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JOHN A. MCCONE

THE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BY

Walter Elder

Edited by Mary S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian

1987

The attached is a draft history

which has not been forwarded for

review outside the DCI History Staff.

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CHAPTER IV

CI

In the meanwhile, Cuba remained

sore point for both the CIA and

the Kennedys.

Shortly

after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General

Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert

Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate.

Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative

decisions which had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor.

report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal

report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.

Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs report to the

President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The

Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy

Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the

operation was likely to succeed. Robert Kennedy was also highly

critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty

minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report

to the President endorsing the operation.

It is worth noting that McCone was

the only official

in the

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government privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation,

including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, the

Kirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board.

McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, but

he did draw

several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision tọ go

ahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistake

to dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIA

should have appealed directly to the President to reverse the

decision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that the

members of the Taylor commission had been too closely involved with

the events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA and

JCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new President

to go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washington

organizations dealing with international affairs which possessed

complete continuity.

Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able to

concentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes in

the future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency's

paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove

the CIA from such enterprises..

He also stressed the importance of

planning an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which

dominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, he

insisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to planned

operations, providing early and frequent judgments.

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Cuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern. In

April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor

Commission, Presidential

adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba

might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or

missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its

conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to

threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its

ideological contours are a moral and political offense to us," he

concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove

that offense....

The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation

directly.. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late

November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale,

acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun

to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These

covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything

possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. He then

proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee

made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which

would cut across organizational lines.

McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed

in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical

from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for

success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role

and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned. He himself

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supported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action

not be reckless. Consequently, he recommended that the Lansdale

group report to

the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly

qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for

action. In addition, although McCone agreed the facilities of all

agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations,

he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to

form a new unit under Lansdale.

In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched.

With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412

Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded to discuss the Lansdale

operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project

had to be

closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA's

representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone

nevertheless stated he intended

to skip no appropriate echelon of the

Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other

senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency

would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but

without excluding the participation of other Agency members within

the strict security guidelines laid down by the President. Further,

McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to

undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such

precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation

which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of.

Pigs landing.

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Significantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and

estimative functions tö bear on Cuban operations from the beginning.

Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small. Most

importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and

conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous

memoranda for the record.

MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert

Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a

dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as

well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite

close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the

extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequently

accepted

as a personal charge the administration's desire to

overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or

anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources.

Had he detached Agency

resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control. He

further insisted

on the checks and balances of 5412 committee

overview.

The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy

Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political

Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate

representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security

Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of

covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to any

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covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed,

reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a

sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through

clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny.

Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential,

could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.

The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threat

of Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962,

another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency),

appeared. Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, Special

Group (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threat

existed or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriate

resources to counter that threat.

In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to expose its

activities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department had

been similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program of

peripheral

reconnaissance flights

to Special Group review, although,

beginning in June 1961; the group began to consider these flights.

The Special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on the

attitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well as

on the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for the

CIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, as

DCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free to

approve or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.

The entire Cuban situation was

difficult from the outset, and

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McCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he

anticipated no quick or easy road to success.

With the approval of —

Ambassador Alphand, a close personal friend of McCone, the French

embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as the Agency's Cuban eyes and

ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative,

reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli reported that at least

ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added

that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve

presently were in comnunication. Contact even with these was

infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December,

had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession"

show).

Nevertheless, at a Spécial Group meeting in April 1962, McCone

urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we

consider more aggressive action, including direct military

intervention. Noting

that various intelligence reports suggested

that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military

strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as

had been understood. In response to objections that such a course

might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show

of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.

Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that

there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay

of Pigs for food.. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in

exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines). Later, in

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early June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such a

release. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not at

that time request covert support for the project. The subject was

left for further discussion, with an agreement that it would not be

discussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active in

cuba operations.

In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed the Cuban

situation in considerable detail. Kennedy thought that, although

considerable intelligence had been acquired, the program's action

phases

had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had the

opportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since the

beginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collection

teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated

into Cuba and

maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had

been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of

third-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights were

being conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation was

costing the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and even

more in indirect support costs.

Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations of

MONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility to

collect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President that

this collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hard

intelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation would

provide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities

for

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political, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow

Castro.

McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that more

dynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and military

activity. McCone did not agree. Our intelligence, he said, did not

support this point of view, and any such attempts would face disaster

unless the United States was prepared

to commit large military forces

to support them.

In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with the

Soviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR was

willing to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep the

"Cuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischief

for the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights over

Cuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reports

revealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.

On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed to

be carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for further

details. On August 5, he

received a breakdown on the ships, and he

directed immediate U-2 coverage (which began the following day).

According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, in

addition to military communications eguipment. The preliminary U-2

readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight was

planned for August 1l.

On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,

Deputy Secrety of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Attorney

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General. It was during this meeting, which approved intensifying

MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his

fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.

His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously

and adamantly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility.

McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles

into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet

military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of soviet

personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the

Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

there.

Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place.

. SAMs in Cuba? If

the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMs could be

easily and quickly destroyed. The SAMs were not being put there to

protect Cuban canecutters; therefore, McCone argued, their real

purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2

overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take

further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.

McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in

Khrushchev's shoes.. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced

in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a

decided edge in intermediate and medium-range missiles.. These

missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet

launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its

borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the

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Soviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was

one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles. As

McCone put it, "If I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in

Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United

States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a

change?

Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I

choose, including all your overseas bases. '"

McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was

prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he

lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of

putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for

American national security interests that the contingency should be

considered as soon as possible.

He stood absolutely alone.

At noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, the

Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban

situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA

had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet

military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of

construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to

handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the

construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile

sites. For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that

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the Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.

The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to

the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba. McCone had

a three-part proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate

aggressive political

action program to awaken Latin America

and the

Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or some other

vital American interest, leading to instant United States

retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.s.

military forces to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people,

and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States.

McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing u.s.

military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task

and because of concern about Soviet retaliatory actions elsewhere in

the world.

Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at

length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The

following day, McCone reported in detail to

the President, adding the

personal report of. De Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The

President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed

concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy

decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his

principal advisers.

On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk,

McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba.

President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive

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missiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin

America. He requested

as well a continuing analysis of the numbers

and types of Soviet and Oriental (as reported by De Vosjoli)

personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment,

their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In

response to the President's question about our ability to

discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone

said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and

350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMs could..

be distinguished. McNamara noted that portable missiles could not-be

located under any circumstances.

The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our

position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us in

the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also

asked what we could do against such missile sites. Could we take

them out by air action, or would ground action be required? Could

they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked

what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a

crisis in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United

States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing

seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,

strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on

MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again

proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban

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situation. After consideration, the President directed the Defense

Department to prepare contingency plans for possible military action

against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps

should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at

completely solving the cuban problem.

Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told

Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up

our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney

General, was more important than Berlin.. It was the key to Latin

America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would

fall to Soviet influence and domination.

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forty-eight hours should the President's terms

not be met.

Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and

no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow

broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing

that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to

dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations

verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President

drafted a quick acceptance. The immediate crisis was over.

* * *

Serious problems, however, remained. It had become clear to

McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American

policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of soviet military

and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much

mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site

inspection, and the SAM

system remained in place to limit aerial

inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to

verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of

Cuban missiles.. Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with

toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not

being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task

Force was acting outside MONGOOSE channels. At the height of the

missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE

agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinue

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sabotage operations while relations between the United States and

the soviet Union were

were so delicate

On November 3, McCone informed the Executive Committee that,

despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there

also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might

represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had

been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to cuba,

and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with

plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the

unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact that

the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial

inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the

exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or

whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out;

there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could

be hidden from view in Cuba's caves.

The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more

concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by

this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near

intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence

information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone

had already ordered an

intensive internal investigation. Now the

President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence

community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and

intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments more

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"however, that the United States continue its surveillance and be

prepared to act if a plane were shot down.

98

With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completion

of Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flights

over Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but opposed by

both McNamara and Rusk because of its possible political

consequences. Noting that the administration could not very well

ignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposed

three sorties on a trial basis. But, after considering the pros and

cons, the President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequent

low-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency.

Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated their

activities, but the Executive Committee was unable to come to a firm.

agreement on how to respond. Similarly, the Special Group to

consider Cuban sabotage operations met with disagreement and

indecision. It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his view

that

the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towards

Cuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presence

and Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that the

covert action program be stopped; but the original impetus which

had given birth to the program had all but disappeared.

American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's role

in supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest of

McCone's tenure. Officially, the United States held the Soviet

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military presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to be

unacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strong

actions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing to

accept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policy

achievement.

McCone

never accepted this judgment; he never was comfortable

with the policy restrictions placed on Cuban operations, and he

never wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the tasks

levied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensive

reconnaissance and covert operations.

Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern about

Cuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largely

disappeared. The United States government turned its attention to:

other issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.

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CHAPTER XVIII

Shortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly

became cooperative.

Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the

Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see. Felt off at

the airport, Diem

asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and

Diem proceded to tell him that. he could understand President

Kennedy's concerns about South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the

President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the

United

States considered appropriate to correct existing problems

and improve relations.

Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late.

At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou

Conein to go at once to the Joint General Staff headquarters.

Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a

comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA

station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.

The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight.

By

mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed. By this

time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was

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concerned about the circumstances. When the facts became known, he

said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the

Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their

surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.

The President was also concerned that the new government might

be tempted to offer anmesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was

emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership

the military group might install. Warning against the installation

of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political

affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective

than a "pretty" government.

As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the

capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment

which McCone noted

with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in

both Colby and the CIA:

On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to

Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported

that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until

an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South

Vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance

of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the

general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak,

with no apparent solution in sight.

There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong

reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than the

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government. And it was clear to everyone present that the military

situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it in a

good light.

The meeting decided that a major effort should be made

to construct strategic hamlets and to

wage anti-guerrilla warfare in

the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever

about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this

impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam

either as a fourteen-foot-tall

political giant or as a thoroughly

washed-up government official.

***

The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in

Vietnam; President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked

another.

The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the

world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone

told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new

President's personal relationships around Washington or his position

on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President

had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even

spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.

McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world

reactions to

the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated.

He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed

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that it be delivered to the White House as usual. Johnson was

unaware of the checklist,

having previously received the Current

Intelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had told

McGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency should

therefore continue to move its publications through the usual

channels until directed otherwise.

In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Before

the morning

meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephone

Johnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White House

at 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morning

intelligence briefing. This message was relayed as

a statement of

fact. The only question

was. whether Johnson would be going to his

old office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office.

The word came back that Johnson was on his way to the White House.

McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15,

President Johnson arrived.

Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long background

of association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issues

which had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson

said he and

McCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIA

and complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wanted

McCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in the

past.

After McCone in turn expressed his confidence in the President

and stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed some

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of the items from the President's checklist, explaining the nature

of the publication. Johnson asked that, for the next few days,

McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and that

senior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson also

directed

that any urgent matter of importance be brought to his

personal

attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, he

designated no intermediary.

That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay the

information that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet

and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewed

this information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering the

Agency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitors

coming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.

After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he would

make an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow

"immoral" for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a direct

adviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twenty

minutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested,

should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range striking

capability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Soviet

economy. McCone also suggested

that the President learn about the

CIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watching

Venezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversive

activities.

That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,

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McNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam.

Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for

the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said, •

they would be alive today and said he was hopeful about the

future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an

improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.

McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President

with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed.

The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet

Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It

had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong

military and political communications networks, which could indicate

preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new

government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in

organizing the government's political structure

and were receiving

little if any help from civilians, who were staying

on the sidelines

in their traidtional role as critics.

In consequence, McCone could

not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future

prospects.

Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the

situation in Vietnam with some misgivings. A great number of

Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the

coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we

should get out.of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him

considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States had

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)

followed the right course in upsetting the Diem regime; but now

that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.

In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with

American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American

community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the

situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed

u.s. policy there should be removed.

At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a

successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission.

What was needed was

a capable administrator to run the country

team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in

charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally

responsible for the situation.

Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and

McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be

generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government

to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept

of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not

think we

had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often,

he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs

of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country .

along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was

anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much

effort devoted to so-called social reforms.

Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that the

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United States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnam

policies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting in

Honolulu.

McCone also observed that, for the first time, he had

received an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.

McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day of

President Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department reception

that evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were there

were any developments which required his personal attention?, he

asked. McCone replied that there were not and that he would call

him if any developed.

The following day, McCone met with the President for about

twenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agency

resources were being made

available to support the FBI's

investigation of the assassination. He then told McCone with

considerable contempt that certain Justice Department officials had

proposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E.

Dewey, to investigate the assassination. Johnson had rejected this

proposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as lead

editorial in the Washington Post. Furious at what he believed was a

deliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorial

by intervening personally with Katherine Graham.

McCone met again with the President on November 28 for about

thirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson questioned

him about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania and

Yugoslavia. He asked McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador to

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McCone History

CHRONOLOGY

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StCKel

CHRONOLOGY

10 November 1960

17 April 1961

22 April 1961

4 May 1961

28 June 1961

30 August 1961

7

September 1961

19 September

1961

27 September 1961

13 October 1961

President-elect Kennedy announces that

Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will

continue in their positions.

Landing at the Bay of Pigs

Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor,

Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles)

¡to examine Bay of Pigs operation.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board (PFIAB) reconstituted with James

Killian as chairman.

Taylor named. Military Representative to the

President and Chairman of the Special Group

(5412) •

USSR resumes nuclear testing in the atmos-

phere

President Kennedy confers with John McCone

on nuclear issues.

Kennedy asks McCone to become the Director

of Central Intelligence.

Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone.

McCone becomes consultant; travels to

the Far East until 23 October.

]

* ?..

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28 October 1961

21 November 1961

29 November 1961

30 November 1961

30 November 1961

1 December 1961

4

December 1961

5 December 1961

6 December 1961

11 December 1961

12 December 1961

13 December 1961

15 December 1961

SECRET

Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe

until 13 November.

McCone meets with President and Robert

Kennedy to discuss new program for Cuba.

McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren

McCone attends meeting of NSC committee

on nuclear testing.

McCone attends first meeting of United

States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman.

McCone attends first meeting of Special

Group (5412) as DCI.

McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric

to discuss NSA and national estimates

McCone establishes study group under

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr..

Mrs. McCone dies.

McCone meets with President Kennedy alone.

McCone calls on J. Edgar Hoover.

DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB.

McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli.

2

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27 December 1961

5 January 1962

6 January 1962

8 January 1962

12 January 1962

15. January 1962

16 January 1962

16 January 1962

18 January 1962

18 January 1962

19 January 1962

20 January 1962

SECKLI

General Cabell announces retirement

effective 31 January 1962.

Schuyler, Coyne added to Kirkpatrick

study group.

McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos.

McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff.

McCone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm

Desert.

McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed

Services Committee.

President Kennedy issues letter of in-

structions to DCI.

McCone meets with Ambassador Alphand and

Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.

Confirmation hearings begin

DCI attends first meeting of Special Group

(Counter-Insurgency) .

McCone meets with The Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy and the PFIAB.

McCone briefs President Truman at Mayflower

Hotel.

3

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22 January 1962

28 January 1962

31 January 1962

6 February 1962

8 February 1962

17 February 1962

19 February 1962

19 February 1962

22 February 1962

28 February 1962

SECRET

McCone meets with House Sub-Committee

on CIA.

McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from

Western Hemisphere Division in Panama

until 2 February.

Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of

71-12; total vote is 84-15.

McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign

Service Institute.

McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on

CIA.

Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Directorfr

Plans; succeeded by Richara Helms.

ate 505

Deputy Director/Research established as

new directorate with Herbert A. Scoville,.

Jr. as head.

McCone meets with Board of Inguiry chaired

by Judge Prettyman to study implication of

Powers' case.

McCone meets with Major General Marshall

S. Carter.

Kennedy receives first briefing by

Arthur C. Lundahl

SECKEr

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7

March 1962

30 March 1962

1 April 1962

10 April 1962

23 April 1962

3 May 1962

15 May 1962

3 June 1962

4 June 1962

SECRET

McCone presents Carter to President

Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on 9 March.

tor

Robert Amory, Jr. resigns as Deputy Director/

Intelligence.

Office of General Counsel, Office of

Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comp-

troller moved to Office of the DCI; John

'Brose named Comptroller.

Kirkpatrick named to new position as

Executive Director.

Ray S. Cline named DD/I

Jack Earman becomes Inspector General;

Walter Elder named as Executive Assistant

to the DCI.

DCI attends meeting of National Security v

Council with Congressional leaders on

American role in Laos.

McCone travels to Far East until 17 June; v

develops basis position paper on situation

in Southeast Asia.

Albert D. Wheelon, JI. named Assistant

Director/Scientific Intelligence.

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29 June 1962

10 July 1962

12 July 1962

20 July 1962

27 July 1962

28. July 1962

10 August 1962

10 August

1962

21 August 1962

SECRET

McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget

to review the projected intelligence community

budget.

McCone meets with Frank G. Wisner on

latter's future.

McCone discusses consultant status with

Allen W. Dulles.

President Kennedy briefed in detail on

information derived from Anatole Golitsen.

McCone becomes immersed in nuclear testing

issue and the role of intelligence in the

event of a treaty banning nuclear testing

in the atmosphere.

McCone meets with Prince Souvanna Phouma

(of Laos.]

At Cuban meeting, McCone makes first

explicit statement outside Agency on the

possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba.

Najeeb Halaky proposes covert development

of super-sonic transport.

McCone warns senior government officials

about offensive missiles in Cuba.

SECRET

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21 August 1962

22 August 1962

23 August 1962

29 August 1962

7,10,13,16 and

19 September 1962

24 September 1962

27 September 1962

4 October 1962

9

October 1962

10 October 1962

SECRET

McCone attends meeting to discuss inten-

sified operations against North Vietnam.

McCone advises President Kennedy about

possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba;

also on 23 August with senior advisers

present.

McCone leaves Washington until 24 Sept.

McCone marries Mrs. Paul Piggott in

Seattle; SAMs in Cuba photographed.

McCone sends cables reiterating his concern

about missiles 'in Cuba.

McCone meets with Robert Kennedy on

ransoming brigade prisoners in Cuba.

6,11

McCone meets with President

Ayub of

Pakistan in New York.

McCone urges Special Group to direct U-2

coverage of Cuba.

Special Group approves U-2 coverage.

President Kennedy briefed on II-28 crates;

Kennedy orders limitations on dissemination

of

information about offensive weapons.

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'12 October 1962

14 October 1962

15 October 1962

15 October 1962

17 October 1962

18 October 1962

18 October 1962

19 October 1962

19 October 1962

20 October 1962

21 October 1962

21 October 1962

22 October 1962

23 October 1962

ULUNLI

SAC takes over U-2 overflights of Cuba.

U-? overflies San Cristobal MRBM site.

NPIC identifies MRBMs

McCone notified; returns from Seattle.

McCone develops position paper on Cuba.

IRBM sites identified.

'NSC Executive Committee divides into two

study groups to consider "fast" and "slow"

courses of action.

Special National Intelligence Estimate

concludes that USSR would not risk general

war over Cuba.

McCone develops position on measures beyond

a blockade.

Chinese Communists attack India

McCone briefs Vice-President Johnson on

Cuba®

Briefers

go to London, Paris, Bonn, Otiawa.

Meeting with Congressional leadership just

prior to President Kennedy's speech.

President Kennedy signs blockade proclama-

tion.

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24 October 1962

27 October 1962

28

October

1962

29 October 1962

2 November 1962

5

November 1962

9 November 1962

14 November 1962

17 November 1962

20 November 1962

4

December 1962

17 December 1962

SECRET

Soviet ships near Cuba stop or turn.

Messages from USSR show willingness to

avoid confrontation.

McCone orders post-mortem on handling of

intelligence.

Cuban refugee reports on missiles in caveg.

President Kennedy requests review of

intelligence handling.

McCone meets with Rusk to protest nibbling

away at approved operational programs.

PFIAB requests post-mortem on intelligence

handling.

Kennedy and Eisenhower meet at McCone's

residence.

Kennedy announces lifting of the blockade.

McCone meets with Gilpatric to discuss

Air Force view of NRO.

Kennedy approves concept of covert support

to Congo government.

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27 December

1962

StUKLI

Report on intelligence community's handling

of intelligence relating to Cuban missile

,crisis completed for PFIAB.

2 January 1963

NPIC moves

into Building 213.

3

January 1963

McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric

to discuss A-I1, SWITCHBACK, policy towards

Cuba.

10 January 1963

Special Group reviews reconniassance over

Cuba.

10 January 1963

17 January 1963

McGeorge Bundy discusses DOD-CIA friction;

raises Kennedy's concern over Chinese

Communist nuclear potential.

Mocone moote with tallan Prime Minister

Fanfant

21 January 1963

Meeting with President Kennedy on surfacing

A-11.

27 January 1963

30 January 1963

McCone meets with Chiefs of Station in

Panama until 29 January.

Co1. Delsany, SDECE, admits charges of KGB

penetrations and French espionage against

10

10 us nuclegrity program.

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31 January 1963

1

February 1963

6 February 1963

10 February 1963

28 February 1963

4 March 1963

11 March 1963

13 March 1963

13 March 1963

SECRET

McCone attends meeting with Kennedy to

discuss European problems.

McCone develops basic position paper on

Europe.

Public statement by DCI on Cuba before

Stennis sub-committee; DOD public briefing.

McCone travels to Paris and London until

17 February.

McCone talks with Bundy on lack of policy

towards Cuba and problems in the Middle East.

Meeting with President Kennedy on Cuban

reconnaissance

gap.

Meeting with President Kennedy on the

Middle East with special reference to

Yemen. :

McCone meets with the President and then

the NSC to discuss Latin America and

policy towards Cuba.

McCone and Gilpatric sign new NRO agreement.

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2,1 March 1963

25 March 1963

26

March 1963

29 March 1963

9 April 1963

11 April 1963

11 April 1963

15 - 17

April 1963

SEUKEI

McCone meets with Brockway McMillan, new

Director/ NRO.

Meeting with President Kennedy to discuss

special Agency

operation aimed at exposing

the KGB.

Meeting with Dean Rusk to discuss the

Middle East with special reference to

Israel's nuclear potential.

Executive Committee meeting on raids. by

Cuban exiles.

McCone meets with Stewart Alsop for

general

background briefing.

McCone develops basic position paper on

responsibility for reconnaissance over

denied areas.

Special Group discusses sabotage operations

against Cuba.

President Kennedy, the Attorney-General, and

the secretary of State briefed on spesial

operation against french intelligence?

service.

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2'0 April 1963

23 April 1963

25 April 1963

25 April 1963.

26 April 1963

7

May 1963

9 May 1963

13-14 May 1963

14 May 1963

15 May 1963

StUKLI

At NSC meeting on Laos, President Kennedy

requests study of increased pressures

against North Vietnam.

Clark Clifford succeeds Killian as Chairman,

PFIAB.

President approves low-level reconnaissance

flights over Cuba.

Scoville submits resignation as DD/R

effective 14 June 1963

McCone travels to Paris, Rome, and

Frankfurt until 8 May:

Penkovsky put on trial in Moscow,

NSC meeting on US support for India:

McCone meets with Rusk to discuss support

fox Mondlane}

McCone meets with Clark Clifford.

McCone meets with President Kennedy to

discuss Penkovsky

SECRET

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19 May 1963

21 May 1963

3 June 1963

7 June 1963

14 June 1963

19 June 1963

21. June 1963

21 June 1963

25 June 1963

SECKLI

McCone develops position paper on Haiti.

McCone attends three meetings with President

Kennedy; low-level reconnaissance over Cuba;

high-yield, large megatonnage nuclear weapons;

Haiti.

McCone develops position paper for dis-

cussion with Gilpatric on Air Force push

to take over all reconnaissance.

McCone presents his view of the world in

speech to National War College.

McCone meets with Rusk to discuss relations

with France.

McCone attends three meetings with President

Kennedy; the Profumo case; Laos; Cuba.

McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy

on British Guiana

McCone meets with Rusk to discuss covert

program on Cuba.

McCone develops position paper on the role.

of intelligence in a nuclear test ban treaty.

14

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2'6 June 1963

1 July 1963

9 July 1963

10 July 1963

21 July 1963

23 July 1963

23 July 1963

30. July 1963

5 August 1963

SEUNCI

McCone notes Roy Iod's paper on an inventory

of intelligence community assets.

DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established

under DI. Kinzel.

President Kennedy briefed on mosaic of Israel

gas bomb in Yemen, and findings of the

Purcell Panel on reconnaissance satellites.

McCone writes McNamara on need to review

intelligence community programs.

McCone meets with Rusk to discuss DeGaulle.

McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy

to hear John J. McCloy report on the

Middle East.

Sgt. Dunlap commits suicide.

McCone attends meeting with President.

Kennedy on Laos.

DD/R re-constituted as DD/Science and

Technology with Wheelon as head.

15

SECRET

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5, August 1963

16 August 1963

21 August 1963

24 August 1963

26 August

1963

31 August 1963

September 1963

4 September 1963

9

September 1963

ULUIILI

Nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow.

McCone presents position on test ban

treaty to Stennis sub-committee.

McCone attends meeting with President

Kennedy to discuss actions by Diem govern-

ment against the Buddhgsts.

Department of State Telegram

243 sent to

Saigon.

Saigon station officers in contact with

Generals Khiem and Minh..

Caden Lage pressiti

i Sarch Wienes pints

John Richardson cables his view that there will

be no coup.

McCone reviews

two papers on Diem government;

one by William Colby; one by George Carver.

McCone meets with McNamara and Rusk to discuss

terms of reference for review of intelligence

community programs.

John Bross appointed Deputy to the DCI for

National Intelligence Programs Evaluation.

-16

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I0 September 1963

11 September 1963

16 September 1963

19 September 1963

19 September 1963

20 September 1963

20 September 1963

24

September

1963

SLUMCI

McCone develops position paper for meetings

with President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy on

Vietnam.

Huntington D. Sheldon cables his views from v

Saigon; McCone asks Agency experts to answer

six basic questions on Vietnam.

Ambassador Lodge requests Lansdale as re-

placement for Richardson.

McCone writes Lodge about COS Saigon.

Colby briefs Special Group on re-vamping

Agency operations in the Far East.

McCone briefs McGeorge Bundy on plans to re-

organize Saigon station and a covert program

aimed at the KGB.

McCone develops basic position paper on

National

Reconnaissance Program.

McCone develops basic position paper on

Agency role in Vietnam.

17

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3

October 1963

5 October 1963

7 October 1963

9

October 1963

16 October 1963

17 October 1963

25 October 1963

1 November 1963

SEUKLI

McCone asks John Richardson to return to

Washington on temporary duty; Dave Smith

acting CoS Saigon.

After hearing trip report by McNamara and v

Taylor, President Kennedy states publicly

that war in Vietnam can be won by the end

of 1965; McCone takes pessimistic view.

McCone meets with John Richardson.

President Kennedy answers two questions at

press conference about Richardso and the

Agency.

Far East Division develops basic paper on

re-organization of Saigon station.

McCone discusses role of Air Force and national

intelligence assets with Gilpatric.

McCone develops position paper for meeting v

with President Kennedy on coup plotting in

Vietnam.

Diem government overthrown by Vietnamese

generals.

18

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3

November 1963

12 November 1953

18 November 1963

18 November 1963

22 November 1963

23 November 1963

24 November 1963

28 November 1963

29 November 1963

SEUNCI

President Kennedy orders Colby to go to Saigon

as Presidential emissary.

McCone, Helms meet with President Kennedy

for basic discussion of Cuba; President is

shown Cuban rifle captured in Venezuela.'

McCone attends conference in Honolulu on

Vietnam until 21 November.

Executive Director and Comptroller functions

merged under Kirkpatrick.

President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas.

McCone meets with President Johnson alone.

McCone meets with President Johnson and Lodge v

on Vietnam.

McCone meets with President Johnson who asks

that Mccone play an active role as a policy

advisor.

McCone attends meeting with President Johnson

on A-11.

19

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u.

December 1963

6 December 1963

7 December 1963

12 December 1963

13 December 1963

13 December 1963

16 December 1963

21 December 1963

SECRET

President Johnson holds first NSC meeting;

McCone presents intelligence briefing.

McCone meets

with President Johnson to discuss

cos, saigon;

Peer de Silva named; Johnson

sends message to Lodge.

McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss

, changing the image of the DCI and CIA.

McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget

to review the Agency's covert action program.

McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to

discuss the need for economy in intelligence

operations.

McCone meets with Rusk and Harriman who approve

concept of releasing information on Soviet

economy.

McCone visits Saigon to install de Silva - v

until 20 December.

McCone presents his views on Vietnam to

President Johnson.

20

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.27 December 1963

31 December 1963

4

January 1964

7 January 1964

9 January 1964

9 January 1964

13 January 1964

ULUILI

McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ

Ranch; Johnson reiterates hig views on

McCone's policy role.

McCone meets with General Eisenhower in

Pasadena and again on 2 January 1964 to discuss

President Johnson's budget plans.

McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ

Ranch to review meetings with General

Eisenhower.

McCone attends meeting to hear General

Krulak discuss proposals for intensified

operations against North Vietnam.

Thomas Dale of The New York Times publishes

article on Soviet economy with attribution

to CIA; other newsmen briefed.

McCone attends meetings with President

:

Johnson on Panama.

McCone develops position paper on how plan to

release information on Soviet economy was

mis-handled.

SECRET

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## Page 50

13-00000

14

January 1964

14 January 1964

18 January 1964

7 February 1964

11 February 1964

28 February 1964

28 February 1964

4 March 1964

4 March 1964

StUKEl

McCone attends meetings on Robert Kennedy's

trip to meet Sukarno.

Cyrus Vance succeeds Roswell Gilpatric

effective 28 January.

McCone travels to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid,

Bonn - until 1 February.

McCone attends meetings on Cuban fishing

boats and Guantanamo water supply.

McCone develops position paper on reconnais-

sance after Air Force deployment to fly

U-2s out of Clark Field..

McCone develops position paper in preparation

for trip to Vietnam.

McCone attends meeting with President

Johnson on surfacing A-1l.

William Bundy succeeds Roger Hilsman as

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern

Affairs.

USIB re-organized.

SECRET

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## Page 51

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4-5 March 1964

6 March 1964

17 March 1964

1 April 1964

2 April 1964

7. April 1964

22 April 1964

29 April 1964

• May 1964

StUNLI

McCone meets with General Eisenhower who

discusses relations with de Gaulle.

McCone travels to Vietnam until 13 March;

McCone dissents on McNamara's trip report;

reports policy disagreement separately v

to President Johnson.

ÑSC meeting on Vietnam.

McCone develops basic position paper on NRP

for use with Baker panel of PFIAB.

At evening seminar, McCone develops position

paper on operations against North Vietnam.

McGeorge Bundy develops position paper on

Covert Program Against Cuba for use in

meeting with President Johnson.

McCone tälks to McGeorge Bundy about lack of

direct briefings of the President by the DCI.

McCone talks to President Johnson about lack

of direct access.

NSC meeting on Cuban overflights.

SEGRET

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## Page 52

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5

May 1964

5

May 1964

6

May 1964

14 May 1964

16 May. 1964

18 May 1964

24 May 1964

25 May 1964

SEUNLI

McCone sets forth position on "The

Invisible Government."

McCone attends meeting with President Johnson

on Cuba and Laos; remains for Tuesday lunch

meeting with the President, McNamara, Taylor

and Bundy•

McCone attends meeting with President Johnson

to consider General Khanh's statements about

war footing and march north.

McNamara's report on trip to Vietnam discusses

bombing North Vietnam.

McCone gives President Johnson Agency estimate

on action against North Vietnam.

At meeting on Laos and Vietnam, Rusk raises

question of when does the United States

commit troops.

Meetings all day with President Johnson on

Southeast Asia.

William Bundy paper on Courses of Action on

Southeast Asia.

SECKET

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## Page 53

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28

May 1964

4,5,6,7. June

6 June 1964

11 June 1964

11 June 1964

15 June 1964

17 June 1964

30 June 1964

SCURLI

McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on

Vietnam until 3 June.

McCone attends meetings with President Johnson

on Laos with the President asking, "What comes

next?"

McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise

with McCone the possibility of an Agency

program along pre-SWITCHBACK lines.

McCone develops position paper on Southeast.

Asia.

McCone writes McGeorge Bundy about PFIAB

report on NRP.

McCone meets with President Johnson to suggest

that McCone leave his post; President asks

that he remain until after the election.

McCone develops position paper on NRP.

McCone issues guidance for developing re-

quirements for reconnaissance satellites.

25

SLURET

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