EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Originator: CJCS
From: MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
To: MULTIPLE
Document date: 02/18/1964
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date

Page

08/18/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10184

RECORDS SERIES

: RG 218 JCS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CJCS

FROM : MAXWELL. D. TAYLOR

TO : MULTIPLE

TITLE : EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE : 02/18/64

PAGES

: 3

SUBJECTS : SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: 1B

CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : RG 218 JCS "NND 941071 BOX 3/8." Memo from Taylor to

LeMay, Wheeler,

McDonald, Greene re: attached

evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DIA

DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Situation in South Vietnam

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned over

the way in which the situation in South Vietnam, particularly the military

situation, is being reported and evaluated. They feel that inadequacies in

intelligence procedures have resulted in placing before the President and

his principal advisers a picture of the anti-Viet Cong campaign which is

sometimes of uncertain validity, This situation arises largely from the

following factors:

a. Intelligence reports on South Vietnam reach Washington by

several channels: State, Defense, CIA, AID, USIA and the

Military

Attaches.

They are not correlated in Saigon and given a Country Team

interpretative evaluation there; rather, they are forwarded piece-meal

to Washington with no evaluation or with only that of the originating agency.

b. There is need for greater effort in South Vietnam to identify

reports of low reliability as such.

c. There are too many reports on the military situation from

non-military sources and too little use of US military observers stationed

throughout South Vietnam.

d. USIB evaluates the situation in South Vietnam from intelligence

analyzed at a distance from the scene of operations without participation

in the over-all evaluation by the responsible military commanders in

South Vietnam who should be, of all US officials, the closest to the true

situation.

2. To correct these deficiencies which are affecting the governmental

view of the situation, the JCS recommend the following actions:

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Situation in South Vietnam

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned over

the way in which the situation in South Vietnam, particularly the military

situation, is being reported and evaluated. They feel that inadequacies in

intelligence procedures have resulted in placing before the President and

his principal advisers a picture of the anti-Viet Cong campaign which is

sometimes of uncertain validity. This situation arises largely from the

following factors:

a. Intelligence reports on South Vietnam reach Washington by

several channels: State, Defense, CIA, AID, USIA and the

They are not correlated in Saigon and given a Country Team

interpretative evaluation there; rather, they are forwarded piece-meal

to Washington with no evaluation or with only that of the originating agency.

b. There is need for greater effort in South Vietnam to identify

reports of low reliability as such.

C. There are too many reports on the military situation from

non-military sources and too little use of US military observers stationed

throughout South Vietnam.

d. USIB evaluates the situation in South Vietnam from intelligence

analyzed at a distance from the scene of operations without participation

in the over-all evaluation by the responsible military commanders in

South Vietnam who should be, of all US officials, the closest to the true

situation.

2. To correct these deficiencies which are affecting the governmental

view of the situation, the JCS recommend the following actions:

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DocId: 32425062

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