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157-10011-10078

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/06/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10078

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

UNKNOWN

FROM :

TO :

TITLE :

TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD J.

DATE: 02/17/75

PAGES : 22

SUBJECTS :

MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD

DASSIFYCATION : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 288, Folder 9

send to CIA

3/2194.

classifel

Annex

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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SSCI Box 288, Folder 9

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288.9

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Record Number 157-10011-10078

MAJOR SUBJECIS TO BE COVERED IN THE

TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN

February 17, 1975

Background of MI. Osbora

See the written statement submitted to the Commission by

MI. Osborn dated February ll, 1975.

Activities of the Office of Security Giving Rise to Questions

1. Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices

In the offices of the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the Executive Director-

Controller, the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration),

the Director of Security, and the Deputy Director of Security, a

system of telephone taps and microphones has existed. This

system has made it possible to record covertly any telephone con-

versation or office conference taking place in those offices. All CIA

officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully

aware of its presence and its capability of being activated only by them.

Portions of the system have been disconnected in recent years.

2.

Covert Uses of Listening Devices by the Office of Security

In each instance the installation of listening devices was expressly

approved by the Director of Central Intelligence:

a. A conversation which occurred in a motel between Victor Marchets

and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central In -

telligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged

by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mr.

Marchetts not to divulge sensitive information in a book which he

was then writing;

b. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time

to time;

c. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap

was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to

be a spy of a foreign country;

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

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d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been

routinely covertly recorded;

e.

The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert

recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with

others where there was some reason to be concerned about the

loyalty of such employees.

3.

Physical Surveillance

Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare

as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under

which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:

a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi-

fied information to unauthorized persons;

b.

Victor Marchettilto find out if he was getting information from current

employees of the CIA;

c. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their

sources of classified information, and Michael Getner

a staff writer

for

Washlagton Post,) for the same purpose;

d.

A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her

associates) who reported to the ClA the existence of a plot to

assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central

Intelligence.

4. Watergate Contacts

a. The McCord Letters

b. The Pennington Matter

C. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg

Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

a.

Within the Agency and Its Contractors

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in-

formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency.

Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone main-

tenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These

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employees are paid additional compensation to act as infomers

and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security

problems which they observe among their fellow employees at

the Agency.

A few outside employees, i.e., non-employees of the Agency, are

also retained for the same purpose. This would inclide employees

of the telephone company and construction workers engaged in the

construction of Agency buildings. In all instances, however, the

purpose is to maintain security among CIA employees and those

working for CIA contractors.

Two proptictary companies, called Anderson security associates.

and General Personnel Investigations, have beca used to do large.

seale investigations of the

personnel of compandes who costract with

the CIA

b. Outside the Agency

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for Anderson Security

Associates

to have its employees attend meetings and other functions

of various organizations thought to represent potential threats to CLA

personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of

organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was pro-

vided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular

reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization

monitored.

There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local

police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made

to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate

what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to

solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements.

The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as

recruiters on college campuses, and its offices around the country.

The field offices were directed at about that time to establish a

clipping service on campus and other newspapers to report on organi-

zations and individuals who might represent threats tò CIA personnel

or offices.

As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating

to organizations and individuals who may represent such

threats. a

substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and or-

ganizations.

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6.

Mail Intercept Programs in New York and San Francisco

7. Cover Operations Using Local Police Cover

Arrangements were made several years ago with Colong parter or

the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department for the issuance of

badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel.

This involved about 15 sets of identification.

These badges and other identification were never used by the ClA. They

were all returned to, Colonel Dussera

- Similar arrangemests have been made with other police departments.

Strict orders were issued that the use of identification as local police

officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual cover

for surveillance purposes.

8. Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance

Assistance was rendered to many local police departments, including

those of the cities of New York and Chicago, and to the Maryland and

Virginia state police during the period 1965 to 1972. He states that this

program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported

by Mr. Helms.

Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment,

and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as

photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives

detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and

covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of

intelligence operations.

This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law

Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and

state police departments by the CLA.

9.

Break-Ins Without Warrants

Mr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his

knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving

employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under

investigation for suspected disclosure or classified information.

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10. Counter-Audio Sweeps

At the request of other departments and agencies, including Congres-

sional Committees, the Office of Security conducts "counter-audio

sweeps"' of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hiddon

microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

John T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkiand

Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Ji.

David W. Belin,

Executive Director

February 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

ROBERT OLSEN

SUBJECT:

Sunmary of an Interview of Howard Osborn, conducted on February 10

and ll in the offices of the Carmission by MI. Robert B. Olsen

Present throughout the interview, which was conducted from 2:00 pm to approxi-

mately 5:30 pm on February 10 and from 12 noon until 2:45 pm and from 4:45 pm

to approximately 8:00 pm on February 11, was the attorney for MI. Osborn,

Jack Debelius.

Mr. Osborn apeared voluntarily at the request of the Cormission staff. At the

outset, Mr. Debelius raised a series of questions:

1. He asked us to supply an outline of the authority of the Cormission. He

was handed a copy of the Executive Order creating the Cormission and spelling

out its duties and powers.

2. He asked whether the Commission had subpoena powers, and he was advised that

it did not.

3. He asked whether the Commission had power to grant immunity to witnesses, and

he was advised that the Cormission does not have such power.

4. He asked what liaison has been established, or will be established between the

Commission and the various Senate and House Cormittees which will be investi-

gating the CIA and other intelligence activities.

He was told that the com

mission expects to establish such liaison, but that none of the ground rules

or arrangements have yet been agreed upon.

He asked whether Me. Osborn would have an opportunity to review the transcript

of any recorded testimony that he may give to the Commission or to the com

mission staff. He was told that the Commission staff had agreed upon a policy

of allowing any witness to examine the transcript of his own testimony.

6. He asked whether MI. Olsen had been cleared for security and whether Mr.

Osborn was free to reveal all levels of classified information in the course

of the interview. He was advised that such a clearance had been obtained for

Mr. Olsen and that Mr. Osborn was free to answer fully any questions put to

him within the scope of the responsibilities of the Cormission.

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MI. Debelius stated that he had carefully reviewed his own situation as a

former employee of the Office of Security within the CIA and that he had

concluded that there was no prospect that he would be called as a witness

either bu the Commission or by any Congressional or other cormittee. Hence,

he did not feel that there would be any conflict in his representation of

MI. Osborn under the canons of ethics applicable to the legal profession.

Background of Mr. Osborn

Howard Osborn graduated from the Virginia Polvtechnic Institute in 1940 and

shortly thereafter entered the military service. After World War II he was

briefly with Firestone Tire and Rubber Campany, and then joirca the Central

Intelligence Agency in late 1947. He served in various assignments within

the United States and Europe prior to September 1963, including assignment

as Assistant to the Inspector General and positions within the Directorate

of Plans.

In September 1963 he was named Deputy Director of Security. At

that time the Director of Securitv was Rob Bannerman. On July 1, 1964, he

was named Director of Security, and he continued in that position until earlv

March 1974 when he applied for disability retirement and went on sick leave.

He was retired on disability on December 31, 1974, having not returned to

work since going on sick leave on March 8, 1974. He states that he had no

involvement whatever with Agency activities after March 8, 1974.

Activities of the Office of Security

The Office of

security provides guards and security personnel to protect the

phusical facilities of the Agency. It has ressonsibility for overall security

measures for all CIA installations, both in the United States and in foreign

countries.

Counter-Audio Sweeps

At the request of other departments and agencies of the United States Government

it conducts "counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone

taps, hidden microphones, and other irtercepts of audible communications.

In the case of Congressional committees and suboormittees, it conducts such

sweeps of hearings rooms on the occasion of classified presentations bv CIA

personnel. Mr. Osborn further stated that there may have been other occasions

when such seeps were made of Congressional committee rooms, at the committee

request, where classified presentations were to be made. Mi. Osborn does not,

horever, specifically recall such other occasions.

It also seems to Mr. Osborn that the Office of Security has made similar Sucter.

sweeps for one or more individual congressmen or senators of their offices in

the Senate or House Office Buildings, but he again has no specific recollection.

The Office of Security also makes such sweeps of the homes of officials of the

CIA with their knowledge.

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He knows of no case in which the CIA has made a sweep of any other residences.

It does make sweeps of private firms who have CIA contracts, but always with

the knowledge and consent of the firm.

He states that his Office has never used equipment for counter-audio sweeps for

"positive intelligence."

he sweeps conducted included physical inspection, checking all telephones for taps,

checking desks, walls, cellings and floors for listening devicas or radio

reœeivers, and may involve such sophisticated measures as counter-laser measures

and the use of a Dodge mobile home equipped with sophisticated equipment capable

of picking up a radio transmission from nearby premises.

Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices

Mr. Osborn stated that Mr. Helms had authorized for use in his office,

in the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in the office of

the Executive Director-Controller,

in the office of the Deputy Director for

Support (now Administration), in the office of the Director of Security, and

in the office of the Deputy Director of Security a system of telephone taps and

secret microphones which made it possible to record covertly any telephone con-

versation or office conference taking place in those offices.

The taping system

could be activated with respect to telephones by depressing a button on the tele-

phone in the office of on the telephone at the desk of the secretary in the

adjacent office.

The taping system to record office conversations would be acti-

vated by depressing a button under the carpet in the vicinity of the desk of the

person occupying that office. All CIA officials in whose offices such equipment

was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being acti-

vated only by them.

The resorded conversations from all of these offices, except those in the Office

of security, were recorded in a central ban': of recorders located in the base-

ment of the building. Those emanating from the Office of the Director of Security

or Deputy Director of Security were recorded on twin recorders located down the

hall from those offices.

All recorded telephone and office conversations were transcribed. In some in-

stances the tapes were retained, and in some instances they were erased. It is

not known whether the Agency retains any copies of the typed transcripts. From

time to time, particularly as an official has departed from the CIA, he has

Ordered tapes erased and transcripts destroved.

Mr. Osborn reports that Mr. Colby directed the removal of the recording and tele-

phone taping equipment from his office hen he becai? Executive Director-

Controller of the Agency and again when he became Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Bannerman also had the eguipment talien out of his office when he became Deputy

Director for Support (Administration). Apparently all other officials in whose

offices such ecuipment was installed used it from time to time.

Positive Uses of Counter-Audio Equipment

Mr. Osborn stated that he wishes to clarify his previous testimony that counter

audio had not been used in a positive sense. Mut he meant was that it had not

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been used in the positive sense under any of the circumstances refenced to

above.

There were, however, several situations in which telephone tapes and

covert recording devices were employed by the Office of Security:

1. A conversation which occurred in a motel between Victor Marchettle

Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was

covertly recorded.

This was a meeting arranged by Acmiral Taylor for the

purpose of attempting to persuade Me. Marchetti, not to divulge sensitive

information in a book which he was then writing;

2. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;

3. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed

on the telephone of a CIA emplovee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign

country;

4. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely

covertly recorded;

5. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert

recording devices to record oversations of CIA employees with others

where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such

employees.

In each instance the installation of such listening devices

was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Osborn

recalls only three such instances:

In 1972-73 such a device was installed in an effort to unoover details

where an old defector was being forced to make kickbacks of his copens?-

tion from CIA to his CIA case officer;

b. At a date which could not be recalled by Mr. Osborn a device had been

installed to record activity of a female employee of the CIA who had

become closely and intimately associated with persons believed to be

dissidents;

c. In about 1968 or 1969 at the request of Mr. Frank Bartamo of the Depart-

ment of Defense the CIA planted listening devices at the apartment of a

serviceman doing highly sensitive cryptographic work. This was done with

the full knowledge of Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI. Mr. Osbom specu

lates that the CIA was called upon to accomplish this task for the De

partment of Defense because Mr. Sullivan believed that J. Edgar Hoover,

Mr. Osborn states that there may have been other instances where such listening

devices were installed within the United States, but he does not recall any

others. He is emphatic to the effect that after President Johnson issued an

Executive Order prohibiting telephone taps without the authority of the Attorney

General, the CIA never to his knowledge covertly tapped a telephone within the

United States except in the one incidence authorized hy Attorney General

Katzenbach.

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Physical Surveillance

Mr. Osbom states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country

has been vary rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts

that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted

as being limited to the following:

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified.

information to unauthorized persons;

2

Victor MAchett ilto find out if he was getting infomation from current

employees of the CIA;

3. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources

of classifieil information, and michael cecter

an a staff writer for the.

washing ton

POS

for the same purpose;

4.

A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the

existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the

Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the

supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full

knowledge of the FBI.

Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent

in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. Tie agent involved here was Thelma

King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (MI. Osborn reports that

a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel

was also covertly recorded.)

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of physical surveillance

in his experience was authorized by the Director of Cen'tal Intelligence erœept

that

Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the

official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that

these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. MI. Osborn is also emphatic to the

effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance,

has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect

to any conversations or communications, or has ever had a security check performed

on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

1. The MoCord Letters: Mr. Osbom states that a letter directed to Mir. lielms

• in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail"

received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that

of a former employee of the Office of security, Mr. James McCord. MI. Mocord

had shortlv before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the

Democratic National leadouarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he

immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

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MoCord Letters (continued)

Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that

nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it.

Thereafter a series of letters vere reœeived from li. Mocord by Paul Gaynor,

then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security.

These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was

promotlv brought to the attention of Mir. Helms. The thrust of these letters

that the Carmittee to Re-elect the President and high officials within

the Nixon Administration ware planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate

break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the

Justice Department and that he would take care of them. MI. Osbom recalls

being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the

MIA, Mr. Houston,

who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these

letters

to the Justice Department

At a much later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these

Mocord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcommittee of

House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate subcommittee.

The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former

FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His

compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he

has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by

Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.

In Auqust 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deouty, Ermal

Geiss, was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had

been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies

and departments relating to Watergate matters.)

While Mr. Osborn was on vacation anFBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted

the Office of Security and requested information on a man simplv named

"Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of

Security. Mr. Kuhn's Seputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent

Parham to Ermal Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names

of both Penningtons or just one of them. Mr. Geiss instructed Whitaker that

Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired

employee of the CIA, who was not related in any way to lee Pennington. Ciss

instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.

Mx. Geiss would have known that James NoCord while he was employed in the

Office of Security had acted as the case officer for lee Pernington, that

Mocord was involved with the watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really

interested in Lee Pennington.

Mr. Osborn states that all of the abore information came to his attention in

February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.

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Pennington Matter (continued)

Lee Pennington and a man named Charles Wylie were the only tvo onfidential

informants who Osborn can think of who were emploveed as such by the Office

of security during his tenure with that office. (This is in addition to

CIA emplovees and the employees of propriety investigating companies ho

have been used as informants.) Mr. Wylie was a journalist and writer who

was paid $10,000 per year, plus certain travel expenses, by the CIA to

as an informant, but Mr. Ösborn has no idea what kind of information

he provided to the Agency in recent years. He does

recall that many

years ago wylie provided information regarding the Vienna, Austria, Youth

Festival and also some information gathered on the trip he made to Japan.

Mr. Osborn states that he has never met Lee Pennington or Charles Wylie,

nor has he ever talked with either of them in person of by telephone.

(MI. Penninaton was apparently terminat. 3 as a CIA informant on December 31,

1973.) Mr. Osborn states that he "started action" to terminate wylie in

about January or February 1974. He thought that Wulie had never provided

actit wolie had reverave a domestic

anything to the Office of Security and that it was "no time to have a domestic

informant."

Both Penninaton and Wylle had been informants for the Office of security for

many years. They had been retained in that capacity even before MI. Osborn

became Deputy Director of Security in 1963.

In February 1974 in connection with a search of files in the Office of Security

some indication was turned up that MI. Osborn had been informed in January 1973

about the fact that Lee Pennington had entered the home and the office of

James MoCord at the reguest of Mrs. Mocord on January 22, 1972, to locate and

destroy records which would have revealed a "link" between Mr. MoCord and the

CTA. Mir. Osborn denies that he received any such information. The informa-

tion was allegedly given to him by Paul Gaynor, Chief of Security Research, in

the Office of Security.

Mr. Gaynor retired in 1973 at the request of Mr. Osborn, who had been directed

to cut a GS-16 from his staff in a personnel reduction move. He states that

Mr. Gaynor accepted this request gracefully and retired.

Osborn and Gaynor have never discussed with each other the subject of Lee

Pennington or the deception practiced on the fBI in August 1972. Osbom does

not think that Gavnor opened up the subject, but he does believe that Gaynor

has testified before either one of the Congressional committees investigating

Watergate or the Special Prosecutor's Office.

After MI. Gaynor retired, Lou Vasaly of the Office of Security has handled

contacts with hylie and Pennington.

In January or February 1974 Mr. Osbom sent Sidney Steinbridge of the Office

of Security to New York to terminate Mr. Wylie.

Ice Pennington died in the fall oi 1974 of natural causes. He was in his

middle 70's.

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watergate Contacts (contineud)

3.

Assistance to E. Howard Hunt re Ellsberg Brea'-In

Mr. Osbom states that the Office of Security had no involvement whatever

with the assistance rendered by the CIA to It. Hunt in connection with

the break-in of the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and that he had

no knowledge of that matter prio to the break-in. He is now aoquainted

with the White House request made to General Cushman for assistance to

Mr. Hunt in 1971. He is also now familiar with the fact that the CIA

provided to fir. Hunt disguise equipment, false identification papers,

and a camera, in response to the White House request. He also now knows

that Mr. Hunt arranged for the development of the photographs which he

had apparently taken on the occasion of the break-in at the office of

Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

In 1971 Mr. Osborn received a request from MI. Young at the White House

for the psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg.

He says that Me. Young

stated that the White House had been very pleased with the profile which

had been developed by the CIA on Fidel Castro and would like the same

kind of profile on Ellsberg.

Osborn stated that he responded to Young that the CIA personnel had a

areat deal of biographical material on Ellsberg. Young assured Osbom

that the White House would provide material on Ellsberg. Osbom re-

sponded that such a request would have to be approved by the Del,

Mr. Helms.

Osborn then took the matter to MI. Helms, who approved the project and

told him to provide the renested assistance to Young.

Young thereafter sent materials from time to time to Osborn relating to

Ellsberg. It was Osborn's impression that these materials were very

fragmentary and would not be sufficient to provide a meaningful psycho

logical profile. Nonetheless, the recuest and the materials were

turned over to the doctors at CIA and a draft of a profile was ultimately •

worked up. Mr. Young did not appear to be very well nleased with the

draft.

Mr. Osborn sumises that the break-in at the offices of Di. Fielding

(Ellebera's psychiatrist) was accorplished for the purpore of gathering

more information with which to develop a better pschological profile.

-11091s0 & Dan southaniets 105898-74nahisrite

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covert Informers Employed by the Agency

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from

among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are

plurbers, chaufteurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, members

of the char InIce, etc. These employees are paid additional compensation to

act as informers and to report to the Office of security on any ! :tential

security problems which they observe anong their fellow employees at the Agancy.

If an emplovee, for example, has been convicted of a crime or is thought to be

engaging in any contact which would make him susceptibie to blackmail, that

matter is supposed to be reported to the Office of security. Likevise, if any

employee is observed conducting himself in a suspicious manner, such as request-

Ing information from files which do not concem him, that is to be reported.

A fer outside emplovees, i.e., non- emplovees of the Agency, are also retained

for the same purpose. This would include employees of the telephone compary.

In all instances, however, the purpose is to maintain security among the CIA

emplovees and those working for the CIA.

The only staff employees retained as informers are those who work in the recorde

office of the Directorate of Operations. Several staff emplovees in that office

were recruited at the recuest of Mr. Thomas Karamessines because of the extremely

high level of sensitivity and the records maintained in that office.

When the CIA Headquarters was constructed in the late 1950's, the Office of

Security recruited various members of the construction work force to maintain

security against the installation of listening devices, telephone taps, or otter

penetrations of the premises. AS an outgrowth of the succass in that security

ethort, the Oftich of Security organized a wholly owned proprietary company 18d

was called Anderson Security Associates and which was employed to do large scala

investigations of the person i of compantes who contract with the Ch

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for the Anderson Security

Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of variors

organizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installa-

tions and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for

indications of such threats was provided to Anderson Security Associates, which

in turn proided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of

the organization monitored.

Anderson Security Associates was in reality run bu Mr. Ralph True, a CIA Head

quarters case officer, who also ran a similar wholly owned proprietary company on

the West Coast, General Personnel Investigations, Inc.

The Anderson corpany has since folded.

Anderson and Coneral, have been es tensively ut lived to perform security cass

"on the employees of CiA contractors engaged in bighly sensitive projeces: In

auber. of profects, it has been thoght imperative that there be-no indiention

whatsoever of either rederal. Coverment or CIA interest or involvement.

talve of this categony of pioject was the development and mnuacture of tie ur

reconnalssance pilar. Another exale rould be a cument project being conducti!

by a Calitoria coreany.

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Surveillance of Dissident Groups and Activity

It has been mentioned above that Mr. Osborn informed us of the activity of the

Anderson Security Associates in maintaining in the Washington, D.C. area a

check on individuals and organizations who rould represent potential threats

to CIA personnel or organizations.

There was also coordination betiveen the Office of Security and local police

departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the

size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security fordes

would be necessary to cope with them.

In 1967 and 1958 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit

or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned

about the safety of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses.

and

its offices around the country.

Its recruiting office in Ann Arbor, Michigan,

Xins

might represent threats to CIA personnel or offices.

As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to

organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial

number of files were accumulated on individuals and organizations.

Mail Intercepts

M. Osbom reports that a mail intercept program in New York City began in about

1952 and ended in 1973. He learned of this progran when he became Director of

the Soviet-Russian Division in the Operations Directorate. He states that the

program involved the identification of parties within the United States sending ind

receiving mail with persons in the soviet bloc countries and the identification of the

persons in the Soviet bloc sending and receiving such mail. Selected items of

mail were also opened and photographed, and then resealed and forwarded. Mr. Osborn

states that he cannot recall any specific use made bv the CIA of the information so

obtained. The primary purpose of the prajram as he understood it was to provide

information to the FBI. He recalls several conferences regarding the program.

It was his position that the three personnel from the Office of Security who

worked on the program were not performing any useful service for the Office of

Security, that it was a drain on the budget of his office, and that the CIA had

no business tampering with the mail in the first place. Mr. Colby, when he was

Executive Director-Controller of the Agency, supported Mr. Osborn's position on the

matter. It was opposed by Mr. Angleton of the Directorate of Operations, who

argued primarily that the information derived from the project was vitally ncoes-

sary in the FBI. Mr. Helms elected to have the program continue. It was finally

terminated bv Mr. Colby during the time that fir. Schlesinger was DCI in 1973.

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vascist a seider a destina de va

Mr. Osbom also thought that continuation of the progran was too risky in the

light of public and Congressional attitude toward the CIA. He thinks that the

program originatod while Allen Dulles was DCI and that it was undertaken with

the knowledge and consent of the Postmaster General. However, this is hearsay,

according to Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Osborn is also acguainted with the fact that from 1969 to 1971 the project

of mail surveillance occurred from time to timp in San Francisco. The Office

of Security ade the arrangements with the Post Office Department for this

program, but it was carried out by the Far East Division and the Technical

Services of the Directorate of Operations. The Technical Services Division

at that time was headed by Rod M. Kenner, who is now retired and living in

Florida.

The arrangements with the PC.it Office Department were made by Jack Turton of

the Office of Security. Mi. Osborn has only the vaguest knowledge of the pur

pose of this project and could offer no further light than that it involved

some checking on the stamping and postmarking of mail from the Peoples Republic

Of China.

The project was orally okayed by Mir. Helms. Mr. Osborn has no knowl

edge of any. ottier mail undarcover projects in New Orleans or elsevhere.

Cover Operations Using Local Police Cover

r. Osborn stated that arrangements were made several ye. is ago with colonel, Demer

of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department for the issuance of badges and

other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. It is Mr. Oskorn's

recollection that this involved about 15 sets of identification.

These: badges and other identification were never used bu the CIA. They were all

returned to caloncl, butrer

This arrangement was inspired by difficulties which had been encountered by

security personne. in conducting a physical surveillance of Victor Manchetti. It

seens that Marchetti, lived in a residential cormunity and his home was situation on

a cul-da-sac. This made it extremely difficult to cruise by his home or station a

security car anywhere near his home without attracting the attention of other

residents in the neighborhood. Security personnel who may have been sitting in a

car within several blocks of the Machetti, residence would have attracted the curio

sity of the residents and the operation would be threatened if such residents

approached the car and asked what the occupants were doing there and if they were

given straigit-forward ansivers. According to Mr. Osborn, it was highly desirable

that the security parsonnel be able to respond to such inquiries by saying that

they were police perforing official duties. Nost citizens, he savs, would accept

that as sufficient, whereas their curiosity would be even further aroused if the

security personnel identified themselves as being with the CIA.

Osborn states that he had issued strict orders that the use of identification

local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual

ver for surveillance purposes.

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It. Osborn seems to rccall that the Office of Security had similar arrangements

with the washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, and he thinks that

there were instances in which such cover was actually used, but he does not

recall specific cases. He also states that it is possible that CIA field offices

would have used similar cover of local police apartments, but he has no knowledge

of such instances.

Wire Taps

Mc. Osbom states that he has no acquaintance with the wire taps made of the

office and hoire phones of two syndicated columists in Washington in 1962 and

1963, which wire taps are revealed in the file as having been authorized br

Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (The file reveals continuation of activity

with respect to the surveillance of these columists into the period of when

Mr. Osborn was in the Office of Security as its Deputy Director. The file does

not, however, show any indication of actual awareness on the part of Mr. Osborn

that telephone tapping was involved. On the contrary, there are indications

in the file that these telephone taps vere discontinued immediately prior to

Mir. Bannerman becoming the Director of Security in 1963, at which time Mr. Osborn

also became the Deputy Director of security.)

Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance

Mr. Osboin states that assistance was rendered to many local police departments,

including those of the cities of New YOrk and Chicago, and to the Maryland and

Virginia state police during the period 1955 to 1972.

He states that this

program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mi. Helms.

Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and the

declassification of materials and technigues in such areas as photo analysis,

surveillance technigues, metals detectinn, explosives detection, locks and picks,

hidden microphones,

telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up,

handling, and organization of intelligence operations.

This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement

Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments

by the CIA.

Mr. Osbom feels verv stronglv that the program of cooperating with and assisting

police departments in improving their capability to fight crime was proper and

that its termination is a serious disservice to the American people. Referring

to the prohibition on CIA "police and law enforcement functions" in the National

Security Act Of 1947, MI. Osborn is of the coinion that the CIA in sharing its

information and technical developments with state and local police departments

was not exercising any police or law enforcement function.

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The Huston Plan

M. Osborn states emphatically that the Office of security had no knowledge

whatever in developing or assisting in the so-called "Huston Plan," relating

tn amestic security operations. He states that he had never heard of it until

it hit the papers at the time of the Watergate investigation. All relation-

ships with the Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligunce unit was handled for the CIA

by Mr. Helms and Mr. Ober.

The Nosenko Affair

Nosenko was a KGB agent who defected to the United States in Switzerland in the

early 1960'. His interrogation was handled undar the supervision of the SR

Division of the Directorate of Operations, especiallv by David Murphy and Peter

Bagly of the SR Division.

M. Osborn states that he repeatedly protested the treatment of Nosenko. After

more than two years of solitairy confinement in a special facility for which the

Office of security provided all security measures, Mi. Bruce Solie of the Security

Office finally arranged for the release of Nosenko and gradually increased his

privilegas and freedom.

M. Osborn states that Nosenko has proved to be the most valuable defector in

the entire history of the CIA.

He has been responsible for identifying nine

Soviet agents, including a major in the Pentaçor.

Surveillance of Justice Douglas

M. Osborn has no knowledge of the alleged surveillance of Justice Douglas

(referred to in an article in The Washington Post on February 3, 1975, page D-11).

Contact with The White House

Mr. Jshom states that he was not involved and has no information regarding anv

request from the White House for files relating to the coup in which Promier Dien

was overthrown in Vietnam, or regarding the Bay of Pios operation in Cuba.

The

CIA personnel who would have been involved in such matters were William Nelson,

Deputy Director of Onerations, on the Bay of Pigs matter; and George Carver, then

Suecial Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam affairs, with respect to the Diem cour.

The only other contact of any nature with the lihite House recalled by Mr. Osborn

was one which he seems to remember occurring in about 1963 when the Offine of

Security was consulted by the Secret Service with respect to counter-audio measures

to wrotect against buaging and wire taps i': the lihite House. He thinks this

occurred during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.

Unauthorized Break-Ins

r. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occured to his knowledge

by scurity personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former

employces, or CIA contact agents

who were under investigation for suspected

disclosure of classified information. (Details are in the files pinvided to the

Conmission.)

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Ganeral

Mr. Oskor states categorically that the Office of Security has never to his

knowledge:

- conducted any audio surveillance, telephone taps, physical surveillance

or personal investigation of any member of congress or public officiali

- maintained any file for political or other inproper purpose of anv such

congressmen or public official;

- pulled any file for examination for purpose of checking up on anv such

member of Conress or public official.

Mr. Osborn states that he does not recall any instance during his career with

the CIA to which any particular activity of the Agency was examined in the

specific light of Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947; i.e., he

dons not recall any assessment of a proposed or ongoing activity from the

st apoint of whether it was improper as a "police", "law enforcement", or

"internal security" function.

Impression

M. Osborn impresses the interviewei as being honest, intelligent, and dedicated

to the interests of the United States and its people. His memory appeared to be

in error in some details, but considering the wide range of the interview and

the time period involved, coupled with the ride breadth on responsibilities and

the number of personnel under his supervision in the Office of Security, this

is to be expected.

There is one area in which the interviewer was doubtful concerning the complete

candor of Mr. Osborn. That was the area of his knowledge conceming the

Pennington matter.

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......

tel. 11,197.5

Ostar

STATEMENT

hir. Vice-President, Governor Reagan, distinguished

members of this Commission. I am here willingly

at your

invitation;

I shall answer all of your questions fully and

candialy.

My federal service has

extended over a 32 year period, 27

of those years were spent with the Central Intelligence Agency.

I am proud of my service with the C.I.!., and I am proud of the

thousands of dedicated men and women with whom I worked in the

C.I.A. I retired from the C.I.A. on December 31, 1974, after

having been on sick leave from March 8, 1974, until the date

of my retirement. My last ten years of active service with the

C.I.A. were spent as the Director of Security. I was responsible

to the Director C.I.A. and to other senior C.I.A. officials for

personnel security and for the security and protection of classified

information, data and installations, both in the United States and

abroad. During my tenure as Director of Security, I served

successively under Mr. John A. McCone, Admiral William Raborn,

Mr. Richard Helms, Mr. James R. Schlesinger and Mr. William F.

Colby.

HARAMARIE TALECITE

I am aware of allegations given recent prominence by the

news media that C.I.A. conducted improper activities in the

United States. Since my departure from active status in March,

1974, I have had no access to Agency files or records with which

to verify or refute such charges. I can assure the members of

this Commission ny full cooperation but it is possible that my

recollection of dates and details may be imprecise or unclear

without access to particular files and records of the C.I.A.

TO

19%

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the best of my knowledge and belief, all of the actions and

activities in which - participated, or which I rected ari

recorded and documented in C.I.A. files.

At all times, while servinõ as Director of Security I

acted with the knowledge and approval and at the instruction

of the Director of C.I.A., and in many, if not most instances,

with the knowledge and approval of other senior Agency officials

in the chain of command. I should like to emphasize that Security

in the Agency is a service and support function and its activities

are not self-generated. Among other services, the office of

Security provided guidance and assistance to employees with

"?..

personal problems; it provided support to other Agency components

upon authorized request and performed tasks and special inquiri:

assigned to it by the Director of C.I.A. The Director of C.I.A.

was empowered and directed by the National Security Act of 1947

to "protect intelligence sources and methods". By virtue of and

extension of that authority, those actions and activities within

my purview were designed to prevent potential penetration of the

Agency by hostile intelligence services, afford protection to

the Agency's domestic installations and to determine the sources

of unauthorized disclosure of classified and sensitiveintelligence

information to public media.

While I am not now privy to precise statistical data,

I believe the United States Government Agencies involved in

intelligence activities can document the fact that the number

of hostile foreirn intelligence ropresentatives in our country.

has increased significantly in the last ten years.

One of

their prime targets is the United States Intelligence Community.

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uy investigation and review of C.l.A., or any other element

of ühat

community should be made within that context.

After many years of service in the security field, I

can

fully understand the extreme sense of frustration among

the United States Government officials regarding unauthorized

disclosure of classified information. It is devastating to

read the contents of a highly classified document disseminated

in the intelligence community and then a day or two later, to

read the same information ad literatum in the press. I believe

most firmly in freedom of the press, but I believe also that

there should be a sense of responsibility accompanying such

freedom; that sense of responsibility seems often tobe buried

or absent in the publication of classified information which

could endanger our national security.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Commission

and to assist it in acquiring facts relevant to its investigation.

In the course of developing such facts, I am hopeful the Commission

will look at the possible consequences of the Agency's failure to

act even if the Commission should find fault with individual

conclusions or judgments made by Agency officials.

I shall endeavor to answer all of your questions and I

shall put aside my citizen's schield against self-incrimination.

That decision is based on my dosire to assist the commission to

the full extent of my ability and for the equally cogent reason

that. I do not belleve thatany action I performed was unlawful

or in derogation of my duties to the United States Government.

HOWARD

i"".

J.

OSBORN

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d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been

routinely covertly recorded;

The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert

recording devices to record conversations of CLA employees with

others where there was some reason to be concerned about the

loyalty of such employees.

3.

Physical Surveillance

Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare

as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under

which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:

a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi-

fied information to unauthorized persons;

b. Victor Marchetti to find out if he was getting information from current

employees of the CLA;

Jack Ander son,

des whitten and another legman to determine their

sources of classified information, and Michael Gettner?, a staff writer

for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;

d. A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her

associates) who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to

assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central

Intelligence.

4.

Watergate Contacts

-

The McCord Letters

b. The Pennington Matter

c. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg

5.

Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

3.

Within the Agency and Its Contractors

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in-

formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency.

Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone main-

tenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These

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Physical surveillance

Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country

has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts

that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted

as being limited to the following:

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified

information to unauthorized persons;

2

Victor Marchettis to find out if he was getting information from current

employees of the CIA:

3.

Jack Anderson Les Witten and another legman to determine their sources

of classifiel information, and Michael Getter, a staff writer for the

Washinaton Post, for the same purpose;

4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the

existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the

Director of Central Intelligence.

This surveillance was conducted under the

supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full

knowledge of the FBI.

Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent

in Detroit, Miami, and New York City.

King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (MI. Osbom reports that

a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel

was also covertly recorded.)

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of physical surveillance

in his experience was authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence exœept

that MI. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the

official to authorize the surveillance of enployees, but it is possible that

these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. MI. Osborn is also emphatic to the

effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance,

has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect

to any conversations or communications, or has ever had a security check performed

on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

The MoCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mir. llelms

in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail"

received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that

of a former employee of the Office of Security, MI. James MoCord. Mr. Mocord

had shortlv before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the

Democratic National Ileaduarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osbom states that he

immediately brought. this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

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MoCord Letters (continued)

Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that

nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it.

Thereafter a series of letters were reœeived from Mi. Mocord by Paul Gaynor,

then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security.

These letters were received by Mi. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was

promptlv brought to the attention of Mr. Helms. The thrust of these letters

was

that the Cammittee to Re elect the President and high officials within

the Nixon Acministration ware planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate

break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the

Justice Department and that he would take care of them. MI. Osborn recalls

being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the

Letters Houstodystice avised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these

At a much later date, MI. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these

MoCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcammittee of

House Appropriations Comnittee and to the counterpart Senate Subcommittee.

2. The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former

FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His

compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he

has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by

Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.

In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, Email

Gigs; was in charge of the Office of Security.

(The Office of Security had

been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other govermental agencies

• and departments relating to Watergate matters.)

While Mr. Osborn was on vacation anFBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted

the Office of Security and requested information on a man simplv named

"Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of

Security. Mr. Kuhn's seputy, Hollis whitaker, took the request of agent

Parhan to Email, Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names

of both Penningtons or just one of them. eMerGeilss instructed Whitaker that

Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired

employee of the CIA, who was not related in any way to Lee Pennington. chiss

instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.

Mso Geiss wuld have known that James NcCord while he was employed in the

Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that

Mocord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really

interested in Lee Pennington.

Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to his attention in

February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.

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