INFORMATION REPORT: REPORT ON CUBAN DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA - DGI)
Originator: CIA
Document date: 07/22/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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REG: 2718! 127133

CENTRAL INTiL •ENCE AGINViY

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S-I-C-R-E-T

NU FOREIGY DiSSEN

COUNTRY Caba

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT

Roport on Cuban Docu-ent ItIOn did DATE DiSTR

procidurrs of tho bonuss, Directorato

of intoliagenco

(DICULIO: GONUFUL NO. PAGES .

REFERENCES

CS-311/00866-61

22 JUly 1961

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Onity

Do Not Reproduce

CS-311/00115-51

CS-311/0031J-01

CS-311,: 0716-68

DATE OF

INFO.

To March 1964

PLACE &

DATE ACO. Max 1961

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED IMPORN M SOURCE ORADINOS ARE ORPIMITIVE APPRUISAL ON CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE,

A former Cuban 13 officer who served with the Cuban Intoll1-

gonce Service until Aprll 1964.

Headquarters Comment.

The following information, as roported

by source during a debrifing, reveals the misuso of official

documontation

and procedures by tho General Directorate of

Intelligence: (Direccion Goneral do Intellgoncia - DGI).

Use of Altored and Fraudulent Documents by Cuban Intelligence

1. Cubans and othor Latin Anerican nationals operating for the General

Directorato of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia

DGI) of the Cuban Ministry of Intorior are issued Cuban passports

in allas by tho Cuban Foreign Ministry.

•considered legal in all respects by Cuban authoritles.

agents ulso use valld passports of a number of Latin American

countries in which false entries are provided by Cuban Intolligence

authoritios;

IS auspices are intended to hide all traces of their travel Into

and out of cuba.

Cuban Diplomatic Passports

2.

Cuban diplomatic passports are lasued in alias io IS staff por-

sonnel, consisting exclusively of Cuban nationals.

cier issued in allens operating as agents of Is.

There are

over i00 staff employees,

according to Source, all of whom are

oligiblo to receive Cuban diplomatic passports In allas.

Istilo over 100 staff employees are estimated by Source to have

boon dooumented in this way.

5

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4.

5

Issuenco of diploratic passports in allas is an automatic

process whonever an IS staff employee travels

on assignmont

abroad.

The emploree involvod provides the following stoms,

personally,

"Felix Rafael," in the

DGI, who forwards the materlal to the Forelgn Mindstry:

a.

Allas,

b.

Diplomatic title,

c.

One/

photograph..

The diplomatic title chosen by the staff employee is double-!

checkod by the Forelgn Ministry to avoid conflicts or dis-

For instance,

Source chose

the Foreign Ministry determined that

nor.other. Consular. Inspector was scheduled to travel through

the same aroa about that time.

The Foreign Ministry official

charged with Issuing allas diplomatic passports for IS porson-

del 1a ono Otero, Chief of the Diplomatic Passport Soction.

Otero does the work on Short order,

even comploting a job on

the same date the request 18 received, if necessary.

Frequently IS personnel using diplomatic passports travel in

small groups.

For instance,

Source traveled to Mexico In

early 1994 with a group of six or soven stafi employees, alt

using diplomatic passports.

Thore ard no distinguishing features, olthor in tho passport

serial number,

the diplomatic title,

or any other entry in a

diplomatic passport issued in alias to distinguish It from a

bona-fide document.

Cuban Ordinary Passports

7.

Cuban ordinary passports are issued in alias to IS agents, in-

cluding Cubans and nationals of other Latin American countries,

Cuban Foreign Ministry in much the same way as in the

caselof diplomatic passports.

In addition to the bearer's

photograph,

for uso in

to his real life.

As an examplo, Source cited his own case,

sayidg that he furnished a cover

story containing his true

dato of birth, but listing him as single, even though he 18

married.

Typical occupations

shown on ordinary passports

used by Is agents are

"student" (estudiante) and

"laborer"

(obrero).

8.

The only distinguishing feature for differentiating between

ordinary passport issued in'alias to an IS agent and

a bona-fide document is a special code for the serial number.

Source thinks that alias passports for IS agents bear five,

diglt serial numbers while bona-fide passports bear six-

digit serial numbers.

theory was based on the fact

that his ordinary passport issued

in altas bore a five-digit

number while the bona-fice passport issued to his wifo boro

a'six-digit number.

This premise is in direct contradiction

with a study of the numbering system found to be in use on

Cuban ordinary passports.

A pattetn in numbering is found,

with occasional discrepancies, in thich a new set of acces-

shon numbers is used each year.

Thus, serial numbers will

o0 lower on passports issued at the beginning of the year

stan on those issued later in the same year.

The serial,

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numbers are generally in a five-digit pattern, although de

noted that from June to December 1962 they ascended to

six-digle numbers.

9.

Source's ordinary passport issued in alias vas allegedly ob-

tained in January

1964, but was given an lssuance date of 28

August 1963 and boars a serial number consistent with the

accession pattern for the latter issuance date.

Likrulso,

fIve other Cuban ordinary passports issued in 1963 in allas

for use by agents under Source's supervision dear serial

adhering to the accession pattern corresponding to

their particular dates of issue.

10.

Grommets recently ceased to be used on photographs in Cuban

ordinary passports.

Bona-fide Visas, Vaccination Cortificates, and Passages

11.

Diplomatic visas for use in Cuban diplomatic passports in allas

are applied for dircutly by the Cuban Forcign Ministry to the

forcign mission concerned in Havana.

In Source's case appli-

cation was first made in March 1964 for a Chilcan visa and

later for a Mexican visa, even though no travei to Chilo was

contemplated.

The reason for this was awareness by Cuban

authorities of dcxican suspicion of Cuban diplona:le personnel.

The Cuban authoritics believed the Mexican Embassy In lavana

would be less suspicious of a passport containing a vian from

another Latin American country.

12.

13.

Passage bookings and international vaccination certificates

for use by staff employces

and agents using Cuban alias pass-

ports are also obtained through the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

Vaccination certificates are obtained from the Instituto

Cubano de Amistad con los Pucblos (ICAP) .

IS personnel's

passages are always booked on Cubana Airlines because such

fares are payabic in Cuban pesos.

No passages are booked on

Soviet or Crech airlires because

these require payment in

U.S. dollars, which

are scarce for the Cuban Government.

After a Cuban diplomatic passport has been used for ore round

trip, an exit permit from the Cuban Foreign Ministry, known

"Visto Bueno,

"is required for each subsequent departure

from Cuba.

The Forcign Ministry issues these to personnel

using alias passports in the same way as they would for bona-

fide documents.

14:

Forcign visas in ordinary passports issued in alias to IS

agents are applied for directly by the agents to the foreign

missions concerned in Havana.

Types uf foreign Passports; Used by IS Agents

15. The Cuban IS makes use of valid passports from a number of

ports from Spain and the United Stales.

specilied

that the Is does not use Uruguayan passports because the

Cuban Government does not wish to endanger its good relations

with that country.

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the various countles are abrained bo the 15 through the loodl

Conanase bartles

an the counteres comernd.

Forgery and Falsted on Capabrinaes

16.

The 15 has no capabiled les for raine lalse passports of 11-

tornal decuments from and country uccause of the dilliculty

of matching the paper and the technical problems involved in

the chraving and printair proress.

1e also laces capability

for cranicating entrea

in passports because uf the problem

In attempting lo delete entries without defacing the

documents.

17.

FIstfication and forgery is limited to filling in valld blank

porcien passports, maklis photograph and page substitutions

sona-fide loreign passports, and placing false travel entries

in foreign passports.

Travel entries from western Europe und

¡ Latin America can be forged.

Source did not know whether the

IS Itself made the photograph and

page substitutions and for-

All documents requiring

forgertes and substitutions

turned over lo one allonso,

" in the IS,

who took them to

a site unknown to

Source theorized that the forgeries

and substitutions maj have been done by the Departamento do

Seguridad del Estado (Department of State Security - DSE), the

counteri.tclligence arm of

the Cuban Government, which ho

has much more personnel than the dol.

Travel Pattern ur IS Archts

18.

Prospective

igents recruited by the IS in other Latin American

countrtes

brought to Cuba for training In mechods of sabo-

tage and other subversive activities are provided with detached

and spurious passports to conceal the fact that they cucr

19.

In order that no Cuban visa will appear in an agent trance's

bond-lide passport

way to Cuba, the Cuban mission in a

Latin American country

issues the Cuban visa on a separate

sheet of paper.

In 1963 most agent trainees were being brought

into Cuba through Mexico,

where the Cuban Embassy issued the

separate visas.

Parly in 1903 Mexican Immigintion officers

began using a rubber stamp bearing the notice "Salió para

Cuba" (Departed for Cuba), with the date on it, which they

automatically stamped in all pissports of travelers proceeding

To counter this rove the 1s began replacing, wherever

possible, the pages of the passports bearlng this entry with

blank pages from valid passports from the same country as that

of the traveler.

Source alsu believes that

in 1961 the travel

pattern of i few prospeceive agonts procceding to Cuba

may have

been modified, thus decrcasing slightly the number entering

through dexico.

20.

To conceal the agent's travel when leaving Cuba, he is providid

for the first leg of the journey with a Cuban ordinary passport

The route of travel is from Havana to Prague.

authorities colleet those passports upon landing in Prague.

Source does not snow what disposition is made of

the Cuban

passports by the Crochs, but he asserts that they are never

returned to the agent.

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21.

For the second leg of the bourney,

carrying the agent from

Prague via

western Europe back to

his natire land, he is pro-

vided in lavana, before departure. with a passport from another

Latin American country.

The non-Cuban passport may be the

agent's bona-fide document which has boch returned to him or

it may be another valid Latin American passport pressed into

service for the purpose.

If lhe agent's own passport bears

no. evidence of travel into Cuba it will be used for this pur-

pose, being

"brought up to date" with forged western European

entries to explain the gap between the time when he left for

Cuba and when he arrived in Prague, but showing his mode of

travel to be such that he never passed through either Cuba or

Czechoslovakia.

Should the agent's bona-fide passport bear

the Mexican cachet showing that he procceded to Cuba, the IS.

replaces the page bearing such entry with a blank page from a

valid passport of the same country if feasible.

If page sub-

stitution is not possible, either because no other passport

from

the same country is available or because substitution

proves

too difficult, the IS will provide the agent with

another passport, from his own country

If availabie, or from

another Latin American country.

The substitute passport may

be a filled-in original,

in which case a photograph substitu

tion will be made, and the agent will travel under the identity

of the original bearer.

22.

In other cases, where valid blank passports are used, the agent

may even travel under his true identity after

"surfacing" on

the second leg of the journey, In western Europe, provided the

passport used is from his own

country.

In such a case informa-

ion from his vona-fide passport will

be copied directly in

the blank passport.

If the passport is from a country differing

from that of the agent, his identity will be changed.

As in

the case of travel

under the agent's bona-lide passport, in

the case of spurious non-Cuban passports,

false travel entries

are made to account for the agent's time spent in Cuba, placing

him

in western Europe, but not in Cuba nor Czechoslovakia,

during that period.

Quality and Availability of Spurious Documentation

23.

Providing documentation for agent trainces is the resporsibility

of the Is country desk officer handling trainces from

tle par-

ticular country.

The country desk officers receive and main-

tain custody of passports coming from the Communist Parties in

their areas of jurisdiction.

Although the agent's training in

Cuba may take several weeks, or even a few months, it often

takes a jear or mors for the country desk officer to be abls

to provide his trainces with the proper documentation.

Source

commented that invariably a rountry desk olficer will be short

one spurinus passport in his

"collection" of passports for a

group of about six trainees.

Where possible the officer will

borrow" a passport from his colleague from another country

desk.

24.

On at least one occasion forged travel entries made in an

agent's passport were lound to have a chronological error

shortly before the agent's departure from Cuba.

consisted of a false exit cachet for. a given port of entry

caring a date preceding that turnished on the false entry

achet for the same port of entry, a physical imcossibilit

in true life. Despite the discovery of this error the IS

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sodriguez,

Minister.

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