LEONARD MCCOY'S REVIEW OF NOSENKO'S CASE.
Originator: CIA
From: MCCOY, LEONARD
To: MEMO FOR THE RECORD
Document date: 10/16/1978
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Introduction: After examining the evidence of Nosenko's mala

fides in the notebook, which I

assume to

be the best evidence,

although not all of it, I am convinced that Nosenko 1s a bona fide

•defector. I belleve the case against him has arisen and persisted

because the facts have been misconstrued, ignored, or interpreted

without sufficient consideration of his psychological fallings.

recommend that the case be reviewed by a new team of CIA officers.

1. There are several references in the Nosenko notebook to the ex-

tent and quality of the intelligence he provided.. In the 25 March

1964

memo to DDP, it 1s asserted that "A comparison of his positive

Intelligence with that of other Soviet Bloc Intelligence officers

w1th whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of.

them

were consistently better able to

provide useful positive Intell-

gence than has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo states

"His

positive Intelligence production 1s practically nil," and later:

"viewed overall, however, NOSENKO's positive Intelligence production

has been so meager for a

man of his background, training and position

to cast doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other

criteria." All of these statements are incorrect.

2. There are three persons in the Clandestine Service with the

background and expertence to make this judguent. None was consulted

regarding these evaluations of Nosenko's production and access. All

agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has

been able to

provide more useful Intelligence than Nosenko has; intelligence

099.

002205)

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usefulness of all KGB officers (perhaps all CI officers) is

"practically nil". Golitsyn's was nil. This is apt to be par-

ticularly true 1f a requirements officer is not directly supporting

the case officer, as was true in the Nosenko case. Viewed in the

proper context, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence production cannot

be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast

any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides, and the judgment regarding

his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counter-

intelligence information:

3.

Before commenting on the counterintelligence case against

him, I

feel there are some aspects of his personality analysis by the

psychiatrist which have a much

stronger bearing on the case than is

apparent in the notebook. The psychologist's report is only mentioned

in passing in the notebook, but it too may shed light on the validity

of evaluations of Nosenko's counterintelligence information which

bear on his bona fides. The psychiatrist is indirectly quoted

(presumably only in part) in the 1l May 1964 status

report as follows:

"NOSENKO shows significant indications of a serious personality dis-

order." "The sociopathic aspect of his character apparently explains

his inattention to 'objective fact'..." Once these conclusions

are reached by competent authority, the interrogator and CI analyst

are out of their elements.. It is hardly likely that a person with

a serious personality disorder, inattentive to objective fact, will

be able to provide the sort of substantial information which would

inspire faith in him. Neither is it conceivable that he would be

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selected by the KGB to carry out even one of the several vital

missions which he is alleged to be on in the West. The substantive

evidence that he is not on any mission is given below.

4. The March 1964 memo to DDP concludes that "Those of us who

have worked with

Nosenko cannot accept that he is other than a KGB

plant." This statement is also incorrect. The only officer who

worked with Nosenko who has any depth of experience with Soviet

agents--Risevalter--does not accept this. No doubt the psychologist.

and psychiatrist who worked with hin would also dissent. Who, then,

accepts this insidious conclusion? Only one of the officers who.

worked with Nosenko had any prior

experience with one of our soviet

agents, and that was not In the field of counterintelligence. None

i of the officers was experienced in counterintelligence agalnst the

C: USSR. The Initial judguent that Nosenko was a plant was made by the

offIcer with the least Soviet experience, a bare two weeks after the

initial

contact with Nosenko, on the basis of "careful comparison of

NOSENKO's infornation with that provided by Anatolly Golitsyn...

This is an incredible conjunction of inexperienced personnel and

crucial decision.

5. There are three nost important items of infornation in

Nosenko's 1962 revelations

to us. Only two are discussed in the

notebook, so I shall begin. my

comments on his CI infornation with

the one which was omitted from discussion:

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A. Boris Belitskiy - Nosenko told us that this Soviet agent of

ours had been under Soviet control since our recruitment of him.

This was startling news to most persons who had worked on this case.

We recruited Belitskly in 1958 and held our second series of meetings

with him in London in August 1961: At that time I worked very closely

with the case officer and polygraph operator in order to assess

Blitskiy's bona fides, which had come under suspicion at Headquarters.

Upon our return from London, during discussion of the latest Penkovskly

meetings, CSR informed DDP that Belitskly was considered bona fide

by evèryone but me. Belitskly came out to the U.S. in 1962, several

months after Nosenko compromised him, but he has not come out since

Nosenko's defection. It is inconceivable that the

Soviets would

build up Belitskiy, get him past the polygraph, and then compromise

him. As I pointed out in my October 1964 paper on Soviet disinforma-

tion cases, Belitskiy was the first such sophisticated case run against

us, and would hardly be sacrificed needlessly just when it was ready

to bear frult for the soviets.

B. ANDREY - Nosenko stated that this was the most important U.S.

penetration he had heard of in his entire career. The analysis of

• this case in the notebook is very strange, to say the least. The com-

parison of Nosenko's information with Golitsyn's shows very clearly

that Nosenko's Information was remarkably accurate and Colitsyn's

was entirely misleading! Golitsyn is said in the notebook to have

been desk officer for two years on this case! Nosenko stated quite

correctly that this agent was a cipher machine mechanic recruited

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5.

in Moscow in 1949-50 and that he left Moscow in 1950; his informa-

tion that Kovshuk (alias KOMAROV) had gone to Washington to recontact

him in 1955-56 may or may not be true, but it gave the additional clue

that Kovshuk traveled alias KOMAROV. It is really surprising that

this much information did not lead CI analysts to the agent; the only

fact that Golitsyn added to Nosenko's infornation is that the agent

was located in Atlantic City.

The

notebook analysis concludes that there was an agent being

hidden by Nosenko's information, although most of the evidence given

for this is from Nosenko. The opposite conclusion should be reached

by objective analysis

of Nosenko's statements.: Nosenko calls the

agent

ANDREY

and Golftsyn calls him JACK. Obviously, the Soviets

had two agents and we have found only one so far: even the notebook

analysis agrees. Nosenko had no need-to-know on either of these two

cases, and it appears that both Nosenko and Golitsyn have mixed them

up because of similarities in the cases. Nosenko's confused version,

although less confused than Golitsyn's, is much more important than

Golitsyn's, because Nosenko states categorically that as of 1962 thè

Soviet agent "working in the Pentagon at that time provided valuable

information on cipher machines

and related matters." Instead of

hiding an agent, Nosenko is giving information on the agents, one of

whom is at large right now! Golitsyn indirectly gave the opinion

that the

Soviets still have a code clerk in place when he disagreed

• ....

with Nosenko about a recruitment attempt in Moscow, but this may be

only a dispute about the recruitment time, not the fact.

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Nosenko's conclusive evidence that there were two cases is his

identification of Kovshuk as Komarov, which made it possible for us

to check visa lists

and determine that "Komarov" visited Washington

in 1957.

Golitsyn's JACK, on the other hand, confessed that the

Soviet had recontacted him In 1955. Although Golitsyn did not know

specifically why Rovshuk went to Washington, or his allas, he

identified "Komarov's" photo as Kovshuk. The recontact IDY officer

in Golitsyn's story was Yurly Novikov; the notebook does not indicate

whether Novikov did come to Washington In 1955.

•Nosenko was wrong in one respect--he thought he was identifying

one important U.S. penetration, but he actually was telling us about

two! No more time should be wasted in the search for this Soviet

agent.

C. Surveillance -- The March 1964 DDP memo states that "Nosenko's

principal message to us in 1962 and again in 1964 was that the loss

of several of our most productive sources in the years 1958 through

1962 was

solely the result of a comprehensive and technically ad-

vanced system of surveillance in Moscow." Presumably this

means

the loss of Popov in early 1959 (Nosenko 1962) and

Penkovskiy in late

1962 (Nosenko 1964?). In my opinion this "message" is not nearly as

important as messages A and B above, although it is important. .

Although all available sources in our experience testify to the

efficacy of Soviet surveillance in Moscow, with special emphasis on

Penkovskiy, the

notebook chooses

to take issue with this Nosenko

information. However, no evidence is presented to prove Nosenko

ieaside.. inde

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wrong.

The only argument attempted consists of a grave insinuation

about an American citizen and CIA employee, Winters, which was later

checked and found to be without foundation. The analysis asserts

that the Soviet intelligence documents provided by KGB officer

Cherepanov in late 1963 support Nosenko's information about sur-

veillance of Popov.

However, instead of reaching the logical and

normal conclusion that these two sources confirm one another, the

notebook reaches the opposite conclusion--because they support one

another, they are both suspect.

If we have no evidence, as is the case here, what grounds are

there for

contradicting Nosenko? Presumably the same as those for

suspecting Winters., If we are proceeding on intuition at this point,

It has more than a touch

of genuine paranoia in it.

6.' Much is made throughout the notebook about inconsistencies

and discrepancies in Nosenko's information.

This is very important.

However, before an experienced interrogator reaches significant

conclusions about an agent's bona fides, he must weigh:all of the

psychological factors involved. By the time Nosenko's inexperienced

Interrogators were finished with him, they were of course experienced,

but by

that time they were also heavily committed to condemning

Nosenko, and the details which they were covering were already so

trivial, antique, or repetitive. that no useful results could be

expected. In any agent operation, the case officer must be an

amateur psychologist, but in dealing with a complex defector,

particularly when a professional diagnosis has been made, the

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amateur must step

aside.

7. There are several phases of psychological. steps which the

Nosenko operation

must be divided into. There is no direct relation-

ship between them, and it is fruitless to compare information

FrOm

them.

The only thread through all of then is the psychiatrist's

assertion that he has a disturbed personality inattentive to objective

fact.. These primary phases are 1962 meetings, 1964 meetings, and

post-defection meetings. The character of the 1962 meeting 1s

conditioned by whatever motivated him to make contact; the informa-

tion he provided is probably couched in terms of his determination

to get what he could out of us, but he was not then thinking in terms

of a relationship which would make it possible for us to see through

his exaggerated self-importance. The 1964 meetings probably still

had some of this attitude behind

them; but the positive and negative

ramifications of the contact had been fomenting in his disturbed mind

for over a year and a half, and the factors which led him to actually

make the break would probably have disturbed the content and clarity

of his infornation as well. Once he had defected, the disturbed

elements of his personality probably were at a crisis level, as he

had added the need to

compensate for committing treason and to

establish himself in'an alien

environment; he had not only to rebuild

his entire life, but his self-respect, ethics, and other aspects of

his disturbed personality. When one adds to this the psychiatrist's

findings that he is "brutally egotistic", "with no concern for the

feelings and interests of others", "undisciplined, narcissistic,

and exhibitionistic," it becomes starkly clear that this is not an

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individual whose information can be

judged by routine standards.

8. Throughout the notebook there is reference to our capability

• to check on Nosenko's information. It is stated that there has been

an "enormous flow to the West

of detailed information on the Soviet

intelligence and security services

which resulted from the numerous

defections to the West of Soviet intelligence officers and the

successful penetrations of the Soviet Intelligence since 1954."

The March 1964 DDP memo

goes so far as to say that "the West acquired

so much information on KGB personnel, organization and modus

operandi

that there. was very little which the KGB would not consider com-

promised in some way.." While it is true that we have had some

good defectors in the past, the latter statement strains credulity.

If we examine the KGB sources available to us who could have provided

such information, we find that there were several up to 1955 and then

none until December 1961. Since Popov and Penkovskiy were GRU

officers, they had little detail to contribute on the KGB; Goleniewski

was Polish, so his real knowledge of the KGB was accordingly and under-

standably limited. Therefore, as of January 1962, when Golitsyn

reluctantly began to give us information, our enormous "flot of

Information" on the KGB had been interrupted since 1955, and by far

the larger part of it was at least eight years old, as it had come

from Rastvorov and Deryabin. Since Deryabin had left Moscow in

September 1953, and Rastvorov In July 1950, our best stock of KGB

info predated late 1953. Therefore, to say that the KGB would •

consider almost all of its organization, personnel, and modus

operandi

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compromised to the West from January 1934 up to "Penkovskiy's arrest

in October 1962", is a considerable exaggeration. A more balanced

statement

is made in the DCI memo of 9 September 1965, which limits

the "enormous" reference to 1954. The only defector or agent who

might have been in position to provide us any volume of infornation

on these subjects from 1954 to 1962 was Golitsyn himself. A better

Indication of the state of our knowledge on these subjects is

suggested in the March 1964 DDP meno in the form of a criticisn of

Nosenko's performance:

=.

...but he has brought out

not a fraction of

what would have been easily available to him on such subjects as KGB

table of organization, which he knew from 1962 to be of interest to

F. us..." It Is very unlikely that the KGB would equate our 1954 fund

of information with Nosenko's 1964 knowledge; the genuinely relevant

question 1s whether they would equate Golitsyn's knowledge with

Nosenko's, and that is discussed below. In fact, the March 1964 mèmo

later contradicts itself on this point, stating that before

the

Nosenko defection, we had no contact with KGB officials. over many

years.

9. It 1s not easy

to compare Nosenko's information with

Golitsyn's because the latter broke off contact with us before he was

fully debriefed, but the comparison made in the notebook should be valid

to the extent that the two men reported on the same subject matter.

Most of Golitsyn's service in the KGB was spent in school. His

actual intelligence experience consisted of two years on the

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American CI desk from 1951 to 1952, about 6 months on the Emigre

CI

desk, two years in the

field, since August 1955, has been as NATO

Reports Officer from September 1959 to April 1960, and CI officer

on the American desk from that time through his tour in Finland

and defection in December 1961. He left Moscow PCS in August 1960.

His significant information dates

prinarily from his service as a

reports officer. Nosenko, on the other hand, is unique as a source

of information on the KGB., His entire 12 years in the KGB has been

In Moscow, except for short IDY

trips to Europe and considerable

TDY

travel through 1962 and 1963 to outlying KGB posts in the USSr.

Most of this time he was a CI officer working against tourists,

except for 1960-62, against the American Embassy. Therefore, his

Information on KGB Headquarters is almost four years later than

Golitsyn's, and should be correspondingly better.

10. A number of assumptions are made in the notebook about

"that specific area of knowledge which NOSENKO

should have possessed

if he had occupied the particular KGB. positions at the particular

times he claimed." As outlined in the paragraph above, our insight

which would even theoretically permit such assumptions is dated 1954

at best: Does this give us firm grounds for reaching reliable con-

clusions about the access afforded by a RGB position? The most

difficult problem for analysts in the Soviet sphere is to translate

themselves into the Soviet environment. Outside

the Clandestine

Service it is rare to meet an analyst with a realistic concept of

the USSR; most of them go on the assumption that American analogies

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are applicable to the Soviet scene. From our own operational

experience we have learned to be quite wary of assuming knowledge

of specific aspects of the Soviet target. Since our basis for

making assumptions about Nosenko's job is ten years old, that would

suggest that Deryabin or Rastvorov would be as competent as any of

us to judge Nosenko. However Deryabin betrayed his prejudice when he

made the snap judgment that Nosenko was "phony" after he had been

"briefed on the mere facts of the Nosenko case..." Such horseback.

judgments do not inspire confidence; 'Deryabin's competence

to sit In

judgment of Nosenko lis further

analyzed below.

Another example

of faulty projection into the Soviet situation

in the notebook concerns

the $250, in operational funds which Nosenko

misappropriated in Geneva in 1962. In the March 1964 memo it is

stated that the amount of money was "only about!$250 and he could

certainly have made up this deficit through either of two close

friends (another is added elsewhere) who were present in Geneva at the

time..." Aside from

the fact that the notebook tries to prove

elsewhere that neither of these persons was really a close friend,

the weakness in this

assumption is obvious. As the March 1964 memo

states, "loss of ops funds is a terrible offense in Soviêt eyes..."

Does any of us consider $250 to be a paltry sum? It we had misappro-

priated such a sum would we want our best friends or superiors to

know about it? Even in an emergency, most of us would probably go

to extremes to avoid embarrassing a friend by such a request, or

exposing our weaknesses

to a friend. However, the psychiatrist has

already given us evidence that Nosenko was not the kind of person

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who makes friends, so the notebook is probably correct in its

alternate finding that the persons

In Geneva were not friends in

the best sense of the word (the money-lending sense). Nosenko had

no place. to turn,, particularly when one adds his need to indulge

himself, which has been confirmed by the psychiatrist, Colitsyn, our

own experience with him, our knowledge of Soviet VIP sons, and his

own admission. Our ignorance of the specific background is another

factor in weighing the significance of the ops funds vulnerability

question. How many times had Nosenko

misappropriated funds

previously?

How had he made up the deficit before? What would be the rationaliza-

tion of the situation in the case of a disturbed personality such as

I: his?

Throughout the memos and other documents in the notebook there

1s a stream of consciousness discussion of Nosenko's career, first

providing evidence and conclusions that he had certain positions,

later evidence and conclusions that he did not, and so forth. This

uncertainty even goes so far as to suggest, even to

conclude, that

Nosenko is not even Nosenko! Gradually, the case was built up again

that he is in fact Nosenko. Theie are several ways to read this

confusion, but the psychiatrist's findings show the path"

to the

correct understanding of it. It is very difficult to deal effectively

with

a disturbed personality, and it is not surprising that the SR

people working with him found him confusing. However, Golitsyn

confirmed that Nosenko worked where he said he did, even that he was

a "skirt-chaser", many of his agents confirmed his employment in the

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KGB, and Artanonov could have confirmed that he was Nosenko if he

had been asked to do so. The inability of our personnel to see the

facts through Nosenko's stories which were "inattentive to objective

fact" is not necessarily a reflection on them, but neither can it be

used with confidence to support serious accusations against Nosenko.

The evaluation of an agent on personality or "eyeball-to-eyeball"

grounds is extrenely precarious. In fact, the one Nosenko

Interrogator with Soviet agent experience was involved during the

same time period with just such a judgment on another agent, in which

he, and another of our best and most experienced case officers, as

well as the polygraph, proved to be absolutely wrong in their

assessment of the agent. Many of our Soviet agents and defectors

have been unbalanced. This observation applies to Penkovskly, 1t

applies to Nosenko, and it applies to Golitsyn, and to Krotkov; •

Deryabin's long siege with alcoholism shows that he was not entirely

exempt.. Treason is indeed a grave decision, even if committed 1n

steps, as Nosenko did it, and the defector does not become 100 percent

American and O percent Soviet when he crosses the border.

The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona fides, as the

notebook indicates, must be based on his production--how much did

he hurt the Soviets.

The evidence shows

that he has damaged the

Soviet intelligence effort more than all the other RGB defectors

combined. The specific elements of this damage are as follows:

A. Belitskly--The evidence is stated above; this was the pinnacle

of the Soviet disinformation achievement. Once Nosenko had com-

promised it, as I pointed out in my October 1964 paper, all other

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similar agents are unmasked.

B. ANDREY-JACK--Although Nosenko's information was precise on one

of these two agents, and Golitsyn's was largely incorrect, Golitsyn

Is inexplicably given the credit for our discovering the agent. This

agent was no longer active, but this is small consolation, as he had

been a cipher machine mechanic, and details of cipher machines have

value well beyond their date of manufacture:

More important, Nosenko assures us that another agent is still

providing the Soviets such information. All the wrong data Golitsyn

provided may actually apply to the agent who has not been apprehended.

C. Vassall--Nosenko is given credit for the apprehension of Vassall--

this alone is sufficient to establish his bona fides. Infornation on

Western naval matters, particularly Polaris submarines, 1s undoubtedly

top priority for Soviet Intelligence. It is completely out. of the

question that a source with any potential for reporting on

this

subject would be terminated.

even an hour before he had to be. The

only substantial clue that Golitsyn gave us on Vassall was that

British Admiralty documents were being received in the KGB Reports

Office in 1959. It is not surprising that CI officers did not dis-

cover Vassall on this slim lead, since it could have beeh assumed

that the documents came from the Lonsdale-Cohen-Houghton net com-

promised by Goleniewski. It borders

on fantasy to reach the

con-

clusion that the Soviets would compromise Vassall to us over 6 months

after Golitsyn defected on the assumption that Golitsyn had com-

promised him. In fact, it is fantastic!

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D. Johnson--Nosenko is quite right in asserting that this is one of

the best leads he gave us. If it were not for him, this agent would

still be operating against us. The memo to the FBI makes a strenuous

effort to demonstrate that this was a troublesome case

for the KGB

and that there were security weaknesses in it. That is the kind

of trouble we would love to have--this agent had access to some

the highest-level information available la NAIO, which is to say,

U.S. plans for war in Europe. His rank, experience, clearances, and

tradecraft ability qualify him as the best possible type of agent.

The KGB undoubtedly had great hopes for his future access.. If the

complication of his wife's disturbed personality had constituted a

genuine threat to the operation, the Soviets probably would have

arranged for her to have an "accident". They may well have con-

sidered this and concluded that she was a valuable component of

Johnson's motivation. The only straightforward reason that the

memo to FBI gives for the Soviet willingness to compromise this.

operation apparently is Soviet fear of its being blown to the

French. Isn't this pretty weak? Of course. Nosenko's knowledge

of this case is questioned on the grounds that it is a violation

of the "usually effective KGB security compartmentation", yet we

..*..

have said earlier that most of Golitsyn's valuable information

consisted of things he "had

no right to know".

E. The KGB--The March 1964 memo states that "Nosenko's production

has been most useful in those areas which the KGB must consider

already compromised (KGB organization, general methods and

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techniques, Headquarters personnel) of expendable (names of per-

sonnel who do not work abroad, etc:)..." After considering the

five cases cited above, lt is impossible to agree with this. This

sentence is also contradicted by the facts given above on the unique

nature of his access and the paucity of reliable information on the

KGB since 1954, excepting Golitsyn, who served in an entirely different

directorate from Nosenko. In fact the meno states that Nosenko's

infornation on his directorate was far more detailed than Golitsyn's,

and most of the 240 names he gave us were prevlously not known to us.

To assume that the KGB would consider

Nosenko's information com- .

promised 1s to find them unaware of their own defectors or grossly

wrong about our knowledge of the KGB. The criticism that he does

not know (or renember) enough about CIA personnel in Moscow in-

corporates another large assumption; perhaps we have made some

progress in concealing our people from the KGB. They may make errors

in identifying AIS officers just as we do on the RIS.

F. Foreign agents--No Soviet defector has identified as many Soviet

agents as Nosenko. He identified 73 past, present, or developmental

American agents

and 97 foreigners in the same categories. The arguments

employed in the nenoldeprecate Nosenko's list of agents do not provide

evidence that he was wrong or that it is incomplete, but lean heavily

on the fact that we knew

most of them or that they are not important.

Thank God for something. However, the fact that we may have known

of suspected most of them is irrelevant, particularly when our basís

for suspicion was derogatory information. If this were used as a

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primary basis for suspecting people of being Soviet agery, several

thousand more persons could qualify.. The significant ei suet? in

evaluating these agents is whether the soviets knew that t tele

already aware of these agents. The next logical step 14 my juège

whether the Soviets would be willing to give them all up, the way

of looking at this aspect 1s to assume that they are out arkats in

the USSR, rather than theirs in the West, and then calet let 20w

many of them we would be willing to compromise to the series. out

of the 170 on our list, I doubt that we would surrender talk than

half a dozen. Unless they are going out of business, neither sould

the soviets. On the basis of the table in the memo, there 1e

* evidence to indicate that only about 15 of 170 were cerealaly known

by the

KGB to be compromised

to us. The old argument, tunt Golitsyn

said It first, 1s repeated in the memo in respect to Nostrike's 1962

Information: "There was a remarkable correlation between ise two,

sources, giving the distinct impression that NOSENKO was

5e facti

reporting from the KGB's damage assessment on GOLITSYN'# A4lection."

The same clain is not made about the list of agents whirt basenko

provided, as only 8 of the 170 were confirmed by Golitsya"e Laforma-

tion. If the correlation of Golitsyn's information with

1962 info can be judged remarkable, it is only in the sikh

that

Nosenko reported useful details correctly while Golitsy In kon-

sistently vrong. This is understandable, since most of fix 18

points of information

fall into the category of things (4,154kya

"had no right to know", and which therefore probably world hait

appear in the damage report after his defection!

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G. Microphones in U.S. Embassy--Of the 3 points of the 18 on which

Golitsyn provides better or contradictory information, one concerned

Golitsyn's desk directly and was logical for him to know. The other

two concern bugs and SIGINT equipment in the American Embassy.

The

major contradiction deals with bugs, Nosenko stating that the new

wing had none and Golitsyn

stating that a lot of money had been

spent arranging audio coverage of the new wing. Examined carefully,

these statements are not contradictory. Lots of plans end up in the

trash. Golitsyn goes on to say that Embassy bugs were still active.

in 1961. It is clear that this statement does not refer specifically

to the new wing, which was built in 1960-61, and not occupied until

1962. Although Nosenko was the third source to identify a microphone

In the minister-counsellor's office, it was his specific information

on locations of numerous

other mikes which ultimately led

to. the

discovery of the large number of mikes in the Embassy. Once again,

his was the information which was critical to out

security, but he

does not get the credit. In fact, once he had given us the key data,

all other embassies in Moscow with which we are friendly could use

our experience to detect mikes in their embassies, thereby denying

the Soviets additional intelligence. The Soviets would hardly

sacrifice all this! Although we found a few more microphones than

we knew of, they were all compromised

as soon as we found the first

cable and followed it

around the building. Nosenko stated that

there were no mikes in the renovated north wing, and he was right.

Whatever we found in that wing resulted from his information.

Nosenko's service in the American Embassy section from 1960-62

---

## Page 20

4-00000

o.-add.

20

should have made him knowledgeable at least of CI aspects of this

subject. The mikes were not the responsibility of his section,

nor was

the intelligence produced. So far as the entire 18 points

80, Nosenko's information is unquestionably more complete and

accurate in the main.

The Cherepanov papers, delivered to the American Embassy in

Novenber 1963, are said to support Nosenko's story of his career.

and he vouches for then. Logically, they are

both valid, but this

is not accepted. Along with considerable inuendo and insinuation,

the March 1964 DDP meno calls the papers the "Winters Papers".

Since Winters

was examined and cleared after this memo was written,

the arguments against the validity of these papers lose cohesion,

at least, and should be redrafted if they are to make any sense at

all (if not for sake of decency). The only other serious argument

given against the papers relates to KGB resources for wiiting and ,

handling documents.

Since only Nosenko and Golitsyn are accessible

and knowledgeable on such procedures in the modern KGB, Golitsyn's

comments would be appropriate, but the comments used presumably are

: 10 years old, from Deryabin. The conclusion that the papers are of

no value to us is Irrelevant, as long as the individual who gave

them to us thought they were and believed he was hurting the Soviets

by handing them over. Penkovskiy's views on the value of what he

gave us were often inconsistent with our own. Whatever Nosenko

told us, we could not, and did not, pretend to know the identity

of every Soviet agent in any country, including the United

States.

---

## Page 21

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21

His position in the Counterintelligence (Second) Directorate of the

KGB certainly would not afford him such access, since the primary

Intelligence effort of the KGB is in the Intelligence (First)

Directorate for which Golitsyn worked. The aspect which Nosenko

could observe us the narrow one of Moscow, with an occasional .

Incidental, Illegal insight through the compartmentation syaten,

which Golitsyn demonstrated to be rather leaky.

Krotkov, the agent of Nosenko's directorate who defected in

London in September 1963, has little bearing on the Nosenko case

but is mentioned here because it is cited as evidence against

Nosenko, although it also supports Nosenko to

some extent. There

appears to

be good reason to belleve, as Nosenko said, that Krotkov

waS

a "little

crazy". The book which Krotkov wrote gives evidence

of personality disturbance, and the hypertension fron which he

suffers could not be faked, but could well be organic evidence of

mental imbalance. The approach of the KGB officer, Lysov, to the FBI

in September 1962 also lacks conviction as circumstantial evidence

against Nosenko. If a KGB officer were in financiallstraits

involving mishandling of ops funds, the actions of Nosenko and

Lysov presumably are characteristic of the primary steps he would

take to extricate himself. There may be an operational suggestion

here for us, as well

warning which is echoed in the Dunlap,

Johnson, and Whalen cases.

Another question is posed in the memo

concerning the Soviets whom Nosenko has recommended to us for

recruitment, particularly V.P. Suslov. There is an obvious answer

---

## Page 22

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k...

22

to this question, however and that is 'to recruit Suslov. The

objection that this may be a provocation by the Soviets is not

valid, since we are already running a Soviet disinformation agent

in the UN.

The point is made and emphasized in the notebook that the RGB

Disinformation Department was forned in 1959.. This is a very mis-

leading fact. As Rastvorov and Golitsyn have reported, there was a

Disinformation Service in the KI, and Golitsyn confirmed that the

function .continued after the KI dissolved in 1951, although there was

no separate element for 1t. Most of the Soviet disinformation agents

known to us were run against us before 1959, and the most sophisticated

OneS, BEllEskIY, ARDACRON,: and PrObably ACLOO, were concelved and

executed before 1959. The establishment of a separate Disinforma-

tion Department, therefore, appears to have followed the heyday of

the disinformation operation; rather than preceded it.. Certainly

new operations have been conceived since, such as AFIYPHOON in (India

and AFFLASK In EgYpt, and probably others, as indicated by our memos

to CSR.ou ABDARING and [AIMINUS, but the days of the disinformation

agent probably have been numbered since Nosenko's exposure of

Belitskiy.

There are a number of references in the case against Nosenko

to unidentified "knowledgeable sources" who are quoted making

damaging assessments of Nosenko. It is apparent from most such

references that the knowledgeable sources meant are Deryabin and

Rastvorov. However, neither of these two KGB officers can genuinely

---

## Page 23

be said to have knowledge of the KGB which is applicable to the

Nosenko case, since one left Moscow In 1950 and the other in 1954.

The

most serious assumption affecting Nosenko's assessment are

those which Involve his production. The argument agalnst hin" falls

apart completely without the continuous application of the assumption

that he has told us only what the Soviets knew was already in our

hands. This

assumption, in turn, rests entirely on our estimate of

the damage assessment which the Soviets probably wrote on Golltsyn.

This

1s where the argument loses all of its force. We have no basis

whatsoever for making a rellable Itemization of the things which are

Included in the KGB damage assessment except for the documents which

Golitsyn brought with him. We can guess that the list includes the

g1st of all documents which Golitsyn saw while in Finland for the 17

months before he defected. It would be impossible for the Soviets to

say precisely what Golitsyn remembered of KGB organization, personnel,

and activities since he had left Moscow. It would be absolutely

Impossible for the Soviets to know what Golitsyn had learned illegally

by word of mouth, either while. he was in Moscow of after he had gone.

to Helsinki. The March 1964 DDP memo stated

that Golitsyn learned

many details

about sensitive operations. "which he had no right to

know" In this

way.

•Just as it would be impossible for us to make a

parallel itemization on a CIA officer, even with the complete honesty

of all persons who knew hin.. The most serlous part of the KGB damage

assessment probably would have related to Golitsyn's service as a

reports officer on the NATO desk.

From what he has told us, it Is

apparent that he did not know the names of most of the agents whose

---

## Page 24

• 24

reports he handled. He was able to describe subject matter and had

managed to pick up some other operational details, many of them

wong, as in the ANDREY-JACK cases.. While the KGB would probably try

to minimize the damage assessment in their report to higher authorlty,

they would probably maximize 1t among themselves, but it defies log1c

to conclude that they would send us an agent who would be able to

provide the details which would lead to compromise of producing assets:

Neither would we. We would move very carefully operationally, or even

stand down on cases where we thought there was danger of

compromise,

but if our agents survived for a few weeks, or even months, we would

conclude that the storm was past. And the KGB is probably considerably

more coldblooded than we are when it comes to collecting intelli-

gence even in the face of perils to their agents. Nosenko summed

it up accurately when he said that the KGB "would not really know the

extent of my knowledge," "It will take many months to l00k.Into

these matters, so nothing will change for a long time," and when

discussing a case:. "they won't have any way of knowing I know. Cer-

tainly the people who told me won't volunteer the fact." The problem

of the damage assessment, here of there, could not be stated better.

Since Deryabin was employed In the Personnel Directorate, he would

normally know and remember more about personnel forms

and procedures

than would operational personnel. The latter generally consider all

forms and procedures

a nuisance and spend as little time and thought

on them as possible. If organizational errors are to be used against

Nosenko, they can also be used against Rastvorov, as he was one year

off on both the formation and

dissolution of the KI and,. just as

---

## Page 25

25

Nosenko did, left out the GULAG and other extraneous units when

drawing up the organization of

the KGB, although he had only been

away from the Center four years when he defected..

The evidence

which Deryabin uses to support his assertion that he can deny the

truthfulness of various aspects

of Nosenko's story consists

of the

kind of trivia on which few persons could score well.. Since

Deryabin was engaged in actual Intelligence work for less than two

years

before his defection In February 1954, and had been in the fleld

for the six months just prior to his defection, his tests

of Nosenko

Involve facts

at least 11 years old. They are fairly fresh to

Deryabin's mind because they relate to his last experience in the

USSR, but Nosenko's considerably greater depth of experience

naturally has placed so many layers of information over the 1952-53

era that he could not reasonably be expected to: recall the

things

that Deryabin can. This would become clear if we were to have a

current CIA CI officer debriefed on the same period in CIA by a

former CIA FI employee who resigned in 1953.

It has also become clear in à hurried comparison of Deryabin's

original reports with his present criticisms of Nosenko. • For

example, one of Deryabin's trivial points 1s that Nosenko claims

his working hours to have begun at 1030; Deryabin agrees with the

other details Nosenko gave on working hours but insists that 1000

was the starting time.

Rastvorov confirms in his reports that

Nosenko is correct; Deryabin's own reports in 1954 stated that the

working hours

were 1100-2100, although he now agrees with Nosenko

---

## Page 26

26

that 2400 was closing time. Considerably more interesting 1s

Deryabin's accusation that Nosenko made an "outright mistake" l!

asserting that there was a tenth directorate of the KGB 1n 19534l

which was called

the Directorate of the Kremlin Commandant.

Deryabin assures

us In his

criticisn of Nosenko that "This

dIrectorate had actually merged with the Guards. Directorate In

1947, and the combined directorate was designated the 9th Direct/fitz

1n 1952 (and has remained so to this day)." However, Deryabin:.

again contradicts himself in his. 1954 reports as follows: "The

Kremlin Commandant Directorate existed as a separate organizati!!!

unt11 August 1953." ' He made this statenent at least three time-"

his 1954 debriefings. Deryabin thus disqualifies himself as a

knowledgeable and objective examiner of Nosenko. With all the tiff

Deryabin spent in the Guards Directorate, this is a point one timin

expect him to remember. These contradictions, and others which

would probably turn up in

a careful examination of the rest of

Deryabin's case against Nosenko, are in the area of Deryabin's

supposed greatest competence and usefulness to us. It is only

logical to find that Deryabin is also on shaky ground when he

pretends to have knowledge which he never had. : The most obviou."

example is his comment on the fact that in giving his military

mailing address, Nosenko included

the town name with

the field

post number. Deryabin says:. "This is yet another mistake, sin-

military postal security procedures prohibit linking the mista

unit number with the location of the unit on the envelope." No:

could be farther from the truth. When the system was first

SECRET

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## Page 27

vis...

27

established in 1942, this was the concept, but it soon deterlorated,

and almost all Soviet Internal military mail after the war contains

both the FPN number and the place name.

If Deryabin really knew

the Soviet FPN system, he would have been able to say that the FPN's.

were assigned in blocks at first, and that the 9018X block from which

Nosenko's FPN in 'Sovetskaya Gavan was taken was in a naval block. If

he had this real knowledge, he could then say that military intelli-

gence FPN's commonly contained

a zero as one of the five digits.

He

could then have concluded that the number Nosenko gave was in fact a

naval Intelligence unit...

It is admittedly somewhat easier for us to

make such an analysis, as we know from an incontrovertible

source

that the FPN Nosenko gave was assigned to a naval Intelligence unit

in the Sovetskaya Gavan area at the time Nosenko said he was there.

Deryabin is not an experienced Soviet intelligence officer. He

less than

spent/two years in intelligence work, 17 months at HQ and 5 In the

field, two years in military CI at the end of the war and sub-

sequently served as a personnel security officer; this 1s not much

more than a familiarization tour. He 1s, of course, qualified to

comment on Soviet realities in general better than any of us up to.

1954, and to a gradually decreasing extent

since that time. He is an

adequate, but not fluent, translator. He is a

thorough researcher

to the extent that he has access to infornation; his research has

the same limitations as any research--what is written in books or

reported by agents rarely coincides with the objective facts of

human behavior.

---

## Page 28

28

doubt the motivation, or the evolutionn..

of the motivation,

which led Nosenko to defect 1s very complex, In keeping with his

personality disturbance. The same was dramatically true with

Penkovskly.

The same elenents which the rational, nornal person

would weigh carefully before taking the road to treason were

Ignored, fortunately for us, by both Nosenko and Penkovskly, and

I perhaps by the rest of the few important agents and defectors we have

had. Both of them were protected by high-level general officers

and had Illustrious family names; both appeared

, to be devoted

to

their fanilies.

This does not mean that their motivations were at

all alike, only that the obstacles to changing allegiance were

roughly similar. Nosenko's real notivation must be sought in his

formative years, when, like the sons of most Soviet leaders,.

beginning with Stalin's

own son,

the

world was his for the asking

and he took all he could get.

Yet, there is a motivational element

relating to the father in both cases--as an amateur psychologist, I

submit that Penkovskly was revenging his father, and Nosenko defected

as the ultimate act of rebellion against his...

Assuming that the Soviets were to conceive an operation against

us which involved an RIS officer, what would that officer be like and

how would they prepare him?: Our experience with disinformation

agents indicates that they would not prepare him at all in the

sense

Nosenko is said to have been prepared in the notebook..

They would

select a man who could not compromise anything, but who also did not

have to invent any significant period or chapter of his life...The

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## Page 29

29

very fact that Nosenko appears to be fabricating his past from

* KIndergarten days 1s the best evidence that he is not a plant,

and good evidence

that he

is not fabricating anything at all except

what 1s required by his disturbed personality.: A disturbed per-

sonality cannot be controlled, so he is not à candidate for a dis...

information operation. The candidate would have to be a legitinate

officer, for otherwise the KGB would not be sure that we did not have.

a penetration of the KGB of Soviet government who could tell us all

about the operation, or that we would not soon have a defector who

could tell us that. Nosenko's story was fabricated. Actually, one

of our best Soviet

agents told us that Nosenko was a legitimate

defector and knew more damaging information than Penkovskly, so

is remarkable that the case against

Nosenko has gone this far.

As far as the preparation of the KGB officer disinfornation

agent

is concerned, it would be thorough and complete.

This rules out

Nosenko immediately; as he was not able to pass the polygraph

successfully.: As stated above in the Belitskiy case, a known dis-

Information agent, he passed the polygraph successfully in 1961,

It 1s quite unltkely that the most important disinformation agent

would be sent out unprepared for the polygraph.. There is surely a

need to study why the known agent. "passed" the polygraph and the

valid defector (Nosenko) did not. What point would there be in

"resistance to interrogation" and "how to conduct himself in.

detention" if he is not trained to beat the box? Another flaw,

a serious. one, in the theory that Nosenko was prepared by the KGB,

particularly on the basis of Golitsyn's information, concerns

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## Page 30

30

the tourist ops document which Golitsyn had brought out with him.

Nosenko knew that Golftsyn had taken this document, but

was. not

familiar with 1t.

This would not be possible if he had been

prepared by the KGB. Naturally Nosenko did not know Blake had

contributed to this document--he had no need to know.

Along with the tendency to identify Nosenko's detractors as.

"knowledgeable sources", there is a corollary which casts doubt on

sources who help to substantiate his story. Five of these are

said to confirm Nosenko's identity. Some of these are cited above.

Another significant one is the 1959 naval defector, Artamonov. : The.

language used to describe Artanonov's comments on Nosenko is..

decidedly hostile, but there 1s no evidence at all to suspect

Artamonov. Artamonov made a major contribution

to U.S. Intelll-

gence; is highly respected by senior U.S. naval officers, and is.

the most intelligent and.well-adjusted Soviet defector in the West.

He was

Golitsyn's best friend while Golitsyn was here, and Golitsyn

called him several tines from England, having left both his dog

and color television with Artanonov. We have found. Artamonov to be

highly

cooperative with persons who understand the Soviet system

and completely impatient with those who pretend to such knowledge.

He can probably make much more useful and valid comments on

some of

the points which Deryabin was

asked to review..

Something should be said about Nosenko's memory. All memories

are selective, depending on personality, interests, requirenents,

and other factors. : In

a sense,

nothing is ever forgotten, but In

practice we can recall only limited amounts from the sub-conscious.

---

## Page 31

SECRET.

31

As Nosenko said:

"There are

different types of memories.". When

we consider that Nosenko has identified up to 200 leads for us,

over 400 KGB officers and agents, and 127 of 173 Americans in the

U.S. Embassy In 1960-62,. we must admit that he has exceeded most of

us in menory capability. In addition to these, he undoubtedly has

the usual fund of infornation centering on his family and non-career

life. Jet, in examining his production and his statements, we expect

him to add all manner of trivia to the imnense amount of Information

he has already provided, and we expect him to have

it right...!.:

Then. his menory of flylng in lobster and vodka for agent projects

Is called "little details."

We have not asked as much of any other

defector. If we did, we would throw them all back.' Although we

have no place near the agent stable in our past that Nosenko has

identified, I would not be able to come close to the number of

Identifications Nosenko has made, and neither could anyone else.

Unfortunately for him, what is trivial to him on the inside 1s

far from trivial to us

on the outside, and the same no doubt applies

In the opposite direction.:

Another. factor which affects our evaluation of Rastvorov and

Deryabin as judges

of Nosenko is their conclusion that Nosenko's

history is such that he could never have been employed by the KGB.

Times have changed since they were there, since his employment

1s

confired by Colitsyn, independently by one of our best agents,

and a number of agents whom he handled. Another curious remark,

apparently nade by both Golitsyn and Deryabin, is that Nosenko

SEANSTI

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## Page 32

fus.

SCARET

32

seemed to

be givin" safestration fron the CIA reports they

had provided us.: Thie " curious on several counts, because

we do not show defecross reports to then, so they would have

trouble knowing just sit they had told us.

It Is also curious;

If accepted. at face those, because it would be additional

evidence

that Nosenko was prOThIg accurate information, to the extent

that Golltsyn's and LEttin's reports agreed

with one another.

In fact, however, us Ietyabla points out correctly, in part,

Nosenko's nenory li Int #s complete as Deryabin's, so he

does:

not report as accurately

on the KGB up to 1954, when all three.

of these defectors were serving in the KGB concurrently for a few

months.

Comparison of Hosenko's and Golitsyn's reporting shows

that

their reporting overlaps in some respects, but that Nosenko's

1s superior in every respect except French agents and First

Directorate organtideleno

There are a number of contradictions and discrepancies in

the notebook analyris e! Nosenko, some of them quite significant.

The October 1964 status report, for example, makes the assertion

that. "Since NOSENKO'* falsely-claimed service in the American

Embassy Section coincides fairly closely with the period covered

by the KGB-concocied CHYREPANOY papers on the same Section's

activities, and since (U)L.IISYN was aware of certain successful

or impending operations there

In this period, the conclusions

reached here imply that hoth the CHEREPANOY papers and the NOSENKO

information are Intended to cover up penetrations involving

personnel stationed in the U.S. Embassy, Moscow during the period

---

## Page 33

isti

33

fron approximately 1957-8 to 1963." The quality of Golitsya's

knowledge has been discussed above. The key word in this very

critical and final judgment is "coincide". It Is completely

false.: The Cherepanov papers cover the period. 1957-8 to 1960,

while Nosenko's service In the American. Embassy Section was from

:1960 to 1962. Possibly

some other word was meant, but the fact

remains, Cherepanov and Nosenko.did not work in the Section during

the same period of tine... If in fact the two events did coincide,

one would have to consider. them both more serfously; If the Sovlets

had sent

Nosenko out, they probably would coincide. As it ls, the

Soviets cannot hope to convince us with some "worthless" papers

about surveillance that there

were no Embassy penetrations for

three years and then feel obliged to send out an agent to convince

us there were none for three more years. Another case

the assertion that Nosenko

, tells "pat" stories.

This is not

1llogical for someone who is relating gossip or someone else's

jokes. In the March 1964 memo, some 15 such stories are cited

"And the odd thing is that practically every time he tells the

story, regardless of the context of angle of approach to it, the

story comes out in exactly the same form, with exactly the same

details given in exactly

the same way, no more and no less."

This is strong language. However, just a few pages later, with

equal vehemence, his stortes are described as follows: "However,

the number and type of contradictions within NOSENKO's stories

go far beyond what could be considered normal." Now, strictly

speaking, these two violently opposite assertions could be true,

---

## Page 34

34

when an Individual is telling different stories. However

the ANDREY story. is given as an example in both cases! One

• 40

tends to lose a little confidence in the analysis at this

point, and perhaps doubt Its objectivity a bit. Later on,

the STORSBERG case, which was Included in the list of "pat"

stories, 1s said to have been told 50 times "with at least one

contradiction each telling." What are we to believe?

The same question of objectivity is raised by the adoption of

the stereotyped phrase "Ilar's face".. This 1s a subjective

observation; all persons have certain standard facial expressions.

under various circunstances..

There are even personalities

which constantly employ "false faces," people who are always

acting. It is

dangerous to allow such a stereotype to enter

in and corrupt, or replace, judgment.

In effect, Nosenko stated the case for his own defense

very well:. "He would lay the blame on his interrogators, saying

that he knows better how things are done in the Soviet Union

than we do..." I trust that none of us intends to argue this

point-Penkovskly told us this constantly, and 1t is quite correct.

"...that we

were twisting his story and making things look dif-

ferent; that we had already decided that he was 'false' and

weren't listening objectively." I believe the evidence given

above supports Nosenko on these two points; especially when

we recall that the neno which labeled him a "plant" was written

just two weeks after our first meeting with him in 1962.

---

## Page 35

35

"Finally, he would stress the quality and importance of his

basic information, telling us that, because his basic facts

were correct; it was unimportant how he learned them, whether

dates and other

details were wIong, or whether we already

had the

Information from other sources."

Nosenko has an

excellent argument here; when the facts can be checked

Independently, as his can be, and have been, the sourcing details

that one tries to Inculcate in a recruited, trained agent pale

to insignificance in comparison. Let's take the

wheat and

leave

the chaff.

Having examined the varlous memos and status reports

1n

the Nosenko notebook, I am satisfied that Nosenko 1s a bona

fide defector.

The case against him consists almost entirely

of assumptions, subjective observations, unsupported suspicions,

Innuendo, Insinuations regarding his supporters, steady repeti-

tlon of charges against him, relatively trival contradictions

in his

reporting, and negative conclusions about his bona fides.

which actually are derived from evidence of his disturbed

personality.. I have analyzed many Soviet disinformation cases

and many fabrication cases, and

have identified a number of

both

correctly, both before there were any negative operational

indications and in. the face of operational evidence that

the

cases were bona fide, but I cannot find a shred of solid evi-

dence against Nosenko in any of the memoranda or other documents

in the Nosenko notebook.

C5A381

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## Page 36

!:..

121?5

36

The 30 April 1965 meno status report states: "Subject

has repeatedly challenged us to produce proof. of his guilt and

to try him..." Nosenko has another good argument here-the

case would be thrown out of

court for lack of evidence:

How-

ever, what do we lose by taking him up on this? I recommend

that we appolat a new judge and jury for the Nosenko case and

institute a change of venue.

The participants

should be per-

sons not. Involved in the case so far, but with experience

pertinent to the case, such as the following:

A. Psychiatrist of psychologist as

full-time consultant

B. Rod Kenner of IG (SR experience, objectivity) as judge.

He's also a lawyer, by the way.

C. Dick Stolz (Moscow experience)

D. Dick Kovich (KGB defector handler and Soviet agent expert-

ence)

E. Bob Lubbehusen (15 years continuous experience with produc

tIon from every. Soviet agent

and defector,

especially KGB)

F. Ed Juchniewicz (Soviet agent and CI experience).

George fraser (speciallat 1a Soules Lechnical collection

and equipment)

The detention of a defector 1s a serious action, but the

detention. of a bona fide defector on false charges has implicit

explosive potential...It is not the question of justice to an

Individual, but a larger question. First, the handling of his

information as disinformation contaminates our CI analysis now,

---

## Page 37

37

in past cases,

and for a long time in the. future. Rather than

being disinformed by the enemy, we are deluding ourselves.. If

we are afrald that word of our suspicions might get back to

Moscow, we should be even more concerned that word of our

detention of. Nosenko will. also.

How many more Soviet Intelli-

gence officer defectors, or even agents, can we then expect?

since AAPOGER knew, REB officers, and probably GRU as well,

have the advantage of knowing that Nosenko 1s a bona fide.

defector, but they will not have much respect for us or desire

to come over to us, if they learn how we have dealt with him.

The review of the Nosenko case will have to take into

account the KGB. aims which we have theorized for Nosenko as a

disinformation agent. These are stated. in the notebook as

follows:

A. Penetrate CIA and FBI - One wonders how the KGB would expect

this to be done... If it can be

assumed that they have some know-

ledge of the treatment of RIS defectors

In the U.S., then they know that such

defectors are held at arm's length:

Only in the past weeks have we

initiated a program to brief RIS

defectors even on our dead cases and

their production, although Deryabin

has been used on some aspects of

non-sensitive cases the last two years.

---

## Page 38

SIOTET

38

Most RIS defectors have lIttle

qualifications.for, or interest

In, work other than Intelligence,

so the desire of Nosenko: to aid us

Is normal and should be accepted to

the extent that we are using the

others.

B. Redefect, discredit U.S. Intelligence, and generate unfavor-.

able publicity about us-If this 1s the Soviet aim, we have given

then a magnificent opportunity! Imagine what would happen if

Nosenko were a "plant"-the Soviets could make charges at any

moment pointing out that Nosenko had been kidnapped by us,

alded by the Swiss and Germans, and that he was now being held

against his will.

What could we do or say? One wonders if CIA

would survive the subsequent. furor in the press, Congress, and

abroad.

Who would believe our protestations that the goods had

been planted on us -the boy with his hand in the cookie jar is

seldom considered a reliable witness in his own defense.

If:

Nosenko were a plant, the Soviets can get him back whenever they

want him, at our expense..

C. Discourage other defectors-How can he do this? If he did

• not serve in the KGB, as the notebook claims, RIS officers will

know that,

and what we do with him will not affect their own

intentions to defect. If we are wrong (which I am sure we are),

and Nosenko did serve in the KGB, the knowledge of the double

game he is playing would spread among 'his past, present, and

---

## Page 39

f.:

S28791

39

future KGB colleagues and likewise have no effect on future

defections. The only way the KGB could hope to discourage

future defections through Nosenko would be for us to detain him

on false charges and for that fact to become known in the RIS.

In other words, Nosenko 1s a bona fide defector, but we have made

It possible for the Soviets to gain an unexpected windfall by

our treatment of him. There 1s no other rational explanation

of how they could hope

•to achieve

this theoretical aim.

D. Protect existing Soviet agents in the West - There is nothing

lulling about Nosenko's list of 200 agents in the West, particu-

larly the

key cases cited above. Nosenko's background and ex-

perience provide him no basis for reassuring us that no Americans

have been recruited outside Moscow, nor does

he try to do so:

He goes so far as to point out that the most important cases

even

In his own directorate are taken out of the hands of the working

level and handled by the directorate chief personally. How, then,

could he conceivably mislead us about the agents recruited in

Moscow? We have no evidence that he has-it is Golitsyn's

disturbed personality. that confuses

the cases most, not Nosenko's,

including the ANDREY-JACK case on which Golitsyn is said to have

been desk case officer for two years! The only suggestion of

evidence that Nosenko is misleading us is Golitsyn's hearsay

from a section chief

who was 99 percent sure

he was about to

recruit an American code clerk; Nosenko said such a recruitment

was tried and failed. Who accepts this as proof? Nosenko told.

C58M07

---

## Page 40

40

us that the Soviets were still receiving code: machine informa-

tion In 1964_what more do we need? Is this concealing an

agent? Quite the opposite. There 1s

no evidence

to support

the "protection of agents" theory. We are fortunate that Nosenko

could tell us that they still have a high-level agent—it was

surely not within his need-to-know.

E. Lure us into operations in the. UN-Of all the theorles, this

one is the most far-fetched. . Since we are already running a

disinformation agent in the UN, and have been since 1958, the Soviets

could pull the plug on this one at any time, and could have done

so in the past, either while the agent was on IDY in New York,

or by assigning. him. PCS. If they want to move the UN, they have

other means. Since it has proven so useful for their own intel-

ligence operations in the past, it is safe to say that they will

leave it In New York for a while. Considering all the agents

they have run out of the UN, It is not likely that

anyone would.

take their protest

seriously just because we

were running one

agent there..

So, 1t 1s, after all, unreasonable to conceive aims which

would justify sending out an experienced intelligence officer

as a "plant." Whatever purpose one might theorize, there are

better ways to accomplish that purpose. Whenever the Soviets

have set out to mislead by giving information, or by giving us

agents who are without information, they have succeeded only

because they follow the simplest possible formulas, including an

---

## Page 41

41 :

absolute minimum of fabricated legend, and the maximum base of

objective fact which is still consistent with their modest aims.

The all-accomplishing Great Plot is still generations in the

future.

What will 1t take to convince all of us that Nosenko is

bona fide? Nosenko expresses the wish that we will soon get

another KGB defector who will vouch for him. So do I. He can

say this confidently because he knows that if we already had a

KGB penetration that penetration would vouch for his bona fides.

Did

we tell hin that we have no such penetration? If not, he can

only know it because he is Innocent.. It is beyond reality to

argue that everyone in the KGB will vouch for Nosenko's story-

1t.is not enough to alter a few organizational documents. The

truth comes from life, not from the archives. If we call all

that and all those who have already vouched for Nosenko "suspect",

everything and everyone vouching for him in the future also as

"suspect," what do we have left? This way lies madness. What

kind of proof do we need of his innocence, when we call him guilty

with none?

---

## Page 42

4-00000

22 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Recent Developaents in the Revier of the Nosenko Carr

1. On 2 June I vas contacted by the DDCI's Speddal Annistant, George

• Nchanus, and asked to fong to bis office to discuss Soriet inlelligence collection

as it related to Frankfurt Base, Prior to this call I nad beure aware that

McManus was naking inquiries In the SB Dirision about ry posllion and background.

In his office we discussed the SB collection progran and the duecial contribution

of defectors. No comment was made by either of us regarding my talk with the DdCI.

2. On 30 June, at my request, I met with the ADDP to express concern at

having again been passed over for pronotion.

ile inforsed se that oy pronotion lad

been approved but that it had not been nade effective becauss is and the DDP were

puzzled that I had gone over their heads to discuss the Hosenhy case with the DICI.

He stated that it was not a crime to visit the DDCI, but that lihe DDP chain of

command should be followed, and all possible points of appeal for such a disagree-

ment should be exhausted before taking a matter to the Director's office. In reply,:

I stated that my action was prompted by the knowledge that the 3B Division paper on

Hosenko had been sent to the DDCI, that the DDCI was aware thal I had written a

dissenting opinion, and that he had expressed interest in that upinion.

The ADDP stated. that he and the DDP were knomledgerble of the Mosenko

case, that they had listened to some of the interrogation taper, and that they were

inclined to accept the Division position. He advised ze that there were many facts

of waich I was not avare, and that 1t rould be best 11 I would confine nyself to

requirezents natters, leaving counterintelligence analysis to those persons who

were resyonsible for it.

He said that ve had treated Hosenko In a gentlenanly

manner, which was nore than the Soriets would do in a sintlar inse.

4. I stated that the Mosenko case and sost of the canes which the Division

connected with it were cases with which I had been involred, thnt, they were all

cases of evaluating production in comparative terns, and that iny experience in such

eraluations quallfied me to hare ay riers heard. He adrised in that if I would

try again to discuss the subject with CSB that he would not be willing to hear ue

out, He said that 1l I still disagreed and vished to discuss lhe subject with

other senior officers, I should first Infora CSB of that Intent. I called als

attention to the negatire attitude of the Dirision toward intelligence opportunities,

and the ADDP stated that he and the DDP vere entirely aware or lihat attitude and

were watching it closely. This has since becoze apparent to is,

5. After ay return from vacation, on 12 July, CSB called ne in to for-

alize the pronotion and empaasize that de was solely responslbile for 1t. It was

clear that he had discussed sy visit to the DDCI with the lattry and that the DDCI

and verely confired the visit and comunicated the gist of imition to the paper

waich the Dirision had sent ain on the Nosenko case.

---

## Page 43

14-00000

Mosenko paper on a dust to vet up after to rd see suat tic

to CSB.

He subsequently stated that their criticisms would be useful in

tigatening up the paper, and advised ther to continue to analyze the paper

for this purpose.

They continue to find major flars in the case against

Hosenko.

CSB inforned then that the paper forrarded to the DDCI was only a

draft, and that there vere bound to be discrepancies and inconsistencies in

a paper so complex and involving so sany authors.

T. On 24 August I was called in by CSB/CI and told that I could no

longer discuss the Nosenko case with any of the several officers under his

jurisdiction who were working on the case, and that any of those officers

wao initiated such discussions with he should be asked if they had his per-

aission to do so. I agreed to honor this arrangenent but euphasized that y

only interest in such discussions was to facilitate a thorough and objectire

review of the Nosenko case. I then recomended that the two officers be

given uy Deceaber 1965 paper on the case, and this was subsequently done.

8. Since uy determined actions to expedite reopening of the Nosenko

case have led the Division and the DDP to dison zy viens and to exclude ye

Iros the revier of the case, I see no existing forun for ay views within the

Clandestine Services.

Therefore, in spite of the DIP's advice that I either

refrain fron having an opinion, or express it only within the Dirision or

the CS, I have a sense of urgency that the attached views on the disposition

of the Rosenko case be considered at the conzand level of tie Agency where the

ultimate decision

must be rade.

---

## Page 44

14-00000

---

## Page 45

5'December' 1966

MENORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

:.The Clandestine Iffort Againet the USSR

I. The negative positions taken by the division

continue to dominate and negate our efforts to collect

Intelligence on the USSR by clandestine means. In

addition, I belleve that this negative environment has

done permanent damage to our capabilities agalast the

Soviet target, and that this damage Increases with

each day that this environment prevalls.

2.

following is a sunnary of recent developents

1n the divisions positions and a l1st of their effeats

29 I see them.

8.т

Nosenko 1s a deception agent, and Soviet deception

operations revolve around him.

The psychiatrist has told the division that

Nosenko's desperation to change his situation

may lead to a false confession.

The dishonesty and blas in the case agalnst

Nosenko are still evident in the current review

of his bonafides, according to the officer who

1s doing most of the writing of that paper.

Attachment A is an exauple of this technique:

Do;

¿BOURBON 15 a deception agent.

I believe that BOURBO! la bonafide. He has just

made his seventh Identification of a major

soviet agent In the U.S. (Boeckenhaupt), who is

the fourth such agent who was active, unsuspected,

and in a position to do the U.s, serious damage.

Any attempt to develop and disseminate BOUREON'S

Information is inevitably blocked by the CI

enphasis, as well as failure to provide the

officer close substantive support.

SOURBON. 13

providing some significant information which is

within his access and appears valla.

Unwarranted and dishonest judgments of BouRbon's

intormation are made without the knowledge of

division officers qualifled to make such judg-

ments. See Attachment B.

---

## Page 46

The officers of the division's GRU Branch disagree

with the division's evaluation of Bourbon'

The

paper on ROURSON'& bonafides 1a being diatated

to them by the division chier.

ScOTCH Is a deception agent.

SCOTCH continues to provide requirements and

Information which I bollove to be reliable and

appropriata to his acoess.

Buch that it does not permit a firm conclusion

bone 8o:

His Information 19

about his bonafides one way or the other, but

his CI Inforuation 1s the best basis fOr Judging

hlm.

111 Important Soviet agents arrested 1n the U.S.

1n the past five years of so have been compromigod

by Nosenko (Johnson, Mintgenbaugh) , BOURSON

the case for him 1s not as foolprof as for the

other two. Even so, his bonafides or lack of

sane has no automatic bearing on rosenko and

BOURBON

d.

Most Soviet activitles which have been detected

around the world are deception operations, called.

"aisinformation", "goreen", or "alversionary"

operations by the division.

The keystone of this position is the assumption

that the GRU academy class of 1963 which was

identifled for us by Penkovskly In & "throwaway"

group runding deception operations. In fact,

only 7 of 51 in the class have been 1dentifled

1n Intelligence work.

This theory was prepared as a book dispatch

three years ago but not sent out. It 19 given

In briefings of agency and llalson personnel*

Analysts of previous cases, such as the felfe

case, are being written with

a blas built in to

support this theory

No walk-ing and few defectors or liaison agents

escape the deception label.

* In early January the division beglas a course for CT's, and this

philosophy will probably be - 2 - passed on to them.

---

## Page 47

8.

Individuals who provide Information which tends

to corroborate the reporting or bonafided of the

above agents are also deception agents.

Since all RIS defectorg and agents in the future

are certain to provide such infornation, all are

discredited in advance,

This 1s & particularly

crippling position, as our two best positive

Intelligence sources have been GRU officers.

The only such defector we have had since josenko's

walk-1n in 1962 13 Olga Farmaiouskaya; Moon the

division judged a deception agent primarily:

because she stated har husband attended the CRU

academy with Nosenko... see Attachment C.

A number of agents In Satellite Intelligence

services are being tarred with the same. brush.

The effects of the above positions are detrimental

within the alvision and the Agensy, and I belleve they

have denaged our reputation with the FEI, MI-6, and other

11a1s0n serTiCos.: "1thin the clandestine services, these

positions and thegries hate generated & widespread feeling

of frustration, futility, and impotende.

The division

practically preaches the superlority of

• the KGB over the

FBI and CIA, using the above thaorles as "evidence",

•Old standarda of Information and source evaluation have

been abandoned and even reversed, with bad analysis

anting good analysis out of existence.

The validity

of sovlet ares experience is being denied. The effeot

1s paralysis of our sovlet effort.

4.

A number of aotiong have been taken by the

division which have also contributed to the decay of

the Clandestine Services' Sovlet effort.

8.0

Replacement and downgrading of senlor personnel

with Sotiot experience.

bo

Increased dependence on RIS defectors for opera-

tional judguents. These defectors are brought

Into Headquarters and overseas stations and showa

Agency doouments.

C.

Attempted kidnapping of the supposed KGB station

chiar in Tokyo.

₫.

Porsonnel with experience, intelligence, imagi-

nation, and inltiative are bullied, jeered, and

shouted into silence, or into division positions

which they are required to accept on faith and

without question.

---

## Page 48

These actiong are primarily injurious to persoas

Immediately in the division, but the raduction of their

Individual contributions reduces over all effectiveness.

The kidnapping episode discredited the division and the

Agancy, and is a blatant example of the disregard of tha

division chief for the vlaws of his staff.

The requiro-

ment that division personnal mutely and blindly follow

him, abandoning their judgment and self-respect, allenates

some of the best people in the division, and has been ta

direot cause of at least one serious illness and a con

tributing factor to a number of health problems of others.

The motitation of experienced paople who still occupy a

few responsible posts in the division has been seriously

eroded by the unhealthy pollcies sunmarized above, and

the related lack of Intelligence success.

What I have stated here are my own sincers and

sober vlews.

The concern which I feel for this state of

affairg has

Increased to the polut where I am mentally

distressed and physically affected by this catastrophia

developnent in my chosen profesaion.. Even 11 the present

Insidious trend were to be abruptly ended, 1t would take

many years to rectify the damage, ln the minda of our

no dono daup

own personnel, in operational files and guidance, and

with other sgencies and 11aison services. I am entirely

comnitted by experience, quallfications,

and Inclination

to nork on collection against the soviet target. Now

aiscouraged in this work, I sould find It difficult to

regenerate this lost enthusiasm in a new assignment.

However, lf there is no hope of a thorough revlew of the

positions and methods of the division within the next

few months, I feel that both my professional and personal

welfare will require that I find some other assignuent.

7.

In committing these plows to paper, I am aware

that the positions and actions which I cite as offeasive

are also the product of experienced and dedicated Agency

employees, to whom I Impute no dishonorable motives.

However, I belleve it lalr to state that the present

operational philosophy of the division is tailor nade

to sult the. KGB; several present and past SR division

officers have made this observation. It appears to me

that the division chief's preoccupation with the XGB and

manla for attributing so many of the world's 1lls to thom

Is a product of his own professional frustration.

example of this outlook 1s given in Attachnent D.

• He

appears to hold the KGB responsible for a long history

of personal lailures:

0. 4 ∞

---

## Page 49

bo

As head of the (REDSOk'

base in Germanyh he had

major responsibltity for the failure of every

such operation thich we ran.

He was publicly disgraced by the "beer-in-the-face"

recruitment failure in Vienne.

After he noved to Berlin Base, It. Col, Popov

was transferred from Vienna to Berlia and was

soon compromised.

hile he was un Borlin Base close cooperatio

Ith the West german services resulted 1n the

loss of & large: number of our agents too were

compronised through felfe, a soviet agent in

the IND CE section.:

KI-6 stafi officer was discovared to have been.

working for the Sovlots whlle in Serlin (Blake).

The Berlin tunnel was discovered and closed.

15-8

Shortly after he met UNACUTE 10 Paris, the latter

was called home and shot.

1.

He was again publioly disgraced by the kidnapping

fallure in tokyo.

Waile some of these unpleasant events cannot in any way

be blamed on him, lt is easy to see how he may have

acquired a feeling that nothing is bonalide, that nothing

works right, and that he must somehow even the score, with

the KGB as the eneuy.

I belleve that this becomes too

costly when our intelligence gosls and officers are both

expended in the process.

Leonard McCoy

DC/SB/RR

то 5.00

---

## Page 50

13

---

## Page 51

27 April 1967

MIMONANDUN FOR TIE RECORD

SUBJECT: Resalution of the Mosenko Probles

1: josenko has now been held In salltary confisement and Incominicado

for aluost three years. Wen ve first took this course of action, presumably a

plan ras adopted walch vould dispose of the case through normal judiciary pro-...

cedures and relieve the Agency of i penitatiary role: Although the years. should

have strengthened the case agalast llosenko, the opposite trend 1s apparent, As

more qualified, objective, and balanced persons have been exposed to the case,

ulth freedon to express thenselres,.. the case has disintegrated.

:2. Walle the Dirision continues to belabor 1ts nonstrous paper on the

case, I suggest that the rallaity of the case agalast losenko say not even be...

relevant to the larger problen; which is the need to direst the Agency und the

U.S. Governient of the risks invalred in holding or disposing of Hosenso. In

other words, the resolution of the Hosenko case must be just about the sane whether

or not ereryone agrees he 1s hoaafide.:

:3." It appears to se that the riska inkerent ln the case becoze crltica)

as soon a8 losenko's present status becones haow to various elements outside the

Intelligence Community: I further bellere that these riska: gron with tize, and

that eren 1f the story 1s not surfaced for many jears, the dazage vill st1ll be

serious. While the arfleial assessuent, of these risks.can only be made by toy

Agency sanagenent, those walch prompted' ne to, press the Dirision to undertake a

critical revler of the losenko case are represented by the folloning:

Elenents of Congress who are not farorably disposed to the Agency,

the Director, or the Executive could use the case polltically:

against those entities. the greatest risk in this category probably

begins in early 1968 and runs through national election cappaigas.

bi

The President could suffer personal enbarrassment, haring to state

wether he was aware of our handling of llosenko or authorized it.

co.

Trial of the case in the press, at hose and abroad, probably would

not develop in our favor.. Fine points of CI logic often are not

appreciated within the Intelligence Corrunity, much less outside.

(In fact, the FBI 18 said to disagree tith our logic la the losenko case

d. The Agency could be accused of violating the BIll Of Rights, Igaoring

the rights of the individual, usurping judicial prerogatives; an

arbitrary action under special privllege ("gorerning invisibly").

Genuine liberals, cirll rigitists, and fellow travelers nould hare

munition to use against us.

e.

Our treatsent of Nosenko would be used by the dorlets to discourage

other defectors and agent candidates:

I.: Liaison services are likelj to lose sone confidence 1n our compe-

tence and our standing in the U.S. Gorernzent. (Senior officers

of the iritish. Service have expressed disagreedent with our viers

on Hosenko.)

---

## Page 52

Other U.S.. Intelligence agencies will gain by our discomfiture,

and aight use the opportunity to encroach on Agency respoastbilities

and a886t8:

4.

Resolution of the probles therefore appears to me to be nost essen-

tial for political rensons.. The case la bound to be surfaced erentually. To hold

Hosenko under present circumstances Indefinitely cas only add to the riska. If te

vere to tura his over to & cooperative totaliterlan country like South Africa, the

In1t1al danage would be grentest on the norale and self-respect of Agency personnel,.

but the danger of the whole story beconing knows outside the Agency vould becore

greater, so that the schese would only add to the explosive potential of this:

case:...

If he vere to die of natural causes ville 1a out hands, the polltical sal-

IIcations: of the case seen to se not appreciably less then 11 ve vere: to till him.

I therefore submit that Mosenko's status should be legalized an soon as possible,

and that this course of retion should proceed without regard for the refinement.

of the case againat dosenko which 18 non la process.

The solution

Mosenko should be releared fron Agency Incarceration and placed in

a seal-free stetus. Ils change rould contime Agency supervision of his seti-

VIties by maintalaing in Agency-appolated officer or officers to serve as liter

preter, conjanion, and advisor for hill. He could thus watch hin for counter.

Intelligence perposes and probably prevent sose flaps. Hosenko's place of

residence ahould be selected. to keep hin anay fros Sorlet flos eltizers, the

central U.S. preas, and in an erer there any personal excesses he commits could

be localized and played dows.. I necensary, nach excesses could be used so pay

overt evidence of the need to return lie to a nore restricted enrircament..

"U.S. Is probably the only country where ve can maintain suck control. He should

also be gives psychiat-to treatsent, waich could be statted now. Rehabllitation

would also include language training and perhaps further formal education.

6. In prepariag Josenko for normalizition, he shoula be paid & suo-

stantial fee "for his intoraation".. He should also take responsibility for

his sedieal treatent, walch will afford us a continuing reasure al control.

As an explanation to hin of OUr handling of lin to date, as explanation or the

type the soviets night gite should be used. This would lnclude the assertion

that such handling vas routine for persons with his background, as the need to

check out his voluninous Intorantion sust be apparent to hiss... He could now.

assure hin that his bonafides had been recently established by a new KGB pene-

tration.:: In his case, 1t vas also prudent to keep his 1n a safe place to

prevent hostile action agninet his by his forter colleagues.. Sone of this.

danger, of course, st1ll persists.... If the fact of his forzer status with us

should become krom sublicly, fron his or indirectly, the same explanstions:

could be given, plus the staterent that his past behstlor showed he could be

dangerous to hinself and others.

T. In I1ght of the psychologists' eraluation of Hosenko as a veet

personality, he will probably seet viadiention upos release. It 1s therefore

laportant that his release be carried out vith appropriate sincerity. Another

seans of satisfying thia urge on his part rould be to collaborate vith his in

preparing articles or a book which rould tell his story (up to a point). Most

laportant, as a veak personality, Hosenko's ability to sustain, his spirits

through the last three years testifles to his conviction that he rould be

vindicated in tine.. Paradoxically, once that source of strength 18 renored,

by our accepting his bonapides, all the complications of his

"seriously. dis-

turbed personality" will probably return. for this reason, close support

18 neCEsSary.

---

## Page 53

діБ

SECRET,

28 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting with CSB on the Nosenko Paper

1.

On 4 April 1967; the present senior

case officer on the BOURBON case, Jim Flint, who

was on TDY at Headquarters,, Came

• to my office

at my request to discuss the bonafides of BOURBON.

In this discussion I mentioned to him other cases

now going on which Headquarters has related to

BOURBON, and recommended that he ask the GRU. Desk.

for briefings on these cases. I also advised

him that a

major SB Division paper on Nosenko,

which mentions BOURBON, was now well over 700

pages, and that it was

being prepared for the

Director.

In addition, I told him that a number

of persons in the Division and outside the Division

who had read the Division's earlier papers on

Nosenko disagreed with the Division's findings.

him in on that date and questioned him regarding

the origins of the information which I provided

Flint.

Later I learned that another officer of

the same branch was questioned simultaneously by

C/SB/CI, and that immediately after the two meet-

ings were held, the first officer was recalled.

by CSB for further questioning. Both officers

were, sternly warned not to divulge to anyone that

they had

been questioned.

3.

On 7 April I was called to the office

of CSB

at 1630 hours and met with him until 1730

SECRET.

---

## Page 54

SECRET

- 2-

nours.

He stated that he had a memorandum written

by Flint which reported a number of statements

I had made to Flint.

He was particularly con-

cerned about an "impression" Flint got that I

had indicated that the DDCI was reviewing the

Division's Nosenko paper.

I replied that I had

no knowledge of such a review, and therefore

certainly could not have said

such a thing to

I repeated what I had told Flint about

the Nosenko paper, as stated above. CSB stated

that for my information, the Nosenko paper had

been finished and in the hands of the Director

for three weeks, which was news to me. He also

stated that it was perfectly alright for the

DDCI to have a copy of the paper, in his position,

and that he would tell appropriate Division person-

nel that they should not be concerned that the

DDCI had a copy of the paper.

CsB told me that

if I wished to raise the level of my disagree-

ment about Nosenko to the DDP or DDCI, he would

glad to go along with me to discuss the matter

in their presence.

He said that he had lunched

recently with the DDCI and discussed the paper

with him, which was not the first such meeting

with DDCI on the subject.

4. CSB stated that because of the privileged

position I enjoy in regard to Division operational

intormation, he had to be able to trust me in the

handling of

that information.

I agreed, and stated

that in my judgment Flint had a need to know items

I had mentioned to him.

As to the origin of my.

information, none of which I received officially,

I stated that I made a point of maintaining a

good listening post in the informal organization.

In addition, most personnel who have served ir

the Division

very long always assume that any

current case will have been surfaced to me for

intelligence exploitation. Therefore they do not

hesitate to discuss new cases because they believe

I have a need to know.

In this respect, I

fector Olga Farmakovskaya or the new KGB case in

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New York. He stated that the first case had

no such value, and that the second was not under

his control.

Although I disagree with both

statements, especially since a Division officer

is meeting with the New York walkin, I said

nothing.

CSB stated that it is essential that

personnel in the Division, other divisions and

other agency components. do not feel that he and

I have opposite attitudes toward intelligence

collection.

He asked if there was a personal

factor in my opposition to his views and I as-

sured him there was

not.

I pointed out that as

long as the Division had the negative attitude

which was exemplified by the Nosenko, scotch'the

BOURBON, Farmakovskaya, the New York walkin,

[cozY case, and numerous other minor cases,

would not collect any intelligence on the USSR.

This was the only point at which he became upset;

stating that he could not agree with the Polyannas

who say that the US Government is not penetrated

and that the Soviets do not know every move we

make.

I stated that I did not agree with them

either, but that I disagreed most strongly with

the Division's positions on most of these cases,

and would not defend them.

6.

I tried to explain that most of the

Division personnel who are aware of the cases

which are lumped in with Nosenko have doubts about

the validity of the Nosenko paper.

He said that

he met with them and knew their views, and I sug-

gested that his own views, and the deputy divisior

chief's, were stated so vigorously and categorically

in those meetings, that other persons were reluctant

to contest these views.. He did not believe this,

but. I added that since

all of them were at his

mercy in their careers, they did not want to get

into a vehement argument with him,.

leaving bruises

on both sides.

I left his office, a branch

chief who knew that I had been there for an hour

SDORST

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- 4 -

asked why I was not bleeding from dozens of

wounds, and I said that I had listened a lot.)

7.

In closing I stated that I would not

tell

Flint that I knew of his memo,

but CSB

said that I should tell him.

I said that Flint

was ill and

needed help, but CSB said he knew

Flint and that it was just separation from his

family that had been the problem.

(I did not

tell CSB that Flint asked me privately to get

him removed from: the BOURBON job, stating that

he found it extremely trying. Also, I did not

cell. Flint. that 1 knew of his memo.)

8.

Immediately after my meeting with him,

CSB called in all senior CI personnel in the

Division. He began by stating that he knew he

was pompous and domineering but that it was most

important to him to know if any of them had

doubts about the Nosenko paper.

Of five persons,

three admitted, two for the first time, that they

surprised,

reasonable doubt that is always present in the

intelligent mind. He then told the group that

the DDCI had a copy of the Nosenko paper, and

that it was proper for him to have a copy, so

that no one should be concerned about that fact.

He also told them that someone outside the Division

might be coming to talk to them about the paper.

Discussion of whereabouts of copies of the Nosenko

paper led one person present to believe CSB was

trying to determine how a copy of the paper reached

DDCI.

On 24 April my immediate superior returned

from leave, and on 26 April she was called in by

CSB and he showed her a memo for the record of

his conversation with me.

He stated that he did

not intend to forward it to anyone.

He said that

he had discussed the incident with

DDP

who was

He also indicated to

hen that he intended to continue me in my present

position and to "stand by" my promotion recommendation,

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which he has again submitted. In the memo, he

repeated the assertion that I had told Flint

that "a group outside the Division" was going

to review the Nosenko paper, which is a slight

change from what he told me, and information

that I did not previously have to tell anyone.

My superior indicated to CSB that I had already

described my meeting with him to her.

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