ALTERNATE COURSE B
Agency: JCS
Originator: OSD
From: BRIG GEN LANSDALE
Document date: 08/14/1962
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 07/14/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10165

RECORDS SERIES

: JCS FOIA # 4

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOC 166

Released under the John

Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

08-13=2017--------

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

: OSD

FROM.

BRIG GEN LANSDALE

TO :

TITLE : ALTERNATE COURSE

DATE: 08/14/62

PAGES

: 12

SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff.

EXEMPT PER E.O: 13526

SEC 3.3(b) SAX5

MAR

2016

DATE EXEMPTED:

IS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DOC 243>

OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDATOD

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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IOP SECRET

6(1)(C

4)

COVERT

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach

the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected

individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase

the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will

be emphasized:

Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution.

2) Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and per -

formance of the Castro regime.

3)

Expose the encraochment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs

of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism.

4) Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of

the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government

bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers.

5) Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.

The following psychological/political warfare activities

are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan:

1)

Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the

Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups

and individuals which have an existing of potential capability for com-

municating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside

Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities

in Latin America and other critical areas.

2) Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda

material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled

couriers.

Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate

policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.

(CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA)

Continue and expand the "Voice of Free Cuba" minare deceptio

barbedensts in collaboration with the Navy.

[A]

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[AI

6(D(C)

6(1)(C)

[A]

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2. Rural Cells: Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T

communications should be intiltrated into the rural areas

to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented

cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they

are seriously endangered of if they pose a threat to the

security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural

cells would have limited intelligence functions until called

into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting,

and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within

CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.

3.

Commando /Sabotage Teams: (Described in the Economic

section above.)

F. MILITARY

1.

DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in

order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks.

2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full

extent of DOD capability as required.

IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy implications of the activities outlined above include:

A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and

USIA questioned).

B.

c.

Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/esfiltration

missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews.

D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major

Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants,

transportation, and communications.

Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert

operativel purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for

clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban

agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed

operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government

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TOP SEERET

with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing

or planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantanamo.) State and

Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal.

F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide

specialized training for the commando /sabotage teams when such

training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.

LAT

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