DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT 01 APRIL- 30 JUNE 1963.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

i.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

: Current Status of Cuban Exile Reactions

to the Resignation of Dr. Jose MIRO

Cardona

REFERENCE

: Memo to DCI, dated 1l April 1963;

Subject: Cuban Exile Reactions to the

Resignation of DI. Jose MIRO Cardona

I. This memorandum is for your information and is

in response to your request for an updating of reference

memorandum.

2. Our Station in Miami reports that Dr. MIRO has

called a meeting of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)

for. today to reiterate his intention to resign and actually

go through with his resignation if he does not receive word

that the President wants to discuss the matter with him or

he receives no indication from Washington that there

is a definite plan for the liberation of Cuba.

The final

decision may be postponed until 18 April, at which time it

is expected that Dr. MIRO's resignation will be formally

accepted. MIRo would accept a military man, such as

General Maxwell Taylor as an emissary from the President,

but does not want to deal with a "Harvard Professor." MIRO

would expect this emissary to be able to point to specific

United States policies and programs for the overthrow of

the CASTRO regime.

3.

Our Station in Miami further reports that Dr.

MIRO has decided not to release his entire 25 page

resignation statement to the press in its present form

as it is too long to be published in the newspapers except.

as a paid advertisement. MIRO does intend, however,

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to delete quotes from high level United States Government

officials and issue instead a "hard hitting" statement

based on the substance of the 25 page document.

4.

It is Dr. MIRO?s opinion that when he resigns

the CRC will liquidate itself. He feels that the United

States Department of State had planned the liquidation

of the CRC as one of the last steps in the development

When

a1s resignation becomes erfective. Dr. MIRO LeELS 11

vill be impossible for him to continue living in th

incident. It has previously been reported that Dr. MIRO

might leave the United States to form an organization

similar to the CRC in another friendly country.

5.

meanwhile, there appears to be sharp differences

of opinion within

the CRC and among other independent

exile groups and individuals as to the wisdom of Dr.

MIRO*s precipitous action in threatening to publish

l his

letter of resignation, thus causing the alienation of

the United States Government and the probable collapse

of the CRC itself. Dr. MIRO is confident that the CRC

will support his action and its members will, in turn,

use his resignation as an occasion for denouncing current

United States policy on Cuba.

According to Dr. MIRO,

the Revolutionary Students® Directorate (DRE) and the

Association of Cuban Lawyers in Exile have pledged their

support to him and will make public statements in his

behalf.

He claims that he is receiving messages of

support from Mexico, Brazil and Chile, some requesting

copies of his 25 page resignation statement.

A plan to

create a Hemisphere-wide organization to begin a

campaign to free Cuba is allegedly underway.

6. DI. MIRO claims that the United States Government

is now taking the line of insulting and attacking him

and he has declared that he

"will not stand for being

insulted" by the U. S. Government in addition to the

followers of BATISTA and CASTRO.

He added that CASTRO"s

announced support of United States Government treatment

of him tends to support his

suspicion that the U.s.

Government

is following a line of peaceful co-existence.

HENDEY

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He states that he has heard from "friends" whom he did

not further identify, that the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee might request him to testify before that

committee. Although reluctant to get involved in a

political

situation in which certain questions would

be asked which he feels probably should not be answered.

he would, of course, comply, if subpoenaed.

He has sent

word to cuban trainees in the U.S. Army not to abandon

their training, having heard that a number of Cuban exiles

undergoing officer training had their bags packed ready

to leave Fort Benning as a result of the incident

concerning him.

The Miami Herald of 12 April, speculated that

MIRO may be using the United States anti-raid decree

and threatened resignation in order to win support from

exile groups not affiliated with the CRC. A spokesman

for one such group claimed that Dr. MIRO was displaying

to exile leaders a letter from President Kennedy purported-

ly pledging United States aid to exiles in their fight to

liberate Cuba.

According to The Miami Herald, opposition

to United States anti-raid policy has brought about exile

unity not seen

since April 1961. UPI correspondent Adolfo

Merino is preparing a campaign in favor of Dr. MIRO,

according to Dr. MIRO. Merino allegedly told Dr. MIRO

that there appears to be a campaign in Washington to

denigrate Dr. MIRo, and he intends to counter this campaign.

Verino also stated

that he knew the contents of Dr. MIRO*s

25 page resignation statement although he had not personally

seen the document itself.

8. A Miami Station source reports that the present

crisis between Dr. MIRO and the United states Government

has caused great and wide-spread pessimism in exile groups.

This is not due to any popular support which Dr. MIRO has

among the exiles, but because of the issue involved, i.e,

the restrictions

imposed upon Cuban exile efforts to

defeat CASTRO, and upon this issue the exiles are compelled

to support Dr. MIRO whether they like him or not.

9. It is noteworthy that Manuel Antonio de VARONA

Loredo,

leading member of the CRC and one of the most

outspoken critics of the United States policy on Cuba,

privately believes that Dr. MIRO has gone too far and

fast in his dispute with the Kennedy administration.

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VARONA understands that MIRO was asked by Washington

officials to wait 30 days before taking a definitive

position and thus be able to view the crisis more

calmly, but MIRO refused.

VARONA believes that the

abruptness of this action was an error on MIRO's part.

VARONA said that he is opposed to the publication of

MIROs resignation because the document touches upon

sensitive and confidential areas and would be prejudicial

to the Cuban cause.

He hopes that a middle course can

be found as a way out of the present crisis. There

appears to be some sentiment in the CRC to continue the

organization with a new president. Enrique HUERTAS Pozo,

head of the Cuban exile doctors?

association, has

hinted that he would be prepared to step into the vacant

presidency of the CRC.

10. Dr. MIRO's rivals and enemies in the Cuban

exile community are reportedly making plans to exploit

the political vacuum which they expect will be created

by the resignation of Dr. MIRO and the anticipated

collapse of the CRC. Followers of Manuel RAY Rivero

are reported to be pleased with the crisis between

the CRC and the United States Government and hope that

the split becomes irrevocable. If Di. MIRO resigns

they believe that RAY, with the backing of liberal

Latin American leaders, will become the principal

Cuban exile leader.

Although Manuel ARTIME Buesa,

secretary general

of the MRR and former political

chief

of the Brigade, has extended his support to Dr. MIRO

in the present

crisis, it is known that ARTIME has

nothing but contempt for MIRO. This may, therefore,

be a political tactic to encourage MIRO to break relations

between the CRC and the United States Government and

thus place ARTIME in a more advantageous position,

vis a vis, the Cuban exile community and the United

States Government.

One group, the Peoples" Revolutionary

movement. (MRP), which had recently decided to join

the CRC, changed its plan when Dr. MIRO*s controversial

resignation was publicized. The MRP leaders came to

the conclusion that the CRC was finished and they

thereupon entered into negotions to omalgamate with

the ALPHA 66 and the Second National Front of the

(SNFE) Escambray. (SEYE). Followers of former President

Fulgencio BATISTA are reported to be delighted with

MIRO's difficulties and they now feel that MIRO is

getting what he deserves for having played the role

of a U.S. puppet.

i1. In another development, related to, but not

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directly a result of the MIRo situation, there appears

to be a movement within the Cuban Brigade to organize

a formal request for the return of the Brigade flag,

which was peesented to President Kennedy at the Orange

Bowl ceremony for the Brigade on 29 December 1962,

An attempt will be made to obtain the support of those

members of the Brigade who are stationed at Fort

Jackson and Fort Benning who will be on leave in

Miami over the Easter weekend.

Subsequent to this,

it is planned to circulate a letter to all local

Miami radio and T.V. outlets announcing the intention

of the Brigade to demand the return of their flag.

12. We conclude from the foregoing that Dr.

MIRO's usefulness to the U.S. Government and to the

Cuban exile community has come to an end, even if he

should reconsider at the last moment his decision

to resign. His resignation and the probable

disintegration of the CRC is likely to usher in a

period of. intense political manuevering and jockeying

for status among the various political groups and

the many self-styled leaders in the Cuban exile

community.

It is

not likely that this process will

result in any greater degrée of genuine unity and

cohesiveness in the Cuban exile community than has

existed in the past.

More than ever, the prime.

target of these exile leaders in their efforts to

gain support and patronage will be the United States

Government, without whose assistance, they are convinced,

no effort

to unseat the CASTRO regime can be successful.

Desmond FitzGerald

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

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13 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Summary Analysis of Funds Granted to the Cuban

Revolutionary Council for the Period 1 May 1961

through 31 March 1963

1. A budgetary analysis has been prepared covering U.S. Government

financial support to the Cuban Revolutfonary Council (CRC) for maintenance

of its organizational entity and operational activity and for payments to

and on behalf of the Brigade.

2. Period covered: The analysis covers payments made from 1 May

1961 through 31 March 1963.

3. Organization: The CRC was formed early in 1961 and worked in

conjunction with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD). The latter

organization provided the "front" for the Brigade forces before and after

the Bay of Pigs in addition to conducting propaganda and political action

activities.

Although the CRC was not designated the focal point for

Cuban exile activities until September 1961, no distinction has been

made in this analysis since the CRC absorbed many of the FRD activities.

4. Funding of CRC: Each month the CRC submits a request for funds

which is based on general purpose:

administrative support of the Council,

propaganda activities, underground activities, special expenses of the

Latin American delegations, subsidy support of the Judicatura Cubana

Democratica (Jurists), and Brigade compensation payments.

5. Financial reports: Monthly the CRC Comptroller prepares a

detailed financial report on the use of funds granted the Council. This

report is sent to the CIA representative in Miami and 1s then forwarded

to Headquarters.

6.

Summary: During the period 1 May 1961 through 31 March 1963

the CRC received $3,000,000 from the U.S. Government for administrative

and operational expenses.

(Note: This

figure does not include Brigade

payments which totaled $8,300,000 for this same period.)

Do. Miro

Cardona, President of the CRC, receives compensation of $600 a month

($7,200 annually) plus travel

- and related business expenses.

7. Attached are (A) Description of Funds Granted; and (B) Resume

of the CRC financial report for October 1962, a report which is

representative of the Council's expenses.

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ATTACHMENT A

SECHET

DESCRIPTION OF FUNDS GRANTED

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1 May 1961 - 31 March 1963

ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY:

Administrative funds are used for salaries, travel,

office expenses, and related costs of the Council.

At the present time $83,333 is granted each month

($1,000,000 a year) for these costs.

Operational activity funds are used for

the Council's

propaganda and underground operations, special expenses

of the Latin American Council delegations, and sub-

sidy to the Jurists... At the present time, the Council

receives $55,400 a month for these activities.

BRIGADE SUPPORT:

April 1961 returnees:

Payments to Brigade members who returned from Cuba

in April 1961 were continued through July 1961.

Compensation (including bonus) payments amounted

to $1,000,000.

Non-returnees:

Brigade

support payments for non-returnees (includes

60 prisoners paroled in April 1962, returnees in

December 1962, and members missing or killed in

action) amounted to $7,300,000 for compensation,

bonuses, and medical expenses.

$3,000,000

8,300,000

TOTAL FUNDS GRANTED TO CRC .

11,300,000

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(

RESUME OF CRC FINANCIAL REPORT

October 1962

Council President's office: Includes rent and related office

expenses, travel, and discretionary fund.

Executives: Compensation to 13 Council members at $350 a month.

Delegations:

Salaries of delegations to Latin American countries

and in

the United States. Delegations are located in

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile,

Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua;

Panama, Santo Domingo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Washington, D.C.,

and New York.

Payroll: Salaries of Council employees. The highest paid

employee receives $400 a month.

No. of employees

Dr. Miro's office

Comptroller's office

Office employees

Mov. Rescate Revolucionario Democratico

Mov. Democrata Cristiano

Mov. Agrupacion Montecristi

Mov. Recuperacion Revolucionaria

Mov.

30 de Noviembre

Mov. Triple A Independiente

Dr. Enrique Huerta's office

Ing. Carlos Hevia's office

Sergio Carbo's office

Newspaper men

DI. Antonio Maceo's office

Propaganda office

12

11

41

•15

13

16

9

8

1

1

2

6

Total employees on payroll

147

Travel: Travel expenses of Council members and employees.

General Expenses: Office rent, telephone, supplies and equipment,

utilities; translation services, insurance, etc.

Military Committee: Salaries of 16 employees and expenses.

Heroes and Martyrs: Assistance to widows and dependents of

Cubans killed or imprisoned by Castro and to other

appropriate individuals.

$5,121

4,550

15,444

27,782

1,078

11,431

3,865

3,381

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ATLACHMENT B

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Social Work: Salaries of 7 employees and expenses.

Visa Waiver: Salaries of 5 employees and expenses.

Organizations:

Salaries of 9 employees.

Brigade: Salaries of 3 employees and expenses for the Council's

activities in connection with the Brigade. This does not

Include U.S. Government payments passed through the CRC

to Brigade members and dependents.

TOTAL COUNCIL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

Propaganda: Production and distribution of written material,

radio time, posters, etc.

Underground: Payments to member groups of the Council for

underground activities in Cuba.

Latin American Delegations: Operational expenses of the

Council's delegations.

Judicatura Cubana Democratica: Subsidy to Jurist group which 1s

affiliated with the CRC.

TOTAL COUNCIL OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY EXPENSES

Brigade compensation (payments to dependents)

Returnee (April 1962) medical expenses

TOTAL BRIGADE SUPPORT

TOTAL CRC FINANCIAL REPORT FOR OCTOBER

$4,360

3,160

2,250

1,627

84,049

21,629

16,500

4,204

5,000

47,333

297,377

6,867

304,244

435,626

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4-16-63

33

16 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 5:30 - 15 Apr 1963

In Palm Beach, Florida

-9-8.

waR12aTi

1.

*[Mr. Lundahl gave a complete briefing on the latest satellite

photography of the Soviet Union and both satellite and U-2 photography of

Communist China.]

2.

Reviewed with the President the details of the Helms/Angleton

papers covering their counter-intelligence work in the French effort to

penetrate certain U.S. scientific areas. I recommended to the President

Helms/ Angleton activities were based upon intelligence received from

which was confirmed by the French intelligence sources, of a plan on the

part of the SDECE to penetrate certain US scientific and nuclear installations.)

3.

Discussed in some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba. Gave

the President a copy of Miskovsky's summary of the Donovan discussions

and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba. President raised the.

question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts.

I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argu-

ment with Miro Cardona.

I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with

the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to

break relations with Khrushchev, to effect the removal of Soviet troops

from Cuba, reorient his policies with respect to Latin America, and

establish in Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere.

I. explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in

one of two ways; either the manner outlined above or alternatively, by

bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to

force his withdrawal from Cuba, and then to bring about the downfall of

Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of the

Soviets troops (but not before) and thereafter establish a satisfactory

government in Cuba. I stated to the President that we were studying

both courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the

feasibility of either plan.

The President thought both approaches should

be carefully examined and suggested the possibility of pursuing both

courses at the same time. In any event it was decided that we should

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keep the Donovan channel open. I advised the President that Donovan

has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him

privately prior to his departure.

4. The President and I talked at some length concerning sabotage

in Cuba. I expressed grave doubts and pointed out the hazards from his

standpoint in view of the stand-down of the hit-and-run exile operations;

the danger of attribution, etc.

The President seemed to question

whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could

"come from within Cuba." I said this was very difficult and that the

initial operations conceived were from the sea. I said I thought a program

should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an

agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of

98

5. Advised the President of my plans for a brief trip to Europe.

Also advised him that I had delayed my departure for a few days in order

to meet with the Killian Board on April 23rd.

I repeated my very strong

objections to the Killian Board report and that I felt the report should

either be withdrawn from the Board or amended. The President urged

that I not engage in a controversy over this report, he had decided not

to circulate it, that only one copy was in existence, and as far as he

was concerned he had dismissed the entire matter. I told the President

I had not discussed the Board's report with the Board, but if they brought

it up I intended to urge its amendment but would not engage in a

controversy with the Board.]

98

6---

6. Discussed briefly the problems of Soviet leadership in the

USSR and gave the President a copy of the paper on this subject.]

7.

98.

Advised the President of the study of future satellite photography

which I had initiated. It was obvious from our brief discussion on this

subject that the use of the OXCART over Soviet territory was of great

concern to him and he was most hopeful of improving satellite photography

to a point where it would suffice our intelligence needs.

→-9-8-

8. Briefly discussed the views of Mr. Kelly Johnson on the TFX

and the Navy's plans to install a submarine research center on Andros

Island in the Bahamas:

JAM/mfb

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And u

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

illo

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT:

Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-

day visit.

As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned:

on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening

period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make

sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was

political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made

to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who

was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations

with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed.

However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists,

who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United

States.

These officials are under close surveillance. They have no

great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be

in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for

a reasonable relationship between the two countries.

3. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five bours, the

other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including

the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba's

role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around

to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the

Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become

a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America

depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

4 Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that

Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States

Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

Her ot

JOHN A. McCONE

Director

E.t.

212S C

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 APH 1903

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT:

Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-

day visit.

As a reault of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned

on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening

period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make

sure that the Red Cross dellveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was

political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made

to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who

was present at the meetings.

Vallejo said Castro knew that relationa

with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed.

However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists;

who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United

Statee.. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no

great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be

in chaos." He belleved that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for

a reasonable relationahip between the two countries.

3. Donovan had two sensions with Castro, one for five hours, the

other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including

the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba'a

role in latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around

to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba, Castro finda the

Sovlet Undon useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become

a Soviet satellite.. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America

depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

40

Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that

Donovan la sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States

Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

[Signos) JOAN A. McCONE

JOHN A. MCCONE

Director

OLG/GC/M.MISKONSKY (15 APR 63)

ORIGINAL TO PRESIDENT-JAPR 63

ErS 8407

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