## Page 1

157-10011-10066

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199

FK Assassination Systen

Identification Form

Agency Information

7/30/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

SSCIA

157-10011-10066

RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ROCK

FROM: ROETHE, JAMES N.

TO.:

FILE

TITLE: FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE: 02/24/1975

PAGES:

13

SUBJECTS :

ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE

BREWER, GEORGE

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted; 1A; 3; Donor Restricted

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

v9.1

NH 50955

DocId: 32203834

Page 1

---

## Page 2

Date: 05/30/94

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066

RECORDS SERIES :

MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK

FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.

TO : FILE

TITLE :

FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE : 02/24/75

PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :

BREWER, GEORGE

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE

SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 3, DONOR REST., REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

IRJ - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NH 50955

DocId: 32203834

Page 2

---

## Page 3

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

john T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkland

Lyman L.. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagen

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MENORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

MASON

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

286-11

February 24, 1975

David W. Belin,

Executive Director

NoTE: Incidents isi that page nimbers

indicated were not specifically

mentioned in the transcript.

SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

FILE

JAMES N. ROETHE

Record Number 157-10011-10066

Further Information obtained from George Brewer:

(See February 18 Interview)

On Monday, February 24, I again spoke with George Brewer in the Conmission

offices from approximately 9:00 am until 10:15 am. The following additional

information was obtained.

Technical Operations

In 1960 and 1961, Brewer was primary involved in Bay of Pigs operations (pro-

viding support to the liami Field Office in smuggling friendly Cubans into the

United States). He was engaged in little technical activity during that time.

Between 1962 and 1965, he was involved in approximately 30 technical operations,

only four of which wer? telephone taps (the rest were mile and wire cases).

During that same perioi four or five other support agents • were also engaged

in technical activitie:, each performing approximately the same amount of tech-

nical work that Brewer was

performing.

Some of the agents doing technical work

were Jack Cryer, Hal Tittster, and Bill Simpson, the latter being a former in-

structor of Brewer's.

Both Cryer and Simpson had been doing technical work for

quite some time (throughout the sO's), tiTSid, 5z (1151-52)

In 1955 or 1966, following President Johnson's Executive Order precluding wire

taps without court order or without approval of the Attorney General in security

cases, technical work performed by Brewer and others at the Washington Field

Office almost stopped completely. Brewer can recall only two taps that were

placed during that period.

One of these was placed in a Safe House in the

Washington area, and the other was placed in a New York apartment in connec-

tion with Project PARAGON. Brewer assumes that the appropriate approvals were

ob ained prior to his placing these taps. (TTOTA+ (1147-48)

Most of the technical operations in the early 1960's were performed at the re-

quest of the Operations Directorate. While Brewer was not privy to the purpose

for each technical operation that he performed, he believes that many involved

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION IN

DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASE OF THIS DUGUNICNT

AS SANITIZED

31 MAY 9A

(1) CA)

# 50555 DocTa:32203831

Page 3

---

## Page 4

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-2.

Safe Houses for use by defectors and the wiring of operations assets' apart-

ments or other premises where conversations with assets would be forth-

coming. For instance, in 1962 the apartment of a defector (Golitzen) was

wired.

It was believed that Golitzen had become unhappy with CIA treatment

and was considering leaving the country. A telephone tap was placed on his

phone to attempt to verify this. Brewer believes that' these cases involved

positive foreign intelligence gathering as opposed to being security cases.

From the names of the individuals whose conversations were to be recorded,

Brewer presumes that most of these technical operations were directed against

foreigners.

Brewer is aware of a few technical operations relating to security.

One in-

volved the bugging of the premises of a former employee Pant Garbly in

about 1964 because of his questionable associates. Another, in 1963, involved

a telephone tap on a newsman (although Brewer was unaware at the time the tap

was placed that it was being directed against a newsman). (1146)

The Technical Division of the Office of Security may have been involved in

some technical operations in the United States during the 1960's and earlier.

However, their primary responsibility was counter-audio work overseas. Brewer

does not believe that they would have been involved in significant amounts

technical work in the States.

Surveillance Operations

Prior to 1968, the Washington Field Office was performing some unsophisticated

surveillance.

This generally related to surveillance of defectors and training

operations directed against perspective overseas CIA agents. The purpose of

the training was to assist WFO in its surveillance techniques and to determine

how well the perspective overseas agents could make contacts and "drops" without

being detected.

The Field Office had little equipment to undertake sophisticated

surveillance at that time. (117ü-28)

In 1968, with the creation of the Surveillance and Technical Unit, a much more

concentrated effort was made in the area of surveillance. (127)

Assistance to Local Police

Brewer remembers that at some point in time two sets of alias documents prepared

by Technical Services were given to the Metropolitan Police Department.

This

included a social security card, driver's license, D. C. permit, etc.

***************

I again interviewed Mr. Brewer at approximately 2:30 pm on the same day, just

prior to his leaving for the Commission hearings, at which he was testifying.

indicated that it was the policy of the CIA to offer gratuities to various

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NH 50955 DocId: 32203834

Page 4

---

## Page 5

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

policé officers in the Washington, D.C., area for their assistance to the CIA.

Each Christmas a list would be prepared of those individuals from local police

departments who had provided assistance, and appropriate gifts would be given

to these individuals, ranging from candy and liquor to $25 gift certificates.

The money for these

gifts was taken from CIA's "Blue Jay" fund, used for mis-

cellaneous expenses. Some police officials would not accept such gratuities.

Li 22

Brewer is also avare of one occasion when police officials from several deu

partments were flown to a hunting lodge owned by the Agency in souther Virginia.

Brewer recalls several officers from the Montgomery County, Fairfax County (in-

cluding Colonel: Durner), and Metropolitan Police Departments (including&Assistant

Chiot Hughes,

but not (Chief Wilson'-who refused an invitation) attending, as well

as a high police official from Boston. Brewer himself attended this gathering

and indicated that as best as he can remember it was strictly a social affair.

Brewer could not recall ever having agreed to provided Johm Briggman of the

Fairfax County Police Department with an automobile while Briggman was on vaca-

tion in California, although he would not deny that he may have done so.

61:72173)

Brewer indicated that all gratuities given police officials were approved by

Headquarters

and that none were specifically connected with any particular

request being made of the police by the CIA. (11752)

(full distribution)

JNR/Vmr

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- - .-

HH 50955

DocId: 32203834

Page 5

---

## Page 6

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

February 20, 1975

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MENORANDUM FOR:

FILE

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Summazy of an intey poeto anli robert dise

JAMES N. ROETHE

Sunmary of an Interview with George R. Brever, Conducted

on Tuesday, February 18, 1975, in the Offices uf the

Commission by James N. Roethe ani Robert Olsen

The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 pm on Februaxy 18, 1975, and

ended at approximately 8:30 pm on the same date.

Mr. Brewer appeared

voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff.

Background of Mr. Brewel

Mr. Brewer is a graduate of the University of Maryland. He has been with

the CIA for over twenty years and is presently Chief of the Director's

Security Staff. The interview concerned itself primarily with the activities

of the Washington Field Office of the Office of Security.

Ni. Brewer first

worked in that office from January 1955 to Februazy 1956. From February 1256

to April 1959 he was on Director Dulles' personal security staff. He served

with the Headquarters Field Office (now defunct) from April 1959 to August 1960

and again served with the Washington Field Office from August 1960 to July 1973,

when he obtained his present position.

Activities at the Washington Field Office

The Washington Field Office is made up of 35-40 agents. Clericals bring the

total of employees to about 100. It is by far the jargest security field

office. The majority of the agents are designated as field agents, whose

prinary activity is investigating applicants for employment with the Agency

and sóme covert investigations (investigations under cover, such as investi

gations of contractor's employees or individuals planning to be sent overseas

under, cover).

The remaining agents are designated as support agents (about S

men) who provide a broad range of support to the field agents.

In: 1966

Mr. Brewer, a support agent, was designated as the Washington Field Offico's

linison with the local police (including the Netropolitan Police Department,

most suburban police departments, and the Virginia and Mazyland State Police),

In November of 1968, Mr. Brever was placed in charge of a newly created

"'Surveillance and Technical Unit" of the Support Squad. He remained in both

positions until he left the Office in July of 1973. Mr. Brewer emphasized

that no activity was undertaken by the fiold office without the approval of

eadquarters. Requests for action in Mr. Brewer's areas of interest would be

received by headquarteis security, generally from the Operations Directorate.

The "Security Support Branch" at hoadquarters would pass the request en to the

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NW 50955 DocId:32203834 Page 6

---

## Page 7

'SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

"Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Support" at the field office (Mr. John

Hutchinson

during most of Mr. Brewer's tenure), who in turn would ask

Mr. Brewer to carry out the request.

The following persons have headed the Washington Field Office as "Special

Agent-in-Charge":

Charles Kane

Marvin Gentile

John Noble

Ed Klippa

Jack Cryer

1960-1963

1963-1964

1964-1968

1968-1973

Present

Covert Investigations by Field Agents

Such investigations were conducted much less frequently than overt investiga-

tions of applicants for employment.

Several unofficial covers were used by

investigators to prevent the person being investigated from being exposed as

a CIA contact.

Technical Operations

Technical operations consisted of the planting of electronic listening devices

(King) and the telephone taps (Queen). No technical devices were planted by

the Washington Field Office after the formation in 1968 of the "Surveillance

and Technical Unit." However, Mr. Brewer has planted technical devices prioi

to 1968:

1. In about 1966 Mr. Brewer planted a listening device in an apartment

at the Savoy Apartments in Washington, D. C. (a CIA Safe House). This

device was later removed and Brewer was

told it was never used.

2. About 8 years ago Mr. Brewer placed several bugs in a Washington Safe

House.

He believes they have never been removed. They have never been

used to his knowledge.

3. ¡ About 10 years ago Mr. Brewer was called back from vacation to bug a ,

cadillac to be used by two Chinese generals.

4." At one time Mr. Brewer bugged hotel rooms in the Washington area where

unwitting U-2 pilot applicants were being interviewed.

5.: In 1963 Mr. Brewer placed telephone taps on phones in a home in

Washington (MOCKINGBIRD case). At the time he did not know he was

tapping a news columnist's phone, but he later learned that that had

been the case.

6.

Four houses in Miami were bugged by Mr. Brewer shortly after the Bay of

Pigs incident.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HW 50955 Docid:32203834 Page 7

---

## Page 8

SECRET/SENSITIVE

= 3 -

7. A hotel room in Los Angeles was bugged by Brewer several years ago. It

was to be used for some kind of interview.

8. A home in Bethesda, Maryland, was also bugged before being occupied by a

Cuban National.

In all, Mr. Brewer believes he was involved in more than ten technical opera-

tions, but less than 100 prior to 1908. In all cases he was merely supplying

technical support for operations at the request of his superiors, and was not

witting to the actual operation. In each case he assumed the propriety and

lawfulness of the operation.

Since 1966, Mr. Brewer has been engaged in only one technical operation

(Operation PARAGON--threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew).

When that threat was made, Brewer suggested that a line be run into the in-

forming agent's apartment. Such a line was run from that agent's telephone

(a telephone tap). This operation was approved by higher authority.

Surveillance

Surveillance was conducted off and on through the period from 1960 to 1973.

However, active surveillance did not begin until 1968 when the "Surveillance

and Technical Unit" was formed.

Prior to 1968, surveillance was restricted

to training exercises and surveillance of defectors.

Mr. Brewer estimated

that he engaged in about ten such operations prior to 1968. Training sur-

veillance continued after 1968, but only one surveillance of a defector was

made during that time.

In 1966 Headquarters requested that the Washington Field Headquarters form a

sophisticated

surveillance. unit. Such a unit was not really created until

Brewer took over the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" in 1968. After 1968

surveillance took up a large part of the time of the "Surveillance and Techni-

cal Unit's" time.

The Unit consisted of 14 support agents and was expanded

to 20-24 men during some surveillances.

The lashington Field Office did

surveillance for the entire country with regard to Security Office matters.

field office,

i bet o, that felt office one have veer th chare

that field office would have been in charge, with the Washington

Office providing the support. The following surveillance was undertaken by

Brewer's Unit:

1.

Surveillance of Employees or Former Employees

[a Broiect CORSCO A Ma land, under official coven at the Pentagon!

was surveilled duo to his association with suspected security risks.

- He was

eventually fired

His associates vere also surre

1l ed.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NW 50955

DocId: 32203834 Page 8

---

## Page 9

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 4 .

2.

3.

b. Project CAPUSTO (8 Ball): Employee associating with former defector

was

surveilled.

c. Project TONCAT: An associate of CAPUSTO was surveilled.

:d. Project MONEY: A former employee planning to attend the SALT talks

with his new boss was surveilled.

e. Project SIESTA: Surveillance on a former employee and the suspecied

Castro agent she was living with.

f. Project PINEAPPLE: Surveillance of a former employee living above his

Washangton Field Office surveilled outside D.C.

Associates surveilled in D.C, and at subject's Arlington honderson

ington Field Office did not participate in any break-in of subject's

apartment.

g. Project ANOS:

Former employee surveilled to Champaign, Illinois.

h. Project PIXIE: (last job): Two employees and son of another surveilled

for suspected drug use and/or sale.

i. Project PARAGON: Informer who reported threat against Director Helms

and Vice President Agnew surveilled in New York and Detroit.

MARCHETTI:

Former employce threatening io publish classified material

(which he cold not have obtained during the course of his employment)

was surveilled. Three cars were used in surveillance. No police cover.

Surveillance of Newsmen (to determine source of security leaks)

a.

b.

Jack Anderson:

Brewer knew that surveillance was to determine source

oF anderson's publishing of classified information. Mi. Brewer ques-

tioned his superior (John Hutchinson) about the case. He wondered why

the FBI was not involved and understood that the FBI didn't want to

ouch tie as gun i-vere surveilled.

Along with (Jack Anderson, two of mis andes.

Michaci

Getters Mr. Brever also questioned this surveillance, but not

strongly as Getler was relatively unknown.

Further, he really didn't

know the reason why Getler was being surveilled until later.

Other Surveillances

a. A nephew of an assistant to Director McCone was surveilled after he

went berserk and threatened to go to the Russians. He was surveilled

for two days.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NW 50955

DocId: 32203834 Page 9

---

## Page 10

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 5 =

In all cases of surveillance, photographs of the subject and his contacts

were taken.

Further, the identity of the contact was also ascertained and

reported to headquarters.

No surveillance was ever placed on a Congressman,

Senator, Judge or Justice or other public figure except the newsmen previously

mentioned. Mr. Brewer believes that there were no cases of surveillance

undertaken by his Unit which did not involve either (1) a threatened security

leak to newsmen, or (2) a potential security violation, except Project

PARAGON.

The records kept on surveillances include the letters assigning the surveil-

lance to the Unit, the agents' logs, photographs taken and the final report

of each project.

This information was all sent to Headquartcis.

The Field

Office would also retain copies but never made any use of these files.

Break-Ins:

Mr. Brewer's Surveiliance Unit was only

involved in one break-in in connection

with Project SIESTA, involving a former employee living with a suspected

Castro sympathizer.

A photographic studio, jointly operated by the employee

and her Cuban boy friend, was broken into.

This didn't bother Brewer, as

there was strong evilence suggesting a possible security violation.

Further,

the suspected pair was soliciting passport photo business at CIA, which would

give them information about the travels of CIA agents. A second break-in

was offected by Anderson Associates (a CIA proprietary) in Project SIESTA.

Brewer doesn't know who headed up Anderson Associates.

He believes that

Ralph True, Joe Langon aud Don Connor may have had some connection with it.

Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was disbanded in June or July of 1972. Brewer

is not sure why the Unit was disbanded. The Washington Field Office still does

training surveillance and surveillance of defectors. There have been no in-

stances (to Brewer's knowledge) of potential employee security leaks since the

Surveillance Unit was disbanded.

Activity with Dissident Groups

On three occasions (in 1969, 1970 and May 1971) the CIA participated with the

Washington police in monitoring peace and anti-war demonstrations. In each

case a request was made by the Washington Police Department (NPD), through

Captato George Suiter, for assistance.

The Washington Field Office of CIA

furnished six vehicles with communications gear and men to operate the gear.

Mr. Brewer believes that two CIA agents and one police officer occupied

car. (More CIA agents than police were utilized, as MD didn't have the neces-

sary manpower.) The only purpose of this operation was to monitor the move-

ments of the crowds.

There was no attcmpt to penetrate

any dissident organi-

zation or to photograph the crowds. The CIA agents involved in the May 1, 1971,

operation carried police ID's. CIA also provided a fully-staffed communica-

tions center at MPD to receive communications from the cars. This provided

MPD a second radio frequency and freed MPD's own channels for other police

business.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NW 50955 DocId: 32203834 Page 10

---

## Page 11

• SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 6 -

Brewer believes

that the primary purpose of this operation was to render

communications assistance to the local police.

The secondary purpose was

to monitor crowds se

as to protect CIA installations. (For example, MPD

had obtained some information that various dissident groups planned to picket

CIA Headquarters and planned to harass Director Helms during a planned. speech.)

All of these CIA operations were verbally approved by Headquarters Support

Branch (Nr. Cryer). Total period of time devoted to monitoring dissident groups

with MPD (for all three occasions) was about five days. Brewer is not aware of

any instance where the Washington Field Office tried to penetrate any dissident

groups.

Collection of Information on Dissident Groups

During the period of the demonstrations in 1969-1971, all field offices and

resident agents were requested by Headquarters to look out for literature

and other informatior which might in any way affect the CIA. No conscious

intelligence gathering of literature was requested.. Items to be looked for

included campus news clippings, etc..

This project was not a continuing one

over the three-year period when most demonstrations occurred. It was renewed

from time to time as flare-ups in activity occurred. Mr. Brewer does not know

the quantity of material collected or the use made of that material. The only

information that Brewer knows was collected by the Washington Field Office

consisted of the weekly intelligence summary prepared by MPD. Headquarters

specifically asked Brewer to

get the summaries (either Jack Cryer, Tex Mills

or Curt Rivers), and they were forwarded to Headquarters. No effort was made

by Brewer to obtain information concerning any dissident group's intended

activities.

Police Cover Operations

Mr. Brewer indicated that Washington Field Office agents have received police

cover from the following police departments:

1.

2.

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

During the May 1971 demonstra-

tions, MPD furnished ID's to those CIA agents monitoring the crouds along

with police officers.

These ID cards were in fact used. No other police

cover was obtained from MPD.

Fairfax Citv Police Department:.

In connection with Operation SIESTA

which included a break-in at the photographic studio in fairfax City,

operated by a suspected Castro Agent) cover was obtained from the police.

One CIA agent was given a Fairfax City police badge in case some one

walked in on the break-in. The badge was never utilized. Brewer didn't

actually remember obtaining this badge, but it was obtained by some one.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WW 50955 DocId: 32203834 Page 11

---

## Page 12

'SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 7-

3.

Fairfax County Police Department: Apparently undercover CIA agents in the

county (under DOD cover) were being continuously harassed and challenged

in the county while on operations.

They feared their cover might be

blown and felt it would be good

to have police cover to prevent this

from occurring.

Mr. Brewer himself may have suggested getting badges and

identification from

the county police.

In any event, he thought it was a

good idea and Headquarters approved it (per John Hutchinson, Assistant

Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office).

Latter part of 1971) Brewer went toJohn isghal, Assistant to colone

Fairfax County Police Chief ind asked about obtaining

some badges and ID'S." Bragghan reported that Col Perror was originally

reluctant to give CIA the badges and ID, but in early spring of 1972 he

changed his mind and relented.

Brewer does not know if Osborn called

for if there was any arm-twisting ty the CIA. Brewer himself

did

no. arm-twisting. Nine patrolman's badges and one sergeant's badge

Brewer hingele

were obtained, plus ten blank ID cards. The true names of CIA agents

were placed on the cards by Brewer.

It was understood that if the badges

and ID's were ever used that core pus

Durrors ould innediately be notified.

In fact,

they were kept in a safe at Washington Field Office Headquarters

and never used.

They have

recently been returned to Fairfax County.

No police cover was ever obtained by Washington Field Office, or used by them

for the purpose of performing police accivity. Brever stated that local police

were always kept informed of CIA activities in their jurisdiction.

Other Assistance Rendered CIA by Local Police

Project SIESTA:

This project involved the break-in into a photographic shop in Fairfax City.

Three Fairfax City police assisted in the operation.

One entered the apari-

ment with several ClA agents;

one stood watch on the front steps; and one

waited in a squad car outside the building. Much material in the photographic

studio was photographed.

ut sue chance tag -

Surveillance was constantly maintained on the opera-

of the studio while the break-in was being carried out.

Use of Fairfax County Facilities:

On at least one occasion the Fairfax County police station was used for CIA

training purposes. CIA desired to assure themselves that new recruits for

covert overseas duty could not be "broken" if siezed by foreign authorities.

Consequently, CIA officials would "arrest" these unwitting recruits on some

bogus charge

and take them

to Fairfax County jail where they would be subject

to strong interrogation to see if they would "break".

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NH 50955 DocId: 32203834 Page 12

---

## Page 13

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 8

Other Assistance

Almost every police department has agreed to immediately notify the CIA if

one of its agents is arrested.

Assistance Rendered to Local Police by the CIA

Training Programs:

In late 1971 a course in photography was offered to officers of local police

departments by the Washington Field Office, and in 1972 courses in both sur-

veillance techniques and photography were offered. Representatives from MPD

and most large suburban police departments attender. These courses were

stopped after the printing of a New York Times article criticizing the train-

ing of New York City police by the CIA.

Metropolitan Police Department:

1 .

May Day - 1971: MPD was furnished six cars equipped with communications

gear, plus two men for each car, from the Washington Field Office (WFO) •

WFO also furnisheda central communications command post plus operators.

The purpose of this assistance was to permit the monitoring of crowds.

2.

In about 1972, Bcower performed a telephone tap for MPD in connection

with an internal affairs matter where eleven police officers vere poten-

tially involved in a bribe. Brewer understoed that a court order was

obtained before the taps were put on. I Captain Ceorge suter of MPD made

this request and CIA Hoadquarters approved it.

3.

During 1969 demonstrations, Ca

aof MPD asked Brewer

if he could wire a lamp in the apartment of a witting police informant

who had penetrated anti-war dissident groups.

Brewer passed this re-

quest on to security headquarters, and

the Technical Services Division

performed the wiring. CIA did not monitor or receive copies of any con-

versations recorded.

4.

Shortly after a CIA surveillance training course which several MPD

officers attended, MPD became desirous of maintaining surveillance on

one of its unwitting police informants to

see if she was doing what the

police paid her to do. MPD

asked Brewer if his men would assist the new

• trainees in the project. Brewer's surveillance unit did furnish assist-

ance, including four cars and at least one man for each car. These CIA

agents, together with MPD officers, surveilled the subject for one and one-

half days.

This is the only time Brewer's surveillance team actually

provided manpower to assist MPD in a surveiliance.

S ECRFT/SENSITIVE

HW 50955 DocId:32203834 Page 13

---

## Page 14

• SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 9 -

5. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field

telephone.

Office loaned the Means vision

a touch-tone

Roman* Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with bollard and Foran, for

equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn

would direct Brewer to provide the equipment.

6: On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer

to provide receiving devices to MPD.

Once Sigt. Brandardof NPD per-

sonally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver. It was provided

(ostensibly for training purposes).

7.

On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to

MPD on an indefinite loan.

8.

The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice

on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to

time.

MPD

received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up

their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered

MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness.

Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return

all equipment previously loaned to it by the CIA, and most was returned. Appar-

ently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other

police departments as well.

Montgomery County Police Department

In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to mispoctor Ihrashkinia (Rat.)

and ice Glazegeof the county police.

They had already been loaned some re-

ceivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office.

Fairfax County Police Department

1.; Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take

a telephone tap off a dial phone.

2.

On one occasion Brewer accompanied

a county polic representative to U.S.

Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pich out a dial recorder for

telephone taps.

3.

In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police

forces intelligence unit.

The equipment has never been returned.

No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been

given concerning a specific crime or witness.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NH 50955 DocId: 32203834 Page 14

---

## Page 15

•SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 10 -

Other

1: In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA Head-

• quarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Depart-

ments.

2.

Director Helms

owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion

Brewer net with the chief of police there concerning the security of the

beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave

the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the

department) for the chief's

assistance.

************

At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer

indicated that he had not

discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the

interview--except the General Counsel.

IMPRESSIONS

Mr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one

point was considering whether he should retain a liner.

However, as we

went along he opened up considerably to the point where I now believe I have

a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field

Office.

It would appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much,

if not most, of the physical and technical surveillance directed against

American citizens subsequent to 1968.

In every case the surveillance was

directed by higher authority. It also appears that the Washington Field

Office gave substantial assistance to. local police departments in the Wash-

ington, D. C. area.

Much of this assistance was obviously an appropriate

exchange of information between two intelligence units.

Most disturbing is

the incident where CIA agents

assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police

surveillance (a law enforcement function), bui this seems to have been an

isolated case.

JNR./ VMT

_SECRET/SENSITIVE

HW 50955

DooId: 32203834

Page 15

---