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198-10009-10099

• 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199%

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

6/24/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ARMY

198-10009-10099

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

MULTIPLE

DATE: 02/00/1963

PAGES:

153

SUBJECTS :

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA

PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN

CUBA - 1962

CUBAN SUBVERSION

SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony

concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in

Cuba, etc.

JFK Rewrew

Department of the Army EO 1352

Declassify → Exclude • Exemp

19.1

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CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II

NO.

1.

3.

4.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

SUBJECT:

Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA

before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC

Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the

Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator

Stennis

SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte

SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte

SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte

SecNav testimony before HASC

Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState

with attached statement by Mr. Martin before

the Latin American Subçomte of HFAC on subject

of communist subversion of the hemisphere

SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A. M.)

SecNav testimony before HASC

Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell

D. Taylor, ChJCS

Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC

SecDef testimony before SASC

Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC

SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba)

Statement. by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the

Preparedness Investigating Subemte of Senator

Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA)

16.

Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent

Subemte on Investigations of the Committee on Govern-

ment Operations - U.S. Senate

HH 50955

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DATE:

Undated

7. Jan 63

11 Feb 63

12 Feb 63

13 Feb 63

18. Feb 63

19 Feb 63

19 Feb 63

19 Feb 63

20 Feb 63

20 Feb 63

21 Feb 63

21 Feb 63

22 Feb 63

26 Feb 63

(Transmittal

Slip)

13 March 63

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CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)

NO.

17.

18.

19.

20.

SUBJECT:

DATE:

Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert

Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10,

11,. 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments

8 Mar 63

Study on Cuba as a Base for -------prepared by Bob

Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara

at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def

Undated

Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis

29 Mar 63

Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US

Participation in the UN During 1963, fr MI. Califano

w/draft of President's message atchd

Sub

Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm

Undtd

on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military

Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)

14W

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SRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO:

DATE 26 Feb 65

ROOM NO.

3E985

REMARKS:

Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance

BUILDING

Pentagon

MANS THE SO LENINENES

701330

FROM:

CIA - William A. Tidwell

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

Code]43

6614

FOFEB 59-241

EPLACES FORM 36-

HICH MAY BE USEI

GPO: 1957-0-439445

(47)

70900

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286

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE

STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING

SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

OSA, ASG Control No 0-19

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25

February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the

daily record of events in Latin America, and reports

from our intelligence, sources within Communist and

other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-

phere all agree on one salient conclusion:

that Fidel

Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com

munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow

and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis and with

increasing rancor since then-Cuban leaders have been

exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and

terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban

support takes many different forms, but its main thrust

is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the

training, and the communications and technical assist-

ance that revolutionary groups

in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from

other Latin American countries:, "Come to Cuba; we

will pay your way,

we will train

you in underground

organization techniques,

in guerrilla warfare, in sab-

otage and in terrorism.

We will see to it that you

get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we

will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup-

port, send you propaganda materials for your movement,

training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret

communications methods, and perhaps funds and special-

ized demolition equipment."

Castro is not, as far as

we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cu

ban weapons or Cuban personnel-either leaders, ad-

visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them:

"If you succeed in establishing something effective

of a revolutionary movement in your homeland,

if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con=

front regular armed forces, then

we may consider more

concrete forms of

assistance."

So far,

it should be noted, none of the movements

in South

America has reached this final stage-.and in

fact even

Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had

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to fight a pitched battle with regular military for-

mations which might have required more advanced weap-

ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns.

In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version

of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-

ing revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu-

ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part

In the la Croya disorders in Peru in December.

We

know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier,

from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We

know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that

some guerrilla

forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped

with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri-

ority list for revolution.

Fidel Castro said so to the

recent meeting of Communist front organizations for

Latin American women.

Che Guevara and Blas Roca both

emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in

speeches in January. One of our established sources

of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene-

zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee

agreed in January that a

"peaceful solution to the pres

ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla

and

terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un-

der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates

activities with the other militant

extremist groups in

Venezuela.

The result has been the creation of the

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or

ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist

ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter

ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate

shootings.

These were also designed to dissuade Pres-

ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this,

of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized.

The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done

with advanced types of explosives.

The shooting has

reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go

out at night in some sections of the capital. But it

is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that

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this level of activity is not the sort of thing that

will bring down the government unless the president

or other high officials are assassinated.

The FALN

has not reached a point where it stands up to the

armed forces, or seizes and holds government build-

ings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train-

ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any

other country.

Our estimate is that more than 200

Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of

these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and

others were rounded up and given long prison

sentences

when they committed themselves prematurely last spring

In a countryside where the rural population strongly

supports the Betancourt administration. One of our

best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela

tells us

that at present the unified command has less

than 150 guerrillas in

the field, in widely separated

groups of 15 to 25 men each.

I1. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push-

ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin

American revolution, with the implication that nothing

more than guidance

needs to be exported.

Castro ac-

tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on

July 26, 1960, when he said,

"We promise to continue

making Cuba the example that

can convert the Cordillera

of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American

continent.."

In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro

said

that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over-

turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be

in the Sierra Maestra.

For the past three months,

Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both

in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com-

munists which have been repeated to us,

have been in

sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve

power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious

than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that

the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into

such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic-

aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first

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eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today

the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more

covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-

craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced

Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including

veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa-

ganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha-

vana and the

work of Prensa Latina are matters of

public record. It may be worth noting that the postal

and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on

the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda

coming into their land.

Another 10 tons a month comes

into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the

airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla

trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form

of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the

texts on guerrilla warfare by

Mao Ise-tung and by Che

Guevara scattered over all of Latin America.

Our agents

have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet,

about two and a

half by four

inches, called "150 ques-

tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil

War veteran, Alberto Bayo.

This was printed in Cuba,

and turned up first in Peru.

Another version, with

100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's

books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and

mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and in-

cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as

well as charts for calculating the force of various

explosives.

There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's

book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of

Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-

guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla

to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary

preparations from materials that he can obtain easily

and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that

his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come

from "the enemy"--that is,

from the security forces

in his homeland.

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III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps

as many as 1, 500 persons came to Cuba during 1962.

from all the other Latin American countries with

the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo-

logical indoctrination or guerrilla warfare train-

ing or both.

More have gone in 1963 despite the

limited facilities

for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Vene-

of the courses are as

short as

to let it appear that the trainees had merely at-

tended some conference or celebration and done a

little sightseeing.

Other courses last as long as

a year, and may include intensive training in such

things

as sabotage, espionage, and psychological

warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort tó

monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the

main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao.

(Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM

may soon resume flights. The Cubans go

to great

lengths to conceal the fact that some of these

trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they

stayed.

However, we know a great deal about this

travel from our penetrations of the Communist par-

ties, from controlled

agents we have been able to

maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and

from cooperative travel control authorities in

Latin American countries.

The Cuban Embassy in

Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate

piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes

home, will only show that he has been in Mexico.

We have a record, however, of those who fly on to

Cuba •

In other cases, particularly in the case of

travel through Montevideo before the quarantine,

the Cubans furnished passports under other names

for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel con-

trol points, and another set from the information

we receive from penetration agents of established

reliability in the Communist parties.

Some of the

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Latin American governments are also able to maintain

fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to

have been in Cuba.

We get a certain amount of cross-

checking from lists of names furnished us by several

of our agents who have undergone training, and in

confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in

Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we

come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known

to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962.

We have to make allowance for some who did not re-

ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op-

posite direction for those whose names have escaped

our surveillance.

But we are guided in these adjust-

ments by the cross-checking information mentioned

above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home,

by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using

Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and

probably ships

as well--for the trip between Cuba and

the Bloc. This

is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in

some cases permits further indoctrination and

train-

ing in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our

estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees

in 1962 is reasonably accurate.

We also believe that

the scope and volume

of this training is being stepped

up, just as we know

that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement:

of guerrillas,

firing, care of weapons, and general

guerrilla tactics.

One of our Brazilian agents took

such a four-week course more than a year ago, under

cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned

to his Havana hotel every few days during the course

to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An

Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then

was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great

deal of detail on the type of training.

He reports

that some of

the trainees remain indefinitely.

The

Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna-

tional Brigade.

Sometimes they are formed into na-

tional units from a particular country, in effect

forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to

the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

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A trainee who recently returned to Peru after

several months of training in Cuba, said that all

his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and

other similar denolition targets on detailed maps

of Peru. They were also required to fill out :

lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil-

ities for subversion of police, methods for illegal

entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup-

ply, possible points of attack against police and

military posts, and similar information necessary

for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in

such countries as colombia, Venezuela, and Peru,

where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either

in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu-

bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors

or advisors for these forces.

These reports are in-

variably second-hand, and we have not been able to

confirm any of them.

some cases, It has turned

out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas

referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and

was training others, rather than a Cuban national.

However; we know positively that three Cuban nationals

were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya,

the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company.

One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed

invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by

land-hungry Indians.

Information of this nature con-

tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta

to

crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the

complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that

they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in-

structors, but found there were none.

This came to

light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent,

relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in

the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in

Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following

the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision

of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous

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sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare

students and

their leaders to obtain their own weap

ons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group

of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively

in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle

and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns.

His

group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian

guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture

from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar-

gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors

told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because

there was a plentiful source of supply for any de-

termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland.

Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and

of terrilla

Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have

been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing

to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance.

Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is

reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our

stations in Latin America to review what evidence we

have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio

transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba.

(In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen

last fall that this was unnecessary)) In 1962, Cuba

furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug-

gled into Guatemala.

In Peru, the guerrilla trainees

who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident

last March had been issued kits containing a Czech

rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin.

Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla

hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen

of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons

have not been

sent from Cuba.

Latin America has a

long tradition of smuggling,

a long coastline, in-

numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones,

and inadequate security forces to control all such

channels. A Venezuelan

Communist leader has been

telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send

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them mortars.

It is always possible, of course,

that

he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units,

but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making

this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary,

we have evidence that in principle

Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons

to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have

no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do

so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat-

it i cano

Needless

ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that

comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to

Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin

America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our

evidence shows

that it is generally effected by couriers

carrying cash.

The following are a few examples of

these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned

from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several

witnesses to have large quantities of US currency

stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit-

case.

There is no law against bringing currency into

Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter-

mine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap-

tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-

carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep-

tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane

to over-

fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua.

He was found to

be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was

bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla

training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar-

rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary

Ecuadorean Youth.

The leaders of the group admitted

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having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together

with funds to support their activities. One item

of $44,000 was publicized

in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected

last November has given us a specific account of pro-

cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap-

ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also

have considerable evidence of involved bank

• transfers

by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American

front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac-

tivity.

In some countries where the. Cubans still have

diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show-

ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-

group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to

receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked

up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying

to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex~

posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru.

The man

admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him

the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla

We know that this woman is a cut-out in the

communications between the pro-Commanist Peasant Leagues,

which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sus-

taining has obviously been applied to finances as well.

Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob-

beries in Peru,

Venezuela, and Argentina. The most

spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub-

urb last year which netted almost $100,000. From

the participants, who have been caught, we know that

the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer-

rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot

fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals

has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed

to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo

Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

In February 1963 a bank

in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000

by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations

maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all

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times, with regularly scheduled and special broad-

casts to specific countries as well as general trans-

missions to all Latin America. The general theme

of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is

awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op-

portunity for revolutionary action against the "cor-

rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism"

in power ande

which allegedly supports them. Within the last two

months there has been an increase in the aggressive

ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called

•Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out-

let.

More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta-

tion broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50

minutes of propaganda in languages which include

spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and

Haitian

Creole,

to listeners in Europe, the Mediter

ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was in-

augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly

since that time and is now Latin America's first in-

ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours.

Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti

- 7 hr

Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min

English to

Europe

English to the Western Hemis-

phere

French to Europe

French to Canada

French to Mediterranean

Portuguese to Brazil

Spanish to

Europe

Spanish to the Americas

- 9 hr 20 min

- 17 hr 30 min

- 9 hr 20 min

- 3 hr 20 min

- 3. hr 30 min

.- 7 hr

- 16 hr 55 min

- 108 hr 30 min

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In addition to the regularly scheduled inter-

Radio Havana has been known to -

tage of unique political situations.

When serious

disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in

late 196l, for example, broadcasts emanating from a

self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was

located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the

overthrow of the Dominican government.

The station

went off after about a week, but not before direc-

tion finder bearings

and other technical clues in-

dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio

Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states

that it makes its facilities

available to political groups from other Latin Ameri-

can countries so they can beam programs to their home-

lands.

These programs, which have the evident intent

of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are

presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week

schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re-

public.

Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua

and Honduras until last September when they were

Sam Lat programs

replaced by a single program with wider targets now

programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-

emplified by the programs transmitted to the Domini-

can Republic on 28 January.

by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on

the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist

agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re-

public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist

group of Dominicans

in Cuba called the "National

Liberation Movement," It appealed to Dominican

university students to demonstrate against the Con-

stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to

the United States.

"Radio Free Dixie" 15 a one

hour a week transmission in English aimed at US

Negroes:

The other program,

"The Friendly Voice

of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a

wider audience.

Both programs can be heard well in

Florida and also in many parts of southern

United

States.

The technical

facilities of Radio Havana are

at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles

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southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four

shortwave transmitters are being

used, but in the

past as many as five have been observed on the air

at the same time. These transmitters range in power

from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to

be heard all over the world. Programs are being

sent from studios to the transmitter site by means

of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob-

viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos-

cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It

has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping

but his stomach is in Moscow.

This same split be-

tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy-

call it coexistence or

"two steps forward, one step

back'-is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin

American countries.

Thus Cuba at present not only

seeks to serve two

masters, but to choose among rival

Servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism

and revolution in Latin America are more in line with

those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets.

Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are

totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite

of differences over tactics and timing between var-

ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de-

liver the Latin American countries into the Commu-

nists-socialist bloc.

The so-called Soviet "conser-

vative"

view, as it is now espoused, is more intent

on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible

and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly

increasing. An excellent example of this

was the set

ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in

the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The avowed purpose

of this institute is to raise the study of the prob

lems of

Latin America, which in their own statements

the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest

possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese

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languages is to be stressed in the institute and

throughout the school system.

A list of subjects

on which

this institute intends to publish shows

that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for

Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance pro-

gram in Colombia-a showpiece of the Alliance.

have been reliably informed that posters have

placed in some Colombian universities referring to

ors, Problems of the "national liberation and work-

movements in Latin American countries" as top-

ics which with

be studied by the institute.

Re.

sults of these studies will be published in the

near future in a magazine called America Latina,

intended especially

distribution in Latin America.

A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the in

stitute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will

in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic ex-

pansion of the USA" in Latin America.

The institute

also expects to enter into close contact with leading

Latin

American scientists and academicians during.

1963.

One of the most important Communist assets in

Latin America is a

• large number of Bloc diplomatic

and Cuban missions.

These

missions are used to fur

ther Communist subversive activities even in coun

tries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.

The USSR, and

in some cases some Satellites as well,

have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argen

tina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations

with

Bolivia,

but has no resident mission there. Cuba

maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia,

Uruguay, and Chile.

The Chinese Communists have no

diplomatic ties

Latin America except with Cuba.

That fact alone would make Cuban missions important

to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries

Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official

whatever with any bloc country.

ties

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com

munists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor

tance the Communists

that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are

not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity

against the government: In this case even the Cu

bans

appear to be much more interested in retaining

the good

will of the government so that they can con

tinue to use the

country as

base of operations

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against Argentina, Paraguay, etc: Communist diplo-

matic missions, however, are active in supporting

local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re-

tain enough leverage within

• the country so as to

prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a

break in relations.

The badly split Uruguayan

government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly

tolerant of the activities of these missions and

of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of

the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis-

sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel.

In addition, couriers and travellers can go back

and forth between this city and the bloc countries

and Cuba at any time.

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ANNEX A - ARGENTINA

A participant has given us a detailed account

of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course

given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July

to December 1962. Instruction included

such sub-

Jects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, com-

munications, construction of defenses, guerrilla

strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and

open order drill.

The trainees practiced with

Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns,

Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a

57-millimeter recoilless cannon.

Part of the group

reached Cuba by way of Chile.

Some of the men were

given two passports, one Cuban

and one Ecuadorean,

and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.

Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that

they had raided a

warehouse which had served as head-

quarters for terrorists working with both the Peron-

ists and Communists. According to the police, the

gang was engaged in

smuggling cuban propaganda into

Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel

of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and

had carried out about 30 robberies

to obtain funds,

weapons, and explosives.

A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay,

• provides false documentation for Argentines and

Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla train-

ing.

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Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December.. When a po-

lice patrol stopped to investigate, they found he

was carrying a number of rifles in his car.

In the last week of

January, another of the ori-

ginal batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues

Lima, was arrested by national security police at an

airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammuni-

tion for some of the camps which apparently are still

operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to

talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced

he would tell his whole story.

So far; according to

the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in

Rio de Janeiro

had

furnished money with which he had

bought another farm to continue the Peasant League

guerrilla operation.

We know this woman works for

the Cuban Embassy.

Rodrigues says the farm is

in

lis name, and that if he gets out of jail,

he intends

to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the

farm, and work it.

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ANNEX B - BRAZIL

Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now

have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement

in subversion directed against Brazil.

These are the

so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authori-

ties when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial dele-

gation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro

on 27 November.

"Gerardo" ocuments, a letter and attachments fron

• "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cu-

ban diplomat in

Rio de

Janeiro, writing under a cover

name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it

plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by

Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to

set up guerrilla

i Brazilian Peasant

warfare training camps within the

framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization.

The report, which relays complaints of some of the

guerrillas

recruited for these camps, makes it clear

that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued

by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cu-

ban involvement, and names

many Brazilians involved.

Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police

official checking on

• possible clandestine landing fields

in the interior, ran across evidence of the training

camps and arranged to have some of them raided even be-

fore the Varig aircraft crashed.

The raids turned up

no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps

happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo

Petronio correspondence:

The Varig document provided

the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources

matched their details perfectly, and it has become im

possible for the Communists and the Peasant League to

obtain serious consideration for any claim that the docu-

ments might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their

authenticity.

The Peasant League operation, which was staffed

by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take

guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues

to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans

apparently have done their best to avoid all contact

with the guerrilla organization since the expose, Bra-

zilian police continue to turn up further ramifications

of the operation.

The second-in-command of the Peasant

League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir

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ANNEX C - CHILE

On 28 October 1962, at the height of the mis-

sile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly

in a downtown Santiago apartment house.

The Chilean

police who searched the apartment found four members

of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6

cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38

fuses, and one small bomb

already assembled.

One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had

his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed

with three Cuban diplomats.

At least two of these,

Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares,

have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence of-

ficers

The Chilean police told the press that the

group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and

residence, US firms, and local public utilities.

This

incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana

broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack

Us property and installations wherever possible in

Latin America.

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ANNEX D - ECUADOR

Well-placed and reliable agents have reported

that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had

given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolution-

ary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare

training.

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including

three girls, were

rounded up by Ecuadorean para-

troopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp

at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles

west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to

Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez

Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain

Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive

guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January

arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders in-

volved with the guerrilla operation in order to re-

store full Communist control, newspapers reported that

the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists

of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio

Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962,

was reported to have photographs showing him under-

going guerrilla training in Cuba.

Communist Miguel

Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee

and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians,

was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed

a soviet pistol which he said had been given him by

a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soor

as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at

least 80 Ecuadoreans were

in Cuba as of January for

guerrilla training.

We have 30 of these trainees

listed by name.

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ANNEX E - PERU

The ruling military junta in Peru started in

February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists,

including 63 Communist leaders.

In a 68-page indict-

ment, the government charges that the extremists have

attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla

forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in

San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted

in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-

spaced pages. The security forces have given us no

evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is

ample evidence of Cuban involvement.

The trials center on the activities of the Move-

ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organiza-

tion for extremist militants founded

by De La Puente

Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from

Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the

revolution in Peru with economic and technical help

from Fidel Castro." This phrase from

the indictment

conforms with reports our agents received at the time

from close associates of De La Puente.

He is one of

the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched

by the junta early in January. We believe he is in

Cuba. We have a photograph,

taken some time ago,:

which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian

associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.

Although the government did not move against

the Communists and other extremist groups with any

great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion

goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian

police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains

into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible

only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously

raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from

which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a re-

sult, they found complete guerrilla kits including

Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for

dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates,

and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba.

The

custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact

a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this

incident were released, but have been picked up again

in the January roundup and are to be included in the

mass trials.

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An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba

last fall has provided a detailed account of his

training, lists of other trainees he could identify,

and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans

apparently gave to all the Peruvians.

Possibly it

questionnaire for all guerrilla war-

The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint

possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large

The Cuban instructors also wanted information

on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to

subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry

into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up

business firms to cover espionage and agent opera-

tions, and information on location of and access to

police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to

good reports from our agents and from Peruvian po-

lice, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for

coordinated action. This may be one factor that per-

suaded the junta to move against the extremists.

The main guerrilla strength at present is a

force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate

to be as large as 2,000 men.

This is the guerrilla

force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peru-

vian authorities

to have received his guerrilla train-

ing in Argentina. If in fact be has 2,000 men, this

figure includes landless peasants and Indians,

largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to

believe that more than a small proportion are trained

and equipped guerrillas.

The Indians, however, are

almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are

with rifles.

The junta has moved in some troops be-

cause the local police detachments have been unable

to withstand Blanco's raids.

Interrogations and

agent reports have established that the guerrillas

are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bo-

livian military and smuggled across the frontier

into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Com-

munist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

As one example of the activities of the co-

ordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the

Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guer-

rillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the

village Guardia post in Jauja, 110

miles east of Lima,

and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas

with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three

local banks

and retreated

to the hills.

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ANNEX F - VENEZUELA

Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban

subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing.

Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking

Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963,

told various visiting Latin American Communists that

Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin

America.

Venezuela is receiving priority attention

from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt re-

gime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods.

It would appear from the meager evidence avail-

able in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists

have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban

involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic cam-

paign which is being waged in the country.

The wave

of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela

has physically exhausted the handful of competent men

in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or

no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban in-

volvement.

Support from Havana can be inferred, however,

if only from the expert character of the sabotage

carried out.

In mid-February, for instance, it was

discovered that the Communists have begun to use

shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines.

Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explo-

sives.

The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Com-

munist Party, which is directly charged with the mis-

sion for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has

been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts

of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with ad-

vanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges,

pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts

have been well planned and professionally executed.

There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist

sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and

November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana

to attack all American installations in Venezuela as

a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.

Last November a Venezuelan military court tried

139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto

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Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences.

Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba.

One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time

been photographed in Cuban

uniform during Cuban army

maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large

sum of US

currency from Cuba, and had made several

trips there. He was also the recipient of large

quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda.

Venezuelan police early in January raided a

house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Com-

munist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba,

and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reach-

ing Cuba.

Two Communists were subsequently arrested

attempting to enter the house. The armed forces

have also heard a voice radio, which

appears to be

located on the grounds of the Central University in

Caracas, communicating with another station which they

believe

to be in Cuba.

Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader

in Caracas

of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revo-

lutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for

procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When

the man himself was arrested, police found a radio

transmitter being carried in

the trunk of his car.

We have received reports from a

reliable source

that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramili-

tary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last

September for assistance.

Castro reportedly had prom-

ised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. How-

ever, Castro is reported to have given Martinez

$50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez'

men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable

to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not

permit him to do so.

Last month (January 1963), It was

further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia

Martinez, received

business installations in Venezuela.

Mrs. Martinez was

visiting in Cuba at the

time that she

received these

funds.

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1-9

INVESTIGATION OF

THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

INTERIM REPORT BY

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING

SUBCOMMITTEE

Of The

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

Under The Authority Of

S. Res. 75

(88th Cong•, Ist Sess.)

On

THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

5812 (8)

SEGRET

DAISD (LA) CONTROL NUMBER

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman

John Stennis, Mississippi

Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusettr

Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia

Margaret Chase Smith, Maine

Stuart Symington, Missouri

J. Glenn Beall, Meryland

Henry M. Jackson, Washington

Barry Goldweter, Arizona

Sam J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina

Clifford P. Case, New Jersey

Strom Thurmond, South Carolina

Clair Engle, California

Howard W. Cannon, Nevada

Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia

Stephen M. Young, Ohio

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

John Stennis, Mississipps, Chairman

Stuart Symington, Missouri

Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusettr

lenry M. Jackson, Weshingtor

Mergaret Chase Smith, Maine

Strom Thurmond, Narch Caroline

Barry Goldwater, Arizona

James I. Kendall, Chief Counsel

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U. S. Senate,

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,

Committee on Armed Services,

Honorable Richard B. Russell,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

U. S. Senate

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate

Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.

In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received

testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence,

the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the

Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections.

The interim report

transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military

developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection

with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have

been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry

into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more

subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.

It is necessary that this interim report to the full

Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security

purposes and will have the report printed and released to the

public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security

matters have been deleted.

Respectfully,

JOHN STENNIS,

Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

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CONTENTS

INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

Page

1

I. Introductory Statement.•

II.

Summary of Major Findings.

III. Situation Prior to Mid-July, 1962

(A) Cuban Forces...........

Intelligence Activities and Operations

Situation From Mid-July to October 22, 1962..•

(A) Buildup in Soviet Forces and

• Eguipment

10

(B)

Identification of Specific Weapons

and Equipment:

(1) SA-2 Sites.

(2) Cruise Missiles.

(3) MIG-21 Fighters.,

(4) II-28 (Beagle) Bombers..

11

11

11

12

12

(5) Medium Range and Intermediate:...

Range Missiles

(C) Failure to Identify Soviet Organized

.. ... .12

Combat Units..•

(D) Alleged Photographic Gap......•,

(E)

Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC

13

15

.. . . +

16

(F)

Intelligence Activities and Operations

Generally. .....

17

V. Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of

Removal of IL-28 Bombers.

21

(A) Intelligence Activities and Operations

Generally...

21

(B) Identification of Orgenized Soviet

• Combat Units.....i..

(C) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers....

VI. Current Military Situation in Cuba....•.

21

21

22

(A) Intelligence Activities and Operations

Generally..

22

(B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces ani

Equipment Now in Cuba.....

(1)

Types and Numbers of Weapons..

(2)

Strength and Capabilities of Forces:

23

23

26

(3)

Reports of Concealed Strategic

Weapons in Cuba.0.••-•*

(4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal

30

(C) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet

Presence in Cuba...••

(D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion..

VII. Concluding Statement...

31

32

34

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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUF

I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are

now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic

and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President

Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive

weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.

However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not.

subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets st1ll

maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other

underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in

numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports

also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agita-

tional and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.

The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness

Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation Into the entire subject

matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still

continues, the Subcommittee deems 1t appropriate to issue an interim report at

this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments

and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early

1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A diecus-

sion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included

In a subsequent report.

Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central

Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sect10ns

of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of

State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the

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- 2.-

Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a

somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily

refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence

Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other

agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the

extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or

operations discussed.

Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive

bearings fron Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; It. Gen.

Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General

Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear

Admiral Vernon I. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General

Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Alr

Force.

The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written

reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the

Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have

also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security

of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolution-

ary Council.

In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation

and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official

positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent

approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.

Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members

of the House of Representatives.

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This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received frow

the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee.

It does, however:

include some information from other sources.

Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any

overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings,

based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence

activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general

recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all

activities taking place in Cuba.

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelli-

gence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some

areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems

were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance

characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather

and an almost completely closed society.

2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this

capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence

of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit 1s due to those

involved in this mission.

3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting

intelligence Information and data, in retrospect it appears that several

substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of

the information and data which was accumulated.

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4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com-

munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with

Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligenc

judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were :

(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on

October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that

organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our

plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were neces

sarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous

Cuban defense forces.

(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially under-

estimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people

estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that,

at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on

the island.

(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on

October 14th that the intelligence cormunity concluded that strategic missiles

had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative

judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment

as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installei.

were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing

factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to

discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges

and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to

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October 14th.

The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion

that such charges are unfounded.

6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelli-

gence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2

high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October l4th were also closely

inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to

support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from

the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock

or friction between the agencies.

T. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion

that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However,

they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that

offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They

also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from

penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that,

based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern.about

the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the

Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment

of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports

continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activi

ties have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of

the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the

storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage

of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a

substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence

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confirming the presence of strategie missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been

withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic

missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this 1s illustrated by

the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equip-

ment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could

be made operational in a matter of hours.

10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 soviet

personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving,

according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000

to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelli-

gence people say. However, because of what 1s described by Intelligence as

"technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining 18

unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the

Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence In the original estimate.

There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as

to the number of soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree

that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with

the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate

that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of

hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last FalJ.,

we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any

real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the

opinion that the official 17,500 estimate 1s perhaps a minimum figure.

12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban

forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe

opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any

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internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear

that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require

large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive

weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the

Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the

United States or latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in

Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive

evidence.

I4. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring,

aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout

the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous

threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

III. SITUATION PRIOR IO MID-JULY, 1962

A. Cuban Forces

It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962,

the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve

of 100,000, and a home guard of 100, 000. Although the ground combat capability

of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1t

was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training,

they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat

team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with unite

larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained

primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any

attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500

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Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba.

By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the

acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in

bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40

propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.

The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type.

Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been

received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed

Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.

It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July,

1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba

for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then

the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and

equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World

War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether

the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this

time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then

constituted.

B. Intelligence Activities and Operations

The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962,

consisted of reconnsissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnais-

sance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from

refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intell1-

gence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of

Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes.

Commencing In early, 1962, two flights

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were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the

number of flights was increased.

Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographir

flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international watere

but not over the Island of Cuba itself.

In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports

were collected and assessed, Included in these reports were many which con-

tained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet

ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the

greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation

of such activities.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the

Intelligence cormunity in early 1962 Intensified their intelligence activities

and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to

Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month.

The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization

of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment

of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the

activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or

strategic weapons were discovered.

The intelligence cormunity, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba

were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that

It might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) Light bomber would be

supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.

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IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962

A. Buildup In Soviet Forces and Equipment

In late July and early August, our inteiligence noted a significant

change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet

Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger,

increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average

of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped

to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during

the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.

While our intelligence people were aware from this and other informa-

tion that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and

impact was not clear to the intelligence community.

During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile

activity in Cuba Increased significantly. These reports were checked out as

scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent

and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confir-

mation of them.

At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships

were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel

being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in

small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known

to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore

could not be confirmed.

Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of

the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that

some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,

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physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of

fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and

other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals,

the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence com-

munity adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and

trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with

Improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include signifi-

cant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized

into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information

brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "ber-

sonnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.

B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment

1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated

by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention

on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high

altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, estab-

lished positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at

two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from

August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system

can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a

slant range of about 25 miles.

2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile Installation

was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional

cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping

missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th

KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were Identified in Cuba.

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3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air

Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the pre-

sence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture

obtained on September 5, 1962.

4. IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the Intell1-

gence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the II-28 (Beagle)

light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on

September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing II-28's

aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was

disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.

5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been

indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed

reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity

In Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It

1s evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile,

which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identi

fled, still appears large to the untrained observer.

However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced

Into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse

the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--

apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was & suspect

medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province, As a

result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October

14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and

emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range

ballistic missile complex

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Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many

ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announce-

ment that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evi-

dence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic

missiles were, in fact, Introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned

to introduce.

Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and Intermediate-range

ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance

missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which

had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling

of the sites commenced. Three IRM sites were located and it was anticipated

that a fourth would be established. None of the IRM sites became operational

before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become

operational by December 15.

The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100

miles and the Intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles

C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Unite

As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of

the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith-

standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophie-

ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the pre-

sence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25

when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-

analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were,

In fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units 1n Cuba.

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The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people

to be about 5,000 men.

In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba

was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on

October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelli

gence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand.

The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-

up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This

is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One

factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in

October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally

loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and

that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger

ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional

Soviet military personnel

arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to

doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great

quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.

The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units

in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present

there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our

plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantial-

ly complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading

forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter

Is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained,

powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking

power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States

commanders until several days subsequent to October 25.

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In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascer-

tained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our for-

ces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher

price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated.

Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of

the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily

armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his

actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from

the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles.

D. Alleged Photographic Gap

There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in

our photographic reconnalesance over Cuba during the pertod from September 5.

to guilter 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and

have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of

the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be

sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here..

The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted

in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.

On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and

eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por-

tion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference

to the eastern end of the island.

A flight was planned for September l0th but this'was not flown.

On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions,

it was not wholly successful.

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Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights

were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October T. These

flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlightes

as requiring early attention.

Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October

12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2

high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew

the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic

missiles in Cuba.

E. Transfer of U-2. Flights from CIA to SAC

There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a con-

flict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Com-

mand (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights.

These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA

and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the func

tion of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that.

this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.

These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been

found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any

conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photograph:

coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being

operated by CIA prior to October 14.

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the

two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whor.

the flights should be flown.

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The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of

the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC.

It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites

in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight whicl

was flown on October l4th was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the

possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it

was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conduct.

ed by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reason.

able and proper.

It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the

one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without

explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after

inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no signifi-

cance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.

F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over

Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September.

The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been out-

lined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October I4th were flown by the CIA.

After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there

vas a concentrated effort to determinethe precise nature of the missile buildup

and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the mis.

sile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle:

a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiate

until October 23, the day following the President's message.

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During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over

international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using

refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Sub-

committee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, how-

ever, our intelligence did quite well.

The MRBMs were discovered while they

were in the process of being deployed. The IRM sites were discovered in a

very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they

were still in their crates.

The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had

been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were iden-

tified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before

they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite

adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost

completely closed society.

The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited

by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis

commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles

had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2

plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and

Major Anderson was killed.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photo-

graphic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence

operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors

and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the

presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet

government assurances.. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part

in the united action of the Organization of American States and world accep-

tance of the correctness of our position.

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Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only

a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important on

It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period

of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deploy.

ment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and

other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other

sources.

The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have

done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and infor-

mation. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears

to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreove:

there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence com-

munity to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had

been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the

most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available.

This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the

worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence

people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on

the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as mili.

tary observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible

among those things which were within their power of observation as to time,

place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest

of the Cuban sources.

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Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets

would not introduce strategic missiles Into Cuba because they believed that suc

a development would be incompatible with soviet policy as interpreted by them.

The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent

events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the

facts as events unfold is evident.

The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc

judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A

few of these will be mentioned.

The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that

organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until pho-

tographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related

fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated

throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.

It has also been noted that the Intelligence community did not estimate

that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic con-

firmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the

analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it

would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.

In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given

proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile:

complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to

the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile

installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for

the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.

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V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

On the day following the President's statement, that 1s, on October 23,

1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted

effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected

targets.

During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Com-

mand flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through Nov..

ember 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air

Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties.

B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units

As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th pro-

vided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored

task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distributei

to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was

thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized

by the Cuban forces.

C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers

Io a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October

crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic

missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment,

and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.

A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet obser

vation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equip-

ment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accom-

panied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over

Cuba end Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.

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The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of

the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites

to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as 1t

arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.

As stated, the Intelligence community believes that all strategic mis-

siles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed

by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to

the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible tha

despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.

VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers

the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of

the situation as 1t now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue

on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been

no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance. The reason

for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re-

mains a matter for speculation.

The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources

available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the 1l1-fated

Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close survell-

lance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and sur-

face ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic recon-

neissance and photographic aircraft. There 1s additional surveillance of the

aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that

radar range permits.

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A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might

become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated ru-

mors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related

to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial

fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe

that in fact Cuba is now, or has been,

a base for Soviet submarines.

Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide

temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly ex-

tend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate thei:

operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficieni

depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxa-

tion facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home

for any submarine.

The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of

the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods con-

siderably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and infor-

mation from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facili-

tate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt:

to evade detection.

B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba

1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, 1t was tes-

tified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion

level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, ma-

chine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an

organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized

equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.

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They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light

antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of

the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned

above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated.

The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plen-

tiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit

perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar

to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is

also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a

large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite

complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive

training, Including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to

replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites

for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites,

are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in

by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are

manned by Soviets is apparently not known.

There are four cruise missilesites, with missiles of a range of about

30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part

of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment

of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature

of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba,

far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching

sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have

been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and

thus failed to reach Cuba.

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The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-

speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are

each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated

to have a range of 10 to 15 miles.

These boats are under Soviet control, but

Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are appar

ently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expe-

dition.

The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with

almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of

these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motor-

ized divisions, reinforced by artillery and otber units, are known to be in

surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed

to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships

of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy

tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of

almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200

57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field

artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost

100 armored personnel carriers, & number of the truck-mounted multiple laun-

chers for the 130 im rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already

in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor

vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.

To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles

The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10

and SS-11. The second 1s the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,

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which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST

JOHN.

According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approxi-

mately 42 MIG-2l's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet

fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar

to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios neces-

sary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system,

SA-2 and fighter.

2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces

The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same

level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100, 00 10

the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.

The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by

their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to sup-

press an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents

obtain from the people of luba, and the amount of effective outside help

given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern

highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed In United

States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organiza-

tion which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced

battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long

duration.

The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to

consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other

coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been

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somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it 1s

not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol

activities.

The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of

about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 Worla War II propeller fighters,

about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of antiair-

craft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters.

The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been

turned over to the Cubans.

The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The

assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics:

The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action

against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real

air cover or air defense capability.

The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intel-

ligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000

are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile

sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting

Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments.

About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which

includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated

7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contin-

gent in Cuba.

At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of

the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 1s still the official

estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some

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4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accu-

racy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present con-

siderably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in

mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that

no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles --knows how many Russian

troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with

the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The

air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The

coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the

Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary

launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This

gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft.

The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well

coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could •

offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient

to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any

desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence

of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combina-

tion of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in

the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.

Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive

weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe

that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States

or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may

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or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack

of conclusive evidence.

It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of

provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and

present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlanti.

Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the

smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery.

Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons,

grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter.

Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced

and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a cen-

trally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace

to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a

base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.

3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the

strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed

In caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these

reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all

strategic weapons are withdrawn.

It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to

the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there 1s

grave apprehension on this score. It 18 agreed that iron-clad assurance of

the complete absence of Soviet strategie missiles in Cuba can come only as a

result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by rellable observers. The

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current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on

the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This

of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.

There is no doubt that there are literallythousands of caves and caverns

in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con-

cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It isalso true

that military activity has been obsarved in connection with these caves. Our

intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact

utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic

missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res-

pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best

be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump.

tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel

were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi-

ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of

hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba,

the danger is clear and obvious.

The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already

been discussed.

4. Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel

Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to

5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first

of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons"

the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba

remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that

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there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also

some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the num-

ber of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected

arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated

their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-

imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we

have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the

matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does

not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction

in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence

that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have

been withdrawn.

C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba

Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence

in Cuba sesamosanna presents to the Americas 1s as follows:

1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and

agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity

to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin

America.

2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been

withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduc-

tion of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet

forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.

3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSRo

4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities

based on Cuba.

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5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originat-

ing from Cuba.

6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict

our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and elec-

tronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States

and the Caribbean.

7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes

Launched against the United States from the Soviet Unión.

8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports

with very little effort.

9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further

reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.

10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin

american countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage

techniques.

11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation!!

Image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability

to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean

if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep.

A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity

of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.

D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion

The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen

to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insur-

gents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the

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Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the Island-wide

evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently

immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper

to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances,

that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the peo-

ple in Cuba, will wither and shrink.

The communization of the younger ele-

ment creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary

psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as

a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of free-

dom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces

standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the

Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to

insurgent forces.

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VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Barring some development which 1s unforeseen at this time, the public

debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic

weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being

maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The

matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the

real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this

hemisphere and that, If we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and

spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be

sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible.

The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may

be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolu-

tionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may

fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist

goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods

and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates.

With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent.

The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to

violent intervention. Whatever Its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is

conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the

purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is

to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them

with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and

noral control of subjugated peoples.

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This aim and goal has already been ahcleved in Cuba. It will be abbieved

elsewhere in Latiz America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We

must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national

self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western

Hemisphere.

The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting

menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever

alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise

the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available

resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that

unhappy island and to Insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised.

The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the

highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that

the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be

eliminated at an early date.

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Mr. Califano

Col Patchell

?

March 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State

SUBJEGT:

Miselle Crisie Section of the President'e Draft Report

to Congreas on US Participation in the UN During 1962

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached drake

bas been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection

to it, subject to the following changes:

Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24."

Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy

Records.

2.

Page 3, Ling 10: Change "12" to "16" and '25"

to "24. " Reason: Accuracy.

Pago 34, Lines 11 and 15: Insert "10" before

word "November,

"s "and observed" before "42," and "ballistie"

before "missiles," Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

mage 31e Wines 15-15: Insert "by December 6*

before

"Ita promise" and "42" before "IL-28, " Eliminate

the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that

all bombers (42 in number) had left, " and subetitute "their

removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by

along-side obsérvation at sea on the decka of the Soviet ships

carrying thema back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional

positive detall, particularly with reference to the Il 28 removal

being based von confirmed observation and not merely upon

information provided by the USSR,

J0953

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MEO

lesitant

Line 9: Inpert Amoro vigilant and" before

"stronger. "

Hepao: Strengthen pelme poins that inersased

awareness

of

Communine duplicity and potential threats

resuited from crisis, particularly in the OAt.

Joseph A, Calliano, Jr.

Special Assistant to the

Secretary of the Armay

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C

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft

Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN

During 1962

TO :

General Counsel

Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and

the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3,

Line 8: Change number "25" to "24. Reason,

Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

20:

Page 3, Line 10: Change "12"' to. "16" and "25" to "24."'

Reason:

Accuracy.

Insert "10" before word

"and "ballistic" before

"missiles.

i Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4.

"Its promise

mise Meet l December 6" before

Eliminate the sentence

"and, by December

6, the US was informed that all bombers 142 in

number.) had left,

and substitute

"their removal being confirmed

by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea

the decks of the soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR.,n

additional positive detail, particularly with

reference to the II-28 removal being based upon confirmed

observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before

"stronger.

Reason:

Strengthen prime point that increased

awareness

of communist duplicity and potential threats resulted

from crisis, particularly in the oas.

arogh 7 Carrace

CARROLL

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DEPARTMENT..OF DEFENSE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT:

Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft

Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN

During 1962

DO :

General Counsel

Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and

the following comments are submitted;

Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason:

Accuracy,

based on official Department of the Navy records.

Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24."

Reason:

Accuracy

Insert "10" before word

"November

"42," and "ballistic" before

"missiles.

" Reason:

Clarity and more accurate detail;

Insert "by December 6" before

*"IL-28

Eliminate the sentence

"and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in

number) had left,"

and substitute

"their removal being confirmed

by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea

the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR.

Reason:

Provide additional positive detail, particularly with

reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed

observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

5 Page 12 Line 9:

Insert "more vigilant and" before

"stronger.

Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased

awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted

from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

JOSEPH F.

CARROLL

Lieutenant General, USAF

Director

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 27, 1963

am

10:40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

i lo

moore D'А

hok at it

tome

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi

dent's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United

Nation's during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to

me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if

you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by

1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Secretary of the Army

Attachment

As Stated

CC:

Mr. Yarmolinsky

Mr. McGiffert

General Carroll (DIA)

Sc 2,490

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OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-104

UNITED

STATES GOVENNMENT

Memorandum

Ai Calitie

TO

: CCA - Nr. Hurwitch

PROM RA - lian 0. Bondon 86

DATE:

March 27, 1963

SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report

To Congress on US Participation In UN During 1962.

UNP, with RA's cooperation, has preparad the attached draft chapter

on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on

US participation in the UN.

Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have

been asked to obtain Defense clearance.

When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about

this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with

the reply that

the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through

CCA channels.

Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly.

as possible as the report 1a now overdue?

ARA/RPA: WGBowdler: 1Jv

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..?:

me. Calilans

March 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Attached is a draft of the missile criais section of the Presl-

dent's Roport to Congress on United States Participation in she United.

Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this roport and sent it to

me for Department of Defense Clearance, I should approciate it if

you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by

1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Signed

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Callinno, Jr.

Special Aestatant to the

Secretary of the Army

Attachment

As Stated

€c:

Mr. Yarmolinaky

Mr. McGulfert

General Carroll (DIA)

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DRAFT PRESIDENT'S REPORE 2962

SOVIET OFFERSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA

Soviet Bulldar

Or October 22, President Tennedy announced to the nation and to the world

the "secret, siift and extraordinamy buildug" by the soviet Undon of offensive

missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to

cope with this threat.: Infornation on the buildup bad been given to the

Prosident the previous Tuesday morning (Detobes 16) and, during the weck that

followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course

of action decided upon, friendly goverments notified and consulted, the

mencers and nachinery of the Organization of Aueriean States (0.A.S.) brougit

into the picture, and Azerican defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and pu

on the alert.

The Fresident revealed that a serious threat against the peace ard

security of the Americas. was being secretly nounted by the Soviet Unlou or

the "imprisoned islend" of Cuba. Sites for mediur range ballistic blesites

(MRBMs) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been

rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were

designed for internediate range ballistic sissiles (IRBHs) capable of.

travelling trice as far and thus posing a nuelear threat to most of the major

cities of the western Homisphore. This urgent transfornation of Cuba Into a

strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an empliest threat

to tha peace and security of the Anoicas in deflance of the Inter-Aneries

Treaty of Rochprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of chis

nation and herisphere,* and the Chuter of the United Nations. This Soviet

action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both

publicly and

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publiely and privataly delivered, that the arns buildup in Cúba would retain

its original dafensive character. Neither the United States nor the world

community, the President enchasized, could tolerate the delibarate deception

and offensive threat represented by the clandestine doployrent of strategic

nucheer weapons.

To neot this threat the United States was taking Imodiately the

following steps: I) to halt the buliduy, a stries quarantine of all

offensive military equirent under shipment to cuba was being initiated and,

should offensive ailitary preparations continue, "further setion will be

justified," 2) the United States declared that 16 would regard any nuclear

missile launched frou fuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by

the Soviet union, requirlag a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet

Union; 3) Guantanano was being reinforced; 4) the Counell of the Organization

of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of

henisphoric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Mations, the

Inited States was requesting an energency meeting of the security Counstl.

Finally, the President called on Chalman Thrushchev to halt and eliminate

this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to

stable ralations between our tuo nacions."

U.So Objective

This was a diffieult and dangerous effort on which te United States

had set out, the President concluded, "ut the greatest danger of all would

be to do nothing." On the military sida,

steps wore taken to strengthen

defenses in the caribbean and to put united States forces in a posture to

apply the quarantine.. The Department of Defense had ordered a31 tours of

duty of lavy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the

/Guantanazo naval

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Guantanana naval base defenges were strengthened; air pover tas built up in

the Southeaster portion of the United States; and military deployuent put

5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, Initially as part of a

Fraining exercise. Follow i resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation

of the Council of the Organization of American States (destribed balor) the

President issued a proclanation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of

10 AoM. on October 24. The Departient of Defense ordered the Interdiction

of 25 Soviet merchant vesaels known to be headed for cuba, At & Aol. on

October 25 the fingt interception of a soviot ship, the oll tanker Busbarest,

took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels

heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a contrabandocarrying

vessel occurred during the Cuba affair.

Fros the beginning it was clear that In the political and diplonatic

reala U.S. policy bad tuo inmediate tasks. The firat and most prosinaca

task of U.S. diploney was to show that the soviets had ip fact used guile

and deception to euplace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence

was conclusive.. The second was to halt further shipmanly and bring about

rapidly and effectively the renoval of the offensive weapons, under lodg

supervision, before the quarantine could ba liPtod. The United Statos was

prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formalae but not

to abandon this goa.

Fron the start, boththe Organization of American States and the Unlied

Nations wore involved. Resources and institutions of this henisphere ware

used to undorline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet

Union that olinination of the offensive weapons uas a purpose to which the

hensphore tas solidly colited. Froa the start, too, it was clear that

Ithe United Nationg

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the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forma in which the

evidence of Soviet guilt could be nost convincingly exposed to a vorld-vide

audieace, torid opinion nobilized, and the world vardict pronounced. It was,

also, a ready and efficient nechanism for diplomatie comuniestions. The

United Nations served as a site where Tos. and Soviet negotiatoss could

castly anet. the Secretary-Goneral hiavoll supplied an important linis

between the parties paricularly during the first days when tension was

highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevonted their employment, the Unitod Nations

proved itsolf willing and able to devise acceptable nechanisms for inspection

and verifleation of disantling and renoval of the offensive weapons and for

safeguards against their reintroduction, Te Unitod Nations was also prepared

to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simitaneously with

the

Prosident's spesch, therefore, the United States took diplosatic steps to

set in sotion the palitical machinery of the 0.A.S. and the U.M.

DoA. So Aetion

In Washington the U.S. Reprosontative on the Counell of the Organization

of American States. (C.0.A.S.) sent a note to the Aeting Chalan requesting

the immediate convocation of the Council as a provisional Organ of Consultation

under Article 6 of the Interomerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistanco (Rio Ireaty).

This articlo provides for imediate consultation on neasuros to be taken for the

poson defence and for the mirtenance of peace and socurity of the Continent

shon "the inviolability of the integrity of the territory of the sovereignty

pa political independence of any Amerlean States should be affectod by an

assression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continantal confliet,

or by any other fact on situation that night endanger the peace of Anarica."

/The DoAoS.

725209

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The O.A.S. Couneil net on the morning of Detober 23. Secrotary of State

Dean Fust slüting as the U.S. Reprosentative deseribed the nature of the threat

to this honisphere and the cour: rossures unich the United States considered

16 essontial for tbe interomerican systen to take.. He stated thairhe Soviet

intorvention in this honisphere with najor offencive weapons challengos as

never before the determination of the American Governments to earry, out

honispheric commitrents solemuly assued in inter-imerican treaties and

resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the

honisphore against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed

that undor the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ or Consultation,

vIthout delay "call for the immediate dismiling and vithdrawal fron Cuba

of all nissiles and other weapons of offonsive capability and ... recomend ...

that the nonber statos of the Organisation of American States tire the

Decessary measures to east tet cuba does not continue to recalve additional

offensive weapons ... and 11 necessary to prevent the offonsive capacity already

acquired by the castro regius fron boing used to destroy the peace and security

of the benisphere. "

The Soerstary noted that the United States was sisultangously asking

the U.I. Security Council to act in the natter. He observed: The threat

1s to our henisphero and ve have primamy responsibility and duty to act as

wo ara not doing, as a henisphero. Bui the threat originates fron cutside

the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental pover unich

challenges our inter- Anerican commitments ... ba dealt with in the forun in

which that pover participates. It 1s therefore fluting in this ease thai the

Security Council of the United Nations bo requested to call upon this monter

/to rotrain

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to refraia iron his aggressive actions against us and seet to enores upon

him its decisions.

Neanwhile, without avaiting the outeone of the United

Nations approach, it mus' ensure that our herisphere is sffectively

quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military

power in our aidot."

Following a genoral discussion of the danger confronting the heuisphere

the council votad 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstainod for lack of instructions) to

constitute itsall provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (G.O.A.S./0.6.).

Thon, at the suggestion of the V.S. Ropresentative, the Organ of Consultation

adjournod for several hours to pornit a number of dalogations to sonsult their

governants and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the

United States to deal with the throat confronting the hemisphere.

Th Organ of Consultation roconvenud that sano afternoon. Debate contared

on the drait resolution. As each ropresentative spoke, It becase evident that

the Anorican republies vore solidly united in thoir detormination to resist

this most dangerous throat tothe peace and security of the henisphera....A fou

delogations voro soc in a position to vote afrimatively on certain provisions

of the rosolutions attributable for the most part to donostle constitutional

•considerations, but when the resolution as a tnole was put t0 a vote, the support

was unanimous, In ons of the historic docisions of the inter-Angrican syste

the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the umediate dismantling and

withdrawal fron Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive

capability," and (2) rocomonded that "the nonbar states, in accordance with

articlos 6 and 8 al the Interomerdean troaty of Reciprosal Assistance, take

all measures, irdividually and callectivoly including the use oi armed force;

Junich they

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which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Goverrment. of Caba cannot

continue t0 receive fron the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related

supplies which nay threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to

prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability fron ever beconing

an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution

2150 expressed "the hose that the Security Council will, in accordance wich

the Resolution introduced by the Undted States, dispatch United Nations

observers to Cuba at the earliest noment."

Following the meeting of the council of the Organization of American

States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained

In the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy Issued

the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of oflensive weapons

and associated material to Cuba, to conmence at 10:00 Ault. Eastern Standard

Time on Octoker 24, The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense

"shali

take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited

material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States

in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American

states." The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or

restricted zores and prescribed routes and declared that "any vesse). or craft

which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to

dentify insali, lts cargo, equipment ard stores and its ports of call, to

stop, to lie to, to submit to visid and search, or to proceed as directed."

Any vessel thas refused to comply with directions night be taken into

custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except

in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or

/regulations

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rogulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communirate with the

vessel or craft, or ia self-dolense.

In the days imediately following, tualve othor Amorican ropublies offered

assistance in support of the quarantine opsration: Argentina, Dosinican

Republic, Venezuela, Costa Ries, Colcabia, Ecuador, El Sairador, Quaterala,

Faiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicarague. Several of these offers ineluded naval

units, postag the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on Hoverber 5,

the C.O.A.S./0.C. rocounsaded that the contributing manber statas take among

thonsalves the technical reasures nacassary to establish an effielent and

coordinated action. Pursuant to this recommendation, the govermonts of Argartina,

the Dorinican Republle and the United States on November 9 notified the

C.Ó.A.S./0.C. of the establishment of an Inter-Azerlean Coablzed Quarantine

Force into which they vere integrating their rospoctive nava.. units and placing

officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commandor of the

Combined Quarantine Force.

Seeurity Council Consideration

Simultanepusly with the call for a neating of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador

Adlal Stevenson in New York raquested the President of the Security Council

that month the Soviet Representative en to fall an urgent sooting of the Counell

*Ep deal with the dangerous threat to the poses and security of the worid caused

by the secrat pstablishasat in Cuba by tho Union of Soviet Socialist Republies

of launching bases and the installation of long rango ballistie alssiios capable

of carrying thermonuclear warheads to nost of loith and South Anepica." "he

United States," he urote, "nou has Incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.s.R.

has been installing 1n Cuba & uhole series of facilities for launching offensive

rueloar sissiles and other offensive weapons and installing tho veapons theaselves."

The establishent

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Tho establishsont

of these bagas, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "roastitutas

a grave threat to the peace and security of this bealsphere and of the unole

world," It should be the purpose of Security Counell action, he concluded,

•to bring about the innediato dismantling and vithdrawal of the Soviet

missiles and other offensivo weapons in Cuba, under the sucervision of United

Nations observers, to make it possible to lili the quarantine which is being

pat into elfoct." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to

confer with the Soviat Union "on neasures to renove the existing throat to

tho secarity of the wester. Honisphare and the peace of the worid."

Ambassador. Stovenson transmitted a draft resalution which called for the

modiato dismantl.ing and withdraual fron Cuba of all uissiles and other

offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to cuba of a U.lla ooserver

corps to assure and report on complianes ulth the resolution. The resolution

oalled for an end to the US quarantine of military shipmants to cuba when

the above toras mro complied uith and recommanded that the United States

and the U.S.S.R. "eoafer promptly on mossuras to remove the existing threat."

The Security Counell held fow metings on Detober 23, 24, and 25. By

the tino the first sooting opened on the afterzoon of October 29, the Soviet

Union and Cuba had introduced two paralial letters to the Prosident of the

Security Connell making similar roquests for an urgent neeting of the Counti

in an atteupt to change the focus of the question. They contended that u.S.

countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real

threat to peace in the caribbean. Under Rule 37 of tho Council's provisional

ralos of procedure, the cubar Representalve sas invited to participate in the

discussios of the sitter before the Security Council.

/ Ambassado:®

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• 10 .

Ambassador Stevonson's opening spooch put the issue in the porspsetize

of soviet postotar aggrassive expansionisa. He traced the "vast plan of

piecemeal aggrassion" and the basic drive to abolish the worid of the

Charter" which had characterized Soviet poliay in the post var years and' wnich

had not been altored by the presont Soviet Goverment. Contrasting the

history of Soviet empansionis and sojortion of the principles of ihe Charter

with the United States rocord of loyal, support for the Organization and "the

world of the charter," Ambassador Stevenson regrottod that some araberg

"sested to bellove that the cald var is a private var bettoes tuo great supar

powers®"

"It is not a private struggle," ho insisted, "It 1s a world civil

war s a contest beturen the pluralistio world and the monolithic sorid o a

contest betroan the world of the Charter and the world of Comminist contoraity."

"Tho Castro raging," he pointed out, "has aided and abatted an Invasion of this

hemisphero" and "has given the Sorlet Union a staging area in this healsphere"

by inviting tan extra-continental, anti-deroeratic and expansionist povor into

the boson of the Anerlean fanily" and by making itsall "an accomplice in the

cosmunist enterpise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued,

had secretly transforaed Cuba into a forsidable uissile and strategie airbase!

armed with the deadliest, nost far-reaching nodern nuelear weapons, in an

attempt to put all the Averleas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the

"Soviet diploacy of blacimail." The day al forbearanco 1s past, he conciudad.

"If the United States and the other nations of ins bostern Heisphere should

accept this nou phase of aggrossion, le soald bo dolinguant in our obligations

to world peace." He could not belleve that the Soviet leadership had deluded

Itsal? into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its

pover, and ie voiced the lope that the Soriets would eall an end "to this now

/phase of

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phase of aggrassion. "

He urged the Courcil to call for the leediate ulthdraval

of soviet missiles and other offensive weapons fron Cuba.

Asbassador Stevenson than inforaad the Security Council, In accordance

with Articlo 54 of the charter, that the Counell of the O.h.S. bad adopted a

• resolution by 19 affirative votes (as notod above) calling for the dimentling

and vithdrazal of the offensive weapons, recolending that nesber, states of the

Oohos. take all roasures to ensuro that the threat was ronoved fron the

continents and exprossing the hope that the Security Connell will dispatch U.N.

observers to cuba at the earliest norent."

Ambassador Stevanson thus made thres polats before the Security Couneil.

which defined the theass for the debate during the rest of the week.

(1) The Sorlet astion in sending thousands of militany technielans to

Its puppot in the Wastern Henisphere, supplying fot bonbors capabie of dalivering

nuclear weapons, installing missiles espable of carrying nuclear wurheads and

proparing sites for additional misgiles with a range of 2, 200 ndles, and doing

those things through decolt and under the cloak of secreey, were in defiance

of the security comitronts of the Organization of Aeriean States ard in

violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contaired a nanifest threat

to this hemisphere and to the whole world.

(2) The action and policy of the United States in this matter vere in

consonance with the Voll. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the

organization of American Statos.

(3) The Security Council should ronove the throat by esiling, as the

recolution proposed, for the irrediato dismantling and tithdraval Ir03 Cuba

pê a1l nissiles and all offonsive weapons; authorizing and requesting the

Secrateryolenaral t0 dispatch to Cube a ll.N. observer coups to assure and

troport in

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roport in coupliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the

quarantize upon U.N. certification of such copliance; and urgently rescumending

that the united Statos and the Soviet Undon confer promptly on macuros to

renove the misting threat to the security and the peace of the world and

roport therein to the Security Council.

Fallowing Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet

Reprosentatives sade their initial statesents. The Cuban Representative,

Fo Garcia-Inchanstegui, denounced the naval "Poshade" as an "act of wan

and declared that the Cuban people had answored the "arned attack? with

genoral nobilization. He asted the Couneil to eall for the imediase

vithdraval of all troops, shigs and planes deployed on the approaches to

Cuban shores, and for the cossation of all "Intervontionist peasuros.

The

Cuban Representative also contended that the United Statos had no right to

ask for dionantling and disarmanent and that logleally, U.f. observers should

ba sont to tha J.S. bases fros which invaders and piratos energo to punion

and harass a small state.". He insisted that Cuba Pulll not secept any kind

of observers in ratters which fall althin our domestic jurisdiction."

The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the united

states charges more "a elmay attempt to coves up asgrossive declousa la caba.

He deseribed the U.S. quarantino 23 & "neu and extranaly dangerous set of

aggrossion" and as "undisguised piracy." Daring this first encoater, untle

avoiding diresi roforence to the prosence of soviet missiles or bostors in

Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that securaticas that the Soviet Union had

"set uy offensive armaments in Cuba" vere false, and olficially confirsed the

statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, "that the Soviet

Govoront has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive amnamonts.*

He also recalled the statanant of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs

/Ardrel Cresy$O

HH

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Asdrol Cronyto In the Ganeral Assemaly Just a month previously (Septeaber 21, 1962)

that "any sobor minded sou known that Cuba is zot .. building up her fores to

such a dogree that ahe can pose a threat to the united States ... or also a

throat to any state of the Hostern Leaisphore. "

Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published

by the soviet Goverwant that day which addrossed a "serious warning to the

Untred States Goramant, to advise it that, is earrying out the seasures

announeed by Presidont Kenody, it 19 taling on linall a horvy responsibility

'{or the fate of the worid;" declared that the Soviet Covermont illl do

"everything in its pover to frustrata the eggressive dosigns of U.S.

¡aerialistle circles;" and appealed to all govorments and poples to raise

thoir voleos in protost against the aggressivo sets" of the united Statos aud

strongly to condem sush acts. He introduct a dalt resolution condoning

the "aetions of tho dovermant of to United Statos designed to violate the

Charter of the Unived Nationg and to intensify the tbroat of uur." the Soviet

rasalution insisted that the United States

"rapeal its declalon on the control

of ships of other states going touards the shoros of cuba, " and called upon

she Unitod Statos, Cuba, and U.S.Sl. "to establion contacto and cater taio

isgotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thoreby renoving

the threat of var."?

At tha requast of the Representative of Chana the sectiug tus adjourned

to iza pollening norning so that sopresentatives night consult tire other

colegations outside the council.

D2O EsEd MOrarE Detober 24

The nerd noring, the Socurity Commell heard the Representative of

Vonezuela, Mr. Sosa-Rodriguoz, associate the Intin American nations with the

action taxon by the united States puromant to the O.A.S, resolution. Ho noted

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that *it has boen proved that the Soviet Inton has set up inCuba rocket bases

thai might doliver melear sissiles to acout 1,000 miles distance, and that,

apparontly, it is at prosont setting up othors for rockons with a range of un

to 2,200 niles." This had created an atmosphero of insecurity aud concor la

tho countries of the Amoriean komischora unich felt theasalves diraculy

throstened by such weapons. The weapons in Cabs, the Venezuolan Reprosentative

emphasized, vero no longer dofensivo but offensive, and "they aro of a magnitudo

that night ba sufficisnt to

Alpa qui any of the Anemoan repullies and drag the

world into the halocaust of auclear var." ls deseriood the apprehension felt

thronghout the continest at Cuban subversive activitios, Including tha

introduction of agonus, propaganda, and weapons io equip grosilla forces in

Anorican repaalies, Ambasgados Sosa Rodriguaz reesiled the recalution adopted

by the Organization of Anarlean States and declared that he uas spoaking for the

entire continent in asking the Security Connell to take sensaos to stop nuclear

soapons fron arriving la Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of

anchoar sockets in Cuba disnantles.

Sir Patrick Dean, Reprosentative of the United Kingdos, noted that by no

stratch oven of the Soviet inaginatica could a nuclear missile with & range of

2,200 miles la Cuba ba called defensive, a recalled assurancos on this point

By Foreign Minister Arcyto and Prosidont Dorticos of Caba aû the Ouroral

Assembly the previeus sonth. while the Sovict Governant sore acting tbeii

11o, " ho stated, *ho orders vere being gives, plans laid and properatios

boing made los the supply of missiles to Caba. Hao ern possibly ballove in

tho honosty of the Sovlot Covernment's intentions in these eiramtancos?"

Ite United Kingdo, ho concluded, considered that the united Statos seted

proporly by coning to the Security Corneil at the first possible sonal. Nou

the Securly Council must take ismediate and urgent steps to restore confidence

/in the western

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In the Western Featsphere by having these offensive nissiles distartled and

withdras. The Jited Kingdo fully supported the U.S. resolution before the

Conacil.

The Reprosentative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position.

TRO Irish FOreiga Minuter, Ir. Alken, underlirad world concora with the

groath of Soviet intervencion in Cuba. He appreelated Cuban consora siti 1ts

sational security, "out it is a for ery from that to a milliary buildup of the

kind snich the cuban Governt sou appears to have cabarked ana pite the

essivo assistance of the Soviet Union." Is sould not understam Fly tha

Soriet Union should have chosen this nommt to establish neu nisallo and bonber

bases ca the laland of Cuba?" Tha Fonsig. Minister balioved he persaived some

camon browd in the u.s. stateront to the seeurity Council of October 22 which

declared U.S. pullingness "o confer with to Sorlet Union on seasures to

renove the existing threas to security of the lestora Henisphere," and in the

Soviet draft resolution mich proposed that the united States, VoS.S.Ro and

Cuba establish contacts and enter into segotiatione.

The Secrity Courel? reconvened that evening, sone forty-eight hours

aitor providont Kennedy's historie spees.

The naval quarantine bad gone lato

offeet at 10:00 At that morning. Menbors Ineu that sf a Soriet ship attesoted

to run the guarantin the rosuld tould bo serious. they aigo knew that the

Prosident had imaicziod that the quarantino mas an "imodiate stept unieh

woald be folloued by "furcher setion" 18 the Soviet missiles nore not renoved.

At this mooting the Corucil heard stateronts by those norters uno had not

Jot sochon: France, China, Chile, United Aral Republic, asd Chan. In

edition to ensessions a support for tho loS, resolution by Franca and Quiza,

the highlights of the morting varo the statement of Chile, the laited Arab

/Regablse Chann

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Repshlle-Chang "restraint resolation," and te first foral intarcation oi

¿ho Secretary-lenoral. Ambasnador Seydoni, the lepresentativa of Praneo,

nored that "ho appearanco of foreiga nuclear missiles on Cuban z01l...eanaot

Do considered as ottor than a sorious inlilative ained at croating a nau mu?

frost in a region nich up to sou has beon fros frow such thraats." no stated

that tha vos. had denostrated alearly that li is sealing a pascaral solution

1s cocardana mii sho Canor de the tripod Dationa and bas the solution

proposed by tho u.s. vas destrablo la the intorest of the countrios cuernod

and sin ordor to banish once and for all ths dangers with which world pance

1s threatened by tha rocent dovalopents in Cubs." Abbassador Ill, for the

Remblle of Chins, noted that it sas particularly disturbing to sea bana

transiorad, so a result of siro soniet intereation, into an arned base for

cosinist ponstration of the norieas. He declared that the neasuros initlated

by the balted statos dovigasd to call an imodato halt to ta all prent al

military satorial to Cabs tra justified and supported the U.S. draft

rosolstios as a seasonable and peaceral solution.

spacking for Chile, Ambasseror Seholtzer endoracd the ssomity urasures

al the regional syston al exprassed suyport for the U.s. draft resalution.

Ho walconed the anthorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the

secrotary donoral do dispatch an observer corps to cuba, "malortunataly," ho

sald, the Representative ol lubs yesterday rejeeted this ides.

At 328h g

docisive nonent as this, la ballove labe should trust the mothods of the united

wetions for putting out the flares of conflict and for enturing poes. one

suss authed could be to csure the united letions prescice in 1 zona 01

No make a fervont and hoarfelt appeal to Cuba to accept sach

2 procedure. "

/the Talted Arab

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The mited Arab Revablle Repressatatire, Et. Mahrowd Ried, stelared that

bis country "camoì condono the milateral decision of the United Statos of

Amarion to esercise the quarantine" taich ho cbractorizod as costrary to

internaticoal lau nad likely to incrensa sorid tension. He rocalled that

Ir. Dorcicos had laid the donoral Assectly thnt the reapons Cuba had sequired

More "dolcasive in satura" and called la. Somalization" of rolations batecon

Cuba mod the Maitod States.

At the same time he seaffirzed Jalal. policies

against the spread of nuclear sapons. He migod all parties to refrala fro

sensiongevating aotion and ealled for pogotiaticar. The Charia

Representative, Mr. Qualoon Sashey, loos & similar position, stating that ho

bad so "incoatrevorialo proofo..as to tia ollensivo charactor of allitary

devoloments in Cob" and thorefore could not condone the quarantine. He also

enled for nogollations to resalve the srinis on the basis of artarl, respact

for sovereign rigtts." Tha U.hol.-Chans Joint draft resolution roguented tha

secratary-Conoral "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned ou

InoRinto stops to ba taken tO rouse the coting tront i0 vosle pondo, and

to sorealize the sitation in the Carishuangs and called on the partles

concerned to comply lorthulth with tho resoltic, to provide evory assistance

to tha Secratary Conral, and to refrain meanuntle frch any setion wich nay

dirsctly or Indirectly lurthor aggravato tho situstion," The formla proposed

uns thus linited to a general apporl for uriation by the Secratory Qoral,

but provided neither for tho suspensios of the Soviet olfensive bulleu sor

for D.N, involverant In Inspsetion and veritication.

E Thant Fropozal Of Ostoner 24

At tbo eloso of the notingo the Secratary boneral revealed thst he had

just addresses

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juot addrossed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy amd Chatren Barisheker

which proposed "ho voluntary susporatca of all ars shipsonts to Cuba, and

also the volesatary suspensics of ise quaraning nonures involving the searching

of shine bored for Crha." That ballevel that suan volmtary suspendion fos a

period of tuo to thron tects unla frontly case tha altuation and givo tire to

tha parties to froat and dluousa." No clforea to "nako sysell available to

:all partles for uhatover services I my be able to porfora."

In addition to this appeal to president Fennedy and Presior Mmsncier,

the semotamy-tonoral took the uncasion of the security Comes seoking to

address an urgent appeal to the President an Premier of Cuba, declarag that

alt would also contributo grasily to the sana end 11 the constrnetica and

devalopment of major mllitary faullities and installation in tube ucuid be

suspendad during the period of nogotlat1ons." He then apporled to "tho parties

concerned" to entor into negotiations immunataly, "ever this nigtt."

imesrective of other proceduros, with the first subjoot to be dissassed being

tha "nedalities" to sobiovo his suggestions. Sigalfleazi la U Trontos Intorvention

wore his offer to make himall available to U.S, and Soviet ragonlators for

vatever services" he night perfore and the conerato suggestion for "suspensio

al soviet arms shimonto and of the contruction and covalopposi of sajor

military installations in erchange so sho suspansica of the guarantino.

she nest day, president lendy's sonly rennded the secretary donoral

ches tha tarest sas created by the coerot intrauction of offensive vespous.

Jato Cuba, and the mesor lies in tha renoval cê sush tcapoas.?

Ins Prosidon"

anice that sha secratarjateneral herinade certain suggostions ando. lavited

malinnary talks to detaine unether satisfactory arrangests can to

abstrcan and incleated that "Anbassador Stoveason is rosdy to decuss promptly

/these

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thoso arrangerents ulth you" prosier Harashcher's reply veidoned U fhant°a

intlarivo and charasterized the situation "as highly dangerous and calling

for tho immediato intarvantion by the United Hations. "

When ths Security Concil recanvased Thursday alteracon for what proved

to bo tão last Poral acotiag on tho Cuban erisis, Ambassador Stevenson

valeoned both the course adopted by the soviet union the previcus cor to

avoid direet confrontations ii the nine of quarantin and the report that

Mr. Khrachcher bad agned to the proposals savaneed by the Scerotary deneral.

Nevertheless, the situation renined serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the

thomo in his opening renark by inviting the Council to addross Itself 10 ache

realllios of the sitution posed by the buildup of nuelear giriting power

in Crae9."

Assonasador Stevenson eautioned the Conell not to forget that are arg

hero today. for ora single reason: boease the Soviet Union seerotiy

Introdneed this mencing offonsive military buildug into the Island of Cuba

unile assuring the vorld that nothing ans further fron its thougats."

Alroady the commieto bed attempted to distor too racord by arguing that

Iy uns not the soviet Union wich croated this thisat to pence by secretly

installing these soapons in Cuba, "put that iù vas tha united States unico

15 uho piest firo, I sonloss," the U.S. Ropesentative contimed, -chat I

have over heard lt said that the crime is set tha burglary bat the discovery

of the barglay" Do soled that sato reprosatatives da the foell sey thet

they do not los unother too Sovies Union bas 1a faet built fy Cuba

installations capable of firing marlear missiles over ranges froa 1,000

2,000 miles. Il further donst romained on this seoro the United States mould

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giadly erhibit photographie evidence to prove the truth of the charges.

Ons by 020 Ambassador Stevenson denolished the argements that Arbassador

Zorin had prasented at the first Security Comeil mooting. As for the

Throty five bases in foreign countries" unlet the Soriot Representative bad

matlonad, the fact ung that thare vare sank missilos with the forces of

only thres of our 81l10s m the united kingdos, Italy, and furkey, and that

thors vare established by the docision of Heads of Gorerment in Deceabes 1957

which was eompelled to authorize such arrunguzents by virtue of a prlor

'soviot decision to introduca its ou missilos eapable of destroying the

contrios of Hosters Earope." Way was it savessary for the bestora Hesisthore

pations to not with such apend? The "spied and steaith" of tha soviet

offonsive bailduy in Cuba denonstrated the premeditated atteapt by the Serlot

Union "to confront this harisphere ulth a fait secozpil," Il the united States

had not acted prostly aod had delayed'its counteraction, "the malearization

of cuba would have boen quickly completed." He stressed that the united.

States had soted propily to pat into procoss "the politieal melinery which

so pray will achievo a solution to this gram erisis." The one setion in

tha last fou days unish had strangthened tho peace say the doteranation to

stop this father spread of weapons in this homisphere.

The united States

was nou la the Security Connail, Anbaruador Stevensor, noted, because it

wished the nachinery of the United Nationg "to taire over to reduce those

tensions and to interpose itsair to eliminate this aggrossive throat to

peacs and to ansure the rnoval, frou this honisphere of offensive nuclear

anyons and the correspording lifting of the quarantine."

When Zorin again attenpted to daludo the Comell about the laots of

the sovies offonsire bullduit, a dramatie encountor occurred betuea

/Stevenson and

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stovenson and Zoris, which exposed the trate beyond doubt..

STEVENSOR: Wall, let ne say sonathing to you, fix. Ambaseador: be do

have the ovidance. He have it, and 1t 19 clear and Incontrovertible. And

Let no say sonsthing alsos Thoso sapons mat be taken out of cabs.

Went, let no say to you thet, 11 I understood you, you said a vith a

traspass on erecality that excols your bost on that our position had changed

sines I spoke here the other duy bocanse of the prossaros of vorld opinion

pad a majority of the unitod Nations, Hall, lot no say to you, sir: you

are wrong again. le have had no prossure from anyons whatsoever. to care

hore today to indieste our millingness to dinouss U Phant°s proposals a and

that 1s tho only change that has taken place.

$ .

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a changa. Yoi,

the Soviet Unlos, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soriet Union,

have upset the balance of pover in the world. Yos, the Soviet Union, have

created this new danger so not the United States....

Finally, Mr, Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not dony

the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had sudderly

bacone defensive weapons. But today - again, 1f I heard you corroctly o

you say that they do not exist, or that we have not provod they axist u. and

you say this with another fire flood of rhetorical seors. 1ll right, 31",

Jot me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that

the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing mediun and Intermediato range

missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation.

Yes or hol

ZORIN: I an not in an American courtroon, sir, and therefore I do not

wish t0 answer a question that is put to ma in the fashion ir which a.

prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.

/STEVENSON:

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STEVENSON: You are in the courtroon of world opinion right now, and

you can answer "yos" or "no". You have dented that they erist s ard I

want to know whother I have understood you correctly.

ZORIN: Will you please continue your statenant, sir? You will have

your angie. in due course.

Inasmuch as Zorin dalayed his response, Stevenson proeceded to present

conclasive evidence of the exisionce of Sovlet offensive weapons in Cuba.

This consisted of

a display of enlarged aerial photographs and napa

pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aireraf: and of

Soviet missile bases, complote with launching sises and supporting equipment,

"In short, ail of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these torrible

woapons." When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether

the soviet

Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stavensor challenged the

Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to parmit a UN tean to visit the sites he

had identified in order to authenticato tho evidenca.

The proposal made by the United Arab Rapublis, and supportod by chara,

to posipone further work of the Councti and to adjourn the mosting las

adopted ulthout objaction, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the

UaS.S.Ro to consuit with the Secretary-Gonsral on his suggestions of the

previous day. The Seeurity Council thus adjourad but remained "seized"

of the probley while the parties negotlated. The seena then shifted from the

fomal chamber of the Security Coull to the Infornal chambers of the

Secretary -General.

/Weskend Negotiations:

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Weekend Nogotiato

The Kennudy-Khrushcher lotters

That wekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange oi letters

bottoon Moscow and Washington which transfornad the nature of the Cuba

cricia. On Oetober 26, Khrushchew gent a letter to President Kernedy

making cortain proposala on the ramoval of offengive rapons from Cuba.

"On Cetober 27, another lottor fron Khrushcher, which was bruadcast befors

delivery, also exprossed willingrass to withdraw the weapons but proposed

to link the question of soviet olfonairo weapora in Cuba le the unraladad

1asue of stratagio waspons in Turkey. The USSR would "agrae to renove

fron Cuba thoce means which you rogard an offensive means; re agrae

to carry thie out and made a plodga in the United Nations. Your rapre-

sentative will made a declaration to the effect that the United States

of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the

Sovied State, vill remove 1t3 sinilar neans from Turkey. ..After that

persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check or

the spot tho fulfillment of the plodgo made by elther side," of course.

he added, "the nuthorisation os the Coverumente of Cuba and of Turier

would be necessary for to entry into those countrios of there agsta."

In addition, khrushchow proposed sat te United States and the USSR

rive plodges againat lavacion of Cuba and Turkey respectivoly and solem

promicos to respect the sovereignty and the inviolactlity of the frontiers

of these countries.

This tie-in of Turkay with Cuba was Inadiately refacted by the

United States. A statemnt lssued by the White Howa that day noted

that cevaral Incossistent and contlicting proposals had been made by

tho USSR in the past trenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.

The proposal

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The proposal involvod the socarity of nations outside the Heesem

Hemlophere and 1t was the Woeter Fenisphere nations alone that warg

the subjoct of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of

the United States, the statenent read, was that "as an urgent preliminary

to considaration of any proposals work on the Cuban bages must stop;

offensive weapons must be rendered Inoperable; and further shipment of

offonsive wapons to Cuba must cease » all under gifective Interiasional

verification," As to proposals concerning the security of nations aulsidy

this hemisphore, the statenant concluded, the United States and ita allies

had long taken the lead in seeking properly inepected arma limitation,

, on both sides.

thess afforts could continue as soon as the present soviet

craated threat was ended.

President Kerredy"s letter to Chairnan Khruanchey of the same day

(October 27) roplied to Thrashchaw's letter of Jetober 26.

"AS I read your lotter," the Predident wrote, "he key elemento of

your proposale which saen generally acceptablo as I understand them ara

as follows:

**. You would agree to remove those weapons syutens fru Cuba

andor approprlate V.N. obsarration and aupervision;' and undertake,

with suitable safeguards, to hale the farther introduction of such

weapons systems tate Cuba.

"2. We, on our part, would agree c upon establishnant of adequate

arraugements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out

and continuation of these comitments a (a) to remove promptly

the quarantine masures nou in offoct, and (b) to give assurance

against an Invasion of Cuba, and I am contident that other nations

of the western hemiopher would be prepared do do likewise."

• 17..59>."

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Assuning workosased on offenzire miesile baseg in Cuba and all veapons

systene In Cuba capabie of offensiva use vera rendered inoperable, under

effectivo UN arrangemanis, the Prasident was prepared to have repreventativas

In New York works out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary General

for a permanant solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushcher?g

lotter of October 26.

On Sunday, October 28 - Chairan Khrushcher broadeast the text of

his reply, In addition to earlior instructione to discontinue further work

•on weavens construction alton, he said, the Soviet Goveramant "has given

a not order to dignancle the arus which you described as offenaire, and

do crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The loster stated:

"I regard with respect and trust the statemont you made in yewr

message of October 27, 1962, that there wouid be no alback, no lavasion

of Cuba, and not only on the part of the loited States, but alão on the

part of other natione of the Western Fenistere, as you said in your came

message.

Then the notives which induced us to render assistance uf such

a kind to Cuba disappear.

sIt is for thia reason that wo Instructed our officarg u these asang

a8 I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet

officers o to take appropriate measures to diacontinue conctruction of

the aforementionod facilitios, to dismantle shen, and to raturn them to

the Soviet Union. As I had inforrad you in the leuter of Octobar 27,

we are prapared to roach agroomont to enable United Nations Representativos

to vorify the dismantling of these means.

athus in view of the ascurancos you have givon and our instructions on

dismantling, there is every condition for olininating the prosani confiiet."

/Chairman

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Chairman Khruanchor sent a copy of this messago to U Thant "to enable

you to familiarise yourself with our position, which ve ragard as exhaustive

and unich will help you to discharge your noble functions." At the sama

ting, he inforned the thized Stated and the United Nations, that in connection

sith the nagotiations l thant was corducting with reprasentativos of the ussR,

the Unitod Statos, and Cubs, the Sovist Governunt was sending First Deputy

Foreign Minister V. V. Kunessor to You Work to help U Thant in his sobie

efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation."

Prosident Ronnedy repliod at once to the broadeast nessage of October 28

even before the official text reached hin, and walconed it as "an important

contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:

"The distinguished efforts of Acting Secrutary-Goneral & Thant

have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to

you of October 27 and your raply of today as firm undertakings on

the part of both our goverments which should be premptly carriod

out. I hope thut the necessary measures can at once be taken taroligh

the United Nations as your messaga days, so that the United States

in turn can ramove the quarantine masurga nou in effect. I have

alroady made arrangements to raport all those matters to the

Organization o1 Anerican Statos, those norbera shara a degy Interast

In a genuine pesco in the Caribbean area."

»I agrao ulch you, " the prosident concluded, that we must devote

urgent attention to the probion of disarmament. ..I think ue savuld

givo priority to quections ralating to tha proliferation of nuclear

mapons, on earth and in enter space, and to the great effort for a

/nuclear test ban.

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nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see 1f wider

measuros of disarmament can be agreed and put into oparation aù an

early date.

Ino United States Government will be prepared to discuss

these questions urgently, end in a construetiva spirit, at Geneva

or olsechere."

A. U.S. statement lewed the sane day weleoned the Khrushcher response

and stated:

we shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United

Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the paace in the

Caribbean arsa."

Weokend Nogotiations In New York

Meannile steps continued in Neu Jork to rasch agreement on prectical

means of aroiding conflict au

sos and on arrangements to carry out the

Secretary General's suggaction for stopping work on the offenaive bases and

serening further ahipmenta as condidlons of susponding the guarancine.

The 1n1tial sim of the Secretary General was to avoid an ineident at

88a. What concerned him most, he had uritton on October 25 to Chairnan

Khrushcher, was that a confrontation at sea batween Soviet ships and United

States vageals "would destroy any possibility of the discusalons I have

suggestod as a prelude to nogotiations on a poacsful settlonent." Re

thorofore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed

to stay away fron the interception area for a limited time in order ito

permit diacuasions of the modalities of a possible agreenent." The next

day (Detober 26), the Secretary-Ceneral addreased a parallel letter to

Prosident Kennacy, Inforning him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchey

and requesting that instrations may bu isaued the United States vessels

in tha Caribbaan to do evarything possible to avoid direct confrontation tita

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Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an

outward lncident." He expressed the further hope that such cosparation

could be the prelude to a quich agreement in principle on the basis of

which the querantine rasures could be called off as soon as possibla...

Frenier Khrushcher accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of

sorat vossels bound for Cuba.. to stay out of the interception aroa, as

yon roconnand." President Kennedy walconed U Thant's efforts for a

satlofactory solutibn and stated that 1l the Soriot Goverment accepts

and abides by his reguast that Sovlet ahips already on their uay to Cuba

stay out of the interception aras during the period of preliminary discuesione

"you may ho assured that this Governant will accopt and abide by your

roguest cat our vossols in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid

diroct controntation with sorot ships in the nest fow daya in order to

mininize the risk of any untoward incident'" At the same time the Fresident

underlined that this wes a matter of great urgency in few of the fact

that certain Soviet ships vere still proceeding touard Cuba and the

Intercaption aroa.

Screening Shipsanta

As the thite fouss statenant on October 27 made clear, the urgent

preliminary to the considaration of any proposals for s solution was that

work on the Cuban bases stop, the offonsive reapons be rendered inoperable,

and further shipent of suapone to Cuba mist cease--all under effective.

intomational verification. After that mans must bo found to get the

missilos and other offensive weepens renoved and their removal verified and

to inetitute adequate safoguards against their rintroduction.

/Tha innediate

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The triodiate concern af the negotiators in New York, during the

initlal phase, was to work out a syston for inconing shipmente to ensure

that no further offoneive weapons were being introduced.

The UN asked

the Intomational Conmittee of the Red Crose (ICRO) to

gerve as its agent

In Inspecting inconing vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapona

were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for

about one month

and would be entrasted to sone thirty inspectors wich

th9 ICRC vould undertake to rocruit. Mr. Paul Ruegger, former president

Of thO ICRC, arrivad in New York early in November to discuss with the UN

whother and under what circunstances the ICRC could undertake this task.

In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the IChC

pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only wiüh

the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned." The statement

issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the

ICRC would be bazed on previoue concent being given by the three states.

concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in lutura

discussions.

Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed

schore. Before final arrangenents could be made 1t was, in any erent,

realized that the systen envisaged would no longer be roquirad and that

the Inited States and other countries of the Weston Hemisphera could rely

on other means, ineluding air survillance, to guard agalpst new shipments

of offensive weapons.

Fevans Talks

The main obetacle to prograne on establishing the conditions for a

cobalement was the attitude of the Cuban governnent.. On October 26 U Thant

Jurote Prime Minister

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wrote Prime Minister Castro renoving his appeal that he (Castro) direet thai

sche construction and development of major military facilities and

Inatallations In Cuba, and eapocially installations deeigned to launch

nodiu-range and interned ato range balliotic miasilee, ie suaranded

during the period of ngotiations nich ara no underway."

De. Castro's reply cane the nest day and proved to be a hedged accept

ance. He rejected "the presumption ol

the thited States to determine what

action ve are entitled to take within our couiry, what kind of arma wa

consider appropriate for

our defense,

Cuba was prepared to accept "the

compronisos that you request as elforts in fevor of peace, provided that

aù the sama ulne, unile nogotistions are in progreas, the United States

Coveramont docats from threats and aggrossive actions against. Cuba,

Including naval bleckade of the country." Read literally, De. Castro vas

saying that ho would consider the auspension only at the price of ending

the quarantino. At the same tine, his latter contained anothor note:

"..Should you consider it warul to the cause of peace, our government

would be glad te roceive yon in our country as Secretary-General of the

United Nations, with a ver to direet dismasions on tha prosent crisia."

" Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept

tho suggestion ha had made provided the Taired States Covarment "desista

from throats against Cuba including the naval blockade" while negotiations

were in progress. He accepted te invitation to visit Cuca early in the

soning took o. and to "asing a for aides with re to leave sone of shen bahind

so continue our common effort towards a poaceful solution of the problen."

To facilitate his tast the United States had agreed to suapend its naval

guarantino and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's Visit to

/Havana.

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Havana. At this point, the united Nations was worlding on

the assumption

that tha vialt to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of

V.i. observation and inapoction and "noclorocal wasuros to assure the

poace in the Caribbean."

The Isaue was further clouded by Castro?& "statement of conditions"

Jesued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of rich President Komedy

speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not erdot vithout the elimination

2180 of the naval blockado," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of

the following matures:"

1. End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial

and economic pressure" exercised by the United States againet

Cuba;

-2. End of "all cuboveraire activitiosi and the organization or suppor

* of invasions;

3. End of "pirate attacky" from bases in the United States and

Puerto Rico;

L. End of "lolations of air and naval spaces by the United States;

5. United States ithdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and 1t3

This statoment of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated

1t3 Intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the

Havana talke.

Tant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier Caneral

Rikbye and a anall milltary staff, flew to Havana on Detober 30 and held

talke with fuban loaders that day and sho next to arrange for U.N.

superviaion of renoval of the olfensive weapons and to diseuss the other

nodalities for carrying ont the Kennedy-Khrushcher agreement of October 27-28.

/Although general

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Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should

participate in settlemont of the Cuban crista and the talla were characterized

as "fruitiul," the Cuban authorities balled at all proposale for v.N.

inspection of usapons removal and safeguarde against their reintroduction.

Ponder Castro reitarated the five demands he had made in his October 28

statenant. Those demands vere obulouly beyond the scopa of che,

Sacretary-Uneral's purpose in negotiating with the Cubane, and no agreement

was reached.

The Sacretary-Ceneral and his party returned to New York the next day,

where, it was understcod; talke betwen the Socretery-Goneral and Cuban

raprosentativos would continue. Pronder Caatre, hovever, did atase that he

would not interfore ulth the Soret roneval of the miesiles. The missiles

aro "net ours, he said in a radio smooch on Noverber I in wich he

reportod on his talks with l mant, but ho rojected any for of international

inspection on the vliadraval of Soviet wapons. He specifically turned

down a propusal that the International Coumitted of the Red Cross (ICRC)

carry out the inspection tast. He aleo rejeeted other foras of UN inspection.

On Friday, November 2, Soviet Firat Deputy Framier Anestal I. Miloyan

arrived in fou Yolk on his way to Havana and isued a statement supporting

Prender Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regina.

Sarveillance and Dismantling Continued

then U Thant left Havana ulthout a mtually satisfactory formila,

Preeidont Kennedy ordered resusption of the quarantine on shipping to

Cuba and authorized roguption of close aerial surveillance of the island

to deterrine unother disnantling or Soviet missile basos was proceeding

as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of Hovenber 2, the

/President reported

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Prosident. reported in a short television and radio brosdeast that the

"Soviet missile bases ars being dionaniled, the missiles are being

crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The

President said the information was based on aeriai photographs and added

ünst the Undted States intended to lollow closoly the completion of this.

work through various means, including aerial auveillance, until man equally

satisfactory Intomational means a voritication 1a affected, i'

He also

said thas intlo the quarantine romaired in effect, he was hoperul that

adequate procedures could be doveloped for international inspection of

Cuba-bound cargoes.

Ins International Conmittee of the Red Cross could be

san appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspoetion.

Now York Nogotiations:

Verification and IT,288

manhile, talke proceeded in Neu Yor' betwean Anbassador Stevenson

and f. John I. NeCloy for the United States and Dsruty Foreign linister

Kunetsor, for tha Soviet Union. Apam from worlang ouù the datails or

the schons for ICRC Inspection of inconing shipments (deseribed sbove), tha

nagotlators spant the nest three weeks in considering to main 138ue3.

Until Novenber 12 the contral concom at the negotiatore was to make sure

that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satia

lactory ayaten for vorification that dismantling and renoval kad in fact

taken placo. Associated with this was ths probion of longor-term safes

guarda against the reintroduction or orfensive wapons.. Fron Lovember 12

to November 20 tha focus of negotiation shirted to the problem of removai

of tho Soviet Il-28 bonbers from Cuba.

On vorification, It was clear that what the President had termed

"an equally satisfactory international means of verification. requirod an

adequate UN ayaten of ingraction to male sure that the olfonsin waapons

had In fact

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had in fact been ramoved, to guard against hiding, and to preveni

reintroduction of such marons. Various schenes

were considered

and the ISSR made clear 118 tilingness to have Ull verification take place.

Castro adamantly rafused to accept any fora of verification in Cuba by the

ON or under its auspiced for ramoval of the weapons. US regotiators

continuod to malia it clear to the Sovies negetlators that Us aerial

surelllance would continue so long as there was no adequate UN syaten of

inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent

¿o UN inspection or verification of shigents fren his ports, the negotiators

turned to derring a system for IS inopection at sea of outgoing ships

carrying the disnantled misalles. The US naval vossels would come "alongaide"

departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a usy as to enable

the Us vessals to sea and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid

prograss was nede in dismantling and loading the missiles and by lovenber

the iS had counted la departing miestles by this procedure. Falling UN

verification and safogards, the US continued its own systen of surveillance.

under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons

were not reintrodecod.

On November 12, with the missiles removed, the us negotiators

took up again the question of the ramoral of Il-28s and made it clear

that the vited States could not considor lifuing the quarantine ontli

the barbera vore withdraws. The Soviets elained they had fulfilled their

part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and wore

pressing' for I1iling of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge.

The us position was that the bombers vore defined as offensive

weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they.

...*.

were included as

:744

5, 49,

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wore included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushcher exchange of Oetover 27-28.

The United States made is clear that it could not consider lifting the

quarantine until the Soviots agreed to remove the Il-2ôs within a shot time.

Partial Settlemant:

November 20

On Novembar 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that 1f the Soviets wiened

to samero the berbers he trould not objact. That day an agraement was reached

botween Kennedy and Khrushchew under wnich the Il-20s would be withdraw.

" Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenion and Deputy Foreign

Minister Kuznetsov. Soviot agreement to remove the bambers payad the way

for the llfting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just

four wacks to accomplian.

At his press conference thai evaning, Preeident Kennedy announced

that ho had that day been iniorned by Chairman Khrushcher that all of the

II-28 bombers in Cuba would ba withdrawn in thirty days, and that thase

planas could ke observed and counted as they departed. "Inasnuch ae this

goas a long way towards reducing the danger thich facod this homsphere.

four wecks ago," the presidont announced, "I have this afternoon instructed

¿ho Secratary of Dafonse to lift our naval quarantino," The President

then recalled the agreonent he had reached with Chairman Khrushcher

October 2-28, Including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had

complied with all his pledges, a woularenove our paral quarentine and

give assurance againet invasion ol Caba." Evidenco to dato indicated that

a1l known offenaive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and soa

Inspection by the nayy had confired that the missiles had boen withdram.

But, be warned, "'impuriant parie" of the agisement "remain to be carried

out. The Cuban Covemnont has not yet permitted the United Nations to

erity tether ad

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varily unother all orfencive veapons have been ramored, and no lasting

safeguards have yat been established againct the luture introduction of

offendive wapons back into Cuba. *

The United Stases, terofore, had no

choice but to pursue its on nans of chocking on military activities in

Cuba. The Unstod States, he said, ill continue its offorts to achiove

"adequate international arrangemnte for the task of inapection and

verification

of Cube," Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate

safeguards as "an Inspection wnich would provide us with assurances that

there are not in the luland weapons capabie of offensive action against

United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced,"

Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these

were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future.

"As for our part, lf all offensive vespons are ramoved fron

Caba and lupt out of the Fomisphera'in the future, under

adequato verification and saloguards, and if Cuba i8 not uaad

Sor the export of aggressive Camarial purposed, thare ill be

peace in she Caribbean, And, as I said in Sapterber,

"We shall

noither initiato nor permit aggrasten in tais hamisphare. "

Tho United States, ha stressad, would not abandon the political,

econonio, and other efforie to haid subversion from Cuba nor lts purpose

and hope that the Cuban poople shall som day be fully free. "But these

policies are very different fron any Intent to launch a military invasion

of the ieland."

Interomerican Quaranting Force Tominetes Operablong

Following the lifüing of the quarantino, the three governments whose

naval units had

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naval unite had participated in tho inter-imerican combined quarantina

force - 1.*., higentina, Dominican Republic, and the ünited States .

notiflud the C.0.A,5./0.0. on Novenber 30 that the operations of the

quarantine force had been terminated. During this peried, it had not been

necessary to take up the offers of airport and seavor facilities and

otker typos of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and

solidarity.

As the negotiations betten the united States and the soviet Union

in lieu fork progressed, the United Staies kept the 6.0.4. S./0.0. fully

Informed of developrents. The C.O.A. 3./0.C. In the maantine withheld

taking any further action with rogerd to the crisis until these talks vera

complated.

Continued Nogotiations

The Soviet Gevernant carriod out Its promise to withdraw the Il-28

bombers, and, by December 6, the United States wad informed that all bombers

(42 in nuner) had left. No progress, hosver, tad made during the reat

of the month in achioving the "adoquate international arrangemants for the

task of inspoction and verification In Cuba" that the President had

nantloned an Novender 20, and unich were part of the original understanding:

Daputy Pronior Mitoyan's threeshour conversationo with the President on

November 29 and with the Sacretary of State on November 30, did net advance

the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations

In New York.

By mid-Docember several important loose enda

still reneined, No.

adequate,

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sasquate, U.N, -supervised arrangements for verification of ranoval of

offensive veapons and safeguards against thor reintroduction had been

achieved. The U. S, assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion a

Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weaçons vare not

present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained iron aggressive

sets againat the Weatern Hemiaphera.

Soviet 1roop:

The withdrawal of Soviet pergonnel from Cuba vas 2100 a matter oi

deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at bia

pross conference of November 20, the U.S, had boon informed that Sarias

combat units and other Sories units vore associated with the protection

of offensive weapons systens and would also be wlühdrawn in dus course.

The U.S. position wis that ronoval of the offenaivi weapons systems made the

prusence of Soviet treopa to defend tch mapons no longar nocasuary.

Efforts to socure thair renoval continued into 1903.

Sacurity Council Consideration Concluded

The formula for tenuinating Security Council consideration of the

Cuban erials was finally agreed batusen the governants of the United

States and the Sovlot Union on January P, 1963. Il reprocented a standstill

rather than a final settlement. The to governmants agreed to send a

joint letter to the Secretary Goneral which he, in turn, transmitted to

the Security Council for information of its menbera. The test of the

letter read:

"On bahall of the Governments of the United States ard the

Soviet Taion,

we desire so express to you our approciation for

your efforts

In acaleting our governants to avart the serious

throat to the peace unich recontly arose in the Caribbean area.

"While it has not bson possible for our governmants to

resalva all the

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resoive all the problems that hars aricon in connection with this

reached balveer thom on the settlement si the ertoie ard ta

they belleve thet, in new or the degree or understanding

extent of progress in the implementation of this understandings It

is not receasary for this iton to cocupy further the attention

of the Security Council at this time.

"The Govermments of the United States of Anerica and of the

Sovidi Union espreas the hope thet the actions taken to avart te

threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the

adjuatment of other differances batesen them and the general

easing of tensions that eould cause a further threat of war."

The sana day (January ?, 1963), the Fermanent Represertativo of Cuba,

Carlos M. Lechuga, eddrasood a letter to the Secretary-General, which he

requested bo transitiod to United Nations manbors, expressing a diasonting

viou os to concluston as the altar. Cuba, tho letter declared, "dose

, not consider as offective any agmemont other then one shich would include

consideration of five points or macurea, which as minimn guarantees to

peace in the Caribbean, our Prima Minuter Fidel Castro stresses

In his

declaration of 28 October, 1962..."

As the Security Council concluded Its consideration of the Cuban

1tem, the situation renained as folleus:

I. The Soviet Union had withdram its ofiensive missiles,

1t3 berbers, and sons of lis military personnel. The United

States and participating American Repubiles had Lifted the

quarantine.

The Cubany had refused to accent on site inspection and

postorenoval verification or do agre on a systen of continuing

careguarde against reintroduction of offensive weapons under

United Nations auspices.

3. In the absence of adequate inepection and saleguarda, tre

United States contined other methods of sureillance of military

activities in

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• 40

setivities in Cuba in the intereste or henlapharie sacurity.

4, The continued presence of Soviet nilitary personnal in

Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign

military povar in the

Wester Hemisphere, Efforta continuad

with the USSR to cotain thoir ramoral sa agread.

5. The United Stakes continued ic be seriouly concerned about

Cuban subversive efforts dirocted againet other American Republies.

ó. The United States position with rogard to ascurance againat

invasion remained that stated by the President

on November 20, as

outlinod above,

?. With the conclusion of the Now York talke and the Joint US-ISSR

letter terminating Seewity Council consideration of the matter,

responsibility of further action remained with the OnS Organ of

Consultation In 1ts honiapherie contes.

Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilatore, Ragionals, and UN Diplonscy

The Cuban affair demonatrated the utility and possibilities for inter.

action oi the various diploratie and military instrumente araltable to the

United States In a crisis. Orchestration of bilaterial diplonacy, regional

arrangenonts, ard the United Nations syaben masked the handling of the

erists throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique

demonstration of

coordination betwoon a regional system and the world

organisation, with diploratie setion baing taker in the 0.4.S. and the

united Natione, depending on the task to be portorasd and the governments

directly involved. To O.A.S, system successfully not the test of

worrability by

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workability.

by assonstrating comiusivoly the solidarity and determination

of the American Republies thon their security is endangered. The rapid,

dacisire action taken by the American Repunlius under the Rio Treaty

atrongthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world

opinior, in dealing in the securlty Council with the crisia, and in

nogotiating with the Soviets.

The United Nations played a thros-loid role: as a form for exoosing

Soviet duplicity and for eniisting diplomatic support of the United Statea

position; as an instrument for intornational consultation and as a site for

nogotiation; and, an an institution willing and able, on short notice,

to provide inspection and varification services.

(1) The United States provided an unparalleled for for presenting

the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly te representatives of

109 nations and through communicadions media directly do world puolic

opinion. Ambazeador Stavenson's speches of October. 23 and 25 in the

Security Councis, together with the photographe and explanatione to

deiegations both inside and outside the shamber, provented Incontrovertible

evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus beiped in corvincing

the world of the lacte. In addition, the united iationa providad s

forun in which the American Repusilos could imprase on the world and

on the Secretary Conaral their solidarity on this lasuo.

(2) The Secrotary-Geraral provided an effoctive point of contact;

notably in the tense days at the outset of the erisis and valuable

suggostiona for avolding direct confrontation. The Secrotary General's

intervention on the second day of

Security Comest debate, in walch

he called for suspension of amme shiraente and of construction and

development of military installations in exchange for zuspension of

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the quarentine led to the formula under which Soviet shipa stayed away

fron the interception area and on that conditior the United States agraed

do de everything ponsible to avoid diract confrontation. Khrushcher gave

arprecedented agreement to tho idea of V.N. Inspection and urification

of arms removal on the apot. And, the United Nationa proved that 16 vas

ready and espablo of organiaing a corps of obsergers and a systen of.

inspaction in rapid order.

Both tho Unitad Nationa and tha Organiaation of Amarican States proyed

their utility and vigor . and anarged stronger fron the ordeal.

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SECRET WEN WITH ATTACHMENIS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MA. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT Cuba

As a follow-up to my memorandur to you on February 15,

1963. I ars attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba la

testimony given by the Department of Defense to congreesional

committees. They continue from the latest dato of each cormittee

escerpt you tow have, and inclade excepto from the berate Armod

Services Committee transcripto.

Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references

kasmuch as all transcripts are not avaliable. Thue the House

Armed Services Committee bas been covered up to February 2l,

the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to,

F'ebruary 13, and the Sonate Armed Bervices Committee to

February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations

Committee has not yet began its hearingo.

As transeripts become avilable. I will send the requeated

itoms to you.

SIGNED

David S. McGillert

Assiatant to the Secretary

(Legiolative Aifairo)

11 Attachments

* RASC Transcript excerpte

3 DoD SC. RAppne Transcriste excerpte

4 SASC Tranacript excerpta

5644 (z)

cc: (S/ Attachmente included)

MI. McNaughton, GC

MI. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst.

Mr. McGiffert AISD(LA)

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHNENTS

MI. Lennartson, PA

Mr. Califano, OSA ST

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STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA TO-THE PERMANENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

U. S. SENATE

13 March 1963

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted

my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my

views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of

General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new

addition to our Defense arsenal.

My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the

Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based

on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air-

plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend-

able both in training missions and in actual combat.

• The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in

my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the

Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a

single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:

- The least expensive, time-consuming

research and

development effort before production.

The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.

- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.

- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type

aircraft.

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r.

The greatest use of proven design techniques and

methods.

- The most understanding of the requirements and

difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and

producing a fighter-type aircraft.

When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first

identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 --

1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by

six competing companies,

neither proposal was found to be acceptable

without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to

whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or

whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be

continued in order to meet the military requirements.

Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall

of 1962.

In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by

the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully

design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development

design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the

Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,

and changes can be expected during the development period.

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"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft

will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in

carrying out its

assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"15) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed,

and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will

markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability. "

The Report itself did not express a

preference for either proposal,

and indicated there was

little to choose between the proposals. Both

proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to

meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation

with my advisers, convinced me that,

as compared with the Boeing pro-

posal,

the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single

design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the

differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied

a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to

select General Dynamics

as the development contractor,

since I concluded

that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could

be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military

requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considera-

tions entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part

of the record.

When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed

me to:

3

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1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military

requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible

cost.

Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in

both our nuclear

and non-nuclear forces.

The additions to our nuclear

forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory

forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those

weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of

nuclear surprise attack.

At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-

nuclear forces

-- ground, sea, and air - so that we can cope with the

many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure

that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, pro-

curement of weapons, equipment,

and ammunition has been vastly in-

creased.

Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have

attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts.

Because of

the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy

period of development, their tremendous combat power and their

enormous cost,

sound choices of a limited number of major weapon

systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key

decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.

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..

In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have com-

monly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs

estimated when

the program started, and in some instances more. Some of the reasons

for such overruns have been:

1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet perform-

ance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.

2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost

estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied

many times during the program.

3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what

it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered

that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in

what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract

is awarded.

4. We have too often employed inadequate and

unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting in-

sufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production

of similar weapons.

5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and

other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives

to

reduce

cost.

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Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to

attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been:

launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the

end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount

to $1. 4 billion per

year. We

are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed

price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program

definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organiza-

tions as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.

At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under

study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense

Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's

business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our

current source selection procedures can be improved.

One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that

weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where

this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements.

The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in

substantial

savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but

throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic: support, maintenance,

training programs,

and operations.

The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be

observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a

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rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high.

The Air

• Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive

spare parts inventories.

With the present rapid rate of technological change,

the Air Force has acquired a $2. 2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already

obsolete and practically worthless.

When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was

developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the E-105.

At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the

F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common

missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation

with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became con-

vinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the

Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force

reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common

tactical fighter.

The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new.

I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority

of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done.

As late

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as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been

working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both

Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated

requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.

While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways,

was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach,

considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a

modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also

convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would

save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance

and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that

the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both

Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and

economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward

this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept

myself fully advised of the development of the [EX as it progressed

over the succeeding 14 months.

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Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of

the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you

in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision.

On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop

a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the

Navy fleet air defense mission, From the outset, the emphasis

was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum

divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific

guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical

version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall

be held to a minimum." This is a recurring theme throughout the

procurement actions which followed.

Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were

issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms

two months thereafter.

A Source Selection Board was organized with members

appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed

to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting

chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical

Systems Division.

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To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was

established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force

officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the

detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas

of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management

strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft

carriers.

The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source

Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by

appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as

by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief

of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and

Air Force who made their recommendations to me.

Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of

Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by

the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized

that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it

would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher

rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the

higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recom-

mended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General

Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military

requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General

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Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable.

The senior

Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs

was acceptable without very substantial change.

A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board

which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory

design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that

substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine

was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the

radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting

capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection

Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the

limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be

acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommenda-

tion was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force

Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force

Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsi-

bility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection

of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and

General Dynamics;

as suggested by the Evaluation Group.

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The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for

Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence

of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua-

tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies

for continued competition for another, 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized

that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted,

would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by

extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby

more apt to be saved than lost in the long run." It considered that competition

should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity

of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design.

Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the

Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded

to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that:

a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly

superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up

to stated Service requirements.

b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General

Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of

the low probability of its development in the time required, since not

even a prototype existed at the time.

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c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs

and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design

standpoints.

I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and

Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost

estimates.

The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and

the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation

Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correct-

ing identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy

from the standpoint of suitability. for use on aircraft carriers and ability

to remain on station for adequate periods of time.

The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged

more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and over!-

shadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since

the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor

the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorse-

ments transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the

Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to

• achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the

Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified

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concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the

over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson

stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can

indeed be met. " Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature

to state

a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally

selected."

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in

view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by

the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and

wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine

courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the

Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting

divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft,

resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined.

Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz-

ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by

reducing the degree of commonality so far

as to lose the savings inherent

in a joint program.

At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals

which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy

member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of

the new proposals met the Navy's requirements.

The Board also noted that

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the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions

that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications bad not been

determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom-

mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and

the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing,

should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design

definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the

definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the

third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.

Following the second and third evaluations of the TEX, it

appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy require-

ments, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully under-

stood by the contractors

or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to

develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy.

and the Air Force.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air

Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from

which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective

versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and

the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the

contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled.

Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities

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in the Navy and Air Force versions,

and by use of common equipments

and structures.

To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary

of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining

fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in

accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962,

explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any

contract would be awarded. These were:

"I. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant

improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the

winning design.

"2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible

with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the

inherent savings of a joint program.

"3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for

development and procurement of the complete IFX weapon system, which

costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to

our military

strength by the weapon system."

These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used

in judging and weighing the two proposals -- Boeing and General Dynamics.

They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation

Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its

comments and.conclusions.

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The two companies submitted their new proposals in September

1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the

Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.

At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general

conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by

the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of

Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully

design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are

acceptable as initial development

design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,

and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft

will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in

carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and

when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly

improve

existing fleet

air defense capability."

The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors.

When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one.

In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design

as having "a better structural design,

a simpler fuel system, a slight edge

in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel

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Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics

design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera

bility at altitude. It has a low

radar cross section and an integrated

penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the

air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited

deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability,

conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing perform-

ance.

It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For

deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent

deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort. "

In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher

score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable

from the users' viewpoint.

In the "Production, Management and Cost"' area, General Dynamics

was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented

the better program. It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased.

In the "Logistics"

area, which includes the functional elements of

maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal

received a slightly higher rating over-all.

It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in

Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air

Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their

tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which

the two designs met the other twọ cardinal conditions became crucial. : You

will recall that those two conditions were; (1) minimum divergence from a

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common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs.

It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom

less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational

capability.

These are conditions more properly the concern of those

charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are

equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest.

When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint

of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck

by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The Report

found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very

high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions..

On the other hand,

the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less

than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were

the same.

In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect,

proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The

same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of

identical parts in the General Dynamics design - a particularly crucial

point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development

process

to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small

divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds.

In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of

minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral

technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.

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It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role

as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made

about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that

the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could

be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic pur

pose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase

costs at every stage beginning with development itself.

As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by

Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter.

and fatigue analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs;

and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions. "

Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required

earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become compli-

cated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the

logistics area.

These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving

as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates,

common technical manuals, and the like.

If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects

of saving one billion dollarswould have evaporated. The issue of minimum diver-.

gence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.

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lies at the heart of the entire TEX endeavor. My instructions on this point

were clear and consistent.

Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed

the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including DI. Charyk,

who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Direc-

tor of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, dis-

cussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging

development and production programs, it became clear to me that the

General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach

than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable.

There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated

the development of the aircraft.

Three problems in particular stood out in

my mind.

The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers

for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing

touch down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight

on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on super-

sonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commer-

cial jet transports and cargortype aircraft in which the engines are mounted on

outboard pylons underneath the wings.

The Air Force does have one fighter

aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made.

This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline

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and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled

in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside

the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot

gas efflux is unknown.

Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability

was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in

addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight

testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design

would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early opera-

tional date for the TEX.

In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evalua-

tion Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the

development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this

problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate

in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust

reverser design and development.

Speed brakes,

as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically

proven and offer

a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated

military requirement.

Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the

military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must

be weighed against their possible advantages.

I want to point out that in

selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply

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thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility: to under-

take this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall

program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.

The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce

more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant instal-

lation with top-mounted inlets.

The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that

Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the

Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air

flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during

high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this

distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately,

and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under

the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.

In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through"

installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a

good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best

trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems.

The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object

damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that

the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not

be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.

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The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater

development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-

through structure.

We have had some experience in the use of titanium

in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat-

resistant applications and where high strees levels in thick plates are not

involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the

fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use

in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises

the question of the advisability of using such thickness.

The Report

further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details,

especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be

quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded

the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel

Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing

companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems

Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject

to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating

to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and

heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that

not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but

additional costs would be incurred.

In contrast; the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing

loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra

wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing

relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal.

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These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the

overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that

this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the

competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen

more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational

features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This

approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped

General Electric engine for its initial submission.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed

insuperable obstacles. On the contrary,

I assumed that the problems

associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in super-

sonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all

susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth

Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact,

complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly

greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution.

But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than

that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater

complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between

the Navy and the Air Force versions

of the Boeing

aircraft, and the lesser

experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter

aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the

Boeing proposal.

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I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic.cost estimates in the

Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was

overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously

low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and

production phases.

It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate

the complexities of developing the TEX. This is understandable because

Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been

with bombers

and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable

to TEX estimating.

I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition --

demonstrably credible understanding of costs -- Boeing's proposal was

deficient.

The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They

attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in

their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the

General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but

not nearly so much sọ as Boeing's.

The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical

factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The

application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally

low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack

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of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are

subject to substantial errors.

Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group

could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing

and General Dynamics,

and then correct the two cost proposals more or

less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation

of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which

is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by

the application of statistical factors.

The question has been raised as to why costs are important when

both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There

are several reasons.

In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the

TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of

change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two pro-

posals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General

Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with

consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred.

Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of

change orders; there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be

carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.

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It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of

the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years

of effort it appeared that a contractor's coste were going to be far in excess

of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would

be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take

every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a

serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.

In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force

efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expendi-

ture is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that

we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way

we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has

not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of

the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well

as the contractor.

Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and

development phase of the TFX program.

A multi-billion dollar production

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program is to follow. There is no futur e price commitment for this pro-

duction program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research

and development contracts, the price of the production program, which

for all practical purposes would be committed to the development con-

tractor, would probably be affected.

When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense.

This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must

be operational in proper quantities in the ti me span scheduled. The more

straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well

versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters,

and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and pro-

ducer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer

to our needs.

I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment

that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of ob-

taining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within

the dollars programmed.

Having studied the TEX question over many months, I met with Deputy

Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in

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November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently:

coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:

First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid

concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of

the Navy and Air Force.

We therefore decided to move ahead with the

development of the TEX aircraft.

Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to

the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award.

Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad

bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts

again before we arrived at a final decision.

Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to

award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.

There remains one more important aspect of this case which I

believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are

dealing with a question of judgment.

Granted there are specific

technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment

is what is at issue.

In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are

pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments

of the competing

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contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost

within a specific time-frame. Next,

we have the judgments of the Evaluation

Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or

would not satisfy the stated requirements.

Then the Source Selection Board,

using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared

to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational

areas,

rather than on dependability of development and predictability of

costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy

and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining

the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion;

this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons

systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it

has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.

There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error

that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply

the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation;

but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the

best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises

held out by competing contractors,

against the hopes and aspirations of

military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.

That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition

• is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue

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through the program definition phase of the TEX project.

That I attach

great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements

is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program

definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of

both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance

to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is,

I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the

contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations

on the task to be achieved.

I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military

conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed.

In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision; I

considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian

advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final

responsibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my

decision were:

- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs

met stated military requirements and would provide

significant improvements in combat capabilities of

the Navy and the Air Force.

- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in

minimum divergence from a common design

compatible with the separate mission of the Navy

and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings

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and increased dependability inherent in a joint

program.

The

• General Dynamics proposal reflected a more

realistic understanding of costs.

As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the

decision was mine.

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