Agency: FBI
Originator: FBI
From: MORRIS
To: BRYANT
Document date: 03/21/1996
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Hote).

DATE: 11-14-2017

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

3/31/201

Agency Information

AGENCY:

FBI

RECORD NUMBER :

124-103.72-10278

RECORD SERIES :

HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62C-HQ-1029205-1160

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FBI

FROM:

MORRIS

TO: BRYANT

TITLE :

DATE: 03/21/1996

' PAGES:

27

SUBJECTS :

JFKARCA OF 1992

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION:

Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C; 3

CURRENT STATUS :

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/01/1999

OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE

COMMENTS:

INC 2 MEMO, LET, DRAFT

v9.1

DocId: 32319946

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Released under the/John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (14 USC 2107 Hote).

_ DATE: 11-14-2017

Meriorandum

SECRET

To

Dep. Dir._

Chief of

Staff

Off. of Gen.

Counsel

Asst. Dir.:

Crim. Inv.

CJIS

Finance

Info. Res.

Insp.

Lab.

National Sec.

Personnel

Training

Off. of EEOA

Off. of Public

& Cong. Affs.

Director's Office

Subject

Bryant

Date 3/21/96

Carolyn G. Morris

JOHN F. KENNEDY (JEK) ASSASSINATION RECORDS

COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (JFK ACT)

PUBLIC LAW (P.L.) 102-526

DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS (U)

PURPOSE:

To advise National Security Division (NSD) and Office

of General Counsel (OGC) that United States Department of State

(USDS) advised the JFK Task Force (JFKTF) since the Assassination

Records Review Board (ARRB) agreed to postpone until August,

1996,

the release of documents revealing FBI investigation of

Russian establishments and personnel in the United States, USDS

agreed not to seek postponement past August, 1996, on foreign

relations grounds, of the release of information in documents

referred to the USDS by the FBI. (SP(U)

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That NSD, OGC, and the JEKTF meet in the

immediate future to discuss the ramifications of such releases.

APPROVED:

Enclosures

(3)

Director

Deputy Director_

Crim. Inv.

Crim. Jus. Info.

Servs. _

Finance

Gen. Counsel

Inspection

Laboratory

_ National Sec. f

Personnel

Otise of G30

Aliens

- Office of Public &

Cong. Affairs

62-HQ-1029205

1 - Mr. Kennedy, Room 7142

1

- Mr.

R. Bucknam, Room 7176

1

- Mr. Shapiro, Room 7427

1

- Mr.

P. Kelley, Room 7338

- Mr.

Bryant, Room 7110

-

Ms. Buckleitner, Room 4127

- Mr. Loturco, Room 4026.

H

- Mr. Swanda, Room 4425

- IRD Front Office, Room 5829

- Mr. O'Brien, Room 6296

Classified by:

5668

Reason:

c, d

Declassify

O0: X

(1), (6)

1

- Mrs. Keeley, Room 6362

1

1

Mr. Valertine, Koondard 1079545-11670

Ms. Siford/Mrs. Leeper,

asidesv

(14)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 741 USC 2107 Hote).

DATE: 11-14-2017

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 9600932

January 26, 1996

SECRET

E.O. 12958 DECL: 1.5 (c) and (d)

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. BRYANT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records: Release of Information from

FBI Investigations of Foreign Officials

(804)

The Department of State agrees with the FBI's recommendation

•o not release documents related to the assassination of President

Kennedy if they could constitute acknowledgement of investigations

of foreign diplomatic officials and establishments in the United

It is the Department's opinion that disclosure of these

counter-intelligence

investigations

significant

effect on US foreign relations. (S)

legion

William J. Burns

Executive

Secretary

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer E. Sims, INR DAS/ IPC

REASON:

1.5(c) (d)

SECRET

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Note).

DATE: 11-14-2017

SECRET

BY LIAISON

Date:

To :

From:

December 27, 1995

Mrs. Toby I. Gati

Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C.

3115/99 5608-Supet

Robert M. Bryant

Assistant Director in Charge

c.d(6)

National Security Division

(JFK)

Subject: JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS

COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (THE ACT)

PUBLIC LAW (P.L:) 102-526

DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS (U)

The following inforation should not be disseninated

outside your organization without prior BIHQ authority. (U)

Reference Federal Bureau of Investigation memorandum

dated July 20, 1995, and a meeting of representatives of the FBI

and the U.S. Department of State (USDS) on August 29, 1995. (U)

At the August 29, 1995, meeting, referenced July 20,

1995, memorandum was discussed, as were documents which had been

provided to USDS as examples of documents selected by the JFK

Board for the FBI to justify the nondisclosure of excised foreign

counterintelligence (FCI) information. (U)

1 - H. M. Shapiro

(1 - D. H. Evans)

2 - C. G. Morris

@ - J. A. Hartingh)

(1 - S. L. Davis)

CSV (8)

2 - R. M. Bryant

- J. F. Lewis)

(1 - J. A. Swanda)

SEE NOTE PAGES 12 AND 13

Derived/ from:

Declassity

on

SECRET

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X1

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).

DATE: '11-14-2017

SECRET

Mrs. Toby I. Gati

Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

United States Department of State

4.

To date, the FBI has processed documents with

information obtained from technical or mail coverages

i establishments or officials from: 1) the former

soviet Union; 2) Cuba; 3) France: 4) Dominican CS

epublic; 5) Venezuela; 6) Poland; Xl Hungary: (S

l Israel; 9) Bulgaria; 10) Mexico; 11) Panama (Su

(Ambassador 12) Czechoslovakia; 13) British Guiana

Public Relations Office); and 14) The People':

republic of China. A USDS policy statement is neede

on whether investigations of any establishment or

official of these countries can be released. See item

5.

If the policy of not acknowledging our FCI

targets is changed for any country's establishment or

officials, all coverages on the establishment or

officials, as well as cases opened on persons who

contacted

the establishment or officials will also be

declassified for foreign relations reasons. How

DOJ/DRC will handle these matters under Executive Order

12958 is uncertain since no case history has been

established yet.

It appears, at present, that the DRC

will protect the technical coverages, lookouts and mail

covers by allowing classification under the "method"

exemption.

The DRC has classified several

investigations using the foreign relations and method

exemptions. To date, no foreign relations exemption

has been declassified, but two on the former Soviet

Union are being referred to USDS.

If the investigation

is declassified, any telephone calls received at the

establishment or by the officials would be

declassified; however, much of the information would

still be protected under FOIA guidelines.

That would

not protect the fact of the technical coverage nor the

target. (70(u)

6.

If the investigation and technical, mail, banking,

or other coverage of one establishment is declassified.

it sets the precedent of

an open acknowledgment that

the United States Government condones and, in fact,

SECRET

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).

DATE: 11-14-2017

February 26, 1996

DRAFT

The Honorable William J. Clinton

President of the United States

washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

For the reasons set forth in detail in the enclosure,

this letter requests, on behalf of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the State Department, that you exercise your

authority, under Section 9(d) of the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, to postpone public

disclosure of portions of eight documents ordered released by the

Assassination Records Review Board. (U)

Consistent with the spirit of the Act, the FBI has

cooperated extensively with the Board and made the broadest

disclosure of documents in our history.

over 600,000 pages of

material have been transferred to the National Archives, and we

We have withheld very

Nonetheless, when vital national interests would be

compromised by the release of certain information we have asked

the Board to postpone disclosure.

Unfortunately, in this

instance the Board has refused to accede to our request. (U)

Disclosure of four of the documents in question would

reveal investigative or surveillance techniques used to gather

important information from a foreign country. Disclosure of this

material would compromise those techniques and impair foreign

relations with the concerned country.

which we have investigative interests will quickly take

countermeasures once they realize the significance of the

material at issue.

(U)

3/15749

Sat-s Mack

SEC

RET

SECRET MATERIAL, ATTACHED

UNCLASSIFIRD WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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## Page 7

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Recorus collection Act or

T99Z 144 050

DATE: 11-14-2017

HOLET

SECRET

PETITION FOR POSTPONEHKNT

UNDER

SECTION 9(d)

OF THE

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY -

ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECIION ACT OF 1992

DRAFT

This petition requests, on behalf of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) and the State Department, the President to

exercise his authority, under Section 9(d) of the President

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

(the Act), to postpone public disclosure of portions of eight

documents ordered released by the Assassination Records Review

(Board) • Copies of the documents are attached at Tab A and

are. classified; portions ordered disclosed by the Board which the

or the State Department seeks to protect are highlighted in

The State Department's view on this issue is

memorialized at Tab B, and

• is also classified. (U)

•The Board's determinations concerning disclosure of the

information in question are set forth in a letter, dated February

A copy of the Board's letter is attached at Tab C; it is

not classified. Under Section 9(d) of the Act, the President has

the nondelegable authority to require postponement of disclosure

under the standards set forth in Section 6 of the Act.

President's decision must be provided to the Board within 30 days

after the concerned agency receives notice of the Board's

determination. (U)

The Standard for Postponement

Per Section 6 of the Act, disclosure of assassination

records' or particular information in such records may be

postponed if there is clear and convincing

evidence that --

Deriv

1 44 U.S.C. 2107, note.

2 Defined by Section 3 of the Act to mean "a record that is related to the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy, that was created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the

possession of ... any Executive agency..."

SECRET

5466-Sopecle

(1)(6)

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Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote):

DATE: 11-14-2017

SECRET

Docuents Which the FBI Seeks to Protect

Document 10290 is entitled "Funds Transmitted to

Residents of Russia."

of this two-page document, the FBI seeks

to postpone disclosure of a portion of one sentence comprised of

14 words:

"accounts would reveal the Bureau's interest in the

bank accounts of a foreign government."

The government in

question is Russia, or placed in historical context, the Soviet

Union.

The remainder of the document pertains to Mrs. Marguerite

Oswald, mother of Lee Harvey Oswald and the remitter of the

Euna-

and the Bureau's efforts to locate and interview her.

Documents 10017 and 10052 describe the comparison of

the serial numbers of money found on Jack Ruby at the time of his

arrest with the serial numbers of money known to have been issued

to the Soviet establishments in New York and Washington.

We seek

to postpone disclosure of words and symbols that show our

interest in and ability to track money issued to the Soviets.

telephone conversation edicated Necked nee

correspondent in the United

States of Tass, a Soviet government

controlled news organization, and an employee in Moscow of

Pravda, a communist-party controlled news organization we

intercepted this conversation through technical surveillance of

conversation focused on American press coverage of Lee Harvey

We seek to postpone disclosure of

the lass correspondent's name, his Tass affiliation, the identity CAlu

of the individual to whom he was speaking and her Pravda

affiliation and language which suggests that the information was

gleaned from a telephone conversation between the two.

In executing its law enforcement and counter-

intelligence missions, the FBI employs a wide variety of

investigative techniques and procedures.

Some of these methods

are widely known. That we implement wiretaps to gather

information, for example, is hardly a surprise. How, when,

where, and under what circumstances we make such electronic

interceptions, are, however, closely guarded secrets.

that we often

attempt to "follow the money" through analysis of

financial records may be intuitive but how, when, and why we do

so are matters the disclosure of which may seriously erode our

ability to carry out analogous operations in the future.

Further, if the target of such activity is a foreign nation,

disclosure of the activity's existence will inevitably prejudice

foreign relations. (U)

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Released under the John 1'. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (97 U5C 2107 Rotey.

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SECRET

of such electronic interceptions are well or even hardly known.

On the contrary, our abilities in this regard are, and should

remain, closely

guarded secrets. Electronic intercepts of

foreign conversations is an investigative technique that we

employ on a daily basis.

We cannot afford to compromise its

effectiveness by admitting that,as long ago as 1963, we were

able to and did intercept a transoceanic telephone conversation (SJ

onducted on a dedicated circuit between two fpreign individuals

ne of whom was located in the Soviet capitold Disclosure woul

also reveal the speed with which we were able

to translate and

digest the conversation, our interests and priorities, and what

we considered important

or trivial.

Such information will

used to develop and deploy effective countermeasures.

Documents Which the State Department Seeks to Protect

Portions of documents 10402, 10133, 10170, and 10336

reveal our targeting and investigation of Russian officers,

agents, and establishments.

Long standing FBI and State

Department policy has been never to officially acknowledge that

the FBI investigates foreign officials or establishments not

involved in espionage or other criminal activity. This policy

has evolved for a number of reasons, at least two of which

warrant discussion here. (#(U

First, if we officially confirm what the public may

logically suspect in this regard, the country in question would

be all but compelled to diplomatically respond. We may presume

that most nations will tolerate in diplomatic stoicism the

clandestine intelligence activities of their peers so long as

such activities remain officially covert but no country can be

expected to countenance the publicly avowed targeting and

investigation of their diplomatic inviolate establishments and

The inevitable ramifications of such

official acknowledgements would complicate and impair the

relations of even long-standing allies, much less those of former

enemies or neutrals.

Uncertainties in this arena may adversely

affect evolving relationships in others. When the relationships

in question are in a

state of evolution, such as those between

Russia and the United States,

prove especially harmful.

Xipe impact of such a disclosure may

Second, if we declassify today investigative targeting

and surveillance of foreign establishments, officials, ano

agents, we may not under prevailing classification principles

keep classified the same information tomorrow.

Thus, even though

the consequences of a seemingly innocuous disclosure

may be well

understood in a particular context, assessing their impact from

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all other relevant perspectives is difficult at best.

example, we declassity our targeting of soviet orricials in thie

instance, then all other surveillance of the same officials in

other situations could no longer be classified on the ground that

disclosure would compromise foreign relations. Put differently,

once we discard the policy against officially acknowledging our

investigation of foreign establishments and agents, we can no

longer use it to justify withholding sensitive information. Just

as importantly, once the policy is breached, we may not be able

to use it to shield our investigation of other countries which we

target for surveillance. The same issue, for example, can be

expected to arise with regard to our investigation of other

members of the former soviet block, cuba, France

Venezuela, (S

Israel, and a large number of other nations. (s

We are not alone in maintaining this posture.

To our

knowledge, no other country acknowledges targeting, monitoring,

or investigating the establishments or officials of foreign

countries within their territory or elsewhere.

For these

reasons, then, the State Department seeks to maintain our

traditional policy of not officially acknowledging our

investigation of Soviet establishments and officials by

protecting the information in question. We have agreed to

advance this position on their behalf.

Conclusion

In the collective view of the FBI and the State

Department, the threat to United States intelligence operations

and foreign relations posed by the public disclosure of the

information at issue is of such gravity that it outweighs the

public interest in disclosure. Disclosure would reveal currently

utilized intelligence methods

that have not been officially

disclosed before, and would interfere with the conduct of

will impair the national

intelligence activities se urren he united states.

In turn, this

(U)

Action Requested

The FBI respectfully requests, therefore, that the

President exercise his authority, under

Section 9(d) of the

President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992, to postpone disclosure of the indicated portions of the

documents described above. (U)

SECRET

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