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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10011

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

ORIGINATOR

FROM

• TO

-TITLE

PFIAB

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 25-26, 1963

DATE :

01/25/63

PAGES

SUBJECTS

AGENDA FOR JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1B, 1C

RELEASED

WITH DELETIONS

+9/21/08 08/01/2024

2025 Release under the

President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection

Hat of 1992

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10011

ITEM

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

CONFIDENTIAE

PRESIDENT' SAFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISERY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JANUARY 25 - 20,

1962

TIME

SUBJECT

10:00 - 10:15

10:15 - 11:30

11:30 ÷ 12:30

12:30

2:20

January 25th

Executive Session *

Consideration of Draft Report to the President

on Board's Review of Cuba Situation

DiscussIons with the Director of Central

Intelligence

Lurich

Depart Executive Office Building for

New State Department Building

Meeting with the Secretary of State

2:30 - 3:00

(Approx. )

3:00

3:10 - 3:40

3:40 to End of

Day

Return to Board's Offices

Report on Special Board Meeting with

the

President on January 21, 1963

Dr.

Killian

Resume Consideration of Item 2

January 26th

10.

11.

12.

9:00 - 9:30

9:30

9:45 - 10:55

Executive Session

Depart Executive Office Building for Fentagon

Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance

Relating to the Military, Bulldup In Cuba

Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director

Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 C 468

Members will be met at the

Mall Entrance)

13.

14.

10:55

11:00 - 11:30

Depart 2 C 468

Meeting with

the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Room 2 E

873

15.

11:30 - 12:00

Meeting

with the Secretary of Defense

Room

• 3

E 880

16.

17•

12:00

2:00 to End of

Day

Return to Washington - Lunch

Completion of Final Report to the President

on Board's Cuba Review and Discussion of

Future Board Business

CONFIDENTIAL

#Dr. Killian will be unable to Join the meeting until after lunch;

at his request Mr. Gray has agreed

to serve as Acting Chairman.

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act

of 1992

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CONFIDEHIAL

PRESIDENI'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

REVISED AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 26, 1963

ITEM

1.

?.

3.

TIME

9:00 - 9:30

10:45

11:00

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

12:25

12:30

1:00

1:30

2:45 to End of

Day

SUBJECT

Executive Session

Depart Executive Office Building for Pentagon

Review of Results Obtained. from Reconnaissance

Relating to the Milltary Bulldup In Cuba

It. General Joseph Carroll, Director

Defense Intelligence Agency, Room ? © 468

(Members wiil be met at the

Mall Entrance)

Depart a C 468

Meeting with the chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff,

Room ¿ E 873

Meeting with the Secretary of Defense

Room 3 = 880

Return to Washington - Lunch

completion of Final Report to the President,

on Board's Cuba Review

and " DISCUsSIon of

Future Board Business

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, January 25-26, 1963

The Board convened In executive session at 10:15 a.m.

January 25,

1963,

on the first day of a two-day meeting in the

Board's öffices,

Room 297, Executive Office Building.

vere Board members Gray, Baker, Land, Clifford, Pace, Doolittle,

Murphy, and Langer; and

Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Mr. Gray presided as acting Chairman In place of Dr. K1111an

whose arrival was delayed by bad flying weather.

Mr. Gray noted

that the DCI, Mr. McCone, had been called to testify before a

Congressional Committee and would therefore be unable to meet

with the Board at 11:30 as scheduled.

The acting Chairman then

called for a general discussion of the Board's pending review and

dräft report on

the Intelligence aspects of the circumstances

leading to the Cuba crisis.

Dr. Land expressed the view that although tidying up 1s an

obligation, and although looking back 1s a useful technique, the

Board's responsibilitles go beyond the conduct of post mortems

for the purpose of identifying past mistakes in the foreign Intel-

ligence fleld. Without detracting from the Importance of the

Board's after-the-fact review of the Cuba situation, Dr. Land

thought 1c equally important that the Board: become fully informed

on current developments as well.

Mr. Coyne called Dr. Land's attention to the fact that pre-

vIously, In Dr. Land's absence, the Board had submitted a December

28, 1962, report to the President which was Interim in nature, and

which contained recommendations looking ahead to the strengthening

of U.S. foreign Intelligence capabilities in matters not necessarily

confined to the Cuba situation. Taking note of this, Dr.

nevertheless thought that the Board should make sure that It knows

what 1s going on In Cuba today and what are the intelligence and

related actions which are being taken by the U.is. Intelligence

community with respect to the Soviet presence In Cuba.

Dr. Baker, referring to theBoard's December 28 Interim report

on Cuba,

that this is one of the most searching and far sighted

that the Board has produced, and he noted that the DCI's written

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response to this report was devestatingly empty and inadequate.

Dr. Baker saw no excuse for the fact that the DIA had been afforded

only two days notice to comment on the Board's report prior to the

submission of views by the DCI.X (Dr. Langer

thought It incredible

that the DCI had given DIA only two days to comment on the Board's

December 28 Interim report.) It was Dr. Baker's thöught that such

a procedure was contrary to the general agreement which had been

previously reached with Mr. Bundy. (in a discussion between Messrs.

Bundy, Baker and Coyne) that white House action memoranda flowing

from Board recommendations would go directly to the agencies pr1-*

marily concerned. with regard to the latter point, Mr. Coyne

observed that Mr. Bundy had in this instance acquiesced with the

DCI's request that the DCI obtain and report the coordinated views

of the varlous U.S. Intelligence agencies concerned with the

matters covered in the Board's report:

Dr. Langer pointed out to Dr. Land that at the Board's last

(which Dr. Land had been unable to attend) the Board had

been briefed on current aspects of the Cuba situation.

Dr. Land',

pursuing the point which he had raised, hoped that the Board would

be able to avoid the submission of a "boiler plate" report on the

errors made in the intelligence handling of the soviet bulld-up in

Dr. Land said he thought that the draft of the final Böard

report now before he Board was a good effor, but he hoped that

It would not draw from the agencies involved a book covering past

errors.

It was Dr. Land's view that in the intelligence system there

should be someone who knows

the whole story and can inform the Board

fully about 1t. Dr. Land's concern was that the intelligence ele-

ments involved may have been inept and that a year from now they

would be repeating the errors spotted in the Board's report, unless

the Board can get the agency heads, to accept the Board's help in

profiting. from lessons learned so that mistakes can be avoided in

the future.

Mr: Cliffora observed that there 1s a question of timing 1n-

volved in the Board's present Cuba review, because the Board was

under a special assignment from the President to prepare a report

Mr. Clifford thought that the Board would do a better service ir

It made a hard hitting report and recommendations, and then after

an appropriate interval the Board should ascertain whether the

recommendations were being put into effect and urge action on

those which the Board might find were not being Implemented.

Dr. Land

suggested that the Board should complete its work

on the present draft of its Cuba report and then take steps..

to get to

the heart of things with respect to intelligence plans and programs

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regarding Cuba. He added that the Board's responsibilities go to

the effectiveness of the institution and framework within which

the U.S. Intelligence community operates,

the meeting of day-to-

day concerns which arise, and a determination as to whether re-

creation or reorganization is needed based on the "macsive approach"

represented by the draft report which the Board had before It.

Mr. Murphy expressed agreement with points made by Dr. Land.

It was Mr. Murphy's vlew that the intelligence community apparently

does not know enough about what is presently happening in Cuba, He

thought that photographic coverage was not enough and what was

needed was deep cover clandestine agent coverage of Cuba. Dr. Land

added that It was not enough for the Board to make recommendations

but there should also be a "violent surveliiance of their imple-

mentation.

Noting the agenda for the day, Mr. Murphy wondered what the

Charman had in mind as to the nature and purpose of the Board's

scheduled visit to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Gray recalled that

when Mr. Bundy had met with the Board previously he had suggested

that: In the course of the Board's Cuba review lt might well be use-

ful to discuss with the Secretary's of state and Defense, and the

Chairman of the JCS,

their views regarding the U.S. Intelligence

coverage given to the Soviet buildup In Cuba. Mr. Gray added that

1t was his impression that Mr. Bundy's suggestion had been basea

not only on the obtaining of facts pertinent to the Board's review

for Intelligence purposes, but also in anticipation of a Congressional

Investigation which might be made of the cuba experience.

Mr. Murphy thought It Important that the Board organize its

Interview to be had

with the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray suggested

that without going Into a re-hash of the chronological summary of

the Intelligence aspects, the Board's questions to Secretary Rusk

should Include those which would determine the Secretary's views on

what would have been done differently, from the vantage point of

hindsight, with respect to intelligence handling of the cuba devel-

opment; whether there was a proper weighing of the risks and the

incelligence advantages involved in overflights of Cuba, whether the

intelligence analysis and reporting processes were hindered by pre-

concelved views of U. s. "Sovietologists"

and whether raw intell1-

gence reports were adequately communicated to the white House Mr.

Gray recalling that Mr. Bundy had expressed to him the bellef that

the President should have been informed of the contents of some of

these reports regarding the sightings of offensive missiles in

prior to the photography of October 14):

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Lach

12 eling

January 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Cuba

In the course of the Board meeting of January 25, 1963,

the Board members and Mr.

Coyne met at the State

repartment

with the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Alexis Johnson

and Mr. Roger Hisman, Director of Intelligence and Research,

Department of State:

Utilizing the memorandum (copy attached) which contained a

series of questions which had heen drafted earlier In the day by

the Board, the Board members elicited Secretary Rusk!s views on:

a variety of Intelligence subjects pertaining to the pre-bulldup

and post-buildup period in Cuba

At the outset Secretary Rusk stated that the two Administra-

tions must share the responsibility for Cuba and

that cäch in turn

has taken full responsibillty for what was done or what was not

done during their

respective Administrations. He noted that Cuba

1s a national problem; that because of 1t

"we came up to the edge

of Incineration in the Western Hemisphere"'; and that he personally

has a deep anxiety over the question as to where we go from here.

He observed that in the case of a Communist take-over in Cuba or

anywhere else, It'Is easier to prevent the occurrence than it 1s

to correct 1t once 1t has taken place.

The Secretary was queried as to whether he agreed with the

Board's present finding that from October 14 onward there was an

effective performance by the Intelligence community In supplying

support in the policy decision process with respect tence comma

situation.

The secretary agreed stating the intelligence community

performance from October 14 onward was superb. He stated that this

performance enabled the panels of the NSC Executive Committee to

recommend the establishment of positions on which the Government

as a whole could and didyact.

Secretary Rusk was next queried as to whether he agreed with

the Board's present findings that, prior to October 14. the intell1-

gence performance was clearly deficient and that perhaps this de-

ficlency was not fully known to the Department of State at the time.

The Secretary observed that this was a complex question and aw

difficult one to answer.

• He felt it was terribly important that

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as an outgrowth of the review of how the intelligence community

acquitted Itself, we not paralyze the community

as was done by

the Robert's Commission on Pearl Harbor day":

He observed that

from the point of view of high policy we have got to depend on

people who see a great Inflow of information and we must depend

on them to give us balanced judgments, particularly In such a

large area of operation as the Department of State wherê over

thousand cables are received and dispatched dally.

The Secretary stated that it was his impression that in mid

September 1962 the intelligence

community did not expect the soviet

Union to put MRBMs or IRBMs in Cuba; that this was the impression

at higher policy-advisory levels; and that because of this over-

all judgment 1t 1s possible that intelligence analysts were

diverted from the main point, namely, that offensive missiles:

were going In.

He thought this diversion might also have beent

based upon the September 19 estimate of the intelllgence community

and that that estimate might have had the effect uf the analysts

feeling that they should pursue

a hands off attitude"

anything that came up which concerned the UssR's introduction of

offensive missiles..

He sald the lesson to be learned from this is

that some means must be found to assure that we do not take any-

thing for granted in these areas. Also a means must be found for

stimulating the expression of reservation at pollcy levels, noting

that 1t 1s not easy to make these reservations operaticnal

The Secretary staled that 1f one looks: at the problem'of

intelligence

in terns of the time factors Involved he thought

one would find that even before October l4 our intelligence was

"pretty good"

He observed that except for two of the long-rangen

sites, overflighis ten days earlier than October 14 would, have

seen nothing.

Mr. Murphy noted that the last observation of the Secretary

seemed to suggest exclusive dependence on photographs.

To this

the Secretary observed that in 1ts interim report the Board had

called attention to the need for re-enforcing classical intell1-

gence means,

The Secretary said that he agreed with the Boardys

point and that he considered ite tremely important. He said the

Department 1s prepared to provide rover to the CIA, but that

other means must be developed as soon as possible; otherwise 1f

there 1s undue dépendenceon diplomatic cover embarrasments -would

become greatly increased. He noted that already the United States

Government has had "

many problem cases! Involving CIA cover. He

noted also that a good rule is now being followed In this area,

a rule which precludes a CIA agent to target in his country of

assignment une Secretary emphasized the view that our government

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has "under-played old fashioned espionage".

He observed that it

1s easy to fly U-2s but that such flights inevitably bring up

international problems since they violate sovereignty; and there-

fore the Department of State welcomes the idea of beefing up

traditional esplonage activities which are not dependent upon

diplomatic cover.

The Board next inquired as to whether the Secretary belleved

that the interests and requirements of the intelligence community

were aggressively spoken for at the policy level during the pre-

October 14 period.

He responded that the United States would have

been better off with more intensive air (U-2 plane) coverage during

the period beginning October l, but at that time reports were

sketchy,

there was the problem of the stand-down of the U-? because

of the Chinat loss, weather conditions were not optimum, etc. Re-

verting to the principal question asked of him the Secretary expressed

the view that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group operated adequately and 1s

now operating adequately.

He said that he is in touch with the Group

from time to time on its plans and he noted that on the matter of in-

telligence collei ion flights we have run 2500 peripheral flights

around the Soviet Union and every one of them is to some degree

dangerous.

He said that the President and he personally examine

the particularly sensitive flights that are proposed.

that in the State Department Intelligence requirements of the

community are accepted in this area and that the Department goes

along with the overwhelming number of flights proposed.

He said

that in the case of Cuban overflights he personally made two sug-

gestions during the period in question.

The first involved the step-

up of peripheral flights around Cuba as a cover for putting flights

over the island when we wanted to and he said that he had told the

OAS representatives about this noty that the "rioks of strays"

of such peripheral flights was

His second suggestion

Involved breaking up one or two proposed flights into segments of

four flights (the Board members were fully cognizant of this.

Mr. Gray made reference to the delays which necessarily resulted

from breaking the proposed mission into a four-segmented one. He

inquired of the Secretary as to whether he had been advised of the

fact that delays would necessarily result from his suggested amend-

ment of the mission.

The Secretary replied in the negative.

At this point Dr. Land observed that there is not enough

personified

pressure from intelligence; that a concentrated

statement of intelligence requirements and purposes should be

constantly served up to the policy level from suspicious intelli-

gence personalities and that these, of course, should be subject

to ultimate decision by the Secretary of State and others of high

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524-

authority.

The Secretary took issue with a portion of Dr. Land's

statement on the grounds that it assumed that there is no one in

the intelligence community who has any polloy responsibility.

The Secretary sald that he thought this was incorrect because

the Director of Central Intelligence frequently acted as one

having volicy responsibilities.

The Secretary observed that while the intelligence needs are

great there are other requirements which the United States must

take into account and that these must all be balanced out. Her

emphasized again at this point that overflying another country

in peacetime is a difficult thing.

The Secretary

then reverted to the question of traditional

espionäge and expressed the view that "we have gotten a little s

lazy on espionage".

He noted that during World War II excellent

espionage results were obtained by virtue of a "most fabulous:

combination of blue bloods and thugs"

"The Secretary favored

resumption now of this world War II practice.

At this point Dr.

Killlan Inquired of the Secretary as to

whether he was satisfied that Mr. McCone's report on Cuba dated:

December 26th reflects a fair statement of the state Departments

The Secretary said he had been unable to examine theo

report fully; that he had complete confidence in the relationships

which his Department has with Mr. McCone, but that he would take

exception to

"the juxta-position of things on the four-flight

Mr. Hilsman Joined the Secretary In this view.

Secretary urged that the Board members be as analytical as pos-

sible in examining the Cuba situation. He encouraged them to

remember the

"atmosphere of the times

He hoped the Board would

las precise as possiblel in examining the overflight matter

stating that

"iffyou think the U-2 1s not serious, you are on the

wrong track"

Gray indicated that it was the Board's understanding that

the President approved all overflights recommended, and he then

suggested that apparently there were some flights that were not

rejected, but neither were they made.

To this the Secretary

stated that what ought to be looked at were the flights that

were laid on from September 20 to October 5 or 6.

He noted that

during this perlod, following the September 19 estimate of the

Intelligence. community on Cuba, there was some deay. in distrib-

uting reports from refugee and agent sources on the sightings fof

long-range missiles in Cuba.

He again noted that just prior to:

this period there was a loss of a Chinat overated u-2 over the

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China mainland on September 9.

On the latter point Dr. Langer

Inquired whether the Secretary felt that flights over Cuba were

in the same category as flights over the Soviet Union or over

The Secretary responded in the negative noting: that "we

felt much greater freedom of action in the case of Cubal Mr.

Hillsman added on this point that the USIB felt that two U-a

flights a month over cuba were adequate.

The Secretary recalled that early in October he was requested

to authorize overflights based on indications of two specific sites

and he sald he immediately approved.

Mr. Gray observed that there appeared to be some confusion as

to whether we had a pollcy of not overflying SA-2 sites, and

Secretary Johnson responded that the matter of overflying SA-?!s

Invariably came up in the Special Group but that he could not recall

prohibition on overflying such sites:

Secretary Johnson added

that in the Spoclal Group he could not recall any kind of operation

ever being recommended where the atmosphere was as relaxed as it

was In the case of recommendations pertaining to the cuba problem.

Mr. Hisman stated that at the operational level there was

concern about losing a pilot over cuba.

Consequently a CORONA

Mission was programmed for Cuba from September 21 to September 24

Mr : H11sman

thought.this.concern. over..the.loss.oramanmay have

been a factor which contributed to the low number of U-2 flights

The Secretary was asked whether he was satisfied with the

national estimating process and whether he considered that State

Department participation therein was provided for adequately

The Secretary thought that State Department participation in the

preparation of national Intelligence estimates was adequately

provided for. He said that from the point of view of the polloy

officer it is essential that he know what the intelligence people

that on the other hand the

policy officer wants to avoid

taking the

intelligence view as "the Bible"

find a way for the Intelligence community to and he wishes, to

"throw in contrary

Indicators

In their estimatos in order that they might be flagged

for the policy maker.:

The Secratary vas then asked 1f he felt that the Intelligence

community analytical, estimative and reporting lunctions in the

cuba situation were hindered by international political consider-

ations or by preconceived vlews of "Sovietologists! regarding Soviet

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Intentions with respect to Cuba,

The Secretary responded that

he did not belleve that the "Sovletologists" did what has been

claimed. He did not belleve that they had much influence on

estimates:: He thought,

however, he detected an insufficient

alertness on their part to the possibility that the estimates.

ofthe intelligence community were wrong. He expressed the

on this point that the direct indicators came in

after the September

19 estimate was prepared.

The Secretary was next queried as to whether we are currently

informed in an adequate manner about Soviet objectives and activ

1ties in Cuba today. The Secretary responded that the principal

gap 1s our inability to prove the negative because of the absence

of on-site inspections.

He said we are running overflights regu

larly; that we have improved our cooperation with allied govern-s

In Cuba; but that we do not know for certain what the Soviet

objectives are Insofar as Cuba is concerned.

When queried as to U.S. Government knowledge as to the

purpose of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba and as to what Mikoyan accom=

plished, the Secretary stated that he thought we know a great

deal about the Mikoyan mission. He noted that for ten days:

Castro would not talk to Mikoyan.

He said that we are getting

mụch better Information regarding Castro and particularly Castro's

efforts in inspiring other Latin American countries. The Secre-

the thought that the soviet Union may be deciding

that Cuba is not the proper base from which to launch their Latin

American operations. He said rewarding gains have been made ing

attempting to obstruct travel between Cuba and the Free World.

He conceded, however, that we do not have the Cuba-Russian plan

adding that we have not penetrated the Cuban regime

hopes we might be able to later.

The Secretary was asked with reference to the Monroe Doctrine,

whether the Department of State has urged an aggressive intelligence

collection effort to define any new violation of the Doctrine. The

Secretary thought it would not be too profitable to concentrate on

this pointend it would be more profitable to concentrate on the

Rio Pact.

He agreed, however, that the Doctrine 1s violated by

the presence of the Marxist-Leninist system in the Western Hemis-

phere for he said there is no question whatever about the Soviet

presence in Cuba:

In conclusion the Secretary stated that he thought "our

intelligence on Cuba today is not complete but it 1s not deficient.

Vanil (of

racrick Coy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Cuba

In the course of the Board meeting of January 26, the Boar

members and the writer met'at the Pentagon with General Maxwell

Caylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which time the

members discussed with Gensral Taylor the series of questions

set forth in the attachment to this memorandum. The highlights

of the discussion follow.

General Taylor felt that the perfo mance of DIA during the

Cuba period was

on the whole good

-in fact Indispensable.

different had they been here.

912400

job that.he could

no General Taylor disparaged the value of the refugee reports

onanating from Cuban exiles in Florida durins the month's preceding

the crisis.

He sald most of their information as unrellable

although on reflection he concluded that some reports vere in fact

rellable.

When General Taylor vas asked by a Board member ether

the intelligence conmunity's estimating and reporting functions

could have been hindered oy pre-concelved.views. of. Sovietologists

regarding soviet indications with respect to Cuna, Genenal Paylor

stated that either khrushcher was stupid or ve were

Hers aa ai

WIn the minds

of most of us we just didn't

think that, the soveus

would put nuclear weapons on the island." He added that the dirth

or U-2 flights over Cuba prior to Sac's discovery vas occastoned

by the shoot-down of a U-2 over the Chinese communist mabnland

(causing us to go slow on authorizing U-? anywhere),

and the n

highly unsatisfactory weather conditions which prevailed in the

Caribbean during the period preceding the discovery on october 14

DI. Killian asked whether DIA had been as effective as 1t

might have been and General Taylor responded that particularly d

after October 14 it had done, such an excellent job that he could

not suggest any way of improving on it. He said that in the

pre-October 14 period the intelligence community wasn't going

at full steam.

He added that all efforts In the Mongoose

Comnittee to achieve e, better intelligence, pase produced very

little and that in the Mongoose Committee we never received

any urgent information of value on Cuba."

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N1'. Pace Inquired as to why Guantanamo had not been used

more extensively as a base for the acquisition of intelligence.

-General Taylor responded that "we may have viewed it as a Sacred

CON.

He had a feeling that the Navy might consider enlarged

intelligence activitles at Guantanamo as prejudicing the u.s.

Naval base there.

Mr. Pace Inquired as to whether the intelligence community

had been sufficlently agressive in placing 1ts requirements on

the Special Group and on the Mongoose Committee. General Taylor

responded to the effect that he knew of no intelligence requests

emanating from the community that were not supported fror higher

levels.

In an aside General Taylor mentioned that when the

missiles were discovered in Cuba

Vi was a hawk"

meaning that

he favored the launching of the U.s. military

strike agalns.tsn

the missile bases in Cuba,, General Doolittle asked whether at

the present time General Taylor feels he is getting sufficient

Intelligence on Cuba. General Taylor responded "obviously not"

adding that "photographir Intelligence is practically all we are

getting today.

General Taylor stated that

"Most of us are

well aware of the trailty of our intelligence system - we can

beat the DoI over the head but he just can't produce the:

Intelligence we need.

Dr. Killian elicited General Taylor's recommendations on

the Special NSC 5412/2 Group asking whether the General had anv

constructive suggestions to make in light of his having chalred

the special Group prior to his appointment as Chalimon of the

Joint Chiefs of Stafr. General Taylor had no specific suggestions

He noted that as Chairman of the Special Group he d

always had the feeling that representatives of the President e

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board vere closely examining covert

action progroms and were constantly soing around the world to see.

what the intelligence community was doing both in the intelligence

and covert action field. He said that this activity on the part

of the Board gave him a good feeling a feeling of insurance a

in his capacity as Chairman of the Special Group. General Taylor.

added that "If your Board didn't exist we would häve to invent you.

Mr. Clifford stated that he had the Impression that relations

between defense and CIA were not too close and General Taylor

expressed the hope that that was not in fact the case. General.

Taylor recognized, however, that there was a feeling of consider-

able rivalry between CTA and Defense, particularly SAC, when

responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance over Cuba was transferred

General Taylor sald he favored the transfer of

the flights,that CIA was really Cassandra-like on this issue and

that is where the animosity arose.

(Me. McCone later deniedito

the Board that CIA opposed the transfer but the Board's files

clearly reflect that clawas in violent opposition; that t

protestea che mights coche white House both orallyrand a

writing; and that the animosity became so severe that Deputy Di recion

•covie on crAdad not even

peak to the Director NRO Conca

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period of days,

after SAC's first flight brought back the

first photogranhi, evidence of intermediate range nuclear

missiles In Cuba.)

General Taylor volunteered the view that the creation

of the DIA will Improve rather than

between Defense and CIA although he acknowledged that there

w117 always be some rivalry between civilian intelligence

collectors in CIA and military Intelligence collectors in

DIA and the services.

To this Mr. Pace observed that some

rivalry is good and healthy.

Finally, when queried about the posture of service attaches

General Taylor noted that he had recently returned from a lengthy

trip in the course of which he visited with a number of the:

attaches and he had found that they had "improved enormously"

over prior times.

J. Patrick Coyne

Enclosure.

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SPECIAL LIMITED DISLBUTION

PRESIDENTIS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 25, 1963

TOP. SECRET

OXCART

MEMGRANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of January 25 - 26, 1963

For the information of the Board members the following documents.

are enclosed:

Tab 1:

Tao 2:

Tab 3:

Tab 4:

Tab 5:

Tab 6:

Tabl 7:

Tab 8:

Memorandum for the President from the Board dated

January 19, 1963, concerning the handling of OXCART

and of projects in the Department of Defense associ

ated with OXCART.

Board's Interim Report to the resident dated

December 28, 1962, and the Dol's 1/22/63 response thereto.

Draft of final report to the President on the

Board's comprehensive study of intelligence

activities relating to the military buildup in Cuba.

Memorandum for the Chairman from Mr. McGeorge Bundy.

dated January 9, 1963, concerning Presidential 19=

structions relative to control of intelligence intone

mation on offensive weapons in Cuba:

Memorandun on Mr. Ash's review of Special Group

records pertaining to developments in Cuba.

CIA memorandum concerning cable correspondence betveen

CIA headquarters and Mr.

Mc Cone while in Europe

(August 30 - September 21, 1962)

General Chronology of Events In Cubar 2957= 1962,

prepared by the Board's stäff.*

General Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the

Military Ruildup in Cuba, prepared by the Board's

staff.*

Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board

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- 2

Tab 9:

Memorandum concerning CIA Field Station Reporte

(received by NSC or white House staff elements)

dealing with the military buildup prior to

October 14, 1962.*

Tab 10:

CIA Memorandum concerning the Caribbean Admissions

Center, Opa locka, Florida.*

Tab 11:

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy from Mr. Ray Cline, CIA,

entitled "The Effect of Weather on Overflights

of Cuba, 29 August - 14 October 1962':

Tab 12:

the Director of Central Intelligence to the

Report by Intelligence Community Activities Relating

Board.on.

to the Cuban Arms Bulldup!

Tab 13: Letter to the Chalrman from Mr. Murphy dated Dec. 8, 1962.

J. Patrick Coyne

Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: CUBA (Revion on 1/10,63 of Records of the

Special NSC: 5412/2 Group)

On 1-10-63 tha writer reviewed

In the offices of Mr. Iom

Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group,

records of the special troup

which Mr. Parrott Identified as

relating to considerations given by the Special Group io recon-

naissance and covert action operations w1th regard to Cuha.

Mr. Parrott from his

the subject

prepared for another purpose.)

There follows a detailed summary of the results of a

review made

by the writer of the Cuba 1tems referred

to in

Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum; and of other Iteng which

the welter reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining

to Cuba.

Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group

(augmented) =

"MONGOOSE"

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting

of the Spectal Group (Augmented)

Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson,

Mr. Gilpatric,

Mr. liccone, General Carter, General Lemnitzer,

General Lansdale,

and Dr. Cline for part of the meetings.

The Grous noted a

paper presented by che state Department

member concerning "Guideline for a post-Castro Political

Prozram.

General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agênts

now in cuba,

Including legal residents, plus infiltrated teams.

It was decided that a CIA proposal, for resupply of agent teams

and possibl!

of resistance groups, should be deferred pending

a broader review of the entire situation.

General Taylor

specifled, however, that if an ungent need arose for air supply

at any time,

the proposal could be made to the special Group

(Augmented).

Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that a sizable

number of intelligence reports were coming out of Cuba,

jargely on political and economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized

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that no high-level penetration of the cuban Government had been

achieved.

In anever to a question frum the ittorney General,

Lansdale said that intelligence Indicated that although

there was widespread dissatisfaction with Castro, there vas

rallying point for active opposition.

The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need

for an effort to obtain

hard intelligence on subversive.act1v1-

by the Castro regime in

the Hemisphere,

Mr. McCone noting

that such efforts to date had

been fruitless.

Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance

coverage of cuba.

Mir. Mccone emnhasized that his program has

developed complete information on deployments and facilities

for the army, Navy, and Alr Force, and he particularly noted

that these missions have verified

that there is sufficiens

logistic support for a

,75,000-man military foice.

"No missile

sites have been found.

The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward

end of July, with participation by the secretaries of State

and Defense.

General Taylor enphasized that in the preparation

for such revier, there mould be a need for summaries of results

to date, of Intelligence developed, and of future

alternatives opened to the United States

including possible

activities in other parts of Latin Americal.

Johnson said that the State Department 1s Inves 1gating

the possibillties for suboldlzing Japanese purchases of Dominican

to divert. purchases from Cuba and thereby deprive Cuba

o1 a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked that MONGOOSE

operational representatives lock into this further.

Mr. McCone

that the cIA could use unvouchered funds for this vurpose,:

out it would be Illegal to use covert funds as a means of

evadine the intent of congress.

Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting

of the Spectal Group (Augmented)

Those present for this meeting with ragard to Operation

MONGOOSE ere the

Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. GIpatrIc;

General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, Generai Carter, and Mr. Wilson.

The attorney General Informed the Group that higher authority

was concerned about progress on

the MONGOOSE progran and felt

that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage

operat1ons..

The Attorney General wondered 1f a new 100k were

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not renuired in view of the meager results obtained, especlally

1n. the

sabotage field; and he urged.

"massive activity" within

the entire MONGOOSE

framework.

General Lanadale thought that another attempt should be

made against the major target which had been the subject of

three unsuccessful missions and he sald that six new missions

were in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson sald that the "massive activity" would have

to come from within, and he hoped to be able tu present soon

to the Grono a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand,

fully reallzing that this will give additional

VIsIbll1.ty. to

thelr activities.

Mr. McCone reserved Judgment on the feasi

bility and

desirability of such a program; and Mr. Johnson

agreed that he nad reservations

as well.

Mr. McCone said that he had received the Impression

that although. h1gh levels of our Government wanted. increased

activity, they still want to keep it at i low nolse level,

but Mli'.

Mecone did not belleve this would be possible and

felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States.

Mi. Mecone cited the enornous number of telephone calls

directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east

and the time that the cuban exile students. shot up the

apartment house..

McCone therefore urged that responsible

orsicals be prepared to accent a higher noise love: if they

want to get on with operations.:

The Attorney General,

n partial rebuttal, said that the

reasons people had such concern were. (a) the fact that the skin

c..vers were Anericans, and (b) the fact ühat the stucent activity

was Irresponsible and

fool1sh-- and if either of these had

In fact been engineered by the United States it would, have

been a sreat mistake.

The Attorney General also related

possibility of attributabllity to the importance of the

particular undertaling, and he questioned whether we are going

right road

whether more

"direct action"

were not

Indicated.

He urged that alternative and imaginative plans

be developed.

McCone sald that Internal restrictions are 30 rigid

that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed.

that the current guldelines did not call for

Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous

efforts necessary. to insure that operations such as the sabotage

operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on

the United States.

(After discussion, the Group agreed that

1t was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure

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nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)

Mr. Gilpatric Informed the Group that the Defense Depart-

ment

was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recrults:

would be trained

from four to five months and then placed on

call for any future action.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff.1s refining

various contingency military plans based on a variety of

Pens presence of bioc offensive weapona in Cuba":

situations, Including Soviet action against Berlin;

; an attack

against Guantanano; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion

In the Hemisphere; and "the establlshment of a direct threat

to the United States."

D. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this

Group meating for an item regarding.

reconnaissance of Cuba.

It was pointed out that the CIA 1s

"restricted to usins its

high-performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba,

because of SAM sites.

It was questioned whether this was

reasonable restriction at that time, particularly nen

SAMs

were

almost certainly not operational.

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described

a spectrum

of reconnaissance activitles which could befundertaken,.

low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to

the Agency's capabilitles, particularly equipped

with new radar

countermeasures.

As a result of the discussion there was agree-

nent thät the Department of Defense and the CIA should get

together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require:

coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this

coverage.

A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when

Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities,

including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

There was some discussion of the desirability of mining

made and

cuban vat fald by small aircraft operated by cubans.

using nonattributable mines appearing to be home-

It was agreed that the Attorney General would act, as

Chairman of the Speclal Group (Augmented) for the time being.

It was agreed that four major points which had emerged

were: (1) we ought to go all-out for. increased

Intelligence: 12 there should be considerably more sabotage;

(3) restrictions on attributabillty can be relaxed so that

training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and

(4) all efforts should be made to develor new and imaginative

approaches to the vossibillty of getting riu of the castro regime:

In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject

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(continuation of

footnote from previous page)

"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it 1s stated:

"The DOI pointed out that the

Agency is now restricted to using the u2 ln

the

southeastern quadrant

of Cuba, because of SAM sites.

It was questioned whether this was

reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the sars were

almost certainly not operational.

Beside this item in ene

sumnary

memorandum, there appears the penciled notation

"Also agreed

should

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Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting

of the Speclal Group (Ausmented)

Fresent for this meeting vere the Attorney General,

Mr. Bundy, Mi. Johnson, Mr.

Gilpatric,

General Taylor,

Mr. Mo-

Cone, Mr.

Wilson, Dr. Claryk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley,

and Colonel Ledford, CIA.

The Group discussed various possibilltles of accomplish-

Ing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from

low-level. coverage

by tactical.a1rcraft to high-performance aircraft and drones.

Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

agreed that the first priolity1s one high-performance missior

In the western part of

the island, to be accomplished by all-

out clINt support, and depending on the results of

number of similar

sorties might be mounted.

The first mission

was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on

the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to

be discussed at the USIs nd by the Chiefs on Wednesday,

October 10. )

Along with the minutes of this october 9 Meeting there

vas in file a memorandum fron Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated

October 11, 1962.

It was reilected in Mr. Parrott's memorandur

thạt Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M, to say he and Mi.

McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight

would be flown as a milltary flight with a sac pilot.

wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight;

simply to avold any delay.

The SAc pilot would require some

additional training because the equipment in the improved

new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone

apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it vas

hoped to get the flight off over the weekend.

stated in Mi. Parrott's memorandum that 1t seemed agreed that

the terns of the authorization given by higher authority

1t iould be necessary to go back for coproval

of the next

• contemplating tuo or three more high-performance missions,,

and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel ühat the discussion which had

taken place with highn authority was explicit enough to get

an emergency authority by telephone.

Mr. Farrott further 1n-

Bundy that the Cover Committes (Messrs. Charyk,

Hilsmar,

scoville, Parrott,

"et al.) had met that morning and

had agreed on

story for a military phlot and a

revised cover story for civilian pilots,

iith the necessary

changes it was thought that the cover story

would be ready

that afternoon.

Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on

the milltary side, the flight is characterized

as military

reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with part-

reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to

the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing survell-

lance activities, (A penciled note on the file copy of th1a

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memorandum read:

"Later was delayed due to disagicement on

account of training required.

There was

also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the above-

„Il memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mir. Bundy,

stating:

"Later.

The memorandum related that, according

Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11)

that these

f11chts must be either entirely overt or entirely

covert,

he dien't particularly care

which so long

as they

accomplished

as soon as possible.

• In Mr: Victone's absence,

General Carter had

come to an agreement with General McKee,

Chief of Staff of the A1r Force, along those lines on

October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric sald that this was

not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher

autnority.

Mr'. Gilpatric felt that the ldca was that a uniformedi

p1loù should operate the Agency's vehicle.

On Oclipoer 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with

Mr. Bandy and

operation was ready to 50 except for weather, and that this

would hold it up until at least sunday, and meantime the SAC

pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed

that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time

the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all

other arrangements within the Agency framework.

If the pilot

vere not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission

would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.., with

a civillan 3110t.

According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had üaken

the followint actions at its

October 10, 1962 meeting with

respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6:

(1.)

The Group I targets were not discussed by UsIR, the impli-

cation being that there was no problem from the point of view

of USIB's jurisdiction.

(2) Groups II and JII should be

covered

as tapidly as

possible Initially, and after that the

frequency of coverage would be further examined. (3).

was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with

Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of pilorty,

and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17.

did not consider any operational aspects, but confined them-

gelves to the importance of the targets and the frequency

of coverage.

Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group

The following summarizes the minutes of the speclal Groy.

Meetings which were identifled by Mr. Parrott as Including

consideration of the subject ef cuba.

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Minutes of Rebruary 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Groun

This meeting vas attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,

nir. Gilpatric, and Mr, Helms.

On the

sublect of Cuba, the Chalman read his memorandum

to higher

authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up

to that time. The memorandum from General Lanedale suggesting

a different

approach to the content of che manutas of the

meeting of the preceding week on Cuna was discussed, and it

was agreed that the minutes mould stand

as prepared.

General

Lanadale's report of February1 on popular support for the

OAS meeting was distributed.

Mr. Parrott's sunmary states

that the choe mlssions were stepped up from one per month.

to two per month.

Minutes of June l4e 962 Meeting of the Speelal alouD

This nestins was attended by General Parlor, lii. Johnson,

Mr. Ailpatric, and General Carter..

suinject of "Request for special Cuban Missions,"

1r wes stated

ühat the CoriOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was

approved.

lA handwritten notation on the file copy of these

minutes

staved that

wigher authority Inforined

June 15 about

poss1b1l1ty of uprising,

and there was aiso a notation that

the June 13 menorandun regarding the cOMOR request had been

"rewritten cor hook.")

Minules of the uly 12, 1962 Meetinuor the Brectal froup

The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests

for authorizations.

In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect

agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule

of two flights per month.

General Taylor asired that for the

purpose of discussing this matter with highen authority, cIA

should prepare a paper on Cuca, setting forth a summary of

Inf rmation which had been obtained to date, the number of

missions mounted,

what le proposed to be looired at in the

future, and the frequency of further coverag? desired.

Memorandum for the President from the Speclal Group,

JUly 20, 1952

The Special Group records contain a memurandum for the

President from General Taylor dated July

20, 1902, bearing a

handwritten notation by General Taylor,

"App.oved by H. A.

(presumably

higher authority', 20 July 1962,"

In essence,

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the memorandum to the president was as follous:

In the special Group we are aware that we have been

proceeding on a day-by-day baals in requesting authority

for overflight reconnaissance.

At our meeting yesterday,

ve took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements

next few months and agreed that the following

15 the minimin which msets milltary reguire-

• * Cuba: Two flights monthly ...

with. CIA civilian pilots

We wouin like

to set your approvalin principle of the foregoing

program with the understanding-that on the firot of each

month you w1l1 be presented

with the spectflc flights

recommended for that month.

Minutes of furust 2, 1262 Meeting of the Srecial Group ,

Those present vere General Taylor, Mr. HicCone, 15. Hilsma:,

and Mr.

Willian Bundy.

On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated

that the croup agreed that the second mission authorized for

August should be flown whenever the DOI decides that the in-

mediate situation with

respect to soviet material justifies

It was noted that this would use up existing authority

for August,

and if a third mission should necome necessary

later in the month, it should be considered on lus merits-at

that time.

¡nutes of Aust 30, 1362 Meeting Of the Speclal Groun

precent were General Taylor, Mr. Joincon, Mr. 011-

patric, General lennitzer and Mr. Bundy.

The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's

monthly forecast,

General carter mentioned that there might be

an additional requiroment for flights over cuira.

(In the

"Memorandu for the Record,

Detober 21, 1962, on the subject

"Reconnaissance of Cuba,

attached hereto,

there appears beside

the item dealing with.

this meeting the penciled notation

"primarily low-level.")

Munutes of Septenber 10, 1262 Meetina of the Secoil Grous

Those present at this meeting, wnlch took place in Mr.

the Attorney

Bundy's office, were the secretary of Staie, land others.

General,

the Acting: Director of Central Intelligence,

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The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's

planned coverage of cuba, involving extensive peripheral

coverage as well

two legs.directly over Cuban air space,

al1 In one flight.

He said he had no objection to the

peripheral parts and, in fact, thought lt userud to continue

to establish our richt to rly

over international. waters.

the other hand;

recognized the necessity of outalning vertical.

coverage of the

Isle of Pines and

the eastern portion of Cuba

at this time.

He felt, however, that st was unwise to combine

extensive overflying of International waters with actual over-

He pointed out that the long peripheral rights

would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should

the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight nái

occurred,

this. would out the United States in a very poor position

for standing on lts rights to overily Internalonal waters.

Talang these views into account, the Agency's plans to

break this proposed coverage into four paris:

the Isle of Pines;

the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and tro legs along

coast, one north and

one south.

within this framework, higher authority gave approval this

additional

missions to be added to the one for

which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will i-

siven to the two overflights.

¡A notation on the file copy

Special Group minutes states that as of this morning

it appears

that weather will not permit a flight until at least,

Friday, and longer,

range weather prospects are nou very good,

consequently 1t will be some little time before these three

authorizations are used up.

In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Speclal

Group records contain

a note. for the file dated October 25,

1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of

Pigs area should be looked at since 1t had not been seen since

Time over mainland would be 12% minutes for a total

•.. • depth of penetration, 13 miles

•• nearest

knoim SAM site,

35 miles away.

Tie fle note further.

that after considerable negotiation with

the Department of

was agreed that this additional coverage would be

accomplished.

(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a

memorandun from: Mr.

Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense

Gilpatric dated November 30,

1962, chare was an addendum which

Mr. Bundy said on

13 September 1962 that hel

thought the

intent of higher authority's approval was such that

the entire number of four missions would be considered as being

approved.: This thus extends the outstanding authorizations

from three to four.")

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Minutes of September It, 1962 Meeting of the Sreclel Jroup

Those present were Hir. Burly, Mr. Johnson, Mr. NItze;

General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

coverado of certain targets in Cuba.

It vas noted that the

Secretäry of Defense did not wish this operation considered

funther until the results of Agency reconnalasance in the same

area became avallable.

efforts will be required to identify certain installations,

the nature. of nich is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley:

listributed charts for the monthly book, on supplenenting

cLINt coverage of cuba which was begun today.

The Group

had no objection to these missions.

It was agreed that

Joint

Reconnalssance Center should

keep an eye on all military

reconnalosance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area.

(The Special Group record of these minutes 1s contained 1n

a memorandum dated November 30, 1902, from Mr. Pom Parroti

to Deputy secretary of Defense GIlpatric.)

Minutes

of september 27, 1962 Meeting of the Spectal Groun

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. G1lpatrlc,

General. Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

'CIA's October forecast of reconnalogance actlvlties was

noted.

The special miosion request for Cuba was approved.

This urlnes the number of authorizations for this area back to

four, 1.c., four had been previously authorized and one has

been

successfully completed, leaving authority for three out-

standing.

Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Speclal Group

A memorandum prepared for the special Group records by:

Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date

tivo U-? missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved,

and that these were concirred In by higher authority. It is

reflected that after the 15th of October adaitional coverage

was agreed on at other meetings, but the special Group was not

convened for this purpose.

Mencrandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy. Secretary Gilpatric,

November 30, 1262

The Special Group

records contain a copy of a menorandum

(previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy

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Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962.

The

memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared

In answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the

preceding day for minutes of the speclal meetings of the

Special Group which bore on Cuban

reconnaissance, in order

that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed.

It was

stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General

Taylor lad been present on August 30 and had then returned

to the Group on Septemoer 27.

It was further stated that at

the meetings of the oth and

20th of September the subject.of

Cuba réconnaissance did not arise.

The memorandum then pointed

out that the meeting of September

10 vas not a regular meeting

of the Snecial Group but had nevertheless resulted in particu-

larly significant decisions.

The memorandum then went on

to

set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and

27.

A. Russell Ash

Attachinent

Gontrel Sistem

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21 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba

Following is a chronological resume of considerations by

the Speclal Group (5412) and the Special Group (Augmented) of U-2

reconnaissance activitles over cuba.

This summary begins as of

1 May 1961 (1.e., after the Bay of Pigs).

It was agreed that pollcy approval for U-2

flights over Cuba is still in effect.

February 1962. The Cuba missions were stepped up from

one per month to two.

14 June 1962.

A COMOR recommendation: that two additional

flights be

authorized for June was approved by the Group.

12 July 1962.

(Augmented Group.)

Mr. McCone emphasized

that reconnaissance of Cuba has developed complete information on

deployment and facilities for the Army, Navy and Air Force, -and

that 1t has verifled the fact that there is sufficient logistics

support for a 75,000 man military force. No missile sites have

been found.

12 July 1902.

The Group agreed to continue with the

presentiy authorized schedule of two flights per month.

19 July 1962.

Cuba was considered as part of a set of

proposals covering reconnaissance world-wide.

The two flights per

month pattern was reiterated. (This was later approved by higher

author1ty.)

the second mission

authorized PAugust i should roup agrenever the Dot decides that

the Immediate situation with respect to soviet materiel justifies 1v.

It was noted that this would use up existing authorizations for

•August and if a third mission should become necessary later in the

month, it should be considered on its merits at triat time.

NOTE: Coordinated with Reber,

then shown

to General Carter who put a covering memo

on 1t. The Carter memo,

this one and a

compilation from the COMOR point of view,

done by Mr. Reber, were given to Mr.

McCone at the white House Just before

the 2:30 meeting today.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFOR

MATION REFERRING TO IDEALIST

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30 August 1962.

In connection with the

Agency's monthly

forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional

requirement for flights over Cuba.

10 September 1962.

At a special meeting attended by thes

Secretary of State,

the Attorney General, the Acting DOI and others,

the Secretary expressed concern over the Agency's planned coverage

of Cuba. He objected particularly to the proposal to combine ex-

tensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights.

As a result of this discussion, 1t was agreed that the Agency's pro-

posed coverage would have to be broken into four parts - one over the

Isle of Pines, one over the eastern end of Cuba, and two legs along

the coast - one north and one south. Within this franework higher

authority later gave approval for three flights in addition to those

already authorized, with priority to the overflights. (NOTE: The e

gency Later securea agreement to continue the Isle of Pines leg over

che Bay of Pigs area, after considerable negotiation with State

14 September 1962.

A JCS representative outllned the

capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba.

was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation

considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance. in the:

same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts

will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of

which is not clear at present.

27 September 1962. An additional mission for cuba was

approved.

4 October 1962 (Augmented Group•

The DOI pointed out

that the Agency is now restricted to using the U? in the south-

eastern quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites, It was questioned

whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly

since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational.

9 October 1962 (Augmentea: Group:

The Group discussed the

spectrun of possible reconnaissance activities.

It was agreed that

fIrst priority should be glen to one U-? in the western part of the

Island, Depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties

might be mounted. (Higher authority later approved the one mission,.

leaving the second proposition open.

15 October 1962.

At a special meeting,

two U-2 missions,

designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved.

These were concurred

In by higher authority.

After the 15th of october, additional coverage

agreed

on at other meetings.

The Speclal, Group was not convened for this

purpose.

Thomas As Parrott

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Of Specific Events Relating to the Military

II.

chronology

Buildup in Cuba

Presented below:1s a summary of Information on ühe subject

which has

assembled by the staff in a chronological arrange-

ment of selected excerpts of data received from Intelligence

community sources

and from public sources.

The chronology 18

somewhat incomplete because it does not include: (a) the all source

all community review which the DCI 1s making

at the request. (11/14/62)

of the Board,

(b) s1gn1ficant information In the files of the NSC

Special 5412/2 Group on Intelligence and covert actions relating to

Cuba, and

(c) all of the information belleved to have been submitted

to the White

House during the period of the military bullulp in Cuba.

1.

1Y2/59 - Castro proclaims provisional Government headed by

Urrutia as President.

12/31/59 - Cuba and Communist: China sign trade agreement

under

which cuba 1s to sell Pelping 50,000 tons of sugar.

4

2/4/60 - Mikoyan arrives to open a Soviet exhibition. On

2/13/60, Fidel Castro and Mikoyan sign a Joint Sovier-Cuban communt-

que describing their

of frank cordiality ,conversations as

"carried out in an atmosphere

2/13/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign trade and economic ald

agreement.

6.

2/20/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with

East Germany.

3/31/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with

Poland; with Czechoslovakia on 6/10/60; with Communist China on

7/23/60; with Hungary on 9/15/60; with Bulgaria on 10/7/60; and with

rumania on 10/20/60.

During this perlod Cuba established diplomatic

relations with these countries and with North Korea, North Vietnam,

Albania and Outer Mongo11a.

7/9/60 - Khrushchev stated that the USSR 1s "raising its

voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba

Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artilierymen

can support the cuban people with rocket fire.

9.

Union,

7/10/60 - Guevara stated that Cuba 1s defended by the Soviet

"the greatest milltary power in history.

7/21/60 - The Cuban press reported Raul Castro's statement

In Moscow that Cuba 10 grateful for political and moral support from

the USSR.

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8/24/60 - Castro charged the U.S. with supporting counter-

revolutionaries, and stated that Cuba would be friends with the

Soviets and Chinese Peoples Republic.

11/28/60 - U.S. stated that at least 12 Sovlet ships have

1960, anc

that Soviet

12/19/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign jolnt communique through

which Cuba openly allies 1tself with the domestic and foreign pol-

1c1es of the

Soviet Union and Indicates 1ts colldarlty with the Sino-

Soviet bloc.

1,2/61 - Cuba holds milltary parade displaying bloc arms,

Including tanks, assault guns

and fleld guns.

Castro said this

represents only a "small part" of the arms which cuba had received

from the bloc.

15. 1/3/61 - The United States severed diplomatic relations

with Cuba.

2/23/62 - Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declared that

the Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machine guns.

3/24/61 - In a letter to the New York Times, Mr. Juan Bosch

of New'fork City (former Minister of Finance of Cuba prior to the

Batista Administration) stated that:

"Just recently I have received

confidential information that In the western part of the island of

Cuba, specifically in the vicinity of the town of Soroa, Province of

PInar del R10, an Installation Is being finished that has required

hundreds of tons of portland sement, and has led observers to conclude

that a rocket-launching pad. 1s being prepared for use by the Soviet

Many reports of other secret military Installations are being

received continuously in my office.

• Do the American people not realize

thät these Installations may be used to pinpoint atomic destruction to

any part of the United States, and that a military base in cuba would

be invaluable to the soviet Union, not only because of 1ts military

a base at the very back door of the U.S.,

of the prestige that this would give the Russlans?, out also because

4/3/62 - The U.S. Department of State stated that since mid-

1960 over 30,000 tons of arms valued at $50 million had arrived in

Cuba from the bloc; the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the

Soviet bloc for their armed power; Soviet and Czech military advisers

and technicians had

accompanded the flow of amns; cubans. had gone

Czechslovakia and the USSR for training as jet pilots; ground mainten-

ance crews, and artillerymen; and that, except for the U.s.,

Cuba had

the largest ground forces in the hemisphere

-- at least 10 times as

large as those maintained by Batista's and other previous Cuban

Governments.

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4/17-19/61 - The CIA-directed effort againot Castro met

with disaster at the Bay of P1gs.

4/20/61 - President Kennedy stated that any unilateral

American intervention would have been contrary to our traditions and

to our international obligations, but that we do not intend to

abandon Cuba.,

4/20-12/1/6J. - CIA relaxed 1ts intelligence collection and

covert action efforts.

againgt Cuba,

according to the oral report

made to the Board on 6/26/62 by CIA Deputy Director Helms.

of MIG 155 and MữG-17o In cuba.

6/15/61 - A CIA U-? mission developed photographic evidence

7/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence

12/2/61 - Castro declarus "imself a bona fide Communist.

"I believe absolutely in Marxism

w111 be a Marxist-Leninist untl the last day of my Ilfe.

•I am a Marxist-Leninist, and

He admits

that he hid his true political

Ideology during his revolutionary.

struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have strength,

had been lown as people of very radical ideas unquestionably all the

social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so

that time on.

25. 1/31/62 - The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics,

at Punta del iste, declared that because of 1ts public align-

ment with international communism,

the present Marxist-Leninist govern-

ment of cuba 1s excluded from participating in the Inter-Americar

2/3/62 - In a Proclamation by the President an embargo was

placed on trade with Cuba.

entitled port Nareton inentsene deletence treative out

provided guid-

ance to the intelligence community on 1ts Intelligence collection

effort. This guidance included the following:

"First Category: Objectives of such vital importance as to

require a maximum Intelligence effort

Present and pro-

spective Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities for nuclear

attark on the U. s....

"Second Category: ' Objectives of such critical importance

as to require an Intensive Intelligence effort

•E. Presert

ana prospective soviet,

Chinese Communist, Satellite, and Cuban

capabilitles and intentions to initiate, conduct, and support

•3.-

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Cran

(27: 3/7/62 Continued)

"Internal warfare in countries on the

periphery of the sino soviet

Bloc, and In Africa and Latin America.

"Thira Category:

Objectives.of such great importance as

to warrant a major intelligence effort

Z.

The

stability,

Internal pollcy, and international relations of the Castro

regime in. Cuba; the locus of power within the regime; the

progress of its reorganizatinn of the economy, the polltical

structure, and the military establishment; Its capabilities

to control the population and to defend tself against Internal:

and external attack; the extent and nature of popular disaffec

tion and of organized Internal resistance; the regime!s

economic, political, and military relations with the Soviet

Bloc and with Conmunist China; its subversive capabilities

and activities in latin America.

20. 3/15/62 - According to a CIA memorandum of 11/16/62, the Intelligence

community established on 3/15/62 an interagency refugee Interrogation center

(Caribbean Admission Center) at Opa-Locka, Florida, manned by 40 personnel

representing CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, USIA and VOA. : Cuban

refugees were arriving at Miami at the rate or 1400 per week:

On arrival, male

refugees were screened at the Center for Intelligence and counter-Intelligence

potential:: From 3/15 to 10/23/62 (the date on which civil air travel was

suspended), 10,000 refugees were Interviewed at the Center, and 5608 Intell1-

gence reports were disseminated to the community.

According to the 11/14/62 CIA Chronology:

"On 15 February, 1962 an

Interagency interrogation

center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near

Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quallty of intelligence

collected from thein

The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with

a sharp drop in reports

of missile activity received in Washington. When the

defensive phase of the soviet buildup begen, the volume of Opa Locka reporting

rose very, rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equlpment

coming in, on the

use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions

imposed by the soviets on this operation -- such reports were the basis for

the Checklist

1tem cited

" (See Items Nos. 54 and 59, Infra).

(NOTE: As reflected in Item No. 134, Infra, a somewhat different CIA assessment

of the reports appears elsewhere in the CIA Chronolögy of 21/14/62 wherein 1t

1s stated that CIA's files contal 211 Intelligence reports on missile and

missile-associated activity in Cuba before Jaruary 1, 1962, all of which were

either totally false or misrepresentations by the observer of other kinds of

The CIA Chronology adds that CIA analysts had come to view such

reports with suspicion.)

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3/21/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-62 on "The situation

and Prospects in Cube"

steted that Cuban military capabilities

ere

"essentially defensive"

and that "we belleve it unlikely that

the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with alr

and naval capabilities suitable for major independent milftary opera-

tions overseas. We also belleve 1t unlikely that the Bloc widl

station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the

period of this estimate (the next two years).

This attitude would

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 5)

4-8

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(29. 3/21/62 Continuad)

in prepud the tere protein are on area out the verone-

equipment as

of: Cuban naval and a1r facilitles as would enable them to service

Sovlet units.

A foreword to the above estimate states that "our

Information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable

as we could

On some matters,

1t 1s seriously Inadequate

In general, the Information avallable 1s surficient to support the

3/27/62 - The U.S. stated that the Sino-Soviet bloc has

furnished $100 million worth of milltary equipment and technica

services to Cuba, and that several hundred Cuban military personnel

Including pilot training, in the 010c.

"Arms

1ndude ste 15 Mid Jet fignters, 15o to aSo tanks: 50 to 100 assault

guns; 500 to 1000 field artillery; 500 to 1000 antlaircraft artillery;

500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and torpedo

missile bases or bombers.

op sone one prepared of ne state Department al the request

4/11/62 - DIA Initlated mee Ings with JOS and CIA personnel

to discuss refugee interrogation guides for use ät the Opa-locka

center and to review intelligence requirements on cuba.

(source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

Spring of 1962 - "The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a

nilltary base must have been made bythe spring of 1902 and prepara.

Ions within the USSR must have been under way from that time on

There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, In particular,

reconnaissance and survey work.

The only Indication of these opera-

tons which can be found 18 &

single intercepted personal message

(4/11/62) addressed to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at

the Kapustin Yar mia81le teet range.

This fragment was not judged

tant hour towaran us decent intelligence publica-

May 1962 - A Cuban "Indications Center" was established at

CINCLANT on the recommendations of DIA and NORAD.

(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62.

5/31/62 - On this date the NPIC began publishing a series

of formal reports dealing with NPIC's evaluation, from a photographic

standpoint, of refugee and agent reports on Cuba. Between 5/31 anc

éxamined 138 refugee and agent reports.

The CIA Chronology

of 11/7/62 stated that only three of

these reports cited missile

activity which could not be linked to the SAM and cruise missile de-

ployments, and "NIC's evidence negated those three.

the CIA Chronology 1t 1s stated "CIA current intelligence was ordered

on 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of

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(34. 5/31/62 Continued)

misslle bases In Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC."

Between 14

August and miá-October one CIA office sent NPIC 13

memoranda "asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing

information which

was thought to raise the possibility.of Soviet

offensive weapons in Cuba.

A great many more such reports were

checked with NPIC Informally by telephone.

In all cases, NPIC

either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding.

6/1/62 - DIA Issued Intelligence requirements regarding

the mlestle buildup 1n cuba Including missiles of Intermediate range.

These requirements were described by General Carroll as detalled and

comprehensive and as Including suggested clandestine Intelligence

requirements for CIA.

(Source: Oral report

to Board by Director, DIA, 1l/9/62).

36. 16/26/62 - At the PFIAB Meeting on this date, Mr. Richard

mounted a major intelligence effort against Cuba; that there have

been weekly U-2 overflights of Cuba; that an Interrogation center

has been set up at Opa-locka, with Defense participation, where

1600 Cuban refugees a week are interrogated with 250 weekly-intel-

ligence reports resulting therefrom;

that such Intelligence. reports

are coordinated with U-2 photography as the basis for disseminating

Intelligence data on the status of the military situation 1n Cuba;

that CIA 1s operating Intelligence agents In Cuba; that some 1ntell1-

gence 1s also received from British,

French, Maxican and other govern-

ments st1ll maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba; that the

Cubans are credited with being stronger militarily than any other

Latin American country, but that the Cuban ground forces do not

represent an offensive capability; that they have no guided m1881les;

no nuclear weapons are known to have been supplied to Cuba

by the USSh.

July 1962 - According to the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62,

"Intelligence officers dealing with cuba were focusing during July

on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet

acquiescence in Castros' assertion

of his leadership of Cuban

Communism in the Escalante affair.

referring

was probably seeking more. Soviet milltary aid such

to Raul Castro's visit to Moscow'as MIQ-21s and

surface-to-air missiles which

the USSR,was already providing to

Indonesia, Egypt and Iraq.

7/19/62 - CIA's President's Checklist noted that the fact

that Raul Itit Moscow

without publicity indicated

"prEtty good sign

that the vist was unproductive". (Source: CIA

chronology, 11/7/62)

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7/19/62 - The NSC Special 5412/2 Group (and later the

President.) approved a proposal that ü-2 flights over Cuba "be con-

tinued at their current level of two a month"

was based on a memo from the DD/I to the DCI following a request

This recommendation

made of the DCI on 7/10 by deneral Taylor who had asked for a compre-

hensive revlew of all aerial photography activities. The justifica-

tion advanced for the DCI's proposal that U-2 flights över Cuba be

"continued at their current level" was (1) that earlier missions

over Cuba had provided

conclusive evidence that recurring reports

submarines

and missile bases in Cuba have been false'

that "our most important noed 1s for aay evidence of the deployment

of SA-2 missiles and or MIR-21s 1n. Cuba

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

7/26-29/62 - Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel

for the

Soviet buildup In Cuba first began arriving at Cuban ports.

• evidence gradually accumulated that the behavior pattern of

these ships iras imilar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to

other countries,

that even greater security measures than usual were

In effect, that

a number of the ships were comine from the Baltro

rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships,

and finally that

was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward

on an unprecedented scale.

Apparently,

the first recognition.of

unusual activity in any Intelligence publication was a note in a

daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use . . •

this paper stated on August 1, that 'at least some if not all of the

ships Involved probably are carrying additional military equipment

to Cuba'.

This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's

comment on the same information, 1.e., that 1t tended to corroborate

a report by the Brazilian Ambassador

in Havina (earlier Intercepted

by NSA)

that Raul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war

materiel. . ."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

42. August 1962 - "

It should be noted for the record that

in disagreement with DIA over Interpretation of intelligence

on the movement of shipping to cuba throughout the month of August.

The resulting difficulties In coordination of Items for the Central

Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), held up publication from 3 August to

9 August of the first 1tem on this subject in that publication.

Late as 29 August, DIA In Its own dally

In trade between the useh and cuba"

intelligence Sunmary said

"The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned Increases

.. .' There were further diffi-

culties resulting from CIA-DIA dIfferences in the interpretation of

photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the

record shows that CIA was right.

Finally, It should be noted that

there 1s a long history of CIA efforts to

obtain better photography

on deck cargoes and faster service in returning

these pictures to

Washington.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/02)

-7..

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and Prospects

, which stated that the capabilities of the

cuban armed forces

"have been and are being greatly enhanced by the

Soviet Bloc's provision of milltary equipment and Instruction..

cuban maritary capabilities however are egsentially defensive.

combat units of any description,

estimate.

"The estimate was "over the next year or so".)

respect to this estimate CIA reported that

"The Intelligence.

Community view of the Cuban problem in this perlod was crystallized

1n NLE 85-2-02 •

as the Intelligence foundation for MONGOOSE"

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

44, 8/4/62 - CIA's President's Checklist ("not being under a

requirement for USIB coordination was able to report the accumujating

Information fully to the President") stated that

"Eleven Soviet

ships are on their way to Havana and we strongly suspect

they are

carrying arms.

Such a delivery would not be far short of the total

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

45. 8/5/62 - "The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions author-

Ized for august was flown on augiest 5, probably just too soon to

detece significant reflections

soviet equipment

entering the

¡aland at that time."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/.

8/8/62 - "Observations (in reports later reviewed) at the

port of Mariel suggest that preparations for construction of the

Guanajay MRBM sites were being made in early August.

prefabricated

concrete slabs un to 12x4x2 feet in size and more

thirty dark

colored cylindrical tanks about 30 feet iong and 10 feet in diameter

were off-loaded about o August.

Tubular and semicircular shaped

concrete forms arrived In Martel during the same period.

Similar

1tems have been photographed at the IRBM sites In the Guanajay-Bauta

One source reported that this materlal was designed for use

In bullding missile bases, and that some of the cargo was delivered

to the Bauta area. .

"Concrete forms similar to those observed at Marlel were

off-loaded at the port of la Isabela (in the Remedios: IRBM sIte

during August . :.

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

47.

8/8/62. - "The DCI briefed the Republican Policy Committee,

emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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48:

8/9/62 - CIA's President's Checklist for this datc said "Soviet

ships have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July.

vessels are involved; at least baif of these we belleve to be carrying arms.

Five passenger ships

with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already

arrived: Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have

no reason to doubt this.

We do nit belleve that there are any combat troops

among then."

(source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

49. 8/10/62 - At a MUNGOOSE meeting, tbe DCI stressed the importance.

of Intelligence received on the arrival of Soviet milltary equiment and

technicians In Cuba.

The DOI "raised questions as to what purpose was behind

the sudden movement of men and materiel, and said that the United States must

face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that It could

justily because of U: S.:miss1le bases in places Iike Italy and Turkey

(Suurce: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62,

50. 8/14/62 - There arrived In Havana the first shipmént of KOMAR class

patrol craft in Cuba -- each carrying two homing miselles with a range of 10

or 15 nm and carrying 2000 pound KE warheads.

The KOMARS were transported to

Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four fer shipload. By 10/20 there

• 01 12 KOMAR craft In Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report,

10/20/62)

8/14/62 - "CIA :urrent intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's

office on about 14 August nut to publish any information on the construction

of missile bases until they had been checked out with NPIC -- this Instruction

was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; lt had no

relation to later restrictions (see Item No. 152, Infra) . :..

Between 14

August and mid-October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check

on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the

possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports

were checked with NPIC informally by telephone.

In all cases, NPIC either

lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative !inding." (Source: CIA

Chronology, 11/14/62)

8/15/62 - On this date, in an effort to supply guidance and

requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked NºIC to conduct

a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been

obtalned with respect to three particulary suspect areas 1n Cuba. On 8/17

photographic evidence Indicated that SA-2 equirment was located in two of

these three suspect areas, although there was no evidence of their deployment.

(source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, on 11/9/62)

8/15/62 - "Construction material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM

sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August

activity of an Indefialte type was noted there in the 29 August photo-

graphy, and major construction had probably begun by 15 september.

(The fact that shipments to Guanajay started before those to sar

Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction

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(53. 8/15/62 Continued)

"of a fixed site:) It 1s not possible to say how soon after 15

September the

an IRBM site, "activity might have been recognizable from the air as

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

8/18/62 - CIA's President's Checklist reported that "There

are grounds for thinking that the large Influx of Soviet milltary

equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be connected with

the beginning of construction of surface-to-air missile sites. What

we know so far 18 that the shipments have included quantities

transportation and construction equipment, some of 1t

similar to

electronic, soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia for the

building of SAM installations, and that many of the arriving Soviets

are construction personnel

(The CIA, Chronology at this point

states that

"Soviet operations in August Involved primarily the

establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast defense missile

positions.

By the middle of August CIA was recélving a large volume

of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled

and fragmentary,

enabled 1ts (CIA's analysts to pinpoint areas of

construction and identify some of the equipment coming In.")

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

8/20/62 - "The COMOR Iargeting Working Group (chaired and

staffed

largely by CIA) set up he first comprehensive card f1le

system for Cuban targets.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

56. 8/21/62 - At a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office (attended

Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson,

"Information avalable since 10 August indicated.

the extent of soviet ald was much greater than previously thought,

that this probably Included highly-sophleticated electronic

possibility of soviet MRBMS 1n

which developed a discussion of possible U.S. courses of action

• It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the president tha neit

day (which he did) and that rusk,

McNamara, unpatric,

Taylor, Bundy

and the DCI would discuss the situation with the president on

23 August.".

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

8/23/62 - A meeting was held with the President with Messrs.

McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone in attendance.

This meeting resulted in the Issuance of NSAM (National Security

Action Memorandum) #181 dated 8/23/62, reflecting that

"The President

has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken In

the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba ...

"2. What Information should be made avatlablè in the United

States and abroad with respect to these new bioc activities in

Cuba?"

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(57.8/23/62 Continued_

An analysis should be prepared of the probable military,

political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba

of either surface-to-air missiles or

„surface-to-surface missiles

which could reach the United States.

A study should be made of the advantages and disadvan-

or both? which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against

the United States.

A study should be made of the varlous military alterna-

tives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate

any Installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack

•on the United States.

What would be the pros

and cons,

for

outright invasion?"

of pinpoint attack, general counterforce attack, ana

"8. A study should be made of the advantages and disad. .

vantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or Invasion or

other action beyond the MONGOOSE B PLUS, In the context of an

aggravated Berlin Crisis."

NSAM No. 181 Indicated there would be a further meeting with the

President about 9/1 to review progress on the above 1tems and

that

In the event of Important new Information an earlier meeting would

be called.

The NSAM concluded with the statement

"The President

emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions.

58. 8/23/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 referring to the

meeting with the President, which resulted In the issuance of NSAM

#181, states::

Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest

levels of the

goverriment to

a rapidly unfolding Soviet military devel-

opment In Cuba, Including the probable establishment of surface-to-a1r

missile sites,

and

the danger of surface-to-surface missiles.

Further-

nore, the President had taken action on the intelligence received.

There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-

surface weapons were being Installed In fact, the MREM units had

scarcely started en route from the USSR -- but

the possibility had

been discussed by the President ind his advisers.

59. 8/23/62 - CIA's President's Checkl1st stated that:

"Most of our Information from within cuba on the Influx of

Soviet equipment and technicians has come from Cuban sources.

We now have several reports from the British Embassy whose

people have been out looking.

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(59. 8/23/62 Conti ed)

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"They have spotted at least one camp southwest of Havana,

where the number of vehicles suggested the presence of

more than the 200 presumed young Russians they did see, and where

a radio antenna field had already been erected. This they think

could be connected with radio monitoring.

"Their information on the equipment coming in--some hard,

some not--leads them to suggest that an expert might consider

the possibillty of antlaircraft rockets and radar.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 21/7/62)

60. 8/24/62 - On the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62 Senator

Engle sated that "On August 24 the Department of

State gave a back-

ground press and radio news briefing" on the subject of Soviet

activities in Cuba.

The Senator then quoted a number of articles

from various U.S.

Senator Engle summarled, as follows:

newspapers dated from 8/24 to 8/26/62, which

"All these stories contain the

same set of facts.

All of them mention 3000 to 5000 Soviet techni-

clans.

All of them mention the strengthening of coastal and a1r

defenses

•All of thege articles relate that the information

from U.S. officials.

(Source:

Congressional Record)

61. 8/27/62 - In a memorandum of ühis date, General Carter

Bundy on actions taken in response to NSAM 181:

(a). Task rorce

reported to MI• "wl would look into the possibility of removine the

restrictions on the mounting of clandestine operations

(b) the Board of National Estimates would "establish a

Guantanamo to ensure continuing analysig" of the numbers and types of

Board of National Estimates would assess

the physical and psychological

dangers to the U.S. and Latin America of missile installations in

Cuba, (d) a daily CIA

"Cuban Highlights"

memorandum would be pub-

11shed for distribution to the President and

others, (e) CIA WOUIC

arrange Intelligence collection overflights

"as frequently as the

situation demands,

(f) Task

operations for "MONGOOSE B PLUS.

«„force

W" would prepare a plan of

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

began publishing a daily oathe (President's)

ophy and format similar to the

Checklist.

include current intelligence estimative assessments and press coverage

-- for distribution to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric,

Lemnitzer, Rusk,

taylor; and the Attorney General.

(A few off1c1als

were later added to the

distribution.)

'It was discontinued on 19

September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that suf-

Iclent emphasis was by then being riven to cuban reporting in regu.

lar intelligence publications."

(source: CIA Chronology, 1177/52

63. 8/27/62 - "Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting

Working

Group pinpointed

four farms in (the Sagua La Grande)

as suspect missile sites."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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8/29/62 - The State Department briefed a bipartisan group

In the House of Representatives, according to Senator Engle's state-

ment on the floor of the Senate

on 9/5/62.

He said that the state-

ment which had been supplied to the House of Representatives by

Department of State on

8/29 read as follows: "Soviet Military

After a lull since early 1962 the Soviet Union resumed large-

scale milltary deliveries to cuba in the last week in July.

then, Soviet ship movements to cuba have totaled at least 25, 1n-

cluding at least 5 passenger ships.

This 1s 1n addition to normal

tanker and cargo movements.

The shipments contalned both milltary

and economic goods and personnel.

Although full details are not yet

avallable on the contents of the ships, nor of the breakdown

"between

military and nonmilitary, Information to date indicates the following:

'Cargo: Milltary cargo, perhaps as much as half of the total,

Includad large quantities of

transportation, electronic, and construc-

tion equipment, such as communications vans,

mobilé generator units.

the improvenent of coastal and air defenses:

The size and shape of

some of the boxes delivered suggests that 1t is possible they could

contain ground-to-air missiles for antiaircraft use, but we have no

Information on

that as yet. These missiles are not adaptable for

nuclear use.

"Nonm1l1tary cargo, roughly half of the total, consists of de-

Iveries, already behind schedule, of Industrial and agricultural

equipment

under. ald and trade agreements.

"Personnel: A large number of additional Soviet speclallsts

arrived In Cuba

in the same period.

total number 1n

note son herod, both the rey and nomilitary

may be as high as 5000.

The breakdown between military and technical

personnel 1s not known, but the additional numbers of military special-

ists are not Incompatible with the training and setting up of the

complex milltary equipment which has arrived.

There 1s no evidence

of the arrival of Soviet combat troops from other soviet bloc coun-

tries:

"The shipments consist of both economic goods and defensive

military goods:

They appear designed to enhance the Cuban regime's

defense capabilities against an Internal threat, and to Increase the

effectiveness of the Cuban military establishment for possible in-

ternal lse.

Information to date Indicates

that the shipments w1ll

not improve significantly the very l1m1ted offensive capabllitles of

the cuban armed forces.

"The recent shipments Indicate a significant increase in Soviet

involvement in cuba.

The Increased amount of milltary asiistance

accompanies stepped-up

Soviet economic aid to try to relleve Cuban

shortages.

The shipments must have been plannéd several months ago

to have arrived when they a1d. the Cuban regime, facing economic

deterioration and rising popular discontent, probably hopes to

strengthen 1ts Internal position through new demonstrations of

Soviet support."

(source: Congresgional Record)

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8/29/62 - SAM sites In Cuba were "first observed" as the result

of the U-a photographic mission

flown on this date.

On this date 8 SA-? 81tes

were identified.

(Three more were observed on 9/5 -- one on 9/26 -- one on

-- 1 on 10/5--6 on 10/7 --2.00 10/14 -- 1 on

24 sites). (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62; Table 3)

10/15 -- 1 on 10/27 - Total

66..8/29/62 - Referring to results of the 8/29 U-2 mission, the CIA

out of the 29 August coverage showed an

SA-2 site near

Sagua In Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported actlyity there"

(1.e., the pinpointing of four farms In the Sagua la Grande area as

suspect

referred to In Item No. 63 above):.. "the target card was

It should be noted that knowledge. that

this site was in the area could have lead analysts to misinterpret any sub-.

sequent reports of MRBM activity. as part of the saM development

but in fact

(source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

67. 8/29/62 -A DIA study of the 8/29 U-2 photography and a study: of

refugee reports,

suggested some sort of clandestine activity In progress in

the San Cristobal area.

This prompted the DIA to request additional photo-

graphic coverage of this area, but such coverage was not accomplished untll

10/14 for a variety of reasons including poor weather and the requirement that

the U-2 not overfly SA-2 installations.

(Source:: Oral report to Board by

Director, DIA, 11/5/62)

E3.: 8/29/62 - The minutes of the USIB meeting on this date show that

Mr: Nilsman requested an SNIE on the military buildup in Cuba. The paper

requested by Mr. Hilsman and the Board of National Estimates memorandum already

requested by the DD/I (on 8/24) were combined.

• Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff,

were quickly overtaken by the photography which became avallable after 29 August.

At the USIR meeting of 7. September, further attempts to welte such a paper

were deferred until 19 September, by which date the new information could be

This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was In fact passed by USTB on

19 September . :

At the USIB meetlag on this date,

two other subjects were discussed:

(1) the question raised by General Carter and Mr. Cline of more rapia delivery.

from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet sbips, and

(2) the action which General Carter had taken on 8/27/52 In acking General

lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level potograpby using F-101 or F8U

aircraft - to which General Lemnitzer had replied that "something could be

(This action by General Carter in calling General Lemnitzer was. the

result of an instruction telephoned from out of town by the DCI who bad left

Washington on August 23 for the West Coast,

then left the country on August 30

for the Riviera, and returned on September

23. The DCI "was concerned over

the long delay

of 'he 29 August mission by weather."). (Source: CIA

Chronology, 11/7/62)

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8/29/62 - CIA's President's Checklist contained the report

"There 18 no sign of a let-up in the movement of soviet equip.-

ment and personnel Into Cuba.

"By latest count,

there have during the past six weeks been some

80 vöyages to

Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships ünder

Communist charter.

"We note that dellveries of industrial equipment,

foodstuffs,

and other nonmilitary 1tems are being made largely on chartered

Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are Involved In

hauling military gear...

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

8/30/62 - At a meeting of the Special Group, General Lem-

nitzer told the aroup of his discussion with General Carter who had

on 8/27 asked General Lemnitzer about the possibillty of low-level

photography using F-101 or FOU aircraft. The Special Group agreed

to take cognizance of the matter and

and Information needs could be identified.

reopen it when specific targets

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

8/30/62 - A draft prepared by the JCS on 830 In response

to NSAM 181 of 8/23/62 presented to the White House

a study of the

advantages and disadvantages of action to llberate Cuba by blockade

The following are selected highl1ghts. from

In NSAM 109 Of 10/23/61, the President described the four phases

1nto which he expected progressive U.S. and Allied military action

vo fall, In meeting and countering Soviet/GDR measures to force the

Western powers out of Berlin.

"The JCS are of the opinion that positive action of oppose:

communist agression in any geographical

area will be evidence of the

determination of the United States and will Influence. the Berlin

decision.

However, they consider that actions outside of Germany

should be complementary to, and not substituted for, actions to be

taken 1n Central Europe to maintain our rights in Berlin and prevent

denial of access!"

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated repeatedly that the United

States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist govern-

ment In Cuba and that the requirement to remove the communist:

ment from Cuba is rade apparent by Castro's constantly increasing

capabilitles:

"Conclusions":.

undertaking of the liberation of Cuba by invasion during a period of

aggravated crisis 1n Berlin 1s militarily sound -- contingent upon

the call-of of substantial additional forces to active duty and a

firm preparedness to execute full mobilization 1f necessary, and

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(71. 8/30/62 Continued)

(c) other actions (such as covert measures to eliminate cuban nuclear

launch installations) would be less effective than full scale military

Intervention and would produce only partial or temporary résulus.

M111 tary Alterratives

The JCS draft also Included a section ("Item 7") in response

the provision of Par. 7 of NSAM 181 which called for a Department

of Defense study of "the various military alternatives which might

be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installationg

In Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U. S

(a) pinpoint attaci (b) general counter-force äutack, (Egr

outright Invasion).

In a preface to this study the JOS pointed out that (1) although

current evaluation of reported SAM sites In Cuba 1s that they are

for defensive purposes and designed for air defense, 1f these sites are

effectively used to derogate U.S. aerial reconnaissance the Cubans

will have an opportunity

to develop such offensive capabilities as

missile launch sites and submarine bases (2) a Cuban offensive capa-

b1llty would f1ll gaps in the Russian missile coverage of the U.S.

and also proilde the Cuban Communist government with a means of

countering future U.S. actions against Cuba through blackmail, and

(3) continued development of cuban capabillties would Increase. U.s.

defense costs as forces were developed or shifted.

to meet the threat

The JCS analysis of alternative U.s, military actions was then

set forth in essence as follows:

Pinpoint attack (1.e.

a localized attack against a specific

CacilIty followed by planned withdrawal

pinpoint air attack,

• This might be done by

or by covert commando-type raids

(not recommended)

on targets adjacent to coastal

Advantages: economical in

force applied

i: minimizes U.s. and cuban casuaities, and pre-

attack publicity.

Disadvantages: eliminates nuclear launch capa-

bility only on a temporary basis ... no less belligerent than any

other act of war ..

even 1f covert will brand U.s. as aggressor

affords Cuba with outcry before International organizations

and a legal justification for retaliatory attacks on the U.S.

gIves USSR precedent for retaliation against U.S. Installations on

periphery of Bloc

or other Cuban militaryforces.

•. Ilttle or no effect on Cuban Communist regime

b.

General counter-force attack (1.e.,

an attack designed to

destroy or neutralize cuban nuclear capability installations or areas,

through air attacks, naval gunfire,

or possible overt, airborne or

amphibious assaults with or without Immediate subsequent withdrawal),

Advantages: moderately economical in use of U.S. forces 1f adequate

11r ana naval support ..• fewer. U.S. and Cuban casualties than

a full scale invasion.

Disadvantages: same as disadvantages of "Pin-

point attack"

, above, and also..

•could lead to invasion to extri-

cate U.S. forces • • gives USSR precendent for rey sal against U.S.

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(71. 8/30/62 Continued)

with opportunity for

with opportunity per stepped a mister material and technical

USSR

bullaup.

Outrigni invasion (1.e., would be accomplished through

execution of existing U.S. milltary contingency plans with full

preparation for positive and effective overt U.s. Intervention):

Advantages: permanent elimination of Cuban facliltles having present

or potential capability to launch nuclear attack on the u.s.

would eliminate Communist government in Cuba and expel direct Soviet

airfields or potential submar'..ie bases

instrument of U.S.

foreign pollcy... would reassert U.s. determina-

tion to maintain integrity of Western Hemisphere and reaffirm princ1-

ple of government by self-determination.

• i would IrestoreU.S.

prestige, world-wide.

Disadvantages: would reduce in some degree

U,S. capability to react in other contingency areas during the

operation.

JCS conclusion:

the advantages of a decisive execution

of an outright invasion,

" together with the many disadvantages of any

lesser alternative,

conclusively indicate that this 1s the only.

course of action which should be adopted in order effectively and

permanently to accomplish the mission.

"Accordingly, It 1s recommended that in executing a decision

to eliminate any installations In Cuba capable of launching nuclear.

attack on

the U.S,, only overt full-scale military action should be

considered.

Further, noting the Increasing complexitles attending

the delay

of U.s, Intervention in Cuba, a previous recommendation 1s

relterated;

a national policy of early military Intervention be

adopted by the United States.

72. 8/30/62 - The following excerpt from the President's press

conference: of 8/30/62 was reported in the Congressional Record on

9/5/62:

The President:

"We have no evidence of troops

In response

to your speciric question, we have no Information

that troops have

come Into Cuba.

of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy

main thrust of course 1s assistance because

•However,

tinuing to watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention and

will respond to_-- iwill be glad to announce any new Information 1f 1t

should come Immediately."

Question:.

"Mr. President, I wonder 1f a distinction could be

made with respect to the troops

In Cuba.

Some of us were told at the

people who are going to operate missiles, similar to the Nike

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(72. 3/30/62 Continued)

The President: "I don't know who told you that at the state

Department,

that they are going to operate hire missiles,

because

that Informatión we do not have at this time.

There certainly are

technicians

there andthey may be milltary technicians.

We don't

have complete Information about what's going ón In Cuba, but gince

the word

'troops' has been generally used they haù a military ad-

visory commission there for a long perlod of time, so there may be

additional milliary advisory personnel or technicians. But on the

question of troops, as 1t 1s generally understood, we do not have

evidence that there are Russian troops there.

There 1s an expanded

advisory and technical mission. That 1s correct."

Question: "Are there no antiaircraft missiles shipped to Cuba?"

The President:

"We have no Information as yet ... that does

not mean that there have not been, but all. I am saying is that we have

no such Information as yet'."

73. 8/31/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Preliminary Information from the 30 (s1c) August U-2 mission

shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half, of the island.

Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000 Bloc troops.

We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that con-

struction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and

that there

are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites.

The

existence of additional sites can probably be assumed.

"The same source reveals seven or eight soviet missile-equipped

torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks.

The cubans

have had Soviet tanks

for some time, but this is our first Indication

they now have boats of this type.. They appear to be KOMAR-class

converted PI-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an

estimated range of

35 nautical miles.

(source: CIA Chronology.e, 11/7)

8/31/62 - Par 5 of NSAM 181 called for an analysis (by the

White House,

missiles which could reach the U.s."

was made and set forth in a memorandum (labelled

Accordinglyitop Secret and

such an analysis

Sensitive") signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy under date of August 31,

There follows a summary of selected highlights

memorandum, under the topic headings set forth therein:

"I.

Soviet missile poss1b1litles In Cuba"

"The most probable present soviet missile activity would

be the introduction of SA-2 missiles."

Preliminary photo

18

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174.

8/31/62 Continued)

Interpretation shows 7 SA-2 sites. In early stages of construc-

a modern f1rgt-line AA missile with an engagement

range

of 30 miles and high rellability from 2500 to 60, 000 feet,

and limited effectiveness up to 80, 000 feet .

.:. probably

capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there 1s no evidence

that

the Soviet Government has ever provided nuclear warheads to

another state, and 1t seems unlikely that such a move 1s currently

planned

-- although there 1s ilttle reason to suppose that the

Sovlets would refuse to Introduce such weapons 1f the move could

be controlled in the Soviet interest.

Other missiles which could be Introduced now or later are

surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 150 miles to 2000

miles (the Soviet MRBM), which would be of llttle value without

nuclear war heads.

Longer range surface-to-surface missiles

would require relatively substantial installations -- shorter

range missiles

of this sort could be introduced very quickly and

mounted without elaborate construction

As missile capab11-

ties increase In the remainder of the 1960's, 1t w1ll be pro-

ressively. easier for the soviet Union to install in Cuba light-

weight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive'

power against aircraft and

against targets in the .U.s.

"?.

Military Impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles

in Cuba:

"A. Surface-to-alr missiles"

Extensive deployment of SA-2s would make reconnais-

sance overflight and other clandestine ar operations

difficult and dangerous,

and would substantially 1n-

crease the problem of neutrallzing air defense in event

of open conflict...

"B.

Surface-to-surface missiles"

SSMs with nuclear warheads would be a very s1gn1-

IIcant milftary threat to the u.s.i.

•. It appears:

probable that on military grounds

alone the establish-

ment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

than Introduction of any given class of missiles as

such

-- but the covert introduction of nuclear warheads

would be very hard to detect.

Attention should also be given to the possibility

that the soviets may attempt to set up a submarine

119. -

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1174. 3/31/62 Continuid)

"3.

Political and psychological Impact of & Soviet

missile establishment in Cuba

In supplying cuba with missiles of any sort, the Soviet

Union is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale milltary

foothold in the western hemisphere . . .

the dels.vory of

MIGS i jear ago did not

greatly disturo American or hells-

where opinion,

but missiles are something else again

and we cannot. expect that the public mind will serenely.

alstinguish between aircraft missiles and a diroct threct

of 11s3110 attack on thö u.s.

Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics

of the doministration's

"softness"

on Cuba.

This effect

con be sonewhat mitigated by words and actions being con-

sidered in other responses to NSAM 131, but it cannot be

prevented while the missiles remain in place.

There will be a alstinct difforence in impact

between irissiles for defensivo use against aircraft and mis-

siles capable of

use against the United States

•In'cer-

national acceptance of action against defensive installations

would be lower than in the case of action against

posing a diruct nuciear threat to the u.s.

Ainerica the psychological and political effect

of missile installations in Cuba (no matter what lind) wi.11

be substantial .

the missile sites would he seen as

proof of strong

•of pronot and

soviet support for Cuba :

•• in the absence

effective U.

s. counteraction, it would be

judzed that Castro

this would lead to heavy pressure for more U.S. support

against Castro's subversion..

•• other Latin American

states would be more than ever inclined to accommodate to cuba

•.. und all this would accentuate inter-american strains.

"SUMMARY: In sun, the expectation is that any missiles

will have & substantial political and psychological impact:

while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition

of ureat alarin.

even In the absence of prous that nuclear

warheads were urriving with them.

8/31/62. - Senator Kenneth B. Keating Included the following

in his romarks on the floor of the

U.S. Senate:

I am reliably informed--when I say reliably inforned,'

I mean that has been checked:

out from five different sources, and I

am certain I can state it as a fact--that between the dates of 0/4

and 8/15,.10 or. 12 Soviet vessels anchored at the Marante dock area

at Mariel. The dock area previously had been surrounded by the com-

struction of a high cinder-block well.

The Soviet ships unloaded 1200

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175.

8/31/62 Continuea)

"troops. Troops 1s what I mean, and not techniclans. They were

wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.

"On August 13 five Soviet torpedo boats unloaded from Soviet

ships, and

are now moored at La Base.

There 1s every indication

that the naval complement to handle these boats disembarked at the

same time.

"Again let me emphasize that these could not reasonably be

called technicians.

"On August 13, 1,000 non-Cuban personnel in fatigue uniforms

were seen working in the area near Finca La Guatana, In all probability

on or near a missile base located in that area.

, "On. August 3 a largé convoy of milltary vehicies manned by soviet

The

vehicles observed in Cuba; also Jeeps, 6x6. trucks; and tracked trucks.

• "On August 5 there was a movement seen of a 64-vehicle convoy

heading west on Carretera Central.

The convoy

moving In military

order. It included tanks, cannonilke trailers, and flatbed trailers.

"On August 8 there was observed a righi movement of a convoy on

Carretera Central. Flatbed trucks were observed transporting concave

metal structures.

supported by tubing.

The convoy Included a number

of closed vans.

The convoy appeared

to be moving toward an Installa-

tion 4 to 5 kilometers from Canimar in a closely restricted area

belloved to contain a

rocket installation.

"There have been other observations of activitles there, which

have been confirmed.

Since July the Soviet Union has greatly stepped up

shipments of men and equipment.

More than 20 cargo ships have arrived

from communist ports in the last few weeks.

Many have been unloaded

under maximum security.

Between three and five thousand so-called

technicians' have arrived in the course of the past year.

Soviets w1l1 have

shipped nearly

next year and Cuba will be virtually Isolated

from the free world--a

Communist enclave within the free world where the Soviets can operate

unchecked

and to a large extent unobserved,

More ominous reports suggest that the soviets are con-

structing missile bases and sending over technicians and experts to

man them... In this way the Soviets could expect to discourage deter-

mined.refugees.of. other nations of this hemisphere from any kind of

concerted attack on the Cuban dictatorship.

They could alse strengthen

Castro to resist Increasing internal dissatisfaction against his

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(75. 8/31/62 Conting)

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That supposition, which our Government has never openly

admitted or discussed It should be fully aired.

1s a source of serious concern to the people

The dangers in-

herent in the situation should be known and appreciated by all the

people of this hemisphere, and particularly by those nations which

so far have actively blocked measures to combat the menace of

Castrolsm.

"Another very real possibility and, In my judgment, a probabllity

that should be a source of even greater concern to the U.S, and which

has su far not been openly discussed at all in this country 1s that

the Soviets are dellberalely taking advantage of the proximity between

Cuba and Cape Canaveral to conduct other activitles.

There 1s no

question at all of the rossibility of interference with American

space fllahts by sensiive equipment mounted in cuba and operated bi

Communist experts..."

Source: Congressional Record

76. 8/31/f2 - In retrospect "a thorough review of refugee

concerning the general areas now containing IRBM and. MRBM

sites has produced

some probable 1nd1cators. of scheduling.

collateral Information Indicates that plans to deploy ballistic

missiles in Cuba were being Implemented by the end of August.

apparently had been selected and the surveys for the 1n1t1al

IRBM Installations were probably completed by that time.

construction was apparently under way in September and preceded the

MRBM sites.

• This sequence is aiso indicated by the photography."

"Reported activities Indicate that probably all of the San

Cristobal sites were selected by MRBM deployment in August since an

area which includes some of the sites was made a rastricted zone

during late August-early September.

"Refugees had

also reported "about August 22 the owner of a farm,

a village about 4 miles west of Site 1; on 5 September)"

18/31/62 - CIA distributed a raw

from refugee sources) and which stated in part "A platoon of Soviets

who are specialists in rocketry and atomic arms 1s assigned to the

Ministry of the Cuban Armed Forces

78. 8/31/62 - Information received by an American correspondent

In Mexico from a

prominent Cuban exile and reported

to the U.S. Embassy

In Mexico CIty:

• Soviet milltary presence 1r. Cuba was a fact

among the thousands of Soviet technicians who recently arrived

on the Island, many appeared to be between 18 and 20 years of age, too

young to acquire any technical experience to impart to the cubans

these young Russians. dress In sports clothes but give the appearance

of having only recently completed their military training . .

sites with antennae, presumably used for monitoring activity at cape

Canaveral, will be converted into missile bases

" (Sourse: State

Department: Airgram from Mexico C1t% N0 737.00/8-3162, dated. 8/32/62)

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0/31/02 = 1

column by henry J. Taylor (date and newspaper

not identifled. wai

inserted into the Congressional Record of 8/31/52

page A6599, by Congressman W11l1am C. Cramer:

• . we hely Cuba mightily by having no policy at all.

mittedly, enemy rocket sites

Why does the administration

consistently pooh-pooh and soften the Indicatluns these rocket sites

are being built?

It you were Khrushcher wouldn't you build them?

D1s11k1ng the Inevitable does not make lt less inevitable ...

9/1/62 - In response to NSAM 181 the Director of Intelll-

gence and Research,

Department of State, submitted to the Secretary

of state and the white House a paper analyzing the meaning of In-

creased. Soviet ald to Cuba Including an analysis of Soviet and Cuban

motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments

This analysis stated In part: "In addition to training and

arming Castro's forces, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of

overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba.

But we belleve at present such activities are likely to be limited

to the setting up of unacknowledged Intelligence collection and de-

fensive facllltles..

and politically less justiflable,

would be demonstrabiv offensive installations, such as bomber bases

or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries...

believe that the soviets would rule out.

this type of military presence

For the foreseeable future.

In sum, we think there 1s some possibillty

that intelligence and defensive Installations may be set up at least

temporarily undei purely Soviet control, while offensive installations

would not be likely, certainly for a considerable tline.

The State

Department analysis stated at this point "It should be noted in this

connection that presently available Information makes 1t extremely

difficult to assess Soviet Intentions In this field and that a harder

estimate must await more clear cut

evidence."

9/4/62 - The White House Issued the following Presidential

Statement:

as all of our friends in this

nemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the

Soviet

Union to bolster the milltary power of the Castro regime in Cuba.

Information has reached the Government In the last 4 days from a

variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets

nave provided the cuban Government with a number of antlaircraft

missiles with a short range of 25 miles which are similar to early

models. of our Nike.

Along with these missiles,

the Soviets are

apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equip-

ment which 1s required for their operation.

We can also confirm the

presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-

ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles.

The number of Soviet

m1l1tary technicians now known to be 1n Cuba or enroute -- approximatel

3,500 - 1s consistent with assistance in setting up and learning

use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make

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(81. 9/4/62 Continued)

"information avallable as fast as 1t is obtained and properly verified.

There 1s no evidence of any organized

combat force 1n 'Cuba, from any

soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to (s1c) Russia; of

a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo, of the presence

of ground-to-ground missiles,

or of other significant offensive capability

either In Cuban hands or under Soviat direction and guidence. Here It

otherwise,

would arise.

The Cuban question must be

considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats

It continues to be the policy of the Urilted States that the

Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force

or the threat of force.

It will be prevented by whatever means may be

necessary from taking action against any part of the western Herisphere . .

82. 9/4-5/62 - "General Carter briefed & number of Congressional

leaders, Including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees".

(CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

83. 9/5/62 - This was the first U-a mission

for September (of the

two wnich had been authorized "as a routine matter" by the Special Group on

July 19-- based on the DCI's recommendation that "U-2 flights over Cuba

be continued at their current level of two a month"). This flight (and the

August 29 flight, covered areas which in retrospect are known: to have been

the sites of MRSM and IRBM Installations -- but the September 5 photography

"gave no recognizable evidence that any construction was then under way,

although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material

at Guanajay Site I on August 29.

In fact there was probably no ballistic

missile equipment in Cuba at that time."

CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

9/5/62 - On this date photograph: of the Remedios IRBM site

was negative, but road improvements began shortly thereafter, and a flow of

construction from the port of Isabela, on the north coast : : :..

"the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature

1s not determinable.

The estimated date for the beginning of majur

construction 1s about 1 October"'. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

9/5/62 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of

MIG- 215 In Cuba.

(Source: NPIC)

86: 9/5/62 - Senator Keating, speaking on the floor of the Senate

In response to Senator Engle's earlier remarks that day (see Items 60 and 64,

above):

• I have said that the whole story has not been told the

American people. That 1s

still the case

even after the latest

White House announcement yesterday:

I apologize for the, embarrascuent I am about to cause the

Senator from California. On the 14th day of August, In an effort to

get some official information, I wrote to the Department of State to

ask them about Cuba and the buildup there.

Sixteen days later on

,24

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(86.

9/5/62 Continueu

August 30th,

the Department wrote a letter to me which arrived at. my

office just today (9/5/62)

This letter - an Incredible letter

in the tight of what has happened since August 30, and inceed what

had happened before that - reads in part as follows:

'Several Soviet passenger and cargo ships arrived in Cuba during

late July and early August varrying large quantities of technicians

of various kinds.

'The Department has established that personnel landed from ap-..

proximately five uf the ships. We have no specific information about

the number of persons.

We have no information that any Soviet-bloc troops have landed :

Although the full significance of these developments 1's not

there is no evidence that supplles and technicians have arrived

1n Cuba 1n such numbers as to provide support for external aggression

Tron Cuba against other countries.'" (Source: Congressional Record)

87. 9/6/62 - "After further analysis" (of the August 29 flagnt)

there appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September

the information which had previously been included by the CIA in the

resident's Checklist of August 31, 1962

Mugust 29 flight which disclosed sA-? sites in western cuba, paus

KOMAR-class PT-boats and tanks..

(Source:

CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

9/6/62 - By this time "more detailed readout of the 29

August mission had

•. led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of

another kind of missile site -- possibly surface-to-surface at

Banes, on the northeast coast.

General Carter so Informed the Pres1-

dent on September 6.

(For this reason the Information was never In-

cluded in the Checklist)" -

Programs were then set in motion to determine the characteristics

and range of the missiles at Banes:

On 9/9/62 at the request of the

Secretary of State, COMOR reviewed the vehicles avallaple for recon-

naissance of Banes.

•On 9/10 General Carter sent a memorandum to the

necessary actions,

Group approva™

Secretary of Defense requesting "tactical-type reconnalssance

including Spectal

Hor they

Banes area, wen directed by higher authority. On 9/14 a Speciall

Group meeting las briefed by JOS on capabilitles for low level cover-

age of lcertai., targets" in Cuba - but the Secretary of defense dia:

not want the operation considered

further until: there were available

the results.of further U-2 reconnaissance which had been decided upon

at a White House meeting of 9/10.

On September 18 the CIB reported the results of a further CIA

the 9/5 U-? photography, namely, the conclusion that the

Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile.)

"One additional Item was picked up

by the 5 September' mission,

the presence of an assembled MIQ-2l at Santa Clara airfield along

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188: 9/6/62 Continued

"wIth several others still in crates.

This was not reported by CIA

In the Checklist but was

reported In

the CIB of & September. Actually,

these MIG-21 crates (readily Identiflable from photographs) had

arrived In Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had

been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received

1n Washington for several weeks.

Upon the arrival of these and

photographs of other ships.

carrying MIG-21 crates,

an 1tem was

published 1n the CiB of 27 September -- with DiA withholding concur-

rence -- that between

• 22 and 30 MIQ-2ls had been delivered to Cuba.

This Information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

9/6/62 - "Mex1co C1ty,

September 4. -- A detailed report

on distribution of nearly 20,000 Russian, Chinese, Algerian and

African milltary men, naval and air bases and guided missile launching

pads was released here today by a cuban student exile office.

One missile station is being Installed near the port of Bania Honda

and note we made me canta Mona do one a laundres pad.

3000 Russians were landed at Bahia Honda for work on

the statement sald.

(Source: Congressional Record)

90. 917/62 - On this date the DCI (who was on the Riviera and

was being kept Informed by CIA cable) sant a cablé to General Carter

urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that

hunch 1s we might face prospect of Sovlet short-range surface-to-

surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command

Important targets In Southeast U,S. and possibly Carlbbean

(These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National

Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

917 (or 8)/62 - "The first large pleces of equipment for

September.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).

9/8/62 - The CIB on this date included a report on results

of the 915 photography which disclosed the presence of one assembled

and several crated MIG-21s at Santa Clara airfield. Apparently Infor-

• mation on the presence of MIG-21s In Cuba was not reported in the

President's Checklist unt1l 9/27/62. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

93. 9/8/62 - DIA reported that the scope of Soviet Bloc assis-

tance to Cuba suggests motives going tasjund the lending of support

and encouragement of the Castro regime. !Source: DIA report to Boara

on 11/9/62)

9/9/62 - COMOR,

at the request of the Secretary of State,

reviewed the vehicles available: for reconnaissance of Banes (as the

resilt of U-? photography of 9/5 Indicating the possible presence. ol

an SSM site at Banes).

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62.

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95. 9/10/62 - Senator Thomas J, Dodd stated in he Senate:

"I have reason to belleve, on the basis of information from

rellable sources,

that the situation 1n Cuba 1s even more grave than

has yet been Indicated to the American publlc...

Event be demo 2% purely decensive.

"source: washing.cor

96. 9/10/62 - Upon Instruction of the iresident, General Carter

General Eisenhower

"on the cuban situation"

(The DCI

briefed General Eisenhower again on 10/3.)

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

Genera? carter from the Riviera stating:

9/10/62 - On this date the DCI sent a second cable to

"Difficult for me to

rationalize extensive costly defenses being estaulishes in Cuba.

• • appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for

purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as

MRBMs to be installed by. Soviets. after present phase completed and

country secured from overflights.

Suggest Board of National Estimates

study motives .

views were provided to the DD/I and the

Board of Nationai Éstimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 21/7/62)

98. 9/10/62 - In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.

deneral Carter requested

"necessary actions including Special Group

approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher

authority,

of tactical-type reconnaissance" against the cruise.

missile site at Banes.

(source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

9/10/62 - CIA reports that on this date a meeting took place

White House attended by Secretary Rusk, Messrs. Robert Kennedy

and McGeorge Bundy,

and Generals Carter and Lansdale.

of this meeting was to make

"a full review of the overflight progran

for Cuba,

was prompted by

"the results of the 29 August and

the 5 September missions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites.

CIA reports that the factors Involved and the decision reached

at this White House meeting were as follows:

(1) Because of the soviet protest of the August 30 U-2 overflight

of Sakhalin Island, and. because of the September 8 shootdown of a U-2

over. Communist China, the participants at the meeting

"were naturally

reluctant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s. might be

operational.

(2) The hard Intelligence thus far received on the presence of

SA-2s and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in

NIE: 85-2-62 of August 1 and had subsequently been fully repurted.

Therefore, the hard intelligence, was not such as to produce a

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1199.

9/10/62 Continued)

"of alarm or a feeling that urgent action

was required

thon came not as a shock but as a problem to be dealt wiùh deliberately

1t may have even served to relax the sense of urgency generated

by the President's decision of 23 August, the known usually being less

alarming than the unknown .

The participants therefore felt that

the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the areas covered by

the two previous missions (of August 29 and September 5)."

(3) "Finally, the participants at the meeting) were operating in

the atinosphere of the time .

• The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda

apparatus was attempting to focus attention on Berlin.

-•••

up a diplomatic smokescrees..

• Furthermore, they (the participants

at the Walte House meeting) must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was

potentlally the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the

Administration in the election campaign then beginning

(4) The CIA proposed two extended overflights covering the remainder

of the Island not covered in the August 29 and September 5 missions:

"The secretary of State objected"and insisted that "coverage of the rest of

Cuba should be designed

so that peripheral flights over international waters

would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory."

(5) "To meet (the Secretary of State's wishes, the program was

divided into four flights,

two overflights and two peripberal

overfligats were to be: (a) over the Isle of pines, and (b) over the east

of Cuba to cover Guantanamo and Banes:

The peripheral. flights were to be:

(a) over the North coast of eastern Cuba, and (b) the south coast.

All four

Pligots were to be designed for maximum safety, and the overflights were to

be quick "1n-and-out"

operations.

In obtaining approvel for the tracks 1t

was necessary to provide assurance that there would not be flights over

Known: 8A-2 sites.

"The President approved this program" for four flights in September.

"Thus the record shows that the President authorized everything the Special

Group requested.": (Source:. CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

j,00 9/11/62 - Senator Tower, speaking in the U. s. Senate:

"Russian tanks, rockets, military planes and high velocity artillery

have been brought into Cuba. They threaten the entire U. S east of the

M1ss1551ppL.

Pads for light rockets bave already been built in Cuba by

Russiang and Chinese:

.. I am reliably informed that launching pads for

medium rockets with a 2500-mile-plus range can be built in under 4 days

(Source: Congressional Record)

28

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Senate said:

971/62 - Senator Humphrey, speaking on the floor of the

• I think 1t 18 ridiculous and Insulting to the

American people for grown men to wring their hands publicly about

Cuba's being a milltary threat to the United States ..

.. I do not

Intermediate and

wnderestimate the fact that there are missiles it within our capacity

short range.

But i do know ..

that we have

without even so much as violently flexing a muscle, to destroy, every

single military installation in one day.

so. I do not want the

people

of my state to lose a single night's sleep worrying about the might

of Cuba...:

(Source: Congressional Record)

102. 9/12/62 - General Carter briefed the House Armed services

and Foreign Affairs Committees

"on the Cuban situation"

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

103. 9/12/62 - A Cuban National being processed at the Refugee

center at Opa-locka,

center at raven tree pula, sported do de thie tate ne terred

65 to 70 feet in length; that these trucks were observed driving

from Havana to Camp Libertad; that the beds of the trucks were loaded

iith black crates; that the traflers were loaded with what the source

belleved to be large canvas-covered missiles; that there were 4 fins

at the tralling edge of each missile.

The source of the information

drew sketches of the missiles and

these missiles resembled surface-to.

surface MRoMS.

CIA disseminated this information to the Intelligence community

0n 9/21/62.

9/13/52 - "On 13: September a source was Informed by a

'of the general area that a rocket base was being constructed

by the Soviets at a location now Identified from photography as

Remed108 (IRBM) SIte 1.

A second base was also reported, bus a

missile. site has not yet been found in photography although new road

construction exists in that area.": (Source: Joint Evaluation Report,

10/24/62)

9/13/62 - On this date the DCI sent a third cable

Carter from the Riviera

"repeating these premonitions" which

he had set forth: in cables to. CIA on 9/1 and 9/10 rugarding the

possibility of Soviet Introduction of MRBMs Into Cuia.

These views

were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/52)

106.

9/14/62 - At the Special Group meeting, a JCS represent-

tive briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain

targets!

1n Cuba, However,

"the Secretary of Defense was recorded

as not wanting to have the operation considered further until results

of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, 1.e,

General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-?

coverage taken on 1o September at the White House menting on that

date)

(Sourcer CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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107. 9/14/62 -

we CIA reported in the Prei

Ment's Checl: 11st

"The number of conflimed SAM altes remains at 12,

hood that others are under construcüion grows, with the latest evidence

to the Isle of Fines

Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

as one of the additional locations"

108. 48/15/62 - Major construction at the Guanajay fixed IRBM

sites

"had probably begun by 15 September" (the construction equip-

ment and material having arrived at Mariel beginning "about mid-

August").

"It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the

activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/02)

109. 9/15/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist

"A message Intercepted yesterday on a nei serving soviet forces

in Germany called for

"volunteers for the protection of Cuba'.

are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another intercept

referring to the isolation of 'volunteers'. If valid, they would

suggest that the influx of soviet military personnel to cuba is not

finished,

We are investigating further.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/02)

110. Mid-September, 1962 • At this time there was first noted a

high

frequency circuit

in operation between Moscow and Havana relayed

through Bomako, Mall. The fact that manual operations and one-time

codes are used

argue against a command and control function for this

11nk. It 1s

belleved that this link was established to meet a require-

ment for additional back-up communications

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

9/16/62 - On this dave, the Dol sent a fourth cable to

General Carter regarding the possibility of a ballistic missile

buildup In Cuba,

stating: "Do not wish to be overly alarming this

matter, but belleve CIA

and community must keep Government Informed

of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps

possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative.

(these views were provided to the Do/s ana the Boara of National

Estimates.)

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

9/17/62 - The second shipment of équipment for the MRBM!!

sites at

San Cristobal arrived at Mariel on 9/17/62 on the chip 120x

"Poltava" (the first shipment had arrived in

September 7. or 8)

"This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night with

the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September.

That 1s, 17 September 1g the earliest date at which photography might

have detected the first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal"

(Source: CIA Chronology, 21/7/62%

9/18/62 - There appeared in the Central Intelligence

Bulletin on September 18 a report on the September 5 photography which

reflected the presence of a surface-to-surface, short-range, coastal

defense. m1ss110181te. (Source! CIA. Chronology,

(11/7/62)

130 СД

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114. - 9/18/62

he CIA reported in the Pre dent's Checklist

that

"We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route

to Cuba.

Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on

the scene to about 4,200.

We are beginning to see some tenuous

evidence. foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites In Camaguey

province.

115. 9/19/62 - The CIA reported In the President's Checkllst

thạt:

associate interse pope that

"The Interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-

"The message asking for volunteers for service in cuba,

which

we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough soviet military

radio nets to reveal

that a fairly general recruiting campaign 1s

There is no indication yet of the numbers involved."

116., 9/19/62 - (USIB Meeting) - "As a result of the DCI's

rent to ces cables to General Carter from the Riviera

there was a renewed examination of other

methods of reconnaissance of Cuba.

(It should be noted here that

this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary ifter the

establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the j-2

Impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would

the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMu).

September 19 at USIE, General Carter stated his desire to see RF-IOl's

over Cuba.

He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over

cuba could be justified to the Special Group, adding that 'we cannot

out a stoo to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never

on meen the point of decision was reached '"(Source: I TooL,

127: 9/19/52 - USIB 1ssued SNIE 85-3-62 on "The Military Buildup

Among the key findings of the SNIE were the following: (1)

"We believe that ...

the main purpose of the milltary buildup in

Cuba 1s to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the

Cubans and Soviets concelve to be a danger that the U.S, may attempt

by one means or another to overthrow 1t.

The Soviets

evidently hope

to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities

and by threatening Soviet military retallation.

At the same time

chey evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military

vase 1n Cuba might provoke U.s. military intervention and thus defeat

their present purpose; (2) (the Soviets)

are well aware that the

question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has

become a major political issue; (3) the establishment on Cuban s011

It would Indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of

risk In US-Sovigt

relations than the USSR has displayed thus far..

• however, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered

the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic

posture, and, In that connection, the feasibillty and utilly of dis-

playing nuclear dellvery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency

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(217. 9/19/62 Continued)

"must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet

policy; (4) Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMS

to Cuba In order to supplement the limited number of ICiMs now beileved to be

operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-

Launched missiles; (5) the establishment on Cubar 8011 of & 81g01f1coat strke

capabilIty with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from soviet

practice, since such weapons have so far not been Installed even in satellite

territory:.: the Soviets migat think (1t) would be worth a good deal if they

could get away with it, however, they would almost certalaly estimate that this

could not be done without provoking a dangerous u.s. reaction; ard (6) although

the Soviets may see some military advantages In Cuba, as a strategic strike base,

the riska would be great and the political Implications would run counter to

the kind Of pOLIcy they are actually pursuink 1a latin imerice mey count

They do not

propose to win the region for communim by military conquest.

Lastead on a process of political action

* * * **

**

CIA's retrospective comnents on SNIE 85-3-62: (1) the judgment on the

degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error and the

community was virtually unanimous in support of thie judgment (2) the deployment

of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was unprecedented

(3) While the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived 1n Cuba between

917-15/62, the first reports by ground observers who had seen them had not

arrived 1a Washington by 9/19/62, and there was no evidence that MRiMe were on

the war (4) the estimate falled to give adequate weight to the pace at walch

Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new 1a-

stallations were manned by Soviet personnel (5) the community was still thirking

1n terms of rather deliberately-paced Soviet military ald programs for the lar,

Iraq and Indonesin, and for Cuba in the 1960-1962 perlod, but there was already

good evidence that the Cuban prugram had departed from this pattern (6) also

the Indonesian situation bad broken the Soviet pattern only a month before when

the USSR showed Itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk

"Por the sake of a polltical gain something less than vital to Soviet Interests"

(7) the USSR had shown In the Indonesian affair that it was

"WIlling to take

some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States, albelt the

degree of risk involved was far leas than in the Cuban venture,

and (8) "..:.

For the record, there 1s so evidence that the existence of SNIE 85-3 had any

1nh1b1t1ng Influence in later decisions. It was not, for lastance, cited to

support an argument agilast contiauing overfligate.

Nor did it affect current

intelligence reporting; this is conducted Independently of the estimative

¡rocess and provides a check on the continulag valldity of standing estimates"

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

118. 9/20/62 - CIA disseminated an agent report quoting Castro's personal

pilot, Claudio Morinas, who sa1d on 9/9/62: "We bave 40-m1le range guided

missIles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air. . ..

There are al80 many

mobile ramps for Intermediate raage rockets

This report was considered

too general to be used in the process' (In which ClA analysts made up target

cards) V (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/2)

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119. 9/20/62 ntercepted messages (COMIN) Indicatel the

In cuba on unis date of Lieutenant General Pavel B.

Dankev1ch,

Dankevich 18 believed to have held a commanà in Vinnista

probably

as late as November, 1961.

Vinnista 1s the location of a

probable Soviet MRBM command

and the headquarters of a Long Range

Alr Army. It 18 not known how long Dankevich may have been In cuba

prior to

September 20, 1962. The Intelligence publications avallable

to the Board fail to reflect that any particular significance was

attached to Dankevich's presence in Cuba until after the President

made his public address relative to MRBMs and IRBMs In Cuba.

October 27 CIA distributed a memorandum stating that Dankevich g

presence in Cuba

the missile bases in cuated the high prlority asgiened by Moscow

(Source: CIA memorandum of 10/27/62;

DIA Intelligence Surmary 10/27/62; Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)

120. 9/20/62 - On this date the Dul sent a final cable to CIA

from the Riviera, commenting to General Carter on the conclusions

of SNIE 85-3 of 9/19 which had been cabled to the DCI.

The DCI's

cable expressed reservations on the SNIE conclusions and stated "As

an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba w1ll

provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position

In connection with all other critical areas and hence they might

take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position."

views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.

(We have no evidence that the intelligence community was informed of

the views xpressed by the DCI in his several cables from the Riviera

The State and DIA members of USIB advised the Board on 11/9/62 that

they had not been informed of the DOI's views.)

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

121, 9/20/62 - The Defense Intelligence Agency on this date

attempted to obtain broad area coverage of Cuba through CORONA. On

that date the DIA member of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the

ming of an engineering pass of the CORONA vehicle over Cuba

the western end of the island 1s, temporarily at least, off l1mits

and where we need to know if any other SA-? sites have been con-

structed

9/21/62 - An article in the Washington News by V1rg1n1a

Prewett under date of 10/31/62 entitled "Why Didn't JFK Act Earlier?"

,that a report made by Miami's Cuban Student Directorate or

9/21/62, stated that: "One of the European Ambassadors in Havana

recently reported to his respective country that if the countries

of this hemisphere do not take milltary action against Castro 1mmed1-

ately, or at least before the next six months, Cuba will possess

Russian missile bases armed with atomic and nuclear weapons capable

of destroying in a few minutes the most strategio zones in the United

States.

Besides,

It Is known that the construution will be carried out

secretly, with this end in view that while the work continues,

government will go on belleving that the military installa-

tions are purely defensive measures. i'

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9/21/62 - Ine CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"Evidence l1s still coming in on Moscow's canvass of its military forces for

volunteers to serve in Cuba:

This activity 1s puzzling; we have never seen

anything like 1t before:

The move may be purely administrative: to replace

personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for

some time. On the other hand, It could mean another sizable Increment to Boviet

In Cuba or a belief in Moscow that 1te people are Ilkely to be engaged

1n combat. We are trying to get a better answer.

(Source: CIA Chronology,

9/22/62 - "The most Ilkely ship to have carried the large Items

of equipment for the Sagua La Grande MBM sites) 1s the Ktmovsk which docked

(at Casilda,

on the south coast) on 22 September.

This equirment must have moved

to the site.

during the last week of september, and was probably detectable fron

photography after 1 October."

(source: CIA Chronology, 21/7/62)

125. 9/27/62 - The CIA reported In the President's Checklist that:

"Photography snapped earlier this month show at least two soviet ships

delivering 22, perhaps more, MIG-2ls. We now estimate there are 25-30 aircraft

of this type in Cuba.

"(This paragraph was quoted in the CIA Chronology of

11/7,62 but noü 1n the revised Chronology of 11/14/62.)

"Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the

voyage to Cuba since mid-July 1s now over 100. About 85 of these probably were

carrying military hardware."

"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to

In for new credentials by today, telling them that all of cuba bevond Harang, Put

c1ty lImits is out of bounds except by special permission." (Source: CIA

Chronology, 11/24/62)

9/27/62 - On this date CIA received a report of an observation made

on 9/17/62 of & convoy moving toward San Cristobal: This report dovetailed with

the earlier report of the 9/12/62 sighting of MRBMs near Havara (Item 103, above).

"'The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion

that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a

possibility of the ss-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a

target card on Son Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report

of "Russians butlding & rocket base."

Now this card was removed and, with the

two reports cited cove and other less specific Information on activity 11 this

area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and

3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage:

This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight. It read as

follows: 'Collateral reports Indicate the existence of a restricted area 1n

Pinar del Rio Province which 1s suspected of including an SSM site wder con-

struction, particularly

SS-4 Shyster. The area 1s bounded by a line connicuing

the following four ton: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego ilel Los

Banos (0325N/2235W); San Cristobal (S301N/2243W), and Las Pozos < 8317N/22:30W).

Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible sarface missile contruc-

tion, vith particular attention to sS-l Shyster (Source: CIA Chronolgy,

11/14/62)

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127. 9/27/62 - "

• At some point, probably just after 27 September,

an 1tem on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been :

written for CIA current intelligence publications.

It could not be written

because therê was an injunction not to do so (see Item No. 51, above). '

It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites

without NPIC. corroboration had never been rescinded.

had on reporting in late September and October if the other ban had not been In

effect (1.er, the US restriction -- see Item 152, Infra) 10 alfficult to

determine.

These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist, but the Checklist

writers drew. largely on the Cuban Daily Summary

published by CIA.

Since the Surmary was affected by the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the

sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting the

Checklist off from Information on offensive weapons.

Checklist group, nor any otber current Intelligence officers, knew that the

possibility that a Sovlet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba

had been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President and his

advisors more than a month earlier (see Item No. 57, above). In other words,

the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by time and bureaucratic processes

that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that

establishment of such a base was most improbable (see Item No. 117, above).

"It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have

been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it.

The analysts

too vere sensitive to the political impact of the reports they were receiving

In addition, rigia compartmentation was maintained between the COMOR --

Special Group organization for collection and the intelligence components re-

sponsible for analysis. Few, If any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem

even had IDEALIST clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights.

of Pinar de, Rio and Las Villas were included In the September program, o1 that

this program was serlously delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photo-

graphic verification they had requested would not soon be forthcoming, and they

night well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving 1t.

"Nevertheless, It can be established that if the Injunction against

publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee

eports in the Cuban Daily sumary, which is not highly selective. In retro

it seems guite possible -- but by no means certain -- that they would hav

been picked up in the Checklist, but 1t 1s extremely doubtful 1i they would have

survived the coordination process for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. Thus;

at the most the President might have learned that there was suspicions activity

around San Cristobal "lightly more than a wee before he apparently did.

"In sum, the CIA analysts belleved they had done their duty by targeting

the San Cristobal arca for photographic coverage, but no word of their concern

over activity In this area bad appeared in an intelligence publication. It

ppears highly probable that the special Group first heara of this concem at lis

neeting on 9 October (see Item No. 143, Infra) when it ordered a U-2 missior

which covered the area.

"The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correlation of reports and

the Special Group Meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes

of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was

734-82

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designed to provide elaborate justifications an back-up paper work before

each decision was made, procedures reaching back into the early history of the

U-2 operations over the USSR. They were intended for the control of deliberate

strategic reconnaissance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such

as that 1n Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact, after readout

of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned."

(source: CIA Chronology,

11/14/62)

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-At the Board's 9/28/62 meewing the DCI Indica-

tea he did not believe that offensive, strategic missiles had been in-

stalled in Cuba, but he considered this a possibility at some future

time, but only

after Cubals dofensive capability was such as to deny

Cuban alrspace to U.S. reconnaissance alrcraft. The DOI reported that

"our Intelligence collection on Cuba has improved since the first of

the year" and that "CIA now has 45

third-country agents (meaning dip-

Tomats) reporting throughout Cuba.

129:

September 1962 - "Offensive missiles 1dentifled: Wester

Cuba: Two launch sitos consisting of 8 field-type launchers and It

1020-nm MRBMs (SS-4) • these missiles are prohably those re-

ported moving into this area during september:

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report of 10/18/62, prepared by GMAIU/

JAEIC/NPIC)

9/29-10/2/62 - Pursuant to the 9/20/62 request of DIA, a

pass over Cuba was made by the Corona vehicle launched on 9/29/62.

The resulting photography was good by Corona standards but not of

sufficient quality to reflect significant photographic intelligence

on MRBM Or IRM developments un the island.

When this CORONA photog-

raphy was checked against the photography obtained from the SAC-

operated U-2s it was possible to relate some of the earth scratchings

appearing In the CORONA photography to the construction at some of

the long range missile sites which were detected beginning October 14.

Without the U-? photography however, these scratchings could not

possibly be identified as being assoclated in any way with MRBM or

IRAM construction.

The photograplic interpreters at the strategic

Air Command believe that 1f all nine sites had been completed at the

time of the CORONA pass, the CORONA photogr. ohy might have resulted

1n the identification of the IRBM sites but not of the MRBM sites.

Dr. Charyk, In commenting on this subject to Board Member Gray,

noted that this experience makes It obvious that satellite photography

cannot be wholly relied upon when 1t provides negative evidence; and

that this gives one pause when we consider the rellance which has been

on satelilte photography seeking evidence of miss1le installa-

tions in the USSR.

15 confirmed SA-2 sites in Cuba and the discernible pattern wholh

was developing from their location:

(1) In Oriente Province, the 3 SA-2 sites form a triangular pat-

tern around the new military

soon be operational. no MIGs there now but the MIds belleved to

be stationed at Camaguay airfield will probably be moved to Holguln

when Holguin becomes operational. (No SA-2 sites Identified at

Camaguay:

(2) 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military

airfield near Santa Clara in the Central Army area -- where MIGs have

been for several months and also the field on which the first MIQ-21

was identified.

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(131. 10/1/62 Continued)

(3) In the Western Army area, the 3 (possibly 4) SA-? s1tes fOr

a linear pattern for the defense of the military airfield at San

Antonio de los Ranos and the Havana-Mariel complex (San Antonio 1s

headquarters for the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force and the assembly

point for all MIQs except MIG-218).

(4) Further west, in Pinar del Rio Province, a triangular

pattern of SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant

military installation.

There are 2 underground facilities within

this triangle whose use and purpose are unimown. One of these 3

SA-2 sites 10 located very near to the san Julian military alr base,

but this is a most unlikely spot to place SA-28 for the defense of

this air base.

"Therefore, curiosity is Immediately aroused as to

the purpose of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba."

(5) In the north central portion ci Pinar del Rio Province 1s a

trapazoid-shaped restricted area (15-20 miles on a side) controlled by

Soviet military personnel recently intrcduced Into Cuba••• no known

nilitary installations in this rough and sparsely populated area. • •..

uban relugees arriving in Miami say all Cubans have been evacuated

from the area.

Purpose of this restricted area 1s unknown.

(6) Information on the deployment of Soviet military personnel

and "technicians" in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources.

A plotting of all reported locations indicates that there 18 a definite

correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or

missile activity.

Significantly, the greatest concentration of Soviet

personnel, activity and camps 1s In the western end of Cuba indicating

a greater

Interest by the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in other Prov-

(7) The source of an unevaluaisa report says that on September 12

Le saw some 20 SS-4 (or possibly ss-3) missiles in the vicinity ol

Campo Libertad a small alifield on the western edge of Havana). This

report is unconfirmed and there are no other reports of such missiles.

However, it 1s significant to note that ky taking the approximate

center of the trapozold-shaped restricted area previously referred to,

as the point of origin for a radius of 1100 nm (range of an SS-4

missile) the arc includes Philadelphia, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, San

Antonio, Mexico City, all Central American capitals, the Panama Canal,

and. Venezuclan o1l flelds.

"The presence.

of operational SS-4 missiles

1n this location would give the Soviets a great

milttary asset.

Based on the foregoing, DIA on 10/2/62 proposed to the COMOR

working Group that the Finar del Rio search area be Included in COMOR's

reconnaissance objectives for Cuba, (This was done at the October 4

COMOR meeting and the cojective was incorporated in the reconnaissancé

objectives 11st. Source: Letter to Coyne from Director, DIA,

11/13/62)

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132. 10/1/62 - According to reports subsequently reviewed, "on

October I explosions were reportedly occurring at a highly secure construction

project at a location now identifled from photograpby ás Site 1 (Sagua la

Grande area). Material delivered to the project included lumber and pre-

fabricated

concrete forms. This suggests that site construction was under

way at that time." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

133. 10/1/62 - This 18 the estimated date for the beginning of major

construction on the Remedios IRBM B1te•

• the date at which the site

acquiren a recognizable photographlo signature 1s not determinable."

(Source: CIA Chrono108, 11/7/62)

134. 10/1-3/62 - CIA reports that during this perlod CIA prepared

a new target card which was in effect a requirement for photographic coverage

of the San Cristobal area (see Item No. 126, above), and that in spite of

time lags Involved 1n receiving reports of refugees and CIA agents, • •

"Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the son Cristobal area had been pinpointed

as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requestea.

This represents a considerable technical achievement...

the Intelligence

Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile

Installations In Cuba

•"•CIA's files contain 211 Intelligence reports

on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before I January

1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the

observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to

view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion

By September,

the volune of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed.

During

the month 882 reports on Internal activities in Cube were disseminated;

exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors

report that their output represented only a small publishable fraction of the

raw material collected.) A substantial proportion of these dealt with the

deployment of defensive missiles and related activitles.

Knowledge on the

part of the analysts that such a deployment was In fact 801ng on, plus the

normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive

missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke screen around

the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic

apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports

Of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them.

It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged

missile activity shula be negated by photography, but as a suspect s5-4 site.

This process took about three weeks, from the date when the flrst observation

was made in the ground in Cuba lo the preparation of the target cara

• 11

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

(NOTE: The fact that CIA considered San Cristobal as a suspect MRBM site

was not Included in any of CIA's current Intelligence publications until

after photograpbic confirmatin was obtained in mid-October.)

135. 10/2/62 - CIA distributed to the White House and other recipients

a raw intelligence report, based on infoimation acquired in Cuba on 10/1/62

which stated in part that on 9/19/62 large Latercontinental rockets nore

than 67 feet long vere unloaded in Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province end that

the rockets vere on long trailers when unloaded from the ship.

In distributing

this report CIA Headquarters appended the comment. It is more likely that

source onserved SA-2 missiles being off-loaded".

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136. 10/2-3/62 - The Final Communique of the Informel Meeting of

Ministere of Foroign Affairs of the American Republics held In Washing-

ton, 10/2-3/62 stated in pert that "The Soviet Union's Intervention in

Cuba threatens the unity of the mericas and its democratic institu

tions" and it called for

"the adoption of special measures, both indi-

vidual and collective". The communique observed that "it 1s desiraöle

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 39)

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(236: 10/2-3/62 Continued)

"to intensify surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of

war and all other Items of strategic. Importance to the communist re-

gime of cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the

Island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the

Hemisphere.

10/3/62 - The President signed Senate Joint Resolution 230

which had been adopted in the Senate and House of Representatives

during September,

The Joint Resolution expressed the determination

of the United States to (1) prevent by necessary means, including use

of force, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force

or threat of force 1ts aggressive or subversive activities In this

Hemisphere; (2) prevent in Cuba the creation or use of externally

supported military capability endangering U.s. security; and (3) work

with the OAS and with freedom-loving cubans to support the aspirations

of the cuban people for self-determination.

10/3/62 - The DCI briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban

sItuation"

(the Genoral had previously been briefed

by CIA on 9/10):

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

10/3/62 - On this date the DIA member of COMOR submitted

to the Chairman of COMOR a memorandum which (1) noted the concerns of

the Sec/Def and JOS about the (Insufficient) amount of Intelligence on

Cuba that was being mede available to responsible decision makers in

Government; (2) noted that certain portions of the island, notably the

had not been seen since August 29; (3) expressed the view

of DIA and j-2 that the best war of collecting intelligence on cuba

under the present circimstances was by resuming frequent and regular

U-2 overfilghts and that coverage on the order of once a week was

essential; and (4) proposed that COMOR send to the USIB a drait

¡intelligence justification" which had been prepared by the Dia ac

the basis for authorizing frequent and regular U-2 flights over Cuba.

The DIA

"Intelligence justification" pointed to the bulldup of

SAM sites, and "SSM" sites which had been observed in eastern and

western cuba, and on the Isle of Piness The DIA proposal called for

U-2 coverage to meet requirements for up-to-date intelligence on (a)

the location of SA-2 sites; (b) confirmation or negation of reports

from reliable sources concerning the sightings of SS 4 missiles 1n

Cuba, (c) the number of KOMAR class PGMGs in service; and (d) the

number of MIG-21s in Cuba.

The Intelligence justification drafted by DIA gave recognition to

the increased risk to U-2 aircraft in the l1ght of SA-2 ánd MIG-21g

present in Cuba.

Nevertheless, this recognition of risk was followed

by the statement: "But it must be stated that the current need is

extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly

weighed before this coverage 1s deniea.

The DIA memorandum to COMOR also included a proposed list of

target otjectives in Cuba to meet the intelligence requirements which

DIA had outlined.

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(139. 10/3/62 Continued)

With leir changes or omissions,

the DIA's 10/3 draft of the Intel-

juntification for revised overflights of Cuba was forwarded

by COMOR on 10/5

the USB for consideration and approval.

S1m11-

arly, on 10/6 COMOR sent to the Director of NRO,

at his verbal request,

the intelligence justification and statement of target requirements

for overhed reconnaissance of cuba with coples also being sent by

COMOR to the USIB for Information and any

comments prior to the

Special Group meeting on 10/9/62.)

In sunmary,:

the Intelligence justification,

and the listing of

requirements and specific objectives, which went forward to No fron

COMOR on 10/6 Included the following:

(1) A statement of the pressing need for photographic coverage

of the soviet arms buildup In Cuba

particularly with regard to a

SA-2 s1tes, (b) possible MRBMs, (c) MIG-21 aircraft, and (d) tanks

artillery,

and other conventional weapons and equipment "which are

arriving in large quantities.

(2) SIGINI coverage to obtain up-to-date Intelligence on the

soviet-furnished air defense buildup in Cuba which is known to include

(a) radar -- EW, GOI, HP, MC, AQ and FC; (b) missile systems consisting

of 3 confirmed and 1 probable cruise-type coastal defense short range

massile sites, 15 SA-2 sites, and missile storage and support fac111-

ties; (c) MIGs _- 60 MIG-15/17/19 and 36 MIG-2ls estimated; and (d)

a senera aispersal throughout Cuba of 3orm, 37mm and 57mm AMA to

defend airfields, ports and military installations.

..a two-

fold collection program 1s necessary: first, a continued coverage of

the early warning (EW), ground control intersept (GCI), and

:. commun1-

cations networks which 1s now adequately covered by peripheral air,

shipborne and ground efforts; second

overflight missions by a

vehicle capable of stimulating this defense system into an offensive

reaction.

from this reaction, the readiness and effectiveness of

weapons can be determined.")

(3) Conclusions: "Some of these requirements are currently being

mer by peripheral means. However, only overflights will peimit the

accomplishment of all objectives. COMOR will provide a continual.

revlew and up-dating of requirements.

(4) Recommendation:

programs be initiated to satisfy these requirements.

(Source: DIA letter to Coyne, 11/13/62)

140.

10/4/62 - The Director, DIA, established a miba "Situation

Room" operated on a 24-hour basis.

141.

DCI questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time

particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational. The

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(141. 10/4/62 Contiaued)

Special Grop then directed the NRO to prepere an over-all program for recon-

naissance of Cube for presentation at the Special Group meeting of 10/9/62.

10/9/62 - NSA units 1n Puerto Rico, Key West, Florida, and on the

USS Oxford detected for the first time the Cuben air defense net.

On October 21,

1962, this nut shifted from an experimental to an operational status. The

Cuban air defense net is nov a Russian network in almost every respect, ut1l1ztog

Russian call sigas, the Fussian grid system and Russian operators.

The Rusulans are employing the Albatross machine in Cube. (The first

time it bas erer been detected outside of the Bloc except on Soviet bips in

certain Insterices..

NSA bas reason to believe that the Russians are possibly

employing two Alumiaum Scrambler links running between Ravana and Moscow.

(Aluminum is considered by the Russians to be their most secure Scranbler

system. Up to now it bas never been employed outside the USSR except on a

Soviet cruiser and then only when Korushchev was aboard.)

(Source: Deputy Director, NSA, 12/7/62)

143. 10/9/62 - NRO (Dr. Charyk) made a presentation to the Special

Group of an over-all progrem for reconnaissance of Cuba.

This presentation

was based on the DIA-recoumended, COMOR proposed submission of a paper on

"Intelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflights of Cube."

"At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's first recolmendation

was 'A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits."

referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal. • The operation,

which was to be supported by FLINT collection aircraft off the coast, also was

designed to pans over one of the 8A-2 sites which was thought to be most

nearly operational. Thas the secondary objective was to determine the status

of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved in getting ccuplete

U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible. NRO's second recommendation was

therefore conditional: If there 1s no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2 sortie,

maximum covernge of the vestern end of the island by multiple U-2e simultan-

cously, as soor. as weatber permits. (There were also certain other recounenda-

tions for low level, oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)

"The Group gave first priority to the san Cristobal mission and recon-

mended to the Fresident that he approve it. Ine President gave his approval --

presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time -- and the

mission was limediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, froin 10

thrcugo 12 October. On that date operational control was transferred to SAC

by direction of the President in a meeting with the Deputy Secdef and the DCI.

There is no rcason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launchings

the mission, which SAC flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the

prescribed track, but took a course at an angle to it.

planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal,

and the primary mission

was accomplishen." (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)

NOTE: This 1s in error.

See Item 143-8, next page.

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143-8. (See Item 143, above. On 12/7/62 SAC representatives exhibited

to a Panel of the President's Foreiga Intelligence Advisory Board the plar

for and actual flight track of the 10/14/62 U-2 mission over Cuba, as 1a1d

out by SAC.

The material shown to the Board Panel reflects that the pilot

plew the mission precisely as prescribed.

141-000

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(143. 10/9/62 Continued)

Prior to this decision, CIA had operated 21 U-2 missions over

or peripheral to Cuba during 1962. The dates of these 21 missions

are listed below:

1/19/62

2/2/62

2/21/62

3/15/62

4/1/62

5/2/62

5/22/02

6/6/62

5/15/62

6/18/62

6/29/62

7/12/62

17/62

9/200

(Source: NPIC)

144.

10/9/62 = The DCI briefed Congressman Cannon "on the Cuban

situation."

(source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

145.

10/9/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating, speaking on the floor

of the U.S. Senate:

"Mr. President, the President of Cuba, like a two-bit Khrushchev,

has disgraced

the name of the United Nations . . .

"Cuba represents a new and menacing shift In the world balance

of power

• I trust that all of us, regardless o party, are

united in the hope that this Nation, through lus chosen leaders and

in cooperation with its allies, will progress resolutely toward the

stern decisions which may be necessary to deal with the soviet cloud

now darkening our national horizon

"Late In August I called attention to the Russian arsenal in

cuba .

"My first suggestion, made August 31, called upon the Administra-

tion to tell the American people all of the facts about the island

buildup. Rellable information had reached me concerning the number

of ships, types of armament, and Soviet troops arriving in Cuba ...

"On August 29, just 2 days earlier, the President told a reporter

that he had no information that Russians were sending Nike-type mis-

siles to Cuba, after the reporter cited a State Department source to

that effect.

Following my revelations on the Senate floor, on August

31, the Aaministration first declared, through a senator on the other

side of the aisle, that Senator Keating was

misinformed',

theless, there followed from other quarters an effort to make it

that the information I had reported had been released earlier

by the State Department.

"On September 4, however

the President conceded that Nike-type

missiles had been delivered to Castro and confirmed in almost every

detail the facts I had stated 4 days eartler The President character-

azed, the bul dup as defensive

This in my view was a tremendous

error and a serious concession to the soviets. hat was their dine.

It phould not be ours.

142

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(145. 10/9/62. Continued)

•• Under Secretary of State Ball now admits that 85 ships

have delivered troops and war goods to the Islard. He admits that

35 missile sites have been established, and lt 1f estimated that the

total will eventually reach 25•

This knowledge has been possessed

for a long time by many of us.

Under Secretary Ball Bala

that

four missile sites of different types have been identifled.

He said

that these sites are similar to known Soviet defense missiles sites

which are belleved to cortain anti-shipping missiles having a range

of 20 to 25 miles. The significant sentence, rather burfed

away,

18

that several more such sites will be installed.

"Many other facts have been stated which have been known to some

of us but which have not been publicly stated before.

The statement

was made that 4,500 troops are stationed In Cuba.

It will be remem-

bered that the first figure given was 3000. I stated that there were

at least 5000. The first figure given by the President was 3000.

That was advanced to 4200.

It has now been advanced to 4500.

on my statement that more than 5000 troops are stationed In cuba.

Five thousand 1s a modest figure.

of State for revealing these additional facts ..

Bui I commend the Under Secretary

(Source: Congressional Record)

146. 10/10/62 - USIB discussed the COMOR submission on "Intel-

ligence Justifications and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba"

response to the Special Group's request of 10/9 for USIB opinion re-

zarding the coMoR-approvea paper especially as regards frequency of

coverage for the various groups of objectives and targets proposed bi

After discussion USIB agreed that the DCI should express to

the Special Group USIB's view that (a) the targets In Groups II and

III should be surveyed as promptly as possible and that the results

of such initial survelllance should determine the subsequent frequency

of coverage to be recommended, (b) COMOR submit for USIB consideration

at 1ta 10/17 meeting a specific list of those priority targets In

Group IV which should be covered.

Group II and Group III listed "those targets for which survell-

lance 1s desired primarily to provide order of battle and operational

status Information. Around resolution of 2-5 feet or better w1ll

suffice for this purpore. Group II Includes targets for monthly

coverage; Group III Includes targets for weekly coverage.

Because the records of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group have been

unavailable thus far to the Board's staff we are not clear as to what

action was taken by the Dol on the basis of the USIB discussion of

10/10/62.

It may be that by this time. or shortly thereafter, action

on the USIB decision was overtaken by decisions at higher levels in

Government including the decision of the President to transfer from

CIA to SAC responsibility for operation of U-2 missions over Cuba.)

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10/10/62

On this date CIA received Navy photographs

taken of

the Soviet sh1p Kasimoy.of1 Civa,

showing clearly Ident1f1-

able: IL-28 crates which later showed up In U-a photography of 10/17

at San Jullan airfield -

along with

a number of others which must

have come In on unphotographed ships."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

148. 10/10/62 - The DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittee of the

Appropriations Committee on the bulldup,

including the IL-28s.

He also commented on MREMs essentially along the lines of his cables

from Nice, adding that there were many experts: who did not belleve:

the soviets would make such a move, but that he differed with them.

He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in

the next day or so.

(Source: CIA Chronolosy, 11/7/62)

149. 10/10/62 - On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senator Keating

declared

that:

"Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites

for internediate range tactical missiles.

Intelligence authorities

advised the President and top Government officinls of this

fact, and they must now have been told that ground to ground missiles

can be operational

the island of cuba within 6 monthu.

"My own sources on the Cuban situation, which have been 100

percent reliable, have substantiated this report completely:

fact of the matter 1s,

according to my rellable sources,

that six launching sites are under construction - pads which will

have the power to hurl rockets into the American heartland and as

far as the Panama Canal Zone."

(Source: Congressional Record)

10/11/62 - On this date CIA reported in the President's

Checklist the information from Navy photography of 10/10 showing

IL-28 crates on the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.

Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/02)

10/11/62 - On this date General Carter said to Senator

Saltonstall "much the same thing" that the DCI had said on the

preceding day to the CIA Appropriations Subcommittee of the House,

1.e., that he differed with experts who were of the view that the

Soviets would not place MRBMs in

cuba.

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

152. 10/11/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 indicates that

the "USIB principals

aware that they were dealing with an ex-

plosive political issue and aware also that leakagel of intelligence

on offensive weapons

true or false, would seriously l1mit the Presi

dents freedom of action in dealing with what might become a majon

international crisis,

they had evolved a system for liniting alasemine

ation of such informationa

Analysis would continue and senios policy

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(152. 10/11/62 Cont

"officials would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal Intelll-

gence publicationg without the approval c? the UBIB principals.

These 1n-

structions were first issued prally, (CIA does not say when) and later on

October 11, 1962 fornalized by USIB in the 'PSAIM' system.

1n USiB's order were 'such information or intelligence will be disseminated

outside each USIB Intelligence component only to specific Individuals on an

EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisere to the

President have a need to know', and there is no intent, bereby, however, to

inhibit the essential analytic process.! "

(Despite the advisory role to the President which is supposed to be

be perfomed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the latter

Board was not Included as one of the approved reciplents for PSAIM reports.

Accordingly, the Board received 1ts first official notification of offensive

missiles in Cuba when the President made his address on 10/22.

The Board

thereafter requested the restricted "PSAIM" Intelligence reports which were made

available to the Board by CIA on 10/29/62.)

153.

10/13/62 - General Carter of CIA addressed a letter to Mr. McGeorge

Bundy requesting reconsideration of the Presidential decision to transfer from

CIA to SAC operational responsibility for U-2 missions over Cuba. Mr. Bundy

acknowledged General Carter's letter, stating In essence that the decision had

been made and that it would stand. During the period immediately preceding and

following the Presidential decision, CIA personnel expressed considerable con-

cer relative to the transfer on the ground that sAc did not have capability or

experience to effectively operate such U-2 photographic missions:

(The following resume of SAC U-2 operations 1s pertlist to the question

raised by CIA as to SAC's competence to conduct overflights of Cuba:

tablished the 4080th Wing in May 1956, and U-2 aircraft began to arrive in

June 1957. Thereafter, the 4080th operated from a variety of locations In Puerto

Rico, Alaska, Panama, Australia, Guan, Okinawa, Korea, the Unsted Kingdom and

the United States.

"The 4080th flew peripheral photographic reconnaissance

against the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Russian land mass in the East Siberian

Sea, and the Laptev Sea area of Russia, Obtaining thereby the first photographs

of these areas available to Air Force planners.

The 408oth has flown under

every conceivable weather condition Including snow, ice, fog and desert.

addition to photographic missions, It has flown U-2 ELINT missions during 1961

and 1962 in the Far North and Far East areas. Further; It has flown about 3500

sampling sorties since 1957 in support of the national effort.: The 4080th's.

crews average 3500 hours, of which 600 hours 1s in U-2 aircraft.

has flown about 1500 overseas sorties.

eight crews have been lost by accidents (one RAF, seven USAF). During the

period fron October 14 through November 5, 1962,

the 4080th had flown 36 U-2

with the loss of one aircraft which was shot down or

SAC, as provided to Coyne by Generals Power and Smith)

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154.

10/14/62

SAC flew 1ts first U-2 mission over Cuba.

This mission produced the first photographic identification of MRBM

launch sites at San Cristobal No. I. (1his area had last been

covered by a CIA U-2 TIght on August 29.)

From 10/14/52 through 11/8/62 SAC flew 43 U-2 missions over Cuba:

October 14 -

October 19

3

October 25

October 20

November

5

-

october?

1* November

October

November

October 18

November 3

November a

2

TOTAL: 43

During the period october 23 through November 8, the Navy flew

54 FBU low-level (Blue Moon) photo flights over Cuba. In the same

period the Air Force flew 52 low-level phote missions over cuba.

#this mission was lost

#aborted.

10/14-17/62 - During this period SAC U-2 missions 1dent1-

fied 9 MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba.

The dates of Identification anc

the dates of the last previous CIA U-2 coverage of these sites follow:

81te

Last Coverage Prior

Identified

to Site Location_

14 Oct

29 Aug

San Cristobal

#1

San Cristobal

San Cristobal

73

San Cristobal #4

Sagua La Grande #1

17 Oct

05 Sep

Sagua La Grande #2

Guanajay #1

15 oct

29 Aug

Guanajay #2

Remedios

17 00t

05 Sep

10/15/62 - In the early evening the read-out of SAC's

init1al U-2 mission over cuba first became avatiable. It reflected

1dentification of an MRBM site In the San Cristobal

Director, DIA, notified a number of key civilian and military of-

ficials of the Department of Defense of this fact on the night of

October 15, 1962.

Similarly, the Deputy Director of Intelligence,

CIA, notified Mr.

Mcdeorge Bundy and Mr. Hiisman who notified the

Secretary of StateM

The following morning the President was

notified.

10/15/62 - Following SAC's flight the previous day, a

meeting was held at the white House attended by Messrs. Bundy.

Gilpatric, Johnson, Mecone, scoville, Charyk and General Taylor,

by General Kompton - SAClo Director of Uperations, and General Smith -

SAC'S Directon of Intelligence, Messrs, McCone and Scoville were

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critical of SAC's abillty to fly U-2 missions. At the meeting, My. Bundy re-

affirmed the decision made on 10/12 and Indicated that SAC should continue to

fly these m19810n8.

Mr. Scoville was aritical of sAC's flight plans for up.

coming missions, and he complained that his office had not received the ELINT

cake from the first SAC mission of 10/14. Subsequent Inquiry reflected that the

ELINT take bad been delivered to CIA Imediately following 1ts receipt, but that

1t had become bogged down in CIA's -essage center resulting in delay in 1ts

delivery to Mr. Scoville.

158. 10/15/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of crated

Il-¿ou at San Jullan

158-a. 10/15/62 - General Corter briefed Sena or Stennis ("before the

potography of the previous day was avallable") along the same lines of his

Xeating's charges of known MRPM sites in uba -- 1.e:, "General Carter Ruid that

there were refugee reports but no hard evidence. (Source: CIA Chronology 111462)

159:

10/17/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of un-

crated Il-285' at San Julian.

160. 10/18/62 - Gromyko talked to President Kennedy at the White House,

saying that he was instructed by the soviet Goverment to state that Soviet

assistance to Cuba

"pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense

capabilities of Cuba

161. 10/18/62 - There was Initiated the dally issuance of Jolnt Evulva-

tion ("PSALM"') Reports on the Soviet Missile Threat In Cuba prepared Jolntly

by GMAIC, JALIC, and NPIC, based on paotogiaphic, ELINT, COMINT, and other

sources

These reports were cumulative beginaing 10/18. (See Item 152, above)

10/19/62 - The USSR is making & mejor military Investment 1o Cuba

with some of their most effective guided missile systems.

has operation must have started at Least one year ago and the operation 1tse1

begun last spring. (Scirce: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

10/19/62 - On this date the first FRUITSET radar signal from Cube

was intercepted, possibly emitted from a SAM site at Senado. Ihis was a C-Band

signal, indicating that the USSR has committed its most recent version of the

SA-2 system In Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

164. 10/19/62 - "There are several refugee reports indicating the

presence of tactical (FROG) missiles In Cuba, altbouga there Is no photograpoic

confirmation thus far"

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

"Photograpby (M1as1on 5012 of 10/25) confirmed the presence of a FROG

missile launcher 1o a vehicle port near Remedios

tactical unguided

rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, similar to the U. S. Honest John''.

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/52)

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165.

10/21/62 - This was the arrival date

Cuba of a TU 114

CLEAT transport.

The unusual circumstance of Krue flight tracking,

normally reserved for especially important flights, suggests thät

nigh ranking soviet command personnel may be among

the 140 passengers

aboara. (source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/02)

10/22/62 By this date seven Soviet ships identified ass

166 pall1stic missile carriers (having cargo hatch openings of

at least 75 by 15 feet) had made a total of 13 trips to Cuba since

"late July."

These ships were the KASIMOV, KIMOVSK, KRASNOGRAD,

OKHOTSK,

OMSK, ORENBURG and POLTAVA.

As of 10/22 the KIMOVSK, OKHOTSK and POLTAVA were en route to :

the KIMOVSK (en route from the Balcic) and the

OkHOTsK (Prom the Glack Sea) "are among seven ships which were con-

tacted by Individual cipher messages from Moscow six nours after the

President's public statement.

(Source: Joint Evaliation Report,

10/24/62)

157. 10/22/62 - The President made his rar1o-IV address to the

reporting unmistakable evidence of a series o1 offensive

missile sites in cuba and noting that

"the firsi preliminary hard

Infornation of this nature"

was received by him

at 9:00 A.M., on

: 10/16/62.

168. 10/23/62 - The President issued a Proclamation asserting

(1) world peace and U.S. security had been endanzered by the

establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military cap-

ab1llty In Cuba, Including bases for ballistic missiles (2) 'In a

Joint Resolution passed by the Congress and approved on 10/3/62, 1t

was declared that the U.S. was determined to prevent by whatever means

necessary, Including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime 1n

Cuba from extending 1ts agressive or

subversive activitles to any

part of this hemisphere, and te prevent in cuba the creation or use

o1 an externally supported millary capability endangering U.s.

security, and (3) that the Organ of Consultation of the American

Republics meeting in Washington on 10/23/62 had recommended that the

Member States, In accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-

American treaty ci Reciprocal Assistance, take all. measures, Individ-

sally and collectively, including armed iorce, deemed necessary to

ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot receive from the Sino-

Soviet powers milltary material and related supplies threatening

peace and security of the continent, and to prevent the missiles In

Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat

to the peace and security of the Continent.

Therefore, the President proclamed that the forces under his

command were ordered, beginning at 2:00 P.M., on 10/24/62 to Inter-

dict the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to

Cuba, specifically: surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft;

bombs; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any

of the above weapons, mechanical or electronic equipment to support.

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(168. 10/23/62 Continued)

or operate the above items; ard any other classes of material here-

after designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of effectu-

ating this Proclamation.

The President authorized the Secretary of Defense to employ the

land, sea and air forces of the U.S. (in cooperation with any forces

made available by other American States) to carry out this Proclama-

Further, the President authorized the interception of vessels or

craft proceeding toward Cuba and the taking into custody of any

vessel or craft failing to comply with directions to identify itself

and submit to visit and search -- with force to be used only to the

extent necessary.

169. 10/23/62 - A message passed within Cuba from Las Villas to

Placetas suggested an intent to conceal "equipment" and "fuel station"

in a railroad

tunnel in an area south of the Femedios IRBM site. The

message read: "Today situate equipment in the railroad tunnel of

Placetas.

Also situate the fuel station in this place."

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

170.

10/23/62 - The Director, DIA, initiated the issuance of

dally shipping reports and of a summary of Soviet ship movements.

17. 10/24/62 - On this date Khrushchev "categorically stated"

to American businessman W. E. Knox, in a conversation held in the

KremIin, that "the weapons which the Soviet Union had furnished to

Cuba included antiaircraft missiles and ballistic missiles with both

conventional and thermonuclear warheads.

Khrushchev added that even

the Americans would not trust their NATO allies by turning over ther-

monuclear devices to them." (Source: N.X. Times Magazine, 11/18/62)

172.

10/25/62 - The DIA initiated the issuance of a Special

Intelligence Summary on Cuba.

10/26/62 - James Reston, writing in the New York Times,

stated: "Privately,

there are several misgivings. First, many

people fird it hard to believe that the offensive Soviet missile sites

in Cuba suddenly mushroomed over the weekend.

considerable suspicion elther that the official's intelligence was

not as good as maintained, or the Administration withheld the facts."

174. 10/28/62 - SCRAMBLER communications were established

between the USSR and Cuba.

We consider these links as the best

candidates identified to date for Soviet command and control of the

missile forces in Cuba,"

Sourced Joint Evaluation Report, 10/28/62)

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10/28/62 - Until Immediately prior to che President's

statement of this date welcoming khrushchev's decision to stop

bullding bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning

them to the Soviet Union, 1t appears that In Cuba the Soviets contin-

ued at feverish pace with the construction and camouflaging of their

MRBM and IREM bases

1n cuba.

176.

10/29/62 - By this date, accumulated evidence showed that

the Russians had put first-line modern equipment In Cuba, Including

such Items as FRUITSET radar with. C-Band, armored personnel carriers,

177.: 10/30/02 - Senator Scott of Pennsylvania, appearing on the

CBS radio program

"The Leading Question" on the night of 10/30/62,

said that he

and other Republicans had

"very hard Information early,,

In September, that the Russians were building missile bases in cuba.

Senator Scott said, "We knew it began early in September and any Infor-

mation we had we knew was avallable to the administration and to the

President."

Referring to President Kennedy's radio-television broad-

cast of 10/22 in which the President said that he received the first

preliminary hard Information of the offensive missile buildup on

Tuesday, 10/16, Senator Scott declared,

"You don't build a miss1le

site in a week.

before the President spoke.

Those misufle bases were there a long, long one

Senator Scott further stated,

September 13 Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testimony before the

Armed Services Committee admitted that a Soviet arms bulld-up was

on In Cuba.

He added,

"I think the only conclusion can be

that the President himself may not have received the information --

there may have been a failure of Intelligence:

On the other hand,

there may have been a cautious reluctance, to move which Is under-

standable but was not shared by the Republican Party or the American

people.

source: Washington Evening Star, 10/31/62,

10/31/62 - Writing In the New York Times under the heading

"Autient en on ation a san in used and of the

1 the Cuban Crisis.

started weeks or months ago.

the questions being asked are primarily

these: Was the nation's factual Information about the Communist

m1l1tary, buildup in Cuba adequate in quantity and quality, and was

there a long delay after the missiles actually arrived?"

"Were the interpretation and evaluation of this information

Influenced by policy considerations; in other words, were the est1-

mates tallored to lit top policy bellefs? Or did Administration

officials, until aotion was finally taken, reject the intelligence

estimates

as erroneous?"

"Has the marked centralization of intelligence activities in the

two years of the Kennedy. Administration improved or hampered the

production of objective, nonpartisan inteligence analyses?"

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11/5/62 - Dr. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force

expressed to

Board Member Gordon Gray the opinion that the following

lessons were learned from the cuba situation:

(1) There is a need for a group at the policy level, having

access to all pertinent intelligence, which can perform the task o

rapidly identifying intelligence requirements and objectives. Dr.

Charyk belleved that in this Instance USIB did not perform the function

he had in mind.)

(2) There 1s need for a focal point to ensure the availability

of Intelligence-related resources for use in contingency sicuations

(e.g., f:lm for photographic recontaissance purposes).

(3) Comparisons of CORONA and U-? photography of Cuba reveal

significant Instances where u-2 photography was rositive, whereas

CORONA photography of the same targets had been interpreted as nega-

tive. Dr.

Charyk felt that based on this experienca 1t 1s obvious

that satellite photography cannot be wholly relled upon when 1t

provides negative evidence.

He observed that this gives one pause

when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite

photography for evidence of missile Installations In the USSR. (Dr.

Charyk added

that recent satellite photography shows a new missile

site at Tyura Tam which 1s not served by rail facilities heretofore

as an Identifying character1st1c of this type of in1ss1le 1n-

stallation - suggesting the possibility that our readings of sat-

ellite photography have failed to locate other missile sites because

of the absence of rail or other characteristics we have assumed for

them.)

11/6/62 - The Washington Star of this date records the

report of Fernando Garcia Chacon;

a Havana lawyer and an agent 01

the students Revolutionary Directorate,

that Soviet missiles have

been placed in seven caves and other underground installations in

(At Hershey,

Province, ente ovence and panar deera Poultes as Vag

ported that the underground sites are strongly guarded by Russians

and that no Cubans have been allowed to approach them since the sites

were completed.

Garcia's student group Issued a statement in Mlami

claiming that "The free world is on the verge of being a victim of

a new swindle of the soviet Union.

We have in our hands sufficient

Information that there exist on Cuban territory bases of missiles

like the ones that have caused the present crisis and some of even

greater range in subterranean

Installations, that cannot be photo-

graphed by reconnaissance aircraft

"The photo planes have localized on Cuban territory nearly 30

launching pads while our information assures us that there are many

more missiles in Cuba.

The Soviet Union can take out of Cuba and

permit the inspection of more than 50 missiles, but there are on

Cuban territory sufficient missiles to destroy half the continent.

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11/6/62 - (IL-28s) As of this date photographic evidonce

Preflected the: following regarding Il-28 medlum jet bombers In Cuba:

9 alroady assembled or in the process of assembly at st. Jullan

20 packaged in crates at St. Jullan

9 packaged in crates at Holguin

4 packaged in crates at a point near Holguin

TOTAL: 42 IL-285 In CubE.

11/9/62 - when the Lef met with the President's Foreign

Advisory Boaril on

date, he reported that from

the conclusions reached

soviet buildup in Cuba, and in commenting

upon the lessons to be learned from the recent developments pertaining

to Cuba, the DCI (J) expressed the bellef that "we were too timid with

respect

to the conduct of survelllance operations over Cuba in Septem-

"(2) expressed concern because of the lack of weight given to

refugee reports by the Intelligence analysts; (3) expressed the view

that a state of mind had developed in the intelligence community to

che effect that the soviets just

simply would not undertake an offen-

sive bail1st1c missile buildup In Cuba; (4) reported

that CIA has been

operating three rather ineffective intelligence teams in cuba but that

they have not produced hard intelligence

on the subject because they

have been occupying themselves mainly with staying allve; (5) advised

that there were approximately 40 third-country agents meaning diplo-

- mats) reporting from foreign embassies in Cuba bit that CIA "obtained

no hard Intelligence from them regarding the military buildup;" (6)

advised that from the standpoint of reasonable and proper UN verifica-

tion we do not have satisfactory coverage of cuba,

and that "we have

TIttle unofficial on-site informasion;

and. (7) stated that currently,

JIA "1s not getting Intelligence on Cuba through conventional means.

11/9/62 - When the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,

the Board on this date, he expressed the view that there was

danger In placing undue re lance on photography in seeking answers to

questions that plague us from the standpoint of Intelligence. He

noted that DIA received no significant information from agent sources

concerning the Soviet missile buildup.

He suggested that the Army

should play an Increasing role in terms of clandestine intelligence

penetration of cuba.

He also noted that an additional Important

lesson to be learned was that there must/be provided to the washington

area a first class photo processing facility ii we are to be prepared.

adequately for similar cuban situations in the future.

11/9/62 - When Ma, Thomas Hughes, Acting Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of state, met with the boara on

this date, he

Identified the following areas as

warranting further

examination: (1) The need for establishing an improved capability for

the evaluation of indicators as distinguished from the process of pre-

paring intelligence estimates; (2) The need for getting across to tup

level officials the full brunt of such indicators. (Hughes noting that

this did not happen in State, and in fact that State received some of

the refugee Indicator reports as much as two months after. they had

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(184. 11/9/62 Continued)

been prépared.); (3) The need for clandestine intelligence collection.

(Hughes noting that we do not have espionage agents on the ground In

Cuba providing sigrificant data. 4) The need for a better warning

mechanism; (5) The need for registering with USIB views such as those

expressed

the Riviera. Hughes noting, as did the

Director, DIA, that the DCI's dissent was registered internally

within CIA, but was not communicated to USIB until after the Cuban

cr1s1s broke.)

11/14/62 - The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

following 1ts preilminary review of the subject on 11/9/62

requested the DCI for

"a review on an all-source, all-agency basis

of the actions taken and resülts obtained within

the Intelligence

community in providing intelligence coverage, reporting and estimates

on the developing bulldup."

The Board requested that the report

setting forth the results of the intelligence community's review

Include: (a) an Identification of the requirements levied on Intel-

Ligence collection elements of the Government, (b) a resume of the

Intelligence Information obtained from such sources as foreign diplo

matie personnel, cuban refugee interrogations, in-place agent reports;

COMINT, and ELINT, (c) the scope of distribution given such informa-

tion to higher authority and laterally within the Intelligence com

munity, and (a) the extent to which such information was reflected

In reports and assessments provided to policy level officials.

11/21/62 - The Minutes of the USIB Meeting of this date

reflect the following entry: "Noted a view expressed by Genera" Carter

in related discussion of the Cuban situation that, for intelligence

lanning for the future, Cuba should be considered as a sateflit

of the USSR

187. 11/23/52 - The DIA Summary of this date contains a detalled

analysis of Soviet military forces in Cuba as of 11/23.

In summary

the analysis states

"Soviet military forces in Cuba are now believed

to number about 15,000, Including some

4,000 ground combat troops,

3,000 IRBM and MRBM personnel, 7,800 In air defense and alr forge

elements, and 1,200 naval personnel."

188. 11/24/62 - Broadcasting from Havana on this date Allen

Oxley stated (heard on CBS In New York) that "there Is now no doubt

that not all the Russian missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba. Walle

the Russians have removed 42 missiles It is known that others remaln

and one type a rocket with a range of about 25 miles - 1s belleved

to be controlled by the Cubans. Information received from Marlel

and Bayla Onde, the two main seaports of the Province of Pina Del Ric

reveals that at least 8o medium andlong range missiles were unloaled

there from Russian ships; 36 in the month of September and 52 In

October.

In addition a large number of short range rockets arrived

• There are unconfirmed reports of missiles remaining In Cuba

H453

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(188. 11/24/62 Continued)

"which have been hidden underground la concrete shelters where American recon-

naissance planes cannot detect them. Ine Island Is alive with rumors, and

1t. 18 difficult to sift the facts out of the storles of the big Russian

nilltary buildup st1ll gotag on. Some of these stories tell of b1g concrete

conaiructions In the wooded countryside and underground rocket bases st1ll

being built by the Russians 10 the mountains.

189. 11/26/62 - At Fomestead Air Force Base, Florida, the President

commended the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command for the

photographs waich they had taken "which first gave us conclusive proof of the

build-up of offensive weapons in Cube." The President noted that:

"the work.

of these two wits has contributed as mich to the security of the United

States as any unit la our bistory, and any group of men In our history."

On the same date at Key West, the President commended the Navy stating:

'We express particular thanks to you for your work of the last five weeks.

The reconnaissance flights which enabled us to determine with precision

the offensive build-up In Cuba contributed directly to the security of the

United States in the most important and significant way."

190. 12/4/62 - In a briefing provided to Masrs. Gray and Coyne, the

Director, DIA; advised that photographic intelligence 1deatlfled 33 MRRMs 10

Cuba; that it subsequently identified 42 MRBMs on board ship deperting Cuba;

that the Soviets removed either partially or totally the cunvass covers on

36 of the 42 outgoing MRBMs (the Soviets refused to exhibit 6 of them)

and in all instances the skias of the missiles were in no way renoved; that

no IRBMs were detected entering, la, or exiting Cube; that the intelligence

conmunity estimates that the IRMs had not yet been introduced Irito Cuba

but may have been on some of the ships which turned back at the time the

dismantled; that no evidence has been developed reflecting the existence

of nuclear warbead in Cuba; that it would be relatively simple to Introduce

such warheads with little likelthood of detection; that "black boxes" were

employed with negative results in an endeavor to detect nuclear emanations

from the ships exiting Cube With the MRan.

The Director, DIA, also reported that photographie evidence reflected

that at least 42 Ii-28s had been introduced into Cuba; that as of this

date tbree of the IL-28s have been put aboard a Soviet vessel which bas

exited Cuba; that nssenbly of other IL-28s bas aprarently ceased; and there

are indications thut the remaining II-28s may be in the pricess

of belop

readied for shipment out of Cuba.

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