CABLE: SUPEDATA: ZRWAHOO. REF PARA 2
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: DIRECTOR
Document date: 11/1/62
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1 NOV 62

TO

: DIRECTOR

FROM : (GENEVA

ACTION:

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DJM

• 2749062

no, Trono

FiT.

PHOV 1 2246Z 62

INFO

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cl/ops,

01/10 2, 51, F1/D,

F1/INT 2, IW 7, WPS

2,

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TFw.5, 0D/1, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, s/c 2.

15-0

20-11

PRITY DIR INFO BERN) CITE (GNVA) 4398

IN 10713

TOCS DE-3/652,011

Disemed 2 N0s-62

INTEL PBRUMEN

i102

20-11

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. REF PARA 2 (GNVA) 4397 (IN 10705)* FILED: 01201

REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM. NO DISSEM ABROAD

CONTROLLED DISSEM

(ESG) 696

zz

COUNTRY: USSR/CUBA/SOVIET SATELLITES

SUBJ: REACTION OF SATELLITE OFFICIALS TO CUBA CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS

DURING: 27 - 31 OCTOBER PERIOD. DOI: 27 - 31 OCTOBER 1962

APPR TWO (REPORTORIAL ACCURACY)

SOURCE: (UNOFFICIAL (C) OF A. ORBIT NATIONALITY)WHO PARTICIPATED IN

THE DISCUSSIONS DESCRIBED.

C/S Comment: $27 Oct, discussion occurred at Czech-sponsored book exhibitio

31 Oct, discussion at a diplomatic reception at the Austrian Embassy.

IN COMMENT: THE ATTACHED TO PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMINATED

OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

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ELE CRAVIN

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IRMATION REPOT TELEGRAV

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ontains information aflecting

tho transmission or revelation

o'henie in any clanne fo the unised Sted enth id he mibid do abo Espionage Lame, Tilla 18, U.S.C Sect

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DATE DISTR.

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•FIELD REPORT NO.

- THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

- 1. FIELD COMMENT: SUBJECT REPORT IS JUDGED TO PRESENT AN UNUSUALLY

GOOD PICTURE OF THE MOOD WHICH PREVAILED IN SATELLITE CIRCLES IN

GENEVA DURING THE PERIOD CITED.

2. 27 OCTOBER SEVERAL SATELLITE OFFICIALS STATIONED IN GENEVA

DISCUSSED AMONG THEMSELVES DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS: THOSE

PRESENT IN THE DISCUSSION INCLUDED CZECH MINISTER AND RESIDENT DELEGATE

IN• GENEVA MILAN KLUSAK, EAST GERMAN RESIDENT OBSERVER AT THE UN EUROPEAN

OFFICE WALTER BELING, AND RUMANIAN SECOND SECRETARY OF DELEGATION

MARIN OLTEANU. AT THE TIME OF THE CONVERSATION, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

OF DISMANTLING OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA IN EXCHANGE FOR

REMOVAL OF AMERICAN BASES FROM TURKEY HAD BEEN PUBLICIZED..

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INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAV

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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3.

THE MOOD OF THE OFFICIALS PRESENT WAS ESSENTIALLY ONE OF UNEASE

AND FALSE BRAVADO. THE MOOD OF PREVIOUS DAYS IN WHICH SATELLITE

OFFIÇIALS HAD SAID THAT NO WAR WAS LIKELY TO BREAK OUT HAD VANISHED.

THEIR STATEMENTS MADE IT CLEAR: THAT THEY EXPECTED WAR MIGHT VERY WELL

BREAK OUT.: KLUSAK REMARKED THAT "CUBA IS AS IMPORTANT TO THE USA AS

TO THE USSR"

•AND THUS CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE. THE OFFICIALS REMARKS

INDICATED THAT THEY EXPECTED PRES KENNEDY TO REFUSE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

IN QUESTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THEY

THOUGHT THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD WITHDRAW THE PROPOSAL. OLTEANU POINTED

OUT THAT THE ORBIT HAD GAINED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE FACT

THAT THE CRISIS HAD CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL DAYS, SINCE THIS HAD PERMITTED

ORBIT FORCES TO REACH A STATE OF ALERT. OTHERS PRESENT AGREED THAT

PRES KENNEDY HAD MADE A TACTICAL ERROR IN NOT SIMPLY INVADING CUBA

WITHOUT WARNING. THEY DID NOT IMPLY THAT THIS WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE

LIKELIHOOD. OF WAR, BUT WERE SIMPLY POINTING TO AN AMERICAN MILITARY

ADVANTAGE LOST. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IMPRESSION WAS GAINED THAT THESE

OFFICIALS WERE SIMPLY MAKING REMARKS FOR THE RECORD OR FOR THE SAKE

OF HAVING SOMETHING TO SAY, AND THAT NONE OF THEM HAD ANY REAL

INSIGHT INTO SOVIET INTENTIONS.)

4. ON 29 OCTOBER, AFTER THE SOVIET DISMANTLING OFFER HAD BEEN

ANNOUNCED, EAST GERMAN RESIDENT OBSERVER WALTER BELING, WHO HAD ON

27 OCTOBER EXHIBITED PARTICULARLY STRONG SIGNS OF ANXIETY, WAS FULSOME

IN HIS PRAISE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S WISDOM. HE STRESSED THAT HE FOUND

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DEVELOPMENTS'WONDERFUL" AND MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF PRESS REPORTS

THAT THE RELATIVE DETENTE MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO RAPPROCHEMENT OF SOME

SORT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT SUCH

AND ACTION WOULD GIVE A PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE TO EAST GERMANY, SINCE

IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AT LAST WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE

WITH EAST GERMANY.

•5. AT A DIPLOMATIC GATHERING ON 31 OCTOBER, CZECH OFFICIALS,

INCLUDING MINISTER MILAN KLUSAK AND DEPARTMENT CHIEF IN THE MINISTRY

OF FOREIGN TRADE KAREL SVEC, CONTINUED PRIVATE DISCUSSION RE THE

EFFECTS OF THE CUBAN CRISIS. THEY ALL STRESSED THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD

HAD GREAT SUCCESS HE HAD AVOIDED INVASION AND SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING

THE OVERTHROW OF THE FIDEL CASTRO REGIME, AND HE HAD AVOIDED WAR.

THEY UTTERED VAGUE AND OPTIMISTIC BANALITIES WHOSE GENERAL TENOR

WAS THAT SOMETHING GREAT WAS GOING TO DEVELOP OUT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S

HANDLING OF THE AFFAIR. SVEC COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE JUST

BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THE FULL SCOPE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S "COUP". THIS,

ME ADDED IRONICALLY, WAS UNFORTUNATE "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO OUR

ADVANTAGE HAD THEY REMAINED UNAWARE FOR A LONGER PERIOD" KLUSAK SUB-

SEQUENTLY REMARKED THAT "WE" - HE ADDED THAT THIS MEANT NOT JUST "THE

SOCIALIST CAMP" BUT ALL THE EUROPEAN NATIONS - HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING

OF "KENNEDY AND HIS SHIPS, WE WILL LET HIM PLAY AROUND WITH THEM UNTIL

THE ELECTIONS, BUT AFTERWARDS HE WILL HAVE TO PUT THEM AWAY AND NEGOTIATE

SERIOUSLY" .... (SOURCE COMMENT ONCE AGAIN IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THESE

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OFFICIALS HAVE NO CLEAR INSIGHT INTO SOVIET INTENTIONS, OR INTO WHAT

THE REAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CUBA WILL BE. THEY WERE TALKING TO REINFORC

THEIR FALTH.

6. NONE OF THESE OFFICIALS MADE ANY MENTION REPRISALS IN BERLIN

OR ELSEWHERE. (SOURCE COMMENT TO HAVE DONE SO WOULD HAVE BEEN

IMPLICITLY TO CONTRADICT THE THEME THAT ALL THAT HAD HAPPENED WAS DUE

•- TO KHRUSHCHEV'S -WISDOM AND IS-FOR-THE GOOD OF THE ORIBIT.)

7. FIELD DISSEM AMB ONLY.

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