## Page 1

1704-10307-10024

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

•

D

R

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

F

T

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November

1962 by DD/P with DCI

and approved generally

in principle by DCI.

Fully concurred in

by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT:

Operational Plan for Continuing

Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information

and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are

contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum

is to delineate

an operational plan for the action which we

believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable

future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even

intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for

the reorientation of the current effort into a long term

denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public

assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are

present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does

not take action to threaten the peace and security of the

Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to

invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

.....

---

## Page 2

13-00000

..

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA

action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since

unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-

ditions in Cuba,

such a revolt if provoked would be totally

destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at

the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States

Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances

as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext

of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a

distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary,

guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable

as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for

the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus

relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing

unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational

conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is

possible that recent and future developments including the

Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may

serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard

indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over

Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no

support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to

Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

-2-

---

## Page 3

13-00000

• .

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans

both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly

difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already

recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other

efforts

against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably

will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort

against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate

objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very

long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,

will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops

to support such an overthrow. The United States Government

in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not

express the above factors to them in the context or with the

bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two"

course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles

and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes

in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the

Castro regime will, although unrealistic, becone increasingly

attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and

economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive

sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

-3-

---

## Page 4

13-00000

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando

and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances

will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive

since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-

gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very

few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.

Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for

action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority

will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence

coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of

facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,

particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and

desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

(Validity of this assuristion is questional

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives

appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against

Cuba:

.*...

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate

and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba

from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the

Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-

communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the

rest of the world.

-4-

---

## Page 5

13-00000

c.

Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando

and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and

political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only

for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the

additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on

Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-

intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis

on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other

security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the

morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equip-

ment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses

and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,

the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World

and uncommätted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban

economy.

-5-

---

## Page 6

13-00000

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban

regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately

through clandestine means to the extent possible on any

significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime,

or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/

Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible

effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli-

gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-

gence collection and related operational activity at the

present time and its development during the past six months

is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to

serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular

matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign

Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document

breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence

coverage which has been developed

I by the Clandestine Service.

Set out below are specifics of operational action it is

proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase in-

telligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you

know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air

travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled

almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

-6-

---

## Page 7

13-00000

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible

military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation

Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel

• of the Center have been retained intact. In order to

re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees,

it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be

induced to reinstitute their regular flights from

Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as

possible after the settlement of the current negotiations

and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka

refugee interrogation center will be re-established

with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be

made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the

viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-

tions with the 131)recruited agents now resident in Cuba.

To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort

will of course depend upon the stringency of future

Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible

as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-

cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba

will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort

will be made to increase this coverage, both through

the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

-7-

---

## Page 8

13-00000

....

16/1

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press

the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort

against Cuba for additional coverage, including the

recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint

dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-

operating at this point in this connection are the

(Bration) Euten) (Erénch) (spantsh] (taltan) (creek

Norwegian, Danish, (West Gétmany Mexidan Arsentinian)

uruguayan, (Canadian, Chtiean) and ISraeli) Direct

approaches to several of these services either by you

personally or in your name, as you prefer, are

being separately recommended. Personal representation

by you to the services underlined above would be useful.

In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services

with which we are in contact and reiterate to those

appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our

extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.

In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will

endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make

greater use of their national assets, both inside and

outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to

possible utilization of the (Vatican)

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing

efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime

assets through liaison services, we will continue our

unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

-8-

---

## Page 9

13-00000

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty)

officers and crew members aboard(six)Cuban vessels we are

now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At

the present time we are running (2)cuban diplomats

stationed outside Cuba as

controlled agents and have viable

operations aimed at an additional (20) Cuban diplomats.

We propose to continue and intensify the current program

of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official

representative abroad to whom we can gain access and

concerning whom we have any reason to believe a

susceptibility to approach

exists. These additional

penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral

operations and where appropriate in conjunction with

liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations

Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or

telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations

in (chtle) (tals, Mexico, (The Netherlands) (ingland)

uruguay, treóce, Eping, (France) and Canada) No

major expansion of this coverage is presently

contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional

targets of opportunity and wherever possible install

coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-

gence from this type of source over and above what we

are now receiving would appear to make such installation

worthwhile.

-9 -

---

## Page 10

13-00000

....

8.

Communications Intelligence: We will continue

our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA

station in Miami at the same level and will continue

to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica-

tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should

be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even

Increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban

communications.

24

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey

has been made world-wide of all Communist Party

penetration operations and wherever any such penetration

can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the

agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban

targets, this will be done, except in those cases where

suca action mould result in undeceptablerejudice to

the operations in the area where the agent is now based.

It is believed that the most lucrative field for the

redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will

be Latin America where there are (65)penetrations of

various communist parties. Of this (65) the survey

we have conducted indicates that (23) have some direct

pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 25) w111

be directed against these targets unless in any case

there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The

remaining cases in the total of (65)are bein individually

examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

-10-

1025

'..•

---

## Page 11

13-00000

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two

successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID)

which have produced substantial intelligence will be

continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed

primarily at continued intelligence collection and at

the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of

other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba

in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar dei 24

Rio and Orientel. In addition, on the most carefully

selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional

agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba

in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA

and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as

possible, train additional agents legally resident in

Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential

recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for

training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,

and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into

Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,

this will be done through legal travel channels, but

where this is not possible, it will be done wherever

feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration

facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

-11-

---

## Page 12

13-00000

seniori:

*

SPLITTING THE REGIME

B./| Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily

directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress

or strain within the regime and between the regime and other

nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will

be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity

to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible

fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal

of work already has gone into this and the current

status of this program and the proposed further explatation

of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in

the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of

a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at

actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of

course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United

States Government to support them and it is entirely possible

that any such effort might fail unless supported with military

forces

' which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I

above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out

above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other

acts of sabotage inside Cuba

would appear to serve little

purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare

instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable

risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed

to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but

no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

-12-

---

## Page 13

13-00000

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:

Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale

program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we

propose

• to maintain in being our present facilities and

the capability of undertaking such operations in order to

fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con-

ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and

intensify the program already undertaken to deny through

clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban

economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly

some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied

firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic

materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence

and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and

related services will be continued and as possible intensified.

This program has developed substantially and it should be

possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness

considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-

gence operations mounted against United States interests

from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:

In this field the following tasks will be continued and where

appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

-13-

---

## Page 14

13-00000

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American

attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow

of the Castro-communist regime.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro

concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3.

Stimulate, support and guide covertly the

propaganda and political action activities of the CRC

and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as

appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside

Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the

Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum

use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during

the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime

in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis

on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-

clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of

Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-

sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7.

Launch propaganda balloons after an operational.

capability has been established and policy authority is

granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material

into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,

with special emphasis on selective black operations.

-14-

---

## Page 15

13-00000

• 1*

... .. -

.:•:

so satiss.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue

the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for Intelligence

collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions.

As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as

possible from areas outside the continental United States, and

particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides

on a "Track Iwo" concept or on any similar concept which

contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed

action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed

that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible

of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence

type operation into the political field, which is the province

of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed

it would be advisable to press for the creation within the

Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to

handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile

groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides

for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,

the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the

maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity

as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes

in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit

and make advisable the following:

-15-

---

## Page 16

13-00000

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures

and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W

within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component

of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required

detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of

even minor operational details

and decision by committee on

points which it is believed are completely within the purview

of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrencé in the above general operational plan

is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with

the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special

Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan

American Airways and Kll to resume their flights between Miami

and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept

is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of

State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

-16-

---

## Page 17

13-00000

:

(

inciting. ice

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational

mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations

will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force

W within the DD/P.

with

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

Chief, Task Force W

-17-

---