## Page 1

4-00000

104-10225-10027

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MAMA NO A 00 1000AT6 1D

10 166 C00TTE 06 AllO STEE Ml

SUBJECT

COUNTRY CHILE

SECLUSIVE DATES: EEBRUARY 1973-77

• CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

15-11:

DATE

RECEIVED

DATE

RETURNED

REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAT

NO DOCUMENTS WAY LE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS PILE

No.

---

## Page 2

14-00000

um.

Front)

олІго.

10

C/11/1015

Santiago, Chide

1:1 0A

10.:188812891.19

116.8.5.

C01C.1

A';

11.0:0 80 100: 016

0/l.0/01

1111?

Madel

110 ...6

11Ã 19.1: 8:1.

1:100.10.1.1.

11er vels

18111

$ 11,8.

APPEPER COO BUO, O 168.006.80:005, ALDO CORO MACAONE MACCAONDE 8.0S1S.

11186-000. 09190001:9. 1.400: 110 178.01118..

11O PINI H:N900A1080009 P1.F.

101G 8'91

110118

МЕРОВ 60000116: 1

•, 1.::01:81910 1009111. 600:1.1

aromation Consta

1r 1011.091

11 11 -A110016.00008819949 8060: 16::1008 1.

COP: T VOID GNN GOD DEEP PROGRADE.

1111:

Zo ine and

BUNSECT

PRODUCT

015

120

003

Psych Harfare Goneral

ACTICIN

Neers!

LILOUIN

the for more recommencReam

1000:108088F.1

Самістонтисовстосоті

-TIMILARETRO DIATICIS SENORCIS ONLYI

TE POTLRLSITO TIZOLUANGETG DEE TORT ACTOR DESTITENT

0015

TENANCE FEIRAMENTLY TOT

PRIATE: POLUCHAND

LIND TO MONASIR

1001.8911

S FILE

AESTRICTLU

UNRESTRICIFEA

10.

COMMENTS INCLUE SPECUL MADQUARTERS MOUTNG PETREET ONSI

INDONELENT.

40211-190

12

SIONATURI Oi

But.

His APPROVAL

INQUEST ANYHCOLD MY

Leishide Gangueen

SECRET

33

1--25 8338

L9M 812

---

## Page 3

14-00000

400

UUIGUING MESSAGE

• sea tenceousioner

100

100

пто"

.0

0

0

7212

1101.81806991079

SIRE CATA

OAT8.7M8090UD

STAFF

0522372

DIRECTOR - GAGE

COMR LAB INFO: FILE ISTAN, 555, PSTEADE

628080

DISSEM BY: 5C

то 10018

TO: CARACAS, GUAYAQUIL, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, QUITO INFO

SANTIAGO, LIMA. Y

VWNUMBER MHSPAWN Y

REF: SANTIAGO 30693 lIN 4046041 (BEING RELAYED ADDRESSESESI Y

LO REF BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEES IS REPORT 31 OCT ANNOUNCEMENT

6Y GENERAL PINOCHET DECLARING FREEDOM OF PRESS IN CHILE. SUGGEST

RATHER THAN REPLAYING EL MERCURIO ARTICLE TRANSCRIBED IN REF YOU USE

THAT MERELY AS BASIS FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT.. PINOCHET'S STATEMENT PUTS .

ELPHASIS ON CONTENTION THAT PRESS COENSORSHIP EHAS NOT EXISTED IN

CHILE UNDER JUNTA NOR DOES IT NOW. THAT ARGUMENT UNFORTUNATELY WILL

HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY OUTSIDE CHILE SO RECOMMEND EDITORIAL COMMENT

EMPHASIZE THESE POINTS: Y

A. CHILEAN PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED THERE WILL BE NO PRIOR

CENSORSHIP IN CHILE. Y

BO PINOCHET DECLARED THAT JUNTA IS WAIVING PRIOR CENSORSHIP

OF. PRESS DESPITE FACT THAT STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES IN CHILE. Y

C. JUNTA ACTION APPEARS REEFLECT CONFIDENCE ESS IN ITS

AGILITY TO MAINTAIN STÁBILITY OF POLITICAL SITUATION A GRA

UNIT:

EXTER

Psych fie

cOUND: 38110565015887

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIDITEO

-E.?

"INPDET

---

## Page 4

4-00000

nor

ONF

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL GENIRD USE UNLE

ren

10o

M no

-0

0

палачас о наточино пожато

STAFF

CONF:

INFO:

FILE

DIRECTOR

6. /8.080

0

IN MOR

те тика то

-L PubOnd

DISSEM BYS

PER

"DEWCIFE@TTGRETITEDNTRASEOPP.THIS-GESTURE:OF=CONPIDENCE:-UIPH

BERU.S.CONFISCATIONIOFPRIVATELLiOUNEDPRESS-FUOZHONTHSTAGOONN

2. BUENOS AIRES: CAN NTTHRIFTY-L BARRANGE PICK UP FOR ANSA

WIRE? Y

•3. GUAYAQUIL, QUITO: SUGGEST YOU HAVE PUVANDYKE-I OR

PUNETWORK-1 TIME THEIR COMMENTS TO COINCIDE WITH DAS MEETING. Y

4. FILE: 200-120-356. E-2 IMPDET N

Bonemaner

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

S NOVEMBER 1974

E. JAMES MCTIGHE

CALAICA

1593,

AlL Arena

C/LASTA :

COONOMATO DAMIERRE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED.

E?

CL

BY:

IN:PDET

---

## Page 5

14-00000

OUTCOING

Maggios

basemenuse it!

21-1151

uns

nite 1.

•.=:149991690

DIDOR MENDA DIADECAINE

STAFF

C/LA 8

OA18 TINA DOUL.

DIRECTOR

211,733

/1YEG3

=2K0

C/

T0:

rapers

SANTIAGO. Y

CYBAT VUNUNGER Y

REF: SANTIAGO 30587 1IN 3913331

L. YOUR OBSERVATIONS CONFIRM THOSE COS. GIVEN NO NEED MÀKE

RADICAL CHANGE. IN CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE SUGGEST GOC BE

IFLUENCED TO ISSUE FUSLIC STATEMENT DECLARING THAT JUNTA INS

RESTORED CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL STABILITY TO EXTENT THAT PRIOR CEN-

SOSHIP OF FRESS NO LONGER DEEMED NECESSARY. TO GUIDE THE WARY AT:

HANE FROKESHAN MEGHT ME LAUS GOVERNING CRIMINAL LICEL WILL CONTINUE

TO SE ENFORCED. Y

2. FOR FULL IMPACT, OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE IDLE FOR GOC TO

ARGUE THAT UP TO THIS POINT THERE HAS BEEN NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP. FEEL

STATUS QUO ANTE SHOULD DE IGNORED AND EMPHASIS PLACED ON FACT THAT

CONDITIONS NOU SUCH THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOENIZED CONDITION OF

FRESE FREEDOM CAN OBTAIN. Y

3. FILE: 200-120-356•1

poych file

CATE:

ges:

EXT:

22 OCT

74

E. JAMES MCTIGHE:MK

CALANCA

1553

SPLA

2: GAIN

COLA/SOMENT

too: 098-8) 0868848

Calete

REFREONE ÉODY ONE THEN TUE SISUNG OFFICE IS PROMISILE

= 27

ЧHIPDET

CL

Gi:G65457

---

## Page 6

14-00000

• OUTGOING "ESSAGE

JAMALGE

OSAURSDAY

aLo

400

•0

OMF

0

- CLRALTCATION

SECRET

UNARADE MAMOND NOXATOR

STAFF

CONE: C/A8

0

0

INTO:. FILE

1916I6Z

с/п/н

6552

DIRECTOR

C/EURG C/SES

N808200 ATPBDANZ A MANSONA

611750

onues?

→ DISSEM BY:

0

#0:

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO SANTIAGO, ROME. Y

RYBAI MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

r6.801

REF: LONDON 5401? lIN 3901151 4

J: ACCORDING AP RELEASE DATELINED MOSCOW 17 OCTOPER, SOVIETS HAVE

DENIED VALIDIIY OF SIRRY THAT RED CROSS EMPLOYEE IN CHILE TO

NEGOTIATE PRISONER EXCHANGE: WISH USE THIS DENIAL AS PEG REVIEW

PREVIOUS SOVIET PRISONER EXCHANGES CABBEL COMES TO MINDA WHICH ALSO

HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN STRICT SECRECY AND TO SPECULATE ON WHAT

CORVALAN AND OTHERS KNOW THAT JOULD MAKE THEM SO IMPORTANT TO SOVIET

GOVERNMENT• BELIEVE ROBERT MOSS. IF HE STILL HAS ACCESS TO LONDON

MEDIA, WOULD BE GOOD CHOICE WRITE SUCH ARTICLE BECAUSE OF HIS

KNOWLEDGE OF CHILE AND ABILITY USE HIS BACKGROUND FOR SPECULATION ON

KINDS OF INFORMATION CORVALAN HAS THAT COULD EMBARRASS SOVIETS. CAN

MENTION SOVIET CLANDESTINE FUNDING ALLENDE'S ELECTIONS, TACTICAL BUGGE

POCH ALLIANCE WITH SOCIALISTS, CUBAN AND SOVIET AID TO ARMED PECH

UNIONS, LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR EVENTUAL POCH PUTSCH TO OVERTHORW ALLENDE.

A• BUENOS AIRES TELAM SIN SPANISH) REPORTED 17 OCT THAT RED

CROSS ENVOY IS DENIS FELDMEYER AND THAT HE CARRIED TO CHILE SOVIET

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

15-126-3

1i fit 16)

*9.12.0.4.

т.."

.115.245)

RECORD COPY

1558-11

CLASSI

LEANES 00

COUROIRATTONS OUTACIMS

LA/POLUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

SECRET

---

## Page 7

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BIOMAL CAMIARUBRUMY

0

тАв

200

OMF

41A dou daton

SECRET

STAFF

CONS:

2

0

ours: 1904890040

DIRECTOR

INFO: FILE

wow.

10 m00.

water tr

PER

DISSEM BY:

611750

D w0n00

UNION'S ACCEPTANCE OF CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY JUNTA WHEREBY THE SOVIET:

UNION MUST FREE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AS FREED BY

CHILE. WHEN GRUNO DOPPLER, INTERNATIONAL. RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE

IN CHILE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT FELDMEYER'S MISSION. HE DENIED THAT HE

WAS ON THAT TYPE OF MISSION. BUT LATER WHEN ASKED WHETHER IT WAS

TRUE THAT FELDMEYER CARRIED WITH HIM THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE, HE

ANSUERED, "THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION. IT IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

THE CHILEAN AUTHORITIES ARE THE OBNES TO CONFIRM IT. Y

B. AP, ¡USCOW L? OCTOBER: "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DENOUNCED

AS D'A FORGERY' A CHILEAN NEUSPAPER REPORT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS

APPARENTLY WILLING TO RELEASE SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR

RELEASE OF IMPRISONED LEFTISTS IN CHILE. Y

"SERGEI BULANTSEV, A COMMENTATOR FOR THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY

TASS ASAID THURSDAY THE LA SEGUNDA STORY HAD BEEN 'CONCOCTED' BY

FASCISŸ-MINDED GENERALS' WHO SEEK TO DIVERT WOROLD ATTENTION FROM THE

ATROCITIES AND ARBITRARINESS THERE. ' Y.

"GEN• AUGUSTO PINOCHET, CHIEF OF STATE OF CHILE, SAID CHILE

WOULD LIBERATE RELEASE ALL ITS PRISONERS IF THE SOVIET UNION AND. CUBA.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

CLASBUNUCATICS

REPRODUCTION OY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIL.... C

AUTHANTICATAO DANCEA

€ 2

IMPDET

EL BY:

---

## Page 8

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

якомає сось.

000.

OMF O

0

A LARBIDICATAOT

RET

по полая петомо пожатом

STAFF

CONF:

0

0•

fILe

3

cẠo

DIRECTOR

DISSEM BY:

PEA

611750

0

17 Pole

AGREED TO LIBERATE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF THEIR PRISONERS. Y

@DESPISE DOCUMENTED CHARGES BY INTERNATIONAL AGROUPS AND

DISSIDENTS WITHLS THE SOVIET UNION THAT PERSONS ARE PREOSBECUTED HERE

FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MOSCOW INSISTS THAT THERE ARE NO.

POLITICAL PRISENERS IN THE SOVIET UNION. " Y

2. PLS CAELE TEXT ARTICLE TO HAS FOR REPLAY, Y

4. FILE: DEFER. E-2 IMPDET-N

E@liciting

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

18 OCTOBER 1974

MARTIN MILLER

LAICA

9011

115-126-3

DEUCTION DY OTHER THAN THE ISSUINE OFFICE IS PROMIBITRO

Er AMPOET

---

## Page 9

4-00000

'it.

BernducTur

SECRET

PERSON-UNIT NO TIPIRO..

STAFF

AOYANCE CORY IOBURO 960.1110..

ACTION UNIS

HF

fILE

Eur6.

AGTION a

- .

05G

SS.3, C PSTeG3, C/CLOPL

499138

DAGE 01

TOR: 171812200978

IN. 392115

(LOND ' 54817

SECRET LIISSTE OCT TA OCT YA STAFF

CITE LONDON 54017

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO SANTIAGO,

RYBAT MASPAWN REDLEG

; *4.1

REF. A, DIRECTOR 604905)

1,0120:1

8. DIRECTO 629942

1, "REUTERS STORY DATELINED SANTIAGO IN 17 OCTOBER "TIMES"

IS HEADLINER "RUSSIA-HESPONDINGTO CHILE-CALL TO FREE PRISONERS. "

HIGHLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING TO RELEASE A LIMITED

NUMBER OF TOP POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO A

CHALLENGE BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA, INFORMED

SOURCES SAID TODAY.

"A RED CROSS EMMISSARY WAS DUE TO ARRIVE HERE TONIGHT

FROM GENEVA WITH A LIST OF 100 CHILEAN PRISONERS THE

RUSSIANS WANT RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FREEDOM GIVEN

TO ITS DUN DETAINEES, THE SOURCES SAID. THERE WAS NO

OFFICIAL CONFIGMATION OR DENIAL OF THE REPERT FROM ELUTHER

GUVENUMENT OR RED CROSS OFFICIALS."

ARTICLE MECOUNTS PINOCHET CHALLENGE TO MOSCON AND HAVANA AND

REUGE EUPY

15-126-3

---

## Page 10

14-00000

CABLE 88C GIBSON DI

'i**

12918»

MUM Dr

PARBON UNIT NOTIPIRO..

_ADYANCE CORY.IDRUED:@LOI.IER

ACTION UNIT 11.

• i

VR =

-----

ACTION O

9 49913

E14932

FACE 22

+04817-3122CCI74

IN 390119

LOND

540:17

POINTS OUT CHILE HAS SINCE FREED MORE THAN SEE DETAINEES

WITH MUNTIL NOW, NO APPARENT RESPONSE, " ALSO ADIS LUIS CORVALEN

LEADS THE KREMLIN LIST.

2, APART FROM DEN DIMENSION ASDED TO REF PROPOSALS BY

ABOVE, HE DO NOT BELIEVE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CALI COULD BE

INDUCED TO :AKE UP ISSUE, AS NOTED REF AI HAS VERY PRESCRIBED

APPROACHES ANO TECHIIQUES WHICH IT USES TO HANDLE, VIA A CHAIN

or fOIVIDUAL SPOUSEASE, INDIVIDUAL CASES, MILE THEY MAY

OCCASIONALLY USE PUBLICIPY IF ALL ELSE FALLS THEY BASICALLY REGARD

19 AS A DISTINCT INMIBITION TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR BEHIND THE

SCENES PERSON TO PERSON TECHNIQUE. Al'S POSITION ON THE CHILEAN

CHALLENGE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO GE GEGATIVELY INFLUENCEO BY ITS

MAVING ONLY VERY RECENTLY ACCEPTES A MOSCOW CHAPTER DESPITE THE

STRONG OBJECTIONS OF SOME GE I9S REY LEADERS, SINCE OUR ASSETS

WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN FORCING THIS ISSUE THEY ARE NOT IN A

SECUICE POSITION TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ONE ESPECIALLY GIVEN

THE EXTREME UNPOPULARITY

..OF THE OVERALL CHILE STORY.

3. HE CAN CONTINUE

TO BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOME

FORM OF MEDIA PLACEMENTS TO ACCOMELISH REF GOALS BUT WE HAVE

TO ESTIMATE THAT CHANCES OF ANY OR OUR ASSETS BEING ABLE YO

---

## Page 11

14-00000

CABLE SACRIODEM ON

PERSON: UNIT NOTIPIRO.

HUN AT

_PAR

SECRET

STAFF

ACTION UNIS

.-_-DL--AL

VR

RF FILE

ACTION O

499138

E1A302

PAGE

03-33

+0981718122 OC0874

CATALYLE AÑY OHGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY BY GROUPS WHOSE VOICE

WOULD COUNT. ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED AND WOULD INVOLVE MORE RISKS

THAN THE ODDS WOULD PROBABLY JUSTIFY. WE HAVE BROUGHT

SCHWERSUN'S ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION INCLUDING THE PARA ONE

STORY: HE NUTED THAT AL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY

VOTED IN NEW AND TO SOME EXTENT UNTRIED MEMBENSHIP. ALTHOUGH

NEW COMPUSITON COMMITTEE MAY I LONG RUN DE LESS INCLINED

TO AVOID ACTION WHICH PUTS PRESSURE ON SOVIETS, SUCH ISSUES

PRESENTLY ALL THE MORE CONTROVEFSIAL WITHIN AI IN VIEN NEWNESS

COMMITTEE AND NOT LIKELY RECEIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTENTION UNTIL.

COMMITTEE SHAKES DOWN, WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4.

FILE DEFERM EZ IMPDET

IN 380I1S

LOND

54017

SECRET

15-1263

---

## Page 12

OMFO

OUTGOING OSAGE

91•PAL LEMIER UNE UNIY

aco

28 / 08

cen

0 .

0

0. 0-0

SECRET

MISBAD! MANOLINO MORATLO

STAFF

CONF: С/LA8 INFO,

FILE

C/SSS

16119 9H9U4

1523232

ПАдИ

ASE Gi3

сте

DIRECTOR

0

1808.

607942

DISSEM BY: 423:

RE TUNA TO

PER

#

TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

REF: DIRECTOR 6O496AS Y

L. GIVEN PERISHABILITY REF IDEAS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON

FEASIBILITY OF APPROACHES TO

DEELOWER AND AMNESTY INTERNATIRNAL AS

OUTLINED• WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS LIMIT FURTHER

ANTI-SKHERALD PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO CHILE AND ANTI-JUNTA

CUNNEETES

PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO TREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. Y

2. FILE DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

15-126-3

156:174

DATE:

ORIG:

•UNIT:

EXT:

15 OCTOBER 1974

MARTIN E. MILLERITN

LA/CA

9011

-CLEURS.CAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

IMPDET

---

## Page 13

4-00000

VUIGUING MESSAGE

DIQNALLATIPRUST.OMLY

HERE

con

P0N0

1P0

orr

0

0

... .oeeo..

SECRET

0081008 ms no socaroo

STAFF

0

31-3

Cita

0215072

DIRECTOR

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO:

rust@/rnw.c/cuRb. c/sE5,4/553

c/Ps/eG 3, clors/inta,

c/05G/1c

TO: ROTE: LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

604965.

DISSEM DY, 361

0

1400л

no truth

De TURN Yo

PER

0

#

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

15° 12Y

1.

INTERNATIONAL CRITICISH DE CHILEAN JUNIA AND MORE RECENTLY OF

BKHERALD HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED TO DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. HOS BELIEVES

EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF GENERAL PINOCHET'S OFFER TO EXCHANGE A

NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND/OR

CUBAN PRISONERS IS OPPORTUNITY TO BLUNT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. IF THE

USSR AND CHILE CAN BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN POPULAR MIND AS EACH HAVING

FOLITICAL PRISO:ERS, THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DIVERT SOME OF

ATTENTION FROM JUNTA'S SUPPOSED MISDEEDS TO SOVIET HANDLING OF

POLITICAL PRISONERS. A REPORT FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATES THAT

THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES THAT COUBLD

DEVELOP FROM THE OFFER. Y

2. THE EXCHANGE OFFER HAS ASPECTS THAT WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO.

NUMEROUS GROUPS IN EUROPE BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION,

PROBABLY SECAUSE OF CHILE'S EXTREME UNPOPULARITY AND THE LACK OF BOTH

A NEUTRAL SPONSOR AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY. EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS

SHOULD GE INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO RELEASE IMPORTANT CHILEAN

DATE:

ORIGI

UNIT:

EXT:

118514404

RECORD COPY

15-126-3

2 06+74

coronatizo doorens

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

AUTHAMTICATINO OFFICIR

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 14

14-00000

VUIGUING MIESSAGE

GIOMALLONIERUSHONLY

1.0

vir

OMF

0

SECRET.

apons: 4114471 4005006arur

STAFF

CONF:

cra

DIRECTOR

INFO: FILE

in ande peronence musses

' DISSEM BY!

путили то

PER

624965

COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS, WHATEVER THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE

OTHER HALF OF THE EXCHANGE. LEFTISTS OF NUMEROUS SHADES INCLUDING

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL GROUPS SHOULD ALSO FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THESE

PRISONERS, YET BE: LESS TROUBLED BY THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE SOVIETS

AND CUOANS. SECOND, THE OFFER IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUPS LIKE

ANCESTY INTEENATIONAL TO DRING DIRECT PRESURE ON THE USSR TO RELEASE

SOME PROMINENT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS. FINALLY, THE OFFER SHOULD

ATTRACT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO FAVOR RELEASE OF ALL

POLITICAL PRISONERS MON PRINCIPLE. IN FACT, PROPERLY DEVELOPED, THE

EXCHANGE IS POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO ALMOST THE ENTIRE POLITICAL

SPECTRUM. Y

3o trigi

LEST ROME APPROACH DEFLOWER TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN GET HIS

GROUP INTERESTED IN

TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET PRISONERS RELEASED

6. 1) 515.

FROM CHILEAN JUNTAR PERHAPS IF HE CAN PICTURE HIMSELF AS SAVING THE

PRISONERS (COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS IN CHILE AND IMPORTANT.

INTELLECTUALS IN THE USSRS FROM A BUFASCIST REGIME ON THE ONE BHAND

AND FROM A STALINIST COUNTRY ON THE OTHER HE CAN BECOME SUFFICIENTLY

INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE EXCHANGE. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE HAVE

DATE:

ORIGI

UNIT:

EXT:

-...

REPRODUCTION - OTHER THAN THE.SSUI.GOFFICE § PRUM18'

F.2

CL BY:

IMPDET

---

## Page 15

14-00000

100. .

OMF

0

3

SECRET

напалохпогопажаникого

cree

DIRECTOR

STAFF

CONF:

DISSEM BY!

INFO:

FILE

NO TUAM TO

PER

604965

#

DEFLOWER DEVELOP MAXIMUM EUROPEAN INTERDEST IN THE POSSIBILITIES THAT

THE EXCHANGE OFFERS AND MAXIMUM PUBLICITY OF MIS EFFORTS. Y

4. FOR LONDON: REQUEST STATION SEEK MEANS OF INTERESTING

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IN SOME ASPECT OF THE EXCHANGE IDEA. WHILE

AMNESTY OPS SOMETIMES VERY QUIBETLY. PURSUED, PUBLICITY IS IMPORTANT

IN THIS CASE• PERHAPS LINKING SPECIFIC PRISONERS FOR EXCHANGE MIGHT

CAPTURE PUBLIC IMAGINATION. Y

5. FILER DEFER. E-a IMPDET N

E/ROG " ito..

EUR/CA

DATE:

7 SEPTEMBER 197

ORIG:

TARTIN MILLERIN

UNIT:

WH/CA

EXT:

101}

M Kay

C/EUR/iaS

pallars

6. 1A8100CA1100

SECRET

-UR/I

REPRUDUCTION BY OTMER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED:

IMPDET

---

## Page 16

14-00000

OfIF

OUTGOING ISSAGE

тро

23-%

0

0

STAFF

2620222

ОКЁСТОВ

T7U02

885. 35

COMP. C/LAT

c/1s/8530 clerio'2, cobileura" hi

TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS. Y

RYBAT YUHUMDER Y

psyc

REF: CARACAS 2SISS LIN JAST8AI Y

LO RECONNEND YOU CONSIDER ENLISTING SUITAGLE VUNUMBER ASSET :O

PENSUADE JUNTA TO RELAX ITS MESTRICTIGNS CH FREE PRESS. OBJICHINEE CF

SUCH MOVE WOULD GE THESE: Y

A• DETO:STRATE TO WORLE THAT PINOCHET GOUT FIRELY IN

POUER I: CHILE AND THAT IT FUNCTIONS HOU WITH AT LEAST TACHT CONSENT

OF iNÚORITY OF CHALEANSI

SO GIVE S:SESTANTIAL DEMONSTRATION OF JUNTA'S COCMITMENT TO

DEMOCRATIS PROCESS AND THERESY REFUSE DIE OF MORE EXPÉSTIVE GRIEVAICES

OF WORLD PRESS AGAINST CHILE REGI!E. Y

1.125

2. TO AVOID APPEARINS TE CAFITULATE TO PRESS FROM CUBANS PEP.

REF, SUGGEST CHILEAN NOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS INTLUCÜCE SHCUL: NOI

FOLLOU UPON CRITICLIN ENANATING FROM CUBAN DONNATED JOURIALISTS

COITENERCE IN CARACAS. GESTURE. IF ADPRESSSO TO ANYONE. SEOULD ME

LATE TO DATE TO CHANCE DOLRCATIGRIOLO PRESTRA.

ThaT GGE

LOANELITIDN AND THENCE: TO MENDICE ITS LEA

DATE:

Chi's:

DA!T

48:

is Grice is to Sties

---

## Page 17

14-00000

oe

A..0

OilF

8101000m.0000r

SECRET

a18018140099annorenton

STAFF

CONF:

aare prose parsed

INTO:

FILE

что

DIRECTOR

410507

dions

по мого

DISSEM DYI

PER

19 Р.488

REGIMES, WHERE FREE PRESS REMAINS PROSCRIBED. Y

3. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS. E-2 IMPDET N

D.-TE:

1910:

EXT:

15 00÷0508 1974

E. JAi?

SMCTIGHE

C/LA!C:;

1553

CRAME 2A

-

ciaoos +010 508-008

80'0.90 TID80 ON THAN TAE ISTHING CFFICE IS 8=2-19:183

ario: 009080

INFDST

CL EV:

---

## Page 18

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

•21-10

SIONA CATIBAURS UNLE

400

0

50в

OM?

0

traction. a11008

ARUSHAMA

STAFF

0

L020322

DIRECTOR

Pue, P/AN, SS5, PS/E6.4

ONsINT

DOR

600503

DISSEM BY, ST

aaruanto

PER

TOs LASE. Y

PSYCH Y

REF: DIRECTOR 605601 Y

Bill Ce

A1 K.-

BOOK CABLE Y

wister - fil, Pritty.

1O FOLLOWING IS ANOTHER, APPARENTLY WELL-RESEARCHED

PSYCH

ARTICLE BY DAVID F. BELNAP. ON EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN CHILE

file

UNDER ALLENDE WHICH APPEARED IN LOS ANGELES TIMES ON 27 SEPT

74. SUGGEST YOU PASS FOLLOWING EXCENTS TO LIAISON AND AGGEANTS

OF INFLUENCE FOR BACKGROUND. NOTE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE

MERELY REHASH ALLEGED CIA COVERT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PRESS

AND PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO ALLENDE REGIME. THEIR

REITERATION NOT PARTICULARLY WORTHLHILE IN THIS CONTEXT.

WOULD ARPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSHENT REACTION THIS DATE UHEN

USED. Y

ABRIDGED TEXT FOLLOUS: Y

A NO SER POR EL EXAGERADO VOLUME: DEL VERBAL QUE

CARACTERIZO LA ACTUACION DE LOS DOS SANDOS EN EL LARGO Y ENCONADO

DATE:

ORIO:

UNIT:

EXT:

CHRONO

BILLAINS DIDNTE

+1 028-18811130

consort irises

HiPADDUCTION UY OIHER THAN THE ASUGING OFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

autremoo++00 009180

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

SECRET

---

## Page 19

14-00000

ano

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ФІРА СЕМ!

2 км

OMF

81a8000.ca0nns

SECRET

4800100 nanceo de arca

STAFP

CONP:

INFO: FILE

.000

DIKECTOR

608505

0

0

0

пота.

DISSEM DY!!

PER

ENFRENTAMIENTO CHILEND, LOS ATAQUES LANZADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR

CONTRA SUS ENEMIGOS EN LA POLITICA Y EN LOS MELIOS DE DIFUSION RARAS

VECES SE LLEVARON A CABO FROITAL O ABIERTAMENTE. CASI SIEMPRE FUERON

DE CARACTER ECONOMICO. Y EN LO TOCANTE A LOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS,

CASI NUNCA SE LLEGO, POR EJEMPLO, AL EXTREMO DE LA CENSURA DIRECTA. Y

LA PRENSA OPOSICIONISTA PUDO ESCRIBIR Y DECIR LO QUE LE PARECIO

DURANTE LOS CASI TRES ANDE QUE EL ALLENDISMO SE MALITUVO EN EL PODER.

LA DUDA SIEMPRE FUE SI DICHOS MEDIOS LOGRARIAN O SO SOBREVIVIR

ECONOMICAMENTE Y SEGUIR MAMIFESTANDO SU CHITERIS.Y

SOLO TRES MESES DESPUES DE HAGER ASUMIDO ALLENDE LA PRESIDENCIA,

LA PRENSA ESCRITA OBTUVO US PRESAGIO DE LO QUE PODPIA SUCEDERLE AL

MONOPOLIZAP. EL GOBIERNO LA IMPRESION DE REVISTAS Y LIBROS EN EL PAIS.

ESTO SE CONSUMO MEDIANTE LA ADQUISICION DE UNA FIRMA EDITORAIAL QUE

HABIA SIDO DEBILITADA PREVIAMENTE POR UNA PROLOPERDA HUELGA DIRIGIDA

POR LOS CONCHISTAS, Y POR UN ARBITRAJE EN EL QUE ACTUO COMO MEDIADOR

OTKO COMUNISTA, CUYO FALLO COLOCO A LA EMPRESA AL EBORDE DE LA

QUIEBRA. Y

ASIMISTO, LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, QUE SIEMPRE HAN SIDO UN

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

0o00 100 0900040

REPHODULA. BY OTHER IMAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO..ÁITEO

E?

CL BY:

IMPDET

---

## Page 20

14-00000

UUIGUINA

MEssAbt

000000010.

00s

0*F

0

8020020061v0

SECRET

0

18.3

Дато-того 259710

STAFF

COMP:

INFO: 1ILe

Cree

DIRECTOR

604503

0

D

тa."

нао стове.

naruna re

DISSLA UY:

PER

INSTRUMENTO POLITICO IMPORTAITE EN CHILE, TUVIERON UN INDICIO DE ELO

QUÉ LES AGUARDASA, INCLUSO ALITES DE LA TOMA DE POSESION DEL NUEVO

PRESIDENTE• LOS PERITOS EN COMUNICACIONES DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA

LES INDICARON QUE EFECTUARAN REBAJAS EN SU PERSONAL INFORMATIVO PARA

DARLES CABIDA A LOS PERIODISTAS MARXISTAS DESIGNADOS POP. EL PARTIDO.

SO PENA DE PERDER MAS TARDE. SUS LICENCIAS PARA TRANSMITIR. Y

ETTHSES, EL GUORENNO EL ELNUNEELE LE NIE APALISA BAJO LA

FERULA ALLENDISTA: LAS ENTIDADES ESTATALES-- Y LAS INDUSTRIAS PRIVADAS,

A TEDIDA QUE IDAN CAYENDO EN FANOS DEL GOBIERNO-- LE DABAN

PUBLICIDAD UNICAMENTE A AQUELLOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS QUE PERTENECIAN A

LA UNIDAD POPULAR DO QUE APOYABAN AL REGIMEN. ENTRE ESTOS

FIGURABANN, EN EL MOMENTO DE DESPLOMARSE EL ALLENDISMO, APROXIMADA-

MENTE LA MITAD DE LAS RADIGEMISORAS DEL PAIS CUNA DE LAS CUALES, LA

MAYOR, ERA PROPIEDAD DE SALVADOR ALLENDES Y CINCO DE LOS. ONCE

• PERIODICOS DIARIOS QUE SE PUELICABAN EN ESTA CAPITAL. Y

LA TELEVISION COMERCIAL CHILERNA ESTA TOTALMENTE SOSTENBIDA POR FL

ESTADO O POR EL SECTOR UNIVERSITARIO, DE MODO QUE NO DEPENDE POR

• COMPLETO DE LA PUBLICIDAD PARA SUBSISTIR. POR ANADIDURA, DURANTE UNA

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

CRABBOXAR

15. 000 0401-90.009-888

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE. IS PROMIBITED

SECRET

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

---

## Page 21

14-00000

OMF O

OUTGOING MESSAGE

scinde: 843071109 2000

0

0

cr.s

94

STAFF

CON!:

1A7O: FILE

DIRECTOR

409503

100608.

DISSEM BY:

D

narura ro

PER

GRAN PARTE DE LA GESTION PRESIDENCIAL DE ALLENDE CASI TODA LA TELE-

VISION DE CHILE ESTABA CONTROLADA POR LOS MARXISTAS O POR SUS

SIMPATIZANTES. ESTA SITUACION CAMBIO SOLO CUANDO LA UNIVERSIDAD

CATOLICA DE SANTIAGO LE ARRANICO EL DOMINIO DE SU CANAL DE TV A LOS

ALLENDISTAS Y SE UNIO A LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE VALPARAISO EN

UN ESFUERZO POR LLEVARLE UNA PROGRAMACION NO-MARXISTA A TODA LA

CIUDADANIA, UTILIZANDO ESTACIONES DE RELEVO DE MICROONDA DE

ELABORACION CASERA.. TRUNFARON EN ESTE EMPENO EN UNA MEDIDA ASOMBROSA

MIENTRAS SALVAJAN LOS DOSTACULOS DE TODO TIPO, AUN FISICOS, QUE EL

REGIMEN LES INTERPONIA PARA IMPEDIRSELO. Y

EL MERCURIO, EL PERIODICO MAS GRANDE DEL PAIS, HABIA PERDIDO EL

SESENTA PORCIELTO DE SU VOLUMEN PUBLICITARIO NORMAL A MEDIADOS DE

19711 Y CUALQUIEP ESTACION RADIAL CORRIENTE, NO AFILIADA A LA UNIDAD

POPULAR, PROMEDIABA UN OCHENTA PEORCIENTO DE PERDIDAS SEMEJANTES. Y

ESTA EROSION FUBLICITARIA CONTINUO HACIENDO ESTRAGOS A MEDIDA QUE

LAS PEQUENAS EMPRESAS INDEPENDIENTES FUERGN SUSPENDIENDO SUS

ANUNCIOS AL IRSE AGOTANDO SUS'EXISTENCIAS DE MERCANCIAS O AL

SOBREPASAR POR MUCHO LA DEMANDA A LOS ABSTECIMIENTOS DISPONIBLES.

DATE:

ORIG: •

UNIT:

EXT:

¿'OUNDINALIDO OSPICORO

REPRODUC

1 OY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PRE_, DITED

AUTOMAIICALMS ONDOCHO

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

SECRET.

---

## Page 22

14-00000

OUTGOING: MESSAGE

MANA, 4.00

DEI

OMF

++ 498-07 017200

SECRET

-sona remaro moscaron

STAFF

CONF:

65

0118.1.008 000u0

INFO:. FILE:

DIRECTOR

608503

Mana

BACA MOSOR

DISSEM BY:

0

но това

ARCUANTO PER

IPPMФ0

Y A LO LARGO DE TODO ESTE PERIODO ELEVABANSE CONJUNTAMENTE LOS COSTOS

DE PUGLICACION Y TRANSMISION, IMPELIDOS POR LA INFLACION DE DOS

CIFRAS QUE ARRASABA AL PAIS Y QUE ASCENDIO A TRES A PARTIR DE 1972. Y

LAS AUTORIDADES GUBERNAMENTALES NEGABAN ENTRETANTO TODAS LAS

SOLICITUDES DE LICENCIA PARA IMPORTAR PIEZAS DE REPUESTO Y EQUIPOS

DE REEMPLAZO PARA LAS PLANTAS QUE SE DETERIORABAN, Y EN EL CASO DE LAS.

RADIOEMISORAS, DE ELEMENTOS TAN ESENCIALES COMO SON LAS UNIDADES

GRABADORAS: Y LAS CINTAS MAGNETOFONICAS. Y

EN CUANTO A EL MERCURIO Y A MUCHAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, LOS

SINDICATOS MANEJADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR TRATABAN DE INVENTAR

PRETEXTOS PARA QUE EL GOBIERNO PROCEDIERA A ADUENARSE DE SUS EMPRESAS

RECTORAS. LA DE EL MERCURIO, QUE PUBLICA TRES ROTATIVOS DIARIOS EN

ESTA CAPITAL Y OTROS CINCO EN DISTINTAS PARTES DE LA NACION, FUE

OBUETO DE INVESTIGACIONES FISCALES, DE ACUSACIONES DE NEGOCIAR

ILEGALMENTE EN DIVISAS Y DE INSULTOS PERSONALMENTE LAlIZADOS CONTRA

ELLA POR ALLENDE. Y

PERO EL ESFUERZO MAS VIGOROSO QUE REALIZARA EL REGIMEN PARA

TRATAR DE MANIPULAR A. LA PRENSA ESCRITA OPOSICIONISTA FUE LAS

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

00, 8A800 00660

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

SECRET

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 23

14-00000

soe

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BIOMAL CONTIRUSU ONET

0

MAO

oce

плОВ

6 8

BMF 0

SECR EST

STAFF

CONF:

on ro.+040 6000006

INFO: FILE

erre

DIRECTOR

6608503

то мое!

nervan ro

DISSEM BY:

PER

INCESANTES TENTATIVAS DE APODERARSE DE LA UNICA ENTIDAD PAPELERA

INDEPENDIENTE, PROOVEEDORA DE PAPEL PERIODICO PARA TODAS LAS

PUBLICACIONES NO PERTENECIENTES A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, ASI COMO TAMBIEN

PARA LAS QUE SEGUIAN LOS DICTAMENES DE LA COALICION GOBERNANTE. Y

EL GOBIERNO TRATO PRIMERO DE ADQUIRIR LA MAYORIA DE LAS ACCIONES

DE LA EMPRESA, COMPRANDOSELAS A SUS 16,00O ASCIONISTAS. LUEGO

INTENTO PERSUADIR AL CONGRESO PARA QUE /STABLECIERA UN MONOPOLIO

ESTATAL SOBRE EL PAPEEL PERIODICO, Y FINALMENTE ENSAYO LA ELABORACION

DE ViO FRETEXTO PARA DECRETAR LA EXPROPIACION DE LA COMPANIA, TACTICA

QUE HABIA FUNCIONADO CON OTRAS INDUSTRIAS. Y

UNA VEZ FRACASADAS TODAS ESTAS INICIATIVAS, EMPRENDIOSE LA DEL

.. ASEDIO ECONOMICO. NO SE MITIGARON LOS CONTROLES DE PRECIOS IMPUESTOS

A LOS ARTICULOS DE PAPEL PARA MANTENER EL EQUILIBRIO ALTERADO POR EL

ALZA DE LOS COSTOS DE PRODUCCION. ELLO HIZO QUE LA FIRMA PAPELERA

DECLARA UNA PERDIDA DE 9,100,000 DOLARES DURANTE LOS DOCE MESES QUE

FINALIZARON EL 3O DE JUNIO DE 19%2, PERDIDAS QUE AUMENTARON A UN

RITMO DE 120,000 DOLARES DIARIOS MAS TAREDE EN ESE MISMO ANO. Y

SEGUN MAMIEFESTARON LOS SINDICATOS DE LA PROPIA EMPRESA, LA

REPHODUCT®

87 OTHER IMAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROI... ED

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

---

## Page 24

14-00000

OUTGOING

MESSAGE

SILMAL CRNTENUBEUALI

0

nes

100

OMF O

CLANDIAKAINO"

SEA CRE CALOR

STAFF

CONF:

7

nara pros danua

DIRECTOR

DISSEM BY1

INFO: FILE

608503

Marianeo PER

#

AUTORIZACION PARAS SUBIR LOS PRECIOS CONCEDIDA POR EL REGIMEN EN

OCTUBRE DE 1972 PROPORCIONO MENOS DE LA MITAD DEL ALIVIO ECONOMICO

QUE SE NECESITABA. Y.

POR OTRA PARTES AL COMENZAR EL ANO 1972, LA SITUACION DE LAS

•ESTACIONES DE RADIO NO-ALLENDISTAS ERA DESEPERADA: DOS VECES DURANTE

ESE ANO EL CONGRESO APROBO UN IMPUESTO ESPECIAL PARA AYUDAR À COSTEAR

TODAS LAS EMISORAS, VETANDO AMBAS INICIATIVAS EL PRESIDENTE DE LA

REPUBLICA. Y

EN SEPTIENOREO DESPUES DEL SEGUNDO DE ERSIOS VETOS, PARECIA QUE

LAS CUATRO ESTACIONES MAS IMPORTANTES DE ESTA CAPITAL NO ADSCRITAS A

LA UNIDAD APOPULAR SUCUMBIRIAN. NO OBSTANTE ESTO, SUBREVIVIERON Y

FORMARON PARTE DE UMA RED VOLUNTARIA DE EMISORAS APODADA "CADENA

DEMOCRATICA, " LA CUAL LE BRINDO A LA OPOSICION AB:TIALLENDIESTA UNA

TRIBUNA DE EXPRESION PARA COMPETIR CON EL FRENTE DE ESTACIONES

ORGANIZADO SIMILARMENTE POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR A TRAVES DE TODA LA

NACION. Y

SALVARONSE IGUALMENTE LA EMPRESA PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE Y EL

MERCURIÓ. TAMBIEN ESCAPARON CON VIDA EL DIARIO LA: PRENSA,

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

(73404441900104848

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

SUTMEMIXCARMO DOPICRO

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 25

14-00000

...

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BIONAI. CAMTPMUGDONLY

+ 04

oce

OMF

cLanderar

SECRET

•AMANTAINO INGRAIVO

STAFF

DATO 1,000090.10

cero

DIRECTOR

CONP:

INFO:

fILE.

6008503

OISSLM BY:

0

arteran ir

PER

ADQUIRIDO POR INTERESES DEMOCRATACRISTIANOS DESPUES DE LA ELECCION.

• DE ALLENDE PERO ANTES DE SU TOMA DE POSESION, Y EL ROTATIVO TRIBUNA!

FUNDADO POR EL PARTIDO NACIONAL EN LOS COMIENZOS DE LA PRESIDENCIA

ALLENDISTA. ES DE PRESUMIRSE QUE AMBOS ORGANOS OSTUVIERAN RESPALDO

ECONOMICO DE SUS PARTIDOS RESPECTIVOS O A TRAVES DE ELLOS, YA QUE..

NINGUNO DE LOS DOS PUGLICABA MUCHOS ANUNCIOS. ETANTO LA PRENSA COMO

TRIBUNA FUERON CLAUSURADOS POR LA JUNTA QUE DESALOJO DEL PODER A

ALLENDE, COMO PARTE DE SU DECISION DE DECLARAR EN "RECESO" A LA

POLITICA•LY

LA UNIDAD POPULAR EMPLEO TAMBIEN LAS TECNICAS DE HOSTIGAMIENTO

ECONOMICO Y DE DIVIDIR PARA CONQUISTAR CONTRA LOS. PARTIDOS POLITICOS

DE OPOSICION, DIEZMANDO CON ESTA ULTIMA TECTICA AL TRADICIONAL

PARTIDO RADICAL CHILENO, Y ESFORZANDOSE POR HACER ZOZOBRAR AL PARTIDO

NACIONAL, DE TENDENCIA DERECHISTA, DESTRUYENDO EL PODERIO ECONOMICO

DE SUS ELEMENTOS PRINCIPALES. Y

COMO

EN CHILE LA LEY NO EXIGE QUE SE DE CUENTA DEL APOYO

ECONOMICO DESTINADO A LA POLITICEA, RESULTA DIFICIL AVERIGUAR COMO SE

DESENVOLVIERON ECONOMICAMENTE BAJO EL ALLENDISMO LOS PARTI@DOS EN SI.Y

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

1w000.na1.9d 0.ne0e

REPRODUS IN BY OTHER TMAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PI

BITED

CLADANICAINN

SECRET

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

---

## Page 26

14-00000

:

OMF

0

SECRET

моголов.

no marraron

STAFF

CONP:

OUTGOING : MESSAGE

BILINAL CAMPARUDEONE

100.

4P8

U

0

wou

tol: 9-44889570

0

INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

409503

0

Mud.

+918 1941288

D00I4 140

• DISGEM OY:

PEN

1e1n0d

EN LA ESFERA POLITICA, EL OBJETIVO PRIMORDIAL DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR

ERDA EL PARTIDO DOMOCRATRA-CRISTIANO, EL MAS GRANDE DE TODOS LOS

PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE

LA NACION. DE LAS SEIS AGRUPICIONES INTEGRANTES

DE LA UNIDAD POPULARA LOS CUMUNISTAS SOBRE TODO SE PERCATARON DE LO

ESENCIAL QUE RESULTABA PARA ESTABILIZAR AL GOBIERNO MINORITARIO DE

ESA COALICION GANARSE EL APOYO DE LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA, O SI NO

DIVIDIRLA. Y

PERO A NO SER POR LA PEQUENA FRAGMENTACION OCUFRIDA POCOS DIAS

DESPUES DE LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES DE 1920, LOS DEMOCRATA-

CRISTIANOS MANTUVIERON INTACTA SU UNIDAD, EVOLUCIONANDO GRADUALMENTE

DE UNA POSICION DE ADVERSARIOS LEEALES DEL GOBIERIO A OTRA DE 0BD

OPOSICION IRREDUCTIBLE. Y

TRATANDO DE RESCATAR A BALLENDE, CUYO PROPIO PLATIDO SOCIALISTA,.

DE FILIACION MARXISTA, REPRESENTABA EL MAS NUTRIDO DE LOS ELEMENTOS

IRRACIONALES QUE CONFORMABAN LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS COMUNISTAS

LLEGARON INCLUSO A PEDIRLE AYUDA A LA IGLESIA CATOLICA, ROGANDOLE

QUE MEDIARA CON LA DEMOGRACIA CRISTIANA PARA COMTRIDUIR A APUNTALAR

AL REGIMEN CUANDO ESTE SE VENIA ABAJO. Y

DATEL

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

CL ABRON ARQUI

HIPRODUCTION BY OTHER INAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

AUIHANTICALND CUPICRA

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 27

4-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

по в

BIENAL CAMIARUDRONLY

« M

aca

OMF O

0

10 Lide

SECRET

DRAMA MA TUIDO INNONCATUR

STAFF

CONF:

Daro nada unort

61ra

DIRECTOR

DISCUM DY:

INFO:

FILE

608503

De cum lo PLA

O anno

•MAS ERA YA DEMASIADO TARDE. HACIA MUCHO TIEMPO QUE SALVADOR

ALLENDE HABIA SELLADO SU SUERTE CON LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOST AL

FALTAR SISTEMATICAMENTE A TODAS LAS PROMESAS QUE LES MICIERA A

CAMBIO DE LOS VOTOS QUE NECESITABADNA PARA QUE EL CONGRESO

DETERMINARA SU ELECCION A LA PRIMERA MAGISTRATURA, Y AL CONFESARLE:

CINICAMENTE AL INTELECTUAL SOCIALISTA FRANCES REGIS DEDRAY EN UNA

ENTREVISTA QUE MADIA FORMULADO ESAS PROMESAS EXCELUSIVAMENTE PARA

ASEGURAR SU NOMBRAMIENTO COMO PRESIDENTE. Y

2. NO FILE. E-ZE IMPDET N

173,10

DATE:

ORIG:

UMIT:

EXT:

10 CCTOBER

1974

E. JARES MCTIGHE

C/LAICA

1553

CALA

en aran's

REPRODUC

SECRET

?2'-

coonnatino 0000180

N BY OTHEN THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PA

ACLAICA TO

É 21 IMPDET

CL

DY:

---

## Page 28

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

20-7

BONAL CARISAUBROMY

con

400

ONF... D

скапаютатом

SECKET:

STAFF

1021257

DIRECTOR

08530

COMR: 555 IMPO: PILE IPlAN, PSIEGY, EA4:

EURE, AF8, SEZ,

wH: 0.0000

• тО:

BANGKOK, JAKARTAS HONG KONG, MANILA, RANGOON, SAIGON, SEOUL,

SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,

EPORT AU PRINCE, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO, COLOMBO, DACCAS

NEW DELHI, BONN, BONN BASE, BRUSSELS, BERN, BERLIN, THE HAGUE.

HAMBURG, LISBON, LONDON, PARIS, ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, KHARTOUM,

LAGOS, LUSAKA, MONROVIA, NAIROBI.Y

BOOK CABLE Y

Quittysici

ARPEG 069 Y

For

L. "WATERGATE" A COMMO:: PHENOMENOR IN USSR. S"NY TIMES, "

9 OCTOBERS. SOVIET HISTORIAN AND POLITICAL DISSIDENT ROY MEDVEDEV

HAS CHARGED SOVIET PRESS WITH SUPPRESSING NEWS ABOUT WATERGATE

"BECAUSE REGIME FEARS REVEALING TO SOVIET PUBLIC HOW INDEPENDENT

JUDICIARY, FREE PRESS AND ELECTED LEGISLATIVE BODIES CAM RESTRAIN

EXECUTIVE POWER... WATERGATE-TYPE ABUSES ARE COMMON IN USSR, BUT

SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS SECURELY SHIELDED NOT ONLY FROM FALSE CHARGES

BUT ALSO FROM LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OF REAL ABUSES OF POUER...FOR

EXAMPLE... ABORTIVE ATTEMPT BY PROSECUTOR IN GEORGIAN REPUBLIC TO GET

PERMISST TO SEARCH APARTIENT AND INTERROGATE NO REPUBLIC'S

10 OCTOBER 1974

DRIG #BARNA SPRAGUE: SMI

UNIT: CAG/PS8

DC/Wri/d -

еХТ: 1254

WHARD

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE TS PROMTSTTRD

SECRET

andrea no ance

E 2

IMPOET

CL BY: 011078

---

## Page 29

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

MONAL CENTONUSRQMY

жся

100

000

0000

: OMF

CLADNONRATION

¡SECRET

по палоя наносько можатох

core

CONFI

INFO:

40953%

MAS DISSEM BYS

то коли

O normaro PAR

FORMER LEADER MZHAVANADZE, WHO WAS TOPPLED IN SEPTEMBER 1972 AMID

CHARGES OF WHOLESALE CORRUPTION AND GRAFT THAT CHARACTERIZED HIS

RULE...ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THIS

TYPE OF INVESTIGATIONE, HIGHER PARTY OFFICIALS WOULD NOT PERMIT IT.MY

2.. EAST GERMANS REAFFIRM SEPARATION FROM WEST ON 25TH ANNI-

VERSARY. JOHN GOSHKO URITES IN "WASHINGTON POST OF O OCTOBER THAT.

EAST GERMANY'S "NEU SENSE OF ASSERTIVENESS" WAS DEMONSTRATED ON.

7 OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF STATE BY LARGEST PARADE EVER

STAGED BY EAST GERMAN PEOPLE'S ARMY: "THOUSANDS OF JACK-BOOTED

TROMBOPS MADE STREETS OF EAST BERLIN ECHO TO THUD OF TRADITIONAL

PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP... SEEMINGLY ENDLESS WAVE OF SOLDIERS IN

RIGIDLY DISCIPLINED RANKS.. HOLDING OF PARADE IN EAST BERLIN

CONSTITUTED DEFIANCE OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF

BERLIN... IN PROTEST, L2 NATO NATIONS WHICH RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY,

REFUSED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CELEBRATIONS IN EAST BERLIN...

WHICH HIGHEST IN SOVIET BLOC

EAST GERMAN STANDARD OF LIVINÜDIS STILL THIRTY PERCENT BELOW THAT OF

•..WEST GERMANY... DESPITE LIVING STANDARDS EAST GERMANY IS RARESOR

ONE OF MOST CLOSED SOCIETIES IN SOVIET BLOC -- MORE REGIMENTED IN

DATE!

UNIT'S

EAt:

BSig

SECRET

counto curreas

REPRODUCT'- ' BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO

TED

-

AUTMENTICATA CARCAN

IMPOET

CL BY: 012070

---

## Page 30

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BIONAL CONIIRUBRONLI

009

OMFO

SECRET

по пласеим то нематоо

0000 1 000 0 00u

ene

MAM I MEA

COME:

INFO: FILE

661534,

DISSEM BY:

+ 008

servan to

PER

. ...

MANY WAYS THAN SOVIET UNION ITSELF...EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT OWES ITS

PRESENT SUCCESS TO BERLIN WALL AND CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF WALL

ALONG ITS &LO-MILE BORDER WITH WEST GERMANY. "Y

3: EGYPT CANCELS ORDER FOR SOVIET PLANES. CAIRO, 29 SEPTEMBER.

WEEKLY NEWSPAPER "AKHEAR AL-YOM REPORTS THAT EGYPT HAS DECIDED TO

CANCEL ITS ORDER FOR EIGHT RUSSIAN-BUILT TU-154 JET AIRLINERS, CITING

"NUMEROUS AND MAJOR DEFECTS" IN AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE THAT

JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS. ONE OF PLANES CRASHED IN FLAMES

DURING TRAINING FLIGHT LU JULY, KILLING TWO EGYPTIANS AND FOUR SOVIET

CREWMEN. ERACT CAUSE OF ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHER

PLANES OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN GROUNDED. NEWSPAPER SAID EGYPTIAN

AVIATION ORGANIZATION WOULD FILE CLAIMS WITH THE SOVIET EXPORT FIRM.

"FAVIA", FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF @P-S MILLION ALREADY PAID ON THE $47-5

MILI.ION DEAL. Y

4. NO CUBAN SOVIET RESPONSE ON SETTING PRISONERS FREE. NEUE

ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTEMBER, THAT

GENERAL PINOCHET, CHIEF OF CHILDEAN JUNTA, HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR

SOVIET UNIDiA HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF D22 SEPTEMBER TO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

SECRET

оттатьтно отысья

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 011078

---

## Page 31

4-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF O

SECRET

0

aara. 410 00020

crea

MUSBADN

CONF:

INFO: FILE •

604538

DISSEL BY:

то каоль

noruan ro

PER

#

RELEASE SAME NUMBER OF PRISONERS AS CHILE WAS RELEASING.

• PINOCHET

ALSO SAID FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CHILEAN EMBASSIES ARE RECEIVING

HUNDREDS OF LETTERS DAILY FROM RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS, AND

THAT THESE LETTERS WERE BEING FORWARDED

•TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS.

HE ALSO REVEALED. HE WOULD RECHEIVE DELEGATION FROM BUENOS AIRES OF:

UKRAINIANS-IN-EXILE WHO WOULD GIVE CHILEAN OFFICIALS INFORMATION ON

SOME FIFTY UKRAINIANS WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN USSR.Y

S- EDITORIAL IN MEXICO CITY INDEPENDENT DAILY, "LA PRENSA, "

25 SEPTEMBER, ACCUSED KGB OF SPYING AND INTERVENING IN LATIN AMERICAN

AFFAIRS. COMMENTING ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT

AGAINST CIA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, EDITORIALIST WROTE THAT THE

KGB SHOULD GET OUT OF LATIN AMERICA. "... THAT SINISTER RED POLITICAL

ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS COMMITTED SO MANY DASTARDLY CRIBMES IN OUR

COUNTRY SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATION OF TROTSKY. KGB HAS ESTABLISHED

BOOK PUBLISHERS USED BY THE FASCIST LEFTISTS TO INFILTRATE PARTIES,

MEETINGS AND LITERARY GATHERINGS. KGB USED. THE PRESS AND GROUPS OF

ARTISTS, INTELLECTUALS, WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS TO SING THE PRAISES

OF A RED DICTATORSHIP: ...THE KGE SHÖULD GET OUT WITH ITS THOUSANDS

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

REPRODUCT

coNdomar arracens

BY OIMER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROI _ ED

AUTORATICATINO CATCAS

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 011078

SECRET

---

## Page 32

14-00001

OUTGOIN: MESSAGE

SOMAL CINTRR UBIONLY i

T00

0

. ma

aar.

OMF

D

CLASBIAMiATION

SECRET

CONF:

INFO:

FILO

+ to

604538

PETURN TO

DISSEM BY:

PER

OF SPIES SPREAD THROUGHOUT OUR HEMISPHEPE..." Y

S. IPE COUNCIL RECOGNER STA VIETNAM. TORTO NEUSHAPERS OR

2 OCTOBER REPORT EXTENSIVELY ON OPENING OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL

MEETING AND SAID HERATED DEBATE TOOK PLACE IN FIRST SESSION OVER

SEATING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION. "MAINICHI" STORY SAID SOVIETS

AND RUMANIANS IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGED "QUALIFICATIONS" OF SOUTH

VIETNAMESE AND DEMANDED THAT LATTER BE EXPELLED FROM CONFERENCE AND

THAT PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY SOVERNMENT PRGY BE SEATED IN THEIR

PLACE: "MAINICHI" SAID THAT ROLL CALL VOTE WAS HELD, AND SOUTH

VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS SELECTED "BY OVERWHELMING

MAJORITY" TO

PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE. EDITORIAL IN "ASAHI" SAID THAT BITTER

CONTROVERSIES WOULD ARISE AT THIS SESSION OF IPU, WHICH HAS MORE THAN

SIXTY NATIONS PARTICIPATING, INCLUDING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.

BUT THAT "IT IS.. SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS OF

WORLD EXCHANGE UNRESERVED OPINIONS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS."Y

?. CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS APPEAL FOR HELP AGAINST COMMUNIST ATROCI-

TIES. PHNOM PENH, 27 SEPTEMBER (SAIGON POSTE: "TUO MOSLEM ORGANIZA-

TIONS IN CAMBODIA, SPEAKING FOR ALMOSI A MILLION KHMER MOSLEMS, HAVE

DATE:

ORIG:

UMIT:

EXT:

CLASAUANATION

SECRET

COOPDONTNO DANCERS

REPRODUCTION EY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

AUTHRNNICATTS OFFERS

€ 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 011078

---

## Page 33

14-00000

OMF 0

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

MIONAL CINTATUSEONE

700

0

матю

ocr

олта. пно отоль

DISSEM BY:

CONF:

INFO: FILE :

609,535

10 008e

I has to

PER

APPEALED TO ALL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES TO SEND DELEGATIONS TO CAMBODIA

FOR FIRSTHAND VIEW OF THE D'INFERNO CREATED BY INDOCHINESE

COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, WHENEVER COMMUNISTS

CAPTURED A VILLAGE, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF MOSLEM FAITH WERE

MARCHED TO A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND THEIR HOMES WERE BURNED TO THE

GROUND. THE OLD AND WEAK WERE KILLED: THE HEALTHY WERE FORCED TO

GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION AND WORK FOR THE COMMUNISTS. TO HELP DEFEND

THEIR RELIGION AND THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST DEPRE-

DATIONS, KHMER MOSLEMS ORGANIZED A BRIGADE, NOW PART OF THE CAMBODIAN

ARMED FORCES, AND MANY MOSLEMS HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ON THE BATTLE

FIELD. IN THEIR APPEAL, CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS BEGGED FELLOU MOOSLEMS

ALL OVER WORLD TO UNITE IN EFFORT TO COMPEL NORTH VIETNAMESE AND

OTHER INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CEASE BLOODSHED IN INDOCHINA. MY

8. IRAN INCENSED BY NORTH KOREAN BEHAVIOR. TEHRAN, 9-12

SEPTEMBER STEHRAN JOURNAL AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONALI: TUO OF TEHRAN'S

•LADING NEUSPAPERS CARRIED REPORTS ON HOW NORTH KOREAN ROWDYISM HAI

TARRED ASIAN GAMES, AND CRITICIZED THE HASEHAVTOR. ONE REPORT CARRIED

HEADLINE, "WHENEVER THERE'S TROUBLE, THERE'S A NORTH KOREAN * AFTER

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT!.

EXT:

B3B

REPROOUCTIOT BY OTHER THAM THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED.

SECRET

E?

IMPDET

CL BY: 011078

---

## Page 34

14-00000

OUTGOINC MESSAGE

MORAL LAMTINULAONT

con

Aro

100

100

поо.

10B

OMF O

ССАВВОКАРОМ

SECRET

клалалом нажалжь пожа том

-

COMF: .

INFO:

fILE

6.09538

0

DISSEM AY:

10 sorre

ANTURA DU

PER

NORTH KOREAN OLYMPIC SILVER MEDALIST BOXER LOST BOUT, NORTH KOREAN

COACHES, MANAGER AND NEWSMEN ATTACKED INDONESIAN REFEREE, THEN

ENGAGED IN BATTLE WITH POLICE AT MOHAMMED. REZA SHAH STADIUM. RULES

COMMITTEE UPHELD DECISION ON BOUT, THEN CENSURED NORTH KOREAN

PROTESTERS FOR PUNCHING JUDGES AND BREAKING FURNITURE. SIX TRUCK-

LOADS OF POLICE WERE NEEDED TO RESTORE ORDER. NORTH KOREAN FENCING

AND SOCCER TEAMS REFUSED TO COMPETE AGAINST ISRAELIS, AND BOTH MEN'S

AND WOMEN'S BASKETBALL TEAMS REFUSED TO PLAY SOUTH KOREANS. WHEN

NORTH KOREA'S VOLLEYBALL PLAYERS DID CONSENT TO TAKE ON SOUTH KOREAN

TEAM, NEWSMEN CONCLUDED NORTH KOREANS HAD AGREED ONLY SECAUSE THERE

WAS TO BE A NET BETWEEN THEM: MOST SENSATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE

CONCERNED NORTH KOREAN WEIGHTLIFTER WHO, STRIPPED OF HIS THREE AWARDS

WHEN DRUS TESTS PROVED POSITIVE, OBJECTED VIOLENTLY AND REFUSED TO

RETURN GOLD MEDALS. EZ IMPDET-N

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:.

EXT:

il.,

і/.

¿isS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

SECRET

CICAGIPSBY

E?

IMPOET

CL BY: 013078

---

## Page 35

14-00000

OMF O

OUTGOING MESSAGE,,.

SONAL CHIRDUDON

nast

0

0.

SECRET

STAFF

DATA-TEN ORONA

2022152

DIRECTOR

0

600b4

DISSEM DrI e:)

400.

•to mons

0

10 pa 08

TO: SOOTA, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

closelie, elsEs,

RYBAT VUNUMBER Y

REF: A. GOGOTA 24797 lIN 3692471

DC/VISfT

C/w::/A/A

B. DIRECTOR bUY9US Y

/WH/4/19

1. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE IN BRIEFING PUFIFTYONE

1nl3Ans/ 00058640

PRISONEN EXCHANGE PROPOSAL: IS TEXT SANTIAGO MAN CABLE 6009, 2

OCT: Y

*1. RECENT PUBLIC LETTER

?. TO CARDIVAL RAUL SILVA REQUESTED HIS

•SISTANCE IN OCTAINING RELEASE

OF JURI GRIGOVICVICH PRONIM, CURRENTLY

DETAINED IN USSR. LETTER FROM DETAINEE'S WIFE, A CHILEAN CITIZEN

HATES MARIA ELIANA E. DE PRONIN, WAS GIVEN PREOMINENT LOCAL PRESS

COVERAGE SEPT 2b. TEXT OF LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN SOMETIMES IRONICAL

TONE, APPEALING TO CARDINAL'S "NOBLE CHRISTIAN HEART TOWARDS CHILEAN

POLITICAL DETAINEES"" CONTINUING, DETAINEER'S WIFE SAID SHE BELIEVES

AN LUTHORITY SUCH AS THE CARDINAL, "UHO HAS SO MANY TIMES DEFENDED

THE LETAINEES OF THE LEFT," COULD INFLUENCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO

RELEISE NEA HUSBAND, SAID MARRIED PRONIN IN JANUARY 1968, AND

HUSUAID SINCE AUGUST L96& DETAINED IN UUTA CAMP FOR HAVING TRIED TO

DATE:

ORIG:

UPSIT:

EXT:

THAT-EMP

E 2_ IMPDET

CL BY:

SECRET

wit!

.*.

---

## Page 36

14-00000

J

OUTGOING MESSAGE

40e

ося

OMF

CLADBAKATION

0

0

0

₴

DATA-TING ORONO

ena

DIRECTOR

STAFF

CONF:

INFO: FILE

6296H1

10081

то тове

aBrURATO PER

DISSEM BYt

О телео #

LEAVE USSR ILLEGALLY. Y

"2. CARDINAL RESPONDED PUBLIC COCT IS IN FORM OF LETTER TO

CONSERVATIVE "EL MERCURIO, " REITERATING HIS INTENTION TO USE ALL HIS

STRENGTH TO HELP THOSE WHO SUFFER, " REGARDLESS OF OTHER

CONSIDERATIONS. * IN RESPONSE, CARDINAL ASSURED WIFE AND PUBLIC THAT

HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE ON DETAINEE'S BEHALF, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO

RELATIONS WITH USSR AND IS NOT OPTIMISTIC. Y

"3. COMMENT. PRESS COVERAGE OF LETTER EXCHANGE, AND PERHAPS

REQUEST ITSELF, IS OBVIOUS CONTINUATION OF PRESS HARASSIENT OF.

CARDINAL FOR HIS CRITICISM OF GOC HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE, AND FOR HIS

SILENCE DURING CHILEAN HUE AND CRY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN

USER AND CUBA. IN HIS RESPONSE, CARDINAL SOFTLY REBUKED CRITICS AND

GOC BY STATING, "MOREOVER I BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU CEL MERCURIOS

THAT THE CARDINAL'S REQUESTS TO AUTHORITIES, EVENTHOSE WITH MORE

INTIMATE TIES TO HIM, ARE NOT ALWAYS WELL RECEIVED." Y

4. NO FILE. E-Z IMPDET N

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

9 OCTOEER, 1974

E•: JAMES'MCTIGHE

CLATCA

1553

C/LA/S®

@Primes

COORDINATING OVIET

V BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR

SITED

AUTARNIICATI URANEO

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 37

14-00000

OTHED THAN

PROMIDITED

SECRET

Maint

CírlANDDO, OLC, 1353,

9WH8

N

ACTION O

T.. 422.494

€1 4751

PaGE 21

TOR: 17:6622 528 74

1N 362719

5450

30338

SECHET :T1S44Ü SEP TA STAFE

CITE SANTIAGO IZ338

TO: PRIUNITY DIRECTOR.

RYDAT

REF:

SANTIAGE 32318410361362)

• -81111

7.2.

1914508.

CHILEAN COMPARISE EL MERCURIO GE iS SEPTEMBER DESCRIBES

REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AS SECOND (LUGARTENIENTES OF

•SENATON KENNEDY, EL MERCURIO OUTLINES GEGECTIVES OF

HARFINGTON REVELATIONG AS: AY TO GIVE GUEGHITION TO THE

POLITICAL INTERESTS OF SENATORY KENNEDY; 39

TO CONTINUE THE

ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN WHICH INTEMIATIONEL SOMMUNISM HEADS

AND MAS GREGTLY INFILTRATEO THE AELDEMIG DO SOLITICAL

CIRCLES SUPPORTING KENNEDY; CO BIREGT FIDE AT THE CHILEA DAILY

WHOSE PUBLICHTIONS AND OPINIONS SEEM IO HAVE THE STRONGES?

IMPACT INTERMATIONALLY.

20 EL MENCURIO FURTHER COMMESTS THAT WARRINGTON AP?ACE !S

AN ATTEMP! TO IMPEDE THE ECONOMIC SEVELODMENT OF CHILE IS:EI

AND DIRECTLY CORNECTS WITH WORLD HIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO STRANGLE

OUR GOVEHNMENT EVEN AP THE COST OF (CAUSINGS HUNGER FOR

RECORD COPY!

15°-126-3

17%ep74

---

## Page 38

14-00000

CABLO ARE DISEN DY..

SECRET

НОГОТНЕЙ ТМА

PREING OPFICE IS PRONIDITI

STAFF

ACTION UNIS

•RF

FILE

ACTION O

422494

E1A951

PAGE 02

TOR: 1716482 SEP 74

THE CHILEAN PEOPLE WHILE THE GRANERIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE

EMPTIED FOR RUSSIA, "

3. AFTEK TOUCHING SEVERAL OTHER BASES, EL MERCURIO CONCLUDES

BY VENYING THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN ANY "UNCONFESSADLE"

INCOME IN ITS HISTORY, EL MERCURIO'S BOOKS WERE SUBJECT TO MOST

THOROUGH, AND HOSTILE SCRUTINY DURING THE MARXIST REGIME WITHOUT

ANYONE VEING ABLE TO SPECIFY IRREGULARITEIES, THEREFORE. EL

MERCURIO REJECTS "WITH LEGITIMATE DISDAIN THE IRRESPONSIBLE

CHARGES MADE BY A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MR. KENNEDY AND

FEELS AUTHORIZED TO CONJECTURE THAT THE ATTACK IS THE FRUIT

OF JOURNALISTIC IRRESPONSIBILITY OR OF THE ANIMOSITY OF THE

ADVISORS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHO IS STOPPED SINCE

SÖVERAL YEARS AGO IN HIS AMDITIONS BY THE MORAL EXAMINATION

IN 362715

SAGO

30338

OF HIS ACTIONS TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED IN HIS COUNTRY".

* PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENTS ON CHILE FROM HIS 16 SEPTEMBER

NEWS CONFERENCE WERE CARRIED. IN FULL 8Y "EL MERCURIO" UNDER FRONT

PAGE HEADLING "FORD: U.S, HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FALL OF ALLENDE, "

THERE WAS NO EDITORIAL COMMENT IN "EL MERCURIO" AND NO NEWS OR

EDITORIAL COVERAGE OF THE PRESLDENT'S STATEMENT

IN "LA TERCERA".

SE C'RE i

---

## Page 39

14-00000

1. 11 180, 1 10

LA318586: 19059889880

SECR

ET

HAMPONUCTION DU OTHER THAN

INAUINO OFFICE IA PROMIBITID

STAFF

ACTION UNIS 11 HE

------

ACTIONI

FILE

VH

422474

E16951

PAGE 23-83

TOR: 1715427 SEP74

IN 362715

SAGO

30338

MRS. ALLENÜDOS GITAEK AGAINST SECHETARY KISSINGER WAS CARRIED IN

"LA TERCENA" BUT NOT IN "EL MERCURIO".

SO IN TONITO THE EXAGGERATEO POSITION IT HAS ON THE REVELO

TIONS, EL MERCURLO MAS LEFT ITSELE VULNERABLE LOBEING EMBARRASSED

AND CONTRADICTEE EY STATEMENTS (SUCH AS THE PRESIDENTISI THAT ARE

MORE ACCUMATE PRESERTATIONS OF WHAT WENT ON IN CHILE PRE-COUF.

EL MERCURIO MAY DELL HAVE TANGE THIS POSITION BECAUSE, BESIDES

THEIR RIGMINIS VIENS, THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT IS GENUINELY

IGNORANT OF THE FUNDING iNAT TOOK PLACE WHEN FUBRIG-Z WAS RUNNING

THE SHOW, FUERIGOZ WHO SENEDULED TO RETUAN TO CHILE 18 SEPTEMBER,

HAS TOLD COS PHL? DO QNE CURRENTLY AT EL MERCURIO KNOWS OF FUND-

ING. EVEN CUFFENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY LENIE COES NOT KNOW DETAILS

BUT HAD SUSPICIOS ABOUT INFUSION OF LUNDS THAT TOOX PLACE IN U.P.

ERA, WE WILL ATTEMDT TO MONITOR INTERNAL EL MERCURIO REACTION

THROUGH FUERIG-Z.

O. FILE: DEFER.

EZ IMPDET

SECRET

---

## Page 40

14-00000

MAin 2553

ПЕРТОПіСТІСИЛуОТИТЦІ

PSSUITE UFFICE IS PHOMIESTI

', SON UNIT NOTIFIIO

"DULECOY LESUER ALOIIKO

MITION UNIT

• RF

FILE

• WH8 :C/ORS/INTZ, DDO, C/ OSG/IC,

C/1P/AN, C/SS-3, C/PS/eQ3

4:9129

D. secuet,

0/010p2.

, #14568

FAGE 01

TOR: 16:5363

SEP 74

STAFF

IN 361362

SAGO

30318

SECRET 161510E SEP TS STAFF

CITE

SANTIAGO 30318

TO :

DIRECTOR,

RYUAT

REF'S:

A. SANTIAGO 30293(1p 355699)

SANTIAGO EMBASSY 5628 L#41039

1. PEL MERCUALON OF SU SEPTENGER 19ZA DEVOTED ENTIRE PAGE 29

TO HARRINGTON MEVELATIONS ABOUT CIA FUNDING IN CHILE UNDER

HEADLINE "KENNEDY PLAN AGALNST EL MERCURIO", COVERAGE

INCLUDEU COMFLETE TEXT OF HARRINGTON LETTER TO MA, THOMAS

MORGAN AND REPRINTS OF SEYMOUR HERSCH ARTICLE FROM "NEW

YORK TIMES" AND AP DISPATCH FROM "WASHINGTON STAR", LATTER

IDENTIFYING "EL MERCURIO" AS CHILEAN NEWSPAPER ALLEGEDLY

RECEIVING FUNDS FROM GIA, ALSO INCLUDED A 13 SEPTEMBER AP

•TEM DATE LINED WASHINGTON QUOTING DIRECTOR COLBY THAT

"CIA WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY COU?".

JIRt

2. DO NOi XIDE FEASONS THE MOTIVATED "EL MERCUI! O"

TO FUSLISH EXTENSIVE COVERAGE. OF HAGRIRGTON REVELATIONS.

SPECULATE THEY DECIDED TO TAKE OEFENSIVE TO ATTENT TO

MITIGATE CAMAGING NATURE OF THE MATERIAL LUDINGE "EL

MA!:

r::

= 1!

КлВіН

FUNE:

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-126-3

in Sepsy

---

## Page 41

14-00000

AILA SEC DIESIMIL

LION UNIT NOTITIRO

ICIAL COPIES

SECRET

ug or

ISSUING

DIMIR THAN

PROMIDITED

STAFF

RF.

FILE.

VR.

413128

PAGE E2

TOR: 1615352 SEP 74

MERCURIO" DISELF, THE HEADLINE AND A SHORT EDITORIAL COMMENT

INTRODUCING LOVE COVERAGE DESCRIBES THESE DEVELOPMENTS

•S "NEW AND GASTESQUE EPISODE IN THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN"

AND ATTEMUTS TO TIE REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON CLOSELY TO

SENATOR EDWARE KENNEDY WHO HAS SINCE THE COUP BEEN UNDER

STEADY ATTACK HERE FOR HIS CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY INTER-

VENTION AND SUBSEGUENT EVENTS

IN CHILED, "EL MERUCIRON MAKES

CONNECTION MIRA RECENT REVELATIONS BE REP, HARRINGTON BY

"EL MERCURIS"; OF AN ARTICLE FROM "HO CALLS" WHICH DEALT WITH

CHAPPAQUIDIER IN A MANNER UNFAVORABLE TO SENATOR KENNEDY.

3. "EL MERCURIO" RESPONSE, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE NET EFFECT

OF RAISING MORE GUESTIONS MERE THAN IT ANSWERS. THIS INCREASED

PUBLICITY WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON AND POSSIELY. SCRUITINY OF

STATION ASSETS INVOLVED AND MAY AFFECT THOSE NOT DIRECTLY

INVOLVED. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, FUPOCKET-L WAS QUESTIOND BY

NEWSWEEK REPORTER HERE ABOUT HIS KNGWLEDGE OF FUNDING.

SUPOCKETO: DENIES ALL ANGGLEDGE OF AÜY FUNDING ERGM FOREIGN

SOURCES. DETAILS FOLL SEPARATE CAGLE.

4. REQUEST HOS KEEP STATION UP-TG-LATE ON ANY PLANS OR

CONCRETE ACTICES TO CONTINUE LUVESTIGETION DE REVELATIONS.

IN 361362

SAGO

32318

1: 119-413.

in!

...

---

## Page 42

14-00000

"irvisis

• Lone -ts cIssaN or

• •ISSPN UNIT N00I..00..

MIGNIEUOPI IESUER SLOI1GO_

I:PICG LNIT

RF.

FILE

N

VR

"SEGRET

er si

1=1:0n

T :19108

ELAGE8

FAGE.CJ-E3

TOR: 1615562 SSP 74

5.. FILES

DEFER. EZ IMPDET

S

C

F=.00

rangucriae is premeire

Sider

IN 561382

SAGO 30318

---

## Page 43

14-00000

4.90 N66. 9178

CABLE CAC. UIDGEM O

PEMBON: UNIT NOTIFIED

orions 21-5 v=0r

SECRET

RAPRODUCTION DY

OTHER

IDDUINO ORFICE IS ARAMID,

AsTArs

ARTION UNIT.!

ictioN.

wAs;

FILE

VR

CP3 563

9cT/0z

411313

E1A140

PAGE 01

TOR1121800Z SEP 74

SECRET 121711Z SEP TA STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO. 30283

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

1.9 1

REFSI A, DIRECTOR 595482

8, SANTIAGO 38253 (EN 354910)

190.96.

1, FOLLONING STASION AGENIS HERE CONTACIED, PERIOD 8-18

SEPTEMBER,. IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE REVELATIONS.

1211'23

THEIR

COMMENTS AND REACTIONS FOLLOW.

2, FUERMINE-S CONCERNED BUT RELIEVED THAT NO NAMES WERE

MENTIONED..

COMMENTED THAT TIMING WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BAD

SINCE IT COINGIDED EXACTLY WITH EDUARDO FREL'S ARMIVAL IN THE

U,S. AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATE.

FUERMINE -1 ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER

INVESTIGATION OR MEDIA PLAY IN THE U,S..

REPLIED THAT WE

DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD KEEP MIM INFORMED, NE IS TRAVELING TO

GERMANY ON 22 SEPTEMBER AT INVITATION OF INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION INSTITUTE SWEST GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS).

DURING HIS TRIP HE WILL CHECK HIS NUMBERED ACCOUNT FOR THE

ARRIVAL OF RECENT FUNDS. IN VIEW OF REF DEVELOPMENTS, HE

RECORD COPY

15-126-3

IN 358699

SAGO

30293

---

## Page 44

14-00000

ís.-

1.21 satG .1.90

CADLE GIC WISDUM DY..

SECRET

....

SUING OPRICE,

ДРНОМІО

STARS

ACTION UNIT

FILE

VR

ACTION.

411313

E1A140

PAGE 02

TOR11218062 SEP 74

DOES NOT PLAN TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER MONIES DITO CHILE. HE

RETURNINO CHILE VIA NEW YONK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET

WITH FREI 1S OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE-L EXPRESSED THE

OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH

EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE IT IS VOT IN THEIR

INTEREST TO DO SO.

2, FUBRIGOR RECEIVED NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED

ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED

OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANGED

PREV

TO BENT SUCH LEAKS, NE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT

MENTIONED BY NAME COUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT LY WILL NOT BE

EASILY IDENTISIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY!, FUBRIG-1

THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IS USG STILL NOT IN

SOME WAY SUODORTING PDO, WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND

MOST UNACCEPTABLE.

4, FUEAMINE-S ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABUS REVELATION

OF SO,DOG iTEM FOR TRAVEL OF ODE LEADERS, WHILE SHAKING HIS

HEAD ABOUT THE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE

REVELATION, UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT

INVESTIGA: JENS AND PUBLICLTY, WILL NOT CAUSE MIM A PROBLEM.

IN 359658

SAGO

38233

---

## Page 45

14-00000

:

=

all ories

SECRET

ArAUDUITION DY O

BMO OPOCK IS PRONI

SPASS

MANANGAGE D9UED 86OIIGO --DL-A.-

RF

FILE

VR

- 1'

ACTION.

7 111313

ETAIAO

PAGE DJ

TOR:1218862 SEP 74

CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS

BEING PDE AND INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUR OF LATIN

AMERICAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WILL LEAD AWAY FROM

PROPER IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED THROUGH HIS

MANDS WERE APPROXIMATELY SA, BOO AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET

RATE CAS OPPOSED TO STATION SPENDING RATES, HE FEELS THAT THIS

WILL ALSO HELP HIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE POC

OF THIS FUNDING.

5, FUPOCKET-I WAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF 325,000 FOR

PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON & SEPTEMBER, WAS VISIBLY

DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEUPLE NEED

TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES.

NOT GET OUT. "STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP

KVEN THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO

STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PARY IN THE DEAL.

ME REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF THE STATION IS A

SOCIALIST AND UNLIXELY TO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE SALE SINCE

ILLEGAL MONEY PRANSACTION INVOLVED, FUPOCKET-1 PROMISED TO KEEP

US ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK.

Ó. ON 10 SEPTEMBERO FUBARGAIN-I SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET

SECRET

IN 358689

SAGO

30293.

---

## Page 46

14-00000

1099i 490'61

0896000. veers 8o0 erro......

trAiNeR. 60=6.187485-060.4180.=.

ACTITiON UNIT

FILE

.....

E

-b..

ISTASE

V F!

ACTION

411313

PADE 84

TOR11218262 SEP 74

IN 358099

S6G0

32293

DID NOT SEEM VERY UPSET GUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGAID-I'S

PRESENCE THAT THE DISELOSURE "SEEMEO TO BE A DUPEY EMING TO

DO." SON THE FIRST TIME IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITO SUBAEGAIN-".

HE SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS IS GROSING EVIDENCE

OF USO INCOMPREHENSIDI OF GOC. SAID HE

AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TO SIDES

AND ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY USG FINCTIONS CHULD PARTIALS

UNDERSTAND CURRENT U,Õ. G, ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS,: SAID MOST

JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSET AS

CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S.

FAILURE TO BE A "GOOD FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE TRE IMPORTANT

SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HERE IN THE WORLD AN I-

COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.

7, ACCORDING TO FUELAGAIN I, MOST CHILEAN USE:CERS VIEW THE

REVELATIONS AND THEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE ATTEN: BY A

SECTOA DE U.S.G. BALDEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCHS

TO DELIBERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CAST DOLE:

ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN BRINGINO DOWN ALLENDE. OFFIGERS

MAVE ADDED THIS LATEST BLOW TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER ME BE UAS, FOOT-

DRAGGING ON SUPPLYING CHILE

ARMS URGENTLY NEEDED FEE DEFENSE

---

## Page 47

14-00000

LAOLE SEC DISSEN DI

PRADON: UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION UNiT,!

"UN DY

SECRET

AEPRNDUCTION OY

OTHER.

IDOUIMO OPPICEIO PROMIDI

ISTAFF

RF

FILE.

VR

ACTION O

T. 411313

E1A140

PAGE 05-05

TOR112180AZ SEP TA

IN 358689

SAGO

30293

AGAINST PERU AND U,S, FAILURE NOP ONLY TO ASSIST, BUT ACPUALLY

TO CONTRIBUTE TOWAROS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE

ABROAD, SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECCMING

INCREASINGLY BAFFELED AND RESENTFUL ABOUT U,S, ACCORDING TO THIS

SOURCE,

8, FILES DEFER. EZ IMPDET

SE

R

E

---

## Page 48

14-00000

- COURIENTIAL.

Frittey-

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS Fur

MEDIA I:' ALLENDE'S CHILE

HIGHLIGHTS

Psych far

.. Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970, the Government

propiganda apparalas has sounted a coordinated campign againas

the opposition communications media focusing on the prestigious

El Mercurio newspaper chain and key opposition radios. The long..

range goal is to create conditions that will ingure Government

control over the media so that an emasculated opposition vill operate

intuitively and through self-condorship within in approved framework.

• The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal

and illegal devices designed to intimidate them.

These devices

include the threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of

essential Government advertiting revenue, temporary closures,

and Government-fomented etrikes.

-- Chile's national television -- the only country-vide channel -- has

become an important propaganda instrument for the Government.

But it is being challenged by a Catholic University channel which is

attempting to expand its service beyond the Santiago arca.

-- A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition,

lasting more than a year, has taken place at the Papelera, Chile's

only important private neusprint producer, with the company

supported by the opposition redia stymying repeated Government

efforts to take over the firm.

The paper company claims that

Government price policies have brought it close to bankruptcy.

- Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the opposition media

have continued to function, taking advantage of the fluid political

aituation currently prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly

effective in exploiting the Government's economic failures and the

growing dissensión within the ruling Marxist coalition.

-- Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that sustains its media

is being slowly undermined as the Government expands its control

over the Chilean economy.

slany opposition media are reportedly

already in difficult financial straits.

The Chilean Communist Party,

seeking to strengthen its voice in the March 1973 Congressional

elections, has alrcady purchased five beleaguered radio stations

(one a former opposition station) in southern Chile.

• CONFIDE ITIAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

ii

---

## Page 49

4.00000

---

## Page 50

14-00000

CONFIDERTIAL

MI.

THE ALLENDE PROCESS - HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED

"Allende'e treatment of the opposition media and his utilization of

the pro-Government media offer revealing insight: into the unique

claim that Chile will carry out i Socialict revolution within the frane-

work of traditional bourgcois and democratic instilutions without

social cost.

Any Chilean government possesger wide powers thet can be employed

'to control and intimidate media opponerts given sufficient will power and

•cyniciom to do so, despite the fact thai media frocdoms in Chile are

twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 constitution and in a statute of

constitutional guarantees agreed to by Alleride's Popular Unity coalition

and the Christian Democrats. (PDC) as a condition for PDC support for

Allende in the congressional run-off held cubsequent lo the Presidential

election in September 1970.

What are some of these powers? An; Chilean executive under

•provisions of the State Internal Securit; Lay may establish emergency

zones by decrec hended by military comtanders coyowering the State

to enforce news censorship and to restrict access to newsprint supplies.

A law on publicity abuses empowers the government to petition the

courts to suspend access to news and information. (laws on the books

that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information are more

severe and more frequently utilized. See Section Ill. B. Radio.)

Furthermore, through the judicious parceling out of advertising fror.

State and autonomous State firms any government can discrininate

against opposition media by denying or restricting this key source uf

revenue.

Unlike predecessor governments vitich utilized rxisting laws and

accepted practices to reward political associates and benefit business

partners, the Allende Government has consistently and frequently

applied these measures to harass, to intimidate, and to undermine the

morale of political and class opponents in the media. These tactics

are applied throughout the country.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

5

---

## Page 51

14-00000

CONFIDINTIAL

-A badic organizational rechnique for the Up coalition has been the

•"establishment of UP cominittees (CUP -- Comilé de Unidad Popular) --

composed of newsmen who are militant meintere of parties belonging

to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies --

in newspapere, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies.

The:

CUt''s have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbilant

wage incrcades, insisting that UP employece be given the right t

express their opinion on cditorial pages, disrupting legitimate union

meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company dali to

the leftiat press and to the Government.

The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freccom of

the press was most explicitly and rovealingly atated by the organizing

committee for a conference of leftist journalintg which was held in

Santiago in April 1971.

The committee issued the following statement

prior to the conference:

•.. we believe that we must fight for true freedom of

the press, which will only be posoible when there is

true economic independence. We maintain that Chile

will have true freedom of the press only when the means

of mass communication are part of the area of encial

property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans.

The press, radio, television, and the theater must be

tools at the service of liberation and culture of our

people and not a private business, an ideological

battering ram of the national and foreign minority

(the capitalists) as is presently the case.? (under.

lining added)

Another statement said "the mission of journalists" is to support and

defend the People's Government (the UP) together with all the workers."

The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen lor

"Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism, "

and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its "objective"'

reporting of the Chilean phenomenon.

Allende himsel lent legitimacy

to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conterence

when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the "ranguurd"

of the revolution by "elevating the political level of the people."

Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende

aGgerted that his Government would respect freedom oi information

while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive

tolerance" for the opposition media.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

6

---

## Page 52

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Prese

in the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major

opposition diily newspapers and one important neutral daily,

La Tercera de la Hora.

TABLE 2. MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTKAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Title

•El Mercurio

Las Noticias Ultimas

La Prensa

La Segurda

La Tribuna

La Tercera de la Hora

Estimateri

Circulation

160, 000

120, 000

25, 000

60,000

25, 000

190, 000

Political

Orientation

Independent, conservative

Part of the Mercurio chain

Chriotian Democritic (PDC)

Part of the Mercurio chain

National Party (Pi) interests

Independent

A favorite larget of the Government and its propaganda apparatus

has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the

Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential

newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U.S." and

as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" .. potent accusations in

Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt ofjevery conceivable kind of

presaure ahort of outright seizure.

On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with

other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert

with foreign (i.c.. U.S. ) interests to overthrow the Government.

Advertisers have been

"requested" not la do business with the Mercurio

which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by

lax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own stafi, and

by Allende himself at public rallies. Allende, too, periodically reicts

to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the

Presidential office have beer. "insulted, " that the Mercurio chain

indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history. "

R-$-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

7

---

## Page 53

14-00000

CONFIDETHAL

and that the chain is "lithiul to its tridition of infainy." The

Government propaganda apparatus follows suit.

The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party labloid

La Tribuna are secondary Carrels lor the Ul bropagama apparatus

because their circulation in limited.

Treasures unployed ainst

these dailies are aimed cenerally at the policical partie bolind plen

in contrast do the Mercurio chain where premares are intended is i

warning dignal to the "Tred" media is in institution.

Independent La Tercera receivon distinet treatrent. The

Government everts minimal pressures on the paper in return for

favorable editorial treatient of Allende policio: (uce Section VI.

A. The Opposition Medlin Reaction), Thie diretic has pair dividende

for Allende and ior

Percera's owner, German Pico Cánas. Allende

obiains favorable publicity in a mis-circulation paper that maintyins

comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending credence to

Allende's claims that he will respece traditional Chilean freedoms

while making the cransicion co Socialiam. Freed from the need for

the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the press,

Tercera atendily builds its circulation with a pullic soching some

relici from the verbal civil war.

1s i resill Pico, who has been heid

of the Chilean nerspaper association, lins defended lie Allende

Government's press policies in international forums, The under-

standing with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera

Is nor sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party

in the Government coalition.

B. Radio

Radio continues to be the moal important medium of communication

in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV

Handbook give Chile a toral of 137 stationg, including 25 in the capital

city.

Santiaço (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at

3 million, or

one for every third person.

In a country 2,600 miles long

radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and

opposition.

The Government has resorted lo a variuty of devices

designed lo intimidale opposition radio atations: requests by Allende

advisers that opposition stationa hire designated leftist commentators:

threats of violence: lavoritism in the diatribution of needed government

advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by

CUP commitrees.

CONFIDENTIAL

R-1-73 February 21, 1973

---

## Page 54

14-00000

CONFIDINTIAL

TABLE 3. IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS

Station

Radio Agricultura

Radio Balmaceda

Radio Cooperativa

Radin Corporación

Radio: Luis Recabarrea

Radio Magallanes

Radio Minería

Radio Pacifico

Radio Portales

Radio Santiago

Radio UTE

political

Orientation

National Party (PN)

Christian Democratie (PDC)

PDC with PN clemento

Socialist Pariy

controlled by dirtists.

Chilean labor federation (CUT)

sention; Communist-controlled

(Sec Note No. 10)

Communist Party

Independent with PDO and PN elements.

Radical Party (UP)

Socialist Party

Catholic Church interests

State Technienl University station

controlled by Cornmunints

Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest

with "bourgeois" radio owners. Long belore Allende became president

the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio sintiond

made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they beliered

that leftiste were superior professionals agd helped to increase

listenership. When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source

of manpower.

In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations

to gain its ends. Radio concessiona are granted by a Government

entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Yinistry.

The

same entily can cancel or transfer such concessions.

Regulations

promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal

disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject lo the

rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt."

Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were

placed under an obligatory Government networi -- not an unusual

practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial

law was decreed in 21 oi Chile's 25 provinces during the October -

R-4-73 February 27,1983

CONFIDENTIAL

9

---

## Page 55

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

November 1972 truck drivers atrike (See More No, 19%. Another

regulation decroco that statione must interrupt their tranaminsiong

whenever the Inierior Minister judgeu il lo be necerrary in tir

interout of the internal security of the titile.

Still inuther regulation

authorizeg the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment

and spare parto for radio, television, and the preso.

The Goveinment moved quickly ifer the 1970 presidential

election to obtain comrol of key stations.

The Socialist farty

gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most populer station,

and purchased Radio Corporacion from Fl Mercurio (Prortales hi

subsequently lipped in popularity). The Communict Party Purchased

Magallenco, an important Santiago station. The Communist Pirty

recently aloo purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-

opposition) in Concepción as well au four other stations in southern

Chile in preparation for the Congreocional election in March 1973).

The rightiot National Party daily la Tribuna quoted the former

owner as baying that "the age of privately-owned mann media

(in Chile) io over" with only the Government, strong econornic

consortiumo, and the most powerful political partier capable of

sustaining media operationg. La Tribuna sayo the Cornunist Party

jo now the most powerful (singic) broadcarter in southern Chile.

PDC-oriented Radios Balinaceda and Cooperativi, however, have

to date successfully resisted Covernment enticements and pressures

(sce Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Balmaceda -- a

radio station

which over the yeard had carned a reputation for objec-

tive newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the

radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio

facility.

The station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in

June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the

State of Emergency decreed after the assassination o! Perez Lujovic,

a former interior minister in the

Frei Government. At the same

time a UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admoni-

cion for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP

propagandists: During the August-September 1971 period Radio

Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under

similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

10

---

## Page 56

14-00000

CONFIDERTIAL

In radio as in the press the Government has unid CUl

cornmitteca lo formulite exaggerated page demanlo, do farent

atrikes, and lo form rampunions, Clip unions at Radio J'acifico,

sor example, forced the duner to sell out lo a coopcrative

by employees hen are demands could not be mei.

station aubsequenly was purchayed by the Radical Party --i

member of the

Ul coalition.

The principal Governenent weapon, however, is ito control

over public service advertiting, which traditionally has provided

the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stationa.

The Goverment

has dangled the prospect of idvertiserents in return for favorible

news treatment, but the bait has not beeh picked ip by the major

opposition radios which recognize thil their independenee in it

The economic squeere makes the future of Chilcan

independent radioo appear bleak.

C. Television

Since its incoption in Chile in 1968, television has made prent

Ericks, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the

provinces where technical conditions for viewing are pour. Accord-

ing to the best cotimaies available, there are 350, 000 sete in

Santiago and a total of 500. 000 sets in the country, Chile is served

by the following television channels: l) A national network with

some 21 otlets througnout the country: ?) the Catholic University

channel in Santiago: 3) a separate Catholic University channel in

Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chily channel in Santiago.

The Governient clearly recognizes television's importance as

a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction ni an allende

confidante, neusman dugusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected.

member of the ultra-left MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary

Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel

into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition.

Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations

intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drum-

fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming

became standard fare.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

11

---

## Page 57

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Ne the same tire network authoritien made il difficult under a

variely of pretexts for opposition spokeson to air their views in

contravention of the State television sealuie:

For existsiple, the

authoritica frequently obliged all televinion

channels and radios en

carry nflicial stalemento and denied opposition sporehmen equil

tirne, reborting to the legal fiction that the official sealernente were

transmitted voluntarily.

A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in shich opposi-

tion representatives freely debared UP representatives (the only such

show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 197% after lus

yeara of UP agitation againgt it.

The Government defended the slep

by alleging, that the program had poor lintenership ird by pointing lo

a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their

viema on evice-werkly 20-minute slola.

The original chat show

formal provided several hours of open-ended and frescent face-lo-

face confronintion, usually embarrassing to the Govertinent.

The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the

Marxiat line since its inception, but the tuo remaining university

channels have successfully fought Covernment control is date (Sce

Section V!. C.

Section Ve i ring eity Con nation nd Televisin Frontone).

D. Magazines and Book Püblishing

•Early in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment

of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire -- ore of the most

modern in Latin America.

The COC announced the purchase after

prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands

of a Communist-led union,

Under the termy of the accord the

Government purchased Lig-Zag's plant and couipment, the company's

national line of comics, and several magazines while Zir-Lag

retained several mass-circulation magazines (Ercilla and Vea being

the most important) under a two-year coniract with the Chilean

Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the brais for the

newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing

Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Lay has been scrupulously.

observed to date.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

12

---

## Page 58

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Quimantu quickly becan turning out magazines, comic books.

and textbooks pushing UP policies.

Comic books like Eirme

were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with

low cultural levels, while osters like Raniona were aired at the

reen-age market..

Cabrochico, anotherreo.ic book, was geared to

The format of same Quimani products closely rescmbled

competing Zig-ray producis. The weekly shore, for example, was.

designed to compole with E-cilla. Niter eight months Ahora collapsed,

rejecied in the market place by Chileans who were turned oir by heavy-

handed political propaganda.

E. Films

The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became

the Up'a principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilcan

private producers went out oi business, squeezed by rising production

coote and discriminatory lad and exchange rate treatment that denied

them needed equipment and spare parts irom ab road. Chile Films

signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban

Cinematographic Institute (iC.AIC) (Sce Section V. C. Exchange of

Viaitors, and Exchange Agreements).

Chile Filmo aldo initiated agreements with the experimental film

institute (leitist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the

Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Govern-

ment information office,

the film departmeat oi the Communist-

dominated CUT (Central U'nica de Trajahadores -- the major labor

organization), the national television network, and the University of

Chile televigion station.

The stated purpose of the accords was to

"develop the new Chilean silra industry."

Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants,

and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the

proletarian role vi the Chilear Communist ard Socialist Parties, and

attack the "bourgeoisie" ard their "imperialist" allies. Despite an

intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in

the 1970-72 period. Most oi the films thai were produced appeared to

be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende

presidential campaign or from post-eleciion political rallies.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

13

*===

---

## Page 59

14-00000

CONFIDENTiAL

The Covernment's delay in making public te

results of June 1972

elections for top posts in the Communist-domimica EUT tabör

federation also darruged Government credibility. The opposition

media scored heavily in a barrage of charges o: irregularities and

vore fraud with a public that tales justifical price in clean elections.

B. ..

The Papolora Confröntation

The Compañla "lanufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as

the Papelera), Chile's major private producer cé

arusprint, became

another propagarde balleground cast by the opposition in terms of

"freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism.".

In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing

pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Derelopment

Corporation) had opened negotiations to buy out the Papolera through

the purchase of its stock.

The opposition media iminediately launched

a campaign to warn the public that the free press sould be crippled

if newsprint distribution were placed at the merc; of Government

suppliers. At the same time, the opposition media pleaded with

private shareholders to refuse to sell lo the Goveranent. In addition,

a "frecdom fund" was created chabling private persons to buy up

Papelera shares to prevent the company from felting into Government

hands.

For several months pro- and anti-Governmer: media carried out

daily an in:ensive propaganda battle in advertisemerts, news stories,

and editorials.

Botn sides resorted to the familiar numbers game:

the pro-Allende media claimed that the Government was besieged by

willing shareholders eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that

shareholders were resisting temptation. Goverr=en propagandists

argued that neusprint production vas essential to tze State and must

be controlled by the Siate; the opposition said Pacelera must remain

in private hands as á patriotic duty.

Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Pagelera shareholders,

the Government has not hesitated to use other mrezzares -- price

controls, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics --

to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plane.

The Government

press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessarde: jormer President

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

26

---

## Page 60

14-00000

CONFIDENTIA:

of Chile and a leading

shareholder and board chairman of the Papeleral

had made a deal with Allende to give the Gavernment control over the

Papelera to weaken the will of private starcholders ind their supporters.

That the Popelera still withstand: these combined pressures a year

later is a tribute to a determined deiense of the firm by an opposition

Congress, to the lovalty of the bulk oi tie Papolera employces, and lo

an aroused and alerica opposition media.

The battle for control of the Papolora will continue and the oids

are not good for thr company, lepeated requests for price increases

sufficient to absorb cost increases a- forced on the firm in part y

Government economic policien a were noi met, and the firm declared

in September 1972 that it could not meci loan payments due to the

Inter-American Developrent Dank (IDD:). Finally, in December lot?

the Government authorized now price increases averaging 15 per cont.

which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint.

Papclera gains some breathing space bus Government pressures on the

company are certain to continue. The price increase itself may be

viewed as a form of pressure.

The battle has spilled over into the lalls of the Chilcan Congress.

Partly lo protect the Papelera's indepeadent status, the PDC sponsored

a "three areas" constitutionT amendment designed to give Congress

some control over which businesses car be incorporated as social.

property by the Governmeni. (The Papelera is one of the firms

appearing on the Government's originat list of 91 firms to be absorbed

by the Government as social property.! The ainundment -- still a

bitter bone of coniention belvicen the Gavernment ind the opposition .

would, among other points, declare null and void COR FO's atempted

purchase of Papelera stock in the absende of Congressional approval. 13

C. University Corfrontation and Television Freedoms

Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the

University of Chile in April 1972 and 3y stitiening opposition

attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over

effects in television programming al a channels run by Catholic

University. Increasing opposition elicitiveness even raised the

possibility that the Marxist-controlled U'niversity oi Chile channel.ior

the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some

objectivity into its output.

R-1-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDENTIIL

27

---

## Page 61

14-00000

CONFIENTIAL

Incumbent University uf Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, in

independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cont

of the vole for rector in April igainst tire other contenders repre-

senting the UP coilition ind leftist Eplinter groups, includins, the

An independere-PDC slate aleo gained control of the previously

Marxist-controlled Superior Hornalise Council. The victory sis

biller by the opposition inedia as another victory for democrary and

pluraliom over Marxist totalitarianion.

In the procees liestor

Boeninger became a hero o! tie opposition media and a ayrsiol of

"democratic" defiance of Gogerminent efforto to impose its will on

an independent university. The opposition's rallying ery bocaine

"Deferd a democratic and pluralist univereity, " Translated into

media termo it became "!'e vant a democratic and pluralistic

university TV channel."

Rallying bohind that slogan, opposition supporters at the lio

Catnolic Universities (Santiago and Valparaíon) began to case out

leftist influence in the mous departments of the two university

Channels.

UP supporters, hogever, remain at the sochnician level

al the Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for

their opponenes. Opposition authorities who now control the channel

are proceeding cautiously egsinet them.

A snore significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward

television freedoms has licen the Government's persistent refusil lo

permit university television stations to extend their networks

throughout Chile. In Septernier 1972, President Allende blocked the

opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction fur

such an extension by vetoing elected ileins in a PDC-introduced bill.

The Government claimed trat its own bill -- pending before Congress

and allowing universities to establish stitions only within the

territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would

create a national netword. for all recognized universities on an

"equal and non-discriminatory" basis.

What the Government did

not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State dework's

position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national

television audience.

Presumably the Governinent bill also would

permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University lo

operate a television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's

Catholic University channel which, according to available public

opinion surveys, is

viewed by approximately 69 per cent oi the

capital's audience. 15

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

CONFIDESTIAL

28

---

## Page 62

14-00000

COE:

: 229222A1.

Frcilla

October 5, 1972

Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Volo of Bill Permitting

= Uairersisy. (Sniago) lo kited lis Television (Chinnel 13) Throughout Chile.

In subsequent developirents the: Cotholic Univeraily at Santiago

as nevertheless extended il television service to the Concepción

seirgolican area, third mont important in Chile, via a television

epasier in Talcahuano, The Goverument has ordered that the

epelier cease operation is the University lacks a concession under

lose lab to function in that area.

The University has refused to

orepit, claiming that the 1970 National Television.

Act, which

upharices the universities to operate celevision channels, is the

overring statute and that il needs no additional concession to

persie in any pare of Chile. cannhile the repeater is still

uncriania: (as oi February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political)

ebase continues.

CONFIDENTIAL

-#-73 February 27, 1973

29

---

## Page 63

14-00000

Allende in Retrospect

By Paul E. Sigmund

i forld attention has moved away from Santlago front-running candidates he was elecied president

since

bloody overthrow of Salvador

/Allende last Septernber, but the questions

by a lopsided majority vole of 135.35. Mu received

the suppore of the centrist Christlan Democratic

that were raised at that time still need answering.

Party (PDC) in the run-ofl in return for his agrec.

Where should the primary responsibility. be placed

ment lo the adoption of a Constitutional Stature of

for the tragic events on and after September 11.

Democranic Guarantees protecting frecroms of ex.

1973?. Was it, as the Left contends, the resule of a

pression, education and religion, and guarantecing

fascist counterrevolution aided and abetied by the

the independence of the military from political con.

forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts;

trol. The text of the statute, which was added to

the only available response to Allende's atlempt 10

the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allendus elec.

establish the dictatorship of the proleiariat by a

tion, reflected the lears of non-Marxist groups tha!

mixture ol guile and force? Did it mark the "dealh

the new. Marxist President would use the consider.

of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by

able power of the Chilean exccutive to undercut and

democratic means, and was it thereby one more

eveniually destroy all opposition to a Marxist take.

demonstration inat Marxism must use force to ac-

complish its goals? Were there internal.and external

over.

political and economic factors which made it Im.

possibie for Allende's experiment to succeed, or

Political and Economic Strategy

was the downfall of the Unidad Popular (Popular

Unity) coalition government the consequence of a

series of Ideologically influenced analyses and mis.

taken policy choires which, it they had been differ.

ent, might have produced another result? A review

of the course uf the Allende government with the

ald of the considerable new material that has be-

When he look office, Allende promised that he

would follow a "second model" of Marxism-the

via Chilena to socialism, "with meat pies and red

wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated

by the classics of Marxism," he quored from

Friedrich Engeis on the possibility of

come available in recent months may heip to answer

these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out

... a peacelul evolution from the old soclely to lhe

new in countries where the representatives of the

that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote

in a three-way race.' What they do not mention is

that in the congressional run-off between the two

Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics al Princeton

Unlversity. Among his published works are Modeis

of Political Change in Latin America, 1970, and

The locologies of the Developing Nations (2nd rev.

ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since

1963, most recently in January 1974 10 do research

on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.

"Allenda's suppurtors in Ino Popular Unity coalitian consisted ol

Mis cuen Socialist Paisy (Pallida Socialisio-PS), Ino Communial

Parly (Partido Comunisia PC), tha main dody of the Radical Party

(PalidO RAG,CaI-PR), Ine leflist Calholic "Movement of Populas

Unlied ACIon" (MovimIento do ACCiOn MODuiar UnIOU MAPU), and

Ino other smaller drouDs. Tha largest apDosion groups moro tho

centrist Christian Democralie Party (Parlio Democrata Cristiana

POCI ard Ind righest Nalunal PaIlY (POISiDO NSCIONAL PAl..

in retrospoce, il is ironic inal ina Chilean Seralo nonde acres on a

constiulional amendment proposed early in 1970 lo establian a

socond-rouna dupular electión, anich mould Moro providEd lno

President thus elecied (probably lna eigniming candidalo, forde

Alessanar) miln a clear popular manadio.

45

---

## Page 64

14-00000

Ailence in Retrospect

ocople hase all power and in accord with she consti.

lution can do what shey desire when they have the

majority of the nation behind them."

Yet it was precisely the question of majority sup.

port that was Allende's centrul problem in his de.

sign do carry. out a peaceful transition lo "socialism

with democracy, pluralism and liberly." The parlies

in his coalition were in a distinct minority in the

Congress, and although there was no doubt about the

legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory

had only been possible because of the conditional

support of the Christian Democrats.

The PDC, it

should be noted, included both Radomiro Tornic.

the party's. 1970 presidential candidate, who had

gone lo Allende's house to congratulate him the

day after the popular election, clearly interring his

futüre support, and conservatives like Senator Juan

de. Dios Carmona, who had lought within the party

to prevent ll from voting for Allende in the run-off.

In the immediate altermath of the election the PDC

was controlled by she Tornic forces, who claimed

to be In favor of "communitarlan" socialism, nation.

alization of copper, acceieration of agrarian reform,

and reduction of Chile's dependencia on the United

States. One way, then, for Allende lo achieve his

acknowledged goal of majority support for the

transition to socialism would have been to try to

arrive at an understanding with the Christian Demo.

crats on the points in his program with which they

were In agreement. This might have prövoked the

secession of some of the rightist members of the

PDC, but it an accord had been reached with the

party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende

a majority in the Congress for at least part of his

program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to

terms with the party which he had termed "the new

face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose

an alternative strategy. The next congressional elec-

tions were not scheduled to take place until March

1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in

the event of a conflict with the Congress over the

text of a constitutional amendment, the President

could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course.

adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popu.

lar support for his coalition and then propose a

constitutional amendment which, in accordance with

the. Popular Unity electoral program, would replace

the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral

• El Morcurio (Santiago), Mov. 8, 1970, D.23.

Salvoder Allende speaks of his plans for Chile al

the 23rd Congress of the Soclalist Party, held in

January 1971, three months aller his election as

President of Chile.

-Phora by Sant Vloalli for Phararaporers.

I house, labe elected Immediately following the ap.

proval of the amendment. The Congress would be

certain 8o reject the amendment, but it Allende

had

the support of a majority in the country, he

could win the plebiscite and secure control of the

unicameral legislature that would then be estab

lished.

Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral

support was an economic one which drew as much

from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Mark.

The Chilean econony, already operating belon

capacity, had gone into a prolound recession as a

result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro

Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was 10

"prime the pump" by adopting a defici! budger, in-

creasing public expenditures, and redistributing in.

come by skewing the annual wage readjustment for

the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970)

in favor of the low income sector of the population

(the lowest income groups received a 40-percent in-

crease). The utilization of unused industrial ca.

pacity, combined with strict enforcement of price

controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and re

fusal to devalue the Chilean escudo in relation lo

the dollar, were expected to contain possible inlla.

tionary pressures which might result. (The Allende

government also had a cushion of nearly $400

million in foreign reserves left lo it by the Frei

government as a result of high international prices

for copper, Chile's principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist element-

46

---

## Page 65

14-00000

DEALE

BWE0202

accentualion of the class struggle. At the sarne time

that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the

lower-class Chileans, there was also 1o be an elfort

to increase their class consciousness (concienti.

zación) through gorcinment publications and" lhe

use: of the media 1o remove the elemenes of "false

consciousness" instilled by "bourpeois" propaganda.

Expressing the diametric opposit of a claim often

voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende

eaid in a press conference just after his installation,

"I am nol president of all Chileans." And in his first

"Slute of the Nation" message lo the Congress he

asserted:

•'.. the People's Government (Gobierno Popular) is

inspired in ils policy dy a premise that le artificially

denied by some-the cristence of classes and social

secrors with antagonistic and opposing intereses.'

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an addi:

tional source of revenue for the government from

the "exploitative" profits of the industries that were

to be nationalized by the new government. The par.

tially American-owned copper mines were lo be

laken over by a constitutional amendment-toth lo

lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of

the Frei Chileanization agreements of 1967 and

1969, and because a general consensus, in Chile

lavored nationalization. Other companies were 1o

be rationalized after a controlling interest was gained

through the purchase of shares on the open market

by the government development agency. The latter

course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price

of shares had been depressed since the elections,

and further economic pressures could be crested

by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise

in prices. The legal adviser to the zovernment,

Eduardo Novoa, also outlined other "legal loopholes"

in existing Chilean las which could be used for

"pemporary" takeovers

of companies,

including

"intervention" because of labor disputes and "requi-

sition" because of a "breakdown in supply of an

article of prime necessity.".

• Salvador Allennie,

"The Chilan Way to Socialism," In Paul E.

sigmuns, La, The Ideologies cl tno Gerelosing Nalions, 2nd rev. ed..

Arora York, Praezer, 1972, 0. 450.

afra!'8 Chileanization program had involved ine purchase by ino

Chinan slate of a controllina interest in the large copser mines

oured by the rennecoll and Anaconds cornpanies. The afreemenis

nas diso provided that Chreia paymenis lo ine American companies

mere to de invesied in ine expansion of copper producian ana

rer.ning in Chile, earning ine country adational revenue in ine

19108 la pay back ino loans contracied lo linanco ina purchases.

The takeover of large sectors of Chile's busic

industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity

pregiom, was thus seen as an essential part of an

economic and political strategy aimed at achieving

and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid

accoleration of agrarian reform (again using existing

ligiolation -the 1967 agrarian reform law-but ex.

ploiting,

provisions such

aS

one

authorizing

the

expropriation of "abandoned or badly-farmed land,"

with one percent payment in cash and the rest in

bonds), the planned sakeover meant that even if

the etfort to create a unicameral left-dominated

legislature falled, the

Allende government could

destroy the economic base of tho "capitalist" oppo

Dition through a series of "'irreversible" laits accom.

plis (hechos

consumadoss which would give the

CE TOONA

LA PESEiSYA

A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south

of Santlago which was seized from its owners on the

pretext that it was

"operated unproductively" (mal

explotada).

Thato by Magal Conteros

47

---

## Page 66

4-00000

Allendle in Retrospert

government control of.the economy and.ofthese...

profits shat the private sector had used for luxury

consumption or haid sent out of the country as prote

remittances lo. forcign companies. At the same torris.

the lact that the policy remained within the letter,

it not the spirit, of: the law meant that intervention

by the military was unlikely.

Allende's constitutionalist and legalist straicey

was not universally accepted within his coalition.

Most of his own Socialist Party-beginnine with il:

newly

elected General

secretary,

senator Cario,

Altamirana-und several other groups further 10 thre

lefe, such as the MIR (Movimiento de la liquiards

Revolucionaria - Movement

of the Revolutionary

Left) and the VOP (Vanquardia Organizada

Puebla Orginized Vanguard of the People), 895s;

openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elec.

tions and "bourgeois legality" to achieve poser ano

advised preparation for an armed confrontation with

the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as iradi.

table. Allende's effort to portray the transition la

soclalism as peaccful in character was not assisies

by the publication of his conversations with French

revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in carly 1971.

112E

la 10re, Debray declared that "in the last analysis

äis until further nolice, political poiver corner out

of lie trid of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated

frisi to differences with apostles of violence live Ché

Gussara mere only "factical," because the Chilean

austion required that he observe legality "for the

tirrs; trsinig." Allende himself organized an armed

sose orial bodypuard, the so-called GAP (Grupo de

brripo, Personales), and-we now know-is carly

is, Encember 1971 reccived reports on the illegal

irrigarlation and distribution of arms to the Mif and

10 tis bergyzuards.

Wils: there were thus intermittent hints of revo

lutianary alternatives, Allende's basic economic

siresay nas "socialist consumerism,"• combined

with a rapid expansion of state control in industry,

toor ans agriculture, and his basic political sirategy

8309 PEdis Debedy, Tha Chllcan Revolution: Conversations will

AlMera, too tira, Random, 1911, DO,32, 17, 91, and 97. El MerCurt

deares on see predicterilial palace.

elf pile sinoj" Piobiams Ol Communism (Washingion, CC).

: 31

A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the lirst anniversary ol the Allende presidency-in the

toreground, a piclure of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

-phors by Claus Mayes for Black Dras.

48

---

## Page 67

14-00000

2822072

was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende I when the reginic's pepularity was at ils highest

coalition by an appeal to the material interests and

poirl,' but in reirospect it does not appear at all

the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was

certain that lie sould have won-particularly since

the interaction of the various elements of this politi.

by the time thirt the constitutional prerequisites for

cal and economic stralegy that finally produced the

such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and

breakdown of Chilean

constitutionalism

and the

political situation would have been much less favor.

intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left

of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.

Thie period after the municipal elections now ap

pears to have been crucial for tre long term survival

of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the

Instil Success

Christian Democrais. had elected a compromise

leadership which was not committed to either of the

Al the outset, the new

economic policy was

party's wings, and the short run economic and politi.

astoundingly successful, although it had

cal indicators were faverable. Yet, instead of taking

the secus of future disaster. Income redistribution

action on the economic front lo stem the loss of

stimulated demand, while price controls and an arti.

foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pres-

ficially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a

sures-and on the political front lo prevent the

consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971

movement of lhe Christian Democrats into an alli-

the Sociedad de Fomente Fabril (Asscciation for the

ance with the right-wing opposition parties-the

Manufacturing),

regime continued its previous policies, confidently

Chilean business and industry, admitted that produc-

assuming that in the long run "the people" would

tion had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure

support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois"

of 12 months before, and by. May that figure had

economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the ex.

reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Eccnomics

"pansion of. demand, and the sharp decline in invest.

of the University of Chile later reported (hat unem.

ment would produce disastrous consequences in the

ployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3

following year.

percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June

1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8

percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price

Political Polarization

Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970

and had only increased by 6 percent by the time

ol the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest

rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and

wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.

This wave of economic prosperity-combined

with the absence of the political repression that

some rightists had predicted would result from a

victory by the Marxists-led many, particularly in

low Income groups, to vote for the candidates of the

Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elec-

lions. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its elec.

toral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by

nearly 100 percent la jump from 12 percent to 22

percent of the total), and the candidates of all the

parties supporting Allende received about 50 per-

cent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent

which the President himself had received only seven

months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were,

the caulition was still a few votes short of the abso-

The hardening of the Christian Democratic posi-

tion began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June

by the assassination of the former Christian Demo-

cratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by

extremists, al least one of whom had been released

trom prison by Allende upon his accession to power.

A month later in a by-election in Valparalso, the

victorious Christian Democratic candidate received

the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the

Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight

deputies and a number of other party leaders to form

the pro-Allende liquierda Cristiana (Christian Left).

This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the

other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of

the seven Radical senators (including two former

presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies

left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the Partido

de la Izquierda Radical (Party of the Radical Left-

PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a

luse majorily that Allende required to win a plebi.

I scite on a constitutional amendment. He was later

! crificiaud fur not calling the plebiscite at the time

I See, 8.8., Paul M. SateTy, Chile: 1h0 Questlon of Pomer,"

Moninly Rovion (New York, london) Driemoor 1973, Dp. 118.

49

---

## Page 68

4-00000

Allenile in Retrospect

PR policy resolution which the dissidents described

as "completely removed from the characteristic and

distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to

"Itie interest of the middle social strata" whom the

party had always represented. For a time, the PIR

continued to support the Allende government, but

within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposi-

tion.

In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voled

In favor of the constitutional amendment national.

izing the copper mines, but from that point forward.

the cattern was öne of polarization of Chilean politics

and sociely into two opposing blocks. The Allende

forces controlled the erecutive and pursued an in-

creasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who

were not entirely sympathetic to the government.

The opposition controlled the legislature, and in

October 1971. the Christian Democrats and the

rightist parties attempted to assert legislative con-

trol over the expansion of the public sector by voting

in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the

use of the intervention and requisition procedures

and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises:

to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in

accordance with specific legislation adopted by the

Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an

amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," be- 1

came the focus of a continuing deadlock between

the President and Congress that lasted • until

Allende's overthrow in September 1973.

Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to

call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the

Congress appeared to the congressional opposition

to be a decisive indication of his determination to

bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular

Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of

the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats

began to cooperate with the rightist parties in. op-

posing the executive. One method was to impeach

ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforce-

ment of the law. The first of many such impeach.

ments took place in January 1972. Another method

was to present a united electoral front against the

government. Informal

cooperation between the

rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to

striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972,

and a month later these groups formed the Demo

cratic Confederation (Contederación Democrática

CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congres.

sional elections. A third area of cooperation was in

• El Mercurio, AuR. 8, 1971, D.37.

marches and cernonstrations against the government,

the most tarous of which was the March of Emply

Pois in

December 1971, in which thousands of

housewives.

mostly of middle-class background,

marched, barring, pots to protest lood shortages.

Those shortages had developed because tie pre-

dicted eccromic difficulties resulting

from

the

Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971: The

balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at

such an alarming rate lin 1971 there was a deficit

of $315 million, while in 1970 there had been a

surplus of 231 million) that in November 1971 ine

Allende government called a moratorium on payment

of its foreign orbls. Chile had already experienced

difficulties in securing loans from the inter-arrierican

Developmert Bank, the World Bank and the Export-

import Bari, as a result of its failure to compensale

the Anacores 'and Kennecott copper companies

for the nationalization of their major mines. The

debt moraiorium was bound to make it consicerably

more difficuit for Chile to secure foreian crediis,

particularly for the short term.' In December 1971,

the Chilean Earernment linally permitted a cartial

devaluation si the Chilean escudo so as to decrease

the distortions created by its overvaluation, but tris

created pressure on prices of goods manufaciured

with importedcomponents. Shortages of certain ford

items-esperaily cooking oil, detergents, sugar,

toothpaste, ard cigarettes-were ascribed by the

government to upper-class hoarding and to increased

consumption by low income groups; however, the

distocatioris in the countryside associated with the

very rapid excansion of the agrarian reform (Allende

took over almost as much land in his first year in

office as Frei rad in six years) clearly had something

to do with the problem as well, and the situation

could be.expected to get worse with the harrest in

early 1972. A 100 cercent increase in the money

supply as a result of the government's deficit spend.

ing was also beginning to produce inflationary pres-

sures now that the unused capacity of Chilean indus

try had been taven up by the 1971 expansion. Prest

important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said

it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition

economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent)

meant that the spectacular growth rate achie.ed in

1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972

Yet the degice of the incipient crisis was not

"On the inaccuray ol the term "invisicio Elockado" to descron

the Allendo ge enment's credit prociams, sie paul E Sistics

"Ine Invisible Bucease' and ine Oreriniero Of Allergo," More 69

AMairs (New YOrk), january 1978, DD.322-10

50

.. I

---

## Page 69

14-00000

SETTEREI IU FINATEM

lidently replice mad "with a gradual heightening of

the political conciousness of tha proletariat, there

scener 10 be no obitucles in the internal logic of

the Chilian hourgueis state to prevens the workers'

winning sulficient strongth to sain control of the

legislature as well as thie executive." 1

On the political fient, there were individuals and

19S BA8MMN

groups on both sidos nho attemptad to stem the

movemunt loward polarization, which they coriccily

foresaw would leaid to the breakdown of Chilean

institutiono. Too important elforts do arrive at a com.

promise on the issue of the constitutional amend-

ment on the "Three dreas of Proporty". were made in

the furst part of 1972. in Aprilthe Lelt Radicals, who

had entered the Allende government in January,

carried on lenathy negotiations with the Christian

Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement

on this issue, only in have it rejieted by the top

command of the Popular Unity cosition parties. The

Leli Radicais responded by leaving the government

and joining the opposition, a move Allende described

as "'a clab In the back."'' A second set of negotia.

dions in June between the head di the Christian

Workers occupying a plant outside of Saniiigi? pro-

Democralic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice

claim their intention lo hold il l0 the desin.

The

brokr ilown when the time limit set by the Christian

initials of the Unidad Papular (Popular Unity! are

Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused

painted on the wall by the gate.

to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations seem to nave co!-

-Phoso by Maggi Corialtas.

lapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of

Immediately evident from the figures for 1971. In-

the Popular Unity coalition was univilling to accept

dustrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian

a compromise which would sloir down or stop the

production (based on plantings before

Alience's

forward movement of the government nationalization

accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent,

progran, while in June the righ: wing of the

and unemployment had dreoped to record loris. The

Christian De.nocrats could poini iu an impending

Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity

by-election ir, mid-July as a ressen for discontinuing

"conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong

discussions. Both cases illustrated a general prob

inflationary pressures could make

our silvation

dem posed by the Chilean muitiparty system. Orce

acute," but the government took ilo action to deal

political conflict became polarized, the extremes

with the problem. The continuing optimism di goi

held the rest of the opposing coaltiens hestage and

ernment policymakers.at this time was expressed

prevenied what could have been a convergence of

ai a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the Uni.

viers in the center.

versity of Sussex. and the Chilean Planning Ofice in

The negotiations were interspersed with a series

March 1972. In the course of discussion Racemiro

of demonstrations

and counterdemonstrations by

Tomic, the deteated Christian Democratic presiden-

the government and the opposition which

always

tial candidate, asserted thai the Allende governnient

stopped just short of open violence. Several ob

had committed a "fatal political error" in failing lo

servers, including the American Ambassador 10

establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress

through a "far-reaching agreement between soria isis

1J. Ann Zammil and Gabrial PalMA ÉIS IV CH.e31 RIDO PO

inspired by Christianity and those inspiras by

Siria:sm, Auston, Univeisity d1 Teras Press, 18:3, Do. 33, 247.

Marxism-that is, between the Christian Democrais

The Communis! Party renurt acoeas in di verazrio (international

and Popuiar Unity— in the period following the 1970

Ел:юлі !п. 31 FeD. 6, 1973.р. 8.

l: PaiRaS laQUerda RuJiDI, TedyAZOra POrNia dei PIR (Polítical

presidential election." Altende's representatives 607, Pain ol (no PIR), 5911a20, 19%2, D. 72

51

---

## Page 70

14-00000

Allende in Krerospere

ібле.

Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the palien of liracal arena: Several auditional ministers mere

"brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibilee." Social

iringther, including the Minister ol Inferior, Who

and political lensions increased-but üs long is

as, charged with abetting the illegal importation

economic deterioration was liot reflected in cunavray

of stens from Cuba in March. (The Allende govern.

inflation, the Chilean political system scorned able

misfit claimed that suspect shipmerite from Cuba-

to contain them.

"Hulies Cubanos"- were "works of art." but after

Ins September 1973 coup, the greenment White

The Turning Point

teeir published in inventory of auer 2.000 pounds

di etiris sent tron Cuba in 13 crates, which customs

The strains in the system only became unman.

ageable in mid. 1972, when the lid bless off the

fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures

that had been building up for at least a year. As the

deficit in government spending. rose, particularly

because of its subsidies to the

"social area," its

foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the

growth of industrial output slowed doun.. Allende

replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic wilh Carlos

Matus and appointed Orlando Millas a Finance:

Minister. The Malus-Millas leam sought 10 "lind

stability at another level," ordering a drastic cur.

rency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized

sector, and permitting limited agricultural firice in.

arcases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of.

living Index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the

end of June to 99.8 percent al the end of September.

A wage readjustment to compensate for the ircrease

In the cost of living only accelerated the inflation.

so that by the end of the year the official consumer

price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1)

In September, industrial output began lo drop in

absolute terms (i.e., not merely in terms of the rate

ul increase)-a drop that continued every month

therealter until the September 1973 coup." Agri-

cultural production (excluding livestock) also com.

menced

lo decline, and mineral production regis-

tered precipitous drops, although copper production

rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that

a number of new mines came into operation. 1On

other elements of the worsening economic situation,

see Table 2)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the

18 A socret cable Irom US Ambassador Nathaniel Daris to the

Berie Depärlment, Dublished in sace Anderson's column in tre

mosringiun Post (Washingion, DC) on Marin 28, 1972, commeried

Duat "pho Chlieans nave a great ability to rusa to ine brina, embraco

ench othor, and back on." On the same point see Mauricio soldin

and Fernando Cepeds.

Allende's Chrie: On 899 Pollis o

Brinamanshio, Bubila, Universidad de los Andes, 1992.

1l The Aliense Borernment blamou ine drop in producion on the

October 1972 airine, dut thie ignored ina lace inas production declines

Defan before October.

Table 1:

Monthly Flucluations in Conzumer Prices

and Industrial Output under Allenda

Month

1973

1971

1972

1373

OCE

Consumer Price Index Industrial Output •

35.6

35.3

34.9

28.1

22.8

20.1

20.2

21.0

21.1

19.1

.17.4

15.6

16.5

18.8

22.1

24.8

32.0

34:0

38.1

10.0

40.1

45.9

77.2

114.3

142.9

149.9

163.4

180.3

174.1

183.3

195.5

233.5

283.4

323.2

303.6

286.0

528.4

528.9

- 8.0

4.3

-0.3.

-4.5

-7.3

6.3

1.6

13.5

10.7

6.7

10.7

25.5

22.6

22.1

19.5

18.5

11.9

10.2

12.6

11.4

2.5

5.0

3.6

-7.8

_7.7

- В.1

-11.1

- 6.8

-4.7

-2.8

- 11.3

- 11.0

-14.8

- 10.7

-11.9

- 22:9

18.0

5.1.

• Percentate of change trom lna tame monin of the prendous year.

SOURCE: InsPiRUdO NACITal de Estadisticos (Natonal Institure ol

$881.18.091, Sarriago: Scrip's de fomanto MaDell. (Association for un

deredgrent of Manulatiurinal, Santiaso.

52

---

## Page 71

14-00000

farareitea. d:

7UEIKE

Tablo 2:

Gross doniistie product (% chango)

Intestmneill (9 change)

fral mides and salories (% chanje)

Expoils (§ miliion)

emports (s mullion)

SOURGE: Mivisment of Economics, Unluergity of Chile.

BIÜITAY

R349444952704

S32

Some Inaices of the Chilean Econony, 1970.72

1970

3.7

10

13.0

1129

1020

1971

8.3

-24.2

30.0

1045

1128

1972

-9.0

• 853

1287

hnd been lorbidden lo inspect.") Tha juuiciary

joineid in the conflict, prolesting the failure of the

Ministry of Justice lo carry our court orders, wndie

progovernment demonsirators denounced dre viejos

de miirdia-- "Yilthy old men'-in the

Court. As it became apparent that there was no real

possibility. or resolving their difterences, the two

sides lurned lo the armed torces as impartial arbi-

ters, arid she national holidays in mid-Saptember

1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Cirgress

and the Fresident to ingratiate phemselves wih the

The political involvement of the milirary was

accelerated by the next step in the Chilean trag. dy-

the October 1972 strite, Respectivoly termies the

"employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by

pro- and anti-Allendo forces, il began fa: from

Santiago, in the remore southern.province of disen,

with a strike by small truchers. (Referred 1o by she

sovernment press as the "fruck-owners." the meri.

bership of the truckers' fremia guild-was aimiest

entirely composed of owners of one or mwo rruchs

who leared an announced plan to establisa a staie

trucking agency which would have had finrity

access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike

quickly spread across the nation, as the truchers

vere joined by bus ond sari drivers, shapkccçeis.

doctors, nurses, dentisis, airline pilots, enginears

and part of the peasantry. The Christian Demnaerais

and the rightist parties supported the strihers, and

the work stoppage dragred on for over 3 minin

resulting in an estimated loss of $150.200 miition

ln production. Agriculture mas particularly naus hie

because the strike, took plase in the midst si the

planting sesson; indeed, there is no doubt that p3:t.

though not all, of the 25. percent drop in the 1973

harvest was the consequence of the strike. Inausiry

as adversely atfected, since workers at.

rerngilar lo keco factories going despite manage.

insinil'; elforts to cease production-and the Oclober

slribes sow the emergency of "Industrial Belts"

(Cordones) and "Communal Commands," which

suemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular

pürsie" shat leftist ihcorists hud spoken of as lhe

barie ol a genuine revolutionary class consciousness

1o rriplace the materialistic "economism" that had

characterized Chilcan workers until this timc."

When the workers seized close lactories, the plants

vurre: usually "interyened" by the sovernment, so

phat an important resule of the October strike was a

consieterable expansion of the government-controlled

sector of industry and trade.

The moit important outcome of the strike, how.

ever, was the direee involvement of the military in

the Alleinde cabinet. A condition of the settlement

of the strike was that the military take over key cabi.

net posts. This resulted most notably in the assign.

ment of the Ministry of the interior to the Com.

mander-in-Chiet of the Army, General Carlcs Prats,

so ins 10 assure that she congressional elections

schrduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely

The involvement of the military and the prepara.

sions for the March elections brought about a lull

in the escalation of political conflict in Chite. Inevi.

"ª Soirelaris General del GODlerno, LiDro BiasCO (ATiro RAsa!

Запрід, 19:1, кр.103-08.

lo Tho cordones mera more oe less anunianedusiy ordanirod

commillens ul morkers liom seizeu laiisries nnien coordinstod

pradurlin and dissributiun in a firen industrial aica. Tho Communal

Commaris (Comanues Comunaies) mero drdanireU Di lno Corouses

la mobilira lne local populaion In lhe surrounlina area. They

inciutest representalives ol neiinturtadl committees fiuntas de

reiinoll, matrers' groups (centros de mairest, peica control ans

diseriouran commollces (iuntas do asdsidl niento y precos), an

olner g'puas. On tre persistence of worker "drunomism." seo jamos

Perras, "Crile: Naronaluzation, Socoeconmié ênanão ano Popular

Palacipalon," Seuu.os on Coniparaiino In'oinelonal Derolomose

(Beutrly M1l8, CAll), Scrina 1913, 00.2451, dis ausilabio in

jarnos Palras, EU, Lalin America: fram desenuenco do Renolurion.

Nem York, W.ley, 1913, CMAs. 2.

53

---

## Page 72

14-00000

Allende in Retrospere

110 DAA1

Mi2.RG2

NORE LEASIG

Symptomatic of leftist allacks on Chilean institutions, a Sarago wall poster denounces the country's

"Supreme Cou: as "Prolectars of Fascist Sedition."

-Photo by Juan do Doin for The Moro Youk Times

tably, however, it also produced political divisions

I of the crass of government-appointed Supply and

within the military itself, which had hitherio been

Distriters. Committees (JAMs) to deal with lhe

relatively alect from the process. of polarization. it

Diack roame problem led the opposition to charge

was soon apparent, for instance, that General Frais

politica manpulation of lood distribution; nonethe-

was willing lo give the parernment the berefit of

less, tre earsenment seemed poverless lo condar

the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions

biack-freter eperations.

or actions sere challenged. Conversely, the Navy

was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January

Admiral Ismael Huerto resigned from the cabinet

The Matra 1973 Elections

over plans for the initiation of nhat he took to bo

a food rationing system. It is now also known that

the first plans for a possibie coup were made by

intermediate level officers at the end of 1972.'

Food distribution became a critical issue as the

black market continued lo expand, with much of

Chile's agricultural production going into illegal

channels because of the fovernment's refusal to

increase the official prices paid for agricultural pro-

duce. The result was, in effect, two separate price

systems-a subsidized, staie owned distribution

system oriented primarily lorard the low income

groups and i flourishing black market aimed at

middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion

10 1n0 Ner York Punts (Mer York), 5801. 27, 1973.

The core essional elections in March did not re

solve anyrit. Chile's right wire, parties had hoped

thai loce siriages and econornic difficulties would

produce e arratairas majority against the govern.

ment, arus. mignt in turn permit the impeachment

of the risergeni, but the results, while showing

an aniled timent majority of 56 percent, gave

the Allenét regime 44 percent-a larger dote than

most casadas

had predicied.

The

opposition

pointed di iner the vore of the pro-government

forces nue seclines from the 50 percent they had

regisiere in: ase 1971 municipal elections, while

she goverren: compared its 44 percent with the

35 percere tra: Allende had received in 1970. In

fact, tre cry proper basis for comparison was the l

re

in:

In

Cli

80

Unis

1000

54

---

## Page 73

14-00000

• y.

Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower dong a security wall built around their Santi.

aço neighborhood: a Socialise slogun on the cutside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."

-Photo by Sondi Visalli lor Photoroportera

11969 congressional elections. On that disis, the ! have stemmed the erosion of support, at least amora

refist purties had suffered a slight loss in voies but

¡the masses of the poor.

i had achieved a slight gain in seats. Cortain paposi-

Unfortunately for the government's longer-range

"Ponists later argued that the Left would have suf.

interests,

the

de:liberate

accentuation

of

class

Pired much greater losses had it not been for a

consciousness had an opposite effect on the midale

arrenment assisted electoral traud involving some

class, driving middie-class areas to organize them-

200.000.300,000 votes. but the statistics presented

solves into "Neightorhood Commitices" do delong

,." support of she argument are unconvincing."

themselves. It also, for the first tine, led many to

While the government's interpretation of ine elec.

arm themselves ler a possible confrontation, which

irens as procl that it was expanding lis poputar sup.

scemed more likely ron that the salety valve of an

son mis not accurate, the election results indicated

impending election sas no longer present. A god.

mal al least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as

ernment proposal to limit full wage readjustments

irrinus sorernments faced with similar esonomic

to those making less than three times the minimum

•creeses Despite a wage readjustient in diaber,

wage did nothing la reassure the hostile midale.

Pid migas has declined 7 percent in 1972. and rag.

income groups.

•¿ inflation continued to consume the sage increase

Before the elections, it had been rumored that

a carly 1973. However, the combination of dis.

there might be another attempt in March at an

.erminu10rydistribution of government-araduced

accominedation beliten the regime and the opposi.

pass snu dopeals to class consciousness seemed 1o

tion ferces, possibly under the auspices of the

military. Any possible accord of this tipe was quickly

"sane at sno investigaina Commitled el la 63:95 a

0.5o 1 10 180

Suale, redlured in ino Libra Bians, Ra. 30:39

a nam wiere in 1973 omit ino 21-10.34, ease Bizua

•and Iran 100 yOuRE 10 vola in 1910. 1989 cNi590

col analy the number of "'audulent" rolers esi mliou in the

prevented by the publication, luo days after the

elections, of a goiernment decree calling for the

initiation in June of a single rational unified school

system, which would follow a common curriculum

including compulsory courses in socialism and work

55

---

## Page 74

Allende in Ketrospere

criods in terrelies. The ensuing uproar involved and is tender the desiribulien of leads in the

he Cathere Corch for the first timo in formal renal formin" arctor lo the erasantry iller a transitiona

sition to ire; goernment and mobilized thou ands

paries ed trio years: (The goverarnert diad once again

of secondsip school students in violent demeritra.

usrid i locphole in dro 1967 lase lo pertpore in.

lions in die cirin Santiago. Stories of lierer: argu.

definily the distination of expropriated land by

ments over die school propo:als among lii: top

indiscigel title.)

military otties?, the military had left she cabinet

In Big the official price inder jungrid 20 percent,

aller the electione) filtered into the national press,

indiestra that the indiation was mcira into a new

and a millis, delegation beli a formal morting

hypose lationary stage. The one clierl that the gov.

with the Ensition Ministry to express their orposi

errari hail mado ta hold the line-ito relusal 10

tion. The contecuersy subsided only when the sov.

9ränl is luil costor living wane increase 10 the El

conment anstunged that the proposal had been

Tonierie copper minars on the ground: that under

postponed. cog.rz, further discussion.

their contract they had already recroes partial cost.

Within te advernment, the debate continues on

of-liane increases--led 10 a brodise, tro-und a-half

whether to "consolidate in order lo advance" (lha

ronin airine, which included is miserd march on

communisi grition) or to "advance without com.

Santices, mass railies. and siruitaricous one-day

promise" (tre Socialist stance). One indication of

gerisie: strikes for and agairiet the sovernment in

how the decile was resolved was the decision by

mid-Jurie, By that fine, Alleride sas once more

the governmant is use a conctitutionally-authorized

ready is reser to milliary involverrent In the cabinet

"decree of insistence" allowins: the cabinet lo over.

to resurre social panice.

ride the rulira, o! the Controller General of Chile,

Heclor Hurrass, who had disaliowed the requisi.

sioning of serre, of the luctories laken over during

1.e Stage-Decline and Fall

the Octote: 1912 strike. Conflicts also continued

with the judrary over the executive's refusal 1o

obey court raders to return seized properties. On

May 26, tre Sacierre Court sent a public leiter lo

the President denouncing

the illsaal attitude of the administration.

(Ils) open art continual rebellion against judicial

orders... unich signities a crisis of the rule of lam

(and) the imminers breakdown of the juridical struc-

lure of the courtry."

The stalerate between the executive and the

Congress ouse tre constitutional amendment on the

"Three Aress of Property" was compounded vihen

the Constituticial Tribunal refused to take jurisdic-

tion over the disquied question of whether, in the

absence of a geoiscite, the Congress could override

the Presiderit's item vetoes by a majority or by a

two-thirds wete: A second constitutional conflict

along the sarre lines developed when the opposition

majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment

10 give farmis under 40 hectares. (about 100 acres)

In size an absolute guarantee against expropriation

10 The term "ilen atta" relecis the tact inst ino Chilean president,

unlimo nis US cecilescon, con vero or eren remarito individual settions

On Sure 29, the list act of the Chilean tragedy

began with an abertive revolt by the Second Armored

Frazires in Santiago, Apparentiy, eriveral army

units died been in contact with Patrio y Libertad, a

righi-ace, political riganization, and hird planned to

seize Fresident Allonde at his residence and lo

occupy ere presidential palace. The revolt was

carcelet ene day betare it was to orcur, but when

one el ine clicers of tup Second Armored Regiment

was arrested and hold in the Delense, Ministry, lhe

Repiment decided to irse him and in the process lo

seize tria presidentiai palace as originally planned.

General Prats, lie diay Commander, uses the other

military nuts in Santago to put down the revolt in

a fer razurs- most of which were spent in negotia.

tion ratier inan showing-but noi before President

Allende dias gone en tha air to urge "the people" to

take cres all industries and enterprises as a response

to the warising of "a small group ol rebellious mili.

tary men." The Central Labor Federation also urged

the nairers to cocupy the factories, and in one day

the nurter of conipanies taken over by the sovern.

ment rese fiom 283 to 526. The "Industrial Belts"

that has sprung up 3! the sime of the October strike

now achieved new importance. The spread of "peo.

ple's pourer (pader pioular) had been seen by

Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup.

but it creaies many additional probiems for the l

---

## Page 75

14-00000

Workers in hardhats and bearing, pitchlorks march

in Santiago in suppore ol the, Allende administralion

during briet nationwive strikes by pro- and anti.

Marxist elemente in mid-June 1973.

-Vido World thoros

dovernment. Production declined sharply alter thie

eskeorers, the opposition 801 fresh duel for its claim

that the expansion of state control of industry. mas

raing carried out through extralegal channels, and

: "fanter popular"- as expressed in the worker occu.

saliansappeareddo sone exient to pose a possibie

inrcat of an alternative to the power of the contral

forcenment

Aller the June 29 revolt, Allende made new elforts.

la recure military involvement in the governinent,

oul his negotiations with the armed forces were

uisuccessiul." Instead, they embarked on a policy

il rigarous enforcement of the Arms Control La:, a

I Picssure which had been adopted in October 1972

Dus only sporadically enforced thereolter. This lisiv

authorized any, military or police commanders lo

esesy out arms scarches il there was "a presumption

al le clandestine existence of illegal firearms." :

• In righe wing Patria y Libertad organization had

les announced publicly that it was going under-

"Tono re as aline eccounto ul Inase regalialions appese in Ercilla

k0889.9,109 11-19, 191), 00.7-10.

"per to,

81. 1'28, 0.00.0 Oficial (5811:080), OC8. 28, 1972. By a

anno a coa teo una nou cuma la Allenced cest in the midal of stro

7..00.

and daco il neo lne duery busparl of tre armed

munirea do dien i1 despira ine opposition of the

8157-791447

##l: +4447-72879597

T: 00240950901

ground in in attengt lo nverthrow the governinent

by fores, isid military intelligence vus also aware

of tir: indistion of arms training by all the govern.

ment silice, even the centrise Radicals.". In lhe

course et their cruckerin, the military fobind arms

caches in lectorico in Suntlago and Concepción, and

the baries, el a worker in one such arms raid pro.

voled eresede from the lettise partles.

.Al troio goins, the Chilein Communist Party and

the Critelie Church hoth concluded inderendently

that tir: crile colution to the Impasse in Chile was

orie treis: illeingt at on agreement boturen the

Allende Ederriment parties and the Christian Demo.:

cristo. Tir: Coinmunios initiated a campaign against

civil vise diment simultancously with a statement by

the Chilean hierarchy calling for a rencual of dia.

logue. Psebsbly in response to these pressures on

both sidea, tao longthy discussions look place on

July 31 Palesion UP and PDC representatives. Both

Allense aris the Christian Democrats agreed on the

necusity ed enforccinent of the Arms Control Law.

but discretinent continued on the constitutional

reforni erede ellered to sign tie arnendment on

the "There breas of Property" in return for a con.

stitutions: arnendrunt specifying that the Congress

could only riderride presidential vetocs of constitu.

tional argomerils by a two-thirds vote. He also

proposer: sfr estisblishment of joint committees 1o

work out further agre-ements. However, the Christian

Democrats serounced these proposals as "dilatory"

and broke off the negotiations.

A feri dayo before the dialogue was Initiated, she

truckers krzen another strike, which was to last

from July 26 until the coup on September 11. As in

October, the, truckers were joined by the other

eremie:. Coming, at a time when the 12-month

inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget

deficits and subsidies to the nationalized industries

and agriculture, had renched 323 percent-and in

a situation where inventories had not yet been built

up from the October strike-the truckers' action

created ruch more serious problems for the govern-

ment than the carlier strike. This new crisis once

again raised the question of military participation

in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his

fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty

1o re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

18 Allenié'= Fersaras Ecorduded nal Organised courses In arma

traning al Ris nataian rause vulsila of Santidis. Ino AIAPU casen

arms-1ra.n.ng en DECEmbEr 1912, and Ine Ravicais dls so in Juiy 1573.

The dimes lerces nere andre of luis al least or lno ens cl duly.

Se doiuminis in deoro Bianco, pD. 47-45, 192.93, 196 200.

.

57

---

## Page 76

Allende in Berrospere

-dia

Trucks stand idle outside Valparalio, Chile on Sep-

lembor 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing trans.

portation strike.

-UPI.

On August 9 Allende swore in what he called a

"national security cabinet," with General Prais as

Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz

as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would

deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of

the Navy and of the National Police in olher cabinet

posts.

Almost colncident with the entrance. of the mil.

Itary Into the cabinet, the naval establishment be.

came involved in a serious conflict with the left wing

of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval

Intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot

to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in

Valparaiso and Concepción.

The

announcement

accused PS Secretary General carlos Altamirano,

MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques.

head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors"

of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the con.

gressional immunity of the first two, who sat respec-

tively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

Two days before the September coup, Altamirano

admitted that he had encouraged navymen do resist

their coup-minded (goipista) officers."

This altempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service

command from below was combined with maneuvers

• ao 18 voz an Inficairon ol ina continuina press tece-som in Chilo lial

crosslands in dornton Chile al inis lime contarea a lettmina

publication nesalinod, "'Sold ers, Disobey Your OMicors," and a

magarine of the extreme Righi milh ina nescines, "The Rigne. ol

Robalion," "'Rebelion and il8 Goais," ano "Resisiance lo Ino Tyrant."

by Allende to replace officers uncympatteric to him.

When General Ruiz resigned his Cabinet post on

August 17 in protest aguinct his lack of sufficient

power lo sittle the strind, Allende Corpilled him

10 add that his; departure from the cabinet "im.

plicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force

Commander.

This was correctly seen as an Allende

lactic to remove an officer opposed lo him, and il

met scrious resistance from within the Air Force,

provoking a series of actions which ultimately led

directly to the September 11 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide

whother to resist Allende's action. 'By erening. Ruiz

had persuaded them to accept it on the condition

that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer.

General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and

name another Air force general to the cabinet (so

that Allende could not repeai the same maneuver

with leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking

military officers, including those of six generals..

Eathered in front of General Prats' house lo present

a letter asking for his resignation. When the comon-

atration was broken up by police scar gas, it pro-

vokea such dissension in the armed forces that on

he following day General Prats decided to resign

both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He

was joined by two oiher generals who, with Prais,

had led the military forces that had quelled the

tank-regiment revolt in June.

The resignation of what appeared to be the last

defenders of Aliende in the army now meant that

all three services were opposed to the President. it

coincided with the adoption on the same day of a

"sense of the house" (acuerdo) resolution by the

Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and

the military ministers, drawing their atrention to

"the serious breakuown of the constitutional and

legal order."* The resolution criticized the Allende

government for repestedly bypassing the legislature

through the use of legal loopholes and for refusilig

to promulgate the constitutional reforms voed by

thr: Congress. Il accused Allende of ignoring judicial

orders, encouraging iliegal seizure of property, perse.

cuting opposition labor groups,

and supporting

illegal paramilitary organizations, In conclusion, it

stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious

breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of

the Republic"

and urged the military ministers to

"put an end to the de lacto situations listed abave

which violate the Constitution and the lain" or be

1 Libro Blanco, pp. 239-42.

58

---

## Page 77

4-00000

guilty of "compromising tin" nitional and protes-

sional character of the armed forces:"

In its original form, she resolution ha: declared

the Allende government lo be illegitirnai:, but the

acuerdo had later been softents in order to secure

the support of the Christion Democrats. Yut its effect

was still 80 give a congressional green. light to the

military, and Allende immediately so intorpreted it.

He replied to the motion by accusing. i: Congress

of "promoting a coup d'etit by askin! inc military

forces to

make goveinmental judgments inda.

pendently of the authority

and

direction of the

President"; he also pointed out that according 10

the Constitution the only way that the Congress.

could decide on the legality of the President's con.

duct of his office was through. imprichment by a

two-thirds vote."

The congressional vote was echoed by several

professional associations. The Medical Association

called on their "colleague" Allende 10 resign-a

request that was echor by the Fedriration of Pro-

fessionals (CUPROCH)--and resignation petitions

were circulated in Santiago. The Lawycrs' Association

Issued a declaration which-"without attributing a

malevolent intention" to the President-asserted an

"incompatibility between the institutional framework

within which he is supposed to exercise his office.

and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out

in his program." Arguing that Allende "would appear

to be incapacitated (impedido) in the exercise of his

functions as he understands them," the statement

suerested that he could be removed from office

under Article 43 of the Constitution, which author.

i¿ps the Congress to declare presidential incapacity."

The Coup

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup

was made is not yet certain, but it evidenily was

resched in the days following Prats' resignation.

The armed forces had contingency plans for the

control of vital points throughout the country in case

ol any emergency, and it only required a signal to

"Al Mercuria (International Edition) Aug. 20.26, 1973, D. 5. The

•no-nan 0l Inn Christian Democrale Paily luld ine New York Times

see nahar mo nor ine armed forcis lavar anyining but a

amera's: Boturin la Chile's palsical crisis" but emphasited. inal

us any doy to avoid a breakdown.of thi Constitution was ine

a do. a'mani nt miliaiy men in al least sia cabinel posts, as well as

"e untracerelary posilions and as pesos el the chiel govern.

Dea arancias Ino licw YOrk Times, Aug. 27, 1973, P.12.

=1, Mercuro (Iniernational EdisOn), Auz. 26-5ED8. 1, 1973, D.7.

pur livem into operation. merce the actual seizure of

control required littic preparation.

After the resignations of the third weck of August,

Allende restructured his cabirict without the top

military commanders but still retained representa

tives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over

the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as

tinister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos

Briones, who was known to te; interested in another

attempt at accommodation with the Christian Dema

crats. The president aiso canceled a projected trip

10 the Conference of Mon. Aligreg Nations in Algiers.

The government and the opposition again staged

rival demonstrations in conrection with the third

anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections.,

On the weekend before the coup, the Christian

Democräts called all provincial party leaders to a

meeting at which a proposal was adopted for the

simultaneous resignation of tre Congress and the

President and for new elections to resolve the con-

Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the

Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the i

President Palace on August 15, 1973, alter a

conference on the transport crisis.

59

---

## Page 78

14-00000

Allende in Retrospect

18, 6,

Salvador Allende hurries through the corrida's of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on

the morning of September 11, 1973, shorti) before tahing his own lite during the military coup d'éfat.

-Photo by Tha Now York Times

flict between the executive and legislative branches.

During the same weekend, Allende met with the

leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and railed for

the holding of a plebiscite on his conduer ei ofice.

Although this step was reportedly opposed by the

Socialists,

Briones subsequently

asserted

that

Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a

radio address at noon on the day of the coug."

Meantime, after a stormy session with Aliende on

September 7, the military commanders proceeded on

Sunday,

September 9, to draft the text ci the

pronunciamiento issued on September 11. They did

not secure the agieement öf the National Police

until early on the morning of the coup itseif, and

only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniaria had

taken over the position of police commanser."

On September 10, Navy

units set sail from

Valparaiso for previously scheduled maneuners, but

that evening they returned lo port and ty

early

morning of the 1lth had seized control of ira! cily.

Concepcion, the third-ranking city in Chile and a

known center of leftist activism, was taken over with.

out a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.

To justify their action, the military. commanders

broadcast a communiqué to the

nation. While ad.

mitting that the Allende government had initially

come to power by legal means, they announced that

it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating

fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the

class struggle," by refusing to implement the de

cisions of the Congress.

the judiciary

and the

Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in

agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in

the country, and by bringing about a state of in-

flation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and

external security of the country." The coup leaders

concluded:

These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical

doctrine ... to justity our inierention to depuse a

government which is illegitimate. immoral, and un

representative of the overwheiming sentiment of the

nation."

« information 1rom ine author's personal interviers a ma Patricio

Ayrain, Jan, 11, 1974, and Carlos Brianes, Jan. 18, 19:8.

10 Accounes o1 pre-cour military dilinies dadear in is Crisian

Science Monitor (Boston), Sept. 17, 19:3: 1ne Wail Sirent uri

(New York), Sep1. 25, 1973. Le More (Parist, AN. 19, 19711 and

Robert MOss,

"Chile's Coup and After," Encounter (Lonest, baren

1974, рд. 12-80.

At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one

but the GAP, his personal badyguard, was ready to

defend him, Alleride broadcast his last message to

5ª LIDO Bianco, DA. 248-49.

60

---

## Page 79

4-00000

the Chilean people over the single pi.. Allende radio l admunistration do justily

i course stults as a pre-

station that had not yet been shut down by she

requisite "the support of the majority of ine prople."

military. He began:

Allende acted as it he had that support; but even

at the highest point of his popularity in the April

This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak

1971 clections, he never achieved it. Morcover, his

80 you... .. My words are not spoken in bitterness.

policy of deliberate class pularization, aimed at ex-

but disappointment. In the lace of these events !

panding his clectoral base, was more successlul in

can only say lo the workers,

"I arn not going 10

pitting professional and middle-class groups against

resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my

him than in widening his surport among workers,

life for the loyalty of the people.

peasants and low income groups.

2) Marxist economists and policymakers have

Slaming "foreign capital, Imperialism, and reaction"

for persuading the armed forces to break with their

tradition, he said:

always placed primary emphasis on investmem and

the expansion of the productive capacity of the

economy. By contrast,

the Allende policymakers

emphasized increases In consumption and cornbined

History will judge them.... My voice will no longer.

come lo you, but it does not malter. You will con.

tinue lo hear il; it will always be among you. Al the

least, you will remember me as an honorable man

who was loyal to the revolution."

this with a headlong rush to take over industry and

agriculture-a course far removed from the

"ENO

steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The conse.

quences of these policies alter their deceptive initial

success were massive government deficits, runaviay

inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy.

Al 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those

who wished. lo do so to leave the building, and—

except for his personal secretary-all the women,

Including Allende's pregnant. daughter, left. The

military also offered the President and his family

safe conduct out of the country if he would sur.

render. Allende rejected the offer. The Air. Force

then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which re

peatedly hit the palace, with rockets and set fire to

large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m.,

Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and

the members who had been with him left the build.

ing in single file, led by the secretary carrying a

white flag. Allende stayed behlnd and, sitting on

a sola in a reception room on the second floor, put

Iwo bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he

used was a gift from Fidel Castro."

(The argument that Allende's economic probiems

were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does

nor really hold water, since they were caused by

policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and

since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to

secure enough foreign credits from Latin American,

European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase

the Chilcan foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $3.4

billion in less than three years. Much of the new

indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin

American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the

USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only.from

million to $40 million between 1970

and

1973.")

C'onclusions

Since the coup, comments in the world

press

representing widely divergent political postures have

cored the Chilean case as

proof that the hope of

schieving Marxist socialism

through democratic

means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to

note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy,

mither of which was essentially related to the

attempt to establish democratic socialism:

(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from

l'Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his

do Transtated from lne transcript of Ind tape recording of the ssooch

published in Ricardo Boizard, El Ullimo Dia do AlienJo (INO Last

Day 01 Allende), Santiago, Eatenrial do Pacilico, 1973. DD. 53-55.

11 On Allendos suicido, see ena medical roport In El Mercurio

(International Edition), OC8. 29-NOV. A, 1973, PD. 1 and 7. Tho

eyewitness testimony of one o1 tha president's personal physicians,

ww.entered ine room immediately thereaner.ispublishiiinErcllia.

san. 28. 1974 DD. 10-13. Allendo's widow has assertou that

witnesses lold her shey nad seen bullet wounds in nis chest and

siemain. A supposeu account by a personal bodyauard circulatod

in Menico and elsenhere describing his murder contains numerous

lactusl errors and describes events which could nol haro laken

place orcause 01 lna physical design of ine building. On inis and

many oiner myths of Leil and Right concerning the overthrow of

Allende, seo Paul E.

Sigmund,

"Allende through the Myths."

Marlourer (New YOrk) April 1974 pD. 16-21.

• Secretaria, Comise Inte americano de la Alianza para al Progreso

(CIAP), El EsPuerto Interno y las Aeresidades do Finanicamienso

Enterna-para el Desserollo de Chilo (Domestic EMoris and Ina Needs

for Enternal Financing for the Development of Chile), Wasningion, DC,

1974, p.V.9.

61

---

## Page 80

14-00000

Allende in Retrospect

-ПОПИТЯ

Specile aspects of me Chalcan system also made

tha Allende experiment in particularly difficult one.

Me nos able lo come to power in the first place

because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the

democratic system and because she Marxist parries

were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and

the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many

instruments for state control of the economy which

had been developed by previous administrations

since the 1930's. However, he was required to

operate within an institutional system which included

frequent and staggered elections, proportional rep.

resentation, and a multiparly system which made

majority rule very diflicult.and often gave veto pow.

ers to the extremes of Right. and Left. The economy

had been characterized for nearly a century by a

chronic tendency to inflation, and successive govern.

ments had consistently ignored agriculture in the

interest of securing urban electoral support. The

most important systemic constraint of all, of course,

was the existence of a prolessionalized and insti.

rutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive lo

the ideological blandishments of the Lelt."

The immediate causes of the military intervention

are apparent from the preceding account. In the last

part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean

politics by both sides and became as polarized as

the rest of Chilean society-with the overwhelming

majority joining the opposition to Allende. The con-

flick over education in March-April 1973 height.

oned that polarization just at the time the military

were 'atiempting to extricate themselves from politi.

cal Involvement.

Then the expansion of arms

searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which

Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge

of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing

military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activ.

ity among enlisted men and presidential maneuver.

ing with promotions and retirements provided the

classis scenario for a coup d'état.

8ª The Socialisis ariars Deliovod phat lhey could convert ir

millary to their outdra. This is strikindly rerediou in Sucialiss Party

documenis publishes in Ino LiDio Bianco, DO. 12430.

Ore can also relare Alienads atreuities do the 1

inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory so which

No arpealed.. At the same line that he proclaimed

his laith in a democratic, pluralise and liberparian

transition, lo socialise, many of his Murxist. sup.

porters spoke and acred on the hasis of a beliel in

she inevitability of armed confrontation. With his

knowledge, they armed themselves ind--what was

worse-talked incessangly about revolution, The re.

beated statements el Régis Debray and others that

ine observance of the rules of "hourgcois" legality

was. only a lactic until the balance of forces had

improved was hardly likely to persuade douliers of

the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy,

When the imporiation and distribution of arms was

combined with efloris lo reorgania: education along

ideological lines, to sübvere military discipline, and

so rearrange the hierarchy of command, it is not

altogether surprising that the military finally look

action.

A positive evaluation of the. Allende years would

certainly credit him with a sincere effort to ralse

des living standards of low incomo groups and to

involve them actively in the determination of their

own future. It would likewise stress the continued

existence of trecdom of expression for all points of

view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative

assessment would ask whether

the low Income

sioups in Chile genuinely benefited from an eco.

nemic policy. which after the first hall of 1972 pio.

duced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agri.

cultural and industrial production, and a reduction

in she real value of wages and salaries. Even more

critically, one could inquire who has suftered the

most in economic and in human terms as a result of

the breakdown of the Chilean systent-the Marxist

politicians, many of whom were able to escape or

§o into exile, or the workers, peasants and sium.

dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now

paying the price of she Allende regime's mistakes

in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply

reduced consumption and the strictures of dracon.

ian military rule.

62

---

## Page 81

14-00000

17513

75277T

110.7

SOVIET MiNUSE, LOTTiER

15 auguet 1974

Aremin's Hand in Allanta's Chile

bY JAMES THEBERGE

Why did Salvador Allende's regglusionury gov.

Is lo socialism necessarily requires that sha

ernment end in a doodbard deigie sorice sup.

prolotarial bus converied into the loading class.

pors ind tha plaudiis al dna merlo; leli-wing

into cho determining social forea"

axererises, uno sam in Chile a seri push lor

Tho Communist strary, shared by Salvador

Socialism's morch :o power?...

Allando and line "moderaio" wing of the Socialise

James Treberge, who lo. Directes of 88.99 Larin

Party, voss in "parthrow" the bourgeois siams

Americon Depsrenions of the Geel9e80wn

and. conspiretir using, sho legal devico of ine

versisi Censor for Strategie ard Messenariorial

mobiscie. " an interview with. Regis Debray In

siudies, shows how floscow, tie" lig brostri".

1979 elenor cold: "As for the bourguois sra:0 al

shough eagor so exploie this spening in Latin

line presene manent, do are sciking to overcorno

Amarica do the full.

disgreed with allende's

il. To overberim ill (Regis Debrag, The Chilean

needlong mechuds, and whits werring him of she

Revolution, Conversations wiih Allende, Now

chaos deried him cnough

York, Pardon Houso, 1971 p.82).

financial aid.

In 1935, Moscow dispairred, assacio Ravines.

a brilliant Peruvian Communis: dr,ani96e, lo Chilo

so implement sho "united drone" arr"anti-lascist

popular trent°

strategy that ted seplacad. the

unra-loft straiggy ol the Cor ircers.

Since that

cimo sha Chilean Coinmunier gary aunerally has

followed a straregy of broad allistice and linised

sims,

aithough the Cuban seactation led 10 a

radicalisalion of perry 3:2:331.

The Chiloan Communise $119%, ane 01 it 0 most

loyal pro-sovine partias in Lain minbric, Dava

unqualitoo support po the Sadie. blos irvasion

of Caachoslovakia in 1903, dirio its forrunes

have shillod through the jeers is a sesult of

dorrestic and intornational dareica rares. it un.

stintingly supporied thorist. did luns of Sov:l1

turaign solicy and repeated : accris semes of

anti-imperialism and class vrariare.

The party, at least priar 1o dis military inser.

vertion of September, 1973, res ire best digan.

ised and strongest in lin freries. Estween

1956 and 1959 il formad an trizoy alliance for

olecioral piarposes

with the See alist Party,

its

moro militant Marxise rival ca Re Leir. Sut in

1969 tho Communists deciaid inal a much more

broadly besed ailiance of !sti-ming ipices lv3s

necessay lor the translo malice el she souniry

Into a socialise stio and iner sieger a toy rola

in the founding of the Posite! Laily Front la

coalition of six lottist partital oi dre end of that

year. Aila! the 1970 eleciseal diciary of tha

Popular Unity Fron: under Satreda: Flando the

Communisis bacamo era sing'a most induential

forco within she coalition, le tues è fai callor

organisod and disciplined fartegon: than ils

closest rival, the more iderlogica id unplable and

militant Socislist Parsy.

The ultimaie aim of tre parry did ror waver

shroughout pho Allando period. iro Commurisis

hoped to be ablo lo lako advariara d. the wosk:

ness of the democraiir institutiors to install a

"dicratorship of the proleisria:" under their

dircetion.

Their

Eduardo

Labarca.

made this cluar in los Calödlin 27

Moreo (Sardiaco, Guironizi Camels, is72), in

which he drelarod: "Fret: life:: doma capital-

Mass richilisarlon. inliteration of Chilean in.

stiulians ding tacrical alliances with tho efussi-

pion were to bes employad to generais sufficiere

popular ms5e118. Congress dos lo ta replaced by a

"pupula: issibertily" and tho existing legal sysiem

by

"populer

tribunals.

President Allende's

piedge 10 uphold sha

"Statuto of Guaranices"

luasigned to carimit lis government lo preservo

Chile's assascretic treedoing and institutions in

exchange ter Congressionil suppore das simply

a "tactical recessily" lo pain power, as he ex-

plained laise.

The Chilean Conmunists and their allies. In

Moscour viere uneasy about she idcoiogical im-

plications of tie via Chilena as advocaied by

Salador Aliena? (Debray, p.119). The Com.

munis: carly 1610000 10 endorse the via. Chilena

as a uniquely Chilean path to socialism, which

implica trat it nighe nos nocessarily assume sha

leading role alter complete power was pained by

she Popular Uncy coulition. The Chilcan party

spors106905011 doctire of the via pecidies.

which accented fire Eluctions and popular piural.

jan as a store-term rachel devico under Chilean

condition: to aired in the long run at installing

a Soviei-sirie Conmunise diciatorship. The via

"pacifis" as the slogan im.

plied: in erribraced all lorms ol class contlict and

viniones shere of armed insurruction and

war in ine arnauss of establishing the "dictator-

ship ol ino perletarias."

wisleading Image

The via Chilena proclaimed by Allende scon

miter his election vas midaly misundersicad in

she lest. The image that sas officially prepa-

galed was phat of a uniquely Chilean path lo a

nor 8ioa of lácrise humanis: socialisin, sitere

sario liberties, pronomic piuraliam

Pict

trea

elections were respected by ail. Was con iberals

rate lad l0 believe that the filende governmen:

was constiucing a new liestern-Euroscan iype

of democratie socialism in Chile.

This inage

Clashe: bite die reality of Salvador Allenda's

reputionary ambition lo use Chio's pluraisi

enmuciasy in discany it. Ma seemed to tavo

16a095d phe dia Chilena formula during ine 1158

p's: o' lis governmen:. Nus onis cid. no rarely

31

---

## Page 82

14-00000

employ it in luis speeches bus the importance of

liberty"

so conspicuously essent.

Tha governient's faler was very much

to

Moscor's liking: serturo ol US invosiments, 119

espuusil of the cactice el "iúbulenicsi plu-al.

dem" pralations wiin all

51011g

regirdioss

1doology and inionai soiled charucter), clager

rolations with the socialist camp, urd the foster.

Ing uf en

"anti-ingerialise fanti-Us) leont in

Latin America.

Under the Allened irgime, foreign policy was

reoriented, and the pierreusly close lies with tha

Unitod Stares mere realacod by strong political.

oconomic and scientiée dies with the

countrias." above ail initin Cubo onu the USSR.

Tho firse trip of iho foreign ilinistor, Clodomiro

Almaydo, outside or latin America vias lo lha

USSR and Easiern Fergao, in May-June, 1971.

Presidone Allendo visited Moscow In December,

1972. Strong idealegiodi and personal ties linked

sna Chiloan Communise party lenders with the

Sovler party loadership and Salvador Allende wiih

President Allenda's description of the USSA

"big broiter" (hermono mayor) was

no more figure of specch due refleclod ino oxyoce.

arion of hig guvernmeni that the USSR would bo-

cume sha most importune socialist ally of the

revolution and the main econo nic bulovark of tha

rogimo. Moscow did, in face. bicome the most

imporiant source of serialist camp scenomic aid

and credits lo the Pazular Unity governmens.

localling $620.0 million is: 56.5 million in shore.

sorm bank credit and 5+83.5 million in projcet

ald and suppliar credies) in tho 1971.73 pariod.

Tho USSR authorises $360.5 million in credits

1$98.5 million in shaip.!eim credit and $162.0

million in econonic aid! to the Allendo regime.

most of which was nevar utilised. This was far

from tha massive heip allende neuded. But Mos.

cow was under no illusion that iis economic co-

immediato prospecis der radical social and

economit transformälies. alinough it no doubr

helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United

States.

Sovier influence expanded rapidly as a result

of the Chilean Cormurist paily 's loyally to the

Sovier-Chilean

economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and

possible by

victory ol the Communis: Socialist regime.

exonomic situation,

violent clashes of the ulra-let: and the ultra-right.

and the growing organisation of opposition forces.

after the Popular Unily government

failed in the March, 19:3. elections to obtain the

majority elecloral supper reguirest lo transform

•Seo Deuta Esterra da Civia. Tano V. Departamanio de

creditos Exornos, CORFO, Seriago, 1973, lor lull de

{018.

the political and economic siructure by peacalul,

Nevertheless, Prescod dos roi tilling to Dro-

ride the miasiren shorterim cotinadier assist.

anco louch is toodiullo or undea converslo

curiency credits which sho regime needers

finance ino impore of lood, spare paris.

machinery 10 aileviola local shortages. lioscoris

$93.5 million in short enem bank crodiis das no

doub: helpful but paled into insigniticarco beloro

ino rood lo financo Chrign inore requiremerts.

which, for 1ood along, were running ai the raig al

etour s700 enillion a year shen tho Allenge

rejime collapied. The Sovior leadershio 101d

Chilean Communisi and Popular Unity olficiala

¡nal the main elore to improve the tcanamic si:u.

stion would have to be rado by the Allerdo gos

ernment: incecoe repraindly stressed that the

Posular Unity government!

calamiious decling in prosuction and produce.

irisy so have a chance of winning over a majority

o: sho Chileans lo the causo 'of socialisin.

Relusing 10 give Aliendo the hard currency

crodies he needed in irpeove his worsening

chances for survival, Moscow contenied ilsell

with organising colidarity muetings at home und

3b10rd in the hope that sheee deineastrations

would "reuch she care of the Chican people"

lioscow Radio 13 Auguel 1973), Mllende's loyal

aliy and "big brother" was willing is sell Soviet

machincry and equipmons in him-iha: is: ca.

sand Savier expone tinenicó by longiern credils

=bur denied him the short ierm hard currency

credits he desperately needed.

A combination of circungrances - Moscow's

costly entangierent in Cuba, economic disticulsieg

at home, shortages of grain and foreiga exchange

—ied the USSR to escher massivo short ieren

did 1o Chile and to counsel a policy of sell-help

so the allende regimo - a theme repented tre-

quently by the Chilean Communist Dirty leader.

ship when referring to Sovier assistance. In the

final analusis inoscow walched idly whie the via

destroyed by

disasirous

economic policies, the circumvention of tie laws,

and the lacit ercouragemen! of ihe ulia late by

President Allende and the Popular Unily govern.

iloscon pursuer, a dual sirategy in Chile. Al

ine level of state-to-slate

relacions it acled

cautiously, acupted a non interventionist porture.

and encouraged anti-americaniem and independ.

enca fion the Urited Statas. Since it realised

inal she internal baiance of trices did nor favour

te aired struggle, tha Pogular Urigy leadership

3s wind lo mainiair, internal unity. reject the

"arovesaiiva ard adventurous" overiures ol lha

vira-tate, aunid actions tiat mign: provide a sivil

war or military iriervention, edopt a mora rarional

ecoromic policy, and consolidaio the initia: gains

ol the revolution.

Al the same time, Moscoir did raining lo re-

strain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean

revolution. Protected b;

a friendly. tierxise.

dominared government and ils flarxist President.

Cuba transporien large quantities of Saries and

Carchestovak.supplied weapors ta mer.id.es/ left

• in Chile on lie Cutan airine ail merchan; srias.

---

## Page 83

14-00000

1l also crablished s guneriid training baso and

coordinating conire la Crolo.

The laise iniolig.

enes learn in tha Colon Srbassy in Santiago

maintained linion sita do libertion movement

indepentina. Bolidia.arUracuay. Cube's 500ier.

consertied imelliger o beaco. Dirección General

do Inislinencia (OGI%, dice had close lios veila

sho Chiican ultra-letic: ind older revolutionary

exilo groups, providing siem with training.. ars

and luris; los the arring strugglo in Chilo and

oiher Latin Amarican couisries.....

Revolusionaries Tranned

Soviet army personnel vere directly involved

in the lining of varast resolutionarios lor urban

guerrilla vartaro. This ercured during 1972-73

al El Belloro, near Vilparaito, where sho USSR

nad insalled a lacisiy ire the manuinciuro o!

pre abrica do housing, the firm (KPD) employed

sixicen fussions, lour si whom were cagingers

the returning thon. wore

Sovier army olicers. Alier joiring hours, these

@welvs officers insirucies@hard.cor ol specially-

solecles.rrorker-revoltdrararigs in tha

arms, stret: lighting. ind ustan guerrilla tactics.

Tho Russian-buile tocresy ies tepe Undür Constant

surveillarco by Chile's raval intelligener. On she

morning of 11 Sopremier 1973, noval intelligence

arrested die Russians

polled them from the country".

clandestine irialrement in training

guerrillas in Chile was an excription 1o Moscow's

ollicial line of giving full suppore to she legal and

pracelul pin lo socialion, dur tha jovint leader.

ship operates on the princiale that sincu every

evontuality connor bo foresten is is boiler de take

advance messies which might "cuntrudier"' the

official lire shan to be araly liter. In Chile there

clearly vere some adriages in having some

ormed reiolutionaries unde direct Sovici control:

Moscow sould bu able la remin some measure of

influence over the ultra-lois, particularly impore.

ant in the event shat this fartion dos able to seize

power, las is turned out, Plustis's

"united tront"

tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted

by the Crilean military.

Souler Industrial Espionar o

The Sorior Union made every effore to axiract

the maximum advantage !.om is rechrical aosis?.

anco piaz'omma, le assigred to rechnicians lo

naticralised cooper industry to help raise

produstori. all of when diere engaged in in.

dussial espiorage. Tray i ere far more interssted

In gaining dest hand interedge of the advanced

Us minira equipment and meinods ol operation

Chilean development. Arures

Zauschauerieh, executida vicepresident of tha

cupper coinsation, lie me in Deceinicer 1973

that tha spacialists diring their to year sigy

con...buted ro.hirg to wrina.vemen: cl mining

operaiions and were mainly uccupied in gatherirg

spacitications di Ararican cruisment. obtaining

infaimation on mining rechniques and oiganisa.

lion, and coliccting cala en cosis and produci-

Moscar was also especially interesed in

fisheries

fishery-pr.arer

hydrographic and maring

(occanographic.

biological research)

assistanca lo Chilo.

Fisiaries aid gave

Russlin's ascess lo Chilean pores for i's tishing:

adianodi: chic and dian uns-n'

she Chileans with a Sovire enaritima percence:

The growing presence in Chilean volcre, i:cund

the Capa and in sub Animere Maior, pendiced a

inelligenon and casano.

graphic data of use 1o she Soviet pavy.

The Sovier Union

million in mitiay caulprnent to allende in 1571.

sue sho rilitary rodused ino olles and decided lo

continuo lo obtain arms from the Uried Jiatos

and othar Wostern suppliers. The anti-Corninunist

disturbed by

thig asesoning

economic and political violence unidor are Popular

Unity government, und overg anxicus not lo

weiken their military dies with the Unires Siates

end Wastern Europo by turning so sne sovine

Union 10r arms. M...cow had hoped to crablish

in important precedent for curalying artis lo ron.

Communist countries in Latin America and Suriner

resen Washingion's airaady strainso reisiono

with pho Latin American military: Despise sta 600%.

mugs of oficial US-Chilean relalic.ng. is Unilod

Gretas continued to mainiain friendid selations

The Krenalin ivas very much arrase of irie vreax.

ness of tho Aliendo regima, Mus chiy diss it a

minorily government (in 1970, 25% ang. in 1973,

63% of tha dinciorara supported lie repular

Unity coalition but the arried forces and cower.

ful national polico were strongly anti-Communist.

"democratic forces" laches full

pilical and economic pover, Mussour 'araured

a gridual saka over by ia Commicnic and

avoidance of rivil war ne militiry contioniation

¿l all coses. Both tha ulira late and disa-right

exponenis of Allenda were arched reguially in

Pre Soviat prass. But the ilovanani of lie Revo.

lusionary delt (MURl, an uiirs.let group thas pur-

sued she anüd path and liosed lo coleat she

ciposition forces in a violent controntation, was

singled out for particularly scathira articism. le

was charged with

"rovolutionary advertgrisn"

contributing lo political inslability ard harming

she prospects of survival of the Popular Unity

From mid. 1972

onwards, Moscors realised

that the opposition to tha Allende governinent dag

growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd

and dilatory personality ol allanda trilind in

meintaining a balance letween the disruptive

t3rees within his can governmen! at held 1o-

Eesher the disintegialing labric of sosiety. Trero

vas Soviet criticism ol the irrational economic

managument. declining agrioul.ural and indus:rial

production.

accelerating

inflation,

and the

worsering balance of payriens.

Soviot observers advised a slower rare over

of the ecunomy, nationalising the large firirs fiest

but leaving the smaller and medium-sizes firms

zione lar tha sinia being, In die las: morths trio:g

tha miliary coup they saw die handirig en tha

vall and uigid a concalidition o! Ira ceonomic

53:75

already achieved, collaboration with ing

apposition

political

parties

jespecially

the

Christian Deinocrais), and avoicance of armed

confiict.

•Esculla 15a088001, 10-16 Oerabir 1973, ins author's

inte dires uh pha Chilean ruliuey high duriana. Doc.

---

## Page 84

14-00000

collapso of Socialise inosel

This Soviet pricy visa vis Cailo erretalines

congestion in tie political licle, sin forete of

an arti. US fioni wish Chiis, Peru and Clin, and

Barcion of irado and air reinions rohile 1a.

Maüria drone palemics and intoilating in Chile::

internal alairs irainly thiclih lie intlueries over

the Chilean Communist Pariyl. The Chriean Comm.

munices vere given moral and material euniort

for widening the buso of subsurd sol she seigime.

but il, trace no dillarence lo lin linal durcony.

The masaness of ine Allendo sogirne, its fisleful

inisreal contradictions, oricial conniverie in the

arming and violence ul she ulira dels, the teeinar.

Pype inflation

and load shortages,

The giring

politieal polarisation and violerce, ang the faiu.

sul alienation of the arriod lorras were the du.

cistes conditions that priggare the coup d'éfor

that led to Aliendo's countall and replacerners by

a military junis on 11 Suptember, 1973.

Moscon sas deeply disturbed tur nor especi.

-ally surprised. TAsS admired on 20 September

1973 frat the "Chilean experience vas bitter and

drama'ie." and Fidol Casiro Coclarad that he vras

"vory unsee by cronis in Chile" (he rees military

junsa tuss immediaiely broken oll salerichs wish

Havana). Moscaor saverod diplomalic relations

with Sarsiaço aid wlihdrow lis amtassador and

embassy sial because of allaçod persecution of

Sovies aliciais by idio junta, felter less iran a

were in porni. Chila's now moliisary dovernent

begen :o real tha full blast al sovint digginasure

and trusiration, expenssad in a veil orchestra.ad

are gagicined propaganda campaign

arined at

isolating and disciudiling the regirno.

Tre sorior miedia accused the junta al "Der.

Docuing leir wingers with unparalleles cruelty

Miloscio Radio.

13

Saplamber 19731. Thera

were resorts in Praida on 20 Sepieriber inal "tho

siresis of Senliago vere Moving with bise" and

sha radio sacke ol "lens of thousands al. Chilean

democrais" killed. Salvador Allenco was alsern.

atively reported lo have been "murderer in cold

WASHINGTON POST

28 AuguSt 1978

Argentine

was "he Peronist workers

answer to the srenies o

our class."

Mensger

Murdered

BUENOS

AIRES - Gun.

men kilied the lohor reia.

tons manazer of a Srench.

orined asses plan! in ('or.

doba jesterday, and Pa's.

dent sara Estela

Peron

spoke aul agäinst the recint

"cowardis

ind meterrang

assassinations in Arion.

Una.

The estreme leftist Mirag

Ist Arned

forces sian!

тероплі!ні? lог lhe, 3:1

cardo Consis, 55, Babi!:

it

the Renault plar! climaxed

Bonday with ossier of loll.

Ist leadero of tie auto un.

Ion. li'nsiers initied police

Jase night on the streeis of

Cordoba.

Airs. Peron, In her first

srecch.from the polare bal.

conly that her late husband,

President Juss D. Heruns 0f.

ten ussd

as a rostrum..

Ceclared:

"Waty

people Jin's that

because I am a to:nan !

cannot rule... bu! with this

frazile

appraririo i hate

committeel snucall. Dier ile.

nunciation di lie nolitical

- Arlines canso in a raik par-

lies with provincial corp.

noIs.

bloud" ci la have dirt a horos deto, resisting

the rabel, 1o ine very ends. Allenio's residenen

was alleged is have been "bipad oll the lace of

the corth.

"The jura dies should de vamen and

children in an ariempt to internidrio the poople.

Or. 29 Dareser TASS indignantly blamed the ClA.

Chilean

"rescrion" and "Arnericon monopolies"

for organising the military coup. And according

10 a viciociy broadcast

even Leonid Brechnov,

n0l kno: for his devotion 1o Western democ.

rasi, expiessed hoiror at tha "monsireus, com.

piuiely open vidiation of a country's constitution,

the uncereronious diailing

of the democratic

traditions o! un entire nation,

Tro overebrow of the Allendo porcenment was

a bitter but not entirely urexpected selback for

Moscow's unlied front ructics in Latia Anierica,

partics olsenhara in she lease. Communises and

Socialists in France and Haly who had earlier

pointed lo Chila as a model al sho peacclul irana.

itlon to socialism moved to disengage thorrselvog

from tho Ailendo disusie:. Instead of landing lo

socialism, united front i-clics in Chilo unhored

in a period of unparalleled political violenco,

workers and

middin class, and tho worse ecenomic crisis in

Soving rosigns lor Chile lo servo as tho van.

guard of the anii. US trons in Latin Arnerlan andod

in a completo liasco and lefi a deep impression

on ino non-Communise political partlus ind the

armed forces in the region, l: reininded them of

the grave risks of entering into an nilianco with

rosalitarian parties. Daspire prorestations so the

Maixisi governnents aro driven in-

exorably lo violate pledges to uphole tho con-

destroy the private sector of tha

economy, and ultimidicly so ingrall a suialitarian

Authoritativa

sislaments ol tha

Chilean Communiss

Parry's position undor lha allence regimo can bo lound

in

Labares's

Convolan

27 MCI39

and quid Corvalan's,

Camino do Vicrors, (Saniiaga, 1971).

NEW YORK TINES

28 August 1974

SPARSE AUDIENCE

Morning,

Perón,

•had'

train mores ni thousands of:

HEARS MRS. PERON *"M

supporeis on numeries occa.;

The elone was marred by the:

Guberimoni:

mounting

prud-

irene with tell ring

industriat

Only a Felt Thorsand Attend univers in roninha.

din milto

Her Firs! Publie Rally

marchwest of the cipilal.

Early this mainine.

fried teriorats commed down the

labor relains manager of lka.

•konsull, a loadino car tranu.

granel 107901:507000?1900

laclurer in coriols.

hel

BUENOS

AIRES,

27n. drove l the man plant that.

Only a lon Pennand ire un. has horn in the remer of a bie-,

innesee marh.red cod.es do hear ser

Pipe dont

locked

The brilne re abe seamtine.

Poren, in her dise ritin ralis executive.

Ricon!

5.5

1h.

shere lor the hussand. Gol. Miahone and foreig

---

## Page 85

loft sur diade unlonia: esrinis, ply wich his corterne. ro

ly

iLar

win 1alis pal an mal'er

The roli; was ostensitigeal? limene ine cass." said dirt Peror.

tys?

le powere the

During the deo marrie

eier an enormous personal veie ursing dia. Teron to haid!

belore her death

Major

r.N.:0

raiy

to

latrengihen der tire in thei

•dro'e that

many

chini lare dl riang terroris: deivily,

+s9 19m9

werr.an, t 1as.ar

take sier the

urits:

8:.

conomic

ne.m.

-probleins.

ol petroleum

perduci!.

Sirs

Peron.

still arcared.

Desire the pour lutiour. al

Stiell, and

F.e12

arercared

arice tad shared ine Ius! 80!e

forcedes

of the

lengthy black locar's

ralis.

an-t

of nil produces mith tro 511:9

ahie 1o aide a satan di

she

has donned

ierist

Husband's

since nouncers

radikes

mat the

coatn

"But

Jerods

were

"mittitldiinous."

Petroleun Company,

into nurserius

8:21!138.

and mixero: - jaciren:,

and

in

one and at leas: one culinentrlor

descrilon of Leadeiehp

She has luid ser pusheri

and l hare Peron and in the sicke of

"hanárees of thousi

But Mrs. Peron derrind Moseifalunng taniazs ard pairitis 0879i

Eva Peron,"

¡ands" of papple un hard. But

of her

speech

to Goleral

1.48 dl:n

operailion

times her voice cracked'a

walk throch the D'air con-

claim 1o leadership d! die Me. Genestavren

mican; sia priorion and she shorix her firmed that onir ste sireer in

ronist

4282910D9.

been in growing disarray prie

clany

eniralad anne, recalling per frone of the pile Government

eif hur spenches are enierded

arms.

realingtimli; house was hird. The camerast

General Poran's death on adel. beardy

laced asin caleiences tures ured by tra Peron

÷of

the

teievisio:t

stations-l

"Do not diabe fix a ranite triage and siosans are 1 in Gor.

iteie nare burn rumors in'utien

have

recentlv

hen

that Isabel Perin.

his arreard. era) Perin and his dend wile. die toss three wieks that con-' ientiy brouens ürder siale

Quarie

fe:rme.

Peronist

trade

unionises and aroided phoia.

BAL'TIMOPE SL71

graphing the empty sireeches

One of the piganizers of the

28 Mizust 1974

rally asseried thit ii Was sud-

Forecast is cloudy for

cessful

considering that

villy

too unions-the lighs and pow:

er union

185 0:10101100. 60880139

eum

and the staie pelol.

noiteis-v.ere

supirised

Min de Sunrien Morean ell fare ium

20 allend. Bur he ainu:sirdied

Rio de Silviro-Diesitar. 1s

amainst the curtirisis.

Bolivia's Banzer!

that "Peron word neier have

addressed so amil a crow'd."

growing

Ine chief focus of pulsical

lion in silice of dresiders: Hugo

80120508 bolivia. But edias:.

jon Filance dentorded ibime.

those nificers why plotted and

murase in the cousire has been

Curdaba.

the

soond larkest

ers ure disidol over steriar

ire Falanges excruied the unsuccessiul coup cils.

Laid February.

AGeneral Canair will

---8 1919

daunt his government June S. wing malice

apparently

1520s 6s

by

1 pimphlet was circulaied-bached by General lorin,

liors promier for neat gent, pire Clite finl, a smaller recordly lo all military units in

moved the

einsted leit-wing!

jor by the uruil inechanie for

roup nain:d

sier she laie Li Por. aliezedig priduccu by

Pescinist sorernor irun poler.

Vuring

me uphersal,

right.

tractering power in Malicia-

presideni. More Pees.Ber9O5.

a group of joung cilicers who

the coup d'itil.

riven

as the

cisition ele-buse iaken inspiraiion from

trade

unionists

s'so

irrated conriol. at the incal

Last werk, rieneral dizils.

tirel

inte

supporta

their coricrports in loriugal

celenraied the bannine dais liesdunt

wh0 last april led a successful later icderacion imin

leftisis

Since shen, Cordoba has been

suren goor in the cres nancy

coup

againse the authoritari. the scene of repezier ircidents

by dancine in she sorter: rur-

rigitre

here lui an rorime there.

of politiai

rivience.

fow

jing a masse colebration es

ting out, were were reports di

The pimplice read, in part.

dess aRo, the lubur Ministry de

the colo d'eiil phat decánd dissension

within

mili-

"Ranic?'s

repression

against rided lu remore iigol sergai.

:Gen. Juan duis Torres Ass-

bery.

his vira instirution ithe Armist

lius fruit the lils controlied

just 21.1971.

Alhough Presider: Buncer

has persuided liose

de me.

unior. at tks.R.naidl-g con.

cern with miod argertine and

Even is he vas celebratini.

scariend the pestra iore sip

crane dificers to light test'e french

capiial a ailer labor

making

siraste?

Me jit ol lne cominind. is di the

C. 1130:.700

miners.

workers leaders calice a serike in sup-

durability

of she Natioratin arned

services

faring las: or cudelis..

pu:: of higher winses

'Ponular

Frone-the cirisa: decis fole, it is esident lo

A:tet the attempted coup ol

The clashes uith the police

military

confition

thrrats pourees here. and from reparts

Joe 3. mans of the olicers lose night resulied when off.

¿ere miered in diindge labor

which

he has fovered::: iron Bolitia, Mei De antalY

prided were sitter jailed r

powertul

Bolisian

sirmas is divariced over stre presidene.

" i:

-TiU

leaders front the union head.

exile t

Porarling uirters.

Umon declared iself virtust's

isral his policies.

aid Argenna. decording

10

al ear wilh the socines. Aid.

lt is behened that the scurd

crocis froir. Argenana, M.iny

she Front appareny was dis er onicers are boise

alien-

these

nificers have wen

integrating.

aled increasintly to tre prese-

returning to Bolivia clandes-

This neck one party a 190

they oppone

tire'!

coalition. Hia Nitionalist Ecli, his relusal 1n Eras: aminesty 80

..-...

THE WASHINGTON POST Palericy, Aur. =3,17.8

Argentine Left

Clings to Hold

On University

dion. a 10 to 71011000

1005.110:S-T.87.

Univer-ily of Clones

mectings" hang from tre

high ceilings 1o the floois.

Coiners

ar.d

culumnis

are

alastered with poiters that

ario the defens? of the ror.

d'ution or nurie Gen. duan

D. Prion, lie drientine pin

aulit loader mile died in of.

dee ar presirent on Jil: 1.

ilue-ule. perple wok past

armind lu anlice.

But inside.

behind the pess.

tors. Die sulli perple stin

moser in

Arcontes

1:n - t

Hid 801a0 10 0001880005 100

the unwer.ils.

loui

i7e899

Well a spare dull al dü alternals ker.

1x.1101-1

university

aiministration

aril siudent burts.

prolisenrs

Peronist

that

f'resi-

dent Maria

Peron.

the leader's sidew and sue.

cersor.

lollins

line

laid Jon ls lorer:: To ease

tie diarris: iude sie vi

Peroris:

the

This

means winnin: Daid coniro!

vide l'nire:stio of Buenos

: direspio

rudert bordy

eel allosi

€00.0.0 roakes it

far the lariest in the

country--irom sir Prionist

The arise l has der's: a

Melaria:

sulitient

"rounit do

---

## Page 86

14-00000

The univeraits.

all urban

camping milli

buddies cattered

shrunken the city. is

alon;:

turopean .

lines. Eleven separe rarel.

lies

like separade colleces.

edurale

lawyers.

Jortors,

natre riots of a new 5:1.

con heel tire with piricars

al the circlads shares. 901011s

and is triard by a dircus.

sun of Minorica: imperial.

ast: 10159-19114.

"last wear

agronomists and liberal pro.

ressionais

Each

fist's

"iso; in."

said a coconddcar yu.

¿cars of basic colleco educa.

dent of err-nomies.

"I:: re.

lion.

Seven gears aco, aller

alis interning. He toarted

a rioicit

purse

brose Sairuelan's buot

be Argentira's military

ernment, many pauls of thie

Introdian

rAn

tu

Econninies

by Paul i. Samuelson, in in.

separate

curricula

were

rulucior! test widels used.

shapça 1o American models.

in

tre

tailed

States

ind

When the

Peronists Ic.

som?

ruuntriust.

turned so power last May.

used a!! those

Fraphs and

young leftist iraders lojal so

curies in prove that imperi.

Peron were

gisen the

unt.

alism was necessary. Oh. not

versily as sheir share of lhe

now government. ll changed

direcily.

but

subtly,

You

almose overnighie.

Entrance

examinations

but we die not replace line

were abnlished and all high

school

graduates

with lenir: or Jtarx." Oscar

were of

Sbarra difre, the 13-90a6:01d

fered adinission. One ycar

dean of the economies fac.

Jater, 85.060 ness stuckönts

ulty, said duina an inier-

had eniered and the enroll.

VICH.

explained

that

ment had doubled

there is srir no single lirt

"There are su many peo.

hock lur the sunscar intro

ple nos. is seems that even

ductory course.

but.rather a

the rats from the basement

trarling li! with a majurity

take rsains." said a fourth.

of Lain American aulliors.

year philosophy sludent.

Marina Diell as John May.

Professors

with

CunnAC.

nard trires shons up as

tions to the millars gorern.:i

an indicidal theorist, but

men: or fore in companies

not as the tore word.

were

dismissed.

fourteen

The shift from studies de.

were fired from the facully

signed lo produce

execu-

of cronomics alone. The uni.

rises for giant compilles to

versily brose off assistance

more

Moulist

and

exchange

agiciments

and 1a.

dional mist loosk. Sharra Mitre

• with the

Ford foundation.

snid. is

ketter exemplitied

the Unisersie of California

and

the

course

calied

kulgers.

and opened

"History uf the lirion doir.

new propranis with universi.

munt and Labor Relations,"

ties it

Peru, Algeria and

"nich replaced a courie un

Mexico.

personnel inanagement.

Courses of

study were

changed. Traditional philos.

It was tic. educational pol.

icy, however. but

opny courses were replaced,

pure poli.

In part, bi siudies of South

lies that turned the univer.

American

politicians

sits duto a lale wing reduubi

Peron's deserine. In an in-

deiging the leronist gown.

trodurtory

architecture

deal.

basic

university

las, lasing down the rules

for Mirrors Afres and the

A weck and they look over

10 of lie 11 faculties in

national viversits

pared eriness by a Jarao

majority lied last join sitla

the sport from ron feron.

ist printires.

The law ranbos.

ied Mr barie chantr:

that

had legun at Buenos Aires.

majority

faction

in

the

P'eronis

your movement backed by

more tre hold onto thie tom.

purare university

rector,

•Raul Lasuzzi. 12. a profestor

of pharmacy silo is loval lo

the Alonioneros.

And, inside

the focuitics. it often seeme

an if one is inside Peron's

"sack of cals."

Al the medical faculty re.

rently. students

proclaim

who still

Insalty to Peron

1hn: bid sole the military

started playin: the Peronist

under

Peron'st

marching song on a loud.

banner, had made the uni.

speaker

versi!

here sheir power

systom..

faction

that stands further to the

base.

thies, proclaimed

self put on the

gubernment prugrans

that

Internatio;

nale, thie Chemunist hymn.

smacked heartily of Mari.

and ruined up the volume

Ism-Lamini:in and, in erfett.,

on their own sound system.

challened veron for diader.

The P'eronists turned

up.

ship of his movement.

their sprune, and so it went,

"Leet, these

people are.:: to ear.shnuering levals.

anythin.

but

Poronisls..

"It isn't bad once you get

Gen. leron said last Febru.

abore the secund

nоoг."

ary, when he first began try:

professor of ncurobiology

ing le separate bis move.

ment's truth sing from the

said.

Slowly the unisersity cri.

leaders boin of the guerrilla

sis scers lo be heading for

movement

who

cill thems.

sume kind of resolution. A

selves Muntoneros.

wech azo, President Maria

"Before

getting:

thinking

about

Estela Peron named a new

organized seve sol

minister of coucation. He is

to think he's it can bo a truc

expected

to

name

organization and not a sack

rector. Student street demon.

full of cals who will start

strations hare been quickly

shosins: thair claw's prolly

and sharply put down by pa.

sooh." feros cold leaders of

lice.

The sarne demonstra:

the south. wins.

He astied

l'ons scra loioraler uy her

them to scorganize

them.

late husband.

selves and cxpel the Mars.

There

hase been some

ists. "Ilial's why shis purifi.

hints that thie

cation is necessary," he said.

government

will irs to defuse the crisis

The

purification

J'eron

hy unraveling l'eronise poli-

wnnted has been thwarted,

tics and the quarrel with the

in pril 15 1064501008 relue

Muntoncons from university

lance tu

drive the whole

policics.

youth sins into open rriull.

"Ise're waiting to see sho

and in

stuuents

on the liversity dues

a young

i Sound cores be hit

NOS

dires.

Twice.

siner

professor.

should clear up something.

April. they have marched

In the meantine, if su're

no thie sireeis lo protest

chinking of building a house

the

appuniment of mon

in Argrutina, gel an old ar

deans and hair furced the

covernment la back down i thitest."

---

## Page 87

Westen Hemisphere

ENCOUNTER, London

January 1974

Allende

& the Myth Makers

David Holden

Political Realisin& Revolutionary Romance

Revose Agains the Bullor Box" for Which tho

IFTAUNO AS IT MAY SEEM'TO SJY SO D'DEN Y

blondshed of the Chilean coup driar

still so konly mmembered and the generals who

maile is are riling unpleasunuy high, the fact

terneins that Salrador Allende died a lucky

• man In life he mas a failure. Both his milicies

and bis courts nore startered long before lio

end. But in death he achierre suitess beyond his

decame.

Insianuy canonised

as the l'esiera

world's "neirise left-wing martyr, he besame

overdiali the most polent political cuir-figuro

since his old fricad, Cbe Guevara:

To some extone, of course, the congregation

bad already. Teen prepared for this-posthumous

elevation. la the three years of Allende's aconiai.

stration the "Chilean experiment" and the

"Culers road to socialism" had beconie fuv.

ourite ropies of discussion among deli-ning

groups

in

Europe,. where Chile's

supposed

resembianie to les'y or France bad encouraged

Ibe beliet that Europe might for once, foliow in

Latio America's fooliteps insiead of the other

way about Many espiring revolutionaries frora

Ewrope and the Uniied Silles hild actually

joined their Latin American counterparts in

Chile in much the sare spirit as their dropped.

out contemporaries had hirch-hileil to Nepal

bopiaz for s glimpse of Paradise in action. By

the time of the September coup the military junta

claired there mere as many as 15,000 foreigners

of all kinds in Caile, actively supporting-soma

times with nolease tbe "socialist revolution."

Chilean amod funics could ofter no crouxe

(The Guardiar, 12'9,73); as à "Disasics lis

Chile" that would "ser bick the cause of social.

in and demaracy erchwhere" (New Stases

pron, 14/9173); and as "The Death of a llope"

coinparable, cron, lo the Russian invasion ol

Caccholovakia Mist enued Alexander Dutock's

aégime in 1963 (The Obserier, 16/9/73).

Within 21 hours of the first, bare ners of the

coup the General-Snarelary of the British Labour

Pany, Mr Ron Hayward, was ariting olicially

to one of Allende's funnes colleagues to say that

it was diticult in craress the sense of horror and

arge fell by the British Labour movement '"as

the aspirations of the working people of Chile-

shared by so many olhers around the world.

are destroyad al the hands of a few arrogant and

inorant ofticers acting at lbe behest of lboso

Who beliere uncis right to rule is unchaliengeablo.

(Tue Times, 13/9/73). Mr Les Murrsy, LieDeral-

Socrelity of the Trades Vaioa Council, expressod

his shock and abbortence with equal spood and

vigour, And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking is a

member of the lafour Party's National Execu

uve, unleashed a torrent of assertions so passionato

as to suggest that her mind had como closo lo

• being. ovenhrown mith Alleade's goverament.

"They ragged from the declaration that "tha

democratic will of the poople of Chile" had beer

defeated by capitalise "collusioa" (The Guardize,

17/9;73) to

"Tor Socialists of this geberation

Chule, is our Spain* and "This is the most vicious

fascista me have soen in geserations" (The

DAVIs HOLDiN has travelled in Chile on several

Chief Foreign Cories

pandèri for are "'Surlos Times."

Атогі піз

BEJULIE COMiCariOns lO ENCOLNTER aTe "S'usA

Africar Mortark' (August 1970).

"Duo Trip

Ro ZariBer" (Septemire 1977) ard "Erhispia

Forty' YeJr On" (February 1973).

Guardian, 1919(73).

Mise the Labow Party Cooferenoe met al

Blackpil three areks laler these insiant ro

actions had hardened into established orthodoxy.

Tie former Chilean Ambassdor in London was

given, a standing oration then he bocane tho

first Doa-delegale 10 address a Party Conferenoe

These spocially interested groups or isdivi

dast abriously provided a ready nervort for

international propicanda in the alienath of

Allende's dealh But the shocked ind, as times

almost bisterical reaction lo the coup went far

beyoad such commilled parties lo entraco

many of the W'est's ordinary liberais an social

democrats. For thom, as much as for the sell.

styled terolutionarios, it somed, a bright light

of worldwide bone bad been extinguished in

Santizgo: and Irom Viassiastoo lo Rome, via

Paris, Boon and Loadus, anguishod crios of

"Foull root the air.

sidoe two Spanish Republicans were allowed to

do so in lbe 1930s Resoluticas were then carriod

utterly condemnins the military coup and tho

procipitate action of the British Govemment in

rocognising the military juata; demanding tho

rocail of lbe British Amharador from Sentiago

and the withholding frum the military rtfina of

al aid, lazas, and cralits; and calliog on 1so

Laboar Movement lo campsisa for lse restora.

lion of demazasy in Chile sod to offer fiasacial

and oshee assistanoo to tha Popular Unity

(Alenda's) mO:EDEDl (The TUnes, 5;10/73), Mu

THE OUTORY IN sTaD was spical and

instantaname

SAN ILLOSTRAMON

---

## Page 88

the renwas for this firce reartion mirals irray

daning several of the surse fashionalia mallora

¡ of tielero politica! siolose had Misss inco

dislury or beco shadoes by disillusicaness la

tie jair or duo tirors Aende's dounth from

Vice Nam and Grrive 10 Black Positi coù tho

Student Movement. Miendles diarisis end

supplica a neve cause juse whea il mize manted

rumiliar doublo siandaris were cererialy ia

•volveil Nobady' al lie Labour Party Cerferenos,

for example, thoust it norcisary lo Rsli tily

such a royal welconse should to offerad in tha

representative of a sovernment which had io

cluded one of the very four Communisi purtics

oveside Fastero Europe 1o approvo lue Russias

insasion of Crechmiloratia A Paviosiun so

ponse to the very ides uf "revlution" n:15. also

clearly to evidenco-and nuide ail the snot cager.

Ml seemed, by the fact Uns this particins serolut

tion had been taking plive it such a sue disiaaco

to suct sublinaly forcion parte I'to pay

peshaps, a characteristic love of Worlily failura,

loa for it was difilizie to read some if the moro

extravagine expressions of grief al Alléodoo

death without sensing a touch of pralitallion at

the idea that Good hind once more surturbed to

Evil and so deliveral another

marit unio

¡erves befuro he could bo corrupied by lo

pructical demands of ile on Farth Dire roost of

all, perliaps, the res; onso sormed to siem frum.

Ignorance and wishful thinking-auays the too

most powerful sources ul political ronanticisio

which left the facts of lite in Allende's Chilo

either unknown or ismured and the fold wido

open, therefose, to the creation of instant maye

Mcace the composite picture.

now airrpind

ehroughout a wide sperm of Weitem liberal

and left-wing upinion, of Allenue as a genuine

social democral of impoocable constitutinal

propriety who met his end at the hunds of a

fascist conspiracy on tehalf of a minority "ruliag

class" aidal and abxiied by the Uniid Suiles

of America

To replace this romantic vision with something

approaching reality may aircady be imprisible,

for myths undoubledly possess a life of thir ora

immune to rational challenge. To allerpe lo 10

so also may entail sume risk of abuse, for de

poems lo be a common assumption nowadays

that anyono who secks a rational explansrivo of

a militisy coup d'elas (unless il happens to

represent a left-wing interest) is raisenly a

fascist beast

I SHOULD MUm'iT PLAN, therefore, that I am

concerned bere with Allende's Chile and dor wich

what has taken its place. I hold no briet far

military juntas, nor for the summary cencutions

mass imprisonments, censorship or whalever that

the Chilean junta my haro inspied or solarated

during its early months of power. Iniard, bocruse

I happen to loom and lilie Chile as a cordurj and

coual a number of Chileras amons my tricada l

foel some personal sadness at lice constry'a

present plight Bus I feel no surprise dor. I am

afraid, much moral shock. Military mon wil be

military men, the world over; and in asy caso

Onio mas let in suia a moss by Alleado tbel

some vindictiveness, ales, was only to be curated

when bo fel

Nar am I cosoemed will Chilean michi tiva

bene I accepl that the country praird pravine

31

mont

have lean achievd willou ridience ing o?

democralia covemment lias 276 terdy lo work t

pragizalically mithin the cortujon ind with a

mopes serped for what lhe econossie and

political fabric of Chile wou'd slaad.

But that is not the point any more. Weat lam

concerned about is how lie cosury clot 10 ils

present pass. And withous wilin, lo spcak in of 1

she dead, it scenis do me necesary lo say outright

for the sile of the living that die Chilean coup

was larrely Aliendedownfaul and Uha? the myths

with which it has been surrounded of the Left aro

nos merely a falsification of Cideas bisiors but

e polentil danger lo the future of liberal and

social democratic politics in she Wesiern world I

as well. Indeed, phat is muss disturbioz lo mo

about thie fachionable l'estem seactioas lo eveais

in Chile is their revclation of the de gee 10 which

revolutionary romanticism has corbided with

Jeft-wing cynicism in receas jeas to corrup: out

• owo polities. Is is cerlainly "co accident" that,

for example, the British Labour Pany which so

uncritically adopts Aliendo's cince is also lo i

parsy which has permitical lis sch-avowed

Marxists and usopian socialisia lo zaio factional

positions of unprecedenied power.

I will leave nihers lo pursue thir theme,

however. All I want to do is lo try to sel some of.

the Chilean secord straight-or as aoy rate;

straizhies-by looking in some detail al throt of

the main myths that now surround the cod of "

Alleade and his famous experimeal..

1. The American

Inicrocntion Myth

THIS POUND ils mose virulent expression la

T the equation of Allende's downfall with that

o! Dubeck. Yet in the absence of zay Aterican

armed assault to coupare wilb the Soviet invasion

of Crechoslovakia-ler alone the fact that

whereas Dubocks Parliament suypor.es him

agniase the Russians, a majorisy el Alleados

Congress invired him 10 resign-t.ere were only :

siercoryne suppositions to sustaia ir

la seneral, the American intervention myth

seemed lo derive Grom that characierisic Latio

American and left-wing scapesost Cop'ex vtich

insises phat the Y'anquis are sesporsible los every.

cisE (excepi, of course, aDjuhing EGod). Gaí-

nished with bisiorical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of

Pigs, eic) this is frequenty transmured in Latin

American aésirs into a plausible arti-áurerican

smacar; and the stale of Washingion politics in

1973 uas, of course, glaraniced to Eise such a

•Essear extra credence this time. The New Stares

man offered a fine cumple "The likelihood is

that the trail will lead buck to the Peclagod", is

assured its readers, "if a proper intesugalion cro

ever be mounied But in default of this is does

socin possibic l0 say thai NixonisT and is allios

were aleady 1oo heavy inplicasad in 200

= Addicti o! the ITT COnSTiNY IStary siebt lilia

to mora ouL, insidentaly, uby liT ia Cie uai rever

alen over by Alienue,

memoraadun

bocure pubir prosaty.

Was

18.

perraps,

hecause is cocralOsA leTE DER mustly

oing money and diezie did Dul Diast 10 Giare 108

Roaccial enibartasst.cau: O, was it L'al le kreu the

corepany has poco Lin do ciazire pollizal soak 10

baal his orponeDia aila dad de did cos Mars lo 12:07

I anay dy dies be courany oul? tie say.

wait ins mara

did so

28

---

## Page 89

subversion of Añando for lien io de exoneraied :

now' (14,9,71). The chane is alrial ecloplas

mically vague ge: simuianeously all erabracing

But whar dens it aciuito rest oa?

First, presunalis, bie dietraied meinorandum

of ITT. which sugrisied ways of preventing

Allende Groin assuming the Presidensy in 1970

and of soppling his riginie if he did t0. There in,

of course, no doure el this meinoiandumis.

authenticity, por of is amadling folly: and with

such organisatios aunliculy pushing their

→ conspiratorial noticas al the hear of American

politios it is nor surprising lit suipicione of

Yanqui skuldugaen were argused. Mut there is a

major snag for anyone a bosses the memorandum

as evidence of aciual dirty work: simply, that all.

Inquiries so far indice that its recomincudations

were never adppind They were stüdied by the

ClA where one defereness produced a con•

lingeaoy plan based upco then: But neitter the

remoradia no: the piaa deni to have received

assent ai any higher live!; and fisca she kind of

publio exposure so malia she mustares of the ...

While Horee, the ClA aud most other shires in.

Wastingtus tave Sen redied during ile Wiser.

cale crisis (cluding the al'erations of Nixon'a

personal involvement with ITT, I am hard-

pressed to heliere was if such assent bad been

given it could have tera dept quiet until now.!

Secondly, in suppore of the Ancrican intere

vention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S.

maintained lis consisis with the Chilean armed

forces and continued so supply tbem with arins

tigen other America aid lo Cule was sus

perica. Muerefore, so cho inpiration soes, iha 1.

Pentagon mas deliteraiely treping opeo lo

optlon of usspirios a mitiles coup against an

unwelcome sorernment. But this is obviously a

twaedged argundar. For one lung, an army

that is still getting its toys to play with is usually

rather mure than lais likely to endure the follies

of its tuling politiciens slaully. And fur anolier,

what would have then sid if the Americias bad

actually suspended arras stipments lo forces

whose commanders were serving in Allende's

cabibel? The oulory abras "j'acui imperialism"'

and "pentagon politic"' may easily be imagined

Thirdiy, the stranguistion of fureign aid and

credit is laid as H'ashington's duor as a majur

aeapon in a cold aar agaies! Allende from the

start. Al first glanue this has more substance lo it.

The US. certainly suspendid further commercial

credits of its oD to Chile afler Aliende had

nationalisal the AmorinD ountu copper mines

on terms amounting to crasätion. As the major

power in the World Bank and lbe IMF the US.

also argued there against further aid for Chile:

and lo the extent thas is was successful it must have

addod 10 Allende's inall dilicullics But it

was not able l0 preseat riper. l'esiera couptrics

(e.8. Holland and Sualen) from contiouing lo

offer credie; it anT proudl Britain do ciose

down its small ail proprane: i: dil nul exclude

the roscheduling oó snist of Chile's foreiga debe

repayanenis in 1972, and it tal not presented the

discursion (incompiste al un time of the coup)

of a simlar reschatuliss for 1973. In short, lie

U.S, infuence may hare lizii Herera aid aod

crodit but it was far from being ablo to condemn

Allende's Chie 10 pardoni purdal la day case,

Chile was DAl oDe of lie under-dercinpod world's

herd cases, lutally de ala! on erremal aid and

credits for in suminal The nadia of it corpor

mies dose carnal lul in Dural lites il may --

29

rot intre chan marsinally "nil-auris", and

mill seville conomic managerent il crishe do. 1

bair turn alie to with tunil a dired did of

essemal piessure. Unfortunately, nold with

ered a malling acquaintane with disgimics

muld lare dlassified the iranuxemess of the

Niende povernment as anthing but disadrias

To s areas eatene it placro ilcil legrand the pulo

for any but the mese trusting or dinting-of.

olitors. Hur even if that had not tren as and it

the blune for Chile's economic difauite als

Mir@tonlaidfairlyandsuarels.as bashinions

dair, Allende worid surély hase had crail inuce

for complaint. le wies, ufter all, his adminisa!ra

nrich announce its immodiate driencissiva lo

"e propriaie imperialist carilal. Malises peo

of asif-tinating... and review, don mene ard i

repudiate, as the case nosy de, iraatios or auros

menes limiting our severeignty, sprcifility the

miprical assistanoe treaties, the mutuil ail a

parts, and nihers, berrren Chile and the liniird

Stales" (Ino Feople's Unity-Basie JrijTs579

of Guirrariens, 1970).

It was alse his administration nich promised

lu "repudidio the ageanents letunen us and tho

Inemational Monelry Hund" (The Frisie's

Governmers-Fiest 80 Sieps, 1970). These dold

totentions were never fully realised, it is true:

but they mere expressad as ollicial polig defuro

tha United Stales of any other "imprieliss"

power had actually dune unything lo smiurrass

Allende's gorerumear. In olher words it 13s

Allende who darided lo pick the quarrel. li scores

naive, lo say the lease, lo complain that dis

chosen opponents took defensive nicasuros ll 7a8

else wire they especied lo do?

'HOSE WHO DO COMPLAIN of American

T action nevertheless misht be better co

ployed in ashing why Allende got so little sugpurt

from most of the governments which profeiças 1o

te his frients. Freept for Cuba, whick ofternd co

thusiastic (but not almiys practical) suri lo

Alleode, as well as supplying arms and training

for his militant Left, the world's established slart.

ist governments nero consistently cool lo las

"Chilean esperiment." The farthest the Soviet

Unica viruld so 1o show is approsal ass ro

open a lajear credit in roubles for (aera

imports of Russian induserial gours and ls surro

1o lilie a limited amouor of Chileila ca, ne dor

a year or two in repayment. But the hard curray

loans ihar Chile really needed lo plug the sago

ches quietly opal hercer, Allendes adanci

promises and performance were DeTT fores

coming from any Martist source. Nor was ther

surprising. In the nature of things

countries marly have hard cutenty lo spere sail

they were unlitely to devote whas little chry miche

hare to tulling out a régime which soemed isseel

upon orer-reaching ilself in entry diratica

Conceirably, Alleade mouid have dose herro

for himialf and his country if he lad sia?

ahendind the "Ute" wurld marie ailserber

and telea Chile at 0s00 into the coatrollad trade

Has of tha Comanist siorld in tbe baso el

string Local Sunit support Dut thal woa!1 baro

meant irsposing acomph-telycentralisn/ara.ry_

and sit policial contral inside Chio is cbse

matsoa dy dance To dis credit azza

00000-?

---

## Page 90

4-00000

Jus eves if lue hiail. ll might not hire wailieil

To suniore Cirrepia Qulle is Iutiared lo tivo

cost Morcosr lie equiralent of aiarur S1 inillion

n day for inanygras. To suppore a similas réguro

in Chile wowld nrchebly halre ross even muic.

Miero w'as

never tiso slighiest Rizn thas Ms

•Hsezhocy, or anyone eise ia lic Asemlin, was

ready lo accepl such a burdea.

To sum ua, lich, il sncaas 10 mo lhat lbe laca

of an American conspiragy lo orcithrom Allendo

is both unproven and unnmrescuy to explain his

dounfall 1 am nor aiyuis

of cour'c,

that

Washingroo mas not mlieird lo soe hira go:

alchough I think some Auncricss pilicial: would

Lavo preferica lo sne him siumbisoa fir somelimo

Jonger in the hopo thit growing disillusioament

would infecs even his slouless supporiers and

accordiogly diminish, the chanses of his bein%

rando a marlys ubeo seniesis finally overiook

him But io sencral the American aitiiudo sccms.

, 8o haro boen a predictably ciutious ode:

Thou shall noe Aill, hus nenfsl nol sirire

Ofuclauely lo heep alire....

A realistic Chilean sovemment embarled on 118

"road to secialisn" would surely huve baisained

for that much, and (oo a iraly Marxiss analysia

such as AJfuic professed) ir should have expesied

much moro-tha8 Ainerica would move in for the

kill as soon as possibla. Yer whilo adopung s

aeliberaicly provocativo stance, Alende 100k no

sleps lo proicet himscil egainst possible American

seprisals, declincu lo compromiso for lhe cnko

of other Wesiera help, and failco lo piovido

grounds ciea for his iupposcù Marxise ésicnús

20 belp bim.

It was magnilient, perhaps, but it was not

polírica. Al tha very leail, Allende piust to

convicied hero of a lack of realisro that would

probably bavo boea faul 1o uny sualesmas aby-

where

2. The Ruling Class

Conspiracy Myeh

MHs MICTURE Ol Allenie being ovenhrow

I by vihat bas boco variously described 2s

"revolt of the privilesed" a series of "busses'

strikes" os a "coaspiracy oi lie tadisioaal ruling

class" contrins so many m.iscoscepiioas that it is

bard to krow whero lo higin 10 sor t.em our

Ono iceis, bowerer, seeras basic so thema

all:

tbar Allende and his Popular Unity coslition

mere somchow the uniqualy legitimale sopro

centalives pf "the People's W'ill' That such an

add beliet should hare suined any curreccy

whalevir oulside purely propagandist circies is a

mark of sbe codíusivn

that surrounús tho

Chilezn experience in the maind's of masy con-

Chileaas To judge from published commienes,

such as those referring lo lhe "dcfest of the

¿emoralic will", some oí Allende's sympashisero

abroad soem eren lu ixliore thar he nos mierely

eajoyed a massive popuiar rujo.ity of lie vore

bue was also the firs! President of his coustry lo

do so.

•Yes the faors are bejioas dispule. Chie was

and had boca fur many years a functioaing

democragy with a constizurion wlish vesied

erocutive power in lbe Presiúcai anf legislazive

power in Congreis. Boih is Lheory and is practice,

Do doube, tbere wero serious nedlsesses-el

rerce!: d, fos inscanos, la lhe insdatiry of preriova

coveiteid io bieis siruues docl jeeins es?

Bnifily es esérig Cilaur: Mowid dave wished 1

But dij cri: mon eriüient dlie aysteno mis lhe host i

and sieit tubie in latin Americi aad i: Ras

enatied l itade himurif 1o coalest the Fresidiacy

unsue.:nily si.see lires lafore be fiaily woel

il at his Srouide atieraa: in 1970. Thiere was no

donde ca sie lesátiaaicy of llesl riciory. Bue, 1

untortinniy sor thioie tiho saw de ao a uniquo :

expresiiid rif "the prorgir's wild", it wias gained

unly shuciãlo a nasro: plurality ia whic! Aliendo !

obtained juit orer j6%, of lie poll. llis prasese 1

rivial, sidy a couple eá percentago points lihind

was tise carelidale ol tie conservative Nationnl

Pasti aluro membera in Congieis opposed

Allerde fium üe siart Aorolier 23% went lo tho

thisd cardidale, a sadieal seformitl fiom lho

Chsistien Penoeral pissy, manyi of uhoso

memieia in Corgcia i firel gayo Allenda lho

bereit aif the coubi, liuping ha would modiry

hie arones tlarziisn in practico 1o a kiad of

sefosmi:in compatible "with their own lecus and

the existing crinicuiion

In tlie mit-lero Conesessionali clections of

Mürch 1973, the l'ozulu Unily conlition raised

ies sbare el the vole 10 44% (although this simo

de "lezitimagyo sis sur,ect owing.to opFosilon

:allerations uf subriautial eloctorad fraud). Bue

te opporiçion fardes scinined a larce majority :

la Corigsess Wiese, liy thas line,

'snost of loo

Orristian Demanornts hiul juinad lre Nationalista

is anitrigie @ola2001:in 8ie Uie President On Uese

1acts it vesans plain that, no fis fsoin sepresenuins

"Die D'ergle'e Vill", diliende never. acluiully sos

presnled more than a substantinl minority

irterent. Only if "slie l'eople" uue lilentified as

Lxing thoe tihe voied for Allende, while Ure rest

atre isiajorily-ase selegulad lo the ssatus of

"nun-peropie" cas suay other interpictation bo

Buitainal Bus thes, of course, is juse wihss

is inplied by lie mytli of lhe "ruling class

conspiraty."

Ip turke das a "ruling class" in Chile ll uas shaò

of lie politicians and the surroundiis establish

ment drasin rod:Uy from the narrow ujoper end of

Chiie's pros;aious milude class. Allende himselt

and many uf his mninisters and leading suppories

were is much part of that sroup as weie their

politicil oppunents, lut, ironically, itwis a group

Liat Ghien zutered les than others from Allende's

socialism bocause its menbers on toth sides

senerally posiersed enuugh cash or firoperty lo

exploit the black snarkes at home or slip into

Bgrccable exile if khings 201 100 rougis- in any

case, 10, survive lüüe Mllende himself until Sis

death) in very reasonable comfort But the poplo

whio did most t0 over:brow Alleude were rarely

of this group a1 all. With the possibic crsrptioo

of some daval otlicers, tha armaal forcrs utro

very mruch apart from the crtablislunent of any

polilical colour; and even afler Allenile brought

l'ie service commanders into his gorernent they

semained aliuf from, und renarkably litlle

koownty. thasesel:livelysmadlcircles ia Sartiaso

which were ecrustonued 1o ad lhe cuilDioys

political come

Indood, es cierts sinoe the coup d''lae haso

shown, Chilc's milisry men-lilie teir counler

parle elserihera wert probably as conteirpruous

of the politiciace (ardl as igourent r: poülios) as

the politicians siere of them Thay hid segyed

ouzside polilica fos nearly 40 yearsi aid il Allcado

---

## Page 91

himself had not dracere Corn into dix artirrud

they micht häre been content lo mandin that way.

Mut their position and made alterable by the

Mesident's oun decisions. On the ene hand Ursy

were encouraged to turn a bind ee to the seauy

grouth of illeral, para-millary fonts under. live

command of the f'rulent's friends or alliers uho

, were more esteine in their mertlinary com

nutment. On the other hand they were roquired

lo serio. in his cabinet to maintain law anil

ordor" and rasure the counery al the Prescol'a

pastinitioan propricty. On lip of that they i

sero ihreniesod by allempis tria silhin tho

¡Presidents ona circle lo aubrent their authority

within tris uun forces, as in lie naval our !

I spiracy unantrod in July 1971, and the publio

i call fur a navi insurrailor by Alrade's friend i

and failomicades of ube Socialist Party, Senals

.. Carlos Altimiranu, made only dune daj's befuro

Чо оо чер.

A surer way can bardly te triagined of pro-

voking mutiny amon re pensiti: cifior., and

Is to only surpriving, us reuosmir, thal le did not

I rappoo soones-as in mose Lalin Anierican.

countries l8 euely would have dise in sicile

I cho musing? thercaller to the nuclinations of

"the riling clais" is to undersiard rothing.

either of military wen in dencral or of Chie's mill.

cary in particuias.

SMAIRLY, THI DO CALLED "bosses" strikes" whi:b

prazied the military soup were, in fais nothing.

of the kindl The lörry men who polised hall,

or more, of Chile's transpo.t by their month-long

strike in September eroter 1971 and their even

longer strike in July-Saglember 19?1, veie mosuy

ooner-drivers a ho would have lied fairly readily

into Ure Teamsters' Uaion in te United Stares

They displayed the ferce sconomic and sorial pro

roctionism sypical of will in Europe or NuMb

America would be called lie luaer middle class,

and they saw thorielves threaiened by salluping

inflation and by whas they heliered lo be the

Goverament's intention to desiny their way or

life through state condol of outership of their

services. Along mich the small shutropers who

supported them —not forgeiling the queue-weary

housewives whose famous "Saucepan March" in

Santiago dias the most dramatio early sign of

revolt-they might be classed as the Poujadisses

of Chile. Bur by no suerch of the imagination

could they be desiribad as repmientalies of a

''boss"' or "ruling" class, or eres as being

especially "ryivilised" in a sariu or ruenomic

sense. Moreover, they owed lible, i any, alle inancs

lo the traditional political groupings of Chileao

politics, although they obviously urlioned any

suppart they could gel from than On the

contrary, they tended to cut acros ise traditional

spocrum and look to new leaders, uterber of

right or len Thus, their priati sarlesman,

Senor Loon Vilarin, was actually a member of

Allende's Surialise Party while olbers of to

..lendership came fact the NaLienal se party ranke

"Although even that was pos unchisiable sonarde

ese end, suis aas the chaos lie pianoer had falica

into. The last time 1 left Clile, a maci ei sa heidie una

coup, I drove over the Anuis lo Aritaly dad di tho

Chilcan customs post al lie suTTi di lie piss l

found alrial Ling a large Amensan dot 10 freits

nd laying una the snowcoser Lifund around i

ne son of copper inguis lial dus bera rindea u

various nouks and crannic of te chauis li would

bave tres worth arouid US. Sil0 is card in

scentia-a fortune, by liea in tico tena o

DOUS ANNE ALLIE CAUTION OR LOC DIDI JUStE

or frura Do party as al

..a.

The member of lia various professicoal

assmiations, lide dacion, dentisis, laugiers and

airline pilots, which joired the securd bunspurt

serike, weie lilicwise not "bosses" although they

mese ceraialy, In Chilean terr:, rather moro

"privileial" Their proicie as probably moro

ideological than that of the lorry men and tio

shoptrepers- it wils

uinally their wives, for

example, who objected

most forcibly

to tho

•Goratment's politically inpised changes in tho

school curriculum bu: il s'as alo provolira by

sheer exasperation and lear al lie

FOWiNg

threat so dieis profcisional blasus poied by tho

Gorempicnt's combination of acininiserativa

inciliciency and ditinus socil priorities.

For

example. Chile's economic collapse and irRation

aot only chreatened mady doctors financially

but seriously frustraier their work. Some early

repores from Santiago aller the enup inado tho

point that hospitals were apicaling urgendy

sor bandages and drugs 10 ireat the wounded.

as if that indicated tat the number of casuailies

must be overwhelmingly high. But bandases,

drugs, and other niedical supplies had been only

sporadically obtainabie in Chile for many monirs

befurchand. Tho daily round of the pharmacies

in search of the simplest medicines, bad become a

redwar fearure of Suntiato life; and foreign

erbussies had been driven so siock-pile their own

supplies, impuried throuch the diplomatic bag.

fur she tresument of the most normal ailmenus

among their staffs. I was pardly in the hope of

ending

that situation that many osherwiso

conscientious doctors finally joised the movensent

la ge8 Allendo oul.,

NOR SHOULD IT DE SORCOTTEN that some of tho

most damusing strikes of all viere those of

Chile's most infuential blue-collar workers -tho

copper-miners. Thie last lorry-men's strike was

immediarely preceded by a swo monubs' stridio for

higher wages by miners al El Tenicsie, the coun

Ey's bigsest mine. Because copper accounts for

three-quaries of Chile's forciza camings, shat,

strike probably cost the country far more ia real

tems than the transport strike, whose costs to a

Erear extenecould be absorbed internally, Inuced

as one Wail European diplomat remarked lo mo

in Santiago, the money lust in those twa months

se El. Teniente would have more than repaid

Child's entire debt to his govertments debl

which Allende at tlut moment was tying lo ra

schedule fo: the sciond consecutive year.

Is is true lar the copper-miners wese the elita:

of Callo's bluecollar class and no doube

warled to leep it that way. To that exient,

perbaps, they may be deened "privilesed"

like, say, coll miners or motor car workers in

Britain: alchough I doubt if that is what members

of the British Labour Party, or the licw Sialesman,

can hare had in mind in embracioz the "prisi

leçad" Ibesis. But a more important reason for the

miners restiveness, I believe, is thar although

they were the must vital of all Chile's manual

workers they sufered far more thau mose of

their cassibile comrades from the couotry's.

sharleting economic decline undes Allende UD 1

live tama and failory worlitos, they could sor

supplement ebeir didial Mages by selling the

Truis a' their Lahour on the black marker The

fana morier abo could tale horse a ract

00000-?

---

## Page 92

poiniore a ler clicers, ui erin a siie of iral.

could made a sand living on the black meikes:

even it his odicind mares semained slationary

while indution soared ol.r.od. The factory sirike?

who nise entitico do suy a proportica o! hi:

raclory's ourgut at pilicial fired, prices could

(and diú) bril that of air or len times what la lad

paid as sonn an ho lufl the fociors geic, its!

miners could hardly find ready buyers fo: a rolen

truck-lond of cooper orc. "

Thus tho copper-miner: were trust, in cher:,

into the sure position as the lotry men, the shop

koepero, ard virtually all of Chile's sclaried

professional men and women: they viere left.

mure or leis defcoccicis against the most vicious

indation lho country had ever experienced

SOMe APOLICiSTS for Allende have maintaiaca

that the decree of inflation was exismersiid 0r.

al any rale, little worse than was custois:ty in

Chile and electere in Latin America. Tie trul

Is that is was far beyond anything nörnälly

endured in that coatinent. As litile as

nine

montis alls Allende came lo power, wisen a

Eurst viriled Chile, the escudo had arcady fisies

from 20 i 10 apainst te U.S. dollar on die fice,

or black, market Eightcen months laler, on 559

socord vi il, live Governinent's own fauci pur

Use sale of inflation at 130% in a year, the soncy

Sue was going up by 10% a munth and lie

escudo had fallen 10 about 350 10 1he black U.S.

dollar. Ily Nusuit 1973, Use official infation rate

was 323% and rising fist, and the ecudo was

worth only 2,000 10 the dollar-an eltuctive

devaluation in less than three years of 10.000%!

•Nor is it cough lo attribute these calai:ro, hic

tates to such adventitious or inalicious ficiors

as-and egin I reler to published arrumenta

falling viorle copper prices, the normal dificulties

of maintaining industrial and farm output in a

dione of railical political chunge, or dcliterale

American intervention,

On the last of there three I have alreilly said

cough, I hope, to show chit it was far from

docisive and that it was,, anyway, largely ralf-

lovired. As lo falling copper prices, the fact is

Chas afles a fall in the first year of Allende's

Govemnient, priocs rocorered until by llie time

of his overthrow they were 80% above the level

at the limo of his election. Hind they not risen

80 siceply he would almost cortinly hive falleo

sodes and probably would not have scurud his

relative,

short-lived succesg in the mid-icon

clactions of March 1973. The dilliculties of main

Laining output jo a time of change, holcier, were

real-unfortunalely, fir more so than Allende

ent scented to realise.

To take just two examples: copper and milk.

Expropriatiou of the cupper mines froin their

Amerian owners would, no doubt, hire led in

isself to the wihdrawal of American rechnicians

as will as of American manugement with some

consequent risk of losing production umporarly, .

at least. But this might have been overcone by

the promotion of trained Chilean manar-rs and

rochnicians, of abom there was no sborage

Alas, for Chie's national income, Allende pot

merely nationalised but deliberatty politicisod

the mines as weil. Jobs for the party boss were

handod out to thousands while traiced Chileam

emigratad so that, aller larse years of Popular

Unity Goverament, mining manpower and 005

had risen by more than a third while mining

Culeil wis corn to abest le dire arreste

:1 like mii, ra lie, secund reain, is derailie l8 !

.....

to soone to ps0000 cl leers

resining lucklide and agen the may be 00

or state lagininão trichit fiar, tos?

Cition der a your en 870 while lie Vertainz

prudestine dropeles is it morneono lad doripiy

pistmled a linie in lie kellerin of every chians in l

tie, land 1l cine lare couperaire Cairy is !

Trinisco.enieefli.mraisilk-prod.cis.zarcasof.i

Crite, the arerage tily winter intake el snit

Tie ahoul Sa10.1451 falloas in 1979, kiy 1'973 18

da" dono 1o YUN, lies was Chis surprisinz

Bart from dire fuel diet leral land returns tanl

cister Menal 1aa1 seizures so that uns szany

disims were in the 128.1s of people wirerly wisherd

engerience, the prices establibers dos resumes

Sass 500st oiher ferm producte tore drauly

ersomic nunitrie, Freurnally in the t05e of

•Cheap, the spireras coerced that a trilo of

milk would seich les las half the frice ul une

eiz trevichly, roladiy mas isicresier ta pra

durinz milk iIi corus rese alauphtered 309a, lezzlo

tiruntains lo hireruna while Arela was

Jused 10 kour the word lus dried milk instis

Mial, tbanks to his systicy in the croses miDes,

te no longer had forsion curseney. 80 88y.801.

SUCT POLLIS WErE TERRIEd EVErYUIETE 28 tAC

tinnantic pe tures ul seiragied revolution mere

prefeated to facine tire facts of life. V.Y.de corerall

prinsuction in buit insiculture and indussy fell

¿rastsou:ly, Allence circuitaneou:ly artempied 10

sodi:tibute the nannal wealch ly giviry Crise's

poorer disses nose isinty to spond. They were

his consuluency and they viere proporiy taidul,

sur many of then ceraialy had never had stuch

telose. Bus you can't redistribule shat yoo kave

aircady thican away; and as outpur variated,

so domestic queues zEN longer, foseiza Lebls

piled up, and the t'rest deficit exparced lize a

hydrozen balloon. Ayes beforc the final criflapse

1 aiked one of Aliende's chiel economic advisors

M'at they were goinz to do to control a stration

lizt was already locking critical the ropliod,

sith commindable annur, lut he ready dila't

kogw. "'I kuow," heraid, " what we ought la co-

we should impose an aueriry sétime untanton.

frozze wages, and talioa essontial supplies But

How can ve? We woald destroy our own pulitical

base...

Precisely. In the end, rather than do tas thi

plunzod un donn the primrose parb of pronaises

and illusions and proclially dellroyon loe

country.

"ruliog dass conspirzoy was

the gloss that they and their supporters put upon

lae reility of their ons miscalculstions

3. The Mjih of the

Constitutional Revolutionary

I policie and characle aburnt which, foeli

---

## Page 93

14-00000

"all lo oches arguments restore. Nas to a

ernuine con-tituticizalis? Shas he a un sevolu.

donary?Washe-couldheeserturehrn--hoth?

Allende himsell, of cours.

admiled no

double Repeatedly, De insisted lal he was a

revolutionary and a Mereist, and that lie intended

1o establish al least the preconditions for what

he told Kégit Dobray sould De loid, wientific

¡Marti: sncialism." Equally repratally, he pra

clairned his faith that he mould achiere this end

by contilutiond nicans, throuch the tailor box

and all it implied. Tiad wins dier all, to te the

distinceivo ""Chilean roid to sorialian" of which

80 nLy pouple outside Chile dierished such

high hopos

Mut no hindsishe is required lu ane this boid

theory and prostive were riddlid wich contra.

dictiona Revolutions are born of, or sonerale,

coctional contier-a fact of poliviail life that

Allende acknowledied erer sino he spoke of

"overthrowing"' what de cided lie "bourgeoi,"

stale, But a d'enitradio constiiation 18s1s UpOn

•consensura basic dcpiance of the fact Usat

the State represents mure phila a mately sectional

Intereil The sosond permis raohn, but the fust

denies it; and there is no way of rounciling the

гно.

All Allende's proctical distantics follos ed

from this simple distiction. Toboo sarinusly, his

construtionalism nican. that his programine

could only succaid it a majority would actually

vote for il Bul, cliörid is he wils wich paly just

over a tlurd of the popular sore and will a large

majorly of Congress ainst hiin. Aliends had

neither a dimocratic nur án administratircly

effective mandale for lis revolution. Indeco, in a

parliamentary rather than a presidential demo

cracy, he would probichly never hure been able lo

begin.

If he was to succeed within his sir year term of

oftie even in opening the door to revolution, let

alone establishing it as accomplished luis, be

had so transform his ininority into a majority.

But how to do is? For, it wards nieins anything.

Alende's had to mean that he intended 10 replace

the existing, sefommable constitution of Chile

with another that would he.

of its Marxist

nature, irreversible. In wher words, a system that

was admittedly demouratic ias lo be usat so

build another that would he eilectively dictatorial.

This was asking the majority to hang liself from

ils own gallows; and, nes surprisiasls, it dailined

ALLENDE'S ATTEMPTS

80 overcome this basic

illogicalisy in his position were precisely what

ensured his ultimare doumifall.

Refusing to

abandon either his revolutiony rhetone or his

professad constitutionalim he was furice to rely

more and more upon politial illasionism. His

sleight-of-hand was oilin semarkable, as

ho

sught to ourwis the epposition majority in

Copereis by exploiting the letter of the consiitu.

tion, usingevery legal loophole to furie ununthem

measures they did Dot sant But in the provets,

inevitably, be destroyod the constirution's spirit.

so that his oppracau briame as ruibless as ho

"Indood, as l discovera fio myself on a risit lo

couttiero Chile nine roans alie: Aüsria's cotives,

local palive furces there were under s, talis inseras

TORs nor lo aliCTIpi lo mIore lue fins de cheu leçel

"Aliende's Chike",

Augar 1u:1, and Alisiair liorar's

"CommAsiant Pepe", July 197::

33

Mas. Al live sian he bro crensiderable oppositioo

sippire in Congra fir neded chancer like do

nationalisation of the corpses mince, laind reform:

and the Balco eidonur of haras anil major i

Industries condone that the deriosals con

senius could and would work within the existing

conititution. Mie, at this enol, not a sinzle membos

of the copersitien maiorily would case a vuie in

his spot They told untrimously lo contents

his "Habitual illesalities"' ant wese cen juined

by die Supreme Court in recusina him of dis

..seeiidling. Uhe male of las. He lund cut away the

middle around of Chiican politios, atocked tho

dannisalie conversus and berullen the reality!

of counter-revolution through his oom addiction

10 revolutionary storans..

Equally intritable uns tho ecosumic breaka

down, which carte tron ilisnuca artempes 1o

enlargo his popular billo outside the political

institutions. Hiere his slan aas two-fuld: to buy

political support aironig: "lie People" through

mansre naie increave ind obe: ber. üts and at

Due came tune do splecio thie sudile class into

submission, or even night from de country,

thioud whelesale naionelication of their inter.

ests and the appointment of his d'un men to all

digniticant civilisenio jobs

, Tie two sinply

cancelled eich other out; for while the first part

¡ of the plan raised vase now expoclations and

demands, the sound diminished the country's

capacily so meet then. The whirling spiral of

infacon follueil as a necessary sesull ol

Allende's pulitical confisione

TIER BASIC CONTRADICTIONs were compounded

by the fragmiented nature of Allended support.

His Popular Unisy coalition was far from united

lu majorily c'ement uns Allende's oun Socialise

Passy-a budy dull buse little sescinblance

"beyond its name lo most of lhe democratic

socialise purries of Lurope which so sathusias

lically ripoused ils cause, It was, in fact, a

revolutionary Marxiss party that begro as a

splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist

Chilean Communise party in the 1930s, and in

rocent gears had acquired a fiery "New Leil"

wing as weil. Several of its leaders, like Scoator

Altamirano, and many of iss rank and fie, con-

stanly uged Aliende to "sperd up the revolution"

without much regard for constitutional nioeties.

The smallest slement of the coalition was the

Cristian rajicals of various persuasions,

5000

of whom hoped un utter a bridge to lie centre.

of Chilean politics hy cooperating with the left

wing of the Christian Demar:is, but Done of

whans ever allained pusitions of real irfluenos

The coalition's sheet anchor was the Coumunist

Party which, as business and adminisiration,

slipped into chaus tirame increasiozly in

portant as a souros of dimipline and suralegio:

thinking

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN hard couch to drin

this soile do tray withour either overstpaul

Ibe constirutivad limits of government or aalt

sonising oue or other of ils elements and thereby

jeopardising the only 'Jemoratic" buse tho

revolution had But Aliende had also lo contend

with the still more militens left ourside the coali.

lion, lod hy the Murement of the Revolubonary

Left (MIR), which insilt on revolution dow,

and by rioice il sanscery-as is MiR's vicH.

Here Allende's professel constitutiosalism was

---

## Page 94

rovealed

r.t

Leur oruinsnt

1io

picially

stipcieel filil'e viuberoe, get lie inter permullled

Ua Asury to real out licia rura-ililury grou;s

When day alignatised lus lisd-refor pro

sarnme as "indequate" and seiial hundreds of

sures al pin-paint he rebulod liam in pocasional

species but did nothing in sertree their actions o

Who Ury Mi jacked lorry-loads of salurbio

manufactures, lo raise funds by seiling them on i

le black suricer, he rarely fried to radress tho 1

crime Tie Icit-sid this was bocauso the MIR

"the Poople" prainst tibom

• Allendi dund not sol. But thie truth, I fear, was

more equalid for one thinp.. Uie MIK hind closa

i friends in the Socialist Party nnd in Allende's

oma entourage chom the President did nor Hunt

lo oferd. for another, as long as their activitics

did nor actually sslit the Pupular Unity coalition,

Swoon ones to so ten pushing mone

tho revolutiva by uncoristitutional mears stilo

Allende denounced there in his sole is a

constitutionaliss

It was not as il Allende was unable lo deal.

with die PfIRi aben he bus 10. For erumple.

muben a Milia force blociaded the Philps

relevicion faciory in Santiago in 1973 alter an

unsuscos: ful aliempe lo hi-jack a lorry-load of.

TV tels, they were allowed by le Goveranient

1o semaio urmolested for sen days, although a

police post was juse across the road. Yet when

diplomatic repicientitions

were made by loo

Duich chargt d'ofaires with the hine rbat his

country's financial aid migit have to be rocoo.

sidered it dais barassment of a Duich calerprio

continued, the Mirisias were hustled away

i wilbout a stor in 21 hours.

A SIMILAR ROUTVOCATION WaS eVident in Allende's

adoption of a personal anned bodyguard-lo

first in memory to accompuny a Chilean President.

It is true that the extreme. Right in Chile was

quick la threaica violence as a resposse lo

Allende's proclaimed revolution, and" Allendo

himself always maintained that be needed pro

loction. But right wing para military groups were

Dever as tiz or as highly organised as those on

the Left; and, in any case, the proper reaction of a

constitutionally-minded President would surely

bave been to call upon his state security forces 10

protest nAjiende formed a personal unit.

Insicad,

known as "the Group of Friends of the Pro

siderl" Trained, armed, and party manned by

•Cubans, it was led by known scvolutionaries,

• sympachelic 10 te MIR,

including Alicade's

sOD-in-Law. The existence of such a group al the

very centre of lbe Stale was sol merely a pro

vocation 10 lie established security furces and an

affront lo Chiero tradition, it was also an implied

rejection of the principle of construtional rule

DOUBTs ABOUT the real depto of Alleade's cos

seirutionalise were raised also by his persosal

history and his languase, both of which russested

a rainentic altachrani do riolenie.

He was

aper all, a foundes and fiss picnical of lo

Latio American Solidarity Oiganizion, cicaled

in llarina in the 1950% and dediaried lo tho

encouragement of arned insurrecion droughout

the continent lle pronised 80 "piuce Suntiago

with blood" in 1970 il Conness Cirlined lo

rarily his cioction as l'icsident, and ha repealcolly

tried so intimidare the opposition, incide and

ourside Congress, with lbe threat of civil war.

These tiere not the actioas or lbe sentimenis of a

man dedisaral do consilutional change, erceps

as a master of expedienoy.

On the other hand, it was bard so see allendo.

as a scnuine revolutionary.. He rcier looked

anything bus the complese bourgcois seducrara

A bun vineur, Dorid bus well-groomed, a snapzy

dresser, with a twinkling eye fos the ludice and a :

good deal of personal chand, his drougest

political card was his still in taclisal manoeuvre

• Buz as a stratesise, a thinker, a mus will a real

messase, he was unconvincing Towards the end,

as he innered wilb increasing frequency oa the

presidential balcony in Santiago

so adisess

chanting crowds of his supporters with revolu

zionary platitudes, he seemed to me to lose all

contace with reality, to haro become an aeror in

love wilh his revolutionary part rather loan a

scrious leader who kncw where lie was going

IN RITROSPICT, I am inclined 1o think this was

always tho truth of the mailer with Alicade.

Basically, he mas a political romantic, dealiaz in

sensations ruther thin sebse. He enjoyed his hour

upon te stage but he never properly assessed

_tha forces he was dealing with, cither for or :

againss him. He raised espoctations on his owa

side without commanding the means so satisfy

them, and be encouraged opposiiva on tho

otbur sidr. by his use of a revolutior. uy sbetoric

whose threats ho also could not suli.

At best be was muddle-headed; and lime may

stow that be was deliberately doccitiul. Cortaialy

be managed to deceive a los of people, including

himself. But in the end reality taught its old, hard

lessons. That you can't be a damocrat and a

revolutionary-at lease, not in a soricy lilt is

already admitiedly democratic That you can't

be anti-American and expeci the Americans lo

help you. That you can't pose is the people's

leader and kick most people in the treih. That

you can's conscripi soldiers into politics and

expect them to remain apolitical. That you can't

have infation roaring out of sight crid maintain a

base for social wellure. That, in short, the real

world is nor Cloud-suckoo-land. Dunn bere,

you just can's bave your cake aru eat in

It is sad that such elementary lessons should

have to be laught jer agaio at sual tragi cost in

•Chitc. But it is alarrios that so many peoplo

elsewhere should evidealy fail to grasp that they

are the lessone.

---

## Page 95

14-00000

MATERIAL RESIREEN AN COA HEADQUARTRID 18

HOUSE SHECY COMMITTEE ON ASSARGENATIOSS STAND BEERS

INCLISIVE DATES: SERT. 1973-H99 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

KOON:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:!,

DATE

RECEIVED

DATE

RETURNED

REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAI

NO DOCUMENTS

HAY

BE. COPIED OR REMOVED FROT THIS FILE

-

FUOMEN

BOL..

---

## Page 96

14-00000

watudenescoogunool"tg

SUAAC: ANN

IrOMCT

REATFD:

S2 F0 PoloCeS5X2E

0/:1/1NS

FROAt- LDivicion!

_Cansia8e, Chilc

---.

110H99A11

C/1A

a 1lo!1

118.7:5

CoospaEreP.ced 1 81200589 :2.

1:1.9.4

i- idl.

1e! 111615 1068 16 G0019 G1101.1. 1111.0 DV11 L

8.P::41 011 T11:

11..0 LGANCLID DE MAGEOE IN,TS.

115:A 1- A1L Dó! MARAÓ 1:06;8 BSF:,T8811.F..

116.11

Aeir H0r!

lllt.l1

AmtWOl

LAIID

10

wend maroeNemd doos mor

tm Goe100 19 1919 161019.10:11000

NS0 0r l0 T0 6: 1.10015 dE ll D0 DEEll0i Pilai.i.

orsit:.

10

loftlt dur. tfl. Or

Mantiral. Tol dir ildi - 13

IN A FILE. DM 10 BAAMI: OTIILR I XHEADAIURÀ FLATARINS.

1619 7 1000 0-058. M1996T 1100G DU6t110 d06

Drnicn tiim

LULE 1Oi dIli Glastario.

u1n11-Am.6010.611611 Mr!r14.1 41.141?d 11011 &

1110:15 ACCORDIRG 1O LEMHL!i0 PEREie Coiic.

QUI:?5.

CONiULO PEU 11A0 CiA ANE PECBLENS 11..1

HIEGREOON CONCEININO TIE

iYp.OF rIE

Z coirmr Nurar

COUE IFHTI MUMIHLN

Titiour mümdiie

Horten ie autoralr.ct

SUBJECT

PROJE.CT

015

124

052

3 MEr Mi: CSREGIC SUWLCTTIPRONACTE LRAINES 1O95 CrACiST

FUOMEN

ACTIOTE TEEQUIRED

_AIALYSIS

AC

Lorea tius

JiRLUSE AERADDRATS DE.

PIOFIIN CILE THLE

Mhu r3Ro0Tc5.05

MiLenLT,

TETAIN

UISPOSITN

DISTRNC TON REROMAC.:

SA:OU IIDAILI

T. HITCTLETLO STATIONS IPHJILETS GIRITT

HCS

EILESACTION

O1.

G /1L!

HESTRICTED

UPRESTRICTED

10. COMMPERTS CINCLUDE SPECHL HEADQUARTERS ROUTRE INSTAUC IO%SI

TO. INTERISTEU NFEDQUARIERS DESKTESTECHONOETREIT

015

LEMARGI PERNAVEAITY

LIOFTICER & PFEN:

•ПЕРАН FCIUEE A!!

•ENO TO REQUESIN

ENDOR:ENENT

De SNAR.CR:DISN a. D17 4 S

nisfer Dare

116.26

- LA/RAS

Frai.le

12-83

812

OUSONAT PRI:0US

COORDIP ATIOS

SIGN.

ATUME GA LRANCIVCESR R. O

WISEN AFPLICANLEI

SECREI

.13.

RiD APPROVAL

Hr.gUISI APPMOVEU BY

isfdlieide finaneiek

cos mer remasle.

idini

38

1--üs cart

---

## Page 97

14-00000

CADLE SEC DISSIMO ZE._ PER...

PERSON :UNI: NOTIPIRO

10.9 runt:

SEGRET

APRODUCTION O

GOUIND OFFIC

ОТИВА ТИДЯ

•MOMIDITED

STARS

ACTION UNIT

RF

FILF.

•!

ACTION !

т 375103

E1A916

PAGE 81-31

TOR 12816287

AUG 74

IN 165016

141)

„НАМЗ jR5402

SECRET 281011:

AUG 7& STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 25402

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE.

MÜCRUNCH FUOMEN REDLEG

REF: EGGA- 6103, 12 AUG 74

rio-jer

1. OARTICLE BY PROF, JAMES

THEBER GE, PUBLISHED IN

SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. J, NO. 17. 15 AUG, ENTITLED:.

"KREMLIN'S

HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR

PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF.

WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE, WILL ADVISE, SUGGEST NO INCLUDE ARTICLE

IN PRESS COMMENTS.

2.

FILE DEFER,

EZ IMPDET,

SE C

E.

128 G74

---

## Page 98

0000+

---

## Page 99

14-00000

TU

Listenri

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

FROM

Chief, EUk Division

No. 669923

ITEMNO.

DESCRIPTION

Newspaper articlo

FUONEN/PSYCH Ref: 10:1.SINNT

22455

E2 IMPDET

FORM 1 236a

SECRET

113-87)

---

## Page 100

14-00000

KITIR 3

Allendes misstag

site dobredora jundidro

crombrobre 1110m

chile. beraroibrigtalhoomobritinerooded.comoor.fel

: One san parie nor deijo forno do do bade ond del some

Dir

firs

hippen.

nos ander

19:11

-ij

ril

Horarihe Clilo Guer, moder ned eflor Allondes sil. 1io

orle ekörder fraseisen.

-Salsilore Allerale sat "Polher.

disen serenilaralo.

Afon «lulie lintli-

pá teealg säg i larinameida. Ar

prolitick ermodrato? Mion in aruial

paliteck cenobrati""

foralistliganale

di de seus land.

chommais tillones

ren confordel.

ning au intranser cato livrarientre-

Kopyour sikrige.

— Frppaen soarar lir upp fill fura

expuses 140%

ar Milanohlerna. Linter dren fire

füesfis

dier i melameriband agro. I alutel

hallien

av

frei regimen.

Staten iverloge

'chilenierrin"

,1'"

freis

as herpsarn dis.dde

larsdallogiale greson ill rillogg lisl

pruselagon 1971. 8005a0 010er.ill.

ning

fill

14810.0

amerihansdn

"K'14

hans

espering ansig ale ale inte hide riu

all bretala konant orälung i dollar.

int

ai de fleste

der.

flore

dure Alleralo emis den idi7 di mon

berlankle

ill.a

ADE 1.19G.

sindrada. con lushedlas em tcht.er

Tick le'n

i

ühade under Allendes providomid.

Under hans finora ir mingsinlisles

bele dens linegient serdiga presi.

dengerindon.

dinis

Alla

sera peritegen..

upports ho

din oralligars

1073.

Tantarteterna repanivorales liedlige.

lin annan dil predia dupationino

mas ganger realan unador

Allerates lunara de pantore lne urales

Freis ed. Jordagena tarjade gui till

nadangrepp.

garderng hiat inte

Mesolers

Aürego jenneneslise weile

fürfulliero, alger ars Chile-ilo.

lealdere

fir

murielig.

"Hos dir

rikrigs inte iron liennes liritier.

pri ded sue cor fil prà Alleeslos

siel senero borre minso indo lineca

ais magensins".

101.3

.. Violer min vistels i Sintiago i

Aixina i contrum ele lor boarler

lange, Direllad Arares Kung.

Fürlrade städler

de chronomista

problemen

melirde politis problem. Allen-

mrlatarckl..vm

seil minskinke.

Arpectoralen dolosole h. 1.9ri.

li'l

Jet

war

поко л1ніn

a parlament — presidene fortalle

Alenor dredo mill arearder som inte

wur

lirrenliga

no demohrialishie

prisiper din gallando lagar.

à inn urrechling lyder pü ai

sarpo lisot alt mut llertalers sile

linea

Irain

parliecki

nestlin desdor lix

Mil board sulle gymnis

kum faterar Andres Küng.

sen

ing's

miss challanden

tillgangen

sering problem

bringer.

en riel alfärer lor all depu en

stre lendining do ermizonte.

nusarane mulalar juntan.

Flitir färfaltare

---

## Page 101

14.00000

i seen..

readin. 4189

i 10.0

LiAS

11A211

haditi

"77 79997}

MELS. 82499

...tt t

site Mesical 16459.

1817459851

¡ago MOUNG Satie.

ACCOP11•D TE : MAY TA REVIEN IN PLANION

ME DESCRE, DOING AND AGREE GLENDE'S TIME-CLADELS THE

SHEDISA LEGATE ENEMILE AS "OVE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES LA DETAIL

ALLENGE'S ECCROMIC DOLLETED DUD THE INCREASINGLE CRITICAL ECONONIC

OREFLETS UNDER ALLENDE'S INDEE MEDRSO AND THE CONCOMITANT

•GLITICAL PROBLEMS MAT LEU DULENCE DO MEASURES WHICH WEG

MISCEMRATIBLE MiTH DEMOGGRIE DRDOCIPLES AND EXISTINO LANSO..

10:911

AUTO NOTES PHA: "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETNER REAGTIONARY

DO REVOLUTIONADO, CAL BRITU ABCU? A MOVE AGAINST A SOGIALISS.

OR PASTINI DICIARUGER OUTA ME DODS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTARE -

DURITO RULENDE'S TIME CAN DE USES AS EXCUSE MOR PHE COUP

AT AL

---

## Page 102

14-00000

is

. ....

. 8.

4!.

STATE

a. 1120 .

• 291:41

F156 82-32

7H 775779

NELS 8?493

7.

MON LIVES DY HALND. NAS

DEOCHÖLE MAITRE GRO DUTEN ALiA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC

.?..

'jo.

---

## Page 103

14-00000

TOTAL COMEs 781

SECRET

RUN Or

IQUIMO OPPICE IN PRO

_ADYANGA COCLISZUIRISHRLILO

ACTION UNIT

AF.

FILE

-AL

STAFF

CHION I

Т 172681

E 1A126

PAGE 01-01

T0R18716312 JUN 74

IN 274496

SAGO: 29396

SECRET B71544Z JUN T4 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGOE8396

TOS DIRECTOR DUFO PARIS:

RYBAT HYADE

REFSI A. PARIS 48988(2273492)

B. DIRECTOR 558514

1O STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT, IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY

DID WANT TO SUÄRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING

ГАСТ.

2. FILE:

5606-4213-281-927986. EZ IMPDET

li.-

SEC

E

---

## Page 104

4-00000

CABLE SEE DIBSEM DY

•PER -

POPAL COPIRO 27.1

PRODUCTIO

PRACON/UNIT NOTIPIRO.

LADYANGE SOFT ISQUID:SLOLIED_

ACTION UNIT

qw HS

N

FILE

ACTION O

STAFF

9353 4eslE63

164854

E1A366

• PAGE 01

IN 273492

TOM: 8620187 JUNTA

PARI

48989

SECRET EO1EZGZ GUN TA STAFF

CITE PAHIS 48989

Til:

1OS DIRECTON INFE SATIAGO FUELEN

RYBAT HYSAGE

HEF: DIRECTOR. 5,95:4

DC/V/H/3

V/H/di:

WH/C!i

1, DEFER SANTIAGO GE PARAS BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE

GAINEO IN FSYCH TERPS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY

WHETHER ALLENDE KILLES ANILE FIGHTING UR ATTEMATING SURRENDER.

JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LON IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING

WOULE NOT MAKE MUCH SIFFEREICE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND

AGAINST QUINTA SNUULO IT EMENGE HE DIED NHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUNO ALLENDE REFUSED

ALLOW HIN SUPRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT GE AHOTHER STORY BUT THIS

NOT CLEAN FRON DEF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE

SUCH VENSION STICK BEÇAUSE OF MIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL

PALACE.

3.

FILE:

55+0044138 211-987906. t2, IMPDET

PAOHIBI

SECRET

---

## Page 105

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Helsinkl

IN/O.

FROM

C/MM

Diviston

Acting Chief of Station, Santiago i"

SUBIC " FUDMEN Psych

ACTION REQUIRID. RUTERENCIS

•Ref: HELSINKI 22455

PROCESSING ACION

MAÇAID FOR INDEXING

AD IADEKING FIQUIRED

ONLY QUAINTO DiSK

¡CAN IUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

It available, we would appreclate receiving four

coples of Anures Kung's book mentioned in reference.

EZ IMPDET.

Lestle Hi BERRERIAY

Distribution:

2 cos Helsink - to out poil

1: 19

CROSS REFERENCE 1O

RECORD COPY

¡DISPATCH SIMBOL AND NUMBER

HCSA - 18908

CLANUTRATION

SECRET

3 Hay 192.

HOS HU MUMBLE, 5-02Y-52

"Defer

---

## Page 106

NETHERLINDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

Lutstorial by M van lifeuwenhuysens Reformatorisch Dasblad,

butch, 19 April 1974, P 5

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be

having adjustment problems.

These rather prolonged

symptoms

seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they

still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of

their karxist president. is

definitely over and that their

country is now being ruled by a small

group of reactionaries

who are trying to keep the

people under control through

terrorism, repression, and torture.

Such problens will take

you quite a ways

in the letherlands and those idealists were

quick to take advantage of it.

"elfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately

250 refugees with a high school or university education do

not work.

About half of them have been housed at the

"Huis

ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on

the terrace or play volleyball in

the yard.

Board and

lodging are free and at the end

of the week they pick up

another 25 guilders pocket money.

In addition they receive

free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and

compensation for each

trip they have to take.

idea that they are better off than

many. old people

in the letherlands?

You are probably right,

because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare,

are being paid from the frozen funds which had been

allocated for development aid

to their fatherland, Chile.

So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

---

## Page 107

14-00000

Considering that this small proup of pampered exiles

is preaching revolution even here

and with a full stomach,

It may be. useful to point out a few facts.

These are facts

which are well known

in the Ministry in The lague but for

some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Faster

The great majority of the refugees are not even

Chilean

nationals.

Uruguay.

They are natives of

They came to Chile as a result of illegal and

revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in

these south and Middle American countries, the ultimate

congequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende

His first action ag

president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to

declare amnesty for all those who "were members of

terrorist

underground organizations," those who during the last months

of. his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank

the armed robbery of self-service stores,

the theft

of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and

attempted

murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received

Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of

granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries.

These refugees with a high

school or higher level education

seemed

to have no adjustment problems in Chile.

Ag a result

they soon found their way to important key positiong in the

government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in

Chile either, because they

felt protected by a militant

liarxist army, armed to

Some 10,000 revolutionaries,

from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition

is known for not exage rafeblat

a Swiss newspaper which

Dr. liario Puelma,

niversity of freiburg, wrote the following

"The concept

i political refugee is only of limited value when appliec

tọ Chile.

whatever one's attitude toward the military junta

---

## Page 108

14.00000

may be, one thing is certains

the Chilean rofupens wore not

pursued only because of their ideology.

thoir status, or

thoir origin.

This is the traditional, humanitarian dofini-

tion for a refurce.

for the most part they are people who,

in their own country, could be lerally charged with crimes

which are punishable under any Judicini system.

These rofugees carried out activities in Chilo which

were againat the constitution.

As a matter of fact, they are

specialists in violence.

This in why they sought asylum

the foreign embassies

in Santlago and why there are so many

foreignors among them."

8463

C.50 s

8014/2087-W

---

## Page 109

frunrleen hocft

srisstemeligri ely-

e neuors

zullen

en sefoullleerd

hol eprnet

k19-

edrn (fs 511818101-

1 mil Mecranten.

lens zurdor pari

beltrallenr neet

I-

jlelling dan net-

*ilurinten.

e z11n brland.

• hetire vertinis.

gengurrt

lussen

ibrilch!

tipt"

inlocinla dat

prs pesrtif-ifer.r'

Hrr-gingess ont-

dero cremmunis-

de ivaliticatlos

'гіл-п-

Rinrnrinir vor-

1n 1n6n1tz

milltulre, brind-

fxermangeuvrry

a het kussische

soleren.

Hei

АтАТІ-

wuttenlandse

laK

exfuoriver-

util

krarhlaris

dechtrronder-

Brotr

Ameri-

orlekcin

Cubd.

DULU'S

Deze

waargchlinljk

dixlrns;

riar;

i,e.1

i de orRatisai'e

en teyon Cubo

anbargo!

V.S.-eronomie

loopt terug

WA5H1XI;TUS

- D Ainerikaanor

miraig huritt dondening irnend Er-

m.iidt dud elr nathonale erespamie lir.l

dritihliger la tenupérlopen, ln her ror-

sir äwiartanl sun dit Jians,

17racht.

dan Wias

frijeen

sieksn lastendirn

riei Mires dinn lien prerni!,

brun naihwidie

srralukl i'na.

mnindenle in lire renste d'oarlail mrt

mn mar-penentage van sil bit te dle

mair keer ands 1070 dat hot brulro

П913:Vidir

proxiliae 1s

her di sie

srirnisidlert en

shrrpsre dlaling in 18 jaar.

de vermindoring van hei bru's, naito-

8.ale

pereadint micl S.B prie;rrit

veisririen

ttirk'?

tail

worden mies ren schatlinié

lussen de 3'°n a preatlil, 20010

din sr de regrring wak poriesh. Ii

hird

MAALSIr

kiartaal

t'in

weirtg

jiar nain hes bruto natkenale produxe

wart 1.0 procent.

MINISTERO KKIGEN NUIS.ARREST

Ethiopische leger nit

scherpe verwijten

ETINOPIR': : DKER

ADDl

ANibil - Prmler Eindal-

hem de rraas werel gesteld waarm

kachen Malnara van Arhirgid hreft

arme

Ethlopitr

die

donderdas idradermasbs due de le.

hort: festolen.

mn brocd

numiddrllilk

drla van de merriue dir eind lobrsurt

vangeaus Ingant, lerwifl de ex-mints-

derer

ters

Mnüilrnhten

werd df e inte userrest

PMISlIRC.

RAISOnErA

hebben

hrbbrn begaan.

miscaden

zouden

niet

voor ie recht-

band

wunden gedaagd en

tniar or.-

Nolgons de Areecisihe radio herlt

schinden! op stran: rundinpen.

Makkonen di guogi on eon bijern-

Matonnen oo1 dat pe ren rurnmissie

komy 1n Aàisi diitu vun rond 2.000

Is benitemd dir een onderzutik mort

officiern

Inspotie:

=uichuppen.

naar

het

T pre-.

gedrag

van

mler s0a Tiax:

we bijernkeast ont-

r'oormalige ministers.

boden zin aint de siridkrachten dle

hem hadden iawe weidr dat het leger

Eeobungin

POLITIE

: in te grijpon als

er nier mnmrids

"s iegen de minis-

In da stad Asmara heelt de polltle

Bors wrni ongririça.

bekerrigemaakt dar alj geen routine

Hlet leger

inroii de ministers dat

werà ninis tal vertichten, onda: haar

aij hes laind in ra revuomische chaos

eis

10t

ontala?

van

hei

bebhen

iandelife

h00!1 ran

srantE

willze sortlido broders ea na

onwelllre

raal tülme Shibeshi.

de polltle, lultemant-zene-

hun al-

Ireden

nlet le ingrwil-

lied.

hebma

MitatezwOren

orn

l'ivris betsben de 1.200 spuor-

verderiüheid le rseica

WrymnAir.en

die woensdng in siakirg

aljn pesaan, de vrachiauio's legennge-

houdes

PL.ANVEN

nuar

die

gOAieren

van

Ab.nara

de haversiad Massawa zouden

Mnkonnen

brengen.

bijrenkomst

epn

4111975:0

rtrptiing

t'an

norvorinuls'.

10k. 01:? 1070

tifn

de

hun

vourliep:e::

..r...110.

crril ern

vanoep

op ho?.

CMel0 le L0den

van

Ttrht

14!1r HIPI

land

In

Hantr'

üayen

die nug

zullen

krinten.

-.tlarrn

huisarresr

Tin

Z0U

ney

i,srmalige mints-

ICrS

bekend

mnee

yemaakt

torn

Liberaal

Kennedr aan

het woord

rbeidsonrust

in Canada

OTT.AIrA -

ommrairle

De

pastenjen,

ruchtferkeer

he:

schreprssrrerkeer

op

e.n

het

rence avies in

Carada

de S!.-Law-

Rijn

verlaind

dais mey stating die het

land dagr-

1:Jks

De

fdr':

miljoenen

KasL

arhe:Jannust

dan

duurt

dollars

nu

al

Ir.PeT

urrs en zal volgens de Ca-

nade.e

miirmentaire

inilatie.

i!e

oppositie

mmenise!

jaarlijks

de

10

pricent Iniraag:.

oimuc.th

Dai?

tizhir

stakinben

de holft

ailro

is

Er'slute?

nilkkantoren

in init

tan!!

triistiakoood

gerülgt

•an

14:

wlilat..

mneihtchedion

tsr.

VRIJDAG 18 APRIL 1978

Opgemerkt

Chili

C'hlleense

rlurhirlingen.

üeueM

schijnen

•папродка!

prublemon'

hrhien.

Togal

langiiurlar

vrtrhtmont Tlüiht

on-

Herrisoer

errmoreaaks er

M0edien

sloordat

if)

hre noog alerele sles

kunnen derkrogpen dire de corlalla.

dlache druom

dille dle

dlurslallorhe

presldent deflnidtel coorbol).de rn dal

hun land mue bebirened worile direr

sen kielue arorp martionnleen dle

nore derseur, onderdriokklnz en lol.

lerlazeno probrero lere coll ondler do

dulm le houden. Del so'n lange s0l.

sin hoom de een horl eindl lss die.

derland en die hädden dero Ideallo-

den al sauw ln de gaten.

VERZORCING

S'ant wat-lo hel krool?. Hrrken

doen de mresle dan de ongricer 270

rluchlelingen vau

milddrlbanr

unlorrallair nireau niet.

Dnkevere

de helle dan hes lo ondergebruels 11

het „Iluie der schlr" In esrerochle.

wnas all op her terras prnlrien san

de zon of sollesbal apelen In de

eriles. Kuot en inmontug stlu Rralle;

r°san hel eindr van de serk v'ans.

son all ook nog eeno vilfemsotmlle;

rulden zakerld. Maarblf krllern il)

noR Bralls laalruroussrn. con rit.

lrnkaars soor de huis en cen verano.

ding sour elle selo die alj moeten

maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U sinds das xij hes beier hebben

als

menig

Nederlands

bejaarde?

H'aarschljnlljk hobt u relljk. want

de

C'hlleensse

hallingen hrhixien

nies san de biforand le lesen: all

sarden namelijl ertinanrleral doue

de erblukkeerde pelden sour ont.

mihheitogshulse

aan hunt raderlaret

Chill. He aird u nodar herr goed 111s

brlasthegeold seurile lontrrl.

Dase dil lii dr

madlres srleedlo

Rrnepue ballingen erlsa hier nog nirt

solle mass de rerolutie predibo lo

hes nolsorhirn nuttig enige leilen le

nurmen. teiten die op hee minierir

In ihrn Hlaas welbrliend sljn.

midar

am de sen of andere relen nooil de

pers Ill irderland halrn.

FFITEN

De slurhtelinzen hobbru toar ber

osererure deel nirt reos de Chi-

lernoe natlunalitril. 'Ly djo atkom.

---

## Page 110

4.00000

---

## Page 111

4-00000

1:83/:100189

--

Ainapiratstioa

eeaater tolssaril Kiramnalo brelt d011-

Meatloge latruod dgo code preric19.11ge1ilie.

iis

"eblettrkn

hoantdiiros leei-

aridlra

ilro

wmdmtcnth.com

oothd

1tro

ipiri serenroloddd dis ontures is toes

meestilons van do allciatischr

(,ee dljt)

geterearid:11.

12-28: 0080m1ngn hridoen hed gesnhll

tuiern Millü

12 1

Pusdslavir

trior

ze +285730389179100

Aotir li"

Irn doidrt in

T.1÷=t

vetwcherpe.

Krnardly

TV ATR::)o

hot geen

narlocnode saorleds

ciint eit age--

erninig nleg bon mindrh aleirlast :19n-

diet se.

in vercheidrnr maundlete

vITrTi

l virlerinliid Widsedo

4011)-

тле-ті.

I.t:

Amrrikänhsr

somialens

durd.er0ig 119801

brkxe'x

vit

ds!a

diszere.

11)038118

hriwrtk

hij brrcgire.

kinken

vorrie met onler incer

8i:do.et

T'1lo,

1:8:-

naar

tie sovaral;nir.

arratzr rriass.

llij

wiror

orate.?

...

Iralrui," le- olgm van alom sosperresen

1et lre Culddasiseln sluätsheailes.

s martnomare dollertin pardar i: 1-

shiiris

unrerns,

wiary

poitttiria

wenl rerecatt do l'anadoo prddote::

dr berseraliei.

workneniet with

lamrioon ciolien.

ma.r

dr aroalirid

wrieeit de underhandeirn

irinls: ip.

detres wrer san lur wirk ks.

108 leaMison age do 51.-1.01050198° Ti-

vler. dir srue alle shrrpranriritn?

goTärn

luasrey

390H1r0:1

irigox

aijn al eon werk ln atabinà exarias aij

rin

mnidrligkn loamsvertrciins ri-

gr1

van 20 (xx) d0t

AMOr) dotler Iwr

далт.

179

TrartlnK

horft he'm

89187)

dullar grbemien eure ren prrlvie van

drie Jhar en dorkl munenerel naar

ningrligkhedlen

(AT)

tr.

Inaisen

dwingen hrt

wark to hurvaitria.

het luchthaten periine!

rist

loonsicrhozing von rnd dr dar dii-

lar. Ie achit erretatr luchularrias van

hrt

landd holben 1r

nfarkyoil

urri

halvr

kricht

tourril.

lintor

Amist cen slaking von de vorderrici-

ders.

ligk halfrond

ver Cuba

Trak krijgt

parlement

ungton

oco donder-

an miniNterH

mielfrond in

ramenligad oys

jolgend jaur

nalaten

le voorkonión dal de lrireer

uit

Listijng-Amerik.

nog

metr.

B'oJd

kerperkinigen

onuerhertg

worus

*к:-

• Fnisisk.L,

BAGDAD

Mesoan de rrok kr oim

solksverteaenworrdlging.

Het '1.

diuna vnn het „uroirraslore naion.ale

fron!"

horse hlertor.

besleten.

e0 1a

dondontuk

ttkendg.munkt.

N'anirer

de

wolksvenesenwenridlaing ir

tinit

en oe die col stund eal komnen diaer dl.

grniene

verkleringen,

1o nog 11td! iye

gloten.

In

Huxdad

alaat

SNA'E

gebouw voor crn natlonalo vérjaio-

ring

maar het ly nog noall drbruii.

Do

sixlaldstlacha

Bans-partij nn

cuminuniilen

→wentre

samdch

in

fiel

progressirie natlonale fron%.

COUDPRONATIE ACHTERUIT

ein van hei wes-

Iexles-y1ad

resr hart slell niet

yruw in de prul-

Tusk

Mintster

KIs-

woker

van

nterl Stlen

1?

Efte zlin in vorle-

onitrent

bijee-nkomst

nkoinst

wurdt

n de organtsutle:

n о rrin t

Grote onrust onder

mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

J0H1NSrsBBl - 1n de algelopen weken ls mourd en dinndslag in de

Puldatrikaanse poudmlinen onder de zuarle munsierkere dot cen sorabamado

omsang ustgrgrocid. De junpole balano van bloedige slambuisien lusson sest-

arleidrro ult Lesotho eu de Sbeni's In de Ruudmün Carletunullle, bU Jobaners-

burg, lulde: dien dourn en drie en zeotig sewonden.

EMBANGO

waarmey"

nswmrmen atr

over

Cuim Ke-

•his economliche

neden. Nlettemin

mimens

dilt het

ultaat

de

ingion 1s.

dat de

lijken tr sljn

rgoheleld

tegen

natigen.

Wut

de

un de verschillen

enerika en de LA-

den

gebleven

te

De meresto slachidlens waren

welijks veirminkt.

de:n

Stulodlaalien

iru-

ЖУЄТ-

vernteid,

me: tildinr

uveracen

en'

in

Iikalle

mijnwtrke.ts

Eeslosen.

V'iuchtende

cijn roigens augge tuigin

durigrsch01e1.

Tienduvend Baacho's hebben

siruds

februari

werkiermin

in

Z.u1d-

Afritin

in

de.

Sic'й

srlaten to

2in

nadr

hun

veilige

Mrxaihtig*

vider-

lard Laisulhlo

terkssrdct'n!.

V'ele an-

dere zijn

van plan nt naur lesíriho

Besui de gaun, tia de busorso's vrezen

thans de mujnwertors u!

Ja!aw'l dan

de DeuT? le zyn.

zegt te

wettn

waurom de nijale's

Kers elkaur dondslaan.

"llun rerte

Genwnindigers weten

her nice en ik

bermislel, of de arbelders arif toi viel

wcien", aldus de bedrijfslelides.

l'eien

menen,

dit

ingenteieiie

vo_- afschuffing

mmernun

nladt

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders

N'#?.

de

zwarte

mljnwerkers verklarn. da: de mijn-

niets

in

it

brnien

hetben

Begenover de bianär

lriding von de

munen

+'n

niets

+a.1

ir

arDttilaim-

stantmen-rijandschap

de

arreatk

is

s'an d'e onlusien. Daarblj kanil dás dij

de

huidise

HUAKnCAAI

Ririgt

aanteiding

r'oldoende is

on ir 13.t1

segin de gastarbelders lol den étplut

sie

te

bringen.

De

mlinmaatihia

pljen

hebben zich to1 duster lerzes

segen

de els.

de

zwarle muantairs

Le s'roeperen naar de strexen 8715 =

v'andaan

komen.

Zij

nurcanrale

ds:

dan

Fog arnient onlusten zouden inili:aar

Het

kunnen

zelfs

rot

„slachspatier"

komen.

Intussen

gousproduklie

achteruit.

:613:

In

LANYIO

de dr deri meorden hicns

braclios

ceuorden

leruastárta

dlin lne dloer Buid vie Dill09.

Anreriadoeso landlon Punivis Porie

erhonden mere cendodlede ine ror.olu.

siomnirr

огогодіокА

a S-aZt.NIP

sti

de ulelndrllike consngoreiles nire

senerrn lo dlragrn.

In hre d'hlll dan Aikorär deuchlin

OU dicd shule anodre .Nitrvie Degrlyo

soonle dener hum ardras. Giiie riralr

daad als presisond, porn sii la no.

iember 1970 arinsraltenod, sai2s br-

scone namcllfl uit trs sisundigon

ran amneslir voor al dirttoen, dle

illd sarrl tan con seeruristische

ondrrenondler organisaiir", rour hen

die In dr lailade maandes voder aljn

Ptersaneer wurr aanertäterd tour

hel hirodrre

tan hantros

gerrid.

dlantler

overdallen

seilbedir.

nineuolnkels, dicfalad daz

bypent

ale mislealrr denale anmtarigen es

manirolanndluren.

1u snlen Tan dene sesolu-

dlonaimis

Chllrens

eigèrmatleke

Flasur hreern lo anh rertia.chaas

alo men virrl dlat de arcecina ran

Allendlo eou brlrid drnroo due er op

perliht

1'19 DIT

juist rertäitster.

Runninarl eo greon das düe lope

mrdludlonalren. Doze virebielineen

san mblelelbanr on titrs

mibrau

llchrn

namelljk: In

jpiX

Reen

saanpas+(n441041450009 teheb-

bren. 7ll ronden dan mnt osidra bun

wee baar bélangrlitie drca busitire

In de rrerrlng.

Slapeloee

nachern hordin

do

"ierrnbeilen" ln Chlll ont zier. om.

dat alj aich bescherad darivin duur

nesl lud de tandlen erairzetul mili-

rans-11ar8l tiach enldaimircer. To'n

10.00n rroolutlonatren ni aite wtnd.

serrken slunden hon ero soichik-

alnx.

DEFINITIEF

In

het

„Berner Tarnhisti' sen

Twlesene krant die ahet ziet aan

orcrelruring

krhuldic

maakl.

schrelle dr. Marto Meriras dan de

Friburere Unierrliril: "tied ione-

ropt dan de

polllirtie rrabieling

kan mes belrekkine lot übit dlechas

In seer beperkle mals srileia Hise

wil man slaan traizuver de

milisaire junta, con ding $a siter: de

Chileruve dluchlelingen antien niel

alieen sersolad soor bua iinulugie.

atalus al afkomse. Dil lassite in de

traditloncle

humanitaire

utilenitle

s'an son vervoledo, Viomi see gruol-

sie doel zUn het monsra de in hun

rieen land

seltrluk

anTieatliaagd

kunnen worden vons miusalea die

ander elt

rechlihr.trscrarb.oor

• dlin

1esr sluchrelingen suerdeo ln

Chili daden uit die in stid varen

mel de srundiret in fniz siio hel.

aprrlalidien

in srarid (in

deze

mlenen sorhten sij auirl inp de but-

senlandor ambassadrs to

santisgo

ea dasnor berindra

Tih soberl

Auitenlenders onder bra.*

---

## Page 112

14-00000

UNIGUING MESONGE

35-3

1:'-

OMF. 0

0

0

0

SECRET

+0 804084669м0 030-0200

STAFF

COME: EURT

$910.4048 3000,0

3022402

DIRECTOR

554999

309 16/6

PГ.R

13/E 44, 056/10, 0831765 0 MenS

C/18H11,

TO: BOIN BASE INFO BONNI SANTIAGO, HAMBURG.Y

FUONYX CASUAPPY TOFOCUS Y

REFS: A. CONN BASE 31991 SIN 2620141.

W/HIS/SA

VIH/L/FI.

W/H/1/F.P.--

• 8. DIRECTOR S18HSZ Y

• L FOR REF A FEATURE, SUGGEST BASE PROVIDE CARUARRY WITH

APPROPRIATE INFO ON REBUFUGEES AVAILABLE IN NUMEROUS HAS TRACE CAOLES

SENT BOll.. WE ARE UNABLES IDENTIFY ANY REFUGIES LIVING IN GERMANY

UNDER FALSE IDENTITY.Y

2. AIPMAILING TO OCROUTSAS BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON LEFTIST BRBOD

EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME, INCLUDING:Y

A. LCBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES. Y

B. NEUS BULLETILD PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY

COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEUS" SECTION AND A

SECTICA GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y

6. ARTICLES RE PUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME,

APRIL 74..4

D. MAY 1474 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y

• EBB. APRIL 1.971 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN

DATE!

ORIG:

UMIT:

EXT:

нах тотьел

REPHODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUIME OFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

ATHANATOO CArEER

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 113

14-00000

COLLINU

AROMAI, CAMIAR USE UNLY

1r. p

lindersus

0

400

OMF D

4108010184951n

SECRET

по палие нажа ноо тотям. А 9о,о

STAFF

CONF:

BE

Dn /8. 10008 0947600

DIRECTOR

000210078penno nr00

INTO: FILE

0000.

но окол.

DISSEM BY:

556999

0

i ease

SOLILARITY MELTING HELD FRANKFURT 24-22 APRIL. L

3.. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOULEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR

•INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST-EFFORT DISCREDIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE,

SUGGEST CARISARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO

PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO

WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN DA815-L6 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY

BERNER TAGELATT ON SUBJÉCT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA

GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS

RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF TREFU-

GEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT. OF.

POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY.

CUOTES FIREM

LIMITED SENSE...' (SEE ARPEG BOZD, REF BO FOR SECTED ARTICLES- JA

4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT

D

CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS

¡ND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTER-

NATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETINE HAS INTIMI-

DATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BEENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF

"SOLIDARITY, " EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINALI

DATE:

ORIO:

UNIT:

EXT:

respecaron

REPRODUCTION

(OOD0-1ATIS DARICANS

OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMI9..È

ДИНАМТУСАТЬЯ САТИВА

E 2

IMPOET

CL BY:

---

## Page 114

4-00000

1р0

OMF

0

0

0

SECRET

1010 1-000 09-00

STAFF

CONF:

елоо

DIRECTOP

DISSEM DY:

• INFO: FIL&

556999

0

18

TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN

•ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND

REASSESSING THEIR OUN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESEFULLY DEALING WITH MON-

COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NOW-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT

ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH

.VIETNAM NO LONGEP. AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRE-

SENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETUEL! COMMUNIST AND MON-

COMMÜNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE. Y

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEN ON EXTREME LEFTIST O

VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR 2DF

REP'ARTER MIGHT CONTACT

SPONS?

"SOCIALIST BUREAU GETITO

OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT

025/016

24-27 APRIL. (SEE BOIN 31274 AND ABONN JLÓ69E, FOR INFORMATION OR

POSSIOLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENIS-

CHER BUND BURGER (SEE BERLIN 61306, OCT 738. 676994)

b. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.

for ACASS/CAG/PSB

E/ROG

Fa baue Galduno

WH/CA

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

30 MAY 1974

CONNIE MOORE: SRM

EICAG

CIEILAG

COUROMATINS OPPICURS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHIA THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRONIAITED

RET

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 004244

---

## Page 115

14-00000

CADLE SAC OLDBUMAN-

9 ...

PIRBON/UNIT NOTIFIES_

AGYANCE GORE ISSUEO SUPIED..... Or.

ACTION UNI

ЧАЧ:

RF

1---

ACTIONA

т 149793

11d656

SECRET

METMODUCTION DY

OTHER TH

INTUIMO OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

STAFF

2

PAGE 81

TOA:30114Ã2 MAY 7E

1N 265992

BANG

59314

SEGRETWDZZ MAY 74 STAFF

C/WH/6.

0C/WHi/6 -

CiTE BANGKOK ÷9314

WH/6/S%

TOI DIRECTOR :LO SANTIAGO.

WH/S/F:...

REDLEG AEFiS-

WH/B/RR

REFSI A, Saliask 59665 ju 260348)

WH/6/Sosy_Fl: FuineN

1, MILTON E, REPOUSE AND MALON M. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETEKI

ON 25 MAY AID CASSEO REF E INFO, TOLGIEN HAD FULLOW-UP MEETING WITH

GALETZKI ONES "AY TO DiSCUSS HiS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2O GALE"ER: "ET CUNNINO AT MOME OF ROGER: 3. HARTFORD, U.S.

CITIZEN ENFECTEE IN COPULATIDN DIVISION DE ECAFE: HARTFORD IS

PRO-ALLENDE dIE CRGANIZEC SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTEO

PERSONS TO MEE: CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.

CUNNING IS LESTEISED AS ASOUT FORTY YEARS GLO, BLACK HAIR, FULL

BEAND AND AVERAGE BUILD, HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BE UNITED

NATIONS A CES•SO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARFOLLO (CELADES IN

SANTIAGO,

-EARSHED CHILE IN CCTOBER LOF0 WITH HIS WIFE, CUNNING

DEPARTED FIGHT ET MAY FOR DELOI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND

3013 VE GOE ASCUE HELENDE REGIME AND

SECRET

---

## Page 116

14-00000

CABLE ARE DISDEM DR.

PARÇON UNIT NOTICINO--

ARIANGE COPI IDSUIU:BLOITED

ACTION UNIT

RF

FILE

D'AL COPIES

SFCRE T

RUN DY

PRPRODUCTION

ORHER TI

PRUINO OPPICE IO PROMIDITI

STAFF

VR

ACTION O

т 142793

614058

MAGE 22

IN 205992

TO4: 3211942 MAY 74

BANG

59314

CONCERTRATEO GU GISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME, CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS

OF REPRISAL KILLDINGS dY ARMY, FUN ANAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF

GOODS

AND GENERAL REFHESSION DY REGIME: CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN

STATEMENTS AND HAD FEN FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS, WHEN GALETIKI

ASKED CUNNING MOW WE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING

CLAIMED "T-ERE IS CIA REPORT MICH STATES OVER THENTY THOUSAND HAD

BEEN KILLED," GALETANI FOUND FORTIONS OF REF G INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING

CUNNING STATEMENTS, HOWEVER GILETAKI'S TEMDER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF

WAS THROUG- MECTING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM

ARGUING ALTA GUINING GEST THE LITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

GO GALETZAI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO.

HE TOLE TOLGIEN WOULD PASS MIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT

RECEIVE.

SO REQUEST FDA AND 201 OF GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS

MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTES PRIMAFILY ON AEFISH, TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE

COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVIL:A! ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING

DEVELOPNENT.

511: 62-7852770 2UI-GALETZKI.

EZ, IMPDES.

SECRET

---

## Page 117

14-00000

moral core sid.

PERSON UNIT NUIPIRO -...- --

-..a... car...=...

dato rie un chen, els dis ...

... DDO a

т 148171

6l4272

TAFF

cale 11°41

TOR: 2921510

„Mi"

'AAY

705-5

Retambok.

C/WH/6 -

DC/WH/6

SE CRE

12ос160!

CITE SaN a50 21514

тО :

WH/G/FI.

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Scc'y

PUSAT PSYCM

Fil: FUrMeN

FEE: CHRECTOr 553537

FUERMING-D HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH 19041

OFFICES OF MAUGE WINE SERVICES.

NE TASKING LIE NITE COUPEE-

HENSIVE LIST LE GAPS NEGO AS WELL AS SOOTHING AND ASSAGENCE!

MENT.

3.

No fiLe.

IMPDET

§ EC

---

## Page 118

14-00000

11 MIG. 10.89

¿ADLE SEC UISDEM ON Z2_ PAR

ONE DENTI

L

ENOUGH IS OTURNTRA

ISTAFF

•T. ANGE COPY ISSUED ELOIIIO_

CHION UNIT

RF. FILE

EUR8

N

ACTION O

MAN, WHS, SS.S,-

1: 62736.

E1A997

PAGE 11-01

+0912929557M4874

CONFIDENTIAL 23Z3512 MAY 7A STAFE

CITE HELSINKI 22538

TO: SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REFS

HCSA 18924

1, LARGEST LUCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER;

RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER FEE.

WHEN

HONEVER.

WISH POINT OUT, LE SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY dWARE, THAT BOOK IN

SWEDISH, IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN

EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE 800K

SHOULD BE READILY AVAILADLE IN SWEDEN.

2O FILE DEFER, EZ IMPDET,

TN 263354

HELS

22.538

18.74

RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

15-124-52

is Play 74

---

## Page 119

14-00000

MATRODUCTION OF OTHER

JODUINO OFFICE

SECRET

MANSON: UNI: NOTIPIRO.

ACTION UNIT

EURB

ALTIUN.

8. 137606

.01.

-at

FILE

ItAN KuH8.

PSlELL OPStENT

E1A805

PAGE DI

TOR: 2417162 MAY

STAFF

355

74

C/WH,6

DC/WH/6 -

IN 262014

BNN8 310.91

bals

SECRET EI MAY TA STAFE

CITE BONA BASE S1991

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN, HAMBURG.

FUONYA CAQUARRY TOFOCUS

Wil/0/11

WH/G/RR

Wrl/6/Sec'y-

REF DENN ÜASE 51510(0 241838)

1.. CAQUARRY ADVISEU ZOE MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE

ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY.

CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVULUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF

SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE

IDENTITY, ALSO INTERESTEO FOGUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST

EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY

NUULE LIKE TO MAVE LOS INTERVIEN A PENSON KNOWLECGEABLE ABOVE.

IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEN

CAN SE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NOR"M AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE.

SECURITY VUT A PROÖLEM AS CAJUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK

REOGATER TO MANE INTERVIEN EN SONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS

CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

¿• ALSO AFPRECIATE ANY jACKOROUNO MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT

ÄTIET COULD 8E PASSED TO CAJAARY, GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL

MOSi USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY MAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

SECRET

F3.

FUOMEN

---

## Page 120

14-00000

My 0.

CADLE MRS DISTIN 0........

PROTON: UNIT NOTICINO..

........

47300e

PROHIBITS

SECRE!

a...D! ....Aluaaa......

STAFS

ACIIUNUNIY

1:11. 5.

INd.

13760°

E14065

PAGE 82-02

ION: 2917102 MAY ?9

3.

HE CARAÈ REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATIHOE'ER

RECENTLY CONTAGILO CAQUANDY TO ASK MIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION

OF PAÑA È STATEMENT, CADUANAY HEFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER

INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT, MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN.

INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT DONE TO LEFT-WING SPD. MOS WILL

NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER WAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH

AND TECHNOLUGY UNDER NEW GUVERNMENT.

4.FILE: 201-02397051 XoREs 201-8903810. EZOIMPDE?.

IN 282014

BNNB 31991

---

## Page 121

14-00000

::. mil

FRASON: UNIT MOTIPIRO.

_ADIANCE CORY ISPURD'SLOIINO

ACTION UNIT

RF.

FILE.

EUR: 8

ACTION O

7 145881

t14160

TOTAL ORK: 33<1

SECRET

RUN Or

va VAN, 555, 563,1011%

PASE 21-01

TO#:1410222 MAY74

SECRET. 142938Z MAY TA STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 15691

TOS DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REE!

AO DIRECTOR 549305

3. HELSINKS 22455 (*239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.

2, NO FILE, EZ IMPDET

DC/WH/6

WH/6!SA

WH/d/Fl

IH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

НУ ОТНЕР ТИ

1900 ОРІСК 1О РОМОТИ

STAFF

IN 251122

STOC

15691

Fil. TUOMEN

---

## Page 122

14-00000

r. A1s1. 8 138:

TOTAL UP: 33 - 2-

SECRET

PERRORA/UNIT 401101111,

ISTAFF

_ ADVANCA. SOMLIBIURU: SiO!?80

ACTIORIUMIT

FIF

- AuR B

N.

ACTION A

or....Ml-

-__C'/OP2. PS/EG4, 066/00-c/ORS.

т 183782

ETA146

PAGE B1

TOR: 131831244874

SECA E T 1310212 MAY TA STAFF

------

CITE SANTIAGO 29118 (JABAUT ACTINGS

TOI

PAOIS IN O DIMECTOR,

TOFUCUS WASTHER

REFI

.

SIRECTOR 549348

C/Wilbe

DC/WH/5

WH1/6/SA--=

WH/8/61

WH/6/R$--

WH/6/Sost-

3. 94215 48380 6 14 2501%0)

:1, AGHEE WITH RES & RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME

OF FRENEH ELECTION GEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST

UNSOBER-!.

IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS

SHOULD SE CONSIUEHEDI

A, WHILE STATION WAS CAPARILITY VIA FUTRUNKOL CIDEN

FOR PARISS, RECENTLY HECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIS:

UNSOBER-1 !Y OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. !T

SHOULD BE KEA! IN MIND THAT DUE INTERVENTION NO MATTER

HOW SUBTLE, MUULD VERY DIGGARLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-I TO

FUTRUNK-L AS AGENCI SELLABORATOR.

8, THE CHILEAN GOUT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN

PRESS CRITICISM ANG MOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY PIV, DROGRAM

WHICH REFLECTS SADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS EE WON SLIGNE iNE

CRITICISM MIGHT BE, CONSEQUENTLY, WE OULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

SECRET

IN 258476

SAGO

27117

it.

FUBMEN

---

## Page 123

14-00000

CABLE DAC DISSEM O'-

_PER_.

PEASON UNIT NOTITIRO...

- AYANGE SCHY ISSUSO ELOIILO

ACTION WAIII

RF. FILE. VR

-CALFURL!

SECHE

RUMS BY

STAFF

ACTION O

105782

E 1A146

PAGE 82-02

TORIIJIBSLZ MAY T&

IN 252476

SAGU

20117

FUTRUNK-I'S ASSISTALGE FOR ANY PRGGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE

EMBARRASSING TO MIM.

2.

FILEt

22:-872897, E2 IMPOET

..

---

## Page 124

14-00000

BIOMAL CANTARINETY

uno

OMF

CLASVIANCATIOM

SECRET

10200100

STAFF

COMF. KURS8

30-2

}

4022487

DIRECTOR

MARRAOS ANTANANO MUNIRN

549348

то0.

10, 9081

DISSEM BY: VO

so taro

PER

#

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF:

OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 INOT NEEDED SANTIAGOSY

L. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP. ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS

AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES.

IN FRANCE THIS HAS SEEN PARTICULAROLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS

STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/L. THIS FORMER STAFF

ON JOURNALIST FOR PRETIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY

COMPLETED A 3O-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY.

IT WAS WELL. RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND

30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBERAL APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF

SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS

RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET

ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE

OF VALUE IF UNSOBER: COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN

CHILE. Y

Fil.

FUCHEN

DATT:

UNIT&

EXTI

AARONATON

REPRODUETADN ET OTHER THAA THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PAOHIDITED

E2.

CL BY:

IMPDET

---

## Page 125

14-00000

VUIGUINU

MOMAL CANTERUSAONL

con

0.

ков

474

OMF O

CRABANATOn

SECRET

ANCATRO DARICATON

on ration aral

DIRECTOR

STAFF

CONF:

INFO: FILE

549348.

MONS

то то 0!

РАТИНИГО

DISSEM BY:

PER

2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE

AIRING. AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL

PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD

BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF

RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBERALS, WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET

HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEUS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND.

PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAPEFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBERILI AND HE HAS

SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST

TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE. Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEN WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA

LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION BEBEFILM CONDITIONS ON DAUSON ISLAND AND

ELSEUHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/L HAS ASKED FOR OKHERALD ASSISTANCE.

UNSOBER/S IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF

UNSOBER/I COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEUS, ETC-Y

4. • PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE

TO UNSOBERID-Y

S. FILE: 201-872997. Ea IMPDET.

DATE: 8 MAY 1974

0RAG: DAN WAGNER:LD

UAIT: EXFÜINT

ExT:

9165

contest late

COLLADOO OPPRES

SUITRET

REPROC

tul

CIENE 7A

(conorer was danceos

ION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS

MIRITED

€ 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 055747

---

## Page 126

14-00000

SIGNAL CARIEDIT ONLY

wiLdunur

4ою

OMF

0

0

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: EUR&

Date nee one

102239Z

INFO:

DIRECTOR

cro

.555

6.?

547305

0

DISSEM BY: XS

0

no Kara!

потить то

PER

Weat

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI: SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: HELSINKI 22455 lIN 2399731 Y

L. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER CAECLUSTER!

REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH KYUNG.

BORM 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN. AFPEARED ON SOVIET VISA

BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS

DENIAL BY MFA• (DOI: MID-1971}. NO OTHER TRACE HAS FILES. Y

2. STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. EZ IMPDET M

SB/X/EU-

WIE.

jere Here

Fil. Fu 0.45N

DATE:

10 MAY 74

Pecu

ORIG:

MARIA C. WALSH/JD

UNIT:

EISCIS

EXT:

111020S00001

REPRODUCTION BY OIMER THAN THE ISSUING UFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

CLADBOTICATION

SECRET

SteameD File

ACIEISC

authentara cara do

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 008234

---

## Page 127

14-00000

111 gro 11 83

¡AULT SEC DIDLENDY

PERSON UNIT NOTIPICO

TOTAL COrE 29 - 1

SECRET

NEIRODUCTION

SOULAROTIILE IN PROMIDITA

STafr

A=:I0N UPIT

EURS

N

ACTION O

RF.

FILE

VR

SS5

7 1÷3294

E1A072

PAGE R1

TER: 1315:22 MAY 21

IN 250170

PARt 20396

SECRET 1313352 MAY 76 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48392

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

TO PALOMITY SANTIAGO INFO SIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

FUGMEN

DC/V/:1/s,=

W!116'0:

WH/6/!;

WH/CHER.

WH/6/500%-

1.. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

IS ELECTEU ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER I COULD DO

PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD DE ACCEPTAGLE TO BAMERALD CUR TO PINOCHETA.

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SA!TIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES.

OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS GE ELECTION KNOWN. IF MASCRITY CANDIDATE

GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS SHE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLST CLIMATE

MILE DE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORNELE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET, IN THIS

CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COS SO MAY TO

COLNCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS GE HAS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. GILE: 221-872987. E-2 IMPDET

SEEET

---

## Page 128

14-00000

• ^90 1120%

• 1e 01/si. 11 19

"ANSOV UNIT NOTIPIRO

TOTAL COMr 2 T-1

MUN DY

SECRET

•EMMODUCTION

STAFF

DiTION UNIT

LURS

RF.

FILE

ClopS

PlAN. WH805000

555

т 1852%4

E1A67A

PAGE 01

IN 250170

TUR: 1515:22 MAY 74

PARI 98390

SECRET 131535E MAY DA STAFS

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIONITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1, IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

IS ELECTEU ON 18 MAY, IT MOST. DOUBTFUL THAT UNSUBERDI COULD DO

PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BAMERALD COR TO PINOCHETI.

2. THEREFORE RECOMMENC SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES.

IF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE

GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS SHE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLSS, CLIMATE

WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS

CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 3U MAY TO

COINCIDE WITH TOY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 261-872997. E-2 IMPDET

---

## Page 129

14-00000

! І неї "1?9

"AULE ARE DISORN DU.

EURS

ALIION

FILE

183294

E1A672

TOTAL SOFIrS

29-1

MUN DY

SECRET

VIl.

PAN, WHTS OSoloc

JOPS SS5.

PAGE 81

TOR: 1315:22 MAY 74

74

STAFF

OTHER TIE.

HEROICE TO PRONET

STAFF

IN

250170

PARI

18390

SECRET 131335Z KAY

CITE PARIS 48394

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549348

1, IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

IS ELECTEO ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBERAI COULD DO

PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTAULE TO BEHERALO COR TO PINOCHETI.

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES.

OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS GE ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE

GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS SHE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLST, CLIMATE

ÄILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORAGLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS

CASE, WOULD DE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO

COINCIdE WITH TOY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 221-872997. E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

---

## Page 130

14-00000

: i Meú 11 1)

211838

¿AGLE BEL DISSEM DY 35 _PER_

PANSON, UNIT NOTIVIRO_

TOTAL CORIES

30•2

SECRET

HUN DY

MEFRODUCTION MY OPURA THA

ISQUINO OFFICE IS PHONINITE

STAFF

CYANCE COLY ISSUEL ELOIED

CHION UNI

EURS

ID. FILE

ACTION I

-_DY.

VH IP/AN,

555,

OPSINT

WIS'

т 196017

E1A22U

PAGE 01

TOR: 1109247

MAY 74

SECRET 8314297 MAY 74 STAFF

211838-11

14 246700

3 NNB

31516

#132 DUPE i CORRECTED

FOR WASH Sle NOTE.

CITE SONN 345E 31516

C/WI-1/6

DO/WiliG-

N:1/e/31-

TO: DIRECTOR. INFO BONN, PARIS:

CATHATCH CAGUARRY TOFOCIS FUOYNX

REF: 90MN EASE 31234 (IN 2300-53 9H16/19.

1O 1 MAY ZIE MAGAZIN MITH CAQUARRY AS

15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, À THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY.

MALI PART FEATURE WAS LÜTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN,

FRIEDRICH EE ERMANN I SUBJECT REFS NNO RECENTLY RETURNED

FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, BEERMANN

STRESSED THLT ALLENCE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS

NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN PODULATION

FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHRON, SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW

WITH SPO POLITICIAN AND SPO. AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING,

HAS BEEN STAGNELY ANTI-JUNTA,:

2. HANSMATEHO EFER, LEFT WING SOO PAPLIAMEN-

TARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN

LE-DING GERMAI, OPFOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING GLOCK

ECONOMIC AID. ERASING ON FULÄLAS BACKGROUND INFO SEE ES: -5363,

NOW 731 WE HAVE DISCUSSED LATTHGEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

SECRET

---

## Page 131

14-00000

11 0:10.111

CARLE SEC DISCAN DI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIPILO

POVANCE COFGISSUEU S62UGD

ACTION UNIT

FILE

1OTAL COPIES

SECRET

HUN OV

HEPRODUCTION DY

OTHER TrIA

IGSUING OFFICE IB FROMIDITEI

STAFF

VA

ACTION O

124417

E14ULE

PASE 22-32

TCF: 1120242 MAY 71

CUESTIGRISG IS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN

STRCNGER CONDEMMATION OF JUNTA, BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON

PER "OU" E6S1S WITH MATTHOEFER INOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS)

AND HELL GÄLFE MATTHOEFER BACKGRGUND INVOLUMENT LEFT WING

ACTIVITIESO END OF CHILE FEATUFE CARRIED STATEMENT SY CAQUARRY

THAT IT STÄLIGE MATTHOEFER CONCONED ALLENCE GOVT USE OF FORCE

AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDENNING

JUNTA ACTIVITIES, STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY

IN DEALING SITA CHILE.

3. FEGUEST TRUCES ON MATTHOEFER, SUGGEST

OPEN

221 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SFIERS AND WILL

UNDOUETEGLY EE INVOLVED IN APY SUTURE

POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN

RIGHT ADD LEFT WINGS OF SPOI

G. FILE: 221-2238785 X-REF 221-

• EZ IMPDET

WASH SIC ROTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ALDES PER MOS REQUEST.

ie 241838

15299258

BNV3 31516

SECRET

---

## Page 132

4-00000

(li

CABLE NEC LOORM OUT ORA

Chile

ПОМО ОРНІСЕО РОНІВІТІ

PERBON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ACTIOP UNIT

N

FILE

AL

VH

Fland, W18, 555,

ACPION O

1077141

ELAZ3Z

PAGE dI

TOR: 021103Z MAY 74

IN 230913

HELS: 22455

CONFIDENTIAL GLUSADE MAY TA STAFE

CITE HELSINKI 22855

- TO: DIRECTON INTO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO,

FUOMEN PSYCH

1. °

IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION

ANURES K

KU li & CUMLAUT. "U") ENTITLED ITO SOW SOCIALISM

TIAM HELS

AND READ FASCISM", "MICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED. COMINO

FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY TA REVIEW IN FINNISH

PIS

SHEDISH-LANGUAGE DALLY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, KUNG-OHHO VISITO

150/268

CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE

W. 211.--

HE 172

SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL

ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC

PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT

POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE.

"INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LANS".

KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY

OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST

OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE

DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

CON

RECORD' COPYA

15-124-52

2 May 74

---

## Page 133

4-00000

'CABLE DAC DISORM DO

PRMSON/UNIT MOLITICO

ACTION UNIT

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

CONFIDENTIA.

HER TMAN

BOVING OFFICE TO PUOMIEITEE

STAFF

RF

FILE

VR

ACTION O

7997141

ETA230

PAGE 02-02

TOR: 221103Z MAY TA

TN 239973

HELS 22495

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED.

2. KUNG IDPUB8 1945. GAVLE, SWEDEND IS FORMER 81968-728

EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS", NOW LIVES IN MALMO: HAS

PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALLA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC

STATES.

3. FILE DEFER, EZ IMPDET.

!D

---

## Page 134

14-00000

: 81016.18.73

POTA

COPES 25:1

SECRET

RUN BY

REPADDUCTION BY

ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

FERSON: UNIT NOTIFILO

ALANCE COPY ISSUER SLOTIRO

AETION UNIT

FILE

ivil Y

N

135c12

STAFF

VR

No Cr 3, 555,

PAGE ET

TOR: 2311497 APRJ4

IN 231132

HДM3

24795

SECRET 232953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMEURG 24795 (SHARECHILD ACTING)

TO:

DIRECTOR INFO SONN, BONN

BASE, SANTIAS).

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: DIRECTOR 540262 :

¿. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR EURDOSES INDICATED IN

REF.

2. RELUCTANT. TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON ENTLE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR

SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HOS KEEP OPEN MING ON SELECTIVE

FLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.

3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE FLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN

FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR WIENS AND REACTIONS

OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY, AS AN EXAMFLE. ECULO POSSIBLY ENGINEER

ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIACULATION 1,502.R00),

WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTE PREFAGANDA GAMPAIGNAT

THROUGH MRS, VERA VACEK.

4. FILE: 15-124-4613. EZ IMPDET.

Titu

a H/6

RECORD COPY

-RET

15-124-52

23 Apor 74

---

## Page 135

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSIMOY

PEASON: UNIT NUTIFIED

_ADVANGE CORN ISSUED/GIOrTEO

ACTION LINIT

SS.6

AF.

ACTIONA

FILE.

OSG./IC

17729892

SECRET

ANDRUCTION AROUND: PreY

AGENCY MESSAGS

VR./

EIN, EURS, LUHS,

PIGE DI

: 0910410112 DEG 73

TN 104043

WAMB

23019

SECRET WIGZIZ DEC ME STAFF

K!+.

CITE HAMBURG 23818

lies 39

TO: DIRECTOR INFE SANTIAGE. RON"

MACRUNCH CA SPECIAL SUOMER NATTY

DET

wт/5

1, BASE INTERESTED LA "DOS ANOS DE PENETSACION SOVIETICA EN

CHILE" (PORTADA JOS AS VET'ELE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE

EXTENT OF SOVIETACUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCI ECONOMIC FABRIC OF

CHILE.

20, STUDY COULE DE FLES-SO CUT TO ENCOMERSS DOLITICO MILITARY

ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESFECIALLY PERCEPTLONS GAINED BY TWO

NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS, IME LAST VISITINO USSR JUST PRIOR TO

ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND

TREATED WITH FARE CIVILITY. IT MAY ALSO DE WSSFUL TO MENTION THAT

SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE NOT CHILEAN

ARMED FORCESS MIN ARMANEN'S FOR SPECIFIC PLETESE OF DEFENDING HIS

REGIME, ALLER DE'S MOSCON ISLE AND UNAVAILING. PLEA FOR SOVIET

SALVAGING GERATIO! IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AUS:GUOUS SOVIET ROLE

WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CEIDEGIENTLY SWERT UNDES THE RUG.

3. REUSEST HOS COMNENTE E FEASIBILITY HE TURNING OUT FINISHED

PRODUCT TO MEET EUROFEAN FESUIREMENTS WWICH L' SRESENT PREEMPTED.

OY DEC. 73

RECORD COrd

15-120.52-

---

## Page 136

25-11

10000-+

---

## Page 137

14-00000

CABLE GIC, DIGGENDY

PIRÇOTE UNIT NOTITIED

ADVAISE CODY ISSUED/SLOTTIO

ACTIGHUNIT

AF.

- MPEA

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

1510018::818А ПОСТРИ PA

AGENCY MESSAGE

AY

fILE.

VA.

ACTIONA

-PAGE 22-02

+091&418117 DEC 73

iN TOUCAS

НАМВ

23918

BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS, IF AFFIRMATIVE.

SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITAGLE DISTRIBUTION

VEHICLE.

•A, FILE DEFER, EZ IMPOET.

---

## Page 138

4-00000

VUTÖCING MESSAGE

nots

Fit:

5l:

orif. U

0

0

0108.0-098091708

1212342

DIRECTOR

STAFF

CONF CAS

INFO:

fiLE

446010)

4000

(

PER

PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO,

THE

HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMSUNG, PARIS, LOPIPIT, LONDON, BERM INFO

DOC. MICRO. SER

SANTIAGO.

KYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

NOV 1 1973

MICROFILNED

RES: DIRECTOR 465768

1. FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.

2. ACCORDING VASHINGTON POST LE OCTOBER, "THE CITTERNESS DE-

TWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND. CHILE, ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF

OBSENITIES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN

MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE. CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A "SONg? OF A

WHORE, ' AND ANOTHER CUSAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.

3. "DISPUTE BEGAN UHEN ROA

DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH

IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIES IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN

MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOPE PODIUM

DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY: JAZAN

INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED SUICIDE

77t

AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

15-124-52-

D-15-12

53

RECORD COFY

1300873

car00 saracrocens

mercasts deeded

CLASDANCATION

REPHODUCTION BY OTHER THA: THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIDITEO

€ 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

SECRET

---

## Page 139

14-00000

Ace

OMF

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ar.a.

.. 190.

0

ople line amous..

1217367

CONF:

INFO:

FILE

466010

10000.

1000 10000 в

ReTURA TO

PER

MITTED AND FEGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF SEL DEATHS IN CONNECTION

WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE,

WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD. AS HIS DAILY PASTINE, THE

WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFGRE THE FIRING SAUAD VALL, TO WHICH HE

EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS..:'

• 4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SENT AND DASHED DOUN THE

AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONG OF A WHORE' AND OTHER

INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOUED HIM. MICARAGUAN

DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS.

OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIFLOMAT WHO WAS THERE

SAID A CUERI SHOUED HE WAS, CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH

PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....

5. "U.N. GUARDS SUARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED.

ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM

LATEP. TO CALL THE CUBA'S "GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIMIT OF A

DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A.

. SCALI SAID RIA HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER

VULGARITY... THE OUTLODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA. "

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXUA

• 1

CLOSBIARiATION

SECRET

REPRODUCT MY OTHER THAN THE ISSUNG CFFiCE IS PrOr

2-

• in

IMPDET

057556

---

## Page 140

14-00000

VUTGOING

10d

MESSAGE

uno

OMg

0•

0

SECRET

U

D118 eine voulo

1217377

Cita

0

3

3

461010

NISCH BY:

CONF:

iNFO:

FILE

b. FILE:

15-121-521 45-124-53. Ea, IMPDET.N

*REF ATTACHED.

1a OCTOBER 1973 UlKeuT

DATE:

OPIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

WILLIAM M. KENT: SMB

ADC/CH/L

6556/9455

C/UM/SA •

C/EUR E launes

PEPHODUCTION DY ORIEN MAL THE ISSUNG OPFICE IS PHOMISIO

15-124-52

Ju.

sECRET

8.00000

E 2

I'APDET

CL BIP: 057556

---

## Page 141

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

one coin use"!

1r.n

0

OMF

0

02000.0.:00.0.40

SECRET

MICROFILMED :

11918.8-48577140

€110

STAff

1122542

DINECTOR

465768

DISSER UY: 12

COMP: C//8

HITD: FILE

spin ones sess

Our IAU0s

PER

1/533. 1/13/99

TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO,

THE MAGUE, ROME, CONN, HARDURG, PARIS, LOPIPIT, LONDON, BERM INFO

SANTIAGO.

RYDAT FUOMEN FUJORACLE

L. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS

RECLIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO

ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERHMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS

WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY

OU!T, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG

AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIN•

Z. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILFAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL

LUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESEUTATION BEFORE UNGA

TO EXFLAIL "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE

CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH À REGIME OF MATIONAL

RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERHMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM

OF A "POST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-

ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S DIORITY REGIME HAD

DATE:

ORIGE

UNIT:

EXT:

015

3

70-15-124-53

1act 73

15-124-52

PEPRODUCTION EY OLHENTITATT ME TESUING OPTICE TS PHOMISITED

SECRET

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 142

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

arse

con

OMF 0

0

0

100

. 0

но).

SECRET

18000ç8 mariain, our atas

cre

CONP:

INFO:

FILE

0

•

DISSEM OYS

то 1000 "

neung to

PER

445768

#

BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER

ILISTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA: THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN

CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS UHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS,

IPISTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPSI INTENDED TO BECOME

A PARALLEL'ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTEN

OLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY.

PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR

AND CHAOS.

HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL

IS TO SET CHILE BICK ON ITS HISTORIC PATHI AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE

WILL HOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."

4. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED

MARXIST GOUT IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE: HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN

MANY, BUT IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN

EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION

AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DE-

TAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT TINT

DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE

EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHIMERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO

DATES

ORIG:

UNITI

EXIS

Chase Car

SECRET

REPRODUCTI

TY OTHER MEN THE ISSUING EFFICE IS PREA

AUTHENTICALIAS OPEN. PR

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 143

14-00000

ACO

OMF

0

OUTGOING

MESSAGE:

SIGNAL CORUSSONS

0

0

MeSsa,, Nanoei0 000-10100

0

DATA-AMA DAONA

3

DISSEM BY:

CONF:

IPIFO: FILE

4655748

NO INORE

PEA

#

AWAY WITH DEKECRATIC IDEALS FOR WHICH COUNTRY STOOD.

HE SAID MEDIA

WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE ILLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND

AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS,

POLITICANS AND VILLAGERS WERE ASSASSINATED, HE CHARGED THAT

FOREIGN AGENTS, SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT

ENOUGH UEAPOLIS TO CHILE TO FRUIP 20,000 MEN. HE DECLARED THAT

SOVIET-MADE SIDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITANK GUNS, NOCKET LAUNCHERS.

CANNONS AND EGPLOSIVES HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN -- SOME PACKED AS WORKS

OF ART AND SOME DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

S. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUEAN INVOLVEMENT, HUERTA

READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1973 HAND-WRITTEN LETTER FROM CASTRO NODRESSED

TO "DEAR SALVADOR." LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN WORKING

CLASS HAD BEE!I FOREWARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGIME

WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED

CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE

"ILLEGAL METHODS" OF THE ALLENDE REGIME.

6. IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL

ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-MINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF

GOEBBLES. SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

*XT:

CLASS-INATI

15-124-52

COOPAINATIAS OPENEDO

DNTARMTRATINO DARIES

REPROVUCTIÓN BY OTILR THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PHOMIDITED

E 2

INSPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 144

4-00000

Асв

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGMA CENSERUSTUNGO

0

OMF O

0

SECRETAR

ORLe-81266902009

0

DISSEPA BY:

CONF:

INFO: FILE

4651468

PER

" #

HISTORY OF NASI GERMANY, HE DECLARED. THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT

ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN

CUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT

AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DEMY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S

LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED: ROA SAID THAT THE

LETTER WAS NO SECRET.

?. FILE: 15-124-521 15-124-530 E22 IMPDET•

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

12 OCTOBER

WILLIAM M. KENT: SMB

ADC/WH/6

6556/9155

C/EURGSL

REPRODUCTI_ DY OTHER TINY THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO. JEO

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

SEGRET

---

## Page 145

14-00000

CUTGOING 11565408

0

0

i...

SECRET

rosonou-9.189108

tre

wa18.9.00. a0000

1015032

15-1

INFO: FILE

erre

DIRECTOR

0/553, 0/25/663

4S4203

18980

TO:

PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYCAT FUOMEN

REFS: A.? SANTIAGO 26409 TIN 0315501 .

8. SANTIAGO 26512 lIN 0317221

2. PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUONEN.

CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. EZ, IMPDET ON

*REFS ATTACHED.

PLEASE ADVISE CONCUSRENCE AND

711

sown

*T

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

fier

L5 SEPTEMBER 197311

VELLIAM M. NEHT:SM&

АРСЛУНЛЬ

6555/7155

SHH?

REPRODUCIU: MY OTHER THAN THE ISNONGG OFFICE IS PROMENCO

SECRET

8L CTE

1512432

1850073

157124-52

E 2

1FDET

C9:391,

---

## Page 146

14-00000

MANET MORERSE LETTEND TS DOX.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BIONAL CENTEMUSEONLY

Aca

too

• что

OMF O

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: CUNt. 8

O no mooni

iNTO:

26=5.

..

orre. +00 000000

cite

4329762

DIRECTOR:

454507

plan 555. 05/864, oscha2,

DISSEM Or: 3.8

al Gilce. sistint soo,

TO: IMMEDIATE ARGENTINA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE.

SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PORT AU

PRINCE, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY,

ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, PORT AU SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO, CARAÇAS

INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

r

р.."

BOOUK CABLE

FUOMEN SUMMARY DE COMP EVANTS

02.T1:

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCALSN/

• AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:

Z. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED. AGAINST MARXIST RE-

GIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON LI SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF

THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON

I2 SEPT THERE WAS FIRGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TEBROOPS AND

SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE

ALLENDE SUPFORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND

•AND MIGHT

EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY

*BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS

FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEU EXTENDED TO NOON L3 SEPT.

3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

DATE:

ORIGI

UNIT.

EXT:

iran! pricely.

W:12.

ALIASE ORACED

RECORD COPY

COUDONRATINO GRANITA

REPRODUCTION OY OTHER THAY THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRUMIBITED

15-124-52

1350875

AUTANATICATAO DR

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

065556

---

## Page 147

14-00000

•--— /l.96e1714.

40.

OMF Q

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DUMA COMIRRUSCOMY

0

0

cite

CONF:

INFO: FILE

454557

DISSEM BY:.

PER -

O nervanto .

AND. CIVILIANS.

THEY EXPECTERD TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE

BY LY SEPTEMBER.

3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION

OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY, NEWSPAPERS

: PLANNED RESHUME LIMITED EDITIONS L3 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSOR-

SHIP•

4.. JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE

IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A

DINING ROOM.

S. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA SMONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE

ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

b. JUNTA RPRESIDED OVER SY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET CARMYS, AN

INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES; .

ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO (NAVY?, WHO IS INCLINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY

(CONSERVATIVES; GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH CAIR FORCES, A STRONG LEADER

WHO FORMER SUPPORTER RADICAL PASTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN

•DEMOCRATES: AND GENERAL CESAR MENDOZA, SCARABINERO CHIEFS WHO HAS

DATE:

ORIGI

UNIT:

EXT.

crassacare

SECRET

ЛАМ-ОРЕІЮ

REPRODUCT... OY OTHER THEN INE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR:

E - 2

IMPOET

CL

1857556

---

## Page 148

14-00000

400

OMF

L10DBI8NCA1T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CAMIERUSEUMY

con

aco

100

0 .

700.

400

3

0008. 1on0 conso

CONF:

INFO: FILE

454587

DISSEM BY:

PER_#_

CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AlID APPAPENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.

?. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET I2 SEPTE

MINISTER OF INTERIOR - MAJ GEN OSCAR BONNILLA. CARMYS.

WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITARY AIDE FOR

• TWO YEARS.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL

HUERTA SHAVYS, HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF

INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.

MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ CARMYS.

REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 197}.

MINISTER OF ELUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A

CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AID BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOUN POLITICS.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN

LAWYER.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL.

FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTAFF, REPORTED

INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1973.

• .

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

DATE:

ORIGs

UNITS

EXT:

CLASBIANCATION

AALRASIMO ORANGO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIDITEO

SECRET

лотняктосятою опроста

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 149

4-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DIANAL CAMIPQUSNONLO

8 un

ченю

OMF

білльогатать

SECRET.

an aside woreno macaron

00018-1-04005040

cora

CONF:

0

INFO: 5128

454587

DISSEMBY:

• PER_I_

GEN SERGIO FIGUERDA CAIR FORCES, REPORTED IN EARLY 1972

TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE - COL SERGIO CRESPO GRET. AIR

FORCES, AGRICUITURAL

AND CIVIL ENGINEER.

MINISTER OF LABOR -GEN MARIO MACKAY (CARABINEROSE,

ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN SONCEP-

CION.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH - COL ALBERTO SPOERER CAIR

FORCES, FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEON DESCRIBED AS HARD

WORKER.

MINISTER OF MINING - GEN ARTURO YOVANE (CARABINEROSE i

WHO WAS SCHEDULDED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST,

CLOSE TO MILITARY.

MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-

JORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE FERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE

SOMEUHAT WEAK.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT - COL PEDRO EUING

CARMYS, DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.

DATE!

UNITS

EXTE

021: Mrs OrREN

coonorators areat

REPRODUCTIÓN AN OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRETIONED

cuttacats

SEERST

aunt cares circãs

• E 2°

IMMOET

CL BY:

052556

---

## Page 150

4-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BIGNAL CANTANILI ONLY

400

200

OMF O

SECRET.

DATA.41008 0 00000

CTO

CONF:

JAFO:

'FILE

454587

DISSEM BY:

PER_#_

O conna

USDERSECRETARY OF IlTEPIOP - LTH COL ENRIQUE MONTERO

LAIR FERRED FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.

MISSISTER OF LANDE AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA

RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.

• MINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR, .

LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.

& JUNTA HA& BROKEN RELATIMONS HITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY BAD

BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR E

STRENGTHEN TRADITIGNALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND

DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST. AND SMALL

LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERA-

TION. THEY DO NO? PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES SUAT MAY CONSULT

WITH THEM. THE CHPISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS

SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL

GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRIDKING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS

HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AID CALLED OFF STRIKE.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

10.

FILE: : 15-124-52. EZ. IMPDET.M

L3 SEPTEMBEP. 1973

WILLIAM CLYBNSZOSO

C/UH/bARR

7710/1069

15-124-52

CLANBIRCATION

REPROQUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

057556

---

## Page 151

14-00000

OUTGOING MESS 2 11

900.

OMF !E

0

11 adoredones

SECRET

on to nuts to nor Aron

STAFF

cos. LUH8

0

0

INFO: fILE

00 40.1-001(0502

1720442

DIRECTOR

1PlgN, 2018,555

0

540262

VISSEM BY:

1AD80

TO MEA

maluan 10

. и от еo

PER

TO: GAMBURG INFO SANTIAGO, BONN. Y

FUOMES PSYCH CASPECIAL Y

REF: RANCHGG 24759 EIN Z2503124

1. AT THIS POINT DO NOT BELIEVE BHERALD ATTEMPT IMPROVE

CHILE: IMAGE IN GERMAN MEDIA STANDS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PREFER

LET DOVIGRATION CAMPAIGN RUN ITS COURSE. ECCLE: AUTO UE WOULD BE

WILLIEG SUPPLY SPECIAL BRIEF DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAREFULLY SELECTED

I¡DIVEDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND WHOSE VIEUS WOULD CARRY

REAL HEIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT FEEL BKHERALD SHOULD ENGAGE IN GENERAL

PROPIGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME SINCE LATTER APPROACH BOTH

INEFFECTUAL AND MIGHT WELL BACKFIRE. Y

2. FILE: 15-124-4613. EZ IMPDET=r

RECORD COPY,

11610 /

15-124-52

19 ApreT!

DATE: 13 APRIL 1974

ORIG:

KEITH GARDINER:NO

UNIT:

DC/UH/b

EXT:

6556/9455

dressest

Or Docto

CLANBODNCATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTMER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMITED SUSH ORA

ILIPDEr

CL BY: 057556

SECRET

---

## Page 152

14-00000

CABLE SEC DIADEAD.

• PRAGON/UNIT NOTIPILO

OTAL CORINE_L

30-.

SECRET

RUPAOOUCTION DY OTHER THAN

IBSUINO OPPICE IO PHONIBITRO

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

EVR8

ACTIONA

-7037829

AF

FIL-E

VH

Restaur

PAGE 81

TOR: 1713282 APR 74

IN 225831

HAMB

24759

SECRET 1712532 APR 94 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24759

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO;

FUDMEN PSYEM CASPECIAL

1, CHIL'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMEN-

TARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED.

OUTLETS EY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER S!DE."

EASTERS FADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN

PROPAGAIDA AND THEPE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN

RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.

2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, PUNLESS JUNTA

DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR

OPINIONS OF MANKIND, WE

CAN STILL FROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN

SITUATIG: TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND.

TOMARO THAT ENO, REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBVECTIVE APPRAISIN OF

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.

3, FILE DEFER. EZ IMPDET.

SECRET

wt..

---

## Page 153

14-00000

TOTAL COMES LT-

SECRET

PERSON'UMIT NOTIFIED_

AMAN UNTRY ISSUER SLOTSO LIA

ASTION UNIT

RF.

FILE .

VR

N

188:JINO

ION DY OTHER THAN

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION O

7144267

PAGE 01-01

05:

707: 0421402 APR 73

SAGO

SECRET DAZLI8Z APR 73 STAFF

C'TE SANTIAGO 24516

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR:

REFS! A: SANTIAGO 24677

(in 878105)

8, DIRECTOR 391223

1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF A INFO IF IT

WERE SURFACED OR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTIÓN OF THE U.P.

GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION

A? THIS TIME.

2: FILE: 150124-52: EZ IMPDET

IN 888779

24516

AN

VAB

PS

BX

DES | B8D

RECORD COPY

SECRET

---

## Page 154

14-00000

CADLE BIC DISSEN DY

PERSOM/UNIT NOTIFIED

RAPAJOUCTION BY OYMER THAN

INSU,NO OFFICE IS FAUNIDITEO

AOXALES COPY ISSUEUISLOIER

STAFF

WHE

ACTION!

N

fILE

4074

Cest5o:3

167548

FAGE N1

TÖM:141717Z JAN 74

IN I3S804

SAGO - 27899

SECRET 1410SOE JAN 74 → AFF

CITE SANTIAGO 27099

TOS DIRECTOR, PARIS, MELSINK!, DONN; TOKYO, LONDON.

RYDAT FUUMEN

REF: - DIRECTOR

+99 460-15-124-52

1, WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING OUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF

WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY, PARA 31

":.: CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTSTEXPORTS BY

SLIGATLY OVER 1Ã0 PERCENT IN AN EFFURT TO CURO INBORT DEMANO,

ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE NESSURES: "" "...OTHER PRICE RISES

GROUGMT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO SUE PERCENT:'" (FOR DIRECTORI

WHiLE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES SY EGTH EMBASSY AND IME IN NOVEMBER

FLACED INFLATION FOR THE KENA L PRUDAULY BETWEEN TOO AND 800

PERCENT, THE END-UFOTHE-YEAR FIGUFE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL

INSTITUTE NAS DUO:!

SE= jANTHRED EMDASSY TELEGRAM @173

OF 11 jANUARY.Y

Jail pinan

¿. PARA A LAST SENTENCE SHUULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3,5

8:0

F.M

DILLION DOLLAR FURELUN UESI..:"

PAÑA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER

PRUDUCTION MAS ALREADY INCÄSASED MORE TMAN S6 PERCENT OVER

53222

(4) (8)

THE AVERAGE DURING THE FINDS NINE MONTAS OF 1973 ANO PRODUCTIONIE

FICA INS

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

14 da..?7

---

## Page 155

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES

TUM BY

CAULE NAC DIDBEM DY

PERBUN: UNIT NOTIFIXO_

_AUVANCE.COPY BRUED/SLOITER

ACTION UNIT

uF. FILE.

-BY_

DEPRODUS, PION

ДРОТИКА ТМЛІ

JOBUIND OFFICEO PROMIDITEI

STAFF

VR.

ACTION

307548

PAlE 62-22

TÜRIIG1TITÖ JAN 74

IN 136884

SAGO

27899

WILL PRODADLY REACH A RENONU OF AT LEAST

3. NU FILE.

&2 IMPDET

850.000 TONS IN 1979.0."

E

C

---

## Page 156

14-00000

• OUTGOING

MESSAGE

57- sides:

SOMAL CONGRUSE CALE

tre

nos:

OMF 0

MANURICATION

SECRET

as save nearina mortaron

STAFF

DIRECTOR

Міновим насі немо мінс

417169

DIsSAM or:S

PER

#

TO: PARIS, HELSINKI, SONN, TOXYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOUING

SUNMARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONONIC SITUATION IN

CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1474 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS UNO INTERESTED IN CHINESE:

STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.

12, 119

2. THE OUTLOOK FOR. CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. POTHE NEUTE:

MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICES MIND AS LI

MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO REORGANIZE GOVERUMENT ACCHICIES MORE IS

EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT

THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE

SOCIALISM. ITS ECONONIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE: ARE SOUND AND

OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROUTH OF THE CHILEAN

ECONOMY, THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTES SY THE JUNTA HAVE

BEEN! SUCCESSFUL. IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM

AND ARE LIKELY TO SE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESECABLE FUTURE.

3. THE JUNTA MOVED GUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 12 SEPTEMBER TO

REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT SO BASIC COMEDITIES, WHILE THE

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

1/ Jan74

15-124-52

co.-00609139

RECORD COPY

CAJADINATIGPTKARS

RÉPRODUCTION BY OTHER PUN INE ISSUIN: OFFICE IS PACITITEO

110.057581

---

## Page 157

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTEAUSEOLT

ai,a

0

1p0

uno

OMF

0

CARDONAION

and

1 4O MOAT

0

DATA TIME QMOLO

2

DIRECTOR

STAFF

CONF:

INFO: FiLE

0

0

mOs.

INCO NUMBER

DISSEM DYI

MarUMATO PER

494968

CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB

IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN.

EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88%

IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770%

FOR THE YEAR•

4. THE JUNTA HAS HOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION

3

PROGRAM PROPOSED. BY AN IMF TEAN WIICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE L97A.

THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING

INFLATION TO 100% IN 1774. THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY

BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY

CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACCER-

BATING THE PROBLEM OF COMTROLLING INFLATIO!. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF

PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVEI CHILE'S CEREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE

SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE WHITED STATES ON CHILE'S

1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIYELY GOOD POSITION FOR

THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE MASSIVE $4

BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT. HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF

BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:.

DELRARUSO ORPICAN

SECRET

L'OURIBAI,DO DEIKEOS

REPRODUCTION 0.- THER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE I PROMOTI

or: 9951000250

- 19-1 OF.T

CL. BY: G57556

---

## Page 158

14-00000

OUTGOING

I.ESSAGE

OilF 0

11010-00 814-09

REl

STAFF

CONF:

0

0

CITe

DIRECTOR

0

INFO: FIL&

DISSEM BY!

по смоля

abruanto PEA

1199469.

7. • COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50%

OVER. LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REÄCH A RECORD

750,000 TONS IN 1974 DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND

SERVICEABLE VEHICLES: FARM OUTPUT, HOLEVER, IS NOT ENFECTED TO

RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL

IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN, WELL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S

• FOREIGN RESERVES•

8. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF

FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UN SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO

ENAOLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAY-

MENTS GAP. ' THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUT-

STANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EILANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALIZA-

TIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE

PRIVATE SECTOR, OR AS IN THE CISE OF LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY

COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OUIERS. FORMER PRIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE

RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OUERS, BUT PROBAULY UITH SONE FORMULA

INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATICN IN BAiK MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO

STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEUED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

(OСADAR.MО ПОРИТИВ

REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAN THE LAGUNG OFFICE IS PROMIDITEO

8089108 871E

SECRET

E 2

HIPDET

CL SY: 057556

---

## Page 159

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CONTIOUS ONE

CIA

OMF D

618-0-01 A91000

SECRET

STAFF

CONF:

DA18:9.000000000

сть

DIRECTOR

INFO: $118

O more

О хо тока

DISSED BYS.

499468

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY SURING

1974.

9. INTERNALLY, THE ELIMIVATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AMD ADJUST-

MENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTISALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISH-

ING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGH EXCHANGE, HOWEVER, THE

BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS DEEN HEAVY. DESPITE

HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RELIEUED CONFIGELCE BY BUSINESSHEN,

WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT LIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST

NECESSITIES, AND WORKILG CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE

ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOUEVER, WE ORGANIZED FEZISTANCE TO THE JUNTA

OR ITS PROGRAMS, SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PAPTICULARLY THE

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY EPDES ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATIS-

FACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-

POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISHS FOR REACHING THE PUELIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AID ALL POLITICAL:

PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT.

UNICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAURGELY RESFONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S

CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID EY AI INTENSE USE OF

DATE!

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

"SECRET

REPRODUCTIO DE WEHER TARLi TrE RESUNG OF¡ICE 1, FAD MRITEU"

vimer jardo neids

E.2.

CL BY: 054556

---

## Page 160

14-00000

OUTGOING

iSSAGE

т08

und

10.

TOMF

LEASINOTA

SECRET

DI DRAU, MONEYINO MORATOO

STAFF

CONF:

. 0

5

e118

DIRECTOR

DISSEND BY:

INFO: FILE

0

по товя

499469

CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERUMENT MINISTRIES.

THIS

PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN

SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE ITPORTANICE

OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE

IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD

DOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF

HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENT-

ING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRIS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY.

AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY

BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS

AFFECTED BY

THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

L2. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A

LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN

EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KAOUN OF THESE IS THE GROUP IN INTER-

NATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE

ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCA-

TIONAL SEYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON UNCHAMPLOYMENT, URITING A

STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

+0370-909-08018K878

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITCO

SECRET

AUTHEDI TARTS ORALIS

E 2

HiPDET

CL BY: 0.8556

---

## Page 161

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DIEDAL CRUDRUSTON!

100

0

0

Ire

ADe

: 12009.008 arms

SECRET

STAFF

CONF:

enra

TRECTO

* INFO: FILE

1000.

то стова

O mares.

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

499449

DELVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.

12: ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEHOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERN-

MENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR

APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN

LEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROGLEMS FOR THE GOVERIMENT IN THE FUTURE.

ESFECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTIUG WORKERS, CAMPESINOS

AND POBLADORES WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN

DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDCS OR THE ALLENDE GOVERIMENTE ARE SO FAR

INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS

ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBOR-

HOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND

HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE

COMMUNICATION.

13. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDE EFFORTS TO

WIN NEU POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY

SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEGLY BELIEVE THAT THE

PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS. THE JUNTA IS

PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PIO'S LEFT WING

DATE:

OPIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

441440/144

REPRODUGTION DE OTHER THAN THE ISSUNG OFFICE IS ORCMUTTO

CL

BY: 058.556

---

## Page 162

14-00000

OUTGOING I SSAGE

BIGMAL CENT

MnO

7

AUd

0

011F

0

crossandras

oare.ras arous

erra

DIRECTOR

, STRAFF

CONF:

0

0

00!.

DISSEM BY:

INFO: FILE

HETURATO

PER

1199469

WILL AID THE FORMER UP PARTIES IN RETURN FOR FUTURE ELECTORAL

SUPPORT •

14.. ONE PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE JUNTA IS THE POSSIBILITY

THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO 1979, THE LOOTH

ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETUEEN CHILE AND PERU: IN ORDER TO REGAIN

SOME OF THE TERRITORY LOST IN THAT WAR. THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY

THE SOVIET SALE OF ARTIS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR MAY BE TRY-

ING TO CREATE AMOTHER UNSTASLE MIDDLE EAST TYPE" OF CLIMATE IN

LATIN AMERICA.

L5- THE JUNTA IS ALSO CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE

INTERVAL DISCONTENT AND TO MOUIT AN INTERVAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT.

THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORDER UP PARTIES, LED BY THE COMMUMISTSI

WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND

POLITICAL DISCONTENT, AND WILL TRY TO ¡ANIFULATE THE PEDE INTO

OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERMIENT. TUO FRONTS FOR CHILEAN RESISTANCE

ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AID SEVERAL ARE DEING SET UP IN

EUROPE.

LLO DESPITE THE FROSLEMS MOTED ADOVE, THE JUNTA GOVERNNENT IS

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

(+47407491 966 6075-198

PILLAINS DOMICIA

REPRODUCTIOY SY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS MACHIMITEU

15-124-52

AUTMOST ALIAS DANCIN

[ 2

LIPDET

CL BY: 057556

SECRET

---

## Page 163

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIC MAL CENTIMUSIONLY

-1S°.

roo

чато

OMF O

0

, Pocat-on

SECRET

STAFF

CONF:

DATA-TIME O TOVO

cite

DIRECTOR

INFO:

FILE

19081

10 InORE

DISSEM BY:

499468

IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN

REORGANIZING THE GOVERMMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUELIC SUPPORT FOR

ITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AILD DEVELOPMENT ARE

THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY. WHOSE

ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTENBER 1973.:

17. FILE: 15-124-52. EZo IMPDETON

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

10 JANUARY 1974

JEANNE LI!TON:LSS

CHUM/GISA

UNVEICO - BILL KENT SIN DRAFTS

1. 12

REPRODUCTION O -UTHEN THAN THE ISSUING UFFICE 3, FILIBIAO

SECRET

C57556

---

## Page 164

14-00000

*0

ani

BIONAL CANTANUSE

cos

OMF

C

0

0

CLABAIANCATION

SECRET

STAFF

0521582

COMP: WH8

DIRECTOI

INFO: FILE

PS ELA, EUR8, 555

длов

}

on issa.

487650

DISSEM DY: O

PERIM ME LA EAT

TO: HAMBURG INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET

REF: HAMBURG 23881 IN 096923|

16:010;

Lialt

L. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF RISK

FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE. PREPARED FOR PASSAGE

TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA I REQUEST.

A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE IS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO

REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND IN-

STITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED TO RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONOMY.

B. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP TO REMOVE PRICE

CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 3O BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK

EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB

IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EX-

CHANGE RESERVAES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88%

IN OCTOBER, BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS

OF THE YEAR. ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS EX-

PECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SOME 750% FOR THE YEAR.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF

DATE:

ORIG:

UNITS

EXT:

•

RECORD COPY

DALLABCHO ORCACHO

CLAARENICATIONN

S'ECRET

соохожитию отросяко

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

04 PEC73

15-12:4-52

15126-58

AUTHENTICATNA CANCES

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 165

14-00000

OUIGUING MESSAUE

BIONAL CONTER UBE ONLE

cOn

rero

0

0

OMF

SECRET

01808100 Manimasaroo

n0 no nanance museon

COMP:

INFO: PILE

DISSEM BY,

457650

O avanta

PER

EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY. ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK

MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE, WHILE EXCHANGE RATES

CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS DEEN

SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND

A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.

D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A

HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE

FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE DAREST NECESSITIES.

AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF

•RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED

UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS

BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CON-

SIDERATION.

E• THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR

THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE.

CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO

ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA.OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED,

EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXTE

• смая. баткоо

SIEGRET

BY OTHE ' THAI PRE ISSUING OFFICE 1S "RE

ITED

AUTHOMIHATDO CARICES

E 2

IMPOET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 166

14-00000

SECRET

ше полов меноято толсятоо

onlo. 91048077409

enta

COMP:.

DISSEN BY:

INFO: PILE

457650

ко холет

0

О a000о 11

FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.

F• CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS

IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974. EVEN IF DEBT-REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH

YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE #Y BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S

HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST DE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-

PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.

GO HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE

•THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF

THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY

REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF

SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.

H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN

ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A

PRIORITY OBJEGTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EX-

PECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75. MARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS

ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS.

CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.

I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

DATE!

ORIGE

UNIT:

EXT!

AS LIARIO OPICAN

S'ECRET

COOMOMRAIINS DIRICANS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHEP. THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 052556

---

## Page 167

14-00000

DIONAL CANIRRUSSOALY

Aca

roo

OMFO

SECRET

0

4

CONF:

INFO: FILE:

DISSEM AY,

187650.

no boss

0

OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION

QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO

ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW..

INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD

WELLAS

FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS THEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL ME

CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROUTH. A

CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSEATION

CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS

STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE

SECTOR OR.. AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY

COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE

PROCESS OF REVERSION.

S. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUF-

FICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL

GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE

STRONG INDICATIONS OF REMEUED INVESTOR CONFICENCE, IND PRIVATE FOR-

EIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE

NEXT L2 MONTHS.

DAYE:

ORIG:

UNITS

EXT:

силаїжатюм

SEGRE.T

COCDOMATINO DURIANS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAT THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PREHIBILEO

E 2

JAIPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 168

14-00000

AdD

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DORAL CIMITRUSE CALY

con

ures

0

OMF D

(LABORATON

SECRET

CONY:

INFO: FILE

eno

487650

O mode"

narrion ro

DISSEM DYS

•K: THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHIELE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTI-

MISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY

•THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMSI

THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION

FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECOMOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY

CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND

TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY

ORIENTATION.

LO THE ENERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC

ADVISOR IS PROBABLY

FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S LUSTERITY PROGRAM

MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC FECOVERY AND .

STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANUHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO

SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NE-

GOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS

CLUB AGREEMENTS, TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES UILL GO FAR

IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIRDENCE IN CHILE.

2• FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES ' VIEUS

ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

DATE:

ORIGI

UNITE

EXT:

15-1234-532

15726-52

COO DORLATIS OPPIÇERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMISITED

S'ECRET

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 169

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DOMAL CARTERUITON

roo

0

400

шло

DAL.$. 9100809000

OMF D

сеазиржатном

SECRET

падолав немочто пожатоя

cre

CONF:

INFO:

FILE

487650

DISSAM BY,

narumn co

PeR

A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN IN-

VESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO

ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT LE MONTHS?

B. DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR

OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHSP

WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS!

C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC

REACTION IN EURCE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY

AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL

BE OF INTEREST.

4. FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET-N

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

4 DECEMBER 1973

FUNNE SANTON SMB

C/WH/bISA

6609/1069

navenera derri

indiercern

SECRET

REPRODUCi.... DY OTHER THAN THE IS SUING OFFICE IS PRE_

Ere in dis

= 1T2 AC/UND

E2

IMPDET

CL BY057556

---

## Page 170

14-00000

QUICON"

'ro@l.4.49140 о 104У

tr; re

.

(1

0

SACKET

or, eat if a resen

STAff

• :

"wt.

ine 1

2425342

DIRECTOR

іср:/

1575533hwr: 35

U

0

5135

РF.1°

PRIORITY CARACAS, LA LAZI QUITO: GOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA,

MEXICO

CITY

BUENOS MERESE GUATEHALA CITY, SAN SALVADORI

MANAGUA.

KYBAT FUDHEN

REF:

DIRECTOR-458246

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR DRAL FUOMEN UNIEFINGS, STIPU-

LATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING

TiL LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: POISIBLE SUPPORT DY LATIN AMERICAN CONNUNIST

PARTIFS FOR KESISTANCE IN CHILE.

3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS CGHINDICATED IN AiL EARLIER BRIEFING

CRIFT THAT SOVIET CONNUNIST PARTY OF PERU IPCP/SOVIETE INTENDED 1O

SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERKILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER

COUNTRIES UHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE

NOVENENT IN CHILE.

4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEA COUP WAS RECEIVED BY POP/SOVIET

FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA, CENTRAL COMMITTLE CALLEBEN EMERGENCY

ÄZETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE

CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST

• 110159

sir:

'26 Sep 73

Winfle @7=7-45-124-52

FECRET

REPRODUCTIOH BY OTHER TILIO TOE ISCUIG GEFICE IS PRiCHIMITEO

E?

CI. 38: 057956

---

## Page 171

14.00.000

ini?

110.1.-0.

OUTCOWG MESSAO6

ANMEINDEN USE CHIR

"...

ind

0

0

D

0

SiAIT

corr.

INFO: FiLE

core

DIRECTOR

454557

sues

0

O a minare

0155811 87:

FER

ALLENDE REGIME. UNILE MAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROI MOSCOU, CENTRAL

CONCITEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MENSURES SUCH AS SENDEG SIX

MEGALEZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MENGERS OF PERUVIAN

COMMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OSTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN

ERSASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGEMCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE.

SUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NANES, VERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS NERE

TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE

ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.

S. ON L5 SEPTENSER, TUO UNIDENTIFIED NEN WHO DÉRE LATIN

ANERICHIS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PEP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSUT.

INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF. PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL

COMMITTEE AND IIMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING

JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ IPCP/SOVIET SEC GENI, FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER

•EPCPISOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION NEMBERT, GUILLERMO HERRERA

¡OTTESENOS CALSO NENBER OF POP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSIONE, AND

GHE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS : • UHO USED

THE ALIAS "FIGUERDA " FOLLOWING PISCUSSIONI THESE PARTY LEADERS

BATE:

CHIG:

EXT:

noli: 48

jEGRET

REPHODUC

DITED

CL BY:

INDE

15795

---

## Page 172

OuTcOIG 11235305

0

SIAFF

COor:

r.1ed

DIRF.CTOR

446÷557

DISSEM BY:

FILE.

suratee

Rate f'ill

ORGAN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTY ASIDERS TO AID IN SUPPOST

TRIR COUNTERPATS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE CRECHE. INITIAL

I STRUCTIOUS TO PCP/SOVIET HENCERS WERE TO ARRANGE FOR LODGING FOR

¡LAGERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO WERE ARRIVING

IN LINA, TO OBTAIN MAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUMENTATION, ETC.

I. SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT TO CHILE WAS TO BEGIN DURING WEEK

OF ZU SEPTEMBER WHEN COMKUNISTS AND OTHERS WERE TO ARNIVE FROM

VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COLOMBIA, CUBA AND OTHER É.

ALL WERE TO DE

LODGED IN LIMA: ANDO LATER, GIVEN FALSE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION

TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK IN CHILE WAS TO ASSIST

IN REORGANIZATION OF POCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS WELL AS IN PRO-

DUCTIGIO OF CLAiDESTINE PROPAGANDA. THEY ALSO WERE TO STUDY POSSI-

DILITY OF AIDING IN MOUNTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY

REGIME, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAI GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE WAS NO

NEED TO SEND ARMS, SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS HIDDEN IN CHILE

TO MAKE SUCH RISK UNNECESSARY.

7. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN CONMUNISTS WERE TO MEET IN LIMA

DIl ES SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER SENDING PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

CAlE:

ni:5:

EX8:

15-124-52

rmny.n0d1...i0.0.801

REFECHUCHO! DY CHICH DUAN THE IGUAG OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

CL 6Y.057551

---

## Page 173

14-00000

OUrGOrG

16A08

tit

0

0

0

•..-ч..

'?a.1.1901

CUidF:

Pid: FILE

DIRECTOR

45÷56,7

11

13

it

GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO NID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

SOME

DELEGATES

¡S MELTING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER NITEND REGIONAL MSETING OF INTER-

MATICHAL LABOR ORGANTZATION CILOS WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS

CARDOS, CHILEND, SECRETARY FORLATIN ANERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD IF DER-

ATION OF TRADE UNIONS LUFTUS, WHO IS IN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD

PRESS CONFERENCE ON 13 SENTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON AII. WORLD

TRADE UNTON ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST

CHILEAN JUNTA.

S. FILE: 15-124-52. E2o INDEToN

.l...*::

CH:T:

do SENTENDER 2173 KieT

LILLIAM M. KENT:LSS

656607355

an.c

SECRET

91r.100U:

Come on or con jerco

LIVET

BY. 057951,

---

## Page 174

14-00000

OUTGOING

SIGHALYINIPRUSETHLY

101

100.

rooms

• 0.

SECRETA

STAFF

INFO: FILE

pa18. 0-001 711420

2515242

6. 158.5

RECTOR

459023

0•1800.

PiSSEs Or: ")

0

nathan ro

PER

TO: PRIORITY LIMA.

RIBAT FUOMEN

ÑEFS: A. PANAMA CITY 25754 |IN U353071

B: LIMA ZGOLO lIN 0381801

1. REF A UAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF

B'ASCULECT YOUR CONCURRENCE MUD CAVEATS: WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN

EXILE I LINA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT (PIP PENE-

TRATION AGENT AND HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF PERUVIAN SERVICE UND IS

PROFESSIONAL INTEL OFFICERS AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY: PLEASE AD-

VISE.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. Ea, IMPDET-r

#REFS ATTACHED.

DATE:

OHIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

15-124-52

25 wig. 13

WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB

ADC/UH/Ь

6556/9155

...

Grahamation Uerdi!

18494.

iF PRODUCTiO: MY OTHER THAN DIE ISSUIPiG OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2

CL BY:

057556

---

## Page 175

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

8110

DiE 0 .

side entities unio

0

0

0

1

SECRET

STAFF

Com c/Wer di INFO: FILE.

2yc2102

c.19 a

DIRECTOR

Hang defilera

453040

Disre 106523

MACUAR 900

РЕЯ

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,

LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: BONN 26475 IN 0375921

1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED SUCH AS

CORPER COMPANIES- BANKS AND ITT HAVE CECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND

• WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE UUSINESEES WHICH WERE INTERVENEDI

INCLUDING NOST

DOMESTIC MANUFACTUFINS FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO

THEIR FORMER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY:

LARGE FARNS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR

FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARNS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL &E

RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO CUR KNOWLEDGE NO

LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR

PROPERTIES FALL. INTO WHICH CATEGORY. UE HAVE NO FURTIER DETAILS

THIS SUBJECT.

2. FILE: 15-124-52.

E2, IMPUET.A

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

Exi:

24 SEPTEMSER 1973

SEAUSE LINTON ESS

UH/L/SA

66074104?

15-124-5.?

WHo cry

CARMEUR

miderato

ніїї

Felines

.10.0n7 7u2.

REIRODUCTION BY OTHER INAY DUE CONG DEFICE IS PROMiNICO

1 45.000

SECRET

CL MY: 057556

---

## Page 176

14-00000

CADLE DEC DISSEM BY L

PERSON/UNIT NOTIMID_.

N

RF.

FILE.

SIPSIEG 3

SECRET.

FERNIT

(or 111/52021

Sintri, 94R6, 9:x33,

chall

REPROMIC TIM DY UTIESTHAN

INSU,NO JI TICE IS PROMINITEO

AUENCY

MESSAJE

ACTION A

т 551709

PAGE 01

iN 937508

TOR: ?414502 SEP 7}

26475

-1000.

SECRET 241TISZ SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 20475

TO: PRIORITY DISECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS. BRASILIA. PARIS.

LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: A. DIRECTOR $58535

B.: DIRECTOR 455615

C. BONN 25432 L 035549)

1, PARA 38 REF 3 STATES PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH

HAVE BECOME QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOY 35

RETURNED OWNERS, DEF O REDUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC

PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM FES A WHETHER EXPROPRIATED

AND PEQUISITIONEE PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUETE LEGAL UNGUOTE

PROPERTIES OF GOUT SUBJECT TO FROVISIONS PARA 39 PER B. IN

OTHER WORDS. WHAT IF ANY FIRMS IN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NOT BEGOE

LEGAL PROPERITY DE GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS HAVE BEEN PANES

OVER OR INTERVENEO NITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL FROPERTY CE GOVERN-

MENT.

2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

OF FIRMS INVOLVES.

...

SECRET

RESCED COPY

15-124-52

ä+ Sip 73

---

## Page 177

14-00000

CABLE DEC DISDAM BY.

_ PER

PERSCRO/UMIT AOTIATIO

_ANYAPSE.SOPY IBSUED HOTTER

AL. PHON UNIT

RF.

FILE.

SOTAL COPIES

SECRET

VR.

"ACTION.

9591789

PAGE 32-82

102: 2914501 SEP 23

3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2

IMPDET

SE

CRET

PETRO OCTION TY OOHETEO

AGENCY MESSAGE

BONN

237584

25435

---

## Page 178

14-00000

OUTGOING HESSAGE:•

AVIADOALY

sue

тоо

1r8

OilF

0

SECREC

STAFF

COnr: C/ U'1/8 INFO: FILE

0018 pre asona

2217217

26180

спа

DIRECTOR

МA1AM0

MOTONIMO MUMORO

458535

•DISSEN DY:

0

0

0

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CHARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,

LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER

REFS: A. BONUAN 26432 lIN 0355441 1*1

B. DIRECTOR 4566L5 |**1

La ""SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM OFOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF

ECOUONY. STATE CONTROL OVER UIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS

SIGIIIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME. THROUGH PURCHASES-

EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONES AMD INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR

ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER 2UI PRODUCTION OF.

GOODS AlID SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST WALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COM-

PARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT ES END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN

1970.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOUT HAD TAKEN OVER AT

LEAST 400

FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE. HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS

. OCCASIONS BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN

SCOPE AND RANGE

GOUT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON UHAT

SECOTOR'S

LIMITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOUT, THEREFORE DIAD

CONTINUED

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT&

EXTI

GLADDANCATION

RECORD COPY

REPRODUCTION DE OTHER THAN THE ISSUING ORFECES PROMIEITEO

15-124-52

atiriabad corredo

2:2 Sep 73

E ?

IMPOET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 179

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DIONAL CUNTERUBEONLY

con

ACP

тоо

ТРА

A00

OMF. 0.

ССАВЛИКСАТЮЙ

SECRET

•MADRACO MANCHMO MONATOR

STAFF

CONF:

Padi

0410.41N8 O ROU

INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

458535

0

MARRAORDI

тое.

NO 140E I

потипи 10

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT

CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED•

3. FILE: 15-2204-52. EZ, IMPDET-N

*INTEND USE TREF B3 CONNY FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA"

PROPERTIES.

**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

...

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

22 SEPTEMBER

1973

WILLIAM KENT;DSO

ADC/UHIS

1655679155

wl'4,14

ASLEURASA

REPRODUCTIC. BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUIME DEFICE IS, RO... ITED

TE?

CL BY:

IMPDET

057556

---

## Page 180

4-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

25-2:

SIGMAL CENTAGUAG ONLY

P00

0

100

M NO

OMF .0

SECRET.

STAFF

CONT: S/i l/8

INFO: FILE

OAPE-PIME DROVO

2217197

DIRECTOR

(p/.

MN, C/ FA4, C/EURG.

c/555.c/0m/N729

0 =0r70

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERN.

MONTEVIDEO, TONKYO, ROME.

RYEAT FUOMEN

L. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS.

STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST

WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES.

2. SUBJECT: @REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENGE OFFICER IN MEXICO

AFTER THE IL SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

•3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN FIBASSY.

OFFICER UHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE.

EDGIS IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOUT WAS IMPRESSED EUITH THE

GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERTHROW OF THE

ALLENDE REGIME ON LI, SEPTEMBER.

4. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOUT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERF

NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AID ATTEMPT. AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS

MADE UBECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, UMILE A GOOD

- MARXIST, LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOUARD HIS ENEMIES.

5. HE SAID DES CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO MAD PLANS

PREPARED

UNIT:

EXT:

RECORD COPY

COOMOMATINO OPFICATO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

2.2 Sap? 3

W4/6: 07-775-174-57

F. 2

IMPPET

CI. BY:

057556

SECRET

---

## Page 181

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DIONAL CENTARUSGONLY

aco

100

158

штю

OMF

СКАРЛАЖАВЮЙ

SECRET

MARRAOUN

onle: 1148050220

CONF:

INFO: FILE

ene

458572

толя

as ruen 10

DISSEN BY!

PER

IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW. LONG BEFORE LI SEPTEMBER CUBAN

EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES,

AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN

WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR

LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN

CHILE WOHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERSO IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST

BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP

AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AID TRAINING,

BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF

: CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

6. FILE: 15-124-528. E Z, IMPDET-M

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

21 SEPTEMBER 2973

WILDALLIAM KENT: DSO

ADC/UH/b

5515/90192

C/WHD

DELIABLAS DATICEO

REPRODUCTIC

Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROM

I Z°: IMPDET

CL- BY:

N057556

SECRET

---

## Page 182

14-00000

DIGNAI

con

.n

TRA

OMF. 0 .

CLARS-NICAIION

SECRET

+7714-1941N00 INtRATOn

0

поло

по сково

453246

DISSEM 84/3

0

O in ends

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZI QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA,

MEXICO CITY, DUENOS GAIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

•L. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPU-

LATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZÉN RESIDING

IN LIMA•

2. SUBJECT: MEETING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE..

ON OR ABOUT Z2 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN LIMA ON

OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMBERICAN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE

PURPOSE OF MAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

• 4. THE PRO-SOVIET COMFUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE •

POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUPS TO CHILE TO FIGHT. ALONGSIDE ANY

CHILEANS WHO ARE STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA.

THE PARTY INTENDS TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA

FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO

JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES BIN CHILE.

DATE?

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RECCAD COPY

LASBUAICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRONIBITED

3/L C

15-124-52

2: Lip 13

AUTHENT

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

057556

'"'

---

## Page 183

14-00000

BIONAL CHTIFHUSRONLR

cere

100

0

шлю

OMF

.. •

0

• SECRET

mageaco.

госжатоя

DATA-TIME ORONA

CONg:

INFO: FILE

0 men

Nо 10081

MATURATO

DISSEM BY:

PER

458276

5•

FILE:

15-124-52.

E 2, IMPDET. M

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

21 SEPTEMBER

WILLIAM KENT: DSO

3973) Кат

ADC/WHA

5515/9192

DC/UH/3-

"CAWHD

aurentiato dories

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING REFICE IS PHOHIBITED

SECRETE

- Ci 3Y: -

IRIPDET

057556

---

## Page 184

14-00000

- ...

SEÜRrE?

857

7498

PAGE 01-01

TOR: 211917Z SEP 73

SECRET 2119112 SEP 73 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 25771

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF A, ° DIRECTOR 457922

PANAMA CITY 2575

1, CONCUR REF A.

2.

FILE: 15-124-52.

035309/

EZ IMPDET

RECED COPY

TRET

2Y

RIPRODUCTION DY OTHIRD THAI

S SUING O

TICE IS PAOMIDNTEO

AGENCY MESSAGE

.. .e.....

IN

838128

PACY 25771

15-124-52

2/5ap33

---

## Page 185

14-00000

•CABLE SEC DISSEM OL

PEASONUNIT NOTIPIRO_

ACTION UMIT

сіШн8

142

RF.

___PER.

TOTAL CORIS 12:

SECRET

PILE :

VR

LP/AN

ORECEDENE

PAGE B1-01

TOP 1211811}

SEP 73

SE GR E I 2118202 SEP. 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25263

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF

DIRECTOR 457888

1,

2.

CONCUR. NO CAVEATS.

FILEI 15-124-52, EZ IMPDET

FESCENE GOZYT

"Dn..

ПРО ОСТО В РОМІВТИ

AGENCY MESSAGE

-IN 036085.

MEX!

25763

:.=!

Lunte Erey

15-124-52

2: Sip 73

---

## Page 186

14-00000

OUTGOIN- MESSAGE

=13

BOMARCED?

ros.

100

uns

OMF O.

0

23.

SECRET

маллов-sm adonaros

STAFF

CONF:

0118 1,000 a mono

211725Z

DIRECTOR

457722

DISELA BY: 21.

INFO:

DOsE 4/.5.33

U •103 1012

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: PANAMA CITY 25754 |IN 0353091

3. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ALTER TEXT TO SHOW LIMA

AS FLICE ACQUIRED, OMITTING REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF QUISADA OR HIS

PARTICIPATION AT MEETING. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA.

SAlE SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2.. FILE: 15-124-52. E2. INPDETON

*MEETING IN LIMA OF LATAI SOCIALIST ORGS TO MAKE PLANS SEND MILITANTS

TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

))

Dost

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

21 SEPTEMBER 1973

WILLIAM M. KENT :LSS

АDСIUH/Ь

RECORD COPY

6556/9355

! -C/UHD

15-124-52

221 Say 73

Seen Miery

enrocarras opences

couponies persias

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

E 2:

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

SECRET

---

## Page 187

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

And

• ONF

con

0.

0

0

0

0

SECRET

STAFF

CONF:

19050:

1 50 90e

2416121

DIRECTOR

we are 41553-49408

457088

OISSEMUY: "2

AA TUMM ID

TO :

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: "MEXICO CITY 25260, IN 0353056

PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL OMIT NAME OF MANUEL

CORTINA AND REFER TO HIN ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUEIN EMBASSY WHO

MENDER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CON-

.. TACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE

AND ANY CAVEATS.'

2.. FILE: 15-124-52. E21 IMPDEToN

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 29231116

OFIG:

UTLLIAM M. KENT:LSSIN"

UNIT: ADC/WHAL

EXT:

6556/9155

15

124-52

21 Ju? 3

NЛI1 ASINO DARIEN

RESS

Topy

S7046

derxeas

REPRODUCTION BE OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEO

SECRET

C/UH/SL

E

• 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

---

## Page 188

14-00000

CAEME BEC DISSEM BY.

PRASOA/UNIT NOTUIED.

TOTAL COPILO =

APRODICTON DY OTTIERTIAN

SONIMO OTFICE IS PROMIDITEO

AGENCY. MESSAGE

RF.

rur. va clistan, c/SS3 c/nH18

546182

PAGE 21-01

TOR1211012Z SEP 73

1/i 235549

(56NN. 26432

33E

wirs

SECRET 210956Z SEP. TE STAFF

CITE BONN 26432

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR ¿DSO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, gRASILIA, OSEIS,

LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER SURMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456615

1. INTEND USE FUQNEL INFO REF, TO INCREASE USEFULNESS,

PLS RIDENTIFY "SOCIAL D'EL" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 33

REF,

2. FILE 15-124-52.

EZ-IMPDET

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

21 8c,773

---

## Page 189

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0

See Cool Dues ONe

0

AL B

OME

0

SECRET

STAFF

Maarona

1333247

-/D3

DIRECTOR

iver. Crit

0

455935

nie.

SU INDEE

PER

TO: FRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACIS, BRISTLIA, BONDA PURGE LONDON.

SYBAT FUOMEN

FOLLOWING INFERMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FLONEN SRIEFINGS,

STIFULATION NO FURTHER ENFLITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN SUSTHESSIAN

WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNIENT.

Z. SUBJECT: ECONONIC ELAS iF CHELEN MILITIAY JUIET.

30. ON IS SEPTENCER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT

OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ECORFOS, CUTLINED MELITARY JUNTA'S

ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:

A• ALL OF FIRTS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE DEEN EITHER TAKEN

OVER OR INTERVENED SUT UHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OUNED SY GOVERIMENT;

WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OUNERS:

B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME

LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOUT WILL. MOT BE RETURNED TO FREVIOUS OUNERS.

NUNO

SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OUMERSHIP OF THESE

PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 1O OR 50%I SHOULE EE ARE MAILABLE

TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING FERCENTASE SESOLD BE SOLD AS SHARES

TO THE PUBLIC.

DATEs

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

ст.-Y

r--:

REPRODUCTION OY OTHER TRAY THE ISSUING CITICE IS PROHICITEO

SECRET

18.54P73

15-124-52

E 2

IStPDET

CL EY: 057556

---

## Page 190

14-00000

OUTGOING

144614.

1E6SAGE

C"F

•a.r.aton

SECRET

1181868m00 91-900185468108

0

CONF:

IRIFO: FILE

4156413)

0

INNI+28920080

• DIGGER BY:

"grabs a

10:-000n

PER

TO THE FUELIC•

4. ACCORDING TO MUNO; PERSONEL IN CHIAGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES

HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING 4E SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY

ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARIED FORCESS AND IN EVENT

OF ANY FROELEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL HUO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT

TO HELP THEM.

."" SO GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ISSUMED THE

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONCHIC DEVELOPMENT: GEHERAL

NUNO AND CORFO WILL VORK VERY CLOSELY WITH IDUSTRIAL LEVELGO.IENT

SOCIETY ISOFOFAJ, WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIRENS AS ¡SOFOFA

COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.

b. FILE: 15-124-52. E21 IMPDET.d

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

16 SEPTEMEER 19731) Mer

HILLIAM M. KENT: SIB

iC/UHD

K4t,81

REPRODUCTI MOTHER TUNA IME ISSO SO MICE IS PE DI...

I:!PDET

SECRET

---

## Page 191

1-00000

---

## Page 192

14-00000

CARLE STE DISSEN BY Z8

PERSOV LAT NOTIFIEO

TOTAL COPIES.

SECRET:.

ACTION ÜNIT

SUED AFRO INK CD Or M2N2000 1

RF.

N

FILE.

FEPRONUCTION DY OTHER THAN

MBUINT OPTICE IN PROMIBITEO

AGENCY MESSAGE

732

т 538842

PAGE 01-01

TOR: 1819352 SEP 73

SECRET 1818562 SEP. 23 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26529

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: " DIRECTOR 456283

(IN 031351)

CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26488 CHCS

.?836) FOR

FUOMEN, NO SPECIALCAVEATS,

(IN 031722)

2. PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE

OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY, INFO NAS GIVEN

DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY

TO FUSRMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2,

3.

NO FILE. EZ IMPDET,

IN- 052783

SAGO

26529

SECRE

RECOND GORY

18 SiP?3

15-124-52

---

## Page 193

14-00000

018980 80 1%

PERDONIUMIS NOTIPICO

VANCE COPY 19SURDISLDT

TION UN

WH 12

ACTION

129

JFB

_TORAL CORIRE

SECRET

RUY

E2.

IMPDET

Ch. BY: 007A22

FILE, VR, DDO, D00/00, IP/AI, IW, OPS/INT 5, SS 4,

PS/EG 3e CL; C1/OPe FR. 4, SS/SOG 3.

PAUE N1.

TOR1172145Z SEP 73

SEGRE T 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL

CITE SANTIAGO 26512

TO! DIRECTOR.

INTEL

SUPDATA!

SOURCEI FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN.

15-9-4, CL BY DD9S60.

NO INDEX.

FILEDI 1719582

AGENCY MESSADE

SAGO 29512

TOFIR- 3:4.075/1-73

MCS-9839

Orer

FILE:

7120913

S

R

E

---

## Page 194

14-00000

Intelligence Information Cabie

VARNING NOMICI

ENSITIVE INTELLICENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEL

STATE INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIANACC NIC NSA IRRAS SON ONE CRS

IN

031722

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

DIRECIORATE OF

NSC/S

OPERATIONS

Si eulam tr Biaded aporting Offree, Ruempe from Ornaral Dentonelicallen Schedule of 1Q. 11083 frimplion Colory 88 (8), (2). Impossibla lo Foremino Dolo

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -514/07571-75

DIST

17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTHY CHILE

' 15 SERTENGER 1923

SUBJECTI

- PLANS

REDUARDO FREL, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE

ANDIE DER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE E."

A CO

/ CHILE, SANTIAGO 110 SEPTEMBER 19731 FIELD NO. HCS-9830.

SOURGEI AN ENFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTI

WHOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLACES HIM IN THE

CENTER OF THE PARTYIS IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM, HE HAS

GOOD ACCESS TO BOTH THE RIGHT- AND LEFT-WING SECTORS

OF THE POC, MUCH OF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN

CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND SOURCES.

1: ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI.

A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIO PARTY (POCI, TOLD OTHER

PDC LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE

CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE

DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY

SECRET

---

## Page 195

14-00000

IN 0.9.2:22

TOFIR -314 0?5310:

PAGE 2 OF & PAGES

WARNING NOTICH

SENSITTVE INTEILIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(010981/100110101

(dissein controle)

SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLIZED.

2: :SOURCE COMMENTA MOST OF THE PDO LEADERS ARE CONCERNEO

ABOU" "HEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE

TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY

MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING

•OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SAENZ. THE

PRESIDENT OF INE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFAD, WHO

HAS BEEN NAMED ÀS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS AND LEON VIL ARIN, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS

FEDERATION: WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC

WORKS: WHICH HE REFUSED.

•WHILE SAENZ HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY

CONTACTS WITH PDE MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDO LEADERS

AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE POC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATICN

AS. A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY, I

3. FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY

OF HiS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY HS

MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE.

HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE

SECRET

---

## Page 196

14-00000

C

IN 031722

TOFIR

314/07571-73

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOUNCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Classication)

IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY,

A, FIELD DISSEMI EMBASSY, DEFATT AT SANTIAGO,

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER, EXEMPT.FROM

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.9, 11652, EXEMPTION

CATEOGRY 58.121, IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC

DECLASSIFICATION

E C

E

---

## Page 197

14-00000

CADLE SEC DIBDEM DY 298.

PENSON/UNIT NOTIPILO

_ADYANSE COPY ISBVSDLEAZLLER

ACTIONONIT

RF.

10TAL COMES: 3/ -1

SECRET

FiLE..

_AL

VRIE/AN SS5, PS/EGS

ACTIONS

184

: 535956

PAGE 21-01

TOR: 1718431 SEP 73

SECRET.

2713142 SEP 73 STASS

CITE SANTIAGO 26508

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR..

FUORACLE FUOMEN

REESE A.. MEXICO CITY 25196 (IN 031341)

B. SANTIAGO 26984 (IN 030951)

1: CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.

2. FILE: 15-124-5313, EZ IMPDET

WH/F/H-

WIT/LARR

WH/S/Sec y

S

E

C

RET

REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAN

JOBUINO OFFICE IS PROMIDITIO

AGENCY MESSAGE

$ 6:

IN 031535

SAGO

26502

---

## Page 198

14-00000

CATLE BEC DISSEM Or E

PERSOMUMT MOTINERO.

ACTION UNT

—PER

JOTAL CORE AD :1

SECRET

RUPACOUCTION EY

ÚT HEA THAN

LOUINS OFFICE IS PPONAZITEO

AGENCY MESSAGE

RF.

FRE

va. 19/21 506 Biless

138

9555509

PAGE 01-01

TOR: 1715582 SEP 73

IN 031341

MEX! 25196

SECRET 1715412 SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25196

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE

REF- SANTIAGO 26161 030451)

Wild'Capta

1, BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED

• TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM, REQUEST

SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.

2. FOR DIRECTORI OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE

SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE, PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS, ALLENDE AT

AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL

MBURNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT, UNLESS WE

CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT

ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLICON, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO GITY

PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF

SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL

APPEARING LOCALLY, THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE

U,S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.

3. FILES 15-124-5313. EZ IMPDES.

SECRET

---

## Page 199

14-00000

CALE LEC DISSERNESES-CER-

PEASONUNT NOTIFIEO...

_ARIANSE COMY HESEOISLOMED

ACTION UNIT

RF.

N

FILE.

TOTAL CRALS:

SECRET

RUM:

AT

IS SUING DA FTCE iS PALACEIT

AGENCY MESSA:

181

ACTION I

$36

7532968

PAGE 81-01

TOR: 15:547I SEP 73

IN CJ042

_- MEXI

25191

SECRE I 151536Z SEP T3 STAFF

С!TE МЕХ:СО С:ТУ 25191

TO: DIRECTOR.

KOCDEL :SK FUOMEN

REF: DIREC:OR 454587

WH/G/Sody.

÷1;

G:ST OF INFURMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED

1N SEPT KDGLACIER-S TOLD GRANDGEW: THAT KOOBELISK-I WAS

VERY LEPRECHA IVE OF THIS REPORT. KIOSELISK-1 IS RECEIVING

NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY iN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND

HAS TO DEPEND ON NENS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA

WHICH ME CONS:DERS TO BE OF DIBIOUS ACCURACY.

2. FiLE:

52-8-91/3. E2. IMFDE:.

---

## Page 200

14-00000

CABLESEC ASSEM BY 2E

_PER

10Y

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_

---

DEPY SAUCTION BY OTHER THAN

ISSU TO OFFICE IS PROMIBITEO

AGENCY MESSAGE

ARYANGE COPY ISSUED/3L9TTE)

CTION UNI

Wis

N.

RF.

FILE.

ACTIONE

683

T. 527885

FRECEDENCE

BY

VA CAN FURS FER

PAGE 21

TOR: 132324235373

IN 228495

SAGO

26421

S

EGRET 132233Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26421

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR PRIORITY BUENOS GIRES, LA PAZ, BRASILIA,

BOGOTA: SAN JOSE: SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, MHAMIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY,

GEORGETOWN, TEGUCIGALPA: KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY.

ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, MONTEVIDES, CARAÇAS, LONDON, PARIS,

LOPIPIT.. BONN:

1.

EL MERCURIO: A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE SANTIAGO DAILY! RESEARED

TODAY 113 SEPTEMBERI CARRYING FOR MOST FORT OFFICIAL DECLAFSTIONS

• BY THE CHILEAN JUNTA: THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL AND ARTICLES, HOWEVER,

APPEAR WORTH REPLAYING:

A: MACIA LA RECUPERACION NACIONAL

CON DISTINTOS LENGUAJES Y CRITERIOS, LAS PERSONALIDADES

POLITICAS, LOS DIRIGENTES GREMIALES Y LOS INSTITUCIONES MAS

INFLUYENTES RECLAMABAN UN CAMBIO PROFUNIS EN LA DIRECCION SEL PALS

TANTO LA OPINION PUBLIC NACIONAL COMO LS EXTRANJERA HABIAN

1-52

GLEGADO A LA EVIDENCIA DE QUE CHILE ENTEREA EN UN PROCESO ELTAL

QUE DEBIA LLEVARLO A LA DICTADURA MARXISTA O A LA GUERRA CIVIL.

LA INTERVENCION DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, VINO EN ESTE CASE.

Bill

A LIBERAR A LA CIUDADANIA DE LA INMINENTE DICTADURA MARXISTA

-SECRE

15-124-52

1355873

---

## Page 201

14-00000

CADLE BEC DIASEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTTIRO_

ARNANGE ESPY IARUKOLALSINO

ACTION UNIT

RF.

SECRET

IIPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAN

BRUINO OFFICE IA PRUMIDITRO

AGENCY MESSAGE

FILE. • VR.

ACTIONA

527885

PAGE 02

TOR: 1323242 SEP 73

1N 028495

SAGO

26421

Y A SALVAR À CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICO, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.

SE ABREN AMORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MED:ANTE UN

INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO. DEL

TRABAJO, NORMALICE LAS FAENAS, DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO

NACIONAL Y REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE

AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.

CON :NNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS

ARMADAS MAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA

INSTITUCIONALIDAD, PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS

HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO

DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS PONOS, HA PEDIDO

UNA HONDA SECTIFICACION:

EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONIL PROVOCADO FOR EL MARXISMO

NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS

POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI

HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOURE SI LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DE CONDUCIR

LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL CRAMATICO FRAÇASO DE LA UNIDAD

POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA

CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMBO FORZARON LA SITUACION

HASTA EL PUN'C EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA:

SECRET

---

## Page 202

14-00000

CABLE REC DIBERIADY

PERSON:UNIT MOTIVITO

PER

TOTAL SOPICE.

SECRE

AY

ACTHON UMIT

AT

ISBUIMO OFFICE IS PHOMIDITET

AGENCY

MESSAGE

RF.

FILE.

VR.

ACTON A

527885

PAGE C3

TOR: 1323242 SEP 93

IN 028495

SAGO 25421

CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SENORES

COMANUANES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL

Y EL SENOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR

HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO.

RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRI-

DUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA

CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL

PARLAMENTO. DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR. EL CAMINO

ADECUADO PARA

INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALiDAD QUE SE REQUIERE,

LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR

A CIERTOS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE

LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO

DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES

DE LA ¿UNTA, ES CHILE MISMO EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA

PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO, DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA

DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCIÓN DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES

Y LA COLADORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE

AGUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO, SU INDECISION,

SU EGOISMO O SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PER-

MITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA :DEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA

AL. PODER EN :9T0 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.

SECRET

---

## Page 203

1421000

CAOLE BEC DISIMAY--

PERSON/UNIT NOTIMEO..

_SSYANCE SOPLISENSATiQISO

ACTION UNIT

RF.

TOTAL COPES.

SE.

RUN OT

REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAN

IBRUINO OFFICE IS PROHIDITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

FILE.

VR .

ACTION.

527885

FAGE DA

1N 028495

TOR: 1323242 SEP 73

SAGO

26421

EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION

Y ASSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA

TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS, À NADIE PUEDE

SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE

CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE

A LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.

EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTIS

MO ES TRABAJO. ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL

ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.

B. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA •- COMPLACENCIA

DEL PODER JUDICIAL

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREME, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO.

ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARAC!UN:

"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL

PROPOSITO DEL BUENO GUSTERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS

DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL STA EXAMEN PROVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD.

COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTICULO 1: DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES.

MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA

EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION EE JUSTICIA DE CHILE. Y ESPERA

QUE EL PODER JUDICTAL COMPLA CON SU DESER. COMO LO HA HECHO

LASTA

SECRET

---

## Page 204

14-00000

CADLE DEC DISDEM DY

PERDON/UNIT NOTIFIRO.

ADYANiRCOPY ISSUIOLLCTIAO:

ACTION UNIT

RF.

N

_PER__.

TOTAL COPIS

SECRET

AY.

MAPA IDUCTION

AY OTHAR THAN

ASUNIO OTTICE IS PROMINITRO

AGENCY

MESSAGE

AL

FILE.

VR

т. 527885

PAGE Q5

:OR: 1323241 SEP 73

AHORA.

SANTIAGO, 12 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973, FIRMAL ENRIQUE

UPRUTIA MANZANO, PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA",

C. ACTIVIDADES DE FF,AA. Y CARABINEROS --

152 CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS

ALLANADA: UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO, TENDICION DE ODO

PERSONAS. .!

REDUCCION DE EXTREMISTAS.

INCAUTACION DE ARMAS EN INDUSTRIAS E INSTITUCIONES BANCARIAS.

CONTROL DE LA MONEDA, TOMAS MORO Y "CANAVERAL" EN EL ARRAYAN.

CIENTO CINCUENTA CUBANOS EXTHEMISTAS FUERON EXPULSADOS

AYER DEL PAIS POR LA JUNTA MILITAR DE GOBIERNO, SEGUN EL BANDO

NO: 26 QUE DETALLA LAS ACTIVADES PRINCIPALES DESARROLLADAS POR

LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS EN LAS ULTIMAS HORAS EN LA

GUARNICION DE SANTIAGO:

LA COMUNICACION SENALA QUE FUE ALLANADA LA UNIVERSIDAD

TECNICA DEL ESTADO, DONDE SE RINDIERON OND PERSONAS, Y SE

ENCONTRO GRAN CANTIDAD DE ARMAMENTO, ASI COMO INJUSTRIAS,

ENTIDADES BANCARLAS Y OTROS RECINTOS EN LOS CUALES LOS EFECTIVOS

MILITARES SE INCAUTARON DE ARMAS Y EXPLOSIVOS...

2.. FILE: 15-124-52:

EZ IMPDET

SECRET

IN 028499

SAGO

26421

15-124-52

---