MEMO:SUMMARY OF CONTACTS WITH AMWHIP/1 AND AMLASH/1.
Originator: CIA
From: FALLUCCI. TFW/FI
Document date: 09/01/1962
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10215-10210

' 2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Se/at 62

Sumnary of Contacts with

ANWHI?/1 and AMLASH/1

HELSINKI:

1.

Events of 30 July 1962.

ANNHIP arried in Helsinki on 30 July 1962. He called HBFINCH

according to plan, and after his second call (due to his hotel porter's

abysknal understanding of English), Fallucci established contact with

AMAH IP without further difficulty. The meeting took place in the

restaurant of his hotal, The jaakuna, and later in his room. We had

not at this time located AMLASH, so the time was spent briefing AMWHIP

on the local scene, and on his conduct with AMASH when they met. The

meeting lasted about

one and a half hours.

Later the same day we called AMWHIP at his hotel to report

no progress in locating AMLASH. Feeling it advisable to keep AMWHIP

occupied, we took him out to dinner, at Fisketorpet, located in the

suburbs of Helsinki. The evening lasted until 1200, terminating with a

drink at the roof bar of the Yaakuna. During the six hours, we had an

opportunity to explain carefully to AMWHIP that in order for us to help

his friend, AMLASH must be willing to follow our directions and agree to

certain conditions (already agreed upon by interested Hqs. parties).

AMWHIP realized that this was necessary, and agreed with our ideas. However,

he 18

attached to AMLASH, and will continue to look upon him in the most

benevolent and subjective manner. This being rather far removed from our

Intended approach to, and opinion of AMLASH. AMWHIP will require handling

of a close nature in order that he fülly understands and is aware of our

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position in this matter. He closed the meeting by telling him that we

would have an effort made in the morning to locate AMLASH, and that he

might as well relax, sight-see li he wished, and that we would te in touch

with him at intervals during the day.

2. Events of 31 July 1962.

Our efforts to locate AMLASH through UNRUMBLE/2 proved to be

fruitless.

Theadore I. Wintergrst, who was handling UNRUMBLE/2, said

that the latter tried his best, but had not been able to do us any good.

The Station also reported that its contacts had been unable to aid us.

We reported to AMWHIP the fact that we had not located AMLASH, and suggested

that we have dinner together, to which he agreed. We net AMWHIP at 2100

at our hotel, the Kamp, and proceeded to the Royal Restaurant for dinner.

AMWHIP was obviously getting on pins and needles because we had not found

his friend. He suggested that we call up the Cuban Festival delegation,

or try some hotels that evening. We persuaded him that it was not the

best Idea yet, and to give other people more time to locate him. He

agreed, but kept coming up with ideas all evening for ways to locate AMLASH.

He suggested that AMLASH Ilked night clubs, and that after dinner we could

perhaps try several. We agreed, more to placate him that with any thoughts

of success. We tried several, the Bruunsparken and the Theater Grill,

both of which were filled with drinking Finns, but no signs of AMLASH. The

Finns, engaging in their national pastime, obviously irritated AMHIP, and

after being pushed around in the Theater Grill for an hour, he said that

he thought this was a waste of time. We agreed, grabbed a taxi and went

home. During the evening, we told AMWHIP that tomorrow morning, if nothing

had turned up, we would start by calling the better hotels in town ourselves,

and try this rather laborious nethod to locate AMLASH. We agreed to meet

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between 9 and 10 o'clock at our hotel.

3. Events of 1 August 1962.

AMWHIP arrived at our hotel at 0945 on 1 August, and we retired

to our roon to telephone.

Securing an outside line, our friend began

to telephone. We decided to try the local "pink" hotels first, the flaas

Korkki, and the Torni. AMWHIP had no luck with the Klaas Korkki, but when

he called the Torni, he was told that AMLASH was there, and was connected

with room No. 201. A Spanish-speaking man (who was later identified as

the newly appointed Cuban Diplomatic Representative to Finland) answered

the phone in 201 and said that AMLASH was in the shower, and call back

later if it was Important. AMWHIP left a message that he was fron Mexico

and that he, "Carlos", would call back. During the break, we instructed

him to be careful on the telephone, and to talk as if the opposition was

listening. He was just to be casual, greet AMLASH, arrange to see him,

saying that he was in Europe on business in Scandinavia, France and Switzerland,

and that hearing in Helsinki that AMLASH was attending the Festival, he

had decided to stop over and contact him. When AMLASH answered the phone,

AMWHIP's face lit up, caution was abandoned, and he was off at a rapid

rate in Spanish. AMASH said that he would be right over to see AKHIP

in his room at the Vaakuna. We briefed AWHIP once more on being careful,

and showed AMWHIP to the door. We arranged to have AM:HIP call us when

he could at the office, urging him once more to be careful and discreet.

We hope he has been. It was later learned that finding AMLASH in this

hotel room was pure good fortune, as he was just using this room to take

& shower, since he was still residing In the quarters of the common delegates.

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3T

AMRIP talked to AMLASH for at least seven hours, fron about

1000 in the morning until approximately 1700 the same evening. When AM HIP

called us at 1730, he presented us with the fact that he had convinced

AMLASH to talk with us, and for this purpose, he had arranged a dinner

meeting that same evening for approximately 1930. He would have preferred

to talk longer with AMWHIP about AMLASH's reactions, but time did not

permit. We arranged a dinner for 2100 at "The ihite Lad'", a restaurant

some way from the center of town, and succeeded in obtaining a private

dining room, a practice not uncommon

in this Station-recommended restaurant,

as it is often used by businessnen to have private dinners and afterwards,

business discussions.

We arrived at the White Lady first, arranged for the dinner, and

awaited AMWHIP and AMLASH, who arrived at 2110 by taxi. Although AMWHIP

had suggested to us that the discussions should be merely devoted to

getting acquainted the first evening, AMLASH commenced almost immediately

Into a discussion of his feelings and, his position concerning Cuba today.

As reported in our cable, (Hels 1609) AMLASH was quite intense, and showed

the strain of his unexpected meeting with AMWHIP. Although obviously

under emotional strain, AMASH presented his feelings in a relatively calm

manner, and was given to discussing them throughout the meal. He said he

was considering not going back to Cuba, but after talking to ANWHIP, he

felt that if he could do something really significant for the creation of

a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there.

He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking,

but that 1f he could be given a really large part to play, he would use

himself and several others in Cuba whon he could rely upon. These he said

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included two majors (one of which AM HIP later reported was a militia

commander in the center part of the island), two captains, and sereral

others whom AMLASH said he could trust, but whom he would not raze.

AMLASH said he had had plans to blow up an oil refinery, as he felt that

the continuing existence of a semblence of normal functioning in Cuba

depended upon a continuing supply of

petroleum, supplies of which, as we

know, are at a critical stage today. He also wanted to plan the execution

of Carlos Rodriguez and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel,

by execution if necessary. He feels that if Fidel is eliminated, it would

be much easier to effect a take-over. (We listened for the most part, but

at this point tried to explain to AMASH that men like Rodriguez could easily

be replaced by Moscow, and that the killing of the Soviet Ambassador, would

have only the briefest effect on the Soviet contral of Cuba.) AMIASH was

not too interested in listening at this point, and contined by saying that

If he could achieve all these actions, plus others, in one master stroke,

a take-over, during the ensuing confusion, would be much facilitated. He

did not feel that Raul or Che would be able to rally the people in sufficient

time to prevent opposition forces from forming. His arguments and plans had

many flaws, but AMWHIP could not help admiring (to himself) AMLASH's

professed desire for vigorous and, hipefully, effective actions, designed

to alter the situation in no uncertain terms. While we were waking no

cormittments or plans, we pointed out to AMASH that schemes like he envisioned

certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, plannirg, information-

collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success

of such plans. AMLASH said he agreed with this, but we weren't too sure just

how much of this argument AMASH was willing, or would be willing, to buy.

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AMLASH made it clear during the discussions that he was completely

against Fidel's use of Soviet help from the first, but he had never envisioned,

that even if it vere used, just how ineffective it really would be towards

solving Cuba's problems. He still feels strongly, he said, about the

plight of the lower classes in Cuba, and in any future Cuba, he would still

insist on a new deal for them. AMLASH said that although he had not been

effective in helping the formation of a beneficial new Government in Cuba,

he was now prepared to work towards that end. This time, he said, he

wanted to look more towards the future, both for his own interests and for

Cuba's. The last time, he said that he thought only as far as the elimination

of Batista, and had not given consideration to planning for a government he

favored after the fighting was over. We felt that AMLASH meant that he was

as mich concerned about his (AMLASH's) position in the government and

personal stake in a new Cuba, as he was about anything else. It is our

Impression that AMLASH feels that he did not get his share of the spoils

or power fron the Castro regime, in proportion to his contribution against

Batista. AMLASH is a complicated personality. It is difficult to fairly

Judge, at this time, AMLASH's degree of concern for a truly revolutionized

Cuba for the people's benefit, vs his concern to see a new government in

Cuba in which he gets just recognition. This does not necessarily mean

that AMLASH wants high political office, but he does want credit for his

efforts and the resultant power and prestige among his countrymen.

In addition to his concern for the manner in which the Soviets are

using Cuba for their own designs in Latin America, AMLASH is worried about

the extent to which Castro is using the Soviet technique of capturing the

minds of the young people and the mass propaganda efforts against the masses.

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He feels certain that in a couple of years, the young people will be completely

and irrevocably won over to Castro, and that the masses will begin to believe

the intense anti-American, anti-west propaganda to which they are subjected.

Just as great as are AMLASH's fears about the Castro's winning of

young minds, is his concern that the USA will begin to consider a status

quo for Cuba, and in the event of any intense and successful anti-regime

activity, such as he plans, and which looks as if it might depose the regime,

PBPRIME will withdraw its support from such efforts in the face of serious

threats from the Soviets. Although AMLASH did not say it in so many words,

it was apparent from the discussions that AMLASH would prefer to be able to

free Cuba without any outside support (and by inference, obligations), but

he is a realist enough to concede that any efforts to overthrow Castro

must have the support of PBPRIME. He i8, therefore, willing to enter into

discussions with a representative (s) of PBPRIME towards this end.

AMLASH agreed to meet in Paris for the purpose of further debriefings

and to give any information in any field which he has. He is also most

willing to discuss any plans which may lead to an overthrow of the present

government. AMLASH stated many times, however, during the course of the

meetings, that he was only interested in involving himself in a plan of

significant action, and which was truly designed to achieve rapidly his desire

to help Cuba. (He told AMWHIP later after we had left the meetings, that

he was afraid that PBPRIME would continue to pursue its present course,

that of providing money and ideas, but no ACTION!) AMLASH was also most

adamant about not becoming involved in any way with the Cuban refugee

circles and organizations in Miami. He. said that he feels these are still .

the same people who left Cuba, i.e., willing to wait for the chance to return

and again pursue their only interest, that of making money. He also said

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he felt that the Cubans

there were completely penetrated by Castro informants,

and that for them to know of his cooperation with PBPRIE, would be the same

as telling Castro, and thus his future would end against the Wall! We

assured him that maximum security would be practiced, as far as tiese people

were concerned.

He also does not wish to trust or be involved with, any

contract Cubans. Only

PRIMERS does he wish to deal. (Along this line,

AMWHIP stated that he did not think it advisable to reveal any of these

negotiations to AMCONCERT/1, whom AMWHIP has known for many years and is

quite friendly, but whom he does not feel can keep a secret of this nature.)

This meeting terminated at 0030 on 2 August. The three participants

took a taxi together back to town. AMWHIP and AMLASH stopped off at a local

night club, Teatey) Grillen, while we continued on to our hotel. No incidents

of a security nature were observed, and it was felt that the meeting was

held without the knowledge or observation of the opposition.

4. Meeting of 2 August 1962.

We met with AMWHIP in his hotel room (No. 142 at the Vaakuna) at

1700 hours on 2 August. We discussed the events and talks of the preceding

evening for some time. At approxinately 1800, AMLASH arrived, greeted

us affably, and joined us for a drink. AMLASH used this meeting to re-

state his position concerning his desire for participation in a really

significant action against the Castro regime. Having decided by this time

that further discussions and debriefings of AMLASH should take place with

& Spanish-speaking C/O, we outlined the idea to meet for such a purpose in

Paris. AMLASH did not like the idea of too many people being aware of his

cooperation with PBPRIME, but agreed that it would be best in order to

allow himself to express his ideas and plans better, and to be able to provide

us with his information in the greatest possible detail.'

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We persuaded AMWHIP and AMLASH that it would be best not to have

further meetings with them in Helsinki, but that we could continue our talks

in greater safety in Stockholm and Paris. They agreed. AMLASH

also said

that he felt that he shouldn't st AMWHIP too much more in Helsinki, as he

was beginning now to make some public appearances, and his presence was now

established to everyone in the city. Incidentally, prior to Thursday,

2 August, AMLASH had purposely refrained from making any public appearances

at the Festival because (1) he and the other Cubans had been aware of the

AMSPElL group and their announced intentions, and (2) AMLASH did not feel

very disposed to play the "Public Relations" man from Cuba and espouse the

"peace and friendship nonsense", as he called it. However, AMLASH also said

that he felt that he had better perform this role to some extent, as it was

expected of him by Fidel, and he did not wish to provide any unnecessary

chances for unsatisfactory reports to be sent back home concerning his lack

of cooperation with the Cuban delegation. In making the arrangements for

& Paris meeting and further discussions, AMLASH said, in response to the

question, that it would be quite normal for him to be in Paris, as he had

already cleared this with Fidel, with whom, he remarked caustically, one

had to clear everything these days. He then expressed the idea that he

would like to return to Paris, via Stockholm, and at AMWHIP's suggestion,

spend a few days there just relaxing. From there, or Copenhagen, he would

return to Prague for two days at most, in order to pick up his luggage,

then come as soon as possible to Paris. There, he intended to visit a

hospital or two, as agreed upon with Fidel, and spend a total of at least

& week there. He said that if he was to return to Cuba to begin his

efforts, he did not wish to be away from Cuba any longer than necessary.

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томо со стівехосі жерт вілян

(He has, It is noted, a sense of urgency in beginning action against the

regime as soon as possible.) AWHIP

told us later that AMLASH also was

interested in a Pan American Migai

eased stewardess, whom he would have

come over to stay with him. AMHIP suggested to us that he thought the

stewardess might be connected with PBPRIME. He based this apparently on

a remark which the stewardess made concerning AMLASH's political frame of

mind last year. We answered that as far as we knew there was no basis for

AMWHIP's thoughts along this line.) AMHIP will try to get the stewardess

full name for us.

Meeting arrangements for Stockholm and Helsinki were laid on at

this meeting. AMLASH felt he had to stay until the end of the Festival for

cover purposes. Since AMWHIP had already accidentally run into several

people he knew, it was agreed that he should leave town for Stockholm in

the near future. We would remain behind until AMLASH left, serving as an

emergency contact in the event of change in AMLASH's plans. It was arranged

to meet AMIASH If absolutely necessary, at either 1200 or 1800 each day

at a given restaurant in the center of the city. Normal security measures

for the "emergency" meeting were laid on. In Stockholm, meeting arrangements

for Paris will be established. AMWHIP departed Helsinki 5 August and is

presumably staying at the Palace Hotel in Stockholm; he will make arrangements

for accommodations for AMLASH there. We will follow AMLASH to Stockholm.

5. Helsinki Meetings between AMWHIP/1 and Pallucci.

AWHIP and Fallucci were in public together only three times for

any length of tine. Other meetings were held in their respective hotel rooms.

One breakfast meeting (the 5th of August) was held in the near-deserted

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dining room of the Vaakuna Hotel

at 1030. AMVHIP and Fallucci met at least

once a day during the sojourn in Helsinki. AMWHIP used the name Willian

Thompson, as instructed, when calling HBFINCH to make initial contact.

There were no incidents of a security nature observed during any of these

meetings.

6. Other Youth Festival Targets.

This area covered by cables. Hels 1584 and Hels 1609. The best

and, actually, only possibility among the participants was Jose Venegas.

However, both AMLASH and AMHIP did not want to become involved with him

as they felt that this, in both their cases, might compromise their

Interests in AMLASH's returning to Cuba. AMWHIP felt, for example, that

Venegas would almost certainly connect his presence here with an attempt to

do something with AMLASH. AMLASH also felt that he did not want to disclose

any indications of his real sympathies to Venegas, 1f he (AMLASH) were going

to return to Cuba. Without doing this, it would be difficult to get any

reactions or opinions from Venegas, thought AMLASH. Venegas, it is felt

by AMLASH, might very possibly be counted on at a later date if this was

desirable. An approach could

then be worked out at that time.

As reported, AMLASH

came to the Festival as a "special delegate, "

after his request to Fidel was approved. AMLASH claimed to Fidel that he

was fatigued and sick and needed a good rest in Europe. The Festival

provided the excuse, Fidel bit the bait, and AMLASH got to Europe to see

AMHIP, his original intention. AMWHIP felt that this is a logical and

honest explanation. It is interesting to note that neither the local

service, 0/2, or any of the Cuban

delegates he asked, could determine the

whereabouts of AMASH. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the Cubans

were told not to tell of his presence to anyone not from their immediate

delegation.

Excist:.

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7. AMiHIP's Role in AMASH Talks.

AMWHIP has been most helpful and cooperative in establishing

the initial contacts with AMASH, and he undoubtedly does have much

Influence over AMLASH. ALASH also trusts AMWHIP explicitly, as evidenced

by his remark to us that AMWHIP was the only one whom he felt that he

could fully trust and to whom he could speak openly. Of course, he did

speak openly at length to us at the behest of AMWHIP, but it is also

obvious that he does not tell us everything. AMWHIP has given good advice

In the handling of AMLASH, but, as he has a tendency to interpret AMLASH's

remarks and feelings subjectively, and to attempt to guide us a bit too

much, it might be wise to eliminate in later portions of the talks in Paris.

With a Spanish-speaking C/O, this should not be too difficult to do, and

without alienating AMWHIP. AMWHIP has no clandestine training to speak of,

as evidenced by his actions in this case. However, to his credit, he

responds readily to directions in this area, and follows rather well suggestions

for adding to the security of the meetings. His remark about the

advisability of keeping his old friend AMCONCERT/1 out of the operation or

from any knowledge thereof, is gratifying. AMWHIP also has gently explained

to us, that while he is a Cuban at heart and loves the Cubans, they simply

cannot be trusted to keep secrets among any of their friends who, for no

real tested reasons, they consider safe and discreet. As a general

statement, we feel that AMWHIP is & good security risk operationally, and

that with nore exposure to the game, will become a good and useful asset

under almost any circumstance. He is, however, somewhat subconsciously

subjective about his evaluations of AMLASH. He is completely honest, and is

using & considerable amount of his own money, not to mention time, in this

operation. We onl, hope his faith in AMLASH 1s justified.

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8.. Evaluation of and Corments about AMLASH.

our Initial corments forwarded in cable Hels 1609 remain unchanged.

We have seen too little of, and cannot converse in the native language of

AMLASH, to make any strongly valid assessment of him to date. In the

second meeting with AMLASH, he was considerably more relaxed than in the

first, but just

as

intense about his

corvictions...or seemingly so. AMLASH

stated that, having decided to return to Cuba, he would enrole in an

officers! refresher type course at Matanzas in an effort to renew old

Army contacts, re-assert his position as a major in the Revolutionary Army,

and attempt to re-establish sone recognition and following in Army and other

Government circles.

For the sake of completeness, we repeat our comments regarding

AMLASH from Hels 1609:

He appears capable of rash, thoughtless, violent

action under the strain of provocation, tense

situations,

or frustration.

For examole, he stated to us that last year

during a period of dejection and frustration, he had con-

templated suicide. Although AMLASH appeared to concede

some validity to our argurents for planning and for

carefully prepared actions, we feel that he will present

difficult control and directional problems in any op

situation. He himself stated several times that he

is not the type to sit tight, but prefers solutions

to problems by violent, positive actions. AMLASH

showed the strain of not trusting anyone. He was according

to AMWHIP, overjoyed to see him, and talked very, very

much about many, many subjects.

It is not possible

to comment at this time about AMLASH's capacity for

loyality to friends or causes, nor his willingness to

see a job through.

However, AMHIP assures us that

when AMLASH says he'll do something, he will. We

don't know at this point.

AMWHIP also told us that in discussions subsequent to our meetings

with AMLASH, he expressed the hope that "Bill" and his friend (s) in Paris

will have a really fruitfal, forceful idea and plan of action for him to

follow. Otherwise, he said he might drop the whole idea and not go back,

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but to forget the whole problem, leave the Cuban fold quietly, and work

in Paris or elsewhere, forgetting completely Cuban problems and Cuban

politics.

AMHIP also told us on Sundaj that he was truly surprised when

AMLASH said he wanted to go back and fight. AMHIP was sure, as were we,

that he rould defect, period. AMLASH told AMWHIP that he could not see

the point of making a statement regarding defection and the state of affairs

in Cuba, and then accepting a dole in Miami. Nor could he see any use in

propaganda efforts in Latin America or Burope. Later, after our talks

with him, AMLASH told AMWHIP a little different story, 1. e., that he

old not want to make a public defection statement, because of the

probable repercussions against his friends in Cuba for no good rea-on.

This area of thinking needs to be examined at length in Paris. A Spanish-

speaking C/o night well do the trick.

STOCKHOLM: •

9:

Travel to Stockholm.

AWHIP departed Helsinki for Stockholm on i August. Both AMWHIP

and AMLASH felt that they had been together enough in Helsinki. AMWHIP

also ran onto a refugee newspaper friend of his in Helsinki who was

quite curlous as to why AMHIP was there. AMLASH departed Helsinki in the

afternoon of 7 August; we took the same flight unbeinownst to AMLASH.

No problens were encountered in arriving at Stockholm. We took the next

bus after AMLASH to the city. Both AMLASH and AWWHIP stayed at the

Palace Hotel, room 828 and 970, respectively. Talks of a general nature

were held in our hotel room (the Carlton) and during the several dinners.

It was obvious that AMLASH had rach on his mind. He can return to the

Eret!::

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2271

subject of cuba at anyame, with a question, suggestion, or comment upon

it, regardiess of the context of the general discussion. It was during

the talks in Stockholn that AMHIP revealed that AMLASH had told

sant

Naranjo, Revellon, Venegas, and the "Mayor of t

'", Kamal DOHTSiES

Vazdaz f, (in Helsinki) that he was seeing ASHIP. In Helsinki, he

also told the layor Datingues to tell Raul that he was going on his

present itinerary, and that he wanted a refresher course in the Army when

he returned home.

COPENHAGEN:

10. Travel to, and Stop in Copenhagen.

AMLASHI and AYAHIP took SAS flight 407 to Copenhagen on the after-

noon of 10 August. In speaking at length about meeting in Paris, AMLASH

felt sure that there would be no problem in getting permission to visit

Paris after returning to Prague. He felt that he better not visit Paris

first, as 1t might cause sone undue interest in Prague Cuban circles

as to why he was away so long. He also had some trouble in getting the Air-

line to approve his

side trips to Stockholm and Copenhagen. They wanted

him to fly direct

to Prague from Helsinki. He refused their requests,

and said that he would pay his own way to Stockholm and Copenhagen (or

the difference) if need be. This he finally had to do, for which AMHIP

footed the bill. (perhaps we should later absorb). (We felt that this

ability to pay for the extra routing might cause some suspicion anong his

colleagues. AMIASH said "no", but we are not

so sure. Perhaps he can tell

them, should they be curious, that ANNHIP paid the bill, as all know he

has money and has, in fact, paid bills before for AMLASH during the time

of the Batista regine.)

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11. Copenhagen, 10 August 1952.

AMWHIP and AMLASH arrived as scheduled in Copenhagen and obtained

rooms at the Richmond Hotel. AWHIP phoned HBFINCH as planned and we

In turn contacted them by phone at the Richmond at 1845. A meeting was

arranged for 2000 at the bar of the Terninus Hotel. After a drink, the

party retired to Divan I for dinner. Apparently the spell of Tivoli,

Danish food and snaps, and beer at the student's inn, Faergekroen ( in

Tivoli), served to mellow AMLASH. He for the first time appeared to talk

to u8 as

& friend, rather than as a PEPRIME representative. During

supper, and for most of the evening, at intervals, AMLASH talked about

himself, his thoughts, and problems. The evening was well worth it, in

terms of the rayport and insight gained.

12. AMLASH's Thoughts and Personality:

AMLASH feels basically that he would like to live in a world in

peace under an acceptable political system, practicing medicine, thus

giving expression to his desire to help the less-fortunate people, and fron

this to find happiness for himself, something he seeks, but which heretofore

has eluded him. As a young student he got into the struggle against

Batista without thinking much about the future, particularly that it

could be less than perfect. He soon found that the opposing parties in

Cuba, and in particular the Commnists, were not about to bring true peace

and contentment to the people, but rather through mismanagement and poor

planning, had created unnecessary hardships for the people. After his

fighting time was over (or 30 he thought), AMLASH became a student again

and leader of the FEU. This did not satisfy him and he sought to leave

politics all together, and return to medicine. The political climate,

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0N2A003A774458420995.656

however, and the acceptance of AMLASH as a military leader by the people

rather than as a doctor (Hello Compandante! not, Hello Doctor!) forced

AMLASH to reconsider his future, and to decide that he must flee Cuba or l

fight against what he considers a ruinous future for his country and

her people. This time, however, he hopes to make the "operation"

successful, and never again subject the patient to another such ordeal.

Then when he is sure that the political and social outlook for the

Cuban people and the country are sound, he would like to try once more

to enter private life as a doctor. He is not sure, however, that this

will ever come about. AMLASH was also quite frank, we thought, in his

conversation with us concerning his views on the PBRPIME position vis-a-

vis Latin America. (And, although he had nothing to say which has not been

said by many before him, they were interesting to hear from a disenchanted

Cuban revolutionary.) He feels that PBPRIME is simply not getting "through"

to the youth and students of Latin America, as are the Communists, and for

this simple reason alone, the next ten years (when these students become

the political and economic leaders in Latin America) will see us lose

the struggle for Latin America. We replied by using the old line that

PRPRIME realizes only too well today that there were serlous short-comings

in our latin American policy for a number of years and that now we are

doing what we can to correct this. However, it is not our policy (said

with tongue in cheek) to attempt to alter these conditions or influence

future events by going behind the backs of the established governments in

the various Latin American countries.

Instead, we must take the often

slow, laborious path of working through these governments, however bad

they may be, in our attempts to guide and influence the minds of Latin

SSORST

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6: 1.

American youth. AMASH said that he understood why we take this point

of view, but nevertheless, if we intended to win the struggle, we must

do as the Communists do, and disregard the archaic and doomed old-line

govermments in Latin America. We agreed that this was undoubtedly the

more agressive way to deal with the problem, but that such methods would

leave us open to the old familiar charges of interference in the internal

attairs of sovereign countries. AlaSt smiled and replied that from a

practical viewpoint this didn't make any difference, for if we didn't

act forcefully and soon, there wouldn't be any opportunities there for us

to be open to arything! He then cited Venezuela as the next obvious

Communist victim and thereby a loss of another opportunity for PBPRIME.

Obviously AMLASH was correct in much of his thinking, but rather than stand-

Ing still with our shoes untied, we gave him the ball by soliciting from

him, as a forner student leader and politician, any ideas he might have

for combating the Communists in the struggle for the minds of Latin

American youth. He replied that he would be glad at any time to disuess

this problem and to offer what ideas and suggestions he could.

As a result of the discussions of this evening, we felt that

• AMLASH now was genuinely interested in getting Cuba out of its present

predicanent with the active aid of PBPRIME. AMLASH seemed more sincere

and interested in discussing his thoughts and problens with us than st

any previous time. He no doubt skinned over in his own mind (or at least

declined to rereal this to us) his record as president of the FEU. The

full story of this period from his side would be most interesting.

However, we felt that a discussion of this particular subject required the

use of Spanish and the propitious moment.

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As a matter of record, AMASH stated during the evening that he

had met Algeria's Ben Bella at one time and knows him more than casually.

He felt that the man bears strict watching by the West as a measure of

protecting its interests in developments in Algeria. AMLASH thought

Ben Bella was a clever man, devious, and ambitious, and not to be taken too

literally at his word.

In dealing with AMLASH, one trait of his which confronts the C/O

at every tyin is his tempermental reactions over points which would

generally be considered minor. For example, at one time when we were

discussing the various aspects of AMLASH's future role in Cuba, we used

the term "assassinate". The use of this term, we later learned from

AMWHIP and from AMASH himself, was most objectionable to the latter, and

he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely

the choice of word used to describe it. "Bliminate" was acceptable, but

obviously the term "assassinate" had a distasteful connotation. From

discussions with AMWHIP, this labye of "assassin" had been given to

AMLASH after some of his escapades against Batista supporters in the

pre-Castro era. Another example, which ASHIP discussed with us, occurred

during a meeting in Mexico City in March 1961, when a KUBARKER said to

AMLASH, "I'm prepared to help you in any way within my power". According

to AMWHIP, AMLASH later turned to him, shrugging his shoulders in a manner

of saying, "So I need help from him?" These examples are pointed out

here in order to indicate the degree of pride and sensitivity one find's

in AMLASH, and to note that however tedious this attitude may become to

the C/0, it is, from personal experience, quite necessary to adfust one's

approach accordingly in order to secure AMLASH's maximum cooperation.

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13. Paris Meeting Arrangements.

AMLASH has been given AWHIP's hotel in Paris, Franklin Hotel,

19 Rue Buffault (telephone TRU 6940). AMWHIP will reserve a room there for

AHLASH, who can come there directly after he has landed in Paris. We

also had another contact address in the form of the office of a jeweler

friend and business contact of AMNHIP's; M. B. Rosenblatt, 20 Clte-Treuise

(Telephone TAI-7438). Rosenblatt's number has not been given to AMLASH.

In discussing security precautions with AMWHTP, it is obrious, that he

still is not possessed of a good sense of security by normal clandestine

ops standards. This, however, can be improved over a period of time.

Note:

Subject expressed interest in obtaining

expert instruction in use of silenced-equiped

rifles and in use and handling of plastic

explosives. This can be handled from France

on priority basis, it is felt, after preliminary

discussions in Paris.

PARIS:

1l. Events of 12 August 1962.

According to prior arrangements with ANNHIP and AMLASH, AMHIP

would see AMLASH off to Zurich fron Kastrup Airport on 12 August, then

take a late afternoon fillght down to Paris. As it turned out, however,

AMLASH was able to book a passage on a Rumanian Airlines (Taron) flight

to Prague, via East Berlin's Schoenfeldt Airport. AMWHIP later took

the early evening flight to Paris; ve took the 1150 AF flight the same

night.

In Paris, AMWHIP took a roon (#60) as planned at the Hotel Franklin,

where he remained throughout his stay in Paris. He also booked a room

for AMLASH. We arrived in Paris at 0115, 16 August, booking & room

(#41) at the Hotel Roblin, 6 Rue Chaveau-Lagarde (ANJ-5700).

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15. Events of 13 August 1962.

On the morning of 13 August, we checked into HBFINCH to discuss

the Parla meetings with Peter J. Kymington. Thru his good officene were

able to arrange for precautionary surveillance of AMHIP and AMLASH,

obtain use of a Station safehouse, and effect other arrangements as

necessary: The cooperation and help of the Paris Station was excellent.

Following this meeting, we went to a small bistro near our hotel, phoned

AMWHIP, and arranged for a meeting in our hotel room at 1830.

This meeting took place in our hotel room (#41) at the Hotel

Roblin, at 1830. The purpose was merely to meet AHIP and re-assure him

that arrangements for AMLASH's neeting were laid on. We also made

arrangements to give him his expenses for the trip and account for same

during a meeting the following day. This will permit him to leave for

Milan without delay at the close of our business with AMLASH. He was

getting "nervous", as he called it, and will be glad to get this business

over and done. We agreed. He wanted to remain until the conclusions of

the talks with AMLASH, however, for he felt that he could be of use in

handling AMLASH. We agreed. He did not, of course, want to be in on

any operational discussions, but just to be on hand to guide his

tempermental "charge".

He was very anxious to meet Wallace A. Groweryd in order to

point out to him in advance some of the quirks in AMLASH's personality.

In talking to us, AMWHIP said that a person with the background of

AMLASH, must be handled in a certain nanner, and if done, he will respond.

AMWHIP told us that while he is of course subjective about AMLASH, he also

realized that he is of & different background and make-up (flattery?)

than either

we or himself, and that in order to get him to produce and

cooperate, the problem must be approached in a certain way. He said

077-

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that AMLASH 18 very proud ard indepundeni. He does not waso in ¿eti '€ has

to take help from anyone. AWHIP said that this is a rather naive way to

look at 1t, but AMLASH does, and for this reason, one must be careful

not to appear to be buying him.

We said that we understood this, and were

willing to advance our arguments in any manner necessary to get AMLASH'&

cooperation, but that eventually AMLASH must be made to realize that,

though he is of no little Importance to us, he is after all, the only one

man with one man's resources.

AMWHIP continually stressed the point that to work with people

Like AMLASH, it was necessary to have them first accept a person either

by personal contact over a period of time or on the recommendation of a

good friend. He felt that while it was necessary for us to spend some time

becoming acquainted with AMLASH, 1t also might be necessary for Growery

to go slow at first. This, we said to AMHIP was all right, up to a point,

but that we felt quite enough time had been spent with AMLASH already,

and that the meetings in Paris were going to get down to business quickly,

and proceed as necessary to conclude business as rapidly as possible.

• We felt that AwHIP understood our point.

During this talk, AMHIP again expressed the feeling that if

Cuba 1s not returned to freedom within two years, he was going to set

up business permanently in Paris or Southern California, and forget the

idea of returning. He was obvious moved by the finality of such a decision,

as he is a real Cuban patriot. Or so we believe.

We agreed to contact AMHIP by telephone at his hotel at 1200

on Il August (Tuesday). Subsequently a meeting at 1700 in our hotel room.

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•M/X91000 1000-024

16.

Events of 14 August 1962.

As agreed, we called ANNHIP at his hotel at 1200 on 14 August

and arranged a meeting for 1700 in our hotel room.

At the 1700 meeting

ANWHIP informed us that A'LASH hau arrived as promised from Prague about

noontime, and was already inquiring about a meeting time with "the man

from Washington". AWHIP was told that "the man from Washington", (whom

they in the future called "Jaime" as they could not readily pronounce

Growery's true first name) was not able to arrive before that afternoon,

and that a meeting with him could not take place before the 16th. Also,

AM HIP was reminded that he himself had stated that it would be best for

him (AMWHIP) to talk to Jaime first in order to explain AHLASH's personality.

ANNHIP was unhappy that this meeting could not take place inmediately,

but said he would explain the matter to AMLASH. This meeting, 1t is noted,

took place initially at a snall cafa across the street from our hotel,

so that we could finger AMHIP to tho surveillants of the Paris Station.

The two principles then retired to our hotel room for the remainder of the

meeting. We said to AMWHIP that we would check in with him by phone the

following day and inform him whether there was any chance of Jaime

arriving on that day, the 15th.

At this meeting, AMWHIP was also paid $350.00 to cover hotel

bills for him and AMLASH in Helsinki, Copenhagen and Stockholm.

15. Events of l4 August 1962.

We phoned AMWHIP at his hotel at 1300 to infom him that there

was no change in plans and that the best we could do was to call him

sgain that evening. AMWHIP said that he would be out all evening;

arrangements were then made that AMWHIP should call us at our hotel at

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•indusion

:T

2200. Subsequently, AWHTP did call as agreed,

and was inforned that he could

plan to come to our room tomorrow, the l6th, at 0900. The hour bothered

him (too early) but he said he could make 1t.

Later the same evening, kimington, Grovery and dif met to

discuss plans for the meetings tomortow. At this neeting Kynington

disclosed that his tean had detected what was believed to be survellance

Of AKRIP and AMLASH. To be positive he planned to have the meeting the

next day surveilled.: Grovery agreed to come at 0900 for preliminary talks

with AKHIP.

16. Events of 16 August 1962.

Growery arrived within five minutes of appointed time at

our hotel room. AwHIP arrived later at 1015, apoligizing for his tardiness

(a late evening!). Breakfast was provided and, after Introductory amenities,

the to began their talk, in Spanish. The talks terminated at 1230.

The second meeting of the day was postponed until 1600, as AMASH was not

feeling too well.

Later at the station, Kymingüt revealed that he now believed

the morning meeting had been surveilled and that efforts were being made

to determine who was responsible. It was readily established that it was

serdeillar.ci

no Cuban or Soviet exercise, but rather

one by one of the French services

or local police. Since it was pointless to stop the meetings now and

the address of the safehouse had not been mentioned verbally, it was

decided to contime as planned. Paris will forward account of surveillance

and outcome as soon as possible. (When we left Paris, it was determined

that this "surveillance" of our meeting might have been a truly freak

coincidence, and the subject of the surveillance was another target, not

us. We don't think so. However the pending Paris report should resolve this.)

f.

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Growery and we arrived at the safehouse (49 bis rue Spontini,

XVI) ahead of AMLASH and AMWHIP. A tape recorder was installed. At 1615,.

AMLASH and AWHIP arrived.

shortly after introductions, Growery and

AMLASH were talking business in Spanish. After about 30 minutes, we took

AWHIP out of the flat on the pretense of buying food, in order that the

two principles could talk freely. Procuring food and beer, we returned

after a two hour absence, and made a cold supper for the four. The meeting

terminated about 1930, AMLASH and AMHIP leaving some 15 minutes before

Arrangements had been made for a meeting at 1000 the following day

for further talks, and beginning do Sw training.

,17. Events of 17 August 1962.

At 1000 Growery net with AMLASH for several hours. Arrangements

were made for AMASH to return to the safehouse fo: SW training that

afternoon at 1400. (See Sw training report for account of meeting.)

Before breaking up, arrangements were made for a continuation of the S/d

training the following day.

18. Events of 18 August 1962.

(See SW report for account of training this meeting conducted

at the aforementioned safehouse.

Account of debriefing of AMLASH during

this meeting and others to be filed by Growery. All debriefing of AMLASH

by Growery was conducted in the Spanish language.)

19. Events of 19 August 1962.

Meeting was held at 1900 at safehouse. Account of meeting to.

be included in Growery's reporting.

2.1.

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1. 533

20.

Events of 20 Aupust 1052

Kymington and Growery picked us up at Madelaine church at 0500,

and proceeded to rendezvous with AMLASH. Counter-surveillance detected

no apparent observation of the pickup of us. The four then proceeded by

car to the Army Air Corps Support Element at St. Andres, for te demonstration

and instruction in plastic explosives. The classroom work and the field

demonstration lasted until 1430, at which time the four proceeded back

to Paris. AMLASH was let out of the car in the suburbs and told to

take a tax back to his hotel. Kymington took some snapshote of ANTASH

receiving this instruction. These are not too satisfactory, but neverthe

less, will be enlarged and forwarded for the files.

The participants met later that evening at 2100 for a drink and

critique and comments of the days activities. AMLASH seemed quite

satisfied with the demonstrations, but was interested in having snaller

explosive packages with more force, and a remote control method for

detonating them. The neeting was short and broke up at 2200. It was

agreed to meet once more on 22 August for a final briefing sesson at

Growery's hotel room (in the (rillon) at 1200.

21. Events of 22 August 1962.

AMLASH came alone and on time to this meeting." A tape recarder

was in operation. About one hour was spent on a review of S/W, followed

by requirements, and tasks to be performed or looked Into upon AMLASH's

return. (See Growery's report for tasks and S/W report for this section

of meeting.) Arrangements for emergency contact in Paris were set up

using the phone of a contract KUBARKER of Paris Station. AMWHIP and

we made arrangements for a meeting at queenie's for 1000, 23 August.

STORET

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22. Events of 23 August 192.

At the morning meeting, AMWHIP sa'd that AMASH wanted to see

us on a matter concerning s/W. The meeting was arranged for 1300 at the

rue Sportini safehose. This meeting took only a few minutes as te

problen was minor. AMLASH and AMIHIP departed the safehouse at 1325.

We left a little after. This was the last time we were to see either

AMLASH OF AMWHIP in Burope.

23. Events of 25 August 1962.

AMLASH departed for Prague. We left Paris at 1045 aboard PAA 119.

for New York.

•26. Miscellaneous Comments on Case, Personalities, and Actions in Paris.

AMLASH's attitude in Paris was essentially that which it had

been during the previous contacts in Scandinavia, that 18, changeable as

the weather, varying from occasional flashes of wit and mirth to degrees

of discouragement and perhaps despondency. He was generally receptive and

Interested in procedires and conversations during the meetings and during

periods of instruction. He makes little attempt to disguise his feelings,

should he become tired, bored, or disinterested. His social graces are

not the sharpest honed. He can, however, be reasoned with, even in some

of his contrary moods. AMWHIP was

particularly effective in reaching him

during these. We are in complete agreement with AMWHIP when he describes

AMLASH as being full of complexes. But further than that, AMASH not only

has complexes as such, but it is felt that he is generally preoccupied

with his thoughts, presumably about problems Cuban, and is often seemingly

Incapable of maintaining his interest in things about him for any length

SEORET

-27-

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## Page 28

;.

of time. It one is discussing Cuba, however, he obviously is very

Interested. Therefore, It might well be that he is actually so pre-

occupied with thoughts about problems at home, that all else is secondary

and treated accordingly. When, on occasion, he "opened up" a bit with us,

It was obvious that he had done, and was doing, a great deal of thinking

about Cuban problems. It may be that Growery will have wuch more to say

on this point, as their discussions were in AMLASH's native tongue. On

many occasions, AMASH is rather exasperating to deal with, but we feel

that this is a trait of his which

1s a normal fact of his personality,

and not assumed to try the setal of his case officers. We may be wrong,

but doubt it.

27. Physical Appearance:

AMLASH 18 about 5'11", weighs about 175 lbs., dark wavy hair,

thinning noticably on top and usually needs combing; brown ejes, small,

almost pertulant mouth, small nose, pale complexion, eyes are a little

small for his face and very intense in expression. He prefers dressing

Informally, and is prone to wearing

jackets with no tie. (He could

mingle with the typical snall town corner-loungers without difficulty.)

When dressed up, he presents a good appearance in a masculine way, and

apparently fron AMWHIP's stories, does quite well with the women. Concerning

the question of his being a homosexual, we cannot say whether he has a

hidden bent in

this direction, but if he does, he is not at any rate, a

purist but rather AC-DC.

28. Language:

Native Spanish, fair to good English, but with limited vocabulary.

He can be successfully conversed with using English, but it has to be

done slowly and with basic constructed sentences.

It is not possible to

be articulate with him, If he is expected to

grasp the full meaning of the

conversation.

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29. Family:

AMLASH is separated from his wife, and stated that since he 18

going to undertake to work against, the regime, he could not go back to her

If he wanted (which we don't think he does) as she has been too outspoken

In her disilke of the Castro regime and of her desire to get out of Cuba.

AMLASH's mother lives with him as she is divorced from his father.

AMLASH's father is in the tailoring business and has recently married

a girl many years his junior. AMLASH does not approve.

30. Girl Friends.

AMLASH is on good terms with a Pan American stewardess of French

descent who is based in Miami. AMWHIP said to us that he thought she was

w1th us, but we replied we really uld not know. AMASH also is friendly

Sariene

with the Cuban dancer Sonia CALERO, whom he telephoned from Paris to give

the return date to Havana.

31. Pastimes.

AMLASH likes nightclubbing and dancing. He is also interested

to a linited degree in architecture and historical buildings and sculpture.

It is Interesting to note that, AM HIP was reluctant to answer

many questions about AMLASH's private affairs. He felt that this was not

In good taste (somewhat) and most of the information in this report was

obtained by elicitation rather than direct questions.

32. AMLASH's Original Schedule in Paris.

AMLASH was interested in coming to Paris, executing his business

with us in the first three days, then checking into the Cuba House or a

small hotel on the left bank, and socializing with the Cubans at their

Embassy in Paris. He also wanted to spend some time on the Riviera

End'::

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EAST IS AIMOSION 951+

(several days), as he felt, or so he told AMWHIP, it may be some time

before he would see this area again. As it turned out, scheduling for

the Growery meetings, S/W training, and plastics demonstrations precluded

his taking the Riviera trip, and als postponed his seeing his Cuban

friends. He finally went to the Embassy on Tuesday, 21 August to make

what contacts he felt were necessary. As it turned out, Gramatges and

most of the men were away on vacations, etc., so that his late showing at

the Embassy was not a problem at all. No plans had been laid on for his

entertainment by the Embassy, and no one, it turned out, was expecting

him at any definite time after his leaving Prague. He felt much better,

AMWHIP reported, after he had made the Embassy appearance and learned

the above facts.

33. Money Banked by AMLASH.

At our last meeting with AwHIP on 23 August, he said that

AMLASH had given him $500.00 to be banked in Paris or elsewhere against

a rainy day. It is also interesting to note that while AMHIP said that

any offer of money to AMASH would be an affront to him, AMLASH readily

allowed AMWHIP to pick up the tabs for the hotel rooms and all expenses

incurred during the trip, Including a number of new pleces for his wardrobe,

and the plane tickets to Prague from Paris. AMWHIP said that when they

dined together on 22 August, AMASH insisted on picking up the tab, stating

that he felt he should get this one, then expressed surprise at the

expense of living in Paris. Neither did AMLASH seem to worry when It was

we who picked up several tabs in Scandinavia. Funny sense of obligations

and finances!

SECRET

RICHARD M. FALLUCCI

_TEW/FI

Excinda: li

•30

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