Originator: SSCSGO
From: ANGLETON, JAMES
Document date: 09/12/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

## Page 1

157-10014-10004

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

7/7/2015

Identification Form

Agency Information

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Document Information

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TO :

TITLE :

SSCSGO

ANGLETON, JAMES

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

09/12/1975

151

ANGLETON, JAMES

CIA

HUSTON PLAN

FBI

HOOVER, J. EDGAR

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS: Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/26/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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NUMBER

:157-10014-10004

RECORDS

SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 01-H-06

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

FROM

TO

SSCSGO

ANGLETON, JAMES

TITLE

DATE : 09/12/75

PAGES

: 151

SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES

HUSTON PLAN

CIA

FBI

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

HOOVER, J. EDGAR

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

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ORIGINAL

Volc1 or 3

Ohe Anited Statra Ernate

NATIONAL SECURITY

CINFORMATION

Unaurhor teed Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctlor.a

R71

Report of P'roceedinga

NVENTOGIEO

N 2/15/01

BC

Hearing held before

0300 m

BY.

ps

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

C.

• Friday, September 12, 1975

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

. 110 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 644-6000

TOP

SESRET

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CONIENTS

TESTIMONY OF

James Angleton

EXHIBITS

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8

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16:

Number

Angleton Exhibit No. A-1

Angleton Exhibit No. 1-2

Angleton Exhibit No. 1-3

Angleton Exhibit No. A-4

Angleton Exhibit No. A-5

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

1

Friday, September 12, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect

to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committ-e met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m..

in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotal, Senator Richard R. Schweiker

presiding.

(Present:

Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present:

Paul Wallach and Loch Johnson, Profession

al Staff Members.

promotos, fre

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Senator Schweiker. Mr. Angleton, the first thing we will

do is swear you in.

Will you stand and raise

your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to

give

is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

MI. Angleton.

I do.

Senator Schweiker.

As you know, since you have been

here

before, a Senator is normally present at all times during

the

testimony.

However, with the press of

Senate duties we

have not been able to effectuate that fully. So if I have

to leave -- and I will have to leave for at least a substantial

portion -- you have the right to hold up your testimony until

a Senator is returned.

so would you be willing to proceed without a

senator

present?

Mr. Angleton.

Yes.

And I understand that I am entitled to the draft of

the testimony?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

le let every witness

see it

and correct it. So there is no problem there whatever.

Mr. Angleton.

To me it is

immaterial one way or the

other.

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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, would you please state

your

name, address and organization for the record?

Mr. Angleton.

James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia,

and no organization.

Mr. Johnson.

May the record show that Senator Richard

Schweiker of Pennsylvania is present, and staff members Loch

Johnson and Paul Wallach.

MI. Angleton, I want to make sure that before we start

you understand that you have certain rights under the law and

under the Committee

Rules of Procedure. Although this

is riot

a criminal investigation, do you know you have the fifth Amend-

ment right to be silent in answer to questions if the answer

might tend to incriminate you?

MI. Angleton. I do.

MI. Johnson. Do you understand that you may be

accompanied by counsel?

MI. Angleton. • Yes.

MI. Johnson. Are you appearing here today freely and

voluntarily without counsel?

Mr. Angleton.

Yes.

MI. Johnson. Are you aware that you may stop at any

point during the examination and request counsel?

MI. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Johnson. I would like you during the proceeding to:

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let me know if at any time you would ilke to stop and take a

short recess.

Let the record also show that staff member Elliot Maxwell

1s present, but leaving.

Mr. Angleton, do you wish to make a brief opening

statement before we begin to talk about the lluston Plan?

Mr Angleton.

No, I really don't. I say that because

as of the end of December, just'shortly before Christmas, I

have had not really had much access to my files, basically in

the sense that a legman necessarily would pull things together:

I imagine that with the number of personnel

the Rockefeller

commission had, the number of personnel that you had, that

you will get all the relevant documents.

Senator Schweiker.

I hope we do: We will sure try it.

MI. Angleton.

The Huston Plan is literally about five-

eighths of an inch thick, and I think half of it is a blue-

covered report.

In other words, there is nothing much

by way of files.

Mr. Johnson. I like to forget by tracing chronologically

the events

surrounding

the

so-called Huston

pian. And it is my

understanding that the first import nt event

in this episode

has to do with a meeting held in the President's office on

June 5, 1970. And at this

meeting were the

principals of

the intelligence community, of course, including Mr. Helms

present?

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When did you first hear about this meeting, if in

fact you did hear about it?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think the first news came

when llelms called me, and I believe it was with Tom Kara-

messines, and simply stated that there would be a rather extra-

ordinary

meeting in the White House.

I think he did mention

the principals being the Executive of the USIB

and Mi. Hoover.

And that the President made some very strong!

statements' regarding the aack of domestic intelligence on the

incidents of the time.

And therefore, that he had

set up

wanted a working group set up by the principles. And in

the course of this discussion, which was very short, he

nominated me to

be the agency representative, and Dick Ober

to be my legman.

Mr. Johnson. Did Mr. Helms give you any additional

feeling for what that

meeting was about?

Mr. Angleton.

He didn't really have to, because the

question of what was going on in the country

was burning in

every investigative agency or agency in government.

In

other words, it was not -- the luston plan was jist simply the

momentum of what was happening in the country.

Mr. Johnson. Couldyou be more explicit when you say

what was happening in the country?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the question of bombings, the

questions of

protest, the question of travel abroad -- all

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the things which a contemporary newspaper would set forth,

and the statistics which Director Kelley can give you ad nauseum,

on which there was not coverage. To put it bluntly, as it

came through to me - and this is the reason I think the

thing was rather short - it was a question everybody was

asking themselves, basically, that the President of the u.s.

did not feel he had any answers, and, therefore, was more an

anger in reaction to the

inability of the country to give

him answers.

ME. Johnson.

So the summer of 1970 there was perceived

to be a definite internal

security threat?

MI. Angleton. It had been growing for a long time.

Mr. Johnson. As the leading counter intelligence

expert in the CIA, did you have any concrete evidence yourself

that there was a foreign connestion to this domestic unrest?

Mr. Angleton. The way I would comment on that is

simply that the intelligence that we had gathered, fundamentally

from December '61 on through, that the counter intelligence

effort in the government was very

important.

Mr.. Johnson.

Does that include the effort of the

Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Angleton.

Absolutely.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Johnson. Before the telephone rang we were talking

about the inadequacies of the counter intelligence effort

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in this country to include that of the CIA.

Why was the effort in this area inadequate in your

view?

=.=.

MI. Angleton. I think the reason it was inadequate

was simply that we did not have the quality of souices

to whom we could turn to resolve these problems.

Fundamentally, the degree to which

the

soviet bloc

was taking advantage of stimulating the unrest in this country.

In other words, we were dealing where everyone had a

hypothesis based on holdings, which

was quite a different

thing from having a live source who could in fact tell you

what was going on.

MI. Johnson.

SO

in response to the President's concern

about foreign connections over domestic unrest, the answer

of the CIA, at any rate, was that we are not sure, because:

we don't have adequate sources to answer that question?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think, that necessarily follows,

because I wasn't present when the President was present.

Mr. Johnson.

Let me rephrase the question, then. Mi

earlier question was, what was the degree of foreign influence

over domestic unrest?

Mr. Angleton, Well, that's a long -- I am prepared to

give you a written paper on that, but to try to verbally

reconstruct all of the scene of that period is very difficult

for me at this moment. We had bombings going on, and there

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was travel abroad, and the dissident groups - there was a

whole series of literally hundreds of incidents. The whole

question came up because of what we knew. from 1961 regard-

ing Soviet bloc political action. In other words, the

most important development in the Soviet bloc was the re-

orientriion of their

services into their respective central

committees to make a return to Leninist principles, that

every intelligence operation must have a political objective.

so, the verblage of the day, and the intelligence we

had on Communist Parties, plus what we knew on secret

sources, we could hypothicate in terms of the civil unrest

and the travel of Americans abroad.

Our weakness was anyone

in the American department's concern who could

give us the

black and white answers as to what groups and what was going

on.

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MI. Johnson.

I have looked at

some reports presented

to the white House in 1969 by the FBI and the CIA, and those

reports conclude that there is little concrete evidence

of foreign support, although there was a potential for

such support to increase in the future.

I am just wondering --

Mr. Angleton.

I don't know what reports you are re-

ferring to.

All I can say

is that

there was obviously

very cautious approach to this when it

was dealing with

the subject which might result in another Presidential ie-

action.

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In other words, you had to be able to prove it, and I

can well understand that any reports going in pilor to this

meeting would be hedged, because within the Agency itself there

were those who took a very staunch stand that there was no

foreign involvement.

Again, they had no more information than we had that

would justify their position.

And these were fairly senior in-

dividuals, mainly on the overt side of the business.

Their

attitude was very definitely that there was nothing to it.

Mr. Johnson.

But you have indicated to me, if I am

reading you properly, that there were gaps

in intelligence

concerning the degree of foreign influence

over domestic un-

rest.

MARO A PAUL

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Is that inaccurate?

Mr. Angleton.. No, that is an

accurate statement, and

it goes

back

again to what I described to be a source who

would have access

to information that comes into the

First chief director of the GKS that deals with American

problems:

MI. Joinson.

Why is it that we didn't have such

sources?

MI. Angleton.

I can't answer that.

MI. Johnson.

What I am driving at, is whether or

not the intelligence agencies are constrained or fettered by

barriers to collecting quality intelligence, and if so, what

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these barriers are.

Mr. Angleton. There were no barriers as such. I mean,

speaking from the foreign point of view, it is just simply

that the target is one of the most difficult ones that one

can conceive of, because you are dealing with a police state,

unless they are on internal security, and with a degree of

efficiency that simply doesn't fit in with western terms.

Mr. Johnson. What are the topics that apparently

were discussed at this June 15 meeting at the White House?

What was

the degree of cooperation between the CIA and the

FBI, in particulare the liaison between the two agencies?

What was your feeling about the quality of liaison between the

FRI

and the CIA in June of 1970?

MI. Angleton. This still doesn't have the official

date on it?

Mr. Johnson.

I understand that in May of 1970 Mr.

Hoover terminated the official liaison.

MI. Angleton. Well, naturally this was a very big blow

to every one concerned.

Mr. Johnson. It was more than a symbolic gesture,

then?

21.

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MI. Angleton. Absolutely. And it wasn't on a terminat-

ing liaison with CIA, it was a termination, as

I recall, of

all liaison in government with the exception of the white

House.

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MI. Johnson.

So in May of 1970 we had a very serlous

rupture in relationships between the CIA

Mr. Angleton.

If that is the accurate date of the

Colorado Case, there was a very serious rupture.

MI. Johnson. In what sense was it serious? I wonder

if you could elaborate.

MI. Angleton. Well, fundamentally liaison is misleading,

a misleading word, because the fruits of liaison are obtained

through dáily contact.

In other words, it is

a creative process, it is not

a static thing of a post office box.

It means that cases

are discussed, argued, meetings are held, and it is a type

of creative process

that you cannot reduce to paper in

correspondence.

MI. Johnson.

Of course, there was the telephone.

couldn't the

same kind of conversations take place over

secure telephones?

Mr. Angleton. Impossible.

MI. Johnson. So in face to face liaison is quite im-

portant in your opinion?

Mr. Angleton. It is essential, because it is a

process of one side supplying the gaps to the other side,

which could

not prior to thatmeeting

have been identified.

It is only when all the case

from one side is laid out, and

then you have

a

rebuttal, and so on, and you define future

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courses of investigation, and you reconsider actions that

were going to take place. You simply do not have enough

stenographers in Washington to keep up to date with that type

of give and take.

MI. Johnson. It is my understanding that San Papich

fulfilled this role of liaison with the FBI for a long

period of time.

Were you his contact in the CIA for liaison purposes?

MI. Angleton. Well, the history of the liaison is that

it started back in the days of Admiral Hillencotter with

Ben DeLoach, and he was eventually -- his successor became

Papich, whose alternate was Charlie Deak, from San Francisco,

and

so Papich took it over, I believe, around 1952, and

was

Charlie Deak, and later Bill Creager, up until the incident

in Colorado in which it was terminated.

MI. Johnson.

And how

often would you get together

personally with these individuals to discuss interagency

problems?

Mr. Angleton, Well, I would say that sam had two contacts.-

excuse me -- he had the following contacts.

He had contact

with my liaison section, headed by Mrs. Jane Roman, and

this dealt with the broad

routine business of the agency, much

of it not so routine when you deal with operational cases.

His other contact would be with the office of security,

which eventually became, to my knowledge, so burdensome

that

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they put Bill Creager on as full time liaison with the office

of Security, plus Bill Creager was handling many of the

interagency committees representing USIB and many others. He was

a perennial

person sent to the committees interagency-wise.

And then Papich's contact was with myself and my

various deputies.

That was on a daily basis approximately.

MI. Johnson. In the summer of 1970 it seems to me, then?

the country and the intelligence community faced these

facts of life: proncunced domestic unrest;

inability to

completely uderstand the degree of foreign connections over

domestic unrest; and a severing of relationships between the

FBI and the rest of the intelligence community.

Mr. Angleton.

with the exception of the White House.

Mr. Johnson. With the exception of the white House.

Were

there any other factors that we can bring up as

background in this situation of June 1970 that would be

particularly relevant?

Mr. Angleton. There would be also the allegations

made by bloc defectors, which was maintained

at a counter

intelligence level, and

was never injected into the body poli-

tic.

21:

261

In other words, counter intelligence people were aware

of the allegations made, and yet there was a great difference

of opinion as to the validity of those assertions.

MI. Johnson. What allegations are you thinking of?

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Mr. Angleton. I am referring to the allegations of the

activities of the KGB and the bloc services.

let's take a simple one. That is whether Rumania was

In other words,

independent of the Soviet bloc or not, and this had, of course,

far-reaching political impact, because President Nixon had a spe-

cial relationship with Rumania.

The estimators were taking

the position that Rumania was in a position comparable to

Tito when he broke with Stalin.

Now, on the counter intelligence level this couldn't

be supported.

First, it couldn't be supported by way of information

derived from

defectors.,

And second, thare were too many cases which were in

fact exposed which showed the most intimate relationship

between the

Soviet and Rumanian intelligence services.

only within the last few weeks there has been a Rumanian

de-

fector who has detected to the Norwegians, and apparently

has exposed a great deal of the intelligence activity of

Rumania against Norway.

So, we have cases that we know about in 1961, without

knowing the name of the agent, and one in France

in parti

cular. . If our identification is correct - this is infor-

mation, I might add, that we passed to the French in 1962 --

there was a French

ex-Colonel who was being

operated by the

Soviets and the Rumanian intelligence, and they gave other

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descriptions of the person without a name.

Subseguently, after some years, we acquired the man's

real name, and we passed it to the French.

They picked him

up and he acknowledged that he was an agent. He acknowledged

the broad outlines of the allegation.

He was taken by two French counter intelligence people

to his apartment and while they were searching his quarters,

he jumped out of the window and committed suicide.

so there hus never been a thorough interrogation of him,

but by tracking on our information, and trying to reconstruct

his activities, it showed very clearly that the Rumanian and

Soviet services were working hand in glove, and that the rum

Rumanians were not reluctant -- that the quality of their FEI's

essential elements of intelligence, were for the warsaw

Pact.

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Now, we had several other cases in NATO of very

deep penetrations into the most highly classified information

by Rumanian intelligence, and this also resulted in the

French breaking up an

entire network and expelling people

from Rumania.

Now, these were issues, that if you accept them as being

more accurate than the so-called overt manifestations of the

rumanians, where they are telling us a story, then you

could not distinguish between Rumania and the Soviet Union

as a member of the opposition.

And, therefore, it is ironic

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that the President visited Rumania and danced in the streets

in the Ciescue at the time that the Norwegians were picking

up the network in Norway.

And than the Congress granting favored nations status

and trade agreements to Rumania.

And, therefore, we had sources that stated thia was a

part of the reorientation of 1959, of presenting a type of

wilderness of mirrors to the Wegt, and to encourage the West

to deal with these countries independently of one another.

so, this again permeated the counter intelligence

picture, not only in Washington, but in all allied capitols,

and it was part and parcel of the kind of counter intelligence

spectrum, where you could never come to grips at resolving

these matters.

One of the reasons simply was trat counter intelligence

did not have a voice at

any policy level in the government

and the Bureau could go along with their views, and we could

go along with our views, but there wasn't any third party

statue who banged heads together and imposed time factors as

to when these issues

should be resolved one way of the

other.

24

25

We lived with this from 1961, 1962 on, in all leverls

of intelligence.

Mr. Johnson. Do you think that Tom Charles Huston

viewed himself as a potential arbitor for domestic intelligence

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disagreements within the community?

---

Mr. Angleton. I think he did. Because his short

"letter of instructions to the heads of the intelligence commun

Ity said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger'g was

in foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to

speak, that he was the ultimate authority in the Executive

for domestic security.

MI. Johnson.

I believe Mr. Angleton is referring to

a July 1970 memorandum.

MI. Angleton.

That is correct.

Mr. Johnson. What directions did Mr. Helms give to you!

if any, concerning how you ought to respond as the Chief

CIA representative to the work group sessions held to

draft a raport for the President on intelligence problems?

Mr. Angleton.

He didn't give me necessarily any

instruction.

He just simply stated that the President had

outlined his needs, that Huston would in due course call a

meeting. He may have stated that the FBI would chair the

meeting, and he attended the first meeting.

MI. Johnson. Who attended it, ME. Helms?

Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Helms. But he attended only for a

few moments. Huston made the opening remarks, as I recall,

and since it was being held in our building, Helms made a bries

appearance..

so to speak, the host. And he took off, and

I don't think from that moment on he attended any other meetings.

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Mr. Johnson.... Could you tell me your impressions of the

relationship between Mr. Sullivan, who was chairman of this

work group, and Mr. Huston, who was the White House reprcentay

tive to this work group?

Mr. Angleton.

Well, it was my understanding that they

had known one another for some time prior to this, and

that Sullivan

was seeing a great deal of Mr. Huston on domestic

intelligence

problems.

And that would be-- I don't know

how natural and normal it is. I know that since they main-

tained the open link of liaison to

the White House, there were

probably a great number of reports going to the White louse

from the Bureau directly.

I would

assume that within the White House staff that

as the work was parceled out, that lluston was probably the

recipient,

and as a recipient would bring him in touch with

the domestic intelligence, in those days the Internal Security

Division of the FBI, which was headed by Mr. Sullivan.

MI. Johnson, Would it be fair to say that Mr. Sullivan,

who had a great deal of

experience in counter intelligence.

was cultivating the relatively inexperienced Me. Huston,

and perhaps tutoring him on the difficulties that the in

telligence community

faced

in obtaining the kind of infor-

mation the President wanted regarding foreign connections

over domestic unrest?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I wouldn't characterize it that way.

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I would say that Bill Sullivan - that he was a person that

would postulate a position, and then it would be in his nature

to propagate it. I don't think that. Bill Sullivan ever

propagated anything that he didn't belleve in very deeply.

I know that he was extremely frustrated and I think part

of his frustration was what the counter intelligence always

encountered, and that is that there are no higher forums

that take into account the

finding of counter intelligence.

In other words, it tends to feed on itself, because

unlike espionage, which is conducted for the purpose of

disseminating information to customers, counter intelligence

produces intelligence for its own consumption. And, therefore,

it tends to be blocked off, and there is no question that

Bill; who spent many 'years, Bill Sullivan, who spent many years

in the battle, underwent the frustrations that everybody

did. I dare say that he found a kindred spirit with

luston, which is reflected in the correspondence that has

been published between Huston, Ehrlichman, laldeman, and so on.

Me. Johnson. I wonder if you could be more explicit about

the frustrations that Mr. Sullivan might have been propa-

gating to Mr. lluston.

Are you referring to Mr. Hoover's raising of barriers

to

certain intelligence collection techniques?

Mr. Angleton. This all gets into the world of hearsay.

But it deals with everything as to the Bureau's ability to

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operate, and to have a voice. That would cover all type of

domestic collection.

Mr. Johnson.

Is it true that Mr. Hoover underwent

a kind of transportation in his attitudes toward what intelli-

gence collection methods were feasible and acceptable in this

6

====-=

country, and that he refused to conduct certain activities that

he had conducted in the forties and fifties?

MI. Angleton. Well, during the JOhnson Administration

and my facts by way of time may not be accurate -- he was

10

being attacked in the Congress over many operational techni-

ques. It is my understanding that he looked to the white

House for some relief or approbation, and he received none.

I think his attitude was

that if he was not going to have the

support of the Executive, he was not going to subject the

1:..

Bureau to a losing battle with politicians. Therefore he

!..

began systematically to cut back on all activities.

MI. Johnson. As an expert in counter intelligence and

intelligence collection methods, do you think Mr. Hoover

was being unfairly criticized in the Congress and in the

for certain techniques that the Bureau had

used?

Mr. Angleton.

Well, I can't recall having read

all of

this.

I knew it more from people who were knowledgeable

and involved, and I think that there was a lack of both the

support of the President and the Attorney General.

I know

that I have been told that when the President's foreign

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all type of

nderwent

what intelli-

ible in this

tivities that

linistration

.. he was

al techni-

e White

ved none.

=0 have the

ict the

ore he

.==

::

ence and

sover

n the

ead

all of

¡eable

oth the

I know

isyn

TOP SECRET

21

intelligence board isolated these areas of neglect, this

eventually resulted in a meeting with the then Attorney

General, the purpose of all this being to restore different

kinds of coverage to the Bureau.

Mr. Johnson. What time period are we talking about, the:

Johnson Administration?

MI. Angleton. The Johnson Administration.

And it is my!

- understanding that the President's attitude was that he was

not going to give any instructions to MI. Hoover, because he

had never told MI. Hoover to cut back on operations

affecting

the national security.

And so the whole exercise went for naught.

MI. Johnson.

But given Johnson'g

statement, if indeed

that is accurate, wasn't that in essence a green light for Mr.

Hoover to continue?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't think so. I think he would

regard that as a passive thing, it was not charging him for

directing him, it was given to third parties

and not

given to him directly.

It was simply to satisfy the third

parties without taking any action with Mr. Hoover.

MI. Johnson. So the upshot was

for MI. Hoover to elimin-

ate certain collection methods he had

used

before?

MI. Angleton. Gradually eliminate them.

MI. Johnson. Now, what impact did this climination of

previous.collection techniques have

upon the cIA from your

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perspective?

Mr. Angleton.

I think the basic thing was that it

gradually closed sources of information and quality of in-

formation. And more important, - and I think this is

axiomatic -- that counter intelligence in about only as good

as the relations between the FBI and the CIA are.

In other words, any activities we took up with the

Bureau the Bureau always had constructive operational Judg-

ment to make. And I think by the same token we had a lot

to say on the matter. As your cata base disappeared,

then your whole perceptions became cloudly, you didn't have the

infornicion. And you could not levy on the Bureau as we had

prior to this requirement, targets, and othermatters where we

had coverage abroad. And this interplay between the external

and internal is the heart of the operational task.

In other words, to us, if the Bureau is operating one

part of the psectrum and we are operating the other, then

we would have total coverage.

But when you don't have this

kind of relationship, and they can't follow up, and they are

thwarted from doing many things, I would say the operational

value diminishes, and eventually the final blow, banning,

doing away with liaison.

Mr. JOhnson.

Let's turn directly to the meeting

held out at Langley to write the special. report for the

President. And I want to get into the

gubstance of that

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report a little bit later. But initially I wonder if you

could give me your recollection about the personalities in-

volved and who seemed to be setting the agenda for this

meeting, and what the role of the NSA generally speaking was,

and the DIA, and the CIA, and the FBI?

Can we point to a motivating force here, a certain group

that was leading the operation?

MI. Ingleton.

You haven't one of the tables of or-

ganization of that group so that I can see the names?

MI. Johnson. Yes, I do.

Let's take

a

short recess.

(Recess.)

Mr. Johnson. Back on the record.

Based on your recollection of the individuals involved

in the work group

sections at Langley, I wonder if you could

give us a feel for the role that the various spokesmen played

at that meeting?

For example, John Downie as a representative of the

Army.

MI. Angleton.

Well, going down the list, naturally the

key individual was Bill Sullivan of the FBI.

Mr. Johnson. Why was he the key individual?

ME. Angleton. He was the key individual because Mr.

loover was the Chairman, and he was representing Me. Hoover

under Presidential instruction, or instructions from Hoover,

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nder if you

sonalities in

1 for this

Ly speaking was,

, a certain group

tables of or-

: names?

duals involved

" if you could

pokesmen played

tive of the

:, naturally the

¡dual?

because

MI.

ig Mr. Hoover

from Hoover,

TOP SECRET

24

1

and in turn delegated to Sullivan. And the basic concerns

?

dealt with domestic activities in the FBI.

Mr. Johnson. Did MI. Sullivan bring to the meeting a

distinct point of view on the problem of intelligence gaps?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, very deeply. He was probably one of

===-

the most cognizant.

Mr. Johnson. What was his viewpoint, as you recall it?

Mr. Angleton. Well, his viewpoint, I think, was the one

achoed by Huston. And I think that to recast this,

Huston was the authority present, because he came cloaked

ma .....

"with white llouse authority.

Mr. Johnson.

1::

He was certainly not the authority when

i; it came to inter-intelligence, and the problems that ci

specialists faced?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was very knowledgeable. He had

...

obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the

meeting. He knew precisely what none of us really knew, that

is, the depth of white llouse concern. In fact, the

most dramatic moment, I think, was at the beginning

of

one meeting, ort

some stage in the meetings, after

preliminary draft had been put forward, he found it totally

26

unacceptable, an his comments were, to the effect that the

subcommittee

was not being respongive to the President's

needs.

Mr. Johnson, I wonder if you could explain this to me.

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MI. Sullivan was MI. Hoover's representative, and.

Mr. Hoover

wanted intelligence restraints maintained on various collec-

tion procedures.

And yet you tell me that Mr. Sullivan

tended to agree with Mr. Huston's point of view, which was

that restraints needed

to be carefully scrutinized, and

quite possibly lowered.

So I am wondering why Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hoover's re-

presentative, didn't reflect Mr. Hoover'a point of view?

Mr. Angleton.

He obviously didn't agree with him.

Mr. Johnson. Wasn't that a rather difficult situation

for MI. Sullivan to be in, then?

Mr. Angleton.

I don't know. You would hve to ask

him. He didn't seem to manifest any difficulties with his

role.

Mr. Johnson.

At no time during the meetings at Langley

did he express his dilemma representing Mr. Hoover on the

one hand, but wishing

to lower

restraints on the other hand.

Mr. Angleton. He may have. But it doesn't stick out.

in my mind. I think he played this role very straight.

MI. Johnson.: Do you remember there being a

military point of view at this meeting?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Downie -- the one remark that

Downie made -- and he may have made it more than once, about

which he expanded at some length, was that he couldn't

even

afford to keep the minutes of the meetings in his own office.

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And then he went on to some length about the troubles the

military had. I think it had to do with ROTC rioting, and a

tremendous number of other civil acts against the military.

And he believed that up through the non-commissioned officers

that the thing would be leaked, to the

detriment of the Army,

or the Pentagon. He posed questions as to how he was going

to be able to take it up to higher authority within the

Pentagon, and

really, this was the dilemma which he kept

pounding on, that he didn't know how

he was going to

handle the paper, and he didn't know how he was going to

play any role in it, because of the discontent wihin the

Defense establishment, the draftees and what not; the cleri-

cal, and

non-commissioned officer.

Mr. Johnson.

llow did you feel on a more conceptual

level about the role of the military insisting domestic

intelligence collection.

Mr. Angleton. He thought that in recruiting centers

and campuses of ROTC, and places where intelligence existed,

that there was

a real problem.

Mr. Johnson.

And did he see a role for the military

in actively assisting in the gathering of domestic intelli-

gence to find out here about domestic unrest.

Mr. Angleton.

Yes, a lot of it had to do with aetivi-

ties

against the Pentagon, against soldiers.

Mr. Johnson. But isn't it true that during this period

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the military was under severe criticism for earlier civilian

surveillance programs?

Mr. Angleton.

From where?

MI. Johnson. I belleve the military was preparing for

hearings before Sam Ervin's Committee on the subject of milit-

ary surveillance over civilians.

To some degree the mili-

tary was under public criticism for being in the domestic

intelligence gathering field.

Mr. Angleton. But I think the military took the posi

tion that they were responsible for

their own security in

conjunction with all other investigative agencies.

In other words, there has always been a cardinal rule

in government that the head

of every agency

is responsible

for his own security, that when

the

FBI develops information

on any subversion, within any branch of the government, they

send copies of those reports to

the heads of the agency

concerned for their action.

And, therefore, as far as I know no one had turned over

the military prerogatives.

MI. Johnson.

Do these prerogatives extend beyond

the military base itself?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think it has

anything to do with what directly affects the security of

the armed forces.

MI. Johnson. Was there an NSA point of view that emerso

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in these meetings on the subject of intelligence, collection

procedures?

MI. Angleton.

The NSA position, I think, was simply

that they nceded an espionage assist to further their own

activities, the results of their own activities, and that Mr.

Hoover, In changing his operational posture, was depriving

NSA of very highly sensitive collateral, which resulted in

one, non-production, or if there was production, tremendous

costs to arrive at the

same intelligence break-through, and

unfortunately getting away

from real time collection.

Mr. Johnson.

Are you talking about foreign

intelligence?

1r. Angleton.

Foreign intelligence, foreign and

domestic, but where it is interrelated. But the real time

factor was that with the Bureau's help they were able to

have real time in terms of their collection.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnson. We are talking about the point.of view of

the NSA.

I am wondering next if the CIA brought to these

meetings any perspective on intelligence collection problems

and how to resolve the difficulties with

gaps

in intelligence?

Mr. Angleton.

i don't think it brought it anything

that wasn't well known in the community.

MI. Johnson. And that relates back again to Mr. Hoover

throwing up barriers on certain procedures?

MI. Angleton.

That is right.

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I mean, there wasn't any secret in the community re-

garding the gradual cutting back of liaison, and cutting

back of operational support, and cutting back responsiveness

to requests, in other words, ever sector of the domestic

intelligence, which

was a service of common concern which the

Burcau bestowed on the community.

And everyone could see, they were too experienced not tu

see it all disintegrate, and more important, they knew about

it as it happened, because there

is a great deal of communi-

cation within the intelligence community. And, therefore,

if the head of NSA was asking Mr. Hoover, and he had been

turned down on certain things, then that would be known

to

many others who were expecting NSA to produce as many as they

had been producing a few months prior to that.

So as those things dried up, it just hit more and

more individuals in the community.

It wasn't any theoretical,

it was all fairly hard core coverage.

MI. Johnson.

Earlier you said that Mr. Hoover decided

not to allow certain operations because of lack of support

from the White House

and the Attorney General?

Mr. Angleton.

I said that is my understanding.

Mr. Johnson.

Is it also true that Mr. Hoover, going

one step further, was concerned about the image of the Bureau,

and

he was afraid that that image might be blackened by pubiii

criticism of techniques that had been

used once before.

2:

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Mr. Angleton. I think so. I would go a step further

and state that the success and stature of the Bureau depends

in large measure on the public support. And once the public

support starts diminishing, it has a direct impact on the

effectiveness of the Bureau, because they rely on much of the

citizenry of this .country to come forward as informants and

voluntary cooptees of the Bureau.

And once: conficence is lost in the Bureau, they lose

this public support. And I think MI. Hoover was very

conscious, and probably more so than many people in the

government, was very conscious and sensitive to the degree of,:

public support, or the lack

thereof.

And I don't think he was going to stand idly by and have

the Bureay made a

scapegoat. when the Executive wouldnot

stand forward.

Mr. Johnson.

Before turning to the actual special

report itself, I wonder if you can tell me something about

the drafting of the special report, and also the degree of

consensus among participants as to the product that emerged

from those meetings.

Mr. Angleton.

To my knowledge it was no real dispute

in the product. Of my own party, used ober as my research

associate.

In other words, when I needed information re-

garding the strength of the operation and activities, ard

so on, his job was to produce the study.

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Much of this was well known to the community, as I say,

prior to the meeting, I mean with the gaps.

so, I don't recall offhand -- this is nothing that stands

forward as in any disagreement - there may have been some,

oh, verbiage, but I can't recall it.

Mr. Johnson. Was the actual drafting or the report done

by the Bureau?

MI. Angleton. I think they took all the proposals and

came

forward at each meeting with the drafting.

Now, whether we cooperated with them in that I don't

know.

But I know that, as I recall, they would submit drafts

that tried to reflect the consensus of the prior meeting.

Mr. Johnson.

Let me at this point introduce into the

record Exhibit A-l, Mr. Angleton, a special report inter-

agency

Committee on Intelligence, ad hoc, June 1970.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-I :

for identification.)

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Mr. Johnson. Now, this is the 43-page pecial, report

that eventually went to MI. Nixon. And essentially it had three

major sections.

The first section was a threat assessment. Do you

recall what the CIA contribution was to the writing of the

threat assessment, just in general terms?

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Johnson. Back on the record.

Mr. Angleton. From reading this, I would say that I

don't think there was any dissident on the fact as laid forth

here. We now know a great deal more about the Vinceremos

Brigate because we have had defectors

from the Cuban DGI, and

their intelligence service.

And we are quite accurate

on the

uses of that for espionage, and so on.

And the projections

there, I don't think we dispute

today.

MI. JOhnson.

The

second

section of the special report

had to do with options for the President.

There

are parts

that are somewhat indistinct, but what I wanted to focus

your attention on was the actual options presented to the

President under six different collection titles, the first

one being communications intelligence. And you can

see

on gpage 25 there is a series of options provided for the

President with a little space

whereby he could check off which

one he approved.

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Now, what I would like to know is, from your

perspective as a CIA representative, of what relevance were

these optlons to your organization?

MI. Angleton.

What is the intelligence directive No. 6?

I don't recall that.

MI. Johnson. That just outlines for the NSA its mandate

in monitoring the communicationa facilities, international

communications facilities, used by American citizens. You

might want to briefly glance over this section which explains

it.

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Communications intelligence is an activ-

ity of the NSA, as I understand it. And from reading the text

it seems like NSA had primary interest here. But I wonder if

the CIA was also interested in relaxing restraints in this

area.

MI. Angleton.

Every participant is a consumer of NSA !

product. And therefore they all have a an equal interest,

they all had a departmental interest in enhancing the coverage

by NSA.

Mr. Johnson.

And this would have included the DIA

as well?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because that is all they

are, they are under -- NSA is under the Secretary of Defense.

MI. Johnson. Areyou

aware of the NSA watch list?

Mr. Angleton. I am aware - you mean

ag of today, or

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then?

Mr. Johnaon. Then

Mr. Angleton. I know they had a watch list.

Mr. Johnson. . Let me be more specific, then.

Was not the CIA providing names of individuals of

Interest to the CIA who had been placed on: the NSA watch list?

MI. Angleton.

Are we talking now about domestic

intelligence, or normally?

Mr. Johnson.

Let's begin with normally.

MI. Angleton.

Normally all customers, to my knowledge,

would levy requirements on

NSA.

Mr. Johnson.

In the case of the CIA, what would be an

example of a name

that might be sent to the NSA to be

placed on a watch list? You

say a terrorist.

Would that be an example?

MI. Angleton.

A terrorist, an organization, intelligence

individuals, political individuals, travel control.

Mr. Johnson.

Would any of these names include the

names of American citizens?

Mr. Angleton.

As of that time I don't know. I would

assume that if they were American citizens coming within

our jurisdiction, traveling abroad, there was reasonable

grounds for believing that they either belonged to an or-

ganization, or have been in contact with foreign

intelligence

or foreign officials, that these

names would appear on the

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watch list.

Mr. Johnson.

So before the Hustón plan the CIA

was levying requirements on the NSA to include on the watch

list names of relevance to the CIA?

Mr. Angleton.

That is right.

MI. Johnson.

Now, would one objective of the Huston

Plan from

the CIA point of view have been to perhaps expand

the number of individuals being monitored that were of in-

terest to the CIA?

MI. Angleton.

I can't answer that, because at this mo-

ment I do not recollect the procedures or the

channels of command

through which these watch lists were

built up. I can't recall whether it went through Staff D or

whether components in the Agency have independent liaisons

with NSA.

In other words, the overt side of the House weould ob-

viously have relations with NSA directly. And the CIA

people who were observers with the USIB

covering other sectors!

of the Agency would obviously have liaison in substansive

matters, and then the clandestine side would hve relations.

Now, it is that channel command, the channel of liaison,

that would normally have been through Staff D.

MI. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, I am puzzled by these options

presented on page 25. Let me read the second one to you:

"Present interpretation should be broadened to permit

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a program for coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S.

citizens using international facilities".

MI. Angleron.

Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Wasn't that already being done before the

Huston Plan or before the special plan?

Mr. Angleton. I would have to see what this directive

No. E says, since it related to that.

Mr. Johnson. Do you have any knowledge that before June

of 1975 the NSA was in fact covering the communications of

U.S. citizens using

international facilities?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

MI. Johnson.

You don't recall getting any product

from NSA?

MI. Angleton. I didn't handle -- I had a unit that

worked on counter intelligence data that came from

communications

intelligence.

And there were so many pro-

grams in the clandestine

services on travel control --

in other words, all through the Cuban period there were

literally thousands and thousands of pages of information

derived from all other

sources.

During the Cuban

phase there was all the travel controi

on all foreigners

going to Cuba. And I asgume that covered

U.S. citizens. What I am trying to say is that there are

so many components in the clandestine side of the business

that would be engaged in

special operations which through

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Staff/D they would levy requirements.

MI. Johnson. But do you also see my point in I am

wondering why these options would be written for

the President's approval when in fact there is some indication

that these activitles were already going?

Mr. Angleton.

Because I think it relates to the

question of interpretation of the President's Directive No. 6,

in other words, that NSA was obviously complying with some

portion of that intelligence directive which the group felt

should be changed.

In other words, they were relying on that verblage

to justily some fields of Inquiry into which they weren't

going, because they didn't have the personnel. But if we

had the directive it would be very clear.

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Mr. Johnson. Do you recall at the time any discussion about

the need to make this directive more explicit by having the

President -

Mr. Angleton. No. All I know is, there was a directive

that was inhibiting to NSA. What paragraph of it, what it

said I cannot recall. But it was something that they held up

as a restriction in their liberty of action.

• MI. Johnson. From reading the text here one gleans the

understanding that restriction had to do with coverage by NSA

of communications o US citizens using international facilities

And obviously they wanted the directive to be relaxed and

broadened to allow that kind of coverage. And

go the dilemma

I am having is why they wished to have the President expand

that coverage when in fact the coverage was already there?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether it was present in the

sectors we are discussing. I mentioned to you the Cuban thing.

There could be dozens of projects which would not be known to

the Counterintelligence, which would be known to Staff D, in

which there was direct

NSA

involvement in supplying coverage.

I mean, the ones I can think of were such things as Cuban,

were matters where there was an enhanced interest on some

matter, operational or otherwise.

But NSa does have liaison

officers covering the needs of NSA and so on.

MI. Johnson. The second collection method discussed in the

Special Report has to do with

electronic surveillances and

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penetrations. Of what relevance was this particular method

to the CIA? The second opening talks about intensification of

coverage of individuals and groups in the US who pose a major

threat. Now, based on your recollection of the Langley meetings,

to which organization did this operation refer? Who was going

to intensify the coverage?

Mr. Angleton. The coverage would have been FBI, I think.

In other words, they are the only ones that were conducting an

electronic surveillance. If you leave NSA out of the picture.

MI. Johnson. Within the US?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. And I think our problem, or the

problem that communities always had, is the lack of broad

coverage to begin with on foreign diplomatic establishments,

and individuals within those establishments. And I will give

examples, of at least I will give one example which I think

characterizes the hard core counterintelligence interests.

Soviet intelligence is probably most deadly when it recruits

a foreign diplomat from a friendly country, say, in Moscow, and

follows his career. Eventually he ends up in the US. He has

all the colurition of a friendly country, and thereafter all

kinds of doors are open to him. And he is not under surveillande:

Yet having diplomatic cover he can deal with legal KGb and the

GRU at social functions. And the classic case is the case of

TOr.

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Wennerstrom, The Swedish Alr Attache, who had been recruited

by the

Soviets in the middle forties. While he was in Moscow

the Soviets built him up as the source of the American military,

and under Soviet guidance he produced a great amount of infoma

tion

for our attache's, which looked as though he was risking

his own life on their bahalf to acquire information, it being

unknown that he was being manipulated all the time by the

Soviets.

So many years passed. And eventually he was assigned to

Washington. And the American military, because of his favors

that he had done to American military in Moscow, opened up all

the gates to him regarding US installations, and teated him

almost like one of their own.

Now, his control was in the Soviet Embassy.. And he would

take microfilm rolled up in

the palm of his hand, and as he

shook hands he would make his delivery. And he had dead drops,

and so on.

Now, taking that one case,

and basing it on all of the modus

operandi which has come out of the knowledge of the KGB, we

would believe that there should be a listing of all diplomats

who have served in Moscow, because the realcenter for compromise

and recruitment is there, by the Secretary Chief Directorate.

And they eventually turn it over to the First Chief Directorate,

which is the CIA side of it, when a man leaves Russia. So the

danger point in terms of economy of personnel allocated to Bloc

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countries, and they have no activities really covering the so-

called friendly countries. But you could build up a priority

list for anyone who had served behind the iron curtain as

distinct from any of the other embassles, then if you didn't

have constant electronic coverage at least you would have

periodic coverage to take the pulse of that individual, what

is he doing.

Now, one of the cases the Bureau had involved an individual

from a friendly foreign country, and they found him in touch

with one of the Bloc countries, and a lot of other activities.

This was given to the intelligence - or

the security service

of his native country. Eventually they broke him as a Bloc

Intelligence agent. Now, that came from electronic coverage.

So my point is simply that the status of status for counter-

intelligence purposes is totallly inadequate, based on the

information which we had relating to modus operandi.

MI. Johnson. So this has been strictly an FBI activity?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but working together with the other

investigative agencies, because the Pentagon has all of the

liaison sections, and

they have hundreds of officers who wander

in the diplomatic milieu, it is a question of tightening up

the controls where

there is memorandum of record, and of meet-

ings, and social events, and

so, where they

are dealing with

Bloc people these should be deposited with the FlI in order that

they have a data base

against their electronic coverage.

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In other words, it is absolutely unbellevable that with all the

conterintelligence data and defectors that we do not have the

manpower and the lists to perform this relatively easy type

of coverage. In fact, in my view it is almost irresponsible.

Mr. Johnson. When it comes to this kind of coverage, does

not the CIA also involve itself in planning and landing to the

Bureau the use of sophisticated gadgetry?

MI. Angleton. We have loaned atuff, I don't know how much,

to the Bureau. But again I have had something to do with the

policy there. My attitude over many years - and I was on the

Technical Production Board was that anything the Agency

developed by way of a sophisticated piece of eguipment, that

prior to its use by us, where it could be compromised abroad,

that it be offered - an offer and refusal business would be

given to the Bureau to see whether it could be used domestically.

before its classification of secrecy became exposed, on the

gournds hat the priority for the

Agency is the espionage

situation in the US. And therefore if we developed a piece of

equipment, they should be brought in and they

should be exposed

to the equipment to see whether they can apply to

a domestic

case: And then if they refuse it we submit it at much

lower

security abroad, where essentially, when it is compromised it

empromises the use of that equipment against all Bloc services.

In other words, we had a piece of equipment compromised in

Mexico. And the equipment was being used in other places

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abroad. So you have to immediately know that that service would

have immeidately take counter action in all'installations around

the world, but it would also tell the other Bloc services. And

therefore your dilemma is, you had given it to the Bureau with-

out telling them of its compromise. And therefore on the

technical side you have to have the closest exchange. And by the

same token, if they have a breakthrough, and equipment no longer

has the same sensitivity to them, then we should get it for

the purpose of either improving it or utilizing it.

MI. Johnson. Would the CIA also have a rule inviting

personnel

to administer this equipment in this country vis-a-vig

dipolomatic establishments?

MI. Angleton. Not to my knowledge. I can see the Bureau,

say, a very hard case goiny to any government agency, or even

to the private sector, to bring in people who are superior to

their own, who complement or supplement their own. In other

words, I think when you have any operation, and you find a

fault in it, or a lack of axpertise, you go where you can

find

it, without regard to charters or all that stuff.

MI. Johnson.. If you will look at the two operations on

electronic surveillances and penetrations, there is quite a

difference between

the second operation and the third operation.

The third one has to do with diplomatic establishment, but the

second one has to do with coverage of individual groups who

pose a major threat. Did the CIA have an interest in using

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this particular collection method within the US against certain

groups taht might pose a threat to internal security?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that -- I don't remember

explicitly, but I don't think that it was our desire that

we would take on this activity if we could get the produce from

the Bureau. Our interest would be to see what breaks out of that

inorder that we could take the foreign element, if the individual

traveled abroad, and there was a foreign angle to it, then we

would take over that aspect of it.

And furthermore, in our

findings abroad we would have those meetings with the Bureau

that we didn't refine in the requirements and we could target

more accurately individuals. When once you get latched on

someone that is domestic, and you make the foreign connection,.

you are in. And

you have got the Bureau controlling some

double on their side, and

we are controlling some abroad, then

you can expand that thing into the entire network all the way

back.

MI. Johnson. Did you personally feel at the time that there

needed to be some expansion of FBI activities in that area?

MI. Angleton. In the area of what?

MI. Johnson. In the area of electronic surveillances and

penetration between individuals posing a threat to internal

security?

MI. Angleton. Well, I think that wherever there is a threat

to the internal security, I think the Bureau should be on top

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of it.

MI. Johnson. What I am getting at is, I am wondering that

if in June of 1970. you felt that Bureau coverage in this area,

using this technique, was inadequate when it came to radicals

within the US?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Bureau or anyone else had

professional coverage to the degree that it was needed. And

this means not to be opposed to these people, because I think

that. what has to be spelled out here, our motive was never to

curtail the legitimate part of this student unreast or whatnot,

our real problem was that

since we weren't covering the

foreigners and the diplomats, and we didn't know from morning

to night what they were doing, that we didn't have a credible

or professional data base on foreign activities. And the

easiest. place to start on

from is in our own country. The

efficiency of the CIA's counterintelligence depends in large

measure on the Bureau's, because anyone with a foreign

connection is going to broaden our jurisdictior. Every

diplomat or espionage operator in this country operates from the

headquarters within our jurisdiction. And therefore

we have a

very highly vested interest that

the coverage and the quality

of the coverage in

the US

be brought up.

And we didn't think

much of the Bureau coverage, because we knew the limitations

that existed, as did most everyone in the community.

MI. Johnson. Looking at these first two collection methods

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that we have discussed so far, one on communications intelll-

gence, and the second one on electronic surveillance and

penetrations, would it be fair to say that the CIA already had

some names on the NSA watch list of interest to the CIA, and the

CIA was already receiving some product from the Bureau gained

through electronic surveillance and penetration, but in both

areas there was a great deal of inadeguacy, and so what the CIA

was really interested in here was a better product in both

areas, which really meant an expansion of the use of this.

technique?

Mr. Angleton. There 1s no art in this technique. The

problem of the technique is -- let me rephrase that. Mr. Hoover

obviously conceived the Bureau as a group of mean primarily

concerned with law.

enforcement. And in terms of his budget

career, esprit de corps, he didn't want to water his organization

with a tremendous number of clerical officers who from the

beginning to the end with only in electronic surveillance,

because my understanding of the electronic surveillance is

fundamentally that the message is in a strange language, and

collected by the thousands, and had to be processed by linguists

and I don't think he wanted to clutter his table of organization

with this. He was prepared to do it as it came up in the course

of their normal operational

activity if they came across a

lead or an agent, then it might stimulate temporarily coverage

of that target.

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What we wanted was saturation on the foreign people, and

on the Soviets. In other words, we had a case in which a young

Soviet in the United Nations went outside of the restricted

area and threatened or brought a threat to one of our agents

who was hidden.

We asked the Bureau, where was he that weekend.

And they said they last saw him that Friday night in New

York. in his house.

Something was inadequate in terms of manpower, of not

knowing that on Saturday and Sunday he had gone to the Midwest

on operational assignement. And that is what I am trying to say.

I could take tiht case and multiply it a hundred times.

And my view is that since

the opposition works in a way that

ERV

both the KGB and GUR are principals, I mean they run the

embassies, that there should be coverage on all of them. But

the Bureau can only

take a limited

amount of personnel and then

allocate it. And therefore if you

are going to have any

assurances of evaluating the situation, and so on, then you

have got to have the coverage. And the coverage, the easiest,

cheapest coverage there is electronic surveillance.

Principally when it is secure. If everybody knows the phone

is being tapped, then you learn nothing. And I dare say after

all these hearings are over that there won't be much counter-

intelligence derived it any.

MI. Johnson.

Doesn't the embassy officials from Bloc

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countles simply assume that their phones are being tapped?

Mr. Angleton. There are emergencies that arise in which the

phone is the only way you can handle the emergency. Or there

can be pay telephones, and they are unaware that you have the

ability to tap a pay telephone. In other words, there 1a a lot

of art within this thing where the whole thrustood everything.you

do is to get the enemy to underestimate you, so there modus

operandi is geared to really a false estimate of your capability.

And they don't use the phone, but they go to a pay telephone,

and there are only five pay telephones within walking distance.

And this particular day the 5th is the one they are going to

use. And surveillance can state which code that they are going

into number one. And thereafter the calls is picked up. If

he doesn't know that you have that capability he is going to

start running his agents out of those five telephone booths.

I am only giving that example.

MI. Johnson.

I would imagine if we were monitoring pay

telephone booths we would

pick up a lot of other calls besides

calls made by embassy personnel?

Mr. Angleton. Those are all pinpointed types of things.

It is known there has had to be communication between the

agent and the principal. If you have a source that you can

possible

compromise, it tells you that there is going to be

a meeting, and therefore a call and arrangement made, a code

word

said. And

since they have gauged the fact that you don't

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don't have that kind of thing, that means that for one call

based on inside information, you pick up the business.

Mr. Johnson. I would imagine that vigorous effort by the

Bureau in this effort would have saved the CIA a tremendous

number of man hours.

MI. Angleton. It would save everybody in the community.

Because you have to keep in mind also that the targets of the

Soviet espionage and black espionage relates also to the State

Department, Atomic Energy, the entire military, and it goes all:

the way down the line. Those agencies have standard security

officers. And they have to rely on the Bureau for the domestic

coverage. And my point is this, that when you see cases of

espionage which have occurred, and you go back track on them,

you will find that had there been full time surveillance, and

a lot of manpower devoted, that those would have been nipped in

the bud, and you could have taken a straight agent and double

him back into the opposition. But in a case such as the Dunlip

ninja

case, the Sergeant who allegedly committed suicide in SA, his

activity with the Soviets was only after his suicide.

MI. Johnson. How was that?

MI. Angleton. It was known, it became known. In fact, if

I am not mistaken, I think some of my communications to NSA,

very sensitive, were found in a plastic bag in his attic, as

I recall.

Mr. Johnson. You say alleged suicide. Do you have reason

to believe that it wasn't actually a suicide?

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Mr. Angleton. Well, one accepta he la a suicide. But my

point is that I do not know that we have such depth of knowledge

regarding his case that we know all the facts. And I would say

the President's Foreign Intelligence Board made the most

exhaustive inquiry into the case, probably more than anyone

else in Government. And I have never seen their findings.

Mr. Johnson. The thirs set of operations discussed in the

Special Report had to do with the subject of mail coverage.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Johnson. Of what importance were those operations to

the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Now, would you tell me your question again?

ME. Johnson, What significance were those operations for .:

our organization in June of 1970?

Mr. Angleton. I think everybody there, with the exception

of the Bureau, was unaware that we had mail coverage.

Mr. Johnson. If you had mail coverage why was the President

asked to remove restrictions on mail coverage?

Mr. Angleton. I think the basic thing would have been --

I mean, he would know that this was a cover thing against the

other members of the community. In other words, if this had not

been brought out from Downie and all those observers, and

so on.

Mr. Johnson. I suppose I am still unclear about this. Did

the President at this time know that the CIA had a covert mail

coverage program?

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Mr. Angleton. My recollection is that we had certain

information from mail coverage which must have come to his

attention.

MI. Johnson. If you will look at this page you will see

that it states "covert coverage has been discontinued." Was

that in fact true?

MI. Angleton. I think thia is probably, - that paragraph, :

I think, was a Bureau comment.

MI. Johnson. Do you

find this rather misleading, to send

a report to the President that tells him the covert coverage

has been discontinued, and then asks him --

Mr. Angleton. I am

not so sure -- I don't know the origins

of that paragraph. In other words, it refers here to

Congressional hearings. I don't recall -- I know they were

happening, but I don't recall which ones they were referring

to here. We had a former Deputy Director, Scientific and

Ded wille

Technology, Solville, who had belonged to the group of

scientists who wrote

some very pointed inquiries to the Post

Office -- and I don't remember the date - regarding the whole

mail coverage business.

To my recollection, Colville, while

with the Agency, knew of the program. Now, what this is

referring to I don't know.

Mr. Johnson. Did the

Bureau have a program at this time?

MI. Angleton. I don't know. They may have had one that

was discontinued. The operative part of that as I see it is

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shether those are Congressional hearings Involving accusationa

of Government invasion of privacy.

MI. Johnson. So you think the sentence applies to the FBI

program, not to the CIA program?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think it has anything to do with the!

CIA. I don't remember any of us ever making any representationa

to those representatives of USIB regarding the existence of the,

program.

MI. Johnson. Including the White House Representative,

Mr. Huston?

MI. Angleton. Well, I don't think we bring him into it.

That was the kind of thing that if anything was going to be

sald, it would be said to the Attorney General and the

President, becuase the Bureau naturally knew about the program

for a long time.

And they knew that we had a common code name.

And therefore they would be just as conscious

of the fact that

this was somehow known to the two of us, so there wouldn't be

any purpose in a roomful of people of exposing the mail

coverage to those people that had to go back and report to

principals, particularly when you have the kind of statements

that Downie and others made about the fact that they could not

vouch for any security in their own organizations.

Mr. Johnson.

But isn't there a problem here that a report

was

prepared for the President which had some misleading

statements in it?

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Mr. Angleton. No, because I think they would have all been

clarified fact to face with the President. And they may well i

have been. In other words, what I am trying to say is, it is

quite conceivable -- and it really never occurred to me - that

it is quite conceivable that given the closeness between Huston

and Bill Sullivan, that well before this meeting Bill could have

gone into the whole status of the Huston project.

Mr. Johnson. Huston claims now not to have known about the

undercover program, and he feels somewhat duped by the intelli-

gence community. And of course, the more important question is.

was the President duped into believing that this was such a

program, and being

asked a few pages

later to allow the Agency

to institute it?

MI. Angleton. I don't think other than' your thought that

the President wasn't going to be notified.

Mr. Johnson. Notfied about a new program?

MI. Angleton. No, notified about why we had to put this

thing in there. My God, you couldn't be there asking for

electronic surveillance and all those other forms of coverage

with a group of counterintelligence people who raised the

question of mail coverage.

Mr. Johnson. But isn't it possible that President Nixon

read this on its face value and did not know about the mail

program, and thought that he was being asked --

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that he ever read the thing.

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I don't know myself. Because I was shocked when I heard later

on that Mitchell alledgedly did not know about the Huston

project. And I refused to believe it.

Mr. Johnson. But to return to the question, isn't that a

possibility that the President read this report to him at its

face value and thought that he was being asked to inatitute a

mail coverage program in which he was already doing --

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer

that. I know that any byplay!

of what happened to that

report until the blowup, in which Mr.

Mitchell begged MI. Hoover in terms of destroying this project

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• Mr. Johnson. This section of the report states that routino

coverage is legal, while covert coverage is not.

MI. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. And you said that the CIA had a covert mail

program underway?

Mx. Angleton: Yes.

Mr. Johnson. So the obviousl conclusion was that the CIA

was conducting an illegal activity, is that the correct

conclusion to draw?

MI. Angleton. I don't know. That was drawn up for the

audience which was there. The audience which was there was

fairly junior people within the USIB.community.

Mr. Johnson. You mean the Special Report to the President

was drafted with the unior officer in mind and not the President

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himself?

MI. Angleton. I mean, the people who were there were

representatives who were pretty low on the totem pole. I mean,

outside of Huston and Sullivan, all ot those were relatively

junior officials of the organization.

MI. Johnson. Well, you were not a general officer?

Mr. Angleton. I mean junior in terms of the entire Agency,

yes. Normally there have been Tom Karamessines, the Deputy

Director, or somebody.

Mr. Johnson. But on June 5th in a most

serious fasion, the

President asked the intelligence community principals for a

complete report on intelligence gaps and how these gaps could be

closed?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

MI. Johnson. A very serious meeting, and, as you mentioned

at the beginning of this proceeding, a rather extraordinary

meeting.

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Johnson. And yet it seems to me that the produce that

was prepared for the President was not compared in the same

kind of serious vein in which all of the fact were laid out in

a very valid fashion for the President's position.

MI. Angleton. I think that the paper responded that -

said that the first papers of first drafts, I don't remember

how many were involved, were such that they were unacceptable

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to Huston, and that he turned the thing around by making a very

articulate denunciation of the priorities, and of stating that

the papers produced did not respond to the President's request.

So he was very clear-cut on this.

MI. Johnson. Even after that upgrading by the 29-year old

Huston, did the group drafting this report eventually respond to

the President's request, that is, ior a thorough complete

report?

MI. Angleton. As far as Huston was concerned, yes.

Mr. Johnson.

But of course Huston --

Mr. Angleton.

I was the judge of those things, because no

one who was present had talked to whoever he was reporting to.

He was the only one that would take the thing into the white

House

and emerge from the White House. He was speaking with the

authority of the White House.

Mr. Johnson. Yes, but he was a young man with not much

experience in the intelligence community, and certainly no

basis to judge whether this was actually a complete and factual

report for the President. In fact it wasn't a very complete

and factual report in some part, because the President wasn't

even told

about a mail coverage program.

MI. Angleton. I didn't say he wasn't told.

Mr. Johnson. In the Special Report, I mean.

MI. Angleton. I didn't say they were going to get close to

a lot of people over there. When Downie made the statement,

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I can't even take these papers back - we weren't talking about

anything as high level by way of secret as mall coverage, and

that he could not take any responsibility of building the papers.

Mr. Johnson. Because of the concern about leaks?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, penetration.

MI. Johnson. Within the Defense Department?

MI. Angleton. That is right, within DIA.

Mr. Johnson. Was this viewpoint shared by you and the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. We have no point ot make on his organization!

we have no way of judging it.

MI. Johnson. I mean

for your own organization?

MI. Angleton. We took him at

face value for what he had

to say.

MI. Johnson. But were you interested in diluting the

report for fear that it might fall into the wrong hands within

your own Agency? You were manipulating and diluting it because

of Downie's, concern about DOD?

Mr. Angleton.

Because this was a roster that people were

present. Is that it there?

Mr. Johnson. No, it is back here.

Mr. Angleton. You don't have to go over that roster to see

that you couldn't do a lot of things. There were a lot of other

things you couldn't open up. Their report was not in otherwise

supervísed lateral arrangements. What business we were conduct-

ing with the Bureau, we didn't table with those people. The

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things that we are doing with NSA we didn't table with these

people, because they were already on going operations or on-going

liaisons. So there was no reason to table it to them.

Mr. Johnson. Was this a charage in essence, then?

MI. Angleton. No, it wasn't a charade. It was the fact

that this was one area where, the same as you would enhance an

electronic, you would enhance all forms of communication, all

channels of communication.

Mr. Johnson. But you harken back to the June 5th meeting in

which the President was deeply concerned about the domestic

Intelligence, because he says it to the intelligence community

leaders, please bring me a complete report

on intelligence gaps.

and we want to close those gaps. Please do that report back

and have it back on my desk in three weeks on June 26th. And

yet when the report comes back one could argue that it is not

the kind of complete report that the President requested.

MI. Angleton. All I am saying is that it met Huston's

need, and from what I read in the papers, his correspondence

with Haldèrman and Erlichman, he expresses surprise at the

cooperation received. And he was totally satisfied. And on

the basis of that he submitted his famous letter of 8 July that

he was assuming that sole as the agent for of the white House

representative on domestic intelligence. So he was obviously

totally satisfied. And he wasn't as naive as you indicate,

because

for the years prior to that, of for a year or so prior

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to that, he was working with Sullivan on all the Bureau

problems, as again is reflected in his White House Interoffice

memorandums with Halderman and company:

(Off the record discussion.)

MI. Angleton. As I recollect, the letters when they were

printed in the newspapers referred to the fight with Hoover,

Billy Sullivan's own situation. And that was all in the papers.

So my point there was that he was much more sophisticated than

one would think.

And second, he was speaking to a group who respected the

fact that he was the White House representative. And you have

to keep

in mind, this was a unique

situation, 'because to my

knowledge it is the first time in history of American counter-

intelligence that a person at that high level ever attended a

substantive meeting. Never ir history has there ever been

that t'pe of thing, even though many times in the last 20 or

30 years the Bureau and the CI people, counterintelligence, in

the Agency, had always wished to have a meeting between the

Director of CIA and the Director of FBI with the President to

resolve the question of cooperation between the two agencies.

MI. Johnson. So were

you pleased to see

this kind of high

level policy access with the counterintelligence people?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know whether I was pleased or

not. That never crossed my mind.

Mr. Johnson. You had never had that kind of access to the

White House before as counterintelligence people. Weren't

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you hopeful?

MI. Angleton. I am not pleased by those kinds of things.

It was a development that didn't astonish me, because I was

quite aware, in and beyond all the Sullivan and Huston business.!

of what the real state of affairs were. And I know the

problems that Admiral Gayler was having, and knew the issues in i

counterintelligence organizations regarding the threat.

Mr. Johnson. With this new White House interest in the

problem, weren't you hopeful that the thing would change, that

the CIA individuals would have their day in court in the white

House

and be able to point out their position?

Mr. Angleton. I certainly hope that the liaison with the

FBI would be reestablished, because all that was something in

which myself and my deputies had been involved in since 1954,

and

even before, and to have that cut off was - just simply,

it was like losing your moorings, you just simply drifted.

Mr. Johnson. Let's return to this discussion we were

having before about the meaning

of the options:: here on mail.

coverage. Is what you are telling me that this document was not

really meant to represent the entire truth about collèction

procedure, because that would have

revealed too mamy gengitive

matters to a rather large audience?

Mr. Angleton.

We were

not going to reveal outside the

Bureau the mail coverage operation.

Mr. Johnson. When you say outside the Bureau. --

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Mr. Angleton. To the people who were present.

Mr. Johnson. But what about the white House representative.

he was not to know either?

MI. Angleton. I never had any private talkg with the white

House representative.

Mr. :Johnson.. I know, but he was in attendance at these

meetings.

Mr. Angleton. As I said earlier, I don't know what in the

year prior to that Huston learned from Sullivan. But I was led!

to believe that they

saW

Sullivan frequently, and Sullivan's

point of contact, and

so forth, was Huston. So it would not

suprise me at all if he had not aired it frequently with

lluston, because I always knew the fact that Sullivan had a

contact in the White House. I didn't know anything about him,

and I didn't know his age or anything else. But I thought

highly of him, and so on.

Mr. Johnson. I suppose we have belabored this point enough.

MI. Angleton. Personally it is a very simple one to me,

that in a thing of this sort, with the personnel who were

present there, that on a compartmented basis you could not

disclose to them in an interagency meeting this type of thing

when they had to go back and report to unknown principals.

And when I say junior, I mean junior in the sense that a

colonel in the Army is a very - and he was then even a full

colonel, a lieutenant colonel -- and going back and getting a

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Pentagon position, which with the DIA and Secretary of State,

means a tremendous channel of staffing, which he himself

outlined to us.

MI. Johnson. Of course one interpretation: that is made by

some people in examining this document, 18 that :it was an

effort by the CIA to conceal from the President one of their

on-going collection procedures?

MI. Angleton. That is not s0. Because I can't recall

whether it was before or after that we saw the Attorney General,

who we regarded to be the President's Chief Executive Officer.

And where he was shown the actual messages of intercept. He

saw the mail coverage on things which were of deep concern.

And so there wasn't any - the last thing in

the world was to

withhold from the President anything.

Mr. Johnson. Now, if you are talking about the meeting

that

is discussed in the Rockefeller Report, that occurred a year

after this?

Mr. Angleton. I can't recall those things, because we

were working on many levels here, we were working on a level

like this, which occurred -- how many meetings, I don't

remember?

MI. Johnson. Four meetings.

Mr. Angleton. Was it the entire month?

MI. Johnson. Anyway, that was a very short period. And

at the same time all the activity was going on. This was

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purely a side line affair. And I would have thought that the

meeting with the Attorney General was at a different time. I

always thought this was a meeting coincident with this, because

I remember . the reason. I feel that there was some communica-

ton with the Attorney General was the shock I felt when I was

told that the Attorney General stated he was aware of the

Huston business, and it didn't make sense --

Mr. Johnson.. You know, on this same page, in a footnote

----

that was apparently added at the request of MI. Hoover, the

Director of the FBI felt compelled

to point out to the

President in no uncertain terms that he was not going to support

a covert mail coverage program.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I can't speak for what was on Mr.

Hoover's mind.

But the Bureau, and I think the Secret Service

even, were levying requests and getting all the take, all of

the production out of it. Now, I refuse to believe that given

the quality of the information, that it wasn't -- that Mr.

Hoover did not know what was going on.

Mr. Johnson. My point was, though, that the Director of

the FBI felt compelled to speak very

frankly to this issue,

apparently, in a footnote. But Mr. lelms did not speak with

total frankness about his own program in this report.

MI. Angleton. But I don't know -- the thing aborted. No

one expected this thing to die as it died.

MI. Johnson. But that is another issue --

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Mr. Angleton. No, it is not another issue. Because my

view is that Hoover - I mean that the Bureau and ourselves

would have disclosed

the mail program to the White House,

because we would have no customers.

MI. Johnson. Would have disclosed the mail coverage?

MI. Angleton. Of course, Because if you had a man in

Huston's position, domestically having the same authority, as

he put it, ad Dr. Kissinger had for Foreign Affairs, then he

would be entitled to all sources of information. That is what

I am trying to say. And therefore he would be a point of the

closest tie-in with the Administration, with the Executive,

to work out priorities.

Mr. Johnson. So the CIA and the FBI were going to hold off

on informing the President on this program?

Mr. Angleton. No, I didn't say that. I said that if the

program had gone ahead, if there hadn't been this unexpected

reaction, then -- because you see, no one -- I would never have

dreamed that the White House staff could have launched such a

thing without the Attorney General being fully apprised, because

everyone was rightly or wrongly conscious of the fact that the

most powerful individual, in terms of the white House, was the

Attorney General. And therefore it was inconceivable that in

his role you could have

the FBI chairing from Justice a meeting

of this sort without his being

sully appraised at the white

House level of what was going on. To me it still is somethin

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tie;

I refuse to believe. Because I only heard by hearsay of how

his reaction was to the Huston thing, and how he had killed it,

and how he went to the President. It was all hearsay.

But it is inconceivable -

MI. Johnson. I want to return to that point in a moment.

To finish up this section on mail coverage, I wonder if we

could finally reach some conclusion on why it was that mail

coverage, covert mail coverage, was called illegal in this

report, and yet the CIA had a program going at the time, and

the Bureau had one going before. Why is it that the Agencies

were involved in illegal prograna?

MI. Angleton. That is the whole history of the mail

program.

Mr. Johnson. I jon't ask you to do that, because I think

Mr. Wallach is going

into that.

Mr. Angleton. I say, I would have to go into the whole

history of the mail program.

What I am

really ttying to raise is a philosophical question

here. When does an agency feel compelled to conduct an

intelligence collection procedure which is widely considered to

be illegal? What kind of decisions are made to go ahead on a

program like that, despite its illegality?

MI. Angleton. Well, it went on since - what was it, 1952?

And I think it was going on three years before we became

involved in it. So it was an on-going operation. And I don't

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think that the files properly reflect that there was a much

stronger counter intelligence interest than the record shows.

And Eric Trimn, who was prominent in the origination of it with

the Office of Security, by background an FBI man in counter-.

intelligence. 'And in OSS he was 8-2, counterintelligence.

And I know him intimately. And his whole thrust of any kind of !

espionage or other operational usage would have a very strong

counterintelligence base to it.

Mr. Johnson. But you see the thrust of my question. Here

was set before the President some options

which presumably

he could improve by making a change in the little blank to

the options. . and if. he had approved those options

he would have been approving in essence the kind of lawlessness

in the intelligence proyram, he would have been approving a

program that right in the report itself was

referred to as

illegal

MI. Angleton. I understand that.

Mr. Johnson.

So could one make the argument that the

intelligence community was asking the President to approve

something of his own?

MI. Angleton. Not the intelligence community. The

intelligence community was not told of the program. The people

who appeared were not told.

Mi. Johnson. Okay, let me refine that by saying the leading

representative of the Bureau and the CIA?

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Mr. Angleton. I don't understand you at all.

Mr. Johnson. Let me start over on this point, because in

fact it was the intelligence community, wasn't it, because this

document. is signed by Gayler and llelms.

MI. Angleton. But they didn't know to my knowledge anything

about the maid program.

MI. Johnson. But my point is that they were setting down

on paper some options irs for the President to check off which,

had he done so, in case of two and three, would have meant that

he would have approved an illegal program. So can't we say that

the four principals of the intelligence community

si ined a

document that laid before the President a set of options:

that were

illegal?

MI. Angleton. Let me see that again.

This isn'i it. This is electronic.

It says here: "High level postal authorities have in the

past provided complete cooperation and maintained full security

of this program."

that is, covert coverage. It explains that !

there is covert coverage in existence.

Mr. Johnson. Where does it explain that?

Mr. Angleton. "High level covert coverage. High level

postal authorities have, in the past, provided complete

cooperation and have maintained full security of this program."

MI. Johnson. But isn't this the key phrase, "in the past"?

MI. Angleton. We will come back.

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"This technique involved negligible riak of compromise.

Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence"

which is the present tense -- "and personnel involved are highly

trained, trustworthy and under complete control of the intelli-

gence agency.

"This coverage has been extremely successful in producing

hard core and authentic intelligence which is not obtainable

from any other source. An example, is a case involving an

interception of a letter to a Soviet establishment in: in:1964.

The writer offered to sell information to the Soviets." et

cetera.

"Other examples include" -- and here we are missing a very

operative part in this xeroxing.

You had better read this, because I haven't read it.

MI. Johnson. I think it is really the key phrase where it

talks about covert coverage not being legal.

Mr. Angleton. In your

research on this have you come across

any draft papers on these different things?

Me. Johnson. No.

Mr. Angleton. Because I mean, I can't reconstruct who wrote

this, who supplied the verbage. In other words, I don't know

whether we are the ones or it was the Bureau that devised this

phrasing.

Mr. Johnson, Let's go off the record for just

a moment.

(Off the record discusgion.)

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Mr. Johnson. Back on the record.

The next operations that were discussed in the Special

Report have to do with surrepticious entry. And to repeat what

we have done earlier, I would be interested in knowing what the

objectives of the CIA were here if any.

Mr. Angleton. Let me read it.

MI. Johnson. The report leads one to believe that this was

one of many NSA interests. Was that your perception, too, at

the time?

MI. Angleton. It may have been only because of Admiral

Gayler's abortive attempts to change Mr. Hoover's mind on

relinguishing this type of operation. But in actual fact we

had as much

interest as did the Bureau in the surrepticious

entry.

Mr. Johnson. Could you bilefly explain why?

MI. Angleton. Because of the product. In other words,

it is not solely an NSA product. The NSA

would want the

cryptographic assist.

But on the other hand it could be bag

and pouch reports that went through the air, and expense books,

and identities of agents, and all kinds of documentation. In

other words, it is probably the highest level of collection,

both for espionage and counterintelligence purposes, that exists.

Mr. Johnson. Is this kind of operation carried

out by

the Burnau in this country?

MI. Angleton. I don't know. I don't know what they had

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done.

Mr. Johnson. In the past, was this strictly a Bureau

activity?

MI. Angleton. I think that they should be asked. What I

am trying to say is that to my knowledge - I may be wrong -

I don't think that they ever officially told us of their

activities, although I think it was well known -- I mean, it

was known to selected people.

MI. Johnson. Does the CIA use the technique of surrepticious

entry within the US?

MI. Angleton. I have read the story, I think I have read

in the press something about some disagroement with Mr. Hoover

over some operation in Chevy Chase or something, I don't know.

MI: Johnson. According to the set of options on -

surrepticious entry - we are talking about more than diplomatic

embassies, we are also talking about the use of this technique

against other urgent and high priority internal security

targets. To your knowledge has the CIA ever used surrepticious

entry against non-diplomatic establishments within the US?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

I am not an expert on that.

I read that some of the security cases involved it, there are

some personnel. And Mr. Colby has given a very lengthy numeri-

cal thing as to how many

times that is used or not used.

Mr. Johnson. Why is it that the CIA and the NSA have relied

upon the FBI to conduct surrepticious entry in most cases when

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it comes to foreign embassies within this country? Why don't

they conduct their own activities?

MI. Angleton. Basically it is because to be successful

requires an enormous amount of manpower and expertise. In

other words, the process of surrepticious entry first requires

sources. It requires identifying the time of the entry. It

requires total hermatical sealing off of any people from that

- -

embassy from returning unexpectedly, which means that all

-.

parties that might return are kept under total surveillance,

so that in the event that they decided they have left something

back at the office, the team is warned. And it would be

almost impossible for anyone to try to do it

successfully

except the FBI. They are the only ones with the assets and the

coverage.

Mr. Johnson. At the bottom of the page of the Special

Report, in this section on surrepticious entry, the FBI added a

note. The naote is indistinct on the page or copy I gave you.

But it is reproduced here. Do you find that

a credible reason

for eliminating this collection technique is the reason that the

number of police guarding the embassy adds to the operational

hazards? Or do you think that was a smoke

screen

put up by

Mr. Hoover because he simply didn't want to use that procedure?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know what he means by the

increase

in the number of police.

MI. Johnson.

He is referring to that executive protection

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force that came into existence in late' 197011110.

MI. Angleton. I really don't have any comment to make on

that. I don't think that the Bureau would have told -- they

would have told the Attorney General

and the President of the

state of the art, but I don't think that MI. Hoover would feel

obligated to expose to the other principals an activity of this

sort in which the Bureau is the primary beneficiary. In other

words, as the chief law enforcement officer charged with the

domestic counterespionage, he would not to my

way of thinking

share the

information until its use had been exhausted for

internal security purposes. And this was an audience to which

I don't think he was prepared to spell anything out. Normally

he would handle that by seeing the Attorney General and the

President.

Mr. Johnson. He wouldn't have even shared his views with

MI. Helms?

Mr. Angleton.

He was under no obligation to charter-wise

or any other way.

MI. Johnson. The next set of options has to do with

development of campus

sources. And the list of options

are

here. And here is one specifically mentioning the CIA.

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MI. Angleton. I think this is mainly FBI language,

that is, up until paragraph 5, up to that point it 1s involv-

ing the problems of the Army and the Bureau running into the

ROTC problems.

And then I guess

down to 5 - of

course, we have had experience for many, many years with the

international concerns, and the troubles that the Ft. Myer

outfit had in the Katzenbach report, we knew from hard core

activity that the Youth Festival in Vienna, and that the

Soviets -- I mean, the Soviets ran the International Student

Business and front organizations.

MI: Johnson. MI. Angleton, would this first option

have been of interest to the CIA -- I am sorry, not the first

option, but rather the second option?

MI. Angleton.

I would put it this way, that I think

it would have permitted the FBI to have gained much more

intelligence.

And

as it opened up, to travel abroad for

international conferences, it would give us the opportunity

for recruitment, and opportunity to take those people over as

agents.

MI. Johnson. But would you have wanted to develop

your own campus sources?

Mr. Angleton. No, we would rely on the Bureau -- we

may have selected once where, for example,

it was a period

for this when in Mexico City Soviet intelligence was cultivat-

1ng Americans at the University of Mexico for espionage

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*73

purposes.

Now, when we get a case of this sort, then we would be

zeroed in on the hard core Soviet case. So, we were working

from a broad back into the country. ' This would give us the

strength of working from here outward.

Mr. Johnson.

In order to protect your own CIA re-

cruiters who were visiting campuses, did you ever think it

would be useful to have your own CIA sources who might tell

you what the student body was doing?

Mr. Angleton.

Personally, outside of the domestic

contacts people, I would say at that time we did not have

personnel or manpower.

MI. Johnson.

The

next and last set of options has to

do with the use of military undercover agents.

Would that have been of significance to the CIA directly?

Mr. Angleton.

It is the same way as the previous

options, that the Agency would benefit from any hard core

intelligence developed by the Army. And you have to keep

in mind that over the

years

we had broken the Army cases of

espionage abroad, in which the agents concerned came back

to the U.S., and so on.

They would pass the military

counter intelligence

to the FBI. In other words, we worked

with them abroad, and then when it reverted to the U.s. we

worked with the FBI.

So any knowledge that they could acquire extending

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this into the Armed Forces on campus, and so on, it is

bound to have - eventually these people would be assigned

abroad.

Mr. Johnson.

would you have supported at that time an

expanded counter intelligence role for the military within

the U.S.?

MI. Angleton.

No. We have always had first rate

liaison with the military counter intelligence services.

We have trained the original OSI people in the counter -

by "we", I mean my people trained them.

And that. was a

cadre of people who in

turn

went out and trained others, and

we have refresher courses.

Mr. Johnson:

What I am really getting at is this

second option in which it says, the counter intelligence

mix

of the military services should be expanded to include the

active collection of intelligence concerning

student-

related dissident activities.

would you have supported that?

Mr. Angleton.

No.

That is

a matter between the

Bureau and the military. We would

get a by-product in a rare

instance, I would assume. But that appears to me to be

primarily a matter between the military

and the Bureau.

Because I think the military were charging the Bureau with

all kinds of investigative leads and things of this sort.

I don't think the Bureau had the

manpower to comply.

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175™

Mr. Johnson. According to the testimony of other wit

nesses, there were two other options that were discussed

in some detail at these meetings, but not included in the

special report.

One of these was surreptitious optical surveillance.

Now, the questions that I would pose to you on this is, number

one, what does

it mean?

And nimber: two, how did it relate to the interests of the

CIA?

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Now, I am just wondering if you thought it did.

Mr. Angleton.

well, again, my understanding of the

term, it is simply the accumulation of newsreels, the dissi-

dent acts, and violence, and what not, when you acquire

enough to identify the ringleaders, you can identify those

people who appear in all the different front organizations

who are the stimulant in this.

So, it narrows down your investigative target.

Mr. Johnson.

Was that -- is that being done already?

MI. Angleton. .

I think that - my understanding at

that time was that it may

have been done -- I don't know

this from direct knowledge.

I think that Downie did talk

to that subject.

Mr. Johnson.

But you don't recall these specifics?

MI. Angleton. Yes, I can remember. I think that is

Downie who mentioned something about the photographing of

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people who attended rallies and so on, where you can identify

that this one person, this group of people who you see

visually, who are actually doing the egging on here turning the

car over, who are doing that, and then pretty soon you will

find that they are in Washington, and they are in college

and then some other place. Therefore, as in all that type

of Fifth Column work, once you get the hard core of your

real targets, then you can anticipate where the next action

is going to be.

There were publications then or later when they had the

Washington thing, I mean the big hassle here in Washington,

where the people that were putting on the show worked up

militant plans of every conceivable type on how to handle the

police and communications and

all of that.

The query was whether they dreamed that up themselves

or whether they had technical assistance from professionals.

Now, I was not directly involved in that, but I did

hear comment to the effect that it was too professional to

just come out of the woodwork, that it had to be that somebody

with a professional background to devise the strike action.

I wish I could remember some of the verbiage that was

in the

cover of this.

Mr. Johnson. I know what you mean.

I have read that.

Do you have any recollection why this option was re-

moved from the special report?

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MI. Angleton. No. I would say maybe the only reason

it ws removed was simply that it was not regarded to be -

that it was a matter of minot importance in terms of the other

matters.

Mr. Johnson.

The last option that presumably was of

some importance in the discussions had to do with the investi

gation of diplomatic personnel.

Now, I understand that before the FBI will conduct

an investigation of diplomatic personnel in this country

it will get a clearance from the State Department.

I further understand that

some of the members

of the

Bureau wanted to eliminate this clearance procedure, and so

that was brought in discussion.

Do you remember anything

about this?

Mr. Angleton.

The problem has been a problem that

goes far beyond this interagency business.

The problem is

that it was our understanding, rightly or wrongly,

that this was a self-imposed

restriction of the Bureau's.

In other words, the Bureau was under no compulsion by law or

procedures to clear these things with STate Department, that

they did it by way of protection, if anything

went. wrong,

then they could fall back on the State Department's agree-

ment.

our objection was, number one, that we believed it to

be a needless disclosure of counter intelligence data, and

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because in order to make your case with State, you had to put

into their possession the most sensitive information. And

from our point of view this was again gratuitous.

And second, we didn't agree with their policies of

leniency regarding the activities of the Soviet bloc per-

sonnel in this country.

Now, this was brought out in a very lengthy annual

report by the President's Foreign

Intelligence Board, in

which they went down into all the problems and restraints as

they dealt with the diplomatic community here - the

lack of reposit.

And the thrust of their findings was that

the State Department was leaning over backwards in order not

not facing up to the Soviet bloc presence.

That was

submitted, I believe, to MeGeorge Bundy by

the President's Foreign Intelligence Board. And answers

were sent back from State to the

Bureau and ourselves.

The result of it was, nothing was done,

and State argued

and justified their position, but no higher

authority arbi-

trated it or moved in and made decisions.

I think that is what it relates to.

Mr. Johnson. But in the context of these

others

MI. Angleton.

It was an on-going argument, and

probably the reason it wasn't raised is because it was so

complex in terms -- I mean, the problem was

known

already, was

known. to the Attorney General, it was known to the President's

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79

..Foreign Intelligence Board, et cetera. And I think

probably again it was considered to be minor in come ni

parison with the other.

Mr. Johnson.

I have pit others down here.

Do you reinember any other optiong that were discussed

and

not included in the special report?

Mr. Angleton. I know there were many others, but I

don't remember any of them that stand out.

You can't get

a gathering of these

people together. We knew very little

about the original meeting, what transpired at the original

meeting with the President - and got a great number of

proposals that were very far from target.

Mr. Johnson.

Do you find

it ironic at all that the

President was mainly interested in domestic unrest and ob-

taining better intelligence data about radicals in this

country, yet the meeting itself seemed to dwell at great

length on foreign intelligence data?

Mr. Angleton. No, I think his interest was equal on

both, and

I think he saw the problem very clearly in terms

of both the intelligence abroad and at home.

I think this

is borne out by the fact that at some period of time my

understanding is he met with Mr. Hoover

at Camp David and

expressed to him his dissatisfaction with the Foreign Intelli-

gence coverage, and instructed him to increase his legal

attache representation abroad, which in fact was done against

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•80

the protest of the State Department or Ambassidors in the field.

Mr. Johnson. And also CIA protesta?

Mr. Angleton.

We were encouraged to join them, but

we did not, because we had different points of view. In our

View any American presence abroad, increased American

presence abroad, working counter intelligence, is an

advantage, as long as we get the product. And as long as

they coordinate, and Mr. Sullivan's attitude - and he knew

that we disagreed -- was that it was hampering the Bureau

by taking away personnel. He felt his people could be

better employed at home than abroad, because he was hurting

for personnel.

I think personally - I disagreed with him -- and he

knows this very well .- it was because we didn't have

strong enough personnel abroad. And then, the FBI, by

virtue of the prestige of MI. Hoover, and the kind of men

they have, inspired a lot more confidence in many instances

with foreign police, who really did have a very high regard

for MI. Hoover.

And, therefore, his representatives were

accorded a kind of professional treatment that wasn't

necessarily accorded to us.

And they would visit the U.s.

and they would meet Mr. Hoover, and he in a sense was the

leader in the

non-Communiet world of law enforcement

offices. And, therefore,

it accrued to our advantage when

the Bureau operated abroad, as long as we got the product,

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481

and as long under the charters, as long as they coordinated

in advance in the business.

But there was also a tremendous

amount of law enforcement business criminal in nature, which

sometimes goes into the field of subversion, which only the

Bureau can properly handle.

Again, because of their personnel - they had lawyers,

law enforcement, they know the chain of evidence, and how it

has to be preserved, and basically because of Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Johngon.

The third section of the special

report had to do with the recommendations, and the primary

recommendation was for a permanent interagency committee on

intelligence.

How did the CIA feel about this concept?

Mr. Angleton.

Well, I think that we were in agreement

that if the President -- I mean, I don't know, I don't know

what our position was at the meeting, but I know --I think

it might have been -- and that is that if the President had

set in motion Mr. Huston for a purpose, therefore, the

implementation had to be controlled by somebody with the

authority. And Mr. lluston was putting himself forward as

that authority. There wasn't anyone to dispute his position.

MI. Johnson. What

really want you to address your-

self

to is the concept of coordinating intelligence evalua-

tion and dissemination within the intelligence community by

some kind of interagency body.

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87

Is that a good concept?

Mr. Angleton.

I don't know if thin is an accurate

statement of that, is it?

(Referring to document.)

Mr. Johnson. .

Let me show you the text itself in the

special report. Here are the options.

Mr. Angleton. Let me

see how this gets introduced.

I think it is self-explanatory. The attitude, as I

remember, of the Agency was that the whole exercise wouldn't

have been done unless the President had in mind evaluations of:

finished intelligence. And there wasn't any such body in

the government.

MI. Johnson. WAs there

hesitancy on behalf of the

CIA to get involved in domestic intelligence which was primar-

ily topeserve the FBI.

Mr. Angleton. After all, we are in a number of inter-

agency meetings, that is, as observers of members, where the

Bureau is the Chairman and so on.

Mr. Johnson. Probably as blatantly oriented as

this one would have been --

Mr. Angleton.

I mean, the whole exercise was

blatently domestically oriented, and everything

stated there

is true, that there wasn't any point whether this could be

done, and if the Bureau didn't agree on

a point, they each

went their separate ways.

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83

There was no one in authority to try to evaluate it and

put it before the President as a decision.

MI. Johnson.

Apparently Mr. Hoover viewed it as an

encroachment upon FBI turf. I wonder if the CIA viewed

it that way, too,

and were a little bit hesitant?

Mr. Angleton.

No, the CIA's attitude very definitely

«there.

was that Mr. Huston wasn't their except as the President's

representative, and if this was what the whole exercise was

about you couldn't do all these things unless it was policed.

And since it was the President's desire from calling the

principals together to get this thing embarked on,. and at

the end you have to see how it was going to be policed, who

did

you turn to?

So, as I say, there were different attitudes

in the community on domestic problems, and to articulate what

in fact existed, you had to have somebody, or you had to have

some chairman in close contact with the White House who could

submerge agency and departmental differences into common

priorities, common objectives, and so on. And no one knew

how It was going to he. At least it was one of the options.

Mr. Johnson.

Do you recall any other recommendations

that were made that were later withdrawn from the special

report?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall anything about how these

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84

footnotes were included into the special report?

MI. Angleton.

You mean Mr. Hoover's?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Do you know the story behind the footnotes?

Mr. Angleton. No. All I know i8 that I heard that

the report had gone up to him, and he had taken an adverse

position on every recommendation, that he had seen the

Attorney General, and the Attorney Generad, who had been

unaware of all of this, took a very strong stand against

Huston, and either saw the President or something and got it

killed.

MI. Johnson. Did you know who were involved in the

discussions that led to this special report, did they ever

really think that it was going to get by Mr. Hoover?

MI. Angleton.

I don't think anyone ever came to a

consideration of it.

Mr. Johnson. Wasn't it widely known --

MI. Angleton. Personally, as I said earlier, I had

believed

that there wouldn't have been any such meeting had

it not been worked out

in

advance between the Attorney

General and the President.

That is the reason I still

refuse to believe that the Attorney General was unaware of

the exercise.

Mr. Johnson. Were you surprised that the Attorney

General was not invited to participate in any of these

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proceedings.

MI. Angleton. I thought he was behind the whole thing.

And it stood to reason, he was regarded as the most powerful

person under the President, and with. a lot of special assign-

ments.

You would hear that such and such a thing, he was the

one who was the President's advisor, or making the recommenda-

tions.

So when this thing came up, I thought that this was

the Attorney General, and the President had had many

meetings - they had

a meeting of the minds, and Huston was

chosen with the Attorney General's blessing.

When I found out later that he didn't even know, then

knew that there wasn't going to be any -

MI. Johnson. Didn't anyone ever ask at the Langley

meeting what the Attorney General's views had been on some

of these items?

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't any reason to raise it.

I wasn't going to disclose to people I didn't even know what

I happened to know about domestic problems, the Bureau and

the Ariorney General.

That wasn't the kind of forum for

that.

Mr. Jehnson.

So no one at these meetings say, 100k,

some of the things we are talking about here are illegal, and

before we put them in an option paper to the President shouldn't

we have consultation with the Attorney General's office?

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Mr. Angleton. There may have been somebody that

said that, but it doesn't stick in my mind. In fact, the

discussion of those meetings was so fluid and so many times

Off the target, that it was only when the Bureau brought back

the finished draft of the previous meeting that it gave any

cohesiveness to what really took place the day before, in

other words, the fact that Bill Sullivan had a recorder present,

one of hig men who took the notes and papers and all that.

Now, whether he had an ad hoc drafting committee I am

not certain, but I think he might have had, in which Ober was

a party to it. .

So, the coherency of the meeting became apparent the next

meeting when the paper was circulated. And I think if you

-wanted some insight into many questions you would ask, it

would be to find the different drafts so you can compare

what happened in the openingmeeting with what emerged out of

the last meeting.

And I am certain those were in being

someplace.

MI. Johnson.

Have you seen these drafts yourgelf?

MI. Angleton.

I saw -- I was present when the Bureau

would disseminate the next draft.

And I will certainly --

I can't believe that they don't have a file dealing with

this subject.

MI. Johnson.

Do you have these drafts in your own

file?

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Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. They

may be, but I haven't been able to find them.

No, I don't

think I have them on file. I think that Ober kept the paper.

and you have to understand that one thing I would try to

resist, since I have probably more paper than anybody in the

business.

Ober was the one who kept whatever materials

we had.

Mr. Johnson.

Do you recall other second-hand or

strictly hearsay anything about the signing ceremony in which

this document was

signed by the four principals?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think there was a meeting. I

think that they ran it around by courier. I think this

was a lot of pressure by Huston or somebody to get it

signed, and I think there was also a question that all the

principals were in town or something of that sort.

But I don't think there was a meeting at which it was

signed, there may have been.

MI. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit !

A-2, MI. Angleton, Memorandum for Richard Helms from

Tom

Huston entitled "Domestic Intelligence, dated 23 July

1970.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton

Exhibit No. A-2

for identification.)

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Mr. Johnson. This is the so-called Huston Plan which

Mr. Huston sent out to the intelligence community principals.

And as you can

see, he suggests in the memo that the

President approved these various options.

Mr. Angleton. He said that he approved them?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Do you remember the CIA reaction to this document?

Mr. Angleton.

I don't think I ever saw it, or

I don't remember ever seeing it.

Mr. Johnson.

Do you remember when Mr. Helms

told

you that the President had approved it?

MI. Angleton.

Let me just go through it, because it

might come back.

Let me ask you, before I reply to your question, some-

thing on dates. This was dated the 23rd of July. When

was MI. Hoover's turndown?

When did Mr. Hoover take all the

exceptions?

Mr. Johnson.

He put his footnotes on the document

around the 24th, 25th of June.

And then the Special Report

went to the White House on the 26th of June.

As far as

can ascertain, the next response to the intelligence

community was this document saying --

Mr. Angleton. A month later?

MI. Johnson.

Yes.

MI. Angleton.

I find that very hard to believe.

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Are you sure you got the right date, June?

MI. Johrson. The President received the Special

Report at the end of June. And this was the response to the

intelligence community.

Mr. Angleton.

The President received the report on

20 June, you say?

MI. Johnson 26.

Mr. Angleton. The 26th of June?

Mr. Johnson. Off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the recora.)

MI. Johnson.

Back on the record.

MI. Angleton. I believe that it became known that the

- Attorney General had not been

party to the Huston business,

then the turndown - it didn't seem surprising.

MI. Johnson. Tell me, is it surprising that a documént

of this importance which would have changed the intelligence

community in many

substantial ways would have expanded their

collection procedures, is it surprising that such a docu-

ment was signed over by a 29-year old staffer as opposed to

the President himself, or Mr. Maldeman?

Mr. Angleton.

I don't know how to respond to that.

because I don't think I saw this. The only one I saw was

the one in which was three lines or so in which he directed

that no domestic intelligence be sent to the white House to

his attention.

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Mr. Johnson.

What was your reaction to that parti

cular memo, the one you have just mentioned?

Mr. Angleton.

My reaction was that he was working

closely with the President and the Attorney General. It is

Inconceivable to me from anything that we knew and heard that

the Attorney General was not the moving hand in the entire

business.

MI. Johnson. Did you think it was a good idea that there

was a domestic equivalent of Henry Kissinger to deal with

domestic intelligence problems?

MI. Angleton.

Well, I think that there should always

be somebody who enjoys the trust of the President who is

accessible for high level counter intelligence, interagency

disputes -- I mean, whether there is an independent co-equality,

there should be an arbitor, someone

to whom

the agencies

in question have access.

I am strongly in favor of an

ombudsman of some sort on the National Security Council, which

is not controlled by people involved in the foreign affairs,

distinct from it.

And I think the internal security is a legitimate concern

of the President, and requires full time or part time,

a full time or part time expert who has

access.

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall being happy or pleased

that the President had approved relaxation of collection res-

traints?

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Mr. Angleton. I imagine I approved. I don't know.

At first I didn't see that.

Mr. Johnson. : Did you get the news by telephone?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I got the news that

way. I mean I am trying to remember, I don't recall any

document that Huston signed of this nature other than the

one where he said he was a recipient, to be the recipient.

Mr. Johnson. He must have heard in some way the

President did not approve the series of options that were to

relax restraints?

MI. Angleton. I am not certain.. I don't know.

Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit

A-3, Mr. Angleton, memorandum for MI. McManus from Mr. Helms

dated

28 July 1970.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-3

for identification.)

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Mr. Johnson. This simply indicates that Mr. Helms

was returning to the situation room the previous document

which I just showed you. And the reason I show this to

you 1s, I am trying to recall to your mind any recollection

about the recall of the Huston decision memorandum.

We have a lapse of five days here.

Do you remember any reaction of the CIA, the 23rd to thel.

28th?

mI. Angleton. But what day of the week was it?

Mr. Johnson:

It was over a weekend.

MI. Angleton. You would have to know where the

Director was --

Mr. Johnson. My point was

simply, were you advised

that the President's order was recalled

almost as quickly

as it was isgued?

MI. Angleton. Not when I heard that Hoover went to

Mitchell, and that Mitchell was unaware of the exercige.

Then the whole house of cards became apparent. That was the

first indication we had of what the details, power politics

were.

MI. Johnson. Let me

introduce into the record Exhibit

A-4, MI. Angleton, a memorandum for the record written by

Richard Heims dated 28 July 1970.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-4

for identification.)

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Mr. Johnson. This, of course, refer to the meeting

that you have alluded to earlier in which Mr. Helms found out

that Mr. Mitchel did not know about the special report or the

Huston Plan. I wonder if you could interpret this phrase

for me in paragraph 2.

MI. Helms says:

"I told the Attorney General that we had put our

backs into this exercise".

Now, presumably he is talking about the preparation

of the Special Report.

Mr. Angleton.

That is right.

Mr. Johnson. And does that indicate to you that the

Central Intelligence Agency was enthusiastic and strongly

supportive of the options developed in the Special Report?

Mr. Angleton.

It is not a question of whether they

were in support of all of the actions

there, but were

supportive of the fact that the President, in accordance

with what Huston had to say, did not feel he was getting

a picture on the domestic activities, because we didn't

feel we were getting it.

I mean, there was no question about that, but that goes

in and beyond the Huston things of anything else, the atmos-

phere in the community was the lowest possible thing in terms

of domestic counter intelligence, or foreign, evolving

around this split and the lack of liaison.

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MI. Johnson. The final area that I wanted to talk

to you about is the aftermath of the Huston Plan. And when on

speaks of the aftermath I think one thinks of the Inter-

agency Evaluation Committee, and also subsequent efforts

to relax intelligence collection restraints.

Let's turn first to the Interagency Evaluation

Committee. You were a member of that committee, were you

not?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson.

Could you descrlbe briefly the origins

and purpose of this committee?

MI. Angleton.

I don't remember the - when was the

first meeting, can you tell me?

MI. Johnson. December 3.

Mr. Angleton. The same year?

MI. Johnson. Yes.

Mr. Angleton.

I don't remember how this thing

originated. I think

the question of gaps which preceded the

Huston Plan was still active on another level, in other words,

there were many levels of express concern. It was the

normal level of the lack of FBI liaison, and another level

with the luston Plan, and then there was

something

that

generated or brought back to life this whole question of

domestic intelligence.

And I am not certain unless you have

documents on how I was notified to be nominated for that

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business.

That is my first statement. It is possible that Ober knows

or has. the papers, because I know that when it eventually

came to having working bodies, Ober was the natural choice

for taking that on.

The first meeting, as I recollect, was in Dean's office.

And I think that is when they had - that is my recollection.

And that is when Mardian appeared. And whetheriit was in

that meeting or in a series of meetings, he proposed setting

up a -- and again this is all as though we were working for

the President in this thing, meetings were held there, and

one meeting was held in the Vice President's conference room,

and here was the counsel to the President doing the laying

off of hands. And they had some judge from Seattle in mind,

whom they eventually brought to a meeting who was to be

the head of this evaluation business. And there was a

lot of discussion on the cover he would have, and where he

would be located.

And it boiled down to the fact that he was totally

out of his depth, he could not foresee his being able to do

it the way it was proposed on the grounds that he had tuo

many friends from the State of Washington who had come to

Washington, and he had -- and there were questions of

prestige involved, and a question of what was he doing in

Washington, and

so on.

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So, I think that was the last appearance he made.

But nothing seemed to be generative regarding these meet-

ings until Mardian began holding them in the Triangle

Building. And his whole thrust there was that he wanted

permanent representatives from each

of the agencies to be

there full time under him in some kind of a staff setup to

work on domestic - on the evaluation of domestic affairs.

And this is when the thing began to become concrete,

until he ran into problems with Mr. Hoover, and the Bureau

took a very strong position that they would not supply a

secretary. And as I recall, I was opposed to supplying

personnel, and then

there were

a lot of things that we were

not privy to behind-the-scene things.

And finally, George Moore, I believe, was the --

I can't recall whether

he was

the one nominated.

In our case I reported to Dick, and I believe Tom

Karamessines, and the result was that we decided on ober.

But with an understanding

that it could not be full time, and

a private understanding with him that he could handle it

any way he liked.

In other words, we didn't want him to go into a make-

work situation.

MI. Johnson.

What was the Committee doing, conduct-

ing any operations?

Mr. Angleton.

I think it was

pulling together all

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Information on given situations. I can't even tell you the

subject matter right now. But I think dissident newspaper

things, I really don't know. I would have to see the

papers, because they were about as incohesive - I think they

were

the most inconclusive meetings I have ever seen in my

life. And so the buck was passed to Ober, really. He had to

arrange some way to go down there-- and I don't know how many

times he went. And any papers, I don't think were very

informative. I don't think they ever came to any kind of

conclusion. The people that had the best information to my

recollection was the Bureau.

Now, whether this got into the Berrigan case - the

reason I mention that is that while all of this was going

on, Mardian was running the phone all the time, and giving

us - telling us aside something about the Berrigan business.

And that is about the extent of my immediate knowledge of that.

Mr. Johnson.

Did Mardian have a good grasp for

intelligence problems?

Mr. Angleton.

No, not at all. I think he was

really out of his depth. But he had connections. He obviously

had a very powerful position, I mean in terms of being able

to get what he wanted.

Mr. Johnson.

Did John Dean play

an important role

in the history of the IDC?

Mr. Angleton.

Well, he loaned his office and himself

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to the launching of 1t.

Mr. Johnson. Did he stay with it?

Mr. Angleton.

No. He gradually withdrew, but the

whole - those meetings which gave it a certain prestige.

and all the rest of it were those at which he was present.

And then he gradually got out of it.

Mr. Johnson. Why did you stop attending these meetings?

MI. Angleton.

I had too much to do -- it was par-

tially that, but also - with my responsibilities I can't go

to meetings. And usually I would send people to meetings.

Mr. Johnson.

Let me introduce the final exhibit

to the testimony today, which is Exhibit A-5, memorandum

for the files, John Edgar Hoover, dated April 12, 1971.

(The document referred to was

marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-5

for identification.)

i:

TOP SECRET

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Mr. Angleton. What about this?

MI. Johnson.

Did Mr. Helms ever discuss with you this

meeting that Mr. Hoover and Mr. MItchell and Admiral Gaylor

attended?

Mr.. Angleton. I am trying to cast back and latch onto

somebody in '71 to get a feeling.

I am certain he did.

MI. Johnson, More importantly, do you have any

recollection of a report being prepared for MI. Mitchell as

a result of this meeting, a combined CIA-NSA report, as was

requested?

Mr. Angleton. I think -- what I am trying to remem-

ber here is whether this had to do with an operation that the

Bureau was

conducting in

this country ardwhich they were

going to close down, and which we were trying to save, and

we were trying to save it in part because of the Director's

responsibilities to the intelligence community.

In other words, Dick

was not necessarily speaking

here as the head of CIA, he was speaking for the USIB.

Now, I may be off on a different phase of life, but I

think this is related, and this entailed our moving

out

man in to replace Bureau men, and putting up money, and I

think we used the Office of Security, if I recall correctly,

if this is what was

the outcome of all of this.

But I know that there were many telephone calls about

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trying to make sure, that there was a problem of rent, and a

problem of access, and so on, the time factor that was in-

volved.

Mr. Johnson. Do you remember the Helms-Gaylor report

wIitten for MI. Mitchell?

MI. Angleton. But that is something that would normally

be taken up with Staff/D, the people who are in liaison with

NSA, or that could have been directly from Dick or his Deputy.

Mr. Johnson. Do you remember Mr. Helms coming to you

and saying something to the effect, Admiral Gaylor is after

me once again to try and

get Mr. Hoover -

Mr. Angleton. This was going on all the time. there

were probably hundreds of calls in reference to the problem

about the NSA thing. I know that I strongly backed the

idea of keeping the operation from dying.

Mr. Johnson.

Which operation?

Mr. Angleton. The operation dealt with clandestine

procurement.

Mr. Johnson. Did that operation relate to any of the

collection methods we have discussed today?.

Mr. Angleton. I think so.

Mr. Johnson. Surreptitious entry?

MI. Angleton. It was a bugging operation, I mean

taps.

Mr. Johnson. Could you shed some light on this sentence -

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MI. Angleton. That 1s, 1f what I am discussing have

any reference to this. But this was a thing that Gaylor

wanted to save, and I was called by people in NSA to give

support to, and so on. That type of intervention.

Mr. Johnson. Could you shed light on this sentence:

"There was his discussion upon the part of Mr. Helms

of further coverage of mail".

MI. Angleton.

No, unless it is dealing with black

bag job operations.

I think that means diplomatic mail in

bags, pouches.

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Me. Johnson. I thought black bag referred to surrepticious

C.

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entry.

MI. Angleton. No, black bag could be also steling a

courier's bag. And you have a diplomatic courier, and he has

got the code and the mail for an embassy. The plane doesn't

leave New York, It is 30 below zero. And hewants to get warm:

He leaves his pouch there for a minute, or half an hour. And

the Bureau picks it up and photographs the contents. So the

black bag -- what I amtrying to say 18, Mr. Hoover could not

use the same art forms that we would use. And I just am trying

to think - he didn't say how long this thing went on.

Mr. Johnson. Would this sentence imply that Mr. Helms is

encouraging Mr. Hoover to reinstate a mail cover program?

Mr. Angleton. No. I read it -- my own view is that it

would be more than mail. It would be black bag job operations.

Now, those black bags would refer to the surrepticious entrance:

into an embassy, the penetration of a diplomatic pouch in

transit, and part of that of course, is mail. And the

most

secret of all mail is unciphered mail, in other words, it is

mail that does not go

out over the air waves, but where all

the cryptonyms or identities only go by armed couriers with

the identities. And then the correspondence goes through the

air with those identities. And it makes no sense to an

interceptor unless he has

got the key. So I can't imagine Mr.

Helms referring to coverage of mail except in terms of the

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proceedings in those black bage.

Mr. Johnson. Why couldn't he be talking about a mail

intercept program?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think he was referring to it.

Mr. Johnson. It notes there that MI. Helms was going to

respond rapidly, take care of the report rapidly. But you

don't recall any response?

wal". In other words, it looks as though we were

trying to work toward a resolution of the same issues as

developed in the Huston Plan, and Mr. Mitchell is going to make

a decision --

Mr. Angleton. But

those things were all going on -- what

I am trying to explain is that people are reading a lot into

the Huston Plan, and at the same time are unaware that on

several levels

in a community identical bilateral discussions

were going on. In other words, the Hugton Plan

didn't

affect

one way of the other the normal flow of business. And when

Gaylor was faced with Hoover's shutting off and cutting out ::

certain things - there were time factors involved, the lease

of

a piece of property, the personnel who would take over, the

point being that if you didn't meet

those deadlines that was

the end of it. And therefore those were sort of frantic things.

And I imagine that the reason that Helms said it would be taken

care of very

promptly was that he probably already had staff

studies, and all it meant was simply boiling them down into a

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letter and sending the letter." And that would involve basically

myself. But the principal person would have been staffed, and

probably a Deputy Director that he might have called in as a

legman on it, and he might have told me something about the

Gaylor -- what had happened. But I don't remember his discus-

sing that with me precisely in the meeting with Mitchell and

Gaylor. There was no reason why he should have - with Hoover.

Mr. Johnson. Were you aware of the series of meetings that

were very much like this one?

MI. Angleton. Not of a series of meetings with Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Johnson. But a serles of discussions going on at

different levels?

MI. Angleton. Oh, yes.

MI. Johnson. Are you aware of any other specific meetings

on this topic between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover?

MI. Angleton. .No.

I think that Mr. Papich, who has the

best memorandum of record of anyone in Government, will surprise

you by showing you how few times any Director of Central

Intelligence ever met with Mr. Hoover. Practically never,

except when it was a National Security Council meeting or

something by accident.

Mr. Johnson. Why is it that Mr. Hoover would send a formal

liaison over to the other Agency? Why didn't it work

the other

way? why couldn't the CIA say, we are going to send over Mr.

so and so to be liaison from the CIA to the FBI?

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Mr. Angleton. That was his own way of operating. In

other words, Mr. Hoover belleved that his statutory responsi-

bilities were not negotiable. And he would not permit any

inter-gency committee to challenge or water down what he had

by right. And therefore he never attended usual meetings, and

he sent observers or someone, they may have been members in

the end, but they were originally observers, and so on.

And

personally I feel that that was the proper way of operating,

because of the compartmentation necessary: for the activities of

the FBI, and the internal security.

And he didn't want people who are here today and gone

tomorrow wandering around in the FBI. And it was very tidy

housekeeping on his part.

Mr. Johnson. Let me end by just touching on one other

topic. Couldn't one argue that if we could do away with a

number of laws that restrain intelligence collection, that the

quality of intelligence would increase dramatically? Aren't

there certain barriers that keep the intelligence specialists

from getting high quality product that they need?

MI. Angleton. My own feeling is this. This country can

never work against the police state, or contain the activities

of a police state, until there is a lot of relaxation in the

law as far as counterintelligence and internal secuirty people

are concerned. To begin with, in an open society you don't

have the laws for protection of secrets. You don't have an

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Pirone (Area 202) 344-6000

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official secrets

act. You would not have penalties for

disclosure, except the passage of unauthorized personnel to a

foreign power. Now, President Truman made the comment tha it

doesn't make any difference whether it is spies or newspapers

who publish the secrets as far as the US Government is concerned.

Washington himself was the greatest bellever in intelligence.

And he wrote about it. And he spelled out very clearly that

intelligence was worth nothing unless it was secret. And he

tried to kidnap twice Aaron BurI, once or twice. Benjamin

Franklin opened the mail of the British.

He was

fired

as

Postmaster for doing it. In other words, there is a whole US

tradition that believed in standing up to build up the national

security. It has been wreaked these last years.

MI. Johnson.

Don't we have a real tension here?. Isn't

there a danger of transgressing against the civil liberties

of the American citizens when we relax those laws?

MI. Angleton. I am not proposing solutions. I am saying

that first the law makers and the press - let's leave the

press out -- the law makers and the Administration, the

Executive, have to know the danger of a threat. And I think

they have to examine the laws in terms of those which are

unrealistic in view of the threat. Now, that has never been

done. And again, I come back to my original

suggestion that

there should be an ombudsman, a person who does have that

access to the Executive, who is not shackled by inter-agency,

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internecine fights and all of that, and who is in a position

powerful enought to take what he does know, that is communicated

to him, and be able with the President work out legislation

to meet the threat.

And also counterintelligence should have

a very direct bearing on the objectives of the Executive, I mean

the realities. And if you do have, as I mentioned, the

Rumanian intelligence working with the Soviets, then obviously

you can't treat the Rumanians as something apart from and special

in terms of the threat, because if they are arrested on Oslo

working against NATO and against the West, and their activities

are -- I mean their questionaires benefit the Soviet Union

strategically, then you can't make that differentiation. So

you are not arguing philosophy here, you are arguing factual

matters that derived from counterintelligence operations.

Today there is total gap between the realities of counter-

intelligence and the knowledge of the public and the knowledge

of the Congress. Otherwise you wouldn't find them all going to

Russia on jaunts and all that type of thing, there would be an

entirely different point of view. In other words, today we

are equating ourselves with the Soviets on so many levels.

They are not equating themselves with us. What we regard today

as having some permanence to them is the tactical. Those

are

not my words. Those are the words of the soviet, and the

powers who are in the sovit bloc in official capacities, and

you have access to: documents and to party directives. So the

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point I am coming back to is that I bellove - I have not read

his entire speech, but the speech that Kelley gave from

Canada to the Lawyers Association, the Bar Association, was

something to the effect that there had to be in the interests

of internal or national security certain sacrifices of personal

liberty. And I subacribe to it all the way. I am not talking

now about criminal activity, I am not talking about marijuana

or otherwise. But where there is conspiracy, - and their

country is incapable of getting below the iceberg.

We know a

tremendous amount of illegals. And yet there has not been a

true high grade legal case since Abel. And Abel didn't talk.

And yet from what we have heard from people in the KGB the

identity of high grade illegals are only

maintained by the

chief of the service and nut known to the resident tourists.

And those are people who assume the identities of the Americans

and who work for the opposition. You have to have a great deal

of latitude in order to uncover these types of people, and to

penetrate through the communications problem, how do they

communicate. They

need money. There are many ways that they

can be discovered. But they can't be discovered the way we are

hampered today, and also where we are breaking down compart-

mentation. And I think the tragedy of all of these hearings

and everything that has transpired from the beginning has been

destruction of the secrets as

to the collection and modus

operandi and techniques and the identity of individuals,

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et cetera. And I don't think we are going to recover from 1t

without a complete housecleaning. But if you are going to have

a complete housecleaning, no on is going to be left that knows

anything, that knows the techniques and the training schools

and so on. There is sa much sensationaliam . to discuss cobra

venom and all of that. It raises in everybody's mind, did the

Agency receive a specific instruction to destroy the toxins?

And did the person who allegedly didn't follow through on the

order, did he see a Presidential instruction which ordered

him to destroy the toxin? It is inconceivable that a secret

intelligence arm of the Government has to comply with all of the

overt orders of the Government.

MI. Johnson. So treaties passed that deal with other

countries do not necessarily apply to the covert arm of the

Government?

Mr. Angleton. But you mean, first, you have an allegation

that this will kill many thousands of people, we knot that to

be a fact. We can just take that announcement.

MI. Johnami. And what is the point to my question?

Mr. Angleton. I su saying that I think that if I am not

mistaken -- and you can correct me -- I have

not read the treat!

-- I think it is of unilateral declaration by the President?

But I may be mistaken.

MI. Johnson. That was my understanding.

MI. Angleton. But I don't think that the Soviets

agreed

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Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

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to it, did they?

Mr. Johnson. We both will have to have another look at it.

MI. Angleton. I know in ita original context, I think it

had an element of being a unilaterial affair.

Mr. Johnson. But what if there is a bilateral or multi-

lateral treaty? Do their provisions also apply to the covert

arm of the CIA?

MI. Angleton. I only am taking this one instance up. I

would say -- I don't know how to respond to that. It depends

on what the substance of it would be. If, for example, we find

the other party of the treaty violating through their intelli-

gence service the treaty, then

I think it is a question that

would have to be considered here, that we could not permit them

to outdistance us.

But let me put it to you another way.

One Soviet -- we had a very high level

source who attended a

general staff briefing of the Soviets, addressed by a three-

star general of the general staff. And the subject

was electronics. And this was in 1961. And the Soviet general

stated that the US was ahead 14 years. in the field of

electronics. But he said that they would overcome us through

three tactics. One would be through the

increase of 2,000

staff officers added to their espionage side on the scientific

and technical to exploit the openings of the west of scientists

and others going to the Soviet Union, for espionage and

recruitment.

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Bear in mind that espionage is the highest art form in the

Soviet Union. They came out of the cave by reason of what

Soviet intelligence did in the atomic and other fields. And

here was a Central Committee directive of 1959 that 200

scientists would be added to the espionage corpa: to exploit

opening to the West. That was number one. And number two, as a

weapon of overtaking us, would be disinformation, misleading

us scientifically up blind alleys.

where we would expend both monies and assets and capability and

manpower on

impossible objectives transmitting disinformation.

And number three, by tying us down with binding treaties

which would blunt our technilogical growth. Now, that was

the word. Before I left the Agency, perhaps a month before,

some American scientists and intelligence estimators, sat down

and made an estimate that the Soviets were four years behind

us in electronics. Now, you take the story of an agent who

was present in that high level top secret meeting, and here

are people who knownothing whatsoever about that meeting, who

independently have brought out a study to the effect that they

are four years behind ug.

Now, my own view is that there will be a terrible reaction

in my lifetime against what is going on today. Because there

will be a period when there will be a shift in the balance

of power or there will be a confrontation with the soviets

where this country will back down, it will be probably an

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unpopular issue, and where there will be a new perspective

directed at this period of time, and there will be a very strong

reaction, because the damage can't be seen now, it will be stuii

then.

And I have no doubts as to that being the case, because the !

long term Soviet objectives were directed and redirected in

'59 to one thing, and one thing alone, the change of the balance

of military power. And I stand on that.

MI. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, I would like to thank you very !

much for spending the afternoon with us today.

MI. Angleton..

It has been enjoyable.

Me. Johnson. Do you wish to make a brief closing statement.

Mr. Angleton. I may some other time, but not today. I

may really read the statement and see what I said.

MI. Johnson. You are welcome to at any time.

Mr. Angleton. And I will direct it to the judge. Because

I am embarrassed about one thing, and that is the lack of paper

regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, I mean the

fact that there weren't files on it.

MI. Johnson. You will be given an opportunity to inspect

the transcript of your testimony and to make minor corrections.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5:28

Pom., the Committee adjourned, subject

to

the call of the Chair.)

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30335

DOC.

0:32123392

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сіробор -

C:

SPECIAI, REPORT (ICI AD HOC)

I. Thircut Assessment

II. Options for the President

1. Communications Intelligence

2. Electronic Surveillances and

Penetrations

3. Covert Mail Coveroge

4. Surreptitious Entry

5.

Development of Campus Sources

6. Use of Military Undercover Agents

7. Surreptitious Optical Surveillance

8. Investigation of Diplomatic Personnel

9. Others

III. Recommendations

1. Permanent Interagency Committee on Intelligence

2. Intelligence Review Board

Prior to lluston

Plan

liuston Plan Objectives

After Huston Man

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Sper

ar keport inter.gency

• Connittee co Intelligence

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

9=12-75

SPECIAL REPORT

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE (AU HOC)

CHAIRMAN J. EDGAR HOOVER

JUNE, 1070

"!'

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June 25, 1970

This report, prepared for the President,

is approved by all members of this commitice

and their signatures are affixed hercto.

(s/ J. Eigar Hoover

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chairman

1s/ Richard Helms

Director, Contral Michligonee Agency

/s/ It. General D. V. Bennelt. USA

Director, Detense Intelligence Agency

/2/ Vice Admiral Noel Galler, L'SN

Direcior,

National Sacurity agency

COY NO. " OF 5 COME

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PART TWO

RESTRMIMTS OF EITELLICENCE COLLECTION

The Coinmittee noted that the President had made it clear

that he desired full consideration do given to any regulations, policios,

or procedures wick tend to limit the effectiveness oi comestic intelli-

monce collection.

Tito Committee furthor noted that the President santo

the pens and cons of such restraints clearly set forth do that the

President will be noid to decide wiether or not a change in carrent

policies, practices, or procedures should be macie.

During mectings of the Commitlue, i variety of limitations

and restraints were discussed.

All of the apunches involved. Duence

Intelligener deeney (iliA), the three military counterintelligence

ine Control inelligence agency (CHA), the National Socurty

Arency (16A), and the Foderal Barcau of frestigation (FEl, Partici

mated in these considerattons.

In the light of the dircetives furnished to the Commiller ty

th: While linse,

the sabgeet matters herdinatier set forth vere rorior

for lie concideratioo

and decision of the

President.

1. S12016022

2002AL0282A215

A. Interoretice Restraint on Comesticolone intel 2089

2u8tmia0e: Diseasies

NSA careless dippitichet comested intellited toters

in it:

til

:::.

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Nature di Rescriction

According to NS interpretation of NSCID-6, which is it:

basis of iS authority for development oi communications intelligence,

the processie: of "ioreign.communications" sharply limits its authorit;

with respect to those communications in which a U.S. citizen is t

sonder no recipient, While a case-by-case approach is used in prodicin

such dala, the continuation of such a procedure would innibit the

production di domestic intergence and any copansion could result in

encroachment on ine jurisdiction of the FB!, as sot forth in ASC!D-g.

Broader interpretation by Executive claritication of "foreign" to inalude

any commications of any individuals usiny international incilities

regardless of the nationalit of the sender or recipient conid rectit;

this situation.

Assantages of Acintaining Restriction

1. Esireme vigilance would be repaired to prevent espaded

coverage from straying into an appetrance de censorship.

2..

Expanded coverage in this area, if disclosed, card

result in unfavorole proticity ard a more ruderground by those t

now take colounted acantage oi the supposed inviolability o. norti!

communications.

3. Significant expansion in this area would constitue a

breach of lad indent of pricinal Parican! Scrarily Cooneti Inteligered

Directive Mumber 6 establishing jurisdiction.

sponded cerations would contire certial operat

proceetres, inciting a coatimation of corront repatrices and tot

19 11

1111"

11S1Y

indict:

Parado.

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?. A'relaxation di the castriction now in effect w0r!1

sharply increase the amount of intelligence miormation bearing ci

foreign trotrement in U.S. diairs, and would permit more processing

and tims a more timely ilow of such information as it is vitained.

DECISIOS:

intsipretice Restroint on

Commea

1ons 1n2lideaca

Interpretation of Intolligents Directive

Number 6 should not be rolared.

Present interpectation should be broadened

to permit end program for coverage by NS.

of the communications of U. S. citizens using

international lacilities.

Present interpretation shout be broadered

1o pereit and progre for coverage by NS.A

at the reonget ot dee Ral of the communientions

o1 U.

"Cluzchs using international facilities.

More information is needed.

indians

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B. Elcotronic Surveillances and Penetrations

Prominary Discussion

The limited number of electronic surrelilances and

penetrations substan ady restricts the collection oi valuable

intelligence information of material importance lo the entire

intelligence community. lSd has buen particularly hard-t by thi

limitation,

for the absenco of eluctronie penetration of foreign divia-

matic establishments has soverely curailed its capability for thie

exploitation oi potemially availabie communications intelligenor.

Ackitionally, other agencies are deprived oi access in ligh-lordl

political, diplomatic, and militar? information, as veil as valuabie

data regarding hostile inteliigence operations.

Nature of Restrictions

Electronic surveillances have been used on a silect::!

basis.

Restrictions, indiated at it highest lexels of the freckt

Branch,

aroso as a rosult of the condemnation cf trase technick

ly civil rights croups, Congressional concern for risin of tittery.

and the possibilit of their adverse cfect on criminal prosecut"

1. Disclosure and embarrassment to the using egor:

mmo/or Ma Unite Gates te alraga goostole aince such technit

used in lou process do installation.

: 2.

donut the Cared Seller

Ліі"!"

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100" -

C.

Arantees of Relatios Restrictions

. .

1.

The U.S. Goveraman, has an orceriting obligation to

use very madable scientifie means to deicet and neutralize forces

which pose a direct threat to the nation.

??.

Every magor intelligence service in the world, inclucin

1h05e of the communtel bloc, use such techniques as an essential part

of their marationg and i is believed the gongrel public would support

their use by the United Staies for the same parpose.

3.

The President historically has had the authority to det

in matiers of national security. In cadition, Title M! of the Omnibas

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1958 proddes a statulory basis.

Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not roari!;

Obtainable from other lechniquas or sources.

Such date inclodos infor-

mation which might assist in formulating forcian policy decisions,

information leading lo the identification of intelligence and/or espionaae

principals and coutd well declude the firsi iadication of intention to commi

hostile action against the Uniled! States.

0. Acquisition o! such material froin COMINT withont

bonelit of the ascistance which electonic surveillance technignes can

provide, it possible at all, would be extremily rapensive.

Therefore, this

approtch could rauli ia considerable dollar savings compared to colliction

methods.

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DECISION: Elastronic Surveillanees

ani Panetrations

Present procedures on eirctronic corcrage should

continue.

Present procodures should be changed to permit

intensitication of cotorage of individuals and

groups in the United Statea who pose a major

threat to the internal security.

Present procedures should de changed to permit

intensification of coverage of forcign nationals and

diplomatic establishments in the United States of

interest to the intelligenee community.

More information is needed!,

the cooted outta fig

tend pretender"

threats an

thirt!.

'it:

il::

i!:

tarted be then earl!

H10!11.

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TOP SECRET

C. Mail Corerage

Prcliminar: Discussion

The us? of mai! covers can result in the collection oi

valuable information relating to contacts between U.S. nationals and

foreiga governments and irriligence services. Chi anil this military

investigative mencies have found this information particularly helot!

in the pasi.

kissentially, there are too types of mail coverage: routind

corerge is loral, wile ino second--covert cotcrage--is not.

coveras intoles recording information fromtee lace of entelopes.

is arilalde, legally, to any duty authoriard Federal or state investi-

sative agoney submitting a written reptest io the lost Ottice Deoartment

and has been used frequently be the military irtelligence services.

Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated med cocerase,

or "flips and seals,

"entaiis surroptitious scroning and may include

opening and examination of comestic or foreign mail,

This icchniane isr

based on high-lorel cooperation of top echelon postal officials.

as civilian pot is concerned, unty mail designater lo diclomatic

establishments in the Vated States and airman wiressed to spscific

forcion locations has been covered,

Nature of Restrictions

Covert corerage has been discontinued while routine

corerne has boon rotaced primarily es an outcrooth of pablicit;

arisin from disclosure of routine mail coverage durind legai

procodine ned puckiend afforded iis natter in Congreasionai

hearings incoling accusations of gocernmental invasion dd prisacy.

1.

Alice the Coutt"

mal Motoris il: :

gilt titties.

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TOP SECRET

Present restrictions on both types of maid

coverage should be continued!

Reatrictions on legal coverage siould ie

remoted.

Present restrictions on cotart corerage shout

be relaxed on selected targets do priority for tr

inilligance and internal sacurity interest.

More information is needed.

..!'..

i. "P..r..

/ 1

Moreotel is careded to tartarted de cout mott out

1.11: 1.111

1:::

'j::!

1: 10 1!1

.11 1:

futur

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## Page 130

TOP SECRET

-

.:**

пова

Prelimina:

NSA has a particular interest in the use of surrcotitious

entry as a 1001 for obtaining cryptographic

materials necessary for

decipherine imporiant datomatic and foreign inictligence sertice

traftic. in man; instances enciphered messages of this kind can be

read oly if laring materials can be surregstously obtained. NS.

could exploit the communicatons of many additional foreign goternments

ií a surrepitious entry program vere reinstituted.

Niture of Restrictions

Use of surreptitinus entry, also roforred to as "anonymous

sources: and "black bag jous,

"has boen virtually climinaied.

it intottes

clandestine entry into areas occupied by an individual, organization ey

diplomatie establishment to collect intolligence material. In the forcin

intolligenes liaid, it inclaces the collection of vital crypiographic

materin which anables the disciphering of intercepted diplomatic tott

Aduates of Lininteinine Restrictions

1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass.

2. Information wich is obtained through this technique

could not be used for presecutive purposes.

The public disclosure of this icchrigue would result in

widespread poblicity and embarrassment The nous modd toil potir

the incidnt ase ilgrant ciolation of citi! rights dad/or diplomat

2812426

untin the poor ninti

---

## Page 131

TOP ЗЕСРЕТ

2. Benpfits areruing from this tochnique in the past hara

been innumerabi.

in addition to idealing espionage agents, including

illants, Vital cryptographie infernation has beck obtained. Without

crypto prophie material which often can be obtained only from these

operations, much sigrifican: diplomatic traftic cancot be deciprero:

even with the most sophisticated enclomont.

Such cryptographic

matorial had bach valued at mitlions di dollars in teams of the sarings

in cryptanilgie resourees and in terms of the high-level intelligence

intormation which it produced.

In the past this tochniere, when used aguinst subcorsires,

has produced caluable intolligence material.

DECISiOn: Surreptitious Entry

Present restrictions should be continued.

Present restrictions should be modified to parmit

procurement of vitally nesded foreign cryptographic

material.

Present restrictions should alse be modified

to perini! selectire use of this technique agnirst other

urgent and high priority interna! security targats.

Mord inforiation is icedoci.

!:: ::

132

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## Page 132

TOP SECRET

E. Declament Of Camas Searces

Prelimax Discussion

Public disclosure of CIA ludis with lie Nationa! Studont

Association and the subsugees: issace of the Kaizenbach: Report

have contribared to a climate adraree to inteli nee igne certily

on collote campuses and dith staden-related groups.

li should be

noted that tie lateenbach Report itself does noi specifically restrain

CIA trom developing positive or counterinelligence sources to work

on targets moroad.

Restrictions currently in force limit certain other clements

of the intelligence community accoss to some of the most troublesorte

arcan: campases, college lacutties, foreign and comestic gouth groups,

fellist journats, and black militants. I is ronognized that these it

prime treets of communict intailigenoe certiced and that the opportund:

for foreign communisi coplomation incredoes in proportion to the workedss

ora U.s. couterintelligence effort.

Natura of liestrictions

The need for great circumspection in mating contacts

with steams, tacult mentors. and emplorers of Mistitoriors o:

learning is tidely tocoonized.

donovel, the requirerants of the

intelligence comundy top increased information in this area is

obrjons irom the concern of the White Mouse at the dosened of bard

normalit cost the plans and proprams di catapus mud student-

solated militant oremications.

Al the present the to boorces cle

collected thier its,

indict in!:

lee peached local doe, wilt bet creepilio,

matt did te thinked the coopittle d ember? lasted

1.ätl..11

wind let total di tonde

Hf111l1111111111111

---

## Page 133

19

C.

Aramares of Maintainine Nasirictions

1 Students, facules members, and oihers connected with

. educaiti

adite te and hostile 10r9r03

anj Goverment activity which smacao ci iniringenion on academic

They are prone to pasticise inquiries it gotermentai

agencies and the resultic; poticity can oiten la mistending in

portraying ine Government's interest.

2. Studenis are Gregently immature and unpredictable.

They cannot ba rolied on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion

1o the sume extent as adult sources.

Adraneses of Relasing ResPictious

1. To a substantial degree, militant New Leil and antion?

Groups in the tinier Siates are comprised of students;

faculty membat's,

and others connected with cducational institutions.

'lo a correspondia:

atinctire coverage of these groups and activities depende upan

devenoman of knottedgoalle sources in the categories named. M1t

• connection,

the military services have capabuities which coul bo of

valid to the fil.

2. Much oi the violence and disorders which have decurred

on college campuses hare been of a hnstily gianned rature. Unless

sources are available gachin the student bodies

it is virtually imposated

1o develop arance incormation concerning suck violence,

The derdlooment of sources amond students afitiat

ricote costione at tenderchin in the corolelorert

11!:.

1.

The carother the the etedled Matt O Mastert

:'¿ ::!

ritll.:i::

.. M11::

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## Page 134

SECT

Contreis with students will matra-it possible to

obiain information about travel abroad by'U.S, students and about

nitendaner at international conferences,

DECISION: Development of Campus Sources

Present restrictions on development of camp:s

and siudent related sources siould be continued.

Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit

expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and

student-related groups.

ClA coverage of American Students (and othrre)

traveling abroad or living abroad should be increase

More information is needed.

NOBLE The Fil is Opposed to remotine and proom controls ari

restrictions tehna to the dorietont of timid sout

Me on would entertly tragett

rial! cut la teetes to the tit

when monit des

allet could twitt did

y'::..

Hold till;

135

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## Page 135

TODS

Preliminar: Discussion

The use of undercover asents by the military services to

cerelop domestic intelligence is currently limited to penstration ol

organizations

whose membership dilades military personnel and shose

activitive puse a direct throat to the mititary establishment.

For example,

although the Kary has approximataly 54 Yard! ROTC Units and numerous

classified Goverment comtract protects on carlous campuses across

lie country, the Sara! Investigate: Service conducts no covert collection

or college camposes. The same is true of the other military services.

Nature of Restrictions

The use of undercover agents by the military investigative

services to develop domestic intelligence along civilian

targets in belioted begond the slatory intont of the Congress ns

expresend in Title 10, U.S. Code, and in current resource authorian-

tions. The Detimitations Agreement (190) corcement sired ly the

FI, Anny. Mary and Air Fored Which delinits responsiotity for

euch agency with cooted to investigations of rpionage, cooter-

copionage, subcordion and sabotage) reflects the curront missions

of the ill md the mitary servicos. Further, there is i loc!: oi

astels to undertale this mission unless essential service-related

counterintelligence missions are reduced. There is nico concern ior

morale and discipinaty rescilois

within the services should the

existence of such cobert operations bocoine known.

1. if the chication ot military countermto ogence in 101s

1165101 800100 111i9 13k:

the Contruss, discontry eftiplj

ment me Poout in thiarorable lorictation tie

. 37 -

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## Page 136

aren

TOR SECRET

1!

sission of the miltartaser fices with

regard to college campuses 15 toy

sarag dot ar, sumidicanes,

it will raquire corollary lucrenscain cesources.

5. Prosecutens for wearious of lam discovered in the

course nt military penetration of ciritian organizations must be triori

in civil cottis.

The providing of mitrary witnesses will roguire compli

cated inter departmental coordination to a much greater extent than tie

present and will serve, in the long run, to rejuce security.

6. Disclosure that military counterintelligerce agencins inve

been furnishing ircoration obtained through this tochnique to nonilitar;

investigative agencies with respect to civiliar activities would containty

resul! in considerable adverse publierty, The dimy's recent exporicro

with former military intelligence personnel contims this estimale.

Since nuballed nervice officers, firs: enlistoes and dentices are dran

fron: a

veer proug in which reaction is most unicorable, morale did

disciplinary problems can be anticipated.

Advantases of Relosing Restrictiors

1. Jilting these restrictions would expand the scope of

domestic intelligence collection ciforts by curerting adelaict mamporcr

and resources for da collection of iniormation or coilege campusts and

in the ricinity of military instailations.

2.. The use of undercover agents by the military counter-

intelligence ageneies could be limited to localized taryots there tat

throat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal, Morsorer,

controlled use di trosted personnel leaving the sarrice to return in

college coule expand the colloction capabiliries at an accoptable rist.

3. The military services have a certain punier of peteranc

pursuing special academic courses on camprocs and anitarsitiss. Such

parcoracl the to many testances lare catty boon intraticated tet

security eteerance would terresent malate poot me patratial triacs

1:1:0p.;.

-it-

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## Page 137

Use on walary

Uncarcover Afents

Present restrictions sicuid be retained.

The counterintelligence mission of the military

services should be esganded to include the active

collection of intoiligence concerning studeni-

related aissident actirities, with provisions for

a close coordination with the FBI.

No change should be made in the current

mission oi the military counterintelligence

sarrices; nowever, present restrictions

should be relaced to permit the use of trusted

military personnel as FDl assets in the

collection of intelligence regarding studeni-

rolated dissident actirities.

More information is needed.

NOte To tolis opposed to the use of any military underacter neat

montend deceited tiled talll

Motion dt the

Datiation tortient thick trould extend taut jeriarictien

Prattt P0109

moore to compereas end

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## Page 138

C.

TOP SECRET

il. BUDOSE AN LENDOWER RESTRICTIONS

The capability of member agencies, MSA, Cli, DiA, FI,

and the military counterintelligence services, in collect intelligence

data is limited by avallable rescurces, particularit in terms of budget

and/or qualided manpower. For some agencies fiseal lintitations or

recont cutbacks hare bech acuis.

Budgeiary requirements for some

agencies, other tan the Fbi, are reviewed and passed upon by officinls

who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concorning intelligence

requirements.

CIA reported that recent and current manpower reductions

. (the Balance of Payments and Operation Reduction exercises) hava

lowered Clo's cacabilities abroad with a corresponding decrease in its

level oi operational efiectiveness, Lowered captoilities have cocurred

at a time when the communist services are expanding in Wesiern Europe,

Africa, the Mear Fast, and Latin America. There has also bean a

serious loss in flexibilily of deployment and some loss of cover positions.

The military services noied that cuis in budget requireanis

for counterintellicence aotivities have the effect oi severely hampering

the ability of these sorrices to accomplish missions relating to coverage

of throats to t mtional security.

Begetary dietiniencios have decurred

ain time when inestigative work loads are increasing significantly.

Manpower linitations constitute a maior restriction on

the Fit's capabilities in tie investigation of subursite actirities.

The problem is fucher complicated is the inci thai, even it subsiantial

mmors of aments could be recruited on a crash basis, the tied beakired

cound irectiottons aed to prodid rosen int trainink

would ileen the toll mouthe doing in personnel tring mailabld for use

gained the rapidly escalating subversive situation.

inciltre!

rated des anond do career did trustles ed litt

kettle tether the tell!"

111M11001111

filin

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## Page 139

"TOPISECRET

In the event, as a result of this report, additional

colluction requirements should he levied on the agencies involved,

it saule be necessary to provide for essential funding. For chample, ?f:

¡l the scope of NSA coverage is brordered to permit coveraga of

activities of U.S, subversiva elements andfor the military services!

are called upon to provide counterintelligence lunctions or assistance

not being furnished at preseni, adjustments will be necessary in their:

budgeis to cover the increased custs.

DEC15:O%: Budget and Aranzever Restrictions

Each agency shouls submit a detailed estimate as

In projected mannower needs and other costs in tie

event the various investigaiive restraints herein are

lifted.

Each agency must operate within its current

budgetary or manpower limitations, irrespective

of action reguired as result of this report.

Nore information is reeded.

:! -

OPERATE

He W100111? 01111111 0111.

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## Page 140

r:

C.

.. m

TOP SECRET

PART THREE

EVALUATON OF BTERACENCY COORDINATIO:

1. CURREACE PROCEDURES TO ERFECT CCORDINATION

There is currently no operational body or mechanism!

specifically charged with the overall analysis, coorcination, and

continuine evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisi-

tion and dissemincion of inelligence, the pooling of resources, and

the corrclation of operational activities in the domestic field.

Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research

material botween certain of the interested agencies already crists, much

remains to be done in the following areas: (!) the properation of coordinat

intellinence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation; (2) tie

coordination of intelligence collection resources di the member agencies

and the establishment of clear-cut prioritius for the various agencies;

and (33) the coocuation of the pocrational aetirities of member agencies

in developing the required intelligenes.

11.

SUGGESTED DISASURES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF

MEGACLACE COTECTION

11 is botieved that an interagener group ou domestic

intelligente should be established to citect ccordication betroen ibe

various matter teenties.

This group would doine tie spectie rottire-

nonts oé the various agencios, procide regular exctuationo di comestic

intelliter, develop reconcendaions relating to poticies peternit

operations in the field of comestie intelligeone, the peopate periodie

duratie intelligene ostimates which tothe neottonte the rosal

o the record tries do to entire totellite contraily.

Here pot thi

Me me!::;

without titt

of the tread bacon of dearestedle, ter Caled latellige grie

!::

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## Page 141

TOP SECRET

L..!

-

the National Security drency, the Dalense intelligence Agency, and the

courier tell tence agencies of the Departrents Of te Army, Navy,

in addition, an appropriate representative of the

White House would have membership.

The commitica would report

periodically is the white Rouse, and a White House stait representative

would cootsunate intelligence originating with this committee in the

same manner as De. Honry Kissinger, Assistant to the President,

coordinatos ioreign intelligence on behalf of the President. The

chairman would be appointed by the President.

This interagency group would have authority to determine

appropriate sit requirements and to implerent these requirements,

subject lo the approval of the President, in ordor to meet the

responsivilities and objectives described above.

DECISION: Permanent Interarency Group

An ael loc group consisting of the TBI, CIA, NS:!,

DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies

should be appoinied and should serve as long as lia

President deems necessary, to provide evaluations

of comestic intelligence, prepare periodie comestie

intelligence estimates, and carry out the other

oljectives incicated above.

A permanent committer consisting of the FEI, Cla, Na

Did, and the military counterintolligence agencies

shoula be appointed lo provide craluations of

comeone intellence, prepare periodie domestic

intelligenon estimates, and carry out the other

onjectives indiented abote.

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## Page 142

C.'

A -2

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## Page 143

23-76 TOm/10810

senor andum

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASILINGTCR

TOP SECRET

LATOLE VEE COUNT CHANNELS OILY

MENORAMDUA FOR:

July 23, 1970

A-2

9-12-75

SUBJECT:

RICHARD MELAS, DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

C :

The President has

carefully studied the Special Report

of thie

Ineeragones committee on Intelligence (ad Hoe) and

made

the following decisions:

National Grenrily Crumsil

Interprets Restraine on Commuications Intelligence.

Intelligence Directive Munbor 6 (OSCID-6)

interpreted to permit did do program for covcrage the

commications of los, cilicens using international lacilities.

Plectronic Sureillances and feuctrations. The

intelligence commily is dirceted in intensity covorate of individuals.

and groups. in the United States who pose a major threat to the

coverage of

nationals and

diplomatic establishments in the United States of intercit to the

intelligence commity is to be intensified.

3. 20il Coverage.

Restrictions on legal coverige are to

he removed.

restriction: on covert coverage are to be relaxed to

permit use of this tochnique on selected targots of priority foreign

intelligence and internal security interest.

Nestraints

on the use of surreptitious

chery are to be removed.

The sochnique is to be used lo permit

procuremene of virally needed foreign crycographie material and

against other urgent ind high priority internal

security targets.

10C SHORE

#SC C6375-70

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## Page 144

TOP SECHET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

-

....

C.:

- 2 -

Develonment of. Campus Sources.

Coverage of violence-

prone campus and prudent-related groups is in be increased.

restraints which linit this coverage are lo be scmoved.

coverage of american students (and others) traveling

AISo, CIA

abroad is to be incroased.

Use of Militarx lindercover Nechle. Present

restrictions arc to he rotained.

7. Budget and Mannower.

Each agency is in submit a detailed

estimate no

to projected manpover needs and

othcr costa required to

implement the above decisions.

Domestic lutelligence Onerations. A committco

consistim: of the birectors or other appropriate copresentatives

Directors, of the fel, CIA, AsA, DId, and the

military counter-intelligence agencies. is to be

constituted effective

Auguse 1, 1970, do provide evaluntions of domestic intelligence,

prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, .corry out the

other objecrives spreified in the

report, and

the ipecident shall, fron

lime to time, arsisn.

Director of thie Mit shall serve

as chairman of the committer.

Further details on tic

organization and

operations of this conmittec

are sot lorth in

an attached memorandum.

The President has directed that cach addressee submit

a detailed report,

due on September 1, 1970, or

to implement these decisions.

Wurther such periodic

be requested as circumstances merit.

The President is avare that procedural problems

arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, lie is

anxious that such

problems be resolved with maximum speed

minimum misunderstanding.

Any difficultios which mas arise should

be brought so my immediate attention in order that an appropriate

solution may be found and the President's directives inplemented in

a maner consistone with his objectives.

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

Atenchmont.

CC:

The President

H.k. lialdoman

10F SECRET

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## Page 145

nc cordinal:

TOP SECRET

HANDLE YEN COINT CHANNELS ONLY

ORCATSZATION AND OPEPATIONS OF THE INTEAGENCY

CROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND

INTENNAL SECURITY (1AG)

-

Homburahin. The membership shall consist or

represontatives of the out, cla, DiA, aSA, and thie counter-

intelligence agencio: of the lepartments of the Army, Havy, and

To insure the high lovel consideration of Issues and

problema which the tresident cxpects to be before the group, the

Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally.

if necescary and

appropriate, the Diractor of a munber

ageney may designate another

individual to serve in his place.

Chairman.

The Director of the FBI shall serve as

chairman.

He may designate nother individual from his agency to

serve as the FBI representative

on the group.

3.

Ohselvets.

The purpose of the group is en effectunte

community ride coordination and

securr

the benefits

of connit;-

Hide amalgis and relimating.

then problems

arise shiel involve

ArUns 01

interest

to agencios or departments not members of the

ErUlp,

they shall be invited, it the discretion of the sroup, in join the

as observers ind

participants

in those discussions of interest

Such agencies

and deparements include the Departments of

State (18 K, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BilD,

communily lelations serviced, and such other agencies which may have

investigative or law enforconent responsibilities touching

domestic intolligence or interbal security matters.

on

White House Liaison.

The President has

assigned to l'om

Charles lusion staff corponsibility for domestic intelligonce and

internal

security afiairs.

He will

participate in all activities of the

group as the personal

representative of the president.

• s Stallins.

The gromp will establish such sub-conmittees

no working arnops in it deens

appropriate.

It will alsn determine and

implement

much platting requiremonts

is it may deem ncessary lo

enable it to carry ot its responsibilities,

subject to the approval of

the President.

TOK SECRET

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## Page 146

TOI SECHET

LAHOLL VIA CONLET CLINELS ONLY

attangon

C..

r.

- 2-

6. Dulles. The group will have the following duties:

(a) Define the spoelfic rcquirements of member agencies

of the Intelligance community.

(1s) liftoct close, direct coordination between member agencies.

(c) l'rovido regular evaluations of domestic intelligence.

(1) levine policies governing operations

domestic

intelligence

in the field of

and develop accommendations.

(e) l'repare

periodic domestic intelligence estimates which

incorporate the results of the combined

efforts of the titelligence

community.

(1) l'erform such other duties as the President may from

time to time assign.

Meetinas.

The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman

a member

agency, or the khile House representative.

securite.

Knowledge of the existence and purpose of

the group

limited on i strict "need to know" basis.

and papers originating with, the group shall be classified "Top

Sceret-Handle Via Comint Channels Only,"

?..

other irocedures.. The group shall establish such

other procedures as

il believes appropriate to the implementation of the

duties set forth above.

TOP SROSEL

Relyped

1ron

indástinct

originat

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## Page 147

C.

7 6

A-3

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## Page 148

Richard Heims, menorandum

A -3

9-12-75;

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ha. ReMani:

Per your telephone request, I en returning

heroilin it.

ruston's canoranct to ro

Subject:

Donentle intelligenes,

dated July 23, 1270.

direstline

Picnard teles

0. 0

23

julY 1970

(DATE)

14% 9

t.

1 a90 39.

101

:r=11

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## Page 149

76 0 0

A-It

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## Page 150

renaratio lo senorandum

SECRET/SENSITIVE

:S362.N03 522 28. 2322

25 deg lio

A-4

9-12-15

3J0500E:

Diachasion with accorney Generai Mltchell on

Donostic intelligenes

27 July i9io

in cactus

repting ts the abcorner General 0n

cicar,

to my bread

had heard nothina dratorer

surprise, that ne

2s0n6 tho Prosident's instructions

"Doreddie Thickligenes"

until thee ter? coming.

cords,

the attorner coreral tad rob coen told of the mooting at

the Wallo House on 5uene 1270 or 02 the ad doo commiture moei-

ings enairad up the for drien has colbored on about the report.

shich

ing

constrainto on donastic intolligance collectione do I understand

1bg the titomor Camral carso Heard abouo these mattars taco the

Direcent on the Fel complained to din soouo a necorandon trea

aro con Charles dabbon trash meso be essentially 67e 5er2

?..

I told ens ditorey Goneral that de had Dut ou- 1ac13

into

raig geercise,

vecausa we had thought that ho knew ail acout

Cha 10:orney Caneral das frank with mo.

In adulton, he aid thee nerd told do. dearer to lisit tight"

tal be (ere datoraar Goneral) hod en coporconito to discuss

ris mole color c2tn

sie President teen his rebem to lashingùn

fron San Clarente none reek.

•¿, in cornection vira too grocers tablred in recastie

is end doorney Coperal

Jard.

pointed

cili:

1ei 111lp moblood Coon the 728.

Tro Muorney Camaral Again crowe

don too region dare.

Rishird Reins

Director

Di610106011:

Dri:

?. C :

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## Page 151

A-5

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## Page 152

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENG ORKUSTICH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTICATION

MASHINGTON, P.C. 30335

STre

Mrod glish

?fr.

:!r. 1:-

April 12, '1071

Mr.

f"el

!!r.

Mr.

losin

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Alr.

Thril

fr.

Walters

Trie. Kin

On March 29, 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney

1e: 111908.

Plisa Gianoly

General, Mr. Richard Melfis, Director of the Central Intelligence Ache ==.

(CIA), and Admiral Noel A. Gaylor, Director of the National Security

Agency.

This meeting lnd been requested by Mr. Helins and was for the

" purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particulily of the very

an confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and foreign.

Admiral Gaylor stated that he was most desirous of the FBI resuming the

= su-called "Wick bag" job operations.

There was some discussion upon the

•. part of Mi. Helms of further coverage of mail. dou".'

I stated to the Altorney General, Mr. Helms, and Admiral Gaylor

that 7 was nofal all enthusiastic about such an extension of operations insolar

as the Fill was concerned in view of the hazards involved.

Thic Attorney

General stated that he thought belore he could make any final decision in

this matter, Mr. Helms should make an in-dapth examination of exactly what

he and Admiral Gaylor desired and then submit to the Attorney General and

myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would

call another mecting of this particular group and make the decision as to what

could or could not be done.

Mr. Jielms said he would take care of this very promptly.

dis.

Lohn edgar Hoover

Director

JELL:EDM (1)

---