## Page 1

Date

: 06/25/98

Page

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

: 145-10001-10183

: 112

Released under the John

f. Kennedy

assassination Recorda

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) .

Cased: NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017 -

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO : ROBERT KENNEDY

TITLE : BRIEFING FOR ROBERT KENNEDY

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS : PROGRAM REVIEW

PLANS TO ASSIST CUBANS IN OVERTHROWING THE COMMUNITS

REGIME

DOCUMENT TYPE

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

: 1C

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 02/25/98

OPENING CRIIERIE :

COMMENTS:

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

CIE CONCURRENOCE OF

DATE:.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH

54214 DocId: 32977068 Page 1

---

## Page 2

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINT NOFORN

Prazantit

BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

Concerning the status of DOD plans and

activities to date - our first completed

action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position

as to the military's stake and proposed

role in the ousting of the Castro Communist

regime. Basically, the policy refelcted

in this paper establishes that the military

will support State and ClA as necessary

during the preparatory phase of Operation

Mongoose in terms of supplies, transporta-

tion, personnel and bases. It also

establishes the point that the military

believe the continued existence of the

Castro Communist regime is incompatible

with the minimum security requirements

of the United States and the entire

Western Hemisphere. It further makes

the point that the military could inter-

vene overtly in Cuba without serious

offense to national or world public

opinion if:

a. We moved in response to a

+: +75477595797471

(24)

humanitarian requirement to restore

TAD CADET COECHA WANNHAR

EXCLUDED FROM. GDS

NAPARA

HH 54214

DocId:32977068 Page 2

11/2

---

## Page 3

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINE NOFORN

C

order within Cuba;

b. If we announced incident to

going in; that we were moving in to

restore order and hold free elections;

and that we would withdraw from Cuba

as soon as the new government advised

that they had he capability to main-

tain order without further assistance

from AS nations;

c. If the operation was conducted

as quickly as possible and with suf-

ficient force so that the Communist

Bloc's ability to take effective

counter-measures was reduced to the

minimum.

We feel voy strongly that without

damage to their international position

and simply by making the decision to do

so, the Soviets can take a page from our

book and establish an overseas military

10554

base or bases in Cuba. This wauld

greatly increase our national vulner-

ability and our defense costs as forces

would have to be developed or shifted

FANATINA

MATRON

ITH 54214 DocId:32977068

Page 3

---

## Page 4

TOP SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLIN? NOFORM

to meet this threat from the south.

would also provide the Communists with

a secure base for espionage,

sabotage

and subversion throughout the entire

Western Hemisphere.

The Soviets have an option on which

they can foreclose at any time.

They can

make the decision to establish military

bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure,

and if they exercise this option, we

would likely be unable to remove them

without initiating World War 11l. Con-

sequently, we feel it is mandatory that we

face the facts squarely now, and determine

as early as possible whether we can rid

Cuba of Communism by covert support of

Cubans within Cubas and it is equally

mandatory, for logistic and planning

purposes, that we have an early decision

as to whether we definitely intend to

use military force, if covert means fail.

We also feel strongly that the knited

States should intervene to preserve

74+0+6409496497

Cuban nationals identified as being

TOP FFGAFT SPECIM HANTH

THA

MAFARN

NH 54214 DocId:32977068 Page 4

---

## Page 5

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

essential to the establishment of a

friendly Cuban government if they are

in danger of being exterminated by a

widespread Hungarian type blood purge.

In furtherance of the DOD/JCS polcy

that any military intervention should be

conducted as quickly as possible, and

with sufficient force to minimize the

Communist Bloc's capability to react, we

are working with CINCLANT in attempting

to reduce the reaction time of his con-

tingency plans for moving into Cuba,

and at the same time to beef up his capa-

bility so that there will be no doubt

as to the US ability to move in and

take over rapidly regardless of the

opposition we may meet.

Our primary plan can be activated

fu frama condition of no warning in 18 days

and provides for confronting Cuban forces

4

HN 54214' DocId:32977068 ' Page 5:

---

## Page 6

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINE NOFORN

with sufficient strength to be clearly

DR324)

beyond Cuban capability to resist, to

induce early capitulation of their units

and to avoid needless loss of life.

A secondary plan can be activated from

16

80,

a condition of no warning in 5 days

although this plan involves a degree of

risk by a piecemeal commitment of forces. He

CINCLANT is planning to reduce these

reaction times through prepositioning of

forces and materiel. This planning effort

should soon provide us a basis for deci-

sion concerning the extent we wish to go

in prepositioning without endangering

16

security and the element of surprise

to

an unacceptable degree.

We feel that there is an alarming lack

MEREKANES SOMETI

of appreciation that time is running out -

H: H9 KA

that we cannot let this operation drag

on for an indetinite number of years,

hoping to develop a massive resistance

capability within Cuba.

We are concerned

05556099t14ia7

/that the new proposal de-emphasizes the

49940430404949424 taes

time factor by walter

untIl July before

5

LAP SFARET

SPECIAL HANATING

NAFARN

HH 54214

DocId: 32977068 Page 6

---

## Page 7

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINE NOFORN

a decision is made as to what to do next.

This would permit the Soviets (Communist

regime in Cuba) additional time to fore-

close on the options open to them, viz.,

entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/

or the establishment of Soviet bases in

Cuba. Either one of these actions would

9(0) add new dimensions to our problem, and

Mi: 54435479899724liste

introduce considerations which wauld

postpone positive action indefinitely if

SKES

not preclude for the foreseeable future

the elimination of the Communist regime.

In the event that the coming months

may disprove the feasibility of initiating

an internal revolt in Cuba, it is suggest-

ed that phase l might be sparked with

the execution of a Cover and Deception

Plan.:

Normal training of US forces would

be the primary cover; the deception would

be concurrent efforts to convince the

Communist Cuban goernment that we were

in fact invading cuba. This course of

action could provide adequate provocation

for Us intervention depending, of couse,

6

HH 54214

DogId:32977068 Page 7

---

## Page 8

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN"

NOFORN

106

Ha

on Cuban rashness in their reaction.

If successful, we might not have

to +

engage in the more difficult and dangerous

game of developing pretexts, although

we should include this requirement as a

final resort to assure successful initia-

tion of Phase l1:

As I previously mentioned, one of our

primary responsibilities is supporting

CIA. To date, ClA has submitted several

requests for support. In each case,

action was initiated immediately and the

request processed expeditiously. These

requests included:

Use of Avon Park, USAF Bombing,

Range in Southern Florida, as an

16

exercise area for training agents.

(DOD has approved this request pro-

vided national policy permitted train-

ing of Cubans on US military bases.

b. Assignment of a Navy Commander

were 34146895teistü?

experienced in small boat operations

16

to handle their maritime small boat

activities? (The following day, the

TAD AFARTT I

HH 54214

DocId: 32977068 Page 8

---

## Page 9

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINC

NOFORN

'HI

51211

Chief of Naval Operations approved

the request and directed the Navy 16

16

Bureau of Personnel to procure and

assign a qualified officer without

delay.

c. Advice and assistance from BJ

Ile Unit No. Zu in testing certain simula-

tion devices.

Direct contact with

BU No. 2 and appropriate ClA personnel

was authorized)

D. CIA has infomally requested the

it/

Navy to obtain 6 PT boats for their

use. (Staffing to date indicates that

he Navy does not have 6 PT boats in

their inventory. They have 2 in moth

balls, 1 designated as a Presidential

escape boat, and 1 hull without a motor.

The lead-time required to place moth-

balled PT boats in operation is 30

days at the minimum, at a cost of

10

$200,000 each. The purchase of

additional PTs requires an estimated

3 to 6 months after signing the con-

tract.: The cost per unit for new PT

boats Ls estimated. at "7 million

DocId:32977068 Page 9

---

## Page 10

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIN^ NOFORN

The Navy is currently waiting ClAs

formal request.)

e. ClA, submitted a request to DoD

for use of certain personnel, supplies,

equipment, facilities and bases includ-

ing but not lmited to aircraft, boats,

submarines and landing ships dock (LSDs),

plus the use of US Armed Forces to

furnish air and sea cover for cla spon

sored activities. This request raised

several national policy decisions

necessary to permit fulfillment of the

request. These policy decisions de:

(1) Whether, and/or to what extent

a policy of non-attribution to the

MEA

US Government will apply to projects

in connection with the activities

of the CSG.

(2) Whether, and/or to what

extent US bases and facilities should

ной діна "

be utilized for training cuban

refugees.

(3) Whether, and/or to what extent

US Armed Forces personnel will be

IN 54214 DocId: 32977068 Page 10

---

## Page 11

LOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

12

employed on CSG projects and if so,

whether, and/or towhat extent they

will be non-attributable.

(4) Whether, and/or to what extent

US Armed Forces personnel will be

employed within the territorial

boundaries of cuba.

1553F7X8

(5) Whether, and/or to what extent

overflights of Cuba for purposes of

leaflet drops, resupply and diversion

will be permitted.

(6) Whether, and/or to what extent

Guantanamo will be used as a base for

agents, black flights and black

16

broadcasts

(7) Whether, andor to what extent

use of British-controlled and other.

foreian areas for staging areas will

be permitted.

(8) What is the priority of Opera-

tion Mongoose, as compared to other

projects and operations.

We have also prepared an assessment of

the risk involved in air resupply missions

160

HH 54214.

DooId:32977068

Page 11

---

## Page 12

LOP SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLIN

NOFORN

sanitized aircraft and "sheep-dipped"

crews for air resupply missions to

agents within Cuba, and we are assisting

ClA with its mari time needs, including

help in obtaining PT type boats from

foreign sources, readying "sheep-dipped"

crews and equipment as deemed necessary,

and providing operational concepts on

disrupting or destroying Cuban capability

of maritime coastal patrols.

In order to accomplish our assigned

tasks, l have a working graup with full-

time representatives from J

austhe sirirces

+115,16,50/01

- DIA

who

serve,

as representatives of their respective

Directors and as action offioors, in

dealing directly with their respective

Directorates. Chuf.

Further, I have representatives of

each of the services who also serve full-

time

on the working group.

They

work

directly

with thee people on the Service

staffs, the Operations Deputy, the

Deputy for Plans, and one action

TriceI

TAD PEDET EDICIA HANDINA

MAFARN

HH. 54214

DocId: 32977068. Page 12

16

---

## Page 13

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINE NOFORN

Obviously, my working group cannot

staff all the tasks placed upon us,

consequently, whenever possible, we

sanitize the tasks and have them accom-

plished by the Joint Staff or the

regular service staffs.

12

THP CFCRET

IN 54214 DocId: 32977068 Page 13

HAFARI

---