Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 11/12/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

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157-10014-10090

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 FORMATION

ORIGINAL

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctions

Vol. 1 OF 3

The Quited Statra Sruate

R1907

EN 4/12|707:

EY-

BC

Report of Proceedings wome

3112/22

Hearing held before

Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Wednesday, November 12, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

:..

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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A

Statement of:

Bronson Tweedy

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STAFF INTERVIEW

coes to se

Wednesday, November 12, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C

The Staff met, pursuant to notice,

at 10:50 o'clock a.m.,

in Room 610, Capitol Hill Hotel.

Present: Susan

Pitts and Elliot Maxwell, Professional.

Staff Members.

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STATEMENT OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Ms. Pitts. Would you please state your name and address

for the record?

Mr. Iweedy. Bronson Tweedy, 6412 Garnett Drive, Chevy

Chase, Maryland, 20015.

Ms. Pitts.

Starting as early as 1959 apparently the first

related mission directive for a Leopoldville station was

written, And the jurisdiction of the station covered a lot

more territory than just what was known as the Belgian Congo.

And I am wondering if you remember at what point the juris-

diction of Leopoldville Station became restricted?

Mr. Iweedy. I think probably basically as we got coverage

in the other areas, I imagine Brazzaville, probably, which

was of course the French Congo, was in that. We probably had

a sort of a watching brief for Angola, but it really didn't

go much beyond that in those days. We may have had a watching

brief for the Central African Republic, but I can assure you

the Central African Republic was very little more than

geographical expression then.

We already had people, as i remember, in Salisbury.

And

it certainly didn't cover South Africa. I imagine that is all

it covered. It may have covered Cameroons.

Ms.

Pitts. And it covered Luanda?

Mr. Iweedy. Luanda, of course, is Angola. Yes. But I

think that is it.

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(Off the record discussion.)

Mt. Iweedy. To complete the answer, that is there sort of

for the record, but no one really expected the Chief of Station

in Leopoldville would really be able as a practical matter to

do very much about the other areas, nor at that stage was it

really that important. But this was sort of an administrative

device to try to keep the continent covered, is all.

Ms. Pitts. So the related mission directive which was

directive which concentrated on intelligence collection and

trying to develop a field for if there was Communist influence

and that kind of thing would have just been a very general

kind of direction, wouldn't it?

Iweeäy. What we were doing at that point is, we

were developing our knowledge of Africa in the first instance.

The Agency's representation in sub-Sahara and Africa had been

very limited. And for the first time we, and I as the

Division Chief, was faced with the problem of building a

division, staffing as many stations as seemed sensible, and

getting our feet on the ground in Africa, learning how to

operate in Africa. And those aspects obviously had to be

stated in terms of targets and priorities and the rest of it.

If you want to look back on it realistically, what in effect

we were saying was, get yourself at home in Africa and then

come back here.

Combe back in about a year and tell us where you are.

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OH WRONGI

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and that is what we did. In about a year we began to have

a feel for the area. And in the process we were reporting.

And a lot of the reporting was the sort of thing which was

giving us background. It wasn't that the President was

hanging on our every word. That really wasn't the state of the

art.

But we had to learn what it was all about, how the

Africans ran their own affairs, what were they like. One

thing you couldn't do was generalize about Africa.

If you were

in Kenya it was Kenya, and in Angola, it was Angola, and

never

the twain shall meet. Those were the things we had to learn,

and we could only learn by doing it the hard way.

Ms. Pitts. In the 1950s Mr. Bissell has said that the

emphasis on intelligence collection shifted from the Eastern

European bloc to third world countries because the ability to

collect intelligence

was very limited in those areas, and it

was easier to combat Communism or collect information on

Communist influnece in areas where Communism may just be

starting. And he made this general comment about the shifting

emphasis in the CIA's collection. Would you say that is fair?

Mr. Tweedy.

I think that is fair

Ms. Pitts. I am wondering how that might have been

translated into something like the creation of the African

Division in 1959?

Mr. Iweedy. The things that created the African Division

of course was the creation of modern Africa. That is what

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really created the African Division.

Because other than that

it

was a series of colonial estates.

Ms. Pitts.

And our relation would have been restricted

to things like liaison an so on?

Mr. Tweedy. Very much so, exactly. But starting around

about 1959 for the next couple of years Africa exploded into

independence. In the National Geographic they gave up the

struggle about halfway and didn't print a map for about eight

months until things sort of settled down. And this was what

caused the African Division to be formed.

Ms. pitts. A lot of that is given to President Kennedy's

interest in Africa, and Africa as a campaign issue in the

Kennedy campaign before his election in 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. Let's face it, the whole of the Us was seized

and intrigued by this African explosion.

Ms. Pitts. It seems as if the interest would have

increased without Kennedy to me.

Mr. Iweedy. It would have increased without Kennedy. I

think also Kennedy, and a lot of other people, wrongly, I

think in the end, tied this to the black population of the

Us and the interest they would have in this - which in fact

was minimal. But that took a long time to really recognize.

I think the general feeling was that there would be a subject

of insistence on the

part of the black population in the US

that the US, in quotes, do something about Africa. It just

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didn't eventuate.

Ms. Pitts. By the same token, in terms of the US having

to do something about Africa, it seems as though another trend

that was influencing policy-makers as a group was the trend

of non-intervention in African, in that domestic black popula-

tion of the Us would be outraged if we didn't do something.

Do you think if we intervened that would have carried weight?

Mr. Tweedy. It what you mean by intervene is try to run

the African affairs, ghen I think I would agree. But the

other aspect of this was, of course, in the early days, the

fear that the bloc, Soviet bloc, would gain some kind of

control over Africa. Now, in the end a lot of this proved

erroneous. But there was no way in the world you could prove

that in 1959. It was felt, I think, that those young,

unsophisticated African States would be sort of sitting ducks.

They didn't prove to be. But again it was a number of years

before the series of events occurred which indicated that the

Africans in their own funny way had a way of preserving their

own independence - perhaps that is the wrong word - but their

way of doing things. And they could be just as

mercurial

as the next man. But the experience in the Soviet Union had

with Sekou Toure in Guinea, it was like a yo-yo, they were

up one minute and down the next, and

they never knew from

one minute to the next how they were going to be treated.

But.

there was

no way in the world that the US could predict this.

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And thus the Kennedy Administration's interest in Africa was

certainly predicated partly on that political thing, the

blacks and the black continent, but also very much the fear of

the Soviet influence and the strategic leverage on the world

that would give them if it really went down the drain as it

were. And this of course was certainly a major interest --

a combination of both those things

was the major influence

in our involvement in the Congo.

Ms. Pitts.

Was the Congo particularly of strategic interest?

Mr. Tweedy. The Congo was the largest geographical

expression in the whole sub-Sahara and Africa.

Ms. Pitts. How much merit would you give to the argument

as entertained by some historians, and so on, that the Congo

as a supplier of uranium was of uniwue strategic importance?

Mr. Tweedy. This was an aspect. And again not

so much

the uranium supply was very important to the US then, I guess

there are many other sources of it now, for awhile of course

it was the only source, during the war. Copper was very

important, not that the US didn't have access to copper, but

they did not want some hostile power to have total and free

access to this enormous residual supply. So this was a factor

too. But I think the most important factor was that if the

Congo was going to fragment, the ripple effect in the balance

of sub-Sahara and Africa was unpredictable, but likely to

be very harmful. After all, a neighboring country was Nigeria.

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And in those days an enormous amount of hope reposed in the

orderly development of Nigeria. And it was felt that in the

Congo had gone down the drain the infection might easily

spread to Nigeria. And a lot of other developing countries.

And when Tsombe started to lead Katangan secession,

nothing became more apparent than the fact that the Congo

without Katanga was like constructing a cadillac without

gas tank.

Ms. Pitts. How about the view that it would have truly

served US interests for Katanga to have ceceded and to have

been under Western influence because of Tsombe

Mr. Iweedy. We didn't believe it, believed that it

should belong to the Congo. And we also felt that the

effect of cutting Katanga off from Leopoldville would not

only have set an example, but it would have a palpable

effect on the rest of the world which would have been very

difficult for the democracies to answer. As I remember it

- this was nothing of a factor in any discussions I held,

it may very well have been in the policy areas.

Ms. Pitts.

What interests me about that

aspect is that it

seems that our relationship with Belgium was very important

in terms of the courses of action that the US took in the

congo, and respecting the long term relationship with Belgium,

And it would seem that if they had been most interested in

respecting that relationship they would have favored the

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IT DESH

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secession of Katanga. But obviously there were other factors

that

Mr. Tweedy. There were other factors very much more

important. I think we would have been glad to see the

Belgians able to maintain a sufficient control, administrative

control over the mining industry in Katanga, so that it

continued to be efficiently run. But I don't think the US

Government felt it owed anything particularly to the Belgian

Government to see to it that they maintained their hold there

at all. Let's face it, the long term relations between

Belgium and the US are important, but they are not overriding.

Ms. Pitts. In terms of the relationship of political and

military instability in Africa as in Communism, the increase

of Communist influence in Africa, do you think if there was

an automatic assumption that any political instability was

unfavorable -- what I am getting at is, if there hadn't been

evidence, for instance, that had been receiving arms through

the UAR from the USSR and that kind of thing, do you think

that the US would have taken a stand of supporting Mobutu

and the Central Government generally?

Mr. Iweedy. I think probably for the simple reason that

we had Gizenga identified probably rightly as a radical

racist African, bitterly anti-white. And we didn't believe

at that point this was the kind of development in Africa

that offered much solution for Africa's early days of

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independence.

The role of the UAR and the USSR merely put

icing on that cake, there is no question but that it did. But

in the first instance

I think the worry of the Us Government

was over the possible political disolution of the Congo for

African reasons, and superimposed on that came the husiness

of what the bloc would he likely to do, or what role they were

playing, and so on and so forth. In the first instance it

looked like it was going to fragement Africans. By that

I mean, Gizenga not so much as a Soviet pupil, but Gizenga

early developments in the Congo independence

and Lumumba were

which were more likely to produce chaos, which was the last

thing one thought they needed, rather than at least

a somewhat

orderly development.

Ms. Pitts. What prompts my question is that today, in

1975, the CIA justifies its action that it took on behalf of

the US Government on the basis of the Soviet threat in the

Congo.

Mr. Tweedy. All I am telling you is that it is a bit of

both. The Soviet threat certainly became more and more a part

of the general cole was worry. And of course the soviets

themselves became more and more fascinated by Africa. If we

were unprepared for Africa, the Soviets were even more

unprepared. But they began to move into the African scene

early on. And we were very apprehensive about it. In retrospect

they could have been much less apprehensive about it. But

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there was no way in the world that we could have told at that

point. But I would make the point, and I stick to it, that

the early fears were compounded of both the soviet Union's

thing as well as the dissolution of the Congo State and the

effect it would have on frican Africa.

Ms. Pitts. My concern with it is that it seems as if there

weren't any Soviet Influence whatsoever, we still would have

been concerned with the Congo, and would probably have taken

the political action that was taken to fund the Binza Group,

and so on

Mr. Tweedy. I guess, Ms. Pitts, that would be fair.

is kind of difficult to tell at this point.

Ms. Pitts. Right, because you can't speculate on something

that didn't happen. But it was a very important area in

Africa potentially. That was the thing, both in terms of

the acreage it covered, the strategic marerials it contained,

and its potential for harm or good in terms of its relatively

orderly development or chaotic dissolution.

Ms. Pitts. I think it makes much more sense to have a

multi-reason policy for taking covert action in an area,

and I have just been sort of dismayed at the insistence at

the hands of the Soviets.

Mr. Iweedy. My own conviction is that it was both.

Ms. Pitts.

That seems reasonable.

Mr. Tweedy. But I would not disagree that obviously the

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Soviet thing in the long haul was the most important.

• Ms. Pitts.

Were relationships developed with those various

moderate Congolese politicionas who, after independence,

became the recipients of political funding and that kind of

thing?

MI. Tweedy. I think the first Station Chief - the previous

Station Chief, whose name I have forgotten?

Ms. Pitts. Was it Mr. Devlin?

Mr. Tweedy. NO.

Ms. Pitts. Before Mr. Devlin?

Mr. Tweedy. No, he was married to a nice Pan Am hostess,

and he was raising a hugh family, I think he ended up with

about seven children. He had already made some tentative

contacts with some of the African leaders before independence:

But it was a very difficult thing to do when the Belgians were

in charge, you had to be very discrete. But basically all

those contacts were made later.

Ms. Pitts. It seems that the strong man, as various

people have named him, was clearly Mobutu from the beginning.

Mr. Tweedy. Once he got on the scene this young man

aid

remarkable job of establishing himself and hanging onto it.

And even though there are times today when he looks to be a

bit of an ass, it has been a considerable career. I knew him

somewhat well. He and his wife had dined with me in my house

in Chevy Chase back in about 1962, I suppose it was. The

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country without any question, has been much better off as a

result of him than it might have been otherwise. And now,

of course, he is becoming

sort of an end of the 20th Century

African, because I think the political urgency is called for.

But I don't think it is anything that we should get very

panicky about.

Ms. Pitts. It seems

that a secondary goal in the congo,

the primary goal that Congo be unified and that it be

politically and militarily stable, the secondary goal is

that it is possible that the kind of Government that would

come to be would be a democratic government, whatever that

means.

an elected government, represented by a parliament or

whatever, and we have a policy, it seems that the State

Department would levy requirements, do this, but make sure

that it keeps the prime minister in the position he is, and

that kind of thing. In other words, we were allowed to fund

Mobutu, but it should be made clear to him that he should

seek a secondary role to the elected politicians and that kind

of thing. Do you agree that that would he sort of a secondary

goal?

Mx. Tweedy. I have a hard time really remembering that.

Obviously the State Department didn't want to upset the very

delecate democratic balance - let's use that word, because

there

isn't another, that is being realistic about it.

We

weren't interested in building up a one man dictatorship.

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And Mobutu was obviously sensible enought to realize that this

wasn't a sensible way to go about it either,

even though you

can say that he has virtually reached that point now, or is

very close to it, ane even though I guess the parliamentary

trappings are still there.

Ms. Pitts. Would you agree that it was a goal at all to

try to have a democratic government?

Mr. Iweedy. I think those of us who are very much

involved in Africa soon became a bit realistic on democracy

as such. What we were much more looking for was stability

commensurate without one man rule, but as the years went by,

it was perfectly obvious that there was no way you could

legislate this kind of thing, because in the early days of

primitive country's development, the leaders are inevitably

coming to the fore. What

country in Africa can you think of

today where a man hasn't been of just enormous importance

to

development of that country? Some of them survive. Houphuet,

Obignynseng and some others, Sengh of Senegal, still survive.

And they came there before Iweedy became Division Chief, and

they still survive.

Now, it may not be a one man dictator organization. They

are not.

Ms. Pitts. But one strong man who pretty much is the only

person capable of handling the country?

Mr. Tweedy. Ahidjo in the Cameroon.

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Ms. Pitts.

So I would say among the people who worked

with Africa there was no lip service to always trying to

encourage the formation of leadership by electoral mechanisms

and that kind of thing?.

Mr. Tweedy. I think we were realistic about it.

Ms. Pitts. I am not saying that that would have been

desirable at all.

Mr. Tweedy. I don't say that - we certainly didn't try

to undermine it. But I think we and the State Department were

terribly realistic about it.

Ms. Pitts.

Would you say that the state Department was

more interested in that kind of thing than the CIA would have

been?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't think you can differentiate the two.

Our jobs were different. We didn't disagree with what the

State Department wanted for Africa. Sometimes we could

disagree over detail, not so much what was wanted but what

was practical and what could be done and what was likely to

develop, our assessments of situations quite often varied.

But that happens all over the world. And sometimes they were

right and sometimes

we were right. But I don't think this was

a philosophic split at all.

Ms. Pitts. I would like to ask you a little bit about

what we actually did down there, my primary interest is the

introduction of the pilots and so on in 1963. And if I may

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say so, it seems that though one really had no idea what their

ultimate outs would be at the time that they were sent down

there.

Mr. Tweedy. You are absolutely right.

Ms. Pitts. And I am wondering if at that time there was

any indication that the military instability to rock the country.

if you will, in 1960, would ever be coming?

Mr. Tweedy.

Well, I think probably our concern was, we

were

after all under

a mandate from the Government to keep this

situatión shored up.

Ms. Pitts. To keep the US involvement very low key?

I don't understand.

ME. Iweedy - What I meant was to make sure that once

again the Congo situation didn't fall apart. By this

time I am prepared to say, support the Mobutu government.

it was quite unpredictable at that point what would be required.

One thing that was perfectly clear was

that if we were going to

have to act in a military situation fast - and I think

we were

probably clear that if we ever had to act at all there

wouldn't be all that much lead time - it would be much too

late to do anything about it, And thus I think you are quite

right in saying that when the pilots firs of all got out there.!

their mission was uncleared, they were there as a contingency

resources.

Ms. Pitts.

They were brought in apparently at the request

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over the initiative of the field as more of a phychological

kind of operation to fly the planes around?

Mr. Tweedy .

If that is the way the record emerges I

wouldn't be surprised. You know we encouraged Mobutu and

stiffened his spine. I expect that was true.

Ms. Pitts. But it seems as if we weren't really prepared

to take on or to provide a combat capability, but as soon as

some of the makings of a combat capability, that is, pilots

to fly some little planes, were down there, Mobutu immediately

began to press for military support. It seems shortsighted,

is what I am saying, without leaning too much on the benefits

of looking back, to have procided the makings of a combat

capability without the intention of using it or becoming that

deeply involved.

Mr. Tweedy. You know, if you want to examine those things

in hindsight, all I can do is nod my hoary head and say,

perhaps you are right. But somebody, I quess, is in the

process of raising hell about Chile. All I am telling you is.

in 1967, when the Government was looking at the possibility

of a Marxist Government being freely elected south of the

border in Latin America, there was a large element of the

US

Government that had the shivers. And there is no point in 1975

in saying they were all bloody well wrong. Maybe they were.

But that is the way we frail human beings are. And when you

have the security of the country as your responsibility -

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and I am not talking about the Agency, I am talking about the

Government - you are apt to run scared. And that is the way

life is. But to say that we did all the right things and

never made a mistake in those matters, or misassessed things,

would be nonsense. And Africa was an area where misassess-

ment was very easy to make, But I don't feel very shy about

it-

Ms. Pitts.

There is no reason why you should.

Mr. Tweedy. This is the way it was. And it is very.

very difficult - it is even difficult for me now in 1975

to

put myself back in the situation we were in in 1959. But that

clearly was the situation we were in. And we weren't doing

it just for fun and games.

Ms. Pitts.

I don't think at any time I have indicated

that I thought the reasons were inadequate.

MI. Tweedy. But you see, this is the thing. You said,

in retrospect it seems too bad.

Ms. Pitts. No, what I am taking issue with is whether

the US was able or attempted or considered the relevant

criteris to look ahead or try to look ahead in a given area

and set. limits on how far it would be willing to become

involved along the line.

MI. Tweedy. I am sure it did.

Ms. Pitts. And it concerns me, and it concerns the

Committee, I think, given the continued capability to a

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covert action in the area, that those kinds of criteria can

be taken into account. I suspect in the congo, or it seems

very obvious, that the situation was so moment to moment,

our experience there was very short term, and so on, that

there wasn't any ability to look forward like that, and no

time.

Mr. Iweedy. That in effect is what I tried to say, that

some

of these

assets were put together as contingency assets,

For the simple reason that we knew that if certain types of

situations developed there was no way that we could press

buttons and have instant resources and responses to our

needs.

Ms. Pitts. And this would have been the kind of thinking

about the project that was

being developed while you were

the Division Chief also to maybe provide a mobile gendarme

group?

Mr. Iweedy. Yes, I do remember that now, since you

mentioned it. I had forgotten it.

Ms. Pitts. And it would have been a similar kind of

thing, not knowing what might happen, that we wanted to

support this Government?

Mr. Tweedy. That

is right.

Ms -

Pitts.

And had to be ready.

Tweedy, That is right.

Ms. Pitts.

I am wondering if you remember it the air team

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was used in combat at all before the termination, if you can

call it that, of the Katanga secession? They get involved

in that?

Mr. Tweedy. Quite honestly, O don't have any idea.

The

record will certainly show whether it did or not.

I do not

remember basically any guns being fired in anger except by

the pilots.

But that is my recollection. I don't think it

had happened before I left. I don't know how much I heard

about it afterward. I don't recall that those people were

ever sent into combat. But I am not saying they weren't.

I just don't know.

Ms. Pitts. Would you categorize this operation as very,

very small scale, and

so on?

Mr. Tweedy. It is the biggest one I had ever been

involved in. But I hadn't been involved in any before.

If

you want to compare it to other paramilitary activities,

obviously it was very small. We hadn't been engaged in all

that paramilitary activity. If you want to look around the

globe, it is obviously on a very small scale.

Ms. Pitts. Apparently after the termination of the Katangal

secession in 1963 everybody had to think: about what they

wanted to do with this air team. And it seems as if - and

I would like to know if this seems right in your memory - that

the CIA was not anxious at all to retain a responsibility

over this pilot capability, and they certainly didn't want

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to be the air force in the congo, and so on. And in light of

that, the sponsorship, other sponsorship, non-CIA sponsorship

to the air program was sought?

Mr. Iweedy: Air sponsorship

Ms. Pitts. Sponsorship for the air program, other than

the CIA. And even in some cases, I think, considering the

alternative side, the sponsorship external to the US. And

what ultinately happened, according to the record is, no

one

else was

willing to take on the responsibility, all the

options dried up and the CIA was stuck with -

Mr. Tweedy. Stuck with the baby.

Ms. Pitts-

Yes. And if this is true I think it is

important, because I think that there is a misassumption that

the CIA is always anxious to get involved in these covert

operations. And most people I talked to seem to view it as

a method of last resort. It is always less desirable to do

something covertly if one can do it overtly.

Mr. Tweedy. I think that is fair enough. And I don't

think our Division Chief, when the question of dissolution

of the pilots came up --

Ms. Pitts. Were you the Division Chief until September

19633

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Ms. Pitts. This was going on - the consideration of

the sponsorship of the air program was being considered in

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the spring -

Mx. Tweedy.

Spring of 1963?

Ms. Pitts.

And it was resolved in April of 1963.

Mr. Iweedy. April of 1963?

Ms. Pitts.

Yes - that the CIA would continue to fund

it and a separate project was set up for it.

Mr. Tweedy.

Yes.

Ms. Pitts. And I think it had been funded --

Mr. Iweedy.

Were the pilots out of the congo by then?

Ms. Pitts. No, they stayed the whole time, they didn't

run.

Mx. Tweedy. That is what I meant. They stayed.

Ms. Pitts. And I am not sure if they were used. I think

they continued to train, because there was obviously a need

for a policy decision --

Mr. Tweedy. I think they were used after I left the

Division, but there is the vaguest possible recollection in

my mind.

Ms. Pitts. Yes, they were. But in this period of tome

in 1963 when, one, there wasn't the Katarga secession

necessitating their use, but you weren't sure if you wanted,

I think, to get rid of this capability. And there was sort

of a long delay, as the options were tried out. And I guess

one option was - or one alternative of the CIA sponsorship

that was tried

-- was that the US AID would provide the

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funding to the Government of the Congo, and the Government of

the congo would then be able to hire the pilots on their own,

and that kind of thing, and would get us out of the covert

area altogether. And apparently Harlan Cleveland was an

advocate of this position. And I am wondering if you remember

why their attempt -

Mr. Tweedy.

Was he at that time the Assistant Secretary

of State for International Organization Affairs?

Ms. Pitts. Yes.

I am wondering if you recall why this

alternative of overt US Government sponsorship through AID

for the air program was not a viable one?

Mr. Tweedy. I can't recall.

Ms. Pitts. Do you remember these options being

considered?

MI. Tweedy. I can't.

Ms. Pitts. That is understandable.

Mr. Tweedy. I really don't. I suspect one of the reasons

was that somehow this didn't really meet normal AID criteria.

Ms. Pitts. I have a question that has to do with

the

congo today. And that is, what do you think the consequence

of the publication of US involvement with Mobutu from his

early years would be today? Do you think it would discredit

him immeasurably in the African community or anything like

that?

Mr. Iweedy. I think it might indeed. I think it would

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be irresponsible to publish it, I really do. A Chief of State?

lle was never our agent. I have made that point under oath.

We had very close relationships with him, and

not only just

us, a series of ambassadors have had very close relationships

with him. Clare Timberlake in the early days was a first

class Ambassador, and Mobutu thought the world of him. But

to stress at this point this kind of relationship, if I may

say so, is the sort of silly thing that the US shouldn't bo

doing. It just doesn't make any sense. I don't know what the

consequences would be for him personally, but there are a lot

of other things involved. There are a lot of Americans that

live in the Congo. And his political directions could well

be affected by this. You can't put a crystal ball on what

the results would be. but to say it quite flatly, I think

it is a breach of faith.

Ms. Pitts. You mean a breach of Mobutu's faith in the

US?

Mr. Tweedy. I mean in the relationship that we had with

him over the years irrespective of what it may be today.

Obviously it is quite different today from what it was in

1960. And I think it would be the height of irresponsibility.

And I see no excuse for it - which is one of the reasons

why basically things like government files and foreign policy.

this's and that's, are not published until after a certain

statute of limitations runs out. This is the sort of basic

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a the the I la

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philosophy which is what I call normal, well ordered, human,

responsible, human relations.

Ms. Pitts.

I appreciate your opinion.

Mr. Tweedy. I hold it very strongly.

Ms. Pitts.

Thank you for your time.

Mr. Tweedy.

That is fine.

Ms. Pitts. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Tweedy, what I would like to ask you

about if possible is the operational use of drugs by the

Agency, either proposed use or actual use. Let me try to

outline for you the state of the evidence at this point.

Apparently drugs, including ISD and Meretran, were used

relatively frequently for interrogation purposes throughout

the fifties and into the sixties. In 1957 and 1958

the

Agency began, under the auspices of Mr. Helms, who was at

that time Chief of Operations in DDP, an analysis of policies

and procedures to be used in regard to drugs. And what we

were most interested in is that the policies and procedures

that were set up to govern proposals in the DDP for such use,

and operational use that flowed from that. I have with

mea

series of memos that were done at that time on policies and

procedures, and one case that mentions a particular use that

does

not involve the African Division, but which raised

some

questions that we might discuss. And if you would like to

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I ST NINa!

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look over the memos

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, because at the moment I have the

hardest time remembering them.

Of course at that point I was in London.

Mr. Maxwell. There is no indication that you were

involved.

Mr. Tweedy. Of course I may not even have seen the memo.

Mr. Maxwell. You were in London from when to when?

Mr. Tweedy. 1956 to 1959.

Mi. Maxwell. And you came back to Head the Africa

Division?

Mr. tweedy. I did.

Mr. Maxwell. The only reason for looking at those is

that they may in fact refresh your recollection as to the

discussions that were going on in the Agency, or that you

might have become aware of.

Mr. Tweedy,

Sitting in London, a non-operational

station, strictly, it would be just the sort of thing that

would go right over the top of our heads and we would

never

hear about. For example, I think I would be almost willing

to swear that I have never seen this memorandum. And it has

got some very interesting stuff in it here from the viewpoint

of the Medical Staff and

so forth.

Mr. Maxwell. That is quite likely. The routing slips

would not reflect those materials?

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Mr. Tweedy.

They wouldn't have gone to a station like

mine, they might have gone to some station, but not one like

mine.

Mr. Maxwell. I think those internal policy papers

probably went to no stations.

Mr. Iweedy. That is very possible, because what the

case was, the divisions would have been instructed, and in

terms of their normal discipline over stations they would

have controlled the use that way without, as it were, involv

ing the stations in the bureaucracy of memoranda of this

kind, which, among other things, might be considered overly

sensitive to repose in the station.

Mr. Maxwell. But the last memorandum, which is a

memorandum in draft form for the Chief of Operations on the

subject of the operational use of chemical agents, proposed

a committee which would pass on the use of drugs and also

proposed that anycables coming in from stations which

concerned proposals for such use be routed to this committee.

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure I have never seen this draft.

Mi. Maxwell. Are you aware of any policy decision on the

part of the Agency to institute such a committee, and if so

Mr. Tweedy.

The Comnittee itself means nothing to me,

which merely means that iether I have totally forgotten it

or I never knew about the committee. It never occurred to

me at that stage of the Agency development, i.e., say, about

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Y DELNEI

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the time that I came back from London, that the use of drugs

was not under strict controls. But if you are asking me

whether I can

resurrect the nature of those controls, either

by a committee or this memorandum or the rest of it, I just

don' * recall.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall what you would have done if

a proposal, from a station in Africa came to you which involved

the use of drugs, chemical or biological agents?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been quite routine. One

would have

cleared it through DDP, or the thing would have

been discussed with the DDP. It would have just automatically

have happened. It never did result that I heard.

ME. Maxwell. Did the DDP or the Chief of Operations?

Mr. Iweedy. His office would have been aware of it.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any Agency regulations -

there were a

series of regulations that existed from 1952

on and which were replaced by a regulation known as CSI 220-10

governing what were called MK DELTA materials.

Mr. Iweedy. I am sure I saw those, I can't recall. them

now, but I am sure I saw them. I tell you, as so many things

were in the Agency, which were governed by rules and the rest

of it, you didn't have to refer to the book to do things, it

automatically happened. Obviously if I was running the

Africa Division or the Eastern European Division and something

like this came up, I didn't have a pile of those things in

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safe and just say, go ahead and do it. Even if I had been

so ignorant that I had just gone to ISD and said, how about

this - the system at that point starts to work. Obviously

at that stage I wasn't ignorant. All I an saying is that I

don't remember. But discipline of this kind was just part of

the system. And it never occurred to me to go off half

cocked on my own. I didn't have the capability to do it.

The system wouldn't have permitted

it.. To do these things,

they have to be administered, you have to get access to them,

all this has to be done. And by that time the controls were

at work, even if I had been so ignorant a Division Chief

that wouldn't have gone through the proper procedures.

Mr. Maxwell. I understand that. That is part of what

we are trying to do in the absence of -

Mr. Iweedy. But it never came up anytime I was a Division

Chief in either of my two Division Chief jobs.

Mr. Maxwell. For the record, your second Division Chief

job was

Mr, Tweedy. EE, Eastern Europe, which in effect was

Central and Eastern Europe, and Greece and Cyprus in those

days.

Mr. Maxwell. From when to when?

Mr. Tweedy.

September 1963 to I think the first of June

1966 г

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any independent recollection

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of a committee known as the Drug Committee?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I don't.

Mr. Maxwell. And this Committee would have consisted of

the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence, a representative

from FI, a representative from TSD, a representative from the

Office of Security, and would have made recommendations to

MIX.

Tweedy

And a representative from Medical Staffe

Mr. Maxwell. That is not clear.

Mr. Tweedy. I merely noticed from that draft that this

was accommodated but I don't recall the Committee, no.

Mr. Maxwell. In a later occurrance, a proposal came

from the Acting Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division

for what was described as a "health alteration operation"

and was proposed - and sought the approval for the "health

alteration committee"

in 1960.

Mr. Tweedy. I never would have heard of it. Compartmen-

tation on something like that just plain works, and I just

never would have heard of that.

Mr. Maxwell. Compartmentation - perhaps you can explain

what you mean by compartmentation in this situation?

ME. Iweedy. What I mean is, this was the business of the

Near East Division.

Mr. Maxwell. The Health Alteration Committee was not the

business of the Near Bast Division.

Mr. Tweedy. I thought you were raising with me the case

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of this bloke, whoever he was, whose health was to be

altered.

ME. Maxwell. NO,

I was raising the question only in

the context of

Mc. Tweedy. I could not recall ever having heard of the

change of health committee, frankly. And I an rather diverted

by the name.

Me: Maxwell. The Division was interested at the very

least in an institutional committee.

r. Tweedy. Yes. But I do not recall it. But i am

not at all saying that I never heard of it. I certainly

don't remember it. And probably the reason I don't recall it

is that I never in fact had any intercourse with it, is

probably the answer. Because I can only assume that it

wasn't active very often. And if it was active on behalf

of another Division, I

wouldn't have heard of its workings,

obviously if it had been an operation which was business

in

another Division I wouldn't have heard of it.

Mr. Maxwell. And you have no recollection of proposals

coming in for the operational use of drugs, chemicals or

biological agents which would be referred to it?

Mr. Tweedy. I have no recollection of that at all during

the time that I was Division Chief in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of any issuance

which, came to you as Chief of the Africa Division which

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indicated that

cable traffic on this subject would be

referred to another body for consideration?

MI. Tweedy. I don't have any recollection of it. But

there is no

reason why the African Division should have been

immune to this, and I am sure I probably was in receipt of

the instruction, which must have been sent to all Division

Chiefs.

But I can't remember it, that is all. But I am sure

I must

have

seen it if it was

issued.

Mr. Maxwell. That is all that I had. And I appreciate

your cooperation.

Mr. Iweedy:. I am sorry that I wasn't more helpêi

(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the interview was concluded.)

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