## Page 1

124-10276-10400

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FROM

SUBJEOT

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

WAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

'Memorandum

(5)

SECRET SCONE

- Mr.

J. B. Adams

W.

Fi.

Wannall

-Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

DATE: 7/15/75

1. - Mr.

F.

S.

Putman

- Mr.

- Mr.

A.

Branigan

I. F.

Schwartz

1 - Mi.

11. E. L'Allier

:I. S.

SENSTUDY 75

' TM SUITTON CONTAINS

where sai Ciacalle

Reference is made to memorandum W. O. Cregar to

Assoc. Dir.

Dop. AD Adm. -

Dop. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir-:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs.

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Loboratory

Logal Coun. _

Plan, & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. _

Training.

(5)

STATE

G

I-GONORIE

CLASSIFIED BY SP- 2ALM

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X./

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize

information in FBI files concerning Israeli intelligence col-

2) Phi

lection capabilities in the United States.

James J. Angleton,

Iormer Chiet, Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), advised the fBI on 0/26/75 that he appeared before

the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and in response to questions

advised

SSC he only had

secondhand and fragmentary information

concerning (Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collection!

in the United States, including (nuclear information He advised

the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly

be directed to the TBI. Sensitive technical source coverage by

the FBI of the Ismaeli Embassy yashington pral between

February, 1969, and October, 1972, developed information showing

that Angleton, during this period in his official capacity at

CIA, had

frequent personal liaison contacts with the Inbass

asrael, Israeli Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives involvin

the exchange of extremely sensitive information.

Currently the

FBI has

no pending investigation involving Israeli intelligence

collection capabilities in the United States.

The most current

information in FBI files concerning this matter involved the

investigation based on CIA information dated 11/14/68 concerning

the establishment at the Embassy of Israel,

Washington, D. C.,

an Israeli technical intelligence network.

Also under

investi-

gation during this period at New York City

was an IIS attempt to

penetrate United Nations, and official Arab establishments by the

use of live sources.

IBI IiLeS aLso, reILeCt

that as repre

periodically have operated in the Urated States since 1943

1 - 65-58700 (IIS)

REC-88

CONTINUED

- OVER

• JUL 23 1975

MRL: med

(9)

SECRET SCODE (S)

DETAILS - PAGZ

Classifted by 7005 ÷M-

Categories 2 and 3

6 JUL 2 2 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

getC

---

## Page 2

SECRET /CODE (s)

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy 75

ACTION:

None. For information.

Wob

SECRET SCORE (s)

- 1a -

---

## Page 3

SECRET SCOPE](5)

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy 75

DETAILS:

According to referenced memorandum, James Angleton,

former Chief,

frenCheat rented ento eat one code cats we thout

counsel before three Senators and

staff members of the Senate

Select Committee (SSC) •

He was questioned concerning his knovl-

edge of Israeli capabilities to conduct. intelligence collection

(5)

in the United

States, including nuclear

information. Angleton

stated he avoided any direct answers,

(5)

advising that any Inowledge

he might have would be secondhand and fragmentary.

He informed

the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly

be directed to the FBI.

Senstive technical source coverage by the FBI of the

STATE

Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., between February, 1969, and

October, 1972, determined that Angleton, in his official capacity

at CIA,

had frequent personal liaison contacts with Israeli

Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives at the Embassy of

Israel, Washington, D. C.,

involving the exchange of extremely

sensitive information.

This special relationship was confirmed

by Angleton and other CIA officials during a meeting with an FBI

representative on 4/3/69.

At this meeting CIA representatives

stated that this liaison

with IIS was known by the White House

and the U. S. State Department. (S)

JFK (1)(B)

At the present time the FBI has no pending investigation

involving Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the

United States. (S)

The most current information in FBI files concerning

this matter involved the investigation based on CIA information

dated 11/14/68 concerning the establishment at the Embassy of

Israel, Washington, D. C., of an Israeli technical intelligence

networl directed by Avraham Hermoni, Scientific Counselor.

Hermoni,

prior to his assignment as Scientific Counselor in Washington,

D. C., was involved in the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

activities and contacts of Hermoni and colleagues at the Embassy

were investigated through 1972.

The investigations of these

individuals were discontinued as no specific information was.

developed to indicate that they had

acted unlawfully or outside

the scope of their official duties. (5)

JFK (I(B)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET/SCOPE

(5)

-2-

---

## Page 4

SECRET /§CODE (5)

W. R.

Wannall

Memorandum to Mr.

Re:

Senstudy 75

During the period of these investigations it was

determined that Embassy of Israel officials recruited U. S.

scientists for employment in Israel, and extensive liaison

was

established with individuals within U. S. scientific, political,

academic and industrial communities.

As an example, Hermoni

developed close contact with Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, Director

of Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo,

Pennsylvania, a firm which processes uranium 235 for nuclear

The basis of the discontinuation of the sensitive

technical

source coverage on the Israeli Embassy in 1972 was

a U.S. State Department directive. (5)

During this period it was also determined that the

IIS was attempting to penetrate the United Nations (UN) and

Arab diplomatic establishments in New York City.

An informant

of the New York Office, who previously engaged in intelligence

activities in the Middle East for the Israelis between 1955 and

1960 while vorking at the UN, was recontacted by Israeli intel-

ligence in August, 1968, while visiting Israel.

This informant

had access at the

extremely sensitive information from the

office of the Secretary General.

Israeli intelligence had

directed him to obtain and furnish, through a mail drop in

Belgium, interoffice communications between the Secretary General

of the

UN and his undersecretaries, and information regarding

the Middle East, particularly relating to Arab matters. (5)

In May, 1958, another informant of the New York Office,

who previously resided in the Middle East and was active in the

Igyptian intelligence

Israelis should force the Egyptians to surrender and

sign a peace

treaty.

Informant was subsequently contacted in New York City by

an Israeli intelligence agent who furnished his name as "lichael"

who showed informant a copy of his letter to Dayan.

"Michael"

subsequently "recruited" informant and furnished him a mail drop

in Italy.

"Michael" instructed informant to obtain employment at

an Arab diplonatio establishment la New York city in order to (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

STATE

JFK(I)(0)

SECRET SCOP (5)

-8-

---

## Page 5

SECRET SCOPEJ (5)

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy, 75

furnish Israeli intelligence information on Arab moves in the

Middle East crisis.

was surveilled to the Israeli Consulate where

IIS representative.

The informant subsequently received

instructions that in the event of an emergency

he should call

a specific telephone number and ask for "Paul." This telephone

number was identified as being a private line located at the

Neither of

the above-described operations is currently

active at New York. (S)

Korem, during his assignment at the Israeli Consulate

in

New

York, initiated liaison contact with the New York Office

of the r'BI. (5)

TBIHQ currently has liaison with Menachem Navoth, IIS

representative at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C.

During July, 1956, through December, 1956, while attending

American University, Washington, D. C., and employed part time

as a guard at the Embassy of Israel, Navoth was engaged in intel-

ligence activities in the United States. Navoth met with an IBI

double agent who was an employee of the U. S. State Department

on several occasions and paid the double agent $250.00 for

cooperating with the Israelis. (5)

New York currently has liaison with the Israeli Consulate. 5)

FBI files

also reflect that IIS representatives have

periodically conducted operations in the United States similar

to those described herein since 1948. (S)

gon

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