DRAFT: FURTHER CLARIFICATION
Originator: CIA
To: ARRB STAFF
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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FIELD DOUBLE AGENT GUIDE

August

1960

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listsee

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FIELD DOUBLE AGENT GUIDE

August 1960

. it

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FIELD DOUBLE AGENT GUDE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT

I.

INTRODUCTION

PAGE

1

III.

THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION:

GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

2-24

A. Definition

B. DA Types by Origin

1. Transfers

z.

Walk-In or Talk-In

3. D and D

4. Provocation

C. Goals in DA Operations

1. KUBARK

2. Adversary

D. Selection and the Four Key Tests

1. The Tests

a. Withholding

b. Stayability

d. Antrol oy Tommunication

2

3-6

3

3-4

4-5

6-10

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SUBJECT

2. Significance of Tests

3. U.S. Citizens as DA's

E.

Planning and Preliminary Steps

Estimating Adversary Goals

2. Information Needed for Planning

3. The Plan

4. Preliminary Testing of Bona Fides

III. THE DOUBLE AGENI AS A PERSON

A. Willingness

B. Emotional Stability

C. Emotional Attachments to Others

D. Level of Intelligence

E. Gullibility - Scepticism

F. Trustworthiness

G.. Ambition

H. Clandestinity

I. Introversion - Extroversion

J. Other Traits

K. Summary

PAGI

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SUBJECT

IV. THE DOUBLE AGENI AS AN AGENT

A. Prior Intelligence Associations

B. Continuing Investigation

C. Training.

D. Testing

E. Control

F. Agent Motivation

v.

THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION:

SPECIFICS

A. Access

B. Appetite

C. Production

D. Mirror-Reading

E. KUBARK Security

F. Adversary Security

G. Communications

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SUBJECT

H. Finances

I. Reporting

VI. CASE OFFICER'S CHECK LIST

VII. INDEX

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Field Guide for Double Agent Operations

I. INTRODUCTION

(

For the past two years KUDESK has been engaged in a

detailed analysis of KUBARK double agent cases. The

results have been collated, and the findings have been dis-

seminated within headquarters in a study which is also

available to the field upon request.

This guide is intended for field use by case officers and

others concerned with DA operations. It represents both

the above research and the views of a number of experienced

and senior KUBARK officers.

If field reporting of double agent operations includes all

essentials discussed here, further research on this subject

will be facilitated and further guidance will result, in a

continuing cycle.

The comments and views of the users of this guide are

solicited.

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II. THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION:

GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

A discussion of operational details appears in Part V

of this guide. Here the purpose is to present basic infor-

mation and principles about the beginnings of DA operations.

A. Definition.

A double agent is a person who engages in clandestine

activity for two intelligence or security services (or more

in joint operations), who provides information about one to

the other or about each to the other, and who is wittingly

withholding significant information from one on the instruc-

tions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so

that significant information is withheld from the other

service. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who do not per-

form a service for an intelligence organization, but only for

themselves, are not agents at all and therefore are not

DA's. As a rule the DA has an agent relationship with both

services, a fact which distinguishes him from the penetration

agent, who usually serves the CI service as an agent but the

target or adversary service as a staff member or in a staff

capacity. Multiple agents frequently draw a variety of

assignments from several services. Although they may pro-

vide counterintelligence information, and although they

present difficulties in handling and security which resemble

these problems in the double agent operation, the two types

are distinct. The DA is usually directed against a single

adversary, whereas the multiple agent resembles a private

detective with a number of clients.

The part of the definition which stipulates the with-

holding of significant information results from the fact that

an agent who tells everything he knows to both sides becomes,

unless unwittingly manipulated by one of the services, an un-

authorized liaison channel with the enemy. Such situations

are unprofitable and cease to be operations.

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B. Types of DA Operations by Origin.

Almost all double agent operations begin in one of three

ways; a walk-in or talk-in, hostile agent detected and

doubled, or a provocation.

KUBARK often acquires a DA

case by transfer from another ODYOKE service of from

liaison; when it does, it is important that the type of origin

be included in the information obtained from the transferring

service. A DA case can also result if one service offers

recruitment to the agent of another not because of provoca-

tion or stake-out but by chance.

1. The Transferred Agent.

Analysis suggests that nearly two-thirds of KUBARK's.

DA operations begin (for KUBARK) by transfer from another

service. Usually, however, the transferring service merely

made initial contact with a walk-in and turned him over to

KUBARK without having used him operationally. If a going

operation is transferred, it is vital that the base or case

officer accepting jurisdiction obtain the case records of the

prior service. If these are unavailable, knowledgeable

representatives of the transferring service should be de-

briefed as completely as possible. Flaws imbedded in the

operation may make it unsuitable for exploitation or may

require correction. In addition to determining origin, the

KUBARK case officer should obtain the prior service's

assessment of the DA, both as person and as agent. : Even

if the case officer considers that the earlier handling was

defective, he should give due weight to such an assessment.

In a few operations KUBARK has repeated the mistakes of

the transferring service through failure to obtain an assess-

ment or through ignoring the earlier record.

2. The Walk-In and Talk-In.

More than half of KUBARK's DA cases start because

an agent of an adversary service volunteers information to a

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non-Bloc service or official. Although the danger of provo-

cation is always present in walk-in cases, the fact remains

that DA operations that have begun in this way have, as a

class, proven more rewarding to KUBARK than any other

type.

The agent of an adversary service who approaches

KUBARK and volunteers information about the adversary has

a choice of a number of means of making the first contact.

In addition to presenting himself physically (to KUBARK or

any ODYOKE intermediary), he can send an emissary,

write a letter, make a phone call, or even establish radio

contact. KUBARK's problem, clearly, is to separate the

i our satative

walk-ins and talk-ins who are acting on their own initiative

from those who are seeking contact at the instigation of a

hostile service.

3. Detected and Doubled (D & D).

About a fifth of the DA cases handled directly by

KUBARK have begun with the identification of a hostile

agent, interrogation, and doubling. Analysis suggests

that in peacetime D & D cases are frequently perilous and

unprofitable. The agent's agreement to double, obtained

under stated or implied duress, is rarely accompanied by

a real switch in loyalties. The likeliest exception is the

agent who served the adversary unwillingly, under pressure,

and who (though afraid to approach the authorities on his own

initiative) is relieved when his clandestine role is brought

to light. The risk in handling D & D cases is also mitigated

in joint operations conducted with liaison services that can

exercise strong executive authority.

4. The Provocation Agent.

Provocation is the least common origin of DA cases.

When employed, it has, in the past, been used by a Bloc

service against KUBARK or another Western service more

frequently than vice-versa. Provocation may be direct, as

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in an approach by a walk-in or talk-in, or indirect. The

latter technique usually employs an agent whose access

and other assets make him attractive to the adversary and

who places himself in the way of recruitment without seizing

the initiative. Provocation through direct approach is

plainly difficult if the adversary service is sophisticated.

Even the agent whom we initially consider detected

and doubled can be a provocation. We may have learned

something (but not all) of the story of his ties to the adversary

because the adversary wanted us to. Or the agent's con-

fession may be partial; he may withhold, for example, one

channel of communication to the hostile service and then,

through that channel, tell the adversary how much he has

told us.

A provocation agent establishing initial contact as

a walk-in must have direct contact with the target service

at least once. And the target service, if interested in the

bait, is likely to try to arrange for future meetings on

territory under its jurisdiction (or that of a cooperative

service). Under such circumstances the provoking service

usually fears some slippage of control. The provocateur

who never appears - who makes contact only by mail, W/T,

a go-between, or a like medium - is less likely to be

acceptable to the target service, and if accepted is less

likely to be trusted. But the security and control advantages

for the provoking service are obviously weighty.

KUBARK use of provocation seems to be a rarity,

so that the available evidence has not provided a basis for

estimating our effectiveness in using the technique. Because

its value has been demonstrated by others, however, personnel

are urged to plan and mount, as feasible, provocation oper-

ations designed to yield counterintelligence of high quality.

5. The way in which a double agent operation starts

is of continuing significance. The chances that KUBARK

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will "get the edge" are best if the agent's prior service

was with KUBARK rather than the opposition, are better

than average if he is a walk-in who has not delayed i

telling his story to a non-Communist official or servic

and who passes KUBARK testing, and are poor if a detected

adversary agent has been compelled to double. As the oper-

ation develops, the case officer should not forget the

significance of the way in which it started.

C. Goals: Kubark and Adversary.

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2. Adversary Goals.

Analysis of a number of unilateral KUBARK double .

agent operations has shown the following adversary objectives,

listed in order of descending frequency:

a. To obtain information on emigres and emigre

groups outside the Bloc. This goal is frequently coupled

with the purpose of gaining information about AIS (or other

non-Communist IS) use of emigres.

b. To penetrate the AIS or other non-Communist.

services.

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c. To acquire intelligence about U.S. non-intelli-

gence personnel and organizations abroad, principally

military.

d. To serve other adversary operations in a

supporting role.

e. To obtain information about AIS-associated

organizations abroad.

f. To assassinate or kidnap.

§. To ensure the safe return of an agent detected

by the AIS.

h. To exploit for KUCAGE purposes.

i. To recruit or place an agent inside PBPRIME.

j. To establish an agent as a long-range illegal

in the West.

k. To determine the fate and whereabouts of Bloc

intelligence defectors.

The early discernment of the adversary's true ob-

jectives is important because determination of hostile

appetite, obtaining clearances for release of information to

the DA, other operational decisions, and termination and

at may no one event to one trac bet at-

mates based on targets, access, and the DA's potential are

still useful.

D. Selection and the Four Key Tests.

1. The testing of a double agent should be continuous,

and a wide choice of testing mechanisms is available. But

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before a decision is reached on accepting or rejecting a

DA opportunity, asking the following four key questions

will help us to strike the balance.

Has the potential DA told us everything? Or

are there any indications of withholding? In particular,

is there reason to suspect that he has withheld a communi-

cations channel to the opposition?

b. Does the prospective DA have stayability? That

is, is he emotionally and psychologically stable, and are

there good prospects of conducting the operation on a long-

term basis? Can he sustain the anticipated stresses

indefinitely?

c. Does the opposition trust him? Some indication

of degree of adversary trust may be found in his length of

service, the nature and level of his assignments, level of

pay, and quality of communications systems provided him.

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Direct control of a DA's W/I link would require

the presence of the KUBARK case officer whenever the agent

receives or transmits. Although direct control is not

usually feasible, monitoring all incoming and outgoing

transmissions permits effective indirect control. Such

monitoring has the advantage that it can be concealed from

the DA.

• Most agents to whom hostile services communi-

cate by one-way voice-link are scheduled to receive broad-

casts at least once a week. One preliminary test of bona

fides, accordingly, is the monitoring of the next scheduled

message after initiation of the double agent operation.

2. A potential DA operation need not be rejected because

it fails to pass all four tests. But negative answers are danger

signs, marking the elements of the case which must be

regularly re-evaluated as the operation progresses.

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E. Planning and Preliminary Steps.

1. Before a DA operation starts, a considered plan

should be prepared. In its details the plan is necessarily

more tentative than is most operational planning because

the operational initiative rests - and should rest - almost

entirely with the adversary. But usually we can estimate

the goals of the opposition at or near the beginning of a DA

case. If we have a good idea of what the enemy is after and

if we know everything essential to our part of the case, the

hidden fraction which constitutes the double life of the

and the operation, then we can plan effectively.

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m. Time and support available. The base or

station planning a double agent operation should consider

whether enough time and support will be available. Ideally,

the case officer who will conduct the operation should be

staying in the field for a lengthy period, so that a transfer

is not required soon after the operation has started. He

should have enough time to conduct and report the case

well. Assistance should be available when needed for

surveillance, countersurveillance, monitoring of radio

communications, control of hostile dead-drops, continuous

testing and assessment of both agent and operation, and

other time-consuming essentials. If time and support are

inadequate, the operation may consist almost entirely of

periodic debriefing of the DA, with little of no attempt to

obtain information independently. Under such circum-

stances it may be better, at the outset, to drop other activity

to make room for the case or to reject the prospective DA

operation.

il.

Termination and disposal. In some long-range

operations no plans for termination and disposal can be

made at the outset. In other cases, and especially those

intended to run for shorter periods, it is best to plan the

ending at the start.

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Prosecution is normally ruled out because of

the necessity to avoid condonement and legal entanglement.

But if a decision to prosecute can be reached at the

beginning, all subsequent handling can be designed to pre-

serve the chain of evidence and other requirements of the

court. In such cases, including those involving U.S.

citizens, KUBARK should either bow out, as a rule, or

seek immediately the assistance of a duly constituted

executive authority.

Joint operations usually present fewer problems

of termination and disposal because of the facilities avail-

able to the host service. If a unilateral DA case is to be

turned over to liaison, it is usually best to do so before the

dwindling equity has disappeared completely, so that there

is more chance that liaison will accept jurisdiction and

less chance of irritating the liaison relationship. Early

transfer has two other advantages; it minimizes the amount

of information which the DA acquires about KUBARK, and

it facilitates legal detention in those cases in which pro-

longed interrogation of the DA is desirable.

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4. Preliminary Testing of Bona Fides.

A thorough testing of bona fides requires the avail-

ability of all the information outlined above and in Part IV

of this guide. But in one or two initial meetings the case

officer can conduct the following quick and preliminary

tests, to be augmented by deeper probing as the operation

develops.

c. If the agent arrived on the scene recently, any

friends or relatives of his in the area should be traced

quickly. If he is a provocation agent, he may have orders

to establish contact with a friend or relative who has an

established IS tie.

d. The agent's documents should be subjected to

technical examination.

e. If LCFLUTTER is to be used at all, the first

test should be made as early as possible. Refusals to

undergo testing should be reported, as well as any indi-

cations that the agent has been briefed on the technique.

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f. The interviewer or prospective case officer

should be on the alert during initial meetings for phrases

or concepts characteristic of clandestine activity and for

any other clues to prior intelligence training or experience

which the agent is concealing.

g. The agent should provide dates and reasons

for any arrests. Arrests in denied areas, followed by com-

paratively quick release, may indicate intelligence recruit-

ment.

h. The prospective DA may be asked to sign a

statement that if he is held and surfaced by the opposition

or exploited for purposes of propaganda, this fact will

constitute prima facie evidence of coercion. Refusalto

sign may indicate hostile control, although it may also.

indicate timidity. If a DA operation is conducted and if

the DA later remains or is detained in a denied area, where

he is used for purposes of Communist propaganda, the

signed statement may be useful.

It is stressed that this list of suggestions is

intended to serve only as a superficial guide to assessment

of bona fides before the operation is launched. Much more

information about the DA as both person and agent is re-

quired for the establishment of bona fides.

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II, THE DA AS A PERSON

In the opening phase of the DA operation, as was

mentioned earlier, all basic personalia on the agent and

selected associates are assembled, bona fides are deter-

mined or estimated, and a preliminary psychological

assessment is drawn up. Somewhat later, but still early

in the case, a more searching examination should be made

of the agent as a person. This assessment, sent to head-

quarters as a separate dispatch, should include informa-

tion about the following topics.

The following discussion of the psychological charac-

teristics of double agents is based upon research and

analysis of unilateral, peacetime, KUBARK cases. Our

postwar experience strongly suggests that there are vital

differences between peacetime DA's and DA operations and

those directed in war, when patriotism, idealism, and

subordination of self were more frequently encountered.

A. Willingness to serve as a DA.

The results of case analysis to date amply demonstrate

the importance of establishing whether the agent wants to

be a double or not. Those peacetime DA's who enjoy the

role tend to share, in greater or lesser degree, a number

of distinctive psychological and emotional characteristics.

An understanding of these traits is extremely useful to

the case officer. Unwilling DA's, serving either service

or both against their own inclinations, are more variegated

but are usually unlike the willing doubles in major respects.

They usually seek - consciously or not - to end the oper-

ation as quickly as they can without damage to themselves

or those emotionally close to them. Therefore a long-range

plan, of indefinite duration, based upon an unwilling double

agent is very likely to founder because of his personality

rather than external, operational factors.

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1. In the operations studied to date willing DA's have

outnumbered the unwilling in a ratio of seven to one.

2. In a majority of the KUBARK DA cases studied to

date the case officers have made little or no attempt to ex-

plain in writing the kinds of persons with whom they were

dealing.. It is plain that case officers cannot be expected

to produce professional psychiatric or psychological analyses,

nor are these usually necessary. It is also clear that case

officers invariably form an estimate of the agent's per-

sonality. But if the estimate is dim, unformulated, or

unreported, two drawbacks result. The case officer's

handling of the agent is weakened; and the quality of help

from headquarters, station, or elsewhere also suffers.

Our experience shows that there is a high correlation be-

tween a sound assessment and a sound operation.

B. Emotional stability.

1. More useful than a general conclusion about the

DA's emotional stability is a report of the circumstances

under which he is stable and unstable.

2. Willing DA's show much higher-than-average

emotional stability in stress situations, which they tend

to dramatize and enjoy. For example, they often show

little or no reluctance to meet the adversary in a denied

area. (They are apt, however, to exaggerate their cool-

ness under fire when reporting on the adversary.) Con-

versely, they are less stable in slack periods than are

most persons. Suffering from boredom rather than tension,

they may relieve the monotony by heavy drinking, sexual

adventurousness, or shady financial deals. Their

dangerous restlessness evaporates, however, when they

are kept busy operationally.

3. Unwilling DA's show the reverse pattern. They

avoid situations of stress and are agitated by them. They

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do their best work under safe and routine conditions. DA's

who are unwilling but valuable require much help and

reassurance from case officers, especially in the form of

detailed security safeguards.

C. Emotional attachments to others.

1. The voluntary double agent often seems incapable

of forming lasting, adult, emotional relationships with

others. His attitude toward other people is basically com-

petitive and exploitative. Many willing DA's have been

divorced at least once and have gone through a series of

mistresses. Because most willing doubles are good con-

men and good verbalizers, they are usually adept at creating

an impression of sincere feeling, of courtesy and concern

for others. Sometimes they are good enough actors to con-

vince themselves, temporarily. Most of the time, however,

they are emotionally empty. One consequence is that a

KUBARK case officer handling a willing DA in time of peace

should be extremely chary about concluding that esteem or

friendship for the case officer plays a significant role in

the agent's motivation. The DA may feel a close rapport

as a result of the clandestine nature of the association rather

than the personality of the case officer, but even this reaction

is likely to last about as long as the agent meeting. Another

practical consequence is that the location of members of

the voluntary DA's family is likely to be much less important

as an element of control than it may seem. The agent may

feel close to one or more persons, more commonly a son

or daughter than a wife or parent; but even such bonds are

not typical. The defector or double who left a wife behind

in a denied area and who continues to express concern is

likelier to be reacting as he thinks he is expected to react

than to be expressing sincere and deep feeling.

2. Unwilling DA's are unlikely to be demonstrative,

but they do seek enduring emotional relationships. Their

concern about members of the immediate family is likely

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to be genuine. In fact, it may have been this concern

which the adversary exploited in recruiting the agent.

Unwilling DA's tend either to remain aloof or to seek

filial relationships with case officers.

D. Level of intelligence.

1. Both willing and unwilling double agents are

characteristically above average in terms of intelligence.

Willing DA's usually think quickly and show cleverness;

their extent of formal education (well above average) and

their typical vocations suggest some depth of intelligence

(but not feeling) as well. The fact that willing DA's are

almost invariably without funds or property reflects not a

lack of intellectual competence but a tendency to trust to

their wits, not to their bank accounts.

2. Linked with high native intelligence is the voluntary

DA's skill as a verbalizer. Typical overt occupations in

this group are those of interpreter/translator; editor,

journalist, writer, or speaker; bibliographer; teacher; and

salesman. The DA may be at home in two or several

languages. One drawback is that his reports, both verbal

and written, may require careful stripping before the plain

facts can be discerned.

3. The willing DA's combination of intelligence and

unscrupulousness make him as hard to handle as a two-

edged razor blade. One piece of usually applicable advice

can be offered. The case officer should avoid competing

with the DA. Relying on the authority inherent in his posi-

tion, the case officer can best handle a clever, competitive

double through calm firmness, not through evident anger.

Willing DA's are likely to respond well to a stick-and-

carrot or kick-and-kiss technique. "Your last report was

excellent, but it was not as good as the work I expect from

a man of your abilities. "

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E. Gullibility - scepticism.

1. Willing DA's are usually sceptical about the motives

and abilities of others but unsceptical about themselves.

They distrust others, including those with whom they are

on terms of intimacy.

They are frequently cynical. They

tend to underrate the adversary - and presumably KUBARK -

and to overrate themselves.

so than the hardbitten, willing types, and they are as

so than the

2. Unwilling doubles are also sceptical, though less

sceptical about themselves as about others.

F. Trustworthiness.

1.

Willing DA's can be trusted to follow instructions

that coincide, in their view, with their own interests. They

become unreliable if the case officer's orders conflict with

their wishes. Confronted with indications or evidence of

the agent's untrustworthiness, the KUBARK case officer

should consider whether the unreliability is the result of

the agent's loyalty to the adversary or of his own ego-

centricism.

The former cause ends the case or puts it on

a totally different footing. The latter is merely one of the

facts of DA life, to be expected and countered by inde-

pendent checks and sound handling.

2. The scanty evidence available on the trustworthi-

ness of unwilling doubles suggests that on a day-by-day basis

they are more reliable than their opposite numbers. If they

disagree with the case officer's instructions, as they are

particularly likely to do if an element of personal risk is

involved, they will usually express their concern. But if

they accept an order, they will normally try faithfully to

carry it out. On a long-range basis, however, unwilling

DA's cannot be considered reliable, because the indefinite

continuation of the operation is directly contrary to their

wishes. They are prone to make deliberate or unconscious

slips which will end the operation without bringing retribu-

tion down upon them.

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3. Part Il, paragraph D, listed the four key questions

used in deciding whether to accept a DA opportunity. One

of the questions is whether the opposition trusts the DA.

In the continuous task of agent assessment, the KUBARK

case officer, therefore, should mirror-read. Is adversary

confidence in the DA diminishing, increasing, or stable?

If it is static or weakening, what can be done to bolster it?

G. Ambition.

1. Willing double agents are ambitious in the sense

of seeking immediate material rewards with little effort.

Few are content to work slowly and consistently toward

long-range goals. Gratification is non-deferable. They

seek the immediate effect or gain, by a display of skill

or cleverness, by demonstrating artistic or intellectual

attainments, or by such displays of generosity as buying

drinks for the house. But they lose interest when the easy

satisfaction has been achieved. The case officer working

with a willing DA on a long-range operation is usually well-

advised to stress immediate objectives - especially those

which permit the agent some ego-gratification - rather than

distant goals, in which the agent may not be interested.

2. Unwilling doubles are likely to be only moderately

ambitious. They are, however, far more content to move

slowly toward long-range goals. Their reluctance to serve

as double agents can sometimes be thawed if successful

DA performance over a lengthy period can be identified

with the attainment of such long-held, personal objectives

as security and status. The length of required service may

be less important to them than the fixing of a definite, agreed.

date for concluding the operation.

H. Clandestinity.

1. In the typical willing DA, clandestinity is doing

what comes naturally. He is usually accustomed to concealing

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facts from others - his wife, his creditors, the local

authorities. His scepticism about the motives of others,

which reflects his own exploitative motives toward others,

reinforces his secretiveness. He enjoys concealing of

withholding for its own sake.

In the early stages of

handling a willing DA the case officer may be delighted

with his innate knack for the clandestine and the nimble-

ness of his wits. But there are two dangers. One is that

the agent is prone to conceal things from his case officer

too. KUBARK's need to know everything about him con-

flicts directly with his desire not to place himself in the

power of another through divulging too much. Persistent

case officer digging into his past, especially if performed

formally in accordance with a PHS outline, may merely

arouse his competitiveness, his desire to outwit. But

encouraging him to reminisce, especially about episodes

that place him in a favorable light and let him brag a little,

is likely to be rewarding. Another danger is that the

willing DA may resist or ignore training in operational

security. He is used to depending on his natural talents

to get him out of trouble. But he is intelligent enough to

recognize that the adversary service is professionally

clandestine and that KUBARK security training is not a

denial of his aptitudes but a chance to expand them.

2.

The few unwilling DA's studied to date were found

to be less clandestine than the average person. They need

careful, step-by-step training in security. If they are to

face a situation which they consider dangerous or even un-

usual, they want and need a specific prior briefing by the

case officer.

3. Whether the DA is willing or unwilling, the case

officer should determine the kind and amount of security

training needed and should supply it, being careful to tailor

the training to DA purposes and avoiding training the agent

for the adversary's purposes.

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I. Introversion - extroversion.

1. The willing DA is introverted in the sense that he

is much more preoccupied with himself than with the world

around him. But his actions resemble those of the extro-

vert. He is likely to be gregarious and to dislike solitude.

He prefers large social gatherings at which he can make a

bid for attention or admiration. Because the wide array of

contacts is sought for self-gratification, willing DA's are

not likely to form firm friendships, at least not friendships

involving a normal give-and-take. The aim is to exploit or

impress. It has been noted that some willing DA's strike

up conversations with total strangers solely to achieve a

striking effect.

2. The unwilling DA is likely to be introverted. He

is not typically gregarious, and his circle of friends may

be small. To those few friends, aa to his family, he is

likely to be loyal.

J. Other major traits.

The following additional traits of willing DA's have

appeared with sufficient frequency during the analysis of

past cases to merit their mention; sporadic heavy drinking

(but not alcoholism); failing to react visibly to harsh

reprimands or threats but nursing a consequent grudge in

secret; frequent demands for money (no case was found in

which a willing Da refused payment; almost all of them were

importunate in trying to get more); vanity and a desire for.

prestige; and sexual promiscuity.

K. Summary of analysis of traits.

1. The foregoing profile of willing double agents repre-

sents their psychological patterns as a group; the individual

DA will naturally have his own pattern of divergency from

these norms.

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2. Effective management of the DA requires an early

determination of how much he wants (or does not want) to

play the part.

Because willing and unwilling doubles show

different - and sometimes antithetical - characteristics,

the determination of willingness will help the case officer

to fit his treatment of the agent to the agent's personality.

3. The psychological profile of willing DA's as a

class or group is that of the con-man (or, in the psychiatrist's

terms, of the sociopath). The incidence of con-men is high

among willing double agents in time of peace, just as the

incidence of persons in rebellion against any form of

authority is high among defectors. This fact is cause for

caution but not for apprehension.

The case officer who

recognizes the dangers to himself and his service which

are likely to result from the very nature of the willing

double is better able to control them. And he is likely to

find that the agent's stability under stress, intelligence,

scepticism, and natural clandestinity are valuable assets

when channeled against the opponent.

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IV. THE DA AS AN AGENT

A. Prior Intelligence Associations.

As was stated in Part II, paragraph E 3, it is necessary

or planning purposes to obtain all the facts about all the

gent's intelligence experience before he became a double.

The extent of that experience is likely to be one of the basic

differences between the DA and the non-CI agent. If the

double has not had prior contact with more than one service,

the operation itself will give him some insight into a second

service and thus permit him to compare and learn.

The

result of this extent and breadth of experience (and in some

cases of considerable agent training) is that DA's are likely

to be sophisticated in clandestine matters.. As a result

the margin of superiority ususally enjoyed by the KUBARK

case officer, who ordinarily has had much more training

and experience than his agent, may diminish, vanish, or

even be reversed. For this reason KUBARK case officers

who have had little or no earlier experience in directing

DA's should not be hesitant about seeking help from others

at the base, from the station, and from headquarters.

B. Continuing Investigation.

As was noted earlier, background checks and the in-

spection of all overt records should precede the decision

to accept the case and the formulation of the operational

plan. During the operation these measures should be con-

tinued, to the extent consonant with security. (Continuing

checks do pose a graver security problem in some DA

cases than in many other types of operations; at times the

isk is impossible or the risk is unacceptable. But if th

A lives outside a denied area, safe ways to continue inde

pendent probing can usually be found.) Apart from the

danger of concluding that all the facts are in, that the

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record is complete, continued probing is required for

the duration of the operation.

C. Training.

1. Adversary Training.

Most of the agent training given by hostile services

concerns tradecraft, and the emphasis is on communications.

2. KUBARK Training.

÷ Ci

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c. If the agent has weaknesses as a double,

corrective training will be far more effective than merely

haranguing him.

D. Testing.

1. KUBARK Testing.

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d. Most of these methods entail a significant ex-

penditure of time and effort. This fact should be weighed

at the outset, before KUBARK is committed to the oper-

ation, and should also be reflected in the planning of the

operation. It is manifestly insecure to conduct a double

agent operation as a series of debriefings, in which the

case officer merely records the unchecked assertions of

the DA.

mechanism, but only if the adversary has been identified

mechaniem,

e. Analysis of substance is useful as a testing

correctly. If, for example, a double agent who is a citizen

of a satellite state provides useful and valid information

about one of the intelligence or security services of that

state - counterintelligence of such caliber that it seems

obvious that the satellite service would not willingly per-

mit its release - KUBARK may easily misread the DA's

loyalties and assume that he is "ours" when in fact he is

providing the information on orders of the KGB or GRU;

probably without the knowledge of the satellite service.

f. The four key tests were described above (see

II D) as an aid to deciding whether or not to accept an

opportunity for a double agent operation. The case officer

should ask the same four questions periodically during the

later phases of the operation because they constitute a

sound framework for testing.

2. Adversary Testing.

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b. Hostile services may test the agent and oper -

ation by testing the communications channel. See pp. 61-64.

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E. Control

1. KUBARK Control.

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:

• • ••.

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2. Adversary Control.

a. A major weakness of the Communist intelli-

gence and security service is an inadequate understanding

of the principle that control rests upon an understanding

of the motives of individual agents. Consequently there

is an adversary tendency to pay scant heed to the agent as

a person and to consider him, instead, as an instrument..

In half the KUBARK DA cases studied to date, for example,

the DA has alleged that his work for the adversary was

totally or partially motivated by duress and fear.

No other

element of motivation for serving the opposition is cited by

DA's as frequently. Even after allowance is made for

agent exaggeration, it remains evident that adversary

attempts to achieve control through duress may of them-

selves cause the agent to approach a Western service.

Continuation of hostile pressure on the agent is likely to

create in him attitudes which the KUBARK case officer

can exploit to our advantage.

b. A related weakness in adversary control stems

rom overcentralization. The headquarters of a typica

communist service exerts tight control upon its field repre

sentatives, who often relay requirements to agents without

tempering them to achieve some correlation between head-

quarters' needs and the agent's access and capabilities.

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Agents who have protested that assigned tasks were im-

c. On the other hand, the adversary services,

and especially the KGB, have at times shown skill in the

manipulation of political motivation for purposes of control.

F. Agent Motivation.

1. Analysis of double agent operations has indicated

that there is somewhat more uniformity in the motives of

double agents than case officers have recognized. Clearly,

the reasons why the agent works for KUBARK may not be

wholly identical with his reasons for serving the adversary.

For example, an agent recruited under duress by a Com-

munist service may obey its orders chiefly through fear

and may serve as a double chiefly because of hostility toward

the adversary. But if he is a fearful person, predisposed

to yield quickly under pressure, then fear of detection and

retribution in the Free World is also likely to play a part

in his performance for us.

2. According to the statements of DA's and case

officers, the following are the principal motives of DA's

for serving KUBARK (the percentages state the number

of agents reportedly thus motivated in comparison with

the total number studied): monetary (77%), political (55%),

pleasure in the clandestine (50%), personal (50%), self-

protection (41%), ideological (23%), fear (23%), and

patriotism (9%). The statements of the same agents and

their case officers about their motives for serving the

opposition show a very different picture: fear (50%),

monetary (50%), pleasure in the clandestine (27%), self-

protection (27%), and personal (14%). No political, ideo-

logical, or patriotic motives for serving a Communist

service were reported in any of the DA cases studied.

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3. An element of rationalization seems to be reflected

in these findings. For example, an agent who finds very

real pleasure in clandestinity per se is likely to be thus

motivated in working for both sides, not just one. Yet

nearly twice as many agents were reported to serve KUBARK

for this reason as were listed under the same heading for

service to the adversary. It seems likely that KUBARK

case officers may consider it somewhat reassuring it an

agent works for us because he likes the game but may find

it threatening if he conducts espionage on behalf of a hostile

service for the same reason.

4. During analysis it was also noted that agents and

case officers had advanced nearly twice as many explana-

tions for KUBARK service as for adversary service. In

a significant number of operations KUBARK case officers

had made no report at all on the agent's reasons for working

for the opposition.

5. Some precepts can be based on these findings:

a. KUBARK should always examine and report a

double agent's motives for engaging in both halves of his

clandestine work.

b. Most peacetime DA's serve both sides for much

the same basic reasons.

c. The examination of motivation should be as

probing as the case officer can make it. The use of a label,

such as "anti-Communist", is not a substitute for a

searching examination of what makes the agent tick.

d. The case officer who is working with a willing

DA should be slow to conclude that the agent's esteem for

the case officer plays an important motivational role.

Genuine esteem for others is not common among willing

DA's, although many are adept at creating an impression

of esteem.

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6. There has been relatively little KUBARK reporting

on unconscious motives. Although lengthy and theoretical

speculation on this subject may be a waste of time, the case

officer's continuing assessment of the DA as a person does

permit him to compare the agent's own statements about

his motives with his actions, which are sometimes clues

to deeper drives, of which the agent may be unaware or

only dimly aware.

7. I KUBARK has accepted jurisdiction of an oper-

ation from a transferring service, that service's recorded

or verbal estimate of motivation should be obtained in as

much depth as possible and should be weighed carefully.

Failing to benefit from earlier insights often leads to a

repetition of errors in handling and control that were made

by the transferring service.

8. The case officer should determine whether any of

the agent's basic motives are incompatible with KUBARK's

goals in the operation. He should also consider whether

the DA is looking to KUBARK for satisfaction of a desire

which KUBARK cannot or will not satisfy.

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V. THE DA OPERATION: SPECIFICS

A. Access.

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edentather daigod.

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2. To Adversary Targets.

a. In the DA cases analyzed to date each agent has

had believable access, from the viewpoint of the adversary,

to the opposition's targets. This fact, however, seems to

reflect less a careful program of recruitment than the wide

range of hostile goals listed in Part II, above.

b. The list makes it clear that many of these goals

are counter-intelligence objectives; penetration of Free

World intelligence and security services, obtaining infor-

mation on AIS sponsorship and use of various groups (RFE,

VOA, refugee organizations, etc.), securing information

on the emigration abroad, checking on the fate and location

of intelligence defectors from the adversary service, and

the like.

The DA's contact with KUBARK obviously means

that he has some access to one or more of these CI targets.

Sometimes KUBARK case officers have tended to dismiss

this fact lightly by remarking, "All he knows is my face and

a cover name. " As the later discussion of KUBARK security

in DA cases makes clear, this observation simply does not

hold for the great majority of these operations. Because

KUBARK normally cannot control the kind and amount of

intelligence and counterintelligence passed to the hostile

service by the double agent, his access to a principal target

of adversary CI makes it mandatory that KUBARK handle

the operation, to the extent practicable, as though the DA

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would tell the opposition everything he learns. Hence the

C. Adversary services test the agent's access to

their targets in a number of ways. The agent is usually

asked to explain in detail how he acquired each significant

item of information and to identify all sub-sources, witting

or not, as fully as possible. In the early phase of the oper-

ation he may be given targets about which the opposition

already knows a good deal, so that substance can be tested

analytically. Other adversary agents may be assigned to

report on him, and various other techniques of surveillance

may be employed. Such adversary testing underscores the

superiority of true access, which permits the agent to

function normally, over hand-outs.

B. Appetite.

1. As was stated earlier, it is useful to determine

the opposition's appetite, as well as goals, as soon as

available information permits. Examination of the record

has shown that the chances of obtaining a net profit from

a DA operation are considerably enhanced if the case officer

continuously assesses the nature and intensity of the

adversary's appetite. If he has a strong desire to get what

the agent's access promises to make available, the adversary

may be inclined toward greater patience with error or delay,

is likelier to plan the operation as long-range, and is more

prone to expose additional assets, for such purposes as

training. Here is another exploitable weakness of an over-

centralized intelligence service. An inferior report on a

subject of currently intense interest to the headquarters

may enhance the agent's standing more than a sound report

on a matter given a low headquarters priority.

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2. One indicator of hostile appetite is the sudden

levying of a requirement on a target to which the agent

has no real access. Agents who have protested such

assignments have sometimes been told frankly that head-

quarters pressure had obliged the field unit to give the

task to several agents without regard for access. If the

new target is significant, and especially if widespread

allocation of the target is confirmed by other DA's or

other means, it is advisable to notify headquarters

expeditiously.

3.

As was said earlier, a notional access may awaken

an ungovernable appetite. The same is true for real access,

and for this reason the KUBARK case officer should attempt

to foresee those topics or areas too sensitive for release to

the opposition and block off the agent's access to them with-

out his knowledge. Otherwise, as has happened, the case

officer reviewing for release a sensitive report already

prepared by the DA may find himself constrained to forbid

its transmission. As a rule, he cannot be sure that the

double agent will respect the prohibition. And there is the

added danger that the adversary service will gain new in-

sights upon learning which items were cleared for passage

and which were blocked. Keeping abreast of shifts in

hostile appetite will help the case officer to anticipate and

avoid these risks.

C. Production.

1. For KUBARK.

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A case officer review of this list before the meeting

or its use as a check-list during the meeting may prove

helpful. Analysis of production in former DA operations

has shown that the number of the above topics on which each

double agent reported ranged from 5 to 18, with an average

of 10. Although this range is obviously dependent upon the

DA's access and the life-span of the operation, it also

depends upon the thoroughness of the case officer. Failure

to debrief a knowledgeable DA on predecessor services or

any other item listed above nullifies a principal purpose of

the operation.

2. For the adversary.

a. As noted above, KUBARK must keep careful

records of all classified information released to the DA.

In addition, it is suggested that the case officer keep a log

on all of the DA's reports to the adversary, whether classi-

fied information is included or not. If the DA reports to

the adversary in writing, the case officer should take at

(

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least two copies of each report before approving it for

release, one to be forwarded to headquarters and the other

to be retained. If the DA reports verbally, the KUBARK

case officer may require him to submit a written version;

or the case officer may elect to write a full account. What-

ever methods are used, it is important to keep close tabs

on the agent's reporting to the adversary. Such a record

may make it easier to detect a DA's transmittal of un-

authorized information. It will certainly facilitate a com-

parison of hostile requirements and the DA's production

for the adversary and thus make it easier for the case

officer to put himself in the place of his opposite number --

that is, to mirror-read the operation. And finally, in the

broadest sense, KUBARK's effective conduct of counter-

intelligence (including deception) requires that headquarters

maintain a current and complete record of all information

known to have reached adversary hands.

b. Despite the general principle that it is almost

always better to require that the DA obtain on his own the

information which he reports to the hostile service, some

cases necessitate the release of build-up material.

The

twin problems of acquiring such material and obtaining

clearances for its use are easier to solve if the operation

has been developed according to a plan carefully designed

to satisfy specific counterintelligence requirements.

The

ODYOKE military services, for example, will consent to

release much more readily if the potential gain to national

security is demonstrable.

D. Mirror-Reading.

1. Throughout the life of the operation the case officer

should consider each development not only from his own

point of view but also from that of his adversary. Only in

(*

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this way can he estimate whether the operation looks

normal to the opposition, whether the agent is making

satisfactory progress, and what action the hostile service

is likely to undertake at critical junctures.

2. Mirror-reading is not merely a process of putting

oneself in the other man's place. It is a process of being

the antagonist, as nearly as is possible, and then viewing

the operation. Therefore the case officer needs to know

as much as he can about the antagonist personally, the

section and base in which he works, his headquarters --

in fact, his entire service. He also needs to know some-

thing of the typical customs, thoughts, and feelings of the

country which the hostile service represents. Otherwise

the case officer will be a mentally transplanted American,

his mirror-reading out of focus and his conclusions dis-

torted. The same distortion results from identifying the

adversary service incorrectly.

3. For the kind of information that allows the case

officer to mirror-read accurately he is partly dependent

on the agent.

He needs to draw from the agent all the

details and nuances of the DA's meetings with the adver-

sary, so that he can sense the character of the opposing

case officer and the flavor of his relationship with the agent.

In doing so, the KUBARK case officer must rectify dis-

tortions produced by the agent's personality. The obser-

vation that the hostile case officer is brutal and overbearing,

for example, must be read one way if made by a normally

confident man, another way if expressed by a fearful person.

4. A knowledge of the service as a whole and of its

headquarters is particularly important for sound handling

of DA operations run against Communist services because

of their characteristic centralization. The operation will

be misread if the KUBARK case officer attributes to his

opposite number decisions actually made at a headquarters

far away.

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E. KUBARK Security.

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4. As was noted in Part II, cover must be established

for KUBARK, the case officer, the DA, and agent meetings.

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c. The double agent's cover for clandestine work

for the adversary is a problem for the adversary, not

KUBARK, to resolve.

But the KUBARK case officer must

consider the agent's cover as a double. In practise DA

cover is nearly identical with cover for DA meetings. As

a rule such cover does not consist of a valid reason for

overt association, as it may in a positive operation, because

it is necessary to conceal from the opposing service all

indications of AIS association (except under such specialized

circumstances as deception operations). The problem is

more one of concealment than of cover. Selection of a

proper meeting site or sites and training the DA in sound

security practises are the best defenses. Once the adver-

sary service learns that the DA is in touch with the AIS or

even with an American, the operation may become worse

than valueless.

5. Like other agents, DA's -- and especially willing

doubles -- sometimes tell wives, mistresses, and others

about their clandestine activities for either side or both,

despite all admonitions to the contrary. DA's have been

knwon to exaggerate their roles, in order to impress, and

to confide that they are chiefs of services, undercover

staff members, and the like. Discovering such indiscre-

leaving the confidant half-in and half-out of the case. |

See roost

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6. A security check-list is included in Part VIII of

•this guide.

F. Adversary Security.

1. As was mentioned earlier, the fundamental principle

regarding adversary security is that the KUBARK case

officer should not interfere. Adversary services have been

guilty of some elementary breaches: meeting agents in

their homes, exposing the clandestine status of agents to

families and friends, failing to provide or even consider

agent cover for trips, using ill-chosen or untrained couriers,

requiring travel too frequently, and other sins. Fearing

that such practises will expose the operation to local

security forces, the KUBARK case officer may be tempted

to tighten up his opponent's operation. But intervention

by KUBARK is likely not to save the operation but to blow

it, to local security, the adversary, or both. Our restraint

may permit flaps or near-flaps, from the adversary's view-

point; but experience has shown that unless a flap indicates

that his agent has been doubled, the adversary is not

Likely to terminate. On the other hand, flaps do tend to

cause the opposing service to view the agent and oper-

ation with increased scepticism and may produce periods

of inactivity which are profitless for KUBARK. If the

agent is somewhat sophisticated and aggressive, and if

his relationship with the hostile case officer permits, he

may be told to complain about sloppy handling. In any

event, the underlying principle remains the same: the

adversary's problems are his, not ours. If rapport is

the DA tends to present his KUBARK case officer

service.

And naturally, the case officer must not refer

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the double agent to the adversary so coldly that the DA

feels rebuffed. Sympathy and perhaps non-discernible

naterial assistance are in order, along with an explan-

ation of why our direct intervention would imperil the

agent.

G. Communications.

1. Adversary Communications.

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2. KUBARK Communications.

a. In the unilateral, post-war, KUBARK DA cases

studied to date, direct meetings between case officer and

agent have been by far the commonest method of communication.

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Although personal contact is slightly more risky than

other methods because it increases the damage that can

be done by a DA who is giving the edge to the opposition,

its advantages are notable. The possibilities for adver-

sary counterintelligence manipulation of the operation

are increased if KUBARK maintains communication solely

by an impersonal means. KUBARK's opportunities for :

testing the case are largely restricted to testing its

product. For this reason it is especially important in

W/T, S/W, and similar operations to remember that more

than one adversary service may be involved or that the

opposition may not be the service that the circumstances

seem to indicate. Even if the adversary is identified

accurately, KUBARK's inability to assess psychologically,

employ LCFLUTTER, interrogate, or otherwise probe

directly greatly increases the risk of being deceived.

b. Personal meetings are sometimes supplemented

by additional forms of communication, chiefly the tele-

phone, open code mail, and S/W. A fast emergency

channel is essential in most DA operations because the

initiative rests with the adversary, who may require the

agent to act quickly. If forced to act on his own, because

he cannot reach the KUBARK case officer, the DA may

wreck the operation.

c. Details of KUBARK's communication channels

with the DA, like other details of our modus operandi,

should be included in the reporting to headquarters. A

primary reason is that such reporting enables headquarters

to study the effectiveness of our methods and to make the

results of such study available to others who can use them.

H. Finances.

1. The key principle in paying DA's is that the

money should be used by the case officer as one of his

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instruments of manipulation and control.

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4. Hostile services have more frequently made pay-

ments to relatives on behalf of the agent than has KUBARK.

The operational value of such payments depends chiefly on

how the DA feels about the recipient. He may be grateful,

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or he may be uninterested in the recipient's welfare and

inclined to view such payments as involuntary deductions

from his own salary.

5. If the opposition directs the DA to take a trip or

otherwise incur expenses for which he lacks funds, the

KUBARK case officer should be hesitant about supplying

the money. The adversary may be testing. Usually the

DA should respond by explaining his problem to the

opposing service.

I. Reporting.

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VI. CASE OFFICER'S CHECK LIST

The questions that follow are intended as a check list

to be used by KUBARK case officers to ensure that none

of the essentials of a double agent operation have been

overlooked.

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INDEX

Access

..

. .

Alcoholism

| ? ?000

Ambition

....... .

Analysis of agent production by hostile service.

Analysis of agent production by KUBARK

Appetite, hostile

..

Arrests

. . .

Assessment, psychological

Attachments to other persons, emotional

Attitude of DA toward case officer

Audiosurveillance ..

Background of DA.•

Bona fides, preliminary testing of

Build-up material..

Cables

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Page

19-20, 39-40,

47-51

32

30

40

39, 47-48

13, 19-20,

51-52

24

25-34, 68,

74

27-28

27

63

71-72

23-24

40, 48, 55

68

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Case load

Case officer's check list

Centralization in adversary services

Clandestinity in DA's

Communications, KUBARK .

Communications, opposition

Contact reporting ..

Continuous investigation of DA's

Control, by adversary

Control, by KUBARK

• Cover

Dand D cases

... .

Dead drops ........

Deception .........

Disposal

: : : : . .., m

Document analysis.

..•..

Page

21, 39

70-82

43-44

30-31

63-64

11-12, 61-63

67, 68

34-35

19, 41,

43-44

19, 41-43,

65, 75-76

58-59, 66,

78

4

63

7

21-22

14, 23-

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Page

Double agent, definition of

Duress

Exposure of KUBARK personnel and assets

to DA's...

...

43

Extroversion ......

Fabricators

Finances

35

32

2

64-67,

80-81

11-12, 39

Four key tests

Goals in DA operations, KUBARK and

(

adversary

Gullibility-scepticism

Identity of DA, establishment of

Intelligence background of DA's

Intelligence of DA's

Interference

Introversion

Joint DA operations

6-10, 13,

50

29

13-14

15-17, 34

28

50, 58, 60

32

17, 22,

72-74

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Knowledge by outsiders

LCFLUTTER

.......

Mirror-reading ....

Money •

Monitoring of adversary commo channels

Motivation, conscious and unconscious.

Motivation for serving KUBARK

Motivation for serving the opposition

Multiple agents

Objectives of adversary in DA operations ..

Objectives of KUBARK in DA operations

Origins of DA operations, significance of •

Overt information on DA's, sources of

OWVL.

Parallel DA operations

Pay ...•

Peddlers

Page

14-15, 59-60,

67

23, 36-37,

61, 74-

30, 55-56

see Finances

42, 61

44-46

44-46

44-45

see Goals

see Goals

3-6

13-14

12, 61

see Finances

2

(

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Penetration agents •

Planning the DA operation

Positive production from DA operations

Prior intelligence ties of DA's

Prior record of case

Production for adversary

Production for KUBARK

Prosecution of DA's

Provocation

| ? ? ? ?09

Psychological assessment

Recruitment by adversary •

Recruitment by KUBARK of adversary staff

personnel

Reporting the DA operation •

Reporting of DA's on hostile services . .........

Scepticism in willing DA's

Security of the DA ..

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2

13-22

7,8

15-17

3, 46

54-55

52-54

22

4-5

see Assessment,

psychological

15-17

6

67-69, 81

52-54

29

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Security of KUBARK in DA operations

1660900

Security of opposition in DA operations

.........

Selection of DA's .......

Side-commo

....

ee00!

Spoon-feeding DA's ..

Stability

Stayability

Sub-sources, identification to adversary

Support of DA operations

Surveillance of DA operations

S/W .

Talk-ins

Taps, mail and phone

Targets

Terminal report

Termination

Testing by adversary

Page

57-60,

79-80

60-61

10-11

38, 61

40, 49

26-27

11

39

21

38

61-62

3-4

22, 63

see Access

68

20, 21-22,

49, 81-82

39-40, 62

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Testing by KUBARK .

Third services

Threats

Tracing ..

Training by adversary

Training by KUBARK

• •

Transfer to KUBARK from another service ....

Trust of DA by opposition

/ ơ 6ơ 9

Trustworthiness of DA's

Types of DA cases, by origin.

Unconscious motives

Unwilling DA's .....

Unwitting DA's

...

U. S. Citizens as DA's

Verbal skills in willing DA's

Walk-ins

Willing DA's

'...

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10-12, 36-39

72-73

32

14-15

35

18, 31,

35-36

3, 46

20

29

see Origin

46

25-26

2

12-13

28

3-4

25-26

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Withholding

W/T

• . ....

' ‹ : .. ...

Page

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8, 12, 37,

61-63, 69,

74

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