SPOT REPORT DATED 24 MAY 1978--EXPRESSION OF CONCERN BY BELGIAN SERVICE WITH "U.S. LAW" ON REPORTING TO THE CONGRESS.
Originator: CIA
From: MILLER, LYLE L.
To: SMITH, HAVILAND, JR.
Document date: 1978-06-07 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32400916

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION

FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

: CIA

RECORD NUMBER : 104-10145-10075

RECORD SERIES

JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT

INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

: MILLER, LYLE L.

TO

: SMITH, HAVILAND, JR.

TITLE

SPOT REPORT DATED 24 MAY 1978--EXPRESSION OF CONCERN

BY [DELETED] WITH

"U.S. LAW" ON REPORTING TO THE

CONGRESS.

DATE

PAGES

06/07/1978

3

SUBJECTS : WITHHELD

u.s.

LAW

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

COMMENTS

PAPER

SECRET

1B

: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

08/07/93

JFK59: F9: 1993.08.07.10:40:10:870059

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collecton Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Notel. Case#:NW

55924 Date: 10-26-2121

—---

[R] - ITEM

IS RESTRICTED

104-10145-10075

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OLC 78-2079/2

7 JUN 1978

MEVORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Haviland Smith, Jr.

SA/DDCI

Lyle L. Miller

Acting Legislative Counsel

Spot Report Dated 24 May 1978--Expression of

Concem by Belgian Service with "U.S. Law's

on Reporting to the Congress

1. (S) Subject memorandum notes that the Belgian Service has registered

concern over a "copy of a U.S. law ... which could be interpreted as obliging

CIA to identify 'to certain members of the Congress' its sources" and sources

of liaison services. if known. My view is that the quoted "U.S. law" is the

intelligence charter legislation (S. 2525/H.R. 11245), which, of course, is

not yet law but which could be mischaracterized as such. We have received

expressions of concern from other liaison services regarding provisions in

the charter legislation.

(U) There is no provision in the charter legislation that explicitly

would require the CIA to disclose intelligence sources to the Congress.

There are, however, several provisions that could be construed to extend

the reach of the Congress into sources and liaison matters. These pro-

visions include the following:

a. Subsection 114(j) would require that all proposed

liaison agreements be reported to the oversight committees.

b. Subsection 137(b) would require notification to the

oversight committees whenever an entity of the Intelligence

Community requests a foreign service to engage in any activity

in which the U.S. entity would be prohibited from engaging

without prior Presidential approval.

C.

Subsection 152(a) contains the overall congressional

oversight provisions, requiring, among other things, that the

oversight committees be kept "fully and currently informed"

and that the Executive will furnish to the committees "any

information or material ... whenever requested ...

9407R

21633

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3.

(S) There are, of course, other documents which could give rise

to a misimpression that the CIA could be required to disclose intelligence

sources to the Congress. For example (only the first of these is a "u.S.

law') :

a.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment (section 662 of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended), which requires notification

to the Congress of covert action findings.

b..

The general oversight and reporting requirements in

S. Res. 400 and H. Res. 658 which established the two intelligence

oversight committees; these, of course, are not binding on the

Executive Branch.

c. The general oversight and reporting requirements in

section 3-4 of E.0. 12036, which, if read without reference to

the section's prefatory language or if read by a person not at

all familiar with our Government, could be construed as requiring

that the Executive Branch must provide any information the

oversight committees request.

d. H. Res. 222, which established the House Select Cormittee

on Assassinations, provides for a broad mandate to conduct an

inquiry into the assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin

Luther King; yet the terms of the Resolution, while providing

standard subpoena authority and so forth, do not remotely

touch on intelligence.

The Memorandum of Understanding between

the DCI and the Chairman of the Assassinations Committee,

although not a public document, discusses the manner in which.

identities of intelligence sources will be retained or deleted

from material to which the Committee has access. There are no

references to liaison sources or arrangements, however, in the

Memorandum of Understanding.

e. H. Res. 252, which established the so-called "Fraser

Committee' to investigate aspects of Korean-American relations,

similarly grants the Committee a broad investigative mandate,

including subpoena power, but does not have anything to do

with intelligence sources or liaison matters. The operative

Memorandum of Understanding recognizes the authority of the

DCI to excise sensitive information from material made available

to the Committee.

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SEGRET

4. (S) In sum, although it is possible the Belgian service expression

of concern could have been based on one or more of the items mentioned in

paragraph 3 (it would of course be interesting if the service had obtained

a copy of one or both of the Memoranda of Understanding discussed above) ,

in ily view the reference probably was to intelligence charter legislation.

SIGNED

Lyle L. Miller

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - OGC

1 - DDO/PCS/LSN

1 - OLC Subject

I - OLC Chrono

OLC: RLB: sm (6 Jun 78)

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