EXCERPT OF INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM HARVEY
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 00/00/1976
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32202027

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Date: 07/01/94

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER : 157-10004-10138

RECORDS SERIES :

INTERVIEW SUMMARY (EXCERPT)

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE :

EXCERPT OF INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE: 00/00/76

PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :

HARVEY, WILLIAM

BISSELL, RICHARD

CUBA

CIA

CASTRO

QUWIN/ ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/01/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Released under the John F. Kennedy

issassination Records Collection Act of

992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

bla Date: 11-03-2021

BOX 450-4

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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N98361

sten

FILE:

In 1959 Harvey came back to head Division D of the

Foreign Intelligence Staff, which is the unit basically in

charge of obtaining

ntelligence and supporting

operations related to that field, particularly

rept

hon of couriers

and other sensitive methods

of obtaining*

ryptological

information:

During all. of this period he had many occasions to

work directly with Mr. Helms and had a close working rela-

tionship with him.

The beginning of 1961, he was asked by Mr. Bissell to

explore the possibilities of setting up a "executive action

capability" within CIA. In the Fall he was asked by Mr.

Bissell to turn his attention with regard to the general

area of executive action to the specific target of Castro

and, particularly, to take over one ongoing operation from

the Office of Security. Shortly thereafter, but as a distinct

matter, Mr. Helms (who was clearly slated to take over DDP,

even while Mr. Bissell was still its nominal head) asked

Fallf

Harvey to

set up Task

Force W, to be the new working group

on Cuban matters. These Items are all

iscussed in more de-

tail later on. when legin

Harvey stayed as head of Task Force W until the spring

of 1963, at which point he turned it over to Desmond Fitz-

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

erald, served about a month on TDY in Rome, and then in

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

(1)(A) l

June forma

it ton Chiet

in Rome. He returned

23-6-94

to Langley in 1966, and then took a special assignment to survey

the vulnerability of CIA installations to "technical coverage.

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NTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Harvey is not sure how much he knew of QJWIN's mission

to the Congo for for pommel

although he thinks that he may

well have signed some of the cables to Leopoldville, since

was in Staff D/and therefore both were working under

Harvey at the time that

was lending QJWIN to

for the Congo mission.) In any event;

briefed Harvey

about it later when they were discussion WIN asa possible

ZRRIFLE asset. Harvey does not recall anything about the

WIROGUE; does not recall anything about ROGUE asking WIN

to participate in an executiion squad, nor does he recall

ever having been told by

r anyone about viruses

getting to the Congo.

Paise

5.0f

FILE:

ZRRIFLE

To summarize at the outset, the following is the thrust

of what Harvey would testify to regarding QJWIN/ ZRRIFLE:

Harvey regarded ZRRIFLE as the overall project crypt under

which QJWIN as an asset operation was going forward. He had

discussed with

the general assignment of exploring

executive action capability, and the possibility that either

QJWIN or that other criminals whom WIN helped to spot might

be assets. He never did more than review some of them as

possibilities in the course of his taking an inventory.

However, he did not use WIN or anyone WIN spotted in con-

nection with any

assassination operations against Castro

or otherwise, nor did he even discuss the concept with any.

of them. He did not stockpile any materials or discuss pre

liminary targets or make plans or evaluations premised on

Nw 66008 35day2ô2oz7 Patefive targets. Essentially de

montrassed

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

176717

Onent 125e

the technological, human asset, and organizational poten-

tials in being, or which might be organized, under the cland-

estine services, and came up with a pessimistic report to

Helms and Bissell that the possibilities of effective dis-

creet action were slim. He also concluded that it was

"ridiculous" to try and set up a general reserve capability

in being, and counselled that the one sure way to do it, or

at least the only one close to having a chance at secure

success, was to simply appoint a single senior officer to do

everything: to run the operation, kill the person, bury the

body, and. tell no one. In regard to Castro, he had used

the

ZRRIFLE project as the administrative hook for his billing

and so forth, and said that at some times there were mix-

ups in terms of the financing offices, so that QJWIN/ZRRIFLE

might be used. He did not completely explain why on some

of his own bills

seems to have indicated QJWIN/

ZRRIFLE, but we did not have time to pursue this at greater

length.

whether he would regard this as his own slip or

indicate that to some extent they were written up by others,

the bottom line is that he would swear that QJWIN was never

involved in any way in the castro operation - nor, for

example, ever in the United States, although there is a

plane trip ticket from Miami to Chicago which is charged

to "QJWIN/ZRRIFLE" (Harvey says it was a plane trip of

Roselli's, which was the only thing he ever paid for of

Roselli's.)

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In early 1961 Bissell asked Harvey to explore an

executive action capability. Harvey confirmed and said he

firmly recalls that Bissell on at least two occasions indi-

cated to Harvey that he, Bissell, had been repeatedly im-

portuned by the White House to explore such a capability.

The first time Bissell spoke to him, Harvey thinks, was

early on and at least one other time occurred which was whe

Bissell asked him in the fall to turn the RIFLE approach

to Castro and pick up the Roselli operation. The first time

- BISSETI

Bissell spoke to him about it, I definitely said he had

been urged by the White House, but Harvey does not recall

whether he mentioned anyone at the White House. Harvey

thinks that if Bissell had said that he had been directly

asked by the President, then Harvey would have remembered

it even today. His impression is that the implication in

Bissell's conversation with Harvey was that the White House

had initiated it; but he said that he couldn't be sure

whether Bissell had said the White House wanted it set up

to be ready. in being or whether

the White House wanted the

possibility explored.. Harvey elaborated that the White House

might say "create such a capability", or might say "deter-

mine whether it would be a good idea to set up such

capability" or might say "see if it would be possible to

set up such a capability."

Harvey is fairly certain that Bissell did not indicate

whether Dulles knew about this White House request, nor could

Harvey be sure whether Bissell had indicated whether it was

someone in the Kennedy White House or the Eisenhower

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White House who had made the request. Again, he has the

impression, although he can remember nothing express, that

at the time he received the distinct impression Bissell's

conversation

at the White House had only been a short time

prior to his conversation with Harvey. When pressed, he

said he was not sure and he might even have spoken to Bissell

a short time before the Kennedy inauguration which would

have meant that Bissell was more likely to have been referring

to the Eisenhower White House as having pressured Bissell

to set up an executive action capability. On the other

hand, he has the strong impression that the second time he

was told by Bissell, i.e., in the fall, Bissell again implied

that the renewed pressures had been recent, thereby strongly

suggesting that, at least at that point, it was the Kennedy

White House which was involved.

Bissell

asked him to explore the current clandestine

services capability to make recommendations on how such

an

operation should be set up. He does not recall Bissell men-

tioning Castro, Lumumba or Trujillo, although it is possible

that it was at that time that Bissell told Harvey about his

approach too

113 (and as noted above, Harvey definitely

remembers that, at some point, Bissell did do that). But

Harvey does not preclude the possibility that there was a

general discussion of the kinds of situations when that

pability might be useful to have, and that

this could have

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Kill

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included discussions of Trujillo, Castro and Lumumba. He

simply does not remember and does not think they discussed

the project in terms of likely specific targets.

Either at that first meeting with Bissell or shortly

thereafter, Harvey learned

that Argol

and Sidney

Gottlieb had been "cut in" by Bissell

on Bissell's interest

in executive action capability. Harvey thought this was

unfortunate, but it was done. Harvey also thought Bissell

should have known better than to discuss Lumumba with

Donn

although Harvey understands and fully respects

® Do

moral scruples against being involved.

Also, shortly after being asked to set up executive

action capability, Harvey learned about the Cuban operation

involving the Office of Security and understood that both

J.C. King and J. Esterline were witting, as well as O'Connell

and Edwards. Harvey is not sure why Bissell would have told

about the executive action project. But he has a

vague recollection that at some point Bissell indicated to

nim that

had an asset who might be useful. (So pre-

sumably Bissell knew about QJWIN, perhaps from O Donnel

use of him in the Congo.)

in any event, knew: (1) that Bissell was

interested in setting up an executive action capability,

and (2) that Bissell had spoken to Harvey about it. There-

fter he and

spoke about it (see discussion of notes

of

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_TERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

• Page 10.or

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in the file, infra. n

relationship to the entire

project was really threefold: (1) he was actively running

QJWIN the asset, (2) QJWIN was spotting people whom Harvey

assumes

was considering both for normal Division D

type

and

and executive

action capability, and (3)

did explore the general

concept involved for setting up such capability with Harvey!

We next spoke about the portion of the report suggest-

ing that Harvey had been briefed about the technical de-

velopments. of capabilities under the Roselli plot. Harvey

said that he does not recall the name and is fairly certain

he never met or dealt with

the person who

actually made the pills in the TSD. He did know both Sid

Gottlieb and "Manny" Gunn fairly well. He said that in

terms of his general professional duties as a Station Chief

and counterespionage expert against the Soviets, he had

made it a point of keeping fairly current in background

knowledge on the enemy's capabilities for assassination.

He had therefore discussed the latest state of the art with

the Office of Medical Services (where Gunn was) and TSD

where Gottlieb was). He said he had also discussed with

those offices medical and other scientific aspects of

FILE:

interrogation techniques (e.g. truth serum) and control

techniques (e.g. post-hypnotic suggestion for controlling

agents). He had had general discussions, therefore, with

both Gunn and Gottlieb. However, he does seem to recall.

a discussion of specific techniques with Gunn at one point,

although he is not positive this was after he had been

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assigned the ZRRIFLE task by Bissell. In

any event, he cannotIlE:

remember asking Gunn to brief Gottlieb, as is suggested in

the IG Report.

We next discussed the notes in the ZRRIFLE file. (The

xerox of those notes sent us by CIA is in part illegible.

I returned and took down completely that set of notes which

specifically discusses the executive action capability and

which is the set Harvey identified as his. Appended here-

to :

are my notes, but if Harvey is going

to be questioned about them we would really have to ask CIA

for the file copy before next Wednesday.)

The reference to Notes hereafter refers to a package

of three sets of notes which we had xeroxed by the Agency.

The first two or three pages which are not in Harvey's

handwriting appear to be a draft of what would be the basic

project outline used as a cover for the ZRRIFLE project.

It does discuss QJWIN as the asset and does indicate that

he will be used to spot other criminals for sensitive pro-

jects.

But unlike the subsequent notes, it does not discuss

issues regarding the setting up of an assassination capa-.

bility. The next setlof notes which are in large writing

on pages covered with various doodles

are those identifiedty

Harvey as his. From looking at them, he judged that they were

notes based on two successive conversations. First, with

Idney Gottlieb on the 25th of January, 1961 and then on

the 26th of January with Arnolds

Harvey concluded

that the first conversation with Gottlieb ranged across a

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variety of activities which fell within the framework of

Gottlieb's position at TSD. (Harvey speculated Gottlieb

had just become Acting Director or taken over some other

high post in ISD.) His conclusion in this regard is based

in part on references

in that first section of his notes

to items which he recalls and which hewould swear have

nothing to do with ZRRIFLE. For example, there is a dis-

cussion oft

phonomena

roject

detranslation machine"

With C.B. [then something TilegiblelD.

commit

gear

hesia.

." Harvey said that there was a project to develop

a new kind

omone sto

the

checkma

that ch

ntedato check wit

who was someone he brought into the Agency and whom he

regarded as the best man anthe tehligencer community of

COMINI

Inter

Ligenc

whom he sard had-ab-

solutely nothing to do with ZRRIFLE.

Above the remarks just noted in the Notes was the phrase

"Framework of Sid's job," and under thatlabl

RiGD

emos

Ledroi

Again, Harvey identified this

who wa

an BLINT Specialist

with the Agency.

The first part of the Notes of the 25th/1 meeting with

Sidney Gottlieb is headed "Executive Action." Harvey could

not recall what he meant by the phrase "the magic button"

but said that he assumed this was a euphemism either he or

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FILE:

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NIERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Gottlieb used for whatever mechanism was eventually chosen.

He could not understand the reference to the narcotics

bureau, except that if Gottlieb or he at that point knew

about QJWIN they might have been aware of his initial in-

volvement with American intelligence agencies in a narcotics

enforcement operation. The reference

to "RIS 201 cover

caution" meant that if there was an attempt to get a fake

201 file as cover involving the person allegedly in some

operation relevant to the Russian intelligence service, this

had to be done with great caution. Harvey speculated that

the word "bankruptcy" referred to the same considerations

discussed below -- that there was a bankruptcy of policy on

the part of the CIA or USA if there had to be a resort to

assassination. (This might frame an interesting general

policy question for Harvey.)

Harvey did not know what "no star" meant. I asked him

if that might refer to the star file system, and he said that

when he was in the Agency he didn't know about one or does

not recall one now. He thinks the reference to "eyes ...

Jim A. -- contradistinct from U-2". may have meant that the

check of any assets to be used through the CI Division, a

normal operating technique, in this case should be done on

an "eyes only" basis through Angleton. He also thought the

reference to the U-2 might mean that unlike that operation,

this project should not be run on such a compartmented basis,

that any assets to be used were not checked with CI so that.

the counterespionage protective resources of the Agency

were utilized.) Harvey thinks that the phrase.

"not a TSD

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