## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10241

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-146

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

JFK ASSASSINATION FOLLOW-UP

DATE: 00/00/1976

PAGES:

275

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITES

BRADEN, JIM

CIA

ROSSELLI, JOHN

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

OSWALD, LEE

DURAN, SYLVIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

CCBOX 441

v9.1

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Date

Page

08/08/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

SSCIA

157-10014-10241

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-146

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : JFK ASSASSINATION FOLLOW-UP

DATE : 00/00/76

PAGES

: 275

SUBJECTS : ROSSELLI, JOHN

CIA

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

BRADEN, JIM

DURAN, SYLVIA

OSWALD, LEE

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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JAK ASSASSINATION FOLLOW-UPP

Box

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fior

The Senate Select. Committee on Intelligence is conducting a

limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee

did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is

whether or Mr. Rosedli's murder

was related in any way to his testimary before the

Committee.

HH

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Cal

таВ

CIA.

EBL

Cuban Exiles & Soldies of Fortane

Hugher

Ches Plots

Oct I2 Mty

$2

/ AMCASA

Wrote

Ruв4

Connection >

Osured Connection,

coralague

Libring

1 laventag- Kerio → Jem/Ed.

2 Digestina.

3. TuninG! Nature n Pistic Statement

4. House areas y literest

internens

Someone

HH 54923

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## Page 6

SECKET

file

SECRET - CALL 24 LaTE.

i see facer rampic stones ry a exposue te

stants base papiacin

stage, even inly tempssing expedint, we have adele

in logar;

expece on her toget do cirt, He meght recent

ternation i cit for someth te not rapine.

for.

March 76 0s memes te it on Maker Hughe

Jesne-1914

sees officia Specene Step Props Asked os to chuck

mund in timed: Phelant Wallar Junne, bor.

interest in connection ay a sensitin S15 actinity.

treal. Divian crie sail dies le mater deposition

suit w, Hugies. Makin thought to it stuc. Jacket wealt

22.

That in embarked on d

new thesis pespect t had was fore

Then hers.

(Maren-Aughis fisht Main fre permin

Ven offsec. Does in Mebrigi is Fide

cover in a mann to so it nerd for a meeting wi

Aims iffin

1W 51923 DocId 32423629 Page 6

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Non dIS Doa, i Remi fili SECKET

2, tune 66 Houston to DDC1 re Long Subtimmid

And RAM: John Leon tistefuid defore

Long Sutton: on Ondesis

Kuord Made used Radio dece.

i, a Miller Memo For Record 14 March 1974

par. 8

More contact io, L.Htouston ne Mahen/ Fearcon

Horsion sold ine outy beeney pficise"sware

> detail, were Edwaide, Deborn, Angliton, Ricea

and himself.

lyle miller. mFR

10 det. 73

he meeting i, sort hemst. he his interver

10/3/73 + intered in

RAM assie. i, cIt:

"New years due frty". Wilkinsin repoet

§pose little mend 1/18168 1e"CBserateis

on.

core compa lessel a Activities

(RAMA).

b1o.ovr

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SECKET

- Muelin/Satilis

14 MAy62 TOPSECHET Edwards MER - le Balteli.

meno prepared for lick precovy aro issufig.

"Rosselli and mahus speat consid,

tore s Mironi. talke with the

EDU:

Gasconne feet them in touch wy a

cresis sand pa. peasiale

Tom. 11-

in ciA conct ; dom cut off:

because Hastes dactle tunfar. pull.

Hawene-Osh. not the Hem, had

ducted termin. 8 Malies relat. em

carly an 1966.

"flass" ignores

O'connell MER. 15/11- he: RAM

On 17 Nov. 70- Mahen called

O'Cozacce

to son that Rossellis lawyer advisise

that unlen someone interceded in his

they se deportation - Ros. was going

Is make complete expose of his activetti

that lu;

past affilia. avi ciA hod no

Hughes

struadle situation.

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SECKET

Mevicio STREE FILE ER propri

2115/71 0sd memo te Calls re Russelli

Des agnised Rosselli exposure threat, taking

calcul. rich as to expresse. Essnitizes

ein spicu; name por centinous reason,

Hs sume 15

- Subm. to Scheat,

from knocke-

a- pragmeta resume -Cutiels

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SECRET

3.71 Angeloni: used for at cork. Serveil, ba malien

Mahen fili "Gaps"

Vol. l Nov63-Dec. 73

3

-Cas 12419

tine 71

EriI to Sam Halper.

" He attacked 2 memoranda

conrain the tatiat developrasat

si the Rolet A. Maple Associals

(RAMA) tasiela.... Ile secra

memorandom is sey explanating

Except you. showd know that.

тий

lower m put dost, in a Lingtins

cooped in the care fried, and Newised

Hust is wand one git lei, Persedint,"

(No Attach.)

13 Qu 71

re.

meeting-

5

(COS /(PHLOBiE)

hivs lui name came

Up in Hughes Tool.

cavealeg. 8 RAmA.

of enterte to det. Hes

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= rud un sentired capy

to pae 16.

> Why did Nauston tell byl Milled (per misters mar 26 mens)

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RESSIONAL, RECORD

978301

Iter

the

tlat

art:

ord

of

iald;

it.18

TO CUBAN PLOTE

HON. DAWSON MATHIS:

IN THE HOUSE OF BE

CHON

le:

BEEN

5B668

B6:0

lale,

article, ronas

post ber nkerter at

this

from Virginter that. this

should he lovestigated ap

selectroummittee of the Ho

Cuban elementa were ta an

sible Tor President Kenner

determine thist If fon

ixony had deen assoctat

grO

upe, and Wathe "white

yIn. lecturefer to such

us determine that I

yesterdas is not

bumme titties)

Mr Spenier, the time

settle those and many ot

questlons about the seng

aye walted long

majority pi.

would support, the resoly

Ushi an investigating. co

came to the floor for ary

use the Committee job:

he Hours that up

;wo.

ind/

hts: N1x09y.93719642495

cause

"ter tho Bay of Pigs layaston

ingE

sald.

& the statements only be:

norA

cause they are sworn, and part of a package

118:

or documents

raltag, the possiblitty. that.

oildent Kennedy was assassinated by rigut-

Ouban

exiles who felt betrayed becauses.

1084

tod

rm

tis

costA

..We;

ying

thatithey thought they had fren

had not been; kept in the Bay of Pig

The two

sworn atatements were mado tbis.

by. Marlo Kohly JI., son of the

late

Lender wao, Calmed: the agreement

with: Nixon, and Bobert. Morrow, an suthar

who, asyl. hor wasna Central: Intelligence,

evei...

Ag6p05:44035

MOrION B2a

Ament: BByB: that the elder

erita. Bohly said

the agreement was made on tola

1t:

pledge to bain his 42000 underground foroes:

theye

Inalde Cuba, as well is 800 to 400 guerrillas.

In the Becambery Mountains, support-an on

And vaslon by CIA trained Cuban exlles.

cut:

Kohly If says da his sworn statement: "I

mont:

nine:

cold: was toll that Vice President Nison had agreed

Ord,

to tho elimination, of the leftist approved:

Cabin Resolutionary Front leaders at a time:

ber;:

when theisland would be invaded by theerio

fat.

troops, tralnedi under the dirsction. of-tha

electorates

1659 Central Intelligence Agency,"

choose: fron

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MEMORANDUM

October 1, 1976

TO

' Bill Miller, Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood,

Mike Epstein and Ed Greissing

FROM

: Rick Inderfurth

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Hart

I've set up a meeting with Senator Hart for Wednesday,

October 6,

to discuss where we go with the JFK inquiry.

The

meeting will take place here at 10:30 in the morning.

Please

let me know if for any reason you cannot attend.

The meeting

should go for about an hour to an hour and a half.

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•UNTTED STATES COVIKAMENT

Meinorancum

TU

Mr. Mohr

DATE:

:..

FRUM

-07.1

December 12, 1963/14.

Trolle

1i1n85-

Conly 1

C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT:

Coin

1=101?

-....

ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

1.927518

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford

(R. - Micnigan) in his officc. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he

told nie he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Er-! Foru told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which

(Chick Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission.

He explained that the list inistake that Warren mace was his attempt to establish a

"one man commission" by appointing a Chiet Counsel, Warrei Olney, that was his own

prolege.

Ford stated that alter the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, it

their first meeting; Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently.

Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know

more about Olney prior 10

giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale bogss joined

#Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be accoptable and that

he (Toggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiti

arguncht jut a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned.

Warren siated he knew Rankin and could work with him.

cindi i.

...i:..

i le

N'l"".

--

Ford told me that he was currently having probicms inasmuch as the

majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendatio

made i De, Atoney encom ate tich len to she mies on dated 12--63

press reicase pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no internationiz

conspiracy oi callusion and that Oswald was a loner. ford staied he was a minorily off

one that did not want to give out any press relcase until the Commission had had a

thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noled that the report was,

on his desk at the time of our mecting.)

1 - Mi. Lichmont

shis a mining paint to.

1 - Mr. R-sch

•1 - Mi. Drins

1 - Dly.

Sullivan This decement i prepared in vesse hi

antin delsi-li inger Committre.

1 - Mr. Jones

we Conn' e and the content may not be dischaged to unauthorized persort

55

CDO:saj-

(s.

1?.105.90

FB!

1954

. XF :0X

DEC 20 "003

22 0 027 1903

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DeLopch to Mohr 12-12-63

Red, Assassination of the President

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his

viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that

Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FEI

investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip

and it, therefore vould be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to

li the evidence being turned in.. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that

although he was a minority of one he intencied to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately

one weck ago, gone up to his office and told him that ClA had uncovered some

"startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a

source oi Cla's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an

unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greaily inasmuch as it definitely

ended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination i i

the President. irissrows inow

mious

I told Ford that apparcnly McCohe had failed to follow up on this matter.

I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a

sment of his inastention.

Towever, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source;

he source had later clamec that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we

ie stin cincheng some ameres ol ths. Towever, the Cla source was obviously either

nsi e or somewhat or a psycacpathic dar:

Lil?

Ford stated he could certainly see this.

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly avised as to the activities of

ne Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he.

hought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and

traighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all

icans he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain

onfidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years.

le has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism"

ind has been in touch with my oifice on numcrous occasions in the past.

CTION:

Contact will do maintaned with Congressman Forde Rise pers 63,

Will händled.

151

=

-2 -

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My Turn

Donald E. Schulz

Kennedy and the Cuban Connection

Conspiracy theories are lashionable.

sometimes even fruitful, as in the

case of Watergate. So it is not surprising

that recent revelations of the Senate In-

telligence Committee have resurrected

an old question: what connection, it any,

did the Castro government have with the

assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Current speculation is that the Cuban

dictator.

having learned of CIA plots

against his life, decided to strike back,

returning violence for violence, with

consequences that are now history. In-

deed, the recent report of the Schweiker-

Hurt task force, while finding no hard

evidence to support this theory, did un-

cover some interesting new leads. More

than that, it established that a CIA-FBI

"cover-up" had deprived the Warren

commission of vital information that pre-

vented it from seriously exploring the

possibility of Castro's involvement and

that consequeritry there is no longer any

reason to have faith in its picture of the

Kennedy assassination.

And so we may well have a reopening

of the ingestigation. At last.

Given all this, it seems appropriate to

examine the record of the period. A small

but interesting body of published testi-

mony and reminiscences describes and

imply documents a little-known cam-

paign of accommodation launched by

Washington and Havana in the weeks

preceding that fateful day in November

1963. Actually, the origins of this tenta-

tive and ultimately ill-fated rapproche-

mut may be traced to the previous

pring, when Castro, increasingly de-

sondent on his Soviet sponsors, tounc

vimselfobliged to embrace the banner of

peaceful coexistence"" in order to obtain

"cononic and military agreements need-

«i to assure the continued development

of his revolution. In practical terms, this

meant the normalization of relations

with the United States.

A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO

It was not until September 1963, how-

ever, that this campaign began to show

results. At that time, William Attwood, an

adviser to the U.S. delegation to the

United Nations, told his superiors he had

word that Castro wanted an accommoda-

tion. John Kennedy got the message and

approved a "discreet contact" with the

Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Le-

Subsequently,

communications

were established and meetings held

to discuss the prospect of negotiations.

with their revolu-

By early November, Kennedy had de- tionary brethren in

cided to push toward an opening with

other lands. But ul-

Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the

timately,

each

Soviet fold and erasing the memory of

na-

tion would have to

the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a

determine

its own

meeting to draw up an agenda for later

destiny, and "if they

discussions. On Nov. 18, this message

choose regimes oth-

was transmitted to Havana.

er than ours, this is not our business."

thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set

This was two days prior to President

forth such a plan for U.S. consideration. Kennedys death.

Even as these developments were un-

I mention these developments be-

folding, a second dialogue was taking

cause they provide an important-and.

place through an unofficial envoy-the

perhaps crucial-frame of reference for

French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct.

Congressional investigators and the pub-

24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the

lic alike: They are not, of course, proof of

White House. The President, it seems,

But they are suggestive:

had learned of the Frenchman's forth-

would Castro have been so intent on

coming visit to Cuba and had decided to

coming to terms with a man. he was

seize the occasion to send Castro a mes

conspiring to kill? One may seriously

sage. The essence of this communication

doubt it. In point of fact, the assassina-

was a strong hint that the United States

tion would bring a quick end to Washing-

would be willing to normalize relations

ton's interest in accommodation.

providing certain conditions were met.

What were those conditions? One, clear-

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

ly, was an end to Castroite subversion.

Still, this is not to rule out the possibil-

The U.S. had a special responsibility to

ity of a "Cuban connection." Govern-

contain Communist expansionism. As

ments often behave in inconsistent and

long as Havana continued to export revo

self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the

lution, the economic

"blockade"" of the

Kennedy Administration was taking

island would remain in effect.

first covert steps toward rap

prochement, the CIA was engaged in an

ACCOMMODATIONS

attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack

Beyond this, not much was definite.

of political control and a prevailing at-

The American negotiating position had

mosphere of cold-war hostility;

not yet been worked out. Even so, hints

agents could be conducting such activi

of possible Cuban participation in the

ties in direct conflict with Presidential

Alliance for Progress and of the desire of

policy, it is not difficult to imagine simi-

the United States to see a decline in

lar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a

Soviet influence on the island suggested

few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly

further avenues for discussion.

denounced U.S.-sponsored assassina-

Bearing this message and an invitation

tions and even threatened retaliation.

to revisit the White House upon his re-

Might not some overzealous security of

turn, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he

ficials have taken this for tacit authority

found a remarkably receptive Fidel Cas-

to set up a

"program of elimination"?

tro. Indeed, during the course of a six-

But all this remains speculation. It is

hour interview the lider máximo found

possible to envision any number of sce-

occasion to praise the American Presi-

narios that might have led to the fatal

dent for his sincerity, realism and "good

events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evi-

ideas"; Kennedy might yet understand

dence, however, it seems only fair to give

that there could be

"coexistence be-

Castro the same benefit of the doubt that

tween capitalists and socialists, even in

Kennedy has been accorded-namely,

the Americas." Castro was convinced

that he be considered innocent until

that normal relations could be restored

proved guilty. It is hoped that the inves

"on the basis of mutual respect for sover-

tigations to come will proceed on the

eignty." His country needed peace in

basis of that assumption.

order to concentrate on the socio-eco-

nomic tasks of the revolution. The issue

Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political

of subversion would not be an obstacle.

science at Ohio State Untuersity, is wnt.

Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity"

ing a book on the Cuban revolution.

9

September 6, 1976

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Note

shalos

" GAuden Tons

305=861-765

Fonzi mty.

Crete

He Zarabmemo:"

9/20/16

King 67/63 mtavens to see antegic dealer

DEA

vi valveat

cast

Bernstein

Workall

Tratti

Cribe A Allemen/Tafficente -

CUSA - conseratisin

Black bordered ado

Larry Cragord

lind Crane it to te

Herong

Monta-lorenz

рит funt ul STaigs easte. Shortle

apter she got here.

snes

tent as touardo

me Meskill - N4 Duly News - 1975- Serces 7

Strais Lorenz

puces

alvia Odo - sure it WAs OswAld in DAMAs INte Sep

here Dion- Asset.

supposed to

be in prey.

impostes

AcQuiley

"Strawron

Norman

Kathiran - i

voe 9, 477

nob

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## Page 18

Lorenz-

Sem Benton - Aeral Ser del to assisati Conta or

firming house. seeploask/Sturai

_mining.

Shamma

Naval Cutelt

Artime.

sesfficante-

arg. Cri

Sorce

Nosady Quality Forch

Gaillot → Coccone

Gile 214

Liannon feuce

Eduard Batari

TRice Ca, Realtor

Eduardo Buttari

Сива

antone

Carlos Martini»

De modest Mosa 7 Gersteini pertãa

-wortang

for Rothm

when in

pulsort

KNX

mitr

Nom Kothmasi.

Bind

Norman Rothman - puntind

o essess

5-4.60

(qua numer

HH 54923

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## Page 19

Is as Jack ibitten

- Lensly.

1965- Hunt straighten;

but Calula componice

Spani

12

Mclane

Fitz: alias

4. Nosento.

> Jack Whitter

Sanchez> → transcupt.

Amelish fite

5. -Alvarrado,

→ a sensitive reliable soun

H# 54923

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2o issassination

COIFIDSTIN

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PART THO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incrodible bodies of recent information

concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research

done by Peter doyes, a former CBS Producer and

top inves-

tigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which

summed up

many of his findings, and which generally outlines

what Noyes believes was heavy

Mafia involvement in the

assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual

is largely based on substantiated information such as

police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police

Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and

Texas police officials.

Though the hoyes book (like most recent assassination books)

did not sell well or receive much

press attention, it has

been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author

Noyes'

fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Moyes' findings,

particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden,

nave been factually substantiated and are solidly establishec

by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a

mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene

of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the

shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who

thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified

himself under the false name of Jim Braden,

was released

shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas

Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his

true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune

of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for

"looking suspicious" that the warren Commission critics now

believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking

tape on

the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate

fatal slip-ups

in the two conspiracies.

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 21

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## Page 22

2.

For Jin Braden, those true identity is Eugene Hale Brading,

is a man with

singularly avesome direct ties to the highest

levels of the

Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected

the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities

of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and

outside murder contracting,

Jim Braden appears to be an

indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's

far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists

and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon

"enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast

and covers virtually every national crime syndicate juris-

diction: According

to federal authorities working with the

Justice Department's organized crine strike force units, and

according to other high government sources cited by author

loves Lans praden is now serving as personal courier for

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up

under a false name across

the street from the Texas Book

Depository just moments after the shots were fired on

November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders

in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or

brought in for questioning

by the Dallas police, all of thom

were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at

that precise moment does in fact raise an

incredible specter,

and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics

of the Warren Commission now attest to.

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3.

Jan Bracion's direst On lovember 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police

officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository

following the assassination.

within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired,

Deputy Lowis confronted a man across the street from the

Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting

suspiciously."

Deputy Loris questioned the man for several minutes before

taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation.

The man identified hinself

as Jim Braden, and said that he

was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy

Lewis became even more suspicious. over the way the man first

tried to identify himsolf. Instead of producing his driver's

license, the common means of identification, the man pulled

out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested

when Deputy Lawis told him that he would have to take him in

for further interrogation.

it the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary

statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in

Dallas on oil business and

said

had been there for two days. He

he was staying at the cabana liotel, s short distance away

the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been

walking down the strcet by the Texas Bool Depository at the

time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab.

Jim Braden further

stated that he was confronted by Deputy

Lewis inside a building across the street from the depository.

during an attempt to make a telephone call following the

shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's

office.

Braden

was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made

of possible criminal records relating to hin.

Two nonths later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was

interviewed by tro

FBI agents

at his office in Beverly Mills.

The warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing

and witnesses to the

assassination vere being questioned by

the IBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden

gave the same account as he had given to the dallas police on

the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on

Braden's interrogation further stated, that,

"Braden has no

information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey

Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

HH

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4.

Jim Braden's True Identity Energes

In early 1909, Peter loves, the investigative reporter

whose book: covers much of

the information regarding Jim

Braden, began investigating the mysterious California

"oil man."

joyos originally received a tip about Braden from a

former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney

Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination.

The FBI man told loves of Braden's presence at the scene of

the assassination at the time of the shooting.

loyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at cither

of the addresses that he had given the dallas police, and

had left no forwarding addresses.

loyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles

run a chock on the license number that Braden had given to

the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the

assassination.

Hotor Vehicles told Moyes that Braden's

(11751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego

county in lovember of 1906. Braden has also listed new

business and home addresses, which interestingly were over

a hunarca miles apart.

The Department of l'otor Voiclos' records on Jin Braden

also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original

name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's

to Eugone lalc Erading, which is Braden's true identity.

On Sentenber 10, 1903, just ten wechs before the assassination,

Bugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had

Icgally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he roquested a

new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jin Braden vas really a false

identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noves

contacted the Intclligence Division of the California

Attorney General's

office, and had a chech run on the

mysterious Brading.

Hoyes was told. that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy.

H'e's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has liafia connections."

Nojes shortly thercafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's

(Jim Braden's) police records.

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5.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35

soperate entrles covering virtually every phase of

crininal activity, including mall fraud, embezzlement,

operating a ganbling house in diani, car theft,

shop

lifting, receiving stolen property, and solling wartime

gas ration coupons

on the black market.

lost of these arrests had been made under the name of

sugonc Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him

also

showed a handful of other aliases,

including Harry eugene

Bradley,

Gone Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee,

and invitably, Jim

Braden.

"Jin Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's

records.

Incredibl:, investigator lloyes found that due to the fact

that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or

run a male on him, his true identity of sugene trading las

never discovered by the FBI

or the warren Commission at the

time of their investigation of the assassination. The warren

Commission had only routinely included Braden's short state-

ment about being

in Dallas on

"oil business" in a police

exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's

Volune XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at

faco value.

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6.

Jim Braden (Buricne Brading) ind The lafin

Investigator loves bogan a thorough investigation of

Braden based upon all available police records and

docunchts.

What soon clearly emerged as a long record of involvement

' by Braden (Bradina) viti

many of the most notorious haria.

Icadcis in the nation, a record of close association with

Key

figures in the national crime syndicate.

Folloving a string of arrests in the 1910's, dating all

the way back to his young adulthood, sugene

Brading had

moved to El Paso, Texas,

in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor

Pereira, a

man who was a close associate and confidante of

scveral

Mafia

menbers. Brading and Pereira becane irvolved

in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement

of wealthy widows.

In 1951,

Brading and his close friend Porcira wore arrested

by the rD! in New York on a

fugitive varrant issued in Texas.

The two mon

were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from

a wealthy widow whom Percira had marrica shortly beforc

flocing with her moncy. Brading and Percira vere

soon con-

victed of the charges

and wore each sontenced to 12 years

in prison.

llow:eve:,

Brading and Icreira were out free during the three

ycars of their appeals,

and Brading was later paroled in 1959

after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE

SMALDOIES)

During the three vears of frcedom under their appeals of the

convictions,

Brading and Percira left Texas (folloving still

another floccing of another wealthy widow and moved to

Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became vory closely associated vith

two leading lafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde

and Gene Smaldone.

HH

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7.

The smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers

and

Flip Flos," verc the Mafia Icaders in charge of the

syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from

the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show

that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the

entire lueblo arca of Colorado.

The smaldone brothers wore notorious for the brutal brand

of violence they practiced in their opcrations. Brading

(Draden) becane involved in many transactions with the

Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years

Later, after brading inally went to jail for the embezzlement

of the Icxas wirow, the smaldone brothers reqularly wrote

to him in prison, secking his advice on various financial

matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAIT)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved

to Beverly Hills

In calliornia. shortlY thercaiter, Brading Inevitably came

under investination by the los Angeles lolice Department

Intolligence Division's lafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on

his close association in Beverly Hills with tro

"oil specu-.

lators" from !liami, Arthur Clark and Roger Baunan. Clark

and Bauman

were notorious Maria figures with lona police

records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the ton leaders of

he famous purple Gang of the bafia, which had oncratec

ut of Detroit and Younastown. The Los Anacles nolice hac

nlaced Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had

compiled extensive information on their friendship with

Brading•

In 1956, the Chief of intelligence of the InPD, captain

James fianilion,

sent a letter to the Crime Commission of

Greater liiami

seeking infornation about Clarl, Bauman, and

Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost

experts on the infia in the nation, asted the Miami Commission

Which was conducting ostensive investigations o's the Mafial

to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of

Clark and Baunan.

Among those named was Eugene

Brading.

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Captain Hamilton's lotter stated:

"This Department has under investigation Arthur

Lewis Clark, SI., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman.

These men arc representing thomselves as officials

ot the sunbean oil company both loosevelt theater

Building, liami Beach, and

are spending moncy

vory lavishly."

"Clark has been arrested several times and has been

associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such

Victor Percira,

jugene Brading,

brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter loves points out, the men listed

with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "who's imo"

of organized crime leaders

between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND PRATIANO)

Of these top lafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps

the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known

as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the

Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Conmittee of

the California logislature, Captain Hamilton, the chiet of

LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

"ie have long considered Fratianno to

he the

exccutioner for the lafia on

the Hest Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence

Division had linked Jinnie Frationno to at least sixteen Mafia

executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination

of Los Angeles

Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Conen had

survived the bloody shooting wich took the lifo

nis licutenants. Fratianno was later releasca duc to insuf-

ficient ovidence. Fratianno used the alini that he had been

at the home of liafia associate Nick Licata the night of the

shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles

Mafia,

and, perhaps significantly, was later aven control oI

the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

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3.

jimmie Iratianno was also suspocted of complicity in

the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who

made the

mistake of robbing the Mafia's

Flaningo Hotel in Las

Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the

robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by

fired behind

the ear, apparantly in true Mafia

fashion.

Fratianno had also boen linkod to the famous murder of

the Los Angeles Mafia head.

another top member of the lickey Cohen gang, Frank Hiccoli.

Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner

at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a business-

man in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy

gambler, had apparantly welched on a $30,900 gambling debt

that he

orca the Mafia,

and was blown to

bits from a dynamite

charge hidden under the hood

of his car.

Pratianno later corved a six year prison term (1954-1960) for

extortion. In later. years

Fratianno becane the contral

involved in LOOK magazine's "exposc" of san Francisco layor

Josenh alioto's allegca liafia connections. LOOk alleged that

Fratianno had becone a close friend of Mayor alito and that

the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over

5105,000

from a bank where Alioto sorvod as Chairman of tho

Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno vas a "casual acquaintance"

of his, but donied that he had used any influence in the loans.

The layor also said that he had not known that the notorious

Fratianno was

a nember of the Mafia.

(BRADING AID MELTZER)

Brading (Jin Braden) also became

While in los neen maria leader Harold "lappy" loltzer.

connected. with

The LAPD Intelligence Division had originall: becone

avaro of Brading's close rolationship with lieltzer when

Brading's nane was

on l'eltzer's Christmas card list.

Meltzor was widely known as one of the most powerful lafia

leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Sonate Packets Committee identified Brading's

friend richtzer 25 a

top Mafia boss in the arcas of union

rackcteering and narcotics.

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 29

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In.

i renort of the senate Rackets Conmittee from 1961 states:

"leltzor now is reported

to operato a large

bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in

California. ¡ major figure in the organizod

undervorld, le is known to all the important

• narcotics traffickers throughout the United

Statos. He has also operated in Ollahona,

1eras,

Baltimoro, Miami, Las legas,

Boston,

liong kong,

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Ios Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with

yet another top

taria oneration. Brading becane a close

friend and associate of the notorious sica brothers - Joe,

rroddie, and Gorac. The sica brothers were particularly

brutal syndicate menbers specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.s. attorney

in Los ingeles accused Brading's

friends, Jos and Proddie

narcoties ring in the United star bending the single largest

The Sica brothers vere shortly thereafter brought to trial.

on the night before the trial openca, the government's

star wieness,

an informant

named Abo

Davidian, as mysteriousty

shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno.

The nurder was

never solved and the sica brothers were soon released for

lack of evidence.

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11.

Jim braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

Ihe same inadequate investigative work which led the

Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid

Mafia involvement,

apocars also to have been responsible

for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of

Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the

Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the provious account of Jack Ruby's very

substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby vas particularly

involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But bevond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates

that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important liafia

figures opcrating in the same general arcas, at the

general times,

there is another single niece of evidence

which nlaces both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the

day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby

visited the Dallas offices of the !l.l. Hunt Oil Company

on the afternooi? of lovember 21, 1963, just twenty four

hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any

link which places both Braden and Ruby in the

same place

at the same time on the day before the assassination does

of course raise further significant questions about a

possible relationship between the tro men.

Jin Braden received parmission fron the U.s. Board of

Parole in los ingeles to male a trip to ballas, Texas on

coverber 1?, 1903, four days before the assassination.

Braden was required to report all of his travels to his

Parole Boaid following his parole in 1959 for the embez-

on November 21, 1903, the day before the assassination,

Jim Braden chocked in with the U.S. Parole Office in

Dallas. According to Roger Carroll

the Chief Parole

Officer

in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that ne

planned to see Lamar liunt and other oil speculators while

here." Lamar Hunt is the son

of f.L. Hunt, the famous

right-ring oil billionaire.

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12.

laul nothornel, a former fil agent ho was Director of

security for the liunt oil Connany in Dallas at that tine,

has recalled

that he distinctly renombers Braden visiting

the funt offices on November 21 in the company of three

other men. Rothernel has stated that the office 10g for

lovember 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old

Hafia

friend and tornan Brown and Duane Howlin "and friend"

visited the llunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states

that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(security chief Paul Rothormel was later firod by l!.L. Hunt's

sons after reports allcgadly surfaced that Rothernel was

"suspicious" of a possible lunt connection to the assassin-

ation. Folloving his termination by

the tunts, Rothermel.

Sound

that he was being illegally wiretapped.

Rothernel

filed suit agninst Lamar Hunt and another one of w.l. Hunt's

sons, charging them with the virctapring, and asking for

several million dollars in damages. The

suit, which has

produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers,

is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination,

accordina to a conclusion of the larren Commission, Jack

Ruly was also on his may to the lot lunt olilces In ballas.

The larren Commission concludod that Jacl Ruby drove a woman

Friend of his to tho llunt offices sometime that samo after-

noor. The woman, who had acclined

work in Ruby's nightclub

stripper,

drove with Ruby to the

lunt offices,

apparantly

in scarch of emploument. This does coincide with Braden's

visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The warren Commiasion investigated soveral other

possible

links of Jack luby to to munts,

includind the still

unernlined fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found insido

one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible lints, the

Harren Commission concluded only that evidence diù indicate

that Ruby had criven to the Hunt offices on lovember 21.

Thus a possible ruby-Braden connection on the day before

the President's assassination does indeed arise.

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13.

Jim BIncion: iossible link to David Ferric

Investigator Peter Moyes has turned up several pieces

of information which indicate a possible connection botreen

Jim

Braden and the mysterious

David Icrria.

David Farric was the homoscrual airline nilot and private

invostinator thor Jim Garrison accused of participating

in the plot to assassinate

PIcsident kennedy. Six days after

District ittorney Garrison's charges vero nade nublic, David

Ferrice was

found?

dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His

mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has boen a target of investigation ly critics

of the Warren Connission ever since the assassination. In

inct the aBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible

Ferrie role inmodiatoly after the assassination. It was

widely rumored in He: Orloans and Dallas that Forrie vas to

alleged assassins out of the country folloring

the assassination. Ine warren Commission decided not to include

the official secrot sarvice and FBI reports on Forric in

26 volumes of Hearints which vere released after the warren

Leport was

issued. However,

the Justice Denartment did finally

release those ronorts to the National Archives in 1957 following

Garrison's public accusations.

author Noves has siner established that both Jim Braden and

Davod Ferrie worked out of thenfloor of offices in a building

in Now Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the

assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the faci that

at that

time the mysterious David Forrie was cnploved as a private

investigator by Carlos Marcello, the lon Hafia Kinavin. It

is widely believed by nost federal authorities that Carlos

Marcello rants with his close friend lloyer Lansly as one of

the two single most poverful loadors of the infia's national

international crine syndicate. Carlos inrcello heads the

l'afia ompire conterod in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls

most of the Mafia activity in the southern part

of the United

States.

In Septenber and October of 1963, just weeks bofore the

assassination, David Ferrie was

working out of the offices

of carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. wray Gill. Ferrie,

who was doing investigative work on a

nerjury charge that his

boss larcello was then encing, worked out of loom 1707 in the

Fore liarauctte Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in september and October of 1963, Jim

Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the fere ilarguetic

Building.

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Braden was then commuting between ller orleans and

Beverly tills, with the approval of his Parole Board.

was working as a representative of his lafia

fricnd Roger Bauman, the oil spoculator. Braden worked

out of Room 1701, which was the office of his associate.

victor Main, Jr.

an oil geologist. This was just a short

way down the hall from David ferrie in room 1707.

Interestintly,

in one visit to his Parole Offico, Braden

"nistalenly" told his Parole Officer that he as worling

out of Room 1706 - which would have heen the room next

door to ferrie - instead of room 1701.

Thus a nossihle Braden-Ferrie connection in the weeks

just bofore the assassination does indeed arise in acdition

to the possiblr Braden-Ruby connection. Both connections

definitely do seem to fall outside of or bevond the arca

which could reasonably be attributed to coincidence, chance,

or circumstance.

Povond sovoral sets of information nich tend to indicate

that David!

Ferric had some contact with lee Oswald at

the critics of the warren Comission

articularly focused on Ferrie's ties to Carlos marcelic

the Marcello kafia empire.

In fact, in his interviews with the FBI and secret Service.

after the assassination,

Forrie claimed that he was with

Marcello at the very time of the assassination. Ferrie

stated that he was in court with Marcello on

the afternoon

of rovember 22, which does appear to be true.

Carlos Marcollo, along with leyer Lansky, had become the

of the Justice Department's Organized

Crine Division in the carly l9bl's, under the vigorous

direction of Attorney General Robert Kenncdy.

rarcello, known

Marcello once claimed that he had been kidnapped under orders

of robert lichnedy and the Justice Department.

Fa Reid,

author of the Greeniclt Jungle and widely recognized

as one of the most respected exports on the Mafia in the

nation, has written that Carlos Marcello once threatened to

have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Roid has

written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant

who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in

scotember of 1962.

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15.

Iccordina to heirl's informant, Marcello told his top

lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby

sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The

informant stated that larcello said that President

•Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and

that his brother would then follow. The informant

further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut"

to do the killings.

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16.

Jim Braden: Author Peter loves And Judae lvIng

Peter Moyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered

most of the

material regarding Jim Braden (Bugone Brading),

is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthe!

Byrne, JI.

the U.S. District Court Judge who presided

over the Ellsbera

Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case

against Ellsbera after he was notified that the white

Ilouse "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of

üllsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that fresident Nixon

had twice instructed John thrlichnan to anproach Judge

Byrne during the course of the tllsberg trial and offer him

the rosition of Diroctor of the FBI. This offer, which Judge

Byrne resused, has

been regarded as a potential

bribery by some critics of President Inson, and is currently

under investigation by the soccial Prosecutor's office.

It has boon widely assumed

that lixon's fervent intcrest

in the outcone of the prosecution of allahore may have

been the motivation behind his approach

to Judge Byrne.

Author Moyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's

involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 195?

, after

coyes had accumulated much of his

information regarding

tie mysterious Braden, he took the information to hin

Prichd, Matt Byrne, uno was then los. attorney for southern

California. Hoyes had several talks with Byone and has said

that Byrne

was very impressed by the subatantive evidence

which Moves had

gathered. During one of these mectings with

byrne and another FBI man

whom Byrne had invited to attend,

the Fil man told Moves that the FBI had never before linown

that Jin Braden - the man arrested at the scone of the

assassination in 1903 - was actually Bugone erading. The

FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistala

in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record.

The FBI man was nearly incredulous over loves' evidance on

Braden.

loyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been

in ios angeles on the night that robert Kenncdy was assassinated

in carly June of 1968.

Though loves couldn't find any significant information indicating

any. Braden connection to the secona kennedy murder, he and his

friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the

Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the rek doath.

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1/.

The special Unit of the mapp, accordin?

to loves

counted the incornation reming the Rel asaassinations

but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the

1963 assassination. loyes writes that Judge Byrne never

heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information

to the REi investigators.

Inter, ittorney General John Mitchell slecied Byrne to

be Brocutive Director for the scranton Commission that

investigated student unrest several years ago. Folloring

his sork for the scranton Commission, U.s. Attorney Burne

was arpointed U.S. District Court Judoc b! President Wixon,

the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

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!''.

Jin bration: there lie Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of fresident.

Konnedy, Bugene Brading (Jim Bradon) had an upturn in

his porsonal finances.

Bracing later roported a large increase in revenue from

an oil w0l] he had

an interest in bach in Louisiana. ic

reported the large increase in revenue from the well for

the month of lovember 1963.

A month Inter, in Decendor of 1963, Bradina becane a

charter momber of the exclusive land very capensive)

ra costa country Club in southern California. Later that

year, 196t, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend

Roger Dauman established the "D and B'Cattle Comnanu."

The connany was set u! in Chicago and yes presumably

naned after them,

"B and b," though neither of the tro

men are listod as corpornte officors. It uas also during

this same neriod that Brading made a subotantial investment

in two. lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lenathy parole vas finally terninated.

1Ie 500:1

bought a new home near the la Costa Country Club

which he had joined, and

he also bought a house for his.

parents in santa

Barbara.

And

it is at the la Costa Country Clus that the mysterious

trail of Jim Bracion, or Lucene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The li Costa Country Club,

which Brading had joined as one

of its 100 Charter nenbors in January of 1961, is one of

the more. notorious lafia propertios in the nation.

the most poucrful force bohind la Costa is Noc Dalitz, one

of lever Innoky's single closest associates. Hoe Dalitz hác

been the loader of the early Mayfield road Gang in Cleveland,

and mnd been the founder of the

actual Clevoland syndicate

one of the nost noverful forces in the national crime syndicate.

joe Dalitz hall been one of the lifia's biggest investors in

vegas,

and it had been Dalitz who had porsonally helped

sot un the lovard lughes empire in Las Veras. Dalitz hoa

sold nuch of his own holdings to lloward liughes in the late

1960's.

54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 38

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## Page 39

1.9.

The la Costa Country Club had become, under the direction

of dioc Dalitz and liever Lansky, a key "watering hole" of

the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through :

syndicate deal

with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of

the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used

in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is

known in the Mafia as "open

territory" - neaning that no

single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long

regardod la Costa as a

nrime hangout for the Mafia. Some

officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in

La Costa to a numbor of Hollynood celchrition, so as to

soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members

were Frank Sinatra, Bob liope, and Bing Crosby.

lombors of Prosident Mixon's inner circle also became

frequent quests to la costa, which is just trenty miles

San Clemento. Early in the Mixon

Administration,

in 106?, Los ingeles Police vere astonished to find Murray

Chotiner, ons of the President's closest confidantes, living

it up at

La Costa while the President

was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Mixon was at san Clem-

ente, H.R. Inldoman, John Ehrlichman, Richard toore,

Dean held a sarics of mectinas at La Costa to discuss

the latergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to

unravel.

John Dean gave longthy testimony during the irvin Committoo

hearings rogerding

"the la Costa nectinos." These meetings

at lin Costa

have since onorged as porhans the nost crucial

stratogy sossions involved in the allened cover-up of

Maternate by the

President's closest aides. Dean

testified

that the la costa mentinos took place over a period of tio

days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testifind that the sessions

hold in a special villa at La Costa that was used by

laldeman.

Eters been during us benarao reen the desome

the most important Mafia operatives at la costa.

iccording to numerous intelligence reports, from callfornia

wevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of

being the personal courier for national crine syndicate boss

Heyer Lansky.

HH 54923 DocId 32423629 Page 39

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## Page 40

20.

the movara Gaming Board is continuing an investigation

into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for

"skimmed" gambling revenue from las Vegas. Investigator

Hoyes was told by several high government officials that

Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal

courier for lever Lunsky. One official disclosed that

Bradon ins suspected of

taking over 572 million out of

the country for the sindicate. inother official said

that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investi-

nation by Califoinia authorities following an incident at

La Costa.

A janitor at la Corta opened Braden's molf locker to malic

a routine inapection. Out of

the locker tumbled a bundle of

well over sino, con in cash.

author loves was informed by one official that tie bundle

had contrina! at least 1120, dog in cool, and another Cal-

¡fornia official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questionina regarding the incident, traden

stated

that he had received the

noney from an oil transaction,

and that he had temporailly stored it in the locker. Later,

one of the officials vorling on

that particular investigation

of Braden, told Hoven that lraden had also been given the use

of two planes ouned by Howard Hughes to fly lafia gambling

cash out of lovada and the country.

It present, surene Brading, alias Jim Bronion, is still

opcrating out of la costa.

(Braden is now lining in Atlanta)

- Mike Ewing

sen. Hughes office

June,

1974

HTH

54923

DocId: 32423629

Page

40

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## Page 41

RICHARD I. THORNBUIGH

RE: JKE ASSASSINATION

January 21, 1977

IN REPLY PLEASE

REFER TO R4 6250

Honorable Richard I. Thornburgh

Acting Attorney General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C.

Dear General Thornburgh:

The Senate Select Coumittee on Intelligence would.

most appreciate prompt access to Federal Bureau of

Investigation materlal rolating to MI. Nelson Bunker

Hunt and Mr. Eugene Brading, a/k/a Jin Braden.

Your assistance and cooperation with the Select

Committed:is most appreciated.

Aloha,

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Chairman

HSL/ de

ce:

15- author file

1 subjact matter file

Willtan G. Miller

MIchael J. Madigan

NH 54923 Docld:32423629 Page 41

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## Page 42

DONALD F. MASSEY

RE: LEE HARVEY ONWALD

December 8, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE

REFER TO RA5785

Mr. Donald F. Massey

Washington, D.C.

Dear Don:

As I mentioned briefly this afternoon, the Select

Conmittee has expressed an interest in recent press accounte

suggesting the existence of transcripts of lee Harvey:

Orwald conversations in Mexico City. I would be pleased:

if you would advise as to the existence of such transcripts

and their avallability for review by the Senata Select-

Committee.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this

request.

Sincerety,

HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

Minority Staff Director

CC:"

1 - Author File

1 - Subject File

1 - Minority Counsel

1 - Staff Director

HH 54923

DocId:32423629 Page 42

---

## Page 43

Schule

AM

rudeau

MD!

LE

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy

1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover

gan, has waived the confidentiality we

was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the

later divulged this important informa

had promised him.

Central Intelligence Agency received

tion to the Warren Commission.

evidence suggesting that Cuban Pre-

Morgan told us in January, 1967,

Of course, various CIA officials also

mier Fidel Castro arranged the assassi-

about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot

knew about the assassination scheme.

nation in retaliation for attempts on

Not the least of them was the late CIA

against Castro. He raised the possibil

his life.

ity that the plot could have backfired

Yet sources privy to the secret dis-

chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved

cussions at the highest levels of the

the original plan. He later served on... against President Kennedy. There

were suspicious circumstances,

the Warren Commmission, yet he sat :

CIA during those hectic days now tell

silently throughout the investigation

pointed out, indicating that Castro

us that the CIA deliberately withheld

the evidence from the Warren Com-

without mentioning the Cuban angle.

may bave learned of the attempts on

his life and may have retaliated

mission investigating Kennedy's death

Within hours of President Kenne-

against Kennedy.

Our sources cite two reasons for

dy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled in-

Morgan refused to identify his

holding back this evidence. One was a

formation from Mexico City suggest-

sources because it would have violated

resolve to cover up the secret that the

ing that the Cubans may have been be-

the attorney-client privilege. But he

CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill

hind the assassination. Our sources say

was an attorney of such stature that

Castro.

that the CIA developed similar infor-

we didn't doubt his word. He had been

There also was a legitimate concern

mation in Washington.

chief inspector of the FBI. He had di:

that the Castro revelations might in:

The first person to reach Robert

rected the historic congressional inves

flame the American people,

whose

Kennedy's side after the shooting was

tigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing.

grief could have turned into a terrible

CIA Director John A. McCone, who re-

Later, he ran the investigation into the

wrath that might have precipitated

mained alone with the Attorney Gen-

excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCar-

some rash action.

eral at his McLean, Va., home for

thy.

Only a few key people knew about

nearly three hours.

We got Morgan's permission, to

the CIA plot to assassinate Castro: One

McCone swore to us that Castro's

write a cautious story. We confirmed

was Attorney General Robert F. Ken :

name was never mentioned during the

the general outlines from a CIA

nedy, who was his brother's personal

three hours. But CIA records show

source. Then on March 3, 1967, we

watchdog over the CIA. It has now

that the next day McCone not only

wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have

been established that Robert Kennedy

mentioned Castro to the new Presi-

' approved an assassination plot, which

was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the

dent, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed

then possibly backfired against his late.

attempt to use underworld killers to

him on the information from Mexico.

brother."

knock off Castro.

City.

The next day, according to records

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cau-

Yet no one brought the Cuban

now available, Kennedy's secretarv

tioned the CIA not to go ahead with

connection to the attention of the War-

called for a copy of the May 7, 1962,

the assassination without consulting

ren Commission. We were the first to

memo, which summarized the briefing

him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd

get word of the anti-Castro plot to

he had received on the assassination

on the CIA, it must be assumed that he

Chief Justice Earl Warren, the com-

plot.

was kept advised of subsequent assassi-

mission chairman, four years later.

On March 7, 1967, we reported more

nation attempts. However, there is no

We are now free to reveal our role

details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to

documentary evidence of this.

in the drama. Two of our confidential

assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we

Records now available show

that

sources,

CIA agent William Harvey

wrote,

may have resulted in a

Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J

and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A

counterplot by Castro to assassinate

Edgar Hoover of the plot on: May. 10,

third source, attorney Edward P. Mor-

President Kennedy."

• DROPOUTS

YOU SAY YOU HAVE

RECURRING FANTASIES

OF. SPACE FLIGHT...

NOT

PARTICULARLY...

- DO YOU DESIRE TO

EXPERIENCE INTERPLANETARY

TRAVEL?

JUST. THE

WEIGHTLESSNESS

HH

549'

DocId: 32423629CPadL/YF 11.I.FY

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## Page 44

imposteal

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed

Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder,

John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld

recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Cas-

tro, had been privately claiming that

agents of the Cuban premier, in' retali.

' ation, were involved in the assassina-

tion of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connec-

tion to the Kennedy assassination was

expressed through his attorney,

Ed-

ward P. Morgan, to the FBI

as long

ago as March, 1967, and also in private.

, conversations with a longtime associ.

ate of Rosselli who participated in

meetings between Rosselli

and the

CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on

an

interview

with

Morgan

dated

March 21, 1967, was included, without

identification of the

interviewee, in

last June's Senate Intelligence Com-

mittee's report on the role of the in-

telligence community in the Kennedy

assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli

and

another Morgan

client had in-

formed him that Castro became aware

of

CIA

assassination

against him and "thereafter employed

teams of individuals who were dis-

patched to the United States for the

purpose of assassinating Mr. Ken•

nedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Ros-

selli was identified in the Senate re-

port, the significance of that portion

of the 106-page

document was dis-

counted at the time it was published :

in June, before Rosselli's disappear:

ance and the subsequent discovery of

his body in

an

oil drum

in

Florida

waters. The Washington Post, however,

has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli

. were the sources of the testimony that

suggested a Cuban role in the Ken-

nedy murder.

Morgan's account, according: to a •

summary of the FBI interview, was

that Rosselli had reached his conclu-

sion about a Cuban connection to the

Kennedy

assassination

from

«feedback" furnished by sources close

to Castro who were involved in the CIA

plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware

of the identity of some of the individ-

uals who came to the United States

for this purpose and he understood

that two such individuals were now in

the state of New. Jersey," the FBI in

terview summary stated.

A long-time

associate. of Rosselli

who was interviewed separately by

The Washington Post, said there was

no question in the slain mobster's

mind that President Kennedy was

¿ killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal

for the CIA schemes against the Cu-.

ban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said

the associate, who knew Rosselli well

and was in contact with him before

• Rosselli disappeared from his Florida

home on July 28. The associate, who

i does not want to be identified pub-

i licly, is scheduled to be interviewed

this week by Dade County, Fla., homi-

cide detectives. He was a party to Ros-

selli's contacts in the early 1960s with

CIA case officers overseeing the at-

tempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the

collective conclusion of all

official

U.S. government investigations into

the Kennedy assassination-including

the Warren Commission, the FBI and

the CIA-has been that there was no

evidence that implicated the Castro

• government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in

. the schemes to assassinate : Castro

was not divulged to the Warren Com-

mission, and knowledge of them was

confined until 1967 to a small,

elite

circle of the U.S. intelligence commu-

nity: President Johnson

apparently

first learned about the schemes only

after a March 7, 1967, column by the

•late Drew Person,

which

prompted

: Johnson to order a CIA investigation

of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld

collusion in the plots to kill Castro

did not surface publicly until the pub

lication last year of the Senate Intelli-

gence

Committee's assassination re

port and the ensuing report last June

on the possible role of the intelligence

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629 Page 44

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## Page 45

agencies in the Kennedy assassination

and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived

flamboyantly in a world of mobsters,

politicians and playgiris,

was found

two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum

weighted with chains but buoyed by

¡gases

from

decomposition

on the

' ocean's surface off the coast of Miami,

The specific cause of death was deter

mined by an autopsy to be asphyxia-

Last year, an underworld colleague

¿of Rosselli,

Sam (Momo) Giancana,

who also had been recruited by the

CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was

; found shot to death in his Chicago

home in what police described as a

highly professional job by assailants

who penetrated the mobster's per-

'sonal security screen. Giancana was

due to testify before the Senate Intel-

ligence Committee shortly after his

Neither murder Has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's mur-

der might have been related to his

Senate testimony on the CIA schemes

to kill Castro has brought the FBI

into the investigation at

of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Gian-

cana and other underworld figures-

Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana

gambling enterprises fell hostage in

1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots

against Castro had been a closely held

secret within the top echelons of the

CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppres

sion and eventual disclosure, although

detailed in the June report, has re-

ceived little public attention. Rossel-

li's murder adds significance to those

Here is the sequence, pieced to-

gether from the testimony given to

Senate intelligence investigators:

-

the late Chief Justice of the United

States Earl Warren late in January,..

1967, and told him that a Washington:

lawyer had confided to him that one

of his clients said the United States

"had attempted to assassinate Fidel

Castro in the early 1960s and Castro

had decided to retaliate." •

Warren declined Pearson's sugges-

tion that he see the lawyer,

Edward Morgan. Warren referred the

matter to then Secret Service Direc-

tor James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, :

1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Ho-

over, informing him of the allegations.

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 45

- 2 -

• Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six

senior bureau

• only basis. There is no.record of FBI

meetings or discussions of those alle-

gations. At that point the sensitive let-

forth'in the

higher reaches

of the FBI bureauc-

The job of responding to Rowley's

letter was assigned to the supervisor

of the FBI's General Investigative Di-

vision who was given responsility for

the overall assassination investigation

in March 1964.

• This official's job was complicated

by the fact that he had never been in-

formed of what Hoover and his closest

circle of confidants in the FBI learned

1962—that the CIA was

involved in assassination

attempts against Castro, and promi-

nent American underworld figures, in-

cluding Rosselli and Giancana, had

been recruited for the attempts:

So on Feb. 15, 1967. the FBI ofticial

prepared a draft reply to the Rowley

letter for his superiors saying "our in-

vestigation uncovered no evidence in-

dicating Fidel Castro officials of the

Government were involved

..with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assas-

sination of President Kennedy. This

'bureau is not conducting any investi-

gation regarding this matter." The

FBI official added in later testimony

that "everyone.in the higher echelons

Drew Pearson went ahead and pub-

lished a column on March 7; 196%, ref-

erring to reports that ClA schemes

against Castro's life in 1963

have resulted in a counterplot by Cas-

tro to assassinate President Kenne-

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one

of Lyndon Johnson's

chief deputies,

called FBI, assistant director Cartha

DeLoach with the message that "the

President had instructed that the FBI.

interview (Morgan) concerning 'any

knowledge he might have regarding

nee a sassination of Fresident Ken;

DeLoach told

peared Morgan "did not want to be in-

terviewed, and even if he was inter-

viewed he would probably not divulge

the identity of his sources . ." Wat-

son persisted, however.

circumstances,"

Loach concluded in a memo for the.

"it appears that we have no al-

ternative but to interview (Morgan)

and then furnish the results to Wat:

son in blind memorandum form.".

The interview was assigned to two

agents from the FBI's General Investi-

gative Division, which the Senate

committee concluded was "puzzling"

because it was

the Domestic Intelli-

gence Division which had been as-

signed responsibility for investigating

possible foreign involvement in the

assassination.

Neither agent was

privy

to the

knowledge, confined to Hoover and

his top aides, of the CIA's assassina-'

tion plots against Castro. Both agents

testified eight years later that they

were

"surprised" when

Morgan

al-

luded during the interview to U.S. at-

tempts' to assassinate Castro.

'(Morgan's) allegations or question him

in detail on them, since they had not

been briefed on the CIA assassination

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Wash-

ington Field Office sent headquarters

copies of a blind memorandum

summarizing the interview with Mor-

In a Senate Intelligence Committee

summary of the FBI interview, Mor-.

gan was reported to have acknowl-.

edged that his clients. were

fringe of the underworld" and that

they faced "possible prosecution in a

crime not related to the assassination

Morgan said his clients "were called

upon by a governmental agency to as-

sist in a project which was said to

have the highest governmental ap

proval. The project had as its purpose

the assassination of Fidel

Elaborate plans were made, including

..the infiltration of the Cuban Govern-

ment and the placing of informants

within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according

to the summary, that Castro had em-

of individuals

were dispatched to the United States.:

for the purpose of assassinating Presi

* "dent Kennedy."

It was not 'clear then—nor is it to!

day-why Morgan came forward

that time to bring Rosselli's story to

the ears of the nation's highest law.

enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had

serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI. threatened to

deport him for living in the United

States under an assumed name unless

he cooperated in an investigation of

the Mafia (his true rame was Filippo

Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA

contact from the anti-Castro conspir-

acy days, CIA security director Col.'

Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

---

## Page 46

FBI that Rosselli wanted' to "keep

the bureau" but was

afraid that the mob might kill him for

In 1967, after he was arrested for

gambling fraud at the Friars. Club' in

Beverly Hills,

Rosselli approached his

former CIA case officer, William Har:

vey. who sought unsuccessfully go in

tercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that

Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson,

and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sen

against Castro and the Cuban counter-

espionage directed against President

Last April Rosselli told the Senate

Intelligence Committee he had no rec

ollection of either receiving intorma-

President Kennedy or of having dis-

cussed it with Morgan. This meant ei

ther that Rosselli suffered a dramatic

memory loss or that Morgan's state-

ment to FBI agents nine years earlier

for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source. could explain

the discrepancy, and Morgan declined

to confirm that Rosselli was the client

allegations against the Cuban govern-

ment or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967

interview with Morgan was sent to

headquarters with a transmittal slip

saying: "No further investigation is

field office unless it is advised to the

contrary by the Bureau."'

The Senate intelligence committee,

in commenting on this position, said

the interviewing agents

known of the CIA underworld plots

against Castro, they would have been

aware that the lawyer had clients who:

had been active, in the assassination

On March 21, FBI headquarters for-

memo to the White House, the attor-

ney general and the Secret Service. It

vestigation of Morgan's allegations.

the following

day, President Johnson called CIA Di-

rector Richard M. Helms to the White

House. The next morning, March 23,

Helms ordered the CIA inspector gen-

eral to prepare a report on the CIA

involvement in the assassination plots

Mongoose-of

Helms had full knowledge at the time:

they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President:

Johnson on the results. There is, how-.

ever, no evidence that Helms briefed

the President on the November, 1963,

plot-one of eight major schemes on

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 46

- 3 -

Castro's life from 1960 to 1965-to as-

sassinate the Cuban leader through

the employment of an agent with the

cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity

was revealed as

Rolando Cubela, a

1961 CIA "recruit" with close access

to Castro.

CIA, operatives turned over assassi.

nation equipment to Cubela during a,

• Paris meeting on November 22, 1963-

the day President Kennedy was killed

in Dallas. There has been subsequent

speculation that' the mercurial

and

talkative, Cubela was either a double:

agent or

intelligence.

being, monitored by Cuban

During the later days of his presi-.

dency, Mr. Johnson: spoke cryptically

of a

"Caribbean

'Murder Incorpo-

rated" targeted against Fidel Castro:

The inspiration for that statement un-

* doubtedly was the CIA inspector gen• :

era's report he ordered Helma to have

i prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and

two of his co-conspirators in the Cas

tro assassination schemes have died,

Giancana. at the hands of a profes-

sional hit man and Harvey as the re-

sult of a "massive heart attack" last

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of

the deceased CIA'

suspected no foul play in her hus

band's death. She did, however, tell

Washington Post that she re-

ceived a call after Rosselli's disappear.

ance in late July warning her that Cu-

bans appeared to be attempting to

wipe out all those who participated in

the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old

friend who was acquainted with Ros-

selli's sister, whose name is Edith Dai-

gle. Mrs, Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle

told the mutual acquaintance that the

Rosselli family had received a tele-

phone threat from unidentified Cu-

bans prior to Rosselli's disappearance.

She also said that Rosselli had gone to

meet the Cubans in an effort to pro-

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by

The Washington Post. But another sis-

ter of Rosselli said she had heard of

no such threats or warnings.

whose exploits as a clandestine opera-

tor are both legendary and controver-

sial within the agency, testified to the

Senate Intelligence

had become Rosselli's case

• Operation Mongoose and supplied the

mobster with poison pills, explosives,

detonators, rifles,

radar for transmission to'

anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and

Rosselli. a CIA superior testified to

the Senate coinmittee.

"developed a

: close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked

with Rosselli, James!R. O'Connell, was

asked if he knew whethet the agency

transmitted information to the mob-

ster on possible Cuban involvement in

the Kennedy assassination. He replied

that he was out of the dountry at the

tune Kerody was killed, and had no

further.comment.

, Two months before the Kennedy as-

sassination,

Lee Harvey Oswald, who

was identified by the Warren Commis-

sion as Kennedy's murderer, had trav.

eled to Mexico City in an attempt to

gain entry to Cuba. According to the

Warren Commission, Oswald

repre

sented himself as the head of the New

Orleans branch of the Fair Play for

Cuba organization and a friend of the

Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy

was killed,

Castro told

Associated

Press reporter Daniel Harker that

U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to

eliminate Cuban leaders would them-

selves not be. safe.'

A U.S. government committee coor

dinating policy toward Cuba at the

•, time agreed there is a strong liklihood

that Castro would retaliate in some

fashion. However, it concluded Castro

would not risk a major confrontation

with the U.S. by attacking U.S: lead-

ers.

On the same day Kennedy was as

sassinated, a CIA officer met with a

high-ranking Cuban official, who had

said he would kill Castro, to tell him

the U.S. would provide him with ex-

plosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Com-

mittee said it found no evidence suffi-

cient to justify a conclusion that the

Kennedy assassination was part of a

conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies

did not properly investigate the assas

sination or tell the Warren Commis-

sion about the CIA plots on Castro's

"There is no indication that the FBI

or the CIA directed the interviewing

of Cuban sources

the Cuban exile. community," the Sen

ate committee said.

According to a former FBI official

in charge of key aspects of the FBI's

probe of the Kennedy murder, the

FBI never satisfactorily determined

what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or

what he had done in Russia.

---

## Page 47

Howard neting

THE WASHINGTON POST

September 12, 1976

Mon tirg'e

The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana

An inquisitive American learns many things on a

visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high

officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the

investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be re-

opened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban

factor in the murder.

•Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban;

government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos

Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed

closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence

Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commis-

sion investigation. The Cubans are well aware that the

doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to

inform the Warren Commission of the several plots

mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge

of these plots appears to have been withheld even

from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible

for investigating the President's murder and for sup

porting the work of the Warren Commission. As a re-

sult, there was no special effort to explore the possi-

ble involvement of either the Cuban government or

Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed

by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plau.:

sible and a new inquiry imperative.

The situation is murkier and more perplexing than :

ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories.

• and who have been prepared even, eager -to be-

lieve that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no:

Jonger rely on the Warren Commission report as an

"The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on For

cign Relations." 7

21194

adequate prop for their predilections. The commis,

sion did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the

very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the

Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a rank-

ing Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and re.i

cently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the mur.:

der of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French re.

porter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Cas-

tro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed"

by President Kennedy in a brief interview at they

White House on Oct. 2%, persuading Castro that Ken.

nedy: wanted to explore ways to normalize relations.

• Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S.

policy. toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only

on two tracks but in opposite directions, and move;

ment on either track could have provoked violent re-

sponse by one or another Cuban faction...

Perceptions inside the Cuban government re-

sponded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is

good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation

involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept

one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CLA even-

, tually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "inse-:

cure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries.

within two days of the assassination it was known (but

not to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had:

been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City,

where Oswald had gone in September 1983 to visit

hoth the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these .

• facts are significant or merely coincidental, one can-

not tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with

some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit

Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted;

the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at

Havana.

Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AM•:

. LASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7,

1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cu-

ban conspirator for the first time since the preceding

year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called

in Associated, Press reporter Daniel Harker för an un.!

expected interview. Only three Western reporters.

were based in Havana at the time and their contact

with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban

leader had a message he wished to get on the record

through Harker. He charged that the United States

was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S.

leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to elimi

nate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory

and more understandable now that we know what

Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United

States was in fact stepping up its covert operations

against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet

it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban pol.

icy as it was then evolving.

For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro

had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are

signs that he was interested in an opening to Wash-

ington, On Sept. 5, the. Cubans quietly proposed talks,

with the Americans at the United Nations, and Ken-se

medy soon responded with interest: Also, in early Sep

tember the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos

Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport.

spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials

have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that

occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and com-:

ments as hinting of American interest in a possible ace

commodation, much as they were later to interpret

the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.

Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Ken-?

nedy has been a compound of political antipathy andy

personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role

in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and

his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate re

gard for the President's courage and realism. They

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 47

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## Page 48

profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to

more hopeful relations between the two countries

The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment,

he same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a,

more mature, poised and forward-looking leader, with i

whom they could have done business.

With this frame of reference, Cuban officials specu.:

late that the real origin of the assassination lies in an-.

ti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch.

• They emphasize that assassination is incompatible

with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they

never contemplated it even against Batista, the pre--

vious Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion

that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny

Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the

CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with

Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.

Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "count.

er-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, )

but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further

investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from :

seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American rela-

, tions, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry.

Their curiosity seems greater than their completi

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629

Page 48

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## Page 49

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked

Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE

In 1960, when the CIA was try-

• ing to set up a delicate attempt on

the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to

a man once described as "the big-

gest flag-waving SOB in the coun

Coast underworld

• figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli - a seemingly improba-

¡ble conspirator in a

plot — got the "flag-waving" label

from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana,

¡then Chicago's top crime boss and

a man Rosselli brought into that

Now both are dead, murdered in

the past year, and investigators are

wondering

whether their

plotting

led to their deaths and whether the

CIA plots against Castro - only

recently made public and even kept

from the Warren Commission -

are vitai clues to the John F. Ken-

nedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June

of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer,

have aroused a renewed concern in

Washington, where on Friday the

House of Representives voted to re-

open the investigation of the Ken-

nedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D.,

Va.), who will be chairman of the,

panel, said he is "convinced" a con-

spiracy was involved in Kennedy's

death.

Now, in the aftermath of the vi-:

olent deaths of Giancana and Ros-

selli, the question arises of what

role, if any, the Kennedy White

House

played in the early 1960s

"deal" the CIA made with the two

underworld figures to have Castro

murdered.

Whether "the Kennedy" Whité'

House knew about about the. CIA's

plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found

out after the contacts were ended),

the ClA's use of the underworld

seems ironic in retrospect.

• Robert Kennedy's passionate ef-

forts to disable organized crime are

well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy

wrote about what he had learned

of organized crime in America

from his years as chief counsel to

the Senate Rackets Committee, he

•t00 quoted Giancana to make a

He told about Giancana's inter-

view at his local draft board at the

outbreak of World War II, when

he was asked what he did for a liv-

ing steal," Giancana is said to

have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to

war and years later would boast to

Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that

he stayed out of the Army - la-

beled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndi-

'cate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana.

"Two or three of us get together

Son a business deal and

"says it's a bad thing. Businessmen

A Senate committee began stu-:

"dying the Kennedy questions more

than a year ago as it looked at co-

{vert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate

¿report last November, Sen. Howard

(Baker (R., Tenn.) said,

personal view that on balance the

likelihood that presidents (the re-

port dealt with Dwight Eisenhoweri

and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro)

assassination plots is greater than

the likelihood that they did not."

lust to trace Rosselli's history

with the ClA is mind-boggling

the investigators. Yet, it is just one

aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli - born on the

fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and

71 when he died - was not first

and foremost a ClA operative.

÷ His greater role as evidenced by :

two convictions, his

associations

and to some extent his own .com-

ments, was as an influential, if

publicly lesser known, organized

crime figure.

• HIS ASSOCIATION with other

identified

underworld

members.

was monitored by law enforcement

agencies

as recently as several:

weeks before his July 28 disap-

pearance.

• By all accounts, Rosselli was a i

charming man, dressing in expen-

'sive clothes, married for only two

years in the

early

1940s

and

iknown most of his life as one who

leasily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told

lin a short autobiography written

tabout 1967 that his

"life of crime"

¡began as a teenager in Boston, at-

tempting arson for his stepfather

and stealing $50 on his own. As her

traveled west, finally to settle in

California, his attention turned to:

bootlegging,

gambling

and dab-

'bling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded

the West Coust gambling interests

for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the

ClA for a Castro plot in 1960 is un-

Clear, although ClA officials have

since testified that they wanted the

'kind of contacts in Cuba which or-

ganized crime had made during the

pre-Castro days when Havana was

a. gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rossel-

li because he had influence with :

Florida's Santo Trafficante, consid-:

ered the key underworld gambling

figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and un-?

derworld conspiracies, an awesome

web spanning decades, is left to a

tean of nine in the Metro Homicide

Division. It is a team now clearly

consumed by the task which has

been a full-time operation

Rosselli's body was pulled from

Dumfoundling Buy on Aug. 7.

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 49

---

## Page 50

• THAT THE Metro team is even

involved is happenstance. Rosselli

lived in Plantation, Broward Coun-

ty, with his sister and brother-in-

law. It's just that his killers chose

• to dump his body in Dade.

While.

several

detectives say

their instincts lead them to con-

clude that the Rosselli murder was

an internal underworld affair, all

on the team are aware of the pres-

sure on them to search each clue

that leads back to the CIA-Castro

affair.

• With Rosselli's death this sum-

iner, the newly appointed Senate

committee saw its list of knowi-

edgeable witnesses further trim-

med. Some of those witnesses have

died violently and some from natu-

rai causes.

• When Giancana was murdered in

June of 1975, before he could even

be questioned by the committee

staff, authorities attributed it to an

internal gangland struggle - even

though. the murderer is still. un:

known.

• The death of Rosselli, who had

appeared

before the

committee

three times in the past year with-

out immunity, caused greater con-

cern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body

was identified - the legs hacked

off and stuffed along with the body

into an oil drum - Baker, vice

chairman of the Senate Intelligence

Committee, called for the FBI to

get involved in the case. (Several

days later, Attorney General Ed-

ward Levi ordered FBl involve-

ment.)

It wasn't until

several weeks

later, however,

that

what

was

known to Baker became public

knowledge.

A section of the former commit-

tee's April report told of a Wash-

ington attorney who in 1967. went.

to

Supreme Court. Chief Justice

Earl Warren (chairman of

the:

then-disbanded

Warren

Commis-

sion) to say that two' of his clients?

believed they knew about Cuban

agents in the United States who

conspired in the assassination of

John F. Kennedy.:

THE INFORMATION; eventually

• reached the FBl, but as the senate

committee concluded this year, the

1967 FBI probe was slipshod

and

incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in

the report has since been identified

as Rosselli. And it has since been

learned

that Rosselli

was con-

vinced he held a vital clue to the

JFK murder.

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 50

- 2 -

"There was never

the slightest

doubt in John's mind that Castro.

was responsible for the assassina-:

tion of Kennedy," said Edward P.

Morgan, the attorney referred to in

Morgan is an attorney of no

in Washington. He

- served as chief counsel to the joint.

congressional

committee • which

the Pearl Harbor attack,

counsel to the Senate Foreign Rela-

and for seven

years was chief inspector of the

ROSSELLI told Morgan

the CIA plot in 1967, when the De-

partment of Justice was vigorously

attempting to deport Rosselli for

being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was cer-

tain that the people he (Rosselli) :

put around Castro in the CIA plot :

turned right around and killed Ken-

nedy. The people he still knew in

1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan,;

decided to talk about his CIA activi

ity in hopes of decreasing the pres-

sure from the FBI and Department

of Naturalization and Immigration,.

both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, in-

cluding Morgan, say they are con-;

vinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli :

to become an organized crime in-:

formant by threatening

him deported if he didn't coopera-:

through a bungled

wiretap

effort,

FBr became:

aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

• While Giancana

Rosselli :

were in Florida planning the opera-

tion, Giancana wanted to return to

Las

. Vegas

to check on his girl

friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he

suspected' of dating comedian Dan

Rowan. To keep Giancana in. Flori-

da, it was agreed that a bug would

be placed in her hotel room and her

conversations monitored.

But the private detective they

hired, with CIA money. it has since

been learned, was discovered and

arrested. Eventually the police in-

vestigation led back to the Castro

plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when

the CIA intervened and said the

"national interest" would be dam-

aged if the plot information be-

came public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was

again to be investigated in 1966,

this time by a Senate committee

headed by the late Sen. Edward

Long (D., Mo.), the CIẠ again step-

ped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pend-

ing investigation by Rosselli and

Robert

Manue,

a former FBI

agent-turned Howard Hughes aide

who was the CIA's initial link to

Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he

and Rosselli had been subpenaed to:

appear before the committee. Mor-!

gan said he called Lawrence Hous®:

ton, the CIA general counsel. Hous-

ton went to Long and the investig

gation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the:

Senate committee recently

empha-:

sized as well, that all information:

• about the CIA plots - which could

have been the incentive for pro-'

Castro forces to kill Kennedy -;

had been kept from the Warren:

Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl War-

ren," Morgan said.

"(His) report!

said that ... Oswald alone killed:

Kennedy. It kept bugging me after

so gruesome a detail from Rosselli

that the Chief Justice could put his

name on a report which didn't as-:

sess the most significant piece of

evidence bearing. on the killing of

Kennedy."

The

information Morgan

had

was passed to Warren via colum-

nist Drew Pearson, a

mutual:

friend. Eventually, it reached

the:

FBI, but, remarkably, even after di-

rect orders from President Lyndon

Johnson in the spring of 1967, in-:

vestigation was not vigorously pur.:

THE SENATE Intelligence Com-

mittee compared that apparent in-

action with a statement former FBI

director J. Edgar Hoover made to

the Warren Commission on May 5,

1964. Hoover said,

"well, I can as--

sure. you so far as the FBI is con-

cerned the case will be continued:

in an open classification

time. That is, any information com-

ing to us or any report coming to;

us from any source will' be thor-:

investigated,

ull be ave to prove or disprove

the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff memb,

ber commented recently,

really happening is that the investi-

gation which the FBI should have

done in 1967 - and no one can

come close to explaining why it.

wasn't — is actually being done:

HART, AS have local investiga-

tors, has established three possible

scenario's for Rosselli's death: his

recent organized crime activity, re-

taliation for his Castro assassina-

tion efforts or the information he

held concerning the JFK assassina-

tion.

---

## Page 51

Rosselli's - information

was the vital nerve of the Kennedy:

assassination,

" a Senate source told

High officials in the Cuban gov-:

ernment also reportedly feel there:

was a "Cuban factor"' in the JFK

death, but they see it as a result of

exile politics, according to a recent:

article by Alton Frye, a senior fel.

low of the Council Foreign Rela-:

Frye wrote that he visited Ha-

vana recently and met with. Cuban,

officials including

Deputy Prime

Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

... they volunteer the suspicion

that the recent murders of Sam Gi-

ancana and Johnny Rosselli ...

surely have some connection with

/ Cuban exile politics and the 'Kenne-

dy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories re-

cently propounded to show why

both pro and anti-Castro forces

could have wanted to get JFK out

On the one hand; there is the re-!

port of French journalist Jean Dan-

iel, who was the bcarer to Castro

of an offer from JFK for calmer re-

agreeable, The report stated thall

Daniel later was lunching" with

Castro when word came that Ken-:

nedy had been

scribed the Cuban leader as genu-

inely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that

probably in the very hour JFK was

shot, a one-time Castro supporter

was receiving a poison pen device

from a CIA agent in what was is

long-running

That Cuban agent was code-named

AM/LASH, and he has since been :

identified as Rolando Cuebala, now.

imprisoned in Cuba for his assassi-

nation plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge

of, or perhaps even approved, any:

of the assassination plots will prob-

ably never be known.*.r

His closest advisers, who testi-.

fied before the Senate Committee,)

all said he had no knowledge of*

such plots and would never have.

i approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was

passing poison pills to

his Cuban

contact

at a meeting: at the fon-

tainebleau, March of 1961, former

Florida

Sen. George Smathers, a

friend of Kennedy, said he and

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 51

- 3 -

Kennedy discussed the ramifica-

tions of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy

rejected the idea and that the dis-

cussion was more of a "brain-pick-

ing"' session.

AT LEAST one high-level.CIA

official did testify he believed the

White House was being briefed on

the plots but according to Richard

Bissell, one of the officials who

originally decided to use Rosselli, it

was through the method of "plau-

That, according to the recent

Senate report, "can also lead to the

use of euphemism and circumlocu-

tion, which are designed to allow

the President and other senior offi-

cials to deny knowledge of an op:

eration should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between

the White House and the under-

world plotters, first made public by

the Senate Committee,

been denied by virtually everyone

involved. Judith Campbell Exner,

the woman who claims to have

been friend and lover to both Gian-

cana and JFK, introduced to both

by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in

the Castro plotting, those close to

both Giancana and Kennedy have ::

A MAN with access to Kenne-

dy's closest advisers told The Her-

ald recently,

"The Giancana-Ros-

selli thing is unrelated to the Exner

thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew

her, but he was naive about those

kinds of things."

There is documentation to show

that on March 22, 1962, Hoover

lunched privately with Kennedy

and presumably gave him his first

information linking Exner with the

final recorded

call between

White

House and Exner was made only a

few hours later.

Another possible link discussed

in the Senate report shows that the

same unidentified Cuban to whom

Rosselli

prior to the Bay of Pigs operation

in April of 1961, was among

group of Cuban exile leaders who

met with JFK following the inva-

sion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the

Cubans • with

whom

Rosselli

worked have been identified, but

investigators say that not all are

known.

As a

condition to his appear.

ances before the Senate Committee.!

in the past year, it was agreed that 4

Rosselli

"would

not

state

the

hones or confirm the exis ence u

those

agents

whom

about," Rosselli's attorney Leslies

Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of

Rosselli who could be contacted by

The Herald all said

they

never

"i heard the names of the Cuban.

agents.

But a committee source cau-

tioned, "they (Cuban agents) read

the committee's report, they know

who's being referred to."

lom Wadden, a partner of Edward a

Bennett Williams, said,

think he had more knowledge"

Searching Rosselli's more recent:

for enemies also presents:

, problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli ap-d

pears to begin in the late 1960s. In

1967, he was convicted in a card-:

cheating scandal at the posh, celeb-.

rity-filled. Friar's Club in Los An- :

geles where the influence of Sina:

tra had made him a member ac-

Deportation pressures were also

mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the

conviction in 1970 where he would

serve three years of a five-year.

sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a.

federal grand jury in Los Angeles

which was probing whether some

indentified Detroit organized crime

leaders conspired with the Emprise

Corp. — a giant firm with nation-

wide race track and sporting event!

concessions - to hide financial in-

terests in the Frontier Hotel in Las

Rosselli, too, had, an interest in

the Frontier, which opened in 1967.:

He owned the gift shop concession :

along with a partner named Joe.

How Rosselli obtained the

concession is unclear, but' Breen:

said it gave Rosselli an' income of

about $60,000..

ROSSELLI at one time had been :

a major influence in Las

Vegas.

Several sources sajd that when the

owners of the Desert Inn wanted

Howard Hughes to move out of the

penthouse - because his special:

needs were costly and putting

---

## Page 52

- 4-

some

"high rollers" in would be

more profitable — it was Rosselli

who patched things up.

Hughes eventually

Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal

grand "jury about the Frontier in

1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't

testify later at the trial at which

Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Pol-

izzi and the Emprise Corp., among

others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in

jail. In 1973, the House of Repre-

sentatives

Select Committee

on

Crime probed the influence of or-

ganized crime in sports - and one

area they looked at was Emprise

and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the

federal prosecutor asked that Poliz-

zi and Terilli be jailed immediately

because

monitored,

wiretapped

conversations showed that the two

had talked about "murder, the kill-

ing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli,

however,

discounts the possibility

that Rosselli's grand jury appear-

ance could have led to his death.

"They know Johnny didn't talk to

the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't

been to Las Vegas for nine years,

that "he's never even seen the gift

shop."

Since his prison release and

move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't

trying to regain power; according

to his friends.

"He had no muscle."

said an associate."I can't believe

Rosselli was getting back into mob

stuff."

But at the same time,

many of

the associates

were

surpised to

learn about Rosselli's recent visits

with alleged organized crime fig-

ures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that

Rosselli wanted to get involved in

casino gambling, preferably in the

Middle East, and was looking for

someone with money to back him..

"MY IMPRESSION was that he

was broke," Morgan said.

"He told

me last

straite ,;Year; 'I'm. in. bad financial.

Scheer said Rosselli's income in-:

cluded about $60,000 from the gift

shop and about $3,500 in social se-

curity, most of

back fees to attorneys and for gov-

ernment fines.

One friend said. that just before

Giancana's death, Rosselli had ac-

cepted Giancana's

offer of money.

The friend was to act as the inter-

mediary. "Let me figure out what

my next (attorney's) tab will be,".

the friend. quoted Rosselli as say:

ing.

Rosselli is described as a man

with a sense of humor who did lit-

tle offending

• A California woman who had

known Rosselli for about 40 years

, told The

Herald,

"If

you

were.

around him for 30 minutes you'd

like him because he would regard

you as a human being.".

"If you had a headache he would

either get you an aspirin or send

someone to get one. I said some-

thing significant there — he would

get it or he would send someone

he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a

tough guy either

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 52

---

## Page 53

Oswned z01- 57 pili preden- chion. amanged.

Balten for accesd

→ Ck. CIA fitio on pelen Wllzon - Kudzon,

Crt ttact Fiicin selegedl comphanosis

lu llu Caben peil - Willianazand (ai 1867 1E Aprst

Stare Hunt - hot ni Secmies report clich focca

reguiaded in 1967uhen Lacca -reguitidtea

Espissa file, ai uals f Sunisen investig

tunedó- Smeuson te spaim :

1961 - trea Steveit - (1401 I8 Mepoid) fuist ricrented

Ameastt n Mepieo City.

FBI , Pre :2i

-, soiysi the F31 enpeieint muled

tics them ?.

ANLASE 1at Ce 2it

Tepedeis.

Biresara repecde to ttip iellid

Iher srue.:

Cit desi ihe

tenparomanit.

Tepideia,

Espeieso trié eiile depmarnite veai Starici

Mie: Ci leama

1 Meta

1465,

- T.

HH 54923

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## Page 54

notes las

Pions i le lessed floen Measuna 1467 I0 Repost -

Techneid aspect f

planning. basket restors up lether material.

- take Estinkene cm head a Calea tuck force in fre Bas f Pegi

Connelus Lassuell- Chief, TSD, dierg eanly plots.

Seanconne nexed gengland straing became

un is evapond rendered beeape and

evival negligilile.

The disclited luben aficial happice en

tyreto lue 1e012

turn Osta, edi unk accis e

time firme.

Arta lost pisilera to Culmen goot. do a le vane 1900 +

lose refuge in Verseean embarry on Apre 1, 1961

and recane the responsible yehe inerecan

Embassy. when Veng: Loke Relatiens eif Cubaci

MoV. 1961. Crete refueed a sape

wait

Oct. 19f14 eite: alecued lin toge is Mexico ale

Die enuins Pricini in 110, 1965 (Crist, pace farm

favor 1t del feet teled free gee Cort.)

Orlà ingril a success co de verses

3) Who us, succeets.

HH 54923

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## Page 55

Bie Landergriled Loug Varana (high en excle

movement)

head y Demacratic Revolutionary Front Zipant

14 CIA aN

Vasona noT satiful o degree z dA

large

assistance.

21 ibe so - TRI pave CIA a memo on racketeers effort

is Son 61 - Verona Accocided of chive scherner. Here

Edu. Moss, D.C. public Mercuis seen a feird

raises and public relaticie advisor. Mossa misin.

Juba Cellini, Polare Cureles darned 2 large Neonar

4.) Edward k. Moss file

Esterine supposedly took 'ineffective steps

E thwest Varonas invalo. In molst plas

An he was onc

five Key fegures in the

Revalintenary

Fronto heavily invalued in

the approaching Boff plan.

3.) Who were other I leaders? What slipe take

take? Why ensyficitaris

Pin

6) Cass Varonan son-in-lad - Chase, engindisp hein

during relevant lie preme

2RRiple nas coumed as an El/D operation (stenseil

to develop-capatill; for enterig septe sin for

idnapping coccieees.).

§suri dininenile l Legendare slitera-des. 19

HH 54923

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## Page 56

46

47

48

Here deliwered preson pills to Hainey

souven sags Russelli in touch we Vasona when Horney assivid in

Fla. O'connell does not beacher cohen Varona was re-activated for

phase 2 efforts

Giancana and raspianti apparently nor involved si

shas 2. Rosselle desceng we a Oilan who spoke Italian named

MACEO into merit du the hase barce, Homeg + Goday / Vason

+ Varomas son-s -Ines.

50- Shackley was never told who pill deliv. to a why. Only then senetilans

cn suppose s a 19 aps.

19 Imney and Shackley delin. arms " equip. to Rosseei for Varona.

32 Jan 63- Consci egred we Harrey that not much.

us son happe

52. rebb3. Harvey left wad for MACED that it looked like the

eput was are. Rossell met as Harvey in LA and

agreed is close apn off "but that el wald be unmiss te

alempe to precipitate a prent hetman Rossui « Varona"

with Rosselli agree to sedan fraquings of contactantl these wa

sone.

53 June 63- Rosedli bisited Harveyan DE. I went out to dinner -

lunite dising Papach Dellid Harvey o aoken if he kneed cok

his dunes quest was Reselli lunder intensive surveillance

Papich said have to. tell Hoover

Eduds.

ws snoo when an fact they still

underway die inal at thar

111500-681

HH 54923

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## Page 57

10 ABI Interviewed Ed Morgan.

11e1

sall 111!

Marchos vis-a- vis Onassis.

23 Manen Need sumane do do tech, surveil. on Onussi

Sea: Case

sen.Long not

"to came counse, Ed Morgan, pusuaded

73 Sam Hrepun war in on the contamunald diving seet

scheme ofte In Fitzquald loth over Cuban Dask Force from

Harvey in Jan. 63. Sottied of cocuseals involved.

TAS A ho CIfelo revered d4 1G in preparang report.

messies

18 march 61 -Jack Stewsit met us CulelA.

to mex. city knew Cubeli cosumly from Havanna days. Tepedino

(Amwhip-, long lome fiserid. Culele arranged meting te sound

Cullen out on his vlas on cuban situation..

Tuci musing

though inconclusie led 1s Amenst.

80 Machel - men adel espoiled that Cubels and

Luan Ortre (gaugiles anin (uts) wasted to defect.

(A foind 3 name lants betwi Cabela and, dersons

involved in gorist i recente episedes - All Picoulous

to laCk Were frand is Stiaits in Paris ey parciale. Sen ira Cele

geil freend-aline hasties.

Peris giren Ok to approach.- no indic.

he was ever contacted.

fune 67- Depedes

Repecl..

Bureau said noved refes CubelA to CIA co tars en he

intaded Buseau's lians attache.

HH 51923

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## Page 58

speda contactie Fat leane hell way cin handle

Cubelos "defection

Aug ba Waranght prom 19 met w, Tep. + went 10 Helsinki

for serves?

meetings uy Catuls Whire deficion shan turned is recruitig Canels

Pacia lates in Cologe

quir

85°

Helsinki:

10 - 23 Auq62 - Earle Williamso Jernh spending line afeel

freir inäsid, mut in Pars in Caler, Tep, + Wainwright, On 18 Aug.

H9. s11ma14 dared Cubein -not so begina slugucul elematio

16 Sext 63

300563.

sanches arice ni Paris ANyWAy. Learned That French

Kupena CubelA under sevillance.

11 OCT 63 - sancher caller Culler werent on meeters senion dis aspicial,

pref. RFK, for anuances.

290563 Des merg vane, bank dea arrest colin Paris a

home: a Red Stent,... Jarshez enterp. Fitzi sue 4i5i wanted

no parts attention Castrós llfe..à

Des meing flameling slandpent but the wading d? not

beena given teet.

•re.

19. Nou 63 Des apored

Cuba.

he would be fermitil sarke

p91.47

fill is ness gop here

HH 54923

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## Page 59

Sam Iresemo ston Sanches

sent ite

seen her energ an eat is sees pen per benes me de,

22 Now Saveles anua Paris o mels Culela late AM. Culela

Accepts pen hut down't rund much f device.

Fite called Sanchez oftu JFK ass, saying everything. 01

The cable not in file.

30 Gug 64- Artini rec. enfe Turn Modul

that decidents in Caster regeni

wasted direct Arteme corlet

Who Xon OcT 64 an Artine actor went

to France to serve as intermediais

wi dissid group.

1964

-

aguay consping to put CubelA - Antine

tigether

ConT

weapon

акті скали

W/o lachi other

knowing it.

Dile 64-Astume mect Cubela in Madred

Fel:65- Calula get silenced meapon flora Artines

secty in Madied

march 65 - maduch cable that lawyer Seeia-Ban,

Wrived in Madid us neuse elet he win an contade wi

cucula, long a close bruid. I. B was jailed in 1962 fir

al underg JanTas TRefficAnTEe

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 59

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## Page 60

106

p108-

matus Espin a spice, neuterey Calain plana

and of ain complicity.

June 2365

No sent cable to el statess direting termin.

of contect us Cabela graup.

much too. Culela austed for counterval. act.

excalving dA. Cubila tual Maught ouT

contact wi James Noel in Bladid.

a gangland effort to pr

150,000 te

kue Caster+

refer te EB/ interv. o partie.

de reported nelli stured to Morgan sepaito,

from Maheu) by Greenspun.

, Norgan , Roselli

+ perhaps premspun intouch

es lach venes in Las Veg. ca March

p/21

128

tho says isi participated in Castro

expected to uring his diy

Weenie very embittered ly

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 60

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## Page 61

part turnt auto salesman.

130 "Mahen has gord reason for nor wanting

the story aned father. Unprosable

publicly mught cause tum to loze lei;

lucratur clt., Hawd. Hughes. "

7 Mar 66- cable to Ruck - Lies about ass involu

54923

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61

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## Page 62

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 petitin

Reseusch

Review Staff:: 76-0298/1

11 March 1976

Mr. William G. Miller

Staff Director

Select Committee To Study Governnental

Operations With Respect To Intelligence

Activities

Room G- 308

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C.

20510

Attn: Mr. Johnston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In

response to a request dated 9 March 1976. about

the Oswald file held by the Agency, the attached is

forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Wast Elder

Walter Elder

Review Staff

walteri

21.1

Attachment:.

As stated

'"!

Mar

LUTI

SCENTENNIA,

11796-1916

WH 54923 'DocId:32423629 Page 62

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## Page 63

220P05/

2275

.A2,

Attachment to:

Review Staff:

76-0070/1

1. The following CIA Staff Employees, all of whom

are

now retired, participated in the preparation of DIR

86054

on 30 November 1963:

Originator:

Mr. Louis Armstrong

Coordinators: Mr. John M. Whitten, Mr. William

B. Tyng, Ms. Sue L. Darling

Authenticator: Mr. William B. Tyng. ("'for"

Desmond FitzGerald)

Releasor: Mr. John M. Whitten ("'for" J. C. King)

2.

We believe that the Italian diplomat on the Cubana

flight No. 465 on 22 November 1963 from Mexico City to Havana,

Cuba;

was Mario MAURI who was accompanied by his wife, Maria

Antonieta MAURI. Ne have been unable to determine who trans-

mitted the information contained in DIR 86054 to CIA and we

have not been able to locate any documents relating to this

matter in Latin America Division files or the Oswald files.

3.

We have been unable to locate any documents which

would indicate that there was a response to DIR 86054 from

Mexico City.

4. Assuming there was no response to DIR 86054, the

originating Headquarters component should have initiated

follow-up action if a response was not received.

5. We have been unable to find any further information

relating to DIR 86054 in Latin America Division files.

RECEIVED FROMA

FEB 5 1976

CIA

SECRET/S.

SIGIVE

HH 51923 DocId: 32423629

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63

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## Page 64

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2-

6. We do not have a copy of the Cubana manifest for

the 22 Novenber 1963. flight from Mexico City to Havana, but

we have determined that the following persons were on that

flight:

NAME

NATIONALITY

OCCUPATION

Jakob ETT

Hector LEMIEUX

Joseph POULIOT

Donald George CAMERON

William POULIS

Thomas Clark OSULD

Dungan MCPHERSON

Leo John DEST

Thomas MURPHY

Arthur EDMONDS

James DISINOP

Venancio OLIVAREZ Villaverde

Jose Luis CACHO y Barcha

David FLOR Lechago

Maria Antonieta MAURI

Mario MAURI

Maarten Van DERPLAAT

Swiss

Canadian

Canadian

Canadian

Canadian

Canadian

Canadian

Canadian

Canadian

British

British

Spanish

Spanish

Spanish

Italian

Italian

Dutch

Diplomat

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Diplomat

Diplomat

RECO

ROM

the 5 1976

CIA

NW 54923 DocId 32123629. "Page 64

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## Page 65

éttachment F

•3. MecCS J&2

K:rE

EJ4I!

DSEDLEE

SLB-NUT: IIRECT OI SIITIA ILUL

TIES AIRICYIS SIATICI II LEXIOO! WAS AUTISEO LI 27 SOT2B2I EE

VERICS LTIORIIS RAD PAUSTOISO SUTIA LURII,) MUECAI TATICHI DOLOIZ

CE INE LON DOSST II LEEICO, UEO LND TAERO 1O LIE CSSALO SE TSE CUASS

PE1SI II IADS SETGREA 1563. IEN TEISES FOR LIE REDFRESI DAS ERAT BIUFIA

VIRAJ IAS ITTTEG DO IEAVE DESRRO POB CIIA.

RD & 13572

BisSSO Ca|

Documont Numbsr 134-595

for FOlA Raview on

AP.R 1976

F.ICIAPD 12A233

HH 54923

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## Page 66

ist (i

bailes!

745740

FBi did in los 69, hit.

hous firee

Taling asent this for

006 315:12-52

far BOla Roview on

sEAl a sald tey meched

2: LA Liemo

infol

land foind it

unsubstantizted.

2.1

astred me to

send

tis cable:

3

He vill try to confirm

79001.09

ejercer Commurists bet montal in posas reparts.

et ivannen Commissione investigalio

RECORD COPY

NH 54923

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## Page 67

5, 196%

Mexican Con unists mio ira contacü with Oswald,

has not appaarca in torren Comnission vorte-los in pras!

suï cround recailing detail:

of their having boon in a groug wish Covald hero last fall

during the daysthat he vis in liexico.- The write-ups of the

larson Commission royort in the neuspapers sparked this

discussions and they apparently nad never really Sat around

detormind to pieco iù all togeines,

although all thras vera

deeply affected by Kennay's assussination, seened literally

to adore the kennedy lamily inage, still follow Robart renned

career with great interest and admiration.

The dain points:

SOURCE

Horacio is the husbend o

SYLVIA DURAl,' the Mexican girl who was arrasiod lor quastion:

about Oswald

bocause she had been in touch wiih hin' at the cu

encassy when be went there locking- for a visa...(üha.is.or u

also a ringleader at ina Cubur-koxican Institute on Iokic, I

renenbar).

hile Ostild was here last fail the Duran cousins invited the

to a "twist party" at the

none of Ruben Duran mid-weak. a few Communists they bnew

and a number of people no struck ta

as very peculiar at the time, were there. MD OSTALD MASTER:

DIZE THO CHARE BEATNIK ICOKING SOYS, CNE OF EECE HON VAS

VERY TALL AND ALL TERES CE MOM TILLY

REIN-BER UITE

shen they began as.ing questions about the saaricans,

were standin? togethy ail eveningand didn't dunco aù all,

they were shifted to nothar roon. l

however

were intrigued because!

said he didn't inor

who thay were,

arcopt that sylvia Durun had ocusat they, and

none of the other assis made any attenut to approach then.

Also, wen the l

so insistent about nesting that,

mim the Durans raplied that the boys were leaving town i

oarly the neut noming. The next day, vall along in the day,

SOURCE

• sa: all tarc

coys togethcr on insurganiss. In other wores,

thoy had not Ir

torn. It the time, they sonariod bout tin it;

às soon as espala's picture vas printed in the nauspapers

SourcE

clearly resend rod hin. And of course the arrest of

sylvia biron almost immediately aiterward, undcrlined thoir

cortainty.

HH 54923 DooId: 32423629

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ricy moro so sickonodl

their relations wit thabusons.

SCHE

inot tyra Duran and one of the Duran

boys. havo made tries

to

joses. and that nose conspicuoisly

they hare all prospered

this last yai. Always poor before,

they now rave

expansive car each.

істот-

c] Horacio Duran works at El Dia neispapor..

It's employmen, firel

HH 54923

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## Page 69

к ; :

¿VEMBO? I.

fro!

DIRECTOR

CONF

DEFEPRED

ROUTINE

INFO

XXX

TO. FLASiI/

INFO

CITE DIR :.

34916

ARREST OF SILIVA DURANT IS EXILELI SERICUS NATRE? WEICI COLTD PREJUDICE

U.S. FREEDO: CE ACTION CU ENTIRE QUESTION OF CUBAN FESPOUSICILITY. VITH TUDI

REGARD FOR EZICAT ITERESTS, REQUEST YOU MISURE THAT LEE ARREST IS KEPT AESOLUTELE

SCREE, PIAC 30 LORIALICH FRO HER IS FUELISEED OR LEALED, FAT AU I SECT LEO IS

CABLED TO US, AID THAT FACE CE HER ARRESI AND HER STATERERTS ARE NOT SPREAD IO

LESTISE CE DISLOYAL CIFCUES IT ME MEXICAN GOVERTENT.

2. HE ARE IRVING TO GOT MORE INFO CHT OSWALD FROM FBI AID WILL ADVISE DIECE

CER FEROUCHI FBI MEXICO,

EID CF HESSACE

37-

Document Number

for FOlA Review ore APR 1975

23 Nor 63

GS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THONAS E. KARA-ISSIES

ADDP

RELEASING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUIHENTICATING

OFFICER

Caprila.

NH 54923

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## Page 70

27

T. 1963.

C7 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FROM: MAFGIOR

CONF:

INFO

23 607Y

IO

FLASH

2740:63 20

1Lz

DEFER REU

ROUTINE

FLASH

CITE DIR

8.5318

RE:

(XN-69048)

I. THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH

AND

20.

LEXICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD INTERROGATE SILVIA DURAN TO EXTENT

NECESSARY CLARIFY OUISTANDING POINTS WHICH BEEN RAISED TOUR CABLES LAST 48_

HOURS. YOU NAY PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO MEXICAN INTERFOGATORS BUT WE DO NOT

REPEAT NOT WANT ANY AMERICANS TO CONFRONT SILVIA DURAN OR BE IN CONTACT WITH

HER.

Documen: Number 158-610

3: ADVISE ASAP RESULTS INTERROGATION.

for FOIA Review on

APR 1976

(END OF MESSAGE)

•Comment: Silvia Duran rearrested because she was attempting

to leave Mexico for Cuba.

83 COPA

Miraitin

RICHARD HELLS -

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

VAUTHENTICATING

OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Cupy No.

HH 54923

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## Page 71

TONG INDEX

O FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TECH. 1963

27H00 65 21

192

: THRECTOP

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERREU

ROUTINE

1O

PRIORITY

INFO

CITE DIR

8537!

FURTHER TO DIR-S

85318. TO BE CERTAIN THERS IS NO NISUDEESIANDIN

WEITHER NOR CUBANS

BEIWEEN IS, WE WANT TO INSURE THAT, SILVIA DURAI GETARD IAPRESSION THAT

AMERICANS BEHIND HER REARREST.

IN OTHER WORDS, WE WAIT MEXICAN AUTHORITES

TO TAXE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHOLE AFFAIR.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: *Mexican authorities should interrogate Silvia Duran to

extent necessary to clarify outstanding points which have been raised.

MEXI may provide questions to Mexican interrogators, but Hgs. does

not want any Americans to confront Duran or be in contact with her

Document Number 177-618

for FOlA Raviaw on

APR 1976

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEACHARD -HELAS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN: THE ISSUING. OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUTHENTICATING

OFFICER

•: Copy No.

'...

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 71

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## Page 72

the Warren Commissiur

Consulars 2a 2j Soreader 2563, Daliaring Des Pirat

¿sissica 1n tba eralustlia oi it, DiAl'a stasy.

may 2an 603

Document Number 043 - 273

for FOlA Review on

JUN 1976

RECORD COPY

HH 54923

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72

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## Page 73

L A JIlLiala sai sitaitire sauree, icil irédeci sa

raidi resulia nd trents a tea ties Easily sad

La millio soility tho 35ss stary about box cititi

SEEILANCA MiLD MATI ACCOSTS 10 S0 SONE SITI

and since ta asterdation the peasant a tie disas

Inbassy ma sociod and passiod - in ararationa 0s

2icara 25 the apsastlestion vira beard, nud tisor sas

HH 54923

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## Page 74

origial& 3 - Addresseo

7 April 1954

Bajed Da DI S5ú70 dated 29 NorsmaDes 1963

17

HN 54923

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74

---

## Page 75

'llo, letters.

ACTIOY

I Tenins

luding raider

rame.

il applicable) must do

in must be used.

Jiseed.

i1os1

If ete iden-

SACTIUS

11:1

SECTION 11I:

To

be coopletod

all

I SENSITIVE

NON-SENSITIVE

(Las:)

20 1 10.

→ Las

(First)

(4936)

SECTION I

1.

SOURCE DOCUVENT;

(Middlo)

HENRY

NADE VARIANT

(Tillo)

¿ (Middles

SEX

(Ti:10)

NB:

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH

PHOTO

BIRTH DATE

• COUNTRY OF BIPTH

Leas

TO 0I8110•39 USA

DICUPATION/POSITION

175

OTHER LOZNTIFICATION

POCCYPOS, CODE

PSEUDONYM

SECTION 111

COUNTRY. OF RESIDENCE

Ü5581

" P ACTION DESK

2N0. COUNTRY INTEREST 12M.

2RO COUNTRY liNTEREST

-OUMENTS:

if:?

Document Nunba: 1-L6

Directed to the lissR ni October 1959

for FOlA Peview gil.

201-

SIGilATURE

PERMANENT CHARGE

YES

0R"1. 8312

C= 57

RECORD COPY

158)

HH 54923

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## Page 76

OSWALD, LEE HENRY

20 i

SEX M DOB 18 OCT 39

NEW!

ORLEANS, LA., USA

CIT

REF =

A USSR

RADAR OPERATOP.,

U.S. MARINE CORPS, AS 05. 60.

DEFECTED TO USSR IN

1 ост 59.

for FOlA Roview on

APR 1976

HH 54923

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76

Documont Numbor!

2-524

---

## Page 77

tremodes

3

LUP:

ROSA CENTRAL INTALLICENCE AGENCY

=0:

INTO :1

714

1:1

10067 63 26

R

ROUTINE.

• CITE DIR

SINGO:

DEPARTHENT OF STATE

INDERAL, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BLINDE

SERINE

DEPLETENT OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSTATI

3.487

-S

C

I..

ON 1. OCTOBER 1953

LEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AUERICAN MALE,

IDENTIFIED

ASIDE OSTALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN

IBZICO CITY INQUIZING WESTHER TE EURASSY. HAD RECEIVED

ANY NETS CONCERNING A TRIEGRA WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO

DISHINGTON, THS AMERICAN HAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXINATELT

35 YEARS OLD, HITE AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX POT TALL

TITA A FESCODIEG. HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELISTED THAT OSHALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE

ERNPY OSHALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBEZ 1939 IN NETY ORIEANS, LOUISIANA,

A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DIFECTSD TO THE SOVIET UNION IN

OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEENTS THROUGH THE UNITED

STATES EMBASSI IN MOSCON TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES FITA

onculA, Rovlaleon

EiS RUSSIAN-PORY TIFE, LARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAJOVA. AND ILEIR

COORDINS

AS LAINE OFFICERS

(CONTINUEDY

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHINTICATING

10 Ket 65

OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAIN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHICITED.

Copy tia

HH 54923

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## Page 78

O INDEX

O NO INDEX

O FILE IN CS FILE NO

PION: DIRECTOR

CON

INFO

DEFERRED

ROUTINE :

PAGS TIO

TO

12E7 CiTE DIR MEET

CHILD.

it::

3.

THE INFORIATION IN PARAGRAPE ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATE

TO YOUR RaFRaSTATIVES IN lEXICO CITY. ANX FURTHER INFORMATIC

RECEIVED ON TRIS SUBJICT HILL, BE FURNISESD YOU THIS INFORMATIC

IS BRING MADE AVAILABLE TO TEE INMIGRATION AND MATURALIZATION

SEBTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASED ON

(IN 36017)|

RELEASING DIFICER

REPh UCTIO"

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUNG OFFICE PROHIBI

AUTHENTICATIUL

OFFICER

Copy!

HH 54923

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78

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## Page 79

_1200: 1963 ORLENCS FILE

1:2:1:

CONFE

INFO:

XX

TO.

DIP. CTOR

GS COPY

11400753.22

R

ROUTINE

227: |

_ INFO

(TY 35017)

CITE DIR

7.4031

WhO CONTACTEd SOVIET EmbAssi

15.175 OSHALD

IIII3 ESTRY OSTRATO

BORN IS OCT 1939, NOT ORLALUS,

LOUISIANA, FORURE RANIE OPIRATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES:

BR TO SA TE CH 1959 OSHAL ME FIVE TO SE

- INCHES, QE ALMORSE SITY FIYS FOUNDS, DIGIT BROWN WATY HAZZ

BLUE EYES.

-ON 320CT1959 ES ATIONDIED TO RENOUNCE HIS LYRATO

STATES CITLZANALS TO TRE UNITED SRATES TRIB IN MOSCON,

==.

Documont Number

for FOlA Rovicw on

SIER US ZAB MOSCOT RECRIYED AN UNDATO LETIER FROM OSTARA

FOSTIARISD HINSK ON FIVE TIB 1961 IN FAICH SUBI INDICATIO

FE DESIPED RETURN OE HIS US DOT AS FISHED TO RETURN TO USA

IF "I COULD COLS TO SOI AGINE CONCERNING THE DROPPING

OZ ATT LEGAL PROCASDINGS ACHINST UE.". ON 8 JULY ON HIS ONi

INIZIATIVS HE APPRARZU AT THE BIB. MITH HIS WIDE TO SEE 2200

anit

HIS RETUEN TO STATES:

SUST STATZO THAT. ER ACTUALLY SAD MSVER

APPLIZO FOL SOVIET CITIZENSAIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT LO CRET

• COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASIME OFFICER

GEONTINDED)

:..:

• AUTHENTICATING

OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN. THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHISITED.

• Copiña

eS BOPY;

HH 54923

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Page 79

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## Page 80

O FILE IN CS FILEI".

CONF:

DEFEPRED

ROUTINE

PAGE ITO

INFO

CITE DIR

7430

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO RELAIN IN USS? AND FOR LEORARY EXTENSION

OF HIS TOUZISI VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS BEATEST TEES

APPLICATION, ACCORDING IQ OSTAID, CONTAINED NO BI? TO SOVIET

CITIZANSHIP.:: OSFALD STATED THAT HED BEEN ELLIOYED SINCE:

13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN BADIO AND IT. FACTORY IN HINSK:

WHERE FORTED AS METAL WORKER IN PESSARCE SHOP. OSFAID-FAS

VAPZIED ON 3O APRIL 1961 TO MARIXA NISOLAZINA POSASOVA AC

DENTAL TECENICIAN BOR 17 JULY ISAL USSE DO EDES TRACES.

IT RN OR HI CN HIM N MS ME SE

COULD APPRAR AT PUB FOR VISA INTERTIST. HIS EURRIDAN PPE:

HAS RETURNED TO HIM. US ZUB LOSCON STATED IPENTY LONTES D

OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING

RETECT ON OSHALD.

3.

LATEST EDOS INFO FAS

REPORT BATED MAY 1962

STATE

SAYING /

HAD DETERTINND OSFAID IS STIII US CITIZEN AND

BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE SATE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE

EAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAFEE MITH THEIR INFANT CHILD

TO USA.

(CONTINUED),

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

PEPRODUCTION

OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHISITED.

_AUTHENTICATING

OFFICER

Copy Na.

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 80

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## Page 81

O NO INDE:

O FILE IN CO MENO

I"OH: DIPECTOR

CONF:

DEFERRED/

POUTINE

PAGE THREE

TC.

. INFO

CITE Dig "

748

1. 1

SEOULD PASS INFO REF AND PIZ1 ONE|

LOGARI. 30R0 PARAS

TRO ANT TRIES ORIGINATES HITE|

SEE AND POSSTELE IDENTIFICATION ABING DISSEMINATED

FOES ADVISCO ON ANT FURTIS. CONTAGIS OR POSITIVS IOENTIFICAZION

CE OSHAIN:

=.

END O? LESSAGE

REP. ON

stated he at Sor tao on 23 Sept Baeu:

He discussed sarding a telegraz

to Hashtagton. No local Dissemination had deen nade.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

•RELEASING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUTHENTICATING

OFFICER

Copy Na.,

HH 54923

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## Page 82

15 Prosas 1555

CORDER TOR

=122

: 1.

ta sacer i

25a=t tO Fito Tapes

Document Numbar

10: EOlA Review 03 1

9-5

APE 1970

0r15 - Tra 150ar5820

Ica Mitision

Essiscal secaito laIre=

-Insul literas

RECORD COPY

HH

54923

DocId: 32423629

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82

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## Page 83

÷ COT 1953

5

DEFILE IN CS FILE NO. !

}

CARTIENT OF TEE 1AYZ

OM: 132en

05 5017

CENTRAE INTELEIGZICE NOBICI

=355

IFO :

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242463

DER

31

POUTING"

dete dene.

•INFO

lari te 24212

SUBJECT

INI ISTRI OSTATO

CITEDIR

77973

BEARSICE IS MADE TO CIA DUE ESISEDES SO. 74013, DATEO 15%

77363

OCTOFER 1963, PEGARDITE FOSSIBLI PARTEICS E STATTI IL RICS LUI

27222

HO CON ME TI TEST TECNI PECTORI TOU CATS 0E SURTETTIS

TO DETRAUE I TE LUS CSMALO IN ABXICO CIST AND SURISCE A33 223

SIBE INDITITUALI

BISBO 02: /

(IZ 40357)

124-04631

Documen Mumbar 10 - 6

for SOlA Deview on APP. 1975

COORDIMATING

OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER HAMITRE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHISITED.

Copy N3.:

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629 Page 83

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## Page 84

"episs of photo of Gswild

Reproducod foruse of logal

Attacha. withsisxecan.pol.co

11-67

Documeni Number

for FOld Review on

The made fifty 53)

rous peach y these

unien

Legal Attache frite;

Attachi do ise

лист

mexica police;

RECORD COPY

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 84

---

## Page 85

HW 54923

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Page

85

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## Page 86

Lee Harvey Oswai

Race White

Sex Mala

DOB 1ò Octobe= 1939

POS New Olzaus,

Louisiaza

Height 519"

Weight 140 Pounds

Hair. Medium Brown

Eyes Blue Gray

HW 54923

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Page

•86

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## Page 87

UNITED STATES DEF:ATMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDEPAL BURED AFINVESTIGATION

TASHINGTOY :S.D.C.

ґида 9, 196÷

SI COURIER SERVICE

Fonorzole j. Lee Rardin

Ganeral Counsel

The presidant's Commission

200 Margland Avenue,

Northeast

Frasaington, D. C. 20002

Dea. Mr. Ranjin:

Your istier of Juze 1, 1961, requesting su-aries

ci IBI Isporis tito regard to ten pared persons and certain

incomation regarding

the contact by special agent Caziles ii.

acinorledged.

Lyca rita daco la audy oa Marca li, doga, 1s berarita

As you mere advised by my leiter of february 27,

195÷, Jacs Ruby mas contacted by Special Agent Charles

§Igna of the Dallas Cifice on larco 11, 1259, in view of bis

and it so, if de nould be villing to iurniso infornation to

this sureau. Fuby mas advised of the Esi's juisdiction in

crinical mattars, and le expressed a millingaess ta lurish

Inforaation.

A personal description of Ruoy mas ootzized by

Sceciai igent Fljan on the occasion of this contaci on

Haich 11, 1959, but no iciorzation or other results rete

ostained.

Batrean Marca 11,

1559, and Cctober 2, 1959, PuST

was contaciad on eigat other cocasions, but se surrisied 2o

Iniornation pateter aad iurthai contacis rita biu vere

• discontiausd.

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 87

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## Page 88

Honorabla 5. Lee Rascio

;

Ta? personal description of Ruby as obtained by

Speciai Agent Elgar on Marca 11, 1959, did sot la jiself contai

the rauark "Enoña Dallas crininal."

This renara tas added to

tha description by Special Agent louis d. Halley at the tize

¡nea he mas assisting in the preparation oi the report of Special

Azent iangiag C. Clesents ai Dallas dated lozeaber 30, 1563.

enclosed heregith is the affidavit of special agent louis a.

forth his

zezark "Enord Dallas

crininal". to the descriotion of ruuy as it agpears in the report

of special agent Manning C. Clerents at Dallas dated lovember 30.,

1953, and in the enclosure to my letter to you oi April 7, 1961.

The sunaries concerning the ten naged individuals in

your letter of June 1, 1961, are currently being prepared aza

mill be omarded to you promptly upon cospletion.

Sinceraly yours,

Enclosura

NN 54923

DocId: 32423629

Page 88

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## Page 89

twittin

Ariansas

June :: 155÷

I, louis do kelley, Goecial dgeat, Federal Ju=eau

of investigation, alter being daij suore, depose as foilows:

I arrivad at Dallas, Teisas, lovember 23, 1963, to

assist in the investigation of the assassination of Presicent

Join Fitzgerald Kernedy and related matters.

On or about

to prevare an insert based on such file review for inclusion

in an investigative report. This insert was to include such

physical descriation and biographical data as ivere available

¡rom the file review and iron inioration develoyed on

liovander 2=, 1963.

I had beiore me at tha time I dictated

the insert inforaation which had been obtained on lioverber

24, 1953, by otber Special Agents of the E3i aud iron tbe

Icentification Division files of the Dallas Police Departuent.

The Dallas Police Department records, under Dailas. Police

Departnes: lio. 22255, included

inforsation concerning arresis

ui Ruby dating iron february à, 1949, to darch 14, 1903.

In dictating the physical descriation and biogragnical

data concerning ruby, I possibly included nader the heading

"Remarks," "known Dallas area crininal," based on the fact I

ind before me Ruby's identification record iron tie Dallas

Police Departaent, which listed several arrests in the Dallas

area.

This rould

have been the only thiag on nich such an

ocservation could have been based.

• Sruin and subscribed to baiore ma

this:

day of June 1964.

•....

Notary zublic

Diminission Guida jer, 22, 150ó

HH 51923 DocId:32423629 Page 89

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## Page 90

1 ki 11

Prat. 9/1/26

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy

1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover

was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the

later divulged this important informa-

Central Intelligence Agency received

tion to the Warren Commission.

evidence suggesting that Cuban Pre-

mier Fidel Castro arranged the assassi-

Of course, various CIA officials also

nation in retaliation for attempts on

knew about the assassination scheme.

his life.

Not the least of them was the late CIA

Yet sources privy to the secret dis-

chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved

cussions at the highest levels of the

ne original plan. He later served or

CIA during those hectic days now tell

he Warren Commission, yet he sal

us that the CIA deliberately withheld

silently throughout the investigation

the evidence from the Warren Com-

without mentioning the Cuban angle.

mission investigating Kennedy's death.

Within hours of President Kenne-

Our sources cite two reasons for

dy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled in-

holding back this evidence. One was a

formation from Mexico City suggest-

resolve to cover up the secret that the

ing that the Cubans may have been be

CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill

hind the assassination. Our sources say

Castro.

that the CLA developed similar infor-

There also was a legitimate concern

mation in Washington.

that the Castro revelations might in-

The first person to reach Robert

flame the American people,

whose

Kennedy's side after the shooting was

grief could have turned into a terrible

CIA Director John A. McCone, who re-

wrath that might have precipitated

mained alone with the Attorney Gen-

some rash action.

eral at his McLean, Va., home for

Only a few key people knew about

nearly three hours.

the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One

was Attorney General Robert F. Ken-

McCone swore to us that Castro's?

name was never mentioned during the

nedy, who was his brother's personal

three hours. But CIA records show

watchdog over the CIA. It has now

been established that Robert Kennedy

that the next day. McCone not only

mentioned Castro to the new Presi-

was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the

dent, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed

attempt to use underworld killers to

knock off Castro.

him on the information from Mexico

City.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cau-

Yet no one brought

the Cuban

tioned the CIA not to go ahead with

connection to the attention of the War-

the assassination without consulting

ren Commission. We were the first to

him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd

get word of the anti-Castro plot to

on the CIA, it must be assumed that he

Chief Justice Earl Warren, the com-

was kept advised of subsequent assassi-

mission chairman, four years later.

nation attempts. However, there is no

We are now free to reveal our role

documentary evidence of this.

in the drama. Two of our confidential

Records

now available show that

sources, ClA agent William Harvey

Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J.

and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A

Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10,

third source, attorney Edward P. Mor-

gan, has waived the confidentiality we

had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967,

about the CLA-Mafia assassination plot

against Castro. He raised the possibil

ity that the plot could have backtired

against President Kennedy. There

were suspicious

circumstances, he

pointed out, indicating that Castro

may have learned of the attempts on

his life and may have retaliated

against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identity his

sources because it would have violated

the attorney client privilege. But he

was an attorney of such stature that

we didn't doubt his word. He had been

chief inspector of the FBI. He had di

rected the historic congressional inves

tigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing.

Later, he ran the investigation into the

excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCar-

thy.

We got Morgan's permission, to

write a cautious story. We confirmed

the general outlines from a CIA

source

Then on

March 3, 1967, we

wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have

approved an assassination plot, which

then possibly backfired against his late

brother."

now available,

The next day, according to records 1?

Kennedy's secretary

called for a copy of the May 7, 1962

memo, which summarized the briefing

he had received on the assassination

plot.

On March 7, 1967, we reported more

details. "A reported CIA olan in 1983 to

assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we

wrote, "

... may have resulted in a

counterplot by Castro to assassinate

President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS

Br Howard Pest

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 90

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## Page 91

THE MASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, Sapirinher 7, 19:6

(.19

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Behind John F.

Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may

They were under the loose control

In an impromptu, three-hour inter

have taken the secret of the John F.

of Florida's Mafia

chieftan, Santos

view with Associated Press reporter

Kennedy assassination with him to his

Trafficante. His gambling enterprises

Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that

death. He was brutally murdered a

in Havana had been closed down by

he knew about the attempts on his life

few weeks ago, his backed-up body

Castro after the 1959 revolution. In

and warned that. U.S

leaders also

stuffed into an oil drum and dumped

fact, Trafficante bad been lodged for a

into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

period in a Cuban jail, an indignity

might not be safe. That was Sept. 2

Before he died, Roselli hinted to as-

that didn't endear Castro to him.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted

sociates that he knew who had ar-

After Trafficante made it back to his

the same underworld elements whom

ranged President Kennedy's murder. . Florida haunts, he left part of his or-

he had caught plotting against hiri.

It was the same conspirators, he sug-

ganization behind in Havana. Some of

They supposedly were Cubans from

gested, whom he had recruited earlier

his henchmen even managed to de

organization.

to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

velop contacts in Castro's inner circle.

Working with Cuban intelligence. they

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro

These were the people Roselli wanted

'allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharp-

learned the identity of the underworld

to use to knock off Castro.

contacts in

Havana who bad been

But Roselli didn't have the stature

shooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had

been active in the pro-Castro move

trying to knock him off. He belleved,

inside the Mafia to make the necessary

not altogether without basis, that Pres-

arrangements with Trafficante. So

According to Roselli's version,

ident Kennedy was behind the plot.

Roselli called in bis patron, the Chi-

Oswald may have shot Kennedy of

The Cuban leader, as the supreme

cago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana,

may have acted as a decoy while oth-

irony, decided to turn the tables and

to deal with Trafficante.

ers ambushed him from closer range.

use the same crowd to arrange Ken-

As Roselli's associates tell it, he per-

When Oswald was picked up, Roselli

nedy's assassination, according to

suaded Giancana that it would be to

the underworld conspira-

Roselll's scenario. To save their skins,

their advantage to win the good will of

tors feared he would crack and dis-

the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Os-

the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew

close information that might lead to

wald to pull the trigger.

down to Florida to make the prelimi-

This almost certainly would

Roselli could never be pinned down

nary arrangements.

have brought a massive U.S. crack-

on names or details. It was also diffi-

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it

down on the Mafia.

cult to assess whether he knew what

up, Roselli used the Havana under-

he was talking about or whether he

world to plot Castro's demise. At first,

So Jack Ruby was ordered to elim-

merely described what he thought

they tried to plant poison pills, sup-

inate Oswald, making it appear as an

might have happened. Certainly there

plied by the CLA, in Castro's food. The

act of reprisal against the President's

is no real evidence to support Roselli's

pills would have made it appear that

killer. At least this is how Roselli ex-

story. But there are enough curious

he died of natural causes. When this

plained the tragedy in Dallas.

circumstances to justify telling it. Here

failed, snipers were dispatched to a

Several key CIA officials believed

are the fascinating highlights.

Havana rooftop. They were caught.

that Castro was behind the Kennedy

The word reached Roselli that some

assassination.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a

of the plotters had been tortured and

It has also been established that Jack

flamboyant mobster with underworld

that Castro had learned about the

Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and

contacts in Havana, was recruited by

whole operation.

had connections in the Havana under-

the Central Intelligence Agency in

The ClA called off the Roselli opera-

1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no

tion in March, 1963, but recruited a

1963, reported table, dated Mov. 29

authority, however, over the under-

Castro assoclate, Rolando Cubela, to

gangster type named Ruby" had vis

world elements in Havana.

murder Castro.

ited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.

DROPOUTS

Billonard Pusl

I SEE YOU'RE EN-

LARGING YOUR HUT,

CHIEF... EXPANDING

FAMILY?

NO,

ALF.

- EXPANDING

WAISTLINES

HH 54923

GASOLINE ALLEY

where's

the truck

the boss

DocId: 32423629 Page 91

The man got

it Started, Sarge!

AY,

Good! That saves

me a trip to the

city

I brought your

iced tea, Mr. Turnip!

Be Moores

Thank

40U 50

---

## Page 92

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, August 27,1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Smudge Only Clue in Rosselli Case

It was a grisly end for John Rosselli,

fidence, so he came to trust us. We

gave information,

according to

Our

the dapper, debonair mobster about

were the only reporters he would talk

sources, which resulted in a grand jury

town, who had been a familiar figure

to.

confrontation for Tony Accardo. The

in the glittering night spots of Holly.

So when he vanished last month his

surly mobster took the fifth. But Ac-

• wood, Las Vegas and Havana.

associates came to us for help. We

cardo grumbled to associates that he.

His killers shot or stabbed him in the

were suspicious, of course, that his dis

would pay back Rosselli some day.

stomach. The autopsy indicates they

appearance was linked to the Castro,

Rosselli was also, blamed for passing

may have shot him and then dug out

caper. But our investigation has now: information to the government, which

the bullet with a knife. Then they bru.

produced evidence to the contrary.

led to the conviction of Detroit mob ;

tally hacked off his legs. It is possible

that he was still alive when they, Rosselli was not the amiable, retired

We have learned, for example, that ster Anthony Zerilli. He is now serving"

a four-year sentence at Sandstone fed.

stuffed his body into a 55 gallon drum.

old duffer he pretended to be. He be

eral penitentiary for racketeering.

They wrapped chains around the

gan in the big time as a bookkeeper for

Perhaps the last straw was Rossell's

drum to weight it down and tossed it Chicago's notorious Al Capone and be-

testimony in the Castro case. He identl

, into Biscayne Bay. The autopsy sug-

came &

specialist in

white collar

fied two mobsters, the late Sam Gian-

gests he may have died of asphyxiation

crimes. It's a profession, apparently,

cana and Santo Trafficante, as being

inside the drum before it hit the wa-

that he never gave up.

involved in the assassination attempts.

ter. The gases from the decomposing

Competent sources say that, be

It's no secret in the underworld that !

body floated the heavy container to

tween rounds on the Florida golf

Trafficante detests publicity.

the surface. It was discovered, with its courses, Rosselli was involved in stolen

nightmarish contents, 10 days alter

securities and financial swindles. His

Our sources belleve that the Mafia !

bosses finally became fed up with Ros

Rosselli had disappeared from his sit operations reportedly were resented selli. His' execution would have re

er's home in Plantation, Fla.

by Santo Trafficante, who has been

quired the approval of the top leaders,

The police withheld the gruesome

identified in Senate testimony as the

our sources say, because it was almost

details of his death while they

Mafia chief in Florida.

certain to bring the federal govern-

searched for his killers. We began our

Rosseili came to Florida from Las

ment into the case.

own investigation, meanwhile, after an

Vegas, where he allegedly represented

Who were the viclous killers? The

appeal from his associates.

the Chicago mob. Our sources say that

only clue is a smudge spot on the win. i

We first encountered Johnny Ros

he handled millions in illegal gambling

dow of Rossellt's car. One of his assail-

selli more than five years ago. We

money, which he forwarded to the

ants probably had used a greasy hair

were investigating his role in the Cen-

Chicago underworld. There are re

pomade.

tral Intelligence Agency's plot to assas

ports that Chicago crime lord Tony Ac-

sinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

cardo feit he had been short-changed

The CLA case officer, William Harv-

by Rosselli.

ey, told us that Rosselli had been the

Still earlier, Rosselli spent time in

hero

of the abortive adventure.

the slammer, first, for extortion and,

Harvey broke his oath of secrecy be later, for a card swindle. Those who

cause he thought it might help Rossel. know him say he had developed a taste

li, who was in trouble with the law.

for the good life. He dressed in the lat-

The CIA agent had nothing but praise est styles, dined at the best restaurants

for Rosselli's daring.

and

dated

beautiful women.

In the strictest of confidence, Ros

thought of going

back to prison,

selli himself confirmed that he had di

friends say, horrified him.

rected

six assassination

attempts

To avoid prison, he began to talk to

against Castro. We protected his con. the government as early as 1970. He

HH 54923

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Page 92

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## Page 93

LRS - MAIN FILE COPY

she Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feh. 23,1971 B11

astro Stalker Worked for the ClA

Jack Anderson

Robert Maheu, a for

"sell with deadly poison is

still on the ClA payrolt.

mer FBI agent, who admitted capsules

he tried Both admitted to us a friend.

The mystery man whom the

to us that he had handled un. through a relative of Castro's

ship with Roselll but refused

Central Intelligence Agency

to discuss their CIA activities.

dercover assignments for the

recrulted to assassinate Cuba's

chet to plant in the dictator's Harvey said tie had a "high re-

CIA. He refused, however, to food. Later, marksmen armed

gard". for. Roselli and called

Fidel Castro has been lald up

discuss the details. This le the

with high-powered Belgian ri-

the Friar's Club case a "bum

In the sick ward of the Los

same Maheu, Incidentally, who

fles attompted to Inflitrate

rap.". Said Harvey::"The

Angeles County Jall.

Is now Involved in a legal bat close enough to gua Castro, Friar's Club Indictment Is

He is handsome, hawk-faced

over phantom

billlonalre down.

John Roselll, once & dashing

Howard Hughes' Nevada oper

All told, sit assassination at

phony. Roselll had no more to

do with that than I had."

figure around Hollywood and

tempts were made; the last in

Roselll's lawyers are.now

Rosell was so flattered over

the spring of 1883; Through.

year-old Inmate with a respira- being asked to perform a so

trying to get clemency for

out this pertod, Roselli worked

tory ailment

their client, citing our stories,

cret mission for the U.S. gov-

Confidential FBI files Iden•

undor, the direct, supervision

as. "a top Mafia fig.

ernment that he paid all his

of two secret CIA agents, Wil-

about his secret CIA service.!

expenses out

lam Harvey and James (BLg

ure" who watched over "the

pocket and risked his neck to

Jim) O'Connell.

Firearms Fiasco

concealed interests

In Las land the assassination teams

Under pressure from the

Vegas casinos of the Chicago on the Cuban coast..

underworld."

Roselli's Reward

"flearms lobby, the Treasury

In James Bond fashlon, he

hay admitted

The FBI which got wind of Department has falled to en-

to held whispered meetings in

the assassination plot, has

frlends that he was a rum run.

Miami Beach hotels with Cu-

ner during the Roaring Twen. bans willing to make an at-

tried to pump Roselli for in-

force a vital section of the

1968 federal firearms act.

formation. But he was sworn

les. Operating niong the East

tempt on Castro's life. Once,

to allence by the CIA, and up

The law was passed after

Coast, he learned how to evade he

called on Chicago racket

Coast Guard cutters and po

to this moment, he hasn't bro

the murders of Sen. Robert

boss Sam Giancana to line up

ken it

Kennedy and Dr. Martin Lu•

The confidential

name later became files report that Glancana had

' Meanwhile, the Justice De-

ther King. It authorizes the

partment, as part of its crack-

Treasury Secretary to require

linked with the biggest names "gambling interest and an in-

in the Chicago and Los Ange- terest in the shrimp business

down. on, organized lerime,

full reports of all firearms and

les underworlds. He also de. In Cuba." However, the Chi-

trled to nall Roselfirm:FBI ammunition sales.

discovered that his Chicago

For the two years that the

• veloped contacts in the Cuban cago gangster took

no direct birth records had been forged,

law has. been in

force, the

underworld before Castro look part In the assassination plot.

that his name was really Fi-

Treasury Department has 1g

over the Havana gambling ca-

midnight lippo Sacco and that he had nored this key provision The

dashes to Cuba with his hired

come to this country fram gun industry has complained

He had the right back- assassing in twin powerboats. Italy as a child. He was con-

would be a bookkeeping

for a hush-hush mis

Once a Cuban patrol &bip

sion that the CIA was plan turned Its guns on his dark-

victed for falling to register as nightmare.

an allen.

The

federal government

ning in 1961. As part of the

ened boat, tore a hole In the

He was also convicted for

which would have to compile:

Bay of Pigs Invasion, the CIA

bottom and sank the boat. Ro

conspiracy to rig card games

all the sales data, has alsos

hoped to knock off Castro and

selli was fished out of the at

leave Cuba leaderless.

Los Angeles'

exclusive

been reluctant to spend the

water by the.other boat, which Friar's Club.

$100 million it would cost for;

Rieks Neck

escaped into the shadows.

Of Roselli's two CIA asso-

computers and staff to main*

earlier columns, we re.

clates, Harvey has now retired tain the firearms flies.

Rosell was recruited for the ported how the CIA furnished to Indianapolis and O'Connell|

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## Page 94

URS - MAIN FUE COPT

YAy Washington Herry-Go-Round

THE MASHINGTON POST Tuesda: Jun. 12, 1971

D 15

Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Undersan

(behind the Trujillo and Diem ment

and

had traveled to sion, there was a wide spoc.

assassinations.

Mexico to visit the Cuban trum of plans ranging from

The plot to kill Cuban dic-

Did the late Robert Ken-

Embassy a few weeks before one extreme to

another,".

lator Fidel Castro, hidden for

nedy know about the assassina-

the dreadful day in Dallas. McCone admitted. "Whenever

10 years from the public, raises

tion attempts? After the Bay

Could Bob Kennedy have this subject (assassinating Cas-

some ugly questions that high

of Pigs fiasco, President Ken-

been plagued by the terrible tro) was brought up-and ft

officials would

rather keep

nedy swore

to friends he

thought that the CIA plot,

was _ it was rejected imme-

buried deep inside the Central

which he must at least have

would like "to splinter the CIA

Intelligence Agency.

condoned, put. into motion

diately on two grounds. First,

in a thousand pieces and scat forces that may have brought

It would not be condoned-by

1. Has the CIA tried to as- ter It to the winds." He put about his brother's martyr

anybody. Second, it wouldn't

sassinate any

his brother, Robert, in charge dom?

have achleved anytbing."

John McCone, who headed the of the CIA with instructlons

The last surviving brother,

CIA during the six attempts to shake it up. The CIA made Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass),

There was also talk in high

off Castro, denied five attempts on Castro's Ilfe could give us no insight. His

places, McCone acknowledged,

emphatically that the CIA has after the Bay of Pigs while brothers had never spoken to

of supporting a coup to oust

lied to kill anyone. But ex- Robert Kennedy was riding him about any assassination

The

former CIA di

Sen. George Smathers, one of herd on the agency.

attempts against Castro, he rector sald he had argued

closest 4. Could the plot against said. He was aware, he volun-

against this at a secret session

friends, told us the late Presl- Castro have backfired against teered, only that Sen. Smath-

with both Kennedy brothers.

dent suspected that the CIA President Kennedy? The late ers had talked to the late

He had contended that there

had arranged the shootings of President was murdered nine President about eliminating

was no one strong enough to

:the Dominican Republic's Ra- months after the last assassi- Castro.

take Diem's place and that a

ael Trujillo in 1961 and South nation team was caught on a

Smathers told us that Presl-

coup, therefore, would bring.

Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in Havana

with high-dent Kennedy seemed "horri-

"political upheaval."

powered rifles.

Did President Kennedy they were subjected to flend-

ted sumed assassina the , rememel

"I told the President and

Bobby kogether," recalled Mc-

personally. sanction the plot ish tortures until they told all him saying," recalled Smath-

"that if I were running

against Castro? The prepara-

they knew. None of the assas- ers, "that the CIA frequently

a baseball team and had only

rations to assassinate the Cu-

sination teams, however, had did things

one pitcher, I wouldn't take

ban dictator began during the direct knowledge of the CIA about, and he was unhappy

him out of the game."

last months of the Eisenhower involvement. The CIA Insti- about it. He complained that

The November,

1963,

coup

administration as part of the gators had represented them- the CIA was almost autono-

caught the United States com-

¡Bay of Pigs scheme. All six

selves as oilmen seeking re- mous.

pletely by surprise, he sald.

attempts, however, were made

venge against Castro for his

"He told me he belleved the

While the plotters were mov.

during 1961-63 when Mi. Ken-

seizure of oil holdings.

CIA had arranged to have

ing on the palace,

he said,

Diem and Trujillo bumped off.

then Ambassador Henry Cabot

PLOT BACKFIRE?

House. Smathers told us he

He was pretty well shocked

was

visiting

Diem.

once spoke in the late Prest-

recall about that. He thought it was

Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our

ident about assassinating Cas.

that Robert Kennedy, deep- a stupid thing to do, and he

Pacifle commander, had also

ly despondent, went into semi- wanted to get control of what

been present, but had left

brother's the CIA was doing."

early to go to the airport.

rolled back his eyes, recalled

McCone

said

President

Smathers, as if to indicate the been tormented by more than vigorously, told us that

McCone, disagreeing Diem escaped through a tun-

fidea was too wild to discuss. natural

certainly plot was authorized or imple-

nel but was caught in nearby

Kennedy learned that the assassin, Lee mented" to assassinate Castro,

Cholon and "shot in a station

told Smathers of his suspicion Harvey Oswald, had been ac- Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

Chal the CIA may have been tive in the pro-Castro move-l

"During those days of ten-l

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## Page 95

PAUL! L!C.13

h!: Hashington Merry-Go-lound

THE "ASHNGTON POST Wonde. Son 1ST 137

'Allempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

¡tor before the motley Invad.

late agalnst President Ken- coniplole with secret trysts at

Locked In the darkest re

ers landed on the Island. Their nedy.

glittering Miami Beach hotels

cesses of the Central Intell!-

arrival was expected to touch

To set up the Castro assassi-

and

midnight powerboat

gence Agency is the story of

off a general uprising, which

nation, the CIA enlisted Roh. dashes to secret landing spots

the Communist militia would ert Maheu, a former FBI

six

assassination

attempts

against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

have had more trouble putting

agent with shadowy contacts,

on the Cuban coast. Once, Ro-

selli's boat was shot out from

who had handled other under.

For 10 years, only a few key

down without the charismatic

under him.

cover assignments for the CIA

people have known the terri. Castro to lead them.

For the first try, the CIA

out of his Washington public

ble secret. They have sworn

After the first

attempt relations office.

He

later

furnished Roselli with special

never to talk.

learned

the

Yet we have falled, five more assassination

poison

capsules to slip Into

moved to Las Vegas to head

details

from

Castro's food. The poison was

sources whose credentials are

teams were sent to Cuba. The Nevada operatlons.

up billionaire Howard Hughes'

supposed to lake three days to

beyond question.

act. By the time Castro died,

last team reportedly made It Maheu recruited John Ro- his system would throw off all

We spoke to John McCone, to a rooftop within shooting selli, a ruggedly handsome traces nf the poison, so he

who headed the CIA at the distance of Castro before they gambler with contacts in both i would appear to be the victim

time of the assassination at. were apprehended. This hap. the American and Cuban un of a natural if mysterious ail-

tempts. He acknowledged the pened around the last of Feb. derworlds, to arrange the as-

idea had been discussed inside | ruary of first of March, 1963.

ment.

sassination. The dapper, hawk-

the CIA but Insisted it had

Nine months later, Presl- faced

Roselli

arranged with

been

"rejected

Roselli, formerly mar- Cuban, relaled to one of Cas

Immedi- dent Kennedy was gunned ried to movie actress June tro's chefs, to plant the deadly

ately." He vigorously denled down In Dallas by Lee Harvey Lang,

was & power in the pellets in the dictator's food

that the CIA had ever partiel- Oswald, a fanatic who pre- movie Industry until his con- On March 13, 1061, Roselli de.

pated in any plot on Castro's

viously had agitated for Cas

viclion with racketeer Willie livered the capsules to his con-

life. Asked whether the attro in New Orleans and had Bloff In a million-dollar Holly- tart at Miami Beach's glamor-

tempts could have been made made a mysterious trip to the wood labor shakedown. The!

with his knowledge, he re- Cuban

jous Fontainebleau Hotel.

Embassy In Mexico CIA assigned two of ils most

plied: "It could not have hap- Clty.

A couple of wecks later. Just

trusted

operatives,

William about the right time for the

pened."

Among those prly to the Harvey and James (Big Jim)!

¡ plot to hare been carried out.

We hare complete confi- CIA conspiracy, there is still a O'Connell, to the hush-hush, a report out of lavana said

dence, however,

in

our

nagging suspicion-unsup. murder mission. Using phony Castro was ill. But he re-

sources.

ported

The plot to knock off Castro

by the Warren Com- names, they accompanied Ro-covered before the Bay of Pigs

mission's findings-that Cas- selli on trips to Miami to line invasion on April 17, 1961.

began as part of the Bay of tro became aware of the U.S. up the assassination (rams.

1 Four more attempis were

Pigs operation. The intent was plot upon his life and some.

The full story reads like the

to eliminate the Cuban dicta-l how recruited Oswald to retal-Iscript of a James Bond movie,

,made on Castro's life,

@ 1971. Beli-dIcClure Syndicnie. Ilie.

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## Page 96

BY JACK ANDRASON

with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON-Press

account

have

identified

Cuba's Fidel Castro as l'' target

of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have conc.at a

worse time for Secretary of State Hinry Kis

singer. He is in the thick of "most jelicate

negotiations," according to our White House

sources, to restore some

kind of

diplomatic rela-

tionship with Cuba.::

Actually, we reported

as far back as Jan. 18

1971, that the CIA had ar

ranged six assassination

attempts against Castro

in the early 1960s. Now

that the story has been

revived, it might be use

ful to recount the details.

The plot began as part

Anderson

of the discredited Bay of Pigs Operation.

The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban

leader before the CLA invasion force landed.

on the island.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA

selected an underworld figure who could be

disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli,

identified in confidential FBI files as "a top

Mafia figure" who watched over

"the con-

cealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the

Chicago underworld."

Roselli represented himself as an oil man

seeking revenge

against Castro for his sei-

sure of oil holdings.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Ro

selli with special poison capsules

to

slip

' into Castro's food. The poison was supposed

to take three days do act. By the time Cas-

tro died, his system would throw off all

traces of the poison, so he would appear to

be the victim of a natural if mysterious ail-

ment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to

one di Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly

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96

poliets In the dictator's food. On March 13,

1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his

contact at Miami Beach's glamorous For-

tainebleau Hotel.

A couple weeks later, just about the right

time for the plot to have been carried out, a

report out of Havana said Castro was ill.

But he recovered in time to rout the Bay of

Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Although both the murder plot and the in

vasion failed, the CIA continued trying to

get rid of

Castro.

The Cuban who had

sneaked the poison into Havana was never

seen again.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength cap.

sules to be slipped into Castro's food several

weeks after. the Bay of Pigs. But once again,

the plot failed and the conspirators disap

peared.

Four more attempts were made on Cas...

• tro's life. thereafter,

using assassination

teams equipped with high-powered rifles,

explosives and two-way radios. Roselli per-

sonally made midnight powerboat dashes to

deliver the teams at secret landing spots on

the Cuban coast.

:. The assassination teams never got a shot

at Castro, although the CIA learned that the

last group reached a rooftop within range.

This occurred around the last of February

or first of March, 1963.

Nine months

later, President Kennedy'

was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey

Oswald, a fanatic who had been active in the

pro-Castro movement and had paid a myste

rious call upon the Cuban embassy in Mex-

ico City a few weeks before the dreadful day:

in Dallas.

Sources familiar with the CIA conspiracy

can't shake a nagging suspicion-unsup

ported by the Warren Commission's findings

—that Castro may have become aware of

the U.S. plot upon his life and, therefore,

may have

recruited Oswald to. retaliate

against President Kennedy.

---

## Page 97

CHS ME THE COPY

The Wauklagton Marry-Go-Found

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday. March 10, 1975

CIA Plots Against Castro Recounte

By Jack Ander+n

who watched over "the con- lets in the dictator's lood. Onling spols on the Cuban

und Les Whitter

cealed interests in Las Vegas March 13. 1961, Roselli deliv

The

assassination

Press accounts have identi.

casinos of the Chicago under- cred the capsules to hiscontact never got a shot at Cast.

at Miami

Beach's fontaine.!

though the CIA learned I:

fied Cuba's Fidel Castro as the

Roselli's CIA contacts were bleau Hotel.

target of an unsuccessiul ClA

last group reached a ri

William Harvey and James

A couple of weeks later, just

within

range. This bee

assassination plot.

O'Connell,. who accompanied about the right time for the plot

around the last of Febru:

The headlines couldn't have

him on hush-hush tripsto Miami to have been carried nut, a re- firstol March, 1963.

come at a worse time for Secre- to

line up the assassination port out of Havana said Castro

tary of State flemy A. Kissinger. teams. No one else was told, was ill. But he recovered in time

Nine months later, Pre:

the thick of "most deli-

however, of the ClA's role in the to rout the Bay of Pigs invasion

Kennedy was gunned doi

cate nerotiations," according to

011 April 17, 1961.

Dallas by Lee Harvey Os

our White House sources, lu it-

Koselli represented himsell

Although both the murder

i fanatic who had been act

store some

kind of diplomatic

as an oilman seeking revenge

plot and the invasion failed, the

the pro-Castro movement

relationship with Cuba.

against Castro for his seizure of Cld continued trying lo gel rid

hard paid a mysterious call

Actually.

we reported is for

ol holdings. The assassination

of Castro. The Cuban who had the Cuban Embassy in .

back

aS Jan.

18, 1971, that the

weapons were also carcíully se-sncaked the poison into lavana

Cily i few weeks befor

ClA had arranged six assassina-

lectert

from foreign

makes, was never seen again. There-

dreadful day in Dallas.

ton attempts against Castro in

mostly Bolgian, to prevent any

fore, the ClA, unsure whether

Sources familiar with the

the carly 1060%.

Now that the

link to the United States.

the plotters had failed or the

conspiracy can't shake i

story has been revived, it. micht

Each attempt to kill Castro

poIson

hadn't been strong

linesuspicion-unsupport

br usefulto recnuntthe details.

was meticulously planned, like

enough, decided lo try

again

the Warren Commission's

The plot beran as part of le

an episode from the TV draina

with a more powerful dose.

Ings-that Castro misy hase

miscredited Bay

of figs opor

"Mission Impossible." For the

Roselli arranged for triple-come aware of the US.

tion. The strategy was to clim

tirst try, the lA furnished lo-

strength capsules to be slipped

upon his life and. there

the

Cuban leader before

selli with special poison cap.

into Castro's food several weeks!

may have recrunted Oswal

the CIA

Invasion force landed

sules to slip into Castro's food.

after the Bay of Pigs. But once

retaliate against President.

on the island. Without the char.

The poison was supposed to again, the plot failed and the

nedy.

ismatic Castro, it was thought,

Take three days to act. By the conspirators disappeared.

Footnote: sources falls.

tho defenders

would

become

tine Castro died, his system

Four

more ittempts

were

with the secret review of

demoralized and disorganized.

would throw off all traces of the made on Castro's life, therealter

cid's activities have now

To carry out the assassination,

poison, so he would appear to using assassination

teams

knowlerged that Castro, is

the CIA selected an underworld

he the victim of a natural if mys-cquipped with high powered

reported

four ycars ago.

who coult be disowner

lemous ailment.

rifles, explosives and two-any

marked for assassination hy

hawk-face

John

Roselli arranged with a Cu- radios. Koselli personally made CIA. A ClA spokesman refu

led in

confidential bon, related to one of castro's midnight powerboat dashes to to comment.

'll files as " top Mafia figure"

chels, to plant the deadly pel- deliver the teams al secret land.

1is. linted tralure Syndicate. lov

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## Page 98

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

corner greasy spoon can engage in

By Russell Baker

"home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a

The gangsters Sam Giancana

and

victim who is a bona fide citizen of

John Roselli who were associated with

ganglard. Obviously, a philandering

the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch

husband cannot do in a loyal wife of

Fidel Castro have now both been mur-

40 years "gangland-style" and expect

dered after discussing their C.I.A. en-

the police not to lift an eyebrow. Un-

terprise with the United States Senate,

less the subject is the real ganglard

and the police have pronounced the

thing it won't work.

incidents "gangland-style killings."

The corollary of this fact is that

The phrase "gangland-style killing"

gangland people are peculiarly vulner-

has the cozy resonance of "home-style

able to

"gangland-style" murder by

cooking," perhaps because both sug

devious non-ganglanders, who have no

gest the Intimacy of hearth and fire

right to get away with it.

with nobody but us family gathered

This must be infuriating to them.

round and nobody else welcome, Jack.

Imagine that you are an eminent.

These family affairs are, of course,

statesman of gangland, and the vexa-

meddled into by the constabulary, but

tion becomes manifest. You are en-

rarely with much enthusiasm.

tirely prepared to be sent off "gang.

This may be because police success

land-style" by your colleagues. Those

at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-

are the rules of the land.

style killings" has never been such ais

Moreover, if they complete the job,

to get them into the world series of

you wouldn't dream of telling the po-

detection, with the result that inces

lice who did it, even if you could. That

sant failure may have dulled: their

would violate the rules of the sports-

appetite for. the hunt.

manship governing gangland. In gang.

Or, it may be because policemen

land, good sports don't tell.

believe the subjects of "gangland-style

But to have some alien from the

killings" aren't worth working over-

outer world-some straight-Jake cous-

time for. I don't know, and I certainly

in who wants his share of your will

don't mean to impute either languor,

timidity or indifference to America's

homicide squads. I simply point out

OBSERVER

that once a murder has been called

"gangland-style," apprehension of the

prematurely, some barber who hates

perpetrator almost invariably fails to

your sideburns— to have somebody like

occur.

this do the job on you and get away

This raises the question

whether

with it because it's done "gangland-

"gangland-style" murders might pos-

sibly be catching among people who

style"-Ah, my friend, that must seem

& cruel injustice.

don't come from gangland. Consider

- Such a bad egg as. that you would

the Roselli case. The body is found in

surely betray to the cops. How infuri-

the customary barrel, with the cus-

ating it would be if they looked at the

tomary weights, in

the customary

barrel, the concrete,

the water, the

water.. It bears the customary bullet

bullet holes and closed the case with

holes. Roselli's publicized standing in

a quietly murmured,

gangland seems to leave an open-and-

gangland-style killing."

"Just. another

shut case, which the police will quietly

You will have been the victim, not

shut as soon as possible..

only of murder, but also of discrimina-

If you and I know this, reader, does

tion, for it is only your membership

it not follow that it is also known by,

in gangland that prevents the police

let us say, some hot-tempered waiter

whom

Roselli has

been consistently

from extending themselves; to bring

: your persecutor to justice.

undertipping for years?

I do not know how policemen feel

If that waiter wanted to take his

about nonmembers of gangland killing

revenge and get away with it,

is it

gangland members "gangland-style,"

not logical that he would do it "gang-

but my hunch is that they take &

land-style," so the police could forget

sterner view of it than they do of

it, rather than by scalding Roselli to

gangland men bumping off each other.

death in public with a tureen.of lobster

The average cop probably thinks it is

bisque?

not the kind of thing decent people

This is not to suggest that the police

ought to be doing.

ought to be giving Roselli's waiters

I know very well that gangland folks

the third degree, but merely to point:

don't approve of it; and to make sure

out that gangland can have no monop-

that there is no misunderstanding, I

oly on

"gangland-style killing." Any-

want to assure them that I haven't

body with a barrel, some concrete and the heart to swat a fly, myself, and,

a capacious expanse of water can. "what's more, I've never beert any good

engage

in it, just as readily as your

with concrete.

$/24/21

Turn

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## Page 99

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

By Russell Baker

corner greasy spoon can engage in

"home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a

The gangsters

Sam Giancana and

victim who is a bona fide citizen of •

John Roselli who were associated with

gangland. Obviously, a philandering

the C.I.A, in & scheme to dispatch

husband cannot do in a loyal wife of

Fidel Castro have now both been mur-

40 years "gangland-style" and expect

dered after discussing their C.I.A. en-

the police not to lift an eyebrow. Un-

terprise with the United States Senate,

less the subject is the real gangland

and

the police have pronounced the

thing, it won't work.

incidents "gangland style killings."

The corollary of this fact is that

The phrase "gangland-style killing"

gangland people are peculiarly vuiner-

has the cozy resonance of "home-style

able to

"gangland-style" murder by

cooking," perhaps because both sug-

devious non-ganglanders, who have no

gest the Intimacy of hearth and fire

right to get away with it.

with nobody but us family gathered

This must be Infuriating to them.

round and nobody else welcome, Jack.

Imagine that you are an eminent.

These family

affairs are,

of course,

statesman of gangland, and the vexa-

meddled into by the constabulary, but

tion becomes manifest. You are en-

rarely with much enthusiasm.

tirely prepared to be sent off "gang-

This may be because police success

land-style" by your colleagues. Those

at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-

are the rules of the land.

style killings" has never been such as

Moreover, if they complete the job,

to get them into the world series of

you wouldn't dream of telling the po.

detection, with the result that inces

lice who did it, even if you could. That

sant failure may have dulled their

would violate the rules of the sports-

appetite for the hunt.

manship governing gangland. In gang.

Or, it may be because policemen

land, good sports don't tell.

believe the subjects of "gangland-style

But to have some alien

from the

killings' aren't worth working over-

outer world-some straight-Jake cous-

time for. I don't know, and I certainly

don't mean to impute either languor,

in who wants his share of your will

timidity or indifference to America's

homicide squads. I simply point out

OBSERVER

that once a murder has been called

"gangland-style," apprehension of the

prematurely, some barber who hates

perpetrator almost invariably fails to

your sideburns— to have somebody like

occur.

This raises

the. question

whether

this do the job on you and get away

with it because it's done "gangland.

"gangland-style" murders might pos-

sibly be catching among people who

style"-Ah, my friend, that must seem

a cruel injustice.

don't come from

gangland. Consider

- Such a bad egg as that you: would

the Roselli case. The body is found in

surely betray to the cops. How infuri-

the customary barrel, with the

cUS-

ating it would be if they looked at the

tomary weights, in

the customary

barrel,

water.. It bears the customary bullet

the concrete, the water, the

bullet holes and closed the case with

holes.

Roselli's publicized standing in

gangland seems to leave an open-and-

a quietly murmured,

"Just another

shut case, which the police will quietly

gangland-style killing."

You will have been the victim, not

shut as soon as possible.

only of murder; but also of discrimina-

If you and I know this, reader, does

tion, for it is only your membership

it not follow that it is also known by,

in gangland that prevents the police

let us say,

some hot-tempered waiter

whom

Roselli has been consistently

from extending themselves to bring

your persecutor to justice.

undertipping for years?

I do not know how policement feel

If that waiter wanted to take his

revenge

and get away with it, is it

about nonmembers of gangland killing

gangland members

"gangland-style,

not logical that he would do it "gang-

but my hunch is that they take &

land-style," so the police could forget

sterner view of it than they do of

it, rather than by scalding Roselli to

gangland men bumping off each other.

death in public with a tureen. of lobster

The average cop probably thinks it is

bisque?

This is not to suggest that the police

ought to be doing.

out the kind of thing decent people

ought to be giving Roselli's waiters

I know very well that gangland folks

the third degree,

, but merely to point

don't approve of it, and to make sure

out that gangland can have no monop-

that there is no misunderstanding, I

oly on "gangland-style killing." Any-

want to assure them that I haven't

body with a barrel, some concrete and

the heart to swat a fly, myself, and,

a capacious

expanse

of

water can. what's more, I've never been any good

engage in it, just as readily as your

With concrete.

$/24/21.

M. Gok

Turn

NW 54923 DocId: 32423629

Page 99

---

## Page 100

Terrorist Activities

Charged to Cubans

By Police in Miami

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI))'

-Militant pro-Castro

and anti-

Castro groups in

the Miami!

area are engaged in terroristie

activities both

in and outside t

the United States, according to*

lestimony given before a Sen-

ate subcommittee and released R

today.

The testimony came last May r

before a Judiciary subcommit-

tee on internal security headed gi

by Senator James O. Eastland, ar

Democrat of Mississippi. It said ri

that as

many as

50 Cuban

groups of various shadings had ti

been operating in Miami at anyla

one

time,

many of them

en-T

gaged in violent plots involving r

local actions and activities in i

Mexico,

Central

and

South W

America and Cuba itself.

Lieut.

thomas

Lyons, who D

has been with the Dade County o

Public. Safety Department for h

more than nine years, and Raul c

J. Diaz, of the department's or-d

ganized crime, terrorist and se-

curity unit, told of efforts to C

track down

terrorist elements p

in the greater Miami area.

Lieutenant Lyons said mostle

Cubans in the area

were hard-c

working

and

some

industrious; but v

individuals

"use

Dadele

County as a base for interna-l

tional terrorism against allied

governments

of

Cuba, Cuban e

shipping,

Communists, purporty

ed Communists and individuals

who take a stand against their

terroristic-type tactics."

During

the last two years,

Lieutenant

Lyons

said,

there

have been four homicides "with

strong indicators on each that

the motivations were political

in nature and terroristic, by de-

sign.'.

Mr. Diaz said that some. Cas-

tro groups had infiltrated exile

organizations and

that

there;

were plans to assassinate Latin-

American

diplomats and for-

eign ministers.

Lieutenant

Lyons

said his

unit received Information from

a confidential source early this t

year that there outdoor

отня

attenpt on the life of Secretary

tl

of State Henry

A. Kissinger E

during his

February visit to

Costa Rica.

HH 54923 DocId:32423629. Page 100

8/23/76

The Federal Bureau of Inves-

tigation and the Secret Service

were notified, he said. A well.

known fugitive exile, Orlando

Bosch, was jailed after illegally

entering Costa Rica.

There no

incidents during the Kissinger

visit.

He did not mention the Cen-

tral Intelligence

Agency's ef.

forts to use Cuban

exiles in

Florida and American gangsters

to kill Prime Minister Fidel Cas-

tro.

Two weeks ago, the body of

an

underworld

figure,

John

Roselli was found stuffed in a

chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum

floating in a bay near Miami.

Mr. Roselli had

testified last

year before the Senate Select

Committee on Intellegence Ac-

tivities that he and a Chicago

gangster, Sam Giancana, were

hired by

the C.I.A. to

recruit

•Cubans to kill Mr. Castro.

Mr.

Giancana was shot and killed

by unknown persons last year

just before he was testify be

fore the Washington panel.

---

## Page 101

ine Boston Glove

monday, August 23, lurb

19

JACK ANDERSON

Plot to kill

Kissinger

blocked

WASHINGTON - A reported plot to assassinate Sec-

retary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months

ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four

days before it was supposed to be carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret lestimn-

ny before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and

from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was re-

ported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on the

Secretary's life was expected, according to underground

reports, during his visit to Costa Rica last February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into

Costa Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and Secret Ser-

vice had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and

notified the Costa Rican authorities. The suspected assas-

sin was arrested and clapped into a tiny jail cell four days

before Kissinger got to town.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his

overtures to improve relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro

back in 1972. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist

band, known as Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story two years later after a

lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and

Nov. 12, 1974,

we

warned that anti-Castro terrorists

planned an "assassination ... against American congress-

men and businessmen who supported a….. thaw." We noted

that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger, himself, was one of the

• targets came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the

man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was

active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's little

Havana. But he later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a

fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said, "(about)

the plan to assassinate the US Secretary of State." He said

the plot had' taken "certain form" by 1973 and had. been

"actualized" by 1974..

Then, in a reference to our 1974 columns, he added:

"This fact which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been

corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro l

ers who had conspired to kill US and other leaders prom

ing a Cuban-American detente. Bosch arcady had be

convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a b

zooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped Feder

parole and fled to Venezuela ir 1974.

Months later, he was reported to be in Curacao, prc

lected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to th

reports, of his "money, friends and protection."

Florida's Dade County Public Safety Department, be

cause of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellent

ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, tbe county's

terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electri-

fying news.

He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in secret tes-

timony. "We received information from confidential sourc-

es," he swore, "that there was going to be an attempt on the

life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger... We passed the

information on to the FBI, and they had also received the

information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they.

have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Cos-

ta Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was

held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely

out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the

country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never

proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is

now at large somewhere in Latin America.

-...

HH 54923 DooId:32423629 Page 101

---

## Page 102

HH 54923

Slain Mobster Claimed

Cuban Link 1o /FK Death:

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder,

John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld

recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Cas-

tro, had been privately claiming that

agents of the Cuban premier, in retali-

ation, were involved in the assassina-

tion of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connec-

tion to the Kennedy assassination was

expressed through his attorney,

Ed-

ward P. Morgan,

to the FBI

as long

ago as March, 1967, and also in private

conversations with a longtime associ.

ate of Rosselli

who participated

in

meetings between Rosselli and the

CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on

an

interview

with

Morgan

dated

March 21, 1967, was included, without

ROSSELLI, From Al

•ance and the subsequent discovery of

This body in an oil drum in Florida

•waters. The Washington Post, however,

¿has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli

mere the sources of the testimony that

suggested a Cuban role in the Ken-

#nedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a.

¡summary of the FBI interview,

Was

that Rosselli had reached his conclu-

sion about a Cuban connection to the

Kennedy

assassination

from

""feedback" furnished by sources close

Sto Castro who were involved in the ClA

*plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware

Not the identity of some of the individ-

tuals who, came to the United

States

"for this purpose and he understood

"that two such individuals were now in

¡the state of New Jersey,"

jerview summary stated.

" the FBI in-

A long-time associate of Rosselli

"who was interviewed separately by

The Washington Post, said there was

no question in the slain mobster's

mind that President Kennedy

was

killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal /

for the CIA schemes against the Cu..:

ban leader.

* "He was positive; he was sure." said

the associate, who knew Rosselli well*

and was in contact with him, before

Rosselli disappeared from his Florida

Some on July 28. The associate, who

does not want to be identified pub.

licly, is scheduled to be interviewed

Ihis week by Dade County, Fla., homi-.

'cide detectives. He was a party to Ros-

selli's contacts in the early 1960s with

CIA

case officers overseeing the at

dempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the

"collective

conclusion of all official

'U.S. government investigations into

the Kennedy assassination-including

the Warren Commission, the FBI and

the CIA-has been that there was no

evidence that implicated the Castro

government or and prite "102

DocId: 32423629

Page

identification of the interviewee.

in

last June's Senate Intelligence Coin.

mittee's report on the role of the in.

telligence

community in the Kennedy

assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli

and another Morgan client had in-

formed him that Castro became aware

of

CIA

assassination

conspiracies

against him and "thereafter employed

teams of individuals who were dis-

patched to the United States for the

purpose

of assassinating Mr. Ken-

nedly."

Because neither Morgan nor Ros-

selli was identified in the Senate re-

port, the significance of that portion

of the 106-page docunent was dis-

counted at the time it was published

in June, before Rosselli's disappear-

See RUSSELLI, A8, Col. 1

" However, the CIA's involvement in

the schemes to assassinate Castro

was not divulged to the Warren Com-

mission, and knowledge of them was

Confined until 1967 to a small, elite

circle of the U.S. intelligence commu•

nity. President Johnson apparently

first learned about the schemes only

after a March 7, 1967, column by the

late Drew Person, which prompted

Johnson to order a CIA investigation

of the highly sensitive episode.

Full-details of the CIA underworld

collusion in the plots to kill Castro

did not surface publicly until the pub-

lication last yeat of the Senate Intelli-

gence: Committee's assassination

re.

port and the ensuing report last June

on the possible role of the intelligence

agencies in the Kennedy assassination

and ingestigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived

flamboyantly in a world of mobsters,

politicians and playgirls, was found

two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum

weighted with chains but buoyed by

from decomposition

on

thei

ocean's surface off the coast of Miami

The specific cause of death was deter.

mined by an autopsy to be asphyxia-

Gion.

Last'year, an underworld colleasue

st Rosselli, Sam • (Momo) Giancana

ho also: had been recruited by the:

CIA in the effort to kill. Castro; was'

found shot to death in 'his Chicago!

home in what police described as

highly professional job by assailants

#ho

penetrated the mobster's per-

sonal security screen. Giancana was

due to testify before the Senate Intel-

ligence Committee shortly after his

/ Neither murder has been solved.

" The possibility that Rosselli's mur-

der might have been related to his

Senate testimony on the CIA schemes

to kill Castro has brought the FBI

nio the investigation at the request

of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

$/0,7114

ivcistie.ton

144.3

---

## Page 103

tripally

santos

Traificante

Fla., whose one-lime

Havana

ambling enterprises fell hostage in

1Jag to the Cuban revolution-in plots

against Castro had been a closely held

wilet within the top echelons of the

tIl and FIl until recently.

; The tangled chronology of suppres.

sion and eventual disclosure. although

tailed in the June report, has re-

crived little public attention. Rossel.

li's murder. adds significance, to those

events.

Here, is the

sequence, pieced

to-

§ether 'from the testimony given to

Senate intelligence investigators:

• Columnist. Drew Pearson went to

the late Chief Justice of the United

States Parl

Warren late in Janualy,

1967, and told him that a Washington

lawyer had confided to him that one

of his clients

said the United States

"had attempted to assassinate Fidel

Castro in the early 1960s and Castro

had decided to retaliale."

Warren declined Pearson's sugges-

tion that he see the lawyer, who was

Edward Morgan. Warren referred the

matter to then Secret Service Direc-

tor James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13,

1967, wrote FBI Director J: Edgar Ho-

over, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six

senior bureau officials on

an

"eyes-

only" basis. There is no record of FBI

meetings or discussions of those alle-

gations. At that point the sensitive let-

ter bounced back and

forth in the

higher reaches of the FBI bureauc-

racy.

The job of responding to Rowley's

letter was assigned to the supervisor

of the FBI's General Investigative Di-

'vision who was given responsiility for

the overall assassination investigation

This official's job was complicated

by the fact that he had never been in-

'formed of what Hoover and his closest

circle of confidants in the FBI learned

early in 1962 that the CIA

assassination

attempts against Castro. and promi-

nent American underworld figures; in-

cluding Posselli and Giancana, had

been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official;

prepared a draft reply to the Rowley

letter for his superiors saying "our in

restigation uncovered no evidence in:

dicating Fidel Castro officials of the

Government

with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assas.?

sination of President Kennedy. This

bureau is not conducting any investi-

gation regarding

matter." The

FBI official added in later testimony,

that "everyone in the higher echelons

Drew Pearson went ahead and pub.

lished a column on March 7, 1967, ref:

erring to reports that ClA schemes

against Castro's life in 1963 "may

nave resulted in a counterplot by Cas.

tro to assassinate President Kenne

dy.""

called 118 assi end director C'artha

Deloach with !.

message that "the

President had in tructed that the FBI

intervicw (Mor.") concerning any

knowledge he wiht have.regarding

the assassinatim of President Ken-

623/76 bursticiden

Delouch told Vatson that it ap.

Pist

peared Morgan 'id not want to be in-

terviewed, and in if he was inter-

viewed he would probably not divulge

the identity of his sources..." Wal-

703

son persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," De-

Loach concluded in a memo for the

"it appears that we have no aly

ternative but to interview (Morgan)

and then furnish the results to Wat-

son in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two

agents from the FBI's General Investi-

gative Division,

committee concluded was "puzzling"

because it was the Domestic Intelli.

gence Division

which had been as-

signed responsibility for investigating

possible foreign involvement in

assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the

knowledge.

confined to Hoover and

his top aides, of the CIA's assassina-

tion plots against Castro. Both agents

•It was not clear then—nor is it to.

came forward

that time to bring Rosselli's story to!

the ears of the nation's agnest.

enforcement authorities.

I may ho rolovant that Dacoolli had

serious legal problems at the time.

In May. 1966, the FBI threatened to

deport him for living in the United?.

. States under an assumed name unless !

¿) he cooperated in an investigation of!

the Mafia (his true name was Filippo

testified eight years later that they

were "surprised" when Morgan al-

Saco). At the time, he reached a CiA

contact from the anti-Castro conspir-

luded during the interview to U.S. at-

acy days, CIA security director Col. 3

tempts to assassinate Castro.

Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

"These agents stated that theu

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep ?.

the lawyer's

square with the bureau" but was!

(Morgan's) allegations or question him,

afraid that the mob might kill him for

in detail on them, since they had not

been briefed on the CIA assassination

In 1967, after he was arrested for

efforts," the Senate committee ob-

gambling fraud at the Friars Club in

Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Wash-

former CIA case officer, William Har-

, ington Field Office sent headquarters:

vey, who sought unsuccessfully. to in-

ten copies of a blind memorandum

tercede in the prosecution.

summarizing the interview with Mor.

It was against this background that

Morgan went,

first to Drew Pearson,

In a Senate Intelligence Committee :

and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sen-

summary of the FBI interview, Mor-,

sational allegations of CIA plotting

gan was reported to have acknowl.

against Castro and the Cuban counter-

edged that his clients were "on the,:

espionage directed against President.!

fringe of the underworld" and that

they faced "possible prosecution in a

Last April Rosselli told the Senate !

crime not related to the assassination Intelligence Committee he had no rec-

ollection of either receiving informa-

Morgan said his clients "were called

that Castro retaliated

upon by a governmental agency to as-

President Kennedy or of baving dis-:

sist in a project which was said to

cussed it with Morgan. This meant ei-.

have the highest governmental ap.

ther that Rosselli suffered a dramatic

proval. The project had as its purpose

assassination of Fidel Castro.

Elaborate plans were made, including

the infiltration of the Cuban Govern-:

ment and the placing of informants i

within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBl, according

to the summary, that Castro had en?-

ployed

"teams

of;

individuals who

were dispatched to the United States

for the purpose of assassinating Presi-

dent Kennedy."

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629 Page 103

---

## Page 104

• a pure invention. a serious risk

• established Washington lawyer.

i ommittee source could explain

1!.: liverepancy, and Morgan declined

to montirn that Rosselli was the client

is auration or to discuss either his

alicactions against the Cuban govern-

mont we his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967

interview with Morgan was sent to

headquarters with a transmittal slip

saying:

"No further investigation. is

being conducted by the Washington

field office unless it is advised to the

contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee,

in commenting on this position, said

that

"had

the interviewing

agents

known of the CIA-underworld plots

against Castro, they would have been

aware that the lawyer had clients who

had been active in the assassination

On March 21, FBI headquarters for-

memo to the. White House, the attor-

ney general and the Secret Service. It

did not recommend

any further in

vestigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening

the following

day. President Johnson called CIA Di-

rector Richard M. Helms to the White

House. The next morning. March 23,

Helms ordered the CIA inspector gen.

eral to prepare a report on the CIA

involvement in the assassination plots

• Mongoose-of

Helms had full knowledge at the time

they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President

Johnson on the results. There is. how.

ever. no evidence that Helms briefed

-the President on the November, 1963,

plot-one of eight major' schemes on:

Castro's life from 1960 to 1965-10 25-

sassinate the Cuban leader through

the employment of an agent with the

cryptonymn AMLASH.

His identity

was revealed as

Rolando Cubela,

' 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access

to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassi

nation equipment to Cubela during a

Paris meeting on November 22, 1963-

the day President Kennedy was killed

in Dallas. There has been subsequent

speculation that the mercurial and

talkative Cubela was either a double

agent or being monitored by Cuban

intelligence.

During the later days of his presi-

dency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically

of a

"Caribbean

Murder

Incorpo

rated" targeted against Fidel Castro.

The inspiration for that statement un-

• doubtedly was the CIA inspector gen-

eral's report he ordered Helms to have

• prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and

two of his co-conspirators in the Cas-

tro assassination

schemes have died,

Giancana at the hands

of a profes.

sional hit man and Harvey as the re-

sult of a "massive heart attack" last

June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of

the deceased CIA official, said shef

suspected no. foul play in her hug

band's death. She did, however, tel

527/71

Nastylin

30l3

Pest

Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to

the Senate committee, "developed a

close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked

with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was

asked if he knew whether the agency

transmitted information" to the mob-

ster on possible Cuban involvement in

the Kennedy assassination. He replied

that he was out of the country at the

time Kennedy was killed, and had no

further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy ag-

sassination, Lee Harvey Oswald,

who

was identified by the Warren Commis-

sion as Kennedy's murderer, had trav-

• eled to Mexico City in an attempt to

gain entry to Cuba. According to the

" Warren Commission, Oswald repre-

sented himself as the head of the New

Orleans branch of the Fair Play for

Cuba organization and a friend of the

Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy

was killed, Castro

told

Associated

Press reporter Daniel Harker that

U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans.to

eliminate Cuban leaders would them-

selves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coor-

The Washington Post that she re-

dinating policy, toward Cuba at the

; ceived a call after Rosselli's disappear.

time agreed there is a strong liklihood

ance in late July warning her that Cu-

that Castro would retaliate in some.

bans appeared to be attempting to

fashion. However, it concluded Castro

wipe out all those who participated in

would not risk a major confrontation

the anti-Castro plots.

with the U.S. by attacking U.S. lead.

The call, she said, came from an old

ers.

On the same day Kennedy was ag-

friend who was acquainted with Ros-

sassinated, a CIA officer met with a

selli's sister, whose name is Edith Dai-

high-ranking Cuban official, who had

gle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle

said he would kill Castro, to tell him

told the mutual acquaintance that the

the U.S. would provide him with ex-

Rosselli family had received a tele-

plosives and a poison pen device.

phone threat from unidentified Cu-

While the Senate Intelligence Coná-

bans prior to Rosselli's disappearance.

mittee said it found no evidence suffi-

She also said that Rosselli had gone.to

cient to justify a conclusion that the

meet the Cubans in an effort to pro.

Kennedy assassination was part of a

tect his family.

conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies

Mr's. Daigle could not be reached by

did not properly investigate the assas-

The Washington Post. But another sis-

sination or tell the Warren Commis

ter of Rosselli said she had heard of

sion about the CIA plots on Castro's

no such threats or warnings.

life.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and

"There is no indication that the FBI

whose exploits as a clandestine opera-

or the CIA directed the interviewing

tor are both legendary and

of Cuban sources or sources

within

sial within the agency, testified to the

the Cuban exile community," the Sen-

Senate Intelligence Committee. He

ate committee said.

had become Rosselli's case officer in

According to a former FBI official

Operation Mongoose and supplied the :

in charge of key aspects of the FBI's

mobster with poison pills, explosives,

probe of the Kennedy murder, the

detonators, rifles, handguns,

FBI never satisfactorily determined

and boat radar for transmission. to

what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or

anti Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and

• what he had done in Russia.

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 104

---

## Page 105

FROM

SUBJECT

MAT '909 1011IO..

GSA GUIS. BIG.

NO. 18

UNITED STATES GOI

RNMENT.

Memorandum

hir. Belmont

4.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON THE ASSASSINATION OF

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

simont .

Note -

Callahun -

file:

Hadken

Sulllunt

Troller.

Tol. Room -

Holies-

Gandy

DATE:

12-10-64

1-Hr. Sullivan

(O.H. Bartlett)

1-hr'. DeLoach

1-Mr°.

Belmont

I-MI'. Rosen

1-Hr.

, Malley

1-MT.

Shroder

1-Mr. nogge

PURPOSE:

Lilit

To advise you that an Agent of the Secret Service, when

I testifying before the President's Cormission, denied making cortair

statements to FBI Agents which were subsequently reported to the

Commission. i

DETAILS:

-

In Volume iI of the hearings before the President's

Commission conmencing on page 61 there appears the testinony

of Roy I. Lellerman, Assistant Special Agent, White House Detail,

U.S. Secret Service

on 3-9-64.

*In Chaige

Under questioning by a Conmission member, kellerman

was asled about certain statements reportedly made

by him on

11-22-63,

to SA's Francis ¼. O Neill, Ji. and Janes W. Sibert,

of our Baltinore Office, which appear in the 12-10-63 Dallas

report of Special Agent

Robert P. Gemberling (page 3, paragraph

SA's O'Neill and Sibert were under orders to be observer's

during the autopsy of resident Kennedy at the National Naval -

Medical Center, sethesda, Haryland, wich commenced on the

evening of 11-22-63, to be oi assistance to the secret service,

and to look after the Bureau's interests.

RLi

"He advised he heard a shot and imediaints

turned around, tooling past Governor Connally;

who vas seated directly in back of him, to-the

President. He observed the President slumped

forward and heard him say,

'Got me to a hospital."

fir. Kellerman then heard irs. Kennedy say,

FAt, 1976

'Oh, no!'

, as the President leaned towards her.

He imnediately advised the driver

to take the

FBI

President to the nearest hospital."

ROR: tint y

6.1

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 54923. Docid: 32423629

Page 105

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## Page 106

• A. dosen to Nr. Belmont Memo

RE: PRESIDENT'S CONMISSION

The Commission in questioning Kellerman made specific

reference to the underscored portions of the above paragraph

as it contradicts some of Kellerman's testimony. Kellerman

claims he did not hear the President nor Mrs. Kennedy say

these things and had never told our Agents that he had.

denter to

In

part of Kellerman's denial he stated "I don't know where they

got those quotes."

OBSERVATIONS:

Kellerman is claiming our Agents furnished inaccurate

accounts of a conversation with him.

It is to be remembered

that at the time this conversation with our Agents reportedly

took place 11-22-63, Kellerman had been a security guard in

the President's car

Ka more than

and more than likely was upset and feeling

remorse over

the days episode.

In his testimony before the

Commission hosendeavored to give the impression that he acted

• calmly and immediately took command, issuing logical instructions

after the Presiddnt was hit.

The conversation reported by

our Agents made it appear kellerman reacted normally to the

tragedy and not dramatically as indicated in his testimony,

as he didn't order the driver to the hospital until after the

President had so directed.

It is felt our Agents reported accurately what

Kellerman told them on 11-22-63, and that kellerman's testimony

3y months later is the result of considered deliberation, on

his part,

to paint the

most favorable picture possible, under

the circumstances, for the Secret Service.

Consideration has been given to discussing this matter

vith Chief Rowley of Secret Service,

hovever, since it is the

word of our Agents against Kellerman's, it is not felt any good

purpose would

be served by this course of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

Affidavits are being obtained from our Agents Sibert

and O'Noill attesting to the accuracy of their report and

refuting Kellerman so that we will be in a position to show

any future inquirer that we recognized this contradiction and

did something about it.

1!

like

1410023973

FBI

-2-

1

NH 54923 •DocId:32423629 Page 106

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## Page 107

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 2 6 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman

United

States Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence Activities

Washington, D. C.

20510

Dear Senator. Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET

enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter

dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of

your

Committee staff.

Sincerely,

Mind & Shekir

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

• Prig tates →

ly → Wallach

Tosie a thran

1076 FEB 27 AM 11: 4:1

CELOT EGORGICE ON

L9320 N

MOUNTIES

BELOLUTION

HH 54923

DocId?32423629 Page 107

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## Page 108

SECRET

10

• DIRECTOR

3

" HEXICO CITY

ACTION, NH 8... (VA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1535 25 NOY GU)

iNTO A DOP, CI, CI/CPS, Fl, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

1J1

MOROFiLMED

FEB Ü 1964

GOZ. MiCRO. 3ER

35 70 63 1497632

S. E C

£ I 2519547

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI: 7059

REDCAP

082

REF MIXI •5568

(IN 60046)%

ACCORDING LIFIRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFI MEXI FOR CUBA 12 NOY VIA:

CUBANA 465,. RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV VIA CUSANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY,

THEY PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOV VIA AERONAVES FLT

4510

AVANYEV (PHONETIC) OF SOV CONSULATE NEW YORK PHONED- SOVEMB

23 NOV ASKING FOR INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING. COMMENTS

THIS ONLY INFREQUENTLY OCCURS. ASSI CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE

SALL FROM

NEW YORK.

S

EC P

C/S COMMENT: * ALEKSEY PAPROV AND VALENTIN PONCHAREY, SON DIP COURIERS ARRIVED

MEXI 10 NOY.

ROUTING

INITIAL

RID/AN

0-201-291579 (cefies)

RID/LIS

RID/2S

19Y

1G

CROSS FILE COPY FOR

201-289.248

DO NOT DESTROY

RID/TI

201-3223

9130: 95

SECRET

REPRODÜCTIOR SY OTHER THAN THE LE SUING OFFICE IS PROMISITED

: i.

WW 34923*

DocId: 32423629. Page 108

---

## Page 109

0.16

IDEN 4

UNT: 7H/5/Mezico

EXT

: 8020

DATE : 25 MOI 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-02

FOUTING

O INDEY

GENO INDE DE!

SECET

L§OFiLE INi CS FiLE NO..

200-3-5

•2.

3

5

6

TO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

29ioy 65

15 232

FROM: E5SK

TAX CANTRAL INTALLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF: WH 8

ROUTINE

INFO: DOP, DOP, CI, C1/OPS, 5R SAS 8, VR

TO

FBI

INFO

CITE DIR

85678

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEU

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS

1. RENORENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TALITYPE DE & NOTEBER 1963

CONCORNING TEE TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLONATIC COURIERS VALENTI

PERCIANOVICE FONOHAREY AND ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPKOY.

2.. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY, FONONAREV

AND FOPKOV LEIT LEXICO CITY FOR CUBA ON 12 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465

AND RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY ON 18 NOVEMBER VIA CUBSNA.

3. A USUALLY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THEY

PROBABLE LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR NEM TORE ON 23 NOVEMBER VIA AERONAVES

FLT 451. THE SAME SOURCE REFORTED THAT ONE "ANANYEY" (PHONETIC) OF

THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORE CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXI

CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND REQUESTED INTORHATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE

COURIERS TERE TAKING. ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKO

PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ON BEHALE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSI IN MEXICO CI:

RECENTR

FROM

UN 28 1976

CIA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDI:: TING OFFICERS

GROUP I

Exctuded tecm automatie

donngradiaz and

declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUTHENTIGATING

OFFICER

Copy No.

IN 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 109

---

## Page 110

OP'S

UNiT

EXT

DATE

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

TO

CLASSIMED MESSAGE

O INDEX

• NO INDEX

• FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

12-6.2

POUtiNG

5

6

F2G5 2

See Sanitizea File

Irinber

For sterile copy of this cuchuest.

DEFERRED

POUTINE

INFO .

CITE DIR

05078

4..

"ANANYEY" IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH

ALIST CE TES SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: HEXI 7060 (IN 67582)

IDEN 58

SR/CI/K CH

C/17H/3

IDENY

Lio. 7. de

12=9461952

rie.,.

IDENIK

CI/LIA

IN 25 1515

RELEASING GrACER

REPRODUCTIO:'

COORCINATI": OFFICERS

CHELP I

Exciuded tram autamalie

drongratirring.

declassificaiin

SECZET

j OTHER THAN THE ISSUING. OFFICE PROHIBITED.

AUTHEHTISSTING

OFFICER

Copy No.

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 "Page 110

---

## Page 111

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the

Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine con-

tinuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish

to review.. The three operations involved are:

(1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal

warehouse and pier;

(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in

a harbor; and

(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding

in coastal waters..

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago,

and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted

because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict-the noise

level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the

small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December

which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation

approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it

seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review

of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small

sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we

call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians.

We thus

have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle

of covert sabotage against Cuba.

I know that Rusk has never liked it

and that McNamara thinks it does very little good.. McCone and the CIA

are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the

Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

SECRET. - EYES ONLY

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 111

Copy

Lundon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 112

(

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2 -

Jan. 9, 1964

but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position

I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal,

ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish

to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

NH 54923

DooId: 32423629

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Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

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## Page 113

K2255

ME MORANDUM

TO :

FROM:

SECRET

Tas #

Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator Schweiker

Jim Johnston

Dan Dwyer

Ed Greissing

January 27, 1976

Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation

of JFK Assassination

DATE :

SUBJ:

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the

mlash operation might have had some effect or

'CIA's response to

he investigation of President Kennedy's assassination.

On January

9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and

after a delay which was not explained, the

staff was permitted to

review the file on January 23 and 26.

y Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with

case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruc-

tion in secret writing and explosives.

Interest in Amlash continued

after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA

agents until mid-1963.

Why there was a year lapse in contact with Am-

lash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962

undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 48198*

to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that

Amwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of

an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was

"reluctant dragon"

'and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban

officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil.

He cabled Amwhip

about his arrival on August 29.

This cable apparently was the signal

that he was

prepared to meet Anwhip in Porto Alegre.

Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre

between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to

the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of

meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session.

CIA messages tell a different story.

• Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR öf 7

September stated that Amlash told Anwhip he felt there were only two

ways of getting rid of Castro.

The first was an invasion by U.S.

forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was

an "inside job."

Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action.

He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier

as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

WH 51923 *DocIDER312f₴9mEsyaged sent from Langley. ?l.:

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## Page 114

-2-

At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters

cabled on 9 September that, based on

what little feel Headquarters

had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should

be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own co-

horts.

He should be urged to recruit a

few trusted friends to assist

him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage

and:more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto

Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.)

On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intel-

ligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying

all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left

Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775

appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means.

There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but

it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.

"Mary: I don't want to imagine things but

this thing of Amlash.

Moreno:

It is either a tremendous secret or a

top secret matter (unreadable) then the

word "treason"

or "reason").

Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in

contact with Anwhip.

Paris station apparently was picking up responsi-

bility for Amlash at this? time, since

Paris 0706

to DIR dated 19

September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of

an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group.

as well as a communist group.

The message also notes that Fidel is

allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them

in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.

Nevertheless, Auwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash

and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris

0934 to DIR dated? October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5

October.

Case officer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get

everything off his chest.

Amlash seemed to be complaining about the

low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September

meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role.

Case officer

O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and

that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)!"

"With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash

• con-

The files do not accurately identify these case officers.

and M

→, however, were the principal case officers.

HH 54923 DooId: 32423629

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## Page 115

-З ПА

siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating

his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job!""

On October. 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with

Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October.

Although the case officer had been

forewarned by Anwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's

request for a high level meeting.

"Amlash convinced that if such meet

does not take place at this time

it will be almost impossible come out

again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite

decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many

Cubans would refuse to see a major"

such as Amlash.

The message notes

the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest

target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's

role.

DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to

return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case

officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative

of REK.

He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that

the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-

communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban

to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S: support could come only

after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel,

he military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would

disintegrate.

He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussior

but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was

asked about Amlash's reaction to the

meeting.

His reactions are

summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 Novem-

beI.

Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.s.

government.

While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not

at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical

assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not under-

stand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised

a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave

much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets.

Amlash had accepted the fact he had to

work with the clA, but ClA might lose him if it continued to procrastin-

ate.

Amlash talked about going

to the wrench terrorist organization,

real so trate are cue ane

the OAS, but realized that was not feasible.

The memorandum ends with

what apparently is the author's conclusion:

"It is hoped that he does

that Havana must first be taken

.. or failing that, a

truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which

could be true rallying point."

That !!:

HH 54923 : DocId: 32423629

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## Page 116

SECRET

In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized

the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash.

Amlash

was

to

be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup.

He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18

and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters

had approved giving Amlash

and rifles and other equipment.

memo ended by stating that "C/SAs* requested written reports on Amlash

operation be kept to a minimum."

Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called

on the night of November 20 and had

agreed to postpone his return

Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting.,,fo

CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that

The

it was

to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to

give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in

the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S.. so as to arrive in Paris on the morn-

ing

of November 22 for this meeting.

Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November

is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting

had taken place.

It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to

Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that

day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or

any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash. **

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason

to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages

and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash.

The first two pages

have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon.

typewriter

with an old ribbon. It made

e passing

of a poison pen to Amlash.

On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information

obtained

in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices.

À source com-

plained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they

denigrate the revolution.

The source said she wished she had a con-

cealed tape recorder to record these conversations.

She named Amlash

as one of these visitors.

* Desmond Fitzgerald

In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent

but could not be found.

SECRE

HH. 54923 DooId: 32423629.

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- 5-

On 3 December, Headquarters

furnished JMWAVE some details on the

Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S

support if he is successful in a real coup

He was

against the Castro regime."

also promised arms which will have to be furnished through

JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE

on December 6, 7, and 8.

Apparently, Headquarters first gave IMWAVE

authority to drop a cache of arms in

Cuba.

Then Headquarters called

off the operation.

In DIR 87615 of ? December, it is noted "major

top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which

should provide basis for decision."

JIMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8

December.

JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message

indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher author-

ity but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be de-

layed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure

was

to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority"

even though there is a reasonable chance operation may

be postponed

or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation.

"This procedure

will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirma-

tion needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted." Head-

quarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating

objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others.

"Believe by

January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal

assets.

By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left

Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case

officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio

2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December

1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information

relevant to the October-November

activities.

Nevertheless, in red pen

on the cover page

"Dec 1963 Not to leave this office

(Sanchez) orders." Followed by initials that appear to be "GN. "on Nestor's

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information

about the November 22, 1963 meeting.

nat document, a rough draft of

a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found)

appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest

for a later plot against Castro.

It states:

"22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald

and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him every-

thing he needed (telescopic sight, silencer,

all the money he wanted).

The situation changed when Mr.

Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meet-

ing to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because

of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

HH 54923

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CISTRI

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## Page 118

COOPET

Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader

(including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt..

included the following.

"We would not furnish the silencer,

nor scope

nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift

a finger to help subject

escape from Cuba should he

assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash

in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez.

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash

through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-

November 1963 Amlash operation.

Several such documents report informa-

tion received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of

Amlash's plots against him. For example,

Amlash's one time Cuban

mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her

brother was known to be with Cuban

intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR

in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too

many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known

double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's

Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intel-

ligence.

He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban

-—

exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important opera-

tions.

Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any

detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash

operation,

although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one re-

port rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers

gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given

a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash,

and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for

self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.

finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible ClA

files to determine what other operations Castro might have been re=

ferring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates

that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other

CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.

SECRET

NH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 118

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SCenariO fOr B-9

This doctrine is based on the proposition that

the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live

with a Castro/communist regina in Cube which continues

its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin

Amories and that no are determined to taie appropriato

action to put as end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before

the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution.

Settle

for & li voto majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian,

or Chiloan support.

2. II, despite 1, above, OAS waters down resolu-

t1os, vote agalast the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed

to 5. below.

4. If waterod-down resolution

passed over our

protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents

as adequate benispheric safeguard and theretore that the

United States must unilaterally declare (ses 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and

subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable

to the Unsted States and, in the event of a new act on the

part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan

Copy

HW 54923

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London B. Johnson Library.

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## Page 120

arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures agalast

the Castro/communist regine in Cuba as it deems appro-

priato ln the circunstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic

chinools to tho soviet Union that the United States

finds tho present behavior of the Castro/communist

rogino 1n Cuba Intolerable, that Cuba's activitles in

Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts

of violence of comparable danger or potential danger

on the part of Cuba will cause the U.s. to feel no

longar bound by any inhibitions against invasion or

other appropriate action. Urge the soviet Unlon, in

ordor to reduce tensions in the Carlbbean and permit

tho U.S, to llve pescofully with the Castro/communist

regime 1s Cuba, to assure that Cube 1s restrained

Iron repeating its dangorous practices. Make 1t plain

to the sovlet Union that further behavlor of this sort

by Castro w1ll compel the U.S, to adopt drastic measures.

Point out to the soviet Unlon the physical vulnerability

of Cube as well as the effect a fallure to resolve the

Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which

the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the

Soviets' European satellites. Make 1t plain that the U.s.

desires peaco in the Caribbean and expects the soviet

Union to achiove good behavior on the part of castro.

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7. Docide upon the type of action on the part

of Castro which would triggor action on the part of the

U.S. A rula of thumb could be: such action as would

represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the

stability of a latla American state. By this crlterion

20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced

into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger,

whereas the sane effort by Castro 11 a Central American

country might. The judgment can be unilateral and

subjactive on the

part of the U.s.

8. Formulato a progran for a post-Castro Cuba

giving full weight to the real changes which have taken

place there during the past five years and full recog-

sition to the nood for channeling Castro's unfinished

revolution into constructive lines.

The abovo scenario should not be commenced unless

It 1s recognized that, although these actlons are

prinarily designed to deter Castro fION his present course,

he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such

circunstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the

doctrine, cannot then withdraw fron the corsequences.

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Advantages

Disadvantages

2.

Probably feasiblo

within JAs.

b.. surveillance com-

plotoly legal and

low noise lavel.

a. Does not attack prin

cipal problem of

Castro's subversion

in Latin America.

b.

Castro may return to

policy of non-shipment

of arms.

C.

Probably will not result

in apprehending arms

carriers.

d. Expensive.

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above,

engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting

"autononous" exile groups and continue to encourage

Internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and

leaflet campaigns.

Advantages

Disadvantages

Some economic advan

tages and limited

encouragament to

anti-Castro senti-

ment.

b. Deniability by U.s.

as U.J. soil and

personnel not used.

2.

Results commensurate

with limited skills of

exile groups.

b. Though fact of u.s.

support carefully

guarded, Castro will

blame U.S. anyway.

c. Some noise lovel.

7.

In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5, and 6. above,

engage in soft sabotage operations employing

CIA-controlled

Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced

Intervals.

Advantages

Disadvantages

a. More professional

operationg that are

targetted and con-

trolled.

8.

Constant danger of prooi

01 U.S. involvement.

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5

b.

Improvement of morale

among internal anti-

Castro elements.

Better domestic poll-

tical position as

result of Increased

noise level.

b. Continued exacerbation

o1 Castro without chance

of delivering a nortal

blow.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7.

above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban

exile maritine raids and als strikes against Cuba from

U.s. territory.

Edvantages

Improvement of exile

noralo and internal

resistance spirit.

Disadvantages

a. General ineffectiveness

against targets.

b. Obvious employnent of

U.S. soil.

c. Air strikes however

ineffective begin to

arouse Soviet response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It 1s assumed that maximum intelligence collection

7111 be continued.)

•1. Engago in CIA-controlled as well as "autonououg"

covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact

but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery,

satanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel

only.

Advantages

This essentially minimu

plan evolved June 1963,

but never permitted to

develop, having some

chance to overthrow

castro.

Disadvantages

a. High risk of capture

and exposure.

b. High noise level.

c.

Possibility of some

Soviet response.

b.

Measurable economic impact

and strong encouragement.

to anti-Castro elements.

Scared

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6

2. Institute an economic denial progran based upon.

tho establlahment of a "Proclained List" under the Trading

with the Enemy Act together with all other leagible actions,

overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its

есодому.

8..

i.

Advantages

Considerablo inereaso

1n Cuba's diffloulty in

procurlag хоу iuports.

u.s. obviously "doing

something about Castro."

Disadvantages

a.

Multiplication of U.s.

problems with major alllea

including possible loss of

allies' support of U.S.

dol125.

b.. Loss of trade.

c. Will sot assure overthrow

a1 castro..

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.1. above

using not only Cuban but other nationalities including

U.s. soldier of jortune teams.

Advantages

Improved operations and

greater economic damage.

?.

Disadvantages

Technical deniability

only and very high

noise. level.

b. Will not assure over-

•thron oi castro.

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable

sabotage activities,

using u.s.

service personnel where

surfaco craft, snort air attacks on bey installations, etc.

Advantages

Disadvantages

Much moro effactivo opora a. No deniability.

tiong and roal acononio

danago..

b. Very high noise level.

c.. Il does sot result

rapidly in fall of

Castro, will result in

Bay of

Pigs typo of

criticises.

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$E0227

7

5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban

ostensibly for the purpose of preventing

aport 01 are to Latin amertea with the ain of humi-

llating and degrading Castro.

Advantages

Proof of U.S. Intention:

to stop Castro.

Disadvantages

a.

W1l1 probably not catch

contraband.

b.

Il vigorously pursued

against all Cuban

shipping, may provoke

Soviet response.

c. Very expensive without

assuring fall of Castro.

Cutoff of all communicationg (except radio) into

and out of Cuba including a clandestine cutting of tho

Jamaica cablo.

Advantagos

Disadvantages

H111 at least for a

Considerable outcry

period disrupt Cuba's

from Europe and Latin

diplomatic and economic

Anerica.

offengive and hinder

subversive efforts.

b. Not fatal to Fidel.

A Presidential public declaration making clear

that tho U.S. considers the continued presence of the

Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement

with 1t and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident

elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages

Very effective Ingide Cuba

and encouraging to Latin

America.

Disadvantages

Must be followed by some.

form of effective action.

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SEGRET

8

8.

An official declaration that should Castro

engage in certain specified proscribed actions the

U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation

inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

Advantages

Disadvantages

.

Hay force Castro to

stop his subversive

actions.

b.

whether retaliation by

the U.J. 1s required

or not, 1t will have

profound effect on

anti-Castro morale.

2.

May provoke Soviet

response either before

or after retaliatory

action taken.

b.

Difficulty in pinning

down clear-cut viola-

tions by Castro.

c. Difficulty in avoiding

civilian casualties.

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union

through high level diplomatic channels that further sub-

version by Castro 1n Latin America is intolerable and

that 11 Castro persists in his present course the United

States will no longer feel bound by any innibitiong

against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as

1t deems appropriato.

See Annex A.

Adyantageg

Disadvantages

2.

Proper basis for

a. Difficulty of clear

future actiong.

proof.

b. Possible deterrence

b. Possible Soviet

o1 Castro.

reactions.

C. Best method of mini-

nizing Soviet reaction.

10. After having established the appropriate bagis

for such action, impose a total blockade oi cuba.

Advantages

Disadvantages

The most effective nethod

Possible Soviet reactions.

of bringing dow Cagtro.

SEAR

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2RGEST

9

11.

After having establishod the appropriato basia

for such action, invado Cuba.

Advantages

Will bring dow Castro.

Disadvantages

Possible Soviet

reaction.

b. Probable heavy

casualtias on both

sides.

0.

Increasod difficulties

1n post-Castro Cuba.

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TS? BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N.Y. ORegOa 48299

to a mimeo machine to prepare public material if you are going to operate. A

good typewriter is essential and above all pepple that will carry out the million

and one mechanical functions necessary-to make it a going operation.

Note: when you contact people by mail ve recommend that only first class be

used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope,

You will notice how we work our's here on the national level. Many people 1ll o

spond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and

over curious

postmens These may sound like small things to you, but I can assure you that i n

gone through thi a thousand and more time the length and breadth of the country st

have learned a great deal over the last three years through some bitter experience

Naturally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning

yourself so that we can get to knor you and possibly be of sone assistence to pra

as we get mora information.

Te hope to hear from you very soon in this regard and ara looking forward to

a good working relationship for the future. Please fell free to discuss this assa

quite thoroughly with me.

]:

Fraternally

%. Tale

V. T.

Leo,

National Director:

V. I. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) ExHIBIT No. 3-Continued

516

rade

78

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21 February 1964

SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECI TO CUBA

Accopting as valid the Attorney General's statement

that thers is no point in discussing courges of action

with respect to Cuba until the lundamental decision is

nado as to whether or not it 1s possible for the United

States to live with Castro, the following possible

courses of action are listed under the headingy "Can

Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither

of these headingy is absolute; the courses of action

listed under each are indicative of degrees of accepta-

bility of the castro regime or conversely the urgency

to overthrow 1t.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards

full recognition of his regime and unfinited trade

between the United States and Cuba.

The negotiator of

the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro com

mitnents not to engage in subversive activities in

Latio Anerica and not to engage in polemies against

the United States. He would also endeavor to reduca

or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet

presenca in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine

to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful

Latin American island republic.

No covert activitlas would bo undertaken and

intelligence operations would be of a

nature compat-

ible with our relations with a neutral power.

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2

Advantages

If the plan works, this

would rapresent & satis

factory solution of the

cuban problen, espectally

11 the soviet presence

could thereby be eliminated.

Disadvantages

8.

As plan almost sure not

to work, it mould have grave

consequences throughout

Latin America as well as

serious domestic political.

repercussions.

b.

Even 11 plan ultimately

successiul there would

be short ter domestic

political losses and

short term weakening

U.S. position in Latin

America.

2. Do sothing. No spocific efforts will be made.

to arrange a rapprochement with fidel but we would

remain receptive to any advances made by bim. No

covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence

operations would not include black maritime operations

Into cuba..

It would be hoped that fidel, recognizing

the good raith and good will of the new Administration,

would make his ows advances leading towards a satis

factory detento.

Advantages

As in l. above.

Disadvantages

As in 1. above but less

short teru domestic and

Latin Anerican losses.

o. Even less chanco of

success.

maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and

caches of Intelligence gear would continue but no action

operationg would be conducted.

We would be "keeping an

eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making

so effort to hinder his internal development.

Copy

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- ...

.. .:

3

Maximum effort would be made to increase the

coustersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign

target countries.

Advantages

Disadvantages

He would be maintaining

a. Evidenco of American

& clean hands attitude

inaction would be

towards Castro and our

domestically assailable,

policy would be more

would be quickly sensed

compatible with that of

by Latin American coun

our major allies.

tries and would jurther

denoralize the exile

community.

D.. He would be in eifect

helping Castro to con-

solidate his position

at home and establish

his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligenco collection as in

3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial

progran employing diplomatic efforts and the coopera-

tion oi U.s. corporations.

Covert subtle sabotage

against selected Cuban Imports (e.g. contamination of

lubricant additives).

Advantages

Disadvantages

A carefully targetted

Wa will remain at odds with

denial program with effoc

our allies on Cuba trade.

tive subtle sabotage is capa

we may

delay but not prevent

ble of at least disrupting

Castro's progress.

tho tining of Castro's

econonic efforts. It may

have a measurabia eifect

on Cuba's one domestic

source of economic strength -

sugar.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above,

engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft

carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilataral

agreements with individual countries 1n Latio America,

such surveillance to be accouplished without the use of

force in intarnational wators and the use of force in

national waters.

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MIR PLAY FOR

CUBA COMMITTER

.799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. Oregas 48399

ExtubaT No, 3 TO

(80515i0n aV.Tilu

411764 ar new pou

for cray an 5/14/44)

II.8

May 29, 1963

1r.G ..

Cavald

1917 Lo Magazine Street

For orleans, Louisiana

inar friend:

Thanks you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, along

with our thanks and welcone.

Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans 18 gratefully

received. I shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have

a botter sicture of what this entails.

For one thing, I an enclosing a copy of our constitution and ly-laws for all

Chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonomy

for an organization our sizo. Me try and let all Chapters operate according to the

Local requirements.. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be mit.

(111 chapters can receive literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at

the ritail price and use the proceeus for further Chapter activities) Credit is

citended and payment is not required with the order. lie do expect payment within a

reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation.

It would be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few mèmbers as seem to exist

in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Lousiana

scens somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities.. Horever, with what is there

perhaps you could build a larger group if a fer people would undertake the disciplined

responsibility of concrete organizational work.

le certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would

expect that there woild be at least trice the amount noeded to conduct a logal executiva

board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable me could readily issue a charter fa

take

7e f:

contac

I ori!

experie

those

Yo:

to do ?:

mich i:

been

for.

'are in

ises our

overed t

sur for a.

ganizat:

could mot.

roceedure

porters.

easily i

commend :

Terate in

Te wili

the locai

V.I. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) ExHIBIT No. 3

514

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## Page 133

No, 370

Mer Newsi

Sutstinted

8y: 01 5/14144)

Wde

Іт.т

29, 1963

meipt, along

sans i8 gratedully

lo that you may have.

ic:

nd By Laws for all

insiderable autonony

mate according to the

which must be met.

gun tad ate and resell at

s'activitios.) Credit is

"at payment within a

s operandono

cow nenbers as seem to exist

illos and find that Lousiana

over, with what is there

would undertake the disciplined

1 Chapter but certainly would

ded to conduct a logal executive

Id roadily issue a charter. for

• No. 3

AIR PLAY FORET

CUBA COMMITtER

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3. N. Y.

ORegoo 4.8299

= "em urleans Chapter of Fpui. In fact, ve would de very, very pleased to see this

take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about.

ve feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of

contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida whici

I originally organized before coming up

to work in the National Office.

I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but know from

experience that it is quite a problem and requires sone sacrifice on the part of

those inv lved.

You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt

to do FPCC work in that area and that you till not be able to operate in the manner

which is inventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have

been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public. The national office

here in New York is the only one in the country, today and the New York City Chapter

uses

our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have dis-

covered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.o.

Sox for all mailings and public notices. (A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the

organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an incividual

should nove or drop out.)) 7e do have a seriais and often violent oppusition inà this

proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prosoective

supporters. I definitely

would not reconnend an office, at least not one that will

be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your comnunity. Certainly, I would not

recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can

operate in the community through several public experiences.

"e will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much. It is up

so the local Chapters in hindle their am affairs. You shaould have at least access

V.T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) ExHIBIT No. 3 Continued

515

10N 524456124

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SEC A1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Deputy Director (Plans)

Cost of Cuban Operations

Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Supporta/

Fiscal Year

Covertb/

Collection

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

• (est.)

Total

$319,534

6,293,580

3,599,274

5,343,973

5,030,000

20,586,361

PA/Propd/

$131,063

$1,677,161

457,033

5,168,584

793,8248/

6,444,098

1,738,9778!

5,786,797

1,767,500

3,520,000

4,888,997

→ 22,596, 640

Covert Actions/

Post-InvasionE/

Paramilitarye/Brigade Support

$318,409

30,164,698

2,975,635

5,038,880

9,317,5002/

Total

$2,446,167

$1,627,824

4,176,000

3,899,830

565,000

47,815,122 10,268,654

43,712,319

17,988,831

21,808,457

20,200,000

106,155,774

administrative

administrative

support:

Includes staff salaries, purchase of/equipment and supplies, rental of properties an

facilities, etc.

b/ Covert Collection: Includes foreign Intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence

operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audin and other technical devices, use

of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

Covert Action:

• Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities

encompassed by NSC 5412.

Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers,

magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardare, the

formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

Brigade Support:

Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in

action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade

members, cic.

Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Contor at

Opa Lncka, Florida:

$95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year

Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in

June 1963.

Adog

15 December 1963

S890

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200? 1

from autonatio

's and

cation

DETSISBANLILYS

This document coll a cia rages

- Copies, Series -

3

Cibant 1/25/14

REVIEN DE CURTUNT PROCKAM OR

COVERT ACTION AGAILST CUBA

I. - The CurTent Situation In Cuba

115.t2

See: page

During 1953 tbe situation 1a Cuba steadily vorcezed.

sconomy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt:

the dosmiard curve. Hurricana Flora intensified Cuba's econonio

problens. Disilluslomment and apathy among tha great cajority

of the populazion contiqued to groi, and enthusiasu vas increasiagly

restilcted to a hard core.

As populax support wared, coercion and

terror vere esployed pore and sore to ruintala the regina's control.

Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard commialst prototype

caused Increasing disillusioment anong his origioil followers.

ils stature in the eyes of sany cubans and latia luericans suffered

with tha realization, in the afteruth of the October nissile crisis,

that Cuba had been a pawn snd Castro a cupa of Soviet polley.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to.

stop acla of defiance against his reglue. Guertilla activity,

altaouza scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontancous

sets of sabotaze ara comon throughout the island. At great

Ils's refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols

to escape fIon list. In tals afrospcers, externally mounted

ralds agalast Cubas tsrgets have added to Cistro's sease of

frastration and helped sustain hope arong the many Cabang dis-

11asloned vita bio regime.

During 1963 Cuba's International situation seerad altost as

bad as the domestic.

Althouga chinks appeared in the wall, the

U.S, palloy of econonie and diplonatic Isolation of Cuss vas

holdinz un fairly well. Soviat-duban relations clorrly sere uider

strals. Castro scarad no foreiga policy victories to provida a

much needed psychological boast.

His major effort to stivalato

Castzo-type armed uprislags throughout latin Anerica failed to

distupt the Venezuelan elections o1 December and netted a potentially

embartassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestioely to

Venezuela.

These istoral and intersational trends and develop-

seats brasght Cuca to a los point during 1963.

Within the past feu veeis, howaver, five developments have

siren the Castro regias an immortaat political-psycholozical.

lift

SECRET-SHISITIYE

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• 2 =

Iift.. They ere:

1.. Tue realization in the Cuban Goveraent that the

continulaz high sugar prices in the world variet

have enabled Cuba so espand ite convertible

CUTRIC ICARTYeS ETCH about $20 million to

alnost $100 rilllon darlig the year.

2.

Ise Sorlet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed

On JaRsary 11, and Lia Khrushchevassurasces of

January 22, debonstraied a Soviet willlagness to

malatain 123 ald and trade progaan at a very

subatantial level and to support Cular suger

prices.

Ta protocol calls far Cubannioriot trade

to increase by 22 par ceat over 1953. soviot

esporta, cocut 40 per sent as waics will te on

credit, will Increase by at least 10 per cent.

3o The dischact possibility that the United States

polloy of econonic and diploratic Isolation of Cuba

say not be able to stari in the face of increasing

pressizes fIca leadera coustrias to empaud trada

with Cuba, extending cradit 1f necessasy. The

British tus deal, with payment spread over a

five-year perlod, 1s an importunt palitical and

paychological triamph for mautos. Its eLssive

effeata on porential Cuben suppliers ars already

C1035,

The recent floting and violence 1a Pasma, is which

Castro had some band, will inject new revolutionary

fervos Into Castroits activitles. In additios,

Params and 1ts afterrath will take the play asay

from the loclient of the Venazuela anus cache..

The revolt la Zaazibar, in which Castro also had a

band, 1s bound to InpIesa latia AnTica as vell as

other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's

arn and the poterzy de hia dectrise.

Inese

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- 3.

Thesa recent diveloparts bave provided the upsara

political and psychological thrust Castzo's raglea badly

Deeded, la sow bas a fimor basa for hia repcated chalua

cast cuba has sarrived the full biont of a major laired States

effort-to destzay the Cuben revolution, claina lively to sa

press masy latin Anerleans as well as Cubens. In accizion,

CastIo noù bas tho possibility ai producing sone tangible evidence

that his regine can restore lomard notoniun la the ecosory.

Consequently, the general pasizion of tha fastro rezine 18

mach Inproved over that of tbice or four sonths eza.

II - GusTent I. S. Poller and Promana

The altinata U.S. objective 1s the replacement of tra

resent se tate a by a fully compatibla with the

Is attain this objective, ta are toying, by ezesting

madam pressure tirouga all means short of the use of u111-

casy force, to ercata a degren of disorgasization, uncertainty

sad discontent in Cusa thica 11l1, (a) predispose elesents in

the nilliary and otter power centers of the regime to briag

about the overtion of the Castro/Commist group end the

@1'n1-atioz of the soviet presence in Cuba; (o) verina tha

BaSE foI SuiTersIOn In the Herispaare; and (s) ass13t In

cenvincing the Soviets that they ase lacking a losing and

Expensiva borGe.

In order to create the optima situation just descrided,

se bare teea cartying ost a progran of integratad, tually

„retsforcing and sutually dependent courses of accion,.. Taesa

congrise:

Tus econle, Tolitical and ssycholorical isolation

DE Cuba fame the fEDE NoELú

Di overt and corcri activitias designed to

zidsce free-world trads with Cuba and, especially,

to deny Cuba acceas to concodities critical to

Its

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econowy. ¡topassla for espanditz and intensi

fyinz these sctivitles are now being presented.

Tho exccution of tiesa additional seasures depera

casically on a decision to Incur the considerable

polltical costa and Ilsks that ara catalled.

2.

The reduction of fuse world suinzim, in the Cha

Sxase:

tie have maintained dipionatic pressure

on free-world nationa to Icduct and eventually

eliminato their ships in the Guza trade, he have

deried U.S. fisanced cargoes in U.S. psIta to

saips 1a tue Cuba trade (usdil 220, as suended).

To the sume general end, wa have employed exlsting

Legislation, and tha threat of additional legis-

Iation, restricting econonic and silitary assist-

are to countzles with ships la ice Cuba trade.

3..

The reduction of free world, and the containent

SE SoViet 3l05, a1E saarles to Cuba: le have

maintainad dipluatic pressures on frce-worla

countrles bivias. or wishica to establisa, al

service ta cuba.

die are innokiag Iccoat legis-

Istloa denyiaz assistanca to countries whose

ships and alicraft carry comodifies to and Iron

Ciba. In addition, we kave exerted diplomatic

pressures on frce sorld countries to deny their

facilities to Soviat Bloe and Cubon airlines

nerving of trying to serva Cuba, or karaas such

airlines.

4. The 11adtet3on 01 fees meal 11olouncis selationa

Eith Guba: As opportualty las offered, we hava

exarted preSsure to persuade irce toIli couairles

to break diplosetic relaciona vita cuba or to

prevent the establisizent.of such salations silth

Cuba.

5.

Esforty to indeming the Caste inane abraad and

By som of liplenacie, propaganda aid covert

Isagures te have endeavored to doronstrate the

sealuass, fallurea and betzayals of the Casino

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SITIVE

grainut Castro-Commigt Surersion

Io WEbin SubE: As Indicated abova, all out efforts

to bilag about disorguniratica, unceriziaty sou

discontent la luia sra latesdad to weatcs the

Caban kasa for Castro/Crunist subversloa.

2. Cst31da Guba:

MultIlateral: le bave sougut, through the cas,

to outala sonaral Intis inerican recogaltion

of tas serlousness of the subveraiva ttreat

and approval of recomendations of measures

to llali travel to and fron Guir, and the

traasiCI di funds and propaganda, At tbe

present time, ve intend to expand and Intenaily

this effost through actions to be taken by tha

Dis on the basis of tho Vecezuelan cooplaine

against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the Q49,

ko have made special efforts witi the Central

Enrican countzias mid Firand to tuva then

tighten controls on the activities and soyment

có suicitives, to develop lalind and iroliore

surveillance capablllile?, to crcusa effective

intalligance organications and to establisi a

systen of intolligence excrange.

3112:0z21: Tarough trainina miterial assiat

anca and cachange of insollizence, ue bava

Horsed to liprova the laterasl sacurity

capabilitias of indiviisal countries.

•Ia addition to maltilateral and

bilateral ncasures, de bave continuad to

paintala DII surface patrola in the vicinity

of Culo, ta liprove cus ona comesications

systons and to davilos our oua latelligence

capabilities agaizat suburrsive activitios..

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• 6

Ite seduction and eventual alicination of tha soyiat

0111÷253

presaace In Cuba

He batve maintaiaed diplonatic pressura on the Sovlots

Do cantians troopivitadasuals and ve have warned the

Soviets that we will not tolerate the usa of soviet

forces in Cuba to suppIass popular upIlsiag.

D..

Ice collection of Intelliteres

We have unlitained and Improved out overt and covert

collection of intelligence to meet not only u.S.

stratogie requirecents but alsa operational requira

menis comected tits air covert activities within Cuba,

Vie have maintained perlodic big'-level overflighta

supplemented on a fes occanions by lon-level flighis.

He bave warned the Soviety and Guisas agalast later

fererce with these fllzhts..

Corest onerations to sealin and undermine the Castro

Roatue

A detalled discassion of tua covert elesents of our

prOzIms appears In Section Illi

An stated above, 2il inste courses di action intezact and

are Interdependent, For estualo, our coviri econchic denial

operations are designed to Iciniorca and la Isinforced by dis

overt mnasures of econonte prossure, Both types of activities

directed agalast the econcury are intended to aggravate existing

ceomale difilcultles and trus to increase the leval of dia-

affection not only in the popular maus but particulerly 1a

che power canters of the rogim. This disaffeciion chances

out ability to establish naiagiul contece vita figures 1a

the illitary and other power centers and to develop Intell1-

FENCE SOUTCOS

the ericcace as vulnerability to outsida attacks provided

by the succass of covert sabotage and barassment activities.

By

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By the saso token, the failuze or ellainatica of oro of thesa

mataally supportlng courses of action jeopardizes tus otbera

sad thus comprovises the Entita program.

Torough 1963, these courses of actlon were having a measure.

abla pasitive impact. lia are nou confranted, bonever, by a

seTies of develoruents, described 1a Seczion I, which threaten

to fIrest or eves leverse out forward novement. Tas situation

13 particularly acute vith respect to the maintenance of our

ecotonic pressures.

This fact naces tils review of our covere

operations particularly tirely and iuportant.

III. Consgat of the Covert Action Pronan

The Cl: covert action prosesn alus at maintaining all

fezaible pressures on cuba did at ereating and exploiting

s1zu3t1on9 in Cuba caleulated to stimulato dissiient elements

olitin the regise, particularly la the amed forces, to carty

out a coup. The objective of the coup mould bo to renove

Ibe Gastro/Commists Iron the reflue and to elimizate the

entlEs Soviet pIesenCe Exus Cuba.. Recognizing that the U.s.

19 engaged in 1 Inca againat time with Cuca and its Sovie

ally to obstruci the cancalidation bi Castro's regina at bo=s

ead to prevent bia fron achioriaz bis achitions in Latla

sacrict, ve sat the time frune for this progian at aboat

eighizen nonths fron June 1953.

An originally conceived and approved la June 1963, the

covert action progIan las based on the assumption that U.s.

polloy procludea a military investon or a Eull blocisdo of

Cuba thica could lead to a confrontation with the Soviat Unior.

In addition, the covert action progron was and 13 predicsted

on the thesis that its cisuce of success would depend beavily

os a sustairer! and Intensiva elfort in otiar sectois, pasti-

cularly the overt econoic denial and political Isolation

programs, by all elements of the United States Coverrusent.

Thes, the interction of the overt and covert effert against

Cuba is ragarced as a vital ard liraplaceable factor if there

Is to be any toço oi accarplishing the overall mission;

CIA's

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CIl'a lntegrated covert action prozian consisis of the

following Interdependent coursas of action:

1.

Covert collention of Intelligence to nect U.S.

Istional security reruirents and to support

curtent and plated covert operstions. It sbould

Da soted that clandestina maritima operations are

an intageal part oi latettigonos collectios.

2a Prosaganda action to etimilate 10u-r10 simple

saborare and ocher forms of activa and passive

resiataaca agalast the regina.

Ecoronic dental actions la support of sovertacat-

viña ovest aificial U.Sº ecoronLe isOLAtLOn

D2254ES.

14.

Emploitation and atimlation of diesifection 13

the Cuban aue1 10=0es and other noucE cuntare oi

the ranne to encourage these elements to cility out

a coup against tho castro/Comunisi factions. CIA

1g ideazliying, contacting and attempting to es-

rablis: channels of commication with these indi-

viduals.

Sa GerOSal BALOTOgE aNd haJUsMenE 13 da econoniO DeapoR

asd 3a 2 stimalus to inIzraal resistanCE. As en

ecozonia mapos, 1ĩ 13 designed to supplosent sad

suppost the overall econonic denial progran by

dinazing economically Importuni installationa and to

aid to castro's aspaonto problema by forcing his to

divert solay, mangower and resources fran economic

to Intersal security ectivicles: As a stimalus to

resistanca, sabotage and paysical baressant operations

provida visibla and crinatic eviderco oi tue eristence

and cipabtlisy of organized resistance against tue

ragine, Io the estast that these operations are

eccessia!, shey also deumstrate to the Cuban

populazion and ellte groups tho vulcerability oi the

regime to militant action. It is recogalaed chat so

singla act of zavotage by itself can raterially affect

tra economy or stimilata resistance, dui we belleve

that tat

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that tie cumlativa psychological and political

Impact within Cuba of sustained sabotaga perations

1s a necensaty elenat in the accompllabant of sus

11132100°

Guanast of extonarous mti-Gastro Cuben exila

200U22.

These operations are intended to provida

a deniable setivity, a scana of supplemutinz ani

expanding out covert capability end a mans of taklag

advantage of untapped palitical and scsistanca rescussas

of the exile camunity. Tha program noa inclades tio.

autorocous groups shoce credibility as to autonony 13

stengthened by tire facts that:

They sio led by men those prominancs and status

13 the Cuba ezile conmity naices plausible their

secess to funds, equiment and sampower quite inm

dependent of tha U.s.)

Both ara based in the Caribbean area outaide of

U.S. territory;

Foth havo natural, silling allies 17 pover la

SEVEISI INLIN ATETICIN COURTILES;

Both are Cuben and employ Cubes rationals

enlisalvely;

Every iten of financial and lolstle support haz

been kondled 1a a namer as to provide nasium

protection against proof ci Cis or U.5. parti-

The Initial ain of these coeritiong 1s to strengtuen

the will to resist dy increasing the tempo of suba

version and sabotage lungely natatalied cutll sou

by CIA; Ice crantual ain is to ssie ine ilght

from tha coastline to the interior oî cuia..

The disadvantage of out autoroncus cpurstions 13

tbat 1l 15 accessary to accopt a lovar ordor of

efficiency and esutral tian "cula ba considered

accaptable 1a ClA-tua operations..

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3u

ПООСІІУ»

= 10 m

of the foregulag Inter-loclung courses of astion, ltena

(1) and (2) are 1a traja and no polley prodlans regarding them

BIx expected. Item (3) 19 the subject of mother paper whica

15 bejaz presentad for coscureut consideration.

Ittom (4)

Is the essence of our program and 18 dependant los its succesa

on the resulta of all other overt and covert courtes of action.

Iten (5) has been the subjest of contimual revier siece the

Inception of tho program and is the primary subjoct of thia

paper. Consideration of ILEn (6) (autoncious ogeratious) siould

taka place with a discussion of savorage and baIlscuent (Itay 5).

Thesa latter tro liens are discused in more detail ly Section V

belous.

IV.. The Sabotaza Frames in Retressect

He inor of at least 30 acta of intcrasi sabotage sad 60

erred classes betzen Cuban sccurity forces and insurgents.

since 1 June, Insurgeroy and sabotage lagida Cuss arE coE

part of a coordiantad progica; tbay are sets oi individual.

Da suall group ceilince.

Tasy are stimalated by miy factosa,

Bod to one factor can ta assigned entire credit. Sabotage

Lacidents, which Includs a higa proportion of sugar care

biralags,

cavs a tendeney to ba seasonal, & fact which furtsar

obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that Excu

& low point la sabotage Incidenta curlag the summer of 1953

there was a hesuy isoresas curing tha fall (followirz the

concorresent of ous Inidiry activity), se bellova char elez=st

11ght 1s soed ou the effects of our harasement progran by tue

stitements of vitresses of varying points of vias wichia Gula

and by the acts of the Cuban razine itsel

escaped, 1 Aurust 1963, fre sabotage raide haye toea

All were successful: There sas substantial

dimaga to the target; all particiamts vere anicly recovered

and the plausiole deniability of the operations vas not

compromisedo

The Lack

1o. Aarez I contalia a bilel review of these operatloase.

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The laci of pIoOf of U 3. Involvesent did not preveat

Castro frou chazzing tue Cli vith respensibillty: Indeed,

almost eyary act of duflance against his rogive has beca

credited to ite Agersy.

Castro's erotional resetions to real or russred security

threats point up his scuta sensitivity to lateral resistance

and suggests leat ba feals lila regina to be far fron secure

fros exterral threats. The Sovlet Unlos, on the other bacd,

hao reacied to the savotage Iniúa with much 1e9s vigor and

blister tam be anticipated. Tiem only sirp teaction,

asido fnen tise espected propaganda, follower a series of alt

Ialds durIng august and Septenber sporscred by Guian exila

groups operating fran florida and for unica the Agency had

no respoastbility. They did no real danage, but they did

denoustrate that the Cuban air defense systca could be

bocacied, and they added substaatially to the prycizalogical

ImPEr Of OUE ElIJI tO FAidS.

The igenoy sabotags raids produced sona very specifis

resulta, Tos escale, in the political and psychological

IRal, Coadina Lasassador Klid reportcú in late dugust

Last the troldents that conth, Including the surta Incla

ad Casilia operations "disturbed the feeling of censoll-

dation and trirazillay which tha Castro rosine had succroded

la crezting in recent conths." He reparted that tha Cubang

vers unccitala ond apprehensive over tha possibility of a

Vos, camalga of subversion aná sabotago because of Cuca's

valerability to such a camalga due to the "Jou ebo" of

enthusiasa foz the Costro regime anonz the people. le alro

stated. that the raids had "raised hores of those opposed

to the regise" and that "dispiritad opposition had roceived

A 11111p to 113 corale,"

In a September report, Ambassador Ried sisted that

the "Lost innediate effeci de suca attacha is the psycho

logical blo dealt to the stability of the castro regise.

with consequent boost la opposition." Lo corala and

dejection 12 the counterrevolutionary danka of sons southe

₫20s

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ago, he sald, "has siven way to a save of optimis that tee

Hadrum Leader 13 so longer recassarily a permant fistare."

Ambassador Kid also roported that Cha GuevarTs rid indicated

concera that the ralda would divert such needed nanposas

and IcsouIces fron the econonte to the ndlitary sector.

Da 4 septenbor a rellable clandestina sourco in Cuba

reported that the Icaction of the average sin on the strcet la

svans to the sens of lha attacko on Casilda and Santa Lucia

"astoundlag-" Frior to the Cuban govarment's Innovace-

-Dent of the raide, the average san on the strcet seemed

apsthetis, dcpressed and in 1 los state of morale. Following

the anounceras their sood changed to one of pleasure, joy,

and hope,. Ine observations of lula source sare reinforced

by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived ia the U.S.

abortly after the Cubaa amouncenest of tha raida.

A forDer Major lu the Suban Label Astry sho broso with

Gastro reported after his ezfilization from Cusa 11 Janaary

:1964 that the 23 Decenber Elzuanea taid unich castroyed a

8a patral boat was a graat boost to notale aronz disaffected

стaaт.

A Cuban lawyer with estersiva comections auong Cubin

sovarinent officials and in the testem commity in Eaves

bas just reported thas the "morale effecta of the recent

erdotage operation are good anosy anti-regina seguents of

•the ropulation. Soci, acts, to then, indicate that the cutsida

sorld 1s Iot forgettinz the Cuban people, that tho fight con-

tinues and sugzasta s possible prelude to some nslitary action

against CastIo. Opposite morale effecks are noted mong the

pro-rezime segaents wo have tended to resain notably guiet

about the regina after successful subotage operations.

A fusan commicatioss technician asployed. by the Cubas

goverment reported on l January that the "act of sabotage

against the torpedo boat on the Isle of pines tag very succesa

ful lo the opinion oi the peopla sod, for sure, pablic opinian

sooded sonething to stizulate 1tr thas happened at la Sizusnes

= bad such sa effect; Although at times falluraa era suffered

shish depresa the people, they are analous for sesaching to

bappen,"

•1.59

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SURELESENDLILYS

то 13 .

The Isida a1so had an Impact on tho tuban military sni

SECUTITY FOICES,

Certain arcas and ports vera placed ou

special alert status.

Forces aId often Inched to cafensive

positions; grousd, raval, and air patrols are lIsquently

Launched o= Intensified; and defensive positicas in ladustrial

os agricultural completes ars marned to met tha Ical or

Insgined threats. The Islay InterfzIe not only with toutina

adlitary tralalaz but alio with soris on construction and

azoicultural projects walch use military personnel.. Baul

Castro personally lavestigated too Siguanca incident.

In addition, Castro empandod his coast bazching networi

Exon 46-0196512110n posts at the end of Jurs to 103 at tbe

end of ostober.

Those posts have radio coumications and are

maned by 10 to 25 full-tina personal. In a furtuar affort

so scal Suag'a stores, at least 10 surface search radar atations

have been establisbed sinca june, and sa bave evidace tenta

Castro's lans of slulng diasidenos and Insuzzoney la

reflected 1n blo initlation of a ride varlety of repressive

measures.. lany aro bound to have adverse folltieal, psycho-

2081031 01 eCoLondE Icpercussions Insido Cuba. Le has con-

ducted aliast constant 20t1-insurgeni operations involving

mita af up to 2,500 sea. AlI, naval au ground force

elementa bave been put on special alert, elzacz en a local

0I Islaad-vide basis, on 2t least 35 occaalong durlag 1953

as a Iesult of Innored ot actual natitiae operations.

denta 1s arcas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly

zelocated, sod restrictions have bees placed on transportatios

17 suspect arcas. In August 1953 a nou Internal accurity

force, the Lucha Coatra Fisatas, was forued to attempt sa

cope ulta off abora Iniding parties. In Septancer sou trainiag

courses vera initlated for commanó cadrea of "popular deferso

" Tha paspose of these unita 13 to organise the people

to deirad theaselves against enomy attaci and to protect

Inutest= lal centers and tastallationa fron sabotago.

Despita these ceasures to Incrcase Cuba'a defensiva

capability azaina 1a1ds, we have contisued to laprove our

ou infiltration sectaigues and ara still abla to penetrato

Cuba's

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то 14 .

Cuba's dalenses ulia good Iegularity, Raidiaz oporations of

have dona 1a sho fest givlag Castro lhe opportmity to sale

voelfaraus propaganda agilast U.S. agiression. In audition,

although thrushchay has not made Agency harasslag talas the

subject of special protest (as be did 1a the case of tho

xlla alI Inids In August and Seytenbez), a majar step-to

1a the frEquency or sCale ai, lot lastance, an attacia on

a sajor cccacale targot such an Matanzas oI Santlago, night

biluz about a Sovias protest. Tua chance of a piysical

Istallation by Castro as, foz Lastanca, an aitici spoa a

DoS, Installation la the Caribbean, altacugh ulikely,

camos be entizely discousted.

If Castro 1a to be brought conn without overt allltasy

actios tbe main effort will have to cona fiou insida Cuia.

Na belleva that there la sufficiont evidence zo show thet

sadoraga raids, despite the rio's iuvalved, ure a necessasy

acimlas to internal action taich will noed to ba continued for

a considerabla parlod to permit che trupo of Inturnal acts to

Isach a polos sibera 1t con becous salt-sustaloed.

V. "Isnact of Cessation of Sabotage Onerationa

Pocause of the tisiblo anù dianaile estura of sabotage

operations, thoir cessatios vould soon be notar by alt

Interasted partios to and observers of l. E/cuban relations.

Jue cessarios of ibesa Ialus, losever, dioclairaula by tha

S.SO tHE II1US EUONULIYAS MY CE, HOULE DIODDIT ES LATEI-

PICICÓ 1I INtIA ALOIICO MId CarIaial, Inside Cuta a3 a Fuitea

of U.5, polloy fron one of ilucreat cacouragement and support

of agressiva action agalast the Castio regina to one of

"consistence" and eventual accomodation with a Castro/Commist

Cabia. litious constant and visiblo sigua of offensiva action

ag11nst Cara, a reakerlag piccesa would be set 1n zatlon

tibich could rell lead the countries of latin inerica to dram

thais oun conclusions fron thesa indicators and enuari on

accomodation policies of thair out. Ibose goverments in

Latis Americs alreudy threatened by Castzoltas in their owe

cojattles arellikely to be sabjectad to erea atronges domestio

As thla

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As tals bellef spreads, Wastera Duropeas and ather free

torld coustries cager to trada ulia Quia uill cone to feel

that they may safely igore and evade, in si, even greater

estent than they do nos, U.S. appeals for l'he econoale dad

political Isolation of cuba. in Importaat addizional ecocolo

alfoci sould be eba telesse into normal ecoronle activity of

apposer asd funda son tied up la defenze agalast salds.

Finally, asd 20st Importaat, this development 1a tire

19 boma to bave a severa decoralizing effeci on the internal

zasistance agalast Castro. The Cuban exila community and

particularly its silitant and articulate elchanta vould be

acutely sensitiva to a cessation of talus and cin ba expected

to react vociferousty. Judging fran past esperience, tie

can espect a nEN surge of inastic political agitation on

he part of the rumeroua Cubas extles uho hava political

onections sitain tae Uoi.

In tha event thas 1t 19 decided to tornloata CIA-

controlled sabotage dod haraismus operations, 1t carnot be

sasuned that the autonovos groups, despite the greatex :

denleb1l1ty of thela actioas, could tale over catliely tso

rassica of furassing proof of visible resiatance to Castro

Bad InspiIlI latezral, elemenis to tako the personal I13ks

necessary to sit a coup in Istion. Autoranous gioaps are

1s jot untasted la their canasility to conduct successeul

sabotago sad karassuent sparations on a sustained basis.

It ta unlliely that in the nezi mouths the autonosous gr0tps

u111 devalos tue ability to natch (Il controlled operaziona,

elther 17 quartier 0r qualIt}-

•If sabotage and barassuint operations sera to ba terminaçed:

for the antonanous grcups as well as for the ligeney, lts

support to tha duionatous stoups sisi also de terainated

completaly as otherviso va bould not bo la a position to

lusura that they hould discoatime saids and sabotago.

such terrination nould coucound tue offects of tha cessation

of our ova raida, particularly la those aress in the Carlbbern

stera the autonosoua groups havo been mast active.

VI

SECROT-SENSIESE

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SURES ALESYS

- 16 .

V7. The Residus? PrOsti

In tea event lt 13 decided to abandon the core of tha

sorest program, ue will be obliged to fall baci on essentially

overt courses of action which are already operating bur ubica

can be rafized and intonsified, provided the political Ilsea

nad costs ara judged accoptable sad ve rsceive sicguato

cooperation from our allies.

d: Action arainst free-orld eceronic ties wich Cuba

Because of the recent erosio of our efforts in this

sectoz end the clear intention of tha Cubaas and Soviets to

expand Cuban econonic sclations with the free world, a sarles

of recommendations to intenally this course of action has been

"made and 13 now being presented. The baste issue la the

recounendations is our ability and willingness to incur the

political costs and risis that heightered econcule pressure

vould involve. Even 11 the recommendations sra adoptod

completely, uz could have no real assurance that our attemita

to curtail Cuban-free world economic tles sould be successful.

On the other hard, if the actions and commitreats Included

in the racoumoniations are nor edoptad, 1t 1a a sear certalaty

that; under present circuastiuces, our economic prossuros will

be seduced to laeffcctivanass.... In auy case, it must ba cicarly

recognizad that to arount of econonto pressure can by itsele

brdiz jous the Castro soverment, at least as loag as the

soviata sno prepared to subsidina tie cuban ecoromy, tua

CuTEsilMent and disruption of cuban econonio ILes Wiza tra

fIna vorld can baly contributs, and then only over time, to

the creation of the optima situation we ars trying to derclop.!

The effcctiveness of this contribution would be at loast

shasply lupalred by the relaxation of the pressure creatod

by covert operations; Beyand these considerations, La can

never have assuruce that a foreign goverment cooperating

In tia econone progran will not pull out and vitually.

callapse the prozas.

os acorenie pressura as a quastitato for the covert progres

sould be to daliver the fata of cur policy lato the uncertaia

bands of govertmonts which do not share our convictiona dod

prasa of prilarity ulta respact to cubai

QAS ACTION

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SOUNDT-SENSITIVE

* 17 m

Bo 049 Actlon

An a sosals of tho venezuelan charges againot Cuba arising

ton the arms cache discovery, we have been considerlag a series

Of IzaguTes wilch ta sould seeis 1n the O1S. II stould be noted

that the asnosphere for all adoption of strong measures bas

deteriaratad as a result of the Parmanian crisis.

Ibe neanutes which me have been studying include:

I A breck in diplomtic rajations

Tus princioal effects of this measure, which would

maas actlon by five consteles, Including 1Ia=11,

Calla and Hexico, nould da to provide rather drasstlo

evidenco of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cucas

Ingins subrarsive facilitles offered by ita remaining

heavy reslatance fron larico, Chile and particularly

Zi A bresa 1n economic relations

Although this would bave littla practieal effect

econosically, 11 tould bare sons utility as a seans

of soral preszure on other Escold comi les

trading sith Cuba.

Li A LIGAR IN BUT THE CUTERCE TO

Oran Else tbis unald lend to a raduction 1a tha

Giban ability to nova subversives to sad fIon latin

Auerica. It tould be useful as a naans of noral

pIzzause on oticer fres-world countries baving, or

11sh1ng to establisi, air services sita Cuba.

the negative side li rould asan the tomporary 1033

of Intelligence Encilities and rould have su adversa

effect on cuban estle morala by closing in axlatlag

escape roste for persons lazide Cuba,:

SECURI-SU

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SECEIT STASTILE

018.

4. Azeroval for coonerative survelllance measures

23a1751 EveRent of aras and sen

The siagle Last daraging dis action to distro would bo

an anthorization for tha usa dE force la comection

tata the novenent of sous and nes.

Tiss chances of

gettiog a politically acceptable rajority for sued

Ene nay estimated to ba less tias even before the

events 13 Pasina dod the prospects have diminished

since then. Sucò DiS actios kould alnost certaialy

dramatize tha Cuban Issua conestically and 1nter-

nationally. At the present tina, 1t appears that tha

survalllases systen unlcy night ba zathesised by tha

cas could Imolve the use of forco only in tha

tersitorial vatera of the countrias for which the

aricading shipuents ars destined.

Thus the question

Di Dis sacroIization fOs the Da of fOsCO da tba

high seas will not arl5e.

condemation of the Castro serine

This would be a aro fora action, with only linited

paychologlial force.

Raffination of previons CAS measures on coutroliing

cuten based and supported subversion

This boald be of value as a means of Itiaforedog a

general offort 1a this sector (see 6 belor). It 1a,

howzver, a purely defendive messura.

In sun; this series of ais seasares would certainly be

helpfal. and would constituts important saltilateral progress.

The actions, borever, aro prizarily psycholozical and

defeastma

C. InTerned cEfosts against subrerslon

He can probably Increase and Expand our multilateral,

bilateral and unflateral afforts to increase the soility of

'Latin AnariCa tO Iaslot subvarsion. Suca efforts dra purely

defensive and extorial to leba. No certala results can be

SECRET-SENSITIVE

guaranteed

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T-SENSITIVE

satanteed,

In soy CaJO, 1E lLa Cubzs base vera to bei

strengthened by the salazation of covert prassures or by

the seatcoins as econonle pressares, so will be fisatiaz

Realast Increasinz odds.

D. Increased psycholozical and arosaranda efforta

He can Intensify our seasures du this sector, Ineludinz

major polley declarations on Cuba by the President and otber

Benlos ailicers of too coverament. Tue efficusy of such

alforta 1a entirely dependent, hoverer, upoa tie substanca

behind thes. A propaganda offensive would be productiva

only 1l there varo credible evidence that our bards were

bedag accompanied by sacceasful actions 1s other rectors.

VII.. Conclusion

Iut tasidaal program set out abora 1a substantially

veRter than the present progran. Accordlagly, the prospeces

for attainlag our ultimite objectiva di roplacing the Castrol

Consist regime, which have been by no means certaia even

under the present progres, would la very neasurably diniaishad

meer the resiqual progres. The elimination of the core of

the preseni covert progras, especially 1f accoupaulad by a

rejection or fallure at tia proposad expanded riezas of econonle

prEssare, sould salsa la sharp ferna the question of the nead -

to examina the tra basjo alterantiver the uss of foIca dr

веса

nacation.

7III.

Bei

That the covert progrin ba contloned is at lezat 125

present fora sad scope,

SECRST-SENSZILVE

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re to Eno:

SECRET-SENSTILVE

hroex I

Tos five sabotago solda sua by cIA,

Ja: On 18 AugusI the POL storago tanks at Casilda, Lis

Villas Provlaca vera attacied aslog 4.2 sortara.

Que tank car maa destroyed and one starazo tank

breacied, causing considerable fire danage.!

20

On 19 August the culphurie said plant az Santa

Lecia, Plaar dol Rio Province was attacked.

Thare sas considerable fira damags and fuel

lines mera broken, lie have reports that cold

found 1ia way into the turbines as a resulti

of the sald causing additional damago.

3m. On 30 Septerber a luabermill st Babia da

Baravi, Orienta Province, a almor lastallation

of local econoule importance, was 70 per ConE

centroyed by a tadding party.

on 21 October an undertiatco demolitson teza

attacked a dredge in the barbar at la Isabala)x

:I23 VIllas FrOVlICe, ThA vessel tas socio.

On 23 December an undervater desolition texa

attacked a Cuban Rival fod patzol bast in the

Siguanea, Iala of Pires, Dival base..

712€

patrol boat was serlously danaged and say have

Ruska Threa Cuban naval porsonnel mera killed

and 13 othors lajured in the esplaston.

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tive." Second question: What does the American gov-

ernment expect to gain from the blockade? Is the

economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political

maneuver?

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the polit-

ical effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain (smile]?

You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not.

In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in

the other Latin American countries.

Two dikes are

needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on

the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on

the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles

are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment:

"The continuation of the blockade depends on the, con-

tinuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to sug-

gest anything, since I had never been to Cubal and,

on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of

the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing

to their isolated economic situation. But I could see

plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking

a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in

detail to an American colleague - on intimate friend of

President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this

interview -and to the editor of The New Republic.

Both my confidants, who knew the President a thou

sand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedv

had never before expressed hitertaso specifically and

with such feeling on his understanding of the first;

phase of the. Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw

any political conclusions from his remarks. However,

they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to

come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic charac-

teristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming

degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a

particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and

only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with

a problem was sufficient to make him come to aldeci-i

sion, and because of this, his decisions were unpredic-

table. At that point he had a consuming. need for

information, and this need had increased a great deal

since experience had taught him not to rely solely on

official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

Night Session

TABM

In the "Pearl of the Aller rum-perfumedi

steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described

in those American tourist folders still lying about in

the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and"

intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would

never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I tallied with farme.

: 1. 1003

eis, writers and painters, militants and counter-revo

lutionaries, ministers and ambassadors - but Fidel re-

mained inaccessible. I hid been warned: he was snowed

under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the

Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole

planning program; and then, above all, he no longer

had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all

after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my

interview with the President. We went up to my

room at to in the evening and did not leave until 4 in

the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that

part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John

F. Kennedy's remarks.

tidel listened with devouring and passionate inter-

est: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's

beret down over his eyes! adjusted his maqui tunic, all.

the while making me the target of a thousand malicio.

sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point

I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner

with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do

battle; as though I myself were in a small way that

intimate chemy in the White House whom Khrushchev

described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is pos-

sible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain.ie-

marks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed

his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Ken-

nedy showed his impatience with the comments attrib-

uted to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which

Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war

fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion..

Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the

end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humor-

ous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know wheth-

er Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons cari-

caturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the

Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality.

I orily know that at no time during the two complete

days I spent with him (and during which a great deal

happened), did Castro abandon his composure and

poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself,

reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judg-

ments on these two political leaders based on my own

experiences in Cuba.

"I beliere. Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I

also believe that today the expression of Sis sincerity

could have political significance. I'll explain what I

firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Ma-

chiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at

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The item RepublIc

invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organiza un

of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above evily

thing, all the retaliatory measures which were impused

hefore, long bufore there was the pretext and alibi of

Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult

situation; I don't think a President of the United States

is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present

feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe

he now understands the extent to which he has been

misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at

the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also

think he is a realist; he is now registering that it is in-

possible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the

explosive situation throughout Latin America, to dis-

appear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you ilew

information right away. I have refrained from doing

this until now; but today an altempt is being made to

frighten all mankind by propagating the idca that

Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war,

so I feel the world should know the true story of the

missile emplacement.

"Six months before these missiles were instilled in

Cuba, we had received an acmultion of information

warning us that a new invasion of the island was being

prepared under sponsorshief the Central Intelligence

Agency, whose administrators were humilialed by the

Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being

ridiculed in the eyes of the world and heraied in US

goyernment circles. We also knew that the Peitagon

was vesting the ClA preparations with the mantle of

its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of

the President. There were those among our informants

who even thought it would suffice to alert the President

and sive him cause for concern in order to arrest these

preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law,

Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to

Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's assóciates.

Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei

had been received by the American Chief Exccutive,

and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A weck

after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of

Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report

which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen lo

this carefully, for it is very important; he had said that

- the now situation in Cuba was intolerable for the Unit-

"ed States, that the American government had decided

it would not tolerate it any louger; he had said that

peacetul coexistence was seriously compromised by the

fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance

of strength, was destroying the equilibrium lagreed

18

upon and fat this point Castro emphasized his state-

ment by pronouncing each suble separatelyl Ken-

neily reminded the Russians that the United States

had not intervened in Hungary, which was obviously

a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the

event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word

communicated to Khrushchev all our previous informa-

tion, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-

Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to

the source of our information. By the end of a month

the Russian and Cuban sovarnments had reached the

definite conviction ithat an invasion might take place

from one moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the

invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned

about the same things that were worrying us. He asked

to realize this objective? All our thinking and discus-

sions revolved around this point. We thought of a

proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid.

The Russians explained to us that their concern was

twofold; first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolu-

tion (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes

of the world), and at the same time they wished to

avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conven-

tional military aid was the extent of their assistance,

the United States might not hesitate to instigate in

invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this

would inevitably touch off a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cub.: could

have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention.

After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos,

the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because

such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones

of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations

cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. More-

over, since then we have had every proof of the im-

mense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders.

You can sce for yourself how clearly this solidarity is

manifest here. Then there is. something else, specifi-

cally apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and

others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev

for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward

the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several ex-

amples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the

prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me -

and I believe him - that Stalin would never have em-

placed missiles in Cuba.

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"It is true that it was said then by other factions

that the real

reason for installing the missiles

because certain internal problems were driving the Rus-

sians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here

to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not

today want war. One only need visit them on their

home territory, watch them at work, share their eco-

nomic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the

workers' standard of living, to understand right away

that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation

or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted

by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (be-

cause of their commitments and their position in the

socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked:

or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing lo

retreat before the missiles, would not give up the at-

tempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity

and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans

have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It

was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't

you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role

in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you?

Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are

militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplace-

ment of the missiles. And I might add here that for un

Cubans it didn't really make so much difference

whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydro-

gen bomb. Nevertheless, we were gambling with

the peace of the world. The United States was the one

to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat

of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1oo2, my brother Raoul and Che

Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means

of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in

three weeks. The United States was able to find out

that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it

took them tio months to discover that these weapons

were guided missiles. Two months... in other words,

longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, ive

were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progriss

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Prog-

ress..

"In a way," Castro said, "it was a goud idea, it

marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be'said that it

was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the

moment, under constraint... despile all that Kam will-

ing to agree that the idea in test constituted an effort

to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in

Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in

he papers this morning - did you see the news? That

Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argen-

tine government! Do you realize what that means? This

will cause more commotion on the dew York stock

exchange than Castroism!' The Catholic and military

conservatives of. Argentina, the factions most closely

linked with American interests! There is talk of na-

tionalization of industries there, of agrarian reform

there….. well and good! If the Alliance for Progress

provokes these developments, then it's not doing so

badly; all there things are consonant with the aspira-

tions of the people. I can look back to the days of

Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore

which broke out when the United States and Cuba to-

gether decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply,

mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000

hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts

was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin

American countries, because the Communist banner is

used as a bogeyman, the rcaction of the American

trusts is shrewder: They are going to choose strawmen,

so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to

vield any results. It is very casy to understand and at

this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told

you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy

- not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon

- has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the

prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class

which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of

Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who

tries to support the interests of another class (which

has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the

various Latin American countries the impression that

the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators,

and so there is nin mure need. to start Castro-type revo-

lutions: What happens then? The trusts see that their

interests are being a little compromised (just barely,

but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strate-

yie bases are in danger; the powertul oligarchies in all

the Latin American countries alert their American

friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short,

Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or

allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instru-

ments of the new policy are swept out of office, like

Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed

Betancourt, for example, was not a Balista; noir he

has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American

government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is

at the root of explosions taking place all over the

South American continent? In Venezuela, for, example,

are you familiar with the situation there? Do You think

the Venezuelans need us to inderstand what's going

un in their country? Do you think we don't have

enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only

one thing: Leave. us in peace to better our country's

economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to

19

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educate our young compañeros. This doesn't mean we

do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling

and suffering, like the Venezuclan people. But it is up

to those nations to decide what they want, and if they

choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business.

"We Have Alionys Lived with Danger".

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will

the situation develop? Even if the United States uses

against you what you call the alibi of Communism, it

still remains true that you have chose! Communism,

that your economy and your security depend on the

Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior mo-

tives in this association, still the United States considers

that you are part of an international strategy, that you

constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends

on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of in:

fluence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet

Union." Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent.

We have none but feelings of fraternily and profound

total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are

making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts

which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own

policies which are perhaps not always the same (we

have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to

divell on this point, because asking me to say that I am

not a pawn on the Soviet chessta is something like

asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square

that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States. sees the problem as you have

posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But

who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried

everything against us, crerything, absolutely every-

thing, and we are still alive and getting better day by

day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to cele-

brate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1,

1964, the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution!!

The United States policy of isolating us economically

is less effective with each passing day; we are increas-

ing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with

Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons

of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us,

the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmos-

phere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we

in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say

nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many

friends one discovers in the world when one is perse-

cuted by the United StalaaNd truly, for all these

reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll

tell you something else: since the rupture and the

blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel

neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply

don't think about the US. When I think of the problems

20

34923

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Page 158

which diplomatic relations with the United States

would pose! The Swiss Ambassador istepresenting the

Us at present. I prefer to do business with him than

with 2oo members of an Embassy among whom surely

some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary.

But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and

from this viespoint I believe the United States is too

important a country not to have an influence on world

peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader

will come to the fore in North America (why not Ken-

nedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing

to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth

and, most important, let the various nations act as

they sec, fit. I ask nothing, neither dollars, nor assist-

ance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men -

nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We

are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation,

the Latin American countries will choose what they

want. All the same, at a time when the United States

is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with

China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be.

impossible to make the Americans understand that

socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to co-

existence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because

the Russians have never done us any injury such as

the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained

of in the past, and because the Americans have never

given us any of the benefits for which these two nations

congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in

Latin America through Cuba's subversive activitio:..

this is just attributing to others one's own desire tu

dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago tha:

the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involve-

ment. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speak-

ing from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force

nations io turn to the Russians for help. Really, it

seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of

seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to

pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So

far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to

normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sover-

eignty."

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you

are going to see Kennedy, again, be an emissary of

peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear:

I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and

as a revolutionary the present situation does not dis-

please me. But as a man and as a statesmin, it is my

duty to indicate. what the bases for understanding

could be."

All this was said two days before President Ken-

nedy's death.

DuisA: The Ni Repblic and Jean Dunich

---

## Page 159

54923

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Page

159

From

CIA

prepared chronology

was alleged to ba Salvador DIAZ Verson. This Irdividual was intervlewed at

te statel

that while in Mext 29-29 Nov 63 attending the Congress of the Intemutionai Faderaulon oi

Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at the offices of the nevaparer Ercels or on

the night of 25: Nov 63.

There he learned through the Maxi press that the taxi gor tad arzested

one SIlvia DURAN; that DURAN allegedly had OSVALD as a guest in her, loure duvi:

nie iisit

to Mexis and that DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of che cus i

DIAZ Verson went on to claim that he wes & told by di, BORRELI Navarica, en ailed

newspaperman employed by Exceisior, thai OSWALD and DURAN on the dey follono Cold's arriia?

In Mexi went to a restaurant called the Caballo Blanco or possibly the Cabalio Bayo nava they

met an' official of the Cub. Imb, DIAZ Verson claimed that he knous nuching audat OS100 and

artioles for the Moxi City Excelsior, currently rasides at 1303 Horero Si., igurt

311. Wexi,

=BORRELL Naverrowas Interviewed on I1 Jan at. which time he furniched the following suio:

Salvador DIAZ Verson' was in Mexi as claimed and discussed OSWALD vith Desert and cuner Cuban

exiles!, DIAZ Verson' also visited BORRELL in BORRELL'S homa. / EORren did not tell tha stori

SIlvIa DURAN.

of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Emb officials other then the neutings eden occurrea

at the time OSWALD visited the Cub Con in Mext. / BORRELL knew nothing concering mur vieit

by OSWALD to the home of DURAN. / It 1d-to-be noted thut DUMAN vas ghestioned by Neil authoritica

Cuban Imb was to obtain i Cuban visa.. She stated she had given him a telephono number to uso

in calling her concoring the vica, but donied that he had ever visitod in her home. / On

17 Jan 64 à source..

!.: advised that he had been|unablo to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant

In Mexi, but etated there 1a a Caballo Bayo restauraht located on outskirts of Maxi.

Source weut to restaurant, shoved photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUD Lopez, who lias in

charge of cub con at the time of OSWALD's visitithere, of Cub: Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvia

DURAN and of OSWALD to employees of restaurant and conduct extensive Interviews of these

employecs.

!He was unable to find.

who oould recall any of the

persons as havine har

CR

---

## Page 160

SECRET - SENSITIVE

-112-

BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely

to contain relevant information.

Therefore, the files in this

box were not examined.

SECRET -

SENSITIVE

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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160

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## Page 161

SECRET - SENSITIVE

MC CONE PAPERS

NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964

REFERENCES

TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS,

WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with

Attorney General Kennedy -

"Lansdale operation" mentioned

in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with

Attorney General Kennedy -

"Lansdale operation" mentioned

in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with

Attorney General Kennedy -

Reference to a "Lansdale paper"

to be discussed by the 5412

Committee plus Robert Kennedy:

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special

Group/Mongoose Project -

General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that

Attorney General upset that Perpez was apparently telling

people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney

General.

Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General -

included a

short discussion of

"Reuther plan" for labor

operations apparently 'in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis

Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central

Intelligence,

General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion

of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's

are discovered in Cuba:

"McNamara expressed strong feelings

that we should tale every possible aggréssive

action in the fields of intelligence, sabo-

tage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans

and do such other things as might be indi-

cated to divide the Castro regime.

(emphasis added)

SECRET - SENSITIVE

PROTOTY OF

01509 THE WITH Must crang

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 161

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## Page 162

SECRET - SENSITIVE

' - 2-

File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy:

McCone wanted to

be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was

more conservative.. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on

Cuba [MISSING]

Apparently not a meeting or phone calll

(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba

[MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba

[MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and

Eisenhower (transcript)

about Cuba. (No mention of

assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney

General [No one to see without DCI permission]

[DESTROYED]

[According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney

General at Hickory Hill (No one to see without DCI permission]

(DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and

Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts

developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem

and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by

representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during

his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains

the following:

01540

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE MOUSE DEFICE

NN 54923 DooId:32423629 Page 162

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## Page 163

SECRET - SENSITIVE

•- 3-

"I agree

with the ONE estimate that

Castro's political position will im-

prove within the next year (barring

assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not

proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this

statement:

"Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassi-

nation, will survive the efforts of internal opposition

elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or

considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney

General and Director of Central Intelligence

about "Helms/

ingreton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED'

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about:

"Helms/Angleton

Project..."

[DESTROYED]

File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963

Nothing Relevant

FIle: JulY 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan,

Tom Ross of Chicago Sun

Times (MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group"

[MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at

Justice Department

[MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at

Kennedy's house

[MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about

Kennedy assassination

MISSING]

01531

SECRET - SENSITIVE.

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOLE DEFICE

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 163

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## Page 164

SECRET - SENSITIVE

: - 4

-

(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk:

Sukarno had said

that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked

if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI

said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House

Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms (DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk:

"EYES ONLY -

NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan;

Republican Platform of 1960."

[DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with:

DCI, Justice Warren,

Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject:

"Met in

DCI's Office"

[MISSINGJ

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: :

"Warren

Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms).

Helms

saw

commission

transcript and returned it to the commission."

"No MR

expected"

[MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr.

and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos

used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION -

nothing on assassinations.

01512

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE MOUSE DEFIC

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## Page 165

SECRET - SENSITIVE

-5-

File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION -

discussion re Walter Jenkins'

matter."

[DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In

Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY

JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION"

[DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President

and General Taylor, DCI

advised Kennedy that there were

possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassi-

nation attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and

which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

"not guaran tao cho

Venezuela,

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President,

Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one

Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life

magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently,

article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and

Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail.

No mention of assassinations.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

01513

PROPERTY OF

THE WWITE HOUSE OOFICE

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 165

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## Page 166

SECRET - SENSITIVE

-6 -

File: JulY 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering

through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President,

Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed.

mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962:

•At a meeting of NSC Executive

Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose.

No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962:

"Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential

Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups;

estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press."

[MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962; At a meeting of the NSC

Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed

Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President,

DCI, and Helms."

No memo present. Listing does not indicate

whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally

Indicates when memos were not prepared.

Secretary's note

of 1/27/72 (MB) notes:

"No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45:

p.m.): Meeting between DCI

and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI

"reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance

intelligence at selected, embassies and foreign residences within

the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk"

with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

FIle: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI

discussed two methods of dealing with Castro:

(1) "Working

on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to

remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of

Castro by means which could be developed after the rémoval

of Soviet troops..." No mentión of assassination.

SECRET ÷ SENSITIVE

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PROPERTY OF

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7-

(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and

others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were

discussed.

No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963:

In meeting with the President and

others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against

Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record

by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

FIle: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963:

At a meeting of the President, DCI,

and others, 'McCone emphasized that to a very considerable

extent these. (Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and

forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect

some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking."

(This was in a general discussion of

covert actions against

Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told

Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City.

DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City:

...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by

Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In

meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed

"contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent inves-

tigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed. the

DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B.

Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest

developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald.

of "late developments" is in file, to be used. for this purpose.

day inte

A list

(Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICF

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18-

File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April T, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others

re Cuba Covert Action.

Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective

set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963:

"The ultimate objective

of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the

military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the

eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage

and the

elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba."

(emphasis added)

[OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to

discuss

"Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential

Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP,

CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after

paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations:

"See special

minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes"

appear to be contained in this file.*

However, this same nota-

tion appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem.

Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of

Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to

"explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in

the

immediate future."

(May 12, 1964)

*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE PETICE

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## Page 169

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9 -

The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964)

contained the following:

(OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve.

the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders.

Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and

stated that he would like to go into the matter further.

Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was

being put on notice and should do everything in its power to

and pay a de chat got a and pove

ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then under-

take prevention.

It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the

matter to the Attorney General's attention as a

matter of law

enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this

meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same

information.

(OBTAIN COPY) It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA

memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate

leading Cuban government leaders."

This memo apparently had

been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General.

[OBTAIN COPY]

McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we

should

to establish the credibility of the report; also

communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should

call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee

meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report)

contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba.

isonal memorandan

MI. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had

only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for

August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

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- 10-

BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"

Much information on Mongoose.

No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled

"Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" -

contains comments on Dr. King's personal life.

Relayed by

J. Edgar Hoover to Mccone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile

crisis.. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence

to, from, and of interest to the White House.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

01518

PROPERTY OF

Fur Malte wallse raries

NH 54923 DoOId:32423629 Page 170

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## Page 171

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- 11 -

BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this

box.

The name of this file, however, appears on the page which

purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central

Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs

Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses

of Action with Respect

to Cuba."

This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible

courses of action which the Ü.S. Government could take with

respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as

an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces.

however, contains no mention or reference to possible

no mention

It,

assassi-

nation of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen

Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement.

There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "w" File

Nothing relevant:

SECRET - SENSITIVE

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## Page 172

When Castro Heard the News

Hauri.:

TABN

It was around tie in the afternoon, Cuban time. We

both the American continents inchieve this gout, a

sere having lunch in the living room of the modest

• leader would have to arise in the United States Capable

summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magni-

of understanding the explosive realities of Latin Amer-

ficent Varadero Beach, 12o kilometers from Havana.

ica and of mecting them haifway. Then, suddenly, lie

For at least the tenth time, i was questioning the Cuban

had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be

Icader on details of the negotiations with Russia before

this man. He still has the possibility of becoming,

the missile installations last ycar. The telephone rang,

in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the

a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dor-

United States, the leader who may at last understand

that there can be coexistence between capitalists and

socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be

the phome and I heard him say: "Como? Un atentado?"

'"What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then

turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck

lown in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone

ind exclaimed in a loud voice "Herido? Muy grave-

richie" ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times

hewords: "'Es una mala noticin" ("This is bad news.")

He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call

with further news. He remarked while we waited that

inere was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in Amer-

can society and that this deed could equally well have

he work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a

Victnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The

econd call came through: it was hoped they would be

able to announce that the United States President was

ill dive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel

Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is

ready re-clected." He pronounced these words with

satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had

eld on a previous evening and which had turned into

in all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in

the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of

the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted

to him of an interview which President Kennedy

granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel

Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this

nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of

• relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the

recent past Washington had had ample opportunity

to normalize its reiations with Cuba, but that instead

it had tolcrated a CIA program of training, equipping

und organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me

that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since

danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become

I virtim of the United States this would simply en-

ha. his radius of influence in Latin America as well

is throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he

said, from the viewpost of the interests of peace in

an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for

example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you

can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all

my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have

assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await

his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible

for everything, but I will say this: he has come to

understand many things over the past few. months;

and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that

anyone else would be woise." Then Fidel had added

with a broad

and boyish grin: "If you see him again,

you can tell him that l'milling to declare Goldwater

my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was heid on November 19.

Now it was nearly a o'clock and sc got up from.

the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio.

Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and

intimate friend, was casily able to get the broadcasts

from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came

in, Vallero would translate it for. Fidel: Kennedy

wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder

of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: Presi-

dent Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to

me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to

change. The United States occupies such a position in

world affairs that the death of a President of that

country affects millions of people in every corner of

the globe. The cold war, relations with Kussia, Latin

America, Cuba, the Negro question... all will have to

be rethought. I'll tell you one thing; at least Kennedy

was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed.

This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter.

After the quarter-hour of silerice observed by all

the American radio stations, we once more tuned in

on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a re-

broadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange

indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn

ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a

circl of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they vill

ha: to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly,

7

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 172

---

## Page 173

otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they wi?

try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell i

how many Presidents have been assassinated? Fou

This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has bee;

assassinated. You know, when ive were hiding out i

the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in an

other) who wanted to fill Batista. They thought they

could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have

always been violently opposed to such methods. First

of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, be-

cause so far as Cuba is concerned, it Batista had been

killed he would have been replaced by some military

figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists

pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also

opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is

repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter

felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy

was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings.

Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He re-

peated the remark

several times: "What sort of a

mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations

after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin

Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it

mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes de-

cency, dignily, respect. There are even street urchins

who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally,

this reminds me of something else: if you write all

those things I told you yamalay against Kennedy's

policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the

policy of the United States governmcit."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since

there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we

must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He

wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a

granja de preblo (state farm), where he had been en-

gaging in some experiments. His present obsession is

agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies

and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers,

and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough

n the Cho doug,

sugar cane by 1970 to achieve.economic independence.

"Didr't I. Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas

police were now hot or the trail of the assassin. He

is a Russian spy, says the news commentator.. Five

minutes later, correction; he is a spy marricd to a

Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be

-myturn next." Butes jil. The next word was; the

assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came

through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man

who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Com-

mittee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel

declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said

HH

54923

DOCId: 32423629

Page

173

he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In

saying simply that he is an admiss, this is just to try

and make an association in people's minds betwech ihe

name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the

assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda

device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will .

all soon blow over. There are too many competing

policies in the United States for any single one to be

able to impose itself universally for very long."

We arrived at the granja de preblo, where the farm-

ers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker

announced over the radio that it was now known that

the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commen-

tator followed another; the remarks became increas-

ingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then

had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his

reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy?

With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of

the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most

important of all: "What autherity doss he exercise

over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch,

saw that it would be half an hour before we reached

Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to

slecp.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state

of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting

the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before,

he said to me that it was an irony of history for the

Cubans, in the situation to which they had been re-

duced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of

a President of the United States. "'After all," he added,

"there are perhaps some people in the world to whom

this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese

guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine,

Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the

sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army

with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming

captions *HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. .

I thought of all those who had been led to associate

their deprivations with the policies of President John

F. Kennedy.

At dinner I was able to take up all my questions.

What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of

the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent

was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to

envisage relations between Cuba and the United States

along the same lines as those between Finland and the

Russians? How was the transition made from the

humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism

• of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an

explanation for everything. Then he questioned me.

---

## Page 174

DICE 5ER 7, 100}

once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized tic

intellectual qualities of the assassinated President,

awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in

that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized

with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy

In that very seitative city of Havana to wnich we re-

turned in the evening, where the luminous signboards

with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and

toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Sovict exhibits

and Crechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emo-

tion vibrated in the aimosphere, compounded of re-

sentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of

everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rap-

prochement. After all, this American President was able

to reach accord with our Russian friends during. his

ifetime, said a young Cleanencilectual to me as livas

taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apolo-

gizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

JEAN DANIEL

ROMANS

By Saturday night, even the television seemed worn

out by attempt and failure and ceased to comment and

gave over to a succession of photographs of the col-

imns and the window's and the corners of the White

House and of the shadows of the great Lincoln head

in Springfield and to a voice reciting

"Oh, Captain,

My Captain." It is to be, then, the grand style. But the

ship has. not weathered every storm; Mr. Kennedy is

not Abrahum Lincoln; not because he is. more or less,

but because he is a remembered physical presence and

Mr. Lincoln an image of the plastic aits. One's oun

time is personal, not historical. Just how long will it be

before many of us will want to read a book about the

day Mr. Kennedy was shot?

The news of the President's assassination was given

by a taxi driver to three gentlemen as they left a hotel

on Arlington Strect in Boston. They turned right

around and hurried back inside to allend in their in-

vestments. Packed with students and businessmen a

shuttle plane from Boston to Washingion ivaited for

permission to take off when the captain came on the

intercom: "Folks, up here on the flight deck we've been

listening to the news and the President is dead." There

was only time to hear one woman say, "How dread-

• ful" before three men went back to discussing plan

specifications. A college student reading denmemnon

:o visible attention. One of his notes read, "love-

in-ure!" The plane took off, the stewardess collected

the money and started to serve drinks. Then the cap-

tain was back again they had been listening to more

- JOHN F. KENNEDY, November 19, 1905

neivs, that is trying to listen to news because their

real job was lo hear flight control. There had been a

gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was killed; the police

had taken a man in Tarrie theater. Vice President

Johnson was now the President. The talk of business

vient on through this, and stopped only when the cap-

tain again interrupted to say that the new President had

been sworn in aboard an aircraft. A few laughed.

Ther ask too much of us when they ask us to act up

to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent

people: And yet some of us always complained that

Mr. Kennedy did not seem quite emotionally commit-

ted enough. But now someone remembered with special

affection a moment late in the 1060 campaign. Mr.

Kennedy was in a motorcade and the Democratic gov-

cinor who was with him said how wonderful it was to

feel the love with which these crowds pressed forward

to feel the touch of their candidate. "Oh, dry up," Mr.

Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace

in him that he used only the real in emotion and ab-

stained from fabricating the expected. He had too much

respect for the grand style to counterfeit it; how much

truer to him might we have been if ive had come down

in scale and if the many of us who must have remem-

bered the lines from Cymbeline had thought them

proper to speak

"Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious

winter's rages.

Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home. art thou

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 174

---

## Page 175

Flash from Dallas

Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the

presidential. party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news-sketchy

as it was at first-to the world. United Press, International's Merriman

Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32-33

his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result

of Smith's first efforts-the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately

clacked out of hundreds of UPl machines in newsrooms, radio and

television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over. the world.

CETECTIVES VERE THERE AVE THEY "ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE BRIEF-

CASES FOR SOMETHING•

THE CASE WAS OPENED AND

AN ENVELOPE HAS FOUND

CONTAINING 44 $ 100

DILLS,

THE WITNESS

SAID.

THE STATE HAD SAID IT WOULD

PRODUCE.

THAT

PIECE

LINKS. OF EVIDENCE BUT

IT HAD

NOT

LISTED IT AS ONE OF THE

SEVEN

THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT CAROL'S

DEATH AFTER A.

SAVAGE LUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER HOME WAS THE

RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED

MOREDA 1234PCS

• ..

UPI A7N

DA

PRECEDE KENNEDY

MOTORCADE

DECADE TODAY TE DONE DALLAS.

(UPI) -- THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

JTIZ3APCS. •

UPI AgN

HX

2ND ADD 2ND LEAD THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST

BUOS HO

UPHOLD

DA IT YRS NX

UPI A8N AJ

DAY

CORRECTE

BUOS UPHOLD--NX

UPI A8N DA

URGENT .

IST ADD SHOTS,

DALLAS. (A7N) XXX

DOWNTOWN, DALLAS.

NO CASUALTIES VERE REPORTED.

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED

NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON MAIN

STREET,

JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE

THE PRESIDENT VAS TO MA

FLASH

FLASH

KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED

PERHAPS

SERIOUSLY

PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET

JT1239PCS

54923

DooId:32423629

Page 175

At 12:34 the Teletype was

supplying copy on a

Minneapolis murder trial.

The Dallas bureau, alerted by

Smith over radiotelephone from

the press car as it careered

toward the hospital, sends out

the first sparse news.

Minneapolis starts to add more

details on the murder trial. The

New York bureau, knowing

that ace reporter Smith is covering

the President's trip, tells all

bureaus to "uphold" — get off the

wire. "Dallas, it's yours."

Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is

quickly squelched by the

New York bureau.

The Dallas operator begins

sending the rest of Smith's account

from the press car.

At the hospital, Smith sees the

President's limp body in the cas

and races to a telephone. At

12:39, nine minutes after the

shooting, the grave news flashes

over the wire.

---

## Page 176

UPI 9N

BULLETIN

IST LEAD SHOOTING

DALLAS,

NOV.

22 (UPI)- PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV:

JOHN B.

CONNALLY

TEXAS VERE CUTDOVN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY TOURED

DOUNTOWN DALLAS IN AY OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY.

MORE JTI241 PCS

UPI AION DA

IST ADD IST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS CON DALLAS AX TODAY.

THE PRESIDENT,

HIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE,

WAS

RUSHED TO PARKLAND HOSPITAL.

THE GOVERVOR ALSO VAS TAKEN TO PARKLAND.

CLINT HILL,

A SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY,

SAID

YE'S DEAD,"

AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR OF A WHITE HOUSE

•OURING CAR.

THE FAMOUS SUBSLETOP" FROM WASHINGTON. HE WAS RUSHED

TO AN

EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL.

OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS VERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE

HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM.

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A

PARK

IN DOUNTOWY DALLAS.

REPORTERS ASOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

HEAR

MORE INAPES

UPI ALIN DA

2ND ADD IST LEAD SHOOTING (ON DALLAS XXX DALLAS.

REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS JEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE BURST OF

SECRET SERVE A SWAPORE PICKET UNDERED THE IR

AUTOMATIC RIFLES.

THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAR WAS DOWN.

THEY DREY THEIR PISTOLS,

BUT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.

THE PRESIDENT WAS SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE

DOWN.

CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT.

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE. TO TELL AT

MORE 145 PES

UPI AI2N DA

IT WAS

IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY WAS HIT,

WOUNDS IN CONNALLY'S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE,

INDICATING

SUT BULLET

THE

GUNFIRE

MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON.

THERE WERE

THREE LOUD BURSTS.

DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS

ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED

FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL.

MORE 146PES

UPIAI3N DA.

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629

Page 176

Now reporter Smith is dictating a

story ready for printing.

Smith rolls on, swiftly and

fluently, adding fresh details as

"pandemonium" breaks out

in the corridor outside his

telephone niche.

Searching his mind for

impressions of the shooting,

Smith adds all he can remember

to the story. The shaken wire

operator stumbles in the

second line.

As yet nothing is known of the

sniper, what kind of weapon

he used, or where the

shots came from.

28

---

## Page 177

/

Ali Darious in% curing, D3C1

Icte in saling lin, lat beccuse or la inüers me: line, lis rus rat doie so

until =or..

Te caùs liat "i apolo mus talo to .:.i did noù add artbiug ingorizat

the concrete point wiich you asked ue ajout, no ili thare tas no offer of aiy tina!.

Dorticos:

"no.:.I rasn't asking about en ofte:"

tenandez Armas: "ab, ilid

understood tant with the confusion of tae..."

zilano: "2o, I as seléaring as 50

weether they had threatened der so that she judi raid i statement that the Consilate.

had it given roney to the man...that American.. understand?" Eemerdes Armas: "ab,.

20, 20, no, not at day moreat", Durtloos: "taing of that?" demurdez Amas:

"I0,

no, that nothing absolutely was given to her...ratier they (enderezar. - straightened cut?)

is the

the isterrogation...." Dorticos:

"then we can so alonspir version of ser your

infosation?" Hersandez Amas:!!

yes, SI. Presidente, oi course". Dorticos: "then

nothing nore or importance? Hermandez Armas: "o, nothiag deportant. a aayiey,

: an foing| to subuit soon a draft of all the astriis, beczuse there are obher detail.

of nizor Importance, and others of soze at all, but contained in the suatement....

1 I have astod hes to make me a datin draft aa prolleo as posesaie to duant 1t

at the first opportualty"

2871 * COPIES DE SPANISH LANGUAGE

--

TRANSCRiPTS AND SOME ENGLISH.

TRAVSLATIONS DE TELEPHONE

CONVERSATIONUS AS CONTAINEO IN

TItE MEXICO CITY STATION FILES

HH

5491

423629

Page

Paper ts Clack

177

ExT 281

11/26/63

1, 41:

---

## Page 178

-This document is arenarea t: response your request and is for perni

natih nutside your Commitier.

1s. is limitri do official errors ins

lemorand ou the cal the come may me la discosed to cent nest

Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 27, 1963

FROM :

C. A. Evans

Sullivar

Tavel

Trolte:

Talo. Pest.

Holmes.

Gandy -

SUBJECT:

Jatin. F.

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIENT KENNEDY

Brow

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a.m.

He said he had just completed talking on the telephone with Alexis Johnson,

Deputy Under Secretary of State. Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as

the investigation of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department

felt this should be coordinated and directed by the FBI. State took the

position that the President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity

outside of the United States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the

Ambassador in Mexico is concerned, Johnson believed he should be kept

informed of any pertinent developments but that the Ambassador should not

be running the investigation.

As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thing

he would want would be for the FBI to take Agents away from their investiga-

tive duties to prepare reports. He requested, however, that if there were

any pertinent_developments he be orally briefed.

Move son or titt contine EriK

With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson,

Katzenbach said he had been asked whether the State Department should make,:

a formal inquiry of the Soviet Government for information concerning Oswald

and his wife, particularly as to their activities in Russia.

He asked tinat this.

question be considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most

important.

In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we

did not ask the Soviets for information there would be no answer should the

question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had

made no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place

any reliance on anything the Soviets said.

UTTaCULUSI

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

REC. 78

+2-118-40-1493

After conferring

.

with Messrs. Belmont and Sullivan, the

1

. - Mr.

Mohr

45D FROM

1 - Mr.

De Loach

1 - Mr. Rosen

12 Mr Sullivan

XEROX

DEC

10

1963

2 DE0 & 1953

CAE:vap

(8)

NY 54923' DöcId:32123629 ' Page^178

Stre

---

## Page 179

gist

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points

raised by Nir. Katzenbach:

1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government,

we believe this undesirable. Such a formal request from the United States

will enable the Russians to put out an official statement entirely favorable

to them.. The United States will have to acopêt this, since it is in response

to our formal request, and we won't be in a position to disprove it. The

State Department has responsibility here and we should not dictate the

position they are to take, but our views should be stated.

2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico, it is

recommended Katzenbach be informed that the State Department and

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have jurisdiction in dealing with foreign

governments and in getting investigative results and intelligence coverage

abroad; that while we are cooperating fully with State and CIA in Mexico,

the responsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA.

If approved, Katzenbach will be so advised."

Die235pm

511/27/63

V.

oH. she ambassador

--::

FLu 27.1916

- 2

131

..UM

54923

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Page

179

---

## Page 180

SECRET

Project ZRRIFLE

HAKYEY EX/ R371

6/25/75

(

HH

1. Identificatime: The purpose of Profeit IRRiFLE is

to spot, levelop, and use fousipe aput act for Divisis D

port operations. Apents will be spotted in were exess,

micheling the kited Hit's, but sit poste for spentiond

remity resious will probably not be used is their

countries of residence. Precent denlopmental actuits, is

teng conducted in the WE aud EE areas, lust it

is untiipated that this will be extended to atter diners.

areas. The project will he speated aquint third country.

mistalletiace and persuel.

2. Objertion: The slictive of this propert in the ens,

of of code and cipher materials, in accordauce wuitt...

requiremente levied on the Clandectice terica, primarily, leg

the Nationd deart, agency: five these requirements are?

whipet to frequent revicion, no listing of tippete waile

he valid for the duration of the prapect. specific

openstions will he mounted on the baris of wied and

oppentunity. The profect will le conducted by Duision

I with assistauce from ança divisions and statione an

3 Bodegro

RECE

needed.

JUN 24 1975

GLA

_3. Racliground: Du responce to the incressing regisements

for the sparetions procurement of forcion code and cipher

misteria!a, Dricion D in 1960 began the spotting of

agent arte as a declopmental actiety. Dusing the same

- Classiod by 00. 7.789.1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIOI

Exampt from goneral

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject lo

doclassilisation scheduld of E.O. 11852

exemplion sct.- Jula 513 (1), (2), (3)

Deans 2361 vage 180

nutsmalcally cocicysified on

puro trapossiblo to Determito

1

---

## Page 181

SECRET

-perial requinemento from NSA becaue neare refuel and in.

mauy respecto rare sensitics: Because most stutine are

not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and license

of the désiralility of completely centralised control auer this..

entire effort, it was determied that Dision D, which is..

in direct touch with NSA on procurement regiments, could.

best conduct the estity. The fist spotling artist,?.

has now advanced for ensugh to pistify newouing from

the 014 estepany.

4 Operational ascets :

(1) Persuel: # PTWiN is under written

contract as a pricipal set, with the imary tadle of

spotting apent candilstes. Of fuin wise firet contested in

1958 through the Chief of the tuxenhowg Ii; hy

the Chief of Station, Luperbourg, in commection nott

an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For

a perish of a year and a half t was contacted i t

sporadically bey COS, Lukeutzing, in lehalf of the

Bureau of Miscates. Hiles of this Bureau reflect

an excellent performance les Quin Du tep the 1960,.

RECEIV

JIN 2& 1975

GIA

SECRET

NH757923

DocId: 38123629 Page 181-

---

## Page 182

SECRET

Afric annual salone.:.

$ 7,200

Travelt ofs expenses for

RAini + other agento 7 ageit cantisits: 2, 000

Nees for resies by, and

standly of agents aid

agent candidates:

2,000

Travel of staff employees o

engaged in Zorifle actinity :

2,500

Hire of rafehouses, automobiles.

and other spectiond pence:

-1, 000

(1.4700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

RECE

JHY 281-1575

CIA

WH-51923 DecIa: 32123629

Page 182

SECRET

---

## Page 183

SECRET

4

1) Liga, ethical mole, operatisual pratlines; politial:.

nou -ittrihite-

belite,.-

2) Our ern expirice (Raughsh). (elleston DSP) and experence

w/KGB (Cracup, Batera praupe, Hholler) → require most:

proformal, janen operationall, competerit, vethlece, stable,

F-euriened ope officer few esilable, able to couluct patient

3) Maçimum recity:

a. Pickank auly (e. g.; what does teques nor

how?); no appros, to itts haut. agencies.

b. Within Rubat, one focal pant for contral,

in this focal pant mandatory. Di officiall, lied?.

c. May. racity cable counco for imocesue

caller auly; no restrictions on travel; porciliate,

of ine-man overcess (Gropel antrol bace with

no balifilies ne tripio

from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign

gante.

JIN T24 1575

1- No rece of sughis amy agent als

his pena be A Mat agency.

Trien

Markelf in the reach.

SECRET

MH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 183

---

## Page 184

SECRET

pas as foreigners.

4. Flecterst:

i Protest DutcheD Mean, teach Kne

1. 15" tige

a Ho American citigens or recilentper.

people who ever atred ris, versi

I No chaine of comestine: striatly person to

person, singleton ops.

c. No mittes any caulilats in lease tanitory

1. Exclude organization

1.g, sunels, thore.

aprecord of emerts, those uf metabilit; of jaurpse.

as criminals.

5. Couer: planning chul ritude pression for.

Flaming tous or Geds in care of blair.

sit test amines escentiali me folling ficitine,

3 Former resistance pennel a possilutty.

: 8. Ure nobody uho has never decot ef enminals, other

will seat be aware of pitfalls or criter factors such

as freelim to traud, wanted listo,; eto.

→ 4. Meauld licue plane, 201 in Ri to bachatop this, ell.

documents their forget backdated, Shull okille

a CE file:.

10. Possible ue of staffers for the action.

i silverthorne.

Keeping if file,

REGENED FROM -

MA 24 1975

GIA

SECRET

WW 54923 DocId:02423629 Page 184

---

## Page 185

...•

SECRET

freek " to ittand

Lezel; operational ethics urole prakau

dass fire quca our luco?).

..... inititire on munter is.

derks for enciple

rig. + leciphering)

celestions Complete

DDP authorite in this food prust ricilete

Overcas one-man

control base witts run is Aston convers..

3) Every spentire to

lie migilly,

cace-officer'd; no sille-slun

Riverican peridento for hect actio;

-pocidly for approac

foreigu elemento. No criminal.

who taunted ley rese le

y auster timencan agency. Ice of

sy cace officine who a

pacs as foreispere aud linted

official reference,

s) No chain of

fenections permitting blackmail.

6) Dow't meet any actecter in hore teritory.

7) Quaid decision up foreign efficials with all possi lility.

of search thraugle privete citizers (eg, AJai, has.

RECEIVED FROM

As 242 191

3) Plamming should include persisin for

suits (or Gechs) i cave of blow.

9) Exclude organization miels, there with record of

amesto, thare who haue eugaged ne sueral tippe of creive

HHA 54923

:32123629

Page' 185

SECAZI

---

## Page 186

SECRET

waled. fiction

I could lied its

11) Corsicans per;

Mafia..

(

arclutes,

12). Period of teste

millauce, eto. for each

silester.

13) Half here prenuel instied shoull have some CE.

esperence.

14) Filthone e stable no Peris.

is What and limits on team or ridividuals sob

selected? No "tan" until read to go.

16) Fo Daups of strudigs,

RECEIVED (HOM

JUN 24 19T5

CIA

WW 54923 DocId:32423629 Page: 186 -

---

## Page 187

SECRET

sed

111-25% -

Eye fation

"The magic button"

sarcas

"for a leung.

181S: 201

coner...

cautión..

eyes- jun A.

Contiadlesteuet.

Ra & T50-

3 apply traches

Last resent heyond loxt resent a

on i uealne..

El Benepoctor

acsumptions -

6 Example 3 " mo

Lenfera

estative.

basic

sounds proper

Comi

w/- Year

RECLI

quarter. i

4008 24 1975

GIA

36/1.

AS = Fanfam 2001 Matter -

In here militi

suard assassin

1 Select proper open to rin -

2. Plaes a comer

2axo2

3. Secuit, Ruler

B-WIN- AS

quire leves

Sid - Resem.

5 Lost: 1es01-111ka1-

HH 54923 DocId 92423629 Page 187-

---

## Page 188

(

SECRET,

? пожерт ры саме

AF- Projer

tector. 1500-prom iB.

More - die Plato

Disposed-

a larget inhod duckers

must tvow leave

we can spot -

11. case officeng

ja comer file create to prou

13- has dave As colinter

retion

a marter they.

dro blamed -

7a Vest - Remember

RECLA

JUR 244 1915

CLA

HH 54923

Doctat 32423629

Page 188

SECRET

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## Page 189

January 28, 1276

The Honorable Otis Fire, Chalman

House Select Connittoo on Intelligence,

Rajburn Hous: Office Building,.

washington, D. C. 2053.5

Dear Congresman Pike:

congratulations on your Conniitze's groat sorvico to the inerican eleca

torate in ronoving cone of the mask of scescey fion the donostic covere

oporations ard l'undirg of tho CIA.

Socracy pootcoisd counterproductive

and indefensible corest operations for wrenty-reven yars, The light

of exposure and cleansing is now enharcing our counts's cecurity.

Thos

cub:ining o1 you excellene sopore ever Cla and tastr House oblections

13 an act of courage the cloctorate vill soon apprecire.

Roliance, however, by, any Congressional comnittee on tandunts from the

Chi itsell, is like an investigative peporter compiling his story fron

gourmont press roleeses. Neithe, 1u doing the job les employei paid

It to do.

Finding the bidden Cl! budgets for thire or four dines the billions of

dollaro mindeted to dio electorate lo a comendable acrovement. But

mat sould your inveotigators have achiered it a law ms alroady in

fores imposing criminal penalties uper. CIA enclojeos tio loaked Into

mailon to you?

Tis CIA proposed cecrtey law is a blacail weapon.

Intelligenco, money und secrass combino do constitute autocratic povor

in ous accidty.

The Congross enjoys so intulligence arice of its

the doctrine of secracy li is

ponerlees indeed. To stungthon Congrons!

pover I offer you my on comterintelligenes corsice li place.

Tho

sources hava baen carefully tooted and accunulated sire 1949.

The problen is not leaking intelligence out of Committie; it Is leaking

Independont intelligerco luto 1%.

starting exaculy orr year ago today

I launched penetration offorts alch a 19 page report aldressed to

"Chairman and lembers, Solect Commitices on Intelligene Operations.

I hand delivered this report to every comittoo member's offico. My

wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person dellicret to.

On June 25, 1975 Edward Rooder III of your staif rocelited for 103

pages of counterintelligence on CIA. This representeda distillation

ol a quartor contury of inclligence gatiorini. CIl cotrol of the

Watergate broakin and coverup and Cla's investigation d my

penetration

of their sacrets 1o covored.

The suplication to the U.S. Attornay and

three U.S. Spacial Prosecutors requesting investigatle anil prosecution

of murder of Anarica citizens within the U.S.d. is Inyour files.

Neverthelous, none of this intellioner leaked to recorition or 1nvo3-

tigation within the executivo departnents or your Cometoz.

HH 54923 DooId: 32423629

: Page •189

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## Page 190

(2)

On July 30, 1075 Finily Shoketoff of jour staff cocclated for a one page

nottication distributed io chairmor and nonbors that anna l. Commandu..

an employes of Cin's donestic assassination orried, had been mi-

dered th bor arartment houre swinning pool by cli assuasin Eugene Halo

Brading®

I no: enjoy the addstional intelligenco that Comanduras vas executed

wáuh a CIA dart gun auch as that displaged to novo conorao by a member

Serate Intraligerce Cornittra,

the intelligence reapon fires a

sliver coated with shelltich tozi: that kills within sucondo, dissolves

and leaves no naike.

The OlA proserved thoir chollfish toxin supply in

direct contravention of an order ot dro Presidone.

Your Connittee filed

this coport ra thout sotion olong with over 200 adriltional counterintel-

Ilgoron. Is this secuoy that protocts national security?

Congreasman Pile, you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly

hidder. in anothor budgat.

tilll. you go for mors? Then examine the

State Departient, Cretary Department, justice Department, Inlte House

and congrese appropriations.

All or

thess support personnel accepting

orders for covert domestle oparations from CIA.

you love uncoverad CIA operations in the media.

Investigat polico

departnents throughout the nation funded by Leil that are responsive to

CIA DECUS3.

In the Fairlue County, Virginla, Folica departent alono

a Cil iscansin has tirior emploged the badge of the dopertment as cover

to guin entrance to domiciles to perior executions.

I again connoid your Comittes for resisting the pressure for secrecy

in publishing your report. I deplore your resistance to the leaking

or intolligence into your Comities.

The Latter confines your Con-

mittes's intolligence to official and unofilcial leaking channels of

the CId. Pleaco corcede tat thore are other cltizens as concerned

for the secuilty of America as you aid.

I respectfully request opportunity to confer mith you, Congressnan Pike,

or rach your capable, diligeno and honest stati chiof, A. Scarle Field.

I rant to uscist your Comitan in reconnending retodial legislatior

based upon 21 years of lalining.

the problem.

Respectiully submicted,

Almos E, Heacock

Amos E. Haacock

4410 Cilathorpe, Apt. 708,

Ratisville, Ma.

20781

Telephore 064-5353

Erel: Lotters to Sanator

Abrahas Ribicofi and to

Senator Frank Church,

WW 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 190'

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## Page 191

ABHANARS RIBICOFF, GUNN., CHAIRMAN

JOHN L. ME CLILLAN, ASK.

CHARLES M. PERCY, ILL.

HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.

JACOB K. INVITS, N.Y.

EDMUNO 5. MUSKIE, MAINE

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.

LEE METCALF, MONT.

BILL BROCK, TENN.

JAMES B. ALLEN. ALA.

LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.

LAWION CHILES, FLA.

sen Nune 1r

JOHN GLENI, O11IO

RICHARD A. WEGMAN

CINEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

GENCE DiVISION, CiA - PENETRATION CE NON-

INTELUEENCE ARANCHESE GANT AND CHUNTER-REMETRATIEN

BY SOVIET KEB.

-this

?Inited States Senate

COMMITTEE ON

| GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 8, 1976

Mir. Amos E. Heacock

4410 Oglethorpe, Apt, 708

Hyattsville, Maryland 20781

2.334-NIPSS.

Fille Chanch, L'2, 22843

Tel, (791) 534-3975

Dear Mr. Heacock:

Thank you for writing

to me regarding your knowledge of

the activities of the Central

Intelligence Agency.

I understand

that you have discussed these questions at length with members

of the Committee staff.

On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating

a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities.

The legislation

which was betore us concerned only the establishment of a new

congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that would

n did no.

significantly modify the structure or the powers of the ClA it-

self.

The Conmittee has not been authorized to hire additional

staft personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further-

we were under instructions from the Senate to report out

a.

formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March 1.

I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you

have made because, if

true,. they represent grave examples of

corruption and criminality.! It is my hope and intent that the

new committee created by the legislation we are considering,

once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the re-

sources to explore the

kind of issues which you raise.

I assure you that the entirety of the information you

have submitted to my committee will be made available to the

new Congressional oversight comnittee.

I am sure you understand the constraints on the Govern-

ment Operations Committee which prevent us from undertaking the

investigations you suggest, but I shall forward the material

you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established.

For your information, I

am enclosing a copy of S. Res.

400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure.

Sincerely,

Gile itin

Abe. Ribicoff

Enclosures (2)

HH 54923 • DocId: 32123629 Page 191

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## Page 192

January 28, 1276

The Honorable Auranon Ribicot

Connittee on Governaa: Operations,

Chaimman

United Stites Senata

DIrksen Sonate Office Building

Washington, Do C. 20510

Dear Senator Ridicoft:

Destiny has chosen you tha second time in seven years to chaii? com

mitten mith capaustice ai estaolishine larislativa renedies

to provent

dowestic and foreigu aasassinatios, huge corcuption within ntlitary

supply atreans, mul'l billion doller curroney manipulation and massive

interrention of the CIA in domestic covert operationg.

Or od about March 6, 1250 you fore the soling chalman of the Permanent

Investigations Subcomitted that beard Cornelius Hankridge, my vitness,

describe a mulat billion dollar curreney manipuladion sacked in souch

Viethan.

Carmine Ballino, sualt investigaton, pravanicd Handradga from.

also tootifying avoit truck convoys of sialen military amus and cupplles

that he doserred heuding tomsi the Carbadia border,

tha fianca" for

those stolon arno vas the fabalous Sorict KOB agon Jaiques long, dos-

crabail by sure 1a yous nearinge to ba a more Viathanie cornisuary

cloris.

The orgailated crine vendors of the sulen goods roschod into

your Comalties in Carano Baliano is projade cashe sucratire rackoù.

¡investaga later wrote gou a lotte corning this defiolenes du 23081-

mong •

He pointad out the sala of

anas generated tunde usad in cur-

raney manipulation.

I aidod the criolod Haucidge abourd hio 1light do gettle. lour Con-

nuts prordod an amoulance to naut him for 16 was Lois Can tho

months since ho surrood an abbasaination autonp that tolled his sife.

Tha Soviet 80B lat a contract Mith organiard crine's Cl assassination

facillins to lall thon, Tha KoB considored Markoliga a defecior.

Willlans. mood, alas illian conley, Cla alias Willled Harvay and

doudle agont los KGB fingers Hankalugo and dis mies Migola, a "baby

91t4:r agent for rost German and Cli int:lligence.. In the contrived

traci-car "accident" Hakridge was crippled for 1lre.

I met with CIno Harvey as Boxley In Noverbor, 1968, 1: New Oileang

pursuant to my counterintelligenes Invostigations.

Haryoy, wiêna33

bufore the sonato Intolligance Comittoe, has admitter his rola a3

organizer of the 2R/RIMLE Erecutioo Aation abbasslaatin capabllity

and his contacts with John Mossalli and San Glancina ol organized Cilno

to inplonent that capability. Harvey Incocrucily junged to the conclu

sion fox the KGB that Har'crige was a cooporative sours of much of my

accurats counterintelligence on KOB.

Kaircridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a truasury

official. The official provalled doon Senator John Nclellan, thon

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 192

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## Page 193

(2)

chairman of your connittie, to conducù it. He 11r3t exposed dha 1a10ng

"Prysaneen" account in a New Yore bank.

It was used to convert South

Viotnanese piastors to dollars, nost of mich onded up in three banks

in the shiekdon of Dubal on the Porsian Gulf.

My further Investigation beyond the Comittro prove, sabataged by Pel-

Lino, estrollched the dollars vare used to requisition gold Ingots

fron the U, So Iraasury at $35 per ounce.

Those were rencited to con-

venient "taels" or viors of gold for black market trading for Indo-

china currencies again at huge discounts.

the conspirators enjoyed

goverment facilities for convurting piasters to dollars at fantasti-

cally unicalistic official exchange rates.

The exchange provided huge

profits to conspirators and huge losses to the Ircasury.

This inflation naching is st1ll at work, though at a raduced rate sinca

the end of the war in southeast Asia.

The entrepreneurs see! gicencr

pastures there not dars dostabilige currencles.

Perhaps Angola?

Hankridgo's real nare is Comsl Solyon. His intolligence acuiritles

for à decade vere traced in a bli page repost in the possession of tha

Sonate and House Intelligenco Connittees and your Committee.

Senator Ribicoff, had the actiottles of ClA-Grine double agent Camine

Pollino and Hankridge's testimony veon exposed in the public record in

1962, tie trauna for you, for your Cornittse, for the Congress and for

the irarican cloctorate Hould hava been ercifully softened. Bellino

went on to become Chief Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committoe.

He covered up the sources of $1, 050, 000 of so-called political donor

runas 1 have traced. He went on to instruct CIA agent Aloxander But-

terfiola in the inite louso to reveal the existonce of tie President's

tanes, thereby insuring his doimfall.

A filo of my lettors to Senator Henry. Jackson In 1969 were sont by him

to jour committes.

The intelligence was suppressed by Ballino.

Although

your comnistse vublined elznt volunes of hearings in this investigation,

Hawkridge's vital tostiony vas daleted. My intelligence vas disrugirded.

Tho legislative remedies noir boing proposed to counter corruption of our

Intolligence servicos can only 'õe made adequat: by exposing to public

vier tho depth of the proulen of secrecy. I an alamed at demands for

secrecy to support ClA cover operations such as those that lad our

country into the nost counterproductire covert operation in our nation's

history - the war in Vietnan. Did the secrecy Imposed by Bellino with-

In your committer advance the security of the United Statsa? Or did It

Insure the greatost huniliation of our foraign policy and our armed

forces since the birth of our republic 200 years ago?

I am alarned that crininal penalties are being proposed for publle ser-

vants whose conscience impels them to notify Congress and the public of

Irresponsible actions of men Infected with the arroganes of pover. I

HH 51923 DocId: 32423629

Page 193

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## Page 194

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.G. 20530

FEB 2 4 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman

United

States Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence Activities

Washington, D. C.

20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared

by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation in response

to

the request

in Item 15 of a letter dated January 14,

1976, from

Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

ncerely,

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

Vougt att → lAmin

11-C-5-031

Trades-

27

HN 54923

-DEId: 32423629 Page 191

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## Page 195

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 19, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 14,-

1976, requesting access to various materials contained in FBI

files.

Item 15 of referenced letter requested access to

materials pertaining to FBI contacts or interviews of

Loran Eugene Hall from January, 1963, through December, 1975.

Material responsive to Item 15 has been assembled and is

available for review by SSC Staff members in Room 4171,

J. Edgar Hoover Building•

SSC Staff member Paul Wallach advised on

February 10, 1976, that the portion of referenced request

concerning Item 14 is withdrawn.

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page

195

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## Page 196

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Researcht

MAR & 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman

United States Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence Activities

Washington, D. C.

20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an attach-

ment which is responsive to a letter dated February 12,

1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Steven Blackburst

STEVEN BLACKHURST

Assistant Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

RECEIVED FROM

MAR $ 1976

EB!

---

## Page 197

«CE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT

TO. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 12,

1976,,

which requests delivery of Mr. Hoover's memorandum

dated November 29, 1963, which memorandum is contained in

the "Official and

Confidential Files" (0 & C) and which was

made available for access

on February 12, 1976, to an SSC

Staff Member.

A copy of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29,

1963, is attached in compliance with the above request. One

excision

has been made by reason of privacy.

Instant memorandum also serves to confirm a conversation

on February 20, 1976, between Mr. Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Counsel,

and Mr. Steven

Blackhurst; Assistant Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, a pertinent

portion of which conversation was relayed by Mr.

Blackhurst

to Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff. Mr. Blackhurst reported

that during

the above conversation Mr. Wallach gave assurances

that should the SSC decide to use the

attached memorandum or

any portions thereof; the material used will not be identified

as having been maintained in Mr. Hoover's O & C files.

In addition to the above,

referenced SSC letter of

February 12, 1976, also requested delivery of all material in

the O & C liles pertaining to a number of specifically identified

items relating to the Warren. Commission and to this Bureau's.

investigations of both the Oswald matter and the assassination

of President Kennedy.

A thorough review of the special indices

relating to material contained in the O & C files failed to

indicate that any documents contained in these 0 & C files,

other than the attached memorandum,

items listed in referenced SSC lettevould be responsive to

the

of February 12, 1976.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings ?

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauchorized person:

nel without the express approval of the FBI

1779.1818

---

## Page 198

Original

Page one

Document Routing! Sheet

Date Received

3/2176

Received From

CHA

Classification

R #

Confidential

2762

Description:

311/76 eh..

to miller/attr:

Johnston) fm Elda wattach. Ips

re: Oswald file

Copies to:

Date

Date

Original to:

Date

Research sa

Filed:

VI-C

54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 198

---

## Page 199

Research

Page three

Locuneut

MUU

41143 010E1

Date Recelved

3/11/16

Received & ron

Classlfication

R A

CiH

Confid 12762

Description:

311176 ltito micle

rattn. Sobsny fm Elder

wt'ps.attuch.re: Oswald

file

CopLes to:

iDate

Date

Or1ainal to:

Date

Piled:

Research

3/12

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629

Page. 199

---

## Page 200

OPIIONAL POPM NO. 10

MAY 1P62 IDITION

OSA GEN.

PIG. NO. 18

UNITED STATE

IMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Belmontll no

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: November 25, 1963

Tolson

Belmont

Mohr

Casper

adilnhon -

Conrad.

DeLoach I

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan f

Tavel -

Trotter

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT:

JACK RUBY;

LEE HARVEY OSWALD - VICTIM

CIVIL RIGHTS

At 9:20 A.M. this date an individual

1dentifying himself only as lix. Miller,

Northwest, contacted the bureau

1nd aavised that he was a close friend of Ruby.

In addition he identified Clin lurchison and

Conny lebb as being friends of Buhy.

aeclined to lurnish additional information but

agreed to interview. Washington Field Office

was Immediately advised and an Agent dispatched

in order to get full details concerning the above.

I - Mr. DeLoach

RE6-22/4-24016-11

SUMI

EX-114 1 12 22N0V 291563

150 -0 1918

19453

22114.23

- This document is preparen

dation artsier your. Committee.

in response ta hour request and is hit let diasemi-

Its use is limited to offimal proceedings ?!

your Commi'e and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

ny without the express approval of the FBI.

1053

HH 54923

DooId: 32423629

Page

200

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## Page 201

TOP SECRET

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

May

21, 1975

C-x1-23

MEMORANDUM

To:

File

From:

Subject:

Mason Cargill

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING

TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents

in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal

Division.

The file was

about one-half inch thick, was marked

"#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET." It contained documents relating to

the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

The documents in this file indicated

l the following

items of interest:

1. The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to

March 1, 1963.

2.

IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J.

Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed

to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified

information she had obtained from Giancana.

3. Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General to U.S..

Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed

that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.

4.

Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur

James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of

Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA - The file

contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing

which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962.

(We have a copy of this from CIA.)

RMC: clb

TOP SECRET

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

: 02312

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 201

---

## Page 202

TOP SECRET

-'2-

5.

Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of

April 24, 1962, Subject:

Arthur James Balletti - Wiretap

Case - Sam Giancana - This memo recommends prosecution in

this case would be against national interest. It contains

no mention of assassination.

6. The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director

and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re

Las Vegas case.

They did not mention assassination.

7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961,

relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically

outlined facts of the Balletti matter.

8. FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12,

1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one

indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether

Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.

9. There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961

of participants in the Las Vegas incident.

10. Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22,

1961, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an inter-

view with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of

the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject:

"Arthur James Balletti, et al."]

11. FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu.

It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if

Giancana. or McGuire were leaking information.

12. There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation

of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.

13.

Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney

General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI!

Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication

or Use of Communications transmitted a report of an FBI

agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The

agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on

October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas.

This

report contains the details of the arrest.

(This document is the last entry in this Criminal' Division

file on the Las Vegas Incident.)

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14. Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu

did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had

been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investi

gative work in Las Vegas.

Maheu declined to name the

attorney.

Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview

on April 18, 1961 lafter the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an

agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to

Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said

he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered

to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information.

(Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he

under took

for CIA.)

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## Page 204

11o eliminate a break for bog investors.

'still

inal

va!.

Icd

its

peded lu improre the meas.

Ire's image in the eyes of

House, liberals, who have been

fearful that the

commilice

might report out a "rich man's

bill."

The crucial vote in the hair-

breadth decision

was under.

stood to have been cast by Rep.

Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.),

who was absent when the com-

millee deadlocked 12 to 12.

TO, ME

loungslers stand in ront vi the newly completed Jaines W. Johnson School al 1420 S...)

Alboop if at as de last of eu :

;..iy mobile co...don; is mored mg. ferle

se!: 'olenome more uved lo Delano School, 3937 W. Wilcox, where they'll be used until a

new wing is completed there. In an interview Thursday Schools Sups. Benjansin C. Willis

defended the flexibilily of the mobile units, saying shey are leing requested in somo areas

in spite of protests directed against their use at 73d and lowe. Stories and other pictures on

Page 3. (Sun-Times Photo by Howard Lyon)

VI-

Elicire.

1le staciest 1963

CIA Sought Giancana

Kellp For Cuba Spying

By Sandy Smith

Sun-Times Correspondent

Castro forces kidnap 19 refugees in the Babumas while

U.S, fliers watch helplessly, lage 2.

WASHINGTON-A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving

Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moc) Giancana and the Central Intelli-

cau of Investigation of Gian- I was

cana's

gence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Timès.

crime

syndicate

Chicago led directly to the ex-

. It was a weird gangland spy

case in which, govermment of.

ficials said, ClA agents con-

EXCLUSIVE C

posure of the La Cosa Nostra

Giancana never did any spying

("our cause") brotherhood and

at all for the ClA.!

the Commission.

racied Giancana in an effort 10

Giancana, according to these

connections

obtain Cuban intelligence after

the Fidel Castro regime came

into power in 1959.

What the ClA accomplished

-if anything-by negotiating

with the 53-ycar-old Chicago

rackels chief is one of many

unexpinined mysteries of the

matter.

One thing, however, is cor-

tain:

19,59 and carly 1960, Giancana,

a big shot on gangland's "Com-

mission" and in its La Cosa

Nostra murder-and-terror so-

cicty,. became what his fellow

gangsters abhor and would act

swiflly

exterminate - an

agent for the U.S. government.

The ClA wasn't talking about

the case here on Thursday.

But Justice Department

several months in latelsources expressed belief thatl pariment and

sources, merely pretended to

Cuba,

Giancana declared he

go along with the ClA in the

would be able to sneak intel.

hope that the Justice Depart.

ligence out of the island. for

ment's drive to put him behind

the CIA.

bars might be sloweu-or at

A high government source

least affected-by his ruse off

gave. The Sun-Tinies this ac-

co-operation with another gov-

count of how Glancina stepped

ernnient agency.

into the role

of a government

If this was Giancana's mo.

tive, his scheme was a failure.

For a probe by the justice De-

• Federal Bur-

The CIA made its first con-

tact with Giancana in 1959.

The Chieago gang boss then

embittered because the

Commission, in traditional gang

bipartisanship,

had

dultars.s

backing

both

sides in

the

Cuban revoll:

The Commission was said 10

have given financial backing lo

Castro-only to have him shut

down the gambling casinos.

And the former Cuban dic-

talor.

Fulgencio Batista, re-

portedly fled Cuba with mil.

lions he received from Coin.

mission hoodlums.

In his dickering wilh the

CIA, Giancana reputedly boast-

cu that he had contar with

Turn to - age 2

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PROPERTY

HITE

HOUSE

5.30!

worth it...

Reveal CIA Sought Giancama's Aid

Continued from Page 1

the abortive rebel invasion at

he was on the payroll of a pri-fold investigators to gel investigator's mission in the Lis

anti-Castro factions and

was

the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

vate deicctive agency in Flo:-

touch with the CIA.

Vegas suite of the exertainer

ready to use his contacts for

An equally bizarre episode

ida.

The inquiry then shifted

was another riddle of Gianci-

the CIA.

months later gave the Justice

Florida authorities sought an

fron Florida to Washington

nil's caper with the ClA. Neith-

Department its first clue to

explanation

of the

incident

and revealcu Giancana's nego-

er the ClA nor the Floridi

Justice Department officials

say now that Giancana was just

Giancana's negotiations

with

from the operator of the deice-

liations with CIA, it was dis-

detective agency ever has of-

the CIA.

talking.

five agency. At first, the oper-

closed.

fered an explanation of what

He might have had

some

"contacts," but he never

The figures in this incident

alor refused to discuss thc

Government sources reported

the investigator was doing in

were a male night-club enier-

matier.

Finally, however, he Thursday that the private in-

produced anything of value for

the hotel suite, the sources said.

tainer

and Giancana's

girl

the CIA, the officials said.

friend, Phyllis McGuire, one of

The CIA was said to have

the singing McGuire sisters.

dumped Glancana as a possible

At the time, in Giancana's

source of Cuban intelligence

opinion, the entertainer was

some-time-in- 19(if), long before

Fifth Buddhist Burns Self 1

overly attentive lo Miss Mi.

Guire.

HUE, South Viet Nam (AP)| courtyard of the Tu Dam pa-| to herself in the market place l

Sign First Trade Pact

Al Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961,

-1 71-year-old Buddhist monk

goda brought immediate mar-

of Ninh Hoa, a coastal vil.

DAR ES SALAAM, Tangan-

sheriff's police seized a prowler

burned himself to death in his

tal law to Hue, which lies 40

lage 200

miles northeast ol

yika (AP) - Tanganyika and

in the entertainer's hotel suile.

ceremonial robes inside Huc's

miles north of Saigon and is

Saigon. She was the first won.

the Sovict Union have signed

For hours, the intruder refused

biggest pagoda carly Friday.

the ancient capital of Vict Nam.

an fire-suicide.

their first trade agreement. The

1o identify himself or say he

He was the fifth to burn lo

He was the third to burn this

Informants at Ninh Hoa said

African nation will exchange

NEls

rifling the entertainer's

death in the mounting Buddhist

17-ycar-old

novice

governinent authorities had sak-

sisal, colton, hides, 'shins, 10-

roonis.

campaign. against the

monk commitled suicide Tues.

en the nun's body in a move

hacco. and coffe

for Sovict

Persistent questioning by

Vicinamese government of

day and a middle-nge nun look

aimed at preventing a mass

metal, tools, vchicles,

road

sheriff's deputies, according to

President Ngo Dinh Diem, a

her life in Ninh Hoa Thursday.

demonstration at her funcral.

equipinent;

cameras,

rishing

federal authoritics, led lo an

Roman Catholic.

Reliable informants said

They followed the same inc-

boats, planes and other things.

admission by the prowler that

His seli-immolation

thelthe nun, Dicu Flien, set fire

lic with the body of i novice

monk who immolated himseli

Tar-Feathers Torture' Bared As Hoax

carly Tuesday near the central

Vietnamese religious center i

ITuce.

Il had an opposite effect.

00

IOS ANGELES (UPI) - A

owner of the house which was

Mrs. Smith, a baby-sitter, ill-

woman tarred

and feathered

set afire, Henry Lewis, attempt-

mitted setting fire to the house,

INDEX TO

and apparently lefe lo die in a

cu to inspire a racial incident

authorities said.

She and the

flaming house told a bizarre

that would pressure his neigh-

Lewis couple faced charges of

54923

story Thursdiy that her "for-

bors in a right-of-way dispule.

arson and conspiracy, deteclives

actually was part.

of n

Offici

said Mrs. Harwell

said.

Milburn Aiors

1. Vii,

Astro-Guide

John Dre

Businesy News Sigs! Palitorie

DaX

dent.

1o stir up a racial inci-

and the russises were arrested

Acconline in Mrs. Marvell

---

## Page 206

4

elected

JOB #

see

(-X1-1

iscellaneous John McCone Papers

hai Pilots

ateral used at NSC Exec. Committee Meeting 29 March 63

irge envelop of miscellaneous papers

riefing Memoranda-1962

resident Briefing 22 Dec 1964

¡" File

1962

?" File

1962

N' ile

1962

1r East Trip 2-14 June 1962

ircell Panel 1963 & 64

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JOB #

-

TH0r1

jotes for DCI and Weekend Reading June-?Dec 1963

sriefing Memoranda 1962

itate Cables for DCI Raborn 1966

ask Force Report on Free Europe Committee and Radio Liberty Committee. 12 Mar 65

Ictivities relating to Cuban Arms Build-up. 14 April-14 Oct 1962.

PROPERTY OF

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## Page 208

of

#: 478-45-11131

Pa-lin

19*48

2-8-72

spy #1

'py #2

Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan.

retained in Executive Registry.

Retained in O/IG. - Rut t-E 12

11-15-72

py #3 thru #7

Records Center

spy #8

DDP retained.

spy #9

PPB Retained.

'py #10

D/DCI/NIPE retained.

'py #ll

Records Center

spy #12.

DDS&T retained.

'py #13 thru #16

Records Center

P: 17

PPB retained.

'py #18 thrull26 Records Center.

all, Executive Registry retired 19 copies of the Long-Range Plan.

so three bound books of Working Papers and one bound book of Working Plan Committee

reting minutes.

^. Bye destroyed all loose working papers.

David L. Bye

Chief, Executive Registry

Pidi

THE WHITE HOUSE OrtICE

;

02300

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Job #

Sx #301/4

8-12/1 Meetings with the President-25 Oct 61-31 July 62

8-12/1 Meetings with the President 31 July 62-29 Nov 62

Meetings with the President 1 Jan 63-31 March 63

Memoranda on Mectings with the President 1 Apr 63-1 July 63

Nectings with the President 1 July 63 - 12 Nov 63

Meetings with President Johnson: 23 Nov•63 - 31 Dec 63

Meetings with the President 1 Jan-2 April 1964

Meetings with the President 1964 3 April-20 May

Meetings with the President 21 May 64-5 Oct 64

Meetings with the President 6 Oct 64

eetings with the President Jan-28 April 65

#1

#2

#1

#2

#3

#1

#2

#3

#4

#1

PROPERTY OF

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JOB + 12-6-431

1#1. 0110

3 Committee

3 Committee

January-December 1963

-

January-December 1963

unter-Insurgency. July-December 1962

unter-Insurgency January-June 1962

scial Group CI-1965

ccial Gu up CI - 1964

rono

1962 >

Checked generally-

rothing

spot checked.

FROPERTY OF

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complete

M'emoranda for Record:

1 March-28 April 65

lanuary-28 Feb 1965

Vovember-31 Dec 64

I1 Sept-31 Oct 64

, April 64-8 July 64

) July-ll Aug 64

12 Aug - 10 Sept 64

I Jan-ll Feb 64

?.7. Nov-31 Dec. 63

13 wuly 63-26 Nov 63

; June 63-20 July 63

15 April. - 4 June 63

1. Jan 63-9 Feb 63

1 Sept - 31 Dec 62

? April 62-21 Aug 62

29 Nov 61-5 April 62

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page

211

job #_

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## Page 212

>xH3018

nam

ietnarn

ietnam

"ictnam

inuaTy

'ictnam

'ietnam

¡ietnam

rictnam

ietnama le

'ictnam

ietnam

/ietnam

'ietnam

/ietnam

ietnam

ietnam

August 1963

September 1963

October 1963

November 1963

December 1963

January 1964

February 1964

March 1964

April 1964

May 1964

June 1964

July 1964

August 1964

September 1964

November 1964

January 1965

February 1965

March 1965

LA-DCI Notes 1-2 June

DE- SA Trip

¡ODIS---LOR-

-McCone Eyes Only

DEFOLIATION

HH 54923

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JOB A

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## Page 213

Selected

AX#T

of /4.

NRO

1963 thru 1965 (also includes one 6 Sept 61 Itr to DCI frmDefense re

Management of NRO)

CYPRUS 1964 material on Cyprus & the DCI trip in Sept 1964

Binder containing excerpts frm the National Security Act of 1947; the Organization_

of USIB; Summary of NSCID's & charts & regs on Organizaton of ClA.

Summary Reports Chiefs of Station, WH Division, presented at Conference-

Panama(29 Jan-l Feb 1962)

White House-1962 & 1963 (containes correspondence to, from and of interest to

the White House. )Also included autographed picture of the CIB wich appeared in

the newspaper & compromised the code words. Autographed to McCone frm McGeo B

randy.

Duropean Trip-10 thru 17 February 1963 (John McCone/DCI)

Memoranda of Record on DCI Trip to Europe-17k thru 29 Sept 1964

"'moranda on DCI's European trip-January 1964

Panama Conference-29 Jan-2 Feb 1962.

Memos for the Reocrd EA/DCI for 1964 & 65

DCI's 1962 Far Eastern Trip

Caribbean Survey Group (1961 and 1962-mainly on Cuba)

DCI Letters of appreciation for hospitality extended him on his Far East Irip-1962

DCI's Disucssions with Government Officials during his European trip in 1964

also containes some background papers on trip.

linvelop containing FBI report on Dr. Martin Luther King. 18 Oct 1963-

I)CI Speech File (1962, 63 & 64)

Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba-1964

02305

CURA-Background Material-1962

- PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

i. i

to DCI from DDCI-September 1962 on Cuba Situation

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 213

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## Page 214

elicted

Job #

se?

can Republic-1965

uba Package

ixecutive Registry File "John McCone 1962

ommittee of Principals

208 .

1962

1964 >

ube

ook-Bay of Pigs

uclear Papers

IcCone Speeches

7 June 63 - 25 May 64.

IcCone Speeches

8 June 64 - 11 March 65

")a 1962: >

ut Prisoner Exchange #1- Aug 62

late Eyes only Cables

xecutive Registry DCI File 1963

epartment of Defense 1954 - 1964

300

H# 54923

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## Page 215

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-x1-72

MEMORANDUM

TO :

File

FroM:

Mason Cargill

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly

examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassi-

nation, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971.

According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed

these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State

Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963:

Basically these

files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from

congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.

Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several

entries in these files respecting allegations by people

claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination.

One claimed to have been a CIA agent.

There are also many

letters from assassination "nuts."

Other documents relate

to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the

Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.

One document is an FBI report, dated February 2,

1972,

stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the

FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy

assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in

the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963.

Kleist was not

a State Department employee.

He appeared to be a free-lance

magazine writer.

MC: c1b

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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## Page 216

-Loach to Mohr 12-6-63

te: Assassination of the President

that before looking at the FBI as to possible "leaks, " he should carefully examine his

own house. I told him I was quite thoroughly familiar with the way Guthman and

Rosenthal dealt with the press and that as he well knew the wire service people stayed

'constantly in Guthman's private office. I told him it was quite obvious to me how the

AP had learned that the report had been sent over to the Department.

Katzenbach reiterated that he had no complaints against the FBI. He

stated again that the purpose of his call was to tell me about Senator Russell's feelings.

He added that he had another reason for calling and that was to determine

if we could give him any ideas as to how Warren Olney could be dropped as Chief

Counsel of*the Presidential Commission. I told Katzenbach of our feelings concerning

Olney. He stated that he was presently working through Congressman Hale Boggs and

he thought he was going to be successful in getting Olney's name removed from

consideration. He told me that Boggs was very sympathetic.

Katzenbach mentioned that Waggoner Carr, the Texas State Attorney

General, would like very much to see the Director on Friday, 12-6-63. I asked him

what for. He stated that Carr had no particular motive in mind other than to indicate

io the press later on that he had discussed matters with the Director. I told him I could:

see no percentage in the Director's seeing Carr, that we were the investigative

agency and that Carr's dealings should be with the Department and the Presidential

Commission. Katzenbach indicated that the White House might think otherwise. He

stated that the President was most anxious for Carr to be given attention in Washington

inasmuch as Cafr was running for office next year. Ttold Katzenbach I knew this,

however, I still felt that the Director should not be injected into this matter.

Kat zenbach stated he would attempt to disuade Carr from seeing the Director, however,

Carr was quite persistent.

ACTION:

In view of the close friendship which Carr obviously has with the

President, the Director may desire to just shake hands with Carr without sitting down

and discussing facts concerning our report.

es he calls l mill

aed

brim

, 1"

RECENTA FROM A

H68 13 1976

FBI

- 2 -

NH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 216

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## Page 217

Cutarchi Cire.

SECRET

CC::

"Ide depionaro Lors, Tilie 18. US.C. soee

i en

Ruonírio, TOCSa 3/550,097

DATE DiTZ 2 ILI 2952

PRECEDENCS BOUTI!E

Rifticies

PlaTt 1952

E. CITO STATES (@ LERIL 1552)

.A.L 3

THE: IS UNEVALUATED IRGIMAREN GOURES

S..AD1OS A::

IN

22103

FIELO RIPCAT NO.

¡ÓE. ARiTAISAL CICO:

=.t.

1. FIDEL CISDEO CALINO CI A GENUE DE LERE CCIOLIDERS LEOUT DO REDIS EURORE

: OUSTER OF LUELL ESCALLITE D @ TUCH 1052 LID TOLD THET TIAT DIS COITESES

1S TELLIG TO TLE OVER DIE COVARDIT IN CUBA. THE LEZ. OFFICEIS CCHTLOTEN 5I

r..

LE LITENUSO TO EIGLI FULI COITEDI DE TIZ SCCIALISI ESTOLUTICH, LiD THEY LUREDD.

2. AI THE TRIE OF'ESCALLIRE'S OUSTER CISTEO LIÃO OPEFSO THE EPAISPER CP A.

LUMIST LINDER DI SATANZAS PROVI:CE TO NI AGRICULTUFLE CO-CRERATIVE IN ORIENTS

VINCE, (FIELD CODENE: DOUEDE CUULO ¡ÕE REZIDER TE NADE DE THE LULDER TREISTEREED).

3O CASTRO ALSO ODERED A COIFLITE INVESTIGATICI OF FELIX DORRES, CGIATNIST LEADER

L'S VILLIS FOURICER CUSTE TEID BUE

-C-PE-T/NOFORI/LIMITED

CLASSIFICATION → DISSEMiNATION CONTROLS

ANNY/ACSI

NAiY

A12

JCS

SECOEF

NiSA

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US!A

CCI C.N3

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1013/00

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UG 15 19'5

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SECRET

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629 Page

217

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## Page 218

SECHET

CLASSIFICATION - D

SEC-PULT CHORM/LINITED

AMATION CONTROLS

TDCS DE- 3/650,097

25103

11662

"IF NACESSIS I! VILLANS TORRES SiOT I TUS CHITRUE PURI DE SANTA CIURA".

LO CISIDO TUDE II CLEAR TO HIS LEE CONFIDUTS THLI, LUFFCUCE HE HAS NOT

LIVILIZIO DEO TIL SOVILT UNIO: O3 THE COISUIST FIRTY LELE HE MOULD APRAIGE IT SO

•CLUS LAZLEO PRIA, BLIS ALCA, LID OVER CORUNISTS HOULD LGI ES OCCURIO FOSETTONS OF

5. DESPITE THE FACI TAT INE LEY LEADERS LGREED TO EACH UP CASTPO, THEY HAVE.

I' 1IND A PIN MICH MLE INVOLVE TIE LESLISINGICICE IDEL, RAVI CASTEO, MID GiG

¿ JARA iT SOLO RISZITIOUS SCHOIT LID TIS TAiJCVER OF THE GOVERNET FOR. TIDISELVES.

REE MEI LE O? TIE OPENIC THAI SICA A PELT NTLE SUCCOND, 1S TAST ARE IN CHRISS GE TIS

ANULLS LET AND MILITIA TEDOFS IN CUBA.

THE LEY LEIDERS SAY THAT THEY APE NOT "..

• IS.S, LiO TiSY RENTZE LILI HOI OILY THE CIVILIA FOFULITICI, SUT ALSO A INÃOB

LORETY OE THE LENSO FORCES DE CUSA, 105 FED UP VEIL CASTES LiD THE COIRUNISIS.

6. 6500:05 COST"T:

SOURCE

• SAID THAT THE SiEOTAGE

CURITU SOZIG CARIND OUE DI TIE CITY KID PROVINCE OF HABAIL CAN BE AITRIBUTED TO

TIS GIOUR OF ANT LEIDERS. HE BLSED HIS OZINION IN BAT CH THE FLOT THAI DE LA

ERA IS A LEADER CE TRE LUX MORERS' UITO, LiD THE NEY CUBEY NATIONAL BAIK

WILL:O IN MARLA "LS THE PECEIT OBJECT OR SABDIAGE BY EUFTILG.)

TO FIELD DISTO!: CHICILIT, CRICLIB.

- THOM

RID OF N2S5463

SECRETI

GLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL

CIA

34023

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## Page 219

OPIIONAL PORM PiE. 10

5109149

uh:: 85121018-110

ISA GIN. PIG. NO. 11

UNITED STATE

IMENT

Memorariuum

1

1

1

1

A. H. Belmont

- ili. Bellion

Mr.

Rose

1

MODE:

i!!.

- De Loach!

-

Mall

-

Mr.

Rogge

Mr.

McGowa

Mr.

llines

DATI: February 26, 1964

mit

• Mohit -

Casper

Callahan

i this

Tele. Room

Holmes -

FROM

A. Rosen

Gandy

Dalianor

SUBJECT:

THE PRESIDENT'S COMISSION.

ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

Balligan

While at the offices of the President's Comnission on other

matters,

J: Lee Rankin requested Malley to stop by his office.

that he desired to

make it known that the Bureau had been of tremen-

cooperative in handling all requests which had been made by the President's

Conmission.

- He conmented that recently there had been quite an increase in the

1o1.

number of requests and there was a possibility that there would be many more

additional requests. Mr Rankin stated this was not intended as a criticis.

of the Bureau's work but instead was the following through of the Commis-

sion's desire to complete the Commission's record and leave no unansvered

i questions.

ir. Rankin went on to say that the Bureau, in

count a that a a detail tea to nich a beer covered.

had an extrenely difficult and enormous task

been amazed at the amount of detailed information which had been developed

by the Bureau in its investigation.

He conrented that the Connission in,

performing its tasks was of necessity making a most minute study of the

Bureau's work as well as that of other Goverment agencies with the idea of

picking the

investigation to pieces to the extreme degree so that wherever

Connis on was in existeng any item, this could be handled while the

=

Mr. Rankin advised that in connection with the letter which had

just recently been transmitted to the Bureau requesting an explanation con-

cerning information relative to Special Agent Janes P. Hosty's nane being

omitted from a report prepared in the Dallas Office

(report of Special Agent

Robert l. Gemberling dated 12/23/63), he wanted the

Bureau to

know the

following:*

Enclosure 'nt 2-27-64

• REC-

53

1 - Nr. Sullivan-

• 1 =

Mr.

Branigan

YChOX

1

1 - 62-109060

- 105-82555

- 44-24016

ilr. Conrade

1

Lenihan

FRiARIL

654390

nation netside your Committee Utts use is limited to official mocagato bi

Daguer Coumice and the content may not se disclosed tanauthere person

nel without the express approval of the FBL: 1

HY 54923• DocId:32423629. Page 219

---

## Page 220

Memorandum 1. Rosen to A. H. Belmont

Re:

TIlE PRESIDENT'S CONMISSION

The Conmission had noted in reviewing the notebook in question

that Agent liosty's name appeared in the book along with the office telephone

number and a license number.

It had been noted that this information did

not appear in the ballas investigative report and members of the Commission

wondered why this item did not appear iten

"takankin stated that prior to any

question being raised concerning this

the Bureau in one of its letters

to the Conmission (dated 1/27/64) set forth full information for the.

Commission's information explaining the appearance of Agent Hosty's name

Jin the Osvald notebook.

is a result of this information being furnished by

the Bureau. the menbers of the Commission were fully aware that there had

been no effort on the part of the Bureau not to nake this information

available. "ir. Rankin stated that after some discussion concerning this

item, the members of the Commission directed Mr. Rankin to request the

Bureau for an explanation so that the record of the Conmission would show

the exact circuustances by which this item was omitted from the Dallas

report of 12/23/63 by Special Agent Gemberling.

ACTION:

Attached is:a letter in J. Lee Rankin setting forth the reasons

We

ure enclosing for the Coumission affidavits from Special Agent Robert P.

venberling and John d lester wherein they set forth their explanations

handling the losty entry in Oswald's address book, Both affidavits are

excellent and shouid satisfy the Commission that our handling of the hosty

entry was sound.

RECE

FbI

HH 54923 Do0Id:32423629

Page 220

---

## Page 221

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff:

13 May 1976

76-ü+12

Mr. William G. Miller

Staff Director

Select Committee To Study Governmental

Operations

With Respect To Intelligence

Activities

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 205101:

Attention: Mr. E. Greissing

Dear Mr. Miller:

As requested by Mr. Greissing, transmitted herewith

is a cony of a 1 May 1967 memorandum numbered 502 and

captioned "Claimed Agency Affiliation by Conspiracy Cuse

Figures"

This document was recently released by the

Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

Sincerely,

Seymour P.

Bolten

Chief, Review Statf

Attachment:

As Stated

REGUVERTA

MAY La I0M

HH° 54923

A... DocId: 32423629 Page 221

---

## Page 222

ROUTING AND RICORO SHEET

2, 5

SUBJECT: (Optional)

ОтА:

ACTION COPY:

TO: (Oñcor designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

EXTENSUN

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

Ns 1116117:21

DATE

NOV 2 3 1963

1o

whom.

Drom o lina across column

RECEIVEO

FORWARDED

DENI

2.

3.

NOV 23

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

$07.41

3-52

.23/X1

/ 83),43

than her,

OU USE PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

COMFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

IN 54923 •DöcId:32423629 Page 222

---

## Page 223

13

MELO FOR THE RECORD:

fur rocaint of iGla 7029 wat ut 1715 e1 23 or 1013, oyi: the

Mozi as havi & the laticons arresi Sir Didan,

order das to prote

2 duce to do it not had.

Trash Ci.:

answored and said it us tor into to cact of the arrect.

aarhasized that the Mexicans hid nom of the Ostald invol anont nich Silvia Duran

througn the sane informt

Fe agreed rich in recuest that the cmost be topu

secret ind that nu i formatio, be Isled.

IDEN 4

чтоі

TX-1240

23 Nov 63

C/WH/23 MEHO for record re

MexI Station tale in arvest of

a Silvia DURAN by MexicaNs.

ES COPY.

206- 2892(8

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629 - Page

223

---

## Page 224

COS

"T.:

ST?

COMMO

CHRONO (DUMMY)

SECRET

CLASci/104115i

INITIALS

Urü.

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE:

P-3573

Silvia DURAN P-

LLIE:PO/ PIaL

NUNaER

DEFERRED

POUTINE

XX

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL

IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

IMMEDIATE DIR

INFO.

7020

CITE MEXI NUMaIR

KAPOK

REF: DIR 84888

3. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON IELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV

AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT DEN WITH LEE

OSWALD HELD DALLAS, DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALI, AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS

ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO

MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD

ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY

ON ZÔ SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO

HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

RACEK..

END OF MSG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

W.C.C.

RELEASING OFFICER

HH 54923

DocId: 32423629 Page 224

---

## Page 225

I 2is LuiSt 1i she bas beard the latest news aul IULaA, in a jodag caca say3,

"Yas, of course, I lew almost before jadEDY". I aniles and comments sat 1s

vary bad: that at ilost they thought it bad been ore of we acilorary entremist

who vare against Integration and that, but lt seens that they apprehended a tige i.

1s sothing nore than the president oi ons oi the candttees oi lie Fair Play for

Cubs. LUISA: That she low this also, Il: Mnt nothins has been confired jet,

but it seens.•.ticat the one vio did 1t, was Crazy, Independently of the fact that

this could bare ben said about KaNovy "given the interrational corditions and

the interal conditions of the lnited States, vell..." IVISA: Ard exterally,

principally. #s "at's thy I saY, Internationally.. li seened quita artected.

asd they can't so througi a great change, iith a change of president or sonetbing

of that sort; aboye all, that...WUISA: Interrupts end esks 1i 1t was a gilago tha

Illed hin and it says yes, but said that he had been in Passis, and that he wantei

to beccus a fussian citizen, but fussia bad not ranted to rationalize bith...

IVISA 1s surprised and says "Ilsten - they really now tirings there!" BE: Yes:

that he Imona fussian very vall and besides this type had gone with Ildel's forces

to the sierra, or wanted to go, scathing Illa thet -who knows how it was. ilal:

Pretty serious. His Pulte a bit;

he asks thai else she has learned and. LUISA

says just about that, that they lenised about 1t a Ilttle wille azo and they are...

Er: That It's 211 very bad, that he was eatly with some frlends and coumenting ar

the Revista Polltica which bad just cone out, inan suneme cans and sure them the

reis; that he was surprised and thought he vas joking. LuisA: That she bad

Seen Icoking at tie magazize, that tue courade bad brought li to ber

That

RECENIEN

FROM

JAN 29 1976

54923

DocTa: 32423629 Page 225

---

## Page 226

=-

the radio; that's what they did and they leurned cout 1t; that the last le bud

beard, a soment 350, was that that type is cha CSWAlD, that it 1s bellerad ibat

this is the oe, but he bas not contassed anptaicg... LuISA: it tuay alroady

ow that da speaks lusslan and belongs to the PTO-Cuba Comittee; that they

aIreedy boow that ba tauted to nationalize hisseli, but he bas not confessed..

It says sha 1s right, adding that it could be that they tried to fled soue let'a

say solation iron bia, because.. IUISA after esting bin to valt a minite, aata biu

to 50 01. 7: le think that 11 1t'bad been of had seemed. public or had bee

ase ci the segregaticists or against Integratica woo had lillad Kennedt, tren

there was, let's say, the possibility that i sort of citil ver would ardse in the

ünted States; that contradiotions would ba sharpered, the critical sitution the

country 19 going through, then te were commenting here, that they iound a resclu

tion 17 this type, no? Hors Isternational; they will find 1t Of 1t was tiro, sho

imows; Iet's see what Lappens. IVISA sniles and asta ast will lappen. Er:

Eno brais. INISA: Inagine, ors, tro, three and now, that sales three (ske laugas)

I: I thiat that it t11l be the topis of the day at that party of SILVIA's.

IIISA: They suspended it because they could not so. lf asiss ihy, and luIsA says

"so that aiter they can say that ire are observing the deata di sallay, then wa

Jaks with SIVIA and she agreed to ruspend 1t and leare 1t until nert tze's, out 1t

¡ill not coincide with the turial (de lausas)".

#: Tesi mas to be taken lats

accourto LuISA: That 1t sill be arter the soumiro and all ci tbat nonsense.

RECENTO FROM

HH 54923

WAN 2.8 J97S

DocId: 32423629

Page 226

---

## Page 227

27: Coy; he asks there sbe is going to stay sori, and LuisA concents 1205 :105

sue plana to nure tentiat to the house of the doctor (female).'

i asks in ices

now trerything now, and LUISA says yes, int doesn't know how the thirg is, or 1f

they will have to stay in the

enbassy, horever balleres that today it will nui be

possibla, seceuse eteryore has goce to the airport and the embassy bas so car,

however, possibly tonorrow noming insteed of going to the study circle, sia will

Love. If: Inen he will call her tonorrow. INISA: To try the emoassy or at the

house, since 1i they sill not

stay at the eatessy, sie will go home where she wil

be at about 10. If accepts.

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629

Page

227

---

## Page 228

Soviet Entassy - 15-50-55.-

27 Sent 63.-

134-M8.-T129

0900-2114 hrs.

395-

i..

(1405) IN.- OV. - From the Cuban Consulate- Says that there is an

American hare who has recuested a transit visa for Cuoa because

he is going to the USSR.

CV. - ants to know with whom he (American)

spoke at the Soviet Embassy bacuase she (OV) had sent him over to

them thinking that if the Soviets approved the visa then the Cubans

would give him one without anymore processing - only advising the

Emmigration of Cuba. OV - wants to know with whom he (american)

spoke since he himself doen't know either and he was told that there

were no problems.. IV. - asks that OV. wait a minute. .

404-420

OV is SILVIA DURAN of the Cuban Consulate and explains the same to

the other IV. This one tells her to leave her name and number so

& he can call her. SILIA gives it to him along with the tel, num.

11-2347.- Silvia says as a personal thing that she has moved and

that she has not advised about her changesof address and will not

receive the Eullatin and she can advise them no!. IV. asks that she

call KOUKHARINKO in order to change the address, and then asks for

the name of the Culturäl attache.

SILVIA says it is TERESA PROENZA.

whose number is 14-13-26. IV. thanks her.-- 435--

HH 51923

DocId: 32423629

Page

228

---

## Page 229

.395-

27 coptiembre ds.

!÷ 5 144

Entrada a rel Critico la Cuua, dico que duia allí

•. un ciudadado larricano 26 0a solicitar una xisa para C

on Transito porque va pari la this y antonicos quiero sabor co:

quica habia haijario porque ilia 10 mandó con ollos do la Emba.

da rusa dicicicole qua si rini lo hacian o acoptabas la visa

1uo antoneca ollo: l03

cuu. ios tanbion se la daban sin mas -

tranitos nadarias avisando : Emigración on Cuua, y quiato sado:

con quien Malló poiquo ol ¿co quo no sabo taupoco con que -

persona y quo le dijoron al? si quo so tonia problona. hD lo

pido osporo un momento. 4ci-- 110- 10 0s SILVIA DURAÙ del

Consulado do Cula ¿ axplica lo misno a otro IlD. Esto le dico

quo lo dojo su ¿cirono y ! lobro para que despuos le. Llamos

SILVIA so lo jIoprIciona an: cono.ol tolofono 11-28-47.- Y qUE

aprovocha como coui person!] le que olla so cambio do domicili

y no ha podido quinar para que le cavion ol boletin y que ahoi

se la pucde dar. ill la pico mi linmo a KOUNURENSO para que i

do su cambio, s pido le de di noloro co la Consejero o Agregad

Cultual. SILVIA dice que :: JiO.i TARESA PRODiZA Y 10 llamas

a1 14-13-26. ID al:0 cracian 135--

A ¿plophono call to the Soviet Embassy mado at

100% bours en 27 Septender 1365 by Siltia DURAN

af the Cubar Enbassy saring therewas an America

citinen au the Cuban Embassy requesting a Cuban

Tis: in transit to the USSR. She was asked to

lop, hor tolephone nunber (11-28-47).

HH 54923 Do0Id:32423629

Page

229

---

## Page 230

• 3--135-1122.-.

IV - inside voice.

O - outside voice.

288-

ut to 14-13-26.- (1625 hrs.= (Cuban Embassy) IV. - asks the

number of the Cuban Consul. Ov.- 1t's--11-28-47-- 294-

295-

Out to 11-28-47.-(1626 hrs) - IV asks SILVIA if the American

has' been there.

SILIVA: says yes, he is here now.

IV. - According

to the letters that he showed from the Consulate in rashington he

wants to go to russia to stay for a long time "ith his wife who is

Fussian. Eut we have not received the answer from iasrington con-

cerning his problem and considering the processing it will tale 4

• to 5 months.

"ithout that permission of the USSh they have to recuest.

and better still the visa can't ba given here without asking washingto

But according to this man, he balongs to an organization in favor of

Cuba and he has said that the Cubans can't give him a visa "ithout the

Russian visa and I don't know what to do with him. I have to vait for

the answer from

washington.

SILVIA - je have to wait also because his

problem is that he knows no one in Cuba and it's dificult to obtain a

visa in these conditions. Fe expected to process the visa.

He knew it

would take long to process the hussian visa and would watt for it in

Cuba and leavs from there.for the USSR. IV. - The thing is that if his

wife is nois in rashington she will receive the visa for returing to

russia.

She will receive the visa in dashington and having the visa

she can sent it to any place or example here or any other place tut

right now she doesn't have it. SILVIA - Naturally, and we can't give

him a letter of recommendation because se don't know if his visa will

I. - se will only zive the visa according to insications

(intructions) SILTIA.. - Then that is what I will put in my plans.

IV.-

He can't give him a letter of recommendation either becuese we

don't know him. Flease parson the bother. SIlVIA. - No bother and

thank you very much.--

--331-

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page

230

---

## Page 231

1 teorir:

hess

16

jinet '.

pintuitine

si hn ido ailate

ID que somin in: extras gua

ninó dos concilado vii -

Vashiaron cà Mirra do alico Mea 65i0r 2115 nucio tiempo

todarin do de la eccibido ia

contestación de connoton a piet

= su problema, pezo 0so

según con trámicos deupan t

tener oso portao

o ca UlOs iconn dr picolatar y nas bien no

so lo pucco dracii aquí el Minario sin pirgntario a vashingto

via chIta on quo os un miemuro

do una oIcaniaciú:

ca favor le Criba y ha dicho quo 01100 109

cubanos no puodon dirlo cù inado sin ol visado ruso j ahosa,.

IlD no sabe que hacer con oi, porque icber de osporar la contes..

tación do Mashingion, SILVIi iii ollos tambion, porquo al pro

blema do al, os sun of no ciroce i andio, on Cuia y entoncesad

os ast os muy dificil quo lr dun la visa, porque el pensaba

tramitar su visa, porque coa ol ja sabla que se 1ba

a tardat

mucho on esperar ol visado uso en Cuba y ya do allá irso a

1a URSS. IID quo la cosa es quo si su osposa ostá ahorita on.

Washington va a rccibir auoritr el visado a ol permiso de la

UnSs para regresar a la patzia, olla va a rocibir su visado en

Washington pero terriendo es!

visado clla porrian comunicarlo

a cualquior lugas ese permino por ojemplo aqui o en cualquiar

otra parto lu puede rocibir. poro ahorita no las tienon. SILVIl

quo claro y que tnrrioco

so le purão dar una carta porqua no

Jabon si su visa sora aprovada. In que ollos solo daran ol visi

do sogún las inicacionos, SiLVli qua entoncos eso pondrá en si

•* planilla. Il qua timpoco so le puedo dar ninguna carta do -..

rocomondación porquo no so lo conoco y qua perdone

por.la...

-=.

molestia. SIlVri que no may chidado y quo muchas gracias...

-- 331--

Attachanit c:

HH 54923 DocId:32423629 Page 231

1 teinaso call to the Cuban Enbassy mado at

1620 1. es on 27 Septenber 1963 by an unidertified

---

## Page 232

28lr1963

208

IN - OV. from the Cuban Consulate - says that there is

an American there in the Consulate who had been at the Boviet

IV. iait a minute. 213-- OV. Is SILVIA DURAN and

speaks English with someone outside--and comments in Spanish

that they installed a telephone for APARICIO and

takes down the

number as 14-12-99--- 230-- SILVIA informs (ther) of the American

and says she will call.-- 232--235-- OV,- speaks in Fussian. IV.-

speaks in English. -- EOTH CONTINUS IN ENGLISH. -244 -1151 hrs.-

54923

DocId: 32423629

Page

232

---

## Page 233

¿ u 3ET. 1553

15 60 55

208.

MO:

•MI:

HO:

MI:

MO:

?

MI:

NO:

an sa consulado

esta # maest norteamericano que astro all1

ar: la tabajada fusa. m que espere ut nomento. is--ines -

SALTIl DULA T habla IJALES Con alguna leIsor Cla--y Cone

en español que

10 MulLeTOn telaROnO L APARICIO J 10 apIta qu

es 01 14-12-99

23/-- SILVIl le dice, sobre el ciliadadono

*que los va a hablar - 232-- 235-17 habla

RUSO. ID 10 habla CHINGLES. -- SIGUEN LOS DOS DE ITLIS---244

1151 hIsor.

Mloaso seo tho Spanion transcription/. NO vallo waltiag

sposks 1n Englishito sonoone in the bickground: Lo sald vall

•„Do you speak Russian? Yas. thy don't you tali to him?.....

I don't know.

Mo takes the phone and says In broken Russia

I was 1n your

Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minu

MI takos the

phons and asig HO in English what doos he want

/1n Russian/

Please speay Russian.

#ast elso do

you want?

I Has just now at your Embessy and they took my address

I know that.

/speaks terrible, hardly rocogaizabla Russian/ I did not

know it then!

I went to the Cuban Bnbasay to ask them for

my address,

because they nave it..

why don't you coma again and leave your sidress with us, 1t

not far from the Cuban Embass].

Noll, I'1l be there right away.

RECEIWE FROM

JAN 23 1976

CIA

eleones

Ti-nie.

HH 54923 DocId: 32423629 Pàge 233

---

## Page 234

....

•cion cir ^il.1

1! 1011111

.....

•i:a

iiin

÷ 651. 1663

55050

208.

11:28.24

?rl19d 11°

cá:l 14n11-13.

ma tailoot

Mud. did to indi:

- 1151?:..

longs cert

sponds in drit

•„Do jou spu.":

We do Me the TiGrinzilan

cut, tres tid don's you tolk to him?..

¡ baloo t: paro and says. In broion Russion,

rita pole da jour consula Just a minuto

sand nottid In Inaliah what doos ho wont?

NO:

MI:a: that cisoüs

I was just nov

ME:

I jenow that.

N1O:

pods t0:10

knon li tries.

no Been

iant?

1€ 70Ur Bi

and they took my addrosa

:, marat: raidiaablo Russian! I did not.

went to tao mior anbossy to bals them for

accause they dove it..

sing don'" you guno ogala ond loive your sadross with us, it

8:0:

not fa= fron to

Mól1, I'll do thare sIgn 549g.

Attachmero d:

A telophone oill to the Soviet Embassy rade at

115I hare on h? Sapterher 1965 by Silvia DURAY

of the cuban Embassy who cuts on an unidentified

norteamrican man tino tells the Soviet that he

was just is their Brbassy and wants to nive then

his address. The Soviet tells him to retur to

NH 54923

DocId: 32423629

Page 234

ri..

•name citin the adires?.

---

## Page 235

45.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-69-57

1 October 63

I.26-M26-T129

1031 - 2002

outside

outside

hims

7 Man

In at 10514

MC talks to

MI, In broken Rusalaa•

MO:

Hellow. I was

at your place last Saturday and I talked to

your consul." Thoy said that they'd send a telegram to wa

shington, and I wanted to ask you if there 1s anything newt

I'd lIko to ask. you to call another phone nuuber.

MI:

MO:

MI:

MO;

•MI:

Please:

Please write 1t down; 15-00-55 and ask for a consul.

Thank jou.

Please.

NW 54923 DocId: 32423629

Page

235

---

## Page 236

RUSSIAE EMBASST. M1-1

1

Octobor 65

4; 7

45°

NO:

MIs

MO:

MIs

MO;

MIS

In at 1051. 10 calies to do: du ironon Russian.

ñollow. I vas a your plai. Juds saturday and I taliod to.

your conoul. Indy said that thog'd sond a tolegram to Wa-

inlagton, and i wanted to is jou if there 18 anything now?

I'a lino to sai you to cali anoinor phone nuaber.

Plosso.

Thank Jou.

Please.

Ploase "ilto 16 down; 15-00-55. and aot for a conaul.

Attachment ?:

A tolophor, call to the Soviet alitary Attache

at 1031 hours on 1 October 1965 by an unidentified

man speaking brolion fussian ino asked about a

telegran which they were to send to washington.

unidentifiud man said he was at the Sovie arbassy

"Last Saturiay", Soviet told him to call 15-60-55.

NH 54923

DooId: 32423629

Page

236

---

## Page 237

128 •

• OBYs

OBRE

Out to 15-12-64 at 0955. OSYEDKOV talks to OBRUBOV.

OLODYA,

come here

a last as you

саД.

Alright.

135°

140.

(proVIOUSI

transcribed)

Man outside

(proviously transcribed)

151.

MO:

' OBYS

LEE:

OBYS

OBY:

LEE:

In at 16a (?) M0 / the sane person who phoned a day or 80

ago and spoke in broken Russian/ speaks to OBTEDROV.

Hello, this 122

OSHALD (phos) speaking. I was at your plar

last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that

they'd send a telegran to Washington, so I wanted to find

out 1f you have anything now? But I don't remember the sas

Ji this

consul.

KOSTIKOV. He 1s dark /hair or skia?/.

Yes. My name 1s OSWALD.

Just a minute I'll find out. Ibey say that they havenst

received anything yet.

Have they done anything?

Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but sothl:

has been received as jet.

And what...? /OBY bangs up/.

249.

previously transcribed)

IT 54923

DocId: 32423629 Page 237

---

## Page 238

15-10-45

I Cotoser u.3

I at 1065 hours 10/the 5a÷

:..0n whe

1: : 1ia: 00a0 a50 id upons in

aroson inacian/spears to 03!

No: soilo, this ide CSitio

(phon) spear:

"ing to your plats list

Saturday and spore to &

consul, aid. sid that uney"d soad a

telegran to lashington,

30 I wanted: fini min if you have in thing

new? But I don't renonver the name ... tila: consul.

03Y:

KOSTIKOV. He is dark /nair or shin:!.

LES: Yes. My nane is OSALD

037: Just a minuto I'll find

out. They of thint they haven't rocoired anything yet.

LEE: Have they. done anything?

037: Yes, they say that a request has brin sunt out, but nothing has been

recoived as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

Antachront i:

I telophone call to the Soviet Erbassy at

1035 icars on 1 October 1963 by the sana

in sho called previously (28 Septerbor 63)

and spoke broken Russian.

He said his name

aS LeE OSAID and wanted to know if they

1230

heard anything. Soviet said no.

HH

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238

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## Page 239

TAs

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press

Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address

tonight before the Inter-American Press

Association:

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyran-

ny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and

concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country

and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band

of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and hand-

ed over the independence and

sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces

beyond the hemisphere.

They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperial-

ism,

an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dic-

tated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This,

and this alone divides us.

As long as this is true nothing is possible.

Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work

with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few

short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people

throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken prom-

ises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere.

For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of

friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic insti-

tutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

*

WH 54923 DocId: 32423629

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239

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## Page 240

Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Danich

A recent trip. to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it

possible for me to establish a "'dinlogue" betincen the late President Kennedy ani

Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is

being written, I have bech asked whether the impressions I derived from these

interviers could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on

future relations betecit Lyndon B. Johrison and Castro.

Last wech in these pages I muswered the first question by describing the re-

actions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to lol Ken-

nedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the

Kennedy-Castro dinloguc from the viewpoint of one who uns a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

TABL

President Kennedy received me at the White House

on Thursday, October 24: My appointment had been

iche luled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference

'oom, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual

custom, came to look for me himself so that he could

escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay,

no! so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to ex-

plain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be

ver: strictly organized. As we passed through the small

room where his secretary was working, we caught a

glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window

on for way to the private garden of the White House.

The President called her back to introduce me..

Ic was still Indian summer in Washington. The

weather was very warm, and both the President and

Mr. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhanc-

ing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity

which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity

of entering these august chambers. The President

(athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with

quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at

times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, al-

moit, I would say, completely expressionless) invited

me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in

the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair op-

posite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25

minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief tele-

phone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French

situntion was developing. After my reply, he spoke

about General de Galle. He talked in a relaxed fashion,

like someone who has at last found solace in indiffer-

ence after having long been exasperated and fascinated.

John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart

of a matter quickly, abanake decisions even more

rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de

Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khru-

slichev. One day, impatient at not understanding the

General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him,

Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Odd-

ly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's

foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington

Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned

about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had

made up his mind not to worry about them any more.

According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we

didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And

we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly cal-

culated to create a flourishing friendship beticen two

great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that

General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incom-

prehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension

with the United States. It would seem that only through

this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire

to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence

on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with con-

riseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between

the United States and France. On the subject of Ger-

many, nuclear policy, Europe, the : lea of "indepen-

ince," he told me what has since become public

15

1W 54923 DocId: 32423629 Page 240

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## Page 241

THE iN REPUBLIC

knowledge. He added, however, that France had

strange way of manifesting

its independence, part.:

ularly, for example, on the subject of! Vietnam and

Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the

French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling

him how the Uniied States should proceed, without

assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was

more appreciative than he of advice, information, and

even criticism; but that these were all the more valued

if the friends proffering them were themselves com-

mitted to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected

from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United

States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing."

But he followed this up immediately and with a broad

grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of

the impending meeting:

"It will be exciting, just the

same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is de-

cidely the strangest great man of our time."

Relations with Cuba

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the

subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists

were not the only ones in France who deplored certain

mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time

Thad the opportunity of mecting John Kennedy, he

was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech

Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall

let the late President speak through them:.

"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam,

but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our

conversation will be much more interesting when you

return, because Ben Bradlee (of Newsweek] tells me

you are on your way to Cuba now.

"Every now and then I read articles in the European

press pointing out that we Americans were blind to

What was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just

learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Com-

munism in Cuba as nothing but the 'accidental and

temporary form of a will to independence from the

United States. Of course it is very easy to understand

this 'will to independence around President de Gaulle."

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force.

He punctuated each sentence with that, brief, mechan-

ical gesture which had become famous:

"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happered

in Cuba, to the misfortone du all. From the beginning

I personally followed the development of these events

with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which

I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclu-

sions go much further than the European analyses. Here

is what I believe.

16

"I believe that there is no country in the world, in-

cluding all the African regions, eluding any and all

the countries under colonial domination, where cco-

nomic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were

worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's

policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we

created, buill and manufactured the Castro movement

out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe

that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized

all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for

Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is

one of the most, if not the most, important problems in

American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have

understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation

which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when

he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to

rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some

extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a

number of sins on the part of the United States. Now

we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the

Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban

revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."

After a silence during which he was able to note my

surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But

it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a

Cuban one, and has become international - that is, it

has become a Soviet problem. I un the President of the

United States and not a sociologist; I am the President

of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the

Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises

made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to

be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that thraigh

his fault - either his 'will to independence, his nad-

ness or Communism - the world was on the verge uf

nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understond

this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as

Fidel Castro. is concerned, I must say I don't know

whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it."

A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when

you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin Amer-

ica are not going to attain justice and progress that

way, I mean through Communist subversion.. They

won't get there by going from economic oppression to

a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced

a few years ago. The United States now has the pos-

sibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it

has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we

alone have this power - on the essential condition that

Communism does not take over there."

Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate at the interview

was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two

quick questions. The first: Could the United States

tolerate cconomic collectivism? He answered: "What

three days ago, and our discussions were most posi-

---

## Page 242

TO

Terry Lenzner

From

Bob Muse

Subject:

Interview of John Roselll

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob

Muse interviewed John Roselli at the

office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden,

888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were

Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had

discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with

which

we were concerned; add

Pound that it presented a great problem of national security.

Accordingly he had

tried to reach Senator Ervin,.

an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the

Senator from allowing this interview to go forward.

Ervin directly but talked to & staff member in Ervia's office, whou he would it

Identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any Information

about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be coupelled to testify

recte further wed anat.

He did not get in touch

about the matter.

Thus

the interview was not productive Insofar. as Rosell!'s

Involvement with Maheu in 2960 vas

view Rosell1 about his background and we

involvement with Maheu in Cuba.

It should be noted that Wadden would not identify

his privilege

Clalm other than saying it related to national security.)

79.-

and Mr Joseph old see tea te core tet on, lord 353%.

with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr.

His

telephone number there is area: 305 581-6585•

He has been living In retirement with

them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he

had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the

Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman,

Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involve-

ment either as & co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's

in either Washington or, California

through & mutual acquaintance, Hernan Spitzel.

When questions were asked as to what his

Rosel11'a attorney instructed alm not to luberent quotyene ta the Men of,

national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for

Hughes

to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He

said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for

Hughes to move to las Vegas from Boston.

According to Maheu, no one wanted to give

Fughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles

and went up to las Vegas and asked his acquaintance. Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of

the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses:

at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for

seeing that Fughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas.

Kolod acquiesced and told

Rosellf that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate,

but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years.

When the New Years date

was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice fron Kolod and

were suppose to leave their premises.

Rosell then convinced Kolod to allow

them

to stay. At the same time he told Maneu that Fughes should buy the Hotels an

and avoid

any problems:

Maheu responded that he was of the impression that highes dian'th

---

## Page 243

to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of

receive a finder's fee. Roselll then turned around and-asked Maheu if he wanted to

purchase 1t.

Maheu responded that he would and Roselll turned the matter over to

his attorney Fd Morgan who then handled the matter until the end.

Rosell1 also

instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did

not negotiate it, received at a later date from Fd Morgan a check for $95,000 which

represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands:

Rosell noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he

did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He

said

that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters

concerning the Las Vegas hotel Industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that

time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas Interests. He noted that

Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense (but did arrange-for JIm

Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no

trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted

Morgan Implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John

Rosell to be represent

by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal

Prom the Friar's Club.

Roselli Indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns

his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started

In 196T when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work

out

Thereafter he made an arrange-

ment with & Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and lidemnify him

against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop.. This arrangement has worked

out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from

the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly

treated by the Fughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier.

He

recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the

gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did.

Ultimately a loan

was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Rosell has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall

the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had

terminated with Hughes.

He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while

his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselll to have supper.

Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other

than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibillty of arranging a loan for

Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went

to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever

Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no subsequent substantu

discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about larry O'Brien, Tony Fatsis, or Jack

Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and

knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

HH 54923 DocId: 32123629 : Page 24'3

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## Page 244

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney

He remembers that this grand jury was

convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and

that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971.

He has no recollection of lavia Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made & comment

about Maheu; nor did he question Roselll about his recollection of his involvement

with Maheu In the Cuban undertaking:

Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and

mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated state-

ment discussing Roselll's background, which Roselll, and Wadden both said was very

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen.

Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the:

possibility of being an Informer.

This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Rosell recalls appearing lour or live times before the Frontier Hotel

grand jury.

appeared at

the nevered questions

extensively only on the first day and thereafter

request

Wadden indicated that we should

else might have access to those grand jury

minutes to get Roselll's testimony about the Frontier.

Rosell1 does not recall

having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury.

He said he

had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden

that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about

1t.:

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an

application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions

with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over

$10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making

any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no

knowledge of ferry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of

Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does

not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have

bad with Thonas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he

knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's Involvement at

Paradise Island:

Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate

of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Fundley about 7 years ago to

100k at the Paradise Island set-up.

Rosells has never talked with or net Jack Caulfield.

recall ever having any private individuals interview him while be was in jail.

He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once vis-

ited him'and told him about the detainer that was being held on him.

Similarly,

while he was 1n jall, the IRS interviewed bim in Los Angeles about the finder's

lee he received in the Frontier Hotel.

to Mahen, but, since it was so short, he does otte tid met the dece seet

about Maheu concerned

He doted that no one has ever asked him about Danner,

Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

-alas:

---

## Page 245

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselll has known him since the 50's.

The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly

after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions

were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his Involvement with

Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard funt of any of the

Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in.

He said however that

he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terninal Island when he was acting as &

prison librarian.

There were no discussions with Liddy. He 1s fairly certain he

has never. net Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted

that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoens upon Mr. Rosell

and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

HH 54923 . DocId: 32423629 -Page 245

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## Page 246

Memoranaum

TO

: Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject:

Interuler of John Rosells

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob

Muse interviewed John Roselll at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden,

888 17th Street, N. W.; Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were

Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin; and Leslie Scherr.

= '

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had

discussed with

Roselll the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and

found that it presented a great problem of national security.

Accordingly he had

tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the

Senator from allowing this interview to go forward.

He did not get in touch

Elvin afrectly but talked to & stafe member in Ervin's office, whom he would not

identify. He further noted that Rosellf was insistent upon not giving any information

about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify

about the matter.

We beet ate be a deserte me not toper eaten ta i or te to

However Wadden did allow us to inter-

VIew Roselll about his background and we

reserved the right to have

session before a Senator where John Rosellf might be compelled to testify about his

Involvement with Maheu in Cuba.

(It should be noted that Wadden would not identify

his privilege

claim other

than saying it related to national security.)

52

John Roselll presently, resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr.

and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314.

His

telephone number there is area: 305 581-6585•

He has been living In retirement with

them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he

had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the

Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman,

Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involve-

ment either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time In the mid-50's

in either

Washington or Callfornia

through & mutual acquaintance, Hernan Spitzel.

When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was,

Roselll's attorney Instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of

national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for

Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966.

Re

said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for

Hughes to move to las Vegas from Boston.

According to Maheu, no one wanted to give

Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles

and went up to las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of

the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses

at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for

seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas.

Kolod acquiesced and tola

Rosellf that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the

going rate,

but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years.. When the New Years date

was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and

were suppose to leave their premises.

Roselll then convinced Kolod to allow

them

to stay.

At the same time he told Maheu that Flughes should buy the Hotels.

and avoid

any problems.

Maheu responded that he was

of the

Impression that Fughes

didn't

---

## Page 247

2.

want to get Involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want

to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of

trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to

sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would

receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and-asked Maheu if he wanted to

purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Rosell turned the matter over to

his attorney. Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end.

Rosellf a150

represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands:

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he:

did not negotiate with him because he lound him less agreeable than Kolod. He said

that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters

concerning the las Vegas hotel Industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's.

Since that

time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas Interests. He noted that

Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense (but did arrange for Jim

cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no

trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted

Morgan Implicity.

He noted that Morgan had arranged for John

Roselli to be represent

by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal

from the Friar's Club.

Rosell1 Indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns

his boldings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started

in 196T when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out

and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop.

Thereafter he made an arrange -

ment with & Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him

against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop.. This arrangement has worked

out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from

the gift shop.

He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly

treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier.

He

recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the

gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did.

Ultimately a loan

was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselll has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall

the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had

terminated with Fughes.

He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while

his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselll to have supper.

Roselll has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other

than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for

Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went

to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever

Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no subsequent substantiu

discussions with Peter Maheu..

He Indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack

Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met

Bebe Rebozo, and

knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

WH 54923. DocId:32423629 Paye: 217:

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## Page 248

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a LOs Angeles attorney

He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime In the summer of 1970 and

that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was Jamary 25, 1971.

He has no recollection of Tavia Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment

about Maheu; nor did he question Rosellf about his recollection of his involvement

with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking.

Roselll had very bad words about Nissen and

mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated state-

ment discussing Roselll's background, which Roselll, and Wadden both said

was very

Inaccurate.

Rosell1 has no

recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen.

Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the.

possibility of being an informer.

This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Rosell recalls appearing four or live times before the Frontier Hotel

answered questions

s extensively only on the first day and thereafter

appeared at

request of Nissen and

make a request of Judge Bine or whoeytalted

around

Wadden indicated that we should

to get Rosell's testimony avet the front have see to those seen sury

Roselll does not recall

having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury..

He said he

recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden

that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an

application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

knowledge of ferry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of

Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration.

Specifically, he does

recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have

had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he

knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's Involvement at

Paradise Island®

Wadden chined in by noting that he had been an old associate

of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to

look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Rosellf has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield.

Nor does he

recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail.

He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once vis-

Ited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly,

while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in los Angeles about the finder's

Pee he received in the Frontier Hotel.

The investigation may have related somewhat

about Maheu concerned.

to Maheu, but, since It was so short, he does not recall what the discussion

noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner,

Rebozo or any members

of the Administration.

---

## Page 249

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselll has known him since the 50's.

The last time he met Greenspun was when

he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly

after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions

were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with

Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never net Gordon Liddy, Howard Funt of any of the

Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that

he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a

prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he

has never met Hunt with regard to any. CIA Involvement of his own.

He also noted

that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Rosell

and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

HH 54923 . DocId: 32123629 • Page.

219

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(VERIFICATION - 446, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF

I am the

in the above entitled action; I have read the Joregoing-

and know the contents thereof; and l certify shes she same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those mallers which

are therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to those malters I believe is to be true.

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury," shat the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on

(date)

at_

→ California

(place)

Signature

(PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL -- 1013a, 20155 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF

Los Angeles

(8S.

I am a citizen of the United Slates and a resident of the county aforesaid; I are over the age of eighleen years and not

a party to the within entitled action; my business address is:

9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400, Beverly Hills, California 90210

June 25

- 1971_ I served she within Notice of Motion For Reduction

of Sentence (Rule 35 FRCP); Points and Authorities; Affidavits in

Support Thereof

on the-

Plaintiff

in said action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in she

United Slates mail at

Beverly Hills, California

adaressed as Jollows:

DAVID R. NISSEN

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Chief, Criminal Division

1200 U.S. Courthouse

312 North Spring St.

Los Angeles, Calif.

90012

I certily (or declare), under penalty of perjury, " that she foregoing is irue and correos

Executed on June 25, 1971

Beverly Hills

(daze)

(place)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

25th day of June, 197}

Anterin

int

Myria J. Weinstein

Californio

pi

FICIAL SEAL

KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL

KAJHRYN A. SCHEIBAL

VOTARY

Both the serificatien each broN

service by mail forms, being signed under penalty al perjury, do not require nolariction.

LOS ANCILES COUNTY

My. Commission Exnires August 29, 1477

HH 54923

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Page 250

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## Page 251

Co all to

By y

certify

' оп

that the

his

* sach

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

National Archives and Records Service

ant these prescuts shall come, Grecting:

of the authority vested in me by the Administrator of General Services, I

behalf, under the seal of the United States General Services Administration,

reproduction(s) is a true and correct copy

of documents

in his custody.

SIGNATURE

GSA

NAMI

GILBERT DORAME

TITLE

FEB 1219741

Center Manager

NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEPOSITORY

General Services Administration

(9NC- I*

Federal Records Center, NARS

4747 Eastern Avenue

Bell, CA

90201

R9 Overprint 33 (4-72)

GSA AFR dE 6791E

HH

54923

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ROBERT L. MEYER

United States Attorney

DAVID R. NISSEN

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Criminal Division

1200 U. S. Courthouse Building

312 North Spring Street

Los Angeles,

California 90012

Tel:

688-2406

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Fto 17 4 46 CHI

TX 1LG.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

FILIPPO SACCO,

also known

as JOHN ROSSELLI,

Defendant.

No. 1175-PH-CD

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

REDUCE SENTENCE

Plaintiff, United States of America, strongly opposes

defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence based upon the files and

records in the case and the attached Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. MEYER

United States Attorney

Dand R- Arsei

DAVID R. NISSEN

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Criminal Division

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America.

DRN: jt

- 1 -

WI-0700N.1Z9

HH 51923

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1.."

MEMORANDUM

John Rosselli is actually Filippo Sacco, born July 4, 1905,

in Italy of parents Vincenzo and Maria Sacco. Vincenzo Sacco

came to the United States after the birth of Filippo, his oldest

child, and in 1911, Mrs. Sacco and Filippo joined Vincenzo in

the United States where they resided as aliens in East Boston.

Filippo Sacco completed the sixth grade in the public

schools of East Boston and was discharged from school in 1917.

By this time Filippo had two younger brothers and two younger

sisters. In 1918, Vincenzo Sacco died. His wife Maria and the

five children moved into the residence of Liberato Clanciulli

and a daughter was born in 1920. In 1922, Maria and Clanciulli

were married.

In 1922, Filippo had a job driving a horse-drawn milk

wagon and was nicknamed "Milky". However, in addition to his

legitimate occupation, Filippo had made connections with the

criminal element in East Boston and was engaged inarcotic

traffic with his headquarters in and around Maverick Square.

On September 14, 1922, Filippo sold morphine to a government

informant named Fisher while under surveillance by a narcotic

agent. On September 19, 1922, Filippo arranged for a large

sale from his "source" and was present and under agent sur-

veillance when the morphine was delivered. On September 29,

1922, Filippo Sacco and his "source" were arrested by Federal

narcotics agents. On October 18, 1922, the Federal Grand Jury

in Boston indicted Sacco for the sale of narcotic drugs and

two days later he was

released on bail. While awaiting trial

in the narcotics case, in Federal Court, Sacco was arrested and

Indicted in Massachusetts State Court for grand larceny and

was released on bail on July 2, 1923.

-2-

TPI-LPC-8-87-150M-9184

HH 54923

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In 1923, while he was on bail awaiting trial in the

narcotics and larceny cases, Filippo Sacco jumped bail in both

cases and disappeared from East Boston. The Government narcotics

informant, Fisher, disappeared about the same time and Government

sources believe that he may have

been killed to prevent him fron

testifying Because of his fugitive status, both indictments

against Sacco were dropped.

After Sacco's flight from his home in 1923, he spent some

time in New York and Chicago, and finally made his appearance in

Los Angeles in 1924 under the fictitious name "John Roselli."

Sources indicate that Sacco engaged in bootlegging and hijacking

during this period and police records show he was frequently

arrested on such charges as carrying concealed weapons, and sus-

picion of robbery.

After 1930, Sacco became associated with the Al Capone

gang in Chicago and was also closely associated with organized

crime in Los Angeles. Reliable sources relate that he was an

executioner for the criminal organizations in both cities. In

1936, by demands and threats, Sacco forced his way into part

ownership of "Nationwide News Service," a horseracing information

service used by bookmakers across the country.

After prohibition was repealed, Sacco left the bootlegging

business and associated himself with Columbia Picture Studios.

As a close friend of Los Angeles underworld leader Jack Dragna,

Sacco soon became known as a labor muscleman and racketeer for

the movie studios. In 1943, Sacco was indicted on a charge of

conspiracy to extort millions of dollars from movie producers

and a labor union. Also indicted

were union officials Browne

and Bioff, and the following ranking members of the Chicago La

Cosa Nostra family: Frank Nitto (aka Nitti), Louis Campagna,

Paul DeLucia (aka Paul "the waiter" Ricia), Phil D'Andrea,

Francis Manitote (aka Frank Diamond), and Charles "Cherry Nose"

- 3-

TrlrS-a07-14049174

HH 51923

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Gioe. In 1944, Sacco and the Chicago defendants were convicted

and all were sentenced to ten years in prison.

In 1947, Sacco and all his co-defendants were paroled

immediately upon their becoming eligible therefor.

There were

indications that their release had been secured by bribery but

admissible evidence sufficient for prosecution was not obtained.

In July 1948, Sacco's parole was revoked because of his con-

tinued association with known criminals and he was imprisoned

until Hovember 1948, when his parole was reinstated. Shortly

after Sacco's parole terminated in March 1954, William Bioff, a

key Goverment witness at the extortion trial was murdered by

the bombing of his vehicle. (The trial judge reportedly had

warned the defendants that if anything happened to Bioff while

they were on parole he would hold them responsible.) Two other

co-defendants of Sacco have also been victims of gang slayings.

Upon his release from prison, Sacco returned to Los Angeles

and again associated himself with a movie studio." Reliable

sources report that this was a front and in fact, through his

close association with Sam Giancana of Chicago, Sacco received

the responsibility of overseeing the concealed interests in

Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld. Sacco lumediately

became a powerful figure in Las Vegas. He travels back and

forth between Las Vegas and Los Angeles extensively and asso-

ciates with the known Cosa Nostra members and major gamblers.

Rosselli appeared before the Kefauver Coumittee investi-

gating organized crime and falsely testified concerning his

association with underworld figures and even his own personal

background.

During the period 1956-1958, Sacco was very active in

the construction and pre-opening operation of the Tropicana Hotel,

and Sacco received the lease to operate the gift shop. The

-4-

+91-186-5-87-1501-3886

HH 54923

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Nevada Gaming Control Board refused to allow the Tropicana to

open as long as Sacco was associated with its operation, where-

upon the hotel owners were forced to buy back the gift shop lease

at a cost of $180,000, reportedly about thirty times the amount

paid for the lease.

During the above period, Sacco also involved himself in the

production of shows for the Tropicana, but again the Gaming

Control Board refused to allow him to participate in any capacity

and he sold his interest.

Following his ouster from the

Tropicana, Sacco sold Ice machines to most of the Las Vegas hotels:

at prices far in excess of prices on the open market..

Sacco has

also received numerous "finders fees" from various Las Vegas

hotels and casinos for which few if any services were performed.

• In October 1960, Sacco and T. W. Richardson were involved

in placing a wire tap on the telephone of comedian Dan Rowan in

Las Vegas at the request of Chicago gangster Sam Giancana.:

In May 1968, Sacco was convicted of failing to register as

an alien and report his address annually. In the course of that

trial, it was show that birth records in Chicago, Illinois, had

been forged in an effort to make it appear that Sacco had been

born there as John Rosselli. Sacco has long been a close friend

of Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk, Cook County, Illinois, in

whose office the birth records for Chicago were kept.

Among Sacco's underworld associates are the following:

Al Capone - head of the Chicago underworld gang;

Charles F. Fischetti - a Capone lieutenant;

Micky Cohen - gambler and racketeer;

Jack Dragna - leader of the Cosa Nostra, Los Angeles,

now deceased;

Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel - member of Murder, Inc.,

murdered June 20, 1947;

- 5-

TreLPC..s7.1001.1d4

HH 54923

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Allen Smiley - gambler, bookmaker, racketeer;

Tony Accardo - ranking Cosa Nostra figure;

Momo Adams - ranking Cosa Nostra

figure; and

Frank Costello - ranking Cosa Nostra figure.

Numerous prospective witnesses in the course of investiga-

tions concerning Sacco's criminal activities have expressed or

displayed fear at the prospect of being called to testify

against him, and a number of witnesses have refused to testify.

In the Friars Club trial, It was apparent that a number of

witnesses deliberately perjured themselves in order to exonerate

Sacco, Including Friedman, Vinnie Donato, Lee Deer, and Nat Ross.

Defendant Sacco was convicted in the Friars Club case in

December 1968 of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering

enterprise and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained

securities.

He was also convicted of making a false statement in

his income tax return. Sacco has had a long practice of concealing

the source and nature of his income. He was sentenced to five years

in prison.

In view of Sacco's extensive criminal record extending back

more than 40 years, as well as his membership and participation

in the organized criminal syndicate known as Cosa Nostra, we

strongly urge that defendant Sacco's sentence not be reduced for

any reason whatsoever. He is a genuine menace to society and,

in particular, to those witnesses who have testified against him.

-6-

+81-176-8-87-1504-3134

HH 54923

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## Page 258

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I,

JUNE S. TOKUYAMA

, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or em-

ployed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address 1s

office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North

Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age

of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Cen-

tral District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United

States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose

direction the service by mail described in this Certificate was made;

that on

February 17, 1971

_ I deposited in the United

States malls in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring st.,

Los Angeles, California, in the above-entitled

action,. In an envelope

bearing the requisite postage, a copy of

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO REDUCE SENTENCE

addressed to

Adrian Marshall, Esq.

Attorney at Law

9601 Wilshire Blvd.

Suite 400

Beverly Hills, California 90210

at his last known address, at which place there 1s a dellvery ser-

vice by United States mail.

This Certificate 1s executed on

February 17, 1971

at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

and correct.

lene S. Ziteranen

2 JUNE S.

TOKUYAMA

USA-12c-240

(Rev. 10/19/67)

HH 54923

DocId:32423629 Page 258

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## Page 259

Memorandur

MM 2/14/74

To: Terry Lenzner

From: Jim Moore

Subject: Robert Maheu - John Roselli -

Hereis a summary of what I have done on the Roselli- Maheu

HH 54923

connection.

Yesterday I spoke with David Nissen, who prosecuted Roselli in

1968 for being an unregistered alien and for being involved with hidden

owners in the Friar's Club case. Nissen never met Maheu or spoke with

241029

him. However, he did remember that stories about Maheu and Roselli

being involved in anti-Castro plots did come to his attention when he was

investigating and prosecuting Roselli. He couldn't remember the source

of those stories, saying that his information came from many people,

including Justice Department lawyers in Washington and the FBI. One

story he heard was that Maheu tried to intervene in Washington, either

through direct contacts in the FBI or at Justice or through Edward P.

Morgan, to kill the Roselli prosecution on the basis that Roselli had helped

the United States in Cuba. Maheu was reportedly an old CIA agent, • Nissen

remembers hearing at some point that Roselli had gone to Cuba in an attempt

to assasinate Castro •

Nissen said that there are extensive files on Roselli maintained by

the FBI or the Department. Nissen had a vague recollection that the files

contained a story about Maheu somehow being involved in a wiretap on Sam

Giancona, for whom Roselli worked. Nissen also remembered information

about a meeting between Maheu and Giancona regarding. Cuba, but he couldn't

remember any of the specifics.

DooId: 32423629 Page 259

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When Roselli came up for sentencing, he was represented by Tom

Wadden, who had been associated in some capacity with Edward Bennett

Williams. Wadden filed a motion to reduce sentence and included with it

two col lumns by Jack Anderson that recounted the story of Roselli and Maheu

trying to assasinate Castro. Nissen thought the motion might also have

included an affidavit from Edward P. Morgan.

The government successfully

resisted the motion on the grounds of fraud, since Wadden produced no

witnesses or documentation to support his claim. I called the Federal Court

in Los Angeles, and they have seat the motion for reduction of sentence and

attached papers to us.

The Clerk there told me that in addition to the Anderson

F. 284

columns, the motion included affidavits from Anderson and Les: Whitten

vouching for the unnamed source of the columns.:

Roselli is now in Florida so he can be reached, but, according to

Nissen, Giancona is in exile somewhere in Mexico.

FRONTIER CASE

Nissen never heard about Maheu being questioned in Washington in

Frontier

lieu of the Grand Jury appearance.

Nissen did not try the/case, because he

had been promoted to supervisory capacity. However, he seemed surprised

that he had never heard of such a meeting. He gave me the names of

three lawyers who handled the case after he gave up direct responsibility.

for it. My phone interview with the first of them, Jerry Ullman, is written

up as a separate interview. The second Lawyer, John Hornbeck, has not

yet returned my phone call.

The third, Tom Kotoski,actually tried the case.

He is now an assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles and about to

become head of the San Francisco Strike Force. He will be in Washington

Thursday and Friday, February 14 and 15, and I have asked him to call me

as sonn as possible.

HH 54923

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that

file

One final note - Nissen said/the Roseli/in the Justice Department

contains many references to Maheu. He never, however, saw or heard about

a file kept on Maheu himself.

Richard Crane, head of the Organized Crime office in Los Angeles,

is also in town until the end of this week. He may know something about

Maheu and Roselli,

ast

¡well as about

Balitz coming back to the

Desert Inn.

He should call me this evening of tomorrow morning.

Also,

Mike Defeo, head of the Kansas City Strike Force,

i will be in town tomorrow

512244

and Friday. He, according to Crane, might know something about the Dunes.

In addition, Will Wilson mentioned the strike farce man from Kansas City

as the one who set up the Maheu interview at the Justice Department.

spoke with DeFeo today, and he will call me tomorrow to arrange a meeting

time before he leaves town. :

HH 54923

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## Page 262

144

NAME

: Sam GIANCANA

ALIASES

..: San Mooney, Sam Malone

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-16-08, Chicago, Ill.;

5'9", 175 lbs., hazel eyes,

dark chestnut hair, fair

complexion and medium build.

LOCALITIES : Resides at 1147 Wenonah Ave.

FREQUENTED

Oak Park, Ill. Frequents

the Army Lounge, Norwood

House, Villa Venice, all of

Chicago, Illinois.

FAMILY

BACKGROUND

: Wife, Angeline DeTolve, died in 1954. Has three:

daughters, Annette, Bonita Lou and Francine.

Mother deceased, father is Tony Cancana, and

sisters are Mary, Josephine and Victoria.

Sam's

consort is Ladana Collins, 20 E. Delaware, Chicago,

Illinois.

CRIMINAL

ASSOCIATES

: Tony Accardo, Paul Ricco, Willie Baddone, Nicholas

D'Amico, Sam Battaglia and Leonard Gianola, all of

Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL

HISTORY

BUSINESS

MODUS

OPERANDI

cord of 13. arrests dating from Sept. 1925, on such

convictions.

: Ouns the Forest Lounge, the R&S Liquor Co., the

Lohmar Dist. Co., Chicago, Ill., and has gambling

interests and an interest in the shrimp business

in Cuba.

: A top ranking member of the Mafia in the State of

Ill. and a director of the organization's activi-

tipe in Chinaon and vininitt

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56

NAME

ALIASES

: Giovanni ROSELLI

: John Rosell1, John Russelli,

John Kasselle, John Passell1

LOCALITIES

FREQUENTED

FAMILY

BACKGROUND

CRIMINAL

ASSOCIATES.

CRIMINAL

HISTORY

BUSINESS

MODUS

OPERANDI

hair, blue eyes.

: Resides 1251 No. Crescent

Hts., Hollywood, Cal. Fre-

quents gambling casinos.at

Las Vegas where he has room

at Iropicana Hotel. Travels

frequently all parts U.S.

Divorced from movie actress June langs fathers

Vincenzo; mothers Maria Russo (both deceased);

cousins Joseph Evangelista.

: Dragna family, Philip Kastel, Harold Meltzer,

Francisco Costiglia, Charles

Fischetti, louls

Piscopo.

•: FBI #3339986. LoA. Sheriff's Office #51247.

Record dating from 1926 includes arrests for

suspicion of robbery, vagrancy, interfering with

trade, mail fraud & violation of parole.

: Vice-President Monte Prosser Productions and

varied other interests.

8 A top Mafia figure at Los Angeles and Las Vegas.

Active in labor racketeering and control of gamo

lingo

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CAN I. LAVIN, TR. ME, CHURMUR

HOMATO M BAKER, IN, TENN, VICE CHAIRMAN

HERMAN E, TALMADOR, DA

DANIEL K. INOVYE, HAWAII

TOMATO S. GURNEY, MLA

JOSIAH M. MONTOYA, ML MIX.

LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR, CONN

SAMUEL DASH

CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

FRED D. THOMPSON

MINORITY COUNSEL

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN

DEPUTY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 60, 13D CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To::

Senator Ervin

From:

Terry Lenzner and Marc Lackritz

Subject: Relevance to S. Res. 60 of John Rosselli's :

testimony about his CIA activities

:..=

Summary:

John Rosselli and his attorney, Tom Wadden, object to

testifying about Rosselli's involvement with Robert Maheu in a :

CIA-financed plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960's .

The objection is based upon national security grounds as well as

an assertion by Mr. Wadden that the material is not relevant to

our inquiry under S. Res. 60.

Testimony of Mr. Rosselli about this matter is relevant

and necessary to our investigation for a variety of reasons.

Facts: -

angel Wheator!

During the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the

CIA apparently financed and organized a plot to assassinate Fidel

Castro. Among the participants in this plot were Robert Maheu and

John Rosselll. Maheu had a public relations business at the time,.

and Rosselli was associated with some alleged organized crime

figures (e.g. Sam Giancana) who had lost substantial gambling

investments when Castro came to power. Apparently, the plot

continued into the early 1960's even after the abortive Bay of Pigs

invasion, but it failed in attaining its objective of killing Castro.

Only a few officials in the government knew of the exis-

tence of the plot at that time.

Justice Department officials stumbled across this infor-

mation about the plot as a result of their investigation into an

illegal wiretap by Sam Giancana in the early 1960's.

54923

Amarinan and. Maihan

Roseli, Harvey said he had a high

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The sensitive information was brought to the attention of

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and

either he or then-Attorney General

Robert Kennedy ordered the prosecution of Giancana dropped in order

not tó compromise national security considerations.

4119218.

The information about the alleged assassination plot then

lay dormant in a secret file in the Department of Justice until early

1969; when Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson requested the

file from the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Section. The file

was returned to Central Files shortly after t was taken out. ente

" "AsSistant Attomey General Wilson next requested the secret

Justice file in early 1971 in Connection with his interview of Robert

Maheu on January 27, 1971 (see attached chronology). This interview

at the Department of Justice, in lieu of a grand jury appearance, was

arranged by a telephone call to Attorney General Mitchell on January 19,

1971, only one day after Jack Anderson published his first column linking

both Maheu and Rosselli to the CIA plot to kill Castro. (see attached)

...

However, the significance of Anderson's column on January 18,

1971, was that on the same day, Haldeman requested Dean to find out

what he could about the Hughes - Maheu - O'Brien relationship.

In the follow-up memos from Caulfield to Dean on the Maheu-

O'Brien link, Caulfield notes Maheu's prior "covert activities" for the

CIA and advises Dean that a check into CIA, FBI, and IRS files on Robert

Maheu is advisable to avoid a "counter-scandal."

In addition, Assistant Attorney General Wilson showed the

sensitive "Castro file" to Attorney General Mitchell, in January, 1971,

and discussed with him the political implications of the information.

Following the on-the-record interview of Maheu on January 27, 1971,

by Lynch, Wilson and Petersen, Maheu was interviewed privately by

Wilson concerning his prior CIA activities with John Rossell. Maheu

was not forthcoming with information about the plot at that time.

Attorney General Mitchell discussed the contents of the sensitive file

with President Nixon, according to Wilson, who had advised him to do

sO.

Conclusion:

Therefore, the obsession of the Administration in keeping tabs

on Larry O'Brien in 1971 and 1972 was in part motivated by a fear that

Maheu would impart some of this sensitive information about the plot

HH

54923 DocId: 32423622

P gedlyehandsome gambler vita contacts Rosell, Harvey said he had a higk

-B

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to O'Brien. Alternatively the objective was to discover if there was

any information about the plot that might be damaging to the Democrats

that O'Brien might possess

from Maheu. And these concerns could

have been a possible motivation for the break-in to the offices of the

DNC and Larry O'Brien by four Cuban-Americans on June 17, 1972,

especially since their directions were to photograph any documents

relating to Cuban contributions or Cuban involvement in the 1972 •

Democratic campaign.

It is for these reasons that we wish to question John Rossellitor:

about the nature and scope of his activities. "

with Robert Maheu in the

early 1960's:

inship tea

06.40s

16117

1751.

-2942brg

-BI

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Thanksgiving, 1970

December 4, 1970

January 18, 1971

January 18, 1971

January 19, 1971

January 19, 1971

January 25, 1971•3:

50512991

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January 25, 1971

January 26, 1971

January 27, 1971

MINE MOST 16 LA

Pirouet

January 27, 1971

February 1, 1971

February 12, 1971

Hughes leaves Las Vegas.

Maheu is fired.

Jack Anderson column published linking Mal

and Rosselli to plot to kill Castro.

Haldeman sends memo to Dean requesting ir

mation on O'Brien-Maheu-Hughes relationst

Jack Anderson column appears with more det

on Maheu's Involvement in plot to assassini

Castro. :

Attorney General John Mitchell called Robert

Maheu in Las Vegas at 5:12 p.m. and talked

Caulfield to Dean memo discussing Danner

relationship with Maheu, O'Brien relationshi

with Maheu, and request for investigation Ir

CLA, FBI, IRS files for information to avoid a

"counter-scandal."

John Rosselli enters prison.

.. *t.

Dean to Haldeman memo on Maheu-O'Brien-

Hughes relationship

Maheu interviewed at Department of Justice l

A.A.G. Will Wilson, Henry Petersen and Bill

Lynch, in lieu of an appearance before the

Grand Jury. Interview is about "skimming" ir

Las Vegas:

A.A. G. Wilson and Petersen meet with Mahe

privately to discuss Maheu's prior CIA activi

Caulfield to Dean memo noting that Maheu wi

involved in "covert activities" for the CIA in

early 1960's.

Rosselli's attorney files a Motion to Reduce

Sentence based on Rosselli's prior CIA activi

÷."

i.=

17216?

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11121

Maneu recruited John Hoselll, a rug-

gedly handsome gambler with contacts

I 151923 • DocId: 32423629 1746th€le American and Cuban un-.

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about

Harvey said he had a high

equality

—By

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This is cover ice in

25 coụn trọm

ji's

use

of

arisena

FRIARS

Crit

folls.

for

Melisal

gambling

activities

i,

i i:

FILED

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BY

DEC 2 1 1967

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNLA

DEPUTY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

Plaintiff,

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v.

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MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN;

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MANUEL JACOBS (aka RICKY JACOBS);

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VICTOR G. LANDS;

I. HARNER RICHARDSON,

FILIPPO SACCO (aka JOHN ROSSELLI) ;

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BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM,

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Defendants.

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NO.

1432

[18 U.S.C. §371: Conspiracy;

18 U.S.C. $1952: Interstate-

Transportation In Aid of

Racketeering; 18 U.S.C. §2314:

Interstate Transportation of.

Funds Obtained by Fraud;

47 U.S.C.

$502: Operating Un-

certified Communication

Device;

26 U.S.C. §7206 (1) Subscribing

False Tax Return. j

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The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

[18 USC §371]

Commencing prior to June 15, 1962, and continuing to the

date of the return of this indictment, defendants MAURICE H. FPIEDMAN,

MANUEL JACOBS (also known as RICKY JACOBS), VICTOR G. LANDS,

I. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (also known as JOHN ROSSELLI),

BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, and their unindicted co-conspirators Ernest S.

Allen, Vernall Furlong (also known as William G. Douglas), Edwin

Nathaniel Gebhard (also known as Pete Kelly, Pete Peterson, and

George McFarland), Alfred Mathes, George E. Seach, and Albert Snyder

agreed, confederated and conspired together to commit offenses

against the United States as follows:

?

(a) To travel in interstate commerce and use

facilitles

DRN: mim :mt

2

+91-LP0-8-87-1801-9188

HH 54923

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ADRIAN MARSHALL

WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

9601 Wilshire Blvd.

Suite 400

Beverly Hills, California 90210

272-9211

Attorneys for Defendant

Filippo Sacco, also known as

John Rosselli

FILED

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JUN 28 9 31 AN 'TI

CLERK V.S.*.

CENTENA 2:01.68

Ball file

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vS.

FILIPPO SACCO, also known as

JOHN ROSSELLI, et al,

Defendants

7-6-71

ZPM

NO. 1432 - Criminal(WP6)

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR

REDUCTION OF SENTENCE

(RULE 35 FRCP); POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVITS

IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO DAVID R. NISSEN, Chief, Criminal Division, Umited States Attorneys

Office, Los Angeles, California:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that. On July 6, 1971, at 2:00 o'clock P.M.,

or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, at the Courtroom of the

Honorable William P. Gray, defendant, Filippo Sacoo, also known as

john Rosselli, will move the Court for a reduction of sentence entered in this

case.

Said motion will be based upon the grounds stated herein, the

affidavits attached hereto, additional affidavits defendant proposes to file

before the date of the hearing, oral testimony to be presented at the hearing,

and all of the files, records, pleadings and other documents in this case.

Defendant was convicted of one count of violation of 18 U.S.C.

§371, one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952, three counts of violation of

18 U.S.C. §2314 and one count of violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1).

Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine

of $10, 000. 00 on Count One, two years to run consecuively to Count One and

HH 51923

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a fine of $10, 000. 00 for Count Six, and two years imprisonment to run

concurrently with Count Six and a fine of $10, 000. 00 for each of Counts

Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the Indictment, and one year imprisonment

to run concurrently with Count One and a fine of $5,000. 00 for Count

Twenty-Two. The total imprisonment was five years and the total fine was

$55, 000.00.

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On January 18th and 19th, 1971, there appeared in newspapers

throughout the country nationally syndicated articles by columnist

Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence

Agency of the United States Government as set forth in said articles.

The affidavits of Jack Anderson and his assistant, Les Whitten, are •

attached hereto and included therewith are copies of the columns, set forth

as Exhibits A and B. Exhibits A and B were published on the 18th and 19th

of January, 1971. Attached as Exhibit C is a follow-up column which

appeared on February 24, 1971, and Exhibits D and E which are copies

of the office records of columnist Jack Anderson, which were released

and published on April 18th and April 27th, 1971.

The undersigned is informed that at no time prior to the

sentencing of defendant were the matters set forth in Exhibits A and B

of the attached affidavits brought to the Court's attention. It is the belief

of the undersigned that had these matters been brought to the Court's

attention they would have materially affected the sentence handed down

by the Court in this case.

Defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in

support of this written motion and to present the testimony of at least one

witness at the hearing on July 6, 1971. The additional affidavits and/or

testimony to be produced at the hearing may relate to the financial ability

of defendant to pay the fine of $55, 000.00 as well as the condition of

defendant's health.

1/1

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//

//1

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HH 54923

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

United States v. Ellenbogen (2nd Cir.) 390 F. 2d 537.

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DATED: June 25, 1971.

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Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL

WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

Adrian

Maishad

ADRIAN MARSHALL

Attorneys for Defendant,

Filippo Sacco, also known

as John Rosselli

3.

HH 54923

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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE

AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SS.

JACK ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says the

following:

1. I am a nationally syndicated columnist writing

under my own by-line. For many years prior to the death of MI.

Drew Pearson, he and I wrote a column known as the "Washington

Merry-Go-Round".

2. I wrote the articles attached hereto as Exhibits

A and B pertaining to certain activities performed by John

Rosselli, the Defendant herein, on behalf at the United States

Government.

3. The information contained in said articles was

made available to me by persons employed by the United States

Government who, in the past, have supplied me with accurate and

truthful information

as pertains to other subjects.

4. After receiving said basic information, my staff

and I conducted an impartial and independent investigation

regarding John Rosselli's activities as described in Exhibit A,

which were performed

at the behest of Agents of the United

States Government.

HH 54923

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5.

The aforementioned investigation satisfied me that

the facts set forth in Exhibit A are a truthful account of Mr.

Rosselli's activities

as described therein.

JA

Sworn to before me this 17th day of

June, 1971.

hôm P. Oned

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commiccin sigeces Mauch 31, 1975

HW 54923

DDC11:32423629

'Page 273

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## Page 274

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE

AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SS.

LESLIE WHITTEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the

following:

1. I am employed as principal associate of nationally-

syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, writer of "Washington Merry-

Go-Round".

2. I worked on certain articles relating to John

Rosselli, and services performed by him on behalf of the Central

Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Federal GoV-

ernment.

3. As part of my investigation, I twice called William

R. Harvey, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official, now of

Indianapolis.

4. On my first call, in January, I asked Harvey if it

were not true that he had personally intervened with the Justice

Department in order to mitigate the government's prosecution of

Rosselli on the basis that Rosselli had done a 'formidable service

for his country. Harvey said "this is a long story... I don't

think it ought to be printed." I asked him whether it was not

true that he had

a high regard for Rosselli. "I still do," he

earnestly replied.

5. In pursuing the story further, I called Harvey

again in Indianapolis in February and asked him whether he could

\

comment on our story about Rosselli which by now has been pub-

lished widely in the United States. He declined to comment. "But

10492

HN 54923 DocÍd:32423629 Page 274

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he twice reaffirmed his "high regard" for Rosselli. I advised

him I was making an affidavit on Rosselli's behalf. and he ex-

pressed concern for Rosselli, asked his present status and said

he would "follow up" on Rosselli's behalf from his end.

6. Based on my part of the investigation, I am satis-

fied that the facts set down in Exhibit A, appended to the Affi-

davit of Jack Anderson, are a truthful account of Rosselli's

activities on behalf of the United States.

bali Natten

LESLIE WHITTEN

Sworn to

before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Same P. Ooner

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commercin experia Maick 31, 1975

HH 51923 - DocId: 32423629

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## Page 276

STATE OF CRUFORENS

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

being by me fuse dudy sorr, depance end saya: chal he ite

in cho above valieled ecsion; ches ho

hes.

end krons the contents thereal; and thes the sane is tre

incris sealed aper. inferracion in boil, and in to chois

Tains

Subscribed end suons to before me thi

Notery Pablic in and for said. C

(SBAL)

Notice of Motion, Motion for Reduction

Received copy of the mibin Of Schtence and Request for Evidentiary 12th ayd February

Hearing,

Memorandum of Points and

ARELUENED A SOPYOF THIS DOCUMENT

THIS 12. D

DAY OF Fee, - 1900

toe

Plaintiff

day de

U.S. ATTORNEY'S-OFFICE,

BY E. Somay

Assames-

(AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BE MAIL

• 10130, GGPJ.

1071

STATE OF CALIFORNLA

COUNTY OF LOS ANCELES,

United Slates and a residens of sha county aloressid; chei.

nichin abore casiled action; shes afrente residence eddies be

doy it.

lizer of the

party so sha

chas on the

che wishir

on she

addressed to the attorney _ of record for said

flee address of said elorney as follo: a i.

= 19_ «ficas seroed

a said action, by placing a stre oopy thercol in eno enorlope

as she

mail bereta he place of maili

suerised and soons

joy of.

munication by

ww..0/008

HH 54923

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ADRIAN MARSHALL

WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

9601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400

Beverly Hills, California 90210

272 9211

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

Plaintiff,

NO. 1175- PH

MOTION FOR REDUCTION

OF SENTENCE AND

REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY

HEAR ING

vS.

FILIPPO SACCO, also known

as JOHN ROSSELLI,

Defendant.

Defendant FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, by his attorneys,

ADRIAN MARSHALL and WADDEN, WALL & RUDY, requests this Court

to grant a hearing for the presentation of oral testimony and other evidence

in support of defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence entered in this

case. As grounds therefor defendant alleges:

1.

Defendant was convicted of six counts of violation of Title 8

U.S.C. Sections 1302 and 1306 (a) and Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1305 and

1306 (b) and sentenced to six months on Count 1 and thirty days on Counts

2 through 6, all to run concurrently.

2.

On January 18, 1971, the mandate was spread and defendant was

ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal at noon on January 25, 1971,

for direct delivery of defendant to Terminal Island for service of his sentence.

3.

On January 18 and 19, 1971, there-appeared in newspapers through

out the country nationally syndicated articles of columnist Jack Anderson

alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency in an

.=1-

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assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Attached hereto as Exhibits A

and B are Xerox copies of said publications.

4.

5.

6.

At no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the

matters referred to in Exhibits A and B brought to the Court's attention.

At an evidentiary hearing, defendant will present oral testimony

and other evidence in support of this motion related to the matters set forth

in Jack Anderson's column which defendant feels will materially affect the

Court's reconsideration of the sentence entered in this case.

On or before February 19, 1971, defendant proposes to file

and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion.

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Dated:

February 12, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL

WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

Adrie

ADRIAN MARSHALL

Attorneys for Defendant.

=2-

HH • 54923

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