COMMITTEE BUSINESS RE: RELEASE OF CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT ON ASSASS.
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 05/26/1976
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Infornation

Date:

9/22/201

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10179

RECORD SERIES :

TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER. R-3033

Document Information

ORIGINATOR.:

FROM:

TO A

SSCIA

TITLE: COMMITTEE BUSINESS RE: RELEASE OF CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT ON ASSASS.

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

05/26/1976

40

KENNEDY

ASSASSINATION

AMLASH

CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE:

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: "

Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS:

Consulted

CURRENT STATUS :

Withold oPEN

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

09/30/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Box 325Folder 11

79:1

98

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ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

Ohe United Statra Sruate

NATIONAL SECURITY INEORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctions

Released under the

John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Aet of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54545 Date:

10-12-2017

R3053

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Wednesday, May 26, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

3017 WILSON BOULEVARD

ARLINGTON, VA 22201 •

(703) 841-0800

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COMMECOND BUSINESS

Recaesday: Gag 26: 1976

WARD &

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Unased Scates Senate,

Select Commttee to Scudy Governmantal

Operacions wich. Respect io

Inteiligence Accivicies:

Mashington, Pic.

The Commictee

mec, porsuant: to notice, at

10: 43 0° clock

a.l:, ili Room. S-407, Che Capitol, Che Honorable John Towei

(vice Chairnan of the Committee) presiding.

Present:

Senators Power (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondare, Mudalescon, Mart of Colocado, Machias, and Schweiker.

Also present:

Senatos inouye,

Staff: Willian G. Miller: Scaff Director: Charles Kixbow:

JIm

johnscon, Britt Snider: Faul Wallach, Michacl Apacei:

Rick inderturth, David Aaron, Da Greissing,

ban Dwyer, Allios

Maxweli, Michae: Madigan, Charles Combard, Bob Kelley and Joda

Bayly, Professional deale Membera.

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2299A822223

sonator dover.

bee's go ahead and start.

the Conmictse

wiis come to order,

the first thing I want to do is welcome Senatos inouye

do the Commitree.

He is the chasman desginace of the Committes

co succeed this

one as the oversight. Commistee, and we have

Inviced hin to come view the scellar example that we can sei

Foc him for his Comictee and its wock

Senator inooye.

I am learning,

Senator lower. The firat thing you have co do is get a

quoran, and that is the most difficult job, and I would like

to ash, Dan, if you have any queations.

The first icem on the agenda is che consideration oi

requests from Senator Abourezk in his capacity as Chairman of

the Indian Affairs Subcommittee

for certain files.

Bill, would you enlighten us on that?

Mc: Miller.

Yes.

During the course

of the investigation, the Committee

acquired a file of documents from oucside. sources, that is,

oucsida the Executive Branch, on the American indian Movemeni:

with parciculai reference to events ai

Wounded Knee.. Anony the

documents is one FBi document. All 06

the othere are documents

which are not Executive Branch dosumenta

i have looked through them. I don't think chey ace

sensitive in a securicy fashion. ' I chink they are of selevanos

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to Senator Aboureak's Committee

We have asked che Bureau to

clear the one document which seens to come from the rBi, and

I Would recommend that che Conmittee anchorize the turnover of

enac file to Senator Abourezk for such use as be may wish.

Senacor Tower.

The Chart ds prepareú to entertain a

mocion to the effect that

the files should be turned over to

Senator Aboureak

with

the exception of the one document that

comes from the Bureau: contingent - including chai document,

contingent on its declassification by iuccice.

Senator Mondale.

So moved.

Senator Power.

Ie Chere

any objeccion?

So ordered.

the next iten on the agenda is the consideration of the

assassination report.

Senacor Hart: are you going to take the lead ork on this?

Senator Mars of. Colorado. I would prefer that either Dick

or the staff talk. I think what we are going to request here

is a finai decision by the

Comittee, or at least a majority

of the Committee, on disposition of thie. My own fecling

sper, cape

wel

I will reserve

that, bue Dick way want so say something, o

the stars,

Senacor

lower

Senatos senwelker?

Senazor Schweiker. Thank you:

First i want to congraculate our new chairman on his work.

I don't know if he fully knows wec lie is getcing into, but we

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wish you our best and good luck in your new

assigument.

And

second; I want to say that the zeport, I guess everybody

DOW

has a copy of the seport, has been revised subscandald

in terns of format and approach, and i think it zexoes in

completely on what che original request of Senators Church and

Tower were, which was, to look inco the pertormanoe relacionship

ol the intelligence agencies to the kennedy assassination and

the Warren Commission.

i chink the earlier seport Crankly

strayed a little bit from that goal, but we I think nave pinned

it down very specifically and i think we bave substanciated

the stacement of the Conclusions in the summary that we made.

I would like to reconnend I realize you cannot read che

whole report, buc i think you can certainly get ine complete

gist of what we are saying in the summary and in the conclusions

by reading those two things you pretty well come

down on what

we are saying and doing. and in view of.

the time factor, a

suggestion i would like to make is that if people take time co

sead the sumardos and conclusions, which we can do in a matter

06 Live minutes at some point, and basically toel saciatied

as to the thrust of it, -that we thet vote on

the release of che

report under this condicion, coat we vote to publicly release

the report and chen, since there are poviousy: want to get

tai and the cia the opportunicy to correct aby sourced and mechola

which we

wondd concis with that we would ask. the scaft so do

chas and let senator Warc and I work cui any sources and methods

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problems, detail problems, were they might contradide some

informacion we have here in terms of just following it up.

I do think it is

& very good job.. I chink it is a very

credible. work; and I think thac by caking chis phase and

publicly releasing is now, after we dave cleared the CiA and

the FBI problems, it vill give Danny Inouye's Committee a

Exee hand.

In ocher words, all we made is a cecommendation.

we don't publish a report now, you immediately get a real

problem in your Comittee, as I see, as to what you do with what

We

have done.

If we pubiish now. I think you are a lot freer

secide, having us made a judgment on

the ChA and FBi

responsibilicy, whether you want to pursue or not pursue.

Wa

obviously recommend that you pursue, but I think if we don't

publish that,. I think chat would be a bad mistake, because

we would be accused of a coverup. We would also immediately put

hot potato in your new Comittee which you would be hung with,

and I think it gives you a lot nore freedom so treat at arm's

length our recommendations if we publish now in berms of the

Rol and the cia relationshios

i think chat there

is some embarzassment here

to boch the

CIA

and the abi.

I don't think we should kid oursalves aboui

that.

We don't find out who done it; and we don': contradict

the basic finding of the warren Commission, buc ve certainly

criticize the process and subscancially document why thai

criticism is valid, and i chink just the sane as our original

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assassination report. our abudy or the and of other things,

I think this would tall inco that kind of categorical treatment.

That, I guess, is iny situation in a nutshell:

Senator lower.

Do you want to have the staff summarize

this, Dick?

Senatos Schweiker.

that probably would be waii.

Senator Power,

Why don't you call on whoever you choose to

Kick 1: 0662

Senator Schweikes. All right. We did cry to be very

even handed, as i say.

Neither the CIA or the FBi is going to

like what we say.

on the other hand, i don"t think we singled

out One agency in either respect, so Paul, how do you want to

divide up the briet report?

Mr. Wailach.

i think i cen begin just by putcing the

ceport in perspective, but I thin that if we take

÷ step back

and I am going to ask jim just to ceally detail juot quickly

again, succinocly the period from 1960 through November 22nd,

1963, the day of the assausination, just very generally what

the agencies were doing at that time period, and i will come

back and tie in what the Est was doing with Oswald during chat

cine period, which

ia one sectron of our report.

And then the next

section of our report really goes

HOW

agencies

reacted in one of the nost

critical time

periode, and I thinks that you will vee that there was an incaiii

gence

dailue os sorts, both before and atcas the assassination.

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The intelligence failure before I don't want to say was of

a nasure that would have prevented the assassination, and chere

18 no suco statement

in the repoxt to chas effeco, in fact, the

suggestion is not really even enece.

What you do see are many

probiens inherent in coe structure as ic now exists between

tha

N91 and

che CIa: probleme that cane up during the investigation

wnere

there vere quescions as to who had jurisdiction to investi

gate what, and many areas feil beoween the cracks. You have

che problem of covert accione thar our Commiccee has looked

dece may have been a covert action that was 'so covert.

thac no one could tell the investigators about it, and it

backfired, in à sense,

on some of the highest officials in the

country+

And many other problems & think that our Coumittee

has dealt with cone out so clearly on the scudy that we have

made on the assassination report:

I just woule ask Jim so very orleily jusc make

a couple of

scatements about that period so you

can get a feel as to what

really

I know che committee has a good feel as to whas ve

were doing vis-a-vis Cuba, but I don't think it has the sane

feel as to what was happening with the

anti-Castro exile groups

in shis councey in the context of Lee Marvey Dewald.

Nir. Johnston, Let me start ouc with we tried to put

ourselves back in the position of the warren connission, wich

the Chief Justice of the United States who was

not

Families

wich che ancelligence agencies and aow he approached the problem

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ot

che

assassination, and whac comes out is ic does no: look

Like the warren Comussion fully understood the vele program

the Uniced states Goveanmenc had been running against Cuba tor

three years.

They knew about the Bay of Pigs, they fully mderatood that

Te 1s unclear

if they knew about now that evolved inco a

MONGOOSE operation, which was the use of Cuban exiles to accomplisi

the same end, and now apparently, after the missile crisis of

October 1962, Government policy again changed to a clamp down

on Cuban exiles, the very group that the Government had been

supporting for two years.

Ultinately as events moved inco the summer of 1963, the

United States Govemment was raiding, seizing arms of the Cuban

exile

groups on the one hand, and on the other hand, using the

CIA to accomplish the same ends by having CIA agents make those

caids againse Cuba.

And it ultimately evolved inco the ANuASH

operacion, which is au

operation apparently designed to bring

about a coup in Cuon wich AMLASt himselt proposing that they do

that by assassination of Castro.

And 'especially after dune or 1963, things becare very

muddled. The Cuban exile groups yot very irked at the kennedy.

administracions decision to clamp down on them, they were

in

turn meeting in actempts co heve unity, efforte co bring abou:

their own

invasion or operations against Cuod: but the Kennedy

adminisccasion was trying to put the clamps on them.

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The CIA has escalated by dis own coup planning.

The report then focuses principally on how AMASh figured

into this scheme,

Castro in eacty September warned againat

U.S. leadera who were meeting with sectorist in Cuba, and that

he would threaten zetaliacion againsc o. S. leadera:

and the

coincidence of that warning coning two days after the original

meetings wich AMASa.

Subsequent to thee, five

da?s

after Castro's warning, we

nave determined that the Cubad, one of the incezagency commitees

on Cuba

Senator Schweiker,

" think this is one of the most importaht

points of all tbai has just come to light.

S0 go

ahead, Jim,

I just wanted to call cheir attencion to it.

Me, Johnston.

One of the interagency committees dealing

wach Cuba on September 12th, which is five days after Castro's

warning, had a meeting to evaluate cheir contingency Plans

Cuban retaliacion.

We have nad access to the memorandun ot

General Haig who was ackending that meating, and in that menoran

dim, according: to. General Haig, whac went on at the meeting

was they

said, book, the xash of covert activicy chat is now

going or against Cuba nay lead to some iind of rocaliation, an

lec ua. 100k at our contingency plans to prepare ourselves for

retaliation.

They decided at that neeting that any recariacion by casaro

would be at a low level, and that he would not zial confrontation

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against ine United Scates, although he had in the September 7ch

speech warned against a majos confrontation worse than che missi

crisis.

The CiA people attending that neeting care from the Caban

Altsirs

Staft, the

various

staif who probably ve don's know

the names of the people who attended, bus in ali likelihood, the

very-pedele who were working on the AMASH operation. At the

meecing on September 12uh, this interagency Cormictee rejected

the possibility of an assassination of & U.e. Leader in the

United Scates,

Senator Schwerker.

Do we know, Jim, whether the peopie fron

SAS cold that meeting about AMLASH?.

Were the people ail aware

OF AMLASH at Chat meeting?

Mr. Johnston. There is no ihoicacion that they were.

we have to rely on is the memorandum. There is no mention of

that, any mention in that memorandum the possibility of

recaliation by assassinacion of s. U.S. laader as an unlikely

possibility.

Senator Mathias.

Was there any evidence that General

Haig

had

ever been further questioned about that?

Mr. johnston, No, sic.

Subsequent to that meeting, on the 12th of

September,

they continued their contingency pian, and they had eliminated

the possibility that Castro would retaliace by an assassination

against a

leader in the United States. Phey did program into

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their consideracion the possibility that he would

assassinate

U.5.

leaders in Lacin America, U.6. officials in batin America.

At the end 'of

September: coming our of this whois review.

chey wazned, or they boid the Justise departent repcesentatives

to wann the 2BT chat Castso mighs conduct a sabotage operation.

bue basicaily che thrust coming out of that meeting. is the

FBi was not told that they had considered and cajected

Rud

assassiation of a 0.5, Leader within this country.

And again, we know little about the group's planning. We

do know that events in the AMLASH

operation on september 12th

would indicate that they were not duily at that point decided

on the face thas they would use AMLASA to assassinace Castro,

or that they would ever give him that assurance.

in any event, they did later give that

assurance to AMASS

after these series of meetings of the inceragency committee

were

over,

and on October 29th, 1963, Desmond Fitzgerald, who

was head of the Cuban Affairs Staff, actually net. with AMLASH

in Paris, and

the significance of that id, at least

co out

thinking, was that it destroved plausible deniability for such

a Senior official of the CIA co actually neet with an agent:

Senator

Schweiker. Who wanted to assassinate Castro:

Ma, johnston, Who wanted to assassinate Castzo, and who

sold that agent that the Jniced Scates Government, nos the

mafia or anybody else, bus accually told hai toat the united

States Government was behind his proposals, would have given

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assurances

that agent. that this

government was

going to conduds

was considering conducting an assassination operation.

Senator Power Thai:

was

cather extraordinary conduct,

waan

it, sor. d

senior official to meet with an agent?

Mc. Johnston, We belleve so.

le was vacned not to do it.

Senator Schweiker.. Several people warned him not to do

chat; John.

We have records of that. So he

went against sort

of in-house policy.

Mr. Wallach.

He also stated, I believe, that te was &

personal representative speaking for the

Attorney General.

Me. Epstein.

One of the reasons they had been expressing

advice that they noc have that kind of a meeting, because

they

were concerned about whether the project was secucity, the

security, of course, involving the question of whether or noc

AMLASH night be & double agent and might not be trustworthy and

whether the information might get back co Castro, which later

bears a relationship to whether or not that threat that Castro

made was based on real knowledge or not.

Me. Johnston. At this point in the chronology, before the

Ficagerald meeting on Occober 29th; the FBI learned through

a source it bad

Senator Schweiker. And this is snother very important

point because it

shows sone kind of action pazallel to che

CHAe

Mr: Johnston.

• that AMuASD vas meeting with CiA.

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Senator Schweiker.

And the 2Bi, it's own, the fbi told

178+

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Nr: Johnstoa: AMASa had the reputation of being a pcatty

eigney character,

and had during the revolution against Baciaca

once

shot

somebody or killed a man in a bar, and that was

indeed his attractiveness, was chat de was probably fairly weil

known as someone who was capable of assassination. So the

knowiedge oucside of the CLA

of the face that AlLASH was neting

with tue Cia could lead many people to believe chat the Cin

was using him in an assassination plot, even though there is

nO

indication in the FBI report that the source knew of the

nature of the CiA-AMLASH meetings:

The point is chat in eaci?

October, the CiA operation using AMLASt was compromised, and

in appears that the Cuban exiles, anti-Castro cuban exiles

could have had knowledge the CIA was engaged in this piot.

This goes ultimacely to mocivation of other groups to

06G

an assassination attempt agatose Kennedy for cheir ow

P100s25.

Ia any evenc, planning with AlLASt continued until

altinacely, two days befoce the President's assassinacion, he

was toid that chere vould

be a meeting on Movember 2206, and

chat it was

not the meeting - he aidn"t know whether the

meeting

would be

satisfactory to AMLASA; but it was the neering

that.

AMLASt had requested, and so aocually that neeting was

set

up ahead of time, and if AMLASH vere a double agent, or

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somebody else in the operation a double agent, ¿nere would have

been advance knowledge of the November 2and necing.

Then aster the assassinacion of Presiden Kennedy, in

fact, as the very noment CiA had fashioned a poison per, 2

Paperhate pen, and

had passed that or offeced is to AvASk at

this

meeting, and had aiso assured AMLASH that che Preside

was fully behind the coup attempt and fully behind AMiasa.

He

also offered or cold AMiASS that rifles wich telescopic sights

would be dropped in Cuba fox his use, again, the thrust being

great mocivation on

Novenber 22nd, a great motivation wishin

ClA to de very concerned about thie operation and to be very

concened about its owi reputation, and possibly concernec

wichin the goverment circles as to the whole Cuban area.

We then followed the trail on AMLASH and later on chrough

hiscorx. and found, first of ail, on Wovember 24ch;

that there

appears to • Cla investigators on the assassinacion reguested

AMLASH'& file, and apparentiy did not get chat file, or at least

if they got it: did not get any operational materials, so chat

those people who were investigating the iresident's assassination

were

denied

at that point knowledge of the AMbash operation.

in face, those investigators have told us chat they never

in thac cineframe about any assassination operation, and

when we described to them the scenaris I have

just descrised to

you, chey said that chat would have been a vical laccor in their

investigation, te goes again, to not whether Castro did it, but

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to che whole shaping of the assassination investigation.

Senator Hart of Colocado. As to whether Oswaid did it.

1s. Johnscon, Castro did it tarough oswald.

Senator

schweiter. I think that is probably the noat

significant Cia castimony we have. we talked to the chiet

invescigator for CiA, a very responsive, very straightforvard

guy, and he had absolutely no inowledge when he as asked by

Nelms to conduct

this investigasion of AMLASH or any attempcs

against Castro's life, was

nevex told that during his whole

conducting of the investigation, and

admicted to us ic would have

changed the whole direction and Encust of what he had been doing

if he had known that.

So it was deliberately withheld Econ him

And, the parallel to that, which I am sure that Paul

is

going to get to, is you go to ine Criminal Investigation of che

FBI and the exact parallel appears there. The chief guys in

the FBI charged wich the investigation were denied scoees, were

not told of things ve now know Hoover and the top leadershie

did know about

AMLASH and the other investigation.

So the two cop investigacors in both bodies were withhela

the vital facts of the castro ching. And I don't parcicularly.

necessarily see.

je come down on the Castro side, because if

yOu

know about the Castro thing, then you also would be

investigating the anci-Castro possibilities. So by denying

this, they didn't look at either the pro or

antl-Castro

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posslotlicies.

I am sorry. dime I encertuoted

Mr. Johnston. I just wanted to nake one point followiny

up on this.

the detailed report buiids the duss' in the two weeks

after the Presidens's assassination, the incocmacion that was

coning

into Cid, and much of that infomation is pointing to

Cuba.

indeed, the

hottest leads that were coming into CiA

Pointed to Cuba,

and yet we find that by the and of December

the Cuban specialiste, at diA. were not put directly in touch

with the warren Commiscion; and they were not pue in touch cr

they were not given the responsibilicy for continuing the

investigation, and indeed, they have testified, che counterintelli

sence expert on Cuban afrairs, testified that he never really

sat down with any of che invescigacors to analyze a11 oi che

facts in the Oswald case, to see whether there was any possibility

of & conneccion with cuba.

And so what it appears, what we have done in this report

1s to build the case, then, of all of the possibilities of

conspiracy on a giobal scale, the most likely looked to be a

conspiracy somehow involving eicher pro di anti-Castro forces,

and we do

not underetand why that was not fully pursued by

the CIA.

And clere are

mammoth zecoras out ac CIA of their investi

gation

of Soviet, poscable soviet responsibilEy

for the

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assassination, and indeed, their experts on Soviet airals

Were

che ones who can the CIA's investigation into the kennedy

assassination. And they have exhausted that area, apparently

and have cone up wich nothing. But we don't find a comparable

encore with

the cuban experts.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Keep in nind as just a footnote

heres

think a number of us heard in general testimony

Anglecon suggest that he scill is intrigued by the possibility

ne

never comes out and says it, but he always troils around

in those waters about Soviet connections in the assassination.

to the degree that Angleton was involved in the

investigation of the Keunedy assassination, I think he greatly

coloced the direction that that investigation took coward che

Soviec side instead of the pro and anti-Castro or the cuban

side.

Senator Schweiker: There are two other footnotes.

One

is that when the first. CIA chief investigator terminated his

cole, which was in about six or eight weeks, I guess, the main

thrust it the ceport had then been writter, he then went and

nad

a meeting wich the Justice Deparcment and the FBi, and he

said he was astounded at che

number of things that he learned

ac that meeting that be

had ween denied access to and was not.

given by the FBi chat aigo would have been inscrimental in che

investigation.

They withheld Osuald's diary and other

staft

chat frankly would have beiped them, Looking ac whatever Cuban

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connection there was or wasnic. So he made a very clear point of

saying that for à cricical six weeks, the FBi

never gave him

vital information chas he falt

was inportant for that period.

The other point is, and i think you have got to keep the

ocher side in mind, too, and that is the President somewhere.

adong the way blew the whistle on the anti-castro Cucans.

what

was that timeirame, the last one?

was

Mr. Johnston. March 19ch, 1963.

Senator Schweiker. And this is important because kilo 15

new

knowledge. Not only did we raid the Lake Ponchartzaine

anti-Castro Cuoan group, which was well known.

We had a foreign

countiey, and i don't want to mention their nane, we dad &

foreign country and ve

gave them maps of where seven or eight

Cuban camps were, ,and we encouraged them to go in and raid

chose canps:

So we got another country to raid seven anti-Castro

Cuban camps, and I think you can pretty well imagine the fury

and

the wrath and the vengeance on the anti-Castro side at that

parcicular point in tine.

But nobody checked that out..

I mean, that's the point.

].

nean,

here

are two tremendous mocivacion factors.

Ma. Epstein,

Those are the sane camps that at one time

bad

been helping our goverament.

Senator Schwesker.

And we were working closeiy with chese

people. So

we really burned ous bock on our brochers, so to

speak. i mean,

I. am sure chey feit betrayed, and we got anoche:

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country co do it for us.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Pussuant to the policy reached

between President Kennery and Khruschey, Khruscher puils the

missiles oue of Cuba, and Keanedy agrees that we will haile

our activicies so overthrow Castro. That was the arcangement.

Nell, that becane orystal ciear to all of chose people,

as jim was said, that we had been supporting for two years or

more la their eftorts to overthrow Castro, but we just overnight

as part of the missile criais, the goveinment changed its

policy toward Cuba in that respect 180 degrees.

Mr. Wallach:

I would lake to • I think there is a

tendency that we

can get bogged down in the facto and the

details of the case. I think at the last meeting in the

begia2i2g

of our summary, i sore of plagiarized

and stole a quote from

Senator Mondale, and I wiil read it, where he said nothing was

moRe Crucial

to this country than to determine che facts of

the

assassination of President Kennedy. No one single event

has ahaken the country mose, yet it appears from the evidence

che Committee has developed chai both the CiA and the

FBI

failed in

certain of their responsibilities and for dasterent

cessons avoided ochers in this matter.

Now, insolar generally as the assassination investigation

went on boch sides, the Fit and the Cia, it appears that at

every cura,

when they cous have

Looked into Cuban involvement.

they did not. Often it fell between the cracks. CiA people

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nave

told us that ir was the EBl's jurisdiccion to 100k into

it.

We have seen PB% memoranda

which said de was CiA'g

jurisdiction.

Senator Schweiker. And the Cuban section of FBi said che

Criminal

Section never asked us.

Mc. Wallach. A6 both agencies, it would appear that none

of the Cuban experts were ever allowed to get into the invesci

gation.

The scation chief ac OMWAVS, which was the stacion

down

in Florida that had the operational assets inside cobo, that

possibly could have answered some questions, told us he was

never directed to do anything, and he didn'c beliave it was in

the CrAs

jurisdiction to do so, to cap those assets inside

Cuba.

But more than that, boch agencies are trying to tell us

that they had no reason

to believe that there was any Cuban

invoivement in the assassination, whareas we have recently

found 'documents that tell us about this interdepartmental

conmittee on recaliation and we khow that they were considering

that very possibility.

We have Me. Helms and Mr. Elsagerald who knew about the

ANTASE plot and about the earlies assassination plots, kept this

intornation from their invascigators.

Hoover kept the same

information Econ his investigacors.

Additionally, the FbI had sone other motivations, and

WC.

have all

heacd the phrase "don"t embarrass the Bureas."

The

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FBi had a pre-assassinatior case on Lee fisavey Oswald. They

opened it when he defected to the soviet union, and they later.-

viewed him cwice when he came back to chis country. On boch

of those occasions he lied capeatedly to the agent who was

interviewing bal.

Setator Schweiker. And the agent knew he lied.

Mr: Wallach.

And the agent luew he lied because he hed

che Scate Deparcment reports

in ais hands,

the agent asked hit

to take & polygrach teet

as to nis cesponses, as to ties wich

Soviet incelligence. The Warren Commission was not informed

he

was requested that he take a

polygrap.

Oswald refused.

Despite that fact, and despite the fact that the

FB1

supervisor said

tha: the case on lee oswald could be followed

in conjunction with the case ou Marina, the Oswald case was

closed

immediately after boch of those interviews.

Now, while the Commictee nas documented all of the

methods that the FBI used in those days to gather information

soneons, I don't want to come down and say that they

were

proper or improper.

I make no juägment on that.

I just want to say thai they were used on security cases.

None of those were

used here.

Subsequently, the case on bawaid, about siz nonchs lacer,

ceopened agair, after he stbacribed to the worker, which

in

Buread parlance, is an East Coast: Communist newspaper, which

was Cisectly contradictosy to his statements that he made to che

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agent, that he had no Communist leanings since he had

returned.

He then began his Fair Play for Cuba Committee work, and was

in tadt arcested in New Orleans in August, and asked to see

&n

F3l agent; and again lied repeatealy to this 281 agent.

In fact

ne told che FBI

agent that he met and marzied his wife

in Dexas

instead of the soviet Union.

When we have Oswald disappearing, going down to Mexico

City.

Senator Schweiker. He cold the agent that he married ler

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in Texas.

NES"

Wallach.

les, Senator.

Senator Schweiker. Yes,

they had the files on it.

Senator Tower. Hell, Oswald wrote me in early 1962

help expedite and exit visa for his

wife. Why in the world

would he tell & plopper like chat?.

Mic. Wallach.

In any event, he told what the agent knew

was lies,

and

what I am brying to get ai is there was no

analysis

within the Burenu of any of this.

He even goes

dowd

Mexico City, contacta the Cuban consulate and the Soviet

embassy:

happens to be in contact - we don't know if there

is anything sinister about it with an agent who is known

be KGB oy the TBT and by the CiA, and suspected of being

Department 13, which is theis assassination and sabotage

squad.

In any event, he then returns to che Uniced States, is never

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again interviewed by the FBi, because of sone, as has been

described to us by the agent in Dallas, and i clearly don't

want to puc any blame on this

agent

Senator: SChweiker.. Even though: they have a record that

he was interviewad by a Department 13 officer, they have a

record that

he had an interview with & Deparcment 13,

ascagsination, kGB guy, and they never talked to Oswalá after

that.

M1, Wallach,

that I really wanted to cone down on was

the fact that with all of these facts in hand, on the day of

the assassination, one of Mr. Hoover's first responses was to

direct his chief inspector, Inspector Gale, who wac Assiscan:

Director of the FBI, to conduct ar investigation of the Bureal'e

handling

of the Oswald case before the

assassination.

Six days

later Gale came down wich I think it is an 18

page report citing numezous what be called, and I quote,

serious investigative deficiencies in the FBi's handling of.

the pre-Oswald assassination case. And I want to be clear.

there is no statement in there which says the fBi could have

prevented Oswald, or in any way

chat these deficiencies would

have

prevented Oswald from assassinating the President.

Buc the fact chat

the PBt was criticizing its own internal

handling of

ene case, One of the major criticians was that

it did

not intensify its

investigation

after knowing that

oswald repeatedly lied to the egenta, and after hiS Nexico City

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contacts, that there were four or five month periods

when noching

was done, when communications were mishandled, and you get

basic: ceally a basic intelligeuce failure within the FBI

itseli.

101 chen

have Director Boover knowing this, represonting

the Warren Commission the FBI handled the case as it would

any other case, neves mentioning to anyone - 17 agents,

including

an assistant director, were censuced, put on probation

or demoted,

and with this motivation, he never told the warren

Commission that there was anyching that the fBl did wrong.

i chink one

of the things we have to do is pur ourselves

back into that time period, and not for the sake of criticizing

the Warren Commission, but for che sake of what the perspective

then was of the FBI and the CiA. & chink no one at that time

would have

believed that the FBi would have done anything wrong.

Senator tower.

in other words, the thruat of yow: critician

lies against the Agency and the Bureau and not the Warren

Commission itself.

Senator Schweiker. Uxactly:

Wallach.

Exactly. now

chey perfozned.

And I think in

reading

the report, " think one of she first things you will

600y

Vir. Hoover, it was a negative invescigation, in a

sense.

12 waS 2h

investigation to prove oavald gulley. I enlak che

documents in a sense show

that.

I don': want so say that there wese not hundrede of agents

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in the field who were doing their damnedest to cry'to solve this

case.. They were just not provided with informacion that would

nave led them to soive it.

¿ dor'= know if there is & solution or whether we can stil!

Find 1E.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

That

is a very critical point,

also, becadse we have got to be careful in anyching we write.

IC 1s not just separating the agencies from the Commission..

Ic is separating the leadership of the agencies from their

rank and file.

As Jim and Paui boch have testified, we

go through here

and Lault the CIA and

the F3z: I think we have got to refine

thac.. le

have got to say the leadership of the Cid and che

FBI.

there was obviously a conscious eifort, as

the scaff has

cestified, by che leadership of both agencies,

to prevent those

assigned, to provide investigative capability to the commission,

froit knowing what had been going on.

So you cannot even fault the whole agency because I think:

as Padl has just said about the FBJ agents, I think the CiA

peopie in

charge of the investigacion and che PB5 people in

chacge of the invescigation really tried to do their damnedeat

Senator Schweiker.: mied to do their best.

senator lart of colorado.

But the leadership of bott: of

those agencies, in Hoover's case he was more concerned about

his reputacion,

and cherefose infosmation was withheld, and it

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as Paul says negative investigation.

In che ClA's case, i think they were exying to cover theis

you know what oy not revealing so their. oun invescigators

Chat

they had been crying to kill Castro.

Senator Mondale,

Could I ask & question, if questions

are in order about this? this lasc FBi file that we found?

now, we asked in

a broad reques: the Bureau and the CIa to give

us all documentations and files relating to assassinations, a0d

those requeses went forward some is months ago.

And chen es

understand it

about & nonth ago as a result of our review of

many of chose files, we came to the conclusion that there nad

co be other files indelivered and undisclosed at the Bureau.

And we found out that there were.

We have now seer some of those tiles, but we are not sure

we have seen them all, is chat correct?

Mr. Wallach. I beiieve thai is a fair statement, Senator.

Senator Mondale:

And it was

in those files that we have

seen that we found out foz che firse tine that there was thi

sort of ad hoc, tempozary interagency committee which was

convened following Castico's threas to determine whecher there

W8S

in face a threat against American leaders, is. that eigh:?

ME,

spacein.

I think chat was in a Department of dustice

file.

what we

discovered in the RSi Siles that this Commitces

had not received before was the fact that in 4964 the Sareau

¡earned of the CiA's assassinacion opezacion againat Castro tha:

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involved ALask,

and learned that the Agency's operacion had

been compromised.

Senator Mondale.

So that, file shoved for the firot, time

that the Bureau knew about both AMbASH and the Maria.

Mr. Wallach.

We know about that they knew about the Maria

che May 10th --

Senator Mondale,

But chey aiso knew about AMLASS,

air. Wallach.

BUT

even when we gor chose documents, and

we requested those files, there was a probiem of trying to get

the documents.

Jim and i were sitting at the EBI, they brought

in the file on AMLASH. They

left out two critical documents.

By reviewing the serials we saw that two were missing. They

just happened to be the two

documents which established that

they had knowledge of AMLASH. I think the critical fact is

not only did they have knowledge of smash, but they, got that

knowledge from i Cuban source in the Cuban community down in

Florida, and as one FBi agent said, when one Cuban knows some

things, ic is not a secret.

They knew that that most secret

operacion was compromised, and they never told the CiA.

Senator Schweiker.

In fact, we have

a memo of the FBI

saying

don't tell the Cia that their operation was compromised.

I mean,

this is so typical of wai you find through that

invescigacion, they wouldn't even tell the cia their

agent was flawed, and they kept that a secret from che CIA.

Senator Mondale.

What I an crying to get ai is, firsc ot

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all, do we have all the files now?

ic. Epstein.

NOr

Senator dart of Colorado.

NO.

senator. Mondale.

And secondly, is there scason to beiieva

that they were

deliberacely withholding those files, because

I think that ia a very serious thing if true.

ME. Wallach.

Well, i don't know if the Committee has

seen iü, bus we got à letter vesterday from the Justice Departnete

Linison wich the Conmittee which essentially adopts wiat the

FBI said. As i renember - do you want to speak to what the

Jetcer said, Mike?

Mr. Epsteis.

Tes.

Ne viote to the attorney General.

and

supplied us with what be

had been informed oy

the FBT,

and

What he

said was the FBI tells me that they don't have a topical

index which would have permitted them to locate these matecials,

captioned "Assessination Offorts Involving Castro," and that that

is why those files weren' located back last year when this

Committee asked for all of the files.

What ve also dido'e get, which came here just a few days

890

we and this wasn't provided a year ago either were

materiast reflecting that the i3i was deeply involved in this

Goverument's policy with respecs so

Cuba: following the Bay or

Pigs.

Mr. Wallach.

They net wich Lazedale, and in'lace, on one

occasion,.

Beinone, who was

second or. third in chacge of the

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FBI, Jokingly suggested so lansdale that they use the Maria

to gei ric of Castro, and we had no idea at that poins chat

cha

F31

was invoived at those early stages, 1961, wich what was

going on visa-vis Cuba and in face, Boover made some recommenda-

tions as to, you know, what should be done.

i want to be clear,

he didn't say go out and

assassinate Castro.

Sanator Mondale.

an not getting at wat is in those

files.

I want

-I an trying to got at was there an effort

not to see

those files?

Mr, Epstein.

We have not examined chat questioned.

Nis

nave our complaint to the Actorney General, their

response

giving their reasons for why they didn't provide those flies

last year"

Senator Schweiker

That is soct of a tough one, Fritz.

I don't know.

Senator Mondale,

Now, the so-called interagency committee

set up after Castro's threat, am i not correct, we

suet found

out about that?

Mc, Johnston. Senator, we knew that there was euch an

interagency comnittee.

As a matcer of face, it was a succeasor

TO

MONGOOSE:

and it is decailed in our assassinacion report.

anc its activicies chrough June of 163. What we did not know

was

that che connictee had met 1a September of 1963 to consider

cetaliations

Senacor Mondale,

in other words, the point is that prior

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to Kennedy's assassination, an interagency ask tocce, had 'been

assenbled to discuss toe

fear, based ol Castro's threat, thet

in fact our top

leaders

in chis countcy might neve their

Lives exposed to assassinacion because of waat we

were doing,

and

despire shet, the Warren Connission

was never told of any

relationsnip between the assassination

and

when did we find

out

about thas discussion?

Mr Epstein.

About two weeks ago.

Senator Mondale. All righi.

And is not true that some of the people that worked with

this

Conmictee representing the agencies

wers

on chat commsctee?

Senatos Hact of Colotado.

List the memoers,

Senator Sohweaker.

No, we don't know that now, do we?

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Just List the members.

Mr. Jonnston:

The members, Mr. Crimens of the State. De

partment was coordinator of that: Mr. Califano was Inown to

be, or we have evidence that he was the Defense

Departmen

representative.

General Haig, at that time it. Colonel.

Haig, worked wich Mc. Califano. We have indicacions chat

Mc. Ticagerald, was

the dia representative. i called Seymo

Bolten at CiA and

said our concern about that, and

Seymour

cold ne that Fitzgerald indeed was the CIA representative: aft

chat even he,

Seynour Bolten;

had attended

meetings or the

incezagency committes

when

Mr. Ficagerald. couldn't ascend.

In

other words, there could have been other peopie iron cia.

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Senator schweiker..

Did he attend the specifio meetings?

Johnston.

We have no evidence that be attended.

We

have

no evidence of who attended.

Senator Schweiker, Is there is any evidence that he attended

those meecings, he is in & vecy precarious position in regords

to what he's told this Committee in recent months.

Senator Hark of Colorado. I shink that

is the point that

you are gecting at. There is

a pactera, a perceptible patteri

that

information has been withheld on this Committee on a

matter that we specifically indicated that we wansed

to know

about.

The only flaw in your formulation was the phrase "based

upon Castro's threats."

We only have the circunstances that

the Committee met within 48 hours, and that is circumstantial.

Senator Mondale.

I think it is fair co say, Dan, that

that's

is a

feeling here that

some of these pending requests

being

stalled out in the hope that chis Commictee will expire.

Senator fower. At this point can I yield to senator.

Inouge, because I think he wanted to ask some questions.

Senator Inouye. Just one.

You indicated

that the Commission, the Warren Commission,

waS

noc reaily awase of the scope of the inceiligence activicies

01 the United Scates.

it. Dulles was a member, waan't he?

vic. Johnston. Yes, sir.

Senator Inouye: . Was he eware of these assassination piers

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or plotsa

Me. Johnston, What de seems to be js this. Me. Dulles

was replaced in November of 1961 by Mir. MoCone. But Mr. Dulles

indeed, when that repiacement occurred, President Kennedy

desired a shake-up of the CIA, and othes organizational changes

were made so that Mr. Dulles' knowledge would have been complete

knowledge as of November 1961. He probably knew about the

Mafia plots.

Whether he knew about the evolurion through

MONGOOSE and on so the AMLASHl plots is leas certain, We have

no evidence that

he knew about the AMTASH plot, and on this

point, Mr. Angleton, who was then head of the CIA counterintelli

gence, told us that he met with Dulles frecuently, in fact,

mec

with Dulles frequently during the cougse of the warren

Commission and they would bounce ideas book and forth.

It is important to. note that Mr. Angleton said that he

did not know of the AMLASH

operacion, and that indeed he was

compartmented.out of most. Cuban operations, although he nad

a general kaowledge of it. He did not have the detailed

knowledge of Cuban operations chat cher people did.

we, at least the

evidence looks like that Dulles would

höve known about the mafia plots, but we have no evidence that

he ever could

have learned about the later operations.

Senator Inouye.

are you sacistied that be knew about

chem?

Me.

Johnston.

i think the Committee's

ceport on

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assassinations concluded that he probably did know.

Senator Inouye. Is there any evidence to show that as

discussed

this matter wich his fozlow commissioners?

Senator Hart of Colorado, Let that yield to me. Bill

Miller nas somethiug.on shat matter.

Mr. Maller.

When Senator Cooper was here last week, i

asked him on behalt of this

inquiry whether the Warren Commiscio.

members were in any way informed, eicher privately by. Mr.

Dulles of Mix. Helms or by any ocher member, by Hoover or the

Depucies, of any of the assassination atrempts wich regards

Cuoa, and he said no.

The issue was not raised in any way.

shape or tomm.

Senator Schweiker.

In addition, our repore does say

chat four of the counsel, say exaccly the sane thing. Mr

Belin, and Mr.. Griefin

Mr.. Johnston. Mi. Rankin.

Senator Schweiker. Fouc Of the leading counsel make exactly

che

same representation.

Senator Huddleston. On that point, bas these been any

effort co

research the Comnission's report,

noc only the final

report itself, buc the backup infochotion that they released, suet

to make sure that we are aoc making a claim relating to some

evidence that is new that was not presented to the Commiesion.

Sanator Hart of Colorado.

Here is

the only thing the

final report contains on any Cuban connections; and you can

38 2

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how big it is, and these are portions of pages. 1e 16 about

eight or ten Pages.

No, Maller.. Senator cooper did expand on one point.

said that the interest of the Commission nembers was on'

determining who killed John Kennedy.

That was the focus.

Senator fart of Colorado,

Not why.

Mr:. Miller.

Why insofar as they were able to determine:

out he said it was

their view, and they feel there is nothing

that they have seen during their inquiry that would make them

believe otherwise, that it was Oswald, and that it was the

circumstances of the assassination, and Oswald himself they

focused on and his motivations and so on.

think he was disturbed by the lack of any knowledge at

that time about any other connection with Cuba, but it was from

his

remarks, it was clearly not a part ot their discussions.

Senator Tower. Ler me sepair to

Senator Schweikers

eroposal that there be inmediare publicacion of this report

to assist the successor Committee, and just ask Senator inouve

if he has any comment on chat proposal.

Senator Inouye. I have been thinking about it, but i

don't think I am in a position to make any

contribusios,

Senator Schweiker.

I think, Danny: this wii: give you

freedom to do anyching that you want.

Senator Inouye. From the scandpoint of relieving the

Committee of any pressures, that is crue, and eventually, woecher

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you release it or not, i would suppose bit by bit it wizl be

released.

Senator Schweiker.

that is the probiein.

Sanator Inouye. So that being the case, from my standpoint

it is just as weil.

Senacor Tower. In other words, you would approve Senator

Serweiker's proposal.

Senator Machias.

Would you rield for a question?

In its present form, is it sanicized as

to methods?

Senator Schweiker. No:

we-want the right and this is

why i put in my notion that Senator Hari and I could work out

with the

staff complete sanitization with the FBI and

the CiA,

that would just,

you know, we would just do as a matter of

Course.

So we want to make it very clear there is no zeason not to

do that.

Senator 'fower. So what you could do is publish & sanitized

reporc and such matters as cannot be sanitized would be

Cuoned over to the Commi cise.

Senator Schweiker.

Exactly.

Senator

tower. boee that procedure accord with your

desires?

Senator Inosye.

Fire.

Senator Schwetker.

And there is one otner thing that

could do that night he healthy, and maybe in refuting, it

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we

have

a memocandum, and

they issue it, you know, they mighs

give us

another menorandum that we have been unable to shake

them loose on, and so we wouid doviously include their side

of the story if thece is a side chas they have been holding

oack.

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Senator dare of Colosado. Mc. Chairman, I want to persiat

in my view that this should be a full Committee repore, and

not

Hari-Schweiker report.

Senator Schweiker.

I support that.

senator Hart of Colorado, So i think we have got to buy

of you

glace veriod here of what, a week or whatever you

need to read. this thing and sign off on it, bus i don't wanc it

co be a two-member report.

Senator Schweiker.

All of the other

reports have been

Conmittee report, and i think that is

a valid request.

Senator Inouye, Let me ask another question,

Senator Tower.

Senator Inouye.

Senator Inouye: Are you satisfied that the only reason for

che coverup conspiracy on the part of the cop leadership of che

FBI and the CIA was

simple face-saving?

Senator: Schweiker.

2o .

Mc. Joniston.

No, Senator, I am not satisfied chat that

would be the conclusion, and I vosid like to touch on the faot

that first of all there is open the possibility thac higher

authority inthe government, at least when knowleägeable of che.

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general parameters

of the problem,

and approved the CiA's

conduct in this regard.

We have actempted to detail every

meeting between the President, President Johnson and Dicector

MaCone in the relevant time period, November-December 1963-

There

no evidence that the AMLASH operation was detailed to

President Johnson. There is evidence that the Pcesideni was

cold tuily abouc the general thruse of the covert operacions

against Cuba, and apparently told that chis included

sone coup

plans.

It would be very important to find out precisely what ha

was told abouc that, as for example, if he were told only

that there were coup planning in the works, that's one thing,

If he were told that the coup plan had reached the stage that

Desmond. Fitzgerald had met with this agent and assured hin

chat the

assassination coup had u.s. support: chat would be

anocher matter.

don't think it is solely limited at thie point to

coverup by Agency officials, high level Agency officials:

thinks the other option has to be kept open.

Senator Schweiker.

This is something, Dan, you may or

may

not want to pursue, That is one of your options.

Senator Power.

Since it is a suggestion of Senator dart,

do i understand that Senator Mart and Senator Schweiker boch

agree that the question should be put over until all of the

other Conmittee members have an opportunity to read the report?

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Senator

Hart of Colorado. Or in the alcernative, chat

we vote, that

ve reaffirm our vote two weeks ago or three

wesks

ago

to release, but making pending seven to ten days

period for every member to read and sion on the report or

something like that. Therefore, when the period enda, we wild

release it.

Senator Tower,

Do you want to couch that in the form of

nocion?

Senatos Schweiker. Well, we have à technical problem.

we uave to have a vote prior co the end of this month on it.

Senator Mathias.

well may i make

a suggescion? Can we

make

the voce conditional on wether or not a majority of the

members have regiscered an objection prior to Midnight on

che dist?

Can we do something of that sout?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Yes, we have

got a little

technical but a very important problem for the gentlemen sitting

neatly in front of you, and that is

that theic salaries are

going to end one of these days, and we can'? expect thee

peopie to vork pro bono.

Senacor Schweiker.

I was willing to subsume some of

that burden, but I wonder it it woulda't be more tidy, ic Danny

woule be reepective to, for severa: weeks, co just put them

on the cemporary basis, because you have got classified macerial

can't handle thas, nobody can in their office, until that

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project terminates:

Senator Inouye. i can

assure you that is under very seriou:

consideration.

the only reason we have not acted is very

simple.

The

majority side has nec

to organize, the minoricy

side has

not yec, and although i an Chaintan of the Coumittee,

don't wish to take any step untii the 1u2) Committee has

been organized.

Senator Schweiker.

velle i will be glad to go along wer

what you

saj. Danny. It would be strictly until the basis of

this

project is compieted, so you are in no way • We are

not delineating your new

Senacos inouye. What do you mean when the project is

completed?

Senator Tower. Well, you see, we go out of business on

the

3lst, and to tidy up this matter, i think what senator

Schweiker is suggesting is some of the scaff of this Committec

could be continued on & temporary basis on your Comnittee uncal

the repore is published, and ther you can hire your owii.

Senator Schweiker.

See, we have to go back to the CrA

and

che FBJ in the next day or so.•

Senacor Bower. You are going to have to . li is going to

take you a while to hire your own peopie, anyway.

Senator inouye, I have already asked for the names of

the members:

Senator Pover, Would you like co restate your notion agair

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Senator Mathias.

My motion would be that the work be

Published as a

fil]. Commitcee report, uless a najority or the

members of the Committee would register an objection prior ic

manicht on May aist.

Senator Tower.

Do you want to take that a step further,

an winch case

the

matter would be turned over

to the successor

Committee?

Senator Mathias.

I think we would have no opcion, to waich

case it would be turned over.

Senato: Hart oễ Colorado. What day is the sist?

Senator Mathias.

Monday and nobody will be here

I wouid suggest we have & meeting.

Senator Mari.of Colorado. So you all have, in effect, unci

Friday nighi.

Senator Schweiker.

Why don't you make it friday night?

Senator Mathias.

I would be giao to accept that. That

gives us chree days.

Senator hart of colorado.

It is & two hour reading job.

Senator Schweiker. Say that again?

Senator Mathias.

That the report be published as a

2uil Commiccee report, subject to being sanitized and

so forth,

uniess a majority of the members of the Commictee registes

objection by 5:00 o'clock on Friday: May 28ch.

Senator Huddleston, lec's establish how and where we registe:

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an objeccion.

senator

Tower.

With Me. Miller.

Senacor Mondale. Can we take this thing with us?

Senator Hart of Colorado, Nor. no.

Senator Tower. You have heard che motion.

• Me. Miller, would you call the roll?

ME. Maller.,

Mc. Hart of Michigan.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Aye.

ME,

Mister.

ir. Mondale.

Senator Mondale, Aye

Mr. Marier.

Me. Ruddieston.

Senator Huddieston.

Aye.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. Morgan.

Senator Haddleston. Aye by proxy.

Mc. Miller.

Ma. Mart of Colorado.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Age

Mc. Miller

Mr. Baker.

Senator Power. Mr. Baker is absent. I have no instruction.

Mc. Mizler.

Mi. Goldwater.

Senator Tower. NO.

Mx. Misler:

Mx. Machias.

Senaior Machias.

Aye.

Mc. Miller.

Mr. Schweikes.

Senator Schweiker.

Aye.

VIC:

Miller.

Mx. Church.

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He told me on the phone that he was for thie.

senator Power, Ask Phil to exercise dis proxy.

Senacor Hart of Michioan. sy scoxy, aye.

Mc. Miller.

Mr. Power.

Senator Power, NO.

Mr. Miller. The motion carcies.

Senacor Schweiker. What is the vote on it?

vir. Miller.

It is eighe to two with one to be determined.

Senacor Lower. I ask unaninous consent that Mr. Baker

be

polled.

If there is no objection, thac will be done.

Now we move on to consideration. of burtover of Committee

Files and other transition matters.

Me, Miller?

Senator Hart of Colorado.

John, maybe I ain out of order,

Senator Tower. I recognize the Senator fron Colorado.

out of order.

Senator Hart of Colorado. In case we are asked the

grounds for dissension, do we know it or not?

Senator Tower. I think chat

,is incumbent upon those who

dissented.

Senator Rant of Colorado.

I just seter it.

Senator Tower. Mr. Miller.

Miller. Che. Committee scaff has put che files in ordei

for curn-over to the successor Committee.

We have returned to

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che Agencies all the materials that have been on a loan basis:

and i think our account is cier in this respect. What is

left in the flies after removing, returning and destroying

are 15 file cases of four drawers each of material that we

think might be of use to a successor commitee.

The problem this

poses for the successor committee

that

because of the mass

of material, there

has

S01s

means

of communicating

what is inside the files to the new

connittee.

Ic would be my cecommendation that For a transi.

tional period, that the research group, that ie be recommended

that the zesearch group be taken on by the oversight committee

for a period of transition so that they can make a decision

whether they want to recain all or any of the material thas

the Select Committee has acquired in its 18 months of existence.

Senator Huddleston, And there is a matter of security to

continue, too.

Mic. Maller.

the security sacuation is, I chink the most

secure place for it as the moment is to renain in the audicorin

with, ideally with Mr. Marshall or some equivalent.

Senator Rover, What you suggesc is that this committee

immediately cetain the security force that we now have.

Mis

Miller.

Certainiy on & transitional basis.

Senacor Tower. Certainly on a cransitional basis, and

they will probably use

then

anyway.

Senator inouye.

We are already in the mádst of discussiona

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with Miller:

I tried to get ahold of Frank, but me was busy

eicewhere.

And

I think ve will be retaining your man in charge

of

security.

We are looking over for Commarcee space.

we have got

Chis

space

now, but 45 cabinets takes a lot oi room.

Ne are

preparing & letter to the Rules Committee requesting that we

serve as your successor, not only for space, but for everything

else:

the equipment. and the works.

And at the appzopriate

time, iive don't want it, ve will juat throw it away:

At chis moment we are juse putting a big hand on it.

Senator Tower. i don't think this requires any formal

action by this Committee. I chink we all agree that the

cransition will be made, that all the remaining materials

in our files will be turned over to them, subject to their

making a determinacion of what they

want.

And

then i would suppose it could be worked out wich the

staff.

Senacor nouye, The only problem we have on personnel

action

Senator Torer. You more or

less have to leave it where

is,

as i understand, because of the sccess factor.

Mr: Kizbow.

If chey try to out you in one

of the old

buildings, Me. Chairman, they are not stressed so hold anyching

nore

Senator Inouge.

the oniy othes place we codid find would

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be the tunnel near our subway tunnel.

Buc in the transition, we intend, at least I am going to

recommend, that we retain some of the personnel you have

here for purposes of transition, bur this is a bad time, it

you know what i mean, We are right on the eve of a recess, and

the troops are going to scatter, and

so i hope that those we

will be selecting, they will be notified,

but they may find

themselves with a one-week hiatus or something like that.

They may have to survive on

beans for a week or something.

Senator Tower.

Bill, is there anything that requires

Formal

sction by the Committee?

Senator Inouye.

May i request that your Committee submit

CO uS

at the earliest the list of those who you

feel

should

be in this transicion team?

Senator lower. The staff is so directed.

Is there any further question?

Senator Huddleston. By about 2:30 chis afternoon.

Senator lower. Is there any further question or any

urcher pending

jousiness?

Senator Mathias, Well, John, there is one other question

about which I feel sone responsibility.

I made a motion that the gross expenditure for intelligence

purposes

should not be divuiged in, the Conmitice report, and

that that question should be referred for decision to the full

Genate.

No action has been taken by the full Senate on that

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and i feel some cesponsibilicy for raising the question in

che

Sonate.

I prefer to raise it here first to see what the other

members, and advice oi counsel, is.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

Mr. Cosirnan?

Senator Power. Senator Hart?

Senator Mart of Michigan. I am glad senator Mathias

reminded me,

because is was decided by a margin of one vote.

and i supported his motion. I did it then in the belier that

it would be one of she easiest clubs to be used by chose who

did not want the creacion of a permanent commitcae, to clobber

is with.

i did it also in the beliet that when is was presented

to the Senate, that is probably would then be disclosed.

share Senator Mathias's concern that somehow or other

we get the issue before the Senate,

Senator lower. I an sure it wili goi

there.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

well, it has noc yet.

Senator tower.

I chink it is almost inevitable that it

will.

Senator Mathias. " don't know whether it takes a

resolution here, or requescing the Majority Leader to schedule

it, and that is about the only thing thac we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Any member can make a

motion on the

f1o0r.

Senator Hart of michigen.

weil, senacor Machias would be

the logical one, having made the motion here.

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Senator Mathias.

I all prepared to do that, and I would

be

glad to have the concurrence of the Senator from Michigan.

Senator Mast of Michigan. You do.

Senator Mathias:

Weil, why don't we get together and plan:

CO

do chat.

Senator inouye.

Are you satisfied that you have made

this mocion that it is from now to ecernity and nobody wil

aver know

how much the gross figure is?

Senator Mathias.

it we make the notion, they wall know.

will publish it.

Senator Inouye.

what, you

want to publish ic?

Senator Machias.

We want to publish it now.

Senator Inouye. I chought everyone wanted to keep ji

secret:

Senator Toves. Gentlemen, is there anything further?

Senator Schweiker.

I just have a minor point.

Danny, did I understand on the technical thing on the

staff that while there may be a week's gap, which i can

underacand, would thare possibly be a retroactivity to the

First of June when it is set up?

Senato: Inouye, Oh, yes.

Senator Schweiker. No problemn.

Sehator Inouye. They nighe Have a week of uicers, that's

TNe

all.

Mix. Wallach.

Just before, we conclade, I guess on behalf

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of the scath i would like to thank bosa Senátors Hare and

Schwe ker tor

the anount of time that they have put into this

and i think ti

is -I don't know it the Commintee realizes

really the amount of cine that they pecsonally have put into

accending sessions and reviewing documents and things like

that. And on behalf of the staff, the cooperation they have

given us, and I juac want to express thanks very mch.

Senator lower. Well, thank you very much, and I want to

say on behalf of che committoe chat we all of ve expross to

Senators Hart and Schweiker our appreciation for the hard work

they have done on this. Having served

on the drafting commicree

last sumer, I know how time consuning this can be in the

hands

of cwo people or three.

So I think that che Commitcee would like to express

their

thanks to

Senators Mark and Schweiker.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, thank you.

I think it is the other way

acound in terms of the stait and

113&

I think we owe it to the five pacpie that you see here.

Senatos Schweikar: They have oeen a very dedicated

staff.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

We have gor che very same

problem we had a couple of weeks ago..

Ian cold there are.

reporters outside. I am not going to go talk so them because

a11 we have got to aay is the same thing we have said bio

or three

weeks ago.

Senator. Tower

"will go shead and calk co shem and bell.

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them the action we took.

is there anything else?

Then i declare that this Committee is adjoumed, sine die.

(Whereupon, at 11:57 o'clock p.l., the Committee adjourned,

sine die.!

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