL

MDR-14

62-111385

(CONTINUED - OVER)

17 JUN 26 1975

MS A Smo2 31975609 Be 45: Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan.

---

## Page 193

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo

Re:

SENSTUDY 75

Department of Justice. Mr. O'Connor also mentioned that the

summary would, of course, have to set forth the sufficient

information to allow the Committee to make a determination that the

information derived from these wiretaps was not used for political

purposes. Mr. Mintz expressed concern that the publication

or leaking of information from summaries could expand the number

and nature of suits facing the Bureau and suggested the Department

should, in obtaining the Court approval for making the summaries

available, request the Court to issue appropriate safeguards

against publication of such information. Mr. O'Connor stated

that such a recommendation to the Court would be proper and that

this would be done.

Mr. Mintz told Mr. O'Connor that the Bureau at this

time cannot make a commitment to the making available of the

summaries to the Committee without further study and approval,

and an approval would be sought expeditiously.

Additionally,

Mr. Mintz requested that the Bureau be given the opportunity to

review the summaries prepared by the Department to insure the

Bureau's interests are protected.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we notify the Department that we are in agreement

concerning the preparation of summaries based on existing

summaries of "Kissinger 17" wiretaps with the provision that

we be given the opportunity to review these summaries prior

to the Department seeking Court approval for making them

available.

goo

puss

FEM

-

2

-

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 193

---

## Page 194

:

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

0

ON ATE ENTITLES CONTE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

2 - HIr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Ur. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

June 9, 1975

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices,

the SSC requested certain infornation and documents fron the FBI.

Inclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committec is the original of a memorandum containing a

response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this nomorandun is being furnished for

your records.

Enclosures - 2

G2-116395

I - The Deputy Attorney Genoral

Attention: K. Millian O'Connor

Spocial Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

TEB : amt dit

(10)

NOT NMORMATIUT CONTAIN:

MDR16

Assoc, Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com...

Gen. Inv. -

ident. -

Inspection

Intell..

Laboratory

Training.

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

sogUn

F3

REG- 102

62-1he3a2-anoyn

S7 JUN 26 1975

BOOM

TELETYPE UNIT C

989609 Page 194

670 41-79,

---

## Page 195

:

62-116395

2 - M. J.

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

- MI.

W. O. Cregar

1

- MI.

B. H. Horner

1 - Mr. T. B, Burns

June 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVENNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECE TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: RIQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE

ALL INMORMATION CONTAINEU

IMDR-16

reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and

other intormation Iron the PBl.

Iten number 21, Appondix D, roquests that with

respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI

testified before the House Appropriations Camnittee from

1965 until the present, the number of varrantless electronic

surveillances in operation be provided for:

(a) The date of such testimony;

(b) 30 days prior to such teatinony; and

(c) 30 days subsaquent to such testimony.

Set forth below is the number of warrantless

electronic surveillances in operation with respect to each

occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified bofore

the House Appropriations Comnittee fron 1965 until presant.

Also set forth for part of 1967 and all of 1968 through 1972

aro the numbor of such varrantless electronic surveillances

in operation approxinately 30 daya prior to such testimony

and approximately 30 days subsequent to such testimony.

As

a rasult of the manner in which our filing syston is presently

constituted, statistica covering the period 30 days before the

Director's testimony and 30 daya following his testinony for

the years 1965, 1966 and part of 1967 are not avallable as a

practical matter. Furthermore, the number in operation 30 days

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. _

Comp, Syst. -

Ext. Aftairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident...

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval..

TEB:dnt

(9)

SES NOTE PAGE 3

Spec. Inv..

Training ---

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Legal Coun. _

Its use is himited to official proceedings by

Telephone Rm. -

Director See'y _

MAIL ROOM L

ne without the encas approval of the Ret 1i

you committe end the content may not be disciosed to unawthorized per th

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 195

---

## Page 196

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

prior to and 30 days subsoquent to the Director's testimony

could not be determined in all instancos and therefore, the

ilgures provided are for artes as close to the 30-day time

frane as practicablo.

to his March ?, 1972, apponrance and theretore the request

No UnAnAMArablO with respect to 1973, 1974 and 1973.

DATE OF

BEFORE

DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY

AFTER

KarCh

1965

44

uNP

Betriaval not

Practicable (RNP)

ANP

ENP

JAnURry 15, 1068

33

Harch 14, 1969

46

Februazy 5, 1070

38

Fabruary 16, 1971

33

January 31, 1972

32

FebruBEy 10, 1966

Fobruary 16, 1987

February 28, 1988

Aрг11 17, 1969

49

March 5, 1970

36

March 17, 1971

33

March 2, 1972

34

1 - The Attorney General

ENP

March 13, 1967

42

March 22. 1968

May 15, 1969

50

Apr12 G, 1970

Apr11 17, 1972

March 31, 1972

35

- 2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 196

---

## Page 197

TO CONTAL DEA TONS TIEN

RESPECT TO INTELLIGINCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

The above material which ve are furnishing the

Committee was supplied by the Special Records and Related

Research Unit of IS - 3 which has responsibility for

information in the requested area.

similarly, this Unit

determined that the infornation requested was not retrievable

as a practical matter with regard to 1965, 1966 and part

or 1157, the 30-day timo frano, and for ¿ne years 1073, 1074

3

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page 197

---

## Page 198

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Senate Select Conmittee

gence activities.Re: Request Pertaining to

Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office:

FBI

Delivered by:

aul Velal

_ Date: 66-13-25-

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page 198

---

## Page 199

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

for review

X I DOCUMENT!

note.)

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

TESTIMONY

OTHER

3. TO WHOM

PROVIDED (check appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

J. T. Elliff

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subjecti

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in

response to formal request, other.

state verbal request of (name),

initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 21.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

Codews, IS or

"U"

7. Keed order center

underline

SURVEILLANCE

e pharispiate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

TECT CONTATNEL

P 01 T00 B

mDR-16

8.

SUMMARY (see

reverse

side before completing this

item)

Furnishes SSC with number, where available, of warrantless

electronic surveillances operated by FBI at time of Director's

testimony before House Appropriations Committee, as vell as

number in effect approximately 30 days prior and subsequent to

such testimony.

NOTE:: Ouginal via Liaison to Central Community Index

onnection with Senstudy 75.

110-

TREAT AS VELLOW

TJM:1hb

(4)

62-116395

379 | (6-75)

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 199

5-TSM

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRiATE

---

## Page 200

INSTRUCTIONS

-

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes 'to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 200

---

## Page 201

OPTIONAL FORMANO, 10

MARLIPEZ'ÈDITIÓN

GSA FPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM

Legal Counsel

SUBJECT

SENSTUDY 75.

DATE:

6-6-75

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. _

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Idebt.

in thin

(poc. V. -

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Soc'y -

ATT TNZOTMEASTORT CONTATED

2-16

Mark Gitenstein, staff member of captioned Committee

who has been doing an extensive inquiry into the "official and confidential"

files reportedly maintained in former Director Hoover's office,

telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly 6-5-75 and requested the

identities of the employees who had brought the material from the

Director's office during May, 1972, to Mr. Hoover's residence and

to Mr. Felt's office.

By way of background, Mr. Gitenstein has obtained through

interview of Mr. Felt, former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr,

and other Bureau personnel familiar with the operations of the Director's

office, considerable knowledge concerning the official and confidential

files.

There is also an extensive request contained in captioned Committee's

letter of 5-4-75 pertaining to information surrounding these files.

Additionally, we responded to a request of the Committee contained in their

letter of 4-28-75 pertaining to the allegation of removal of certain material

from Mr. Hoover's residence after the death of former Associate Director

Clyde Tolson. We have not, at this point, determined that Bureau documents

have been removed from Bureau space to Mr. Hoover's residence or any

other place outside the Bureau. However, it is apparent that Mr. Gitenstein

has information, or believes he has information, relating to the removal

of Bureau documents.

Mr. Gatenstein stated he had recorated to 3r abstan 61 X/

to the Director John P. Mohr on 6-5-75 and Mr. Mohr, in response to

Mr. Gitenstein's question, stated that the identities of employees who may

have brought material from the Director's office to Mr. Hoover's residence

and to Mr. Felt's office subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death could be learned

through an inquiry in the Mechanical Section supply room.

62-116395

3 'Ill!

Ci"*

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Bassett

1 - Mr. Daly

2 - Mr. Mintz

PVD:kjs, (10)

84

1 0 1 19/5°

CONTINUED - OVER

S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 65360oBocld:32989609 Page

---

## Page 202

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams

RE: SENSTUDY 75

In light of this response, Mr. Gitenstein requested that

the Bureau identify the personnel involved and it is his obvious intention

that the personnel will be interviewed.

Inasmuch as the Inspection Division is conducting inquiry

into this matter, it would appear proper for that Division to determine

the identities of such personnel and,

if deemed necessary, interview in

connection with the current inquiry. It is also believed that while this

request is oral in nature from the Committee, we should consider

furnishing the information as to the identities of employees to the

Committee inasmuch as if we do not respond to the oral request •

Mr. Gitenstein indicated, because of the Committee's interest in this

matter, there would be no problem in his obtaining authority to furnish the

request in writing. It is apparent at this point that we would not be able

to keep such information from the Committee if such a written request were

to be received. Additionally, by responding to the oral request it will

encourage the Committee, in the areas they described as "abuse-type,"

to give us an advance indication as to their inquiries.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Inspection Division make the necessary inquiry

concerning the identities of the employees and, if deemed advisable,

make available to the Legal Analysis Office that information which will

be furnished to the Committee.

- 2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 202

---

## Page 203

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. s.

SENATE SELECT COSTITER IO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAI, OPERATIONS VITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGEKCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

May 29, 1975

1 - Mr. H. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. H. O. Cregar

i.

Enclosed for your infornation is the original of

a memorandum concerning the interview of retired Special

Agent Charles D. Brennan by members of the Senate Select

Committee Staff. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed

for forvarding to Ir. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel

to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE2-20:8)_ BY SP4JRMM

(10)

6076

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by HOC:el.

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

1 - 67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan)

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst._

Ext. Affairs.=

Files & Com. =

Gen, Inv.

Ident.u

Inspection .

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Evalif

raining.

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. =

Director Sec'y

REG. 102

!!""

575 269,

87 JUN 2G 1975

THAN ROOM I

12989609 Page 203

680 951-346

---

## Page 204

62-116395

INFORMATION CONTAINED

UNCLASSIFIED

RE:

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

May 29, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECI COMITILE TO STUY

GOVERIMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECI TO INTELLIGIICE ACTIVITIES

INTERVIEW DE RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)

CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY STAFF MEMBERS OF

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

HEREIN IS

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished

'to the FBI by retired SA Charles D. Brennan following his

voluntary interview by Mark Gitenstein ani two other Indiviusals

whose names Brennan did not get.

Gitenstein as well as the

two umaned Inütvicuals lüentifled themselves as Staff Members

of the SSC.

The Interview which took place in Washington, D. C.,

on May 22, 1975, lasted approximately two hours. Brennan was

not provided with a copy of Senate Resolution 21; was not

provided with a copy of the Rules of Procedure of the SSC;

nor was he advised of his rights including his right to private

counsel.

The interview, which was not conducted under oath,

covered three specific areas: the organizational structure

of the FBI; Martin luther Ring, JI.; and COINTELPRO.

With regard to the organizational stzucture, they

askeú frennan to describe what a unit, section, and division

constituted at FBI Headquarters. They showed him several copies

of C. D. Brennan to l. G. Sullivan memorania asking him about

Assoc. Dir. -

specific facts containe in these memorancia.

When Brennan falled

Dep. An in. to have intimate krorledge of the memorande, they wondered why

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

he had such a poor memory when in fact they were memorande from

Comp. syst. him. Brennan then proceedes to explain hor such memorantia tere

Files & Com..

preparent coate Ass Brent Street, name, Suitivan, but chief,

Laboratory - WOC: ekw

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Training -

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM |

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 204

TELETYPE UNIT I

ENCLOSER 1-111

2: 403138

---

## Page 205

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGINCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEL OF SA CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY SSC

With regard to Martin Luther King, JI., Brennan advised

that he got the impression from the Staff Members they felt

the Bureau hau an "illegitimate" interest in King. Brennan

countered by saying the basis for the FBI interest in King

was predicated on the commnist influence surrounding King-

He was asked if the Bureau employed many wiretaps against King

to which he answered that most of the information obtained was

derived fron live informants.

Relative to the COINTELPRO, Brennan advised the

Staff Members he couldn't be very specific regarding COINIELPRO

Inasmuch as he did not pay too much attention to it. They

questioned him about this statement and Brennan stated that

ontinued to which he replied "I city Hell wants it, you give

them what they want."

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by WOC:ekw.

• 2 a

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 205

---

## Page 206

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

PROVIDED (check

appropriate term

If a document was made available

review but not

transmitted, so

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING X INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

5/29/75

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

Frovided to Attorney General with copy for forvarding

to the White House.

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number

of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of Interview by SSC Staff Members

with former FBI Special Agent Charles D. Brennan.

5. IN a SPoNserbal stadate on ian, mer ativo, suppose formal request, other-

state verbal request of (name), initiative,

NA

U

7. Keed under dine for emphasies

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Organization

Operating procedures

MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse side

before completing

this item)

Interview covered three spacific areas:

1) Organizational structure of FBI

2) Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

3) FBI's former counterintelligence programs (COINTELPRO) •

MENT AS YELLOW

58

SFPilhb

(4)

62-116395

3791 (6-751

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 206

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL, COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75255

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 207

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit' a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

ubstance of intormation and showing relationship to Intelligence Communit

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interest

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if

necessary.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 207

---

## Page 208

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

DEC 1 9 1975

TO :

Mike FROM:

SUBJECT:

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael E. Shaheen, JI.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

House Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the House Select •

Committee requesting access to certain Bureau

information on the U. S. Recording Company. Please

prepare an appropriate response.

Chas

debtor/Ga% 0/26 (62-116404)

PVD/ Red

TIme

Cc: Paul Daly

suzerter,

Асику ліанась ,

17/21/250

Keehow

in clogist

1-Aed de

ALL INFORMATICH CONTATIO

12-22-75

REC-100

#:: 11:0104-26841

CO FEB 19 107S

:==..

NỮV

85368-B dia: 19789609 Page 208

---

## Page 209

TO: John A, Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: House Select Comnittee Roquest

Attached is a letter fron the House Select

Committee requesting access to certain Bureau

information on the U, S. Recording Company.

Please

prepare an appropriate response.

co: Paul Daly

BYSOMAN-

MDR16

NW 65360 Docld:32989609

Page 209

---

## Page 210

OTIS G, PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN

MOBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.

ROBERT MCCLORY, ILL.

JAMES V. STANTON, OHIO

DAVIO C. TREEN, LA.

RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIF.

JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.

MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.

ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.

Ls ASPiN, WIS

DALE MILFORD, TEX.

PHILIP'H.-HAYES, IND,

WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.

A. SEARLE FIELÒ, STAFF DIRECTOR

AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751

Select Committee on Intelligente

U.5. House of Representatities

¿Hashington, D.C. • 20515

December 18, 1975

MI. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

U. S. Department of JUStiCe

Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

In order to complete our analysis of the cost of

intelligence,

we request access to any and all financial

analyses compiled by the FBI with regard to transactions

between the FBI and the U.S. Recording Company •

Since we are under time constraints, we hope you can

provide access to these figures at your earliest possible

convenience.

Sincerely,

A. Searle Field

Staff Director

ASF/TO/mas

ALL INFORMATION CONTAITE

HEROIN IS TACLASS SAMAR

DATE 0-6-2000

BITH 131 C

RECEIVED

ULL 17:975

121

ENCLOSURE

62-1164604

268k/

NW 65360 Docld:32989609-Page 210

---

## Page 211

OPTIONAL fORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962

ELISTON

ESA'GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr.

J.

B. Adams

1

- Mr.

J.

A.

Mintz

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

MR.

W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 28, 1975

FROM

:MR.

!, PORGAR

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Admis

Depi AD/ lav:

Asst. Dir

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Gom. -

Gen. Irv

Ident/

' INFORMATION CONTAE": O

0. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

FREINUS UNCY ASS)!"

This memorandum reports the results of

and gl spiramin pial

Legal Coun. 1o2

Telephone Rm.

• tele-

Directors

phonic conversation with former Special Agent (SA) Charles D.

Brennan and recommends that the attached letter to the Attorney

General with enclosures be sent.

On the morning of 5/23/75 the Department of Justice

advised Assistant Director Mintz that former SA Brennan has or was

to be interviewed by Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee

(SSC). On that same date I telephonically contacted Mr. Brennan

to advise him that the Bureau had been alerted to the fact he was

going to be interviewed by the SSC Staff and should he desire, a

representative of the Bureau could be available during the interview.

for consultation. It was made clear to Brennan that the role of

Bureau representative would be to insure that he could consult wit

the representative at any time during the interview should the

de inter eyeal, thidentity de senelive M source, method o

or sensitive investigative techniques; information derived from

third agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services; or any

100

information which Brennan felt could adversely affect sensitive

ongoing FBI investigations.

woc: ekw

Brennan then changed the conversation to personal chit!

chat. At what appeared to be the conclusion of the conversation

Cregar asked Brennan if he had been contacted by the SSC Staff. S

Brennan advised that he had received a telephone call earlier in the

week inviting him to an interview in Washington, D. C., and in fact

was interviewed on 5/22 by SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and

two others whose names

Brennan did not get.

Brennan showed some concern over the fact that the Staff

had invited him to be interviewed earlier in the week but only

notified the Department subsequent to his interview. (At the

outset of the conversation with Brennan, I had advised him that

the ssC had intormed the Department

which in turn informed the

62-116395

EC- 102

Enclosures - Sent 5-30-25 edm

62-1163955

75-5

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, JI.)

1 - 6/-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennaly)

CONTINUE 1975 OVER

WoG, elw (8) PKW

NO 6$360 Doeid:32989609 Page 211

---

## Page 212

Memorandum to Mc. W. R. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Bureau that he was to be interviewed). Brennan stated he was

not furnished a copy of the Senate Resolution or its Rüles of

Procedures and was not advised of his rights or the fact that

he could be represented by counsel. He was not put under oath,

and was not given any indication as to the scope of the inter-

view prior to his appearance in Washington. In response to a

question by Cregar as to what areas the interview covered,

Brennan stated the interview covered three specific topics.

(1) The organizational structure of the Bureau; (2) Martin Luther

King, JI.; (3) the COINTELPRO.

With regard to the organizational structure Brennan

advised that the Staff Members appear to have little understanding

as to the way the Bureau was structured. He stated they had no

appreciation of what a unit, section, or division was comprised

of.

They showed him several copies of memoranda from (Brennan to

Sullivan,

and proceeded to ask him about the contents of these

memoranda. When Brennan was unable to describe the background

or details surrounding a specific memorandum, they voiced

wonderment as to why he had such little recollection about a

memorandum he apparently wrote. Brennan advised the Staff

Members that just because the memorandum was written from him

to Sullivan did not mean that he necessarily wrote the memorandum

or even saw it.

In respectito Martin Luther King, JI., Brennan got

the impression that the Staff Members believed the Bureau was

"illegitimately" interested in King. Brennan advised that he

Thit back hard on this stating that the Bureau's interest in

King was predicated on the communist influence surrounding

King. They asked if the Bureau had employed many wiretaps

against King. Brennan advised that most of the information

obtained on King derived from live informants.

Brennan voiced

the opinion that the Staff Members were rather disappointed with

Brennan's defense of the Bureau in the King investigation.

Staff Members showed some disappointment in Brennan's

inability to remember circumstances surrounding COINTELPRO.

Brennan responded by saying that he never paid much attention

- 2 -

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 212

---

## Page 213

Memorandum to Mr.

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

W. R. Wannall

to COINTELPRO and when compared to such activity as to the

Bay of Pigs and the Glomar Explorer, the COINTELPRO was

"peanuts."

At' the conclusion of the conversation, Brennan advised

that SSC Staff Members indicated they would want him to return

for additional interviews. I advised Brennan that should he

receive a subpoena to return or should he be invited to return

to Washington, D. C., to be interviewed under oath, it would be

wiseffor him to contact the FBI's Legal Counsel Division for

advice to insure that he was in compliance with the Attorney

General's order relative to the release of information obtained

while an employee of the FBI.

Brennan indicated he would contact

the Legal Counsel Division should he be contacted by the SSC and

would probably ask that a Bureau representative be available for

consultation during a subsequent interview or testimony.

ACTION: If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney General

and its enclosures reflecting the results of the debriefing of

Brennan, be sent.

pur

-

• 3.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 213

---

## Page 214

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

EE itE " MEMORANDUM NO ALL EMPLOYERS

INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting

an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former

and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation

with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement

(copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment

in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal

Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of

Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority,

produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of

the performance of his official duties or because of his official status

without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the

Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24."

ALL IVFORMATION CONTAININ

TUP KIT IS UNCLASSTATIO

106-2000 BY.SP2H

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order

MDР16

Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among

other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony

to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent

with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for

purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as

required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before

ENCLOSURE

furnishing information, testimony, or record material.

92-116395

Enclosures (3)

MAte NOT RECORDED.

46 SUN 26 1975

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

8436

19 7 1975

NW 65360-Docld:32989609 Page 214

ORIGINAL

---

## Page 215

-

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United

States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare

that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the

President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations

issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal

Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or un-

authorized disclosure or production of national security information, other

classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of

the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files

of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could

result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or

result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects

of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its

responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; there-

fore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge,

publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to

any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the

Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory

files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the

performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden

is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed

and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each

such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to

the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand

that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed

in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBl but

it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be

contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is

in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official

duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains

the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand

by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any

material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal

law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may

be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment

in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and

following termination of such employment.

(Signature)

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

, 19

-, by

(Signature)

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 215

---

## Page 216

SEOU

Offire of the Attorney General

Washington, 1. 0. 20530

Tanuary 18, 1973

ORDER NO.501-73

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Title 28— JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRATION

Chapter I Department of Justice

[Order 501-73]

PART 16-PRODUCTION OR DISCLO-

SURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMA-

TION

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

other authority is issued for the produc-

tion or disclosure of (1) any material

contained in the files of the Department,

(2) any information relating to material

contained in the files of the Department,

any information

material

acquired by any person while such per-

son was an employee of the Department

as a part of the performance of his of-

ficial duties or because of his official

For purposes of this subpart, the

term "employee of the Department" in-

cludes all officers and employees of the

United States appointed by, or subject

to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control

PIT, INFORMATION CONTAMAD

FIRIN IS UNCTUSSIFIND

MDR-16

1: 091016-2020

This order delegates to certain De-

partment of Justice officials the author-

ity to approve the production

or dis-

closure of material or information con-

tained in Department files, or informa-

tion or material acquired by a person

while employed by the Department. It

applies where a subpena, order or other

demand of a court or other authority,

such as an administrative agency, is is-

sued for the production or disclosure of

such information,

By virtue of the authority vested in me

by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301,

Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of

Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is

revised, and its provisions renumbered,

to read as follows:

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure in Response

to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other

Authorities

Sec.

10.21 Purpose and scope.

16.22 Production

or disclosure prohibited

unless approved by appropriate De-

partment official.

16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand

for production or disclosure.

16.24 Final action by the appropriate De-

partment official or the Attorney

Goneral.

Procedure Where a Department deci-

sion concerning & demand is not

made prior to the time a response

to the demand is required.

6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse

ruling.

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C.

;01.

jubpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

of, the Attorney General of the United

States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S.

marshals, and members of the staffs of

those officials.

§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohib-

ited unless approved by appropriate

Department oflicial.

No employee or former employee of the

Department of Justice shall, in response

to a demand of a court or other

thority, produce any material contained

in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material con-

tained in the files of the Department, or

disclose any information or produce any

material acquired

part of the per-

formance of his official duties or because

of his official status without prior ap-

proval of the appropriate Department of-

ficial or the Attorney General in accord-

ance with § 16.24.

§ 16.23 Procedure in the event of a de-

mand for production or disclosure.

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon

an employee or former employee of the

Department for the production of ma-

terial or the disclosure of information

described in $ 16.21(a), he shall im-

mediately notify the U.S. attorney for

the district where the issuing authority

is located. The U.S. attorney shall im-

mediately request instructions from the

appropriate Department official, as desig-

nated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials author-

ized to approve production or disclosure

under this subpart are:

(1) In the event that the case or other

matter which gave rise to the demanded

material or information is or, if closed,

was within the cognizance of a division

of the Department,

the Assistant At-

§ 16.21 Purpose and scope.

torney General in charge of that divi-

sion. This authority may be redelegated

(a) This subpart sets forth the pro-

to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.

sedures to be followed when a subpena,

(2) In instances of demands that are

order, or other demand (hereinafter re-

not covered by paragraph (b) (1) of this

erred to as a "demand" of a contese 12416391

'NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 216

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## Page 217

(1) The Director of the Federal Bu- § 16.26 Procedure in the event of an ail-

verse ruling.

one made on an employee or former em-

ployee of that Bureau for information to stay court or to the thomay den mes

or if the demand calls for the production

of material from the files of that Bu-

sponse to & request made in accordance

with § 16.25 pending receipt of instruc-

(il) The Director of the Bureau of tions, or if the court or other authority

Prisons, if the demand is one made on rules that the demand must be com-

an employee or former employee of that

plied with irrespective of instructions

feasible, & statement by the party seek-

ing the testimony or his attorney, setting

forth & summary of the testimony de-

sired, must be furnished for submission

by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate

Department oficial.

Department official or the

General.

(a) If the appropriate Department of-

icial, as designated in § 16.23(b), ap-

proves a demand for the production of

material or disclosure of information,

he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and

such other persons as circumstances may

signate in De en

¡ecides not to approve & demand for the

Dated: January 11, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc.73-1071 Filed 1-17-73;8:45 am]

ney General shall make the final decision

and give notice thereot to the U.S. attor-

ney and such other persons as circum-

stances may warrant.

§ 16.25

l'rocedure where a Departme

cision concerning a demand is n

made prior to the time a response 1o

the demand is required.

If response to the demand is required

the demand has been,

the case may

day the demand ponte ree o one

requested instructions.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 217

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## Page 218

!

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1956

ORDER NO. 116-56

It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest

possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from

departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of depart-

ment personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures

are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be

mutually satisfactory to the congressional cormittees and to the Department.

March 23, 1953; and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formal-

Izes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing

procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized repre-

sentatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners.

It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order

No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum

of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated

January 13, 1953), Insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be

followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In

support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter

dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney

General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT FILES

I. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN

or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by

the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and

congressional committees.

The request shall state the specific information

sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy

Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a

reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signa-

DATE 1616-2000

oture and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

102-1

2. If the request concerns a closed case, 1. e., one in which

there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated,

the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence

of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure

shall be followed in such cases:

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 218

a.

The reply letter will advise the committee that the

file is available for examination and set forth the

name, telephone extension number, and room number of

the person who will have custody of the file to be

reviewed;

ENCLOSUR

62-116395

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## Page 219

• v

- 2 -

b. Before making the file available to the committee

representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI

as well as investigative reports from any other agency,

will be removed from the file and not be made available

for examination; provided however that if the committee

representative states that it is essential that information

from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available,

he will be advised that the request will be considered

by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents

of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be

prepared which will not disclose investigative tech-

niques, the identity of confidential informants, or

other matters which might jeopardize the investigative

operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded

by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as

to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of

such summary by the committee representative. The file

will not be physically relinquished from the custody of

the Department. If the committee representative desires

to examine investigative reports from other government

agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he

will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose

reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, 1. e., one which 11t1-

gation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may

not be made available for ezamination by the committee's representative.

The following procedure shall be followed:

a. The reply letter should advise the committee that

its request concerns a case in which litigation or

administrative action is pending or contemplated, and

state that the file cannot be made available until the

case is completed; and

b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in

as much detail as is practicable and prudent without

jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or

B. REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEVS WITH DEPARIMENTAI PERSONNEL

1. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding

any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing,

signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney

General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the

employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with

the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting

open cases and data in investigative reports;

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 219

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## Page 220

- 3-

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee repre-

sentative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a

copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney

General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIIYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTHES

I. When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional

committee

regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney

General shall be promptly informed.

When the Deputy Attorney General's approv-

al is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations

prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee

on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy

Attorney General.

In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229

(Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning

of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare

a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head

and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which

their public testimony may arfect the discipline and well-being of the institu-

tion, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners out-

side the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of

being intervieved or examined under oath by congressional committees. However,

when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be

adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise

adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath

by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated

under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the

I. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony

rom a federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorize

epresentatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a writte

request by the chairman of the cormittee to the Deputy Attorney General.

2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days

prior to the requested date for the intervier and the taking of testimony

and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the

interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the com-

mittee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the sub-

jects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of

all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who

3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be

present during the entire time of the interrogation.

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 220

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-..

= 4 -

4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal

prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the

tIme at which the interview takes place, advise the federal prisoner concernea

of the proposed interview or taking of svor testimony; and shall further

advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any

other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete

authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the mainte-

nance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at

the interview and taling of testimony.

The warden or his authorized representative shall be present

at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice

shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout

the interview and taking of testimony.

7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript

made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy

of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVIRS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in

matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney

General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and

its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a

congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of

the proceeding which

should be sent to the division head and a copy routed

to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 221

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## Page 222

1-

1-

w. R. Wandall

Mr.

W. O. Cregar

1 - Mx. R. H. ROSS

URGENT

CODE

TELETYPE

TO SAC LOS ANGELES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

162-1207051

JUNE 17, 1975

( SENSTUDY 1975

THE FÖLLOWING REQUEST IS BEING MADE IN CONNECTION WITH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HEARINGS. SUTEL REPLY, ATTENTION

INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

DURING A RECENT HEARING, AN SSC STAFF REPRESENTATIVE QUES-

TIONED A WITNESS WHETHER OR NOT HE KNEW OF MAIL OPENINGS IN

IOS ANGELES BY FBI AGENTS RON MASCAR (PHONETIC) AND (FNU, BUT

POSSIBLY WILLIAM) MILIER. THE WITNESS REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT

KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THIS MATTER AND NEVER HEARD OF THE ABOVE TWO

AGENTS.

IT WAS THE WITNESSES' OPINION THAT THE QUESTION MAY HAVE

BEEN POSED AS A TEST QUESTION ONLY AND ASKED THAT THE INFORMA-

TION BE CAREFULLY HANDLED BY THE FBI.

SO FBIHO WILL BE IN POSSESSION OF ALL BACKGROUND INFORMA-

TION UPON WHICH WE MAY BE CALLED TO TESTIFY, LOS ANGELES ADVISE

REGARDING ANY DETAILS WHICH MIGHT ILLUMINATE THIS MATTER AND/OR

ALL OWFORMATION Co. Au

(5)

MDR-16

REC.56

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

267

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. -

JUN 17/1975

TÉLETYPE

Troining

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

-ire

tori

JON 2

597500M

TELETYPE UNIT I

NW

Docld:32989609 Page 222

62-111-30

B l17!1015

GPO : 1975 Q' - 5

569-920

.. 1

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## Page 223

PAGE TWO 62-116395

IDENTIFY SPECIAL AGENTS CONCERNED. IF SUCH ALLEGED ACTION

OCCURRED, ADVISE AS TO ALI DETAIIS AND ANY COMMUNICATIONS OR

NOTIFICATION TO FBIHQ CONCERNING SAME.

HANDLE ON AN EXPEDITE BASIS.

NOTE :

Inspector John D. Tarpey, U. S. Postal Service advised

Liaison Officer I. A. Crescioli of

above incident which occurred

in connection with Tarpey's 6/10/75 testimony before SSC. Tarpey's.

testimoney did not touch on any FBI mail cover activities and

question was posed to him by SSC staff representative Paul wallach.

Movement Desk was unable to identify Special Agents based upon

phonetic spellings.

Details of above contained in V. V.

Kolombatovic memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/16/75, and

captioned "John D. Tarpey, Assistant Chief Inspector, Office of

Criminal Investigations, U. S. Postal Service, Appearance Before

Senate Select Committee

(SSC) 6/10/75."

NW 65360 Docld:32989609 Page 223

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