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157-10011-10018

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Date: 08/15/92

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10018

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM

TO :

TITLE :

SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL

DATE : 06/11/75

PAGES : 135

SUBJECTS :

TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 231, Folder 5, Testimony of Richard Bissell

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until

after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962.

Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably

with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing more

capability of assassinations. And you may have discussed

it in the context of various potential targets without

deciding on them. Once you decided on a target, or you were

going to recommend a target, what was the process of getting

clearance?

Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply because

no specific target was

ever recommended.

And to the best

of my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discussed

at length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE pro-

ject.

The issue of obtaining clearance never arose.

I

can speculate on how that would have worked if you wish.

Senator Mondale. No.

The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions.

MI. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz.

did you tell him about it?

Did you turn over SRRIFLE to him and

Mr. Bissell.

I believe I did. And I also believe

that Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a man called Justin O'Donneil?)

Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.

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Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or substance to

kill Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility

and to make explanation for so doing.

MI. Schwarz. When did you do that?

MI. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may

have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter

of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't

remember the date.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did you tell him this connection with

making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell you he wouldn't do it?

Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want to

do it. But he also said that he thought it was an inappro-

priate action, and that the desired object could be accom-

plished better in other ways.

Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized you to tell Mr. O"Donnell)

to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. Nobody.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform the White House of that?

Mr. Bissell. No.

Mr. Schwarz. To the best of your knowledge, did anybody

inform the White House of that?

Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no.

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MI. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr.

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Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell.

I didn't seek to assassinate him. I

told a member of the clandestine service to make plans and

develop the capability so to do if it were approved and

ordered.

Senator Goldwater.

Approved by who?

Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to have approval

at the highest level of government.

The Chairman. Where did the idea come from?

MI. Bissell. I don't remember, MI. Chairman. It could

possibly have been mine.

The Chairman. It could possibly have been yours?

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was your initiative?

Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to

o Donnell

was my initiative.

Senator Baker. How many others did you plan on, just

as a contingency?

How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans

to assassinate?

Mr. Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which

went to the point of instructing that a man be prepared.

Senator Baker. How many were there that didn't go that

far?

How many murders did you contemplate?

Mr. Bissell.

Well, Senator -

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quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent

to the Congo in the fall of 1960.

The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which

counsel has referred reads as follows:

"In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE, the Chief

Lof Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African

Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960:

'He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong,

but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong

in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case offi-

cer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he

will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution

without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize

all actions'".

Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that

applied to such matters at the time?

Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the

range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE.

Could I say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in

which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency

or a secret service unless it has at least a number of

employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to

carry out orders involving acts of this sort.

The Chairman. That assumes, of course, that the

United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders.

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meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable?

Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to suggest that it was

entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned

were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to

their own countries and the U.S. interests.

Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his

experience?

From my readings in trying to learn more about intelli-

gence, I gathered the impression that the actions such as

you have been describing up to and including assassination,

are practiced by every intelligence organization that I have

been studying, is that correct?

Mr. Bissell. That is my impression likewise, Senator.

Senator Goldwater. Including England?

Mr. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I think definitely

it has been used (by, MI6. I couldn't give you specific

cases.

Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB.

Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB -- although as, the Chair-

man pointed out the other day, I at least cannot point to

any case where the KGS has carried out the assassination of

a chief of state.

Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that in the cases

of those other countries that this ruler would have knowledge

of this in every case?

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Mr. Bissell. In the case specifically of (the Uke

I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however,

that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of any one of those

countries would flatly deny that the chief of state had

knowledge of such action.

Senator Goldwater. Thank you.

Senator Baker. Would you deny it?

Mr. Bissell. In our case here?:

Senator Baker. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriate to do so.

Senator Baker. Have you done so?

Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to, because I am

unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by

the U.s.

Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial?

Mr. Bissell. It is a denial that any has occurred,

at least in the period that I am aware of.

Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to

indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter?

Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context.

There are occasions when I would go a long way to protect the

President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrass-

ment.

Senator Baker.

The question was, very simply, would

you try to protect the President in such a case as you des-

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cribed, MI6 or otherwise?

Mr. Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, Senator.

Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further?

You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a

committee like this, but say another thing publicly, is that

what you mean?

Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean.

The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir.

The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir.

Senator Tower. I think that distinction has to be made.

I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself.

The Chairman. Shall we proceed with the questions?

Mr. Schwarz.

The remaining topic I have is Trujillo.

It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents.

And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up.

I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would

suggest that we ask the witness and whatever

Senators that

can return to come back this afternoon on Trujillo.

The Chairman. We have a Senate order that there will

be no further committee meetings this afternoon.

I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent.

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almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such as the

Gúatamalan operation, the Bay of Pigs itself is, the earlier

operation that has been discussed in the press (In Tran, and

which resulted in the ouster

Mosse degyand the return

Shah,

there is an expectation that such operations will involve

military or semimilitary action, and that some people will lose

their lives in the process.

Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more

precisely of a single person or a group of people who were

targeted, or discussions were held about targeting them, for

what would be an assassination were it not for the legall

significance of the term.

MI. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in

which that sort of matter was discussed or was the subject

of planning, other than the ones which have already been

mentioned in testimony.

Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this

point.

But of course that contemplates what we have seen in

the earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation -

and I think this was the history of the Castro operation --

to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often

moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't

that true?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir.

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AFTERNOON SESSION

81

2:17

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D)

The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning.

It will be understood that the oath still continues to

apply.

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questions.

the making

like Suka

Prop

Mr. Schwarz. Before we turn to Trujillo, two quick

the subject of Sukarno, were your involved!

the movie

chian actor was made, up to

100K

and herengaged in asexual, adti

BY o

the

the plan being that

that

movie

be released,

indonesia:

Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and

broke it apart you would have no recollection?

Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.

M. Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr.

Helms, did you brief. him about the Mafia matter?

Mr. Bissell. I am reasonably clear that I did not brief

him in the early stages, that is to say, in 1960. And my

impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on it

until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962.

Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him?.?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally

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they might eventually be so used.

MI. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon

any recollection?

Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection.

But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish

between an element of supposition and a dim recollection.

Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter.

There was, as you have already indicated, several discussions

in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very

small groups with representation from State, the White House

and the Agency. And I am clear - I do recollect that the

plans at that time contemplated the arming of obviously a

relatively small group

inside the Dominican

• Republic, that is,

the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so people, but

not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion of a major

geurilla activity.

Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am

perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the

discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well

be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his.

Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience

at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident

groups within the country?

Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases;

Indonesia is another case during the time I was in the Agency,

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or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember other cases,

but there may have been some. Well, earlier before I was ever

in the Agency, there was the case offran. And there was the

reasonably well publicized case of Cuatamala.

Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries?

Mr. Bissell. I think we have.

Mr. Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly

common to supply arms to dissident elements in countries all

over the world?

Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an

assassination contemplated or not?

Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases

not. In a large scale operation like Guatamala/ there was

no intention of any assassination. I think you would include

it under that term.

The same is true in irandof course -- the possibility

that a chief of state would be killed.

The Chairman. But you would distinguish this matter from

just supplying of arms to dissidents? In other words, there

was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied

for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassi-

nation of Trujillo or other highly placed people in this

Government, correct?

Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, Senator,

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I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would

say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approval

process, those involved would probably have given a higher

probability to such use being made of the weapons than they

would in some of the other operations that I have referred to.

Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special

Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the

minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint

recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as of

the 12th of January?

Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as

I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the

reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's

representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was

a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political

ties with the dissidents:

Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should

focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently

reflecting a discussion of Project LuDEED.

Was EMDEED

the

code for the overthrow of Trujillo?

Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the

project of support to the dissidents.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name amstel?

I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed

"Discussion of Project EMDEED." Does it appear to be a

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and this record, which is a record we have obtained from

the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree

that on this record it appears that on the item of the pass-

ing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact

used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State

Department uninformed on that item?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way.

It appears -- if I put these two together --

Mr. Schwarz.

By these two you mean your cable of March

24 and the cable of May I relating to certain matters is

not to be discussed with the State Department?

Mr. Bissell. Yes. The earlier cable of those refers to

machine guns.

Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers?

Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And

I believe that : what eventually passed to the dissidents

were three rifles, not the revolvers. And, therefore, neither

of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissi-

dents lout of vok. control.

This cable states the conditional willingness at some

time in the future to pass machine guns. That permission

was never granted and they were never passed.

It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't

know whether there was a record that those were ever passed,

or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents. And it would

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