INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Originator: SSCIA
From: TREVERTON, GREGORY
To: THE RECORD
Document date: 1975-05-27 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32281923

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10083

RECORDS SERIES :

MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM : TREVERTON, GREGORY

TO : THE RECORD

TITLE :

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

DATE : 05/27/75

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

GOODWIN, RICHARD

• KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

ASSASSINATIONS

BAY OF PIGS

CUBA

CASTRO

MCNAMARA, ROBERT

NITZE, PAUL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : S

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

open

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 244

Folder 5

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW. 66000 Docld:32281923 Page 1

Date: 09/30/93

Page: 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Flecords Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

66000 Date: 11-03-2021

Part

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INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

Date: May 27, 1975

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Page 1 of _6

SENSITIVE

FILE:

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place:

Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

5 NoV 93

INVENTORIEDI

ON _

511677

EY -

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign

policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the

election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During

that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter

on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of

1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward

and then Edwin Martin. After

working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White

House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama

crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America,

instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late

in 1965.

1. Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as-

sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone

on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of

assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was

established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his

capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force,

held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro,'

someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his

interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later

in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason+

able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that

Cuba was politically stable;

Castro would merely have been replaced

with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later,

Goodwin

sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the

President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an

article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba

Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States

let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but-

tress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every

week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division

of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor

did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin

worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in-

volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life.

During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed

diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican

Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as-

sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern-

ment was surprised when it occurred. HenryDearborn, the American Consul

in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-

Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some

weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces.

Goodwin suspected that

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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FILE:

the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said

that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have

come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even

would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that

sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact,

he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea

because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field

might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in

supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone

might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that

the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g.

by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In

general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in

all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2

CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United

States had Strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the

period before 19645

the U.S. gave political support to

anti-Goulart

factions:

followers

of

Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the

Brazilian northeast.

The U So had beent involved» in Brazintian eleccions.)

for many years

esumably spentra good.

deal in the 1963 congrese

sional elections. On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome

to keep a contact with the Brazilian military.

How-much-further

Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

5 Nor T3

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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FILE:

CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic

forces,

in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist

influence and

promoting development in the region. That decision was

applied to

Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conserva-

tive Alessandri

Goodwin sat in

on meetings of the Special Group only

rarely, only

if

Latin

America were the subject of the meeting. As he

remembered it, the

proposals that came to the Special Group were general

statements, policy papers,

not descriptions of recipients of support or

conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic

political elements. The U.S.

certainly provided assistance to the

Christian Democrats

the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know

how much.

The figure of $20 mation, menti

toned by Stern, did

seem,

inconceivable to Coodwin

He contested

however, the assertion

that

the Chilean election was the most,intensely watched election in Washing.

ton since the 1948 Italian campaign;

From

vantage point in the

White House it did not seem

so.

(B

5 Nor 93

4. Changes during the Johnson Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America than

had

Kennedy --

Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less

about covert

actions in the region.

Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American

policy, although the President did become active in the two crises,--

Panama

and then the Dominican Republic.

Goodwin saw a sharp changes

in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and

conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled

by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated"

in the Caribbean.

"The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was

Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from

the very beginning and

so could hardly have "discovered" it after he

became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during

the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis

was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no

reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American

objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was some-

thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police through

AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American

militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity.

At that point,

the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to

power and that the threat was subversion.

Paramilitary operations

were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin

American matters were considered there, and in some ways

Latin

America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia.

Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little

difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not

in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America

without

substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla

movements that began had little indigenous support.

z

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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FILE:

In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that

these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good-

win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on

occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like.

Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin

America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of

intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-

day operations.

What is required is an active Congressional committee,

on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active

staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major

operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to

tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional

checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned

that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-

director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto

Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a.

question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay

of Pigs through Cushman.

He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of

that.

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