## Page 1

1-00000

104-10106-10143

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUNE:

HSCA Request Ltr 8 May 1978 OLC 78-1573

LETUAN TO EA

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

Directorate of S & T Memo 22 June 1978

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE

DATE

RECEIVED

RETURNED

77.78

7-7.78

7-10-7812-10-78

9-26-78

REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)

G. ROBERT BLAKEY

Kenneth Klein

Johanna Smite

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICI

S. Nobut Blahg

Kenett 1Q.

Isherme Suite

HERCE GA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

---

## Page 2

4-00000

.....

'ind bitalies

ottestisi

TO:

1

2

3

4

ROUTING

NAME AND ADDRESS

Scott Breckenridge, OLC

6D15, Hqs.

ACTION

APPROVAL

COMMENT

CONCURRENCE

REMARKS:

DIRECT REPLY

DISPATCH

FILE

INFORMATION

DATE INITIALS

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. S0-01836-78

PREPARE REPLY

RECOMMENDATION

RETURN

SIGNATURE

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.

AEO/DDS&T, 6E60, Hqs., x6561

DATE

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to

those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

E2 IMPDET

---

## Page 3

4-00000

TOP SECRET' - EIDER - CHESS

SC-01836-78

24 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel

ATTENTION

:

Scott Breckenridge

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: HSCA Request

: HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573

1.

(U) Reference requests access to information in

cho

six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know

the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650

reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center.

have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent

files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The

information requested covers an era and an organization which

was not a part of this Directorate.

As a result much of the

corporate memory is no longer available and research of the

files by current personnel is time consuming and requires

almost a learning process.

We have depended a great deal

on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files

and

for information contained in this memorandum.

2.

(U) The primary

interest of reference refers to

the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi,

Japan.

Attached are replies

keyed to the six areas in the

HSCA letter.

3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by

this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas

requested.

Because of the broad and encompassing nature

of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact

that our files are not organized to readily respond to

such broad

requests we request that

the HSCA staff review

the material and determine if their requests

could be

limited or narrowed in some way.

thomas A. Mard, g.

Thomas G.

Ward

Acting Executive Officer

Directorate of

Science and Technology

Attachments:

As

stated

•'.'

May be downgraded to

Unclassified when

removed from attachment.

CL BY:

469804

TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

---

## Page 4

4-00000

TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

Attachment To:

SC-01836-78

SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,

OLC 78-1573

General Background: Detachment C advance party of

security and communication personnel departed the U.s.

for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon

of administrative

personnel departed 4

March, and the main

body of the detachment with

two U-2 aircraft and equipment

began deployment on 15 March.

On 29 March Headquarters was

notified that all personnel and equipment were on base.

Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April.

Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with

the following major U.S. components:

Far East Air Force

Far East Command and Th

Theater Commander

Agency's Tokyo Station and local support unit

54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron

Atsugi Naval Air Station

Details or specific operating agreements or procedures

with the above components have not been located.

By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties.

All of these operations were preparations for the primary

mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the

Detachment,

a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on

20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or

recover at Atsugi.

The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred

on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight.

was tracked, as other previous flights by other Detachments,

by Russian radar, even

i though the U-2 aircraft

had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made

on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington,

Mikhail Menshikov.

Attached are copies of the Soviet

Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).

The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions

in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960.

Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the

last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel

and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities

back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.

•TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

---

## Page 5

14-00000

"catteres

TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

During the deployment of Detachment C it performed

approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43

originated and recovered at Atsugi.

1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-

offs and landings of the U-? at Atsugi, Japan,

limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have been unable to locate files which would

contain logs of

all take-offs and landings of the U-2

aircraft assigned to Detachment C. In addition to

the mission flights stated above we must assume that

there were a large number of take-offs and landings

which would include flights for pilot familiarization,

training, equipment testing, transitional and flights

(purely for cover purposes. 32

2.

Any and all information concerning the radar

procedures, tacilities, and staff involved with

the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the

years

1959 through 1962.

As stated in the General Background above we have

not located details or specific operating procedures

or agreements with the local Navy base

at Atsugi.

3.

Any and all information pertaining to contact

between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air

Group II, Ist Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at

Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to

housing, recreational,

and eating facilities -

limited

to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have not identified any relationship between

Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1.

On

the subject of housing, we have noted that late in

1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and

a result housing was provided in the compound assigned

to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented

on the local market.

4..

Any and all information pertaining to defectors

with knowledge of the U-2 program.

The DDS&T has not located any information pertaining

to defectors.

We defer this request to the DDo.

- 2 -

TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

---

## Page 6

4-00000

TOP SÈCRET - EIDER - CHESS

Any and all information within the U-2 program

file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of

the U-2 program.

See above.

Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge

of the U-2 program previous to May 1, 1960.

Attached is an extract from a report dated

3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which

gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2

overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B) •

Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note

of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956

which was the first

penetration of the

Soviet borders

(Tab C) •

- 3 -

TOP

SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

---

## Page 7

4-00000

5 March 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AIDE MEMOIRE

According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at

4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having

appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state

border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya

Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remain-

ing over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter,

the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south

of the Olga Bay.

The information on this violation has been carefully checked

and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representa-

tives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the

knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny

the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, such a

denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the

Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if

it had not actually taken place.

A the present time, when negotiations are being conducted

on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an im-

provement of relations and to strengthening trust between states,

the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft

may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at

convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.

From the messages of the President of the USA and his con-

versations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements

by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet

Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement

between our governments and improvement in the relations between

them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of

the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering

this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.

---

## Page 8

4-00000

The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to

the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of

the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly

dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, Ameri-

can military planes make flights around the clock over many countries

of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the

USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences

for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a

load will find itself shot down.

The attention of the Government of the USA has already been

previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of

the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven

by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary

measures to prevent such violations.

It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of

the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts .

capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the

Soviet Union and the USA.

The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations

of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that

the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty

of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and

tha: it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.

Taking into account the present situation, where a summit con-

ference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the nego-

tiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government

would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in

the UN.

The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfac-

torily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there

will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for

its settlement.

(Initialled by M. Menshikov)

Washington, March 5, 1958

---

## Page 9

4-00000

21 April 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Note No. 9

vaue.a

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United

States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Depart-

ment of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the

Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of

the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the

Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet air-.

craft, has the honor to communicate the following:

In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an

attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft:

having violated the Soviet border.

As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has

at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability

of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2,

1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance

aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction

of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the

area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that

settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace

of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable

period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilo-

meters south

of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a.m.

In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government

of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satis-

factory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a

reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately

by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered

it possible to proteci such persons subordinate to it, who, without re-

gard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders,

thus creating a threat of international complications.

---

## Page 10

4-00000

castier

Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America

to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause

serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet

airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of

the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the

necessary steps to prevent such violations.

In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects

that the Government of the United States of America will undertake

further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the

USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those

guilty of this violation.

The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of

the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent

violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and

states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their

consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.

Washington, D. C.. April 1958

---

## Page 11



---

## Page 12

4.00000

SC-02164-58

Suman o2 Initial Missions

In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense

syster as subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven

osorning rithin a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that

24 (cora) provides tian only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet

syster.

This is inportant because it is clear fron RECAL raterial that ?y

considerable air defense business is conducted.

over landlines and thus not

by cOMINg.

HoWevEr,

somo tentative conclusiona maj be drawn frou

these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

is clear evidence that their

Ma corerese extends above (12,000) cet.

In spite of the fact that these missions cone as & surprise,

one of them went undetected

- 23 .

TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

---

## Page 13

TUP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS

S0-02754-59

2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware

of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action.

One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the

mission aircraft was over the USSR, and & second action wich is

believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into Bast

Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved

into Hungary at about this time.

The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission,

2014, was indeed curious.

While the action evident iron CoMI j24

is not clear an explanation which appears to lit the known facts

is offered as follows: As a, result of the previous missions, the

Soriets had concluded the essential lacts concerning the missions,

I.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above 65,000%4

feet, and that a penetration as deep as lloscow was possible.

procably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when

the track appeared on a northeasterly heading.

The loss of the

target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and

"red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge

or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system

to see that a "nostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow sith no

means availablo to stop it.

Inis idea is supported by the use

of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the voint

were the track had been "lost".

In addition, the track was not

labelad "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it

had passed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did

appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested tnat other

stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track.

Further, it may

on lay not be a coincidence that the heignt broadcast was almost

exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on

the noxt missions,

four days later, the altitude reporting as

consistently above 50,000 feat.

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recoguition of

the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and

in general the performance of the waming system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning

system closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of

confusion or track loss.

Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet

with one plot rassed 68,800 which was only 100 feei off target.

The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning

systen is deployed in depth. This was evident fran both the continuity

for track ana most forcefully from the ELliT date collected.

Some 1461

intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were

obizined by project ErIT as follows:

TOKEN-1331, WEIFT-37, GAGE-26,

PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30.

These nunbers cannot be equated to in-

dividal radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than

618 TOKEN sites were located, including 213 new sites. Some

343 adaitional TOKEN signals were identified but available information

does not permit determination of location so that lt must be con-

cluded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because

of the limitation nI ELINT to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet

practice of sollocatizg radars on difierent frequencies the total

number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number

•of sites.

- 21 ∞

TOP SECRET - EIDER- CHESS

---

## Page 14

SC-02164-58

7. Confusion and track loss seamed to be related to the

presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point

ha.5 not been determined because of insufficient data.

8. The question of radars for height finding, the caraoilities?

of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKEs and later

develogments are discussed in another section. It is believed,

that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction

Of ROCK CAKES.

99

• 25 -

TOP SECRET - EIDER- CHESS

---

## Page 15



---

## Page 16

(Text

of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist.

Republics presents its compliments to the Department of

State of the United States of America and, acting on in-

structions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to

state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of

this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium

bomber of the United

States Air Force appeared from the

American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over

the territory of the German

Democratic Republic,

entering

the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the

Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The

aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union

flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad,

penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of

320 kilometers and remaining over such

territory for one

hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-

engine medium bomber of the

United States Air Force, coming

from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany,

flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic,

and at 8:54 penetrated

the air space of the Soviet Union in

the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish

People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier

of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Bara-

novichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet

territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained

one hour and 20 minutes over such territory.

The same day

another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the

United States of America

Washington, D. C.

---

## Page 17

14-00000

"...

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated

to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United

States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers

of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be inter-

preted as other than intentional and conducted for purp-

oses of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of

the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time

when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and

other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of

international tensions has been achieved, when relations

between governments are improving, and when mutual confi-

dence between them is growing.

Such a development of inter-

national relations is fully supported by the peoples of all

countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary

circles hostile

to the cause of peace in a number of coun-

tries are

worried by the relaxation of international tension

which has taken place.

These circles do everything possible

to interfere with further improvement of relations between

countries and the creation of mutual trust among them.

Among such

attempts is the said gross violation by the

American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union,

which

consistently carries out a policy of strengthening

peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all

countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that

the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union

by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General

Twining, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal

Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the

Government of the United

States

against such gross viola-

tion of the air space of the Soviet Union by American mili-

tary aircraft and considers this violation as an

intentional

act of certain circles

in the United States, planned to ag-

gravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United

States of America.

2

---

## Page 18

4-00000

Calling the attention of the Government of the United

States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the

air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the

Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible

consequences of such violations rests with the Government of

the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken

by the Government of the United States to punish those

guilty for the said violations and to prevent such viola-

Washington,

July 10, 1956

D. C.

---