STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO
Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
Document date: 3/12/79
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

4/27/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

HSCA

180-10147-10191

CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

61-10-05

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

HSCA

TITLE:

STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED

ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

03/12/1979

101

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

ORGANIZED CRIME

CIA, FILES

CIA, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE :

REPORT

CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: IA; 1B

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/07/1995

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Box 34

Released under the John F.

assassination Records

Collection Act of

1992

144

USC 2107 Notel.

Case#: NT

53080 Date: 06-05-2017

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DRAFT

SDB

STAFF REPORT ON THE

EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS

OF THE CIA - SPONSORED

ASSASSINATION COnSPIRACIES

ESSUE

CUBAN CONSPIRACY

AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO

Introduction

The attempt of the United States government

to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro as well

as other foreign leaders during the turbulent decade

of the 1960s shocked and disgusted the American

citizen. When sources disclosed that the Central

Intelligence Agency (hereinafter "CIA") intentionally

solicited and received the assistance of various

members of organized crime, la Cosa Nostra, in the

furtherance of such plots, more outrage prevailed.

Civilized society simply did not and does not condone

such acts as a legitimate instrument of foreign

policy. There is no excuse; no rationalization.

The effect and influence of these

actions

did not stop, however, with invoking the disdain of

the American public and world.

These assassination

attempts gave birth to the haunting theory that

Fidel Castro orchestrated the assassination of

President John F. Kennedy in defensive retaliation

for the plots on his life.

21199

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In its Final Report published in April,

1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

(hereinafter "SSC") responded to this theory.

In this Report, the SSC focused on two operations

of the CIA which may have provoked Castro into

retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint

effort of the CIA and Organized Crime to eliminate

Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and

extent

of the CIA AMLASH operation. The SSC concluded its

analysis with the statement that "/E/he Committee

believes the investigation should continue in certain

areas, and for

that reason does not reach any final

conclusions. "1

This analysis is an attempt to make such

conclusions.

It is not the purpose of the remainder.

every

of this material to minute review tire

detail$ of

the CIA-Mafia plots or of the AMLASH operation, to

resolve all of the conflicting viewpoints of the

SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the

various operations, or to

subject anyone to moral

tongue-lashing. Instead, this material first seeks

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bUTt

to present a comprehensive review of the CIA

operation AMLASH and of the involvement or potential

involvement of organized crime in the CIA operations

against Castro during 1960-1963. From this review

inference:

certain

intense and conclusions are then drawi

concerning the nature, scope, and ramifications of

these operations.

II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL - RELEVANT SUMMARY

A. CIA-Mafia Plots

The genesis of the utilization of the United

States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to

assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the

Inspector General as occurring during a conversation

between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell,

and the Director of security, colonel sheffield edwards.

These plots extended fromp1960 until early 1963 and

can be divided into two stages. 4 The first stage

occurred from August, 1960 until April, 1961, and

can best be termed as phase i or the pre-lay of pigs

From April, 1961 until late 1961, the CIA

takes the position that the plots were dormant.

1g60

plauning-

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=4..

In late 1961 the CIA decided to renew

the CIA-Mafia plots, then creating Phase II, and

kept them active until late 1962 or early 1963.

7

During the initial stages of Phase I, Edwards

assigned the

specific task of locating the proper

Persons

to assassinate Castro to F

ötm"

= Conne

who was Chief of the Operational Support

vision of the office of security.

8 Both men

agreed that opten shout contact Robert A. Maheu,

whom the CIA had previously used in several covert

operations, to recruit the necessary personnel, o

Maheu subsequently contacted Roselli,

contacter

in turn rested two persons initiallyknown te

Me ope renal East-Same Gold" and "Joe, "11

says

he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities

of these persons to be Sam Giancana and

Santo Trafficante,

12

respectively.

After meeting several times in Miami and deciding

upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the

reported

1967 IG Report contends that Trafficante made the

arrangements for

the assassination of Castro with

one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips.

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5

he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. 13 This contact

was awar gota, a Cuban official who held a position

close to Castro. 14

The 1967 IG Report then states that Roselli

passed the pills to trafficante. is Roselli sloseguently.

told o'Connell that the pills were delivered to bite

in Cuba, 16 M

eata apparently retained the pills for

a few weeks

and then returned them since he was unable

to fulfill any plan.!? asta was no longer in a

position to kill Castro because he had lost his Cuban

post. 18

With Aba unable to perform, the syndicate

looked elsewhere.

Roselli next told oomnelb,

sometime during early 1961, that Trafficante knew

a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who

could

accomplish the job, d

Antonio de

Atter receiving approval, Trafficante

Do Cuban exullie las der

approached Verona about assassinating Castr

and

Uhe axile leade

20

which eventually reached

Verona.

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186?

itself

Insister, 1

imprecito.

This activity concluded the pre-Bay. of

Pigs phase of the plots. The 1967 IGR does not

Actial

document anypattempt to a

a administer the

pills to Castro.

The 1967 IGR relates that after a period

22

of apparent dormancy,

Bissell directed William

Harvey in approximately November

he lead Sappit Cheer

Connell therefor

reactivate the CIA-Mafia plots.

introduced Harvey to Roselli.

During this phase,

the CIA decided against using Giancana or Trafficante;

instead, a person referred to as "MACRO" entered the

plot as the person who would help provide Castro

25

contacts.

In addition, the plots still utilize

Me Colora

cile 12600

the services of Antonio desvemona.

Even though the plots no longer included

Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admitted that

Roselli most likely kept them informed.:

ECIA

fires:

nobel

noted in The 1967 IGRAthat "LI/t would be naive

to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of

informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was

working in à territory considered to be the private

judgmental word

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27

domain of

someone else in the syndicate."

In June

of 1962 Roselli reported to Harve

No Cost

exile leader

that Verora dispatched a three-man team into Cuba

with the general assignment of recruiting others

to kill Castro, and, if the opportunity arose, to

kill him themsleves, maybe through the use of pills.

In September of 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey

in Miami that the "medicine" was reported in place,

cheese lente

that the three-man team was safe, and that venera

was prepared to dispatch another three-man team

29

to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard.

In December,

1962, Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much seemed to

be occurring and by February, 1963, Harvey terminated

sparse, 30

the plots.

B.

The Las Vegas Wiretap Incident

The 1967 IGR also mentioned

an event that

occurred during Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots which

resulted' in the first

dissemination of the details

of

the plot

to persons other than the ones involved

in the operation.

On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas

police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a

Florida investigator named Edward DuBois, for placing

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an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas.

Subseguent investigation determined that Robert A.

Maheu authorized the surveillance and possibly the

wiretap of ihe subject involved and that Maheu ecosably

acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA.

The violation of the wiretap statuteplaced

the case under federal jurisdiction and the FBI soon

began an investigation. In the course of this

investigation, Mahe informed the FBI that he

instituted the

surveillance on behalf of CIA efforts

to obtain Cuban intelligence through the hoodlum

In its efforts to

element, including Giancana.

prevent the prosecution of Balletti, Maheu, and an

unidentified individual known as J.W. Harrison, the

CIA eventually told the Justice Department the details

of Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro

This

most accurately

Eis can best be related through the following

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memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney

General Ramsey Clark /quoted in part/:

Blank letterhead memorandum

3-6-67

TO:

FROM:

Attorney General

Director, FBI

TOP SECRET

/Attorney General Robert KennedyT indicated

that a few days prior to /5-9-627 he had been

advised by the CIA that Robert A.

been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana

with a proposition of paying

gunmen to go

into Cuba and kill Castro.

He

further stated CIA admitted having assisted Maheu

in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas

which uncovered this clandestine operation and for

this reason CIA could not afford to have any action

taken against Giancana or Maheu.

Mr. Kennedy stated

that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action

in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of

Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never

again take such steps without first checking

with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this

matter it would be very difficult to initiate any

prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could

immediately bring out the fact the United States

Government had approached him to arrange for the

assassination of Castro.

He stated the same

was

true concerning

action we might take against

Maheu for any violation in which he might become

involved.

inciden

In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap

forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the

CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA government officials

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 14 SEP94

GUB

* RELEASE IN FULL

• RELEASE IN PART

• TOTAL DENIAL /

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and provided the first occasion for participants

to manipulate the operation to prevent prosecution.

C. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

The next major event related to the CIA-

Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his

involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before

Senator Edward Long's Committee which was investigating

35

invasions of privacy.

The attorney for Mahue,

Edward Pierpont Morgan, informed the House Select

Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter the "Committee")

that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and

said he was going to be called before the Long

Committee in conjunction with the Morganthau investiga-

3%

35a

tion.

Maheu then informed

Morgan of the plots and

suggested that any testimony might ney surly reveal his

previous covert activities with the CIA.

Morgan

then contacted

Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the

General Counsel to the CIA, to reiterate Maheu's

concerns in an apparently successful effort to block

-356-38

any testimony.

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D.

Roselli Efforts to Avoid Prosecution

The SSC related that in May, 1966, the FBI

threatened to deport Roselli *for living in the

United States under an assumed name unless he

cooperated in

an investigation of the Mafia.

09,3z39

The SSC then states that Roselli contacted Edwards

who subsequently spoke to the FBI in regard to

38.40

Roselli.

The SSC reports that Roselli again contacted

CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when

Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities

41-39

at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967.

Roselli

contacted Harvey, who was no longer a CIA employee,

to represent him.

Harvey subsequently attempted 3-4

to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution.

The Justice Department, however, subsequently convicted

Roselli for a violation of the interstate gambling

laws.

1244

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E. Debut of the Retaliation Theory

The genesis of this theory can be attributed

to an interview that Premier Castro held on

September 7, 1963, with Associated Press reporter

Daniel Harker. In that interview, Castro warned

against the United States

to chiminate Cuban Stader a s terrorist plans

"aiding terrorist plang

stated, according

to Harker, that United States leaders

would be in danger

if they

promoted any attempt

to eliminate the leaders

of Cuba:

WIn early january, award Morgan approached

Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots,

posed

the possibility that the plots could have provoked

a Castro retaliation, and asked Pearson to inforn

HD44 (nO NO. 43

Chief Justice

Earl Warren of the operation.

Warren subsequently informed Secret service rector

James J. Rawley who in turn notified the FBI

Morgan

informed the Committee that Roselli initially approached

him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance ever

412-46

since he had been involved in this patriotic venture.

Roselli also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated

for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy.

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After receiving this information the FBI

47.1

decided not to further investigate the allegation.

Following the publication of the Jack Anderson

and Drew Pearson articles of March 3 and 7, 1967,

however, where the theory of retaliation first

gained public notoriety, President Johnson ordered

the FBI to investigate the matter.

63-48-

The FBI

consequently interviewed Edward Morgan on March 20,

49

1967.

Morgan informed the FBI that he represented

clients that were reasonable individuals who entered

into a project that they understood

to have high

governmental backing

and which involved the assassina-

5450

tion of Fidel Castro.

Morgan then stated that his

clients had reason to suspect

that Castro learned

of these plots and killed President Kennedy in

5355

retaliation.

The FBI investigation resulted in President

Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the

retaliation theory which prompted CIA Director Richard

.. 52.56

Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots.

F. 1967 IGR

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On March 23, 1967 Director Helms ordered

the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on

5753.

the CIA assassination plots.

This report detailed

• plans and

the accounts of various

CIA operations against

cosm

including an analysis of the CIA-Organized Crime

plots and the AMLASH

operation. The IGR also

examined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap incident.

In reference to the AMLASH operation, the

IGR related AMLASH's activities in Madrid, Spain

in late 1964 and Ga51y 1965, where AMLASHl was meeting

with Manuel Artime.

The IGR further noted that

Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer for Santo

55

Trafficante, was in Madrid, Spain in March, 1965.

Bongo claimed to be in contact with dissident Cuban

56.60

military leaders, including AMLASH.

G. Anderson Articles

In 1971, Anderson once again published

information promoting the retaliation theory in two

articles dated

January 18 and 19.

These articles

exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins

made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of

Castro before being apprehended,

that this event

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9

occurred in late February or early March, 1963,

that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA-

Mafia plots, and that Roselli delivered poison

pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at

-60-0.

the Miami Beach Fountainbleu Hotel on March 13, 1961.

H. Roselli deportation

In 19.71, the same year that Anderson releasëd

additional information on the plots, the CIA contacted

the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department

of Justice, in an attempt to prevent information on

CIA operations from being disclosed in the event INS

5762

brought deportation proceedings against Roselli.

The SSC stated in its Interim Report, released in

November, 19.75, that the deportation order was still

*5.843

in the process of being litigated.

In August,

1976, authorities discovered Roselli's butchered

body stuffed

in an oil drum and floating in Miami!s

59.

Biscayne Bay

His colleague in the plots to kill

Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death in

his home in June, 1975.Ck

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irtemerurroit. 2157.45 -uev.pF iymneitrzm -:/tita, Pageefh LedofFaelne) tresteennion

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I.

The Senate Select Committee To Study

•Governmental Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities

In connection with its mandate to investigate

the full range of governmental intelligence activities,

the SSC "examined the performance of the intelligence

agencies in conducting their investigation of the

assassination and their relationship to the Warren

6766

commission."

In April, 1976, the SSC published

its Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted

the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing

the Warren Commission of the CIA's fon-going plots

against the revolutionary government in Cuba and

its

attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro.

After reviewing the details of the CIA-Mafia

plots, the SSC stated that "Castro probably would

not have been certain that the CIA was behind the

underworld attempts" and that it would have been

unlikely that Castro would have distinguished the

the CIA plots with the underworld from any plots

sponsored by the Cuban exile community and not

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626%

affiliated in any way with the CIA.(")?

The SSC identified the AMLASH operation,

however, as being "clearly different" from the under-

world plots.

The SSC stated that AMLASH

was in

progress at the time of the assassination, that it

could clearly be traced to the CIA, and that AMLASH'S

proposal for al

coup i

had been endorsed by the CIA,

61 64-

the initial step being the assassination of Castro.

The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw "no evidence

that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government

plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation

65.79

for U. S. operations against Cuba."

As related in the Introduction to this material,

the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it

believed additional investigation needed to occur.

TASK

FORCE

The CIA 1977 Persast

TER

Stung. by the senate criticism and the rippling

effect that Book V caused in the media, the CIA

1977

prepared a comprehensive report in 3 disigned

r, at least within the CIA, the critical

questions postulated in the SSC Final Report.

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-18.

TFU

The

identifies

a principal theme

of Book V as the possibility that Castro retaliated

• against the United States for attempts on his life

and that

the CIA operations may have specifically

72. 71.

caused any such actions by Castro.

In responding

to this theory the CIA decided to perform the

following:

1) to conduct a ful.

review of information

and operations & the Cuban target to

identify

any

activity that might relate

to the assassination of President Kennedy,

and

2)

to review the possibility

activities against Cuba did, by their

nature,

cause Castro to order

the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy, 7873

The details of the loan

are thoroughly

related in this material because no source has

previously publicly released them.

1. Syndicate Operations

Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the

CIA first related new considerations pertaining to the

TER

syndicate operations. The FER refers to a series

of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing

in the New York Daily News in April, 1975.

In these articles Meskill described how

alsa

Frank Fiorini, a known as Sturgis, allegedly

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119-

•192

recruited Marie. Lorenz to spy on Castro.

and

how Sturgis knew Jur ta and planned to use him

75.193

in a bombing assassination of Castro.

Meskill

asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired

operati

for the CIA for at least a

decade and that

Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators

1:9476

in Havana during the period of

the Castro takeover.

In another article on June 13, 1976, Meskill related

the claim of Marie Lorenz that in the fall of 1960

Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two

capsules of poison powder which

she was

to sprinkle

195

in some

• 77

food or drink of Castro.

TFR

The writers of the 1977 for were quite concerned

these

with their assertions because

name had

publicly surfaced, in connection with a Castro assassina-

rebelatur

@reapals 5018 111

tion plot before the SSC recordations the CIA-

organized crime plots, am

thas thengagignmemto

poison. Castiave

to theofficialrcase to castro

who may-have-received-kickbacks-from.the-gambling

interests

→ The possibility that orta was involved

in assassination plots other than the CIA operation

also attracted the attention of the CIA

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In reference to Sturgis' allegation that he

had been a hired operator for the CIA for a decade

the laptor asserted that he was in contact with

some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area,

1977}

but had no direct relationships with the Agency."

TFR

The ter recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling

activities and relationships with various casino owners,

may quite possibly have known beta, and also

raises

the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source

of information to Castro regarding Ostads participation

198. 20

in

any

assassination plot.

In reference to the Lorenz-Sturgis poison pill

plot, the mirror noted the similarity

of this plot

memorander dare no a piat to Kill Cart 99

to the details in the 18 October 1960 FBI ramo! 3!

The CIA concluded that this October date is too early

for the CIA syndicate operations and that therefore

- 8184

the syndicate may have been acting independently.

The CIA

also concluded that Ant

the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate

operations, may

have already been active in plots

8283

with the

Mafia when the CIA approached him.

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-21-

Cone CIA cited two FBI memorandum as

support.

First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to

underworld support for some Cubans, and

second, a

18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed

report that v

8374

support.

one was one of the Cubans receiving

The cila/further, acknowledged that although

the operation with the Mafia<was suspended after

the Bay of Pigs, it appeared to still be in progress

when re-activated in April, 1962.

8485

TFR

The Jor summarized its position concerning

non-CIA sponsored syndicate operations in the following

passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found,

itself involved in providing additional

resources for independent operations that

the syndicate already had underway.../ I/i

a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on

the syndicate and in addition to its material

contribution was also supplying an aura of

official sanction. 85,8k

2.

AMLASH

TER

The

states the SSC suggests that AMLASH

was

possibly a Castro agent assigned a provacation

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mission which would then justify retaliation, or,

in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security

risk through which details of the plotting may have

surfaced to Castro thus providing

87-86.

the impetus for

TER

provocation.

Additionally, the

cer cites

the

SSC as holding that in either case, AMLASH should

8733

have been reported to the Warren Coinmission.

*88

The tez contends neither theory is correct.

stating that the relationship between the CIA and

AMLASH before the death of President Kennedy was so

"unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no

basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible

8990

CIA support for plotting against Castro.

In support the Fit proceeds to narrate the

Agency's understanding of the operation. On August 17,

1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he

"/has/ no intention Lof giving AMLASH/17 physical

elimination mission as requirement but recognize

this LasT something he could or might try to carry

9190

out on his own initiation."

Headquarters replied

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the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical

9:174

elimination mission be given AMLASH/1."

From

August 29, 1962 until September, 1963 the CIA states

92 43

it did

not have any contact with AMLASH.

September 7, 1963 the CIA received the

following cable:

AMLASH still feels there only two ways

accomplish change either inside job or

invasion he realistic enough to realize

latter out of question.

According AMWHIP,

plan of action.

AMLASH still awaiting for. U.S. reveal

notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job"

as referring to an operation against Castro;

the CIA,

however, says it refers to a general

commitment

concerning

TER

how to effect change.1: The oh also states that

at

this point Book V says "characterization of this phase

95

of the AMLASH operation is disputed. "4

The CIA

existed

contends that any dispute only exists in the eyes of the

9697

SSC.

TFI

The Her next comments on an interview of

Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro

said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of

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The fiscA draft report

is sorenha of terpet in

commen-

whal- the cIA

1977 TaSK force report said about

AMLASH'S idea at whol.

wis

involved

m austing: Mo Casino regime.

The Task force rapint uns

not commenting on the report est

AMLASIt's vens, per se It

comn enting on

misquot son of

Rose

vians te lhe SSe Final

Report. The

distinction is wilh

reviaving.

The 1972 Tisk force report

bested the AMLASt mate a mo

secons. The furt was a Summing

at the AMLIst o person through the

ne of President Kennedy's desch,

with

recitals of

spectie: limitatons envisioned i he

eloison of IMLBBH11, how he was

old his, and Chis he cleady

undersloud and was upset one

The second section sddressed

• series it detoled seperste

repretentaland on the AMLASH

sperdon

sse find keport. The sulamom

"Reparte

at AMLASH/1'R

views on his

part war

of velore unimportance

HH 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 25

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## Page 26

in itself at for the misquito

et it 4

the SS< fmol Reporte

It was that mTs quet to

othewise it was a reliona

un importance.

That is omitted th

ISCA daft report, tud to

extent

it is worth note al

sili Is.

mosely distorted.

H# 53080

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26

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## Page 27

- 24-

9793

U.S. leaders.

The IGn states that the Book v

implies that AMLASH/1 may have reported to Castro

what the SSC characterized as

assassination plots.

The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks

at that

time could

not have stemmed from anything said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing

and undertook nothing. "0

called

On October 11, 1963. the case officer

Ca

headquarters and said that AMLASH/1 claimed to have

the necessary people and. equipment to overthrow

Castro without U. S. assistance.10/

Or October 20

10-1

1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in Paris.loa

records

At this meeting the CIA maintains that Fitzgerald

rejected AMLASH's request for an

assassination weapons

specifically, a high powered

rifle with a telescopic

102

TER

lens. 153 The ClAy contends that

at this point it

-хії

was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would

be no U. S. assistance until after the

fact, which

is contrary to the SSC statement in Book V to the

effect that it was uncertain how AMLASH

1.0-3

interpreted

the put-off by Fitzgerald./o4

Rather detaled recitaton

of what AMbisH was

told, as.

for

view.

The"'

put-oft"

soboralind1@cougselers/582s

directed ad.

statement: 1701 181elen

He was pact.

NW. 53080 DocId: 32273516 Page 27

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## Page 28

On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved

informing AMLASH/1 that he would be given a cache

inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a

10,4

scope would be included upon request..0%

On

November 20

the case officer informed AMLASH that

he would be receiving the meeting he requested.

*106

This meeting occurred on November. 22.107

TER

The I9a summarized the significance of these

contacts with AMLASH as related to the contentions

in Book V in the following passage:

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1

following the death of President Kennedy,

there is every indication that during

President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had

no

basis for believing that he had ClA support

for much of anything. Were he a provocateur

reporting to Castro, or if he was merely

careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting afts

actual CIA plot directed against Castro.

10đ

Finally, in reply to the SSC allegation that

the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's

request for all possible relevant information, the

TFI.

baR observed:

HH 53080

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28

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N'6-

eintory

While one can understand today why the

Warren Commission limited its inquir

to normal avenues of investigation, it

would have served to re-inform the credibility

of its effort had it taken a broader view

of the matter.

CIA, too, could have considered

in specific terms what most saw in general

terms - the possibility of soviet

or Cuban

involvement in the assassination (JFK) because /0%

of tensions of the time... The Agency should

have taken broader initiatives, then, as well. "6

K.

Recent Anderson Articles

JACK

In September 1976 and October, 1978, Anderson

again published articles which propounded the retaliation

theory. 110

In addition, for the first time Anderson

/publicly revealed/ that John Roselli served

as his source

for the retaliation theory in all of the articles

published through the years.

The September 7, 1976 article appearing in

the Washington Post contains all components of the

retaliation theory.

This states:

Mafia mobster John Roselli may

have taken the secret of the John F.

Kennedy

assassination with him to his

death.

He was brutally murdered a

few weeks ago, his hacked up body

stuffed into

an oil drum and dumped

into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died,

Roselli hinted to

associates that he knew who had arranged

President Kennedy's murder.

It was the

same conspirators he suggested, whom he had

recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier

Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro

learned the identity of the underworld

NH 53080

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29

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-27-

contacts in Havana who had been trying

to knock him off.

He believed, not

altogether without basis, that President

Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme

irony, decided to turn the tables and

use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's

assassination according to Roselli's

scenario.

To save their skins, the

plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to

pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down

names or details.

also difficult

to assess whether he knew what he was talking

about or whether he merely described what he

thought might have happened. Certainly there

is no real evidence to support Roselli's

But there are enough curious circumstances

to justify telling it. Here are the facinating

highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant

mobster with underworld contacts

in Havana,

was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency

in 1960 to assassinate Castro.

authority, however, over the underworld elements

in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's

Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante.

His gambling

enterprises in Havana had been closed down

by Castro after the 1959 revolution.

In fact,

Trafficante had been lodged

for a period in a

Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear

Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his

Florida haunts, he left part

of his organization

behind in Havana.

Some of his henchmen

managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner

These were the people Roselli wanted

to use to knock off Castro.

53080 Docid: 32273546

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30

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## Page 31

28"

But Roselli didn't have the stature

inside the Mafia to make the necessary.

arrangements with Trafficante.

Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago

godfather Same (Momo) Giancana, to deal

with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he

persuaded Giancana

that it would be to

their advantage to win

the good will of

the CIA.

Convinced, Giancana flew down

to

Florida to make the prelininary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up,

Roselli

used the Havana

underworld to plot

Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant

poison pills,

food.

supplied by the CIA, in Castro's

The pills would have made it appear that

he died of natural causes.

When

this failed,

snipers

were dispatched to a Havana rooftop.

They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters

had been tortured and that Castro had learned about

the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in

March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate,

Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with

Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro

indicated that he knew about the attempts on his

HH 53080 DocId: 32273546 Page

31

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## Page 32

29-

might not be

safe.

1963.

That was Sept. 7,

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted

the same underworld

elements whom he had

caught plotting against him.

They supposedly

were Cubans from the old Trafficante organiza-

Working with Cuban intelligence, they

allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter,

Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the

pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald

may have

shot Kennedy or may have

decoy while others ambushed him from closer

range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli

suggested, the underworld conspirators feared

he would crack and disclose information that

might lead to them.

This almost certainly would

have brought a massive U. S. crackdown on the

Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald,

making

it appear as an act of reprisal against

the President's killer.

At least this

is how

Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro

was behind the Kennedy

assassination.

It has also been established that Jack

Ruby,,

indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections

in the

Havana underworld. One CIA cable,

dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American

gangster. type named

Ruby" had visited Trafficante

in his Cuban prison.

HH 53080 DocId: 32273546 Page

• 32

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## Page 33

- 30°

III. ISSUE ANALYSIS

A. Preface

Con

The -is

e investigated this material to

determine what conclusions can be ascertained

concerning the nature, scope, and remifications

of these operations. In this regard, various

issues

are presented in the following sections,

subjected to analysis, and then resolved according

to available evidence, probable motivations and

the most logical inferences.

Cormetter

To fulfill this process, the loes reviewed

material from numerous governmental

sources that

pertained to the persons and operations relevant

to the investigation.

These persons

included:

1.

John Roselli

- principal in CIA-O

operation

2..

Santo Trafficante

- principal in CIA-O.C.

operation

Antonio de Verona

- principal in CIA-o.c.

operation

4.

Sam Giancana

principal

in CIA-o.C.

operation

5.

Robert Maheu

- principal in CIA-o.C.

operation

WW 53080 DocId: 32273546 Page 33

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## Page 34

Follas

6. Michael McLaney

7. Samuel Benton

8.

Norman Rothman

9. John Martino

10.

Edward P. Morgan

11.

Edward K. Moss

12. Dino Cellini

13: Richard Cain

14. Charles Tourine

15. Rafael "Macho" Gener.

16. Evelio Duque Miyar

17.

Jorge Alonso Pujol

18.

Joseph Shimon

19.

Angelo Bruno

20..

Sam Mannarino

N6 53080-RecTA:32273546 Paue 242m

Houwa.den.

Слано don

- Toreted Herend

- Aludi-contra detiisé

-Jenatural Pelle Relatens

Representative

•= Hasno Casino operaren

- Asco de df Sin Quereran

- Indes in

Herna: Casin

beivices

- Associete dente rechile

-

ht Casco Cute.

Casmo Culano

- Associale ob 50:

Caser c

operales

---

## Page 35

21.

Kelly Mannarino

22.. Edward Browder

23.

Joseph Merola

24. Arthur Balletti

25.

Dominick Bartone

26.

Richard Helms

_ Haweia

Cruiue

aperadlas

=p.lat.a.ed.ura in. QurhiKestrlo

Acfuntie;

-

piot acure in énti. Carnis

OCnair

- fsemer privale delectie furz

tawone

gu boi:

- Lepulck Ogenized Geume

Cleiciand, otio,

- Tenman Dinector éfC1A

27. Janes O'connetl

- feirer Curploucey ciA

28.

Luis Balbuena Calzadilla - isoe mie un Eucho üuere

miyour

29. AMLASH

- Cubanaffrinh in

tie Castio goverirent

30 .

William Alexander Morgan - fyuaractie in Cinii=

Lainro aitinite

31.

tan rti

- fuemer seiretarg to Fidel

Carsivig

32.

Jack Anderson

- column:St

33.

Frank Sturgis

34.

Fidel Castro

- dotdieref foatune aitivé

in antia Cesteo eelilities,

- Premier s

Cailoa

(Roselli attorneys)

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35

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## Page 36

39

wherever applicable and desirable, the men late.

either interviewed or deposed these persons or

subpoenaed them to give testimony before Committee

members.

The government

sources where the usen Carnitte

requested and reviewed material were:

1. Central Intelligence Agency

2..

Federal Bureau of Investigation

3. Drug

Enforcement Agency

4. Department of Defense

5. Department of

State

6. Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

7.

United States Customs Service

8..

Immigration and Naturalization Service

9.

10.

United States Senate Committee

on Intelligence

United States Secret Service

11. Chicago Crime Commission

12.

13.

Chicago Police Department

New

York Police Department

14.

Public Safety Department, Organized Crime

Bureau, "Dade County, Florida

15. Cuban Government

---

## Page 37

-34-;

In the

majority of instances, review

of any material at these

sources and any statements

from individuals were not pertinent to any

assassination plots against Castro, particularly

and

the CIA-Organized Crime eft the AMLASH operations.

Further, almost all relevant information acquired

was already known through the SSC investigation

and the CIA Inspector General Reporte

For this

reason the following analysis represents conclusions

principally derived from information

substantively

the same as that which the SSC and CIA previously

considered!

Computes

Consequently, the Heck investigation

FACTIAL

resulted in additional corroboration

of this informa-

20đ

tion from a diversity of sources.

to be drawn.

Weilthe conclusions.

What remainsa

в.

Issues

Pertaining to the

AMLASH

Operation

The Committee found no evidence that the

AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro to assassinate

President: Kennedy in retaliation.

Capitals

coicensins

bold prent

NH 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 37

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## Page 38

hold

all carry

35-

one

wishes,

inst

CIA

not

pist

The Committee has received

equally persuasive

evidence and therefore cannot state whether the.

AMIASH operation prior to the death of President

Kennedy can be characterized

as an

assassination

plot.

Richard Helms, the former Director of the

CIA, in his testimony before this Committee stated

that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be

188a

an assassination plot.lli. As already indicated,

TER

the 7977 IGn concluded that AMLASH had "no factual

basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot

directed against Castro" during President Kennedy's

life. lie

Joseph

Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence

for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the

component responsible for CIA operations directed

against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban

Intelligence

Services, offered a contrasting view to the testimony

TFR 114 1080

of Mr. Helms

and the assertions of the 1977 IOR.

Desmond Fitzgerald headed the Special Affairs Staff

1080115

which was responsible for the AMLASH operation.

In an affidavit to the Committee, Longosch recalled

that:

Lamosa's lemon

hore

ехреіел

Penalute since,

1n

17.

the.

The

Church Comin

he

1s 9516e

anes, auct facts

includiop

opera se

Thave tink the ANAf

(See

Рде 35. 8o0k 71

HH 53080

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/T/he AMLASH operation prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy was

characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation initiated and sponsored by the

CIA. 108e

Langosch further recollected, that as of 1962 it was

highly possible that the Cuban Intelligénce Services

were aware of AMLASH and his association with the

CIA and that the information upon which he based his

conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure

was available to senior level CIA officials, including

108F

Desmond FitzGerald. |1

In response to Langosch's sworn statements,

this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA

Pollock "served

as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during

the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special

Affairs Staff... and discussed with him the AMLASH

operation as it progressed." Pollock specifically

contested the assertions of Langosch stating:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr.

FitzGerald considered the AMLASH

operation to be a political action

HH 53080 DocId: 32273546

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39

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-3%

activity with the objectith of

organizing a group under cubarbaras

to overthrow Castro and the

Castro regime by means of a

coup d' etat.

I heard Mr.

FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH

operation frequently, and never

heard him characterize it as

an assassination operation.

Mx.

FitzGerald

stated within my hearing

on several occasions his awareness that

coup d'etat often involves loss of

life. 108g

1/7

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald dia not characterize

the AMLASH operation as an

'assassination

operation'; the case officer did not; I,

as Executive Officer did not, never discussed

any

aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph

H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief,

the other

branch chiefs and the special

assistants

could not have so characterized it since

they did not know about the pen (the pen

was specially filled with a hypodermic

syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH

for a means to start the coup by killing

Castro.)

The case officer offered the pen

to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's

death.

AMLASH rejected the pen with

disdain.108h

a 300802 Docta: 3227354601

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## Page 41

3°

BOLD

2J Assuming that AMIASH was not an assassination

plot during the life of president Kennedy and that

Castro uncovered its existence and scope, the Committee

wnsiscet.g

believestithat castro would sat have been provokea

in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating

President Kennedy in retaliation.

Assuming that AMLASH was

an assassination

plot during the life of President Kennedy and that

Castro: uncovered its

it is will existence and scope, the Committee

still believesAthat Castro would not have resorted to

assassinating the President of the United States in

retaliation.

In his interview with the Committee, Premier

Castro set forth some

reasons supporting this contention.

The Committee agrees with the reasoning in his

statements.

Castro said in part:

That was insane.

From the ideological

point of view it was insane.

And from

the political point of view, it was a

tremendous insanity. I am going to tell

you here that nobody, nobody ever had the

idea of such things.

What would it do?

We just tried to defend our folks here,

within our territory.

Anyone who subscribed

to that idea would have been judged insane...

absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of

revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor

even speculate about a measure

of that sort,

because who could think of the idea of

HW:S308Qg DocTQ:32273516 Page 41

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39-

alien no

initial

organizing the death of the president of

the United States.

That would have been

the most perfect pretext for the United

States

to invade our country which is what

I have tried to prevent for all these

years,

in every possible

sense.

Since the

United States is

much more powerful than

we are, what could we gain

from

a war

with the United States?

The United

States

would lose nothing.

The destruction would

have been here. 120

Castro

also added:

I want to tell you that the death of the

leader does not change the system.

It has

never done that .1zl

In this interview Castro also commented on

the speech of September 7, 1963 which has been cited

throughout the years as an indication that Castro may

have

assassinated President Kennedy in retaliation.

Premier Castro asserted:

So, I said something like those plots

start

to set a very bad precedent.

very serious one - that that could become

a boomerang against the authors of those

actions...but I did not mean to threaten

by that:

I did not mean even

that...not

in the least...but rather,

like a warning

that we knew;

that we had news about it;

and that to set those precedents of plotting

of other countries would be a very bad

precedent.. something very negative. And,.

if at present, the same would happen under

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-45-

the same circumstances, I would have no

doubt in saying the same as I said (then)

because I didn't mean a threat by that.

I didn't say it as a threat.

I did

not mean by that that we were going to take

measures - similar measures - like a

retaliation for that.

We never meant that

because we knew that

there were plots.

For three years we had known there were

plots against us.

So, the conversation

came about very

casually, you know; but

I would say that all these plots or attempts

were part of the everyday life.;a7

Some reasoning, which Committee cautions is

speculative, may be of some assistance, hate. It

does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled

Any

reference to assassinating, American leaders in

retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually

planning o contemplating such acts. he would want

to call as little attention as possible to himself.

Rather, it seems Castro was attempting

to display

his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts i

in an effort to prevent their continuance.

Consequently,

together with an absence of any evidence implicating

Castro in the assassination, the Committee believes

---

## Page 44

conclusion braio in teotroi demine Uoi ha mado a laccadt:

Castes would ideerally sing such a stane,

that this incident, while displaying Castro's

displeasure at American activities, does not

implicate Castro in the assassination.

The Committee believes there are additional

reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in

the assassination which are also compelling.

The

Committee

cautions that these reasons, while persuasive,

are

0150

stilel

necessarily speculative.

First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the

United States Delegation to the United Nations,

was

involved in diplomatic effoxts to establish a frame-

work for detenté during the fall of 1963. Atwood

told the SCC that McGeorge Berndy, an advisor to President

Kennedy, told him that President Kennedy was in favor

of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take

Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out

the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normal."

Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean

Daniel to neet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled

trip by Daniel to see Castro. Daniel and Kennedy

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44

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-42-

discussed the prospects for reestablishing

United States-Cuba relations and

Kennedy asked

126

Daniel to see him after visiting Castro.

The Committee believes

that

such efforts

to establish a peaceful coexistence between the

United States and Cuba would

have hampered

any

desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy

second, the comparing to atitude ot the

it can be arguedthat

anoranthe leaders of the United States, President

Kennedy supported a less hostile attitude and position

toward Cuba. Even if Castro felt the relations between

Cuba and the United States were bad under the Kennedy

Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspect they

would have been worse

under any other administration.

Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic

relations in the air and the knowledge that Kennedy

possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than

other military or political leaders, Castro would have

NH

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43-

had

every

reason to hope that Kennedy maintained

the Presidency. Further, the Committee does not

believe that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily

have favorably altered the United States' operations

and

ties toward Cuba. In addition, the Committee

does not believe Castro would have assassinated

President. Kennedy because such an act, if discovered,

would have afforded the United States the excuse to

destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth

it.

Issues Pertaining to the CIA-Organized

Crime Plots

1.

Scope and Nature of Plots - Analysis

a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Sponsorship

Lames A cot l informed the Committe

that Maheu told Reselliche represented an international

DOg: 126

group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba...

roselit

however, testified to me Sut chiehe

tola him from the beginning that o'connald was

with

the CIA.12}

-171

Maheu confirmed this account to the sSc.

naheu also stated in a deposition to the

Committee that

Giancana knew at the time that afrept as with the

CIA. 129 Further, Trafficante testified to the

HH 53080 DooId:32273546

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46

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## Page 47

44=

Committee that Reseid informed him that he,

130

113

Roselli, was operating as

an agent of the CIA.

The weight of the evidence indicates that

Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trafficante, knew

the CIA was behind the assassination plots at an

early stage. This recognition of CIA initiation

is important, tames it shows that Giancana and

Trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly

became involved with the CIA.

b)

Discovery of Irue Identities

Roselli arranged for the entrance of

Giancana

and Trafficante into the plots and introducec

them to Seput Chias "Sam Gola" and "Joe. "13,

•7 teemel

contends he learned the true identities of these

persons a few months after the operation was in progress

when he and Maheu saw an article in one of the Sunday

115

sections of the Miami newspaper. 13~ This article

supposedly pertained to Organized crime in the United

States and contained pictures of top hoodlums, including

"I16

Same Giancana and Santo Trafficante. 32 In the

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45-

Mes pout Chick

1967 IGR @Cemetl stated that the article

from the Parade magazine 34 in the Miami Times:

Maheu also contends that he did not know

the true

identities

Sam Gold

article

appeared. 135

i hope to santa this at cheden:

occurred after the "we were up to our ears" in

operations and consequently the CIA decided to

"11.9

progress forward. 13

The SSC conducted a search of supplements

to all Miami newspapers for the requesite time

120

period and could not locate any such article.'3/

The Committee consequently searched Parade magazine

for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of1962;

the years which spanned the entire operation.

The

Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade

published an article entitled, "Our government's

crackdown on organized crime," written by Jack

Anderson,

which contains a listing of the top ten

hoodlums in the country as well as several photographs

of mobsters, including Santo Trafficante. 132

article focuses on the efforts of Attorney General

HH 53080 DooId:32273546

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48

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## Page 49

46:

Robert Kennedy's campaign against

organized

crime and mentions both Giancana

and Trafficante.

Although this Parade

article appears

to correspond with sternt hit

and Maheu's description,

it is over one year past

the beginning

months of the

operation. Indeed, it occurs nine months after the

completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally,

neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered

any other article pertaining to organized crime in

Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami

newspaper for the alleged

time period.

It appearS Peshineh ar

and Maheu are lying in

an attempt to. look for an

ex post facto reason for

continuing the operation after the introduction of

two of the top organized crime figures in the United

States. Implicit in their contention is that while

the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to

assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have

veganized or e. a to the o to hid

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49

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## Page 50

4'

statement that "we were up to our ears in it" is

even more difficult to fathom

since according to the

1967 IGR the operation was in its embryonic stage

in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered

until approximately February or March of 1961.

_Without additional support, the Committee

does not believe the contentions of Maheu and

liformerl.

Furtter,

Athis CIA plot to assassinate Castro was

necessarily a highly volatile

and secret operation.

Once

Roselli introduced additional contacts into the

scene

it is not logical that the CIA would have

neglected to verify the identities of such principals.

On the contrary, it is more believable and

• more

probable that the CIA ascertained the true identities

of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" at an early stage and

consciously progressed forward in the operation;

confident that these two persons, in the words

attributed to Colonel Sheffield Edwards, were

122

individuals "tough enough" to handle the job. 14ù

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48-

c)

Roles of Principals

1) Phase One

Castro. 141

utilize Maheu as someone

to recruit persons

effectuate the operation.:y Connel also

described his role

as the liaison to the CIA and

confirmed that all reports or information would

to the Agency. 143 In addition,

groom i he to the a genesy storm 40 803011;

that is, remaining with him to occupy his time to

insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. 1yu

There is a discrepancy over who suggested

Roselli for the operation,s

Tat but in any event,

he was recruited because he had connections with

I28.

persons who could handle the assignment.

Conflict arises over the role of Giancana.

Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a

129

"back-up" man. 147

It should be noted that Giancana

was murdered four days before Roselli made this

statement.

Mahue, however, described Giancana

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## Page 52

-44-

as having a key role and characterized his job

"to locate someone in Castro's entourage who

could accomplish the assassination." 145. Joseph

Shimon, a close friend of Roselli who had knowledge

of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted

Giancana to provide Cuban contacts!4f Shimon further

characterized Giancana as only providing contacts,

specifically Santo Trafficante, and not as an active

732150

participant.

The most sound analysis is that Giancana Solely

servealas a person Roselli could approach who could

then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain,

specifically Santo Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI

files indicate represented Giancana's

interest in

Probably

Las Vegas

and was

subordinate to him, wouldinot

directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban

and southern Florida area without first contacting

his superior, Giancana, who would then make any

necessary arrangements. Both Giancana and Trafficante,

being bosses of two organized crime domains, would

have the

means, power, and stature to arrange for

the assassination. After contacting Trafficante,

327735462-Page--52г

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:50

na!!

who have the influence to recruit the necessary

personnel to a

perform the assassination,

Giancana

probably was not an active

participant in

the process of poisoning

133,5 pills of actually arranging

the assassination.

The role of Trafficante, the only living

major organized crime figure involved in the plotsi

is a major source of conflict.

The 1967 IGR contains

several references to Trafficante which characterize

his function. In discussing how poison pills could

be given to Castro, it states that "Trafficante ('Joe,

the courier') was in touch with a disaffected Cuban

official with access to Castro and presumably of a

wort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison

-1-34

Castr.", Sa Later the report states that "Roselli

the pills to

passed the in, cante, " and that Rosell!

an, the cuban government and coul northpass

pills, the for says "Roselli told O"eumell that

Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile

-736

movement who might do the job."15% Roselli identified

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155

endle 16,1r-137

him as

Anton

Verona.

The following

passage further confirms T'rafficante's role:

Trafficante approached

verony and

told him that he had clients who wanted

to do away with Castro and that they would

pay big money for the job.

verone is

reported to have been very receptive,

since

it would mean that he would be able

to buy

his own ships, arms and communications

equipment. 138

156

Trafficante testified in public to the Committee

that Roselli asked him to solely act'as an interpretor 15'

131

between the American operations and the Cuban contacts.

Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills

used in the operation, denied recruiting Verona

160-142

and denied recruiting Oter.

In his Senate testimony,

Roselli

confirmed Trafficant's role as that of a trans-

lator.

The Suppet Chint

i, however, informed the Committee that

Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubans in

Havana/ad Giancana partially confirmed this in the st

IGR by

identifying Joe as a man "who would serve

• courter t

Cuba and make arrangements there.

11Aa 153

Peopen Chie

also confirmed that he was the only CIA

conduit and that if the for IGR states Trafficante

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contacted or procured the assassin then it

accurately reflects the information the

-144

CIA received. /04

It is interesting that the 1975 and 1978

Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante

corroborate each other but remain contrary to how

the principals reported the facts

in 1967. The

evidence (strongly indicates) that Trafficante was not

merely an interpreter but an active participant in

passing the poison pills and in recruiting the

potential assassins. This is important in dramatizing

the deep involvement of organized crime with the CIA

in these plots. One can understand why Trafficante

today wishes to downplay his role; the facts, however,

simply do not support his assertions.

The Committee

believes the CIA IGR.

he liban

The Committee also heard testimony from Antonio

axle est verontestated that he is not aware of any

CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied

165

involvement in their operations.

Hr

werena is obviously

The conmittee does not feel, however, wat

prosecution for perjury"if possible, would assist

ive

the investigation goals:

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-53

Phase Two

In Phast Iwo William Harvey

- Open u

role. Giancana and Trafficante were

no longer involved in the operation. !? The

IGR states that Roselli remained as a prominent

figure and worked "directly with the Cuban exile

-147 168

community and directly on behalf. of the CIA."

reflect

Although the IGR does

reguest that Trafficante

was not involved in Phase II,!

lol it contains this

caution:

Trafficante was one of the principals

in Shef Edwards Phase One of the operation.

He presumably was not involved in Phase Two

under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of

that.

After all, Trafficante was the man who brought

Verona into the operation late in Phase One,

and Verona was one of the main players during

Phase Two. 110

It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept

both Giancana and Trafficante

informed of the

operation's progress.

d) Delivery of the Pills

Neither the hi

the date on mit de la the see minguinte

delivered the pills

to Roselli during Phase One of the plots.

The chain

of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli

to deliver the pills to Trafficante.

The subsequent

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54.

site tie no ory but nose rooted to the

Cuba in late February or

early March, 1961.

Joseph Shimon informed the Committee that he

17/

and Maheu travelled together to Miami to

the

Fontainbleu in March, 1961, to witness the Patterson-

Johansson fight.,. Once there Maheu informed him

of the plot to assassinate Castro. 173 Shimon also

says that during this trip he attended a meeting

where a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination

157,11

was passed.

Shimon is probably the source for

Jack Anderson's

column of January 19, 1971, which fixes the date of the

passage of the poison at the Fontainbleu as March 13,

1961.

In any event, it appears certain that the CIA

did not pass any pills, poison, or assassination

weapons before February of 1961. The fall segment

of the plots only constituted

a planning

stage;

no

one undertook any operational activities.

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e) Location of Trafficante

To support the description of Trafficante

as a courier,

the 19gy IGR states that "/A/t that time

the

gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba,

and Trafficante was making regular trips between

-75₴175

Miami and Havana on syndicate business."

The Committee has obtained

some evidence

which indicates that Trafficante was not travelling

to Cuba during this period. No records available to

the Committee from INS, State Department, or the FBI

reflect any travels after February, 1960. During this

time, the FBI maintained physical surveillance on

Trafficante. I% Trafficante testified before the

Committee that he only made two trips to Cuba after

CuBA,

his release

from the Trescornia prison, in August, 1959;

and that these trips occurred within two to three

months of this release. 11) Additionally, considering

Trafficante's reputed top position in the La Cosa

Nostra, it seems more reasonable that Trafficante would

send a representative to Cuba to conduct any business

rather than risk being detained by Castro again.

K5-530BA- Dactai

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If Trafficante was

actually travelling

between Miami

and Havana, the implications are

interesting. He was either willing to risk being

detained again or had acquired

assurances from the

Cuban government regarding his safety. In any

event the presence of Trafficante during the fall

of 1960

in Cuba raises

the possibility. of a moße

cooperative

cose relationship between himself

and the Cuban

government than previously believed: such a

relationship during the period when Trafficante

was scheming to assassinate Castro invites the theory

that Trafficante was possibly informing the Cuban

government of activities in the Miami area in

general and of the plots in particular.. In return

for such information, Trafficante could havenaequirod

been promised

lost gambling operations as well as support and

Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband"

into the United States.

The Committee realizes the enormous ramifications

of such a theory and cautions that it has not received

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any

information or evidence in this regard. In

addition, the available evidence indicates

Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and

Havana although the Committee recognizes

'that'

Trafficante could make such trips and

not disrupt

his normal routine in Miami and Tampa, thus possibly

undermining the effect of any surveillance.

E) Verona's Other contacts of Mi Clova exele leath

As prevously related, the FBI forwarded

to the CIA a memorandum on 21 December 1960 revealing

that U. S. racketerrs were making efforts to finance

anti-castio activities and subsequeally forwarded

another memorandum

en 18 January

anuary 961 which associated

Verona with

those schemes.

ox le

other,

sources were also providing assistance to

demona to

conduct arti-Castro operations. At the time

Revolutiona in ExatiC front and the Cuban Revolutionary

Council.111 verona informed the Committee that the

purpose of the council stemmed from an agreement with

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.58-

the American government to invade Cuba and

100

1.57

establish democratic control of

the island.

Adding

We entite leak

to the support for merona

were the

promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who

reportedly were working through a Washington, D.C.

public relations firm, Edward K. Moss ang

Associates.

Moss had previous CIA associations, awas supposedly

acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini

brothers with the understanding that this group would

receive privileged treatment in the cuba of the

1-58-181

future.

In his testimony before the Committee Verona

also described a meeting with Jorge Alonzo Pejol and

Meyer Lansky in Lansky's home in Miami in the summer

759

of 1960. 117 Lansky said he had business

interests in

Cuba and

wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro,

destroy Castro, and try and establish a democratic

160-183

government.

The logical inference to be drawn from this

is that the CIA, Organized Crime, and other persons

interested

in removing the Castro regime all settled

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-37:

the exilelook

pon deverona, probably independently, as a persor

who had the potential of uniting the multitude of

exile groups to overthrow Castro.

Additionally,

Ve exile reported contacts with Organized crime

raises

the possibility that he was involved with

them in a plot to kill Castro before the evolution

of the CIA-organized crime plots.

If this was the

Me + 10r

case, then Trafficante's recruitment of verona into the

CIA operation would result in providing official U.S.

sanction to an already existing independent operation.

The CIA recognized this in stating "it is possible

that Venera already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal

syndicate when first

approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961

to carry out the Castro Assassination. 8f (see yellow page

g) Introduction of "Joe" and "Gold" and

Related

Events

The timing of the introduction of Giancana

("Gold") and Trafficante ("Joe") is important to the

analysis of the true role of organized crime in the

Castro assassination plots. This introduction,

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- 60-

together with other related events, [furthek suggests.

the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in

providing additional resources for independent

operation that the syndicate already had

commenced.

According to the 12a7 IGR, the entrance of

Giancana

and Roselli occurred during the week of

162

September 25, 1960.18

In contrast, the SSC did not

assign a precise date for their entrance because of

conflicting evidence between the 29gy IGR and Maheu's

Senate testimony which set the date after November, 1960.

The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved

in the operation during October because of the Las

Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30,

and because of the October 18, 1960 FBI memorandum

which revealed

Giancana had told several people of

I6A18%

his involvement in a plot to

assassinate Castro.

Although these two events which the SCC cites

may

support the involvement of Giancana during

October, they

also

invite speculation of independent

organized crime operations.

The October. 18, 1960,

FBI memorandum is particularly applicable.

This

states:

/D_/uring a recent conversation with several

friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro

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was to be done away with shortly,

said it

would occur in November.

Moreover, Giancana

said he had

already

met with the would-be

assassin on three occasions, the last meeting

taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu

Hotel, Miami Beach.

Giancana stated everything

had been perfected

for killing Castro and that

the assassin had arranged with a girl, not

further food bed strolls,

'pill' in some

since. according. the 1907f the poison pills,.

which the CIA prepared at Giancana's request, were.

not

ready for delivery until late February or early

March, 1961, it is extremely doubtful that Giancana's

November, 1960, assassination plot was part of the

CIA operation.

Rather it appears that organized

crime already had its poison plan in progress, using

a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the

CIA fortuitously entered the

scene.

Organized

crime then occupied a perfect position"

if their

private plot succeeded, they then would

possess

far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA

which they could exercise at an opportune moment;

if their intrigue failed, however, they could then

assume the position that they were only executing

the directives of the government And dould possibly.

As blackwo.

potentiali

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(see yellow-pi

h)

Government

Richard Cain

Dilainless stammit

The

"sari" that Giancana refers to in

involved

the October 18 memo may have been Richard Scallzetti

Cain. Cain, in connection with the top Echelon

Criminal Enforcement Program, informed the EBI

of his criminal activities and close association

166

with Giancana. 18 Cain admitted that he had

covertly worked for Giancana and been on his

payroll while he was

a member of the Chicago Police

Department from 1956-1960, director of a private

detective agency from 1960-62, and Chief Investigator

1024 for the Cook County Sheriff's Office from 1962-1964.

Several of Cain's activities during the fall

of 1960, together with his past experience, support

the proposition that if Giancana was involved inrany

Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro.

independent of the CIA plot, he would have recruited

Cain to assist him.

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3

(See yellow 104).

First, Cain maintained a record of voluntarily

providing infornation to the CIA concerning his

foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have

promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage

with the CIA. In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated

4 November 1960 Cain supplied the following informa-

tion in his first contact

with the CIA:

1)

that in 1950-52 while in Miami,.

Florida, he initiated several telephone

taps on various Cuban revolutionary

figures under the supervision of william

Buenz, a private detective who had contact

with the Batista government.

2)

that on October 2, 1960, William Buenz,

then operating out of New York City,

met with Cain at O'Hare Airport and

offered him $25,000 to travel to Cuba

at the request of former President Piro

to install telephone taps on various

Cubans, and

3)

that in 1959, Constantine Kangles, a

former

attorney for

the Cuban

26th of July

movement, inquired whether. Cain would instruct

Castro Army officers in the use of poly-

graphs.773 191

It seems more than coincidental that Cain's approach

to the CIA

to supply this information occurred

simultaneously with Giancana's meeting with Roselli

and Maheu. Cain subsequently volunteered information

to the CIA during 1961-63.

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6e=

Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential

informant told the Bureau that on October 20,

1960, serapio Montajo, the former head of the

July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain

in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former

attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th

of July

Movement and former counsel in the United States 192

-174

for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro.

Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who

wished to get news

stores and photographs out of

1913

-175

Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills.

Cain further indicated that he wanted to cover this story

and was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter

Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and

Bob Ajamian of Life magazine, had knowledge of this

176

venture. 1or

Third, on November 2, 1960, the FBI interviewed

777,95

Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach.

Cain said he was

a reprasentative of Accurate Detective

777a 196

Laboratories,

Life magazine, and sixty-four

other newspapers. Praiter providing information on the

military armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the

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6>

Resistence movement had eight hundred men fighting

in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting

the opportunity to parachute

ITs ia pinto the escambrays

to take photos for Life.

Cain said that Antonio

de Verona gave him the information on the Cuban

180

armaments. ,99

When Cain's plans to visit Cuba, either to

install wiretaps for former President Prio or to take

photographs

of rebel activity, or both, are considered

simultaneously with Giancana's presence in Miami ana

his reference to the assassination of Cane in November

and with Cain's approach to the CIA, the true purpose

and

possible interrelation of these events become

even more suspect.

The wiretap assignment and the

photographic story may have been covers, Giancana

may have been

attempting to send Cain to Cuba to

supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain

belonged to La Cosa Nostra,

spoke Spanish, had

extensive "contacts in Latin America, was well-versed

in sabotage and investigative procedures,

had been

on Giancana's payroll for four years, and apparently

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was attempting to arrive in Cuba by approximately

November, 1960. Further

Cain's reference

in his FBI interview to antonio de verena..

the

person that the CIA concedes may have been active

in independent organized crime assassination plots

against Castro prior to his recruitment by Trafficante

in March, 1961, raises more suspicion.

These events can be interpreted to indicate

that Cain may have been the "assassin-to-be" whom

Giancana referred to in the 18 October 1960 FBI

oR

memorandum, or he may have been the contact man

for the operation. The Committee cautions that this

analysis is obviously speculative.

Cain could also have provided another service

to Giancana. As already indicated, a second person,

called J.W. Harrison, allegedly

accompanied and

assisted Balletti in the wiretap. Although the Justice

Department Vigorously) pursued this investigation

and

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- 67-

prepared to indict the principals, no one could

determine who Harrison was and

no participant

would

admit

to knowing his identity.

There is no

doubt he existed; he signed the hotel register and

187200

accompanied Balletti on the flight to Las Vegas.

See DuBois, the private investigator Maheu hired

to conduct the surveillance, and Badieuri maintained

that

Maheu arranged for J. W. Harrison to accompany

Balletta from Miami to las verse ale sign Chit

operation?""

Maheu-denied thin

• omell, the

CIA liaison man, informed the Committee that whoever

183202

Harrison was he was not a CIA employee.

Clearly someone

arranged for Harrison's

presence

and knows his

true identity.

Since DuBois and Balletti

acted only as the instruments of Maheu, it seems logical

that they would have revealed Harrison's identity in

the face of federal prosecution if Harrison were just

an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA

or to the associates of Maheu in the CIA operation

against Castro. Thus, Balletti and Dubois either dia

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thea, houder

mation.

not know the identity of Harrison or felt that

their client's interests prohibited them from

revealing such information. The eith

deniéd

Clearly someone arranged-for Harrison's

Haws, presence das ay tidentity. At seems mast

the Likely that Maheu provided larrison at the request

of a source that had a direct interest in the surveillance

seeins

rost

mates do to ti

Mahou informed the Committee that he instituted

7

the surveillance to pacify Giancana's concerns that

Phyllis McQuire was having an affair with Dan Rowan 204

and to uncover any possible leaks regarding the operation

Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate.

'185 205

testimony.

Shimon further informed the Committee

that Giancana told him he paid $5,000 for the Las

4114

20t

Vegas operation.

Assuming that Maheu did provide for Harrison,

he

at tikedy did so at the request of someone else.

Maheu did not have any reason to independently prefer

one person over another; The CIA or Giancana, however,

did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest

obviously stemmed from his relationship with McQuire

and it is probably correct

that Giancana requested

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## Page 72

69-

Maheu to bug. Rowan's room.

This personal interest

could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to

use a person of Giancana's choice. Cain fits that

role perfectly. He was a skilled electronic

surveillance technician and was in Miami during

late October and early November.

Miami- was the

Ballitt

debarkation point for Harrison and Batitti on their

their trip to Las Vegas. In his deposition, Maheu

187.207

denied any knowledge of Cain.

When

shown several

photographs of Cain from the late 1950's and early

1960 's, Arthur Ballitti also could not identify Cain

as Harrison. 208 rhese denials do not detract from

the theory that Cain was Harrison, if no one would identify

Harrison in 1960 there is no reason to expect any

change in testimony.

The CIA had a personal interest

in surveilling

McQuire because of the 18 October 1960 memoranduin where

Giancana discussed an assassination plot against

Castro. The SSC concludes

that this memo caused the

CIA to be concerned with determining if Giancana

was leaking information on the CIA-organized crime

plots.

This may be partially correct, but as already

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seer

p.

indicated, the FBI Memorandum depicts a plot

substantially in progress and involving a girl which

does

not resemble the October status of the CIA

operation. The CIA could have been more concerned

that Giancana was involved in a separate assassination

plot and consequently could have been concerned with

its nature and extent.

The reasons why phyllis

Mcquire would have been the target for such surveillance

were two-fold. First, her relationship with Giancana

might have entailed her learning of certain clandestine

activities.

Second, she was one of the "several

friends" in the conversation related in the 18 October

189

memo. 20%

The CIA interest would also explain why a wiretap

was installed. Maheu informed the Committee that he

only ordered physical surveillance of the target,

Rowan, and could not understand why anyone installed

a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on

190

McQuire's reported affair with Rowan.

Physical surveillance and a room bug would,

admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any eilace i

and affair. If, however, Maheu also wished to investigate

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the

possibility of

leaks in the operation as well

as the possibility of Giancana's involvement

in an

independent plot, then the use of a wiretap would

have been logical.

Assuming that investigating an affair was not

the primary focus of the Las Vegas operation,

it can

in ta devo: Perim and silen habitatio,

be argued that direct surveillance of McQuire, would

have been the optimum method to investigation her

for quet leaks and information that Giancana may have

given her. This, however, would have run the risk

of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his possible

departure from the CIA assassination plots if

anyone

detected the

surveillance.

Through the cover of

surveilling Rowan for a possible affair with McQuire,

however, the CIA had the opportunity to indirectly

surveil McQuire to obtain information on the

assassination plots for a reason which met the approval

of Giancana.

Indeed, Giancana probably always believed

that his directive to investigate a possible affair

was the only issue involved in the surveillance.

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112°

In any event, the objectives of both Giancana

and the CIA could have been achieved whether Harrison

was a Giancana choice, specifically Cain, or an

Agency aparation. operatine.

After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the

CIA obviously decided to

continue

o1ots his and cata hour chees are eat the

security of the CIA organized crime plot had not

been seriously breached.

Additionally, it possibly

indicates that the CIA determined that even if Giancana

was involved in an independent operation, that it would

not hamper their efforts, and that all interests could

be reconciled. The CIA continued on the same track,

blithely going "to bed" with organized crime.

i)

The "girl" in the 18 October 1960

Memorandum

In this memo Giancana spoke of

a girl who

was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro.

This format is again contradiction to the CIA

operation which initially relied on star orta, an

inhe

656734

mistryntomadminister

the pills

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- 13-

Insert.

Paiges

The identity of this"girl"referred to by

Giancana has not been ascertain but it is reasonable

to assume that frafficante was in the prime position

to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous

contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution

circles.

American gamblers routinely maintained Cuban

mistresses and Trafficante was a typical example.

A witness also informed the Committee that Castro

customarily arrived at the Nacional Hotel unescorted

-191

•to visit one of his peramours.ol! This indicates

that it may have been relatively easy for Trafficante

to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro

and to attempt to poison him. Consequently, the use

of a girl is quite logical and further supports the

involvement of organized crime in an independent plot

to kill Castro.

i) Articles on Frank Sturgis

As indicated in Section II Paul Meskill of

the New York Daily News wrote several articles in

1975 and 1976 concerning activities of Frank Sturgis.

these articles (further reflect) the theory that

organized crime was involved in independent Castro

assassination plots:

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went

before

The Committee consequently agrees with the

TFR

CIr assertion that the Agency "may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to

its material contribution was also supplying an aura

of official sanction. " 212

tease-man....

formulete in the Goriltee

_The following considerationslemanate. from

this theory and more thoroughly respond to the allegations

in the Meskill articles.

First, organized crime probably initiated

independent assassination plots against Castro prior

to any CIA involvement in late 1960.

Such plots may

have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its

• plans

to kill Castro in April, 1962.

Second, organized crime could quite possibly

have been directing activities such as those described

in the New York Daily News article.

Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established

contacts with organized crime through his gambling

associations

and

probably was used by them

in

some

capacities.

This does not imply that he was a member

of organized crime.

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- 15

Forth, Frank Sturgis probably knew ota

and could have been involved with him in an

assassiña-

tion plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source,

however, his allegations are

suspect.

Fifth, according to the Committee's

review of

the CIA was not

an any operations no a go to 0 ve

involved

was not necessarily involved with

or esta in a plot to kill Castro. He may have

involving Me and possibly Lorenz

Learned of ple An i

in Miami after Orta arrived there in 1965.

Additionally, the April, 1975 Meskill articles

• did not relate the Sturgis-Lorenz plot to kill Castro

with poison pills. It is only after the publication

of the SSC Interim Report in November, 1975, and the

Final Report in April, 1976, that Meskill describes

this plot. Thus, Sturgis may have combined accurate

information obtained from Orte: and

other Maimi sources

with the facts the SSC presented and then fabricated

which)

the Lorenz story, together with other evidence such

as the 18 October memo,

a can succeed Infortunately

in appearing both logical and believable.

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16°

Implications Arising From Phase Two of

the Operation

Significant differences are apparent between

Phase One and Phase Iwo which reflect upon organized

crime's

motivation and seriousness in fulfilling

its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960.

First, in Phase One, Roselli and his colleagues

demonstrated their ability to execute the contract

on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed,

in a position close to Castro.

In Phase Two the modus

operendi and the ability of the assassin or assassins

No. 1 0441984

ecomes quite vague. Harvey reported that verona

had an asset

in Cuba who had access to someone in a

restaurant which Castro frequented who could administer

207-

the poison. 21" In June, 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey

la exile leim

that i

mona had

dispatched a three man team to Cuba

to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill him

themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity

-202

203

Harvey said they had no specific plans.

Second, as already indicated, the cast of the

organized figures involved changed. Maheu, Giancana,

and Trafficante allegedly retired from the scene, with

*

in fact, the modus

operandli

for lotte pot

phose.I

relied...on,

extention. som

inprediat

employed

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17

« "Maceo""

a sunile the position of trafficante.

Roselli and verona remained.

The Committee agrees

with the CIA that these figures, at least Trafficante

and Giancana, were kept informed of the progress of

the plots.

What is puzzling is the introduction of a

person simply referred to as, "Maceo" into a highly

sensitive and covert CIA operation without any

apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background

or ascertain his identity. It seems extraordinary

?

that the CIA would propel the plots forward without

performing any security check.

Indeed, it seems

more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did

ascertain the identity of Maced and for whatever

reason decided to withhold this information.

Further,

although th

mobilization involved venera, whom

Trafficante recruited in Phase One, it seems reasonable

to assume that some of the individuals in Phase One

were actively attempting to kill Castro after the Bay

of Pigs and probably until the advent of soviet

solidification. These efforts, however, may well-over

nest pege at parnt A

Macho

Do bettis

I those I

Tears

soose went

Triane

replie

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18

have been conducted without CIA knowledge and

again support the theory of independent organized

crime plots. → oves to p. 79-tup:

A related issue is whether "phases" actually

existed or whether the operations to kill Castro

encompassed a continuous time period. As previously

indicated, the CIA precautions that the plot was

dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumeanat

direction in the spring of 1962. Both Harvey and alenfe.

aidenmall stated, however, that Harvey "took over payti

a going operation." Considering that Roselli was

Vable to Immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in

response to Harvey's request and that this 1967

ttiaeotdredlbndeddedarordotnconooiicidir.idionddittotdoobiidaidddid9dtoridddum.ia.oom

IGR characterizes Macco as Roselli's man, it is

more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited

all the Cuban personnel previously used in the

attempts and who maintained the most complete network

of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this

individual.

If this speculation is accurate, then it

displays Trafficante again performing a direct role

during Phase II, a function every source has denied.

qjer finecheg.the)

pasagrapu ele

HH 53080 DocId: 32273546 Page

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199-

During late 1962 and early 1963 Phase Two

/ undramatically and slowly terminated. In retrospect,

the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity

of the potential assassins, the total reliance of

Harvey on Roselli for any information,

and the

seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate

any information

from Roselli all converge to posit the

theory that organized crime was not seriously attempting

to assassinate Castro after following the solidification

of Soviet. influence in the Castro regime. Trafficante,

Lansky, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized

by the mid-1962 that the "golden goose" of Havana

had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be

made elsewhere. Certainly, history shows growing

Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas

Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic,and

burgeoning bolita operations

in Florida arising from

the influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized crime

may have determined that the new Justice Department

crackdownwould probably not have permitted the

"wide open" Cuba of the pre-kennedy era even if the

United States had succeeded in ousting the Cuban

regime.

Consequently, while the United States

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80-

government, specifically the CIA, still possessed

viable.

interest in assassinating Castro, organized

crime did

not.

2. Motivation of Organized Crime to be

involved in Plots

Despite the reasons just presented to discontinue

attempts to kill Castro, organized crime still had

strong

incentive to string the CIA along. Specifically,

this incentive was to establish a relationship with the

CIA for subsequent use in thwarting prosecution for

infloud offenses and thus blunting any Justice

Department proceedings against organized crime.

The Committee believes that organized crime,

while always

recognizing

the benefits of establishing

a relationship with the CIA, finitiallylwas also

seriously interested in

assassinating Castro to regain

lost territory.. As already indicated, the Committee

believes this desire ebbed with the solidification

of sovier influence and other factors just mentioned.

After this occurrance it appears organized crime may

only have put forth the "appearance" of involvement

and good faith in the plots to further define a

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- 81-

relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA

prevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las

Vegas wiretap incident would have given Maheu,

Roselli and Giancana confirmation of the value of

such a relationship and impetus for continuing it

in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro

may no longer have been

a viable

alternative.

The actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly

Roselli in the years following these plots support

this theory.

As related in Section II, these

individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation

and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder

204-216

law enforcement prosecutions and objectives.

The success of some of their efforts verifies the

tremendous blackmail potential they possessed.

AS

Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, commented in

May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over

a barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted

that

the FBI would be able to do anything about either

Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous

205

activities" with the CIA. 217

It is clear that at least one group benefited

from the failure of the assassination plots.

3.. Retaliation Theory

The Committee found no evidence that these

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operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate

President Kennedy in retaliation.

The Committee also has found no evidence that

Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities

or even knew of their existence prior to

the death

of President Kennedy. Iran If Castro did discover

their

existence, however,

the Committee

does

not

attached

insert

In an article in the Washington Post on

**5:

September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex-CIA

agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P. Morgan,

and reputed mobster John Roselli were his sources.

The Committee has determined that John Roselli was the

person who informed Harvey

and Morgan about the plots

and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source,

HH

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the

cicipt. thie

would not biry

trition if this sSC that Castic

connicied them virth luCIA.

GITa The

Commette recognizes that only a file pirsons actually

Kine of the CiA spinsorship and that the

Cuban operatives and others engaged in peretrating

Citi in direct participating in the assassinatio

efforts were reportedly toed that the

United stales businessmen and organiyed

crime sponsored the operation. The Committer

st bileres, horever,: that whell not being

able to be cutes Castro insued hose highly.

suspected the CiA in any assassination plot

he uncovered, at least to the deque tas

he loved has suspected the CiA ins

finding the i person or persons plotting

his murder.

The reason is that Castio

suspected the CiA of Constantly allerpting to

through every possible methad including assess

overthrow his Government Castios mectin

with sendor George me govern

where Castio

alleged

gas. negoven a listing

de^ CIA-sponsore

supports thirtention

'Cinseguently,

assassination plots it

there is no reason to assume. that Costio

would not has attributed the particular

plot to the CIA

HH 53080 DocId:32273546 Page

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-84-

Even assuming that Castro did

ascertain

the existence.of the CIA-organized crime plots and

that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the Committee's

belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory,

the Committee still believes it is unlikely that

Castro would have resorted to assassinating the

President of the United States in retaliation for the

reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the

Issue

Analysis section. Specifically, these reasons are:

1)

the prospect of exposing Cuba to

invasion and destruction would not have

been worth the risk;

2)

3)

the act of changing a leader does not

necessarily change the system;

It caN be argued that,

Castro may have recognized that among)

the leaders of

the United States/Kennedy

maintained the least hostile approach

towards Cuba; and

4)

the growing prospect of detente between

Cuba

and the United States would have

refrained Castro from assassinating an

American official.

4. Related Organized Crime Activities

The Committee reviewedlevidence that f

raises the possibility that various organized crimeurhich

were

figures involved in attempts to assassinate Castroßwere

unrelated to the CIA.

HH 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 87

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See yello p. 149

To ascertain more information about organized

crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots,

the Committee investigated Norman Rothman, who was active

in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro

takeover and who consequently maintained associations

with organized crime and the Batista regime.

At various times, Rothman served as manager of

the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs in Cuba representing

the interests of the Mannarind brothers of pittsburgh 30g

FBI files on Rothman indicate that a proposal

to kill Castro was made to Rothman as a "quid pro quo"

in which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for

a 1960 gun running conviction dig

During an FBI interview,

Rothman stated that he had been in "personal contact

with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well

as Assistant Attorney General John Liegenthaler both

of Washington, D.C." and members of the Kennedy

Administration. 220

In a deposition to the Committee taken in

Miami on April 16, 1978, Rothman expanded on the

theme to include a series

of mysterious telegrams

sommoning him to the White House for a series of two

or three meetings which began in Attorney General

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86°

See yellow p. 151

Kennedy's office with members of his

staff and

continued in a conference room where. Rothman's

assistance

in providing contacts inside Cuba was

221

explored.

At the last meeting Rothman says that:

"one of them happened to_discuss /the

assassination of Castro/with me, but not

in a technical way.

You know, just in a

casual way.

That is about it.

I cannot

for the moment remember it word for word

because it is too far back. " 275

The evidence suggesting such an approach by Robert

Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense

when viewed in light of the Justice Department crack-.

down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely

doubtful that

any meeting with Rothman on this topic

would have occurred at the White House. Consequently,

the Committee believes it highly unlikely that such

event occurred.

The Committee also reviewed evidence which

indicates that organized crime may have been aware of

the AMLASH operation during

its existence.

The last IGR identified three name links between

the AMLASH operation and the organized crime obere sorte

The IGR did not sufficiently analyze, however, that

the common denominator in two of the links was Santo

Trafficante.

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87°

Link One

In March, 1961, the CIA

received

information

that a high-ranking military figure in

the Castro

close t

regime and a former personal secretaryof Castro

both wished to defect.

The military efficer was

Caline 8

Rolando=CubdosSecades-(AMbASlandmthentonsmer

secretary.wasmuan-Ostatheoperatveused.in

phaselwofnthe@tA-organi.zed.crimemphats.

As already

revealed

or rep

indicated, the by IRG documents/that Trafficanten re-

cruited eaten

infiltration at the same time there is nothing to

suggest a relationship between the two men in attempting

to assassinate Castro, not a common denominator with

Trafficante, Roselli, Giancana or any other members

of the American gambling syndicate. This link is mt à)

therefore insignificant.

Link Two

In mid-March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a noted

Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious

position of Minister of Sports in Cuba, contacted CIA

HH

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88..

station personnel in Madrid. to inform the agency

that "he was in contact with a group of military

officers

who were planning to kill Castro" (1967

I.G. Report, p.

1. It quickly became clear to CIA

employees that Bongo's reference was to euboia and the

group of military men who were allied with him in attempt-

225

the TFR

ing to depose Castro.

Although the t2ey and

epents are silent den

ar attitude toward Bongo's

information, it must be assumed that bey did not

respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was

in progress at the time and Artime was in the process

of delivering arms caches

to debehens people within

Cuba.

Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency

extension

personnel

as a lawyer, for the Capri Hotel and Casinc

in Havana, who had been jailed in July 1975 for a

period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for

representing Santo Trafficante.

Bongo's utilization

of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides"

is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during

August, 1959.

For the Cuban government to wait for

years to exact retribution for that representation makes

Tittie

a sense.

Possibly; Bongo was involved in approaching

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88-

station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency

that "he was in contact with a group of military

officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967

22 4

I.G. Report, p. 1.

It quickly became clear to CIA

employees that Bungo's reference was to euvare and the

group of military men who were allied with him in attempt-

te TER

ing to depose Castro. Although the too and that.

angues are silent ashnast attitude toward Bongo'

Mi CIA

information, it must be assumed that thr did not

respond

affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was

in progress at the time and Artime was in the process

of delivering arms caches to cubetes people within

Cuba.

Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency

repicendeny

personnel as a lawyer, fo

the Capri Hotel and Casino

in Havana, who had been jailed in July 1975 for a

period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for

2-25

representing Santo Trafficante.

Bongo's utilization

of the short prison term to establish his "bona

fides"

is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during

August, 1959. For the Cuban government to wait for flic

years to exact retribution for

that representation

makes

liftie.

no sense.

Possibly; Bongo was involved in approaching

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the Castro government in 1962 on Trafficante's

behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino.

Bongo's trip to Madrid apparently involved more

than a contact with the CIA for he was arrested for

counterfeiting and held until his old client, Santo

Trafficante, arrived with a sunse

to obtain his release, 227

Presumably, Bongo was paroled

back to Cuba, at an unspecified later date, where

he died.

One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship

in Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is

doubtful that anything more than supposition can result

from further exploration.

As already indicated, it has

been reported by Jack Anderson that

secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason

to speculate that Cubans originally recruited, by Santo

Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and

sent back to the United States where they were directly

involved in

the assassination of President Kennedy.

If this line of hypothecation is adapted, then the

trip to Madrid by Bongo could

assume some

sinister

implications such as the possibility that Bongo's

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90:

in descle it reat.

MASA CURES And

95501007/2.46

Tiradicante

real purpose in contacting the Madrid Station was

to act as a

double agent for Castro

in ascertaining

the nature and scope of the AMLASH

operation. Castro

certainly became aware of the Artime meetings with

Cabetas in the fall of 1964 since the list of charges

upon which Cubeta went to trial in 1966 began with

these Madrid meetings. If Castro had begun his

suspicions of embeda's role with the CIA during

Late 1964 or early 1945, it is likely that he voula

have begun counter-intelligence measures to confirm his

fears which could have led to Castro

sending Bongo

to Spain to contact the Agency. Given Traffieantes

A 5506 1 58 43-95099

closeniaste Bongo, it can be postulated that

Trafficante was-aware of Bongo's true mission prior

to his departure or became knowledgeable when he bailed

him out of jail in Madrid.

-Trafficante also could have received news of

AMLASHI'S

Cuberare ties with the Agency through his close

associate Jorge Nobregas who was described by Gorge

Crite in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76)

AMBASIY

as "having worked. with the CIA, was in

ass

student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close

to Trafficante."

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Actually, given the extent of Trafficante's

high-level contacts within the exile community and

the low-level security in the CIA exile operations,

it

is extremely logical that Trafficante and other

members of the underworld knew, in some fashion,

part or all of the AMLASH plot. The question

becomes :

So what? Short of being able to blackmail

the government about the modus operendi of the 1960-62

events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH

is not readily apparent.

housener,

I/Trafficante was a double agent, working for

the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro,

then another scenario emerges. It is then logical

to assume that Castro knew of the AMLASH and CIA-

organized crime operations from their inception.

As mentioned earlier in this

material, Trafficante

could have received a sanctuary and assistance in

"ir?

smuggling contraband for such information. As also

discussed earlier, however, the Conmittee believes

that even if Castro had knowledge of CIA sponsorship

of plots

against his life, that this would not have

provoked him to kill President Kennedy.

The benefit

of contemporaneous knowledge of the plots would be.

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-G2-

to neutralize their effect. Consequently, the

Committee believes that any contacts between

do

necessarily

AMLASH and Bongo tasy not effect the untenability

of the retaliation theory.

c). Link three

The SSC noted that information contained in

the

aper from "A," Kiator Spinosa Hernandez, raised

the possibility that a link existed between the

AMLASH operations and the 1960-62 CIA plots to

228

assassinate Castro using underworld contacts.

A review of the I

toG. report does not

sustain the Senate's conjecture in that there is no

available evidence cited in the Report to suggest

dezt had knowledge of,

that "A" (kictor Spinos

or involvement with, any of the syndicate or Cuban

exiles who participated in Phase I or II of the

CIA-Mafia

assassination plots during 1960-62. What

Book V did was to seize upon the 1967's tentative

identification of "name

links" between the 1960-62

organized operation and AMLASH intrigue, and expand

no nas

batonced

It is noted that a comment on

link" of A mplit one

said

gages.

78,79

At

I,

and:

Report

yes at book

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the amorphus

nature of those

"name links," which

included "A," into a theory that. "A" was. the

conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeable

of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA

efforts to eliminate Castro.

The only solid factual basis for Book V's tie-

in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots

is based upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities

in June-July 1963, which Book V examined.

Moreover;

CIA files contained at least some FBI reports on "A,"

the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting

explosives to New Orleans in 1963.

These reports detail

his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld

figures" who were operating the guerilla training

camp

in New Orleans in July 1963.

The "underworld figures" reference relates to

Michael and William McLaney who have been considered

organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and

media

personnel. (See profile). Again, however, no

evidence from any source places McLaney into the early

CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation.

A review of the June-July 1963 activities of McLaney

and Victor Espinosa leads only to the inference that

*

We cannot contribute positively to

the "A" syndicate link. Hosted it

is noted that what "A"

knew: 160d

AMLASHA

seans testingsted the

• 1963

perad: See 18 78790 101

at

Book I, SSC Final Report

---

## Page 98

their operation was a private limited venture

with no agency or syndicate support and very little

chance of success.

Moreover, the link between McLaney, Espinosa

and the organized crime principals connected.to

the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected

in

order to make a judgment

as to the likelihood of

the SSC speculation that the syndicate held "inside"

information on Agency operations in 1960-65.

Since the Senate did not attempt to interview

either of the McLaney brothers or Victor Espinosa in

1975 nor ask principals of the 1960-62 plots of their

knowledge or relationship to McLaney or Espinosa, the

Senate's hypothetical question of underworld knowledge

of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a

minimum of hard data

and a maximum of free-wheeling

conjecture.

The evidence linking Espinosa to any known organized

crime figures consists of his admission to being

friends with "Cappy" Rothman, Norman Rothman's son,

and a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned

from his student days of visiting the Havana casinos.

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-95.

Mike McLaney's ties to organized crime have

investigated

been

within federal law

enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid

evidence has linked him to Trafficante, Roselli or

Giancanaj

#ince McLaney has been most frequently

mentioned as a "Lansky man."

To place a witting

McLaney into the 1960-62 plots, it requires

series

of

speculative hurdles which include:

v (2)

ng

Meyer Lansky was a plotter with

Trafficante,

(B) McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; and

the various underworld figures acted

in concert in promoting anti-Castro

operations.

The Committee believes that

these premises.

NOr

areneasily supportable with tacts and consequents

does not place any significance in the Victor Spinosa

link.

As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana

and

John Roselli were murdered Sam Giancana was shot

in the basement of his home in Chicago in June,

1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before

the ssc regarding the CIA organized crime plots;

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John Roselli's butchered body was found inside

an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne

Bay, Florida in August, 1976 which was shortly

after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA-

organized crime plots.

Various theories have surfaced concerning

why they were killed and who was responsible.

One

theory relevant to this investigation is that Giancana

and Roselli were killed because of

their participation

in the Castro assassination plots and the SSC attempts

to elicit information on the plots. . In this

regard, Trafficante has most often been the person

assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other

hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee

that it believes that organized crime performed the

murders and that the reasons were unrelated to the CIA-

organized crime plots.

The Justice Department is still investigating

both murders.

The Committee

has not uncovered evidence

relevant to solving these murders... The Committee

does believe, however, that a variety of motivations

inspired the deaths. These motivations included

internal mob conflict, especially in the case of

Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-

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organized crime plots. The Committee considers it

soci% probable that Trafficante approved of and

assisted in the murderd of at

• John Roselli.

coucal

Trafficante's motivation word have been to maintain

a low profile in connection with the CIA plots and

to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons

involved in the plots as well as other operations

and activities which an investigation of the plots

might uncover. The Committee does not believe that

such activities were necessarily connected to the

assassination of President Kennedy.. For instance,

Trafficante may have had a covert relationship with

Castro which may have

entailed his running contraband

through cuba into the united states:

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98-

_Consequently, although the deaths of Roselli

and Giancana

related miery to

the CIA-organized crime operations, the Committee

does not believe that they are related

necessari to the

assassination of President Kennedy.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Committee makes the following conclusions:

A.

AMLASH OPERATION

THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE

AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER. CASTRO

TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

2.

THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN

WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH

OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS

AN ASSASSINATION PLOT.

3.

ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION

PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND

THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE,

THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY

THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVOKED IN A

MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING

PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

4.

ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION

PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND

SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES IT IS

UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO

ASSASSINATBATHE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN RETALIATION.

5.

THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES. THAT ANY KNOWLEDGE ON

THE PART OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH

OPERATION OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED

CRIME FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED

PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD NOT ALTER THE

CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

HH

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B. CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS

•1.

THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO. EVIDENCE THAT THESE

OPERATIONS PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO

ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

2.

THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE

THAT CASTRO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE

PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY;

touRie, rapes IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE

THE COMMITTEE DONE BELIEVESTHAT CASTROprocably

WOULD HAVE BE

WEED THEM UPH THE

CIA.

Attribited Te

3.

ASSUMING THAT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT

KENNEDY THAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE

OF THESE PLOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING

THEM, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES IT IS UNLIKEL

THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4.

5.

6.

THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME

WAS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS.

THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE PRINCIPAL

REASON WHY ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE

PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS

FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD

SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONE

OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES. INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS.

THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT JOHN ROSELLI USED

THE FACTS OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS TO

FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS

TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION IN LEGAL MATTERS.

HH

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