INTEL MEMO: CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: NONE
Document date: 10/20/1965
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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TELLIGENG

CENTRAL

20 October 1965

OCI No.

2336/65

Copy No

190

AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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OCI No. 2336/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Current Intelligence

20 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Cuban Subversion in Latin America

Cuban spokesmen continue to reiterate their

determination to aid subversive movements in Latin

America. A variety of sources confirm that some aid

is being provided, although the deve. lt such materia.

assistance seems to be less than a few years ago.

2. However, Cuba's activities in support of revolu-

tion in Latin America

seem to be undergoing a change.

Ernesto "Che" Guevara's fall from power is sympto-

matic of this shift, Guevara was Cuba's most doç-

trinaire spokesman for militant revolutionary tactics.

Moreover, at the Havana Conference of 1964, Cuba

agreed to

funnel its aid only to those subversive

movements endorsed by the pro-Moscow Latin American

Communist parties. It is still too early to judge

the extent to which this commitment is being imple-

mented. For the present, Cuba seems to be following

a cautious policy of providing support--largely in

the form of propaganda--in those countries where

Havana judges indigenous revolutionary movements to

have the most chance of success. .

Castro will probably

use this coming January's Tri-Continent Conference in

Havana for a summit meeting of Latin American sub-

versive groups to assess the results of the 1964

Havana Conference, what has been accomplished, and

what

will be required for the future.

As recently as 3 October, Fidel Castro re-

affirmed that Cuba "is the fatherland of the revolu-

tionaries of this continent.

" He stated that Cuba

has the

"responsibility" for aiding the revolutionary

-movements in the hemisphere, and "we assume the re-

sponsibility and the consequences and the risks."

Lest there be

any question as to Cuban aims he an-

nounced that

"while there are exploited and colonial-

ized peoples, we shall continue running these risks,

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and we shall continue serenely assuming these

responsibilities."

In mid-August, another regime

spokesman called

Cuba's assistance

to subversion

his country's "international duty."

Propaganda Support

Propaganda has been the instrument most

heavilv used by the Castro regime, in its attempts

to overturn established governments in Latin Amer-

ica.

Cuban broadcasts to Latin America total more

than 160 hours a week in Spanish, Portuguese, French,

Creole, and the Indian languages of Quechua, Guarani,

and Aymara. In the early days of the Castro regime,

such broadcasts were primarily devoted to strident

calls to immediate armed action. Now the emphasis

is more on laying the groundwork for future revolu-

tionary action and on attempts to unite feuding rev-

olutionary organizations.

The majority of these

broadcasts masquerade as objective commentary on

political, economic, and sociological conditions in

the various countries of Latin America; they replay

statements by revolutionary groups, and feature

documentaries

designed to show that only the "Cuban

way" will solve the problems of Latin America.

During the month of July, for example, one

third of Havana radio's total international radio

service commentaries were devoted to specific Latin

American countries.

Venezuela received the greatest

attention, primarily through the regular three-times-

a-week program "Venezuelan Realities."

6.

Broadcasts to Haiti are an exception to the

general rule.

In these, Havana directly incites the

Haitians to launch immediate revolutionary action.

Haitian Communists long-resident in Cuba broadcast

vitriolic commentary on the economic and political

deterioration of Haiti and the need for unity among

Commenting on the lack of

concrete action by Haiti's two Communist parties, a

recent broadcast stated, "it is of the utmost neces-

sity that all honest Haitians gather under the banner

of the Unified Democratic Front...to make Duvalier

-pay for his treason and all of his crimes." On the

practical side of revolution, Havana radio has been

serializing selections on guerrilla warfare tactics

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and broadcasting speeches that were given in Cuba

by the representative of the militant Venezuelan

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

7.

Havana radio broadcasts have had some de-

gree of success, according to both their supporters

and their opponents.

During the Dominican revolt,

several clandestine

sources reported that the rebels

listened regularly to Radio Havana and were impressed

by the speed with which the Cuban network reported on

local developments.

In Haiti, President Duvalier is

making strenuous efforts to outlaw the Cuban lottery;

Haitians listen to Radio Havana for the lottery re-

sults and absorb a good dose of anti-Duvalier propa-

ganda at the same time. Peruvian President Belaunde

has attacked the provocative reporting of the Cuban

which the Peruvian Government, accoring to a

randes tine sarace, plans to jam with equipmentine

has yet to purchase. Venezuela is already jamming

Radio Havana.

In August,

a high Honduran official

stated that his government has evidence of coded broad-

casts from Cuba.

Training

8. It is on training of Latin American sub-

versives and limited financial support of their move-

ments that Cuba rests much of its hope for revolution-

ary success.

The experience of the Dominican Republic

--where a small group of Cuban-trained extremists was

able to lead the rebels in the worst of the fighting--

has probably convinced Havana of the merit of continu-

ing to train subversives from a variety of countries

so as to be ready for targets of opportunity.

Cuba's

organ for intelligence and subversion, the General

Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), maintains installa-

tions for training Latin American

subversives in the

specifics of revolutionary warfare and providing them

with

ideological orientation. Two weeks ago the DGI's

director, Manuel Pineiro, was named to the Cuban Com-

munist Party's Central Committee and to its select

three-man foreign affairs committee, an act which at-

firms the priority Cuba places on the activities of

his organization.

9.

Reliable estimates of the nationality and

numbers of trainees are difficult to obtain because of

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the devious routes most of them use to travel to

Cuba and because of the efficiency of the DGI in

providing false documentation.

However, clandes-

tine sources provide some specifics on such travel

by Latin Americans.

was informed

that the party planned

to send 60 men to Cuba in early August for special

training in guerrilla tactics and Communist doctrine.

Another group of 15 to 20 men who had been under-

going training in Cuba was expected to return to

Guatemala during July. A number of Panamanians are

expected to leave for guerrilla warfare training in

Cuba in the near future; several earlier trainees

recently returned to Cuba for a refresher course.

10.

reports that

since

early 1965 the People's Progressive Party (PPP)

of British Guiana--the party of ousted premier and

Castro-supporter Cheddi Jagan--has emphasized the

reorganization and expansion of its long-term po-

litical education program. On 1 September, Jagan's

wife reportedly told an organizer of the PPP that

she was

making arrangements for anine-month "political

science" course to be held in Cuba.

Two PPp "scholar-

ship students" who returned to British Guiana in

September informed police that the obligatory military

training they had received in Cuba had included making

four types of bombs, including Molotov cocktails.

11. Although Jamaica is not one of Cuba's

priority targets in the hemisphere, a report of June

indicates that Cuba intends to train about 200

Jamaicans during the next few years.

These Jamaicans

are then to become leaders and instructors for the

pro-Castro elements in Jamaica. The Cuban Consul in

although not directly involved in the arrange-

ments,

reportedly has given assurances that the group

would receive guerrilla warfare training if it could

get to Cuba.

*An additional 25 Guianese are scheduled to leave

soon

for guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

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12. Although sufficient documentation is not

available, it is believed that Cuba continues to

train unspecified numbers of representatives from

other Latin American revolutionary groups. It

should be noted, however, that very few Colombians

and no known Peruvians are receiving guerrilla war-

fare training in Cuba at the present time despite

the fact that these two countries are at the top of

Cuba's subversion list.

13.

Cuba's only known large shipment of weap-

ons to a Latin

American subversive group was a three-

ton cache seized by Venezuelan authorities in Novem-

ber 1963.

This experience apparently convinced

Castro that weapons procurement is a problem to be

solved by the internal subversive forces, not by

In a speech on 28 May, Castro said, "In

reality, the people's weapons are in the hands of

their enemies. ...When we learned to take weapons

from the enemy,

we had learned to wage the revolution."

This appears

to confirm the statement of a defector

from the DGI that because of the exposure of arms

Shipments to Venezuela it is now Cuban policy to re-

Ject all Latin American requests for assistance other

than for funds ana some training.

The Havana Conference and Afterwards

The most significant recent change in

Cuba's support of subversion in the hemisphere oc-

curred at the Havana Conference of Latin American

At that

Cuba and the Latin American representatives

agreed to limit their support to those revolutionary

movements officially endorsed by the pro-Moscow

Communist Party of the respective country.. The

attending parties pledged themselves to increase

their support of such groups and to attempt to unify

revolutionary movements in the hemisphere.

15. Implementation of this policy involves a

sharp

departure from past Cuban practice.

Formerly,

Cuba

devoted much of its support to revolutionary

groups which were competitors of the regular Commu-

nist parties.

Cuba's adoption of the new policy may

partially be

the result of its disillusionment over

the failure of these organizations, its recognition

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of a

need to repair relations with the old-line

Communist parties,

and some strung urging by the

Soviets m

A letterda

#vindicates

that Castro has indeed had a change of heart in

regard to the official Communist parties.

Castro

is quoted

as saying that "the present Communist

parties are the best things that each Latin Ameri-

can nation has" and his attitude is represented as

demonstrating

that Castro's confidence in the Latin

American parties has increased substantially.

16.

Along with agreeing to channel support

through the orthodox parties, the representatives

at the Havana Conference also specified the countries

in which they believe

that an exploitable revolu-

tionary situation already exists: Venezuela, Guate-

mala, Colombia,

Paraguay,

Haiti, Honduras, and

Panama.

All of these countries,

and especially the

first three, are constantly mentioned by Cuban

spokesmen as the leading revolutionary targets in

Latin America.

In July, Castro added Peru to this

list_of areas

of primary Cuban interest.

17.

Evidence is still inconclusive as

to the

extent to which the agreements reached in Havana

are being implemented.

The results of the con-

ference seem to be most apparent in Guatemala.

previously, extensive Cuban support -feud, dacha

"Das noip--had been provided

to the 13th of Novem-

ber Movement led by Cuban-trained Marco Antonio Yon

Sosa.

This group operated outside the official

Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT. However,

Cu ba

has apparently switched its support to the PGT, which

has cooperated by establishing paramilitary arm,

the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)

me tables

cheche re-

ported

that the PGT had received a com-

munication from Castro stating that if the PGT succeeds

in intensifying its activities and sustains itself

until the

1965, Castro will then give the PGT

complete financial support. This pledge appears to

have been instrumental in increased militancy on the

part of

the PGT and FAR.

18.

Cuba confirmed its commitment to the PGT

at Cairo in September by insisting that the FAR, rather

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than the Yon Sosa group, be accepted as the official

Guatemalan representative to the preparatory meeting

for the "Tri-Continent" Conference.

This conference

opens in Havana on 3 January. Thus the FAR is ap-

parently Havana's choice for

Guatemalan representa-

tion at the Conference.

Representatives of the Com-

munist and radical states of Asia and Africa, as well

as delegates from revolutionary movements in these

two areas and Latin America will be brought together

at the conference to discuss problems of imperialism

and colonialism, and ways to coordinate their revolu-

tionary movements.

An observer at the Cairo meeting

commented that only the Guatemalan representative

seemed to be really in "Castro's pocket."

pocket sentativing

19. In Peru, Cuba is continuing its propaganda

support of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left

(MIR) .

In the past, the MIR received considerable

material assistance from the Cubans--although this

is no longer so.

Its leader, Luis de la Puente Uceda,

has visited Cuba several times and is reportedly on

good terms with Castro.

In an interview printed by

a Lima

newspaper on 3 May, de la Puente was quoted

began its long-delayed guerrilla operations with at-

tacks near Huancayo in Peru's central zone.

The

action has been applauded in Cuban propaganda media.

On 27 September, the Union of Peruvians in Cuba (one

of several such

national groups parroting the Cuban

line) issued a manifesto stating, "under the condi-

tions prevailing in Peru, there is no other way to

eliminate all the ills that afflict our people than

the path blazed by the MIR

guerrillas.

...we.. pro-

claim our wholehearted support to the guerrillas."

Formal Cuban support for this position was contained

July article in the Cuban daily Hoy which de-

clared, "The Peruvian masses have learned where the

only solution to their ills rests, and for that reason

they are looking today toward the mountains, the

jungles, and the guerrillas."

Since August, the pro-

Soviet

and pro-Chinese wings of the PCP have taken

increased cognizance of the guerrillas and condemned

the government's counterinsurgency activities.

They

have not openly endorsed the MIR, however.

At pres-

ent, it seems unlikely that either faction will support

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the MIR with acts of violence. The pro-Soviet PCP

faction may yet decide to seek the best of both

worlds by giving partial support to the insurrec-

tional movements while continuing its current ac-

tivities in the political sphere..

20.

It is believed that as of April, the Cuban

Government had cut off financial support to leftist

Peronist groups in Argentina and promised to channel

its support through the official Communist Party of

Argentina.

Venezuela and Colombia--two of Havana's

most emphasized targets in the hemisphere--fall into

separate categories.

Cuba has always strongly sup-

ported the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Libera-

tion (FALN), over which the Venezuelan Communist Party

(PCV) exercises a dominant influence.

by internal

problems,

The PCV, beset

is making attempts to justify

more emphasis

on

political action, although not giving

up the support of paramilitary activities.

The extent

of Cuba's current material support of the FALN is un-

known but the propaganda support is continuing at a

high level.

Cuba maintains an official office for a

FALN representative in Havana and approved having a

FALN delegation

preparatory meeting for

the Tri-Continent Conference.

22.

In Colombia, it is even difficult to speak

of an

official Conmunist party; on 30 May the party

split into two factions, each professing to be

"authoritative."

The original Colombian Communist

Party (PCC), by far the larger, has been generally

content to

follow a pacifist, political role, with

the exception of the defense of the so-called "en-

claves" of Marquetalia and Riochiquita.

The rival

faction, the Colombian Communist Party--Marxist

Leninist (PCC-ML) is more violence oriented but there

is no evidence of its having received any support

from Cuba.

Before the Havana Conference, Cuba sup-

ported an independent insurgent force, the Army of

National Liberation (ELN), with money

and training.

However, this aid appears to have been terminated.

The ELN

, in fact, may soon disband as an entity; its

remnants

may be absorbed by the PCC-ML.

23 .

There are only tenuous indications that

another

aspect of last year's Havana Conference--the

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promotion of unity among revolutionary forces in the

hemisphere--is being accomplished.

A source of proven

reliability has reported that a Latin American Commu-

nist "politburo" has been established to coordinate

the implementation of the agreements reached at Havana.

This "politburo" reportedly held its first meeting in

this spring

Another source

AMEN 190140

•A Salvedo

The un

THEO

reports that the Communist

parties of Central America have formed the Military

Revolutionary Front of Central America to coordinate

Communist military movements in their area.

The po-

litical bureau of this organization is reportedly

composed of the secretaries-general of the five

Commu-

nist parties. This select group was planning to hold

its first meeting in August. Both of these unity

efforts appear to be still in the first stages of

organization.

Outlook

24.

The shift in emphasis in Cuban propaganda

and Havana's assumption of the responsibilities and

drawbacks

inherent in the decisions of the Havana

Conference reflect Cuba's increasing awareness of the

realities in Latin America. In 1959, Castro was con-

vinced that his revolution would spark similar revolu-

tionary movements in the rest of Latin America.

He

backed up this conviction by blatant incitements to

immediate revolution and by aiding small-scale in-

vasions of Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

However, the luster of Castro's revolution has been

dimmed by Cuba's performance in the domestic field

and the failure of its hemispheric goals.

In the last

two years, Castro's hopes have been rebuffed in

Venezuela, British Guiana, Brazil, and the Dominican

Republic, as well as in the failure of any of the

continent's militant subversive groups to overturn a

that his

regime can continue to exist without like regimes

elsewhere in the hemisphere.

25.

Thus, while Castro is still willing and

able to aid subversive movements, he has shifted em-

phasis.

He now

is concentrating

• on those countries

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where he believes the "objective conditions" are most

conducive

to revolutionary action and where there is

a viable or potential revolutionary group to take

concrete action.

The Cuban regime's constant refer-

ences to Venezuela,

Guatemala, and Colombia stress

its desire to concentrate on these areas.

At any

rate, Castro's consuming interest for the past year

and a half has been his desire to improve the per-

formance of Cuba's economy.

His revolutionary pro-

gram for Latin America has definitely taken second

place in his order of priorities.

26.

The Havana conference was indicative of

major policy shift in that Castro committed himself

to work with--not against or outside--the official

Communist parties.

Part of this shift was based on

the dual hope that promise of his support would stir

the Communist parties to more militant policies and

that they could achieve together what he could not

achieve unilaterally.

So far this hope has not been

realized.

27. Castro has

also been

forced to the realiza-

tion that tagging a "Communist" or "pro-Castro" label

on a

movement is not always useful to Cuban interests.

This was demonstrated in Cuban reaction to the Domini-

can revolt.

Havana apparently decided that the

achievement of popular support for the Caamano forces

demanded that Communist and Cuban-trained participation

in the revolt be overshadowed by its pro-constitution,

pro-Bosch, anti-Imbert cast.

As a result, Havana did

not refer

to Communist participation and used

its

propaganda media to concentrate on the "evils" of the

Dominican military establishment, the Imbert junta,

and the OAS and US intervention.

28. Nor is Cuba alone in its realization that

identification of a movement as Castroite is not

always in the best interests of Cuba or the group

concerned

whitecid stated that one reason why his party

wavered in its support of a planned Solidarity with

Cuba Congress--which, significantly, has not been held

--is that its central committee now

believes that

identification with Cuba is not in the best interests

of the party and is, in fact, dangerous.

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29.

Two coming meetings may reveal whether Cuba

intends to maintain its new policies toward subversion

in Latin America.

A clandestine source reported that

representatives of Cuba, the Latin American Communist

parties, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

are scheduled to hold extensive discussions stung

nonene, pool. The Cuban delegate to

the congress is Lionel Soto, a member of the newly-

named Central Committee of

the

Cuban Communist Party

and the director of the regime's Schools of Revolu-

tionary Instruction.

30.

An equally significant meeting of Latin

American representatives will reportedly take place

after the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana next

January. This conference will provide another op-

portunity for a summit conference of Latin American

Communist Parties.

In addition, the identities of

the participating revolutionary

groups may give a

hint as to Cuba's willingness to abide by the de-

cisions of the Havana Conference.

At the preparatory

conference in Cairo, Cuba accepted a delegate from

the Guatemalan Communist party's new militant arm,

the FAR, rather than the long-time Cuban-supported

movement of Yon Sosa.

This decision--as well as the

general question of what other Latin American move-

ments were to be invited--aroused controversy among

other participants. Mitmaste cabamsonte reports

that these differences of opinion over who should be

accredited to the Havana Conference led to the de-

cision that each Latin American leftist group will

have to agree upon the composition of a single dele-

gation from his country.

Then Cuba, as the sponsor

of the meeting,

will have the final

say on who will

receive official invitations.

This arrangement gives

Castro a great deal of leeway in designating those

whom he considers the most representative of the some-

times conflicting and antagonistic revolutionary move-

ments in several Latin American countries. If Havana

is indeed serious about living up to the commitments

it made last November, this meeting would provide an

excellent opportunity

to assess the results of the

past year and to plan strategy to carry out more ef-

fectively the decisions of the Havana meeting.

does

31.

This shift in Cuban policy toward subversion

not, in itself, mean a lessening of the potential

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subversive threat against established governments in

Latin America.

Moreover, hundreds of anti-government

extremists in a number of countries, feeling that

their grievances continue to grow, are moving ahead

with organizational efforts and plans to step up

violent activities.

The total Cuban support effort

will probably be smaller, but more of the aid may

well be channeled to those who can use it effectively.

Cuban-trained militants already make up the hard core

of numerous Latin American extremist and Communist

groups.

Cuba also has given ample notice that it in-

tends to continue its propaganda and some training and

financial support to revolutionary movements.

The

only change is in regard to means and priorities, not

ends. As long as exploitable situations exist in

the hemisphere, Cuba is on record as being willing

and able to contribute toward the establishment of

"more Cubas" in Latin America. It seems increasingly

apparent, however,

that Cuba is unwilling to run great

risks to provide material assistance to anti-govern-

ment groups in Latin America.

Castro's more cautious

subversion policy means that now, more than ever, the

burden of carrying out revolutions rests with the

local revolutionaries themselves.

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