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178-10004-10054

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992]

JFK Assassination jystem

Identification Furm

Agency Informal on

Date:

4/17/201

AGENCY: ROCKCOM

RECORD NUMBER :

178-10004-10054

RECORD SERIES: • ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

Document Infomation

ORIGINATOR: PFIAB

FROM: KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN

TO: RECORD

TITLE: MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBLAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS:

12/28/1962

10

DOCUMENT TYPE:

CLASSIFICATION:

RESTRICTIONS:

CURRENT STATUS:

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

PFIAB

MC CONE, JOHN

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CUBAN EXILES

MEMORANDUM

Top Secret

1B

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09/09/2016

WH 52879

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3.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FINCIDENT'S FORGION INTELLIGENCE ADVIGORY BOAKD

AGENDA FOR MERCINGS OR DECONDER 27 - 20, 1062.

SUBTECT

0:00 -8:30

7:20 - 10:00

10:00 - 12:15

12:15

1:00 - 2:30

2:30 - 3:30

3:30 - BM 0?

Day

1:30 p.1.

9:06 - 9:30

1:30 - 1:00

Decenber 27Ch

The Crimmon's Tim

Review of Doand's Draft Interam Report

the Prosident

Revier Di Mraft Report on Intelligerico

Commur 1lt

Arm 0111609

(Roccarad them

on Decanbor 20, 1902)

Depart l'or Kuch

janah ine lay-inerts

(Guesto of Di.

Longer)

fr.

CIA

Mircctor/intelligence,

Revier of neporo on Gibar 1m0

1.110np

• st

residente of Mit.

john Mecons

fortraect, D. C.)

: (3025

Decause:

The Cinderan's Tine

Discuislon of Renord on the Cuban Aras

Buildie with the Following key teela

a. 0:30-10:30clr. john MoGone

o. 10:50-11:00 LIst.

generalM. Carter,

Deputy Director, CIP

c. 106-1460 dit. Genarch G. Blake,

Dipector, MgA

d. 11: 30-12:00-119.

hones ruches,

Director,

Intelligence

110!.30

Rescarch, Department of Stal

e. 12:00-1:00 Vii. General oseph Carrold,

Director, DIA

CONFIDENTINI

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• cred.

CONFIDENTIAL,

(ascraber 200% - Continued)

SB.J222

IDDI

11.

12.

•TIMS

- 8:153

2:20 - 3:30

13.

3:30 - 5:15

Linch - Horm i!

rabus of Implemencation or Prior-Board

20200212822230

Romane Diccuocion of Acport i the Croan

is Ballaug

and connicte treparation oi

ilaport to ind frontient.

CONFIDENTIAL

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...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASH NGTON

HOP. SECE

This true at casela faration

IDEALIST, CORONA

EXCART.

MEMORANDUN FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1902

The board conveneà at 9:00 a.m. on Decenber 27. * Those

resent were bi. Killian,

Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy,

ray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Mesors. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft

report which had been furnisied to the Board on

day by Mi. MoCone, the Director of Central Intelligenee, setting

forth the results

of the all-source review miich the Board hai

requested concerning U.S. intelligence cormunity activities with

respect to the

soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-morths

preceding October 22, 1962.

The Chalrman asked that Board members

make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise

for discussion

during this

twc-day meeting.

Di. Killian said that,

sure the DCI's repert had the approval of the inteili-

gence community at this point,

for he understood that Mr. McCone

vas at that moment reviewing tne draft report in Seattle, and it

Has possible that some of the conclusions and factual details

might not have yet received final approval by te agencies which

the preparatior of the report (oll, DIA,

State and

Accordingly, the Chairran noted the importance or the

discussions which

the Board iculd have on the following day witr

heads of the intelligence agercies.

The Chairman also thought

preparation

of a board report

to the President at the close of his 2-day meeting.

Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr.

McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs

to produce a solid report on the handling given by U.S. Intelli-

gence agencies to the soviet military buildup in Cuna.

Mr. Bundy

assured that the President will undersiand that the Board is going

into the subject deeply and oljectively.

Abnut 10 days ago, the

Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mi.

had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from

a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not

set to the basic issues,

and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to

sail to Mr. Mcuone about this.

De. Killian stated that he had an

appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he

would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of

this meeting.

*

Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

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24-day stay In Cuba, and our Gov amment. equally in the dark

alout Soviet and Cuban plansifor further activitles'involving

other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking Intel-

discussions.

Mr. Murphy reiterated

his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these,

indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to

keep

our Government informed

aboli developments in Cuba at the pre-

sent

time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this, point r'ported to. the Board on lihe con-

versation which he hadzjust.had iith Mr. "Bundy. According to

Mr.

Bundy, the Fresidentiis fully aware that the Board is con-

ducting its review of the cuba ,gituacion..

The President wants

an vijectlve report froma group oi citizens who have no are to

grind,

and he is placing great store, on this effort of the Board.

The Chairman said

that fir. Bundy was

obviously concerned about

the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba.

matter.

However, Mr. Bundy recis there is a bare possibility that

Congressional

investigators will

be more nesitant to raise ivvo-

thetical questions if they leain

of the existence of a stuay naving

been made by a group such as the Board.

It is tir. Bundy's hope

tnat the Board will caefully consider the preparation of a sani-

tized version of the report;

•but if the. Board end the President feel

that this cannot be done then the Board

should try to prepare a

report which could be used

in crocutive session of a Committee of

the Congress.

Dr. Killian

went, on to report other matters which had been

covered in nis discussion with fir. Bundy.

He said that Mi. Bundy

nad expressed concern over the failure of the dôl to accent the

suggestion that there be suinüted a more adequate report than the

one

which

the DCI forwarded io the Board on Decemier 26.

Bundy

noted in shis connection

that the DCI's report

assigns to policy

maicers prime responsibility.

for any failures with respect to

intelligence handling.

on the question offavailability of Special Group records for

purposes of the Boarals study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman at

Chat certainly the Boara should axamine such recoras and that

chey could be obtained: from.Mr. Parrott Mi.

the board, is the only group which can have this lind of access.

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As to the Board'stscuay,'

Bundy told Dr. Killian that.

should include in its review discussions with the

Secrotarles of State and Defense and the Chairmen of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff - Mr.:

Bunay ind: cating that the Secretary

Defense has particular reservations about the DCI!s report.

Another matter mentioned by. Mir. Bundy was his belier that

the morale of the intelligence

community as a snole stands to

suffer in the ausence. of a carefully done review and report

which is being expected. from the Board

With regard to the interim eport which the Board has under

Bundy informed the Chai man that the report could be

alivered to him or it could be presented to the.

Iresident directly,

and fir.

thought 1t important that the Board present st to.

the President in person

"Onetother matter discussed was the Board's

concern about any intelligence lit-doin in the wake of the cuba

it being tir. Bunciÿ's vel ef that no such let-down is in

prospect if present directives.and discussions on the subject have

any effect in Governnent.

('t the conclusion of the Clairman's account of his discussion

With Wi. Burdy, the Board recessad for lunci. )

At 2:30 p.Mn., the Boaid was

briefed on the world situation by

Lairlor, senior: Intelligence officer in CIA's Office of

Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/ Intelligence vas

on vacation leave and not availarie to be present at this Board

meeting).

li. Lawlor explained. that his own responsibilities in-

the handling of current intelligence matters,

and write-up of current intelligence Items (e.g.; in the CIB and in :

memorancia for the White House), and the preparation of internal in-..

telligence nutes for use at the 3IA working level.

vir, Lawlor'

pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis an?

the scare included the following subject matuers:

not the coldection, of intelligence. His brieting of

USSR/Chicon relations: Recriminations between the USSR and la

Conmunj.sü

China are the greatest in the history of their dispute

and an open bread in party relations Is most likely near

USSR/Cuba:.

The. USSP 1s piesently

reappraising its: foreign

policy posicions.

1ni the licherof the Cuba crasts

s artermath:

USSR/Berlin: In Ther UeSR,

isfatiadiplomatic.standstitt.in bexthr

this is traceable

nift

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20:

•The Chairman

asked-the DCI whether the MONGOOSE actIvity

presented any particular"intelligence, problem in the Cuba.!

McCone said' hat. 1l had not.

He said that

in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group

and the Attorney

given a great denl of consideration to the neec

for intelligence collection 11th: respect tu Cuba,

Intelligence needed was primirily:for covert action rather

than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity!:

contributed to the over-all. intelligence collection effort

Fir. licCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the

collection of intelllgence.or Cuba after the Bay of Pigs 1n-

vasion, and when he took off: ce in November 1961 Mr. McCone

Interrogation of Cuban refugees

the Presiden' and the Attorney General they got the

refugee,;

Interrogations under: way. 2 3

fir. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in

intelligence gathering after

the Bay of Pigs incident.

Mccone said that this took s ace before his time, but he

assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and

otier psychological factors.

In response to Di. Killian's

question as to whether anothur intelligence let-down was in

store in the wake of the Cubi: crisis, Mr. McCone said that

there was in fact a great danger of such a development following

what some offictals consider was an "intelligence victory"

for the United States:

"Iccone, noting that the soviet

SA-2's remain In Cuba,

said lie had

brought this up forcerully;

a week ago at an NSC Executire Committee meeting,

President had agreed to get lord to the USSR that any inter-

ference with our aerial recoinaissance of Cuba would be

as being nost grave

-- and Messrs. McCloy and

Stevenson have passed this.word. to Kuznetsov.

Mir. McCone:

that, while low-level:r/conraissance

flights. have beent

suspended, should

any.ominou:. development 'occur.it.will.be

necessary. to.obtain/President.lal.approval.of the resumption

of. low-level'flights,:

:S/4 062/29 500.34

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were

on the conduct of. inteiligen e operations

with regard to. Cuba.

it Is desired to follow a more 'aggressives

matter on sent deration into cuba. He wond et see

a:3. or 4 month effort directed: torard the obtainingior.straight

Intelligence zon Cuban lin/llen or political warfare,: for example

to.determine the..trend.of/So/lathplans.1n.Cuba..The DCI.noted

that the Sovlets. mave guietly

getrout.of.cuoa,cor.theytnay

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21

fact take one step back" and tir

steps;forward,

and hold' on to

the Cuba real

estate"as.a: propéganda and: insurgency base,

as a means of keeping. Castro vi der control, or in order to

retain a capability: for quickiestoration

ofia Soviet offensive

capabillty.

The kind'of concerted'intelligence action which

the DCI had in mind would inclide: 1•" penetration. of+the-Castron

government regime, (2) the

placement of additional agent teams i

in Cuba, (3) the

continuation: f efforts to obtain the assistance

..of British,

French andiGerman. epresentatives in Cuba, (4). the.ra

possible obtaining

of useful i telligence from the attorney,

"African Pilot!!

iyestcrday.asked..to

sechazu.iSs

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of

Guantanamo Naval Base as a base :for launching intelligence and

Mr. McCone said that he would

favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo

for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other

support

for Cuba's demands for !,S. el acuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General:Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that

U-2 overflights of Cuba were: gring: at the rate of two a day, re-

sulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of

some important targets' (e.g., larbors) more often.

Mr. liccone said

that COMOR and USIB. list: the

he turgets and that he then establishes

flight schedules.

10279

Pace.asked whether

Don dame a study the expected Intelligence return thati

would be obtained 1.f-intelligence operations were conducted from.

the Base -- Mr. Pace: adding thit. he

thought such a study should be

¿made before: a final policy dec sion was reached.

Mr.. MeCone said:

"that he had not made.such."

opera had no one choostiao the Monoose Group that Guan-

tanamo Base be.

wascopposed at the policy. lever

Mr. McCone said that he, would nothbe opposed to a restudy. of the

proposal".at this.time..In ansverato:D. Killlans. inguiry,Mr

"McCone confirmed.-that?we/are conducting SIGINT iperationsat

Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatriclipotea that NSA.had onlY/recently

added.two.more positions:

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B PLUS" Murphy asked the DCI to

'state: the meaning of

"MONGOOSE

• McCone

explained

chat in

the MONGOOSE Group 1t?

was originally conceived that Piase I would be one of gathering:

intelligence on the possibilities

for the organization

and

supply

of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly

successful" because Castro has. some. 100,000 Informers' in place in y

Cuba and exercises internal sec arity controls through a system of:

ration cards, and therefore,

cia did not get as many teams into i

Cuba

as had been hoped.

Augist 10, Phase II was reached with

MONGOOSE planning. fur (a) violent actions. b) a relatively high

or. "B. PLUS"

and lesser autiens, or "B MINUS"

PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing,

because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with

MRBMs in Cuba.

In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted

by considerations of Soviet activates in Cuba, Mr. Mccone

stated.

In answer to a question fron Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the

MONGOOSE Group at this time,

Mi. McCon, said that he did not inow!

whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorrey, General was now serving as.

Chairman.

With reference to the abserce of photographic evidence of Soviet

offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr.

McCone said that 1f one

looks it photography of Cuba obtained on

September

5 1t 15 possible.to. spot evidence of activity at the San

Cristobal MRBM site, but this ictivity could have been that of

agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile

activity.

Dr.

Killlan noted ti e Board's concern

ouflage operations may be deceiving us.

Mr.

McCone expressed his

own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage

methods.

Acknowledging that or intelligence estimates leave a

certain margin for error, Mr. liccone noted that it is nevertheless

impossible for us to say that le know all thai is going on in the

USSR with respect to missile

activity.

In response to Dr. Killian's.

comment

that public.discussion:,seem.to Indicate that U. S. missile

capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considerea

that any such conclusion' is:er oneous and dangerous and could lead:

to a complacency which. might wull result in curtailment of the U.S.

missile program.

by an

economy-rinded Congress.: Mr. McCone.added ;

that in his presentations:to. gulect Committees

of the: Congress he

always expresses.reservationsroncerning.u.s missile superiority.

M0.024

Dr. Killianswondered:whether.the.: President; the:Secretary. of

Defense, i and :the Congress unde: stand the danger: of conclusions that

"nothing's,there becäuser

J: C

in thbe seen" Mr. McCone said that

undoubtedly. there sia ten

oward heavy dependences upon photon

graphic intelligenced

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