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Date

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09/24/98.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10003

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

PFIAB

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 21-22, 1963

DATE

11/21/63

PAGES

22

SUBJECTS

: AGENDA FOR NOVEMBER 21 AND 22, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 21 AND 22, 1963 MEETING

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

08/06/98

08/01/2024

2025 Release under the

President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection

ect oh 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10003

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

206-16001-15003

041

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LI: 6:

1=21/201403

SSCRET

ITEM

1.

20

3.

4,

5.

7.

S..

9.

10.

PRESIDENT'S POREIGN INTELLIGENCE MOVISORY BOARD

22, 2963

AGENDA POR VOTING OF LOVEIDER 21

TIE

SUBJECT

November 21, 1903

9:00 - 9:30

9:30 - 10:30

Chairman's Ilme

Board Panel's Revier of the Dunlap

Espionage Case and

1t3 Ranif1cat1ons

Messrs.

critora, Gray, boolitele

10:30 - 11:30

Actions Talen and Contemplated by NSA

Based on its study of the pangase

LE. deneral Gordon

Director of NSA

11:30 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:00

1:00 - 1:30

1:30 - 2:15

2:15 - 3:00

3:30 - 4:30

4:30 - 6:30

Executive Session

Resuits of U. So. Army's Study of Dunlap Cage

and

of Counterintelligence and Fersonnel

•security Screcning Processes Appled to

ArTy Personnel

Major General Alva Hi. Fitch, assistant Chier

vi stall, intelligones, Department of the Army

Brecutive Session

Lunch - inite House Mess

Executive Session

Assessment of the Adequacy of the Several:

Defense. Department Reviens as an Outgrowth

of the. Dunlap and Related Espionage Penetra-

tions

LE.

general Joseph fi Carrall, t

Director, DIA

Discussion and Drafting of Material to be

included In Report

the President.

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I'TEM

TIME

1].

1?..

13.

9:00 - 9:15

8:15 - 10:00

10:00 - 12:00

1!!.

12:00 - 12:30

15..

16.

17.

12:30 - 1:30

1:30, - 2:15=

2:15 - 6:00

SUBJECT

November 22,

1963

Chairman's Time

Resume With Item 10

DIscussions with the Director of

Central Intelligence

Tr.

John i. lictone

south Vietnam:

Activities of CIn Preceding

and Following

the Overtinow of pier.

In. W1lllam Colby, DD/P Starr,

Resune with Item 10

lunch - white House Mess

•Completion of final draft of Report

to the President.

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JOR SECRET.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

"ada copat sail estatio de me

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

November 21-22, 1963, Meeting of the

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

November 21,

•"1963

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in

Executive Session at 9:00 a.m. November 21, 1963, on the first day of a

scheduled two-day meeting, at the Board's offices, Room 297. Executive Office

Building.

Present were Chaistan Clifford; mombels Land, Gray, Langer

and

Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R.

Ash.

Chairman Clifford Informed Board memberu that in this two-day meeting

consideration would be given to the Soviet esplonage case involving the

late

ü. S. Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, prevlously assigned to the National

Security Agency by the Army Security Agency. Mr. Clifford said thai the

Board was in a position to do a unique service in this

situation, and was

the only Government entity engaged in a detailed, full-time review of

the

counterintelligence and national security ramifications of the case.

Chairman Clifford advised Board members that some of the facts invoived aie

extremely sensitive and must be given extreme

security.

(Here Mr. Clifford

outlined to.the Board

the substance of highly sensitive information which

had been given orally to Mr. Coyne by FBI Director Hoover for the Infornation

of the Board and the President with respect to a uniquely valuable intelli

gence sourcs which supplied information concerning the espionage activities

of Dunlap:)

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November 22, 1963

The Board re-convened at 8:45 a.m. In executive session. Chairman

Clifford announced that General Carroll had called to

emphasize that during

his remarks yesterday hè did not intend to be critical of corrective

measures taken by General Blake (Director of NSA) after the Dunlap case,

rather, his criticisme were directed at the situation existing prior therete.

Board members directed their attention to a further revlew of materials

relating to the Dunlap case, and to further work on the draft of the Board's

report to President Kennedy:

(Messrs. Pace and Murphy joined the meeting.)

At 10:00 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mo. McCone, DCI, who

was accompanied by CIA officials Kirkpatrick and Helme.

Mr. Clifford Informed the DCI that the Board would appreciate his

couments on the subject matters which had previously been indicated as of

Interest to the Board, and in any comments on other subjects which the DCI

or his assoctates night wish to make.

Mr. McCone said that he was prepared to discuss all of the items listed

by the Chairman, plus 3 additional subjects: (1) the Soviet Space Analytical

Center (2) organizational changes in regard to CiA's scientific and technical.

activities, and (3) Vietnam. He said that at noon he would have available

to the Board Mr. Willlam Colby, CIA headquarters official assigned to Far

East matters, who had Just returned from a several weeks' visit to Vietnam

at President Kennedy's request.

Mr. Mccone, said that he himself would have

to leave the meeting at 12:20 in order to keep an appointment with

McGeorge Bundy.

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First Mr. McCone said he wanted to refer most emphatically to the

damage being done to CIA through adverse publicity appearing lil the press,

radio and IV In a campaign which, if not arrested, could well destroy the

CIA. If the campaign continues, 1t will prevent ClA recruitment of good

men, and will discourage present Cla personnel at all levels in the organiza

tion. Mr. McCone said that there is little he can do to dissuade the press

from pursuing this line for ideological reasons or otherwise. There are

those in the Defense Department who have opposed CIA ever since it was:

established, and there are Foreign Service Officers in the State Depairment

who are highly critical of the CIA.

Mi. McCone urged most emphatically that the Board bring this matter

to President Kennedy's attencion and to urge the President to take not one.

but several occasions to try to correct the CIne public Image. Por example,

CIA has been accused of being a "Third Governmuit in South Vietnan"

•and

varlous people have been led to the erroneous conclusion that the anti-Diem

coup was engineered by CIA.

One result of liresponsible charges may be that

Cambodia will swing over to the Cormunist camp.

Mr. Clifford

asked whether these criticisms are traceable back to the

Bay of pigs as a turning point. Mr. McConc said yes, and back to CIA's

Involvement in Guatemala. The criticisms of CIA make interesting copy for

wilters who know there will be no denlal or defense:

For some reason

or

other, extreme liberals in and out of Government feel that a secret intelli-

gence service is contrary to the democratic principles of our Government.

The N. Y. Times 1s particularly critical and Times staffer james Reston

would destroy CIA if he had his way, and the Washington Post from top to

bottom 1s opposed to CIA:

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Mr. Gray asked if Mr. McCone was suggesting that the President should

talk to the Secretaries of State and Defense about criticisms of CIA made

by persons in those Departments. Mr. McCone said, no, what must be done

18 for the president to make the matter the subject of a major speech and

several press conferences. General Doolittle inquired whether MI. McCone

had discussed this with the President, and Mr. McCone replied that he had

and this was the reason for remarks which the President made 30 days ago

during a preys conference. Mr. Murphy observed that public.

statements of

the kind urged by Me. Mccone often have a way of proving to be

a liability,

because they may generate a whole flock of further press and radio commentaries;

and

for this reason Mr. McCone might consider the prospect of having to ride

out this storm.

Dr. Land asked what 1s the CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said

Its role was not to overthrow governments, and there are many other reasons

why CIA 19 1n Vietnam.

Dr. Land asked what, however, should the President

publicly say about CiA's role in Vietnam. Mr. Moçone said that he could

supply the President with that.

Chairman Clifford stated that the matter raised by Mr. McCone is

an area in which he would hope that the Board might be of assistance.

How-

ever, Mr. Clifford did not know how much the President could do In the way

of public statements to the press. Perhaps a lot could be done within

Government to stop damaging leaks of information from the various departments

and agencies. Me. Clifford said that the Board would address Itself to the

problem.•

Mr. McCone agreed that leaks are a part

of the problem, and here-

called that the editor of rews' week told him that he obtained information

from State Department, but the editor would not name the source.

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Turning tu the subject of Counterintelligence wich was included

on the Brard's list of items of interest, ME. MüCone asked ME. Helms:

to speak to this matter.

Mr. Heims said that in looking at the subject öf our counterintelligence

posture he prefarred to refer to

1t. a8

"counter-espionage". He said that it

1s the most dreary and least attractive job that ClA has. When CiA goes out

for positive collection of intelligence in an espionage operation; the

objective is clear -- e.g., the obtaining of information about a soviet

missile site. But counterespionage is like Blind Man's Buff where you know

somcone 1s In the room but you aren't certain who it is.

There 1s a passive

side of the effort, invulving securlty checks, safes, fences, guards, etc.;:

but if the counter effort is only passive, it continuestio be a game of

Blind Man's Buff. Therefore, a counterespionage activity 1s needed for the

purpose of identifying hostile espionage agents. In this latter activity ClA

has about 5 years to go before getting to the level that is desired.

Mr. Hélms pointed out that the USSR not only has an aggresgive cold war

Policy but jr uses the instruments of the GRU and the KGB operating In

parallel -- with coordination taking place under khrushcher in Moscow where

decisions

are reached as to dividing up the slots and espionage missions

between the CRU and the KGB.

Next Mr. Helms exhibited a chart reflecting a number of espionage cases

which have been uncovered as a resült of cIA's counterintelligence efforts:

the Able case lan 1llegal KGB agent who was located by the FBi In New York

after Able's subordinate defected to the CIA in Paria); Blake (of BEltain's

MI-6 who worked for the Soviets for 6 years until uncovered as a regult of a

Polish defection to the CIA); Philby (the old school tie MI-6 official whose

Soviet espionage recruitment dates

back to

1934 and who recently fled to the

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USSR from the Middle ?ast); Clemens and Pelfe (who served 9 years in the

West German counterespionage service, and were uncovered through a Polish

defector's tip to CIA); Cox (aU. S. citizen who took $500 from the Soviets,

returned the money, suffered a heart attack, and the case

dropped by U.S.

authorities); Ethel and Harry Houghton (uncovered through a tip from a Pollsh

defector), the Krugers (a U. S. couple whose real names were colen and who

disappeared in 1950); the Lansdale case in England; Vassalls (a homosexual

clerk in the British Admiralty); and Wennerstrom (CIA didn't give the Swede's

a direct lead to this Soviet agent, but CIA laid out to officials of Sweden

the manner in which the Soviets would effect a penetration, and

when

the

Swede's surveyed their situation they found that Wennerstrom fit the prototype,

with the result thet Wennerstrom confessed when confronted.) Mr. Helms also

presented another chart dealing with cases of espionage penetrations by other

Soviet bloc Intelligence services including Czechs, East Germans, Poles aid

Yugoslavs.

Mr. Murphy asked whether CIA had concurred in the U.S. release of the

Soviet espionage agent, Able, in exchange for U-2 pilot Powers. Mr. Helms

said that considerations of national interest prevailed in that decision,

although CIA's counterintelligence officers objected to the action.

As a result of Information gained through CIA's counterespionage efforts,

CIA has informed French and Isracli governments that the KGB is obtaining

information from them. The worst siruation is in the French government which

has recently arrested the Soviet agent Pacques, and this action by the French

government may be an indication that they are moving against Soviet espionage

infiltrations. CIA selleves in the accuracy of information it has received

from a Soviet defector that there are 10 or 12 high placed French officials

serving as Soviet

agents:

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Mr. Clifford asked whether this situation should cause the U.S..

to furnish less Incoration to the foreign governments involved. Mr. Helms

sald that CIA is recomending to the USiB that there be less distribution

of senstelve papers piaced in the hands of forelgn recipients, but that these

foreign governments be provided more counterintelligence Information to

protect themselves against Soviet esplonage penetrations (for example, lest

Germany is crawling with hundreds of last Corman agents).

In answer to General Doolittle's question as to motivations in these

cases, Mr. Helms sald that in the Western world the prlmary motivations

have been desire for money, blackmall pressures, ideology, and vanity (the

agent Blake enjoyed confessing how well he had fooled his British superiors).

In blackmail situations,.

the Sovleis develop leads as to personality defects

and then exploit them persistently

Mr: Cllfford asked whether CIA's counterintelligence program has un

covered U. So citizens serving as Soviet agents. Mr: Helms replied that one

such instance was the case of Sergeant. Rhodes... (Mr. McCone

Interjected that

If there had not been a mix-up in signals, Dunlap would have been turned up

18 an

agent:

Mr. Cllfford said that the Board knew about that.)

De. Langer asked whether the FBI 1s more active now in its counter-

espi nage colerage to the United States.

Mr. Helms said that FBI is at a

maximum of activity.

He added that the Able case had proved something that

CIA and FBI had doubted, lue., that the USSR was operating "illegals" in the

UiSo after Horld War II.

in anguer to a question as to whether new policy guidance is needed

wich respect to counterespionage activities, Me, Helms stated that CiA does

not recl that NSCID No, 5 nocus revision as the problems that exist are

encountered in the implementation of the dircctives There 1s & view in the

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intelligence community (supported by Army and Navy, although CIA and FBI

are not keen on it) that there is a need for a Counterintelligence Committee.

The objection to this ls grounded on the nature of counterintelligence work

which Involves highly sensitive operations almed at penetration of foreign

goveriment's intelligence services, and the security of these sensitive

operations would be weakened if several agencies shared in them. Under n

present arrangements there is no duplication of counterintelligence actions

on the part of the agencies involved because of the day-to-day lialson that

is maintalned arong them; and, also, the CIA maintains a central counter-

Intelligence Index file for use by Interested agencies. In adultton, the

USIB provides a place for the resolution of policy questions. Therefore,

Mr. Helms said, che CIA feels that the present bureaucratic apparatus 18

sufficient for its purposes. He added that one improvement that 1s needed

1s for U.S, milltary agencies to make 80od memoranda for the recora con-

C: 02

cerning contacts made by U.s. military attaches with forelgn officers

(in the Wennerstrom case it has been found that no such records dere main-

tatned about the many contauts with wennerstron during the perica in which

it is now known that he was serving as a Soviet agent).

Mr. Mecone next addressed himself to the subject of Cuba, in which the

Poard had expressed an interest.

He sold that from 15,000 to 18,000.

military personnel have been wichdrawn since the missile crists. A few

hundred have arrived during the past month, and siice October there appears

to have been a rotation replace

Int. of Soviet personnel. in Cuba.

It 1s

believed that the USSR 1s mi

Ing a large MAAG-type" contingent in Cuba,

including military advisers,

inclans, and personnel training the Cubans

in the.operation of SAM sites. ar

KOMAR vessels.

All missiles have been

remove from Cuba by the Soviets except cruise missiles, FROG missiles ard

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SAM's. The Soviet decision to train Cübans and to relocate SAM sites

Indicates an intention to turn them over to Cuban control eventually.

Further Sovlet withdrawals will probably taxe place when Cubans become

proficient in the weapons systems.

so, In Cuba there 1s a transition from

soviet military forcea to a MANG-type operation, with.

the Soviets retaining:

control of only the most oophisticated weapons systems. Equipment with

drawals have been limited to the missiles and launchers, and the replacement

of advanced SAM radars with older types of the kind supplied by the USSR

to Egypt and Indonesia

In answer to Mr. Cllfford's query about news accounts of CIA agent

operations in' Cuba, Me. McCone sald hat CIA has hau a very active operation

against Cuba and the Board has been briefed on it from time to time, Although:

there have been some disappointments and roll-ups. of agents, CIA has vastly

Improved its agent nets and internal agent sources among legal travelers

and friendly foreign government missions In Cuba.

Of. the 17 agents reportedly

executed in Cuba, 7 were CIA's. One unfortunate experience was the identi-

fication of the S.S. Rex as a CIA support ship. (Mr. Helms said that the

story first came to public attention on October 21 when Cuban planes strafed

a bauxite ore vessel, thinking it was the mother ship which CIA was using

to return an ageit team from a desolate area In Western Cuba.

The CLA

agent team had been in o weeks, had recruited additional agents, and was

scheduled to come out on October 21. Thie s. 'S. Rex was lying off shore

and personnel were sent ashore in small boats to meet the agent. team. The infri-

red blinker signals from shore were correctly given, although the lights were

placed closer together than they should have been. A hailing signal was

given from a rubber boat and was acknowledged, but then machine gun fire

opened up on the small boats.). Me. McCone stated that the cover story

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tor the S. S. Rex was a good one -- a hydrographic oil exploration vessel -

and when the agent team was rolled up it was decided to bring the Rex back

to a florida port as called for in the cover plan, rather than taking it

to some foreign port and thereby ruin the cover story.

Referring to the Dunlap case, Mr. Clifford said that the Board was

shocked to learn of the lack of coordination between NSA and ASA, and he

Invited the Dol's comments oll this in view of the Board's responsibility to

the President in this matter.

Mr. Mccone replied that his recommendation to the Secretary of Defenge

1s to overhaul the security system and to ensure that military personnel

assigned to NSA be subjected to the same kind of security screening

as

that

which NSA applies to 1to clvillan personnel, 1.e., a background investigation

and polygraph examination. The DCI noted that NSA rejects i par cent of the

military personnel who have been working as military assignees to NSA, when

they apply for civilian emplo ment at NSA.

Critics of Mr. McCone's proposal

say that any such new procedure would have to be applled among agencies

generally and that would present nroblems, but Mr. McCone fcale that the

more stilugent security clearance procedure should start at NSA which is the,

heart of the problem, and then widen the circle to other agencies gradually.

he DCI said that he 1n also lcoking into the need-to-know by lisA with

respect to the large number of sensitive ClA documents which are used by

NSA.

Some 135,000 such documents were at NSA during Dunlap's employment therè.

The DCI stated that CIA has not completed its damage assessment yet, and a

few weens more would be required.

Mi. Gray asked whether the CIA Investigates a military man assigned to

CIA In the evont that derogatory incormation is developed concerning him.

Mr. McCone replied that before a military assigned comes to CIA, the CIA

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ELINT. For example in connection with aSoviet missile shot on Kamchatka

there was a suspicion that the test would Include a Soviet anti-ICBM shot,

but fur Alaskan radar site was not alerted, the radars were not up, and

we missed coverage of any anti-ICBM test. Mr. McCone agreed with De. Baker's

observation that there is a relations lp between the activitles of

the new

Center and the responsibilities. to he assigned under the Defense ELINI Plan,

and the DCI added that there may well be resistance from some elements of

the military.

Next Mr. McCone reported to the Board on the recent. U-2 crash in the

Gulf of Mexico.

The whole plane has been found in 9 fathoms of water 40

mIles Nu of Key West.

The ejector canopy 1e off and the seat is out. ' An

empty. life raft and parachute were found.

There was no attack made on the

aircraft. The pilot reported a successful mission over Cuba, he flew over

the Key West station on the return trip and 10 minutes later he was down.

When the wreckage is raised it should be possible to determine the cause.

Mr. Mccone said that this exhausted the list of things he had in mind

to discuss at this meeting.

Mr. Cllfford asked if there were any Intelligence facets of the arrest

of U. S, professor Barghorn in the USSR. The DCI said that an analysis of

the professor's debriefing had not yet been completed. He had no intelligence

mission even indirectly, but was once a CIA consultant and the KGB knew that.

No doubt this soviet move was made because they had run out of paing to use

In obtalning an exchange for the Sovlet spy Egeroff arrestei in the u.s.

As a matter of fact CIA had forecast that the Soviets would do something

Like this when they ran out of people to use in exchanges, Mr. McCone said.

At 12:15 Mr. McCone brought in Mr. Colby who was in charge of the CIA

Station at Saigon for 5 years and more recently has been in charge of tha

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Far East desk at CIA headquarters.

At an NSC meeting following the anti-

Diem coup In South Vietnam the President decided to send Mr. Colby to

Saigon to survey the situation as a representative of the President and of

the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Vietnam coup 1s the 8th that has

taken place

around the world during the past year. Mi. McCone sald that he

has looked back over CIA reporting on these events and found that without

exception there had been a forecast of what was to come an of the people

involved,

Mr. McCöne said that reports of possible coups in Vietnam had been

received for yeare. Up to carly August 1t was CIA's practice to inform

the Diem government about reported coup plotting.. Then when Diem began to

resist efforts to get him to change some of his policies; CIA decided not to

report to him on coup talk which was noted in August, bur CIA would watch the

situation.

-- which CIA did In detail through August and September.: CIA

knew quite

a lot about the General's coup plotting but not thele precise

plan.: General Dhin told ClA that the coup was ready..

CIA maintained a radio

telephone link between the Joint General Staff and the CIA Station in Saigon,

information. on

so that the CIA contact could report developments. CIA did not have/and does

not know about the assassinations of Diem and Nhu. CIA had no part in

organizing the coup, MI. Mecone informed the Board, although some rave

accused CIA of this. Mr. McCone said he would now ask Mr. Colby to brief

the Board, noting that My. Colby attended the Honolulu meeting (as did

Mr McCone) and 1s knowledgeable of the decisions made there. CAt 12:25

Mr. McCone left the Board meeting to keep his appointment with Mr. Bundy.)

Mr. Colby began by Informing the Board that CIA has for some time

been watching signs of instability in the Vietnam government, in order to

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determine reasons for discontent and to learn of any plans to overthrow the

government. (Iwo earlier coups had been attempted.

In November 1960

Junior paratrooper officers took part. In 1962 two Ale Force pilots bombed

the palace in the hope of killing members of the royal family.)

In the

surmer of 1963 CIA's policy was tied to clear and present danger to.U. S

Interests.

If CIA saw threats to the Diem regime, CIA would give warnings

to Diem so as not to spoil ClA's contacts with the reglme. In the summer,.

the Intense feelings over the Bhuddist issue were graver than any that CIA

had seen in Vietnam.

There were major popular grlevances against the regime.

The regine insisted it had the answers to all questions and that any

opposition was either venal or stupid. All was decided from the Palace, and

the Generals did not have much to do.

The regime had à total lack of appre-

clation of public relations both at home and internationally, While the

Bhuddist sulcides by burning were taking place there were b or 8 potential

coup groups being formed,

some of them being alllances between civilians änd

the military.

The situation was crystallized with the Government raids on

pagodas, resulting in public outcry.

Diem convinced his Generals that these

repressive actions were necessary to maintain the war effort, when in fact

Diem was making a political move agalnst a Bhuddist political operation.

Mr. Colby said there was no tle between the Bhuddists and 'the Vieg Cong.

although there had been some Communist penetration of the Bhuddist priests

dating back before 1954) The anti-Diem Bhuddist movement actually began

as a concept to protect Bhuddism against Catholic supremacy. When the

Government raided the pagodas, this almost set off a coup attempt at that

time but the coup planners had not yet obtained support of sufficient troops.

Meanwhile, CIA was watching developments carefully, Mr. Colby said. In

answer to a question from Mr. Coyne, he stated CIA funds and activities were

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not directly or

Indirectly involved in support of Diem forces which raided

the pagodas.

a. Continuing, Mr. Colby reported to the Board that In Septembércanaces

October CIA had identified (1) a General's coup. group, and (2) a coup coc

group headed by junior officers

and civilians, which was.allrset.corove.i..ti

on October 24 but could not do

for lack uf needed trucks... Mr. Colby it:

then werit on to describe the Generals' coup action which resulted in the

overthrow of the Diem government, along the lines publicly reported... i

•In answer to Mt. Murphy's question, Mr. Culby Informed the BoardSthat

there were 10 executions

of members of the Diem regime during the coop. y

action.

"Looking ahead, Mr. Coliy stated that as soon as the Generals have

finished removing pro-Diem officials fron the Government they will proced

to inótitute popular programo in an effort to solidily the suppore of the

people in the prosecution of the war effort (the strategic hamier program

i 1. 11

12:11!

probably be continued). The Generals will have to change the compartmentation

of the Vietnam military forces which Diem had established as a means of

preventing the Generals from knowledge of the overall situation. Accordinglyin

the new ruling Generals' group sees the need for thorough rcorganization

of the military chain of command, and are attempting to form an organizational

pattern which will be better suited to fighting the war against the viet

Cong:

The basic war concept is to clean out Cong forces in the southern

deita grea

and then expand military activities in the northern area.

General Doolittle asked whether there is any organiied Communist

movement within South Vietnam. Mr. Colby replied that the Viet Cong guerilla

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I92 SEERLI

effort hag

penetrated into the South Vietnamese soclety.. Viet Cong:

m1l1taty units are guided by Cong Political Committees which are set up 1n

cach Province.

There 18, Mr. Colby

stated, a Communist. Party In South

Vietnam whose main efforts are directed at "shnoting at us" and propagandaring

the south Vietnamese into the bellef that their real enemies are

the U.s.

and.

the prestrt Government of the country.

In answer to Mr. Pace's question as to whether realistic looks have:

been. taken of the potentials for winning the war in Vietnam, Mi. Colby sald

that

a hard

nose

100k

1s necessary: It 1s not yet clear whether the new

Government regime can claim the support of the people in the countryside,

The

situation is in fair

shape in the northern'two-thirds of the country;

but

1s. bad

1n

the

southern one

third.

MI,. Coyne inquired

about U.S. coordination öf its some fliteen are:

Intelilgence elements In South Vietnam. Mr. Colby said that the J-d is

coordinating military

Intelligence activities, CIA coordinates politica!

Intelligence efforts, and paramilitary matters are being turned

ovEr tO

U.S. Special Forces. He said that there are 200 personnel engaged in che

CIA effort in South Vietnam.

Di. Langer asked about the recall of the Cla Station Chief In Saigon

(Richardson) Mr... Colby said that Richardson had become publiely identifted.

as a close contact of the Diem

regime at

a time when the U.S. Government

became

critical of policies of

the Dien regime.

Ag

for French Government attitudes toward

the South vietnam situation,

MI. Colby observed that the French have considerable. commercial holdings

in the country' and a history of cultural affinity, and the French are

piqued

at their loss of a "protective image".

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Mr.. Colby concluded his discussion with the Board and left the meeting

at 1:00 p.n.

In executive session, the Board had a further discussion of its report

to be made to President Kennedy on

the Dunlep case. Chaliman clifford

brought Messrs. Murphy and Pace. 'up to date on the principal nattèrs covared

at the preceiing day's session of the board meeting with regard to

the ex-

tensive revlew and materials which had been completed thus fai by Mr. Gray

and Mr. Coyne in the Dunlap

case. Mr. Clifford surmed up the Board's reaction

of being aghast at the

shocking luoseness of security attitude at the NSA:

He referred to the many questions which had been put to the Director of lisa

at yesterday's session. Mr. Clifford observed that General Flich had made

a very Intelligent presentation, and that an exceedingly valuable session

hail been had with General Carroll of DIA.: Mr. Cllfford said that after

lunch the Boaid would complete its consideratior of the Dunlay report and

1....

recommendations which the Board Panel had drafted. Arrangements lad

been made for a meeting of board members with President kennedy in con-

junction with this particular Board mecting because Mi. Cliftord had felt

that the Board would require all the time of this 2-day meeting to complete

action on its report on a complex subject.

Chairman Clifford sald that Board members should plan to convene for

ralf a day at

the next Board

meeting and then meet with the President for

an hour

on

the dunlap case report. In vier of the serlous nature

of the

counterintelligence problems involved, Mr. Clifford expressed

the opinich

that the Board's report and

reconmendations may well constitute one of the

most important contributions which the Board has made.

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Mi. Clifford then Informed Board nembers Murpily and Pace of.

the

• Board's discuss10n

yesterday assessing the degrce of damage resulting

from Dunlap's espionage activities. Recogniting the difficully of arriving

at sn assessment at this time, Mr. Clifford observed that the damage must

have been serdous, and he noted that the Cll 1s still evaluating les pracuice

of mending lis sensitive documents to the NSA. MInClifford

stated that.

despite differences of opinion which may exist as to the damage

done. to

U.S. interests by Dunlap's espionage service for the Russians, the. Board

has infumation which beats un the subject but which cannot be unde generally

known and which the Board ian pass on only to the President, (Mr. Clifford

then related to the Board the most sensitive Item, consisting of información

which iad buen given to Mi: Coyne by approprlate authority, for reporting :..

to the Board. and to the President. It was agreed by Buard members

that the

Boaid

must take particular pains to potect this information, and would. do

50.)

At 1:35 the Board

adjourned for Lunch at the White House .St.ff Mess.

Having heard the report uf the assassiuu:ion of President Kennedy

which had just

occurred

at 2:00 p:m. EST In Dallas, Chairman Clifford re-

convened the Braid in executive session. Mr, Clifford expressed the keen

sense.of.

personal loss which he felt upon the President's death. lie joined

Board members in their indivitual

expressions of profound surrow occasioned

by tie tragic cirrumstances of the President's death, and their

deep sympathy'

and concern for the President's family.

Chairman Clifford announced that at this point the Braid's meeting of

the past iwo days was

at a close,

and that completion of the board's report

which was in preparation for submission to President. Kennedy rould be

suspended pending further developments.

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I was Charman Clifford's feeling thai it would be inappropriate

and premature, during the transition period fullowing Presideni dennedy's

death,. For the Board

to present to President johnson the Board's recommenda-

tions calling for su itantial changes in the U.S. Intelligence effire.

MI. Ulifford expressed his intention, and Board members

sireed, to indicate

to president johnson

soon as

possible the Board's willingness to serve

In any way possible. Meanwhile, pending a resolution by Pecsident Johnson

as to whether the Board would continue as án institution, and

to the

President!s. wishes.concarning continued services of thé present Chairman

and

membeis, Chairman Clifford ast i that the Board members te prepared to

meet on a quick notice should intelligence developments require it.

ME. CliEfOrd sald that he would infar che Dol de the course of accion anich.

the Board

waS

taking at this time.

The Board meeting was adjourned at 3:20

p.m., subject to call of the

Chalrman as determined

by developments.

A. R. Ash

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- SECA

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The Director of Central Intelligence has suggested

to the Chairman that the Board might wish to be brougno

up to date on recent Intelligence and related activities

Involved in South Vietnam, Including the activities of

CIA preceding and following the overthrow of Diem.

The Chairman concurred in this suggestion.

arrangements have been made for the

aral briefing on

the subject by,

1s/

J. Patrick Coyne

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