Originator: SSCIA
From: WALLACH, PAUL
To: SCHWARZ, FRITZ
Document date: 07/22/1975
Document type: SUMMARY

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157-10014-10219

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

7/7/2015

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER:

157-10014-10219

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-124

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

SSCIA

FROM: WALLACH, PAUL

TO :

SCHWARZ, FRITZ

TITLE:

DATE: 07/22/1975

PAGES:

13

SUBJECTS :

OPERATION MONGOOSE

MCMANUS, GEORGE

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: CC Box 254

v9.1

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Date :

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10219

RECORDS SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS. OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

07-M-124

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

WALLACH, PAUL

TO

SCHWARZ, FRITZ

TITLE

DATE

:07/22/75

PAGES

13

SUBJECTS

:MCMANUS, GEORGE

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION

: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CC Box 254

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Nawaus, beorge-vl

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MEMORANDUM

57242).

TO : Fritz Schwarz

FROM: Paul Wallach

DATE: July 22, 1975

RE : Staff Interview of George McManus (Monday, July 21, 1975)

As we discussed last week, I asked George MeManus to come

down for an interview Monday evening. The interview lasted approxi-

mately three hours; the substance of that interview - as reconstructed

from both Joe DiGenova's and my own notes - is reflected in the at-

tached memorandum.

McManus should make a brief appearance before the Committee.

e worked closely with both Helms and Harvey, and his testimony wil

llow a different perspective on the Mongoose operations and the as-

sassination issues.

MeManus will also testify as to his perceptions of Robert

Kennedy, and Messrs: Helms, Lansdale, Mccone, and farvey. More spe-

cifically, McManus may show us that Helms was not as "on too" of the

Cuban operations as he would have had us believe on June 13 - a posi-

tion from which he attempted to back away during his most recent Com-

cc: William Miller

Curtis Smothers

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Historical Data:

McManus retired in May 1970 after some 20 plus years

of covert/clandestine agency service. In the early 1950s

he headed up the CIA's European Defector Interrogation

Center.

He was

subsequently appointed Canadian Station

Chief and later Director of the Cover Staff.

In mid-December 1961, Helms asked McManus to apply his

European expertise to the Agency's Cuban Defector Inter-

rogation Center. McManus headed for Florida on Christmas

Day and spent the following week at the Opa Locha Center.

He reported directly to Helms on his findings, conclu-

sions, and suggestions in a memorandum dated January 3,

1962.*

McManus recalls that the "center" was then inopera-

tive; he called for an immediate operational restructuring.

McManus stressed the importance of the positive intelligence

that the Center could, and indeed eventually did provide

at the time of the Missle Crisis.

It was not until early January 1962 that Helms formally

brought McManus "on board" as his assistant for "Cuban

activities.

The initial weeks were dedicated to ensuring

that the revitalized Center got off the ground; subsequent :

*This afternoon I requested a copy of McManus' January 3

memorandum.

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weeks allowed for attention to the full panoply of Cuban

activities. McManus describes himself as "Helms' eyes and

ears" in the Cuban area.

McManus spent his final years with the Agency as

Director of Cover (1963-1965), Assistant to Admiral Rayburn

(DCI: 1965-1967), and as Station Chief in Europe (1967-

1970).

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McManus on the meeting in RFK's office (January 19, 1962) :

McManus--at Richard Helms' side--attended the January

19 meeting.

McManus was to take notes to ensure that

McCone

was adequately briefed and to substantively support

Helms should RFK ask about the CIA's Cuban Defector Center.

One copy each of McManus' handwritten and typed notes

(the latter with numerous typographical errors) are attached

hereto.

Surprisingly enough, the January 19 meeting was McManus'

first Cuban operations "briefing". McManus recalled that

RFK "firmly" stressed the need to do something about Cuba.

He analogized the Attorney General's remarks to those of a

football coach's during halftime. (albiet, a Don Schula

and not a Vince Lombardi). However, RFK did not specifically

delineate what was to be done; this was left to the Opera-

tional Chief, Edward Lansdale. McManus now recalls RFK

stating--in addition to the alleged direct quotes as set

forth in his memorandum--"we've got to get on with it",

and "we've got to get this fellow off our necks". McManus

was naturally surprised by the high priority which the At-

torney General placed on Cuban activities.

The quotation marks in McManus' handwritten notes were

intended to reflect verbatim statements by the Attorney

General.

However, McManus--who was at

that time was just

"a beginner in Cuban operations" hastened to add that this

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was

not a question and answer session; without attempting to

understand this meaning he penned the Attorney General's

words.

(With the exception of discussion relating to Opa

Locha Center--see typed memo, at paragraph 3).

McManus

assumed that RFK was speaking for the President.

McManus "never got anything off the ground as fast as he

did the Cuban Refugee Center". However, at no time did

McManus discuss the meeting or RFK's statements with either

McCone or Helms. At the meeting McManus thought in terms

• of increasing our positive Cuban intelligence. He did not

really tie RFK's stress into sabotage operations.

Aside from the January 19 meeting McManus claims that

he was

not aware of continuing Cuban pressures emmanated

from the Attorney General. According to McManus, Helms met

regularly with the President and "much less often with the

Attorney General." McManus neither was present nor discussed

the substance of those meetings with Helms.

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McManus on being Helms' assistant for Cuban operations:

As Helms' assistant for Cuban activities, McManus was in

daily contact

with both Helms and Harvey. Moreover, he

often

assisted Task Force W in responding to and indeed

often implementing Lansdale's plethora of requests.

Soon after the January 19 meeting, Harvey was brought in

as Director of the Cuban Task Force. McManus understood

that part of his job was to keep track of Harvey who was

"quite an independent fellow", and not "extremely forthcom-

ing with information". McManus explained that Helms shared

his feeling that "we had to get off our asses and get mov-

ing on Cuba". However, Helms as DDP had "lots of other impor-

tant concerns."

McManus prepared a weekly report for Helms wherein

he summarized intelligence information and the operational

work of Task Force W. Apparently, the operational section

was prepared by Harvey and simply reviewed by McManus prior

to transmittal to Helms. Helms in turn reviewed the draft

report.

The final version was eventually disseminated

to seven recipients, including"inter alia, McCone, Lansdale,

Defense, and the White House."

Although McManus was Helms' "Cuban eyes and ears" he

disclaims any knowledge of discussions, plans or attempts

relating

to the assassination/ elimination/ liquidation of

Fidel Castro. Although we did not show McManus specific

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documentation of assassination attempts (for the reasons

discussed last

week), we informed McManus generally as to

the nature of the plans and attempts, their time sequence,

and the cast of characters. McManus admitted that he was

surprised that these were just now being called to his at-

tention. He told us that assassination was "a completely

different ball game". Indeed he stated that assassination

was

in his opinion senseless; "viz., our leaders would have

been

sitting

ducks"

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McManus on General Lansdale:

McManus described Lansdale as "Kook", "wild-man", and as

"just plain crazy". He told us that Lansdale was similarly

viewed by most others at the Agency. Unfortunately, Lansdale

was "sponsored by the Kennedys" and "as good soldiers the CIA

had to cooperate."

McManus vividly recounted Lansdale forays into the sabotage

arena. He presented his initial laundry list of Cuban action pro-

posals early in 1962, of course, he expected immediate CIA

action on his requests. In McManus' words, the CIA was "re-

quired to assist Lansdale in these "unrealistic", "half-baked,"

and "half-ass" schemes. McManus added that with every new

dawn a Lansdale courrier bearing yet another "half-baked

scheme" would arrive at Task Force W's door.

McManus succinctly painted a picture of the Agency's --

and more specifically, McCone's, Helms', Harvey's and McManus'

-- resentment of Lansdale. Lansdale -- with the CIA "as his

troops and horses" .. was ready to do battle, albeit indi-

rectly, with the Castro regime.

McManus stressed that "Lansdale's projects simply gave

the impression of movement. Although the frenzy of activity

gave a whirlwind impression, it was without

substance. McManus

noted some higher ups regarded Lansdale as a mystic, viz, "they

must have believed that despite Lansdale's insane ideas, he had

some sort of power to accomplish results of they wouldn't

have kept him."

Neither Helms nor McManus had daily contact with Lansdale.

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As mentioned above, Lansdale often communicated directly with

Harvey.

(Who also

held Lansdale in contempt).

McManus added

that the Task

Force was a new

and unusual concept, and not

"really part of the Agency organization."

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McManus on the Special Group (augmented) :

McManus was surprisngly uninformed as to the Special

Group (augmented) and the established approval structure we

have heard so much about. He felt that the "33 tasks" were

so broad that virtually any and all sabotage/propaganda

activities

envisioned by the task force would ha ve been

permissible.

In pressing McManus as to authorizational

scope, he again reiterated that assassinations were not within

the perimeters of permissible activities.

McManus admitted that as a result of Mongoose, Castro's

death might result from a Cuban uprising. However, McManus

sees clear moral and political distinctions between this

indirect death and U. S.-sponsored assassination attempts.

One practical distinction mentioned was that'targeting Castro

was tantamount to placing our leaders in a shooting gallery."

McManus is aware of the make-up of the Special Group

and Lansdale's focal role. However, he claims to have had

virtually no contact with the non-CIA members (Querre: how

did MCManus formulate the opinions set forth in his November

5, 1962, memorandum):

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McManus on his November 5, 1962 Memorandum

In early November Helms asked McManus what he thought

about the past year's Cuban operations.

McManus replied that

he would rather put it in writing. The November 5, 1962

memorandum is his "thinkpiece." Helms never discussed the

memorandum with McManus. However, McManus deduces

-- from

the handwritten notation in the margin which reflects that the

document was removed from the files of McCone's executive assis-

tant -- that Helms reviewed the memorandum and forwarded it to

McCone.

McManus ducked many of our specific questions relating

to the memorandum. He had

said earlier in the interview, however,

that the Attorney General "viewed the project in a political

light -- i.e.,

as the means to limit Castro's advances in

Latin America.

Moreover, McManus did not sufficiently answer

our

questions as to which of the other players shared his ex-

pressed views.

I would think that we will want to review this memorandum

with McManus tomorrow.

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McManus on not being informed of assassination attempts

while Admiral Rayburn's executive assistant:

As noted previously, McManus disclaims any knowledge

whatever of

assassination plans or attempts.

He rejects

the notion of "plausible deniability" at the operational

level; i.e., where the operatives would not inform the

SCI or DDP. In adamantly rejecting the existence of any

such unwritten law in the intelligence community, he

stressed that DCI must be fully informed as to all ongoing

Agency operations. Indeed, McManus told us that McCone,

Rayburn, and Helms were all 'inquisitive" men.

McManus believes that McCone would have been "morally

outraged" if informed of assassination attempts. However,

the "accuracy" of McManus' statement may be questioned as

he also stated that "Helms would have been opposed to assa-

ssinations." When I explained that Helms was aware of such

attempts, he could not provide a satisfactory response.

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