Originator: FBI
From: SULLIVAN, W. C.
To: DELOACH, C. D.
Document date: 03/07/1970
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

124-10185-10098

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

50104100

MAY 1952 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 28

-UNITED STATES ^ "

NMENT

Memoranaum

TO

Mr. DeLoach

"SEO

DATE: larch 9, 1970

FROM :

w. C. Sullivas

DECLASSIZIEDBY 5668 SEDGEL

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference is made to the memorandum l. C. Sullivan

to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70; captionedi as above. At that

time the Director was advised this Division would make an

analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of

Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA

might hold in connection with relations with the FBl.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items

(2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37

memoranda), In substance our analysis does not show any

real reason why CIA would raise any isse in connection with

37 out of the 38 items.

The recommended action in each of

these cases would logicaily close the mutter.

In one memorandum

.

the 37th itemesses, it is recommended that a careluly worded

letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of

intelligence and counterintelligence wok affecting the

United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is

to protect

the Bureau by giving CIA a diance to make any

comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization

•pf sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau.

If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelli-

gence conditions in this area, we will gut this particular

matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply

with the Director's wishes in this matier and in any other

concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the timector.

Classified by_

Exempt from GDS Category 2 € 3

Date of Declassifiction Indefinite

Private pan

ner?

SEEM

---

## Page 2

OF'T INAL PJAM NO, 10

5010-100

162 kNITIG,&

MA: CAN ROT. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolen.

Wallers.

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper.

Callahan

Conrad -

Fell -

TO

: hir. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel -

FROM : Mr. N. C. Sullivan

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes .

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

MOCASI (THE BORIS MORROS CASE UFKU)LA)

Item number one in the material submitted to the

CASSITED BY SP-a Am 1226

1-10-01

ANDRIG

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

ALL INTORMATION CONTAYASE

HERBIN IS UNGLASSIFISD ETCET

WHERE SHOUN DEFERNISE?

JFKCI)CAS

BACKGROUND OF CASE JK OriS MorTOS] a Hollywood motion picture

producer,

was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1935.

1947 to 1957 he was operated as a double agent by the FBI. This

was an extremely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving

Soviet intelligence

activities in the United states in which

Morros traveled behind the Iron Curtain for meetings with his

Soviet principals.

Information obtained by borrosfrom his Soviet contacts

was disseminated to interested

including the Central

and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy

to commit espionage against the United States.

PROBLEM WITH CIA SERIAN

On march 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated

Information received from Boris Morros to heads of the various

intelligence agencies, including, CIA. By letter of March 27, 1954,

Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA,

criticized the information and, in effect, characterized it as

"fabrication or the product of a paper mill," which conclusion

Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations ir

the past from apparently the same source.

By letter of April

5,

1954,

the Bureau informed CIA that it was believed that no useful

purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to

CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles,

then Director of

CIA, advised Liaison Agent Papich that he had been looking into the

matter and there was no question in his mind but that his agency

had acted sturgly in

transmitting such a letter

to the Bureau,

62-80750

1 - 100-352385 [Mocase - The Boris Morros Case)) JFK (1)(A)

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

] - Mr.

C.

Sullivan

Classifted by 6 2 8$

]

- MX.

W.

A. Branigan

Exempt from CDS, Category 2 t

1

Mr.

Do

Jo

Brennan

Date of Declassification Indefinite

1 - Mr.

Ii. Whitson

IW:as ?''(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 3

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

SECRET

By letter of April 21, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated that

CIA would appreciate it if the Bureau would kindly continu

to send reports from the

source (Morros) which relat

JFK(P)(A)

to matters of foreign intelligence.

By letter of April 29, 1954,

the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose

would be served by disseminating to CIA information received

from the source in the future.

Nevertheless, memorandum Branigan to Belmont dated

April 28, 1954, pointed out that when and if the Bureau receives

JFK(IC) information in the Mocase, in the future of a type required

by National Security Council Directivto be furnished to ClA,

it should be carefully evaluated and a decision made at that time

as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it

should be disseminated.

The Director noted "OK but before anything

goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it.

This

restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H''

Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were

based on information

and December, 1954, and appropriate

dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

JFK(IJCA)

JFKU)(A)

As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the

Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if

Department attorneys could interview a soviet InteLligence

Jetector then in custody of CIA named Peter Derjabin.] JFK(I)(A)

Accordingly,

the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles

and on 1/8/57 he and james Angleton of his stall were generally

briefed on the Mocase and the contemplated prosecution.

They were

furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in

France, Jane and George Glatovski. CiA was requested to search

the names of individuals involved

asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have

information of pertinence concerning the Zlatovskis ]JFK (» (A)

On March 4, 1957, Mr. James Angleton informed the liaison

agent of resentment on the part of CIA employees and officials

based upon the following:

SECRET

- 2.

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 4

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

SECRET

(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much

earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to

CIA employees.

(2) Leads were given to CIA at the same time the

case was

publicized and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects

of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence

agencies to play a dominant role in the European

investigation.

(4) CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there-

was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

The Bureau took the position

that any

necessary investigation looking toward prosecution

in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be

referred by the Legal Attache to the appropriate investigative

agency of that country.

In those countries where the Bureau

did not have a legal Attache, request for investigation would

be channelled through CIA,

Because the Zlatovskis were in

JFK(D(A)

France,

the interrogation

of the Zlatovskis was handled by

request from the legal Attache to the French: JFK(LA)

JFK() Jane Zlatovski during World War II had been with the

Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA

personnel.

Prior to decision on prosecution we did not

disseminate information regarding the (Zlatovskis]because we FK(JA)

feared

the effects of compromise from possible leaks would

endanger the life of our source.

This was particularly true

in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954.

Some leads had

been given to CIA over two weeks before the

arrests of the

subjects in the United States. •Leads were not given earlier

because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as

coordinating the French aspects of the case were concerned,

it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over

the

French investigation after the French had the information.

There was a distinct difference in this case between

intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive

action.

SECRET

- 3 - CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 5

....

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

(5)

Recently the British MI-5 representative in

vashington has made some inquiries relating to Boris Morros? JFKAU

indicating the British may now believe Morros was eithe

known to the soviets as our agent or was under their control.

It is not known if the British have discussed this matter

with CIA..

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

got

SSE

GRET

-

---

## Page 6

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10

3010-100

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, MEG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SERRET

DATE: 3/9/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Iol.on

wallors -

Moht -

Rishop -

Casper -

Callahan -

Conrad -

Fell -

Gale -

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Bermingham

AMDR16

DECLASSITTED BYSPEZALINETG

0H 1-10-0

JFKCI)(B)

Item number two in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 states

that during the 1950's, CIA periodically complained that the

operations of our office in Mexico and specifically those

involving the operating of informants and the penetration of

the Communist Party of Mexico violated the understanding that

this office was to act only as a liaison post.

He also states

questions on our running informants

in Mexico and still being able to comply with Directives requiring

coordination of overseas clandestine counterintelligence

operations under CIA.

He states comments by CIA officials

along above lines have been casual and informal and indicate

the situation has been a potential issue rather than an actual

conflict or disagreement.

at the assnee

The essence of his remarks in this

item is that the Bureau is vulnerable to criticism by CIA

because of our operations in mexico.

Review of our files fail to reveal receipt of any

formal protest by CIA concerning these matters.

We have been

operating alongside CIA in Mexico City since 1947. In 195k,

Inspector V. P. Keay, after visiting Mexico City, reported

that CIA was not adequately investigating matters in Mexico

JFK(I)(B)

affecting the internal security of the U.S. and recommended

that after properly advising CIA, Legat, Mexico, be instructed

to undertake such investigations.

The Executive Conference

considered this problem on 4/19/51 and decided we should extend

ur coverage in mexico but should not reach any, understanding

with CIA regarding these increased activities.

• It was decided,

however,

to advise CIA in writing of this problem in Mexico

in order to fix responsibility on that Agency and such a letter

was sent on 5/1/51. A copy is attached.

Enclosure

RAB: bst/wnk Wok

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 7

JFK(1)(8)

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

SEYRET

In 10/51, almost simultaneously, our Legats in

Mexico City, Madrid, and Paris, reported instances of ClA

fieldofficials openly challenging our operations, generally

on the grounds that we were violating CIA overseas

jurisdiction.

Inspectors V. P. Keay and DeLoach personally

and forcefully brought these instances to the attention of

General Walter B. Smith, Director of CIA, in a heated exchange

on 10/24/51. Out of this meeting developed a luncheon on 11/7/51

attended by the Director, Bureau officials and General Smith,

who was accompanied by several officers of his Agency.

According to a memorandum, D. M. Ladato the Director, dated

11/7/51, CIA recognized our presence abroad and both agencies

pledged

cooperation and coordination through greater liaison

so as to prevent conflict and competition in these closely

associated operations. During the ensuing 19 years, the

Bureau continued to operate in Mexico and on occasions

moderately expanded its activities in order to meet its

needs.

During this lengthy period, there were no serious

problems with CIA, with reference to our Mexico City office.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SENRET

- 2

---

## Page 8

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date:

To:

May 1, 1951

Director

Central Intelligence Agenoy

2430 E street, Northwest

Hashington, D. C.

Attention:

aajor General H. G. Wyman

Office of Spectal Operations JFK (1)(B)

From:

John sagar Hoover tirector

Foderal Bureau of

InVeStigAtION

Subject: COVERAGE OF ACTIVITXES OF

AMERICAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO

Reference is made to recent discussions between representa

JFK

KiXB)

tives of the Office of Special Operations-CIAand Special Agent C. D.

Deloach of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the captioned

matter.

it is understood that your representatives pointed out that

JF

(1)(8)

the Mexico City station of CIA, with its limited personnel, attempted

to follow novements of American Communists as well as possible,

however, it would be impossible to guarantee an advance report in

each individual case when the Communist member in question is about

to return to the United states.

You will recall that the following suggestions were

offered by your representatives in connection with this matter:

(1) Utilization of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service Watch list.

(2) Advice from FBI as to whether the Mexican Police

could be used in handling cases.

(3)

Advice from the FBI to CIA indicating which cases

Tolson

CeLoach

Walters

Hohr

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conted

Felt

Gale

Rosen

"evel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Jandy.

CĐD: PA/LL ROOM TELETYPE UNITC

are nost important so that those cases could be

given preferred attention.

It was Indicatod by the CIA representatives that possibly

the adoption of these suggestions would in some manner assist them

Mexico city, Mexico

SECRET

-ec: Foreign Service Desk (detached)

AIR COURIER

SECRET

---

## Page 9

¡ SECRET

The FBI

of course, fully realizes the difficult problems

involved in surveilling American Communists in foreign countries.

At the same time,

however, it must

be pointed out that in the present

energency each individual

Communist investigation, routine or

otherwise, should receive proper attention when the subject concerned

travels to foreign countries. As you no doubt realize, the Communist

Party, U.S.A., represents a potential force as far as espionage

and sabotage

operations are concerned.

Therefore, even minor

members of the Party could become involved in delicate operations.

As pointed out in the discussions between Mi. DeLoach and representa

tives of your agency, the travels of Comnunists fron the United

States to Mexico are

very likely to become much greater, thereby

proposing a more serious problem than is now faced.

The FBI has for some time utilized the Immigration and

Naturalization Service

Watch List as a source of information concorning

the travel of Communists. Although representing an excellent method

of ascertaining this type of information, at the same time the FBI

is not affordad any advance warning from

this source as to the return

of the Connunist. Party member to the United States.

Therefore, the

investigation of that member becones delinquent in view of the

active investigation 1s not initlated at the time of his re-entry.

It is, therefore, believed that this particular source of intormation

would

not be satisfactory in lieu of information Iron your agency

which would notify us in advance of the return to the United states

of the Communist Party member in question.

With respect to the FBI advising your agency when the

services of the Mexican Police may, be utilized in Individual cases,

this Bureau will be most happy to

advise you of those "sensitive

cases" which are considered too delicate for referral to the lexican

Police, or foreign factions. With regard to the remainder of

investigations, however, we shall defer to your judgment as to

whether you wish to utilize the Mexican Police or not.

jurisdiction of the Qifice of Special Operations in foreign

intelligence matters allows for a more over-all knowledge of the

Mexican Police than

this Bureau presently possesses. Therefore, we

suggest that you weigh the facts in each individual case and consider

whether the Mexican Police should be called in or not.

Concorning the ranking Importance of cases, it is the

opinion of this Bureau that the facts provided your agency in each

individual case will determine the methods of investigation you

wish to apply.

It is not, therefore, considered necessary for the

IBI to point out

the importance of each matter referred to your

agency.

CRET

---

## Page 10

"SECRET

As suggested by your representatives, we will be most

happy to hold a conference with your Mexican supervisory personnel

at any time concerning discussions. of investigations in Mexico.

It is additionally suggested, however, that you advise your field

representatives in Mexico City to contact the FBI's Legal Attache

regarding coordination of the same matters in that locality.

3

SECRET

---

## Page 11

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

#MDR16

DECLASSIFTED BY SP-2 ALM

on 110-01

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY 186Z EDITION

OSA GEN, MEG. NO 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr.. C. D. DeLoach

Mr.

W. C. Sullivan

ISEDNEY

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan

1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento

1 - Liaison

Tolson -

Pistouch -

sullers -

Mohi .

Bishop -

Casper -

Callahan -

Conrad -

filt

Galc

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel —

Soyars

Tole. Rooin

Holmes -

Gandy -

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

THE ABEL CASE

Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the

Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper

recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the

risk and responsibility of transporting Hayhanen from Paris to the

U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined to become involved in this

transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the

I Hayhanen, an alcoholic, because he became a problem

and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the

Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads leading to the

apprehension of Abel; that CIA vas responsible for making Hayhanen

mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also,

CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau;

further, the Bureau never thanked ClA for its cooperation nor did It

see fit

to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the

role played by CIA.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered

in the U. S. in 1957 through the defection of Reino Hayhanen,

Abel's assistant®

On the night of May

7, 1957, James Angleton of CIA advised

Mr. Belmont that Hayhanen had

walked into the American Embassy in

Paris about three days ago and was referred to fIA. He claimed he

was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details

to back up his

story. He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow

got "cold feet" in Paris and wanted to cooperate with American

officials.

He was in a highly emotional state which led CIA to

question his mental stability. It was the opinion of Mr. Belmont

that no steps should be taken to return Hayhanen to the U. s. until

the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual

status.

Our New York Office inmediately instituted investigation,

62-80750

APL: tap (7) K.*

1 • 65-64538

CONTINUED - OVER

SE

---

## Page 12

Memorandum li. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

P.E:

KELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

based on Hayhänen's disclosures

and was not able to prove or

disprove his story. On May 3, 1957, CIA was informed of the

facts developed by our investigation and asked what action it

intended to take regarding Hayhanen's return to the U.s.

May 9, 1957, Angleton advised of a report received from ClA,

Paris,

revealing that Hayhanen had suffered almost a complete mental

breakdown and that in view of his condition,

arrangements were

made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane.

May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned to the U.s, in the company of

a CIA agent.

On arrival our New York Agents were at the airport

to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was

confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until

Ilay 15,

1957, when he was released to the custody of our Agents.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities

Public Healtn Service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously

conferred with an INS

official who had stated that if Hayhanen's

condition warranted confinement upon his arrival in the U.S.,

an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health

Service).

Hayhanen and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel

by New York Agents and were under bureau control from May 15, 1957,

until June 20, 1957, when they were taken to their residence

Peekskill, New York,.

at their request. All expenses for their

maintenance vere paid by the Bureau.

During this period Hayhanen

and his wife were becoming a problem because of heavy drinking

and irrational behavior.

on June 1o,

1957, Abel was located by Bureau Agents when

visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New YOrk,

Efforts by Bureau

Agents and the Department to have Hayhanen testify against Abel in a

criminal prosecution were unavailing.

With the Department's

concurrence, we arranged for INS authorities to arrest Abel on

Department continued to raise questions concerning Hayhanen's

willingness to testify in an espionage prosecution against Abel

and requested the Burea to press Hayhanen in thai regara.

took the position that any efforts to induce layhanen io testify

should be made by the Department, as we realized that Hayhanen

would undoubtedly want assurances, such as remaining' in this

country and financial assistance,

and the Department was so

advised.

The Department was

also advised that the Bureau

would no longer pay Hayhanen's subsistence and that other

arrangements would have to be made. In an effort to solicit

Dulles of CIA to determine if CIA would be willing to sponsor

the entry of Hayhanen into the U.S. under the authority grantedi

not only to sponsor Hayhanen but also to assist in his rehabilitation

2-

---

## Page 13

Memorandum Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. Deloach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-30750

in the U.S., such as assist

him in obtaining a job

and furnishing iinancial assistance lor an extended perio

of time.

On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed

in touch with Hayhanen by New York Agents for this purpose

Our Agents also arranged for IBI's access to Hayhanen whenever neces

sary.

Subsequently, Hayhanen agreed to testify and appeared

before a federal grand jury on August 5 and August 6, 1957.

As indicated above, we located Abei on June 13 and

he was taken into custody by INS on June 21, 1957. On July 21,

1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for

Hayhanen's rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurred heavy expenses on

ochalt of hayhanen, it was not.

at the request of the Bureau

but at the request

of the Department.

fiegarding CIA's complaint that the Bureau never thanked

1t for its cooperation, it is pointed out that a letter rom

the Director was sent to Mr. Dulles on November 19, 1957,

It pointed out the excellent

cooperation of James Angleton and his staîf with the Bureau

since the inception of this case and that the Director wished

to express his personal appreciation to Angleton and his staif

for their valuable assistance.

LECOMMENDED ACTION:

None, we do not believe, in light of the facts set

¡orch, that CIA will make an issue

of,

this matter.

V.

WeS.

SEARET

---

## Page 14

"OPTIONAL PO-M NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1902 EDITION

GSA GEN. NEO. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1-

Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr.

Cotter

DATE:

1 - Liaison

3/6/70

leslion -

: 01.00.%

Hollers -

Moht -

Pr.hop -

Casper -

Callahan

Conrad -

Foll -

Gaic -

Rosen -

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

#MDR16

DECLASSIFIDD BYSP-LALI 11G

ON 1-10-01

Item No. 4 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses

belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding

William P. Bundy emanated from a Bureau report. Bundy

was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to

be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was of the belief that

the Bureau leaked the information to Senator Joseph McCarthy

who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between

SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53

Dulles inquired of Papich as

to where McCarthy could get infor-

mation such as that released concerning Bundy. Papich

immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any

suspicion that the Bureau might be disseminating such infor-

mation to Senator McCarthy he was definitely wrong and off base.

Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau

investigation concerning Bundy had also been made available

to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as well as other

interested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely

did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the McCarthy

releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been

an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning Bundy

which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any

information concerning Bundy to Senator McCarthy or the news

media. There was considerable publicity concerning Bundy

at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that Bundy

was the son-in-law of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson

TJS :mea

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 15

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

SEUR

IET

there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to

the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the

matter by Republican Senator McCarthy. It is also noted

that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning

Bundy had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil

Commission, Army and the Attorney General.

out between CIA and Senator Joseph McCarthy after McCarthy

publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spelled

out Bundy's contribution to the Alger Hiss fund. The files

indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the

information in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SERRET

-

2

-

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## Page 16

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1862 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 17

Tolion -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Killers -

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach

Hohs —

BIshop -

1 - Mr. Sullivan

Cosper -

Callahan

Conrad -

TO

Mr. DeLoach

ISEKRET

DATE:

March 6, 1970

Felt -

tale -

Rosen -

Sullivan

Tave! -

FROM : ,

W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennarion.foom

1 - Mr. Wannall

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

1 - Mr. Harrell

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

#MORIG

CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

DECIASSIFIED BYSPEAR

0x 1-10-07

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by

former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI

dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone, who in the late

1920's headed the U. S. Communist Party, thereafter became completely

disillusioned with the Party, and subsequently occupied an executive position

with American Federation of Labor.

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been

furnished FBI by Spencer Miller, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Labor.

Miller made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position

that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General

and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the Miller

data was not a complete story.

BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on 12/4/53 Miller had informed CIA representa-

tives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward Jay Lovestone's being a

communist and active agent, and that Lovestone might shortly be exposed

by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great .

Soviet ring after Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. When interviewed by

Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that Lovestone was

engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as

Lovestone was concerned. He acknowledged everything he?had ceme to him

secondhand. Results of interview were furnished ClA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that Dr. Milton

Eisenhower had told him of a conversation he had with Spencer Miller. The

Attorney General said he told Dr. Eisenhower he would have Miller inter-

viewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous

interview with Miller and advised we would have him interviewed again to

WRW/HLD:am$

(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 17

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

secure any additional data he might have. Miller was reinterviewed

the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/19/54, Governor Sherman Adams called

the Director from White House about the Miller situation.

The

Director advised Governor

Adams that he had personally talked to

Miller for two hours the

previous day and had concluded that Miller

was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared

to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have

specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with Miller, 2/18/54, he

referred Miller to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed

interview was conducted and results incorporated in a 20-page memo-

randum, copies of which were furnished Attorney General, Governor

Adams, CIA and State Department.

We intervieved Miller at the specific instructions of the

Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination

of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not

only proper but required under the circumstances.

CIA and State

Department received results since allegations concerned officials

and operations of those agencies.

Miller furnished names of

persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed

them and disseminated results. Mr. James Angleton of CIA commented

on 3/13/54 that when the Miller information was first received at

that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately

collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose of "hurting"

CIA. Angleton said results of interviews and investigation conducted

by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that FBI was

living by its well-known tradition and reputation of developing

facts and reporting information in an impartial manner.

He said

on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the

following the Lovestone case in conformity with its

well established reputation of getting all the façts. In view of

this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would

raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its

handling of the Miller matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

-2 -

---

## Page 18

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1P02 COITION

GSA GEN, REG, NO, 17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolion

i-Louch .

#allers

Mohr

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1

- Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Cotter

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Ryan

'Bishop

Casper

Cullchan

Conrad

Fell -

Gale

Rosen

sullivan i

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

#MORIG

PIT, INTORMATION CONTAINED

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS

I RESH IS UNCLASSIFIED

FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

DANS 1-16-0/BX SPR ALM 11G

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam

Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's

when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States

under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no

contact with Bureau officials.

CIA felt contact with Bureau

officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable

impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and

when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials

they were left with suspicions there was friction between the

FBI and CIA.

In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect

that tours for

such visitors would be of a restrictive nature

and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public

and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont,

captioned

"Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence

Officials," (Bureau file 94-2-32781) recommended for Director's

approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to

foreign police officials and security officials would continue

to be of a restricted'nature and the visitors will only view

facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such

foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared

to the Bureau's advantage.

In regard to 1, the Director noted,

"I thoroughly agree.

I am not too keen anyway about such tours.

We were 'burned' in the Johns matter."

The Director noted in

regard to 2, "I see no need of interviews."

Doctor Otto John was an official of the West German

security service who was closely associated with CIA and who

was alleged to have defected to the East Germans.

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past

several years there was no basis for complaints with regara to

Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to U.S. under CIA

sponsorship.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

SECRET

None.

We do not believe,

in light

of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an igsue

of

this matter

DR: sfw/j1s( 1(6)

---

## Page 19

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

1969 EDITINN

GSA GEM. RIG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES (;)VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

:Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

SECREY

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

Tolion

----

Proach -

Mohr

Bishop

Casper

Callahan -

Conrad --

Fell

Gale

Roson -

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars a

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

CIA-DUTCH TERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGI ACTIVITY

Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by

Get terests in raviet estee activity.

service asianted

(5)

notes that in 1956 the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD), wanted

to nave certain individuals in the U. s. integylewed and approache

When CIAl'approached us, We

AN, INTORMATION CONTAIN

HEREIN IS UNCLASSITIZD EXCAL

WHERS SHOWN ORERUISE.

1-10-01

FAMDR16

CLASSIFIED BY SR 2 ALM

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XL6

wewould not handle the

interviews for the Dutch Although CIA accepted this, they felt it

hurt efforts to gather soviet espionage information in Europe. Our

position was based on failure of the Dutch to deal honestly with us

in the case of @Joseph Petersen,, Who was involved in collectin

(intelligence information at the National Security Agency for a

Dutchofficial.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

(5)

This question first arose when a Dutchofficial approached

our representatives at the NATO Special Conmittee conference in

Paris in May, 1956, and requested Bureau assistance insinterviewing

Mrs. Antonina Thomas in the U. S. and to have a Dutch representative.

present during the interview.

*Mrs. Thomas is the widow of General

Walter Krivitsky, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior

to his defection in 1937. The Dutch representative said CIA had

interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactoryoishe was told

to submit his request through dipsomatic channels.

In June, a CIA

representative advised SA Papich they were receiving pressure Irom

the Dutch to have a Dutch representative bring all the material

on the case to the U. S. for the Bureau's use in interviewing

Mrs. Thomas and two others in the U.S., but not to participate in

tie to have thes

the interview: (sin accordance with instructions, sA Papich told

Dutch submit their request through diplomatic

channels and to include all informationsin writing, and that the

Bureau would not deal personally with a butch, representative.

By

memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that [James Angleton

(5) of CIA told SA Papich

he was of the very strong opinion that the

Bureau's position made good sense, but Other CIA officials lelt the

(Dutcly should be helped in every possible way.

(5)

62-80750

JPL: tdp (6)i, 11

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

---

## Page 20

Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

SECRET

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then

Assistant Director A. H. Belmont

and SA Papich met with Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of

Plans, and James Angleton of CIA.

Helms asked if the Bureau

would

talk to a representative of the Dutch if he came over

and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information

and leads furnished by the Dutch! (s)

(S).

case when their representatives had been obtaining highly

the rat even romested to intery ew the Dutch presentatives

involved

the Dutch Ambassador hotified State Department

(5) that if Dutch representatives

were to be interviewed,_ It should

be done by State Department and not by the FBI. Melms was

'(5)

told that in view of this, the Bureau notified state Department

that any requests for information from the Dutch'to be handled (5)

by the Bureau must be channeled through the State Department.

chemeted throwth in

Mr. Belmont said that this was a situation created by the

(5) Outch and the Bureau had no intention of altering its position

and wewould not talk to a Dutch'representative and did not

desire to receive any leads in the Krivitsky case through CTA,J(s)

(S)Mr. Helms advised that CIA respected the Bureau's position

and had attempted to guide itself accordingly in dealing with

the Dutch…SHe said he understood the Bureau's position, which

in essence was that the Dutch had made their bed and could

now lie in it.

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOW:

It would appear remote that this problem would

arise at this time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

Ve do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CrA

will make an

issue of this matter.

(5)

-2-

SECRET

---

## Page 21

-- OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY IODi EDITION

GiS GEN.

REG. NO. 17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATE: March 6, 1970

SECRED

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

I - MI.

1 - Mr.

A.

S:

W. Gray

F.

Phillips

Tol:on -

tallers -

Moh! -

Fishop -

Casper.

Collahan

Conrad -

Felt

Gole -

Rosen -

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes .

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his: memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

SA sam

relations between Bureau and CIA with Grombach, head of private

intelligence network (O'Brien was Grombach's aide who had liaisor

with Bureau).

Problem: Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving

Information from Grombach which was also of interest to CIA;

and that while it is possible Grombach had given same data to

CIA, we do not know.

JFK(D(B) Analysis: Grombach was financed by CIA during early 1950s (e•%•,

CIA budgeted $650,000 for Grombach in 1952) • (62-77306-60) There

is ample evidence CIA knew we were receiving information from

Grombach. We do know some information was given by Grombach to

CIA

and Bureau jointly.

O'Brien, for example, told us of

conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and Grombach when

it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by

Grombach, provided CIA was advised by Grombach of what was given.

(62-77306-23) Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested

Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving

from Grombach and

asked for our views regarding method to be

employed in channeling information from Grombach to Bureau.

Significantly, under procedure then, Grombach directed communica-

JFK(I)(B)

tions to CIA with copies to Bureau.

appeared Grombach was an appendage of CIA, Bureau was not recom

seeination a eat was

CIA was told that

as it

mending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle

problem. (62-77306-25)

In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and

Grombach over channeling of information and Bureau made every

effort to stay out of dispute.

In late 1952, for example, Helms

inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed.

He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's

desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how

received. (62-77306-27)

Our position of not becoming involved in

'Grombach-CIA dispute reiterated'on.other occasions. (62-77306-36, 69,

81; 65-58725-56)

SECRET

SFP:115'

(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 22

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONS WITH CIA

COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

(SECKE

On the other hand, there were instances where we

received information from Grombach which was of either an

administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did

not inform CIA.

These instances covered period both prior

and subsequent to the contractural relationship between CIA

and Grombach which was from 4/51 to 7/54 (62-77306, unrecorded

memo 11/29/55, Belmont to Boardman re Grombach).

For example,

Grombach wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former

nation ot

Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd which contained infor-

is not ter

mation of interest to CIA. This letter contains a penciled

notation:

"This info, not to be given to CIA. per DML--OHB"

(62-77306-7) •

Memorandum 10/11/50 from A. H. Belmont to

Mr. Ladd

contains information from O'Brien concerning

Grombach's intentions to plant microphones in Finland to

cover meetings attended by Russian high staff.

It was

observed in the. memorandum that at that time O'Brien

and

Grombach had no relations-with CIA and that Grombach's

intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA.

No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau

(65-58725-10).

O Brien furnished Bureau a memorandum dated

6/29/54 entitled "Termination Memorandum to FBI" which

informed of the termination of contract between Grombach

and CIA.

In the memorandum it is pointed out that Grombach

will continue to receive raw material from the field and

that while he will no longer be in a position to translate,

evaluate, publish, etc., Grombach desires to forward such

material

to Bureau as Grombach would not trust any other

agency. The memorandum also states that Grombach has continued

the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would

be interested in even though Grombach received a written

order specifically directing him to not give Bureau any

thing. (62-77306-70).

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not belleve, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

-2 -

SECRET

---

## Page 23

OPTIONAL FORM NU. 10

3010-106

MAY 1962 EDIT:ON

GEA GEN.

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM

:W. C. Sullivan

'SEN

DATE:

3/7/70

- Liaison

1 - Mr. Dix

Tolcon -

I'Looch

Wullers -

Moht -

Bishop -

Casper -

Callahan

Consad -

fell-

Gale -

Rusen -

Sullivan

Tirel -

Coyars -

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(HERBERT HOOVER COMMISSION - 1954)

IMDRIG

1-10-01

Item number nine in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954.

According

to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished

the names of subversives within CIA to Senator McCarthy.

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wisc) was Chairman of the

Senate

Investigations Subcommittee.

General Mark Clark headed the Task Force which

surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55. In 10/54, CIA

alleged that the McCarthy Committee was attempting to develop

According to the Washington

information regarding CIA operations "one of the worst situations

Star, 10/1/54, McCarthy said CIA was

we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned."

He said

he would give his data relative to this matter to Clark's Task

Force.

According to the Washington Star, 1/15/55, McCarthy

said he had given Clark information relative to alleged communist

infiltration of CIA.' As of 1/17/55, CIA had not received from

Clark the names of those considered security risks but CIA

believed it had done a good job of removing security risks and

believed that it was in good shape.

On 1/21/55, the Task Force requested name checks on

security risks named

by McCarthy.

Memoranda containing the

results of those checks were given to the Task Force on 2/8/55.

On 5/13/55, the Bureau received a letter from Clark asking for

investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty

of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA

was aware of

the names as me asked it for identifying data concerning them.

Clark was later advised that

the investigations would entail

interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign

countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

HPD: bsf

1'7.

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

DET

---

## Page 24

*.

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE :

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL

• INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

! St

The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished

McCarthy the names of subversives at CIA has not been

recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the

matter recorded.

Neither is there recorded any complaint

by CIA to this effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None•

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

eten

SECRET

---

## Page 25

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY IPOZ EDITION

3010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr.

1

C. D. DeLoach

Mr.

W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/6/70

REd - L7.150

- Mr.

C. D. Brennan

• 1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Tolson -

[11.00.1-

Walters -

Moht -

Bishop -

Casper

-

Callahon -

Conrad -

Fell -

Gale _

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyors -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

DECLASSIFTED BYSPHALM

ON 1110 01

• inter diezen

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of

3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches

(Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

or requesting the Agency to handle the lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this

matter are broad and

general in nature. His presentation is

hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal

security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence,"

thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our

Legats to have leads covered in toreign countries.

The Manual

of

Instructions, Section 102, page 23,

states CIA's responsibilities

include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and

dissemination of intelligence

information. CIA does not have,

among other things, responsibility for "internal security

functions."

In the absence of unusual situations,: we forward

investigative leads pertaining to our cases in countries where

we have

liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache

concerned.

Through his contacts the Legat arranges for the

necessary investigation and submits the desired information

according to our reporting needs. The Legat coordinates.

this activity on a local level..

It is more desirable to have our representatives

request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage,

and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill

our responsibilities.

RECOMNENDED ACTION: '

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth,

FBG: ser: ekn en

(7)

that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

V.

---

## Page 26

OPTIONAL /ORM NO 10

5010-108

OSA GEN, REG. NO. 8T

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloach

DATE:

FROM :%. C. Sullivan

SERRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBATE(U

i..

daltu..

Mohr

Bishop

1 - Mr. DeLoach

- Mr. Sullivan

3/7/70

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Flemister

Ca..prog

Conrad

Felt -

Galc

Rosen

Sullivan

Tovel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes.

CIA HAS NO OBJÉCTION fordy -

DECLASSIFIDATION AND/OR;

....,..

A INFORMATION

ISFORKEZION CONTAINED

ALASSIFTED

(V)

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that

we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a

Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations

with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that

after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn

certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a

memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the

Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the probler

of whether a Havana sourcellused in an intercept operation

(0)

between the Communist Party oi Venezuela and the crenshould be

turned over to cra to obtain complete coverage. we,

R8f course,

#MORS

WECLASSIFIED BYSPZALML

AND MANG OLD LEASE

1-12-01

PERCIA

+88-1826/J5K4)2198

sureau had not advised other

we did not want Castro to uncover

any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau.

The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a

letter to the bureau,

, 4/28/53, regarding Havana informants,&

the logat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that

in fact, it was not developing pertinent information.

time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana who

and had no plans for any aggressive action

in that field. o

this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage.

We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Hakana CIA

representative information available to him concerning matters

of interest to the Bureau; however,

2/.

Classifted

Declassify on•

Subsequently, our

relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as

excellent

in 1958.

We think our overall position to be sound.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe,

in light

of the facts set forth

that CIA will make an issue of this matter

HCF : bsf/mst

(5) not

SECRET

---

## Page 27

in=.

TO

"OPTIONAL FORM 1O, 10

5010-106

MAY 1902 EDITIC•

GSA GEN. KEG. NO. 2Y

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

:Mx. C.D. DeLoach

FROM :W.C. Sullivan

Tolson

DrLoach -

Walters.

Mohir

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

Felt.

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room.

dimes.

Gandy —

SECRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

C4-0K

DATE: March 6, 1970

#mDEl6 1-10-01

CLASSIFIED BYSPALM 11€

DECLASSIFY ON: 26X1,6

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL

1959

Item #12 in the material submitted to the Director by

relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat)

William G. Friedemann (now retired) and former. U.S. Ambassador

Ellis 0. Briggs.

According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that

Legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that

CIA was unhappy with Legat's activities and had told the Ambassador

that Legat had disseminated information from a source who was either

a fabricator or a provocator.

LITOLE ER ILISSTIONA SI AGRAS

Friedemann was assigned as Legat in RiCon October 25, 1958,

and was transferred as Assistant Legat in Havana on August 22, 1959,

(:)

an employee of

the Political Section, Federal District Police.

Martinez furnished

derogatory information concerning one General Lott of the Brazilian

Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in 1960,

indicating that lott had questionable contacts with the Czech Embassy

in Brazilols)This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to

a source who had not been contacted sufficiently to determine his

ce sad do derane vinst sue at the information concerning dott (5)

caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable

to evaluate reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility

that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist

deception operation.

CIA requested

that we identify our source but

we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated October 1, 1959, the new Legat, Rio,

recommended that Martinez be discontinued

as a potential

source

based on his admissions to legat that he had no sources in Czech

Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional

details concerning information he had reported. Legat concluded that

(5)

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

1

- Liaison

•Mr. LoF. Schwartz

LFS: bew (5)

SECK

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 28

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

could have come from public sources, the political police or

could have been invented and attributed to his alleged contacts.

Legat also concluded that Martinez could not have been a

provocator used by Czechs to pass deceptive information.

Contacts with Martinez were discontinued in November, 1959. (5)

In our dissemination of information from Martinez to

CIA we were careful to state that our contacts with the sourçe

were insufficient to establish his reliability. Although

(subsequent events established that it was likely that CIA was

correct in speculating that the information was fabricated,

there was no indication that the source was a Czech-controlled

provocator. (S

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None•

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

2

W

SECRET

---

## Page 29

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

JFKCI)(B)

JFK() (B)

= OPTIONAL POLLA NO, 10

MAY 1862 EDITION

3010-100

CS. GEN, KEG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

• W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

- Mr.

W. C. Sullivan.

I - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Liaison

MX.

H. W. Little

1 - Mr.

J. E. Gauzens

•1.00ch _

Walters -

Medit

11. 0p

han -

et1d-

Fell.

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan —

Tavcl

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Hondy =

Gandy

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV).

DECTASSITTED BY SPEAUM LIE

4 1-10-01

nates dit

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957;

concerning the

Mexican border Bureau's handling of informants on

These informants were operated inside Nexico.

The problem was predicated on situations which might arise

the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were

already being handled by the Bureau.

BACKGROUND:

The Director initiated BOCOV in 1948 to fill a void

in the lack of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U.s.-

Mexican border on the part of CIA and Immigration and Natural-

ization Service (INS).

The program, which at first involved

3 and subsequently 5 of our border offices including Phoenix,

was designed to detect and neutralize anti-U.S. activities by

subversives in that zone.

JFK (i)(B)

In June, 1956, CIA assigned a representative to the

American Consulate, Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, which is in the

border zone then covered by

Phoenix.

PROBLEM:

By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA

representative had endeavored to develop 3 Bureau sources in

Mexico and stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless

advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated

62-80750

1 - 100-356015 (BOCOV)

1 - 100-356015 Sub 38 (BOCOV-PX)

SEC

JEG:HWL:dImdion

(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 30

IFK(I) (B)

JFK(I)(B)

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

II:

"FLATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BORDEN? COVERAGE (BOCOV).

SEE

received from these sources was to be broken down

and

paraphrased in reports in such manner as to conceal as far

as possible the fact that these individuals were assisting

The Director approved these safeguards which were

A reviow of our files since June 14, 1957, fails

to reveal that this problem has been raised subsequently by

CIA activity in the Phoenix BOCOV area.

In accition,

CIA representative was transferred from Mogales on 7/6/59.

He was not replaced by CIA and the border torritory he had

covered was subsequently handled by CIA on a road trip basis

out of [Mexico City. Furthermore,

the participation of the

Phoenix Office in BOCOV was

discontinued with the Director's

approval by letter dateà 12/10/69.

RECOMLENDED ACTION:

lone.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of

this matter:

---

## Page 31

1962 EDITION

oд 0e2 рol00. 19

3010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Co

D. Deloach

C. Sullivan

TO

:Mro C. D. DeLoach

, SECRET

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS VITH CIA

JFK(I)(A)

CARPORT (S)

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

1

W.

A. Branigan

1-Mi• Lo H. Martin

1=10-01

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/318

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6*

Tolson

Walters -

Mohi —

Bishop -

C'usper -

Callahan .

Conrad -

Felt

Golc

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tuvel -

soyars -

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gandy -

Item number 14 in material submitted io Director

2y sa dam Papad in his memorindum 3/5/70 discusses Carport

case Carportyis code nanoor case on our couble agent,

Andre Deglon, who was recruited by Sovieis while on business

trip to Moscow in 1954.

Until discontinued in 1364 he delivered

extensive material, clearca by United States Evaluation Board,

to the soviets in United states and Europes (S)

Mi. Papich's memorandum states case was being

highlighied since ve cannot exclude possibility Central

gence Agency (CIA) hassevidence to demonstraie we were

Intelli-

JPRODUAD

JFKULA)

vas meeting the Soviets in euron

and Mr. Papich's memorandum does not disclose CIA raised any

objection to date.

We recognized at the time there could be

A jurisaictional problems le permitted cla to Inteiviews

(S)Deg10n in December, 1954g

shortly aiter his recruitment

JESCA

MOHS JACKE

time CIA learned from him he had a scheculed espionage

neeing in Switzerland in March, 1955.5)On 12/15/54/SCIA agreed

handling of Deglomas solely wichin jurissaction of Bureau

(5) in Switzerland in March,

1055g that we desired CIA lo take no

INFOR'AITON CONTAINS

OAIAISSUTONN SI HIGHEH

On 8/2/55, CIA was orally informed Deglon vould neet Soviets (s)

"ISTANT OI

action which would interfere with our operation and that results (

would be furnished CIA (approved by menorandun Belmont to

Boardman, 2/25/55)• Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/10257,

recommended we noi advise

(3)

(5)

(I)CA)

of seculity, This was approved and this policy was followeci

chereaftel'.

JFK(ES)

All information from Deglon was disseminated to CIA

meeting Soviet at various skuas

acquired in his world-wide

cravels providing it ala not use hin 1li operarional capacity

Deglow was instructed not to disclose to ciA information on his

1 - [105-25453 (CarpoxED (5)

(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEGRET

---

## Page 32

Memorandum to air. C. D. DeLoach

REIATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

SECRET

relationship with Bureau.

We discontinued him as an informant in 1964

EECOMHENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JFK(I(A)

SECRET

---

## Page 33

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 196? EDITION

3010-106

GSA GEN.

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Talien -

111.00.n1.

walters -

Mohi -

Bishop -

Casper -

Callahon

Contad -

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

Felt

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel -

FROM

Soyars -

: W. C. Sullivan

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DNCLASSITIED BYSPAAZMHC

0n 1-10-01

CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE

itia tie at to 1665584-48

ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA San Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's

refusal of a 1958 CIA request for Mr. W. C. Sullivan to lecture

on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted

this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most

important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by

James Angleton, CIA requested Mr. Sullivan to address a selected

group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S.

CIA suggested dates of 12/9,10,or 11/58.

The Director by routing

slip attached to Angleton's letter commented, "It seems strange

that CIA should seek this when its top representative in Japan

considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers

of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the r'BI.

But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director.

nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont dated 10/1/58

made reference to CIA's request ard the Director's comments. It

recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served

by giving this lecture, not because of the information which

could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U. S., but because

it would give Sullivan an opportunity to raise a number of

questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities

It was pointed out that it could be

considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could

learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture

and discussion rather than the converse. •Mi. Tolson recommended

that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting,

"We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit."

(5)

1-Mr. DeLoach

1-Mr. Sullivan

I-Liaison

1-Mr. Rachner

CONTINUED _ OVER

---

## Page 34

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTEN

IGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U.S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was

directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising

that it was not

possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of

Mr. Sullivan's other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate

CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

We do not believe,

in light of the facts setforth,

that CIA will make an issue of this

matter.

--2.

---

## Page 35

TO

OPTIONAL CORM NO, 10

5010-100

MAT 1PO2 COITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

Tolion

tallers —

Mohr .

BIOP =

Casper

Calluhan -

Conrad -

f'elt.

Gale

Rosen.

Sullivan -

Soyars -

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

CASE OF EDWARD ELLIS SMITH] JFK (1)(8)

Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director

by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the case of Edward Ellis Smith, that CIA

might criticize our not

identifying our source.

JFK(I)(B)

JFK(I)(B)

BACKGROUND OF CASE

Smith was the CIA employee assigned to

the American Embassy, Moscow, in 1956, under State Department cover.

He became involved with a Russian girl, and the Committee for

State Security (KGB) approached him for recruitment, using the

affair with the girl and

compromising photographs as leverage to

carry out the approach. (Smithreported the approach to his

JFK(I(B)

superiors and was returned to U. S. and ultimately removed from

CIA.

JFK(I)(B)

PROBLEM WITH CIA

We first learned of this case on 7/9/56

from David Teeple, a consultant to Scott McLeod of State

department,. Who, turnished the intormation in confidence and who

indicated Smith might have been involved in espionage.

7/16/56 Robert Bannerman, Office of Security, CIA, advised

SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that

by Director of Security, CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed

that the request not be

made.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

This problem never officially

arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles. Bureau files

contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

62-80750

1 - 65-64084 (Edward Ellis Smith)

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

JFK (D(B)

~ MI.

W.

C. Sullivan

1

- Mr.

D.

J. Brennan

1 - Mr.

W. A. Branigan

1 - Mx. T. N. Goble

TNG: as: bjpbjp (7)

SECRET

---

## Page 36

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 108? EDITION

GSA GEN. MEG, NO. 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

1

• Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

- Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATL: 3/6/70

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. W. R.

Wannall

1 - Mr. J. R.

Wagoner

l'olson -

irl.oach.

Y'allers -

lahr -

Bashop -

Casper -

Calluhan -

ConIud -

Fell -

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Hoimes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(THE SLIVA

OPERATION) JFK(I)(A)

IrmOr 1-10-01

CLASSIFIED BY SP-SALM/ARE

DECLASSIFY DIV: 25X1,6

JFXCD(A)

Item Number 17 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses

concent the ta a Papa noted that perhaps cra

SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA

might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case

vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under

restrictions on

JFK(1)(B)

FBI investigations in this case.

(S.

In February, 1963, CIA made available information from

Philippe de Vosjoli, the Washington,

D. C., representative of the

JFK(I)LA)

French intelligence

service (SDECE)to the effect that the Erench (5)

Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of

scientific and technical information in the United States. CIA

insisted information not be made available to other government

agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize

its source. CiA then made available extensive Intormation trom

jFKU) coded communications from SDECE in Washington](S)Analysis of the

JFK(Scommunicationg revealed several discrepancies which would have

made interview by FBI of de Vosjolißdesirable. CIA refused this JFkaA

explain items mentioned in SDECE, communications and CIA failed

to respond.

(S)

in March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning JFK(B

SDECE interest in American personnel and installations in ParisJS,

This intormation was made available to Legal Attachg, Paris,(s/On

1/11/63 CIA advised that its ClA Station in Parisy which had not JFk(

heretofore

been apprised of SLIVA case had made

inquiry concerning

the case.

our Inquiry of Legal Attache, Baris,

disclosed that i

1 - 105-109053

[SLIVAD (S)

JFK (1)(A)

LEB: bjpbjP (7)

OBSERVATIONS - OVER •

StUNGr

---

## Page 37

• Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Inquiry of CIA personnel in Paris had been made concerning kc(5)

iöne of the individuals previously identified as an SDECE agent

and also requests had been made for certain biographical data

(s concerning other naividuals.

Legal Attache noted that CIA

JAKCI)(B)

AFRICA)

of the case.

We furnished this information to CIA headquarters

and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it

was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any

future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache

be coordinated in advance with that Agency.

This practice

was closely followed.

The Director observed in January, 1964,

that he thought the whole

of CIA which had been played as a sucker by de Vosjolia The

thing had been imaginary on the patersha)

Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at

least until CIA restrictions were removed. We continued

to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and

covered outstanding leads.

JFK(U(B)

FK(D(A)

In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed

that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened

only three SpECt agents were uncovered.

Original allegations

(5)

ofErench intent to mount an espionage mission in the United States

could not be substantiated.

This information, coupled with the

fact that CIA refused to make deVosjolil available to us for

the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision

(s)

transtigation in this case see that we were closing our

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70

CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the

Bureau in

this case.

Our review indicates our efforts in the

matter were as full

and complete as possible under circumstances

where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not

respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove

restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative

steps.

Should any question be raised in the future, we are in

a position to document our difficulties experienced

with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

-2.

SECRET

---

## Page 38

OPTIONAL IDAM NO, 10

5010-108

MAT lYOU COlION

OSA GEN, REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECKET

DATE:

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

BACKGROUND:

3/6/70

Tolsion -

c. Looch -

Walters -

Monr

Bishop —

Casper

Callshon -

Contad -

Fell -

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

EMORIG

DECLASSE 180 BY SE 2ALM 116

011-10-01

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

FK(1) (B)

former Assistant to the Director Lou Nichols as among his

contacts.

PROBLEM:

JFK(1) (B)

Papich implies that CIA may have further information

regarding Nichols' involvement.

ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum R. R.

Roach to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/59.

We do not know if CIA has

additional

between bunson and Nichol tes gested celationship

We do know that they have not

made an issue of this matter to date.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None•

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an

issue of this matter.

HHW : km1/mst

(6)

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1

- MI. W. C. Sullivan

1

- Mro A. W. Gray

1

- Liaison

1 - Mr. H. H. Wallace

SEl

---

## Page 39

TO

OPTIONAL FOGA NO, 10

3010-106

MAT 190 140

OSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C.D. DeLoach

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

SECRET

1

- Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan

- Mr.

W.R. Wannall

- Mr. E.R. Harrell

1 - Mr. R.A. Mullins

7.1. •

Niohl -

Rishor -

Crisper

Collah rea

Conrad -

Felt

Gale

Rosen —

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars _

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF

BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants

to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us

potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside

the U.S. without coordinating

with CIA.

BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send a Border Coverage

Program (BOCOV) informant to a guerrilla training camp in

Cuba.

The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965,

we were vitally interested

in

determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training

sites being used

to prepare Latin American subversives to carry

out revolutions in their home countries.

EP 572-S, a Mexican

national residing in Juarez, Mexico, which is within the area

covered by the BOCOV Program, had infiltrated Cuban and Chinese

intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself

attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to

pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba.

CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

EP 572-S was an integral part of our top secret

BOCOV Program which is

handled on a need-to-know basis.

We

had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary

targets inside Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant

as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was

established for

use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip

materialized which would fully protect our informant and not

jeopardize the BOCOV operation.

OUTCOME:

During period informant was striving to arrange the

trip to Cuba his wife became mentally ill, extremely emotional

and temporarily deserted the informant.

This strained family

relationship

caused us to order El Paso to have informant cancel

efforts to make the trip to Cuba and thus no trip was ever made.

RAM: drl (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

---

## Page 40

- Jo

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF

BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

SECRET

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

After EP 572-S had moved to Guadalajara, Mexico,

which is outside our BOCOV area, in November, 1966, wE

advised CIA of his past cooperation with us and interposed

no objection to his use by CIA in areas outside our

jurisdiction.

On 11/22/66 CIA stated it would consult us

should it initiate contacts with the informant.

There is

no indication that CIA did use the informant and on 6/24/68

we discontinued EP 572-S as he was of no further value to us.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

---

## Page 41

TO

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

LISA GFN, REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION

IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1-

Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan

MI - Mr. D. J. Brennan

SLOKEI

DATE: 3/6/70

Mr. R. D. Cotter

1-

Liaison

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

#MDR16

1-10-01

Tolson

ErLoach

saaltors -

Mohr

Bishop -

Casper -

Callnhan

Conrad-

Felt

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy —

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his

memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph

dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic."

Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the

document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA

information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested

agencies, including CIA..

According to SA Papich, CIA never

made any

protest although it considered our action a violation

of the

"third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did

contain CIA data, it also set forth highly significant data

obtained by Bureau through our own informants. The CIA data

was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to

characterize the past, including communist contacts, of key

figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963

CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA telegrams dating back to

• 1961,

all of which were previously disseminated to the U. S. intelligence

community by CIA. No attempt was made in the monograph to

characterize CIA data as Bureau information and, in fact,

information was attributed to "another Government agency," in.

accordance with established

procedures.

agency rule" provides that

classified information originating in a department or agency

will not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without

the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception

to this rule provides that the receiving

agency may. disseminate

such data to other members of the U.S. Intelligence

Board (USIB),

of which Bureau is a member, unless the originating agency

uses appropriate control markings limiting its data

to the

use of the receiving agency only.

The CIA data used in the

Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph

was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and

USIB members only.

EJO: ekn etu

(7)

ET.

---

## Page 42

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

St

The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own

data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the

It was prepared under emergency

conditions for the President and had a significant bearing

on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community

of a

serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. "e do not believe, in light of the facts

set sorth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

'Li

---

## Page 43

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010 - 106

MAY 1902 EDI"ON

GSA GEH. RIG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1

- Mr. C.D. DeLoach

- Mr. W.C. Sullivan

1

- Mr. D.J. Brennan

TO

: Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

]

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

- Mr. J.E. Gauzens

1 - Mr. A.H. Solomon

501.00 am

L'vLoach.

wallers-

Mohr

•Bishop -

Caspur -

Callahan

Conrad-

Fell -

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tele, Room

Holines -

Gandy —

SUBJECT:

IN QUANTES WITH CIA - BURBAU INFORMANTS' il DE/SP-2AM 316

IN GUATEMALA (S

Item Number 21 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

Bureau operation of informants in Guatemala and comments on

our potential vulnerability for not having

informed CIA at

the inception of the operation of these informants.

(s)

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first

concerns Roberto francisco castaneda felice, an attorney

residing in Guatemala City Our Legat, Mexico, In the far

of 1966,

identified Castaneda as a potential source of intelligence

ALL INCORHIATION CONTAININ

HEREIN IS UNGLASSIFISD BICHES

information of importance to U.S. security; conducted

appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined

his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence

WHERE SHOWS LEERWIN

information to U.S. Government.

By memorandum 11/23/66 it was

approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison

channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with

Castaneda; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained

and that we would service Cla requests provided they could be

(badlane to be 12/2 ster and tated home no reason ke)

why FBI could not proceed as we desired and that CIA headquarters

e not pro02d/65

SA Papich so informed/fake Jurks

would so inform its representatives in Guatemala and Mexico,(s,

instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this

JFK (')(B)

operation.

Since that date we have operated Castaneda as a

valuable and productive unpaid confidential source.

Since this

matter was coordinated with CIA at the outsets;

there appears to

be no problem.

The second situation cited by SA Papich concerned

Legat, Mexico, informant MEX-65.

This individual has cooperated

with the Bureau for

official in 1945-4T, One 25 years. As a Guatemalan police

(s)

was most helpful to our répresentativ

assigned in Guatemala. Swe had no contact with him thereafter

until 1954 when he appeared in Mexico City as a political refugee

from Guatemala. For 11 years thereafter, MEX-65 was operated

by our Legat, Mexico, in Mexico.

AHS: drl (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

KIE7

---

## Page 44

(5)

(5)

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS

IN (GUATEMALA

(5)

¡ SECRET

In April, 1965, MEX-65 returned to Guatemala

and

by memorandum 6/7165 it was approved that contacts with him

be continued in Guatemala by our Central American road trip

Agent.

He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on

criminal matters as well as those of interest to U... security

in Guatemala. (S)

Upon MEX-65's designation as a highly placed police

official in Guatemala in 1967, we promptly advised CIA

headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity.

We advised CIA that we had utilized MEX-65 for handling

criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information

concerning political developments in (Guatemala. At that time,

10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of

informant and that after each contact with informant by our

road trip Agent, the latter would confer with Lestor Sanchez, JFK UB)

Head of CIA operations in Guatemala (who was present at CIA

neadquarters at the meeting) concerning political informatior

furnished by the informant. We were assured of complete CIA

cooperation in this matter

jFK()(B

(S.)

bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of

operated a source in (Guatemala without CIA's knowledge.

stated that responsibility for the development of security

information outside the U. S. is solely CIA's. It is noted that

JFK()(B) (s) Sanchez, has been a difficult person with whom

to deal and has been

inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat,

Mexico, and there have been no

further indications of difficulty

with him.(SCTA, (Guatemala, has 'afforded us complete cooperation JFKCD&

in our handling of MEX-65 as we were assured it would in the

10/6/67 meeting. Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter

with CIA.

MEX-65 continues as a very valuable paid informant

•of our Legat,

Mexico. CIA has made favorable conments regarding

...

the excellent quality of the information obtained by MEX-65.

" This arrangemen't has worked snoothly for two and one-half years

and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an issue

regarding this matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. He do not believe, in light of the lact set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

• of this matter.

-2-

SECRET

---

## Page 45

•-9 OF MIONAL FORA NO 10

5010-106

HAT TYO SONION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SE

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ITEM (22) SOLO

walls.

liohr

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Bishop -

Couper.

Callahan -

Conrad -

Felt -

DATE: 3/6/70

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan -

1 - Mr. W. C. SullivanTavel.

1

Mr. C. D. Brennan

-

Tele. Room

1 - Mr. R. Strain

Holmes -

Gandy -

#moRl6

ON 1 -П-0

catabrassach

Item (22), SOLO, in the material submitted to the

Director by Special

Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

mentions that the Bureau could be vulnerable and charged with

failure to identify the source and coordinate with them on

this matter if they were to become cognizant of the high-level

foreign ramifications of this operation.

SOLo is the code word used to refer to the liaison

operation performed by our informants between the Communist

Party, USA, (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world.

This operation basically is performed to gain

high-level intelligence concerning the Soviet Union's

financial support, domination and control of the CPUSA.

Attendant to this objective, our informants have met with and

discussed mutual problems with leaders of the various inter-

national departments within the Soviet Government.

They have

also held discussions with CP leaders fron other nations.

All information received as a result of this operation

which has foreign ramifications has been promptly disseminated

to CIA at the highest level.

It has not been considered desirable to identify our

sources in this case

in view of. the sensitivity of the case

and the physical danger to the informants.

Considerable security precautions have been carefully

built into the SOLO operation both in the field and at the

Seat of Government to insure the fullest protection to its

security and to the safety of the informants involved.

Exposure

of the identity of these sources might jeopardize the

entire

operation.

CONTINUED - OVER

(6)

SK

---

## Page 46

SECTER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ITEM (22) SOLO

While former Bureau Agents have gone to work for CIA,

there is no information available indicating they have com-

promised this operation. Of course, they could have done this

unknown to us.

The prompt dissemination, to CIA, of information

developed through SOLO, which is of interest to that agency,

(completely fulfills this Bureau's responsibility without

needless jeopardy.

The mechanics of the operation itself

are of no essential significance to CIA.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

Wet

SEGRET

-

-

---

## Page 47

OR:ICE-AL TORM NO. 10

3010-106

"el 1POZ EDITION

OSA GEN, REG, NO, 87

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloạch

FROM

:W. C. Sullivan

- Mx.

1

C.

D. DeLoach

- Mr.

w. C. Sullivan

- Mr. W. R. Wannall

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

1 - Liaison

Tolion -

10l.000h1

W.211055 -

Mohr

-

Bishop -

Casper.

Cullahon

Conrad -

Felt

Gale -

Rosen -

Sullivan -

T'avel -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gundy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HARASSMENT OF CIA

DECTASSIPIED BY SP-2'ALM I

_1~11-01

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter

dated November 15, 1967,

from CIA which requested that the Bureau

check telephone toll calls from the home of one Robert Kenneth BrOw

ho was allegedly harassing CIA in the Miami area. Brown was JFK(C

supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations.

SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll

calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient

to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich

also states that "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt

that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of

refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the

security of U.s. intelligence operations."

A review of Bureau files disclosed that a memorandum,

D. J. Brennan, Jr., to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated November 17, 1967,

was prepared.

This memorandum encompassed the above facts and

recommended that CIA Llaison Agent advise CIA that we would not

check the toll calls as requested. This memorandum and recommendation

was prepared by SA Papich. The

Director noted "OK H."

In addition

to the above, on December 9, 1967, Brown

contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book

about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami

Office.

Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of

• interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that

:1I Brown did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given

to CIA. Brown did not follow through with his offer.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the fäcts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JAM : bew/bad

(6)

if the

SEt

---

## Page 48

OPTIONAL FOXM NO. 10

HAT YO2 1416M

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolion --

10l.0r1-

Hollers-

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloach

.- MX.

C.

D. DeLoach

- Mr.

W. C.

Sullivan

I - Mx. R. D. Cotter

DATE: 3/6/70

Niohr.

Bishop -

_Casper -

Callahan -

Conrad -

Felt -

SEDR

• Gate

Rosen .

Sullivan -

- Liaison

Tavel -

Soyars -

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. R. S. Garner

Tele. Room

•1 - Mr. J. E. Keating (CINAL- Hong—

Administrative File)

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

DECLASSIFIED BY SPLAIN LE

01-1-0.

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70

discusses the restriction of dissemination of the Current

Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) to Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) •

Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on

the distribution list for CINAL received multiple copies.

The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CINAL

as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/83/62 for

additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials

and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information

within CIA.

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CINAL:

"Please look over list of distribution. I have marked with

a dot those I question as to why they should recieve copies

and I do not think more than 1 copy should be sent anyone.

Let me have your views. H." By memorandum R. W. Smith to

W. C. Sullivan 10/6/67, it

was stated that although security

of the classified document CINA, had been maintained, it the

Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would

recieve only one copy each in the luture.

Mr. Tolson noted

on this memorandum, "Yes.

T 10/9." Mr. Tolson also noted,

"We could never run down a leak."

The Director noted, "Send

only 1 copy & 1f any inquiry, then indicate we have had to

cut costs. H."

Since 10/67 the Director's instructions have been

followed and only one copy of CINAL has been furnished to

those, including CIA, on the CINAL distribution list.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. He do not believe, in light of the facts set forth,

that CIA will make an issue of this

matter.

RSG: ekn/bad (7)

WRET

---

## Page 49

...

"OPTIÓNAL PORM NO, 10

5010-106

HAY 1909 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27

Tolson -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

leLouch.

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

allers —

Niohs -

1

- Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Bishop -

Crisper -

.. - Liaison

callahun.

1 - Mr. J. M. Fitzgerald

Conrod -

Felt -

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 7, 1970

Gole

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Sayals =

Soyars

FROM

•W. C. Sullivan

Tele. Room.

Holmes -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

:1-11-01 Fm0R16

Candy

ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALm |716

WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XL.6

SERVICE (BVDS 65)

1960

Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA. Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to

5) Holland by Legal Attache (Legat), Bonn, bin 1960 to explore arrange-

nents for liaison with appropriatelDutch authorities

It is given.

as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with

EXCEN®

The U.s.

ALL INSOFT ITION CONTAIN

should first reach agreement with CIA, which he said had previously

FORE IS IT MULASSIFIED

EXONE CHIFFRIE

handled all relations with Dutch authorities.(s)Papich says CIA

Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we

did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory

to all concerned was eventually worked out.

Papich also says

; that

in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in

henmark}but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

PERSOSAD

Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, London, to broaden liaison

in sandina viued

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark,

contacts in scandinavian countries and told Legat, Bonn, to make

exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities

in Holland CS,

for the same purpose.

Since we had told state by letter of 3/10/55

we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with

(5) the butch regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State

approved.

state sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in Holland (5)

on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention,! but it apparently

did not get'to the Ambassador prior to Legat's trip to folland. (s)

JFK(1)(B)

On 1/4/60 Legat, Bonn, called the BVD from Germany and

arranged to call on them on 1/7/60.

The BVD reported the call to

(5)

(5)

the CIA representative in Holland who told U. S. Ambassador

Philip Young.

On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60

from. Young in which he said he was disturbed about the manner

in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While

offering to assist the Bureau, young spoke of the long standing

(S (contractual and financial arrangements CIA had with BVD/and

JFK(I)(B)

suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if

permanent Bureau liaison with (BVDwas planned.

JMF: jan (5)

SECRET

sar

---

## Page 50

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY

PROBATSON

SECRET

SERVICE (BVD = 2960

on same feet met with ambassador on me to

(SCIA Chief of Mission prior to visiting BVDS He expiained

that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with

(s) BVD/concerning exchange of information bearing on U.s. internal

He said he would not be operational and that

the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference

with the existing ClA arrangement. s while the Embassy officials

expressed misgivings that the Dutch might be confused, no request

was made to refrain from contacting BVD.f/The CIA representative

said he had requested his headquarters for comment on learning

of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply.

Legat later briefed both Embassy officials on the results of

(5)

his visit to BVD, who were friendly but deferred a final

commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked Ambassador

Young for his offer to assist, and

sald Bureau Interests 1

¡candinavian countries and Holland were under discussion with

Allen Dulles.

Young was also assured our proposed contacts with

(5)

the Dutch vere purely liaison in nature; that while we would

keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with

its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to

go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in

coordinating with CIA matters taken up with the Dutch.)S)That

Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all

U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities

or which involve foreign clandestine services. Paragraph 10,

however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison

relationship concerned with U.s. internal security unctions,

or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly

related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and Richard

Helms the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and

(s) Holland exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark.

When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply

with the Directive for coordination of U.s. lisison activities

abroad, Helms immediately stated there were no such instances.

In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints

or problems, Dulles stated that neither

he nor his representatives

had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not

being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give

all possible assistance... (Dulles did assist by writing a personal

letter to Ambassador Young which resulted in a Joint FBI-BYDaCIA

meeting on 4/8/60, at which direct FBI BVD Ilaison was agreed upon).

- 2 -

(S)

SECRET

---

## Page 51

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY

SERVICE (BVD) - 1960

SECRET

On memorandum Frohbose to Belmont of 1/14/60,

concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and Helms,

Director noted: "I. Well handled by Papich.

All of

the turmoil developing in this situation could have been

avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also

followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe,

in light of the facts

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

set

-2-

SECRET

---

## Page 52

nATIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-108

MAY 1902 EDITION

CS, GEN. ECG. 1:0.27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

тО.

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3-6-70

SEURLA

Tol. con

1.1.000h.

Mallrors

Mohr -

Bishop

Corpor

Callnhon

Conrad

tolt

Gole

Rosen.

Sullivan -

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes —

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

TO FOREIGN SERVICE - 1962

ATE DID SISATION CONTATIN

MERICH TE UNELASSITIED BXÇAT

WEERT SHUT QUAERWISTS

Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by

letter 11-7-62 raised questions concerning the propriety of our

dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the

(5) Greek Intelligence Service.

This concerned certain Committee

for State Security (KGB) technical equipment which was obtained

from our sensitive Soviet defector in place, Bureau code name

Fedora.

CIA letter 11-7-62 stated that a representative of

5) Greek Intelligence Service informed ClA it received alore-

mentioned information from our Legal Attache. ClA claimed

such dissemination abroad should have been coordinated with

CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)

5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.S.

liaison concerning clandestine intelligence activities abroad or

involving foreign clandestine services.

CIA claimed that pursuant

above we were obligated to coordinate

with CIA prior to dissemination.

Memorandun Branigan to Sullivan 11-9-62 under Fedora

caption reviewed this situation and indicates that on 7-13 and

8-1-62 Fedora provided information concerning several types of

technical paraphernalia used by KGB.

Dissemination of above was

made to State Department, CIA and military intelligence agencies

by letter on 7-24 and 8-16-62. Information was also furnished to

Legal Attaches, London, Bern, Bonn, Paris, Rome and Madrid, with

instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelli

gence agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

62-80750

1

- 105-104811

- MT. C. D. DeLoach

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

• !?

CLASSIFIED BY SEE ALMATE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

-

Mr.

D.

J. Brennan

- Mr.

W.

1

A. Branigan

- Mix.

F. Mabey

JFM: plm

(7) !1

CONTINUED - OVER

Jill.

WolD

SECREY

---

## Page 53

Memorandum to MI. C. D. DeLoach

the instructions that it be given limited distribution and

handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated

from the Bureau or

a source within the U.s.

Above memorandum

points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its

inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of inter-

pretation.

We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities

but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational

angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above

since we had previously given the information to CIA.

memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering

CIA's inquiry according to above.

Director indicated "o,k.

and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around." On

1i-1s-oe we directed a letter to cla accordingly.

As indicated

in memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did

not

further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DJI

-

2

-

SECRET

---

## Page 54

TO

3010-108

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN.

REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SERIEL

DATE:

3/6/70

#MORIS

DECLASSTETED BYSPEALIT HIL

70l10n

101.00ch -

Walters

Mohr

BIshop

Casper

Callahan

Contad

F'ell..

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy.

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

"THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT,

" A BOOK AUTHORED BY

DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that Wise and

Ross had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a

book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies.

It was suggested

that CIA be advised

of this, and the Director noted, "I see no

reason for doing so."

Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, 8/28/63, reports

this visit

and notes that Wise had asked for data concerning

the Bureau's internal security procedures and had asked concerning

other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one

exception.

He did inquire as to whether there was friction between

the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and

maintained daily liaison with CIA.

It was on this memorandum

that the Director said he saw no reason for informing CIA con-

cerning the visit of Wise and Ross.

We later learned that their book, "The Invisible

Government," was furnished in the form of advance proofs to

CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs

from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe,

in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this mattey.

- Mr.

1

1

Mr.

C.

D. DeLoach

T.

E.

Bishop

-

• Mx.

Liaison

iso C. Sullivan

1

- Mr. Rose

BFR: mIm/mk1

(6)

SENREN

---

## Page 55

6 OPTIONAL FORM, NO 10

3010-106

MAT 1YOZ EDITO AN

GIC SEN. REG. VU 17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

• Memorandum

TO

: Mx. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SLBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1

- Mr. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

1 - Mr. Rozamus

#MOR 16

DECLASS IT TED BY SIPATEN

OAT 1N0

Tolin -

Irl.ouch .

sulters -

Mohr -

31.:hop -

Casper —

Collahan -

Coniud -

Fell -

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Sam

Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations

Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960,

CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to

assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by

providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist

Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa.

His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no

informants available because they were necessary for our own

operations.

He claims we took the position since we saw no

benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or

long term basis.

He states that CIA could argue that as early

as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional

coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance,

we did

not cooperate.

He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60

concerning this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

memorandum referred to discloses that on 4/5/60

that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength

on the continent of Africa and that his agency found it most

difficult to establish effective penetration.

Horton noted that

in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to.

move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable

him to develop worthwhile sources.

He asked if the Bureau would

consider furnishing one of its

Negro informants or developing an

informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventyal use by CIA in

Africa.

Papich told Horton that

if the Bureau had a good Negro

informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future

jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production.

Papich

added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau

informant, have him'travel to Africa under some cover and still

be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist

colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. Horton said

he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give

consideration.

MJR: ssr

(6)..

CONTINUED + OVER

---

## Page 56

'Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by

the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our

informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly

in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved

that CIA be orally informed that it is not possible to provide

an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau

was not in a position to

(assist CIA. "CIA's problen was an administrative one within

that Agency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

V

SECKET

---

## Page 57

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

: ' C. Sullivan

SEE ET

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

Tolson.

i "i.onch -

Wallurs -

Mohr

Bishop

Cusper

Callahan -

Conrad -

Felt -

DATE: March 6, 1970

Gole

Rosen.

Sullivan -

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Tavel

Soyars -

- Mr.

W. C. Sullivan

Tele. Room:

1

-Liaison

Holmes -

Gandy _

1 - Mr. W. J. McDonnell

DECLASSIE PLANTE

ON 1-11-0

o satistic listican

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau

letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the

White House information

received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg wherein

the latter was critical of intelligence operations, particularly

the overstaffing of personnel.

SA Papich comments

that we do

not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but

could construe same as relating to its operations.

Our Legat, Paris, in a letter to the Director dated

10/19/64, set forth

the results of a conversation with Ambassador

State one eate Borote ne

William R. Rivkin at Luxembourg.

The latter was assigned by the

State Department to conduct a survey of the U.S. intelligence

operations in six Luropean countries, assisted by representative:

of Defense, State Department, and Bureau of the Budget.

Rivkin

remarked that the results of

the survey were appalling,

there

being 23, 000 military personnel in the six countries engaged in

intelligence operations and numerous CIA personnel.

He described

the lack of coordination between the military and

"scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches

were grossly overstaffed

and he was recommending drastic cuts

and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those

of the embassies.

He made no mention of specific intelligence

operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination.

Rivkin commented that on his return to the U.s., he intended to

see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to

his attention.

Rivkin's comments were incorporated in a letter to

William D. Moyers,

Special Assistant to the President, dated

10/23/64, in accordance with the Director's noted instructions.

Our files disclose

no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau

letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

We do not believe, in light of the

facts set forth, that CIA will make

an issue of this matter.

, WJM: bcw/mk1 (5)

SECRET VE

---

## Page 58

TO

OPTIONAL TORM NO. 10

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 37.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

:.! Ouch —

Hollers

1. top

SUBJECT:

DATE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

March 7, 1970

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1

- Mr.

Sullivan

- Liaison

Foil.

Galo

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gandy

1 - Mr. Haynes

#MORIG

DECLASSIFIED BY SPY ALTA ATE

ON

1-11-0

sanaticia call 1135361

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970,

liscusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a result

of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

It was pointed out that

in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information

to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of

increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

McCone

charged that the information attributed to him was not so

because he had never made any such statement and he could

prove it.

The fact was that the information relating to

McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had

indicated the information originated with McCone.

McCone

maintained that we should have checked with him before going

on record that any information had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses that

In April, 1963, Mr. Belmont along with Papich had discussed

with Richard Helms and James Angleton of CIA McCone's alleged

position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the

board telephone taps on diplomatic establishments. The

Bureau, of course,

wasopposed to this and advised Helms that

we would request to make our position known before the board.

At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, Helms

specifically asked what he should tell McCone and Mr. Belmont

told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at

the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board

wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PrIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:'

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of

this matter.

RHH : wmk/sef

(5)

---

## Page 59

TO

as si tp:"* OPTIOITAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1907 ₴1

GSA GEN. RÍG. NO, 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan

¡ SECRET

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

. - Mr. W.

C.

Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 = Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. L. Whitson

1.1.on

Ballers

Mohr

Pishop

C'a.ipor

C'allahon

Consad

Gulc

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel

Soyars -

Tole. Room -

Holmes —

Gandy —

SUBJECT RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the

material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his

memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by

Anatoliy Mikhailovich Golitzyn regarding recruitment of tour

CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB),

that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE

Golitzyn, an intelligence officer of the

KGB who defected to CIA in 1961, alleged that the KGB had

penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name "Sasha."

In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided Golitzyn

with information regarding many individuals who had worked for

CIA in Germany.

Golitzyn identified two individuals at various times

as "Sasha" and in each instance investigation "washed out" the

identification.

Golitzyn finally identified "Sasha" as one

JEK (018)

Igor Orlov, a former employee of ClAy During the course of

extensive document reviews Golitzyn became acquainted with

backgrougd of yarious individuals who had worked in Germany at

JFK(SCA)

the time orlov did. Golitzyn identified four present employees

of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while

he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA

CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-

scale investigation of its four employees based solely on

Golitzyn's allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA

was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a

full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of

allegations by Golitzyn. With regard to any investigation in the

informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

62-80750

1 - 105-105608 (Golitzyn)

Ll: as: bipbjp (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

---

## Page 60

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

62-80750

which supported Golitzyn

SECREC

JFK(I)CA)

speculation that Orlov) was

JFK() (B)

instrumental in the recruitment by the soviets of either

Rafael Goldfarb or Andrew Hanfman and nothing was developed

which would support Golitzyn's allegations against the other

wo suspects, Richard Kovich and David Nurphy Furthermore

JFK(I (B)

SIA had furnished no documentary material regarding (Kovich 1 JFK (\)B)

jfks) lor murphy which would in any way support Golitzyn:

Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting.

investigation of Goldfarb, Hanfman, Kovich or Murphy. We JFK(B

they are all employees

will interpose no objection to pursue Anatoliy Golitzy's

of your agency, if you wish

allegations concerning them, including interviews of the

individuals concerned.

"This Bureau would, of course, be interested in

receiving the results of any investigation which would tend

to confirm Golitzyn's conclusions that one or more of these

employees of your agency had actually been recruited by the

Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

(SECRET

---

## Page 61

OPTIOTiAI FORM NO, 10

3010-106

OSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

• Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

:W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO

SOUTH AMERICA • 1958

1 • Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/7/70

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 • Mr. F. X. O'Brien

Tolton

Mohr .

Bishop

Casper

Callahan .

Conrad -

Felt

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel .

Soyars.

-

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -

#m0216

0n 1-11-01160

Item number 32 in material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice

President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA informa-

tion concerning events in Latin America relating to

Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information

in above letter came from CIA. He commented that this

letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning

quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted

it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter.

Papich stated that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy

Director of CIA, was attached to the then Vice President

Nixon's staff.

SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of

above letter, could raise question as to violation of Third

Agency Rule.

Results of Review of Bureau Files

• The letter to the then Vice President Nixon

is located in Bureau file 62-88461-117. It contains"

summary of information relating to riots and attacks.

against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58

Latin American trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

62-80750

FX0: dgo/ sef (6)

CONTINUED • OVER

---

## Page 62

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SCARE!

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

62-80750

FIMORIG

DUCIASSIFTED I SPEALMAIG

941-11-01

source of the information set forth in our letter.

paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the

impression gained

from a review of CIA reports indicates that

CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles

concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter

also stated as follows:

"It is significant that information in the indi-

vidual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your

arrival in a particular country.

Therefore, there is a

question as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist

organizations which would have led to the development of

information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of

your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding

instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1958.

The first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director

had a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as

the first sentence of the above letter reads as

follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set

forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency

reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to

Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum Mr. R. R.

Roach. to

Mr. A. H. Belmont dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for

the Director's information, The Director noted on this memo-

randum, "Send summary to A. G.

In accordance with

instructions, a letter was

sent to the then Attorney General

under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a summary

of CIA information in the

same manner.as had been sent to

Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958.

Our letter to the Attorney General,

however, did not contain any observations regarding .CIA

coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and

his party.

file in this matter (62-88461-150) indicates that

on June 9, 1958, Colonel Robert Cushman in the office of the

then Vice President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

---

## Page 63

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

62-80750

of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from

the Director to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding

Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the

press.

Colonel Cushman's request was set forth in memorandum

G. A. Nease to Mr. Tolson June 9, 1958, with the recommenda-

tion that Colonel Cushman be advised that if the iniormation

were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a

serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's

confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed

CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information

should not be given to the press.

Both Mr. Tolson and the

Director agreed with the recommendation, and Colonel Cushman

was advised of our decision.

It is noted that Colonel Cushman

is identical with the individual who is now Deputy Director

of CIA.

Comments on Remarks in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

1. That most of the information in our letter to

Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came frOm CIA and that this

letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning

the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute

as to the source of the informa-

tion which was summarized in our letter to Mr. Nixon, and we

clearly indicated in our letter that the source was CIA. With

regard

regard to any question being raised as to the quality of

CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to

Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader

of the CIA reports - - that 15,.

that the information from CIA

popped up rather suddenly as related to the country and

Mr. Nixon's arrival.

Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since

he

was personally involved in demonstrations directed against

him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that

advance information from our responsible intelligence agency.

(CIA) may have been lacking.

We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of

our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary

conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

- 3-

---

## Page 64

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAI INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

62-80750

personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff.

As indicated above, Colonel Cushman, who was a member of

Mr. Nixon's staff in 1958 and who is now a Deputy Director

of CIA, was aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents.

We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of

protest in this matter.

That CIA technically could raise a question

as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our

5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a

Government agency from disseminating information originating

with another Government agency in the absence of specific

authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there

are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to

Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly

identified as having originated with CIA. This letter

was apparently prepared at the specific request of then

Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make •an issue

of this matter.

V

4

ET

---

## Page 65

OPTICAL TURM NO, 10

MOY 1PGZ EDITION

OSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HERBERT ITKIN

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

I - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Mr. A. Rosen

1 - Mr. J. H. Gale

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

Mohr

Bishop -

Casper

-

Callahan -

Conrad -

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan -

Tavel —

Soyars -

Tole. Room

Holmes —

Gandy -

Item number 33 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum

3/5/70 discusses Herbert Itkin as an individual who was operated

as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable

information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution

of cases being handled by the Bureau.

Mr. Papich states that

the Bureau acquired access to Itkin through the CIA and that

although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the

Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed

that the Bureau never

acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered

extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. Belmont captioned "James Hoffa" set out that James Angleton

of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General

concerning a source whom Mr. Angleton had used since World War II

and who subsequently has developed a close association with a

lawyer who does considerable work for the Teamsters Unions.

Angleton's source was confident that the lawyer could be developed

as a penetration which could "sink' Hoffa and all of his cohorts.

The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the

matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

Mr. Angleton set up the first contact! with the individual

who had the contact with the attorney

and at that time Angleton

stated that he did not want to get involved in any. investigative

aspects and wanted to step out of the matter as soon as possible.

As a result, eventual contact was made with Herbert Itkin who

developed into a very productive source. Itkin has been publicly

identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his

testimony.

JGD: rmm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

---

## Page 66

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HERBERT ITKIN

SECRET

The Bureau's success in handling Itkin can be

attributed to the know-how of the SAs of the New York

Office because Itkin is a highly emotional individual

and he had aggravated marital problems, severe pressures

from his many business associates; therefore, it took

a high degree of skill in dealing

with this

source in

order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us

originally in touch with this source, it was not

believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA

and explain to them our success or to thank them for

giving us this original lead. It is also noted that

there is an obligation upon Government agencies to

cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this

matter was in accordance with the long standing policy

among all Government agencies.

Review of Itkin's file does not reflect any

instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau

(not acknowledging CIA's

assistance in placing us in touch

with Itkin. This is in line with Mr. Angleton's statement

in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any

investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step.

out as soon as possible.

In view of the above, it is not

believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the

Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRE

---

## Page 67

¿aria OPPIONAL FARM NO, 10.

LAT 1O6. 20L4190

SISA GEN, REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

SECRET

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM.

:W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C.

D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. J.

P. Mohr

1 - Mr. I.

w. Conrad

DATE: March 7, 1970

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1

- Liaison

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Tolion --

:04.0.1011 -

Mohr

Віз.hop -

rall-sh an -

Conrad

Fclt

Galo

Rosen.

Sullivan -

T'avel.

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes —

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns

exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as

it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states

CIA exhibited its equipment to us, but for many years we declined

to show any of our devices, with some exceptons. •He states

that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated

from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to

overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied

we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA.

Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is

the tread and

a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has

furnished the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use

or inspection.

They have also furnished technical manuals obtained

abroad and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of

some

of their operations abroad. Laboratory personnel have been

afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities and

equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded

training at CIA schools. As recently as October, 1969, CIA

afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerring a Clandestine

Transmitter Activator, developed by their technical people and

offered to loan us one of these units as well as afford our

personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity

on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important

technical information to CIA over a period of many years..

Representative examples are cited below:

Prior to 1955 an important unsolved technical

intelligence problem involved desired access to

enemy intelligence and other security information

FJC:sef

(7)

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 68

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

RACHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

protected by combination-type locks (safe doors, and

the like,.

Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were

able to solve this problem by

using X-rays from

radioactive materials to "see" into the interior of

a combination lock and

thus recover the combination;

without trace of tampering or other indication that

the lock had been compromised. This was a scientific

breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and,

with Bureau approval, our results and techniques were

made known to the appropriate CIA representatives..

CIA advised that they had theretofore spent thousands

of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to

solve the same problem.

The impact of this scientific

discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable

intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and

CIA.

In approxinately the late 50's and early 60's, both CIA

and iBl encountered a new, highly sophisticated type

of secret writing placed

into use by the russians for

communicating with espionage agents. In spite of a

massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists

of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling

the basic principles and techniques underlying this new

russian system.

This important breakthrough thus permitted

for the first time a successful attack against the new

Russian secret ink communication system. Because of its

extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval,

this development was made known to CIA, and its importance

to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the

Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA,

under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in

i August even a 2,arg

part, "For the past several years there has been

increasingly effective technical liaison between the

Technical Services Division of this Agency and correspond

ing components of your Bureau. . ."

Dulles further

commented that Bureau technical personnel had "

• made

an outstanding

technical contribution for which they are to

be highly .commended.

Their work not only has an important

impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a

chemical mechanism from which may well stem new high-level

secret writing systems. The discovery will have an

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

---

## Page 69

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

SECRET

important influence

on the discharge of responsibilities

assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider

access to these findingsto be further evidence of the

value of close technical liaison between our two

organizations..."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever

it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational

interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available

to CIA actual Soviet secret writing chemicals and methods

of development which had come into the possession of the

Bureau through investigative activity and through high-

level informants. A recent example involved the Russian.

espionage case of Herbert William Boeckenhaupt wherein

on 2/12/69 a sample of secret writing material used by

Boeckenhaupt to communicate with the Russians was

furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples

of FBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important

technical information, and certainly the letter from CIa reflects

the satisfaction and importance which CIA attached to such

information received

from the Bureau. Within general Bureau

policy guidelines, there were, of course, on a continuing basis

numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA

over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JK

V.

SECRET

- 3-

---

## Page 70

OPT

MAL tO

•0. 10

5010-106

GEN. NEG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

1

1

-

Mr. J.

P. Mohr

Mr. J.

J. Casper

- Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

- Mr. D. J. Brennan

1

- Mr. W.

H. Atkinson

FROM : Mr. N. C. Sullivan

I0ln -

Holleri-

Mohr

Bishop -

Caspor

-

callah in -

contid -

folt -

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Soyars -

'Tele. Room.

lolmes -

Gandy _

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

= mUR16

EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

DICTASSTFIED BEER 2ALM 16

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum March 5, 1970, indicated

CIA has never understood why Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to

lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude

concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested

it be permitted to

discuss training problems with

FBI training staff in view of

necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and

security agencies.

Following recommendations by the Executives

Conference, Bureau advised CIA by letter May 25, 1950, that we did

not believe FBI training staff could intelligently discuss training

methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning

conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

Since 1962, we have taken foreign police officers into the

National Academy through the Agency for International Development

(AID). These officers spent two weeks of orientation with AlD and

atter

graduation certain selective officers have been in touch with

CIA through AID. We are aware that CIA has used many of these

graduates as sources of information.

In 1966, the Director approved a request of CIA to have one

of its men

attend

the National Academy for purpose "to improve

capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training

programs." As a result, a CIA Security Officer graduated from the

77th Session of the FBI

National Academy (March 7 - May 25, 1966).

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have

addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type

training courses on 31 occasions between June, 1962, and December,

1969.

WHA: mbm

(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SE

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## Page 71

Memorandun to Mr. C. D. Deloath

SEYXET

We loaned CIA four Bureau training films in

February, 1966, one was eventually returned, but CIA

continues to utilize the other three films entitled "On

The Record," "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations."

We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which.

were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language

Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at

Bureau training schools and there is no indication in

Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the

Training Division.

RECOMMENDID ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

will.

SENNET

2

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## Page 72

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10

5010-106

"OJA GUN, riO, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

idle wack

Hutter:.

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

- Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: 3/6/70

Mohr

Bishop

Caspor

Callahan

Confud.

l'olt

Gole

Rosen

Sullivan

1 - Liaison

Tavel

Soyars

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Mr. W. R. Wannall

Tele. Room

Holmes -

- Mr.

1.

M. Linton

Gan dy

1 - Mx ..

E.

R. Harrell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

ADRIG ILOS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM HIG

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16. 107

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

40 +3/5/10

discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief

that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance

in collection of positive intelligence in the United States.

Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich

to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy

of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

AT INPORMATION CONTAININ

FERRIN IS LNCLASSIEIZD EXCALS

RACHE SHONE OTHERWISE +

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item by Papich points out CIA belief

that

more aggressive action should have been taken in field of

collecting positive intelligence in the United States.

Papich

notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been

restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when

political crises occur in some country.

He points out CIA belief

that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveil-

Iance coverage, developmenapichintormants and collection of

cryptographic material.

cites two specific cases occurring

in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage,

suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the :

Attorney General.

Review of

specific cases mentioned set forth

with Director's comments relative thereto being noted.

Our

policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delinated to field

by SAC Letter

66-10 (B) - copy attached.

SAC letter calls for

guarding our jurisdiction but shows our

willingness to cooperate

with CIA.

Enclosure

ERH: bipiy"

(7)

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

SECRET

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## Page 73

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of

our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and

we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the

future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA

outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and

counterintelligence work affecting the United States and

forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo

and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

wel

exchange

2

SECRET

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## Page 74

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DETAILS:

SECRET

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored

field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States

but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive

order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of

such information.

He notes we investigate subversives, spies,

and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and

that facets of these investigations of violations of United States

laws serve

to tulfill a counterintelligence objective referred

to by us as investigations of internal security matters.

notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence

field

has been

restricted to the compliance with requests by

State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring

in some foreign country.

Papich points

out CIA feels there is unexplored

field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of

vastly increased technical surveillances, informant development

and collection of cryptographic material.

According to Papich,

CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area

and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the

problem.

Papich cites two cases Alfred S. Gonsalves, 10/69 and

(S) (Zalman Shapiro] 10/69) where CIA requests for technical surveil-

Iance were declined by us with the suggestion to ClA that these

matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with the

Attorney General.

• Specific Cases

Representative of the

a result of his weakness for yomen when assigned in Moscow > (5)

from 1957 to 19615)Gonsalves was to participate, in bilateral

talks with United States officials 'in October, 1969 3)By letter

(s) Q/26/69 CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances on

(s) Gonsalves.

The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority

of the AG.

I don't want them utilizing FBI as their channel."i

(6) Czalman M. Shapirol was originally investigated by us

in 1965 as a possible unregistered agent of the Israeli Govern-

ment due to negotiations by him with Israeli officials designed

to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company in IsraelJ.."".

(5)

(5)

(5)

-3 -

SECREN

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 75

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECKLI

of activity by that subject

Commission (AEC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by AEC.

Our initial investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney

General - Internal Security Division found that facts did not

justly soliciting (Shaptro'esistration as a foreign agent.

In Spring of 1965, sixty-one kilograms of nuclear

material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed

by Shapiro, but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC

revealed this shortage was probably the result of

cumulative

process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight

di version of nuclear matertal on the part of Shapires)

and did not justify an unqualified determination of a

unauthorized persons or government'

CIA, in 1968, became alarmed on receipt of information

of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings

felt it may indicate illegal diversion or at least justification

for reopening investigation. Richard Helms of CIA contacted

the

Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the

need for additional investigation. Attorney General contacted

Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine

advisibility of additional investigation.

The Director, in

approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisibility

getting into this.

Is to das he suspects we would in helmets gone aroun

An intensive investigation of Shapiro conducte

(5) during late (1968) and into Fall of L969 revealed no positive.

(5)

intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion ot

AEC material to Israel)SOur investigation included technica.

surveillances installed @/27/68and discontinued, 9/4/69. Shapiros

was interviewed by AEC 8/14/69 and disclaimed passing any

classified data to Israeli Government.SFacts of case were

reviewed by Department of Justice which found no evidence or pro-

secutable violation by Shapiro.(s) AEC felt the additional investi-

gation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate

withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In

view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised.

A 10/13/69 letter from Helms acknowledged additional investigation/

-4-

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 76

(S

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

would produce no legal evidendelpertinent to the issue which

prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstituted

audio surveillances of (Shapir@would produce positive intelligence

information.

He therefore requested reinstitution of this

coverage.

The Director's letter to Helms 10/17/69 noted that

after careful review it was felt that CIA should take this

matter to the Attorney General. $

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by

Special Agent Papich that inthe future CIA should transmit its

requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States

to the Attorney General.

This specifically covered the cases

of Consalves and Shapiro The Director commented "Right."

Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests,

changes inherent in faster communication, hysteria to facilitate

international travel and in response to requests from CIA, the

Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA

regarding that Agency's operational activities in the United states.

On a memorandum reporting the

results of the conferences with

CIA, the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our

guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our

gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the

field and Bureau offiçials results of the conferences with CIA

and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction in

the counterintelligence field.

This SAC letter (copy attached)

emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement

upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness to

cooperate

with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the

United States.

In approving this SAC letter, the Director

noted "I hope

there is no sneaker' in this.

Time will tell."

There has been no renewed request from CIA for

technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there

been any indication that such requests have been sent. by CIA

to the Attorney General

as we suggested. Due to CIA interest

in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility

the Agency may approach Attorney General for the desired

coverage at some time in the future.

= 5 .

SECKED

---