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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10260

50

Released under the John

Kennedy

Assassination Record=

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54214 Date:

10-04-2017-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC

FROM : GORDON CHASE

TO : MR. BUNDY

TITLE : MEMORANDUM

DATE

: 03/04/65

PAGES

: 2

SUBJECTS: SPECIAL GROUP MEETING- - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 02/17/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Mecting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group

meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, large!

because of his recent irresponsible activity. CLA opposes State on this one

for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc-

tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff

will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that

could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East.

For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably

prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the cours

of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it

would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we

. finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange 16

ave afluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose talk

one for such reasons as the folfowing: First, it will mean going to the Dutchflo

Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal

with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be

turned down.

Segond, there is the moral issue of whether of not we should

dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchan:)b

Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one i

the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or no! :

start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the

working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed thi

position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the

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Op SEER

STON

Mr. Bundy

-2-

March 4, 1965

attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-

promise its position on Artime fi.e., If you give aid lo RECE, how can you si.

aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give

them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of

its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple

months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the

small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are:

(a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will

not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they

are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault.

We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have

liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that

$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having

Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble

between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might

be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man

wouldn't get received at a high level;

also, there are other ways to do the

job if it needs doing.

While I admire CLA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them

invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con-

traption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose

CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD

that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability

to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this

capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a

very short space of time.

6C

Gordon Chase

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