THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS
Agency: ARMY
Originator: JCS
From: KRULAK, V.H.
To: COORD. CTE. ON CUBAN AFFAIRS
Document date: 03/14/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10006-10008

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/24/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ARMY

198-10006-10008

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: JCS

FROM:

KRULAK, V.H.

TO: COORD. CTE. ON CUBAN AFFAIRS

TITLE:

THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

DATE: 03/14/1963

PAGES:

12

SUBJECTS :

COUNTERING CUBAN PROPAGANDA

CUBAN SUBVERSION

KRULAK COMMITTEE

PROPAGANDA MEDIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/11/1997

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 11. Memo transmitting the Krulak Committee's paper on the movement

of Cuban propaganda.

JFK Assassination Records Revrew

De beast of the lude 152e

b Exemp

NO STATE OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

BY IN DATE 01/19/16

TO DECLASSIFICATION

DATE:

MAR

2016

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

BUBCOMIXTTHE

ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

THE JOINT STAFF

BAOSA-D 156-63

24 March 1963

NEVORANDUM FOR:

The Coordinating Committee on Cuban

Astairo

Subject: The Movement of Propaganda Materiale

Reference:

a Guana Be 10, da Sa - Tara 1963

Attached 1a a peper which outlines the problem of

the 11ou of

propaganda naterials

from Cuba to and within

Letta Amonica,

and which presente

séquence of actions

contemplated

to meet the problem.

Fox the Sub-Committee

V. H. KRULAK

Major General, USYC

Chatman

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.. Introduction ---

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

III.

Direct

Actions to Impede Legal Movement

of Propaganda Materials-

1. Political Actions

2. Intelligence Actions

3. Covert Actions

IV. Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement

of Propaganda Materials

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-

1. Intelligence Actions

2. Surveillance and Reporting Action - -

3. Political Action

4. Technical Assistance Actions

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CUBA

MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede

the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba

to and within Latin American countries.

They complement

the basic actions relating to control of movement of sub-

versive trainees to and from Cuba, which actions are gen-

erally applicable in the solution of this problem as well.

As in the companion measures for control of the movement

of subversive trainees, successful execution of the actions

proposed below will reduce the llow or propaganda materiali

but will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through

which propaganda materials flow.

As these legitimate

outlets are blocked by the initial steps herein proposed,

It will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists and their

sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass exportation

of materials to the production and dissemination of the

same materials in a clandestine environment within the

several Latin American countries. Of the two threats, the

illicit production of propaganda

materials in each country

will be by far the more difficult to abate.

In combatting these threats, one of the most power-

ful factors is the influence of our own information and

counter-propaganda efforts, which USIA and CIA have in=:

creased greatly during the

past two years.

This paper,

however, is concerned wholly with direct actions; actions

designed

to impede the movement of propaganda materials

to and within Latin America.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

While the Castro image has faded somewhat in Latin

America, and the attraction of Cuba as a model has dimin-

ished, the susceptibility of the Latin American people to

communist propaganda remains high.

The basic social and

economic factors which have made

this true in the past

have not greatly altered, and the variety and quantity of

propaganda materials with which the Latin Americans are

now beset are impressive, as exemplified in the one han-.

deed million dollars which the communists are estimated to

be investing in the project annually. It is a large pro-

gram and it presents a continuing threat to the tran-

quility of Latin America.

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Our efforts to combat the problem, moreover, are

complicated by the fact that freedom of

thought,

ion and press

are generally highly regarded in Latin

America, albeit not universally honored, and any proposals

to reduce the flow of Castro-Communist

subversive materials

must be influenced by this fact. Otherwise the United

States may find itself indicted for fostering police-

state methods, a charge which could alienate many of the

Latin Americans

we seek to influence.

For the purpose of this paper, propaganda materials

include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings, printed

materials, (posters, pampniets,

magazines, leaflets, books,

newspapers, news service output), motion pictures, dupli-

cating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications

equipment, and printing resources, particularly paper stock-

However, to be complete, "movement of propaganda

materials"

must extend also to publications which are hand-

carried into a country by legal or illegäl travellers for

subsequent reproduction.

It must also include materials

transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic

channels, shipments

via postal channels, quantities intro

luced through smuggling operations, oral

transmission of

propaganda guidance.. by individual travellers or by Radio

Havana, and the dissemination of communist oriented news

by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, for re-

production by local outlets.

Finally to be considered are

thematic guidance, which can be reproduced and exploited

locally by returning trainees, front groups and sympathetic

publications and, in some countries such as Mexico, Argen-

tina and Uruguay, the products of those commercial

lishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro-

Communist materials as a matter of policy or ideological

conviction.

Press and Publications

There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers

and periodicals in Latin America, and infiltration of the

democratic press, coupled with the non-critical attitudes

of some newspapermen, increases greatly the diffusion of

the Cuban propaganda

There are 228 Communist-oriented

publishing houses and bookstores in Latin America, serving

as outlets not only for 30 different Cuban periodicals, but

for a large variety of other Communist printed material.

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Every Latin American country except the Dominican

Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela permits

these bookshops to operate.

cations at very low prices or give away several books

operate.

Many of them offer publi-

with the purchase of one, and easy credit terms are

available.

Excluding TASS and the New China News Agency (NCNA) ,

Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency in

Latin America.

It operates openly, although not entirely

without restriction, in ten countries -- Bolivia, Brazil,

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico,

Panama and Uruguay. While most users of Prensa Latina

- adole

releases are covert or overt Communists, some non-Communist

media make unattributed use of Prensa Latina releases.

This is especially true of radio broadcasts.

All of this publication activity is essentially

overt.

However, decrees banning Communist propaganda

have not prevented the clandestine publications and aistri-

bution of periodicals and books in some countries, and

propaganda materials continue to seek entry through the

mails. In Panama, for example, postal and customs authori-

ties

destroy an average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda per

month. Another ten tons per month is seized and destroyed

in Costa Rica.

This suggests the further quantities, per

haps larger, may be finding their way into these and other

countries.

Radio

Short wave radio is the principal direct mass audience

medium used by Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin

America. The Castro regime has constantly increased Radio

Havana's short wave broadcasts to Latin America to a current

to tatan America to

level of 115:30 hours per week.

Cultural Activities

Penetration under the guise of cultural activities is

a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America,

where there are now some 64 Cuban binational centers and

Friendship Societies.

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E1 Ims

Feature films and short documentaries produced by the

Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry play a

direct propaganda role.

These films are shown primarily in

binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups,

and in private or clandestine meetings.

It will be seen from this brief review that Latin

America is the target of a broad-scale propaganda program,

comprising not only propaganda materials but Including

also the ideas, the knowledge and the resources which are.

necessary to make those materials effective.

III. Direct Actions to Impede the Legal Movement of

Propaganda Materials

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated

to impede the legal movement of propaganda materials from

Cuba to and within Latin American countries. For the pur-

pose of this paper, legal movement is defined as movement

by recognized private and governmental carriers and communi-

cations, as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching.

These

actions offer promise of achieving early and

effective results in some Latin American countries, but

they do not have universal application, and those which may

be feasible in one country may not be necessary or feasible

in another.

1. Political Actions

a, Induce newspapers in countries in which Prensa

Latina operates to cancel their subscriptions to the

service.

b. Persuade those governments which receive Cuban

and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close

surveillance over the propaganda activities of the

Communist embassies with a view toward prohibiting

abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive pur-

poses *

c. As applicable and feasible, induce Latin

American countries to:

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(1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation

to provide severe penalties for any person engaging

in dissemination of Cuban-Communist propaganda

which inspires terrorism or proposes the overthrow

of the legal government by force and violence.

(2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates at

international meetings held in Latin America.

(Delegates are propaganda disseminators.)

2. Intelligence Actions

a, Continue U.S. intelligence efforts in each

country to identify individuals, organizations and

facilities involved in propaganda importation,

reproduction and/or dissemination; make available to

each country

selected intelligence concerning these

individuals, organizations and their activities.

b. Encourage each country in which the Communist

Party is illegal to offer rewards for information

leading to interception of Castro-Communist propa-

ganda and, in countries where the Communist party 1s

legäl, for conviction of persons supplying or

disseminating propaganda materials considered dan-

gerous

to the country's tranquility.

c" In separate diplomatic approaches

to each

country, urge full and effective cooperation, with

the appropriate organs of the OAS and bilaterally

among the several nations, in the interchange of

information concerning movement of propaganda

materials.

d. Persuade Latin American countries to report

promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country

concerned, the identity of any national of that

country who arrives from Cuba and who is discovered

to have

been carrying Communist propaganda materials.

3. Covert Actions

a. Disrupt the reproduction and distribution of

propaganda materials, and the procurement and delivery

of related supplies

and equipment.

No

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b. Seek opportunities to induce Latin American

printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint

Castro-Communist propaganda in the process of re-

production.

C. Disrupt Castro-Communist sponsored labor and

youth congresses, industrial and agricultural

exhibits in Latin American countries.

d. Maintain or increase pressures on media owners,

local advertising agencies and film producers and/or

distributors who accept Communist materials.

e. Dissuade U.S. and local business firms from

advertising in Latin American media which carry pro-

Communist materials; prepare and circulate to U.s.

firms, for information, lists of such media In order

to encourage their support of a non-Communist press..

I. Inhibit the spread of Cuban and Bloc binational

centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America by

an active program to expose their subversive activities

and objectives.

§. Provide financial support to selected non-

Communist news media requiring assistance in order

to compete with Communist-aligned publications which

have significant circulation or impact.

h. Induce Latin American countries to organize

surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint

and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use

of these supplies for printing Communist materials.

IVa

Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement Of

Propaganda Material

Many of the actions outlined in Section III related

materials will serve also ti

Additional measures designed

specifically to impede clandestine traffic are enumerated

below.

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1. Intelligence Actions

a. Use penetration and other intelligence techniques

to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from

Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries; deter-

mine routes and methods employed; report selected

information,

consistent with requirements for protect

ing our own intelligence program, to the governments

concerned.

b. Utilize the U.S. Intelligence community to

determine the nature and extent of clandestine air-

craft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other

countries in the Caribbean and Central American area,

giving particular attention to Mexico, Honduras,

Jamaica, Haiti

and the Dominican Republic.

evidence obtained to induce the governments concerned

to initiate

surveillance and other control measures

aimed at interception of propaganda materials.

2. Surveillance and Reporting Action

Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean surveillance

system, approved by the President in the

study on

movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding

the movement of propaganda materials by 1llicit means.

3. Political Action

Where legally feasible to do so, induce each Latin

American country to improve its police procedures

designed

to expose the subversive Communist propaganda

apparatus in that country, and

to detect and eliminate

corrupt officials who permit 11l1cit shipment of

propaganda materials.

4. Technical Assistance Actions

a. Provide technical assistance, where requested

to enable Latin American governments to locate

clandestine transmitters.

b. Assist in the accelerated improvement of the

capabilities of Latin American internal security

forces, especially those patrol and intelligence

activities whose function is the prevention of clan-

destine propaganda activities. Provide equipment,

training and advice as required.

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