## Page 1

1104-10330-10070

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

Central intelligence Agency

Washington. D. C 20505

13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT:

(U)

Identity of Human Sources

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA

once

the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the

issues discussed below.)

1.

(U) Issue. The purpose of this memorandum is to

relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the

release of the true names of human sources of intelligence

which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal

on how this problem could be addressed.

I. Factual Background

2.

(U) In general, CIA "sources" are foreign

nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who

provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise

of confidentiality.

Their act of passing information to the

U.s. is generally against the national interest of their own

country and would be considered espionage, which is a

capital offense in most countries.

Just as in this country

when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it

would be "headline news," even 30 years after the fact.

The

Review Board will recall that when former National Security

Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a

mployee forest he

year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years

earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United

States.

Lipka is currently awaiting trial in the U.S. for

his alleged espionage activities.

3.

(U) This month, the Review Board will be

considering

approximately 50-60 true names of human sources

for release.

These particular sources range from encrypted

CL BY:

(0185904

CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON:

X1

DRV FM:

HUM 4-82

SECRET

---

## Page 2

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that

additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection

and will be reviewed in the future.

therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a

consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in

the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the

future review of documents.

4.

(C) The Review Board has recently developed a

policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees.

Although there are many similarities between covert

employees and

sources, there is an important difference that

should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at

this issue.

With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in

this collection, it has been possible in some instances to

go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names.

Some of these former employees have even been made available

these best air ove

for interviews and depositions.

With most sources, it is

not possible to do this.

First, CIA has dropped contact

with some of these sources and may not be able to locate

them. Attempting to find these individuals would create

some

risk of creating suspicions that they were or are

associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government.

If CIA

were unable to locate a particular source, there would still

be some risk in releasing his name.

locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well-

nor that he is not a

because CIA cannot

known in his own community.

Even if we were able to locate

a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he

would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many

years.

More than likely, sources do not now want their past

association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in

their lives to do other things.

Some may be in political or

private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would

damage them professionally and/or harm them and their

families personally.

5.

(U) Another important distinction that needs to be

taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). "sources."

Perhaps the most

significant difference is that many FBI sources provide

information with the understanding that the information and

the source will be publicly revealed.

FBI sources are often

used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses.

CIA, on the

other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its

sources.

CIA sources rarely appear at public trials.

In

fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from

public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within

the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a

2

SECRET

---

## Page 3

13-00.000

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

foreign national cooperating with CIA is usually committing

a unique violation of his own country's laws--espionage. If

one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many

countries is for a capital offense.

On the other hand, a

foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually

committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full

knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a

criminal investigation.

there pit a

Therefore, the risks for

cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as

cooperation with CIA.

In addition, the FBI has greater

means for protecting individuals who provide information to

it, for example, the witness protection program, which CIA

does not have.

II. Legal Considerations

6.

(U) Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides

that when the Act requires release of information, it takes

precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit

the true names of sources.

CIA believes that it is

important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which

have been growing and developing over the years, to protect

classified information because they clearly reflect a larger

U.S. Government policy

to protect intelligence sources.

7. (U) BY Executive Order (E.O.)änd statute, the

President and Congress have made the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence

sources.

In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which

established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman

made the DCI responsible for protecting sources.

With the

establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this

responsibility.

The National Security Act of 1947, Section

103(a) (3), codified at 50 U.S.C. 5403(3) (C) (5), requires the

DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized

disclosure.

In addition, §403 (3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to

ensure that risks to the

United States and those involved in

the collection of intelligence through human sources are

minimized.

8.

(U) Protecting the identity of individuals working

with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.s.

lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For

example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of

1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted

the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the

publication or disclosure of the organization,

functions,

names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by

the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect

3

SECRET

---

## Page 4

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT:

(U) Identity of Human Sources

employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it

indicates Congress' intent from early on to protect those

working covertly for the U.S. Government.

9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified

Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,

trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving

or potentially involving classified intormation. Working

with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has

successfully protected intelligence sources from public

release even in criminal trials where there are heightened

(i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to

the defendant of all government information relevant to the

defense.

CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in

which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and

relevancy of classified information, including the identity

of human sources who may have information pertaining to the

defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or

defense counsel, or in open court.

In some cases involving

CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned

over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such

as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the

classified information and ruled

that the harm to national

security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the

information.

In still other cases.

the defense was never

notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case

as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed

this information was classified and outweighed any rights

the defendant had.

Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney

General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those

cases where the risk to national security is too great.

(U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human

intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities

Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. $421 which criminalizes

the revelation of a source's identity.

anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert

agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and

$50,000 in fines.

A covert agent includes:

(a) a U.S.

citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.s.

Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent,

informant or source of operational assistance to an

intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a

U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship

to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present

or former agent or informant of, or is of operational

assistance to, an intelligence agency.

4

SECRET

---

## Page 5

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a

larger government policy to protect human sources from

public disclosure.

There has also developed over the years

a significant amount of case law which further implements

this policy.

For example, in Sims v. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981

(1985), the

Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National

Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from

release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the

identities of individuals conducting research on projects

financed by CIA.

The Supreme Court further stated that the

DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not

limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed

confidentiality.

12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an

Executive Order on classified national security information

which came into effect in October 1995. Although it

requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts

than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958

affords human sources

extra protection from its

declassification provisions.

Under E.0. 12958, information

that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be

declassified within

five years.

However, information

revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be

protectea.

13.

(U) The above federal statutes and case law show

a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who

provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government. In

carrying out its statutory obligations; the

• Review Board

should give serious weight to this policy and afford the

protection of human sources the highest priority.

III. Operational Considerations

14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order

for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around

the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work

for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular

individual's affiliation with it.

This is true even more so

with sources.

In addition to the risk to a source's

personal safety, discovery of

a CIA source would also reveal

any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with

whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the

' (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. $552 is another

example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of humar

sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government

documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release

information that is exempted from disclosure by statute.

Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding

statute. Sims V. CIA, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985) .

5

SECRET

---

## Page 6

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less

true with a source who no longer works for the Agency.

source's prior affiliation with CIA is normally still

classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at

CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting

with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect

his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he

conducted.

15 •

(U)

The public disclosure of an individual's

affiliation with CIA could and, in tact, has threatened the

safety and lives of not only the source, but also their

families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and

other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.

The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case

(since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in

which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to

be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent

years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and

their professional and personal lives were ruined. The

threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with

CIA is even more real.

These individuals live and work in

foreign countries, many of which have a local population

hostile to the United States and especially CIA.

If one

should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face,

one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were

murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in

Virginia.

If this type of

risks that those working with the CIA abroad face.

Clearly,

the risk is that much greater for those who are sources:

for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to

the KGB,

10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were

executed.

16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate

that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an

important one.

Individuals associated with CIA have been

individuals de

and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and

physical injuries from foreign intelligence services,

terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile

to CIA or the U.S. Government.

Individuals choose to

undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is

with the condition that the CIA will protect their

cooperation with the U.S. Government.

* he overnment.

IV. Proposal

17.

(U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is

important to work toward a

general policy of protecting CIA

sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in

6

SECRET

---

## Page 7

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

most cases

substitution for the true name be used. In

prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board

agreed to redact the true name and substitute "source." If

the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular

sources throughout the records, a particular identifying

substitution can be used for an

individual source throughout

(for example, "Mexican source 1").

are come a e the can propose be Eat in th haone

True name of LIRING/3.

an encrypted asset of the

CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban :

Embassy:

His wife also worked_at_the Embassy and

he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it

was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point

disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his

current situation is.

• True name of ERTHYROID/3,I the unilateral.

penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review

Board will recall that it has already been fully

briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the

protection of the fact that he was a unilateral

source.

Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022))was [is] a

member of the British Service.' As such, he was

~[is) a liaison:source.

This raises concerns about

protection of our liaison relationships.

Moreover. Mr. Devere's identity constitutes

"foreign

government information", which, as the

Board has already been informed, the CIA does not

have the authority to release.

Cutien

19.

(S) Another type of name that similarly should be

protected from release is the new identity provided to a

defector.

Although defectors do

not face some of the

dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given

new identities for their protection

because there is some

risk to their personal safety even in the U.s.

For example,

in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in

documents being reviewed this month.

Since the time of his

defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities,

because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not

3(5)

Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again.

However, there is a

risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the

identification of Golitsyn's current identity.

7

SECRET

---

## Page 8

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U)

Identity of Human Sources

been officially released and that are closely held within

the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of

his family even though they live in the United States.

CIA

cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of

Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any

defectors that appear to date in the collection.

20.

(S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is

identified by only a first name or a code name.

Where CIA

has been unable to identify any information about that

individual or there is no other source revealing information

that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be

possible to release that name.

in a few

documents, the name "Tota" appears.

To date, CIA has been

unable to determine who this person is and there does not

appear to be any further source revealing information in the

collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name

or a street name known to his colleagues.

As "Tota" is a

common name, such a release would not threaten the

particular individual or his family, and as the person can

not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.s.

Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be

particularly important to the JFK story.

In such cases, the

CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to

the

appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a

record search for information on that individual.

It may be

that in these cases, if the

person 1s deceased and has no

living family, that

the Review Board and the ClA can agree

that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need

to protect that source from disclosure.

22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review

Board

can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the

identity of human sources that will not undermine the

important policy of protecting those who work covertly for

the U.S. Government.

As usual, my staff

and I are available

to discuss this matter with you.

Wh & Paris

John F. Pereira

Chief,

Historical Review Group

8

SECRET

---

## Page 9

13-00000

SUBJECT :

(U)

SECRET

Identity of Human Sources

DCI/CSI/J. Pereira:

apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)

G: /CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc

Distribution:

Original

- Addressee

- CSI/HRP Chrono

- D/CSI

- C/CSI/HRG

- Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRP

- Linda Cipiriani.

SECRET

---