MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
Originator: DOD
From: HARRIS, BENJAMIN
To: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
Document date: 07/23/1962
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10011-10063]

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

5/5/2016

AGENCY: NARA

RECORD NUMBER: 176-10011-10063

RECORD SERIES: NSF

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 4

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: DOD

FROM: HARRIS, BENJAMIN

TO: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

TITLE:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

DATE: 07/23/1962

PAGES:

12

SUBJECIS:

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS:

IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS:

NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED):7/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-48

v9.1

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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

23 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION

MONGOOSE

Subject: End of Phase I

In response to the questions posed in your memorandum of Il July

1962, subject: End of Phase I, I have prepared 5 paragraphs each of

which is directly responsive to your questions:

1. Statement of What DOD Hoped to Accomplish During Phase I.

a. DOD hoped to provide all required support to CLA, State

and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of

Operation Mongoose during Phase I.

b. DOD hoped to accomplish all the planning and essential

preliminary actions necessary to establishing a decisive capability

for US Military intervention in Cuba:

2. Accomplishments in Phase !

a. 'Establishment of a DOD Working Group. A Brigadier

General was appointed to full time duty as the DOD/JCS Repre-

sentative to handle Mongoose affairs. Each of the Services,

JCS Directorates and DIA appointed full time representation to

serve on the Working Group. Each of these representatives

has direct access to his Chief of, in the case of the Services,

the Operation Deputies as well. Office space cleared for Top

Secret information was established in the Joint Staff area, and

secretarial help was assigned.

b.

Establishment and Operation of an Interrogation Center

at Opa Locka, Florida, on 15. February 1962. DOD assisted

CLA in the initial planning for and the establishment of the

Interrogation Center. Since the inception of the Center, the

DOD has provided personnel support to the Center by furnish-

ing 26 personnel (15 officers and ll enlisted men) out of a total

of 37 personnel manning the Center.

TOP SECRET

Excluded from automatic •

regrading: DoD Dir $200.10

does not apply

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c.. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible

use by CLA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on

• characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other

countries.

d. Voice Radio Broadcasts from a Submarine, DOD

made a submarine available to CIA for the conduct of voice

radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA.

e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several

reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the

CIA.

f. Utilization of AVON-PARK, Florida, by CIA as a Base

for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the

feasibility of using certain facilities at AVON-PARK for the

training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare.

• g. Oil Drum Mines. DOD transferred 40 oil drum mines

to ClA.

• h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer

to duty with CIA to be in charge of small boat operations at

Miami, Florida.

• i. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention

in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability

for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular

contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are

being made to reduce the reaction time required for imple.-

mentation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US

forces.

j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Inter -

vention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which

accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piece -

meal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk in-

herent in such an operation CINCLANT. is seeking means for

reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment.,

k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed

for the purpose of covering the prepositioning of forces allocated.

to the contingency plans for overt military intervention in Cuba.

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It also includes means designed to provoke Cuban reaction and

thus act as a triggering device. for US intervention.

1. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed

for the use of airpower. only following a national policy decision,

to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execu-

tion of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal

revolt.

m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. - A plan has been develop-

ed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours

after decision.

• n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan

providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs. and for a

provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared.

o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the

Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper

included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes

that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished

without leading to general war and without serious offense to

public opinion.

p. BW/CW Capabilities. A paper was prepared listing the

things that can be done against Cuba in BW/CW field.

• 9. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been

readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba.

• I. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning

the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba.

s. Manufacture of Soviet Aircraft. A survey was made con-

cerning the US capability for the covert production of facsimiles

of Soviet aircraft.

t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements

of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the require-

ments of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied

on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance

activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols,

electronic collection and special operations were implemented.

Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation

of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political

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and economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission

Center, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these

sources was processed through the Intelligence Community's

channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been

greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps

still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle.

Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps..

u. Utilization of US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for

Joint Navy/CIA Intelligence Operations. DOD investigated the

possibility of using Guantanamo as a base of operations for the

collection of national level intelligence, in light of the present

policy limitations and possible policy changes in the future.

v. Establishment of "Patrol Posts" in the Caribbean. In

response to a request from the Chief of Operations, Operation

Mongoose, DOD examined the possibility of establishing "patrol

posts" in the Caribbean.

w. Psychological Operations: A survey was conducted

in an attempt to increase Naval Base Guantanamo's role in

psychological operations. As a result special OSD funds were

made available for Special baseball sportscasts over the base

radio station.

3. Operational Estimate of the Potential for Intelligence Collection.

• a. Reconnaissance - a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance

operation is given below:

Completed

Vehicle

WV -2Q

A3D-2P/2Q

USS Moale

RB 47

Submarine/UDU.

Code Word

Melrose

•Fitbolt

Operation

Frequency

13

4

19 Mar - 12 Apr 62

1 May 62

5 - 6 May 62

Continuing

F3D-2Q

AD-5Q

C-130

A3D-2P

Navy DD

Navy P-2V

Call Money

Sleepwalker

Quick Fox

6 - 11 per month

2 per month

10 per month

6 - 8 per month

daily

twice daily

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In addition to these, there are two special operations per

month.. The results of all this reconnaissance are satis-

factory as far as producing air and navy order of battle

information. However, against ground order of battle,

they are not able to contribute too much.

b. Refugee Interrogation - Although the quantity of

refugees processed at Opa Locka has not diminished, the

quality of the information that they have available is not as

good as in the past. Particularly in the area of military

intelligence, very few refugees can make major contribu-

tions.

Occasionally, they do fill some gaps in military

V intelligence and they make considerable contribution in

other areas. Therefore, this effort should be continued.

c. Electronic Intelligence - The existing program is

producing limited information; however, it is suffering

from not only the insufficiency of the effort but also from

the recent shift to more sophisticated communication

systems by the Cubans. The approved new program should

overcome these difficulties and provide increased informa-

tion in the following areas:

Organization and deployment of Cuban Army, Navy,

Air Force and Militia.

Troop, ship and air movements.

Tactics and training Cuban armed forces.

..

Patrolling and policing information on locations,

installation or equipment.

Materiel employed by Armed Forces.

Evidence of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical support,

training, volunteers and of the presence of Sino-Soviet

military materiel (vessels) or aircraft.

Activities of Department of State security.

Evidences of GOC interception of Cuban resistance

forces communications.

/

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Clandestine operations of Cuban government in the

United States. and other American Republics.

Information on sabotage, dissident activity and

defection of Cuban ships and/or personnel.

Restrictive of punitive policies to be applied to Cuban

nationals or their property in Cuba.

Strikes, slow-downs and labor problems.

Location and movements of principal Cuban govern -

ment, military and para-military personalities.

Plots against prominent figures.

Reactions to probes, special activities and recon-

naissance flights.

Surveillance of the possible operations against Naval

Base at Guantanamo.'*

Organization, deployment and capability of Cuban com-

munications.

d. Clandestine - The Intelligence Community has put con-

siderable effort into improving their clandestine colkection

capabilities against the target island. However, these operations

suffer from the lack of a definite target date and objective. With

an open-end operation, such as Project Mongoose, specific military

order of battle information is largely perishable especially when

the Armed Forces are in a constant state of reorganization, re-

groupment and redeployment. About 25 per cent of all reports on

Cuba received from clandestine sources prove to be of definite

value.

Collection of information through third-country sources varies

widely as to quality. The number and competence of observers

and the specific collection requirement levied on the third-country

source determine

the value of the information obtained. Some very

valuable information on specific items have resulted from this

effort and this source should continue to be exploited.

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e. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of

battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off con-

siderably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in

the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organi-

zation itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a

definite target date and objective is set making it possible to

inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with

specific targets, this situation will probably continue.

4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba -

Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the

U.S: could:

a. With 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne-

amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key

military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba

within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

b. Should the situation demand, a piecemeal. commitment of

US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows:

• 2 Airborne Divisions

4 Marine BLTS

Following Forces

5 days (para-drop units only)

7 - 8 days

15. - 18 days

(This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk.)

c. In conjunction with either of the actions described in a and b,

bove, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed,

would result in prepositioning of forces assigned to the invasion of Cuba

and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately

12 days for a coordinated assault.

d. Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in

Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft

availability and desired intensity of attack.

e. Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours with effective-

ness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours.

5.

Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four

Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect

Hemisphere from it.

7

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Advantages

(1). This would be temporarily economical in terms of funds,

equipment and allocation of forces.

(2) It would demonstrate the US devotion to the principle

of non-intervention.

Disadvantages

(1) This would be an acceptance of a Communist bridgehead

in the Western Hemisphere and an admission that there was nothing

• that the United States could or would do about it.

(2). This would be damaging to the prestige of the United

States and would weaken the will to resist of fight against communism

in Cuba, Latin America and elsewhere.

(3) It would increase the probability of the establishment of

Soviet military, base(s) in Cuba which could ultimately prove to be

an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

(4) It would become increasingly difficult to protect the

United States or the Western Hemisphere as Cuban military force

capabilities increase.

(5) It would prevent the United States from assuming a posture

which would permit exploitation of any "breaks" that may develop

within Cuba.

(6) . It would permit the Castro Communist regime to consolidate

its gains and become even more firmly entrenched.

J. (7) It might encourage the Communist regime to become

even more bold in exporting communism to Latin America.

(8) It would permit the Castro regime to prepare at its

own pace the exportation of their revolution to other Latin American

countries.

(9) It could eventually cost billions of dollars as US defense

forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet the increasing

threat .from the South.

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(10) It would virtually assure the permanent existence of

a Communist base for subversion and espionage throughout the

Western Hemisphere.

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and

other pressures to overthrow the Castro Communist regime without

overt US military commitment.

Advantages

(1) Would demonstrate US devotion to the principle of

non-intervention.

(2) Would be in accord with the UN charter and stated US

"policy regarding the non-use of military force in settling disputes.

(3). Depending upon the success of the pressures, in the

short term, it would conserve US military forces and resources.

Disadvantages

(1) Except in matter of degree, this has essentially been

the US policy since the severance of relations on 3.January 1962,

and it has.not been successful.

(2) This would give the Soviets time to develop Cuba as a

base for operations throughout the.Western Hemisphere.

(3) It would give the Communists further time to develop

military bases which could cost the United States billions of

dollars in developing appropriate defenses.

(4). This would require that US military resources and

forces be tied up indefinitely to protect the Hemisphere against

the continuing Communist threat.

(5) This would permit the contipued indoctrination of Cuban

Youth and the progressive strengthening of the internal police

state and military forces. These would combine to make the

threat to internal revolt more remote and the price of US inter-

vention more costly.

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Clandestine operations of Cuban government in the

United States and other American Republics:

Information on sabotage, dissident activity and

defection of Cuban ships and/or personnel.

Restrictive of punitive policies to be applied to Cuban

nationals or their property in Cuba.

Strikes, slow-downs and labor problems.

Location and movements of principal Cuban govern-

ment, military and para-military personalities.

Plots against prominent figures.

Reactions to probes, special activities and recon-

naissance flights.

Surveillance of the possible operations against Naval

Base at Guantanamo.

Organization, deployment and capability of Cuban com-

munications.

d. Clandestine - The Intelligence Community has put con-

siderable effort into improving their clandestine coltection

capabilities against the target island. However, these operations

suffer from the lack of a definite target date and objective. With

an open-end operation, such as Project Mongoose, specific military

order of battle information is largely perishable especially when

the Armed Forces are in a constant state of reorganization, re-

groupment and redeployment. About 25 per cent of all reports on

Cuba received from clandestine sources prove to be of definite

value.

Collection of information through third-country sources varies

widely as to quality. The number and competence of observers

and the specific collection requirement levied on the third-country

source determine the value of the information obtained. Some very

valuable information on specific items have resulted from this

effort and this source should continue to be exploited.

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C.

Commit the United States. to.help the Cubans to overthrow

the Castro: Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure

success, including the use of US military force if required.

Adyantages

(1) Would permit the United States to control the timing

..of operations against Cuba and permit a progressive build-up

which could be modified or terminated as circumstances require.

(2) It would eventually show that we are willing to back anti-

communist efforts and it would reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine.

world opini antion waid Cuba would be more aceptable o

aiding Cuban freedom fighters.

(4) Widespread revolution would simplify some of the

problems. of military intervention.

(5) Revolution could produce leaders from within Cuba who

could constitute the new Cuban government.

(6). It would furnish new hope and incentive to anti-communist

elements inside and outside of Cuba.

(7). It would be economical in terms of military resources

and force's by. obtaining maximum. support from the Cubans.

(8) It would assure the eventual ousting of the Castro

Communist regime.

Disadvantages

(1) : The time involved in this course permits additional

Cubans to be indoctrinated thereby. creating more problems

during.the invasion.and. after.

(2). Contains the danger of "telegraphing the punch" and

thereby putting Castro and the Soviets on notice, which could

result in counter-action and possible escalation if the Sino Soviet

Bloc provides open assistance.

Furthermore, the longer US

intervention is delayed, the higher the cost will be in American

lives.

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(3) : This course would further antagonize die-hard

non-intervention elements within Latin America.

(4) This would require the United States to establish,

control, support and manipulate front organizations, develop

Cuban leadership and run covert training and operations which

carry the risk of extreme national embarrassment.

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro Communist

regime by US military forces.

Advantages

(1) Would permit the United States to take action against

Cuba at a time and place of our own choosing.

(2) Chances of premature disolosure and compromise,

compared with other courses of action, would be reduced.

(3) It would demonstrate to anti-communists throughout

the world the US determination to oppose communism.

(4) It wöuld reaffirm our adherence to the principles of

the Monroe Doctrine.

(5) It would stop further communist indoctrination of

Cubans.

(6). It would eliminate the possibility of Soviet bases being

established in Cuba.

(7). It would eliminate the utilization of Cuba as a base

of subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere.

(8) It would eliminate the possible requirement for a major

outlay of funds in preparing to meet an increasing threat from

Caba.

Disadvantages

(1) Without a truly plausible provocative act, the United

States would pay a very considerable price in terme of world

opinion.

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(2) It could inspire Soviet counter-action in other areas.

(3) This course of action is contrary to the UN charter

and the non-intervention doctrine enunciated at the Bogota

Conference.

(signed)

BENJAMIN I. HARRIS

Brig General, USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

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