## Page 1

124-10185-10214

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DAVID L DORIA, OKLAMDILA CHARILAN

• WILLAUS. COMEN ALAME NICE CHAIALAN

SAL! MUNN. BFOAGLA

ORAIN MATCH, UTAN

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROUNA FRAME MURKOWSK ALASKA

ROLEN SPECTER PENHSTIVANL

ALAN CRINSTON, CALIFORMIA

JOKN WARNER MACHINA

DENNIS DE CONCINI, ARIZONA

ALTONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORX

HOWAND AA METZENBAUM. OHIO

JOHM C. DANFORTH MISSOURS

JOHN M GLENA SA OHIO

GEORGE MITCHELL HAUNE EX OFFICIO

ROBERT DOLE KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

"GEORGE J. TEMET. STAFT OMECTOR

IAMES M, DYKSTRA MIMORITY STASF DIRECTON

L BATTT SMIDER GENERAL COUNSEL

KATHLEEN P. WITHEE CHUES CLEAK

SECRET

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DE 20510-6475

Feb!

8003893990

'90 FEB-20 9:22 PM

SSCI #90-505

The Honorable James A. Baker, III

Secretary of State

Department of State

washington, D.C..

20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

• budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on u.s.

counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

We request

that you make available to testify at that hearing MI. Ivan

Selin, Undersecretary of. State for Management.

Other

witnesses invited

to testity are FBI Director

William S.

Sessions, Mr.. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mi.

Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for

Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center;

and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss

with the Committee the results of the Administration's review

of counterintelligence

whether recent changes in the threat and operatinge 19905.

environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and

the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,

program direction, and possible legislation.

The hearing

will also consider issues identified in testimony from a

group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and. we

will be in touch with you further on those matters.

He would like MI. Selin to address in his witten

testimony and be prepared

to discuss the following guestions:

(1) To what extent has political change in the soviet Union

and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the

1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security

neasures against, that threat?

(2) To what extent do other

traditional threats, such

as the PRC and Cuba, require

greater attention an the 199057 (3) What are

the emerging

threats in the 1990s fron

third world and "friendly"

intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and

terrorists?

(4) What new challenges do technological

advances and transfers

to criteria countries and terrorist

-groups pose in the 1990s? • (5) What are the conseguences of

these changing threats for embassy security priorities and

protection of diplomatic, military

and intelligence

secrets?

62-110395-1

SECRET

---

## Page 2

SECRET

АНВ & ВОЖИ. ОНСНОК СНИТИЯ

тини я сонек, шал ня спириня

GEORGIA

НАКИ НАТЕК ИТАМ

FRUIT, MUM OWE XI, ALABRA

NEW HASIY

SMOTIR PENMSIZVANRA

ALFOMBE L DAMLATO. HEW TOME

MTZINBAULE ONiO

JOHN E DAHIDATH, MASSOVE

12. 0nd

ROBIAT DOLL KANSAS, EX OFTICIO

2nited States Senat

BELECT COMMITTEE OM INTELLIGENEE

WASHINGTON, DC 20810-8678

LANES N DTASTRA, MANORITY STATE DARIETOR.

¿ BATT EMOER CEMERAL, COUNSEL

КАТНИЦИ І МІВНЕЕ GHII СЦЕАК

February 7, 1990

SSCI 490-507

The Honorable Willlam Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation •

J. Edgar Hoover Building

Washington, D.С. 20535

Dear Directoi Sessions:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S.

counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

to testify at that hearing as fBI Director and as chairman of

the DCI's Advisory Group on Counterintelligence.

witnesses invited to testify are Undersecretary of State Ivan

selin, Mr. red Price, the announced successer te Mr. Gardnor

Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and

head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center, and Mr. Rich Haver,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with

the Committee the results of the Administration's review of

counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment

reguire modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications

for NFIP and non-NIP resource allocation, program direction!

The hearing will also consider

Issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent

citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with

you further on those matters.

We would like you to address in your written testimony and

be prepared to discuss the following questions:

(1) What are

the results of the administration's review of counter-

intelligence and security programs to meet the needs of the

(2) How will the Administration coordinate nationa

policy in

these areas?

(3) What national policy initiatives

¿.e., personnel

security standards,

actions to deter leaks?

what extent has political

change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their

Intelligence threat in the 1990s and the reguirements for CI

operations and security measures against that threat? (5) To

what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRo and

Cuba, reguire greater attention in the 1990s?

(6) What are the

emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly"

intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers

02-111345-1139

SECRET

---

## Page 3

AN ARSEN

TOM CALFONNA

Сх оКиноКА СНАжнАм

А СОНЕМ, МАЛИЕ НЕЯ СНИННАМ

ORASH MATON UTAN

FRANI HUNKOVER, ALASZA

ALLEN EMECTLA POMMSIZYANIA

DHN WAPHER VAGINA

ALTONSE IL D'ALLATO. NEW TOM

JOHN & DAMONTH, MISSOUN

SECRET

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON IATELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20810-8478

ROBERT DOLL, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE L. TENET, STAFF DIRECTON

JAMES H OVKETRA, ANHORITY STAFF DURECTOM

L. BATT ENDER, GENERAL COUHISAL

KATHLEEN P. AKOHLE CHIES ALERT

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-506

The Honorable William H. Webster

Director of central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C.

20505

Dear Judge Webster:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process,. will hold a hearing on U.s.

counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

We request

that you make available to testify at that hearing MI. Ted

the announced successor .to.MI. Gardner Hathaway as

Associate Deputy Director for operations and head of the CIA

Counterintelligence Center.

Other witnesses invited to testify

are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Undersecretary of State

Ivan Selin, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with

the Committee the results of the Administration's review of

counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment

reguire modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications

for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction,

and possible legislation.

The hearing will also consider

issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent

citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with

you further on those matters:

We would like Mr. Price to address in his written

testimony and

be prepared

to discuss the following questions:

(1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s

and the requirements for CI operations and security measures

against that threat?

(2) To what extent do other traditional

threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, reguire greater attention in

the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from

third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as

narcotics traffickers and terrorists?

(4) What new challenges

do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries

and terrorist groups pose in the 19905?

(5) What are the

consequences of these changing threats

for operations and

embassy security priorities, and

secrets?

tpons

po

---

## Page 4

SAPNUMM, GROAGLA"

ANGST F. MOXINGS, SOUTH CAROUNA

NEW JERSEY

«CAN GRANSTON, CALIFORNIA

DENNIS DICONCIN, ARIZONA

HOWARO ML METZERAUM, ONIO

JOHN N. OLENN. JR, OMO.

ORAIN HATCH, UTAM

FRANK MUAKOWSKL, ALASKA

ARLEN SPECTER PENNSTZVANIA

JOHN WARNER, VAGUANA

ALFONSE M, D'AMLATO, MEW YORX

JONH & DAMFORTH, MISSOURI

GEDAGE MITCHELL, MAINE EX OFFICIO

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE L TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR

JAMES IL DYKSTRA, MINORITY STASE DIREGTOR

& BATT SHIDER GENERAL COUNSEL

KATHLEEN P. MCQHEE, CHIEF CLERX

United States Send

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20810-8478

OFFICE OF 1!5

¿GRETARY OF LEF

SO FEB 13 AHII: 29

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-508

The Honorable Dick Cheney

Secretary of Defense

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Cheney:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

budget authorization process,

will hold a hearing on U.S.

counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in

Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

We reguest

that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Rich

•Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence.

Other witnesses invited to testify at this

hearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ivan Selin,

Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price,

announced successor to MI. Gardner Hathaway as CIA

Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA

Counterintelligence Center.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss

with the Committee the results of the Administration's review

of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,

whether recent changes in the threat and operating

environment reguire modifying objectives in the 1990s, and

the implications for NFIP and

nOn-NFIP resource allocation,

program direction, and possible legislation.

The hearing

will also consider issues identified in the

testimony from a

We would like Mr. Haver to address in his written

testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:

What are the results of his review of DoD counter-

intelligence which you stated was "an early and high

priority" in your letter of May 31, 1989? (2) Io what extent

has political change in the Soviet

Union and

Eastern Europe

diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the

-requirements for CI operations and security measures against

that threat? (3) To what extent do other traditional

threats,

such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention

in the 1990s?

(4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s

from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as

well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (5) What new

challenges do technological advances and transfers to

criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s?

(6) What are the conseguences of these changing threats for

90/51066

X52444

SECRET

180-1 103425-500

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## Page 5

SECRET

Memornadum to Director, FBI

12. ISSUE:

The Committee believes the FBI does not share all

information contain in its files with other members of the

intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would

ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.

QUESTION:

What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single

database for CIA, FBI, and DOD?

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INID, ASD, CID, and RYD prepare

responses for the questions identified above and submit those

questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business

Piate with a heading for issue,

1989 in the format currently in use classified as appro-

question, summary response, details,

and approval signed by the appropriate Assistant Director or Deputy

Assistant Director ana date signed.

APPROVED:

Director

Exec. AD-Adm..

Exec. AD-inv.

ExeC. AD-LES

yAdm. Servs.

SCrim. Inv. 5

Ident.

Ispeodo

Intell. Ai

Laboratory

_ Legal Coun

Off. of Cong,

godfa Public Affs.

Off of Lia.

& Inti Affs..

Tech. Servs. -

_ Training .

2. That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the

preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening

statement and briefing book.

APPROVED:

Director

Exed. AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

Exec. AD-LES

/ Adm. Servs. i

> Crim. Inv.Fal

Ident.

• Inspectia

nelle ABU

Laboratory

, Legal Coun.

¿ Off. of Cong,

< & Public Affs.

Off of Lia.

& Intl Affs.

Rec. Mgmi._

4PMI

Tech. Servs.

. Training

-5 -

SECRET

---

## Page 6

DAVO L BOREN, ATLAHOMA, CHURIAN

LLOYD BENTSEN TEXAS

SAM MUTEL GEORCIA

STONEST F. MOLLINOS, SOUTM CAROLINA

TIL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

ALAN CRANSTOAL, CALIFORNRA

DEARS DA

WALLAN V. ROTH, MA, DELA

ORIUN HATCH, UTAN

ARLEM SPECTER PERSISTI

CHIC HECHT, MEVADA

ДОНИ ШАРЖА УМЕНИ

NOBERT & BTRA, WEST VIAGINIA, EX OFFICIO

ROBERT DOLE, RAMSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR

JAMES H DYASTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

KATHLEEN P. HIGHEE, CHIEF CLEROX

SECRET /SENSITINE

United States Sunate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475

#88-3613

October 17, 1988

Honorable William Sessions :

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C.

20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is

conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence

and security programs and capabilities.

Included in this

review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of

sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.

Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers

been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel.

Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee

on any unauthorized transfer of technology and equipment from

the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis.

the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played

in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission

and Trade Center in. New York.

Sincerely,

Said LBor

David I. Boren

liam S.

Cohen

vilde Chairman

SECRET /SENSITIVE

42-10295-797

---

## Page 7

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO

From

Subject

Mr. S. M. moweeney

Date

4/20/88

M. V.

Ha

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)

REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON AND

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLTA) AND THE

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN

This communication is classified SECRET.

Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.

Exec AD Adm

Asst.Dir.:

Adm. Servs._

Сіт. InV._

Ident.-

Insp.-

Intell._

Lab._

Legal couns.

Off.Cong &

Public Affs._

OLIA_

Rec. Mgnt._

Tech: Servs._

Training_

Telephone RM._

Director's Sec'y_

PURPOSE:

To set forth results of briefing of John Eliff,

Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of Congressional

Public. Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr.; Unit

Chief Roland O. L'Allier, Jr., Intelligence Division, and

OLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) representation in Berlin.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv...

Ident.

Director

Inspection

Exec. AD-AdM. -

Intoll.—

Exec. AD-InV.

Laboratory

Exec. AD-LES _

, Lega coun.

Off. of Cong.

& Publle Alls,

Oft of tia.

& Intl. Atis

Rec. wign.

. Tech. Serys.

- Training.

1 - S. M. McWeeney

1 - J. H. Geer :

Attn:

J. E. Tomlinson

1 - Ji K. O'Brien

Attn: J. S. Hooks, JI.

S. A.

Pimentel

1

1

1.

E.

Crosson

-

M.

V. Hale

(CONTINUED - OVER)

67-116-395-1727

MAY 28 1988

SECRET

Classified by:

Declassify on:

3642

DADR

18DEC 22 1988

---

## Page 8

SECRET

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

Re:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

Request to Discuss the Office of Llaison and

International Affairs (OLIA) and the

Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS:

Embassies and establishments, including the U. S. Mission in

conferred with appropriate U.

S. military, U. S. Department of

State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in

oraer to present the FBI's case for representation in

West Berlin. During these discussions,

Mr. Hale was advised that

staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin

concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale,

in that

context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding

the FBI's

perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a

counterintelligence point of view.

Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently

Visited West Berlin, he was intimately familiar with the

intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin

and supported the FBI's presence there.

He indicated he was well

aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence

coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in

that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian

intelligence intelligence components were

addressing the threat

to these individuals and this for two reasons.

The first involved the basic functions of the U. S.

intelligence components in West Berlin, a function he describec

as being the collection of positive intelligence as opposed to

counterintelligence, the latter being at best a secondary

requirement.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

SECRET

- 120

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## Page 9

SECRET

Nemorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

RE:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and

International Affairs (OLIA) and the

Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DELATIS CONTINUED:

The second reason for this gap involves the legal

guidelines under which the U. S. military, by virtue of their

authority of an occupying power in West Berlin, conducts

technical surveillance and mail openings. Mr. Eliff stated that,

as an occupying power, the U. S. military, much like the ril

domestically, is the entity which conducts telephone monitorings

of criteria country establishments and personnel

in the U. S.

sector of West Berlin.

It also opens certain mail of interest

from the East which passes through this sector.

However,

whenever there is an overhear of a U.

S. national or whenever

there is mention made of a U. S. national in a piece of

correspondence, that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to

any other U. S. intelligence agency.

This lack of dissemination

is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. S.

Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the

activities of U. S. nationals.. As a consequence of this lawsuit,

very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. S.

military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to

monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for minimizing

overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.

The net results of these restrictions is that, according

to Mr. Eliff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as

well as the like potential collection of names

of U.s. persons

via mail openings has been lost.

Mr. Eliff advised it was his belief these minimization

restrictions were too stringent and should be amended to allow

for dissemination. He however stated that he thought the issue

should be brought up after the upooming elections in that he dia

not believe a "lame duck" administration would be interested in

undertaking the issue.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

SECRET

-3-

---

## Page 10

SECRET,

International Affairs (OLIA) and the

Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblum,

office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice,

had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant with

this U. S. military monitoring issue.

Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBI

presence in West Berlin in that his study of the

counterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that the

many double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were run

for parochial reasons with no strategic view of

counterintelligence.

He stated that even though the u. S.

military services were professional and did coordinate the

turnover of some of their many double agents to the fil when

these agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believed

the FBI should have input at the outset of these double agent

cases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamental

counterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with the

principle counterintelligence service, the FBI, at their

inception in order to better globally addrese

counterintelligence

He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin would

therefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherent

national counterintelligence strategy.

Mr. Eliff concluded by reiterating his support for the

FBI's presence

in West Berlin,

by indicating that he would be

willing, were we to ask,

to indicate his support of this position

to the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. Jeff

versed In counterintellIgence issues and a potential strong

Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also well

supporter of the FBI's cause.

Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff for

his time and indicated that the

FBI had designated a new

assistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely be

to travel weekly to West Berlin in order to prepare the FBI's

case for a permanent presence there.

SECRET

-4-

---

## Page 11

JFK

(LIXB)

PAGE THREE DE HO 01S5 SECRET

___IF CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY

AGENCY INSAZ AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ECIAS COMPONENTS

EIN-NEW YORK-

THE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE

¡GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE NEGAHUT FACILITY. ACCORDING TO

SSCI STAFF. MEMBER, NSA HAS POSED NO OBJECTIONS, AND INTD HAS NO

OBJECTIONS EITHER. HOWEVER, TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED!

1. BY THE SUPERVISOR, AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED. UNDER NO

-CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED. AND NO DISCUSSION

SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZEDI

_ AS "EXCELLENT.". SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION

BE

EXTENDED TO NEW YORK CIA FOREIGN RESOURCE DIVISION ERDI

REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

THIS

i REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO

: CONTACT CIALERD JENDEPENDENTLY.

2} UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE

¡-CONGRESS. SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING

_VIEWS OF FIELD ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS; PROBLEMS, VALUE, ETC-?

1 INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"

JFK (1)

JFK|<1)(B)

JKF

(11(8)

5010A9.

---