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104-10210-10020 in 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TOP SECRET

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret

study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB

Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).

Copy 10 of this study had been

forwarded to you earlier for

your revier.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages

containing information which bears on the security of

ungoing, viahle CIA operations, or is related thereto.

j. We request return of tha study (copy 10), Annex A

and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachnent:

Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278

281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and

357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

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Top Secret

CONTENTS

PACE

VIII SEVENTH DEPARIMEHT (January 1962-January 1964)

(Cont. )

Deputy Chief of Seventh

Department

(July 1962-January 1964)

KGB Operations

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

Investigation

Of SLESINGER

Arrest and Interrogation of KOTE!

GRU Agent SHUBIN

ArreSt Of BAKGHOORN

Investigation of OShALD

Regidence In USSR

Request to Return to USSR.

Post-Assassination

Review

of KGB File

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Contents

NOSE!KO'S Travel Document

Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)

Purpose of Irip

Visits to KGB Legal Residency

Avallability for Meetingo

with

CIA

NOSENKO's liritten Notes

NOSENIO'S Defection

The Recall Telegram

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department

Operations

Operational Activitles (July 1962-

January 1964)

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among

American Tourists

Infornation Furnished the KGB by

George BLAKE

KGB Study of Auerican Intelligence

IouIlst Operations

NOSENKO'& Information

Summary

Summary and Conclusion

291

292

242

293

295

296

298

303

303

305

307

309

314

315.

316

317

319

318

319

320

324

325

326

326

327

327

330

331

331

(v1)

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Top Secret

CONTENTS

IX OTHER ASPECIS ÓF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE

Relationship

with General GRIBANOV

Communist Party Status

Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures

Awards and Decorations

Sourcing

Ranka

PAGE

335

335

338

342

345

349

350

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

- 35.5

357

Annex A - statements of soviet Officials About

NOSENKO

AnnEx B - Summaries

of Cases Not Examined in Text

Index of Personalities

361

399

437

(V11)

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402, 352

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(FOUSDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIYS)

Soviet Ofiscials' Stalesent: About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which energes from Soviet

officials'

statements

abunt

since

his defection coin-

oldes sarkedly wich duStico's saii-descripelon.

According

so the commente of soviet officials, principally intelli-

gence oificers nost likely

be speaking authoritarively,

defector NOSENKO was the

son of the deceased dinister, he

served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortconings

were overcone through the patronage of KGS General GRIBANOV,

and in connection with uperations zainst Americans ie

occupied positions of progrissively greater trust and

responsibility,

ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the

largest department in the icy

Second (Counterintelligence)

Chief Directorate.

According to these sources, his defection

wrought severe damage

"for years to come" to the KGB

because of his krowledge of KGB operations against American

targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and

disgrace of numerous senlor KGB personnel, the recall of

шапу

others fron

operations

in

abroad,

the virtual

suspension

of KGB

the United States, and extraordinary plans

assassinate him.

These staterents

are related in chronological order in

Аппех А.

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.

In a

second

version

(more probable

since entry

to the Moscow

Special Naval School required

prior completion of the

Seventh Classl NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he

and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he

completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942.

They returned

to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the

Moscow Speciai Naval

school (then in Kujbyshev) where he

completed the Eighth

Class in 1943; in the fall oi

1943

NOSENKO

was enrolled

in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the

Nirth Class, HOSENKO ran away from school and returred to

Moscow.

_...

Comment:

ROSENKO has asserted variously that he ran

and fought on the front at Tuapse, and

that he had tinished the tenth craas en baku

and then spent the perzod 1943-1945 at the

Frunze Higher Naval

School, the equivalent of

Annapolis.

le. has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO corpleted the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the

Moscow Mining

Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval

Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku,.he

resumed his studies there.

Early in 1945, however,

NOSENKO

received a gunshot wound

in the

hand, and

after being

hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment:

NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by

a jealous naval officer whom he then protected

by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,

and that he actually did accidently shoot him-

a sensitive sourcer

self.

the effect that NOSENKO shot nimself to avoid

being sent to the front while attending a naval

college in 1942.

a KGB officer

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)

After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,

Soviet tiaval defector ARTAMONOV volurteered

that he had known

son of the

Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in

Leningrad from 1914 to 1945.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leringrad Siip-

Luilding Tekhnikum

in Jure 1945,

successfully passed

the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to

the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Sunmary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on

his carly life.

this portion of his claired

biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-

abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his

father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the

schools he clains to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics

fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and

Formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of

which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's

claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO

and the substance of his claims about his life unti! 1945

are accepted

as true.

•.. .....

16-31.

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(PRE-"G" BIUGRAPHY)

NOSENKO Has said at various times that the Institute

course was of four years' duration and that he entered the

Naval RU on graduation in 1942; that it was four years'

duration and that Lecause he failed a state examination

he

was graduated later,

in 1950; that it was of five years'

duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it

was of live years' duration but he failed an camination

which delayed his graduation for three months.

Corrent:

see ?.367 tor report that NOSENKO joined the KG°

upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.

The duration of the Institute course and the

cate of Musliro's completion are material to

tie plausibility of his claimed Naval PU service.

vinicii ne said followed almost irradiately upon

his departure from the Institute.

Naval

Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO clains that upon completion of his studies at

the Institute of International Relations he

entered the

Naval RU, serving

in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post,

finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through

the

intervention

of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULO%.

A sensitive source

ma is the sole source also asserting that YOSENKO

serves in the Ru.

According toleran, NOSENKO attended

the Military-Diplomatic Academy

and

then served in the RU

Information

Department for about a year before securing a

transfer to the KGR

through his father's influence.

NOS ENKO

denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and

has

never claimed service in the RU Information

(Reports)

Department,

although he had on occasion claimed to have held

Reports assignments.

this

source

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(PRE-%GB BIOGPAPRY)

cuoted/iGs office=s

respectively, as stating HOSEd joined the KGb in 1347

1949.

The significance of NOSENXO's RU service is the fact

that be clairs it liuncied his intolligence. career and

served as the means through itis. he secured appointment

to the äCB after once having been rejected.

The two or more

years he claimad to have served in the RU

represent a

significant period of. his

adult.life. for which he should

no difficulty accounting.

Finally, the date of lis

actual transfer from

the laval fi to the KGB is critical to

fron whic: his clains about XG3 service

can de judgea credible.

HOSENKO volunteered extensire comment on his Naval RU

service

at his first meetings "ith CIA in 1962.

After his

1964 defection, it as the topic on which he made one of

his initial retractions

and his first admission that he had

earlier rade a false clain.

subject of his Naval RU

service was corsequently promi-eat in interrogations in

1964, 1965 and 1966.

liowever, =rroughout these interrogations.

challenges of nis assartions aècat his RU service picroted

adjustments in his clainea date of graduation from the

Institute or claired date of erry into the KGB, just as

challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-

merts with respect to his

RJ service.

The extent of the

still-unrecorciled discrepancies and contradictions

in

NOSENIO's various accounts

is best perceived in

comparison

of his staterents made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Infornation-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institite of International Relations

in 1950 and irrediately

reportes for duty with the ru.

(He did not amplify how he dred such an assignment.)

Septenber 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningradi+so

moscow, and in the far East, and he chose the far East

would trink he would

take advantage of his father's

position".

He was assigned to a radio signals interception

unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite

Sakhalin), where he collected order of Battle information by

monitoring the communications of American units operating in

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(SEST DEPTSEST - JAMBrY 1952-January 1964)

"he dus afraid and gave practi-

cally aothine."

said that although he

had

recruited

nim.

FRIPPEL was not an agent."

The KGD

neverticless lores

tha: ERIFPEL would be reassigned to los

coi ai some future catc. (See p.13) for details of :he

FRIE?EL Case.!

C==722t:

a sensitive source

FRIPPEN agrees with SOSENKO that they met twice

in the issk in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts

he also nue dOSEiNO in Odessa in February 1962.

which dositro flatly denies.

FRIPPEL iS

known

to have pianned to

travel

to the Sovie: ünion

at that tise, ard

were

is

no

apparent irason

who he wealt

=3%2 2

false claim on this matter.

In tia: to:".

city.

a current target of the o

stelay Soviet intelligence service.

Jehannes PREISFREUND

The KGB CO:SIderES PRLISFPLUND corpromised to Anerican

Inteiligence after GOLISt:'s dufection lin Decenber 19611 and

thus unsuitable for further use

against Americans at the Ex-

bassy in Moscow.

For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take

PREISTREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventil De-

partment.

As the

agent spoke only Finnish

and

Russian,

however,

he was of no use agairst English-speaking tourists.

NOSENKO

net ö1th PREISFPEUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962.

but did not use hin ir. any operations.

Soment:

PREISERELD asserts that he was no lorger a KGB

agent after the STORSBERG operation

(see p.1751

and that although he saw NOSENKO on his freguent

return visits to Moscow, it was only because

NOSaUKD sought a co-panion for wenching and

drinking.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - Jinuary 1962-January 1364)

who was lerroncousiyl.considored to be a CIA officer.

SHAKHOV "maybe"

har

some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961.

but lOSE! iD din not hinow the sulstance of it.

& country-

intelligenoc officer of the First Chief Directorate, s.".

GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation. with. SHAKilOV

aod te

had noted

"little iccails".

While SHAKHOV was

in the tricca

States, earlier,

he had been terminated las

KGB officers inho had

submitter

an agentl by

a report stating that ShirloY

liked life

in the Unites States, Ancrican products, inc

In that kes reyort he was depicted as "not good"

and

'nut wanting to worl: as an agent

NOSENKO stated that SikHOV had served with the linistry

of foreign Affairs in the lirated States and that during that

service he

acted as

an agent-recruiter for the KGB.

SHAKHOV

was permitted

to travel

abroad even

an American agent, decause

though

suspected ci being

he belonged to the Ministry of

Forcign Astairs,

ard

"the KGB could do nothing about his

trips abroad'.

"There was no proof, only suspicions, and

furthermore, SHAKHCY was

a member of the personal staff of

the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Isarapkin."

recording

to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB office:.

Comment:-

SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United

States since 1912, when he was assigned to the

Soviet Consulate General in New York.

He at-

tended the 1945 Conference on International

Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-

tended

a number of sessions of the UN General

ASSemblY.

Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned

to the u.s. in

1903 as a member of the soviet

Mission to the UN.

KGB Officer RASIVORO! ICen-

tified him as an MVD (KGB) officer whom he is

certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,

a sensitive source men identified him as

"an

employee of the

KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN

have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's

face

"was familiar".

An FBI source, however.

in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplorat"

and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged

in no soviet intelligence activity. until that

time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMCNT - January 1962-January 1964)

of

HOSENKO described tie various ways he had tested suspicions

SHAKHOY an Geneva.

He gave SankloV disinformation and then

watched for an indication that he passed

it on to his American

contacts.

SHAKHOV dus told to perform countersurveillance

tasks. during a necting by HOSENko with an imaginary agent,

while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHakhov had

forewarned the Amiricans about the reetirg.

revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and

checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared

materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way.

conclusion was that SHAkHOV was absolutely free of suspicion.

and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-

turned to üG3 Headquarters fron Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKRiCT is still

"under suspicion", according to diffinal a sensitive source,

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that hu was the sole KGB officer with the 94-

an Soviet dolegation

to the Disarmament. Conference and

such he was responsible for the security ard benarior of the

entire delegation.

(KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and :.S.

TSYMBAL Came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left

Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.)

To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO

had the services of a number of coopted

informants of the iGB

who were serving in the delegation.

INOSENIO has rever re-

ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates

in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants

provided him.l

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days

and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed

of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little

He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he

Pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most

of the delegation.

No one paid him any attention.

known that he was

not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs

officer, and he could

absent himself from conference meetings.

at any time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARIHENT - January 1962-January 1961)

Yu. I. GUE

Impijing that their friendship was of long standing,

NOSENKO relatod in lor2 that he

and GUK were together nearly

every day in Geneva,-where they went out to chat

ard have o

few drinks.

As a consujience, NOSENKO was granted acress

the residency and was able to elicit information arout some

of GUK's operations li jeneva.

friend" GUK as

the

lie described his "big. big

Deputy Legal Rezident in Conova and the

only "strong officer" in the residency.

ConTent: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access

• to tho rosidency in 1962 to ISYMBil, not to

According to several sources

Isee innex A.

because of his

friendship with NOSENEC, Gui wns

dismissed fron the KG3.

M. S.

TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSELiKO reported TSYMBAL'S presence in Geneva and

identified him as

chiot

of the Illegals Dirertorate of the

KGB First Chief Directorate.

He alluded to having spoken witi

him, but placci no particular emphasis on their reistions.ie.

In 1964 NOSENKO clained that he had been dealing ith

TSYMBAL since 1900 or 1961, when he was looking

for. some

candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back-

ground would have

made them

suitable for the Special (Illegalsi

Directorate.

NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-

quarters and ISYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer

to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that ie might be

assigned

to the United States.

In Geneva, ne and SYMBA: had

dinner together several times

a week, sometines accompanied

by KISLOY and sometimes alone.

It was TSYMBAL's influence.

NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency

in 1962 and established the precedent from

which he was

granted access in 1964.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO'S Information

SLISINGER came under

suspicion by the KGB First

Chief Directorate because of his

business transactions

with a number of Soviets who visited his

store and

in

whom he seemed to show more than casual interest.

The

First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that

SLESINGER was tryirg to become closely acquainted with

some soviets,

to study them.

SLESINGER had visited the

Soviet Union

several times.

Learning SLESINGER planned

another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected

that

"he

might make some contacts or do something interesting"

while visiting the soviet Union.

The KGB wanted to

resolve Its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an

agent or operational contact of the FBI.

The KGB had

a file on SIESINGER, nd a

senior case officer in the

American Section of

the Seventh

Department, Yu.".

DVORKIN, was

the responsible case officer.

An agent

of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-

graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to becone friendly

with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet

Union,

and the two men later exchanged correspondence.

SLESINGER went to Odessa. to

visit relatives, and DORKIN

directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. ino

could

watch his behavior.

If there had been any indication

of intelligence activities, the KGB would have atterpted.

to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,

no approach was made.

SLESINGER had travelled to the

Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment:

A sensitive

source

sten artists had reported to the

FBI that the kea

suspected SLESINGER to

be an

FBI

"plant" and that KGB officer

"might be

trying to develop

SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some

other

agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially

Altred Lazarevich SLESINGER.

reported to the fBi are July 1962 ot his

June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.

In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a

Soviet official who exhibited "intimate

knowledge" of his business in New York

City and had asked whether SLESINGER had

"ever been bothered by the FBI."

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(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - January 1962-1964)

(Contirued)

SLESI:GER reported to the FBI that.

he was in

a Moscor photographis

shoo proprietor, and he described evidence

of KGB interest in him during his visit to

Odessa in 1362.

Previous to visiting the

Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in

a number of soviet cificials

from te Unita: Nations.

NOSENTO waS

not spacific in describing how he learred

OF SLESINGER, iho may represent a First. Chief

Directorate

case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB agent &

NOSENKO was asked in Gereva in 1961 whether he was

involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the

USSR in the fall of 1963.

Almost at once, NOSENKO

identified the case as

that of ternard KOTEN, a guide for

Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of

Alexander SVENCHANSKIY,

see abovel who had been arrested

on homosexual chaiges

in kiev.

NOSENKO said that KOTEN

was involved with

an American agent of the KGB Scientific

NOSENKO did not know the

agent's nane, but from the

description he provided he is

believed identical with ghana a KGB S&T

agent identified earlier

on the basis of a May 1962 report

sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist

Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War

to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among

dissident literary

tigures and other soviet citizers,

•particularly among Russian Jews.

INOSENKO explained in

another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts

with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service

has frequently inspired such contacts.]

Because of these

many suspicious contacts, ioth the KGB First and Second

Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation.

agent" planted in ur recruited from the ranks. of the

Communist Party in the United States.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

rosENko's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian

traction, a Russian spealer, and

a university professor

in New Yors City.

SHUBIN, who had visited the soviet

Union twice vefore, visited thi Soviet Union in 1953

or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour

of

duty in

the Seventh Department.

At that time, SHUBIN

was the. target of seventh

Departnent case officer

A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was'

placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance

abserved ShUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense

automobile,

the GRU was asked about the Anerican.

"They

very

furtively said that they were intcrested in him,"

from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1362 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign

visitors to the sovict Union and he noted SHUBIN's name

and rccalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.

NOSENKO himself telephoned GRJ General

SOKOLOV's office

and informad SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according

to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by

others).

SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for

having failed carlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's

interest in SHUBIN:

Comnent:

a sensitive source

Carlier,

Grassy. identified a

agent apparently Identical with SHUBIN

and FBI sources reported SilUBIN's travel

to the USSR in summer 1961 and in

Septenber 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport

between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited

the Soviet Union during that period it was

not as an American tourist under his true

name.

Consequently, he

could

not then have

been the tourist target of the Seventh

Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.

If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring

to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further

contradiction: NOSENKO could not have

noticed his nane while reviewing tourist

lists in the Seventh Department, because

he claims he was

in the American Department

at the time.

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(SEVENTH DEPART"ENT - Junuary 1962-January 1964)

NOSEIKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after chiir-

PANOV's disappuarance.

very deep

woods,

"where a

person could los: himself for life".

seventh day CHERFPAYOV ras located

and arrested in Baku,

where re was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was

So!. FEDOSEYLV and

inmediately

sent to Balu,

Anerican Department

They brought CHEREPANOY imnediatcly back to Moscow,

interrogati.g hir on the plane.

He immiliately corfossed

to laving given the documents to the Americans.

why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and

besides, he thought he might ast the Americans for soma

morey in Icturn

Eor the documents.

le confessed that on

4 roverber le nad passed

documents to an

librärtun

inericar. tourist

had given

in the entrance

hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

the building in wiich

the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also

Because CHEREP:"OV ha! eluded the KGB tetween the two

surveilla:ce posts

snich had been established, the

Second Chief Directorate

suffered considerable criticism

for not putting. CHERI:PANOV under full, round-the-clock

surveillance.

CHEREPACOV himself, however, told the iGn

that if he had detected his surveillants he would have

to the government and newspapers a letter of protest

"such an indigrity,

such persecution"

, and then

would have cormitted

suicide, leaving the KGB without proof

of his guilt.

sensitive sources,

Comment:

Other sources, including ENouSNEsses

also reported

various aspects of the

CHERSPANO! incident.

NOSENIO's assurtions with respect to the

CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to

his clain that he was Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department at the time.

313.

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## Page 17

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegran

HOARIKO's Information

On 3 Feuruary 1904, NOSEURO claimed, he visited the KC3

legal residency once during

the morning

before he ret with

C.i and again

that evening after 1300; there were at those

times no KGB telegrans concerning him.

On the morning of

4 February he again stopped in a the

Residency, but there

were again no such massaais for him.

Later in the morning

of 1 February, horever, ifter attending a session of the

Disarmarent Conference,

he returned to the Posidency and

found

that a telegram

fron iGb Headquarters had arrives,

instructing

him to return

to loscow

immeliately to partici-

pate in the KGB conference

on

tourisn.

After relating the

substance of the telegram, NOSEUKO defected and was thence-

forth in CIA custody.

Comment:

Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's

assertion regarding the

existerce

of the recall

telegram.

iccording to Special Intelligence,

there were ercipiered

cormunications fron Mosco%

to the Soviot Mission in Geneva earlier and

later, Lut there sas none from 1815 on 3

February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours

after HOSPIKO was in custody of CIA.

324

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## Page 18

Top Secret

(SEVENTII DEPARTENT - January 1902-Januazy 1904)

MOSERO'S LUChEual Retraction Regarding Recall Teiegram

NOStko muintaincd throughout cis interrogations

ir. 1904 and 1965 that there was the recall telegrar and that

it prompted iis defection.

In Octover 1966, however, while

being questioned again, NOStItO stated that

there had bee::

no telegrar roculling nim to Mosco aro: Geneva, ond he

signed the following statement:

"On 1 Foliruary 1964, I told ay CIA cortact

in Geneva that a telegram

fron Headquarters ir

loscow had been received in the KG Residency 2a

Geneva Iccalling.

me immediately to Moscow.

at the

Line that

this telegram

said that I was

recalled to participate in

a conference to plar. KGB

activity

against tourists for the 1964 season.

I

maintained this story as fact throughout subsecuent

interviers and interrogations by American authorities

in 1964 and 1965.

No such telegram ever existed.

No telegian was received in Geneva.

"admit that

the stor: was a lie.

I myself inventes this teie-

grain

in order to hasten my defectior.

I was reivcus

and afraid that y contacts with American Intelli-

gence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Otier Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to. CIA in Ganeva in 1964

(see p.31)) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB

operations conducted, against what NOSENKO describe as

tourists during

the 1962-1963 period.

For reasons cited

in the description of these operations

1n Annex B, these

opcrations are not material to MOSEllKO's claim to service

In 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British

Commonwealti Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department.

• 325

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## Page 19

Top Secret

(SEVEITH DEPARTHENT - Jaruary 1952-January 1964)

Operational Activitzes - July 1262-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to havina served as Deputy

Chief of the Seventh Lepartment during

this perica, NOSElKO

descrives KGB

involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY.

the arrests of HOTEll and BARGEOORd, and

the investigations

Of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGE officer CHEREPANOY,

his discovery that SHUBI!: vas a GRU agent, and his aasignment

to Geneva.

Evon if HOSENKO learned of the operations as

he descrived and they were as he described (there are sulstan-

tial reasons wns they might have been conducted by KG?

elements other than the Suvent:: Deprtrent), they are atypical

with respect to HOSElkO's oin description of Soventh Depar=-

irent cperations.

They do not accurately characterize, as

NOSENKO claims, *GB counterirtelligence

operations against

tourists, and thus do not substantiate his

Seventh Department

service.

NOSENKO'S explanations for his assignment to

Geneva in 1961 are no more plausible

than

for his carlicr

assignment there in 1962.

NOSENKO has asserted that he was

not a lieutenant colonel

as the temporary duty authorization

indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy

Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would

have been promoted as ho assumud

the

sanior KGB positiong

which he clained to have hold.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations

Arong

imerican

Tourists

1962-1563

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief,

then First

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed

awareness of what the KGn posture was with respect to

326

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## Page 20

Top Secret

(OTTER ASPECTS OF MOSTITO'S KGB CAREER)

other Sources - 1964 and 1965

sensitive

sourre

As indicated in Arner i, tastinks

reported

"..

several itens of informition te

stateu he outained from

various KGB coileagues.

According to these reports, GRIBIOU

was expelled frcm the kGB as a consequerce of NOSENXC's

defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOY was to le fired

because he had been NOStNiO's friend and patron,

GRIBiNOV was told

rustonsible for the defection

protoze, that GRIBANOV had

approved NOSE:KO's assignment to

Geneva in 1904 despite irowledge uf facts making NOSCHKO

incligible, that GRIBA:OV was a log-time friend of nostic's

father, that loSchkO had been a duputy to a departmont Chict

arspire his junior runi: Lucause of GRIBANOV'S influence,

and that GRICiOV was cismissed from the iGB and Party

Lecause he willfully withhold information about NOSLN"O's

procuring lonen for parties which he and the General arzanged.

NOSENKO'S Information - Post 1964

Innediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to

refer to this special and personal relationship, which

touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENIO'S KGB service:

Under interrogation, hcrever, NOSENKO could not sustain

this claim.

The extent HOSENiO'S

staterents were retracted

or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by

other evidence, is scen from the following examples excerpted

from the earlier chronological examination:

GRIBANOV wrote

the very best fitness report on HOSENKO that could be giver

(Retracted.

GRIBANOV wrota none of NOSENKO's fitness

reports); NOSENKO anu GRIBANOV carroused together with women

provided by NOSENKO (Retracted.

NOSENKO recalled only two

occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);

recruited

Edward SMITH (see p.

(Retracted.

37) together with NOSENKO

NOSENKO played

no active role in SMITH recruit-

ment attempt ard was not in Embassy Section at time.);

NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in

1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador

DeJean was GRIBANOV's ayent, (Retracted.

NOSENKO accompanied

336

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Top Secret

SUMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCETTING NOSENZO'S BONA FIDES

Mosenko claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in

succersivel: senior positions of authority from which he

derived extensive

inowledge of the scope, character, and

results of "Gb operations

against Americans ir the Soviet

union in the period 1953-1963.

To substantiate his clain,

re provides en

impressive

array of information about kG3

personnes, organization and operations which, to the extent

inat it las been contirred, is presunptive

evidence of his

Lona fides.

Various sovict sificials,

including intelli-

gence officers,

have generally corroborated NOSENKO's

clains.

According to sone ci these sources, NOSENKO was

senior kGS officer who occupied a series of sensitive

positions, ino enjoyed considerable authority and trust

resorte personal snortcomings, ana whose detection,

"the

reatest loss ever suffored ¿y Soviet Intelligence"

paralyzed

tre dork of

The examiration has corpared each element of NOSENKO'S

biography

reievant to his claimed KGB

service with known

facts. and reasonabie surmise.

The examination reflects

the

test to which his accounts were put:

whether

hus

accounts

are interrally

coherent

and

consistent with known

fact, and nether he actualiy gained the information he has

from occupying the KGB positions he ciaims to have held.

In short, is he what he says he is, according to his oin

accounts?

357

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