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177-10002-10099

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FRENCH VIEWS ON STRATEGY

The following is a despatch dated 23 November

from the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Pierson

Dixon, to the Foreign Office in London. (The Brit-

ish Intelligence liaison officer here in Washington

often provides CIA with copies of reports such as

this which, for one reason or another, the British

Intelligence apparatus would like us to know about):

I saw General de Gaulle today and am re-

porting on other questions separately. The follow-

ing exchange took place on strategy.

2. In response to an invitation from General

de Gaulle to explain the particular point on which

I was seeking his views, I said that I had noticed,

in the reports of our representatives in various

NATO bodies, that there was a difference of view

about how best to assure the security of Europe.

I was not sure how serious the difference of view

was. The French view, 1f I understood it aright,

now was that the line should be established the

crossing of which by the enemy would automatically

mean that he had committed an act of aggression,

to which the response should automatically be the

use of nuclear weapons.

3. General de Gaulle said that this was exactly

right. Speaking with considerable emphasis; he said

that the French had been led to take this position

Sa

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because of the uncertainty which one was bound to

feel about what the Americans would do. The Ameri-

cans had twice intervened late when Europe had been

involved in a war. In the 1939 war France had been

prostrate before they intervened and Europe had only

been saved by Britain holding out. Even when Brit-

ain was in dire straits with her communications and

the problem of feeding her population, it had taken

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour to bring the

Americans 1n.

4. I remarked that this time the Americans

were in Europe physically and in great force. It

was surely because they were determined this time

not to be too late and because they wished to deter

aggression that they had sent men and arms to Europe

In peace-time. General de Gaulle said that this

might be so, but the fundamental point was that

the Americans did not intend to use nuclear weapons.

The reason was that with the development in weapons

the territory of the United States was no longer

immune from attack and the Americans were not pre-

pared to face this. This was clear to his mind from

the American insistence on a pause before nuclear

weapons could be used. This in effect meant that they

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never would be used and Europe meanwhile would be over-

whelmed. Europe must therefore look to herself.

5. I asked General de Gaulle whether he did

not think, taking the case of Berlin, that it was

mis-conceived to rely on instant nuclear retaliation.

In the case of Berlin it might be the West who would

have to take the initiative in using force if the

Russians exploited their position on our lines of

access to test our strength. It seemed to me that

the immediate threat of nuclear retaliation would

not be a credible or effective response to inter-

ference with access. General de Gaulle did not

answer this point directly but maintained that what

was essential was to establish a line the crossing

of which would involve the use of nuclear weapons

against the enemy. I asked whether the General

thought this evident difference of view was suscep-

tible of solution by a discussion within the alliance.

He said that he feared it was not. When it was a

matter of life and death, you did not give way in

discussion. It was your life and you had to look

after it.

6. I asked whether he had considered what the

effects on the alliance would be if this difference

of view on the strategic concept remained unsolved.

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If there was no agreement on strategy, would it not

be difficult to decide what forces the alliance

should seek to maintain? General de Gaulle said

that this would obviously follow but that he

could not see that the question of force goals had

any real importance.

7.

It was clear to me from what General de

Gaulle said that he will not be moved from this

position. I shall be commenting on November 25

after consultation with Sir E. Shuckburgh (UK

Ambassador to NATO). We seem likely to be faced

with a serious situation.

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