CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Originator: CIA
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Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10006

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDE SOME On SEY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19921

6/24/201

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198-10007-10006

CALIFANO PAPERS

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TITLE :

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CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES

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9

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

INTELLIGENCE SHARING, LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Paper re: the exchange of intelligence concerning Cuban

subversive activities. Similar to 198-10007-10005 with marginalia.

JFK havin

Department of the Army EO 1352€

T Declassify

• Exclude I Exemp

Authority.

= Refer TO -

Review Dare 12 AUSTS By whoM 9

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

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GROUP-1

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

1. Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through-

out Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement

for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the

timely acquisition and processing of information as

well as its rapid dissemination,

on a selective basis,

to countries concerned.

While efforts are now being

made by CIA, AID, and

the US Military Services to

improve Latin American intelligence systems, success

thus far has been limited, and much remains

to be done.

problem, however, that this

paper is primarily concerned, but

rather with the

narrower matter of the need

for a stronger program of

exchanging essential information regarding Communist

subversion in Latin America among those who need to

know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to

discourage the exchange of intelligence on an

international basis,

even among

allies. National

privacy with regard

to the inner workings of an

intelligence system must be preserved.

Com-

pounding the

problem further, where Latin America

is concerned, is the divisive influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and

disputes which have characterized relations among

the nations concerned.

The wounds of past conflicts

among pairs and

groupings of nations are not com-

pletely healed.

There is lingering hostility

between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their

boundary war.

Chile and Bolivia continue at

odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of

Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now,

Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the

borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It

could hardly be expected that these countries

would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full

and frank basis.

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b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homo-

geneous entity in

social, political, or economic

terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist

suoversive menace vary widely.

A completely

unified

approach toward exchange of intelligence

concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be

regarded as attainable.

c. Additional impediments to intelligence ex-

change are the generally low level of competence

of most Latin American intelligence services, their

lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the

absence of adequate security systems, and the lack

of security consciousness.

Deficiencies in

security safeguards must necessarily limit the

exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any

of the nations involved, and particularly the

United States, which has the most sophisticated

and hence the

greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist, since the

governments of

some countries have little desire to

develop a competent career security service.

is a fear that the existence of an efficient service

would constitute a threat to further activities of

members of the existing governments at such time

as they might find themselves out of power.

over, many Latin American intelligence services

to label as "subversives" those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are

opposed to the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact that

multilateral intelligence exchange must be

approached on a most circumscribed basis.

should not be concluded, however that nothing

of value can be accomplished multilaterally.

With proper definition, limiting the problem

of exchange to matters directly related to communist

subversive activities,

such as the movement to and

from Cuba of subversives, the production and

movement of propaganda materials which threaten

internal

stability,

the movement of arms,

and the

movement of funds, it should be practicable to

marshal a useful measure of cooperation.

pursuing this effort, it will be important to

a sharp distinction between secret intelligence

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*

Portions underinets entre ty des ay the formitlee

to the ClA submission.

gained by covert means and information obtained

openly.

The former involves the requirement to

protect national secrets both as to sources and

acquisition methods employed. The latter, which

can be of great value, can be exchanged without

fear of compromise.

New paraga?, Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

The following describe generally the categories

of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material

under each:

a. Travel information - Unevaluated information

devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement

of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or

Soviet Bloc countries.

Such reports can be

reduced to a few

elements such as identification

of the individual, point of departure, date and

time of

departure or arrival, destination, and

carrier.

When presented in

an abbreviated form

such information offers minimum security problems

with respect to exchange with one or more countries.

b. Intelligence information reports - Un-

evaluated information derived from clandestine

collection operations or confidential sources

reporting

on plans and activities of Cuban or

communist connected subversive individuals or

groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds;

on shipping and air movements and on results on

surveillance efforts.

Because continued receipt

of such information by the United States is dependent

on careful protection of sources and methods of

collection,

the exchange of this information with

other countries must be carefully controlled by

the collecting department.

Intelligence reports and studies - Evaluated

intelligence. in all of the above areas, prepared

by an appropriate element of the Us

government in

a form which is releaseable to other Latin American

countries.

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news

stories drawn from press, periodical and other

overt publishers.

Selected for maximum impact on

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other countries particularly where such infor-

mation is not freely available to security services,

as in the case of foreign broadcast reports.

•3. Current Exchange Arrangements

a. At present there is little organized ex-

change of intelligence among the Latin American

nations.

There is a limited amount of informal

exchange, often on a basis of personal relation-

ships between government officials having a

community of interest with respect to a particular

matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has estab-

lished working liaison arrangements in those

Latin American

countries where such

relations have

been considered to be in the best interest of the

United States.

Most of the intelligence concerning

subversion in

Latin America available to the CIA is

derived from covert operations or through contacts

another intelligence or security service.

This inhibits the passing of such information to

agencies of a third country.

There is, however, a

substantial amount of intelligence available from

overt or non-sensitive sources which can be pro-

to other countries.

In 1962, CIA received

information reports from

26 services with which

Ilaison is maintained in Latin America and released

reports to 35 recipients.

Intelligence items

exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelli-

gence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

c. The US Army, through its attaches,

currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral

exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.

Information provided by the Army has been concerned

with subversive personalities, communist infiltration,

weapons movements

and related matters.

Reciprocal

intelligence received has been of small value.

Army also provides selected information on sub-

versive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala

and Mexico, without reciprocation.

The Navy has

established a Navy-to-Navy program for the ex-

change of intelligence among nine south American

navies, the Mexican Navy and the US Navy.

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d. Exchanges of information are also effected

from

time to time

ment of State.

through channels of the Depart-

e. As yet, however, the program for the pro-

vision by United States agencies of information

subversion to Latin American governments

has not

been developed to an adequate degree.

Since the

United States possesses the most extensive

acquisition capabilities, as well as the only

secure and reliable means of rapid communication

throughout Latin America (currently in process

of improvement), the development of an integrated

United States system for bilateral exchange offers

the greatest possibility of achieving the results

desired.

I. United States experience in the matter of

intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in

of the world, has led to the conclusion

that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than

multilateral arrangements such as those established

within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO.

Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that

multilateral

arrangements can be of some use,

particularly in creating an awareness of the need

for intelligence exchange.

8. The concept of an exchange of information

among members of the OAS with regard to subversive

activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-

American meetings, but has not been implemented,

largely for the reasons set forth in Section II. 1.

Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members

were urged to cooperate in strengthening their

capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,

subversion.or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion,

Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCOS)"

is established to give technical advice on request

to governments and

the Council on matters relating

to subversion.

A11 American governments have been

asked to furnish information

on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and

recommendations by the council of the oAs on how to

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counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting,

the OAS has been making slow progress in the

countersubversion field, but there has

as yet been

no significant exchange

of intelligence through

its machinery.

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has

also demonstrated

an awareness of the need for

exchanging intelligence regarding communist sub-

version.

Annex 4 of the General Military Plan

prepared by the IADB requests the American States to

report information to the Board and to establish

agreements among themselves for exchanging infor-

mation of collective interest. The United States

has approved the General Military Plan, but similar

action has not been taken by all member countries.

1. This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral

intelligence

exchange arrangements among the Latin

American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best; as well as a need

to create an expanded

program for bilateral intelligence exchange between

the United States and individual countries, and

finally, a requirement to develop

the possibilities

of a multilateral approach within

the recognized

limitations involved.

Items checked were taken from the

III. Existing Programs

'Actions Recommented" portion of the

paper.

/ 1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being

conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US agencies with their

Latin American counterparts in instances where it has

been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements

for exchange of selected information consistent with

security requirements.

2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the

feasibility and desirability of establishing military

intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the

Caribbean

Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, Ior further

dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in con-

junction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid

processing and dissemination when appropriate, of

intelligence on subversive activities directly to the

countries concerned through the US Ambassador.

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3. Intelligence 1s being provided to the Caribbean

Command by CIA and other elements of the US Embassies

in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for

further dissemination as

appropriate.

4. Various agencies of the US Government are now

disseminating to Latin American governments unclassi-

fied studies and reports and other non-sensitive

information concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

15. Us Government communications systems through-

out Latin America are being expanded and improved upon

on a high priority basis.

6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD fOr

the training and equipping of Latin American internal i

security and intelligence services.

Additional programs

could be established in other countries where it is

found to be in the best interests of the United States

and

acceptable to the country concerned.

New

7. All information received by CIA concerning

travel

to and from Cuba is put intò a computer system

capable of producing lists by name, by country, by point

of travel, or sorted on various other bases.

IV. New Actions Recommended were added by

Items marked "new" in paragraph IV

• CIA.

Now 1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral

exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III. 1.

by recommending that the US Ambassadors utilize the

existing Country Team mechanisms as an intelligence

aavisory committee to coordinate procedures for ensuring

timeliness, completeness and freedom from duplication

or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with

the host governments.

2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage

in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-

communist subvereive activities date to lea

3. Arrange for the electrical

appropriate Latin American governments of daily

summaries of radio broadcast material as monitored

•by

the FBID of CIA.

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cummittee deletes "the appropriate" here.

New

Make available to as many countries as security

permits, vanitized results of the extensive travel

coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency,

already processed by machine. (See paragraph III. 7.)

5. Increase, where feasible, emphasis on the

provision of US intelligence advisors to Latin American

countries.

Discourage the employment of intelligence

advisors from nations other than the United States

except in instances where the United States can arrange

to provide for the training and control of any third

country intelligence advisor.

New 6. Arrange for the preparation of periodic studiesloy elA

of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which

can be disseminated to selected Latin American govern-. "By CrA" strues

out by Cummittee,

7: Undertake action in the OAs to stimulate govern-

ments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed

on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of

subversive activities in their respective countries.

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve

the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence information and

estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive

activities.

* Revised 9. Undertake action In the OAS to establish a

Security Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of

senior representatives of

the appropriate services of

each government to

deal with all major aspects of sub-

versive activities in their respective countries, consider

new coordinated plans. of action to counter and neutralize

subversion, and implement necessary actions to insure

the most effective and timely exchange of information

between the governments on subversive activities.

* In committee paper, this recommendation mas,

... arrange

for regional meetings of senor intelligence and secureta

service representatives. for the purpose of fostering

the exchange of intellipence... and develoaing...

mechanisms and procedures,

Kineman.

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